In the Spirit of National Ideology. Organization of State Propaganda in Eastern and Southern Europe in the 1930s, Comparative Perspectives on Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria 9788670051195

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BOJAN SIMIĆ

IN THE SPIRIT OF NATIONAL IDEOLOGY

BOJAN SIMIĆ

IN THE SPIRIT OF NATIONAL IDEOLOGY ORGANIZATION OF STATE PROPAGANDA IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN EUROPE IN THE 1930s, COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON POLAND, YUGOSLAVIA AND BULGARIA

INSTITUT ZA NOVIJU ISTORIJU SRBIJE 2013.

INSTITUT ZA NOVIJU ISTORIJU SRBIJE Edition “Monografije” Book No. 90

For publisher Momčilo Mitrović, Ph.D.

Editorial board Olga Manojlović Pintar, Ph.D. Miroslav Perišić, Ph.D. Dragan Bogetić, Ph.D. Mira Radojević, Ph.D. Slobodan Selinić, Ph.D

Reviewers Zoran Janjetović, Ph.D Vladan Jovanović, Ph.D

English Editing Vanda Perović

Text Editing Mirjana Vujašević

ISBN 978-86-7005-119-5

The book is published with the support of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Chapter One: PROPAGANDA AND ORGANIZATION OF STATE PROPAGANDA IN EUROPE IN THE 1930s Propaganda – history of the term and modern scholarly definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Organization of state propaganda in Europe in the 1930s. . . . . . . . 28 Chapter Two: ORGANIZATION OF STATE PROPAGANDA IN POLAND, YUGOSLAVIA AND BULGARIA IN THE 1930s POLAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Council of Ministers (PRM). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Ministry of War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Camp of National Unity (OZN). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 YUGOSLAVIA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 BULGARIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Chapter Three: NEWS AGENCIES IN THE SERVICE OF STATE PROPAGANDA IN POLAND, YUGOSLAVIA AND BULGARIA IN THE 1930s News agencies in Europe in the 1930s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Establishment of news agencies in Poland, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and their early years. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 The structure and duties of agencies in the 1930s . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Comparative perspectives on the agencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

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Chapter Four: MEDIA IN THE SERVICE OF STATE PROPAGANDA IN POLAND, YUGOSLAVIA AND BULGARIA IN THE 1930s PRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 General situation of the press in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Press legislation and censorship in the three countries in 1930s. 136 Press in the service of state propaganda in the 1930s . . . . . . . . . . 145 RADIO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The foundation of radio networks in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jurisdiction over radio and radio legislation and organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Development of the radio in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the 1930s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Radio in the service of state propaganda in the 1930s. . . . . . . . . .

152 155 156 159 162

FILM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 General situation in the film industry in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 Film legislation and censorship in the three countries in the 1930s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Film in the service of state propaganda. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 REZIME NA SRPSKOM JEZIKU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Appendix 1 PROPAGANDA GUIDELINES FOR THE POLISH RADIO (1938). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 Appendix 2 ON THE ROAD OF RENEWAL: YUGOSLAVIA, YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW – MOVIE TRANSCRIPT. . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 Appendix 3 PLAN AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR FUTURE PROPAGANDA WORK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 ARCHIVAL SOURCES AND LITERATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 INDEX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 6

INTRODUCTION

Propaganda is a form of communication that has always been a part of human society, regardless of time and geographical space. Throughout history, people have tried to influence each other, especially in the struggle to win or maintain power. At the beginning of the twentieth century, these efforts have become more organized, centralized and coordinated. On the international level, the period of the 1930s represented a special chapter in the history of state propaganda due to the rise of Nazism and Fascism and their global influence. The historical development of six Eastern and Southern European countries in the interwar period: Poland, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece was somewhat similar. All of them started as parliamentary democracies and in time shifted towards authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes. Dealing with half a dozen countries at the same time is a difficult task for one historian due to an enormous amount of sources and literature, financial constraints and language varieties. The decision to choose Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria among the six, as case studies for comparison in this monograph was firstly based on their common Slavic origin, even more on the similarities of their interwar development, and finally based on the similarities of their state propaganda organizations. The interwar history of Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria is mostly unknown to the readers of other European countries, even to historians outside these countries. That history is fascinating, but somewhat complex. In this monograph, my aim is to explain how state propaganda was organized in Eastern and Southern Europe during this period, namely in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, to show: which institutions were involved, the roles of media and news agencies, the similarities and differences between the examined countries in the proposed area, the main objectives of the ruling classes’ propaganda, to determine the purposes behind it, to evaluate its influence on the modernization of societies and, finally, appraise what the result was. Comparative history deals with similarities and differences between historical phenomena like national states, regions, cultures and 7

economies. In comparative history, two or more historical phenomena are systematically studied for similarities and differences in order to contribute to their better description, explanation, and interpretation. Frequently, one looks into another culture, another country or another society in order to better understand one’s own.1 At this point it is important to establish a historical framework and shed light on the interwar history of the three states formed in the early twentieth century. Bulgaria was officially recognized as an independent state in 1908, while Poland regained its independence after the First World War. Yugoslavia was formed for the first time in 1918. These three countries can be considered as latecomers to European society being a product of a long-lasting struggle for the independence of the Slavic people who inhabited these territories and the fall of the Great Empires (Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Germany and Russia) after the First World War. The Bulgarian modern state was formed more than 500 years after the Turkish invasion of the Bulgarian medieval state. The idea of the unification of all Yugoslav peoples was an idea that originated among an influential group of intellectuals in the independent Serbian state and amongst the South Slavs from the Habsburg Empire (Serbs, Croats and Slovenians).2 After it had been occupied by the two great neighboring powers in the eighteenth century (Germany and Russia), Poland regained its independence. The three new states geographically occupied territories in the Eastern and Southern parts of Europe,3 and 1

2

3

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Some recent notable works in the field: HG. Haupt, J. Kocka (eds.), Comparative and Transnational History, Central European Approaches and New Perspectives, (New York/Oxford, 2010); D. Cohen, M. O’Connor (eds.), Comparison and History. Europe in Cross-National Perspective (London, 2004); Cf. B. Z. Kedar (ed.) Explorations in Comparative History (Jerusalem, 2009); C.Ragin The Comparative Method. Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1987); Uvod u komparativnu historiju [Introduction to Comparative History], (Zagreb, 2004). The meaning of the idea changed during time, but the unification of all Yugoslavs was officially declared in the late 1914 as one of the war goals set by the Serbian government. See: Dj. Stanković, Srbija i stvaranje Jugoslavije [Serbia and Formation of Yugoslavia], (Belgrade, 2009); D. Janković, Niška deklaracija, Nastajanje programa jugoslovenskog ujedinjenja [Nish declaration, The Creation of the Yugoslav Unification Program], Istorija XX veka, X (Belgrade, 1969), pp. 7–111; М. Екмечић, Ратни циљеви Србије 1914 [The War Goals of Serbia 1914], (Belgrade, 1990). In this study, I used geographical terms Eastern and Southern Europe as these were used at The United Nations Statistics Division’s Standard Country and Area Codes Classifications (M49). This division considers Poland and Bulgaria part of the Eastern and former Yugoslavia part of the Southern Europe. The division is geographical, which lacks any shifting political content.

these territories were inhabited (and still are) by a large number of nations, especially in comparison to Western Europe. The results of the First World War strongly shaped the present and future of the three countries. Poland and Yugoslavia benefited from the outcome of the War, while Bulgaria a defeated ally of the Central Powers was punished by a reduction of its national territory. Yugoslavia, and especially Poland, were established as a part of the cordon sanitaire between Germany and the Soviet Union, and the aim of the two countries was to maintain an established system. Their foreign policies in the interwar period were built on that assumption, and that goal influenced their policy, especially in the 1930s. These countries were considered to be “small fry” when the Versailles treaty was put together and it was the great powers that decided for them. Eventually they were greatly affected after the breakdown of this system. After the First World War Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were predominantly agricultural societies. This is true for the interwar period and for practically all the Eastern and Southern countries at the time (Czechoslovakia excluded). In 1918, that percentage was very high in Bulgaria where 80% of people were engaged in agriculture, in Yugoslavia, this figure was 75%, and in Poland, around 63%.4 At the end of the period under review, these numbers have slightly decreased. In all three countries under review, the transition process went from a parliamentary democracy (with all its faults) to a dictatorship and authoritarian system (with all its ‘”democratic elements”). The failure of democracy in these countries was not attributed to the World Economic Depression, like in Germany, but to the failure to implement democracy in these societies with authoritarian legacies and nonproductive political struggles (dictatorships in Poland and Yugoslavia were established before the global crisis between 1926 and 1929). Nevertheless, the dictatorships in these three states were not fascist, despite some fascist elements existing within the states.5 4 5

H. Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars 1918–1941, (New York, 1946), p. 75. Some notable works discussing the topic: D. Bunikowski, ‘Prawo hegemona w Polsce pilsudczykowskiej po 1935 roku’ [Right of the Hegemon in Pilsudskist Poland after 1935], in: M. Wolos, K. Kani, eds, Polska bez Marszałka: dylematy piłsudczyków po 1935 roku, (Torun, 2008), pp. 229–255; Н. Поппетров, ‘Авторитаризьм-фашизьм (кьм модела на политическото развитие на Бьлгария 1918–1944)’ [Authoritarianism-fascism (to the Model of Bulgaria’s Political Development 1918–1944), Исторически преглед 1997/2, pp. 25–48; П. Цветков, Н. Поппетров, ‘Кьм типологията на политическото развитие на Бьлгария през 30-те години’ [To the Typology of the Political Development of Bulgaria During the 1930s], Исторически преглед nr. 45, 2/1990, pp. 63–78; B.

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The political systems of all the three countries were greatly affected by corruption and inefficiency, caused by incompetence of political leaders and bad political legacy. The failure to establish true democracy was also a result of a pervasive apathy among the population and its inadequate education as well. Above-mentioned factors combined with the strong military and authoritarian legacy facilitated for the ruling elite to maintain order, often by using force and repression. The countries under review went through similar political changes in the interwar period. After the First World War, a parliamentary system was established, which was set up by both the Polish and Yugoslav constitutions in 1921 giving significant powers to the Parliament.6 The situation was similar in Bulgaria where the “Tarnovo” Constitution from nineteenth century remained in power.7 In Poland, parliamentary democracy lasted until 1926, when a ‘coup d’état’ led by Marshal Piłsudski was staged. He changed the government, appointing his friend, a scientist Mościcki as the new national President. Marshal held the chief position in the country, but he did not hold the presidency or the position of prime minister. He stayed “in charge” of the country until his death in 1935 officially serving as Minister of Military Affairs and General Inspector of the Armed Forces. After Piłsudski’s death, his comrades-in-arms ruled the country with the most important people, apart from the President Mościcki, being the new Marshal Rydz-Śmigły and Colonel Beck. This ruling group (together with other less important militarists) was known as the ‘Government of the Colonels’.8

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Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1988 [History of Jugoslavia 1918–1988], I, (Belgrade, 1988), 193–198; P. Marković, ‘Die Legitimierung der Diktatur in Jugoslawien und die Offentliche Meinung’ In: Autoritäre Regime in Ostmittel und Südosteuropa 1919–1944, ed. E. Oberlaender (Paderborn/Munich/Wien/Zurich, 2001), pp. 577–632; Dyktatury w Europie Srodkowo-Wschodniej 1918–1939 [Dictatorship in Central and Eastern Europe 1918–1939], Konferencja naukowa w Instytucije Historii Polskiej Akademii Nauk 2–3 XII 1971, (Wroclaw/Warsaw/ Cracow/Gdansk, 1973). Even during the 1920s parliamentary praxis in Yugoslavia was highly influenced by King Aleksandar. See: B. Gligorijević, Parlament i politicke stranke u Jugoslaviji 1919–1929 [Parliament and Political Parties in Yugoslavia 1919–1929], (Belgrade, 1979); B. Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1988 [History of Yugoslavia 1918–1988], I, (Belgrade, 1988), 132–175. The constitution was in effect from 1879 and, with the some changes made in 1893 and 1911, remained in effect until 1947. The “Tarnovo” constitution was finalized after the Berlin Congress in 1878 when Northern Bulgaria received autonomy within the Turkish Empire. About “Pilsudskists” see: W. Paruch, Myśl polyticzna obozu Piłsudczykowskiego 1926–1939 [The Political Thought of the Pilsudski Camp 1926–1939], (Lublin, 2005).

In Yugoslavia, the parliamentary praxis was interrupted in 1929 when King Aleksandar Karadjordjević suspended the parliamentary system. The governments that followed did not depend on the will of the people, but on the will of the ruler, which made the entire parliamentary model further removed from the earlier democratic practices in the country. With the death of King Aleksandar in 1934, party politics were revived, although the true parliamentary principles were not re-established. There was some disagreement in Bulgarian literature, on the length of parliamentarism in the country. The older generation of Bulgarian historians thought that 1923 was the year which announced “the end of parliamentary democracy” in Bulgaria.9 However, the change of government by force carried out by the military elite took place in 1934. This act, abolished the party and the parliamentary systems in Bulgaria. Next year parliamentary practices were re-established, though with significant limitations. The government of Georgi Kjoseivanov (1936– 1940), supported by “Tsar” Boris, led the country on a road to a nonparty system which meant the suppression of former political parties.10 One can conclude that the 1930s were a period of transition from semi-democratic to semi-authoritarian states for the three countries under review. Describing the political situation in the Eastern European countries (which included the Balkan ones), the historian Hugh Seton-Watson wrote in 1946: “Most of the political struggles of the Eastern European States during the last twenty years were fought between different small groups within narrow ruling classes, over the heads of the people. These struggles were no more than scrambles for power, for material advantages and for personal prestige between ambitious individuals and interested cliques”.11 9

В. Мигев, ‘Политическата система в Бьлгария от 9.юни 1923 г. до 9.септември 1944 г.’ [The Political System of Bulgaria From June 9, 1923, to September 9, 1944], Исторически преглед No. 46, 9/1990, (Sofia, 1990), pp. 77–90; Ф. Милкова, Бьлгарска буржоазна дьржава през периода на фашиската диктатура 1923–1944 [Bulgarian Bourgeois State During the Period of Fascistic Dictatorship 1923–1944], (Sofia, 1987). 10 И. Димитров, Бьлгарската демократична общественост, фашизамьт и войната 1935–1939 [Bulgarian Democratic Society, Fascism and War 1934–1939], (Sofia, 2000); П. Цветков, Н. Поппетров, ‘Кьм типологията на политическото развитие на Бьлгария през 30-те години’ [To the Тypology of the Political Development of Bulgaria During the 1930s], Исторически преглед, No. 45, 2/1990, pp. 63–78. 11 Seton-Watson, p. 256.

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This classification could be applied to the ‘democratic’ period of these states’ development and even more to the ‘authoritarian’ stage. Many of the struggles involved an enormous use of propaganda aimed at political opponents, both inside and outside the ruling circle. The 20th century was to be known for the vast growth in the power of mass communications. Many new forms of media were developed very quickly, and specialist publicity methods were used to develop propaganda into an outrageously “fine-art”. At the beginning of the First World War, national governments started to use massive propaganda campaigns for the first time. The Allied victory in 1918 was achieved by a skillful combination of military power, economic power and propaganda. In the aftermath of the First World War, there were some changes in propaganda organization. Some states even dissolved their propaganda ministries, which had operated during the war such as Britain, whose public had a “healthy” dislike for all forms of government propaganda. Different kind of changes took place when the Nazi Party came to power in Germany in 1933 as party propaganda played a key role in their foreign and domestic affairs. Joseph Goebbels believed that propaganda was to play a central role and therefore, the function of the newly formed Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda was to co-ordinate the political will of the nation with the aims of the Nazi state. Italy followed and founded the same Ministry in 1935 (firstly called the Ministry of Press and Propaganda and later, this was renamed the Ministry of Popular Culture). Other European countries, influenced or rather threatened by these examples, started to form similar institutions as well as give greater priority to those which had already existed. Historian Eric Carr wrote about this period: “In the totalitarian countries, radio, press, and film are state industries completely controlled by governments. In democratic countries, conditions vary, but everyone is heading towards more and more centralized control”.12 Foreign and domestic propaganda became one of the main preoccupations for most European countries at that time as state propaganda efforts, as well as budgets for propaganda purposes, increased during the period under review. The 1933 budget of the French Foreign Office sent to the Chamber of Deputies included an estimate of sums 12 E. Carr, Propaganda in International Politics, (Oxford, 1939), p. 9.

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to be spent by European countries on propaganda in 1933. They were (in French francs): Germany 256,000,000; Italy 119,000,000; France 71,000,000; Great Britain 69,000,000; Poland 26,000,000, Hungary 23,000,000; Czechoslovakia 13,000,000, Yugoslavia 13,000,000, Romania 7,000,000. In total the amounts spent by the aforementioned European countries were: 597 million French francs which were the equivalent of about 24 million US dollars or almost 5 million British pounds.13 The figures speak for themselves. This monograph is focused on the organizational models of state propaganda of Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the 1930s. As a part of this study it is important to highlight the similarities and differences in the organization of Eastern European states’ propaganda, the ways in which they influenced each other and the extensive use of elements of Nazi and Fascist propaganda. The wide use of radio technology in propaganda, the development of the leader cult and growing nationalism, were some of the propaganda motives and practices applied by Eastern and Southern European countries. State propaganda of most of the important European countries at the time, especially the totalitarian states (Germany, Italy, Soviet Union) is well-documented and analyzed in historiography. It is important to underscore the studies, which were completely or partly made, by using the comparative method (Eric Carr,14 Bytwerk Randall,15 Krachunova Daria,16 Welch Dаvid).17 These books were helpful for the reconstruction of this era. For Southern European countries, it is important to mention the study on the Metaxas regime (1936–1940) that very aptly covered the Greek state propaganda case during the 1930s.18 There are a lot of comprehensive Polish books, which partly or completely deal with state propaganda in the interwar period. Monographs “The System of State Propaganda of the Government in Poland 1926–1939” by Elżbieta Kaszuba19 and “Newspapers in the System of Government Propaganda in Poland 1926–1939” by Andrzej Notkows13 R. Desmond, The Press and World Affairs, (New York-London, 1937), p. 207. 14 E. Carr, Propaganda in International Politics, (Oxford, 1939). 15 R. Bytwerk, Bending Spines, The Propaganda of Nazi Germany and The German Democratic Republic, (East Lansing, 2004). 16 Д. Крачунова, Тоталитаризамьт – Власт и пропаганда 1917–1953 [Totalitarism – Power and Propaganda 1917–1953], (Sofia, 2002). 17 D. Welch, The Third Reich, Politics and Propaganda, (London, 2005). 18 M. Petrakis, The Metaxas Myth, Dictatorship and Propaganda in Greece, (London/New York, 2006). 19 E. Kaszuba, System propagandy państwa obozu rządzącego w Polsce w latach 1926–1939 [System of the State Propaganda in the Poland 1926–1939], (Toruń, 2004).

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ki20 are the most prominent, and these monographs served as an excellent starting point for further research and comparative analysis. Apart from these, there are several other authors whose publications deal with some propaganda aspects or the personality cult.21 When considering Balkan countries, this phenomenon is analyzed only generally and without detailed explanation. Literature from Serbia and Bulgaria deals with particular cases of state propaganda, and particular analyses is offered of some propaganda institutions and media development (Bjelica Mihailo,22 Dimitrov Veselin,23 Lažetic Predrag,24 Dragan Tešić,25 Petko Belokonski,26 Kiril Chukanov).27 These authors in their solid studies mostly did not use the comparative methods, avoiding to go beyond the reconstruction of the general framework of propaganda institutions and propaganda manifestation. This monograph examines, generally, state propaganda considered in terms of propaganda conducted by the most important officials of the state (president of the governments and government parties). The people who had most influence on political decisions in the period under the review were Marshal Rydz-Śmigły and President Mościcki in Poland; Prince Pavle in Yugoslavia and Prime Minister Stojadinović; in Bulgaria, King Boris and the Prime Minister Kjoseivanov. Others were not ignored, but their importance was noted according to their significance. 20 A. Notkowski, Prasa w systemie propagandy rządowej w Polsce 1926–1939, Studium Techniki władzy [The Press in the system of the State Propaganda in Poland 1926–1939], (Warsaw /Lodz, 1987). 21 M. Pietrzał, Reglamentacja wolności prasy w Polsce 1918–1939, [Regulation of the Freedom of the Press in Poland (1918–1939)], (Warsaw /Wiedza, 1963); H. Hein-Kircher, Kult Piłsudskiego i jego znaczenie dla państwa polskiego 1926– 1939, [The Cult of Pilsudski and his Importance for Polish Society 1926–1939], (Warsaw, 2008). 22 M. Bjelica, Srpski rat rečima 1844–2000 [Serbian War of Words 1844–2000], (Belgrade, 2003). 23 В. Димитров, История на радиото в Бьлгария [History of Radiophonia in Bulgaria], II, (Sofia, 1994). 24 P. Lažetić, ‘Milan Stojadinović i predizborna kampanja 1938’ [Milan Stojadinovic and propaganda for 1938’s elections], Zbornik Istorijskog muzeja Srbije, (1988), No. 25, pp. 117–139. 25 Д. Тешић, Југословенска радикална заједница у Србији 1935–1939 [Yugoslav Radical Union in Serbia 1935–1939], (Belgrade, 1997). 26 П. Белоконски, Истина по време на война, Пропагандата в Бьлгария през 1941–1944 [Truth about Wartime, Propaganda in Bulgaria 1941–1944], (Sofia, 2000). 27 К. Чуканов, Дирекцияа на Обнова (1934–1935). ‘Кьм началото на институтизацията на бьлгарската национална пропаганда’, [Beggining of Institutionalization of Bulgarian National Propaganda], Минало 3/2010, pp. 87–96.

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An important part of the dissertation was written using previously unexplored archival sources on state propaganda found in Serbian, Polish and Bulgarian archives. For the Yugoslav case, the most important archive was the Archives of Yugoslavia (Arhiv Jugoslavije – AJ). At that time, the state was highly centralized and all the working papers of governments and ministries were housed in this institution. Some important documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are missing because they were destroyed. However, the two most crucial sets of documents were found in Central Press Bureau section of the Archives of Yugoslavia, and those found under the section of Milan Stojadinović. The Central Press Bureau was an institution that served as the Ministry of Propaganda and the Milan Stojadinović section had documents from the period of Stojadinović government, who was Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1935 to 1939. The archives of the oldest cultural institution of modern Serbia, Matica Srpska, were also important for this study because it houses the personal papers of Milan Jovanović Stojimirović, who was a famous journalist and writer, publisher of the pro-government newspaper Samouprava and head of the state press agency Avala. Not only could his personal papers be found there, but also official documents of the government party and state agencies. Similar types of documents, part of the Stojimirović legacy, were found in the Historical Archive of City of Smederevo. As in the case of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria has an archive where all the most important government documents of the period, papers of ministries and state agencies are housed. It is the Central State Historical Archive (Централен Държавен исторически архив – CDA) in Sofia. However, only a small number of saved documents can be found in the archive of state news agency section (Бьлгарска Телеграфна Агенция, BTA) that made the reconstruction of the history of BTA very difficult. In the case of Poland, documents relating to the government are located in the Archives of Modern Documents (Archiwum Akt Nowych) in Warsaw. These include ministerial records, papers of the government party “the Camp of National Unity” – OZN and the state press agency (PAT). The Press Department of the Foreign Ministry was the most important source for this study. Some useful documents were found in the personal section relating to the second Polish Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły and it was interesting to see the development of his cult as a successor to Piłsudski. 15

Contrary to the cases of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the most typical documents relating to state propaganda in Poland are located in the Central Military Archive (Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe – CAW) because the army played a crucial role in the country throughout the period between the First and Second World Wars. Major official propaganda campaigns were created and carried out directly by the military authorities or by their prominent participation. These documents showed the organizational charts of the propaganda departments, the methods of influence and the efforts used to coordinate all the organizations of propaganda by the military. This monograph is organized into four chapters. The first chapter entitled “Propaganda and Organization of State Propaganda in Europe During the 1930s”, discusses state propaganda organizations in Europe of this period, both totalitarian (Germany, Italy and Soviet Union) and democratic (Great Britain and France). Special attention is given to the neighboring countries with similar regimes such as Hungary, Romania and Greece and others similar in size and internal organization. This part lacks primary sources for several countries but nevertheless the reader is provided with the basic information about the organizations and their propaganda functions. The second part of the study “Organization of State Propaganda in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the 1930s” mostly covers the structural organization of state propaganda in three countries and its manifestation in the political aspect of the development of the state where it deals with the central propaganda institutions. In this part of the dissertation, the organization, financing, personnel structure, influence and specific manners of these institutions are all explained in detail. The third part of the monograph, discusses the role of the news agencies PAT in Poland, Avala in Yugoslavia and BTA in Bulgaria with explanations regarding their establishment, their connection with the state and governments as well as their structure and role in state propaganda. The final section of the study analyzes “Media in the Service of State Propaganda”, the role of media in the increasing use of state propaganda. The accent is on pro-government newspapers, radio and cinema and a comparative perspective is imposed on legislation, technical development, and organizational changes. The role that media played in politics and public life of the three countries was of great importance in understanding the structural changes in the period under review. Special attention is focused upon their structural similarities, level of correlation and cooperation, common elements and patterns of their 16

work. The conclusion is followed by a summary in the Serbian language as the book is published in Serbia. Finally, three translated documents are presented, one for each country. The first appendix pertains to radio propaganda in Poland, the second is a transcript of a propaganda film made in Yugoslavia in 1938 and the third discusses the organization of practical propaganda in Bulgaria. These documents, which are published in English for the first time, represent a significant and valid illustration of the propaganda conducted at that period. As previously noted by other historians, an evaluation of the impact of the most authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, proved a difficult task due to censorship, the lack of public opinion surveys and other important, sometimes even basic sources. Some other documents, like foreign services reports could partly help to resolve that issue. The main aim of this monograph is, primarily, to show how propaganda organizations in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were organized in the 1930s and which institutions and organizations were involved. Hopefully, the following chapters will fulfill these aspirations.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This monograph is based on the PhD dissertation defended on 13 September 2011 at Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa (SNS). It is true to say that the research project on the organization of state propaganda in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria would not have been possible without the institutional help and funding received from SNS. The PhD program of this institution is an excellent opportunity for all young researchers from all over the world, and I was fortunate enough to be part of it. Foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Professor Daniele Menozzi for his support and help throughout the three years of the PhD program. I have greatly benefited from the help and advice of many professors, colleagues and friends who have made many insightful comments on my work and who have helped me in gathering information on the topic. I am indebted to: Professor Ljubodrag Dimić from the University of Belgrade, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt from the European University Institute, Professors Biljana Šimunović Bešlin and Branko Bešlin from the University of Novi Sad, Professor Karl Kaser from the University of Graz, Aleksandar R Miletić, Zoran Janjetović and Vladan Jovanović (Institute for Recent History of Serbia), Miša Djurković from Institute for European Studies from Belgrade, Nikolay Poppetrov and Voin Bojinov (Institute for Historical Studies from Sofia), Hristo Saldzhiev (Trakia University from Stara Zagora), Kiril Chukanov and fellow historians from SNS PhD program, Carlo Baja Guarienti and Martino Patti. I would also like to thank director Momčilo Mitrović and my colleagues from the Institute for Recent History of Serbia for their help in the final stages of writing this monograph. The research project and the resulting study would not have been realized without the useful information and help that I received from the archivists and staff of many archives in Poland (Archives of Modern Documents, Central Military Archives), Serbia (Archive of Yugoslavia, Manuscript Department of Matica Srpska, Historical Archive of City of Smederevo, Archive of Vojvodina) and Bulgaria (Central 19

State Historical Archive, State Military-Historical Archive, Archive of Bulgarian Telegraph Agency) as well as Italy (Central State Archive). I extend my sincere appreciation to them who have unselfishly shared their information and knowledge of sources and made this research easier on numerous occasions. Special thanks go to Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of Republic of Serbia who generously agreed to finance this monograph. Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my parents Velimir and Piva Simić and numerous friends for their moral support while working on the monograph. This book is dedicated to all of them who have generously contributed to the success of my research.

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Chapter One: PROPAGANDA AND ORGANIZATION OF STATE PROPAGANDA IN EUROPE IN THE 1930s PROPAGANDA – HISTORY OF THE TERM AND MODERN SCHOLARLY DEFINITIONS At the beginning of this chapter, it is important to say something about the use and meaning of the term propaganda throughout history and in the present day. In general, propaganda does not have any positive or negative connotations. It merely exists, not only in the modern period, but it has existed since the beginning of organized human society. It exists regardless of time or geographic location and it only pertains to human communication. The use of propaganda practically began at a time when humans started to communicate to each other. In simple terms, propaganda can be defined as the spreading of ideas designed to persuade people to think and behave in a desired way. What distinguishes propaganda from other processes of persuasion is the question of intent. Propaganda is similar to education. The crucial difference is that education teaches people how to think and propaganda tells people what to think. Propaganda uses communication to spread a message that is designed to serve the self-interests of the person or persons who have initiated the dissemination of the message and the success of propaganda is measured by comparing the outcome with the original intention of that person or persons. Based on past experience, the most successful propaganda is the one that preaches to the already converted. In the beginning, propaganda was based on face to face communication, but in modern times, a third party is involved and this involves the widespread use of various media such as the press, radio, television etc. that mediate in the communication process between the sender and recipient of any propaganda messages. This form of propaganda can also deliberately deliver partial information that can be either misleading or can purposely withhold certain information. The control of the flow of information is very important for the propagandist and throughout history, censorship has often been used. In the struggle for power, propaganda is the 21

weapon for those who want to retain their positions in power and for those who want to replace them.28 The term propaganda comes from the Latin word propagare, which means to spread. It is a well accepted fact that the term was coined in 1622 when Pope Gregory XV, frightened by the global spread of Protestantism, formed the Office for the Propagation of the Faith (Congregatio de propaganda fide) to supervise the missionary efforts of the Church in the “New World” and elsewhere. The Pope wrote: “It is to be desired that, especially inspired by divine grace, they should cease to wander, amidst heresies through the unhappy pastures of infidelity, drinking deadly and poisonous water. However, they should be placed in the pasture of the true faith that they may be gathered together in a saving doctrine, and be led to the springs of the waters of life”.29 The word remained closely linked to the Catholic Church well into XIX century. However, there are scholars that claim that the term propaganda lost its neutrality at the very beginning because the society that was formed under its name was in conflict between the Catholic and Protestant church.30 One encyclopedia offers a chronology of the development of propaganda that places its roots in the V and IV century BC with the use of Plato’s books to exert influence on Greek towns.31 Literature on propaganda is vast and the term propaganda has been defined in numerous ways in scholarly literature.32 In the XX century, the number of definitions grew to such an enormous number that its collection would take several years’ work and even nowadays, there is no uniform definition of propaganda. Many of them are partial, limited by the political, psychological or sociological aspect of the problem and it is difficult to add something new in the theoretical analysis of 28 Inspiring introduction on propaganda, psychological warfare and persuasion see in: P. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day (Oxford, 2003), pp. 1–16. 29 Quoted from: E. Bernays, Propaganda (New York, 2005), p. 10. The Latin text of Gregory’s bull is included in Magnum bullarium Romanum: bullarum, privilegiorum ac diplomatum Romanorum Ponfificum amplissima collection (Graz, Austria: Akademische Drucku. Verlagsanstalt, 1964–1966). It is available online at the Notre Dame Archives, http://classic.archives.nd.edu/bull.htm. 30 J. Garth, V. O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (Newbery Park/London/ New Delhi, 1992), p. 2. 31 International Encyclopedia of Propaganda (Chicago, 2001), p. 608. 32 At the end of dissertation, some notable titles in the field can be found in the list of references.

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propaganda that has not already been written. Thus, I will shed light on some authors and their theories that are the most interesting and influential in the modern era and these will be highlighted in order to illustrate their scope and direction in the development of propaganda. In the 1920s, Edward Bernays defined propaganda as a consistent, enduring effort to create or shape events to influence the relations of the public to an enterprise, idea or group.33 Bernays saw himself as a “propagandist for propaganda” and thought of it as a modern instrument by which “we can fight for productive ends to bring order out of chaos”.34 Contrary to Berneys, there are more authors that view propaganda as a negative concept. In the 1950s, Jacques Driencourt said: “Everything is propaganda” (“Tout est Propagande”).35 This tempting, but unsatisfactory, explanation could be used by some as an excuse for not studying this phenomenon further. One of the most important books in the 1960s was Jacques Ellul’s Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes as he saw propaganda more as a technique than a science. His definition is: “Propaganda is a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated into an organization”.36 Ellul saw propaganda as negative and manipulative and also stated that only successful propaganda can be considered to be real propaganda. In recent years, the number of definitions has multiplied. The propaganda historian David Welch offered a solid chronological survey of the development of the term, as well as dozens of existing definitions. According to him, propaganda is: “Deliberate attempt to influence the opinions of an audience through the transmission of ideas and values for the specific purpose, consciously designed to serve the interest of the propagandist and their political masters, either directly or indirectly”.37 33 Bernays, Propaganda, p. 52. 34 Ibid, p. 168. 35 J. Driencourt, La Propagande nouvelle force polituque [The Propaganda New Political Force], (Paris, 1950), pp. 18 and 26. 36 J. Ellul, Propaganda, The Formation of Men’s Attitudes (New York, 1973), p. 61. The first edition of the book was in French in 1965. 37 N. Cull, D. Culbert, D. Welch, Propaganda and Mass Persuasion, A Historical

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This definition is satisfactory and it will be used as a basis for future references. However, it is important to stress that a “deliberate attempt to influence the opinions of an audience” is true for both giving and withholding information. In general terms, propaganda consists of six elements that comprise the whole and only when considered as a whole can a complete picture be seen. • The Subject of propaganda; • Propaganda message; • Propaganda object; • Media that transmits the propaganda; • Conditions in which the propaganda is conducted; • Consequences of propaganda work. Political propaganda is the instrument of politics and it is made by politicians while professional propagandists only carry it out. The subject of propaganda is the one who decides to initiate propaganda activity and that subject can be an institution, organization, group or individual. This study, will be focusing on state propaganda in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria where the subjects of propaganda were representatives of the state such as kings, marshals, presidents, prime ministers, ministers and chiefs of propaganda institutions. The message is one of the crucial aspects of successful propaganda as it is transmitted by the subject and has to fulfill some conditions if it is to be successful. The most important of these conditions are: to be reachable, attractive, clear, interesting and convincing to the recipients of such messages. Every one of above mentioned conditions must be met, otherwise the propaganda activity could easily pass unnoticed and be rejected. Only if a balance is achieved among the mentioned elements can the propaganda goals set by the subject be achieved. Objects of propaganda are groups or individuals targeted by the propagandist’s message. Even in the early years of propaganda usage, one of the main tasks of the subject of propaganda was to better understand the behavior of its object as human behavior is complex and not always easy to understand. Its study remains an open task for both the propagandist and scientist as the hypothesis must always be tested Encyclopedia, 1500 to present, (Santa Barbara/Denver/Oxford, 2003), pp. 317– 323.

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and retested, and adjustments must be constantly made and relearned. In general, a constant revaluation of what we already know about the topic is the only road to successful propaganda. An analysis of propaganda requires an understanding of the communication media as they are generally the connection between the propagandist and propagandee. With the appropriate media, the subject of propaganda can reach many targets (objects of propaganda) at the same time as this number rises along with the development of modern technology. The greatest emphasis in this dissertaion will be placed upon newspapers, the most diverse at the period, the radio, and the motion picture because this is the media that reached the largest numbers of people. The media of sight and sound is the most effective of above-mentioned media, but during the 1930s, one could only talk about film since television was not yet sufficiently developed. The conditions in which propaganda activity is conducted cannot be overlooked. To better understand the impact of propaganda, one must know the specific situation in the society or group linked to the propaganda, the historical heritage of the people and area as well as the overall social, politic, economic and cultural environment. Germany in the 1930s is good example since Nazi propaganda was very successful at that time while similar campaigns conducted only ten years earlier were rejected and seemed somewhat ridiculous.38 Propaganda can be divided and classified in numerous ways. One of the most popular classifications deals with the source of propaganda as it can be black, gray and white. “Black” propaganda (sometimes referred as covert propaganda) tries to conceal its own identity by purporting to emanate from someone or somewhere other than the true source. If “black” propaganda is to be successful, it is very important that attention is paid to the message as that message should be well adjusted to the objects of propaganda such as beliefs, cultural, social and political experiences. Examples of “black” propaganda are various, especially in war conditions, e.g. Nazi radio broadcasts during the Battle for Britain or the war against France in 1939/40.39 On the other hand, propaganda can be honest and open and in this instance, we speak about “white” propaganda. The formation of the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda in Germany in 1933 is a clear example. The minister Joseph Goebbels openly de38 I. Kershaw, Hitler, I, (Belgrade, 2003), pp. 17–30. 39 For examples see: D.Welch, Black Propaganda in: Propaganda and Mass Persuasion, A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present (Santa Barbara/Denver/ Oxford, 2003), pp. 41–43.

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clared that the responsibility of the new ministry was to be “the mobilization of mind and spirit in Germany”.40 In this case, the source was well known, its intentions were well known and the public knew that an attempt to influence its opinion was going to be made. The “white” propaganda message was created with the intention to convince people in the sincerity of the regime and their ideology. “Gray” propaganda is somewhere in-between “black” and “white” propaganda. The subject of propaganda is not formally presented, but its identity can be assumed. This type of propaganda is usually used to cause confusion in the enemy lines and weaken their morale. During the “Cold War”, Radio Moscow took advantage of the assassinations of Martin Luther King and John F. Kennedy to undermine the United States and the Voice of America on the other hand exploited similar opportunities with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Sometimes, it is difficult to differentiate between “black” and “gray” propaganda. The division of propaganda is determined by whether the subject is known or not, but this cannot explain all the fine work that exists, no matter what form of propaganda is used. Jacques Ellul offered the division on vertical and horizontal propaganda. Vertical propaganda comes from the top and it is initiated by the leader who acts from the superior position of his authority and seeks to influence his subordinates. This type of propaganda is by far the most common. According to Ellul, horizontal propaganda is determined from inside the group (not from the top) where, in principle, all individuals are equal and there is no defined leader. The propagandist is there only as animator or discussion leader and sometimes his identity is not even known. This form of propaganda could be seen in Mao’s China.41 Another classification of propaganda can be made according to the areas where it is present such as politics, economics, culture, ecology, theology or sport. Besides the aforementioned classification, propaganda can be divided into war and peace propaganda or internal and foreign propaganda. As the names of these divisions speak for themselves there is no need for further explanations. We can also classify propaganda in various ways but that is not of primary importance. The most important issue is to evaluate propaganda by analyzing all its elements and to perceive it as a whole. Only then can propaganda be evaluated appropriately. 40 Ibid, p. 425. 41 Ellul, Propaganda, pp. 79–85.

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In this study, an analysis of the organization of state propaganda in the three Eastern and Southern states in the 1930s will be conducted. When we say state propaganda, we mean propaganda initiated by the highest state officials such as the King, Prime Minister, other Minister etc. and the existing propaganda apparatus which was made to serve the interests of the ruling classes. Therefore, a working definition for state propaganda in this thesis will be: state propaganda is a deliberate attempt made by the ruling classes to influence the opinions of people through the transmission of ideas and values for their specific purposes. The main focus will be on the organization of the propaganda apparatus that was made and developed in order to spread state propaganda in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. In order to present a broader picture, a survey will be conducted on the organization of state propaganda in Europe during the 1930s.

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ORGANIZATION OF STATE PROPAGANDA IN EUROPE IN THE 1930s

Each European country in the interwar period paid full attention to intelligence and propaganda in accordance with their interests, intentions, desires and means. During the 1930s, with the development of the international situation and the existence of imminent threat of war, that activity became more important and intense. It is fair to say that in the 1930s, propaganda became a daily preoccupation of all European governments. State propaganda in the period was usually carried out by ministries, propaganda departments (press office), sections that were located within the individual ministries and private organizations. With modern means of propaganda, especially the radio, it was possible to broadcast messages across the boundaries of individual states and thus have a much broader impact than before. Propaganda efforts of some countries were so extensive that we could talk about a new kind of war – an information war. The conflicts became so bitter that some states even negotiated agreements to cease hostile propaganda.42 In this period, the organization of propaganda in European countries differed because of the diverse organizations of the state, administration, needs, goals and tasks, internal and international situation, as well of the views of leading circles and their goals and means for achieving these goals.43 Several documents were published regarding the fear of propaganda in the interwar period and their aim was to regulate the question of the prohibition of propaganda, which was directed against 42 The first such agreement was reached between Germany and Poland in 1931. This agreement was supposed to ensure that issues of radio broadcasting did not offend the national interests of other listeners. Carr, Propaganda, p. 20. 43 If the reporter of Yugoslav CPB is to be believed, Switzerland was one of the few countries in Europe that did not have any form of press offices. To publish their communiqués, the government used the Swiss Telegraphic Agency that was formed on the basis of a joint-stock company whose shareholders were the most successful Swiss newspapers. For this service, the government gave subsidies to the Agency in the form of individual subscriptions to its newsletters’ agencies. Arhiv Jugoslavije (AY), Fond Centralni Pres-biro (38), box 141, CPB correspondents’ report from Switzerland on 3rd February 1934.

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peace. Such documents were signed in 1925 in Washington, 1932 in Geneva, 1933 in Madrid and Vienna and 1938 in Geneva.44 European experience in the field of organizing state propaganda in the interwar period was interesting and varied, depending on the country and region. Many states had similar organizations of state propaganda; sometimes they were just copied from one country to another if they proved to be successful. The organization of propaganda institutions in Europe of the 1930s often underwent changes and modifications according to the needs of the moment and the will of the political leaders. Such changes sometimes occurred when the head of ministry or department was changed. Many of these institutions were ideal for solving individual problems of the people working in them like: achieving material independence, social climbing, advancement in careers, personal benefits etc. One of the biggest problems for historians in the study of state propaganda organization was the secrecy of their work as well as issues with funding. The real amount of money invested in one country’s propaganda was almost impossible to quantify, but in general, one can assume that fascist countries and other big European countries spent the most. One of the reasons for that was active foreign propaganda. However, small countries made the greatest efforts in forming and controlling public opinion in their countries. Further on this chapter, I will try to explain how state propaganda was organized in some European countries in the 1930s by grouping the states with similar organizations. According to their institutional organization, one can classify countries into two groups of: A) States that have a Ministry of Propaganda or specialized propaganda institutions and B) States that have propaganda departments within the ministries or government bodies. Only a few countries had a Ministry of Propaganda before the outbreak of the Second World War. After the Nazi Party in Germany came to power in January 1933, many changes took place in Europe. It can be argued that their coming to power was firmly linked to the situation in German society where a difficult economic, psychological, moral and political crisis had engulfed society after World War I and which peaked in the early 1930s. 44 M. Oreč, Sloboda informacija i propaganda [Freedom of Information and Propaganda], (Belgrade, 1966), p. 62.

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Hitler’s new regime quickly introduced a one-party system in which all opposition parties were banned. Hitler underlined the importance of propaganda in his speech at the party congress in Nurnberg in 1936 where he shouted to crowds: “Propaganda has brought us to power, propaganda has allowed us to maintain power, and propaganda will give us the opportunity to master the world”.45 When these details are considered, it is no surprise that one of the first tasks of the new government was to establish of a propaganda organization. The Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda (Reichministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda) was established by a presidential decree on 12th March 1933, headed by Joseph Goebbels.46 In a speech held before the formation of the Ministry, Goebbels presented his ideas and plans on the role of the newly formed ministry. He said the press, but this applied for all media in general, that: “an ideal situation would be the one in which the press is so finely tuned that it is, as it were, like a piano in the hands of the Government on which the Government can play, a situation in which it is an enormously important and significant instrument of mass influence that the Government can make use of in the work for which it is responsible”.47 This was a typical example of “white” propaganda when the subject of propaganda stated clearly his intentions and goals. However, in the same speech, details were revealed on the penalties that will be administered against those who did not want to accept the roles offered to them and Goebbels openly announced that the Government would use “all possible measures against such attempts”.48 In the above speech, Goebbels formulated one of the most important principles of Nazi pro45 Quoted from: П. Остојић, Пропаганда, (Belgrade, 1940), p. 72. 46 Joseph Goebbels (1897–1945) graduated from the University of Heidelberg and obtained his PhD in 1921. He began a not so successful journalistic career. In the conflict between Hitler and Gregor Strasser, he took Hitler’s side and became party chief of the Berlin district. In Berlin, he founded and edited the party newspaper Der Angriff that could be translated as “attack”. He became a deputy in the Reichstag in 1928 and in 1933, he became a Minister. He was very intelligent and an excellent public speaker. After Hitler’s suicide, he was appointed as his successor as Chancellor, but he committed suicide. His diaries and recorded talks are of importance to historical science. More on Goebbels see: R. G. Reuth, Goebbels, (New York, 1993). 47 Goebbels speech in Reichstag on 15th of March 1933, in: D. Welch, The Third Reich, Politics and Propaganda, (London/New York, 1993), p. 143. 48 Ibid.

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paganda – simplicity and this rule was also promoted by Hitler in his book “My Struggle” (Mein Kampf) that was written in the 1920s. The tendency for the ‘facts’ to be presented to the people in a more accessible manner was a dominant one throughout the period of Nazi rule. In his book, the leader of the new government made the distinction between “scientific exposition” which was for intelligentsia and propaganda, which was for the masses. To better understand how the Ministry of Propaganda worked, a better insight into its structure is needed. Initially, only five departments were planned for the ministry but during April 1933, the structure changed so the number of departments increased to seven. The division of departments and their sections was as follows: Department 1: Legislation and Legal Problems; Budget; Finance and Accounting Department 2: Co-ordination of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda (“active propaganda”); Regional Agencies of the Ministry; German Academy of Politics; Official Ceremonies and Demonstrations; National Emblems; Racial Questions; Treaty of Versailles; Opposing Ideologies; Youth Organizations; Public Health and Sports; Eastern and Border Questions; National Travel Committee Department 3: Radio; National Broadcasting Company (Reichsfunkgesellschaft) Department 4: National and Foreign Press; Journalism; Press Archives; News Service; National Association of German Press Department 5: Film; Motion Picture Industry; Film Censorship, Newsreels Department 6: Theatre Department 7: Music; Fine Arts; People’s Culture49 The names of these departments speak for themselves showing which area they covered and what their main task was. However, it is interesting to note who were the highest positioned officials in the different areas of propaganda.

49 Cull, Culbert, Welch, Propaganda, p. 354.

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Control in Nazi Germany50 AREA

Films

STATE CONTROL Goebbels Dietrich Ribbentrop Goebbels Ley Goebbels

Books

Goebbels

Public Meetings and Ceremonies

Goebbels

Newspapers Magazines

Foreign Propaganda

Goebbels Ribbentrop Rosenberg

Theater

Goebbels

The Arts

Goebbels

Domestic Radio

Goebbels

Party Education

PARTY CONTROL Goebbels Dietrich Amann Goebbels Amann Goebbels Bouhler Rosenberg Amann Goebbels Rosenberg Ley Goebbels Goebbels Rosenberg Goebbels Rosenberg Goebbels Goebbels Ley Rosenberg

The table, clearly shows Goebbels’ influence on state propaganda in Nazi Germany. Goebbels’ ministry began with only 350 administrative and executive officials, but its number grew over time. The main task of this institution was to re-educate people for the new society based on National Socialist values and to instill a military spirit.51 The establishment of the German Ministry of Propaganda had worldwide impact as Mussolini’s Italy soon followed. In May 1933 when Goebbels visited Rome an agreement for the establishment of an Italian propaganda organization was reached. The Italian propaganda institution started as a Sub-directory for press and propaganda. After June 1935, that sub-directory became the Ministry of Press and Propaganda (Ministero della stampa e della propaganda). The head of this 50 R. Bytwerk, Bending Spines, The Propagandas of Nazi Germany and the German Democratic Republic (East Lansing, 2004), p. 59. 51 More about the German case in the numerous literature see: D. Welch, The Third Reich, Politics and Propaganda (London, 1993); D.Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema 1933–1945 (New York, 1983); Z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi propaganda, (Oxford, 1973).

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Ministry was Galeazzo Ciano, Mussolini’s son-in-law.52 By 1936 there were ten general directorates in the Ministry: Directorate General for the Italian press; Directorate General for the Foreign press; Directorate General for Propaganda; Directorate General for Cinematography; Directorate General for the National Authority for the Tourism industries (ENIT), and Provincial Authorities for Tourism; Directorate General for the Theater; Directorate General for the Institute Luce; Directorate General for the National Institute of Ancient Drama (INDA); Directorate General for the State Record Library; Directorate General for the Committee for Hotel Credit. Ciano soon left to become the Minister of Foreign Affairs and his place was taken by the journalist Dino Alfieri,53 his deputy in the Min52 Galeazzo Ciano (March 18, 1903 – January 11, 1944) was a famous politician in Mussolini’s Italy. He was the son of Admiral Count Constanzo Ciano. After receiving his law degree, Ciano served as an attaché in Rio de Janeiro. On April 24, 1930, he married Benito Mussolini’s daughter Edda Mussolini, with whom he soon left for Shanghai where he served as an Italian Consul. Back in Italy a few years later, he became the Minister of Press and Propaganda. Ciano took part in the Italian invasion of Ethiopia (1935–36) as a bomber squadron commander. Upon his highly-trumpeted comeback as a “hero”, he became Foreign Minister in 1936, replacing Mussolini. At the beginning, he supported Italian participation in World War Two but in 1943, he turned against the doomed war and pushed for Italy’s exit from the conflict. He was silenced by being removed from his post and resigned as ambassador to the Vatican. At the Fascist Grand Council, he voted for Mussolini’s demission and was arrested, tried and shot in January 1944. Ciano is best remembered for his famous Diaries 1937–1943, a daily record of the meetings with Mussolini and many foreign political figures. 53 Eduardo Dino Alfieri (1886–1966) was an Italian fascist politician. He completed studies of law and participated in the First World War. He was member of the nationalistic group even before he became a member of Mussolini’s party. He was elected to the Italian Chamber of Deputies in 1924. Under Mussolini’s government, Alfieri was assigned several tasks between 1929 and 1934, such as the co-director of the Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution, deputy secretary of the Corporazioni, and deputy secretary for Press and Propaganda from 1935, taking over the duties of Minister Galeazzo Ciano during the latter’s mission in the Second Italo-Abyssinian War. When Ciano moved on to become Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dino Alfieri found himself appointed the Minister of Popular Culture in 1937. He supported the Anti-Semitic racial segregation laws passed in 1938. He was Italy’s envoy to the Vatican in 1939 and then to Nazi Germany (where he met Adolf Hitler). A member of the Grand Council of Fascism, he supported Dino Grandi’s coup d’état in July 1943 after sanctioning the presence in the Axis under Mussolini’s rule. He was sentenced to death in absentia and had to flee. In 1947,

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istry. In 1937, the Ministry changed its name to the Ministry of Popular Culture (Ministero della Cultura popolare, MinCulPop) and this change had more to do with camouflage than a genuine change of its original purpose. There were about 4,000 instructions for the press in only one year from this ministry and this tells us a great deal about its range and influence.54 The Ministry continued to operate under the new government even after the fall of Mussolini.55 The two largest democratic states in Europe in this period, Great Britain and France did not have a Ministry of Propaganda in peacetime, although France had one for a short period in the first half of 1938 during the second government of Socialist Leon Blum (13 March – 10 April 1938). In Britain, the real Ministry of Propaganda existed during both World Wars under the name of the Ministry of Information. Even on the eve of the war, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain refused to create such a Ministry because it was unnecessary during peacetime.56 In the meantime, several propagandistic institutions were active, the most important being: the Foreign Office News Department, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the British Council. The duties of the Foreign Office News Department were: to give information to the domestic public, to give briefings to correspondents of the British press, correspondents of foreign news agencies and press based in London and to the all other news agencies based in London. The department had three sections with different functions. One was to give information to the journalists in London; the second was to collect information from abroad and third was to manage the official radio service. This department was responsible for all press attaches in the embassies and consulates. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was mainly the propaganda arm of the British government overseas – and occasionally at home as well.57 The corporation was founded in 1922 and it began to transmit its programs overseas at the beginning of the 1930s, which

54 55

56 57

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he returned to Italy and a year later, published his memoirs as Due dittatori a fronte [Two Dictators Face to Face]. Dj. Gocini, Istorija novinarstva [History of Journalism], (Belgrade, 2001), pp. 322–323. More about MinCulPop see in: A.Mignemi (ed.), Tra fasciscmo e democrazia, Propaganda politica e mezzi di comunicazione di massa [Between Fascism and Democracy, Political Propaganda and mass communications’ instruments], (Novara, 1996); N. Tranfaglia, La stampa del regime 1932–1943 [Regime’s Press 1932–1943], (Bompiani, 2005). Chamberlain’s speech on 15 June 1939. For example during the General Strike of 1926, its airwaves were commandeered to powerful effect by the government. Cull, Culbert, Welch, Propaganda, p. 37.

was very important for foreign propaganda. The service was used in the struggle against opponents like Italy after 1935 and in the Middle East after 1938 (with the establishment of the Arabic service).58 The British Council was formed in 1934 and its duty was to spread British influence all over the world by organizing lectures on British culture, concerts, plays and teaching the English language. Its influence and funding grew over the years and the following table shows the increase of investments: Donation of the British government to the British Council Year 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939

Donation in pounds 6,000 15,000 60,000 130,000 386,000

Source: Report on the work of the British Council 1934–1955, p. 10.

The Coordination Committee was formed to enable easier co-operation between propaganda institutions in Great Britain during 1938. The head of this committee was Foreign Affairs State Undersecretary Sir Robert Vansittart.59 This change was needed for more efficient state propaganda due to the intensive crisis in Europe and the onset of World War Two. Before and after the idea of the Ministry of Propaganda was abandoned in 1938, the main propagandistic institution in France was the Department of Information and Press within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This department had three sections: Central, Section for Study and Analysis of the Foreign Press and Document Section. The Central Section was the most important one and the head of the Department was also the head of the Central Section. This section maintained relations with the domestic and foreign press and special attention was paid to relations with the foreign journalist based in France as these 58 Ibid. 59 Robert Gilbert Vansittart, 1st Baron Vansittart (25 June 1881 – 14 February 1957) was a senior British diplomat in the period before and during the Second World War. He was Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister from 1928 to 1930 and Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office from 1930 to 1938. Later, he served as Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the British Government. He is best remembered for his opposition to Appeasement and his hard-line stance towards Germany during and after the Second World War. Vansittart was also a published poet, novelist and playwright.

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journalists often received favors like regular contact with the Department’s head, railways passes, easy appointments with the state officials. The aim was to create a better image of France abroad.60 Over the years, several commissions were formed with the aim to co-ordinate propaganda activities like the Inter-ministerial Commission in 1936 and the General Commissariat for Information and Propaganda in 1938 that was directly under the control of the Prime Minister.61 After the beginning of the war in 1940, the Ministry of Information was formed but it was active for a very short time, as was the Ministry of Information and Propaganda from 1938, but it is interesting to note that the same minister Frossard was employed in both ministries.62 Smaller countries in 1930s Europe did not officially have a Ministry of Propaganda and usually this task was performed by some departments within the ministries. The ministries involved were usually the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior or Council of Ministers. However, the relevance of the most important propaganda department in the specific countries varied e.g. in Czechoslovakia and Romania, the press department within the Ministry of Foreign Affair was dominant and in Turkey and Albania, the Ministry of Interior was dominant. Special organizations for propaganda, as independent institutions, also existed in Romania (the General Direction for Press and Propaganda), Portugal (the Secretary for National Propaganda) and Greece (the sub-Ministry of Press and Tourism). Several changes took place in the propaganda institution in Romania during the 1930s which could be understood as a request for a proper propaganda organization to be formed. Finally in 1938, the General Directorate for Press and Propaganda had six different parts: Directorate of national propaganda of tourism; Directorate of cinematography and committee for control and censorship of the movies; Directorate of press and propaganda; Directorate of books; 60 AY, 38-141, Report of Ivan Marković, Yugoslav CPB correspondent, from 30 June 1938. 61 Ibid. 62 Ludovic-Oscar Frossard (also known as L-O Frossard or Oscar Frossard; Foussemagne, Territoire de Belfort, 5 March 1889 – Paris, 11 February 1946) was a French socialist and communist politician, a member of six successive French governments between 1935 and 1940.

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Directorate of radio, and Service for phones and telegraphs from abroad.63 At the same time, the sub-secretary for press and propaganda had to enforce the work in the field of foreign propaganda. This section was supposed to co-operate closely with the Romanian news agency Rador. It is interesting to note what requirements were needed in order to become a press attaché. The future attaché had to graduate from a Faculty of Law, to speak French and the language of the country he would work in, to have a certificate from a journalistic association and at least two years work experience as newspaper editor. If he wanted to marry, permission from the Minister was needed and in case of a marriage with a foreigner, personal permission from the head of the government was needed.64 As time passed, state propaganda required more money and a different organization. The outbreak of the Second World War prompted the regime in Romania to form the Ministry of National Propaganda at the beginning of 1940. The central propaganda institution in Portugal was formed in 1933 named the Secretariat of National Propaganda (Secretariado da Propaganda Nacional). It was not controlled by the government, but was under the direct command of the dictator Salazar. The institution was formed with the aim of reaffirming the new regime established a year earlier.65 Its role was stated in the foundation law: “the institution of the Secretariat of National Propaganda, is now a single body responsible for managing all the information on the activities of various ministries in order to highlight the new spirit of unity that at last prevailed in the country”.66 Salazar declared the tasks of the organization, were to: fight against all lies and to impose centralized control over all information, especially regarding the regime.67 The head of the institution was Antonio Ferro (1895–1956), a politician, journalist and writer, and a close friend of Salazar. The Sec63 Централен дьржавен исторически архив [Central State Historical Archive in Sofia], (CDA), 176k-20-56/47-48. 64 AY, 38-141, Report from the CPB correspondent from Romania from 16. July 1938. 65 More about Salazar’s regime see in: F. Ribeiro de Meneses, Salazar: A Political Biography (New York, 2009) and M. Derrick, The Portugal of Salazar, 2nd edition, (Norfolk, 2009). 66 Quoted from: G. Adinolfi, Ai confine del fascismo, Propaganda e consenso nel Portogallo salazarista (1932–1944) [Borders of Fascism, Propaganda and Consesus in Salazarist Portugal], (Milan, 2007), p. 94. 67 Ibid, 99.

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retariat was simply divided into two sections: Internal and External, in other words, according to their functions. Due to the stability of the regime, this institution continued to exist for many years after the Second World War.68 The case of Greece was somewhat different. After Metaxas came to power in Greece in 1936, the special sub-Ministry of Press and Tourism (Yfipourgeion Typou ke Tourismou) was formed. This institution was in fact the Ministry of Propaganda and Indoctrination. Theologos Nicoloudis, an old politician and publisher, and a close friend of the dictator became the new chief of this ministry. Nicoloudis controlled and directed the entire propaganda organization in order to strengthen Metaxas’s position. In Article 1(a) of Emergency Law 45, on establishing the sub-Ministry of Press and Tourism, its mission and tasks were clearly stated: “The sub-Ministry of Press and Tourism regulates and governs all issues concerning the indoctrination of public opinion through the Greek and foreign daily and periodical press, through the control of all congresses, exhibitions, theatres, cinemas, and gramophone records, as well as any kind of cultural demonstrations. All these expressions, including radio broadcasts, should be in accordance with the values and traditions of the nation”.69 An important decision was taken in the direction of controlling the media in Greece in 1938, when the new Press Law was passed. This law introduced stricter regulations on news coverage and imposed heavy penalties for editorials unauthorized by the regime. The press was obliged to publish all the material distributed daily by the sub-Ministry marked ‘compulsory’, including large amounts of foreign news coming mainly from German sources.70 It is possible to say that the sub-Ministry was the actual Ministry, but not “officially” as it had the quality and power of the real ministry. Two Central European countries Czechoslovakia and Hungary had two press departments within the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The general division between them was that the first one was pre-occupied with internal affairs and the second with foreign propaganda. The Czechoslovakian Ministry of Foreign Af68 From 1945, its name was the National Secretary for Information (Secretariado Nacional de Informacao). 69 Quoted from: Petrinax, The Metaxas, p. 9. 70 Ibid, p. 11.

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fairs, had a third department dedicated to foreign propaganda and this department was split into six sections with Propagandistic and Political-Information being the most important. Those sections did not only prepare propaganda instructions for the press, organize exhibitions, concerts and plays, but they also monitored articles by the foreign press about the country. Like many other states in the interwar period, Czechoslovakia had problems with the existing territorial revisionism by its neighbors, especially Germany and Hungary and that was one of the main preoccupations of foreign propaganda. The Political-Information section published the review Zahraniční politika (Foreign Policy) and helped other propagandistic newspapers. As mentioned above, the main task of the press department in the Council of Ministers of Czechoslovakia was internal propaganda and as this department had 40 officials, their main duty was to guide and control the domestic press.71 The commercial enterprise Orbis, controlled by the government, whose main task was to publish newspapers, should also be mentioned. At one moment during the 1930s, this company published eight newspapers, amongst others Prager Prese that also published an edition in German.72 Clearly, an attempt was made to stand up to the aggressive and powerful Nazi propaganda. Considering the above mentioned territory revisionism, Hungary73 spent much money on propaganda during the interwar period. The press departments in the Hungarian Council of Ministers and Ministry of Foreign Affairs had the same functions and responsibilities as their Czechoslovakian counterparts. In the Hungarian case, the Press Department of the Council of Ministers published four daily (Függetlenség, Esti Újság, Új Magyarország and Budapesti Hírlap) and influenced more than 80 newspapers.74 One of the differences between these two countries was funding. Hungary invested large amounts of money into propaganda during the period and according to Yugoslav intelligence reports, the annual funding for Hungarian propaganda was 55 million dinars, three times higher than in Yugoslav CPB, despite the fact that Yugoslavia was a 71 AY, 38-141. 72 Ibid. 73 Fear of Hungarian revisionism forced its neighbors Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania into an alliance known as the “Little Entante”. The main aims of the organization formed during 1920/21 were joint defense against Hungarian irredentism and prevention of Habsburg restoration. France supported the alliance by signing treaties with each member country. 74 AY, 38-141, Report of Božidar Albert, Yugoslav press attaché from 21 January 1937.

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larger country. The same report from 1937 informed us that the former head of the department, Stefan Antal, raised even more funds “double from the banks and industry by under-hand pressure and anti-Semitic threats”.75 Turkey and Albania were examples of countries that were far more committed to internal than to foreign propaganda. The main task of the Turkish Press Department was to control and direct the domestic press and it is no surprise that this department was part of the Ministry of Interior. Formal censorship was not proscribed by law, but the penalties for those that wrote against the regimes were severe. Journalist loyalty to the regime in combination with fear of retaliation resulted in almost harmonious relations between the journalists and state representatives.76 In the light of this relationship, one could observe the fact that the Minister of Interior was the honorary president of the Journalist Association. The department had only about 20 employees who received substantial payment, but on the other hand, they could be removed from their position at any time so this “winning combination” secured their full co-operation and loyalty. The Press Department only had a few sections: Turkish, Balkan, Italian and English (in which there was also an American section). It is interesting to note that the institution did not have any correspondents abroad so this seemed to support the aforementioned statement that Turkish propaganda was strongly oriented towards the domestic public. Pressure was one method that some authoritarian regimes used in the order to suppress certain information from the foreign public and one interesting comment was made by the correspondent from Yugoslavia on the way propaganda was conducted in Turkey. In his report to the state central propaganda institution, he made the following observation: “There is one other method, which can easily be used in authoritarian regimes like the Turkish one, and that is to make it clear to all foreign correspondents that they will be putting themselves at great risk if their work brings even the smallest harm to the inter75 AY, 38-141, Report of Božidar Albert, Yugoslav press attaché from 21 January 1937. 76 In one report, the correspondent of the Yugoslav CPB said that co-operation between the journalists and regime was “complete”. AY, 38-141, Report of Stojan Lukačevic from 7 July 1938.

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ests of the state in which they work. Foreign correspondents are aware of that and they are very careful with their words”.77 This was not rare and not uncommon for just one country. Authoritarian countries used that kind of pressure regularly, but this anomaly was not exclusive to them. As in Turkey, the main press department in Albania was within the Ministry of Interior since 1936. Before that it was part of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With only a few employees the Albanian Press Office published one news bulletin in Albanian and French. This bulletin was handed out to embassies and journals free of charge. The institution formed in 1936 was called the Central Press Bureau and its tasks were to control the domestic press and to help progovernment newspapers. Another task of the department was to write denials of the news published in foreign press that was unsatisfactory for the regime. The Albanian press department did not have any contract with foreign news agencies and their propaganda budget was only 0.7% of the state’s total budget.78 The new General Head Office for Press, Propaganda and Tourism was formed with the arrival of the Italians in 1939. They invested more money into the propaganda service in Albania, three times more than in the period when financing was provided for by domestic politicians. This easily explained the plans of the Italian state towards its neighbors Greece and Yugoslavia that were put in action at the beginning of the World War Two. At the end, it is interesting to note the case of the first Socialist state in the World, the Soviet Union. As Eric H. Carr noticed in 1939, the Soviet Union was the only first-class European power which had no official propaganda department and he explained this paradox “either by saying that Soviet institutions, having been pioneers in the use of propaganda as a normal instrument of policy, were so familiar with the spirit of propaganda that they did not require a special organization for this purpose, or by regarding the Russian Communist Party and the Communist International respectively as the domestic and foreign propaganda departments of Soviet Russia”.79 77 Ibid. 78 AY, 38-22, Report from 17. January 1937. 79 Carr, Propaganda, p. 23. More about Soviet propaganda organization in: P. Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State (Soviet media and mass mobilization), (Cambridge, 1986); M. Lenoe, Agitation, Propaganda and the, Stalinization’ of the Soviet Press 1922–1930, (Pittsburgh, 1998); Д. Крачунова, Тоталитаризамьт – Власт и пропаганда 1917–1953 [Totalitarism – Power and Propaganda 1917–1953], (Sofia, 2002).

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With reference to all the above mentioned organizations and institutions in the service of state propaganda in the 1930s, Europe aimed to create the conditions which would ensure that the regimes remained in power and could persuade people in their rightful missions. There were no exceptions as there are today, regardless of some differences both in the methods used and the organizations formed. Some states like Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Soviet Union had more ambitious aims in foreign policy than the smaller countries whose primary tasks were to control public opinion at home. The first mentioned countries had more developed propaganda organization that were far better financed. In the late 1930s, propaganda became an established fact of everyday life. International broadcasting, state-controlled cinemas and newspapers, public opinion polls, mass rallies all became new features of an age characterized by a globalised ideological struggle thanks to the increased use of technology in the communications revolution. As Philip Taylor put it, “truth was a major casualty long before the actual fighting began”.80 Many of the aforementioned propaganda organizations were short lived due to the change of regimes in many European countries during and after the Second World War. Countries that lost the war like Germany and Italy significantly changed their regimes as was the case in the majority of Eastern and Southern European states that became socialist states after 1945 such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. These changes meant that other type of propaganda organizations were formed, but not necessarily that other propagandists were employed.81

80 Taylor, Munitions, p. 207. 81 Dimo Kazasov, Minister for Propaganda in Socialist Bulgaria 1944–1946 was also the editor in chief of the newspaper Zveno, the main organ of the ruling circle Zveno that was in power from 1934–1935 in monarchist Bulgaria.

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Chapter Two: ORGANIZATION OF STATE PROPAGANDA IN POLAND, YUGOSLAVIA AND BULGARIA IN THE 1930s

As discussed in the preceding chapter, very few countries had central state propaganda organizations on a ministerial level. They existed in the three countries under review, but they operated at different times in each country and only in Yugoslavia did it truly exist for a longer period. It was the Central Press-Bureau (CPB) which operated from 1929 to 1941. It can be argued that the CPB was the Ministry of Propaganda, but under a different name. In Bulgaria, before the beginning of the Second World War, there was only one central state propaganda institution from 1934–1935 and this was the Directorate for Social Renewal (Дирекция за обществена обнова). In Poland, similar state propaganda organizations were formed during the wars in 1918,82 1920,83 and 1939. Nevertheless, it seemed that state propaganda in Poland was highly organized and coordinated, especially in the 1930s. In the following chapter, all the central state propaganda organizations that operated in three countries under review will be examined. In order to present a clearer picture the analysis will be made separately for each country. POLAND The central state propaganda institutions in interwar Poland were placed in the Council of Ministers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of War. The Council of Ministers was the most important center, but the other aforementioned ministries maintained a certain level of autonomy during the entire interwar period. In essence, the Council 82 Ministry of Propaganda headed by writer Wacław Sieroszewski was established during the first government of Ignacy Daszyński for a short time (6. XI 1918–14. XI 1918). 83 The name of the institution was Internal Propaganda Bureau (Biuro Propagandy Wewnętrznej), it operated for few months, from 5 August until 3 November 1920. Head of the bureau was Antoni Anusz (1884–1935), politician and deputy to the Sejm, the lower house of the Polish Parliament.

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of Ministers took control of internal propaganda and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took control of propaganda abroad. The Ministry of War, as expected, took control of propaganda in the army, however its influence was so significant that it could not be underestimated or overlooked in the research. These propaganda centres did not always work in harmony. COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (PRM) One of the main characteristics of the Polish Government after 1926 was that key political decisions were made amongst members in small informal groups, which was not considered to be the traditional and legal way of conducting Government affairs at the time. Marshal Piłsudski, usually had the last word regardless of the position that he occupied at the time. The closest supporters of the marshal were: Walery Sławek, Ignacy Mościcki, Kazimierz Świtalski, Aleksander Prystor, Józef Beck, Bogusław Miedziński, Ignacy Matuszewski, Bronisław Pieracki, Janusz Jędrzejewicz, Bolesław Wieniawa-Długoszowski and sometimes Stanisław Car.84 The political movement led by Piłsudski was known as Sanacja and it can be translated as healing, as they proclaimed to heal Polish society. Two among them were leading Sanacja journalists, Ignacy Matuszewsky85 and Bogusław Miedziński.86 The later maintained his high rank position until 1939, only overshad84 A. Micewski, W cieniu Marszalka Piłsudskiego, Szkice z dziejów myśli politycznej II Rzeczpospolitej [In the Shadow of Marshal Pilsudski], (Warsaw, 1968), pp. 350–384. 85 Matuszewski Ignacy (10 September 1891, Warsaw – August 1946, New York), colonel, politician, publicist, close collaborator of J. Piłsudski. After coup d’état in 1926 belonged to the right wing of Sanacja. In 1928–1929 was ambassador in Hungary, 1929–1931 Minister of Treasury, 1932–1936 chief editor of Gazeta Polska. Emigrated to the USA after the Second World War. 86 Miedziński Bogusław, nickname Świtek (Firefly), (22 March 1891, Miastków, Garwolina – 8 May 1972, London), politician, publicist, lieutenant colonel, close collaborator of Jozef Piłsudski. During the First World War member of Polish Army. From 1918–1922 member and chief of Section for Information in the Ministry of War. Long time member of the Sejm (1922–1939) and last two years senator and president of the Sejm. Participant in the coup d’état led by Piłsudski in 1926. One of the founding members of both pro-Pilsudski parties, first BBWR and then OZN. Well known journalist and editor of several important Sanacja newspapers. Assistant editor of Głos Prawdy, 1929–32 chief editor of Gazeta Polska. After the occupation of Poland in 1939 he emigrated, first to France and from 1940 to Great Britain. Author of several different papers in the field of propaganda. He was highly decorated for his achievements. See more in: A. Adamczyk, Bogusław Miedziński (1891–1972), Biografia polityczna [Boguslaw Miedzinski 1891–1972, Political biography], (Torun, 2000).

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owed by a key propaganda expert of the ruling government Wojciech Stpiczyński. The institutional organization of state propaganda was formed from existing institutions after the coup d’état in 1926. Changes were made in the human resources department where the key positions were occupied by people who were loyal to the marshal and who were trusted by him. Many of these people had a military past and were often recruited directly from the army. Their purpose was to serve the ruling circle and to develop general propaganda ideas received from above. The transfer of information was vertical, very well structured and organized. It could be assumed that until 1935, Piłsudski made the key decisions regarding state propaganda and general directives were transmitted by the chief of staff to all political departments of the ministries, editors of Polish Telegraph Agency and most importantly, progovernment newspapers after discussion with his closest supporters, the Prime Minister, other department ministers as well as the leaders of ruling parties. Instructions were then passed on to the heads of local communities, duchies and regions so that they could direct their local newspapers. After the death of Piłsudski in 1935,87 PRM again strengthened its position as an important center of the government propaganda machine, mainly due to efforts made by the Prime Minister Marjan Zyndram-Kościałkowski who was determined to make the Press Office of the PRM the highest center for state propaganda. He used the Press Office to restore control over state activity relating to the problem of uncontrolled leakage of information from ministries to the public. Zyndram-Kościałkowski sent a memorandum to all department ministers stating that he wanted better coordination of media activities within their individual departments. 87 According to Polish historian Waldemar Paruch The Pilsudski camp, in a specific historical time, was comprised of the following numerous political milieus divided into four groups: 1) the Kazimierz Bartel ruling government, the colonels group, the naprawiacki (“repairers”) movement, conservative groups, “national Pilsudskites”, the Sanacja left; 2) Intraparty splinter groups and individual politicians that left the people’s movement, Polish Socialist Party, National Workers’ Party, Christian Democrats and even the all-Polish camp; 3) Non-formalized political circles assembled around journals such as Droga, Glos Prawdy, Przelom, Epoka, Mysl Mocarstwowa, Bunt Mlodych, Jutro Pracy, Zaczyn; 4) Social organizations – Legions of the Young, Union of Polish Democratic Youth, Organization of Working Youth, Central Union of Young Countryside/Rural Youth, Central Union of Farmers’ Circle. W. Paruch, Myśl polyticzna obozu Piłsudczykowskiego 1926–1939 [The Political Thought of the Pilsudski Camp 1926–1939], (Lublin, 2005), pp. 871–872.

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This document was divided into three areas: a) Responsibility for the information campaign; b) Coordination of information activities within the Press Office of the PRM and c) Informing the press.88 The exact duties of individual officers were written down specifying the ways in which information was forwarded, and what type of information was forwarded. This was the responsibility of each individual ministry. The Prime Minister reminded the individual officers that information must be forwarded to official channels after passing through a “double filter”, firstly via special ministry departments and then the Press Office of the PRM.89 This not only established guidelines for the future work of state propaganda, but also discussed flaws of the previous strategy so mistakes would not be repeated in future. It is interesting to note that the autonomy and power of the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of War was also confirmed by this document. It was also said that another directive would regulate the relations between Press Office of the PRM and similar institutions within two ministries.90 The departure of Prime Minister Zyndram-Kościałkowski in 1936 did not halt work towards the institutionalization of state propaganda and there was evident activity towards setting up a more centralized propaganda organization. In June 1936, a new Prime Minister general Felicjan Sławoj-Składkowski formed the Special Tasks Office (Biuro Zadań Specjalnych) as well as the Planning Office (Biuro Akcji Planowania). The formation of these new institutions reduced the activities and duties of the Press Office of the PRM. This office was now only responsible for the transfer of media information relating to the ongoing operations of the government and preparation of press surveys for the Prime Minister.91 The Planning Office focused on the issues of conception and programming of propaganda. Its director was a candidate of Inspector General Zdzisłav Grabski. Due to the strong support of Ridz-Śmigły, he controlled the publishing company Kurier Porrany (Morning Courier) in 1936. He replaced one of the most prominent members of the Sanacja left wing, Wincent Rzymowski.92 Grabski then became the 88 Archiwum Akt Nowych (Archive of Modern Documents, AAN), Prezydium Rady Ministrów, (Council of Ministers, PRM), 63-54-2/5. 89 AAN, PRM, 63-54-2/5. 90 Ibid. 91 A. Notkowski, Prasa w Systemie Propagandy Rządowej w Polsce 1926–1939, [Press in the System of State Propaganda in Poland 1926–1939], (Warsaw/Lodz, 1987), p. 234. 92 Ibid, p. 233.

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head of a newly established political Discussion Club whose members were important Sanacja officers and the group maintained close contacts with influential people within the government.93 The Special Tasks Office was formed to deal with topics of press and propaganda with an emphasis placed upon the effective coordination of information activities between the different government institutions. The Director of this office, until the outbreak of war, was Major Mieczysław B. Lepecki (1897–1969), who was an ex-legionnaire and well-known journalist who wrote for Piłsudski’s biased press. During the period 1926–1935, he was one of the key officers working in the propaganda sector and he performed the following duties while in office: Adjutant of Marshal Piłsudski, chief of the Press Office of the Ministry of War and the director of the Presidential Office in PRM. Of all aforementioned offices within the Council of Ministers, the Special Tasks Office proved to be the most important one. At the end of 1938, structural change was made that increased the activities and duties of this department due to the termination of the Planning Office. In addition, its activities and duties were also extended to include all work relating to PAT and Polish Radio. These two institutions were now accountable to the Council of Ministers and also accountable for the tasks set by the President of the Council of Ministers. One could reasonably conclude that within the Special Tasks Office, one of the most important functions was the centralization of key sectors within the official propaganda: the Government’s press offices, the state Information Agency and the radio. After this structural change, Council of Ministers had six departments: a) Presidential b) Legal c) Economic d) Modernization of Administration e) Office for the Special Tasks f) Personal issues.94 On the eve of war, the necessity for the absolute centralization of propaganda was evident. The first step towards the creation of a Min93 Among them were Colonel Leon Strzelecki and Major Emil Vacqueret, close collaborators of marshal Rydz-Śmigły. They were closely connected with General Kordian Zamorski, Chief of State Police (Policja Państwowa), A. Micewski, Z geografii politzcznej II Rzeczypospolitej [Political Geography of the Second Republic], (Warsaw, 1966), p. 280. 94 AAN, PRM, 20-10-40.

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istry of Propaganda was the introduction of a Commission for the coordination of propaganda (Komitet Koordynacji Propagandy), which worked continuously. This Commission was led by Józef Ołpiński who was director of the Presidential Office of the PRM. The members of this special body were representatives of all key government departments: President of the Council, vice-president of the Council, Minister Interior, Minister of War and OZN.95 It was obvious that all key political figures were involved in this process. These included a representative of Marshal Rydz-Śmigły, who was delegated by the President of the Council and a representative of President Mościcki, who was delegated by the vice-president of the Council. The Presence of OZN party members, plus key Ministries clearly underlined the significance of the newly formed body. The Commission had several different departments: a) Spoken word; b) Radio; c) Theatre; d) Cinema; e) Press; f) Books; g) Holidays and Tourism; h) Public appearances.96 The main tasks of new formed commission were as follows: a) Develop the ideological assumptions and goals identified by the Government Delegate; b) Initiate the different objectives of propaganda; c) Set an agenda of goals and set the time for their realization d) Propose the propaganda plan and identify trends and methods of the implementation, as well as inter-ministerial cooperation; e) Identify resources needed to finance the propaganda campaign; f) Set up the transfer of the Office of Coordination for the implementation of the propaganda goals.97 Member of this Commission was a government delegate who was none other than General Tadeusz Kasprzycki, Minister of War. This spoke for itself.98 A similar document from 1938 it clearly stated the instruments by which the given tasks should be accomplished: 95 Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (Central Military Archive, CAW), Gab. MSWojsk (Cabinet of Minister of War), I.300.1.531, pp. 139–151. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 Kasprzycki Tadeusz (16 January 1891, Warsaw – 4 December 1978, Montreal, Canada) one of the most important Polish militarists, a member of the “First Brigade”, personal assistant of J.Piłsudski in 1919. Kasprzycki was Polish delegate at the League of Nations. Worked at Ministry of War for a long period of time. From 1935, he was Minister of War. After the occupation, he left Poland. During the Second World War, he was interned in Romania. After the war, he lived in Canada.

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Military Institute of Research and Education (WINO) State Office of Physical Education and Military Preparations (PUWFiPW) Association of Legionnaires and Polish Military Organization (POW) Veterans Association Polish Radio Polish Telegraph Agency (PAT) Film Office of the Interior Ministry Press Office of PRM Camp of National Unity’s (OZN) Press League for Supporting Tourism TKKT theater and other organizations.99 According to a Prime Minister’s communications from 10. March 1938 the main goals of this institution were: “Ensuring that the action of propaganda at the end exerts parental influence on the society” and also “coordination and monitoring the implementation of agreed action plan across all ministries, public institutions and other that will be in the scope of its work”.100 As we can see the work of this commission went in to two general directions. One was coordination and control within government bodies and the other to influence public opinion in order to gain dominant influence. The commission was the highest center of planning and propaganda. On October 1938, 102 documents/plans regarding propaganda were enlisted in its protocol. The documents were divided in eight sections: a) general (23); b) film (29); c) radio (17); d) various (22); e) theatre (5); f) publishing (3); g) press (2); h) tourism (1). Protocol was signed by three officers: Lieutenant-Colonel Kiliński from Ministry of War, Major Kencbok and Captain Radecki.101 That is only one example of the dominant role of the military in organizing of state propaganda in the country. According to historian Andrzej Notkowski, the Commission for the Coordination of Propaganda was so significant in the history of the Second Polish Republic that it was one of the most important bodies 99 E. Kaszuba, System propagandy państwowej obozu rządzącego w Polsce w latach 1926–1939 [System of State Propaganda in Poland 1926–1939], (Torun, 2004), p. 359. 100 Notkowski, Prasa w systemie, pp. 321–2. 101 CAW, Gab. MSWojsk, 300.1.531-108/113.

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set up in Poland during this period along with the Office for Internal Propaganda,102 even though both did not operate at the same time. This last change in the organization of state propaganda in Poland led to the formation of the Ministry of Propaganda which came into effect when the war started. One of the measures undertaken to improve relations with the press was to hold press conferences twice a week from June 1939. These conferences were set up by the Prime Minister and they included the editors of newspapers, agencies’ correspondents and all heads of press departments within the government. The aim of these conferences was to control the transfer of information as much as possible in the crisis situation such as the outbreak of war. At this point, it is important to mention Wojciech Stpiczyński as he was probably the most important person in the creation of state propaganda in Poland as he was effectively a member of the government with the same level of authority as the Minister for Propaganda. He was a protégé of Marshal Rydz-Śmigły and was very dynamic, sharp and well known for being confrontational towards opponents. He was also a very experienced journalist and in the 1920s, published a weekly newspaper called Głos Prawdy (Voice of Justice). Stpiczyński did not get along with Walery Sławek and was moved aside during his presidency. At the beginning of the 1930s, he was editor in chief of Kurier Poranny (Morning Courier), which was a very influential newspaper. In this period, he became a close friend and adviser of Rydz-Śmigły. He was one of the creators of the aforementioned reorganization of the Council of Ministers in 1935 with the mission to create a more centralized state propaganda machine. His position at the Council of Ministers allowed him to be chief adviser to the Prime Minister on every issue concerning propaganda. In the well-informed circles, Stpiczyński was already seen as a future Minister of Information and Propaganda and he managed to strengthen the position of PRM in the field of controlling information as the censorship over PAT and government administration was soon established.103 Only the Ministries of War and Interior had partial freedom in their own activity. He died suddenly in August 1936 whilst preparing the Marshal’s visit to France, but his death did not slow down the activity towards the further centralization of state propaganda in interwar Poland. The Ministry of Information and Propaganda was formed in Sep102 The Office of Internal Propaganda operated under the PRM during the PolishRussian war in the 1920s. 103 A. Micewski, Z geografii, p. 238 and Notkowski, Prasa w systemie, pp. 229–231, 234.

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tember 1939 when German troops were already on Polish soil. The head of this Ministry was Michał Grażyński.104 However, this institution was not able to function effectively due to the occupation of Poland, but the formation of this ministry was seen as the final step of the centralization of state propaganda that took place in Poland during the 1930s. MINISTRY OF WAR The Ministry of War was one of the most important centars of state propaganda in interwar Poland. This was not only because of its huge influence on the army, but also because of its influence on civil institutions and government. In one propaganda brochure issued by the Military Institute of Research and Education in 1937, this was very clear. As propaganda objectives, the document underlined the three main issues: - Support for the army amongst public opinion; - Preparation of the public for war; - Detection and control of political opponents.105 All the aforementioned objectives aimed to be established well beyond military level and it can be seen that they were primarily addressed to the non-military sectors. Thoughts and ideas on the “consolidation” of the nation under the name of “defense of the people” were more common in the late 1930s and therefore, the influence of army and military institutions grew during this period. Several different institutions used for propaganda could be found in the Ministry of War. The most important ones were the Military Institute of Research and Education (Wojskowy Institut NaukowoOświatowy, for future references WINO), Ministry of War Press Department, and the State Office of Physical Education and Military Preparations (Państwowy Urząd Wychowowania Fizycznego i Przysposobienia Wojskowego, for future references PUWFiPW). Of the three, WINO was the most developed and most important military propaganda institution. It was created in 1921 under the 104 Michał Grażyński (Gdów, 12 May 1890 – London, 10 December 1965) was a military leader, social and political activist, doctor of philosophy and law, duke of the Autonomous Silesian duchy, scouting activist and president of Związek Harcerstwa Polskiego (Polish Scouting and Guiding Association). 105 P. Stawecki, Następcy Komendanta – Wojsko a polityka wewnętrzna Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1935–1939 [Sucessors of the Commandant – Army and Internal Politics in Second Republic 1935–1939], (Warsaw, 1969), p. 215.

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name of Institute for Education and Publishing (Institut NaukowoWydawniczy). After a number of reorganizations that resulted in the increase of its powers, this body was finally formed as the Military Institute of Research and Education (WINO) at the end of 1934. WINO had four departments, which consisted of sections. These departments were: a) General; b) Scientific; c) Press; d) Budget and Publishing.106 The General Department107 and Press Department were the offices that had the most duties in the propaganda area. The first department was split into the following sections: a) Propaganda, b) Organization and Technical Resources of Propaganda and c) Culture and Education.108 WINO had other institutions, over which it had full control. These institutions were: Central Military Library (Centralna Biblioteka Wojskowa), Main Military Bookstore (Główna Księgarnia Wojskowa) and from 1935, the Corps of Cadets (Korpusy Kadetów).109 The main responsibilities of this institution could seen in an order given by the Minister of War to the chief of WINO: “- Conduct the cultural and educational work in the army under the general guidelines of Vice Minister of War; - Propaganda of ideas and issues of national defense among the troops, trainees, reservists and the broad mass of the population; - Cooperation in countering the propaganda of sedition in the army; - Maintaining the libraries of the army; - Maintaining the press and publishing in the army; - Leading the military, scientific-publishing activity and administrative budget of scientific publication I and II from Vice Minister of War, the principal Chief of Staff”.110 106 L. Wyszczelski, Oswiata, propaganda, kultura Wojsku Polskim w latach 1918– 1945 [Education, Propaganda, Culture in Polish Army 1918–1945], (Warsaw, 2004), p. 193. 107 In 1932, there were only three departments: a) Scientific, b) Culture and Propaganda and c) Publishing. Kaszuba, System propagandy, p. 33. 108 Wyszczelski, Oswiata, propaganda, p. 193. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid.

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WINO developed a very wide and complex propaganda machine. In December 1932, it published 17 different journals.111 In the late 1930s, the publishing activity of WINO was in progress and in February 1939, the “Bulletin of the Press of WINO Press Department” was published every 2–3 days.112 The budget of WINO was 400,000 zlotys, of which 124,000 was spent on military schools.113 In May 1936, on the initiative of Minister of War General Kasprzycki, the Central Coordination Committee of WINO was formed. Its purpose was to coordinate the actions of propaganda within the military, all with the common objective of “defense of the people”. This was a clear sign of the ruling circle’s desire to create a more centralized and more coordinated propaganda organization. Those tendencies were also clear in the government so one could safely assume that there was a general strategy towards a more centralized and controlled state propaganda. In the second half of the 1930s, WINO played an important role in the political consolidation of the nation around the army and Marshal Rydz-Śmigły, thus it can be said that this was one of WINO’s unofficial objectives.114 The Press Office in the Ministry of War was established by Marshal Piłsudski immediately after he regained control of the army. The head of the office was Major Lepecki until the end of 1935 when he became head of the Presidential Office in the Council of Ministers. His post was filled by Captain Karol Koźmiński, a former legionnaire, writer, historian and publicist.115 The main task of the office was to communicate to the press any information about armed forces. As was noted earlier, this office had a certain level of autonomy alongside a similar office inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The State Office of Physical Education and Military Preparations (PUWFiPW) was the third center of military propaganda. It was formed in 1927 and it was directly under the control of the Ministry of War. Its head carried the rank of general, which underlined the importance of this institution. The head was in charge of all military training for young people. This organization was large and in 1937, its membership levels reached 179,000.116 Therefore, the influence of this organization was significant. Notkowski, Prasa w systemie, p. 314. Kaszuba, System propagandy, p. 35. Wyszczelski, Oswiata, propaganda, p. 192. On the development of the cult of Rydz-Śmigły during the 1930s, see more: Kaszuba, System propagandy, pp. 276–314. 115 Notkowski, Prasa w systemie, p. 312. 116 Ibid, p. 318. 111 112 113 114

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The aim for this kind of organization was explained even before it was formed in December 1926 when Captain Tadeusz Zakrzewski wrote in the newspaper Bellona: “If we assume, that (...) all youth will be directed towards growing up in the organization of the army and be trained only by the military, then you can be sure that young people will actually be brought up in the military spirit and on the basis of state laws. It will be possible for them not to be prematurely drawn into the vortex of political struggle and often rescued from the destructive impact of subversive elements”.117 The supervision of adopting military training was held by the district commanders of the corps and regiments. PUWFiPW had its own publishing service and its budget for that purpose was 40,000 zlotys. Alongside WINO, this institution participated in several different activities such as organizing literacy classes, organizing cultural activities, film production, teaching about civil rights, cooperating with the Polish radio etc.118 There were other organizations in the military working in the propaganda industry like the education sections in the Corps District Command (Dowództwo Okręgu Korpusu, DOK). In the districts, they set up independent newspapers and maintained contact between local and military authorities. They also followed the latest political developments and informed their leaders on current affairs issues. The heads of these offices were usually officers in the rank of major.119 Propaganda activities in the army 1935–1939 were focused on centralizing the organization and expanding its influence beyond the military. They thought that winning future wars would depend, to a large extent, on factors of morality and ideology. These factors began to impact on society in two ways. One was through a massive paramilitary organization and other was through the reserve officers’ associations and the veterans association.120

117 Stawecki, Następcy Komendanta, p. 213. 118 For more details see: CAW, Gab. MSWojsk, I.300.1.531-22/24. 119 Stawecki, Następcy Komendanta, p. 212; Wyszczelski, Oswiata, propaganda, p. 194. 120 Stawecki, Następcy Komendanta, pp. 213–214.

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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS During the 1930s, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was run by Colonel Beck, one of the most important Sanacja people. He took the position in 1932 and remained in office until the occupation of Poland in 1939. In the second half of the 1930s, he kept a certain level of independency from both the president’s and marshal’s groups.121 His ministry was primarily responsible for foreign propaganda i.e. propaganda towards other countries. Most of that work was carried out by the Press Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, MSZ). After the reorganization at the end of 1932, the Press Office of the MSZ had two departments: Political and Propaganda, with 30 clerks. These two departments were divided into the following sections: Press Office of the MSZ in 1932 POLITICAL DEPARTMENT General Economy German Anglo-American Romanic countries Northern-eastern

PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT General Propaganda Art-Culture Science

The main tasks of the office were to inform the foreign public about news from Poland and to give information to the Polish media on foreign news. The final structural change of the Press Office of MSZ took place in 1936. As a result of those changes, the organization of the office was simplified and some sections merged. There were now five sections instead of ten under the following structure: a) Polish press – instructing the national press and analyzing public opinion at home; b) Western; c) Eastern; d) Information – providing official news to the national and foreign journalists and transmitting instructions to the diplomatic missions of the Republic of Poland; 121 More on Colonel Beck as Minister see in: O. Terlecki, Pułkownik Beck [Colonel Beck], (Cracow, 1985).

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e) Propaganda – exchange of cultural, artistic and scientific cooperation with foreign countries.122 This organizational structure, the Press Office of MSZ remained until the beginning of the Second World War. The key working tasks and responsibilities of the Office were written and published in 1935, they were: a) Various forms of material and program influence on the national press, PAT, other agencies and radio; b) Supervision of the activities of foreign correspondents of PAT and semi-official agencies; c) Concluding agreements between the Polish and the other states’ press and control over their observance; d) Sovereignty over the foreign press sections through letters and agencies in the spirit of proper exposure of Polish foreign policy and events and domestic issues; e) Studying the foreign and domestic press; f) Organization of arrivals and departures of journalists, scientific exchange, Polish readings and cultural events abroad, the issues of foreign publications on Poland.123 As an example, in an order given by the Press Office of MSZ to the correspondent in Romania (4.II 1936), topics of his propaganda work were also mentioned: financial stability in Poland, development of commerce, development of the city of Gdansk, Polish tourism, literature, music, sport etc.124 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs spent a substantial amount of its budget on propaganda. In the financial year 1931–1932, the budget of the Press Office of MSZ alone was 1.5 million zlotys plus 909,000 zlotys were allocated for diplomatic missions. However, in the financial year 1935–1936, the entire propaganda budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, excluding the press, for organizing lectures abroad about Poland and the popularization of Polish science, culture and art, totaled 4.36 million zlotys.125 According to the opposition, in November 1935, a monthly subsidy was given to several different papers. The list of newspapers and sums that they spent were as follows: Gazeta Polska – 45,000 zlotys; 122 123 124 125

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Notkowski, Prasa w systemie, pp. 427–428. Ibid. AAN, MSZ, mf. 7660, p. 244 Notkowski, Prasa w systemie, pp. 442–443.

Słowo, Vilnius and Wiadomiości Literacky – 10,000 zlotys; Iskra agency, close to the ruling party – 30,000 zlotys.126 The propaganda influence of the Press Office of MSZ was crucial for Polish propaganda abroad and very important at home. Significant amounts of money were spent in order to achieve their goals and this was proof of the strong desire of the ruling circle to maintain and spread their existing influence. CAMP OF NATIONAL UNITY (OZN) Shortly after the formation of the government party, Camp of National Unity (Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego, OZN) in 1937, the Party Propaganda organization was formed. As seen in the final phase of the centralization of propaganda, representatives of OZN participated in the Commission for the Coordination of Propaganda so that they could be involved in making the key propaganda plans and decisions. During its brief existence, even the propaganda organization in OZN underwent structural changes. Chief of Staff Colonel Zygmunt Wenda created the following organizational structure: Organization of propaganda of OZN under Wenda (1938–1939) General Organization Finance Archives

Press Foreign Information Registration Photography

Propaganda Publications Radio Techniques Scholarship/Research Film

Source: E.D. Wynot, Polish Politics in Transition, The Camp of National Unity and the Struggle for Power, 1935–1939, (Athens, 1974), p.191.

Although there were problems with the organization of the party itself, the OZN propaganda department was very active, especially in the election campaign of 1938. As a result, OZN had complete control of the Parliament after these elections.127 Due to its complicated structure, it was difficult to establish how much money was invested in Polish state propaganda in the Interwar period. According to Yugoslavia’s CPB correspondent from Warsaw, the 126 Ibid. 127 Wynot, Polish Politics, pp. 217–234.

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budget for Polish propaganda in 1937 was around 5.6 million zlotys. In the second part of the report, he added that an annual subsidy for PAT was around 2 million zlotys.128 Therefore, funding for the Polish state propaganda was at least about three or four times higher than in Yugoslavia. As a result of the efforts of the ruling circles in the 1930s, their control of the powerful institutions in the information and propaganda industry became much stronger. Privileged positions in the communications industry ensured that Piłsudski’s camp brought cohesiveness to an expanding government hierarchy. The obvious centralization of activities in the field did not completely eliminate opposition within government departments. According to historian Kaszuba, activities of official Government propaganda, both civilian and military, never led to the implementation of a uniform and fully concentrated system. The tendencies in some military circles and OZN’s preferences for strong and even radical solutions in terms of the propaganda apparatus of the state were equally limited and suppressed as they feared the total ban of the liberal-democratic institutions.129 In matters specifically relating to state propaganda in the Second Republic, the army had the biggest influence. Plans and implementation of major official propaganda campaigns were created and carried out directly by the military authorities or by their prominent participation. During the mid 1930s, they had been taken over by the armed forces’ initiatives in this area. In view of the support for public interest on the matter of consolidation, citizenship and national solidarity, the “militarization” and active defense of independence blurred boundaries between civilian and military propaganda. YUGOSLAVIA In the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (from 1929 Kingdom of Yugoslavia), the “general state intelligence services” were under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, except from 1920–1921, when they were controlled by the Council of Ministers. The Central Press-Bureau of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (CPB) was founded in April 1929. This institution 128 AY, 38-51, Letter from CPB’s Warsaw correspondent from 15 January 1937. The correspondent based his calculations on known figures and his assumption on how much money was used from the special funds. 129 Kaszuba, System propagandy, p. 317

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had its roots in the practice already established in the Princedom of Serbia, i.e. from the institution of the Press Bureau. It had been founded as early as the 1860s during the rule of Prince Mihailo Obrenović.130

Politika published The Law on Organization of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and the biography of CPB chief Milan Marjanović on 8th May 1929.

According to the Law, which had only four articles, this institution was meant to be a state information service. According to the same law, the detailed tasks, obligations and the structure of the newly founded body were to be formulated by the President of the Council of Ministers in an appropriate manner. The Law stated that the Central PressBureau should be a constituent part of the Presidency of the Council of 130 The head of this institution was a renowned publicist from Dubrovnik, Matija Ban. For further information see: M. Bjelica, Srpski ratovi rečima 1844–2000 [The Serbian War of Words 1844–2000], (Belgrade, 2003), pp. 21–21.

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Ministers as one of its departments and that a special budget should be set aside for this department as part of the Council’s overall budget (Article 3). A general scheme of the internal organization of the CPB was set by the law as an organization of the Presidency of the Council of 1 May 1929.131 The detailed structure was established in the following years by the Manuals of 1931 and 1935. The head of CPB was an official who was named Chief of the Central Press-Bureau. This position was held from 1929-1941 by: Milan Marjanović,132 Milan Nikolić, Teofilo Djurović,133 Kosta Luković, Boško Bogdanović,134 Predrag Milojević135 and Milorad Radovanović. The 131 Službene novine Kraljevine SHS [Official Journal of Kingdom SHS], N0. 105XLII of 7 May 1929 – Zakon o uredjenju Predsedništva Ministarskog Saveta [The Law on Organization of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers] of 1 May 1929. 132 Milan Marjanović (Kastav, Istra, 12. V 1879 – Zagreb, 21.XII 1955) was a journalist, writer, critic and film director. He attended high school in Karlovac, Rijeka and Zagreb and trade school in Prague. He was one of the leaders of the movement against the Hungarian administrator in Croatia ban Kuen Hedervari (Károly Khuen-Héderváry). Marjanović was one of the founders of the Yugoslav Committee during the First World War. After the War, Marjanović was a member of the Yugoslav delegation at the Peace Conference in Paris. He was the founder of various newspapers throughout Yugoslavia. Marjanović was the first president of State Film Central in 1932. During the Second World War, he was interned in Italy. After the war, he was a writer, director and literary critic. 133 Teofilo Djurović was born on 8 March 1896 in Gornji Milanovac (Central Serbia). He was educated in Serbian high schools. After the military retreat through Albania in 1916, he studied in France. His faculty education was completed in Poitiers. He gained PhD degree in Paris in the field of political and economic sciences. He joined the service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 1919. Djurović performed various duties. He was a clerk of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and served in Czechoslovakia, France, Austria and Italy. In his short time in Vienna, he was the Acting Consul General. From 1930, he was on duty in the Legal department of the MFA. Djurović was the Head of the MFA Press Department in 1932. He was appointed as Chief of the Central Press-Bureau and in May 1934, temporarily becaming the acting head of the institution. Then, he was adviser to the Royal Embassy in Paris. In 1934, he became Consul General in Valona (Albania). From 31 October 1938 until the beginning of World War II, he was Consul General in Thessaloniki (Greece). He later immigrated to Canada. 134 Boško Bogdanović (1888–1945) completed his primary and secondary education in city of Valjevo (Western Serbia). He graduated in Classical Philology at University of Belgrade. He was professor in Third Belgrade High School, National Teacher’s Academy and Trade schools in Skopje. Bogdanović was a long time associate and Chief Editor of the newspaper Vreme. During the Second World War, he cooperated with the government of general Nedić who was appointed by the Germans. In 1944, he tried to escape to Germany, but he was captured. He died during the deportation to Yugoslavia. Bogdanović spoke Latin, Greek, Italian, German, English and French. Patriarch Varnava Rosić and Minister Interior Korošec were his close friends. 135 Predrag Milojević (1901–1999) was a journalist all his long life. After high school, he studied philosophy at the Faculty of Philosophy with the famous professor Branislav Petronijević who chose him to be his assistant. Shortly after that, he quit his studies and became correspondent of the most important newspaper in

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Chief’s mandate was not specified and they were appointed, removed and retired by the existing government. It should be noted that the first head of CPB was supposed to be Toni Šlegl, the director of the Zagreb newspaper Novosti and a close friend of King Aleksandar. However, he had been killed shortly before he was to take up his post.136 The Chief of CPB had the rank of vice minister and he was responsible to the President of the Council and the government. The department was divided into three sections: Administrative, Information and Publishing. Each of these sections had its own head who reported to the Chief of CPB. Heads of departments had the same rank and privileges as the State Secretary. The above mentioned document on the organization of the Council of Ministers,137 stated the exact duties of each of the departments of CPB. The Administrative department was responsible for the conduct of administrative affairs of the staff, i.e. receiving and sending mail, letters etc. This Department also had a Secretariat whose responsibility was to deal with all complaints from the staff, whether business or personal. The Information Department was responsible for collecting and providing information on a variety of different national issues dealing with politics, economy, finance, culture etc. The principal function of this department was to inform domestic and foreign citizens about the existing situation in Yugoslavia. Another important feature of this department was to collect information about the foreign and domestic press as well as maintain the data archives and a library. The Central Press-Bureau was constantly seeking to improve the organization as much as possible and formal legislation, governing its structure, was passed in March 1931. Beside the Chief of CPB, a Deputy Chief of the institution was introduced. This duty, in later years, was often performed by some of the heads of departments. The division on Administration, Information and Publishing remained unchanged, but there were some changes within all these departments. The Publishing Department dealt with the news service pertaining Yugoslavia Politika. After the dictatorship of King Aleksandar was established, Milojević lost his regular column, but still became a foreign correspondent for Politika from England and Germany. In addition to journalism, he did some translating work. After the Second World War Milojević worked in Politika for a long time. He was even fired twice but rehired. 136 В. Драговић, Српска штампа између два рата, Основа библиографије српске периодике 1915–1945 [Serbian Press Between Two Wars, Basis for Bibliography of Serbian Press], (Belgrade, 1956), p. 382. 137 Službene novine Kraljevine SHS [Official Journal of Kingdom SHS], No. 105-XLII of 7 May 1929 – Zakon o uredjenju Predsedništva Ministarskog Saveta [The Law on Organization of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers] of 1 May 1929.

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to propaganda abroad, whilst the Information Department dealt with information propaganda services at home. In 1931 for the benefit of all the clerks, 56 different instructions were issued. It is important to note that the establishment had two separate archives - confidential and administrative. It is interesting to note that in 1931, there were around 3,900 files in the administrative archives and about 12,000 files in the confidential ones.138 This summed up the secrecy of the institution. The majority of CPB employees were clerks and they were divided into two groups. The first group consisted of full time staff while the others were only part-time. It is interesting to note that clerks of the Central Press Bureau had specific benefits. They were allowed to advance within the civil service, regardless of their academic qualifications and experience which was obligatory for career advancement in the case of other state department officials in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. CPB officials thought that these benefits would enable them to recruit more staff from the national pool of journalists, regardless of their qualifications. So clerks were recruited and allowed to advance to a position that corresponded to their rank and reputation in journalism as well as to their personal competence and performance.139 It is easier to understand the actual number of employed and their duties in CPB if we look at the following scheme: The structure of CPB in 1931 Staff of the Central Press-Bureau and their rank Duties Number 1 Chief of Central Press-Bureau 1 Deputy chief of CPB 4 Heads of Sections and secretaries 12 Clerks 4 Secretary of Sections and secretaries 12 Proofreaders 1 Redactor 2 Stenographers 15 Typist 33 Correspondents 40 Other staff 125 TOTAL Source: AY, 38-1, Izveštaj o radu CPB-a za 1931. godinu [Annual CPB Report for 1931].

The number of CPB employees varied in future years, but usually it was around 150.140 In addition to this number, there were a number 138 AY, 38-1, Izveštaj o radu CPB-a za 1931.godinu [Annual CPB’s Report for 1931]. 139 AY, 38-1, Izveštaj: „Organizacija štampe i propagande u Jugoslaviji” [CPB report entitled “Organization of the Press and Propaganda in Yugoslavia”]. 140 In 1940 that number was 167. CPB, Annual Report for 1940, Manuscript held in National Library in Belgrade.

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of associates who were not officially on the payroll. This was done because of the secrecy of their work so they were not even mentioned in the report, but they did work for the CPB.141 Central Press-Bureau employees were different, not only in the level of their education, but also in their temperament and behavior. Among them were people with PhDs, professors, writers etc. Many of them worked for CPB more for material gains than due to their personal political and moral convictions. The salaries and benefits that this job offered were way above average when compared with other jobs in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In addition, one could not ignore the possibility to advance within the CPB structures thus gaining social status and positions, the possibility to travel, earn good money etc, but all these benefits brought competition, rivalry, conflicts of interests and intolerance among CPB employees. Milan Jovanović Stoimirović, who for decade worked for CPB or close to it, referred to it as the “wasp’s nest”, “the pit in which different types of insects crawl”, “the mad house in which much wickedness was accumulated”.142 Correspondents in the country and abroad played an important role in realizing the propaganda goals set by the institution. Their key task was to be a link between the central institutions and the editorial boards of the newspapers in the area entrusted to them. The duties of the correspondents abroad were practically identical. They were, firstly, responsible for monitoring the work of the press and had to report to the central institutions on regular basis. They had to inform on the press and on political events in the entrusted area every week. They were obligated to send a complete report of their activities and on the work of the correspondence center at the end of each month and year, and sometimes every three or six months. Besides these regular duties, the correspondents also had to cooperate with all political, national or cultural activities organized in their sector. They had to fulfill all the tasks given to them by the central institution in order to produce all the desired results for the CPB. There were also supervisors in charge of the press in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. They paid regular visits to the editorial offices and kept in touch with the editors and the journalists to whom they gave 141 Some employees were record under nicknames like French citizens e.g. Leon Savajian was known as Leo. AY, 38, Payrolls, box number 3. 142 М. Јовановић-Стоимировић, Дневник 1936–1941 [Diary 1936–1941], (Novi Sad, 2000), p. 72 and p. 387.

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instructions, and made threats when necessary. The success of their work depended on the competence of the correspondents themselves as well as the department in which they worked. The complaints of the correspondents about the lack of cooperation of the local media were frequent, especially in the Croatian parts of the country.143 The Central Press-Bureau in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had regular correspondents, not only in Belgrade, but also in each of the nine banovinas.144 They were located in the centers of the banovinas, but also often made trips into the provinces. The seats of the regular correspondents in the country were: Ljubljana in the Drava Banovina, Zagreb in the Sava Banovina, Banja Luka in the Vrbas Banovina, Split in the Primorska Banovina, Sarajevo in the Drina Banovina, Cetinje in the Zeta Banovina, Novi Sad in the Danube Banovina, Niš in the Morava Banovina and Skopje in the Vardar Banovina. In addition, there were correspondents in Sušak and Osijek in Dalmatia and Slavonia. As far as foreign countries were concerned, the propaganda organizations had their correspondents in the most important European capitals and in the capitals of neighboring countries. The regular CPB foreign correspondents were posted in London, Paris, Berlin, Geneva, Rome, Sofia, Prague, Budapest, Warsaw, Bern, Vienna, Athens, Bucharest, Washington, Brussels and Frankfurt. In 1931, the foreign correspondence centers were closed in Brussels and Frankfurt and a new center was established in Tirana. The correspondents posted abroad were called press attaches affiliated with the Royal Legates (embassies). This change was introduced in order to stop the ongoing practice of provisional granting of titles.145 The duties of the foreign correspondents were to an extent more numerous and complex than those of their colleagues back home. They were expected to be completely at the disposal of the state. The correspondents, nevertheless, kept some level of independence regarding the entrusted tasks. Their additional duties were to monitor the newspapers and publications in their area, inform the state on these issues, react to any unfavorable mentions of the country in the foreign press, offer help in writing denials and similar official documents, connect the state and the editorial board of the newspapers, make sure that the highest possible number of articles on the country got published in 143 AY, 38-11, Izveštaji dopisnika iz Primorske banovine [The Various Reports of the Correspondents from the Primorska Banovina]. 144 Banovina was an administrative unit of the internal division in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia introduced by King Aleksandar in 1929. 145 AY, 38-1, Pravilnik o atašeima za štampu (čl. 1) [Book of Regulations Regarding the Press Attachés (Article 1)].

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foreign newspapers and of course, report on regular basis to the central institutions in Belgrade. Bearing in mind all the enumerated duties, it seemed that the most important qualification for correspondents, besides being competent, was to be well acquainted with the situation in the country they were posted to and, above all, to cultivate contacts with the key people in power and the editing staff of the newspapers. In order to achieve this, it was necessary for the correspondents to have certain experience in this line of work, many years of service in the given country and of course, a good command of the local language. It was noted, in the reports on the correspondents’ work, that they were not as efficient in their jobs as they could be because of their frequent relocations. New correspondents needed time to become “acquainted” with the “important people” and to gain trust and distinction in the new country. Of immense importance to them, besides the usual activities, was the so called “invisible propaganda”. This consisted of their normal daily activities – visits to the editorial staff, restaurants, taverns, talking to people, giving information which formally had no official character. These activities could, depending on the professionalism and talent of the correspondent, have had more far reaching effects than their regular activities. Regular correspondence with the central institution was carried out by written reports, phone conversations and codified telegrams, depending on the importance and urgency of the news. Some of the correspondents had problems with their telegrams being read, thus they could not inform openly on the real situation at hand. In such cases, they turned to various options, such as visiting the home country for the purpose of presenting reports. The famous Yugoslav writer Miloš Crnjanski was one of the correspondents who encountered these sorts of problems during his service in Italy. He had to send some of his reports through the Legate.146 The correspondents found it considerably easier to get information on certain celebrations, such as public holidays into foreign newspapers than to push their country’s political agenda. In England, for example, articles on the Yugoslav royal family were published quite often, due to their family and friendly ties with the English royal family. The principal aims of propaganda produced by the Central Press-Bureau in the first years after its foundation was to explain and justify the new course established by the King’s dictatorship. 146 M. Crnjanski, Nova Evropa [New Europe], (Belgrade, 1991), p. 139.

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The very establishment of CPB could be associated with the establishment of the dictatorship regime. The King needed an institution that could justify and explain his actions to the domestic and foreign public, especially foreign allies like France and Czechoslovakia. After the constitution was reinstated in September 1931, one of the main propaganda aims was to familiarize the foreign and domestic public with it. The entire CPB propaganda was divided into political, cultural and touristic. The period of Milan Stojadinović’s government (1935–1939) brought significant changes to the intensity, scope and the structure of the Central Press-Bureau. The first such change was the implementation of the new manual in November 1935. This manual helped to define more precisely the tasks and structure of CPB.147 It was important to note that Milan Stojadinović changed the existing manual only ten days after taking over the presidency in 1935.148 It was obvious from the beginning that Stojadinović was well aware of the importance of this institution for the state propaganda. His personal ambition to succeed on the domestic and international political scene should not be forgotten. The latter was, of course, more understandable if it were not for the fact that Stojadinović was not just Prime Minister but also Minister of Foreign Affairs. His more active foreign policy helped the work of CPB and opened relations with some countries like Italy and Bulgaria. Bilateral agreements with these countries were signed in 1937 and relations with these countries improved.149 During the entire period of Stojadinović’s government, the Chief of Central Press- Bureau was Kosta Luković. He held the position from April 1934, even during the rule of King Aleksandar, up to January 1935 when he was shortly replaced by Teofilo Djurović, but quickly reinstated to the post. The fact that Luković kept the post was one of many examples of Stojadinović’s pragmatic policy. He accepted people 147 AY, 38-1, Poslovnik o radu u Centralnom Pres-birou Predsedništva Ministarskog saveta [Manual of Central Press-Bureau of Council of Ministers]. 148 This information was written even in introduction of the Manual. 149 On the agreement with Italy see: M. Buccareli, Mussolini e la Jugoslavia 1922– 1939 [Mussolini and Yugoslavia 1922–1939], (Bari, 2006), pp. 327–383; E. Milak, Italija i Jugoslavija 1931–1937 [Italy and Yugoslavia 1931–1937], (Belgrade, 1987), pp. 132–141. On the agreement with Bulgaria see: Ž. Avramovski, Balkanska Antanta [The Balkan Alliance], (Belgrade, 1986), pp. 250–260; К. Манчев, Югославия и международните отношения на Балканите 1933–1939 [Yugoslavia and International Relations on Balkans 1933–1939], (Sofia, 1989), pp. 137–179.

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on the basis of their expertise and personal loyalty to him, not whether they were members of the Radical Party. This attitude caused clashes with members of the People’s Radical Party who initially cooperated with him.150 Luković was a prominent journalist, founder and director of the newspaper Vreme, and he served in the Serbian Press Bureau during the World War I in 1914/1915.151 When Milan Stojadinović came to power, Luković already had considerable experience as a Chief of the Central Press-Bureau, but the new manual gave him more power. He led all the CPB activities (Article 1) and all legislation was formally signed by him, apart from the one which he authorized the heads of departments and certain officials (Article 2) to sign.152 The Chief of CPB was considered to be an immediate reference to the Prime Minister in his relations with the press and propaganda, both at home and abroad. In fact, Luković received orders directly from Stojadinović and answered only to him. When one considered his position and power, Kosta Luković was a key figure in planning and conducting propaganda in Yugoslavia.153 He gave numerous instructions to correspondents, both home and abroad. These instructions were wide ranging from any moderately important issue, every speech from the president, every public appearance or performance by the ministers etc. The interpretation of these instructions was sent to correspondents home and abroad. Such interpretations differed in size and frequently ranged from short telegraphic instructions to ten pages of text. These depended on the importance of specific events, harm or benefits that could arise from such events. The case of the Concordat can be taken as an example of an issue that demanded a huge propaganda effort from CPB and the cor150 On this conflict see more: T. Stojkov, Vlada Milana Stojadinovića [Milan Stojadinovic’s government], (Belgrade, 1983), pp. 90–114. 151 Kosta Luković was born in 1886 in Belgrade. He was educated in France at Rennes 1906/1907, where he defended his dissertation in the field of literature in 1933. Luković was a clerk at the Arts Department of the Ministry of Education and was one time head of the National Theater in Novi Sad. He received domestic and foreign decorations – the Order of White Eagle Order V level in 1928 and the Order of the Republic of Czechoslovakia and France (1926 and 1934). For successful service in CPB, Luković received the Order of St. Sava, the second level in 1938. In the fall of 1944, the Yugoslav partisans executed him as a collaborationist. 152 AY, 38-1, Central Press-Bureau’s Manual from 11 November 1935. 153 M. Jovanović Stoimirović, Varia o Pres birou, Manuscript Department of Matica Srpska, document, M 13.314, p. 70a. In one of his papers, Milan Jovanović Stoimirović referred to Luković as an intelligent, but lazy man. Interestingly, the observation was made that he was significantly influenced by Stanislav Vinaver, writer, former correspondent from Berlin and later Chief of the Publishing Department.

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respondents themselves. The position of the government was shaken by the decisive protest of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the summer of 1937. That protest gathered strong opposition, from the right to the communist left.154 The text of the Concordat, the mysterious death of the patriarch and skirmishes on the streets demanded an immediate response from the propaganda center. On that occasion, Luković sent instructions on a daily basis that diminished the seriousness of the crisis, by presenting a smaller number of demonstrators and incidents. He accused opposition groups who were allegedly supported by “leftist and extreme elements”.155 Instructions sent by Luković were produced primarily in the interest of the government and secondly in the interest of truth. That did not automatically mean that all the instructions were incorrect, but that the priority was to present the situation in the best interests of the government, especially from the Prime Minister’s perspective. One can also note cases when the Prime Minister was not satisfied with Luković’s work. Thus in September 1935, the Chief of CPB was criticized that information sent by Luković to the press in the afternoon was “too late” and that this needed to be published next morning. This order was sent on behalf of Stojadinović by his chief of staff Jovan Gašić.156 Throughout the period of its existence, the institution was in search of the best organizational practice, which would make it possible for them to fulfill their set objectives. These “uncertainties” were best illustrated by the fact that the operating regulations of CPB were passed in March 1931. They relied on existing laws and these defined the structure of the department in more detail. The Chief of the Press-Bureau was a civil servant with the title of the Chief of the Central Press-Bureau, and he had deputy. There were three departments: Administration, Information, and Publishing.157 This division within CPB was the most lasting one. The rationale behind it was that, although it did not function perfectly, it was still written in the manual. It was very likely that the Department for Radio 154 More about the Concordat crisis in Yugoslavia see: M. Mišović, Srpska crkva i Konkordatska kriza (Serbian Church and Concordat Crisis), (Belgrade, 1983); Р. Радић, Живот у временима: Гаврило Дожић 1881–1950 (Life in Times, Gavrilo Dozic 1881–1950), (Belgrade, 2006), pp. 156–186. 155 AY, 38–1, Kosta Luković to all correspondents on 22 June 1937. It was said that this report had been sent from the “highest place”. 156 AY, 37-73-97. 157 AY, 38-1, Izveštaj o radu CPB-a za 1931 [The Report on Work of the CPB for the year of 1931].

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Broadcasting was added to these three departments in 1939.158 The detailed organizational structure of CPB in the late 1930s can be see in the following table: Organization of the Central Press-Bureau at the beginning of 1937 THE THE THE PUBLISHING ADMINISTRATION INFORMATION DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT Section for Activities Section for Public Regarding the The General Section Relations with the Enforcement of the Foreign Press Press Law Section for Section for National The Secretariat of CPB Propaganda in the Political Propaganda Sphere of Culture Section for Political Section for Press Service Monitoring Section for Press Monitoring in the Country Section for Radio Broadcasting Section for Film and Tourism Section for Economic Issues Section for Photography

Throughout this period, the activities of the Administration Department remained unchanged, but it is important to examine the work of the two other departments: Information and Publishing. Firstly, it is important to examine one of the key sections within the Information Department, the Section for Activities Regarding the Enforcement of Press Law. This section was solely responsible for the preventative inspection of the press, magazines, books and other printed documents. During the 1930s, press legislation passed in January 1929 came into effect. This was one of the first pieces of legislation passed at the start of the King’s dictatorship and it was very strict regarding the press. This remained until the end of examined period. Although, the 158 AY, 38-1, Izveštaj: “Delokrug rada Centralnog Pres-biroa Predsedništva Ministarskog saveta” [The Report “The Domain of Activity and Work of the Central PressBureau of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers]. After analysis, the text was dated to 1939.

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Press Law formally proclaimed the freedom of the press against any preventive inspections, in practice this was not the case. According to Article 14 of the Press Law, any newspapers could be prosecuted for the slightest offense. After three such prosecutions within one month, the newspapers could be definitively closed down. Due to this strict legislation, newspapers had to show CPB copies of their forthcoming articles for a inspection every day before they were published. This was preventative censorship that gave the press a very limited amount of freedom. Outside Belgrade, this type of work was performed by state prosecutors or the police administration where there were no prosecutor’s office. This job was carried out by directives and instructions from CPB and these were sent by telephone and telegraph to save time.159 This section, in addition to carrying out activities related to the implementation of the Press Law, instructed newspapers daily on every subject, which in its opinion, could be harmful to the general public and national interest. 160 In addition to controlling the local press, the state prosecutors and police administration exercised control over foreign journalists who came into the country. They also monitored the import and sale of certain foreign newspapers in Yugoslavia. The final decision on this matter was made by CPB and it was strongly influenced by the editorial viewpoints of foreign newspapers. CPB would approve of those newspapers which did not focus on political issues and dealt with cultural issues. Other newspapers were evaluated by their location and in some instances, according to the level of their country’s relationship with Yugoslavia. For example, CPB approved of the Bulgarian newspapers Dnes and Utro as they were from a country seen as “friendly” to Yugoslavia. For a better understanding of the extensive work of this department, see the table below with information taken from the annual report on the work of CPB in 1936.

159 Interesting cases occurred in Croatia, especially when the state prosecutors took out entire paragraphs from some articles and newspapers. They were then published with blank spaces in the place of the censored text. Newspapers editors then used this to draw attention to to state repression and stifling of the freedom of the press. 160 For more examples see AY, 38-88.

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Monthly preventive examination in the Belgrade area161 Types of sheets and their scope Daily newspapers Weekly and biweekly issues Weekly and biweekly issues in 1/4 Biweekly and monthly in 1/8 Typed radio lectures Typed oral news Different reports for the newspapers Books in various foreign languages in 1/8

Approximate number of pages 1,800 3,168 922 1,658 1,200 96 450 4,000

This strenuous work was performed every day from 9am until midnight and special shifts were organized to review all kind of papers, regardless of the printed language. Different proof-readers participated in the examination of foreign newspapers.162 This department published a daily bulletin on its activities from which one could see the editorial opinions of newspapers and their stand towards important state issues. At the beginning of 1936, the Information Department established the Section for National Political Propaganda. The main goals of this section were to increase the propaganda activities and increase its influence on the press at home and abroad. They had to supply newspapers plenty of information on a daily basis on issues ranging from politics, economy, finance to culture and tourism. By establishing this section, the CPB showed their intention to influence the newspapers to write “in the spirit of national ideology and policy of the Royal Government” and to use them to gain influence over people. The Section for National Political Propaganda supplied newspapers with both general and more specific material depending on the profile of the newspaper. Special in-depth articles were written on the occasion of major celebrations and national holidays like Unification day (1st December) and the birthday of King Petar II (5th September). In 1936, the department submitted news and reports to almost 80 newspapers, which published a total of about 20,000 different articles.163 161 Centralni pres-biro, Izveštaj o radu za 1936. godinu [Annual Report for 1936], p. 9. 162 There were proofreaders for: Russian, English, Hungarian, German, French, Bulgarian, Czech, Polish, Romanian and Slovakian languages. 163 Centralni pres-biro, Izveštaj o radu za 1936. godinu [Annual Report for 1936], p. 12

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As an example on the impact of the Central Press-Bureau on public opinion in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, see the table below, which consists of information submitted by CPB and their utilization by the most influential media in the state. Usage of CPB’s data by different media in 1936 Media Radio Avala Agency Samouprava Vreme Pravda Politika Provincial press

Delivered 1,460 1,800 1,050 1,050 1,000 900 5,700

Used 780 1,500 950 700 700 400 4,000

Percentage 53% 83% 90% 67% 70% 44% 70%

Table prepared by the author based on data from: CPB, Annual Report for 1936, p. 19.

It can be seen that the largest percentage of CPB data, 90%, was used by the government party newspaper Samouprava (Yugoslav Radical Union – JRZ). In 1936 Samouprava published 266 issues and according to the above given data, the enormous influence of CPB can be seen. Newspaper Pravda was similar to Samouprava, but it was not influenced as much by CPB data. On the other hand, newspaper Politika, which tried to be neutral and objective, used only 44% of CPB material, the least out of all media outlets. This data clearly stated the extent to which some media outlets were close to the government. Another innovation in CPB made by Stojadinović’s government was the establishment of the U.S. Service immigrant press within the Section for National Political Propaganda. This service followed all Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian newspapers and even the newspapers of Bulgarian-Macedonian emigrants in the United States, Canada, Argentina and Chile. This service had two tasks. One was to monitor the separatist propaganda, both Croatian and Bulgarian-Macedonian. Secondly, the service was encouraging and helping those newspapers that were on the “border of national and state unity”. These were sent various articles, photographs and materials that expressed the “real” situation in the distant homeland.164 The report on the activities of the service, in addition to praising their own work, listed some problems and made suggestions for the improvement of the service. An interesting report, stated that “separatist” and “federalist“ newspapers were more skilled 164 Some titles of articles that best described these tendencies: “For the United Yugoslav State”, “The Ideal is Achieved”, “We Will Defend Her and Succeed”, “Maček and Pavelić”, “One Nation – One State”, “Croatian Perpetuum Mobile”.

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than “patriotic”. This was explained by the fact that they obtained material mostly from Europe and had better educated editors.165 The foreign policy of the Balkan countries, which needed some sort of clarification, created additional problems for the correspondents abroad. They sometimes had to make exceptional efforts to clarify some points. In some cases, in addition to the text of the Prime Minister’s speech, the correspondents were given special instructions, which varied from one country to another. As an example, it is important to mention Stojadinović’s address to the National Assembly of 9 March 1938. The correspondent from Paris received instructions to put special emphasis on the “standing ovations” and “applauses” after the mention of France, whereas the correspondent in Berlin was told that “great applause” followed the mention of the German Reich”. Naturally, the positive reception of France was left out of the second instruction for the Berlin correspondent.166 In addition to the activities of the correspondents at home and abroad, special attention was paid to co-operation with the foreign correspondents that were, permanently or temporarily, posted in Yugoslavia. Special efforts were made to maintain the best possible relations with them. The correspondents were offered all sorts of “benefits” in order to make them more susceptible to “suggestions” and to gain as much control over their work as possible. The process of attempting to gain a foreign correspondent’s approval was manifold, e.g. organizing: tea parties, excursions to the countryside, receptions with the heads of the departments and receptions by the chiefs or the directors themselves when very important journalists were concerned. Foreign correspondents were offered all the material they needed to do their jobs properly. The propaganda institutions had standardized articles which dealt with different issues regarding various aspects of daily life and the history of the country. However, relations with foreign correspondents were not always smooth. There were cases when their reports were put on hold until they were changed into something which was regarded as “acceptable” for the government of the host country. This occurred with a Reuter’s correspondent in Belgrade on the day of the parliamentary elections, 11th December 1938.167 165 Centralni Pres-Biro, Izveštaj o radu za 1936. godinu [Annual Report for 1936], p. 24. 166 AY, 38-1, Cirkular za dopisnike [Circular Notification for the Correspondents] 9 March 1938. 167 AY, 38-93, Izveštaj predsednika CPB-a Koste Lukovića predsedniku vlade o radu stranih novinara za vreme izbora [The Report of Chief of CPB, Kosta Lukovic, to the president of the Government on the work of foreign journalists during the elections].

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The results achieved by the propaganda institutions were not insignificant, but they were not always completely successful. This can be said for the Yugoslav case in particular. Although the whole propaganda machinery was set up for the benefit of Prime Minister Stojadinović,168 he was re-elected with a considerably smaller margin than expected in the parliamentary elections of 1938. This, amongst other things, brought about his eventual downfall.169 The Political Service of the Central Information Department of CPB reported exclusively on domestic and party politics. Its main task was to inform the public about the work of the National Assembly and Senate and to draft reports on the activities of the parties. Those reports were published via Avala Agency by its bulletin “News from the Country” and broadcast on the radio. This department kept records, archives and statistics of the complete political history of the all parties in Yugoslavia. The Central Press-Bureau had its own Photography Department in order to make its propaganda more convincing and striking. This department had extensive archives, with tens of thousands of negatives. Their content was not only political and cultural, but historical and touristic. With by far the largest photo archives in the country, CPB was in a dominant position in relation to the competition provided by the photo services of other newspapers. They submitted material to the large number of domestic newspapers. This was especially appropriate for the provincial press in the poor parts of the country which were under-equipped and did not have their own photo-service. This photo material provided by CPB was often the only one used in those newspapers. Very soon after the establishment of the JRZ regime party, this department became the service of the party. It photographed important party events and rallies and made resized photos of party leaders, pri168 For details on propaganda during the rule of Milan Stojadinović see: P. Lažetić, ‘Milan Stojadinović i predizborna kampanja 1938’ [Milan Stojadinovic and Election Campaign in 1938], Zbornik Istorijskog muzeja Srbije N0. 25, (1988), pp. 117–139; J. Опра, ‘Изборна кампања Милана Стојадиновића 1938 године’ [Milan Stojadinovic’s Election Campaign in 1938], Arhiv Year II No. 2, pp. 171– 185; Б. Симић, Пропаганда Милана Стојадиновића [Milan Stojadinovic’s Propaganda], (Belgrade, 2007). 169 For further details on the descent of Milan Stojadinović from power see Љ. Димић, Историја српске државности, [The History of Serbian Statehood], III, (Novi Sad, 2002), p. 182; D. Biber, ‘O padu Stojadinovićeve vlade’ [About the Fall of Stojadinovic’s Government], Istorija 20.veka, Zbornik radova VIII, Belgrade 1966, pp. 5–66. и Д. Тешић, Југословенска Радикална Заједница у Србији 1935–1939 [Yugoslav Radical Union in Serbia 1935–1939], (Belgrade, 1997), pp. 389–401.

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marily Stojadinović, but also others like Korošec, the Interior Minister and leader of the Slovenian wing of the JRZ and Spaho, who was leader of the Bosnian wing. Of all photos made during the 1936, 26% were of founders of JRZ and the organization itself.170 During Stojadinović’s government, Yugoslavia experienced moderate economic recovery after the economic crisis that had adversely affected the country in early part of the 1930s. Informing the domestic and foreign public on the work of the government in the field of economy was the responsibility of the Sub-section for Economy and Finance. These tasks were performed by a group of domestic and foreign journalists who were involved in the development of CPB’s publications, lectures, radio programs, etc. They were also involved in the preparation of various presentations associated with the opening of new factories or plants which was a common event at that time. Although the work of this sub-section was very important, “where one potentially misleading piece of news could cost the country millions”, only a small number of employees were involved. In addition to the Chief of this sub-section Vladimir Skerl, there were only a few clerks.171 If we consider the importance of the economy for the Stojadinović government, this is a surprise. Skerl asked for more employees and the transformation of this sub-section into a department because its lack of “organic contact” with the press and the authorities, but this request was refused.172 This sub-section had an active role in the propaganda activities regarding the registrations of loans that were connected with government’s new economic program. Considering its working conditions, the sub-section for Economy and Finance had recorded solid results, especially in collecting information from its domain. This sub-section supplied the most information for the propaganda publication connected with the government anniversaries. The Publishing department had three main tasks. Firstly, it had to inform the public, directly or indirectly through a correspondent on the situation in the country. Secondly, to prepare material for journalists and foreign correspondents and thirdly to collect data on cultural life and minority issues and make a bulletin based on the monitoring of foreign and local press on a daily, weekly and monthly basis. 170 CPB, Report, p. 77. 171 AY, 38-1, in one moment, there were only three clerks, The annual report of Subsection for Economy and Finance for 1937. 172 AY, 38-1, the letter of Vladimir Skerl to Kosta Luković from 19. February 1937. He referred, in this letter, to his previous unsuccessful attempts to reconnect with others important factors in the area.

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Milan Stojadinović said: “I will not allow our grain to be sold cheaply”. Taken from publication Три године владе др. Милана Стојадиновића [Three Years of Milan Stojadinovic’s Government], (Belgrade, 1938), p. 53.

However, one of the most important duties of this department was to publish special publications. Every year, a large number of newsletters and publications were published regarding political and cultural issues. Special effort was put in the publications that were published for the anniversaries of the Stojadinović government. Kosta Luković sent instructions received from the Prime Minister in 1937 to the ministries who were asked to submit data on what had been done in their domain. Such letters were sent several months before the anniversary dates. The main reason for this was that CPB needed time for additional work on the material and later for the transfer of this material to domestic and foreign journalists and correspondents. The result of this action was the publication of a book called “Two Years of Milan Stojadinović’s Government”. The following year, preparations were even more systematic and progress was made during 1938, which was the year of the parliamen76

tary election. This included collected data of almost 500 pages issued with the same title containing full data, high quality photos, charts with the success and progress in every field in the country. At the time, these luxury publications reached certain standards that even nowadays deserve some respect. Carefully chosen photographs of the Prime Minister were printed. Photos showing him with all the major foreign politicians whom he met over the years as well photographs taken of his talks with workers and peasants, photographs showing him in Parliament, at the openings or laying the foundation stones for of new hospitals, factories or any new facility etc. In addition to the material in Serbian, propaganda articles were also written in foreign languages. The material marking three years of Stojadinović’s government consisted of fifteen articles in French and German, three in Italian and two in English.173 These articles were adjusted to suit the readers of that specific country. The institution was financed by regular and secret funding. As an illustration of the allocation of these funds, it is important to note the budget of CPB for 1931, which totaled 18,180,580 dinars.174 The 11,580,580 came from regular funds and 6,600,000 dinars came from the secret funds.175 This amount remained almost unchanged throughout the following years. It is important to note that the chiefs of the Central Press-Bureau were never satisfied with the considerable financial means allocated for the activities of this department of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. Their constant complaints about the lack of funding reappeared in numerous reports throughout this period.176 According to official Government statistics, Stojadinović’s government increased the budget of CPB in 1936–37 by 1,700,000 dinars.177 173 AY, 38-1. 174 AY, 38-141. The initial draft of the budget drawn up for CPB totaled 36,580,580 dinars. It also had a paragraph reffering to publishing activities in the country and abroad, which suggested a budget of 20 million dinars for these activities. 175 The draft of the budget for the period 1929/1930 (the first year of the existence of the institution) was specific in so much as the 3,400,000 dinars came from regular funds and 9,600,000 from the secret ones. This can be explained by imprecise calculations of the possible expenditures of the institution at the time when it had not been in operation. Naturally, there were also cases later on when the secret funding was boosted due to specific needs and exceptional expenditures. 176 AY, 38-1, Izveštaj: “Delokrug rada Centralnog Pres-biroa Predsedništva Ministarskog saveta” [The Report “Domain of Activity and Work of the Central PressBureau of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers”] of 1938. It is interesting to note the emphasis placed on the fact that Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary had twice as high budgets, which was, as stated, also the case in all the neighboring countries. 177 Previous budget was 18 million dinars. According to one earlier report, it stayed unchanged up to Stojadinović’s government. AY, 38-141.

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Although this seemed as a large increase, one must be bear in mind that some new items were introduced to the budget and that the increase was less in real terms.178 At this stage, it is important to mention the relationship between Prime Minister Stojadinović and the Central Press-Bureau. Stojadinović was a politician who knew the importance of state propaganda as well as the importance of his own personal propaganda. While in office, he made many improvements in this area. In addition, he personally participated in propaganda campaigns by advising CPB Chief regularly as well as writing drafts on articles on both himself and the activities of the government. The interest of Prime Minister in the propaganda activities of the Central Press-Bureau could be explained by the fact that there was more political freedom in the country than in previous years and therefore it was more difficult to gain the trust of the people. In addition, the success of propaganda in a totalitarian state was seen as very beneficial for the Prime Minister who, during his time in office, often used CPB to fulfill his own personal ambitions. Sometimes it was difficult to distinguish between Stojadinović promoting himself in his role as Prime Minister and promoting the state. This tendency increased with time and Stojadinović gained more power as a result of these activities. After the fall of Stojadinović’s government in February 1939, the Central Press-Bureau continued its propaganda work. The key tasks in this period were the promotion of the Cvetković-Maček Agreement179 and the defense against hostile propaganda from abroad. The second task was more complicated as the situation in Europe deteriorated with the outbreak of war. The stand of the government and its policy of “strict neutrality” were increasingly difficult to maintain as the number of countries who took part in World War II increased. Activity abroad was severely interrupted by the outbreak of war. In 1940, there were some organizational changes in CPB. These included the Section for Activities Regarding the Enforcement of the Press Law, which was handed over to the Interior Ministry. This 178 It related to purchase of free railway tickets for the staff and some difference in the exchange rate of the dinar that was previously conduct by the Ministry of Finance. 179 The agreement between Stojadinović’s successor Dragiša Cvetković and leader of Croat Peasant Party, Vladimir Maček was made in August 1939. A new Croatia Banovina was formed from the earlier Sava and Primorska ones plus some parts of other banovinas. Maček also agreed to participate in the government as vicepresident. This agreement could be seen as beginning of the dissolution of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. More about the agreement see in: Lj. Boban, Sporazum Cvetković-Maček [The Cvetkovic Macek Agreement], (Belgrade, 1965).

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stripped the Central Press-Bureau of one of its most important functions.180 During the same year, some of their offices abroad were closed: in Paris, Brussels and Geneva. A correspondent from Paris was relocated to the Vichy, the center of Marshal Pétain’s government. A new bureau was opened in Moscow as a result of improved relations between Yugoslavia and Russia. The CPB Service for Minorities was formed and new correspondents in the border areas were located in this region. These special correspondents’ role was to monitor the writing in the press. This change was caused by the ambitions of the revisionist states in the region and the justified concerns that the Yugoslav regime had about these states. In this period, the institution of the Central Press-Bureau continued to gather information about the newspapers, press in general and journalists. They monitored 107 local newspapers, 25 daily and 82 others, while press clipping was made from a total of 139 different newspapers.181 Before the end of its activity in the country, the Archive of CPB contained about 2,670 files of people and institutions as well as 7,000 in their newly formed database.182 As explained earlier, The Central Press-Bureau preformed the role of the Ministry of Propaganda in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, without officially being recognized for performing these tasks. Its role was carried out in two principal ways. It controlled the press and radio and practiced censorship. These roles were actively carried out in co-operation with the Prosecutor’s Offices and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On the other hand, the CPB delivered information on not only key political issues, but also day-to-day non-political issues thus informing the public on all matters of national interest. Besides the Central Press-Bureau, there was the Press Office of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Press Office of Ministry Interior. Those two institutions also dealt in propaganda activity, but their influence, in comparison with the CPB, was minimal.

180 An regulations from Ministry of Foreign Affairs even predicted the transfer of the CPB’s correspondents abroad to this institution. It was not clear if that really happened, but complaints from the CPB were noted. AY, 38-1. 181 Centralni pres-biro, Izveštaj o radu za 1940.godinu, [Annual Report for 1940], Administrative Section, p. 6. 182 Ibid, p. 4.

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BULGARIA The organization of Bulgarian state propaganda started as early as the 19th century. One of the key steps in that direction was the establishment of the Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency (BTA) in 1898. The Press Office was first founded on 5 December 1913, with the mandate to coordinate propaganda activities in Bulgaria. In this period and later, in the twenties the main focus was on foreign propaganda which was the result of the lost war and territories that were considered Bulgarian. During the 1930s Bulgarian state propaganda went through two different phases. The first one ended in 1934 with the establishment of the new regime on 19 May. The second, more important period, ended in March 1941 when Bulgaria entered World War Two. The main characteristics of this phase were: consolidation of non-party regime and the state became the main factor, not only in the political life of the country but also in regards to the economy.183 At the same time the international situation began to change and the agreement reached at Versailles started to weaken. All these factors were elements for a more active and organized state propaganda. At the beginning of the 1930s the main propaganda institutions were under control and supervision of the two different ministries, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Railways, Posts and Telegraphs. Most of the institutions were colligated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The exact division of responsibilities can be seen in the following table: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ministry of Railways, Posts and Telegraphs

Press Directorate

Radio

Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency

Press Distribution

Press Department Department for Information and Documentation

Significant change in organization of propaganda came with the change of the regime in Bulgaria in 1934. Political group Zveno came 183 Н. Поппетров, Бележки вьрху бьлгарската политическа пропаганда (1918– 1941) [Notes on Bulgarian Political Propaganda (1918–1918)], Историческо бьдеще 1–2/2011, pp. 17–18.

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The act of establishing the Directorate for Social Renewal published in the State Journal on 9 June 1934.

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to power by a military coup.184 State propaganda was one of the priorities of the new regime and establishment of one central propaganda institution soon followed. Directorate for Social Renewal (Дирекция на обществена обнова) was established on 6 June 1934. It was subordinated directly to the Prime Minister. Its tasks were explicated in the decree that followed three days later: a) to deal with the spiritual life of the country in the direction of unification and reconstruction in the service of the state and nation, b) to work on raising the prestige of the nation, to follow the spiritual life abroad and inform about development and the needs of the Bulgarian material and spiritual culture, c) to take part in organizing the people into one ideological nationwide group.185 The above mentioned decree stipulated that the Directorate was funded from the budget based on laws that would be subsequently adopted. This and the special rules that precisely define the organization of the Directorate should be made by the government. The Directorate was managed by a Director, who dealt with all state and municipal offices and heads of departments who formed a Standing Committee appointed by the Prime Minister. The selection and appointment of regular and part-time staff was the prerogative of the Director who submitted separate applications for approval of the Prime Minister. The Directorate consisted of a Secretariat, Internal and Foreign Service department with following functions: I Internal Service Department: a) Section 1 – Guiding the press: clarifying government matters to the press to enable it to properly enlighten the public on the manifestations of state power. b) Section 2 – Press Control; Pre-emptive censorship of all published material, stopping everything that undermines public order, security and morality. c) Section 3 - Public education: to infiltrate into all environments, to cultivate a new spirit in the midst of sport and other organizations, to organize lectures, meetings, radio lectures, films and theater plays.

184 More about Zveno see: B. Задгорска, Крьгьт „Звено”: 1927–1934 [The Circle “Zveno” 1927–1934], (Sofia, 2008); В. Мигев, Утвьрждане на монархофашиската диктатура в Бьлгария 1934–1936 [Consolidation of the MonarchoFascist Dictatorship in Bulgaria 1934–1936], (Sofia, 1977), pp. 25–75. 185 Дьржавень вестникь [State Journal], 9 June 1934, N0. 54, p. 937.

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II Foreign Service Department (Press Directorate): a) Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency (BTA); b) Press and Information; c) Newspaper “La Bulgarie”.186 Beside establishing an office in the capital there were a few regional sections headed by directors. These directors were also appointed directly by the Prime Minister.187 Their tasks were to follow the instructions that came from Sofia. That, which characterized the Directorate as a modern propaganda institute at the time was a significant effort to educate and re-educate people. The following instructions found in the Prime Minister’s personal archive illustrate this concept: 1. To impose upon the minds of the citizens new conceptions of state and government as the only ones that will push for progress; 2. T  o impose and fortify faith in the founders of the state; 3. T  o suggest ways to achieve the spiritual content of the new citizen and the implementation of the new state; 4. To create the perfect image of this country to make this image a fountain of inspiration, and introduce creativity into the ordinary life of the citizen, to create a cultural elite of the nation; 5. To encourage grouping of citizens, submitting them to spiritual renewal in order to create a creative and militant force of the new age; 6. To show the enemies of the National Revival - their methods and leaders.188 Along with the resurgence of cultural institutions, theaters and associations and distribution of printed propaganda materials, the primary role of the “spoken word” (agitators) was demanded, who have to be used as channels of propaganda through “personal meetings, radio and mobile cinemas of Ministry of Education”.189 Although the influence of the German system was visible, the system was not a carbon copy of German one. According to Kiril Chukanov, formulations such as “ideologically unified nationwide group” provided 186 Ibid, p. 938. 187 Бьлгарските дьржавни институции 1879–1986 [Bulgarian State Institutions 1879–1986], (Sofia, 1987), p. 80. 188 Из личния архив на Кимон Георгиев [From Kimon Georgiev’s Personal Archive], edited by К. Aнчова, М. Тодоракова, (Sofia, 2008), p. 71 189 Ibid, pp. 71–72.

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ground for reflection in this direction, but in reality, as it become clear in the one-year period of its existence, the Directorate was developed as a state institution with relatively modest capabilities (but mostly quite adequate for the Bulgarian conditions) mainly for domestic propaganda.190 The founders of the Directorate clearly found its role model primarily in Nazi Germany and in the Soviet Union. That is obvious in the document on the supervision and development of cinema in Bulgaria. The author of the text stresses the importance of propaganda in film, points to the experience of Germany and the Soviet Union and requires supreme control over the development of this very modern industry, at the time.191 It should be noted that while it existed this propaganda center did not particularly manage to employ high quality human resources and provide for adequate financial founding. The number of the staff in the capital and at regional level cannot be established with precision, but from January – February 1935, when the institution was fully consolidated, it did not exceed 140 – 150.192 The Directorate for Social Renewal during its relatively short existence had several directors which indicated some changes in the ruling groups. The first director of the institution was Penchev Petko (Петко Пенчевь), a longtime journalist, lawyer by profession and one of the founding members of Zveno. In one of his first statements after taking the office Penchev clearly revealed the government’s intentions for and objectives of the new institution. On that occasion, he said that “the Directorate has the task to create a new state for the new citizen”. His answer to the question how it will be done was: “in the spirit of state discipline and social prosperity”.193 The directorate had two separate departments from the very beginning. At the head of two were chiefs who answered to the director of the institution. The first one, the Press Department whose activity was coordinated by the Directorate of Social Renewal covered propaganda, the domestic press, organization of intellectual cooperation, use of radio, film, books. The head of this department was Georgi Kulishev (Георги Кулишевь), an experienced journalist, director of several newspapers like Slovo (“Слово”), Svobodna rech (“Свободна реч”), Makedoniya (“Македония”).194 190 К. Чуканов, Бьлгарска национална пропаганда и неината институтионализация (1934–1947) [Bulgarian National Propaganda and its Institutionalization 1934–1947], Unpublished B.A thesis, p. 28. 191 CDA, fund 232к, the unit of description 1, archival unit 20, pp. 12–19. 192 CDA, 232k-1-20. 193 Утро, 14 June 1934. 194 Ibid.

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The second one, Department for Education and Social Reconstruction, had a more difficult task whose aim was to organize people into one ideological group that would accept and spread the new ideas of the regime. The head of this department was the writer Vladimir Polyanov (Владимирь Поляновь).195 Certain rules of conduct had already been established by the head people in the Directorate. What particularly attracts attention is the definition of what criticism is and what kind of criticism is allowed. At a meeting held with all newspaper’s editors Penchev said that the criticism would be allowed but not destructive criticism only a “loyal and constructive” one.196 That clearly and unambiguously banned any possibility for critical writing. The only possibility writers and journalist had left at their disposal was to give suggestions that would improve and expand the impact of governmental propaganda. As a measure of control and a way to side step any questions about what and how to write special meetings were scheduled every Thursday between the journalist and the Head of the Press Department, Kulishev. In September 1934 the Directorate changed its name and certain changes in its organization and operations were made. It was renamed Renewal. The new-old goal was to “prepare and organize a Bulgarian citizen, women and youth in the spirit of the new national conditions and social life”. The proclaimed objective should be achieved in the following ways: a) by educating and organizing the Bulgarian citizens and youth in the spirit of selfless service to the state and nation; b) by controlling the development of society, encouraging renewal; c) by propagating the ideas of the new state and explaining them to the people.197 The name change was accompanied by a change of directors. The new head of Renewal was Colonel Krum Kolev (Крум Колев), head of the Military Academy. The arrival of Kolev was justified by the fact that the Directorate required a more active reorganization that would be more suited to perform the previously set objectives. A month later he was replaced by Petar Popzlatev (Петърь Попзлатевь), reserve army major, the most influential head of Renewal in its history. He was a very active and ambitions man also known as a good public speaker. He introduced military discipline and put the sign on his office 195 Ibid. 196 CDA, 232k-2-4/49. 197 Дьржавень вестникь [State Journal], No. 161, 16 October 1935, p. 2433.

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doors: “I do not have more than two minutes for any visitor”.198 In one of his speeches he stated the apoptosis of the regime: “The accomplishment of 19th May is a holy deed. Our goal is heroic, noble and lofty: to inspire the Bulgarian spirit to unite the Bulgarian people in a spiritual whole, to enable the maximum manifestations of spiritual and material forces of the Bulgarians, to perpetuate, finally, our Bulgarian historic mission”.199 In one of his reports to the Prime Minister Toshev (Андрей Тошев) explained his understanding of propaganda work that had to be done by his institution: “Propaganda has become even more necessary today, when a modern state system is being built, when we are leaving the old epoch and entering a new one, when the men who lead the country must be manly enough and have the courage to do something that can be unpopular. The unpopular has to be prepared on time, and precisely formulated to be understandable by the people. To place a nation before major events and challenges overnight, is not a sign of wisdom and foresight. Therefore, people must be prepared not only politically and economically, but also psychologically to face the new facts of life”.200 We can see that Popzlatev was well aware of the new tendencies in modern Europe. Propaganda was pretty much seen as a weapon which could be used to achieve goals of the new regime in Bulgaria like in some other, especially fascist countries. The organization gained its final shape in October 1934. The structure was as follows: a) b) c) d) e) f)

Secretary Section “Propaganda” Section “Control and Guidance of the Press” Section “National Education” Section “Organization of the Professions” Section “Organization of the Youth”.201

This new structure shows that the new aim for Renewal was not only to spread the regime’s propaganda but also to try to organize peo198 П. Чинков, Сега ще чуете нашият коментар [Now You Are Going to Hear Our Comment], (Sofia, 2001), p. 266. 199 П. Попзлатевь, Волюта на нацията [The Will of the Nation], (Sofia, 1934), p. 47. 200 CDA, 284К, description 3, archive unite 42, p. 5. 201 Дьржавень вестникь [State Journal], No. 161, 16 October 1935, p. 2433.

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ple into different groups. Special attention was paid to the youth which was a trend in contemporary Europe and neighboring countries.202 During its short existence Renewal developed significant activity. Accents were both on printed and spoken word. Several propaganda brochures were published with the speech of Prime Minister Kimon Georgiev: “19. May and New State” and Popzlatev’s speeches: “New State and Workers” and “The Will of the Nation”. In one campaign in July, 70,000 banners with slogans were put up all over Sofia and the provinces and propaganda slogans were even placed on city trams.203 Renewal founded new newspapers like Novi dni (Нови дни, New Days) and Plamak (Пламьк, Flame) that became instruments of the new regime. Much effort was put in recruiting and instructing special public speakers and agitators. According to the some data available in the press in 1934 Renewal organized 3,062 meetings. Of these 2,527 with local speakers (82.5%) and 535 with speakers that were send from capital, Sofia for the occasion (17.5%). Total costs of the organization were 127,838 leva, ie. the first group of 36,500 (28.5%) and for another 91,338 leva (71.5%).204 Special attention was paid to the character of the new agitators. The ones to be selected were those: “who fanatically believe in the new ideology, ones whose manner of speaking is lively and passionate, whose spirit to fight has been awakened, and the ones who are ready to bear the new cross of apostleship disregarding all the obstacles and difficult circumstances of our reality”.205 Considering the fact that Bulgaria was mostly an agricultural society Renewal made plans to extend propaganda activity in the provinces. It planned to enlist the help of every mayor, form the action committee which was supposed to consist of people of “competence” like: medics, teachers, priests, agronomists, representatives of patriotic organizations etc. During 1935, Renewal tried to establish official cooperation with the Italian Ministry for Press and Propaganda. The Bulgarian propaganda institution was especially interested in the organization of radio and film propaganda.206 The cooperation did not have time to develop because Renewal soon ceased to exist and their plans for future activities were terminated. The fact that Renewal asked help from Fascist Italy is indicative of their role models. 202 For the Greek case see: M. Petrinaks, The Metaxas, pp. 18–26. 203 К. Чуканов, Бьлгарска национална, p. 32. 204 CDA, 232k-2-4/50. 205 К. Чуканов, Бьлгарска национална, p. 36. 206 Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS), Ministero della Cultura Popolare (MinCulPop), Propaganda presso gli stati esteri 18.7, busta 38.

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According to official data the budget of Directorate was 5,306,000 leva. It was allocated in the following way: salaries 860,919; material expenses 789,327; and office expenses 1,727,204 leva.207 We can say that this was not a large institution but we have to bear in mind that Renewal was a new institution for Bulgarian society that was in the process of development. By the order issued on 1 July 1935 Renewal ceased to exist. That fact was explained by the need for a reorganization of this institution. The institution was dissolved and its responsibilities were divided between various different institutions. The allocation was as follows: the youth organization was placed with the Council of Ministers; the Press and Control of the Press Office with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Propaganda Department with the Ministry of Internal Affairs; Care about publics reading rooms, library, theater and cinema with the Ministry of National Education and care of professional organizations with the Ministry of National Economy.208 It can be concluded that Renewal was dissolved, at least partly, because its founding and activity was tied to the Zveno political group that was overpowered in mid 1935 by King Boris III.209 The order officially terminated the existence of a single centralized organization that deals with the organization of state propaganda in Bulgaria. Propaganda returned as a single institution with the beginning of the Second World War, the establishment of the Directorate, and then the Ministry for National Propaganda Actions. Despite the fact that there was no central propaganda institution in Bulgaria from 1935 to 1941, we cannot speak about the absence of state propaganda influence. Indeed, the Council of Ministers did not have a central institution, which combined functions of propaganda, ideological control and influence, but there was no lack of institutions and certainly no “absence” of propaganda impact. All functions of Renewal were taken over by other government institutions, mostly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior. There were among others the Press Office, the Press Control, and Section “D” inside the Ministry of Interior. Using these institutions the Council of Ministers was able to filter information, not only by using censorship, but by a selection of provided information, preventive and repressive surveil207 Дьржавень вестникь [State Journal], 8 October 1934 , N0. 154, p. 2348. 208 Дьржавень вестникь [State Journal], 1 July 1935. 209 Н. Поппетров, ‘Личността на цар Борис III като специфичен образ в идеиния живот на авторитарна Бьлгария 1935–1943’ [The Personality of King Boris III as Specific Image in the Life of Authoritarian Bulgaria 1935–1943], in: История и обществознание 5–6/1990, pp. 11–20.

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lance of the information content, limited distribution of articles, advertisements and any other printed works. In the following pages the functions and structure of the most important propaganda institutions of the period will be presented. From the second half of 1935 up to the beginning of the World War Two the most prominent propaganda institution and the one with the most influence was the Press Office as was the case in the early thirties. Its main task was foreign propaganda but influence over domestic public opinion cannot be overseen. Beside the Press Office there was also Press Control whose main task was to oversee the press in the Bulgaria. The structure of the Press Office was determined in 1937 by the Internal Manual issued by Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The institutions functioned in the following organization: Organization of the Press Office in July 1937210 PRESS OFFICE SECRETARIAT

INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTATION DEPARTMENT

Secretariat Archive

Political Archive Cultural Archive Biographical Archive

PRESS DEPARTMENT

BULGARIAN TELEGRAPH AGENCY

The director of the Press Office was appointed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and was his direct link to the press. He was in charge of all activities in the institution and responsible for its work. The Secretariat and Departments had their own chiefs who were subordinate to the Director. As we can see the Press Office consisted of four departments: Secretariat, Information and Documentation Department, Press Department and the Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency.211 While the Secretariat was in charge of the usual type of administrative business, the most important section of the Press Office was the Information and Documentation Department. Its main tasks were: a) to supply Bulgarian royal legations and consulates abroad with the propaganda material: articles, brochures, books, photos, records, notes etc; 210 CDA, 325-1-162, Вьтрешен правилникь на Дирекцията на печата [Internal Manual of the Office for the Press]. 211 More about Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency in the following chapter.

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b) to supply all individuals with necessary material, Bulgarians or others, who wrote, lectured or did any other work for Bulgaria abroad; c) to publish and spread various publications intended to enlighten foreigners about Bulgarian society, Bulgarian culture and all development in Bulgaria; d) to participate in organizing various international, collective or individual efforts like concerts, theatric production and similar events abroad; e) to follow Bulgarian cultural activities abroad, and foreign cultural activities in Bulgaria, and to give assistance where necessary; f) to conduct the necessary correspondence and maintain relations with Bulgarian participants at the international congresses abroad and foreign participants taking part at international conferences held in Bulgaria.212 In addition, the Information and Documentation took over the archives: Political Archive, which kept printed materials on Bulgaria clipped from the foreign press, and other important foreign publications in the field of international politics; Cultural Archives, that stored information about Bulgarian cultural activities in the world, of the cultural activities of foreigners in Bulgaria and systematized information on the cultural activists of those who participated in important cultural events in the country; Biographical Archive, that collected personal data, both about Bulgarians and foreigners, among others: politicians, writers and artists.213 The Information and Documentation Department had broad powers pertaining to state institutions dealing with cultural diplomacy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which meant that it could also have specific propaganda tasks that involved espionage. Thus, it is not surprising that the database collected by the Information and Documentation Department could have been used not only for soft diplomatic purposes. The main task of the third department named the Press Department was to follow, on a regular basis, the foreign press in the all matters relating to Bulgaria. In addition it had to publish following issues: 1. Review of the foreign press (press clips or short summaries of arti212 CDA, 325-1-162, Вьтрешен правилникь на Дирекцията на печата [Internal Manual of the Office for the Press]. 213 Ibid, pp. 4–5.

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cles); 2. Official review of the foreign press (documents of foreign governments or high officials); 3. Reports on the Balkan states; 4. Weekly report on the Bulgarian capital and provincial press.214 The institution during the thirties kept pace with the times and improved its structure. The fact that the correspondents received orders to monitor and report on how the neighboring countries organized their propaganda institutions implies that this was a matter of considerable importance. They were mostly asked to gather and send information on the technical organization of the institutions, means of control, the organization of the press and its activities.215 The activities of the Press Office were financed from the budget which came from the funds allocated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The press attaches who were posted abroad received their salaries from the funds of the embassies and legations that employed them. During the 1930s, the Press Office had five different directors: Ivan Popov (Иван Владимиров Попов, 1925–1933),216 Todor Hristov (Тодор Христов, 1933–1934),217 Dimitar Naumov (Димитьр Анастасов Наумов, 1935),218 Nikola Balabanov (Никола М. Балабанов, 1936– 1938)219 and Georgi Serafimov (Георги Константинов Серафимов, 214 Ibid, p. 7. 215 CDA, 325-1-162-254, The order of the director of 6 November 1936. 216 Ivan Popov (1890–1940) was a diplomat and journalist. He studied philology in France and Germany and law at the University of Sofia. Popov was press representative in Bucharest (1923), worked in the Bulgarian Embassy in Budapest (1933–1935), was ambassador in Belgrade (1937–1940), the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Religions (1940–1942) and ambassador in Budapest (1944) where he committed suicide. His property was confiscated by the tribunal of Socialist Bulgaria. Popov was rehabilitated in 1996. 217 Todor Hristov (1890–1940) was a diplomat. He completed classical gymnasium in Varna and was a teacher from 1909 to 1912. After graduating law, Hristov became a lawyer in 1923. His started his diplomatic career in Vienna (1923–1924) and later continued in Berlin when he was press secretary and attaché. In 1934, Hristov was the principle secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ambassador in Berlin in 1935. Next year, he was transferred to Ankara. His diplomatic carrier and life ended while serving as an ambassador in Moscow in June 1940. 218 Dimitar Naumov (1893–?) was a diplomat. He completed the French school in Istanbul and studied law in Sofia. From 1920, Naumov was one of the secretaries in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from 1922 to 1924, he was secretary to the King’s office. From 1936, he was ambassador in the United States. 219 Nikola Balabanov (1886–?) was a lawyer and diplomat. He graduated law in Montpelier (France) and Sofia. From 1912 to 1921, Balabanov was a judge in one of Sofia’s courts. He was a government agent to the Italian-Bulgarian Court of Arbitration in Rome from 1923 to 1930. Balabanov worked at embassies in Rome and Paris (1931–1935). In the second half of the 1930s, Balabanov was ambassador in Prague (1938), Paris (1939) and then later in Ankara (1943). After the Second World War, he immigrated to the United States.

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1938–1940).220 All of the directors were well educated and with significant experience gained abroad, they did not have a precise mandate and they were changed according to the will of the ruling circles. Two of them, according to one report, Balabanov and Naumov were the people that the King trusted the most.221 It is important to underline that the directors of the Press Office were also directors of the official news agency, BTA. This fact made the director one of the key figures for the organization and development of state propaganda in the country. The Press Control in the late 1930s had a budget of around million leva annually. The exact figures can be seen in the following table: Budget for Press Control 1936–1939222 Year 1936 1937 1938 1939

Annual budget 916,000 910,000 1,009,000 1,050,000

The Yugoslav CPB correspondent claimed that there was a considerable difference between financial means spent on propaganda activities at home and abroad. The Government of Prime Minister Kjoseivanov financed two daily papers Dnes (Днес, Today) and La Parole Bulgare (Bulgarian Words) and a few smaller provincial ones. Subventions to Dnes amounted to 100,000 leva per month.223 The financial means came from the special dispositional funds. During 1937 those expenditures amounted to 6 million leva.224 On the basis of the data offered, as well as on the basis of the structure and activities of the Press Office we can conclude that at that time Bulgarian authorities focused 220 Georgi Serafimov (1890–?) was a Bulgarian diplomat. He completed high school in Sofia and law in Nancy (France). He worked in one of the Sofia courts in 1920 and after a year, he joined the diplomatic service in Rotterdam (Netherlands). From 1940, he was secretary in the government, Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister from 1940 to 1943. In 1944, Serafimov was Chief of Protocol in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He resigned at the beginning of 1945. 221 Архив на Бьлгарска телеграфна агенция [Archive of Bulgarian Telegraph Agency], (BTA), box 1, Справки за БТА, материали за историята на БТА…, Report made in May 1952 for the new Socialist regime in Bulgaria. 222 Статистически годишнак на Бьлгарското царство 1939 [Annual Statistical Survey of the Bulgarian Kingdom 1939], (Sofia, 1937–1940), p. 640. 223 AY, 38-141, Izveštaj dopisnika CPB Boška Radovanovića od 15. januara 1937. godine [The Report of CPB Correspondent Bosko Radovanovic of 15 January 1937]. The amount of these subventions grew to 120,000 leva during 1937. 224 Ibid.

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more on propaganda activities abroad. The propaganda work of somewhat lower intensity in the country could, perhaps, be explained by the fact that the authoritarian regime in the country was already consolidated by the mid thirties. The Bulgarian Press Office in comparison with the Central PressBureau, had fewer employees. During 1936 their number was 77 and that number remained unchanged a few years later.225 The Press Control had only 19 clerks in 1939.226 This, no doubt, had to do with the difference in size of the two countries, as well as with a somewhat more difficult task that lay ahead of the CPB. Proof that the duties of the correspondents were far from insignificant is the extensive order of the head of the Press Office of the time, Nikola Balabanov, dated 26 April 1938 in which he enumerated the duties of the correspondents in detail on no less than five pages. It is interesting that the first of their various duties to be mentioned is learning foreign languages as a basic precondition for the fulfillment of the given tasks. The orders were more explicated instructions that were written in the above mentioned manual.227 Director Balabanov also stressed that every correspondent should be strictly obedient to the consul or representative of Bulgarian embassy and their action should “always be in accordance with the permission” of the later.228 The director also sought ways to improve the efficiency of his institution. In his order to all correspondents dated 6. November 1935 he asked for data on foreign counterparts. He specifically asked for information about: a) how many directories and press offices the country had and who controlled them; b) their organization (chief, personal, condition of the work etc.); c) what kind of publication they had; d) if they had secret press reviews. Finally he asked for one copy of each of their publications.229 Although the Press Office ardently fulfilled its duties throughout the thirties initiatives appeared for the establishment of a separate Ministry of Propaganda. The proposal of Venceslav Protich (Венцеслав Протич), the director of the pro-government Dnes and La parole bulgare, dated 22 November 1938 was submitted to Prime Minister Kjoseivanov. At the beginning he explained the propaganda organization in Italy, Yugoslavia and Romania. It can be said that he did not have 225 Бьлгарските дьржавни, p. 40. 226 Статистически годишнак на Бьлгарското царство 1939 [Annual Statistical Survey on Bulgarian Kingdom 1939], (Sofia, 1937–1940), p. 628. 227 CDA, 325-1-162/44-48. 228 Ibid, p. 45. 229 CDA, 176-20-56/254.

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complete knowledge of the three countries’ organizations but his information was very reliable. He proposed one institution with the three different sections: Organization of City and Country Youth, Section for National Propaganda and Culture and Section for Tourism. The most important part of this new directorate would be the Section for National Propaganda and Culture that should be divided into there parts: Press, Radio, Cinema and Spoken Word.230 Protich saw nationalism to be the main ideal of the government which should “serve as opposition to communism, social estates and partisanism”.231 The project also proposed that the Press Office and BTA should be part of the newly founded institution. This suggestion reflected both personal initiative and a certain level of dissatisfaction with the work of propagandistic institutions, as well as the desire for their constant improvement and adaption. A similar idea can also be seen in the project of Petar Lungov (Петьр Лунгов), president of capital’s journalist assossiation, the following year. He also explicated propaganda organizations in contemporary Europe and expressed his regrets that Bulgaria “is one of few countries that did not develop its propaganda organization”.232 In his paper he pointed out some flaws in the existing propaganda service especially the way radio and cinema was used. His suggestion was that the new telegraph and news agency must be established, formally independent but practically in the service of the government. He pointed out examples of Germany and Poland.233 It is interesting that he also praised the Polish propaganda organizations in the sector of film making, underlining the role of the Polish Telegraph Agency. At the end he concludes that: “Propaganda has now become a weapon, equal in its force to the military and economic ones. In the complicate system of this weapon, which one nation should be armed with, in order to become victorious in the contemporary world crisis, the spiritual weapon should not be forgotten. This weapon is forged by the service of propaganda. It is used not only abroad, but also at home – and the one, who does not forge it in time, risks losses, on both the domestic and foreign front”.234 230 CDA, 176-20-56/46-50. 231 Ibid. 232 CDA, 176-20-56/1. 233 Ibid, p. 2. 234 Ibid, p. 7.

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These proposals did not immediately change the organization of propaganda but their impact could not be overseen. Lungov’s proposals were submitted after the German attack on Poland which only stressed the necessity for change in the organization of propaganda. However, changes did take place soon and state propaganda was raised to higher level. At the end of the period under review one other institution was formed - the Press Surveillance Service that was established by the special decree in 1938. Lack of data has not allowed precise analysis of its operations to be made but the basic functions of this institution are clearly stated in its name. The organization of the state propaganda in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the 1930s was complex and somewhat difficult for a historian to reconstruct due to a lack of sources. Many similarities but even more differences could be found in the state propaganda of the countries under review. The propaganda apparatus functioned in the two main directions: at home and abroad. The main task of domestic propaganda was probably the control of information to the public. That was accomplished firstly by “filtration” of the news and secondly by censorship. As we saw control of information and censorship were part of the state propaganda of three countries. One could say that it was the primary objective of the propaganda organization. This task was not easy because of the existence of the opposition that was active in the whole period under examination. Even under difficult circumstances, the opposition was very strong and that was true, especially for some periods (Yugoslavia in 1938, Poland and Bulgaria in 1935). An even bigger problem for state propaganda was perhaps the opposition within i.e. conflicts of interest within the ruling circle, from top to bottom, from government members to basic clerks. Vanity, rivalry, personal vendettas were serious problems for the functioning of state propaganda organizations in these countries. In times of limited and restricted democracy, those problems were more acute and more frequent. One of the most important similarities between Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was the fact that key propaganda decisions were made by small groups of people, often by informal groups. The existing propaganda structures were only present to legalize decisions that had already been made. They were well financed and their job was one of the most esteemed in the administration.

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Press Offices existed in the countries under review and this was commonplace in Europe of that time, as was seen in the preceding chapter. They were present in every significant ministry, but the important ones were placed in the Council of Ministers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Interior Ministry. During this period, changes occurred that made all three countries different. Poland had the most autonomous press offices in the Council of Ministers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of War until the end of this period. In interwar Yugoslavia, the Central Press Bureau was formed and this meant that the press offices within Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior became less important. Bulgaria was somewhere in between. At some point, Bulgaria had a central organization and before and after press offices that functioned separately in the different ministries. The Press Office within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs controlled most of the foreign propaganda together with the embassies’ employees, foreign press correspondents and the national telegraph agency. Judging by the budget levels, that could not be fully established in my study because of government secrecy acts, Poland spent the most money on foreign propaganda in the 1930s. That was understandable, not only because Poland was the biggest of the three reviewed countries, but also due to a complex situation that was dictated by its geographic position between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. There were several similarities between the propaganda organizations in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and propaganda organizations in Germany and Italy. It is correct to say that some of the ideas and structural models in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were copied from Germany and Italy (for example, the organization of the Committee for Coordination of Propaganda in Poland was very similar to the Fascist Ministry of Popular Culture). However, every propaganda organization was unique due to many factors such as cultural differences and specific political backgrounds of each state. It is my personal opinion that fascist copies were made mainly because they seemed to work in practice in Germany and Italy and less for the political affinities or dislikes of those regimes. However, the later cannot be dismissed either. The tendency towards increasing centralization of the state propaganda organizations in Europe during the last decade before the Second World War was also apparent in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. These tendencies, so obvious in the countries under review in the 1930s, had a logical ending in the creation of separate propa96

ganda ministries in Poland and Bulgaria after the outbreak of war. In Yugoslavia, the ministry already unofficially existed in the form of the Central Press Bureau during the whole of the examined period. After the Second World War broke out the organization of propaganda in the three countries went through a considerable transformation. In the Poland there was a brief experiment with the Ministry of Information and Propaganda (Ministerstwo Informacji i Propagandy) which was formed on 2. September 1939, only a dozen days before the the country was occupied. There was no time for this institution to develop and work to the full capacity. After the occupation of Yugoslavia in 1941 CPB ceased its operation in the country, which can be practically considered as the end of its activity. The propagandistic organization which was operated by the Royal Government in London, in respect to the circumstances and the conditions, was considerably different. On the other hand, Bulgarian state propaganda became much better organized and achieved an even more prominent place in the state hierarchy. The Directorate of National Propaganda (Дирекция на националната пропаганда) was founded on 4 April 1941. During 1944 it developed into the Ministry of Propaganda. The change of the state organization and social structure of these countries that took place after the Second World War brought the organizational structures of the propaganda institutions, which were the topic of this book, to a definitive end.

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Chapter Three: NEWS AGENCIES IN THE SERVICE OF STATE PROPAGANDA IN POLAND, YUGOSLAVIA AND BULGARIA IN THE 1930s

A news agency is basically a group of journalists, established to supply news organizations (newspapers, magazines and radio) with news. The first agencies were formed in the first half of the nineteenth century. The oldest news agency was established in France in 1835 by a Parisian translator and advertising agent, Charles-Louis Havas as Agence Havas. Two of his employees, Bernhard Wolff and Paul Julius Reuter, later set up rival news agencies bearing their last names in Berlin (1849) and London (1851) respectively. In 1853, in Turin, Guglielmo Stefani formed the Agenzia Stefani and this became the most important agency in the Kingdom of Italy and the set example was soon followed by the other countries and agencies.235 Literature on news agencies in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the interwar period is rather limited. Only few titles on the general history of agencies were written for the period in question.236 This fact is mainly due to a lack of sources, especially for cases of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Before analyzing the three countries under review the situation on the general European level will be examined. NEWS AGENCIES IN EUROPE IN THE 1930s Over the years, news agencies became increasingly important and thus became more attractive to the governments. Generally in Europe in the 1930s, one could find three different systems of relations between the news agencies and the states: 235 Chronologically the second world wide agency was the American Associated Press established in 1848. 236 W. Grabowski, Polska Agencja Telegraficzna 1918–1991 [Polish Telegraph Agency 1918–1991], (Warsaw, 2005); E. Rudzinski, Informacyjne agencje prasowe w Polsce 1926–1939 [Press Informational Agencies in Poland 1926–1939], (Warsaw, 1970); 100 години Бьлгарска телеграфска агенция [100 Years of Bulgarian Telegraph Agency], (Sofia, 1998); Б. Симић, Агенција ,,Авала” [Avala Agency], Зборник Матице српске за историју 75-76/2007, Novi Sad, pp. 75–91.

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1) The free press system, where all telegraph agencies were private, some were subsidized by the government who had their own correspondents and special representatives in the publishing houses. Central government offices, which were adjunct to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, only had limited direct contact with the agencies. This applied to countries such as France, England, USA and Belgium. 2) The controlled press system in which the agencies operated as semi-governmental official agencies and their correspondents were located in major capital cities. Government authorities had impact on the press and this system was implemented by such countries as Romania, Hungary and Turkey. 3) The directed press system in which the institutions of news agencies were subordinated to press discipline exercised by the government and ruling parties. Members of the ruling circles were officials in the agencies and the agencies were instruments in the hands of the government. This was the case in countries such as Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union and Spain. Over the years, news agencies began to cooperate with one another and it was necessary to define their obligations more precisely. In the late 1920s and in the 1930s, there were as many as thirty news agencies, in as many countries and these functioned as an unofficial World League of Press Associations for the exchange of news. Most of them were European countries except for the USA, Canada, Japan and China.237 The majority of the countries represented in the world league had one or more news agencies in addition to their main agency, e.g. Great Britain had seven and Italy four other agencies.238 The exceptions 237 Members of the World League of Press Associations were: Amtliche Nachrichtenstelle (Austria), Agence Télégrapique Belge (Belgium), Balgarska Telegrafska Agenciya (Bulgaria), Canadian Press, Ltd (Canada), Reuters, Branch of British Agency (China), Československa Tisková Kancelá (Czechoslovakia), Ritzaus Bureau (Denmark), Eesti Telegraafi Agentuur A.S. (Estonia), Finska Notisbyran (Finland), Agence Havas (France), Deutsches Nachrichten Büro G.m.b.h (Germany), Reuters, Ltd. (Great Britain), Agence d’Athènes (Greece), Magyar Távirati Iroda (Hungary), Agenzia Stefani (Italy), Domei Tsushin Sha (Japan), Latvijas Telegrafa Agentura (Latvia), Agence Télégraphique Lithuanienne (Lithuania), Algemeen Nederlandsch Persbureau (Netherlands), Norske Telegrambyr (Norway), Polska Agencja Telegraficzna (Poland), Agence Havas, Branch of French Agency (Portugal), Agence Orient Radio (Romania), Telegrafnoje Agentstwo Ssojusa, TASS (Soviet Union), Agencia Telegrafica Fabra (Spain), Tidningarnas Telegrambyr (Sweden), Agence Télégraphique Suisse (Switzerland), Anodolu Ajansi (Turkey), Associated Press (U.S.A), Agencija Avala (Yugoslavia). 238 Other British agencies were: British United Press Ltd, Central News Ltd, The Central Press Ltd, Exchange Telegraph Co. Ltd, Press Association Ltd, British Continental Press, London General Press and Italian were: Agenzia di Roma,

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were the smallest countries or countries where agencies were made official or semi-official. Initially, each agency was restricted to the sale of news only in its own country or in defined territories. At the London meeting in 1932 of the representatives of Reuters, Associated Press, Havas and Wolff239 agency, that arrangement was liberalized and any one of the agencies was permitted to sell its services independently to any newspaper or other clients wanting it in a country normally served by one of the other member agencies.240 The four biggest agencies reached an agreement to organize coverage for most of the world in the following way, with the exchange of news among them: Associated Press – United States, Central America and South America in co-operation with Havas; Reuters – Great Britain and the British Colonies, the Netherlands, the Far East and Near East in co-operation with Havas; Havas – France, the French Colonies, Romanic countries of Europe, South America in co-operation with the Associated Press and Near East in co-operation with Reuters; DNB – Germany and Austria.241 The majority of news agencies in Europe in the 1930s were official or semi-official. The classic examples of official agencies were in Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union. In those countries, oppositional stands or views not to the liking of the government almost never received any publicity unless it suited the regime’s propaganda purposes as the news agencies were in fact government agencies. The situation with the semi-official agencies was a bit different but in many cases, it was not that diverse from the official ones. Most of the semi-official news agencies were tied to a government and subsidized by them. All news agencies at some point co-operated with the government out of national loyalty. Even agencies that declared themselves as independent were at least partly propaganda organizations. The agencies on occasion received exclusive news releases from their governments and in return, they provided the governments with advance copies of incoming foreign dispatches before distribution. This sometimes gave governments the opportunity to revise dispatches in accord with the official viewpoint and, in some cases, to withhold the news completely until a time that seemed more suitable for its release.242 Agenzia Volta, Agenzia Telegrafica Orientale, Radio Nazionale. 239 Wolff became known in 1933 as the Deutsches Nachrichten Büro (DNB). 240 R. Desmond, The Press and World Affairs, (New York, 1937), p. 68. 241 Ibid. 242 Ibid, pp. 73–74.

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ESTABLISHMENT OF NEWS AGENCIES IN POLAND, BULGARIA AND YUGOSLAVIA AND THEIR EARLY YEARS Of three countries under review the first to establish a news agency was Bulgaria. The organization of Bulgarian state propaganda started as early as the nineteenth century while the country was still under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. One of the key steps in that direction was the establishment of the Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency (BTA) in 1898 and this was founded by the decree of King Ferdinand. Initially, it only delivered dispatches on international events and the first bulletin was published on 16th February. In the early years BTA was based on the model of the Russian Petersburg Telegraph Agency and unlike most news agencies at the time, which were private, BTA had the status of a special department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Religions (MVRI). In the period in question, the Head of the Office was the experienced journalist I. Herbst. The associates were young educated people who excelled in their command of foreign languages.243 In the beginning, its task was to provide the Bulgarian media with information on domestic and international events. Most of the news dealt with the affairs of European royal courts, crime, trade and exchange of messages. In addition, the Agency provided information on events in the country to foreign telegraph agencies. Initially, there were only five employees: director, his deputy, a press clerk plus two collaborators in the technical area.244 After the First World War, BTA signed new contracts with the most important news agencies like Havas, Reuters, Wolff and Stefani. The main tasks in that period were: to maintain contact with the largest European news agencies, to protect the Bulgarian national cause abroad, to counter negative foreign propaganda against Bulgaria and to inform the foreign press about the situation in the country. From 1921 BTA published two bulletins, one in Bulgarian and one in French to ensure that the aforementioned tasks were carried out.245 The situation in BTA in the late 1920s was not satisfactory. Some concerns were expressed in a note written by the Press director in December 1929 as director Ivan Popov urged for the separation of BTA from MVRI and for a formal transformation of BTA into a pri243 И. Илчев, Родината ми права или не [My Real Motherland or Not], (Sofia, 1995), p. 148. 244 Бьлгарските дьржавни институции 1879–1986 [Bulgarian State Institutions 1879–1986], (Sofia, 1987), pp. 38–39. 245 Ibid.

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vate agency on commercial grounds with the aim to improve its role in state propaganda. Besides the obvious, Popov stated one other reason: “Especially for one small and weak country like ours, this is of great importance, because, when a telegraph agency is official, the responsibility for all its telegrams which are unfavorable to some countries lies with the official government…”246 At the end of the passage, Popov asked a very important question: “How many times has BTA missed an opportunity to publish some interesting and useful news because it was unpleasant for this or that neighboring country! Is this a weakness?”247 This was a valid point from the point of view of state propaganda. At the time in Europe, state propaganda tasks were becoming increasingly more demanding and complicated and the official news agencies were always under scrutiny and sometimes treated with distrust. Nevertheless, Bulgaria did not follow the proposed measures and remained one of the countries with a state news agency during the interwar period. The Yugoslav Avala News Agency was established in September 1919 after the founding of Yugoslavia (at that time known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes). Initially, the French journalist Albert Mousset a friend of King Aleksandar Karadjordjević, was in charge of this organization.248 He remained in this position until 1927 when he left under suspicious circumstances.249 From 1920, the agency began to receive news from some European capitals (Paris, Bern, Athens, Madrid) and began to develop its network of foreign correspondents. In the first phase of its development, Avala was subordinated to the Press Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and French was the official language of the agency. 246 Архив на Бьлгарска телеграфна агенция [Archive of Bulgarian Telegraph Agency] (BTA), box 1, Справки за БТА, материяли за БТА…, Из докладна записка на директора на печата до главни секретар на Министерство на Вьшните работи [From the note of director for the Press addressed to secretary general of Ministry of Foreign Affairs], p. 2. 247 Ibid. 248 Albert Mousset (Paris, 1883–1975) was a journalist and historian. In 1908, he completed his studies at the School for Archives. He was a librarian trainee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Secretary of the Committee for the publication of documents relating to the origins of the war of 1870–1871 and in charge of courses at the l’école des Hautes études hispaniques, attached to the Embassy of France in Madrid. In addition, he was the founder and editor of the magazine Affaires étrangères (Foreign Affairs). 249 According to the Yugoslav writer Vuk Dragović, Mousset maintained certain relations with the French military and one letter regarding this issue was found. В. Драговић, Српска штампа између два рата, Основа за библиографију српске периодике 1915–1945 [Serbian Press Between Two Wars, Basis for Bibliography of Serbian Press], (Belgrade, 1956), p. 380.

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In the late 1920s, the news agency in Yugoslavia, as in Bulgaria, started to lag behind the leading European agencies and this was expressed in the letter written in 1929 which urged for the necessary changes in the work of Avala. The report described the situation in the agency in the late 1920s: “As an official agency, Avala is not capable of satisfying all the requirements of modern journalism, and even less so in the service of state propaganda. This agency is at the bottom, while other agencies, even officials, have their statutes and programs, agency Avala does not have a statute, program, and no specified duties. Agency Avala is, because of poor expertise and slow control of its work, doomed to be late with the news and this is why other agencies are often dissatisfied with its work”.250 Remarks made in this letter were not far from the truth. The reorganization of Avala began in June 1929 when the agency left the jurisdiction of the Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and become a joint-stock company with capital of 5 million dinars. The state bought the vast majority of stocks, 9,540 out of a possible 10,000. Others were bought by the administration of the biggest newspapers in Yugoslavia.251 The reorganization was not an easy task. The contract between the state and the agency was signed in May 1930 and the first payment was made in April 1930.252 The contract regulated relations and proscribed obligations between them and the first four articles stated the obligations of Avala: 1) t o provide information and journalistic services regarding the general public interest of the state; 2) to publish official declarations, to distribute them to newspapers in the country and abroad, 3) to publish denials of all writings harmful to the interests of the state, with the right to underline its jurisdiction whilst doing it; 4) to deliver its bulletins to the government members, free of charge.253 250 AY, Personal Collection of Vojislav Jovanović Marambo (335), box 74. 251 Најновија фаза у развоју Агенције Авала [The Newest Phase in Development of the Avala Agency], (Belgrade, 1937), p. 7. 252 Ibid, Until 1st April 1930, the Agency managed to spend 3,750,000 dinars of the original capital invested by the state. 253 AY, 37-75-37, The Contract Between the Yugoslav State and Avala Agency A.D.

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The most important obligation of the state was to pay five million dinars to the agency for the costs of its operations. The contract was signed for a period of five years with the automatic renewal for another five if one of the parties chose not to cancel it. The work manual of the Avala agency defined the structure and functions of the company. It is interesting to note that the contract was signed on the government’s behalf by Milan Marjanović, chief of the Central Press-Bureau (CPB), the unofficial Ministry of Propaganda. This fact only underlined the importance of Avala for state propaganda. The central propaganda institutions were closely connected even when the Yugoslav agency Avala ceased to operate under the authority of the Press Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and became a joint-stock company in June 1929. However, this transformation was regarded more as a formal one than as a real one as the state owned more than 90% of the overall stocks.254 The cooperation of the Agency with the CPB was, in the words of its general manager at the time, “extensive” and “harmonic”.255 The Polish Telegraph Agency (Polska Agencja Telegraficzna, PAT) was established in December 1918, shortly after the new state was proclaimed as the last of the three agencies. The agency was to be subordinated to the Council of Ministers as an official press and news agency. According to the regulations, the main tasks of the agency were: 1) to inform the Polish society on all forms of political, social, cultural and economic events; both at home and abroad, and provide reliable foreign news about Polish affairs; 2) to publish its own bulletins and be an exclusive agent for posting official publication toll, non-commercial institutions and state enterprises, or acting under government control in all national and international journals, as well as the exclusive placement of advertisements in all kinds of the above-mentioned state institutions through posters, ads, film, photography, etc. 3) to be the exclusive agency for making films and photos of buildings and offices and state institutions on state properties.256

254 Најновија фаза, p. 6. 255 Ibid, Извештај директора Агенције Авала Светислава Петровића из 1937. године [The Report of the Director of Avala News Agency, Svetislav Petrović, from 1937]. 256 AAN, PRM, 33-5, Letter of the director Starzyński from June 1930.

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To achieve the following goals, PAT used different methods, the most important of which was the publishing of daily bulletins with information. It is difficult to present a full range of editorial activities because of the large number of changes during this period. From the beginning the Polish agency was bigger in size compared to the other two which was understandable because Poland was country of more than 30 million people while Yugoslavia had 15 and Bulgaria only 6 million inhabitants. THE STRUCTURE AND DUTIES OF AGENCIES IN THE 1930s At this time in Europe, state propaganda tasks were becoming increasingly more demanding and complicated as the official news agencies were always under scrutiny and sometimes treated with distrust. In 1930, BTA was one of the three sections of the Press Department, together with the Press and Documentation sections. A positive step towards modernization was made when “Hal” apparatus was obtained in 1923 which allowed 147 foreign programs to be received.257 These sets were rented from agencies like Reuters, Havas and Stefani. The Press Department was renamed the “Press Section” and it functioned within the framework of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with three separate departments – BTA, Press and Information and Documentation where the number of employers varied from 16 to 39 people.258 After the coup d’état in 1934, official censorship was introduced which was reflected by the short existence of Censors Committee within BTA.259 In 1936, BTA was reorganized again where the Press Office was re-established with three sections – the BTA, Press Service and Information and Documentation and the only formal change was the renaming of the Documentation section into “Information and Documentation”.260 The final structure of the Press Office and its duties were set by the Book of Regulations from 1937 in the following way: 257 100 години Бьлгарска телеграфна агенция [100 Years of Bulgarian Telegraph Agency], (Sofia, 1998), without page numbers. 258 И. Калчева, Бьлгарска телеграфна агенция (1898–1944) [Bulgarian Telegraph Agency 1898–1944], unpublished BA thesis from Faculty of Journalism, (Sofia, 1975), p. 54. 259 Ibid, p. 56. 260 Ibid.

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1) Secretariat 2) Information and Documentation Department 3) Press Department 4) BTA. Institutions with this structure existed until the fall of the Monarchy in September 1944 and the number of employees increased to 77.261 All sections, BTA included, reported to Director of the Press Office. He reported to the Minister of Foreign and Religious Affairs for more important issues and carried out the orders given by the minister. The director maintained contact between the ministry and local press and gave information to the foreign correspondents in Bulgaria. BTA’s staff consisted of a chief and redactors working in two shifts. The press director, by common consent, with the chief of service assigned a senior redactor for BTA bulletins and the latter had to manage the work of his shift, to redact the bulletin and to supervise the work of the redactors. In 1938, the BTA extended the number of foreign agencies with whom it had links. Later in 1942, a new transformation of the Press Department was made and as a result, the Department was charged with additional tasks referring to foreign propaganda.262 Proof of BTA development, can be seen in a letter from 1937, probably written by the director of the Press Office. In it, the author explained the need for 10 more clerks due to the increased workload of the Press Office and BTA. According to the director “it was not possible anymore to follow all transmissions and use them for BTA bulletins” with the existing number of BTA clerks.263 Many proposals for the reform of the organization of BTA were given in this letter sent to the Budget Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, some of them were not accepted like increasing the number of shifts for BTA that remained two: day and night one. The Radio service of BTA was of crucial importance for the operation of this institution and for regulating employee obligations, one manual was published in May 1938. This manual stated working hours to be 20 hours per day, from 07:00 until 03:00 the next day and the service was carried out in three shifts, from 07:00 to 13:00, from 13:00 to 19:00 and from 19:00 to 03:00. One could see that the third shift was the longest and lasted 8 hours against 6 hours for the previous two 261 Бьлгарските дьржавни институции, p. 39. 262 BTA, box 1, Справки за БТА, материали за историята на БТА…, without page numbers. 263 Ibid.

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shifts. Documents from the late 1930s showed a very busy schedule of BTA telegraphers and in some cases in 1939, there were receptions of transmissions from 7 pm until 4:15 am most of them being from Havas, Reuters, DNB and Stefani. According to the telegraphers, Havas had the best quality of sound reception.264 The new Book of Regulations issued in July 1937 regulated the position and tasks of BTA (articles 21 to 31). According to the first article referring to BTA, its tasks were: to notify government, press and subscribers about the situation abroad, to spread news from Bulgaria abroad, through foreign news agencies and with its own correspondents and state consulates, and to provide news on the economy and finance to its subscribers.265 The main obligation of BTA was to usually publish three bulletins per day, at 13, 19 and one hour after midnight. These bulletins were in Bulgarian and French. In the holiday period, its numbers were reduced to two and on Sundays, only one bulletin was published. During the whole year, there were only three days when BTA was not supposed to publish bulletins: 1st January and the first days of Christmas and Easter.266 From the table below we can see that the number of pages of the BTA bulletins significantly increased during the 1930s. BTA bulletins in the 1930s (number of pages per year)267 Year 1930 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939

Number of pages 956 1,900 2,405 3,633 4,233 3,297 4,958 5,700

BTA also published special bulletins that were classified and limited to a small group of people. In 1934, the top secret bulletin named T-4 was published and only four people were supposed to receive this 264 CDA 176-20-26. 265 CDA, 325-1-162, Вьнутрешен правилник на Дирекция на печата [Internal Manual of the Press Office], Article 21. 266 Ibid, Article 25. 267 100 години Бьлгарска телеграфна агенция [100 Years of Bulgarian Telegraph Agency], (Sofia, 1998), without page numbers.

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bulletin: The King, Prime Minister, and Press Office Director and one copy for the Archive. This was similar to the bulletin T-3 which was published in the late 1930s for the King, Prime Minister and Press Office Archive, the T-3 content was the news that was unfavorable for Bulgaria as it was received by radio and published in the press.268 Something similar was, the Hors bulletin that was founded 1935 in which unfavorable telegrams concerning Bulgaria were published. The BTA service that dealt with economy was one of its important tasks and it was taken to a higher level in September 1938 when the daily publishing of the “economic bulletin” was initiated. This bulletin contained the most important news from foreign markets and stock exchanges and at the same time, the bulletin Daily News (Дневни вести) was founded.269 In 1939, BTA arranged to receive news from the Soviet Union’s agency TASS, but this was not used very often due to mistrust between the two governments. The situation, of course became significantly different after 1944 when a Communist regime was formed in Bulgaria. The budget of BTA was difficult to determine because of lack of sources, but it was known that it was part of the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Religions. The ministry was, of course, very cumbersome and complex with 412 employees in 1939 compared with 70 at BTA.270 We can conclude that their salaries were significant. Only for 1939 more than 2 million leva were allocated for the BTA payroll while top clerks received 5,810 monthly or around 70,000 per year.271 During the 1930s, BTA reported to the Press Office and that meant that the chiefs of the Press Office were also heads of BTA. Of the five directors, the most important ones were Balabanov and Serafimov who headed the office in the second half of the 1930s and the most important changes and improvements were made in both offices during this period.272 The structure of the Yugoslav Avala news agency during the late 1930s consisted of the headquarters in Belgrade and special bureaus in Zagreb, Ljubljana and Novi Sad. For a clearer picture, see the table below:

268 Ibid. 269 Ibid. 270 Статистически годишнак на Бьлгарското Царство 1939 [Annual Statistical Survey on Bulgarian Kingdom 1939], (Sofia, 1937–1940), p. 640. 271 Budget for 1939, p. 11. 272 For the biographies of the directors, see the second chapter of the thesis.

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Avala News Agency Personnel at the Beginning of 1938 HEADQUARTERS (BELGRADE) Director 1 Editor in chief 1 Editors 4 Acting editors 2 Chief of sections 1 Relocated correspondents 2 Acting chief of services 1 Secretary 1 Associates 16 Treasurer 1 Administrative clerks 10 Typists 11 Radio telegraphers 2 Chief of personal 1 Additional personal 22 Cleaning stuff 2 Total 87 ZAGREB Editor in chief 1 Associates 2 Clerk 1 Typists 2 Radio telegraphers 4 Additional personal 5 Total 15 LJUBLJANA Acting editor in chief 1 Associates 1 Clerks 1 Typist 1 Radio telegraphers 3 Additional personal 1 Total 8 NOVI SAD Editor in chief 1 Associate 1 Clerks 1 Typist 1 Radio telegraphers 2 Additional personal 1 Total 7 CORRESPONDENTS FROM ABROAD Correspondent from Tirana 1 TOTAL

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From the above table, one could see that 87 of the employees (74%) were based at the headquarters in Belgrade. It can also be concluded that the agencies outposts were the only services at specific locations. In different areas of the country, these outposts also had different duties. Having been only responsible for the territory of the Drava Banovina, the section in Ljubljana published and delivered all of its material in Slovenian. This was due to a fact that all the leading newspapers in Slovenia were published in that language.273 In Novi Sad, the city with the largest number of newspapers in languages of minorities, its section had specific duties and responsibilities. The city was the capital of the Danube Banovina where six daily newspapers in languages of minorities were published and this gave this Avala section a special, “national and promotional” mission. Agency staff noted that the developed minority press often printed news from foreign sources in the absence of information on events from the domestic scene. This was not in the interest of the government so an effort was made to upgrade the work of Novi Sad Avala section. This progress can be illustrated by the fact that the quality of reporting in 1935 was considered to be “primitive”, but in 1937, this service was thought in every way to have reached the “required standard”.274 In total, the bureau had only nine subscribers, of which five were from the minority press (three Hungarian and two German), one was a newspaper in Serbian (Dan, Day) and three government institutions. In addition to the existing outposts in the country in 1937 one was also formed in Skopje, the capital of the Vardar Banovina. The service was provided only by one editor, one associate, one radio telegrapher and one servant. This bureau ceased to operate after only four months because it did not meet “certain expectations”.275 Although the specific reasons were not revealed, one could assume that financial reasons were the most crucial. The difference in organization between the Yugoslav and Bulgarian institutions was reflected by the fact that the correspondents of the Press Office were at the same time correspondents of BTA, whereas the Avala news agency had its own correspondents. Nevertheless, the number of these correspondents was reduced and, after a period of 273 Ljubljana had four daily newspapers in Slovenian: Jutro (Morning), Slovenec (Slovenian), Slovenski dom (Slovenian Home) and Slovenski narod (Slovenian Folk). 274 Годишњи извештај Управног одбора Агенције „Aвала” А.Д. o раду у 1937. години [Annual Report of Governing Body of the Avala News Agency A. D for the year 1937], (Belgrade, 1938), p. 73 275 Ibid, p. 35.

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time, the majority of the remaining ones were, after all, those of the CPB.276 In the late 1930s, several correspondents from abroad were withdrawn due to financial reasons. Correspondents from Paris, Vienna and Sofia were also withdrawn during 1937. The only remaining foreign correspondent was left in Tirana, the capital of Albania, which could be linked to some suggestions made by the CPB.277 The director of agency had very important and multiple duties, but he had three main tasks: 1) Chief of Finance; 2) Editor in Chief (especially in the political news area) and 3) Editor and Proofreader of all bulletins. This unusual concentration of duties in one person made the post of director vital for the operations of the agency. During its existence, Avala (1919–1941) had eight different directors and all of them were journalists with Albert Mousset being the longest serving director from 1919–1927. Other directors were Serbs, the most prominent of whom being Milan Jovanović Stoimirović, the director in 1937 and 1938. Stoimirović was a highly experienced journalist who was, amongst other things, the Chief of the Publishing section of the CPB, founder and editor in chief of several important newspapers like Vardar or Samouprava, the main organ of the government party.278 Under his management the agency’s finances were stabilized and there were recorded improvements in the other operations of Avala. During this period, the agency became the key source of information coming from abroad and in his report from 1938, Stoimirović proudly 276 Ibid, p. 34. 277 AY, 38-22. CPB correspondent from Tirana made several proposals on the necessity of Avala to attempt to achieve the broadest influence in Albania and to fight rising Italian influence. 278 Milan Jovanović Stoimirović (Smederevo, 1898–Belgrade, 1966) was raised by his uncle, whose surname Stoimirović he took out of gratitude. Stoimirović began his journalist career in the most important newspaper Politika in 1919. He was editor in chief of Samouprava (1921–1923) and press attaché in the Yugoslav embassy in Berlin. During the 1930s, Stoimirović was publisher and editor of Vardar and worked in the Central Press Bureau. Before the Second World War, he was Chief of the Political Section of Council of Ministers. In the short April war in Yugoslavia, he was a common soldier. During the occupation, he was the director of State Archive and Editor in Chief of the newspaper Obnova (Renewal). He was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment by the new Communist government. Stoimirović left a lot of unpublished material that is currently housed by the Archives of Matica srpska in Novi Sad and the Archives of the city of Smederevo.

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underlined that Avala was the sole source of news for the domestic press regarding Prime Minister Stojadinović’s visit to Germany in January 1938.279 It became clear how important this was for state propaganda to be the only source of the news for domestic public opinion about sensitive events such as the official visit to Hitler’s Nazi Germany.280 The work of the agency was intensive and constantly growing over the years. The following table illustrated the level of activity during the 1930s: Avala News Agency - number of received words per year Year 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937

Number of received words 1,048,200 4,028,000 12,180,000 15,050,000 17,630,000

Source: Годишњи Извештај Управног одбора Агенције „Авала” А.Д. о раду у 1937 години [The Annual Report of the Governing Board of the Avala Agency on Work in 1937], (Belgrade, 1938), p. 33.

According to the same data, the number of the words in the first three months in 1938 was 3,151,000 and that was a sign of improvement considering the turnout in previous years. It is important to mention that, in comparison to the CPB, the Avala news agency did not have the instruments to ensure that the newspapers published the received information. The financial aspect of Avala’s operations was one of the most fragile points of its affairs. For a clearer understanding of the way it functioned financially, the following tables of its accounts should be looked at:

279 Годишњи извештај агенције „Авала” А.Д о раду у 1937.години [The Annual Report of Avala Agency A.D.about the work in 1937], (Belgrade, 1938), p. 14. 280 During the visit, Jovanović, as well as the chief of the CPB Luković, were highly decorated by Hitler himself.

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Balance of the Avala News Agency on 31st December 1937 Table of outcome Expenses Payment at headquarters

2,703,313.97

Fees

191,556.00

Telephone expenses

181,116.00

Telegraph expenses

44,146.50

Payment of correspondents abroad Telegraph and telephone expenses of correspondents Expenses of radio service

376,288.08 23,203.90 4,925.50

Office material

189,828.58

Subscription to foreign agencies

399,215.27 4,113,593.80

Expenses of outposts Zagreb

597,092.36

Ljubljana

425,835.87

Novi Sad

208,395.45

Skopje Bonuses of the Boards and travelling expenses Monitoring duties of members of Governing Body

126,216.12 1,357,539.80

66,000.00

Sessions of Governing Body

83,900.00

Travelling expenses of Governing Body

39,053.00

Sessions of Supervisory Board

9,600.00

Clerk’s travelling expenses

98,240.15

296,793.15

Various expenses Rent, fuel, power, official taxes, hospital taxes etc.

906,186.04

State and communal taxes

193,500.00

Write-off 10 % of radio station and furniture

183,085.80

Losses from 1936

376,164.94

Total

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7,426,863.53

Table of income Subscription Contract with Yugoslavian state

5,000,000.00

Income of Headquarters Bulletins, different courses and news subscription in Belgrade

930,554.25

Income of Outposts Zagreb

513,070.00

Ljubljana

250,799.50

Novi Sad

190,252.00

Skopje Loss Total

40,500.00

994,621.50 501,687.78 7,426,863.53

Source: Годишњи извештај..., Извештај Надзорног одбора Агенције Авала [Report of Overseeing Board of the Avala Agency], pp. 116–117.

The above numbers show that the loss of 376,164.94 made in 1936 grew to 501,687.78 in 1937. The losses were particularly linked to the outposts where one of those outposts, Ljubljana had doubled the amount of expenditure over income while in Skopje, Avala had tripled the amount of expenditure over income. Nevertheless, the overall state income of five million dinars remained unchanged. As the Bulgarian counterpart, Avala only distributed its classified newsletter to those people who were approved by the government. In the late 1930s, it was Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović who decided on the recipients. One documents shows that Stojadinović gave a list of names to the president of the Supervisory Board Stijepo Kobasica. The list shows what institutions and people the Prime Minister considered crucial for the functioning of the state. They were regents, several ministers and chiefs of staff, plus representatives of the General Staff and the CPB.281 It should be noted that among them were four military officers - Chief of the General Staff, the King’s aide, Head of Intelligence Department and Head of the Operational Department. It is interesting to see that the classified bulletins were delivered to both Stojadinović’s heads of cabinets. 281 AY, 37-75-255, The list has 17 names.

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One of the biggest problems of the agency during this period was the import and distribution of foreign newspapers and magazines. That concession was sought and received from the state in 1932 and according to the license of the Ministry of Trade and Industry; the agency was required to establish a special department for the import of foreign magazines and newspapers with separate accounting. Since the newly established department recorded only losses, it was decided to reorganize it together with the Putnik company. For this goal, a separate department was formed which was supposed to be directed by a Governing Board composed of seven members. Those members were: both directors of Avala and Putnik, one of the members of Governing board of both societies and representatives of the Ministry of Trade and Industry plus the Council of Ministers. The newly established department was named the Department for the Distribution of Foreign Newspapers and Magazines and it was officially formed in March 1933.282 In addition to Avala’s problems, there was also dissatisfaction with the allocation of profits between the agency and Putnik and the battle to change the existing contract lasted several years. After resuming the post of the agency’s director Milan Jovanović Stoimirović immediately started the process of reviewing the existing contracts and in his address to the Assembly of the agency, he requested the return of the concession or termination of the contract.283 In his words, the agency received only a sixth of the realized profit so the contract proved more damaging than beneficial. The long-term efforts in this direction were only completed in 1940 when the contract was terminated, thus the harmful contract was valid during the whole period under review. In order to comprehend the amount of potential impact regarding the import of foreign newspapers, the following information was very useful. During 1937, the total number of imported newspapers was: 197 daily and weekly political newspapers, 531 illustrated and other magazines and 217 various fashion magazines. Most newspapers were imported from Germany, France and Austria. The table bellow shows import from each country:

282 Најновија фаза, pp. 95–96. 283 Istorijski Arhiv Smedereva [Historical Archive of city of Smederevo], Zaostavština Milana Jovanovića Stoimirovića (The bequest of Milan Jovanović Stoimirović), box No. 10.

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Imported Newspapers and Magazines into Yugoslavia in 1937 Countries (in alphabetic order)

Newspapers and Magazines

Austria

117

Bulgaria

3

Czechoslovakia

71

France

155

Germany

172

Italy

53

Hungary

14

Poland

15

Romania

6

Switzerland

9

United Kingdom

93

Other

26

Source: Годишњи извештај..., Извештај Одељења за промет страних часописа [Report of Section for Distritubition of Foreign Newspaper], p. 93.

Therefore, it can be assumed that after the Anschluss in 1938, cooperation with Germany (now including the territory of former Austria) was even stronger and that the number of imported newspapers and magazines from Germany was by far the largest, which coincided with the growing economic and political co-operation of the late 1930s. The number of magazines in German can be also explained by a significant number of German minorities in interwar Yugoslavia. During this period, the publishing company Hachette had a monopoly over almost the entire French press, thus Avala was obligated to conclude a contract with it for the import and distribution of all newspapers and publications in French and English, including those issued in those countries. The contract was concluded in December 1932 and according to Avala, the agency benefited very little from this contract, but was heavily obligated. In his report, the lawyer of Avala Andrija Petrović Njegoš characterized the contract as “a series of Hachette’s rights and numerous duties of Avala”.284 Despite these com284 Ibid, p. 96.

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plaints, the agency continued its relations with the French company over many years. It is also important to note how the profit that was made from the Avala news agency’s distribution of imported magazines was planned to be used. The profit was going to be split in the following ways: - 1/3 for the promotion of tourism, as decided by the Ministry of Trade and Industry; - 1/3 for general advertising purposes, according to the decisions of the Central Press Bureau; - 1/3 primarily for economic propaganda, according to the decision of the Governing Board at the General Assembly.285 The role of Avala was to spread state propaganda, but in addition, part of the income was required for propaganda funding. As one could see, one-third of the income was directed for propaganda purposes, especially economic propaganda. The biggest problem of Avala throughout its existence was the issue of financing and after assuming the role of director in 1935, Svetislav Petrović complained to the Assembly that he found the agency to be deep in debt. Although he hinted in his reports on the consolidation of the company under his leadership, the reality was different and his successor Stoimirović stated that when he took up the post of Director, he found out that there were only 1,500 dinars in cash and that “debts were everywhere”.286 His investigations into finances showed a number of irregularities, such as tardiness, sloppy bookkeeping, unpaid taxes, and so on. The measures that he had taken, improved the financial situation, but losses continued to be made in the future years. It is important to mention that Avala’s journalist were well paid considering the general economic situation in the country. The average salary was 3,720 dinars, only second to the biggest Yugoslavian newspaper Politika that paid 4,556 dinars per month and almost twice as much as journalists of Belgrade newspaper Pravda received.287 The structure of the Polish agency was more complex than the previous two mentioned agencies and during the 1930s, PAT consisted of the following parts: 285 Годишњи извештај..., Извештај Одељења за промет страних часописа [Report of Governing Bodу of Avala Agency, Report of Section for Distritubition of Foreign Newspaper], p. 91. 286 Годишњи извештај..., Извештај директора Авале [Report of the Director of Avala], p. 10. 287 М. Бјелица, З. Јевтовић, Историја новинарства [History of Journalism], (Belgrade, 2006), pp. 353–354.

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1) Information Office 2) Publication Office 3) Advertisement Office 4) Film Office 5) Film Institute 6) Printing Headquarters 7) State Printing 8) P.A.T. branches The main goal of the Agency was to inform the Polish society on all events pertaining to the political, social, economic and cultural life, both at home and abroad, and provide overseas news to all Polish news agencies. The Information Office of PAT provided the following services: 1) Information to the daily press; 2) Information to foreign agencies and PAT’s correspondents; 3) Information to public authorities; 4) Illustrations for publications; 5) Information to the Polish ships at sea (Patoceana).288 The main preoccupation of other offices is clearly stated in their names. Among other duties, they had the task of procuring funds to cover the operating expenses for providing the relevant information. The main objective of PAT was to maintain the level and range of information “from the Government’s point of view and the interests of the State”.289 The influence of information provided by PAT was significant and important for state propaganda. In order to achieve the aforementioned tasks, PAT needed a huge number of subscribers and clients. Among the subscribers in the 1930s, PAT had more than a hundred daily newspapers with an increasing trend: 106 in 1935 and 113 in 1936.290 The annual efforts of the agency resulted in increased business and the statistics below illustrated the increase in the amount of information sent to the press in the mid thirties:

288 AAN, PRM, 8-21II, p. 7. 289 AAN, PRM, 8-21II, p. 2. 290 AAN, PRM, 8-21II, p. 7.

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Information Sent to the Press by the Information Office291 YEAR NEWS (daily) NEWS (annual) WORDS (daily) WORDS (annual)

1934 200 73,000 20,200 7,300,000

1935 210 76,460 22,900 8,400,000

1936 230 81,000 26,000 9,100,000

The slow but constant increase of work was apparent and this progress was vital for state propaganda efforts of PAT. The position of the agency as the state agency guaranteed that the news was government approved. Besides the daily news bulletins, the Polish Telegraph Agency had several special regular publications. In 1936, those publications included the following items: 1) Monitor Polski (Polish Monitor) - Polish Republic Journal; 2) Zbiòr Wyrokòw najwyższego Trybunału Administracyjnego (Reports on the Verdicts of the Administrative Supreme Court) - a quarterly; 3) Gazeta Lwowska (Lvov Journal) – daily; 4) Biuletyn Gieldowy (Bulletin of the Stock Exchange) – daily; 5) Wiadomości Porty Gdyńskiego (the Gdynia Port News) - a monthly, the authority of the Maritime Office in Gdansk; 6) Rocznik Polityczno-Gospodarczy (Political-Economic Yearbook); 7) Special Releases: Arcade, list of State offices and institutions, etc. The aforementioned publications had different public and propaganda significance for state propaganda. Probably the most important was Monitor Polski (Polish Monitor) which was established in 1918 as the official legislative paper of the new Second Polish Republic.292 The publication had traditionally consisted of two sections, the governmental and non-governmental. The first included orders and decrees and the latter contained varied material. Because of the nature of the published material, it was important for state propaganda to have numer291 Ibid. 292 From September to December 1939, the government section was published in exile in France. The Gazette was resumed in 1945 and since 1950, it had been published by the office of the Prime Minister (Chairman of the Council of Ministers) to announce legislation passed by the Parliament (Sejm).

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ous subscribers for the Monitor Polski. In 1936, that number was 283, and from that figure, 238 went to the state and local institutions and 45 copies went to the individuals. According to the official PAT report, the number of the subscribers decreased over the years and this was also reflected in the income generated from advertisements.293 The Daily Biuletyn Gieldowy (Bulletin of the Stock Exchange) was the most important source of information for the business community. The number of subscribers was high and exceeded 700 in 1935 where the figure was 794.294 Compared to its Yugoslav agency counterpart, that had barely reached 100 (service in Belgrade and Zagreb put together), that number was significant and impressive. However, despite these factors, this bulletin also made losses during these years.295 One of the most interesting publications from a propaganda and historical point of view was beyond any doubt the Rocznik Polityczno-Gospodarczy (Political-Economic Yearbook). This treasury of data provided information on all aspects of public life in the Second Polish Republic and this publication was, of course, similar to the ones published annually in most of the European states during this period. The edition Mały Rocznyk Statystyczny (Small Statistical Yearbook)296 the standard reference book for Polish statistics. The 1936 Small Yearbook had 311 pages while the Political-Economic had 1,244 pages. The actual difference between the two editions was not that big because Mały Rocznyk Statystyczny was published in very small fonts as a pocket edition. At this point, it is interesting to analyze the business results of PAT sections illustrated in the line of the assigned work. The following table from 1936 data illustrated a general business trend:

293 AAN, PRM, 8-21II, p. 10. 294 AAN, PRM, 8-21II, p. 11. 295 AAN, PRM, 8-21II, pp. 43–44. 296 To illustrate, the 1938 yearbook consisted of 23 different sections. The sections were as follows: 1. Geographical location. Hydrography. Meteorology; 2. Area, Administrative Division, Population; 3. Movement of Population; 4. Housing; 5. Agriculture, Forestry, Farming, Fisheries; 6. Businesses, Business Associations; 7. Mining and Industry; 8. Internal Trade, Consumption; 9. Foreign Trade; 10. Communication; 11.Money and Loans; 12. Prices; 13. Jobs; 14. Social Care; 15. Public Health. Sport; 16. Insurance. Fires; 17. Education. Learning Outside Formal Schools; 18. Cultural life. Entertainment. Association; 19. Administration; 20. Sejm and Senat; 21. Public Administration; 22. Arboriculture, Crime, Prisons; 23. Treasury Finances, Local Silesian government Treasury.

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Profit and losses for the year 1936 (in Polish zlotys) Sections Information Office Publication Office Advertisement Office Film Office Film Institute Printing Headquarters State Printing

Outcome

Income

Balance

1,689,345.83

917,496.78

- 771,849.05

849,295.77

1,833,893.65

+ 984,597.88

1,693,919.15

2,128,601.59

+ 434,682.44

486,776.52

442,419.06

- 44,357.46

190,976.94

170,553.58

- 20,423.36

3,777,849.98

3,900,023.42

+ 122,173.44

3,170,381.65

3,639,429.41

+ 469,047.76

Source: AAN, PRM, 8-21II, p. 31

The first and the last page of Rocznik Politiczny i Gospodarczy from 1936.

As seen in the table above, the Information Office made the biggest loss, along with the Film Office, but on the other hand, the Publication and Advertisement sections made significant profits for the agency along with the two printing sections. However, the loss made by the 122

Information Office was somewhat excepted due to the nature of their work, which was gathering information at home and abroad. The most important thing, from a financial point of view, was that the sections concerned with publishing and advertisement made a profit, but that profit decreased in 1936 due to some additional costs. In the first place, there were expenses for the PAT branches of 269,575.60 zlotys, taxes of 271,922.72 zlotys and for the purchase of inventory which totaled 134,386.08 zlotys, but even when some other expenses were added, the total loss was only 27,734.53 zlotys.297 On the other hand, the Publication Office also made losses compared to previous years and this was due to factors already mentioned such as: unexpectedly large increase in taxes, increased printing prices, the reduction of advertisement prices, etc.298 The most interesting PAT’s section was the Film Institute, formed in 1935. The main task of the institute was to make films of educational characters for various schools. Until 1938, it delivered 130 film cameras to schools, gathering 600 scientific and entertainment films and 60 full-length movies.299 According to reports, PAT made constant losses and this negative trend corresponded with the beginning of the world economic crisis in 1929. In 1937, after major analysis, the management of the institution came to the following conclusions on the causes for their losses: 1) A general decline in turnover and 2) the excessive burden of taxes which had to be paid to the Treasury.300 Just by looking into these figures, one can agree with these conclusions. The second reason was especially valid for 1936, namely the total contribution made to the Treasury in 1936 was 745,322.56 zlotys compared to 1933 when it was only 292,939.03 zlotys.301 A significant increase of taxes surely affected the business of the PAT which was reflected in the increased losses made by the institution. During the 1930s, the position of the PAT’s director was occupied by Roman Leon Starzyński (1929–1933),302 Konrad Libicki (1933– 297 AAN, PRM, 8-21II, p. 31. 298 AAN, PRM, 8-21II, p. 11. 299 Rocznik polityczny i gospodarczy 1939, p. 584. 300 AAN, PRM, 8-21II, p. 2. 301 AAN, PRM, 8-21II, p. 3. 302 Roman Leon Starzyński (Warsaw, 1890–1938) was the older brother of Warsaw’s major. He completed his studies of philosophy at the University of Cracow and

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1938)303 and Mieczysław Stanisław Obarski (1938–1939).304 All three directors were highly ranked and experienced operatives within the state propaganda machine during the Second Polish Republic and this was no surprise due to the importance of PAT’s director’s position. In the late 1930s, the Polish Telegraph Agency had around 1,000 employees which was by far the largest number of the three countries under the review.305 The agency had various correspondents abroad and the most important cities, from the Polish point of view, had permanent correspondents (Berlin, London, Paris, Moscow, Wien, Riga, Rome, Geneva and New York).306 The data for 1935 and 1936 shows that the number of correspondents increased from 243 to 248 with an interesting change in the structure as the number of correspondents at home increased by 19, but the number of correspondents abroad decreased by 14.307 Thus it can be concluded that the regime wanted to direct its propaganda efforts more towards the domestic audience. The job of a correspondent was well paid, especially in Poland where the directors monthly received about 1,800 zlotys, deputy director and chief editor between 1,200 and 1,500 zlotys; editors received at the Senior Military School, in the rank of major. He had several different positions in the Military as Chief of the First Section of General Headquarters and the Chief of the Organization Department of Ministry of War. From 1933, he was chief of staff for the Ministry for Post and Telegraph. As well as being the director of the Polish radio, he was also a member of the International Radiophony Union and its budget commission. Starzyński wrote several monographs on the military and publication News Agencies (Agencje informacyjne, 1935). 303 Konrad Libicki (Warsaw, 1891 – London, 1980). Since 1911, he was in the Rifles Association, the Polish Military Organization, in the Military Free School in Warsaw. He served in the Brigade as a company commander in the Warsaw battalion. During 1923–1924, he completed a course at the Military Academy as a chartered major. From 1927, he worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he was head of the Press Department. In the years 1929–1934, he worked as a deputy in Estonia. He was also a military attaché in Finland. In Warsaw, he became the chief director of the Polish Telegraphic Agency, the director of publications and newspaper printers and Managing Director of the Polish Radio until the outbreak of World War II. He evacuated all the movable property of the institution to France at the disposal of the government in exile. Libicki later worked in the editorial of Reuters. He was one of the founders of the Pilsudski Institute in London and editor of the first volumes of “Independence”. 304 Mieczysław Stanisław Obarski was born in 1899. He participated in the war in 1920 as ensign. Later, he was director of the Telegraphic Agency Express (Agencja Telegraficzna Express, ATE). He was a relative of Bogusław Miedziński, one of the most important Sanacja men responsible for propaganda. 305 Polska Niepodległa [Indipendent Poland], (Warsaw, 2008), p. 521. 306 Waldemar Grabowski offered an incomplete list of cities and correspondents of PAT: Grabowski, Polska Agencja, pp. 207–221. 307 AAN, PRM, 8-21II, p. 6.

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PAT’s network in the 1930s

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1,000 zlotys.308 The foreign correspondents received even more, if they were employees at a fixed place. For example in Berlin, they received between 2,900 to 3,500 zlotys, in Paris they received around 3,000 zlotys and in Moscow, which was obviously considered the “toughest job”, from between 3,500 and 4,000 zlotys.309 The number of correspondents revealed that PAT was one of the top agencies in Europe during the 1930s having between 150 and 180 correspondents at home and between 70 and 100 abroad. This was equal to or even better than, some of its bigger agency rivals, e.g. one of the most important world agencies Havas had 100 correspondents abroad while German Wolff had only 50.310 These statistics illustrate just how seriously the Polish state took propaganda during the period under review. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE AGENCIES The news agencies in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were, in many ways similar but also significantly different. The Polish Telegraph Agency, the Avala News Agency and the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency had the same main tasks which were to inform the domestic public about events abroad and to inform the foreign public about the situation at home. Those main tasks were no different than the ones that other agencies performed during this period all over the world. The agencies had an duty to inform the public at home and abroad “in accordance to the public state interest”, make official announcements, import and distribute foreign newspapers and journals. Nevertheless, their most important role was to transmit official information which came from the top of the governing hierarchy so everybody was aware that the information released was official and “checked”. The three agencies differed in size, their relationships with the government, their structures, levels of funding and several other none the less important things. BTA, Avala and PAT were formed as governmental institutions with the aim to inform, but propaganda was, beyond any doubt, one of the main tasks of the agencies. Nevertheless, the three agencies had different organizational forms within their own governments. Initially, BTA was a division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but over time, its position became weak308 Rudzinski, Informacynje agencje, p. 187. 309 Ibid. 310 Ibid, p. 185.

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er and during the 1930s, the agency became part of the Press Office subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its budget was part of the Ministry budget and its directors were directors of the Press Office. Although a state agency, PAT was in a different position from its early years, PAT was structurally an independent institution with various additional tasks and functions. PAT was considerably better organized than the other two agencies. Moviemaking, independent publishing, wide range of foreign correspondents network, highly functional advertisement offices were all activities linked only to the Polish agency during the 1930s. The case of the Yugoslav counterpart was different in regards to the other two. The agency started as division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but after a decade the position changed when the Avala News Agency, according to common European practice in the interwar period, was transformed into a joint stock company, but with the state as the dominant owner of the capital – as it owned over 90% of stock capital. Therefore, the transformation of the agency basically meant a structural, but not a core change and Avala remained an instrument of the state propaganda and a state controlled institution throughout the whole period of its existence. The Yugoslav and Bulgarian agencies received an annual donation from the state and in the case of Avala, this donation amounted to 5 million dinars, but this sum was not sufficient. The money was often not spent for intended purposes, so Avala, almost constantly, operated with losses. BTA was also totally dependent on state funding and the income generated from subscribers was not enough to match the costs of both agencies’ operations. PAT was the only of the three agencies that was almost self-financed as the income earned from advertisements and especially from the sale of publications and movies was significant and important. However, even that income was sometimes insufficient to cover the growing costs of the Polish news agency organization and its well developed business, especially in the late 1930s. The difference between the three agencies under examination can best be seen when one considers the number of employees. With around 1,000 employees, PAT was by far the biggest of the three, almost ten times larger than Avala and more than thirteen times larger than its Bulgarian counterpart. This difference was also apparent when considering the correspondent network so whilst the Yugoslav and Bulgarian agencies had none or few correspondents abroad, PAT had a very highly developed network which was similar to that of a leading global agency. 127

The most significant difference between the number of employees in the Polish agency on one hand and those in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria can be seen in the Advertisement Office of PAT which employed 75 people, more than in the whole Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency. This difference corresponded with the budgets of the institutions, but also with the quality and quantity of work that was completed. Judging by the above data, one can also conclude that the Polish Telegraph Agency had a more significant role in state propaganda than news agencies in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. PAT had more duties like publishing official data such as books and magazines and making films that were, in the cases of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the duty of other propaganda institutions. Those assignments were well beyond the common news agency job scope, which only underlined the statement expressed above about the Polish Telegraph Agency’s propaganda influence and significance for the state organized propaganda in the period under the review. The three examined agencies suffered different fates at the beginning of the Second World War. The Bulgarian Telegraph Agency remained part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, even in Socialist Bulgaria until 1951 when it became an independent institution. Under the new regime, BTA continued its propaganda role, maybe even to a greater extent than in the 1930s. The Avala News Agency formally ceased to exist after the German occupation of Yugoslavia. The official announcement of its liquidation was published (for the third time) in the Opštinske novine (Municipal Gazette, Општинске новине, No. 56, p.4) on 6th June 1941.311 After September 1939, PAT operated in exile, initially in Paris and later in London. After the end of the war, it operated as a governmental news agency for the Polish government in exile. In 1991 after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, it was symbolically incorporated into the Polish Press Agency.312

311 Драговић, Српска штампа, p. 380. 312 Polska Niepodległa, p. 521.

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Chapter Four: MEDIA IN THE SERVICE OF STATE PROPAGANDA IN POLAND, YUGOSLAVIA AND BULGARIA IN THE 1930s In this chapter, the development of the media in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and their role in making and spreading of state propaganda during the 1930s will be discussed and analyzed. Particular attention will be paid to the dominant media of the period: press, radio and film. PRESS The press was the most powerful tool in the hands of the regimes in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the interwar period. This was mainly due to the fact that radio and cinema were not as developed a media as the press was while television was at the very beginnings of its development. The press was the traditional and the most widespread media for informing the masses as well as being the most economical one. The governments were well aware that controlling and influencing the press was one of the most important steps towards controlling public opinion. The ruling circles in these countries put a lot of effort into controlling the transfer of information in order to control what was to be published in the press. This was accomplished in various ways from enforcing harsh censorship to resorting to bribery. In this part of the chapter, I will examine the development of the press in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the 1930s, the degree of its freedom, and the use of the press as a weapon of state propaganda. GENERAL SITUATION OF THE PRESS IN POLAND, YUGOSLAVIA AND BULGARIA Of all examined countries Poland had the largest number of newspapers because it was the biggest country. According to official data 129

for the interwar period, the number of journals and newspapers in Poland constantly increased. The only period of stagnation was during the Great Depression. In the 1930s, the number of journals and newspapers was as follows: Journals in Poland in the 1930s Year

Number of Journals

1931

2,406

1932

2,503

1933

2,572

1934

2,566

1935

2,854

1936

3,043

1937

3,592

Source: T. Jędruszczak (ed.), Historia Polski [History of Poland], volume IV, 1918–1939, part 4 (1935–1939), (Warsaw, 1978), p. 748. There is no official data for 1938 and 1939.

As the table shows, the number of newspapers and journals grew from year to year, except in 1934 when the number fell a bit. In Poland, as in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the press was not equally spread across the country. The center of journalism was situated in Warsaw, the capital city. Together with the central Polish duchies, Warsaw published in total 49.5% of the magazines in 1931 and in 1938, this figure was even higher, 52.6%. These numbers were significant, especially when compared to the Eastern duchies’ 6.4%, Western duchies 22.2% and Southern duchies 18.8%.313 For a clearer picture, one should examine the last recorded data from interwar Poland on the number and type of magazines:

313 T. Jędruszczak (ed.), Historia Polski [History of Poland], volume IV, 1918–1939, part 4 (1935–1939), (Warsaw, 1978), p. 751.

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Magazines in Poland on 31 December 1937 Type of Magazine Informative, literature, art Scientific Religious Economy Youth (including school) Bodies and professional associations Official government Illustrative, entertaining, humorous Sport Other Total

Number

%

885 440 295 274

32.9 16.3 11.0 13.9

167

6.2

162 132 39

6.0 4.9 1.5

49 149

1.8 5.5

2,692

100.0

Source: “Mały Rocznik Statystyczny” 1939, p. 345

The statistical data does not show the difference between informative magazines and those dealing with literature and art, but we can conclude that the ones dealing with information, plus the official progovernment, constituted a significant percentage of the total number of newspapers. That was of major importance for state propaganda. However, a shortage of published data means that it is difficult to do an accurate analysis. Poland was country with various minorities. It is of interest to see in which language the journals were published: Languages of Magazines in Poland on 31 December 1937 Language

Number

%

Polish Yiddish Ukrainian German Belarus Russian Other

2,255 130 125 105 8 9 60

83.8 4.8 4.6 3.9 0.3 0.3 2.2

Total

2,692

100.0

Source: “Mały Rocznik Statystyczny” 1939, p. 345.

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With the dominance of the press in Polish one can notice a large number of Jewish, Ukrainian and German newspapers. These minorities had different goals in interwar Poland and after the war they suffered different fates.314 The development of the press in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was very dynamic in the period under review. A lot of new newspapers and magazines were published, however, a significant number of existing newspapers ceased to exist due to financial or political reasons. The overall number of newspapers, however, was high and was constantly increasing, but it is difficult to determine the exact number due to the aforementioned reasons. As an illustration of the period and the number of newspapers, one can use officially published data. The number and intensity of published newspapers and magazines in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the banovinas in 1938 Several Several Once times times Monthly in 2-3 Banovina Daily per per months week month

½ 1/1 Periodically

Total

Drava

6

39

22

133

13

1

5

24

244

Drina

2

6

2

21

2

2

1

0

36

Dunav

8

97

12

46

3

0

3

25

220

Morava

0

9

3

4

1

0

0

0

17

Primorska

2

8

1

14

2

0

0

3

31

13

83

41

194

29

1

1

25

389

Vardar

0

12

1

5

1

0

0

0

20

Vrbas

0

2

0

2

0

0

0

0

4

Zeta

0

9

1

4

0

1

0

1

16

Belgrade

2

45

23

129

14

3

5

20

246

33

310

106

588

65

8 15

Sava

Total

98 1,223

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Kingdom of Yugoslavia 1938–39, p. 392. 314 On minorities in interwar Poland and state policy towards them see: Brzoza, Sowa, Historia, pp. 118–168; A. Chojnowski, Koncepcje polityki narodowściowej rządów polskih w latach 1921–1939 [Concepts of National Policy of the Polish Governments 1921–1939], (Wroclaw, 1979).

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The above table shows a huge difference in the number of newspapers that were published in some banovinas (provinces). Thus, in the Sava Banovina (Croatia and Slavonia), there were 389 newspapers and magazines but in the Vrbas Banovina (Western Bosnia), there were only 4. This was just one of the indicators of the cultural and economic differences that existed in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. To determine their purpose and field of interest one can use the official statistics shown in the following table.

Total

Others

Crafts

Tourism

Economy

Art

Culture

Health

Religious

Scientific

Political

Official

Banovina

Newspapers and magazines by topics in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1938

Drava

5

27

13

40

4

37

12

17

9

53

27

244

Drina

1

2

3

11

0

1

0

3

0

5

10

36

Dunav

8

57

6

31

0

37

10

20

3

24

24

220

Morava

1

8

0

2

0

0

0

0

0

2

4

17

Primorska

2

8

0

6

0

2

0

5

1

1

6

31

Sava

2

86

13

45

12

35

13

25

7

79

72

389

Vardar

2

1

1

2

0

8

0

1

0

5

0

20

Vrbas

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

4

Zeta

0

4

1

3

1

2

0

1

1

1

2

16

Belgrade

15

26

11

12

9

28

10

15

8

67

45

246

Total

37 220

48

152

26

151

45

97

29 238 190 1,223

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Kingdom of Yugoslavia 1938–39, p. 394.

The list of newspapers and magazines that covered political issues, can be expanded to include those under the official label, as well as those labelled as political, that is a total of 257 newspapers, which constituted 21% of all newspapers and magazines. That meant that political content constituted only a fifth of all the news content in the newspapers. This tells us more about how the government tried to restrict the distribution of sensitive news to the cooperative media, and less about the diversity and development of the press in Yugoslavia during the period under review. 133

One of the key tools of Yugoslav government propaganda was the press. It was not free in this period and it was under the supervision and control of the ruling classes. Notwithstanding this, the number of papers constantly grew and this number varied because many of them were permanently banned and some were re-founded. In general, the press in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was biased towards the government, except for the newspapers in the Sava and Primorska banovina (Croatia). In the Drava and the Dunav banovina, the majority of newspapers were controlled by the Slovenian part of the government and national minorities thus they tended to follow the general government policy alongside defending theirs particular needs and aspirations. The press was restricted in number and with serious financial problems in the Morava, the Vrbas, the Zeta and the Vardar banovinas, so their influence was reduced in comparison to the situation in northern ones. Censorship existed in practice and this hindered the existence of many newspapers but it can be concluded that the pressure of the censors was not spread equally across the whole country. The Belgrade press was under more scrutiny than anywhere else in the country. In Bulgaria, the newspaper industry was not as developed as it was in Poland and Yugoslavia, but it was no less interesting. As illustrated below, one can see the situation at the end of the reviewed period: Newspapers and Magazines in Bulgarian in the Second Half of 1930s Year

Newspapers

Magazines

Total

1936

470

373

843

1937

512

363

875

1938

531

381

912

1939

513

393

906

Source: Статистически годишнак на Бьлгарското царство 1939 [Annual Statistical Surveys of the Bulgarian Kingdom for 1939], (Sofia, 1940), p. 733.

It is important to note that according to the same statistics, the number of newspapers labeled as political was less than 4% (33 in 1936 and barely 22 in 1939). This clearly meant that regime did not encourage the founding of new political papers and even, as one can see, some of the already existing newspapers ceased to exist. 134

Nevertheless, there were several important daily newspapers that sold well in Bulgaria during the 1930s and the aforementioned table shows their monthly circulation: Newspapers in Bulgaria on June 1939 Newspaper

Published

Sold

Utro

2,220,000

1,908,000

Zora

2,172,000

1,904,000

Zarya

735,000

538,000

Dnevnik

661,000

529,000

Dnes

614,000

476,000

Slovo

309,000

240,000

Mir

271,000

197,000

Source: CDA, 176k-20-19, Report of Strela on 29 July 1939.

According to the data, it can be concluded that in mid 1939, the key pro-government newspapers Utro daily published more than 74,000 copies and Dnes more than 20,000 copies. One of the important events in the development of the press in Bulgaria was the foundation of the Strela (Arrow) society. It was part of the Society of Journalists from the Capital (Дружество на столичните журналисти). This society had an exclusive right to distribute journals and periodicals in Sofia and in the provinces. One representative, delegated by the Prime Minister, was a member of the governing body of the society and this made it easier to spread propaganda to more people in more places.315 In 1935, the Society had 11,000 subscribers and Strela retained its monopolistic position in Bulgaria, even after the Second World War.316 One of the characteristics of the Bulgarian press in the 1930s was the small number of journalists working in the newspapers. The main pro-government papers were Dnes and Utro, which only had 25 and 18 full time employees respectively. Zora had the largest number of employed journalists 30.317 315 Дьржавень вестникь [State Journal], No. 161, 16.October 1934, pp. 2434– 2435, “Наредба-закон за разпространение на вестниците и периодичиските издания” [Order-Law for Distribution of Journals and Periodicals], art. 8. 316 CDA, 284k-3-42-30. 317 Ibid.

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PRESS LEGISLATION AND CENSORSHIP IN THE THREE COUNTRIES DURING 1930s It is important to analyze the 1930s legislation in all three countries under review in order to achieve a better understanding of how their press operated. Before 1938, press legislation in Poland was not completely uniform as the western duchies had a more liberal legislation than the central and eastern duchies. However, all differences were eliminated with the new legislation as the “Press Law” passed in 1938 placed greater responsibility on the editors of the newspapers.318 It became obligatory for the press to publish official press statements of the government, the president and cabinet members. Every newspaper had to publish the statement on its front pages and a minimum length was also established by the law (article 30).319 The papers could be shut down permanently or temporary, from six months up to five years (article 39) and these newspapers could not re-appear under a similar name or context.320 As a result of this law, the fines for “violating the law” were higher than before, in some cases up to 3,000 or 10,000 zlotys (articles 43 and 37).321 There was a long discussion between the Interior Ministry and the Press Department of the Council of Ministers that seemed to have initiated this law before it was formally declared.322 Both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria passed very restrictive press legislation, which remained in existence throughout the 1930s. The changes of legislation referring to the press in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia took place in 1929. Those changes were introduced into an already existing law from 26th August 1925. According to the Article 1 of the Press Law, the press was formally given freedom from any pre-emptive editing, in practice, this was not the case. As mentioned earlier according to the Article 14 of the same law, the newspapers could be closed down for several different reasons: a) If they were banned three times within one month; b) If they do not print government’s corrections and c) If the responsible person from the newspaper did not pay the fine within three days.323 318 Press law was declared in the form of a President’s decree on 21st November 1938. 319 Prawo prasowe, Dzennik Ustaw, Poz.607 i 608, No. 89, p. 1337. 320 Ibid, p. 1338. 321 Ibid, pp. 1137–38. 322 AAN, PRM 63-13. In this box, there are numerous pages that contain opinions of the aforementioned institutions and their proposals for most of the articles of the law. 323 „Закон о изменама и допунама Закона о штампи од 26. августа 1925” [The

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Due to such strict regulations, the editorial boards, either willingly or unwillingly, made a habit of taking proofs of their issues to the state organs to be approved before they were printed. This was a form of preemptive censorship, which gave the press very little freedom. In areas outside of Belgrade, this job was done by the state prosecutor’s offices or by the police in towns which did not have these offices. All censorship, as mentioned earlier, was carried out according to the directives and daily instructions of the Central Press-Bureau. The Bulgarian press legislation set up a new registration system for all the newspapers which had to pass a series of inspections prior to distribution and this proved particularly strict. The decree dated 12th June 1934, which had legislative power, ordered that following a period of ten days after its enactment, all newspapers and journals in Bulgaria should be re-registered. For the newspapers that would not follow this procedure, the law proscribed a permanent ban (the Article 2). Those editors who tried to publish newspapers without a permit faced a term of three year imprisonment and a fine of 30,000 leva (Article 4).324 On 6th April 1938, several decrees were issued dealing with the press control. Control was preliminary, which meant that no material could be published before approval. To get approval, one would need to provide the following data: name of newspaper, financial sources, name, age, education, birthplace and address of the editor. It was obligatory that the editor was a Bulgarian citizen age of 30 or more (for newspapers) and 21 (for magazines). It was underscored who was allowed to be editor and who was not: persons convicted for treason and betrayal, debauchery or corruption, crime against dynasty and for crimes punishable by the “Law for Protection of the State” etc. Sanctions included fines, confiscations and seizures but comparing with 1934, there was no imprisonment.325 The aim of the ruling class was to financially cripple the power of the opposition press with high fines and taxes. The additional pressure on the newspapers was an order dated 15th April 1938, which established supervision and pre-released proofing of all printed materials with a right to ban or stop publication permanently.326 Law for the Press with changes dated 26th of August 1925], Политика from 6 January 1929, p. 3. 324 Слободата на печата в Бьлгария [Freedom of the Press in Bulgaria], (Sofia, 1992), p. 151. 325 И. Димитров, ‘Диктатурата и печатьт [Dictatorship and Press] in: Политическата цензура в Бьлгария [Political Censorship in Bulgaria], F. Panaitov (ed.), (Varna, 2003), p. 102. 326 Р. Даскалов, Бьлгарското общество 1918–1939 [Bulgarian Society 1918–

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Since the early 1930s in Poland, the scope and extent of harassment and interference from various forms of censorship, largely driven by the administrative authorities, steadily increased and this most severely affected the opposition press. In 1931, the number of seizures was 2,100 in Poland, in October 1935, this figure decreased to 1,626 seizures and in the same period of 1936, 1,869 seizures were made and this data also included the confiscation of periodic publications.327 With World War Two about to begin, state pressure on the press increased. In 1937, there were 2,848 seizures across the country.328 The editors rarely filed complaints against the seizures due to the flexibility of the laws, the possibility of defeat and additional costs. In 1937, the courts revoked about 10% of seizures ordered by the administrative authorities and prosecutors.329 This situation had not improved after the law passed in 1938. Lack of data for the last two years of the Second Polish Republic did not allow the exact numbers to be recreated, but it is possible to assume that number of seizures was at least the same, if not larger. The principle of freedom of the press in Poland had lost its constitutional nature after the April Constitution of 1935 not only theoretically but also practically.330 The 1938 Press Law basically legalized the practice that had already existed in Poland under Sanacja. Seizures brought serious material damage to the newspapers. Large financial losses occurred as a consequence of frequent seizures carried out by Sanacja authority as an additional punishment for opposing journals. They also allowed the appearance of “voluntary” preventive control to which some editors were forced to submit in order to prevent the shut down of the magazine. “Voluntary” preventative control had been recognized by the Supreme Court to be compatible with the provisions of the “March Constitution”, which was valid until 1935.331 The press in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, as we mentioned earlier, was not free and was under the control of the government and state organs. This primarily referred to the transfer of political information regarding the government, as well as the news on the ruling party and the royal house. Nevertheless, the press in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, as we saw, was diverse and disparate. 1939], II, (Sofia, 2006), p. 485. 327 M. Pietrzak, Reglamentacja wolności prasy w Polsce 1918–1939 [Regulation of the Freedom of the Press in Poland 1918–1939], (Warsaw, 1963), p. 520. 328 Ibid. 329 Pietrzak, Reglamentacja, p. 521. 330 March Constitution from 1921, Article 105 declared the freedom of the press. 331 Pietrzak, Reglamentacja, p. 529.

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Stojadinović’s government controlled the papers in two ways. Firstly, by pre-emptive censorship and secondly, by banning the newspapers, if it was concluded that its writing was harmful for the interests of the President, the Government or the party in power. The reasons for closing down most of the newspapers were communist tendencies or contents. Most seizures due to opposition writing were made in Croatia, but other regions were not spared this common practice, either. In 1936 around 60 newspapers were banned after the suggestion was made by CPB.332 Control and supervision of the newspapers was carried out, in addition to various pressures such as blackmail and bribery, in two ways. Firstly, as we have already seen, the preventive censorship was carried out by the CPB, the state prosecutor’s office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and secondly, newspapers were closed down if their writing was judged to be detrimental to the interests of the government and the ruling party. There were papers that were obliged to submit to preventative censorship and there were those that were exempted from such an obligation. Objective circumstances could be a reason for this, such as the lack of a sufficient number of reliable censors.333 The severity of censorship could be illustrated by fact that the Split daily newspaper Jadranski dnevnik was banned 23 times in the period March-June 1938.334 That meant that every third number was banned and as we have said, censorship was stringently applied to newspapers in Croatia. Sometimes the censors went so far as to ban newspapers when they omitted to publish the material received from the propaganda institutions. Thus on 24th June 1938, the newspapers Jadranski dnevnik (Adriatic Journal) and Novo Doba (New Age) from Split did not release any news related to the anniversary of the government and they were consequently banned. This ban was the result of anger, and also the incompetency of the government representatives in Primorska banovina.335 A similar situation occurred on the same day with the newspaper Dan (Day) from Novi Sad because they omitted to publish an article on the anniversary on the front page. That was described, in the opinion of the state prosecutor, as an “insult”, to “Mr. President”.336 332 Centralni Pres-biro, Izveštaj o radu za 1936.godinu [Annual Report of the Central Press Bureau for 1936], p. 26. 333 Milan Jovanović Stoimirović complained that even he was requested to submit progovernment’s party newspaper Samouprava to preventative censorship of CPB. He refused because he considered himself part of CPB. 334 AY, 38-11. 335 Ibid. 336 Arhive of Vojvodine, Royal banovina’s administration 1938, Letter of State Pros-

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Censorship sometimes banned newspapers, even when they printed the official press release about an event. The being that they omitted to print the official article in its entirety and this could lead to arbitrary interpretations in the opinion of the censor. Sometimes this “mistake” was unintentional and due to a lack of space, but mainly because newspapers were obliged to publish official announcements. This happened, especially with comments on politically sensitive issues like the opposition agreement in Farkašić,337 Concordat338 etc. In addition to the overall official press releases, for which the agency Avala was responsible, newspapers had to print these additional comments. It was clear that these comments were pro-government and were adjusted to suit the government’s needs and political interests. The prosecution office had its censorship duty to perform every day. For example, there were four officers who dealt with that business in the State Prosecutor’s Office in Ljubljana. The prosecutors worked daily shifts, so that each one worked an average of two days a week. However, there were cases that even the prosecutors’ influence on the newspapers was not in the interests of the government. Thus it happened that, despite instructions from CPB to publish an article on Stojadinović’s visit to Italy, which was offered by Avala, the Slovenian press only printed comments on this visit.339 The report on the prosecutors’ work alleged that only one of these four prosecutors openly supported JRZ, which was seen as a problem. This case revealed that, during the implementation of censorship, there were some problems, and even more when it was revealed that CPB, in certain situations, was viewed as superior to the prosecution. There were cases when the state prosecutors received orders for special surveillance under the guise of some newspaper and those prosecutors who received this special status could be forced to delete even the smallest content that was suspected to be contrary to the governments’ best interests. ecutor to the Ban of the Danube banovina of 25 June 1938. 337 Agreement on cooperation between opposition parties from Serbia and Croatia. See more in: T. Stojkov, ‘O stvaranju bloka narodnog sporazuma’ [About the Foundation of People’s Agreement Coalition], Istorija XX veka, VI, (Belgrade, 1964), pp. 245–301. 338 Concordat was signed in 1935, but it was invalidated in 1937 due to the strong opposition of Serbian Orthodox Church and people. See more in: M. Mišović, Srpska crkva i konkordatska kriza [Serbian Church and Concordat Crisis], (Belgrade, 1983); Р. Радић, Живот у временима: Гаврило Дожић 1881–1950 [Life in the Times: Gavrilo Dožić 1881–1950], (Belgrade, 2006), pp. 156–186. 339 AY, 37-73-333/335, Report on the work of prosecution in connection with preventative censorship.

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Both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria had central institutions in charge of the press and publishing information. Yugoslavia had the CPB and Bulgaria had the Press Office and Press Control. These institutions decided which information was “acceptable” and controlled its publishing. Similar institutions existed throughout Europe as we had seen earlier and they all basically shared the same functions. The section of CPB that dealt with the preventive examination of the press was responsible for monitoring the local newspapers, magazines and also preparing bulletins. This bulletins included a review of all minority newspapers in the Hungarian, German, Czech and Slovak languages and it reviewed 27 daily newspapers, of which four were German and Hungarian and 125 weekly newspapers.340 All of them were put into a database which showed the political orientation of each newspaper. In addition, special files were made with information on the editor and his associates as well as information on all journalists in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. There is a significant report from the British Consulate in Belgrade dated 1938 relating to the freedom of the press in Yugoslavia that explains the situation from an outsider’s point of view: “Censorship of the press in Yugoslavia has become increasingly harsher towards the end of the year. Some headlines, even whole editions, were excluded, often without any good reason where Belgrade’s newspapers especially were obligated to publish all the information that the Central Press Bureau wanted. In September, publication of the Belgrade Pravda, which received material for its news from Czechoslovakia and France, was terminated by an order from the Interior Ministry. In the official statement, they stated that there were some damaging accusations about the highest officials from the head offices of this newspaper. One month after the termination, the newspaper was published once again”.341 The Prime Minister Stojadinović himself was involved in censorship. In the case of the newspaper Javnost (Public), which was suspected of receiving money from Czechoslovakian government, he made the following statement: “if any, even a small thing could be found which does not follow the basic line of our foreign and interior policy the 340 CPB, Report, p. 41. 341 Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji, Godišnji izveštaji Britanskog poslanstva u Beogradu [Brits about Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Yearly Reports of British Consulate in Belgrade], II, (Zagreb, 1986), p. 683.

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newspaper should be terminated according to the law”.342 In the case of Zagreb’s journal Novosti (News), he urged for the dismissal of ten journalists in order to stop this paper from having “leftist-communist tendencies”.343 Instructions, on the implementation of censorship in specific cases, have been issued by the Bans, heads of the Banovinas. They had some kind of autonomy, and were thus able to censor writing about events that had a regional character, and for which CPB did not give specific instructions. Marko Natlačen, of the Drava banovina issued an order to the press that banned criticism of the transfer of teachers in Slovenia that happened often.344 With the same order, any articles about some property transfers that were taking place at the time in his party were forbidden.345 Some journals and editors received special treatment. There were situations in Yugoslavia where prosecutors were instructed to pay particular attention to some newspapers. On those occasions, they even deleted sentences that could be interpreted differently from the official line of the government’s propaganda.346 The newspapers and their editors fought the war against censorship in every possible way. There were examples, as mentioned, especially in Croatia, of state prosecution officials censoring whole passages of a texts and newspapers publishing these articles with empty spaces in place of the censored sections. The editors of these newspapers used this tactic to draw attention to state repression and to suppression of freedom in the country. The director of the Bulgarian Renewal Petar Popzlatev, made an interesting comment on the advantage of censorship at a meeting with capital’s journalists. He said: “Today’s regime of censorship has the advantage of liberating editors of all responsibility, after the newspaper passes our control. We could eliminate censorship, but can you imagine how much more difficult your job would be, when you intentionally step outside the limi342 AY, 37-46-542, Stojadinović’s letter to the Minister of Interior Anton Korošec on 21st December 1937. 343 AY, 37-14-279, Stojadinović’s letter to the Finance Minister Dušan Letica on 27th June 1937. 344 Teachers in the interwar Yugoslavia were transferred from one place to another as an act of punishment if they did not collaborate with the government’s officials. 345 AY, 38-5, Telephone report of CPB’s correspondent from Ljubljana on 10th January 1936. 346 Oral testimony of Lazar Atanacković, editor in chief of Dan in: Д. Попов, Српска штампа у Војводини 1918–1941 [Serbian Press in Vojvodina 1918–1941], (Novi Sad, 1983), p. 382.

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tations and come under the sanctions of the law? It is better now, because once your newspaper is controlled by censors, you are free from any future responsibilities”.347 One of the most interesting collections of articles about the press and its role in the state was published in Asen Bojinov’s (Асень Божиновь) book Press in the New State (Печатьть вь новата дьржава). These articles were published by Zveno and one can assume that they were government approved. Bojinov explained in this book, from his point of view, the relationship between the state and the press where he urged for an elimination of every subjectivity in journalism (“personal, party, partisan, pathological and traitor”). The book consisted of several different sections that treated various problems. The names were as follows: Press – a Factor or Agent; News Policy; Totally Objective Journal; New State – New Press; Press and Criticism; Press and Education; Press and the National Cause; the Press Office; Press Secretary; Organized Internal Press; Press and Preparation; Press and Censorship. It is obvious that the publication was supposed to be a manual guide for the editors and journalists. The main role model was found in contemporary Germany, Italy and Soviet Union and Bojinov said that the press should be aware of its new role of “re-educating the whole nation”. He expressed his belief that the “new state” should have the “new freedom of the press” where this freedom should be “organized” freedom. In practice, that “freedom” meant that the regime could not be criticized and that the press should be an instrument of the government and by extension, its people. Bojinov demanded reform of the press that would “make the press simpler as it could pass from the present chaotic situation to a state of organized domestic press under the command of the state”.348 Soon after the Press Law was passed in Bulgaria in 1934, the first bans on newspapers were imposed and 14 different journals were banned. Four of these were newspapers that supported the communists: Rabotnik (Работник, Worker), Edinstvo (Единство, Unity), Zvezda (Звезда, Star) and Rabotnicheska Misal (Работническа мисьл, Workers Thought).349 On 29th June and 3rd July, 20 more journals were banned (ten on each day), amongst them were some military newspapers that wrote against Zveno, “tabloid” newspapers and even one Jewish, Evre-

347 Из личния архив, p. 261. 348 А. Божинов, Печатьть вь новата дьржава [Press in the New State], (Sofia, 1934), p. 51. 349 Дьржавень вестникь (State Journal), No. 69, 27 June 1934, p. 1195.

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iski vesti (Еврейски вести, Jewish news) paper.350 However, around 120 journals were given permission to be published amongst them were newspapers loyal to the regime as well as some apolitical papers. At the end of 1935 and the beginning of 1936, some weaknesses of censorship in Bulgaria appeared. This was due to the change of regimes and the King’s circle tried to find the most appropriate policy for the country. After a brief period, their control over the press was strengthened once again and an analysis made by the Society of the Capital’s Journalists, gives a clear picture of the situation the Bulgarian press: “1935 – was difficult for the journalists due to ongoing censorship, limited employment, promises on the termination of censorship were not fulfilled; 1936 – partial liberation but only from time to time and unsatisfying. On a couple of occasions, Kjoseivanov gave promises about less censorship, but instead new, harsher measures against the press were introduced; 1937 – regime of press control did not change, it became more strict, not only regarding internal but also external affairs; lack of instructions, no one knows what is permitted to be published and what is not”.351 As in the case of Yugoslavia, there were many reasons for the shut down or suspension of some journals. These included not only articles written against the interests of the ruling circles, but also articles that were not written in its favor. In July 1934, the newspaper Makedoniya was suspended for one month because it did not publish the Prime Minister’s speech.352 The historian Ilcho Dimitrov (Илчо Димитров) underlined the difference in the censorship of different newspapers where left wing communist and democratic newspapers were more likely to be banned whilst opposition and right wing newspapers were usually suspended for some period of time and then re-instated.353 The Bureau “Presa”, which was formed in 1927 was one of the most important institutions for controlling the press. At the beginning, it was used as a weapon against the increasingly powerful leftist press. During 1931, the leftist newspaper Eho (Ехо, Echo) was confiscated 74 times and one of those acts resulted with one member of the left receiving a three year prison sentence.354 350 Nowosad, Władza i media, p. 225. 351 Димитров, Диктатурата, p. 97. 352 Ibid. 353 Ibid, p. 98. 354 Т. Натан-Пауновска, ‘Цензори и журналисти, Левият печат и бюро «Преса». Закони за прeследване 1926–1934’ [Censors and Journalists, Leftist Press

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After the functioning of the Directorate for Social Renewal was terminated, there were 3 different sections responsible for dealing with the press: Section for Overseeing the Press (Отдел за надзор вьрху печата) in the Council of Ministers (one chief, ten controllers in Sofia and four in the provinces – Plovdiv, Burgas, Ruse, Varna), the Press Directorate with special service for the press in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Section “V” for the press in the Interior Ministry.355 The aforementioned Bureau “Presa” was subordinated to the Section “V” and the chief of the bureau sent monthly reports to the chief of the section about the writings of the domestic and international press.356 According to the official statistics before the “reform” in 1933, there were 281 political papers but in 1935, there were only 96 and this number was decreasing. However, the government did not always succeed in carrying out its intentions. In 1938, we noticed one, not insignificant, victory for democratic forces in Bulgaria. The Parliament, with a narrow margin, did not vote for loans to be taken in order to buy machines and other equipment for the pro-government newspaper Dnes. One of the deputies even said that he would not vote for the newspaper in the service of propaganda and the aims of government, with anti-parliamentary and anti-social points of view’’.357 In this case the remaining democrats were strong enough to block some authoritarian laws, even in Parliament.

PRESS IN THE SERVICE OF STATE PROPAGANDA DURING THE 1930s

In the following part of the chapter, the most important pro-government newspapers in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria will be examined. Other newspapers will be mentioned only to explain details relating to the pro-government press. and Bureau “Presa”. Laws for Prosecution 1926–1934], in: Политическата цензура в Бьлгария, F. Panaitov (ed.), (Varna, 2003), p. 89. 355 Димитров, Диктатурата, p. 100. 356 For an example, see the report dated June 1938 in: Дьржавен военоисторически архив (State Military-Historical Archive) - DVIA, Fond Културно-просветна дейност (V2.07) [Cultural and Educational Activities], box 23, description 1, archive unit 319, pp. 36–45. 357 Димитров, Диктатурата, p. 109.

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The first page of Gazeta Polska on 1 September 1939

The newspapers in Poland that were affiliated with the government were numerous. Some of the most important ones in the late 1930s were the Gazeta Polska (Polish Newspaper), Kurier Poranny (Morning Courier) and Polska Zbrojna (Polish Military). The Gazeta 146

Polska was the semi-official newspaper of the government from 1929. That did not mean that Gazeta Polska was under the same newspaper management throughout the period under the review. It was quite common that different groups within the government exerted influence on the editors and staff of the newspapers. In the early 1930s, the newspaper was under the control of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and during 1935 and 1936, this newspaper first came under the influence of President Mościcki’s group and then, Marshal’s group. The last became obvious at the end of 1937 when Gazeta Polska became the official OZN newspaper.358 The newspaper had three editors in chief in the 1930s and all three were important Sanacja members. The first was Colonel Adam Koc, who was later the head of OZN and who was editor in chief until 1931. The second was the most important Sanacja journalists Bogusław Meidziński who held this position until 1938 when he was promoted to a high position in the “Sejm”. The last editor of Gazeta Polska was Lieutenant Colonel Mieczysław Starzyński.359 The newspaper published around 30,000 copies daily.360 Kurier Poranny was one of the most widespread pro-government newspapers. It was founded in 1877 and from the start was very loyal to Piłsudski. This was very significant as in the 1930s, its editor was the unofficial minister of propaganda Wojciech Stpiczyński (1931–1936). In its final years, Kurier Poranny supported Sanacja right wing (RydzŚmigły, OZN) and had an average circulation of 25,000 copies daily.361 The newspaper ceased publication with the German occupation. The newspaper Polska Zbrojna (Polish Army) was an unofficial organ of the Ministry of War. The newspaper was not only intended for the military but for all Polish citizens and its influence grew over time. At the beginning of the 1930s, Polska Zbrojna printed only 6,000 copies, but in later years, this number grew to between 25 and 30,000 copies on the eve of World War Two.362 After the death of Piłsudski, the newspaper firmly supported Rydz-Śmygłi and was one of his strongest supporters. Foreign policy was one of the main issues on the pages of the Polska Zbrojna as this newspaper had foreign correspondents in many countries like Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania and Palestine. Polska Zbrojna with a price of 10 grosz was cheaper than many other 358 A. Paczkowski, Prasa Polska w latach 1918–1939 [Polish Press 1918–1939], (Warsaw, 1980), p. 146. 359 Polska Niepodległa, p. 512. 360 Paczkowski, Prasa Polska, p. 146. 361 Polska Niepodległa, pp. 515–516. 362 Paczkowski, Prasa Polska, p. 158.

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newspapers (Gazeta Polska was 20 grosz) and this also increased its popularity. Each issue of the newspaper had a front page quotation by Marshal Piłsudski entitled: “Jozef Pilsudski speaks” (“Józef Piłsudski mówi”). That was one of numerous ways to develop and spread the cult of Piłsudski in interwar Poland.363 In total, five pro-government newspapers were published in Warsaw (Gazeta Polska, Czas, Kurier Polski, Kurier Poranny and Polska Zbrojna), but none of these exceeded 100,000 copies daily. That was not something that government was especially proud of because at the beginning of the 1930s, only Kurier Poranny had circulation of 50,000 copies.364 That too was a small circulation compared to the most popular newspaper in Poland Ilustrowany Kurier Codzienny (Illustrated Daily Courier) that sometimes published 200,000 copies daily.365 However their influence could not be underestimated and the aforementioned newspapers were amongst the most important weapons of state propaganda in the Second Polish Republic. Of other pro-government newspapers, one can mention Kurier Wileński (Courier of Vilnius), Słowo (The Word), Kurier Czerwony (Red Courier), Głos Prawdy (Voice of the Truth) and Droga (The Road). The two most important newspapers whose task was to spread government propaganda in Yugoslavia in the second half of 1930s were Vreme (Time) and Samouprava (Self-government). The Belgrade newspaper Vreme was practically owned by Stojadinović himself, since the main shareholders since 1936 were members of his family or his friends. It was a widely read paper, second only to Politika when it came to the number of copies sold. Considerable means were invested into the founding of this newspaper and the most modern printing house on the Balkans, equipped with German and American machinery, was built for this purpose. The Prime Minister himself took part in choosing the recognizable visual images and the contents of the paper. According to one of his associates, he spent a few hours every day editing it.366 Vreme was supposed to represent a model newspaper and to present Stojadinović’s stands on domestic and foreign policy because European events began to exert more influence on the situation at 363 More about the cult of Józef Piłsudski in Poland see: H. Hein-Kircher, Kult Piłsudskiego i jego znaczenie dla państwa polskiego 1926–1939, [The Cult of Pilsudski and his Importance for Polish Society 1926–1939], (Warsaw, 2008). 364 Paczkowski, Prasa Polska, p. 158. 365 Ilustrowany Kurier Codzienny was a tabloid newspaper that was popular in the whole country during the 1930s. 366 Јовановић Стоимировић, Дневник, pp. 404–408.

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home. In the 1930s, Vreme was one of the largest newspapers in the country (more than 130,000 copies in 1937) second only to Politika (150,000).367 Though attempts were made to present Vreme as a neutral paper, it gradually became known as the paper which presents the views of the government which heavily contributed to a drop in sales. Samouprava was JRZ’s main party newspaper and it controlled all the other papers in the hierarchy of the party press. This very title, which was taken from the old Radical newspaper, was meant to imply that the newly founded JRZ was the only real successor of the old Radical Party active in the Kingdom of Serbia. Although it had low sales (couple of thousands per day), the importance of this paper was not insignificant, since its articles were reprinted by many provincial papers throughout the country. Amongst the other newspapers which spread the propaganda of Milan Stojadinović’s government, the most important were Vrbaske novine (Vrbas Journal) from Banja Luka, Vardar from Skopje, Narodni list (People’s Newspaper) from Cetinje, Narodna samouprava (People’s Self-government) from Kragujevac and the Država (State) from Split. The Party Press-Bureau of the JRZ was closely connected with the press. This party organ was founded in 1936 and its main task was to be the central institution for all party and “friendly” papers. It sent information to be published to the provincial press and often sent complete articles. Press-Bureau ensured that the sent articles were published on the front pages of the papers, and it synchronized their appearance. The Press-Bureau cooperated with about 35 papers that published almost everything they received from it. The head of this institution was Milan Jovanović Stoimirović, the editor in chief of the Samouprava. The Press-Bureau shared its premises with Samouprava almost until the end of 1938 and the same associates worked in both institutions.368 The most important newspaper of the new Zveno regime in Bulgaria was Novi dni (New Days). This newspaper was published from 24th June 1934 until 28th June 1935 and it was published by the Direc367 Politika was one of the oldest newspapers in Serbia/Yugoslavia and was founded in 1904. During the 1930s, it tried to lead a neutral policy towards any government. More about Politika in this period see: М. Симић, Лист „Политика” и његов утицај на ширење демократских идеја у периоду између два рата [Newspaper Politika and its Influence on Spreding Democratic Ideas in Interwar Period], (Belgrade, 1987). 368 More about the Party Press-Bureau of JRZ in: Б. Симић, Партијски прес-биро Југословенске радикалне заједнице [Party Press-Bureau of Jugoslav Radical Union], Arhiv VI/2005, pp. 73–78.

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torate for Social Renewal where the government’s achievements were glorified and emphasized every day. In the section titled “Facts That Should Not Be Forgotten”, people were reminded about the “glorious past”. Novi dni was the regime’s main instrument for creating “new people” for the “new state” and this newspaper lasted until the regime was changed.Regime change did not mean the end of the “Press Law” in Bulgaria. This law was in effect until 1943, thus covering the whole period under review in this study. In the second half of 1930s, the most influential daily newspapers in the service of the state propaganda were: Dnes (Днес, Today), Utro (Утро, Morning), Vecher (Вечер, Evening) and La Parole Bulgare (The Bulgarian Word). From 1936–1944, Dnes was one of the most important newspapers for state propaganda in Bulgaria. Its director was Dino Bojkov (Дино Божков)369 and the editor in chief was Simeon Gruev.370 The main tasks of the newspaper were underscored on the front page of first issue of Dnes: “To start one comprehensive newspaper, which will fill the absence of true and documented facts on state activities and social life in the country and help, in its own way, stabilize life in the country, with the aim of bringing better days to Bulgaria, which it has every right to expect after all its suffering”.371 The formulation of helping the country in practice clearly meant helping the government. That was one of the primary tasks of Dnes from its beginning until its end. Later in the 1940s, under the Prime Minister Bogdan Filov, the newspaper officially became the mouthpiece of the government.372 The newspaper Utro was founded in 1911 and lasted until the fall of the Bulgarian monarchy in 1944. Its director was Atanas Damyanov (Атанас Дамянов)373 and its editor in chief after 1918 was Stefan 369 Dino Bojkov (1876–1966) – teacher, translator and publisher. He was the author of various publications on religious topics and propagandist of Christian ethics. He was the publisher and director of Vchera i dnes (1939–1940) and Vecher (1939–1940), unofficial newspapers of the Kjoseivanov government. 370 Simeon Gruev (1894–1944) - journalist. He worked at several different newspapers like: Balkanska tribuna, Zarya, Narod, Slovo and Makedoniya. Editor in Chief of Vchera i dnes (1939–1940) and Dnes (1939–1940). He disappeared in the first days of communist rule in Bulgaria. 371 Dnes, number 1 from 3rd February 1936, page 1. 372 Bogdan Filov (1883–1945) – professor of archeology (1920–1944), dean of University of Sofia (1931–1932) and president of Bulgarian Academy of Science (1937–1944). As a politician, he was Minister of Education (1938–1940), Prime Minister (1940–1943) and regent (1943–1944). 373 Atanas Damyanov (Sopot, 1871 – 1948) advocate, journalist and publisher. He finished high school in Romania, university in Venice, Paris and Geneva. Damyanov worked as a prosecutor and judge. He was remembered most for his work in

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Tanev (Стефан Танев).374 The newspaper never came into conflict with the governments and always remained faithful to every regime. Tanev had an interesting explanation: “It is not good for a journal to tie its fate to one regime. That is the case of Utro. It supported not only one government, not one regime but it supported all of them for the time while they had the sympathy and confidence of the majority. Not for the ruling class, but for the majority of the people”.375 Utro was directed towards the masses, as their articles used “folk language” that was closer to the minds of the masses, the main consumers of propaganda. That was the reason why, in some circles, it was known as the “people’s journal”.376

The first page of newspaper Utro from the 7 May 1938 journalism. Beside Utro, he was the founder and co-founder of Echo d’ Geneve, Dnevnik and Zarya. 374 Stefan Tanev (Turnu Magureli, Romania 1888 – Sofia, 1952) He started studying law but became a journalist in his youth. He dedicated most of his life to the newspaper Utro which was very popular in the country until 1944. After the World War Two, he was sentenced to life time imprisonment by the new communist regime. He died in jail. 375 С. Танев, Дневник (Diary), (Sofia, 2005), p. 7 376 Ibid, p. 1173.

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It is important to mention La Parole Bulgare, the Bulgarian newspaper that was published for foreign propaganda. It was published in French and was financed by the government. La Parole Bulgare was published weekly and it cost the government around 3 million leva per year.377 At the end of this section of the chapter, we can conclude that the press was the most important propaganda tool of governments in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the 1930s. The press was the most diverse and widely used instrument for these government’s propaganda purposes in the period under review. With restrictive legislation and various methods of pressure, the ruling circles in these countries tried to control public opinion. Many newspapers, willingly or otherwise, reported the activity of the governments and interpreted events in the light of the official positions. In the event of disobedience, the governments did not hesitate to use bans, fines and threats. Nevertheless, the most important tools for state propaganda were the newspapers that were controlled by these regimes. RADIO The first regular radio broadcasts in Europe started in the first half of the 1920s.378 One of the first radio stations of this type was set up in the UK in 1922. It was the British Broadcasting Company (later Corporation), known as the BBC. This station, as well as the others 377 CDA, 176k-20-12/21, Document from 1940, which covered the period from 1st September to 31st December. It shows that the total costs for publishing were 1,246,947. Of these, only 155,000 were earned from subscribers, commercials and foreign orders. In 1940, there were also Italian and German versions of the newspaper. 378 Miroslav Jokić said the following about radio broadcasting: ‘’The term ‘radio broadcasting’ signified in the beginning only transmission of sound across distance, including also wireless radio-telegraphy (transmission of sound signals) and wireless telephoning (transmission of human voice). With the development of technologies for transmission of speech and music, the meaning of the term ‘radio broadcasting’ was broadened to the field of radio-technology, which dealt with matters of ‘musical qualities of transmission of human voice’, i.e. with the highest quality broadcasting (microphone - transmitter) and reception (radio – receiver - speakers). The complete range and content of the term ‘radio broadcasting’ was set only with the tape recorder revolution, which generated the artistic approach that was the use of sound recording as a sound signal (signifier). By these means, the non-existent possibility of sound expression was accomplished. It became the key term in development of the new, ‘eight art’ called radio-broadcasting’’. М. Јокић, Историја радиофоније у три епохе [History of Radiophonia in Three Periods], I-III, (Belgrade, 2004), pp. 7–8.

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founded afterwards, were linked to the territory of the mother country. The first international radio station was Radio Holland, which started bradcasting in 1927.379 It is an immensly significancant year beacuse short wave broadcasting began, which made long distance transmission possible. Propaganda spread via radio broadcasting in this period had significant advantage in comparison to propaganda spread by the press. It knew no geographical or state borders and it could be heard on different continents at the same time, thus even the illiterate could be reached. This was important considering the fact that at the beginning of 1930s the number of illiterate in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was higher than 40%. In addition, radio broadcasting had the indirect effect of making personal contact with the listener. It also had the practically unlimited possibility of broadcasting to other states since jamming devices used at the time were quite primitive.380 During the 1930s, radio broadcasting expanded. In 1937, radio stations in the world were allocated as follows: Asia 161 (8%), Africa 19 (1%), Australia 130 (7%), America 1,142 (62%) and Europe 408 (22%). When one considered the power of the aforementioned stations, a different picture emerged: Asia 579 kW (5%), Africa 118 kW (1%), Australia 271 kW (2%), America 3,423 kW (27%) and Europe 8,096 kW (65%).381 Clearly America had the largest number of radio stations, but in terms of their power and development, Europe was way ahead. For further details, see the table below on radio development in Europe during the 1930s:

379 N. Cull, D. Culbert, D. Welch, Propaganda and Mass Persuasion, A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to Present, (Santa Barbara/Denver/Oxford, 2003), pp. 331– 333. 380 First mass and efficient jamming of radio-broadcasts of foreign radio-stations was conducted by Germany during the Second World War. It was not completely successful, but it represented one of the first attempts of its kind, M. Oreč, Sloboda informacija i propaganda [Freedom of Information and Propaganda], (Belgrade, 1966), p. 190. 381 S. Miszczak, Historia radiofonii i telewizji w Polsce [History of Radio and Television in Poland], (Warsaw, 1972), p. 147.

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Radio-broadcasting in Europe during 1936382 Number of Number Beginning of Number of Energy inhabitants of radiobroadcasting subscribers total (in millions) stations Austria 6.7 1924 575,000 9 149 Belgium 8.2 1925 757,000 16 41 Bulgaria 6 1929 10,000 3 5 Greece 6.2 1932 5,000 1 1 Denmark 3.6 1922 625,000 3 75 England 46 1922 7,700,000 29 858 Estonia 1.2 1926 30,000 2 20 Italy 41.1 1924 560,000 19 323 Yugoslavia 14 1926 85,000 3 9 Lithuania 2 1925 85,000 4 80 Luxemburg 0.3 1932 22,000 1 150 Hungary 8.6 1925 380,000 8 154 Germany 66.6 1923 7,600,000 41 1,015 Norway 2.8 1925 208,000 16 193 Poland 32 1925 540,000 11 217 Portugal 6 1933 45,000 3 25 Turkey 14 1925 9,000 2 12 Romania 18 1925 101,000 3 62 Switzerland 4 1923 426,000 8 257 Sweden 6.1 1925 884,000 31 245 Spain 22.7 1924 304,000 9 51 France 41.8 1922 2,800,000 28 851 Finland 3.6 1926 145,000 10 263 The 8.5 1925 950,000 6 295 Netherlands Czechoslovakia 14.7 1923 859,000 8 101 SSSR/ 128.1 1924 2,500,000 75 1,600 the USSR Country

The Soviet Union had the largest number of radio-stations after Germany and those two countries were in the forefront as far as total energy was concerned. These figures also represent the development of their state propaganda organizations. However, England had the largest number of subscribers which was due to the fact that it started to develop the radio early and due to a better general economic situation in the country. 382 Based on the data published in the magazine Радио Београд [Radio Belgrade] on 20 September 1936.

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THE FOUNDATION OF RADIO NETWORKS IN POLAND, YUGOSLAVIA AND BULGARIA As the table shows, radio broadcasting in the Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria started at about the same time as in the other European countries. Radio Warsaw (Radio Warszawa) started in 1926. One year earlier, the society for control of the radio was formed (Polskie Radio Sp.Akc). The second radio station was formed in Cracow (1926). After that, several radio stations were formed: Katowice (1927), Poznan (1927), Vilnius (1928), Lwow (1930), Lodz (1931), Torun (1931), Warsaw II (1937), Baranowicze (1938) and thus the national radio network was created. In 1929, the Ministry for Post and Telegraph gave the aforementioned society a 20 year concession for the use of radio until 1949. Radio broadcasting in Serbia began to develop during the First World War. The radio stations were temporary ones set up for military purposes with the help of the French.383 Domestic radio stations started broadcasting regular programs by the second half of the 1920s. This was first done by a radio station in Zagreb in 1926, whereas Radio Ljubljana started broadcasting two years later. The radio station in the capital city of the country, Radio Belgrade (Радио Београд), started its regular broadcasts on 24th March 1929. The main transmitter was placed on the building of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in the downtown area. In May 1934, it was moved to the suburb of Makiš.384 The development of radio broadcasting in Bulgaria lagged a few years behind the development in Poland and Yugoslavia. One of the most important steps in the development of radio in Bulgaria was the establishment of Native Radio (Родно Радио) in 1930. In the same year, regular broadcasts began for a couple of hours per day. Only in 1936 was the national radio network set up when Radio Stara Zagora (Стара Загора) and Radio Varna (Варна) started to broadcast.

383 See more in: Овде Радио Београд, Зборник педесетогодишњице, [Radio Belgrade, Here, 50th Anniversary Anthology], (Belgrade, 1989), p. 11. 384 Д. Тешић, Југословенска радикална заједница у Србији 1935–1939 [Yugoslav Radical Union in Serbia 1935–1939], (Belgrade, 1997), p. 197, reference 33.

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JURISDICTION OVER RADIO AND RADIO LEGISLATION AND ORGANIZATION Jurisdiction over radio in these three countries belonged to, at least partially, the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone or the local equivalents to that ministry. In Poland, the radio started out as a private company, but over time, state control of the radio grew. Initially, the state had only a 40% stake in the society for control of the radio. In 1935, that stake rose to 96%.385 That meant that by the mid 1930s, the ruling circle in Poland completely controlled the radio. Jurisdiction over radio in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was handed to several different ministries during the 1930s. Radio was controlled by the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone before it was handed over to the Ministry of Civil Engineering from April 1929 until December 1930. The transfer of jurisdiction continued and from December 1930 until September 1935, the radio was controlled by the Ministry of Traffic. Only after that period did the radio return under the jurisdiction of the Ministry for Post, Telegraph and Telephone and remained there until the occupation of the country. The main legislative characteristic in the field of radio diffusion during this period in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia could be summarized as follows: - R  egulation of radio diffusion followed valid international conventions, but it was partial and this was confirmed by the fact that no integral laws on radio diffusion had been passed; - According to its character, the normative acts passed in this period could be classified as: acts regulating relations between owners of radios and the state and acts regulating relations between the state and prospective owners and founders of radio stations; - High levels of distrust and caution of the state towards new media – radio, where the state which started as the leading promoter of radio at the end became its sole controller; - Numerous restrictive state measures towards “subjects” wanting to broadcast, but also listen to radio programs; - Insufficient dealing with copyright problems.386 385 Polska Niepodległa [Indipendent Poland], (Warsaw, 2008), p. 505. 386 M. Nikolić, Radio u Srbiji 1924–1941 [Radio in Serbia 1924–1941], (Belgrade, 2006), p. 25.

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The Department for Radio-Broadcasting was established later in 1939 to complete the diverse tasks in relation to radio broadcasting within the Central Press-Bureau. This affected the standard division into three departments: Administrative, Informative and Publicist, prescribed by CPB’s manuals of 1931 and 1935. The new Department for Radio Broadcasting was divided into as many as ten sections: Secretariat, Editing board for the domestic program, Editing board for foreign programs, Editing board of news in foreign languages, Editing board for overseas programs, Office of foreign news broadcasts, Radio telegraphic office, Technical office, Information office – reportage, Cultural propaganda and Music section.387 Understandably, the importance of radio broadcasting increased over the years. Between 1937 and 1939, a developed program concept was presented and it was “developed” in every sense. It was designed by the first generation of founders who had been educated at the radio station and who clearly knew what could be done with radio. Since listeners of radio broadcasts were known, the author referred to a structured and differentiated auditorium in which target groups could be recognized. This “golden era” of Radio Belgrade ended with it being nationalized which was an essential reflection of the international socio-political situation.388 In Bulgaria the first article of the “Radio Law” (1935),389 clearly stated that the radio belonged to the category of a state monopoly and the state was the only one that was allowed to “build, control and use” radio stations.390 After the law was passed, the situation in the radio industry developed as follows: - B  ulgarian Radio was the property of Ministry of Information and it was run by the ministry; - Employees of the Radio were the state clerks; - Ministry of Information created all programs, appointed members of the committees and defined duties and also conducted preventive censorship; - The government delegated members of the Executive Committee. Independent intellectuals could only be members of the Program Committee in a consultative capacity. The Head 387 AY, 38-1. 388 Nikolić, Radio u Srbiji, p. 91. 389 First law regarding radio in Bulgaria was declared in 1927. 390 Дьржавень вестникь (State Journal) No. 22 from 31 January 1935.

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of this committee was delegated by the Prime Minister on the suggestion of the Ministry of Communication. - Radio was financed by an imposed radio tax and by money generated by advertising. Finances were controlled by the Ministry of Communication.391 According to the new 1938, regulations on the radio service the Program Committee was made up of representatives from the following ministries: Ministry of Post and Telegraph, Ministry of War, Ministry of Education, Interior Ministry, Health Directorate, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Commerce. Their mandates were for three years.392 This shows that, the radio was placed under direct state control and propaganda tasks became the main function of radio in Bulgaria. It is interesting to note that the system created in the late 1930s remained almost unchanged under the communist rule in Bulgaria after Second World War that is until 1990.393 During the 1930s, the Bulgarian Radio was organized in five departments: The organization of the Bulgarian radio in 1938394

Music

Education and Professions Information Propaganda Enlightenment and Economy

Standard and Drama, Classical Literature and Music Art Folk Music Pop and Dance Music

Popular science Health, Religious and Popular Education

Agriculture Industry and Craft Commerce

General Information Foreign Information Internal Information

Domestic propaganda Foreign Propaganda

Domestic propaganda was divided into the following sections: popular culture, state and social ventures, ideological and propaganda 391 Р. Чолаков, Право на радио-телевизионните организации в Бьлгария [Regulation of radio-television organizations in Bulgaria], (Sofia-Vienna, 2000), p. 26. 392 Nowosad, Władza i media, p. 232. 393 Чолаков, Право на, p. 28. 394 Ibid, p. 27.

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communications between cultural and economic organizations and national defense. Meanwhile, foreign propaganda dealt with national propaganda, export and tourism sections.395 At first glance, the extensive organization of Bulgarian radio was in reality created with very few experts and employees and this will be discussed in more detail later. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RADIO IN POLAND, YUGOSLAVIA AND BULGARIA DURING THE 1930s In general, the 1930s were a period of rapid radio development. The following table shows the number of radios in the world and more importantly, the number of radios per thousand habitants in each country: Number of radios in the World 1936–1938396 State United States Denmark England Sweden Germany Netherlands Belgium Switzerland Norway France Austria Czechoslovakia Latvia Hungary Japan Poland Lithuania Italy Romania Yugoslavia Bulgaria

1936 1937 1938 (in thousands) (in thousands) (in thousands) 22,500 609 7,403 834 7,193 947 746 418 189 2,627 537 848 82 353 2,372 492 27 550 127 80 -

24,269 652 7,961 944 8,168 989 890 464 240 3,219 594 928 96 365 2,711 677 35 625 163 74 40

704 8,480 9,087 1,072 1,018 504 305 4,164 620 1,044 114 383 861 48 795 216 154 62

per thousand habitants (1938) 190 190 182 151 136 124 123 122 107 99 92 68 59 43 39 26 19 18 12 11 7

Source: Mały rocznik statystyczny 1938, “Główny Urząd Statystzczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej”, (Warsaw, 1938), p. 338. 395 Nowosad, Władza i media, p. 233. 396 For the countries with missing data for 1938 calculations were made on the basis of 1937.

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Of three countries under review, Poland had the most developed radio service. The power of Polish radio station grew significantly over the years. The following table shows the situation at the beginning of the World War II: Power of the Polish radio stations 31st August 1939397 Radio station (in alphabetic order) Baranowicze Katowice Cracow Lodz Lwow Poznan Torun Warsaw I Warsaw II Vilnius

Power

Range

50 kW 50 kW 10 kW 10 kW 50 kW 50 kW 24 kW 120 kW 10 kW 50 kW

120 km 160 km 45 km 45 km 100 km 100 km 60 km 300 km 45 km 140 km

As the table shows, the most powerful radio station was in the capital city of Poland, Warsaw with a range of 300 kilometers. It is interesting to note that the station that was built in 1938 in Baranowicze near the border with the USSR. Obviously, this station was built to neutralize strong Soviet propaganda in the area at the time. The growth of the total power of Polish radio stations can be seen in the following table: Total Power of the Polish Radio Stations 1926–1938398 Year 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938

Number of Stations 1 4 5 5 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 9 10

Total Power 10.0 kW 28.3 kW 28.8 kW 28.8 kW 31.8 kW 168.8 kW 168.8 kW 169.3 kW 183.8 kW 207.8 kW 275.8 kW 294.0 kW 378.0 kW

397 Miszczak, Historia radiofonii, p. 142. 398 Data as of 31st December the previous year. Miszczak, Historia radiofonii, p. 148.

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The development of radio broadcasting throughout the 1930s in the two Balkan countries was slow and noticeably lagged behind the main European countries of the time. Very few radio stations existed in the Balkans during this period (four in Yugoslavia and three in Bulgaria) and the ones that did exist had a very weak transmission capacity. The number of individuals who owned a radio, as we saw in the previous table, was also quite small (in 1936, approximately 85,000 in Yugoslavia and approximately 10,000 in Bulgaria) with most of them living in the cities. Nevertheless, there was a growing tendency towards the use of radio. The number of radio subscribers grew considerably in Yugoslavia as the range and influence of the radio stations became greater. The situation in Bulgaria was rather similar. The number of subscribers grew to more than 90,000 in 1940.399 However, according to statistics released in 1938, both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were at the bottom of the list of all the European countries in terms of radio usage. For example, Bulgaria had only seven radios per 1,000 citizens and Yugoslavia had eleven. The only countries that were behind them at this time were Greece and Turkey with 4 and 3 radios per 1,000 inhabitants respectively. The third country under review Poland had higher radio usage, with 26 radios per 1,000 inhabitants, higher than its neighbor Romania (12) and even Italy, but lower than Hungary (43) or Austria (92).400 The radio program in these countries mainly consisted of music, but news formed a significant part of the radio output. In Poland during the 1930s, radio output roughly consisted of 40% news and 60% music. The news aspect of radio was one of its key functions. According to data, the “speaking” radio program of Polish radio (main and local) in 1937 consisted of 56.5% news and only 16.6% of radio usage was devoted to literature.401 Due to an increasingly developed radio network, the number of employees working in Polish radio grew during the 1930s. In 1929, there were 180 employees, at the beginning of 1936, 790 and in June 1939, there were 1,456 employees.402 399 Х. Милков, Клубьт на Месиите [The Club of the Messiahs], (Sofia, 2010), p. 39. 400 Р. Даскалов, Бьлгарското общество 1918–1939 [Bulgarian Society 1918– 1939], II, (Sofia, 2006), p. 225. 401 Classical music was only 29% of the music part of the program. Dominant was “popular” music 67% while dance music had only 4% of the share, Miszczak, Historia radiofonii, p. 171. 402 Miszczak, Historia radiofonii, p. 83.

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In 1939 the spoken word program of Radio Belgrade was 41.4% of the total radio output, out of which information was 18.50%, lectures 6.0%, literature 2.10% etc.403 The music program was more balanced. The share of classical music was 20,44%, popular music 16.67%, as approximately was the percentage for folk music.404 In Bulgaria, music played a more significant part in the radio programs. During 1939, music had a share of 82% of total radio output while lectures had only 9.5% and news 5.2%.405 Bulgarian documents provided us with the interesting social breakdowns of radio listeners. During 1938, the biggest group of radio listeners were clerks (33.7%), followed by independent professions (29.1%) and merchants (22.4%). The majority of the listeners were in the cities, one third of the total number came from Sofia alone. In 1939, Sofia had 18,802 out of a total of 56,884 radio owners.406 The radio owners outside Sofia were mainly in the other major cities in Bulgaria while the use of radio remained rare in the villages during the period under review. Data for Radio Belgrade provide us with an interesting structure of the listeners. According to it the craftsmen were the biggest group of listeners with 19.9%, followed by private clerks 15.49%, merchants 14.17% and state clerks 13%. Among the lowest were officers 4.87% and students 0.7%.407 RADIO IN THE SERVICE OF STATE PROPAGANDA DURING THE 1930s The ruling circles in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria recognized the importance of radio as a tool for the state propaganda and during the mid 1930s this became increasingly clear. Judging from the aforementioned indicators, it was clear that radio broadcasting in Yugoslavia, at the time when the government of Milan Stojadinović came to power in 1935 was not very developed. Stojadinović was a politician who paid a lot of attention to propaganda and this was also manifested in his great interest for the radio. He was involved in the development of the radio network in Yugoslavia from its early years. In the 1920s he was president of the Governing body of the society Radio A.D, officially in charge of radio in the 403 Бјелица, Јевтовић, Историја новинарства, p. 347. 404 Ibid. 405 В. Димитров, История на радиото в Бьлгария [History of Radio in Bulgaria], II, (Sofia, 1994), p. 128. 406 Ibid, pp. 102–103. 407 Овде Радио Београд, p. 19.

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country.408 As early as the beginning of 1936, in a letter to a minister in charge, he stated his plans for the future of radio broadcasting. These plans involved setting up a new radio station, as well as enhancing its efficiency in the field of propaganda. Due to its exceptional importance, it is important to quote a part of the letter, which best summed up the place and relevance Stojadinović gave to radio broadcasting as a means for spreading government propaganda. The letter said, the following: “Radio has played an immense role in state and foreign affairs, as well as in the social life of different countries, especially in the last few years. Therefore, great attention is paid to it in the countries with the highest level of culture as to a first-rate means of propaganda. It beats all the other means for spreading propaganda when it comes to speed, clarity and availability of the program. National propaganda uses all means available in far more powerful countries. Our country also needs to pay more attention to radio-broadcasting as the best means of spreading propaganda. The radio can thus play a very successful role in our lives. Radiobroadcasting is not divided into spheres according to this or that alphabet or dialect – it is available to everyone in the most effective way. Radio Belgrade has always met the needs of the state and of national propaganda, but these needs grow on a daily basis and it cannot satisfy them in a way which a radio station, organized by the Central Press-Bureau of the Council of Ministers, could”.409 The realization of the aforementioned plans were initiated by forming the Short-Wave Radio-Station or Radio Belgrade II at the beginning of March 1936. This station was built by the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone. However, the Central Press-Bureau was exclusively in charge of this program. Its original strength was 0.25 kW, but it was strengthened to 1 kW after only two weeks. The main goal of the newly established radio-station was to promote the government policy both at home and abroad. News made up the main part of the program of this Short-Wave Radio-Station which also broadcasted in foreign languages. Apart from the political news, there were also lectures on Yugoslav culture, its natural beauties, economy and trade. The following table gives us an insight into the degree 408 For early years see: Овде Радио Београд, pp. 11–17. 409 AY, 38-116, Letter of Milan Stojadinović to the Minister of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, Branko Kaludjerčić on 18 January 1936.

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to which propaganda activity was intensified by setting up this radiostation: News broadcasts in the program of radio-stations (in hours per year) Radio-station Belgrade Zagreb Ljubljana Short-Wave Radio-Station TOTAL

1935 280 219 132

1936 301 275 140

1937 277 242 88

1938 274 283 130

0

1,020

1,371

1,240

631

1,736

1,978

1,927

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1934–1939).

Propaganda material on the development of radio in Yugoslavia, Три године владе Милана Стојадиновића [Three Years of Milan Stojadinovic’s Government], p. 74.

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As many as 1,100 hours of additional news was broadcast, almost 300% more in 1936 than in 1935. This clearly demonstrated the endeavors and tendencies of the Government. Concrete achievements in this field resulted in additional efforts, as well as additional finance for this purpose.410 In the budget for 1936/1937, five million dinars were allocated for the improvement of radio broadcasting.411 Two Belgrade radio-stations broadcasted news from 7 am to 11 pm. The Short-Wave Radio-Station, paid attention to scheduling the news hours so that they were not broadcasted at the same time as those on Radio Belgrade. The result was that radio news from Belgrade was broadcasted almost every hour and were practically “prepared’’ in one center. The broadcasted news had to be thoroughly checked in this case before it went on air. Firstly, the news was taken from the daily press reports and from CPB, i.e. from the materials that had already been censored. Afterwards, before the news was read by a presenter, it was once again “purified and adjusted” according to the instructions. Apart from the news in Serbo-Croatian, the Short-Wave Radio-Station also broadcasted news in Hungarian, Italian, Greek, Turkish, Albanian, French, German and English. A report in 1936 showed that in the period from March 1936 to 31 December 1936, over 17,000 pages of news were read in nine different languages.412 Regarding these details, there was no doubt that the top people of CPB understood the importance of this media and that they considered its propagandistic possibilities very seriously. Broadcasting news in other languages was, above all, intended for the Yugoslav citizens, but a certain level of exerting influence abroad was considered important as well. The regime also paid a lot of attention to the popularization of the radio station itself. In the letter sent to correspondents in May 1936, Luković asked them to write as much as possible about the Short-Wave Radio-Station and its work in the respective fields. Certain progress in the field of radio broadcasting in the period of the government of Milan Stojadinović was noticeable regarding the number of subscribers. They increased from 66,504 in 1934 to 135,132 in 1938 and despite this development, new possibilities for broadening the field of opera410 Loans that Stojadinovic took out to set up the new Short-Wave Radio-Station resulted in an increase of the set budget for 1938/39 by 553,728 dinars, AY, 38-116, The Letter of M. Stojadinović sent to Minister of Finance D. Letica. 411 AY, 38-116, Letter of Milan Stojadinović to the Minister of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, Branko Kaludjerčić on 28 May 1937. 412 Centralni pres-biro, Report, p. 56.

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tions were also investigated. This was reflected in Kosta Luković’s letter which was sent to the Ministry of Trade and Industry, in which he urged that restaurants, cafes and holiday resorts provided the highest possible publicity for the Short-Wave Radio-Station. Furthermore, the correspondents were told that they needed short waves radios and that they should not broadcast programs of propaganda radio stations from countries with unfavorable attitudes towards Yugoslavia as it would lead them to confrontation with the authorities, who were asked to prevent broadcasting of this kind of program.413 A similar letter was sent to the Department for the Protection of the State of the Ministry of the Interior. This proved that the government wanted to secure a larger number of listeners for the program, even if it meant exerting pressure. It also showed how much attention was paid to pursuing that kind of activity. The aforementioned forms of pressure had less effect on the territory of the Primorska and the Sava Banovina. One could read, in CPB’s correspondent’s report from Split, that the population was generally “not interested in that program’’ and that newspapers refused to publish the programs of the radio stations.414 The problems with disinterest and resistance to the broadcasts of the Short-Wave Radio-Station remained until the end of the aforementioned period, although the possibility of its reception was on a satisfactory level. In addition, there was the problem of availability of propaganda and it could not be truly effective as everything that came from Belgrade was in some regions rejected. Realizing the importance of this media, Stojadinović put considerable efforts into the development of radiophony in Yugoslavia. During his government, the capacity of Radio Belgrade was increased from 2.5 to 20 kilowatts. A new Short-wave radio station was also founded and it began broadcasting at the beginning of March 1936 becoming a radio propaganda center. The task of monitoring and editing its radio programs was taken over by CPB and throughout 1937, broadcasting abroad was initiated and starting in 1938, this became a regular activity. The main task of the Short-wave radio station was broadcasting the news. This radio station practically became the one to which all the others were subordinated when it came to political news. Considering the fact that the news was created “in CPB’s kitchen”, their main aim was to serve, above all, the interests of the ruling party and its president. Notwithstanding the advancement of radio broadcasting in Yugoslavia, the number of people 413 AY, 38-116, Letter of Kosta Luković to the Minister of Trade and Industry. 414 AY, 38-11, Report of the correspondent of CPB from Split of 6 March 1936.

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who listened to the radio was still amongst the lowest of all the European countries. The ruling circles in Poland had the same stand on radio and its role in spreading propaganda. An introduction to brochure from 1939 was entitled “Radio in the Service of the State and People”, stated clearly that: “Broadcasting is an organism which must remain in the service of the nation and state. Observing the development of the radio world, it is clear that with the rapid increase in importance and influence of radio, privately run broadcasting companies are being taken over in many countries by the state, and others are closely controlled by them. The organization of the modern state in the period, in which the radio was considered solely for entertainment, quite expensive and only available to wealthy people, must be considered as history. Over the years, the number of radios in terms of subscribers grew and in proportion to the decreasing price of radios, broadcasting has become more influential in society and is therefore responsible for shaping the psyche, morality and division of our citizens. It is also responsible for exploiting the dynamics of development of nations. Radio microphones have become an indispensable means of making direct contact with the masses of people, impacting on their mood, directing their actions, mobilizing public opinion with accurate and timely information and informing the public about what is happening in the country and the world”.415 The two most important officials in the second half of the 1930s were the Polish President Mościcki and Marshal Rydz-Śmygłi and they addressed the nation by radio on numerous occasions. During the period between 1935 and 1938, the President made 12 public speeches on national radio while the Marshal made 20.416 Half of the president’s speeches were related to the propaganda lectures about the late Marshal Piłsudski (6 of 12). The second Marshal spoke about various issues such as public, military and local holidays and it was possible that radio in the last years of interwar Poland leaned more towards Marshal Rydz-Śmygłi rather than the president. For example, in October 1938, his speeches were transmitted live on four occasions.417 415 Radio w Polsce w latach 1935–1938 [Radio in Poland 1935–1939], (Warsaw, 1938), p. 7. 416 Ibid, pp. 5–8. 417 Ibid, p. 8.

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The Polish radio, broadcast the news three times per day until 1937 when it was increased to four times per day. In most cases, PAT and pro-government newspapers were the source of information. The most important news was Dziennik Wieczorny (Evening News) and it was broadcasted at 20:45 each night. In the late 1930s, there were roughly 200 hours of news a year less than there were in the earlier mentioned situation in Yugoslavia.418 According to one document, the Polish radio had three main propaganda goals: 1) The whole radio program must be propaganda orientated; 2) R  adio broadcasts and public address systems must be developed in the whole country; 3) Short wave radio transmitters must be developed. After a long explanation on how a certain part of the program should be presented, the author of the document concluded: “The atmosphere in the Polish radio must change. All employees from the janitor up to the managerial staff must accept the concept that they must work with enthusiasm, will and with an understanding of the role that radio should have in the state”.419 In 1939, when the outbreak of war was eminent, leading circles in Poland expressed the need for the unification of radio programs. A document made in the Ministry of War set four main objectives: 1) Codification of the radio programs; 2) Control of an inferiority complex and restoration of historical traditions; 3) struggle with life’s problem (individual and national); 4) It is the character that primarily determines an action. Knowledge and talent were prerequisites, but not sufficient.420 It was obvious that new tasks were aimed to strengthen the moral of the Polish people and as the main objective radio was considered to be a part of national defense. Initially, radio in Bulgaria was taken to be a tool for commercial use, but in the mid 1930s, it became an instrument for education and state propaganda. Even in 1934, the newspaper Cherno More (Черно Море, Black Sea) urged that the key representatives of state propa418 Ibid, p. 95. 419 CAW, Gabinet Ministerstwa Spraw Wojskowych, I 300.1.531, document entitled “Wytycyne propagandy Polskiego Radia” [Propaganda Guidelines for the Polish Radio] from 4 June 1938. See the whole document in the Appendix I. 420 CAW, Gabinet Ministerstwa Spraw Wojskowych, I 300.1.531, document entitled “Projekty do programu letniego” [Projects for the Summer Program] from 16 February 1939.

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ganda, Petko Penchev, the head of Renewal and chiefs of departments Polyanov and Kulishev, needed to decide on how to use radio as the main instrument for “national propaganda”. Later that year, a more developed plan was published in the semi-official government newspaper Novi dni (Нови Дни, New Days). The article was entitled “The Radio and the New State” and it began with the assumption of complete state control of the radio.421 The propaganda offensive in radio began with the Directorate for Social Renewal, which was created in 1934. In November 1934, the editor of Radio Sofia was named chief of radio propaganda. With this move, Renewal took complete control over radio. From May to November 1934, 45 lectures were delivered by ministers and other important officials at Radio Sofia.422 In the second half of that year, the number of lectures increased significantly. There were 250 lectures on the ideology of new the state, measures taken by the government, reforms and success of the state. Twenty-two of these lectures were delivered by either the Prime Minister or by members of his cabinet.423 In the same document, the new Renewal Director Popzlatev said on the future role of radio: “it (radio) will influence the spiritual and the material values which the Bulgarian nation has and this will be accepted by everyone”.424 Most of the information used by the Bulgarian radio was taken from the domestic press as was the case in Poland and Yugoslavia. Another significant step in the development of radio was to organize a radio program for the American continent. In 1937, a radio program was broadcast for North America via Holland from Yugoslavia. At the beginning of 1938, this became a regular practice as this program was primarily meant for emigrants. The first program of this type was broadcast on the night between 31 March and 1 April. This program lasted for an hour and fifteen minutes with the transmission controlled by the Philips company. The opening speech during the first broadcast was delivered by Prime Minister Stojadinović himself “to whom we have to be grateful for this connection through the universe”.425 In the first months of 1937 when the program was broadcast twice per month, introductory lectures were mainly delivered by ministers and other respected individuals.426 An important part of the program 421 Димитров, История на, II, pp. 124–125. 422 CDA, 284k-3-42/51, Article by Petar Popzlatev, chief of Renewal, p. 51. 423 Ibid, p. 52. 424 Ibid, p. 54. 425 A part of the text read by a presenter directly before the Prime Minister’s speech. 426 After Stojadinović, the guests were the Minister of the Interior, Anton Korošec, the President of the Senate, Želimir Mažuranić, a Minister without portfolio,

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was “news from the beloved homeland’’. It aimed to inform the emigrants of the situation back home and on the results that the government had achieved. It stressed the great results that had been accomplished and Stojadinović was depicted as a democrat with a Western emphasis and as the main implementer of an economic plan, similar to the one in America. Furthermore, the dominant part of this overseas program was to broadcast programs with a cultural and music content. They were, of course, focused on news about the “faraway’’ mother land. The result was that this program could be followed all over the world. In October 1937, the Polish radio began to transmit its programs that could be heard as far as the two Americas. Broadcasting usually started at 18:00 and that specific program lasted 2 hours per day, except on Saturday and Sunday when it lasted for 3 hours. In September 1938, two more short wave stations were set up and some South American countries were able to get a signal of the Polish radio. The main recipients of this program were Polish emigrants throughout Europe, United States and Brazil. We can conclude, based on available sources that the radio broadcasting service in Bulgaria, during the interwar period, could not reach the same level of broadcasting abroad or overseas. The mid 1930s were a period when the ruling circles took strict control over the running of radio in all three countries. To do so, they had to remove all the “subversive” elements. By taking a dominant position in the country in the field of radio-broadcasting, CPB and the Short-Wave Radio-Station also started preparing news for Radio Belgrade. It was observed that “suspicious elements” dominated Radio Belgrade and that control over it “proved to be insufficient”. It was estimated that its Director Kalafatović “belonged to opposition circles”, that the Program Director Veljko Petrović “was not fully committed to the state and national political course” and that the Editor in Chief of the Music program Vukdragović had “leftist tendencies”.427 By 1940 all of the mentioned left the radio or have been removed from it.428 Unlike the Belgrade radio-station, the one in Ljubljana was controlled by Prosvetna zveza, the central Slovenian educational association. The head of this society was the university professor Franc Lukman who was also a close friend of Korošec. The other members were Miha Krek and the man presiding at the Parliament Stevan Ćirić. 427 AY, 37-75. This consisted of a short report broadcast on radio-stations on April 1938 made by Bogdanović (possibly Boško Bogdanović, who was, for a while, the deputy in charge, and later, he was the successor of Luković on the function of the Chief of the CPB). 428 Овде Радио Београд, p. 23.

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also followers of the political course of JRZ, so one could conclude that “the radio station in Ljubljana was in quite safe hands and that the government could, by all accounts, count on it in respect of all the issues”.429 This information was also indicative of the fact that in the Drava Banovina, the JRZ had undisputed control, especially when it came to the Slovenian aspect of the overall operation.430 After the state gained a 96% stake of radio in Poland, it was clearly time for a change in its management structure. Sanacja took control of the Polish radio and the heads of the institutions became its prominent members earlier mentioned Roman Starzyński (1935–1938) and Kondrad Libicki (1938–1939). The program director became Dr. Piotr Górecki, former director of the Polish Telegraph Agency (PAT) and he was a man who knew how to inform the public. Other changes concerned the positions of secretary general and administrative director so one could safely conclude that in the mid 1930s state control over the radio was complete.431 Radio now became the main instrument in the state propaganda program.432 The number of the employees in Radio Sofia also increased during this time. In 1936, there were only 22 employees, but in 1941, this figure grew to 99.433 Until the outbreak of World War II, Radio Sofia had three directors: Iordan Stubel (Иордан Стубел), Sirak Skitnik (Сирак Скитник) and Konstantin Konstantinov (Константин Константинов). The most prominent one was Skitnik who remained in his high position until his death in March 1943. A man of many talents, Skitnik was one of the key people responsible for the development of radio in Bulgaria.434 From 1935 to 1939, the number of listeners more than quadrupled, from 11,000 to around 50,000. Income from radio was more than 12 million leva. According to the propaganda publications dedicated 429 AY, 37-75/537, Short report on radio-stations, appendix to the sent report. 430 The other members of the Managing Board were: engineer Mario Osana, a university professor at the Technical Faculty of Ljubljana, in charge of the technical part of the station; Professor Franc Koblar the presiding of the Association of Slovenian Writers in charge of the program and Miloš Stare took care of the administrative part of the process. 431 Miszczak, Historia radiofonii, pp. 82–83. 432 The directors of the individual stations in 1938 were: Zenon Kosidowski (Warsaw), Zbigniew Cis-Bankiewicz (Baranowicze), Stanisław Ligoń (Katowice), Bronisław Winiarz (Cracow), Juliusz Petry (Lwow), Stanisław Nowakowski (Lodz), Zdislaw Marynowski (Poznan), Bohdan Pawłowicz (Torun) and Roman Pikiel (Vilnius). 433 Димитров, История на, II, pp. 55–58. 434 More about Skitnik’s life and work see: К. Крастев, Сирак Скитник, Човекьт, поетьт, художникьт, театральт [Sirak Skitnik, Man, Poet, Artist, Actor], (Sofia, 1974).

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to the Kjoseivanov government, the ruling circles were happy to make radio “one of the most important institutions for propaganda and national culture”.435 Another important novelty in Yugoslavia which took propaganda to a higher level was the introduction of live broadcasts. Throughout this period, different events live broadcasts were Sokol rallies,436 eulogy for Nikola Pašić, the rallies of the party in power, etc. The first live broadcast of the JRZ rally was in Skopje on the occasion of Stojadinović’s visit to the Vardar Banovina in the summer of 1936. The number of rallies and Prime Minister’s speeches broadcast live grew rapidly in 1938, especially during the pre-election campaign as the last pre-election rally in Belgrade on 9 December 1938 was broadcast live by all four radio-stations. In the second half of the 1930s, the number of live broadcasts on Polish radio increased rapidly. National holiday events like the military parade on Constitutional day (Uchwalenie Konstytucji Trzeciego Maja) on 3rd May and Independence Day (Narodowe Święto Niepodległości) on 11th November were seen as the most important. One of the key events from the government propaganda point of view was the live broadcast of the official Rydz-Śmygłi becoming a marshal in November 1936. The number of live broadcasts in 1937 was 285 (without sport events) which added up to 136 hours in total. With 82 sports events being broadcast live, Polish radio reached a level of one live broadcast per day, which was very advanced in comparison to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.437 The first live broadcast (outside the studio) in Bulgaria was in 1931438 and those kinds of events were pretty rare. The radio in Bulgaria was mainly focused on lectures that were delivered inside a studio by prominent government members and pro-government journalists. Radio was poorly developed in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, but was more advanced in Poland. There were many different reasons for the insufficient development of radio broadcasting in both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Apart from the small number of radio sets in both countries, one could perhaps mention the high price of radios, the insufficient electrification of these countries and the lack of skilled personnel available. Maybe the most important one was the financial hardship that 435 И. Минчев, Управление на творчество и дела (Government of Construction and Deeds), (Sofia, 1939), p. 231. 436 Form of mass physical activity practiced in the country with the strong Yugoslavian character. 437 Radio w Polsce, p. 97. 438 It was a live broadcast of a celebration for the Day of Bulgarian Revival. Professor Zlatarov and general Kratunkov addressed an audience.

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most inhabitants had to endure in both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The lack of skilled personnel led to an inappropriate use of available technology and enormous repair costs. Bearing in mind all these problems, people from Radio Belgrade organized a special “propaganda car” during the summer, which travelled around the provincial towns to spread the word about radio broadcasting. This was purposefully meant to increase the number of listeners through practical discussions “on the field”, collecting information and improving working conditions. In 1938, places in Šumadija and Vojvodina were visited.439 Polish radio also undertook radical measures to increase the popularity of radio. In the second half of the 1930s, around 100,000 popular brochures were delivered to people throughout the country. The titles of those brochures were: “How to Put Together a Radio”, “How to Set Up a Radio” and “How to Use a Radio”.440 The brochures were well illustrated and plainly written for the mass population. As in the Yugoslav case, there were also special “propaganda cars” involved. In Bulgaria, those activities were not particularly well developed but one could find some brochures like “What Is the Radio” (Какво нещо е радиото) by Svetozar Prenerov. Judging by his son’s testimony, Prenerov gave many interviews and had talks with the different social groups with the purpose of convincing them that “radio in Bulgaria was a reality”.441 However, the radio was popular in both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria at the time. People used to listen to it together in groups, in bars and restaurants. Radio magazines were founded like Radiolybitel (Радиолюбител, Radio fan) from 1927, Novo Radio Sofia (Ново Радио София, New Radio Sofia) in Bulgaria and the weekly Radio Beograd (Радио Београд, Radio Belgrade) in Yugoslavia from 1929. It is important to mention that the radio industry was profitable for the governments. The income of the Polish radio was 17,127,024 zlotys in 1937 and the costs were 14,745,830 zlotys, thus the profit was 2,381,194 zlotys.442 Most of the income was raised from taxes paid by the listeners and only a small portion was raised from advertisements. For example: in 1930 taxes brought 5,270,220 and commercials only 120,543 zlotys.443 The income of radio service in Bulgaria was significant 439 Радио Београд, July-August of 1938. 440 Radio w Polsce, p. 135. 441 Димитров, История на, II, p. 100. 442 All data was taken for fiscal year begginnig from 1 April until 31 March of following year, Miszczak, Historia radiofonii, p. 82. 443 M. J. Kwiatkowski, To już historia [That’s already History], (Warsaw, 1975), p. 109.

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and growing: in 1934, it was 3,060,029 leva, in 1936, it was 6,747,819 leva and in 1938, 15,257,524 leva. During the war years, income continued to grow and in 1941 it totaled more than 35 million leva.444 When the war broke out, the radio stations in Yugoslavia and Poland were either destroyed or used by the armed forces. The radio in Bulgaria continued to serve state propaganda and new war objectives. Thus, we can see that the mid 1930s in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were a period when the radio was transformed into a medium of state propaganda. Even with its slow development, in comparison to some European countries, radio was a powerful tool in the hands of the ruling circles in Eastern and Southern Europe. FILM Film was probably the most powerful propaganda tool between two world wars. The film industry was more advanced in America than in Europe during the interwar period. The USA had 17,000 cinemas in 1937, the Soviet Union had 6,337 while the situation in the leading European countries was: Germany 5,395, UK 5,000, France 3,700 and Italy 3,600 cinemas.445 The widespread use of film as a propaganda tool began in Bolshevik Soviet Union446 and it quickly spread all over the world. Propaganda films were especially popular in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.447 The three countries reviewed (Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria) also used film and cinema for state propaganda purposes but they were limited by the existing technical capacities and the prevailing economic climate.

444 Димитров, История на, II, p. 71. 445 Mały Rocznik Statysticzny [Small Statistical Yearbook], (Warsaw, 1938), p. 336. Data was taken from the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, (Washington, 1938). 446 From various literature on the topic see: D. Gillespie, Early Soviet Cinema, Innovation, Ideology and Propaganda, (London, 2005); P. Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State (Soviet media and mass mobilization), (Cambridge, 1986). 447 From various literature see: D. Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema 1933–1945, (New York, 1983); N. Reevs, The Power of Film Propaganda, (New York, 2003); S. Ricci, Italian Film and Society, 1922–1943, (Los Angeles, 2008).

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GENERAL SITUATION IN THE FILM INDUSTRY IN POLAND, YUGOSLAVIA AND BULGARIA Comparing the number of citizens and number of cinemas with other European nations, Poland was third from the bottom, ahead of only Yugoslavia and Albania. In 1939, the total number of cinemas was 789, only 300 of which operated every day. The statistical data of that year shows that 98% of the films in Polish cinemas were imported (62% from the USA, 13.4% from Germany, 10.8% from France).448 On average, each Polish citizen only went to the cinema 1.5 times in 1938 while citizens of some towns attended the cinema more frequently than the national average, e.g. each citizen in Lvov went to the cinema 13 times on average in 1938 and this figure was 12 for both Warsaw and Poznan.449 The most popular films in Poland in the 1930s were the ones imported from the United States, German films came second and French were in the third place. The share of US films was always around 60% but in 1935, this figure rose to 77%.450 The number of Polish films varied during the years as illustrated in the following table: Polish films in the 1930s Year

Polish films

1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937

198 146 157 142 113 124 123

Polish films (per thousand meters long) 100 92 83 68 64 82 94

The share of Polish films % 10.5 12.3 10.7 11.0 9.7 13.4 13.4

Source: CAW, Gab. MSWojsk, I.300.1.538

This data illustrated that the number of films was decreasing, but that the share of Polish films released in Poland grew slightly in percentage terms from 1931–1937. The government officials were not impressed by these figures, even the increase of more than 30% from 1935–1937 as well the increase of 78% in the production of full length 448 Polska Niepodległa, (Warsaw, 2008), p. 469. 449 Ibid. 450 CAW, Gab. MSWojsk, I.300.1.538.

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feature films. In total, out of the 24 of these films produced in 1937, 10 were comedies, 11 were dramas, two were melodramas and one was a review with the total cost of these films being 5,750,000 zlotys.451 It was clear that a figure of around 10% Polish films released in Poland was not satisfactory both for state propaganda and for the people that worked in the film industry and there were lively discussions over the years about the future development of the film industry in Poland. Something had to be done. A new organization was formed called the Film Section (Sekcja Filmova), which consisted of members of important ministries who met several times to discuss what can be done. These members included representatives of the: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interior Ministry, Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education, members of Military Institute of Research and Education (WINO), Polish Telegraph Agency (PAT) and government party Camp of National Unity (OZN) and on some occasions, they invited guest participants to their meetings like script writers and legal experts.452 During these meetings, plans and actual problems were discussed and one of the key problems that emerged was a lack of financial recourses for the development of domestic cinematography. This was mainly due to a low level of enterprise and capital which was being invested in film production. A representative of PAT, Tadeusz Katelbach underlined that the Ministry of Industry and Commerce allocated a “symbolic” figure of 100,000 zlotys in its budget for the film industry during the period of 1936–1937. This figure was very low compared with 1,000,000 zlotys in 1931.453 These meetings also underscored the importance of short films for propaganda purposes in Poland and several suggestions were made to increase the financing of the Polish film industry. The film industry in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had always served the propaganda purposes of the ruling circles, especially the Karadjordjević royal family. When one considered the lack of education and general knowledge amongst the majority of citizens in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia at the time, it is safe to conclude that this “technological miracle” had an important political impact on these citizens. 451 CAW, Gab. MSWojsk, I.300.1.538. 452 CAW, Gab. MSWojsk. I.300.1.531. Antoni Cwojdziński, a script writer and Andrzej Ruszkowski, a legal expert in the film industry were also invited to attend the meeting on 25th February 1938. 453 CAW, Gab. MSWojsk. I.300.1.538. The specific meeting was held on 13th January 1938.

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Existing data show that interest in film varied from region to region, from town to town. In 1932 only 11,834,300 cinema tickets were sold in whole country while that number in 1937 rose to around 15 million.454 In the 1930s Yugoslavia had about the same number of citizens which means that one visit to the cinema per citizen was recorded. The data for major cities tell a different story. Belgrade with around 300,000 people and Zagreb with around 250,000 had a sale of 3,031,800 and 2,546,500 tickets in 1937 that means around ten visits per year.455 The following table shows the number of cinemas in the country and their capacity: The number of cinemas and seats in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1935–1938)456

Year

Sound cinema

Silent cinema

1935 1936 1937 1938

262 301 330 357

33 17 13 13

Total number of cinemas 295 318 343 370

Total number of seats 92,905 106,014 113,971 121,120

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1934–1939)

In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the existing cinemas had different programs. For example, 108 cinemas showed films every day while 110 cinemas only showed films twice a week. Out of the biggest cities, Belgrade had 18 cinemas and Zagreb 16 and American films were dominant in those cinemas.457 During 1935, 678 films were imported and 436 came from the United States (64%), 144 from Germany (21%), 30 from Austria (4%) and 27 from France (3%).458 Using the Section for Film and Tourism, the Central Press Bureau, the unofficial Ministry for Propaganda, made propaganda films that 454 D. Kosanović, Kinematografija i film u Kraljevini SHS/Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1918–1941 [Cinematography and Film in the Kingdom of SCS/Kingdom of Yugoslavia 1918–1941], (Belgrade, 2011), p. 48. 455 Ibid. 456 This number included travelling “silent” cinemas: for 1935 - 22, 1936 - 31, 1937 40 and cinemas in 1938 - 14. 457 All data from 1938, Statistički godišnjak [Statictical Yearbooks of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia for 1938–1939], p. 396. 458 CDA, 177k-3-927/1. Izveštaj Državne filmske centrale o prometu filmova i stanju kinematografa u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1935.godine [Report of State Film Center on the distribution of films and the state of cinemas in Kingdom of Yugoslavia for 1935].

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were primarily political. The main task of this section was to record all important political events, make films about them and then distribute these films to a wider audience. According to its data in 1936, CPB produced 7,065 meters of film and all the other producers only 6,675,459 so it is safe to conclude that the Central Bureau was the biggest producer of films in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In addition to the procurement of modern equipment for the Section for Film and Tourism, CPB also established good relations with foreign producers, especially those from Germany.460 Apart from making and distributing films, the Section for Film and Tourism together with the official CPB’s section for the implementation of the press law dealt with the censorship of domestic films and foreign imported films that were to be shown in the country. These joint activities meant that CPB had almost complete control over the development of the film industry in Yugoslavia. According to the Chief of the Cultural Section of the Bulgarian propaganda institution Renewal, 80% of the population in Bulgaria was not familiar with the cinema,461 but statistical data shows otherwise. The number of cinemas in Bulgaria was indeed the lowest of the three countries reviewed. According to statistics that number during the following years was: Number of Cinemas in Bulgaria During the 1930s Year 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939

Number of Cinemas 114 121 114 116 120 142 155

Source: Статистически годишнаци на Бьлгарското царство 1937–1940 [Annual Statistical Surveys of the Bulgarian Kingdom 1937–1939], (Sofia, 1937–1940).

As seen, the number of cinemas constantly grew, except in 1935 due to the economic crisis. That year was also critical both for Poland and Yugoslavia due to the difficult economic situation. Sofia had the most cinemas in 1936, it had 32 of the 116 existing cinemas. The most complete data, in the existing statistics, can be found for the year 1939. Of the 155 cinemas in Bulgaria, only 32 were in the vil459 Centralni pres-biro, Izveštaj o radu za 1936.godinu [Annual Report for 1936], p. 66. 460 Leni Riefenstahl visited Belgrade while filming Olympia, the occassion was used by CPB to improve relations with the “leader of German film”. 461 CDA, 232k-1-20/22, undated document, probably from February-March 1935.

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lages and 123 in the cities. Judging by the country of production the films showed in Bulgaria represented a more balanced selection than in Poland and Yugoslavia. Of 10,524 films showed, only 3,775 were in English (35.9%), 2,833 were French speaking (26.9%), 2,622 were in German (24.9%) and interestingly, 608 films came from the Soviet Union (5.8%). As can be seen, films from the first communist country in the world were not imported or mentioned in the other two countries under review. The reason for importing Soviet films could be in the historical connections between Bulgaria and Russia and the fact that the Russian language and culture were closer to the ordinary Bulgarian citizen. However, only 117 film showings were Bulgarian films (around 1%).462 FILM LEGISLATION AND CENSORSHIP IN THE THREE COUNTRIES DURING THE 1930s It is very important to understand the legislation that regulated the film industry and how the three states understood and used this powerful propaganda weapon. The most important document regarding legislation referring to the cinema in Poland during the 1930s was the Law passed in March 1934. It regulated various matters such as office rent, records and laboratories, import of films, promotion of domestic production, position of cinema, theatre and their technical personnel and censorship. The examination of films and advertisements was supposed to have been carried out by committees, whose membership, methods of appointment and dismissal, duties and powers were supposed to be specified by a regulation issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Minister of Religious Affairs and Public Education (Art.18). An article of the Law passed latter, specified various reasons why some films should be banned: “The authority can refuse permission to release the movie if the inspection shows that the public showing would either jeopardize the vital interests of the Republic, security, tranquility and public order, damage the reputation of the Republic, or its relations abroad, damage the national honor or insult religious feelings, invoke a call to war, invoke savagery which affects the viewer or which has a demoralizing effect on them”.463 462 Статистически годишнак на Бьлгарското царство 1939 [Annual Statistical Survey on the Bulgarian Kingdom 1939], (Sofia, 1940), p. 736. 463 Ustawa o filmach i ich wyświetlaniu [Law on Films and their Distribution], Dzienik Ustaw. Poz. 323, No. 36, p. 586.

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The film industries of these three countries were submitted to censorship of the state apparatus and when it came to making films in Yugoslavia, state intervention began in 1928. That year the financial legislation proscribed that not one movie could be shown until it had been checked by the censors from the Ministry of Education.464 During the 1930s, the film industry was governed by the State Film Center (Државна филмска централа) and a special censors’ committee, which consisted of twelve members and their deputies. The members of this committee were three representatives from the Ministry of Education, one representative from the Ministry of Army and Navy, two representatives of the Ministry of Social Welfare and Public Health (one member was a representative of the national women’s educational organizations), two representatives of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, one representative of the Ministry of Trade and one from the Central Press-Bureau.465 The law set the tasks for this organization as follows: a) to arrange and oversee the import, production and distribution of films; b) to develop the domestic film industry; c) to help educational and useful film propaganda.466 The valid law in this area in Bulgaria during the 1930s was legalized in April 1930.467 The first article underlined that cinematography was under the supreme control of the Ministry of People’s Education. Members of the censor’s committee were as follows: the head of Department of Cultural Institutions and Funds in the Ministry of People’s Education, the prosecutor from the Sofia district or his deputy, one representative of Interior Ministry, one representative of Ministry for Health, one representative from the Educational Committee and two special members delegated by the Minister of People’s Education (article 12). Representatives of other Ministries or institutions were only invited if the nature of the film requested their presence. At this point, it is important to mention some data about censorship, which was present and established by the law in these countries. Accordingly, the statistical data in Poland is as follows: 464 Љ. Димић, Културна политика Краљевине Југославије 1918–1941, [Cultural Policy of Kingdom of Yugoslavia], III, (Belgrade, 1997), p. 332. 465 AY, Ministry for Education (66), folder No. 383, Book of Regulations for the Censorship of Films of 22 February 1932. 466 The Law on the Distribution of Films from 5th December 1931 with changes and appendixes according to the article 57/7 of the Financial Law from 1933/34. 467 The “Law on Cinematography” was published on 29th April in the State Journal.

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Number of censored film in Poland 1934–1937 Year

Censored films

Cleared films

1934

780

769

1935

714

699

1936

652

638

1937

619

605

Source: Mały Rocznik Statysticzny, Warsaw 1938, p. 336

As shown, most of the films that came to the censors’ attention were cleared for distribution. This was due to the fact that most of the films were already made with the standards that would have been considered “acceptable”. The State Film Center in Yugoslavia was a very busy institution. Only in 1935, they sent 779 films to the censors and of these, 100 were domestic and 678 foreign. Only 14 films were banned, all of them foreign.468 Censor committee resided in Belgrade and had two sub-commissions, one in Belgrade and one in Zagreb. For a clearer picture about the films that did not make their way to the public cinemas see the table above: Banned Film in Yugoslavia 1933–1937469 Year

Banned Films and their Country of Production

1933

12 (5 American, 3 German, 2 Soviet, 2 Domestic)

1934

17 (8 German, 5 American, 2 Soviet, 1 Hungarian, 1 Domestic)

1935

14 (7 German, 2 American, 2 Dutch, 1 French, 1 Hungarian, 1 Swedish)

1936

5 (1 French, 1 Soviet, 1 Austrian, 1 German, 1 American)

1937

9 (3 German, 2 American, 2 French, 1 Soviet, 1 Hungarian)

Unfortunately the existing data does not give the names or genres of the banned films nor the official reasons for the ban. 468 CDA, 177k-3-927/1. Izveštaj Državne filmske centrale o prometu filmova i stanju kinematografa u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1935.godine [Report of the State Film Center on Distribution of Films and the State of Cinemas in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia for 1935]. 469 D. Kosanović, Kinematografija i film u Kraljevini SHS/Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1918–1941 [Cinematography and Film in the Kingdom of SCS/Kingdom of Yugoslavia 1918–1941], (Belgrade, 2011), p. 41.

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FILM IN THE SERVICE OF STATE PROPAGANDA One of the most important institutions for film propaganda of the Second Polish Republic was the Film Department of PAT (Wydział Filmowy PAT). This department was formed in 1929 for the production of silent short films. After acquiring modern equipment in 1933, they started with the regular chronicles PAT’s Weekly Film Magazine (Tygodnik Filmowy PAT). Besides political films, other films were made including genres like the musical, cultural, artistic and so on. Short films had the greatest propaganda significance in the Polish film industry and they were a weekly newsreel produced by PAT. The production started in 1927 and until the outbreak of the Second World War, around 600 of them were produced and shown. These films were about 10 minutes long and only consisted of current news. It is crucial to mention that PAT’s newsreels were broadcast in every cinema before the regular film and in this instance, the propaganda impact was very strong and some serious results were achieved. Even the people who did not share the government’s point of view could have been consciously or subconsciously influenced by those journals. There were also some special films dedicated to some specific topics. Sometimes, these were cultural and educational but on some occasions, they were pure political propaganda. In 1936, such films were: Long Live the Army (Niech Zyje Armia), Journey of General Edward Rydz Smigly to France (Podróż Gen.Edwarda Smigłego Rydza do Francji) and Long Live Polish Marshal Edward Rydz Smigly (Niech Zyje Marszałek Polski Edward Smigły Rydz).470 The first film about the second Polish marshal was 200 meters and the other was 180 meters long.471 In the same year, personnel of PAT’s film section (Wydział Filmowy, founded in 1928) consisted of only 17 editors, eight technicians and four janitors and messengers.472 With the establishment of the Central Film Bureau (Centralne Biuro Filmowe, founded in 1928) the ruling circles in Poland showed more interest in film. However, the films in the propaganda sector were very few and ineffective. Only in 1937, the newly formed Polish Film Company (Polska Spółka Filmowa) made a patriotic and propaganda film Hearts Aflame (Płomienne serca) directed by Romuald Gantkowski.473 The film was well received by the authorities, received awards at 470 AAN, PRM, 8-21II. 471 CAW, General Inspector of the Armed Forces - GISZ 302.4.1634. 472 Ibid. 473 Romuald W.Gantkowski (Poznan, 14 August 1908 – Hollywood, USA, 17 March

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the Film Festival in Lvov and prizes from the War and Interior Ministries. Much less successful was the label Orion-Film whose film The Commander (Komendant) directed by Henryk Bigoszta474 was not approved by the censors for distribution.475 As already mentioned, twenty films had already been made by CPB in Yugoslavia in 1936 and all of these were shown in cinemas all over the country. Amongst the most interesting film titles, one could choose either: - Prime Minister Travels in Montenegro (showed for 247 days with a total of 741 showings in 55 cinemas in 46 different places); - Meeting of Little Etente in Bled (showed for 252 days with a total of 765 showings in 70 cinemas in 54 different places); - The Opening of the Railroad Veles – Bitola (showed for 137 days with a total of 411 showings in 28 cinemas in 26 different places); - Celebrations in Zenica (showed for 83 days with a total of 249 showings in 18 cinemas in 17 different places).476 The most interesting film from the propagandistic point of view in Yugoslavia was made in late 1938. The novelty was introduced during the government of Milan Stojadinović (1935–1939) and a special party propaganda film On the Path of Restoration – Yugoslavia Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (Putem preporoda – Jugoslavija, juče, danas, sutra) was made.477 This film was specially prepared for the pre-election campaign of December 1938. The movie was produced in co-operation with experts from NSDAP and it was edited in Germany with the assistance of personnel from the government party JRZ. This group was led by Vojin Djordjević, an official of JRZ and the first secretary of the State Film Center. He is remebered for participating in the film as the narrator. This cooperation was not without difficulty, Djordjevic said in his report that German colleagues did things their way and often insisted on using some effects at

474 475 476 477

1989) was Polish director, scriptwriter and actor. His most famous films in the interwar period were: Girl Looking for Love (Dziewczyna szuka miłości, 1938) and The Genius of the Scene (Geniusz szeny, 1939). Henryk Bigoszta (Kalvaria, 5 May 1895 – Cracow, 20 March 1971) was Polish film director. His well-known films were: Kalisz (1918), A Cry in the Night (Krzyk w nocy, 1922) and Kizia-mizia (1922). Brzoza, Sowa, Historia Polski, p. 432. Centralni pres-biro, Izveštaj o radu za 1936.godinu [Annual Report for 1936], p. 64. For the transcript of the movie see Appendix 2.

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the expense of the context.478 The German side also promised a gift of one million film posters, but there is no evidence that this promise was kept.479 The film arrived late, more than month after the election campaign had began mainly due to the fact that the election campaign had already started when the idea to make the film was first discussed. 32 copies of the film arrived in Yugoslavia and during the final two weeks before the elections, the government propaganda focused its efforts on showing the film in as many locations as possible. Purposefully, some cities in Croatia were avoided as no result was expected there and according to some reports, the greatest impact of this propaganda was felt in Belgrade.480 The Director of Renewal Popzlatev, in his report in May 1935, in the final days of this propaganda institution in Bulgaria, said that the propaganda role of the cinema did not develop due to some internal problems within the government.481 One of the reasons for that statement was the fact that control over cinema remained in the hands of the Education Ministry and never passed to Renewal. The Ministry strongly opposed the idea that control of the cinema should be entrusted to Popzlatev’s institution. In Bulgaria, as in Yugoslavia, there were films dedicated to the royal dynasty. These films were propagandistic by nature and were intended for all social groups. It was not surprising that these films did not have any problems with the censors. The most famous Bulgarian films with national propaganda topics in the 1930s were: Revolt of the Slaves (Бунтът на робите, 1933) Tracks of the Balkan (Песента на Балкана, 1934), In Front of the Fatherland We Should Forget Hate (Пред отечеството да забравим омразата си, 1935), Enemies (Врагове, 1938), Duke Strahil (Страхил войвода, 1938). During the 1940s, several new films were released with the help of the foundation Bulgarian Deed (Българско дело). The most well-known films with the strongest national propaganda messages were For the Motherland (За родината) and They Won (Те победиха).482

478 AY, 37-12-388/390, Report of Vojin Djordjević sent to Gradimir Kozomarić, chief of Film Section of JRZ. 479 AY, 37-12-383, Letter of Gradimir Kozomarić sent to Milan Stojadinović from 3rd November 1938. 480 AY, 37-12-392. 481 CDA, 284k-3-42/35-36. 482 А. Грозев, Началото. Из историята на бьлгарско кино 1896–1956 [The Beginning. From the History of Bulgarian Cinema 1895–1956], (Sofia, 1985), pp. 77–84 and pp. 165–168.

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The media played a key role in creating, developing and spreading of government propaganda in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the 1930s. The press was the most widespread and the most used tool, but the use of radio and film increased rapidly, especially in the final years before World War Two. The press was also the oldest instrument of state propaganda, but practically the only one also used by the opposition in these countries. The governments in these three states tried, but failed to control all newspapers. During the whole period, the opposition and neutral press were active and very powerful and some of the most read newspapers in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were not under the control of the government, or at least not completely anyway. Harsh censorship was deployed that only partly managed to change public opinion to the satisfaction of the government. Censorship pressure varied depending on the situation, but this remained a constant enemy of the freedom of the press. During the 1930s, radio became an increasingly used propaganda tool in the hands of these governments. While the beginning of its development was similar to that in most European countries, future development of the radio in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was slower. Ruling circles in these countries soon realized the power of this tool as a form of propaganda. During the 1930s, they made large investments into its modernization with new stations being built and already existing stations improved and strengthened. The number of radio owners increased significantly from year to year but despite all these factors, these three states remained at the bottom of the European countries’ list showing the total number of radio owners. The Polish, Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments tried to use radio more often as part of their plans and aspirations as radio became the property of the state over the years and editors were removed from their posts at radio stations because of political disagreements with the governments. Despite its slower development, in comparison to some European countries, the radio was seen as a powerful tool in the hands of the government to help with its propaganda objectives. The film industry was the easiest to control for the governments of the three countries because censorship was legalized and constantly present during the period under review. The government committees examined every film, domestic or foreign and only those considered acceptable were shown in the cinemas. Domestic production of films in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was small in comparison to the number of imported films and the companies owned 185

by the government, or government institutions, made several short propaganda films and numerous newsreels in an attempt to influence public opinion in its favor. Nevertheless, despite its relative lack of numbers, the impact of film could not be underestimated because it offered more than the press and radio with its combined effects of picture and sound.

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CONCLUSION

In the years after the First World War, Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were newly formed states, thus they had limited experience in the organization of state affairs where propaganda played a significant role. Although many similarities can be found in the organization of state propaganda in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the 1930s there were even more differences especially regarding institutional structure. Propaganda apparatus of the examined countries functioned in two main directions: at home and abroad. The principal task of domestic propaganda in the three countries was the control of information released to the public. That was accomplished firstly by “filtration” of the news and secondly by censorship. It can be said that maintaining power within the country was the primary aim of the ruling circles and their propaganda organizations. This was not an easy task to accomplish because an active opposition, strong even under difficult circumstances, existed throughout the period under review. The bigger problem for state propaganda was perhaps the opposition within i.e. conflicts of interest within the ruling circle, from top to bottom, from government members to ordinary clerks where vanity, rivalry, personal vendettas were all serious issues for the functioning of state propaganda organizations in these countries. In times of limited and restricted democracy, these problems were more acute and more frequent. One of the most important similarities between Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was the fact that key propaganda decisions were made by small groups of people, often within informal groups and the propaganda structures existed only to legalize decisions that had already been made. The propaganda organizations were well financed, and their job was one of the most highly valued in the administration with the heads of the propaganda institutions usually being experienced journalists who were properly educated, intelligent and loyal to the regimes.

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As in contemporary Europe, the press offices in the three countries were one of the most important institutions used for creating and developing propaganda. During this period, changes occurred that made all three cases different. Poland had the most influential press offices in the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of War up to the end of this period. In interwar Yugoslavia, the central state propaganda institution named the Central Press Bureau was formed in 1929. This meant that the already existing press offices inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior became less important. The Bulgarian case was different from the previously mentioned ones. Bulgaria had a central organization Directorate for Social Renewal, for a short period of time (1934–1935) while the press offices within the key ministries functioned separately during the whole period under review. There were several similarities between the propaganda organizations in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and propaganda organizations in contemporary Germany and Italy. It is correct to say that some of the ideas and types of organizational structures used in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were similar to the ones in contemporary Germany and Italy (for example, the organization of the Committee for Coordination of Propaganda in Poland was very similar to the Fascist Ministry of Popular Culture in Italy). However, every propaganda organization was unique due to many factors such as cultural differences and the specific state’s political background. It is my opinion that fascist copies were made mainly for practical reasons because they seemed to work in practice in Germany and Italy and not because the ruling circles in these countries liked or disliked these regimes. Of course, the latter cannot be dismissed either. The tendency towards increased centralization of state propaganda organizations in Europe during the last decade before the Second World War was also seen in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. These tendencies, so obvious in the countries under review in the 1930s, logically resulted in the formation of separate propaganda ministries in Poland and Bulgaria after the outbreak of war. In Yugoslavia, as said earlier, such a ministry already unofficially existed in the form of the Central Press Bureau throughout the examined period. The news agencies that played an important role in the state propaganda organizations in the Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were in many ways similar, but also significantly different. The Polish Telegraph Agency (PAT), the Avala Agency and the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (BTA) had the same main responsibilities which were to in188

form the domestic public about events abroad and to inform the foreign public about the events at home, “in accordance to the public state interest”. Nevertheless, their most important role was to transmit authorized information, which came from the top of the governing hierarchy so that everybody would know that the information released was official and “checked”. The media and the people working in them played a crucial role in developing and spreading of government propaganda in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the 1930s. The press was the most widespread and the most used tool, but the use of radio and film increased rapidly over time, especially in the years just before the Second World War. It was the oldest instrument of state propaganda, and at the same time, it was practically the only tool that was also used by the opposition in the three states under review. The governments in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria tried, but failed to control all newspapers. During this period, the opposition and neutral press were active and very powerful. Some of the most read newspapers in these three states were not under the control of the government or at least not completely. Harsh censorship was used, but this only partly managed to change public opinion to the satisfaction of the government. Censorship pressure varied depending on the domestic and international situation, but it remained a constant enemy of the freedom of the press. As the Second World War approached that freedom became more and more suppressed. During the 1930s, radio became an increasingly used propaganda tool in the hands of all three governments, and the techniques used became more advanced as radio sets became cheaper, thus more accessible to the common people. The development of radio in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria followed a global trend, but its growth was still slower than in many European countries. The ruling circles in these countries soon realized the propaganda power of this media and during the 1930s, they made large investments into its modernization with new stations being built and already existing ones improved and strengthened. Although this helped the development of the radio and the spread of its popularity these three countries at the end of the observed period remained at the bottom of the European list. Poland had 26, Yugoslavia 11 and Bulgaria 7 radios per 1,000 inhabitants in 1938. The governments of the three countries found the film industry easiest to control because censorship was legalized and constantly present during the period in question. The government committees examined every film, domestic or foreign and only those considered 189

“acceptable” were showed in the cinemas. Domestic film production in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was small in comparison to the number of imported foreign films. The film companies owned by the government, or government institutions, made several short propaganda films and many newsreels trying to influence public opinion in its favor. Even with its relatively slow development the propaganda impact achieved using film was significant because it offered the combined effect of picture and sound. The organization of state propaganda in Eastern and Southern Europe respectively in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the 1930s followed many different models set by the other European countries. Those models were often combined with the local tradition and experience with the main aim of the state propaganda in those countries being to control domestic public opinion and thus their organizations were set up accordingly. The structure was also bound to the economic situation in the specific state as these countries went through the Great Depression. At the end, when the Second World War began, the power of state propaganda and its organizations could not withstand the power of the guns.

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РЕЗИМЕ

Пропаганда је намеран покушај да се утиче на мишљење публике путем емитовања идеја и вредности из специфичних разлога, свесно формираних да служе интересима пропагандисте и његових политичких господара, директно или индиректно. Она представља моћно оружје које се, као средство за освајање и учвршћивање власти, примењивало од када постоји организовано људско друштво. Развојем медија и њиховом употребом у пропагандне сврхе расле су могућности и методе утицања на масе. У овој књизи реч је о државној пропаганди, односно пропаганди која долази са врха државе и апарату који је задужен да је развија и спроводи. Тридесете године двадесетог века представљају својеврсну прекретницу у развоју и организацији државне пропаганде. Томе је недвосмислено допринела Хитлерова победа у Немачкој и формирање Министарства за народно просвећивање и пропаганду 1933. године. Организација државне пропаганде у Европи тридесетих година разликовала се зависно од величине и устројства одређене државе, конкретних економских околности, као и спољнополитичких и унутрашњополитичких циљева владајућих елита. Сходно томе, можемо направити грубу поделу на државе које су имале министарство за пропаганду или централну институцију сличне намене и државе које су пропаганду организовале и спроводиле путем секција и одељења у појединим министарствима. Међу првопоменуте спадају Немачка и Италија са посебним министарствима, као и Грчка и Португалија са централним пропагандним институцијама испод нивоа министарства, док је већина земаља следила други образац. Неке државе имале су привремено министарство пропаганде као Француска (1938), док су га неке основале тек након избијања Другог светског рата (Енглеска). Генерално, током тридесетих година приметан је тренд ка централизацији и бољој организацији државне пропаганде код свих европских земаља.

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Развој земаља Источне и Јужне Европе (Пољска, Мађарска, Румунија, Југославија, Бугарска и Грчка) између два светска рата био је донекле сличан. Све оне су временом прошле пут од парламентарне демократије до ауторитарних и полуауторитарних режима. Одлука да се за истраживање одаберу Пољска, Југославија и Бугарска темељи се на њиховом заједничком словенском пореклу а још више на њиховом међуратном развоју и одређеним сличностима у пропагандним организацијама. Једна од најважнијих сличности између три државе била је та што су се кључне одлуке из домена пропаганде доносиле често у неформалним круговима, док је постојећа пропагандна организација била ту да те одлуке спроведе у дело. Пропагандни апарат функционисао је у два правца: унутар земље и према иностранству. Један од најважнијих задатака у самој земљи био је контрола информација које су биле доступне јавности, што се постизало „филтрирањем” информација и цензуром. Овај задатак није био једноставан услед снажне опозиције у наведеним државама, што се нарочито манифестовало током изборних кампања (Пољска и Бугарска током 1935, Југославија 1938 године). Озбиљнији проблем за државну пропаганду представљала је унутрашња опозиција која је долазила из самих организација и странака. На функционисање пропагандног апарата утицали су и лични односи и ривалство између државних чиновника али и чланова владе. Канцеларије за штампу постојале су у свим поменутим државама, као и у остатку тадашње Европе. Оне су функционисале у свим важнијим министарствима а пре свега у Председништву владе, министарствима спољних и унутрашњих послова. Током времена дошло је до промена у организацији које су сва три случаја учинила другачијим. У међуратној Југославији постојала је институција Централног прес-бироа (ЦПБ) од 1929, која је играла улогу „Министарства пропаганде без пропагандистичке фирме”. Његовим оснивањем прес-бирои у другим министарствима изгубили су ранији значај. Поред осмишљавања, организације и ширења пропаганде ЦПБ је у својој надлежности имао и превентивни преглед штампе а његови представници су учествовали и у цензорским телима осталих медија. У Пољској су се посебно истицале три канцеларије за штампу: у Председништву владе, Министарству спољних послова и Министарству одбране од којих се свака бринула за пропаганду у својој области. Крајем тридесетих година основана је и институција са ширим овлашћењима која је била задужена за координа192

цију целокупне државне пропаганде (Комитет за координацију пропаганде). Истраживање је показало да су у Пољској, више него у друга два случаја, представници војске током целукопног посматраног периода имали веома велики утицај на пропагандну организацију и осмишљавање планова из ове области. Како је време пролазило, границе између војне и цивилне пропаганде почеле су да нестају. Случај Бугарске био је сличан са претходна два али опет особен и другачији. Бугарска је током непуне две године имала централну пропагандну организацију (Дирекција за друштвену обнову, 1934–1935), док су у целокупном периоду функционисале засебне канцеларије за штампу од којих је најважнија била она у Министарству спољних послова. Постојала је и посебна канцеларија за контролу штампе. На основу увида у непотпуну документацију везану за финансирање државне пропаганде може се закључити да је Пољска улагала највише средстава од три истражене земље. Овај закључак је сасвим очекиван имајући у виду њен географски положај између нацистичке Немачке и Совјетског Савеза, као и чињеницу да је територијално била већа и многољуднија од Југославије и Бугарске. Наравно, ни инвестиције друге две државе у поље пропаганде нису биле занемарљиве нити мале. Према неким проценама из 1933. године, Пољска је годишње трошила 26 а Југославија 13 милиона француских франака. Током тридесетих година тенденција ка централизацији пропагандних организација у Пољској, Југославији и Бугарској је била све уочљивија, као последица сложене ситуације у тадашњој Европи. Напори у том правцу резултирали су стварањем министарстава пропаганде у Пољској и Бугарској током Другог светског рата. Таква институција, као што смо рекли, већ је постојала у Југославији у виду Централног прес-бироа који је функционисао до окупације земље 1941. године. Новинске агенције су играле важну улогу у државној пропаганди европских држава током тридесетих година ХХ века. Те агенције су биле државне, полузваничне и приватне. Њихова главна дужност била је да информишу домаћу јавност о догађајима у иностранству и страну публику о догађајима у матичној земљи. У првом периоду свога рада након Првог светског рата централне новинске агенције у Бугарској (Бугарска телеграфска агенција, БТА), Југославији (Агенција Авала) и Пољској (Пољска телеграфска агенција, ПАТ) биле су у државном власништву и функциони193

сале у складу са „вољом владе и интересом државе”. Иако су агенције мењале структуру, па чак и трансформисале у акционарска друштва (нпр. Авала), њихова основна функција и веза са државом се није мењала. Новинске агенције у Бугарској, Југославији и Пољској биле су сличне по настанку и основним дужностима, али и различите по величини и структури. БТА је почела као део Министарства спољних послова али је касније стављена под јурисдикцију Дирекције за штампу. Југословенска Авала је од 1929. формално постала акционарско друштво али је држава имала преко 90% акционарског капитала тако да се фактички њен положај и функције нису мењали. Све три агенције су примале значајне донације од својих влада, а једина која је имала знатне приходе била је пољска агенција ПАТ која је зарађивала од реклама, продатих публикација и снимљених филмова. И поред тога, све три агенције су пословале са већим или мањим губитком. Са око хиљаду запослених ПАТ је био далеко најбројнија организација, десет пута већа од Авале и више од тринаест пута већа од БТА. Разлика између агенција посебно се огледала у мрежи коресподената. Док је пољска агенција имала разгранату мрежу по целој Европи, па и свету, остале две агенције имале су свега неколико дописника ван матичне државе. Без обзира на бројне недостатке у раду и организацији, новинске агенције Бугарске, Југославије и Пољске су имале велики значај за државну пропаганду у међуратном периоду. Медији су играли кључну улогу у развијању и спровођењу државне пропаганде у Пољској, Југославији и Бугарском током тридесетих година. Штампа је била најстарије и најраширеније оруђе у рукама тадашњих пропагандиста. Владе поменутих земаља покушале су да контролишу штампане медије путем рестриктивних закона и њиховом строгом применом, док је фактичко постојање цензуре ограничило слободу штампе. Власницима опозиционих листова су непрекидно претиле високе новчане казне али и могућност забране излажења. Притисак на новине и часописе није увек био исте јачине а био је условљен унутрашњом и међународном ситуацијом. Он је растао како се ближио Други светски рат. Ипак, цензура и разни притисци само су делимично успели да креирају мишљење јавности. Закључак је да владе нису успеле у потпуности да спроведу контролу над штампом и да су током периода о коме је реч постојали бројни листови и часописи који су заступали ставове опозиције или се трудили да објективно извештавају о догађајима и проблемима. 194

Почетак развоја радиофоније у поменутим државама се поклапао са европским и светским тенденцијама али је њен развој био успорен добрим делом и због компликоване економске ситуације. Владајући кругови у све три земље брзо су увидели значај радија као модерног средства пропаганде. Током тридесетих година улагана су значајна материјална средства у његову модернизацију, подизане су нове радио станице и појачавани снага и капацитет постојећих. Број власника апарата и слушалаца константно је растао из године у годину али су и поред тога три државе остале у доњем делу европске лествице. Владе у Пољској, Југославији и Бугарској покушавале су да домаћу радио- службу потпуно потчине својим интересима и плановима. Радио се фактички нашао у државном власништву, из уредништава станица су уклањани неподобни и непослушни. Истраживање је показало да је у другој половини тридесетих година XX века радио био значајно средство пропаганде и за владајуће режиме у Источној и Јужној Европи јер је број његових слушалаца вишеструко надмашивао број регистрованих радио-пријемника. Између два светска рата филм је био једно од најмоћнијих средстава државне пропаганде у свету али и у државама о којима је реч у овом истраживању. Почетком тридесетих година прошлог века филмска индустрија у Пољској, Југославији и Бугарској била је тек у раној фази свог развитка и државе су касниле за водећим европским земљама, имајући у виду однос броја становника према броју постојећих биоскопа. Убедљиво највећи број филмова на биоскопским репертоарима био је страног порекла, углавном америчких, док је домаћа продукција чинила веома мали део програма. Сви филмови, како домаћи тако и страни, морали су проћи законом предвиђену цензуру коју су обављала нарочита државна тела. То је владајућим круговима омогућавало да у потпуности успоставе контролу над емитованим садржајем. И поред економских ограничења филмски радници у Пољској, Југославији и Бугарској успели су, нарочито у другој половини тридесетих, да произведу неколико успешних и интересантних филмова са националнопропагандном тематиком. Без обзира на мали број снимљених филмова њихов утицај се не може потценити јер су нудили више од штампе и радија. Комбиновање слике и тона је, имајући у виду генерални ниво образовања тадашњег становништва, остављало јак утисак на публику. Организација државне пропаганде у Пољској, Југославији и Бугарској током тридесетих година двадесетог века пратила је мо195

деле постављене од стране других европских земаља. Ти модели су често комбиновани са локалном традицијом и искуством. Превасходни циљ тих организација била је контрола домаћег јавног мњења. Сама организација била је ограничена економским могућностима држава на које је додатно утицала и Велика економска криза, која је током тридесетих кулминирала на овим просторима. Коначно, по избијању Другог светског рата моћ државне пропаганде и њене организације није успела да се одупре моћи оружја.

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Appendix 1 PROPAGANDA GUIDELINES FOR THE POLISH RADIO (1938)483 Radio increasingly penetrates the broadest sections of society. Thanks to its comprehensive advantages, it has become a very important factor in the life of every human being. Although there are 33 million people in Poland, the number of subscribers has not yet reached 1 million, however if we know that not just one person, but a group listens to the radio, and if a public address system is provided for it can reach large groups, it can be assumed that the radio can influence several million people. That is why radio propaganda broadcasts in Poland must be conducted in three directions: 1) The whole radio program must be propaganda orientated. 2) Radio broadcasts and public address systems must be developed in the whole country. 3) Short wave radio transmitters must be developed. Ad 1. Everyone, starting from the director, to all heads of various departments, ending with the performers and program presenters, must abide to the principle that the program and production of verbal or musical programs must have a discrete, logical and to an appropriate extent propaganda orientation. In the present state, radio teaches, educates and entertains and these three segments are not propaganda orientated. A. Radio teaches ... only from the point of view of popularizing knowledge, which is basically the task of the school, while this kind of teaching lacks elements of upbringing, such as the development of national pride, value of the individual and the state and reduction of scientific issues to the needs of the national defense. Speakers who present scientific topics neither have guidelines nor are they directed to connect their knowledge with the contemporary needs of the state and its needs in the future war. 483 CAW Gab. MSWojsk. I 300.1.531 The document is from 4 June 1938 and it was first published in Polish in: E. Kaszuba, System propagandy państwa obozu rządzącego w Polsce w latach 1926–1939, (Torun, 2004), pp. 342–351.

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It is not sufficient to simply insert into a radio program several lectures on topics such as the military, national defense, national economy, etc. presented by more or less well-known personalities or even by members of the government. It is essential that all scholars, or appropriate speakers not only present a certain amount of information usually intended for a handful of selected listeners but also to present scientific subjects in a popular and interesting way that will be useful for the state. Example: the program “On the Waves of Southern Atlantic”, only deals with the Atlantic ocean. It would be very easy to draw a parallel with our Baltic Sea and show our people and others the value of having their own sea. For example, we cannot speak about the Baltic Sea, only in the program that deals with it because there are people that cannot or do not want to listen to the program at that time, but they will listen about the Atlantic and they should then also be informed about the significance of the Baltic for Poland. If the speaker ignores the issue of our sea when speaking about the Atlantic, we will lose an opportunity for discrete propaganda. This will not be the speaker’s fault but the program director’s because he did not draw his attention to the above observations. There are many similar examples of general knowledge topics which were not used for propaganda purposes. To summarize – it is necessary that the live word be heard on the radio, whether it deals with serious or entertaining topics, presented in a scholarly or popular way, live in the real sense of the word, interesting to the widest possible number of people and focused on current issues. It should be used for the purpose of supporting the future war whenever possible and to awaken a sense of pride and joy in society for the past or things done in the past and interest them in matters that require effort and execution. All boring speakers should be fired, even if they have the best names, their lectures are to be delivered by a special presenters. Peasants or ordinary workers care little whether the professor of the university or a member of the Academy of Sciences speaks, they only want to hear the speech delivered in a language which they can understand and in a strong voice and good diction – so they do not have problems understanding the words on their low quality radio sets. Let us, for example take German and Russian lectures. Polish radio avoids that kind of lectures considering their tone to be too harsh and vulgar. Thus, the listeners fail to understand the topic and it turns a propaganda instrument such as the radio into a university hall for a selected audience or into discussion clubs. 198

Who want to learn goes to school and attends universities while the radio has the task of popularizing scientific/scholarly topics for those that did not have opportunity to study. The intelligentsia in Poland has high quality radio sets and they always emphasize that they listen to foreign programs, having that in mind, we should focus on the segment of population that can listen only to Polish radio stations because of the poor quality of their radio sets and wants to listen to them not as born malcontents and citizens with a pessimistic attitude towards all aspects of state life. These people can probably be reached only by radio and it is the radio that should encourage them and point out higher goals to them. Combating subversive propaganda using the radio is an issue that pertains not only to Polish intelligentsia but even more to the peasants and ordinary workers. The program director of the Polish Radio is required to accept the new trend that determines contemporary life of Poland. The current program is lethargic because it is lifeless and it lacks a propaganda attitude. B. Radio informs. Most listeners of the Polish radio have radios only to be informed, particularly in the provinces, where daily radio news competes with the local press and often substitutes it. Therefore, everything should be done to fully use the radio news, most of the people listen to, for propaganda purposes. First of all, the editing of radio news must go through a special propaganda process, that is completely different from the one applied to the press. Radio cannot word-for-word broadcast information received from the Polish Telegraph Agency (PAT). It must be able to choose from the received information. Newspapers often publish their comments next to the news, but the radio news must always have one comment, clear and brave to clarify the matter, in accordance with the interests of the state. Due to the wide coverage of radio news in Poland – this kind of information should be smuggled but it must reach the public. For example, news dealing with the activity of OZN (Camp of National Unity) will only be listened to by the ones who know about it, while the same information broadcast by radio news will reach the masses. Therefore, special broadcasts on OZN will not have the same effect because they are listened to only by OZN supporters, while it is the others it wants to reach. Therefore, it is necessary to talk about important things when everybody listens and when the listeners do not know they are going to get certain information. 199

Information must be presented in a lively and interesting manner. The monotonous voice of the presenter is not suitable for propaganda purposes. For example, information about the success of our cavalry abroad that is broadcast in a dull, blasé voice will not have any effect and will pass without any reaction. There should be a few days pause after broadcasting the information in order to find the presenter who will read the report about the success of our cavalry. This report will be heard by listeners who have already formed their stand toward the information and will accept it without emotions. Therefore, propaganda must be up-to-date while the thing is still “hot”. Only then it is successful and animates. Information that affirms the individual’s or a group’s physical and moral strength must be broadcast to listeners in a proper way and it must animate them. It will then be easier to provoke the listeners’ reaction which is important for the general psychological attitude of the society. So, the best way to battle pessimism in society and to raise hope in our own power will be to present good, cleverly, aimed information accompanied by suitable musical-vocal scores. Polish Radio has the wrong idea by converting only the ‘’Southern News’’ into a popular language. We cannot assume that lower social classes listen only to the daily news at noon. Bearing in mind that there are only a limited number of radio service centers for workers and peasants it is clear that the majority of them listen to radio in the evening, after work, therefore the radio news that are not modified into popular propaganda language are often dull and uninteresting. Here again, the Polish national radio incorrectly tries to please an insignificant number of listeners who belong to the intelligentsia, fearing that the popularization of all radio news (morning, afternoon and evening) will decrease their standard. Radio management forgets that popularization is not a synonym for lowering the quality standard of the program and that it will not lose the intelligentsia by introducing the popular form of broadcasting information while at the same time it will gain broad masses of radio listeners that are the main target of our propaganda. Therefore, in conclusion: all of the news the radio broadcasts should be popularized and propaganda processed, the afternoon news, state-making, political and economic topics that OZN advocates should be specially promoted by the whole information and lecture section of the Polish radio, less in the form of already given reports and lectures but more by adjusting and reducing all the topics radio covers down to OZN issues. 200

Reportage is the excellent form of propaganda which must be suitably prepared like vivid pictures showing work and efforts of certain social groups. It directly influences the listeners and offers them the best experiences. Foreign radio stations have almost every reportage perfectly directed and therefore listener experience these events with sufficient interest for propaganda goals. Here in Poland, the quality of reportage is very low. We do not have talented and skilled personal available for this area of radio work. Therefore, our reportage, with the exception of very few are mainly boring, and those that have been improvised do not reflect the activity taking place during the reportage, thus they are completely devoid of any propaganda. The person presenting the reportage must have enough knowledge and skill to fill the pauses which can take place during the reportage and not to stutter or sigh and speak nonsense when no action is taking place. Broadcasting car. The Polish radio has only one broadcasting car. This is ridiculously insufficient. Instead of many unnecessary investments, it is time that the radio is provided by several cars that could reach the place the situation demands. The Polish radio broadcasting car has terrible equipment. There is a lack of even simple equipment for communication between the technician in the car and person who is conducting the reportage. Therefore absurd situations take place, while the broadcasting is on air, the presenter must speak continuously and speak about things that are not connected with the reportage. If he were connected with the broadcasting cars he could give signs to stop the broadcast and thus, to comment at intervals about things actually happening. Both the recorded and live broadcasts must be well prepared and always propaganda processed. For example, if the person who is broadcasting a military ceremony dealing with the reception of military equipment donated by the public does not have sense for propaganda, if, he does not have anything better to say, but to inform the listeners all over the Poland it is pouring, that everybody has umbrellas, that it is difficult for him to broadcast because everyone around him is pushing and etc., then the listeners will lose their focus and it will create bad conditions for them to perceive the event. The person responsible for the radio reportage must be young, energetic, full of initiative, because we are talking about one of the most difficult and very important radio sectors and for propaganda purposes one of the best ways to influence passive masses. 201

The radio must have a certain number of qualified reporters for every sector: politics, sport, economy, church, school etc. The military must also have them and so must OZN for its goals. WINO (Military Institute for Research and Education) will deal with organizing radio reporters training for military purposes. C. Radio – entrainment. All program that contain music and humor in various forms can be put under this section. Humor is the best vehicle for ‘’smuggling’’ propaganda and educational content. All serious topics, difficult and mostly boring are not fit for propaganda. We cannot, as is often done in radio, promote one topic by laughing at others. For example – in order to spread the idea that a location for shooting clubs should be allocated in all municipalities, we make fun of a few mayors who do not support this only to find at the end of the program a mayor who will gladly give location for the club. This propaganda approach is wrong because it insults the pride of all mayors on behalf of the idea of building the centers in municipalities (that is an authentic program). As we said earlier, scientific topics in radio programs are broadcast only for the sake of science, the same is with humor in radio programs which is not used for propaganda purposes. This is difficult but not impossible. Topics should be suggested to the authors and the program must not be limited only to the texts that had been sent to radio. It is difficult to expect the authors of humorous programs without any propaganda directives to know what the propaganda meaning of their program is. However, the editor of the entertainment program of Polish radio thinks that his role is only to amuse listeners with monologues, light music, sketches etc. Since the editors do not have a precise propaganda plan, heads of some departments limit their activity by filling the overall program with their programs without thinking about the whole, without connecting them with propaganda issues. We will never hear a radio monologue or program that makes fun of, for example, a family in which every member is affiliated to a different political party. This topic could be used to make a good analogy with Poland in which many political parties are founded and all of them claim to be the ones that will save the country. Asserting, in the radio program, that the best political party that every Pole should be a member of is Poland itself, would be making fun of many listeners and provoke harmful political speculations. Nevertheless, the topics for humorous/entertaining programs should be imposed on the author by 202

the directors, because if they do not know the director’s program policy the authors will not initiate a program from fear of being rejected. As the majority of listeners are of average intelligence, satire should not be used in humorous program, especially the one referring to the state. An intelligent man will understand satire in the theater – radio listeners will react to satire in a completely different way and therefore satire should be avoided in radio programs. Music. In order for radio music, classical or popular, to fulfill their educational tasks it too must have a director who will take into account not only the musical aspect but also the propaganda one. It is not the task of the radio to educate its listeners on music, that should be done by music schools. The task of the radio is to popularize music. Any lessons on music, especially those in the form of a systematic program should disappear from radio programs, as they only pertain to a handful of followers or sick people who cannot leave the beds and can afford the luxury of systematic listening to programs. Radio music must be accessible to everyone. What benefit will a worker or peasant in the village have if radio broadcasts an hour long symphony concert? Even members of the intelligentsia do not listen to it, and it is not worth the effort for a handful of music devotees. There should be less solo recitals in music programs and more orchestra and chorus music, thus band music. Soloist should be included in collective music program auditions. An average listener is not interested in a 30 minute performance by a mediocre male or female solo artist, but will gladly listen to one or two songs performed during the chorus or orchestra concert. In essence, the music program should be conducted energetically and must be more diverse. As elsewhere, there is no cooperation in that department with other sectors. The head of the music department deals only with his sector so his work is similar to work at the music conservatorium and the concerts broadcasts people of more or less good talents. Thus, we cannot speak about propaganda having in mind the current situation in that department. Radio music programs are generally monotonous and do not provoke excitement in the masses. The head of music department of the Polish Radio is wrong when he thinks that his sector is doing what is required of it if he from time to time broadcasts concerts by Polish composers. This is propaganda of Polish music, it does not have a music propaganda impact on the listeners. Music programs should choose 203

to broadcast compositions of foreign composers that have highly dynamic and not long, boring music pieces that have artistic value but have a very weak psychological impact. For example, when a person starts his working day and tunes into a radio program to listen to the morning news – the music repertoire should be selected not randomly but intentionally. A citizen who is going to work has no need to hear cabaret songs or some waltzes but a few good foreign or domestic marches in order to go to work enthusiastically, and not feel sleepy after listening to waltzes or some sad song. Only then, will the music broadcast in the morning have we propaganda impact on the listeners because they will proceed to work with greater satisfaction. Once I heard that they played to children at 8 o’ clock in the morning ‘’Sleep baby, sleep little one’’ – at the moment when they just got up and should not think about sleeping – this must not be allowed. The directors of Music Department of the Polish radio thinks that they meet propaganda needs regarding the peasants by playing oberek, kujawiak, mazurek,484 etc. While playing the music of Polish composers their detail biographies and description of the epoch they worked in (Chopin, Moniuszko, Noskowski etc) should be included in program. D. General. In all its programs, the Polish radio lacks a uniform stand, determination, courage, especially in programs which should have a national propaganda character. There is fear of subscribers whose wishes are taken into account even if they are contrary to the direction which the Polish Radio as a state institution should take. It does not realize that subscribers, even when dissatisfied with this or that idea, will not throw away their radio set, because they do not listen only to Polish radio stations. Radio is not familiar with propaganda, it does not understand it and knows nothing about it. These shortcomings are covered up by its assertion that as an institution that brings together different political and national sentiments, it must avoid any suspicion that it works in favor of one or other social group. This approach is false and in this case we cannot speak about deliberate and decisive propaganda. While other states, with no harm done to science, information and entertainment, have made radio, and cinema, the best means of state propaganda with a clear and decisive program, Polish radio creates an 484 Polish folk dances.

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impression of broadcasting a program mixture lacking spine, leading thought and coordination between its departments. If OZN wants to use radio for its propaganda goals, it cannot rely only on the minutes that have been kindheartedly given to their lectures or on announcements, but it must have a decisive influence on every department of the Polish radio, so that the thesis of the February declaration could be implemented everywhere.485 The atmosphere in the Polish radio must change. All employees from the janitor up to the managerial staff must accept the concept that they must work with enthusiasm, will and with an understanding of the important role that radio should have in the functioning of the state.

485 Declaration of OZN political program from 21 Februry 1937.

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Appendix 2 On the Road of Renewal: Yugoslavia, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow – movie transcript486 Petrovgrad, November 6, 1938. Young men dressed in green shirts are marching. In the background, we hear a chorus singing “Greetings to the Leader” (“Pozdrav vodji”). Milan Stojadinović waves to the people of Petrovgrad in an open car and they greet him enthusiastically. Stojadinović steps out of car, uniformed young men greet him. He climbs onto the balcony, followed by the Minister of Agriculture Svetozar Stanković. A crowd of people applaud and wave their hats. SVETOZAR STANKOVIĆ: Dear Banatian brothers. City of Petrovgrad, center of Banat Woke up all decorated and happy Because the Prime Minister of the King’s government, (Long live.) The head of the Yugoslav Radical Union (Long live.) And the leader of our movement mister, Mister, Doctor Milan Stojadinović is visiting it. (Long live.) (Long chants: Leader, leader, leader.) MILAN STOJADINOVIĆ: Dear brothers and friends No other part of our state That was earlier under foreign rule Was that spontaneous, that joyful, That enthusiastic, without any conditions and demands In their approach to our national unification As was proud Vojvodina Twenty years ago. (Crowd: That’s correct. Hooray.) Vojvodina was then economically in the best position Other provinces envied Vojvodina On her national conscience 486 What we see on the screen is written with normal letters and what “actors” are saying is in cursive. The text in the brackets discribes what we see on the screen whilst the “actors” are talking. The transcript was first published in Serbian in: Б. Симић, Пропаганда Милана Стојадиновића, Belgrade, 2007, pp. 319–324.

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And economic welfare. That was the position of Vojvodina twenty years ago When our great state and National unity was achieved in the great state Of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians. (Some man: Long live unified Yugoslavia! Crowd: Long live!) All of you from Northern Banat now know me. In 1925, we, in the Southern Banat, did not give One sole mandate to the opposition. I know you as you know me. My fight knows only for victory. And because of that, knowing you, I believe that On 11th December, we will have the most complete, biggest and the most glorious victory as we have never had up till now. Long live! (Shouts of approval, long chants: leader, leader. Stojadinović happily waves back to the crowd.) Peasant is plowing the field with oxen. Minister without Portfolio, Krek on the platform: MIHA KREK: With the arrival of Milan Stojadinović’s government pacification and tranquility was achieved in domestic policy Real national spirit in public administration Caused new love of the people towards their public administration and also towards the country. The Minister of Construction Dobrivoje Stošović on the same platform. DOBRIVOJE STOŠOVIĆ: Construction policy reaches that level 208

This allows our country rapid And planned work on the modernization And improvement of our road system. (Workers are building roads, Milan Stojadinović is cutting the ribbon for the opening of a new road.) Using a one billion loan taken in 1935, We have managed to complete the first, Thousand kilometers of our road system. We managed to supply water, To thousands of our villages, Small towns and towns and We also managed to build Countless permanent bridges. (A train is passing over the bridge. Machines are working on the road.) And we also managed to build And begin to construct three... (Sound suddenly stops.) The Minister without Portfolio Djura Janković on the same platform. DJURA JANKOVIĆ: Prime Minister Dr Milan Stojadinović, Welcomes and returns visits of European statesmen. Scenes of the new hospital built in the Stojadinović era are shown. The Minister of Social Policy and People’s Health Dragiša Cvetković stands on the same platform. DRAGIŠA CVETKOVIĆ: Social policy of Milan Stojadinović’s the government achieved big and crucial results. Never in our country have in the interest of our working people bigger reforms, nor such useful ones been made before SPOKESMAN: With belief in his great ability, Good will and determination We salute him as the leader which 209

Led Yugoslavia on the road to renewal Towards a better and brighter future. (Milan Stojadinović arrives at a train station. Smiling girls in national costumes, Stojadinovic receives flowers from one girl.) The arrival of Milan Stojadinović in Negotin (Eastern Serbia) on 30th October 1938 where crowds welcome him with young boys and girls in national costumes and men on horses with Yugoslav flags. Stojadinović with the local party leaders greets the crowds and walks through the city, surrounded by the crowds. The Prime Minister Stojadinović standing on an improvised platform. MILAN STOJADINOVIĆ: Brothers, this is what we did In the economic field: Reduced taxes Reduced peasants’ debts And at the same time, increased prices of the peasants’ products. (People hold up Stojadinović’s portraits with the written slogans.) Gave good harvests, Or had good harvests, brothers, these are no ordinary successes, They are huge successes, They are miracles In the economic policy of our country. Crowd: That’s correct. (Shouts of approval.) But, as we achieved miracles In the economic field, We could say that We also created one unseen miracle In the political field. 210

The work of my government, And the work of the Yugoslav Radical Union Crowd: Long live!!! managed to reconciliate your countrymen Mr Petar Živković With Dr Maček in Zagreb. Crowd: Down with the villain! (Shouts of disapproval.) Our people say, when winter is bad, When winter is strong Then cat and mouse sleep together. (Stojadinović is laughing.) I could conclude that Those two gentlemen Are predicting A very bad and evil winter for themselves. Crowd: That’s correct. That winter will be harder than The Winter from the peaks of Stara Planina. That will be a real Siberian winter for them When knees unite with the jaw. Crowd: That’s correct. Long live the leader! Brothers and friends, we were supposed to have This rally last week. I decided that it should Be today. If it had been last week We would have had rain. Today, we have nice weather That’s the biggest proof that God is with us. Victory is ours. 211

Crowd: That’s correct! (Shouts of approval.) Milan Stojadinović followed by the Ministers and the “green shirts” walks the streets. Big crowds follow him. Stojadinović greets the gathered citizens. (Shouts: Hooray and long live.) Milan Stojadinović on the same platform as other ministers before. МILAN STOJADINOVIĆ: In one terrible cataclysm When a whirlwind blew away states And changed frontiers We have succeeded in preserving peace for our country. That means that we have managed to preserve and save Yugoslavia. SPOKESMAN: You have seen what Milan Stojadinović Has done for you and your country. Think, believe and decide. On 11th December, every one of you is responsible For the destiny of Yugoslavia. ...With your help and trust to continue his great deed Dr Milan Stojadinović. (probably missing word.) In the background, we see Milan Stojadinović smiling. After the statesman finishes, we see the Yugoslav flag fluttering in the wind.

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Appendix 3 The Main Directorate of Renewal Section for Propaganda Plan and Instructions for future propaganda work487 Last year on the 23rd December 1934, the first phase of our propaganda work was concluded. At the conference that was held on the 26th, 27th, and 28th December last year, the Head of Propaganda pointed out, in essence, the big problems that have to be tackled and solved in the future. The goals are: 1. To prepare for the practical work of the regime. 2. T  o remain the most powerful weapon by which to win over and control the people for a new construction and support of the state. 3. T  o bring clarity and new knowledge to people and create new consciousness for the citizens, the state and the whole nation. 4. To be a strong impetuous which will awaken society, make people aware that they should invest themselves, and enthusiastically lead people towards the tasks and goals of the regime. 5. To strengthen the bright flame of the people’s enthusiasm and re-educate them in the spirit of the coming era and to give purpose and scope to rebuilding of the new state. 6. To finally eradicate from people’s the consciousness the old state and its social and political formations by conducting severe and historically objective criticism. The main goal of the leadership of the Directorate of Renewal is to see the final arrival on the highest level of a moral force and working organization with the aim of activating the social and national spirit. In order to complete these tasks, I order that the following plan be implemented in the next four months:

487 CDA, 232k-1-19.

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I

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PLAN

1. Make a list of people, in the spirit of article 40 of the Manual, consisting of the independant citizens, officials and others, that can be used for conducting a public campaign on general political issues. 2. Prepare plans for meetings to be held in every village and city where no discussions on political and economic issues haven’t been held yet and in villages and cities where meetings had not been successful enough with the aim that: a) Meetings should take place in every place within two weeks; b) Plans with the names of the places and speakers should be completed by 20th January 1935 the latest; c) Using instructions for organizing meetings, given at the end, district activists should be ready to organize regional, area and district meetings whenever they are informed by the Directorate. Special instructions will be sent for organizing these meetings. Note: If a speaker from Sofia is wanted for certain meetings, it should be noted in the plan. II

PROPAGANDA OF THE REGIME INITIATIVE AND CLEAR EXPLANATION OF ITS REFORMATORY ACTIVITY

The task of this type of propaganda is to make every initiative of the regime as clear as possible to the broadest mass of people. For this goal, it is necessary: 1. To make contact with representatives of every powerful professional group and every competent person from all civil and economic sectors: a) Agronomist; j) Work inspectors; b) Veterinarians; k) Priests; c) Medics; l) Cooperative activists’; d) Forester; m) Librarians; e) Inspectors and teachers; n) Court clerks and legal experts; f) Administrators and policemen; o) Reserve officers; g) Engineers and architects; p) Reserve non-commissioned officers; h) Work inspectors; r) Representatives of economy i) Finance administrative; s) Representatives of sport, youth and patriotic organizations One joint conference should be held in order to organize a clear sequence of the speeches under the initiative of various ministries. 214

a) Ministry of Interior 1. Administrative legislation; 2. People’s health b) Ministry of People’s Economy 1. Agriculture and its sectors; 2. Cattle-raising; 3. Economic-social legislation; 4. Forestry issues; 5. Credit; 6. Monopole: hemp, onion and other; 7. Professional societies, societies of state clerks. c) Ministry of Finance 1. Taxes and finance legislation; 2. Monopoles, tobacco, spirit, salt, etc. d) Ministry of People’s Education 1. New educational reform; 2. Other special issues. e) Ministry of Justice 1. New judiciary reform; 2. Laws that interest peasants. f) Ministry of Urbanization 1. Urbanization; 2. Law regarding roads; 3. Employment (1. regular, 2. part-time) Note: You will find material for speeches in the appendix of this document as well as in the brochures of the Directorate for Renewal. The speeches should be held in places that have already been visited by the propagandists. In that manner, if one speech is read in these places, we could have six speeches in every village and eventually, every speech should be delivered until the 15th April. The plan, with the names of all the speakers and the villages, should be presented by 20th January 1935, the latest. Note: The district teachers have organized the so called “people’s universities” by the order of the Ministry of Interior at the request of the Direction for Renewal, on the grounds of article 7 of the Manual they must coordinate their initiatives with the future plan without destroying everything that had been achieved up to this moment.

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III

CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL PROPAGANDA

This type of propaganda aims to convey general knowledge to the people in the villages and cities on cultural and educational, religious, sports, pedagogic and health and other issues. The most important aim is, however, that this type of propaganda should includs the following: 1. Our history a) Idealism of the most famous activists before the Liberation. b) War for unification of the Bulgarian tribe. c) Educational meaning for our national history. 2. The role of the school in our Revival a) Teacher and the new state. b) Village and the people’s teacher. 3. Education a) National, civil and state education. b) Meaning of the people’s revolutionary for national education. 4. Church a) What we owe to the Bulgarian church. b) Why we should maintain national religious and the state traditions. Sport – Health issues: a) Preventive medicine; b) Motherhood; c) Child care, etc. The activist’s sense of purpose will be his guiding principle that will help him best organize speeches on the subject that will interest the local community. PREPARATION FOR THE MEETINGS 1. In order to successfully prepare a meeting to be held in the provinces, it is recommended, with the help of the mayor and deputy mayor, to form an “Action Committee” in the village consisting of: teachers, agronomists, priests, librarians and cooperative activists, representatives of patriotic organizations, representatives of the economy, manufacturing classes, village leaders – all the members of the committee will be assigned special tasks dealing with the publicizing, preparation and organization of the meeting. 2. The role of the mayor, his assistant and members of the Action Committee, besides the work of touring before the meeting, is to pro216

voke interest in the meeting, to win over the hearts and minds of the peasants and to make them feel welcomed and invited so they would not have the feeling that they are ordered or forced to attend the meeting. In short, the meeting the should be organized with great sincerity and cordiality. 3. Female teachers and clerks’ wives, like all other women, from the village belonging to the intelligentsia are to be used as supporting members of the Action Committee to organize women’s meetings. The (government’s) orders for the dissolution of parties and monopoly on alcohol – things that estranged husbands from the family – were correctly accepted by women, and it is important that we should hear more of their views. 4. As already proscribed by the regional committee, all meetings should begin with the national anthem “Shumi Maritza” and finish with the “Mila Rodino”, all performed by a civil and school choruses. 5. If there is a stage, in places where the meetings are organized, it should be decorated with flags and flowers, and where there is no stage, the room should be decorated in the national decor. The aim should be to transform our meetings into a real national gathering in order to revive the Bulgarian national spirit. MEETING MANAGEMENT 1. The meetings should be opened, managed and closed by an official representative of the government, a mayor or doctor, agronomist, head teacher, director of high school etc, or by an inhabitant of that village belonging to the intelligentsia. 2. The opening and closing of the meeting should be done in a special way so the differences could be seen from the very beginning between yesterday’s party meetings and today’s when representatives of the regime and the state are talking. 3. Chairmen, especially, should stress that our meetings are like religious congregations and if everyone asks questions and quotes the speakers, which are the remains of bad communist practice, that will kill the impact of these meetings and it will turn them into ordinary meetings – what is absolutely unacceptable. SPEAKER 1. The first condition that well organized propaganda has to meet is absolute clarity of the speakers’ speeches. 2. For that goal, in the spirit of articles 7 and 39 of the Manual, seminars, must be organized in order to prepare activists and to at217

tain a consensus of views amongst the speakers, all the brochures dealing with the direction, laws and the regime’s reform activity should be studied and analyzed at these seminars. 3. The speakers of Renewal should be chosen among people that: a) Fanatically believe in the new ideology and in the new state. b) Have the ability to speak well and passionately in public. c) Have the temperaments of fighters and are prepared to struggle to overcome all obstacles and difficult conditions, to bear the cross of new apostolicism. 4. When such people are found, activists should instruct them to adopt a different approach that should have the following characteristics: a) A determination towards a more detailed study of government activity liberated from old partisan attitudes. b) An understanding of local problems and needs by arriving to the place of the meetings one day earlier, time enough to study local needs. c) Conduct a stimulating short psychological study of the local people in order to understand their hearts and minds and understand their audience better. d) Make every word relevant to the Bulgarian people. e) Always have faith in, energy for and love for the sincerity of their mission. f) Distance themselves from old attitudes and prejudices, not make false promises and talk of obligations. They should only be content with following the correct legal procedures that could fulfill every legal and just request and with that attitude make the government more prestigious. g) Be tactful and correct in not accusing a party leader of past events on account of others. Let us stress that we are criticizing a system full of vices that destroyed even the best ambitions and the purest hearts, because the experience taught us that whenever a speaker had criticized the old party life, as a system in general, it was always approved by the audience. h) Represent the people in a way which, with a refreshing attitude and modesty and lack of indulgence, underlines the new spirit of regime. i) Believe in justice, the most important word the world knows of and upon which today’s regime is based – this should be constantly stressed.

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THE RESULTS OF THE MEETINGS According to the regional circular, number 87 from last October, a report should always be written after the end of each meeting describing the atmosphere of that meeting and its results. In the addition, one should also add: 1. A couple of days before each meeting, questionnaires should be sent to the mayors or deputy mayors in the villages, in addition to the existing instructions that are to be strictly followed for preparation, organization and course of the meetings and the effect these have on listeners. 2. Immediately after the conclusion of each meeting, activists are to contact by telephone the mayor or his deputy or the person who is delegated to follow the meeting, complete the questionnaire, e.g. one example is a questionnaire which is to be immediately sent to the propaganda section of Directorate. 3. After receiving the summary, on the same night, the district activists are supposed to dictate to the stenographer, by telephone, the part of the questionnaire that should be published. INCIDENTS Activists must send an immediate report to the section regarding every incident that deserves to be especially noted. MALICIOUS RUMORS Each malicious rumor, which deliberately aims to bring turmoil to the local population, should be immediately reported by telephone to the stenographer. This telephone conversation has to be immediately followed by a written report. If, however, the issue is of a confidential nature, then a confidential report must be sent. IV

PRINTED PROPAGANDA

1. Brochures a) It should be noted that until now due to the fact that the Directorate did not have their members in the field in order to fulfill their initiatives and also due to the non-rational transfer and use of published brochures the activity was highly inefficient. b) In the future brochures should be send to activists and every one of them, according to the local conditions, should use this powerful tool of propaganda. After the speech on one topic he should give 219

out brochure to the most intelligent listeners – for consolidation and affirmation by the written word of the already existing belief. c) Activists should always aim for the rational synthesis of the spoken and written word in order to increase the knowledge of the masses and strengthen belief in the new regime. 2. Newspaper New Days (Нови Дни) a) It should be noted that in general, the number of newspaper subscribers is unsatisfactory. b) The first obligation of the activists, in the current climate, is to create interest for this newspaper through persistent propaganda. c) Force should be excluded when dealing with the subscribers, as should the influence of the directors on his subordinates. Only with the cultivation and exacerbation of the needs of the masses will they look for the newspapers on their own. d) Voluntary subscription to the newspaper for a period of 3–6 months should be encouraged but generally in accordance with the financial means of these subscribers. e) It is especially important that administration offices of the newspaper Novi Dni in the cities establish contact with the society Strela and arrange for their subscribers to receive a copy of the newspapers at the same time as those people who buy them daily from the street sellers. 3. Provincial Press Activists should be fully briefed with instruction for steering and controlling the press in accordance with the Manual. 4. Village correspondents a) According to article number 42 of the Manual, people from the villages should be selected by the activists to be voluntary village correspondents; b) For this selection process, one should bear in mind that they should be: - Devoted sympathizers of the new regime; - Culturally educated people; - Well informed about village problems and needs; - Serious and responsible people that should not misled activists or editorials with tendentious news; c) It is recommended that people should be selected among the teachers; 220

d) Duties of the village correspondents in the field of propaganda will be determined during the process. For now, it is enough that, beside their correspondent functions, they become the closest collaborators of the mayor, or his assistants and work as an action committee for organizing every publishing activity. If all of this is accepted and reasonably implemented, we can expect brilliant results. It is essential that we, members of the Renewal, are imbued with high knowledge and great enthusiasm. Let it be known that only faith and fanatical belief is what influences the masses. Will, an essential element for the making of all great historical epochs, is to be found in man himself - let us be conscious conductors of that will and let us strengthen the authority of the state in the conscience of the people. Chief Director: Petar Popzlatev (Signature)

221

List of references Archival sources: Archiwum Akt Nowych (Archives of Modern Documents), Warsaw – AAN: Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego (OZN) [Documents of the Central Headquarters, Camp of National Unity] Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych (MSW) [Documents from the Ministry of Interior] Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych (MSZ) [Documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] Prezydium Rady Ministów (PRM) [Documents of the Council of Ministers] Zbiór Zespołów Szczatkowych, Akta Edwarda ŚmigłegoRydza (ZZS) [Acts of Edward Rydz-Smigly] Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (Central Military Archives), Warsaw – CAW: Gabinet Ministra Spraw Wojskowych [Documents from the Cabinet of Minister of War] Biuro Inspekcji generalnego Inspektora Sił Zbrojnych [Documents from the Files of the General Inspectorate of the Armed Forces]

Arhiv Jugoslavije (Archive of Yugoslavia), Belgrade – AJ: Fond Ministarstva Unutrašnjih Poslova (14) [Collection of the Ministry of Interior] Zbirka Milana Stojadinovića (37) [Collection of Milan Stojadinović] Fond Centralni Pres-biro (38) [Collection of Central Press Bureau]

223

Fond Ministarstva Prosvete (66) [Collection of Ministry of Education] Zbirka Vojislava Jovanovića Maramboa (335) [Personal Collection of Vojislav Jovanović Marambo] Fond Ministarstva Spoljnih Poslova (374) [Collection of Ministry of Foreign Affairs] Rukopisno odelenje Matice Srpske (Manuscript Department of Matica Srpska), Novi Sad – RSM: Zbirka Milana Jovanovića Stoimirovića [private papers and notes of Milan Jovanović Stoimirović]

Istorijski arhiv grada Smedereva (Historical Archive of City of Smederevo), Smederevo – AS: Zbirka Milana Jovanovića Stoimirovića [private papers and notes of Milan Jovanović Stoimirović]

Arhiv Vojvodine (Archive of Vojvodina) – AV: Kraljevska banska uprava [Royal Banovina administration]

Централен Държавен исторически архив (Central State Historical Archive), Sofia – CDA: Фонд Дирекция на Обществена обнова (232k) [Directorate for Social Renewal] Фонд Министерство на вьншните работи и изповедания (176k) [Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Religion] Фонд Министерсти сьвет (284k) [Council of Ministers] Фонд Дружество на столичните журналисти (185k) [Capital’s Journalists’ Society] 224

Фонд на Дирекция за национална пропаганда (15k) [Directorate for National Propaganda] Дьржавен военноисторически архив (State MilitaryHistorical Archive), Veliko Trnovo – DVIA] Фонд Културно-просветна дейност (V2.07) [Cultural and Educational Activities] Архив на Бьлгарска телеграфна агенция (Archive of Bulgarian Telegraph Agency), Sofia – BTA

Archivio Centrale dello Stato (Central State Archive), Roma – ACS Ministero della Cultura Popolare [Ministry of Popular Culture]

Newspapers Днес (Sofia) Gazeta Polska (Warsaw) Нови Дни (Sofia) Политика (Belgrade) Polska Zbrojna (Warsaw) Радио Београд (Belgrade) Самоуправа (Belgrade) Утро (Sofia) Време (Belgrade)

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Index

A Alfieri Eduardo Dino 33 Amann Max 32 Antal Stefan 40 Anusz Antoni 43 B Balabanov Nikola 91-93, 109 Bartel Kazimierz 45 Beck Józef 10, 44, 55 Belokonski Petko 14 Bernays Edward 22, 23 Bigoszta Henryk 183 Bjelica Mihailo 14 Blum Leon 34 Bogdanović Boško 60, 170 Bojkov Dino 150 Boris III 11, 14, 88 Bouhler Philipp 32 Bytwerk Randall 13 C Car Stanisław 44 Carr Eric 12-13, 41 Chamberlain Neville 34 Chukanov Kiril 14, 19, 83 Chopin Frédéric 204 Ciano Constanzo 33 Ciano Galeazzo 33 Cis-Bankiewicz Zbigniew 171 Crnjanski Miloš 65 Cvetković Dragiša 78, 209 Cwojdziński Antoni 176

D Damyanov Atanas 150 Daszyński Ignacy 43 Dietrich Jozef 32 Dimitrov Ilcho 144 Dimitrov Veselin 14 Djordjević Vojin 183, 184 Djurović Teofilo 60, 66 Dragović Vuk 103 Driencourt Jacques 23 E Ellul Jacques 23, 26 F Ferdinand, King of Bulgaria 102 Ferro Antonio 37 Filov Bogdan 150 Frossard Ludovic-Oscar 36 G Gantkowski Romuald 182 Gašić Jovan 68 Georgiev Kimon 87 Grabski Zdisław 46 Grandi Dino 33 Grażyński Michał 51 Gregory XV 22 Gruev Simeon 150 Goebbels Joseph 12, 25, 30-32 Górecki Piotr 171 H Havas Charles-Louis 99

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Héderváry Károly Khuen 60 Herbst I. 102 Hitler Adolf 30, 31, 33, 113 Hristov Todor 91

Luković Kosta 60, 66, 67, 68, 76, 165, 166 Lungov Petar 94, 95 Luther King Marthin 26

J Janković Djuro 209 Jędrzejewicz Janusz 44 Jokić Miroslav 152 Jovanović Stoimirović Milan 63, 67, 112, 116, 118, 149

M Maček Vladimir Vlatko 78, 164 Marjanović Milan 59, 60, 105 Marynowski Zdisław 171 Mao Zedong 26 Matuszewski Ignacy 44 Metaxas Ioannis 38 Miedziński Bogusław 44, 124 Milojević Predrag 60, 61 Moniuszko Stanisław 204 Mościcki Ignacy 10, 14, 44, 48, 147, 167 Mousset Albert 103, 112 Mussolini Benito 32, 33, 34 Mussolini Edda 33

K Kalafatović Danilo 170 Karadjordjević Aleksandar 11, 61, 64, 66 Karadjordjević Pavle 14 Karadjordjevic Petar II 71 Kasprzycki Tadeusz 48, 53 Kaszuba Elżbieta 13, 58 Katelbach Tadeusz 176 Kazasov Dimo 42 Kencbok Bronisław 49 Kennedy John 26 Kiliński Władysław 49 Kjoseivanov Georgi 11, 14, 92, 93, 144, 150, 172 Kobasica Stjepo 115 Koblar Franc 171 Koc Adam 147 Kolev Krum 85 Konstantinov Konstantin 171 Korošec Anton 60, 75, 169, 170 Kosidowski Zenon 171 Koźmiński Karol 53 Krachunova Dariya 13 Krek Miha 170, 208 L Lažetić Predrag 14 Lepecki Mieczysław 47, 53 Ley Robert 32 Libicki Konrad 123, 124, 171 Ligoń Stanisław 171 Lukman Franc 170

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N Natlačen Marko 142 Naumov Dimitar 91, 92 Nicoloudis Theologos 38 Nikolić Milan 60 Noskowski Zygmunt 204 Notkowski Andrzej 13, 49 Nowakowski Stanisław 171 O Obarski Stanisław 124 Obrenović Mihailo 59 Ołpiński Józef 48 Osana Mario 171 P Paruch Waldemar 45 Pašić Nikola 172 Pavelić Ante 164 Pawłowicz Bohdan 171 Penchev Petko 84, 85, 169 Pétain Philippe 79 Petronijević Branislav 61 Petrović Njegoš Andrija 117

Petrović Svetislav 118 Petrović Veljko 176 Petry Juliusz 171 Pieracki Bronisław 44 Pikiel Roman 171 Piłsudski Józef 10, 15, 44, 45, 47, 48, 53, 147, 148, 167 Plato 22 Prenerov Svetozar 173 Protich Venceslav 93, 94 Prystor Aleksander 44 Polyanov Vladimir 84, 169 Popov Ivan 91, 102, 103 Popzlatev Petar 85, 86, 87, 142, 169, 184, 221 R Radecki, captain 49 Radovanović Milorad 60 Reuter Paul Julius 99 Ribbentrop Joackim von 32 Riefenstahl Leni 178 Rosenberg Alfred 32 Ruszkowski Andrzej 176 Rydz Śmygłi Edward 10, 14, 15, 47, 48, 50, 53, 147, 167, 172, 182 Rzymowski Wincent 46 S Salazar António de Oliveira 37 Savajian Leon 63 Serafimov Georgi 91, 92, 109 Seton-Watson Hugh 11 Skerl Vladimir 75 Skitnik Sirak 171 Sławek Walery 44, 50 Sławoj-Składkowski Felicjan 46 Šlegl Toni 61 Spaho Mehmed 75 Stanković Svetozar 207 Stare Miloš 171 Starzyński Mieczysław 147 Starzyński Roman 123, 124, 171 Stefani Guglielmo 99

Stojadinović Milan 14, 15, 66, 67, 68, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 113, 115, 139, 140, 141, 148, 149, 162, 163, 165, 166, 169, 170, 172, 183, 207-212 Stojimirović (see Jovanović Stojimirović) Stošović Dobrivoje 208 Stpiczyński Wojciech 45, 50, 147 Strasser Gregor 30 Strzelecki Leon 47 Stubel Iordan 249 Świtalski Kazimierz 44 T Tanev Stefan 151 Taylor Phillip 42 Tešić Dragan 14 Toshev Andrei 86 V Vacqueret Emil 47 Vansittart Robert 35 Varnava, patriarch 60 Vinaver Stanislav 67 Vukdragović Mihailo 170 W Welch David 13, 23 Wenda Zygmunt 57 Wieniawa-Długoszowski Bolesław 44 Winiarz Bronisław 171 Wolff Bernhard 99 Z Zakrzewski Tadeusz 54 Zamorski Kordian 47 Živković Petar 211 Zyndram-Kościałkowski Marjan 45, 46

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CIP - Каталогизација у публикацији Народна библиотека Србије, Београд 32.019.5(438)”1930/1941” 32.019.5(497.1)”1930/1941” 32.019.5(497.2)”1930/1941” 659.1(438)”1930/1941” 659.1(497.1)”1930/1941” 659.1(497.2)”1930/1941” SIMIĆ, Bojan, 1977In the Spirit of National Ideology : organization of State Propaganda in Eastern and Southeastern Europa in the 1930s, comparative perspectives on Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria / Bojan Simić. Beograd : Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2013 (Beograd : Colorgafx). - 249 str. : ilustr. ; 25 cm. - (Edition Monografije / Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije ; Book No. 90) Tiraž 300. - Apendix 1-3: str. 197-221. Napomene i bibliografske reference uz tekst. - Bibliografija: str. 223-246. - Registar. ISBN 978-86-7005-119-5 a) Пропаганда - Пољска - 1930-1941 b) Пропаганда - Југославија - 1930-1941 c) Пропаганда - Бугарска - 1930-1941 COBISS.SR-ID 204085004

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