Identity and Distinction in Petrus Thomae, O.F.M.

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VENSI MICHIGAN

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JUL 28 1960 3601

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5143 Franciscan Institute Publications PHILOSOPHY SERIES NO. 14 no.// Edited by Allan B. Wolter, O. F.M.

IDENTITY AND DISTINCTION

IN PETRUS

THOMAE , O.F.M.

by Geoffrey G. Bridges, O. F. M. , Ph. D.

DEUSMEUS MEUS ETOMNIA

Published by THE FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE ST. BONAVENTURE, N. Y.

and E. NAUWELAERTS LOUVAIN, BELGIUM

F. SCHONINGH PADERBORN, GERMANY

1959

List 1959 FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE

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IDENTITY AND DISTINCTION IN PETRUS THOMAE, O. F. M.

Franciscan Institute

Publications

PHILOSOPHY SERIES NO . 14 Edited by Allan B. Wolter , O. F. M.

IDENTITY AND DISTINCTION

IN

PETRUS

THOMAE , O.F.M.

by Geoffrey G. Bridges, O. F. M. , Ph. D.

Published by THE FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE ST. BONAVENTURE, N. Y.

and E. NAUWELAERTS LOUVAIN, BELGIUM

F. SCHÖNINGH PADERBORN, GERMANY 1959

BX 3601 • S143 no.14

Cum permissu superiorum

PREFACE

The purpose of the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure University is to promote the study of the development of philosophy and theology in the Franciscan Order. Franciscan scholars since the second quarter of the thirteenth century have made a major contribution in the transmission of the unchanging truths of the Christian tradition in philosophy ; they have contributed to the deeper understanding and more precise expression of these truths ; they have expanded the horizon of Christian philosophy by new insights into old problems and by propounding solutions to new problems which have arisen as the horizon of human knowledge has expanded . For reasons too complex and too numerous to enter into here, this Franciscan tradition was almost completely broken. Treasured manuscripts were lost or destroyed . And so at the present time the work of reconstructing this Franciscan tradition is much like excavating the ruins of an ancient city : first there come to light the more prominent edifices, then the connecting links. Only when the relations of the major parts through the connecting links have been determined may a more or less reliable history of that civilization be written. An adequate history of the philosophy and theology of the Franciscan School depends not only on an understanding of the major scholars but also on the reconstruction of the development of doctrine from one major scholar to another by means of the connecting links, the minor scholars. One must know if possible the influences, the gains, the losses due to these lesser scholars . This work of rediscovery and reconstruction is being carried on in the Franciscan Institute. It is a privilege to play a part in that work and to contribute some little to the advancement of this project by bringing into fuller light a Franciscan scholar of the early fourteenth century . Petrus Thomae, as he emerges from oblivion, is seen to be within the shadow of Duns Scotus . The scope of his work, the brilliance of his mind both suffer by comparison. In relation to Scotus Petrus Thomae is a minor figure. Yet he takes on importance from the fact that he is an immediate successor of Scotus, one of the first links after Scotus in the V

VI

Preface

chain of the Franciscan tradition in theology and philosophy. He reflects the doctrine of Scotus and at times contributes to a better understanding of the Subtle Doctor. But as the structure and design of the doctrine of Petrus Thomae is uncovered , it is found that his doctrinal edifice is more than a reproduction by less skilled hands of the architectural masterpiece that Scotus designed and executed . Masterpiece though Scotus' work was, it nevertheless was not perfect and complete in every detail. No philosophy to date has been, nor, I think, will any philosophy in the course of human life and progress be, perfect beyond perfecting. The scope of reality is too vast, the depths to be searched. too profound, for any single mind to comprehend and expound completely and perfectly. But there are outstanding men who appear from time to time who open up new insights and push human understanding onward. John Duns Scotus was one such, to remain close to the man we propose to study. He not only reached new understanding and insight himself, but he inspired and directed his followers to new advances. Petrus Thomae was one of the first who launched out into original speculation under the inspiration of Duns Scotus. There would appear to be two types of mind bent upon philosophy. One might be called the passive mind, which approaches the philosophy developed by another and expends its full capacity in understanding. The majority of a great philosopher's disciples are endowed with this type of mind. The other type of mind has over and above this understanding the gift of insight, the active ability to advance beyond what it has learned from others. And this is most truly the philosophical mind . Petrus Thomae had some of this gift. He was not as richly endowed as Scotus ; but he did have the ability not only to assimilate what Scotus taught him, whether personally or through his works , and not only to assay critically other philosophies and attacks upon his own or his master's position , but he had a certain amount of that philosophical insight, that active ability to go on where others had pointed but had not tread. The man this study presents, then, is not only a mirror of Scotistic philosophy ; he is a philosopher in the fullest sense. This is not to say, however, that he is an outstanding philosopher. His gift is not of the order of a Scotus ; that much is certain. But much more must be uncovered in the history of Franciscan thought before a final estimate of his true stature and importance can be made. In the work of uncovering those particular parts of the philosophical edifice constructed by Petrus Thomae which constitute the subject of

Preface

VII

this study, I have been helped immeasurably by the faculty of the Franciscan Institute : by Fr. Eligius Buytaert, O.F.M. , who directed my work and rendered valuable assistance through his knowledge of the necessary sources ; by Fr. Gaudens Mohan, O.F.M. , who was indispensable for deciphering difficult passages in the manuscripts ; and by Fr. Allan Wolter, O.F.M. , who often led me to an understanding of the mind of Petrus Thomae through his knowledge of the master and inspiration of Petrus Thomae, Duns Scotus. It is not only a duty but a pleasure to acknowledge formally the assistance which they in fraternal kindness have tendered me.

It was the custom of Padre Junipero Serra, the Apostle of California, when he was professor of philosophy and theology at the Lullian University in Mallorca, to put each course as he commenced it under the patronage of some saint . With due regard for the mind of the Church in these matters, this study was undertaken under the patronage of the said holy Friar, and at its completion is humbly and respectfully dedicated to him through the Queen of Heaven.

Franciscan Institute

Publications

PHILOSOPHY SERIES NO . 14 Edited by Allan B. Wolter, O. F. M.

IDENTITY AND DISTINCTION

IN

PETRUS THOMAE , O.F.M.

by Geoffrey G. Bridges, O. F. M., Ph. D.

BLUSMEUSET OMNIA

Published by THE FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE ST. BONAVENTURE, N. Y. and

F. SCHÖNINGH PADERBORN, GERMANY

E. NAUWELAERTS LOUVAIN, BELGIUM

1959

CONTENTS

Preface .

V

INTRODUCTION

I

Part I : IDENTITY

1. Identity in General 2. Identical and Formal Identity 3. Scotus and Peter on Identity Part II : DISTINCTION .

17 18 25 47

53

1. Distinction in General 2. Distinction of Reason 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. II.

54 57 68

Distinction Ex Natura Rei Distinction of Essence and Essence 70 80 Distinction of Thing and Thing . 86 Distinction of Reality and Reality • 100 Distinction of Reality and Thing 100 Distinction of Formality and Formality · Distinction of Formality and Thing . . 115 Distinction of Thing and Intrinsic Mode . 117 Division of Distinction in De Distinctione Praedicamentorum • 132 12. Scotus' Division of Distinction 136

Part III : CORRELATIONS OF IDENTITY AND DISTINCTION 140 · 140 A. Propositions on Correlations B. The Distinction of the Categories . 154 CONCLUSION .

166

Appendix : The Works of Petrus Thomae

177

Bibliography

181

•

Index

183

IX

INTRODUCTION 1. Petrus Thomae

Detrus Thomae¹ taught and wrote in the first half of the fourteenth cenPetrus tury. He belonged to the first group of Formalists, as the proponents of the formal distinction immediately after Scotus were called . Apparently he was an outstanding light, even though at present he is so little known. Various documents refer to him as ,,magnus scotista“ (ms . 2130, Cracow),,,eximius doctor" (n . 184, Lambeth Palace , London) , "egregius et subtilissimus vir" (n . 50 , Tours) , etc. 3 According to the custom of the time, several titles were bestowed upon him: doctor strenuus, invincibilis, proficuus, serenus.4 We have very little definite information about the life of Peter. For the most part speculation about the dates of his birth, entrance into the Franciscan Order, teaching, and death are based on two facts : (1 ) Peter dedicated his Tractatus de Conceptione Beatae Mariae Virginis to James II of Aragon (d . 1327) and also submitted it to Pope John XXII who reigned from 1316 to 1334 ; (2) the earliest manuscript of any work of Peter, a portion of his tract on the formalities , is dated 1336. It is concluded, therefore, that Peter did his main work in the second and perhaps the third decade of the fourteenth century. Turning on these dates, it is surmised that Peter was born about 1280 and entered the Franciscan Order about 1300. His death is set at the latest at 1350.5 1 Petrus Thomae occurs much more frequently than Petrus Thomas; apparently his father is indicated . Henceforth the simple term , " Peter", will be used . 2 It is well known that Scotus did not originate the formal distinction . In various forms and under various names a distinction of this kind was postulated from Patristic times. Scotus made much wider and more specific applications of the distinction , and thus he gave rise to the Formalist movement and the controversy over the distinction . Cf. M. Grajewski , The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus"", Washington, D. C. , 1944 , ch . VI , “The Traditional Formal Distinction ," pp. 102-123 . 3 Martin of Barcelona, " Fra Pere Tomàs, Doctor strenuus et invincibilis," Estudis Franciscans, 39 ( 1927 ) , 92. This article is still the most extensive and authoritative source of information on the life and works of Peter. 4 Ibid. Martin of Barcelona, op . cit. , p . 94. No reasons are offered for the last conclusion .

I

2

Introduction It would seem that Peter was a Spaniard, born in Cataluña. More

probably he entered the Franciscan Order in the Province of Aragon in Cataluña, even though at least one manuscript mentions the Province of St. James. He studied at Paris and became a master of theology. ' But his main work was accomplished while teaching in Barcelona.8

2. The Philosophical Works of Petrus Thomae⁹ Comparatively speaking, there is extant a rich legacy of Peter's works: eight treatises, in some 40 manuscripts.10 Of the eight works, six are wholly or in great part philosophical . It is indicative of the interest in the Franciscan School in subsequent years that over half of the extant manuscripts deal with the subject of the formalities . The following list is arranged chronologically, according to present tentative conclusions. (a) Commentarium in primum librum sententiarum.This is extant in only one manuscript. It is in very poor condition. The Incipit indicates that it is a reportatio. While there are several references in Peter's Quodlibet to a commentary on the second book of the Sentences, there is no trace at present of such a work.11 (b) De esse intelligibili . This is a rather complete treatise on the ontological status of ideas both in creatures and in God . Two manuscripts were known to Teetaert and Martin of Barcelona : Cambridge Univ. Ff.

A. Teetaert, "Pierre Thomas, " Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, Paris, 1935 , 12, 2046 2047. ? Because of a strong influence of Aureoli upon Peter's tract on the Immaculate Conception, I. Brady suggests the possibility that Peter might have studied rather at Toulouse under Aureoli, and that he thus became acquainted with the works of Scotus . If this influence had been as evident in the other works of Peter, one might be inclined to agree with this suggestion. However, though Peter locks horns with Aureoli on the subject of the formal distinction several places in his tract on the formalities, there is no indication of an acquaintance with Aureoli that could not have been derived from a reading of his works . And I think that probably this is the manner in which Peter became acquainted with the doctrine of Aureoli on the Immaculate Conception . Cf. I. Brady, "The Development of the Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception in the Fourteenth Century after Aureoli, " Franciscan Studies, 15, 177. 8 Teetaert, op . cit. , 2047. • All of Peter's works and the manuscripts and editions in which they are extant are listed in an appendix below, p . 177. 10 Cf. Appendix , pp . 177-180 . 11 Cf. Quodlibet, ed. by M. R. Hooper and E. M. Buytaert (Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series No. 11 ) St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1957, p. 10, lines 256-257 ; 176 , 339–340 . N. B. This edition will henceforth be quoted simply as Quodl. followed by two numbers, one referring to the page (s) the other to the line (s) .

Introduction

3

III 23 ; Rome, Vat. lat. 2190. To these two others may be added. P. Glorieux has discovered the tract in the Vienna manuscript which contains Peter's works.12 Also, Balic indicates another, apparently without realizing it. He notes that ff. 134vb-147 vb of Erfurt ms. F. 182 contains nine questions, the first of which begins : "Utrum intellectus creatus producat rem intellectivam in esse intelligibili . Et videtur quod sic ..." This is identical with the Incipit of the Vienna manuscript.13 De esse intelligibili would seem to be an early work. It is mentioned in one of the tracts on the formalities ; while on the other hand it does not cite the De ente, which one would expect, for example, when he discusses whether esse obiectivum and esse subiectivum are species of being. (c) De ente. This work is variously called " liber de ente" (Oxford, Magdalen Coll. n. 80) , "quaestiones entis " (Rome, Bibl. Vat . lat. 2190), and "quaestiones de ente" (Vienna, Staatsbibliothek, n. 1494 ) . The last named manuscript seems to be in the best condition . Whether the " de transcendentibus" that Peter mentions in one of his tracts on the formalities,14 and which Joannes Anglicus and Zerbius cite,15 is another title for the De ente will be discussed below. (d) Formalitates Breves. (e) Formalitates Conflatiles. Both of these works will be discussed together. Martin of Barcelona, Teetaert, and Sbaralea note that there are apparently two versions of the Formalitates preserved in the manuscript tradition. They designate these versions respectively according to their title and Incipit : Formalitates Breves (Ad evidentiam formalitatum ...) and Formalitates Conflatiles (Ad evidentiam distinctionis ...) .16 To illustrate the complexity of the problem which we are facing in trying to determine the relationship between these two versions, there are 28 known manuscripts and one edition containing tracts on the Formalities which are or should be ascribed to Peter. Martin of Barcelona lists at least 24 copies in 22 manuscripts (some manuscripts contain more than one version) ; Balic adds another, which has erroneously been

12 P. Glorieux, La Littérature Quodlibétique, 2 , (Bibliothèque Thomiste 21 ) , Paris, 1935 , 228. 13 C. Balic, "A propos de quelques ouvrages faussement attribués à J. Duns Scot," Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, 2 ( 1930) , 166. 14 De distinctione praedicamentorum , f . 38 va. References are to the Venice edition by Nuciarelli unless otherwise noted . 15 H. Sbaralea, Supplementum et Castigatio ad Scriptores Trium Ordinum S. Francisci, 3 , Rome, 1921 , 369. 1 Martin of Barcelona, op. cit. , p . 94 ; Teetaert, op. cit. , 2047 ; Sbaralea, op. cit., pp. 368–369.

4

Introduction

ascribed to Duns Scotus ; 17 Doucet adds three more, obviously unknown to Martin of Barcelona ; 18 Maier contributes another ;19 and lastly, Sbaralea, though he did not completely realize it, lists two more.20 Furthermore, from the Incipits and Explicits of these copies we may gather some 16 different titles or designations attached to these tracts ; for example : Formalitates, De distinctione formalitatum, Quaestiones de distinctionibus formalitatum , De modis distinctionum, De distinctionibus et de modis extrinsecis , De distinctione praedicamentorum, and of course the titles above, Formalitates Breves and Formalitates Conflatiles. This gives some idea of the task which faces the scholar who undertakes to edit Peter's works on the formalities. The special problems which these works presented in writing this study will be treated in the next section. (e) Quodlibet. This is clearly one of Peter's later works. The only known manuscript is that of Vienna.21 Peter arranged the questions of his Quodlibet under four categories : (i) those dealing with transcendental problems, (ii) those dealing with God alone, (iii) those dealing with creatures in general, and (iv) those dealing with particular creatures. As is usual in such a work, he covers a wide variety of topics. (f) De unitate minori. This work is extant in only one manuscript. Teetaert is of the opinion that it is but a fragment of a larger work.22 It would appear that this work is referred to in the Quodlibet, where Peter states his intention of treating of unity more at length at a later date.23 That would make it one of Peter's last philosophical works. In the present study on identity and distinction in the doctrine of Peter, all but the first and last of these works were used . The first work

17 Balic, op. cit. , pp. 164–170 . He expresses a strong suspicion that Petrus Thomae is the true author of the tract (Erfurt, Amploniana, ms. Fol. 182 ) . A comparison of the lengthy quotations he gives with the known versions of Petrus Thomae makes the authorship certain. 18 V. Doucet, "Maîtres Franciscains de Paris," Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, 27 ( 1934) , 561 . 19 L. Meier, Quibusdam codicibus manuscriptis editio formalitatum Nicolai Lakmann , O. Min . hucusque fulciatur , " Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati, 2 (1946) . 444-445. 20 Sbaralea, op. cit. , pp. 368-369 . He mentions the Venice edition of the Formalitates by Nuciarelli, 1517 , and a work entitled De modis distinctionum said to be preserved in Toledo, Conv. S. Jos. GG. n. 3 . 21 Vienna, Staatsbibliothek, n . 1494, ff. 67-103 va. Note that both Martin of Barcelona and Teetaert place the conclusion on f. 112 ; however, as we have indicated , De esse intelligibili begins on f. 103 va . As a consequence the number of questions in the Quodlibet is 18, rather than 25 as Teetaert states, or 16 as claimed by Glorieux . Cf. Quodl. , Preface, viii. 22 Teetaert, op. cit., 2048 . 23 Quodl. , 216, 21—22 .

Introduction

5

was not consulted because the manuscript is in such poor condition. Some scholar has a large task cut out for him just to transcribe the text. Until then it is not a practical source for the doctrine of Peter.24

3. Special Problems in the Philosophical Works In the process of analyzing the four main philosophical works certain problems arose - tantalyzing problems, because not enough evidence exists at present to enable one to give satisfactory answers to them. And yet answers had to be given, at least tentatively. The main problems concern the tracts on the formalities. (a) Formalitates Conflatiles vs. Formalitates Breves. Above, just a glimpse was had of the tangled skein of manuscripts attributed to Peter on the subject of the formalities. An attempt will be made to answer some of the questions which can arise. Are Conflatiles and Breves the same work? Comparing two manuscripts having the same Incipit as the Conflatiles (Oxford , Magdalen Coll. , n . 80 and the Venice edition) with two manuscripts of the Breves (Oxford , Magdalen Coll . , n. 80 and Vienna, n. 1494) , one immediately discovers that these are not the same work. There is a considerable difference in length and subject matter. The former is a work of just one question, the latter treats up to eleven . A glance at a brief summary of the contents of the two works will indicate other differences : Conflatiles: art . 1 : 7 kinds of distinction and the rule of their coincidence. art. 2 : the distinction of the categories according to the rule of coincidence . Breves:

Q.

1 : Essential distinction and separability.

Q. 2 : Real distinction. Q. 3 : Distinction of reason. Q. 4: Distinction secundum quid. Q. 5 : Formal non-identity and formal distinction.

24 The other two works written by Peter are : Tractatus de divite christiano, an exegetico-moral work (cf. Martin of Barcelona , op. cit. , p. 101 ) , and Liber de originali Virginis conceptione, also called Tractatus de conceptione Beatae Mariae Virginis. For a short summary of the contents and original contributions of this work cf. I. Brady, op. cit., 176-184 . Martin of Barcelona, ("Notes descriptives de manuscrits franciscans de la Bibl . Nacional de Madrid," Estudis Franciscans , 45 [ 1933 ] , 359) mentions another possible work, Comm. in VIII Physicorum, to be found in Madrid , 2016, ff. 171–1111 (17-49 ?).

Introduction

6

Q. 6 : Identity of formality and formal identity. Q. 7: Formal distinction of divine attributes.

Q. 8 : Formal distinction and the simplicity of God. Q. 9 : Identical Identity. Q. 10 : Kinds of distinction. Q. 11 : Intrinsic modes and their distinction. Patently these are not the same work, not even in the sense of one being a summary of the other. In fact, it is my conviction that they are two separate and independent works written at different times . The arguments which can be advanced in favor of this view are both external and internal. The external arguments are based on a comparison of the Incipits and Explicits , where they are available, and on the divergence of length of the tracts falling under the one or the other Incipit. It is recognized at the outset that such an approach is subject to many difficulties and objections ; but, lacking the opportunuty to study the actual manuscripts , it is possible that such an approach will yet yield some tentative conclusions and helpful observations for any others who might be interested in the problem. At the outset , I exclude 14 of the 29 copies of the works mentioned above and listed in the appendix, because the information available concerning them is insufficient. Of the remaining, I would preface some observations. (1 ) There are 10 tracts with the Incipit : Ad evidentiam [ distinctionis] praedicamentorum. (Some omit the word distinctionis. ) It will be noted that this is the Incipit associated with the title : Formalitates Conflatiles. These tracts are of varying lengths ranging from 2 to 48 folios. Apparently three contain the short work alone, five add the short work as a preface to the long work, and two contain at least a part of the long work. (2 ) There are 6 tracts which have the collatio : Apposui cor meum. It is not difficult to show that these are to be gathered under the version called the Formalitates Breves . This title is explicitly given to a work containing II questions on the formalities.25 The Incipit is : Ad evidentiam formalitatum et modorum and no collatio is given. But in the Erfurt manuscript, of which Balic gives sufficient excerpts for our purpose, on f. 115a begins a question with the collatio just mentioned, and in the introduction Peter mentions the II questions which he intends to treat. It would appear, then, that these are both the same version of the 25 Assisi, Bibl. Com. mss. 659 ; cf. Martin of Barcelona, op. cit., p. 95.

Introduction

7

formalities differing in that the former lacks the collatio . This conviction is strengthened by the fact that the Vienna manuscript contains II questions on the formalities, the same II mentioned in the introduction to the Erfurt tract . I would conclude, therefore , that the Breves is a work on the formalities containing

II questions. Of this many copies

exist , some of them under the collatio : Apposui cor meum, some without it. (3) It is obvious in at least five cases that both works are presented as one. First of all , Oxford , Magdalen Coll. , n . 8o presents the two under the title: formalitatum liber, with the Incipit : Ad evidentiam distinctionis. Erfurt is another positive case, as the citations furnished by Balic show. In three other cases, the Incipit is Ad evidentiam distinctionis praedicamentorum , but there are far too many folios to be simply the Conflatiles.26 From these assembled facts it would appear that there are two possible answers to the question posed above . (a) Either the Breves and Conflatiles are separate works which later were joined in some manuscripts; or (b) they were originally one work and were later separated in many manuscripts . It is my impression that the first answer is the correct one , i . e. , that the joining of the two occurred later. The unnaturalness of the union is particularly clear in the Erfurt manuscript. First the Conflatiles is given under the Incipit : Ad evidentiam distinctionis praedicamentorum , then the Breves with the collatio : Apposui cor meum . Now first, the collatio ordinarily occurs at the beginning of a work. Secondly, the whole tenor of the introduction to this latter question bears the tone of the beginning of a work. There is no evidence of it flowing out of the previous question . The other case of union which I had an opportunity to study (Magdalen, n. 80) , begins with the Conflatiles under the Incipit : Ad evidentiam distinctionis praedicamentorum ; after it follows the Breves . However the distinctive collatio is missing, and it is evident that the scribe considered the two to be one work.27 The information on the other apparent cases of union is not sufficient to determine what follows the Conflatiles, 26 Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, n . 975 , 48 ff .; Oxford , Merton Coll. n . 133 , 36 ff.; Assisi, Bibl. Com. mss . 659 , ff. 29a- 104 . 27 Assisi, Bibl. Com. 659 , ff . 29a - 104 presents a strange case . Martin of Barcelona gives the following : Incipiunt formalitates conflatiles_Petri Thome: Ad evidentiam distinctionis . Apposui cor meum ... X ... Expliciunt questiones breves disputate. In other words, there is the title of the Conflatiles, the Incipit associated with this title : Ad evidentiam distinctionis, yet also the collatio, Apposui , and the Explicit speaks of the questiones breves. And to this Martin adds that there are 11 questions treated . This presents problems which only an actual investigation of the text can solve . It serves to illustrate the danger of relying solely on such external evidence.

2 Bridges : Identity and Distinction

8

Introduction

though the length of the tracts indicate that much more than one question is treated . 28 The witness of the Erfurt manuscript alone is not sufficient . But if it is considered further that the tradition for separation is stronger by reason of the greater number of manuscripts giving the two works separately, some force is added to the argument. On the whole , however, the external argument having weak beginnings comes to a weak conclusion . It is the internal argument which is more decisive and gives support to the external argument . First of all, there is nothing at all in the contents of the Conflatiles that would indicate that it is the first question of a longer work. It gives the impression of being complete and selfcontained, after the manner of a quodlibetal question . Secondly, the contents of the Breves show no connection with the Conflatiles . In the course of our study below it will be pointed out how a different approach is taken as to the manner of dividing the modes of distinction . Though these two approaches do not conflict , there is no attempt to carry through the first or to reconcile the two.29 Thirdly and most significantly, the Conflatiles bears several allusions to a work which Peter calls : De modis distinctionis, and this, as we shall show below when discussing the proper titles for these works , is none other than the Breves. Therefore, the Conflatiles was written after the Breves, and the two are separate and independent works which later scribes joined . What is the original version of the Breves? This question is prompted by the fact that different manuscripts contain a different number of questions. Magdalen n. So has eleven ; Erfurt also mentions eleven ; but Vienna n. 1494 has only nine, omitting Qq. IX and X of the previous two. The earliest manuscript (Rome , Vat. lat . 3130) according to its Explicit contains perhaps only one : "Explicit 7 a questio de formalitatibus magistri Petri Thome ..." But it indicates that there are at least seven . The manuscript tradition seems to favor the view that originally there were eleven questions . Perhaps it could be suggested that since Qq . IX and X are repeated in the Quodlibet, the Vienna scribe decided to omit them in the Formalitates. The other cases of less than eleven questions seem to be fragments.

28 There is no evidence at all that in these uncertain cases the Conflatiles might be followed by questions other than of the Breves ; hence, I have not considered such a case among the possibilities. 29 Cf. below, pp. 56–57 ; 132—136 .

Introduction

9

What are the proper titles of these works ? By "proper" title I mean two things : what is the appropriate title, and, what is the original title given by Peter. As I have indicated, 16 titles might be gathered from the manuscripts. The most frequent is Formalitates, which is used for both works. How Formalitates Breves and Formalitates Conflatiles came to be assigned to the respective works is not clear ; neither title occurs more than once. Formalitates Conflatiles : 30 This title occurs only in the title of a work which evidently contains both the short and long works (Assisi, Bibl. Com. mss. 956, ff. 29a— 104) . For that reason it would not appear to be an appropriate title for the shorter work taken independently. Furthermore, it would seem that no title containing the word Formalitates would be appropriate, since this is not a tract on the formal distinction. One of the seven distinctions treated is the formal distinction , it is true. But this is hardly sufficient to warrant calling it a tract on the formalities. Nevertheless the manuscript tradition persisted in considering it such . But another title is occasionally found . Madrid 2017 carries the Explicit : "Explicit questio

[ tractatus]

de

distinctione predicamentorum

valde

optimus de trini ... per petrum thome de ordine fratrum minorum . Deo gratias." Similarly, Rome, Vat . lat. 1491 begins : "Petri Thomae ord. carm. [sic ] de distinctionibus praedicamentorum." Sbaralea, after studying the Venice edition by Nucciarelli , maintained that the work should not be called Formalitates but De distinctione praedicamentorum . Apparently he did not realize at the time that the work he had in hand was the same as the Formalitates Conflatiles.31 Despite this fact , I would agree with Sbaralea that, considering the contents of the work, De distinctione praedicamentorum is the more appropriate title. As to its original title , there is no evidence that Peter ever gave it one . There is no cross reference to this work in the Quodlibet, which apparently was written after it . In default of an original title, therefore, and in order to have at hand a more appropriate and distinctive title , in the following study this work is referred to as : De distinctione praedicamentorum . Formalitates Breves :32 There is more reason presented by the con30 Conflatiles, from the verb conflare, would probably be best translated "compact." Cf. Du Cange, Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis, 2, Paris, 1843 , 533. Apparently the word can also qualify the style rather than the length of the work ; for example, Francis Mayron's commentary on I Sentences is called Conflatus. 31 Sbaralea, op . cit. , p . 369. 32 Why it was given the title, " Breves, " is not readily apparent . Perhaps it was so designated in contrast to another and longer tract by some other Formalist.

ΙΟ

Introduction

tents for calling this a tract on the formalities. Five of the eleven questions are in whole or in part concerned with the formal distinction . But this work, too, is given another title in some of the manuscripts . Paris, Bibl. Nat. n. 3433 begins : "Formalitates seu questiones de modis distinctionum ." Also, the Explicit of the Toledo manuscript mentioned by Sbaralea reads :

"Expliciunt quaestiones de modis distinctionum

determinatae per Fr. Petrum Thomae de Ordine Fr. Minorum de provincia S. Jacobi." Magdalen n. 8o gives a hint ofthe same : "Tractatus distinctione alias formalitatum ." As far as appropriateness goes, this title, De modis distinctionis , would seem to be preferable . Six of the questions deal with matter other than the formal distinction , though most of them deal with one or the other or all of the modes of distinction. But not only would the title : De modis distinctionis , seem to be more appropriate, it is also apparently the original title given to the work by Peter himself. The evidence for this from the cross references by Peter is clear. Yet one or two difficulties arise . There are eight references to De modis distinctionis (or distinctionum) in the works of Peter. Five occur in the Quodlibet, three in De distinctione praedicamentorum. Let us look at these instances and see the implications involved. First , the citations in De distinctione praedicamentorum : F. 31rb : "... ratio praecisa praedicationis identicae quod est essentialis illimitatio intimitatis, ut determinatur in penultima conclusione de modis distinctionum in principio. " This reference is clearly to a work by that name. If we look in the Breves we find that Peter treats of essential illimitation in the beginning of Q. IX . According to our observation above, it will also occur, therefore , in Q. VI of the Quodlibet. There is much more reason to understand the Breves here rather than the Quodlibet. However, a difficulty remains. This question on identical identity is the second to last , not the next to last, question of that work.34 Ibid.: "... quaedam se totis obiective [ sunt idem] ita quod distinctiones istorum modorum identitatis sunt accipiendae per obiectum ad distinctiones superius datas de modis distinctionum. " The objective distinction is not mentioned at all in any other of Peter's available works. However, since this citation occurs in art . 2 of De distinctione praedicamentorum, and the objective distinction was defined and described in art. I , this particular use of " de modis distinctionis" is clearly simply a reference to his treatment of the modes of distinction “above” in the previous article.

33 Sbaralea, op. cit., p. 369. 34 It would be the sixth of 18 questions in the Quodlibet.

Introduction

II

F. 31va : “modi intrinseci sunt ex natura rei, ut apparet in ultima conclusione de modis distinctionum . " This is a definite and accurate citation. The last question of the Breves is about the intrinsic modes and their distinction from the subject they modify , 35 In the Quodlibet once Peter cites De modis distinctionum , and four times, later in the work, De modis distinctionis.36 Three of these are clear and accurate citations : F. 95 va: "... secundum illa quae dicta sunt in prima quaestione De modis distinctionis." This is said of a case of essential distinction , which is treated in the first question of the Breves. F. 96 va : " ut patet ... etiam in ista prima quaestione De modis distinctionis." Here it is a case of separability, which also is treated in the first question of the Breves. F. 96vb : "... ut patet ex secunda quaestione De modis distinctionis. ” Here he speaks of genus and difference which are treated as indicated in the second question of the Breves. There can be no doubt , therefore , that Peter was accustomed to call the work later designated Formalitates Breves by the name of De modis distinctionis (-um) . But which is it, De modis distinctionum or De modis distinctionis? Despite the fact that the former appears an equal number of times in Peter's works and twice in the known Incipits, I shall use the latter as being more grammatical and more frequently used in his later works. What is the chronological relationship of these two works? The answer to this question is evident from the foregoing. De distinctione praedicamentorum was written posterior to De modis distinctionis, which it cites. However, I would like to add another argument or at least a persuasion . There is a doctrine which Peter holds with some conviction which is expounded in the De distinctione praedicamentorum and again in the first question of De modis distinctionis. This is the doctrine that it is. possible by divine power to posit a relation without a foundation . Now a careful study of the method of developing this thesis would seem to indicate that the version in the De modis distinctionis was written before that of the other work. This thesis will be discussed at length Part III of this study. For the present, it can be noted that although basically the same elements are employed in developing the argument, in De distinctione praedicamentorum there is evidence of polishing and em35 These citations are sufficient indication that this work was written after the Breves. 36 "-um" : 13 , 369. "-is" : 184 , 240 ; 191 , 30 ; 193 , 116 ; 200, 132–133 .

12

Introduction

bellishment. The argument is broken down into one main and two corroborating arguments. Citations of Aristotle and Scotus are added in support of some incidental points . Now this may be a purely personal impression. And perhaps it can be argued that in De modis distinctionis, since he was going through the matter a second time, he dropped the citations and rearranged the matter while working from memory. This is possible. But I incline to the first view, that in De distinctione praedicamentorum he was attempting to improve upon the argument previously stated in the first question of De modis distinctionis. This impression together with the one derived from studying the references cited above have led me to conclude, not without hesitation, that chronologically De distinctione praedicamentorum is later than De modis distinctionis. To summarize the foregoing problems raised by these two so-called tracts on the formalities, the following conclusions are presented . They summarize my convictions , but they are suggested with full realization that they are at most tentative and provisional. (1 ) The diversity of versions of tracts on the formalities was first suspected due to the diversity of Incipits, and , I believe , secondarily due to the diversity in length of certain copies. (2) Analysis shows that this diversity is due to the fact that some manuscripts contain an introductory question on the distinction of categories, which question also appears alone . (3) Tracts containing this question were classed as Formalitates Conflatiles, with the characteristic Incipit :

Ad evidentiam distinctionis

praedicamentorum. (4) Other tracts, especially those beginning with the collatio, Apposui cor meum, were called Formalitates Breves. (Another characteristic of this group is the presence of II questions on the formal and other types of distinction. ) (5) The number of copies presenting the Conflatiles and Breves separately outnumber 2 to 1 (where there is sufficient evidence to judge) the cases where they are joined. (6) Analysis shows that the question beginning : Ad evidentiam distinctionis praedicamentorum : (a) is complete and self-contained ; and (b) is not logically an introduction to the longer tract. (7) This same question contains references to a work entitled : De modis distinctionis. Analysis of these references strongly point to the fact that the work alluded to is the tract with the II questions (Breves) . (8) Therefore the original and more appropriate title for the Breves is: De modis distinctionis.

Introduction

13

(9) Lacking an original title, the more appropriate title for the Conflatiles is: De distinctione praedicamentorum . (10) In view of conclusion 7 , De distinctione praedicamentorum was written after De modis distinctionis . (11) Finally, the two works must therefore be independant ; they were joined in later years by some of the scribes. (b) De ente and Ista convertuntur : The De ente although evidently an early work is a carefully argued discussion of the concept of being. Actually it would appear to be the first part of a projected work on the transcendentals in general. In what was to become a customary mode of procedure Peter prefaces this work with a statement of purpose : "Primo inquiretur de conceptu entis ; secundo de consequentibus ipsum ; tertio de primis partibus eius ."37 At present only the first part is known . The evidence would appear to suggest that the other two parts were never written . There are frequent references back to this work under the designation of De ente.38 Only once does he speak of De transcendentibus.39 In this study we will use the title commonly given by Peter to this tract : De ente. A problem is posed by an addition to one manuscript of this work, Rome, Vat. lat. 2190. Somewhat after the manner of a preface a short (one folio) disquisition precedes the first question. But the contents of the fragment show that it does not belong to the De ente . The title Formalitates Conflatiles would be appropriate . Yet it is difficult to set down the contents because there is little order or logical development . The piece begins with a discussion of ens, res, quidditas, realitas , formalitas. It discusses a real distinction and then a formal distinction . Then it returns to an enquiry into terms like quidditas , res, formaliter. Finally it returns to the subject of the formal distinction , and concludes with the distinction of an intrinsic mode from its subject .

I have not been able to decide where the piece belongs . Probably it is a folio accidentally bound into the wrong place. It definitely is not a preface to the De ente. Comparatively speaking, the contents are at times almost verbatim quotes from De distinctione praedicamentorum . But it goes more deeply into certain notions as quidditas, formaliter. In a word, there is no doubt that it is consistent with Peter's doctrine. 37 De ente, Q. I. References are to the Magd . Coll. ms. n . 80 . 38 For example, De dist. praed . , f . 38 va ; De modis dist . , f. 61 vb ; Quodl., 21, 671 . 39 ut ostensum est in ultima quaestione de transcendentibus ." De modis dist., f. 52 va.

Introduction

14

Probably it is a genuine fragment.40 The thought did occur that this might be a precis gathered from Peter's works by some student . But against this are the facts that there are additions, ideas not contained in Peter's other works, and that the first person is used in some of these distinctions, e. g. distinguo , intelligo , dico. Because of the verbal agreement with parts of both tracts on distinctions, it is possible that this work (or fragment) was written later than both. When used in this study, the work is cited under its Incipit : Ista convertuntur. (c) Quodlibet: The one problem presented by this work has been mentioned several times already. Two questions are repetitions of questions in De modis distinctionis. A careful comparison of both versions shows that in the Quodlibet there are improvements in minor details, such as a clearer subdivision of the material, but there is no change of doctrine . There is no indication why the questions are repeated . This brings to mind some questions. Is it possible that some scribe inserted these questions into the tract on distinctions from the Quodlibet? We have noted already that they do not fit snugly into the context . Because of the improvements , slight though they are, in the Quodlibet version , the opposite would seem to be the case ; the questions were copied into the Quodlibet from the former work. 4. Philosophical Works of Peter Used in This Study The works of Peter which will keep entering our discussions of his doctrine on identity and distinction are the following, listed with the manuscripts used for each and according to the name I have adopted . (a) De distinctione praedicamentorum. Two manuscripts : Oxford, Magdalen Coll . , n. 80, 14 c. , fair condition ; Venice , edition by Nucciarelli, not critical, 16 c . (b) De ente. Two manuscripts : Oxford, Magdalen Coll. , n. 8o, ut supra; Rome, Vat . lat . 2190, 15 c. , fair condition. (c) De esse intelligibili. One manuscript : Vienna, Staatsbibliothek, n. 1494, 15 c . , fair condition.

(d) De modis distinctionis . Two manuscripts : Oxford , Magdalen Coll. , n. So, ut supra; Vienna, n. 1494, ut supra. (e) Ista convertuntur . One manuscript : Rome, Vat . lat. n. 2190, ut supra. (f) Quodlibet. One manuscript : Vienna, n. 1494, ut supra. One edition : by M. R. Hooper and E. M. Buytaert, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. , 1957. 40 E. Buytaert, however, is inclined to doubt the genuinity.

Introduction

15

5. Delimitations of the Subject of this Study Peter was esteemed through the 14th and 15th and into the 16th century as a defender of the Immaculate Conception¹¹ and an apologist of the formal distinction.42 It would perhaps be expected that what is probably the first formal study of any part of Peter's philosophical doctrine should treat of his Formalism. But certain practical considerations entered into the determination of the scope of this study. Before a definitive work on Peter's Formalism can be undertaken the 28 manuscripts I have mentioned must be studied , compared , and from them a critical edition made of both works. Similarly, before a study of the general doctrine, the philosophy of Petrus Thomae, may be undertaken, the Commentarium in primum librum Sententiarum and the De esse intelligibili require at least careful transcription and perhaps even critical revision.43 On the other hand, sufficient progress has been made with the more important of Peter's works to justify a more limited study. It is a fact that the works of Peter show little evidence of doctrinal evolution. From this perhaps we can conclude that all of the works were written within a comparatively short time, as Buytaert is inclined to believe.44 This limited study has one other feature to recommend it. Eventually a study should and no doubt will be made of Peter's place in the Formalist movement. The present study serves as an introduction to this later work. It makes possible a more extended treatment of some aspects of identity and distinction which would have to be treated more cursorily in a work on Peter's doctrine on the formal distinction. The primary object of this study is to present objectively the doctrine of Peter on identity and distinction . No attempt will be made to defend or to refute any opinion which he presents. However, criticism will be made of Peter's method . If he proceeds clearly, logically, defining his terms and rounding out his arguments this is pointed out. On the other hand, if he fails to define his terms, if his arguments are loosely and inconclusively stated, if he appears to propose at one point an 41 Brady, op. cit. , p. 184 , notes that notwithstanding the fact that Peter's tract on the Immaculate Conception was " probably the first attempt to discover in systematic fashion a basis for the Immaculate Conception in Holy Scripture," it seems to have had surprisingly little influence in the fourteenth century . 42 Meier illustrates this fact in the one instance of Peter's reputation in Erfurt in the 15th century . Cf. Meier, " De schola Franciscana Erfordiensi saeculi XV," Antonianum, 5 ( 1930) , 57-94, 157-202 , 333-362, 443-474. 43 A scholar is engaged at present in preparing a critical edition of De ente. 44 Cf. Quodl., Preface, xi -xii .

16

Introduction

opinion inconsistent with an opinion stated elsewhere this too is pointed out ; for such lapses impede the orderly presentation of a philosopher's doctrine. Primarily, then, the doctrine of Peter on identity and distinction should emerge from this study. Secondarily some idea should be gained of the stature of Peter as a scholar . Comparison will be made between the doctrine of Peter and that of Duns Scotus and to a limited extent with that of the later Scotists. But again this is in subordination to the primary purpose of presenting objectively Peter's own doctrine . Nervertheless , a by-product of this study should be a preliminary, a tentative view of Peter's role in the Formalist movement. A full appreciation of this role will be possible only after much study has been devoted not only to Peter's treatment of the formal distinction , but also to the many and varied proponents of the formal distinction in the three centuries that the movement flourished . This study is presented in three major parts. Part I investigates Peter's teaching on the nature and kinds of identity. There are arguments for presenting either identity of distinction first . However, since Peter regards distinction as basically the denial of identity, identity is treated before distinction. Part II , then , takes up the nature and kinds of distinction. The formal distinction is dealt with only in so far as is required to show its place among the distinctions. Many refinements, applications, and rebuttals of opponents' attacks have been passed over and left for a later and more extensive study. Part III treats relationships ; that is, the relationships between the various modes of identity, between the various modes of distinction, and lastly between identity and distinction, both as regards their ontological nature and their modes. As an exemplification of many of these relationships Part III concludes with a study of the distinction of the categories. The Conclusion takes up certain general aspects of Peter's doctrine in so far they can be determined from the works and doctrines studied : Peter's relationship to Scotus, his stature as a scholar, his place in the Franciscan School.

PART I IDENTITY It is a conviction of our every day life that there is a plurality of obIt jects in the world of our experience. Moreover, the analogous nature of these objects is commonly recognized . There are aspects under which they are somehow similar and again aspects whereby they differ. And we recognize degrees of likeness, sameness, identity of objects as well as degrees of difference and distinction of objects . This is common experience, but experience which is more or less explicitly adverted to . The philosopher directs explicit attention to these relationships ; he is interested in the reasons or principles behind this sameness and diversity of objects. Even more so is he interested in the reasons of sameness and difference between the realities which constitute a given object . The scholastic philosopher whether Thomist or Scotist distinguishes various principles of being. The Thomist distinguishes such principles as act and potency , essence and existence, matter and form . A Scotist like Peter sees in beings such realities as act and potency, matter and form, genus and specific difference, transcendental and proper attributes, intrinsic modes. Immediately it is evident that these principles or perfections will have relationships of similarity or sameness, of diversity or distinction with regard to each other and with regard to the whole being. Some of these relations upon critical investigation we know that we construct in whole or in part in our minds, some we recognize as existing as such in reality. A study of these external and internal relationship of sameness and diversity, of identity and distinction has always been an important part of the philosopher's metaphysical enquiry. He has sought to discover the principles of being and then the relationship between these principles. His conclusions on both these questions have played an important role in establishing the character of his metaphysics. In the thirteenth century as the foundations of different schools of scholastic philosophy were being laid in the divergent opinions of outstanding and influential philosophers, questions especially on the modes of distinction between the various principles and perfections of being

17

18

Petrus Thomae

were widely and strenuously controverted . It is no cause of wonder then that at the beginning of the fourteenth century a great deal of attention was being given to the relationships of identity and distinction . Peter was in the vanguard of Scotistic philosophers whose interest in identity and distinction stemmed mainly from their efforts to explain the formal distinction and to defend it against the attacks of Thomists and Ockhamists . It will be evident from the doctrine of Peter on this subject, first , that the formal distinction can be adequately understood only in terms of a complete theory of distinction, and second, that distinction must be studied in relation to a theory of identity. In his works Peter makes many approaches to the subject of identity. The result is a rather complex array of kinds of identity, In this first part the notion of identity in general will be distilled from these many passages and an attempt will be made to give an orderly presentation of the various kinds of identity distinguished by Peter. The major portion of this part will be devoted to identical and formal identity, the principal types of identity studied by Peter. The method of exposition will be to consider the two kinds of identity in separation and then to study them together first speculatively and then practically as found in God and creatures and as related to predication . A comparison between the doctrine of Scotus and Peter on this subject will lead to a summary and some conclusions . 1. IDENTITY IN GENERAL Peter treats of particular aspects of identity frequently in the various questions of De modis distinctionis. The type of identity existing between the divine attributes is discussed in Q. VII . The identity of the metaphysical parts of creatures is considered along with the type of distinction involved in Q. II . Q. IX [ Q. VI of the Quodlibet] is devoted to an extensive treatment of the highest kind of identity, essential or identical identity . However, in none of these places does Peter attempt a definition of identity. Perhaps this is because identity is a simple, irreducible notion that cannot be defined . Such notions we are inclined to take for granted and to proceed to an investigation of the uses of the term , as indeed, Peter does. Just a hint of the nature of identity in general is given by Peter's remark that, as Aristotle says, identity partakes of the nature of unity.¹ 1 De secundo , ut vult Philosophus secundo libro et capitulo praenotato, identitas est quaedam unitas. De modis distinctionis, Q. V, f. 49rb. Aristotle,

Identity

19

No doubt he subscribes then to Aristotle's descriptions of identity based on unity. "Things are called the same, " he says, "if they do not differ by a differentia. ””² Or again , “Things are the same whose substance is one. ” ³ Or more closely to the point, sameness , he says is “a unity of the being either in kind or in number, and those whose essence is one. "4 It is “ a unity of the being either of more than one thing or of one thing when it is treated as more than one , i. e . , when we say a thing is the same as itself; for we treat it as two. " These definitions of same and sameness, it will soon become evident , cover the various types of identity which Peter will distinguish. If identity is not precisely synonymous with unity, at least it is founded on unity and its types can be distinguished according to the types of unity.

As Peter says, identity and unity are

not formally but fundamentally the same. One difference that Peter would seem to imply is that unity is an absolute property of being, identity implies a relation. Some further inferences concerning the nature of identity can be deduced through a comparison of identity with distinction, but this will be undertaken in Part III. In raising the question of identity, therefore , Peter is asking in what way or ways beings may be said to be one, or, more frequently, in what way or ways the realities of a real being are said to be one in relation to the whole. He finds that differences in the ontological nature of the realities involved are the basis of different modes of identity. In distinguishing the various kinds of identity, Peter introduces the first and fundamental division almost as an after-thought, in answer to an objection. It is clear, nevertheless , that he would divide identity first into identity of reason and identity ex natura rei. Identity of reason is a relation of reason , a relation posited by a collative or comparative act of the intellect . Such a relation is pure if posited entirely by the mind. It is non- pure if the relation posited by the mind has a real foundation outside the mind . An example of the latter kind is that whereby a thing is said to be identical with itself. It is an example of what Aristotle meant when he said that identity at times is had when one thing is treated as though it were two.

On the other hand, identity ex natura

Metaph. , Bk. II , which from the context is the obvious reference here , does not contain any such statement. Bk. V, c . 9, 1018 a would perhaps be better. * Physics, Bk. IV , c. 14, 224a. 3 Metaph., Bk. V , c. 15, 1021a. 5 Ibid. ▲ Ibid., c. 9, 1018a. 7 Ibid. De modis dist., Q. V, f. 49rb. Respondeo et dico, quod quaedam relatio est relatio rationis pura, quaedam alia non pura. Relationem rationis voco puram quae dependet totaliter ab operatione alicuius potentiae totaliter collativae ; relationem autem non puram voco illam quae non totaliter ab opere illius potentiae

20

Petrus Thomae

rei is a real relation ; it exists in the thing. The other divisions of identity will fall under one or the other of these two fundamental types. Peter in De modis distinctionis proceeds to the further division of identity by three ways ; first, through the modes of perseity ; second, through the modes of unity in general, i. e ., those modes inclusive of unity in the logical and the real order ; and third, through the modes of unity in the real order. In the first way, Peter studies the doctrine of Aristotle on essential attributes or per se predication. The passage under consideration is the following : Essential attributes are ( 1 ) such as belong to their subject as elements in its essential nature ( e . g . line thus belongs to triangle, point to line ; for the very being or ' substance ' of triangle and line is composed of these elements, which are contained in the formulae defining triangle and line) : (2 ) such that while they belong to certain subjects, the subjects to which they belong are contained in the attribute's own defining formula. Thus straight and curved belong to line , odd and even, prime and compound, square and oblong, to number ; and also the formula defining any one of these attributes contains its subject e. g. line or number as the case may be. Extending this classification to all other attributes , I distinguish those that answer the above description as belonging essentially to their respective subjects ; whereas attributes related in neither of these two ways to their subjects I call accidents or ' coincidents ; ' e . g. musical or white is a ' coincident' of animal. Further (a) that is essential which is not predicated of a subject other than itself: e. g . ' the walking [thing] ' walks and is white in virtue of something else besides ; whereas substance, in the sense of whatever signifies a ' this somewhat , ' is not what it is in virtue of being something else besides. Things, then, not predicated of a substance I call essential ; things predicated of a subject I call accidental or ' coincidental . ' In another sense again (b) a thing consequentially connected with anything is essential ; one not so connected is ' coincidental' . . . If ... there is a consequential connection, the predication is essential ; e . g. if a beast dies when its throat is being cut, then its death is also essentially connected with the cutting, because the cutting was the cause of the death, not death a 'coincident' of the cutting. So far then as concerns the sphere of connections scientifically known in the unqualified sense of that term , all attributes which (within that sphere) are essential either in the sense that their subjects are contained in

dependet, sed habet aliquid de reali licet complementum illius sit ab opere potentiae collativae. Huiusmodi autem est ista identica relatio : est enim relatio quae est eiusdem ad se, nam tam ista relatio quam illa identica identitas habet aliquid de reali, puta fundamentum, non tamen habet complementum. Nec enim habet extrema distincta realiter, nec oritur ex ipsis ut sic distinctis ; et dico bene dicitur quod intellectus utitur uno ut duobus ut cum dicitur quod idem est idem sibi . Quodl. , 106 , 613–625. De modis dist. , Q. V, f. 49rb.

Identity

21

them, or in the sense that they are contained in their subjects, are necessary as well as consequentially connected with their subjects.10 In De modis distinctionis Peter concludes to two modes of formal identity from this passage, from which he in turn derives two modes of identical identity. " However, in the Quodlibet, considering the same passage, he arrives at four modes of formal and identical identity.12 These modes will be investigated below. 13 For the present, we note that from the modes of per se predication he arrives at modes of two basic types of identity, formal and identical ; these receive the bulk of his attention and development. Peter's second approach to the division of the modes of identity is by way of the modes of unity in general, i. e. , unity considered as including modes dependent on the intellect and modes which are entirely objective. In this case , the passage in Aristotle which Peter has in mind is in the Metaphysics . In general, Aristotle states, things are called one either (1 ) by accident or (2) by nature . An example of the first is musical, just, and Coriscus. Coriscus, being both musical and just , may be said to be one with these accidents and the accidents one with Coriscus by virtue of an accidental union, or by accident . 14 Things may be one by virtue of their nature in various ways.¹ (a) Some things are called one by nature because they are continuous.

10 Post. Anal . , Bk. I , c . 4 , 73a—73b . 11 De modis dist. , Q. V, f. 49rb . 12 Quodl. , 92 , 148-171 . This shift in opinion, a rare occurrence in the works of Peter, reflects a dispute over this passage among the Scholastics . Grosseteste, according to John of Cornubia, concludes to only two modes of predication per se from Aristotle's text . For, after giving the first kinds of essential attributes, Aristotle states : " extending this classification to all other attributes, I distinguish those that answer the above description as belonging essentially to their respective subjects ; whereas attributes related in neither of these two ways to their subjects I call accidents or ' coincidents . ''' Hence only the first two are essential attributes admitting of per se predication . Furthermore, Grosseteste considers only the first two to be modes of inherence (modus inhaerendi) ; the last two are modes of being (modus essendi) ; which again would make only the first two genuine modes of per se predication . (Cf. [ John of Cornubia] , Opera Omnia Joannis Duns Scoti, In libro I Post. Anal. quaestiones, Vives, Paris , 1891 , Î , q . 32, n . 2 ; 2 , 289b.) St. Thomas and John of Cornubia, however, considered also the fourth mode as a mode of inherence . In Aristotle's text therefore, they find the basis for three modes of per se predication . (Cf. John of Cornubia, op. cit., loc. cit.) Peter in his first position concurs with those of Grosseteste's mind . In his second opinion he goes beyond St. Thomas and John and finds a basis for four modes of per se predication . 13 Cf. below, p. 29 f. 14 Scotus comments only very briefly on this passage of the Metaphysics. In making Aristotle's divisions more explicit I have followed the commentary of St. Thomas. Cf. In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria, Marietti, Turin, 3rd ed . , 1935 , Bk. V, 1. VII , nn . 842-865.

22 22

Petrus Thomae

Of these, some are naturally continuous (not merely by contact) and some are continuous by art, i. e . , artificially united, as when two sticks are glued together. Those continuous by nature obviously enjoy a higher unity than those continuous by art. (b) Some things are called one because their substratum is one. This is possible in two cases : when the parts are united in the whole, as for instance , when the various ingredients unite to make wine ; or, when several objects are considered one because of a common substrate , e . g. wine , water, oil, etc. , have the common ingredient of water. (c) Again, two things are called one when they are one by genus. For example, a circle , a triangle, a quadrangle are united under the genus of "geometrical figure. " (d) Some things are called one by reason of definition. Either they have the same definition of their essence (coat and jacket would have the same essential definition) , or they have a common definition of some part of their essence (the definition of animal applies to both ox and man) .15 (e) Lastly, those things are most perfectly one of which our knowledge is undivided . Aristotle refers to those things whose quiddity can be known separately. Among these especially rank substances . These last are one in the highest sense, because they are one in themselves, whereas the others are considered one in relation to something else.16 Peter does not specifically name the types of identity which he would derive from this division of unity in Aristotle's Metaphysica . It is evident that modes of both logical and real identity would result. For example, the unity by reason of genus would be the basis for a logical mode of identity ; while the unity of parts in the whole would be the basis of a mode of real identity. However, Peter leaves this particular approach to the modes of identity undeveloped. The third way in which he would arrive at modes of identity is through the modes of unity found in real things . Of these he manages to find eight : (1) unity of aggregation , the least type of unity ; (2) unity of order, i . e. , an aggregate unity but with some order among the members ; (3 ) accidental unity, involving accidental information of the subject; (4) unity of composition, i . e., through intrinsic principles , whereby a per se unum is established ; (5) unity of singularity ; (6) unity of simplicity, which is a higher type of unity by the very fact that it connotes simplicity ; (7) unity of the supposite , which is evident in the Trinity, and is clearly something different than the unity of simplicity ; 15 In so far as this part is the genus this mode would appear to coincide with the third. 16 Aristotle, Metaph. , B. V, c . 6, 1015b- 1016а .

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(8) unity of formal notes, beyond which no other unity of real things is possible.17 By the fact that sameness or identity is founded upon unity Peter once again draws the conclusion that from these modes of unity we have an adequate index of the modes of identity. In this case, however, he gives to each mode of identity the name of the mode of unity : identity of aggregation, identity of order, etc.18 Like the previous division of identity this one is not developed in any detail by Peter. This approach to the kinds of identity through the kinds of unity gives us a fuller understanding of what he wishes to include under his notion of identity. Wherever there is any unity, there is some type of identity. The weaker the unity, the looser the type of identity is there involved. Unities then which are composed through the work of the mind imply an identity only in a derived or logical sense . Unities which are accidental, which do not involve the essence of the thing, involve identity in a broad sense, as Peter says, identity secundum quid. We could continue here and say that a unity of the essence not involving formal notes is identity in the highest and most proper sense, to such an extent that in comparison to this even formal identity must be said to be secundum quid. But this would be anticipating a later discussion. We have had occasion several times already to mention identity secundum quid. Peter uses this designation to describe various situations. One mode of this identity "after a fashion " is that which exists between things united in the same supposite or subject ; it is said of things joined to the same essence.".19 Thus, as we have just indicated , accidents are said to be identical secundum quid with the subject in which they inhere. Another case analogous to this, though Peter does not speak of secundum quid identity when treating the situation , would seem to be the identity of matter and form in the composite . For he denies identical or formal identity between these two . Rather he says that they are two partial essences which constitute one essence.20 It will become evident after a study of his meaning of identical and formal identity that this is a case of identity secundum quid. A third case of secundum quid identity, mentioned explicitly by Peter, is the identity of individuals in a species or of species in a genus . Finally, it was noted above that Peter considers 17 De modis dist., Q. V, f. 49 va . 18 Ibid. 19 Primum est quod in his quae sunt idem tantum supposito vel subjecto est identitas secundum quid : illa enim quae sunt in eodem supposito saltem habent istam identitatem quod iunguntur eidem essentiae. Quodl. , 107, 658-661 . 20 Ibid., 114, 866.

3 Bridges: Identity and Distinction

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24

any mode of identity even formal identity to be secundum quid in comparison with identical identity. If we analyze these uses of the term secundum quid with reference to the modes of identity, we see that it is used in an entirely unique sense each time. In fact the use is so varied as to render the term almost devoid of its usual meaning . However, it would seem possible to reduce the term to two main uses . In the first case identical identity is evidently the point of comparison ; in reference to this all other modes are secundum quid, of a lower order. In the second case it would appear that identical and formal identity are the point of reference, and any other modes of identity are secundum quid. Here the term would mean, not involving the essence or formal notes of the thing in the real order. This second use of secundum quid would seem to be indicated in Peter's statement that any forms of secundum quid identity can be reduced to identical or formal identity.21 No indication is given how he would go about this. He simply states that no rule can be given for this reduction.22 Several further classifications of identity are mentioned but only in passing. One is that of adequate and inadequate identity.23 The terms are not defined . However, from his use of the term in De Ente and De modis distinctionis it appears that by adequate identity he means the identity whereby the things related are wholly and mutually identical, e. g., the divine essence and divine wisdom. Non-adequate would be the identity whereby the things are not completely and mutually identified , but are identical in part and disparate in part . Thus he says that the superior (genus) and its inferior (species) are essentially identical by non-adequate identity, i . e . the genus can be predicated of the species , but it is more extensive than the species, while the species has a difference whereby it is not identical with the genus.24 Another example of nonadequate identity given by Peter is the identity of the divine essence with the Paternity. They are identical but not wholly and mutually so ; the divine essence can also be predicated of the Filiation and Spiration, but Paternity cannot.25 Another classification of identity is the division into per se and per accidens.26 Obviously identical and formal indentity are per se; while at least the first case of secundum quid identity mentioned above is per accidens. 21 Ibid., 107, 666—668. 22 Ibid. , 114, 877-879. 23 Ibid., 109, 730-734.

24 De ente, Q. IV. 25 De modis dist. , Q. VI , f. 82ra. 26 Ibid., f. 84rb .

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What might have been the basis for a major classification of the kinds of identity is likewise left undeveloped by Peter, In De distinctione praedicamentorum after giving a seven-fold division of distinction, he observes that identity might be divided in the same way. This would yield the following division of identity : identity of reason and identity ex natura rei; the latter would be formal, real, or essential ; this last would be subjective or objective.27 Since he does not develop the division, we will pass it by, though we will return to it in Part III to consider a rule of coincidence between various types of identity thus distinguished . Finally, Peter qualifies identity in objective reality sometimes as ex natura rei and sometimes as real. For example, in De modis distinctionis he says that whatever are identical independently of the work of the intellect are really identical, e. g., essentially, formally, accidentally.28 However, since the term " real" is also used in a restricted sense as in the previous division , we will retain the term ex natura rei as an unambiguous designation of this broad division of identity, namely, for any type of identity which is independent of the work of the intellect ( ante opus intellectus). 2. IDENTICAL AND FORMAL IDENTITY It is a difficult matter to trace the origin of Peter's particular interest in identical identity. The question he poses in the Quodlibet is : Whether identical identity can be posited in something without intensive infinity in both or (at least) one of the extremes.29 His manner of treating the question would suggest that he is refuting the opinion of some opponent and at the same time developing his own doctrine . As of the present, however, it has not been possible to locate the problem in Scotus , Peter Aureoli, or other contemporaries.30 Identical identity is that identity which is rooted in the unity of the essence. For that reason it may also be called appropriately essential identity.31 Peter shows preference for the first term. For him "identical" specifies a particular type of identity , since there are, as we have seen, different kinds. It seems to him the better term, because what he wishes

27 De dist. praed. , f. 31гa. 28 De modis dist., Q. XI , f . 61 vb. 29 Quodl. , 87, 1—4. 30 Scotus uses the term " essential identity" but apparently not " identical identity." Francis Mayron frequently uses the term " idem identice, " but he does not enter into a discussion of the term. Cf. Francis Mayron, Scripta, Venice, 1520, Conflatus, d . 33 , q . 4. 31 Quodl ., 104, 570—573 .

3.

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to designate by it is the highest type of identity. He admits that it is simply a verbal designation and not a term that signifies precisely the determining difference . He insists, however, that it is not a mere play on words. Its redundancy expresses the highest, the most perfect kind of identity: identical identity.32 For the rest , he is of the same mind as St. Augustine, who said that there is no reason to dispute a term if it expresses clearly the notion intended.33 Concretely, those things are said to be identically identical which are the term of one simple productive act ; for example, being and any of its transcendental attributes, e . g. goodness.

Another means of determin-

ing a case of identical identity is through the property of inseparability. Peter uses this criterion to prove that being and its intrinsic modes are identically identical.35 Penetrating deeper into the nature of this highest type of identity, Peter seeks to establish the ontological root of it. Identical identity is rooted in and arises from the unity of the essence . This must be specified. It is not rooted in that unity whereby the species is said to be one with its genus, nor in the unity of the members of a species, for then all the members of a species would be identically identical ; nor is it rooted in the composite of matter and form , for matter and form are not identically identical, although together they compose an essence ; nor is it rooted in the unity of the subject or composite, since the accidents are manifestly not identically identical with the subject.36 The specific type of unity of essence involved Peter calls the unity of illimitation of essential intimating . We will have to approach this unusual and complex notion a step at a time. Illimitation apparently, for he does not define his terms here, means a lack of limit or restriction. He enumerates several types of such illimitation . There is permissive 32 Secundum dictum est quod identicum additum identitati videtur specificativum identitatis, licet huiusmodi specificatio magis sit ex usu loquendi quam ex proprietate seu ex modo significandi . Primum, videlicet quod sit specificativum, apparet : non enim omnis identitas est identica, sed tantum aliqua specialis . Secundum, puta quod huiusmodi specificatio magis sit ex usu loquendi quam ex modo significandi , patet : cum [enim] dicitur identicum, non dicitur aliud ultra identitatem . Tertium dictum est quod identitas identica dicitur identica antonomastice , sicut si diceretur diversitas essentialis " diversitas diversificata, " pro quanto est summa diversitas ; consimiliter quod identitas essentialis seu identica, ― quod est idem, ― - [est] maxima seu summa et perfecta identitas. Ibid., 554-566. 33 St. Augustine, De Trin . , Bk. IX, c . 23 , PL 41 , 276. 34 De modis dist. , Q. I , f. 41vb. 35 Ibid., f. 39 va. 36 Quodl. , 88-89, 40-52.

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illimitation, as in the case of the transcendentals. The convertible transcendentals are not limited to certain individuals but extend to all beings by reason of the unlimited extension of being of which they are attributes. Perhaps this indirect extension of the attributes to all beings is what Peter means by permissive illimitation.37 Then there is the illimitation of indifference, such as all superiors have with respect to their inferiors . The latter type, however, he feels is not different than permissive indifference , since all superiors seem to be illimited permissively to their inferiors.38 Another and quite different illimitation is that of intimating. What is thus illimited can intimate itself, as it were fuse its reality, with everything compatible with it . The clearest case of such illimitation is that of being, which intimates itself to any positive perfection. No positive perfection, partial or complete, can be posited without this kind of intimating ; otherwise it would be nothing, and certainly therefore not a positive (and real) perfection . Being has this intimating of itself as regards anything that is compatible with it ; the attributes of being have it only in an indirect sense ; they do not have essence and so cannot intimate themselves to all things compatible with them ; but in so far as they are essentially and identically convertible with being they can be said to intimate themselves to whatever is compatible with being.39 37 Huismodi identitas identica oritur ex unitate rationis illimitate essentiali intimitate. Expono hic primo quid voco illimitatem essentiali intimitate . Ad quod dico quod illimitatio est multiplex. Quaedam enim est cuiusdam permissionis, qualis ponitur in transeuntibus ; alia cuiusdam indifferentiae, quae tamen non est alia illimitatio a prima, quoniam omnia superiora videntur esse illimitata permissive ad sua inferiora ; alia illimitatio est intimitatis. Nec enim quaecumque illimitatio est huiusmodi intimitatis : subjectum enim est illimitatum ad suas passiones et aliquas passiones nec tamen subjectum respectu passionum suarum est illimitatum hiuusmodi essentiali intimitate, quia quidem quod est sic illimitatum potest se intimare omni sibi compossibili, eo modo quo ratio entis se intimat cuicumque positivae rationi. Ibid. , 89, 53-67. 38 Ibid. 39 Licet enim ipsa entis ratio absolute accepta ab huiusmodi intimitate abstrahat, quia nec ipsa est de sua intrinseca ratione, licet sibi competat necessario, saltem in aptitudine, eo modo quo potest poni in transcendentibus aptitudo ; tamen cum hoc stat quod omnes partiales rationes positivae et essentialiter et identice sunt idem enti necessario, et non solum rationes positivae quae quiditative ens includunt, sed etiam omnes passiones eius et omnes differentiae eius, quae ipsum ens quiditative et formaliter non includunt ; nam quod non est ens essentialiter nec formaliter, videtur penitus nihil . Quod dictum de ente, verum est de quolibet alio transcendenti , puta de eius passionibus ; tamen est in hoc differentia, quia ens habet ex se huiusmodi intimitate cum quocumque sibi compossibili , eius autem passiones, puta verum et bonum , non habent idem ex se cum ex se nullam habent essentiam, sed pro quanto sunt idem essentialiter seu identice, convertibiles cum ipso ente. Ibid. , 88–89, 69—84.

28

Petrus Thomae The illimitation of essential intimation Peter describes as that where-

by something so intimates itself to many that it is the whole essence of each, without, however, being formally the essence of any one.40 For example, in the Trinity the divine essence essentially intimates itself to each of the three supposites and is the whole essence of each ; but it is not the essence of any one of these supposites exclusively, for if it were then it could not be the essence of the other. In creatures, the essence of the soul intimates itself to all of the powers, the essence of man to all of his quidditative perfections.41 The note of illimitation apparently would add the notion that this intimation is possible as regards all compatible perfections, so that if it were possible to add some new quidditative note, some new intrinsic mode, the essence would intimate itself to the addition. In general, then, in so far as any perfection pertains to the essence of a thing, it is said to be essentially identical with it . On the other hand , the essence may be said to extend to and include this perfection, and this intimation of the essence to all and every perfection in it so that they may be said to be individually and collectively of the essence, is the root of identical or essential identity. Peter's attempt to establish the basis of identical identity would appear to be a noteworthy contribution to metaphysics. It is to be regretted that he deals so briefly with the subject . Perhaps a fuller exposition will be discovered some day in his commentaries on the Sentences. Certainly the present passages on the subject would suggest a previous treatment where the terms are defined and more explicitly applied. An important question concerning identical identity concerns its ontological status as a relation . Is identical identity a mental construct, or is it something real ? Peter states first of all that identical identity is formally a relation.42 It arises from the nature of the thing. But it is not 40 Illimitatio essentialis intimitatis est qua aliquid ita se intimat pluribus quod est tota essentia uniuscuiusque, non tamen est formaliter unius essentiae. Ibid., 115-116, 927—929. 41 Ibid. , 116, 937-938 . Our difficulty in analyzing these notions is increased by the fact that Peter does not define his terms completely and accurately. We may conclude either that he defined them in his commentaries on the Sentences, or that they were so well known at the time that he considered it unnecessary to go into detail. Regarding the first point, it has already been indicated that the commentaries on the Sentences are not available . On the second point, consultation with experts on the writings of Scotus , Ockham and Aureoli revealed that such terms as "illimitation of essential intimating," "permissive illimitation, " and " illimitation by indifference" do not occur in the writings of these authors . 42 Ibid., 88, 22.

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a real relation, since it lacks two of the three requirements for a real relation. For a real relation it is required that the foundation be real, that the relation proceed from the nature of the foundation, and that the terms be really distinct (ante opus mentis ) .43 Identical identity has the first requirement but lacks the other two . Hence it cannot be a real relation.44 Note, however, that Peter states this of identical identity in general. There are cases, which will be noted immediately below, where identical identity has all three requirements and hence there is a real realation. Identical identity, then, if it is not formally a real relation must be a relation of reason . Peter distinguishes two types of such relations : pure and non-pure. The pure relation of reason is one that proceeds entirely from a collative or comparative power. The non-pure has something of the real order in it, though it is still formally a relation dependent on a collative power. In the case of identical identity, there is something of the real order involved, namely, the foundation of identity : illimitation of essential intimating. Therefore identical identity is a non-pure relation of reason.45 In the course of his discussion of the ontological nature of identical identity Peter mentions the first of several classifications of the modes of identical identity which can be gathered from his works . Some things, he says (1 ) are identical with themselves, e. g. two infinite things : the divine essence and divine wisdom. (2) Some things are identical with another, but the other is not identical with them, e. g., where there is identity between an infinite thing and a non-infinite thing : the divine essence is identical with a relation (Paternity) , but the relation is not entirely identical with the essence .

(3) Some things are identical in

some third thing, e . g., the divine persons in the divine essence , or animality and rationality in man. While in the first two cases there is no possibility of a real relation, in the third case he sees definitely a real relation between the divine persons ; and though in the case of creatures there is no possibility of a real relation in such a clear-cut fashion, he feels that there is some real relation or order of partial entities.46 He would seem to be leaving the way clear here for the formal 43 Ibid. , 105 , 591-595 . Cf. Scotus, Oxon . , I , d . 31 , q . un .; 10, 489b-490b. 44 Quodl., 105 , 595-597 .. 45 Ibid., 112, 832-838 . Note that he expresses a doubt whether the identity whereby a thing is identical with itself has any real foundation. Ibid., 105, 598-599 . 46 Aliqua autem in divinis est realis relatio ; ut patet de divinis personis , inter quas est realis relatio cum ista identitate identica quam habent in

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distinction, the distinction between formalities or entities which are distinct irrespective of the work of the intellect . Another division of identical identity used occasionally by Peter is that of adequate and inadequate identity, 47 which we have mentioned under the kinds of identity in general. The divine essence and divine wisdom are adequately identically identical ; man and his rationality are inadequately identically identical. The main division , however, is made according to the modes of perseity.48 What is meant by per se is described in a somewhat succinct phrase. Those things are per se which are " in that which a thing is” (in eo sunt quod quid est) ; that is, which belong to the essence in some way.49 (1) The first mode of perseity is had when the predicate is contained in the quidditative notion of the subject . More extensively, that is predicated per se primo modo which is so conceived that the concepts of subject and predicate are identical, so that one part is not conceived without the other, but the whole is conceived . This first mode admits of degrees. (2) The second mode of perseity is had when the predicate is outside the quidditative notion of the subject and the cause of the perfection is not expressly mentioned : man is risible . A property is predicated of a subject without mention of the essential root of the property. (3) In the third mode the predicate does not have its cause in the subject, but is ordered by nature to the subject. This type of perseity is characteristic especially of substance, above all of the primary substance, because it is primarily suited to have things subject to it.50 (4) The fourth mode resembles the second in that the predicate is outside the quidditative notion of the subject, but in this fourth mode the cause is expressed , e . g . , the slain man died by slaying.

essentia. In creaturis autem illa quae sic identificantur in tertio, ut in isto identificantur non referentur realiter ut realitas generis et differentiae ut identificantur in specie ; tamen, ut ab isto in quo identificantur abstrahuntur, puta ab entitate speciei , et inter absoluta accipiuntur, potest dici quod aliquomodo habent inter se aliquam relationem realem seu ordinem sicut quaedam partiales entitates ; tamen ut sic, non habent huiusmodi identitatem identicam, cum isto modo abstrahuntur . Ibid. , 107, 648-657. 47 Ibid., 109, 732. Cf. above, pp. 20-21 . 48 Ibid . , 92, 142-147:. 49 De modis dist. , Q. V, f. 51гa. 50 Because this mode of perseity deals with that which is subject to another, this type of predication, he maintains, belongs to demonstration, which shows the connection of a thing to that to which it is naturally subject. Quodl., 91 , 114-117 .

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It will be noticed that the distinction of the four modes is based on the fact whether or not the predicate is contained in the subject. We may sum up the four modes, therefore, in the following scheme :

Within the subject . •

Ist mode expressed

• 4th mode

•

Predicate :

cause in subject

Without

not expressed . . • 2nd mode

cause not in subject

·

3rd mode

Though these four modes of perseity give us four modes of identical identity, Peter notes that identical identity corresponds more properly to the first mode. 51 His attention, therefore, is centered especially on this first mode. Within this mode he distinguishes various degrees . (1 ) The first degree is where the subject and predicate (he approaches the degrees from the aspect of predication) have the same quidditative definition, taken in exactly the same way, and designated by the same term : man is man. (2) The second degree is had when the predicate is the whole quidditative definition of the subject : man is a rational animal. (3) The third degree is had when the predicate is part of the formal quiddity of the subject : man is rational.

(4) The fourth degree, when

the predicate is part of the material quiddity of the subject : man is an animal. These four degrees in turn , he asserts, can be subdivided , since, for example, if the predicate is a formal part of the subject, it can be a remote or proximate part, etc.52 From other passages it is apparent that Peter would add a fifth degree, namely, (5) when an intrinsic mode is predicated of a subject.53 Among the degrees of identical identity Peter notes a hierarchy. The first and highest degree is the identity of a thing with itself. The second degree is the adequate identity of the definition and that which is defined . The third is that between a thing and its formal note, e . g.,

51 Ibid., III , 802-808. 52 Ibid. , 91 , 118–141 . In Ista convertuntur Peter gives a slightly different arrangement of the four degrees of the first mode. ( 1 ) A thing is predicated of itself. This is the same as the first degree in the Quodlibet. (2) A formal or material part is predicated of the subject. Here the third and fourth degrees are combined . ( 3 ) A definition is predicated of the defined . This is the second degree above. (4) An intrinsic mode is predicated of a thing. This degree is not mentioned in the Quodlibet. Its omission leaves a lacuna. In Q. XI of De modis distinctionis he insists that this is a degree of the first mode of per se predication. Cf. f. 61rb. 53 De modis dist., f. 61rb.

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between the essence and the specific difference. The fourth is that between a thing and its material note . The fifth in the hierarchy corresponds in certain cases to the second mode of perseity and identity. It will be recalled that the second mode deals with subjects and their essential attributes. Now if a property is really distinct from its subject , i . e. , in creatures, then it will not be possible to have identical identity in the highest sense. But where such a real distinction is not involved, namely, with the transcendentals and the attributes in God , identical identity is involved, though of a lesser degree than in the foregoing. 54 The sixth degree would be that between a thing and its intrinsic mode . 55 For the comparative degrees of identity in God and creatures, see below.56 In general, the more perfect the foundation , i . e. , the more perfect the unity of the essence, the more perfect will be the identity. Hence, in God is found identity in the highest degree, then in angels , then in men, etc.57 In summary, identical identity is that identity which is rooted in the unity of an essence. The specific type of unity which is the basis of such identity Peter calls the unity of illimitation of essential intimating. This expression, indicates, though in a very abstract and obscure way it must be admitted, the fact that the essence, as it were, extends to and draws within itself the essential perfections, properties, metaphysical parts, intrinsic modes ; as a result of this, these realities may be said to be of-the-essence or to belong to the essence , though in different modes and degrees according to the nature of the realities. Peter chooses to call such identity identical identity to emphasize that it is identity in the truest and highest sense . Peter notes that the doctors of antiquity distinguished a two-fold predication as regards God : through identity and through inherence. He calls the first identical predication ; the second , through inherence, he calls formal predication. From these modes of predication are derived

54 Quodl., 92, 148–171 . 55 I add this degree to his list, on the authority of Q. XI of De modis distinctionis, as just noted . I do not think that its omission in the Quodlibet constitutes a change in opinion. Since the Quodlibet question is simply a copy of Q. IX of De modis distinctionis, and intrinsic modes are said to be predicated of a subject in the first mode of per se predication in Q. XI of the latter work, the Quodlibet position cannot be called a later opinion. By way of explanation of its omission in Q. IX, I would suggest that Peter is cleaving more closely to Aristotle here. In Q. XI he makes it a point to suggest a reason why Aristotle did not include the modes when speaking of per se predication. Cf. below, Part II , p. 117 . 56 Cf. p. 36 f. 57 Quodl. , 115 , 906—910.

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identical and formal identity. The latter is called "formal" because it pertains to the formal notes of a thing. 58 We can cull at least a descriptive definition of formal identity from Peter's works. When things are formally identical simply (i. e. properly, as distinct from secundum quid), one thing is contained in the concept of the other.59 If, therefore, one note or perfection is contained within the quidditative concept of any thing or reality, then the perfection and the thing or reality are formally identical. For example, animality is formally identical with humanity, because it is contained in the concept of humanity. The existence of formal identity is discovered by comparing the concepts of the realities involved. If there is an overlapping of concepts, if one is included in or agrees with the concept of another, then these realities are formally identical. As above with identity in general, we can get a fuller notion of the nature of formal identity from a study of its kinds. First of all , set off against simple or proper formal identity is formal identity secundum quid. There is identity of the latter kind between things of the same species or genus. They have in common one or more quidditative notes . 60 It is secundum quid, because it is not a unity within a subject but among many subjects . It is formal, because the formal notes are identical in whole or in part. The main division of the kinds of formal identity, however, follows the modes and degrees of perseity.61 There is no need to repeat them here. But some comment is necessary. Applying the definition of formal identity to the four modes, we must conclude that only the first mode is properly indicative of formal identity. In the other modes there may be some agreement in concepts, but not agreement in quidditative concepts, in formal notes. Take for example the second mode , the predication of a property of a subject . The subject does not enter into the quidditative concept of the property, nor vice versa. Yet a property cannot be defined without at least the addition of the subject or some quidditative perfection of the subject. Hence, in an improper sense the second mode may also be said to be the basis of a type of formal identity. With regard to the degrees of the first mode, Peter makes one exception. 58 Omnes doctores antiqui posuerunt in divinis duplicem praedicationem , videlicet per identitatem et per inhaerentiam . Illa autem praedicatio quae ab antiquis vocabatur ' per identitatem, ' vocatur nunc identica ; illa etiam quae appellabatur ' per inhaerentiam, ' appellatur ab isto Doctore formalis. Ibid., 104, 545-550. 59 Ibid., 107, 661-666. 60 Ibid. 61 Cf. above , pp. 20-21 .

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and should have made another. He denies formal identity in the first degree, i. e., where the thing is identical with itself.62 We must infer his reason . In this first degree the formal aspect is not the quidditative concept but the concrete individual considered as identical with itself. The further exception he should have made is the fifth mode, the identity of the intrinsic mode with its subject. Like the property, the intrinsic mode does not contain the subject in its quidditative concept , nor vice versa. But the intrinsic mode cannot be defined without mentioning the subject : infinity is a mode of being.63 The preceding discussion on formal identity is necessarily brief, because Peter did not develop this part of his doctrine as fully as he did that on identical identity . However, a consideration of the mutual relations between these two fundamental types of identity will give a better insight into the nature of both. Peter considers identical and formal identity to be the two ultimate types ; all others must eventually be reduced to these .64 But formal cannot be reduced to identical. The two are distinguished , he says, not by opposing notes of difference but by disparate notes. They cannot be radically opposed, because they are compatible in the same thing.65 Wherever one finds formal identity one must always find identical identity in the very same thing. But the reverse is not necessarily true ; formal identity is not always necessarily found where there is identical identity.

The reasons for these two conclusions can readily be inferred.

Formal identity in the strict sense involves the formal, the essential notes of a thing ; it always occurs within the essence of the thing therefore ; and the essence is the font of identical identity. As a result formal identity of necessity needs identical identity and is impossible without it . The second conclusion applies only to the order of abstraction . In certain cases after ultimate abstraction only identical identity remains.

62 De modis dist. , Q. XI , f. 63гa. 63 Peter devotes Q. VI of De modis distinctionis to the question : Does identity of formality necessarily imply formal identity ? The answer is in the negative. Peter can pose the question only by using the term "formality" in an analogous sense. But this problem will be discussed below. Suffice it for the present to note that by identity of formality in this particular question he means the identity of the divine essence and a divine attribute. În effect it means identical identity. Formal identity on the other hand is taken in the sense just explained , the identity of formal concept. Obviously there is no identity of formal concept between a divine attribute and the divine essence from which it is abstracted . 64 Quod. , 92 , 174-175 . 85 Ibid., 105 , 581-582. 66 Ibid., 92-93 , 176-183.

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The effect of ultimate abstraction on these two types of identity is the subject of frequent discussion in Peter's tracts . Ultimate abstraction is that whereby everything extraneous to the simple and proper quidditative note is abstracted.67 Thus all accidents, modes, and attributes are left aside and simple rationality, for example, is retained to the exclusion of animality.68 Now a fundamental distinction between identical and formal identity can be seen in the fact that, given ultimate abstraction, identical identity necessarily remains but formal identity is lost. In God, even after ultimate abstraction the separated attribute is still identically identical with the essence. But in creatures , for example in man, animality when abstracted is lacking that to which it can be said to be formally identical. That is to say, animality and rationality are genus and specific difference and are identified in a third thing, namely, man. When ultimate abstraction is applied and animality or rationality is taken singly, the third thing in which they are identified is left aside and hence formal identity disappears. The same is true in God from a standpoint of formal identity. When the divine wisdom is considered ultimately abstracted from the divine essence, formal identity is removed, leaving only identical identity . We see here confirmed the assertion above that not every case of identical identity presupposes formal identity.69 Comparatively speaking, identical identity for Peter is the nobler ; it is identity in the highest and most perfect sense . It is rooted in the unity of the essence, and for him the identity of the essence is the most perfect. Where there is this identity of the essence there is the greatest simplicity; hence identical identity must be identity simpliciter. It is impossible to have perfect identical identity with any composition ; composition is opposed to the very idea of perfect identical identity. As a consequence it is found in the highest and simplest degree in God. And since it is identity simpliciter, identity in the purest sense, even formal identity is really identity secundum quid.70 It must be admitted that, though the point he wishes to make is evident enough, Peter leaves something to be desired with regard to 67 Abstractio dicitur ultimata secundum quam aliquid abstrahitur ab omni eo quod in eius ratione quidditativa seu diffinitiva proprie et simpliciter dicta nullo modo includitur . De dist. praed. , f. 30vb. 68 De modis dist. , Q. II , f. 43 vb . 69 Ultimata abstractio non tollit identitatem identicam ab illis quae se ipsis identificantur vel quorum unum identificat sibi aliud , et tamen in illis ipsa ultimata abstractio tollit identitatem formalem, ut patet in essentia divina et sapientia in relatione et essentia. Quodl. , 113 , 854-858. 70 Ibid., 94, 211–212 .

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terminology. We saw above that he distinguishes identity in the proper sense (identical and formal identity) from identity secundum quid. There the reason of distinction was that in identity in the proper sense, identity within the essential and proper notes is indicated , while in identity secundum quid either identity of the accidents with the subject or of individuals in a species is indicated . To use the same terminology now to distinguish between identical and formal identity can lead to unnecessary confusion . Following his lead, however, we can attempt a summary of the types of identity in the following fashion: Strictly: identical identity

Proper sense : wide sense : formal identity IDENTITY : accidents with subjects

Secundum quid:

individuals in species species in genera

Thus formal identity would be an intermediate type partaking of the character of both. This leads to a further point of comparison. That which is simply and most perfectly identical must be greater intensively than that which is so only secundum quid. This would seem to be confirmed by the fact that between the divine supposites and the divine essence there is identical identity but not formal identity. " The highest and most perfect identity is naturally found in the highest and most perfect being. On the other hand , where the two types of identity convene there is found the greater identity extensively. 72 This is evident since in such a case there is present more reasons of identity. Applications of these conclusions can be found in God and in creatures. Since Peter makes application of his doctrine on identity to God and creatures in diverse places in such a way as to leave the picture somewhat confused, an attempt will be made to present these applications here in some order. Again, these applications should lead to a deeper understanding of identical and formal identity. It has already been noted that the more perfect the foundation the more perfect is the identity. Since the unity of the divine essence is the highest, the identity of the same according to the first degree of the first mode of identity is the highest . This is the identity whereby in God all the attributes are identical among themselves and with the divine

71 Ibid., 94, 226–230. 72 Ibid., 231-236.

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essence.73 Intensively there is no greater type or degree of identical identity. However, extensively the divine essence is identical with itself to a greater extent than to any of the attributes, just as an attribute is more extensively identical with itself than with another attribute.74 The reason lies in this that in the former way there are more modes of identity, i. e. , there is both identical and formal identity ; in the latter only identical identity.75 In the first case, it might be added, there is adequate identical identity ; in the second, non-adequate . At this point we can take up the problem that was the occasion of Q. IX in De modis distinctionis and Q. VI of the Quodlibet : Is intensive infinity necessary for identical identity ? We have already seen that Peter would answer in the negative. The root and foundation of identical identity is the illimitation by essential intimating.76 Nevertheless, in God intensive infinity has a close relationship to identical identity. That is , identical identity in God is a necessary consequence of intensive infinity. It is impossible for anything to be essentially distinct within that which is intensively infinite; it is not possible for an intensively infinite thing to be composed or capable of composition. Hence , every77 thing that is compatible with such a being is identically identical with it."7 Furthermore, and this should be evident, not only identical identity but illimitation of essential intimating follows from this intensive infinity, since this is the origin of identical identity. If any attribute in God is essentially identical with the divine essence it is not immediately because of intensive infinity but because of the illimitation of essential intimating of the divine essence with regard to all that is compatible with it.78 He concludes that he found no doctor who makes intensive

73 De modis dist., Q. VI , f. 51vb. 74 Ibid., Quodl. , 94 , 236-242. 75 De modis dist. , Q. VI , f. 51 vb. N. B. The text is defective in this place in both manuscripts, but this seems to be the meaning intended . In the Quodlibet Peter raises a further question : is the identity of the divine essence with what is compatible with it greater than the identity of being with its transcendental attributes ? The answer is in the affirmative, for the following reasons. There seem to be more causes of identity in the divine essence ; and it is identical in a more perfect way. In both cases there is illimitation of essential intimating, but it is more perfect in the divine essence, since the notion is found more perfectly in God . Quodl. , 110 , 752-762 . 76 Cf. above, pp. 26—28. 77 Quodl. 99, 374-389. 78 Ad infinitatem intensivam necessario consequitur identitas identica, quoniam impossibile est ab infinito intensive aliquid sibi compossibile essentialiter distingui ; ergo per consequens omne sibi compossibile est cum ipso idem identice ... Consequentia est evidens : nisi enim omne componibile infinito transiret in identitatem essentialem cum ipso , iam ipsum esset compositum vel sibi aliquid componibile, quia alias impossibile esset ex illis fieri unum, nisi transiret in identitatem essentialem vel componerentur. Ibid.

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infinity the cause of identical identity ; but they use intensive infinity as verification of the fact that such is present, since the cause of this identity is, as said, illimitation of essential intimating, which follows necessarily from intensive infinity.79 When dealing with identical identity in God it at times makes a great deal of difference, Peter indicates, whether one thing is predicated of another in the concrete or in the abstract. Some things can be predicated of each other identically in the concrete and the abstract ; for example, it is true to say both " God is wise" and "divinity is wisdom ; " or, " the Father is the divine essence" and "the essence is paternity. " These are true essential predications. But sometimes , according to the content, what are identical can be predicated of each other in the abstract but not in the concrete ; it can be said "the essence is the relation," but not, "the essence is relative , or related . " Conversely, some identical things can be predicated of each other in the concrete but not in the abstract ; it can be said, "the generans is a spirans," but not, " generation is spiration. " The reason behind this last is that through abstraction the ultimate root of identity in God is removed, namely, the infinity of the divine essence. Lastly, some things are identical and yet they cannot be predicated of each other either in the concrete or in the abstract . This is true of the three divine persons : the Father is not the Son, nor is paternity filiation.80 These observations by Peter bring out the close relationship between identity and predication . This subject will be discussed further below. At present , I would like to remark that Peter would have added considerably to the worth of his contribution and to the clarity of his exposition if he had applied more extensively his distinction here between predication in the concrete and in the abstract. In the preceding paragraphs we have dealt mainly with identical identity in God. There is a problem with regard primarily to formal identity but also involving identical identity which can be included here ; for though it has application to both God and creatures, the primary application is to God. The problem centers mainly on the question whether the identity of a formality and formal identity are the same. The problem has special importance in connection with the formal distinction ; for the problem can be stated in another way ; does the denial of formal identity necessarily imply a formal distinction ?

79 Ibid., 118, 995—996 . It would appear that Scotus is an outstanding exception. Cf. below, pp. 49–50 . 80 Ibid., 108, 683-690.

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Since the problem is complex, it may be helpful to follow Peter's exposition, adding commentary as we progress . First, however, it might be noted that Peter's treatment has the merits and defects which we shall indicate later in our comparison of the doctrine of Scotus and Peter on identity. Briefly, he shows keeness of mental acumen in making his various precisions ; but he fails to define his terms and to illustrate his meaning by example ; his thought is often keen, but his expression lacks precision. As a result a certain amount of conjecture as to his meaning is inevitable . An outstanding example in the present context concerns the terms " formality" and "identity of formality." The terms are not defined in the context ; at the same time "formality" is obviously used in two different senses. At times by " formality" he means a formality in the strict sense, 81 and at times the composite of formality and essence. It would seem that by "identity of formality" he means the identical identity that exists between a formality and the essence. His statements on formal identity and identity of formality can be arranged in a three-fold division : general observations, comparison of attributes among themselves in terms of identity, comparison of the essence and the attributes . The application throughout is to God . 82 (1) In general, two conclusions are stated : (a) identity of formality is compatible with the denial of formal identity. Wisdom is really identical with the essence (identity of formality) though not formally identical with power. To deny this would be to posit a real distinction between wisdom and the essence .

(b) Identity of formality therefore does not

necessarily imply formal identity. This is evident, because identity of formality is compatible not only with formal identity but with the denial of formal identity. Hence, there cannot be a necessary connection between the two. (2) Conclusions arising from the comparison of attributes : (a) All the attributes are identical with the identity of singularity. They all make up the one singular subject , God. (b) All the attributes are identical with the identity of simplicity. Since there is no real distinction of essence and essence, there is the unity of simplicity and hence the identity of simplicity in the divine essence . (c) The formality of one attribute is not distinct from the formality of another. Here Peter must certainly mean that they are not really distinct . The implication is that there is identity of formality or essential identity between formalities . The point is an important one to make for the sake

81 Cf. below, p. 104. 82 De modis dist., Q. VI , ff. 51 va― 51vb. 4 Bridges : Identity and Distinction

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of a better understanding of the formal distinction . Essential identity and formal distinction are compatible . (d) The formality of one is the formality of the other. Identity of formality is here stated a bit differently. Perhaps he would also mean to say that , looked at from the angle of essential identity, all the formalities are included in one, such as "divinity."83 (e) All the attributes are one attribute. Cf. (d) . This is simply a restatement in other terms. (f) The formality of one is not formally the formality of another . Formally considered wisdom is not identical with power, which is evident from the fact that their formal concepts are different . (g) The attributes are not formally the same. Cf. (f) . (h) Any attribute formally considered includes any other formally considered. At first sight this seems to be the contradictory of (f) . However, there are two possible explanations. It may be that he is considering attributes here formally as attributes (not as this or that specific attribute) ; as such they are infinite and inclusive of all other attributes thus considered . Or he may mean that formally considered any attribute includes its subject at least "sicut additum," as the Scholastics put it. All of the attributes of God include in their formal notion in this manner the same subject . Hence, one attribute includes the other by reason of being of the same subject. Yet one attribute formally considered is not entirely the same as another ; their formal real concepts are different. (i) No attribute formally includes another. That is, wisdom, for example, now considered formally as wisdom (tale attributum ) does not include power, nor power wisdom . (j) Any attribute quidditatively considered includes any other thus considered. Here the attribute is considered precisely as a reality, a "quid," as such it is infinite and inclusive of all other attributes, since there is only one infinite quiddity in God. (k) No attribute includes another quidditatively, since they are not the same formally. The attribute is now considered as "tale quid," as a quidditative perfection formally distinct from other perfections ; and as such it does not include the others. (3 ) Conclusions arising from the comparison of essence and attributes : (a) The essence formally and quidditatively considered includes all the attributes formally and quidditatively considered. Taking the essence

83 Ibid., f. 51 vb.

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completely and as a quiddity, it includes, or, understood rightly, it is made up of, all the attributes . It is essentially identical with the attributes. (b) The essence includes none of the attributes formally and quidditatively considered . Taking the attribute formally and quidditatively now as "tale quid," it is not formally identical with the essence . Ultimate abstraction is implied. (c) The essence of all the attributes is one formality, one reality, one causality, one singularity, one simplicity. This is an expansion of (a) . (d) There is not a greater identity of the essence with itself than of the essence with some attribute . The whole essence is the same as any attribute essentially speaking. There are no degrees of identical identity in God. (e) Improperly speaking, however, (comparatio abusiva ) the essence might be said to be more identical with itself than with some attribute, since the essence is not formally the same as the attribute. The essence might then be considered more properly and primarily identical with itself before being identical with its attribute. (f) Something may befit the essence as such which does not befit some attribute formally considered. This conclusion and the following need no explanation. (g) Something may befit an attribute which does not befit the essence. (h) Something may befit one attribute which does not formally befit another. (i) Both the essence and the attribute can cause distinct intellections in the mind. This is an important fact indicating some real ground for a distinction . (j) The essence of God is not formally the same as the attributes . This seems to be a repetition in a slightly different form of (b) immediately above. We have here an exercise in the various aspects under which the divine essence and its attributes may be considered . That this is not a useless past-time, a sterile exercise of mental gymnastics, has always. been the staunch contention of the Formalists. If, as the Patristic tradition holds, the doctrine of the real distinction in the limited sense and of the logical distinction is inadequate to explain some of the deeper problems in the Divine Being, and if the formal distinction with all that it implies is the answer to these problems, then there is need for exact precision in thought when considering the essence end the attributes in themselves and in their relations.

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This is not to say that Peter has given us a complete or at all times a lucid explanation of these various aspects . He has not . But he has put his finger on certain important considerations that must be borne in mind when studying the divine essence from a Formalist viewpoint . At the same time , at least indirectly he has shown the necessary connection between a doctrine on identity and on distinction. As regards identity in creatures, the question which it appears Peter was most anxious to solve concerns the problem whether in them there is to be found identical identity. If intensive infinity is the basis of identical identity, as apparently some held, then of course it would be impossible to have such identity in creatures. Peter lines up several arguments to prove that identical identity is found in creatures. The first argument he professes to borrow from Scotus : In every being there is some perfection and this perfection has some degree . Now the degree of perfection goes along with the perfection and is identical with the thing that has the perfection . It is by means of this degree of perfection that a being is said to be such and such a being. And no being will be found without its proper degree of perfection . Since this is true of all beings, there is identical identity in all beings , i . e . , in so far as the degree of perfection is identical with the essence . 84 Secondly, there is certainly formal identity in creatures . But if this is true, there must also be identical identity, since formal identity cannot exist without identical.85 Thirdly, in creatures an essential part is identical with the formal whole, since it is included in the quidditative concept of the latter. It must then be essentially identical with it ; and it will also be formally identical. Conversely, the whole will be identically but not formally identical with the part , since the whole does not belong to the quidditative concept of the part.86 This is a necessary consequence of his definitions. But it leaves unspecified just what is the relation of the whole to the part.87 Fourthly, there is certainly identity between the defined and its

definition in creatures. This, as we have seen, is identical identity, i. e . , the second degree of the first mode . He cites Averroes on the question, who says that a thing is identical with its quidditative parts and that 84 Quodl., 97, 325–326 . Cf. Scotus, Oxon . , I , d . 31 , q . un . , n. 6 ; 10, 494. 85 Cf. above , p. 34. 86 Quodl., 97, 336-339. 87 Scotus covers this situation by his first type of real distinction secundum quid, namely, of adequate non-identity. This type of distinction has not been adopted by Peter, at least not explicitly . Cf. below, Part II, p. 137 .

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a quiddity is not other than that in which it is. 88 This is true, Peter adds, of the soul and its powers, as St. Augustine also asserts.89 Having established that there is identical identity in creatures , Peter proceeds to point out the limits of its application . Since such identity depends on the unity of the essence, it will not be as great intensively as in God. At the same time it will vary according to the degree of unity, so that there will be a greater essential identity in an angel than in man, etc. On the other hand , extensively the identity of a creature with itself will be greater than the identity of the divine essence with its attributes, because in the former case there are two modes of identity, identical and formal, while in the latter there is only identical identity.90 It will be obvious that for identical identity in creatures intensive infinity will not be required . This is just another argument against those who place the cause of identical identity in intensive infinity . The argument is bolstered by a consideration of being and identity. The note of being is identical with its attributes ; and yet the note of being does not have intensive infinity. Further, if the note of being were not identical. with its attributes, the attributes would be distinct essences in composition with being. The same conclusion is reached by considering the identity of being with all positive perfections . And the reasoning is the same, with the added observation that anything that does not have being identical with it would really be nothing. Hence , there is identical identity in creatures, even though there is not intensive infinity. There is no need to repeat here the conclusions reached above in comparing identity in God and creatures. Instead we can go on to a consideration of the difference between the identity of the superior and its inferior and between being and all positive notes. The problem is this . It can be argued that since there is identity between being and all positive notes without any composition with these notes, and since there is identity between the superior and its inferior, it must follow that here, too, there must be no composition . The implication is that then a formal distinction would have to be denied in the latter case . Peter replies 88 Cf. Marciantonii Zimarae Solutiones Contradictionum in Dictis Aristotelis et Averrois, in Opera Omnia Aristotelis , Venice, 1550 , vol . 11 , f. 59 . 89 St. Augustine, De Trin . , Bk. 10 , c. 11 , PL 42 , 983. Once , in De distinctione praedicamentorum (f. 31rb) , Peter denies that there is essential illimitation of intimating in creatures and consequently no identical identity. A closer study of the context, however, indicates that Peter there is presupposing ultimate abstraction . In the concrete there is this essential illimitation ; in the abstract there is not . This is one place where a more explicit distinction between the concrete and the abstract order would have added clarity to Peter's work. 90 Quodl., 115, 908—910.

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by pointing out that there is a difference between the two cases. Being identifies itself with all positive notes ; but the superior does not identify itself with the inferior ; rather the inferior identifies itself with the superior. Again, the superior or genus cannot be identified with a thing without being formally identical with it at the same time ; whereas being is identical with all positive notes but it is not formally identical with them . Hence, there is not a parity of cases here . It is true that the superior or genus does enter into composition , but it is not with the species but with the difference : animality does not unite with humanity but with rationality, with which it is essentially identical in the composite. In this case animality is essentially and formally identical with the essence or quiddity ; it is essentially but not formally identical with rationality in the concrete . 91 The relation of genus to species is further specified by Peter. Genus and species are identically identical in the concrete. And yet they are not adequately so. For the genus agrees with the species in one respect but it is different in another. In other words, the genus cannot be said to be completely and mutually identical with the species. The essential identity here is inadequate identity. The same can be said of the identity of the form with the composite . 92 The main points which Peter makes concerning God and creatures are, therefore, that the highest type of identical identity is to be found in God, in whom is found the highest unity of essence ; this identity admits of degrees according to the unity of essence ; identical identity can be had without formal only in God ; yet in creatures in the concrete there must be identical identity ; but this type of identity is lost when one turns to abstraction and predication . In view of the nature of predication and its uses, there is necessarily a relationship between identity and its real forms, which we have been considering, and identity in predication . Whether in mental, spoken or written form predication is the assertion or denial of some sort of identity between predicate and subject . But that identity and predication are not formally the same is evident from the fact that some things essentially identical are not essentially predicable of each other.93 Peter asserts, in the first place, in common with scholastic tradition, that all affirmative predication is identical predication . In fact it could not be a true affirmative predication unless there were some identity 91 De modis dist. , Q. XI , f. 63ra. 92 Ibid . 93 Aliqua sunt eadem identice, quae nec praedicantur de se in abstracto nec in concreto, ut tria supposita in divinis. Quodl. , 108 , 691–692 .

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at the basis ; and a verification of this identity is a verification of the predication. 94 He says further that there are two kinds of affirmative predication : accidental and essential. 95 He does not define accidental predication nor does he mention or use the term again in the available texts. We may presume that he understands it in the traditional scholastic sense. Essential predication is had where the predicate is essentially the same as the subject . It is of two kinds : identical and formal.96 And so we might remark, essential predication is ex natura rei, i . e . it states a relationship of identity actually existing in real things either identically or formally or both. For simple identical predication (where no formal predication is involved) Peter sets down two requirements : (1 ) that the subject and predicate be really and essentially the same ; for all identical predication is essential, though not vice versa ;

(2) that both or least one of the

extremes (the subject and predicate) be infinite, either formally as in God or permissively as in the simple transcendentals . Furthermore , just as in the real order the root of identical identity is found in the illimitation of essential intimating, so too in the logical order of predication the root of identical predication is the same illimitation. 97 This predication can be in the concrete or in the abstract, as explained above. In each case it is necessary to look to the content or meaning of the terms being predicated to determine whether the predication is true and hence permissable . Formal predication is had where the predicate pertains intrinsically to the quidditative ratio of the subject, or, in other words, where the predicate is in the subject in the first mode of perseity : man is a rational animal.98 It follows, therefore, that all formal predication is identical, since the predicate will also be really and essentially the same as the subject. But not all identical predication is formal. This is the natural consequent of the doctrine above on identical and formal identity. Identical predication presupposes identical identity ; formal predication presupposes formal identity. And so the two types of predication will be governed by the same relationship as the two types of identity.99 94 Affirmativa praedicatio est enuntiativa alicuius identitatis subiecti et praedicati ; ergo omnis talis est identica, hoc est, dicens seu enuntians identitatem. Ibid. , 95, 253-254 . 95 De dist. praed. , f. 30ra. 96 Ibid . 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid., f. 31 vb ; De modis dist. , Q. II , f. 44rb ; cf. above, p . 34 .

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A further consequence is that identical predication without formal will be had only in God and with the simple transcendentals , e. g. , divinity is goodness, and conversely. Lastly, with Scotus he concludes that in creatures one never finds identical identity without formal identity, for in creatures nothing is identically identical that does not at the same time belong to the quidditative notion of a thing, i. e . , that is not formally the same with it.100 In the Quodlibet Peter lists some principles governing the predication of abstracted predicates . (1 ) No predication of one abstracted note of another is true if the cause of identity has been removed by the abstraction. Identity is the verifying reason for any affirmative predication. If the identity is removed, then the reason of verification is removed and the predication is no longer true . For example, to say "this musical person is white" is true as long as the subject remains of which musical and white can be predicated . But if the predicates are abstracted from the subject, the predication would be false, e . g. , " music is white ." (2 ) If the abstraction does not remove the cause of identity, then such predication is true. This follows from the preceeding. However, he adds an example from Scotus which introduces somewhat of an extension of the principle. The proposition " white is a color " is true, even though these predicates have been abstracted from their subject. They are true because a reason of identity remains, namely, in their very natures.101 Here one cause of identity was removed , but another remained . So we can say that , given an adequate cause of identical identity, affirmative predication of one abstracted predicate of another will be true. (3) It is possible to predicate of each other in the abstract predicates which are really distinct . The reason is that if they are really distinct as res and res or even as realitas and realitas102 then the act of abstraction leaves aside the third thing in which they are identified , thus leaving aside the reason of identical identity.

(4) Not all things which are identically

identical are capable of being predicated of each other when ultimately abstracted . Again it depends on whether or not the reason of identical identity is removed . In God, even after ultimate abstraction the reason of identity remains in the divine essence, and abstracted predicates can be predicated of each other. But in creatures this is not so . You cannot

100 Peter cites Scotus : " in Tractatu de Principio primo . " I was unable to find any such statement in Scotus' De Primo Principio. However, the doctrine is contained in Oxon . , I , d . 8 , q . 4, n . 25 ; 9, 673b. 101 Quodl., 95-96, 272-284 Scotus, Quodl., q . 5, n . 16 ; 25, 219 . 102 See below, p. 82, 92 , for the technical meaning of these terms.

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state, for instance, " man is animality;" but you can say " God is goodness. " 103 Actually it would seem that these are just some of the principles that could be enunciated concerning such predication. Recalling the precisions he made in discussing formal identity, no doubt a similar list could have been compiled for the predication of formally identical parts with and without ultimate predication. In summary, predication follows the nature of the thing if it is true. Identical predication will be essential or formal depending on the kind of identity in the thing. Care must be taken , however, when dealing with predicates that have been ultimately abstracted from the subject. For in creatures such abstraction removes the ground of identical identity making identical predication impossible. Again , it will make a difference whether predication is made in the abstract or in the concrete, and for the reason just given . In the concrete the ground of identity will not be removed, but in abstraction it may be removed. We have covered the doctrine of Peter on identity from several different angles . It will be useful to try to summarize and assay the field, making some comparisons with Scotus in the process . 3. SCOTUS AND PETER ON IDENTITY Since Peter is ordinarily considered to have been a doctrinal if not a personal disciple of Scotus, a natural question arises. How does the doctrine of Peter on identity compare with that of Scotus ? It may contribute to a better understanding of the work of Peter to compare. the two briefly. Scotus, though he would appear to have devoted more attention to the question of identity than the other scholastics to his day,104 did not develop any formal tract on the subject. His doctrine must be gathered from scattered sections of his work, especially from those sections where he treats of the formal distinction . His main intent, of course , was to distinguish between real and formal identity for the purpose of making specific precisely how a distinction on the part of the thing could be postulated without at the same time postulating a composition of real parts in a thing. As regards a definition of identity in general , Scotus is no more helpful than Peter. The definition, eadem plurium entitas, is not found

103 Quodl., 96, 279–284. 104 Cf. M. Grajewski, The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus, p . 30 .

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in the works of Scotus. He does describe after a manner the two main kinds of identity. The first he describes as real,105 absolute , 106 simple, 107 perfeet, 108 essential, 109 true.110 It is the identity of thing with thing : identitas realis non est nisi rei ad rem.111 He also describes it in terms of the principle of contradiction : "Universally, therefore , whatever is proper to a thing in such a manner that it would be totally contradictory for that thing to exist without it, that is really identical with it . "112 For perfect identity he demands a real relation based upon the three requirements for such a relation.113 This would appear to be a somewhat stricter view of real identity than that proposed by Peter, However, Scotus is almost exclusively preoccupied with identity in God . It could well be argued that he is teaching that real identity in God is more perfect than in creatures, since in other passages he admits real identity in creatures at least along with formal identity . Formal identity is also variously described : "I call that formal identity wherein something said to be the same includes that to which it is the same in its formal ratio, and therefore, primarily and per se ." 114 This somewhat succinct definition can be clarified through another definition , wherein he states that formal identity is found between two things of which one is the definition or part of the definition of another.115 This is practically the same as the descriptive definition of Peter, who states that if one thing is contained in the quidditative concept of the other, it is formally identical with the other. Scotus distinguishes in real identity adequate and non-adequate identity. His definitions are somewhat more clear and definite than Peter's. "Those things are the same with adequate identity where neither exceeds the other, but they are precisely the same , neither more nor less, as the definition and the defined . " Whereas, " those things are said to be the same with non-adequate identity where one exceeds the other, or where the unity of one exceeds the unity of the other, as the identity of animal with man."116

105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116

Quodl., q. 3, n. 22 ; 25 , 142b . Oxon. , I , d. 5 , q . 1 , n. 10 ; 9, 458b . Quodl., q. 1 , n. 1o ; 25 , 19b . Oxon. , I, d . 5 , q. 2 , n . 15 ; 9, 490a. Quodl . , q. 1 , n. 10 ; 25 , 19a. Rep. Par., I , d . 45 , q . 2, n . 9 ; 22, 502 b . Quodl., q. 3, n. 22 ; 25, 142b. Ibid. , n. 15 ; 25, 138b . Cf. Oxon., I , d. 31 , q . un.; 10, 489b--490a. Ibid., d . 2 , q. 7, n. 44 ; 8, 603 b. Rep. Par. I , d . 45 , q . 2 , n. 9 ; 22, 503a. Ibid. , d . 33 , q . 2 , n. 12 ; 22 , 404a.

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No other modes of real identity are suggested by Scotus, though he implies another division. If perfect identity is found only in God, then he must have considered identity in creatures imperfect or secundum quid.117 As regards the relation of formal and real identity, the fundamental positions are the same as those in Peter. Real identity is never found without formal in creatures, but in God it is possible.118 Consequently identical predication when ultimate abstraction has been made will not be true in creatures. Compare again the precision and clarity of statement in Scotus : Respondeo quod in creaturis non est aliqua praedicatio in abstracto per identitatem quod non sit formalis, et ideo numquam fuit tradita Logica in creaturis de praedicatione alia formaliter vera et alia per identitatem ; in divinis autem est vera praedicatio per identitatem in abstracto, et tamen non est formalis . Ratio huius differentiae est ista, ut puto, quia concipiendo abstractum ultima abstractione, concipitur quidditas absque habitudine ad quodcumque, quod est extra propriam rationem quidditatis . Sic igitur concipiendo extrema, nulla erit veritas uniendo ea, nisi praecise quidditas unius extremi sit eadem quidditati alterius extremi . Hoc autem non contingit in creaturis, quia ibi abstrahendo illas realitates, quae sunt in eodem , puta realitatem generis et differentiae, et considerando eas praecissime, utraque est finita, et neutra est perfecte eadem alteri. Non enim sunt modo eadem inter se, nisi propter tertium cui sunt eadem, et ideo si abstrahantur a tertio, non remanet causa identitatis eorum , et ideo nec causa veritatis propositionis unientis extrema illa. Haec igitur est falsa : animalitas est rationalitas, et e converso, et hoc quacumque praedicatione, quia non tantum extrema non sunt formaliter eadem, sed nec vere eadem ; quidditas enim haec praecise est potentialis ad quidditatem illam, et non est eadem illi nisi propter identitatem ad tertium a quo abstrahuntur ; ergo abstractio illa tollit causam 119 veritatis affirmative unientis ea.11 In general it might be said that there is no substantial difference in doctrine in the two authors ; that is, with one possible exception . Peter, in arguing that identical identity follows from intensive infinity in God but is not rooted in it or caused by it, states that no Doctor makes intensive infinity the root of identical identity. Now Scotus does not devote any formal treatment to the question of the root or cause of real identity. However, there are too many instances where he speaks of the reason for real identity in God to doubt that Scotus considered intensive infinity to be the cause of it . We read the following : "Quamdiu

117 Oxon. , d. 31 , q. un . , n. 6 ; 10, 494. 118 Ibid., d . 8, q. 4, n. 25 ; 9, 673 b. 119 Ibid., 673-674.

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manet ratio extremi infiniti formaliter semper in quacumque abstractione, manet ratio identitatis extremi ad extremum. " 120 "Infinitas est ratio identitatis eorum [attributes of God ] . "' 121 " Cum semper maneat in ipsa ratio infinitatis semper manet ratio identitatis ."122 On the other hand essential illimitation is nowhere mentioned in this connection. If Peter was a disciple of Scotus with a particular interest in this question of identity and distinction , naturally one wonders how he could be mistaken with regard to the master's mind in the matter . On the point of extensiveness of doctrine, we can say that Peter has given even more attention to the question of identity than Scotus ; he has analyzed the two major types more thoroughly, distinguishing their modes and noting their mutual relations. And yet though he devotes one question of his Quodlibet to a study of identical identity it would be far from true to say that he has developed an orderly and adequate treatment of the whole subject . We have seen that he often fails to define his terms. (Though it must be kept in mind that possibly he presumes. definitions given in the commentaries on the Sentences. ) At times his descriptions are vague, and examples are lacking to help one understand the precise application of his statement. Examples of his lack of clarity would be his treatment of the reason or cause for identical identity, illimitation of essential intimating ; the ordering of the modes of identical and formal identity according to the modes of per se predication ; and, a point that requires a little more attention , his occasional failure to make a clear distinction between the logical and the real order. Peter divided identity according to perseity and unity without much evident effort to keep identity ex natura rei and of reason apart. In fact, the latter kind occurs only in reply to an objection concerning the true nature of identical identity. Other than to admit that identical identity in the first degree of the first mode is probably not a real relation , he does not attempt to classify his kinds of identity according to this fundamental division. It would certainly seem that the identity of defined and definition must be classified as a case of logical identity . An attempt on our part , however, to arrange the kinds of identity under logical and real identity would involve us in conjecture due to Peter's lack of explicitness . It should be noted that some of the very parts of Peter's doctrine that merit criticism for their lack of precision must also be singled out

120 Quodl., q. 5, n . 16 ; 25 , 219b . 121 Oxon. , I, d. 8, q. 4, n . 26 ; 9 , 674a. 122 Quodl., q. 5, n . 17 ; 25, 219b.

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as apparently advances in the doctrine of identity. The following are some of the notable advances in the doctrine as compared with the work accomplished by Scotus : (1 ) The proposing of a univocal cause for identical identity which can be applied to both God and creatures, i. e . , the notion of illimitation ; (2) the study of the modes of per se predication to determine more precisely the modes of formal and identical identity ; (3) the study of the kinds of unity for the same purpose ; it is interesting to note that Scotus listed only six types of unity : aggregation , order, accidental, composition , simplicity or identification , and subsistence ; 123 (4) the study of the ontological nature of identity ex natura rei; (5) the further penetration of the relationship between essential and formal identity ; (6) the expanded application of these modes of identity to God and creatures. It will require considerably more knowledge of the work of Peter's contemporaries and immediate predecessors before one can determine the extent to which these advances may be called the original contribution of Peter. On the following page an attempt is made to organize the various kinds, modes and degrees of identity which are distinguished by Peter. 123 Oxon., I, d . 2 , q . 7, n. 44 ; 8, 603 ; n. 47, 630b.

Petrus Thomae

Ex Na-

Rei tura

I

D

T

EN I T Y

E Rationis

Per Se

Per Accidens

Strict:

FORMAL

I: Quid

M Secundum

IDENTICAL

Proper

Secundum

II Quid

contained 1. Predicate in subject essence 2. property and

substance 3.

subjects

their Accidents in 3.

genus

2. Individuals in same

species

1. Individuals in same

subject 4. consequence & s

d

S

e

Proper

Secundum Quid III

A 52

itself with a. D identical

definition defined b & e.

difference &. essence gc

r & d essenc e. genus

equiddity

e & mode intrinsic e.

S MON

Part II DISTINCTION in the brief summation of our convictions concerning the relations of IT sameness and difference in the beginning of Part I , it was stated that the philosopher shows a special interest in these relations. He is struck by the unity amidst diversity and diversity amidst unity which he encounters everywhere in his experience and in his philosophical analysis. Mainly he is challenged by the phenomenon of multiple relations¹ whereby a given being may be at one and the same time similar to and different from another being ; or again, looking at the inner realities, by the fact that a reality may be simultaneously identical with and different from the whole or from another reality. In Part I the relations of sameness which Peter found in reality were investigated. In this second Part, the relations of difference or diversity will be studied . In constructing his Quodlibet, as we saw, Peter borrowed with practically no changes the ninth question of the De modis distinctionis, namely, that on identical identity. There was one other chapter carried over with scarcely a change ; this is the tenth question of De modis distinctionis, which asks, "Whether the distinction between genus and difference and diversity formally implies something positive. " This question supplies us with a framework upon which to construct our treatment of distinction. In it are contained a disquisition on the general nature of distinction together with an outline of the major kinds of distinction . Since , however, he suggests a somewhat different division in De distinctione praedicamentorum without correlating it to the division in the De modis distinctionis , it will be necessary to study the two approaches separately, and then to investigate whether the two approaches are compatible . As in the previous part, comparison is made between the doctrine of Scotus and Peter in order to gain some perspective on Peter's work . 1 Out of deference to Peter whose doctrine is being explained , the term relation here should be taken in a broad sense, since Peter does not consider distinction to be a relation in the proper sense . 53

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54

1. DISTINCTION IN GENERAL The word distinction comes from dis-tangere, the prefix connoting a distance, at least in a metaphorical sense . Hence, distinction has more of a negative than a positive meaning.² It means a lack of contact, a removal of one thing from another, a distance between two things . It is evident that this removal, this distance will in some cases be physical, in others ontological , i . e . , in some cases there will be actual physical separation, in others, though the members form a physical whole, there is a distinction ex natura rei between them ; or , the distance or removal of one thing from the other may be logical, as in the case of a distinction of reason . The question may be raised here as with identity, whether distinction is some reality. The question is valid, of course, only of real distinctions. Peter answers with care . Distinction is an attribute of something positive. It occurs between positive realities which are either diverse of different.

But whether diverse or different , in so far as each member

is a being with unity it is distinct. As Aristotle indicated , distinction and identity are attributes of being and oneness .

Peter expands this some-

what by noting that distinction would seem to be the proper effect of unity. The " one" is commonly defined as "that which is indistinct in itself and distinct from every other." "Indistinction in itself" and "distinction from another" he considers, therefore, as at least quasi effects of unity. He qualifies his statement since there is really no causality involved , and so the two attributes cannot properly be called effects.5 Some, it would seem, argued that not only is distinction an attribute of something positive but in itself it is something positive . Peter denies this. Rather than being something positive it denotes something negative, i . e., a privation or a negation of unity. Nor does the fact that it is an attribute contradict this . Negations can be and are attributes of something positive. Take for example " irresolubility" as an attribute of the transcendentals.

Distinction , then , is a negative attribute of something

positive. Fundamentally, however, it might be said to connote something positive, in so far as the extremes of the distinction are something positive ; they are the positive foundations of the distinction.8

2 ³ 4 5 •

Quodl., 126, 230-243 . Ibid. , 119, 38—44 . Cf. Aristotle , Metaph . , Bk. V, cc . 9—10, 1018a—b. Ibid. , Bk. IV, c . 2 , 1003 b. 7 Ibid., 130, 362-364. Quodl ., 124, 175 . Ibid., 124, 194-197. 8 Ibid., 130, 365–371 .

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Again, it was argued that distinction is a relation and every relation is something positive. Peter denies the assertion and its consequence. Properly speaking distinction is not a relation. Distinction does not belong to the genus of opposition and hence much less to that species of opposition, relative opposition.❞ However, previously in this same question of the Quodlibet Peter has studied the opposition between distinction and potency, and between distinction and identity, following the lead of James of Ascoli. Let us see first in what way he finds distinction to be in opposition here ; then we will see if the apparent contradiction can be resolved. James of Ascoli, according to Peter, says first of all that distinction is opposed to potentiality. By act potentiallity is perfected, and thereby it is distinguished ; this act perfects potentiality in this manner, that act in another. Act therefore accounts for distinction. As act is opposed to potentiality so therefore is distinction. And in this sense distinction can be said to connote a perfection.1º According to James, distinction is also opposed to identity both fundamentally and formally. Fundamentally it is opposed because it is opposed to unity which is the foundation of identity. Distinction may be said to be opposed negatively to unity where the extremes are distinct but capable of being united, e. g. , the parts and the whole . It is opposed privatively to unity where the extremes are distinct and are incapable of forming a unity, e. g., two different individuals of a species . Distinction is also formally opposed to identity. The only meaning we can attach to this statement ( Peter offers no explanation) is that the formal concepts of the two are opposed.11 Does Peter contradict himself, then, in saying in one place that distinction is not properly contained under the genus of opposition and in another that it is opposed to potentiality and to identity ? Studying first of all his reasons for not including distinction under the genus of opposition, we see that he appeals to Aristotle and in particular to the commentary of Algazel. They do not list identity and distinction under any of the four kinds of opposition. The four kinds are : ( 1 ) opposition of correlatives , e . g., father and son, which are explained by reference of one to the other ; (2 ) opposition of contraries, e . g. , odd and even of number; (3 ) opposition of privatives and positives, e . g. , rest and movement, which are always predicated of the same subject ; (4) opposition of affirmation and negation, e. g., this man exists, this man does not

• Ibid., 131 , 401–416. 11 Ibid. , 124, 185–197 . 5 Bridges: Identity and Distinction

10 Ibid. , 124, 179–185.

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exist . 12 Now, distinction is not a correlative ; nor is it strictly speaking the contrary of unity or identity ; it is not something positive nor yet something privative ; finally it is not one extreme of an affirmationnegation opposition . In a word, it does not fit into the genus nor any of the species of opposition . Aristotle defines opposed attributes as those which "cannot be present at the same time in that which is receptive of both . ”’ 13 Yet identity and distinction can be present at the same time in a subject. Hence, distinction does not properly belong in the genus of opposition . Yet there is some opposition between identity and distinction, as James of Ascoli pointed out. Peter characterizes it as transcendental . We might explain his meaning in this way. Identity and distinction are found in every being. But they have as it were opposite directions. Identity looks to the unity of the subject within itself; distinction looks to the denial of unity with another subject. In a sense then they are opposed. Yet they are mutually compatible in a subject . This opposition is not the generic type that Aristotle and Algazel describe . It is transcendental.14 In summary, then, as regards the nature of distinction. It is a negative attribute of something positive. It is not in itself positive ; nor is it a relation . It is opposed principally to unity and identity, not with a generic but a transcendental type of opposition . The kinds of distinction mentioned by Peter will simply be listed here and each type will be treated individually and extensively in so far as they have been developed by Peter. Peter makes two approaches to the division of distinction, one in De distinctione praedicamentorum, the other in the Quodlibet . The relationship of these two approaches is an interesting question which will be raised after all the types of distinction have been investigated . In De distinctione praedicamentorum he makes a seven-fold division : of reason, and ex natura rei are the major divisions ; of the latter he distinguishes the following kinds : formal, real, and essential ; and of essential , the kinds are : subjective and objective.15 12 Aristotle, Cat ., Bk. X, 11b ; Algazel, Metaph . , Bk. I , d . 3 (edit. by R. Muckle , Toronto , 1933 , p . 33) . Note that in Metaph. , Bk. X, c. 4, 1055a and Bk. V, c. 10, 1018a Aristotle gives a slightly different line up of the opposites : (a) contradictories, (b) contraries, (c) relatives, (d) privation and 13 Ibid . possession. 14 Quodl., 131 , 401-416. 15 Secunda divisio est eorum quae distinguuntur : quaedam distinguuntur ratione, quaedam vero ex natura rei . Tertia divisio est eorum quae distinguuntur ex natura rei : quaedam distinguuntur formaliter, quaedam realiter, quaedam vero essentialiter. Quarta divisio est distinctionum essentialiter : quaedam distinguuntur se totis subiective, quaedam se totis obiective. De distinctione praedicamentorum, f. 30va.

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In the Quodlibet the approach is somewhat different. First he makes the same major division : Distinctions are dependent on a collative power of the mind or not dependent on a collative power. To the former he gives the general name of distinction of reason. And in De modis distinctionis he subdivides this distinction into pure, i . e. , wholly dependent on a collative power, and non- pure, i . e. , having something of a real distinction in it. The latter he calls the real distinction . The real distinction is of seven kinds ; there are distinctions : of essence and essence, of thing and thing, of reality and reality, of reality and thing, of formality and formality, of formality and thing, and of thing and intrinsic mode.16 The divisions of distinction can be summarized in the following scheme : DISTINCTION

De distinctione praedicamentorum Of reason : [pure]

Quodlibet Dependent on a collative

power : of reason [non-pure] Not dependent on a collative power: real

Ex natura rei: formal real

of essence and essence

essential : subjective objective

of thing and thing of reality and reality of reality and thing of formality and formality of formality and thing of thing and intrinsic mode

2. DISTINCTION OF REASON The distinction of reason was well established in medieval philosophy at the time of Peter. Gradually there emerged two major kinds of this distinction, which were given the designations : distinctio rationis ratiocinantis and distinctio rationis ratiocinatae. The latter was later called

16 Distinctio videtur posse dividi per distinctionem dependentem ab actu alicuius potentiae collativae, et per distinctionem non dependentem ex aliquo tali actu ... Unde prima distinctio ... est distinctio rationis, secunda realis ... Tertium dictum est, prosequendo de distinctione non dependenti ab actu aliquo collativo ... ; quaedam est distinctio essentiae et essentiae, quaedam sicut rei et rei , alia realitatis et realitatis, alia realitatis et rei, alia formalitatis et formalitatis, alia formalitatis et rei , alia modi intrinseci et eius cuius est. Quodl. , 119-120, 30-58 .

5.

e

Petrus Thoma

58

a virtual distinction . Scotus speaks of a distinctio or a differentia rationis.¹7 But it is a matter of some dispute whether the above kinds were known to him. Some maintain that only the distinction of reason in the strict sense is to be found in his writings, not the virtual distinction . Mastrius devotes quite some space to an attempt to prove that Scotus knew of and used the virtual distinction.18 This problem will be discussed below where Scotus' division of the modes of distinction is summarized. Suffice it for the present to note that if Scotus admitted such a distinction as was later called a virtual distinction he found no use for such a distinction in his metaphysics . There is no doubt that Peter knew of such a two-fold division of the distinction of reason. He clearly distinguishes between a pure distinction of reason and a non-pure distinction , one which has some admixture of the real distinction in it. However, since he follows closely the metaphysics of Scotus, he too finds little use for the virtual distinction . As a result, we are presented with an extended investigation of the nature of the so-called logical distinction in general ; the purely-logical distinction is clearly stated and illustrated ; but the virtual distinction is not described at any length . Peter calls any distinction arising simply from the activity of a collative power a distinction of reason.19 This particular manner of expression (distinction dependent on a collative power) was not customary with Scotus ; though he does speak of collative powers.20 In the later Franciscans distinctio rationis ratiocinantis and ratiocinatae are more common.21 By a collative power Peter means any power by which it is possible to compare one thing with another. In particular, man is endowed with at least three such powers : his will, his memory, and his reason. We are not too much interested in the first two . Peter notes, however, that they are capable of producing relations of reason, entia rationis , just as well as the reasoning power. And these relations of reason give rise to distinctions of reason.22 17 In intellectu manifeste est differentia duplex, modorum scilicet concipiendi et objectorum formalium. Oxon. , I , d . 2 , q. 7, n. 43 ; 8 , 602 b. 18 Mastrius, Opera Omnia, Venice, 1708 , IV, Metaph. , d . 6, q . 12, 305–309. 19 De dist. praed., f. 30vb. 20 Potentia collativa potest objectum suum comparare ad aliud et in eo sic comparato causare respectum rationis, qui non inest ex natura rei, sed ex actu potentiae : et ita ratio comparandi objectum suum potest in eo causare respectum rationis. Oxon . , III, d . 26, q . un . , n. 13 ; 15, 333a. 21 Cf. Mastrius, op . cit. , p . 309. 22 Ex quo concludo corollarie quod tam voluntas quam imaginativa virtus et etiam omnia alia virtus collativa potest causare distinctionem

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It is evident that Peter is using "reason" in a very general sense when he says that the will and the memory can produce beings of reason. He observes that "reason" (ratio) has several meanings and uses. (a) It is used at times for " definition " . In this sense ratio stands for the whole essential quiddity of a thing. (b) It also means at times "cause". And in this sense one can distinguish as many kinds of reasons as there are causes. (c) Again, it refers to the power of reasoning. (d) At times, it refers to the object of this reasoning power, e . g . , the " reasons” used by the mind in a syllogistic process. (e) Lastly, and this he says is the common meaning of the term, it is opposed to a real being, and it means an ens rationis.23 It is by an extended use of the last meaning of ratio that Peter is able to speak of relations of reason produced by the will and memory. Whatever is opposed to real being can be called a ratio ; it can be said to originate in reason. The relations and distinctions produced by the will and memory are definitely not real beings. Hence, in a very broad sense they are entia rationis.24 The distinction of reason originates more properly in the intellect , however. This is the main collative or comparing faculty. But it is necessary to make some precisions. The intellect has various powers and acts. There is first of all the active and the passive intellect. The active intellect is responsible for the abstractive activity of the intellect and produces the intelligible species, which is a true being.25 The possible intellect is properly the reasoning faculty.26 It has direct and reflexive powers. The direct or immediate powers are apprehending, composing and dividing of concepts , and arguing.27 The distinction of reason does not arise out of this immediate activity of the possible intellect, because when operating in this way the possible intellect does not produce its object but presupposes it . The distinction of reason is a product of the rationis. De modis dist. , Q. III , f. 46ra ; Ista autem distinctio dicitur communi nomine rationis ; tum quia causare seu originare actum collectivum primo et principaliter convenit rationi, hoc est intellectui possibili . De dist. 23 De modis dist. , Q. III , f. 45 vb. praed., f. 30vb. 24 Accipiendo distinctionem ut distinguitur contra relationem realem potest ab omni virtute collativa originari , tamen ista distinctio a voluntate sive a quacumque alia potentia ab intellectu, non erit distinctio secundum rationem id est secundum potentiam ratiocinativam sive secundum actum intelligendi, sed erit secundum rationem pro quanto non est realis, nec ex natura rei ... Tunc potest dici distinctio multipliciter, tum quia originativa potentia ratiocinativa, tum quia mediante actu ratiocinativo, tum quia est ratio ultimo modo accepta. Cum autem originatur ab aliis potentiis collativis non concurrunt puta duo, sed solum ultimum. Ibid. , Vienna ms., 25 Ibid., f. 46rb. í. 54 rb. 27 De modis dist., Q. III, f. 46rb . 26 De dist. praed . , f. 30vb.

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possible intellect . And its proper place of origin is in the reflex act of the possible intellect , the collative or comparative act.28 Peter refines the point even further. The distinction of reason cannot properly be said to be produced by the reflex act of the possible intellect. Rather it originates there by the very fact that the extremes are posited by the possible intellect . The distinction flows from the extremes . 29 Thus the distinction is not produced ; indeed it does not even properly originate. Rather it is the comparative act which is originated by the possible intellect. From this flows the ens rationis, the distinction, as a consequence of positing the act.30 This seemingly fine point of distinction is a necessary precision. There were those who argued that the intellect is a real being, and what originates from a real being is a real thing ; therefore if the intellect produces a distinction it must be a real distinction . Peter replies : granted that the intellect is a real being and that its product is a real being, it does not follow that only a real distinction can be produced by the possible intellect . The real being produced in the intellect is a real act , the comparative act of the intellect. This act posits the extremes. From these extremes flows the relation of reason upon which is based the distinction of reason. Strictly speaking, therefore , the distinction of reason is not produced by, does not originate from, the possible intellect as an effect proceeding from an efficient cause . In so far as it proceeds from the intellect it must be said to be produced or originated only secundum quid. And yet , since it is a consequence of the positing of the comparative act of the possible intellect, it can be said to be truly an ens rationis, a being proceeding from the possible intellect and wholly dependent upon the intellect, and in no sense a real being.31 Expressing the status of the distinction of reason in other terms, Peter asserts that it does not have esse subjectivum.32 The reason is that 28 Omnis opinio in hoc concordat, quod omnis distinctio rationis est per actum negotiativum, vel per actum collativum vel comparativum, quod idem est. Ibid . 29 Non tamen dicitur proprie productio , sed consecutio ab extremis originatis, pro quanto ipsis positis, ipsa necessario ponitur, non tamen mediante aliqua productione. Ibid. 30 Tunc dico quod illa originata distinctio sive relatio rationis non est proprie originatio . Non enim imaginor quod intellectio organica originet relationem sive productionem rationis , sed quod intellectus originet actionem collativam sive comparativam, et ad illa sequitur sive consequitur esse rationis sive distinctio, sicut quaedam sequela, ita quod proprie non est ibi 31 Ibid . aliqua originatio nisi secundum quid et per accidens . Ibid. 32 The scholastics, as is well known, distinguished esse subiectivum, which is the existence which a real being is said to have, and esse obiectivum, which is the existence of a being considered precisely as known ; it is intentional being .

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an ens rationis can not be said to have existence subjectively in another. However, since the extremes do have esse subjectivum, one can say that the distinction of reason has esse subjectivum secundum quid. Fundamentally it has existence in the possible intellect, but not formally.33 Or, it can be said to have esse objectivum. It has intentional existence in the intellect. Hence , it amounts to the same thing to say that it has esse intelligibile, or esse conceptibile, or esse intellectum.34 In itself it does not have its own proper conceptiveness or intelligibility. If it did it would not be an ens rationis. It derives a sort of intelligibility by the intrinsic determination of the cognitive faculty. In fact by this very determination of the intellect the distinction of reason is posited and derives its intelligibility. Its only being is the being conferred on it by the possible intellect.35 Some asked whether these distinctions of reason are produced by the first collative act of the possible intellect alone, or whether further distinctions could be conceived based on the first . The foregoing discussion of the distinction of reason is an implicit answer. We have been asking where the distinction of reason is posited, what its nature is , and what relation it has to its source . These are nothing more than collative activities of the possible intellect , at least in Peter's terminology. Distinctions can be constructed based on previous distinctions , all with no more than esse intelligibile, and this successively ad infinitum.36 Thus far we have studied the distinction of reason mainly with respect to its quasi agent. We have located the source of origin in the collative act of the possible intellect . In the strict sense it is not produced by nor does it originate in, the possible intellect. Rather it flows from the positing of the collative act. It contributes to a better understanding of the distinction of reason if one investigates the role of the object in this process. Ifthis is to be a genuine distinction of reason, then the distinction must exist only after the work of the possible intellect. But if this distinction is to be fruitful in any way logically or even metaphysically (in the broad sense) the object

must have some influence in the

process .

33 Distinctio rationis habet secundum quid esse in aliquo subiective . Probatur sic : quia habet esse in aliquo fundamentaliter, videtur in eo habere esse aliqualiter subiective . Sed distinctio rationis habet esse in extremis, quae ponuntur distingui fundamentaliter . Ibid. , f. 46va. 34 Ibid. 35 Unde suum esse est suum concipi, nec enim habet esse aliquod nisi in concipi vel in intelligi . Ibid. 36 Ibid., f. 46va.

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proceed from the intellect, it will not be found in the object before the work of the intellect . Nor will it be perceived in the first act of apprehension by the possible intellect. If this were the case the distinction would exist before the work of the intellect, and it would never be possible to conceive of the object without the distinction . The distinction appears only through the collative act, which by nature succeeds the act of apprehension . This presupposes on the part of the object the possibility of rooting extremes for a distinction , and on the part of the intellect the power to conceive an object under different aspects . What, then, are the extremes of such a distinction ? In the distinction ex natura rei, as we shall see, the extremes are things, realities, essences, formalities, which are distinct ex natura rei , before the activity of the intellect. Now some would say that a distinction of reason is always necessarily based on a real distinction , and by means of this real distinction it is possible to have extremes for a distinction of reason . Peter would question the validity, or at least the universality, of this opinion . It is possible for one and the same thing to be conceived under different aspects without any extrinsic reference.37 But he admits the possibility of a distinction of reason having an extrinsic reference, as for instance when he posits a distinction of reason between God and creatures.38 The extremes of the distinction of reason are arrived at in various ways, therefore . They can arise : (a) from a comparison of the object to the intellect, (b) or of the object to the act of the intellect, (c) or of one act of the intellect with another, or finally (d) of one thing to another to which it is not naturally ordered, e . g. , God to a creature.39 In the last case the diversity or otherness of extremes is evident. In the first three cases the otherness proceeds precisely from the different modes of conceiving. Of its very nature the intellect has the power thus to conceive of an indistinct object producing a distinction where before none existed. For example, the mind can think of a point either as a beginning or an end of a line. This would be a case of the mind comparing two of its acts , i . e . , conceiving the point as a beginning and conceiving it as an end.

37 Ibid. , f. 46va ; 47rb . 38 Ibid., f. 46ra ; cf. f. 47rb : Collativitas potest esse ad aliquod extrinsecum . 39 Huiusmodi comparatio sive relatio rationis [est ?] vel ad ipsum intellectum, vel ad eius actum, vel eius intellectus sumpti uno modo ad seipsum sumptum alio modo , vel omnis rei ad aliam ad quam illa ex se et ex natura sua non habet ordinem, puta Dei ad creaturam . Ibid., f. 47va . At the basis of the last instance is the common scholastic opinion that there is only a relation of reason between God and creature, though there is a real relation between creature and God.

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This activity of the mind does not necessarily introduce some falsity. Distinctions of reason are not erroneous views of an object. There is some usefulness and even some truth in such operations. By means of such distinctions the intellect is able to understand better the object it apprehends, and in the case of the non-pure distinction of reason it is able to perceive a new relation among certain things distinct, under another aspect , ex natura rei. Some conclusions can be drawn from these considerations. ( 1 ) Distinction and difference of intelligibility at times are ex natura rei, at times they arise on the part of the intellect . (2) It happens that the intellect may conceive of a thing differently than it is in itself. This is due to the limitation of the intellect ; for example, the mind does not conceive the essence of God precisely as it is because it cannot properly know infinity. However, the way in which it is comprehended is not contrary to its essence . We might say, it is an inadequate representation ; but to a certain extent it is true . Another example which Peter suggests is the line . Lines exist in sensible , material things and only there . Yet we can conceive of a line separate from material things. As so conceived it no longer represents adequately the line as it really exists. Yet the concept is not contrary to the nature of the line. It is in this sense that a distinction of reason can be said not to be an adequate picture of the thing ; for the thing in nature does not have this distinction. Yet the distinction is not contrary to the nature of the thing. Hence it cannot be called a falsification of the thing. (3) Finally, it is possible for the intellect to conceive a thing in a way that is contrary to the nature of the thing. Similarly, it can construct distinctions which are contrary to the nature of the object under consideration . Here there is falsification . But this is no longer the same type of intellectual activity which the mind uses to produce distinctions of reason.40 Summarily, then, regarding the nature of the distinction of reason, (a) considered on the part of the originating faculty, it proceeds from the collative act of the possible intellect . The possible intellect is the primary collative faculty. Its act is an act of comparison of one object with another. If it is a case of a pure distinction of reason , then the possible intellect posits the extremes of the comparison. If a case of non-pure distinction, it considers extremes already distinct under a new aspect. In either case, the distinction of reason does not exist until the collative

40 Rem intelligi aliter quam est aliquando pervenit ex parte intellectus concipientis, sicut intellectus bene intelligit divinam essentiam non tamen eo modo quo ipsa in se est ; ipsa enim est infinita et incomprehensibilis a quocumque limitato intellectu. Ibid. , Vienna ms. , f. 44 va-vb.

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act has been placed . The distinction flows from the collative act, so that it is more precise to say that the possible intellect produces or originates the collative act and the distinction of reason is a consequence of this activity. Although it is an effect of the possible intellect only secundum quid, nevertheless, since it is truly a consequence of the activity of the possible intellect which is more properly the reasoning faculty, the distinction is truly "of reason ." (b) Considering the extremes, in the pure distinction of reason the extremes are posited by the intellect, yet according to the nature of the object ; otherwise, there is a falsification . The intellect conceives the object in different ways and from this diversity of concepts flows the relation of reason upon which is based the distinction of reason . In the non-pure distinction of reason the foundation of the distinction may be really distinct objects . Yet the distinction is not a recognition of this distinction ex natura rei, for this would be simply the first act of apprehension. Rather, the distinction of reason in this case is a distinction posited by the intellect based on the really distinct objects. The distinction is really " of reason, " not ex natura rei . An example would be the distinction between the right and left side of a column, based on the real distinction of the parts of man.41 (c) Considering the ontological status of the distinction , it is an ens rationis. Being the product of the intellect it does not have esse subiectivum. It can be said to have esse obiectivum, since it is known by the intellect ; it has esse conceptibile or esse intelligibile. It was necessary in treating the nature of the distinction of reason to enter rather extensively into the kinds. Only a few observations need to be added here. Peter speaks of only the pure and the non-pure distinctions of reason . A negative discription of the pure distinction given by Peter is that it is a distinction in which there is no trace of a real distinction.42 The nonpure distinction of reason , then, is one which has some admixture of the real distinction . And having made this observation Peter proceeds to ignore the distinction : "Unde intendo tractare de distinctione pura et non de non-pura. "43 He seems to approach the problem, however, in answering the question : Does a distinction of reason necessarily require a real distinction as a basis. (Q. III , De modis distinctionis .) The answer

41 Ibid., f. 47ra. 42 Ibid., Q. III , f. 45 vb . 43 Ibid .

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is a qualified no. The pure distinction of reason does not include any admixture of a real distinction. Yet , there are cases where a distinction of reason may be based on a real distinction . This should have afforded him an opportunity to treat the non-pure distinction ex professo. But, perhaps considering the distinction of little practical importance, he makes his qualifications and passes on.

His chief protagonist in this question it appears is Godfrey of Fontaines , who maintained that three things are required for a distinction of reason : (1 ) a real thing as the foundation of the distinction , lest it be in vain ; (2) an intellect apprehending the distinction , because such a distinction exists only when perceived ; (3 ) some real diversity to which the intellect can compare the object. Peter took exception to this last point. At this juncture , however, we are more interested in his qualifications. He agrees with Scotus and William of Ware that the distinction of reason can be based either on one circumstance or on diverse circumstances. Scotus offers some examples ; for the first case, the distinction between the true and the good : one and the same thing is good in comparison with the will, true in comparison with the intellect ; for the second case, the distinction between the right and left side of a column based on the really diverse parts of animals, or, the point considered now as the beginning, now as the end of a line, based on diverse things. But Peter takes exception to two of these examples. The point as the beginning and end of the line he thinks is purely the work of the intellect. Likewise, he calls Scotus to task for contradicting himself on the first example . In other places Scotus posits a formal distinction between truth and goodness, here he makes it a distinction of reason. By his silence we gather that Peter accepts the remaining example of the right and left side of a column based on diverse parts of animals . This he would consider a case of a distinction of reason with some admixture of the real distinction.44 Another example of such a distinction we have had occasion to mention already, namely, the distinction between God and creatures.45 Though they are distinct according to their essence really and essentially, i. e., they are entirely different essences when considered separately, nevertheless when we consider the relation of God to creature we must say that it is a distinction of reason . These are the two examples of a distinction of reason having some admixture of the real distinction which we find in the works of Peter.

44 Ibid., f. 47гa. 45 Ibid. , f. 46ra.

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Comparing them with the later precisions of the scholastic philosophers, the example of right and left with regard to a column would seem to be an incomplete virtual distinction , while the latter example would seem to be a complete virtual distinction . In the first case, the concepts are not mutually exclusive since they are modifications of the same subject. In the latter case the concepts are mutually and entirely exclusive.46 But Peter did not progress this far in his treatment of what has come to be called the virtual distinction . Again we suggest that Peter passed so lightly over the subject for a metaphysical reason , namely, because he saw little evidence of or use for such a distinction in his study of reality. As a conclusion to this discussion of the distinction of reason, a summary comparison of the doctrine of Scotus and Peter should help toward an appreciation of Peter's place in Scotism . The division adopted above in the summary of Peter's doctrine will be followed. (a) The distinction of reason, according to Scotus , originates in the possible intellect . However, he does not enter as deeply into the process as Peter does. The possible intellect considers one and the same object under different aspects ; this activity results in relations of reason , which give rise to the distinction of reason.47 Peter's treatment of the various collative faculties, of the precise manner of operation of the possible intellect in its collative act, the precision concerning the causality involved, would appear to be advances in the philosophy of the distinction of reason. (b) Concerning the extremes, Scotus observes that a distinction of reason can be distinguished from a real distinction by studying the extremes.48 Every distinction of reason is according to relations of reason caused by the intellect.49 Some distinctions of reason arise from a comparison to something ad extra . 50 Others are dependent entirely on the intellect, which considers one thing under different aspects, e . g. , making a distinction between definition and defined . The extremes in either case are entia rationis . 51

46 Cf. Z. Van de Woestyne, Cursus Philosophicus , II, Mechlin, 1933 , 256 257 47 Differentia ergo rationis stricte loquendo est differentia posterior naturaliter actu intellectus possibilis, considerantes idem objectum sub alia et alia ratione . Meta . , VII, q. 19 , n. 6 ; 7 , 466. ... . . . distinguuntur praecise ratione, hoc est relationibus rationis, quibus comparantur ad invicem. Rep. Par., prol . , q . 1 , a. 3 , n. 36 ; 22, 26. 48 Oxon. , I. d. 31 , q . un. , n. 2 ; 10, 490 . 49 Rep. Par., loc. cit. 50 Oxon., I, d . 8 , q . 4 , n . 8 ; 9 ; 643 . 51 Quodl., VI, n. 22 ; 25, 265.

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(c) Scotus is silent concerning the ontological nature of the distinction of reason. His position is implied, however, by the very fact that he holds that a distinction of reason arises from relations of reason, entia rationis, produced by the intellect . The resulting distinction , therefore, can be nothing other than an ens rationis. On the question of the kinds of distinctions of reason in Scotus' writings there is some disagreement . It appears from Mastrius' approach to the question that some denied that Scotus made allowance for anything but a pure distinction of reason. Mastrius proceeds to attempt a proof that Scotus did know of and use the non-pure distinction . The quotations he advances from Scotus ' writings adequately indicate by their vagueness the reason for the dispute. Certainly in themselves they are not conclusive. But added to this, though Mastrius gives several citations of at least one instance of a use of the virtual distinction by Scotus, I was unable to locate the instance in the texts cited. 52 Grajewski is inclined to follow the lead of Mastrius.53 However, I would like to advance the opinion that, considering the full context, the instances he cites from Scotus' works are rather instances of the formal distinction, and the two distinctions Scotus is distinguishing are the purely mental distinction and the formal distinction. Therefore, it would still seem to be very doubtful that Scotus made a distinction between a pure and a non-pure distinction. According to Peter Scotus does make a distinction between the distinction of reason based on one undiversified object or aspect of an object and the distinction of reason based on two distinct objects.54 But it is indefinite whether Peter is implying that Scotus thereby definitely distinguished between a pure and non-pure distinction of reason. This whole question requires much more attention than can be accorded it here. There is just one instance where Scotus mentions a “virtual" distinction. He says that the formal distinction might be called a virtual distinction. For that which is composed of formalities is not composed of distinct things ; rather it is one thing which has virtually two realities, each of which can be conceived as if they were distinct things . 55 Out of

52 Cf. Mastrius, op. cit. , disp . VI , q . 9, a. 2 ; 4, 186–189 . 53 Cf. Grajewski , op. cit., pp. 52-55 . 54 Cf. above, p. 58. 55 Vel alio modo, potest vocari ' differentia virtualis, ' quia illud quod habet talem distinctionem in se non habet rem et rem, sed est una res, habens virtualiter sive praeeminenter quasi duas realitates, quia utrique realitati, ac si ipsa esset res distincta : ita enim haec realitas distinguit, sicut si illa esset una res et ista alia. Ordinatio, I, d . 2, pars 2 , q. 1-4, n . 402 ; 2, 355-356.

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context this might appear an identification of the virtual and formal distinctions. However, we know that Scotus did not have a fully developed doctrine of the virtual distinction as ordinarily understood now. Furthermore, his exposition of formalities and the formal distinction leaves beyond doubt the fact that he considered the formal distinction to be ex natura rei. As for Peter, he nowhere uses the term "virtual distinction. " From the standpoint of terminology, Peter's approach would resemble the phenomenological method ; he appears to be approaching the question of distinction afresh, and he analyzes it being careful to avoid stock terms. To a certain extent his effort seems to be a definite success . He advances far beyond Scotus in investigating the nature of the distinction of reason, especially the pure distinction , thus filling a lacuna. It is a modified success, however, because like Scotus he gives little attention to the non-pure distinction of reason , the virtual distinction . How great a deficiency this is to be considered depends on how much importance one attaches to the virtual distinction . 3. DISTINCTION EX NATURA REI The distinction existing in a thing before the activity of the intellect is variously designated by Peter. First of all, in contradistinction to the distinction of reason which is produced by the collative activity of the possible intellect, he calls this the distinction that does not depend on the collative power of the mind . 56 Immediately after he designates it as a real distinction . 57 A third designation is distinction ex natura rei¸58 Since the first designation is too cumbersome and seldom used by Peter ; since he uses " real" to designate not only this generic type of distinction but also at times a specific type , we shall use the last term , ex natura rei, for the more general type of distinction . The term covers a variety of distinctions , all of which have this in common that they are discovered by the intellect in its primary act of apprehension rather than produced through the secondary, reflex or comparative act. It refers to the distinctions present in nature rather than projected into nature by the mind. The extremes may be things, or modes of things, or essences,

56 Quodl. , 119, 30-32. 57 Distinctio videtur posse dividi per distinctionem dependentem ab actu potentiae collativae, et per distinctionem non dependentem ex aliquo tali actu ... Unde prima distinctio, puta ab actu potentiae collativae, est distinctio rationis, secunda realis. Ibid. , 112 , 30-38. 58 Dico quod intentio distingui ex natura rei ut quaecumque distinguuntur circumscripta omni operatione intellectus negotiativi. Hoc modo voco distingui ex natura rei . De modis dist. , Q. VII , f. 52rb .

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or realities which can best be designated as " of being" . Whatever the extremes may be, if they are recognizably distinct and present themselves as such to the intellect, they form the elements of a distinction ex natura rei. This does not mean that they must be separate in nature. If this were so there would not be many types of distinction ex natura rei, but only one ; actual or possible separation for Peter is a sign of the essential distinction. Rather the common characteristic would be the capability of the extremes to be an object of the intellect prior to any comparative act of the intellect . Or, to state it in another way, if the object is capable of producing in the intellect diverse real concepts which are not entia rationis, then there is evidence of a distinction ex natura rei.59 Peter distinguishes seven kinds of distinction ex natura rei in De modis distinctionis and again in the Quodlibet. The seven kinds are the distinctions between : (1) essence and essence, (2) thing and thing, (3) reality and reality, (4) reality and thing , (5 ) formality and formality, (6) formality and thing, and (7) intrinsic mode and thing. In his De distinctione praedicamentorum , which was written probably after De modis distinctionis but before the Quodlibet, he lists the following distinctions which are not dependent upon a collative act of the intellect : ex natura rei , formal , real, essential, subjective and objective . Since the more extensive study is given to the seven-fold division in the Quodlibet, it will be investigated first . Then we shall turn our attention to the latter division . However, in order to avoid duplication, common elements will be incorporated into the discussion of the first division and omitted unless necessary in the second . The study of the divisions of the distinction ex natura rei will lead not only to a better understanding of Peter's doctrine on distinction, but also to an acquaintance with his main tenets of metaphysics . This

59 An argument proposed in proof of the distinction ex natura rei of genus and difference states : Istae duae realitates sunt duo obiecta et ita movent intellectum ad suas notitias sicut si essent separatae in actuali existentia, ut realitas generis ad suum proprium conceptum et realitas differentiae ad suum . Ibid. , Q. II , f . 44ra . Of the divine attributes he says : Ut sunt obiective in intellectu sunt vere distinctae. Ibid., Q. V, f. 50ra. More specifically, citing Scotus, he states : [ Divina attributa ] dicuntur obiecta distincta pro quanto ipsa unitive contenta in divina essentia, ita distincte possunt movere intellectum possibilem ad diversos actus, sicut si quaelibet res esset realitas distincta ab alia , et secundum istum modum dicit Doctor quod sunt distincta obiecta pro quanto videlicet possunt se sic movere intellectum distincte. Ibid. , Cf. Scotus, Ordinatio, I , d. 2 , pars 2 , q. 1-4, n. 395 ; 2, 352-353.

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is inevitable, since we are here undertaking a study of the structure of reality through the eyes of Peter, with particular attention paid to the distinction between real beings and what, for lack of a better term , we might call the parts of being. As each type of distinction ex natura rei according to the first division is taken up, the extremes of the distinction will first be studied and then the particular sign or criterion which Peter suggests for the recognition of the distinction.

4. DISTINCTION OF ESSENCE AND ESSENCE Essence and thing are not convertible. This we know from faith. The three divine persons are properly three really distinct things . Yet there is only one essence . Hence, there can be a distinction of things without involving a distinction of essences.60 Peter sets himself the task of investigating the nature and conditions for a distinction of essences, then for things. The extremes of this distinction are essences. In the works available Peter does not define essence. It may safely be presumed, however, that he would subscribe to the common scholastic definition : essentia est id quo res est id quod est. Ordinarily every thing has an essence, and essence and thing are convertible . Because of one undeniable instance from faith, Peter denies the universality of this convertibility. Rather he sets up the convertibility in this fashion : essentia and reitas are convertible, as are ens and res, entale and reale, entalitas and realitas, forma and quid, formalitas and quidditalitas.61 Essence and thing are not convertible, therefore . But this statement leaves much unexplained . How is the difference to be stated in the definition of the terms ? As we have said, he does not define the meaning of essence . Just a hint is given in the De ente, where he explains in what sense ens is a quidditative concept. Quidditative can be taken in an essential, a constitutive, a specificative, a representative, an indicative, and a predicative sense .

60 De modis dist. , Q. VII , f. 52 va. 61 Ista convertuntur, f. 1. Note that in this series ens and res, forma and quid are the root words from which in turn are derived other forms . Later in the same fragment he shows how the adverbial forms likewise are derived from these concrete terms. Cf. also : Ad ista vocabula , sciendum quod accipiendo uniformiter et proprie sic debet accipi ex una parte essentia, ens, entale, entalitas ; ex altera parte, reitas, res, reale, realitas . Et sic uniformiter accipiendo ipsa convertuntur essentia et reitas ; sic de aliis. Quando ergo dicitur in maiore quod essentia et res convertuntur, hoc non est proprie dictum, quia proprie loquendo non essentia sed ens et res convertuntur . De modis dist., Q. III , Vienna ms. , f. 53ab .

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Whatever is capable of being predicated in quid is quidditative in a predicative sense . 62 The definition of a thing is quidditative in an indicative sense. Whatever represents a thing (a word, a species, an idea) is quidditative in a representative sense. Matter and form and whatever else may be an intrinsic contituent of a thing is quidditative in a constitutive sense. Finally, he calls every essence created or uncreated , whether substance or accident, whether composite or simple, whether relative or absolute, quidditative in an essential sense . For essence is quidditative of everything that has it ; and here it is the same as the quiddity of the thing.63 Further on, he states that ens is essentially quidditative. For the essence alone is that by which anything is essentially quidditative . And here ens is the same as essentia. It refers to the quiddity of the object. 64 This is the extent of his elucidation of essence . Let us note that ordinarily he takes quiddity in a more restricted sense, namely, for any part of a definition of a thing.65 Here , however, he would be taking it as the whole definition of the thing. Quiddity and essence evidently are to be taken here as expressive of the essential notes of a thing, for that which makes a thing what it is. Now any such essence is a thing. And with only one exception any thing has an individual essence distinct from any other. This is pointed out again because it will be evident as we lay down the conditions for and modes of recognizing these two types of distinction, that the distinction of res and res is introduced solely for the sake of the exception, and that whatever is said about the distinction of essentia and essentia is, except in this one case, equally true of the distinction between things. In fact, the signs of an essential distinction are those Scotus uses for a real distinction.66

62 "To predicate in quid means to predicate either the entire essence (species) or at least the determinable part of the essence (genus) ... To predicate in quale means to predicate a further determination or qualification of the essence . " A. Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus, Washington, D. C. , 1946, pp. 79-80. 63 Essentia enim est quidditativa omnis habentis eam quod sit idem quod quidditas. De ente, Q. II . ( Quotations from the De Ente are from the Oxford, Magd. Coll. n . 80 manuscript.) 64 Prima conclusio est conceptus entis ut est idem quod concipitur abstractivo modo praeexposito in secunda distinctione est quidditativus essentiative. Nam sola essentia est illud quod aliquid quiddificatur essentiative. Ibid. 65 Ista convertuntur, f. I. 66 It would appear that the distinction between essence and thing is not derived from Scotus . For Scotus rather speaks of res as admitting of two meanings in God : an essential and a notional meaning. As essential, it refers to the divine essence ; as notional, it refers to the divine Persons . Quodl., praef.; 25,3 .

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Peter gives six indications or criteria of an essential distinction.67 By criterion is here meant both the condition for the distinction and the mode whereby it may be recognized . Actually there is only a logical distinction between the condition and the mode. Realities in nature evidence certain characteristics which are indicative of a definite type of distinction. These, recognized by the observer, constitute the modes of recognition. The first five criteria suggested by Peter are actually subordinate. They can be reduced to the sixth, namely, the possibility of separation. (1 ) The first indication of an essential distinction is the possibility of predicating contradictory predicates of the objects in question. No essence can admit of contradictory predicates. If then, for example, God is known to be infinite and Paul is known to be finite, one is certain that there is an essential difference between of God and Paul. (2) The second indication is evidence of a priority of nature of one over the other subject under consideration. Peter enumerates the usual three orders of priority: origin, nature, and time. 68 An essential distinction cannot be argued from priority of origin or priority of time . In God, for instance, there is a priority of origin of the Father as regards the Son and Holy Spirit , but no essential distinction . Where there is a priority of nature, however, one finds an essential distinctiion. For example, the sun is prior by nature to its illumination and ordinarily does not exist without it. But , Peter maintains, God could remove the illumination without destroying the sun. Therefore the sun and its illumination must be essentially distinct. By way of authority he cites Aristotle : Some things are called prior in respect of nature and substance, i . e ., those which can be without other things, while the others cannot be without them.69 And again, substance is prior by definition and time, i . e. , by nature.70 This particular argument is extended by Peter through an appeal to faith. Substance is prior by nature to accident. The two are separable, and the substance is not dependent on the accident, therefore they are essentially distinct. In fact, the two can exist without each other, as faith tells us with regard to the Eucharist .

67 De modis dist. , Q. I, f. 40rb—40va. 68 Ibid. , f. 4ora. 69 Ibid. Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. , Bk. V, C. II , 1019a. 70 Actually the closest statement in Bk VII , the book cited by Peter, is : Now there are several senses in which a thing is said to be first ; yet substance is first in every sense - ( 1 ) in definition, (2) in order of knowledge, (3) in time. Metaph . , Bk. VII , c. 1 , 1028a.

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In his argumentation Peter cannot avoid two later criteria, essential dependence and the possibility of separation. For the present , if one discovers a priority of nature of one object over another, we can be sure that there is an essential distinction between them .

(c) Another indication can be discovered in a diversity of productive or destructive agents. If the products (productions or destructions) are identical, then they proceed from an identical cause. But if they are diverse, then the agents are diverse, i . e. , essentially distinct. He again cites Aristotle in confirmation : "It may be examined in the light of those things which tend to produce or destroy the things in question, of their formation and destruction, and in general of any thing that is absolutely the same, their formations and destructions also are the same, and so are the things that tend to produce them. "" Peter notes in commentary that the opposite is also true . If the formations and destructions are not the same , the things that produce or destroy them must not be the same ; ergo. (d) A fourth indication may be gathered from the possibility of adding or substracting properties . For example , if you wish to know whether A and B are essentially distinct or not, add a common attribute C. If the resulting union AC is the same as BC, then A and B are essentially identical. If the results are different, then A and B are essentially distinct. The same holds for the removal of properties. Peter again cites the Topics. However, in this case , too , Aristotle seems to be seeking the answer to another problem. He is inquiring whether the attribute belongs to two subjects. If the subjects are the same and the attribute belongs to one, then it belongs to the other. 72 It is easily seen, though, how Peter could derive his own conclusion from this passage . If the attribute is found to belong to one but not the other, then clearly the subjects are not the same. (e) One of the most fundamental signs of an essential distinction is essential dependence . This notion is extensively developed in connection with the next and last criterion. However, we will treat them separately since they are listed separately as signs of the essential distinction. First of all , what is meant by essential dependence ? Following Scotus, Peter asserts that that is essentially dependent on another which necessarily needs the other in order to exist.73 This dependence can be

71 Topics, Bk. VII , c. 1 , 152a. 72 Ibid., Bk. II , c. 10 , 115a. 73 Illud essentialiter dependet ab alio quod necessario indiget ad essendum . De modis dist., Q. I, f. 39va . Cf. Scotus, De primo principio, c. 1 ; tr. by E. Roche , p. 4.

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of two kinds : formal and material. Formal dependence looks to the type of dependence which is determined by the general nature of the extremes; it specifies the dependence . Material dependence looks to the specific nature of the extremes which form the basis of the dependence. For example, all creatures are dependent upon God with the same type of dependence from the very fact that all are creatures of God , produced by Him and dependent upon Him for continuance in existence . The creatureliness of the extremes on the one hand and the creator relationship of God on the other determines the type of dependence (formal dependence) . Materially, however, there is a difference among the extremes . Among creatures some are substance , some quality, some quantity. Formally, therefore , all creatures are dependent upon God in the same way ; materially they differ.74 There is a close relationship between dependence annd essential order; in this sense, that anything essentially dependent is essentially ordered to another. But not everything that is essentially ordered is essentially dependent. Peter does not explain essential order. Scotus describes it in this way. Order is a mutual relation between what is prior and posterior. An essential order is one that is based on the very essence or nature of the beings in question.75 Whatever is essentially dependent is dependent by its very nature or essence and hence is essentially ordered to that on which it depends. Peter presupposes the masterly exposition of the essential orders given by Scotus in his De primo principio; he is content to assert certain conclusions . As we have said, not everything that is essentially ordered is essentially dependent. Peter gives the example of a fly which has its place in the essential order of creatures in the universe, yet it is not essentially dependent upon the existence 74 Dependentia potest dupliciter distingui, quia materialiter vel formaliter. Formalis distinctio dependentiae est distinctio specifica illius. Distinctio materialis dependentiae est quae sumitur penes suppositum ut substantia illius dependentiae. Distinctio autem formalis sumitur penes terminum dependentiae . Omnis enim respectus specificatur a suo termino. Dependentia autem respectum importat. Specifica ergo distinctio est secundum diversitatem sive distinctionem dependentium subiectorum . Omnis dependentia creaturae ad Deum est eiusdem rationis formaliter non tamen materialiter. Eadem ratio est in Deo pro quanto terminat dependentiam omnis creaturae ad ipsum. Ergo per consequens, omnis creaturae ad Deum est eadem dependentia formaliter licet non materialiter. Immo materialiter sunt diversae secundum quod supposita vel subiecta quae referuntur sunt distincta, ut puta substantia, quantitas, et ita de omnibus aliis categoriis. De modis dist. , Q. I , f. 38va. 75 Accipio autem ordinem essentialem , non stricte - ut quidam loquuntur, dicentes posterius ordinari sed prius vel primum esse supra ordinem sed communiter, prout ordo est relatio aequiparentiae dicta de priori respectu posterioris et e converso . De primo principio, c. 1 ; ed. by Roche, p. 4.

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of creatures higher in the scale. It can exist though man does not exist.76 Again, as Scotus held , nothing can essentially depend on itself, because nothing can be ordered to itself. " It will follow that wherever an essential order is found a distinction of essences will be involved . Further, among the essential orders (Scotus gives three : efficiency, finality, and eminence) 78 the posterior will be essentially dependent on the prior in that particular order in which it is, and ultimately it will essentially depend on the first in that order.79 Essential dependence is particularly manifested in causality. The effect, whichever kind it may be, depends essentially on its cause in that order of causality : the materialized on the material cause, the formalized on the formal cause, the effect on the efficient cause, the finalized on the end. Applying the conclusions reached above, secondary causes in these lines of causality depend on the first cause. A posterior effect will depend on a prior effect in the same line of essential dependence and causality. For example, the effect of heating is dependent on the effect of the emitting of radiation by the sun. 80 Whatever is essentially dependent on a posterior is essentially dependent on the prior ; for whatever is prior to the prior is prior to posterior. And hence secondary causes depend ultimately on the first cause. These conclusions are not essential to Peter's thesis, but we shall follow him and complete his exposition of essential dependence . From the foregoing Peter concludes, whatever is essentially absolute is essentially independent . For the essentially absolute is either dependent or not . If not , then his position is established . If dependent, then a contradiction is involved . For dependence implies a relation ; hence whatever is dependent is relative to that extent, and therefore not essentially absolute . The essentially absolute consequently is essentially 76 Non omnia essentialiter ordinata essentialiter dependent. Hoc patet. Ordo enim essentialis attenditur in omnibus penes quidditates, ut in ordine universi ponitur ordo essentialis, ut patet. Dato enim quod homo vel angelus non existeret nihilominus una musca vel aliud quodcumque ens imperfectius illis sine ipsis existere posset cum ab eis non dependeant essentialiter, cum tamen sit in eis essentialis ordo determinata secundum universi connexionem . De modis dist. , Q. I , f . 38 va. 77 Oxon., I, d. 3 , q . 7, n. 30 ; 9 , 376b. 78 De primo principio, c. 3 , pp. 39–67 . 79 Posterius in ordine essentiali necessario dependet a priori in illo ordine. Hoc patet ; vel enim posterius dependet essentialiter a priori, vel e contrario, vel utrumque ab alio aequaliter, vel neutrum ab alio ; non utrumque ab alio aequaliter, vel neutrum ab alio, quia iam non esset ordo ; nec prius in ordine essentiali dependet essentialiter a priori in isto ordine. De modis dist., Q. I , Vienna ms. , f. 47rb . 80 Ibid., f. 38 vb. I have modernized Peter's example.

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independent.81 It should be noted, however, that to be dependent does not necessarily mean to be formally dependent . The caused is essentially dependent on the cause ; yet formally it may be absolute . The two may be true of the same effect : essentially relative and formally absolute . It may be further noted about the caused that it may be the effect of an intrinsic or extrinsic cause . If it is the effect of an intrinsic cause , it is essentially dependent upon its cause for its inception into being and for its continuance in being. It it is the effect of an extrinsic cause, it is essentially dependent only for its inception into being. In the first case the dependence is essentially identical with the dependent being ; in the latter case it is not.82 If a prior cause produces an effect essentially dependent upon it, it must contain this effect virtually. Essential dependence connotes the necessary connection of one essence with another. An essentially dependent being cannot come to be except from that essence to which it is related, or without an essence which could take the place of such a causing essence. This is an important principle for Peter in his treatise on the separability of accidents from their substances and relations from their foundation . He is emphasizing the capability of the First Cause to operate immediately in doing what the secondary cause does ordinarily, 83 The final conclusion he draws is that all things totally and simply depend on the absolutely independent. This does not imply an imperfection on the part of the absolutely independent . In some cases to be a term of dependence does imply imperfection ; for example, form has matter depending on it , but it in turn depends on matter, and thus both are imperfect. But on the part of the absolutely independent there is no such mutual dependence implied . All things depend totally and simply on it, but it does not depend on any other.84 With this conclusion he brings to a close his exposition of essential dependence . As we have stated , he undertakes the exposition not for its own sake but in order to prepare the way for his thesis that the possibility

81 Ibid. 82 Causatum causae intrinsicae impossibile est poni et existere sine sua causa, et per consequens sine actuali dependentia ad suam causam et aliam ista dependentia est idem essentialiter ipsi causato. Causatum vero causae extrinsicae dependet essentialiter tantum in fieri , causa illius non existente, et ideo dependentia talis causati ad talem causam non est idem essentialiter causato. Ibid. , 38 vb. 83 Ibid. 84 The text in both Magd . Coll. and Vienna is greatly corrupted ; but this would appear to be the gist of the concluding point he wishes to make.

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of separation is the fundamental sign of an essential distinction . An essential dependence is already a sign of a distinction of essences , because nothing can essentially depend on itself. But, he maintains that all other ways of concluding to an essential distinction can be reduced to the one fundamental way - the possibility of separation.85 (f) The sixth and final indication of an essential distinction, therefore, is the possibility of separation . Separable may be taken in two senses : either actually separate , or, possible of separation. Two essences may be essentially distinct if actually existing in separation or if actually united but capable of being separated.86 Peter does not make explicit here whether he would hold that for two essences to be capable of separation it is required that they be capable of separate existence . However, it may be gathered from his applications that it sufficies if the essence is simply separable ; for example, with regard to the possibility of separation of accidents from their subject or of relations from their foundations he presupposes another taking the place of the proper subject of foundation ; the result is essential separation but not separate existence . Peter lists four ways in which the possibility of separation can be concluded to.87 First, it necessarily follows from essential independence. As we have seen, the essentially independent is that which is essentially absolute and in no way depends on another. If one discovers two such they will necessarily be separate . It might be commented that if this statement (omnino independens) is taken strictly, then this is not a helpful indication of the possibility of separation, because there is only one such, God. It can be gathered from subsequent statements, however, that he is speaking not of absolute but relative independence . The next way is a case in point. Secondly , the possibility of separation is evident from the priority of nature. The prior by nature is essentially distinct from the posterior, and since it is prior by nature it can exist without the posterior. We have given his arguments for the essential distinction of prior and posterior by nature which he draws from reason and from authority. Here he applies the arguments to show that not only essential distinction but the possibility of separation is involved. Another argument from reason states : every being independent of another. can be posited without contradiction without the other ; the prior by nature does not depend on the posterior ; therefore it can be posited

85 Quodl., 120, 67-68. 86 De modis dist. , Q. II , f. 45va. 87 Ibid., Q. I, 4ora.

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without the posterior. In fact, at times a being posterior by nature can exist without the prior, i . e . , if it is the effect of an extrinsic cause. A fortiori the prior is capable of separate existence. Or again from reason, if a posterior is destroyed without destruction of its prior, then manifestly the prior can exist separately. Peter emphasizes that he is speaking here of priority of nature. In the Trinity there is priority of origin and an intrinsic relationship between Father and Son ; and the prior cannot exist without the posterior. But it is otherwise when it is a question of priority of nature. The third way is a specification of the first. The possibility of separation can be argued from the fact that the essences involved are absolute . If they are absolute they are independent , and hence one can exist without the other. Again it must be presumed that he means relative independence and relatively absolute. The fourth way is given where it is possible to supply for the causality of a thing. An example which we presume he had in mind is substance and accident . We know from faith that God can sustain accidents in place of the substance. Therefore the accidents are able to exist in separation from the proper substance . The same is true of prime matter. God can sustain it in existence, thus in a sense supplying for the formal cause ; therefore prime matter and substantial form are essentially distinct and separable.88 If this latter example is controversial, another that we can draw from Peter's works is even more so . He maintains that God can supply for the foundation, causing a relation without a foundation. Therefore he concludes that relation and foundation are separable . We shall devote more attention to this question below.89 These are the signs of a possibility of separation, which in turn is a sign of an essential distinction . We have seen that Peter argues to an essential distinction from the possibility of separation, and that at times he seems to reverse his field and argue to the possibility of separation from essential distinction. What is the relationship between the two ? First, the possibility of separation is not the intrinsic cause of the distinction between essences. The intrinsic cause of such a distinction is in the very essences themselves. Because this essence is this essence and that essence is that essence the two are essentially distinct. 9º Secondly, the possibility of separation is a necessary consequence of the essential distinction rather than its cause. Given the one, the other must follow,

88 Ibid. 89 Cf. below, p . 159 f. 90 Possibilitas separationis non est existens causa intrinseca essentialis distinctionis ; causa autem essentialis distinctionis intrinseca est propria entitas distinctorum. Ibid. , f. 40rb.

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after the manner of proper attributes. 91 As Peter says, "The possibility of separation necessarily follows being, or every essential distinction, or whatever are essentially distinct. " 92 If the impossibility of separation follows from essential identity,93 then conversely the possibility of separation will necessarily follow from essential distinction . As a confirmatory argument for the above he introduces a position which he strenuously upholds also in the De distinctione praedicamentorum. He contends that all essentially distinct things are separable whether these beings be absolute or relative . The absolute beings have been discussed already. But the relative , too, he maintains are separable. And he proceeds to defend the thesis that a relation is separable from its foundation. His arguments in favor of this thesis both in De modis distinctionis and in De distinctione praedicamentorum are somewhat extensive. It would be too lengthy a digression to discuss the question fully here. Rather, we will be content to present here his basic position . And then, because Peter's stand has been lightly dismissed in comparatively recent times, we will present in Part III a fuller treatment of the problem . Briefly, his argument states that the possibility of the separation of a relation and its foundation follows from the fourth mode above of proving separation, namely, the possibility of supplying causality. He maintains that it is possible for God to posit the foundation in the two terms without a resulting relation , or to posit a relation without a foundation in the extremes . But if this is possible, then relation and foundation are separable. He says that to supply in this way would be no more difficult on the part of God than causing a virgin to conceive, or a body to have multilocation , or to have one essence in three supposites . For further arguments and rebuttals of objections see below.94 The strongest and most evident sign of an essential distinction, therefore, is the possibility of separation. All the other indications imply this one. It would be impossible to predicate contradictory predicates of one indivisible subject . A subject admitting of such predication must in fact be constituted of distinct essences which are separable . Again, priority of nature necessarily entails the possibility of separation ; the 91 Unde notandum est quod dupliciter requiritur aliquid ad aliud , vel sicut causa vel consecutive tantum, quia si ponitur hoc, necessario est poni, ut illud necessario consequeretur ; ut se habet passio respectu proprii subiecti. Ibid. 92 Ibid., f. 40 vb. 93 Cf. above, p. 26 . 94 Cf. below, pp. 154-165.

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prior can without contradiction exist without the posterior, and even the posterior in many cases can exist without the prior. In the same way, a diversity of agents producing diverse effects necessarily entails the possibility of separation. Finally, essential dependence above all, as also its correlative essential independence , necessarily imply the possibility of separation . The history of this question of the signs of an essential distinction is interesting. Scotus emphasized the one sign of separability for a real distinction in the proper sense.95 Peter gives the greatest emphasis to separability, but lists five other signs too. Later Scotists gave equal emphasis to many signs and tended to multiply them. Finally, Mastrius brought the tradition back to Scotus and insisted that there was no need for more than the one sign.96 This, then, is the essential distinction according to Peter. It is the distinction between separable essences. And he is rigid in his application. Wherever he finds complete essences even though existing together in the closest union he posits an essential distinction . It would simplify matters if we could say that wherever one finds complete essences capable of acting as supposites we have an essential distinction. But Peter makes it broader than that. It is evident that the accident of quantity existing apart from the substance, or a relation sustained by God rather than by its proper foundation cannot be called supposites. Yet according to Peter they are essentially distinct. On the other hand, if a thing is not an individual essence , it is not essentially distinct. This case is covered by the next distinction.

5. DISTINCTION OF THING AND THING

As we face the difficult task of putting our finger on the precise difference envisioned by Peter between essence and thing, it must be stated again that Peter all too frequently does not carefully define nor precisely distinguish . There is a deliberateness about the later Scotists , such as Antonius Trombetta, Nicholas Bonetus, Antonius Sirectus, even of his contemporary Robertus Anglicus, that is lacking in Peter. We might surmise that the later Scotists seeing the incipient distinctions of Scotus, Peter, and other early Scotists, resolved to refine and accurately state what their predecessors at times left in a tantalizingly indefinite statement. This is not to say that the later Scotists always advanced the 95 Oxon. , II , d . 2 , q . 2 , q . 2, n. 3 ; II , 249a. 96 Mastrius, op. cit., n. 188 , p . 285 b.

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science of metaphysics by their fine distinctions and precise definitions. In refining and defining they manifested too strong a tendency to multiply entities and distinctions, until a Mastrius had to call a halt and strive to get back to the traditional principle of economy advocated by Scotus and Ockham. In defense of Peter it might be stated that he is evidently feeling his way along ; he is striving to advance along the way indicated by Scotus ; he is endeavoring to fill in the gaps . Not being gifted with quite the outstanding genius of his master, he is able to accomplish his intent with only limited success. But advance he did . We do not deny this when we censure his lack of precision, especially since it is possible that some the present problems were given more adequate attention in his commentaries on the Sentences. As the matter stands, he professes in De modis distinctionis to see definite reasons to distinguish seven sufficiently different instances of distinction ex natura rei. But he does not exert sufficient care to justify his stand . This difficulty presents itself not only in our present situation of distinguishing the essential distinction from the distinction of things, but also in distinguishing the distinction of realities from that of formalities. 97

The extremes of this distinction are things. Res like ens has many meanings . 98 Starting from the most general, (a) thing refers to whatever does not include a contradiction. This would be an analogical use of the term , including both real being and being of reason . (b) When Peter says that thing is that of which anything can truly be enuntiated, it is clearly simply another way of expressing the same meaning. In this latter statement thing is equivalent to the subject of a proposition . The subject can equally stand for a real being or a being of reason, as in the preceding. (c) In a a more restricted sense, thing is everything that is not repugnant to be in effect, or has identity of essence. Here thing refers to actual and possible real beings. It is the univocal and proper use of the term as convertible with ens . The first part is almost verbatim the definition of being according to Scotus : cui non repugnat esse.99 When he says, thing is that which has identity of essence, his meaning is not clear. In order to be equivalent to the first part of his statement, it must connote a real essence, possible or actual . Very possibly he intends here to restrict this meaning of thing to that which is capable of existing outside of the mind and which is completely an essence, thus excluding formalities and modes. The second part would then express the same as

97 Cf. below, p. 109. 98 Ista convertuntur, f. un. 99 Oxon., IV, d . 8, q. 1 , n. 2 ; 17 , 7b.

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the first, with a bit of specification added. (d) Having a broader meaning is the definition, or better description, a thing strictly is something outside the mind. Here he excludes ens rationis; but he includes all things whether absolute or relative, all modes, realities, formalities . Hence , when he says he is using the term " strictly", he evidently means that he is restricting the term to the real order. (e) In a more restricted sense again, he says thing is the foundation of modes. It applies only to absolute being : substance, quantity, quality. The other categories are " of being;' in this sense they are not thing, but as Boethius says, they are circumstances of things. (f) Finally, and " most properly," thing is substance. It is the foundation of all the other categories. In this use only substance is a thing, everything else is "of a thing. "100 Of these definitions it may be observed that the first two are too general and cannot be considered to be convertible with ens in its proper sense. But the third definition is the proper and univocal sense of the term . It can be predicated in quid of all that ens can be predicated of. The fourth is again too broad . It applies not only to beings proper but also to the qualifications of being, e . g. , attributes , properties, modes. It is upon this broad sense of thing or res that the use of the term "real" to describe the distinction ex natura rei is based. Anything not dependent on the collative act of the intellect is a res in this sense, and a distinction between them is a real distinction , e. g. , between a transcendental attribute and the essence , between an intrinsic mode and a formality, etc. From this same meaning of res are derived the terms reitas , realitas , reale, realiter. Reitas, according to Peter, is convertible with essence ; it is mentioned but not used. Realitas , as we shall see , is sometimes synonymous with res in its present broad meaning, and sometimes it does not mean res but quid rei, something pertaining to a thing. Reale is simply the adjectival form , and evidently can apply to all the meanings of res. In the same way, realiter, the adverbial form, seems ordinarily to be used in this general sense , i. e . , to denote the mode of anything not dependent on a collative power. For example, he says that things can be said to be really distinct in three ways : as things, as formalities, as intrinsic modes.101 But we must face the question, what meaning of res does Peter oppose to essence ? It cannot be res in the first meaning ; for essence, too , does not include a contradiction . Similarly , essence is that of which anything can truly be enuntiated . And a real essence is not repugnant

100 Ista convertuntur, f. un. 101 Ibid .

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to be in effect and has identity of essence . Essence is also convertible with res in an absolute sense, as a foundation of modes . Especially, essence is convertible with res in the meaning of substance (though not every essence is a substance) . But essence is not convertible with res in the fourth meaning, i. e ., of that which is independent of the collative power of the mind ; not everything that is thus independent is an essence. What follows is pure construction . Peter gives us no help in the available texts.102 Res in the sense of that which is independent of a collative power, existing outside of the mind, includes things, formalities, intrinsic modes. And if there is anything else that is not a thing in the fullest sense as convertible with essence , then it too must come under this more general meaning of res . Now, if the Divine Persons, as faith tells us, are real and distinct from each other, yet share the same essence ; if they therefore are of the essence of God but not the essence, then the Persons are not beings or things in the proper sense. But it is equally evident that the Persons are not formalities, nor intrinsic modes, nor transcendental attributes. In a word, the Persons are entirely unique in the metaphysical scale of being. Using essence to signify things or beings in the full and proper sense and thing for some being or something of being outside the mind, it is possible to make a distinction between essence and thing. But Peter goes even further. When he distinguishes between an essential distinction and a real distinction and later between the distinction of realities, formalities and intrinsic modes, he is restricting res precisely to that one reality less than an essence which is the divine personality. It must be concluded, therefore, that in the distinction of thing and thing, " thing" is used in a way covered in general by the fourth definition of res, and that a proper definition of res in the present restricted sense must be sought in the theologians, who specify the type of reality that the Divine Persons have as really distinct from each other. The difficulty of arriving at such a specification is indicated by the fact that Scotus postulates a real distinction between Person and Person, but a formal distinction between Person and Divine Essence.103 The criterion of such a distinction suggested by Peter is geared to his unique instance of such a distinction . Where one finds a case of one thing originating from another, i . e. , where there is the mutual correlation of generating and generated, there one finds a distinction of res and res.

102 Peter most certainly treated the Trinity in I Sent . Perhaps some day when this text is available the doctrine of Peter may be set down more definitely. 103 Cf. Ordinatio, I, d. 2 , pars 2, q. 1-4, nn . 288-290 ; 2 , 349-350.

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It is impossible that anything should generate itself, as St. Augustine has stated, 104 so there must be a distinction between them. The examples of course are in God , the distinction between Generator and Generated , and between Spirators and Spirated.105 Peter leaves himself open to the objection that his criterion would include also other types of generation . Yet all other types of generation involve the distinction of essence and essence ; presupposing the distinction between essence and thing given above, father and son, horse and colt, etc. , are not things but essences. In one sense, therefore, the criterion here is not sufficiently unique ; in another sense it is the only criterion possible for this sole instance of a distinction between thing and thing. Aperusal of some of the manuscripts of later Scotists indicates that this rather contrived distinction between essence and thing was not adopted by most of the later Scotists . Some, as the anonymous author of Solent doctores, made the essential and real distinction synonymous, with separability as the main criterion.106 Others , as Antonius Sirectus, distinguish between the essential and real distinction, but in a different sense . The essential distinction is between things numerically diverse. The real distinction is principally between things which are separable.107 Mauritius Hibernicus takes cognizance of the problem which led Peter to make his distinction . He notes that the real distinction is between formally positive realities each having their own existence or at least subsistence . He thus puts the distinction of the divine Persons under the real distinction without mentioning an essential distinction and making allowance for this unique case in his conditions for that distinction,108 Mastrius censures the Scotists for multiplying identities and distinctions. He admits only three types of distinction : real, formal, and of reason. The distinction of the divine Persons comes under the real distinction. We have already noted that he upholds the opinion that

104 De Trin. , Bk. I , c. 1 ; PL 42 , 820. 105 Secundum est quod secunda distinctio, puta quae est praecise rei et rei, non essentiae et essentiae, potest cognosci per viam partialis originationis et mutuae concomitationis . Nam, ut dicit Augustinus I De Trinitate, " impossibile est quod aliqua res se ipsam gignat . " Ubicumque ergo ponitur generans et genitum, ibi ponitur res et res . Propter quod in divinis res et res ponitur generans et genitum, spirans et spiratum . Quodl. , 120—121 , 13—19. 106 Anonymous, Formalitates secundum doctrinam Francisci Mayronis, Ferrara, 1490, a. 2 , f. o, 5. 107 Antonius Sirectus, Formalitates moderniores de mente clarissimi doctoris subtilis Scoti, Venice, 1489 , a. 2 , ad 4 & 5, f. 1, 3 . 108 Mauritius Hibernicus, Epitomata in Scoticas Formalitates, Venice, 1588, f. 3 v.

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separability is the one sufficient criterion of a real distinction . When speaking of the divine Persons, this can cause some difficulty. He follows Scotus' explanation in answering the objection that inevitably arose. The criterion according to Scotus and Mastrius is not separability simply; rather it is actual or potential or proportional separability. The first two are sufficiently clear from their terms. The last needs some explanation, especially since it is this type of separability which they would apply to the divine Persons. Those things are proportionally separable which correspond by a certain proportion to things which are separated or separable, that is, which are related as producer and produced, cause and effect , or as one originating from the other, so that contradictory predications can be made of them (even though they are inseparable) , just as such predications are made of separate and separable things.109 Applying this to the Trinity, they state that the divine Persons are constituted such by disparate and incompatible relations (thus contradictory predications can be made) . The proportion to separate and separable things is evidenced by the fact, for example, that one Person proceeds from the divine intellect, the other from the divine will. But these in creatures are separable and admit of contradictory predications. Therefore the Divine Persons are separable in a proportional sense.1110 109 Cum ergo nullum ex assignatis signis sit adaequatum singulis per se, ac seorsim sumptis, ad inveniendum universale, et adaequatum debemus cum Doctore in 2, d. 2, q . 2 , A inadaequata simul conjungere, sic enim conjuncta unicum, et adaequatum integrabunt, quare inquit Doctor, quod separatio aliquorum in esse aut actualis, aut potentialis, aut saltem proportionalis conjunctim sumpta integrant adaequatum, et universale signum realis distinctionis, adeo ut ea universaliter dicantur realiter distingui ; quae vel sunt separata in esse vel separari possunt, vel saltem ita se habent proportionaliter, (sic enim explicari debet separatio proportionalis) sicut illa quae sunt separata, vel separabilia, quia nimirum se habent sicut producens , et productum, causa, et causatum, et unum essentialiter dependet ab alio, aut alio consimili modo, ratione enim talis originis, et dependentiae talia contradictoria nata sunt verificari de istis (etiamsi sint inseparabilia in esse) qualia verificantur de illis, quae re vera sunt actu separata, aut separabilia, et in hoc consistit separatio proportionalis. Op. cit. , disp. VI, q . 8, n. 188 , 285b. 110 Respondetur itaque quod in eo casu adhuc Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus corresponderent proportione his, quae sunt actu separata, vel separari possunt, cum enim constituerentur per relationes disparatas incompossibiles, et omnino alterius rationis, quia unius processio esset per intellectum , alterius vero per voluntatem, talia adhuc in eo casu verificarentur de illis contradictoria, qualia nata sunt verficari de actu separatis , vel separabilibus , quod est proportione illis correspondere, ut explicatum est ; ait etiam Doctor loc. cit. quod aliquae relationes in divinis non tantum habent distinctionem , sed etiam incompossibilitatem, sive incompossibilem rationem in eodem supposito, quales sunt relationes disparatae accipiendi naturam ut generatio, et spiratio passivae ; quae ergo adhuc Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus in eo casu

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problem Peter was seeking to solve by setting the real distinction off against the essential distinction is a complex one . It would appear that Peter is guilty of multiplying distinctions in this case. Our next problem is to determine whether he is guilty of the same fault in setting the distinction of realities off from the distinction of formalities.

6. DISTINCTION OF REALITY AND REALITY In the preceding section we saw Peter's understanding of res and the terms derived from it. One of these is realitas, reality. A reality in the doctrine of Peter is something which, when strictly understood , is different from res and from a formality. Realities in this strict sense constitute the extremes of this distinction. Let us first see in what way Scotus understood the term. Most

1 commonly, he would seem to use reality and formality synonymously. He had recourse to the first term especially when he wanted to emphasize that formalities are not pure mental constructs but diminutive res , if you will, which exist independent of the mind, not however in themselves but in another.111 This is not the exclusive use of the term. (a) At times it is used as a synonym for the quiddity or nature of a thing.112 (b) It also signifies the individuating difference ;113 (c) the specific difference ; 114

(d) the

genus ;115 (e) the substantial form ;116 (f) the divine personality.117 In other words, Scotus used " reality" in the same general sense that Peter often used res. This emphasizes an important point in Scotus' doctrine . talibus relationibus constituerentur, et distinguerentur realiter, posset ea relationum incompossibilitas vocari separatio quaedam in esse suppositali , atque ideo ad argumentum illud neganda est minor, quod in eo casu nullum daretur signum ex allatis realis distinctionis inter Filium et Spiritum Sanctum. Ibid. , p . 286a . 111 Oxon., II , d . 3 , q . 6 , n. 15 ; 12 , 144. 112 . . quia non est formaliter realitas essentiae. Oxon ., I, d . 26, q. un. , n. 34; 10, 323a. 113 Sed ultima realitas seu perfectio realitatis naturae a qua sumitur ultima differentia, est omnino simpliciter simplex. Oxon. , I , d . 3 , q. 3 , n. 15 ; 9, 126. 114 Illa realitas specifica constituit compositum, cujus est pars, in esse quidditativo quia ipsa est entitas quaedam quidditativa. Oxon. , II, d . 3 , q. 6, n. 12 ; 12, 135. 115 Genus sumitur ab aliqua realitate, quae secundum se est potentialis ad realitatem a qua accipitur differentia . Oxon. , I d . 8, q . 3, n. 16 ; 10, 596. 116 Realitas aliquando determinat compositionem et nihil aliud est quam illud quod vere est. Oxon . , I , d. 30 , q . 2 , n. 20 ; 10, 463 . 117 Ista realitas paternitatis quae est in divinis , quae non est formaliter essentia. Oxon. , I , d. 26, q. un. , n. 45 ; 10, 338.

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"Reality" is not necessarily and always convertible with ens , as some would construe it.118 Turning to Peter's use of the term , we see first of all that for him, too, reality is not synonymous with thing strictly understood. Rather like Scotus he very frequently makes it synonymous with entity, which is a very general term applicable to any thing or part of a thing which is actual as opposed to a being of reason . In this use it is also synonymous with the very general use of res noted above.119 But in the present context of the kinds of distinction it is used in a very restricted sense. It is an essential perfection, a formal perfection, a real note of a thing.¹120 More precisely, it is an entity in a thing ex natura rei, formally and actually existing in the thing, in such a way that ultimately abstracted it is distinguished from any other reality in the thing in the first mode of perseity.121 Yet it cannot be separated in actuality from the other realities in the thing by any power whatsoever. 122 One last specification is important. Not every formality is a reality ; they are not always synonymous. Reality has a sense and a usage that is distinct.123 But this is where Peter leaves us. We are faced with the same problem as in the case of res and essentia. Peter makes a distinction which apparently his definitions do not account for. At first glance there is no apparent difference between the definition of a reality just given and his description : "I say that those things are formally distinct which ultimately abstracted can be predicated per se primo modo of no other. " 124 Once again we must endeavor to ferret out Peter's meaning. To find that meaning we must examine the conditions which he lays down for the distinction of formalities and for the distinction of realities. Those things are formally distinct which ultimately abstracted do not contain or include each other quidditatively, or which are not predicable of each other per se primo modo.125 Yet one can include the other

118 Cf. Grajewski , op. cit. , pp. 78-81 , where some but not all of these uses are listed. 119 Cf. Ista convertuntur ; De modis dist. , Q. II , f. 44 va . 120 Ibid. , f. 41 vb. 121 Illud voco formaliter realitatem quod est primo in re ex natura rei et est formaliter et actualiter existens in re ita quod sumptum sub ultima abstractione, nullum a quo primus modus perseitatis distinguitur includit . Ista convertuntur. 122 De modis dist. , Q. II , f. 41vb. 123 Non omnis formalitas potest dici realitas, nec omnis ratio realis, nec omnis perfectio essentialis. Ibid. , 44va. 124 Ibid., Q. VII , f. 52rb. 125 Ibid.; De dist. praed. , f . 31гa.

7 Bridges : Identity and Distinction

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essentially.126 In other words, what are formally distinct are not predicable of each other formally, but they are predicable of each other identically. And this is the root of the distinction between a formality and a reality. Those things are distinct as realities which ultimately abstracted do not include one another, nor can they be predicated of each other either formally or identically.127 The specific difference between a formality and a reality is rooted in that last clause ; a formality under ultimate abstraction admits of identical predication , a reality does not . When we see the implication of this, Peter's meaning begins to emerge. In Part I were noted the conditions under which identical identity remains without formal identity. Identical predication (which is based on identical identity) is possible without formal predication only (1 ) where the subject and predicate are really and essentially identical, and (2) where both or at least one is formally infinite, as in God, or permissively infinite, as in the transcendentals simply taken. The first condition is evident. The second bears explanation . First, infinity is required here because infinity is the proximate basis of identical identity. It is because of infinity that despite ultimate abstraction identical identity remains. Secondly, by permissively infinite it would appear that he means to indicate the capability of the simple (convertible) transcendentals to be contracted to infinity. For he describes the simple transcendentals as those which are found in all beings whether uncreated (infinite) or created (finite).128 The ultimate basis of identical identity and predication is, as he states in the Quodlibet and repeats here, illimitation by essential intimating. Only in the case of God and the simple transcendentals does this remain despite ultimate abstraction .129 If then the formal distinction deals with extremes which retain identical identity despite formal non-identity, one must conclude that

126 Ibid. 127 Ibid . 128 Ad praedicationem autem identicam duo requiruntur necessaria. Primum est quod praedicatum et subjectum sint idem essentialiter ; nam omnis praedicatio identica est essentialis, licet non econtra ; in praedicatione autem essentiali subjectum est idem essentialiter cum praedicato, ut homo est animal ; secundum est quod utrumque extremorum, scilicet subjectum et praedicatum vel alterum ipsorum , sit formaliter infinitum, sicut patet in divinis ; vel permissive sicut in simpliciter transcendentibus. Dico autem simpliciter, quia est dare gradus in transcendentibus ; quaedam enim sunt minus, quaedam enim magis transcendentia. Illud est transcendens simpliciter quod reperitur in omni ente tam creato quam increato sicut ens, unum, verum, bonum . Ibid. 129 Ibid., f. 30rab.

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formalities are such perfections which are found in God or are transcendental, and only such. Actually, in his examples of formalities Peter restricts himself to just these cases. The divine attributes and the transcendentals (being, one, true, good) are solely called formalities . 130 Realities, on the other hand , are extremes which cannot be predicated identically of each other when ultimately abstracted . They are perfections which are united in a third in the concrete . When they are ultimately abstracted that third in which they are essentially united is in a sense lost. Or, we can say that the bond of illimitation by essential intimating is broken. The best and most common example that Peter offers of realities is the genus and specific difference , animality and rationality for instance in man . They form in the concrete humanity. Animality taken in the abstract prescinds from rationality, and conversely. One cannot say "animality is humanity" or " animality is rationality." Identical predication under such conditions is simply impossible . We arrive finally at Peter's idea of a reality. It is a quidditative or a real note of a thing ; something positive ; whose proper concept is wholly exclusive of other such perfections in a thing ; and finally it is a finite perfection. Other examples which Peter gives are : powers of the soul131 and proper attributes of things. 132 In order to show further the relationship between formalities and realities, it is necessary to anticipate some of the discussion in Part III on the relation between identities and distinctions. With reference to the coincidence of various types of distinction, Peter lays down the rule that the greater distinction includes the lesser but not conversely. The distinctions he particularly has in mind are from the list in De distinctione praedicamentorum, namely, ex natura rei, formal, real, essential, subjective, and objective . According to this rule, whatever things are objectively distinct are also subjectively, essentially, really, formally and ex natura rei distinct. Whatever is subjectively distinct is essentially, really, etc., distinct.133 130 There is an exception ; in De dist. praed . , f. 30ra Peter lists the powers of the soul, intellect and will, as formalities in creatures . However, I think it will be evident after we have studied below the rule of coincidence of distinctions that Peter is very probably speaking in a somewhat broader sense here. According to that rule, whatever is really distinct is also formally distinct, and hence in a broad sense could be called a formality. 131 De modis dist. , Q. II. 132 De dist. praed., f. 31rb. 133 Circa quod est dicendum primo quod quando determinat distinctionem se habent quod quaecumque distinguuntur se totis obiective, distinguuntur omnibus aliis modis distinctionum respectu praecedentium. Quaecumque distinguuntur se totis subiective, distinguuntur essentialiter, realliter, formaliter, et ex natura rei, et sic de aliis, non tamen e contrario. Ibid.

7°

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Petrus Thomae Applying this rule to our present distinction, we see that whatever

is really distinct is also formally distinct. This being the case, it is understandable that Peter should call realities also formalities. But what is formally distinct, again according to the rule, is not really distinct ; "reality" cannot be applied to entities which are strictly formally distinct. And so, as Peter says , not every formality is a reality. From his failure to be more explicit in his definitions and explanations of formality and reality one might surmise that in Peter's time this was a commonly accepted distinction among Scotists. So little is known about them, however, that it would be difficult to discover who originated it . The question naturally arises, did Scotus make this distinction between formality and reality ? Grajewski is not aware of the question ; he says categorically of Scotus' use of the terms, "All realities are formalities and vice versa. " 134 And this apparently is correct. A study of the major tracts on distinctions in Scotus shows that he does not explicitly make a distinction between a reality and a formalty in the sense just explained.135 Furthermore, when he discusses, for example, the distinction . between the divine productions Scotus uses entitas, realitas , and formalitas interchangeably.136 Finally, Scotus uses his examples interchangeably to explain the distinction involved . For example, to explain the difference between ens and unum he introduces the example of the distinction between genus and specific difference.137 It would appear, therefore , that the distinction between formality and reality was introduced after Scotus' time. It can be added, however, that one might discern some basis for the later distinction in Scotus' work. First of all, "formality" is a term seldom used by Scotus. Also it would appear to be used only in those tracts dealing with the formal distinction in God. On the other hand, though frequently he says that genus and difference are formally distinct, that they are not the same formal object , the term most commonly applied to them is " reality ." I found no passage where they were explicitly called formalities. 138 134 Grajewski , op. cit. , p . 81 . 135 Cf. Rep. Par. , I , d . 33 , q . 2 ; 12 where various kinds of distinctions are explained. 136 Cf. Ordinatio, I, d. 2 , pars 2, q . 1-4 ; 2 , 255-362 . See also : Potest dici quod quot sunt ibi formalitates, tot sunt ibi realitates et res ; sed quaelibet pluralitas est tantum secundum quid . Oxon . , IV, d . 46 , q . 3, n. 5 ; 20, 448. 137 Meta. , IV, q . 2, n . 2 ; 7, 157. 138 Cf. Si ponamus aliquem intellectum perfecte moveri a colore ad intelligendum realitatem coloris [genus] et realitatem differentiae, quantumcumque habeat perfectum conceptum adaequatum primae realitati, non

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In the later Scotists it would appear that " reality" was held a little more closely to the restricted meaning of " something pertaining to a thing," which was synonymous with formality.139But there is one distinction made by some of the later Scotists that is of interest in our present question. They distinguished subjective reality and objective reality. Subjective reality for them meant what exists outside of its causes. In this sense it is not distinct from res. It resembles the general notion of reality. Objective reality according to some is whatever is conceivable by the intellect either per se or with another ; or more strictly, that which per se can motivate or at least terminate the act of the intellect.140 In explaining objective reality Antonius Trombetta (1438-1518) subdivides the notion , and this is what interests us . In the first sense, objective reality is every positive ratio which is ex natura rei such that it is not dependent on any collative act of the intellect for its existence. In the second and more limited sense, an objective reality is some positive ratio existing in the thing and entirely independent of the intellect to which corresponds some unity ex natura rei . The predicaments are objective realities in both senses of the term. But such transcendental real rationes which are common to God and creatures, for example the transcendentals , would be objective realities only in the first sense . His conclusion is that formality is more common than reality, since it applies to objective reality in both senses, whereas reality properly applies only to the latter sense . And so we find a survival of the distinction between reality and formality, but the usage is somewhat reversed.141 But on the whole such a distinction did not become an established part of Formalistic doctrine. tamen habet in hoc conceptu realitatis a quo accipitur differentia, nec e converso, sed habet ibi duo objecta formalia, quae nata sunt terminare conceptus proprios distinctos . Oxon . , I , d . 8, q . 3 , n. 27 ; 9, 627 . 139 Cf. Nicholas Bonetus, Formalitates secundum viam Doctoris Subtilis, Venice, 1489, a. 2 , f. q . 1 ; Anonymous, Formalitates secundum doctrinam Francisci Mayronis, Ferrara, 1490, a. 2, f. o 4. 140 Cf. Antonius Trombetta , In tractatum formalitatum Scoticarum sententia, Venice, 1493 , a. 2 , pars 2 , f. 7ra. 141 Alio modo realitas objectiva capitur proprie et stricte pro omni ente positivo quod est extra intellectum omnino in effectu et in re, cui correspondet ad extra aliqua unitas ex natura rei , circumscripto omni actu intellectus et abstractivo et intellectivo, quod sic est extra quod potest per se terminare actum intelligendi , circumscripto quocumque alio ; et isto modo nos dicimus quod decem genera generalissima , et quaecumque sunt in recta linea praedicamentali, differentiae ultimae vel etiam non ultimae, sive specificae sive individuales important aliquam realitatem objectivam. Similiter propriae passiones specificae seu praedicamentales sic important talem realitatem objectivam, quia omnibus istis correspondent aliqua unitas ex natura rei extra intellectum omnino. Et isto modo capiendo realitatem, formalitas quae dicitur ratio per se conceptibilis ab intellectu est communior realitate

92

Petrus Thomae To summarize, the extremes of the distinction at hand are positive

entities , actually existing in the thing and inseparable from the thing or from accompanying realities. They are not things but pertain to the thing; they are quid rei. They can be characterized as essential, formal, real perfections of a thing. But most important, in order to set them off from formalities , they are finite entities ; no reality can be infinite or transcendental. When we put the question , what specifically in creatures may be called realities, a double answer is possible. First , broadly speaking, taking into account Peter's rule for the coincidence of distinctions , things (in the broad sense) which are objectively, subjectively, essentially or really distinct are realities. This includes things of different species, individuals within a species, predicaments, etc. Secondly, and more properly, those things are really distinct which are less than essentially distinct and more than formally distinct . The cases again are : genus and specific difference, the powers of the soul, the proper attributes (of creatures) .¹42 The first instance is treated extensively in Q. II of De modis distinctionis; the others are not mentioned in these works again. The criterion for recognizing a distinction of realities and the condition that must be verified is mentioned in the very definition of a reality. The distinction is known by way of ultimate abstraction. Above we saw that ultimate abstraction is that abstraction whereby the quiddity or a formal ratio of something is considered simply in itself, in abstraction from whatever is not intrinsically or per se included in its formal ratio. In Scotistic tradition the possibility of such an abstracted ratio, the possibility of a clear and distinct idea exclusive of other realities of which clear and distinct ideas can be had , and this through the direct apprehensive power of the intellect and not through any collative act, is sufficient evidence of a distinction in the thing ante opus mentis. There must be some distinction ex natura rei to account for the ability of an object to produce distinct real concepts.143 objectiva, quia illa dicitur tam de his quae sunt in praedicamento quam de his quae sunt extra genus et sunt transcendentia, sicuti ens, unum , verum, bonum, etc. Ibid. , 7rb. 142 Non valet : ... distinguuntur realiter ergo essentialiter, quia potentiae animae distinguuntur realiter inter se et ab essentia animae, subjectum etiam a propria passione, conceptus generis et differentiae distinguuntur realiter secundum mentem Scoti in diversis locis, non tamen distinguuntur essentialiter. De dist. praed . , f . 31rb . Cf. Scotus, Meta . , VII , q. 19 ; 7. 143 Quaero igitur, an istis notitiis cognoscat intellectus objective aliquid in re ? Si nihil, fictio est ; si idem , ergo objectum idem est, nisi dicas, quod una res extra facit formaliter duo objecta in intellectu, et tunc non videtur

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Given, then, this ultimate abstraction in creatures the resultant found will be realities, e. g., genus and specific difference . But to this fundamental notion of the criterion must be added the further note, that given ultimate abstraction, the resultant realities are not predicable of each other either formally or identically.

Peter's treatment of the distinction between genus and specific difference is worthy of some special attention before taking up the next type of distinction. He advances the Scotistic doctrine on the subject, at least in the sense of making it more explicit. In the first place Peter takes the usual Scotistic approach to the question, namely, the argument from the objective basis of real concepts. Genus and difference are not synonyms. Nor are they purely conceptually distinct . If that were the case the mind alone could make the distinction , and there would be no reason why the mind could not posit such a distinction in God.144 Again, they are not simply intentionally distinct, as Henry of Ghent taught, being two second intentions in the mind but only one reality from which they are derived.145 The reason is fundamentally the same. The concepts are distinct . Each thing is capable of producing in us a concept which is adequate to it . Hence if one concept is distinct from the other, it must be because the realities are distinct.146 Actually, however, since Henry says that the intentional distinction is. not simply a distinction of reason, they agree that there is a distinction ex natura rei. The disagreement concerns the objective basis.147 Further, the distinction of genus and difference is not according to diverse conformities, as Peter Aureoli would have it. Peter's rebuttal of the objections of Aureoli throughout this question of De modis distinctionis must be left for a more extensive study of the formal distinction , lest we be lead into too lengthy a digression . For brevity's sake, then, we give his reply to Aureoli's fifth objection. Aureoli maintained that genus and difference are entia rationis based on points of conformity and non-conformity actually existing in things though not having any quod res vel aliquid rei sit objectum , sed aliquid factum a re ; si aliud , habetur propositum, quia differentia ante conceptus . Scotus, Ibid. , n. 5 ; 7, 466. Cf. A. Wolter, op . cit. , c . 2 : The Objective Basis of Real Concepts, PP. 14-30. 144 De modis dist., Q. II, f. 42 ra. 145 Ibid. 146 Unaquaeque res est nata facere unum conceptum sibi adaequatum . Sed realitas speciei est aliqua una res ; ergo, etc. Quaero : vel ille erit conceptus quem concipio concipiendo genus, vel ille quem concipio concipiendo differentiam . Sed neutrum istorum potest poni ; ergo oportet quod sit alius ab eis. Ibid. 147 Ibid.

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unity among them. That is, there is a conformity of rationality between men and angels . There is also a non-conformity, in that men are animals and angels are not. In a word, Aureoli holds that the perfections are real but not distinct in the thing. Peter replies, those things whose distinction necessarily or actually demands a real distinction, or which are immediately based on things really distinct are really distinct, i . e . , ex natura rei. In the opinion of Aureoli the notions of genus and difference are necessarily based on really distinct things one of which is the basis of the note of conformity, the other of non-conformity. But this difference between conformity and non-conformity is ex natura rei not only in the different individuals from which the universal notions are derived but also in the single individual in which they are found united. Before any comparative activity of the mind they are distinct.148 Positively, genus and difference are distinct realities capable of separate prescinding by the intellect . Peter offers five proofs based on the natures of the extremes, the nature of the intellect, and the nature of the real distinction. First he argues from the convenience and disconvenience of the genus and difference . The concept of genus is a real concept asserting the convenience of the various species in the genus. The difference is a real concept asserting the disconvenience of species. It is impossible therefore that in a given individual these real concepts be the same ; or to put it another way, it is impossible that two things which are specifically different as man and angel should agree and disagree by the same thing. Before the operation of the intellect they agree in rationality and disagree in animality. There must be a real basis for this agreement and disagreement which exists before the activity of the mind , and which is conceived by distinct real concepts.149 We pass over further objections and counterarguments of Aureoli and Peter on this point. 148 Illud cuius distinctio necessario vel actualiter exigit distinctionem realem vel quod immediate fundatur super aliqua distincta realiter illa sunt realiter distincta. Sed ut dicitur in illo quinto dicto, ratio generis et differentiae necessario exigit distinctionem realem, ut fundata super aliqua distinctionem realiter ; ergo ipsa sunt realiter distincta. Maior apparet. Non enim videtur quod illud quod non est realiter distinctum exigit realem distinctionem, nec fundatur super aliqua distincta realiter. Minor apparet, quia praecise conformitas et disconformitas sunt ex natura rei in re, et distincta ex natura rei, quia circumscripto omni opere intellectus . Sed genus et differentia per te praesupponunt huiusmodi conformitatem et disconformitatem. Ergo, etc. Item : conformitas et disconformitas sunt in re ex natura rei, quia circumscripto omni opere intellectus genus et differentia fundamentaliter non sunt nisi ipsa conformitas et disconformitas. Ergo genus et differentia ex natura rei fundamentaliter distinguuntur, quod est propositum. Ibid., 42 va. 149 Ibid., f. 42 vb.

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Secondly, he argues from the nature of a definition . If the genus is the whole reality of the thing , then the genus suffices for the definition of the thing. Or by like token, if the difference is the whole reality of the thing, then the difference suffices to define the thing. Therefore, either the genus or the difference may be set down as the definition of the thing, since either one expresses the same reality. But it is patently false that one without the other suffices to define the whole being of an object. Therefore the genus and difference must express different realities.150 The next argument considers genus and difference in the concrete, as the foundation of second intentions. It does not appear acceptable to hold that one and the same first intention is the foundation of opposite second intentions. Genus and difference as concepts are opposed second intentions. Therefore they must be based on opposed first intentions. And where there are diverse first intentions there are diverse things or realities of first intention. Therefore genus and difference differ really.151 Fourthly, considering the nature of the intellect, we see that when it apprehends one species, there is caused in the intellect two habitual concepts ; e . g., the apprehension of a man causes two concepts, " rational” and “animal." But two numerically distinct concepts must correspond to two numerically distinct realities ; ergo. If it is suggested that the object is one in reality but dual in concept, it can be replied that this would involve us in the position of never being able to know the thing in itself. For if the thing in itself is one , but we know it as dual, that is, represented by two diverse concepts, then we do not know the thing as it is in itself. He pursues the point a bit further. These two concepts caused in the intellect by the object contain nothing or something. Obviously their content is not nothing. But if something, it is either one and the same thing in both, or something different in each. If it is the same, then the object is the same ; there is no diversity, no genus or difference . If it is different, the proposition is established.152 Lastly, the distinction between genus and difference has all the requirements for a distinction ex natura rei. They are not contained in the species as in a passive potency, nor in anything as in an efficient cause, nor as an inferior in a superior. They are really in the species but formally distinct. They are primarily distinct notions and cannot be the same. And lastly, each ultimately abstracted does not include the other; therefore they are really distinct.153

150 Ibid., f. 43гb . 151 Ibid., f. 43 va.

152 Ibid. 153 Ibid., ff. 43 va -43 vb.

s

Petru

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Thom

After developing his proofs for the distinction, Peter proceeds to expound the nature and relationship of these two predicables. This he does in 12 propositions, which he says are taken from the teaching of Scotus.154 A comparison of these propositions with the writings of Scotus reveal, (1 ) that in no question or series of questions does Scotus develop these propositions as a unified exposition ;

(2) that 8 of the

propositions can be found explicitly stated in Scotus' writings ; and (3) that the rest of the propositions are not be found in the three main loci where Scotus treats genus and difference more thoroughly, viz. , Oxon. , I , d. 8, qq . 3-5 , Quaestiones Super Universalia Porphyrii, and Metaph., VII , q . 19. Nor can a trace of them be found through a consultation of Varesius

(Promptuarium

Scoticum) ,

Garcia

(Lexicon

Scholasticum) , and Minges (Compendium Theologiae et Philosophiae ...). Several questions come to mind. Was Peter working from class notes and hence does he include matter which Scotus said but did not record in writing ? Or is Peter speaking in a general manner, intending to lay down propositions according to the mind of Scotus but phrasing them and adding propositions to suit his present purposes ? The latter off hand would seem to be the case. It is difficult to be definitive in the matter. In the first place it has not been established for certain that Peter was a pupil of Scotus. Secondly, there may have been some scripta available to him that we do not know of ; or the doctrine may be contained in Reportationes not published as yet. At any rate, from the context of Peter's exposition it would appear that he gathered the propositions from various questions in Scotus' writings and perhaps added some of his own or at least made some of Scotus ' more explicit . These propositions are :155 1. None of these realities, namely, genus and specific difference, ultimately and quidditatively abstracted includes the other. The reason is that they are primarily diverse . In the De ente he defines primarily diverse concepts as those which in no way agree, i . e . , in which no note or notes are the same.'156 This doctrine is explicitly stated in Scotus.157 2. Both these realities are identically notes of the essence of the species, in which they are unitively and quidditatively contained , and they are produced when it is produced. His meaning of identity here is not that the realities are formally identical but that they are really or 154 Unde praemitto duodecim propositiones de dictis Doctoris Subtilis. Ibid., f. 44ra . 155 Ibid., ff. 44ra-44 va. 156 Voco conceptum primo diversum ab aliquo qui in nullo convenit cum illo secundum descriptionem diversi datam ab Aristotele 5° Metaphysicae capitulo de diverso . De ente, Q. VI . Cf. Aristotle, Meta . , V, c. 10 , 1018 b. 157˚ Oxon . , I , d . 8, q . 4 , n . 25 ; 9, 673 .

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essentially identical ; they make up one res. They form an unum per se and are essential notes of the thing, hence they are unitively and quidditatively contained in the species. Lastly, because they are unitively and quidditatively contained in the species, the species comes to be as they come to be. They cannot be united in this way without producing the species, nor can the species exist without their unitative and quidditative union. This is also clearly the doctrine of Scotus, who teaches that genus and specific difference are united in a third and are identical (really) in that third. They are produced in the production of the species . 158 3. One of these realities includes and is included, namely, the genus,

the other is included alone . The superior is included in the inferior (animal in man) , but it also includes the reality of the superior (substance) . The difference is simply included in the species ; it does not include any other because it is simpliciter simplex. This is certainly common scholastic doctrine . But it is not stated by Scotus in the sources cited above. 4. One of these realities is perfectible by the other and one is perfective, as if they were distinct things. Despite the fact that they are united to form the species they retain their proper character. The genus is perfectible by the difference . Yet they are not distinct as matter and form , because then one would perfect materially, the other formally, and hence both would be perfective . This doctrine is contained in Scotus' works ; he says that the genus is potential to and perfectible by the difference,159 5. The reality of the perfectible genus is not really perfected by the perfective difference . This would seem to be a contradiction of the foregoing. But there are different realities under consideration here . In the preceding proposition the reality of the genus and the difference was considered formally and ex se. Here it is the reality of the whole that is considered . This reality is the same for both genus and difference, since they are united in essential identity to form the species. Reality in this sense means quiddity . And in this sense of the term genus is not perfected by the reality of the difference because it is the same reality for both.160 This particular bit of subtlety apparently is not in the writings of Scotus. It seems rather to be a conclusion from Peter's precisions on the meaning of reality.

158 Ibid., q. 3, n. 16 ; 9, 596. 159 Ibid. 160 Videtur quod ista contradicit praecedenti . Ista enim dicit quod unum illarum ex propria sua ratione ab alia est perfectibilis . Sed alia dicit quod non. Respondeo quod non sumitur secundum idem. Cum enim dicitur

98

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mae

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6. It is not repugnant to the perfectible reality considered ex se to be under opposed acts. In other words, it is not repugnant, for example, for animality ex se to be either rational or irrational. Ex se the genus abstracts from either act or perfection . Scotus teaches the same in his Quaestiones super universalia Porphyrii.161

7. It is repugnant for the perfectible genus as it is in this individual being to be under opposed act. In this case it is in essential union with a determined difference, and a thing cannot be essentially separated from itself. In the former case the genus was considered ex se and as possible of perfection ; here it is considered as perfected . As Scotus has said , under such circumstances it is not conveniens to assert that the genus is capable of opposed acts.162 8. Each of these realities is finite . It is repugnant to the intensive infinity of a being that such a being should unite with another either as a perfectible or perfective member. Since genus and difference are ordered to union as perfectible and perfective realities they cannot be infinite . Scotus has practically the same argument. The genus is in potency to the difference and nothing infinite is in potency to another.163 9. Neither of these realities is predicated of the other in the abstract. If one were predicable of the other it would be by formal or identical predication. Formal predication is out of the question because formally they are not the same. And in the abstract identical predication is out of the question. As soon as one is abstracted from the other the basis of identical identity is removed ; they are really identical in that which they form, the species ; but abstraction prescinds from the species. The argument is basically taken from Scotus, who likewise asserts at least in equivalent terms that the basis of identical predication is removed through abstraction.164 in praecedenti quod una est perfectibilis ex se, hoc est intelligendum quod quantum habet ex sua propria ratione quod sit perfectibilis ex se. Cum autem dicitur, hoc habet ex alio, quia hoc sibi competit propter identitatem essentialem quam habet respectu tertii, in quo sunt idem essentialiter. De modis dist., Q. II , f. 44rb . 161 Potest dici quod non est inconveniens opposita in actu inesse eidem Genere, licet sit inconveniens de eodem numero . Qq. super univ . Porph., q. 25, n. 3 ; 1 , 305. 162 Ibid. 163 Oxon. , I, d . 8, q . 3 , n . 16 ; 9, 596. 164 Hoc autem non contingit in creaturis, quia ibi abstrahendo illas realitates, quae sunt in eodem, puta realitatem generis et differentiae, et considerando eas praecissime, utraque est finita, et neutra est perfecte eadem alteri. Non enim sunt modo eadem inter se, nisi propter tertium cui sunt eadem . haec igitur est falsa : animalitas est rationalitas et econverso . Ibid., q. 4, n. 25 ; 9, 673.

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10. None of these realities is an intrinsic mode. Rather each is a reality having its own intrinsic modes, among others : finiteness . In describing the true nature of the specific difference Scotus eliminates the possibility of the difference being an intrinsic mode.165 II. The reality of the genus is related to the reality of the difference as a perfection to a degree of perfection . Taking the case of animality, it is of the nature of a perfection capable of being found in many; rationality is a grade of this perfection . It is in this sense that the species is said to partake of the nature of the genus, since it is the perfection and the difference is the grade or degree . Scotus apparently does not make this application to genus and difference .

12. None of these realities should be called an essence ; rather they can be called an essential perfection, or a formal or quidditative note, but not conversely. There are three parts to this proposition. (a) These realities are not essences. Though they are distinct they are not essentially separable ; that is , they lack the criterion of an essential distinction and hence are not distinct as essence and essence. (b) They can be called real notes because they are in the thing ex natura rei ; or they can be called quidditative notes, because they are of the quiddity of the thing ; or they can be called essential perfections because they intrinsically constitute the essence of the species. (c) But not all formal notes or formalities can be called realities . His meaning is clear from our discussion above. Though Scotus would agree with at least the first two parts of this proposition, specific statements are not available, with the exception that he calls realities quidditative notes.166 These twelve propositions serve as a rather apt summary of the chief characteristics and relations of genus and specific difference . If Peter had carried through this practice in other Scotistic problems he would have rendered a great service . His work here is especially helpful because he orders and completes doctrines enuntiated in passing by Scotus. Through these conclusions and his treatment of reality in general we derive a fairly definite idea of the extremes of this particular distinction. The criterion, as noted, is mutual non-inclusion of real concepts under ultimate abstraction, together with the impossibility of formal and identical predication under such circumstances . The latter clause is necessary in order to distinguish this criterion from the one proposed for the distinction of formalities.

165 Ibid. 166 Oxon. , II, d . 3 , q. 6, n. 12 ; 12 , 135.

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Petrus Thomae 7. DISTINCTION OF REALITY AND THING It is clear what the extremes are in this case of distinction . "Reality”

is used in the sense just described . It refers to finite entities. "Thing" is used here, not in that sense to which Peter restricted it in the case of a distinction between thing and thing, but in the more general sense of substance, or perhaps more properly, of the total reality of the thing. The question here seems to be, in the individual what is the relation of the genus, for example, to the whole of the being with its other realities, modes, properties , etc. ? Peter replies that they are distinct ex natura rei. His proof lies in the criterion . Reality and thing are related as principle and pertainant. The thing is that which a thing is ; the reality is that of which a thing consists . The reality pertains to the thing as a constitutive part of the thing. Overly succinctly he concludes, nothing real is of itself, therefore there must be some distinction . In other words, if there is a real basis for asserting a principle or subject and that which pertains to it, there must be a distinction between the two , because we cannot properly speak of something really pertaining to a single, simple, undivided subject, i . e . , a subject having no distinctions in its nature ex natura rei.167 By the very fact that we say that the genus or the specific difference pertains to the subject we indicate a distinction ex natura rei. One comment might be made with regard to the criterion . It is adequate to its purpose only in a limited sense . It helps to recognize the distinction of reality and thing . But it is not an exclusive criterion . The same criterion will be used later to recognize a distinction of formality and thing. 8. DISTINCTION OF FORMALITY AND FORMALITY An independent study could be devoted to this one distinction . Peter is one of the Formalists. As such he holds an integral position among those metaphysicans who, inspired by the extensive and monumental work of Duns Scotus , have devoted special tracts to the exposition and refining of this distinction. Historically Peter is interesting as a contemporary, perhaps a pupil of Scotus . He is in the vanguard of the Formal167 Quartum est quod distinctio realitatis et rei cognoscitur per viam principalis et pertinentis vel per quod et cuius ; res enim ipsa se habet per modum cuiusdam ad rem pertinentis ; similiter ipsa realitas respicit rem ut cuius. Unde proprie loquendo nihil reale est sui ipsius, immo oportet quod aliqua distinctio intercedat inter ipsa . De dist. praed., f. 85vb. It may be noted that Scotus lists an "adequate non-identity" which corresponds at least in part to this distinction ex natura rei noted by Peter. Cf. below, p. 137.

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ists. And he is one of the earliest protagonists of the doctrine , arguing especially against the attacks of Peter Aureoli . The result is another exemplification of the fact that sturdy opposition and level-headed controversy is beneficial, since it makes one re-examine the foundations. and further clarify the elements of one's doctrine. It will be impossible here adequately to set Peter in true historical perspective with regard to the Formalist movement . The main intent will be to present in objective fashion the main elements and conclusions which Peter advances in expounding the formal distinction . Outstanding variations from the doctrine of Scotus, if any, will be noted. But the lengthy rebuttals to Aureoli's objections will be passed over, except in so far as Peter's replies may be helpful for a better understanding of his basic doctrine. The extremes of this distinction are formalities, of which some notion has already been given while clarifying the notion of a reality. The term formalitas is derived from forma. It will be useful to study the origins of the word and then its meaning for Peter. In his works used for this study Peter does not employ "form" in quite so many ways as Scotus does. There are two basic meanings of form for Peter, though he admits that it can and has been used in other ways. In the first use it refers to the correlative of matter in the matterform composite. As such it has a five-fold connotation : (a) it is that whereby matter is actualized ; (b) whereby the composite is specified ; (c) whereby the composite operates, in so far as the nature is rooted in the form ; (d) whereby the composite is distinguished from other composites ; and (e) whereby the composite is known , since in scholastic psychology it is the form which is intelligible.168 In the second use form refers to the whole, to the quiddity. In the present context Peter seems to be using quiddity as convertible with essence . He says : "Form is used of the whole and generally of any quiddity , in the way that substances separated from matter and even God are called forms. " 169 This word quidditas is a chamelion term like res or ratio; it admits of many meanings, and the meaning usually has to be diagnosed from the context. 168 Dicitur enim quod altera pars compositi et ista dicitur proprie forma et sic invenitur in ea multiplex ratio. Ipsa enim forma est qua actuatur, qua specificatur, qua compositum operatur, qua compositum distinguitur, qua compositum ut compositum cognoscitur . Ista convertuntur, f . un . Where İsta convertuntur and Vienna, f. 60 vb , read qua compositum operatur, Magd . Coll. ms. 80 reads quo compositum componitur. Either reading would be true, since in the latter case the form is one of the component parts of the composite. 169 Ista convertuntur, f. un.

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Peter does not define the term. Neither, for that matter, does Scotus , who uses it given more liberally. In the latter's works it at times has a limited sense, i . e. , it denotes a perfection, whether simple or limited. Again, he speaks of the quiddity of the divine Paternity, and here in Peter's way of speaking it refers to a res as opposed to an essentia.170 Most commonly it seems to be convertible with essence. He speaks of the essence of God as a quiddity, 171 of homo and humanitas as quiddities,172 of the quiddity of a relation as being the same as its essence.173 In this sense, it would seem properly to refer not to the total reality of a thing, i. e., it is not convertible with res, but to the essential reality prescinding from attributes, properties, and individual difference.174 Yet indirectly at least Scotus considers formalities and transcendental attributes as quiddities. For example, he concludes that the properties of being are formally and quidditatively distinct from themselves and from being itself.175 In this context quidditative can only mean that the entity or formality of one property is not the same as that of the other. Here "quiddity" approaches the meaning of res or realitas in that broad sense of any thing knowable by the intellect which is not a product of the mind whether it is being or of-being. It is from "form " in Peter's second use of the term as related to quiddity in an essential sense that other similar terms are derived , such as "formal," "formally," " formality." "Formal," the adjective, he says, is derived from "form" in its meaning of quiddity. It signifies whatever belongs to form in any way, i. e., to the quiddity of a thing.176 "Formally" is the adverb derived from " formal" and ultimately from "form ." As an adverb it expresses a mode and is used in propositions to modify the copula . It is similar to "really" in that both are modes ; but there is a fundamental difference between them. "Really" modifies the extremes, while "formally" modifies the composition of the extremes. In other words, " really" tells us of the predicate that it is ex natura rei; while "formally" tells us that the predicate is predicable of the subject per se primo modo. What then is formally related to another is the same.

170 171 172 173 174 tamen 175 176

Oxon., I, d . 26, q. un. , n . 46 ; 10, 339. Oxon ., II , d . 3 , q. 7, n. 3 ; 12, 160. Oxon., III , d . 22 , q. un. , n . 6 ; 14, 757 . Oxon . , I , d . 11 , q . 2 , n. 10 ; 9, 842. Quidditas licet non existat nisi in supposito, vel in singulari, potest intelligi ab intellectu . Oxon . , I , d . 3 , q . 6, n. 28 ; 9, 292 . Oxon. , II , d . 16, q. un. , n . 17 ; 13, 43 . Ista convertuntur; De modis dist., Q. VII , f. 42rb.

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quiddity or part of the same quiddity as the other.177 To state that divine wisdom is not formally divine love is to state that nothing in the formal notion of divine love is identical with anything in the formal notion of divine wisdom. There is no evidence that Peter ever uses "formally" to indicate formality in its strictest sense, that is, in contradistinction to reality. "Formality" is derived from " formal" in the sense given above. But we seek in vain for an adequate definition of a formality in Peter's work. In a way, one would expect to find one just for the reason that Scotus often describes but never defines a formality, and so leaves a lacuna.178 Peter, however, is content to describe and characterize as Scotus did. We can order Peter's statements about formalities under three heads : the relation of a formality to quiddity , to res , and to the intellect . In the first place, a formality is a quidditative note, or, speaking in circles, it is that which belongs quidditatively to the quiddity. If we concluded that a formality is then an essential note or perfection of a thing we would be right, but not if we considered a formality to be exclusively an essential note. The properties of being are also formalities belonging quidditatively to the quiddity. This brings us back to the question, what does quiddity signify in these statements ? If formalities were exclusively essential notes, quiddity obviously would be synonymous with essence . But when formality is used of that which is necessarily connected with the essence and this is said to pertain quidditatively to a quiddity, it is obvious that quiddity is now used in a broader sense , i. e., to include not only the essence but also the transcendental attributes of being. Therefore, quidditative is used somewhat analogously here. It means " belonging to the essence as an essential note" and " belonging to the essence as a transcendental attribute ;" or to put it more generally, it means "belonging to a thing per se primo modo" according to its various degrees. But formality is never synonymous with quiddity itself. A formality pertains to the quiddity. And so Peter coins a term : a formality is a quidditalitas.179 It is true, he says in one place that quiddity and form177 Formaliter est adverbium , et per consequens dicit modum ; unde dicit modum compositionis alicuius praedicamenti praedicati cum subiecto ... Per ly formaliter nihil intelligo nisi per se primo modo . Ista convertuntur. Nam realiter importat modum extremi , formaliter autem modum compositionis extremi cum extremo. De modis dist. , Q. VII , f. 53 vb. 178 Cf. Grajewski, op . cit. , p . 73 . 179 Sed quando dicitur in minori quod formalitas est quidditas , nego proprie loquendo, sed ratio quidditativa. Unde si proprie loqui volumus, debemus fingere nomen de quidditate, quidditalitas . De modis dist. , Q. VII, f. 53ra.

8 Bridges : Identity and Distinction

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ality are the same.180 But to be consistent this would be said only in that improper sense whereby the name of the whole is given to the part, as for instance when res is used broadly to designate also those things which are properly rei . A formality, therefore, is a quidditative note, something belonging essentially to the quiddity as a part of the essence, or something necessarily pertaining to the quiddity or essence . It would appear that Peter considers ratio quidditiva as the most proper description of a formality. His explanation presents an interesting and perhaps original summary of the conditions for a formality. But as usual Peter is succinct to the point of some obscurity. His contention is that " quidditative note " is the proper description of formality because it fulfils all the formal conditions . Perhaps he means by " formal conditions" those things required of a formality considered precisely as a formality. At any rate, the following are the conditions which "quidditative note" fulfils : (a) it is that by which something is formally said to be such; taking "quidditative" in its proper sense of essence or belonging to essence, it is clear that the essential notes do identify a thing as this thing and not another.

(b) It is that by which something formally is

said to be distinguished after the manner of a principle ; the essential notes not only identify a thing but serve to distinguish it from other things. Peter says that it distinguishes principiative. The essential notes can be considered as principles of the distinction in so far as the distinction flows from them ; but this presupposes generic and specific differences and not simply accidental distinctions among members of a species. (c) It is that by which something formally is known and this also after the manner of a principle . We know a thing by means of its essential notes, and without them it cannot be known. Again, since it is by means of these notes that a thing is known , it is possible to consider the notes as principles of knowledge . This relation of a formality to knowledge will be studied more extensively below. (d) Lastly, it is that by which the thing is produced . Peter's meaning appears to be that since the quidditative notes are " of the thing," the thing can come to be only by means of their coming to be.181

180 Ista convertuntur, f. i. 181 Formalitas proprie loquendo est idem quod ratio quidditativa alicuius, nec aliud per formalitatem intelligo , licet aliis diversimode describatur. Et isti rationi formalitatis sic acceptae vere conveniunt omnes conditiones formales . Ipsa enim est illud quo aliquid formaliter tale dicitur ; et illud quo aliquid formaliter principiative distingui dicitur ; est tertio quo aliquid formaliter cognoscitur, et hoc principiative ; et quarto quo aliquid si illud cuius est sic productivum producitur. De modis dist. , Q. VI , Vienna ms. , f. 60 vb.

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In these four conditions we have summarized especially the relationship of the formalities to the thing. They, in a sense, compose the being, and hence they are the principles of the thing's existence and of its being known. However, it is important to make certain observations. First, all these conditions concern quidditative notes only in the proper sense, i. e., as notes of the essence , and they ignore the secondary sense of transcendental

attributes necessarily

connected with the

essence .

Secondly, Peter here ignores his distinction between reality and formality. In fact, I think it true to say that these conditions apply more properly to realities than to formalities. Thirdly, these conditions do not state. anything about the distinction between the quidditative notes themselves . This aspect of the formalities is brought out more by the following relations . In relation to thing, a formality is not a res; it is rei, something belonging to the thing.182 As Peter succinctly says, a formality is related to res as quo and cuius : quo , because it is that whereby a thing is, and without which this thing could not be this thing ; cuius , because it is not a thing in its own right, i . e. , absolutely, but it is a "part" of a thing, whose nature is to be rei and not res. 183 Only improperly can it be and is it called res , i . e . , when res is used to designate any reality not dependent on the operation of the mind. A formality is a part of a thing, but not in the sense that a form is a constitutive part of a thing. According to Peter, matter and form are essences which unite to form a third essence. They are physical parts. But the formality partakes of the same reality as the thing. As Peter says, there is no numerical composition between formality and thing. The thing is not other than its formalities and cannot as a consequence be conceived without the formalities.184 Finally, it is not repugnant that in one thing there should be a number of formalities, nor does the increase of formalities involve an increase in things. In fact, he indicates that every thing consists of many formalities.185

182 Ibid . , f. 53ra. 183 Ipsa etiam formalitas respicit rem ut quo et ut cuius. Ut quo quia natura sua propria formalitas est illud quod est. Ut cuius quia est rei. Et res ut quo vel ut cuius sed non ut quod, id est, ut est res per se absoluta. Ista convertuntur. 184 Formalitas et res cuius est formalitas non ponunt numerum ... Impossibile est enim rem concipi sine eo quo quidditative est illud quod est. De modis dist. , f. 52vb. 185 Res et formalitas sic se habent quod plurificata ipsa formalitas non plurificatur ipsa res ... Supponitur enim quod in re sunt plures formalitates attributorum . Ibid., f. 52 va. 8.

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In connection with the last statement we can introduce the distinction which Peter makes between quidditative and qualitative formalities. Ens, he says, is the first formality, and it is a quidditative formality. But the properties of being have their formalities also, and these are the first qualitative formalities. A certain equivocation of formality results . The attributes are not beings, and if they are called such it is only in an equivocal sense . Hence , formality as applied to being and formality as applied to the attributes of being are equivocal, at least in their relation to being.186 Unfortunately Peter does not pursue the subject further. And so, to be of a thing and not a thing, is one of the fundamental characteristics of a formality. And this in summary is the relationship of formality to thing. More about the ontological status of formalities. is revealed by a study of the relationship of a formality to the intellect. Everything is intelligible by reason of its transcendental attribute of truth . The question is, are formalities really intelligible, or are they only logically intelligible ? To put it in another way, are formalities actually existing and distinct realities ex natura rei, or are they logical parts of a thing projected into it by the mind ? The first question with regard to the relationship of intellect and formality is that of origin . Like Scotus, Peter maintains that formalities do not come into existence through the operation of the mind ; they are not entia rationis. "Formality" is not a second intention but a first intention term.187 It stands for a reality existing in the thing and discovered by the mind , a reality that is distinct ex natura rei from other like entities in the thing. Formalities, therefore , do not originate in the mind. But they are perceived only by the mind ; they are not immediately experienced . A study of the formality as known, as an object of understanding, reveals more of its nature .

186 Ergo in plus se habet formalitas quam ens. Consequentia est evidens, quoniam nulla passio entis dicitur formaliter ens. Sed dico adhuc quod formalitas illa non se habet in plus quam ens. Licet enim tam ens quam omnia transcendentia habeant formalitatem, tamen ipsa est enti et eius passionibus communis mere aequivoce . Hoc probatur vere sic : nihil potest esse commune univocum primae formalitati quidditativae et primis formalitatibus qualitativis. Sed formalitas entis est ipsa formalitas quidditative; formalitates autem passionum sunt primae formalitates qualitativae. Ergo formalitati entis et formalitatibus passionum eius non potest esse aliquid commune univocum dictum de ipsis in quid. Ibid. 187 Ad primum videtur mihi pro nunc quod formalitas sit prima intentio. Cuius ratio est : Illud nomen cuius significatum non est ab operatione intellectus non posset esse nomen secundae intentionis sed primae. Sed significatum huius nominis " formalitas" non est ab operatione intellectus fabricatum, immo est vere in re, circumscripto omni operatione intellectus. Ibid.

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One of the strongest points for Scotus in arguing to a distinction ex natura rei among formalities is the fact that formalities are distinct formal objects of the understanding.188 For Peter , too , this is a fundamental characteristic of a formality. A formality is a formal object of the intellect conceivable of itself independently of the other formalities.189 Exactly what it means that a formality is a distinct formal object of the intellect Peter attempts to explain as a clarification of Scotus' statement to this effect. To be a distinct formal object can be understood in two ways. In the first, they are distinct in such a way that each of them is a real perfection, or a reality, or a formality distinct from the other. This, he says, is not Scotus' meaning. It would appear that he objects, not to calling them so many formalities (the specific case in point is the divine attributes) , but to the emphasis on the distinction, as if they were so distinct as to constitute some composition in the divine essence. This appears from the second way of considering formalities as distinct formal objects. In the second way, the formalities are unitively contained in the divine essence (hence there is no composition) , yet they are capable of moving the intellect to diverse acts, as if they were somehow distinct things or realities.190 188 Dicuntur autem aliqua non habere identitatem formalem, quando unum non est de per se et primo intellectu alterius, ut definitio, vel partis definitionis de intellectu definiti, sed quando neutra includitur in formali ratione alterius. Rep. Par. , I , d. 33 , q . 2, n. 11 ; 22, 403. 189 Per formalitatem enim nihil aliud intelligo ... quam rationem formalem cuiuscumque rei per se conceptibilem. De modis dist. , Q. XI, f. 62 vb. 190 Ad secundum quando dicitur quod huiusmodi attributa sunt obiecta distincta formalia, potest intelligi dupliciter : uno modo, quod sunt sic distincta, quod quilibet illorum est realis perfectio, vel realitas vel formalitas quocumque vocetur, ab alio distincta, et hoc modo non ponit Doctor. Alio modo, quod dicantur obiecta distincta pro quanto ipsa unitive contenta in divina essentia, ita distincte possunt movere intellectum possibilem ad dicersos actus , sicut si quaelibet res esset vel realitas distincta ab alia, et secundum istum modum dicit Doctor quod sunt distincta obiecta, pro quanto videlicet possunt se sic movere intellectum distincte, et hoc est quod dicit exponendo se in eadem quaestione. Ibid. , Q. V, f. 50ra. It is difficult to determine what passage in Scotus Peter had in mind in his last statement. There is no lead given in the text. In the formal treatment of the attributes in God in Oxon . , I , d . 8 , q . 4 , formalities are treated as formal objects of the intellect only in the following passage : Praeterea, intellectus intuitivus nullam habet distinctionem in objecto, nisi secundum quod existens est, quia sicut non cognoscit aliquod objectum, nisi quod existens , ita non cognoscit aliqua distincta formaliter in objecto nisi ut existens. Cum igitur intellectus divinus non cognoscat essentiam suam nisi intuitiva intellectione , quaecumque distinctio ponatur ibi in objecto , sive sit distinctorum objectorum formalium , sive ut rationum causatarum per actum intellectus, sequitur quod ista distinctio erit in objecto, ut actu existens est ; et ita si ista est objectorum formalium distinctorum, in objecto erunt ista formaliter distincta, et habetur tunc propositum, quod distinctio talis objectorum formalium praecedit actum intellectus . Oxon . , I, d. 8 , q. 4, n. 15 ; 9, 654. Certainly this passage does not seem to offer a basis for Peter's distinction .

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It can be noted further that the object of the intellect can have a two-fold aspect, either as motivating or as terminating the act of the intellect. A motivating object acts as a co-cause with the intellect in causing the act of the intellect. A terminating object simply terminates the act of intellection without exerting any causality. Relations, for instance, cannot motivate the intellect, but they terminate the act of the intellect. It is essential to the notion of an object of the intellect that it be attained by an act of the intellect or that it terminate the act. But it is not essential that it motivate the act. Peter teaches that formalities are motivating objects of the intellect. This would seem to be a legitimate conclusion from his statement noted above that formalities are principles whereby things are known. As principles of knowledge they would be co-causes, motivating the intellect and causing together with the intellect the act or acts whereby we know not only the formalities but the thing. From the point of view of determining the true nature of a formality, an important characteristic and indication of a formality with relation to the intellect, is that a formality is capable of being conceived independently of others in a thing.191 The implied argument is that if a thing is capable of presenting to the mind these distinct concepts, and if they are truly presented to the mind and not posited there by the mind, then there must be some basis in reality to account for the fact . The basis can only be that there exist in the thing entities which are distinct ex natura rei. These entities are not things, and so the distinction is not of thing and thing. They are entities of a thing, formalities. The name is particularly appropriate, because another manner of stating the situation is to say that one entity is not formally the same as the other. There is nothing in the formal ratio of the one that agrees with anything in the formal ratio of the other. The test of the mutual exclusiveness of the notions of the formalities comes in predication. When a formality has been ultimately abstracted from a thing, if it is a true formality it will contain nothing quidditatively of the other formalities in its concept . And hence it will be impossible to predicate one formality of another per se primo modo. This is the predication of the definition or part of the definition. Ultimately abstracted and thus reduced to their bare essential notes they are not predicable of each other in whole or in part.192

191 De dist. praed. , f. 31va. 192 Ista convertuntur;De modis dist., Q. VII , f. 52rb .

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Up to this point nothing has been stated concerning the nature of a formality in itself or in relation to the intellect that is not equally true of a reality. Realities pertain to a thing; they are quidditative notes ; and they are formal , motivating objects of the intellect. The difference between a formality and a reality, to repeat it in this context, is that in the strictest sense a formality ultimately abstracted does not include the other formally, but is predicable of the other identically ; whereas a reality not only does not include the other but is not predicable of the other either formally or identically.

11

A formality, therefore, in the strictest sense is always infinite, because it retains its identical identity under ultimate abstraction. As we have seen above when discussing identical identity this is possible only with infinite entities. It is true not only of entities infinite in themselves , but also of entities permissively infinite, i. e. , simple transcendental attributes. What then concretely in reality are formalities ? Again we can answer in two ways. In a broad sense, taking into consideration Peter's rule that all greater distinctions coincide with the lesser, the extremes of the objective, the subjective, the essential and the real distinction can be called formalities . All of these extremes fulfil the general condition for formalities, namely, that one does not quidditatively include the other. In the strictest sense, however, only those entities are formalities which are distinct with less than a real distinction . Peter discusses explicitly in the available sources only these cases : the divine attributes, the divine relations , the divine productions, among the entities infinite in se; and being and its simple transcendental attributes among entities permissively infinite. Negatively Peter has quite a bit to add about formalities, in the sense that he dwells extensively on the proof that the extremes of a secundum quid distinction are not secundum quid entities. This was an implication made by Aureoli by way of objection to the formal distinction. We can summarize briefly the conclusions of Q. IV of De modis distinctionis, which is devoted entirely to this question . In relation to identical identity and essential distinction all other identities and distinctions are secundum quid according to Peter. Formal identity is a secundum quid mode of identity. The formal distinction is a negation of formal identity between the extremes under consideration ; it is a distinction secundum quid. But this does not mean that the formal distinction is a denial of identity between extremes which are secundum quid in the sense of being entia diminuta in the full sense .

Petrus Thomae

ΙΙΟ

Entia diminuta properly speaking are beings of the mind. Beings simpliciter have their proper being outside of their causes. But there are certain beings which though beings simpliciter partake somewhat of the nature of entia diminuta, such as accidents, which are not capable of independent existence.193 Whether or not Peter would consider formalities entia diminuta in this improper sense is not explicitly stated . He would seem to imply it , however, by the very way that he insists that such beings, although they are entia diminuta, fundamentally have esse simpliciter. And this would seem a proper conclusion , because though a formality exists outside of its causes it is not capable of independent existence. It is possible in two ways to have a distinction secundum quid. In the first there is an incomplete distinction in so far as the extremes agree in one part and differ in another. In the second the distinction implies a negation of a secundum quid identity. Because that which is denied is secundum quid, the distinction is denominated secundum quid.194 It is in this latter sense that the formal distinction is said to be a distinction secundum quid. From the foregoing Peter draws a few conclusions. (a) “ Secundum quid" qualifies the distinction and not the entity of the extremes. Applied to distinction it means that secundum quid (i. e. , formal) identity is denied of the extremes. And this is the proper meaning of the secundum quid distinction.195 (b) The second conclusion is that the distinction secundum quid implies that the extremes are distinct secundum quid. But it does not necessarily follow that the extremes in themselves are to be qualified 193 Nam aliqua sunt quae possunt habere esse simpliciter, tamen habent esse diminutum. Esse quidem habent simpliciter secundum modum proprium quia non habent esse potentiale, nec confusum, nec indistinctum, nec intentionale, cum habeant esse extra suas causas . Habent tamen cum hoc esse diminutum , ut omnia accidentia, licet secundum magis et minus. Omnia enim habent entitatem simpliciter modo dicto quoniam ponuntur in actuali existentia et cum hoc entitatem secundum quid propter eorum imperfectionem. Ibid. , Vienna ms. , Q. III , f. 56vab. 194 Ibid., Q. V, f. 48vb. 195 Cum dicitur secundum quid videlicet secundum quam non est additio sicut determinatio determinans aliquam partem, sed est determinatio distrahens. Unde cum dicitur : homo est mortuus, non tamen penitus simile, nisi quantum ad hoc quod sicut mortuus non est determinatio determinans sed totum distrahens, ita videlicet in proposito . Ibid. , f. 48rb . Ita in proposito illo modus identitatis qui per distinctionem istam secundum quid negatur est modus identitatis secundum quid, quia est modus identitatis formalis, qui est identitas secundum quid respectu identitatis identicae ... Ad distinctionem autem secundum quid, ut nunc loquimur de ea, non requiritur extremi ad extremum comparatio, sed ipsam sufficit negatio modi identitatis, immo nihil aliud est . Ibid ., f. 49ra.

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as secundum quid. Several examples of secundum quid distinctions involving extremes having being simpliciter are offered. The divine Persons are distinct secundum quid, because there is no essential distinction between them ; yet the Persons cannot be said to be beings secundum quid, or entia diminuta. In the same way the divine productions are distinct secundum quid, but none of the productions are entia diminuta. The whole and its parts, too , are distinct secundum quid, yet the parts and especially the whole are not entia diminuta . The entity of the extremes does not determine the distinction. For it is possible to have a simple distinction between entia diminuta, e . g., between two relations or between two simple beings ; and it is possible to have a distinction secundum quid between simple beings as well as between entia diminuta; or finally it is possible to have mixed extremes, such as a simple distinction between a simple being and an ens diminutum.196 Peter therefore concludes, "The distinction of extremes is measured more by their distinction than by their entity . "197 (c) Consequently, the extremes of the formal distinction, though in an improper sense they may be called entia diminuta , are entities actually existing outside of their causes. This third conclusion is, I believe, the doctrine implied throughout Q. IV of De modis distinctionis .

Peter

was at great pains to establish the negative part : a distinction secundum quid does not necessarily imply that the extremes are entities secundum quid; but the positive part of his doctrine is not expressed in specific terms. As a corollary, it might be concluded that the distinction secundum quid under discussion here , i. e . , the formal distinction , is not a distinction according to reason . The distinction according to reason arises from a comparison of extremes, namely, through a collative act of the intellect. No such collative act is required for the formal distinction , but simply 198 the denial of formal identity.19 This discussion of the distinction secundum quid, as Peter points out at the outset, is an extended commentary on the same doctrine proposed by Scotus in the Reportata Parisiensia, where he treats the distinction between the Divine Essence and the Divine Relations.199

196 Ibid. , f. 48 va. 197 Ibid. , f. 49ra. 198 Ibid. 199 Dico quod essentia et relatio sic distinguuntur quod ante omnem actum intellectus haec proprietas distinguitur ab essentia secundum quid, sed distinctio realis aliquorum secundum quid potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo ut haec determinatio secundum quid referatur ad realitatem , et sic opinionem priores coluerunt essentiam et relationem distingui secundum

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There is one final use of the term “ formality” in De modis distinctionis that must be mentioned before looking to the criteria of this distinction. In Part I above, under formal identity, we noted that Peter in Q. VI confuses matters by using formality, now in its proper sense, again as a synonym for thing, or perhaps better, for reality in its general meaning of the whole actuality or total reality of a thing. In one proposition he says : "All the attributes are one formality. " In the succeeding proposition , however : "The formality of one attribute is not formally the formality of the other." What he wants to emphasize is the unity and essential identity of the being despite the distinction of formalities. But the terminology is unfortunate . Peter suggests five criteria of a formal distinction. For the most part they are complementary. (a) By way of formal non-identity. From the foregoing it should be clear that this is the first criterion not only in order but also in nature ; for properly according to Peter a formal distinction is the denial of formal identity. Here, if analysis proves that one reality in a thing is not formally identical with another reality, that is, if the formal ratio of one does not include the formal ratio of the other, then there must be a distinction ex natura rei between them . The rest of the argument is implied as above . There must be a condition in the thing which will account for the fact that one single thing is capable of producing two real concepts without any comparative activity of the possible intellect. This condition is a distinction ex natura rei, a distinction of formality and formality. This is a distinction which is less than a distinction of essence and essence and hence a distinction secundum quid. But nothwithstanding it is a distinction ex natura rei, not a distinction of reason. (b) By way of attribution. If something ex natura rei is attributable to one reality formally considered, either per se , or formally, or in some quid, qua realitas relativa non dicit realitatem simpliciter, sed cum determinatione realitatis relativae, ut dicit opinio prima. Secunda etiam opinio dicit quod relatio dicit alium modum super essentiam, modus tamen non est simpliciter, sed modus talis rei . Sed non sic pono ego essentiam et relationem distingui realiter secundum quid , quia tunc esse sensus, quod distinctio essentiae et relationis esset distinctio realitatum secundum quid, quod est inconveniens, quia essentia est res simpliciter, cum sit formaliter infinita . Alio modo potest haec determinatio secundum quid referri ad distinctionem, ut sit sensus, quod essentia et relatio ex natura rei distinguuntur secundum quid, et sic est verum quod distinctio essentiae et relationis est rei simpliciter, et distinctio secundum quid ... Illa ergo distinguuntur perfecte, quae secundum esse eorum actuale proprium et determinatum non sunt eadem simpliciter; et illa distinguuntur secundum quid , quae non habent identitatem simpliciter, sed tantum non identitatem secundum quid . Rep. Par. , I, d . 33 , nn. 8, 9, 10 ; 22, 394-396.

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other mode of attribution, and it is not attributable in the same way to another reality in the thing, then there must be a condition in the thing to account for this. There must be at least a formal distinction between these formalities not admitting the same attributes. (c) By way of denial. This is simply the obverse side of the preceding. Presupposing the situation given there, namely, that something is attributable to one and not to the other, this way looks to the necessity of denying an attribute to one if it is attributed to the other. If the attribute must be wholly and unequivocally denied of one while being attributed to the other, then there must be a ground for this in the thing, namely, a distinction ex natura rei . It is clear that these two ways depend on the first, where it is established that the two extremes have nothing of their formal concepts in common. (d) By way of contradiction. This fourth way is a corollary of the first three. A thing cannot be attributed to and denied of the same thing. This is based on the first principle, of contradiction. If then it is found that an attribute is attributable to one and must be denied of the other, then the two extremes are not the same, because the same attribute cannot be attributed to and denied of the same thing . Therefore, in the thing there must be a basis for this contradictory predication . There must be a distinction of realities in the thing in order that such predication may be valid. (e) By way of adequation and non-convertibility. This last way also stems from the first. If it is found that two things are the same when compared then they are identical. If, however, it is found that they are not the same, that one is not convertible with the other, then they are not identical. Divine wisdom considered formally is not convertible with divine love formally considered , and this before comparison of the mind. The mind simply recognizes their non -convertibility. Therefore they must be at least formally distinct.200 200 Quintum est distinctio formalitatis et formalitatis. Potest cognosci multiplici via. Potest enim cognosci per viam non identitatis formalis , quoniam impossibile est quod ista quae distinguuntur sicut duae formalitates sint formaliter idem ; potest etiam cognosci per viam alicuius attributionis cum ly per se vel formaliter vel similibus modis . Nam si aliquid ex natura rei attribuatur alicui in quantum tale, quod non attribuitur alteri ex natura rei in quantum tale, oportet ponere inter talia saltem formalem distinctionem . Tertio cognoscitur per viam remotionis, quoniam si quid attribuitur uni in quantum tale, vere removetur ab alio in quantum tale, oportet quod intersit aliqua non-identitas , et ita distinctio saltem formalis ; potest etiam cognosci per viam contradictionis , quoniam impossibile est eidem penitus extra intellectum idem convenire et non convenire ex natura rei , et hoc fundatur supra primum principium ; potest etiam cognosci per viam adae-

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As we explained the above criterion we were careful to insert the qualification "formally considered." The reason is that formal nonidentity is not incompatible with real or essential identity . The interrelations of the various identities and distinctions will be studied below. Here it is sufficient to observe before concluding the discussion of the distinction of formality and formality, that really considered the formalities are identical ; they are the thing. Really considered none of the above criteria are applicable. However, despite this essential identity there are in all things entities which are recognizable through the above criteria as being distinct , not as thing and thing, but nevertheless distinct ex natura rei. An objection can be leveled against these criteria. Not one of the five criteria suffices to set off a distinction of formalities from a distinction of realities. In fact, these criteria could very well apply to any of the greater distinctions : objective , subjective , essential, real. What Peter failed to supply was one distinctive criterion whereby a distinction of formalities might be distinguished from all other distinctions ex natura rei. Also a distinction between an adequate and an inadequate formal distinction, such as Scotus made, would be in place, with a criterion for recognizing each. Scotus describes the adequate distinction secundum quid as that between formalities which are equal in extension , that is, where one extreme does not exceed the other ; the inadequate distinction secundum quid is between extremes one of which exceeds the other.201 Such a distinction would cover for Peter the distinction he must make between the formalities which are infinite per se, the divine attributes, which are adequately distinct secundum quid, and the formalities which are permissively infinite, being and its attributes, which are inadequately distinct secundum quid. It is evident when we consider Peter's formal distinction under its strict meaning that there is a considerable difference between the number of cases of formal distinction which can be gathered from the works of Scotus and the two instances given by Peter. Scotus teaches that there is a formal distinction between being and its transcendental attributes ;202 between the transcendental attributes themselves ;203 between the metaphysical perfections of genus and specific difference ;204 between quationis vel non convertibilitatis ; quaecumque enim extra intellectum sunt penitus eadem inter se sunt eadem et si oppositum, puta quod alicui non sunt eadem nec inter se erunt eadem . Quodl . , Q. VII , f. 85 vb. 201 Cf. Rep. Par., I , d . 33 , q. 2, n. 11 ; 22 , 403 . 202 Oxon., II , d . 16, q . un. , n. 17 ; 13 , 43 . 203 Ibid. 204 Rep. Par., I , d . 12 , q. 8, n. 3 ; 22, 37.

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the powers of the soul ;205 between the soul and its powers ;206 between the divine essence and the divine attributes ;207 between the divine .20 attributes ;208 between the divine persons and the divine essence ;2 9 between the divine persons and their properties ;210 between the common nature and the individual difference.211 A glance at this list reveals that for the most part Peter's distinction of formalities together with his distinction of realities cover Scotus' instances. In other words there is an essential agreement between Scotus and Peter on the doctrine of the formal distinction and its application. The one main difference is that Peter subdivides the formal distinction into what we might designate the formal distinction proper (distinction of formalities) and the formal distinction in a wider sense (distinction of realities) . In Scotus' list there is one instance in particular which Peter does not list under the formal or the real distinction . That is the distinction between the common nature and the individual difference . We find it rather under the essential objective distinction. This is an interesting but puzzling difference.212 The judgment of history within the Formalist movement would seem to be that Peter's distinction between reality and formality was not a happy inspiration . At least , it was not universally adopted by the later Formalists. There is no doubt that the distinction interferes with the unity of the exposition of the formal distinction . Taking the two distinctions together, however, it can be said that his exposition along with his rebuttal of Aureoli's arguments form perhaps not an outstanding but at least a valuable contribution to the doctrine on the formal distinction . 9. DISTINCTION OF FORMALITY AND THING Peter follows up his distinction of formality and formality with a distinction of formality and thing. The extremes have already been defined and specified . “ Formality” is taken in the strict sense of infinite quidditalitates. "Thing" must be taken of the whole reality of the being under consideration . The distinction under discussion is that between

205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212

Oxon., II , d . 16, q . un. , n. 77 ; 13 , 43. Ibid. Oxon., I, d . 8, q. 4, n. 17 ; 9 , 664. Ibid., n. 18 ; 9 , 665. Rep. Par., I, d. 33 , q. 1 , n. 10 ; 22, 395–396. Oxon. , I, d . 34, q. un.; 11 , 532. Oxon., II, d . 3 , q. 6, n. 9 ; 12, 133 . Cf. below, p. 134 .

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one formality and the rest of the reality of the being of which it is a part. Concretely, it refers to the distinction, for example, between the wisdom of God and the total reality or essence of God . Peter does not give a title to this type of distinction . It is simply treated among the distinctions ex natura rei. The usual argument is implied. Judging from the distinct real concepts which we are capable of conceiving, now of one formality, now of the rest of the entity of the being, one must conclude that there is a distinction in the thing ante opus mentis. Peter offers two criteria for recognizing this particular type of distinction.213 We can consider first the way of principle and pertainant, which is the criterion offered above for a distinction of reality and thing. Here, too, the thing may be considered as the principle to which the formality pertains. It is equally evident in this case (for we have seen how little reality and formality differ in their ontological natures) that if there is sufficient reason in the thing to posit a principle and that which pertains to the principle, there must be a distinction ex natura rei between principle and pertainant. A single, simple subject admitting of no distinction before the consideration of the mind could not cause real concepts of principle and pertainant . And if the distinction were produced by the collative power of reason it would be recognized as such . The second way Peter calls the way of inadequation. It is possible for a thing to have several formalities. If we consider one formality as distinct from the thing which includes the rest of the formalities, it is evident that the extremes of such a distinction are unequal in extension. For example, ontological truth is a formality with less extension than being together with its other attributes, etc. The argument implied is that the formality is not equal to the whole thing, as the inadequation clearly shows. Since this inadequation is something which is discovered not produced by the mind, there is a distinction ex natura rei between a formality and the thing to which it pertains. Again, it is by reflection on our real concepts that we arrive at this distinction . But, as Scotus observes, these concepts point to distinct quiddities in the thing.214 In this second criterion there is only a hint of the name which was later given to this distinction, namely, an inadequate formal distinction.215

213 Quodl., 122, 112–119 . 214 Est igitur aliqua non-identitas formalis sapientiae et bonitatis, inquantum earum essent distinctae definitiones, si essent definibiles ; definitio autem non tantum indicat rationem causatam ab intellectu, sed quidditatem rei, ergo non est identitas formalis ex parte rei . Oxon . , I , d . 8, q. 4, n. 18 ; 9, 665. 215 Cf. A. Wolter, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

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10. DISTINCTION OF THING AND INTRINSIC MODE A greatly controverted point of doctrine in the Scotistic School is the question of the type of distinction between an intrinsic mode and the thing it modifies. As might well be suspected , the difficulty is rooted in the fact that Scotus was not at all clear on this point himself. He does not define an intrinsic mode (which is not a great omission, since an intrinsic mode is not properly definable) , nor does he adequately describe it. But he does show a clear awareness of the problem presented, for example, by the intrinsic mode of infinity which somehow must be distinct from the perfection of divine intelligence ; for intelligence. considered in abstraction from the mode is a univocal concept, and intelligence may be found in a finite form in man or angel, but in infinite form in God . The same is true of being and all other simple, univocal perfections. The intrinsic mode must modify and contract the perfection to make it proper, yet this determination cannot be the same as that whereby a specific difference contracts a genus. The former contracts without perfecting, the latter contracts and perfects. Again, mode and perfection, inseparable in actuality , do not induce composition in the entity; but genus and specific difference do form a composite entity. The intrinsic mode, therefore, is not a specific difference. On the other hand, it is not merely an accident since it is inseparable from the perfection, and without it we cannot arrive at a proper concept of the thing. A perfection without a mode gives us only an improper and imperfect concept. This much Scotus has. The intrinsic mode is necessarily bound up with the thing, yet it is not exactly the same as the thing . Is it distinct from the thing ex natura rei? This has been disputed both historically and philosophically. There are those who maintain that Scotus posited a type of formal distinction between mode and reality, others that he posited a distinction of reason with a foundation in the thing; and this is the historical question.216 Philosophically, irrespective of Scotus' position , the Scotists have lined up on either side of the question, some holding one or the other type of distinction ex natura rei, some a virtual distinction.217 After studying the tracts in which Scotus discusses intrinsic modes, one must agree that the doctrine "remains to some extent obscure and incomplete, "218 Peter must have realized this deficiency in Scotus'

216 Cf. Grajewski, op. cit., pp . 81-87. 217 Cf. Wolter, op. cit., p . 24 ; Mastrius, op . cit ., disp . VI , n . 204 , P 292 . 218 Grajewski , op. cit., p. 87.

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treatment, and one can imagine him striving to be specific and definitive where Scotus is vague and incomplete . Question XI of the De modis distinctionis is a rather complete discussion of the nature, kinds, number and distinction of intrinsic modes . He takes an unequivocal stand, and there can be no dispute concerning his meaning. The extremes of this distinction are " things ," taken in the same sense as in the previous distinction, and " intrinsic mode. " Peter, without defining a mode in general, distinguishes between extrinsic and intrinsic modes. Accidents are modes of being ; but they are not strictly modes because they are true beings, though accidental. Considered as modes they are extrinsic modifications of being. Adverbs also are extrinsic modifications and hence modes. And finally there are the modes by means of which modal propositions are formed. None of these will be considered here, but only the essential, intrinsic modes.219 Peter disinguishes the kinds of intrinsic modes according to the beings which they modify.220 Proper to the Uncreated Being and every absolute created being is the intrinsic mode of adseity ; proper to the Uncreated Being and some created beings, substance and perseity ; proper to the Uncreated Being alone, infinity, necessity ; proper to created beings alone, finitude, limitation, possibility ; proper to accidents alone, inesseity ; proper to genus and each supposite contained in it, its own proper mode , e. g. , of substance, perseity ; proper to individuals alone, singularity, and according to some, the grades of intensity and remission.221

Peter shows even more uncertainty about accidental

existence. He cannot decide whether it is a mode or not. However, if it is a mode, then it is a mode proper to the individual.222 219 Unde notandum est quod non intendo loqui de modo qui faciat propositionem modalem, nec de modo accidentali, eo modo quo omnia accidentia dicuntur quidam modi. Huiusmodi enim non sunt pure modi, immo sunt vere res, nec sunt etiam modi intrinseci, sed extrinseci; nec etiam loquor hic de illis modis qui communiter per adverbia importantur, ut bene et maxime. Tales enim modi omnes extrinseci sunt. Tantummodo ego intendo loqui de modo essentiali intrinseco rei , sive de ratione cui attribuitur hic quod importatur per istam circumlocutionem : modus intrinsecus. De modis dist., Q. XI , f. 62гa. 220 Just as intrinsic modes cannot formally be defined, so they cannot formally be distinguished into kinds, because they do not have essential parts as a basis for such a division . As a consequence they can be divided only materially, i. e. , according to the subjects modified . Ibid. 221 Below Peter asserts that it is not the proper nature of an intrinsic mode to be simply a grade of intensity or remission. Despite his hesitation here it would be possible for him to deny that they are formally the same and yet admit that such grades are a type of intrinsic mode. 222 De accidentali existentia, an sit modus, an non, nihil pro nunc. Si tamen dicatur modus , erit modus individui , non speciei nec generis. Ibid., f. 62 ra.

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It is clear that Peter makes no attempt to be exhaustive in his examples. It would not be correct to say that these are the only intrinsic modes which he admits. Robertus Anglicus adds to these examples, virtual quantity, haecceity, reality, existence.223 Other Scotists divided the modes as proper to God (infinity, necessity, eternity, and according to some existence) and proper to creatures (finitude, contingence, act, potency, and existence) .224 With some of these examples Peter would readily agree . Perhaps with others he would have his doubts, as he had about accidental existence. With regard to the number of intrinsic modes in an individual thing, Peter teaches in the first place that one essence can have several intrinsic modes. For example, all created substances have the intrinsic modes of adseity, perseity, finitude, and possibility ; the divine essence has necessity, perseity, etc. Secondly, each reality in a thing has its own proper mode, e . g., the genus and the specific difference have their own proper modes. However, it is also possible for several supposites to have the same modes . Here Peter enters the mystery of the Trinity. The three divine Persons share the same mode of necessity and infinity. It would not be fitting to postulate three necessities or three infinities in the Trinity of Persons.225 Lastly, and somewhat surprisingly, Peter straddles the question of the number of modes in the Divine Essence . Is there a distinct mode for each formally distinct perfection ? Judging from his position on the need of only one infinity for the three Divine Persons we would expect him to answer that one infinite mode suffices for all the formalities in the divine essence . He answers, however, that there are two ways of viewing the matter. According to the one, there is a distinct intrinsic mode of infinity for each formality ; according to the other, one mode of infinity suffices for all the formalities.226 It is possible that Peter's hesitation on this question arises from his devotion to Scotus . The latter distinguishes between extensive and intensive infinity . The divine essence is the primary and efficient cause of the other perfections. The divine essence and the divine perfections are infinite, but not in the same way. The divine essence is extensively 223 Quidditas fundat modum. Quantitas virtutis prius in ordine modi est. Secundus modus haecceitas est ... Realitas tertius modus ... Existentia eiusdem ordinis modus quartus et ultimus . Robertus Anglicus, Dialogus de formalitatibus inter unum Dunsistam et unum Occhamistam , Venice, 1501 , f. 50 vab. 224 Cf. Grajewski , op. cit. , p. 87 . 225 Non sunt enim in tribus personis tres infinitates, nec tres essendi necessitates. De modis dist ., Q. XI , f. 62 va. 226 Ibid.

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and intensively infinite. The perfections are intensively infinite . Furthermore, each perfection, e . g. , goodness, power, etc., has its own entity and its own intrinsic mode of infinity. The infinity of the divine essence is primary and as it were originative of the other modes of infinity, which compared to the infinity of the divine essence are secondary. The infinity of the divine essence is simple infinity, that of the attributes is determined to a specific perfection , e . g. , the infinity of goodness is infinity only in the line of goodness. And so there are as many infinities as there are divine perfections.227 This is the doctrine of Scotus as Peter presents it . Peter's reference to Scotus is vague : in Scripto. However, we are given a lead by Lychetus, who in his commentary on the Quodlibet, repeats the assertion of Peter that according to Scotus each divine perfection has its own intrinsic mode of infinity.228 He cites Oxon . , I , d . 8 , q . 4. But search as we may in that question there can be found no explicit statement of such a doctrine. The most that we can say is that perhaps it can and must be implied from his insistence first of all that each perfection with its mode is a distinct formal object of the intuitive intellect of God, that is, that this perfection and its mode is distinct from that perfection and its mode as it is known by God . Or again, it may be implied from his description of the infinity of wisdom as a degree of that particular perfection and infinity or goodness as a degree of that perfection.229 In other words, in both cases he can be interpreted as considering the perfection and its mode as an inseparable unit , as it were, which is set off against the other perfections and their modes . However, if someone wished to maintain that Peter and Lychetus are reading something unintended into Scotus' words there are not lacking in the same question statements which could be used to argue that Scotus considered infinity to be one mode interpenetrating all the perfections. I will leave Scotus' true position an open question and pass on. The other manner of speaking is presented very briefly by Peter, almost apologetically, and yet it seems to be the opinion which he prefers. There is no difference of infinity and infinity but simply of formal perfections. The attributes differ among themselves and are

227 Ibid., f. 62rb. 228 Lychetus, Commentary on Opera Omnia Duns Scoti, vol. 25 , n . 38, 280. 229 Si infinita sapientia esset formaliter infinita bonitas, et sapientia in communi esset formaliter bonitas in communi ; infinitas enim non destruit formaliter rationem illius cui additur, quia in quocumque gradu intelligatur esse aliqua perfectio , qui tamen gradus est gradus illius perfectionis. Oxon., I, d. 8, q. 4, n. 17 ; 9, 664.

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incompatible with infinite perfections of the same formal nature . This opinion is more in conformity with Peter's opinion that there is only one necessity and one infinity for the three divine Persons. However, as suggested, he seems to leave the matter open out of deference to the opinion of Scotus. Peter's observations on the kind and number of intrinsic modes in God and creatures lead us to the question , what is the nature of an intrinsic mode ? He has ruled out the possibility that it is an accidental modification of a thing. Is it negative or positive ? Is it an attribute of a thing? Peter discusses first what it is not, and then he defines (in so far as possible) and describes in a positive manner the true nature of the intrinsic mode. The explanations given for what an intrinsic mode is not are again at times laconic. But the proposition itself is usually evident enough and does not need explanation.230 His first proposition is, an intrinsic mode is not a second intention . As will be shown, it exists in a thing ex natura rei, and such a real determination existing in a first intention thing cannot be a second intention. It is not the quiddity or a part of the quiddity of a thing. If this were so , everything would be modes or composed of modes, and a mode itself would not be a modification of a quiddity, which is its true nature, but a quiddity . Nor is it formally a reality. There are some realities which definitely are not modes, e . g. , the genus, and hence it cannot be the formal nature of a mode to be a reality. Nor is it a formality. By means of the formality a thing is what it is. But a thing is not formally what it is by means of the intrinsic mode. In a certain sense, however, the intrinsic mode is like to a formality. In so far as the mode is capable of being conceived by means of its own proper concept it has proper formality, because a formality is that which is a formal ratio of the thing.231 But formally the intrinsic mode is not a formality. It is not formally something negative either . Nothing negative can be intrinsic to something positive ; but a mode is intrinsic to something positive. It is not something relative. For again nothing relative is intrinsic to something positive . Since an intrinsic mode is intrinsic to the quiddity of the thing it cannot be relative . Peter of course is speaking of the formal nature of the intrinsic mode . His conclusion does not

230 De modis dist. , Q. XI , ff. 60 vb-61 гra. 231 Modus habet proprium conceptum. Sed omne quod habet proprium conceptum habet formalitatem propriam, quia propriam rationem per se conceptibilem. Ergo . Minor apparet . Per formalitatem enim nihil aliud intelligo ... quam rationem formalem cuiuscumque rei per se conceptibilem. Ibid., f. 62 vb.

9.

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preclude the possibility that an intrinsic mode might imply a relation , as for example inesseity. It is not something absolute; for a similar reason. Nothing absolute belongs intrinsically to the quidditative concept of a thing. It is not formally a degree of intensity or remission. Many modes do not admit of such degrees . But , on the other hand , degrees of intensity are intrinsic modes , or at least are very close to the formal notion of an intrinsic mode.232 He gives special attention to the difference between the degree of intensity of a form and an intrinsic mode . 233 The degree of intensity of a form is a proportion of the form ; but the intrinsic mode is not a proportion of a thing, because it is not the quiddity or a part of the quiddity of a thing. In the degree of any form is included the proper ratio of a form ; but an intrinsic mode does not quidditatively include the thing of which it is a mode. The degree of a form is inclusive of the form and included by the form ; but an intrinsic mode is included by the thing rather than including the thing, because it does not include being quidditatively in its formal ratio . The degree of the form constitutes at least aptitudinally a proper individual ; but an intrinsic mode does not constitute some individual ex se. A form can be posited without any particular degree and can subsist in any of its degrees ; but a thing cannot exist without its proper intrinsic mode. The degree of intensity of a form is acquired by some perfection or activity, that is, mediately ; an intrinsic mode is the product of first or immediate production, the production of the thing of which it is the mode . Certainly, then, the two cannot properly be said to be formally the same. Yet, as mentioned above, it is possible to admit that the degree of intensity is a type of intrinsic mode . Finally, an intrinsic mode is not a quantity or magnitude of perfection. There are many modes , such as possibility, perseity , which do not connote quantity or magnitude . Hence , an intrinsic mode is not formally quantity or magnitude ; though a quantity or magnitude of perfection may be an intrinsic mode, e . g. , finitude , infinity . Positively, Peter asserts first of all that an intrinsic mode is something existing in a thing ex natura rei.234 But , if it is not a reality, nor a formality ; if it is not an accident nor a proper attribute, then there is room for further specification. He offers a quasi-definition which we can use as a basis of investigation of the positive nature of an intrinsic mode. An intrinsic mode is a positive , transcendental thing, which though not a quiddity nor a part of the quiddity , actually exists in a quiddity 232 Ibid., f. 62rb. 233 Ibid., f. 62 va. 234 Ibid., f. 60 vb.

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ex natura rei and intrinsically modifies it.235 Each element of this description bears investigation. First, an intrinsic mode is a positive thing. "Thing" is used in its broadest sense . An intrinsic mode is not a thing or a being in the proper sense. As Peter states , being cannot be predicated in quid of an intrinsic mode.236 It is not a quiddity or a part of a quiddity. Like a reality or a formality it is not res but rei . It is not a negation. Rather it is a positive entity which modifies the quiddity of a thing. In the last analysis, all one can say is that it is a real intrinsic modification of a thing, an intrinsic mode. Secondly, it is transcendental. An intrinsic mode is not restricted to any single genus. Some modes are common to all ten genera, as for instance, finitude.237 And so, though by reduction a mode may be placed under the predicament in which the thing is of which it is a mode, properly it transcends the predicaments.238 Further, an intrinsic mode is not a predicable. Peter has already ruled out the idea that an intrinsic mode is an accident or a property. It is equally clear that if it is not the quiddity nor a part of the quiddity then it is not a species, nor a genus, nor a specific difference.239 Looking back to the kinds of intrinsic modes which Peter lists we see that some modes are proper to the infinite being alone, while others are univocal to both infinite and finite beings. Absolutely speaking, therefore, intrinsic modes are transcendental. Thirdly, an intrinsic mode actually exists in the quiddity ex natura rei . Peter asserts that the intrinsic mode belongs intrinsically to the quiddity of the thing. It is not a part of the quiddity, but it is a modification inseparable in actuality from the quiddity. He presents his argument through a consideration of the essence of an angel. Abstracting from all that does not belong to the quiddity of an angel, one may then ask, is that quiddity or essence infinite or finite ? It is not infinite but finite. Since we have abstracted all that does not belong to the quiddity of the angel but must still predicate of that quiddity that it is finite , finitude must belong intrinsically to the quiddity . But it may be objected that abstracting from all that is not of the quiddity of the angel we must say that the quiddity is neither infinite or finite , but that it will be finite when the intrinsic mode is again added . Peter asks in turn, is this quiddity of the angel of which you now speak a being qua being, or is it a being contracted by some intrinsic mode ? To say that it is immediately contained under being qua being would imply that it is somehow contractible to being qua being without an

235 Ibid., f. 61гa. 238 Ibid., f. 63 va.

236 Ibid. , f. 61 vb. 239 Ibid.; and f. 61гa.

237 Ibid., f. 61гa.

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intrinsic mode , which no one would care to admit. Therefore it must be contracted under finite being.240 A second argument is based on the doctrine that a proper concept of a thing includes the intrinsic mode. If we prescind from the intrinsic mode we conceive the thing only imperfectly and improperly.241 Peter reasons that if we abstract the intrinsic mode from "man" we no longer have a proper and adequate concept of man, and hence the intrinsic mode must belong to the very quiddity of man.242 In another argument he states that it is impossible to conceive some special perfection through a proper concept without the mode of that perfection. Now any being taken precisely according to its quiddity has some essential or quidditative perfection . Therefore, it is impossible to conceive of some thing through a proper concept without its intrinsic mode.243 Or again, comparing intrinsic modes with degrees of intensity of accidental forms, it is impossible to derive a proper concept of an accidental form without its degree of intensity, whence it is concluded that the degree is intrinsic to the form. But intrinsic modes are more intrinsic than degrees of intensity. A degree of intensity is intrinsic simply to the form which it modifies. The intrinsic mode is intrinsic not only to the thing itself but to all that is contained under the thing. His conclusion is that an intrinsic mode belongs to the quiddity of a thing not as an essential part but nevertheless intrinsically and necessarily. He specifies somewhat the function of a mode to set off the difference between a mode and a property. Implicit, of course, is the difference indicated above, namely, that whereas a proper concept of a thing can be had without a property it cannot be had without the intrinsic mode. The difference in function amounts to this, that the property perfects a being; an intrinsic mode does not perfect a being ; it contracts it . The quiddity and mode are related as contractible and contractive . For example, being is contracted by its mode to infinite or finite being. All beings in actuality are contracted to proper modes of being. When being is conceived without modes , being is had in an imperfect and incomplete way. Or, to state it in other terms , 240 Non potest dici quod immediate continetur sub ente ut ens, quia tunc ipsum ens non contraheretur immediate per modos. Ergo continetur sub aliquo ente contracto. Non sub ente infinito, ut patet. Ergo sub ente finito. Ibid. , f. 61 va. 241 Cf. Scotus, Oxon. , I, d . 8, q . 3 , n. 27 ; 9, 626. 242 Impossibile est rem concipi propria conceptione abstractive sine suo modo proprio intrinseco . Dico "conceptione propria" non communi, quia aliud est concipere hominem conceptione propria, puta secundum quod est homo, aliud conceptione communi, puta secundum rationem animalis, corporis, substantiae . De modis dist. , Q. XI , f. 61 va. 243 Ibid.

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being as such is indifferent in itself, and hence is determinable or contractible. It is determined or contracted by the intrinsic modes. The determination or contraction of the modes is such, however, that the formal ratio of the being is not varied. The formal ratio of infinite being is the same as the formal ratio of finite being, although the actual beings are completely, absolutely and infinitely diverse.244 Peter expresses the relationship of the mode to the quiddity in another way. The intrinsic mode is identical with the quiddity in the first mode of perseity. The modes of perseity were distinguished above. Since the intrinsic mode is more intimately united to the quiddity than proper attributes, which belong to the second mode of perseity , Peter includes the modes under the first mode. In so doing he goes beyond the degrees of the first mode posited by Aristotle. Peter suggests that the reason Aristotle omitted mention of the modes under the first mode of perseity is that he was interested simply in the more evident forms and especially in those which are useful for demonstration . The modes are less evident and are not required for demonstration.245 He makes the modes, then, essentially identical with the thing. By reason of its identity in the first mode of perseity it can be said to be not only essentially but in a sense formally identical with the thing. He qualifies his statement about formal identity (saltem aliqualiter) because of the distinction he will posit later. However, in so far as the mode does not have its own formality properly speaking, it is formally identical with the formal ratio which it qualifies.246 The emphasis thus far has been upon the intimate connection between the quiddity and the intrinsic mode . They are really identical in the first mode of perseity, actually inseparable by any power in actuality, and the quiddity cannot properly be conceived without conceiving also the mode. By way of preparation for the distinction which nevertheless must

be posited between the two we must mention a doctrine held by Peter which Scotus apparently does not mention but implicitly denies and which the later Scotists explicitly deny. Peter maintained that the intrinsic modes are capable of being comprehended by their own proper concepts. Later Scotists held that intrinsic modes cannot be conceived without conceiving the subject in which they inhere ; "finite " cannot be conceived without conceiving the being in which it inheres.247 244 Ibid., ff. 61rb-61 va. 245 Ibid., f. 63 va . 246 Ibid., f. 61 vb. 247 Modus autem nullatenus potest quidditative concipi sine re, cuius est modus. Mastrius, op . cit. , disp. II , q. 6, a. 1 , n. 150, p . 69.

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of the mode as a contracting element . That which is a contracting note can be conceived without the term of the contraction, because it is prior to that which is contracted . But what is prior can be conceived without that which is posterior.248 In a second argument he uses a line of reasoning which Scotists have followed in arguing for the univocity of being. Peter insists that if we have a concept about which we are certain and another about which we are uncertain, the one concept can be had without the other. He maintains that we can be certain of the finitude of something without being certain of the being itself. Or more evidently, we can be certain of the infinity of the divine essence without having a proper, simple concept of the divine essence . Therefore it is possible to have a concept of a mode without a concept of the subject of which it is a mode. The later Scotists obviously would ask, is the concept of the mode in this case a proper concept ? Does the concept of the mode prescind entirely from the concept of the subject. They would deny that it does.249 And this would appear to be the implied doctrine of Scotus. He compares the concepts we have of genus and specific difference with the concept we have of a subject and its intrinsic mode. In the first case we are presented with two formal objects of the mind capable of terminating two distinct and proper concepts. In the latter case we cannot have a proper concept of a reality without its intrinsic mode . Though he does not go on to state that in like manner we cannot have a proper concept of an intrinsic mode without conceiving the reality it modifies, it would seem to be an obvious conclusion, even though the mode does not enter into the concept of being in the same manner that being enters into the concept of the mode.250 Peter himself teaches that one cannot have a proper concept of a reality without including the intrinsic mode.251 It is somewhat puzzling, then, how he can argue that one can have a proper concept of an intrinsic mode apart from the reality it modifies . Since Peter returns to the same subject in a later context, we will investigate in that place the seeming inconsistency into which he appears to lapse.

248 Illud quod est ratio contrahendi potest concipi non concepto termino contractionis, cum sit prius eo, et prius in suo priori sine posteriori potest concipi. De modis dist. , Q. XI , f. 61 va. Later Scotists disagreed with Peter on this point. For them the mode is posterior to the quiddity. Cf. Mastrius , op. cit., loc. cit. , n. 151 . 249 Cf. above, p. 125 . 250 Cf. Oxon., I, d. 8, q. 3 , n. 27 ; 9, 627. 251 Cf. above, p. 124 .

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The extremes of this distinction , as emerges from the above, are real things (taking “thing” in its meaning of quiddities or real objects) and intrinsic modes. These modes are positive, transcendental modifications of the quiddity, belonging intrinsically to the quiddity and predicable of the quiddity in the first mode of perseity but in the last degree ; they are essentially and in a sense formally identical with the quiddity ; but they are also distinct from the quiddity in a certain real manner and capable of being conceived abstractly without the quiddity. They are called modes because it is their function to modify or contract the quiddity to a determined manner of being ; they are called intrinsic, because they are essentially identical with the quiddity, inseparable in actuality from it, so that the quiddity cannot be properly conceived without conceiving at the same time the intrinsic modes. We can now take up the criteria whereby the distinction ex natura rei between a quiddity and its intrinsic modes may be recognized. In the Quodlibet Peter presents one criterion of this distinction in the following terms : Septimum est quod distinctio rei et eius modi intrinseci potest cognosci per viam determinativi et modificativi, seu per viam intensi[vi] et per gradum intensionis ; nam, ipse modus intrinsecus, licet non sit idem penitus quod gradus, tamen magnam affinitatem habet in ipso, ut post dicetur.252 Though it would appear that he intends to present one criterion, perhaps it would be better to consider the statement as expressing two. Whether considered as one or two, we are given just a hint and must expand the criteria for ourselves. The first criterion would be by way of modification and modified . Where there is found a subject extrinsically modified, as for example by means of an accidental form , there is most evidently a distinction of essence and essence, since the subject and accidental modification are distinct supposites. But even where there is found a subject intrinsically modified , there is evidence of a distinction ex nature rei. We may borrow for our argument Peter's contention that where it is possible to have two concepts concerning one of which we are certain and concerning the other we are uncertain, it is evident that there must be some distinction between these concepts . Further, if these are real concepts, that is, concepts produced in the mind by reality and not produced by the mind's collative activity, then there is a distinction. on the part of the thing. It is possible to be certain about the subject and doubtful about the modification or vice versa ; and we have real

252 Quodl. , 122, 12—124.

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concepts of the one and the other ; hence when we encounter real concepts of modified and modifier we are able to recognize a case of a particular type of distinction ex natura rei. The second criterion is by way of degree of intensity of perfection . As Peter pointed out, degrees of intensity are intrinsic modes but formally speaking intrinsic modes are not degrees of intensity. However, there is a close and useful resemblance . Where a perfection (a quiddity , a reality, a formality) is found to be contracted to a certain mode of being, and especially where the same univocal type of perfection is found contracted to different modes of being, there is evidence of a distinction between the perfection and that which contracts it . We may argue again from the separate conceivability of the perfection and of the contracting element. Or we can argue from the fact that the perfection is quidditative and the degree or mode of being is qualitative . As such they will admit of diverse predications . And this is an indication of non- identity or of distinction ex natura rei. Hence, where one encounters a perfection contracted to a determinate type of being, e. g. , being contracted to infinite and finite, a se and ab alio, we have an indication of a distinction ex natura rei. This second criterion because of its analogous use of degree of intensity would not seem as adequate as the first. Peter presents a concatenation of arguments in proof of his thesis that an intrinsic mode is not entirely the same ex natura rei as the thing it modifies. In the first place, where things are entirely the same ex natura rei, what is proper to one thing will be proper to the other ex natura rei. But if the thing and the mode were entirely the same, a thing would be a mode and a mode a thing, and all that is true of a thing would be true of a mode and vice versa. But such a conclusion cannot be accepted. Further, and also in proof of the foregoing, where the proper notions of things are not entirely the same ex natura rei , the things will be found to be not entirely the same ex natura rei. But the proper notions of thing and intrinsic mode are not the same . The proper notion of the thing is quidditative, but of the intrinsic mode , qualitative. Again, where things are quidditatively the same, whatever includes one quidditatively, includes quidditatively the other also . But though being includes res quidditatively, it does not quidditatively include the mode. In other words, ens is predicable of a thing in quid, but not of the modes. "Thing" here is considered as some proper individual and as such is an inferior of "being." From the same point of view, where things are totally and quidditatively the same, both are subjective parts of that being . It is true to say that a concrete thing in the real order is a subjective part of

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being, but a mode is not. In fact if a mode were a subjective part of being a mode would not be a mode at all. There are other indications that the thing and its modes are not quidditatively the same. That which is not adequately the same as another is not wholly the same as that other. But the intrinsic mode is not adequately the same as the thing. As we have seen above, the mode is the contracting element and thing that which is contracted . The contracting element is not adequately the same as the product or union of the contracting and the contractible. The same lack of adequacy is apparent in the fact that one thing can and usually does have several modes. One intrinsic mode can hardly therefore be adequately the same as the whole thing. Peter's last argument brings us back to the question of the possibility of conceiving the intrinsic mode with a proper concept . Peter argues that where things are formally the same in every way, one cannot be conceived in a proper and formal concept without the other. But an intrinsic mode can be conceived in its own proper and quidditative concept without conceiving the thing which it modifies . It would have been sufficient to prove his point if Peter had argued simply that the mode is conceivable without the being it modifies, even if only by an imperfect concept. But it is evident from his insistence that Peter definitely thought that the intrinsic mode was conceivable in a proper and quidditative concept. We have argued above from the parallel case of the impossibility of conceiving a thing without its mode in a proper concept that an intrinsic mode would seem to labor under the same impossibility. They are not entirely parallel cases , it is true. The intrinsic mode enters the concept of the thing as a real modification establishing the thing in its proper status of being. The thing enters the concept of the intrinsic mode as the scholastics said sicut additum, i. e. , the subject is brought into the quasi definition of the mode by way of addition and not as part of the quiddity, because a mode does not have a quiddity.253 Yet it would certainly seem that the intrinsic mode is less intelligible without its subject than a subject without its mode . In fact, however, Peter holds the opposite. Where even more of an inconsistency seems to occur is that Peter says in the present context that the concept of the intrinsic mode is 253 The scholastics , who based their doctrine on the thought of Aristotle, spoke in this way actually about the attributes of being. But the intrinsic modes certainly resemble the attributes in that they are qualia, simpliciter simplex, and incapable of definition because they do not have an essence . Cf. Wolter, op. cit. , pp. 88-89.

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quidditative, while above he said that it was qualitative. It is evident that when he maintains that the concept is not quidditative in the prior text he is using "quidditative" in its strict sense ; his argument is that, since an intrinsic mode is not a part of the quiddity, it cannot have a quidditative concept. In the present context it is possible that Peter is taking "quidditative" in its broader meaning of that which belongs to the quiddity after the manner of the attributes . If so, then he is using terms analogously again without sufficient explanation . The value of the above concatenation of arguments is greater when

taken as a cumulative whole . A weak point appears here and there, but not to such an extent as to vitiate the worth and the force of the whole . An intrinsic mode, then , is distinct ex natura rei from the thing which it modifies.254 It is of a particular interest to note that Peter calls this distinction a type of formal distinction . Scotus had left the question of the extent 254 Sextum est quod modus intrinsecus non est idem penitus ex natura rei cum ipsa re. Hoc ostenditur sic : quaecumque sunt penitus idem ex natura rei, quidquid uni convenit ex natura rei convenit alteri ex natura rei . Sed si modus intrinsecus et res sint penitus idem ex natura rei, ergo sicut res est res et modus est modus, ita modus est res et res, modus. Conclusio falsa ; ergo altera praemissorum. Non maior, ergo minor. Item : quorum rationes propriae non sunt idem penitus ex natura rei , illa non sunt idem penitus ex natura rei . Sed propriae rationes rei et modi intrinseci non sunt idem penitus ex natura rei ; ergo . Maior patet, quia propria ratio est qualitativa, propria ratio rei est quidditativa [V adds : ratio autem quidditativa et ratio qualitativa non videtur penitus idem ex natura rei] , et ita ex natura rei non videtur penitus idem. Item : illa quae sunt quidditative idem omnibus modis, quidquid quidditative includit unum, [includit] et alterum. Sed res includit aliquid [V : ens] quidditative, quod non includit modus ipse ; ergo . Maior est evidens. Minor patet, quia utrumque ens contrahitur per differentias vel per modos [V : modus autem intrinsecus ipsum non includit ut patuit in ista quaestione utrum ens contrahitur per differentias vel per modos] . Confirmatur quia quae sunt idem quidditative totaliter, cuiuscumque unum est pars subiectiva, [est] et alterum. Sed res est pars subiectiva entis, modus autem non ; ergo, etc. Maior patet, quia quorum est eadem quidditas, omnia essentialiter [V : equaliter]` subiciuntur cuiusdam [ V : eisdem] superioribus. Minor patet, quia ens non praedicatur in quid de modo, ut patet in alia quaestione, septima de ente. Item: si modus esset pars subiectiva entis, modus non esset modus, sed res. Item : quod non est rei quidditas nec pars quidditatis, non est idem penitus quidditative cum re . Sed modus intrinsecus non est rei quidditas, nec pars quidditatis, ut supra ostensum est ; ergo . Item : illius quod non est idem [V adds : alicui ] adaequate, non est totaliter idem sibi . Minor probatur, quia quod est ratio contrahendi , non est adaequate idem cum illo quod ex contrahibili et contracto [ V : contractivo ] resultat. Sed modus intrinsecus est ratio contrahendi ; ergo, etc. Item : in una re possunt esse plures modi, ut infra dicetur. Item : quae sunt omnibus modis idem formaliter, unum non potest concipi proprio conceptu et formali , alio non conceptu . Sed modus intrinsecus potest concipi proprio conceptu et quidditativo, non concepta re cuius est; ergo, etc. De modis dist. , Q. XI , f. 61 vb, with corrections and additions from the Vienna ms. , ff. 64 vb- 65 ra. Neither text is satisfactory alone.

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of the distinction somewhat vague. Peter is explicit . It is a formal distinction because the intrinsic mode is not formally the same as the thing. But it is not formally distinct to the extent that formalities , realities, and things are formally distinct . The thing cannot be properly conceived without the mode, so there is some overlapping of concepts . And yet it must be said that the formal ratio of the thing is different from the formal ratio of the intrinsic mode . Therefore to a certain extent the distinction is formal.2255 Obviously, however, the distinction , since it is not in the strict sense

formal , is less than a formal distinction . The intrinsic mode belongs to the quiddity of the thing per se primo modo, whereas it is a major characteristic of the formal distinction that one extreme does not belong per se primo modo to the other . This results in a seeming contradiction , that the extremes of this distinction are formally the same and yet at the same time formally not the same . It is only a seeming contradiction , however . They are not the same and different under exactly the same aspect . They are formally the same in that one, the intrinsic mode , is in the other per se primo modo and pertains intrinsically to its quiddity . They are formally distinct in that one is not the same adequately as the other, as shown above ; also because one includes in its formal ratio something not included in the formal ratio of the other.256 Because these formal notions are real and objective , according to the Scotistic principle - a distinction which a distinction on the part of the thing is involved ing of the nature of a formal Peter calls less than formal but partak on l ts called it a moda distinction , while Mastrius distincti . Later Scotis preferred to call it a negatively formal distinction.257 There is an omission in Peter's treatment of the modes which causes one to speculate . Peter distinguished reality and reality, then reality and thing ; he distinguished formality and formality , then formality and thing . Why did he not include a distinction of mode and mode in his consideration of the kinds of distinction ? In the Quodlibet there is simply no mention of such a distinction . In De modis distinctionis he notes that one aspect among others under which modes may be considered is the relationship of one mode to another, especially of disparate and opposed modes. He offers some interesting conclusions . There is a greater distinction between opposed modes than between things or essences and their modes . The former are diverse , the latter are different ; and diversity is the basis for a greater distinction than difference . Again , 256 Ibid. , f. 63гb . 255 Ibid. , ff. 63гb , 63 vb. 257 Cf. Mastrius , op. cit., n . 150, p . 69.

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opposed modes are more distinct than disparate modes, since opposite extremes are more distinct than disparate.258 But he does not enter into the question of the nature of this distinction. One possibility why he avoided the subject is that an embarassing conclusion faced him. If he actually wished to teach that it is possible to conceive of an intrinsic mode by means of a proper concept, then according to his own principles he would have to posit a formal distinction or at least a distinction of realities between the modes. The concept of the intrinsic mode of finiteness, e. g., of the whiteness in this paper, would be totally other than the concept of its accompanying mode of inesseity ; nor would it be possible that finiteness be predicated per se primo modo of inesseity. Hence , the distinction would have all the marks of a distinction of realities and formalities. Obviously Peter would not want to be forced to such a conclusion. Whether one agrees with all the conclusions which Peter proposes in his treatment of the modes and the distinction which exists between a mode and the thing it modifies, one must admit that he has made his position clear beyond doubt . He has probed intelligently into the nature of the intrinsic mode. And actually this particular question is one of the more systematic sections of his later work, resembling the thoroughness and care of the De ente.

11. DIVISION OF DISTINCTION IN DE DISTINCTIONE PRAEDICAMENTORUM According to our tentative conclusions at the outset, the order of Peter's works with which we are concerned is : De ente, De modis distinctionis, De distinctione praedicamentorum, Quodlibet. This creates an interesting situation as regards the two methods of dividing distinctions . The method expounded above occurs in De modis distinctionis ; it is alluded to in part in De distinctione praedicamentorum ; and it is re-stated in the Quodlibet. The second method is used throughout the De modis distinctionis but unsystematically ; it is explicitly expounded in De distinctione praedicamentorum, and still taken into account in the Quodlibet. Yet Peter does not attempt to reconcile the two approaches. After a brief study of the division according to the De distinctione praedicamentorum we can inquire into the extent of actual correspondence between the two approaches.

258 De modis dist., Q. XI , f. 63гa.

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The fundamental division in De distinctione praedicamentorum as in the Quodlibet is into the distinction of reason and the distinction ex natura rei. The first he describes as any distinction formed by the possible intellect or another comparative power, such as the will or imagination.259 No sub-division into pure and non-pure is introduced in this work. The distinction ex natura rei is described as that which depends entirely on the proper notions of the terms and not upon the act of some collative power of the intellect, as for instance , the distinction between a stone and a man.260 Therefore any distinction which exists before the comparative act of the intellect and is apprehensible as such. is a distinction on the part of the thing.261 A three-fold subdivision is suggested . The distinction ex natura rei is either formal, real, or essential. The formal distinction exists between extremes which when ultimately abstracted are mutually exclusive quidditatively.262 The real distinction exists between extremes which are formally something positive, mutually exclusive when ultimately abstracted, and incapable of being predicated of the others identically or formally. The essential distinction is described as existing between extremes which either do not essentially depend on each other, or are able to exist even though the other is corrupted or destroyed , or finally, if one can be posited in actual existence without the other.263 This essential distinction is subdivided into subjective and objective . Subjectively distinct

extremes are numerically distinct

individuals.264

Objectively distinct extremes do not agree in some reality or quidditative notion, or from them no single real concept of first intention can be abstracted, as for instance ultimate differences, or those things which have a quidditative and qualitative concept , as ens and bonum.265 It is immediately apparent that the only new additions are the subdivisions of the essential distinction . For the rest , the formal real, and essential distinctions would seem to correspond to the distinctions of formalities, realities, and essences of the Quodlibet. We can raise the question , then, how are these two divisions of distinctions related ? Peter says that all other types of distinction can

262 Ibid. , f. 30vb . 259 De dist. praed., f. 30vb. 260 Ibid. 263 Ibid., f. 31rb. 264 Ibid. 261 Ibid. , f. 31rb . 265 Illa distinguuntur se totis obiective quae non conveniunt in aliqua una realitate seu ratione quidditativa, vel quibus non potest aliquis conceptus abstrahi unicus realis seu primae intentionis, sicut sunt differentiae formales seu individuales, et illa quae habent conceptum quidditativum et qualitativum, sicut ens et bonum. Ibid.

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be reduced to the seven-fold division of the Quodlibet.266 But in practice he tends in the other direction. For example, in Q. VII of De modis distinctionis, except when he wishes to make precisions, he uses the more general term, formal distinction , in place of distinction of formality and formality, or of formality and thing. Similarly, he uses the term real distinction to cover the distinction of reality and reality,267 of res and res,268 and of reality and thing.269 However, in these same questions he uses the other terminology when he wants to be specific. Finally, we note that when Peter seeks to categorize the distinction of intrinsic mode and its subject he places it under the formal distinction, with due qualifications.270 Hence, in practice, it was Peter's custom to reduce the Quodlibet division to the division of De distinctione praedicamentorum, at least in a general way. The subdivision of the essential distinction is not used outside of De distinctione praedicamentorum. It can be said in general that when Peter speaks of an essential distinction he refers to the subjective distinction.271 This distinction does not require much explanation . Evidently Peter calls it the subjective distinction from the fact that it involves a distinction between essences having their own esse subjectivum.272 In Part III we will enter a little more fully into this distinction as it applies to the categories. The objective distinction as Peter defines it presents somewhat of a problem. Taking the definition as it stands, and taking the example offered, it is not immediately evident why or how this distinction is set down as a subdivision of the essential distinction. Ens and bonum , the haecceity of Peter and the haecceity of Paul are objectively distinct according to the definition. But they are not essentially distinct , at least if they are considered in themselves as distinct without reference to their subjects . However, since Peter makes the objective distinction 266 Quodl. , 120, 58-60. 267 Genus et differentia differunt realiter. De modis dist. , Q. II , f. 43 vb. 268 Tres enim personae distinguuntur realiter sicut res et res, non tamen essentialiter sicut essentia et essentia. Ibid., Q. VII , f. 52 va. 269 The example of the distinction of the soul and its powers is given for a real distinction in De dist. praed., f. 31rb. N. B. Since " real distinction" in these cases excludes the essential and the formal distinction, this is not that general use of real distinction which is synonymous with distinction ex natura rei. 270 De modis dist. , Q. XI, f. 63rb. 271 Cf. for example : Distinctio essentialis est quando aliqua distinguuntur ab invicem actuali existentia. Ibid. , Q. II , f. 41vb. 272 Illa distinguuntur se totis subiective vel secundum esse subiectivum. De dist. praed. , f. 31rb.

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a type of essential distinction, and since, as the rule of coincidence tells us, whatever is objectively distinct is also subjectively, essentially, etc., distinct, it would appear that these primarily diverse extremes which are objectively distinct are presumed to exist in numerically distinct individuals . Peter and Paul, numerically distinct essences, are also objectively distinct because they contain certain real perfections which are so diverse that they contain no element in common, namely, their individual and entirely unique differences. For the same reason they are objectively distinct if we consider the quidditative note of being in Peter and the qualitative note of goodness in Paul - I which is a far-fetched manner of comparing Peter and Paul. The objective distinction as the later Scotists understood it evidently lost its connection with the essential distinction. Such a distinction was postulated between extremes of which no quidditative notion could be commonly predicated . For example, being can be predicated in quid of a thing but not of its individuating difference ; therefore thing and individuating difference are objectively distinct.273 One might question the need of making such a distinction a separate kind ; but one can readily see that it is at least a distinct degree, a unique instance, of a distinction ex natura rei. In our effort to trace the correlation of the approaches to the division of the distinction ex natura rei we have succeeded in reaching an allignment at least tentatively according to the following scheme :

DISTINCTIO De Distinctione praedicamentorum

Quodlibet

rationis

dependens ab actu potentiae collativae (rationis )

ex natura rei

non dependens ab actu potentiae collativae (realis)

formalis

formalitatis et formalitatis

formalitatis et rei modi intrinseci et rei

273 Illa sunt idem obiective de quibus potest praedicari aliquod praedicatum quidditative sive illud sit limitatum sive transcendens sive dicat realitatem potentialem sive non . Et illa distinguuntur se totis obiective de quibus non potest praedicari tale praedicatum quidditative . Antonius Sirectus, op. cit., a. 2, ad 7, f. r 5b. 10 Bridges : Identity and Distinction

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realitatis et realitatis

realis

realitatis et rei rei et rei essentialis

subjectivae

essentiae et essentiae

obiectivae

(ultimae differentiae ; ens et bonum)

Studying the two divisions in their contexts , one must conclude that Peter did not intend that one should supplant the other. The division of the De distinctione praedicamentorum he evidently found the more convenient for terminology . The division in the Quodlibet he apparently found more precise, especially in view of the distinction between essentia and res, formalitas and realitas which he wished to preserve. Simply from a systematic point of view, and without entering into a discussion. of the worth of Peter's distinction between these terms, we must conclude that Peter would have added considerable clarity to his treatment of distinctions if he had correlated more carefully his double division of the distinction ex natura rei. 12. SCOTUS' DIVISION OF DISTINCTION It might help to locate Peter in the Franciscan tradition if we review the division of distinction which Scotus makes. Since this subject has been adequately treated in other works it will not be necessary to enter into detail.274 Scotus distinguishes first of all distinctions which exist before the act of the intellect and those which occur after. The first is sometimes called in general a real distinction,275 sometimes a distinction ex natura rei.276 The second is called the distinction of reason.277 The distinction of reason is subdivided into the distinction of reason simply or properly speaking and the distinction of intention.278 The

274 Cf. Grajewski, op. cit. , c . IV, pp. 39—66 ; Van de Woestyne, op. cit. PP. 257-277. 275 et intelligo sic ' realiter, ' quod nullo modo per actum intellectus considerantis . Ordinatio, I , d . 2 , pars 2 , q . 1-4, n. 390 ; 2, 350. 276 ex natura rei ante omnem actum intellectus negotiativi. Oxon., I, d. n . 11 ; 9 , 652-653 . 2778, q. 4, differentia rationis . Ibid. , n . 17, 664. 278 Differentia ergo rationis stricte loquendo est differentia posterior naturaliter actu intellectus possibilis, considerantis idem objectum sub alia et alia ratione . Meta . , VII , q . 19 , n. 6 ; 7, 466. Differentia intentionis , quae nullam differentiam nec compositionem actu ponit in re, sed tantum potentialem, sic quod ipsa nata est facere diversos conceptus in intellectu de se. Ita quod differentia actu est in intellectu concipiente. Ibid. , n. 4, 465.

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latter is, as Scotus says, a greater distinction . It is a distinction made by the mind, but it is based on things outside the mind. But it would appear that Scotus after making the distinction rejects the second kind.279 The real distinction or distinction ex natura rei has two subdivisions. There is the real distinction simpliciter and the real distinction secundum quid. There are four conditions for a real distinction simpliciter: the extremes must be actually existing and not simply in potency ; they must have formal and not virtual existence ; they must be distinct by their proper actualities and not confusedly existing ; they must have non-identity, i. e. , they must be diverse. A real distinction secundum quid exists between extremes which fulfil the first three conditions but not the fourth.280 The distinction secundum quid again is subdivided according to the kind of non-identity involved . In the first place Scotus distinguishes adequate non-identity. We are now familiar with the notion of adequate and non-adequate identity and distinction . Scotus nicely defines inadequate identity as the identity between things , "one of which exceeds the other, or the unity of one exceeds the unity of the other. "281 It should be noted that there are two facets to such a situation. We can say that the extremes are inadequately identical, and that they are inadequately distinct . This arises from the fact the extremes have something in common by which they are identical and something different by which they are distinct. As a consequence such identity and distinction will always exist between different not diverse things, and always between inadequate extremes .282 Scotus points out three ways in which one extreme may exceed the other: according to predication, according to power and perfection , and 279 Ita ponit quadruplicem differentiam, duplicem realem rerum, et rationum realium, et duplicem rationis scilicet intentionis, et rationis stricte sumptam, quod si differentia intentionis non requirat differentiam rationum realium in actu , sed sufficiat quod in potentia sit in re, et in actu in intellectu in esse primo, ut prius expositum est ; qui potest capere capiat. Meta . , VII, q. 19, n. 10 ; 9, 470. (Emphasis added .) 280 Rep. Par., I , d . 33 , q . 2 , n . 9 ; 22 , 402 ; n . 10, 403 . 281 Ibid., 404 . 282 In view of these observations , I wonder if Scotus expresses himself properly when he calls this first type of distinction secundum quid "nonidentitas adaequata. " It is not adequate non-identity, nor do any of his examples have adequate extremes . On the other hand, the extremes of the formal distinction are almost always adequate. " Non-identitas adaequata” would more properly describe a formal distinction . But we will use his terminology, keeping in mind that there is sufficient reason for this two-fold division of distinction secundum quid in the very fact that the one is a distinction of extremes inadequately distinct and the other of extremes adequately distinct.

10°

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according to ratio of identity. In the first way, for example, man is more extensively predicable than animal. Similarly, in the second way, man has greater power and perfection than animal. In the third way, the divine essence exceeds the relative properties.283 All of these are instances of adequate non-identity, the first mode of the secundum quid real distinction . The second subdivision of distinction secundum quid is formal nonidentity. And this is the formal distinction. It is a distinction between realities which are not formally the same ; the concept of one does not include the concept of the other.284 We have listed the instances of the formal distinction above. There is one last kind of distinction ex natura rei . Scotus does not give it a name nor does he devote much attention to it. It is the distinction between an intrinsic mode and a thing or a reality.285 It is a distinction ex natura rei because Scotus says it is a distinction in re. But it is not a formal distinction, because an intrinsic mode is not a formality. Nor would it fit properly under adequate non-identity. It has nothing at least in quid in common with the thing or reality it modifies. The subject enters into definition only sicut additum (or ἔκ προσθέσεως, as Aristotle puts it) . This distinction would seem to belong properly, therefore, below a formal distinction ; it is less than a formal distinction.286 We can put the division of distinction according to Scotus in the following diagram : DISTINCTION

Of reason

Simple of intention(?)

Simple Real

Secundum Quid

adequate non- identity formal non-identity (modal)

It has already been noted that among the later Scotists there is found the seven-fold division : of reason , ex natura rei , formal, real, 283 Cf. Grajewski, op . cit., pp . 62-63 . It would seem that Peter retains this particular type of distinction only implicitly if at all. As a consequence his division of distinctions in De distinctione praedicamentorum fails to cover the instances adduced here by Scotus. 284 Quodlibet ... potest distingui, quantumcumque sit una res, in plures realitates, formaliter distinctas, quarum haec formaliter non est illa. Oxon., II, d. 3 , q. 6, n. 15 ; 12 , 144. 285 distinctio in re sicut realitas et sui modi intrinseci . Oxon. , I , d . 8, 286 Cf. Wolter, op. cit. , pp. 24—27 . q. 3, n. 27; 9, 627.

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essential, subjective, and objective. Adequate and inadequate also are a common division applied to some of these distinctions. Some mention a modal distinction. Stephan Brulifer and Mastrius criticized these Scotists for multiplying distinctions.287 It would appear that Peter was in the vanguard of these later Scotists. His distinctions between essence and thing and between formality and reality began the increase of distinctions . But the critical spirit that censures Peter for contributing to the multiplication of entities and distinctions must also recognize the inherent value of some of his contributions to scholarship, as for example, his study of the distinction of reason, his analysis of the intrinsic mode , and his vigorous rebuttal of the objections of Aureoli to the formal distinction.

287 Cf. Mastrius, op. cit. , disp. VI, q. 7, a. 3, 277-280.

Part III CORRELATIONS OF IDENTITY AND DISTINCTION It is not proper in such a study as this to impose a system where none exists . And yet to make a fruitful study one must introduce some order, some convenient and practical arrangement . In the foregoing, we have chosen to study identity and distinction separately, yet as much as possible it has been Peter's own development that has been followed. At times it was necessary to anticipate, but for the most part the relations of the various kinds of identity and distinction have been reserved for this third part. To understand any relationship it is necessary to understand the related terms and the foundation they contain. This much should be clear by now, at least in so far as Peter has succeeded in making himself clear and in so far as I have succeeded in transmitting and perhaps elucidating his doctrine. Peter's propositions concerning the relations of identities and distinctions are scattered and not fully developed . But as these statements are ordered it readily becomes apparent how it would have been possible for Peter to construct a systematic body of conclusions on this subject similar to the conclusions he drew up on identity in God.¹ Unfortunately he did not undertake the task. The order followed will be to gather together first the conclusions regarding the relations existing between the various kinds of identity, then the conclusions about the various kinds of distinction , and finally the conclusions concerning the interrelation of the kinds of identity with the kinds of distinction. As an exemplification of many of the propositions here set down a study of Peter's work on the distinction of the categories will follow. This work is the first and until recently the only part of Peter's philosophical works that has been published. A.

PROPOSITIONS

ON

THE CORRELATION OF IDENTITY

AND DISTINCTION

1. Relations of Kinds of Identity The greater the unity the greater the identity. Unity is the basis of identity ; we might say, it is almost identical with identity. The per-

1 Cf. above, p . 39f. 2 Quanto fundamentum identitatis est perfectius, tanto ipsa identitas

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fection of identity will depend on the perfection of the unity. And just as there is a hierarchy of unities so there will be a hierarchy of identities. This means not only that there will be different kinds of identity (and so Peter divides identity according to the kinds of unity) but also that within a given kind there will be degrees. Thus Peter attributes to God the highest degree of essential identity ; among creatures angels enjoy a higher degree of essential identity because they have a higher degree of unity of essence ; and so down through the hierarchy of creatures. The greater the simplicity of the essence the greater the unity, and hence the greater the degree of essential identity. Presumably Peter would admit of degrees in formal identity also, again on the basis of the degrees of unity. In his study of the beings of all reality, therefore , Peter has as one of his main ways to the understanding of the nature of those beings the leading question : what kinds and degrees of unity do they manifest ? From here he proceeds to establish the type and degree of identity existing between the unified elements of the being. Obviously from his approach Peter considers identity to be very closely allied to , yet not the same as, unity. But he does not attempt to state the precise relationship between the two. Essential identity is the highest type ofidentity. The reasons for considering essential identity the highest or noblest have already been given in Part I, where identical and formal identity were compared so as to bring out more fully the nature of both . Briefly, Peter considers essential or identical identity to be the ultimate type, that type which alone can exist without any other. Formal identity always presupposes identical identity and cannot exist without it . It is the highest also because it is found in the highest Being, and can exist there even when formal identity cannot, as for example between the divine essence and the divine Persons.4 Essential identity is identity simpliciter. Identical identity is not conditioned upon any other type of identity. Further, no thing can be said simply to be the same or identical if it does not have identical identity. The identity of the essence is the fundamental type of identity; it is identity absolutely speaking.5 Formal identity and any other type is identity secundum quid. The meaning of secundum quid here is "according to some determination. " est perfectior ; et ideo, cum unitas divinae essentiae sit summa, et eiusdem per consequens identitas summa est . Quodl. , 114, 882-884. Cf. above, p. 20 , and Quodl. , 114, 846-847. 4 Ibid., 93, 196-210 ; 94, 227-230. 5 Ibid.; De modis dist., Q. VI, f. 51vb.

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Since formal identity is identity according to some determined reason , it is identity secundum quid. But once again he leaves us suspended without explanation of his phrase "according to some determined reason." One would be inclined to conclude that he means that since formal identity cannot exist without identical identity , it is as it were conditioned and therefore not simple identity. But this is given as a secondary argument for the same conclusion. The primary reason is left implicit ; and it is not as patent as Peter implies. Identical identity is greater intensively than formal; both together are greater extensively. In se identical identity is more perfect ; or to word it otherwise, it is intensively greater. But where both identical and formal are found together, there is a greater identity extensively than where only one is found . The reason is that there are then more reasons or roots of identity involved.8 From this conclusion some corollaries are drawn which illustrate and apply his meaning. In God, intensively the divine essence cannot be said to be more perfectly identical with itself than with some attribute ; or some attribute cannot be said to be more perfectly identical with itself than with some other attribute . But extensively, the divine essence is more perfectly identical with itself than with one of its attributes, and any attribute is more perfectly identical with itself than with another attribute. The second example is more readily seen than the first. An attribute in the divine essence is identical with itself identically and formally; within the divine essence an attribute is identically identical with another attribute but not formally. The first example involves a situation which Peter nowhere explicitly explains. We might call it a case of non-mutual relation . In other words , it makes a difference whether we consider the identity of the essence with an attribute or the identity of an attribute with the essence. In the first case there is no formal identity because the essence is not contained in the quidditative notion of the attribute . In the second case the attribute is contained in the quidditative notion of the essence and hence there is formal identity. As far as identical identity is concerned there is room for another distinction. The divine essence can be adequately identical with an attribute

Quodl., 94, 211—219 . 7 Ibid., 220-230. 8 Utraque istarum identitatum , puta formalis et identica simul, est maior extensive seu perfectior quam altera tantum : ubi enim concurrunt plures rationes identitatis, ibi videtur esse maior identitas extensiva ; sed ubi est identitas identica et formalis, ibi sunt plures identitatis rationes quam ubi altera tantum ; ergo, etc. Ibid. , 231–236.

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but inadequately identical with a Person. In the first case, wherever the essence is found there the divine attribute is found , e . g. , wisdom. But this is not true in the second case.9 A coincidence of identities is possible. In Part I we noted that Peter advances one method of dividing identity without much elucidation. That is the division of identity as it is opposed to the seven-fold division of distinction : of reason, ex natura rei, formal, real, essential, subjective, and objective . The meaning of each would be derived by taking the opposite of that particular mode of distinction.10 Thus, to attempt to say explicitly what Peter says implicitly, identity of reason would seem to be that identity of a thing whereby it is in no way conceptually distinct. Identity ex natura rei is that which exists in nature and does not depend upon a collative act of the intellect . Formal identity implies that one thing is contained per se primo modo in the other. Real identity implies that one thing is predicable of another formally and identically. Essential identity implies unity in one essence. Subjective identity apparently would imply unity in one individual. And objective identity, unity through some common quidditative predicate. Of these modes of identity Peter develops extensively only formal and essential. Identity of reason is only mentioned ; identity ex natura rei is mentioned several times ; but of special interest is the fact that real identity, when it is mentioned in other contexts, is synonymous with identity ex natura rei.11 Taking identity according to this division Peter states that what we have called a rule of coincidence may be established in reverse of the rule for the modes of distinction. Whatever is identical according to reason is identical also in all the other modes. Whatever is identical ex natura rei is identical also formally, really, essentially, subjectively, objectively, but not necessarily according to reason . Whatever is formally identical is also identical really, essentially, subjectively, and objectively, but

• Essentia enim divina identificat sibi quodammodo adaequate sapientiam , non tamen identificat sibi paternitatem ; siquidem , in quocumque essentia est, est sapientia ; sed non in quocumque est essentia est paternitas . Ibid. , 94-95, 242-246. 10 Sicut est quod idem et diversum sunt opposita, ita distinctio vel diversitas et identitas . Quaedam sunt idem ratione, quaedam ex natura rei , quaedam formaliter, quaedam realiter, quaedam essentialiter, quaedam se totis subiective, quaedam se totis obiective, ita quod descriptiones istorum modorum identitatis sunt accipiendae per oppositum ad descriptiones superius dictas de modis distinctionum . De dist. praed., f. 31rb. 11 Idem realiter est modus communissimus identitatis . Unde quaecumque sunt eadem vel formaliter vel per se vel adiective [ ?] vel quaecumque extra intellectum sunt eadem realiter. De modis dist. , Q. VI , f. 51vb.

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not by reason. And so on, until one finds that what is objectively identical need not be identical in any other way.12

This rule can be illustrated by one or two examples. Being is formally identical with Paul, since it belongs per se primo modo to the concept of Paul. It is further really identical in that it can be predicated both formally and identically with Paul . It belongs to the essence of Paul, who is a distinct individual ; therefore it is essentially and subjectively identical with Paul. Lastly Paul has objective identity with other individuals by means of this note of being. Moving forward two steps, the divine Persons are essentially identical in so far as they share in the same divine essence. They are subjectively identical because the divine essence is singular. They are objectively identical through the common note of personality. On the other hand they are not really or formally identical. Their concepts are mutually exclusive . The value of these observations on the coincidence of some modes of identity and the exclusion of others depends on the extent to which Peter's seven-fold division of the modes of identity is a faithful mirror of reality. The Formalists believed this to be a true image. But later Scotists reduced the number of modes to three : formal, essential , and of reason.13 Granted that economy is the best policy, we still cannot deny that Peter points to some interesting and even important relationships of identity, which, however one may distinguish its modes, need investigation and explanation . This is true primarily in God, but also in creatures. 2. Relations of Kinds of Distinctions The greater the non-unity the greater the distinction . Since distinction is opposed to identity, and identity is based on unity, the greater the diversity or non-unity the greater will be the distinction.14 And it is a fact that in nature a hierarchy of diversities are found, just as nature reveals a hierarchy of unities or of identities . The hierarchy which Peter finds is that seven-fold one of the De distinctione praedicamentorum or that of the Quodlibet. In either case it would seem that he does not here distinguish degrees of diversity within the modes. When we ask, what is the true order in that hierarchy, what are the steps from least distinct to greatest, Peter's first division gives the more

12 De dist. praed., f. 31rb. 13 Cf. Mastrius, Opera Omnia, IV, Metaph. , disp. VI , q. 7, a. 3, 279. 14 Quodl., 114, 881-886.

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obvious and explicit answer. It is evident that the division of the De distinctione praedicamentorum is based on a hierarchical concept . There Peter proceeds from the distinction of reason to the distinctions ex natura rei, proceeding from the least , formal distinction, to the greatest, objective essential distinction.15 On the other hand, the division in the Quodlibet only in a broad sense is arranged hierarchically. There he proceeds from the distinction of reason to the real distinction . But from here on the hierarchy is reversed, and it might even be questioned whether a strict hierarchy is intended . The essential distinction is the greatest. The greater the incompatibility of the extremes, Peter argues, the greater the distinction. In the essential distinction more than in any other distinction there is this incompatibility of the extremes. While in the real distinction, i. e . , of res and res, there is a compatibility of the extremes (the divine Persons) in one essence, in the essential distinction no such compatibility is possible. In fact, though all the other distinctions ex natura rei are possible within one individual reality or one essence , the essential distinction is incompatible with all other distinctions.16 It must be noted that he is speaking here of the distinction of essence and essence of the Quodlibet division ; he is not maintaining the greater perfection of the essential over the subjective or objective distinction . The essential distinction is absolutely and simply distinction . This conclusion follows from the arguments of the previous conclusion . Since this is the only distinction incompatible with all other, it is distinction . of the highest and purest type . Furthermore, it is the only distinction which is incompatible with identical identity which is identity absolutely and simply speaking.17 On the other hand : 15 It was noted in Part II that the objective distinction is not always an essential distinction. The distinction between being and its attributes would be formal. Yet, when the distinction is also essential, as when two essences differentiated by irreducible differences are distinguished , then obviously there is had the greatest degree of diversity. 16 Quanto maior est incompossibilitas extremorum alicuius distinctionis , tanto ista distinctio videtur esse perfectior ; sed inter omnes distinctiones, distinctio essentiae et essentiae seu essentialis est maior incompossibilitas quam inter membra alicuius alterius distinctionis ; ergo ista est maior seu perfectior. Maior patet : quanto enim aliqua magis sunt incompossibilia, multo magis sunt non idem quia plus recedunt ab identitate ; [et] quanto aliqua plus recedunt ab identitate, tanto est maior eorum distinctio. Minor patet: extrema enim distinctionis realis sunt compossibilia in eadem essentialiter, ut tres divinae personae in divina essentia . Consimiliter omnia membra aliarum distinctionum a distinctione essentiali sunt compossibilia , vel in eadem realitate, vel in eadem re, vel in eadem essentia. Ergo illa prima distinctio essentialis est distinctio simpliciter et absoluta, ita quod, in comparatione ad istam, omnes aliae possunt dici distinctiones secundum 17 Ibid. quid. Quodl., 122-123 ; 127—142 .

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All other distinctions are secundum quid. Since all other distinctions are compatible with other forms of distinction, and since they are compatible also which identical identity, they are distinctions with some qualification or limitation . They are distinctions secundum quid.18 A coincidence of distinctions is possible. And here we may take up a fuller consideration of the rule of coincidence of distinctions. The rule might be simply stated : a greater distinction may coincide with a lesser, but a lesser may not coincide with a greater. The division of distinctions which Peter uses in this case is that of the De distinctione praedicamentorum . As we have shown in Part II , the objective distinction coincides with the subjective , essential , real, formal, and distinction of reason ; the essential with the real, formal, and distinction of reason , but not with the subjective or objective ; the formal with the distinction of reason, but not with the real , essential, subjective, or objective ; etc.¹⁹ There are several observations that can be made about this rule and its implications. First , in order to understand Peter's doctrine on distinction it is necessary to realize that he has this rule in the back of his mind at all times. One important consequence of this is that the various distinctions have for him both a specific and a class meaning, if we might use that modern term. For example, the formal distinction for Peter means specifically the distinction between formality and formality. But it also means all those distinctions which are more than formal. For this reason , what is essentially distinct is really and formally distinct also. It is possible for him to say, therefore, that what is formally distinct

18 Ibid. 19 Secundum correlarium est quod praedicti modi aliter se inferunt affirmative, aliter negative, quando accipiuntur cum distinctione, et aliter cum accipiuntur cum identitate. Circa quod est sciendum primo, quod quando determinat distinctionem sicut se habent quod quaecumque distinguuntur se totis obiective distinguuntur omnibus aliis modis distinctionum respectu aliorum praecedentium . Quaecumque distinguuntur se totis subiective distinguuntur essentialiter, realiter, formaliter et ex natura rei, et sic de aliis ; non tamen e contrario, immo sic arguendo semper causat fallaciam consequentis. Non enim sequitur : A et B distinguuntur ratione, ergo formaliter ; nec valet : distinguuntur formaliter, ergo realiter, quia ens, unum et bonum distinguuntur formaliter, non tamen realiter, ut patet ex dictis ; nec valet : distinguuntur essentialiter, ergo se totis subiective ; vel distinguuntur realiter, ergo essentialiter, quia potentiae animae distinguuntur realiter inter se et ab essentia animae, subiectum etiam a propria passione, conceptus generis et differentiae distinguuntur realiter secundum mentem Scoti in diversis locis, non tamen distinguuntur essentialiter secundum ipsum ; nec valet : distinguuntur se totis subiective , ergo se totis obiective, nam individua eiusdem speciei et species eiusdem generis et etiam praedicamenta distinguuntur primo modo et non secundo modo, ut patet. De dist. praed., f. 31rb.

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is not really distinct ,20 but again, what are formally distinct are really distinct.21 He can state that the powers of the soul are really and not formally distinct,22 and again, that they are formally distinct.23 In the first case he is speaking specifically ; in the second he is taking into consideration the rule of coincidence, namely, what are really distinct are also formally distinct. The result is that "formally distinct" has analogous meanings in Peter's works . Each time he uses such a term one must inquire, is he using it specifically or as a class term ? It would appear that Peter had this rule in mind when establishing his definitions for the various distinctions. In consideration of this, he would make his definition precise enough to set it apart from the distinctions below but broad enough to cover the distinctions above. Thus the definition of the real distinction while including a phrase which distinguishes it from the formal distinction is broad enough to cover the essential distinction, because the essentially distinct are also really distinct. In Part II when dealing with the ways of recognizing the distinctions we criticized some of these criteria as being too broad. Looking at these criteria again with the rule of coincidence in mind it does not seem that one can detect a systematic advertence to this rule when setting down the criteria. Probably this is due mainly to the fact that there he is using a different division of distinctions. Let us look at some of the implications of Peter's rule of coincidence . Socrates and Plato (to use time-honored instances) through their ultimate differences are objectively distinct . Hence, they must be distinct in all the other modes. Being numerically distinct individuals they are obviously subjectively distinct. Since they are separate, and one can be destroyed without the other, etc. , they are essentially distinct . This much is clear. But in what way can they be said to be really distinct ? It would appear from his application of this rule to the categories,24 that Socrates would not be predicable of Plato either formally or identically when ultimately abstracted. But how does one apply ultimate abstraction to extremes which are objectively distinct essences ? Can it mean, considering the quidditative concept of Socrates without its modifications and ultimate difference ? In such a case it would appear that the concept of Socrates is formally predicable of Plato similarly

20 21 22 23 24

Ibid. De modis dist. , Q. VI , f. 51vb. De dist. praed. , f. 31rb . Ibid., f. 30vb. Cf. below, p. 155 f.

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considered ; "rational animal" is formally predicable of both Socrates. and Plato.25 But apparently this is not the way in which Peter would have us understand ultimate abstraction here. Perhaps he means that we should take the whole proper concept of Socrates, the essence individuated by the individual difference . So considered, Socrates is not formally predicable of Plato . But is this not a stange way to understand ultimate abstraction, since contrary to his definition of the process we include non-essentials instead of leaving them aside ? The same difficulty is attached to the next mode of distinction. As he applies " formally distinct" to the categories, Peter means simply that ultimately abstracted the concept of one does not include the concept of the other. This is not difficult to understand of two distinct categories. But are two individuals of the same category ultimately abstracted formally distinct ? Does the concept of one individual exclude the concept of the other ? It would seem not . And this difficulty seems to attend any attempt to prove that Socrates and Plato are formally distinct. It should be noted that even if one succeeds in finding a suitable way of applying ultimate abstraction to objectively distinct extremes and in explaining how individuals within a species can be considered not formally identical, it will still result in only an analogous meaning of " really distinct" and "formally distinct" . And Peter's explanations do not take such an eventuality into consideration, as certainly any careful metaphysician's exposition should. Finally, according to the rule Socrates and Plato are distinct by reason. And this too can be understood only in an analogous sense, though Peter fails to acknowledge it . Those things are properly distinct by reason which are distinct through the operation of the comparative act of the intellect . As such, they are opposed to those things which are distinct in nature before any comparative act of the intellect , indeed before any apprehensive act of the intellect. How then can Socrates and Plato be considered distinct by reason, since they are distinct ex natura rei? We obtain perhaps an inkling of Peter's intended meaning from a statement by Scotus. He says that " distinct by reason" can be understood in this sense, that the mind apprehends two objects as two formal objects for the intellect . They are distinct by reason because considered precisely as formal objects of the intellect (prescinding from 25 It would seem that Francis Mayron would thus understand the situation. He states that the members of the same species are really, i . e . , ex natura rei, distinct but not formally. Conflatus, d . 8, q. 2 , ad 2 , 44a.

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their distinction in nature) they are recognized as distinct.26 If one wants to give this meaning to " distinct by reason, " well and good ; but it must be admitted that it is only an analogous use of the term . One thing especially emerges from these considerations. "Formally distinct" and "really distinct" are terms which can be taken in a strict sense (distinction of formality and formality, distinction of reality and reality) and in a broad sense. Under the circumstances perhaps there is a good reason for the division of the distinctions in the Quodlibet. But if Peter had this in mind he failed to express his mind adequately in his works. The converse side of the rule of coincidence offers some interesting problems also. This part of the rule states that one cannot argue from the presence of the lesser distinction to the presence of the greater without danger of falsity of consequence . As Peter says, it does not necessarily follow that what are subjectively distinct are also objectively distinct. He gives the example of the categories, and his meaning is evident. But ponder as one may, one cannot think of an example for Peter's next statement, namely, that it does not necessarily follow that what are essentially distinct are also subjectively distinct . For him all the categories are not only essentially but subjectively distinct. That leaves only properties and transcendental attributes. But neither of these are essences ; the former would be realities, the latter formalities. What then would he consider to be essentially distinct but not subjectively ? But for the rest the rule appears to hold, providing that one remembers to use formal and real distinction analogously, as the case may require. In view of the difficulties attendant upon what we have called the rule of coincidence of modes of distinction it might be asked whether the rule has any actual value . It would appear that its main value is negative. It serves as a warning against false consequences . One may not say, formally distinct therefore distinct as things, a consequence into which Aureoli tries to force the Formalists ; or, really distinct (e. g. the divine Persons) therefore essentially distinct . But the positive side of the rule involves analogies which would seem to lessen the value and usefulness of the rule.

26 Potest autem vocari differentia rationis [ i . e., the real distinction between the divine Persons] , sicut dicit Doctor quidam [ William of Ware] , non quod ratio accipiatur pro differentia formata ab intellectu , sed ut ratio accipiatur pro quidditate rei secundum quod quidditas est objectum intellectus. Ordinatio, I , d . 2, pars 2, q. 1—4, n. 401 ; 2, 355.

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Once again, Peter's contribution was to indicate some of the complexities in God and creatures due to the coincidence of distinctions. Those who disagreed with him on the number of modes of distinction nevertheless had to face the problems he presented and accomodate their three-fold division to the explanation of these problems . 3. Relations of Identities and Distinctions In this section similarities and differences between identity and distinction in general will be noted first. Then the correlations between the kinds of each will be studied according to certain rules which Peter at least implies. Identity and distinction are quasi-effects of unity. Peter follows Aristotle in considering identity and distinction as consequences of the unity of being. Identity is the consequence of ens unum being " indistinct in itself" ; distinction is the consequence of its being "distinct from every other" . Both are rooted in unity ; identity being fundamentally the same as unity; distinction being the denial of unity and hence of identity with some other.27 Identity and distinction are negative attributes of being. A certain amount of inference is necessary here because Peter has very little to say about the ontological nature of identity. In one passing phrase he takes it for granted that unity is not something positive.28 If that is the case then identity too is something negative. Like distinction , though , it certainly would connote something positive, i . e . , the unified being.29 Presumably identity is also a relation. For though Peter does not state his mind about identity in general, he does state that identical identity is a relation, a relation of reason with a foundation in the thing. It would seem legitimate to suppose, therefore, that Peter would consider identity of reason a relation of reason purely, and the various types of identity ex natura rei as relations with a foundation in the thing. Distinction , on the other hand , is not a relation according to Peter. His reason, as we saw, is purely from authority. Aristotle and Algazel do not list distinction under the kinds of related opposites, and so distinction cannot be characterized as a relation . Distinction is a negative attribute of something positive ; as such it denotes something negative, i. e . , the 27 Quodl., 123—124 , 168–176. 28 supposito quod unitas ipsa non dicat aliquid positivum . Quod., 130, 384-385. 29 In calling unity something negative Peter departs from Scotus, who says that unity is a positive attribute of being. Meta. , VII , q . 2, n. 13 ; 7, 165.

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denial of unity ; but it connotes something positive, the positive extremes.30 Identity and distinction are transcendentally opposed. Aristotle in several places states that identity and distinction are opposed attributes of being. Though Peter at times follows Aristotle in this, actually his agreement is qualified. He notes that identity and distinction do not fit under the categories of opposition mentioned by Aristotle. He concludes that they are beyond the categories of opposition ; they are transcendentally opposed. Certain principles can be drawn from the opposition of the kinds of identity and distinction. Identity and distinction as opposed can be taken in two ways: uniformly and non-uniformly. Taken uniformly, we consider a proper mode of distinction as opposed to its proper mode of identity : essential distinction vs. essential identity. Non-uniformly taken, we consider one mode of distinction with regard to another mode of identity : formal distinction vs. essential identity.31 Identity and distinction uniformly taken are incompatible. A given mode of identity or distinction is not compatible with its opposite mode. Extremes cannot be essentially identical and essentially distinct at the same time under the same aspect.32 Identity and distinction non-uniformly taken are compatible. In Q. VIII of De modis distinctionis Peter makes particular use of this principle to prove that formal distinction does not preclude essential identity. The presence of identical identity makes it possible for the attributes though formally distinct to be infinite. This supreme and simple identity insures the perfect simplicity of the divine essence which in turn guarantees that the divine essence is pure act.33 In the same way, a real distinction between the divine Persons is compatible with essential identity, just as a real distinction between animality and rationality is compatible with their essential identity in man. This is the only type of compatibility which Peter specifically mentions, namely, the compatibility of formal , real, and " modal" distinctions with essential identity. There does not seem to be any reason, however, why the principle cannot be universally stated , i . e . , identity and distinction non-uniformly taken are compatible . In God, for example, we have all the forms of distinction ex natura rei with the exception of a distinction of reality and reality and an essential 30 Quodl., 130, 385-386. 31 De modis dist. , Q. VIII , f. 55rb . 32 Est enim impossibile quod aliquid per aliquod sit idem identice alicui et distinguatur ab eo distinctione opposita tali identitati . Ibid. 33 Ibid., ff. 53 va— 54гa.

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distinction ; and in this latter case God is at least the extreme of an essential distinction from his creation. In a creature we have all the distinctions, either ad intra or ad extra . At the same time in God we have all the identities : essential identity , formal identity at least in the sense that the formalities are formally identical with themselves, real identity under the same condition, subjective and objective identity. And in creatures we have all the identities with similar qualifications. These last observations on the compatibility of identity and distinction are inferences from the definitions and examples which will be found in Parts I and II . Peter did not lay down any rules for the compatibility of identity and distinction as he did for the coincidence of the kinds of identity and the kinds of distinctions. The kinds of identity can be determined from the kinds of distinction . Peter lays down the rule , but in practice he does not strictly adhere to it. He is influenced here by a passage in the Topics wherein Aristotle states that a study of the differences of things is useful both to know the nature of the thing and to understand likenesses.34 Following this principle Peter distinguishes seven kinds of identity after the seven kinds of distinction : of reason, ex natura rei, formal, real, essential, subjective, and objective. And though Peter also distinguishes kinds of identity from the modes of perseity and the kinds of unity, we can say that this is the fundamental division in Peter's approach to identity. It is essential and formal identity which receive the greater part of his attention. And it is to this division of identity that the rule of coincidence is applied. Each distinction is the negation of the opposed identity . Formal distinction is ultimately nothing else than the denial of formal identity, essential distinction of essential identity. We might call the preceding conclusion the psychological approach, the present one the ontological approach. Diversity is more readily discernible than sameness ; at least this would seem to be the thesis which Aristotle proposes in the passage cited above from the Topics. Yet , when we analyze distinction we find that its nature is that of a negation, a denial of unity and identity. In the natures of things, therefore, identity would have a certain priority. But when we investigate nature we come more readily upon diversity. 34 "The discovery of differences of things helps us both in reasoning about sameness and difference, and also in recognizing what any particular thing is . That it helps us in reasoning about sameness and difference is clear : for when we have discovered a difference of any kind whatever between the objects before us, we shall already have shown that they are not the same." Topics, I, c. 18, 108 b .

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Once this conclusion is established one must be careful not to wander into certain fallacies of consequence . The next two conclusions are enunciated implicitly by Peter and thoroughly argued by many exemplifications. They are directed against those who take identity and distinction only uniformly, ignoring or even denying the possibility of considering them non- uniformly.

From the denial of a mode of identity one cannot necessarily argue to the presence of the opposed mode of distinction. The denial of formal identity does not necessarily imply the presence of formal distinction . The argument Peter uses is from Scotus. When that which is denied in the antecedent is affirmed in the consequent, the consequence is not valid. Such is the case when one states : not formally the same, therefore formally distinct. In the antecedent it is asserted that there is not necessarily a formality involved ; in the consequent it is asserted that the extremes are formalities themselves and formally distinct from each other.35 For example, I can truly say of the divine Persons that they are not formally the same ; but I cannot say that they are therefore formally distinct, because they are not formalities. Similarly, in Peter's sense of the terms, it does not necessarily follow : not really the same, therefore really distinct . But it does necessarily follow: not the same ex natura rei, therefore distinct ex natura rei. In each case , therefore, it is necessary to study carefully the implications in the antecedent and in the consequent . Much less can one argue necessarily from the denial of one mode of identity to another mode of distinction . This, Peter maintains, is precisely what Peter Aureoli does when he argues that the denial of formal identity in the sense of the Formalists necessarily implies the distinction of thing and thing.36 The whole of Q. V of De modis distinctionis is devoted to a development of this thesis. We will leave a detailed study of this question to a more extensive investigation of Peter's doctrine on the formal distinction . For our present purposes we will note for the sake of exemplification just a few of his conclusions. Applying the principle of the kinds of identity based on the kinds of unity, he states : the denial of the identity of aggregation does not necessarily imply a distinction of thing and thing; nor does the denial of the identity of order, or accidental identity, or identity of composition . But the denial of the identity of singularity, as also the denial of the identity of supposite, do necessarily

35 De modis dist . , Q. V, f . 49vb ; cf. Scotus, Ordinatio, I, d. 2, pars 2 , q. 1-4, n. 403 ; 2 , 356–357. 36 De modis dist. , Q. V, f. 49vb.

11.

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imply the distinction of this thing and that, namely, the essential 37 distinction. Again, in each case the full implication of the antecedent and the consequent must be studied before the consequence can be allowed. Analyzing the situation , the reverse of the preceding two principles could also be stated as principles, namely, from the denial of a mode of distinction one cannot necessarily argue to the presence of the opposed mode of distinction ; and, much less can one argue necessarily from the denial of one mode of distinction to another mode of identity. Since there are no statements in Peter's works, however, which exemplify these principles we cannot put them down as implicit principles. The foregoing propositions on the correlation of identity and distinction while expanding have also served to summarize the doctrine of Peter. Though it would be possible to proceed immediately to the conclusion at this point , there remains one fruitful area of investigation, and that is the De distinctione praedicamentorum . B. THE DISTINCTION OF THE CATEGORIES The De distinctione praedicamentorum is the only philosophical work of Petrus Thomae which until very recently has been edited.38 This in itself would be a reason for giving special attention to it. Although the Venice edition of 1517 is certainly not a definitive edition, it does offer a more readily available approach to the mind and method of Peter. However, it is mainly because this work serves to exemplify many of the foregoing conclusions and also to exemplify Peter's method that particular attention is paid to it here . An added reason is that some of the doctrine and method has been attacked . Certainly, then , if the other works of Peter are to be judged by this one, as some will be inclined to do until other works are edited, it is important to see whether this is a representative work and in what light it shows Peter. B. Hauréau, in his Histoire de la philosophie Scolastique,39 was interested in Peter as a representative of the Franciscan School immediately after Scotus. He knows Peter only through Sbaralea and the edition of De distinctione praedicamentorum.40 His remarks on the doctrine and

37 Ibid., f. 50rb. 38 Edited among a number of tracts of contemporary authors by Nuciarelli , Venice, 1517. The present tract is entitled : Formalitates Petri Thome distinctionesque predicamentorum inseruntur. 39 B. Hauréau, Histoire de la philosophie Scolastique, Paris, 1880, II , II, 306–308. 40 Ibid., p . 306 ; no other sources are listed .

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method of Peter are based solely on this edition. Briefly, he takes exception to Peter's doctrine on the separability of the categories. And Peter's method is characterized as consisting of "quibbling arguments" and "sophisms". As a consequence he evinces no interest in the other works of Peter.41 It is doubtful whether such an attitude is really scholarly. But at least we can see what aroused his scorn and whether his criticism is just. An idea of the general contents of Peter's work can be gathered from the description of it in the introduction and from the frequent references to it throughout the foregoing. In this study particular attention will be paid to the distinctions which Peter posits between the categories and as a final point Peter's doctrine on the separability of relations. In the process one can judge whether the arguments are frivolous and sophistical. 1. The Distinctions of the Categories In the first part of this work Peter defined the seven kinds of distinction and established the rule of coincidence. He now applies his definitions and rule to the categories. The categories are distinct ex natura rei. Whatever are distinct irrespective of a comparative act of the possible intellect are distinct in nature. All the categories are thus distinct (e. g. , a substance and its quantity, qualities, relations, etc. ) . The major is evident. The minor is proved from the fact that if the categories were not thus distinct they would be distinct by reason alone. In such a case there would not be ten categories nor ten principles of real things, as Porphyry describes the categories ; for beings of reason cannot be principles of real beings . This main argument is bolstered by others. The subjective parts of real things are distinct ex natura rei, and such are the categories. Aristotle divides real beings into the ten categories, therefore the beings of the categories are real beings, distinct ex natura rei inter se.42 Again, those 41 Les choses écartées, on arrange des mots, on construit des syllogismes , par lesquels on démontre non- seulement ce qui n'est pas, mais encore ce qui ne peut être, et, pour conclure, aux frivoles arguties on impose triomphalement le nom de vérités transcendentales . ... dont la composition savante nous offre une trame de distinctions brochée de sophismes ... Nous ne prendrons pas la peine de rechercher cet opuscule [De ente] . Ne sait-on pas déjà ce qu'il doit contenir ? Ibid . , 307-308. 42 There is some difficulty with the citation of Aristotle. The Venice edition cites "2 ° Meta. principio primo " , but the doctrine is not contained there; Magd. Coll. n . 80 cites " 6° metaphysicae in principio", but again the doctrine is not contained in that chapter. Probably the best citation would be: Meta. , Bk. V, c . 7, 1017a. "The kinds of essential being are precisely

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are real beings which are treated in a real science ; and Aristotle treats the categories in two real sciences ; metaphysics43 and physics .

Further,

those things which are formally first intentions are distinct ex natura rei; considering the categories metaphysically (not logically) they are first intentions. In proof of the major, briefly, Peter states that the formal notion of a thing is its intelligibility which precedes the act ofthe intellect ; ergo, etc. Lastly , whatever are constituted and distinguished by intrinsic modes are also distinct ex natura rei, because the intrinsic modes are ex natura rei, as the last question of the De modis distinctionis proves.45 The categories are formally distinct. Those are formally distinct which when ultimately abstracted one does not include the other quidditatively, i. e., in its concept . Further, wherever it is possible for one thing to exist without another they are at least formally distinct . Negatively, if the categories were formally the same then they would be distinct only by reason, and the categories would be entia rationis. In such a case, as noted already, they could not be the principles of real beings. Entia rationis are posterior to real beings, and as entia diminuta they are inferior to real beings. Taking formal distinction in this general sense Peter's conclusion follows without difficulty. But in view of the more particular sense of a formal distinction, the distinction of formality and formality, we must say that "formal distinction " is used here analogously . And as we have noted above, Peter is not sufficiently explicit in distinguishing the analogous uses of the term. But it should be evident that the categories are formally distinct only in the broad sense.46 The categories are really distinct. Those things are really distinct which are positive beings, and which when ultimately abstracted cannot be predicated of each other either formally or identically. Again, taking

those that are indicated by the figures of predication , i . e . , of the categories ; for the senses of ' being' are just as many as these figures. Since, then, some predicates indicate what the subject is , others its quality, others quantity, others relation, others activity or passivity, others its ' where' , others its 'when, ' ' being' has a meaning answering to each of these. " To this can be added Meta . , Bk. VII , c. 9 , 1034b, which states that all these essences come to be in some concrete unity ; and Meta. , Bk. XIV, c. 2, 1089b, which says that the categories are inseparable from substance. 43 Cf. quotations just given. 44 The Venice edition reads "Physici 70" ; Magdalen, " 50 Physicorum". The latter apparently is correct. Cf. Physics, Bk. V, c. 1 , 225b : " If, then, the categories are severally distinguished as Being, Quality, Place, Time, Relation, Quantity, and Activity or Passivity, it necessarily follows that there are three kinds of motion - qualitative, quantitative and local." 45 De modis dist. , Q. XI , f. 60 vb. 46 De dist, praed . , f. 31va.

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the definition as it stands, it applies to all the categories. The first condition, that they be positive things, rules out negations and privations which are not categories , though per accidens and denominatively they may be classed under one or the other category. It is equally clear that the categories fulfil the second condition. Formal predication presupposes formal identity ; but according to the sense of the second conclusion the categories are formally distinct . Likewise, the categories cannot be predicated of each other identically when ultimately abstracted. They would have to be simply or permissively infinite ; but they are not perfections of God nor are they simple transcendentals. Peter then adds an argument to which I think we will have to take exception . He states that whatever is distinct as res and res is distinct as reality and reality. But the categories are distinct as res and res; ergo. By way of proof he states that ens and res are convertible ; ens is contained in the quidditative notion of the categories ; therefore they are distinct as res and res, and consequently as reality and reality. But we must protest against the free use of terms analogously without explanation . Peter has defined a reality as not a res but a quid rei. He does not use it in that sense here . Again, he has given to res a special meaning as distinct from essence and reality. He does not use it in that sense here. If Peter had avoided these terms and stayed in the realm of general terms as in the previous conclusion he would not have left himself open to attack. As it is, I think we must concede a score to Hauréau on this point.47 The categories are essentially distinct. Separability, we know, is the prime criterion of an essential distinction for Peter. Here he argues, any category can be supported in actual existence without the other by the divine power ; therefore they are essentially distinct. He launches immediately into his arguments for the separability of a relation from its foundation, but we will postpone this subject to the end. In the previous conclusion he said that the categories are distinct as res and res. Here he says that res and essentia are not convertible and that the categories are distinct as essentia and essentia . Overlooking this discrepancy, it is clear that Aristotle would agree with Peter that the categories are real essences, and if so, then they are essentially distinct. It is interesting to note that Peter does not subdivide this essential distinction, as some scholastics did, into a distinction of separable. essences (major real) and a distinction of inseparable essences (minor real) .48 Evidently he considered all the accidental modifications of a

47 Ibid., f. 31 vb. 48 Cf. Grajewski, The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus , pp . 55—56. ·

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subject from quantity down to "where" and "when" to be separable and capable of being sustained in existence at least miraculously by God. We will comment on this further in the last section.49 The categories are subjectively distinct. The conditions for a subjective distinction are the following : each extreme has its own proper esse subjectivum; they are distinct in genus, species, and number ; they can exist actually in separation . Peter answers two objections against the first condition. How can the categories be said to have their own esse subjectivum, their own individual reality, if they share transcendental modifications ? He replies, the transcendentals are contracted to the proper esse subjectivum of each category, and so the individual esse of the categories is preserved. How can they be said to have their own proper esse when Aristotle says that some beings can be classed under several categories ?50 He answers, it is evident that one and the same being cannot be included per se under several categories. If this were so, then the categories would be formally the same, with the consequences noted above. He concludes that Aristotle meant that one thing may belong per accidens to several categories. 51 By way of explanation of the second condition, Peter takes it for granted that it is evident that the categories are distinct as to genus and species. His attention is concentrated on the manner in which they may be said to be numerically distinct . One can distinguish numerality of individuals and of supposites. The categories are numerically distinct in the second sense but not in the first . 52 The case is somewhat parallel to the three Persons in the Trinity ; they have numerality of supposites, but there is only one divine nature, as Scotus points out.53 For these reasons Peter postulates a subjective distinction between the categories. But this is the extent of their distinction. And because it is the extent of their distinction, I suppose Peter would assign this, subjective distinction, as their proper mode of distinction , just as the real distinction is the proper mode of the distinction for the divine Persons.

49 De dist. praed. , ff. 31vb- 32ra. 50 " Further, if anything should happen to fall within both the category of quality and that of relation, there would be nothing extraordinary in classing it under both these heads. " Cat., c. 8, 11a. 51 De dist. praed . , ff. 32ra- 32rb. 52 Et nota quod duplex est numerositas, scilicet, individualis et suppositalis. Auctoritas intelligitur secundo modo et non primo. Si autem in quolibet praedicamento sunt distincta individua ; et per consequens distinctae numerositates vel unitates numerales . Ibid . , f. 32rb. 53 Oxon., I , d . 4, q . 2 ; 10, 269.

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The categories are not objectively distinct. The reason is stated negatively. Those are not objectively distinct from which some common, univocal ratio of first intention can be abstracted . But such a concept can be abstracted from the categories. Peter gives the most obvious example, the common, univocal, real concept of being.54 In the conclusions we see exemplified the rule of coincidence of distinctions. Because the categories are subjectively distinct they are also essentially, really, formally, distinct. (He omits a conclusion about the distinction of reason . ) But one cannot reason that they should therefore be objectively distinct ; and in fact they are not. The rule of identity is quite simply applied . The categories are objectively identical. This type of identity presupposes no other, since it is at the end of the line of the modes of identity ; therefore the categories are identical in no other way.

2. The Separability of Relation and Foundation The subject we now take up evidently was not an incidental conclusion but a strong conviction on Peter's part. He attacks the problem in two places. It was first developed in the first question of De modis distinctionis, which deals with the essential distinction. He returns to the subject with added vigor in the present work. And here he appeals to the authority of a "certain subtle one ", besides bolstering his arguments with appeals to the doctrine of Aristotle and Scotus in proof of incidental points. Because the doctrine is somewhat unique ( Peter calls it opinio nova) , and because he is liable to attack on this point, the doctrine will be objectively presented from both sources, so that his position, with strong or weak points, will be clear. Concerning first of all the anonymous " subtle one" , it must be said that it may be impossible for some time to come to lift the veil of anonymity. Despite the fact that Peter ordinarily cites Scotus by name, one immediately wonders whether Peter might be referring to him. But looking into Scotus ' doctrine on relations we find that he distinguishes absolute and relative accidents . The former may be separated from their subjects, but not the latter.55 It is not Scotus, therefore, that Peter is referring to .

54 De dist. praed. , f. 32rb. 55 Ad declarationem tamen secundi, scilicet quod ista possint esse, praemitto unam distinctionem de accidentibus , quia quaedam sunt absoluta, quaedam respectiva. Si enim omnia accidentia essent respectiva, nullum

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Another author sometimes referred to as a subtle doctor is Ockham. He was a contemporary of Peter and hence according to the custom of the time Peter would not refer to him by name.56 But again, it is readily apparent that Ockham is not Peter's authority. Ockham admitted only two predicaments that were things in their own right : substance and quality.57 Qualities are separable from their subjects ; but since relations are nothing other than the coexistence of extremes, a relation could not possibly be maintained without its subject.58 A third possibility is Francis Mayron, who also is at times called a subtle doctor. But like Scotus, he distinguishes between absolute and relative accidents ; the former can be maintained in existence without their subjects, but not the latter. Francis argues from the nature of a relation. Since it is essentially “ad aliud " it cannot exist without its subject.59 Probably the "quidam doctor" whom Francis mentions in this context as holding an opposed doctrine is the same as the " subtle one" that Peter invokes. But his identity remains a mystery. Basically the same elements are used in both presentations of the arguments for the separability of a relation from its foundation . But the order is reversed. It appears to me that the logical form of the argument in Q. I of De modis distinctionis is better than that of the De distinctione praedicamentorum. But the proofs are more fully developed in the latter work. Also what is one complex argument in the first work is presented as one major and two minor arguments in the latter, which is somewhat of an improvement . In the following exposition the division into three arguments will be followed, but the form of the main argument will be taken from the earlier work. The main argument presupposes certain conclusions : that the possibility of separation necessarily follows from essential distinction , esset, nec esse posset, sine subjecto, quia accidentia relativa, sive sint relationes intrinsecus advenientes, sive extrinsecus, impossibile et incompossibile est ista esse sine subjecto , quia incompossibile est aliquam relationem esse, et non inter extrema, ut inter terminos, quia circumscripta a relatione habitudine ad terminum, jam non est relatio essentialiter ad illud, sed ad se, et tunc est accidens absolutum, quod est falsum, quia nullum absolutum includit essentialiter vel formaliter respectum. Oxon . , IV, d. 12, q. I, n. 2; 24, 135. 56 This custom was prevalent in the 13th century ; though it was not universally observed in the 14th century, Peter still observed it for the most part. One exception apparently that he made was to name Peter Aureoli . 57 Super quattuor libros Sententiarum scripta, Lyon, 1495 , IV, q. 7, D. 58 Ibid., II , q . 2, H. 59 Relatio est ad aliud ; ergo illud quod est terminus relationis necessario est aliud a relatione ; sed quod est nihil non habet alietatem ad aliquid ; ergo relatio non potest esse ad nihil ; sed quod non est existens est nihil ; ergo relatio non est sine termino existente. Conflatus, d . 29, q . 6, 91 vb.

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just as the impossibility of separation is a necessary consequence of essential identity ; that if a thing is dependent on some form of causality for its actual existence, one can argue to the possibility of the separation of that thing from its cause ; and, that the first independent being can terminate any dependence sufficient for the actual existence of anything.60 There are two possible situations to be considered : one in which the foundation is in one extreme , the other where the foundation is in two extremes. It is evident , Peter argues, that in the first case the foundation does not depend essentially upon the relation, because the foundation is prior by nature ; therefore it can be posited without the relation . 61 As for the second case , if the relation cannot be posited without the foundation when the foundation is in two extremes, it will be either because the relation cannot be posited without the foundation in each , or because it cannot be posited without the foundation and its term . In either case, fundamentally the reason is that the relation essentially depends on the foundation or upon the foundation and the term. But the first independent being in either case can supply the sufficient dependency, i. e . , it can act as the support of any being so as to maintain it in actual existence . But if a thing necessarily depends on another for existence it can be concluded that it is separable from that thing. (Possibly he is presupposing here the doctrine that the relation is a thing, a real essence ; otherwise the argument would extend also to properties and attributes.) Hence, since the relation is separable, and since God can supply for the foundation upon which the relation necessarily depends, God can posit a relation in actual existence acting himself in place of the foundation. This conclusion is also indicated by the fact that God contains all things virtually. If He cannot terminate the dependence of a relation, then it cannot be said that God contains the relation virtually. 62 This last argument is specified further, I believe, 60 Impossibilitas separationis consequitur necessario identitatem essentialem . Ergo possibilitas separationis consequitur necessario distinctionem essentialem ... Primum independens potest supplere dependentiam cuiuslibet requisiti ad actualem existentiam alicuius, vel terminare potest quodcumque immediate positurum per ipsum. De modis dist. , Q. Í, f. 40vb. si Nam constat quod fundamentum non dependet a relatione, cum sit prius natura. Ipsa ergo potest poni sine ipsa. Ibid. This reverses the problem and hence is not strictly conclusive . The question is, can the relation exist without the foundation ? 62 Praeterea quaero quare fundamentum in duobus extremis positum non potest poni absque relatione : vel quia relatio non potest poní absque fundamentis, vel quia absque fundamento et termino ; huius non potest alia ratio reddi, nisi unum essentialiter dependat ab alia. Hoc supposito, principium independens simpliciter potest determinare omnem dependentiam sufficienter ad actualem existentiam cuiuscumque ; sed supplere alicuius

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in the following argument from the possibility of God supplying causality. An argument, which can be applied in both cases,63 is drawn from the fact that the foundation must exert some form of causality upon the relation : either efficient , or final, or formal, or material. (In neither text is a reason given why the foundation necessarily exerts some causality on the relation. It would appear that he arrived at his conclusion by analyzing the dependence . ) If the relation depends on the foundation as on an efficient or final cause, the proposition clearly stands. God can supply in every case for efficient and final causality. (He takes it for granted that it is evident that the foundation exerts neither type of causality.) If it depends on the foundation as on a formal cause , then it would mean that formally a relation is such because of something absolute ; or in equivalent terms, that a relation would have intrinsic to its formal notion something absolute, the foundation which is its formal cause. But anything which contains formally in its notion something absolute is absolute ; which is to deny that a relation is a relation . Hence a relation does not depend upon the foundation as upon a formal cause.64 If it depends on the foundation as on a material cause, it will depend on the foundation as the matter ex qua or in qua. The foundation cannot be the matter ex qua, because according to Aristotle accidents do not have such matter.65 Matter is a substance, and from a substance

acquisiti ad actualem existentiam alterius potest [M adds : argui] alicuius possibilitas separationis illius ab illo. Ergo ex hoc [ quod] principium independens potest dependentiam cuiuslibet requisiti ad actualem existentiam supplere vel determinare, potest quodcumque immediate poni per ipsum ; ergo per consequens principium independens, ut Deus, potest supplere vicem fundamenti relationis vel respectus et terminare dependentiam relationis ad ipsum ; et per consequens [ipsum] in actuali existentia ponere absque fundamento. Minor de se patet, sed maior declaratur sic : [tum] quia principium independens [simpliciter] a nullo dependet, et ideo potest omnem dependentiam sufficienter terminare. Ratio enim independentiae illius ab aliquo est praecisa ratio terminandi dependentiam illius ad ipsum ; tum quia principium independens [simpliciter] continet virtualiter omnem relationem ; et per consequens potest ipsum seu eius dependentiam sufficienter terminare, aliter ipsam virtualiter non continet. De dist. praed. , f. 32ra, with additions and corrections from Magd . Coll . n. 80 . 63 It is propounded in the earlier work in proof of the possibility of separation of a relation which depends on a foundation in two terms, and in the later work in proof of the possibility of separation where there is a foundation in only one. 64 Non potest etiam dici quod sic dependeat ad fundamentum sicut ad causam formalem ; nam tunc absolutum esset intrinsecum respectivo ; et per consequens illud quod est formaliter respectivum esset formaliter absolutum et obiectum in opposito ; illud enim in cuius ratione formali seu quidditativa includitur aliquid absolutum est formaliter absolutum. Ibid. , f. 31vb. 65 Aristotle, Meta . , Bk. VIII , c. 2 , 1043a.

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a non-substance patently cannot be derived . 66 But it can be the matter in qua; for it is in this way that the subject is said to be the materia of absolute accidents. And just as the dependence of absolute accidents on the subject is no obstacle to its existence in separation from the subject by divine power, so the relation's dependence on the foundation is no obstacle to its existence in separation by divine power.67 The proper mode of dependence of the relation upon the foundation, therefore, is as upon a material cause, but not as upon matter ex qua, but in qua. If such a mode of dependence does not forestall the possibility of separation of an absolute accident from its subject, there is no reason why it should render impossible the separation of a relation from its foundation. Therefore God can supply what is necessary by way of causality and sustain in actual existence a relation without its foundation.68 The confirmatory arguments are from analogy. Matter can be posited in existence without form ; this Scotus proves.69 Arguing from similarity, it would seem to follow that a relation can be posited in actual existence without a foundation. The relation between matter and form is similar to that between a relation and foundation ; though it is not entirely the same. More important, just as it is possible for God to terminate the dependence of matter and to act in the place of form thus making it possible for matter to exist without form, so there seems to be no reason why God cannot in a similar situation terminate the dependence of a relation and act in place of a foundation thus making it possible for a relation to actually exist without its proper foundation.70 66 This is the reverse of Aristotle's statement that from non-substance a substance cannot be derived, but it is equally evident. Cf. Aristotle, De gen. et cor., Bk. I , c . 3, 317b. 67 Nam fundamentum ad quod est relatio vel se habet ad ipsam in genere causae efficientis vel formalis, vel materialis, vel finalis. Si efficientis vel finalis, habeo propositum ; quia prima causa potest supplere omnem causalitatem efficientem et finalem. Si autem materialis, quaero quia vel erit eius materia in qua vel ex qua ; non ex qua, cum secundum philosophum 8° Meta. [c. 2, 1043a] accidentia talem materiam non habent ; nam sicut impossibile est secundum philosophum 1º de generatione [c. 3 , 317b] , ex non substantiis fieri substantiam similiter impossibile est quod ex substantia fiat non substantia ; si autem sit eius materia in qua cum accidens absolutum hoc modo dependeat ad materiam vel ad subjectum ; hoc tamen non obstante potest ab ipso per divinam potentiam separari et per se poni ; non ergo obstante illa dependentia relationis vel respectus ad eius fundamentum sicut ad materiam in qua poterit ipsa relatio actualiter per se poni . De dist. praed., f. 31 vb. 68 In the earlier work Peter draws a broader conclusion : Dico ergo quod Deus potest facere relationem sine fundamento , et econverso, et unum relativum sine alio. De modis dist. , Q. I , Vienna ms . , f. 48 va. 69 Oxon. , II , d . 12 , q. 2 , n. 3 ; 12, 576. 70 Praeterea materia potest poni in actuali existentia sine forma ; ergo relatio sine fundamento. Ĉonsequentia patet a simili ; tum quia sicut relatio

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Lastly, a nature is more immediate, more intimately united to a supposite than a relation is to a foundation . But as Scotus again teaches,"¹ and other doctors also , God can make a nature without a supposite . That a nature is more immediate to a supposite is clear from the fact that a nature signifies and denominates, it gives its name and definition to a supposite ; all of which is not true of a relation with regard to its foundation. If it is possible, then, for God to make a nature without a supposite as He did in the Incarnation of Jesus Christ, it should be possible for Him to make a relation without a foundation.72 The concluding remark of the argument in the De modis distinctionis is an interesting rebuttal in anticipation . If someone says that a theologian should not propose doctrines which philosophers will hold in contempt, then let us not propound the doctrine that a Virgin conceived, or that accidents exist without their subject , or that the same body can be in two places at once . 73 In a word, Peter's argument is based on the absolute power of God and the nature of a relation as an accidental essence with essential dependence upon its foundation, i. e ., as upon a material cause in qua. As we look over these arguments we see the same qualities as in his other theses : a term undefined here, an argument left incomplete there, with an occasional inconclusive argument (Hauréau would call them "quibbling") thrown in ; but on the whole there is a consistent line of argument that manifests no little degree of philosophical insight . But leaving aside the method and considering the thesis which Peter propounds, a provocative question comes to mind. Among all the philosophers who teach that a relation is a thing, an essence over and beyond the foundation in the extremes, do not Peter and the other few who defend the minority opinion hold the more consistent view ? Is it reasonable to postulate a distinction between accidents which are separable and dependet a fundamento sic materia a forma, tum et quia sicut Deus in separatione materiae a forma supplet vicem terminati dependentia ipsius ad formam . Ita videtur possibile quod Deus potest supplere vicem fundamenti in terminando dependentiam ipsius relationis ad illud . Antecedens ad praesens supponitur et probatur a Scoto 2º Sententiarum. [ See preceding footnote. ] De dist. praed . , f. 32гa. 71 Oxon., III , d. 1 , q. 2, n. 5 ; 14, 65-66. 72 Ultimo arguitur sic : immediatior et intimior est natura supposito quam relatio fundamento ; sed Deus facere naturam absque proprio [supposito] ; ergo, etc. Maior patet, quia natura significat suppositum formaliter, tum quia ipsam formaliter denominat, tum et quia dat sibi nomen et definitionem, quae non conveniunt relationi respectu fundamenti . Minor apparet de facto in Christo . De dist. praed., f. 32гa. 73 De modis dist. , Q. I , f. 41гa.

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accidents which are not separable from their subjects, and yet to maintain that all are alike in that they are things, essences ? It is beyond the scope of this work to enter into a proof of the unreasonableness of such a distinction, granted the starting point that relations are real things. But it can be pointed out that if this thesis is a logical conclusion from a starting point which Peter held in common with the majority of scholastics, then perhaps his arguments are not sophistical after all.

CONCLUSION The preceding study has served as an introduction to only a portion of the philosophical doctrine of Petrus Thomae. Yet it has led through a large cross-section of his works and has introduced us to his method. As a consequence it is possible by way of conclusion to raise some general questions and hope to find some sort of adequate answer, though not always with the same certainty and completeness . Three questions which are important concerning any philosopher of the Franciscan School of this period are : what is his relation to Scotus, what is his personal stature as a scholar ; and what is his place in the Franciscan School ? 1. Peter's Relation to Scotus Sbaralea conjectured that Peter was a student under Scotus.¹ Teetaert asserts simply that Peter was a faithful disciple,² a prudent statement which does not carry any commitment as to whether Peter studied under Scotus. It would seem that this latter conclusion is all that can be arrived at from the words of Peter in his major works. Nowhere does he indicate that he knew Scotus personally. There is ample evidence, however, that not only was Peter a faithful follower doctrinally of Scotus, but that he was extremely well versed in the works of Scotus. For example, he undertakes to set down 12 propositions from Scotus on the relation of genus and specific difference. A perusal of Scotus ' works reveals the source of eight of these propositions in various works of Scotus ; the other four may be found in unedited scripta perhaps , but apparently they do not occur explicitly in Scotus' edited works . Hence , if anyone should argue that Peter shows such an acquaintance with Scotus' writings and doctrine as only a personal student could have, I would be inclined to agree. But it would appear that more evidence 1 Scoti, quantum conjicio, discipulus ... Sbaralea, Supplementum p. 368. Since there is no doubt that Peter was a disciple in the sense of espousing most of the doctrines of Scotus, I take his conjecture to concern the question whether Peter attended the latter's lectures. 2 Il fut un disciple fidèle de Duns Scot. Teetaert, " Pierre Thomas," DTC, 12, 2046.

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must be adduced before it can be said categorically that Peter attended Scotus' lectures at Paris.³ The statement that Peter was a faithful disciple of Scotus must be qualified. He was a critical disciple, and he was an active and original thinker. The latter point will be discussed under the next question. Peter was a critical follower of Scotus but not in a pejorative sense . If he felt he must disagree , he said so . But he gave his reasons and expounded his alternative opinion. Probably the clearest example occurs in Q. III of the Quodlibet. Peter is inquiring whether the transcendental attributes of truth and goodness are definable . He rejects all the current definitions , including that of Scotus. Truth is truth and goodness is goodness , and that is all that can be said. Be that as it may, Peter advances arguments against each suggested definition . Specifically against Scotus he questions whether truth and goodness are the formal objects of intellect and will. He criticizes Scotus for not properly distinguishing. Truth and goodness are fundamentally but not formally the adequate object of the intellect and will. They are per se but not primo modo the adequate object. In other words, transcendental truth is not the same as intelligibility (the adequate object per se primo modo of the intellect) , but it is the reason for it . Another interesting example occurs in the De esse intelligibili , where Peter sets about proving that a creature had some true and real esse from eternity in the mind of God . He uses statements from Scotus to prove his point even though Scotus held the opposite .

At other times, he is doubtful concerning Scotus'

meaning but is willing to disagree with him if necessary." On the other hand, for the most part Peter cites Scotus in verification of his arguments. Scotus and Aristotle are the authorities most frequently cited. And even when Peter does not cite Scotus, it is soon evident as one compares parallel questions in Scotus' works, that Peter is cleaving close to the line of argument developed by Scotus. Occasionally Peter adopts the role of a champion of Scotus' doctrine . This is especially

3 E. Buytaert, in the introduction to his edition of Peter's Quodlibet, inclines to the opinion that Peter was not a personal disciple of Scotus due to the fact that apparently he did not begin his writing career until almost ten years after the death of Scotus . We have commented above in the introduction to this work on the suggestion of I. Brady that Peter might have been a student rather of Aureoli at Toulouse. Quodlibet, Q. III , especially 43-44 , 290-316 and 55 , 105-110. 5 Quod creatura ab aeterno habuit esse aliquod verum realiter hoc ostendo ex dictis Scoti licet ipse senciat [sic] oppositum huius. De esse int. , Q. VIII, f. 119rb. De modis dist., Q. V , ff. 49 vb- 50vb.

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true, as would be expected , in the tract on the formal distinction. In Q. V of De modis distinctionis, on the relation of formal non-identity to the formal distinction , Peter first defends Scotus' doctrine by adding his own proofs. Then he endeavors to elucidate the doctrine by setting down certain propositions which negatively show what is not meant and positively indicate the implications of the doctrine. We have mentioned already the 12 propositions drawn from Scotus ' works and set down in Q. III of the same work. These propositions are adduced in refutation of Aureoli's attacks on the doctrine of the formal distinction between the essential notes of creatures which Scotus had taught . Peter appears, then, as a genuinely devoted and faithful disciple of Duns Scotus. But he did not follow blindly. He assented when intellectually convinced . He did not hesitate to dissent if reason seemed to point out another road. Peter was a critical Scotist , but not as radically so as Aureoli or Ockham . 2. Peter as a Scholar

In this section Peter will be presented as he appears in his writings. In the next section notice will be taken of his reputation among other scholars. Every man who undertakes the task of philosophizing leaves himself open to both adverse and favorable criticism . No one who really applies himself to the task of philosophical inquiry is without merit of some sort , nor without limitations. The question is, how much adverse and how much favorable criticism does a philosopher rightly deserve ? Naturally much depends on the personal convictions of the critic . But there is less danger of personal convictions entering in if the doctrinal content is not being put to the test but the method , if one is assaying not the product of a man's philosophizing but the act philosophizing. And this latter is what shall be undertaken . It is interesting to note that there is a difference of quality noticeable in Peter's works, and even between questions within the works. For example, the De ente and the De esse intelligibili , though I did not have an opportunity to study the latter to the same extent as the former, show signs of more careful planning, or more leisurely execution . On the other hand, for the most part the De modis distinctionis gives the impression of being class notes. Surprisingly enough this seems to be true also of the Quodlibet. And yet there are parts of the De modis distinctionis which are similar in thoroughness to the De ente, for example, the question on the distinction of reason ( Q. II) and the question on intrinsic modes ( Q. XI ) . As a matter of fact , the De modis distinctionis

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gives the impression of being a collection of questions in various stages of re-working and polishing - some perhaps are only a first draft, while others have been worked over for publication (e. g. , Qq . IX and X) . Whether this collection, if it is truly just a collection of questions written at different times, was made by Peter or by some disciple would be difficult to decide . Certainly at least part of it was gathered by Peter because he refers to it in a later work, as we have seen. Perhaps the study of all the manuscripts will give some indication. Any criticism of Peter's method must take into consideration the variety of quality of his works. Peter at his best does not show the defects which strike one so forcibly in some of his other works. It must be kept in mind, then, that perhaps the cause of some defects may be traced simply to the very nature of class notes. On the deficit side of the ledger are the following. The most consistent defect, one which causes difficulty throughout the study of his works, is his failure to define his terms . (In all fairness , though, we mention again that these terms may have been defined in I Sent. and II Sent. which we were unable to consult. ) This deficiency was particularly noted with regard to identity in general, illimitation of essential intimating, real predication, essence, thing, reality, formality. Closely allied to this is his use of terms in different meanings without explanation. We saw how confusing his treatment of formal identity became when he uses formality now for quiddity now for something of the quiddity. Similar difficulty arose over his analogous use of formal distinction, real distinction , distinction of reason. In default of definitions, another defect took added prominence, namely, his frequent failure to illustrate his meaning by examples, either generic or specific . So often it was necessary to ferret out his meaning, when by means of an example he could have opened up the whole problem, and the rest of his explanation would have been simple elucidation. The foregoing were defects as regards the elements of his method . On the score of his method of argumentation it must be pointed out that at times his argument leaps to the conclusion . To take an example, and this is true of many scholastics, " patet" is a convenient shortcut for Peter; but for the reader the major or the minor, whichever it may be, is not so clear. Of lesser importance is that fact that Peter is not as explicit as say St. Bonaventure in distinguishing between logical arguments and reasons of convenience .

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Where real problems enter in are, first , in his cryptic answers to objections. Usually the objections which Peter posits are not straw men. They are difficulties which strike to the heart of the problem. As such, many of these objections merited more attention than Peter gave them. Secondly, there are times when the complexity of Peter's line of argument may have drawn from some the encomium, subtilissimus; but force and clarity are lost in the process. An outstanding example will be found in the arguments for the possibility of separating a relation from its foundation. Some deficiencies as regards doctrine may also be mentioned in so far as they may be related to method . In the section on identity we noted the scant attention given to identity of reason. Formal identity, though more extensively treated, was not adequately explained both as to its nature and its kinds. In the section on distinction , the distinction of thing and thing is insufficiently explained ; the same can be said of Peter's effort to distinguish the formal and the real distinction . Both of these deficiencies probably would have been removed if Peter had given some attention to correlating the two different ways of distinguishing the modes of distinction. Each of these deficiencies detract in their own way from the completeness, the wholeness or integrity, of Peter's doctrine. Here we abstract from the difficulties or duties which may have intervened to prevent him from devoting to all his works the attention which he obviously gave to the De ente. On the side of the assets, despite the criticism just levelled against various points in Peter's manner of proving his theses, at the head of the list, I think, should be placed his orderly manner of argumentation especially in his more polished works. But even in the questions which appear to be more of the nature of class notes, Peter faithfully observes the same orderly plan : first , the question is stated ; then the arguments contra, ranging from two to eight, and be it noted , these too are seldom straw men, stock objections, but real problems. Then he states his program: the number of articles and their general content. Each article is subdivided, sometimes two and three times over. Admittedly this can and does cause confusion . But when executed in moderation it is an aid to the exposition . At the end the arguments contra, the " principal 7 Cf. for example the opening lines of De dist. praed.: "Ad evidentiam [distinctionis] praedicamentorum sic intendo procedere : primo enim praemittam aliqua necessaria, secundo adducam aliqua probabilia. Quantum ad primum, primo praemittam aliquas divisiones, secundo declarabo aliquas propositiones . Venice, f. 30va.

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arguments ", are summarily answered . Peter seldom departs from this form . It can only be that he had an orderly habit of mind, a quality desirable in any scholar. Furthermore, the censures levelled against Peter's elements of method and manner of arguing are true in the main only of some of his works. In the better works there is evidence of thoroughness and care . It shows what he was actually capable of. To take the question on the distinction of reason again as an example , the important terms are carefully defined ; only terms of common usage such as esse subiectivum are taken for granted. It is true, there is scarcely an example offered for any phase of this doctrine. But his method of arguing is thorough . Even the replies to the principal arguments are rather thoroughly handled. And so it might be concluded that Peter was capable of careful and profound workmanship. Due to the orderly bent of his mind and the evidence of such ability in some of his works, I would be inclined to conclude further that when this careful workmanship is not so apparent it is not due to carelessness . At times it may be due to uncertainty as he felt his way along into a new way of arguing his point or into a new view of the problem. But more often it undoubtedly was due to the fact that this was the first draft from which he lectured , filling in as he went along. To single out doctrines and place them among the assets is already to commit oneself as to the content ; and in the introduction this was placed outside the formal objective of this study . I will point out , nevertheless, that Peter would seem to have made some advance in reference to Scotistic doctrine : in the analysis of the distinction of reason ; in the analysis of intrinsic modes ; in the relating of identity and predication ; in the rebuttal of Aureoli's attacks on the formal distinction between genus and specific difference in creatures (though most Scotists would object, I believe, to the distinction introduced between reality and formality) ; and finally in his analysis of the coincidence of identities and distinctions, which though not completely and satisfactorily carried out does open up some interesting problems.

Peter

showed ability not only in advancing new arguments for Scotistic doctrines, but in discovering and investigating new implications and at times new doctrines.

We may approach the subject of Peter's stature as a scholar in another way. It was the custom in the Middle Ages to attach to a scholastic some title representative of his character and ability. There is no doubt that one must proceed with caution in such a matter and not put

13.

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too much store in titles of honor that may have been coined by overenthusiastic and not too objectively critical disciples . Nevertheless , it is possible at times to find doctors aptly summarized by their honorary titles. Peter was dubbed Doctor strenuus , Doctor proficuus, Doctor invincibilis , Doctor strenuus. An estimation might be made as to how apt these titles are in summarizing Peter's work. Doctor strenuus. This first title perhaps is the most apt . Peter certainly was vigorous in his work . There is seldom fewer than three arguments in proof of any major contention of his. In his better works, as we have seen, there is a thoroughness of detail even down to the disposition of doubts and objections. And he did not pick the easy way by bringing up inconsequential objections and doubts ; a man can give a false impression of fearlessness and erudition in such a manner. He tackles real problems, weighty objections, and offers a rebuttal to each. At times he is cryptic in this, it is true. But seldom does he lightly handle or sidestep a serious objection . On a wider scale , we might say that Peter at times was too thorough, "worrying" his subject about , approaching it now from this angle now from that. It involves him in repetition , in overarguing at times, so that he adds new arguments after a point has been sufficiently established ; though he does not approach the profusion of detail of an author like Mastrius. Definitely Peter shows conviction , determination, vigor in his work, all of which seems to be implied by the title : Doctor strenuus. Doctor proficuus . Du Cange understands proficuus to mean " profitable." This title carries a subjective connotation . Whoever gave Peter the title found his works to be of great use to himself. But he no doubt felt that others would find him useful also . Peter must have taken on this aspect for Formalists because of the wealth of arguments which he adduces for the formal distinction in God and creatures, as well as for his rebuttals of objections against the doctrine. In the controversy over the Immaculate Conception it would appear that Peter's tract was considered a valuable defense of this Marian prerogative.10 In these two fields, then, Peter evidently was considered a profitable source of argument and explanation. Doctor invincibilis . This is another title bearing subjective connotation. To agree or disagree with the title is to commit oneself as regards Du Cange, Glossarium . . ., V, 47 . 10 The Tours manuscript (n . 50 , 15 c. ) of this tract is entitled, "Defensorium celeberrime conceptionis gloriose Virginis Mariae. "

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the doctrines which Peter proposes . Franciscans in general no doubt considered Peter's arguments for the Immaculate Conception invincible. The Formalists naturally would adopt the same attitude toward his defense of the formal distinction. I will refrain from assaying the application of the title to his exposition of the doctrine on identity and distinction. Doctor serenus. At first sight this would seem to contradict the first title. Is it possible to be at once vigorous and serene ? Actually Peter would seem to combine the two qualities. He is vigorous in advancing refutations of the objections against the formal distinction . But nowhere does he become acrimonious. There is an admirable detachment and intellectual honesty about Peter's manner of presenting objections. against his position . He is detached in that he presents the objections objectively; he is honest in that he endeavors to present these objections without simplification. The best example is his treatment of Aureoli's arguments in Q. II of De modis distinctionis . Aureoli's case is presented with every effort at completeness and fairness, it would seem ; but Peter's serene spirit does not prevent him from vigorously upholding the contrary opinion . Lastly, in at least one manuscript Peter is referred to as : subtilissimus vir. The title invites comparison with Scotus. Since this study led to frequent reference to the corresponding tracts in Scotus, some comparisons naturally come to mind . First , on the point of subtlety, ignoring the pejorative sense attached to the word by the opponents of Scotus, it would appear that comparatively speaking Scotus would rather be subtilissimus and Peter subtilis. For subtle Peter was, taking the word to mean possessed of a penetrating mind that is always keenly aware of the logical implications of one's position . Subtlety is something more than orderliness, which Peter had. It is the ability to perceive when a break from traditional molds is necessary. It is the capability to carry through logically once the break has been made and a new vista opened up. Probably it is more than this. This much Peter evidenced . He was an original thinker, though not at all to the extent that Scotus was. Like Scotus he was a critical thinker, and in the sense that Scotus was, namely, testing rationally the doctrines received from others, rejecting what appeared defective, thinking his way through to an alternative position to replace the rejected doctrine . In stating this I do not mean to assent to the positions which Peter adopted in opposition to Scotus. I am speaking here of Peter's method . Whether one accepts Peter's

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thesis on the separability of a relation from its foundation or not, it must be admitted that he argues his point logically and forcefully from his starting point . Ordinarily Scotus is considered to have a style difficult of comprehension. Much of this difficulty comes from a technical terminology and a closeness of reasoning. Once this terminology is mastered it becomes easier to follow the line of reasoning. But even then thought always takes precedence over style. In comparison to Scotus, it must be said that Peter often shows less clarity. It is true that this is not as readily perceived in the more carefully thought out works. But in the other works , even when paraphrasing the thought of Scotus there is no improvement . Of course one must remember that no critical edition of Peter's work is available . Until such is available it will be impossible to judge how much of this difficulty is due to Peter and how much to successive scribes. But even after a critical edition is published I believe that it will be evident that Scotus possessed the clearer, sharper, more penetrating mind ; but that Peter, one of the first of his disciples , is far from the least of them.

3. Peter's Place in the Franciscan School In this final section we can look at Peter's reputation and his influence in the Franciscan School. Some idea of the esteem in which Peter was held can be gathered from the titles assigned to him, which have already been discussed . In addition to these titles , there are one or two other testimonials of the opinion held of him in the 15th century. The Cracow manuscript of a tract on the formalities in attributing the work to Peter speaks of him as " magnus Scotista " . " The London manuscript bears the title "Eximii Doctoris Petri Thomae Formalitates. "12 The Tours manuscript of the tract on the Immaculate Conception refers to him as "egregius et subtilissimus vir " .13 All of these titles combine to convey the impression that Peter was looked upon as an outstanding figure in the Franciscan School . Even granting, as we have said, a certain amount of exaggeration on the part of enthusiastic partisans, there must have been some foundation for their esteem . An added witness to this esteem , and perhaps this may be considered a more objective sign, is the number of times that Peter's works have

11 Cracow Univ. 2130. 12 London, Lambeth Palace n. 184. 13 Tours n. 50.

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been copied. Considering all the sources available on the manuscript history of Peter's works, I would say that one or more of Peter's nine works appear in 40 different manuscripts between the 14th and 17th century. Four of these manuscripts were written in the 14th century ; 26 were written in the 15th century ; 2 in the 16th ; and one in the 17th ; the rest are not dated . It is evident that the zenith of Peter's career as an influential Formalist and defender of the Immaculate Conception came a century after his death.14 It was not only as a Formalist that he was known. All of his works , De esse intelligibili , De ente, Quodlibet were still known and considered worthy of propagation in the 15th century. Nevertheless, it was probably mainly because he was a Formalist that he was popular. For his name is apparently forgotten in the 17th century revival of Scotistic doctrine when Formalism as a definite movement was then history. Mastrius, who presents a storehouse of citations of great and little Scotists, apparently does not know Peter. While, of course, at the present time it is necessary when one mentions Petrus Thomae to stop and explain who he was and when he lived, so little is he known. It is questionable how much may be inferred from the above facts concerning the influence which Peter exerted on his contemporaries and on later scholars in the Franciscan School. It must be supposed that if his works were considered worthy of being perpetuated it was because his doctrines and his arguments were accepted as worthy statements of the Franciscan tradition . But the extent to which he led others into his way of viewing reality cannot be determined at present . Little is known about all the men who made up the Formalist movement ; and their works have suffered the same fate as Peter's. All that one can say is that though the extent of the importance and influence of Peter in the Franciscan School especially during the 14th and 15th century cannot be determined at the present time, there is evidence that it may have been substantial. This study though limited is sufficient to show that Peter is a disciple of Scotus not the framer of a new system . His main importance, therefore, is in connection with Scotus. His main interest for us is historical. Peter is a link in a chain not a stanchion . However, if his philosophy

14 Though it may be true as Brady has pointed out (op . cit. , p. 177) that Peter's tract on the Immaculate Conception was not as influential upon 14th century authors as might have been expected , still the number of copies made of the tract argues to the fact that it was fairly well known at least in the 15th century and later.

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as a whole is not original, there are fresh insights here and there , as should be evident from this study of Peter's doctrine on identity and distinction. It would appear, then , and allowance is made for the fact that this has been only a limited study of his philosophy, that Petrus Thomae is a minor philosopher of the Franciscan School , but a philosopher whose acquaintance one must make in order to understand and trace the history of the Formalist Movement.

APPENDIX

THE WORKS OF PETRUS THOMAE For the convenience of the reader the works of Petrus Thomae are presented here in summary form together with the manuscripts and editions in which they are contained in whole or in part. Undoubtedly, since several manuscripts erroneously ascribed to Duns Scotus already have been identified as properly the work of Petrus Thomae, this list will in the future be increased . At present the only known work of which no copies have as yet been identified is his II Sent. The source of information concerning the manuscripts is Martin of Barcelona¹ unless otherwise noted .

I. Commentarium in primum librum sententiarum. 1. Rome, Bibl . Vat . lat . 1106 , 15 c. , 340 ff. II. De esse intelligibili. 1. Cambridge, Univ. Ff. III 23 , 16 c. , ff. 222-237. 2. Rome, Bibl. Vat. lat . 2190 , 15 c. , ff. 130-145. 3. Vienna, Staatsbibliothek, n . 1494 , 15 c . , ff . 103-122 . [ Glorieux].2 4. Erfurt, Amploniana, ms. Fol . 182 , ff. 134vb- 147vb. [Balic] .³

III. De ente. 1. Oxford, Magd. Coll. , n. 80, 14 c. , ff. 1-37 2. Rome, Bibl. Vat. lat . 2190 , 15 c . , ff. 1-62 . 3. Vienna, Staatsbibliothek, n. 1494 , 14 c. , ff. 1-46.

1 Martin of Barcelona , “Fra Pere Tomàs Doctor strenuus et invincibilis," Estudis Franciscans , 39 ( 1927) , 90-103. 2 P. Glorieux, La littérature quodlibétique, II , (Bibliothèque Thomiste 21 ), Paris, 1935, 228. C. Balic, "A propos de quelques ouvrages faussement attribués à J. Duns Scot," Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, II ( 1930) , 166. 177

Petrus Thomae

178 IV. Formalitates.¹ A. Martin of Barcelona :

1. Arezzo , Bibl. della Fraternità dei laici , ms . 432 , 15 c. , ff. 21-24.5 2. Assisi , Bibl . Comunale, ms . 659 , 15 c. , ff. 3a-27a [formalitates breves] and ff. 29a- 104 [formalitates conflatiles] . 3. Assisi, Bibl. Comunale( ? ) , 15 c . , [ no ff. given] . 4. Berlin , Staatsbibliothek, n. 975 (Theol . qu. 32) , 15 c. , ff. 1-48. 5. Cracow, Univ. , n . 2130 (BB VI 3 ) , 15 c. , ff. 4-40 and ff.68-126. 6. Escorial, ms. L, II , II , 14 c. , ff . 1—144. 7. Escorial, ms . P, III , 20 , 17 c. , ff. 55-63. 8. London, Lambeth Palace , n. 184, 15 c., ff. 184-238. 9. Madrid , Bibl. Nac . 1796, ff. 3a—6rb.6 10. Madrid, Bibl. Nac. , 2016 , 15 c. , ff. 1–95.

11. Madrid, Bibl . Nac. , 2017 , 15 c. , ff. 43v —51 v.7 12. München, Staatsbibliothek, ms . 26838 , 15 c., ff. 58—76. 13. Oxford , Merton Coll . , n . 133 , 15 c. , ff. 5—41 . 14. Oxford, Magd . Coll. , n. 16 , 15 c. , ff. 147-200 and f. 114a. 15. Oxford, Magd. Coll. , n. So , 14 c. , ff. 37-63. 16. Padua, Bibl. Ant. , Scaff. XIX n. 407, 15 c. , ff. 1—75 . 17. Paris, Bibl. Nat. , n. 3433 , 15 c. , [no ff. given] . 18. Rome, Bibl. Vat . Urbin . lat . 1491 , 15 c. , ff. 81-83. 19. Rome, Bibl. Vat. lat . 3130 , 14 C. , ff. 1-13 . 20. Strassburg, Bibl . Univ. , ms . lat . 292 , 15 c. , ff. 1-11г. 21. Turin, Bibl . Naz. , n . 981 (H. V. 32) , 15 c. , [ no ff. given] . 22. Vienna, Staatsbibliothek, n. 1494 (Univ. 307) , 15 c. , ff. 47a67a.8

4 In view of the impossibility of completely separating the two works sharing this common title, all the manuscripts relating to this subject are listed here according to sources alone . 5 Martin lists a second part of the same manuscript (ff. 54—68) which is entitled : " Petrus Thomas predictus : De prima et secunda intentione et earum explicatione. ” Judging from the title and the contents of both works this would not seem to be on the subject of the formalities. On the other hand, I do not recognize it as a part of any of the works of Peter which I have studied . This is another problem that must await further study. • Martin of Barcelona, "Notes descriptives de manuscrits franciscans de la Bibl . Nacional de Madrid , ” Estudis Franciscans, 45 ( 1933), 358. ? Martin, Ibid. , sets down this and the previous manuscript as definitely of the 15 c. , whereas in his previous article they were listed as of the 14 or 15 C. 8 Note that Martin listed this as a 14 c. manuscript the first time he mentioned it. Cf. III , 3 above .

Works

179

B. Balic : ⁹ 23. Erfurt, Amploniana, ms . Fol. 182 , 15 c. , ff. 113va-134vb.

C. Doucet :10 24. Naples, Nat. VIII , C. 89 , [ no date ; no ff.] . 25. Naples, Nat. VIII , F. 17, [no date ; no ff.]. 26. Florence, Laurent, Conv. sopp . , 129 , [no date ; no ff.] .

D. Meier : 11 27. Leipzig, Bibl. Univ. , Cod . Lat. 1348, 15 c. , ff. 302г - 309r.

E. Sbaralea : 12 28. Venice, ed. Nuciarelli , 16 c. , ff. 30v-32г. 29. Toledo, Conv. S. Jos. GG. n. 3 , [ no date ; no ff. ] .

V. Quodlibet. I. Vienna, Staatsbibliothek, n. 1494 , 15 c., ff. 67-103. 2. St. Bonaventure, N. Y., ed. by E. Buytaert and M. R. Hooper, 1957. VI. De unitate minori.

1. Rome, Bibl. Vat. lat. 2190 , 15 C. , ff. 113-125 . VII. De divite christiano.

1. Bordeaux, ms. 267 , 15 c. , ff. 32-44. 2. Paris , Bibl. Nat . lat . 3417 , 14 c. , f. 2. VIII. Liber de originali Virginis conceptione. 1. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, ms. n. 640 (theol . qu . 206) , 15 c. , ff. 317-388. 2. Madrid, Bibl. Observ. n. 1009 , [ no date ; no ff. ] .

3. Rome, Bibl. Vat . lat. 1288 , 14 c . , ff. 15—52. 4. Tours, n . 50 , 15 c . , ff. 1—100 .

C. Balic, op. cit., loc. cit. 10 V. Doucet, "Maitres Franciscains de Paris, " Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, 27 ( 1934) , 561 . 11 L. Meier, " Quibusdam codicibus manuscripts editio formalitatum Nicolai Lakmann, O. Min . , hucusque fulciatur, " Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati, 2 (1946) , 444—445 . 12 H. Sbaralea, Supplementum et Castigatio ad Scriptores Trium Ordinum S. Francisci, III , Rome, 1921 , 368–369.

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Petrus Thomae 5. Greifswald, Bibl. Rubenow, Cod . VIII . E. 38 , ff. 193-216 , 13 [no date] .1

6. Monumenta antiqua seraphica , 212a - 274b.14 7. Würzburg, Library of the Convent of Friars Minor, Clchq . I , 50 , 15 c . , ff. 1—216.15 13 L. Meier, "De schola Franciscana Erfordiensi saeculi XV, " Antonianum , 5 (1930) , 80, fn. 8 . 14 Cf. Balic, " Joannes Duns Scotus et historia Immaculatae Conceptionis," Antonianum , 30 ( 1955) , 433 . 15 L. Meier, "Citations scolastiques chez Jean Bremer, " Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, 4 ( 1932 ) , 181 , fn. 115. N. B. Martin of Barcelona (" Petrus Thomae . . ., Estudis Franciscans , 39 , 103 ) also lists three French translations of this work.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Algazel, Metaphysics , edit. by R. Muckle, St. Michael's Philosophical Series, Toronto, 1933. Antonius Sirectus , Formalitates moderniores de mente clarissimi doctoris subtilis Scoti, Venice, 1489. Antonius Trombetta, In tractatum formalitatum Scoticarum sententia , Venice , 1493 . Aristotle, The Basic Works of, edit. by R. McKeon, Lifetime Library, New York , 1941 . — The Works of, edit. by W. D. Ross , II , Oxford , 1947 . Balic, C. , " A propos de quelques ouvrages faussement attribués à J. Duns Scot," Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale, II ( 1930) , 160—188. "Joannes Duns Scotus et historia Immaculatae Conceptionis, " Antonianum, XXX ( 1955 ) , 359–488 . Brady, I., "The Development of the Doctrine on the Immaculate Conception in the Fourteenth Century After Aureoli , " Franciscan Studies, XV (1955) , 175-202 . Doucet, V., " Maitres Franciscains de Paris, " Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, XXVII ( 1934) , 531-564 . Franciscus Mayronis, Scripta, Venice, 1520. Glorieux, P., La Littérature Quodlibétique, II, Bibliothèque Thomiste 21 , Paris , 1935 . Grajewski, M. , The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus, Philosophical Series 15, Washington, D. C. , 1944 . Hauréau , B., Histoire de la Philosophie Scolastique, II , II , Paris , 1880. John of Cornubia, In libro Posteriorum Analyticorum quaestiones, in Opera Omnia Ioannis Duns Scoti, II , Vivès ed. , Paris, 1891 . John Duns Scotus, Opera Omnia, 26 vols . , Vivès ed . , Paris , 1891-1895 . De primo principio, edit . by E. Roche, Philosophy Series 5 , St. Bonaventure, 1949.

Ordinatio, II, Vatican, 1950. Martín de Barcelona, " Fra Pere Tomàs (XIV) , Doctor strenuus et invincibilis, " Estudis Franciscans, XXXIX ( 1927) , 90-103. Marcusantonius Zimara, Solutiones contradictionum in dictis Aristotelis et Averrois, in Opera Omnia Aristotelis, XI , Venice, 1550. Mastrius, B. , Opera Omnia, IV, Venice, 1708. 181

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Meier, L., "De schola Franciscana Erfordiensi Saeculi XV," Antonianum, V (1930), 57-94 , 157-202 , 333-362, 443–474 . - "Quibusdam Codicibus Manuscriptis Editio Formalitatum Nicolai Lakmann, O. Min. Hucusque Fulciatur, " Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati, II , Studi e Testi 122 , Vatican, 1946, 431-464. Nicholas Bonetus, Formalitates secundum viam Doctoris Subtilis, Venice, 1489 . Sbaralea, H., Supplementum et Castigatio ad Scriptores Trium Ordinum S. Francisci, III , Rome, 1921 . Teetaert, A., "Pierre Thomas, " Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, XII², Paris, 1935 , 2046—2049 . Thomas Acquinas, St., In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria, Marietti, Turin, 3rd ed. , 1935. Van de Woestyne, Z. , Cursus Philosophicus, II , Mechlin, 1933 . William Ockham, Super quattuor libros Sententiarum scripta, Lyon, 1495 . Wolter, A. , The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus, Philosophy Series 3 , St. Bonaventure, 1946.

INDEX

Abstraction, ultimate, 34, 35, 38, 43 fn., 46, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93 , 95, 98, 99, 108, 123 , 127, 133 , 142-148, 156. Accidents, 35 , 36, 71 , 82 , 127 ; as entia diminuta, 110 ; not intrinsic modes, 117-118 , 122 ; separability from subject, 76-78, 80, 163—164 ; subject as materia of, 163 ; union with subject, 23 , 26, 72 . Act and potency, 17, 55 , 98. Algazel , 55, 56, 150. Animality-rationality, as realities, 89 f.; distinction , 151 ; identity in a third, 29, 33 , 35, 44, 151 ; in formal predication, 45 ; relation to each other, 99 ; see also, genus and specific difference. Antonius Sirectus , 80, 84. Antonius Trombetta, 80, 91 . Aristotle, 12, 54, 56, 72 , 73 , 129 fn ., 150, 152, 158 ; categories, 155 ; difference and sameness, 152 ; kinds of opposition, 55, 56 ; per se predication, 20 ; unity and its kinds, 18 , 19, 21-22. Attributes, 20, 54, 56, 113 , 129 fn. , 130, 151 ; divine, see God, attributes ; proper, 79, 82, 89, 92, 102, 103 , 122-124 ; transcendental , see Transcendentals ; union with subject, 40. Augustine, St., 26, 43, 84. Averroes , 42.

Balic , C. , 3, 6, 177. Being, 13 , 17, 56, 83 , 97 , 105, 106, 114 , 116 , 117, 123 , 124-125 , 135 , 144, 159 ; identity with transcendental attributes, 26, 43 ; illimitation of, 27 ; and intrinsic modes, 26, 128 ; "parts" of, 70, 105, 128-129. Boethius, 82 . Bonaventure , St. 169. Brady, I., 2 fn. , 5 fn., 15 fn . , 167 nf., 175 fn.

Brulifer, Stephan, 139. Buytaert, E., 2 fn . , 14 fn . , 15, 167fn. Causes, 75, 76, 162. Coincidence, Rule of, see, Distinction , Identity. Concepts, diverse, 64, 66, 69, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 99, 107 , 108, 112 , 116, 127-128, 129, 131 , 138 , 148, 156 ; proper 124, 125-126, 127, 129, 132 , 159 ; quidditative, 34. Creatures, 91 , 152 ; dependence on God, 74 ; distinction between God and, 62 , 65 ; having esse in the mind of God, 167 ; modes proper to, 119.

Definition and defined , 22 , 42, 51, 59, 95, 108, 138 ; distinction of, 66 ; identity of, 31 , 42, 48 . Dependence, 73–76, 161–163 . Difference, 131 , 152 ; individual, 86, 102, 115 , 133 , 134-135 , 147, (see also Haecceity) ; specific, see Genus and specific difference . Distinction, 15 , 16, 17, 18 , 53 f. , 81 , 104, 144-150. adequate and inadequate, 114, 137, 139. compared with identity, 55, 56, 150-154 . essential, 5 , II , 37, 39, 56, 69, 70-80 , 84, 89, 109, 112 , 127, 133 , 134, 135 , 136 , 139 , 145-150, 151 , 154, 157, 159, 160 . ex natura rei, 56, 57 , 62 , 63 , 64, 68-70 , 81 , 89, 92, 94, 95, 100, 106, 107, 109, 113 , 114, 116 , 127, 128, 130, 133 , 135 , 136, 137, 138, • 144-150, 151 . -- formal , 1 , 2 fn. , 5 , 6, 10, 13 , 15 , 16, 17, 18 , 30, 38 , 40, 41 , 43 , 47, 56, 57, 65, 67, 87 , 89, 100-116, 117, 130 , 132 , 133 , 134, 135, 139, 144-150, 152, 153 , 155, 156, 168, 169. intentional, 93.

183

184

Index

modal, 128, 151 . - objective and subjective, 10, 56,57, 89, 115, 133 , 136, 139, 144—150, 158-159 . - of reason, 5 , 41 , 56, 57-68, 72 ; pure and non- pure, 57, 58, 63 , 64, 67, 133 , 136, 139 , 144-150, 155 , 169, 171. rationis ratiocinantis, 57 , 58. rationis ratiocinatae, 57 , 58. - – real, 5 , 13 , 32 , 39 , 41 , 46 , 54, 56, 57, 60, 64, 65, 66, 71 , 80-86 (inter rem et rem ) , 89 , 94, 133, 134, 136, 137, 138, 144—150, 156, 158 , 169 . secundum quid, 5 , 109, 110, III , 112, 114, 137–138, 146. rule for coincidence, 89, 92 , 109, 135, 144-150, 159, 171 . virtual, 58, 66, 67 , 68 , 117. Doucet, V. , 4, 70. Ens, 13, 70, 81 , 82 , 87, 106, 133 , 157 ; concept of, 13 , 70—71 . Ens diminutum , 109 , 110-111 , 156 . Ens rationis, 58, 59, 60 , 61 , 64, 66, 67, 69, 81 , 82 , 93 , 106, 156. Entalitas , 70. Entale, 70. Entity (entitas) , 29, 81 , 87, 90 ; secundum quid, 109-111 . Esse conceptibile (intelligibile) , 61 . Esse obiectivum, 60-61 , 64. Esse subiectivum, 60-61 , 64, 134, 158 , 171 . Essence, 23 , 24 , 30, 32 , 34, 68, 74, 77, 78, 99, 105 , 129 fn . , 149, 157, 161 ; and identical identity, 26— 27, 28, 34—35 , 42 , 44 ; and quiddity, 101, 103 ; comparison with res, 81-83 , 87, 102 ; definition , 7071 ; distinction, see Distinction , essential ; divine, see God , essence.

Form (forma) , 70, 86, 101 , 105 ; and matter, 17, 23 , 26, 71 , 76, 78, 97, 105, 163 ; comparison with intrinsic mode, 122, 124. Formalists , 1 , 16 , 41 , 42 , 91 , 100, IOI, 115, 144, 149, 153 , 172 , 175. Formaliter, 13 , 102 . Formality (formalitas) , 1 , 2 , 6-10, 13 , 38, 39-41 , 62 , 81 , 82, 83 , 100, 101 , 103—113 , 119, 128, 131 ,

133, 134, 136, 149, 169 ; comparison with intrinsic mode, 121 , 131 , comparison with a reality, 87—91 ; in God 39-41 ; identity of, 38— 39 ; quidditative and qualitative, 106 ; distinction, see Distinction, formal. Francis Mayron, 9 fn., 25 fn., 148 fn., 160. Genus, 17, 22, 23 , 121 , 158 ; and species, 23, 24 ; and specific difference, 11, 35 , 53 , 69 fn . , 89 , 90, 92 , 93-99 (distinction) , 100, 114, 117, 119, 123 , 126, 171 . Glorieux, P., 3 , 4 fn. God, attributes , 6, 30, 32 , 34 fn., 35 , 36, 37, 39-41 , 43 , 46, 50, 63, 69 fn. , 88 , 103 , 107 , 109, 112 , 113 , 114, 115, 117 , 119-121 (and modes), 142-143 , 157 ; essence, 28, 29, 34 fn. , 35 , 36, 37, 38, 39— 41 (identity in), 43 , 44, 46, 48, 71 fn., 83 , 115 , 116, 119, 125, 138, 142-143 ; Persons, 22, 24, 29 , 36, 38, 44 fn. , 71 fn ., 72, 78, 83-86 (distinction), 102 , 109, III , 119, 121 , 138, 141 , 143 , 144, 149, 151 , 153 , 158. Grajewski, M. , 1 fn. , 67, 90. Grosseteste, R. , 21 fn. Haecceity, 119, 134 ; see also Difference, individual. Hauréau , B., 154, 157, 164 .

Identity, 15 , 16, 17-18, 23 , 44, 152, 169. adequate and inadequate, 24, 30, 44 , 48, 137. comparison with distinction , 55— 56, 150-154. ex natura rei , 19, 25, 50, 51 . formal , 6, 21 , 23 , 24, 25, 33-36 (kinds) , 39-40, 42, 45 , 47, 88, 96, 109, III , 112, 125 , 141-144, 151 , 153, 157, 169, 170. identical (essential) , 6 , 10, 18, 21, 23, 24, 25-32, 33 , 34-47, 48, 50, 51 , 75, 79, 81 , 83 , 88, 97, 98, 109, 112 , 113, 114, 125 , 127, 141-144, 146, 151 , 161 . - in creatures, 42-44. -- in God, 36-41 , 43 . in predication, 44—47 , 171 . - in Scotus , 47-51 .

Index of formality, 6 , 34 fn . , 38—39. of reason, 19, 22 , 29, 169, 170. per se and per accidens, 24, 25. real, 22 , 25 , 48-49, 98, 125 . rule of coincidence of, 89, 143144, 159, 171 . secundum quid, 23-24, 33 , 35, 36, 110, 141-142 . subjective and objective, 25, 149. Illimitation of essential intimating, 10, 26-29, 37-38, 43 fn. , 169. Immaculate Conception, 15, 172 , 173, 174, 175. Independence, essential, 75, 77, 80. Infinity, 37-38, 40, 43, 45, 49—50, 63, 88, 98, 109, 114, 119—121 , 122 , 126, 157. Intrinsic modes, see Modes, intrinsic . James of Ascoli, 55 , 56. Joannes Anglicus, 3. Joannes a Cornubia, 21 fn.

Lychetus, 120. Martin of Barcelona, 1 fn. , 2, 3, 5 fn. , 7 fn. , 177 Mastrius, 58 , 67 , 80, 81 , 84, 85 , 131 , 139, 172 , 175. Matter, see Form and matter. Mauritius Hibernicus, 84. Meier, L., 4, 15 fn. Mode, 35 , 68, 72 , 81 , 82 , 83 , 102 ; intrinsic 6, 11 , 13 , 17, 26, 30, 32, 34 , 82 , 83 , 117–132, 138, 139, 156, 171 ; transcendental , 123 . Nicholas Bonetus, 80 .

Ockham , W. , 28 fn. , 81 , 160, 168. Ockhamists, 18. Opposition, 55. Order, essential, 74-75 . Perfection, 40 , 42 , 55 , 99 , 102 , 117 , 119, 122, 124 , 128 , 137 . Per se primo modo, 30, 87 , 102 , 103 , 108, 131 , 143 , 144 , 167 . Perseity, 20, 30-31 (modes) , 45 , 87, 118 , 124, 125 , 151 . Peter Aureoli , 2 fn . , 20 fn., 25, 28 fn. , 93-94 , 101 , 109 , 115 , 139, 149 , 153 , 160 fn . , 167 fn . , 168, 171 , 173.

185

Porphyry, 55. Predication, 44-47, 72 , 79, 99, 108, 112-113, 137, 169, 171 ; per se, 20-21 , 50, 51 , 87-88 , 102, 127 , 132 ; formal, 32 , 46–47, 88, 157 ; identical, 32, 44, 46-47, 88 ; through identity and inherence, 32; in quid and in quale 72 , 82 , 123 , 128, 135. Priority, 72, 77–80, 126. Property, 30, 33 , 34, 73 , 82, 102, 124, 125, 161.

Quid, 40, 70. Quidditalitas, 70, 103 , 115 . Quidditative, 70, 71 , 102 , 130. Quiddity (quidditas) , 13 , 40, 41 , 43, 44, 71 , 86, 97, 101 , 103 , 116, 121 , 123 , 124, 127, 128, 129 . Reale, 70, 82 . Realiter, 82 , 102 . Reality (realitas) , 13, 19, 40, 41 , 66, 69, 72 , 81 , 82 , 84, 86-99, 100, 109, 114, 115 , 116, 119 , 121 , 122, 126, 128 , 131 , 133 , 134 , 136, 138, 149, 157, 169. Reason (ratio) , 59 , 101 , 148. Rei, 82, 92 , 104, 105, 113 , 157. Relation, 53 , 55 , 74 , 75 , 102 , 109, 121, 122 , 142, 155, 156 fn . , 158 fn.; divine, 109, III ; of reason, 19, 29, 50, 62 fn. , 150 ; real, 20, 29, 39, 50, 62 fn.; without a foundation , II , 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 159–165. Res , 13, 86, 87, 91 , 97 , 102 , 103 , 104, 105, 123 , 128 ; distinction, 71 , 8183 , 101 , 136, 157 . Rule ofcoincidence , 5 ; see alsoIdentity, Distinction . Sameness , 17, 19, 23 , 45 , 152. Sbaralea, H. , 3 , 4, 9, 10, 154. Scotists, 16, 18 , 66, 80, 84 , 90, 91 , 92, 93 , 117, 118 , 119 , 125—126, 131 , 135, 138-139, 144, 171. Scotus, John Duns, 4 , 12 , 28 fn. , 39, 53, 71, 73, 74 , 75 , 80, 81 , 100, 103 , 116, 150 fn., 153 , 158 , 163 , 164 ; absolute and relative accidents, 159, 160 ; adequate and inadequate distinction, 114 ; adequate nonidentity, 42 , 137 comparison with Petrus Thomae, v-vi, 166-168 , 173-175 ; distinctionof genus and specific

186

Index

difference, 96-99 ; distinction in God, 83 , 85, III ; distinction of reason, 58, 65-68, 148-149 ; divi. sion of distinction , 136-139 ; "form", 101-102 ; formality and formal distinction , 106, 107, 114115 ; identity, 25, 45 , 47--51 ; mode of infinity in God, 119121 ; "reality", 86—87 , 90 . Separability, II , 54, 72, 77-79, 84, 85, 155, 157 , 159–165 (of relation and foundation) . Soul and powers, distinction, 89, 115, 147 ; identity, 28, 43 ; powers as realities, 92 . Species, 22, 23 , 24, 26, 36, 43-44, 55, 92 , 158 ; intellectual, 59 , 71 , 95, 96, 97, 98. Specific difference, 32, 44 ; see also Genus and specific difference .

Substance, 20, 22 , 71 , 74, 76, 78 , 82. 83 , 101, 118 , 119, 155, 160, 162 , Superior -inferior, 24, 43-44 , 97. Teetaert, A. , 2 , 3 , 4 fn. , 166 . Thing, 19, 20, 21 , 62 , 68, 70, 80, 83 , 100, 105 , 115 , 118, 123 , 127 , 128, 131 , 133 , 161 , 169. Thomas, St., 21 fn. Thomists, 17, 18. Transcendentals , 13 , 17 , 26, 27 , 54, 82, 83 , 88, 91 , 102, 103 , 105 , 106, 109, 116, 157 , 158, 167 ; distinction , 65, 114 ; identity with being, 27, 32, 45, 46. Unity, 18-19, 20, 21—23 ( kinds) , 26, 43, 48, 50, 53 , 54, 55 , 56, 91 , 112 , 140, 141 , 144, 150, 152 .

Whole and part, 42, III. William of Ware, 65.

Zerbius, 3.

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