Illusions of Security: North Atlantic Diplomacy 1918-22 9781487595609

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Illusions of Securit y The Firs t World War was i n many ways the mos t formative experienc e for th e wester n worl d i n th e twentiet h century . Littl e i f anything o f importance escape d its influence . For those who helped shap e foreign an d defenc e policies i n Britain, the Unite d States , an d Canada , th e wa r an d th e consequen t peace making raised perplexing political , ideological, and racia l problems. I n their searc h for solutions , som e among the anglophon e elites of these three countries arrive d a t th e ide a o f Atlanticism. To the m i t seemed possible that the Britis h empire an d th e Unite d States, the cor e of th e victorious allied coalition, could create a global hegemony, an amended version o f the Pa x Britannica , whic h might provid e a panacea for th e ills of the postwar world. As their views became known, the Atlanticist s met wit h som e enthusiasm and muc h outrigh t hostility. Deliberation s for an d agains t Atlanticism focused o n renewa l o f the Anglo-Japanes e alliance and on two vital postwar conferences, the Imperial Conference of 192 1 an d th e Washingto n Conferenc e o f 1921-2 . Initia l prospect s for Atlanticism seemed encouraging, but hopes were dashed in real political issues of war debts and Europea n recovery b y the en d o f 1922 . The Atlanticist thesis languished an d despit e periods of co-operation i t never regained its appeal throughout th e interwa r years. Michael Fr y relate s i n fascinatin g detai l th e histor y o f thes e deliberations an d o f th e statesme n wh o worke d fo r an d agains t Atlanticism. Hi s stud y shed s a ne w ligh t o n th e evolutio n o f foreig n policy i n Britain , the dominions , an d th e Unite d States , an d yield s insights int o relations betwee n these governments during an importan t time in history. studied a t the Londo n School o f Economics, Universit y of London, earnin g hi s PH D i n 1963 . From 196 2 to 196 5 he wa s assistan t professor o f history at th e Universit y of Saskatchewan, and sinc e 196 5 has bee n associat e professor o f history a t Carleto n University . H e i s working on a two-volume study of David Lloyd George and the conduc t of British foreign policy from 189 0 to 1945 . MICHAEL FRY

MICHAEL G . FR Y

Illusions of Security North Atlantic Diplomacy 1918-22

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRES S

© Universit y of Toronto Press 1972 Toronto and Buffal o Printed in Canada ISBN 0-8020-1774-6 Microfiche ISBN 0-8020-0084-3 LC 74-163814

Frontispiece Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Bonar Law, and Lord Birkenhead at the Peace Conference 191 9

To my mother and the memory of my father

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Contents Preface i x Acknowledgments x i ONE The Adantícists : Prospects and Problems 1919-21 3 TWO

1921 : New Opportunities 6 8 THREE

The Imperial Conference 12 1 FOUR The Washington Conference 15 4 FIVE

Prospects for Atlanticism 18 7 Bibliography 20 1 Index 21 1 ILLUSTRATIONS

British representatives at the Peace Conference of Versailles frontispiece Lloyd George, Milner, and Philip Kerr 1 3 Balfour and C.E.Hughes 12 7 Balfour and Lloyd George 16 1 Robert Borden and Winston Churchill 18 3

Preface Amid th e semina l themes of wartime diplomacy none surpasses i n significance tha t o f the debat e withi n th e victoriou s allianc e a s it s members individually an d collectivel y see k to imprin t thei r versio n of justic e on the futur e peace . Idealism and crusadin g zeal, realism and the logic of their separate histories tend to transform thi s debat e into an internecine struggle, often intens e and bitter in tone. During the mid and late stages of the two world wars of the twentieth century this interallie d contes t centre d o n thre e issues : nationa l interests , expressed i n economic , political, an d strategi c term s a s th e allie s sought t o establis h thei r postwa r worl d positions ; ideologica l an d philosophical confrontations; and differences ove r racial problems. In the prolonged process of peacemaking the debate matured. Statesmen, experiencin g th e prospec t o f victor y simultaneously with th e frustration s cause d b y th e disintegratio n o f thei r wartime co-operation, sensed the magnitud e of the task . History would condemn a false step, accuse them of sterility, or indict the m for setting the world on the wrong path. Indeed many analysts of the tragedie s of the interwar years base their mansion of logic on the single premise of the frailties of the 1919 peace settlement. The policy-makers sought new formulae t o avoid the egregious errors of the past, to surmount current problems, to set the world on a peaceful course, and to secure their place in history. Yet, curiously but understandably , these were sanguine years; to Lord Curzon, soon to become British foreign sec retary and citing the Hellas chorus to the House of Lords, the golden age would return. Military success combined with diplomati c inge nuity would induce reconstruction. While th e Secon d World Wa r le d t o th e creatio n of the Unite d

i PREFAC E Nations, eventuall y to the Nort h Atlantic Treaty Organisatio n an d other international systems, the first great conflict bred or accelerated the birth o f the Leagu e o f Nations and various ephemeral concept s and schemes. Less frail than most, although for lengthy periods seeming to survive in absentia, was the theme of Atlanticism, rooted deeply enough i n th e pre-191 4 er a an d ye t frequentl y obscured b y mor e dramatic theses. Under the impact o f the entry of the Unite d State s into the war i n April 1917 an d despit e th e legac y o f deeply-felt fissures in Anglo-American relations create d b y such problems as that of th e blockade , Atlanticis m too k o n greate r attractio n an d eve n fascination for a section of the elite of the British empire. These seemingly inspired men were the Atianticists and they viewed the futur e of world peace an d civilisin g progress a s intimately bound u p wit h the sustaine d co-operatio n o f th e Britis h empir e an d th e Unite d States. In the eyes of the most optimistic, Atlanticism was a panacea for al l problems; others , however, were more cynical an d eve n antagonistic. In a comple x yet logica l fashio n th e Atianticists , afte r frequen t disappointments an d even disillusionment, turned to Pacific and Fa r Eastern problems. Specifically, the question of whether or not to renew th e Anglo-Japanes e alliance , whic h raise d th e vita l issue s of imperial defenc e and the empire' s relation s wit h the Unite d States , provided bot h th e vehicl e an d th e tes t case . Anglo-America n cooperation might be forged, the Atianticists felt, out of the debates on the futur e o f the twenty-year-ol d alliance. Thei r hopes wer e raise d by the Imperia l Conferenc e held i n London in the summe r of 192 1 and b y th e Washingto n Conference , deliberatin g fro m Novembe r 1921 t o February 1922 , onl y to b e disappointe d b y subsequen t de velopments in 1922 and beyond. Optimism in fact ha d bred illusio n and resulted virtually in despair. Apostacy was then possible . The three North Atlantic powers, Canada, Great Britain, and th e United States , alon g with th e othe r dominions , participated a t th e centre of this debate. Atlanticism quite naturally was their preserve . This study, abstaining from lengthy observations on domestic politics, is of those members of the elite s wh o helped formulat e the foreig n policies of the North Atlantic powers. Based primarily on official an d private archives in London, Ottawa, and Washington, it attempts to investigate th e fortune s of Atlanticism in the immediat e postbellum period up to 1922.

Acknowledgments A North Atlantic Treaty Organisation fellowship enabled me to complete this study . I a m als o gratefu l fo r suppor t fro m th e Researc h and Publication Fun d o f Carleton University and for a grant in ai d of publication fro m th e Socia l Scienc e Research Council o f Canada, using funds provided by the Canada Council. Anyone familia r wit h hi s wor k will appreciat e m y debt t o D.C . Watt, reader i n international histor y a t th e Londo n Schoo l of Economics. Ove r a longer period , I a m one of those students fortunat e enough to have received th e assistanc e an d encouragemen t o f Professor W.N. Medlicott, former holder of the Stevenson Chair of International Histor y an d no w senio r edito r o f Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. Professor Roger Graham, of Queen's University, gav e me help an d guidance , an d D.M.L . Farr, professor of history and dean of arts at Carleton University, provided continuou s support. The staffs o f th e Publi c Recor d Office , th e Hritis h Museum , th e Birmingham Universit y library, th e Scottis h Recor d Office , Queen' s University library , th e Publi c Archive s o f Canada , th e Librar y o f Congress, th e Massachusett s Historica l Association , th e Houghto n Library a t Harvard , th e Burto n Historica l Divisio n o f th e Detroi t Public Library, an d especially o f the Beaverbrook Memorial Library were unfailingly helpful. I am indebted to them all in varying degrees. I als o appreciat e th e assistanc e o f m y typists , M . Clar k an d H . Zourdoumis. I am grateful for permission to use and to quote from the following sources: th e Beaverbroo k Newspaper s Lt d fo r th e Lloy d Georg e

xii ACKNOWLEDGMENT S

Papers; the Controlle r of HMS O for crown copyright material i n th e Public Recor d Office ; th e Trustee s o f th e Britis h Museu m for th e Balfour Papers ; an d Professo r A.K.S. Lambto n an d Franci s Noel Baker for the Cecil Papers.

M.G. FRY Ottawa 1970

ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y

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ONE

The Atlanticists Prospects and Problems 1919-21 As the great war drew to a close in the fall of 1918 an d the dream of victory over the Centra l Powers became a sudden reality, th e allie d leaders sough t t o ensur e tha t ingeniou s diplomac y woul d consum mate militar y achievement. The democrati c powers , shor n of ideo logically embarrassin g allies, coul d delud e themselve s int o thinkin g that the y ha d reache d th e pinnacl e o f succes s an d the y sough t t o seize the opportunitie s apparentl y created . The y mus t mak e peace with German y and he r satellites , settl e European , Middl e Eastern , and even Far Eastern frontiers, begin to resurrect the world economy, and provide global security. In broa d term s thi s giganti c tas k presented itsel f i n tripl e form . First, and traditionally, France , Italy, th e members of the emergin g British commonwealth, the United States, and Japan would demand that their national interests, legitimate , justifiable, moral, and defen sive be met. Clemenceau must seek a new order in the Rhineland and in Easter n Europ e an d ensur e France' s economi c an d financia l re habilitation, an d Orland o must attempt t o secure for Italy extende d frontiers, contro l of the Adriatic , and ne w influence i n Nort h Afric a and Asia Minor. Lloyd George must ensure the destruction of German naval an d colonia l powe r an d resurrec t Britain' s worl d economi c position, whil e th e dominion s sought t o confir m thei r authorit y i n Africa, in the Pacific, and in the Atlantic. President Woodrow Wilson must defeat proposals which threatened his perception o f world order and at the same time strengthen America's commercial, financial, and maritime position . H e would , therefore , deprecat e eithe r Japanes e attempts to consolidate her position in the northwest Pacific, in Shantung, and in Manchuria or the renewal of commercial imperialism by the European powers.

4 ILLUSION S O F SECURIT Y The secon d dimensio n of th e proble m o f peacemaking aros e be cause of the singl e fact o f the Bolshevi k seizure of power in Russia which enveloped an d impregnated those material issues.1 The global threat of Bolshevism had emerged and although the democratic elite differed i n their assessment both of the nature of the problem an d on what would be the mos t efficacious solution , they sensed its signifi cance and felt the magnitude and urgency of the threat. I n London no one surpassed Winston Churchill, soon to inherit the War Office , and Si r Maurice Hankey , hea d o f th e cabine t secretariat , i n thei r concern.2 Political leader s looke d for sign s of domestic malaise an d internationally the y feare d a ne w terror . Dangerou s force s wer e abroad, men sought inspiration across national frontiers, and liberal democracy seeme d t o som e degree vulnerabl e despit e th e victor y over Germa n militarism. Perhap s th e war' s tota l rhythm s had un leashed irresistibl e socia l an d politica l force s whic h woul d swee p across Europe. This was the grea t dilemma, for if victory was not to be a cruel illusion the allies must find an answer, whether economic , political, or military, which was an expression of the combine d wil l of a league o f ideologically acceptabl e powers . Indeed, narrow na tional interests migh t be forfeited consciousl y to meet this challeng e from Bolshevik Russia, for what value was the left bank of the Rhine to France i f communism overtook Germany or a formidable RussoGerman combination emerged ; and what if Japan joined Russia and Germany in a menacing tríplice? The victorious allies were also imperial powers and in their mids t stood Japan, China, and India, symbols of the third dimension of the overall problem. The war had ushered in a new phase in the history of imperialism , th e slogan s an d rallyin g crie s o f liberal-democrac y were no t applicabl e exclusivel y t o Anglo-Saxo n communities , and , however mute d an d incipient , equality , justice , an d nationa l self determination were phrases with appeal in Afro-Asia. Japan's demand that the Allies insert a statement on racial equality into the preambl e of th e Covenan t o f th e Leagu e o f Nation s wa s neithe r a n empt y gesture no r a mere tactica l move . The deman d was both rea l and symbolic, sounding the challeng e to all facets of imperialism an d t o IFor the various dimensions of this problem, see Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking, Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism and the Versailles Peace, and Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War. 2 Fry, 'Britain, the Allies and die Problem of Russia'; Hankey memoranda, 19 March 1919, Ca b 1/27, an d 17 July 1919, Ca b 21/159

5 TH E ATLANTICIST S parts of the ver y foundations of western society . Consequently , de votees of the emergin g British commonwealth could envisag e one of its primary goals as that of building a bridge between East and West and of reducing racial divisions lest they become irrevocable. A t the same tim e man y fel t th e nee d t o creat e th e unit y an d confir m th e prestige of the Anglo-Saxon powers. In term s of broad principles o f policy, where did solution s appar ently lie? How could the peacemakers serve immediate national interests in Europe and the Middle East primarily, meet the challenge of communism, an d creat e th e basi s of a new rapport wit h non-whit e peoples? Orthodo x realist opinio n i n Franc e an d Britain , a s repre sented by Clemenceau an d Curzon, sought the answer in traditiona l concepts associate d with military alliances, naval hegemony, and the balance o f power. Russia' s defectio n complicate d th e situatio n bu t the realists sough t to preserve th e wartim e coalition, reinterpre t its function, an d frame it in precise political terms . After all, such traditional methods had saved France and Europe. They were proven and vindicated, the y demanded sustained allied co-operation , a reduced Germany, selective disarmament, a reorganised Eastern Europe, and, to counter both Germany and Bolshevik Russia, a strategic and ideological cordon-sanitaire. The degree of hostility toward and the extent of acceptance of an accommodation with Germany and Russi a would be expresse d through variable s suc h a s the establishmen t or no t of de facto diplomati c relation s an d th e continuatio n o r termination of the economic blockade. In contras t t o thos e wh o advocate d traditiona l solution s stoo d those, primaril y i n th e Unite d State s an d th e Britis h empire , wh o sought a powerful League of Nations. This concer t would constitut e a set of regulations and directive s t o govern the conduc t of interna tional affairs which would render obsolete much of the old diplomacy and be a n expression of democratic statecraft. Onl y when these re vised rule s governin g internationa l relation s wer e operative , the y argued, would the world experience peace and justice. Other members of the western elite, having discounted preventiv e war an d militar y roll-back , sa w salvatio n i n par t throug h change s within Russi a itself . The y hope d tha t th e Bolshevi k governmen t would moderate its attitudes quit e rapidl y an d return to sanity an d decency, aide d by commercial, cultural, an d political contacts . The n a ne w Russia , federal an d liberalised , woul d emerg e cleanse d an d ready to play a stabilising role in European and world affairs . Finally, in Britain, the dominions, and in the United States, Allan -

6 ILLUSION S O F SECURIT Y tícists advocated tibeir solution, urging that the key to peace lay in the creation of a global hegemony enjoyed b y the United States and th e British empire, expressed in maritime and financial terms.3 The Atlantic Powers, aided by the dominions, would police the seas, help pacify Europe, th e Middl e East, and Asia , stimulat e economic reconstruction, wield th e powers of trusteeship, an d provide moral and philo sophical leadership . In sum , Atlanticism meant drawing the Unite d States int o sustaine d an d complet e co-operatio n wit h th e Britis h empire as a panacea for the world's ills. Who were th e Atlanticists , o n what assumption s was their cred o based, an d wh y had the y an y ground s for optimis m in th e fac e of alternative propositions an d even fierce criticism? Although Atlanticist sentiments were expressed publicly by many who held high offic e throughout the world war, oratory, especially in the flush of victory, was an inadequate guide . Who could dismis s or discount with confidence the seemingly momentous potential of intimate rapport with the United States? The process of identifying the Atlanticists among the British and dominion statesmen must emerge from a study of the postures adopte d i n the Britis h an d th e Imperia l Wa r Cabinets , i n British Empir e Delegatio n deliberations , an d i n othe r intergovern mental an d privat e exchange s o n relevan t issues . Thei r differin g motives should permit the historia n t o mak e general classifications and to note further important distinction s on the basis of dedication to the Atlantícist thesis. One must also note the criticisms levelled a t the advocates of Anglo-American co-operation by proponents of alternative courses of action, in order to weigh the strength and credibility of the Atlanticist s and to assess their prospects of success in postwar policy reviews. Three group s ar e identifiabl e withi n th e Britis h an d dominio n elites: the Atlanticists with varying and usually diminishing degrees of dedication; the sceptics, whose disillusionment bred cynicism ; and those who became frankly hostile. The levels of devotion among the Atlanticists tende d t o fluctuate more severely than those among the other tw o factions, bu t actua l movemen t between th e group s was rare. However, the profound sceptic could adopt a more hostile attitude o n occasions , thos e wh o wer e hostil e coul d appea r t o hav e moments of conversion, and the dedicated could justifiably lapse into 3 This study will view Atlanticism primarily from the standpoint of Britain and her dominions, although an investigation of Atianticist elements within the United States is obviously needed.

7 TH E ATLANTICIST S despair. Unquestionin g Atlanticists, embodying the traits o f the convert, wer e rare , fo r th e legacie s o f America' s prolonge d perio d of neutrality durin g the war, reinforced by postwar friction over naval, financial, and commercial problems, placed a severe and even intolerable burden on Atlanticist loyalties. Indeed, over certain issues Atlanticism seemed to survive despite the absence of Atlanticists . Within th e rank s of the Atlanticist s stoo d groups , identifiabl e b y the varied emphases in their motives , although certai n stimul i wer e common to many of them. Edward Gre y and Lord Haldane, respec tively foreign secretary until December 1916 and lord chancellor unti l May 1915 , but stil l participatin g marginall y i n th e relevan t polic y debates o f 1919 , H.A.L. Fisher , ministe r o f educatio n an d a successor in part to C.P. Scott as the custodian o f Lloyd George's liberal conscience, an d G.N . Barnes, Labour' s renegad e representativ e i n Lloyd George' s coalition , stood , o n som e questions , close r t o th e liberal-radical-left oppositio n tha n to the coalitio n Liberals , Conser vatives, an d apolitica l adventurer s aroun d Lloy d George. 4 The y were Atlanticists because they subscribed to an interpretation o f the historical realitie s o f th e precedin g quarter-centur y whic h insiste d that the growth of American power was a complementary rather than a competitiv e factor . Moreover , they wer e attracte d b y th e radica l idealism which viewed the Unite d States a s a model of political organisation, socia l harmony, and economic progress and because the y identified wit h the ideal s o f the Wilsonia n peace programm e a s expounded b y Presiden t Wilson' s confidant , Colonel House . Indeed , Wilson embodie d a n Anglo-America n radical-liberal programm e of war aims which seemed to offer plausible guideline s for internationa l behaviour and prospects for order, justice, and disarmament. Edward House provided a significant link, especially fo r Grey, who regarde d their persona l friendship a s an expressio n of the commo n aims an d 4 Grey, note, May 1917, Balfour Papers, 49738; Curzon to Lloyd George, 30 July and 6 Aug. 1919, Lloyd George Papers, F/12/1/30 an d 35; Fishe r Papers and Ogg, Fisher, 89, 95, 111-12. Whe n discussing policy issues, prior to his accepting the special mission to Washington in 1919, Grey stressed how, before 1914, the Liberal government had unanimously agreed never to build naval forces against the United States. This decision recognised that the United States could always outbuild Britain in a race and that Britain must never risk war with her. Grey urged Lloyd George to remain true to this policy and never to allow false prophets to replace the old German menace with a supposed threat from the United States.

8 ILLUSION S O F SECURIT Y ideals of the tw o democracies. Grey, although ousted with Asquith, was therefor e willin g t o represen t Lloy d George' s governmen t i n Washington in 191 7 an d agai n in 1919 . Moreover , Grey, as early as 1916, ha d realistically viewed the creation of a League of Nations as a function of Atlanticism. In his view Britain must adopt the idea of a League both as a war measure to help draw the United States into the allie d fol d an d a s a metho d decisivel y t o influenc e th e peace . Anglo-American co-operation became, to Grey, vital during the war, a prerequisite o f a just settlement, and, in full circle, fundamental to the health of the future Leagu e itself. Barnes, for his part, had been prominent i n th e leftwin g Leagu e t o Abolis h War an d ha d bee n Robert Cecil's only constant ally in the pre-armistice debates of the War Cabine t o n th e questio n o f th e Leagu e o f Nations . Both ha d earned the contempt of the Foreign Office , th e service departments, and many of their cabinet colleagues." Robert Cecil, most effective i n the wartim e Foreign Offic e an d i n control of blockade matters, head of the League of Nations section of the Britis h delegation a t Pari s and a member of the Suprem e Economic Council , an d Genera l Jan Smuts , most influential of th e do minion leaders, were Atlanticists by acceptance of historical realities, but principall y becaus e of their concern for the Leagu e of Nations. Anglo-American co-operatio n wa s th e pivo t o n whic h th e Leagu e would turn and conversely the demise of Atlantic harmony would be the roc k on which the Leagu e woul d founder. Cecil ha d bee n th e most prominent supporter of the League idea in official circle s since September 1916 . Wit h Smut s he enjoye d significan t discretionar y scope a t th e Peac e Conferenc e to handle the relevan t negotiation s and, co-operating more closely with President Wilson than with Lloyd George, Cecil had used his powers more effectively tha n wisely. The Covenant wa s a n Anglo-America n compromise, born o f Ceci l an d Wilson, but no t on e which satisfie d Cecil' s principa l colleague s o r Lloyd George.8 In turn Cecil could not but regard the Premier, whose indifference and preoccupation elsewhere ironically had in part resulted in Cecil's discretionary power s at th e Peac e Conference, as a menace to th e League and t o Anglo-American accord. Cecil's devotion t o Atlanticism faltered over only one issue, that of naval competition, an d h e warned House at the Peace Conference that he would spend his last 5 Imperial War Cabinet debates 1 3 Aug. and 2 Oct 1918 , Ca b 23/7 an d 8 ORaffo, 'Robert Cecil and the League of Nations'

9 TH E ATLANTICIST S shilling t o perpetuat e Britain' s nava l authority . I n contrast , Lloy d George seeme d obsesse d wit h tactica l manoeuvring and indifferen t to fundamental principles o f policy. Cecil was convinced that his own approach wa s no t onl y morally soun d an d represente d th e bes t of British opinion but als o the most realistic, a s Britain needed th e support of the United State s far more than the reverse. Attempts to impose terms on President Wilso n or to complete tactical deals amount ing to blackmail, suc h a s Lloyd Georg e ha d determine d o n durin g the momentous weekend at Fontainebleau betwee n 22 and 26 March 1919 t o secure a naval agreement, were both foolish and dangerous . In view of the resulting Anglo-American naval battle o f Paris, Cecil' s criticisms ca n hardl y b e dismisse d and , considering th e apparen t power disparities, neithe r can one reject Cecil's view that the Unite d States had followed Britain's lead to a surprising degree at the Peace Conference. Thi s development , Ceci l felt , showe d tha t Britai n re tained th e mora l leadership an d tha t he r greates t asset , typifie d i n Grey, wa s still he r reputatio n fo r justice , magnanimity, and gener osity. Full and frank co-operatio n betwee n Londo n and Washingto n and a process of mutual commitment above all to the League woul d ensure sustained harmony between the Atlantic Powers and were, in Cecil's opinion, the pillars on which to base world peace.7 Smuts could als o qualif y a s an Atlanticist in part becaus e h e re garded the empire, based o n the freedom an d equality of all participant states, as the only successful experiment in international govern ment an d a s a 'polity of many sovereignties an d man y cultures.' I n his search for a solution to international anarchy , Smuts came to regard th e empir e a s the embry o of th e Leagu e whic h itsel f woul d bring a new degree of co-operation betwee n Britain , th e dominions , and th e Unite d States. 8 Befor e an d durin g th e Peac e Conference , Smuts's position had not been free fro m embarrassmen t fo r he coul d not tolerate, eve n from the United States, opposition t o South Africa's territorial claims on South West Africa. Moreover, although he agree d that Britai n mus t encourag e America n internationa l involvement , Smuts preferred to divert and restrict that involvement to the Middle East or even t o a development boar d fo r tropical Africa . However , 7 Cecil to Smuts, 4 Dec. 1918, Cecil to Lloyd George, 27 May 1919, Cecil Papers, 51076; Cecil to Balfour, 5 April 1919, Cecil to House, 8 and 10 April 1919, ibid., 51094; Cecil to Drummond, 7 Oct. 1918, Balfour Papers, 49738; Cecil, AH The Way, Cecil, A Great Experiment, i, 356 8 Hancock, Smuts, i, 429-67,491-523 and Smuts, n, 17,37-8,129-30

10 ILLUSIONS OF SECURIT Y his admiration fo r President Wilso n an d hi s personal rappor t wit h other leadin g Americans such as Bernard Baruch reinforced Smuts's belief tha t Atlanticism would counte r American isolationism, which in turn persisted a s the chie f obstacl e t o European recover y and t o the success of the League. Moreover, Smuts seemed utterly disillusioned with France in particular and with European entanglements in general, and Atlanticism was an avenue of escape or withdrawal fro m Europe . At the en d of die war Smuts regarded internationa l politic s a s a tripartite syste m involving France, the British empire, an d the United States, and he advocated without reservation that the empire proceed i n close harmony with America . Smuts denounced France a s a ba d neighbou r historically, unti l thrashed by Germany in 1870, a s likely to revert to her old arrogant diplomacy , as seeking to reduce Germany and be come the mistress of Europe, and a s an ambitious, militant, an d un scrupulous imperialist power . Britai n had, in Smuts's opinion, bee n excessively generous to France eve n to the point of stupidity in th e Middle East, an d only Anglo-American pressure could remove such iniquities. Britain must join with the Unite d States, i n s o far a s cooperation was consistent with the empire's interests, an d link the two great democrati c 'Commonwealths,' tied by language, interests, an d ideals, in the pursuit of a common destiny. Whether Smuts looked to imperial securit y in the Pacific, t o the Middl e East, or to the threa t of a revival of European militarism, the United States seemed the key consideration, and , therefore , 'Al l fundamenta l consideration s o f policy poin t t o ou r having to co-operat e wit h th e Unite d State s i n future world politics.'9 The point of departure was obvious to Smuts and i t als o complete d th e circle : Britai n mus t suppor t Wilson' s League a s the 'reversionary ' of the destroye d European empires , a s the ne w foundation for European stability , a s the solven t o f globa l problems, an d as a check on all vindictive powers . I n thi s wa y th e empire, th e Unite d States , an d th e League , i n splendi d harmony , would bring salvation . Next to Smuts stood the Canadian prime minister and Conservative party leader, Sir Robert Borden, his successor Arthur Meighen, and their principal aide in foreign affairs, Loring C. Christie, legal adviser in the Department of External Affairs. The y were Atianticists at th e same time as being nationalists, anglophiles, an d devotees of a matur9 Smuts to Cecil, 3 Dec. 1918 , an d Smuts memorandum, 'Our policy at the Peace conference,' 3 Dec. 1918, Ceci l Papers, 51076

11 THE ATLANTICIST S ing commonwealt h relationship, because th e vita l considerations of Canadian and imperial policy seemed realistically t o permit no other posture.10 Whatever dissentin g voice s i n othe r part s of the countr y might think , Borden, viewin g the situatio n fro m Ottawa , coul d no t but advocate the closest possible relations between the British empire and th e Unite d States . Th e Canadia n government , consumin g th e security provided by the Monroe Doctrine and British sea power, and tending toward postwar isolationism, sought the most economical and satisfying policy . In an Atlantic entente, Canad a could play her role of persuasion in the formulation of British empire policy and function as a junior but vital partner in the North Atlantic Triangle. Thi s was the summit of her expectations. Whe n Borden argued tha t al l other considerations wer e secondary to those concerning the United States and th e Britis h empire , h e advance d th e Atlanticis t argumen t bu t little; when , however , h e asserte d wit h convictio n tha t America n isolationism was in decline and that the anticipated degre e of American internationa l involvemen t wa s sufficien t t o for m th e basi s o n which to secure peace, he broke vital ground . This latte r view was the singular premis e basic to the whole Atlanticist structure , an d of course the premise proved to be unsound. While realism and yet excessive optimis m wer e abundantl y i n evidenc e i n Ottawa , Borde n could als o talk freely o f a common ancestry, language, and culture , of Canad a sharin g th e sam e democratic ideal s as Great Britai n an d the Unite d States , an d o f enjoying simila r political institutions . Fo r Borden an d thos e politically vigorou s sections of Canadia n opinio n who thought a s he did , to work for a league o f the grea t English speaking communitie s was , therefore, natural , enlightened , an d morally responsible. Linked symbolicall y an d intellectuall y wit h th e Sout h Africa n 10 Borden, Meighen, and King Papers, records of the Imperial Wa r Cabinet, th e British Empire Delegations, and the Imperial Conferences, 1917-22, Cab. 23, 29, 30, 32; Borden, éd., Robert Laird Borden, 2 vols.; Graham, Meighen, 2 vols.; Wallace, Memoirs of Sir George Foster. Detailed reference s fro m thes e sources are in Fry, 'Anglo-American-Canadian Relations.' Christie, a product of Acadia and the Harvard Law School, a Canadian nationalist with strong American affiliations, earned the reputation of the brilliant young man and rapidly became the acknowledge d expert on foreign policy . Confiden t an d hard working, he possessed ideas, judgment, an d a fluent pen , and accom panied Borde n and the n Meighe n from th e session s of the Imperia l Wa r Cabinet in 1917 to the Washington Conference in 1921-22.

12 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y leader were Phili p Kerr , Lloyd George' s principa l privat e secretar y handling foreig n affairs unti l May 1921, Edward Grigg , Kerr' s successor and secretary of the Rhodes Trust, and their mentor and patron, Lord Milner , minister o f war until th e armistice , colonia l secretar y until his resignation i n March 1921, and senior Rhodes Trustee fro m 1917. Thes e elite publicists or illuminati, virtually apolitica l i n terms of party machinery and loyalties, were Atlanticists because all things imperial wer e thei r intellectua l mea t and drink. 11 Their milie u was the Round Table grou p in London, and their closest associates were Lionel Curtis, dubbed 'the Prophet,' fertile and productive but erratic , and a n adviser t o the Britis h delegatio n a t Paris ; R.H . Brand, F.S. Oliver, L. Hichens, Waldorf Astor, also a member of Lloyd George' s secretariat; an d G . Dawson. Thes e me n o f th e Roun d Table wer e neither a homogeneous group slavishly tied to Milner, nor an uncomplicated conspirac y le d by the proconsul . The y shared , however , a radical, idealistic , moralisti c vie w o f th e empire , the y possesse d a deep faith in the emergin g commonwealth , they were Anglo-Saxon racists an d elitists bu t accepte d a missionary obligation t o raise the lesser races to new heights of civilisation, and they remained devote d to their mentor. Because of the change d circumstances produced b y the war, such as th e defea t o f Germany , the threa t o f Bolshevism , the maturin g of dominio n nationalism , an d problem s associate d wit h th e thir d world an d imperia l defence , th e Roun d Tabl e movemen t faced a new era. In term s of their imperia l preoccupation s sinc e 191 0 they were floundering or awaiting introspectiv e an d reorientativ e study, but th e principal member s in London were heavily involve d i n the service o f government , business , finance , an d th e press . Ker r an d Curtis were no less fertile or confident, no less committed to imperial union and to a commonwealth based on the rule of law, order, good 11 Milner, Lothian, Grigg , and Garví n papers; Gollin, Proconsul in Politics, 17, 18,45,48,123-32,164-7; Wrench, Milner, 329-32,354-5; Milner to Lloyd George, 9 June 1918, Lloyd George Papers, F/38/3/37; Butler, Lothian; and Smith, 'Lord Lothian and British Foreign Policy.' Kerr had been editor of the Round Table until December 1916, many of this group were active in the Rhodes Trust and the English-Speaking Union, and Curtis became deeply involved in the Royal Institute of International Affairs from 1920. Cecil had established some rapport with the Round Table group in 1910 and L.S. Amery, though a party political animal and qualifying as a sceptic, had enjoyed quite close links with them.

13 THE ATLANTICISTS

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15 THE ATLANTICIST S government, an d freedom , bu t broade r problem s i n internationa l affairs, th e League , an d Anglo-America n relations no w confronted them. Milner was a tiring giant even as early as the spring of 1917 an d lost influence perceptibly after the armistice, despit e his contributio n to the creation of the mandate system. Even Kerr declined somewha t in importance towards the end of 1920. But they enjoyed a significant period whe n they were rarely far fro m Lloy d Georg e an d th e vita l policy debates . Kerr and his associates tended to view Lloyd George as a dynamic force, wh o brought almos t tota l fluidit y t o politic s an d woul d b e susceptible t o their influence. The Premier's lac k of intellectual com mitment the y regarde d a s a n asse t i n thei r favou r an d the y wer e confident the y could defeat any competition for his mind. However , Lloyd George' s ver y dynamis m created th e dange r tha t h e woul d break free from their influence. Arthur Balfour , wh o vacate d th e Foreig n Offic e i n Octobe r 191 9 but continued to enjoy influence and high position, was the outstanding representative o f the Conservativ e Pan Anglo-Saxons , long convinced emotionall y an d intellectually , a convictio n reinforce d b y realism, of the common heritage an d the joint future o f the English speaking peoples. 12 The Pan Anglo-Saxons and the imperialists ha d much in common and both welcome d th e radica l idealis t wh o had viewed the United States since the nineteenth century as a model of political virtue . Whethe r Balfou r was writing t o hi s friend s i n th e Republican party in the early years of the century, speculating at the height of the world war, or eulogising as vice-president o f the AngloAmerican Society and as the British empire president of the EnglishSpeaking Union, he lingered on the community of ideals and character and the joint mission enjoyed and inherited by the co-heirs of AngloSaxon civilisation. To Balfour, Anglo-American co-operation was not a mer e temporar y o r tactica l expedien t bu t a fundamenta l polic y 12 Balfour to J. Chaote, 1 June 1905, Balfour Papers, 49742; Balfour to Putnam, 27 Dec. 1917, ibid, 49865; Balfour to Cecil, 8 Oct. 1918, ibid. , 49738; Balfour to Lord Weardale, 1919, ibid. , 49749; Balfou r to Bryce, 15 Aug. 1919, ibid., 49749; Balfour memorandum, GT 1138, 2 2 June 1917, 'Futur e Naval construction in the Unite d States,' ibid, 49699; Balfou r t o Si r G. Trevelyan, 2 Jan. 1917 , FO/800/211 ; Balfour t o House, 5 July 1917, FO/800/209 ; Balfou r to Lloyd George, 29 Nov. 1918, Fo/800/199; Young, Balfour, 388,419 ; Dugdale, Balfour, i, 226-31; n, 203-12,300-3. Balfour was a close friend of Joseph Chaote and knew H.C. Lodge, H. White, and N.M. Butler.

16 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y contributing to an ultimate goal. It followed that war between Britain and the Unite d State s would be civi l war. To some degree Balfou r had shared the concern of Cecil and Smuts at the Peace Conference that Lloyd George's willingness and determination to co-operate with Wilson would waver, and he denounced as insane any attempt to side with the greedy and inflated French against the Americans. Yet while Balfour advocated the policy of encouraging United States participation in the League of Nations and in the troubled areas of the postwar world, he gave surprisingly little support to Cecil in the cabinet discussions and stood closer to Lloyd George than to Cecil and President Wilson o n th e questio n o f th e natur e an d exten t o f th e League' s powers. Moreover , although Balfour ha d bee n the principa l British negotiator i n th e 191 7 attemp t t o secur e a defensiv e treat y an d a naval agreement with the United States, his devotion to Atlanticism was also tempered by a determination to retain Britain's treaty links with Japan, perhaps i n a triple alliance, an d to ensure that Britain, while avoidin g a n arm s race , woul d no t fal l behin d Japa n o r th e United State s in postwar naval power. Balfou r neve r deviated fro m his position on these two questions and , in the brie f perio d o f postwar disillusionment, one might even see Balfour lapsin g into scepticism. And yet he typified those who could still view Anglo-American relations in terms of a partnership o f strength between equals rather than a relationship i n which the United States would bring aid to a wounded and venerable empire. With Balfou r wer e lesse r me n politically, includin g Lor d Le e of Fareham, friend of Theodore Roosevelt, married to an American, one time professo r a t th e Roya l Military College o f Canada , and risin g with Lloyd George to become first lord of the Admiralty in February 1921.13 On most matters Lee was a cypher, owing all to Lloyd George, but on questions relating to the United States he claimed special understanding and paraded his Republican connections, even his visits to the ver y nursery of Co L Theodor e Roosevel t jr, Edwi n Denby' s assistant in the Navy Department during the Harding administration. Lee, tolerating no professional naval speculation on the possibility of war with the Unite d States, an d speakin g of close Anglo-American relations a s a functio n o f civilisation , threatene d t o rejec t Lloy d George's offe r o f the Admiralt y unless the governmen t intended t o 13 Lee to Lloyd George, 10 Feb., 19 March, and 1 6 July 1921, Lloy d George Papers F/31/2/50, 52 and 61; Young, Powerful America, 48-52; and Fry, 'Anglo-American-Canadian Relations,' 347-51, 358

17 THE ATLANTICIST S seek an armaments agreement with Washington. Lee dismissed Ambassador Aukland Geddes's reports as the product of an overwrought, ill-informed, an d panicky mind and he offere d t o go to Washingto n and re-open the negotiations. A naval race with the United States Lee denounced as ruinous, insane, and criminal, but, conscious of imperial security, eve n he agreed wit h the decisio n to lay down four capita l ships in 1921 in order to avoid qualitative inferiority to Japan and the United States by 1925, and to enable Britain to negotiate from a position of strength. His support, however, was conditional on an attempt being mad e to resume negotiations wit h the Unite d States , an d h e did not regard the replacement of obsolete ships as a breach of Atlantic co-operation . Significantly , Lee had extensiv e persona l contact s with the Unite d States; Balfour, aide d b y Lord Reading, lord chief justice and ambassador to the United States, and by Sir William Wiseman, wartim e hea d o f Britis h Intelligenc e i n th e Unite d States, 14 handled man y of the negotiations wit h President Wilson ; and , with the exceptio n o f Phili p Kerr , the y wer e th e bes t travelle d o f th e Atlanticists in terms of visits to America. Finally, o n specifi c issue s relevant t o thi s study , th e Atlanticist s received pragmati c an d empirica l suppor t fro m variou s sources. 15 King George v, on naval and Far Eastern matters, urged co-operatio n with th e Unite d States , an d th e Foreig n Offic e an d th e diplomati c service produced similar influences. Sir John Jordan, ambassado r to China and acknowledged Far Eastern expert; Sir Beilby Alston, Jordan's successor ; Si r Miles Lampson serving with Alsto n in Peking , Victor Wellesley , an d possibl y Si r William Tyrrel l a t th e Foreig n Office preached a policy of Anglo-American co-operation as a solution specifically to the problem of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and generally to a broad range of Asian questions, ofte n i n the fac e o f direc t criticism fro m thei r superiors . I n addition , official s a t th e Boar d of Trade reached similar conclusions and participated i n the policy review in opposition to the Admiralty and tibe War Office . The intellectual an d spiritual foundations of Atlanticism were ex14Balfour t o Wiseman, 2 4 Feb. 1919 , Balfou r Papers, 49741; Wfflert, The Road to Safety; Seymour , Intimate Papers of Colonel House, n, in, rv; Hyde, Reading, 213-41 15 Johnson, George Harvey, 323; Watt, Personalities and Policies, 13; Fry, 'Anglo-American-Canadian Relations,' 215; an d below, chap. 2. Alston's Atlanticism gre w and matured whereas Jordan could lapse into scepticism, but Wellesley seemed consistently dedicated.

18 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y pressed mos t articulatel y b y th e imperia l illuminati an d th e Pa n Anglo-Saxons. O f these , Phili p Kerr , reinforce d b y Lione l Curtis , provides the most appropriate example as an intimate of Lloyd George and as a person who deviated little on this question until his death.16 The future Lor d Lothian, his complicated an d sometime s bewilderingly inconsistent thought processes both illuminated and clouded by religious beliefs which changed from Roman Catholicism to Christian Science, worshipped a form o f government based on the rul e of law to protect civilisatio n an d ensur e peace. An y such form o f government depended for its success on individuals within the state upholding basic religious values, being obedient to conscience, and agreeing to subordinate thei r wills to a central authority, the fountain of law. Subordination mus t replace anarchica l competition , an d th e rul e of law must oust brute forc e an d ensur e mutual service, genera l hap piness, welfare, and justice. This thesis, which prevailed fo r any individual state, was equally relevant for a group of nations united in an imperial framework and for a global international system. Individuals, states, an d ultimatel y al l mankin d must observ e th e cod e s o that civilisation coul d prevail as the expressio n of Christian principles, of human love, of God's will, and of the reign of law. In sum, heaven on earth wa s attainable o r at leas t shoul d be pursued wit h dedicatio n and optimism. Such themes bear the unmistakable stamp of a missionary idealism which was relevant to the individual, the race, and the British empire. Whatever it s constitutiona l future , whethe r organi c union an d im perial federatio n ensued; whateve r relationship s emerge d betwee n the whit e and other races of the empire ; an d even though constitu tional reform languishe d and India and Ireland presented seemingl y intractable problems, the empire was the vital model for the future . The emergin g commonwealth , the greates t civilisin g forc e an d th e fullest expressio n of humane, efficient , an d democrati c government, bringing th e rul e of law to a broad an d heterogeneous grou p of nations an d race s whil e securin g commo n interest s an d denyin g n o separate rights, provided th e basi s fo r a worl d commonwealth . In sum, th e Britis h empir e offere d a n exampl e o f th e mos t elevated , Christian, an d hopefu l for m o f internationalism, before whic h eve n the Leagu e o f Nation s paled . Withi n thi s imperia l structur e th e English-speaking, white , advance d people s controlle d an d guide d the backward races toward higher values and ultimately self-govern 16 Smith, 'Lothian,' 69-76; Butler, Lothian, 234,253,316

19 THE ATLANTICIST S ment, and as the empire fulfilled thi s civilising role it became a free , enlightened, an d great association of nations.17 Once this mission was accomplished, th e 'spiritua l commonwealth ' o r worl d stat e shoul d emerge logicall y fro m th e Britis h commonwealth, be self-enforcin g and self-perpetuating, and bestow the blessings of peace on all mankind. To Kerr this was the imperialism of ideas and morality, religio n and empir e wer e one , an d afte r th e proces s o f self-indoctrinatio n came the phase of activism to convert others. The strong elements of idealism in Milner, and KBIT' S emphasis on the intangibl e rathe r tha n th e materia l benefit s o f imperialis m ar e undeniable. Othe r an d not always consistent themes emerged, however, when Kerr insisted that the civilising task of imperialism, which was th e hop e o f mankin d and th e embry o of utopia, wa s als o th e preserve o f th e whit e English-speakin g races . Th e missionar y wa s white and , indeed, a white elitist wh o alone possessed 'th e majestic governing art, ' scientific , orderly , an d comprehensive . Thes e elit e missionaries wer e enlightene d paternalists , detache d experts , and , morally and intellectually unassailable , they alone could guid e politicians and peoples. Politics, race, and culture were thus inextricably interwoven. Kerr asserted that the process of civilisation which would eventually elevate the non-white races to new heights of achievement was not that of compromise between cultura l concepts , but th e dis semination o f superio r Anglo-Saxo n politica l an d spiritua l ideals . Clearly, therefore , th e cultura l heritag e o f th e Anglo-Saxon s demanded that they take up the task and shoulder the supreme burden. Kerr's frailtie s an d arroganc e ar e undeniabl e an d example s i n hi s writings abound: I think it is true that there has never yet been a successful democracy outside the Christian World , an d that the most successful ones have been predominantly Protestant . Democracy i s much mor e tha n a question of political machinery. I t requires a n intelligent, educated electorate , a con siderable degre e o f public spirit, an interest in public affairs i n the people, and a readiness to understand, support, and fight, sometimes physically, for th e right - fo r law and for freedom, a s against corruption , oppressio n and lawlessness. Th e whole story of democracy i s one of struggle an d 17 Milner, in the kte stage s of the war, urged Lloyd George to send Smuts to the United States to demonstrate Britain's dedication to the liberty and freedom of young nations, and as an object lesson of how the empir e promoted the exten sion of self-determination and democracy ( Milner to Lloyd George, 21 Oct. 1918, Lloy d George Papers, F/38/4/22 ).

20 ILLUSIONS OF SECURIT Y sacrifice for right ideas on the part of large numbers of people. I ofte n wonder whethe r the dominan t religion s of Asia — Mohammedanism, Hin duism, Buddhism, Confucianis m - are capable of giving to their adherents that energy, fidelity to the right, brotherhood, public spirit, and devotion to duty and the rule of law without whic h democrati c institutions simply give rise to a more subtle and veiled form of tyranny.18

These imperial illuminati tended to make a fictional utopia of the late nineteent h century , regardin g tha t perio d a s a golde n ag e of expanding democracy, growing prosperity, and peace under th e Pax Britannica. The world war, however, had brought new crises and the sadly constrained British empire, still lacking organic unity, could no longer stan d alone . Fortunately, however , even divinel y fashioned, the othe r grea t experimen t o f th e nineteent h century , th e Unite d States, stood ready to assist. As part o f the English-speakin g world, the United States shared the same language and spiritual values, an Anglo-Saxon cultura l heritag e flourished , and , a s Balfou r woul d agree, the United States experienced the same inspirational ideals. A broader English-speakin g union coul d emerg e and Britain , the do minions, and the United States, wielding vast resources and possessing moral fibre and a sense of common destiny, must co-operate t o police th e sea s an d restor e th e Pa x Britannica . Onl y a n Anglo American globa l hegemon y woul d secur e th e peac e an d induc e solutions to th e world' s problems , an d Britai n shoul d no t fea r th e growth of American power for that process was necessary, inevitable , and innocuous . Philip Kerr, 19 frequen t visitor t o th e Unite d State s from hi s youth and a t ease with Americans, would argue, as Milner before him,20 that while the empire was still Britain's destiny and her ISKerr, 'World Problems of Today,' in Kerr et al., Approaches to World Problems, 92-3 IQKerr, "The Harvest of the War'; Kerr, 'The Harvest of Victory'; and Kerr , "Walter Page'; Kerr, in discussing prospects for Anglo-American co-operation or even union, could range from loose co-operative schemes to the idea of an 'Amphictyonic Council.' 20 At the height of the military crisis in June 1918, Milne r saw salvation only in the closer co-operation between and the willingness to make the maximum sacrifice by Britain, the dominions, and the United States. He called for a gigantic effort o n the part of the 'only remaining free peoples of the world' to defeat th e bid for world hegemony by the Centra l Powers. President Wilson, as part of this effort, must drop his aloofness and co-belligerency, or 'whatever

21 THE ATLANTICIST S source of power an d prestige, sh e could no longer stand alone . Th e solution, intuitive, intellectually sound , and morally defensible, lay in the closest co-operatio n with the United States. None could deny the urgency an d magnitud e o f the problem s facin g th e postwa r worl d and, according t o Kerr, should Atlanticism fail then the only barrier to the triump h of irrational an d immoral ideologies woul d collapse , and heaven on earth would be lost forever. The fact that Müne r was never a n admire r o f Woodrow Wilson an d that Kerr described th e Fourteen Point s as mostly verbiage so as to calm Premier Hughes of Australia was not pivotal, for the tas k of civilising was not a part y political matte r an d th e problem s involve d i n securin g America n co-operation di d not deter the Atlanticists, even though Kerr himself was at times driven to soul-searching almost to the point of despair.21 What mattered most at the end of the war was that the United States, led by Wilson, seemed ready to accept broa d involvement and even commitment and she was demonstrably the most suitable an d attractive partner. If th e Atlanticists needed confirmation tha t the United States was the ideal partner fo r the British empire they found it in their faith in the histori c specia l relationshi p betwee n Britai n an d th e Unite d States.22 The Atlanticist could elevate thi s special relationship often in fine disregard o f such facts a s British appeasement o f the Unite d half way house he loved to shelter in.' Milner to Lloyd George, 9 June 1918, Lloyd George Papers, F/38/3/37 21 Kerr did not close his eyes to the dangers involved in the sustained forc e of American isolationism, nor did he ignore the various problems involved in securing American co-operation in the postwar world. He wrote in 1915, and his words were relevant in 1919, 'By breaking her long-established nationa l tradition and assuming common responsibilities fo r maintaining right an d justice throughout the world she can probably save the world from anothe r Armageddon. By clinging to the policy of isolation she can condemn mankind to another era of estrangement and war' ( Kerr, 'The Harvest of the War' ). In 1918 Ker r noted the problems involved in securing United States willingness to shoulder the burden, for the Americans had 'a childlike faith in the nature of democrac y and laisser-faire,' an d regarded paternal guidanc e of the back ward peoples a s 'iniquitous imperialism' ( Kerr to Curtis, Oct 1918 , Butler, Lothian, 68-9). Amery would have applauded such sentiments. 22 A recent attemp t t o analyse this phenomenon is Max Beloff, Th e Specia l Relationship: An Anglo-American Myth,' in Gilbert, éd. , A Century of Conflict, 151-71.

22 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y States begun by Lord Salisbur y and the fundamental divisions, principally ove r maritim e question s s o recently elevate d b y th e worl d war. The y seeme d abl e t o mas k deep-fel t antagonisms , disguis e serious differences by resorting to phrases in praise of racial similarities, an d dismis s divergencie s o f vie w an d eve n confrontation s a s errors an d aberration s o r merely American gaucheries. Afte r all , an Atlanticist coul d argue , th e Unite d State s ha d neithe r joine d an y European coalitio n hostil e t o Britai n no r courte d Britain' s imperia l enemies, an d Britai n ha d no t attempte d t o moun t a coalitio n t o offset th e rise of American power. Neither of them really threatene d the other's vital interests, a growing intimacy was natural, an d problems o f leadershi p an d powe r disparitie s wer e ephemeral . Indeed , one must assume that Londo n and Washingto n would walk in ste p and act in unison. Moreover, with patronising comfort , the Atlanticis t expected the American elite to recognise th e implicit value s and th e moral conten t o f British ideal s an d aims , to lear n fro m Britain , t o follow he r lead , not to ac t th e parvenu , an d t o overcom e any rash feelings o f irritation . I n addition , an d almos t withou t exception , Atlanticists tended to regard anglophobia i n the United States as the preserve o f th e lowe r classes , o f vulga r chauvinists , o f th e ill-bre d masses, and o f the raciall y divergent. 23 They would thu s lament on the result s o f misguided immigratio n law s an d ferventl y hope tha t Anglo-Saxon Americans would retain their authority. The sceptics in England als o tended t o accept this interpretation o f America's racial decline an d wer e les s sanguin e abou t th e future , whil e th e mor e hostile had alread y written of f America as beyond salvation . Embedded in the idealism and the sanguine themes of the specia l relationship wer e obviou s elements o f realis m a s Britain, burdene d with obligation s an d hampered b y overtaxe d resources, invite d th e United State s t o shar e th e responsibilitie s an d benefit s o f worl d leadership. At one level, and a viewpoint dear to American isolationists, the British invitation could be interpreted a s a crude attempt t o ensnare th e Unite d State s i n under-writin g Britain' s imperia l in 23Geddes to Curzon, 2 Dec. 1920, FO/371/4548. House, Geddes reported, had spoken of the struggl e of Anglo-Saxon Americans to retain power in th e fac e of 'undignifie d swarm s of immigrants' of a bad typ e who must be 'Ameri canised.' Tyrrell, at the Foreign Office, minute d that the Anglo-Saxon stock were a diminishing quantity, watered down by foreign elements, as the United States produced a new race essentially American and hardly Anglo-Saxon, and nationalist if not chauvinist. Curzon and Crowe did not dissent.

23 THE ATLANTICIST S terests. At its most elevate d th e proces s wa s moral leadership , de manding joint involvment in world affairs an d ultimately detachmen t and even escape when all was secure. Meanwhile, Britain's nationa l interests and those of her empire would be safeguarded in defiance of the dislocatio n produce d by the war. Disarmament and lower taxes would g o hand i n hand wit h peac e an d prosperity, Britis h an d do minion public opinion would enjoy ne w levels of emotional satisfac tion and economic prosperity, and the statesmen would receive thei r applause. In th e heat o f war an d unde r th e threa t o f a military collaps e in France in June 1918, Milner had advocated a new and closer relationship between the Atlantic powers and Japan.24 This proposal was not free fro m contradictio n althoug h i t might aid th e empir e in its task of forgin g link s betwee n th e world' s race s an d betwee n Eas t an d West. Milner' s proposa l wa s clearly , however , a temporar y an d emergency measure and hardly deviated from th e more fundamental proposition tha t Atlanticis m wa s the basi s o n which t o erec t worl d peace. The most revealing issu e and th e mos t appropriate entrée to th e critics o f Atlanticism, notwithstandin g th e fac t tha t i t range d Kerr , the Roun d Table group, an d Balfou r t o some degree agains t Cecil , Smuts, an d Presiden t Wilson , an d alongsid e Lloy d Georg e an d Hankey, was the debat e withi n th e Imperia l Wa r Cabine t an d th e British Empire Delegation befor e and during the Peac e Conferenc e on the Leagu e of Nations. The questio n of more lenient treatment of Germany wa s similarly instructive . I n th e first place, Kerr and th e Round Table coul d no t vie w the Leagu e i n isolation fro m thei r aspirations fo r a Britis h commonwealt h an d ultimatel y fo r a worl d commonwealth.26 I n thei r view , th e Allie s led b y Britai n an d th e 24 Milner, when demanding co-operatíon between Britain, the United States, and the dominions as the key to victory, also pressed for a new and less grudging attitude toward Japan and for accepting her as a full and equal partner, in order to tie Japan securely to their side ( Milner to Lloyd George, 9 June 1918, Lloyd George Papers, F/38/3/37). The difficul t questio n of the precise relationship between the Atlantic powers and France or Japan was often discussed in terms of an ideal tripartite arrangement. 25Kerr's articles 'The Foundations of Peace,' "The End o f War,' "The War fo r Public Right,' 'The Principle of Peace,' 'The Making of Peace,' 'The British Empire.' Also Curtis, "Windows of Freedom,' and anon., "The Victory that will end the war'

24 ILLUSION S O F SECURIT Y United States , having destroyed Prussian militarism, mus t negotiat e a moderat e an d jus t peace , foste r democrati c governmen t and na tional self-determination , erec t a league or concert o f nations in th e short run , and pursue th e ultimat e civilisin g worl d commonwealth . The league or concert would serve two interim purposes for Kerr; it would protect th e peace treat y which, however jus t an d moderate , could hardly be self-enforcing, and , by substituting international law for anarch y and worship of the balanc e o f power, by enforcing new regulations for international behaviour, and by providing an effectiv e consultative body in whic h al l the grea t power s woul d meet regu larly, dea l with controversia l questions and remov e antagonisms, i t woud hel p preserv e genera l peac e unti l a worl d communit y ha d evolved. Kerr's concert would b e i n fac t a voluntary association in which th e membe r states woul d los e non e of their sovereig n inde pendence bu t woul d act in unison for the welfar e of the whol e and as their nationa l an d imperia l interest s dictated . Th e leagu e coul d help prevent war but it could not ensure permanent peace. It was not even a substitut e fo r al l th e traditiona l safeguard s for Britis h an d imperial security and, as Lloyd George would agree, the league must reflect pragmatism not wild idealism and embody what was possible and desirable . Fo r Lloy d Georg e a sensible grou p of great powers , led by a realistic Welshman, would suffice . To Phili p Kerr , in th e hierarch y o f mora l internationalism , th e League o f Nation s mus t i n fac t reinforc e th e Britis h common wealth an d hel p hol d th e Un e until a civilised , peaceful , legal , global orde r ensued . Thi s vie w of the Leagu e set the Roun d Table group somewhat apart fro m th e liberal-radical-left , an d fro m Cecil , Smuts, and President Wilson , but i t di d not undermin e their devo tion to Atlanticism. At every stage in Kerr's argument, the nee d fo r a jus t peace, the desirabilit y o f a realistic leagu e based on wartime allied an d Britis h empir e practices , an d th e pursui t o f a worl d order, he returne d t o th e crucia l theme : th e intimat e co-operatio n of Britain, the dominions, and the United States . The related question o f mandates evoked a similar analysis . Th e Round Table group and their America n confidant, G.L . Beer , wer e convinced tha t a syste m o f trusteeshi p woul d hel p preven t th e exploitation o f less civilise d races , establis h a ne w leve l o f contac t between Eas t an d West , an d hel p the whit e ma n fulfi l hi s obliga tion t o rais e backwar d people s u p t o highe r level s o f civilisation . These unfortunat e race s wer e unabl e t o civilis e themselve s an d

25 THE ATLANTICIST S were vulnerabl e t o oppressiv e influence s but , wit h human e an d responsible guidance , the y could probably achiev e self-government , enjoy law , liberty, and freedom , an d ultimatel y eve n participate in the Britis h an d the n th e worl d commonwealth . Mandate s would , therefore, Ker r argued , expres s th e mos t suitabl e relationshi p be tween the lesser race s and white administrations an d between thes e governments and the res t of the civilise d world . German y and Tur key were unworth y of trusteeshi p an d predictabl y Britain , th e do minions, and the United States, and perhaps even France, must turn to this gloriou s task. The United State s must accept it s responsibili ties, probabl y i n tropica l Afric a o r th e Nea r East , an d furnis h th e most practica l an d th e mos t significan t exampl e o f functiona l Atlanticism, joint co-operation in the highest for m o f imperialism. Th e fundamental proble m wa s o f cours e as obviou s t o Ker r a s t o any one.26 The conscienc e o f the Unite d States seeme d immune to suc h theory and indifferent to these prospects, and naïve American leaders, suspicious o f Britis h an d dominio n aspirations, harboure d fear s o f iniquitous imperialism . Th e critic s o f Atlanticism could no t bu t b e impressed with such attitudes. When the Britis h and dominion leaders deliberate d o n the natur e of th e League , weighing it s practicability, potential for success , it s likely contributio n t o imperia l interest s an d security , an d ho w fa r its powers shoul d imping e o n national sovereignty, virtuall y every one had agree d that Britai n must support som e form o f association because public opinio n and the Unite d State s governmen t expected or demande d it. 27 A league clearl y ha d electora l an d internationa l value. Moreover , in s o far a s th e Imperia l Wa r Cabine t opte d fo r co-operation wit h th e Unite d State s rathe r tha n wit h France , i t viewed acceptanc e o f the Leagu e in part a s a wa y t o hel p ensur e Wilson's suppor t o f th e empire' s interests , an d t o secur e Unite d States co-operatio n i n economi c and politica l reconstructio n an d i n the contes t wit h Bolshevism . Wilson's devotio n t o th e Leagu e was demonstrably confirme d b y lat e Decembe r 1918 , th e Britis h dele gation at Paris would hopefully exercis e significant influenc e o n th e actual negotiation s t o settl e th e term s of the Covenant , an d conse quently the y coul d permi t Wilso n t o hav e a league . Fundamenta l to this decision, and subsequently proven false a t the Peace Confer 26 See note 21. 27 Imperial War Cabinet debates, 26 Nov., 24, 30, and 31 Dec. 1916, Cab 23/42

26 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y ence, was the assumptio n tha t Cecil would adop t tha t version o f a league, limiting its powers and functions, favoured by Lloyd George, Hankey, and Kerr. A direc t i f comple x correlatio n betwee n attitude s towar d th e League, mandates , and Atlanticism was therefore established. Cecil , Smuts, and Barnes supported a league with the most extensive powers and duties possible. Borden felt obliged to oppose specific article s in the final Covenant negotiated b y Ceci l and Wilson, but hi s concern les t th e empir e embar k o n annexationis t imperialis m cause d him to insist tha t the United State s be unreservedly involved in the trusteeship system . All four i n their ow n way, therefore, sought th e closest possible co-operatio n with the Unite d States . Lloyd George , Bonar Law , Churchill , Auste n Chamberlain , Hankey , and , o n thi s issue i f not fo r identical motives, Balfour an d Kerr , did no t regar d the Leagu e with suc h gravity . A postwar concer t was not a substi tute for traditional policies o r the empire , i t ha d a lowe r priority , and must be functional, an d realistically limite d in scope. Moreover, the League, like so many other questions, was in part a tactical con sideration whic h mus t hel p servic e othe r vita l interest s an d still , hopefully, induce Anglo-American accord. A certain scepticism about the League matched a similar attitude toward Atlanticism, and while Balfour an d Ker r shared the forme r the y coul d avoi d th e latte r fo r other and to them more vital reasons. More cynical and even hostile toward the League and Atlanticism were Curzon, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson , th e chie f o f th e imperia l genera l staff , th e repre sentatives of the Admiralty, and Prime Minister Hughes of Australia, who were most reluctant to compromise on matters pertaining to the balance o f power an d nava l hegemony. In an y case the debat e di d not fully matur e until th e Senate rebuffe d Wilson' s Leagu e an d th e American electorat e demonstrate d indifferenc e rathe r tha n regret. Personally th e Atlanticist s wer e impressiv e enough , thei r view s initially ha d a sufficien t measur e of idealis m an d realis m t o meri t close consideratio n an d th e cabine t coul d hardl y rebuf f the m ab ruptly. Both domestic and international considerations dictate d tha t the Britis h governmen t test th e validit y o f Atlanticism. As the glo w of victor y receded, however, sterne r examination s presented them selves. Th e Atlanticist s wer e no t unite d o n ever y issue, empiricist s searched out their intellectual weaknesses, the response of the United States was progressively hardly encouraging, and realism seemed to become overshadowe d by a more frail idealism . All too rapidly th e Atlanticists' expectation s seeme d ridiculousl y exaggerated . More -

27 THE ATLANTICIST S over, Lloyd George' s coalitio n was not a stable grou p and its power structure fluctuated . Milne r los t ground , s o to a lesse r degre e di d Balfour, Ker r graduall y becam e emotionall y exhausted , Ceci l an d Grey eclipse d themselves , an d Smut s an d Borde n returne d home . Given thes e development s an d th e failur e t o maintai n a clos e Anglo-American dialogue , wit h bot h Londo n an d Washingto n a t fault, the task of the Atlanticists became almost intolerably difficult . They were never impotent, however, and the debate continued , but the Atlanticists seeme d to fac e progressiv e disillusionmen t The sceptic ofte n indulge d i n oratorical Atlanticism , but , lackin g the basic conviction s of the Atlanticists, he was increasingly difficul t to convince . Th e scepti c wa s somewha t attracte d b y th e possibl e advantages offere d b y Atlanticism, but tha t policy was at bes t one of several . Davi d Lloy d George , a s prim e minister , wa s bot h th e pivot o f scepticism an d th e mos t important voic e i n th e polic y de bate among the British elite.28 In some of his rare speeches on foreign policy befor e 191 4 Lloy d Georg e had accepte d th e specia l relation ship theme , applaudin g Anglo-America n co-operation an d statin g that wa r betwee n the m wa s unthinkable . Durin g th e worl d war , however, he had share d the anger and despai r felt in Britain a t th e policies adopte d b y Presiden t Wilso n i n th e perio d o f America n neutrality an d particularly Wilso n s attempts t o secure a negotiate d peace. A t the sam e time Lloyd George's premiership coincide d wit h the hig h perio d o f Anglo-America n wartime co-operation . Despit e the Britis h government's reservation on the freedo m o f the sea s and the problem o f naval hegemony 29 there was much in the Wilsonia n peace programm e that Lloy d Georg e could applau d an d thei r rap port a t th e Pari s Peac e Conferenc e was a s impressiv e a s wa s th e extent of their differences. 80 Lloy d Georg e was certainl y influenced 28In a recent attemp t t o classify Lloy d George, D.C. Watt , pointing t o the Premier's contemp t for idealism, his chauvinistic patriotism, and his delight i n the exercise of power, called him an 'irresponsible' (Watt , Personalities and Politics, 33). 29 Fry, 'Imperial War Cabinet' 30 Walter Long, first lord of the Admiralty, warned Lloyd George of damaging rumours that he was so committed to the League of Nations and a peace policy that he would cut the navy drastically and accept United States control of the seas. Long also expressed fears that Lloyd George's loyalty to President Wilson could endanger his influence in Britain ( Long to Lloyd George, 8 May 1919, Lloyd George Papers, F/33/2/42 and 43).

28 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y by Kerr, Milner, and Smuts; his position on the questio n of whether the United States should become a mandatory power in the Middl e East and Africa was close to that of Milner, and, indeed, on occasions the Premie r coul d exaggerat e th e significanc e of th e Roun d Table group, observing on one occasion: 'It is a very powerful combination and in its way perhaps the most powerful in the country. Each member o f the grou p brings to its deliberation s certai n definite an d important qualities ; an d behind th e scenes they have much power and influence.'31 However, Lloy d George' s somewha t cavalie r treatmen t o f wha t he regarded as an excessively narrow institution, tibe Foreign Office, 82 his impulsive an d creativ e virtuosity , hi s nerve, energy , an d imagi nation, his tactical unorthodoxy, hi s realis m an d patriotism , rathe r than an y shee r irresponsibl e opportunism , le d hi m t o explor e al l avenues an d tes t al l shade s o f opinion . Hi s skil l i n debat e an d i n verbal transactions an d his lesser facility on paper led him to encourage sustaine d discussio n o n polic y a s h e sough t t o discove r th e political and socia l realities of the day . The clue s to Lloyd George , therefore, ar e foun d mor e in conferenc e minute s tha n i n persona l memoranda, and in letters received rather than in letters despatched . The Atlanticists ' argument s mus t surviv e by thei r intellectua l content, their realism, their timing , their repetition in the fluctuation of debate, and whether they stood the test of empiricism. Lloyd George would weigh them along with other views , less as philosophical o r idealistic argument s an d mor e a s pragmati c answer s t o curren t problems. Lloyd George could write and speak about the great postwar role which the Unite d States coul d play an d abou t the nee d fo r AngloAmerican co-operation a s the sures t basis on which to secure peace, and thes e views became a n of t repeate d statemen t o f regret a s h e became more disenchanted wit h French policy. 83 On specific issues , such a s th e disposa l o f Germany' s colonies , Lloy d Georg e agree d 31 Riddell diary, entry of 23 Oct 1921, Riddell, Intimate Diary, 329-30 32 This view of Lloyd George's relationship with Balfour an d especially wit h Curzon is as widely accepted as it is exaggerated. 33Draft of interview between Lloyd George and W.W. Hawkins (United Press), June 1921, Lloy d George Papers, F/86/1/4; Lloyd George, Where Are We Going, 108-9,115. In a different vein he would applaud those who engineered prohibition in the United States as 'of ou r own race and kind, bred in the Puritan tradition that came originally from our shores' (ibid., 350).

29 TH E ATLANTICIST S that Britai n shoul d wor k with th e Unite d State s a s fa r a s their co operation wa s in harmony with the vital interests o f the empire , bu t he neve r accepte d th e basi c assumptio n of inevitable compatibilit y of interests . I f Britain' s interest s wer e endangere d Lloy d George , very reluctantly, would attempt to co-operate with France.84 As earl y a s Novembe r 191 9 Lloyd George , Hankey , Kerr , an d others, never happy abou t Presiden t Wilson' s Covenant , wer e even more dubious. 35 Precisel y tha t aspec t o f th e Leagu e whic h the y valued most, United State s involvement and co-operation, was obviously in jeopardy from th e Senate . Should the Unite d State s refus e to ratify the peace treaty, the League could become a divisive factor in Anglo-American relations an d place intolerabl e burden s and un acceptable obligation s o n Britain . To som e member s of the Britis h government such an outcome would be a prime example of how the unreliable an d eve n treacherous American s urged on e on and the n left on e in the lurch , a sentiment whic h die d har d i n th e interwa r years. Moreover , and a caus e dear enoug h to Lloy d George , i n al l probability th e prospects for disarmament would languish. In Kerr's opinion, the League could not be effective without the United States, in any case it was secondary to imperial considerations, it was obviously forfeit to nationalist policies, and served narrow European interests. Therefore, Kerr looked even more urgently for direc t co-opera tion between the empire an d the Unite d States, with revision of the Covenant a desirable bu t secondar y problem. Ironically, bot h Lloyd George an d Ker r could hav e pointed ou t t o Ceci l tha t thei r mor e limited vie w of a concer t woul d hav e bee n mor e attractive t o th e United State s tha n wa s Wilson' s Covenant . Lloy d Georg e share d many of Kerr's views and expressed doubts as to whether devotion to the Covenan t coul d persis t a s a basi c principl e o f Britis h foreig n policy. Whil e hi s secretar y denounce d th e result s o f th e League' s inadequacies, however , Lloy d Georg e emphasise d thei r principa l cause, the defection of the haphazard and 'comet-like' United States.86 34 Imperial War Cabinet, 47th and 48th meetings, 30 and 31 Dec. 1918, Borden Papers, Memoir Notes, 5,1917-18, and Cab 23/42 SSCurzon to Lloyd George , 7 Nov. 1919; Kerr to R.H . Campbell (Foreig n Office), 30 Oct. 1919; Hurst to Campbell, 4 Nov. 1919; Hurst to Lord Hardinge, 5 Nov. 1919, Lloyd George Papers, F/12/2/3; Kerr memorandum, 10 Nov. 1919, Lothian Papers, GD/40/17/62 and Kerr, The Britis h Empire" 36 Lloyd George, Where Are We Going, 74-5

30 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y Kerr would regar d Atlanticis m a s an alternative t o the Leagu e bu t he met the growin g disillusionment o f his chief . Lloy d Georg e also regarded th e absenc e o f th e Unite d State s fro m th e Reparation s Commission a s its basi c an d cripplin g defec t an d hi s concer n an d anger mounte d a s political , strategic , an d financia l problem s un folded.87 Such considerations coul d not but swa y even the dedicate d Atlanticist and clearly th e sceptic s woul d be impressed t o the poin t of askin g whethe r on e coul d b e a n Atlanticis t withou t appearin g somewhat naïve and even ridiculous. Beneath Lloy d Georg e stoo d othe r sceptic s o f varyin g intensity . Bonar Law , Conservativ e part y leader , hig h i n temperatur e an d low in spirits, declinin g in health an d influence , an d jus t a s elusive in the archive s a s the Premier , wa s not excessivel y concerne d wit h foreign policy but he qualified a s a sceptic.38 On the crucial question of nava l construction, Bona r Law, agreein g wit h Lloy d George , accepted Grey' s pla n o f avoidin g an y challeng e t o th e Unite d State s in orde r t o produc e a reciproca l response . Equall y so , however , Bonar Law accepted the fac t tha t the y mus t regar d th e absenc e of any suc h respons e fro m Washingto n a s clea r evidenc e tha t globa l co-operation wit h th e Unite d State s coul d no t b e achieved. 39 Si r Maurice Hankey, the only member of the cabine t secretaria t t o outrank Kerr, seemed willing to pursue and test Atlanticist policies, bu t only in an empirical fashio n an d never with total dedication. Durin g the wa r Hanke y ha d expresse d doubt s abou t compulsor y arbitra tion couple d wit h sanction s machinery a s a way o f preventing war , damning the proposal a s dangerous because of the differin g nationa l characters o f th e grea t powers. 40 Britain , i n Hankey' s view , wa s thoroughly honourable, German y and Russia could neither be trusted nor coerced , an d th e Unite d State s 'a s likel y a s not wil l b e o n th e eve of a Presidential electio n an d unwillin g t o tak e a hand.' Moreover, the Unite d State s was simpl y unreliable an d 's o cosmopolita n and wedded to the almighty dollar that they cannot be judged even 37Ibid., 143

38 Bonar Law Papers, and Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister. This otherwise excellent study says relatively little on foreign policy. Lloyd George offered Bonar Law the Foreign Office in January 1922, but he declined ( ibid., 437 ). 39 Fry, 'Anglo-American-Canadian Relations,' 234-5 40Hankey to Balfour, 5 May 1916,29 June and 11 Nov. 1927, Balfour Papers, 49704

31 THE ATLANTICIST S by the comparatively low standard of other nations in regard to matters o f national honour.' Hankey wrot e in th e atmospher e o f bitter disillusionment s o prevalent in 1916 bu t hi s scepticism prevailed. I n 1927, at the height of Anglo-American cruiser controversy, he recalled how Britain , unde r th e misguide d impressio n tha t sh e coul d ear n American goodwill by a policy of concessions, had reaped only scorn and abuse as the Unite d States interpreted concession s as weakness. Hankey advised , therefore , that Britai n shoul d stand o n her rights , ward of f a conspiracy hatche d b y Auklan d Geddes , Esme Howard, the Manchester Guardian, an d a n embittere d Colone l House , an d refuse t o be blackmaile d o r browbeaten eve n a t th e ris k o f contro versy an d crue l phrase s aime d a t th e Unite d State s 'which wil l b e none the less palatable because they are true.' Reading, lor d chie f justic e and ambassado r to th e Unite d State s from September 1917 to May 1919, intermittentl y spoke and behaved like an Atlanticist, particularly i n the course of contacts with United States leader s suc h a s Colone l House. 41 Bu t Readin g wa s Lloy d George's man , tied to his political fortunes , luxuriating in offic e an d power, an d on e must conclude tha t a n opportunisti c realis m dominated hi s views . I n brief , Readin g wa s dedicate d t o littl e i n an y permanent way . Si r Aukland Geddes, apolitica l ambassado r t o th e United State s fro m earl y 1920 , an d addin g fue l t o th e debat e o f varying qualit y an d persuasion , reveale d th e complicate d trait s of the scepti c willin g t o b e convinced , but wen t furthe r tha n anyon e in proposing retaliatory measures aimed at the United States to meet commercial competition. 42 By the mid-1920 s he had somethin g of a reputation a s an Atlanticist but he was a late convert. Austen Chamberlain, a s chancello r o f the Excheque r an d prominen t i n th e wa r debts negotiations , als o qualifie d a s a sceptic ; an d Churchill , wa r minister an d then colonia l secretary, impresse d with th e danger s of permitting th e Unite d State s t o become a mandatory power i n th e Middle Eas t an d o f stimulatin g he r nava l powe r i n th e Mediter ranean, must , by hi s contributio n t o th e debat e o n naval construc tion, qualify as a sceptic at best.43 41 Hyde, Reading, 314 42 Geddes to Curzon , 1 1 June 1920 , ro/414/246 and Geddes , Forging of a Family. Both the Geddes brothers were very much Lloyd George's creatures. 43 Chamberlain, Down The fears, 231-8 . Chamberlain's public posture seemed to identify him as an Atlanticist but his record points elsewhere; Hall, 'British

32 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y So must Leo Amery, holding secondary military and political positions but highly regarded b y Lloyd George, eve n though he was still close enoug h t o th e imperialist s aroun d Milne r virtuall y t o b e on e of them . Amer y agree d tha t intimate Anglo-America n co-operatio n was th e mos t vita l asse t whic h th e empir e coul d secur e fro m th e war, but h e was a Conservative imperialist, most unimpressed wit h the League , involve d i n materia l matter s o f security , nava l power , and imperial preference, an d prone to question the compatibilit y of close Anglo-American with stron g imperia l famil y ties . Frequently , inconsistencies an d confusio n emerge d whe n imperialist s investi gated th e precis e relationshi p betwee n thes e tw o desiderat a an d clearly th e imperialis t min d mus t 'tak e of f int o th e mor e rarifie d atmosphere o f interlocking relationship s or close itself, as in the case of Phili p Kerr o n occasions, i n orde r t o preserv e dedicatio n t o At lanticism. Amery coul d no t complet e eithe r o f thes e manœuvres . H e tol d Lloyd Georg e in August 1918 tha t whil e he agree d wit h th e polic y of inducing the United States to accept postwar responsibilities, th e process must be a natural one and confined to areas of special interest to America.44 He warned both that the United States would not welcome the offe r o f an 'undigested lump' of unfamiliar problems at th e other en d o f th e world , an d tha t T o dum p American s with thei r vigorous and crude ideas down into the middle o f complicated Mid dle Eastern problems in Palestine would lead to endless complication s in Egypt, Arabia and Mesopotamia. ' He urged th e establishmen t of a series of Monroe Doctrines, wit h Britain's sphere s of control clearly marked, and, to reduce friction with the United States, Britain should relinquish on e of her severa l possessions such as Guiana, Honduras, Gambia, or even Gibraltar and accept American control of the Congo, Angola, o r Mexico . Amery advocate d onl y selectiv e America n in volvement, adjusted s o as to leav e th e empire' s interest s untouche d and the imperial and naval aspirations of the United States dormant . Commonwealth,' in Bourne and Watt, eds., Studies in International History, 349-50. Sir Robert Home, Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, and Edwin Montagu probably qualify as passive sceptics but the evidence is insufficient. 44Amery memorandum, 15 June 1918, 'Wa r Aims and Military Policy'; Amery memorandum, 20 Dec. 1918, 'Unite d State s and the Occupie d Enemy Territories'; Amer y to Lloyd George, 16 Aug. 1918, Lloy d George Papers, F/2/1/25, F/23/3/82, andF/2/1/29; Amery to Balfour, 21 Dec. 1918 , FO/800/209;Amery, My Political Life, n , 81,98-100,210

33 THE ATLANTICIST S Specific area s o f Turkey , Wes t Africa , Armenia , an d Centra l an d South America were all expendable spheres and he rejected Church ill's fear s tha t a selectiv e America n mandate i n th e Middl e Eas t would dangerousl y stimulat e he r nava l construction . Onl y a con flict o f interest or policy woul d induce the Unite d State s t o launc h a naval race, Amery felt, and he did not regard an American mandate for Armeni a o r Constantinopl e a s givin g ris e t o an y suc h conflict . However, shoul d suc h a conflic t arise , Amer y sa w grea t strategi c advantages i n Britai n holdin g th e Atlantic , keepin g th e America n fleet *bottled up' in the Mediterranean . His strategic reasonin g was undeniably wil d bu t suc h speculatio n tende d t o remov e him fro m the ranks of the Atlanticists . Behind the sceptics were ranged those who were even hostile and who, whil e ofte n genuflectin g t o Washingto n i n public , regarde d Americans as a foreign species rather tha n brothers o r even cousins. In th e forefron t wer e Lord Curzon , foreig n secretar y i n successio n to Balfour, and Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, supported by Lord Birkenhead, th e lor d chancellor, 46 Eri c Geddes , whe n firs t lor d of the Admiralty , Walte r Long , Geddes' s successo r a t th e Admiralty , First Se a Lord s Admiral s Wemys s an d Beatty, 48 an d importan t Foreign Offic e official s suc h as Si r Eyre Crowe, 47 Lor d Hardinge, 48 45 Birkenhead, damned by his Ulster recor d and dislikin g idealists an d 'doc trinaire perfectionists,' seeme d utterly insensitive to American public an d official feeling s even in wartim e ( Murray to Drummond , 2 5 Jan. 1918 , FO/800/329; Earl of Birkenhead, Life of F.E. Smith, 487-93; Callwell, Sir Henry Wilson, 11). 46 Long, Memoirs; Pétrie, Walter Long; Chalmers, Earl Beatty; Wemyss, Wester Wemyss; Roskill , Naval Policy Between the Wars, i, 105, 214-16,220. Jellicoe is rumoured to have told Admira l Kingsmill, wartime head o f th e Canadian naval service, that h e was under orders at Jutland t o bring the capital shi p fleet back intact because , amon g othe r considerations, Britai n might have to defend herself against the United States. In the postwar period, although th e Admiralt y accepted th e on e power standar d i n th e fac e of political and economic considerations and did not seek to challenge the United States i n a nava l race , professiona l hostility towar d Americ a was very apparent 47 Crowe minute, on Alston's memorandum, 1 Aug. 1920, 'Respectin g sugges tions for a n Anglo-Saxon policy for the Fa r East, ' Woodward, Butler, an d Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-193 9 (hereafte r cited a s BD ), 1st ser., xrv, no 80,86. Crowe noted, 'I wish I could share Sir B. Alston's

34 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y and Sir Cecil Hurst.49 Significantly these pillars o f the Foreig n Offic e and the service departments seeme d convinced that Atlanticism was already found wanting and did not provide a basic principle o f British foreign policy in the postwar period. In the name of realism an d rejecting missionary idealism, they demanded a foreign policy base d on proven principle s an d methods . T o Curzon , Beatty , an d Henr y Wilson the securin g o f Britain's nationa l an d imperial interest s was a function of sea power, of military, economic, and financia l strength , all measured unilaterally , o f intuitiv e an d realisti c diplomacy , an d of international credi t an d prestige. I n contrast , Atlanticism seemed to be mere sanguine and idealistic rhetoric. Entrenched i n key positions, thes e opponents o f Atlanticism wer e extremely powerful and, but for Lloyd George and the sceptics, may well have proved irresistible especially a s they als o received crucia l reinforcement fro m th e dominions . 'Billy' Hughes, premier o f Australia, wit h a Ne w Zealand ech o i n Premie r Massey , could matc h anyone on the public platform o n the need for cordial Anglo-American relations.50 But in imperial councils Hughes's antagonism towar d Atlanticism was unmistakable and sustained, expressed in Decembe r 1918 a s a denunciation o f President Wilson over the questio n of th e disposal o f former Germa n colonies i n th e sout h Pacifi c an d i n hi s robust faith in American "co-operation" in China or elsewhere. But I see no objection to making further effort s t o gain it.' The second sentence migh t qualify Crow e as a sceptic, but he viewed Atlanticism partly a s a facet of th e struggle between th e Foreig n Offic e an d Downing Street for the contro l of foreign policy and he favoured both traditional policies an d methods. 48Hardinge, having served in India, a s had Curzon , seemed to prefer co-operation with Japan rather tha n the Unite d States and wa s utterly pessimisti c about the future of Anglo-American relations; Hardinge, record of conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, 18 Aug. 1920, ibid., no 92, 95; Hardinge , minute, o n Geddes t o Curzon , despatch , 3 0 April 1920, Fo/371/5359; Hardinge, Old Diplomacy, 231-2,244 49 Hurst memorandum, 18 Nov. 1919, 'American Reservation s to th e Peac e Treaty,' BD, 1st ser., v, no 399, 1024-8. Hurst, with Curzon in agreement, analysed the impact o f the proposed America n reservations to the Leagu e Covenant on British and imperial interests an d on the Leagu e itself, an d th e tone was decidedly unsympathetic toward the United States. Hurst was chief legal adviser to the Foreign Office . 50 Hughes, Splendid Adventure; Fry, 'Anglo-American-Canadian Relations, ' 93-106,114-26; Hall, 'British Commonwealth,' 349-64

35 THE ATLANTICIST S demand tha t Britai n rene w th e Anglo-Japanes e allianc e i n Jun e 1921. Whethe r Hughes was denying the significanc e of the American war effort in 1918 or insisting on the unreliability o f the United States in 1921, his words were scathing and undeniably critical . Clearly those who were sceptical, cynical, and hostile were a formidable group , growin g in conviction an d authority , whil e th e Atlanti cists wer e increasingl y i n disarray , retainin g thei r fait h apparentl y in defiance of the tide of events. These trends were the result o f four interrelated factors . First , an d a s already suggeste d above , th e At lanticist cred o wa s no t withou t it s weaknesse s an d contradictions . Second, Wilson' s persona l an d politica l collapse , th e demis e o f House's influence, and the inability of secretaries of state R. Lansing and B . Colby t o initiate hig h policy , mean t that th e Unite d State s government lacked directin g leadership, an d this loss was expressed in a partial withdrawa l fro m internationa l affairs . Third , a declin e in bilateral Anglo-America n co-operation occurred, accompanie d b y a los s o f rappor t betwee n Londo n an d Washington . Finally , th e unfinished busines s of the peace conferenc e left menacin g problem s and, elevating th e questio n o f British naval power and imperia l de fence, touched on the rawest nerves. All four factor s operated t o th e detriment of the Atlanticist cause before 1921. The Atlanticis t thesi s containe d certai n demonstrabl e contradic tions an d illusion s an d lai d the m ope n t o attack . Unite d State s re sources were not being matche d b y sustaine d and congenia l execu tive control ; Wilso n ha d becom e a n inaccessibl e an d mysteriou s invalid; a rum p administratio n coul d scarcel y rul e amids t it s ow n death throes ; an d Edwar d Grey , Britain' s specia l representativ e i n 1919, an d hi s successo r coul d no t eve n secur e a meetin g wit h th e President.51 Thu s th e ide a o f a reliable , trustworthy , an d willin g United States , anxiou s for co-operation , becam e difficul t t o sustai n and th e questio n o f whether America n isolationism wa s i n retrea t became at best a finely balanced one . Rather than bein g 'ready aye ready' to follow Britain's lead , the United States could appea r incur ably an d unrepentantl y isolationist , ignorant , stubborn , an d naïve , SIGeddes to Lloyd George, 4 and 8 June 1920, Lloy d George Papers, F/60/4/1 and 2; Lindsay to Curzon, 10 Feb. 1920 , FO/414/246 . Lindsay describe d Washington a s full o f rumour, like an oriental bazaar. The vacuum suited th e Republicans who refrained from criticis m so as to avoid making a martyr of Wilson, while the Democrats remained silent t o preserve party unity .

38 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y bordering o n political and moral collapse an d unawar e of or unimpressed b y he r responsibilities . Sceptic s doubte d whethe r Britai n could guid e the Unite d State s an d teach he r ne w lessons and atti tudes, and, indeed, the United States seemed excessively suspicious of British motive s especiall y a s politician s pandere d t o anglophob e sentiments.52 Man y i n Washington , fo r example , agree d tha t th e offer o f a mandate to the United States was a clever move to enabl e Britain to secure disguised annexations elsewhere, and others viewed proposals o f Anglo-America n co-operation a s attempt s t o entangl e the United States, to destroy the basic principles of her foreign policy, and to enmesh her in underwriting the security of the British empire. Such views, not devoid of substance but often expressed irresponsibly in the press, in public, an d in private, tende d t o undermine the Atlanticists' theories , def y thei r prediction s o f America n behaviour , and obscure the sympath y still felt for Britain in certain section s of the Unite d States . Viewe d i n reverse , o f course , American s could justifiably complai n o f both th e publi c an d officia l hostilit y toward the Unite d State s harboure d i n Britain , an d Horati o Bottomle y i n John Bull was certainly a match for William R. Hearst. These problems revealed that the critic s o f Atlanticism, while unwilling t o jettison all hopes o f co-operation, were impresse d b y th e problems of leadership in any Anglo-American combination an d b y the power disparitie s favourin g the Unite d States, which al l recog nised to be immediate and irrevocable. The Atlanticists assumed that the ris e o f United State s powe r wa s not detrimenta l t o th e Britis h empire and tha t th e questio n of leadership was less of an issue, bu t others were unsure. Could Britain view the adven t of United States naval, commercial , an d financia l power a s a simpl e proces s o f ad justment, containing no challenge to Britain and her empire? Indeed United State s oppositio n t o imperia l preference , he r oppositio n to the empire's six votes in the League, and her professed ideologica l dislike of imperialism suggested that the United States would favour the disintegration o f the empire rather tha n its rejuvenation by way of a commonwealth. The compatibilit y o f Atlanticism with Britain' s national an d imperial interest s wa s consequently a constan t sourc e of doubt and concern . 52 Lindsay to Curzon, 5 March 1920, FO/414/246. Lindsay interpreted Colby' s appointment to the State Department as a move to placate Iris h opinio n and he regarded Admiral Benson's elevation to chairman of the Shippin g Board as an anti-British gesture.

37 THE ATLANTICIST S Any discussion of wartime differences, when the United States ha d seemed unable to appreciate tha t Britain fought to destroy militaris m and to safeguard civilisation, carrie d wit h it disturbin g recollection s that Wilson's political intimacies were shared with the liberal-radical Left i n Britain , wit h th e politica l opponent s o f th e Lloy d Georg e coalition. Whil e Lloy d George had n o wish to challenge th e opposi tion on questions such as disarmament, domestic political considera tions an d foreig n policy wer e in conflic t t o som e degre e an d man y members of the coalition government rapidly lost whatever sympathy they had fo r Wilson an d th e Democrati c party. Tactica l considera tions wer e als o involved , mad e mor e sensitiv e an d delicat e b y th e fact tha t 1920 was a presidential electio n year in the Unite d States . How could th e Britis h governmen t approac h Washingto n an d ye t avoid any suggestion of appearing to lead or ensnare her in nefarious schemes? How could Britain convince the United States that sh e was not an iniquitous imperia l an d naval power? Suc h tactical problem s were urgent an d the Atlanticist would merel y seem naïve to ignor e them. Consequently al l critic s o f Atlanticism , wit h varyin g degree s o f intensity, experienced simila r feelings; disillusionment with Wilson' s administration, concer n tha t th e Unite d State s understoo d neithe r the empir e an d it s mission nor Europe an d its security problems, a growing conviction that th e Unite d States wa s both unreliabl e an d irresponsible, some apprehension about the possible impact of American power and potential an d anger at the moralising, idealistic ton e of Unite d State s diplomacy . Perhap s trie d an d traditiona l policie s were preferable to ventures in new diplomacy and, in the final analysis, the British elit e waited fo r a grand gestur e from Washingto n o n naval problems or war debts, an d they waited in vain. 63 The United States never mad e the gestur e and, although Anglo-America n relations did not deteriorate to a dangerous level, there occurred a cumulative los s of confidence, mutual irritation, an d abrasiv e exchanges . The crucia l theme s i n Anglo-America n relations wer e maritime , financial, and commercial , wit h nava l supremacy , imperial securit y particularly i n th e Pacific , wa r debts , an d economi c reconstructio n at th e core. 64 Although in retrospect Anglo-America n naval rivalry, SSGeddes to Lloyd George , 8 June 1920 , Lloyd George Papers, F/60/4/2; Geddes wrote that Colb y realised tha t Britai n was "holding on' agai n a s she had in the war, waiting for another round of help from th e Unite d States . 54Hankey to Lloyd George, 17 March 1920, ibid., F/24/2/18

38 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y bearing littl e relatio n t o strategi c requirements , appear s t o b e th e artificial creation of admirals in search of a prospective foe for politico-financial reasons and arriving by default at each other, the controversy was real enough. 55 Naval power was a superb vehicle fo r th e anglophobe i n th e Unite d State s and contro l o f the sea s could cal l forth emotiona l slogans in Britain . The Unite d States, viewed fro m London, could replace Germany , as the 'oily ' secretary of the navy , Josephus Daniels, a resurrected Tirpitz , seemed bent on launching a naval programme sufficient t o give the Unite d States qualitative su periority in capital ship s by 1925. Britain , as seen from Washington , could inheri t Germany' s role, for was not navalis m th e partne r an d heir o f Prussia n militarism? 58 Moreover , unsettlin g technica l an d financial problem s associate d wit h th e developmen t o f submarin e and ai r power, th e futur e o f the capita l ship, the lesson s of Jutland , and the changeover from coal to oil had emerged. The problems were as urgent as they were fundamental and a n unsound decision could be disastrous. Related t o the nava l controversy were the problem s of merchan t marine strengt h an d postwa r commercia l competition . Durin g th e war Balfou r ha d propose d t o upgrad e Britain' s diplomati c repre sentation i n Sout h America and sen d a mission , led b y Si r M . de Bunsen, t o demonstrat e Britain's determinatio n t o expan d he r eco nomic and political position despite American and German competition. Th e missio n coul d no t escap e Washington' s scrutiny , indee d Balfour suggeste d tha t th e Chilea n governmen t welcomed i t a s a check on American domination and a competitive respons e from th e United State s seeme d inevitable. 57 Th e Shippin g Ministry , unde r J.P. Maclay, also planned t o counter Japanese and American designs on Britain's prewa r maritim e interests an d th e proble m o f th e dis posal of the captured Germa n merchant fleet, debated a t th e Peac e Conference an d subsequentl y i n th e Suprem e Council , kep t th e SSNotes of a talk with Daniels and Benson, 29 March 1919, ibid., F/192/1/4 ( the author was either Long or Admiral Wemyss); Fry, 'Anglo-American-Canadian Relations,' 66-77 56 United States Naval Advisory Staff , memorandum , 13 March 1919, 'Disposi tion of Germa n and Austrian Vessels of War'; Admiral Benson to Wilson, 9 April 1919 , enclosin g Naval Advisory Staf f memorandum , 'Unite d States Naval Policy,' Baker, Woodrow Wilson, m, docs 22,23,197-205, and 206-17; Geddes to Curzon, 21 May 1920, FO/414/246 57 Balfour memorandum, GT 4253,16 April 1918, Balfour Papers, 49699.

39 THE ATLANTICIST S question alive. By 1920 the Jones Shipping bill, then before Congress and regarde d a s discriminatory an d prejudicia l t o Canadia n trade , followed i n 192 1 b y th e Panam a Cana l toll s question , reactivate d the dispute, although th e Board of Trade dismisse d Geddes's retali tory schemes as folly.68 These question s were associated wit h the freedom of the seas controversy which, in the post-armistice negotiations , ha d revealed tha t the Unite d State s di d no t appreciat e th e blessing s o f Britis h sea power. Presiden t Wilso n threatene d a nava l rac e t o forc e Lloy d George's complianc e wit h hi s policies , jus t a s h e threatene d th e United State s electorat e wit h larg e nava l estimate s unles s the y adopted th e League , bu t th e freedo m o f th e sea s issu e dissipate d itself i n the negotiations over the Covenant. Lloy d George , however , in March 1919 demande d a n agreement, limiting nava l construction and confirmin g British supremac y a s the pric e o f his acceptin g th e Monroe Doctrin e amendmen t t o th e Leagu e Covenant , an d a pro visional arrangemen t o n naval construction wa s arrived a t i n April 1919. However , despit e thi s succes s for Lloy d George' s diplomacy , which Ceci l ha d viewe d a s alarmingly irresponsible, the Admiralty were determined t o retain the blockade weapon, th e postwa r nava l balance wa s still unsettled , th e atmospher e was bitter enough , and much o f th e tal k wa s les s tha n responsible. 89 Clearl y th e Unite d States Nav y Departmen t woul d suppor t multilatera l disarmamen t only i f it s constructio n programme s were lef t intac t sufficientl y t o ensure a t leas t qualitativ e superiorit y ove r Britain . Th e Admiralty , for it s part, would suppor t a process of disarmament only if British 58Maclay to Cecil, 8 July 1918, Cecil Papers, 51093; Geddes to Curzon, 12 May 1920, FO/414/246; Board of Trade to Foreign Office , 2 6 July 1920, FO/414 / 246; Macla y t o Lloy d George and Curzon , 30 June 1921, Lloy d George Papers, F/35/3/58 59Admiralty memorandum, 'Freedom of the Seas, ' 21 Dec. 1918 an d confirmed on 6 March 1920, c m paper 239-u, Cab . 4/7; Fry , 'Imperial War Cabinet'; Fry, 'Anglo-American-Canadian Relations,' 66-77. Daniels referre d to the British attitude as 'the impudence of impotence and the impotence of impudence.' The naval agreement, not entirely satisfactory to Britain, stated that the United States would 'abandon or modify' onl y her new 1918 naval programme not yet authorised by Congress and would be willing to consult with Britain on future building programmes. This agreement meant, however, that the Unite d States would most probably complete its 191 6 programme and future administration s need not honour House's signature.

40 ILLUSION S O F SECURITY naval power wer e lef t supreme . In fact , recoiling fro m th e cos t of recreating globa l nava l power , Britain , fro m a positio n o f curren t superiority, tro d th e pat h o f selectiv e contraction , cite d th e aban donment o f inflated wartime programmes as disarmament , an d in vited her competitors to follow her lead. Irritation o n the part of the United State s nava l professional s wa s inevitable , an d th e Genera l Board of the Navy called for 'equality with the strongest' or a 'navy second to none' with ne w base facilities particularly i n th e Pacific . They use d strategic , political , prestige , an d commercia l arguments to justif y thei r demands, the Hears t pres s supported them , an d th e whole preparedness campaig n took on a n anti-Japanes e an d anglo phobe tone. President Wilson, backed by Daniels, could in turn pose as a saviour and act like an admiral, reconcilin g hi s demands fo r a league of peace' and a *bi g navy,' an d Britis h reaction s inevitabl y mixed bewildermen t wit h apprehensio n an d determinatio n wit h anger.60 The situation, when viewed from Londo n with less heat and emotion, wa s tolerabl e a t leas t unti l 1921 . Britai n ha d a comfortabl e margin in capital ships and in most other classes; the weaknesses of the United States in capital ship s and personnel, the result of a keen Congressional financia l axe , were actual an d Congres s seemed un likely t o repent . Bu t Britai n wante d more , fo r th e Unite d State s could realis e he r potential by 192 5 a t th e latest . Sh e sought, there fore, the security of a comprehensive naval agreement to reinforce the interim arrangemen t o f Apri l 1919 , whic h boun d onl y th e Wilso n administration. Grey' s mission , however , prove d utterl y barren 61 and the subsequent conversations between Lloyd George and Senator J. Medill McCormick produced no response.82 From December 192 0 OOAdmiralty to cabinet, memorandum, wp 73, 7 Nov. 1918, 'Unite d States Naval Policy,' Lloyd George Papers, F/163/4/7; Lon g to Lloyd George, 16 Feb. an d 7 March 1919, ibid., F/33/2/13 and F/33/2/22. The Admiralty memorandum, signed by Eric Geddes, was extremely hostile to Wilson and concluded that h e aimed to reduce comparatively the preponderanc e in sea power of the British Empire. Walter Long was somewhat less hostile but h e clearly saw a naval 'menace' from th e United States, distrusted Wilson, and urged Lloyd George to strike hard for British interests. 61 BD, 1st ser., v, chap. 2, 980-1065 62 Lloyd George regarded McCormick a s President-elect Harding's personal envoy. McCormick to Lodge, 22 Dec. 1920, Henry Cabot Lodge Papers, File 1921, Sept . to Dec. (mis-filed) ; Gedde s to Kerr, 3 Jan. 1921, Lloy d George

41 TH E ATLANTICIST S to March 1921, therefore, the Committe e of Imperial Defence (cao) , under revived pressur e from th e Admiralt y for a renewal o f capital ship construction and with the controversy over the value of the capital ship reopened in The Times, turned to the question.88 The er o assemble d o n 1 4 December 192 0 and listene d t o Lloy d George state the problem.64 They must decide what type of navy was necessary t o ensur e imperia l securit y an d line s o f communication , what constructio n migh t b e required, an d ho w to balance politica l and nava l considerations . Initially , Lloy d Georg e suggested , the y must decid e whic h powe r the y shoul d regar d a s the 'probabl e en emy.' They coul d eliminat e th e Europea n power s but 'Ther e were , however, tw o formidable new Power s in th e world , formidabl e today an d possibl y overwhelmingl y s o in a fe w year s time . Bot h a t present wer e friendly nations, and they were Japan an d the United States of America.' The Premier dismissed the possibility tha t Britain might face a hostile combination of the United States and Japan bu t their individua l nava l strength s presente d problems . Befor e 191 4 Britain ha d ignore d th e Unite d State s whe n calculatin g he r nava l requirements an d Lloyd George felt tha t the economic and strategi c grounds fo r that decisio n wer e stil l valid . Moreover , a decisio n t o enter int o nava l competitio n wit h th e Unite d State s woul d b e of greater significanc e even tha n tha t o f deciding t o ente r th e wa r i n 1914. A naval rac e woul d eventuall y rui n Britai n an d a s she owe d the Unite d State s a deb t o f £100 0 million, Washingto n coul d de mand immediat e cas h payment . Th e whol e affai r woul d perforc e be debate d publicl y and , reminiscent o f Anglo-Germa n relations , the pres s an d publi c opinio n woul d begi n 'snarling. ' I n col d har d Papers, F/60/4/11; for a less flattering view, Dressel (us charg é d'affaires, Berlin) t o W.H. Buckle r (u s Embassy, London), 30 Dec. 1920, Buckler t o Dressel, 15 Dec. 1920, Dressel to W.C. Castle (u s Stat e Department), 29 Dec. 1920, and Castle to Dressel, 17 Jan. 1921, E.L. Dressel Papers, b, MS Am., 1549, box 2 63Hankey note, 13 Dec. 1920, cro paper 263-B, 'Naval Shipbuilding Policy,' Cab. 4/7; Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, i, 220-1 64 Minutes of 134th meeting of cm, 14 Dec. 1920, Cab. 2/3 an d Lloyd George Papers, F/192/1/5; Lloyd George to Long, 1 4 Dec. 1920, Lloy d George Papers, F/34/1/56. Present, and all were either sceptics or hostile, were Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Curzon, Austen Chamberlain, Churchill, Eric Geddes, Beatty, Henry Wilson, Brock, Trenchard, Chatfield, and Hankey. Walter Long, close to resignation, was absent owing to ill health.

42 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y terms the cost to Britain, Lloyd George stated, woul d be the £100 0 million plus at least £ 100 million for actua l naval construction, and a comparison of Britain's national deb t an d populatio n figures with those of the Unite d States and Japan showed that Britain face d th e greatest resource s i n th e worl d fro m a seriousl y disadvantageou s position. A s Lloyd Georg e pointe d out , th e tas k wa s gigantic , th e significance o f an y decisio n wa s momentous , an d the y coul d no t commit Britain to a possibly disastrous naval rivalry except for th e most urgent and convincin g reasons. The decisio n was of such moment that he would suggest that it might be fatal to enter into competition with the United States until every means of amicable arrangement had been exhausted. ' Lloyd George, however, saw certain encouraging signs. High taxation was unpopular in the United States and the incoming Republican administration wa s as hostile to the Daniel s nava l programme as it was to th e League . Moreover, the Republican s seemed ready for a settlement wit h Britai n an d h e personall y favoure d negotiations , after consultatio n with Ambassador Geddes, on the followin g lines: ... to say, that we had no intention of embarking on a rivalry in respect of general supremacy at sea, but that we propose that each nation should be superior in her own seas. We, for instance, in the North Sea, the Mediter ranean, the Indian Seas, etc., while the United States should be conceded unchallenged superiorit y in her special seas. This was not challengin g American supremacy. If, on the other hand, Great Britain claimed complete supremacy in all seas, the United States would undoubtedly accep t the challenge, and this would eventually lead to a fight. This was one of the political considerations to be borne in mind.

Should a buildin g programm e b e necessary , th e committe e mus t consider technical matters and seek expert advice, and Lloyd George summarised the whol e task a s first deciding on the potentia l enemy and then deliberating o n the best method of combatting that enemy by land, sea, and air.65 65 In his letter to Long, Lloyd George wrote that he hoped to establish two subcommittees, one under Balfour t o 'choose' the potential enemy, and a second to consider technical problems. In reply, Long affirmed tha t on all political issues the Admiralty agreed with the cabinet, but that their main concern was to retain the supremacy of the seas. He felt that this problem outweighed all political, diplomatic, and economic considerations, for Britai n must retain

43 THE ATLANTICIST S Churchill, no t particularl y impresse d wit h th e Premier' s views , responded i n characteristi c fashion . Britai n mus t retain supremac y of the seas as the very basis of the Me of the nation, of its culture an d its prosperity, an d should plan in general terms to ensure supremacy rather tha n first identifying a specific enemy. Churchill could see no reason why the United State s should object, he opposed th e idea of an Anglo-American division of the seas, and seemed unmoved by the view that the grea t distances between Britain an d the United State s provided a measure of security. Churchil l the n warne d agains t calculating nava l powe r solel y i n post-Jutlan d dreadnought s and, broadening th e debate , urge d tha t the y conside r al l relevant nava l and political factors, such a s Britain's allianc e wit h Japan . H e personally favoure d the lin k with Japan , bu t Britai n coul d amen d th e alliance and, to avoid a naval race, she must not renew it until discussions on naval policy had bee n hel d wit h the ne w United State s administration. Lloyd George regarded the curtailing of the use of American naval forces, compellin g the Unite d States to maintain a large part o f her fleet in the Pacific , a s an advantage gained from th e Anglo-Japanese alliance, an d bot h Chamberlai n an d Curzo n welcome d sign s tha t some elements of United States opinion opposed naval preparedness . However, after these diversions and speculations, Beatt y brought th e meeting back to the central theme. The Admiralty had already stated that unless Britain reached an agreement with the United States they must decide on a building programme within one year from Octobe r 1919, i n order to secure equality in sea power with the next strongest nation. The Admiralty , after a stud y of the lesson s of the war , was not tied exclusively to battleships a s a yardstick of strength and would accept havin g three les s of such ships i n compariso n wit h th e nex t fleet, but, t o ensur e equality with th e secon d strongest power, construction must commence soon or Britain would lose her facilities for the productio n o f armou r plate. 68 Auste n Chamberlai n dismisse d both war as a solution to a naval race and naval competition with the United States as a solution to Britain's predicament, unless she could utilise dominio n resources , an d h e receive d th e suppor t o f Henr y Wilson wh o preferre d alliance s t o adjus t th e balanc e o f power i n naval supremacy, and he personally could not support a policy which permitted Britain to fall into second or third place among the naval powers ( Long to Lloyd George, 17 Dec. 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F/34/1/57). 66 Admiralty memorandum, 10 Dec. 1920, cm papers 261-B, Cab. 4/ 7

44 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y Britain's favour.67 Bonar Law virtually concluded th e debate, repeat ing tiie view he held on the eve of Grey's departur e fo r Washingto n in September 191 9 that onl y a direct challenge fro m Britai n would arouse th e Unite d State s an d provid e justificatio n fo r he r nava l programme. Britai n shoul d accep t th e attendan t risk , refrai n fro m competitive building, an d avoid antagonising the United States. War with the United States was not probable in the next five years and the new Republica n administratio n mos t likel y woul d b e unwillin g t o support th e aspiration s o f th e Nav y Board . Beatty , however , wa s emphatic in his response. The race was already on, the Republican s would complet e th e curren t nava l constructio n programme , an d Britain must act. The remainin g discussio n wa s cyclical , argumentative , an d no t particularly elevated . Lloy d George clearly leane d towar d th e ide a of usin g Japa n a s a counterweigh t t o an d a leve r o n th e Unite d States, even speculating on Japan's naval value in an Anglo-American war.88 He met wit h Churchill' s opposition , denouncin g th e ide a of basing naval policy on possible co-operatio n with Japan agains t th e United States . Th e Premier , however , preferred tha t polic y t o one which lef t Britai n a t th e merc y of the Unite d States . Supported b y Bonar Law , Austen Chamberlain , an d Curzon , Lloy d Georg e re peated hi s idea o f opening negotiation s with th e America n government, after consultatio n with Auklan d Geddes , to prevent a capital ship race wit h Japan an d the Unite d States . Th e meeting then de cided tha t Curzo n should recal l Geddes , afte r th e ambassado r ha d sounded ou t th e Hardin g administratio n bu t disguise d th e reaso n for his recall, and that Beatty should report to Lloyd George on possible economie s i n othe r categorie s o f warship s i f th e governmen t decided to build new capital ships. The ca o debat e o n 23 December wa s much narrower in scope. 69 Despite the Admiralty's recommendations for a capital ship buildin g 67 Collier, Brasshat, 320-1. Collier wrot e that Henry Wilson urged an alignment with European power s agains t th e Unite d States, bu t tha t Lloy d Georg e rejected the proposal . 68 Incongruously bu t characteristicall y Lloy d Georg e actuall y quote d hi s Rumanian confidant, Take Jonescu, to the effec t tha t Japan was preparing fo r war with the United States . 69 Minutes of 135th meeting of cm, 23 Dec. 1920, Cab. 2/3 an d Lloyd George Papers, F/192/1/5; Curzon and Chatfield were absent and Balfour was in attendance.

45 THE ATLANTICIST S programme and Beatty's protests, Lloyd George, backed by Churchil l and Chamberlain, insisted o n a comprehensive and expert re-examination o f al l relevan t financia l an d technica l considerations . Al l agreed, wit h Churchil l mos t reluctant, tha t th e one power standar d was an acceptable one, meaning the retention of a fleet equal to that of an y other singl e power , an d th e committe e decide d t o creat e a sub-committee under Bona r Law to report o n the capital shi p ques tion, and, further, to ask for an Admiralty study of auxiliary services necessary to supplement their proposed capital ship programme. This sub-committee wa s in addition t o the one to be chaire d b y Balfou r to stud y th e probabl e condition s resultin g fro m wa r betwee n th e empire, with or without allies, and various powers or groups of powers, i n th e ligh t o f thei r relativ e arme d an d economi c strengths. 70 Clearly Lloy d Georg e had carrie d th e meeting . Negotiation s wit h the Unite d State s woul d awai t Geddes' s persona l report , expert s would comment on the value of the capital ship , and, should negotiations wit h th e Unite d State s prov e fruitless , th e cabine t woul d know what type of naval programme would best fulfil Britain' s needs . In pursuance o f these decisions, Auklan d Geddes was recalled t o London in January and, leaving R.L . Craigie i n charg e o f th e em bassy, brought information both extremely disturbing and only faintly hopeful.71 O n the one hand he feared a n increase in American naval estimates, as the General Board of the Navy pressed for a new threeyear programm e t o ensur e America n naval equalit y wit h o r eve n superiority b y 192 7 ove r the combine d fleets of Britai n an d Japan . Moreover, eve n th e 191 6 programm e would produc e sixtee n post Jutland capita l ship s b y 192 5 an d th e Hears t pres s denounce d al l disarmament plan s a s subservienc e t o Britain , France , an d Japan . In addition , Senator s Lodg e an d Kno x an d elde r statesma n Elih u Root demanded that policy decision s wait on Harding's assumptio n of offic e an d that the Unite d States negotiate a multilateral disarma ment agreemen t onl y fro m a positio n o f strength . Th e appea l 701 have found no further evidence of this sub-committee and possibly it never met. The reference may have been to the Standing Defence Sub-Committee. 71 Curzon to Geddes, 12 Jan. 1921, FO/371/5667 ; Geddes to Curzon, 29 Dec. 1920 and 7 Jan. 1921, an d Craigie to Curzon, 28 Jan. and 1 1 Feb. 1921 , FO/414/247; Geddes to Kerr, 3 Jan. 1921 , Lloy d George Papers, F/60/4/11; Riddell diary, entries, 1 8 Dec. 1920,1 and 26 Jan. 1921, Riddell , Intimate Diary, 255, 259-60, and 271-3; Riddell noted Lloyd George's reaction a s one of disbelief mingled with depression .

46 ILLUSION S O F SECURIT Y of naval preparedness wa s not easily dissipated fro m th e public an d the professional mind.72 American resources were, in Geddes's opin ion, limitles s an d wer e matched by high level s o f anglophobia. Yet, congressional pressure s fo r arm s limitation , le d b y Senato r Borah , received widespread press support and, having forced Daniels on the defensive, ensured that completion o f the 1916 programme would be the limit of his achievement. Consequently, Geddes offered som e faint hope for an Anglo-American naval agreement. Study of the capital ship questio n i n Londo n progressed int o th e early months of 1921 but th e sub-committee' s reports , reflectin g th e evidence an d debate, wer e divided bot h o n the valu e of the capita l ship an d especiall y o n th e nee d fo r new construction. 73 Beatty an d Churchill, advocates of the capita l shi p an d a n immediate construc tion programme, wanted fou r capita l ships per yea r fo r four o r five years, followe d b y arm s limitatio n negotiation s wit h th e Unite d States and Japan. Bonar Law and the other members, however, wer e more impressed with political and economic considerations and these differences o f opinion resulte d in divide d counse l an d compromise . Partly a s a resul t o f this compromis e th e Britis h government' s de cisions were plural an d eve n somewha t ambiguous . Lord Lee , now first lord of the Admiralty, would initiate appropriat e informa l moves and public gesture s t o secure a naval agreemen t wit h th e Hardin g administration. However , a s announce d i n th e nava l estimate s fo r 72 American sources confirm that Lodge and President Harding supported only multilateral disarmament negotiated from a position of strength, and regarded Borah's efforts a s premature, politically dangerous, and pursuing false economies. In addition, Lodge saw the value of the navy as a lever on Japan to ensure that Asia n problems were settled in America's favour. Bora h was thus an acute embarrassment to both the retiring and the incoming executives from December 1920 to July 1921, although Secretary of State Hughes saw the value of his campaign as a defensive manoeuvre if Borah's proposals could be adopted at the most suitable moment ( Harding to Lodge, 20 Feb. 1921, Lodge to Harding, 25 Feb. 1921, Lodge Papers, file 1921; Col. Théo. Roosevelt Jr. to Denby, 8 Aug. 1921, Edwin Denby Papers, file 1918-21, Aug. 1921). 73Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, i, 221-7; Fry, 'Anglo-AmericanCanadian Relations,' 245-7; Churchill to Balfour, 26 Feb. 1921, Young, Balfour, 419 ; Bonar Law, Beatty, Long, Home, and Eric Geddes comprised the sub-committee.

47 THE ATLANTICIST S 1921-2, Britain woul d desig n an d plan t o lay dow n before th e en d of 1921 four new 'super-Hoods' at a preliminary cost of &2H million , in order t o modernise her battl e fleet, replace obsolet e vessels , an d build to the one power standard.74 Next i n importanc e t o nava l matter s stoo d th e questio n o f wa r debts, hardly less pressing and embarrassing and equally frustrating. Britain, a s part of a mutual cancellation o f interallied debts , hope d to be relieved of her specific debt to the United States and, as a suppliant, wa s agai n dependen t o n a gestur e o f understandin g fro m Washington. However, the Unite d States made no such gesture and the genera l tone of the negotiation s wa s less than cordial, as shown in the exchange s between Austen Chamberlain an d th e secretar y of the Treasury , D.F . Houston. 75 Chamberlain , applaude d b y Bona r Law, state d tha t h e regarded th e debate o n a multilateral cancella tion of debts as closed. Britain had made a proposal, the United States had rejecte d it , and Britain would not repeat th e suggestion . Moreover, denouncin g Houston' s inferenc e tha t th e Unite d State s ha d gained nothing from the war whereas Britain and her allies had made significant economi c an d territoria l advances , Chamberlai n insiste d that Britain's wa r effor t ha d bee n a giganti c strai n an d had merel y produced ne w responsibilities . I n contrast , th e Chancello r o f th e Exchequer asserted, the Unite d States had refuse d t o meet her obli gations and, on the questio n o f th e Turkis h mandate, had actuall y accused Britai n o f attempting t o entangl e her . Surely if a mandat e were a source of economic benefit th e Unite d States would accept a friendly Britis h offe r t o shar e i n th e advantages , bu t i f a mandat e were a burdensome ensnarement then the United States should recognise what Britain had gallantl y undertaken. Chamberlain, in typica l sceptic style, then concluded by assuring Houston that he hoped for cordial Anglo-American relations, but that the United States must be fair and just. Once th e Sp a Conference was concluded, Lloy d Georg e mad e a personal appea l t o Presiden t Wilson , i n a n attemp t t o reviv e thei r 74 Craig ( Lee's deputy ), statement, House of Commons, 17 March 1921,139, Debates, 5 ser., Cois. 1763-78; Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, explanatory of the naval estimates, 1921-2, Cmd. 1191; Fry, 'Anglo-AmericanCanadian Relations,' 347-51; Young, Powerful America, 48-52 75 Chamberlain to Houston, 12 March 1920, in reply to Houston's telegram, 5 March 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F/31/1/18

48 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y Peace Conference dialogue on financial matters and secure a responsible Unite d State s policy. 78 H e aske d Wilson fo r a ne w roun d of Anglo-American co-operation to cure Europe's ills and to diffuse th e responsibility. More specifically, Lloyd George stated that a moderate reparation settlemen t depended t o a grea t exten t on a multilatera l cancellation of interallied war debts and that the funding of Britain's debt to the United States was delayed because of the interrelationshi p of al l war debts . Lloyd George's appea l brought no early response, however, and on 3 November 1920 the British cabinet met to discuss the debt questio n without the benefit o f Wilson's reply. 77 They concluded that the outlook seemed bleak, United States opinion appeared to regar d Britain' s polic y a s a selfis h attemp t t o avoi d payin g he r debts, th e presidentia l electio n campaig n had bre d confusion , an d the United States could demand immediate payment of the interest due. The cabinet were not united in their views about the respectiv e Democratic an d Republican attitude s o n the deb t question , but, as Harding's anticipated victor y could perhaps be regarded as a defea t for anglophob e element s i n th e Unite d States , Britai n woul d no t resume negotiation s unti l Hardin g too k office . I n th e meantime , Geddes should try an d find out whethe r Wilson had eve r receive d Lloyd George's letter. In fact Wilson's reply was sent that sam e day but, predictably, i t offered little. 78 He could not act without congressional approval an d Congress would neve r accep t th e cancellatio n o f Britain' s deb t i n return fo r Britai n remittin g allie d debt s owe d t o her . Th e Unite d States would never remit any other allied debts either, nor would she concede an y connectio n betwee n reparation s an d debts . Delays , Wilson wrote , wer e merel y embarrassin g an d dangerou s becaus e ultimately the United States would have to collect both accumulate d and curren t interest. Wilson suggested, therefore, that Britai n send a special representative t o Washington to open negotiations t o convert he r deman d debts int o longter m obligations . Othe r tha n that, United States policy must wait on the election results, though Wilson expressed his personal hope that ultimately the United States would co-operate unselfishly. 76Lloyd George to Geddes, 15 July 1920, ibid., F/60/4/6, and Lloyd George to Wilson, 5 Aug. 1920, ibid., F/60/1/28 77 Conclusions of cabinet meeting, 3 Nov. 1920, Cab. 23/23 78 Wilson to Lloyd George, 3 Nov. 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F/60/1/31

49 THE ATLANTICIST S Reports fro m Washingto n confirme d Wilson' s assessment 79 an d emphasized the widespread oppositio n to cancellation, th e mountin g charges of fraudulent behaviour against Britain, and the tendency to link the debt s questio n wit h th e campaig n to reduce taxes . Geddes felt tha t domesti c economi c problem s woul d increas e th e clamou r for paymen t b y Britai n rathe r tha n forc e cancellatio n and , more over, he felt that Britain woul d merely secure worse terms by delaying a settlement. Cold comfor t indeed, an d the final cabinet debat e o f 1920 on this question understandabl y institute d rathe r gloom y proceedings. 80 Chamberlain pointed ou t that b y refusing t o convert her sight deb t into a longterm debt Britai n had ignored her obligations, and , whil e the Unite d State s wa s unlikel y t o deman d paymen t o f th e whol e sum, Geddes had warne d o f possible renewe d demands that Britai n fund he r debt an d pay the accrued interest at a cost of £8 0 million . In tii e ensuin g debat e som e members o f th e cabine t strongl y de nounced th e Unite d State s fo r takin g unfai r advantag e o f Britain' s strained econom y an d fo r jeopardizin g he r nava l position . Other s feared tha t if Britain admitte d th e principl e o f an obligation t o pa y her wa r debt s sh e would plac e hersel f a t th e merc y o f the Unite d States. The general feeling at one stage in the debate was that Britai n should den y tha t he r deb t wa s a n ordinar y commercia l on e an d should refus e t o pay. 81 Finally , however , th e cabine t agree d tha t although the United States was selfishly undermining Britain's trade , she coul d no t repudiate he r debt s an d mus t send a n exper t repre sentative to open negotiations in Washington. By early May, however, the cabinet , wary of gestures fro m A.W . Mellon, Houston's successo r at the Unite d State s Treasury, wa s still debating whethe r the y coul d expec t mor e sympath y an d under standing fro m Harding' s administration . Furthe r dela y wa s incon sistent wit h nationa l dignity , damage d th e nation' s credit , an d continued t o injur e Anglo-America n relations, bu t th e governmen t decided i n fact agains t reopenin g negotiation s a t tha t time , an d on 79 Geddes to Curzon, 2 Dec. 1920, ro/371/4548; Craigie to Curzon, 17 Feb.

1921, FO/371/5667 SOConclusions of cabinet meeting, 17 Dec. 1920, Cab. 23/23 81 Only Lord Inverforth and Sir A. Mond argued firmly against default an d for funding the debt, although Curzon warned that the Republican administration would be harsher than its predecessor and advised against delay.

50 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y this second fundamental questio n there seemed little sustenance for theAÜanticists.82 Other problems , whil e o f perhap s les s direc t importance , wer e almost equally distressing . With som e rationalisation, Britain coul d view th e debri s an d th e unfinishe d Europea n and Middl e Easter n business o f th e Peac e Conferenc e as a direc t resul t o f th e lac k of United States co-operation. The Reparations Commission had become a monument to French extremis m an d Lloy d Georg e cited th e ab sence o f a Unite d State s representativ e t o suppor t moderat e poli cies a s th e principa l reason . Th e Adriati c confrontatio n betwee n Italy and Yugoslavia simmered and boiled and United States obstructions and delays seemed responsible in part.88 The Middle East presented a triple problem. First, as Curzon told Grey, 84 the entire are a was in turmoi l owing t o delay s i n drawin g u p th e Turkis h peac e treaty, th e chie f obstacle s bein g Wilson' s illnes s an d th e resultin g uncertainty abou t Unite d State s policy . Second , th e Middl e East ern mandates question was further disturbe d b y United States accusations of crude imperialism coupled with her own refusal t o accept a mandate. 86 Sh e seemed unable t o decid e whethe r th e mandate s were terribl e burden s whic h sh e mus t avoid , o r lucrativ e asset s seized by Britain, but, demanding equal treatment for the interest s and nationals o f all states i n th e mandat e areas , th e Unite d State s favoured th e latter assessment. Finally, an d at the cor e of the mandates question, oil rivalries were involved with the Standard Oil Company pressing Washington to protect its exploration and exploitation rights, which they felt were threatened b y British oil interests. Ged des, notin g the intimat e relationshi p betwee n Wilson' s administra tion, the Standard Oil Company, the Navy Department, and the press, forecast aggressiv e American policies t o secur e cancellatio n o f pre 82 Conclusions of cabinet meeting, 10 May 1921, Cab. 23/25 83 Lloyd George and Clemenceau to Wilson, 16 Feb. 1920, and J.W. Davis to

Curzon, 25 Feb. 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F/60/1/24, and 25 84Foreign Office to Grey, 22 Oct. 1919, ibid., F/60/3/11. Grey, however, was more concerned than Curzon about possible United State s hostility t o th e Anglo-Persian treaty ( Grey to Curzon, 17 Oct. 1919 and Curzon to Lloyd George, 9 Nov. 1919, ibid., F/12/2/4). 85 Churchill to Lloyd George, 9 June 1921, Lloyd George to Churchill, 11 June 1921, ibid., F/9/3/51 and 54; Grey to Curzon, 29 Oct. 1919, ibid. , F/60/3/ 15; J.W. Davis to Curzon, 12 May and 28 July 1920. FO/414/246

51 THE ATLANTICIST S war arrangement s an d t o forc e ne w concession s fro m Britai n i n Mesopotamia. Furthermore, Geddes warned that these policies would be accompanie d b y a propaganda campaig n to arous e fear s abou t the exhaustio n of domesti c American resources an d th e danger s of future dependenc e o n reserves under British control. Inevitably this campaign woul d b e anglophob e i n ton e an d Gedde s offere d littl e hope either that the influence of the oil companies would decline or that th e polic y o f th e ne w Republica n administratio n woul d b e different fro m tha t o f it s predecessor . Gedde s suggeste d counter propaganda an d even economic ripostes, and Curzon, while avoiding such extremism , lectured th e America n ambassador on the legalit y and th e moralit y o f Britain' s policies , an d o n th e frailtie s o f th e American case. Of course the link s between the Britis h government, the Admiralty, and th e oi l companies were just as close as those of their American counterparts, and the exchanges were almost as acrimonious a s the stake s involved were high. 86 Clearl y also , o n thes e questions, the Atlanticist case seemed transparently frail . Beneath these major issue s were more minor irritants which, in a cumulative way, also helped undermine what mutual confidence an d cordiality remained in Anglo-American relations. Londo n and Washington differe d ove r the statu s of the islan d of Yap, a focal point in the trans-Pacifi c cable system , as the Stat e Departmen t demande d international control while the Foreign Office insisted that the Council of Four a t th e Peac e Conferenc e had accepte d th e inclusio n of Yap in Japan's mandate area. This problem, focussing on the question of whethe r Wilso n ha d mad e a specifi c reservatio n on Ya p in th e Council o f Fou r an d projecte d int o th e debat e withi n th e Unite d States on the ratificatio n of the peace treaty, was an extremely delicate one, for both the veracit y of the participant s an d the accurac y of Hankey' s secretaria t wer e involved. 87 Charge s o f Britis h decei t were no t reall y fa r fro m th e surfac e an d th e questio n o f whethe r Balfour o r other s had full y reveale d th e wartim e secret treatie s t o Wilson and to members of his administration, a question perpetuate d 86 Geddes to Curzon, 29 July, 24 Sept., 26 Nov., and 9 Dec. 1920, and Curzon to J.W. Davis, 9 Aug. 1920, ro/414/246; Rowland and Cadman, Ambassador ior Oil 87 S.P. Waterlow ( Foreign Office ) to Kerr, 3 Dec. 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F/13/1/36. This letter is an effective summar y of the natur e of the contro versy.

52 ILLUSION S O F SECURIT Y by the Shantun g controversy and b y Wilson's defenc e of the peac e treaty, pointe d i n the sam e direction.88 In a similar vai n complaint s from th e United States of British interference with the trans-Atlantic cable system to the detriment of United States commercial and political interests an d th e roun d of abrasiv e negotiations in Washingto n toward the end of 1920 on the whole question of trans-Atlantic cable facilities did little to improve the tone of Anglo-American relations.89 Indeed, Geddes reported tha t Wilso n regarde d th e cable s proble m as a test of British good faith, as a measurement of London's willing ness to co-operate with Washingto n rather tha n wit h Paris , an d a s the fina l opportunit y t o influenc e th e Unite d State s decisio n o n League membership. In addition , the Stat e Departmen t threatene d a press campaign against Britain or the closure of her cable facilitie s in the United States should Britain fail to support America's claims. The only comforting sign o n this issu e k y i n th e fac t tha t Wilso n seemed eve n more upse t wit h Franc e an d migh t appea l t o Lloy d George for Anglo-American co-operation. Two other problems, widel y differen t an d ebbin g an d flowing in their significance, seemed to defy solution . First stood the perennia l Irish question, its hysteria and fanaticism fanned by the war and the Peace Conference , rekindled b y the hea t o f the Unite d States elec tions o f 1920 , an d gratefully utilised b y convinced anglophobes an d anxious politicians o f both parties. Wiseman, for instance, suggeste d that the potent Irish weapon was the only one left to Britain's enemies and that Lodge, ashamed but determined , was bidding for Irish support. Gedde s interpreted J.M . Cox's nomination by the Democrati c party convention as the work of Tammany Hall, the Irish bosses, and the eas t coas t factions , an d a s revenge fo r th e failur e t o inser t a n Irish plan k i n the platfor m and for the rejectio n o f Al Smith. They rejected N.H . Davis because he was Wilson's man and because they regarded hi m a s a n anglophil. 90 Grey , reporting o n th e strengt h of anglophobia i n the Unite d States , tol d Curzo n that Irishme n wer e 88A significant ramification als o emerged when Britain argued, not altogethe r consistently or convincingly in American eyes, that while she must honour her wartime secret treaty commitments to Japan, she was in no sense committed by die Anglo-Japanese alliance to adopt a hostile attitude towar d the Unite d States in the event of a confrontation between Washington and Tokyo. 89 Geddes to Curzon, 3 and 29 Nov. 1920, FO/414/246 ; Fry, 'Anglo-AmericanCanadian Relations,' 133-4 90J. Macpherson (Iris h Office) t o Lloyd George, 7 July 1919, Wisema n to Ian

53 THE ATLANTICIST S everywhere and that the antagonis m of the Iris h wa s at the roo t o f all Britain' s trouble s wit h th e Unite d States. 91 Grey' s analysi s was orthodox enough and hi s solutio n was the familiarl y elusive one of some polic y o f self-governmen t for Ireland , bu t broade r an d eve n more dangerou s consideration s wer e involved . I n Jun e 191 9 th e British Cónsul-Genera l i n Chicag o reporte d that , amids t th e usua l screaming about the 'plunder of Ireland' at a three-thousand strong rally, he heard demands for the freedo m o f India, Egypt , and South Africa.92 Si r Aukland Geddes, in October 1920 , ascribed 'an hysteria of hatred' against England 'to the influence of the Irish , Indian seditionists, and Germa n groups, an d al l those political faction s in th e United States whose world activities are hindered by the machinery of law and order maintained by the British Empire,'93 and, in January 1921, h e reported on plans to weaken or destroy the Britis h empire: The support that Ireland has been receiving is part of the general plan, so is the welcome given to revolutionary Indians and Egyptians. Imperium Britannicum delendum est. England I suppose ultimately is to be purchased and kept as an interesting museum -The Old Home Land - a sort of glorified Mount Vemon managed by a committee of the Daughters of the American Revolution.94

By September 1921 Philip Kerr seemed convinced of the existenc e of links between the American Sinn Fein and certain Indian, Egyptian, and Bolshevi k groups an d al l thos e i n Franc e an d German y who hated Britain. 95 H e sa w a n internationa l conspirac y le d b y Irish Americans seekin g t o smas h th e Britis h empir e o n th e rock s of nationalist republicanism in Ireland, India , an d Egypt while Britai n lay exhausted and impotent because of the war. Kerr's answer, typically, was to unite Ireland with the empire and to show the Irish tha t others sough t t o us e an d manipulat e the m fo r siniste r purposes . Clearly then the Irish questio n was not a, narrow or limited one , bu t Malcolm, 1 July 1919, an d S. Watt (Dublin) to Davies, 23 July 1919, Lloy d George Papers F/46/1/8 and 9; Geddes to Curzon, 8 July 1920, FO/414/248 91 Grey to Curzon, 29 Sept. 1919, an d Grey to Lloyd George , 6 Oct. 1919 , Lloyd George Papers, F/60/3/6 and 7 92British Consulat e Genera l (Chicago ) t o charg é d'affaires (Washingto n Embassy), 9 June 1919, ibid., F/46/1/8 93 Geddes to Curzon , 18 Oct. 1920, ibid., F/60/4/8 94Geddes to Kerr, 3 Jan. 1921, ibid., F/60/4/11 95Kerr to Lloyd George, 14 Sept 1921, ibid., F/34/2/7

54 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y was an issue that could affec t th e future of the whole empire and, in any case, while 'Cromwell remained in Hell' Ireland would bedevi l Anglo-American relations. More difficul t t o asses s and evaluat e wa s th e questio n o f diplo matic representatio n i n Londo n an d Washingto n respectively . I n recognition o f the significanc e and peculiaritie s o f the Washingto n embassy, the Lloyd George government rid themselves of the ortho dox and tragic Si r Cecil Spring-Rice in Januar y 1918 an d opte d fo r special representation. 98 Thi s decision , preface d i n th e discussion s of Ma y 1917 o n the respective merit s of Grey, Lord Northcliffe, an d Austen Chamberlain,97 and in the special missions headed by Balfour, Northcliffe, an d Lord Reading, turned the Washington embassy into something o f a revolvin g door . Meanwhile , Si r Willia m Wisema n and Frederick Dixon, editor of the Boston Christian Science Monitor, provided quit e brilliant , unorthodox , and indispensabl e continuit y until the fall of 1919, usually by way of personal contacts with Colonel House an d others. 98 Lor d Readin g performe d successfull y thoug h intermittently as ambassador until May 1919,99 and Sir C. Barclay and then Si r R. Lindsay, a s chargés d'affaires , fille d th e interi m perio d while likely and unlikely candidates for the post of ambassador were feverishly sounde d out. 100 The search was revealing an d sometime s bizarre becaus e th e governmen t coul d no t selec t a n opponen t o f Home Rule, Balfour feared the charg e that they were convenientl y 96 Spring-Rice still awaits his historian, both contemporary and historical judgments of him vary, but the weight of opinion is condemnatory and some of it quite vicious (Hanke y to Lloyd George, 20 Oct 1917 , citin g Colone l E.D . Swinton and J.M. Keynes, ibid., F/23/1/25; Hyde, Reading, 234-6). 97 Cecil to Balfour, 1 7 and 21 May 1917, an d Balfour to Cecil, 20 and 22 May 1917, Balfou r Papers, 49738. Cecil and Balfour preferred Grey; Lloyd George, Curzon, and Milner, however, regarded Gre y as too pacifist; Lloyd George wanted a businessman or Northcliffe, everyon e else condemned Northcliffe , and the cabinet an d King George v then turned to Chamberlain. Grey' s principal merit was his intimate relationship with House. 98 Willert, The Road to Safety; Hyde , Reading, 234-6. Dixon, a British subject, appears frequently in the Balfour and Cecil papers and in relevant FO/800 files. As an unorthodox channel of communication he deserves further study. 99Hyde, Reading, 234-312 100 Curzon to Lloyd George, 1,14,23,30 July and 3 Aug. 1919, an d Lloyd George to Curzon, 10 July 1919, Lloy d George Papers, p/12/1/20,25,26,28, 30 and 34; Borden to Lloyd George, 13 Feb. 1919 , an d Kerr to Borden, 16

55 THE ATLANTICIST S rusticating eithe r th e Tor y o r di e radica l leade r i n th e Hous e of Lords, J.W. Lowther confessed that he di d no t like Americans and that hi s wif e activel y dislike d them , an d som e hinted tha t Auste n Chamberlain migh t gras p a t th e pos t t o escap e th e trial s o f th e Exchequer for which he was not suited. Finally, Grey left on his special an d ill-fated mission which lasted from Septembe r to December 1919. Within weeks Grey, recognisin g the futility of his position, reported tha t any hopes that a new phase of Anglo-America n cordiality an d co-operatio n woul d ensu e fro m his personal contact s were an illusion, for Wilson was unapproach able, Hous e wa s i n eclipse , an d Wilson' s Europea n an d anglophi l policies wer e suspect. 101 Gre y himself the n starte d th e searc h fo r his ow n successor , suggestin g Reading , Walte r Runciman , an d Babington Smith, but, ideally, H.A.L . Fisher, historian , genuin e liberal, and a scholar who could create the vital dialogue with American universities an d intellectuals fro m whic h rapport over Ireland migh t result.102 Clearly the search was still for a special kind of representa tive rather tha n for a career diploma t and Harmar Greenwood suggested that Aukland Geddes was qualified, as a Scotch Presbyterian, a person loyal to Lloyd George, a university man with business contacts, and someone acceptable t o the Canadian government. 108 This nomination obviousl y received suppor t an d i n Apri l 192 0 Geddes went t o Washingto n fo r a prolonge d tenure , onl y t o b e smuggle d ashore in New York for fear of hostile demonstrations and to live for a long period under the threat of violence to his family. Geddes grew in experience, h e rapidly establishe d a personal relationshi p wit h Sec retary of State Colby, 104 ultimately he seemed to satisfy hi s employers, an d he lef t Washingto n only afte r a tragic acciden t whic h lef t Feb. 1919, Borden Papers, oc no 474; Wiseman to I. Malcolm (BED Paris), 3 July 1919, Balfour Papers, 49741; Curzo n to Balfour, 23 May, 16 and 27 June, 3, 6 and 20 July 1919, and Balfour to Curzon, 9 June 1919, ibid., 49734. Balfour, Borden, Sydney Buxton^Austen Chamberlain, Lords Crewe, Finlay, Peel, Grey, Haldane, and Salisbury, the Duk e of Devonshire, H. Foster , J.W. Lowther (the Speaker), and the Provost of Trinity College Dublin were all approached or suggested as possible candidates. 101 Grey to Lloyd George, 5 Oct. 1919, Lloyd George Papers, F/60/3/7 102 Gre y to Lloyd George, 5 Oct. and 11 Nov. 1919, ibid., F/60/3/7 and 8 103 Hamar Greenwood to Lloyd George, 3 Jan. 1920, ibid., F/19/2/3; Geddes , Forging of a Family, 32 3 104 Gedde s to Curzon, 28 May 1920, FO/414/246

58 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y him virtually blind, and t o resounding applause . I n hi s early year s as ambassador, however, he was les s than satisfactory , many of his reports wer e inconsistent an d unorthodox , hi s phraseology suffere d from hi s medica l training , hi s despatc h o f 1 5 April 1921 , causin g Curzon to question his mental balance, must rank as one of the most extraordinary diplomati c report s ever , an d Curzo n wa s quic k t o seize on his indiscretions.105 In sum, and despite Geddes' s improved touch, British representation in Washington was uneven an d incon sistent an d th e necessar y diplomati c lubricant s wer e ofte n applie d inadequately to the machinery of Anglo-American relations. Equally , neither of Walter Hiñes Page's successors, John W. Davis and George Harvey, an d especiall y th e latter , satisfactoril y represente d th e United State s i n London , neithe r establishe d dee p rappor t wit h Lloyd George's government, and the circle of inadequate representa tion wa s complete. 108 Th e casualt y i n chie f wa s Anglo-American accord. Faced wit h suc h disheartenin g an d embarrassin g developments i n 1919 an d 1920 the Atlanticists were in retreat. Th e debate had con tinued abou t th e principle s whic h shoul d underli e Britis h foreig n policy but, as 1920 drew to a close, the creation of an Atlantic entente seemed an unlikely prospect. Yet a final opportunity seemed to present itself in 1921, offerin g prospects for Anglo-American co-operation and emergin g fro m Pacifi c an d Fa r Easter n problem s whic h wer e themselves part of the unfinishe d busines s of the peacemaking . Th e idea o f using th e settlemen t o f Pacifi c an d Fa r Easter n issue s a s a vehicle t o create the Atlantic entente was not a wild drea m and indeed wa s i n som e ways th e mos t logica l cours e o f action . Bot h Britain and the United States had territorial possessions or dominions in the Pacific and their navies sought to preserve the security of that region. The y were deepl y involve d i n th e economic , financial , an d 105 Gedde s to Curzon, 15 April 1921, Curzo n to Geddes, 18 and 23 May 1921 , and Geddes to Curzon, 20 and 25 May 1921, Lloy d George Papers, F/13/2/19 and 25 . Curzo n reprimanded Geddes fo r references made to Europea n politics, Geddes protested, blaming deliberate press misrepresentation, and Curzon actually apologised. 106 Thi s view of Davis is at bes t an interim on e an d Readin g gave Davis unqualified praise to House (Hyde, Reading, 314). My assessment of Harvey stems from his conduct in 1921 .

57 THE ATLANTICIST S commercial life of the orient and their missionaries were active. Finally, immigration and broader racial issues concerne d both London and Washington, an d Japan had alread y challenge d th e statu s quo in Asia. The world war had disrupted the balance of power in the Far East, eliminated Germany , reduce d Russia' s presence , an d give n Japa n virtually a free hand . Japanese occupation of Shantung and island s in the North Pacific accompanied increased political and commercial pressure on China, Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia, and both Britain and the Unite d States could no t but recognis e th e threa t to Pacifi c security, to their dominion s and possessions, and t o the integrit y of China. Japanese-American relations had reached a low point a t th e Peace Conference , a naval race an d racia l antagonism s threatened to erupt, and rumours of war were heard on both sides of the Pacific . In fact th e United States navy had alread y designated Japan as the most likely enemy of the futur e an d Hawai i seeme d vulnerable. 107 Britain herself, despite their alliance datin g from Januar y 1902, had ample cause for concern about Japan's lack of frankness an d dubious policies. Indeed, without a n exces s of imagination Whitehall coul d envisage complications involving the stability of the whole area fro m Hong Kong to India. Australian alarm about the growth of Japanese naval power matched evidence of her penetration of South East Asia. Moreover, Japan's unco-operative attitude towar d the financial consortium an d he r design s o n th e Chines e Easter n an d Sout h Man churian railways accompanie d her discriminator y administratio n at Tsingtao and act s of apparent barbarism in Korea. 108 Some of these problems ha d provide d opportunities fo r Anglo-American co-operation, but althoug h Curzon lecture d Ambassado r Chinda an d Secre tary o f Stat e Lansin g presse d Ministe r Debuch i o n occasions , co-ordinated Anglo-America n representations wer e rare . Indeed , over the questio n of Japanese occupatio n o f Eastern Siberia , whil e Curzon accepted th e fait accompli, Wilson and then Charle s Evans 107 Wheeler , Th e Unite d States Navy and Wa r in the Pacific'; "Th e United States Navy and the Japanese Enemy'; Prelude to Pearl Harbour 108 Memorandu m by the Genera l Staff, 5 Aug. 1920, 'On the present political and military situation in China,' BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 86, 90-1; cabinet debate, 22 Oct. 1919, Cab. 23/12; W.M. Hughes to Lloyd George, 7Oct. 1919, Lloyd George Papers, F/28/3/42 ; Fry, 'Anglo-American-Canadian Relations , 209 11 and 314

58 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y Hughes declare d th e territoria l integrit y o f Russi a a s a n ai m o f United States policy.109 This failur e to secur e Anglo-American co-operation i n Asia stemmed basicall y fro m divergen t attitude s towar d Japan , fo r Britain' s partial nava l an d militar y abdicatio n fro m th e Pacifi c seeme d t o dictate continue d friendshi p wit h her ally , an d financial stringency made th e recreatio n o f Britain' s nava l powe r i n th e Pacifi c impos sible. I n Britain' s view , th e rehabilitatio n o f Chin a coul d no t b e achieved a t Japan' s expense , Japan's nee d fo r outlets must be met , and a n Asian barrier t o Bolshevis m mus t not b e lightl y discarded . Until 1921 , therefore , Anglo-American co-operation in the Fa r Eas t and Pacific had been hesitating an d rare and this fact itself coul d b e cited as evidence against the Atlanticist case. But the areas of initial concern and commitment remained, American eyes could be turne d more easil y t o Asi a tha n t o Europe , an d th e ver y seriousnes s an d urgency of the Pacific problems demanded an immediate attempt a t a settlement. Moreover , the questio n o f naval disarmament focussed attention o n the Pacifi c power s rathe r tha n o n Europe , an d a t th e very worst there stood the remote possibility of a war between Japan and the Unite d State s in which Britain' s positio n would a t bes t b e tragically difficult . Clearly Britai n hope d t o avoi d makin g a choic e betwee n Japa n and the United States, wanting neither to sever links nor risk a breach with eithe r power , an d al l thes e consideration s becam e focusse d ultimately on the question of the renewal of that las t remnant of the old diplomacy, the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The question of renewal was a matter for decision apparentl y b y 13 July 1921, an d the whole range o f Fa r Eastern , naval , an d imperia l securit y problem s wer e affected. Viewe d fro m London , Atlanticist s coul d se e th e renewa l question a s the opportunit y t o secure a sufficient measur e of AngloAmerican co-operatio n t o provid e th e basi s of mor e sustaine d an d far-reaching co-ordination . T o mor e sceptica l observer s thi s coul d be the final test and the last occasion for a gesture from Washington . To those who were antagonisti c towar d Atlanticism , the renewa l of the Anglo-Japanes e allianc e woul d b e th e occasio n fo r anothe r wearisome but vital debate in which they must ensure the retention of traditional realism as the foundation of British foreign policy. The debate over the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance would 109 Fry , 'Anglo-American-Canadia n Relations, ' 149-50 , 207-8 ; Gedde s t o Curara, 11 July 1920, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 67, 70-1

59 THE ATLANTICIST S provide the vehicle in 1921 which the Atlanticists could use, but why did 192 1 seem t o offe r fres h encouragemen t an d th e possibilit y o f improved relation s betwee n Londo n an d Washington ? Th e answe r lay i n th e recentl y electe d Republica n administratio n o f Presiden t Harding which, althoug h providing the prospec t o f mixed blessing s at best, nevertheless seemed to offer sufficien t hope . In the first place the myster y of who held powe r i n Washington woul d dissolve , th e vacuum woul d be filled, hopefull y vigorou s government would re turn, an d a t leas t meaningfu l talks coul d begin . Secondly , despit e the us e of anglophobe an d isolationis t sentiment s an d th e courtin g of the Irish vote in the election, Harding's victory heralded the return of section s of the ol d Republican elite who were ideologically close r to the Conservative base of the Lloyd George coalition. Some of them were anglophil and all of them would reject ties with the radical-lef t in Britain.110 The death of Theodore Roosevelt was a blow to Atlanticists like Lee, but at least they could hope for less doctrinal idealism, a reduction in public disputes , and more practical co-operatio n fro m the United States both on vital issues and broader questions. As th e Committe e o f Imperia l Defenc e ha d speculated , a ne w administration takin g offic e i n Marc h 1921 might mak e the gran d gesture although the evidence at hand was at best indefinite.111 The leaders o f th e Republica n part y wer e no t oratoricall y Tri g navy, ' Congress ha d checke d Daniel s effectively , an d th e movemen t le d by Senator Borah, however suspect his motives,112 offered som e hopeful signs . Furthermore, Geddes reported tha t demands for reductions in defenc e expenditur e emergin g fro m th e mid-West , an d fo r ta x cuts as a preface to the election s of 1922, would clearly be popular . Consequently Lord Lee, after public statement s in March, launched his informa l bu t officia l approache s i n April . H e enjoye d Lloy d George's support, but by June Lee's initiatives ran aground on Edwin Derby's obstructionism and deliberate procrastination, for the United States refuse d t o embar k o n bilatera l an d prematur e negotiations . 110 Lon g to Lloyd George, 16 Feb. 1919, and Geddes to Curzon, 29 June 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F/33/2/13 and F/60/4/4. Geddes, on balance, felt that a Democratic victory would be unfortunate for Britain. 111 Gedde s to Curzon, 17 June 1921, FO/414/247 112 Historian s have made much of Borah's crusade but Gedde s dismissed his activities as pure politics, designe d to show that he opposed navalism and militarism an d aime d at securin g places in the cabine t fo r his nominees ( Geddes to Curzon, 5 Jan. 1921, FO/414/247 ).

60 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y At least, however, Lloyd George had thought the attempt worthwhile, his leftwing political opponents expected nothing less, and the signal from President Harding on naval disarmament was not too far distant . The question of war debts was even more complex and the British cabinet merel y procrastinated . The y wer e unsur e a s t o wha t th e Republican victory meant, the electio n statements were ambiguous, and few could disagree with Curzon and Geddes that th e evidenc e suggested that Harding must demand that the allies pay their debts. Yet Britai n coul d hop e fo r greate r understandin g despit e certai n discouraging reports, serious economic problems related to declining American exports might encourage new approaches, and the government expected Harding's administration to regard th e economi c revival o f German y and o f Europ e generall y a s a matte r o f urgen t concern. Arthur Willert, The Times' Washingto n correspondent an d reputedly an Atlanticist, noted, despite Harding's pledge to isolationism, a desire to water the wine of French policies on reparations and , consequently, suggeste d tha t th e Unite d State s might increas e he r financial an d economi c involvement t o secure , throug h Germany , European recovery. 113 Against this evidence, however, both Atlanti cism an d especiall y th e 'Lafayett e tradition ' wer e tarnishe d i n th e United States and hopes for an accommodation on the debts question were tenuous at best. Much of course would depend on the personnel in and the balanc e of Harding's cabinet and on the relationship of the executive to Congress, and o n these critical point s Lloy d Georg e and hi s colleague s wrestled mainl y wit h Geddes' s remarkabl e reports . Earl y i n Jun e 1920 Geddes had state d that, despit e the Iris h question , if the righ t man were electe d i n November there wa s som e prospect o f a general agreemen t wit h th e Unite d State s o n internationa l problems , covering naval , mercantile , an d commercia l matters . Negotiation s were, however , pointless unti l a ne w administratio n too k office. 114 Geddes's firs t repor t o n th e amiabl e Harding , however , describe d him a s a party hac k and a machine politician , lackin g intellectua l gifts, administrativ e experience , an d knowledg e of foreig n affairs , and likel y t o b e dominate d b y Lodg e an d th e Senat e o n foreig n 113 Craigi e to Curzon, 2 Feb. 1921 , an d Willert to Tyrrell, memorandum, 26 April 1921, FO/371/5667 . Mellon, appointe d secretar y of the Treasury , favoured a policy of granting extensive credits to Europe according to Craigie. 114 Gedde s to Lloyd George, 4 and 8 June 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F/60/ 4/1 and 2

61 THE ATLANTICIST S policy matters. 116 Lodge , Gedde s describe d a s cynical , cold , an d disillusioned, bu t friendly to Britain and determined that the powers of the president be diluted. In July both Gedde s an d Willert reported mor e fully. 118 Geddes , in addition t o the usual political divisions , saw the Unite d State s as a bewildering kaleidoscope , divided in terms of nationalities betwee n Irish-, German- , Italian- , Anglo-Saxon- , and American-Americans , separated raciall y betwee n white, negro , and re d peoples , spli t be tween "Wilsonolatry * an d "Wilsonophobia / tor n betwee n religiou s faiths, and, finally, divided over prohibition. In the Republican party Geddes distinguished betwee n thre e groups: the extrem e Conservatives who were anglophil; the mild progressives who were not hostile to Britain; an d th e radical-nationalists , suc h as Senators Borah an d Johnson, wh o were extrem e anglophobes. I n th e Democrati c part y Geddes saw idealist Wilsonians , Tammany Hall's men , and a group comprising norther n an d wester n Liberal s an d progressiv e south erners, containin g man y educated Americans , who wer e anglophil . Cox, th e Democrati c nominee , Geddes describe d a s self-made, not a gentleman , ignorant of foreign affairs, an d unde r th e influenc e of a mysterious octogenarian lawyer called MacMahon . Moreover, the Democrats, clutchin g simultaneousl y at th e Britis h an d Iris h links , described themselve s as anglophi l an d internationalist , an d hope d for British aid to help defeat the Republicans. Harding , Gedde s con firmed, was Lodge's creatur e and , professing to se e little differenc e between the parties in their attitude towar d Britain, Geddes advised neutrality in an election, the outcome of which no one could forecast. Willert regarde d neithe r Hardin g no r Co x a s firs t class , bot h parties a s isolationist , an d American s as disillusione d wit h foreig n ventures, preparedness, dream s of world hegemony, and with Britain and France. Clearl y they were more concerned with domestic reconstruction, the forced allied intimacies of the war had lost their attrac tion, and the sentimenta l utopianism of the peace had give n way to practical politics. Th e Senate , in Willert's view , was determined t o harness th e executiv e an d h e expecte d Hardin g t o bo w befor e it s pressure. Lodg e was a gentlema n but wa s wedde d t o politics o f a baser kin d an d wa s unscrupulous, without convictions , deceptivel y 115 Geddes to Lloyd George, 30 June 1920, ibid., F/60/4/4 116 Gedde s to Curzon, 13 July 1920; Willert, memorandum, 'An Appreciation of the Republican and Democratic National Conventions held at Chicago and San Francisco respectively in June and July 1920,' FO/414/246

62 ILLUSION S O F SECURIT Y parochial, an d slippery . Willer t expecte d hi m t o cour t th e Irish , seek to destro y the League , an d sho w himself to be hostil e t o an d envious of Britain. Johnson, Willert describe d a s honest, but a n ignorant demagogue, a provincial "blatherskate,' and a s hostile t o th e peace treaty . Bora h seeme d honest , bu t incurabl y provincia l an d isolationist, an d Medil l McCormic k wa s brilliant , bu t a non e to o scrupulous anglophobe . Th e Senat e a s a body , Willer t felt , wa s neither pro-League nor in favour o f close Anglo-American relations. Willert forecas t a Republica n victory , resulting i n isolationis m an d worship of the dollar , for Americ a had neithe r nationa l conscience nor unity, and unless she were blessed with higher class immigrants he doubte d whethe r th e Unite d State s coul d improv e morally , physically, o r in terms of efficiency. Indeed , the Unite d State s coul d regress and become 'flabbier' for her climate was not inducive to the perpetuation of the white race in its natural vigour. Willert concluded by recommending that Britain remain on good terms with 'this large and succulen t jell y fish,' utilising th e presenc e of the three-fifth s o f her population who were Anglo-Saxon, in power, and mainly anglophil. In crise s and in general, Willer t warned , Britai n could expec t little but economi c aid from th e United States, and she must rely on her own military and naval resources. In October 1920, however, Geddes confirmed his belief in the possibility o f achieving an Anglo-American settlement, assuring Curzon that for the firs t tim e sinc e 1776 there was som e chance of arriving at a working agreement with the United States, despite th e hysteri a of hatre d aime d at Britain. 117 Gedde s emphasised particularly that the Unite d State s had a n embarrassingly bad conscienc e abou t he r shoddy role in the world since 1914 in comparison with that of Britain, feeling on the debts question like a philanthropist caugh t picking the widow' s pocke t t o stea l he r mite . Harding' s electio n wa s now assured, but both presidential candidates were 'real mediocrities' and Harding's electio n pledge s woul d resul t i n certai n unpleasan t act s in foreig n affairs . Hi s secretar y o f state , however , no t boun d b y those pledges, would brin g a bigge r min d t o th e task 118 an d onc e the impact of electoral indiscretions ha d abate d Britai n would have an opportunity to reach an agreement with the United States, which she would honour for at least two presidential terms . To secure this 117 Gedde s to Curzon, 18 Oct 1920 , Lloyd George Papers, F/60/4/8 118 Geddes' s list o f prospective secretaries of state did no t includ e Charles Evans Hughes.

63 TH E ATLANTICIST S agreement Britai n must show real firmness, refuse t o yield to Washington's scowls , handle issues carefully, an d avoid 'sentimental gush.' Once th e America n people had recovere d their self-respec t an d in fluenced their government accordingly, Anglo-American co-operation was possible.119 By earl y January , however , th e scen e i n Washingto n seeme d t o offer differen t prospects. 120 Gedde s reporte d tha t the curren t battl e within the Republican party would result in a victory for its extremist wing and Britain should prepare t o face 'the least straight-laced' and 'the most anti-British' government ever. These extremist 'realists' intended t o dominat e th e world , lea d th e English-speakin g nations , build the stronges t fleet and merchant marine, and treat Britai n as a vassal state so long as her war debts remained unpaid, or force Britain to ced e he r Caribbea n island s i n retur n fo r th e cancellatio n o f he r debts. The y woul d rais e th e bog y o f a Japanese menac e to forg e a bond betwee n th e English-speaking state s borderin g on the Pacific, wean the dominion s from th e empire, 121 and exten d the boundarie s of th e Unite d States sout h of the cana l an d nort h to th e pole . Thi s last aim was 'still whispered excep t in the small hours of an alcoholic morning.' Gedde s insiste d tha t hi s pictur e o f extremis t aspiration s and ambitions was the sober truth rather than the product of his overheated imaginatio n an d woul d mea n th e transfe r o f th e centr e o f English-speaking powe r t o Nort h America . Thei r targe t wa s th e British governmen t not the Englis h people , bu t th e polic y wa s real enough. Th e colossa l resource s of the Unite d State s would provid e the basis for overwhelming sea power and Geddes argued that Britain could not meet this challeng e sav e through the developmen t o f Canada, joine d to Britain in som e organic union an d providing a new basis fo r Britis h power . Geddes di d no t expec t a n Anglo-American war but rathe r a deadly struggle disguise d a s peace. Britain' s salva 119 Gedde s to Curzon, 2 Dec. 1920, FO/371/4548 120 Gedde s to Kerr, 3 Jan. 1921, Lloy d George Papers, F/60/4/11. Geddes identified th e 'irreconcilables' as Johnson and Borah , a less vigorous 'antieverything-not-American group' including McCormick, their opponents , th e Root Republicans, and the cynical and singular Lodge as participants in the power struggle. The 'irreconcilables,' including Hearst, Brandegee, and E.B. McLean, editor-president o f the Washington Post, were the 'extremists.' 121 Simila r sentiments, aims and phrases occur in the Gardiner-Lodg e exchanges in early 1921, althoug h Geddes did not include Lodge in the 'extremist' group.

64 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y tion la y i n th e developmen t o f submarine an d ai r power , globall y based, in the creation of a super-dominion government of the British empire, and in 'rubbing along' with the United States for the interim period, onl y to emerge successful in fifteen or twenty years. Success was possible for they lack fixity of political purpose and the machinery to carry through to a long range objective tha t which requires continued self-sacrifice to attain, provided that they are not challenged to show their metal. The danger is that they can attain their first objective, nava l supremacy, without consciou s effort an d without continued self-sacrifice. If they once have that they will hold fast to it, with what we are often pleased to call 'British' tenacity.

The British government , Geddes felt, was misled both by recurring waves of anglophobia and by the great volume of anglophilia which still existe d i n part s o f America . United State s governmenta l an d defence circles were simply pro-American, wanting power and world leadership t o fulfil th e national destiny and regarding Britain's crip pled position a s their grea t opportunity . Gedde s concluded thi s re port by stating that a paper naval agreement on the basis of equality was possibl e i f Britai n di d no t appea r overenthusiasti c an d i f th e British press kept quiet. Moreove r the appointment of the next governor general of Canada was a vital factor along with others to prevent the sappin g o f Canadia n loyalties , an d Lloy d Georg e shoul d visi t Canada and perhaps Washington to help improve the situation . Craigie, i n Geddes' s absence , ha d mor e encouragin g new s once Hughes's appointmen t a s secretar y o f stat e wa s confirmed , for he , Root, and Harding seeme d to favour bot h an internationalist polic y and close r Anglo-America n co-operation.122 Hardin g wa s eve n ru moured t o b e somethin g o f a Pa n Anglo-Saxon , believing i n th e divinely inspired civilisin g role of the English-speaking peoples, bu t the evidence was less than definite. Geddes returne d t o Washingto n i n mid-Februar y an d resume d his gloomy but ambiguou s and mixed prophecies.128 Charles Evans Hughes, h e reported , wa s a ma n o f unimpeachable characte r an d good judgment, but h e was determined to assert America's position and continu e Wilson's policie s on specific matter s such as oil right s 122 Craigi e to Curzon, 17 Jan. and 2 Feb. 1921, FO/371/5687; Craigie to Curzon, 2 Feb. 1921, FO/414/247 123 Gedde s to Curzon, 25 Feb. 1921, FO/414/247 ; Gedde s to Curzon, 4 March 1921, FO/371/5667

65 THE ATLANTICIST S and cable facilities . Senato r Knox , moreover, able to dictate the ap pointment o f A.W. Mellon as secretary o f the Treasury , A.B. Fall as secretary of the Interior , and H.P. Fletcher as Hughes's assistan t a t the Stat e Department , wished not onl y to use war debt s a s a leve r on Europea n governments , bu t als o favoured Franc e ove r Britain . Geddes's suggested riposte was typically exaggerated; Britai n should offer secretl y t o suppor t Franc e ove r reparation s i f Franc e woul d agree no t to hold independen t negotiation s wit h th e Unite d State s on the reduction or cancellation of her debts. In mi d March Gedde s commented on Harding's dubiou s private life and the unorthodox behaviour of some of his cabinet; in Geddes' s words, 'chickens ' cam e hom e t o roos t fro m a n 'extensiv e poultr y farm.'124 Bot h the nomination of Harvey, a heavy drinker, as ambassador t o Londo n an d certai n embarrassin g event s a t th e inaugura l ceremonies were attributed to the claims of the little chickens.' Turning to th e questio n o f policies an d wit h appropriat e comment s on Secretary Hughes' s Wels h ancestry , however , Gedde s note d tha t both th e Secretar y of Stat e an d Hardin g were ver y cordial towar d him personally and would welcome close relations with Britain rather than with any other country. Hughes personally seemed to feel tha t Anglo-American co-operatio n wa s essentia l fo r worl d peac e an d hinted that the United States might join a new association of nations outside th e League , but Gedde s note d tha t Harding' s governmen t was committed generall y to oppose Wilsonian policies and ha d no t really discovere d an y alternatives . I n sum , Hughes wa s able , bu t ignorant of foreign affairs an d Geddes did not see how Hughes could 'make the Leagu e look like no League' and pas s co-operation of f as isolationism. Harding' s subsequen t disenchantmen t wit h France' s Viviani brought more gestures of goodwill toward Britai n an d eve n disclaimers of support for Sinn Fein, but prospects o f American entry into the League remained di m and the Presiden t confirme d tha t he would encourag e th e developmen t o f America' s merchan t marin e and would not actively pursue disarmamen t at that early stage . In Apri l Geddes fel t Secretar y Hughe s wa s no t onl y ignorant of foreign affair s bu t 'abnorma l mentally and subject to attacks of mild mania. I do not think he can fairly be regarded as individually full y responsible for what he says during these attacks but h e is Secretary of Stat e an d whe n th e Secretar y has spoken , Americ a has spoken . 124 Gedde s to Lloyd George, 17 March 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/60/4/16; Geddes to Curzon, 5 April 1921, FO/371/5667

66 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y This situatio n i s not withou t difficulty.' 125 Hi s repor t the n devote d several remarkable pages to Hughes's mental distress, revealed during th e cours e of an astonishin g intervie w i n whic h Hughes , com pletely out o f control an d mentall y irresponsible, becam e D r Ged des's 'patient' and, arouse d over the questio n o f Yap, raved agains t Britain an d Japan. To Geddes, Hughe s symbolised in a sincere an d compulsive way the national megalomania of the Unite d States with its accompanyin g suspicion o f Britain , and Geddes , to comba t thi s situation, warne d agains t eithe r criticis m o f o r fawnin g ove r th e United States. Instead Britai n should maintain a 'stoney silence.' Whatever Curzo n felt abou t thi s final particular piece o f advice, he tol d Lloy d Georg e that the despatc h cas t doubt s o n the menta l balance of Geddes rather than of Hughes, that Geddes was afflicte d with a mild form o f mania, and tha t th e appointmen t o f an ambassador who was both professor and doctor opened up a style of diplomatic terminology that was new and frightening. 126Finally, i n the period preceding th e Imperial Conference , Gedde s came to the conclusion that th e excitable, indiscreet, and finely balanced Hughes , face d wit h grea t senatoria l opposition , woul d no t even survive as secretary o f state, especiall y a s he wa s s o ill-suite d temperamentally to cope with the problems of his office. 127 Hughes, however, di d survive . I n thes e fluctuatin g an d eve n in credible despatches Gedde s had given with the left hand only to take back with the right and Willert in turn offered littl e conclusive evidence. Gedde s ha d analyse d America n politicians , frequentl y i n derogatory terms , showe d scan t respec t fo r Unite d State s politica l parties an d institutions , an d hi s comment s o n America n nationa l characteristics wer e hardly free fro m contempt . His prognostication s about United States policies were at best speculative, an d any anglophilia seeme d invariabl y balance d b y isolationism . I n Jun e an d October 1920 , Geddes suggeste d tha t a genera l Anglo-America n 125 Gedde s to Curzon, 15 April 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/13/1/19 Geddes's medical training was amply demonstrated in this report and he wrote later that Hughes, a great man and an anglophile, had a source of personal inspiration, his spirit, called the 'Black Dwarf.' At the Washington conference it forced him to accept a policy of naval equality ( Geddes, Forging of a Family, 328-9). 126 Curzon to Lloyd George, 20 April 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/13/2/9 127 Geddes to Curzon, 5 May 1921, FO/371/5667. Tyrrell in a minute of 6 May disagreed with Geddes.

87 THE ATLANTÍCIST S agreement was possible, by January 1921 it was less likely although a naval agreement was not an impossible proposition, an d his subsequent report s offere d scan t encouragement . Clearl y th e Britis h embassy in Washington had not clarified the situation beyond all doubt, and Geddes' s evidenc e was not sufficientl y conclusiv e either t o dis credit entirely or confirm to any significant extent the Atlanticist case. The debat e o n policy woul d reope n and , a s th e renewa l o f th e Anglo-Japanese allianc e an d th e proble m o f imperial defenc e were high o n the agend a fo r th e Imperia l Conferenc e of June 1921 , th e Atlanticists could take heart and await their reinforcements from th e dominions. Their bitterest critics, also buttressed from the dominions, were read y t o oppose , whil e Lloy d Georg e an d th e sceptic s wer e willing once more to debate an d test probable solution s to strategi c political, an d racia l problems . Nothin g wa s settle d finall y an d th e ebb an d flo w o f discussio n woul d continue . Consequently , i n th e proceedings o f the Imperia l Conference , which became the prefac e to the Washington Disarmament and Pacific Conference, British and dominion statesmen in their various ways hoped to arrive at solutions which would improve the prospects for peace and security.

TWO

1921 New Opportunities To the Atlanticist s 1921 seeme d to offe r encouragin g prospect s fo r co-operation betwee n th e Unite d State s an d th e Britis h empire . Britain apparentl y coul d no t dela y a decisio n o n the futur e o f he r alliance wit h Japa n beyon d 1 3 July an d th e questio n o f renewa l would reactivat e consideratio n o f globa l policy . A Republican ad ministration would take office i n the United States in March and the Imperial Conference of June would be the forum in which Britain and her dominion s woul d debat e th e futur e o f thei r join t policies . I n consequence, th e Atlanticists had a further opportunit y t o convinc e the sceptic s an d t o conver t th e mor e hostile t o th e vie w that the y could reduc e o r solv e the vita l political , racial , strategic , an d economic problems troublin g the world since the Peace Conference. To some extent the future of British foreign policy rested o n the abilit y of th e Atlanticists t o win this debate . I n their view , solutions might come by way of the Orien t an d th e casualty-in-chie f woul d b e th e twenty-year-old link between London and Tokyo. This agreement , signed o n 30 January 1902, widened in scope on 12 August 1905, an d agai n modifie d o n 1 3 July 1911 as a ten-yea r alliance,1 came under scrutin y in London, Washington, an d Ottaw a from the early months of 1919. The partnershi p o f Britai n an d Japan , especiall y fro m 1906 , had never been consistently harmonious and complex problems were not erased by enforced wartime co-operation. To many western observers Japan had frequently acted in fine disregard o f the spirit an d letter 1 British and Foreign Stat e Papers, civ, 173-4; Dennis , The Anglo-Japanese Alliance; Chang, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance; Spinks, 'A History of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922'; Nish, The Anglo-Japanese AUiance

69 NE W OPPORTUNITIE S of th e allianc e an d durin g th e Shantun g negotiation s a t th e Peac e Conference Lloy d George , describin g Japa n a s th e Prussi a o f th e Far East , stated tha t her terrorisatio n of China was one of the most indefensible an d unscrupulous acts in history.2 To find a convincing alternative, however , wa s anothe r matter . Britai n coul d no t rebuf f Japan an d abruptl y terminat e thei r allianc e and , a s Lloy d Georg e recognised, the y could not say to Japan 'Nous avons été heureux de vous trouver en temps de guerre, mais maintenant bonsoir.'8 In posi tive terms the allianc e offered Britai n some insurance against future dangers suc h a s that resultin g fro m a Russo-Germa n combination , which a rebuffed Japa n might join. Britain would tolerate, therefore, certain discomfort s and irritations, an d her globa l strategic predicaments seeme d t o dictat e co-operatio n with Japa n i n th e post-191 9 period a s it had i n the years before 1914. Britis h expert opinion differed bot h o n the valu e o f Japan's ai d durin g th e wa r an d o n he r need fo r outlet s an d economi c opportunities i n Eas t Asia , bu t o n balance th e Britis h government tended t o giv e Japan the benefi t of the doubt . Consequently , althoug h sh e was allie d t o a powe r sh e could not fully trust , Britain could neither contain nor coerce Japan and she seemed reluctant to attempt to coerce this barrier to Bolshevism in Asia. The existence of the alliance, however, bred suspicion in the United States, placing a useful weapon in the hands of the anglophobes there and thos e who demanded 'a nav y second to none. ' Despite severa l categorical assertion s by Britain that th e allianc e was not operativ e against th e Unite d States , th e allianc e becam e a matte r o f public concern i n Nort h America , a disturbin g facto r i n Anglo-American relations, and consequently a problem of great significance to Canada. The Atlanticists argued, of course, that co-operation with the United States wa s th e onl y avenu e o f escap e fro m thi s predicament , bu t others had less confidence in such a solution. Lloyd George's governmen t investigated fou r course s of action a s it studied the problem of the renewal of the link with Japan. Britain could retai n he r alignmen t wit h Japa n i n th e for m o f a modifie d alliance. Thi s approac h woul d perpetuat e a trie d policy , enabl e London to exercise some restraint on Tokyo, and help provide for the security of imperial interests and possessions. It would, however, ag2 Council of Four, 22 and 28 April 1919, Mantoux, Les Délibérations du Conseil des Quatres, i, 335,376-8 3Fry, 'Anglo-American-Canadian Relations/ 145

70 ILLUSION S O F SECURIT Y grávate th e proble m o f co-operatio n wit h th e Unite d State s an d antagonise th e Atlanticists . Alternatively , Britai n coul d attemp t t o move towar d th e Unite d State s principall y b y wa y o f negotiation s for a nava l agreement , a s i n th e Gre y missio n o f 191 9 an d i n th e conversations betwee n Lor d Le e o f Fareha m an d Adolp h Ochs , publisher o f the New York World, i n April 1921. Thi s course, involving the dual risk that th e United State s would prove unreliable an d incurably isolationis t an d tha t Japa n woul d becom e detache d an d embittered, woul d involv e th e terminatio n o f th e allianc e an d th e establishment o f Anglo-America n co-operation i n th e Fa r East . As a third but ver y distant possibilit y Britai n could recreate he r Pacifi c fleet an d construc t th e Singapor e nava l base , a s recommende d b y Admiral Jellicoe in his reports on imperial naval requirement s writ ten from September to December 1919.4 This solution would enhance imperial security and British prestige, and offer greater independenc e from bot h Japa n an d the Unite d States . But suc h a ste p woul d b e provocative an d would injure relation s with both those powers, feed the flames of a naval race, challenge th e disarmamen t credo, creat e problems wit h the dominions, and undermine the demand for financial retrenchment . No t surprisingly , therefore , Britai n rejecte d i t as unwise and unacceptable. The fourth approach , generall y regarde d a s th e mos t desirable , rested o n the creation o f a tripartite or even wider Pacific agreement comprising a t leas t Britain , Japan , an d th e Unite d States . Suc h a policy ha d muc h to commend it an d man y regarded i t a s the idea l solution, for Britain would avoid the appearance of a choice between Washington an d Tokyo . Sh e would stee r a middl e cours e betwee n friend an d ally, retain her links with Japan and create ne w ties with the Unite d States , an d avoi d both th e appearanc e o f under-writin g Japanese policie s i n Chin a an d o f desirin g t o co-operat e wit h th e United States in a way hostile to Japan. Moreover, a tripartite agreement seemed to offer the greatest opportunity to prevent both Japan' s disengagement an d America n detachment an d t o enabl e Britai n t o retain the friendship of both, to influence both, and mediate betwee n them. Obviously, however, this policy demanded drastic modification of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and a move by Britain away from he r exclusive arrangemen t wit h Japa n towar d close r co-operatio n wit h the Unite d States . Whil e Atlanticist s woul d applaud , thei r critic s 4Ibid., 289-315

71 NEW OPPORTUNITIE S doubted th e practicabilit y o f the polic y an d coul d eve n dismis s i t as wildly improbable . Deliberation o n thes e alternativ e policie s prio r t o th e Imperia l Conference o f June 192 1 reveale d certai n significan t divergence s o f opinion in two distinct phases of study. A report b y the 'Anglo-Japanese Alliance Committee' of the Foreig n Offic e o n 21 January 192 1 marked the en d o f the first period o f investigation, involving princi pally the major governmen t departments an d diplomatic representa tives in the field. The second and more urgent phase, providin g th e preface t o th e imperia l meeting , involve d exchange s with th e do minions, the United States, Japan, and China, and resulted in precis e cabinet recommendations by the end of May 1921 . The Foreign Office dominate d th e first phase, gathering an d evalu ating evidence and, surprisingly, the Atlanticists received sustenanc e as a result. Curzon , seeking the rehabilitation o f China an d stabilit y in the Far East but admirin g the skilfully bargainin g Japanese much more than the hapless bu t demandin g Chinese , favoured continued friendship with Japan. 5 He advocated a form o f agreement or alignment which woul d facilitate scrutin y o f Japan's activitie s i n China , permit London to demand from Toky o a larger measure of frankness in their dealings with each other, an d allow Britain to moderate an d influence Japan' s policies . Curzo n was convinced that Japa n woul d be less troublesome in China if she were bound to Britain 'even by a loose alliance' and much less so than if Japan became an ally of Germany o r Russia , o r joine d a hostil e Russo-Germa n entente . Japa n herself, Curzon felt, generall y favoured renewa l of the alliance , an d although he wished to avoid difficulties wit h the United States he did not believe in the feasibility of a triple agreement. Political considera tions pointed, therefore , in Curzon's view, to the perpetuation o f the alliance with Japan, and the strategic factors governin g imperial defence reinforced his opinions. The Admiralt y i n Octobe r 191 9 demonstrate d th e fundamenta l relationship betwee n imperial security in the Pacific and the renewal of the alliance with Japan.6 Failure to renew the alliance would alter completely the naval situation in Asian waters, and Britain's position SForeign Office to other departments, 21 Jan. 1920, BD, 1st ser., vi, no 789, 1053-4 6 Admiralty memorandum, 'The Naval Situation in the Far East,' 31 Oct. 1919, CP 54, Lloyd George Papers, F/143

72 ILLUSION S O F SECURIT Y in th e even t of war wit h Japa n o r o f wa r betwee n Japa n an d th e United State s would be extremel y difficult. Th e Admiralt y recalled that in June 1909 the Committee of Imperial Defence had conclude d that British possessions in the Far East were secure while the allianc e with Japan remained in force, that Britain must recreate he r Pacifi c fleet before terminatin g the allianc e t o neutralis e th e dange r fro m Japan's nava l preponderanc e i n th e Chin a seas , an d tha t th e Ad miralty and the War Offic e mus t ensure that Hong Kong could hold out for one month in the event of war with Japan. At the present time, however, the Admiralty memorandum stated, Japan's naval building programme to complete eight dreadnought s an d nine battlecruisers by 192 6 an d Britain' s financial problem s mad e i t unlikel y tha t she could equal Japanese naval power in the Pacific in peacetime. In the event of war, Britain could not easil y or rapidly convert this peace time inferiority into a position of superiority, Hong Kong would likely fall, an d Britain's influence i n Asia would be irretrievably damaged. The Admiralt y concluded, therefore , that i f Britai n di d no t rene w her allianc e with Japan , sh e must creat e a Pacifi c flee t capabl e of meeting a Japanese challenge, an d strengthen the defence s of Hong Kong to enable it to resist a prolonged seige. 7 The Admiralty had offere d a distressingly expensive alternative t o preventive diplomacy and their recommendation s of February 192 0 continued in a similar vein. In a reply to the Foreign Office, th e lords of th e Admiralt y stated that the y considered ' a continuatio n o f th e alliance i n its present for m neithe r necessar y nor desirable.' 8 Whil e accepting th e politica l desiderat a o f Britis h policy , the y sa w little possibility o f providin g a forc e sufficientl y powerfu l t o suppor t a strong policy which might involve coercing Japan. Therefore, in the Admiralty's opinion, naval weakness in the Pacific dictated th e estab lishment of some satisfactory understanding with Japan, a conclusion with which Curzon entirely agreed . Similarly the War Offic e advocate d some form of alliance or understanding wit h Japa n for , apar t fro m th e questio n o f China , 'ou r military position in the Far East might be most embarrassing, to say 7By 1921 the Admiralty had begun to emphasise Singapore rather than Hong Kong as their major concern. 8 Admiralty to Foreign Office, 1 2 Feb. 1920 , BD, 1st ser., vi, no 789,1054. Roskill, citing the letter from the Beatty Papers, omits the phrase 'in its present form,' misses the point of the Admiralty's recommendation and comments on illogical Admiralty reasoning ( Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, i, 293 ).

73 NEW OPPORTUNITIE S the leas t of it, in th e even t o f hostilities wit h Japan.' 9 Th e militar y were also impressed with the need to guard against a possible Russo German combinatio n an d t o dete r Japa n fro m joinin g it , bu t wer e even more impressed wit h the nee d to eliminate th e possibility o f a war with the Unite d States , the preparations fo r which were simply beyond Britain's financial resources. Indeed, the problems raised by a war with Japan paled befor e those raised b y a war with th e Unite d States, friendshi p wit h Americ a wa s essential , and , therefore , i f Britain renewe d th e allianc e wit h Japa n sh e must d o s o in suc h a manner a s to avoi d antagonisin g the Unite d States . Thi s considera tion must be the dominan t one in the debat e ove r renewal, an d th e Army Council felt i n fact tha t Britai n could negotiate a n agreemen t which woul d improv e relation s wit h bot h Japa n an d th e Unite d States, just as she had before 1914 in the case of France an d Russia. 10 In conclusion , however , th e Wa r Offic e returne d t o th e ide a o f a renewed alliance with Japan which conformed with the principles of the League Covenant . These expert views of the strategi c factor s involved were laid ou t for th e Committe e o f Imperia l Defenc e befor e th e en d o f Marc h 1920.11 This memorandum recalled the decision of 3 May 1911 which reiterated th e judgment s o f Jun e 190 9 on th e interdependenc e o f imperial security in the Pacific and the maintenance of Britain's alli ance with Japan, while emphasising the threat t o Australia and New Zealand a s well as to Hong Kong in case of war. With regard t o th e situation i n th e postwa r period , th e memorandu m suggeste d tha t despite the defeat of Germany, which would permit a n early concentration o f naval force s i n th e Pacifi c i n th e even t o f hostilities wit h Japan, the position was still sadly difficult. 12 Wit h the Unite d State s neutral and unless Australia and New Zealand increased thei r nava l 9 War Office to Foreign Office, 1 4 Feb. 1920, BD, 1st ser., vi, no 789,1054-5 10 Using this precedent, the War Office also warned against obligations of honour, vague and secret understandings, and compromising and indeterminate commitments which involved Britain in 1914 in hostilities for which she was not prepared. 11 cro memorandum, 124-c, 'Strategic situation in the event of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance being determined,' 25 March 1920, Cab. 5/3. The cm was not functioning as a body at this time and in 1921 a standing defence sub-committee under Balfour supervised preparations for the Imperial Conference. 12 On the question of complications in home waters the paper stated that, while France and the United States maintained their current naval forces, Britain

74 ILLUSION S O F SECURIT Y forces, Japa n woul d contro l th e Pacifi c i n th e earl y stage s o f war, and woul d us e he r superiorit y initiall y t o attac k Hon g Kon g an d Singapore and t o gai n control of the Strait s of Malacca rather tha n invade Australi a an d Ne w Zealand. 13 Wit h stron g echoe s fro m Jellicoe's recommendations an d fro m th e Admiralt y studie s o f Oc tober 1919, " th e pape r argue d tha t th e probabilit y o f suc h raid s would vary inversely with the quality of dominion naval and military forces, and , if Britai n failed t o retai n th e allianc e wit h Japan , im perial securit y woul d depen d o n whether th e combine d dominio n and British forces coul d match those of Japan. This solution, the re establishment of imperial naval power in the Pacific, however, foundered on the rocks of financial stringency and, despite the decision to recommend th e constructio n o f th e Singapor e nava l bas e i n Jun e 1921, Britai n was forced back on the intuitive and intellectual quali ties of her diplomacy. 15 The strategi c implication s resultin g fro m a n abrogatio n o f th e Anglo-Japanese alliance clearly suggested that Britain could not risk severing he r link s with Japan, an d th e Committe e of Imperial De fence debat e o f Decembe r 192 0 further refine d th e problem. 16 Churchill introduced th e alliance a s a political facto r that they must weigh along with naval considerations when they assessed Britain's could not station the main or a large part of the fleet far from home bases in peacetime. In the event of war with Japan, however, France and the United States would probably be benevolently neutral or even join Britain. 13 The memorandum stated, however , tha t Japa n might revers e this strateg y if Britain faced complications in Europe and the western Atlantic. 14Fry, 'Anglo-American-Canadian Relations,' 291-3, 303-5 ISHankey to Chamberlain, 'Note s on the imperia l meeting,' 1 6 June 1921 , and Admiralty paper, 'Empire naval policy and co-operation," Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 26; Oversea Defence Sub-Committee, 'Report on the Singapor e naval base,' 7 June 1921, Sir George Foster Papers , vol. 66, file 160 and Lloyd George Papers, F/143. The Treasury representative, dissentin g from the recommendation on Singapore, argued that defence decisions were premature until they settled the Anglo-Japanese alliance question, that forecasts of Japanese hostile actions were remote and hypothetical enough to be incredible, an d that fJTmni-ipl consideration s demande d tha t Britai n rel y o n diplomac y t o obviat e the risks produced by inadequate defence systems.

16 Minutes of the 134t h meeting of the cm, 1 4 Dec. 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F/192/1/5

75 NEW OPPORTUNITIE S global strategi c position . H e favoure d perpetuatio n o f the allianc e but argue d tha t Britai n coul d als o amen d it t o alla y Unite d State s fears an d accommodat e certain racia l objection s an d pro-America n sentiments prevalen t i n th e dominions . T o preven t a nava l race , Churchill demanded , Britain must re-assess th e situatio n an d avoi d renewing the alliance until they had held discussions on naval polic y with Presiden t Harding' s administration . Lloy d George' s respons e seemed incredibly irresponsible ; Anglo-Japanes e naval co-operatio n would severely reduce the manoeuvrability of the United States fleet and compel the American government to station a significant part of its naval forces i n th e Pacific . Th e Premie r had, therefore, withou t relinquishing th e schem e for a n Anglo-America n naval agreement , speculated on the idea of using Japan a s a counterweight t o and a lever o n the Unite d States . Indeed , h e eve n ruminate d o n Japan's value to Britai n in the even t of war wit h th e Unite d States . Whe n Churchill denounce d an y suggestio n o f basin g nava l policy o n co operation wit h Japan against the Unite d States, Lloy d Georg e indi cated that he preferred tha t policy to one which left Britain vulner able t o United State s naval power. Thes e exchange s were no t particularly elevate d an d th e Canadia n governmen t i n 192 1 fel t i t detected in its exchanges with London the idea of forcing the United States to accept a naval construction agreement or risk the renewa l of th e Anglo-Japanes e alliance. Perhap s th e Atlanticist s faced bot h irresponsibility an d opposition as the British government pursued its policy review. Looking abroad, the Foreign Offic e assesse d evaluations from fou r ambassadors in Tokyo, Peking, and Washington; Si r John Jordan, Sir Beilby Alston, Sir Charles Eliot, and Sir Aukland Geddes.17 The most senior, Jordan, participating i n the investigation of the allianc e ques tion up to and during the Washington Conference, was a rare enough person, a sinophil.18 He did not regard Japan as a loyal ally, he had 17 Eliot, forme r hig h commissione r in Siberia , replace d Alsto n in Toky o fro m 1 April 1920; Jordan left Peking at the end of February 1920, and Miles Lampson supervised the interi m period unti l Alston arrived in mid-April ; Geddes's tenure at Washington was uninterrupted. Jordan, Alston, and Geddes returned to London at some point to assist in the review of policy. 18 Jordan to Balfour, 23 Dec. 1918, Jordan to Curzon, 28 Aug. 1919,17 and 19 Jan. and 27 Feb. 1920, BD, 1st ser., vi, 566-83, no 479, 691-5 ; nos 678, 679, 682,683,940-4, and no 759,1015

76 ILLUSION S O F SECURIT Y opposed th e Peac e Conferenc e decisio n o n Shantung , h e showe d little faith in Japanese policie s i n northeast Asia , and h e tende d t o dismiss the idea of Japan being a barrier to Bolshevism as a figment of Japanes e propaganda . No t surprisingly , Jorda n advocate d co operation with the United States, for she alone shared Britain's aims and interests in China an d they were the onl y two powers in which China had any faith. Moreover, according to Jordan, only the United States ha d sufficien t financial resources to guid e Chin a toward s her great destiny . The tw o Atlanti c powers should enforc e a policy of co-operative internationalis m an d destro y th e polic y o f sphere s of influence, whic h tended t o benefit Japa n an d harm both British interests an d Chin a herself . Jordan, however , di d no t expec t AngloAmerican co-operation to ensu e so long as Britain retained her connection with Japan and while the Unite d State s retained he r reluc tant attitude . Althoug h he advocate d th e abrogatio n of th e AngloJapanese alliance , h e coul d no t reall y offe r fir m hope s o f Unite d States co-operatio n an d was , therefore, a n Atlanticis t hoverin g re luctantly close to tibe ranks of the sceptics. Sir Beilby Alston was less consistent tha n Jordan and his views on the allianc e questio n underwent certain changes of emphasis which tended t o bring hi m close r t o th e Atlanticists ' position. 19 Whil e i n Tokyo, Alston expressed the view that the alliance had lost its raison d'être wit h th e collaps e o f Russi a and Germany , and tha t Britai n could not renew it in its original form because of the alliance's incompatibility wit h th e Leagu e Covenant . Alsto n als o demande d th e fullest co-operatio n with the Unite d States in China, but he did not harbour hostilit y towar d Japan . Indeed , h e seeme d t o develo p a growing faith in prospects fo r co-operative action with a liberal' and manageable Japan in China . Alston warned agains t isolatin g Japa n from th e Anglo-Saxon powers and against attempting to exclude her from th e Asia n mainland , suggestin g tha t sh e feared isolation an d that Britai n coul d ac t i n harmon y wit h he r t o preserv e China' s integrity. Consequently, Alsto n tended t o recommen d tha t Britai n retai n some for m o f agreement , entente , o r friendl y understandin g wit h Japan, modified t o meet Leagu e requirements, an d negotiate d onl y after having made a full explanatio n to the United States to remove 19 Alston to Tilley, 7 Oct. 1919, Alston to Curzon, 25 Nov. 1919, Alston to Tilley, 30 Dec. 1919, Alston to Curzon, 17 Jan. 1920, BD, 1st ser., vi, no 522, 761-5; no 598,856-8; no 649,912-14; and no 680, 943

77 NE W OPPORTUNITIE S her suspicions . Japa n hersel f wishe d t o retai n th e lin k an d Alsto n felt tha t a n entent e woul d hel p dissolv e Japan' s doubt s abou t th e League, permit greater frankness between London and Tokyo, allow Britain t o asser t pressur e o n Japan, an d permit he r t o mediat e be tween Japa n an d th e Unite d States . Objectively , Alsto n regarde d relations with the United States as of far greater significance than any arrangement wit h Japan, but he , like so many, could no t offe r wit h any convictio n a n affirmativ e repl y t o th e principa l questions ; wa s the United States reliable, would she co-operate in China, and would she stand resolutely with Britain in a crisis? Ideally, Alston looked for a tripl e agreemen t pledge d t o th e rehabilitatio n o f China , bu t h e regarded thi s policy as impracticable an d returned, therefore, to the idea o f a n entent e wit h Japan . I n thi s phas e Alsto n had swaye d between the ideal and the practicable, a sceptic debating hypothetical alternatives.20 In mid-April 1920 Alston took over at Peking , but wen t on leav e late in June, leaving R.H. Clive , counsellor and charg é d'affaires , i n control. Alston obviously gained first-hand knowledge and confirma tory evidence on two important themes; the attitud e o f British commercial interests in China and the attitude of the Chinese government itself.21 The Associated British Chambers of Commerce in China and Hong Kong and the Tsinan and Tsingtao British Chambers of Commerce denounced the alliance with Japan as a failure, as unnecessary because of the League of Nations, as injurious to British commercial interests, an d a s an instrument that encourage d Japanes e ambition s while i t undermine d Britis h hope s fo r a stron g an d independen t China. Th e power s shoul d retur n Shantun g t o Chin a i n ful l sovereignty an d Britain, in negotiating an y new agreement with Japan, should curb her ally's activities an d secure a new deal for the Peking government. These views received suppor t fro m th e Boar d of Trade in London, which suggested that Britain rid herself of any obligation to endorse Japan's claims to 'special interests' in China. The Board of 20 Alston speculated on what policy Britain should pursue should the League collapse. Again he concluded that the likely absence of co-operation from th e United States, coupled with the need to retain Japan's goodwill in China and avoid isolating her, pointed to the retention of an agreement with Tokyo. 21 Alston to Curzon, 4 and 21 May 1920, Clive to Curzon, 30 June 1920, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 26,21-2; no 35,28; and no 59,53-8; Clive to Curzon, 14 July 1920, Cab. 32/6; Board of Trade to secretary of cm, 28 June 1920, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 61,65, note 24

78 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y Trade regarde d Japa n a s a dangerou s competitor , suspectin g tha t Japan had secure d a substantial degre e of control over China's eco nomic development . Th e Pekin g governmen t itsel f denounce d th e alliance as superfluous, as dangerous to China's survival , as an insult to her sovereignty , an d a s an obviou s sourc e o f encouragemen t t o Japanese imperialism . Th e Chines e authoritie s als o demanded tha t Britain consult them before arriving at any decisions on renewal, and warned that they would not recognize the legality of those sections of a new treaty which referred to China, unless prior consultations were held. En rout e fo r England , Alston , receivin g a telegra m i n Toronto , hurried to Washington, arriving there on 26 July.22 He found tha t he and Gedde s wer e i n complet e agreemen t o n question s affectin g China, o n Anglo-America n relations i n th e Fa r East , an d o n th e alliance with Japan , an d tha t Secretar y of State Bainbridge Colby , Assistant Secretary of State Norman Davis, and R. Morris, American ambassador in Tokyo, also shared many of his views.23 Alston, lamenting th e absenc e o f a n Anglo-Saxo n polic y i n Asia , advocate d tha t Britain an d the Unite d States , sharing a common language, mutual interests, and beliefs, and in view of their co-operation in the fields of religion, education, and medicine, should act in unison in China. The Atlanticist in Alston emerged eve n more strongly a s he wen t o n t o suggest that the y establish Anglo-Saxo n naval control o f the Pacifi c and convince China that Britain and the United States would ensure her independence an d integrity. Alsto n later told J.V.A. MacMurray, head o f the Stat e Department' s Fa r Easter n section , tha t bot h th e United State s an d Britai n wer e discredite d i n China , th e forme r because of raising excessive hopes which were never fulfilled an d th e latter because o f failing to speak and act in her defence. MacMurray agreed and , accordin g t o Alston , promise d t o suppor t th e ide a of Anglo-American co-operative action . Alston summarised his new expectations in a memorandum for th e 22 Alston, 'Memorandum respecting talks at Washington in regard to future policies in the Far East,' 1 Aug. 1920, FO/414/246, and BD, 1st ser., xiv, no 79, 77-80 23 Alston and the United States officials agree d that the Chinese Eastern Railway should be under international control and that the Consortium would be a difficult means of organising financial support, but they disagreed over the issue of attempting to force Japan to permit Chinese control of the railwa y to Vladivostok.

79 NEW OPPORTUNITIE S Foreign Office. 24 Th e Japanese government , in which he had earlie r shown increasing faith , he now denounced for a reckless violation of its pledges, its aggressive tendencies, an d its failure to curb a powerful militaris t clique . H e suggeste d tha t Britai n ri d hersel f o f he r alliance wit h Japan , regai n he r diplomati c independence , an d joi n with the Unite d State s to enforce the principles an d interests whic h they hel d jointly . A n Anglo-Saxo n flee t base d a t Singapor e an d Hawaii would police th e Pacific, remove any menace from Japa n by checking the tendenc y o f Japanese militarist s t o gamble , an d hel p induce 'an Anglo-American-Japanes e understanding regardin g Chi nese, Siberia n an d Pacifi c question s whic h woul d reall y mak e for permanent peace in East Asia and the maintenance of those principles which Great Britain, America and Japan have repeatedly declared to form th e basis of their policy in the Far East.' 25 In Alston' s opinion , Britain mus t seiz e th e opportunit y offere d b y th e Anglo-Japanes e alliance renewa l question . I f sh e decided o n renewal, Britai n mus t secure an understanding with Japan on fundamental policies,26 demonstrate tha t Britai n sough t close r understandin g wit h th e Unite d States,27 and show Japan tha t thei r allianc e had been a seriou s obstacle t o an Anglo-American rapprochement becaus e of the discrep ancies betwee n Anglo-Saxo n principles an d Japan' s interests . H e concluded wit h Colby's assuranc e that any American administration would favou r thi s Anglo-Saxo n policy and , withou t suggestin g th e destruction o f al l Britain' s tie s wit h Japan , h e ha d clearl y turne d toward Atlanticism.28 24 Alston, 'Memorandum respecting suggestions for an Anglo-Saxon policy in the Fa r East, " 1 Aug. 1920 , Cab . 5/3 , Fo/414/248 , an d BD , 1st ser. , xiv, no 80,81-6 25 Alston's statement of these principles wa s orthodox enough; th e preservatio n of the mutual interests of all powers in China, the maintenance of China's independence an d integrity, and the elevation of equal opportunity for the trade and industry of all nations above the search for special interests in China. 26 His assessment of Japan suggested that she wanted peace and the perpetua tion of the treaty with Britain, that she was experiencing economic troubles and los s of prestige, tha t publi c opinio n was restless an d critica l o f th e government, and that his Anglo-Saxon policy would bring Japan's extremists to heel. 27 He felt that an actua l treaty between Britai n and the Unite d State s wa s not necessary to secure his Anglo-Saxon policy. 28 Crowe's minute of 9 August was sceptical, bordering on hostility.

80 ILLUSION S O F SECURIT Y Sir Charles Eliot, Alston's successor in Tokyo, took quite a differen t view and, unmoved by opinions to the contrary, consistently favoured renewal o f th e allianc e wit h Japan , modifie d i n th e ligh t o f th e League Covenant.29 At times Eliot ran ahead of the Foreign Offic e i n assuring Japan of Britain's devotion to their treaty and in comforting Japanese official s o n her intentions . H e als o emphasised t o Londo n Japan's dedicatio n t o th e allianc e an d he r desir e fo r harmonious relations wit h Britain and th e Unite d States. 30 Bu t more than that , Eliot's despatches, often circulated to the cabinet, met with a favourable response from Crow e and Curzon, or simply reinforced views at which Curzo n an d hi s senio r official s ha d alread y arrived. 81 Elio t emphasised the strategic benefits o f the alliance, wit h a loyal Japan providing for the securit y o f Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, an d Canada's Pacifi c coast , an d als o the diplomati c advantage s gaine d from Britain' s ability to restrain and moderate her ally. He deplore d the 'myth ' of a beleaguered an d democrati c Chin a terrorise d b y a rapacious Japan and described majorit y Japanes e opinion, her commercial groups, civil administration, and higher officials a s favouring reasonable, moderate , an d honourabl e policies . I n addition , Elio t advocated renewa l o f th e allianc e i n orde r t o avoi d an y rebuf f t o Japan, t o guar d agains t Japa n orientatin g towar d German y o r a Russo-Germa n combination , an d t o remov e possibl e threat s t o India. He did not fee l that Britai n coul d coun t on the Unite d State s i n Asia, her objections to the alliance were ill-conceived an d emanated only from an inferior class of American, and the United States seemed blind to the advantages which Britain an d she herself gained . Moreover, in Eliot's view, as Japan was willing to renegotiate the allianc e and remov e th e ground s fo r Washington' s objections , th e Unite d 29 Eliot to Curzon, 23 May, 8 and 1 7 June 1920, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 36, 28-9 ; no 45, 38; and no 52, 42-8; Eliot to Curzon, telegram, 12 Dec. 1920, Ca b 32/6 30 Curzon found it necessary to restrain Eliot, both on the question of discussing the terms of renewal of the treaty and on the need to preserve the executive position of the forthcoming imperial meeting ( Eliot to Curzon, 16 July and 3 Aug. 1920, an d Curzon to Eliot, 25 July 1920 , BD, 1s t ser., xrv, no 70, 72; no 81,86-7; and no 74, 74-5 ). 31 Crowe minuted on Eliot's despatch of 1 7 June, 'good reading and carries conviction,' while Curzon added, 'It is a good general statement of the case , but says little or nothing about China or India.'

81 NEW OPPORTUNITIE S States had no right either to denounce the alliance's past record or to warn agains t i t i n th e future . Similarly , skilfu l negotiation s coul d remove any conflict betwee n the allianc e an d the Leagu e Covenant and Eliot dismissed as folly th e view that the Leagu e rendere d th e alliance superfluous . Dominion objections 82 he brushed asid e a s the product of confusion, linking immigration matters with the operatio n of the alliance, and of ignorance, which blinded the dominions to the strategic benefits the y gained. Moreover, Peking was mistaken in its belief tha t the allianc e threatene d China' s interest s rathe r tha n th e reverse. Finally , Elio t suggested , the exaggerate d complaint s fro m British commercia l interests abou t Japanes e discriminator y policie s could be met in the renewal negotiations. In return, British commercial and governmental officials shoul d treat the Japanese with greate r frankness an d cordiality and with less suspicion and contempt. Honourable negotiations between equals would produce neither a derogatory treaty nor a mere exchange of notes but what all the best elements in Japanes e lif e desired , a renewe d allianc e i n harmon y with th e League Covenant. With Jordan and Alston ranged to some degree against Eliot, what of D r Geddes , attemptin g t o asses s Washington' s reaction s an d American opinion in an election year? In April 1920 Geddes warned London of the possible injurious effects not only of a decision to renew but also of a failure to seize the opportunity to abrogate the alliance.83 Anglophobe influences could exploit either decision, stimulate a wave of opinio n hostile t o Britain , and injur e the prospect s fo r American entry into the League. As a remedy, Geddes suggested a joint AngloJapanese declaration , deferrin g th e decisio n o n renewa l unti l th e League of Nations was so firmly established that the allianc e woul d be superfluou s o r a t most a form o f insurance agains t th e League' s collapse.84 Again in June 1920 Geddes suggested a public explanation 32 Eliot described Canada and Australia as sharing the sam e views on th e alliance. 33 Geddes to Curzon, 30 April 1920, FO/371/5359 34 Geddes's report struck a responsive chord at the Foreign Office and helped to initiate the Anglo-Japanese moves in June to reconcile their alliance with the League. Bentinck, Wellesley, Hardinge, Curzon, and Balfour all agreed that they must avoid violations of the Covenant and that such a step would improve Britain's image in the eyes of the world and in the United States. Hardinge noted, however, that whatever Britain did she would certainly be hotiy criticised in the United States.

82 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y of British policy to offset damagin g press rumours,85 but b y November, despite his concern over United States reactions, Geddes advised retention o f the allianc e wit h Japan. 36 H e reiterate d tha t American opinion would denounce renewal in any form unless the alliance were diluted an d mad e virtually meaningless , bu t h e doubte d tha t thi s issue could greatl y exacerbate feelings alread y arouse d over the oi l and Irish questions . Finally, Gedde s seemed to feel that a t least th e alliance coul d serve as a restraint on and a sober warning to extreme anglophobes. Ideally, Geddes , echoin g Alston , sa w considerabl e meri t i n a n exchange o f note s betwee n Britain , Japan , an d th e Unite d States , laying down a common policy with respec t t o China , couple d wit h an Anglo-American naval agreement to outclass Japan in the Pacific . He felt, however, that Senate objections to an alliance, constitutiona l difficulties, an d th e lac k of constancy in United States policy would render suc h scheme s ineffective . Eve n mor e than tha t th e Unite d States was in a competitive mood, jealous of Britain, blaming Britain for her errors and problems, trailing a bad conscience, demonstrating ignorance o f internationa l affairs , confirmin g he r isolationism , an d bowing t o th e wil l o f a n unscrupulou s an d dynami c anglophob e minority, which sough t t o forc e 'Joh n Bull' t o disgorg e 'Ireland of course bu t als o se a powe r an d anythin g els e Americ a may fancy , principally th e Britis h Wes t Indies , th e resource s o f Canad a an d more recently Australia.' Geddes, therefore, suggeste d that Britai n should attemp t t o help avoid the election o f a hostile president an d then tie each presiden t down at the start of his term of office to a policy of co-operation in the Far Eas t and th e Pacific . Thi s woul d result i n a series of four-year agreements, whic h Gedde s describe d a s introducing a 'periodicity' into Unite d State s foreig n policy . Gedde s forecast , however , considerable difficult y wit h Harding' s administratio n an d warne d tha t the price of an agreement would be that London give way on every major issue . I n Geddes' s opinio n a decisio n agains t renewa l o f the alliance with Japan would be premature unless Britain had alread y accepted th e view that close Anglo-American relations wa s the prin cipal aim of her foreign policy, and he concluded: 35Geddes to Curzon, 5 June 1920, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 43,38 36 Geddes to Curzon, 1 5 Nov. and 3 Dec. 1920, ibid., no 162, 177-8; no 175, 187-9, and Cab. 32/6

83 NEW OPPORTUNITIES I believe that for a period of years it will remain an important British interest to secure co-operation with America even at the price of introducing some periodicity into our own policy, but it would be a high and I believe unnecessary price to pay to purchase it at the cost of Japanese enmity .

He recommended then tha t Britai n rene w the allianc e wit h Japan , modified t o accommodat e the Leagu e Covenant , omittin g eithe r a military or an adhesion clause,37 and remaining in force for four years to coincide wit h one American presidential term. Britain should also attempt to reach a four-year agreement with the United States which did not require Senat e ratification and then renegotiate i t with eac h new president fo r a s long a s seemed desirable, o r until the Senat e changed its attitude. The Foreign Office, in drawing up its recommendations, had, therefore, Alsto n moving closer to Jordan , wit h Gedde s somewher e be tween them an d Eliot , an d al l fou r findin g commo n groun d i n th e ideal if apparently impracticabl e solutio n of achieving co-operatio n between Britain, Japan, and the United States. However, Jordan and Alston, returning to London, had greate r opportunities t o influence the review of policy. This review by the Foreign Office in 1920 passed through thre e phases . A preliminary investigatio n resulte d i n Lor d Hardinge's summary in April. During the second period the Foreig n Office accepte d th e obligation s o f th e Leagu e Covenan t an d th e Atlanticists increased their impact. Finally th e study which resulte d in the report of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Committee, presented in January 1921 , reflecte d a furthe r movemen t of opinio n awa y fro m that of Hardinge and Curzon toward the Atlanticists. Again all participants foun d a point of agreement in the concept of achieving tripartite co-operation in the Far East. However, by May 1921 Curzon clearly had reasserted himself and was bent on undermining Atlanticist influence. Initially, H.W. Malkin, assistant legal adviser at the Foreign Office , ruled, an d hi s view was never challenged , tha t th e Anglo-Japanese alliance wa s incompatibl e wit h th e Leagu e Covenant. 38 Conse quently, althoug h th e allianc e coul d be operativ e i n case s where a 37 The idea of an adhesion clause, permitting the United States to join a renewed Anglo-Japanese treaty , had alread y emerged from Foreig n Offic e studies , although Eliot opposed the idea. 38 Malkin, memorandum, 'Anglo-Japanese alliance as affected b y the Covenant

84 ILLUSION S O F SECURIT Y war occurred an d did not receive League disapproval, Britain must bring the alliance int o complete accord with the Covenant . Curzo n accepted Malldn's ruling and the Foreign Secretary's general position on the alliance received support from C.H. Bentinck, a member of the Far Eastern department and later head of the Russian department.89 Curzon and Bentinck admitted that fundamental differences existe d between Britis h an d Japanes e policies i n China , an d realise d tha t Japan regarded the allianc e in part as an instrument to remove the threat o f British or Anglo-American opposition t o her policies. How ever, whil e recognisin g th e problem s raise d b y commercia l rivalry and racial-immigration questions, while conceding that Japan might bid fo r the hegemon y of East Asia, and despit e acknowledging th e possibility o f Anglo-America n co-operation i n pursui t o f commo n goals, both Curzon and Bentinck insisted that Britain must retain her alliance wit h an honourable and loyal Japan. In their view , politica l factors reinforce d strategi c consideration s an d promise d ¿ha t th e alliance would benefit both parties in the future as it had in the past. At th e sam e time, Curzon an d Bentinc k hoped t o accommodat e the Unite d State s a s far a s possible. Bentinck , describin g relation s with the United States as the dominant consideration fro m th e point of vie w o f bot h materia l interest s an d racia l affinity , insiste d tha t Britain mus t divest Japa n o f any expectation s o f suppor t i n a wa r against th e Unite d States . Indeed , Bentinc k argue d tha t i f Britai n could rely on the United States the alliance with Japan would be unnecessary, bu t Londo n had receive d n o assurance s o f co-operatio n from Washington. Furthermore, the abject state of relations between Washington an d Tokyo made it impossible to conduct policy in harmony with two powers who seemed set on a collision course. A tripartite agreement was therefore impracticable. Bentinc k concluded that Britain mus t renew th e treat y wit h Japa n an d attemp t t o achiev e friendly co-operation with the United States and France. Our future course lies between our ally with whom our interests conflict and our friend who is united to us by race, tradition and community of interests and ideals. It will be difficult for us to steer a straight course, both of the League of Nations,' 18 Feb. 1920, BD, 1st ser., vi, no 744,1001-3, and Cab. 5/3 39Foreign Office to Admiralty, 21 Jan. 1920, BD, 1st ser., vi, no 789,1053-4, and Bentinck memorandum, 'Effect of the Anglo-Japanese alliance upon Foreign Relationships,' 28 Feb. 1920, ibid., no 761,1016-23 and Cab. 5/3

85 NE W OPPORTUNITIE S parties will no doubt reproach us, as they have done in the past, for not giving them more whole-hearted support against the other, but this course as outlined must be steered; our interests demand it.40

F.T.A. Ashton-Gwatkin's memorandum of March 1920, counsellin g deky and opposing a decision on renewal until the unsettled Japanes e domestic scen e ha d becom e clarified , wa s mor e significan t fo r th e dissenting minute s it produced than for its own content.41 Bentinck, H.G. Parlett , forme r counsello r a t th e Toky o embassy , an d E.M . Hobart Hampden, former secretary a t that embassy, denie d Ashton Gwatkin's assumptions , evidence , an d conclusions . Britai n coul d neither denounc e th e alliance nor delay an d leave it untouched, an d Hardinge drew th e following conclusion : 'I t seems to me that the y all tend to a renewal o r continuation o f the Allianc e i n a new an d modified form . What tha t form shoul d b e will require much discus sion.' Curzo n di d no t disagre e an d Harding e informe d th e Unite d States ambassador that Britain would retain the alliance for a further year and then attempt a reappraisal, inferring that this would be done with the dominions at the next imperial meeting.42 40 Bentinck noted, in support, tha t France and Holland would welcome renewal of th e Anglo-Japanes e alliance and Portuga l would not object. H e als o suggested that France might be included i n a triple agreement , thus fore shadowing the arrangement reached at the Washington conference. 41 Ashton-Gwatkin was second secretary at the Foreig n Offic e an d a member of the Far Eastern department Ashton-Gwatkin , memorandum, 'The AngloJapanese alliance and constitutional changes in Japan,' 23 March 1920, BD , 1st ser., vi, no 789,1049-53. He feared that renewal would bolster the oligarchic bureaucracy an d the military faction in Japan, and hoped tha t prosperity , liberalism, intellectual dissent, and responsible government would result in democratic control of foreign policy, an end to military influences, a reduction in defence expenditures, and a nausea with sabre politics. These developments should, in Ashton-Gwatkin's view, reduce the threat to China and to British interests, hel p alleviate tensio n between Japan an d the Unite d States, an d avoid the possibility of Japan joining Russia or Germany. Subsequently, Ashton-Gwatkin suggeste d usin g the allianc e renewa l questio n t o forc e Japanese co-operation in the Consortium, coupled with offers to recognise her special interests in South Manchuria, and to save her face by a British offe r to restore Wei-hai-wei to China (Ashton-Gwatkin, memorandum, 'Japan and the Open Door,' ibid., xrv, no 61,57-66). 42 Davis to Secretary of State, 28 April 1920, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, n, 680 (hereafter cited as FB).

86 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y The secon d phase, in the summe r of 1920, sa w the Foreig n Offic e accommodate the obligations of the League Covenant and witnessed a new emphasis from Atlanticis t opinion. In a series of harmonious exchanges with Japan, Curzon was able to solve or shelve the prob lems created by inconsistencies between the alliance and the League Covenant, als o ensurin g tha t th e allianc e woul d no t continu e un amended afte r 1 3 July 1921. A s Curzon told Elio t an d Geddes , h e was not denouncing the alliance but merely suggesting a joint statement to the League to improve Britain's moral and diplomatic position, without prejudicing the freedo m o f action of the dominions. 48 Consequently, on 8 July Curzon and Ambassador Chinda despatche d their not e t o th e Leagu e fro m th e Sp a Conference , affirmin g th e adherence o f Britai n an d Japa n t o thei r obligation s unde r th e Covenant4* V. Wellesley, assistant secretary at the Foreign Offic e an d superintending th e Fa r Easter n department , fire d th e firs t roun d fo r th e Atlanticists, afte r listenin g t o guarde d approache s fro m Butle r Wright, counsellor a t th e American embassy, on the questio n of cooperation in China.45 Wellesley denounced the alliance as a notorious failure an d attacke d Japanes e policie s a s antagonisti c t o Anglo American aims in China, as more ruthless, brutal, and insidious than German policy and as an attempt t o establish contro l over China to the exclusion of the western powers . At best, Wellesley argued , th e alliance wa s a n unnatural and artificia l compact , whic h woul d be come a shallo w an d negativ e marriag e of convenienc e i f retained , placing Britain in an ignominious and preposterous position in relation to China. Wellesley advocated , therefore, that the y respond t o 43 Curzon to Eliot, 3 and 1 6 June 1920 , Curzo n to Geddes, 1 3 June 1920, an d Eliot to Curzon, 8 and 22 June 1920, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 41, 36-7; no 51, 42; no 42,37; no 45,38; no 46, 39; and no 55, 50 44 British foreign an d state papers, 1920,113, 370 and Lloyd George, statement, House of Commons, 24 June 1920,130, Debates, 5 ser., cois. 2365-6 45 Wellesley, memorandum, 'Anglo-American co-operation in the Far East,' 1 June 1920, BD , 1s t ser., xrv, no 40, 32-6. Wellesle y and Bentinc k met Butler Wright on 21 May and the latter claimed to speak on behalf of his ambassador. They met again on 14 June, but Wellesley received little encouragement from Hardinge, who advised against further meeting s for the present. Wellesley recognised of course that Washington could disavow thes e approaches and probably would not pursue them in the face of strong anglophobe and antiJapanese sentiments in the United States.

87 NEW OPPORTUNITIE S any overtures fro m th e Unite d State s offerin g th e slightes t prospec t of success , that the y build o n an y hopeful foundation s such a s th e Consortium, an d tha t Britai n see k a tripartit e agreemen t involvin g the United States. This was a practicable cours e in his view as Washington might follow up the Consortium with 'a political understand ing, in order to give definite expression to the similarity of British and American aims in the Far East.' Wellesley also felt these steps would raise bot h Britis h prestig e an d Chines e hope s an d woul d ear n th e applause o f the Britis h communities in China . H e sought, however, to avoid a rebuff t o Japan which would make her fee l isolate d an d insecure, an d h e envisage d eithe r a n agreemen t wit h th e Unite d States accompanied by renewal of a modified allianc e with Japan, or even a triple agreement which at the very least would secure a clear statement o f American policy.48 I f Britai n modifie d th e allianc e t o meet he r obligation s unde r th e Leagu e an d remov e th e militar y clauses, she would encourage United States adherence, and Wellesley concluded that the time was ripe to reach for what had been regarded as Utopian , a tripartit e agreement . Hi s superior s wer e clearl y les s impressed and Hardinge merely assured Ambassador Davis that th e alliance, when renewed, would not be aimed a t the Unite d States. 47 In combinatio n wit h Jordan, an d reinforced b y Alston , however, Wellesley continue d to attempt to influence th e Foreig n Office' s re view o f policy. 48 H e state d tha t Britai n shoul d see k ' a carefull y planned constructiv e policy for China an d the creatio n o f a prope r equilibrium o f economi c interests i n tha t countr y afte r a ful l an d frank discussio n with the Americans, ' and h e explore d fou r alterna tive course s of action. His alternative s wer e abrogation , renewa l of the alliance modified only to satisfy the League Covenant, renewal in a for m differen t fro m a n allianc e an d wit h a n adhesio n claus e t o attract th e Unite d State s an d othe r powers , an d renewa l a s in th e third alternativ e but without an adhesion clause an d with a parallel agreement wit h th e Unite d States . Eventuall y Britai n migh t con solidate these parallel arrangements.49 Without being entirely consis46 Wellesley expected the Japanes e military to resent thi s check on their Chin a policy, but he felt they would recognise the value of a detente with the United States and in any case would not dare undermine this course of action. 47 Davis to Colby, 7 June 1920, FH, 1920, n, 682. 48 Wellesley, memorandum , 'Respectin g th e Anglo-Japanes e alliance, ' 1 Sept . 1920, BD , 1st ser., xrv, no 97,106-13 49 In expanded form th e fourth alternativ e mean t a five-year treaty wit h Japan,

88 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y tent in his reasoning and despite being attracted to the third alterna tive, Wellesley opted for the fourth policy as offering th e best chance of success with the least possible risk.60 An assurance of United States moral suppor t woul d strengthe n Britain' s han d i n he r negotiation s with Japan, who could not risk isolation from Britai n and th e possibility o f a n exclusiv e Anglo-America n combination. Consequently , Wellesley expecte d Japan would meet Britain's terms and, should a multilateral arrangemen t ultimatel y result , the n Japanes e policie s would be subject to adequate restraints.51 Wellesley's proposal s receive d th e suppor t o f Si r Conyngha m Greene, forme r ambassado r t o Japan , an d o f Jordan , despit e th e latter's criticis m o f the cumbersom e procedures involve d i n imple menting th e fourt h alternative and hi s preference fo r a n exchang e of identica l note s with Japan an d the Unite d States . Wellesley suggested that a committee study the renewal problem an d the broade r questions of Far Eastern policy, and clearly there existed within th e Foreign Office a challenge to Curzon. Moreover, when Ambassado r Hayashi reached London on 4 September to replace Chinda he found evidence of public concern over the possibility of war between Japan and the United States, fear of British connivance or involvement, and coolness toward Japan.52 Yet Lloyd George personally had just given Chinda a very different impression in their farewell talk on 17 August, in harmony with the League Covenant and without a military or adhesio n clause, and a parallel agreement with the United States for the same period of time. Then Britain would attempt to consolidate the two agreements into a multilateral treaty including China and possibly other powers, but recognise d as an agreement, rather than a treaty requiring ratification by the United States Senate. This agreement would be a consultative and self-denying arrangement radier than a defensive or offensive treat y and would involve prior consultation with China and the omission of all reference to India. 50 Wellesley lamented the fact that economic restraints checked the development of Britain's naval and military forces an d he urged that a strong British or Anglo-American fleet police the Pacific . 51 Wellesley suggested that Britain coul d use Japan's dependenc e o n Indian cotton as a lever in their negotiations and regarded as essential minimum terms a pledge of Japanese frankness, an assurance that Japan would not repeat her 'twenty-one demands,' and an agreement to pursue the economic stability and independence of China. In return Britain would promise to restore Wei-haiwei to China. 52Nish, 'Japan and the Ending of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,' 374. Hayash i

89 NE W OPPORTUNITIE S assuring hi m that Britai n woul d retai n th e allianc e a s a matte r of course. Th e Foreig n Offic e intercepte d Chinda' s despatch t o Tokyo of 20 August and Curzon, lamenting the Premier's sortie, pointed out to Lloyd Georg e that h e seeme d to have gon e further tha n anyon e else in favour of retaining the alliance. 83 Chinda was impressed wit h Lloyd George' s assertio n that Anglo-Japanes e co-operation wa s one of th e prim e factors contributin g t o world stability , an d tha t whil e Britain would consider dominio n and American views and while he personally favoured the inclusion of the United States in their treaty , Britain woul d maintai n th e alliance. 54 Th e Britis h publi c favoure d this policy , accordin g t o Lloy d George , an d th e curren t chao s i n American politics made it impossible to open negotiations on a triple agreement. Lloyd Georg e was , therefore, th e sourc e o f som e confusio n al though his remarks to Chinda were probably more general and trite, as Curzon conceded, than the departing ambassador claimed. In midDecember th e Premier told Senato r Medill McCormick, an envoy of President-elect Harding , tha t he would welcome an American representative t o work out tiie problems associate d with th e League , th e peace treaty, naval matters, and the alliance with Japan.65 He assured parliament late r that mont h that hi s government would ac t o n th e alliance only after ful l consultation with the dominions. 58 Both these statements wer e too general t o be reall y significant , clearly neithe r the Foreign Office nor the government had made final recommendations or decisions, an d other influences were still at large. Perhaps the Foreign Office' s exper t committee, suggested by Wellesley, and meetinserted a rejoinder in The Times on 4 January 1921 to a particularly damaging article of 30 December.

53 Curzon to Lloy d George , 25 Sept . 1920 , Lloyd George Papers , F/13/1/20 , including Chinda to Foreign Minister (Tokyo), 20 Aug. 1920; Nish , 'Japan and the Ending of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,' 373-4. 54 Chinda was impressed neither wit h the prospect s fo r a triple agreemen t no r with the chances of the dominion s altering British policy, an d Toky o drew comfort fro m th e fac t tha t a s Anglo-American an d Japanese-American relations were so wretched the triple allianc e would not materialise, and th e Anglo-Japanese alliance would remain in force. SSMoCormick t o H.C. Lodge, 2 2 Dec. 1920, Henr y Cabo t Lodg e Papers , fil e 1921, Sept-Dec , (misfiled ) 56 Lloyd George , statement, Hous e of Commons , 23 Dec. 1920, 136, Debates, 5 ser., cois. 2118-14

90 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y ing between 1 9 October an d 3 0 November 1920, woul d narrow the alternatives?87 Wellesley, Jordan, and Conyngham Greene, along with Sir William Tyrrell, assistant under-secretary of state, comprised the expert committee an d produced a predictable report. 58 Th e committe e state d that Fa r Easter n problem s hinged o n Japan's polic y towar d Chin a and that Britain must decide whether her policies and those of Japan were close enough to make renewal of their alliance either practicabl e or desirable . O n thi s poin t th e committe e was emphatic : Japan' s actions were dangerously and persistently expansionist , discriminatory, and at variance with Britain's interests. Th e report specificall y rejected th e assertion that the alliance ha d acte d a s an effective re straint on Japan and accepted the view that postwar circumstance s suggested non-renewal. However, financial and strategi c considerations, in th e committee' s opinion , demande d a polic y tha t woul d terminate an y nava l competition , allo w reduction s i n defenc e expenditure, and still provide for the security of the Pacific . The revers e sid e o f th e questio n wa s tha t o f relation s wit h th e United States , an d th e committe e ha d n o hesitatio n i n citin g th e alliance a s a formidable obstacle t o th e realisatio n o f clos e AngloAmerican relations an d their ful l an d indispensabl e co-operatio n in China. The treaty with Japan, therefore, threatened a cardinal principle of Britain's global and Far Easter n policies an d the committee decided unanimousl y that Britai n must relinquish th e allianc e an d replace it with a tripartite entente with Japan and the United States 'consisting in a declaration o f general principles whic h can be subscribed t o b y al l parties withou t th e ris k o f embarrassin g commitments.' Furthermore, to achieve this declaration of principles, Britain should co-operate closel y with Washington rather than with Tokyo. Only as a regrettable secon d choice , necessitate d b y Unite d State s unwillingness to join in a triple arrangement, would the committee advocate an agreement with Japan. Even this agreement, reconciled with the League Covenant, must contain provision for the eventua l participation of the United States. While supporting the idea of a triple entente, the committee had un57Curzon to Eliot, 21 Oct. 1920, and Curzon to Clive, 23 Oct. 1920, BD, 1st ser., xiv, no 139,158-9, and no 144, 102. The Colonial and India Office s wer e consulted before the committee submitted its final report to Curzon. 58 Report of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Committee, 21 Jan. 1921, ibid., no 212, 221-7. Tyrrell, of course, had been an intimate of Grey.

91 NEW OPPORTUNITIE S mistakably restate d th e cas e fo r reorientatin g Britis h polic y awa y from Japan and toward the United States. They had virtually avoided the questio n of the practicability o f their suggested policy, but Cur zon's position had received an additional challenge and developments prior to the imperial meeting brought further Atlanticis t pressures.59 Whether the Foreig n Offic e committe e could influenc e policy , however, remained undecided, and in fact Curzon, when making recommendations to the cabinet in May 1921, rejected its principal suggestion and turned to the second alternative. The period prior to the imperial meeting of June 1921 brought thre e significant developments . First, an Anglo-Canadian debate i n which Ottawa demanded that Britain seek a tripartite or even wider agreement by wa y of a conference of Pacific powers . Second, a serie s of Canadian-United States contacts which reinforced Ottawa's Atlanticism but di d no t initiate it. Finally , the cabinet' s vita l decision s of 30 May after a further review of political, strategic, and other factors. Significantly, Curzo n carried th e cabine t t o a great degre e an d ye t Lloyd George' s governmen t adopted a plural approach towar d th e question of the alliance and the impending discussions at the Imperial Conference. The Atlanticist thesis received suppor t fro m Ottaw a as it ha d fro m withi n th e Foreig n Offic e itsel f an d expectation s wer e perhaps justifiabl y raised . I n an y even t th e Atlanticis t argument s could no t simpl y b e dismissed , bu t thos e wh o wer e antagonisti c wielded formidabl e powers. Thi s the n wa s stil l th e natur e o f th e debate. The Canadia n government , now led b y Arthu r Meighe n but i n Borden's shadow, was at the core of these developments, demonstrating its faith in the Atlantic entente.60 Ottawa acted with dual intent. 59 A cabinet committee, chaired by Leo Amery, supervised and prepared th e agenda, Cab. 27/112; Milner to Governor-General, 28 Jan. 1921; Churchil l to Governor-General, 28 Feb. 1921 , King Papers, file 1922 (Chandler-Churchill). 60 The first important account focussing on the Imperial Conference itself was Brebner, 'Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference.' Brebner based his article largely on information acquire d from J.W . Dafoe of the Manitoba Free Press, through Professor J.T. Shotwell, and both Borden and Meighen accepted it as an accurate account of the imperial meeting ( Dafoe to MacGregor Dawson, 23 May 1935, J.W . Dafoe Papers, reel 5, M 77 ). More recent accounts of some interest are Galbraith, 'The Imperial Conference of 1921 and the Washington Conference,' and Fry, The Nort h

92 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y As a function of North Atlantic triangular diplomacy Meighen sought to interpret th e North American viewpoint and demanded the maintenance o f that order o f priorities whic h placed Anglo-America n accord at the summit of expectations. In terms of interimperial relation s he attempte d t o us e Canada' s voic e o f persuasion t o deflec t i f no t reverse policies an d alter the order of preferences that the emergin g commonwealth should pursue. Canad a had growin g commercial interests acros s the Pacific , he r missionaries were activ e in Korea, her immigration law s discriminate d agains t orientals , an d ye t sh e was indebted to Japan for naval protection received during the recent war Canada's principal concern, however, accentuated by participation in the allie d interventio n i n Siberia , wa s the antagonis m growin g between Japan an d the United States. Renewal of the Anglo-Japanes e alliance would undermine Anglo-American accord, be injurious to the creation o f an Atlantic entente, an d se t th e empire' s foreig n polic y irrevocably on the wrong path. Meighen's government was prepare d to gamble , therefore , in opposin g renewa l o f Britain's exclusiv e al liance with Japan, on the willingness of the United States to participate i n worl d affairs . Meighen , guide d b y Christi e an d hic e th e Atianticists i n London , viewe d th e Republica n administratio n o f President Harding with greater expectations . In pursuance o f this Atlanticist policy, the Canadia n government welcomed an d sough t out source s of information and contac t wit h receptive Republicans. Prominent on the American side were Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and William Howard Gardiner, a member of the executive committe e o f th e America n Navy Leagu e an d a forme r president o f the America n branch o f the English-Speakin g Union. 61 Atlantic Triangle and the Abrogation of tibe Anglo-Japanese Alliance.' Of less value are Tate and Foy, 'More Light on the Abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance/ Vinson, The Imperia l Conference of 1921 and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,' and Lower, 'Loring Christie and the Genesis of the Washington Conference of 1921-1922.' 61 In the course of their correspondence Brebner thanked Dafoe for his lead on Gardiner, described as an element in 'the 1921 affair' and mentioned the possible existence of more dramatic information. Brebner also suggested the possibility of links between Gardiner's activities and those of 'Putnam Weale.' Gardiner told Dafoe that the views of the American government had been imparted unofficially to Meighen and that he himself was involved. Dafoe urged Brebner to see Gardiner and to 'get him to tell you what he knows about the means that were taken in 1920-1921 to impress upon Mr. Meighen's mind

93 NEW OPPORTUNITIE S Gardiner wa s the mor e active bu t Lodge' s sympath y and support , when other Republicans were lukewarm or dubious, was of considerable value to him.82 Neither was an isolationist, and Gardiner sought a new phase of co-operation in the Pacific and East Asia to secure the interests an d possession s o f th e English-speakin g peoples . H e re garded th e existenc e of the Anglo-Japanese allianc e an d the proba bility of its renewal as the principal obstacle to this goal. In Gardiner's opinion, Britain' s desir e to retai n he r allianc e wit h Japa n reflected doubts abou t th e securit y of India , threatene d i n fac t b y seditio n inspired fro m Tokyo , and showed Britain's selfish desir e to reinforce her position in Asia. Curzon, Gardiner felt, epitomise d these views, supported b y Balfou r an d Churchill , an d thei r deviou s policy at tempted to ensnare the United States in a triple alliance tha t would strangle American initiative an d her Ope n Door policy, an d ensur e the perpetuation of Britain's links with Japan. Gardiner, supported by Lodge, attempted , therefore , to secur e th e orientatio n o f th e do minions toward the United States and to use them as a bridge, leading to a n Anglo-America n alignment agains t th e commo n enemy, th e leader of the yellow races, Japan.63 Gardiner lai d dow n a specifi c pla n wit h thre e clea r goals . Th e United States should create and lead an entente of the English-speaking peoples bordering on the Pacific, dedicate d to a common policy. the advisability of offering resistance at the Imperial Conference of 1921 t o the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance' ( Dafoe to Brebner, 26 April 1935, and Brebner to Dafoe, 30 April 1935, Dafo e Papers, reel 5, M 77 ). 62 Gardiner t o Lodge , 5 Jan . an d 1 4 Feb . 1921 , Willia m Howar d Gardine r Papers, box 3, file H.C. Lodge, and Lodge Papers, file 1921, A-G , Jan.-April. Gardiner claimed to have influenced Lodge's views on foreign and defence policy by expounding his thesis of 'insular America' ( Gardiner to Lodge, 7 Jan. 1937, Gardine r Papers, box 3, file H.C. Lodge Jr, and Gardiner to H.L. Stimson, 28 June 1926, ibid., box 6, file Philippines, 1921 ). Gardiner's role is referred to by R.G. Albion in Gardiner, Writings on Sea Power and American Naval Policy, foreword, and Albion, Makers of Naval Policy, 1798-1947, 454,675. 63Gardiner t o W.S . Sims , 2 5 Nov . 1920 , 1 Oct . an d 2 2 Dec . 1921 , an d 1 9 Feb. 1922 , Gardine r Papers, box 2, file Rr Adm. Sims; Gardiner to Hornbeck, 1 1 Dec. 1921 , ibid. , box 4, file S. Hombeck; Gardine r t o Bywater , 31 March 1923, ibid., box 3, file H.C. Bywater; Gardiner to Fletcher, 30 July 1921, ibid. , box 3, file H.P. Fletcher; Gardiner to Lodge, 5 Jan. and 14 Feb. 1921 , se e note 62

94 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y This entente should ensure the demise of the Anglo-Japanese alliance through th e influenc e of the dominions . Finally , th e Unite d State s should reassert the Open Door policy, rejuvenate China, check Japan, and provide for the security of the Philippines.84 Such was Gardiner's policy, and wit h th e approva l o f Lodge h e used his contacts with the Navy and State departments, once the Republicans had their mandate, to initiate the appropriate steps . He was dedicated t o the task, convinced of its vital nature, and equally con vinced o f the ultimate succes s of his mission, for, as he tol d Senato r R.O. Brewste r from Maine , 'on my initiative Canad a vetoed th e re newal of the Alliance.'65 Gardiner exaggerated his own role and erred in his analysis of Canada's impact, but the significance of his activities remain. From April 1920 he prepared the ground in expectation o f a Republican victory in the presidential electio n and on the assumption that the question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance would be taken up by Britain and the dominions at the next imperial con ference. Hardmg's success in November fulfilled Gardiner' s basi c expectation an d h e launche d int o a flurr y o f activity , discussin g th e renewal question and the broader issues involved with Canadian and Australian 'representatives' in Washingto n an d Ne w York. H e tol d Admiral W.S. Sims that they had assured him that if the United State s evinced some understanding of their problems, Canada and Australia would oppos e renewa l o f the alliance . Gardine r als o pursue d wit h Canadian official s th e ide a o f joint naval defenc e in Pacifi c coasta l waters, regarding this plan as an important basis for an entente and as a step toward the establishment of United States leadership.66 64Gardiner to Sims, 21 April and 30 July 1921, ibid. , box 2, file Rr Adm. Sims; Gardiner to Roosevelt, 29 July 1921, ibid. , box 2, file Col. T. Roosevelt Jr; Gardiner to Fletcher, 6 Sept. 1921, ibid., box 3, file H.P. Fletcher; Gardine r to Lodge, 16 and 19 Feb. 1921 , Lodg e Papers, file 1921, A-G , Jan.-April 65 Gardiner to Brewster, 23 Feb. 1944 , Gardiner Papers, box 3, file R.O. Brewster. Gardiner in the course of numerous accounts given to a variety of people fro m 1921 to 1944 did not embellish or expand his thesis. The story did not grow with each successive telling. 66 Gardiner to Sims, 10 June 1920, ibid., box 2, file Rr Adm. Sims; Gardiner to Fletcher, 6 Sept. 1921, se e note 64; Gardiner to Edwards, 26 Jan. 1921, ibid. , box 3, file Lt-Comm. W.A. Edwards, Naval War College. Gardiner named F. Hudd and Col J.A. Cooper of the Canadian Bureau of Information in New York, but did not identify the Australian officials.

95 NE W OPPORTUNITIE S Gardiner's second tas k involved convincin g eminen t Republican s and prospective member s of the new administration that the Unite d States must pursue a vigorous policy in Asia and the Pacific based on his three-point programme . In this campaign he received apparentl y only the activ e an d sustaine d suppor t o f Lodge, an d actuall y wrot e subsequently of Lodge that 'soon after that he pulled of f hi s entent e of th e Pacifi c Britannic Dominions and ourselves.' 87 Late r h e wrot e to Lodge, urging that the Unite d States avoi d antagonisin g Canad a on tariff matter s to help promote the entent e betwee n th e English speaking people s unde r America' s aegis , whic h woul d resul t fro m Lodge's initiative s i n December 1920. 68 The entent e woul d includ e Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada, and the United States and, whatever its precise nature or form, Gardiner felt that it implied an understandin g t o oppos e th e renewa l o f the Anglo-Japanes e al liance. Perhaps equally surprising , although Gardiner wa s not alon e in mistakenly coupling Australia and Canada together in a supposed joint determination to oppose the alliance, he assumed that Australia would lead the offensive at the imperial meeting. Unfortunately detaile d documentatio n o f thi s phas e o f th e Gar diner-Lodge programm e i s lacking , bu t mor e tha n hint s reache d London, an d Mile s Lampson a t th e Foreig n Offic e warne d o f th e possibility of joint Canadian-United States action on Pacific questions, and noted specificall y a report i n the Morning Post o f 1 December 1920. This articl e spok e of a possible agreemen t amon g the Unite d States, Canada , Australia, and Ne w Zealand o n Asian immigration, which Senato r Lodge favoured. The Canadia n government had de nied tha t suc h a n agreemen t existe d bu t Lampso n wa s impresse d neither wit h th e denia l nor with th e idea tha t immigratio n matter s were the sol e reason for contacts, an d h e warne d o f the possibilit y that Canada , and even Australia and Ne w Zealand, might gravitat e toward the Unite d States to create a union of 'Pacific Nation s of th e Anglo-Saxon stock.'89 Tyrrell, commenting on the possibility of Cana67 Gardiner to Sims, 21 April and 30 July 1921, see note 64; Gardiner to Roosevelt, 29 July 1921, see note 64; Gardiner to Edwards, 26 Jan. 1921, see note 64 68 Gardiner to Lodge, 30 July 1921, Lodge Papers, file 1921, A-G , Jan.-April; Gardiner to Johnson, 21 April 1921, Gardiner Papers, box 2, file H.W. Johnson 69 Lampson, memorandum, 8 April 1921, 'On correspondence with the Canadian Government relating to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,' BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 261, 271-6. As late as mid-September Geddes reported on Lodge's desire to isolate

96 ILLUSION S O F SECURIT Y dian initiatives in Washington, warned tha t independen t actio n b y Ottawa prior to an agreement with Britain would play into Lodge' s hands, fo r Lodg e wishe d t o detac h Canad a an d possibl y Australi a and move the centre of the English-speaking community from London to Washington . Tyrrel l seeme d impresse d wit h th e anglophobi c nature of Lodge's policy but perhaps Lodge's priorities were different He warned President-elect Hardin g agains t unilatera l reduction s i n America's nava l building programme , suggestin g tha t th e threa t of a naval race was tie most potent lever to use on Japan to force a settlement of Far Eastern problems in favour of the United States. Further more, he hoped that Canada, Australia, and New Zealand would join with them to secure th e co-operatio n o f Britain an d t o sho w Japan that she could not control the Pacific. 70 Whatever th e details , Gardine r seeme d optimisti c i n Decembe r 1920 an d Australi a appeare d t o b e th e mos t promisin g o f th e do minions to carry out his policy. Indeed , a s late a s May 1921 Gedde s reported comment s by Mark Sheldon, the Australian commissioner in Washington, on the advisabilit y o f an allianc e betwee n th e Unite d States and the Pacific dominions, and cited press articles t o the effec t that Premier Hughes of Australia and Lodge agreed o n the need for such an understanding.71 Despite such rumours and reports, however, Gardiner soon became aware of the real attitude of Australia and New Zealand on the alliance question, and consequently Canada remained as the onl y avenue of approach throug h which to influence the Im perial Conference. Gardiner surmised that Foreign Offic e representa tions to Premier Hughes insisting that the alliance was vital to Pacific security an d that Unite d State s policy wa s unreliable accounte d fo r Australia's apparen t volte-face . In fact, despit e Australia' s wel l pub Japan and have the United States assume control in the Pacific and embrace the dominions ( Geddes to Curzon, 16 Sept 1921, Grigg Papéis, reel 11 ).

70 Lodge to Harding, 25 Feb. 1921, Lodge Papers, file 1921 71 Geddes to Curzon, 23 May 1921, received 1 June, FO/414/247. Geddes referred to a recent article in the Christian Science Monitor which stated that Hughes and Lodge favoured an understanding on immigration and defence policies and that Premier Massey of New Zealand agreed. Ganada would also be included in such an agreement, which Lodge and Hughes felt would be a more effective instrumen t than the Anglo-Japanese alliance and would be signed by states who shared the same ideals and faced a common danger. Hughes of Australia, of course, passed through the United States en route to the Imperial Conference.

97 NE W OPPORTUNITIE S licised opposition t o many of Japan's policies , Premie r Hughe s doe s not seem to have changed his attitude o n the alliance renewa l ques tion, but i n any event th e roa d t o Londo n seeme d t o pass throug h Ottawa.72 In February 192 1 Gardiner approached th e State Department an d principally Henr y P . Fletcher, Norma n Davis's successor-designat e as under-secretary of state. Gardiner calle d fo r action t o secure th e abrogation o f the Anglo-Japanes e allianc e and , a s Fletcher di d no t feel that the State Department coul d approach Britai n directly, Gardiner urged that they act through Ottawa . H e personally had maintained hi s contacts wit h Canadia n official s an d he coul d arrang e t o make a speech in Canada within two weeks, to meet members of the Canadian cabine t an d priv y counci l an d inaugurat e discussion s t o help subver t Curzon' s policy . Gardine r assure d Fletche r tha t th e Canadians accepte d hi s voic e a s a n authoritativ e i f unofficia l one . Other Republicans consulted , excep t Lodge, remained sceptical, for they expected the dominions to toe the Curzon line and to be unable, even if they were willing, to block the Foreign Office . The Stat e Department, however, accepte d Gardiner' s suggestions , sinc e the y required neither official sanction nor action, and Gardiner proceeded t o implement his programme.73 Three day s afte r Harding' s inauguratio n Gardine r spok e t o th e Canadian Club of Toronto.74 The contents of his speech then became the subject of consultations with Ottawa and Gardine r subsequentl y 72 Gardiner to Sims, 21 April 1921, see note 64; Gardiner to Fletcher, 1 3 April 1921, Gardine r Papers, box 3, file H.P. Fletcher; Gardine r to Lodge, 13 April 1921, ibid., box 3, file H.C. Lodge. B.L. Simpson told Gardiner that Massey would not oppose the Foreign Office lest he prejudice New Zealand's chance of raising a five-million pound loan in London. 73 Gardiner to Lodge, 14 Feb. 1921, se e note 62; Gardiner to Brewster, 4 July 1944, Gardiner Papers, box 3, file R.O. Brewster; Gardiner to P. Kennedy, 24 Oct. 1921, ibid. , box 4, file Foreign Press Service; Gardiner to Knapp, 18 May 1922, ibid., box 5, file Rr Adra. H.S. Knapp; Gardiner to Fletcher, 1 3 April 1921, se e note 72 and 6 Sept. 1921, se e note 64. On another occasion Gardiner said that he warned against direct approaches to Britain, suggesting his procedures to ensure that Britain opted for the English-speaking peoples ( Gardiner to E. Sedgewick, 29 Dec. 1921, Gardine r Papers, box 4, file Atlantic Monthly). 74 W.H. Gardiner, 'Political and Naval Problems of the Pacific,' speech of 7 March 1921, Pamphle t no 2-5061 ( Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa )

98 ILLUSIONS O F SECURITY described his speech as the prologue to Meighen's efforts in London.78 In kte Marc h Gardiner prepared for further speaking engagements in eastern Canada and for a conference with the Canadian government in which he expected Meighen to participate.76 On 23 April he left for Ottawa, the details of his visit having been arrange d with a Colonel McCullough (probabl y C.R . McCullough , forme r chairma n o f th e Belgian Relief and Reconstructio n Fund), an d wit h C.A . Magrath, Canadian chairma n o f th e Internationa l Join t Commission. 77 Th e conversations i n Ottawa , accordin g t o Gardiner , range d ove r th e whole area of Far Easter n affair s an d the problem s associated wit h a joint defence policy i n the Pacific . A s a result Meighe n accepte d the tas k o f attemptin g t o vet o th e renewa l o f th e Anglo-Japanes e alliance.78 Clearly Gardiner was well satisfied with his venture into diplomacy and tended to luxuriate in his efforts. H e looked forward confidently to the Imperial Conference , continued to attempt to assert influence, and claimed later that Canadian officials kept him and the authorities in Washington informe d of the proceeding s i n London. 79 What ap 75Gardiner to Jones, 1 Feb. 1923, Gardiner Papers, box 3, file Adm. H.P. Jones; Gardiner to Cooper, 14 March 1921, ibid. , box 5, file Col. J.A. Cooper; Gardiner to Fletcher, 13 April 1921, see note 72; Gardiner to Sims, 21 April 1921 , see note 64; Gardiner to Roosevelt, 29 July 1921, see note 64 76Gardiner to Sims, 21 April 1921, se e note 64 and 1 May 1921, Gardine r Papers, box 2, file Rr Adm. Sims; Gardiner to Fletcher, 1 3 April 1921, se e note 72. Gardiner was no doubt gratified by the applause his views received fro m C.A.C. Jennings, editor of the Toronto Mail and Empire and a close friend of Meighen (Cooper to Gardiner, 27 April 1921, ibid., box 5, file Col. J.A. Cooper). 77 Gardiner to Cooper, 14 April 1921, ibid. , box 5, file Col. J.A. Cooper. Magrath became Meighen's nominee for the post of Canadian ambassador to Washington. 78 Gardiner to Sims, 1 May 1921, se e note 78 and 30 July 1921, see note 64; Gardiner to Fiske, 16 April 1921, Gardiner Papers, box 3, file Rr Adm. B.A. Fiske. Gardiner suggested to Fiske that the United States should orientate Canada toward the 'Orange Plan,' ie the Navy Department's plan in case of war with Japan. 79 Gardiner to Sims, 30 July 1921, se e note 64; Gardiner to Brewster, 4 July 1944, see note 73; Gardiner to Fletcher, 30 June 1921, Gardine r Papers, box 3, file H.P. Fletcher; Gardine r to Phillips, 'An estimate of the war situation,' 12 March 1943, ibid., box 4, file W. Phillips. Gardiner knew of the difference of

99 NEW OPPORTUNITIE S plause or credence he received, however, from th e Harding adminis tration is difficult t o say, but Lodg e wrote within days of Gardiner' s visit to Ottawa that he expecte d Britai n to modify th e alliance and provide spécifie exemptions for the United States at the insistence of Canada.80 In June, Edwin Denby, rejecting Lord Lee' s proposal for a naval agreement under which Britain would patrol the Atlantic and the United State s would police the Pacific , observed elsewher e tha t the United States counted on dominion opposition to offset the impact of the Anglo-Japanese alliance unless Britain made the treaty inoperable agains t America. 81 Moreover, Geddes reported fro m a n 'unimpeachable an d authoritativ e source ' tha t th e Unite d State s ha d decided to concentrate its diplomatic, naval , and commercial effort s in Sout h Americ a and Asi a rather tha n acros s the Atlantic. 82 Th e security of the Pacific must be in American hands and, as a corollary to this policy, the United States would attempt to organise a union of the English-speakin g peoples bordering o n the Pacific . Secretar y of State Charle s Evans Hughes had insisted , however , that they must avoid the risk of hostilities wit h Japan and seeme d determined personally t o contro l polic y i n regar d t o th e Anglo-Japanes e alliance , Anglo-American relations generally, and naval disarmament. What precis e impac t Gardine r ha d i n Ottaw a i s als o difficul t t o assess, for Meighen' s governmen t had othe r source s of information opinion between Meighen and Curzon by 30 June 1921. He believed that the Imperial Conference, convinced by Meighen, had rejected renewal of the alliance in order to pursue the policies he advocated. Gardiner, therefore, misinterpreted the decisions reached in London and the reasons for them, and, consequently, exaggerated his own role. 80 Lodge to Lord Charnwood, 16 May and 2 July 1921, Lodge Papers, file 1921, A-G, Jan.-April. Lodge suggested that the renewed alliance must not threaten the United States and that they must achieve co-operation between the British empire and the United States. An interesting and perhaps significant point is that Lodge here assumed that Britain would renew a modified alliance rather than terminate it. 81 Young, Powerful America, 48-52. These exchanges were the result of the LeeOchs conversations which had Lloyd George's blessing. The Denby Papers contain no information on this subject, but Denby repeated the myth that Ganada and Australia held a common attitude toward the alliance. 82 Geddes to Curzon, 3 June 1921, FO/414/247, Cab. 32/6 and Lloyd George Papers, F/210/2/11. The report came from the Cónsul-General in New York, quoting Col. Théo. Roosevelt Jr.

100 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y and had already taken the initiative in exchanges with London before Gardiner's appearance. Elder statesman Newton Rowell had met proLeague Republicans, Elihu Root, Hughes, and William Howard Taft in February. 83 Root confirmed Colone l House' s vie w tha t Hardin g would propose an alternative to the League but would consider entering a n amende d Leagu e shoul d hi s proposal s fail . Bot h Roo t an d Hughes spoke of the need to develop co-operation between the AngloSaxon peoples an d between Britai n and the Unite d States, an d Taf t expressed similar sentiments. Taft had abo pointed out that Hardin g was no t a n isolationist , tha t h e realise d tha t th e America n people expected positive action to secure peace, and that he favoured United States involvemen t i n worl d affairs , perhap s throug h a permanen t court o f international justice . Thes e opinions , whil e fro m eminen t enough sources , wer e expresse d in general , eve n speculative term s and House' s congenita l optimis m coul d b e misleading . However , there was some encouragement for Meighen and his advisers. No one was more convinced of this than Loring Christie, Meighen's principal sourc e o f inspiratio n o n foreig n policy . Christie , afte r a formative session in Geneva at the League Assembly and after meeting Ker r and Lloy d Georg e i n Londo n an d discussin g th e AngloJapanese alliance , lai d ou t hi s assumption s an d proposition s i n a memorandum of 1 February 1921 , an d thereby establishe d hi s control of the question. 84 Indeed, Christie's pape r provoked the ensuing Anglo-Canadian debate . Christi e sa w the allianc e a s a vita l facto r affecting th e future o f the British empire and of relations within th e English-speaking world , and he suggeste d tha t Britai n face d thre e alternatives; renewal, abrogation, and amendment by removal of the military clauses. He opposed renewal on the following grounds: th e demise o f Russi a and German y had remove d th e reason s fo r th e alliance; current polic y decision s coul d not be base d o n th e futur e possibility of a Russo-German revival and onl y an immediate crisi s 83 N. Rowell to Meighen, 9 Feb. and 3 March 1921, Meighe n Papers, xxvi, no 97. Borden, Lloyd George, and Kerr also received copies of these letters. 84 Lower, 'Loring Christie,' 38-48. This article contains a number of errors. Lower recalls submitting an earlier account to Brebner and Christie to ensure accuracy, but the documents do not bear out either of his informants or Lower's ow n views in some respects. Lower ignores other contributions to th e subject, and myths about Meighen's role seem difficult to disperse. Christie's historical facts were not always sound, but he seemed well informed on British attitudes toward the alliance.

101 NE W OPPORTUNITIE S could justif y an y alliance ; dominio n publi c opinio n oppose d th e alliance wit h Japan ; Britain' s abilit y t o restrai n Toky o was largel y fictional; China ha d n o fait h i n th e allianc e an d fel t i t implicate d Britain in her rape; and , above all, as a devotee o f English-speakin g concord, Christie believed that the United States opposed any special relationship betwee n Britai n and Japa n and tha t renewa l woul d injure prospect s fo r Anglo-America n co-operation . Christi e als o dis missed an amended alh'ance as 'mere window dressing and dishonest' and as involving Britai n in incalculable liabilitie s an d consequence s with an ally comprising a 'people remote, little understoo d and radi cally differen t fro m ou r view. ' I n searc h o f a metho d t o secur e th e empire's interest s in the Far East and to promote understanding with the United States, Christie proposed to involve Japan, China, and the United State s with Britain , not in an alliance or an entente but by 'a pooling of the counsel and experience of all interested powers for th e purpose of arriving at a common policy in the Far East.' Christie proposed, therefore, a conference of Pacific powers where Britain coul d reconcil e he r positio n wit h tha t o f th e Unite d State s and China, where the powers coul d act in line with the methods and spirit of the 'new diplomacy,' and where they might create th e basi s of a working Pacific concert founde d on common interests an d neces sities. A dedicated Atlanticist , Christi e coul d no t dismis s American co-operation a s a chimera and h e suggeste d that a Canadian envoy , despatched secretl y o n behal f o f Canada , shoul d soun d ou t th e United States. Even if Washington rejected the idea of a conference, Christie still demanded an end to the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the pursuit of informal Anglo-American discussions to arrive at a working agreement wit h eac h secretar y of stat e durin g hi s tenur e o f office . Christie was not impressed with the dangers of Washington dictatin g policy t o London nor with the prospec t o f the Unite d State s seizin g the moral leadership . Th e empir e mus t have the substance , no t th e shadow, it must 'take the cas h and let the credi t go, ' and even dra w strength fro m 'anothe r bond o f sympathy within ou r humour-lovin g Empire' should it face empty boasting from Americans. Curzon would have turned pale a t such levity, or red, but Christie' s final paragraph could not be dismissed: These notes have been written on the assumption that the American is a political animal as we believe ourselves to be; that in his instincts and methods he is nearer to us than any other; that in our and the world's highest interest we should work together; and that it is our business to meet

102 ILLUSIONS OF SECURIT Y and cope with him on the political plane depending upon our skill there as against his. Consistently with our actual safety we should do all we can to prove our friendship and nothing to alienate his. It has not yet been demonstrated that he has definitely rejected ou r friendship. An d if there is to be any rejection of friendship it must never come from our side; if the choice is to be rejection, th e choice must be his; and we must see to it that it is quite plain to the world that the choice was his. Otherwise we shall have failed in the highest art of politics.

Christie's cas e wo n Meighen' s immediat e acceptanc e an d o n 1 5 February Meighen telegraphed Lloy d George to begin implementa tion of Christie's proposals. 85 Meighen dismissed the Anglo-Japanese alliance a s obsolete an d demanded tha t Britain seek an understand ing with the United States : In view of her tendency towards the abandonment o f her attitude of isolation generally, her traditional special interests in China, which is [sic] as great as ours and of the increasing prominence o f the Pacific as a scene of action, there is a danger that a special, confidential relationship concerning that region, between ourselves and Japan, to which she was not a party, would come to be regarded as an unfriendly exclusion and as a barrier to an English speaking accord.

Instead o f renewing the allianc e Britain should call a conference of Pacific power s which woul d terminat e th e allianc e gracefull y and seek a working Pacific concert, all to the betterment of Anglo-American relations. Finally, Meighen proposed that Borden meet with the Harding administration , thus rejecting i n par t Christie' s ide a o f a secret and independent Canadian move. The British cabinet debate d Meighen's propositions on 18 February and Curzon, not surprisingly, led the opposition. 88 In his view, such matters could no t be placed in the hands of a dominion envoy, the Foreig n Offic e an d th e Committee of Imperial Defence were studying the question, and, as there was much to be sai d fo r retainin g the allianc e an d a s Ambassador Geddes urge d renewal , Curzo n hoped tha t th e cabine t woul d not rush to the conclusion that they should denounce the alliance because 85 Governor General to Colonial Secretary, 15 Feb. 1921, Borden Papers, post1921 series, folder 253; Lampson, memorandum, 8 April 1921, 'On correspondence with the Canadian Government relating to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,' BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 261,271-6 86 Minutes of cabinet meeting, 18 Feb. 1921, Cab. 23/24

103 NEW OPPORTUNITIE S of dominion opposition. Churchill , now colonial secretary, countere d to some extent, urging the cabine t t o trea t th e Canadia n proposal s with som e consideration . The y mus t recognis e dominio n specia l interests with regard to the alliance, promise that Britain would take no decision withou t consultation, an d ask that Borde n come to London t o consul t o n the advisabilit y o f a prio r an d independen t ap proach t o th e Unite d States . Th e cabine t the n agree d tha t Lloy d George shoul d draf t a reply t o Meighe n on the line s suggeste d b y Churchill, securing the latter's approval and that of Curzon, and that they should also inform Australia. Although Lloy d George' s repl y o f 2 6 February 87 accepte d th e proposition tha t the y shoul d conside r th e renewa l questio n fro m the poin t o f view o f relation s betwee n th e Unite d State s an d th e British empire , inevitabl y i t exasperate d Christie. 88 Lloy d Georg e demanded tha t th e imperia l meetin g retai n complet e freedo m o f action and suggested that a proposal for a Pacific conference, especi ally i f Washingto n responde d favourably , would impai r tha t free dom. Britain must consult with all the dominion s before takin g any steps an d althoug h th e Pacifi c conferenc e idea ha d muc h t o com mend it as a possible ultimate solution, other political, economic, and strategic issues were involved and were under study by expert committees. Nava l construction , th e League , an d disarmamen t wer e specifically mentione d an d Lloy d George' s repl y inferred , o r s o i t seemed to Ottawa , that th e renewa l issu e was a potential leve r o n the United States to secure a naval agreement. Lloyd George invited Borden t o Londo n t o discus s th e broa d issue s involve d an d th e question o f sounding out the Unite d States , but clearl y he frowned on independent moves by Ottawa , an d insiste d o n the preservatio n of the executive role of the Imperial Conference, Christie prepare d hi s rebuttal , indignant , cutting , an d couche d 87 Colonial Secretary to Governor General, 26 Feb. 1921, Borde n Papers, post1921 series, folder 253, and King Papers, file 1922 ( Chandler-Churchill). Lampson's memorandum dated the reply as 22 February, and the draft in the Lloyd George Papers ( F/9/3/30 ) has that date, but the telegram was not sent until 26 February. 88 Churchill authorised Meighen to give the substance of this reply of 26 February to the Hous e of Commons but h e warned against statements which might arouse misgivings either in Washington or Tokyo ( Governor General to Colonial Secretary, 1 March 1921, and Colonial Secretary to Governor General, 9 March 1921, Kin g Papers, file 1922 (Chandler-Churchill) ).

104 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y in vigorou s nationalis t an d Atlanticis t terms , b y 3 March. 89 I n hi s view, th e ver y failur e t o approac h th e Unite d State s woul d itsel f prejudice th e libert y o f actio n o f th e Imperia l Conference , leavin g the empire for at least two years with only the alternatives of renewal or denunciation of the alliance with Japan. Britain would not counte nance denunciation , regardin g i t a s a n unfriendl y ac t towar d he r ally, an d Christi e therefor e argue d tha t Canad a mus t direc t th e Imperial Conference toward acceptance o f a policy based o n AngloAmerican co-operation . Sh e shoul d investigat e Washington' s atti tude an d buil d o n an y encouraging response . Christi e foun d i t in credible that Lloyd George could suggest that a favourable American reply t o the ide a of a Pacific conferenc e would be unfortunate , an d he rejected an y attempt to forc e a naval agreement o n the Unite d States prior t o a settlement o f the allianc e question . I n hi s view, to compel Washingto n t o ceas e nava l constructio n an d t o ente r th e League woul d b e diplomati c blackmail , equivalen t t o sayin g 'I n short we may need the Japanese to throw in the balance agains t th e power of the Unite d States.' 90 Canada mus t reject such proposition s for they suggested a new justification for the Anglo-Japanese alliance , assumed tha t a n America n menace ha d replace d a Russo-Germa n threat, and inferred a whole new approach towar d Anglo-American relations. I n Christie' s view , Britai n migh t transfor m th e allianc e from a limited Fa r Easter n arrangemen t into th e ver y pivot o f he r world policy and call in Japan to redress the balance of the Wester n world. In addition , Christi e dismisse d Curzon' s exper t committee s a s mere excuses for delay and their findings as irrelevant t o the questio n as to whether Canad a shoul d suppor t a policy tha t woul d alienat e the Unite d State s an d forc e increase d defenc e expenditures . H e sought to secure an Atlantic entente through the reassessment of Far Eastern an d Pacifi c issues , th e allianc e renewa l questio n wa s th e most suitabl e vehicle , an d h e coul d no t accep t th e view s o f thos e who dismisse d hi s policy a s impracticable an d argue d tha t Britai n must retain the friendship of Japan until the United States disarmed. Christie denounce d the British reply as insincere an d as designed t o 89 Christie to Meighen, 3 March 1921, Borden Papers, post-1921 series, folder 253 90 Christie had clearly seized on the crucial relationship between strategic and diplomatic factors and his indictment of British policy forces the historian to recall Lloyd George's irresponsible conjectures at the cm meetings of December 1920 .

105 NEW OPPORTUNITIE S impose Britain' s wil l o n th e Imperia l Conference . Lloy d George' s despatch di d no t recognis e Canada' s rol e i n Anglo-America n relations, it ignored her intermediary position, an d it failed t o recognis e her voic e a s th e mos t vita l on e i n imperia l discussion s o n Nort h American problems. Christie, therefore , rejecte d Britain' s repl y a s unacceptabl e an d recommended tha t Canad a sen d Borde n to Washingto n a s soo n as possible. Canad a must def y Britai n becaus e he r ow n interests a s a neighbour of the United States and as a Pacific dominion were more vital than those of Britain in this matter. I n his view, the welfar e of the Canadia n peopl e outweighe d th e valu e of Britain's possessions , and Ottaw a possesse d superio r knowledg e o f an d qualification s for dealing with Washington. Th e Canadia n government should, there fore, Christie argued, sound out Harding's administration on its own behalf an d fo r it s ow n information, so that Meighe n coul d partici pate in the review of imperial policy and prevent decision s inimica l to Canada's interests. Although Christie' s memorandu m reached Meighe n on 3 March , Ottawa delaye d it s note t o London until 1 April, an d the n sen t a n abbreviated an d somewha t mute d versio n o f Christie' s blast. 91 Meighen di d not send Borde n to Washington, bu t doubtles s Gardi ner's missio n in revers e made Borden's visi t somewha t superfluous. Although Ottawa' s despatc h o f 1 April was quite moderat e i n ton e and phraseology, th e threatene d refusa l t o participate i n a renewa l of th e allianc e wit h Japan was unmistakable an d Londo n could no t ignore the significance of such a stand. The Foreign Offic e ha d win d of Lodge' s move s if not o f Gardiner's, and Lampson , convinced that Ottawa was determined to sound out Washington, urge d immediate action to avert the dange r of Canada joining with the Unite d State s in an independent Pacific and Far Eastern policy.92 Lampson pointe d out that th e Foreig n Office' s ow n expert committe e was in substan tial agreement with the Canadian government, 93 he himself believe d 91 Governor General to Colonial Secretary, 1 April 1921, King Papers, file 1922 ( Chandler-Churchill ) 92 Lampson, memorandum, 8 April 1921, 'On correspondence with the Canadian Government relating to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,' BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 261, 276 93 The Foreig n Office committe e had suggeste d a tripartite entent e whereas Canada advocate d a conferenc e o f Pacifi c power s to achiev e a workin g agreement.

106 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y their views to be correct, and he fel t tha t th e solutio n propose d b y the exper t committe e wa s most likely to unite th e empire . Lampson proposed, therefore , tha t the y sen d th e committee' s repor t t o Ot tawa, t o sho w Meighen' s governmen t tha t expert s i n Londo n wer e aware o f th e issue s involve d an d t o comfor t thos e i n Ottaw a wh o worried lest wide differences o f opinion still existed between Canad a and Britain. 94 Tyrrel l feare d th e machination s o f Lodg e an d th e dangers inheren t i n an y initiativ e take n b y Borde n whil e Londo n and Ottaw a remaine d divided . H e avoided , however , Lampson' s erroneous inferenc e tha t th e Foreig n Office' s exper t committee' s views wer e share d b y Curzo n an d th e cabinet , an d tha t Meighe n had reason to feel comforted. While both Lampson and Tyrrell viewed the matter a s urgent, the cabinet, distracte d b y domestic problems, had othe r priorities. They did no t turn t o the questio n unti l 2 1 April and eve n then , pleadin g the pressur e o f othe r work , instructe d Churchil l t o infor m Ottaw a that labour unrest and Curzon's illness prevented them from replyin g to Meighen' s telegram. 95 Churchil l offere d som e hop e a t leas t o f rapid action and on 26 April Lloyd Georg e responded t o Meighen. 96 94 Britain had sent a copy of the Foreig n Office memorandu m of February 1920, recognising a triple agreement as the ideal solution but advocating renewal of the alliance with Japan as the practical policy, to the dominions, and Lampson felt that the more recent committee report would do much to show Ottawa that different attitudes now existed in London. Bentinck wrote the February 1920 paper under Curzon's supervision ( Foreign Office, memorandum, 28 Feb. 1920, 'Effect of Anglo-Japanese Alliance upon Foreign Relationships,' BD, 1st ser., vi, no 761,1016-23). 95 Minutes of cabinet meeting, 21 April 1921, Cab . 23/25; Churchill to Governor General, 22 April 1921, King Papers, file 1922 (Chandler-Churchill) 96 Churchill to Governor General, 26 April 1921, King Papers, file 1922 (Chandler-Churchill) an d BD , 1st ser., xiv, n o 261, 276 , not e 15 . Curzon drafted th e telegra m after consultin g Tyrrell, according to the officia l British documents, but Curzon was ill and Churchill's hand is also evident He wrote to Lloyd George pointing out that they had not answered Meighen's telegram of 1 April; that Curzon was ill; and that Kerr's draft reply, referring to shipbuilding , th e League , an d t o disarmament , wa s unacceptable . Churchill's suggested reply was somewhat on the lines laid down by Tyrrell although he went further, suggesting that the Pacific conference, held either in Canada or the United States, might well be the final solution and that i t could convene almost immediately after the imperial conference, should the

107 NEW OPPORTUNITIE S He assured the Canadian Premier that decisions o n the alliance would wait on the imperial 'cabinet/ that they woul d s o inform Japan, and that th e empir e woul d los e nothin g b y thi s procedure . Meanwhil e to gain time Britain would negotiat e a three-months' renewal of the alliance. A s to th e propose d Pacifi c conference , Lloy d Georg e ex pected the imperial meeting to discuss it , but he raised th e question of Australia' s attitud e which mad e i t impossibl e fo r Britai n t o prejudge Canada' s suggestion. 97 I n conclusion , Lloy d Georg e aske d Meighen to refrain fro m consultin g th e United State s independently, but suggeste d tha t Britain might use Canadian resource s shoul d th e Imperial Conference decid e on such approaches . This somewha t belated Britis h repl y ende d th e Anglo-Canadian debate prior t o the Imperia l Conference, 98 althoug h Christie' s pré -

dominions and the United States accept it. Furthermore, Churchill seemed willing to permit Borden to go to Washington to sound out the United States on the Pacific conference scheme, providing that Borden could not commit the empire in any way by his consultations. Churchill also warned that although Canada would oppose the Foreign Office's idea of a one-year extension, she would accept a three-months extension of the alliance , and Lloy d George should urg e the Foreig n Offic e t o as k Japan fo r th e shorte r extension . I n Churchill's vie w Britain should enter a Pacific conferenc e with the allianc e intact and should permit its abrogation only after satisfactory negotiations at the meeting of Pacific powers ( Churchill to Lloyd George, 25 April 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/9/3/30 ). Clearly the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, and the Prime Minister's secretariat were all involved in the 26 April reply and some confusion existed about the views of each participant . 97 The specifi c referenc e t o Australi a suggests tha t a definit e expressio n of opinion had reached London, and Prime Minister Hughes had spoken in the House of Representatives on 8 April. Hughes had stated the familiar dilemma. Naval defence was the essenc e of Australia's security , th e Anglo-Japanes e alliance affected the question of imperial defence, the hope of the world lay in co-operation between the English-speaking peoples, but security lay in the renewal of the alliance with Japan modified to be acceptable to both allies and to the Unite d States. In ful l circle , then , the Anglo-Japanese alliance was essential for imperial security and for peace. Churchill circulated this speech to the cabinet on 28 April 1921. 98Lampson had suggeste d that they sen d the committee' s repor t t o Canada , but ther e is no evidence that the Foreign Offic e acte d o n his proposal. On e might speculate on the reasons why a report which reinforced Ottawa's views was withheld from the Canadian government.

108 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y paratory wor k continued . Hi s memorandu m of 2 3 April , t o guid e Meighen's comment s i n parliament , adde d littl e excep t t o cal l fo r friendly relation s wit h Japa n a s well as with Chin a an d th e Unite d States, and to describe Japan as a great and ambitious nation, a faithful ally , and a valuable membe r of the world community." Christie's final paper befor e the Imperia l Conference , however , ha d mor e t o offer an d provide d Meighe n wit h additiona l ammunitio n fo r th e forthcoming debat e in London.100 Its tone, spirit, and message were predictable. Christie issue d anothe r manifesto , calling fo r co-opera tion between th e tw o commonwealths, the empire , an d th e Unite d States, an d denyin g tha t Britai n coul d rene w th e allianc e i n an y form acceptabl e t o Washington . Furthermore , anglophil s i n th e United State s wer e adaman t tha t renewa l woul d injur e Anglo American relations, wherea s their counterpart s i n Japa n looke d fo r British benevolen t neutralit y i n th e even t o f wa r wit h th e Unite d States and then for British support a t the peace table. Christie, however, made other points, som e quite nove l and even curious. Britain, by renewin g the alliance , coul d driv e Chin a int o Russia' s arms but she should seek rather t o rejuvenate China tha n alienat e her . Cana dian opinion, Christie continued, had rallied to the League of Nations and opposed al l alliances as incompatible with the Covenant . Moreover, suggestions emanating from th e Stat e Department , th e Whit e House, an d Republica n part y headquarter s tha t a decisio n t o de nounce th e allianc e woul d greatl y enhanc e th e prospect s fo r dis armament were acceptabl e wisdom , but blackmai l fro m Londo n t o secure a nava l agreemen t wit h th e Unite d State s a s th e pric e fo r Britain severin g he r exclusiv e arrangemen t wit h Japa n wa s unac ceptable folly. In conclusion, Christie felt that the Pacific conferenc e scheme wa s no w eve n mor e vali d tha n i n Marc h an d shoul d th e Atlanticists los e th e debat e a t th e Imperia l Conferenc e Meighen must not accept its decision s a s binding o n Canad a withou t parlia 99Christie memorandum, 23 April 1921. 'The Question of the Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,' King Papers, file 288. Christie urged that Canadian public opinion be heard on the alliance question and clearly Meighen's opposition to renewal had the support of the majority of the Canadian people, of the Canadian press, and the Liberal opposition. The crucial debate took place on 27 April 1921. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1921, m, 2626-80 100 Christie memorandum, 1 June 1921, 'The Anglo-Japanese Alliance,' Department o f Externa l Affairs (Ottawa) , Monthl y Bulletin , Septembe r 1966 , xvm, no 9,402-13

109 NEW OPPORTUNITIE S mentary approval . N o on e ha d state d th e Atlanticis t cas e mor e forcibly tha n Christi e an d thoug h th e Britis h cabine t expecte d t o dominate th e Imperia l Conference , a confrontatio n wit h Canad a seemed unavoidable. In addition t o these exchanges with Ottawa, th e Britis h governmen t reappraised othe r political an d strategic factor s prior t o the crucia l cabinet meeting of 30 May, and the n agai n in the final days before the openin g of the Imperia l Conference . Through sources , orthodox and otherwise , Pekin g continue d t o emphasis e its oppositio n t o re newal o f th e Anglo-Japanes e alliance . Alston , bac k i n Peking , re ported renewed pressure, rumours of boycotts, and even of Americaninspired attacks on the alliance . He also confirmed the opposition of British commercia l opinion i n Chin a t o renewa l an d thei r suppor t of th e ide a o f a Pacifi c conference. 101 Curzon , however , refused t o commit himself t o prior consultation s wit h Peking , merel y assurin g China that her views would receive due consideration, and no doubt China helped undermine her own position by irritating Curzo n with such demands. 102 Th e Foreig n Secretary' s ange r eventuall y spille d over to B. Lennox Simpson (Putnam Weale), the roving envoy from Peking wh o pleade d China' s cas e i n Ottawa , Washington , an d London, an d probabl y di d mor e har m tha n goo d t o hi s cause. 108 Simpson me t Meighe n on 3 May, handed hi m a draf t o f a revise d Anglo-Japanese alliance whic h Britai n supposedly woul d present t o the Imperia l Conference , an d hinte d a t a possibl e Sino-America n defence agreemen t o r Sino-Russia n co-operation shoul d Britai n re tain the alliance. 104 Simpson then visited Washington, met Secretary of Stat e Hughes an d certai n senators , reported bac k to Meighe n on their hostility t o the Anglo-Japanese alliance, an d departe d fo r Eng101 Alsto n to Curzon, 17 May, 3 June, and 2 July 1921, BD , 1st ser., xiv, no 280, 290; no 292,299-300; and no 318, 321 , and Cab. 32/ 6 102 Curzo n to Alston, 16 June 1921, BD , 1st ser., xrv, no 303, 306-7 103 Curzo n to Alston, 28 June 1921, ibid. , no 311, 314-15 . Simpson's own account is An Indiscreet Chronicle from the Pacific, 92-124 . Curzon took particular exception to Simpson's use of that 'Communist organ,' the Daily Herald. 104 B.L . Simpson, 'Report of a Confidential Mission to Canada, the United States and England in 1921. A Campaign against the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,' King Papers, file 288. The draft treaty was not an accurate document, but his hints of possible Sino-Russian contacts may not have gone unheeded, for Christie, for the first time, referred to this future danger in his memorandum of 1 June.

110 ILLUSION S O F SECURIT Y land, arrivin g o n 1 June. Ther e h e met wit h Lor d Riddell , Grigg , Hankey, and Tyrrell and attempted to influence opinion through the press. The Foreign Office , however , dismissed him as a clever and a t times unscrupulous propagandist, prepared to sacrifice accuracy in the interests of his employers, and this verdict remained unchallenged.108 Japan ha d als o launche d a propagand a campaig n t o influenc e British public opinion and to gain support for renewal of the alliance . From Marc h Japan used th e column s of The Times and th e Daily Telegraph, an d i n Ma y the Crow n Prince mad e a successfu l stat e visit to London, helping to improve the public atmospher e betwee n the two countries.106 Curzon no doubt welcomed such attempts an d his negotiations with Tokyo to extend the allianc e for three months beyond 8 July 1921, t o permit the Imperial Conference to debate th e renewal question , wer e fa r mor e cordia l tha n hi s dealing s wit h Peking.107 Curzon , approachin g Ambassado r Hayash i o n 9 May , initiated a curious set of exchanges108 in which initially Curzo n and the Japanes e governmen t wer e range d agains t Ceci l Hurst , th e Foreign Office' s chie f lega l adviser , an d Ambassado r Eliot. Curzo n then petulantly accepted Hurst's ruling but failed to win the Japanese over to this view before the Imperia l Conferenc e convened, only to have Birkenhead rule against Hurst and in favour of Japan on 1 July. On 2 July, therefore, Curzo n returned t o his original position afte r this long exercise in frustration. 105 WeUesley to Geddes, 1 June 1921, King Papers, file 1921 ( Carey-Churchill). Riddell seemed more impressed with Simpson, but was the exception in this case. Riddell diary, entry of 14 May 1921, Diary of the Peace Conference and After, 30 1 106 Lampso n and Leeper, minutes on Foreign Office documents, March 1921 , FO/800/329; Elio t to Curzon, 3 June 1921, King Papers, file 288; Nish 'Japan and the Ending of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,' 374-5. The Japanese government entertained hopes that Lloyd George would make a return visit 107 Th e question of urgency sprang from the joint Anglo-Japanese note to the League of 8 July 1920 . If thi s was a notice of intention to abrogate their alliance, the n th e Imperia l Conference ha d littl e tim e fo r comprehensive debate. 108 Curzon to Eliot, 11,13, and 26 May and 7 June 1921, Curzo n to Hayashi, 8 and 27 June and 2 July 1921, and Eliot to Curzon, 20,27, and 31 May and 11 June 1921, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 277, 287-9; no 279,289-90; no 287,295-6; no 295,301-2; no 297,302-3; no 310,313-14; no 320,322; no 283,292-3; no 288,296-7; no 291,298-9; no 300,305; and no 301,305, and FO/414/247

Ill NE W OPPORTUNITIES

The principles of the debate were clear. Hurst ruled tha t the joint note to the League of Nations on 8 July 1920 constituted a notice of intent to abrogate the Anglo-Japanese alliance and that the allianc e was 'self-extinguishing' on 8 July 1921 unless prolonged, Britain and Japan must , therefore, negotiat e a three-months' extension , make a new declaration t o the League, and give notice that the procedure s of th e Leagu e Covenan t woul d prevai l ove r thos e o f th e allianc e during the three-month period. Th e Japanese government, however, denying Hurst's interpretatio n o f the join t not e o f 8 July 192 0 an d rejecting th e vie w tha t th e allianc e wa s 'self-extinguishing ' unles s renewed, insisted tha t th e affianc e remaine d i n forc e automaticall y unless a signator y specificall y denounce d it . Toky o suggeste d tha t the Imperia l Conferenc e migh t terminat e th e affianc e bu t tha t renewal was not required, an d concluded that althoug h both partners had admitted to the League that their affianc e wa s imperfect an d to some degree inconsistent with the Covenant , they must also assume it to be self-perpetuating. Birkenhead, of course, ruled precisely that for th e Imperia l Conference , they mus t decide o n abrogatio n o f a self-perpetuating treaty , not renewal of a self-extinguishing affiance , and consequently on 2 July Curzon could propose to Japan that they merely genuflect again before the League Covenant. Lloyd George personally and the cabinet collectively wer e subject to two other sources of influence prior to the 30 May debate. Edward Grigg, Kerr' s recen t successo r an d o f th e sam e politica l vintage , urged the Prime Minister to consider his interpretation o f the prob lem an d hi s propose d solutions. 109 Grig g sa w the affianc e renewa l question essentially as a question affecting th e relations between th e white and th e Asia n section s of the empire , wit h India , presentin g a psychologica l problem , a s the mos t sensitiv e area . H e describe d the empir e a s a bridg e betwee n th e Wes t an d Asia , showin g that Britain believe d i n equa l opportunit y fo r an d mutua l self-respec t between whit e an d coloure d peoples . Grig g saw th e affianc e wit h Japan both as a valuable instrument giving proof o f Britain's desir e to trea t Asians fairly, an d als o as a complicatin g facto r becaus e of ambivalent attitudes toward the renewal question. Ordinarily, Grig g pointed out , India would applaud Britain' s suppor t of China agains t Japan, bu t shoul d they renounc e th e affianc e becaus e o f Canadia n 109 Grig g to Lloyd George, 25 May, and memorandum, "The Anglo-Japanese Alliance,' 25 May 1921, Lloy d George Papers, F/86/1/3 and Grigg Papers, reel 11; Kerr, 'Anglo-Japanese Alliance'

112 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y and United State s pressure, Delhi would charg e London with racial discrimination an d Britain's positio n in India woul d be endangered . Grigg, however, i n th e interest s o f cordial Anglo-America n relations, sough t th e idea l solutio n o f continue d link s wit h Japa n an d close co-operatio n wit h th e Unite d States . H e recommende d tha t they fuse Christie's views with those of the Foreign Office committe e and that Britain see k a tripartite agreement , whic h woul d for m th e basis of a standing Pacifi c conferenc e to meet periodically an d dea l with relevan t problems . Suc h a policy , Grig g suggested , woul d "bridge the colou r lin e in the Pacific, ' preserv e Japan's prestige , an d persuade her to co-operate with the West.110 Tactically, Grig g urged that they put Britain' s case to Ambassador Harvey, discuss the problems involved wit h India , and as k for Anglo-American co-operation in the economic rather than the political sphere. If Harvey responde d sympathetically, Lloy d George would enter the Imperial Conferenc e with a clea r policy . H e coul d war n th e dominion s o f th e danger s resulting fro m racia l friction, sooth e the Indian delegation , an d fore stall Canadia n opposition , fo r Meighe n woul d no t dar e oppos e a policy alread y accepte d b y Harvey . Havin g carrie d th e Imperia l Conference, Britai n coul d the n approac h Japa n an d th e Unite d States and summon a Pacific conference to London before the dominion premiers left. 111 110 The tripartite agreement, between the empire, Japan, and the United States, might be based on a recognition of the Open Door and equal opportunity in China, and on arrangements dealing with immigration, cable communications, Yap, shippin g facilities , an d defenc e expenditure. Th e Pacifi c conferenc e would have the same composition and would handle all outstanding and new issues. 111 Grig g returned to this tactical move of using prior talks with Harvey to forestall Meighen, although, as Grigg looked to a Pacific conference and co-operation with the United States, it is difficult to see why he should have expected Meighen to oppose such a policy if Britain suggested it to the Imperial Conference. At the same time Grigg saw the triple agreement as modifying rather than destroying the alliance with Japan and as ensuring against any charges of adopting an anti-Asia policy. Grigg recommended the quiet approach to Harvey rather than a public appeal to Washington also as a way to avoid rekindling American suspicions of Lloyd George. Whatever frailties were inherent i n Grigg's scheme, clearl y the mos t glaring wa s the assumptio n that Harvey's relationshi p wit h Secretar y of State Hughes made him a suitabl e

113 NEW OPPORTUNITIE S Grigg had draw n Lloy d George' s attentio n t o political and racial considerations an d Lor d Le e raise d agai n th e connectio n betwee n strategic an d politica l factors. 112 Lee , expressin g fears o f a schism within the empire over the alliance question, called for an immediate cabinet decisio n i n whic h Admiralt y and Treasur y opinio n shoul d carry equal weight with tha t o f the Foreig n Office . Th e Admiralty , Lee noted , coul d neithe r fram e a n imperia l nava l polic y no r giv e but academi c an d inconclusiv e advice to th e dominions , and coul d not even determine the cost, strength, and distribution of the British fleet until they settled th e broader political question s relating to the Pacific. H e personally , however , calle d fo r th e terminatio n o f th e alliance wit h Japan and for the fullest co-operation with the Unite d States. I n Lee's view, this policy woul d aver t a war between Japa n and th e Unite d States , eliminat e a sourc e o f anglophobe , jingois t agitation in America seeking to secure a large navy, avoid the crip pling burde n o f a three-power nava l race , reassur e Washingto n o f London's good faith, and undermine the influence of Japan's extremists an d Prussian-minde d militar y cast e wh o advocate d dangerou s policies. H e conceded that the link with Japan helped guarante e th e security o f Britain' s possession s and trad e i n th e Pacific , bu t th e risks involved, such as friction with the United States and the destruction of any hope of a disarmament agreement, demanded that Britain adopt an alternative policy. Lee regarded an Anglo-American alliance as a n idea l solutio n bu t h e sa w a tripartit e Pacifi c agreemen t a s the most practicable, an d he expecte d th e Unite d State s t o accommodate Britai n o n man y issues , includin g a nava l agreement , i f Britain ende d he r allianc e wit h Japan . Tactically , Lee , hic e Grigg , urged immediat e negotiation s with Harve y an d wit h Japanes e of ficials accompanying th e Crow n Prince t o fin d a n alternativ e t o a policy o f drift an d avoi d both a schis m within the empir e an d wa r between Japan and the United States. The review of defence policy, underway since early May, was not complete, but Le e had gon e further tha n anyon e in his demand for Anglo-American co-operation. Curzon , however, unmoved by views from th e lower deck, ' spoke for th e Foreig n Offic e i n authoritativ e avenue of approac h (Grigg to Lloy d George , 4 June 1921 , Lloy d George Papers, F/86/1/4 and Grigg Papers, reel 11 ). 112 Lee , memorandum, CP 2957,21 May 1921, 'Anglo-Japanese Alliance,' Cab. 24/123 and Lloyd George Papers, F/143

114 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y fashion whe n th e cabine t me t o n 30 May 1921. 118 H e outline d fo r the cabinet th e arguments for and against renewal, dealing with th e negative an d 'weaker ' cas e first . Th e cas e agains t renewa l reste d on th e followin g grounds : becaus e o f th e eclips e o f Russi a an d Germany th e allianc e wa s superfluous , bu t Curzo n regarde d th e future a s less secure; the allianc e wa s a source of irritation an d sus picion i n th e Unite d States , bu t Curzo n tende d t o dismis s thes e sentiments a s mer e excuse s fo r nava l construction; 114 an d Britai n would forfei t th e friendshi p o f China , wh o woul d regar d renewa l of the alliance as a direct encouragement of Japanese imperialism. Curzon's support of renewal rested o n equally familiar arguments relating to the Pacific balance of power. The alliance had been a successful an d valuabl e instrumen t sinc e th e Russo-Japanes e war an d now ensure d agains t a resurgen t Russo-Germa n menac e whic h a n isolated Japa n migh t support . Th e allianc e helpe d Londo n restrai n Tokyo an d fulfille d strategi c desiderat a b y removin g the nee d fo r Britain to maintain large military and naval resources in the Pacifi c and the Far East. Moreover, Britain's treaty with Japan was popular with her other allies, France and Holland, and Japan herself, on the whole a faithful ally , wanted their alliance to continue. A rebuff fro m Britain would certainly bring resentment and possibly retaliation. 115 Curzon then analysed dominion attitudes. He stated that Australia and Ne w Zealand preferre d renewal , tha t Sout h Africa' s view s re mained obscure , bu t tha t Canada , becaus e o f he r ow n interests , American influence, her attitude on immigration, and her missionary activities in Korea, opposed renewal. Indeed, Canada actually threatened independen t actio n and ha d propose d a conference o f Pacifi c powers t o see k a ne w solution . A triple allianc e was , however , i n Curzon's view, impracticable becaus e of hostile influences in contro l of th e Unite d States Senat e an d th e absenc e of any guaranteed sta bility i n America n policy. Instead , Curzo n propose d renewa l o f a modified four - o r five-yea r alliance , afte r prio r consultatio n wit h 113 Minute s of cabinet meeting, 30 May 1921, Cab . 23/25. Most cabinet members were present and Lloyd George instructed Hankey to make a full record of their discussion. 114 Curzo n made a similar report to {he imperial premiers but omitte d this reference to naval construction. 115 Curzo n gave the misleading impression that Japan would accept the threemonths' extension and, in comparison with his statement at the imperial meeting, said nothing to die cabinet about racial considerations.

115 NEW OPPORTUNITIE S China an d th e Unite d States . Britai n shoul d als o secur e if possibl e an agreement wit h the Unite d State s of the sam e duration an d thi s suggestion marked the limit of Curzon's concessions to Atlanticism. Churchill welcomed th e new s from Australi a an d Ne w Zealand, for thi s would eas e the delicat e tas k of securing the consen t o f th e Imperial Conference to Britain's policy. Their difference s wit h Can ada, h e felt , wer e largel y o n th e method s o f securin g peac e an d stability, of preventing a clash between Japan and the United States , and o f forestallin g a nava l race , an d h e urge d tha t the y tak e u p Meighen's conference scheme. Unfortunately they did not have adequate information on American policy, but Churchil l suggeste d that they as k the dominion s to accep t renewal , perhaps a s a temporar y measure, alon g wit h th e conferenc e proposal. The n i f th e confer ence failed , Britai n woul d retai n th e modifie d allianc e wit h ful l assurances t o th e Unite d States . Bot h Auste n Chamberlai n an d Arthur Balfour spoke in support, with th e former urgin g that Presi dent Harding rather than the British government call the conference. Lord Le e concede d tha t th e Unite d State s ha d lapse d int o iso lationism, that she was suspicious both of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and of British motives in general, as Admiral W.S. Sims had recentl y confirmed, an d tha t renewa l woul d provok e fres h demand s fo r a naval building programme . However, in view of America's potentia l resources and th e extent of Japan's armament s burden, Le e rejected Geddes's views and proposed that a conference, summoned by Harding, would provide a solution and appl y some form o f Monroe Doctrine to the Pacific. I n Lee' s view, of course, Britain must not risk a confrontation at the Imperial Conference. Edwin Montagu, secretary of state for India, wanted all reference to Indi a remove d from th e term s of the allianc e i n orde r t o secur e the cessatio n o f Japan's dubiou s activitie s there , bu t h e supporte d renewal since it would be a wedge to help weaken the idea o f 'Asia for th e Asiatics. ' Montag u als o tende d t o suppor t th e Conferenc e proposal, bu t thi s suppor t onl y provoked Curzo n wh o pointed ou t that a conference required tim e t o arrange , it s decision s woul d no t necessarily conflic t wit h renewal , an d tha t Britai n mus t retai n th e alliance before entering into any such meeting. Lloyd George agreed with Curzon, for abrogation of the alliance would upset Japan, injure Britain's prestig e i n Asia, and giv e th e impressio n tha t th e Unite d States dictated British policy. He also expressed apprehension abou t Russia and Germany and described Japa n as a faithful all y who, although inscrutable an d lackin g in conscience , had stoo d b y him i n

116 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y the postwa r roun d o f conferences . I n an y cas e Japa n woul d b e a greater nuisanc e in India withou t the restraints o f treaty obligation s and Lloy d Georg e cam e dow n firmly on Curzon' s side , urgin g re newal of the alliance before participation i n a conference. This debate produced a quintuple decision. Curzon would explore the possibility of President Hardin g calling a Pacific conference , bu t only after assurin g the powers that Britain would retain he r allianc e with Japan. Th e British governmen t expecte d t o renew the allianc e for a period of less than ten years and modify it to make it consisten t with th e Leagu e Covenan t an d no t offensiv e t o th e Unite d States . Britain woul d achiev e thes e safeguard s in prio r negotiation s wit h China an d th e Unite d States . The Foreign Offic e woul d negotiat e a provisional renewa l o f thre e month s an d th e cabine t expecte d t o secure th e concurrenc e o f th e Imperia l Conferenc e withou t grea t difficulty. Finally , the appropriat e official s woul d prepare a study of Japan's ai d durin g th e recen t wa r an d a n appreciatio n o f th e Fa r Eastern strategic position should the alliance be terminated. The scal e o f prioritie s an d th e degre e o f emphasi s involve d i n these decision s favoure d Curzon's view s ove r thos e o f th e Atlanti cists, for the cabinet had agreed to renew the alliance an d only then to explor e th e conferenc e proposal. A n element o f pluralism, how ever, had emerged because the merit of a Pacific conference an d th e value if not th e practicabilit y o f a tripartite agreement were gener ally acknowledged . Moreover , Britain woul d attemp t t o reconcil e improved relations with China and the United States with the retention o f the allianc e modifie d t o mee t the obligation s o f the Leagu e Covenant. Perhap s th e mos t surprising feature was th e assumptio n that Britai n could carr y the Imperia l Conferenc e without grea t dif ficulty, for Meighen' s oppositio n wa s predictable and Smuts' s views were not likely to support those of Hughes and Massey. 116 Between this crucial cabinet debat e and the opening of the Imper ial Conference Lloyd George's government received additional information of a political nature and th e result s of the revie w of defence 116 A s the dominion delegations converged on London Grigg sounded them out for Lloyd George. Christie was unmoved, he reported, Meighen would oppose Britain's policy on the alliance, and Canada would not even discuss defence matters. Even more alarming, according to Grigg, was the possibility of an embarrassing Canadian-South African front to propose isolationist principles for imperial foreign policy and to force consideration of delicate constitutional problems ( Grigg to Lloyd George, 16 June 1921, Grig g Papers, reel 11 ).

117 NEW OPPORTUNITIE S policy. Th e politicall y orientate d materia l wa s inconclusiv e an d could b e freel y interprete d i n London . Gedde s reporte d increase d anti-British propaganda , renewe d criticis m o f th e alliance , an d a tendency to view an act o f renewal as an unfriendly gesture towar d the United States. 117 Official circle s in Washington were not immune to exaggerated claims that Britain, by her decision on renewal, coul d make either a n enemy of the Unite d States and a friend o f Japan o r the reverse . Moreover , Secretary of State Hughes had inferre d tha t renewal woul d b e disastrous . Suc h attitudes, Gedde s felt , reflecte d excessive America n ambition s i n th e Pacifi c and a n equall y exag gerated feeling of virtue with regard t o commercial competition. O n the specifi c questio n o f renewal , however , Geddes , modifyin g hi s advice o f Novembe r 1920, suggeste d tha t instea d o f renewin g th e alliance Britai n shoul d tr y an d reac h a tripartit e agreemen t wit h Japan and the United States. Geddes had thus changed the emphasis of his advice but h e offere d littl e to suggest that a triple agreemen t was an y mor e practicable . Arthu r Willer t als o reporte d tha t H.P . Fletcher ha d discourage d th e ide a o f a tripartite arrangement , an d Curzon was not converted.118 Moreover, Elio t sa w n o reaso n t o modif y hi s vie w tha t Britai n should rene w th e alliance . H e reporte d tha t Japanes e opinio n wa s both more anglophil and more anxious to retain th e allianc e than in the past, an d that th e Japanese government was more realistic an d moderate.119 Churchill' s repor t o f a conversatio n with Ambassador Hayashi tende d t o confir m Eliot' s views, 120 an d th e adjournmen t debate i n th e Hous e of Common s on 1 7 June showe d Curzo n tha t his policy had a substantial degree of support.121 Members of parlia ment wer e concerne d abou t th e Chin a trad e an d wer e critica l of 117 Gedde s to Curzon, 6 June 1921, BD, 1s t ser., xrv, no 294, 300-1 and Cab. 32/6 118 Willer t report, 31 May 1921, Vinson, The Parchment Peace, 106 119 Elio t to Curzon, 9 June 1921, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 298,303-4 120 Churchil l memorandum, CP 3048, 1 7 June 1921, "Th e Anglo-Japanese Alliance," Lloyd George Papers, F/143. Churchill told Hayashi of the divisions over the renewal question, describing himself, the Foreign Office, Hughes, and Massey as ranged against Canada. He placed great emphasis, however, on the dangers of a Pacific nava l race and said that he did no t want an exclusive Anglo-Japanese arrangemen t to hinde r th e settlemen t of nava l and othe r great problems. 121 143 , Debates, 5s, col. 783-859

118 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y Japan's policie s i n Asia , bu t althoug h the y showe d littl e lov e fo r Japan they revealed even less inclination t o lose her friendship. Some members favoured a Far Easter n or a naval conference and looke d to a quadruple agreement embracing Britain, China, Japan, and the United States , bu t fe w oppose d th e renewa l o f a revise d allianc e which woul d satisf y China , safeguar d India , an d preserv e Anglo American accord . Auste n Chamberlain , replyin g fo r th e govern ment, assure d th e Hous e tha t ill-informe d section s o f America n opinion rather than the United States government itself oppose d th e alliance, an d tha t Britai n hope d t o reconcil e Anglo-America n cooperation with a modified agreement with Japan. The review of Pacific defence policy, because it of necessity pondered th e questio n o f futur e conflic t i n tha t area , containe d man y references to possible hostilitie s wit h Japan, but agai n strategic factors, eve n if they suggested step s t o achiev e preparedness , di d no t point t o th e terminatio n o f th e allianc e wit h Japan. 122 Moreover , financial considerations tende d t o reinforc e these strategi c factors . Balfour's committe e was ready to report t o the cabine t b y 1 3 June on th e Singapor e nava l bas e an d favoure d constructio n o f th e base i n vie w o f pressin g strategi c consideration s whic h dictate d that tiie British fleet should be able to operate in the Pacific. 128 Th e Treasury's demand s that financial stringency shoul d dictat e against premature decisions on costly defence programmes and tha t Britai n must rel y o n diplomati c instrument s suc h a s th e Anglo-Japanes e alliance t o reduce th e risks produced by her inadequat e Pacifi c de fensive syste m were also accepted, t o the exten t that the committe e realised tha t major expenditure s were impossible in the nea r future. The committe e looked , however, t o a gradua l developmen t o f th e Singapore base as funds became available, an d to possible dominio n contributions. 122 Th e Standing Defence Sub-Committee, chaired by Balfour and acting for the Committe e of Imperial Defence , co-ordinated th e stud y of dominion contributions to imperial naval defence, of the need to construct the Singapore naval base, and of what the strategic situation would be should Britain terminate her alliance with Japan. See note 15 123 Standin g Defence Sub-Committee, 6th meeting, 13 June 1921, Cab . 2/3; Hankey to LJoyd George, 14 June 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/25/1/39; and 'Singapore's development as a naval base,' Hankey note covering conclusions of the Standing Defence Sub-Committee, 13 June 1921, O F 3039, ibid., F/143

119 NEW OPPORTUNITIE S The cabine t me t o n 1 6 Jun e withou t th e recuperatin g Lloy d George, an d Balfour , whil e admittin g tha t renewa l o f th e allianc e with Japan woul d reduc e th e probabilit y o f dange r i n th e Pacific , denied tha t renewa l remove d th e nee d fo r th e Singapor e base. 124 Singapore, Balfou r claimed , wa s vital t o imperia l security , servin g the needs of the oil-burning fleet and enablin g th e nav y to conduc t operations in the Pacific. The cabinet in general agreed with Balfour, noting in addition the advantages to Canada's Pacific coast defences, the valu e of showing th e dominion s that Britai n possessed a nava l policy, and the merits of countering claims by the United States that her fleet would protec t th e whit e race s an d thei r civilisation . Th e cabinet decided , therefore , that , providin g n o majo r expenditure s were envisaged i n the next two years, it would approv e th e recom mendations on Singapore and explore the problem wit h the domin ions, while retaining all major decisions in its own hands. Balfour's committe e als o recognised certai n tactica l problems in volved in discussing these decisions with the dominions , for Britai n must no t allo w the dominion s either t o fee l complacen t abou t th e one powe r standar d o r assum e tha t Britai n hersel f coul d affor d greater contribution s t o imperial nava l defence. 125 Ye t Britain must show th e dominion s tha t he r defenc e preparation s wer e adequat e on a global scale, being based on the abilit y t o move the main fleet to the Pacifi c fro m hom e waters in an emergency . This i n turn de pended on eliminating any idea tha t the developmen t of the Singa pore base was unnecessary if Britain retained her alliance with Japan. These problem s were summarised finally in th e Committe e of Im perial Defence paper of 17 June which concluded that Britai n must construct th e Singapor e nava l base irrespectiv e o f the decisio n o n the Anglo-Japanes e alliance. 126 However , shoul d Britai n decid e t o end the alliance , the n th e nee d fo r the nava l base was urgent, any hope of gradual construction disappeared, an d Britain must develo p Singapore rapidly and even at great cost in order to offset th e atten dant risks. Obviously, therefore, the empir e would receive strategi c 124 Minute s of cabinet meeting, 16 June 1921, Cab . 23/26, and Hanke y to Lloyd George, 17 June 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/25/1/44. Balfour did not expect Britain to complete the base before she would again face the alliance renewal question, ie in five years' time. 125 Standing Defence Sub-Committee, 7th meeting, 17 June 1921, Cab . 2/ 3 126 cn > memorandum, 144-c, 17 June 1921, 'Strategic Situation in the event of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance being determined,' Cab. 5/4

120 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y benefits an d avoid a large financial outlay in the nea r futur e b y renewing th e alliance . Curzon' s positio n wa s reinforce d o n th e ver y eve of the Imperial Conferenc e and the Atlanticists faced a s impressive a n arra y o f opposition a s they had i n th e previou s tw o years . Their opportunitie s wer e als o Curzon's , Hughe s of Australia might counter Meighen , an d woul d Grig g b e a n effectiv e substitut e fo r Kerr? Would Balfour and Smuts assert themselves, in which directio n would Lloy d Georg e turn , an d t o wha t exten t woul d Washingto n influence London ? Perhaps in the final analysis the Atlanticists must cling t o the singula r fac t tha t th e Britis h governmen t could no t b e irresponsible enoug h to rebuff directl y the Unite d States. Nor, however, could sh e reject Japan. Realism at the very least shoul d breed compromise and an imperial consensus was hardly beyond the limits of diplomatic ingenuity.

THREE

The Imperial Conference The Imperial Conference , seemingly the pivotal meetin g where th e imperial elit e would settl e th e futur e o f British Fa r Easter n polic y and rul e o n th e Atlanticists ' case , was , i n term s o f personalities, a volatile mixtur e o f ol d an d new . Lloy d Georg e an d Curzon , th e former recently ill and still bedevilled by domestic problems and the latter heavil y committe d i n Europea n affairs ; Hughe s o f Australia, reputably fiery , caustic , an d truculent , know n fo r hi s outburst s i n private and his leakages to the press, but no w reported a s chastened, tired, an d lookin g t o Lloy d Georg e fo r guidance ; Masse y of Ne w Zealand, a n effectiv e pro p fo r Hughes ; Smuts , th e urban e Sout h African nationalis t an d pro-League internationalist, bu t regarde d a s uncommitted on many issues and most concerned with constitutiona l developments; and Meighen, youngest in age and experience, a freshman in imperial circles , bu t confident , intellectually sound , eloquent , and recognise d i n Londo n a s th e mos t difficul t o f th e dominio n premiers an d a s bein g unde r Christie' s influence. 1 Meighe n woul d lead th e Atlanticist s i n orator y an d substance , wit h Smut s givin g considerable an d effectiv e suppor t an d eve n a t time s assumin g the leadership. Hughes , i n fac t unrepentan t an d unchastened , stoo d ready to direct the opposition with monumental powers of repetition. Inevitably th e debate s a t th e Imperia l Conferenc e would moc k the usual published statement s o f cordial unanimity and tolerance . 1 Hankey to Lloyd George, 15 June 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/25/1/41. Hankey noted Meighen's unyielding attitude on the question of the alliance and urged Lloyd George to meet Meighen personally to counteract Christie's influence. Most other observers seemed impressed with Meighen, but Smut s found him depressed and hesitant and expecting political defeat at home.

122 ILLUSION S O F SECURIT Y In hi s openin g statemen t o n 20 June, Lloy d Georg e merel y outlined th e problem s involve d i n securin g peace , stability , an d arm s limitation i n th e Pacifi c an d justic e fo r China. 2 Hi s governmen t wished t o preserv e th e well-trie d friendshi p wit h Britain' s faithfu l ally, Japan. The empire, a bridge between the races of east and west, must prevent the division of the world on racial lines, but friendshi p with th e Unite d State s wa s a cardina l principl e o f policy, dictate d by the 'proper nature of things,' by instinct, reason, and by common sense. Britain must , Lloyd Georg e suggested, work closely with th e United State s in al l parts o f the world , bu t thoug h the y wer e prepared t o discus s arm s limitation wit h Washington , hi s governmen t could no t ignor e th e fundamenta l relationship betwee n se a powe r and imperia l security . The n wit h a no w characteristi c flourish of patrician flattery, Lloyd George praised th e empire's rol e in war and peace and concede d tha t Ther e was a time when Downin g Stree t controlled th e Empire ; toda y th e Empir e i s in charg e o f Downin g Street.' Lloyd Georg e ha d bowe d t o Tokyo , genuflecte d to Wash ington, courted the dominions, and had suggested the basic question was one of priorities an d emphases which familial negotiations would solve.8 Hughes, acutely conscious of the problem s of Pacific securit y an d the financia l an d strategi c obstacle s t o th e recreatio n o f imperia l naval power in Asian waters, was far more precise.4 He accepted th e need t o amend the allianc e wit h Japan t o satisf y th e Leagu e Cove 2Notes of meeting, E!, 20 June 1921, Cab. 32/2 [imperial meetings 1921, notes of meetings nos El-34,20 June-5 Aug. 1921]. The published record is Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers 1921, xrv ( Reports, Commissioners, vn), Cmd. 1474. 3Meighen spoke briefly but not without significance on the value of conference diplomacy, the League, and the commonwealth, and on the need to mitigate racial divisions. 4Notes of meeting, E 2,21 June 1921, Cab. 32/2. Hughes, during the war and at the Peace Conference, had oppose d Japan' s retentio n of former German islands in the north Pacific, had opposed the militarisation clause in the c class mandates to restrain Japan, and had helped defeat the racial equality amendment I n general, therefore , Hughes had adopte d attitude s hostil e towar d Japan, but, in addition, he had little faith in the United States and feared that the 'new world' would dictate imperial policy. Hughes, The Splendid Adventure, 119-26; Galbraith, "The Imperial Conference of 1921 and the Washington Conference,' 143-52; and Whyte William Morris Hughes, 424-46

123 TH E IMPERIA L CONFERENC E nant, bu t stresse d tha t 'th e cas e fo r renewa l i s ver y stron g i f no t indeed overwhelming.' In Hughes's view, the alh'ance enabled Britai n to restrain Japan and renewal would prevent Japan' s isolatio n fro m the wester n nations , avoi d a blo w t o Japan' s nationa l pride , an d would ai d China , th e empire , an d th e prospect s fo r peace. A t th e same time he acknowledged the problem of relations with the Unite d States. Australians admired America , regarding he r a s a mode l fo r their own future, and, in Hughes's opinion, the alliance must specifi cally o r implicitl y exclud e th e possibilit y o f wa r wit h th e Unite d States an d b e renewed i n suc h a manner a s to remove all ground s for suspicio n an d criticis m fro m Washington . H e doubte d whethe r they really understoo d America n opinion an d th e reason s fo r thei r hostility towar d th e alh'ance , and he proposed , therefore , tha t the y summon a conference with the United States and Japan to clear th e air, search for mutually acceptable policies , an d construc t a reasonable basis on which to renew the alliance.5 Hughes receive d predictabl e suppor t fro m Massey , bu t Smut s intervened with a curious combination of internationalist, Atlanticist, and isolationist phrases, which, however, clearly carried considerabl e weight.6 T o Smuts , sanit y an d reaso n demande d tha t th e empir e avoid an arms race with the United States and sentiment and history dictated Anglo-American co-operation. The United States was closest to the empire in 'all the human ties,' she was the 'oldest Dominion' who had left their circl e because of a great historical error, but the y must repair th e los s and return her t o the fold. Smuts regarded th e United States as a staunch and true friend whose intervention, though late because of her failure to appreciate the issues at stake, had been decisive i n th e recen t war . Sinc e then, th e empir e an d th e Unite d States ha d drifte d apart , due , i n Smuts' s opinion, t o difference s o f viewpoint an d t o statesmen' s errors , bu t th e fundamenta l specia l relationship remaine d intac t an d th e onl y saf e pat h wa s tha t o f Anglo-American co-operation . Smut s th e Atlanticist , however , di d not advocate an alliance or an exclusive arrangement with the United States, for such instruments were undesirable, unnecessary , an d be 5 Hughes also suggested a disarmament conference, in which Britain, France, Japan, and the United States would participate, and pointed out that a successful conference would affect the alliance question and the broader issue of imperial security. 6 Notes of meeting, E 2,21 June 1921, Cab. 32/2 an d C. Sifton to Dafoe, 8 July 1921, C . Sifton Papers, file 1921

124 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y yond their grasp . Instead h e advocated tha t th e empire, the world's greatest power , shun alliances a s such and tur n t o universal friendship, global co-operation, and a union of all free peoples in a consultative syste m o f conferences ; i n fac t t o a tru e societ y o f nations . Smuts th e imperia l isolationis t the n pronounce d o n th e demis e of Europe an d o n the nee d t o avoi d preoccupation wit h an d involvement in that disturbe d an d tortured continent , urgin g that wisdom rather tha n selfishnes s suggeste d th e avoidanc e o f entanglin g commitments. To Smuts, the Far East and the Pacific were now the vital areas and the empire must choose between co-operatio n in a society of nation s an d competitio n i n riva l group s and exclusiv e alliances ; the former policy would bring peace and the latter, war. Smuts suggested, as a solution to this dilemma, that the imperial meeting lea d the world to a conference or a system of conferences where the em pire would mediate between east and west. Smuts had clearl y provoked Massey . Deterrent nava l power an d alliances, no t th e League , wer e stil l th e fountain s o f security , an d Massey favoure d alliance s wit h Franc e an d wit h Japan , th e latte r treaty havin g mad e possibl e th e recen t Australasia n wa r effort . Massey spoke of co-operation with the Unite d States; he would give due consideratio n t o her views , an d joi n with he r t o preven t war , but Britai n could not secure an alliance wit h the Unite d States an d must, therefore, renew the alliance wit h Japan with whatever modifications seemed necessary.7 Already, then, by the en d of this second session the Atlanticists an d their opponents had skirmishe d and th e afternoon meetin g adde d substantiv e an d persona l differences. 8 Hughes an d Meighe n indulge d i n test y exchange s ove r Canadia n diplomatic representatio n a t Washingto n and , significantly , Lloyd George issued a gloomy prognosis on the futur e o f the Leagu e an d of Atlantic co-operation, which Smuts countered in a sanguine expression of faith. At the fourt h an d fifth sessions, on 22 June, Curzon reviewed th e 7 Sir John Findlay, an elder Ne w Zealand statesman, who had accompanie d Premier Sir Joseph Ward to the 1911 Imperial Conference, had also travelled to London to offset Masse y "s views. Findlay agreed with Meighen and threatened that renewal of the alliance would force New Zealand to leave the empire and seek the protection of the United States. He did not of course participate in the conference and his influence seems minimal ( Tate and Fay, 'More Light on the Abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,' 541-2 ). 8 Notes of meeting, E 3,21 June 1921, Cab. 32/2

125 THE IMPERIA L CONFERENC E spectrum of imperial foreign policy and wasted little time in rejecting Smuts's propositions an d in praising the Anglo-Japanese alliance as a factor which enabled Britai n to exercise a controlling influence on the 'sometimes dangerous ambitions of Japan.'9 Curzon then launched into a sustained attack on recent United States policies, denouncing Wilson's administratio n bot h fo r it s withdrawal fro m an d it s ill-judge d sorties into world affairs , an d laying the blame for the breakdown in Anglo-American relations squarel y a t Washington' s door . Th e Mid dle East, Curzo n cited a s a typically disastrou s American defection, and he pointed to the problems of Yap and cable communications as examples o f he r lamentabl e interference . Wilson' s foolis h policies , Curzon suggested , wer e responsibl e fo r makin g the Unite d State s 'nervous, useless an d impoten t a t th e critica l perio d afte r th e war, ' but h e regarde d Harding' s administratio n i n a somewha t differen t light. The Republicans , Curzo n felt, woul d ignor e th e Leagu e bu t explore th e ide a o f som e internationa l associatio n fo r peace , an d would avoi d entanglement s i n Europ e bu t a t leas t participat e i n certain bodie s suc h a s the Suprem e Council, th e Reparation s Com mission, an d th e Conferenc e o f Ambassadors . Curzon, therefore , professed to see hopeful signs of future Anglo-American co-operation and looke d t o limite d America n help i n th e tas k o f worl d recon struction. On naval policy, Curzo n sa w the Unite d State s a s balancing be tween completio n o f the 191 6 programm e and Senat e pressure s fo r a disarmamen t agreement, bu t he reported tha t n o approaches ha d been made or received. O n other specific issues he pointed t o America's dislik e o f th e Anglo-Japanes e alliance , he r 'stif f an d rathe r ungenerous' polic y o n wa r debts , an d t o th e continue d irritatio n over the Irish question , but i n general he returned to the theme of a Republican tendenc y to rebuild Anglo-America n rapport an d o f th e need t o reciprocate whe n Hardin g mad e his advances. Curzon concluded wit h a typical flourish: 'My own belief is that in the trouble s and turmoils of the east , if we look to the west and re-establish excellent relations wit h America, we shall see a dawning of light in a sky which is so overcast i n almost every other quarter o f the globe. ' H e had followe d hi s slashin g attac k o n Wilso n wit h som e Atlanticis t oratory which surel y deceived no one about the priorities h e preferred. I n an y case, Churchil l dispelle d an y momentary illusions wit h a stron g denunciatio n o f Wilson' s vacillation s o n th e Middl e Eas t 9Notes of meetings, E 4 and E 5,22 June 1921, Cab . 32/ 2

126 ILLUSION S O F SECURIT Y and of the 'absolute hiatus' in Washington, and with a derisive an d angry attac k o n the Unite d States ' attitud e o n mandates whic h h e felt reflected a fatuous delusion that the mandate areas were a source of large profit to Britain. The Imperial Conferenc e did not hold a formal sessio n on Thursday, 23 June, and the significan t development o f that da y took place in Washington wher e the internationalis t secretar y o f state, Charle s Evans Hughes, and Ambassador Geddes met for a prolonged discussion.10 Gedde s announce d tha t Britai n woul d probabl y retai n th e alliance for another year to allow further study, and Hughes, in reply, left no doubt that he opposed the retention o f the alliance, regardin g it as a stimulus to Japan and not as a restraint impose d on her. The Secretary o f State described Britain's attitude as vital in the curren t strained situatio n with Japan and he looked for British support an d co-operation in the executio n of American policies i n th e Fa r East . Geddes then posed the basic question: would the Unite d State s join in tripartit e co-operation ? Hughes , i n reply , rejecte d an y involve ment i n an alliance, suggestin g tha t co-operatio n mean t the pursu ance of common policies, an d he looked rather for agreement on ends than on means. Geddes replied tha t Britain could not discard Japan abruptly, but she need not renew the alliance and he suggested that an exchange of notes as a triple declaratio n o f common policy would be an adequate substitute. Hughes, giving a personal view and being non-committal unti l h e ha d consulte d Harding , state d tha t i f th e declared policie s complie d wit h thos e o f th e Unite d State s the y would participate . Meanwhile , Gedde s coul d infor m Londo n tha t the Unite d State s oppose d renewa l o f the Anglo-Japanes e alliance, and Hughes reminde d th e ambassado r that thos e in Congres s who supported Ireland's cause would gain strength from any such renewal. Hughes then discusse d this conversation with assistant secretarie s R.W. Bliss and J.V.A . MacMurray an d o n th e followin g day h e in formed Gedde s that he could report to London that Hughes personally accepted th e idea of a triple declaration o f policy. The nature of the declaration an d its practical applicatio n would , however, deter 10 Memorandum of conversation between Hughe s and Ceddes , 23 July 1921 , Charles Evans Hughes Papers, box 175, folder 76a. This is a more detailed account than the record in FH, 1921, n, 314-16. Hughes wanted greater American participation i n world affairs an d a multilateral disarmament agreement, and he sought improved Anglo-American and Japanese-American relations. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, 2 vols; Glad, Charles Evans Hughes

A.J. Balfour and C.E. Hughes drive through Washington

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129 THE IMPERIA L CONFERENC E mine th e attitud e o f th e Unite d State s government . Hughe s had, therefore, offere d th e prospec t o f Anglo-American co-operation as a substitute fo r the Anglo-Japanes e alliance, bu t h e ha d give n no offi cial an d definit e commitment , h e ha d eliminate d th e ide a o f th e United State s enterin g a n alliance , an d h e ha d no t resiste d th e temptation to apply pressure on Britain. Clearly, th e reactio n i n Londo n t o thes e exchange s woul d b e a vital consideratio n an d Geddes' s report s wer e receive d o n 25 June before the substantive discussions on the renewal question took place in th e Imperia l Conference . Gedde s firs t reporte d growin g publi c interest i n the whol e problem and , as a resul t o f the Stat e Depart ment publicly denyin g the receip t o f any information or assurance s from Britain , mounting hostilit y t o th e alliance , to Britain , an d to ward Japan , th e inevitabl e enem y of th e future. 11 Gedde s the n re ported specificall y o n hi s discussio n wit h Hughe s an d emphasise d that th e Secretar y o f Stat e oppose d renewa l o f th e allianc e i n an y form an d had denied that the United States would be appeased eve n by he r specifi c exclusio n from th e operatio n o f a revise d treaty. 12 Geddes gav e th e impressio n tha t Hughe s wa s Very hopeful' abou t the ide a o f a tripartit e declaratio n o f polic y an d conclude d wit h further phrase s t o emphasis e Unite d States hostility t o the alliance . The Imperia l Conferenc e resume d it s meeting s o n 2 4 June wit h Meighen prominent for the first time.13 He devoted himself, however, 11 Geddes to Curzon, 24 June 1921 (receive d 25 June), BD, 1st ser., xiv, no 307, 310-11. For Hughes's public statement, see Hughes to Harvey, 22 June 1921, FH, 1921, n, 313. 12Geddes to Curzon, 24 June 1921 (receive d 25 June), BD, 1st ser., xrv.no 308, 311-12. Geddes's report differed from Hughes's own account on two particular points; Geddes said that he explored the idea of the United States signing an identical or similar agreement or treaty with Japan, which Hughes rejected because of Senate opposition to any treaty; and Geddes did not report that he himself raised the idea of a triple declaration of policy embodied in identical notes, leaving the question of initiative somewhat vague. Geddes also omitted any reference to Ireland. 13 Notes of meeting, E 6, 24 June 1921, Cab. 32/2. Here Meighen laid down his three principles , callin g for regula r or eve n continuous consultation, th e weighing in London of dominion advice, and the recognition of the principle that where a dominion was specifically and heavily involved, its views should receive commensurate attention when the empire debated its policy toward that area.

130 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y to the principle s whic h should for m th e basi s o f the conduc t o f imperial foreign policy and of the role that the dominion s should play, and he pointed t o Canada's specia l concer n and paramount interes t in matter s relatin g t o th e Unite d State s a s a tes t case . Whe n th e empire debated the question of its relations with America, he expected Canada's view s to receive specia l consideratio n an d h e demande d that improve d relation s wit h Washingto n shoul d b e 'th e pivo t of Britain's world policy.' Meighen also demanded that the empire give the fullest suppor t to the League, that they turn away from alliance s and groupings and that a dominion could reject obligations entere d into by Britain. Such views, clearly the result of Christie's prompting , made an obvious appeal to Smuts, forging a Canadian-South African front against the assault from the Antipodes. Smuts denied either tha t he advocated a policy of 'splendid isola tion' from Europ e or that he condone d recent United State s policy, but he confirmed his dislike of an alliance with France an d his belief in Atlanticism as the proper basis for imperial foreign policy, whethe r or not the United States joined the League . Lloyd George and Massey were sceptical about the League's future unless the United States became a member, and Hughes professed to fear bot h an American attempt to dictate policy and that Britain could secure an agreement with Washington only if she let th e Unite d State s seiz e the leader ship. Furthermore , Hughe s accuse d Smut s of inconsistenc y b y op posing a n alliance wit h Franc e bu t proposin g tie s wit h th e Unite d States. Smuts, in reply, argued that the United States and the empir e shared simila r position s i n world affairs , tha t thei r co-operatio n di d not mean American control, but tha t alignmen t with Franc e mean t entanglement i n Europe' s interna l affairs . Smut s wanted Britai n t o remove the cause s of friction with the Unite d States, t o seek a general settlement, create a new atmosphere, and to dedicate hersel f t o Atlanticism a s the basi c principl e o f her foreig n policy. Th e worl d was bankrupt an d half mad , Smuts asserted, the empir e must make a fundamenta l strategi c decisio n abou t policy , bu t hi s critic s wer e unmoved. At the next session, followin g the weeken d recess , Lloy d George , primed by Grigg and Hankey, rejected Meighen's principles, singling out as dangerous th e idea tha t a dominion or Britain hersel f shoul d have a decisive voic e on any issue in which she had special interests , and the n h e attacke d Smuts' s view s o n Europe. 14 Churchil l an d 14 Notes of meeting, E 7,27 June 1921, Cab . 32/2; Hankey to Lloyd George,

131 THE IMPERIA L CONFERENC E Chamberlain supporte d Lloy d George with gestures of Anglo-French solidarity, Meighen rallied t o Smuts, and the meeting decided t o discuss the Anglo-Japanese alliance on the following morning.15 Curzon, with Geddes' s report s o f 24 June receive d an d digested , presente d his argument s fo r an d agains t th e renewa l o f the allianc e an d th e proposals adopte d b y th e cabine t o n 3 0 May. 18 H e confirme d th e urgency of the matter, although expressing optimism about the negotiations fo r a three-month extensio n with Japan, 17 and turned t o the vital questio n o f Washington's attitude . Curzo n insisted tha t Secre tary of State Hughes was awar e of Britain's interpretatio n o f article four of the 1911 treaty, excluding the United States from its operation , but tha t the American press an d public opinion wer e more extreme than just in their reactions. Geddes, in November 1920 , had advised retention o f the alliance , bu t jus t prior t o the conference he had re ported that Hughes would regard renewal as disastrous and his most recent despatches were even less encouraging. Hughes had discussed with Geddes the idea of a tripartite declaratio n o f policy in identica l notes, but there the matter rested an d Curzon saw neither a concrete offer nor any commitment from Washington.18 25 June 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/25/1/48, and Grigg to Lloyd George, 26 June 1921, Grigg Papers, reel 11 15 Notes of meeting, E 8,28 June 1921, Cab. 32/2. Lloyd George arrived late, having dealt with the coal crisis. 16 Curzon, however, made no mention, as he had on 30 May, of the United States using popular opposition to the alliance as an excuse for naval construction and he made much more of racial considerations in his speech to the imperial meeting. 17 The extension would remove the 1 3 July deadline an d giv e Britai n unti l 13 October to settle th e allianc e question . Interestingl y enough , Meighen , foreshadowing Birkenhead's ruling, expressed the view that the alliance was self-perpetuating and did not need renewal, but Curzon insisted on the reverse interpretation. 18 Curzon was absolutel y fran k i n hi s comment s on Geddes' s telegram s of 24 June and obviously he did not feel tha t Hughe s had offere d a tripartit e pact or a clear commitment. J.C. Vinson's view thus exaggerates the categorical nature of Hughes's reply to Geddes and misinterprets the reception given Geddes's reports in London. The debates at the imperial meeting were still sharp an d urgent , wid e difference s o f view and o f orders of priority stil l existed, and the Adanticists' task was still formidable ( Vinson, "The Imperial conference of 1921,' 257-66 ).

132 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y On the questio n o f Asian opinion, Curzon ridicule d B.L . Simpson, gave guarde d prais e t o Japan, an d mixe d contemp t wit h sympath y for China , whil e admittin g tha t the y mus t conside r Peking' s view s and co-operate with the United States in China's economi c develop ment.19 He als o suggested consultation s wit h th e Unite d State s an d the need to meet their obligations under th e League Covenant , but , predictably, h e favoure d the cas e fo r renewal . H e emphasise d th e past value of the alliance , dwel t on the possibility of a future RussoGerman menace , an d applaude d Japan' s reasonablenes s i n thei r negotiations, a fact whic h contraste d sharpl y with th e humiliation , anger, and resentment which Japan would feel should Britain rebuf f her. H e personall y dislike d th e prospec t o f severin g link s wit h a faithful an d valuable ally and he did not regard the need to improve Anglo-American relations a s a justifiable reaso n for doin g so . Moreover, the alliance soothe d racia l antagonisms, offered prestig e t o th e Asians, increased th e self-respec t o f non-white peoples , an d helpe d to remove prejudice. I n Curzon' s opinion, th e allianc e wa s an asse t of considerabl e value , th e Wa r Office , th e Admiralty , Hughes an d Massey agreed , bu t Meighe n oppose d renewa l an d suggeste d a Pacific conference . Curzo n acknowledge d tha t Meighen' s proposa l had considerable suppor t but he felt the scheme might be consisten t with renewal. The Foreig n Secretar y the n considere d th e alternativ e course s of action. He opposed both abrogatio n o f the allianc e an d its perpetu ation amende d merel y to accommodate the League , India , an d th e United States . Curzon di d no t regar d a triple agreemen t a s practi cable an d h e als o dismisse d it a s vulnerable t o Unite d State s sen atorial and public opinion and as dependent on continued favourable results in American presidential elections . Consequently, the Foreig n Office favoure d renewa l i n a differen t form , afte r consultatio n wit h the League, China , and the United States, and proposed that Britai n simultaneously expres s a willingnes s t o joi n the Unite d State s i n a Pacific conference . Thi s conference , accordin g t o Curzon , woul d obviously be far-reaching and protracted. Befor e i t convened, therefore, Britai n mus t sig n a ne w four - o r five-year treaty wit h Japan , fully acceptabl e t o the Unite d States , China , an d th e League , an d 19 Simpson was a man 'of doubtfu l character and antecedents'; the Japanese had great intellectual gifts, resolution, order, discipline, and a fierce patriotism, but were rather unscrupulous, expansive, aggressive, and Germanic; China was a hopeless, inert, and impotent mass.

133 THE IMPERIA L CONFERENC E with provisio n fo r th e adherenc e o f th e Unite d States. 20 Curzo n added tha t th e cabine t favoure d this polic y an d di d no t fee l tha t Geddes's recent telegrams altered the situation. Churchill did not agree with Curzon' s last point but Balfou r rein forced th e Foreign Secretary' s analysi s with the familiar and simpl e proposition tha t nava l unpreparedness dictate d tha t Britai n retai n the allianc e with Japan just as it demande d the constructio n o f th e Singapore nava l base . Moreover , Balfour , impresse d wit h BeneS' s recent schem e for a Centra l Europea n entent e i n harmon y with a revised Leagu e Covenant , argue d tha t Britai n coul d negotiat e a n effective defensiv e and benign alliance, offending neithe r the League nor anyon e but 'a n embittere d controversialist. ' O n that apparentl y hopeful not e the meeting adjourned, with Lloyd George to return to the coal crisis and Curzon to see Ambassador Harvey that afternoon before the next session of the Imperial Conference. Curzon, i n his conversation wit h Harvey , intended t o clarif y th e position o f the Unite d State s but i n fac t thei r discussio n became a source o f confusion. 21 Curzon , attemptin g t o distinguis h betwee n governmental views and thos e o f the press , aske d Harvey whether the mer e fac t o f renewal , apar t fro m th e form , woul d likel y mee t with a necessarily unfavourable response from Washington . Harvey , according t o Curzon , assure d him tha t h e nee d entertai n n o suc h fears, that the view s of the pres s were no t thos e o f the administra tion, an d tha t th e Unite d State s woul d respectfull y examin e an y decision reache d b y Britain . Curzo n the n speculate d o n the possi bility o f broadening a naval disarmament conference into on e covering al l issues related t o th e Pacifi c an d especiall y t o China , an d Harvey agai n gav e a n encouragin g reply. Curzo n conclude d fro m 20 Curzon, memorandum on the alliance, 28 June 1921, E 21, Cab. 32/6. This course of action was alternative A, which Curzon preferred, and he pointed out that renewal would be independent of the Pacific conference but not inconsistent with it. Schem e B, which Curzon di d no t recommend , suggeste d a temporary renewal of the existing alliance, brought into line with the League Covenant and omitting any reference to India. The renewal period would be one year from Octobe r 1921, and the Pacific conferenc e would meet in the intervening period. 21 Curzon to Geddes, 29 June 1921, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 313,316-18, and Cab. 32/6. Harvey , appointed ambassador as a reward for his political services to Harding, did no t enjo y Hughes' s confidence an d wa s hardly a model of reliability.

134 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y this conversation that Washington's reactio n t o his policy woul d be a favourable one and he professed to see few obstacles, bu t clearl y he had paid insufficient attentio n t o Harvey's cautionar y words that he ha d receive d n o instructions fro m Hughe s an d tha t th e Unite d States did not intend t o take the initiative . Consequently , Meighen could diffe r i n his interpretation o f this conversation , Geddes's next reports seeme d t o conflic t wit h Harvey' s views , an d th e American ambassador's reliability, status, and even his veracity were questioned amid much irritation and confusion. 22 On th e followin g mornin g the Imperia l Conferenc e reassemble d for a session which Meighen dominated to a large extent. 23 He confirmed Canada's opposition to renewal of the alliance in any form, and gave a detailed rebuttal of Curzon's analysis . The allianc e ha d no t preserved peace , an d he cite d a s evidence the Russo-Japanes e war; no menace actuall y existe d fro m Russi a an d Germany , and Britai n could no t rene w the allianc e o n the speculativ e possibilit y o f thei r resurgence, whether singly or in combination, and , indeed, renewa l would invit e suc h a development ; Japa n wa s no t a loya l all y an d Meighen sarcastically indicted Japan for exceeding her rights, violating her covenants, committing acts of aggrandizement, and being prepared t o repeat th e performance in the nex t twenty years with th e alliance providin g simila r restraints . Clearly , i n Meighen' s opinion , the alliance had not deterred Japan, and renewal would make Britain a willin g accomplic e an d lowe r he r prestige . Moreover , China op posed renewa l an d ye t th e avowe d ai m o f th e allianc e wa s th e preservation o f her integrity . I n addition , Meighen claimed, a n alli ance modified t o accommodate the League , China, an d th e Unite d States would be superfluous, and exclusive treaties merely subverted the League , stimulate d counter-arrangements , an d encourage d a revival o f th e dangerou s situatio n existin g befor e 1914 . Meighe n could not accep t th e danger s incurred b y the los s of Japan's friend ship an d he r possibl e orientatio n towar d Russi a an d German y as valid reason s for renewal. H e emphasise d rather th e los s of China' s friendship and the danger that renewal would ensure that the United 22 Johnson, George Harvey, 325 ; Pusey , Hughes, n, 493; Butler, Across The Busy Years, n, 124-34 . Johnson concluded that Harvey had expresse d ignorance of Washington's attitude, but tha t he felt th e Unite d State s opposed renewal. 23 Notes of meeting, E 9,29 June 1921, Cab. 32/2

135 THE IMPERIA L CONFERENC E States achieve d a monopol y o f China' s commercia l an d financia l development. Moreover, Meighe n asserted , th e allianc e woul d preven t a n improvement in Anglo-American relations, an d Canada wished neithe r to suffer becaus e of a deterioration i n those relations no r to becom e another 'Belgium' in the event of war. If British policy really pivote d on the maintenance of 'Atlantic harmony,' then Britain must judge all major issue s in the ligh t o f her relation s with th e Unite d States . I n Meighen's view, any exclusive arrangement with Japan would jeopardise Anglo-America n accord, ange r America n publi c opinion , en courage every anglophobe, and would be regarded a s a provocative rebuff t o th e Unite d States . H e dismisse d th e proposa l fo r specia l provisions o r exemption s fo r th e Unite d State s a s inadequate an d regarded Japan' s desir e to retain the alliance despite th e probabilit y of such exemptions as curious and sinister . Japan required, Meighe n felt, t o secure Britain's support i n Asia, her benevolen t neutralit y in the event of war with the United States, and then Britain's aid at the peace table. The United States, Meighen assured the meeting, looked for fres h approaches, a new atmospher e prevaile d i n Washington , an d Har ding's administration expecte d the Imperial Conference to provide a lead. Britain should not demand a naval disarmament agreement as the prerequisite fo r abrogating the allianc e wit h Japan, for renewa l would provoke a naval race whereas termination would produce a n agreement o n armaments . Meighe n challenge d Britain' s prioritie s and rejected the idea that Japan would be estranged by non-renewal, for Canada wished to replace the alliance with a tripartite agreemen t affording equa l treatmen t t o al l signatories . Furthermore , Canad a would no t participat e i n a renewa l o f th e Anglo-Japanes e allianc e aimed at 'a menace' from th e United States . Meighen regretted tha t Britain had opposed Canada's idea of sounding out the United States prior to the imperial meeting to see whether Washington would welcome a Pacific conference, and he charged that Britai n had bungle d the whole affair. I n consequence, the imperial meeting did not know whether th e Unite d State s would accep t a Pacifi c conferenc e an d join in the searc h fo r a tripartite agreement , an d Britai n faced th e stark alternatives of renewal or termination of the alliance by 13 July. This accusatio n produced quibblin g exchange s on the validit y of the 13 July deadline an d the proposed three-months' extension to the alliance, and Meighe n then demande d immediate negotiations wit h

136 ILLUSIONS OF SECURITY the United States and any other interested power to secure an agreement or an exchange of notes by 1 3 July.24 He rejecte d any plan fo r renewal followe d b y an approach t o Washington an d urge d accep tance of the fact tha t renewal was untenable an d tha t a conferenc e must b e convened . H e the n calle d o n Geddes' s recen t report s t o support hi s own position and focussed th e discussio n on the doubl e duets, involving Geddes and Hughes in Washington and Harvey and Curzon i n London , a s competin g source s o f reliability . Meighe n clearly preferred the forme r a s the more accurate source of information on American policies and he would admit no possibility of reconciliation betwee n th e conflictin g reports . Curzon , whil e acceptin g that Harve y an d Gedde s disagreed , rejecte d Meighen' s assessment; Harvey, sen t to London specificall y to secure closer Anglo-American co-operation, had had ample opportunity to state that his government would not tolerate renewal, and yet, on the contrary, Harvey seemed to think that renewa l was the most natural course of action. Curzon and Meighen could not even agree on the significance of various signs of America n friendship. To Curzon they indicated tha t Washingto n would accep t renewal , bu t t o Meighe n the y demonstrate d tha t Britain must not rebuf f th e Unite d State s by renewal an d mus t encourage her participation i n a triple understanding . Balfour the n cam e to the point ; ha d Meighe n an y evidenc e tha t the Unite d State s woul d ente r a tripartit e agreement ? Meighe n hedged; h e could have been more definite had the y allowed Borden to sound out opinion in Washington, but, on balance, he felt that th e United State s would join in a broad inclusive arrangement tha t was neither a formal nor a rigid treaty. Ther e Meighe n rested hi s case , having presente d i t wit h grea t forc e an d som e skil l an d havin g emerged beyond Smut s as the most formidable Atlanticist voice, bu t his efforts provoke d a violent attac k from Bill y Hughes, challengin g and at times distorting Meighen' s proposals . In Hughes's opinion, the facts were clear until Meighen spoke, and yet th e Canadia n Premier , withou t justificatio n and i n defianc e of Curzon's reports, ha d merel y state d tha t the y mus t no t renew th e alliance becaus e th e United State s was opposed. Meighe n claimed a special understanding of American opinion, seemed willing to ignore 24 Although the negotiations with Japan for an extension were incomplete, Curzon claimed that they had unti l 13 October to decide on a policy. Meighen opposed even the three-months' extension and claimed, wrongly so, that Britain had not consulted Canada on that question.

137 THE IMPERIA L CONFERENC E Ambassador Harvey, was excessively attuned to his North American environment, and he appeared read y to permit th e Unite d State s t o dictate th e empire' s policies . Hughes , i n contrast , woul d no t to e Washington's line , Meighen's voice must not outweigh his, especiall y as Australia' s securit y rathe r tha n tha t o f Canad a wa s directl y in volved. The United States, Hughes emphasised, had contemptuously rejected her own creation, the League, and was constructing immense naval forces , an d h e coul d se e n o evidenc e eithe r tha t sh e woul d discuss disarmamen t o r discontinu e he r nava l programme . T o Hughes, th e Unite d States , refusing t o respond t o Britis h initiative s on disarmament , was an irresponsible an d militaris t power , an d h e rejected Meighen' s vie w tha t renewa l o f th e allianc e wit h Japa n would destroy the prospects fo r a disarmament agreement. Further more, he denie d tha t Meighe n really ha d a n alternative to renewal . Australia, naturally, woul d prefe r th e Unite d State s to Japan a s a n ally, but the choice did not exist. Washington offered onl y the shadow and not the substanc e an d in particular offere d n o aid t o Australia's security. Meighen , Hughe s charged , ignore d th e tw o fundamental facts: America' s real objection to the alliance lay in her fear o f Japan and, secondly, deep hatred of Britain existed among certain section s of American opinion. Hughes warned against delay, Britain could not achieve a disarmamen t agreement , imperia l securit y wa s th e aci d test, and they must renew the Anglo-Japanese alliance.25 When the conference resumed that afternoo n Hughes returned t o the attack. 28 Japa n ha d rendere d indispensabl e servic e durin g th e war and , had sh e joined Germany , the Centra l Power s woul d hav e emerged victorious . Meighe n had faile d t o make a case agains t th e alliance, Balfou r had show n that they could rene w it in a way compatible wit h the League, an d he personally regarde d th e allianc e a s consistent wit h th e League , wit h Anglo-America n friendship , an d with disarmament. The y must reject th e suspicions and hostilities o f the voic e of the peopl e of America as invoked b y Meighe n and , instead, hee d th e word s o f Harvey . I n an y case , Hughe s asserted , Britain's rejectio n of Japan would not convert the American hymn of hate, swelle d by the bitter an d irreconcilable Iris h question , int o a song of eternal friendship. Rather, Britain's capitulatio n t o American 25 At this point, Lloyd George interrupted Hughes and suggested that it would be as well for Meighen, who had gone to lunch with the Prince of Wales, to hear the indictment. 26Notes of meeting, E 10,29 June 1921, Cab. 32/ 2

138 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y pressure woul d merel y ear n th e empir e contemp t an d cos t the m prestige and respect. The empire, Hughes demanded, must formulate its policies without weakness or vacillation, wit h faith in its cause and in the justice of its motives, but wit h due regard for and in consultation wit h th e Unite d States . The y coul d neithe r ris k isolatio n nor court the enmity of Japan at a time of strategic vulnerability. In conclusion, Hughe s denie d tha t th e Unite d State s woul d all y wit h Britain, joi n th e League , disarm , o r defen d Chin a an d Meighen' s conference offere d littl e comfort , wherea s th e Japanes e allianc e offered concret e and proven advantages . Hughes had bee n repetitiou s bu t forceful , optin g fo r th e poten tially menacing Japan rather tha n the unreliable Unite d States , and Smuts the n re-entere d th e debate . I n hi s view , the y mus t avoi d a rebuff t o Japa n an d secur e th e correc t basi c alignmen t i n polic y which, for himself an d Meighen , meant a new bout o f co-operation with the United States. Smuts attempted t o merge the alliance ques tion with all the other issues in Anglo-American relations, callin g for a general settlement rathe r than a piecemeal approach to each separate issue . Thi s cours e o f actio n suggeste d a tripl e declaratio n o f policy i n identica l note s draw n u p a t a three-powe r conference . Smuts agree d wit h Meighe n tha t Geddes' s report s indicate d tha t Secretary of State Hughe s would join in negotiations an d that Har vey's conversatio n with Curzo n showe d that Hughe s would g o beyond disarmamen t talks . I n conclusion , Smut s advocate d non-re newal of the alliance an d the pursuit of a triple entente by way of a Pacific conference . Lloyd Georg e suggested that Curzon' s 'Plan s'27 would serv e th e sam e purpose an d Smut s agreed , providin g the y inform both the United States and Japan that Britain desired a triple entente. After furthe r irresolute an d even confused debat e o n the meaning and value of the Curzon-Harve y conversation, Masse y spoke in support of Hughes and opposed renewal for a mere twelve-month period to permit a conference to meet.28 They must renew the alliance forth27 See note 20 28 Curzon admitted that Harvey had not spoken officially o n behalf o f the United States government and Chamberlain felt that Harvey had been more favourable to renewal than had Hughes. Meighen and Smuts applauded Geddes's reports because they emphasized American hostility to renewal and the possibility of American participation in a triple agreement. Curzon and Hughes preferred Harvey's comments which suggested that the United States would

139 THE IMPERIA L CONFERENC E with as the foundation of the empire's policy despite the need to consult the United States. Massey feared the possibility o f war betwee n Japan an d the United State s and the outbreak o f serious racial con flicts. Moreover , he expressed doubt s abou t the futur e stabilit y o f a state so racially diffuse a s America. He also referred to a secret source of information , indicating that th e Unite d State s sough t t o contro l the Pacific and wean Canada, Australia, and New Zealand away from the empire, a prospect which attracted neithe r himself nor Hughes.29 Massey continued a t the nex t session very much in the sam e vein and wa s followed by th e Maharaj a o f Cutch. 80 Whil e acceptin g a triple understandin g a s ideal, h e supporte d renewa l o f a n allianc e with Japan , modifie d s o as t o omi t an y referenc e t o India , fo r th e empire mus t no t discar d Japa n t o cour t th e Unite d States . Lloy d George then made a major contributio n fo r the first time since th e opening session and his speech reflected a cabinet discussion that had taken place earlier that day. 31 Curzon, summarisin g the view s of the dominion s for the cabinet , had expresse d surprise at th e vigour and exten t of Meighen's attack and reporte d tha t Hughe s had me t Meighe n head on , with Smuts, both helpfu l an d embarrassing , balancin g betwee n them . Curzo n conceded tha t Geddes' s report s showe d that renewal of the allianc e would hav e a seriou s effec t o n Unite d State s opinion an d tha t th e Senate would no t ratify a triple alliance , but tha t a declaratio n of policy in an exchange of identical note s wa s possible. Curzon , however, felt that Japan would not accept a n exchange of notes as a substitute for the alliance. They must clarify furthe r th e views of Japan and the United States and they should suspend debate at the Imperial Conference until he had interviewed Harvey and Hayashi. The cabinet, after speculating o n the possibilities o f war betwee n Japan an d th e Unite d State s an d betwee n Japa n an d th e empire , examined the merits of a diplomatic approach to secure both a defensive alliance with Japan relating to China and the Far East, and a trinot object to renewal. Harvey had also, however, supported the idea of a conference, encouraging Meighen and Smuts to some degree, and hence the discussion o n the relativ e valu e of Anglo-American exchanges in Londo n and Washington could become confused and cyclical. 29 Although Massey made no specific revelation s a t th e meeting , the Lodge Gardiner policy seemed to have surfaced again. 30Notes of meeting, E 11,30 June 1921, Cab. 32/ 2 31 Minutes of cabinet meeting, 30 June 1921, Cab . 23/26

140 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y partite agreement to cover the Pacific and provide for the security of Australia. Lloy d George , i n summary , insisted o n certain points a s fundamental: Britai n coul d neithe r quarre l wit h th e Unite d State s nor insul t Japa n an d a settlemen t o f th e Ya p controvers y migh t moderate Washington's oppositio n t o the alliance ; th e empir e mus t secure China' s suppor t fo r an y ne w arrangement , particularl y a s they coul d no t permi t th e Unite d State s t o gai n contro l o f th e lucrative China market; and the ruling that the joint Anglo-Japanese note to the Leagu e was an act of denunciation presented th e immediate problem to which the cabinet must find a solution by reversing or withdrawing the legal opinion. Meighen, as Lloyd George pointed out, would then be force d t o demand denunciation an d not merel y non-renewal of the alliance, abrogation would become the immediate issue, an d a conferenc e would provid e th e solution . Th e Premier' s ingenuity clearl y appeale d t o hi s colleague s and , afte r consultin g Lord Birkenhead , th e cabine t agree d t o propos e t o th e imperia l meeting tha t Curzo n soun d ou t Harve y an d Hayashi . Meanwhile , Birkenhead would prepare himself to reverse the ruling on the joint note to the League in order to remove pressing deadlines an d avoid die need for a three-months' extension of the alliance. Lloyd George then went to the Imperial Conferenc e to show how they could reconcile th e views of Meighen and Hughes and avoi d a choice betwee n Japa n an d th e Unite d States . Despit e attemptin g mediation an d indulgin g i n som e Atlanticis t oratory , however , h e still denied tha t renewal o f the alliance woul d create a quarrel with the United States, and insisted that a refusal to renew would provoke a breach wit h Japan , indicating tha t h e regarde d Hughes' s cas e as the stronger. In Lloyd George's view, the empire must not rebuff he r gallant if opportunistic ally, they must behave like gentlemen, divest themselves of the view that war between Japan and the United States was inevitable , preserv e Britain' s positio n i n China , an d consul t Washington an d Peking. He favoured a Pacific conferenc e to estab lish common ground between Japan and th e United States, and this conference would have ample time to meet as Britain now accepte d the Japanese view that they had no t shown intent to denounce their alliance. Birkenhead dutifully gave his ruling, the allianc e wa s self perpetuating, Meighen was deflated, an d Lloyd George contentedl y suggested that they study the broad issues of policy in the light of the Pacific conference proposal while giving Meighen a chance to reconsider his position.

141 THE IMPERIA L CONFERENC E Lloyd Georg e seeme d satisfie d tha t h e ha d coole d Meighen' s ardour and lowered the temperature of the meeting, and the renewed Canadian offensiv e o n th e followin g da y mus t hav e bee n a s un pleasant a s it wa s unexpected. 82 Meighe n attacke d bot h Hughes' s misrepresentation of Canada's position and Lloyd George's apparen t acquiescence i n th e falsification . H e ha d no t suggeste d tha t the y rebuff Japa n s o as to cour t th e Unite d States , h e ha d no t propose d ungentíemanly conduct , an d h e wa s no t th e Voic e o f America. ' Meighen, turning to the new situation created b y Birkenhead's decision, suggested that before 1 3 July they must remodel the alliance to meet their obligations under the League Covenant and the wishes of India, limi t it s life-span to on e year, an d cal l a Pacifi c conference . This conference , completin g its wor k in 1921 , Meighe n suggested , should creat e a four-powe r understanding , embracin g th e forme r allies, the Unite d States , an d China , whic h woul d the n replac e th e alliance. Lloyd George, in reply, continued to preach reconciliation , bu t he could no t accep t th e ide a o f placing a one-yea r tim e limi t o n th e alliance. They must leave the treat y untouched except for modifica tions to accommodate the League an d seek a permanent solution at the Pacifi c conference . Meighen and Lloy d George were, therefore , still opposed and a debate ensued , becoming less coherent with constant repetitio n o f positions whic h th e advocat e though t consisten t and his audience clearly did not, and in which Hughes still proposed renewal when everyone else realised tha t renewal was no longer th e issue an d oppose d th e ide a o f a conferenc e whe n everyon e els e agreed that a conference was desirable. Finally , Hughes demande d that the Imperial Conferenc e itself decid e without dela y on renewal and then, but only then, would he accept a Pacific conference . Curzon, to restore symmetry and coherence, propose d a five-point plan o f procedure : infor m Japa n o f Birkenhead' s ne w rulin g an d assure her that the alliance remained in force; notify the League that they hope d t o dea l wit h Fa r Easter n an d Pacifi c question s o n a larger plane and in harmony with the Covenant, and that meanwhile they recognised the pre-eminence of the Covenant over the alliance;83 sound out Japan, China, an d the United State s on the questio n o f a Pacific conference and, as the fourth step, report back to the imperia l 32 Notes of meeting, E 12,1 July 1921, Cab . 32/ 2 33Curzon to Hayashi, 2 July 1921, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 320,322

142 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y meeting; an d finally, reaffirm tha t Britai n woul d no t renounc e he r alliance with Japan until the Pacific conference had reached a settlement or a new treaty ha d emerge d to replace th e alliance . Th e inference wa s clear; shoul d the conferenc e fail, th e modifie d allianc e would continue in force and naturally Hughes was quick to applaud . Meighen, however , coul d expres s only partial assent , fo r Curzon' s compromise lost its impartiality by the wording of the fifth proposal. Equally, Smut s disliked th e specifi c emphasi s o n th e nee d t o perpetuate th e allianc e shoul d th e conferenc e fail , fo r thi s proposa l would hand the initiative t o Japan who could wreck the Pacific conference at will, secure in the knowledge that her alliance with Britain remained intact. Continuing o n the sam e theme a t th e afternoo n meeting, Smuts proposed th e omissio n of Curzon's fift h point , Hughe s an d Masse y insisted tha t thi s proposal was the onl y basis on which they would agree to a Pacific conference , an d Lloy d Georg e continue d t o conciliate whil e favourin g th e Australia n attitude. 34 Meighe n joine d Smuts i n demandin g tha t the y leav e al l option s ope n i n cas e th e conference failed and avoid any commitment to Japan which would make her the arbiter, for he did not agree that Tokyo really preferred a triple arrangement as Lloyd George suggested. Moreover, Meighen did not see how Curzon could approach th e respective ambassadors with a supposedl y agree d imperia l policy ; Curzon' s furthe r assur ance to Hughes that Britai n would retain th e allianc e i f th e Pacifi c conference failed, whether the meeting accepted his fifth proposal or not, seeme d t o confir m Meighen' s view . However , th e premier s agreed that Curzon should see the ambassadors and Meighen was left to draw comfort from assurances of an opportunity for further debate . At this point, on Friday, 1 July, the Imperial Conference turned the alliance questio n ove r to Curzo n an d di d no t formall y debat e th e matter again until 8 July. Curzon, still plagued by the confusing disparities between the views of Harvey and Geddes, 35 met Hayashi on 4 July and assured him that Britain would not denounce the allianc e 34 Notes of meeting, E 13,1 July 1921, Cab. 32/2 35 Geddes to Curzon, 2 July 1921, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 317,320 and ro/414/248. Geddes, to correct Harvey, insisted that Hughes disliked the prospect of any exclusive Anglo-Japanese agreement, that the Washington press was privy to Hughes's attitude, and that Harvey did not enjoy Hughes's confidence. Crowe, noting that Geddes's views changed with "bewildering intensity,' was sceptical of the value of his reports and Curzon did not disagree with Crowe.

143 THE IMPERIA L CONFERENC E without good cause and without an acceptable substitute.86 However, despite thei r determinatio n t o permi t n o deterioratio n i n Anglo Japanese relations , th e government , Curzon explained , must seek a more satisfactory and broade r solutio n to alla y th e fear s o f the do minions, China , an d th e Unite d States . Th e imperia l meetin g fa voured a course of action whereby th e Unite d States , prompted b y Britain, would cal l a Pacifi c conferenc e to b e held i n America and Curzon aske d fo r Japan' s approval. 87 Hayashi , whil e expressin g doubts on the participation o f China, agreed to recommend Curzon's proposal to Tokyo and the Foreign Secretary responded by assuring Hayashi that while he hoped they could replace th e allianc e with a broader agreement, he still wanted the old allies to walk side by side in Asia. Curzon then met with Wellington Koo and, though they succeeded in irritating each other, bot h seeme d sure that Chin a woul d accep t the Pacific conference proposal.88 On the following day Curzo n discussed th e whol e questio n wit h Harvey , reportin g th e favourabl e response of Hayashi and Wellington Koo, and proposing that Harvey immediately consul t with an d as k his governmen t to cal l a Pacifi c conference i n th e fal l o r winter. 89 Harvey , i n response , seeme d sanguine enough and eve n anxious to avoid any delay. Curzon concluded thei r intervie w b y emphasisin g tha t th e Anglo-Japanes e alliance's valu e an d relevanc e wa s no t confine d t o th e Pacifi c an d that, whateve r th e outcom e o f th e propose d conference , Britai n wished t o maintai n clos e relation s wit h Japa n an d avoi d racia l divisions. Curzon, in the cours e of these meetings, had attempte d faithfull y to interpre t th e wil l o f the Imperia l Conferenc e and t o captur e it s nuances and emphases. A flurry of information followed from Wash ington which , i f no t uniforml y encouraging, a t leas t clarifie d th e 36Curzon to Eliot, 4 July 1921, King Papers, file 1176, and Curzon to Eliot, 8 July 1921, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 328,331-4 37 The conference would include the United States, Japan, China, Britain, and the dominions, and possibly France and the South American countries. Details of the participants, the venue, and the convener were not included in Curzon's five-point proposal of 1st July and were still somewhat vague. 38 Curzon to Alston, 4 July 1921, King Papers, file 1176, and Cab. 32/6, and Curzon to Alston, 8 July 1921, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 327, 329-31 39 Curzon to Geddes, 5 July 1921, King Papers, file 1176, and Cab. 32/6, and Curzon to Geddes, 9 July, 1921, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 330, 336-8

144 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y major outstandin g problem. 40 Secretary o f State Hughes, undermin ing the valu e o f the Curzon-Harve y discussions , confirme d that h e had not communicated in any way before 7 July with Harvey on the question of America's attitude t o the alliance . Moveover , the Unite d States government, as the pres s knew , irrevocably oppose d th e alli ance or any special relationship betwee n Britai n and Japan. Hughes, insisting on secrecy and irritated b y press revelations in London that Britain, Japan, and the Unite d State s had alread y agree d o n a dec laration o f policy t o replac e th e alliance , applauded , however , th e idea of a Pacific conference. He had informed Harvey on 7 July tha t he would probably welcom e British proposals to replace the alliance with a triple declaratio n o f policy.41 In addition , Gedde s reported , Hughes fel t that the problem o f naval armaments might b e investi gated alon g with detaile d question s suc h as cabl e communications , and, i n Geddes' s opinion , settlemen t o f politica l an d economi c questions was the necessary prerequisite t o a naval armaments agreement. The Irish question remained, however, according to Geddes, as a major obstacle either to a political detente o r an armaments settle ment with the United States.42 After a n interval of one week the Imperial Conferenc e returned t o the allianc e questio n t o study the result s o f Curzon's endeavours. 43 Hughes, supporte d b y Massey, appeared distinctl y unhapp y a t Cur40 Geddes to Curzon, 6 , 7, and 8 July 1921 , BD , 1st ser., xiv, no 323 , 326 , no 325, 327 , no 326, 328-9, and no 329, 334-6, and FO/414/248. Although Washington's attitude was clarified, a flurry of charges and counter-charges between the participants continued to complicate the scene. Geddes accused Hughes of a monstrous breach of conduct and of sending inaccurate reports to Harvey, and felt that both Harding and Hughes welcomed the opportunity to embarrass their own ambassador; Harvey complained of Geddes's report of 6 July to Hughes which suggested that the ambassador had misled Curzon. 41 This policy statement, Hughes envisaged, would seek to secure the territorial integrity of all Pacific states, to underwrite the Open Door and the principle of equal commercial and economic opportunity in China and the Pacific, and possibly to extend financial and development aid to Pacific states in addition to China. 42 On 8 July a truce was declared in Ireland and no doubt helped create a more favourable atmosphere. 43 Notes of meeting, E 20,8 July 1921, Cab. 32/2. On e curious point was Curzon's statemen t that Harve y had propose d that the Unite d State s call th e Pacific conference to meet in Havana.

145 THE IMPERIA L CONFERENC E zon's allege d misrepresentatio n of their views , but thi s was a calcu lated outburs t t o secur e a n unequivocal assuranc e o n th e self-per petuating natur e of the alliance. Meighe n defended Curzon , despite the fac t tha t he personally ha d reall y oppose d an d had acquiesce d only reluctantly i n the instructions give n the Foreign Secretar y on 1 July. Hughes, however, succeeded i n reinforcing his tactical position , for th e meetin g reconfirmed tha t th e allianc e would continu e if th e Pacific conferenc e failed . O n thi s crucia l point , contemporar y opinion an d historica l judgment s le d b y J.B . Brebne r hav e mis interpreted th e will of the Imperia l Conference. 44 Th e meeting ha d not abrogated th e Anglo-Japanese alliance an d Hughe s rather tha n Meighen ha d wo n a n immediat e tactica l victory, a s Lloy d Georg e confirmed officiall y o n at least tw o subsequent occasions. 45 This meeting had taken place on the Friday afternoon, tha t weekend th e premier s retire d t o Chequers , an d b y Monday , 1 1 July , Secretary of State Hughes an d Lloy d George had lai d th e basi s fo r the Washingto n Conferenc e ami d a n unseeml y Anglo-America n scramble t o secur e th e initiative , furthe r charge s o f bad faith , an d more confusion . The evidenc e i s no t entirel y consistent . Fro m th e British side, Curzon noted hi s conversatio n with Harve y o f 5 July, where he had urged the Ambassador to approach Washingto n with out delay on the Pacific conference proposal, but mad e no reference to a second meeting on 7 July.48 Harvey, failing to report to Hughes until the evening o f 8 July, noted a conversatio n with Curzo n on 5 July but claimed that Curzo n had denie d the need for urgency, an d that only at a second meeting on 7 July, with Lloyd George facing parliamentary scrutiny, had Curzon pressed the matter.47 Lloyd George's 44Gratton O'Leary, MacLeans, 1 Sept. 1921, and Brebner, 'Canada, the AngloJapanese Alliance and the Washingto n Conference,' 52 . Both Borden and Meighen assured Brebner that his article was accurate but, Canadian nationalists not withstanding, Hughes's own account seems stronger on this particular issue ( Hughes, The Splendid Adventure, 126-31 ). 45 Minutes of informal meetings of prime ministers, E 31 B, 12 July 1921, Cab . 32/4, an d Lloyd George, statement, House of Commons, 1 8 August 1921 , Debates, 5 ser., CXLVI (1921), 1697-1708 46 See note 39. Surely Curzon would have reported a significant, subsequen t meeting to Geddes or to the Imperial Conference; Harvey in fact met Lloyd George and Curzon for dinne r on Friday, 8 July, immediately prior to the weekend at Chequers; see note 55. 47 Harvey to Hughes; 8:00 pm, 8 July 1921, FH , 1921, i, 19-2 1

146 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y generally worde d statement in the House of Commons on 7 July and an interpretative repor t i n The Times on the followin g day seemed to arouse American suspicions. Harvey, viewing the matter a s one of prestige an d kudos , advise d tha t Hardin g forestal l Lloy d George , avoid an y appearanc e o f actin g a t Britain' s instigation , an d secur e instead a situation where London acquiesced in Washington's leadership.48 Secretary of State Hughes, flooded with rumours but without word from Harvey, and even though he had just insisted that initiatives on the question of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and a Pacific conference must come from London , decide d t o ac t t o ensur e that th e Unite d States woul d issu e th e cal l fo r th e disarmamen t conference which Congress demanded . Fou r hours before Harvey reported from London, Hughes cabled his principal ambassador s inquiring whether the powers would accept an invitation to a disarmament conference.49 On 9 July, Hughes proposed t o broaden the scop e of the conferenc e to include Pacific and Far Eastern problems and urged Harvey to secure British approva l befor e Hardin g issue d a publi c statemen t o n 1 1 July.50 Harvey carried out this mission on 10 July with some success, Lloyd Georg e an d th e Foreig n Offic e reluctantl y an d publicl y surrendering the initiative, but the magnitude of Harvey's task is difficul t to assess especially a s a personal victory would seem all the greate r if th e struggl e a t Chequer s wit h Lloy d Georg e wer e exaggerated . Harvey claime d t o hav e enliste d th e suppor t o f Kin g George v t o assert pressure through Curzon 51 and told H. Wickham Steed of The Times tha t hi s deliver y o f Hughes' s not e t o Chequer s o n 1 0 July 48 Lloyd George, statement, House of Commons, 7 July 1921, Debates, 5 ser., CXLVI ( 1921 ), 621-3; Harvey to Hughes, 9 July 1921, FH, 1921, i, 22-3. Confusion arose as to whether Lloyd George had suggested that Britain awaited replies from the United States, Japan, and China to a Pacific conference proposal. Lloyd George was scheduled to speak to parliament on 1 1 July and Harvey hoped to secure recognition of United States initiative before then. 49Hughes to Harvey, 4:00 pm , 8 July 1921, FB, 1921, i, 18 , and Hughes's memorandum on the calling of the Washington Conference, Hughes Papers, box 169, folder 3 50 Hughes to Harding, 9 July 1921, and Hughes to Harvey, 9 July 1921, FH, 1921, 1,21-4 51 Johnson, George Harvey, 323-4 . Geddes dismissed this clai m as absurd. Geddes to Curzon, 31 July 1921, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 347,361-2

147 THE IMPERIA L CONFERENC E forestalled a plot to issue invitations t o a conference fro m London. 52 Wickham Steed , clearl y bette r informe d b y Harve y tha n wa s th e Foreign Offic e by Geddes o f Hughes's intentions, told A.W.A. Leeper that the party at Chequers and Lord Riddel l had bombarded hi m on 10 July with claim s tha t credi t for th e propose d conferenc e shoul d be awarde d t o Lloy d George. 53 Whateve r th e details , clearl y a squabble over prestige and leadership ha d ensued, Hughe s ha d out manoeuvred th e Britis h government , an d contentmen t reigne d i n Washington as the worl d acclaime d Harding . Irritation was more in evidence, however , in London, where Lloyd George reporte d t o parliamen t o n 1 1 July an d th e Imperia l Con ference reconvene d a t noo n tha t da y t o asses s th e ne w situation. 54 Confusion mounte d o n irritation , mor e charge s o f ba d fait h wer e levelled and, significantly, at the very moment of public agreement a new bout of Anglo-American friction developed over the questio n of a preliminar y conference . Lloy d George , statin g tha t Harve y ha d agreed t o a Pacifi c conferenc e meetin g prio r t o an d a t a differen t location fro m th e disarmamen t conferenc e an d havin g a differen t composition, initiated the fracas , an d assume d tha t adequat e Japa nese representatio n a t th e preliminar y conferenc e wa s th e majo r problem, not United States agreement.55 Obviously the British govern ment, perhaps misle d by Harvey, piqued, or merely confused, sough t to elevate political over armaments questions an d the imperial meet 52 Steed, Through Thirty If ears, 1892-1922, n, 362-4. Harvey had dinne r a t Chequers on 10 July along with the dominion premiers. SSLeeper to Curzon, 10 and 1 1 July 1921, ro/800/329 . The Foreign Offic e di d not kno w whether Lloy d Georg e had approache d Harve y personally o r whether Geddes had reported direct to Lloyd George, for they had received nothing from Geddes since 8 July. Vansittart minuted that, strangely enough, Geddes had sent nothing to them at that time. 54Notes of meeting, E 21,11 July 1921, Cab . 32/ 2 55 Hughes had specifically broadened the scope of his proposed conference on 9 July and yet both Lloyd Georg e and Curzon, pointing t o Harvey' s assurances given on 8 July at dinner, assumed that Washington was merely concerned ove r th e questio n o f initiative. Lloy d Georg e wanted th e Pacifi c conference, comprisin g the empire , Japan, China , and the Unite d States t o meet in London before the dominion leaders dispersed and he expected the disarmament conference to meet later that year in Washington, with France and Italy replacing China .

148 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y ing debated th e time and place o f a preliminary Pacifi c conference, deciding on London before the end of August.56 The Imperial Conferenc e also approved a draft of Lloyd George' s statement to the House of Commons which, important for its tone and somewhat misleadin g i n it s content , publicl y launche d th e contro versy over the preliminary conferenc e proposal. 57 The detail s of this controversy are much less important tha n the immediat e damag e to Anglo-American relations , jus t whe n th e Iris h issu e wa s abatin g somewhat an d shoul d hav e resulte d i n a diminutio n o f scepticis m and hostility on both sides of the Atlantic. Curzo n attempted t o insist on the preliminar y Pacifi c conferenc e a s vital t o th e succes s o f an y disarmament talks , raisin g hi s expectation s t o th e poin t o f hopin g that Hughe s or Harding migh t trave l to London. Hughes, however , would entertai n n o such prospect, insisting tha t Pacific, Far Eastern , and disarmamen t question s wer e a n integrated whol e an d mus t b e discussed a s such, and his suspicions reached th e leve l of suggestin g that Britain's preliminary conferenc e proposal was a mere device t o postpone the disarmament conference.58 Hughes, therefore, remained 56 In a somewhat unreal and even frivolous atmospher e the dominio n leaders discussed London, various places in the United States, Canada, Hawaii, Bermuda, Panama, and Cuba as possible locations, and even explored the idea of a Pacific conference in Washington followed by a disarmament conference in Europe. 57 Lloyd George, statement, House of Commons, 11 July 1921, Debates, 5 set., CXLVI ( 1921 ), 914-19. The Premier emphasised the role of the Imperial Conference in initiating the steps leading to Harding's invitation and pointed out that Britain retained her alliance with Japan in the absenc e of any denunciation. 58 Curzon to Geddes, 14 and 16 July 1921, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 335,342-6, Cab. 32/6, an d King Papers, file 1176; Curzon memorandum, 24 July 1921, on the situation re proposed conference at Washington, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 337,34551, Cab. 32/6, King Papers, file 1176 and Lloyd George papers, F/210/2/12; minutes of inner cabinet meeting, 25 July 1921, Cab. 23/26; Curzon to Geddes, 27 July 1921, King Papers, file 1176; Geddes to Curzon, 27 July 1921, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 340,353-4; Geddes to Curzon, 28 July 1921, FO/414/248; Curzon to Geddes, 30 July 1921, King Papers, file 1176, Lloyd George Papers, F/60/4/19, and Cab. 32/6. Curzon offered severa l concessions; eg the decisions of the preliminary conference would require ratification by die Washington Conference and the latter meeting could reopen any issue, but Hughes was unmoved.

149 TH E IMPERIA L CONFERENC E unmoved b y argument s tha t neithe r Britis h no r dominio n leader s could affor d t o atten d a prolonge d conferenc e i n Washington . I n addition, Japa n di d not support th e preliminar y conference, 69 som e in London expecte d Franc e t o utilize th e disput e t o secur e advan tages in Europe,60 Billy Hughes feared the undermining of his position o n th e alliance, 81 an d Churchil l expresse d dee p concer n les t Britain sacrifice the prospects fo r a naval agreement and a settlemen t of war debts on the altar o f the preliminary conference.62 Churchill's solution, preliminar y à trois conversations a t th e highes t leve l with Japan an d th e Unite d States , whatever th e venue , attracte d Lloy d George and both tende d t o blame Curzo n for the imbroglio . Lloy d George also condemned American amateurishness and inexperienc e in international affairs and feared the hostile British press would seize upon th e issue , wit h Northcliff e t o th e fore . 'Howeve r th e Britis h Empire must not be given away in order to secure a good reception (in the United States) for the Pilgrim of Printing House Square.'68 Churchill's ide a o f prio r conversation s i n Washington , however , proved just as elusive as Curzon's preliminary conference in London. Hughes was lukewarm even to the idea of informal meetings in either capital and again he outmanoeuvred the British government . Lloy d George, wit h hi s domesti c an d imperia l colleagues , attempte d t o repair the position in the last day s of July but the y were trapped b y circumstance an d conflictin g desiderata. 64 Th e Britis h cabinet , stil l 59 Eliot to Curzon, 14 and 20 July 1921, BD, 1s t ser., xrv, no 334, 341-2, and King Papers, file 1176; notes of interview between Crowe an d Hayashi , 25 July 1921, Cab. 32/6 60 Sir M. Cheetham ( Paris )to Curzon, 17 July 1921, King Papers, file 1176 61 Hughes to Lloy d George, 18 July 1921 and nd , Lloy d George Papers, F/28/3/50and51 62 Churchill to Lloyd George, 18 July 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/9/3/68; Churchill memorandum , 'Anglo-Japanese-America n negotiations, ' 2 3 July 1921, Grig g Papers, reel 8 63 Lloyd George to Churchill, 18 July 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/9/3/69. Lloyd George viewed the Washington disarmament and Far Easter n conference as a potential mob scene, prolonged and anarchical, where France and Italy would threaten Britain's imperial interests. 64 Conclusions of inner cabinet, 25 July 1921, Cab. 23/26; Draft memorandum to the United States, E 46,24 July 1921, Cab 32/6 and King Papers, file 1176; notes of imperial meetings, E 29,26 July 1921, E 30,26 July 1921, and E 31, 27 July 1921, Cab. 32/2

150 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y hoping for an agreement by which the United States would abando n her nava l building programme , regarded a preliminar y conferenc e or prior conversations on the Pacific and the Anglo-Japanese alliance as the 'indispensabl e basis ' for a disarmamen t conference. Th e imperial meeting tended rather to emphasise the need to retain the link with Japan, to avoid any rebuff t o their ally and any hint that Britain would sell Japan short in China to court the United States and close the ranks of the white races. The need to promote understanding with the United States, however, suggested as graceful an acquiescence as possible t o the idea of one inclusive conference, but th e appea l o f a preliminary meeting seemed virtually irresistible. Lloy d George even justified th e obsessio n a s necessar y t o establis h rappor t wit h th e enigmatic Hughes and with America's elite for The people who govern in America are our people. They are our kith and kin. The other breeds are not on top. It is the men of our race who govern America. I do not know whether the y are in the minority or not but in the main they are on top. The only exception i s General Smuts's race. He is very much the same. We all come from Holland .

Therefore, despit e protest s fro m Bill y Hughe s an d Masse y who were concerned to secure reaffirmation o f the executive power of th e Imperial Conferenc e and confirmatio n o f the decisio n t o retai n th e Anglo-Japanese alliance, th e imperial meeting decided o n 27 July to press the United States for preliminary conversations. They suggested the inclusio n o f Japan an d th e dominion s and tha t th e talk s shoul d investigate the agenda of the main conference and attempt to achieve an understanding on the broad principles of Far Eastern policy.65 Geddes duly delivered thi s offe r bu t Hughe s was unmoved66 and, after furthe r attempts t o press the case, Curzon, in a flurry of indignant self-righteousness , washe d hi s hand s o f th e affai r an d o f al l preparations fo r the Washington Conference, somewhat to Hughes' s dismay.67 In the final analysis, of course, in view of leftwing opinion, Lloyd Georg e could no t risk the indictmen t tha t h e wa s willing t o jeopardise the disarmament conference. The fracas ended as it began, fruitless an d damaging , an d Japa n wa s suspiciou s an d eve n bitte r 65 Curzon to Geddes, 27 July 1921, King Papers, file 1176. This proposal suggested a site other than Washington in the United States. 66 Geddes to Curzon, 27 and 28 July 1921, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 340,353-4, and FO/414/248 67Curzon to Geddes, 1 Aug. 1921, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 349,863 and FO/800/329

151 THE IMPERIA L CONFERENC E that Britain had no t stood he r ground i n support o f their alliance. 68 Geddes blamed Harve y and Harvey blamed Lloyd George, and th e principal casualt y wa s Atlantic accord. Inter-elit e confidence , trust, and rapport between Britai n an d the Unite d State s were damaged , mutual public respec t wa s shown to be fragile, and Gedde s merel y offered mor e word s o f wisdo m o n th e abnorma l menta l stat e o f American officialdom.69 Lloy d George for his part was left t o ponder the fact that in the discussion s on imperial security Meighen offere d nothing but advice whereas Hughes and Massey offered financial and naval assistance.70 The Imperial Conference never returned to this question except to confirm that they would not press further for preliminary negotiations lest they endanger the disarmamen t conference itself,71 an d Curzon turned t o rebuil d hi s fence s wit h Japa n whic h h e di d wit h som e success.72 Neithe r Lloy d Georg e no r Curzon , however , coul d vie w the event s o f Jul y 192 1 wit h muc h satisfaction . The y face d th e Washington Conference without prior negotiations . Japan's attitud e was les s than clear , and , i n vie w o f Geddes' s reports , Secretar y of State Hughes remained a contradictory and somewhat obscure figure. In suc h circumstance s ther e wer e scan t ground s for optimism , especially a s domestic , Irish , an d Europea n problem s remaine d un solved. Certain conclusions seem permissible. During the discussion s with the dominio n premier s o n 2 7 July, a n exasperate d Lloy d George , under pressure from Hughes , reaffirmed tha t the alliance with Japan would continu e i f th e Pacifi c conferenc e faile d an d unti l the allie s 68Nish, Japan and the Ending of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 379-80 69WiIlert to Grigg , 1 9 July 1921 , Grig g Papers , reel 7 ; Curzo n t o Grigg , 27 Sept. 1921, Grig g Papers, reel 9; and Gedde s to Curzon , 31 July 1921 , FO/800/329 70 Notes of meetings, E 26 A, 19 July 1921, E 26 B, 20 July 1921, E 26 c, 22 July 1921, and E 31 A, 27 July 1921, Cab. 32/4 71 Notes of meeting, E 32 B, 1 Aug. 1921, Cab. 32/4 72 Curzon to Eliot, 5 Aug. 1921, and Eliot to Curzon, 12 Aug. 1921, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 355, 369-71, and no 357, 372-3. Curzon insisted that Britain had always worked to retain close links with Japan, to secure Japan's inclusion in any negotiations with the United States, and regarded a tripartite agreement as a vital prior condition to ensure the succes s o f the disarmamen t conference . Japan welcomed the repeated assurance that the alliance would continue until they negotiated an adequate substitute.

152 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y gave on e year's notic e o f termination . H e suggeste d tha t Meighe n rather tha n Hughe s ha d caus e t o complain , fo r unles s th e Pacifi c conference agree d o n a superio r substitut e i n th e for m o f a tripl e agreement, th e allianc e remaine d operative . Lloy d George' s assess ment was sound. Hughes had fortified his position, he had no need to indulge i n public protests, an d hi s case, dedicate d t o th e them e of imperial security in the Pacific, was reasonable. Should the Atlanticist hypothesis prov e tenable , h e woul d welcome any steps b y th e dis armament and Pacifi c conferenc e whic h secure d the involvemen t of the Unite d States , guarantee d th e securit y o f th e Pacific , an d ye t retained a link with Japan. Meighen's success was less tangible an d coul d prov e elusive , an d he ha d littl e basi s fro m whic h t o soun d th e alar m publicly . Th e decisions to convene a Pacific and disarmament conference, to renew attempts t o secur e co-operatio n wit h th e Unite d States , t o tes t th e validity o f the "Nort h Atlanti c triangle,' an d t o see k to replac e th e Anglo-Japanese allianc e wit h a tripartit e entent e wer e t o a larg e degree tribute s t o Atlanticism . Bu t th e harves t remaine d t o b e gathered, th e Pacific must yield its living and its dead,' and although Meighen could draw comfort fro m th e encouragin g indications tha t Harding's administration would participate i n a tripartite accord , the preliminary conferenc e affai r mus t hav e seeme d menacing . Ther e also seeme d t o be a cumulative facto r involved . Th e sceptic s wer e willing to test Atlanticism again, but a further rebuf f coul d be disastrous, for the 'special relationship' was already a sickly adolescent. As a n exercis e i n imperia l relation s th e Londo n conferenc e ha d proved to be a significant point on the path to maturing relationship s and interlockin g an d compensatin g influences . Th e Britis h leader s could still tend to dominate, but less as a central hierarch y receivin g petitions an d suggestions , an d mor e a s the mos t powerful an d im portant member s of an imperial elit e explorin g the sam e alternativ e policies, subjec t t o th e sam e linea r an d plura l influences , an d viewing problems i n globa l terms . Nationa l demarcation s wer e no t irrelevant bu t the y were diminishing , an d more is to be gaine d b y viewing the controvers y ove r the Anglo-Japanes e alliance fro m th e viewpoint o f th e Atianticist s an d thei r critic s tha n fro m tha t o f dominion influence s o n Britis h foreig n polic y expresse d i n simple , interstate relationships . Meighen , playin g a forcefu l an d creativ e role, ha d opene d th e officia l debat e i n Februar y 1921 . Canada' s Atlanticist view s me t wit h som e sympatheti c respons e i n Londo n and th e concep t o f a tripl e agreemen t receive d wid e suppor t

153 THE IMPERIA L CONFERENC E as a n idea l solution , thoug h it s practicabilit y remaine d i n doubt . Smuts reinforced th e Atlanticis t positio n durin g th e Imperia l Con ference, eve n assumin g th e leadershi p o n occasions . Indeed , on e might vie w Meighen a s being i n suppor t o f Smut s rather tha n th e reverse a t certai n stages . The Sout h African premie r was th e mor e senior and the more prestigious, and, though his influence with Lloyd George had decline d sinc e the early weeks of the peac e conference , he retained grea t accumulated prestige an d Hughes could no t treat him as lightly or as violently as he did Meighen. Meighen after all was the freshma n an d wh o but th e inexperience d woul d meddl e wit h imperial securit y o r flir t wit h th e danger s an d immoralit y o f th e Lodge-Gardiner policy! Atlanticists lurked or functioned in Lloyd George's government, in the Foreig n Office , i n th e diplomati c service , an d a t th e Boar d of Trade, and flourishe d i n some of the dominions . While fightin g fo r survival, they could call on sentiments favourable to the League and opposed t o 'old diplomacy,' and, to sustain their thesis , point t o the opinions of British commercial interests i n the Orien t an d th e views of Pekin g an d Washington . Th e sceptic s an d th e hostile , however , were a formidable group entrenched in the War Office, the Admiralty, the highe r echelons of the Foreig n Office , i n the diplomati c service , and in the Britis h and certain dominio n cabinets. Th e priorities de manded by Hughes of Australia received sustained support, no public outcry emerged to alter them, and the verdict of the imperial meeting reflected this situation. The sceptics had the substance and the Atlanticists retained their faith. Finally, the summe r of 192 1 ha d see n America's 'amateur states men* outwi t Britain' s professionals , an d th e victor y irritate d an d secreted ne w problems. Th e Unite d State s suspecte d bot h Britain' s motives an d th e long-ter m aim s o f he r policy , fo r diplomac y ha d fostered confusio n no t clarity , an d fe w coul d hol d ou t thei r hand s across the Atlantic with confidence. Clearly public expectations about the disarmamen t conferenc e exceede d th e leve l o f mutua l respec t between the governments in London and Washington. Both administrations, for similar domesti c and international reasons, saw the sig nificance o f the forthcoming congress but neithe r could view it with calm nerves and without traces of pessimism.

FOUR

The Washington Conference Whatever the judgment s of historians, t o contemporar y opinion th e Washington Conferenc e wa s a meetin g o f th e utmos t importance . Some looked to the gathering to produce a new order in the Pacifi c and Far East. Others expected a major contributio n to peace by way of a limitation of armaments, and even the less sanguine regarded i t as the most significant international conferenc e to meet on American soil, the Portsmout h deliberation s seemin g trivial in comparison. To the Atlanticist s th e conferenc e wa s th e culminatin g phas e o f th e opportunities presente d i n 1921 to secure Anglo-American co-operation on specific issues and to create a permanent working agreement between th e empir e an d th e Unite d States . No t surprisingly , wit h the Britis h representative s conductin g detaile d negotiations , th e Canadian delegate was prominent in pursuit of this broader theme. The mos t urgen t politica l proble m wa s stil l th e Anglo-Japanes e alliance. To Christie, the conferenc e must replace th e allianc e wit h a broade r multilatera l agreemen t embodyin g mutuall y acceptabl e principles of policy, and , viewin g the relevan t agreement s reache d since 1907, he did not feel that a solution should elude them. 1 United States preparations , however , directe d b y Hughes , wer e devote d principally t o naval questions , an d the Stat e Departmen t produce d no draft formula providing for the abrogation of the alliance prior to the conference. I n London the situation seemed complicated b y the rebuff receive d over the preliminary conference question and the resulting uncertaint y abou t Japanes e an d Unite d State s attitudes . I n 1 Christie, memorandum, 29 Oct. 1921, 'Substitutio n of inclusive agreement or understanding fo r Anglo-Japanese alliance,' King Papers, file 1176. Borden was Canada's chief delegate and Christie supervised the detailed preparations.

155 THE WASHINGTO N CONFERENC E fact, restoration o f normal relations with Tokyo proved far les s diffi cult than Curzon feared.2 After briefly hinting at prior Anglo-Japanese negotiations to secure a preliminary understanding o n their allianc e and the n welcomin g Britain' s assurance s that sh e would no t relin quish th e allianc e withou t goo d cause an d a n adequat e substitute , Japan becam e a mode l o f reasonableness . Th e Har á governmen t clearly preferre d retentio n o f th e alliance , howeve r amended , bu t they would accept a tripartite agreemen t and were willing to join in private à trois negotiations involvin g th e Unite d State s t o secur e a new understanding. Curzon's doubts about the United States, while never erased, were possibly reduce d somewha t b y mildl y encouragin g report s fro m Washington, which, however, were themselves tainted by his lack of faith i n both Gedde s and Harvey. 3 Curzon obviously expected continued Unite d State s opposition t o the Anglo-Japanes e alliance, th e misunderstanding ove r th e preliminar y conferenc e ha d bee n rea l enough, and the American press, reporting rumours of Britain's inten t to retai n th e essenc e o f th e allianc e i n a tripl e treaty , seeme d hostile.4 By late September, however, Geddes announced that a new atmosphere prevailed i n Washington, that th e recen t 'soreness ' and suspicion had evaporated , an d tha t Hughe s sincerel y regrette d th e probable absenc e o f Lloy d Georg e fro m th e conference. " I n mor e detailed report s Gedde s noted a slump in Sinn Fein activity , a n increase in anglophil sympathies helped b y the publication of Walte r 2 Eliot to Curzon, 15 Aug. and 11 and 15 Oct. 1921, po/414/248; Eliot to Curzon, 23 Aug. 1921 , BD, 1st ser. xrv, no 365,382-3; Dugdale, Half our, n, 328; Nish, Japan and the Ending of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 379-81; Asada, 'Japan's "Special Interests" and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922.' Asada shows that the Japanese delegation arrived at Washington with a 'blueprint of an Anglo-Japanese-American entente,' combining the advantages of earlier agreements and seeking to secure United States recognition of Japan's 'special interests' in China. 3 Curzon to Lloyd George, 28 Aug. 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/13/2/42; Curzon to Grigg, 27 Sept. 1921, Grigg Papers, reel 9. Curzon accused Harvey of duplicity and, willing to reopen the circus of representation in Washington, suggested Mimer as a replacement for Geddes. He noted that Lloyd George had spoken to Meighen about repatriating Geddes to Canada. 4Geddes to Curzon, 20 Aug. 1921, ro/414/248 SGeddes to Curzon, 21 Sept 1921 , FO/414/248 and BD , 1st ser., xrv, no 379, 399-400; no 380,400-01; and no 381,401-5

156 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y

Hiñes Page' s correspondenc e an d b y Geddes' s ow n speeches , an d signs that American public opinion , impressed b y the imperial con ference, wa s attracte d b y th e romanti c appeal o f co-operation be tween the English-speakin g peoples. Moreover , American industrial and financial leaders agreed with Secretary of State Hughes that prospects for economic growth were tied closely to future Anglo-Ameri can co-operation. Hughes personally , Gedde s felt , despit e a legalisti c min d an d a tendenc y t o los e contro l o f hi s feelings , an d despit e bein g saddled wit h a mediocre an d suspicious Stat e Departmen t an d th e unfortunate Harvey , was a changed man. The Secretary of State, in the cours e of frank an d friendly conversations , seemed less incline d to blame Britain for the problems he faced and had expressed a keen desire to secure Anglo-American accord. He now looked, accordin g to Geddes , fo r a tripartite agreement o n the Pacifi c an d Eas t Asia , emanating from privat e à trois conversations rather tha n fro m con ference debate, and he wanted to avoid any arrangement that might seem hostile to Japan. Moreover, in Geddes's view, Hughes would not work with France o r Italy a t Britain's expens e and unless a n unfor tunate incident occurre d t o disturb th e status quo , the Washingto n Conference, in a 'poignantly religious atmosphere, ' would open on a note of cordial Anglo-American co-operation. In addition, with Harding an d hi s cabine t sympathetic , wit h delegate s Elih u Roo t an d Democratic Senato r Underwoo d sincerely seekin g Britain' s friend ship, and with Lodg e prepared t o acquiesc e i n wha t seeme d wis e politically, Gedde s expecte d th e Washingto n Conferenc e t o b e a great success . I n an y event, Geddes assure d Curzon , failure would not stem from a lack of American sincerity and determination to work for meaningfu l agreements . I n contras t t o thes e optimisti c predic tions, however, Geddes also reported that the Harding administration was arming itself with tariff legislation and debt collecting procedures to exer t pressur e o n Britai n an d forc e acceptanc e o f a tripartit e agreement which safeguarded Unite d State s interests i n the Pacifi c and the Far East. Finally, an d surely of concern in London, Geddes concluded that most policies would be forfeit t o the demands of the 1922 congressional elections . Curzon's response was ambiguous but not idiosyncratic. In private, nursing hi s wound s ove r th e preliminar y conference , h e berate d Harvey fo r hi s duplicit y an d ineptnes s an d Hughe s fo r hi s part y spirit, ignorance, an d refusa l t o meet i n advanc e wit h Britai n an d Japan.6 In formal respons e t o Hughes, however , Curzo n was eithe r

157 THE WASHINGTO N CONFERENC E warm and cordial, promising co-operation to secure a tripartite agreement, or at least moderate an d guarded , derivin g som e satisfaction from th e fac t tha t Hughe s concede d th e nee d fo r quie t negotia tions to secure a triple understanding prior to the conference.7 Moreover, Curzon professed to see little difficulty in securing a three-power agreement t o replace th e Anglo-Japanes e alliance , bu t h e wa s concerned that its terms would in all probability b e mere platitudes. I n addition, he expected deadlock over China and feared protracted an d fruitless debat e ove r a n impossibl y broa d se t o f issue s unles s th e Americans learned the arts of diplomacy and the ways of conducting an international conference. Indeed, as neither he nor Lloyd George would be present to help educate their America n counterparts, Curzon viewed th e futur e bot h wit h detache d concer n an d aristocrati c contempt. Clearly Curzo n regarde d th e situatio n a s les s tha n satisfactory , especially a s other sources of information reported continued suspi cion of British policy in the United States, American fears that Britain would sabotag e th e disarmamen t negotiation s unles s Fa r Easter n problems were settled satisfactoril y beforehand, and continuing antiBritish propaganda. 8 On e sourc e of comfor t wa s new s o f a virtua l cessation o f nava l constructio n i n th e Unite d States , bu t Lloy d George's illnes s an d periodi c absenc e fro m London , th e prolonge d debate over the compositio n of Britain's delegation, th e questio n of dominion representation , an d concer n ove r th e agend a adde d t o Curzon's woes . Indeed , presse d a s the y wer e ove r Ireland , Egypt , Silesia, an d domesti c problems, on e might sympathise greatly wit h Curzon an d Lloy d George , bu t fo r th e Premier' s avoidanc e o f th e Washington Conferenc e lest it be a fiasco, and Curzon' s suggestion that, in view of the probable failure at Washington, they should take a leaf from Presiden t Harding' s book and include a member of th e official oppositio n in the Britis h delegation. Obviousl y some Americans had learne d a t least some of the trick s of the trad e and Curzon was no t avers e t o distributin g th e blam e fo r an y lac k o f success. 9 6 Curzon to Grigg, 27 Sept. 1921, Grigg Papers, reel 9 7 Curzon to Geddes, 25 and 28 Sept 1921 , BD , 1st ser., xrv, no 384, 407- 8 and no 387,416 8F. Guest to Lloyd George, 4 Oct. 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/22/3/29; Geddes to Curzon, 29 Sept. 1921, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 388,418 9 Minutes of cabinet meetings, 7 and 17 Oct. 1921, Cab. 23/27; Grigg to Curzon, 14 Sept. 1921, an d Curzon to Lloyd George, 28 Sept. 1921, Lloy d

158 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y Finally, laconi c advic e fro m Churchil l tha t Lloy d Georg e shoul d visit Washingto n briefly , cour t Hughe s an d Harding , establis h a n informal understanding with the United States and Japan, and demonstrate t o the Unite d State s both th e sincerit y o f Britain's motive s and the determination t o retain her world position; along with Henry Wilson's dismissal of the conferenc e as diplomatic bankruptcy , was scarcely helpful. 10 Initially th e Foreig n Offic e seeme d unsur e whethe r th e Anglo Japanese alliance should be discussed specifically at the Washington Conference, wha t rol e th e Unite d State s shoul d pla y i n an y suc h negotiations, an d what precis e relationshi p existe d betwee n th e al liance and a tripartite agreement.11 Curzon appealed to Lloyd George and, somewhat surprisingly, received prompt and categorical instruc tions.12 The Prime Minister wanted close co-operation an d consulta tion with Japan o n all Far Easter n issues and Britain must refuse t o discuss either th e alliance or any Pacific problem with powers other than Japan and the United States, and at any level other than between principals. In Lloyd George's opinion, Britain could not discuss issues affecting imperia l securit y a t a conferenc e o f five or eigh t power s when two of the five had neither comparable interest s and responsibilities nor adequate forces in the Orient . I n sum, Britain's interest s and policies wer e no t for open and genera l discussion , and Gedde s and the dominions were duly informed.18 Lloyd Georg e had dictate d th e groun d rule s fo r negotiation s o n the Anglo-Japanese alliance an d Curzon and Hughes, wit h acquies cence fro m Tokyo , had agree d t o see k a tripartit e arrangemen t i n George Papers, F/13/2/45 and 50; Curzon to Grigg, 11 Sept. 1921, and Grigg to Curzon, 14 Sept. 1921, Grigg Papers, reel 1; Fry, 'Anglo-American-Canadian Relations,' 425. After many exchanges, reminiscent of the debates over who should be sent to Washington as ambassador, Balfour, Lee, Geddes, Beatty, Hankey, and Riddell were chosen to attend the conference. However, no one could be sure whether Lloyd George was needed or whether he might arrive at a moment of crisis to save the day. 10 Churchill to Lloyd George, 8 Oct. 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/10/1/10; Callwell, Sir Henry WtZson , n, 306-10, and Collier, Brasshat, 321 ULampson memorandum, 18 Aug. 1921, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 363, 380-2 12 Curzon to Grigg, 11 Sept. 1921, Grigg to Curzon, 14 Sept. 1921, Grigg Papers, reel 1; and Grigg to Curzon, 14 Sept. 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/13/2/45 13 Curzon to Geddes, 18 Sept. 1921, FO/414/248; Colonial Secretary to Governors General, 3 Oct. 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/10/1/5

159 THE WASHINGTO N CONFERENC E informal negotiation s outsid e bu t paralle l t o th e mai n conference . One basic assumption was, however, always maintained i n London ; although th e searc h fo r a wide r agreemen t woul d b e sincer e an d sustained, should these negotiations fail, Britain would retain a modified alliance wit h Japan . Preparation s i n Londo n covere d a broa d range of Far Eastern, Pacific, and naval problems and only one memorandum deal t specificall y with th e allianc e question. 14 This Foreig n Office pape r note d that , whil e bot h th e Unite d State s an d Japa n favoured or would accept a tripartite agreement , the new treaty must contain no military clauses and must be confine d t o a mere declara tion of policy, accepting general principles an d adopting a 'somewhat anodyne nature' to satisf y Washington . Tw o formulae existed; on e reported by Geddes on 7 July, reflecting the views and interests of the United States, 15 an d the othe r draw n u p b y Si r John Jordan . Th e American formul a provoked littl e response , bu t Jordan' s draf t re ceived mor e detailed scrutin y and, a s its author participated i n th e preparations fo r and accompanie d Balfou r t o the Washingto n Conference, i t remain s historically more significant. 16 Jorda n suggested a declaration o f policy to secure respect for the territorial possessions of the signatories an d to promote peace and stability in East Asia and the Pacific. Secondly, the draft sought to preserve the common interests o f al l power s i n Chin a b y supportin g he r independenc e an d integrity and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and 14Hankey to Lloyd George, 1 Nov. 1921, Grigg Papers, reel 9; Washington Conference memoranda and index, ibid., reels 10 and 11; Ashton-Gwatkin memorandum, 10 Oct. 1921, FO/414/248; Foreign Office memorandum, 10 Oct. 1921 , 'Respecting a Tripartite Agreement/ FO/414/248 and BD, 1st ser., xiv, no 405, 448-50 (i n this latter source the memorandum is dated 22 Oct.); Wellesley memorandum, 20 Oct. 1921, ro/414/248 and BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 404,434-48. From the pen of an Atlanticist, this last paper strongly criticised Japanese policies and emphasised the need to create harmony and solidarity between the white, Anglo-Saxon races. 15 Geddes to Curzon, 7 July 1921, BD, 1st ser. xrv, no 326,328-9. This formula sought to guarantee the territorial integrity of the Pacific states, including Britain's dominions and colonies facing the Pacific, to confirm the policy of the Open Door in China and to expand it to secure equality of commercial and economic opportunity in the whole area covered by the prospective agreement, and to offer financial and development aid to all Pacific states as well as China. 16Appendix B to Foreign Office memorandum, 10 Oct. 1921, 'Respectin g a Tripartite Agreement'; see note 14

160 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y industry of all nation s i n China . Finally , i n a thir d article , i f thes e aims were endangered, the signatories would communicate fully an d frankly an d conside r measure s necessar y t o remed y th e situation . Jordan's formul a als o suggeste d tha t the y shoul d invit e Chin a t o adhere to these principles. The Foreig n Offic e memorandu m suggested that the thir d claus e could offer somethin g substantial, for it seemed to be practically a n undertaking to take common action and precluded independent step s by any signatory contrary to the principles of the agreement . Consequently, Jordan' s draf t coul d becom e a modes t substitut e fo r th e Anglo-Japanese alliance. In addition, because all three powers feared the formation of hostile combinations in the future, Britai n worrying lest Japan join Russia and Germany, Japan being anxious to avoid an Anglo-American grouping, an d th e Unite d States being oppose d t o an Anglo-Japanes e combination , th e Foreig n Offic e memorandu m speculated o n the valu e of a fourth clause . I t state d tha t al l thre e powers would agre e no t t o joi n an y arrangemen t or politica l combination inimical to any other signatory. The question of China's ad herence remained unsettled, but th e Foreign Office rejecte d any idea of a multilateral pact no t including the United States as a worthless substitute fo r th e Anglo-Japanes e alliance. Curzon' s reaction, how ever, was less than enthusiastic, fo r although h e accepte d th e prin ciples involved and welcome d any removal of American suspicions, he did not regard Jordan's formula a s an adequate substitute for the alliance. Curzo n still regarde d th e valu e o f compensation s offere d Tjy a temporary conquest of the beaux yeux of America' as scarcely adequate. On the question of tactics the Foreign Offic e pape r urged that th e British delegatio n le t th e Unite d State s suggest a formula an d onl y produce a British draft if and when the American attempt proved to be impracticable. Thi s advic e pointed to two conclusions; tha t Bal four did not leave England with an official draft and that consequently he enjoyed wide scope for personal initiative. Littl e evidence exists , however, of Balfour's concept of a tripartite agreement , although perhaps h e and Lloy d George , whil e acceptin g th e nee d t o transform the alliance int o a triple arrangement, were possibly reluctan t t o see the allianc e ended.17 Perhaps Balfour would seek to retain a s much as possible o f the valu e an d essenc e o f the Anglo-Japanes e allianc e in a broader agreement , so as to secure an adequate substitute , safe ITDugdale, Balfour, n , 317-20

Balfour and Lloyd George in 1922

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163 THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

guard th e empire' s interests , avoi d alienatin g eithe r Japa n o r th e United States , an d fulfi l th e desiderat a lai d dow n by th e Imperia l Conference. Balfour, in fact, reclining in bed an d taking refuge fro m sea-sick ness, crossed to Quebe c City on board th e Empress of France and , closeted wit h Jordan, Hankey, and Lampson , gav e sustained atten tion to the problem. With their expert help, but without further consultation wit h London , Balfou r conclude d tha t tw o treatie s wer e required; on e to replace th e alliance , dealin g with the preservatio n of peac e an d th e maintenanc e o f the territoria l statu s qu o i n an d bordering on the Pacific, and the other devoted specifically to China.18 Moreover, Balfour insisted that the y must settle th e politica l questions relatin g t o th e Pacifi c an d Chin a befor e enterin g int o nava l negotiations. Balfour's draf t three-powe r treaty, while omitting all reference to China, in fact owed something to Jordan's formula . Hi s firs t clause contained the substance of Jordan's first and third articles, but it went further. I n Balfour's proposed treat y the three powers would agree , in order to preserve peace and protect existing territorial rights in the Pacific island s and in the territorie s bordering o n the Pacific , t o respect those rights and consult on how to protect them whenever they were imperilled b y the actio n of another power. Under the secon d article, if any two of the signatories wished to bind themselves to aid each other to defend those rights by force of arms they were permitted to do so, providing they acted defensively and kept the third signatory fully informed . The thir d claus e state d tha t thi s tripartit e treat y would replace any relevant existing agreements. Clearly the second clause was the most significant, and the problem is to interpret Balfour's intent and estimate his level of optimism and expectations about United States and Japanese reactions. Articles one and three were gestures to the United States, suggesting a consultative pact and the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Claus e two, offering th e prospect of renewing the essence of that alliance or creating a simila r defensive military arrangement , wa s a sourc e of comfort to Japan, assuring her of Britain's good faith an d determination to retain thei r specia l relationship . Balfour' s draf t triple treat y 18 Balfour memorandum , Nov. 1921, Balfou r Papers , 49749; Hankey t o Lloyd George, 11 Nov. and 12 Dec. 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/62/1/1 and 9; Balfour to Lloyd George, 11 Nov. 1921, and Hankey memorandum, 11 Nov. 1921, BD , 1st ser., xrv, no 415,466-70, and no 416,470-1

164 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y was a compromise, attempting t o balance betwee n Washingto n an d Tokyo and acknowledgin g the existenc e of new circumstances . Bal four an d his expert advisers had accepte d o n the on e hand th e fac t that Britai n could no t retain th e original alliance wit h Japan a t th e cost o f Anglo-America n relations an d a t th e ris k o f wreckin g th e disarmament conference. A tendency to regard the allianc e a s somewhat o f a n anachronis m reinforced thi s assumption . O n th e othe r hand, however , Balfou r woul d neithe r dismis s th e possibilit y o f a future Russo-Germa n menace no r rebuff a valuable ally . Moreover, he could not ignore the decision s of the imperia l meeting an d espe cially the weight of Australasian opinion. The solution lay, therefore, in a tripartite agreement which included th e Unite d State s but di d not commit her to military obligations, which terminated th e allianc e in its original form without a rebuff t o Japan, and which left open the option of recreating a defensive alliance in the face of a Russo-German menace. I n thi s wa y Britai n woul d reassur e her Pacifi c dominion s and remov e North American fears tha t th e Anglo-Japanes e allianc e would force Britain to be neutral in the event of a threatened or actual rupture betwee n th e United States and Japan. Bot h the Atlanticists and their opponents might applaud and Balfour would test dominion, United States , an d Japanes e reaction s an d weig h thei r suggeste d amendments. In the last resort, should the negotiations fail, the British government could, with varying degrees of reluctance in London, fal l back on a modified alliance with Japan.19 When Balfou r arrived i n Washington fro m Quebe c Cit y hi s first task was to secure the agreemen t of the Britis h Empire Delegation . Lee and Borden, canvassing old friends, an d Geddes confirmed tha t the United States delegatio n wa s determined to secure the termina tion o f the alliance , an d tha t Roo t at leas t wa s confiden t that the y could agre e on a new arrangement for the Pacific . Thi s information was relayed to the Empire Delegation at dinner on 10 November and Balfour, in splendid form and playing his hand with great skill according to Hankey , encourage d an d secure d a degre e o f harmony an d good will to the point where he could safely launch his proposals. H e 19Interestíngly, although clearly he did not understand all the implications of Balfour's draft, Churchill praised the United States naval limitation plan as fair an d honest, and even generous in view of the fac t tha t as far a s Washington knew, Britain meant to retain the alliance. 149th meeting of cn>, 14 Nov. 1921, Cab. 2/3

165 THE WASHINGTO N CONFERENC E circulated his draft treaty, along with his formula dealing with China , and, agai n accordin g t o Hankey, the dominio n representatives , flat tered b y Balfour's court, weighing the information on American attitudes and listening to Borden's advocacy of an entente to include th e United States , accepte d 'thi s ingeniou s draft. ' O n th e assumptio n that everyon e understoo d th e implication s o f Balfour' s proposal , clearly th e compromis e seeme d t o offe r somethin g t o al l point s o f view.20 Balfour had carried th e Empire Delegation wit h ease in the course of on e dinner an d dissen t neve r emerged , but Hanke y regarded th e next step , th e approac h t o the Unite d States , a s a more formidabl e obstacle.21 Hughes impressed him personally an d the Unite d State s government was apparently prepared to work with Britain, but many in Washington , includin g Hughes , stil l seeme d t o fea r a deviou s British scheme to retain th e allianc e with Japan and did not 'appreciate ou r intens e desir e fo r a Tripl e Agreemen t i f i t i s possible. ' Rumours of French and Italian intrigue against Britain were circulat ing an d Hanke y feare d tha t th e pric e o f America n acceptance o f Balfour's proposal s woul d b e th e inclusio n o f Franc e an d Holland . On the whole, however, Hankey expected Balfour to convince Hughes and secur e acceptanc e o f the substanc e o f his scheme . Surprisingl y enough, Hankey praised Gedde s for his great help, his mastery of the issues, and fo r his successful cultivation o f Harding's administration , and Hanke y concluded tha t whethe r du e t o Gedde s o r not, AngloAmerican relations wer e significantl y improved an d wer e mor e cordial than at any time since the peace conference. The conversatio n between Balfou r and Hughes on the evenin g of 11 November was cordial and frank enough, but immediately Balfour must have realised that his 'ingenious draft' would not carry the State 20 Hankey to Lloyd George, 11 Nov. 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/62/1/1; Balfour to Lloyd George, 11 Nov. 1921, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 415,466-70; 'Notes by Sir R. Borden upon the Disarmament Conference at Washington which opened on 11 November 1921,' Borden Papers, memoir notes, vol. 8, 1921,4600-993. ( In effect these notes are a diary and will be cited as such. Hence for these developments, Borden diary, entries of 7, 9, and 10 Nov. 1921, 4604-9. ) Hankey, mildly contemptuous, described Borden as 'the same as ever,' but in a most reasonable frame of mind; Pearce as 'a lightweight,' Salmond as 'garrulous,' and Sastri as 'little help.' 21 Hankey to Lloyd George, 11 Nov. 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/62/1/1

166 ILLUSION S O F SECURIT Y Department, although he permitted Hughes to show it to his delegation.22 In retrospect, Hughes's objections were hardly surprising. He feared lest any suggestion that they were negotiating an actual treaty should leak out, he did not want Balfou r t o approach th e Japanes e delegation wit h this draft, an d he could not accept the word 'treaty' as such, whereupon Balfour promptly substituted th e word 'arrangement.' Moreover, although Hughes wanted improved relations with Japan, he could not accept an y commitment to recognise or defend the fruit s o f Japanese imperialis m an d h e neede d tim e t o conside r Balfour's draf t a s the preface to detailed negotiations . The inference was unmistakable ; Hughe s di d no t car e fo r Balfour' s formula an d suspected tha t i t woul d retai n th e essenc e o f th e Anglo-Japanese alliance. Balfour i n fac t reporte d t o Lloy d Georg e that , althoug h over shadowed by the naval negotiations initiated through Hughes's megaphone diplomacy , his informa l talk s with Hughe s an d the n briefl y with Prince Tokugawa were not unsatisfactory.28 Nevertheless, faced with Hughes's initial objections, Balfour turned to the Japanese delegation. Ambassado r Shidehara , fearin g Anglo-America n collusio n and uneas y because o f th e Balfour-Hughe s conversation , ha d ex pected t o negotiat e fo r Japan, bu t illnes s impede d hi m an d o n 18 November Hankey met with Saburi, counsellor a t the Japanes e embassy.24 Saburi assured Hankey that Japan, while preferring to retain their alliance , woul d accep t a n extensio n o f th e principle s o f th e alliance into a tripartite agreement, but woul d oppose the inclusion of Chin a or any European power in a new arrangement. Hankey , in response, and speculating o n a resurgent Russo-German threat, wondered whether, within a triple understanding, they could retain 'the power o f reconstituting th e allianc e i n cas e th e ol d circumstance s 22 Hankey memorandum on conversation between Balfour and Hughes, 11 Nov. 1921, Cab. 30/27 and BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 416, 470-1; Hughes memorandum on this conversation, FH, 1922,1,1-2; Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, n, 494-5 and Clad, Charles Evans Hughes, 298. Hankey was not present and his memorandum was based on Balfour's verbal account. Hughes's notes were a summary and neither memorandum is really satisfactory. 23Balfour to Lloyd George, 14 Nov. 1921, Cab. 30/5; Hanke y to Lloyd George, 17 Nov. 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/62/1/3; Dugdale, Balfour, n , 328-9 24Hankey to Balfour, memorandum, 1 8 Nov. 1921, Cab. 30/27; Balfour t o Lloyd George, 24 Nov. 1921, Cab. 30/5 an d BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 449,505-11; Nish, Japan and the Ending of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 381

167 THE WASHINGTO N CONFERENC E should recur.' Both agreed, however, that the attitud e o f the United States was pivotal and that the negotiations could make little progress until Shidehara recovered sufficientl y t o meet Balfour. Clearl y both were prepared to engage in a thinly disguised pursuit of the essence of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Conversations between Balfou r an d Baro n Kato, on 18 November and agai n on 23 November, with Hankey , Lampson, an d Hanihar a present on the second occasion, wer e either unproductiv e or merely a repetitio n o f the meetin g betwee n Hanke y an d Saburi. 25 Signifi cantly, however, Balfour, without further contact s with Hughes since their conversatio n of llth November , confirmed tha t he wishe d t o retain th e right t o renew the allianc e shoul d circumstance s deman d such a step . Britai n an d Japa n woul d communicat e fully wit h th e United States on any such renewal which would not violat e Articl e Eighteen of the League Covenant. Finally, Balfou r handed Kato his draft triple agreement and their discussion concluded understandably on a very cordial note.26 Shidehara, however, still indisposed, did not see how the United States could accept Balfour's proposals containing provision fo r th e resurrectio n o f a defensiv e military alliance . H e began work, therefore, on a new tripartite agreemen t which offere d the United States a consultative pact, but als o sought protection for the 'vital interests' of the signatories in 'the Pacific and the Far East.' Here was a compromise of a different kind, the second prepared fro m a sick-bed for American consumption and justifiabl y describe d a s a 'furtive attemp t to salvage the remnant s of the Lansing-Ishi i agreement' of 1917.27 In some ways Shidehara's draft wa s more promising than Balfour' s o r any that cam e from th e Unite d States delegation , but it required close scrutiny and amendation. Although Anglo-America n exchanges had no t proceede d beyon d the original conversation between Hughes and Balfour, the American delegation, with Root, Lodge, and Chandler P. Anderson of the Stat e Department prominent, produced a draf t agreemen t by 22 November. Hughe s rejected thei r formul a becaus e i t neithe r specificall y cancelled th e Anglo-Japanes e alliance no r specifie d th e numbe r of 25 See note 24 26 Despite minor verbal changes, Balfour showed Kato substantially what he had offered t o Hughes. 27 Asada, 'Japan's "Special Interests" and the Washington Conference,' 66; Nish, Japan and the Ending of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 382. In several respects Nish's interpretation of these negotiations is difficult to accept.

168 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y signatories.28 Anderso n the n produce d a n amende d versio n o n 2 6 November fo r Lodge' s scrutiny , an d b y 2 8 Novembe r thei r join t efforts resulte d i n a projecte d four-powe r agreemen t ove r Lodge' s signature.29 Despite certai n acceptabl e features, such as limiting th e scope o f th e agreemen t t o 'insula r possession s an d dominions ' an d excluding China, Hughes rejected eve n this draft, and in any case it faced the competition o f Shidehara's formula, which Sabur i had pre sented to Balfour and Hankey on 26 November.30 Shidehara's tripar tite agreement state d tha t if their territoria l right s o r vital interests in the Pacific and the Far East were threatened, the signatories woul d communicate full y an d frankl y t o decid e o n the mos t efficien t mea sures to be take n jointl y or separately t o remedy the situation . Fur thermore, if a controversy developed betwee n two of the signatories , they could, in mutual agreement, invit e th e third power t o a conference t o adjust their disagreement . Finally , i n th e thir d clause , thi s agreement would provide for the terminatio n o f the Anglo-Japanes e alliance. Significantly, whateve r els e Shidehar a intended , h e had , under standing an d anticipating Hughes' s opposition, omitted an y provision to retain th e possibilit y o f resurrecting th e Anglo-Japanes e alliance . Oddly enough , therefore, bot h Japa n an d the Unite d State s had rebuffed Balfour's proposal and he fought no rearguard action to reverse the trend. 81 Instead, workin g with Saburi , Balfou r made one signifi 28 Lodge Papers, file 'Washington conference 1922'; Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, n, 495; Vinson, The Parchment Peace, 154-5 29 Lodge Papers, file 'Washington Conference 1922." This agreement aimed to preserve peace and maintain the right s o f the fou r power s in thei r insular possessions and dominions in the Pacific . Th e signatories would agree to respect these rights and, if peace were threatened or their rights endangered, they would communicate with each other to find a solution. Moreover, they would agree not to enter separate arrangements with any power which might prejudice these rights or the integrit y of their insula r possessions and do minions, or threaten the peace. Finally, this four-power treaty would supercede any earlier relevant treaty. 30 Memorandum of Balfour-Saburi conversation, 26 Nov. 1921, Cab. 30/27; Balfour to Curzon, 28 Nov. 1921, Cab. 30/5; Balfou r to Lloyd George, 29 Nov. 1921, Cab. 30/5 an d King Papers, file 1176. Shidehara' s draft had been accepted b y th e Japanes e delegatio n bu t ha d no t ye t receive d Tokyo' s approval. 31 Balfour may have expected and even welcomed this outcome because of

169 THE WASHINGTO N CONFERENC E cant amendment to Shidehara's proposals, removin g the phrase 'vital interests.' He also inserted several verbal changes to clarify the meaning and intent of agreement.32 Balfour, however, did not narrow the scope of the pact, permitting th e retention of the phrase 'Pacific an d Far East,' despite the fact that originally h e had proposed separat e treaties for the Pacific region and for China. Later tha t sam e day Saburi showed the amended Shidehara draf t to Hughes, 83 an d Balfou r hande d i t t o Roo t and Lodge. 34 Despit e insisting on the inclusion of France and the need to settle beforehand the Shantung controversy, both Lodge and Root were impressed with the formula . Hughes , however, meeting with Balfou r o n 28 November, recognise d th e merit s o f Shidehara' s proposal s bu t insiste d o n an additiona l amendmen t t o tha t providin g fo r th e inclusio n o f France.35 He wished the four power agreement to apply only to the islands of the Pacific region and to exclude all reference to mainland Asia. In thi s way, Hughes suggeste d t o Balfour , they woul d isolat e the difficul t questio n o f Shantun g an d secur e a suitabl e an d facil e alternative t o th e Anglo-Japanes e alliance . Th e mov e t o includ e France Hughe s describe d a s necessar y to eliminat e senatoria l an d public suspicion, and he was not impressed wit h the problem o f excluding th e Netherland s o r Italy. Moreover, Hughes di d not regar d the insertion of France a s an excessive dilution of the agreemen t an d indeed saw it as an intrinsically advantageous move. Balfour agree d t o approach th e Japanese delegation , an d Saburi , consulted b y Hankey, expressed concern abou t th e exclusio n of th e United States opposition, but he can scarcely have foreseen that Shidehara would reject his gesture to Japan. Balfour reporte d to London, however, that he was satisfied with Shidehara's proposals as amended. 32 See note 30. Balfour's verbal changes focussed attention exclusively on territorial rights and removed the possibility of one of the two disputants preventing the calling of a conference with the third signatory to settle the disagreement. 33Memorandum of Hughes-Saburi conversation, 26 Nov. 1921, FB , 1922, i, 3-4; Lodge Papers, file 'Washington Conference 1922' 34Note of conversation between Balfour, Lodge, and Root, 26 Nov. 1921, Cab. 30/27 and BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 451, 512-13; Balfour to Lloyd George, 29 Nov. 1921, Cab . 30/5 an d King Papers, file 1176 35 Balfour to Lloyd George, 29 Nov. 1921, Cab . 30/5 an d King Papers, file 1176; Balfour t o Curzon, 29 Nov. 1921, BD, 1s t ser., xrv, no 458, 522-3; Asada, 'Japan's "Special Interests" and the Washington Conference,' 66

170 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y mainland. Hanke y attempte d t o comfor t Sabur i o n thi s poin t an d concluded in his report to Lloyd George that prospects fo r an agreement seemed extremely bright, and that relations between the British and America n delegations wer e ver y cordia l an d profitable. 86 Th e Japanese delegation, however, having dismissed the idea of providing for th e futur e resurrectio n o f the allianc e wit h Britain , havin g ac cepted Balfour' s remova l o f th e phras e 'vita l interests, ' an d no w being face d with th e omissio n of Chin a fro m th e scop e o f a four power consultative agreement , was forced to consul t Tokyo . Baron Kato, stil l withou t specifi c instruction s o n 2 December , assure d Hughes and Balfour that the Japanese delegatio n accepted th e proposed change s an d expecte d it s governmen t t o acquiesce , an d Hughes, anxious to appease th e sensitiv e Frenc h an d t o precipitate the negotiations , dre w u p a revise d agreemen t betwee n 2 an d 7 December.87 Balfour, for his part, assured the cabinet in London that China and the Asian mainland would be excluded from th e scope of the agreement, that he would insist on the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand, and, in the absence of instructions to the contrary, he assumed he could proceed with the negotiations.88 Progress no w depende d o n th e conten t o f Hughes' s draf t four power agreement an d its reception b y Britain and Japan . Hughes' s proposals, owin g more t o th e amende d Shidehar a schem e than t o Balfour's origina l formula , looke d to th e preservatio n o f peace an d the maintenance of the signatories' right s i n their insular possessions and dominions in the Pacific. The four powers agreed to respect these rights and , in the even t of a controversy between two of them, they would summo n a quadrupl e conferenc e to settl e th e disagreement . As in the Root-Takahira agreement, if their rights were threatened by the aggressio n of a non-signatory power, the y would communicate 36 Hankey to Lloyd George, 29 Nov. 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/62/1/6 37Balfour t o Lloyd George, 2 Dec. 1921, Kin g Papers, file 1176; Balfou r t o Curzon, 3 Dec. 1921, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 471,535; notes of Balfour-Hugb.esKato conversation, 2 Dec. 1921, FB, 1922, i, 5 and 7-8; Pusey , Charles Evans Hughes, n, 495-6 and Vinson, The Parchment Peace, 156-7. These negotiations ran parallel to the naval negotiations where Japan, if she were to accept the naval ratios proposed, expected a 'non-fortification agreement ' and an acceptable treaty on the Pacific. 38Curzon to Balfour, 2 Dec. 1921, Cab. 30/5 an d BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 468,532; Balfour to Curzon, 3 Dec. 1921, Cab. 30/5 an d BD, 1st ser., xrv, nos 471 and 472,535

171 THE WASHINGTO N CONFERENC E fully t o find the most suitable remedy , to be applied jointl y or separately. Th e agreement woul d las t fo r ten years and woul d continu e in force unles s terminated o n si x months' notice. Th e fourt h articl e provided specificall y fo r th e abrogatio n o f th e Anglo-Japanes e alliance.89 After receiving news that Japan accepted th e inclusion of France , Hughes, with the approval of President Harding, 40 presented his draft to Balfou r o n 7 December. Bot h agree d t o chang e th e six-months ' notice of intent to terminate the treaty to one of twelve months, an d then Balfour and Hughes met with Baron Kato. Kato tabled a n alter native arrangemen t received fro m Tokyo , the principa l amendmen t being th e inclusio n o f commercia l interest s alon g wit h territoria l rights, but Balfour and Hughes summarily rejected it. Hughes empha sised that he assumed that Japan would agree to a settlement of their differences ove r th e Pacifi c mandat e islands , and , apar t fro m th e problem o f whether or not to include the Japanese main islands, all three accepted th e American formula in principle. Hughe s would see Viviani t o secur e Frenc h agreement , whic h h e accomplishe d wit h ease, and Balfou r turne d t o the much neglected Empir e Delegatio n that afternoon. 41 Balfour, claiming that Hughes's proposal s were based virtually on his own scheme, reported th e succes s of the recent negotiations . H e emphasised both the narrow geographical scop e of the arrangement, relating exclusivel y to the Pacific islands, and the fact that the agreement was a treaty requirin g ratificatio n b y th e Senate . Shoul d th e Senate reject the treaty, Britain would retain her alliance with Japan. Balfour then confirmed, after an additional hurried conversation with Hughes and Kato, that the Japanese main islands, Canada, the United States, China , an d Kore a were excluded , bu t tha t Australia , Ne w Zealand, an d al l mandate island s wer e include d i n th e agreemen t under the ter m 'insular possessions and dominions. ' Balfour als o assured the meeting that the treaty was merely a mutual agreement not to disturb eac h other's rights, and noted tha t it s approval depende d 39FR, 1922, i, 7-8; Balfou r to Curzon, 7 Dec. 1921, BD, 1st ser., xiv, no 481, 541-2 40 Balfour to Curzon, 7 Dec. 1921, Cab. 30/5, Cab . 30/27 and BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 480, 540-1; Balfour to Lloyd George, 9 Dec. 1921, King Papers, file 1176 41 Notes of llth meeting of BED, 7 Dec. 1921, Cab . 30/lA; Borden diary, entry of 7 Dec. 1921, 4670 ; Borden to Meighen, 8 and 12 Dec. 1921 , Borde n Papers, oc no 611; Balfou r to Curzon, 7 Dec. 1921, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 482, 542-3

172 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y on Japan and th e Unite d State s reaching a settlemen t o n Yap and agreeing to the extensio n of their commercia l treaty to the mandat e islands. Th e Empir e Delegatio n mad e certai n verba l amendment s and ensured that minor disagreements between the signatories would not require a full four-power conference to achieve a settlement, but beyond tha t the y made no challenge. A s accepted o n 7 December , Hughes's draf t differe d fro m th e amende d Shidehar a proposal s b y the additio n o f a preamble, b y invertin g article s on e an d two , b y adding the time limit in article tirée, and by the insertion of the fourth clause. Balfour applauded the last article because it would force the Senate to approve the four-powe r treaty if it wishe d to destro y th e Anglo-Japanese alliance. Each member of the Empir e Delegation require d tim e t o consult his own government, but Balfour anticipated little difficulty fro m thi s source or from the somewhat superfluous expressions of concern then received from London. 42 In any case the British cabinet accepted th e inclusion of France even though they expected Japa n t o regard th e move as a serious diminution of the value of the agreement , and ap plauded the prospect of the two treaties dealing with the Pacific and China separately. The four-power treaty, Curzon noted, was confined to th e relevan t majo r power s an d supercede d th e Anglo-Japanes e alliance in a satisfactory manner, and the treaty on China would show the other powers at the conference that they were neither forgotten nor ignored. As anticipated , th e new s fro m dominio n capital s wa s encourag ing. Pearc e an d Salmon d reporte d Australia n an d Ne w Zealan d approval o n 9 Decembe r an d Borde n secure d Meighen' s agree ment b y th e followin g day , afte r assurin g hi m tha t th e treat y conformed wit h Canada' s proposal s t o th e imperia l meeting. 48 The 42 Curzon to Balfour, 7 Dec. 1921, Cab . 30/5, Lloy d George Papers, F/141 and BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 478, 539-40 and no 479, 540. Curzon was particularly concerned to avoid the inclusion of Italy, regarding it a s an unacceptable ac t of dilution, and to ensure that Britain and Japan forced th e United States to reject Italian pretensions. In fact the problem of Italy's inclusion was settled easily. 43 Notes of 12th meeting of BED, 9 Dec. 1921, Cab . 30/lA; Borden diary, entry of 9 Dec. 1921,4673 (a); Borden to Meighen, 8 and 10 Dec. 1921, an d Meighen to Borden, 8 Dec 1921, Kin g Papers, file 1176. Borde n emphasised that the treaty was not a military alliance, imposed no warlike obligations, and looked to consultation and conference diplomacy, with public opinion asserting a

173 THE WASHINGTO N CONFERENC E four-power treaty , therefore , bridged o r papered ove r the division s evident at the Imperial Conference, but further negotiations on 8 and 9 December produced ne w difficulties an d two further drafts by the United State s delegation. 44 Shidehar a presented th e majo r proble m by demanding that they exclude the Japanese main islands from the scope of the treaty, as inclusion would be inappropriate, inconsistent , and disturbin g t o Japanese opinion . Balfou r countere d b y pointin g to the problem raise d b y excluding Japan while still including Australia an d Ne w Zealand ; i t migh t sugges t differin g status . H e also raised the issue of possible public fear that sinister motives underlay Japan's deman d and reminde d Shidehara tha t Japa n would re ceive no protection fro m a revived Russia should Tokyo insist on her exclusion. Whether convinced by Balfour or not, Shidehara withdrew the objection a t the meeting on 9 December and verbal amendments were accepted to make categorical Japan's inclusion. A further amendment by Shidehara, to enable a signatory to prevent the callin g of a conference in case of a dispute between two of the contractin g parties , suggesting that th e conferenc e should meet only i f bot h disputant s agreed , wa s als o defeated . Th e delegates , however, accepted a move to exclude domestic issues from the scope of the treaty. Hughes's insistence that they recognise that the United States' acceptance o f th e four-powe r treaty di d no t jeopardis e he r rights and interests in all c class mandate areas in the Pacific proved contentious. Bot h Balfou r an d th e Japanes e acquiesced , however , further brie f delay s ensued while th e Frenc h an d Japanes e delega tions awaite d instruction s fro m home , Balfou r carrie d th e amend ments through the Empire Delegation with ease, and by 10 December the negotiations were virtually complete. On that day, with Root and Underwood prominent an d with th e Senat e in mind, Lodge , a t his oratorical worst and parading his literary accomplishments, presented the four-power treaty to the fourth plenary session. 45 benign influence to settle international disputes. As a model Borden regarded the treaty as admirable, but he was contemptuous of its practical value because of being confined in scope to the Pacific islands. 44 Balfour to Curzon, 9 Dec. 1921 , Cab . 30/5 an d BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 486, no 487,546-7; and no 488,547; Balfour to Lloyd George, 9 Dec. 1921, Cab . 30/6; FR , 1922, n, 8-29; Hankey to Lloyd George, 9 Dec. 1921, Lloy d George Papers, F/62/1/8; Lodge Papers, file "Washington Conference 1922.' 45 Notes of 12th and 13th meetings of BED, 9and 10 Dec. 1921, Cab. 30/U; FH, 1922, i, 30-1; Conferences on the Limitation of Armaments, Washington,

174 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y The delegates signed the treaty on 13 December, Balfour receiving well deserved applause, but he and Hankey had been forced to reject RiddelTs proposal that they postpone signing until negotiation s for the nava l treat y wer e complete. 48 Riddel l viewe d th e four-powe r treaty a s a success for the Unite d State s because i t terminate d th e Anglo-Japanese alliance. Balfour and Hankey disagreed, feeling that the treaty would help the naval negotiations, and that eve n without a nava l agreemen t Britain' s positio n wa s no t weakened . I n thei r opinion, Anglo-Japanes e relations wer e stil l cordial , the y wer e ri d of a n 'unpleasant liability,' and Anglo-America n relations wer e 'immeasurably strengthened. ' Hankey' s 'unpleasan t liability ' wa s ob viously th e Anglo-Japanes e alliance, bu t bot h Curzo n an d Balfou r paid homage to its historical value, saluted Japan' s loyalty , an d expressed hope that the long-standing friendship between Britai n and Japan woul d continue. 47 Althoug h a funerea l oration , thes e wer e neither idle words nor empty sentiments and who could predict the effect of the four-power treaty? There remained an epilogue o f some significance. The protracte d negotiations over Shantung, the delays on China, a blunder by Harding, th e naggin g doubt tha t Balfou r had outwitte d Hughe s i n th e negotiations, and a revival of the questio n of whether Japan's main islands were included in the scope of the four-power treaty made its passage through the Senate perilous enough to raise the possibility of non-ratification.48 Hanke y feared that failure to secure a settlemen t on Shantung could provoke a rejection of the four-power treaty, which in turn woul d prevent Japa n fro m acceptin g th e nava l agreement . Then President Harding , withou t consulting the Stat e Department , told th e pres s on 20 December that th e four-powe r treaty di d no t apply t o Japan's mai n islands. H e retracte d an d Hughe s correcte d the error, but hostile sections of the press seized on the discrepancy , November 12,1921-February 6,1922,1612-18. Hughes subsequently asked for an additional document to show that the four-power treaty applied to the mandate islands. 46 Hankey to Lloyd George, 12 Dec. 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/62/1/9 47 Curzon to Eliot, 13 Dec. 1921, and Balfour to Curzon, 19 Dec. 1921, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 498,555 and no 512,566-7 48 Hankey to Lloyd George, Dec. 1921, Lloy d George Papers, F/62/1/11 and BD, 1st ser., no 517,569-73; FB, 1922, i, 38-9; Vinson , The Parchment Peace, 163-5

175 THE WASHINGTO N CONFERENC E accused Lodg e o f deceit , an d receive d applaus e fro m th e treaty' s opponents in the Senate.49 Repercussions in Japan wer e unavoidable an d Shidehara , fearing a Senate demand for an amendment excluding Japan's main islands, told Balfour that Japanese opinion had adopted the complex position of opposing both the inclusion of the main islands and their exclusion at the bidding of the United States Senate. They regarded th e forme r as injur y an d th e latte r a s insult an d Balfour , providin g the y pro tected the status of Australia and New Zealand, agreed to accept an y settlement satisfactor y to Hughes an d Shidehara. 60 Finally , Balfou r and Hughes accepted Japan's specifi c request tha t the y exclude th e main islands , Hughe s concludin g tha t thi s amendmen t shoul d ai d acceptance o f the treat y b y th e Senate. 61 The Empir e Delegatio n was less optimistic an d th e Britis h government, mindful of Wilson' s fate, decided no t to ratify unti l the Senate had sent the treaty to the President. However , o n 2 4 Marc h th e Senat e approve d th e four power treat y wit h a reservation tha t ther e wa s n o commitmen t to armed force , n o alliance , an d n o obligatio n t o joi n i n an y ac t of defence. Wit h thi s reservation , emotionall y satisfyin g to th e isola tionists but somewhat superfluous, the debate ended.62 The negotiation s fro m 1 1 November to 1 3 December ha d deal t rather unpredictably with predictable problems , resultin g finally in the four-power treaty. Balfou r ha d suggeste d a tripartit e treat y re lating exclusively to the Pacific region, which offered somethin g both to Japa n an d th e Unite d State s an d satisfie d th e demand s o f th e Imperial Conference. Particularly significant was the clause providing 49Minutes of 14th meeting of the BED, 19 Dec. 1921, Cab. 30/lA. Papers such as the Washington Herald sprea d suspicion about the origins and intent of the four-power treaty. 50 Balfour to Curzon, 25 Dec. 1921, Cab. 30/6 an d BD, 1st ser., no 521, 576-7 51 Note of Balfour-Kato conversation , 4 Jan. 1922, Cab. 30/27 and BD , 1st ser., no 532, 585-7; minutes of BED meeting, 31 Jan. 1922, Cab. 30/lA; Hughe s memoranda of conversations with Shidehara, 19 Dec. 1921 and 1 4 Jan. 1922 , FH, 1922, i, 37-8 and 42-3; Hughes to Shidehara, 6 Feb. 1922 , ibid., 45-6. The exclusion of Japan's main islands was contained in a supplementary agreement. 52 Curzon to Geddes, 2 March, and Geddes to Curzon, 14 March 1922, FO/414/ 249; Borden to King, 19 Jan. and Borden to Foster, 22 Jan. 1922, Borden Papers, oc no 611

176 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y for th e possible resurrectio n of a defensive military alliance betwee n Britain an d Japa n and , o f course , if th e negotiation s faile d Britai n would retai n a modifie d allianc e wit h he r Asia n ally . A t th e sam e time, and logically, Balfou r an d his advisers were seeking the most suitable way to end Britain's exclusive arrangement with Japan and to achiev e a meaningfu l reconciliatio n wit h th e Unite d States . Hughes, however, with the Senate in mind, could not accept Balfour' s triple alliance , preferrin g a statement of principles t o supersed e all existing agreements . H e looke d fo r a consultativ e pac t withou t military obligations and with generalised responsibilities. Implici t i n Hughes's positio n wa s a determination specificall y t o terminat e th e Anglo-Japanese alliance and to prevent both its extension to include the Unite d State s an d th e possibilit y o f its revival . Moreover , with Balfour's support , Hughes was determined t o expan d the tripartit e into a quadruple agreement by securing the inclusion of France, and also, with British and Japanese support, to prevent further dilutio n by the exclusion of Italy and other pretenders. In sum, Hughes sought a four-powe r consultative treat y whic h restate d th e relevan t prin ciples o f the Root-Takahir a agreement , suggeste d involvemen t an d not commitment, and avoided any hint of a machiavellian scheme to place the United States in an untenable minority position. The Japanese delegation, although welcoming Balfour's initial gesture, recognised that they could neither retain the essence of the old alliance no r provide for its renewal i n the future . Shidehara , there fore, turned t o securing the recognition o f Japan's vital interests no t only in the Pacifi c regio n but als o i n China , i n a consultativ e pac t acceptable t o th e Unite d States . Balfour , however , remove d th e phrase 'vital interests,' Hughes insisted that the agreement relate only to insular possessions and dominions, Tokyo's attempt to insert 'commercial interests ' receive d n o support , an d consequentl y neithe r Britain no r the Unite d State s concede d Japan' s clai m t o a specia l position on the Asian mainland. The way was open for the United States delegation, guided by the Shidehara draf t a s amende d b y Balfour , t o dra w up a four-power consultative treat y providing for conference diplomacy, terminating specifically th e Anglo-Japanese alliance, an d relatin g exclusivel y to territorial rights in the Pacific. Therefore, after Hughes's initial opposition, th e Japanes e delegatio n i n a n attemp t t o cour t th e Unite d States had turne d it s back on the twenty-yea r alliance an d ha d se t the negotiation s on the path t o a more generalised agreement . Balfour, havin g establishe d cordia l relation s wit h Hughe s an d bein g

177 THE WASHINGTO N CONFERENC E anxious to avoid any disruption of the naval negotiations, acquiesce d and agai n carrie d th e Empir e Delegatio n wit h relativ e ease . A s a result, the four-power treaty emerged a s a compromis e constructed finally b y Hughes, but initiate d b y Shidehar a an d Balfour , an d ye t satisfying the United States and then Britain rather more than Japan. From th e Britis h viewpoin t the y wer e ri d o f a n allianc e which , despite th e argument s of Curzon and hi s group , was o f diminishe d value an d ou t o f harmony with postwa r circumstances . A s Balfou r reported to Lloyd George, the alliance had become a 'source of misunderstanding rathe r tha n a guarante e o f peace' and , despit e th e compromises accepted , h e fel t abl e t o applau d th e result s o f hi s negotiations.63 Balfour coul d point a t one and the sam e time to th e fact tha t he had helped improv e Anglo-American relations, avoide d a rebuff t o Japan by following Shidehara's lead, retained som e for m of connectio n wit h Tokyo , and preserve d imperial unity . Th e four power treaty , i n Balfour' s opinion , wa s a n acceptabl e an d eve n masterly compromise which bridged th e chas m between Japan and the Unite d States , narrowe d the difference s betwee n Australi a and Canada, and gave comfort i n descending orde r to Atlanticists, sceptics, and more antagonistic critics. Moreover , when viewed with th e other results of the Washington Conference, Britain had participate d in a comprehensive attempt to achieve disarmament and peace, she need not begin construction of a Pacific fleet, and she could hope for a new atmosphere of co-operation and conciliation in the Fa r East . At worst Britain faced uncertainty. Would the Unite d States co-operate in a sustained and practical way, had Britain retained Japan's friendship, could she still exercise restraint on Japan, and were Britain's imperial interests better served and protected? Moreover, who could be optimistic about the future o f China whatever the valu e of the nine power treaty ? Answer s i n th e affirmativ e wer e likel y to bree d un founded illusions of stability and optimism, but few were prepared t o condemn the work of the Washington Conference because of inscrutable and unpredictable factors . Rather, contemporaries fel t tha t th e conference marke d a significan t i f limite d advanc e awa y from th e troubles of the immediate postwar period. Moreover, Borde n and othe r enthusiasti c Atlanticist s coul d vie w the four-power treaty as a step forward in the history of the empire's relations wit h the Unite d States. Britain had renounced her allianc e SSBalfour to Lloyd George, 6 Feb. 1922, Cab. 30/7 an d BD, 1st ser., no 585, 643-5

178 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y with Japan an d Borde n expressed hopes tha t jus t a s the 181 7 Con vention dealin g wit h th e Grea t Lake s ha d grow n t o includ e th e whole border, so the spirit of the four-power treaty would extend to other issue s an d othe r areas. 64 I n sum , the Atlanticist s dare d hop e that the Anglo-Japanese alliance questio n woul d become a catalyst, permitting progres s toward a new er a o f co-operation betwee n th e empire and the United States. This would reverse the disma l trends of recent years, secure American involvement in international affairs , and create a new wave of moral leadership b y the English-speaking peoples. Borden in fact was unwilling merely to wait on events and viewed the Washington Conference as an opportunity to pursue the Atlanticist thesis, using two means of approach. First , drawing on his personal contacts an d friendships, but failing to appreciate th e political and tactical problems facing Hughes, he made direct approache s t o the Unite d State s delegatio n an d t o othe r prominen t politica l figures.55 In general , Borde n found the America n delegatio n encour aging and both Root and Lodge accepted the urgent need to secure a close understanding betwee n th e empir e and the Unite d States. 66 Former Secretar y o f Stat e W.J . Brya n als o encourage d Borden , agreeing tha t th e power s shoul d creat e a n internationa l tribuna l with th e Unite d State s a s a member. 67 Thi s organisatio n would , i n times of crisis, investigate and judge the incident, the powers having agreed no t t o resor t t o hostilitie s pendin g thes e arbitratio n pro 54 Borden to Meighen, 8 Dec. and Borden to H. Wrong, 30 Dec. 1921, Borden Papers, oc no 611 and post-1921 series, folder 246 55 Borden to Wrong, 30 Dec. 1921, Borde n Papers, post-1921 series, folder 253 ; Vinson, The Parchment Peace, 127-8 an d 140-8. American public opinion expected positive policies and the disarmament conference provided an opportunity for a declaration favouring association with an international organisation, but Hughes was forced to weigh irreconcilable isolationist opinion. He was also forced to avoid moves which might create controversies and endanger the conference, and, therefore, while paying lip service to the idea, he counselled delay and avoidance of any positive moves toward the League. 56Borden dairy, entries of 9 and 10 Nov. 1921,4606-9; Borden to GovernorGeneral, 2 March 1922, Borden Papers, post-1921 series, folder 116; Lodg e to Lord Charnwood, 18 Nov. 1921, Lodg e Papers, file 1921, Sept-Dec. 57Borden diary, entry of 18 Nov. 1921,4623; Bryan to Borden, 23 Nov. and Borden to Bryan, 26 Nov. 1921, Borden Papers, post-1921 series, folder 149

179 THE WASHINGTO N CONFERENC E cedures. To both Borde n and Bryan, this process wa s a viabl e pre ventive chec k t o th e outbrea k o f an y war , an d wa s especiall y attractive becaus e i t woul d ensur e tha t government s experience d the salutar y influenc e of peace-loving publi c opinion . Borde n tol d Bryan that suc h a n organisation woul d hav e prevente d th e escala tion of th e July 1914 crisis , that he would devote his major effor t a t the conferenc e to securing acceptance o f the internationa l tribunal , and tha t th e Anglo-Saxo n powers would be it s cor e an d it s sourc e of inspiration. Although Brya n wa s scarcel y a representativ e figure , Borde n seemed encourage d an d o n 2 3 November he approache d Hughes , choosing th e perio d immediatel y followin g the clas h wit h Brian d on the questio n o f land armaments. 68 Borden put forwar d the idea of a permanen t internationa l tribunal , likenin g it s procedure s t o those of the arbitration treaties in which the Unite d States had par ticipated betwee n 191 4 an d 1916 , an d emphasisin g that n o nation would be committed t o any specific actio n in the las t analysis . The United State s woul d avoid , therefore , th e embarrassin g pitfall s o f the Leagu e Covenant . Less justifiably , Borde n argued tha t Franc e would find comfort i n her ques t fo r securit y since, i n his view, th e tribunal woul d fulfi l th e rol e intende d i n th e abortiv e Anglo American Guarante e Treat y o f 1919 . Consequently , Borde n sug gested, wit h France soothed and encouraged , Hughe s could expec t an amelioration of the conference's current problems. Hughes, i n reply , seeme d sympatheti c towar d Borden' s genera l aims bu t wa s understandabl y sceptica l abou t hi s prediction s o f France's reaction. In any case, Hughes would not act until the conference had deal t with the immediate Pacific and Far Eastern problems. I n othe r words , th e tim e wa s no t ripe . No t discouraged , however, Borde n urge d tha t th e principa l representative s tak e u p the questio n an d h e the n turne d bac k to his second avenu e of ap proach, the British Empire Delegation. Hughes's dramati c naval disarmamen t proposals o f 1 2 November had alread y provided Borde n with a n appropriat e issue , which h e raised in his discussions with the Unite d State s representatives an d in the debate s o f the Empir e Delegation. 69 Borde n feared tha t th e British naval experts would attempt to wreck Hughes's proposals and 58 Borden diary, entry of 23 Nov. 1921,4634; Borden to Meighen, 23 Nov. 1921 , Borden Papers, oc no 611 and King Papers, file 1921 ( Mea-Mitchell) 59 Borden diary, entry of 15 Nov. 1921, 4617 ; Borde n to Lougheed, 15 Nov.

180 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y he was determine d t o outmanoeuvr e them. Thi s struggle , however , would be merely the first encounter in a broader campaign . After th e disturbing discussion s o f 1 3 November, Borde n prepare d a mem orandum i n whic h h e suggeste d that , whil e the y shoul d accep t Hughes's plan i n spirit an d principle, th e Empir e Delegatio n coul d improve on it in two ways. 60 First, to achiev e a greatly extende d or even permanent holiday in capital ship construction rathe r tha n th e ten-year holiday suggeste d by the Unite d States , Borden advocate d a serie s o f disarmamen t conferences , hel d regularl y ever y thre e o r five years. Second , they shoul d establis h procedures , involvin g th e United States, to ensure the peaceful settlement o f international dis putes, and Borden denounced the folly an d futility of being satisfie d merely with disarmamen t proposals . As he pointed out, th e powers , once a t war , woul d rear m rapidl y an d engag e i n tota l conflict . I n sum, Borden urged that they pursue both his suggested amendments without appearin g t o challeng e an d withou t givin g offenc e t o th e United States , an d h e suggeste d tha t his proposal s woul d improv e the prospects for disarmament and fill the vacuum left b y America's failure to enter the League. The Canadia n governmen t applaude d Borden' s memorandum , expressing th e hop e tha t hi s plan s woul d ensur e th e entr y o f th e United State s into th e Leagu e or at leas t int o a concer t o f powers . Within th e Empir e Delegation , however , onl y Pearc e o f Australi a gave full suppor t and , althoug h the y discusse d th e ide a o f periodic disarmament conferences, Borden's second proposal fo r the peacefu l settlement o f international dispute s wa s submerge d beneat h othe r business unti l mid-December. 61 Th e Foreig n Offic e sectio n o f th e delegation wa s even less encouragin g an d countere d tha t althoug h the Unite d State s wa s no t a membe r o f th e League , Britai n wa s satisfied wit h the Anglo-America n Peace Commissio n treaty o f Sep1921, Borde n Papers, oc no 611. These discussions reflected Borden' s position taken in the Empire Delegation. 60 Borden memorandum, 'America n Proposal for the Limitatio n of Armament,' 14 Nov. 1921, Cab . 30/ln; Borden diary, entry of 14 Nov. 1921, 4614 ; Borden to Lougheed, 14 Nov. 1921, King Papers, file 1921 ( LTieureux-Lyons ) 61 Pearce, note on Borden memorandum, 14 Nov. 1921, Cab . 30/lB; Borden diary, entry of 16 Nov. 1921, 4618 ; Borde n to Lougheed, 16 Nov. 1921 , Borden Papers, oc no 611; Loughee d to Borden, 18 Nov 1921, Borde n Papers, post-1921 series, folder 25 3 and Meighe n to Borden, 6 Dec. 1921, Borde n Papers, oc no 611

181 THE WASHINGTO N CONFERENC E tember 1914. I n their view, and hardly convincing, this treaty, refer ring disputes to a Permanent International Commission , went as far as possible toward avertin g hostilities an d was perhaps a model for a more general agreement. 62 Borden dismissed this reply a s "hardly relevant,' pointing ou t tha t th e treat y o f Septembe r 191 4 ha d no t made United States membership of the League unnecessary and did not undermin e th e importanc e o f establishin g a n internationa l tri bunal, in which the United State s would participate. Clearly Borden and the members of the Foreign Offic e sectio n were having difficult y in communicating with each other and th e most Borden would concede wa s th e possibl e valu e o f th e Anglo-America n treat y a s a model.63 This lack of progress an d th e submergenc e o f his proposal t o in clude the United States in machinery to prevent the outbreak of war prompted Borden to approach Hughes, an d then to present his case directly t o Balfour.64 In a letter to Balfour, Borde n adopted th e procedures o f the Permanent International Commission , created b y th e treaties signed between 1914 an d 1916, a s the model for his proposed international tribunal . H e the n reviewe d hi s recen t conversatio n with Hughes , faithfull y reportin g th e mixe d reactions o f the Secre tary o f State . Undeterred , however , Borde n pointe d t o Harding' s statement o f 25 November which seeme d to favou r internationalis t policies an d perhap s indicate d tha t Hardin g favoure d America n entry into an association of nations created to avert war. In any case, Borden asserted , th e powe r o f publi c opinio n rathe r tha n treat y obligations force d nations to aid each other, world opinion not legal commitments ha d defeate d Germany , and h e fel t justifie d i n pur suing a new international system. Borden acknowledge d th e dange r of awakenin g recent controversie s bu t h e urge d Balfou r t o accep t the propositio n that , whil e th e Unite d State s remained outsid e th e League, th e Britis h empir e mus t secur e he r co-operatio n i n som e other effective association. Ultimately, Borden concluded, the United States might enter a League modified an d amended to suit her international posture. Harding's recen t speech , neithe r a n isolated even t no r unaccompanied b y private conversations , thoug h lacking concret e proposal s 62 Foreign Office section , note on Borden memorandum, 1 6 Nov. 1921, Cab . 30/lu 63Borden memorandum, 19 Nov. 1921, Cab . 30/ln 64 Borden to Balfour, 26 Nov. 1921, Borde n Papers, oc no 611

182 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y and appearin g somewha t nebulous , nevertheles s ha d arouse d con siderable interest . Th e Presiden t ha d provoke d publi c speculation , discussion amon g pro-Leagu e Senators , an d enquirie s fro m th e foreign delegates to the Washington Conference.86 Borden was obviously involve d i n thi s response , bu t Balfou r wa s les s impressed. 88 He agreed with Borden that th e Empir e Delegatio n shoul d discus s and giv e du e consideratio n t o th e schem e for a n internationa l tri bunal, but h e was not anxious to duplicate th e League' s machiner y unless that was the only way to secure American involvement, an d providing th e duplicatio n wa s merel y temporary . Balfour' s repl y reflected his preoccupation with detailed negotiations and doubtles s Borden's proposal seemed not only marginal and premature but als o an unwarranted intrusion into the work of securing actual American co-operation in the Pacific and the Far East. Borden's response, sharp and touchy, scarcely improved matters.87 He agreed tha t the y should no t duplicat e th e League' s machinery , but h e insiste d tha t n o institution b y itsel f coul d preven t wa r no r remove suspicio n o f intende d aggression . Borden's solutio n la y i n the developmen t of a sane , vigorous , an d wholesom e internationa l public opinion, dedicated t o the abolition of war by bringing peoples and nations into a system of permanent association and co-operatio n to settle dispute s peacefully. He saw a world torn by economi c disruption an d politica l unrest , wher e anarch y rule d an d permitte d bankrupt nation s t o rearm , an d allowe d on e supposedl y friendl y nation t o increas e he r ai r forc e an d submarin e fleet . O f th e grea t powers remainin g outsid e th e League , Borde n viewe d th e Unite d States a s the mos t powerful, influential , advanced , an d democratic , her internationa l presenc e woul d provid e a sustained , efficaciou s force to secure peace and stability, and, therefore, 'I should hope that we may not adopt an unheeding attitude o r shrink from duplicatio n of machiner y if such a duplication woul d be o f effective ai d i n tha t great purpose. ' Borde n di d no t see k t o absolv e th e Unite d State s from error, and Wilson, who could not stoop to conquer, must accept some of the blam e fo r America' s absence fro m th e League , bu t h e claimed to perceive hopefu l sign s in Washington. Consequently , h e suggested immediate overtures t o restore America' s participation i n international affairs and to rebuild the Atlantic entente. 65 Vinson, The Parchment Peace, 141-6 66Balfour to Borden, 29 Nov. 1921, Borden Papers, oc no 611 67Borden to Balfour, 3 Dec. 1921, ibid., oc no 611

Robert Borden and Winston Churchill leave the Admiralty OflBce in 191 2

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185 THE WASHINGTO N CONFERENC E Apparently Balfour made no written repl y and in any case Harding had alread y dampened dow n the speculation in Washington. I n a press statement of 29 November the President carefull y minimised the significanc e of his earlier comments on an association of nations, claiming tha t h e envisage d littl e mor e tha n periodi c conference s between th e grea t powers. 88 Indeed , Geddes , reportin g t o Curzon , dismissed Harding' s original comment s as careles s an d misleading , and expressed fears that forces hostile to the League would denounce the whole affai r a s a British tric k to ensnare th e Unite d State s and embarrass the conference. Clearly, many tactical and long-term problems were involved, possibly threatening the Washington Conference itself an d eve n th e futur e o f Anglo-America n relations, an d th e Empire Delegation confined its response to a single and tardy debate on 1 7 December.69 Thi s discussio n merely repeated th e difference s existing betwee n Borde n an d Balfour , wit h th e forme r suggestin g both that American opinion was as advanced as any but tha t he saw little chanc e of the Unite d State s enterin g th e League . Borde n demanded, therefore, that they secure American participation i n world affairs b y mean s other tha n Leagu e membership . Balfou r rejecte d this view, stating that the United States was more likely to co-operate on specific issues which aroused the idealis m of her people , suc h as the trade in opium, than through any new international organisation . Balfour's argument s were accepted, the Empire Delegatio n decide d that they would not raise the questio n of international organisation s at the Washington Conference, and Borde n acknowledged defeat. 70 Borden's efforts , however , wer e bot h symboli c an d intrinsicall y important a s he pursue d th e interrelate d theme s o f Atlanticism by way of Pacific an d Asia n problems, disarmament as a basis of security, an d conferenc e diplomac y an d internationa l organisation s a s the mechanism of stability and order. In the last analysis he believed in th e forc e o f a n enlightene d an d matur e worl d publi c opinio n holding th e futur e o f peace i n it s hands, and despit e th e rebuf f h e was unrepentant: 'I am more and more convinced that the peace of the world can only be secured throug h the process of education, by which nations will be taught more and more to bring difficultie s fo r 68 Geddes to Curzon, 30 Nov. 1921, FO/414/248 69 Borden diary, entry of 17 Dec. 1921,4706 70 Similarly no moves were made by the United States. For an analysis of the reasons for this inaction see Vinson, The Parchment Peace, 143-8.

186 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y

discussion and settlement aroun d the council table/ 71 North American idealist , Atlanticist , an d internationalis t Borde n searche d fo r the enthronemen t o f order , justice , an d reaso n t o preserv e worl d peace, and he searched i n vain, for in truth the opportunitie s wer e an illusion. Balfour , als o a n Atlanticist, preferre d othe r mean s and approaches. 71 Borden to Rowell, 12 Jan. 1922, Borden Papers, post-1921 series, folder 253

FIVE

Prospects for Atlanticism Inevitably, participant s and politicians o n both sid e o f the Atlanti c praised th e wor k of the Washingto n Conference more readily tha n did professional naval and diplomati c opinion. T o some degree thi s difference reflecte d th e oppositio n o f idealism an d undu e optimis m to realis m an d cautiou s pessimism , althoug h neithe r grou p ha d a monopoly of any one attitud e o r emotion. Governments and public opinion welcomed hthe apparent chec k on naval rivalry as consistent with the prevailing financial and political realities, recognizin g that Britain an d Japa n ha d relinquishe d wha t the y coul d no t afford , and the Harding administration had surrendere d merely what Congress would not permit. Nava l experts, however, knew that th e re straints placed o n naval construction were temporary, that th e fivepower treat y legislate d fo r potentiall y obsolescen t form s o f nava l power, an d tha t competitio n in th e developmen t o f submarine an d air force s an d in classe s of warships other than capital ship s would proceed relativel y unchecked . Moreover , British nava l opinio n de plored the surrendering of future primacy and their American counterpart lamented the lost opportunity to create a navy second to none. The political consequences o f the Washingto n Conferenc e seemed, however, more imprecise and speculative or even simply imponderable, and , consequently , wit h som e significant exceptions , receive d both les s intens e condemnatio n an d applause . Bather , observer s spoke hopefully of a new era of peace an d stabilit y i n the Fa r Eas t and a n atmospher e o f co-operatio n whic h migh t spread rapidl y t o Europe and the Middle East. More specifically, and distinguishin g betwee n orator y an d analy sis, wha t of the prospects of the Atlanticists and their critics? Initially at least , althoug h no t withou t reservations , mos t o f Britis h an d

188 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y Canadian officialdom , includin g Curzon , felt tha t th e Washingto n Conference ha d produce d a beneficia l effec t o n Anglo-American relations. B y al l account s Hughe s an d Balfou r ha d co-operate d closely, each delegation had developed some confidence in the other, and their increasing rappor t ha d no t flourished at th e cos t o f their relations wit h th e Japanese . Moreover , th e Iris h settlemen t ha d helped the public atmosphere greatly and Hanke y felt tha t Americans finally began to realize that Britai n shared similar ideals with the United States.1 Geddes hinted that the rise of Britain's popularity resulted from th e impression that she had supporte d American policies, bu t o n the whol e he wa s optimistic and applaude d Hughes' s assessment tha t relation s betwee n Londo n an d Washingto n were more cordia l tha n the y had bee n fo r th e las t centur y an d a half . Geddes als o warned of Frenc h propagandist s an d India n agitator s and di d no t ignor e the outstandin g issues in Anglo-America n rela tions, but he concluded that ... the sentiment is so much more favourable, the atmosphere is so much more genial that it is difficult to realise that this is the same country as that to which I came almost two years ago. Given wise and patient handling of our policy, I see no reason to doubt that we are at the beginning of a new and better epoch in Anglo-American relations.2

Significantly, Gedde s ha d pointe d t o Frenc h propagandist s an d undoubtedly Britai n had reape d a harvest o f goodwill because th e intriguing, petulant, gesticulating, and vaporous French had become the bête-noir of the conference. Indeed Hankey, revealing, like most members of Lloyd George's entourage, growing disillusionment with France, urged the Premie r not to offer a guarantee treat y to Briand lest the United States object or take offence. The inference was clear. Hankey felt that prospects for improved relations with Washingto n would suffe r i f Britain involved herself further wit h the reactionar y and militarist- French. The four-power treaty itself, while an uncertain and unpredictable arrangement, was from on e viewpoint a n extremel y skilful compro1 Curzon to Balfour, 3 Feb. 1922. BD, 1st ser., xiv, no 578, 634; Hankey to Lloyd George, 29 Nov. 1921 an d 1 3 Jan. 1922, Lloyd George Papers, F/62/1/6 and/13 2 Geddes to Curzon, 13 Jan. 1922, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 547, 601-6; Geddes to Curzon, 13 Feb. 1922, FO/414/249

189 PROSPECTS FO R ATLANTICIS M mise. It seeme d to avoid an outright rebuff t o Japan and ye t offere d the promise of Anglo-American co-operation. The Atlanticist s could applaud an d neither the sceptic s no r more bitter critic s coul d con demn it or mount a rearguard action against it, whatever their inner reservations. I n sum , th e policie s advocate d b y th e Atlanticist s i n 1921 seemed to be bearing frui t an d relations betwee n London an d Washington seeme d close r tha n a t an y tim e sinc e th e Peac e Con ference. I n addition , man y i n London , includin g Lloy d George , Curzon, Hankey, and Balfour, began to hope that the rapport estab lished a t th e Washingto n Conferenc e woul d induc e practica l an d immediate co-operatio n i n othe r area s an d ove r othe r problems . Again, however, they tended to demand a beau geste from the United States rather than to cultivate th e new growth, an d as a result the y faced disappointment . I n tur n thi s disappointmen t reactivate d th e debate betwee n th e Atlanticist s an d thei r critics , an d evidenc e of apostacy emerged. Moreover, despit e th e actua l an d potentia l advance s i n Anglo American relation s achieve d a t th e Washingto n Conference , th e Atlanticists ha d me t wit h som e negativ e response , partl y becaus e their expectation s wer e excessiv e an d unrealistic . Th e discussion s at Washingto n had no t produce d a broa d workin g agreemen t between th e Unite d State s an d th e empire , n o entent e involvin g th e Atlantic powers had emerged , and Hughe s had no t committe d th e United State s to futur e participatio n i n an y international organisa tion. A s th e Secretar y of State' s lukewar m response to Borde n ha d indicated, th e Unite d State s ha d no t throw n of f isolationism an d could eve n laps e int o continentalism . Moreover , Hughe s woul d cautiously practise th e ar t o f the possible, guar d agains t premature moves, avoi d issue s whic h migh t rais e suspicio n o f entanglemen t in European affairs , an d acknowledg e that America n foreign polic y could not elude the grasp of domestic political and tactical consider ations. Consequently , short-term advance s i n Anglo-America n relations could not obscure the longrun uncertainties nor provide against a reversal of the more encouraging trends. Rather, despite th e Atlanticists' insistence that ne w opportunitie s were a t han d an d tha t agreemen t ove r Fa r Easter n problem s ha d ushered i n a ne w er a o f co-operation , Anglo-America n relations would return to th e les s heady atmosphere o f detailed negotiation s on specific issues. 8 Most of the issues in 1922 were familiar ones, fe w 3 Hankey to Lloyd George, 13 Jan. 1922, Lloyd George Papers, F/62/1/13

190 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y of the m were les s pressing o r difficult , an d t o th e unconverte d th e path coul d stil l seem ster n an d eve n forbidding . Indeed , afte r th e honeymoon of the Washingto n Conference, fundamental difference s and incompatibilitie s coul d re-emerg e whic h onl y th e mos t dedi cated Atlanticis t coul d ignor e o r regar d a s surmountable . Long standing irritant s an d source s o f distrus t remaine d an d a Britis h tendency t o dismis s th e Unite d State s policy-maker s a s amateuris h and moralisin g wa s matched b y America n doubts abou t th e long term inten t o f British diplomacy . A gnawing suspicion persiste d i n the Unite d State s tha t someho w Britain an d Japa n ha d outwitte d them an d had gaine d mor e from th e Washingto n Conferenc e than they, and was matched by continued interservice nava l rivaby . Th e great distanc e acros s the Atlanti c mad e persona l contact s difficult , and this fact seeme d pivotal t o those who, despite unhappy experiences wit h th e French , though t salvatio n cam e b y wa y o f summi t conferences. Moreover, in spite of Geddes's improve d touch, AngloAmerican relations wer e stil l not receivin g th e lubricant s o f sound representation. Finally , fe w disagreed wit h Hanke y that th e American press remained either hostile or indifferent t o the fate of relations between th e English-speakin g peoples , and , if anything, th e Wash ington Conference had emphasised th e competition for moral leadership rathe r tha n demonstratin g tha t eithe r Britai n o r th e Unite d States would acquiesce in the leadership of the other.4 Of th e issue s in Anglo-America n relations onl y the Iris h traged y and the question of oil exploration in the Middle East approache d a satisfactory level . The Iris h settlemen t was Lloyd George' s triump h and, despite Curzon' s instructions to Balfour t o resist any American attempt to insert the oil problem into the agenda, progress toward a settlement wa s made outside th e Washingto n Conferenc e with th e Already in mid-January Hankey suggested that the Washington Conference was of less importance than the Cannes and Genoa meetings, than Europe's economic problems and the questions surrounding Russia and Turkey. 4 Hankey to Lloyd George, Dec. 1921 and 13 Jan. 1922, Lloyd George Papers, F/62/1/11 and 13. Hankey saw a fluctuating competition for moral leadership; the United States securing it through Hughes's naval disarmament proposals, Britain winning the leadership over the submarine question, the United States regaining it by proposing rules on submarine warfare, Britain countering by her alternate rules, and the United States then forging ahead on the issue s of th e us e o f poisonous gases and th e framin g o f rules o f warfare .

191 PROSPECTS FO R ATLANTICIS M personal help o f John Cadman, Britain's officia l oi l expert. 6 Gedde s had warne d o f persisten t anti-Britis h propagand a emanatin g fro m the Standar d Oil Company, of continued suspicion that British poli cies were discriminatory and injurious to American national interests, and tha t H.P . Fletcher, while posing as a friend o f Britain, wa s unscrupulously perpetuating th e State Department's clos e co-operatio n with Standard Oil initiated b y Colby. Geddes had concluded, there fore, tha t a serious obstacle t o an Anglo-American agreement on oil policies woul d remai n s o long a s Fletche r hel d swa y in th e Stat e Department and he could only offer a s comfort rumours that Fletcher would become ambassador to Belgium . Hankey, however, fel t tha t a genera l improvemen t in Anglo-America n relations woul d enabl e Hughes to handle forces hostile to Britain such as Standard Oil, and Cadman in fact was able to lay the basis for an agreement permitting American participatio n i n th e developmen t o f Mesopotamia' s oi l resources.6 Cadman's work was valuable but othe r problems proved more difficult . Naval rivalry persisted despit e an d i n many cases because o f th e five-power treaty as experts and other s debated it s significance, impact an d intent. 7 Geddes , fo r instance , quickl y feare d tha t Britai n went precipitately to o far i n scrapping warship s an d might becom e a hostage to the United State s and France. H e warned tha t an element of risk existed not because of American malice bu t becaus e of the irresponsibilit y o f Congress, which amounte d almost to frivolity and reflecte d a n impenetrabl e ignoranc e o f internationa l affairs . Geddes reminde d Curzo n tha t Britai n wa s dependen t o n the goo d faith of Harding and Hughes and on a vague and unorganised public sentiment favourin g peac e an d disarmament , an d h e feare d that , without Hughes , Hardin g woul d b e unabl e t o contro l Congress . Equally, economic and commercial rivalry and the connecte d ques tions of merchant marine strength and control of cable facuities were too fundamenta l to b e affecte d seriousl y b y th e Washingto n Con ference's results , despite th e guidelines on China and the agreemen t on mandate islands in the Pacific. 5 Curzon to Balfour, 9 Nov. 1921, Balfour Papers, 49734; Rowland and Cadman, Ambassador for Oil, 100-4 6 Hankey to Lloyd George, 29 Nov. 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/62/1/6; Geddes to Curzon, 20 Jan. 1922, FO/414/249 7 Curzon to Geddes, 16 Oct. 1922; Gedde s to Curzon , 1 9 Oct. 1922, Kin g Papers, file 1178

192 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y Looking beyond the Pacific an d the Far East , both Lloyd George and Curzon had hoped that Balfour could use the opportunity of the negotiations i n Washingto n t o recreat e America n involvemen t i n the Graeco-Turkis h affair. 8 The y looke d fo r a n officiall y sponsore d prominent figure such as Root or Herbert Hoove r to undertake arbi tration a s a wa y t o restor e allie d unity , s o disrupte d b y France' s agreement with Kemal Ataturk, and to arrive at peace terms accept able to the Angora government. Lloyd George assumed that he could dictate to Athens and that the United States, acting as a 'disinterested intermediary,' coul d joi n wit h Britai n t o restor e peac e an d honou r in the Middl e East. Nothing came of the initiative an d th e absenc e of Unite d State s co-operatio n ca n hardly be equate d wit h Britain' s own error s an d th e duplicit y o f he r allie s a s reason s wh y Lloy d George's governmen t stumbled t o Chanak . Yet those who expecte d so muc h fro m Anglo-America n co-operation experience d furthe r disappointment a s they witnessed th e sa d confirmatio n rathe r tha n the reversal of a theme persisting since the Peace Conference. The two principal problem s in Anglo-American relations i n 1922, however, were war debt s an d wha t Lloy d Georg e identified a s th e whole question of European economic and political recovery . Atlanticism a s a realistic polic y woul d stan d o r fal l o n these tw o issue s and the y provide d th e crucia l tes t o f whethe r settlemen t o f Fa r Eastern problem s coul d produc e broade r an d mor e generou s co operation. Initiall y th e latter problem focusse d o n prospects fo r th e Genoa Conferenc e an d Britain' s attemp t t o secur e Unite d State s participation, but to Lloyd George at least much more was involved. His endeavours to curb French extremism , check financial chaos, aid economic reconstruction , preven t th e sprea d o f Bolshevism , an d secure a measur e of military an d ai r disarmamen t wer e part s o f a broad policy to achieve European peace and security. Consequently, the Geno a Conference , regarde d a s a pivota l ste p forwar d towar d these goals , too k on excessiv e significance and America n participa tion seeme d vital. 9 One cannot ignore th e suggestio n of desperatio n or even obsession on Lloyd George's part over this question , for on the whole he had little evidence to encourage him. Initially, Hughes would not permit eithe r th e Canne s discussions 8 Lloyd George to Balfour, 1 5 Nov. 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F/61/1/3; Grigg to Sir G. Thomas, 24 Nov. 1921, Grigg Papers, reel 1 9Hankey to Lloyd George, 13 Jan. 1922, Lloyd George Papers, F/62/1/13; Grigg to Thomas, 19 and 24 Nov. 1921, Grigg Papers, reels 2 and 1

193 PROSPECTS FO R ATLANTICIS M or prospects fo r the Geno a meeting to overshadow the Washingto n Conference, eve n thoug h certai n busines s group s applaude d at tempts to increase th e tempo of economic advance in Europe. Subsequently, as the Washington Conferenc e bore fruit, Hughe s wa s unwilling t o risk a congressional reaction agains t its results, just as he had bee n whe n confronted by Borde n o n the questio n o f a n inter national tribunal . Clearly , i n Hughes's opinion , prematur e an d precipitate steps toward furthe r international co-operation coul d resul t in a n isolationis t backlash , especiall y i f Europea n problem s wer e involved. I n addition , Hughe s sense d oppositio n t o negotiation s with th e Bolsheviks , particular fea r o f reinvolvement i n the repara tions tangle , an d eve n th e disapprova l o f pro-Leagu e group s wh o disliked competitive scheme s seeking to secure United States involvement abroad. Hughes argued, therefore, that timing was the essenc e and, to the disma y of the Atlanticist s an d th e despai r an d ange r of their critics, the United States placed Britain in a predicament. Dela y in calling the Genoa Conference did not suit Lloyd George's politica l and diplomati c timetable , ye t a prematur e reques t fo r America n attendance woul d mee t wit h a rebuff . Henc e Lloy d Georg e coul d either risk an invitation an d its rejection or delay the urgent work of reconstruction.10 Despite Hughes' s reluctanc e an d Poincaré' s obstruction , Lloy d George decide d t o gambl e o n th e Geno a Conference , buoye d b y faint wisps of encouragement that he somehow might secure American co-operation . Rebuf f cam e i n mid-Ma y and Gedde s delivere d the brutal but hardl y unexpected coup de grâce.11 Hughes, Gedde s reported, would not repent, he regarded th e Genoa Conference a s a grave error, and he would have no part of it. In Hughes's view , Bolshevism wa s crumblin g an d th e Sovie t governmen t wa s read y t o capitulate, but, repeating th e impac t o f allied intervention i n 1918, the Genoa Conference would play into Lenin's hands. The Bolshevik government now had a further opportunit y t o become the focu s of national loyalt y an d o f working class solidarity . Moreover , Hughes 10 Geddes to Curzon, 13 Jan. 1922, BD, 1st ser., xrv, no 547, 601-6; Hankey to Lloyd George, 20 Jan. 1922, Lloyd George Papers, F/62/1/15; Borden to King, 19 Jan. 1922, King Papers, file 1922 ( Bennett-Bruce ) HBED (Genoa) to Foreign Office, 1 5 and 16 May 1922, Lloyd George to Geddes, 16 May 1922 and Gedde s to Lloyd George, 17 May 1922, Grigg Papers, reel 10. American Ambassador Child in Rome had somehow raised Lloyd George's hopes of Hughes repenting.

194 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y felt that the conference was fundamentally unsound because its success depended o n the unlikely prospect o f the Bolshevik s admittin g error an d relinquishin g thei r doctrines , an d als o because i t place d an exaggerate d valu e o n Russia n trade. Consequently , Hughe s expected th e Bolsheviks to grow in confidence, successfully to demand new loans , gain a ne w leas e o n power , an d eve n pres s fo r de jure recognition. Befor e th e Unite d States would join in discussions with Lenin's representatives , Russi a mus t acknowledg e he r debts , con cede foreig n propert y rights , giv e jus t compensation , an d refrai n from pressin g Harding' s administration fo r loans. The mos t Hughes would offer, i n order to help save Lloyd George's face, was possibl e American participation i n conversation s between economi c experts , purely t o gain information and onl y if Russi a were not represented . Geddes concluded , therefore , tha t whil e Hughe s hel d offic e th e United State s would no t participate i n th e propose d discussion s a t The Hague , an d he warned Lloy d Georg e agains t an y ambassador or 'globe-trotter' who offered advice to the contrary. These were harsh words for Lloyd George to swallow and despair made digestion al l the more difficult. A s he told Harvey and Taft in July, the whol e panorama of postwar problem s became mor e diffi cult becaus e o f America n withdrawal. 12 Austri a wa s no w o n th e point o f collapse , German y hovered o n th e brin k o f communism, and Russi a tremble d an d wallowe d i n he r troubles . I f German y turned t o communism , Lloy d Georg e warned , the n Europ e face d industrial an d social upheaval, and the Unite d States must not only give immediate financial and economic aid but also assert a detached, moral influenc e t o hel p restor e reaso n an d coo l Europe' s passions . Lloyd Georg e admitte d tha t Britai n coul d no t giv e a mora l lea d because o f her ow n involvement and h e denounce d France , bein g consumed by her hatre d o f Germany, as beyond an y cal l t o reaso n unless the appea l came from Washington . History, the Premie r con cluded, would dam n the Unite d State s i f sh e ignored thi s deman d for responsibl e action . Harve y countere d b y enquirin g wh y Lloy d George had faile d t o initiate negotiation s o n war debts , suggestin g that Hughes intended first to settle with Britain an d then, in unison with her as the other great creditor nation, turn to the task in Europe. But the Unite d State s would not co-operate in Europe until Britai n 12 Notes of conversation, 5 July 1922, Grigg Papers, reel 10. Present were Lloyd George, Birkenhead, Churchill, Bonar Law, Grigg, Harvey, and Taft.

195 PROSPECTS FO R ATLANTICIS M had settle d he r debts , an d Harvey , therefore , in on e gesture , re opened Pandora's box. During the early days of the Washington Conference, Hankey had dared hop e tha t ne w rappor t i n Anglo-America n relations woul d lead to a settlement o n debts, but by February 1922 Geddes offere d little comfort. 13 H e warne d o f preparation s t o begi n collectio n o f allied war debts through the Foreign Deb t Refundin g Act , and that Britain would be foolish to expect special treatment or any significant relief fro m th e Harding administration. 14 Despite th e obvious intent of Unite d State s policy , Lloy d George , involve d wit h th e Geno a Conference, delayed , an d the cabine t di d not decide until mid-Jul y on measures which were eventually embodied in the Balfour Note of 1 August 1922, addressed t o Britain's debtor s in Europe.15 This note offered cancellatio n of all allied debts owed to Britain and promised remittance o f reparatio n payment s receive d fro m Germany , providing Britain received reciprocal and generou s treatment from th e United States . Shoul d th e Unite d State s no t reciprocate , Britai n would collec t fro m Europ e onl y what Americ a demande d o f her, but obviousl y Britai n preferre d a multilatera l cancellatio n o f wa r debts as the preface to a combined effort t o initiate economi c recovery. Equally clearl y Britai n was placin g th e onu s o f rejection an d failure on the United States.16 Whatever th e economi c an d politica l merit s o f thi s policy , an d Hankey subsequentl y endorse d i t a s a n ac t o f honesty, good faith , and firmness, the Cit y oppose d it , th e government' s own financial 13 Hankey to Lloyd George, 29 Nov. 1921, Lloyd Georg e Papers, F/62/1/6; Geddes to Curzon, 6 Feb. 1922, ro/414/249 14 The latest date for maturity of obligations was June 1947; th e interest rate would be not less than 4/i per cent; no part of any debt could be cancelled despite any deferring of interest payments; the bond s of one government were not acceptable in exchange for those of another; and the Senate would scrutinise the whole refunding process. ISDugdale, Balfour, n , 350-1; Young, Balfour, 423-4 ; France, under Poincaré, reacted fiercely against the Balfour Note. 16As on the question of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1921, Balfour seeme d here to deny his Atlanticist belief s. Again, however, this became a tactical question with Balfour believing that firmness was the path to Anglo-American co-operation and the preservation of Britain's interests. Alternatively, he may have opposed his colleagues but would not desert Lloyd George.

196 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y advisers warned agains t it, an d th e Atlanticists , wit h Grig g prominent an d threatenin g resignation , denounce d it . Si r B.P. Blackett, controller o f financ e a t th e Treasury , appealin g directl y t o Lloy d George, described the policy as 'fraught with evil consequences' and as 'fundamentally insincere ' since the governmen t had rejecte d two practical alternatives. 17 Blacket t argue d tha t Britai n coul d eithe r fund an d pay her debt to the United States, retaining a free han d in relation t o European debt s owe d to her, or sh e could insist, a s she had in the past, that Britain's debt to the United States was an indistinguishable par t o f th e whol e o f intergovernmen t indebtedness . Instead, the cabinet professed to be ready to repay the United States but intende d t o collec t fro m Europ e wha t Washingto n demande d of her. In Blackett's view the cabinet, knowing full well that such a policy wa s impossible t o implement , wa s actin g insincerely , eithe r merely pretending to be prepared to fund Britain's debt to the United States, or intending eventuall y to pay Washington, absolve Europe, but t o grumbl e i n publi c i n orde r t o indic t America n callousness. Britain could not collect from Europ e what she owed to the Unite d States, and Blackett urged a sincere attempt t o fun d th e American debt, preparator y t o a n attemp t t o rescu e Europ e fro m financia l chaos. Such a policy, he argued, might secure American co-operation and h e aske d 'If w e reall y mea n to tr y an d sav e Europe an d ar e merely venting our preliminary grumble before doing so, is it worth while to begin by pillorying American selfishness?' Grigg's assault was more emotional.18 Lloyd George must initiate heroic measures to sav e Europe an d avoi d the futil e polic y o f at tempting a n ac t o f salvatio n without th e vita l co-operatio n o f th e United States . Grig g laid dow n two axiom s fundamental to AngloAmerican relations . First , tha t al l American s regarded th e Britis h as a superio r peopl e becaus e o f thei r tradition , experience , skill , judgment, hig h standards , mora l authority, an d thei r soundnes s of mind an d heart. Onl y this belie f ha d prompte d American s to len d money to Britain rather than directly to the allies, and Grigg warned lest Britain slip from he r pedestal an d sin k down to the leve l of th e 'lesser tribes without the law' who inhabit the rest of Europe. Grigg 17 Blackett memorandum, 'Inter-Governmental Debt,' 1 2 July 1922, Lloyd George Papers, F/86/2/8 ISGrigg memorandum, 'Our debt to the U.S.A. and the European situation,' 6 July 1922, ibid., F/86/2/4

197 PROSPECTS FO R ATLANTICIS M thanked God he was an Englishman. Second, he suggeste d tha t th e United State s wa s abnormall y suspiciou s of Britis h diplomac y jus t because of this recognition of superiority. Washington worried about being out-manoeuvred in negotiation an d coul d no t be generou s for fear o f bein g trappe d an d defeated . Grig g urged , therefore , tha t Britain remov e thes e suspicions , launc h a n effectiv e appeal , an d arouse the generous elements in American life. With regard to war debts Grigg argued that failure to fund would deal a blow at Britain's credit, be a slur on her character, an d reveal that she was no better tha n the pitiful European bankrupts. To deny her ow n superiority a s a mere manœuvr e in orde r t o avoi d payin g her debts woul d be base, mean, and, moreover, futile a s the Unite d States would never believe tha t Britai n was like the res t o f Europe . American opinion , Grig g suggested , woul d denounc e Britai n fo r adopting a fraudulen t position , pretendin g bankruptcy , an d de meaning herself merely to discredit the United States. In sum, Grigg warned against adopting an ineffectual policy because Britain would be forced eventually to fund her debt; against alienating the Harding administration, retarding the rate of European recovery, and actually making th e repaymen t o f he r ow n deb t ultimatel y mor e difficult . Furthermore, h e pointed ou t that th e Cit y preferred t o repay tha n to ris k th e los s of credi t an d tha t Britai n mus t repay to avoi d th e threat of a European collapse. In Grigg' s view , therefore , practica l an d mora l consideration s reinforced eac h other an d he sa w no alternativ e t o funding an d re paying th e deb t an d disassociatin g Britai n fro m genera l allie d in debtedness. Lloy d Georg e should provide mora l leadership, cance l unilaterally th e debt s owe d t o Britain , an d gathe r th e harves t of American reciproca l generosit y whic h Grig g fel t sur e woul d b e forthcoming. Britain's declaration of policy should omit all reference to her obligations to the United States and should make a munificent offer t o Europe a s part o f a settlement of German, Hungarian, an d Bulgarian reparations , an d a s a gestur e t o promot e th e rescu e of Austria. Then Lloy d Georg e could, a s the leade r o f one of the tw o great credito r nations , as k th e Unite d State s t o cal l anothe r con ference a t Washingto n t o implement a n ac t o f salvation. Here fro m Grigg was a classical statement of Atlanticism; Britain and the United States jointly were the hope o f Europe an d the world and wer e th e source of moral leadership an d disintereste d vigour . He had n o illusions about the 'manceuverers' in the cabinet who would oppose this

198 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y policy but he exhorted Lloyd George to assert himself, stating 'That Winston is the protagonist o f the bargainin g polic y deepens, i f anything could, my suspicion of it.' The cabinet, however, decided on this "bargaining policy,' and for a government which had demande d much of the Unite d State s th e Balfour Note was a sad denouement. American opinion regarded the note as a rebuke at least an d eve n as an insult, or as an attemp t b y Britain t o avoi d he r obligations . B y Octobe r Ambassado r Harvey warned Curzon of the alarmingly low level to which Anglo-American relations ha d fallen , suggestin g that the y ha d rarel y bee n worse. 19 United State s commentator s had unanimousl y condemned th e Bal four Note as a misrepresentation o f the situatio n an d a s evidence of Britain's ba d faith . Curzo n disclaime d an y persona l responsibility , since he was recuperating abroad when the government drew up the document an d Balfou r ha d manage d the Foreig n Offic e i n hi s ab sence. He merely suggested that Harvey surely exaggerated. Geddes, however, i n repl y an d partl y i n defenc e o f his ow n position, cate gorically denied Harvey's views. 20 He insisted that Britain was never more popular than a t that moment , the America n people an d thei r government wer e friendly , th e ton e o f th e pres s wa s remarkabl y cordial, an d eve n Congress' s mute d anti-Britis h gesture s owe d les s to malice than to irresponsibility, frivolity , ignorance, an d a concern for a posture of 'America first.' Furthermore, Geddes denied that th e Balfour Not e had produce d a n uproar agains t Britain , even though A.W. Mello n had commented on its ambiguous language and a mild reaction o f commercia l rivalr y ha d developed . Gedde s dismisse d Harvey's view s a s reflectin g th e influenc e o f tha t sectio n o f th e British press hostile to Lloyd George, or as a result o f his fea r tha t the United States would receive the odiu m of Europe. He eve n suggested tha t Harvey' s word s were a lever t o force Britain' s han d on the questio n o f contro l o f th e Atlanti c cabl e system . However , t o substantiate his basic proposition, he emphasise d Hughes's persona l cordiality an d th e absenc e of 'tail-twisting' an d anglophobi a i n th e current American election campaigns. The period had ended a s it had begun with Geddes contradictin g Harvey, an d Curzo n left t o unravel thei r conflictin g interpretation s of the true state of Anglo-American relations. In retrospect, Harvey' s assessment was clearly more accurate than that of Geddes, American 19 Curzon to Geddes, 12 Oct. 1922, King Papers, file 283 20 Geddes to Curzon, 25 Oct. 1922, ibid.

199 PROSPECTS FO R ATLANTICIS M response t o the Balfour Not e was neither restrained no r cordial, and Atlanticism ha d eithe r bee n flagrantl y neglecte d an d eve n under mined o r foun d wanting . Give n th e weaknes s o f thei r positio n i n London and despite the salutary but brief impact of the Washingto n Conference, th e Atlanticist s shoul d not hav e bee n surprise d a t thi s neglect an d their critic s could with ease resume a censorious role. The proble m wa s tragicall y cyclical , fo r Anglo-America n rela tions rathe r tha n bein g 'special,' seemed enmeshe d i n exasperatin g contradictions. Th e Atlanticists fel t tha t a fundamental and uniqu e rapport existe d betwee n th e Britis h empir e an d th e Unite d State s but sustaine d co-operatio n did not develop . Lloy d George' s government would not base the future o f British foreign policy on the good faith o f the Unite d State s an d successiv e America n administration s did no t mak e th e expecte d response . O n balanc e th e Atlanticist s tended t o indict Londo n mor e strongl y than Washington an d the n in despair turned in varying degree to other themes and solutions. The sceptic s an d th e hostile , dominatin g Lloy d George' s unbal anced an d vulnerabl e coalition , ha d waite d fo r a serie s o f gesture s from th e Unite d State s and yet had frequentl y acted i n suc h a way as t o undermin e cordialit y betwee n Londo n an d Washington . A t one and th e sam e time they ha d professe d to expect littl e an d ye t had demande d muc h of the Unite d States , an d ha d faile d bot h t o encourage the desire d reciproca l gesture s and to refrain fro m bitte r complaints whe n none was forthcoming. Curiously but no t surpris ingly the y ha d conducte d Britis h foreig n policy fro m a positio n of scepticism o r worse but wer e disillusione d and angere d whe n thei r fears wer e confirmed , an d blame d th e Unite d State s fo r thei r ow n frustration. Despit e Atlanticist efforts , therefore , attempt s t o secur e Anglo-American co-operatio n an d a ne w entent e ha d fare d badl y in the postwar years, and onl y because of the vas t dimension of th e problems involved can the participants escap e censure. Those critical of Lloyd George may indict hi m for failure; those more sympathetic will acknowledg e th e difficultie s o f conductin g globa l polic y i n a period of reconstruction. Clearly th e apparen t advanc e i n Anglo-America n relations cam e during th e Washington Conference , and the resultin g Pacifi c treat y system wa s no t devoi d o f value , bu t th e promis e o f co-operatio n extending fro m Fa r Easter n an d naval issues to encompass Europe , the Middl e East , an d financial problems faile d t o materialise . Th e Washington Conferenc e stoo d virtuall y i n isolation , an d despit e intermittent co-operatio n ove r such matters a s reparations, an d de -

200 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y spite a period of rapport between Ramsay MacDonald and Roosevelt, the succeedin g years brought onl y new irritants an d disputes . Th e cruiser question reactivated nava l rivalry in 1927 and Austen Chamberlain quarreled wit h Fran k Kellogg . Economic and financia l col lapse an d th e Manchuria n crisi s revived misunderstanding. Neville Chamberlain an d Roosevel t could neve r create a dialogue, an d th e years of American neutrality between September 1939 and December 1941 were a logical conclusion. The Britis h empire an d th e Unite d States were not competitiv e solitudes , but th e Atlantícist s were lef t to lamen t what the y regarde d a s lost opportunities . I n thei r view , the liberal-democratic power s were launched into the postwar dec ades fatally handicapped. In fact , a s far a s the interwa r years were concerned, the Atlanticist s reached fo r a n illusion, but thi s di d no t deter elite s in Britain and th e Unite d States , wit h a former scepti c oratorically prominent in London, from resurrecting the theme when faced with similar predicaments a t the en d of the secon d great war.

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203 BIBLIOGRAPH Y Borden, H., éd., Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs, 2 vols., Toronto 1938 Butler, N.M., Across the Busy Years, n, New York 1940 Cecil, R., A Great Experiment, London 1941 Cecil, Viscount, All the Way, London 1949 Chamberlain, Sir A., Down the Years, London 193 5 Chatfield, Lord, The Navy and Defence, i , London 1942 Churchill, W.S., The World Crisis, TV, The Aftermath, Londo n 1929 Daniels, J., The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 1913-1921, éd. J. Cronon, Lincoln, Nebraska 1963 Daniels, J. , The Wilson Era: Years of War and After, 1917-1923, Chapel Hill, NC 1944 Geddes, Lord, The Forging of a Family, London 195 2 - The Truth About Reparations and War Debts, London 1932 - Where Are We Going, New York 1923 Grey, Viscount, Twenty-five Years, 2 vols., London 192 5 Haldane, R.B., An Autobiography, London 1929 Hankey, Lord, The Supreme Command 1914-18, n, London 196 1 - Diplomacy by Conference, Londo n 1946 Hardinge, Lord, Old Diplomacy, London 1947 Hoover, H.C., The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, New York 1957 Houston, D.F., Eight Years with Wilsons Cabinet, 2 vols., New York 1926 Hughes, W.M., The Splendid Adventure, London 1929 Lloyd George, D., Memoirs of the Peace Conference, 2 vols., New Haven, Conn. 1939 Long, Viscount, Memoirs, London 1923 Meighen, A., Unrevised and Unrepented: Debating Speeches and Others, Toronto 1949 Pearce, G.F., Carpenter to Cabinet: Thirty-seven Years of Parliament, London 195 1 Peterson, M.D., Both Sides of the Curtain, London 1950 Repington, C.A.C., After the War: A Diary, London 1922 Riddell, Lord, Lord RiddelFs Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After, 1918-23, London 193 3 Seymour, C., Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 4 vols., Boston 1926-8 Simpson, B.L., An Indiscreet Chronicle From the Pacific, Ne w York 1922 Steed, H.W., Through Thirty Years, 1892-1922, 2 vols., London 192 4

204 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y Vansittart, Lord, The Mist Procession, London 195 8 Wallace, W.S., Memoirs of Sir George Foster, Toronto 193 7 White, W.A., The Autobiography of William Allen White, New York 1946 Wilson, E.B., My Memoirs, New York 193 8 SECONDARY SOURCES

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205 BIBLIOGRAPHY Hancock, W.K. and J. Van der Poel, eds., Selections from the Smuts Papers, m, June 1910-November 1918, rv, November 1918-August 1919, Londo n 1966 Hendrick, B.J., Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, 3 vols., New York 1922-5 Hyde, H.M., Lord Reading: The Life of Rufus Isaacs, First Marquess of Reading, London 1967 Jessup, P.C., Elihu Root, 2 vols., New York 1938 Johnson, C.O., Borah of Idaho, New York 1936 Johnson, W.F., The Life of Warren G. Harding, Chicago 1923 - George Harvey: A Passionate Patriot, New York 1929 Jones, T., Lloyd George, Cambridge, Mass . 1951 Lloyd George, R., My Father, Lloyd George, New York 1961 Marjoribank, E., The Life of Lord Curzon, London 1932 Mallet, Sir Charles, Mr. Lloyd George: A Study, London 1930 Maurice, Sir F., Haldane, 1915-1928, London 1939 McKenna, M.C., Borah, Ann Arbor 1961 Millin, S.G., General Smuts, London 1936 Morrison, E.E., Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy, Boston 1942 Mosley, L.O., Curzon: The End of an Epoch, London 1960 Nicolson, H., Curzon: The Last Phase 1919-1925, London 1934 Ogg, D., Herbert Fisher, London 1947 Owen, F., Tempestuous Journey: Lloyd George His Life and Times, London 1954 Perkins, D., Charles Evans Hughes and American Democratic Statesmanship, Boston 1956 Pétrie, Sir C., The Life and Letters of Sir Austen Chamberlain, 2 vols., London 1939-40 - Walter Long and His Times, London 1936 Pound, R. and G. Harmsworth, Northcliffe, Londo n 1959 Pusey, M.J., Charles Evans Hughes, 2 vols., New York 1951 Rawson, G., Earl Beatty, Admiral of the Fleet, London 1930 Ronaldshay, The Earl of, The Life of Lord Curzon, m, London 1928 Rowland, J. and Baron Cadman, Ambassador for Oil: The Life of John, First Baron Cadman, London 1960 Schriftgieser, K., The Gentleman from Massachusetts: Henry Cabot Lodge, Boston 1944 Sommer, D., Haldane of Cloan, London 1960 Thompson, M., David Lloyd George, London 1948 Trevelyan, G.M. , Grey of Fallodon, London 1937

206 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y Waley, Sir L.D., Edwin Montague, London 196 4 Wemyss, Lady, The Life and Letters of Lord Wester Wemyss, London 193 5 Whyte, W.F., William Morris Hughes: His Life and Times, Sydne y 1957 Wrench, J.E., Alfred Lord Milner, London 195 8 Young, K., Arthur James Half our, London 196 3 Monographs Albion, R.G., Makers of Naval Policy, 1789-1947, Washington 195 0 Allen, H.C., Great Britain and the United States, New York 195 5 Bagley, W.M., The Road to Normaky, Baltimore 196 2 Bailey, T.A., Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace, New York 1944 - Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal, New York 194 8 Beaverbrook, Lord, Politicians and the War, 1914-16,2 vols., London 1928 and 193 2 - Men and Power, 1917-1918, London 195 6 - The Decline and Fall of David Lloyd George, London 196 3 Borden, R.L. , Canada in the Commonwealth: From Conflict to Cooperation, London, 1929 Bourne, K. and D.C. Watt, eds., Studies in International History, London 196 7 Brebner, J.B., North Atlantic Triangle: Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain, New Haven, Conn. 194 5 Buell, R.L., The Washington Conference, New York 1922 Bywater, H.C., Sea Power in the Pacific, Ne w York 192 1 - Navies and Nations, New York 1927 Carter, G.M., The British Commonwealth and International Security, Toronto 194 7 Chang, Chung-Fu, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Baltimore 193 1 Chaput, R.A., Disarmament in British Foreign Policy, London 193 5 de Conde, A., Isolation and Security, Durham, N C 195 7 Davis, F., The Atlantic System, London 194 1 Dennis, A.L.P., The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Los Angeles 192 3 De Novo, J. A., American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939, Minneapolis 196 3 Ellis, L.E., Bjepublican Foreign Policy 1921-33, New Brunswick, NJ 1968 Gardiner, W.H., Writings on Sea Power and American Naval Policy, private, nd

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Gelber, L.M., The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship, London 193 8 Gilbert, M., éd., A Century of Conflict, 1850-1950, London 196 6 Graebner, N., An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century, New York 196 1 Griswold, A.W., The Far Eastern Policy of the United States, New York 193 8 Hoag, C.L., Preface to Preparedness: The Washington Disarmament Conference and Public Opinion, Washington, DC 1941 Ichihashi, Y., Washington Conference and After, Stanford 192 8 Johnson, F.A. , Defence by Committee: The British Committee of Imperial Defence, 1880-1959, London 196 0 Kenworthy, J. M. and G. Young, Freedom of the Seas, London 192 8 Kerr, Philip et al., Approaches to World Problems, New Haven, Conn . 1924 Link, A., President Wilson and his English Critics, London 195 9 Longrigg, S.H., Oil in the Middle East, London 195 4 Lower, A.R.M., Canada and the Far East, New York 1940 Martin, L.W., Peace Without Victory, New Haven, Conn . 195 0 Mayer, A.J., Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking, 1918-1919, New York 196 7 Mott, F.L., American Journalism, New York 1950 Nish, I. H., The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of the Two Island Empires, 1894-1907, London 196 6 Northedge, F.S., The Troubled Giant, London 196 6 Ollivier, M., The Colonial and Imperial Conferences 1887-1937, Ottawa 195 4 Rappaport, A., The Navy League of the United States, Detroit 196 2 Roskill, S., Naval Policy Between the Wars, i, The Period of AngloAmerican Antagonism 1919-29, London 196 8 Russett, R., Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge, Mass. 196 3 Sprout, H.M., Toward a New Order of Sea Power, Princeton 1946 Sullivan, M., The Great Adventure at Washington, New York 1922 Tate, M., The Disarmament Illusion, New York 1942 - The United States and Armaments, Cambridge , Mass. 194 8 The History of the Times, TV, London 195 2 Thompson, J.M., Russia, Bolshevism and the Versailles Peace, Princeton 196 6 Toynbee, A. J., Survey of International Affairs, 1920-23, London 192 7 - The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations Since the Peace Settlement, London 192 8

208 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y Ullman, R.H., Britain and the Russian Civil War November 1918 to February 1920, Princeton 1968 Van Alstyne, R.W., American Crisis Diplomacy, Stanford 1952 Vinson, J.C., The Parchment Peace: The United States Senate and the Washington Conference, Athens , Georgia 1955 Watt, D.C., Personalities and Policies, London 1965 Wheeler, G.E. , Prelude to Pearl Harbour: The United States Navy and the Far East 1921-31, Columbia, Missour i 1963 Willert, Sir A., The Road to Safety: A Study in Anglo-American Relations, London 1952 Young, E.J., Powerful America, New York 1936 Articles Anon., The Victor y that will End the War,' Round Table, vm, 30, March 1918,221-37 Asada, S., 'Japan's "Special Interests" and the Washington Conference , 1921-22,' American Historical Review, LXVD, Oct. 1961,62-70 Beloff, M., "The Special Relationship: An Anglo-American Myth,' in M. Gilbert, éd., A Century of Conflict, 1850-1950, London, 1966, 151-71 Brebner, J.B., 'Canada, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference,' Political Science Quarterly, L, 1935,45-57 Curtis, L., "Windows of Freedom,' Round Table, ix, 33, Dec. 1918, 1-36 De Novo, J.A., "The Movement for an Aggressive American Oil Policy Abroad, 1918-1920,' American Historical Review, LXI, July 1956, 854-76 Department of External Affairs ( Ottawa), 'Christie Memorandum, 1 June 1921, The Anglo-Japanes e Alliance, " 'Monthly Bulletin, xvm, Sept. 1966,402-13 Fry, M.G., 'The Imperial War Cabinet, the United States and the Freedom of the Seas,' Royal United Service Institution Journal, ex, Nov. 1965,353-62 - "Th e North Atlantic Triangle and the Abrogation of the AngloJapanese Alliance, ' Journal of Modern History, xxxix, March 1967, 46-64 - 'Britain , the Allies and the Problem of Russia, 1918-1919,' Canadian Journal of History, n, Sept. 1967,3,62-84 Gardiner, W.H., 'Political and Naval Problems o f the Pacific, 1921,'

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March 1921, Pamphlet No 2-5061, Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa Galbraith, J.S., The Imperia l Conference of 1921 and the Washington Conference,' Canadian Historical Review, xxix, June 1948,143-52 Hall, H. Duncan, The Britis h Commonwealth and the Founding of the League Mandate System,' in Bourne, K. and D.C. Watt, eds., Studies in International History, London 1967,345-68 Kerr, Philip, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance,' Round Table, xi, Dec. 1920,87-97 - Th e British Empire, the League of Nations, and the United States,' Round Table, x, 38, March 1920,221-53 - Th e End of War,' Round Table, v, 20, Sept. 1915,772-96 - Th e Foundations of Peace,' Round Table, v, 19, June 1915,589-625 - Th e Harvest of Victory,' Round Table, K, 36, Sept. 1919,645-71 - Th e Harvest of War,' Round Table, vi, 21, Dec. 1915,1-32 - Th e Making of Peace,' Round Table, vn, 25, Dec. 1916,1-13 - Th e Principle of Peace,' Round Table, vi, 23, June 1916,391-429 - "Walte r Page,' Round Table, xm, 50, March 1923,289-99 - "Wa r Aims,' Round Table, vi, 24, Sept. 1916,607-13 - Th e War for Public Bight,' Round Table, vi, 22, March 1916, 193-231 Lower, A.R.M., 'Loring Christie and the Genesis of the Washington Conference of 1921-22,' Canadian Historical Review, XLvn, March 1966,38-48 Nish, I.H., 'Japan and the Ending of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,' in Bourne, K. and D. C. Watt, eds., Studies in International History, London 1967,369-84 Tate, M. and F. Foy, 'More Light on the Abrogation of the AngloJapanese Alliance,' Political Science Quarterly, LXXTV, 1959,532-53 Vinson, J.C., The Draftin g of the Four Power Treaty of the Washington Conference,' Journal of Modern History, xxv, March 1953,40-7 - Th e Imperial Conference of 1921 and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,' Pacific Historical Review, xxxi, Aug. 1962,257-66 Wheeler, G.E., The United States Navy and War in the Pacific,' World Affairs Quarterly, Oct. 1959,199-207 - Th e United States Navy and the Japanese Enemy, 1919-1931,' Miütary Affairs, xn , Aug. 1957,61-74 Theses Bowen, A.D., Jr, The Disarmament Movement 1918-35,' Columbia University 1956

210 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y Fry, M.G., 'Anglo-American-Canadian Relations with special reference to Far Eastern and Naval Issues, 1918-22,' London University 1963 Raffo, P.S., 'Robert Cecil and the League of Nations 1916-1927,' Liverpool University 1967 Smith, P.A., 'Lord Lothian and British Foreign Policy 1918-1939,' Carleton University 1968 Spinks, C.N., 'A History of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-22,' Stanford University 1936

Index Admiralty (Great Britain) criti c of Atlanticism 17; postwar naval policy 39-40, 41, 43; freedom of the seas 39; Pacific security 71-2, 74; Anglo- Japanese alliance 71-2 Adriatic problems 5 0 Alston, Sir Beilby attitud e toward Japan and Atlanticism 17, 79; renewal of Anglo-Japanese alliance 76-8, 83, 87, 109; memorandum opposing renewal of Anglo- Japanese alliance 79 Amery, L.S. and Round Table group 12n; sceptical of Atlanticism 32-3; and the League 32; concern for empire 32-3 Anderson, Chandler P. 167 , 168 Anglo-American relations x , 35—7, 192; postwar issues 37—40; war debts 47-50; reparations 50; Adriatic 50; Middle East 50; oil politics 50-1; Yap 51; secret treaties 51—2; cable systems 52; Ireland 52-4; Pacific and Far East 56-8; preliminary Pacific conference issue 147-50; impact

of Washington Conference 189-90; issues in 1922 199-200 Anglo-Japanese alliance x ; renewal 58, 67; functioning of 68, 69; United States distrust 69; alternative British policies 69-71; impact of Washington Conference 174 Ashton-Gwatkin, F.T.A. advic e on Anglo-Japanese alliance 85-6 Astor, Waldorf 1 2 Atarurk, Kemal 19 2 Atlanticists (Atlanticism) thesis , x, 6, 17-23, 26-7, 35-7, 197; identification 6-17; critics of 6, 35-7, 67; sceptics 27-33; those hostile 34-5, 153; opportunities in 1921 56, 67, 68, 120, 153; renewal of Anglo-Japanese alliance 58-9, 68, 120; Washington Conference 164, 177-8; prospects in 1922 187, 190-200 passim; fourpower treaty 189 Balfour, Arthur J. a n Atlanticist 15-16; a Pan Anglo-Saxon 15-16; view of Lloyd George 16;

212 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y and the League 16, 23, 26; renewal of Anglo- Japanese alliance 16, 81n, 115, 160, 163; naval policy 16, 17, 42n, 44n; loss of power 27; postwar commercial policy 38; wartime secret treaties 51-2; mission to Washington 1917 54; representation in Washington 54, 55n; Pacific defence policy review 118-20; at Imperial Conference 133, 136; delegate to Washington Conference 158n; preparations for Washington Conference 160; draft three-power treaty 163-4; negotiations at Washington Conference 164-77; analysis of fourpower treaty 177; reaction to Borden's scheme 182, 185, 186; view of Washington Conference 189; war debts 1922 195n BalfourNote 195,198,19 9 Barclay, Sir C. 5 4 Barnes, G.N. attitud e toward Atlanticism 7-8; and the League 8, 26 Baruch, Bernard 1 0 Beatty, Admiral Earl hostil e toward Atlanticism, 33—4; naval policy 41n, 43, 44, 45, 46; delegate to Washington Conference 158n Beer.G.L. 2 4 Benson, Admiral W.S. 36n,38 n Bentmck, C.H. fo r retention of Anglo-Japanese alliance 81n, 84-5 Birkenhead, Lord 194n ; hostile toward Atlanticism 33; ruling on Anglo-Japanese alliance 110, 111, 140

Blackett,SirB.P. 19 6 Bliss, R.W. 12 6 Board of Trade (Grea t Britain) support of Atlanticism 17, 39; opposed to renewal of AngloJapanese alliance 77-8 BonarLaw, A. 194n;andth e League 26; sceptical of Atlanticism 26, 30; naval policy 41n, 44, 45, 46; war debts negotiation s 192047 Borah, Senator W.E. campaig n for arms limitation 46, 59; views on foreign policy 61, 62, 63n Borden, Sir Robert attitud e toward Atlanticism 10-11; Canadian foreign policy 11; and the League 26; loss of influence 27; representation in Washington 55n; delegate to Washington Conference 154n; role at Washington Conference 164, 165, 172, 177-8; special initiatives at Washington Conference 178-86 Bottomley.H. 3 6 Brand, R.H. 1 2 Brandegee, Senator F.B. 63 n BrebnerJ.B. 92n , lOOn, 145 British Chambers of Commerce in China oppose d to Anglo-Japanese alliance 77, 109 British Empire Delegation - Peac e Conference 1919 and Atlanticism 6; and the League 23,25 - Washingto n Conference negotia tions on Anglo-Japanese alliance 164, 165, 171, 172, 173, 175, 177; Hankey's views of 165n; reaction to Borden's scheme 179, 180, 185

213 INDEX Bryan, William J. 178- 9 Butler, N.M. 15 n Buxton, Sydney 55 n Cabinet (Grea t Britain) wa r debts 1920-1 48, 49-50, 60; representation in Washington 54n; attitude toward Japan 58, 69; renewal of Anglo- Japanese allianc e 58, 69-71, 91, 102-3, 106, 13940; views of Harding's administration 59; naval policy 59-60; 30 May 1921 decision on AngloJapanese alliance 116; Pacific defence policy 119-20; Washington Conference policy 172; war debts 1922 195, 198 Cable systems 50-1,12 5 Cadman, Sir John 19 1 Canadian government foreig n policy 11; concern with AngloAmerican relations 75, 91-2; and Washington Conference 180 Cecil, Lord Robert attitud e toward Atlanticism 8-9; and the League 8-9, 23-4, 26; opinion of Lloyd George 8-9; naval policy 8-9; loss of office 27; representatio n in Washington 54n Chamberlain, Sir Austen attitud e toward the League 26; sceptical of Atlanticism 31; naval policy 43, 44, 45; war debts negotiations 1920-21 47, 49; and mandates 47; suggested representative in Washington 54, 55; renewal of Anglo-Japanese alliance 115, 118; at Imperial Conference 131, 138n; and Kellogg 200 Chamberlain, N. 20 0 Chaote, Joseph 15 n

Child, R.W. 193 n Chinda, ViscountS. 57,86,8 9 Chinese government (Peking ) op position to Anglo- Japanese alliance 77-8, 109 Christian Science Monitor 96 n Christie, Loring C. attitud e toward Atlanticism 10-11; Canadian foreign policy 11; opposition to renewal of Anglo- Japanese alliance 92, 100; 1 February 1921 memorandum 100-2; 3 March 1921 memorandum 103-5; 23 April 1921 memorandum 108; 1 June 1921 memorandum 108-9; preparations for Washington Conference 154 Churchill, Winston 194n ; attitud e toward Bolshevism 4; and the League 26; sceptical of Atlanticism 31; naval policy 41n, 43, 45, 46, 75; for retention of AngloJapanese alliance 43, 44, 74-^5, 115, 117; relations with Ottawa 103, 106-7; at Imperial Conference 125-6, 130, 133; preliminary Pacific conference issue 149, 150; attitude toward Washington Conference 158; reaction to Washington Conference 164n Clemenceau, Georges peac e conference policy 3-5 Clive, R.H. 7 7 Colby, B. influenc e on United States policy 35, 36n, 37n, 191; relations with Geddes 55; Far Eastern policy 78, 79 Commercial rivalry 38-9 Committee of Imperial Defence naval policy December 1920 41-5, 59, 74-5; Pacific security

214 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y and Anglo-Japanese alliance 72, 73-4, 119; Singapore naval base 119 Cónsul-General in Chicago (British) 5 3 Cooper, J.A. 94 n CoxJ.M. 52,6 1 Craigie, R.L. 45 ; analysis of Harding cabinet 64 Crewe, Lord 55 n Crowe, Sir Eyre attitud e toward United States 22n; hostile toward Atlanticism 33; preference for Anglo-Japanese alliance 79n, 80; view of Geddes 142 n Crown Prince of Japan 11 0 Curtis, Lionel a n Atlanticist 12, 15, 18; on race and empire, 12, 15, 18; and the League, 23n Curzon, Lord ix ; postwar policy 5; views of United States 22n, 124-5; and the League 26; hostile to Atlanticism 26, 33-4; naval policy 4 In, 43, 44; war debts 1920-1 49n, 60; Middle East 50; oil politics 51, 190-1; representation in Washington 54n , 56, 66; Far Eastern policy 57, 71; renewal of Anglo-Japanese alliance 71, 72, 80, 81n, 83, 84, 85, 86, 89, 91, 102-3, 106n, 139; attitude toward China 109, 132n, 143; opinion of B.L. Simpson 109, 132; extension of AngloJapanese alliance 110-11; case for renewal of Anglo- Japanese alliance 30 May 1921 113-15; at Imperial Conference 121, 124-5, 131-3, 136, 141-3; conversations with Harvey 133-4, 138n,

143, 145; conversations with Hayashi 142-3; preliminary Pacific conference issue 147—50, 155; an d Anglo-Japanese relations 151, 155; opinion of Harvey and Geddes 155; preparations for Washington Confer ence 155, 158, 160; expectations of Washington Conference 156-7; reactions to Washington Conference 172, 174, 188, 189; Middle Eastern policy 1922 192; war debts 1922 198 Cutch, Maharajah of 13 9 DafoeJ.W. 92 n Daily Telegraph, The 11 0 Daniels, Josephus nava l policy 38, 39n,40,46 Davis, J.W. ambassado r in London 56,87

Davis, N.H. 52,78

Dawson, G. 1 2 de Bunsen, Sir M. 3 8 Devonshire, Duke of 55 n Denby, Edwin 16 ; rebuff of Lee 59,99 Dixon, Frederick 5 4 Eliot, Sir Charles renewa l of Anglo- Japanese alliance 80-1, 83, 117; distrust of United State s 80-1 Fall,A.B. 6 5 Findlay, SirJ. 124n Finlay, Lord 55 n Fisher, H.A.L. attitud e toward Atlanticism 7; suggested repre sentative in Washington 55

215 INDEX Fletcher, H.P. wa r debts 65; and W.H. Gardiner 97; and Standard Oil 191 Foreign Office (Grea t Britain) 96 , 198; Yap negotiations 51; AngloJapanese alliance committee 71, 83, 90-1; renewal of AngloJapanese alliance 71, 75, 105-6, 110; Far Eastern policy review 83-91; origins of Washington Conference 146; preparations for Washington Conference 158, 159, 160; representatives at Washington Conference 180, 181 Foster, H. 55 n Four-Power treaty 173 , 174, 176-8, 188-9 France polic y at Washington Conference 165, 179, 188; inclusion in four-power treaty 169, 170, 171, 172 Freedom of the seas 27,3 9 Gardiner, W.H. oppositio n to Anglo-Japanese alliance 92-100, 139n Geddes, Sir Aukland attitud e toward United States 17, 22n, 31; sceptical of Atlanticism 31; naval policy 45-6, 59, 82; war debts negotiations 48, 49, 60; oil politics 51, 191; cable systems 52 , 191; Irelan d 52-3; ambassador to United States 55, 56, 75n; reports on Republicans and Harding's cabinet 60-7, 82, 151, 191; advice on renewal of Anglo-Japanese alliance 78, 81-3, 117, 126, 129, 142n; and H.C. Lodge 95n, 96n; clash with

Harvey 146n, 151; and American attitudes before Washington Conference 155-6; delegate to Washington Conference 158n; preparations for Washington Conference 159; at Washington Conference 164, 185; reactions to Washington Conference 188, 191; an d Genoa Conference 193; war debts 1922 195, 198 Geddes, Sir Eric hostil e toward Atlanticism 33, 40n; naval policy 41n, 46n Greene, Sir Conyngham oppose d to Anglo- Japanese alliance 88, 90-1 Greenwood, Harmar 5 5 Genoa Conference 192 , 193, 195 George V, King view s on foreign policy 17, 146; and representation in Washington 54n Great Britain diplomati c representation in Washington 54-6 Grey, Edward attitud e toward Atlanticism 7-8; naval policy 7n, 30; and the League 8; decline of influence 27; abortive mission to Washington 35, 40, 55, 70; Anglo-Persian treaty 50n; Ireland 52-3; representation in Washington 54, 55 Grigg, Edward 110 , 194n; attitude toward Atlanticism 12; advice on Anglo- Japanese alliance 111-13; views on dominion delegations 1921 116n; war debts 1922 196-8 Haldane, Lord a n Atlanticist 7; suggested representative in

216 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y Washington 55n Hanihara, M. negotiation s at Washington Conference 167 Hankey, Sir Maurice 110 ; fear of Bolshevism 4; and the League 23, 26, 29, 30; sceptical of Atlanticism 30-1, 190; naval policy 41n; view of Meighen 121n; delegate to Washington Conference 158n; preparations for Washington Conference 163; reports from Washington Conference 164-5, 170, 188, 189; negotiations at Washington Conference 166-70 passim, 174; dislike of France 188; oil politics 191; wa r debts 1922 195 Harding, President W.G. nava l policy 46n; the Republican elite 59, 60-7; economic policy and war debts 60; Anglo-American relations 64, 65, 156; and the League 65; origins of Washington Conference 146; attitude to Washington Conference 156; negotiations at Washington Conference 171, 174, 181, 182, 185; war debts 1922 195 Hardinge, Lord hostil e toward Atlanticism 33, 34n, 81n, 86n; renewal of Anglo- Japanese alliance 81n, 83, 85, 87 Harvey, George ambassado r to London 58, 65, 133, 194, 195; conversations with Curzon 133-4, 143, 145; clash with Geddes 144n ; origins of Washington Conference 145-7; preliminary Pacific conference issue 151; war debts 1922 194, 195, 198

Hayashi, Baron G. 88,14 3 Hearst, William R. 36,63 n Hearst press 40,4 5 Hichens,L. 1 2 Hobart-Hampden, E.M. 8 5 Hong Kong 72,73,74,8 0 Hoover, Herbert 19 2 Home, Sir Robert 32 n House, Colonel E.M. relationshi p to President Wilson 7; Atlanticists' attitude toward 7; AngloAmerican relations 31, 54, 100; loss of influence 35, 55 House of Commons (Great Britain) debate on Anglo- Japanese alliance 117-18 Houston, D.F. war debts negotiations 4 7 Howard, Sir E. 3 1 Hurst, Sir Cecil hostil e toward Atlanticism 34; ruling on AngloJapanese alliance 110-11 Hudd,F., 94 n Hughes, Charles Evans 62n , 64; view of Borah 46n; relations with Japan 57, 58, 66; foreign policy 64-5; Anglo-American relations 65, 66, 100; and the League 65, 100; Yap 66; renewal of AngloJapanese alliance 99, 126, 129, 144; origins of Washington Conference 145-7; preliminary Pacific conference issue 148-50; preparations for Washington Conference 154, 158; negotiations at Washington Conferenc e 165-77; draft four-power treaty 170-1; Borden's scheme 178, 179, 189; Middle East 1922 192; European policy 1922 193-4 Hughes, William M. 21 , 96; op-

217 INDEX posed to Atlanticism 26, 34-5; and the League 26; renewal of Anglo-Japanese alliance 97, 107n; a t Imperial Conferenc e 121, 122-3, 124, 130, 136-8, 141, 142, 144-5, 151, 152, 153; preliminary Pacific conference issue 149, 150 Imperial Conferenc e 1921 x, 67, 68, 73n, 98, 173; composition of delegations 121 ; results 152-3 Imperial War Cabinet (Grea t Britain) view s of Atlanticism 6; and the League 23, 25; and Bolshevism 25 Inverforth, Lord 49 n Ireland th e problem 18, 157; in Anglo-American relations 52-4, 126, 144, 151, 188, 190 Japan peac e conference policy 4; attitude to racial equality 4; wartime policies 57-8; decline of relations with United States 57; campaign for renewal of AngloJapanese alliance 110—11; preliminary Pacific conference issue 149; preparations for Washington Conference 155, 158 Japanese delegation t o Washington Conference 170,173,17 6 Jellicoe, Admiral Lord 33n , 70, 74 Jennings, C.A.C. 98 n John Bull 3 6 Johnson, Senator H.W. 61 , 62, 63n Jonescu,T. 44 n Jordan, Sir John Fa r East and Atlanticism 17; opposition t o renewal of Anglo- Japanese alliance 75-6, 83, 87; preparations fo r

Washington Conference 159-60, 163 Kato, Baron T. negotiation s at Washington Conference 167, 170, 171 Kellogg, F. 20 0 Kerr, Philip attitud e toward Atlanticism 12, 15, 17-21; theories of empire and race 12, 15, 17-21, 32; view of Lloyd George 15; and the League 18, 23-4, 26, 29-30; the Fourteen Points 21; and mandates 24-5; decline of influence 27; Ireland 53-4; draft reply to Ottawa 106n Knox, Senator P.C. an d naval policy 45; Harding cabinet appointments 65 Lampson, Sir Miles 75n ; Far East and Atlanticism 17, 95; renewal of Anglo-Japanese alliance 105-6, 107n; preparations for Washington Conference 163; negotiations at Washington Conference 167 Lansing, Robert 37,5 7 Lansing-Ishii agreement 16 7 League of Nations Unite d States attitude 5; British empire attitude 5, 23-6; and AngloJapanese alliance 81, 83-4, 83, 111 Lee of Fareham, Lord anAtlanti cist 16-17; and Lloyd George 16-17; naval policy 17, 46, 59, 70, 99; effect of Theodore Roosevelt's death 59; renewal of Anglo-Japanese alliance 113, 115; delegat e to Washington

218 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y Conference 158n; at Washington Conference 164 Leeper,A.W.A. 14 7 Lindsay, Sir R. 5 4 Lloyd George, David peac e conference policy 3; relations with President Wilson 9, 27, 37, 39; naval policy 9, 39, 40, 41-5, 59, 60, 75; government of 7, 27, 37, 59; and Round Table 15, 28; the League 23-4, 26, 29-30, 39; sceptical of Atlanticism 27-30, 75, 199; view of Grey 27; relations with Milner 28; relations with Kerr 28; and Smuts 28; mandates policy 28; relations with Foreign Offic e 28, 89; Anglo-French relations 28-9; disarmament policy 29, 37; Reparations Commission 30; regard for Amery 32; and critics of Atlanticism 34, 67; view of Harding administration 42, 60, 89; renewal of Anglo- Japanese alliance 43, 69, 75, 88-9, 103, 106-7, 115-16, 140, 145, 151-2 , 158, 160; war debts 1920-1 47-8; representation i n Washington 54n; and Medill McCormick 40, 89; and Christie 100; at Imperial Conference 121, 122, 124, 130, 140-1, 142, 151; origins of Washington Conference 145-6; preliminary Pacific conference issue 147-50; attitude to Washington Conference 157; preparations for Washington Conference 158; reactio n to Washington Conference 189; Middle Eastern policy 1922 192; European

policy 1922 192, 193, 194; war debts 1922 195 Lodge, Henry Cabot 15n ; naval policy 45, 46n; relations with Harding 60, 61, 62, 63n; AngloJapanese alliance and W.H. Gardiner 92-100 passim, 139n; role at Washington Conference 156, 167, 168, 169, 173, 178 Long, Walter Anglo-America n relations 27n; hostile toward Atlanticism 33, 40n; naval policy 41n , 42n, 46n LowtherJ.W. 5 5 MaclayJ.P. 3 8 McCormick, J. Medill 40 , 89; views on foreign policy 62, 63n McCullough, C.R. 9 8 MacDonald.R. 20 0 McLean, E.B. 63 n MacMurray, J.V.A. 78,12 6 Magrath, C.A. 9 8 Malkin, H. W. advic e on AngloJapanese alliance 83- 4 Manchester Guardian, The 3 1 Massey, William F. 96n,,97n ; hostile toward Atlanticism 34; at Imperial Conference 121, 123, 124, 130, 138-9, 142, 151; preliminary Pacific conference issue 150 Meighen, Arthur attitud e toward Atlanticism 10-11, 91-2; Canadian foreign policy 11, 91-2; opposed to renewal of AngloJapanese alliance 91-2, 98, 102, 105; role at Imperial Conference 121, 122n, 124, 129-30, 131, 134-6, 138n, 140-1, 142, 145,

219 INDE X 151, 152; reaction to Washington Conference 172 Mellon, A.W. 65 ; war debts 1921 49; and economic policy 60n; war debts 1922 198 Middle East problems 50-1,125 , 190-1, 192 Milner, Lord attitud e toward Atlanticism 12, 19, 20n, 23; loss of influence 15, 27; theories of empire and race 19; and President Wilson 21; view of Japan 23; and representation in Washington 54n Mond, Sir A. 49 n Montagu, Edwin an d Atlanticism 32n; renewal of Anglo-Japanese alliance 115-16 Morning Post, The 9 5 Morris, R. 7 8 Naval rivalry 37-8,39-^7,59-60, 125, 191 NewVork World, The 7 0 Northcliffe, Lor d 54 , 149 Ochs,Adolph 7 0 Oliver, F.S. 12 Orange Plan 98 n Orlando, V.E. peace conference policy 3 Page, Walter H. 56,15 6 Parlett,H.G. 8 5 Peace conference 1919 8, 9, 16, 22, 25, 27, 153, 164; residual problems 35, 192; and Ireland 52; and Shantung 76 Pearce,G.F. 165n , 172, 180 Peel, Lord 55 n

Poincaré, R. 19 3 Reading, Lord 17 ; sceptical of Atlanticism 31; representative in Washington 54, 55 Reparations Commission 30 , 50, 125 Riddell, Lord 110 , 147; naval policy 45n; delegate to Washington Conference 158n; at Washington Conference 174 Roosevelt, F.D.R. 20 0 Roosevelt, Theodore 16 , 59 Roosevelt, Colonel Theodore Jr 1 6 Root, Elihu 192 ; naval policy 45; Anglo-American relations 64, 100; attitud e to Washington Conference 156; at Washington Conference 164, 167, 169, 173, 178 Root-Takahira agreement 170 , 176 Round Table group an d Atlanticism 12; and the League 23—4; view of mandates 24-5 Rowell,N 10 0 Runciman, Walter 5 5 Russia postwa r menace of 4, 192, 193; allied attitude toward 5 Russo-German alliance threa t of 4, 73, 80, 100, 134, 164, 166; fear of Japan's co-operation with 4, 71, 80, 114, 160 Saburi, S. negotiation s at Washington Conference 166-7, 168-70 passim Salisbury, 3rd Marquess of 2 2 Salisbury, Lord 55 n Salmond,SirJ. 165n,17 2 Scott, C.P. 7

220 ILLUSIONS O F SECURIT Y Shantung controversy 52,78,17 4 Sheldon, Mark 9 6 Shidehara,K. negotiation s at Washington Conference 168, 167, 168, 173, 175, 176, 177; draft three-power treaty 167, 168, 169 Simpson, B.L. (Putnam Weale) 92n, 97n; campaign against Anglo-Japanese alliance 109-10 Sims, Admiral W.S. 94,11 5 Singapore naval base 70 , 74, 80, 112n, 118-19 Smith, Sir H.Babington 5 5 Smuts, General Jan C. attitud e toward Atlanticism 8-10; and the League 8-9, 23-4, 26; South African policies 9; admiration for President Wilson 9-10; distrust of France 10; decline in influence 27; estimate of Meighen 121n; at Imperial Conference 121, 123-4, 130, 138, 142, 153 Spa Conference 47,8 6 Spring-Rice, Sir Cecil 5 4 Standard Ou Company 50,191 Standing Defence Sub-Committee 45n, 73n; review of Pacific defence policy 118-20 Steed, H.Wickham 14 7 Taft, William H. 100,19 4 Times.The 41,110,14 6 Tokugawa, Prince I. 16 6 Toronto Mail and Empire 98 n Treasury (Great Britain) Singa pore naval base and Pacific security 74n, 118 Tyrrell, Sir William 110 ; Far East and Atlanticism 17, 95-6; AngloAmerican relations 22n, 106; on

Anglo-Japanese alliance committee 90-1; relations with Canada 106n Underwood, Oscar W. 156,17 3 United States Congress nava l building 40, 59, 191; war debts 48; and President Harding 60, 191 United States delegation to Washington Conference 164 , 166, 167, 176, 178; draft four-power treaty 167-8 United States Department of State policy on Yap 51; cable systems 52; and W.H. Gardiner 97; and Washington Conference 165-6, 174; oil policy 191 United States General Board of the Navy 40,4 5 United States Navy Department naval policy 39; oil politics 50-1; hostility toward Japan 57 United States Senate 172- 5 passim Viviani,R. 17 1 War Cabinet (Great Britain) an d Atlanticism 6 War debts 47-50 , 60, 192, 194-8 War Office (Great Britain) criticis m of Atlanticism 17; renewal of Anglo- Japanese alliance 72-3 Washington Conference x , 67, 75; origins 145-50; contemporary views of 154; results of 177, 1879,199,200 Washington Post 63 n Wellesley.V. Fa r East and Atlanticism 17 ; for abrogation of Anglo-Japanese alliance 81n, 8691

221 INDEX Wemyss, Admiral W. hostil e toward Atlanticism 33 White, H. 15 n Willert, Sir A. report s on Harding's administration 60-2, 66; renewal of Anglo- Japanese alliance 117 Wilson, Field Marshal Sir H. hostil e to Atlanticism 26, 33-4; and the League 26; naval policy 41n, 43, 44; view of Washington Conference 158 Wilson, Woodrow peac e conference policy 3; peace programme 7; and the League 23-4, 25, 26;

collapse of 35, 55; naval policy 39-40; war debts negotiations 48-9; Yap 51; wartime secret treaties 51; Shantung and the peace treaty 52; cable systems 52; attitude toward Japan 57 Wiseman, Sir William 17 ; Ireland 52; role in Washington 54 Worthington-Evans,SirL. 32 n Wright, Butler 8 6 Yap controversy 51 , 66, 125, 140, 172

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