Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos, & Vietnam, 1947–1964 [Reprint 2020 ed.] 9780520323827

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INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN CAMBODIA, LAOS, AND VIETNAM, 1947-1964

D. R. SarDesai

Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam 1947-1964

1968

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS • BERKELEY & LOS ANGELES

University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California Cambridge University Press London, England © 1968 by The Regents of the University of California Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 68-18379 Printed in the United States of America

To My Parents and Uncles

Preface

In the preparation of this study, I received generous assistance and cooperation from a number of individuals and institutions. The major part of the research work was conducted in India and Southeast Asia in 1963-1964 and was supported by substantial grants from the University of California, Los Angeles, and the American Institute of Indian Studies, Philadelphia. I am greatly indebted to Professor W . Norman Brown, President of the American Institute of Indian Studies, for his personal interest and encouragement. I am also thankful to the Watumull Foundation for a special grant during 1961-1962 and to the John R. and Dora Haines Foundation for a research fellowship in 1964-1965, which enabled the work to be completed in the United States. I used the facilities of a number of libraries and institutions whose staff personnel has been most helpful in the location of materials. In particular, thanks are due to Cecil Hobbs of the Library of Congress and Joseph Buttinger of the Library for Political Studies, New York; Girja Kumar of the Indian School of International Studies, C. Biswas of the Library of the Historical Division of the Ministry of External Affairs, Dr. V. G. Dighe of the National Archives, S. Mirchandani of the Parliament Library and P. Sharma of All India Congress Committee Library, all in New Delhi; C. G. Ambekar of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East Library, Bangkok; and the authorities of the New York Public Library, and the United Nations Library in New York, as also of the libraries of the embassies of Canada and India in Washington, D.C. A number of individuals in India and elsewhere gave their time liberally to the author, answered some original enquiries and made fruitful suggestions. Only a few of them are listed at the end of this volume in the "Interviews and Correspondence" section of the bibliography, whereas many others, no less helpful than those listed, have expressed their desire to remain anonymous. T o all these persons, I am immeasurably indebted. I am specially obliged to Dr. B. V . Keskar, former Minister of Information and Broadcasting; Mrs. Lakshmi Menon,

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PREFACE

former Minister of State, External Affairs; the then Foreign Secretary, Y. D. Gundevia and Dr. B. K. Basu, Director, Historical Division, Ministry of External Affairs. Among the numerous Indian friends who helped in a variety of ways, Dr. S. P. Aiyar, Dr. V . D. Rao, and Dr. K. C. Vyas deserve special thanks. I am most profoundly grateful to my mentor, Professor Stanley A . Wolpert, for assistance at various stages of planning and writing of this book. He was instrumental in helping me come to the United States for doctoral studies, and ever since our arrival he and Mrs. Wolpert have placed us in their debt by their acts of friendship, guidance, and hospitality, all too numerous to mention here. An earlier draft of the work has benefited from the thoughtful criticisms of Chancellor John S. Galbraith of the University of California, San Diego, and of Professors Robert A. Wilson, Y u Shan-han, and H. Arthur Steiner from the University of California, Los Angeles, all of whom I owe a large debt of gratitude. I am indebted to Mr. Alain Henon, Mr. James Kubeck, and Mr. Vincent Ryan of the University of California Press for assistance at the various stages of publication of the book. M y thanks are also due to Miss Ellen G . Cole and the Central Stenographic Bureau Staff of the University of California, Los Angeles, for the final careful typing of the manuscript for publication, and to Mr. Oliver Pollak and Mr. Thomas Giancoli for their valuable assistance in the preparation of the index. Finally, I acknowledge my wife's close collaboration in research and her constructive criticism on many points. Her own training in history and library science has proved an invaluable asset to me. D. R. S. Los Angeles, California April /j, 1968

Contents

Introduction

i

I. India and the Nationalist Movement in Indochina II. Collective Peace or Collective Defense? III. India,

SEATO,

and Bandung

28

52

IV. India and the T w o Vietnams, 1954-1958 V. India and Cambodia, 1954-1958 VI. India and Laos, 1954-1958

6

75

117

152

VII. The Sino-Indian Dispute and Indo-Vietnamese Relations VIII. The Indian Role in the Laotian Crisis, 1959-1962 IX. The Aftermath of the Chinese Invasion Conclusions Notes

261

Bibliography Index

247

327

311

232

210

189

Abbreviations

N.C.N.A.

Asian Relations Conference Report The Combat Arms Training Organization Committee for the Defense of National Interests Democratic Republic of Vietnam Department of State Bulletin Foreign Affairs Record International Control Commission Khmer Resistance Forces Laotian National Army The Military Assistance Advisory Group Middle East Defence Organization North Atlantic Treaty Organization The New China News Agency

NLHS

N e o L a o H a k Sat

A.R.C. REPORT CATO CDNI

DRV

D.S.B. F.A.R.

icc KRF LNA

MAAG MEDO NATO

NNRC PAVN

PL RLG

SEATO S.W.B. TERM TRIM VNIB

Neutral Nations' Repatriation Commission People's Army of Vietnam Pathet Lao Royal Laotian Government South East Asia Treaty Organization Summary of World Broadcasts Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission The Training Reorganization Instruction Mission Vietnam Information Bulletin

Introduction

No single aspect of the Indian political experiment since the country's independence in 1947 evoked so much world attention as her role in international affairs, which was certainly disproportionately large when compared with India's economic and military strength. The major reason, of course, was Jawaharlal Nehru, who, as prime minister, steered the infant ship of state for the first seventeen years of independence, and presided over the formulation and direction of his government's foreign policy. Preoccupation with world events had always been a matter of passion for the Indian leader since the early days of his life, when he jumped into the country's fight for political freedom. After India's emergence as an independent nation, the imprint of his views was evident on every aspect of governmental activity, but on none so clearly and exclusively as in the field of external relations. Not only were the philosophy and style of foreign policy molded by Nehru, but even the daily direction of it became the prime minister's preoccupation. Even so, studies of Indian diplomatic history constitute a very small part of the scholarly literature on India published in the past two decades. And of these, most works have concerned themselves with foreign policy in general, or with India's diplomatic relations with the West, notably with Great Britain and the United States, and, more recently, with the subject of the strained relationship between India and Communist China. The present study covers one of the areas of relative neglect: Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, comprising the states of former French Indochina. The only book that includes this area as part of a larger region is Ton That Thien's India and South-East Asia, 1947-1960 (Geneva, 1963). This work, which has the distinction of being a pioneering study, covers a wide region, embracing nine countries of Southeast Asia, in a general survey, based entirely on published material. Detailed studies of India's relations with the various countries of the Southeast Asian region are still required to understand the deep and varied currents motivating Indian policy toward that neighboring region. Further, any work that stops short of the cataclysmic confrontation with China in October-November, 1962, would have to be considered out-of-date. Things have never been the same in India, 1

2

INTRODUCTION

whether in the economic, military, or diplomatic field, since the SinoIndian hostilities in the fall of 1962. Indian prestige in world councils suffered thereafter in the remaining two years of the Nehru era, although not to the same extent as in the period following his death in May, 1964. The present study is coterminous with the end of Nehru's direction of Indian foreign policy. Indian interest in Indochina since 1954, as contrasted with lack of interest in the region before that date and comparative Indian inattention toward other countries of Southeast Asia, appears somewhat extraordinary. On the eve of Indian independence in August, 1947, India's contacts and knowledge about Southeast Asia in general and Indochina in particular were vague, illusory, and uncertain. Except for a handful of area specialists and those closely related to the Indian immigrants in the area, very few Indians knew as much about their neighbors in Southeast Asia as they knew of Europe or America. A proud memory of Hindu colonies established in some dim historical past, a vague impression of Indian immigrants' trading activities, and a recent reminder of a region in which the Indian revolutionary Subhas Chandra Bose had organized a movement and an army for India's independence—these summed up an average educated Indian's awareness of this region. The colonial interlude referred to by a noted Indian author-diplomat, Sardar K. M. Panikkar, as the Vasco da Gama epoch in Asian history,1 had effectively separated India from a region long styled "Greater India."2 The divergent political, territorial, and economic ambitions of the colonial powers, with attendant tariff and travel barriers and varying administrative and educational patterns, made the colonial peoples more closely oriented toward their respective metropolitan powers than toward one another. Indochina, under the French rule and at the extreme end of the region, was even less in touch with India than was Burma or Malaya. If the historical ties with the region were to be restored in the new era of emergent nationalism and decolonization, imaginative bridges of vital common interests in various fields would be necessary to surmount the barriers erected in colonial days. In a bid to become the pivot of Asia, India and China could be expected to enter a diplomatic race to woo and win over the smaller countries. The intensity of Indian interest in the countries of Southeast Asia has, however, varied from time to time. The periods of closest attention were 1947-1949, 1954—1955, and 1959-1961. An attempt is made here to analyze and explain the factors determining such intermittent interest in a region so close to India. It may be suggested at the very outset that part of this neglect is owing to deliberate deemphasis in Indian foreign policy on local or regional problems and a corresponding stress on global issues affecting Communism and anti-Communism, coexistence and confrontation, peace and war. But even in this wider context, Communist China has loomed large in the mutations of Indian thinking on world affairs. This study is the first attempted analysis of Indian policy in a region of interest to both India and China. It deals, therefore,

INTRODUCTION

3

with the changing canvas of Sino-Indian relationship from 1949 to 1964, more specifically from 1954 onward, and its impact on Indian attitudes toward the problems in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. A t the same time, the Indochinese states, particulariy Laos and Vietnam, have provided for more than half a decade a baffling battleground for all the major rivalries in the world—Sino-Soviet, Franco-American, and between the Communist and "free" worlds. Friends and enemies have been counted based on their attitudes toward this conflict, on which have been imposed considerations perhaps disproportionately larger than they deserved. But since such considerations have weighed in the minds of policy makers in the Kremlin, Peking, Washington, and other capitals of the world on subjects that have no direct bearing on Vietnam, examination of an individual country's attitude toward the Vietnam question assumes importance. I would suggest that in this complex context there could be no better area than Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam for the analysis of Indian behavior in the international field. Politics, domestic or international, is hardly a field where one should look for consistencies. The history of international relations is full of shifting alliances, where yesterday's bedfellows are today's enemies. Yet many countries covetously claim consistency in their foreign policies, conveniently placing their pragmatic policies on the high pedestal of immutable principles. India has been one such country, boasting lack of variations in its basic approach to world affairs. With the solitary exception of October, 1962, when Nehru confessed his Himalayan blunder in trusting China and "living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation," the principal aims of Indian foreign policy have been repeatedly stated as nonalignment, peaceful coexistence, anticolonialism, and antiracialism. Yet one can divide Indian diplomatic history into several periods based on the extent of Indian involvement in world affairs. Thus, the first two years after independence, 1947-1949, were noted for anticolonial emphasis. Indian initiative led to the convening of the Asian Relations Conference in 1947 and of the Conference on Indonesia in 1949. Yet it was a period when India combated internal Communism and maintained a friendly attitude toward the West, particularly Great Britain, agreeing to continue membership in the reconstituted Commonwealth of Nations. But in late 1949, with the advent of the Communists to power in China, began a period of relative isolation and circumspection, which lasted until early 1954. With the exception of Korea, Indian policy seemed to be aimed at cautious neutrality, "a plague on both houses" in the cold-war dispute. Nonalignment posture became more rigid. Caution marked India's relations with Communist China, particularly after the latter's march into Tibet in 1950, thereby establishing a common border with India. During this second phase, neither the East nor the West—the United States, China, and the Soviet Union—accepted India's "third path" of nonalignment. The third phase in Indian diplomatic history began in 1954 with Indian efforts toward achievement of a settlement on Indochina, and ended

4

INTRODUCTION

with the holding of the Asian-African Conference at Bandung in 1955. Indian diplomatic intervention had come in the wake of alleged Chinese military intervention in behalf of the Vietminh and American determination to step up aid to the French, which together threatened escalation of a conflict in Asia. Indian efforts at Colombo and Geneva for the settlement of the Indochinese impasse paralleled another development, which became the most important element in Indian foreign policy until almost the close of the decade. This was the Sino-Indian agreement over Tibet, in which the Panchasheel or the five foundations of relationship between the two countries were spelled out for the first time. Bandung marked at once the zenith and the beginning of the slow decline of Indian involvement in Southeast Asia. Nehru and Chou En-Iai shared the limelight at that Asian-African conference. A period of normalization and complacency ensued, which lasted until 1959. During this period India had reason to be happy because her nonalignment position was accepted by the Communist countries and by the United States. In fact, the United States and the Soviet Union moved closer as the Camp David talks between Khrushchev and Eisenhower promised an era of coexistence between the superpowers. But even as the latter attempted to bridge their gulf of differences, SinoIndian relations began to cool. The Dalai Lama's flight to India and Nehru's disclosure of Chinese incursions along the Himalayan border began a new period of caution in foreign policy and of guarded hostility toward China. By early 1962 it became clear that the dispute would not be settled through bilateral talks. Hostilities on a major scale in late 1962 inaugurated a period of open hostility toward China. A t the same time, disclosures of Sino-Soviet rift brought forth fresh possibilities of continuation of a policy of nonalignment. It is in this wider context of Indian aims and commitments that the Indian role in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam needs to be examined. In the present study I attempt an analysis of India's attitudes toward the states of Indochina on two levels: first, the study of the Indian diplomatic role, where Indian national interests could be legitimately pursued; and second, India's performance as chairman-country of the International Control Commission (ICC), theoretically a nonpartisan body, charged by the Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954 with the supervision of a truce in Indochina. And yet the two roles were complementary to each other. Indian diplomatic intervention in the crisis in Laos, for example, was partly based on India's position as chairmancountry of the ICC, while the Indian officials on the ICC took their directives from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. For India, the Indochinese settlement was a great experiment in the Panchasheel, a doctrine that Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru hopefully thought should govern relations among nations throughout the world. Indochina was a test case. The International Control Commission itself was a trial ground for international amity. The commission, representing the three major strands in international politics—Western,

INTRODUCTION

5

Communist, and nonaligned Afro-Asian—dealt with countries that were in a sense to be isolated or "neutralized" from cold-war affiliations. For nonaligned India, the chairmanship of so "balanced" a commission, charged with the preservation of peace and neutrality, was a challenge and an opportunity. How far was the Indian attitude in the ICC influenced by the changing needs of Indian foreign policy over the period? The present study largely represents an examination of the Indian role in the deliberations and investigations of controversial issues by the ICC and is based on the proceedings of that body. It is clear that an inquiry of this kind would be germane to India's peacemaking role in other areas of the world. The International Control Commission represented a new kind of peace preservation agency. This was not the only instance of India's participation in a mission of this kind, for India had provided the chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea, and later was an important factor in the United Nations International Force in Gaza, the Congo, and Cyprus. But the unique factor in the Indochinese situation was that the settlement there was reached outside United Nations auspices and involved a major country, which was not a member of the world organization. The sanction of the International Control Commission was granted by the Geneva Conference of 1954, which did not have a permanent secretariat, and indeed no enforcing authority. As a matter of expediency, Sir Anthony Eden, then British foreign secretary, and M. Molotov, then the Soviet foreign minister, had acted as chairmen at alternate sessions of the Geneva Conference. When the conference ended, the foreign ministers of Great Britain and the Soviet Union continued purely by practice rather than by any statutory or agreed devolution of authority as links between the International Control Commission and the Geneva powers. The study of the working of the International Control Commission throws some light on the efficacy of a settlement reached outside the United Nations, through such a nebulous "organization." The end of the Nehru era in Indian politics marks the limit of this study. Mid-1964 was also almost exactly the end of a decade of Indian involvement in Indochina. In Laos, an attempted coup d'état in May, 1964, and the subsequent merger of the neutralist faction with the rightists brought about a qualitative change in governmental arrangements envisaged in the Geneva Agreements of 1962. In Vietnam itself, the dimensions of the conflict have qualitatively differed from those in July, 1964, with the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the extension of the war beyond the seventeenth parallel. Mid-1964 was, therefore, considered a convenient terminal point for this study.

I India and the Nationalist Movement in Indochina One of the most significant events since the end of World War II— certainly the most important from the viewpoint of Asians and Africans —has been the attainment of political independence after the overthrow or withdrawal of alien authority. India and Pakistan led the way to independence in August, 1947, quickly followed by Ceylon and Burma. The removal of British power from the Indian subcontinent aroused justifiable hope among other dependent peoples that the Indian nationalist leadership would spearhead the drive against colonialism elsewhere. Even before India became formally independent, Ho Chi Minh dispatched an emissary to the Indian capital to seek assistance against the French, and Indonesia's Sukarno appealed to Nehru for help against the British occupation forces. And indeed, four months before India gained independence, nationalists from twenty-five Asian states met in New Delhi, at the invitation of India, to explore avenues of further cooperation. This was one of many efforts1 to forge Asian, and later Afro-Asian, unity in the hope of solving common problems. Asian nationalism, identical aspirations of freedom, and a common struggle against Western colonialism provided a common denominator to the assembled delegates. Anticolonialism was natural to a new nation, recently freed from foreign domination. T o the Indian leaders it was a creed, a commitment of long years to their brethren under colonial yoke elsewhere. British authority in the East had sheltered the smaller imperial systems in the area;2 consequently, its withdrawal from India was expected logically to be followed by similar action on the part of France, the Netherlands, and Portugal. As early as 1927 the League against Imperialism and for National Independence, meeting in Brussels, had recognized the importance of India as "the central problem in the struggle of the Asiatic peoples for their national freedom."3 Mahatma Gandhi described India as "the key to the exploitation of the Asiatic and other non-European races of the earth."4 Through India's freedom he sought "to deliver the so-called weaker races of the earth from the crushing heels of western domination."5 Gandhi's assurances were reiterated by his followers, including Nehru, who offered fullest cooperation to "those who stand 6

INDIA AND INDOCHINA

7

for human freedom and the breaking of political and social bonds, in their struggle against imperialistic and fascist reaction, for our struggle is a common one."6 Yet, despite all the expressed sentiments of cooperation and solidarity, there was little communication between Indian nationalist leaders and their counterparts in Southeast Asian countries. The closest communication was with the Indonesian leadership; the least, with the Indochinese. Occasionally nationalists from other countries attended the annual sessions of the Indian National Congress. In 1928, for example, Doung Van Gieu,7 a Vietnamese nationalist whom Nehru had met the preceding year at the Brussels Congress, attended the Calcutta session of the Indian National Congress. Many factors were responsible for this lack of communication between nationalist movements in India and in Southeast Asia. The existence of different colonial masters, particularly in Southeast Asia, raised international complexities impeding the formation of an active common front against colonialism. Physical communications between the colonial empires were not easy. Added to such difficulties were passport restrictions and linguistic and other barriers. Second, the Indian struggle itself consumed most of the Indian leaders' energy and time, which was even further reduced by long periods of incarceration in British prisons. A third factor was the ubiquitous presence of Indians throughout Southeast Asia, where they had gone as laborers, merchants, and moneylenders, encouraged to immigrate by the colonial powers concerned. T o the antipathy usually aroused in an indigenous population by immigrants who undercut them in jobs and trade were added the nefarious, usurious practices of the moneylending chettiars, who fattened themselves at the expense of the local people and earned a bad name for India. In Indochina, an additional dimension was provided by the French authorities, who preferred to employ in the national administration Indians from the French Indian colonies, giving these Indian employees the higher status of citoyens as opposed to the low legal status of the colonial Vietnamese. The indigenous suspicion and hostility toward these immigrant Indians were factors against easy communication among nationalist leaders of the Southeast Asian states. An exception was the Japanese-supported revolutionary movement for Indian independence led by Subhas Chandra Bose during World War II, when indigenous people in Burma, Malaya, and Thailand offered help.8 The goal of the movement, begun in Singapore, was to march a volunteer army to New Delhi through Malaya, Thailand, and Burma. Besides being off the main route, Indochina could not figure prominently in this movement; the area contained relatively few Indians, and these few were hindered in their nationalist activity by the puppet French regime, which feared repercussions on Annamite nationalism.9 Yet India had incomparably greater sympathy in Southeast Asia than China, whether Nationalist or Communist, had. The nearly twelve million "overseas" Chinese, spread throughout most countries of the region, had been more hated by the indigenous people for their eco-

8

INDIA AND INDOCHINA

nomic strangulation of the area than had the one and a half million Indian immigrants concentrated in Burma and Malaya. Aggressive and fiercely loyal to their motherland, the overseas Chinese sought administrative and other immunities through their own administrative infrastructure of secret societies, whose chiefs regulated the relations of their communities with the local governments and functioned as an imperium in imperio. All this was especially true of Vietnam, where the memory of Chinese domination of Annam (Chinese for "pacified south") for a thousand years had been recently revived by looting, rape, arson, and other atrocities perpetrated by Nationalist Chinese forces10 sent in 1945 in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement, to occupy Vietnam above the sixteenth parallel.11 On that occasion Ho Chi Minh even welcomed French reoccupation of Tonkin, if only to expel Nationalist Chinese troops from Vietnam. India, by contrast, had no record of political conquest of any part of Southeast Asia, including Vietnam. To be sure, India's expansion in Indochina predated the Chinese, but its character was predominantly cultural and commercial and its progress rarely buttressed by political authority from the mother country.12 Historically, China established its hegemony periodically over the kingdoms of Southeast Asia, which sent grudging tributes to the Heavenly Emperor as long as the Chinese central authority remained strong, lapsing into independence when it became weak. In the cultural sphere, however, the Southeast Asian kingdom preferred to adopt Indian ways, with the exception of Tonkin and Annam, which Sinicized their educational and administrative system and adopted the Chinese calendar, court-system, civil service examination, script, and other aspects of life not so much to show their love for the Chinese as to equip themselves better to avoid if not to overthrow Chinese political domination. Laos and Cambodia came under Indian cultural influence, adopting Brahmanism and later Hinayana Buddhism, which came to them via Ceylon and Burma; Annam accepted Confucianism and Mahayana Buddhism from China. The Indian centers of learning and culture at Nalanda, Taxila, Vallabhi, and Kanchipuram became the Hellas' of the Eastern world. Scholars from Funan (roughly including South Cambodia and Cochin China, from about the first to the seventh century A.D.), Kambuja (roughly corresponding to modern Cambodia but having an empire extending over most of peninsular Southeast Asia, from about the seventh to thefifteenthcentury A.D.), and Champa (former Annam, from about the first to the fifteenth century A.D.) flocked to India to draw inspiration for their works of art, architecture, and literature. The ruins of Angkor Vat and Angkor Thom in Cambodia and around Phanrang in Vietnam testify to the excellence of architecture and sculpture reached by the indigenous peoples, whose basic inspiration was Indian. The Khmers of Kambuja extended their political and cultural domination over vast regions from Burma to Vietnam before they suffered severe reverses and were confined to Cambodia by the advancing tide of Thais in A.D. 1431. The Chams, exhausted after

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9

centuries of struggle with the Annamites, were finally defeated and decimated by the latter in 1471. Thereafter the Annamities established authority over most of Vietnam, extending their Sinicized culture among the vanquished peoples. The Sino-Indian cultural demarcation of interests persisted through the succeeding centuries in peninsular Southeast Asia,13 although communications between that region and India and China were uncertain at best and usually nonexistent. The genius of the indigenous peoples built cultural superstructures on the Sino-Indian bases. Despite superimposition of a Western political, economic, and cultural veneer, the old dividing line of Sino-Indian cultural influence in Southeast Asia persevered. Such cultural affiliations have been invoked by visiting heads of state and delegations from Southeast Asia to India and China in modern times, and have been exploited to buttress relations on the political level. A t the Geneva Conference of 1954, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden referred to the "cultural boundary between China and India in Indochina"14 in support of his argument that Laos and Cambodia should be treated separately from Vietnam. And when Nehru visited Indochina in 1954, Indian officials particularly emphasized cultural spheres of Sino-Indian influence to bolster their urging better political relations with Laos and Cambodia.1* Such distinction was not, however, made by Indian leaders after World War II in regard to components of former French Indochina. The binding force at that time was that of Asian nationalism. Indian nationalists welcomed the establishment of republics by their Vietnamese and Indonesian counterparts, who had taken advantage of the time gap between the Japanese surrender and the arrival of Western troops to proclaim their freedom. Under the Potsdam Agreement, Mountbatten's South-East Asia Command was charged with the task of disarming the Japanese and maintaining local law and order. In Indochina, British responsibilities extended to the region south of the sixteenth parallel, for whose implementation General Douglas D. Gracey was sent to Saigon, on September 12, 1945, at the head of the 20th Indian Division. The general overstepped his instructions, which were strict and specific: "Sole mission: disarm the Japanese. Do not get involved in keeping order."16 Instead, he rearmed the interned French soldiers, detained the leftists among Vietnamese nationalists, imposed curbs on the native press, and restricted freedoms of movement and speech. In Indonesia, too, nationalists battled with British forces and Sukarno appealed to fellow nationalist Nehru to visit his country. 17 The plight of the Indonesians and the Indochinese struck a responsive chord in the Indian nationalists, who complained that, under the pretext of disarming the Japanese, the British were "restoring the country once again to decadent French imperialism."18 The resentment that the suppression of neighboring nationalist movements aroused in Indian minds was aggravated by the knowledge that Indian troops were being arrayed against the Indochinese and Indonesian patriots. The Congress Working

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Committee was indignant over the "mischievous misuse of the Indian forces by the British Government." 19 Nehru, who was denied travel privileges to Indonesia,20 voiced the general Indian sentiment in one of his strongest condemnations of Britain. Drawing a parallel between British intervention and "the war of intervention which Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany waged in Spain," he said, " W e have watched British intervention there [Indochina and Indonesia] with growing anger, shame and helplessness that Indian troops should thus be used for doing Britain's dirty work against our friends who are fighting the same fight as we. . . ."21 Three months later the All India Congress Committee demanded the withdrawal of foreign troops from Africa and Asia, notably from "Indonesia, Manchuria, Indochina, Iran and Egypt," and warned that the continuation of imperialistic domination "under whatever name or guise . . . would sow the seeds of future wars."22 The Indian leaders were at this time in the midst of historic events that were shortly to lead India to freedom. With the Labour party in power in Great Britain, chances of India's independence brightened immeasurably. On February 19, 1946, Prime Minister Attlee announced the appointment of a cabinet mission to proceed to India "to promote, in conjunction with the leaders of Indian opinion, the early realization of full self-government in India."23 Protracted negotiations with the cabinet mission fully engaged the Indian leaders' energies and attention, particularly as the Hindu-Muslim struggle came to the fore. On September 2, 1946, an interim government was formed, with Nehru as vicepresident of the Viceroy's Executive Council, member for external affairs, and virtual head of the Indian government. But the transition of power from British to Indian hands was far from peaceful; the subcontinent, especially the provinces of Punjab, Bengal, and Bihar, was submerged in the bloody Hindu-Muslim conflict, for which Indian history has no parallel. The final independence of India, on August 15, 1947, achieved at the cost of partition into the dominions of India and Pakistan, was further threatened with disruption by violent elements that let loose an orgy of murder, rape, and looting that took a toll of almost a million lives and left ten times that many persons homeless. The problems of stability and security that the new government faced were staggering indeed. Added to the strains and stresses on administrative personnel and finances caused by partition were burdens imposed by refugee rehabilitation. The withdrawal of British paramount authority had legally given independent rights to 562 native states that could "Balkanize" India in the worst manner. The Hindu-Muslim situation escalated into war in Kashmir, and serious clashes occurred in Hyderabad. The most tragic victim was the father of the nation, Mahatma Gandhi, who was assassinated on January 30, 1948, depriving the new government of his valuable counsel in its hour of peril and need. Indian attitudes toward, and participation in, the freedom movements of neighboring countries must be seen against the backdrop of these domestic difficulties. In the midst of such exciting, exulting, and anx-

INDIA AND INDOCHINA

ious moments in the country's history, Nehru did not lose his Asian perspective. Despite its own problems, India did react to the distressing developments elsewhere in Asia, particularly in Indonesia and Indochina. Yet the responsibilities of high office required a certain amount of refrain and restraint, which Nehru could afford to dispense with earlier while in opposition to the government. The necessity of reviewing a decision in the context of national interests and international repercussions restricted his freedom of action. This was particularly seen in Nehru's attitudes: toward renewed repression in Indochina at the end of 1946; toward Sarat Chandra Bose's proposal of January, 1947, to send Indian volunteers to help the Vietnamese freedom fighters; and toward the Vietminh pleas for assistance and recognition at the Asian Relations Conference in the following March. In November, 1946, the Vietminh resumed hostilities with the French after the latter's bombardment of Haiphong, killing an estimated six thousand persons, mostly civilians. Earlier, the French had recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam ( D R V ) , established by the Vietnamese nationalists24 under Ho Chi Minh's leadership in September, 1945, as a "free state with its own government, parliament, army and finance, forming part of the Indochinese Federation and the French Union."25 In exchange, the Vietminh permitted the temporary return of the French to Tonkin and North Vietnam. The agreement was primarily the work of the first French commissioner in Tonkin, Jean Sainteny, who had personal regard for Ho and who believed in peaceful coexistence with the Vietminh. But the agreement was torpedoed by the French high commissioner, Admiral d'Argenlieu, who in June established and recognized another provisional Vietnamese government in Cochin China. Even so, Ho signed a modus vivendi with the French government at the Fontainebleau Conference in July, whereby both sides agreed to cease hostilities. The uneasy truce that followed was rudely broken by the French bombardment of Haiphong on November 23, countered by the Vietminh, on December 19, 1946, with an attack on the French positions in Hanoi and on all French garrisons in north and central Vietnam. The Vietminh retired into the jungles, leaving the cities to French control but retaining authority over the countryside, beginning an eight-year guerrilla war that ended with their victory at Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva settlement of 1954. As soon as the hostilities broke out, Ho Chi Minh's unofficial representative in India, Mai The Chau, appealed to the Indian government and people for help in his countrymen's "fight to death."26 He approached Sarat Chandra Bose, a member of Nehru's interim cabinet and elder brother of the more famous Subhas Chandra Bose of the Indian National Army in Southeast Asia during World War II. Bose called on his countrymen to think of the Vietnamese struggle as part of the larger Asian struggle for freedom from Western domination, and therefore to consider it their duty "to rush in thousands and tens of thousands to help the brave Vietnamese."27 He announced plans to

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raise a volunteer brigade, to collect funds, clothing, and food, and to organize a medical mission to be sent to Indochina. The general Indian reaction was sympathetic to the Vietnamese cause. Acharya Kripalani, president of Nehru's own party, the Indian National Congress, accused the French authorities of Hitlerism in repressing the nationalist struggle in Vietnam, warning that "if the legitimate urge of the peoples of Asia for freedom is suppressed by force of superior a r m s , . . . the world will be caught in a conflagration worse than the last world war."28 The All-India Students' Congress, an organization dominated by the Socialist wing of the Indian National Congress, called upon students throughout the country to observe January 21 as Vietnam Day, the Communistled All-India Trade Union Congress asked its regional councils of Calcutta, Bombay, and Pondicherry to boycott French transport to and from Indochina.29 In Calcutta, the processions on Vietnam Day, in defiance of the existing ban on assembly of more than four persons, ended with the police wounding about two hundred, killing one, and arresting more than five hundred.30 The students dispersed only after Bose's personal appeal to conduct themselves peacefully and "not to fight the battle of Vietnam in the streets of Calcutta."31 More positively, Bose received responses: from Bombay, where J. K. Bhonsle, formerly of the Indian National Army, organized a Vietnam Brigade; from Pondicherry, where the local Congress recruited volunteers; from Karachi and Delhi, where N . Parsram and Brij Bhushan Kashyap provided leadership in the campaign for recruitment. From abroad came Colonel Yan Naing, son-in-law of Ba Maw, Burma's premier during the Japanese occupation, to meet with Bose in order to coordinate the Indo-Burmese efforts to help the Indochinese nationalists.32 The Singapore Vietnamese, led by Ngo N o V y , and Ceylonese former cadets, under P. Samarakode, also approached Bose for leadership in a joint expedition. With such popular support in men and material, Bose wrote to Nehru and his cabinet members requesting transport facilities and passports for the journey to Indochina for his volunteer force. He made it clear that no request would be made to the government of India for either financial assistance or equipment. He reminded Nehru that the "freedom of Asia is one and indivisible," and that his token force would "demonstrate that the heart of nationalist India beats in unison with the IndoChinese people."33 Nehru refused the requisite travel arrangements for Bose's volunteer force. Infuriated, Bose retorted that if the government of India for "reasons of its own" wished to adopt a policy of nonintervention, it should at least allow "Indian Lafayettes to proceed to Vietnam."34 Similar restraint characterized Indian official attitude to the Vietnamese question at the Asian Relations Conference in the following month, from March 23 to April 12, in N e w Delhi. This conference was attended by delegations from twenty-five Asian countries. Indochina was represented by two delegations, representing Ho Chi Minh's D R V

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and the French-backed regimes of Cambodia, Laos, and Cochin China. Both delegations had been invited by India, indicating that country's uncertain and noncommittal attitude toward the rival regimes in Vietnam. The acceptance of the invitation by both Vietnamese delegations demonstrated their desire to avail themselves of the opportunity of ventilating their grievances to the Asian world. The D R V delegates attracted considerable curiosity and sympathy from other delegates, particularly as victims of recent French brutalities. They grimly told how the D R V messengers carrying the delegates' credentials were killed on two different occasions before the documents could be successfully smuggled to Bangkok, where the delegates awaited them.35 Mai The Chau, the DRV representative in New Delhi, gave an up-to-date account of the Indochinese freedom struggle at the Round Table on National Movements of Freedom. He complained that insufficient help had been given his country when the French set up a puppet government in Cochin China, and that some Asian countries had even helped the French perpetuate colonialism by selling them arms and ammunition. He was grateful for the sympathy of Asian peoples, especially India, but added that sympathy and mere verbal support were not enough.36 "We have used enough words about Asian unity," he admonished the delegates; "now let us act."37 The D R V delegation asked the Indian government to help the Indochinese movement in at least three positive ways: by recognizing the government of the DRV, by using influence at the United Nations to take up the Indochinese issue, and by taking practical steps to stop French reinforcements. 38 The D R V joined the Indonesian delegation in making the following requests to the assembled delegates. Place the issue of colonialism, and particularly the issue of Vietnam, on the Security Council agenda. Immediately recognize the Indonesian and the Vietnamese republics. Provide joint Asian action to force the withdrawal of foreign troops from all parts of "occupied" Asia. Provide joint Asian action to prevent Dutch and French reinforcements from going to Indonesia and Vietnam. Send Asian medical aid and volunteers to Asian battlefields.39 The appeals of neither Bose nor the D R V delegation could convince Nehru, who then handled undivided India's portfolio of external affairs, of the propriety of intervention of Indochina by outside countries, even on the grounds of a common struggle against colonialism and for Asian freedom. Nehru emphasized the legal aspect of such intervention in his reply to Bose, pointing out that "so long as the Government of India is not at war with another country, it cannot take action against it,"40 and adding that in matters involving foreign relations the government of India must observe "rules and decorum." Replying to the charge by the Vietminh delegation that India's support to countries of Southeast Asia was more moral than material, Nehru said he did not see how the government of India or, for that matter, that of

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any other Asian country could be expected to declare war on France. His government had already taken steps to limit the number of French aircraft that might fly across India.41 He promised, however, to bring sufficient pressure to bear on France, which could not "obviously be done by governments in public meetings."42 This was not the whole truth. What were the "other reasons,"43 referred to by Bose in his rejoinder to Nehru, for India's reluctance to assist the Indochinese nationalist movement? Certainly, as pointed out by V . K. R. V . Rao at the Asian Relations Conference, there were various degrees and methods short of a declaration of war by which a country could help another.44 And Nehru himself soon demonstrated how potent such methods could be in another situation. When the Dutch attacked the Indonesian republic on July 20, 1947, Nehru thundered: " N o European country, whatever it may be, has any right to set Asii o i a Secretary Ernest Bevin to take action in the matter. Failing to activate Whitehall sufficiently, India and Australia brought the subject to the United Nations Security Council.46 India's delegate, Pillai, described foreign armies on Asian soil as "an outrage against Asian sentiment," and warned that if such acts were tolerated, then the United Nations would cease to exist. The Security Council passed a cease-fire resolution and offered its good offices for settlement of the dispute by arbitration and other peaceful means. India supported the Indonesian republic's cause throughout 1948 in the United Nations deliberations. When the Dutch renewed their attacks in December, 1948, an enraged Nehru, in a spectacular move, called a conference on Indonesia to meet in N e w Delhi in January, 1949. India denied facilities to all Dutch aircraft and shipping, and successfully persuaded Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq to apply similar sanctions. India sent a Red Cross medical unit to Indonesia and granted asylum to Sjahir.47 The Indian government extended de facto recognition to the Indonesian republic, which enabled her to characterize the Dutch "police action" as an act of war against Indonesia.48 The Conference on Indonesia, attended by eighteen countries from Asia and Africa, heard Nehru describe the Dutch attack as an affront and challenge to Asia itself: W e meet today because the freedom of a sister country of ours has been imperilled and dying colonialism of the past has raised its head again and challenged all the forces that are struggling to build up a new structure of the world. T h a t challenge has a deeper significance than might appear on the surface, for it is a challenge to a newly awakened Asia which has so long suffered under various forms of colonialism. 49

In a bitter and outspoken attack against Western colonialism, the Indian prime minister promulgated an Asian Monroe Doctrine: Our foreign policy is that no foreign power should rule over any Asiatic country. T h e reaction of the Dutch action will be heard soon over all the

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Asiatic countries and w e will have to consider what w e will have to do under the circumstances.50

Nehru sent the conference speeches, resolutions, and recommendations to the United Nations, where five days later the Security Council adopted a resolution urging a cease-fire, the release of political prisoners, and the reestablishment of the republican government in Jogjakarta.51 These recommendations were substantially identical with the demands made by the Delhi conference.52 The negotiations that followed between the Netherlands government and Indonesian leaders led to the ultimate transfer of sovereignty to Indonesian hands on December 27, 1949. India did not take any comparable measures in regard to the Indochinese nationalist movement, despite direct appeals from the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for joint Asian action to compel withdrawal of foreign troops and to take the issue to the United Nations. Instead, Nehru cautioned the Asian Relations Conference delegates against any outside interference. He advocated that the area of conflict be limited,53 in the interest of the Vietnamese themselves.54 Had India's views changed enough in the period between March, 1947, and January, 1949, to justify Asian intervention in the Indonesian conflict? If so, would India be equally prepared to espouse the Indochinese cause on similar lines after 1949? When some members of Nehru's own party contrasted the Indian attitudes in the two instances and urged Nehru to convene a conference55 on Indochina as well, he parried the suggestion; his deputy, B. V . Keskar, indicated that he doubted that many Asiatic nations would attend if such a conference were summoned.58 Nehru ruled out intervention in Vietnam on the grounds that it would only be "theoretical"57 and that the nationalist sentiment of the Vietnamese people would resent foreign interference even if it came with the best of motives. He added that such well-meaning interference could be used by colonial powers to discredit a nationalist movement as not being independent and indigenous but controlled by external agencies. It is superfluous to point out that each of these arguments was equally relevant in the Indonesian context and that they did not prevent the Indian government's willing intervention in Indonesia's favor in January, 1949. Among the real reasons that restrained Nehru's enthusiasm for the Indochinese struggle were the character of the nationalist leadership in Vietnam and the continued French hold over five small possessions in India itself. After 1949 a third and more decisive factor was the emergence of a Communist regime in China, sharing a common border with a Communist-led movement in Vietnam. The resulting attitude was one less of indifference or neglect than of calculated circumspection. Of all the anticolonial movements in Southeast Asia, the Vietnamese struggle for freedom was probably the most complex. The movement was substantially dominated by the Communists, who had, however, officially dissolved their party and established a front with representa-

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tives of most nationalist groups. The French made minor concessions, based on their concept of the French union, which did not satisfy even such archenemies of the Communists as Ngo Dinh Diem, who had refused to jump on Ho Chi Minh's bandwagon. A Vietnamese scholar, Ton That Thien, has characterized his country's freedom struggle as between "two ideologies, one imported via China, and the other via France."58 Although it is doubtful that during this early phase of their freedom struggle the Vietnamese nationalists were aware of the global ideological conflict between Communist and anti-Communist forces, it is certain that they were united in opposition to colonialism and that Communism remained an issue of subordinate importance. As William B. Dunn, an American Foreign Service official with long experience in Vietnam, observed, what mattered to the Vietnamese nationalists was not "resistance to 'communism,' but the gaining of 'real independence' and this later phrase has no meaning except in reference to independence from France."59 Only after the liquidation of French rule in Indochina in 1954 did the Vietnamese turn to the ideological conflict between Communism and anti-Communism, while the ancient fear of, and antipathy toward, the Chinese hegemony revived. The general attitude in Asia toward Communism was not the same as the Western postwar dichotomy of Communism versus anti-Communism. Asia, including India, was committed to fight against colonialism and to eradicate it from Asian soil. Most Indians, for whom the colonial experience was recent, either failed or refused to see the international trend of aggressive and expansive Communism and the bipolar division of the world. For most Asians, freedom from the colonial yoke was an immediate and irreconcilable goal, even if its pursuit led to lack of freedom under Communist society. The natural preference in India, however, was in favor of the establishment of democratic institutions in newly emerging states, as in India itself. However, the concept of self-determination was, from India's viewpoint, to include not only self-government but the choice of form of government as well. Accordingly, if a nationalist movement were dominated by Communism, and if the only choice lay between perpetuation of colonial rule and the rise of national Communism, India would consider it a duty to support the latter, although in practice her enthusiasm in such circumstances would be restrained. In the Vietnamese situation, Ho Chi Minh had disclaimed any Communist affiliations and was hailed as a nationalist hero by the majority of his countrymen. Even so, Nehru offered Ho verbal support but little active assistance. Nehru's attitude toward Communist nationalism and nationalism impeded by Communist elements deserves analysis. The Indian leader resented the Communist hampering of nationalist efforts in Indonesia, Malaya, and Burma almost as much as within India itself. India did not object to the Indonesian republican government's arresting Communist leaders like Mohammed Jusuf in February, 1946, or Tan Malaka the following March, since they had attempted violently

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to wrest power from genuine nationalists like Hatta and Sukarno, who were then negotiating with the Dutch authorities for independence. India was more than sympathetic to the Indonesian government's fighting the Communist rebellion led by Musso, Suripno, and Sjarafuddin in 194860 and at the same time combating the Dutch forces, who renewed their attack in December of the same year. In Burma, within three months of independence, Communists attempted to overthrow the government through armed rebellion, followed by more revolts led by the Karen Defence Organization and the People's Volunteer Organization. The Indian government supplied the U Nu government with arms, ammunition, and monetary assistance.61 Later, in March, 1950, India's mediation62 resulted in the decision of five Commonwealth countries, including Great Britain, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Australia, to lend Burma assistance worth six million pounds to meet the Communist threat to that country; India itself contributed one-sixth of the sum.83 The Indian government openly condemned the Communist rebellion in Malaya. On his return from a Southeast Asian tour, B. V . Keskar, deputy minister of external affairs, said that the Malayan movement could not be described as a nationalist struggle, and that the insurgents there were nothing but bandits who do not care what or whom they opposed.64 Nehru told a press conference at Singapore in the following year that such terroristic violence as that indulged in by Malayan Communists was: "something we Indians dislike intensely. . . . This method of terrorism is degrading to the whole human race and reduces men to the level of beasts."65 In 1948, the Home Ministry of the Indian government found conclusive evidence that the Communist rebellions that took place in that year in Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, and Telangana in India had been hatched at the apparently innocent Calcutta Conference of the South East Asian Youth in February, 1948.66 The Communist uprising in Telangana was effectively crushed, and Communists were arrested and detained on a large scale throughout India. Nehru openly denounced Indian Communists in February, 1949, for their program of "murders, arson, and looting, as well as acts of sabotage,"67 and for their determination to "create a chaotic state in the country." The Communist party itself was banned in a number of states, including West Bengal, Mysore, Madras, Hyderabad, and Travancore-Cochin.68 The Indian leadership demonstrated its strong resolve not to permit the hard-won fruits of Indian nationalism to be destroyed by violent Communism. The conclusion is therefore inescapable that although Nehru directly or indirectly helped in the suppression of Communists in Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and India, he recognized that the situation in Vietnam was different. The Communists in Vietnam were genuine nationalists, and there was no comparable nationalist rival rallying point for the people's aspirations in that country. He held the view as late as 1954, long after its Communist character was manifest, that the Indochinese struggle was "in its origin and essential character . . . a movement of resistance to colonialism and attempts to deal with such resistance by the traditional

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methods of suppression and divide-and-rule."69 Such an attitude was in keeping with the prevalent Asian thinking on Communism vis-à-vis colonialism. Nehru told the Institute of Pacific Relations in Lucknow in October, 1950: N o argument in any country of Asia is going to have weight if it goes counter to the nationalist support of the country, Communism or no Communism. That has to be understood. I am not arguing for or against, but am trying to put the position as I understand it. 70

In response to public pressure, however, and to repeated requests from the Ho Chi Minh government, the Indian government made certain gestures calculated to yield limited benefits to the Vietnamese cause. In 1946 Ho had sent a representative to New Delhi to solicit support for his regime, to condemn French policy in Indochina, and—more importantly—to block the work of the French purchasing mission in New Delhi and to prevent repair of French planes and refueling of French ships in India. The government of India responded in February, 1947, by prohibiting operational or combat French aircraft from flying across India, permitting, however, ambulance and other nonmilitary planes to cross its territory.71 This action was much less severe than India took in December, 1948, when K L M Dutch aircraft were not allowed even to refuel in India.72 Even if the Indian government were to place a total embargo on French ships and planes touching India, it could legally do nothing, however, to stop the French from having refueling and other facilities in their own Indian possessions, particularly Pondicherry. The question of the transfer of French territories to India involved strategic and military aspects because of the Indochinese conflict. If it was politic for France to adopt dilatory tactics on the issue of the transfer of French possessions in India, it was equally politic for India to take a less belligerent attitude on the Indochinese question. Franco-Indian relations were an important factor in determining Indian attitudes toward the French Indochinese question. India experienced unexpected inflexibility on the part of the French in granting independence to the five small pockets of French territory on Indian soil. Remnants of a larger French Indian empire—Pondicherry, Chandernagore, Mahe, Yanam, and Karaikal—were separated from one another by Indian territory and had a total population of 332,045, of which less than two thousand were European French. These territories had remained French thanks to the British protective umbrella, which dispensed with even the need for travel documents between them and the rest of India. During World War II, when France lost control of her other Asian colonies, her Indian colonies continued to remain under local French administrators. The Indian National Congress, agitating for the freedom of the Indian subcontinent, had expected the French and the Portuguese to withdraw quietly once the British had

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gone. W i t h India's independence in sight, the Indian leaders had already begun to negotiate for French and Portuguese withdrawal. But contrary to expectations, both the Portuguese and the French proved recalcitrant, reluctant to release their hold over their Indian colonies. In August, 1947, when India became fully independent, the French government agreed to study with the government of India "ways and means of friendly regulation of the problem," taking into consideration "the interests and aspirations of the population of these territories, . . . the historical and cultural links or these people with France and . . . the evolution of India."78 However, it was not until October 21, 1954, seven years later and three months after the Indochinese settlement had been reached, that the French government signed an agreement to transfer de facto sovereignty over the territories to the Indian republic. 74 T h e interregnum was plagued b y deliberate delays in negotiations and recriminations on both sides. T h e situation was worsened by occasional Indian policy pronouncements on Indochina— where French involvement and interest were far more considerable than in the Indian colonies—and doubtlessly acted as a restraining factor in Indian condemnation of French activity in Indochina and as a lever for France in neutralizing or allaying Indian resentment. T h e August, 1947, declaration was followed b y another French government announcement in the National Assembly on June 8, 1948, which provided for referenda in the French Indian possessions to decide their status. T h e details of the referenda, including the dates on which they would be held, were to be settled in agreement with the elected municipal councils of each territory. This was a fair arrangement, in the best democratic tradition, but, as in Indochina and ekewhere in the French empire, French practice reversed the liberalization promised in their official pronouncements. W i t h the September, 1948, municipal elections in Chandernagore returning a predominantly pro-Indian council, the French authorities developed cold feet. T h e y showed their real intentions b y rejecting an Indian request to station observers at the municipal elections scheduled for October 24 in the four other territories. T h e local Congress party protested b y boycotting the elections, which were therefore easily w o n b y the Frenchbacked Socialist party candidates. A t a joint meeting in March, 1949, the councils decided that the proposed referenda should be held on December 11, 1949, on condition that if the results favored an Indian merger, complete autonomy for a thirty-year period should be guaranteed. Clearly, all these moves supported by the local French authorities led the embittered Indian government to revise its assessment of French intentions. India retaliated by abrogating the customs union agreement, which had included exemption of duties on transit of goods between the French territories and the rest of India and a subsidy of $195,000 in lieu of collection of customs duties on behalf of French India. T h e Indian

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government reimposed a land customs cordon that had been withdrawn in 1941, and withdrew the unrestricted travel provisions that had so far existed between the French territories and India. Such fiscal and other measures undoubtedly caused hardship on the French authorities and helped further exacerbate the tense relationship between France and India. A few chronological details might serve to indicate how systematically France procrastinated from 1947 until three months after the Geneva settlement on Indochina in 1954, when the French Indian colonies were finally handed over to India. In April, 1949, the Chandernagore Municipal Assembly voted in favor or merger with India, declaring a referendum unnecessary. But on French insistence, a referendum was held on June 19; the results were 98.5 per cent in India's favor. On August 14, 1949, France announced transfer of Chandernagore to India on a de facto basis, but did not actually transfer it until May 2, 1950. The treaty was signed on February 2, 1951, 75 and Chandernagore was transferred de jure on June 9, 1952.76 In the other territories, the referendum date was at first set for February 15, 1950, but the ensuing stormy negotiations over the procedural details postponed the date to December, 1951. Meanwhile, upon French request and over Indian objections, the International Court of Justice informally sent a team of neutral observers to investigate conditions in French India. The report of the team, consisting of one Danish, one Swiss, and one Filipino member, who visited India from March 28 to April 22, 1951, criticized France for her terroristic measures against those favoring merger with India, and India for the stringent economic measures taken against the colonies.77 Following the publication of the report, the government of India declared that, in view of French terroristic acts, a referendum was impossible.78 In October, 1952, India proposed a de facto transfer of the territories to India, pending negotiations. France refused, on grounds that her constitution did not permit cession of territory without the consent of the people. The issue made little further progress until March, 1954, when the movement for integration with India suddenly intensified in the four remaining territories. All four passed resolutions favoring merger without a referendum; the proposals had also the support of the French members of the municipal councils. Thanks to the change in attitude adopted by the French government toward Indochina, negotiations with India were begun in Paris on May 14, 1954, leading to the transfer of the territories in October, 1954.79 For the first time in seven years of Indian independence, relations between India and France improved immeasurably.80 Although the latent Communist leadership of the Vietnamese nationalist movement and the involvement of Indian national interests in securing restoration of French Indian possessions had restrained the official Indian attitude toward the Vietnamese struggle, the emergence of the People's Republic of China, with all its political, ideological, and military implications for India, Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the

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rest of the world, radically changed India's perspective on the Indochinese situation. The establishment of a Communist regime in China in October, 1949, altered the complexion of the Vietnamese nationalist movement. By the end of 1949 the extremist elements in the Vietminh movement were asserting themselves and openly admitting their affiliation with international Communism. As the Chinese Communists gained more and more victories in their march southward, the Vietnamese Communists were openly exultant. In August, 1949, although the Communist position was strong, Ho Chi Minh was anxious to retain some semblance of the nationalist character of his movement. He told an American journalist that the Chinese Communist victory signified "a change in the center of gravity of power in Asia," but that "Vietnam is relying as always, on its own strength to win its independence."81 Similar discretion was not exercised by his colleagues, who took measures to strengthen control over the non-Communist elements in the movement. In November, 1949, some of them attended the famous Peking meeting of the World Federation of the Trade Unions of Asia and Australia, at which Liu Shao-chi exhorted the colonial countries to adopt the Chinese path in their "struggle for national independence and people's democracy."82 The Vietnamese Communists returned from China with directives from their Chinese counterparts as to how to conduct their fight for freedom from French rule. Hereafter their propaganda agencies completely coordinated their efforts with those of the Chinese Communists.83 In December the moment of gloating glory came for these extreme elements in the Vietminh when the Chinese Communists reached the Vietnamese frontier and unfurled the red flag at the international bridge linking Mon Kay and Tunghing. It did not take long for the world to conclude that the Vietnamese movement, despite Ho Chi Minh's protestations and even genuine reservations,84 had subordinated nationalism to international Communism. The shift did not necessarily benefit Ho Chi Minh's movement; if in the earlier years the French had played into his hands and helped him secure sympathy from former colonial peoples, the Vietminh now played into French hands. At a time when the French were stalemated in Indochina, weakened militarily and economically and with little prospect of extensive foreign support, the Vietminh made them a present of large-scale American aid against the Vietnamese nationalist movement, not to maintain French colonial rule, which the United States had no particular reason to uphold, but to fight Communism.85 The Indochinese war thereafter became part of the worldwide struggle between the Communist and the "free world" forces. In January, 1950, with the recognition of the D R V by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, the cold war lines were clearly drawn. Bao Dai's Vietnam became "an outpost of the Western bloc, protecting all of Southeast Asia, against eventual expansion by China."86 United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that

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Russian recognition should remove "any illusions as to the 'nationalist' nature of Ho Chi Minh's aims and reveals Ho in his true colors as the mortal enemy of native independence in Indochina."87 The United States recognized the Bao Dai regime with the hope that the 1949 Elysée Agreements would form the basis for the progressive realization of the legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people.88 France was already receiving American help indirectly under the Marshall Plan, thus allowing her to release francs for military expenses in Indochina. But from early 1950, with the signing of a Mutual Assistance Program, United States aid to the French effort in Indochina was to be direct. The Indochinese situation was becoming internationalized, and the cold war seemed to extend from Eastern Europe to Indochina—for the first time to Asia. The outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950, however, focused the spotlight away from Indochina for the next three years. The proximity of Vietnam to Communist China held portentous possibilities for extension of Communism southward. The geopolitics of the situation did not fail to impress Nehru, who had always emphasized the geographical factor in the formulation of Indian foreign policy.89 He was aware of Chinese expansionist tendencies throughout history90 and of the Kuomintang's ambitions in Tibet, Manchuria, and parts of Southeast Asia that had traditionally accepted Chinese suzerainty whenever the central regime in China had been strong. Further, the leaders of the new China expressed themselves clearly concerning their intentions to help Communist movements in South and Southeast Asia. Liu Shaochi described countries like India, Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia as semicolonies that must be freed from the stranglehold of Western imperialism.91 Another Communist party theoretician described Western support for such nationalists as Nehru, U Nu, Sukarno, and Hatta as "dykes against the surging force" 92 of revolutionary Communism. Mao Tse-tung himself, in a message to the Communist party of India, expressed the hope that under the party's leadership India would certainly not remain long "under the yoke of imperialism and its collaborators."93 Liu Shao-chi's advice to the peoples of all colonies and semicolonies was to follow the Chinese path to defeat imperialism and its lackeys, among whom he identified Bao Dai, Chiang Kai-shek, U Nu, Hatta, Sukarno, and Nehru. Nehru was condemned as "the pillar of anti-communist movement in Asia,"94 and New Delhi as the "centre of imperialist intrigues for the obstruction and undermining of the people's liberation movements . . . of China, Vietnam, Burma, Malaya and Indonesia."95 The Chinese Communists had nothing but contempt for independent India and its leaders.96 There were innumerable references in Chinese political literature to Nehru as "an imperialist running dog," "a stooge of Anglo-American bloc," "a member of the political garbage group in Asia," and—the highest Chinese Communist decoration of dishonor—"the Chiang Kai-shek of India."97 In the Russian and Chinese Communist way of thinking at that time, one who did not belong to the Communist camp was either an im-

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perialist or an agent of imperialism. According to this extreme viewpoint, man could be liberated only by overthrowing the existing regimes in the non-Communist world and by establishing in their stead Communist systems of economy and government. Nehru's anticolonialism, eloquently manifested in his periodic outbursts against the West, did not satisfy Communist needs. His initiative in convening the Conference on Indonesia in N e w Delhi in early 1949 was condemned b y the Communists as an opportunity and forum provided by a hireling of Western imperialism for a preliminary discussion of a Southeast Asian anti-Communist union!98 Nehru's policy of neutrality in foreign affairs came under the direct attack of Mao Tse-tung, who in his well-known doctrine of leaning on one side said: " T o sit on the fence is impossible.... N o t only in China but also in the world, without exception, one either leans to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Neutrality is a camouflage and a third road does not exist."99 These frontal attacks from the new Chinese leadership, as well as their declared intentions of carrying the Communist revolution to other countries of Asia, had a multiple effect on India. Nehru felt the need of recognizing the People's Republic of China, not only because it was the de facto government in China, a usual tenet for according international recognition to a regime, but also in order to make China responsible to the larger comity of nations and responsive to world public opinion. The establishment of a strong, unified, Communist, and revolutionary regime in China caused reassessment of Indian foreign policy. Although no alterations were articulated in India's official pronouncements, there was a noticeable shift from an obvious bias in favor of the West to a more neutral position.100 Indeed, the emergence of Communist China was only one of the factors responsible for this changed attitude, which was also attributable to the political and military polarization of the world at this time, particularly after the formation of N A T O . T h e second quarter of the year 1949 marked in many respects a watershed, as significant as another in 1954, in Indian foreign policy. T h e changes in policy did not reflect an unrelieved fear of China or an attitude of appeasement at any price toward Communism, internal or external. On the contrary, the Indian government continued its firm policy of suppressing Communist activities within its own country. Externally, even before China moved into Tibet in October, 1950, India took a number of political, economic, and military measures to strengthen her relations with the neighboring kingdoms of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim and her strategic position all along her northern border. After the Chinese occupation of Tibet, Indian vigil over the Indo-Tibetan frontier and welfare measures to improve the lot of the tribal people in the border areas were stepped up in an effort to prevent Communist infiltration.101 A t the same time India continued her efforts to win her powerful neighbor's friendship, determined not to meddle in Communist China's sphere of interest.102 As Nehru told Norman Cousins in

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1950: " W e have no desire to interfere with China and don't want China to interfere with us W e do not want to take any steps to raise hostilities between these two countries, which have a tremendous fron103 tier In 1949 India's attitude toward a Communist-led Vietnam movement also underwent substantial changes. The Elysée Agreements of March 8, 1949, established the republic of Vietnam as an Associated State in the French union, along with Laos and Cambodia.104 Unlike the components of the (British) Commonwealth of Nations, to which the arrangement was compared, however, the Associated States had varying degrees of autonomy. Thus Vietnam's foreign policy and military matters were retained under French control. Vietnam was given the right to appoint diplomats only to China, Thailand, and the Vatican.105 The accords had taken so long to negotiate that by the time they were ready for signature China had turned Communist and India was substituted for China in the accords—a meaningless change, since India did not recognize the Bao Dai regime. The French authorities further made it clear that the measure of independence granted would not be permitted to jeopardize the French position in Indochina. French troops and French administrators were accordingly continued in Indochina. Because of such serious limitations, the Elysée Agreements instead of inspiring enthusiasm among the Vietnamese nationalists, hardened the opposition of even those Vietnamese who were sworn enemies of Ho Chi Minh. Ngo Dinh Diem, for example, rejected the offer of premiership in the new regime. Speaking on behalf of a majority of the nationalists, who desired genuine independence and chose to remain neutral between Bao Dai and Ho Chi Minh, Diem commented the day after the Elysée accords were formally accepted in Saigon: "The national aspirations of the Vietnamese people will be satisfied only on the day when our nation obtains the same political status which India and Pakistan enjoy." 106 The sentiment in India matched that of N g o Dinh Diem. It was felt that the French were maneuvering to buttress their shaky position by bringing Bao Dai back from his exile and investing his regime with a shadowy power in an effective bid to split the nationalist ranks.107 All the prominent Indian newspapers strongly criticized the FrenchVietnamese agreement, which was compared by one of them to the Japanese-Manchukuo pact.108 Doubts were expressed about the ability of the new government to function as a rallying point for the Vietnamese nationalists,109 because the unwanted Bao Dai, who was being foisted on Vietnam, was "more a liability to France than an asset." The Free Press Journal caustically commented: "French guns will have to go into action to keep the Emperor in saddle. He commands neither respect nor popularity either in France or in Vietnam." 110 The Indian government did not recognize the Bao Dai regime for a variety of reasons. Not only was public opinion adverse in India; the government itself was well aware that the emperor was only a French

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puppet who did not command any support from his people. T o have recognized his regime would have been to accept perpetuation of a camouflaged colonialism in Indochina. In fact Nehru went a step further and advised his Commonwealth colleagues to withhold recognition of Bao Dai. His ministry forwarded the British Foreign Office a memorandum received from the Indian consul-general in Saigon, who had pointed out that 80 per cent of the countryside was controlled by Communist and nationalist forces under Ho Chi Minh. The secret document, which had leaked out to the press, concluded that France was trying to govern Indochina against the will of the Indochinese people and therefore failing, and that India would not recognize the Frenchsponsored Bao Dai regime.111 In January, 1950, the Indian government accorded no courtesy whatever to Bao Dai's representative, who had especially gone to New Delhi to seek India's recognition of the regime. Nehru unceremoniously rejected him, stating, "He does not represent anybody to us."112 The internationalization of the Indochinese conflict, the clarification of the Communist character of the Vietminh movement, and the shift of Indian international posture to a more neutral one in late 1949—these were important factors determining the altered Indian attitude toward Indochina. Recognition of either regime in Indochina would reflect Indian policy toward basic global issues, and between the East and West, and between the Communist and the anti-Communist blocs. Nehru would have perhaps preferred to remain silent, but his nonalignment policy by its very nature forced India to articulate her stand on every major issue arising from the cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States. When he was asked about his reaction to the recognition of the Ho Chi Minh regime by Communist countries and of Bao Dai by the United States and other Western powers, he replied: "It is not for me to criticize other governments; they have to decide on what they think is right. But we have, after careful consideration of the situation in Indochina, come to the conclusion that we should not jump into the fray." 113 The Indian government, therefore, turned down the requests of both the Bao Dai and Ho Chi Minh regimes for recognition.114 Nehru's decision to abstain from interference in Indochina did not go unchallenged in India, where anticolonial sentiment often obliterated distinction between Communism and anti-Communism. Many Congress party members, provoked by occasionally disturbing accounts of the Indochinese conflict, invoked their party's anticolonial resolution of 1948,115 and urged the Indian government to intervene in the interest of the Indochinese people's freedom. In 1950 Indian nationalists strongly suggested the convening of an Asian conference on Indochina on the same pattern as the earlier meeting on Indonesia in 1949. It was wrong to compare the two situations, which were really not identical. Unlike the situation in Indonesia, there was in Vietnam a large number of nationalists, militarily supported by an outside power. The Indonesian issue was not of global significance and was devoid of such

26

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ideological implications as a choice between Communism and antiCommunism.116 Calling a conference in the new context of the Indochinese situation and asking the great powers to keep hands off Indochina would not have been of great consequence. The international situation in Asia had changed radically since January, 1949, when the Conference on Indonesia had been called. The emergence of Communist China and its proclaimed aim of supporting the liberation movements in Southeast Asia and extending the cold war to Indochina were important factors in the changed scene. Further, many Asian countries had committed themselves since the Conference on Indonesia, particularly after the success of the Communist revolution in China, and were even less willing than India to involve themselves in the Indochinese situation. Nehru's deputy, B. V . Keskar, gave a clue to Indian inaction in terms that Nehru's pride of Asian leadership (which he often repudiated) would not have permitted him to advance. Keskar doubted whether many of the independent Asian countries would agree to participate in the "formation of an Asian bloc for abolition of colonialism." He referred to the military and other commitments of these countries, indicating the futility of a conference that would only "agree to disagree" and would "bring to light the fundamental differences with regard to various interests that are involved." 117 If a negative attitude can be termed as such, India's policy in the next four years until early 1954 was to keep out of the Indochinese trouble. In her own interests, India could not afford to cross the path of either of the two powers involved—China and France. It would have been imprudent to give the Chinese an excuse for overt interference in Indochina, where Chinese involvement was so far mainly ideological. The United States too had refrained from direct military intervention, limiting its participation to aiding the French financially. From late 1950 to the middle of 1953 the Korean War dominated the Asian scene. Indian diplomacy during that period exerted itself toward keeping China and the United States within safe limits and preventing the war from becoming a worldwide conflagration. By August, 1950, the Chinese-Vietminh axis became clear as Ho Chi Minh openly declared his loyalty to the Communist camp, stating that his fight was as much against France as against the United States. Communist China's aid to the Vietminh remained limited, however. In 1950 some Chinese soldiers crossed the Vietnamese border; in the following year, Chinese aid to the Vietminh increased, perhaps because of the Chinese apprehension of an all-out attack under United Nations auspices, which might include a thrust from the south also. When such fears proved unwarranted, Chinese aid to the Vietminh decreased and was limited mainly to the training of Vietnamese soldiers in China. According to Ellen Hammer, the main objective of Chinese policy during the period seemed not so much to enable the Vietminh to win a military victory as to maintain it at fighting strength and to

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help only in the event that the Vietminh suffered a decisive defeat. 118 Nehru seemed willing to shut his eyes to this minimum foreign intervention, calling the Indochinese situation a civil war. 119 On the several occasions when the matter was raised in the Indian Parliament, Nehru defended with a number of excuses his government's policy of nonrecognition of any regime in Indochina and of denial of any assistance to the Indochinese freedom movement. The Indochinese states did not fulfill "certain tests in international law," which would be the prerequisite for recognition by other states.120 Indochinese nationalism might not appreciate outside assistance, even if rendered with the best of motives.121 Further, India's policy was to keep out of other people's troubles, because she had enough of her own. All these pretexts provided umbrage to the Indian noninterventionist attitude, which Nehru admitted on at least one occasion was guided by "larger considerations."122 The larger considerations were the real reasons for Indian inaction, and they certainly included India's national need for friendship with China and France as well as the broader interests of seeking to maintain world peace. India's policy of nonintervention, not jumping into the fray, and keeping out of other people's troubles continued until early 1954.

II Collective Peace or Collective Defense?

India continued her policy of circumspection and noninterference in Indochina until early 1954. Despite economic and military aid to the rival sides from Communist China on the one hand and the United States on the other, the Indochinese conflict had remained essentially a bipartisan conflict between France and the Vietminh. But toward the end of 1953 and early in 1954 there were ominous signs of escalation of the conflict by direct participation of United States armed forces and the possible development into a Korean type of war if not conflagration on a global scale. It was primarily the concern for peace in an area so close to her own borders that dislodged India from her policy of nonintervention in Indochina. There were also other reasons, including some subtle but sure alterations in Indian foreign policy about this time which invited and appropriated for itself a larger share in world politics. India's role in the settlement of the Indochinese dispute and her détente with Communist China marked the beginning of a more forward stance, described by Nehru as "positive dynamic neutralism." The terms "neutral," "neutralist," and "nonaligned" have been used interchangeably though often tendentiously by writers, diplomats, and statesmen alike to describe the foreign-policy posture of uncommitted nations. Nehru disclaimed for India classical neutrality of the Swiss type, which would preclude belligerency1 and all pretensions to an active role in international affairs.2 He preferred the expression "nonalignment" as describing a position between the two blocs after World War II, but he often used "positive neutralism" and "positive policy for peace," to indicate the positive aspects of an obviously negative term like "nonalignment."3 Spokesmen for Indian foreign policy have emphasized that nonalignment enabled India to "exercise discrimination in judging international issues without preconceived notions or ideological obsessions,"4 with "freedom to participate with either side or neither."5 It must be said, however, that in the early years of India's independence her preoccupations with internal problems precluded any significant participation in world politics. By the early 1950's India had emerged successfully from the period of instability and insecurity that 28

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2

9

had characterized the first few years after attainment of independence. Except for the persisting problem of Kashmir, India had satisfactorily solved most of the issues that had threatened the Balkanization and disintegration of its social and political fabric. Among its notable achievements were: the integration of the more than five hundred princely states into the Indian union; the partial mitigation of economic and social problems resulting from the upheaval of partition; the drafting and adoption of the constitution; the proclamation of the republic; the successful conduct of a nationwide election; and the launching of a planned economic program in the form of five-year plans from 1951. After Patel's death in 1950, and because of Nehru's enviable record of weathering storms in the infancy of Indian independence, Nehru had emerged as the unrivaled leader of the Indian nation. He had always cherished the idea of being ready to participate more actively and prominently in the field of international affairs. Isolation and noninvolvement, which had been forced on India partly by circumstances, were abandoned in the early fifties. India played a major role in Korean affairs, which earned for her the chairmanship of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in 1953. Her participation in the Korean episode, particularly her impartial role as chairman of the NNRC, 6 contributed to the dissipation of Communist misgivings about India's nonaligned position, which had been severely condemned in the past for its pro-West inclinations. India's self-confidence as a mediatory influence between the two power blocs was also bolstered, and raised Nehru's hopes of utilizing India's uncommitted position for promoting a "positive policy of peace." The improvement of relations with the Communist countries, made possible by the new Soviet line of peaceful coexistence followed by Malenkov, was pursued on the diplomatic plane, culminating subsequently in the muchrheralded SinoIndian agreement over Tibet in April, 1954. The Sino-Indian agreement marked a watershed in Indian diplomatic history, because the five principles of peaceful coexistence incorporated therein represented not only a reassessment of relationship between the two Asian neighbors but also, in the Indian view, a pattern for the cardinal principles of international behavior between one nation and another. Nehru hailed the five principles, subsequently known as the Panchasheel, as a "challenge of Asia to the rest of the world" 7 which he hoped to use as a tool for carving out "areas of peace," first in Asia and later in the world at large. He preferred to form a bloc of nonaligned nations like India as a force of peace uncommitted to either of the two dominating forces that seemed to have bipolarized the world. At the same time, he seemed acutely allergic to the word "bloc," spurning all suggestions formally to create an Afro-Asian bloc or a third force. Yet, he saw enough scope for a "third road," whose existence and justification Mao Tse-tung had so vehemently denied and decried a few years earlier. The changes in the Communist approach toward the uncommitted nations after Stalin's death opened a further possibility of

3°

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enlarging the area of peace through agreements like the Sino-Indian one, although they did not necessarily enlarge the area of nonalignment. Reflecting on this period, Nehru told R. K. Karanjia: I think, w e have done something to show to both the communist and noncommunist powers that the world is not just made of colours that are black and white, that there are browns all over the place, and therefore w e of Asia need not be committed to one or the other bloc or ideology. T h e r e is room for a third ideology and also this "area of peace" w e have sought to establish and extend between the warring blocs. This has acted as a sort of a bridge. 8

In 1954 Nehru envisioned great possibilities for bridging the gulf of the cold war. This marked a new and positive direction in Indian foreign policy, through whose instrumentality Nehru hoped to stabilize peace in Asia and the rest of the world. The coincidence of the birth pangs of such a policy with the gathering of dark clouds on the international horizon, in the threatened escalation of the Indochinese conflict in the latter half of 1953 and early in 1954, was largely responsible for Nehru's intervention in the Indochinese dispute.9 Throughout 1953 there were opposing forces at work both in France and in the Communist world in regard to Indochina. Efforts to seek a negotiated peace paralleled a persistent pursuit of the war effort to break the military stalemate of several years. France's frustration with the seven-year-old conflict without any military solution in sight was evident in the growing criticism of la sale guerre by parliament, press, and public.10 By 1952 France had spent sixteen hundred billion francs (twice the amount of American Marshall Plan aid to France) and incurred ninety thousand casualties, including dead, wounded, missing, and prisoners, in Indochina.11 In 1953 the annual war disbursement amounted to five hundred billion francs, while the toll at officer level equaled the number of graduates of St. Cyr (the French counterpart of Sandhurst or West Point) . 12 Pointing out the economic, military, and political implications of these figures in enfeebling France by comparison with the reviving Germany, Pierre Mendès-France, former cabinet minister and later premier of France, reiterated his stand of 1950 that it would be "an unpardonable crime to pursue in Indochina a policy of which the uncertainty, the equivocation and the mediocrity" 13 had cost France so dearly. In June, 1953, he failed by a narrow margin in his bid for premiership, but the result indicated a trend in the fragmented political circles of France of a desire for a negotiated settlement to put an end to an unwanted dirty war. Joseph Laniel, who succeeded in becoming premier, declared on July 3 his government's preparedness to "perfect" the independence and sovereignty of the Associated States by genuine transfer of authority in regard to finance, justice, defense, and political affairs, and invited the three states of Indochina to open negotiations with France. Earlier in the year another premier, René Meyer, had assured the Vietminh through Prince Buu Hoi that France

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31

would welcome arrangements leading to negotiations between the two sides.14 The Vietminh did not respond until November 29, when Ho Chi Minh, in his answers to a set of questions submitted by the Swedish newspaper Expressen, indicated his readiness to negotiate if the basis for armistice was real French respect for Vietnamese independence.15 Ho Chi Minh's reaction came in the wake of a most explicit peace offer from Premier Laniel, who, in a lengthy statement in the Council of the Republic on November 12, stated that his government was prepared to negotiate peace even with Communist China "in order to facilitate the settlement of war in Vietnam."16 He quoted approvingly from Malenkov's speech of September 19, 1953, in which the Soviet prime minister had expressed a desire to see the armistice in Korea become the "point of departure for new efforts aimed at lessening of international tensions in the entire world, and notably in the Far East," and pointed out that Chou En-lai had also made an analogous statement on August 24, 1953. In Laniel's opinion the Korean armistice indicated that "when the communist world is certain that it cannot achieve a military victory without risking a general conflagration, it accepts at least a pause, at least a truce." The French premier concluded that his country, like the United States in Korea, would be happy with a diplomatic solution in Indochina and would not insist on military submission. Although there were such hopeful pointers of peace from France and the Communist world, there were equally significant manifestations of a stiffening belligerent attitude, especially by French authorities in Indochina and even more so by the United States. As Ellen Hammer points out, the French policy toward Indochina had always been formulated and implemented by a coterie of men in key positions, like professional administrators, career generals, vested economic interests, and politicians "dreaming of power and empire, who were able to have their own way because of the peculiar nature of the French political scene."17 These men, interested in the continuation of the conflict at any cost, succeeded in persuading the Republican administration in the United States to augment its economic and military aid to the war effort in Indochina. General Henri Navarre, who had been sent to replace General Salan and prepare the ground for an eventual French withdrawal, instead proceeded with masterminding a plan for a major offensive that ended in the debacle of Dien Bien Phu.18 The men who advocated an increased war effort interpreted the Vietminh thrust in Laos and Cambodia in the spring of 1953 as indicative of a well-planned strategy of aggressive Communism to engulf all Indochina and Southeast Asia. It was the only aberration of the post-Stalin Communist peace offensive launched by the Vietminh for a tactical bargaining advantage in the anticipated negotiations at Geneva. United States Secretary of State Dulles held the Soviet Union and Communist China directly responsible for the increased Vietminh activity, warning them on September 17, 1953, that if they persisted in promoting war in Indochina, their conduct would be "taken as proof that they adhere to the design

32

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to extend their rule by methods of violence."19 Within a fortnight the State Department announced a Franco-American agreement whereby additional financial resources up to 385 million dollars would be made available by the United States to the French government before December 31, 1954, "in support of the plans of the French Government for the intensified prosecution of the war against the Viet Minh."20 The action was based on General Navarre's plan21 and a French pledge to make every effort "to break up and destroy regular enemy forces in Indochina."22 What seemed then to be representative of American intentions and determination was the statement by Vice-President Nixon in November, 1953, in Paris that under no circumstances could negotiations take place that would "place people who want independence under bondage," adding, "It is impossible to lay down arms until victory is completely won." 23 Dulles predicted such a military victory in 1954.24 The situation seemed complex and even contradictory when the four great powers—United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France—met in Berlin in February, 1954. If there were fearful indications that the military stalemate in Indochina would be broken by increased American and Chinese intervention, there were also manifestations of a new political stalemate developing, both sides desiring peaceful negotiations but neither ostensibly prepared to make the first positive move in the direction for fear of diplomatic disadvantages that normally attend a party taking the initiative for negotiations. Whereas France was tired of war, Great Britain was wary of an escalation in the conflict that might be brought about by Dulles' brinkmanship. As for the Soviet Union, it had embarked on a peace offensive on all fronts and seemed particularly willing to bargain with France for diplomatic advantages in Europe in exchange for cooperation in assisting toward a peaceful solution to the Indochinese impasse.25 In the circumstances French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault certainly scored a diplomatic victory, when toward the end of the Berlin Conference, he secured the other three foreign ministers' agreement to discuss "the problem of restoring peace in Indochina" at the forthcoming Geneva Conference on Korea on April 26, to which, besides the four great powers, the representatives of Communist China and "other interested states" were to be invited.26 In this announcement of the forthcoming discussion of the Indochinese question, Nehru perceived an opportunity "to pursue the path of negotiation for a settlement."27 Three days after the Berlin Conference, he contributed to the breaking of the political stalemate by calling for a cease-fire.28 Later, on the eve of the Geneva Conference in April, he made a concrete six-point proposal for solution of the Indochinese dispute. Though his cease-fire appeal and the six-point proposal were not immediately accepted by the parties concerned, they helped to set the ball of negotiations rolling at the Geneva Conference, and eventually they formed the basis for the Indochinese settlement itself. Nehru's interest in peace was not entirely altruistic, but was guided

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33

primarily by India's national interests. As he admitted, India opposed war not only on principle but because of her selfish interest in peace; if a war broke out and even if India managed to keep aloof from it, the resulting economic and political repercussions would adversely affect Indian development plans.29 As Nehru wrote to the presidents of the State Congress Committees in July, 1954, the progress of India and other Asian countries depended upon peace, which may not be guaranteed indefinitely but was certainly worth striving for even if it lasted for a few years.30 "Peace to us is not just a fervent hope," Nehru told the Indian Parliament earlier in April, 1954; "it is an emergent necessity."31 It was desirable to have world peace, but it was even more essential to have peaceful conditions nearer home in Asia. The difference in Nehru's protests about SEATO, MEDO, and American military aid to Pakistan can be contrasted with his attitude toward the more distant N A T O in this context.82 If the Korean problem interested him more than the German, it was because of the former's proximity to India and the prospect of Chinese and American intervention bringing war to Asian soil; similar possibilities in Indochina caused him greater concern because of its greater proximity to India. T o quote again from his speech in the Indian Parliament: Indochina is an Asian country and a proximate area. . . . T h e crisis in respect of Indochina therefore moves us deeply and calls from us our best thoughts and efforts to avert the trends of this conflict towards its extension and intensification and to promote the trends that might lead to a settlement. 33

The events of the latter half of 1953, foreshadowing internationalization of the Indochinese situation, clashed with Nehru's policy of enlargement of the area of peace and of nonalignment in neighboring Southeast Asia. Then too, further intervention in Asia would force fresh policy assessments for the countries of Southeast Asia and disturb the vital balance of power in the region. In this context China was very much in Nehru's mind. As discussed in Chapter I, Indian policy since 1949 had been China-oriented, particularly with respect to China's neighbors and the spread of international Communism in Southeast Asia. Indian interest had so far been to limit the Indochinese conflict to the French and the Vietminh and to keep other powers, particularly the United States and China, out of the region. If American intervention increased, it was logical, on the basis of the Korean precedent and Chinese pronouncements, to expect Chinese retaliation, giving the latter an opportunity to enhance its influence not only in Indochina but elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Indian policy toward China was one of seeking her friendship and getting her admitted to the United Nations, thus making her more responsible to world opinion. At the same time, India had taken certain limited measures to reinforce the regimes of the states lying between India and China.34 But such steps were inadequate, and their efficacy would be tested once China was consolidated on the mainland and freed herself of involve-

34

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ments in Korea and the confrontation with Formosa.35 A more enduring policy was required to contain China within her territorial limits. India's aims in this respect coincided with those of the United States. The difference lay in the methods, which were so incompatible with each other as to drive a wedge between the two most populous democracies. The major difference in approach was in regard to world Communism. India believed nationalism and Communism not only to be compatible but also that the nationalist forces in emerging nations, including China, would predominate and prevent an international Communist hegemony under the aegis of the Soviet Union. In the American view, the Communists aimed at bringing the whole world under a single central authority, an aim obviously incompatible with nationalism.86 In India's opinion, military strength achieved through military alliances resulted in compromise if not the self-effacement of the sovereignty of the emerging nations. A t the same time, building up independent military strength was not practical, given the demands of India's economy. T o India, economic freedom was as important as political freedom, and large-scale military expenses would leave little for much-needed economic development.37 India believed the best approach to preventing the spread of Communism was to make the newly emerging nonCommunist nations economically sound and socially stable. On the other hand, owing to her recent colonial background, India feared that military alliances might signify the return of colonialism by the back door. United States motives in this respect became even more suspect in Indian eyes with rumors, in November, 1953, of a United StatesPakistan military aid agreement, confirmed by President Eisenhower's announcement on February 25, 1954.38 Nehru quoted disapprovingly from the speech of Walter S. Robertson, assistant secretary of state, who had told the House Appropriations Subcommittee on January 26, 1954, that the United States must "dominate Asia for an indefinite period and pose a military threat against Communist China until it breaks up internally."39 The United States was also suspected of complicity in the Sheikh Abdullah episode in Kashmir.40 Indian newspapers and political parties alleged that American policy toward Kashmir was motivated by the cold-war strategy of acquiring military bases there not far from China and the Soviet Union.41 A t the same time, India believed that a military response to the potential Chinese menace would be inadequate, particularly since China was allied to the Soviet Union, and an attack on the former would precipitate a nuclear holocaust between the two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union.42 India preferred to respond to the Chinese challenge in terms of a moral approach rather than to resort to military strength, which was neither possible nor practicable for her to attain. A moral approach would also be in harmony with the Indian historical and cultural tradition of peace and friendship with neighbors, a policy that would be more in keeping with the Gandhian philosophy of nonviolence. Nehru also felt that the moral pressure of a predominantly Asian area of peace might be prefer-

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35

able to military alliance with the Western powers, which he considered to be "a reversal of the process of liberation."43 Conditions seemed favorable to Nehru's approach to world politics in the months following Stalin's death. T h e new Russian line of peaceful coexistence, followed by Malenkov and later by Khrushchev, required recognition of neutrality as a valid approach in international affairs, an approach necessitating a volte-face in Maoist China, which had categorically rejected existence of a path other than the Communist and capitalist.44 In the negotiations over Korea, Sino-Indian relations had improved. B y early 1954 there were indications of a concord and the establishment of relations between the two great Asian neighbors on solid foundations. Nehru felt his policy of extension of the area of peace was succeeding, in view of China's recognition of India's nonalignment and a more conciliatory tone in Communist policy than ever before. W i t h the Sino-Indian Panchasheel (five foundations) 45 agreement to follow, containment of Communism through coexistence seemed a feasible alternative to the policy of military containment propounded by United States Secretary of State Dulles. Despite identity of aims, therefore, the wide gulf between the t w o approaches forced the United States and India into polaristic postures, bringing Indo-American relations to an all-time low. This was important for the course of the Indochinese talks. Whereas Dulles saw in Nehru the greatest obstacle to his policy of collective security through defense pacts for the containment of Communist China, Nehru viewed American policy as the most important impediment to his policy for collective peace through coexistence—it seemed to wreck the best opportunity India had of extending the area of peace and nonalignment and of stabilizing the relations of South and Southeast Asia with the Communist colossus to its north. Nehru's appeal for a cease-fire in Indochina must be viewed in this wider context of the fresh formulation of Indian foreign policy aims and the conflicting positions of the United States and India in regard to the character of the Communist threat to Southeast Asia and the methods to counter such a threat. It is possible to criticize Nehru for having made his cease-fire appeal rather prematurely and probably even without adequate knowledge of Indochinese affairs. Indeed, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs was not so well informed on the internal situation of Indochina, particularly about the logistical position of the combatants, as it was about the international aspects o f the conflict. 46 In response to Nehru's appeal, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden pointed out to B. G . Kher, the Indian high commissioner in London, that in a conflict of the Indochinese type, where there was no continuous fighting line as in Korea, it would be difficult to arrange a cease-fire without leaving the peoples of the Associated States at the mercy of the Vietminh. "In a war not of fronts but of manoeuvre and infiltration," continued Eden, "a cease-fire would enable the VietMinh, by clandestine movement and in civilian disguise to establish

31 1 5 The Jaipur Congress (1948) resolution put down the principles on which "the foreign policy of India must necessarily be based." These were "the promotion of world peace, the freedom of all nations, racial equality and the ending of imperialism and colonialism" (see Rajkumar, op. cit., p. 96; and the speeches of S. N. Mishra and K. Hanumanthaiyya in India, House of the People, Parliamentary Debates, III, ii, March 17, 1950, cols. 1720, 1729, 1732). 1 1 6 It is pertinent to note that at the Conference on Indonesia in January, 1949, the Vietnamese issue was scrupulously kept out because, according to Harold R . Isaacs, "Problems of Nationalism," in Phillips Talbot, ed., South Asia in the World Today, (Chicago, 19J0) p. 159, "Nehru and his advisers . . . showed signs of being afraid of the communist coloration of the Viet Nam nationalist leadership." 1 1 7 India, House of the People, Parliamentary Debates, III, ii, March 18, 1950, col. 1760. 1 1 8 Hammer, op. cit., p. 253. 1 1 9 India, House of the People, Parliamentary Debates, IV, i, Dec. 17, 1952, cols. 167j-1676. 1 so Ibid. 121 Ibid., Ill, ii, March 17, 1950, cols. 1698-1699. 122 Ibid., IV, i, Dec. 17, 1952, col. 1677. 95

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NOTES TO PP. 28-32

II. COLLECTIVE PEACE OR COLLECTIVE DEFENSE? 1 In reply to a debate in the Constituent Assembly, on December 4, 1947, Nehru stated: " W e are not going to join a war if w e can help it: and we are going to join the side which is to our interest when the time comes to make the choice." For Nehru's speech, see India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1946-4!) (New Delhi, 1953), p. 203; see also R . K . Karanjia, The Mind of Mr. Nehru (London, i960), p. 93. 2 Michael Brecher, The New States of Asia (London, 1963), p. m . Brecher's chapter entitled "Neutralism: A n Analysis" provides an illuminating semantic exercise in neutrality, neutralism, neutralization, and nonalignment. 3 See Nehru's speech of January 17, i960, at the Bangalore session of the Indian National Congress, in India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, India's Foreign Policy; Selected Speeches (cited hereinafter as India's Foreign Policy) ( N e w Delhi, 1961) pp. 82-84. See also Nehru's statement at a press conference at the United Nations Correspondents' Association, October 4, i960, ibid., pp. 86-96; and in India, Lok Sabha, Debates, LIX, ii, N o v . 20, 1961, cols. 31-34. Among the growing number of studies on the subject of neutralism is Peter Lyon, Neutralism (Bombay, 1963). 4 G . L. Mehta, "The Indian Approach," in Great Britain, Central Office of Information, Commonwealth Survey, 148 (May 28, 1954), p. 7. G . L. Mehta was India's ambassador to the United States from 1952 to 1958. 5 Kautilya [ T . N . Kaul], "The Philosophy of Non-alignment," India 1962 ( N e w Delhi, 1963). Kaul, a former chairman of ICC Vietnam (1957-58), is now foreign secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, N e w Delhi. 6 See George K . Alapatt, "The Legal Implications of the Repatriation of W a r Prisoners in Relation to the Korean Armistice and in V i e w of the Division of Korea" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, St. Louis University, 1958), pp. i 6 j if. 7 India, Ministry of External Affairs, Foreign Affairs Record, I, (March, 1955), 558 Karanjia, op. cit., pp. 92-93. 9 Nehru told Congress and the opposition leaders especially assembled to discuss the Indochinese question that India's policy was governed by the "twin considerations of seeing an early peace in Asia and maintaining as large a peace area as possible unattached to any of the power blocs." See Hindu, April 27, 1954. 1 0 For details of the reactions see Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina (Stanford, 1954), pp. 297-301. 11 Ibid., p. 297. 1 2 Donald Lancaster, The Emancipation of French Indochina (London, 1961), P- 240. 1 3 France, Assemblée Nationale, Journal Officiel de la République Française, XXII (Oct. 18, 1950), 7003-7004. 1 4 Hammer, op. cit., p. 310. 15 Current Digest of the Soviet Press, V (Jan. 13, 1954), 18. 1 6 France, Conseil de la République, Journal Officiel, X X V I (Nov. 12, 1953), 1748. 1 7 Hammer, op. cit., p. 299. 1 8 Jules Roy, The Battle of Dienbienphu ( N e w York, 1963), pp. 5-6. 1 9 Dulles to United Nations General Assembly, in United States, Department of State, American Foreign Policy, 1950-195; (Washington, 1957), I, 354. 20 Council on Foreign Relations, Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1953 (New York, 1954), pp. 350-351. T h e sum was in addition to four hundred million dollars already earmarked as annual aid to France and the Associated States. 2 1 T h e plan proposed that Vietnamese troops be increased in number and be entrusted with the static defense duties so far performed by the French ex-

NOTES TO PP. 3 2 - 3 4

267

peditionary corps, so as to free the latter for field action against the Vietminh. Lancaster, op. cit., pp. 265-267. 22 DJS£., X X I X (Oct. 12, 1953), 486. 23 New York Times, N o v . 8, 1953. 24 Monde, Dec. 16, 19J3. 2 5 T h e Berlin Conference was preceded by a meeting in Bermuda, attended b y Churchill, Eisenhower, and Laniel assisted by Bidault. A t this meeting American readiness to shoulder increasing responsibilities in Indochina was made manifest, whereas Bidault indicated his inclination toward a negotiated settlement. A t Berlin, Bidault sensed Molotov's willingness to offer the Russian government's good offices to arrange an armistice in Indochina. In Donald Lancaster's opinion, Russia had sounded out China earlier in this matter and had obtained Chinese support before H o Chi Minh replied to the questionnaire from Expressen. Incidentally, the questionnaire itself was submitted to H o through the Vietminh chargé d'affaires in Peking. See Lancaster, op. cit., pp. 290-292. 2 6 Final Communiqué issued by the Four Foreign Ministers in Berlin on February 18, 1954, in Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents Relating to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America (London, 1954), p. 180. 2 7 India, House of the People, Parliamentary Debates, I V , ii, April 24, 1954, col. 5579. 2 8 Nehru in reply to debate on the president's address in the House of the People on February 18, 1954. See India's Foreign Policy, p. 395. 2 9 Nehru's speech at Allahabad on July 11, 1954. See Hindu, July 12, 1954. 30 Nehru to the presidents of the State Congress Committees, July 7, 1954. See Great Britain, Central Office of Information, Commonwealth Survey, 153 (Aug. 6, 1954), 9. 3 1 India, House of the People, Parliamentary Debates, IV, ii, April 24, 1954, col. 5581. 32 Nehru condemned N A T O only when Portugal claimed its protection extended to her colonies in India. See India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1949-5} (New Delhi, 1954), p. 223. 33 India, House of the People, Parliamentary Debates, I V , ii, April 24, 1954, col. 3 4 Nehru told Norman Cousins in 1950, "I should imagine that at the present moment . . . it [China] cannot possibly think in terms of extension toward Southeast Asia or any other direction. That is on pure ground of expediency if you like. . . . It is difficult to say what might happen in the future—what a powerful nation might do to develop expansionist tendencies." See Norman Cousins, Talks with Nehru (New York, 1951)) p. 54. 3 5 See Chapter I, above. 38 W . Bedell Smith, on "Crossroads Asia," CBS Television Program in DS.B., X X X I (Aug. i, 1954), 191. 37 For an exposition of this line of argument, see S. L. Poplai and Phillips T a l bot, India and America: A Study of Their Relations (New Delhi, 1958), pp. 9-12. 38 DS.B., X X X I (March 15, 19J4), 481. 3 9 India, House of the People, Parliamentary Debates, I, ii, Feb. 7, 1954, cols. 971-972. 4 0 Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta, lndo-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1955 (Amsterdam, 1958), pp. 147-148. In Das Gupta's opinion, this is an unsubstantiated charge. 4 1 K . P. Karunakaran, India m World Affairs, 1950-53 (London, 1954), pp. 245246. 4 2 In the thirty-year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed by China and the Soviet Union in February, 1950, it was provided that if either ally was attacked by Japan or any of its allied states, the other party would immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal. T h e text of the treaty is in People's Republic of China, Sino-Soviet Treaty and

268

NOTES TO PP. 3 5 - 3 8

Agreements (Peking, 1 9 5 1 ) , pp. 5 - 8 . 43 Frank Moraes, Jawaharlal Nehru (New York, 1 9 J 6 ) , p. 4 5 2 . See Nehru's statement in the Lok Sabha on February 22, 1954, in India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1953-57 (New Delhi, 1 9 5 8 ) , P- 34544 According to J. H . Brinimeli, Communism in Southeast Asia (London, 1 9 J 9 ) , pp. 2 8 0 - 2 8 2 , the Communist policy switch had come even before Stalin's death and was evident in the latter's concluding remarks to the Nineteenth Party Congress in Moscow in October, 19j2. The change in policy was to exploit all antiWesternism in Asia, and was connected with events in China and based on Chinese advice. 45 The term "Panchasheel", was not used in the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet of April 29, 1954, although the five principles comprising Panchasheel figured in that agreement. They were repeated later in the Nehru-Chou Joint Communiqué of June 28, 1954, at the conclusion of Chou's visit to New Delhi. These were: (1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) nonaggression, (3) noninterference in each other's internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence. The word "Panchasheel" is variously spelled. Nehru himself preferred "Panchasheel" to "Panch Shila" or "Panchsheel," although the last two terms are also widely used in Indian official documents. See Nehru's letter to Russell H . Fifield, in Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, 1954-1958 (New York, 1 9 5 8 ) , p. j n . T h e text of Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet is in Foreign Policy of India, pp. 1 0 1 - 1 0 9 . 46 Ellen Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina Continues (Stanford, 1955), p. 7. Later, at the Geneva Conference, the Cambodian delegation also complained that India had not consulted them and that if she had done so she might have been better informed on Indochina. See Hindu, June 4, 1954. 47 Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden (Boston, i 9 6 0 ) , pp. 90-91.

48 France, Assemblée Nationale, Journal Officiel de la République Française, V (March 5, 1954), 713-714. 49 Prince Buu Loc's interview at the Calcutta airport. See Hindu, March 3, 1954. 50 India's Foreign Policy, p. 395. 51 Hindustan Times, Feb. 23, 1954; Canada, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, IV, March 26, 1954, p. 3401; India, House of the People, Parliamentary Debates, IV, ii, April 17, 1 9 5 4 , col. 4 9 2 2 . 52 Times (London), Feb. 24, 1954. 53 France, Assemblée Nationale, Journal Officiel de la République Française, V

( F e b . 23, 1 9 5 4 ) , 4 7 0 . Si

lbid., p. 471. Ibid., March 5 , 1 9 5 4 , pp. 7 1 3 - 7 1 4 . 56 Times of India, Feb. 24, 19J4. Similar editorials appeared in Hindu, Hindustan Times, and Statesman. 87 Nehru's cease-fire appeal, in India's Foreign Policy, p. 395. 58 National Herald, Feb. 24, 19J4. 59 Hindusthan Standard, Feb. 26, 1954. 60 For the British position, see Eden, op. cit.-, for the American position, see Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-56 (New York, 1 9 6 5 ) , pp. 55

403-4J2. 81

Eden, op. cit., p. 97. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina Continues, p. 54. 63 N . S. Palmer, "Organising for Peace in Asia," Western Politicai Quarterly, VIII (March, 1 9 J J ) , 2 2 . 64 DS.B., XXX (April 1 2 , 1 9 5 4 ) , 5 3 9 - 5 4 2 . 65 Dulles to Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives on April 5 , 1 9 5 4 , in ibid., XXX (April 1 9 , 1 9 5 4 ) , 5 8 2 - 5 8 3 . Later, Dulles said that this was merely a renewal of President Eisenhower's call in the latter's "Chance for Peace" 62

NOTES TO PP.

38-42

269

address of April 9, 1953, for united action. See ibid. (June 28, 1954), 971-973. 66 Eden, op. cit., p. 91. 67 Prime Minister Churchill's statement in Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 526, April 27, 1954, col. 1456. 68 F. S. Northedge, British Foreign Policy: The Process of Readjustment, 19451961 (London, 1962), p. 201. 69 Eden, op. cit., p. 94. For Nehru's influence on British attitude at this time, see also Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 422. 70 Eden, op. cit., p. 94. 71 U.K. and U.S. joint communiqué, in Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 526, April 13, 19J4, col. 969. 72 Eden, op. cit., p. 96. 73 Ibid., p. 97. 74 Ibid., p. 94. 75 For details see Chanakya Sen, Against the Cold War (London, 1962), pp. 82-83. The proposal stood defeated and could not be sent to the plenary session for lack of a two-thirds' majority. Nehru was extremely resentful and told the Indian Parliament on September 17, 1953: "Nearly the whole of Europe and nearly the whole of Asia wanted one thing in this Political Conference, while a number of countries, all from the Americas, did not want it. . . . It is not realized by many of the Great Powers of the world that the countries of Asia, however weak they might be, do not propose to be ignored, bypassed and sat upon." See India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1953—57 (New Delhi, 1958), p. 241. 76 Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 526, April 13, 1954, col. 975. 77 Eden, op. cit., p. 99. 78 Nehru repeatedly referred to decisions about Asia being taken by others without reference to Asian countries: "We recognize that the great countries of Europe and America are intimately concerned in the vital developments affecting world peace or war, but they must recognize that we are also equally concerned in these matters and in fact a little more concerned if they relate to Asia." See Hindu, May 4, 1954. 79 Philippe Devillers, Histoire du Vietnam de 1940 à 1952 (Paris, 1952), p. 160. 80 Moraes, op. cit., p. 453. 81 Hindustan Times (New Delhi), July 21, 1954, Mendès-France publicly thanked India for her help at Geneva and for taking chairmanship of the commission. France, Assemblée Nationale, Journal Officiel de la République Française, V (July 23. '9Î4>. 353582 John Kotelawala, An Asian Prime Minister's Story (London, 1956), pp. 95-96. Sir John was prime minister of Ceylon from October, 1953, to April, 1956. 83 Nehru said on May 3, 1954: "There has been in the past far too much of a tendency to ignore what Asian countries think even in regard to Asian questions." See Hindu, May 4, 1954. He repeated his resentment in his Bhopal speech on June i, 1954: "It is strange that the venue of the Conference discussing problems vitally affecting Asian countries should be in Europe, and their fate decided by other nations." See ibid., June 2, 1954. 84 The full text of Nehru's statement is in India, House of the People, Parliamentary Debates, IV, ii, April 24, 1954, cols. 5581-5582. 85 S. L. Poplai, "The Colombo Conference of South-East Asian Prime Ministers," Foreign Affairs Reports, III (July 7, 1954), 83. 86 Nehru's speech at the Colombo Conference, in ibid., p. 87. 87 For example, Times (London), April 26, 1954. 88 Kotelawala, op. cit., p. 119. 89 Krishna Menon's speech at a reception by Indian students in London. See Hindu, June 1, 1954. 90 Even after the Colombo Conference, Nehru was in favor of limiting negotia-

270

NOTES TO PP. 4 2 - 4 4

tions to France and the Associated States and the Vietminh. H e told reporters at the Colombo airport: "A cease-fire as well as other settlements are more likely to be reached between the belligerents than if others also come in. Therefore, it is necessary to limit the negotiation more particularly because of the aid that has been pouring in on either side." See Statesman, May 4, 1954. 91 The text of the Final Communiqué of the Colombo Conference is in S. L. Poplai, The Temper of Peace: Select Documents, 1954-5$ (New Delhi, 1955), pp. j-6. 92 Kotelawala, op. cit., p. 122. Nehru also said that the Colombo Conference was not held in any spirit of rivalry to the Geneva Conference. See Hindu, May 4, 1954. 93 S. L. Poplai, "The Geneva Conference," Foreign Affairs Reports, III (Aug., i9J4>. 9794 Eden's diplomacy succeeded in averting combined opposition to the proposed security pact for the defense of Southeast Asia. See Eden, op. cit., p. 109. 95 In the opinion of an Indian scholar, Communist China was more responsive to the cease-fire proposals because of the endorsement of the Asian premiers to the proposal to seat China in the United Nations. See Poplai, "The Geneva Conference," p. 98. 96 Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 529, April 24, 1954, col. 432. See also Observer, April 25, 1954. 97 Australia was of a similar opinion. Its foreign minister, Richard Casey, who played a very important role at Geneva, said: "Mr. Nehru's view is a very important one. . . . Southeast Asia is an Asian business. . . . The future of Southeast Asia might be discussed with greater possibility of success by nations bordering on the Indian Ocean." See Hindu, June 9, 1954; see also Casey's statement of May 26, 1954, in Australia, Department of External Affairs, Current Notes on International Affairs, 25 (May, 1954), 351. 98 Northedge, op. cit., p. 201. 99 Kotelawala, op. cit., p. 119; Eden, op. cit., p. 99. 100 Eden, ibid. 101 Fifield, op. cit., p. 277. 102 Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, j26, April 29, 1954, col. 1784. 103 Eden, op. cit., pp. 109-110. 10i Ibid., p. 112. Russian views were identical. See ibid., p. 117. Many Democrats in the United States were aware of the danger. See, for example, John F. Kennedy, "What Should U.S. do in Indo-China?" Foreign Policy Bulletin, XXXIII (May 15, I9S4). 4105 Times (London), July 12, 19J4. 108 Hindustan Times, July 12, 1954. 107 Hindu, July 12, 1954. 108 Eden, op. cit., p. 123. Eden adds that the least alarmed by the threat of the hydrogen bomb were the United States and China, whereas the Soviet Union shared the fear. "This was natural since America could not at that time be reached by bombs from Soviet Russia. . . . The Chinese probably count life cheaper than any other people on earth. T o them though the nuclear threat was grave, it was not decisive." See ibid., pp. 123-124. It is possible to think of India's role in terms of bringing home to the Chinese mind the full implications of the hydrogen bomb. «9 Ibid., p. 124. 110 Nehru condemned the Communists after United States Ambassador George Allen pointed out to him that the Communists had stepped up fighting directly in the face of Nehru's appeal for a cease-fire. See Moraes, op. cit., p. 444; see also Nehru's statement in India, House of the People, Parliamentary Debates, IV, ii, April 24, 1954, cols. ÏJ79-J580. 111 It seems that the Colombo powers were not all prepared to take the responsibility of supervising the armistice. According to H . Howard Wriggins, Ceylon:

NOTES TO PP. 4 4 - 5 0

27I

Dilemmas of a New Nation (Princeton, i960), p. 441, "Indonesia and Burma could spare no troops because of continuing disorders at home. Ceylon had none to send. And at that time it was inconceivable that India and Pakistan could jointly participate in the same administrative and policing enterprise." See also Kotelawala's statement in New York Times, May 6, 1954. 112 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, V, ii, May 15, 1954. 113 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents Relating to the Discussions of Korea and Indochina at the Geneva Conference (London, 1954), p. 131. 114 Prime Minister Churchill's statement in Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 530, July 12, 1954, col. 44. 5 11 India's Foreign Policy, p. 395. 116 Great Britain, Central Office of Information, Commonwealth Survey, 148 (May 28, 1954), 9; India, Lok Sabha, Debates, V, ii, May 15, 1954. 7 11 Nehru, at a press conference in New Delhi on May 30, 1955, in India, Ministry of External Affairs, Foreign Affairs Record (May, 195J), 103. u s x . J. S. George, Krishna Menon (London, 1964), p. 178. ii» Iqbal Singh, "India at Geneva—Apropos a Mission," National Herald, June 27. 195412° Statesman, July 21, 1954. 121 Emil Lengyl, Krishna Menon (New York, 1962), p. 149. 122 v . p. Dutt and Vishal Singh, Indian Policy and Attitudes toward Indochina and SEATO (New York, 1956), p. 13. 123 Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 529, June 23, 1954, col. 436. 124 R. G. Casey, Friends and Neighbors (East Lansing, 1958), p. 100; Australia, Department of External Affairs, Current Notes on International Affairs, XXV (Aug. io, 1954), 577. 125 Madame Pandit's interview with Philip Deane on June 13, 19J4, in Hindustan Times, June 14, 1954. 126 Times (London), May 31, 1954. 127 New York Times, June 1, 1954. 128 Kotelawala, op. cit., p. 126. 129 Hindu, June 16, 1954. 130 Eden, op. cit., p. 141. 131 India, Ministry of External Affairs, Report 1954-S5 (New Delhi, 1955), p. 16; G. L. Mehta, "India in World Affairs," AICC Economic Review, VII (June 1, I9S5)' 5132 Monde, June 24, 1954. 133 "China on Trial," Thought an China (New Delhi, 19J9), p. n . 134 Foreign Policy of India, p. 113. 135 jhid^ pp. 109-114. 138

Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina Continues, p. 7. For details see Great Britain, Foreign Office, Further Documents Relating to the Discussion of Indochina at the Geneva Conference, June ¡6-July 21, 1954. (hereinafter cited as Further Documents—Geneva Conference) (London, 1954). 138 An interesting comment on this statement is from William Stringer, Christian Science Monitor, July 26, 1954, "In a sense, he [Nehru] was paying a compliment to his own diplomacy, for it was Mr. Nehru who urged Mr. Chou to recognize that the U.S.A. had come so close to intervention in Indo-China that it would have touched a major w a r . . . . " 189 Statesman, July 26, 1954. See also India, Ministry of External Affairs, Foreign Affairs Record, I (March, 1955), J3. 140 Kotelawala, op. cit., p. 131. 141 Indonesia's Sukarno also drew satisfaction from the agreements. In retrospect, he said: "Look, the people of Asia raised their voices and the world listened. It was no small victory and no negligible precedent." See Indonesia, Ministry of 137

272

NOTES TO PP. 5 0 - 5 5

Foreign Affairs, Asia-Africa Speaks from Bandung (Djakarta, 1 9 J J ) , p. 2 5 . 142 Nehru, in Indian Parliament on March 31, 1955. See India, Ministry of External Affairs, Foreign Affairs Record, I (March, 1 9 5 5 ) , 5 3 . 143 Economist, 172 (July 3 1 , 1 9 J 4 ) , 3 4 2 . 144 Foreign Policy of India, p. 113. 145 India, Ministry of External Affairs, Foreign Affairs Record, I (March, 1 9 5 5 ) , 55146 President's address to Parliament, in ibid., I (Feb., 1 9 5 5 ) , 2 4 . In India, the president's address is drafted by the prime minister and approved by the cabinet before it is read in the joint meeting of the two houses of Parliament. 147 S. L. Poplai and Phillips Talbot, India and America (New Delhi, 1 9 5 8 ) , p. 1 0 . 148 Panchasheel did not receive all-around support in India. A contemporary Indian critic pointed out: " T o any student of international politics the principles themselves would appear to be merely a rehash of generally accepted standards of behavior between nations. . . . History has only recorded that enunciations like these are of little practical value, if not accompanied by an adequate machinery to enforce them." See "China on Trial," Thought on China, p. 11. An interesting observation is in J. H. Brimmell, op. cit., p. 287: "They [Panchasheel] were the equivalent of the old-time United Front platform between communist and other parties. . . . Whereas the previous United Fronts had been horizontal, involving groupings of parties within nations, the new variety was vertical, involving groupings of nations against other nations—a repetition, in a way, of the situation prevailing during the Second World War." H I . INDIA, SEATO, AND BANDUNG 1 The official name of the commission was the International Commission for Supervision and Control. In deference to popular practice, the name adopted here is the International Control Commission or ICC. 2 India, Ministry of External Affairs, Report 1954-55 (New Delhi, 19$j), p. 16: Amrita Bazar Patrika, editorial, Aug. 13, 1954; Nehru himself told the All India Congress Committee meeting at Ajmer on July 25, 19J4: "This invitation to India showed the confidence other countries reposed in her impartiality." See Hindustan Times, July 26, 1954. 3 Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, J30, July 22, 1954, col. 1571. . 4 Australia, Department of External Affairs, Current Notes on International Affairs, X X V (Aug., 1 9 5 4 ) , 5 8 2 . 5 Hindustan Times, editorial, July 22, 1954. a Full text of Nehru's speech is in Hindu, Aug. 2, 1954. Hindustan Times, editorial, Aug. 1, 1954 noted: "The assumption that the Polish, Canadian and Indian members would strictly judge issues on their merits and not by any pre-conceived ideological leanings is sustained by the wide-spread latter-day spirit of compromise that went into the making of the Geneva Agreements." 7 India, Ministry of External Affairs, Report 1954-55 (New Delhi, 1 9 5 5 ) , pp.

16-17. 8

Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Affairs, VII (May, 1 9 J 5 ) , 1 6 4 . Times (London), Sept. 27, 1954. This followed a decision taken at the preliminary meeting of the ICC in New Delhi in August, 1954. For details see Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Affairs (Sept., 1 9 5 4 ) , p. 8 . 11 Canada, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, III, March 24, 19J5, p. 2 3 4 0 . There was parity between Canada and Poland on all committees of the commission. No exact figures for Poland have been available to me, but it can be assumed that there were almost the same as those of Canada. 12 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, II, i, March 2 4 , 1 9 5 J , cols. 1 3 9 2 - 1 3 9 3 . Of the number, 941 were defense personnel and 145 civilians. 9

10

NOTES TO PP. 5 6 - 6 1

273

13 For example, Carlos P. Romulo, the Philippines delegate to the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, stated in reply to Nehru's criticism of S E A T O : "Far from destroying the so-called climate of peace following the Indochina settlement, the Manila Pact makes it doubly certain that the signatories shall not countenance any fresh outbreaks or renewal of communist aggression in the region. In effect, . . . the Communists can neither renew their aggression in any other part of Southeast Asia without risking counter-measures. One would think that this will serve to reinforce rather than weaken the climate of peace which is said was the direct outcome of the Geneva Conference." C. P. Romulo, The Meaning of Bandung (Chapel Hill, 1956), p. 90. 14 Australia, Department of External Affairs, Current Notes on International Affairs, X X V (Aug., 1954), 57915 Nehru's speech at the closed sessions of the Asian-African Conference. India, Ministry of External Affairs, Asian-African Conference, Speeches of the Prime Minister of India (New Delhi, not for publication), pp. 39-40. 16 Nehru's speech in Lok Sabha on March 31, 1955, India, Ministry of External Affairs, Foreign Affairs Record (cited hereinafter as F^i.R.), I (March, 1955), 53. J. H. Brimmell, in Communism in Southeast Asia (London, 1959), p. 286, observes that S E A T O failed because of the communist policy of coexistence. " S E A T O was born to handle a cold war which was already over." 17 For a discussion of the full implications of this agreement, see Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta, Indo-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1955 (Amsterdam, 1958), pp. 145-ijo. 18 Southeast Asia is generally assumed to include Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and the Philippines. Almost all the military equipment that flowed into Pakistan from S E A T O was utilized to improve the defenses of West Pakistan and not East Pakistan, which was at least nearer to the Southeast Asian region. 19 India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, '953—51 (New Delhi, 1958), p. 269. Portuguese intransigence was demonstrated on August 1 j , 1954, when the Portuguese authorities in Goa fired at unarmed satyagrahis. On September 9, Nehru told the Indian Press Association luncheon meeting: "The interlocking of organizations like N A T O , A N Z U S and S E A T O was like interlocking trusts in big business; no one knew where they stood or to what they might be committed." See Great Britain, Central Office of Information, Commonwealth Survey, 157 (Oct. 1, 1954), 3. 20 Nehru in Lok Sabha on March 29, 1956, in India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Jaivaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1953-57 (New Delhi, 1958), p. 319. Krishna Menon used the same expression in the U.N. Political Committee on Disarmament and Reduction of Tension on December 9, 19JJ. See India News (Dec. >7- i955>21 DSU., X X X (March 15, 1954), 401. See also S. L. Poplai and Phillips Talbot, India and America (New Delhi, 1958), p. 88. 22 "Understanding of the United States of America," South-East Asia Collective Defense Treaty, in India, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Military Alliances, 1947-57 (New Delhi, 19J7), p. 76. 23 Leicester C. Webb, "Australia and SEATO," in George A . Modelski, ed. SEATO: Six Studies (Melbourne, 1962), p. 66. 24 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, VII, ii, Sept. 30, 1954, col. 3685. 25 FA.R., I (March, 1955), 53. 26 Ibid. (Feb., 1955), 30. 27 India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1953-57 (New Delhi, 1958), p. 269. 28 Great Britain, Central Office of Information, Commonwealth Survey, I (May

4, 1955), 388. 29

30

Further Documents—Geneva Conference, 11. Z. M. Szaz, "Cambodia's Foreign Policy," Far Eastern Survey, X X I V (Oct.,

1955), 154.

274 31

NOTES TO PP. 6 1 - 6 5

Further Documents—Geneva Conference, pp. 19-20. Bernard B. Fall, "Cambodia's International Position," Current History, XL (March, 1961), 164. 33 Mendès-France had declared on June 17, 1954, when he became premier, that he would resign his office if a settlement on Indochina were not reached by July 20. This time factor had an important influence on the Geneva talks. When the Cambodian delegation created the crisis, which was resolved at 3:20 A.M., MendèsFrance's plane engine was ready to take off if the conference failed. For details, see Jean Lacouture and Philippe Devillers, La Fin d'une Guerre (Paris, i960), p. 270. 34 Donald Lancaster, The Emancipation of French Indochina (London, 1961), P- 33535 Further Documents—Geneva Conference, p. 41. 36 Szaz, op. cit., p. 153. 87 Ibid., p. 154. 38 DSJ}., XXXI (Sept. 29, 1954), 534. 39 Ibid. (Oct. is, 19J4), 61 j. 40 President Eisenhower to King Norodom Sihanouk, October 2, 1954, in ibid. 41 Statement of August 10, 19J4 in the Australian House of Representatives, Australia, Department of External Affairs, Current Notes on International Affairs, XXV (Aug., 1954), J82. ^ D u l l e s obviously referred to Britain and France. However, the two countries were divided on the interpretation of the Geneva Agreements. Eden said: "It is clearly understood that none of the three States will allow the establishment of foreign military bases on its territory or will become a member of a military alliance." Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 530, July 22, 1954, col. 1571. Mendès-France told the French National Assembly: "None of the three states is neutralized. . . ." See France, Assemblée Nationale, Journal Officiel de la République Française, 66 (July 22, 19J4), 3535. 43 Dulles' address to the nation, September 15, 1954, in DSI)., XXXI (Sept. 27, 1954), 432. See also United States Senate, The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, Hearings before the Committee of Foreign Relations, November 11, 1954 (Washington, 1954), p. 19. 44 Further Documents—Geneva Conference, p. 154. 45 For details, see Chapter VI. 46 Kingdom of Laos, Presidency of the Royal Government, Application des Accords de Genève au Laos (Vientiane, 1955). 47 Great Britain, Central Office of Information, Commonwealth Survey, I (March 9, i9$j), 221. 48 Ceylon and Burma recognized Cambodian independence in August, 19J4. 49 Text of the statement is in Hindu, Aug. 9, 1954. 50 France, Direction de la Documentation, Notes et Études Documentaires, No. 1447, Conference Inter-États (Paris, 1951). 51 Statesman, Nov. 12, 19J4. 52 Hindustan Times, Jan. 1, 19JJ. 53 France, Direction de la Documentation, Notes et Études Documentaires, No. 1973 (Paris, 19J4). 54 Nehru, during debate on Motion Regarding International Situation, in India, Rajya Sabha, Debates, VII, i, Aug. 26, 1954, col. 446. 85 The legal aspects of this problem—whether Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam could or could not join SEATO in terms of the Geneva Agreements—has been exhaustively discussed by J. A. Modelski, "Indochina and SEATO," Australian Outlook, XIII (March, 1959), 17-54. Modelski concluded that there was no legal barrier to the Indochinese states' joining SEATO. Nehru's statements, however, allude to the Geneva spirit rather than to the strict wording of the Geneva Agreements. 32

NOTES TO PP. 6 5 - 6 8 58

275

Hindu, Aug. 28, 1954. Later, Kotelawala veered more to Nehru's view. John Kotelawala, An Asian Prime Minister's Story (London, 1956), p. 131. At Bandung, according to Institute of Pacific Relations, Selected Documents of the Bandung Conference (New York, 1955), p. 7, he said: "The argument of physical force must yield to the argument of spiritual power. Hitherto the approach adopted to problems of international peace has been one based on considerations of relative military strength, the old heresy goes—that if you want peace you must prepare for w a r . . . . Their strength brings no security, their armaments no defense." Despite his staunch opposition to Communism, he did not ally Ceylon to SEATO. 58 According to Hindustan Times, July 31, 1954, Krishna Menon commented in his London broadcast on July 29, 1954: "It is a pity that the idea of a Locarno is not properly understood. It is a guarantee in which different parties come in, including China." He told reporters on the following day: "I am not either personally or on behalf of my Government supporting or opposing the idea of Locarno, but I think it is an unfortunate word to use." 59 A. Doak Barnett, "Asia and Africa in Session," American Universities Field Staff, III (May 18, 1955), 24. 60 For example, Sucheta Kripalani's forceful plea for a third bloc in India, House of the People, Parliamentary Debates, March 17, 1953, cols. 2117-2119. 61 Foremost among the Socialist advocates of the third camp was Rammanohar Lohia. See Socialist Party of India, Report of the Eighth National Conference of the Socialist Party (Madras, 1950), pp. 225-227; and Rammanohar Lohia, Aspects of Socialist Policy (Bombay, 1952), pp. 29-31. 62 Hindu, Feb. 24, 1953. 63 Asian-African Conference, Speeches of the Prime Minister of India in Closed Sessions, p. 29. Nehru's judgment in this regard has not been entirely supported by subsequent events. China has attacked none of the S E A T O member countries; on the other hand, India and Indonesia have suffered from direct and indirect aggression from Communist China. 64 Text of the joint statement in Foreign Policy of India, p. 146. 65 India, House of the People, Parliamentary Debates, IV, ii, April 24, 1954, col. 55 81. 66 Nehru in Lok Sabha on March 31, 1955. See FA.R. I (March, 1955), j2. 67 FAR. I (March, 1955), 55. 68 Chester Bowles, Ambassador's Report (London, 1954), p. 178. 69 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, VII, ii, Sept. 29, 1954, cols. 3679-3680. 70 Economist, 175 (May 8, 1955). 71 On India's attitude toward communism, see Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, Communism in India (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959), pp. 536 ff.: "It does appear that the attitude taken by the Government of India towards the communist movement -within India gives some clue to that government's attitudes towards world communism and the leading communist governments. In surveying the Government's behaviour toward the CPI [Communist Party of India] from independence to 1957, one cannot escape the conclusion that it has been as anticommunist as the rules of the parliamentary system would permit, and on a few occasions has breached the spirit if not the letter of those rules in an effort to inhibit the activities of the CPI." 72 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, VII, ii, Sept. 29, 1954, col. 3693. 73 Chou En-lai's speech at the Political Committee of the Asian-African Conference, April 23, 1955, in Institute of Pacific Relations, Selected Documents of the Bandung Conference (New York, 1955), p. 27. 74 Nehru's letter dated July 7, 1954, in Congress Bulletin (June-July, 1954), quoted in Margaret Fisher and Joan V . Bondurant, Indian Views of Sino-lndian Relations (Berkeley, 1956), pp. 26-27. 75 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, V , ii, March 31, 1955, cols. 3901-3902. 57

276

NOTES TO PP. 6 8 - 7 1

7 6 Burma was also interested in guarantees from China, and joined India in the efforts to secure them. According to Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York, 1961), p. 317, "Fear of China has from the start been a basic element in Burmese attitudes toward Peking." See also Frank N. Trager, "Burma's Foreign Policy, 1948-56," Journal of Asian Studies, X V I (Nov., 1956), 93, for a discussion of Burmese policy toward China. 7 7 T . J . S. George, Krishna Menon (London, 1964), p. 179. 7 8 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, IV, ii, Sept. 27, 1954, col. 368. 7 9 George McTurnan Kahin, The Asian-African Conference (Ithaca, 1956), pp. 8, 36. See also Richard Wright, The Colour Curtain (London, 1956), p. 42: "But a multi-nationed agreement with China would, perhaps give the other noncommunist nations a chance of standing together against China, if she were caught cheating." 8 0 At the Rashtrapati Bhavan banquet on March 18, 1955. See F.A.R., I (March, i95î>. 5'81 Ibid., p. 50. 82 Statesman, March 2j, 1955. 8 3 Nehru-Norodom communiqué of March 18, 1955, in Foreign Policy of India, pp. 159-161. 84 FAR., I (March, 1955), 52. 8 5 Nehru-Dong communiqué of April 10, 1955, in ibid., p. 92. 88 Ibid. 87 Times of India, editorial, April 12, 195j. 8 8 The five sponsors of the Bandung Conference were: India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia. 8 9 Kahin, op. cit., p. j . Kahin attended the conference as a reporter, and later visited several of the countries represented at Bandung and had discussions with most of the prominent leaders, including Nehru. 9 0 Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, former governor-general of India and one of India's senior statesmen, described the Indian role at Bandung as "the crowning hour of Prime Minister Nehru's brave life." See Hindu Weekly Review, May 2, 1955, p. 2. Michael Brecher in India's Foreign Policy: An Interpretation (New York, 1957), p. 29, saw in the Bandung Conference "an organized expression of Asia's re-awakening," to which the principal contribution was "undoubtedly made by India, more particularly Nehru." For the opposite view, see Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 19$$ (London, 1958), p. 399, and A. Doak Barnett, "Chou En-lai at Bandung: Chinese Communist Diplomacy at the Asian-African Conference," American Universities Field Staff, III (May 4, i9jy), 9. Barnett attended the conference as a reporter. 91 N.CJJjl. (April 22, 195J), p. 261. 9 2 See the text of Katay's speech in Kingdom of Laos, Lao Presse, April 29, 1955. 9 3 A. Doak Barnett, "Asia and Africa in Session," American Universities Field Staff, III (May 18, 1955). 9 4 Prince Wan Waithayakon openly questioned Communist China's intentions "in regard to the so-called persons of dual nationality in Thailand, or in other words, to the Chinese community of 3,000,000 in Thailand," and the activities in the Thai autonomous region of Yunnan "for purposes of infiltration and subversion in Thailand." See Indonesia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asia-Africa Speaks from Bandung (Djakarta, 1955), p. 132. 9 5 Supplementary speech, April 19, 19 j j , in People's Republic of China, China and the Asian-African Conference [Documents] (Peking, 1955), p. 26. 9 6 Kahin, op. cit., p. 15. 97 Ibid., p. 22. 9 8 Nehru arranged a numbet of meetings to bring Chou En-lai into closer contact with other delegates. "The liaison thus established combined with important psychological factors to make Chou En-lai recede notably from the unbending position he had previously taken at Geneva," according to Carlos P. Romulo, The

NOTES TO PP. 7 1 - 7 7

Meaning of Bandung (Chapel Hill, 1956), pp. 10-11. See also Nehru's "Report on Bandung," to the Lok Sabha in India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches 1953-57 (New Delhi, 1958), p. 299. 9 9 Kingdom of Laos, Application des Accords de Genève au Laos (Vientiane, •955)' 100 N.CNjI. (April 25, 1955), p. 5; Kingdom of Laos, Lao Presse, April 26, 1955. 1 0 1 Text of the Final Communiqué and the Resolution in Foreign Policy of India, pp. 1 7 1 - 1 8 1 .

1 0 2 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, i g ; s (London, 1956), p. 424. 103 For changes in Thailand's attitude toward Communist China and the growth of unofficial relations between the two countries, see Justus M. Van der Kroef, "China in Southeast Asia," Current History, X X X I I I (Dec., 1957), 348-350. 1 0 4 Barnett, "Chou-En-lai at Bandung," p. 15. 105 DS.B., X X X I I (May 9, 1955), 754. 106 Ibid., p. 757. 107 People's Republic of China, China and the Asian-African Conference [Documents] (Peking, 1 9 J J ) , p. 21; Wright, op. cit., p. 134: "Communism at Bandung was conspicuous for its shyness, its coyness, its bland smile and glad hand for everyone. Chou En-lai . . . moved among the delegates with the utmost friendliness and reserve, listening to all arguments with patience, and turning the other cheek when receiving ideological slaps." 1 0 8 Barnett, "Chou-En-lai at Bandung," p. 9. 1 0 9 Kenneth Younger, "Britain and the Far East," in Australian Institute of International Affairs, The Dyason Lectures 1955 (Melbourne, 1955), p. 31. 1 1 0 India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1953-51. P- 2971 1 1 For a detailed analysis of the significance of the Panchasheel and the Bandung Conference in terms of India's relationship with the Communist world, see Ross N . Berkes, "India and the Communist World," Current History, X X X V I (March, 1959) 146-152. Berkes, p. 148, states that the period from "the end of the Geneva Conference through most of 1956, and in part beyond is the great period of Communist reassurances and goodwill towards the neutralist powers particularly India." 1 1 2 Chou En-lai's statement to the Political Committee, April 23, 1955. See N.C.NA. (April 25, 1955), p. 3. " 3 DJSB., X X X I I I (Aug. 8, 1955), 220-221. 1 1 4 President Eisenhower's statement of July 18, 1955, in Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents Relating to the Meeting of Heads of Government of France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America (London, i 9 î î ) . PP- 8-9-

IV. INDIA AND THE TWO VIETNAMS, I954-I958 1

Statesman, July 22, 1954. Mike Mansfield in Introduction to Wesley R. Fishel, ed., Problems of Freedom; South Vietnam since Independence (Glencoe, 1961), p. ix. 3 See, for example, Prime Minister Menzies' statement in the Australian House of Representatives on August 5, 1954, in Great Britain, Central Office of Information, Commonwealth Survey, 153 (Aug. 6, 1954), 3. 4 According to New York Times, Oct. 18, 1954, Nehru said he was in Hanoi "a little accidentally. I wanted to visit the ICC, which is chairmaned by an Indian, and see that all is going well." Nehru visited all four capitals of the Indochinese states: Vientiane, Hanoi, Saigon, and Phnom Penh. 5 Times of Indonesia, Oct. 20, 1954. 6 Nehru-Ho joint statement issued at Haiphong on October 17, 1954, in Foreign Policy of India, p. 131. ''Hindu, Oct. 31, 1954. 2

278 8

NOTES TO PP. 7 7 - 8 5

Statesman, Oct. 30, 1954. Ngo Dinh Diem's statement of July 22, 1954, in Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Information, The Problem of Reunification of Viet-Nam (Saigon, 1958), p. 29. 10 France, Présidence du Conseil, La Documentation Française, Articles et Documents (Paris, 1954), No. 067. 11 Australia, Department of External Affairs, Current Notes on International Affairs, 26 (Feb., 1955), 86. 12 Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina Continues (Stanford, 1955), p. 8. 13 New York Times, July 19, 19J4. 14 Further Documents—Geneva Conference, p. 7. The South Vietnamese delegation failed to get its statement incorporated in the Final Declaration. 15 Australia, Department of External Affairs, Current Notes on International Affairs, 16 (Feb., 1955), 86. 16 Statesman, Aug. 7, 1954. 17 Manilal Jagdish Desai ( 1904), educated at Ahmedabad, Bombay, London; C.I.E., I.C.S., Bombay Government Service 1938—1946; advisor, Indian Delegation to the U.N. session in Paris, 1948; commercial advisor to the High Commissioner for India in London, 1948-1951; envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary for India in Sweden, Finland, and Denmark, 1951-1953; commonwealth secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, 1953; acting High Commissioner for India in U.K. 1954; chairman, ICC Vietnam, 1954-195 5; commonwealth secretary, Ministry of External Affairs 1955-1961; foreign secretary, 1961—1963; secretary-general, Ministry of E.A. 1964-1965. 18 Hindusthan Standard, Sept. 27, 1954. 19 Article 14(b) of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, Further Documents—Geneva Conference, p. 30. 20 New York Times, Oct. 8, 1954. 21 Great Britain, Foreign Office, First and Second Interim Reports of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (London, 1955) (hereinafter cited as ICC Vietnam First and Second Reports), pp. 12-13. 22 Ibid., p. 36. There are slight differences in the figures supplied by the rival parties. 23 Statement at the Asian-African Conference, Bandung, in Hindustan Times, April 23, 1955. 24 Wesley R. Fishel in Foreword to Fishel, op. cit., p. v. 25 Although the refugees were predominantly of the Catholic faith, there were also many Buddhists, who escaped the severities of the Communist regime. After the deadline for the change of zones, there were still six hundred thousand Catholics in the D R V . 26 ICC Vietnam First and Second Reports, appendix 1. 27 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Fourth Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (London, 1956) (hereinafter cited as ICC Vietnam Fourth Report), pp. 11-12, 20-21. 28 Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 532, Nov. 8, 1954, col. 929. 29 René Coté, "Struggle for Power Continues in Indochina," Mainichi, Feb. 12, I9ÎÎ30 Hindustan Times, Sept. 27, 1954. 81 ICC Vietnam First and Second Reports, p. 48. 82 Canada, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, III, March 24, 1955, p. 2 33933 For economic consequences of the partition of Vietnam, see Robert R. Nathan, "The Consequences of Partition," in Fishel, op. cit., pp. 1-8. 34 Quoted by Hammer, op. cit., p. 20. 3 5 DS£., X X X I (Oct. 11, 1954), 534. 36 President Eisenhower to Ngo Dinh Diem, in ibid. (Nov. 15, 1954), 735. 37 France-Soir, Nov. 27, 1954, quoted by Hammer, op. cit., p. 33. 9

NOTES TO PP. 86-91 38

279

Joseph Alsop in New York Herald Tribune, March 1, 1955. Mike Mansfield in Introduction to Fishel, op. cit., p. ix. United States, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Report on Indochina by Senator Mike Mansfield, October 15, 1954 (Washington, 1954), p. 14. 41 Mew York Times, Nov. 18, 1954. 42 President Eisenhower to Bao Dai, February 19, 1955, in D S J } . , XXXII (March 14. «955). 42343 John Foster Dulles, "Report from Asia," in ibid. (March 21, 1955) 461. 44 Giap to Chairman, ICC, December 5, 1954, ICC Vietnam First and Second Reports, p. 10. 45 Radio Hanoi, Dec. iy, 1954; Hindustan Times, Dec. 22, 1954. 46 New Republic, May 9, 1955. 47 Nehru-Dong communiqué in F AH., I (April, 1955), 92. 48 For details, see Chapter III, above. 49 N.C.N A., June 7, 1955, p. 49; Van Chat Le, The Undeclared War in South Vietnam (Hanoi, 1962), p. 189. 50 Text in Foreign Policy of India, pp. 191-192. 51 Ibid., pp. 186-187. 52 N.C.N A., July 9, 1955, p. 67. 53 Text in Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs (London, 1955), pp. 479-482. 54 Times (London), July 19, 1955. During Ho Chi Minh's visit, China announced a grant of eight hundred million yuan as aid to the D R V . This was followed by a similar announcement from the Soviet Union offering aid amounting to four hundred million roubles. See G. Barraclough and Rachel F. Wall, Survey of International Affairs, ¡955-56 (London, i960), p. 15. 55 New York Times, editorial, June 29, 1955. 56 The anti-Communist and anti-Geneva Agreements campaign created fear of reprisals and discrimination among many, who rushed to take advantage of the extended period for change of zones under Article 14(d). Although only 2,598 persons had moved to the northern zone in ten months, 1,671 moved within two months from mid-May to mid-July, 1955, and another 3,531 applicants were not granted permits or facilities. ICC Vietnam Fourth Report, p. 14. 87 Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference, in Foreign Policy of India, pp. 171-181. 58 Text of Diem's broadcast of July 16, 1955, in Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Information, The Problem of Reunification of Viet-Nam (Saigon, 1958) (hereinafter cited as The Problem of Reunification of Viet-Nam), pp. 30-31. 89 Diem's interview with Ram Singh, in Thought (Nov. 16, 1957), p. 3. 60 Do Vang Ly, "The Emergence of Vietnam," Foreign Affairs Reports, VII (Jan. 1958), 2. L y was the consul-general for South Vietnam in India from 1956 to 1963. 61 ICC Vietnam Fourth Report, pp. 16-17. 62 Further Documents—Geneva Conference, p. 7. 63 Times (London), July 21, 1955. 84 Monde, July 21, 1955. 65 According to the Indian and Polish members of the team, the crowd numbered about fifty thousand, whereas the Canadian member estimated it at three thousand. His Indian and Polish colleagues testified that the Canadian member had gone swimming at the time of the demonstrations. 66 Lester B. Pearson in Canada, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, VI, July 22, 1955, p. 6572. 67 Vietnam Presse Bulletin, July 19, 1955. 68 Monde, July 21, 1955; New York Times, July 21, 1955; Times (London), July 21, 1955. «9 New York Times, July 21, 19JJ. 70 Statesman, July 22, 19JJ. 39

40

28o

NOTES TO PP. 9 1 - 9 5

71 The South Vietnam government later paid the ICC a total of 1,143,716 piasters as compensation for damages, of which the Indian share was 658,796 piasters. India, Lok Sabha, Debates, VII, i, Nov. 21, 19jj, col. 8. 72 Earlier, a government communique had blamed "extremists, apparentlycommunist agents-provacateurs" for having turned a peaceful demonstration into a riot. See New York Times, July 21, 1955. 73 Ibid., July 20, 1955, and July 21, 1955. 7 *Ibid., July 2i, 1955. 75 Ibid., July 23, 1955. 76 Times (London), July 24, 1955. 77 New York Times, editorial, July 24, 1955. 78 Times of India, editorial, July 22, 1955. 79 Hindustan Times, editorial, July 23, 1955. 80 Hindusthan Standard, editorial, July 22, 1955. 81 Great Britain supported the convening of the preelectoral consultative conference. By signing the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam, France had guaranteed the Vietminh implementation of all the provisions of the Geneva Agreements, including the holding of national elections in all Vietnam in 1956. The United States was probably contemplating "development of a free Vietnam" in the southern zone. See Mike Mansfield in Introduction to Fishel, op. cit., p. x. Secretary of State Dulles also believed with Diem that free elections in Vietnam would not be possible. See DS.B. XXXIII, 837 (July IJ, 1955), 50. 82 Prime Minister Nehru's statement on the Saigon incident, in India, Lok Sabha, Debates, IV, i, July 27, 1955, col. 3057. 83 Foreign Policy of India, pp. 169-170. M Ibid., pp. 191-192. 85 Ibid., pp. 185-188. 88 Scotsman, July 11, 1955, quoted in Tarapada Basu's dispatch in Hindusthan Standard, July 19, 1955. 87 Nehru at a press conference on July 19, 1955, in FA.R., I (July, 1955), ijo. At this conference Nehru was asked by a newsman whether by the same argument he would consider India bound by the Treaty of 1472 between Portugal and Britain. Nehru dismissed the analogy by pointing out that "the treaty was made in an age long gone by and contains the most fantastic and curious provisions which have no relation to the modern world, because the world is quite different today." 88 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, IV, i, July 27, 1955, col. 3057. The Indian Chairman of the ICC in Vietnam, M. J. Desai, defined "the competent representatives of the two zones" (mentioned in Article 14 of the Agreement of Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam) as the parties responsible for the conduct of the civil administration in each regrouping zone. He added that Article 27 of the agreement provided that "the signatories of the armistice agreement and the successors in their functions should be responsible for ensuring the observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof," and that South Vietnam was therefore "the competent authority" for purposes of Article 14. N.C.Nui. June 8, 1955. 89 Nehru at a press conference in New Delhi on July 19, 1955 (one day before the Saigon incident) in FA.R., I (July, 1955), ijo. "Quoted in Hindusthan Standard, editorial, July 29, 1955. 91 Menon at a press conference in London, July 29, 1954, in Hindustan Times, July 31, 1954. 92 Times of India, editorial, Aug. 27, 1955. 93 Hindusthan Standard, editorial, Aug. 13, 1955. A similar comment from a Canadian member of the ICC: "The South can do as she pleases. She did not sign the accord. But is she prepared to face up to the consequences? The Viet Minh may decide to settle the question by war." See New York Times, Aug. n , 1955. 94 New Times of Burma, Aug. 20, 1955. 95 British Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan, in reply to a question on July 13,

NOTES TO PP. 9 5 - 9 7

281

1955, said: "Her Majesty's Government are using all their influence with the Vietnam Government to ensure that consultations between the Vietnamese and the Vietminh should in fact take place from 20th July onwards, as provided in the Geneva Agreement. . . . W e are doing all we can to ensure that those consultations should begin." See Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 543, July 13, 1955, col. 29. See also Under-Secretary of State Turton's reply on July 27, 1955, in ibid., 544, July 27, 195j, col. 113. 96 W h e n N g o Dinh Nhu, brother and political Adviser of the prime minister of South Vietnam visited London and Paris to canvass support, he was advised to comply with the electoral arrangements as provided in the Geneva Agreements. See Scotsman, July 11, 19J5, quoted in Tarapada Basu's dispatch in Hindusthan Standard, July 19, 1955. 97 Nehru's statement in India, Lok Sabha, Debates, IV, i, July 27, 1955, cols. 3055-3059. The Saigon incident compelled the United States to alter its public attitude toward the election issue in Vietnam. Earlier, on June 28, 1955, the official position was stated by Secretary of State Dulles: "Neither the United States Government nor the Government of Viet-Nam is, of course, a party to the Geneva armistice agreements. W e did not sign them and, indeed, protested against them. On the other hand, the United States believes, broadly speaking, in the unification of countries which have a historic unity, where the people are akin. W e also believe that, if there are conditions of really free elections, there is no serious risk that the Communists would win. . . . If those conditions are provided we would be in favour of elections because we believe that they would bring about the unification of the country under free government auspices." See D.SJ)., XXXIII (July 1 1 , 1955), 50. 98

Times (London), July 29, 1955. B[rian] C[rozier], "Indo-China: The Unfinished Struggle," World Today, XII (Dec., 1956), 24-25. 100 "Declaration of the Government of Vietnam on the Reunification of Vietnam, August 19, 1955," The Problem of Reunification of Viet-Nam, pp. 32-33. 101 Ibid., pp. 30-31. 102 Lester B. Pearson, secretary of state for external affairs, Canada, at a press conference in N e w Delhi, November 5, 1955, in The Hindu, Nov. 6, 1955. 103 Pham Van Dong to co-chairmen, August 17, 1955. Full text in Van Chat Le, 99

op. cit., p p . 192-195.

104 Harold Macmillan had at this time taken over as foreign secretary of Britain and succeeded Eden as co-chairman of the Geneva Conference. 105 Statesman, Sept. 14, 1955. 106 pham Van Dong to Anthony Eden and V. Molotov, August 17, 1955, N.C.NA., Sept. 16, 1955, p. 126. 107 Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 546, Nov. 23, 1955, col. 117. 108 New York Times, Oct. 27, 1955. 109 p o r details see Republic of Vietnam, Secretariat d'État aux Affaires Étrangères, Le Vietnam et ses Relations Internationales, V (Jan.-Dec. 1961), 100-102. 110 Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 545, Nov. 11, 1955, col. 83. 111 Ibid., 547, Dec. 21, 1955, col. 69. Britain outwardly maintained that her policy "was to sustain the 1954 agreement." See Selwyn Lloyd's press conference at Ottawa, February 7, 1956, in Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Affairs (Feb.-March, 1956) 50. 112 Foreword by the British Foreign Office to ICC Vietnam Fourth Report, p. 2. 113 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Fifth Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (London, 1956) (hereinafter cited as ICC Vietnam Fifth Report), p. 12. 114 Ibid., p. 14. us Ibid.

28z

NOTES TO PP. 9 7 - 9 9

ICC Vietnam Fourth Report, pp. 10, 16; ICC Vietnam Fifth Report, pp. 12-14. ICC Fourth Report, p. 17. 118 ICC Vietnam Fifth Report, p. 15. I " Ibid., p. 16. 1 2 0 Foreword by the British Foreign Office to ICC Vietnam Fifth Report, p. 3. 1 2 1 According to Times (London), Feb. 4, 1956, "The Chinese proposal . . . has the purpose of promoting Viet Nam to as large a stage as possible. This will aim at winning the support of Indian and other Asian countries for the Viet Nam cause." But India did not support the proposal of the Communist countries and Cambodia for a new meeting of the Geneva Conference. See Foreword by British Foreign Office to Great Britain, Foreign Office, Vietnam and the Geneva Agreements (London, 19J6) (hereinafter cited as Vietnam and the Geneva Agreements), p. 4. 1 2 2 Rham Van Dong to the co-chairmen, February 14, 1956. Full text in N.C.N-A. (Feb. 23, 1956), p. 214. 1 2 3 Prince Norodom Sihanouk supported the proposal on his visit to China in February, 1956, ibid. (Feb. 19, 1956), p. 179. 124 Vietnam and the Geneva Agreements, p. 4. 1 25 Note from the Soviet Union to Great Britain, February 18, 1956, ibid., p. 5. 126 Further Documents—Geneva Conference, p. 11. W H . C N A . , Feb. 23, 1956, p. 216. 1 2 8 The French government informed the ambassadors of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and India in Paris of such an intention in February, 1956. See Paris Presse, quoted in Times of Vietnam, Feb. 25, 1956. Diem's antipathy toward the French presence in South Vietnam was caused by French intrigue among the sects and their covert propaganda against Diem. They were also suspected of flirting with North Vietnam. Further, Diem aspired to "rival Ho Chi Minh as an authentic champion of the Vietnamese people," by similarly ending the last semblance of French military control in South Vietnam. See William Henderson, "South Vietnam Finds Itself," Foreign Affairs, X X X V (Jan., 1957), 289-290. 129 Further Documents—Geneva Conference, p. 42. 1 3 0 Articles 1 and 35 of the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam, ibid., pp. 27, 36. This was one of the numerous situations the consequences of which were not clearly seen in the drafting of the documents at Geneva. It was widely rumored that Nehru was in favor of withdrawing the ICC from Vietnam, but Britain considered that the ICC's presence lent an "element of stability in an agitated and sensitive area." See Times (London), Feb. 26, 1956; Times of Vietnam, March 3, 1956. 1 3 1 G. Parthasarathi (1912) ; educated at Madras, Oxford, London; barrister-atlaw; assistant editor, The Hindu, 1936-1949; chief representative, Press Trust of India, 1951-1953; chief editor, Press Trust of India, 1953; chairman, ICC Cambodia, 1954-1955; chairman, ICC Vietnam 1955-1956; ambassador to Indonesia, 1957-1958; ambassador to China 1958-1961; chairman, ICC Vietnam, 1962; Indian high commissioner in Pakistan, 1963-1965; India's permanent representative at the United Nations, 1965- . 1 32 N.C.Nui., April 3, 1956, p. 23. The official communication from the French high command to the ICC intimating the decision to withdraw was dated April 5, 1956. 133Indian Affairs Record (April, 1956), 10. Times (London), March 9, 1956. A French report from London indicated that the Indian suggestion was accepted by the British and the French foreign ministers while in Karachi. See Times of Vietnam, March 17, 1956. 134 Vietnam and the Geneva Agreements, pp. 5-6. 1 3 5 Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 550, March 13, 1956, col. 92; ibid., March 19, 1956, col. 799. See also Vietnam and the Geneva Agreements, pp. 3-4. 116

117

NOTES TO PP. IOO—I02

283

136 N o t e from the Soviet Union to Great Britain, March 30, 1956, Vietnam and the Geneva Agreements, pp. 5-7; Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 551, April 16, 1956, col. 39. T h e modification of the Soviet stand was ascribed to the British and Indian views on the subject. Gromyko hoped to arrange the convening of a conference of the Geneva powers and the ICC while he was in London. See Times (London), April 6,1956; see also A. Karpikhin, "The United States Takes Over in South Vietnam," International Affairs (Moscow), IV (April, 1956), 91. 137 Text of the declaration is in The Problem of Reunification of Viet-Nam, pp. 37-38. 138 General V o Nguyen Giap to Chairman, ICC, April 10, 1956; full text is in N.CJJul., April 11, 1956, pp. 140-141. Giap wrote: "These are merely one-sided declarations deprived of all legal basis and cannot be considered as having any value in the continuation of the implementation of the Geneva Agreements in general or in co-operation with the International Commission in particular." T h e D R V ' s position toward the responsibility for carrying out the Geneva Agreements was: "During the period of negotiations and concluding the Geneva Agreements, the South Vietnam regime had been represented by the French Government. T h e South Vietnam regime has carried out together with the French Government part of the provisions of the agreements. T h e South Vietnam regime is the administrative authority of South Vietnam and has accepted some of the provisions in the Geneva Agreements favourable to them. Thus legally and factually the South Vietnam regime is entirely bound by the Geneva Agreements." T h e D R V also held that France had the responsibility of continuing to implement the Geneva Agreements. See ibid., April 13, 1956, pp. 152-153. 139 Vietnam and the Geneva Agreements, p. 8. 140 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, II, i, March 21, 1956, col. 1271. 141 Hindustan Times, editorial, April 8, 1956. 142 Times of India, editorial, March 22, 1956. 143 Ibid., editorial, April 12,1956. in The Indian Express, editorial, April 12, 1956. Pakistan Times, April 12, 1956, commented: " T h e British stand . . . completed the tragic story of the stultification of an accord which was acclaimed as the greatest achievement in peace-making since the end of the last war." 145 Co-chairmen to the chairman, ICC Vietnam, April 19, 1956; full text in N.CN.A. (April 27, 1956), p. 3. See also Great Britain, Foreign Office, Sixth Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (hereinafter cited as ICC Vietnam Sixth Report) (London, 1957), p. 31. 146 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, III, i, May 4, 1956, col. 3332. 147 ICC Vietnam Sixth Report, p. 31. 148 V. K. Krishna Menon in India, Lok Sabha, Debates, III, i, May 4, 1956, cols. 3333-3334149 Vietnam and the Geneva Agreements, p. 10. 150 Message from the co-chairmen to the governments of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the republic of Vietnam, May 8, 1956, in ibid., pp. 10-11. i?1 Ibid. 152 Co-chairmen to the government of France, May 8, 1956, in ibid., p. 12. 153 Times of Vietnam, July 28, 1956. 154 Statement of Tran Chenh Thanh, minister of information at the National Information Congress on May 13, 1956, in Statesman, May 14, 1956. 155 Vu Van Mau, foreign minister of the republic of Vietnam, to Selwyn Lloyd, foreign secretary, Great Britain, May 22, 1956; full text in Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs 1956 (London, 1959), pp. 723-724. It may be noted that the letter was not addressed to the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference, whom the republic of Vietnam did not recognize. Britain also had taken care to specify in the co-chairmen's message of May 8, 1956,

NOTES TO P P . I O 2 - I O 7

284

to the two governments in Vietnam, that the dispatch of a message t o the D R V did "not involve any departure from the policy of H e r Majesty's Government in recognising . . . the Government of the Republic of Vietnam as the only legal Government of Vietnam." See Vietnam and the Geneva Agreements, p. 3. 156 Times of Vietnam, July 28, 1956. 157 Speech of Walter S. Robertson, assistant secretary of State, June 1, 1956, in Republic of Vietnam, Secretariat d'État aux Affaires Étrangères, he Vietnam et ses Relations Internationales, I (June, 1956), 116. 158 Barraclough and Wall, op. cit., p. 274. 159 N. CM A., May 14, 1956, p. 140. 160 For a perceptive analysis of the altered Sino-Soviet global strategy, particularly in its application to Vietnam, see Bfrian] C[rozier], "The International Situation in Indo-China," Pacific Affairs, XXIX (Dec., 1956), 309-318. In the context of changes in the previous eighteen months, Crozier (p. 309) wrote: "While the ultimate objectives no doubt remain the same, there has been a switch in methods so great as to amount to a change in strategy. T h e implied threat of a military attack has been t o all intents and purposes abandoned in Europe—and now probably in Asia as well—and replaced by a more supple policy of economic penetration and political subversion." 161 Pham Van Dong to President Diem, May 11, 1956; full text in N.C.N A., July 16, 1956, p. 150. 162 Pham Van Dong to co-chairmen, June 4, 19J6; full text in ibid., July 18, 1956, P- 149183 Pham Van Dong to co-chairmen, June 4, 1956; full text in ibid., June 9, 1956, p. 91, and ibid., July 16, 1956, p. 149. 164 A part of the explanation for such a passive attitude lay perhaps in the DRV's preoccupation with serious internal troubles—ideological differences within the Communist party and peasant rebellions, especially in the Nghe An Province, in the latter part of 1956. For details, see Bernard B. Fall, "Crisis in North Vietnam," Far Eastern Survey, XXVI (Jan., 1957), 12-15, ar*d P- J- H[oney], "Revolt of the Intellectuals in North Vietnam," World Today, XIII (June, 1957), 250-260. i«5 Hindu, editorial, May 12, 1956. 166 Times of India, editorial, May 12, 1956. 167 Hindustan Times, editorial, May 13, 1956. 168 Hindusthan Standard, editorial, May 14, 1956. 189 Chairman, ICC Vietnam to co-chairmen, May 27, 1956, in ICC Vietnam Sixth Report,

p p . 31-32.

170 William Henderson, "South Vietnam Finds Itself," Foreign Affairs, XXXV

( J a n . , 1957), 284.

171 For detailed accounts of the trials, tribulations, and achievements of the Diem administration from 1954 to 1956, see: John T . Dorsey, Jr., "South Viet Nam in Perspective," Far Eastern Survey, XXVII (Dec. 1958), 177-182; Bernard B. Fall, "The Political-Religious Sects of Viet Nam," Pacific Affairs, XXVIII (Sept., 1955), 235-253; Francis J. Corley, "Vietnam since Geneva," Thought, Fordham University Quarterly, XXXIII (Winter, 1958-59), 515-568; and Henderson, op. cit. 172 For Nehru's statement on the recognition of the Indochinese states, see India, Lok Sabha, Debates, I, ii, March 1, 1955, cols. 774-775. Canada did not establish diplomatic relations with the republic of Vietnam because of her position as a member of the ICC. See Republic of Vietnam, Seven Years of the Ngo Dinh Diem

Administration 173

( S a i g o n , 1961), p . 159.

Republic of Vietnam, Secretariat d'État aux Affaires Étrangères, Le Vietnam et ses Relations Internationales, V (Saigon, i960), 10t. Pakistan did not recognize the republic of Vietnam in any form except for stationing a commercial representative in Saigon from May 12, 1958. 174 Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference, in G . V . Ambekar and V. D. Divekar, eds., Documents on China's Relations -with South and South East Asia, ¡949-1962 (Bombay, 1964), p. 27.

NOTES TO P P . I 0 7 - 1 1 1

285

175 Times of Vietnam, Nov. 3, 1956; Republic of Vietnam, News of Vietnam (Washington), Dec. 19, 1956, quoted by Bernard B. Fall in The International Position of South Vietnam 1954^58 (New York, 1958), part IV, p. 2. 176 Times of Vietnam, Aug. 25, 1956. 177 Ibid., editorial, Sept. 8, 19J6. 1 7 8 "Diem Makes friends," Eastern World, XI (Dec., 1957), 12. 179 President Rajendra Prasad at the state banquet on November 5, 1957, in FA.R., Ill (Nov., 19J7), 220. 1 8 0 Paragraph based on Times of India, Nov. 5, 1957. Among the dignitaries were: Pham Dang Lam, secretary-general, secretariat of state for foreign affairs, General Van Than Cao, General Mai Huu Xuan, Vo Van Hai, chief of the special cabinet of the president. 181 Hindusthan Standard, Nov. 9, 19J7. 182 The Statesman, Nov. 6, 1957. 183 Text of the statement in Republic of Vietnam, Office of the Presidency, Toward Better Mutual Understanding (Saigon, 1958), II, 27; see also Times of Vietnam, Nov. 11, 1957. 184 Eastern Economist (Nov. 8, 1957). 185 Hindu, editorial, Nov. 8, 1957. 186 National Herald, editorial, Nov. 7, 1957. 187 Diem, on his arrival at the Palam airport at New Delhi on Nevember 4, 1957. See Republic of Vietnam, Office of the Presidency, Toward Better Mutual Understanding, II, p. 7. 188 Diem at the President's banquet on November 5, 1957; see Hindusthan Standard, Nov. 6, 1957. 189 Times of India, Nov. 5, 19J7. 190 National Herald, editorial, Nov. 7, 1957. 1 9 1 Krishnalal Shridharani, "Dr. Ho Chi Minh—The Mystery Man of Asia, Coming at Intriguing Time in Indo-Vietnamese Ties," Amrita Bazar Patrika, Feb. 2, 1958. 192 Republic of Vietnam, Office of the Presidency, Toward Better Mutual Understanding, II, p. 24. 193 foreign Policy of India, p. 319. 194 S. Gupta, "Relations between Viet Nam and India," Times of Vietnam, May 14, 19J7. This issue of the weekly was entirely devoted to Indo-Vietnamese relations. 195 India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Vietnam for the Year 1958 (New Delhi, i960) (hereinafter cited as Vietnam Commercial Report), p. 43. S. Gupta, the author, was India's consul-general in Saigon from 1957 to 1959. 196 Times of Vietnam, Nov. 17, 1956. 197 Vietnam Commercial Report, p. 43. 198 For comparative figures of freight rates from Japan and India to Saigon, see ibid., p. 30. 199 Ibid., p. 45; FA.R., V (March, 1959), 86. 2 0 0 United Nations, General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Official Records, Annexes (1956-57), p. 5. 2 0 1 Pham Van Dong to members of the Security Council and chairman, General Assembly, January 25, 1957; full text in Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Information Office, Vietnam Information Bulletin (Rangoon), Feb. 8, 1957 (hereinafter cited as VNIB), pp. 2-3. 2 0 2 Sabolev of the Soviet Union in the United Nations, General Assembly, Special Political Committee, Official Records (January 24, 1957), pp. 79-80. 2 0 3 Arthur Lall of India in ibid. (January 28, 1957), pp. 93-94. 204 Ibid., p. 94. 2 0 5 India-Syria Resolution of January 28,1957, United Nations, General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Official Records, Annexes (1956-57), p. 6. 2 0 6 See n. 204, above.

286

NOTES TO PP. I I I - 1 1 4

207 United Nations, General Assembly, Special Political Committee, Official Records (Jan. 30, 1 9 5 7 ) , p. 104. India and Syria did not press for a vote in their resolution. See ibid., p. 106. 208 For an appraisal of H o Chi Minh's visit from the North Vietnamese point of view, see Pham Van Dong, "The Foreign Policy of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam," International Affairs (Moscow), VII (July, 1 9 5 8 ) , 2 2 . 209 Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 573, July 10, 19J7, cols. 3 6 2 - 6 . 210 Pham Van Dong to co-chairmen, June 8, 1 9 5 7 , in VNIB (Aug. 5 , 1 9 J 7 ) , p. 4 . 211 H o Chi Minh's itinerary, announced earlier, included only N o r t h Korea, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, and Rumania, "Ho's Travels," Economist (July 2 7 , 1 9 5 7 ) , p. 300. 212 Pham Van Dong to N g o Dinh Diem, July 20, 1 9 5 7 , in VNIB (Aug. 12, 1 9 5 7 ) , pp. 2 - 3 . 213 Communiqué of the government of the republic of Vietnam, July 26, 1957, m The Problem of Reunification of Viet-Nam, pp. 3 4 - 3 6 . 214 For a sound analysis of Ho's motives in visiting India, see Krishnalal Shridharani, Amrita Bazar Patrika, Feb. 2, 1958. 215 H o told a press conference: "I and others may be revolutionaries, but we are disciples of Mahatma Gandhi, directly or indirectly—nothing more, nothing less." See Tribune, Feb. 8, 1958. 216 Shridharani, op. cit. 217 Asian Recorder (Feb. 2 2 - 2 8 , 1 9 5 8 ) , p. 1 9 1 9 . 218 Statesman, Feb. IJ, 1958. 219 At a press conference on February 7, H o Chi Minh was asked whether N o r t h Vietnam entered into military pacts because of the Geneva Agreements or because of fundamental faith in the policy of nonalignment. H o replied: "At the moment, the Geneva Agreement bars military alliances by Vietnam. W h a t my country would do later on, I cannot say now." See Hindu, Feb. 8, 1958. 220 in 1963 the D R V joined Communist China in refusing to sign the partial test ban treaty. 221 FA.R., IV (Feb, I 9 5 8 ) , 19. 222 H o Chi Minh at the civic reception at the Red Fort, Delhi, on February 6, 19J8. See Hindustan Times, Feb. 7, 1958. In a prepared statement read at a press conference on February 7, 1958, H o Chi Minh offered support for the granting of Algerian independence, and for the return of Goa to India, of West Irian to Indonesia, and of Formosa to China. See ibid., Feb. 8, 1958. H o mentioned the DRV's support to India on the Goa issue in almost every speech in India. 223 N e h r u - H o communiqué, February 13, 1958, in Foreign Policy of India, pp.

327^328.

224 Hindu, editorial, Feb. 7, 19J8. 225 Tribune, editorial, Feb. 8, 1958. 226 Hindusthan Standard, editorial, Feb. 15, 1958. 227 Tribune, Feb. 8, 1958. 228 Commander-in-chief of the People's Army of Vietnam to chairman, ICC Vietnam, August 21, 1956, in Great Britain, Foreign Office, Seventh Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (London, 19J7) (hereinafter cited as ICC Vietnam Seventh Report), p. 22. 229 Secretary of state for External Affairs of the republic of Vietnam to the chairman, ICC Vietnam, July 31, 1956, ibid., p. 21. 230 ICC Vietnam Sixth Report, p. 9. 231 ICC Vietnam to co-chairmen, September 14, 1956, ICC Vietnam Seventh Report, pp. 2 1 - 2 2 . 232 ibid., p. 8. 233 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Eighth Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (London, 1958) (hereinafter cited as ICC Vietnam Eighth Report), p. 6.

NOTES TO PP. 1 1 4 - 1 2 1

287

234 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Ninth Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (London, 1959) (hereinafter cited as ICC Vietnam Ninth Report), p. 7. 235 Ibid. 236 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Tenth Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (London, i960) (hereinafter cited as ICC Vietnam Tenth Report), p. 6. 237 Further Documents—Geneva Conference, p. 30. 238 ICC Vietnam Seventh Report, p. 9. 239 ICC Vietnam to co-chairmen, April 11, 1957, in ibid., pp. 29-30. 2« ¡bid. 2 « ICC Vietnam Eighth Report, p. 7; ICC Vietnam Ninth Report, p. 9. 242 ICC Vietnam Seventh Report, p. 10; ICC Vietnam Eighth Report, p. 7. 243 ICC Vietnam Sixth Report, p. 13. 244 ICC Vietnam Seventh Report, p. 11; ICC Vietnam Eighth Report, p. 8. 245 ICC Vietnam Sixth Report, p. 14; ICC Vietnam Seventh Report, pp. 10-11.

V. INDIA AND CAMBODIA, I 9 J 4 - I 9 5 8 1 2

H . C. Taussig, "Neutral Cambodia," Eastern World, IX (Sept., 1957), 32. Sihanouk's speeches at the Rashtrapati Bhavan banquets in New Delhi on March

18 and 2 1 , 1955. See Fji.R., 3

I ( M a r c h , 1 9 5 5 ) , pp. 5 0 - 5 1 .

The United States considered that, in view of Eden's assurance to Chou En-lai, that Cambodia would not join in any alliance with a Western power, a S E A T O membership to Cambodia would violate that undertaking. See Dulles' report to President Eisenhower in DS.B., X X X I (Nov. 29, 1954), 823. •»Text of S E A T O Treaty in George A. Modelski, SEATO: Six Studies (Melb o u r n e , 1962), pp. 289-293.

s DS.B., X X X I (Nov. 29, 1954), 882. 6 See Vice-President Garcia's three-point proposal at the Bangkok meeting in February, 1955, in Manila Times, Feb. 24, 1955. Most delegates, principally from the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand, favored positive commitment of American ground troops in the Southeast Asia region. Earlier, the Philippines had suggested establishment of an international air force for Southeast Asia. For details see Roger M. Smith, "The Philippines and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization," in Roger M. Smith and Mary F. Somers, Tuto Papers on Philippine Foreign Policy (Ithaca, i 9 6 0 ) , pp. 2 1 - 2 3 . 7

8

161. 9

Smith and Somers, op. cit., pp. 21—23. Nehru-Norodom communique, March 18, 1955, in Foreign Policy of India, p. George McTurnan Kahin, The Asian-African Conference (Ithaca, 1956), pp.

15, 2 1 . 10

A. Doak Barnett, "Asia and Africa in Session: Random Notes on the AsianAfrican Conference," American Universities Field Staff, III (May 18, 1955), 1-36. 11 Hindustan Times, April 3,1956; see also interview with Sihanouk in Le Monde, June 13, 1956. 12 DS.B., XXXII (May 30, 1955), 891; United States, State Department, Treaties and Other International Acts, Series 3240 (Washington, 1956). 13 Interview with Sihanouk in Le Monde, June 13, 1956. 14 United States, 82nd Congress, P i . 165, October 10, 1951 (as amended). 15 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Third Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia for the Period April 1 to July 28, (London, 1956) (hereinafter cited as ICC Cambodia Third Report), p. 12. 16 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Fourth Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia for the Period July 29, 1955

288

NOTES TO PP. I 2 2 - I 2 Ç

to September 30, 19$$ (London, 1956) (hereinafter cited as ICC Cambodia Fourth Report), p. 12. 17 Times of India, editorial, June 29, 19jj. 18 Ibid., editorial, Jan. 2, 1956. 19 Hindu, editorial, Jan. 12, 1956. 20 General V o Nguyen Giap to chairman, ICC, Cambodia, June 20, 1955, ICC Cambodia Third Report, pp. 17-19. 21 Text of communiqué in ibid., pp. 16-17; see also Le Cambodge, May 30, 19J5. 22 Lakshmi Menon, deputy minister for external affairs in Rajya Sabha on December 8, 19J5, F.A.R., I (Dec., 1955), 238. See also ICC's final resolution, passed on July 23, 19J5, in ICC Cambodia Third Report, pp. 5-6. 23 Foreign minister, Cambodia to chairman, ICC, June 17, 1955, ICC Cambodia Third Report, p. 7. 24 ICC Cambodia Fourth Report, p. 12. 25 Chairman ICC to foreign minister, Cambodia, July $, 1955, ICC Cambodia Third Report, p. 9. 26 Under an agreement signed in Paris on December 29, 1954, an interstate commission for the navigation of the Mekong was established and special docking facilities at Saigon were granted to Cambodia and Laos. 27 B[rian] C[rozier], "Indo-China: The Unfinished Struggle," World Today, XII (Dec., 19j6), 18. 28 Canadian commissioner's remarks, ICC Cambodia, Minutes, 79th meeting, April 20, 1956. 29 The cease-fire agreements on Laos and Vietnam were signed by the French military command. But since an independent Khmer military command had been allowed by the French since October, 19J3, the agreement on Cambodia was signed by the commander-in-chief of the Khmer army. 30 Interview with chairman of the ICC, G. Parthasarathi, in New Delhi, January 24, 1955, in Statesman, Jan. 2$, 1955. 31 Norodom Sihanouk in a press interview. See Australia, Department of External Affairs, Current Notes on International Affairs, 26 (Feb., 1955), 84. 32 Great Britain, Foreign Office, First Progress Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia for the Period Ending December 31,1 ¡>¡4 (London, 19J5) (hereinafter cited as ICC Cambodia First Report), p. 6. 33 Article 6 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia, Further Documents—Geneva Conference, p. 13. 34 For details see Donald Lancaster, The Emancipation of French Indochina (London, 1961), pp. 271-273. 35 In Laos too, India advocated an unequivocal reintegration of the dissident Pathet Lao into the national community. 36 Chairman ICC to minister of foreign affairs, Cambodia, September 29, 1954, ICC Cambodia First Report, pp. ¡0-11. 37 Every person above the age of eight in Cambodia had to carry some form of identity card without which he could have "neither voting rights nor even liberty of movement." See ibid., p. 7. 3S Ibid., pp. 10-11. 39 DS.B., XXXIII (July 11, 1955), jo. 40 Polish Delegate Katz-Suchy in United Nations, General Assembly, Ninth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 26th Meeting (November 12, 1954), pp. 1 x 1— 112. 41 ICC Cambodia First Report, p. 7. 42 Ibid., p. 17. 43 Ibid., p. 9. 44 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Second Progress Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia for the Period January t to March 31, 19$$ (London, 1955) (hereinafter cited as ICC Cambodia Second Report), pp. 31-33-

NOTES TO PP. 1 2 9 - 1 3 2

289

4 5 In 1952 King Norodom Sihanouk experienced difficulty with the Democratic party, whose leaders he suspected had collaborated with the exiled Son N g o c Thanh. On June 1 5 , 1952, the king dismissed the ministry and assumed premiership himself. H e also asked the assembly for emergency powers, undertaking to obtain complete independence within three years. O n the National Assembly's refusal to comply, he dissolved it on January 13, 1953. In February the king left Cambodia for a "crusade for independence." For details see Lancaster, op. cit., pp. 271— 273. T h e royal mission alluded to was the promise to achieve independence within three years. 4 6 T h e royal mandate was "an autocratic measure fully outside the Constitution." See David J. Steinberg, ed., Cambodia: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture ( N e w

H a v e n , 1 9 5 7 ) , p. 1 9 .

ICC Cambodia Second Report, p. 1 2 . ICC Cambodia First Report, p. 4 . 4 9 These demonstrations were apparently managed by the royal entourage, disturbed by the prospect of a Democratic party victory in the impending elections, perhaps without the king's knowledge. See Lancaster, op. cit., p. 335. 5 0 Official announcement quoted in ICC Cambodia Second Report, p. 1 3 . 51 Ibid., p. 1 4 . 5 2 Sihanouk's abdication broadcast of March 2, 1955, in ibid., pp. 3 7 - 3 8 . 53 Ibid., p. 38. 5 4 For details see Steinberg, op. cit., pp. 9 9 - 1 0 0 . 55 ICC Cambodia Second Report, p. 1 6 . 86 Ibid., p. 1 4 . 5 7 Canada, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, III, March 2 4 , 1 9 5 5 , p. 47

48

2340.

Hindustan Times, March 1 7 , 1955. For details of the various cases of alleged misuse of powers by the government, see ICC chairman to foreign minister, Cambodia, September 1, 19J5. ICC Cambodia Fourth Report, pp. 1 3 - 1 4 . 60 Ibid., p. 9 . 6 1 T o n That Thien, India and South-East Asia, 1947-1960 (Geneva, 1 9 6 3 ) , p. 200. 6 2 "Observed," not supervised. 63 ICC Cambodia Fourth Report, p. 7 . 64 For details of the reduction, see ICC Cambodia Fourth Report, pp. 2 4 - 2 5 ; Great Britain, Foreign Office, Fifth Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia for the Period October 1, 19$$ to December 31, 1956 (London, 1 9 5 7 ) (hereinafter cited as ICC Cambodia Fifth Report), p. 2 3 . Most of the dismissed personnel belonged to India, since she had the major responsibility both in the International Secretariat of the ICC as well as in its military components. See India, Lok Sabha, Debates, VII, i, Dec. 3, 1 9 5 J , col. 58

59

516.

Ibid., II, i, March 2 1 , 1956, col. 1270. Paragraph 4 of the Final Declaration, Further Documents—Geneva Conference, p. 9 . For the declaration of the Cambodian delegation, see ibid., p. 1 3 . 87 T h e Indian military personnel were reduced from twenty-six officers, 1 4 2 junior commissioned and noncommissioned officers, and fifteen noncombatants in 1954 to thirteen officers, ninety-five junior commissioned and noncommissioned officers, and nine noncombatants by November 1, 19J5. See India, Lok Sabha, Debates, VII, i, Dec. 3, 1955, col. 5 1 6 . 68 Indonesian Observer, Sept. I J , 1955. 69 Statesman, Sept. 1 4 , 1 9 5 5 . 7 0 T h e Democratic party polled only 2 per cent of the total vote. 7 1 India agreed to Burma's request that the latter be the first to recognize the People's Republic of China on December 1 6 , 1949. T h e following day, India announced similar recognition of China. See William C. Johnstone, Burma's Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass., 1 9 6 3 ) , pp. 5 2 - 5 8 ; K . M. Pannikar, In Two 65

66

290

NOTES TO PP. I32-135

Chinas (London 1955), p. 68. In late 1949 and early 1950, fourteen non-Communist states announced recognition of the People's Republic of China. China, however, established immediate formal diplomatic relations with only six: Burma, India, Indonesia, Switzerland, Sweden, and Denmark, delaying similar action on the other eight, which included Pakistan and Great Britain. See A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York, 1961), p. 92. 72 Times of India, May 22, 1956. 73 Prince Norodom Sihanouk, "Cambodia Neutral," Foreign Affairs, XXXVI ( J u l y , 1958), 582-583.

74 ICC Cambodia Fourth Report pp. 19-20, 59-61. 75 Foreign minister of Cambodia to chairman, ICC. August 20, 1955, ibid., 76 Pham Van Dong at the fifth session of the National Assembly of the

p. 18. DRV,

September 16, 1955, ICC Cambodia Fifth Report, p. 39. 77 The high command of the Popular Army of Vietnam to the chairman, ICC Cambodia, October 3, 1955, ibid., pp. 38-40. 78 Prince Sihanouk to chairman, ICC Cambodia, November 15, 1955, ibid., pp. 40-41.

79 In November, 1956, Japan announced a grant of i,yoo million yen for the construction of an agricultural experiment center and health research institute on the Kirirom Plateau in Cambodia. Steinberg, op. cit., p. 163. 80 ICC Cambodia Fourth Report, pp. 6-11. 81 Article 1 stated: "The Kingdom of Cambodia is a neutral country. It will abstain from any military or ideological alliance with foreign countries. It will not engage in any aggression against any foreign country." 82 For details see Roger M. Smith, Cambodia's Foreign Policy (Ithaca, 1965), pp. 91-93. According to Smith, there occurred around this time a change in the policy of the United States, which began efforts to woo Cambodia into SEATO. 83 Times (London), March 13, 1956; N.C.N A., April 27, 1956. On April 26 Sihanouk produced a photostat copy of the proposed speech, adding that because of his refusal to make a declaration as desired, he was singled out for attack by the Philippine officials. 84 According to H. C. Taussig (op. cit., p. 35) Sihanouk's address at the Philippines Congress was such a brilliant exposition of 'neutralism' that "some opposition members were too impressed for the liking of the government" and that "the late President Magsaysay therefore approached Sihanouk with a request to make at least a few remarks in favour of collective security and to play down the neutralist line." 85 N.CNA., Feb. 18, 1956, p. 171. 86 Ibid., Feb. 13, 1956, in Survey of Mainland China Press, No. 1230 (1956), PP- 37-3987 Text of the agreements of April 29, 1956, and June 21, 1956 in G. V. Ambekar and V. D. Divekar, Documents on China's Relations with South and South East Asia, 1949-1962 (Bombay, 1964), pp. 314-315. 88 Soviet-Cambodian Joint Statement, July 7, 1956, Soviet Union, Soviet News, July 9, 1956. The two states announced that they would exchange ambassadors. Cambodia accepted the Soviet gift of a hospital in Phnom Penh, and the Soviet Union accepted Sihanouk's invitation to visit Cambodia. 89 Le Monde, June 13, 1956. 90 It would be difficult to state exactly the extent of Nehru's influence on Sihanouk. In April, 1956, when Sihanouk was asked whether he was "dictated" by Nehru in shaping Cambodia's foreign policy, he replied: "I was certainly inspired by his policy but I was never dictated by him. Since he expounded a few principles in international relations which were bearing fruit in lessening international tension I have been following them." See Hindustan Times, April 3, 1956. 91 Times of Vietnam, March 10, 1956. 92 There are about 350,000 Chinese in Cambodia, largely in Phnom Penh. Most of the country's business and trade are controlled by them.

NOTES TO PP. I 3 6 - I 3 9

29I

9 3 Wilfred Burchett, "Report from Cambodia," New Times (Moscow), 21 (May 17, 1956), p. 2 j . 94 Times of Vietnam, March 10, 1956. ^N.CJNA., March 4, i 9 j 6 , p. 33. ICC Cambodia Fifth Report, p. 19. 9 7 Sihanouk at a press conference on April 2, 1956, in Hindustan Times, April 3, 1956. 98 Realités Cambodgiennes, March 17, 1956. 9 9 Sihanouk's broadcast of March 29, 1956, in N.C.NA., April 8, 1956, p. 86. 1 0 0 Referring to Cambodia's agreement with China, Pibul Songgram, premier of Thailand, declared that his country would not permit itself "to be lured by the so-called neutralism." T o show his firm intentions in that respect, he announced cancellation of his projected visit to India. See Times of Vietnam, March 17, 1956. 1 0 1 According to Economist, 179 (May 5, 1956), 485: "In a better atmosphere, the question would have been solved in five minutes round a table. In fact, it almost occasioned a breach in diplomatic relations." 102 Secretary Dulles to Nong Kimny, foreign minister of Cambodia, April 19, 1956, DJ5JB., XXXIV (April 30, 1956), 737. 103 Mainichi, May 12, iç;6. 104 Indian Affairs Record (June, 1956), p. 18. 1 0 5 Statement of Cambodia's ambassador to Thailand, N.C.NA., April 14, 1956, p. 158. 106 Times of India, editorial, March 27, 1956. 107 Ibid., April 3, i9j6. 108 Statesman, editorial, April 27, 1956. 1 0 9 Text of the draft resolution in ICC Cambodia Fifth Report, pp. 9-10. 1 1 0 Another proposal for the dissolution of the commission was made by Great Britain in 1958, when Cambodian relations with Thailand and South Vietnam deteriorated. 111 ICC Cambodia Fourth Report pp. 6-11. 112 Ibid., pp. 11-13; JCC Cambodia Fifth Report, p. 12. 113 Quoted by the Polish Commissioner from the Agence Khmere Presse, at the ICC's 80th meeting of May 2, 1956. See ICC Cambodia Fourth Report, p. 12. On January 12, 1957 the Fourth Congress of the People's Socialist Communist party, meeting in Phnom Penh, urged the commission to continue its work in Cambodia. Its resolution declared: "It is necessary to let the ICC to stay on in Cambodia. The Commission will be asked to serve the Kingdom of Cambodia and to inspect the borders." Sihanouk told the Congress: "The decisions of the Geneva Agreements have been realized in this country and we have decided to carry out firmly the policy of neutrality." See Asian Recorder (Feb. 9-1 J, 1957), p. 1293. 114 ICC Cambodia Fourth Report, p. 13. See also statement by Anil K. Chanda, deputy minister for external affairs in India, in Lok Sabha, Debates, II, i, March ï i , 1956, col. 1270. 1 1 5 In the Canadian House of Commons, Paul Martin stated that the continuation of the ICC in Cambodia would be desirable, particularly in the "light of the situation prevailing in South and North Vietnam." See Canada, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, XII, Nov. 26, 19J7, p. 1544. 1 1 6 For details, see Lawrence P. Briggs, "Aubaret and the Treaty of July 15, 1867 between France and Siam," Far Eastern Quarterly, VI (Feb., 1947), 122-138. 117 Lawrence P. Briggs, "The Treaty of March 23, 1907 between France and Siam and the Return of Battambang and Siem Reap to Cambodia," ibid., V (August, 1946), 439-4J4. 1 1 8 Japan mediated between France and Thailand, and a treaty was signed on March 11,1941, in Tokyo, by which Thailand secured the provinces of Battambang, Siem Reap, and parts of Kampong Thom and Stung Treng. 119 Roger Lévy, L'Indochine et ses Traités, 1946 (Paris, Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, 1947), pp. 82-87.

292 120

NOTES TO P P .

140-I44

Great Britain, Foreign Office, Sixth Interim Report of the International

Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia for the Period January 1,

19$7 to December 31, 1957 (London, 1958) (hereinafter cited as ICC Cambodia

Sixth Report), pp. 14-17. 121

See the minutes of the extraordinary meeting of the ICC of May 9, 1957, in

ibid., p. 38. 122 ¡bid., p. 44. 123 Ibid., pp. 45-46. 124 Ibid., p. 46. 125 Ibid., p. 47.

126 i t w a s t h e fi r s t time in the history of the commission in Cambodia that voting took place on any issue. 1 27 Ibid., pp. 49-52.

128 The relations between Cambodia and South Vietnam were unfriendly throughout 1957 and 1958. In 1958 the ICC received twenty-two complaints from the royal government of Cambodia concerning violations or threats of violation by the South Vietnamese forces. Great Britain, Foreign Office, Seventh Interim Report

of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia for the period January 1, to December 3/, 1958 (London, 1959) (hereinafter cited as ICC Cambodia Seventh Report), p. 2.

129 Foreign minister, Cambodia, to chairman, ICC, June 20, 1958, forwarding a copy of his letter to the representative of South Vietnam in Phnom Penh dated June 19, 1958, ibid., p. 27. 1 30 Foreign minister, Cambodia, to chairman, ICC, June 20, 1958, ibid., pp. 28-29. 131 Report of the chairman (Major-General Ghanshyam Singh) of his conversation with prime minister of Cambodia at a reception on June 20, 1958, ibid., pp.

111-122. 132 Ibid., p. 128. 133 ICC Cambodia Fifth Report, p. 19.

lsi lbid., p. 129. See also the statement of Sidney E. Smith, secretary of state for external affairs, in Canada, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, II July 1, 1958, p. 1794, and, VI, July 15, i960, p. 6378. 135

ICC Cambodia Seventh Report, p. 135.

136 See the minutes of the extraordinary meeting of the commission on June 24,

1958, in ibid., p. 131. 137 Ibid., pp. 136-137. 1asIbid., p. 138. 1 ™lbid., p. 139.

140 See the minutes of the sixth extraordinary meeting of the commission on July i i , 1958, in ibid., p. 142. 141 Report of the ad hoc team with evidence, in ibid., pp. 30-119.

142 Ibid., p. 19. 1 « Ibid., p. 20.

W4 Ibid., p. 42. On August 9, 1958, the royal government of Cambodia informed the ICC that it had decided to hand over the ninety former Vietminh prisoners to the ICC according to the Geneva Agreements. Foreign Ministry, Cambodia, to Chairman, ICC, August 9, 1958, ibid., p. 154. On September 29 the government reminded the ICC of its request of August 9, and on November 6, it suggested that the commission intervene with its sister organization in Vietnam so that the latter might communicate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DRV to arrange for the transfer of the prisoners. See ibid., p. 156.

" 5 Ibid., p. 42. 146 Ibid., p. 143. 147

See the minutes of the 150th meeting of the commission of July 23, 1958, in

ibid., p. 143. 148

See the minutes of the eighth extraordinary meeting of the ICC of July 28,

1958, in ibid., p. 147.

NOTES TO PP. 1 4 4 - 1 5 0 149

2

93

Ibid., p. 149. The majority and minority reports are in ibid., pp. 24-20. ™Ibid., p. 149. 151 Minutes of the eighth extraordinary meeting (adjourned) of the ICC of July 29, 1958, in ibid., p. 153. 152 Foreign Ministry, Cambodia, to the ICC, March 13, 1958, ibid., pp. 22-23. 153 Joint communiqué of Cambodia and Thailand, July 12, 1958, in Thailand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Relations between Thailand and Cambodia (Bangkok, n.d.), pp. 18-19. 154 Asian Recorder (Aug. 16-22, 1958), p. 2189. 155 Thailand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Relations between Thailand and Cambodia, pp. 5-6. 1S « Ibid., p. 6. 157 See Sihanouk's statement at the Calcutta airport in Hindu, Aug. 12, 1958. 158 Asian Recorder (Aug. 23-29, 1958), p. 2225. 159 Joint statement by Premier Chou En-lai and premier of Cambodia at Peking on August 24, 1958. See Peking Review, I, (Sept. 2, 1958), 15. 160 Embassy of Cambodia, Bangkok, to Foreign Ministry, Thailand, November 24, 1958. Thailand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Relations between Thailand and Cambodia, p. 26. 161 Ibid., p. 10. 162 ICC Cambodia Seventh Report, p. 23. 163 ICC Cambodia, Minutes, 157th meeting, December 10, 1958, ibid., pp. 23-24. 164 Ibid., pp. 46-47; see also majority report of India and Poland in ibid., p. jo. 165 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 166 For a general account of how China tried to supplant Indian influence among India's neighbors, particularly in Southeast Asia, see Werner Levi, "Indo-Chinese 'Cool War,'" Eastern World, XI (June, 1957), 12-14. 167 N.CJNA., June 23, 1956, p. 264. 168 Significantly, China began its aid program with grants to Nepal, Ceylon, and Cambodia, three small but strategically located non-Communist states of Asia. 169 A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York, 1961), p. 327. 170 Peking Review, I (Sept. 2, 1958), 14-ij. 171 India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Cambodia for the Year 1958 (New Delhi, i960) (hereinafter cited as Economic Report Cambodia 1958), p. 10. 172 India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Cambodia for the Year 1959 (New Delhi, i960) (hereinafter cited as Economic Report Cambodia 1959), p. 10. 173 An official statement in Rajya Sabha read: "The Government of Cambodia have been informed that the Prime Minister would like to visit Cambodia but he will be unable to do so in 1956 and it would be difficult to say now whether he can do so in 1957." See India, Rajya Sabha, Debates, X V , ii, Dec. 6, 1956, cols. 1755-1756. Nehru did not visit any country in Southeast Asia after 1955. 174 Hindu, Aug. 12, 1958. 175 Sihanouk met Nehru both in 1956 and in 1958 before visiting Peking. 178 Speech of the king of Cambodia on March 15, 1955, F«A.R., V (March, 1959), 39-40. 177 President Prasad at the farewell banquet in Phnom Penh on March 18, 1955, ibid., 40-41. 178 Hindu, Oct. 31, 1954. 179 India, Ministry of External Affairs, Report 1955-56 (New Delhi, 1956), p. 18. 180 Ibid., p. 33. 181 India, Ministry of External Affairs, Report 1956-57 (New Delhi, 1957), p. 20. 182 India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Cambodia for the Year 1951 (New Delhi, 1959) (hereinafter cited as Economic Report Cambodia 1957), p. 10. 183 ]bid., p. 9.

294

NOTES TO PP. 1 5 0 - 1 5 8

184 India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Cambodia for the Year 1958 (New Delhi, i960) (hereinafter cited as Economic Report Cambodia 1958), p. 9. 185 Economic Report Cambodia 1957, p. 7. is« Ibid., p. 8. 187

188

Barnett, op. cit., pp. 242-243.

Economic Report Cambodia 1958, p. 7. ™ Ibid., p. 10. 190 India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Cambodia for the Year 1959 (New Delhi, i960) (hereinafter cited as Economic Report Cambodia 1959), p. 11. 191 India, Ministry of External Affairs, Report 1956-57 (New Delhi, 1957), p. 19. 192 Ibid., p. 20. 193 Indian Council of Cultural Relations, Secretary's Report to the Annual Session of the General Assembly, February 14-ij, 1958 (New Delhi, 1958), p. 8. The other professorships financed by the council were at the Universities of Ankara, Istanbul and Teheran. Manmohan Ghosh wrote the History of Cambodia (Saigon, i960) while at the Buddhist University, Phnom Penh. 194 Indian Council of Cultural Relations, Secretary's Report to the Annual Session of the General Assembly, February 21-22, 1959 (New Delhi, 1959), p. 10. The only other scholarship was awarded to a student from Indonesia. 195 Cultural News from India, I (Jan., i960), 10. 196 G. Barraclough, Survey of International Affairs, 1956-58 (London, 1962), p. 271. VI. INDIA AND LAOS, I 9 J 4 - I 9 5 8 1

Further Documents—Geneva Conference, p. 154. During the debate on the president's address on February 25, 1955. See India's Foreign Policy, p. 67. 8 Further Documents—Geneva Conference, p. 9. 4 Ibid., p. 41. 5 Ibid., pp. 21-23. 6 Great Britain, Foreign Office, First Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos (London, 1955) (hereinafter cited as ICC Laos First Report), p. 76. 7 Vietminh troops were withdrawn from Laos, in accordance with the Geneva Agreements, by November 19, 1954. The D R V carried out the provisions largely because of pressure from China and the Soviet Union but partly because it hoped to succeed in its goal of the reunification of Vietnam through observance of the Geneva Agreements. 8 Under the Geneva Agreements, the two parties to the military settlement in Laos were the Franco-Laotian party and the Vietnamese People's Volunteers—the Pathet Lao. For the sake of clarity, the two sides are referred to here as the royal government of Laos (RGL) and the Pathet Lao (PL), respectively. 9 In March, 1953, the Vietminh launched an invasion of Laos, occupying the northern half of the country and threatening Luang Prabang itself. When they were compelled to withdraw because of French reinforcements, they passed the control over the northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua to their allies the Pathet Lao. Since then, the French had parachuted special commandos into the two provinces to recover control over the area. 10 See ICC Laos First Report, p. 9. 11 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 12 Ibid., p. 44. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid., p. 43. »Ibid. 2

NOTES TO PP. 1 5 9 - I 7 O

295

is V F V / P L delegation to the ICC, October 20, 1954, ibid., p. 70. «Ibid. 18 Jagan Nath Khosla (1906- ); educated at Srinagar, Lahore, London and Paris; Ph.D. (Econ) (London) ; barrister-at-law; editor, Indian Journal of Political Science, 194J-1948; Fellow of the Punjab University, 1947-1948; head, Consular Department, High Commission of India, London, 1948-1951; chargé d'affaires of the Indian Embassy, Rome, and concurrently at Belgrade, 1951-1952; head of the Historical Division, Ministry of External Affairs, 1953-1954; chairman, ICC Laos, 1954-1955; ambassador in Czechoslovakia and Rumania, 1955-1958; ambassador to Indonesia, 1958-1961; ambassador to Yugoslavia, 1961-1964; director, Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, 1964- . 19 Kingdom of Laos, Lao Presse, Nov. 4, 1954. 20 Ibid., Nov. 25, 1954. 21 ICC Laos First Report, p. 46. 22 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Second Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos (London, 1955) (hereinafter cited as ICC Laos Second Report), p. 9. 23Ibid. Ibid., p. 34. 25 Ibid., p. 13. 26 N.CJJ.A. (April 25, 1955), p. 5; Kingdom of Laos, Lao Presse April 26, 1955. 27 The map referred to was delivered to the V P V delegation by the French delegation in the Geneva negotiations in 1954. A copy of it was made available to the ICC by the prime minister of Laos on October 6, 1954, in support of the government's contention that its troops were in control of positions in Phong Saly and Sam Neua before the cease-fire on August 6,1954. 28 ICC Laos Second Report, p. 15. 29 ICC Laos Second Report, p. 14. 30 Ibid., p. 15. 31 Article 19 of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities in Laos reads: "The present Agreement shall apply to all the armed forces of either party. The armed forces of each party shall respect the territory under the military control of the other party, and shall not engage in hostile act against the other party. For the purpose of the present article the word 'territory' includes territorial waters and air space." [Emphasis added.] Further Documents—Geneva Conference, p. 23. 32 ICC Laos Second Report, p. 15. 33 N.CJfA. (April 25, 1955), p. 5. 34 The five principles, which were later designated Panchasheel, appeared first in the Sino-Indian agreement on trade between India and Tibet, dated April 29, 1954. See Foreign Policy of India, p. 104. 35 Letter from the prime minister of Laos to the chairman, ICC, May 13, 1955. Forwarding the text of the joint communiqué to the ICC, the prime minister asserted that the D R V premier had "expressly recognized that the Delegate of that Government [ D R V ] at Geneva was not qualified to have his signature to the agreement preceded by the mention 'For the Commander-in-Chief of the Fighting Units of Pathet Lao.' " He added that his declaration with Pham Van Dong at Bandung had made it clear that "the question of the fighting units is of an internal nature and that if it is the subject of a part of the agreement, this does not for this reason bestow the status of a 'party' on them." If this was the real intent at Bandung, the D R V premier refuted it: "At the Geneva Conference the Government of the Resistance Movement in Laos delegated . . . its powers to the Delegation of the D R V to discuss all the questions relating to the cessation of hostilities in Laos. . . . Hence, I did not say, nor could I have said, nor can I understand how Prime Minister Katay could have stated, that the D R V recognized that its delegate was not qualified to sign for the Commander-in-Chief of the FUPL." See Pham Van Dong to Chairman, ICC Laos, June 7, 1955. It is possible that in the altered context the D R V premier changed his interpretation of the Bandung joint declaration.

296

NOTES TO PP. 1 7 0 - 1 7 6

s® Full text of the resolution is in ICC Laos Second Report, p. 16. 37 Kingdom of Laos, Lao Presse April 28, 1955. 88 ICC Laos Second Report, p. 16. 39 Katay Sasorith to Chairman Khosla, urgent letter of May 27, 1955 in Kingdom of Laos, Presidency of the Royal Government, Application des Accords de Genève au Laos (Vientiane, 1955), pp. 10-11. 40 ICC Laos Second Report, p. 10. 41 Sen's contribution to the ICC Laos was later recognized by the president of India by the award of Padma Shri on January 26, 1956. The citation read in part: "Shri Sen, a member of the Indian Civil Service, was specially selected as Chairman of the International Commission for Laos and at the time he took over there were sharp differences of opinion between the Royal Laotian Government and the Pathet Lao authorities as regards the interpretation of the Geneva Agreement about Laos. By hard and persistent efforts, Shri Sen brought together the two parties and the situation in Laos to almost normal." Letter dated April 6, 1964 from V . J. Moore, Under-Secretary, President's Secretariat to the author. Sen was the only Indian appointee on the international commissions in Indochina to be so decorated. Other members of the Indian Foreign Service so honored were: N. R. Pillai, K. P. S. Menon, A. C. N. Nambiar, Apasaheb Pant, and Kewal Singh Chaudhury. Sen's work was praised by British Prime Minister Eden in a letter to Prime Minister Nehru. See Statesman, Aug. 31, 195 j. Further recognition came in May, 1961, when Sen was selected by the Indian government to head the reactivated Laos commission. Sen is now India's High Commissioner (ambassador) to Pakistan. 42 The talks were delayed by a week because the leader of the PL delegation, Phoumi, was unwell. Incidentally, he was being treated by the Polish doctor attached to the Polish delegation. 43 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Third Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos (London, 1957) (hereinafter cited as ICC Laos Third Report), p. 60. 44 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 45 Nehru-Katay joint communiqué; full text in Kingdom of Laos, Lao Presse, Oct. 3, 1955. 46 Ibid., Oct. 12,195J, and Oct. 21, 1955. 47 Joint statement, September 21, 19J5; full text in Fui.R., I (Sept., 1955), 193. 48 Kingdom of Laos, Lao Presse, Dec. 1, 1955. 49 Bernard B. Fall, "The International Relations of Laos," Pacific Affairs, X X X (March, 1957), 31. 50 Royal Government of Laos, Supplément au Memorandum du 13 Avril ¡¡isS (Vientiane, 1955), mimeo. 51 Quoted in Frank M. LeBar and Adrienne Suddard, Laos (New Haven, i960), pp. 149-1 jo. 52 FA.R., I (Sept., 1955), 193. 53 Telegram from Prince Souphanouvong to chairman, ICC., September 28, 1955. 54 Both the Canadian and the Polish commissioners acknowledged Sen's immense initiative, imagination, and industry in organizing the Rangoon meeting. 55 Joint communiqué, Rangoon, October 13, 1955; full text in Kingdom of Laos, Lao Presse (Oct. 14, 195j), p. 2. 56 Details in Appendix to Annexure I in ICC Laos Third Report, pp. 41-46. 87 Chairman, ICC Laos to prime minister of Laos and Prince Souphanouvong, personal and confidential letter, October 8, 1955; full text in ICC Laos Third Report, pp. 40-41. 58 Text of the agreement is in ibid., pp. 46-47. 59 For a summary of the Rangoon agreements, see ibid., p. 8. 60 Statesman, editorial, Oct. 17, 1955. 61 Royal Government of Laos to chairman, ICC, November 8, 1955. 62

Economist,

«3 Ibid.

176 (Oct. 15, 19JJ), 199.

NOTES TO PP. I 7 6 - I 7 8

297

Arthur Dommen, Conflict in Laos (New York, 1964), pp. 84-85. New York Times, Nov. 11, 19JJ. 6 6 For the royal government's position on elections, see Kingdom of Laos, Lao Presse, Nov. 10, 1955. 6 7 Prince Souphanouvong to co-chairmen, December 14, 1955. 68 Economist, 177 (Dec. 17, 1955), 1040; Dommen, op. cit., p. 82. 6 9 Prime Minister Katay Sasorith said in a press interview that the ICC's role was only to see that the elections were held according to the electoral law and democratic freedoms. See interview with Radio France-Asie in Kingdom of Laos, Lao Presse, Dec. 31, 1955. 7 0 The Polish delegate on the Laos commission contradicted the Communist position in Vietnam, where the D R V admitted the competence of the ICC to handle the political aspect of the Vietnamese problem, whereas the government of South Vietnam and the Canadian delegation on the ICC in Vietnam questioned such a competence. 71 ICC Laos Third Report, p. 9. 7 2 The Polish dissent was based on two points: first, since the commission had referred the problem of political settlement to the co-chairmen, the ICC's competence in this respect was doubtful; second, the Geneva Agreements did not specifically vest the ICC with any powers in a political settlement. Any approach to the problem by the commission should be in the nature of good offices, for which there must be a unanimous agreement among all three delegations. Chairman ICC to co-chairmen, February 15, 1956, ibid., p. 49. 73 ICC Laos Third Report, p. 51. 7 4 Prince Souphanouvong, in a letter to chairman, ICC, January 25, 1956, merely acknowledged the receipt of the ICC resolution of January 7. See ibid., p. 51. The ICC deemed it a refusal to comply with the resolution of January 7, and informed the Pathet Lao accordingly on February 15. See Kingdom of Laos, Lao Presse, March 16, 1956. 7 5 Chairman ICC to co-chairmen, February IJ, 1956, ICC Laos Third Report, 64

65

pp. 49-50.

7 6 Prince Souvanna Phouma was installed as premier after several efforts were made by Katay Sasorith to form a government. The latter could not get adequate support in the new National Assembly elected by the general elections of December 25, 1955. There was, consequently, a ministerial crisis beginning on February

14, 1956.

7 7 The change in the Pathet Lao attitude was perhaps caused by Soviet pressure on the D R V to observe the Geneva Agreements on Laos. See B[rian] C[rozier], "The International Situation in Indo-China," Pacific Affairs, X X I X (Dec., 1956),

317-318.

7 8 Kingdom of Laos, Lao Presse, Feb. 28,1956. Souvanna Phouma repeated his position on March 20, 1956, when he presented his cabinet to the assembly. See Times of Vietnam, March 31, 1956; Lao Presse, March 21, 1956; ICC Laos Third Report, PP- 52—537 9 Head of the Political Delegation of the Pathet Lao to the head of the Political Delegation of the royal government, March 30, 1956. It may be noted that Poland tabled a resolution welcoming the Pathet Lao initiative and commending the resolution of January 7, 1956, as a basis for an early resumption of discussions leading to a settlement. The same resolution had earlier been opposed by Poland and passed by a majority vote of India and Canada. 8 0 Prince Souphanouvong to Prince Souvanna, April 22, 1956; full text in ICC Laos Third Report, p. 54. 8 1 The reference was obviously to Communist China and the D R V . Later, the Pathet Lao insisted on recognition of an acceptance of economic aid from China as a precondition to a political settlement in Laos. 82 ICC Laos Third Report, p. 54. 83 Economist, 179 (June 2, 1956), 908-909.

298 84

NOTES TO PP. 1 7 8 - 1 8 2

Statesman, editorial, Aug. 11,19J6. Texts of the declarations of August j and August 10, içjô, are in ICC Laos Third Report, pp. 54, 57. The same principles were reiterated in a joint statement by Souvanna Phouma and Chou En-lai in Peking on August 2j, 1956. See Summary of World Broadcasts V (Aug. 30, 1956), 12-13. 89 Following the announcement of agreements, Prince Souvanna Phouma visited Peking and Hanoi to secure the agreement of China and the D R V to the political settlement in Laos. For details, see Sisouk Na Champassak, Storm over Laos (New York, 1961), pp. 41-50. Champassak was a member of the delegation. 87 Agreement "On the Question of Peace and Neutrality," ICC Laos Third Report, pp. 60-61. 88 Ibid., pp. 66-67. 89 Great Britain, Central Office of Information, Laos (London, 1963), p. 10. 90 E. H. S. S., "The Independent State of Laos," World Today, XIII (Oct., 1957). 43791 Prince Souvanna Phouma at a press conference on September 4, 1956. See Times of Vietnam (Sept. 8, 1956), p. 4. ICC Laos Third Report, p. 12. 93 Ibid., pp. 68-76. The modified electoral law met all the changes demanded by the Pathet Lao, including reducing the age of eligibility to vote to eighteen and granting the franchise to women. 94 Great Britain, Central Office of Information, Laos, p. 10. 95 Wilfred Burchett, "Laos Takes a New Path," New Times (Moscow), 9 (Feb. 28, 19Î7), 23. The author alleged that the United States was attempting to set up a rival government under Boun Oum. 96 G. Barraclough, Survey of International Affairs, 1956-5% (London, 1962), pp. 272-273. 97 United States, House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, United States Aid Operations in Laos: Hearings before the Foreign Operations and Monetary Affairs Sub-committee March 11-June 1, 1959, 86th Congress, ist sess. (Washington, 1959), p. 195. 98 Note from the United States government to the ambassador of Laos in Washington, April 16, 19J7, in DS£., X X X V I (May 13, 1957), 771-772. Great Britain and France handed identical notes to the Laotian ambassadors in London and Paris, respectively. "Spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the D R V on May 1, 1957. See VNIB (May 17, 19J7), p. 8. 100 ICC Laos Third Report, p. 20. 101 Ibid., p. 12. 102 ICC's resolution of May 16, 1957, Great Britain, Foreign Office, Fourth Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos (London, 1958) (hereinafter cited as ICC Laos Fourth Report), pp. 24-2 j. 103 ICC's resolution of July 15, 1957, in letter from ICC to the prime minister of Laos and head of the Pathet Lao delegation, July 16, 19J7, ICC Laos Third Report, p. 26. 104 Great Britain, Central Office of Information, Laos, p. 10. 105 Souvanna Phouma's investiture speech before the National Assembly of Laos, August 8, I9J7, ICC Laos Fourth Report, p. 46. 10« ¡bid., p. 4j. 107 Kingdom of Laos, La Constitution du Royaume du Laos (Vientiane, 1956), Article 19. 108 ICC Laos Fourth Report, p. 46. 109 Ibid., p. 49. no ibid., p. 46. 111 Prince Souphanouvong's statement of August 13, 1957, in the enclosure to the letter from the Political Delegation of the Pathet Lao forces to ICC, August 14, 1957, ibid., p. 54. 85

NOTES TO P P . 1 8 3 - 1 8 6 Ibid., pp. 57-59. Ibid., pp. J9-Ö2. 114 Ibid., pp. 63-67. us Ibid., p. 12. The actual official transfer of the administrative authority over Sam Neua and Phong Saly took place on December 8 and December 12, 1957, respectively. See ibid., p. 13. 116 Ibid., p. 20. 1 1 7 Telegram from the chairman, ICC Laos to co-chairmen, March 3, 1958, ibid., P- 74us President of the Neo Lao Hak Sat to the prime minister of Laos (copy to the ICC), May 19, 1958, ibid., p. 106. 11 9 Ibid., p. 67. The ICC Chairman asked for copies of the agreement as "it would be embarrassing and might cause difficulties for the International Commission to be able to formulate a position because of ignorance of the Government's action and intentions in the matter." See chairman, ICC to prime minister of Laos, November 13, 1957, ibid., p. 67. The royal government made copies of the document available the following day. See ibid., p. 12. 1 20 Prime minister of Laos to chairman ICC, November 26, 1957, ibid., pp. 70-71. 121 Souvanna Phouma at a press conference in Montreal on January 18, 1958. See Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Affairs, X (Feb., 1958), 56. 1 22 Prime minister of Laos to chairman, ICC, March 20, 1958, ICC Laos Fourth Report, p. 7 j . 1 2 3 Prince Souphanouvong to chairman, ICC, April 9, 1958. 1 2 4 Chairman ICC to prime minister of Laos, April 18, 1958. 125 f h e i a s t p a r t G f t he letter, in the original French, read: "II est essential de veiller à ce qu'aucun élément extérieur, étranger au jeu des Partis et des hommes en cause, ne vienne contribuer à l'aggraver inconsidérément. . . ." See prime minister of Laos to chairman, ICC, Aprü 23, 1958, ICC Laos Fourth Report, pp. 87-88. 1 2 6 ICC resolution of May 1, 1958, ibid., pp. 100-101. 1 2 7 Prime minister of Laos to chairman, ICC, May 6, 1958, ibid., p. 102. i 2 8 Prime minister of Laos to Prince Souphanouvong (copy to ICC), May 24, 1958, ibid., pp. 108-109. 129 f h e text of the Canadian resolution of May 8, 1958, and the Canadian ambassador's statement are in ibid., pp. m - 1 1 3 . 130 x h e Polish delegate refuted this point by pointing out that all three supervisory powers as well as the Geneva Conference powers had recognized the "sovereignty and independence of Laos." He pointed out also that the obligations undertaken by Laos at Geneva were as a government of a sovereign state. See ibid., p. 116. 13 1 Ibid., p. 113; see also the statement of Sidney E. Smith, secretary of state for external affairs (Canada) in Canada, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, II, June 11, 1958, pp. 1037-1038. 132 ICC Laos Fourth Report, p. 120. The prime minister of Laos repeated his request on May 31, 1958. See ibid., p. 121. 133 Such an argument had not been advanced by the Polish delegation when the question of the dissolution of the ICC in Cambodia was discussed by the ICC on April 20, 1956. On May 31, 1958, the prime minister of Laos undertook to honor the obligations assumed by his government at the Geneva Conference in 1954 not to enter a military alliance except in self-defense, not to permit establishment of foreign military bases, and not to request foreign aid in war material, personnel, or instructors. See prime minister of Laos to chairman, ICC, May 31, 1958, ICC Laos Fourth Report, p. 122. 1 3 4 Chairman, ICC to prime minister of Laos, November 29, 1957, ICC Laos Fourth Report, p. 71. The chairman stated that he was proceeding to India for consultations on the future of the ICC. Mrs. Lakshmi Menon, minister of state for external affairs said in Lok Sabha: "The attitude of the Government of India has always been that under the Geneva Agreement, the Laos Commission could not be finally dissolved independently of the progress of the political settlement in the 112 113

300

NOTES TO PP. 1 8 6 - 1 8 8

other two states of Indo-China, particularly Vietnam, without adversely affecting the peace in the whole of Indo-China." [Emphasis added.] See India, Lok Sabha, Debates, XVIII, August 11, IÇJ8, cols. 20-22. 135 Referred to in letter from co-chairmen to the government of India, January j 1, 1959; text in Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 600, Feb. 24, 1959, cols. 140-142. 136 ICC Laos Fourth Report, pp. 117-119. 137 Nehru's statement in Rajya Sabha on August 26, 1958. See F.A.R., I V (June, 1958), 156; see also India, Lok Sabha, Debates, XXVIII, April 2, 19J9, col. 9240. 138 ICC Laos Fourth Report, p. 119. 139 Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Ung-Van-Khiem, at a press conference in Hanoi on May JI, 1958, VNIB (June 20, 1958), p. 2. 140 Nehru's statement in India, Lok Sabha, Debates, XVIII, August 11, 1958, col. 22.

141

ICC Laos Fourth Report, p. 119. S. S. Ansari's statement in ibid., p. 118. Ibid., p. 24. 144 Paul Martin in Canada, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, III, July 2J, 1958, p. 2701. Nehru told Rajya Sabha on August 26, 1958: "I don't think it is a 100 per cent desirable decision but I do think broadly it meets the situation because their functions had almost not quite 100 per cent but almost ended and in theory, therefore, their functions continue though not in practice.... The letter of the law has been followed and in practice, no harm done." See F.A.R., IV (June, 1958), 156. The D R V also held that "the maintenance of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos was very necessary, even if the scope of its activities and the number of its personnel be reduced. . . . The still unstable situation in the Kingdom of Laos, as well as in Indo-China as a whole, requires that the International Commission in Laos continue its task of supervision and control." The DRV's statement of August 9, 1958, is in VNIB (Aug. 22, 1958), pp. 4-5. The DRV's motives in keeping the ICC for Laos in existence were, however, different from those of India. One of its chief interests was to maintain the machinery created by the Geneva Conference of 19J4 intact, for "if the Geneva Agreements continue to be whittled down, North Vietnam's chances of ever gaining control over the South, already greatly reduced, will be further impaired." See "When Is a Pact fulfilled?" Economist, March 7, 1959, pp. 859-860. 145 Article 39 of the agreement required a unanimous vote on any decision to reduce the activity of the Commission. Adjournment sine die did not legally constitute "reduction of activities." The D R V also protested on August 9, 1958, that the ICC's decision "does not conform with the present situation in Laos, and is contrary to the legal content of the Geneva Agreements on Indo-China. Moreover, while the question of the activities of the ICC in Laos is being discussed by the CoChairmen of the Geneva Conference, the decision to suspend the activities of the Commission has faced the two Co-Chairmen with a fait accompli." See VNIB (Aug. 142 143

22, 1958), pp. 4 - j . 146

Communiqué of the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, August 13, 1958, Asian Recorder (Sept. 20-26, 1958), p. 2250. In voting for the adjournment, the Canadian commissioner "had in mind that consultations would be necessary before any reconvening of the Commission and that, if this question arose, the Canadian Government would have regard for Laotian sovereignty." See Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Affairs, X (Sept., 1958), 221. 147 Nehru's statement in India, Lok Sabha, Debates, XVIII, Aug. 11, 1958, col. 22. 1 « Ibid., col. 21. 149 India, Ministry of External Affairs, Report 1958-59 (New Delhi, 1959), p. 24. 150 Secretary of state for external affairs in Canada, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, III, July 2J, 1958, pp. 2661-2662; Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Affairs, X (Aug., 1958), 182. 151 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, XXVIII, April 2, 19J9, col. 9240.

NOTES TO PP. 1 8 9 - 1 9 4

301

VII. THE SINO-INDIAN DISPUTE AND INDO-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS 1

Ton That Thien, India and South-East Asia (Geneva, 1963), p. 325. This is borne out by Nehru's visit to the United States in November, 1961; by his condemnation, though mild, of the Soviet resumption of testing bombs; and by deemphasis on anticolonialism at Belgrade. The abberration in this pro-West leaning was India's reaction to Western criticism on the Goa issue in December, 1961. 3 For details of these earlier incursions between 1954 and 1958, see India, Ministry of External Affairs, Notes and Memoranda and Letters and Agreements Signed between the Governments of India and China, 1954-1959 (New Delhi, 1959), pp. 1-32. 4 This argument has been well documented by G. S. Bhargava, The Battle of NEFA: The Undeclared War (Bombay, 1964), pp. 56-60, 70-74. 5 Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha, August 28, 1959, India's Foreign Policy, p. 328. 6 The Indian patrols were arrested on July 28, 1959 and released on August 18. See ibid. 7 See Nehru's long statement on Tibet in the Lok Sabha on April 27, 1959, ibid., pp. 319-326. It is pertinent to note that India is not a Buddhist country, although it was the land of Buddha's birth and activity. Burma and Ceylon, both predominantly Buddhist countries, however, did nothing to help Tibet. Ceylon even refused permission to the Dalai Lama to visit that country. 8 M. R. Masani's remarks in India, Lok Sabha, Debates, X X X V , Nov. 25, 1959, col. 1755. 9 India's Foreign Policy, p. 326. 10 India, Ministry of External Affairs, Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Governments of India and China: White Paper II (New Delhi, 1959), pp. 4J-46. 11 Pravda, Sept. 10, 1959. 12 Peking Review, 9 (March 1, 1963), 10. 13 Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-61 (London, 1961), p. 21; Arthur A. Cohen, The Communism of Mao Tse-tung (Chicago, 1964). Cohen (p. 125) maintains that the 1956 Congress announcements represented in many senses a compromise between the two Communist countries. 14 Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow (New York, 1964), p. 434. 15 According to Donald Zagoria, the Chinese pursued the peaceful coexistence line until the last quarter of 19J7, when in their opinion the technological breakthrough marked by the Soviet launching of the first intercontinental rocket and the first man-made earth satellite justified an aggressive posture by the Communist camp. Zagoria, op. cit., pp. 154-155, 160-165. 16 India, Ministry of External Affairs, Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Governments of India and China: White Paper III (New Delhi, i960), p. 46. 17 United Nations, General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Official Records, 803rd Meeting, September 22, 1959, p. 90. isF.AJR.,V (Sept., 1959), 212-213. 19 G. Barraclough, Survey of International Affairs, 1958-60 (London, 1964), p. 294. 20 Great Britain, House of Commons, Debates, Feb. 16, 1959, col. 7, and Feb. 23, 1959, cols. 112-113. 21 Burma and Indonesia, neutralists and members of the Bandung group, also did not support the D R V . See Philippe Devillers, "The Struggle for the Unification of Vietnam," China Quarterly, 9 (Jan.-Mar., 1962), 10. MF.A.R., V (March, 1959), 84-87. 23 Ibid., pp. 41-46. 24 Oliver E. Clubb, Jr., The United States and the Sino-Soviet Bloc in Southeast Asia (Washington, 1962), p. 31. 2

302 25

NOTES TO PP. 195-202 Russell H. Fifield, Southeast Asia in United States Policy (New York,

1963),

p. 206. 29

Republic of Vietnam, Office of the Presidency, White Paper I (Saigon, 19J9). For the significance of Le Duan's election, see Nguyen Ngoc Bich, "Vietnam: An Independent Viewpoint," China Quarterly, 9 (Jan.-Mar., 1962), 156-157. 28 Denis Warner, The Last Confucian (New York, 1963), p. 138. 29 For the text of the National Liberation Front's program, see Marvin Gettleman, Vietnam: History, Documents and Opinions on a Major World Crisis (New York, 27

I96J), p p . 2JJ-2SÓ. 30

De villers, op. cit., p. 31. Lacouture holds Diem's dictatorship responsible for the South Vietnamese war in the 1960's. See Jean Lacouture, Vietnam between Two Truces (New York, 1966), pp. 67-68. 31 On the basis of interviews with former detainees, P. J. Honey, "The Problem of Democracy in Vietnam," World Today, XVI (Feb., i960), 73, concluded: "The consensus of the opinions expressed by these people is that . . . the majority of the detainees are neither communists nor pro-communists." 32 Secretary Rusk stated in May, 1961, that three thousand civil officials had been murdered by the Vietcong during the preceding year. See DS.B., XLIV (May 22, 1961), 757. 33

Republic of Vietnam, Office of the Presidency, White Paper I (Saigon, 1959). ICC to co-chairmen, April 11, 1957, ICC Vietnam Seventh Report, pp. 29-30. ICC Vietnam Tenth Report, p. 13. 38 Devillers, op. cit., p. 14. The text of the law is reproduced from North Vietnamese sources in Gettleman, op. cit., pp. 256-262. 37 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Eleventh Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (London, 1961) (hereinafter cited as ICC Vietnam Eleventh Report), p. 9. 38 Ibid., p. io. 39 VNIB, (May 27, i960), pp. 20-22. 40 ICC Vietnam Sixth Report, p. 25. 41 For details, see Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution, The US. in Vietnam, 1946-66 (New York, 1966), p. 119. 42 ICC Vietnam Seventh Report, pp. 16-17. 43 Giap to Chairman, ICC, March 24, 1958, VNIB (April 11, 1958), pp. 2-5. 44 ICC Vietnam Seventh Report, p. 16. 45 ICC to republic of Vietnam, December 23, 1958, ICC Vietnam Ninth Report, p. 13. 46 ICC Vietnam Seventh Report, pp. 16-17. 47 ICC Vietnam Ninth Report, p. 13; ICC Vietnam Tenth Report, p. 19. 48 ICC Vietnam Eleventh Report, p. 18. 49 Ibid. 50 Giap to Ansari, April 16, i960, VNIB (April 29, i960), p. 10. On the same day the DRV's foreign minister appealed to the co-chairmen to intervene and stop the American introduction of additional military personnel into South Vietnam. See Telegram from Pham Von Dong to Andrei Gromyko and Selwyn Lloyd, April 16, i960, ibid., pp. 1 1 - 1 2 . « Ibid. 52 Pham Van Dong to Gromyko and Lloyd, June 24, i960, VNIB (July 20, i960), pp. 11-13. 83 ICC Vietnam Eleventh Report, p. 26. 84 VNIB (July I, i960), p. 6. ss Nhan Dan, June 10, i960. 86 See, for example, interview with N. Gopala Menon in Hanoi in Hindu, Oct. 34 35

20, i960. 57 58 89

Prem Bhatia, "India in the Asian Family," Times of India, Nov. 14, i960. In an interview with the correspondent of Hindu, Oct. 26, i960. Pham Van Dong to Nehru, July 20, i960, in Hindustan Times, July 20, i960.

NOTES TO PP. 2 0 3 - 2 0 9

303

" I n d i a and Canada held similar views in the ICC meeting on February 9, 1961. See ICC Vietnam Eleventh Report, p. 14. 61 Great Britain, Foreign Office, International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam: Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, June 2, 1962 (London, 1962) (hereinafter cited as ICC Vietnam Special Report), p. y. ™DJS£., X X X V (June 19, 1961), 956-957. 63 Most of these data have been used by the U.S. State Department in the compilation of A Threat to the Peace: North Vietnamese Effort to Conquer South Vietnam, Parts I and II (Washington, 1961). 64 Statesman, Nov. 8, 1961. 65 Nehru's televised interview with Adlai Stevenson in New York. See New York Times, Nov. 13, 1961. 66 For example, Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith's televised interview of November 13, 1961. See ibid., Nov. 14, 1961. 67 Hindu, Nov. i6, 1961. 88 Hindustan Times, Nov. 4, 1961. American interest in strengthening the ICC was indicated publicly by Dean Rusk, who called upon the ICC on November 17 to look into the "determined and ruthless campaign" by the Communists to overthrow the government of South Vietnam. See New York Times, Nov. 8, 1961. 69 Madame Nhu in an interview with S. Nihal Singh. See Statesman, Dec. 12, 1961; see also statement by Ngo Trong Hieu, minister for civil action, in Hindustan Times, Dec. 14, 1961. 70 Hindustan Times, editorial, Nov. 14, 1961. 71 Ibid., Nov. 16, 1961. 72 Statesman, Dec. 9, 1961. 73 ICC Vietnam Special Report, p. 6. 74 News from Vietnam (Washington), June 6, 1962. 75 New York Times, Dec. 7, 1961. 76 ICC Vietnam Special Report, p. 9. 77 Great Britain to Soviet Union, November 3, 1961; Soviet Union to Great Britain, January 10, 1962; Great Britain to Soviet Union, February 16, 1962. See Great Britain, House of Commons, Debates, 1961-1962, vol. 661, June 29, 1962, col. 173, and v. 652, Feb. 19, 1962, cols. 166-176. 78 North Vietnam and China made such a demand. See New York Times, Feb. 25, 1962.

79 Great Britain, House of Commons, Debates, 1961-1962, vol. 6j6, March 26, 1962, col. 836. 80 Times of India, June 8, 1962. 81 ICC Vietnam Special Report, p. 10. 82 Ibid., p. 7. 83 Ibid., p. 10. 84 Ibid., p. 8; see also Great Britain, House of Commons, Debates, 1961-1962, vol. 661, June 29, 1962, col. 173. 85 President Kennedy to President Diem, December 14, 1961, DSU., X X X V I I

Jan. i, 1962), 1 3 - 1 4 .

»«Ibid. 87 South Vietnamese government's statement in News from Vietnam (Washington), Aug. 9, 1962, pp. 3-4. 88 Nation quoted in Asian Recorder (July 23-29, 1962), pp. 4703-4704; Hindustan Times, June 10, 1962. 89 D R V consulate-general's bulletin dated June 8, 1962, referred to in India, Lok Sabha, Debates, v. j i , June 22, 1962, cols. 12412-12413. 90 Ibid., v. 4j, June i j , 1962, col. 10802. 91 Ibid., v. j i , June 22, 1962, cols. 12412-1241J. 92 Hindustan Times, Aug. 23, 1962. 93 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, VII, Aug. 22, 1962, cols. 3339-3340.

NOTES TO PP. 2 0 9 - 2 1 5 94 India, Ministry of External Affairs, External Publicity Division, India-China Border Problem (New Delhi, 1962), p. 11; S. P. Varma, Struggle for the Himalayas (New Delhi, 1965), p. 143. ™FA.R., VIII (Sept., 1962), 202.

VIII. THE INDIAN ROLE IN THE LAOTIAN CRISIS, I9J9-I962 I Of the twenty-one seats contested, the Neo Lao Hak Sat won nine; the leftist Santiphab party, led by Quinim Pholsena, won four seats. The latter advocated closer ties with Communist countries. 2 Sisouk Na Champassak, Storm over Laos (New York, 1961), p. 62. 3 Manifesto of the Laotian People's Rally, quoted in ibid., p. 63. 4 Ibid., pp. 63-64. See also C. MacD., "Laos and the Communists," World Today,

X V (Sept., 1959), 336.

5 S e e Denis Warner, The Last Confucian (New York, 1963), pp. 205-206; Economist, 191 (Jan. 24, 1959), 305. See also note 78, below. ® British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts (hereinafter cited as S.WJJ.), V (Aug. 21, I 9 J8). 7 See chap, iii, n. 4. 8 See chap, iii, n. 98. 9 Michael Field, "Laos Crisis: The Background," Hindusthan Standard, Sept. 30, '9J9-

1 0 S . W . B . , V ( F e b . 17, 1959), 25-26.

II Ibid. 12 Thao-tuan on behalf of the command of the Pathet Lao to the chairman, ICC, Laos, June 22, 1959, VNIB (Aug. 7, 1959), pp. 2-4. 13 Great Britain to the Soviet Union, June 9, 1959, Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 606, June 10, 1959, cols. 94-98. 14Times (London), Aug. 19, 1959. The special correspondent of the paper added: "To create an armed rising in the northern provinces it would not be necessary to send more than a courier or two from Hanoi carrying orders for leading communists in the provinces. Vietminh soldiers would be superfluous and dangerous." 15 Nehru's statement in India, Lok Sabha, Debates, XXVIII, April 2, 1959, cols. 9238-9241.

16 When the ICC for Laos adjourned in July, 1958, India and Poland nominated a member of their delegation to the ICC for Vietnam in Hanoi to serve concurrently on the ICC for Laos. Canada did not comply with this arrangement. In strict legality, the ICC for Laos thus existed in Hanoi and could be convened by the Indian chairman to meet anywhere at any time. When the Laos commission was revived in May, 1961, the government of India called its meeting in New Delhi. 17

Champassak, op. cit., pp. 62-66.

Great Britain to Soviet Union, note dated April 7, 1959; text in Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 606, June 8, 1959, cols. 69-70. 19 Co-chairmen to the government of India, January 31, 1959, text in ibid., 600, Feb. 24, 1959, cols. 140-142. A similar letter addressed to the chairman of the ICC for Laos was also delivered to the government of India. This admitted the existence of the Laos commission. 2 0 Nehru maintained that since the co-chairmen's letter of January 31, 1959, held the commission was adjourned, India as chairman could summon an ordinary meeting of the commission at any time without having to consult any party whatever. 2 1 See, particularly, letters from Pham Van Dong to Tara Singh Bai, chairman, ICC, Laos, in VNIB, Feb. 22, April 10, May 29, June 12, Aug. 22, 1959. 2 2 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, XXVII, March 16, 1959, cols. 6439-6440. 23 Ibid., XXVIII, April 2, 1959, col. 9240. 24 Ibid., cols. 9238-9241. 18

NOTES TO PP. 2 1 5 - 2 2 1 25 26

27 28 29

30 31

32

305

Ibid. Hindustan Times, June 1, 19J9.

Nehru to Diefenbaker, June 9, 1959, VN1B (June 26, 1 9 5 9 ) , p. 8. Nehru at a press conference on June 10, 1959. See Hindu, June 11, 1959. Ibid.

Paragraph 12 of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference of 1954.

Hindustan Times, A u g . 8, 1959.

United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 848th Meeting, Septem-

ber 7, 1959, pp. 1 4 - i j . 33 Ibid., p. 4. 34

Ibid., p. 17; Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Affairs, XI (Oct.,

1 9 5 9 ) , 329.

"A Brink in the Making," Economist, 192 (Aug. I J , 1 9 5 9 ) , 396. Nehru to Dag Hammarskjold, June 30, 1959, United Nations, General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Official Records, 8 2 3 r d Plenary Meeting, Oct. 6, 1959, p. 4 1 9 . 37FjÍ.R., V (Aug., 1 9 J 9 ) , 189. 3 8 Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Affairs, XI (Oct., 1 9 5 9 ) , 328. 3 9 See the special dispatch from the United Nations correspondent in Hindu, Aug. 9, 1959. 40 Times of India, Aug. 14, 1959. The proposal was dropped later since there was a lull in fighting. 35 36

41

42

Hindustan Times, A u g . 29, 1959.

Times of India, Aug. 12, 1959; Statesman, Aug. 14, 1959; India felt that the first task of any commission in Laos would be to report on the situation there, a task beyond the abilities of a single person. Hindusthan Standard, editorial, Aug. 14, 1959. There was no confirmation from any Indian official source of any such proposal. 43 Times of India, A u g . 11, 1959; Survey of International Affairs 1958-60, p. 289.

See note 42, above. An Indian External Affairs Ministry spokesman rejected the allegation against the Polish delegation as "completely false and mischievous," pointing out that the ICC had not met for a year and that no complaint had been received from the Laotian government against any official of the commission. See Hindustan Times, Aug. li, 1959. 44

45

46

47 48

Statesman, A u g . 14, 1959. India, Lok Sabha, Debates, XXXII, Aug. 11, 1959, cols. 1 4 3 4 - 1 4 3 9 .

Nehru to Hammarskjold, June 30, 1959. United Nations, General Assembly,

Fourteenth Session, Official Records, 8 2 3 r d plenary meeting, October 6, 1959, p. 419.

49

Ibid.

A political commentator has observed that the general trend after World W a r II is toward continuous negotiations, and that there are no final settlements like Versailles or Vienna in our times. See Brian Crozier, "South-East Asia," in Evan Luard, ed., The Cold War (New York, 1 9 6 4 ) , pp. 1 6 3 - 1 9 0 . 5 1 See note 47 above. 52 Hindu, editorial, Aug. 28, 1959. 53 Statesman, editorial, Aug. 4, 19J9. 50

54

Hindustan Times, editorial, A u g . 11, 1959. Times of India, editorial, A u g . 13, 1959. 56 Hindusthan Standard, editorial, A u g . 14, 1959. 5 7 United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, Fourteenth Year, ment for July-December, 19;$, p. 8 (Document No. S / 4 2 1 6 ) . 55

58 89

India, Lok Sabha, Debates, XXXV, Nov. 19, 1959, col. 595. Hindu, Sept. 12, 1959.

«o Ibid. 61

FA.R.,

V (Sept.

1959), 214.

Supple-

306 62

NOTES TO PP. 221-226

Hindu, editorial, Aug. 28, 1959. "Report of the Security Council Sub-Committee Established under Resolution of 7 September 1959," United Nations, Security Council, Official Records Fourteenth Year Supplement September-December 1959, pp. 33-34. 64 This was denied by Khamphan Panya, who said: "How could anyone conceive of Mr. Hammarskjoeld and Mr. Sananikone reaching any kind of separate agreement on the new trend to be given our country's politics when Mr. Sananikone himself had always insisted that I attend all meetings during the SecretaryGeneral's visit to Laos?" See Interview by Agence France Presse, quoted in Laos Information Bulletin, II (Feb.-March, i960), 2. 9"; a n d ICC, 52, 5 4 - j j , 60, 81, 250-257; and ICC Cambodia, 128, 138, 141—144, 147, 176; and ICC Laos, i j 3 , 1 5 8 - 1 6 1 , 164-166, 169, 1 7 1 - 1 7 2 , 176-177, 183, 185-187, 2 1 1 212, 218, 230, 239-240, 242; and ICC Vietnam, 83, 89, 91, 95, 98, 100-101, i n , 196-203, 206-208, 2 J I Pondicherry, 12, 18 Popular Socialist Community, 130-132 Portugal, 6, 57, 232 Potsdam Agreement, 8 - 9 Pracheachum (People's Party), 131, 178 Pradesh Congress Committees, 67 Prasad, Rajendra, 149, 194 Pravda, 233 Preah Vihear, 136,139 Punjab, 10 Qui Nhon, 91 Quynh Luu, 116 Radhakrishnan, S., 149 Rangoon, 69, 174-175 Rangoon Conference, 174-176 Rao, V . K . R . V., 14 Rattikone, O., 224 Reading, Lord, 100 Ritchie, S. A., 217 Riviera, 87 Robertson, Walter S., 34 Romulo, Carlos P., 72 Royal Laotian Government ( R L G ) , 152-157, 159, 1 6 1 - 1 6 2 , 165-168, 1 7 0 171, 173-175, 1 7 7 - 1 8 1 , 184-187, 210, 212-214, 2 1 7 - 2 1 9 , 221, 223, 230, 238, 255 Runn of Cutch, 58

Sahapak (Union Party), 127 Saigon, 9, 25, 55, 64, 75, 77-78, 80, 84-86, 93. 95, 97, I 0 ' . 106-107, 109, 130, 199, 203-205, 244-246, 251 St. Cyr, 30 Sainteny, Jean, 11 Salan, Raoul, 31 Samarakode, P., 12 Sambaur, Yem, 127 Sam Neua, 153-157, 159-163, 165-173, 176-179, 181, 183, 216, 256 Sam Pong, 140 Sananikone, Phoui, 63, 152, 211, 213-214, 221 Sandys, Duncan, 229 Sangkum Riyastr Niyum, 130-132 Sann, Son, 145-146 Sarafuddin, 17 Saravane, 156 Sasorith, Katay, 63, 70, 162, 166-168, 1 7 0 - 1 7 1 , 173-176, 180, 182 Saudi Arabia, 14 Savannakhet, 223-224 S E A T O , 33, 39, 43, 48, 52, 56, 59-60, 6 2 66, 68-69, 72, 85-86, 99, 108, 118, 134— '38, 145. !48> i 6 7 , " 8 , 231, 252 Sen, Samarendranath, 1 7 2 , 1 7 4 , 1 7 7 , 230 Shastri, Lai Bahadur, 242 Shridharani, Krishnalal, 109 SiemReap, 139,147 Sihanouk, Norodom, 62, 68-71, 117-120, 124-125, 12^-130, 132-138, 142, 1 4 5 146, 148-149, 151, 178, 227, 229, 236, 242, 244, 253, 259 Sikkim, 23 Simmons, Stuart, 237 Singapore, 7 Singh, Dinesh, 236 Singh, Ghanashyam, 143 Singh, S. Nihal, 238 Singkapo, 63, 156, 161, 214 Sjahir, 14 Somsanith, Tiao, 222 Songram, Pibul, 146 Sop Kin, 154 Sop Sang, 154 Souphanouvong, 63, 156, 158, 171, 1 7 4 175, 177-180, 182-184, 2 2 2 > 2 2 4 South Africa, 232, 245 South Korea, 110 South Vietnam: and article 14(c), 115116, 195-199; and Buddhist crisis, 244— 246; and Cambodia, 61, 107, 132, 134, and I 3^- I 49> 20 4> 2 44 - 2 45> 2 5 4 ~ 2 5 6 ; China, 149; and elections, 88, 90, 94,

INDEX 96-97, 99, 102-105, 110-111; and France, 83, 87, 93, 95-99, 101, 104, 148, 200, 244; and Geneva Agreements, 7 7 78, 85, 89-90, 93-94, 100-102, 104-105, IIO-III, 113-115, 202; and Great Britain, 95-96, 100, 102, 244; and India, 75116 passim, 140, 143, 194, 205-209; and ICC, 55, 77-116 passim, 195-203; and Laos, 176, 180, 210-231 passim; and Law 10/59, 197-198, 201-202; and proposal for Geneva Conference, 104; and reunification, 100, 103-105, IIO-III, 114; and S E A T O , 108; and Soviet Union, 102; and subversion, 176, 194— 198, 202-208, 210, 257-259; and United Nations, IIO-III; and United States, 61, 85-87, 89, 95-96, 113, 139, 167, 197210, 242, 244, 249; and Vietnam (North), 103, 175, 194-202 Souvanna Phouma, 156, 162, 178-186, 211, 222—228, 230, 238-242 Souvannavong, Bong, 182 Soviet Union: and Cambodia, 126, 135; and China, 4, 34, 103,189-192, 194, 204, 234, 237, 239, 259; and elections, 96, 102-103, 106, hi—112; and Geneva Conference, 5; and Geneva Conference Proposal, 98-101, 103, 175; and India, 3, 47, 67, 76, 89, 103, 189-192, 194, 229-230, 233, 245-246, 258-259; and Indochina, 32; and ICC Laos, 212; and ICC Vietnam, 95; and Laos, 194, 205, 217-218, 224, 227-230, 240; and North Vietnam, 103, 110-112, 189, 192, 204-206, 239; and reunification of Vietnam, 103, m - 1 1 2 ; and South Vietnam,

102,

IIO-III,

206;

and

United States, 4, 73, 192; and Vietnam, 21—22, 25, 31, 178; as co-chairman, 5, 54, 87, 92, 95-106, m - 1 1 6 , 128, 134, 137-138, 141, 143-144, 176178, 186, 194, 197, 201-202, 206-207, 212, 215, 218, 226-227, 23°> 2?8-239> 251-252, 256 Spain, 10 Stalin, 29, 31, 35, 248 Statesman, 219, 221 Stocks, A., 144 Stung Treng, 125, 142, 144-145 Subversion, 176, 194-198, 201-211, 236, 2 43. 2 57 - 2 59 Sukarno, 6, 17, 22 Suripno, 17 Svay Rieng, 140-142,147 Sweden, 133

335

Switzerland, 133, 180 Syria, I I O - I I I Taiwan, 34, 39,72-73, 136 Taxila, 8 Taylor, Maxwell, 204 Telangana, 17, 247 Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission ( T E R M ) , 199-201 Thach, Pham N g o c , 205 Thai Binh, 82 Thai, Nguyen, 109 Thai, V u Van, 109 Thailand, 7, 24, 38, 60, 70, 134, 136-140, H S - W * *49. 2«o. " 4 . " 4 . 23°» 2 4 2 . 244, 254-255 Thakhek, 156 Than Hoa, 82 Thanh, Son Ngoc, 118, 126, 136 The, Trinh Minh, 87 Thien, T o n That, 1,16,189 Tibet, 3, 4, 22-23, 29> 4 ' . 48> 2 57 Times (London), 36 Times of India, 69, 92, 94, 101, 104, 122, «37. 2I9> " i Times of Vietnam, 102,107 Tito, J. B., 66 T o n That Thien, 16, 189; and India and South-East Asia, 1 Tonkin, 8, 11, 83, 210; Gulf of Tonkin incident, 5 Trade with Cambodia, 150-151 Trade with South Vietnam, 109-110 Training Reorganization and Instruction Mission ( T R I M ) , 199 Tran V a n Chieu, 109 Tran V a n Do, 77 Travancore-Cochin, 17 Tribune, 112 Trung Gia, 80 Tumioja, Sakari, 221 Tunghing, 21 Tunisia, 220 Tyabji, B. F. H . B., 205 U Nu, 22, 59, 67-68, 74 U Thant, 244 United Nations Organization, 5, 13-15, 2 33. 39.4 I _ 4 2 . $7» 6 l . 77. 95. 1 0 7. '10. 120, 123, 132-133, 141, 147, 193, 211, 213-214,216-218, 220-221,225, 244—246 United States: and Cambodia, 61-62, 120-124, '32> '34-'37. !39. ' 5 ' . 1