Hypocrisy Ethical Investigations 9781460403532, 1551115573

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Hypocrisy

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Hypocrisy ethical investigations


Béla Szabados and Eldon Soifer

broadview press

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Copyright © 2004 Béla Szabados and Eldon Soifer All rights reserved. The use of this publication reproduced, transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, or stored in a retrieval system, without prior written consent of the publisher — or in the case of photocopying, a licence from Access Copyright (Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency) One Yonge Street, Suite 1900, Toronto, Ontario m5e 1e5 — is an infringement of the copyright law. National Library of Canada Cataloguing in Publication Szabados, Béla, 1942– Hypocrisy : ethical investigations / Béla Szabados and Eldon Soifer. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 1-55111-557-3 1. Hypocrisy.

I. Soifer, Eldon, 1960–

bj1535.h8s93 2004

II. Title. 179’.8

c2004-901555-9

Broadview Press, Ltd. is an independent, international publishing house, incorporated in 1985. Broadview believes in shared ownership, both with its employees and with the general public; since the year 2000 Broadview shares have traded publicly on the Toronto Venture Exchange under the symbol BDP. We welcome any comments and suggestions regarding any aspect of our publications — please feel free to contact us at the addresses below, or at [email protected] / www.broadviewpress.com North America Post Office Box 1243, Peterborough, Ontario, Canada k9j 7h5 Tel: (705) 743-8990 Fax: (705) 743-8353 customerservice @broadviewpress.com 3576 California Road, Orchard Park, New York USA 14127

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Broadview Press Ltd. gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program for our publishing activities. Typeset by Zack Taylor, www.zacktaylor.com This book is printed on 100% post-consumer recycled, ancient forest friendly paper. Printed in Canada

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For our students

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“Speak the old language, maybe unconsciously, but speak it in a manner that belongs to the newer world, without on that account necessarily being in accordance with its taste.” ludwig wittgenstein

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Contents

Acknowledgments 9 Introduction 11

part i: origins, method, and cases 1 Historical Sketch of a Concept 19 2 Remarks on Method 37 3 A Catalogue of Cases 47 part ii: moral theory 4 5 6 7

Virtue Ethics: Hypocrisy After Aristotle 67 Consequentialism and Hypocrisy 95 Kant and Hypocrisy 121 Egoism and Hypocrisy 161

part iii: privacy, tolerance, and social justice 8 9 10 11

Politics and Hypocrisy 175 Privacy and Hypocrisy 191 Tolerance and Hypocrisy 211 Double Standards and Equality 229

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part iv: deception: aspects and roles 12 Hypocrisy and Deception 241 13 Self-Deceptive Hypocrisies: The Complacent, the Self-Righteous, and the Cynical 255

14 Hypocrisy, Change of Mind, and Weakness of Will 271 part v: irony, hypocrisy, and socrates 15 Irony and Hypocrisy 289 16 The Complex Figure of Socrates 313 17 Socrates, Style, and Us 331 Concluding Reflections 335 Select Bibliography 343 Index 345

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Acknowledgments It took more than a decade of work to write this book. We persevered despite the heavy demands of teaching, other academic obligations, and lack of internal or external funding. In the course of our labours we had discussions with colleagues and friends who made useful comments on papers we presented at scholarly conferences or on various aspects of the topic of hypocrisy. Still others offered encouragement, moral support, or other sorts of help. Hereby we express our gratitude to them all, but would like to single out for special thanks Brenda Baker, Eugene Bertoldi, Allan Carlson, Roger Crisp, Michael Kubara, Avery Kolers, Ann Levi, Peter Loptson, Kai Nielsen, Tim Schroeder, William H. Shaw, and Janet Sisson for comments on or at our conference presentations. For informal discussions and encouragement, the authors are grateful to David and Joan Givner, David Elliott, Heather Hodgson, John Heintz, Lynn Loutzenhiser, William Perks, Ken McGovern, Mark Portnoy, Robert Richards, Roger Shiner, Stanley Stein, Joan Sandomirsky, and Florence Stratton. Carol Gieni helped with the typing and Corrine Gogal gave assistance with formatting the manuscript. The authors are also grateful to the advisory readers for Broadview Press and to John Burbidge who went through the manuscript in its entirety and made valuable suggestions for improving the book. We hereby invite readers to inform us of remaining errors or objections, so that we can continue to repair the book for possible future editions. Finally, we wish to thank Julia Gaunce, Humanities Editor at Broadview Press, for her editorial guidance and patience throughout the process. béla szabados and eldon soifer regina, saskatchewan

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Introduction “Hypocrisy” is one of the most important terms in our moral vocabulary, yet one of the least understood. Perhaps people assume that they “know it when they see it,” but they may feel uncomfortably uncertain when faced with a number of borderline cases, or with the task of distinguishing hypocrisy from related concepts such as weakness of will, self-deception, or irony. This book seeks to illuminate the concept of hypocrisy, perhaps at times contributing to that feeling of intellectual discomfort, but ultimately aiming to assist the understanding, and thereby dispel the unease. The chapters here explore the multiple roles of hypocrisy in our moral and political lives. They critically examine a wide range of perspectives on the nature, varieties, and significance of hypocrisy. The authors not only see hypocrisy as inherently worthy of treatment at the length and depth it receives here, but also as a key concept in investigating the field of morality in general, including its moralizing excesses. The occasions for these writings were scholarly conferences and seminars, yet our intended audience has always been wider. We discuss the small but growing philosophical literature on hypocrisy, but also draw on literature, politics, and life experience. Accordingly, we believe that this book will be of interest to anyone who has ever been tempted to accuse others of hypocrisy, or wondered about the possibility of having been hypocritical oneself. It aims not only to enrich and expand the field of moral philosophy and psychology, but also to interest the thoughtful reader from whatever background, who is willing to enter into dialogue with the arguments and examples contained within the text. Of course, we do not pretend to have dealt with hypocrisy in all the contexts in which it occurs. An attempt to do so would add many more years to the writing, and still assuredly come up short. Instead, we invite the reader to extend the discussion to a number of other contexts, not addressed directly in the text. Hypocrisy is usually taken to be morally objectionable, and with good reason. It is often understood as a form of deception in service of one’s own selfish interests. It has also been held to threaten the very possibility of the institution of morality, in much the same way that the skeptic threatens the edifice of knowledge. By undermining trust, it calls into question not only an important element of social well-being, but also our very ability to make moral judgments about other people.

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Despite the importance of hypocrisy in moral discourse, moral philosophers have largely ignored it. Only recently have a few thinkers begun to address the philosophical issues that arise in connection with this common moral concept.1 Perhaps this is because they have thought it a simple and thus a philosophically uninteresting matter to identify hypocrisy and assign it a straightforward moral value as evil, or indicative of a corrupt character in all its forms. But on closer examination it emerges that hypocrisy is closely related to a number of other concepts that do not share its moral status, such as weakness of will, protection of privacy, tolerance, and self-deception. This fact alone provides sufficient reason for philosophers to examine this concept more closely. Furthermore, the moral status of even clear cases of hypocrisy is not as straightforward as often assumed. It can be argued that certain forms of hypocrisy facilitate human interaction, or enable the vulnerable to protect themselves from the powerful, or perhaps are just morally neutral. If some forms of hypocrisy are beyond one’s conscious control, perhaps involving self-deception or even addiction, that would also affect judgments of its moral status. The chapters of this book aim to examine the moral dimensions of hypocrisy in all their variety. Furthermore, they aim to contribute to moral philosophy by discussing how various moral theories fare in accommodating this crucial and rich moral concept. It could be argued that hypocrisy is particularly relevant in the current age. There appears to be unprecedented use and extension of the concept of hypocrisy in contemporary discourse; and the pessimistic might point to the widespread gap between political rhetoric and action, between personal profession and action, and between what people “pass” as and what they genuinely are. Indeed, it could be suggested that hypocrisy is the central term of condemnation for our age. If this is so, there are several possible explanations. One such explanation stems from the suggestion that people in the post-modern era do not believe there are any genuine demands placed upon them by morality. In the absence of genuine morality, people think it right to pursue their own self-interest, and simply use the terminology of morality as a cover for that self-interest, or as a device for blaming others. Furthermore, in the absence of agreement about objective moral values, hypocrisy remains as the only moral criticism that still has any bite — a complaint that others do not acknowledge and live up to their own moral commitments, whatever those may be. Alternatively, accusations of hypocrisy may themselves be hypocritical, and provide occasions for accusers to promote their own agendas by assuming the moral high ground and hurling abusive epithets at their perceived opponents.

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Introduction

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Another explanation of the prevalence of hypocrisy takes a more accepting attitude toward the hypocrite. On this view, hypocrisy may be an excusable or even necessary response of individuals to unjust situations. Were it not for intolerance, there would be no need for individuals to try to “pass” as something they are not (e.g., Jews passing for Aryans, African-Americans passing for white, dissenting citizens behind the Iron Curtain passing for Communists, or homosexuals passing as heterosexuals). Perhaps, then, the hypocrisy of the age is prompted by some other failing of the age, such as its intolerance. But hypocrisy may be no more prevalent in this age than in others after all. Indeed, we seem to have moved beyond some of the rigid social structures and elaborate forms of denial that prompted so much hypocrisy in earlier ages (e.g., Victorian England, Chekhov’s Russia, or the court life of France in the heyday of Molière). And there have been condemnations of hypocrisy in every age, since at least the days of the Hebrew prophets. What is more, in an age in which human motivation has been studied empirically as never before, and in which, as a result, we have reason to be skeptical about the purity of motives for any action, it could be argued that discussions of hypocrisy are no longer appropriate at all. Perhaps the concept of hypocrisy is best displaced by forms of irony, including the irony of failures of self-knowledge. The approach in this book is not to offer a fixed account first and then apply it. In this, we follow the advice of no less a philosopher than Immanuel Kant, who claimed that, if definitions are in the offing, they should come at the end rather than at the beginning of a philosophical investigation. His reasoning was that the definition of a challenging concept cannot be understood unless the terms that figure in it are understood, and this can occur only at the end of the whole philosophical investigation. We hold, further, that the uses of the concept and their context must be taken into account, which makes the task even more complex. Instead, we begin by presenting a history and some paradigm cases of the concept. We then develop our analysis throughout the book as we encounter, confront, and treat moral and conceptual problems. In the process, we survey and critically assess a number of possible definitions of the term. At the same time, we remain open to the possibility that there may be no one definition, in the sense of necessary and sufficient conditions — there may be only a “family resemblance” between several uses of the term, as Wittgenstein would have it.2 We do a considerable amount of conceptual analysis, and although we also take account of linguistic intuitions, we refrain from imposing a merely stipulative definition. In the end, we aim for as positive and unified a perspective as possible without betraying the concept as it functions in everyday moral practice or sacrificing well-grounded distinctions. In any case, our aim throughout

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is to open up the concept rather than close it down, so we demonstrate the complexity of the concept by tracing its multifarious uses in oral discourse as well as in literature. Lastly, the reader will no doubt notice the fact of joint authorship. The very possibility of such an approach might be brought into question by traditional philosophy, for Plato’s picture of thinking as “the soul talking to itself ” might seem to leave no room for multiple thinkers. In the process of writing this, each of us has indeed engaged in the sort of activity Plato recommends — a splitting of the thinker into self and other for the purposes of internal dialogue and argument. But we believe that the addition of a real conversational partner who is not simply a manufactured alter ego or extension but a genuine source of difference and identity can only serve to improve the process. We consider this fact of joint authorship to be an important, not simply an incidental, feature of the content of, and the ways we engage philosophical activity in, this book. It is not just that there is someone to carry things forward when one person begins to feel bogged down — though that is a definite advantage. The risks of a narrow view, of an unchallenged dogmatism, of an exclusive cultural monolingualism are perhaps lessened, as counter-examples abound and the existential base for philosophical activity is broadened. Of course, the difficulty with such an approach is that two distinct authors are likely to have more unresolved differences than a single soul talking to itself. This may result either in covering over the bases of disagreement, or, if the disagreements become evident in the text, in a sense that the vision expressed is not as sharp as might otherwise be the case. If there is indeed some blurring of the vision here, it could be claimed that the ideal of a single lens and its intensity is sometimes overestimated; while there is a corresponding underestimation of Aristotle’s idea that “Our treatment will be adequate if we make it as precise as the subject matter allows.”3 The deliberate practice of a philosophy with bi-focals needs to be explored. Montaigne, who pioneered the essay form, remarked, “I learned a lot by writing — about myself and others.”4 So did we, by discussing and writing these essays on hypocrisy. No doubt the text will reveal that we still have much to learn. Indeed, writing, speaking and reading are, like any action, susceptible to hypocrisy, malign or benign. A comparison of the ways we approach and treat diverse views and authors, on the one hand, and ourselves, on the other, is probably revelatory of us. But such negative lessons should not prevent readers from benefiting from the positive insights we offer. We encourage readers to join in the conversation, and participate in the Socratic task of “caring for the soul,” as well as looking out for others.

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Introduction

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Notes 1. For recent philosophical work on this topic, see in particular: Roger Crisp and Christopher Cowton, “Hypocrisy and Moral Seriousness,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 31, 4 (1994) 343-49; Piers Benn, “What’s Wrong With Hypocrisy?” International Journal of Moral and Social Studies, 8 (1993) 223-35; Saul Smilansky, “On Practicing What We Preach,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 31 (1994) 73-79; Daniel Statman, “Hypocrisy and Self-Deception,” Philosophical Psychology, 10 (1997) 57-75; Thomas Hurka, “Hypocrisy: Not All It’s Cracked Down to Be,” in Principles: Short Essays on Ethics (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1994) 265-68; Ruth W. Grant, Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Christine McKinnon, “Hypocrisy, With a Note on Integrity,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 28, 4 (1991) 321-29; and “Hypocrisy and the Good of Character Possession,” Dialogue, XLI (2002) 715-39; William H. Shaw, “Is Hypocrisy a Problem for Consequentialism?” Utilitas, 11, 3 (1999) 33-35; Dan Turner, “Hypocrisy,” Metaphilosophy, 21, 3 (1990) 262-69; Judith Shklar, “Let Us Not Be Hypocritical,” in Ordinary Vices (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984) 45-79; Eva Feder Kittay, “On Hypocrisy,” Metaphilosophy, 13, 3-4 (1982) 277-89; Béla Szabados, “Hypocrisy,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 9, 2 (1979) 195210. 2. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), paragraph 43. 3. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1094b:12-13. 4. Michel de Montaigne, Essays, trans. J.M. Cohen (London: Penguin Books, 1958).

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part i

Origins, Method, and Cases

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1 Historical Sketch of a Concept “If the genealogist listens to history, he finds that there is something altogether different behind things: not a timeless or essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.” 1 michel foucault Our word “hypocrisy” comes from ancient Greek roots, and its use as a term of moral criticism is traceable to biblical sources, especially to the New Testament report of what Jesus called the Pharisees. Although we are aware of the potential fallacy of thinking that the meaning of a term can be determined entirely by reference to its ancient uses, we believe that it is also possible to gain some insight into difficult concepts by exploring the etymological roots of the terms we use for them. Accordingly, we shall explore these ancient uses as a starting point for understanding the elusive concept of hypocrisy.

A. Greek Theatre The ancient Greek origins of “hypocrisy” lie in classic theatre where an individual speaker, hupokrites, was differentiated from the otherwise homogeneous chorus and made to speak under (hupo-), and separate (krinein) from it.2 Thus the word hupokrinesthai meant “to reply” or “to act a part,” and hupokrisia meant “to speak in a dialogue” or “to act on the stage.” The word also came to be used in the extended sense of “performing a function,” as when Aristotle in his Politics writes of “to basilikon hupokrinesthai,” meaning “performing the function or role of the king,” rather than the contextual absurdity of “pretending to be king,” or a “pretender to the throne” — an altogether different matter.3 It is well to notice, then, that the early Greek meaning of the word is morally neutral.4 This morally neutral Greek usage also has interesting links with our current notion insofar as the language of theatre is still present in our discourse about hypocrisy. Hypocrites are like actors, pretending to be what they are not, saying things they do not mean, acting out parts to which they have only momentary, if any, allegiance. The actor who plays Othello does

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not really murder Desdemona out of jealousy or any other motive. He pretends to kill her and acts as if he is jealous of her. There is a distance between theatre and real life traditionally marked by the sharp separation of the stage from the audience.5 We expect and respect this distance and are embarrassed by, and resentful of, those who are unaware of it and, say, mount the stage to rescue Desdemona to the consternation of her fellow actors and the audience. We do not blame actors for their assumption of a misleading appearance, because everyone is familiar with the conventions involved; and so no real deception takes place.6 In fact the more compelling the acting, the more we praise the actor, while the more convincing the hypocrisy the more we blame the unmasked hypocrite. The moral criticism of the hypocrite seems to stem crucially from the fact that there is no convention whereby others are led to perceive the truth. Indeed, cases in ordinary conversation in which what is said is intended to be understood as false would more naturally be described as “ironic” or “sarcastic” than as “hypocritical.”7

B. Jesus and the Pharisees Further insight into the Western conception of hypocrisy and the reasons for attaching moral blame to it can be found in the biblical uses of the term. In the third century B.C.E., Palestinian Jews translated the Old Testament into Greek and used the word “hypocrite” to render the Hebrew word “hanef.” This word has been translated into English as a “godless person,” but more specifically refers to a person with a crooked or deceptive heart. Thus the passage rendered in English as “godless in heart” in Job 36:13 was translated as hupokritai kardia in ancient Greek. Clearly in this usage the word carries a deeply pejorative connotation, hypocrisy being the way a godless person acts. With this the original Greek meaning associated with the theatre also kicks in: the godless hide their true face; like actors, they wear a mask, playing the role of a devoted person, putting on the appearance of being righteous.8 This morally negative usage of the word was carried over to the New Testament and later Christianity. Consider first the following key passage: Then the Pharisees went off and began to plot how they might trap Jesus in speech. They sent their disciples to him, accompanied by Herodian sympathizers, who said: “Teacher, we know that you are a truthful man and that you teach God’s way sincerely. You court no one’s favor and do not act out of regard for a person’s status. Give us your opinion, then, in this case. Is it lawful to pay tax to the emperor or not?” Jesus recognized their

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bad faith and said to them, “Why are you trying to trip me up, you hypocrites?”9 Clearly this claim that the Pharisees are hypocrites is meant as an accusation, but what, exactly, does their moral wrong consist of? From the perspective of the writer of the gospel, of course, Jesus is the embodiment of all that is good, and thus anyone who questions him or remains unconvinced is making a mistake. But surely mere skepticism about who Jesus is does not amount to hypocrisy. It may be a failure of perception, and perhaps even a moral failing of some sort, but that failing seems distinct from hypocrisy. Notice that it is not merely the writer of the gospel who here describes the Pharisees as hypocrites, but the attribution is directly to Jesus. Assuming that this biblical usage is more closely related to both the Greek concept of “playing a part” and to our modern concept, it is worthwhile to consider what other features of the described situation might warrant the label “hypocrisy.” The Pharisees did not merely doubt Jesus, they did something about it. They tried to “trap Jesus in speech,” thereby demonstrating “bad faith.” Presumably it is these features that warrant the accusation of hypocrisy. But there are several different ways in which we might understand the situation. Consider first of all the role of the Pharisees. They were, in effect, the “keepers of the faith,” who took responsibility for establishing the standards of observation and belief for most Jews of their time. One aspect of belief that might properly fall within this mandate would be beliefs concerning the arrival of the messiah. It must be remembered that in the times of the Pharisees in question, there were several people who claimed to be the messiah, and following people who turned out to be false messiahs led many Jews to their destruction. Now even though in the Gospel of Matthew Jesus has not made any such public claim, some people thought him to be the messiah. What, then, should be the response of people charged with protecting the faith to a claim that someone is the messiah? A healthy skepticism, issuing in subjecting the claimant to “testing,” might seem in order. Certainly, one might look for signs that the individual in question does indeed meet accepted criteria for being the messiah, but one might also look for indications that he does not meet the criteria. One way of establishing the latter might be to engage the individual in verbal dispute, and perhaps in the process set “traps” which an unwary false messiah might fall into. Notice that doing this does indeed involve a sort of “playing of a part” — the interrogators might say things they do not really believe as part of the test, for example to see whether the individual being interrogated catches the error and corrects it. It is not clear, however, that there is any moral wrongdoing involved in this behaviour: the

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Pharisees may be simply performing the functions of their office. Of course, if we take it as a given that an individual is indeed the true messiah, then people trying to trip him up verbally, and prove him not to be, are clearly engaged in a somewhat unsavoury behaviour. But this is not an adequate explanation of the strong moral condemnation implied in the gospel’s usage of the term, for the gospel does not merely note the fact that the Pharisees, in the process of interrogating and testing Jesus, sometimes said things they did not believe. That by itself, even if they were mistaken in their actions, may not be seen as morally blameworthy, any more than playing the “devil’s advocate” would be in the later Church or in today’s classroom. The mere fact that this behaviour took place against a background of tripping up one who is accepted as good is not sufficient to lend this passage the required quality of negative moral criticism. If the Pharisees were just doing their jobs, as suggested above, then what is the moral criticism here? Perhaps an answer can be found if we make an assumption about the passage in question. Suppose that the Pharisees had available to them adequate evidence to establish that Jesus was indeed the genuine messiah. In this case, the skeptical attitude outlined above would no longer be appropriate. We would expect true defenders of the faith to accept the messiah, in this case, and encourage others to do so as well. If we attribute this recognition of Jesus as the messiah to the Pharisees, then their continued behaviour of plotting to trap him in speech does indeed call out for explanation. If we make one plausible further assumption, an explanation emerges which might indeed legitimate moral criticism of the Pharisees. This further assumption is that the Pharisees were enjoying a position of relative power, and believed that the recognition of a genuine messiah would reduce or eliminate their power, and with it their comfortable existence. The effort to trap Jesus in speech might then be seen, not as a genuine effort to discover the truth, but rather as an effort to evade the evidence and to protect their own selfish interests at the expense of the truth. This description does indeed seem to bring the passage in question into line with the current moral meaning of the term “hypocrisy.” The elements of saying things one does not really mean and selfishness, in conjunction with each other, seem to be emerging as critical elements of hypocrisy. A similar picture emerges if we adopt a slightly different interpretation of the Pharisees’ activities. Perhaps the manner in which the Pharisees were trying to “trap Jesus in speech” is not that they wanted to catch him giving a false answer, but rather that they wanted to force him to answer a question in a situation in which any possible answer would create difficulties. For instance, this would be the case if the Pharisees attempted to draw Jesus

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into a compromising utterance that would suggest that Roman rule was not legitimate. Compare a situation in which someone pushes a politician to take a position on a question that is political dynamite, such as abortion. Some people are adamant supporters of one position on this issue, and others are just as adamant supporters of the opposite side. In this case, it could be that the person asking the question is not sincerely interested in the politician’s opinion, but asks the question simply because any answer given is likely to lose the politician popularity in some quarters. If the Pharisees were trying to put Jesus in such a situation, then their lack of sincerity, in appearing to want an answer when they were not really interested in it, is consistent with our modern conception of hypocrisy. But why would the Pharisees engage in such behaviour? Again, the answer might be found in self-interest — the Pharisees might see Jesus as a political competitor, threatening their privileged position. If one takes this view of the Pharisees’ behaviour, then it again becomes possible to discern several elements of our contemporary conception of hypocrisy in their questioning. An additional feature of the situation is discernible when we consider how Jesus is approached for questioning. Recall: “Teacher, we know that you are a truthful man and that you teach God’s way sincerely.”10 This pretence of ingratiating good will is no mere politesse to another but, given the recognition of the Pharisees’ ill will, masks an attempt to test and discredit a rival religious/ethical leader. Such a masking of one’s true intent may also fit well with our modern conception of hypocrisy. Another biblical passage may cast further light on this emerging term of moral censure: The scribes and the Pharisees have succeeded Moses as teachers; therefore do everything and observe everything they tell you. But do not follow their example. Their words are bold but their deeds are few . . . Woe to you scribes and Pharisees, you frauds! You pay tithes on mint and herbs and seeds while neglecting the weightier matters of the law, justice and mercy and good faith. It is these that you should have practiced, without neglecting the others. . . . Thus you present to view a holy exterior while hypocrisy and evil fill you within.11 Several further elements of our current concept of hypocrisy can be found in this passage. First of all, the Pharisees are described as teaching the right things, but failing to live up to them in practice. Thus there is a subtle shift in the kind of inconsistency involved in hypocrisy. The failure to practice

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what one preaches need not entail that one does not “really” believe what one preaches. For the simple failure to live up to one’s own standards might be mere moral weakness. The case requires some additional element to become more clearly a case of hypocrisy.12 For example, the hypocrisy of the Pharisees may depend on their knowledge that they fell short of their announced ideals, while trying to prevent others from gaining that knowledge. In this light, they might be seen as making grand statements as a way of protecting their reputations. If the Pharisees were indeed failing to practise what they preached, there are two other elements that may be relevant to their alleged hypocrisy. The first is that the Pharisees apparently applied a sort of double standard. They imposed upon other people strict laws and demanded a moral rigour that they themselves did not follow, or followed only selectively. “They bind up heavy loads, hard to carry, to lay on other men’s shoulders, while they themselves will not lift a finger to budge them.”13 This application of a double standard also seems characteristic of our modern conception of hypocrisy, as in cases of rebellious teenagers who accuse their parents of hypocrisy when the parents tell them not to smoke or drink while doing so themselves.14 The other element that seems relevant here is that the Pharisees stand accused of trying to get a good reputation by doing good deeds only when they are conspicuous, or by performing the duties that are easy while avoiding the ones that are more onerous. There is abundant textual evidence that this is part of the criticism of the Pharisees by Jesus. Consider, for example: All their works are performed to be seen. They widen their phylacteries and wear huge tassels. They are fond of places of honor at banquets and the front seats in synagogues, of marks of respect in public and of being called “Rabbi” . . . You outwardly appear righteous to men, but within you are full of hypocrisy and iniquity …15 This theme of a gap between the public display of righteousness and the private lack of it is further underscored: “You are like whitewashed tombs, beautiful to look at on the outside but inside full of filth and dead men’s bones.”16 This allusion to “whitewashed tombs” or “whited sepulchres” is significant, for it will recur in Dante’s influential portrait of the hypocrite in the medieval period. It is also noteworthy that one Hebrew word for “hypocrisy” is tsavu’a meaning “painted,” “displaying an exterior coat of paint,” or “put on,” all suggesting artificiality and insincerity in religious and ethical matters. On this picture the hypocrite is an easy, if not a free, rider who seeks religious status, moral respect or political/social power without putting in the

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moral effort generally required to acquire these desired goals. The point can perhaps be made by setting two aphorisms against each other: In the beginning there may have been the word, but talk is cheap. When the Pharisees do perform their few deeds, they self-indulgently choose those parts of the law that are easily dispensed with and can be seen by an audience, such as tithing. At the same time they fail to apply to themselves the morally demanding strictures concerning the central parts of the written Law of Moses having to do with justice, mercy and good faith. It is important to note that the moral content of the criticism here has to do with not what is done (which are all right things according to the Law of Moses, which as observant Jews, both Jesus and the Pharisees had in common), but how it is done and what motivates the doing. The Pharisees are accused of doing the right things from the wrong motives, pretending to a holier-than-thou attitude in being devoted to the law and God, when in fact they are motivated by selfish concerns such as looking good in the eyes of others. So there is a deliberate effort to deceive their audience through a misuse of the religious and moral system for their own ends. Hypocrisy here is seen to consist in pretending to be motivated by religious and moral principles when one is simply looking out for one’s own interests. To modern eyes this may seem a rather harsh criticism, especially if we believe actions to be motivationally over-determined, according to which one may not be able to distinguish one’s “genuine” motivations from other motivating factors. It is important here to keep in mind, however, the singular importance of the religious life and the personal nature of the relationship to God in the history of Judeo-Christianity. A parallel criticism recurs with Martin Luther’s attempts to reform Catholicism and its excesses during the Reformation. Keeping in mind especially the issue of the sale of indulgences — the sale of letters of pardon for sins — consider the following passage from Luther: It does not help the soul if the body is adorned with the sacred robes of priests or dwells in sacred places, or is occupied with sacred duties, or prays, fasts, abstains from certain kinds of food, or does any work that can be done by the body or in the body. The righteousness and the freedom of the soul require something far different since the things which have been mentioned could be done by any wicked person. Such works produce nothing but hypocrites. On the other hand, it will not harm the soul if the body is clothed in secular dress, dwells in unconsecrated places,

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part i Origins, Method, and Cases eats and drinks as others do, does not pray aloud, and neglects to do all the above mentioned things which hypocrites can do.17

Jesus and Luther both aim to deter an inclination to reduce the religious life to a mere playing of social roles or to an empty going through of the motions of ritual. Indeed, the critique suggests an element of depersonalization in hypocrisy: the Pharisees do not value the religious/ethical ideals they profess for their own sake. Since it is highly unlikely that all Pharisees lacked purity of heart, and since it is acknowledged that they were the most accurate exegetes of the law, what we have here should probably not be read as a portrait of the Pharisees, but rather as an instructive caricature.

C. Who Is to Judge? We have seen that the Pharisees are charged with deceitfully pretending to righteousness and religious piety when in fact they are merely interested in maintaining or advancing their own sectarian interests. Implicit in this accusation is a sharp distinction between the mere appearance of being moral and moral reality. The biblical Jesus seems to be expressing the view that the moral worth of a person is inner, residing in the character of his or her motives, which is readily accessible only to that person and to God. The performance of appropriate actions is simply an external sign of inner worth, virtue or piety. This makes possible the recognition of a new form of hypocrisy where a person pretends to an inner worth or moral character by conforming to the appropriate behaviour, presenting to public view a “holy exterior,” giving the impression of genuine piety or exclusive devotion to God, while in fact having selfish ulterior motives. Hypocrites exploit the gap between the outward acts of being righteous and “purity of heart” by manipulating the evidence to their own advantage and to the disadvantage of others, thereby subverting the reliability of the evidence on which we base our judgments. This amounts to a severe charge of insincere behaviour in religion and morality, domains of life where sincerity is not only expected but essential.18 The possibility of a gap between the outer signs of morality or piety and the true inner morality or piety raises a further issue for morality, however, which also illuminates some aspects of hypocrisy. This involves the question of whether it is permissible to form moral judgments about others. The Bible seems to enjoin us not to: If you want to avoid judgment, stop passing judgment. Your verdict on others will be the verdict passed on to you. The measure

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with which you measure will be used to measure you. Why look at the speck in your brother’s eye when you miss the plank in your own? How can you say to your brother, “Let me take that speck out of your eye,” while all the time the plank remains in your own? You hypocrite! Remove the plank from your eye first, then you will see clearly to take the speck from your brother’s eye.19 What is evident is that Jesus here opens up the concept of hypocrisy by taking the literal standard of purity or cleanness and extending it to the deeper level of inner purity. This may be seen as either a retrieval of a neglected or erased value of the Jewish tradition, or as an upping of the religious/ethical ante, but either way it has the effect of moral levelling by puncturing postures of moral superiority and making moral judgment more difficult. Does this passage perhaps reveal that moral judgment is impossible without some degree of hypocrisy? Purity of heart as the inner standard of righteousness is not only a perfectionist ideal but elusive and unavailable except to an omniscient Other, and this not only makes hypocrisy possible but in principle renders any moral judgment vulnerable to error. So any positive moral judgment to some extent involves charity of interpretation and any negative moral judgment to some extent must involve the lack of it, in that both include the pretension of having access to another’s motives and inner life. In the case of negative moral judgment, this pretension may be driven by the desire to gain ascendance over the other. Thus the implied purity of heart of the accuser of hypocrisy is now seen as somewhat impure and the anti-hypocrites seem to collapse into hypocrisy themselves. So, the moral may be that we ought not judge others on the basis of their external actions, for we secretly harbour the same motives that drive those actions, and thus our hearts may be no purer then theirs. As the concept of hypocrisy is extended and opened up in these biblical fragments, the very idea of sincere reflective judgment is brought into question. The judging conscience is never quite up to the moral superiority it claims for itself, thus collapsing under its own weight. So an unnoticed form of hypocrisy is brought out into the open. One who condemns or criticizes another for that of which one is oneself guilty, whether in deed or motive, is a hypocrite too, since such a person pretends to be what s/he is not, namely a morally privileged being. Initially this may seem a global repudiation of moral judgment in the sense of condemnation of others. On reflection, however, the admonition here should perhaps be viewed simply as a cautionary remark that we should

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be consistent in the application of moral standards when judging others and ourselves, and that we should not be judgmental. On such a reading, moral judgment need not, by its very nature, be tinged with hypocrisy. Nevertheless if moral judgment is to be of things such as intentions, and we can really never know the intentions of others, there is still a significant problem. When we make judgments about things we cannot know, we are either doing so for some self-serving purpose, or at least pretending to be able to do something we in fact cannot do. Either way, we appear to be vulnerable to an accusation of hypocrisy. Thus a case can still be made for the claim that all attempts to judge others morally are inherently hypocritical. The reference to forgetting or overlooking “a plank in our own eye” when criticizing others opens up space for self-deceptive hypocrisy in many cases of judging others. We are hypocrites not only when we deceitfully pretend to others that we are righteous when we know we are not, but also when in judging others we complacently or self-deceptively pretend to ourselves that we are much more righteous than they are. Jesus points to this form of “inner hypocrisy” involved in many cases of blaming others. This species of hypocrisy was named and elaborated much later by the English divine Joseph Butler, even though it already occurs, without being named, as early as the second Book of Samuel. There the prophet Nathan solicits King David’s judgment on a rich man who takes from his poor neighbour to fulfill his duties as host.20 David passes harsh judgment on the man, only to learn that the story was meant as a parallel to David’s own behaviour. The parable told makes it evident that David makes use of a double standard in judging others and himself and Nathan’s intervention enables David to see through his own complacent pretence that he is morally superior to the repugnant host in the story. It is interesting to note that Nathan himself uses the story as a pretext for enabling David to judge himself properly through his act of passing judgment on another. David judges on the basis of certain moral standards, and he is in turn judged by those standards.

D. Dante’s Inferno The biblical features of hypocrisy we encountered recur, adapted to a transformed cultural setting, in the most influential medieval depiction of hypocrisy, which is to be found in canto 23 of Dante’s Inferno. In Dante’s poetic vision, the hypocrite is a kind of “falsifier” or deceiver who, together with the other falsifiers such as alchemists, impersonators, counterfeiters and liars, occupies the “lowest level of lower hell.” The sin of these falsifiers is symbolized by a devastating disease that alters their appearance. As they tried to change

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the aspect of things, so are they changed by repugnant maladies. The hypocrites are described as “a painted people,” which is resonant with Jesus’ condemnation of them as “whitewashed tombs” or “whited sepulchres.” Again, they also speak of themselves as “sad faced” or “sorry” hypocrites, in allusion to the biblical accusation of those who “look glum and change the appearance of their faces, so that others may see they are fasting.” Consider: About us now in the depth of the pit we found a painted people, weary and defeated. Slowly, in pain, they paced it round and round. All wore great cloaks cut to as ample a size as those worn by the Benedictines of Cluny. The enormous hoods were drawn over their eyes. The outside is all dazzle, golden and fair; the inside, lead, so heavy that Frederick’s capes, compared to these, would seem as light as air … “These burnished robes are of thick lead,” said one, “and are hung on us like counterweights, so heavy that we, their heavy fulcrums, creak and groan.”21 Dante’s portrait of the hypocrite then adopts and exploits the biblical dichotomy between inner moral worth or its lack, and a deceptive outward appearance of it. This way they seem morally or religiously superior to others. The hypocrites, even while they are alive, appear to be “all dazzle, golden and fair” wearing gilded monkish robes, which are lined with lead. The ostentatious robes conceal the true inner nature of their wearers. The habit of the Benedictine monks of Cluny was especially ample and elegant and their length of sleeves and amplitude of hood accentuated their appearance of holiness. In this respect, too, these monks resembled the Pharisees who “enlarge the border of their garments and make broad their phylacteries.” The intended effect on the public is an impression of special religiosity and devotion to God. However, Dante also enriches his portrait by describing the psychological effects of hypocrisy on its possessors, which are not referred to in the biblical passages. Like the heavy, burdensome cloaks of thick lead, hypocrisy weighs people down; its “narrow way and heavy burden” makes for “weary and defeated” humans. The constant playing of roles, of keeping up appearances, is not only too much work but results in the depersonalization of the hypocrite,

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since it robs him or her of spontaneity. Dante’s hypocritical monks identify themselves by saying, “Jovial Friars and Bolognese were we. We were chosen jointly . . . to keep the peace. . . .”22 The Jovial Friars were an order of military monks whose original aim was to serve as peacemakers and protectors of the weak, but their observance of the rules became so scandalously lax and their management so self-seeking that they themselves promoted inequity and disturbance of the peace, to the point where their order eventually had to be disbanded.

E. Modern Adaptations Both the biblical and the medieval pictures generally depict the hypocrite as a villain who is a conscious dissembler and a deliberate deceiver of others, even though some of the biblical remarks suggest that there may be self-deceptive hypocrites. On the other hand, our modern conception of hypocrisy tends to highlight cases of self-deceptive, or at any rate not fully conscious, hypocrisy, where people pretend to themselves, and no longer primarily to others, to be what they are not. This singling out of self-deceptive hypocrisy introduces another paradigm beside the traditional self-conscious hypocrite out to deceive others. This further opening up of the concept is largely traceable in British moral philosophy to the Anglican divine Joseph Butler, who in the early eighteenth century gave a compelling portrait of the new hypocrite: There is plainly in the generality of mankind, an absence of doubt or distrust, in a very great measure, as to their moral character and behavior; and likewise a disposition to take for granted, that all is well with them in these respects. The former is owing to their not reflecting, not exercising their judgment upon themselves; the latter, to self-love.23 These people have so fixed and steady an eye upon their own interest, . . . and the interest of those whom they consider themselves, as in a manner regard nothing else; their views are almost confined to this alone. Now we cannot be acquainted with, or in any propriety of speech be said to know anything, but what we attend to. If therefore they attend only to one side, they really will not, cannot see or know what is to be alleged on the other. Though a man hath the

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best eyes in the world, he cannot see any way but that which he turns them. Thus these persons, without passing over the least, the most minute thing, which can possibly be urged in favour of themselves, shall overlook entirely the plainest and most obvious things on the other side …24 Butler perceptively observes a tendency of self-deceptive hypocrites to be preoccupied with self-justification. “. . . [T]heir deliberation concerning an action to be done, or reflection upon it afterwards, is not to see whether it be right, but to find out reasons to justify or palliate it; palliate it, not to others, but to themselves.”25 He adds that, while in ordinary cases of wickedness this partiality and selfishness affects mainly the emotional temperament of a person, “in the characters we are now considering, it reaches to the very understanding, and influences the very judgment.”26 He concludes that, since self-deceptive hypocrisy enables us to do evil in a self-righteous manner, it is intrinsically vicious and immoral: “. . . [I]t will carry a man almost to any length of wickedness, in the way of oppression, hard usage of others, and even plain injustice, without his having . . . any real sense at all of it.”27 The Enlightenment loosened morality from its ties to tradition and external authority, and grounded it in reason and individual autonomy. Since self-deceptive hypocrisy undercuts reason and corrupts conscience, it erodes the very basis of morality and ethics, “undermines the whole principle of the good and darkens that light, that candle of the Lord within, which is to direct our steps; and corrupts conscience, which is the guide of life.”28 Thus this “inward hypocrisy,” which we work on ourselves, comes to share, if not dominate, the moral stage. The hypocrite-villain as conscious dissembler has become less central, if not marginal, to a modern sensibility. Unless we are analyzing such literary hypocrites as Molière’s Tartuffe, Shakespeare’s Iago or Dickens’s Uriah Heep, the manipulative machinations of a cynical hypocrite no longer fully engage or hold captive our interest as they used to in medieval or ancient times. Perhaps this conceptual shift may be explained partly by the displacement of external moral authorities and the placement of the whole burden of morality on the individual’s shoulders. This occurs in two ways. One is by the waning of the either/or view of human motivation presupposed in the traditional picture of hypocrisy, namely, that you are acting either out of a religious/moral motive or a selfish evil one. The second is by the emergence of a modern concept of mind which allows for not only a richer motivational complexity, but also for motivational unawareness. Selfishness, like most motives, can operate without the agent’s full awareness of it. In this reconstructed

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form, hypocrisy is thought to be socially more pervasive and continues to engage our attention and concern to such a degree that “it might almost be considered the preoccupation of modern literature.”29

F. Post-Modern Turns In our own post-modern times, which some prefer to call late modernity, there are several attitudes to the concept and discourse of hypocrisy. One such general attitude is to see the concept of hypocrisy, including its self-deceptive forms, as passé. This tendency is already crystallized in Nietzsche’s prescient observation that: There is a great scarcity of genuine hypocrisy, . . . the soft air of our culture is insalubrious for this plant. Hypocrisy belongs to the ages of strong faith when, even though constrained to display another faith, one did not abandon one’s own faith. Today one does abandon it; or even more commonly, one adds a second faith — and in either case one remains honest. . . . Modern man is simply too comfortable for some vices, so that they die out by default. . . . The few hypocrites I have met imitated hypocrisy; like almost every tenth person today, they were actors.30 The main message of this passage is clear, namely, that our changed cultural conditions no longer provide fertile soil for such an ideologically moralistic concept. To be sure, this claim may be true, but it leaves room for less than ideological or moralistic uses. A related but more concrete attitude depicts “hypocrisy” as a skill to cope and live with social and moral contradictions that otherwise would destroy us. On this view, cases of hypocrisy, including its self-deceptive forms, are sometimes reasonable individual or minority group responses to political or social pressure or repression. Members of a threatened racial, political or sexual minority may try to “pass” as members of the dominant culture simply to get fair treatment.31 Thus the idea of victim hypocrisy makes its appearance.32 A revitalized realization of the importance of a tolerant and supportive community in the moral life of individuals punctures the illusion of rugged moral individualism, softens the assessment of such forms of hypocrisy, and attempts to eliminate obstacles to avow one’s identity. This may in its wake bring on hypocrisies of its own: reactions from the “politically incorrect” as well as from the “correct.” Perhaps these are simply the costs of a pluralistic tolerant society, and are thus worth incurring. So

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some brave post-modern hermeneutists become judgment eliminators, sometimes in a very judgmental manner, by deleting the word hypocrisy altogether from their vocabulary and substituting “irony” as the favoured term of critical appraisal. Part of the argument for this is that in a fragmented pluralistic society the basis for supporting accusations of hypocrisy becomes elusive and less than compelling. Such talk is thought to reflect the animosity of the accuser to his or her opponent under a moralistic guise, a self-defeating move insofar as it is a kind of hypocrisy itself. On this level we can see the emergence of the hypocrite as a victim of social and political pressures. When put into certain social situations where we face the seemingly impossible task of doing justice to important but conflicting values, a certain measure of hypocrisy seems to be called for if one is to exercise the virtue of tolerance.33 Such people may pretend to be what they are not: they may conceal their moral identity to some extent to make breathing room for the other. Such cases are structurally similar to hypocrisy, and may be regarded as appropriate, amusing or tragic. This sort of perspective morally neutralizes hypocrisy by removing the machinery of accusation that is traditionally connected with it. While the intention behind this seems laudable, the consequent conceptual stretch necessitates the introduction of relevant and appropriate distinctions in those cases of irony which do call for negative moral assessment and blame, and those where refraining from judgment is itself expressive of irresponsible moral evasion and indifference. Even though judgmentalism is best avoided, evasive redescription of such situations just generates harmful double-talk: a kind of hypocrisy itself. The responsible use of “hypocrisy” then remains and has an important critical role to play in our moral, social and political lives. This brief historical survey has suggested connections between hypocrisy and a number of other concepts, such as tolerance, self-deception, weakness of will, and irony. In the pages that follow, we will explore these apparent relationships in more detail. We will also assess the normative value (or disvalue) of hypocrisy, seen through the lens of leading moral theories. First, however, some remarks are in order about the methodology we use to conduct these explorations of hypocrisy.

Notes 1. Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984) 78. 2. Jonathan Robinson, Duty and Hypocrisy in Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Mind (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977) 115.

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3. Ibid. 4. For a further discussion of the neutral Greek term, see Robinson, op. cit., 115. It should also be noted, however, that acting has often been considered a somewhat irreputable profession as well, perhaps indicating that even this “neutral” usage can take on some of the taint we tend to associate with hypocrisy. 5. Note, however, that there has been a deliberate blurring of these borders in some schools of theatre. Perhaps such blurrings make the link between the theatrical Greek usage and the modern moral usage even clearer. 6. Eva Feder Kittay offers this suggestion and some other analyses of the ways in which hypocrisy differs from various types of “self-referential deception” (of which acting is a sort) in her paper “On Hypocrisy,” Metaphilosophy, 13, 3-4 (1982) 278-79. 7. Comparisons of hypocrisy with irony can be found in Kittay, op. cit., 281, and in Christine McKinnon, “Hypocrisy, with a Note on Integrity,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 28, 4 (1991) 324-25. For a more sustained treatment of this theme, see Chapter 15 of this book. 8. For further etymological material, see Gerhard Kittel, ed. Theological Dictionary of the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Erdmans, 1964-1976), vol. 8, 56366, and Geoffrey W. Bromley, ed. International Standard Bible Encyclopedia (Grand Rapids: Erdmans, 1979), vol. 2, 790. 9. Matthew 22:15-18. All translations from the Old and New Testaments are from The New American Bible (New York: P.J. Kennedy & Sons, 1970). 10. Matthew 22:16. 11. Matthew 23:2-3; 23:23. 12. We consider the relationship between hypocrisy and weakness of will in detail in Chapter 14 of this book. 13. Matthew 23:4. 14. We discuss this notion of double standards in connection with hypocrisy in more detail in Chapter 11 of this book. 15. Matthew 23:5; 23:28. 16. Matthew 23:27. This theme of focusing on good acts themselves, rather than the outward appearance of engaging in them, is echoed in several other passages as well. Concerning the giving of charity, it is written: “Be on your guard against performing religious acts for people to see. Otherwise expect no recompense from your heavenly Father. When you give alms, for example, do not blow a horn before you in synagogues and streets like hypocrites looking for applause. You can be sure of this much, they are already repaid” (Matthew 6:1-2). As to how to avoid hypocritical prayer: “When you are praying, do not behave like the hypocrites who love to stand and pray in synagogues and on street corners in order to be noticed. I give you my word, they are already repaid. Whenever you pray, go to your room, close your door, and pray to your Father in private”(Matthew 6: 5-6). As to fasting: “When you fast, you are not to look glum as the hypocrites do. They change the appearance of their faces so that others may see they are fasting. I assure you, they are already repaid” (Matthew 6:16). 17. Martin Luther, “The Freedom of a Christian,” in Faith, edited, with an Introduction, Notes, and Bibliography by Terence Penelhum (New York: Macmillan, 1989) 38.

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18. Eva Feder Kittay takes such insincerity in realms where sincerity is most important to be the essence of hypocrisy. See her “On Hypocrisy,” 280. 19. Matthew 7:1-5. 20. II Samuel 12:1-9. We discuss this case in more detail in Chapter 13 of this book. 21. Dante Alighieri, Inferno, trans. John Ciardi (New York: New American Library, 1982). 22. Ibid. 23. Joseph Butler, “Upon Self-Deceit,” in Fifteen Sermons Preached At The Rolls Chapel: And A Dissertation Upon the Nature of Virtue, with introduction, analyses, and notes by W.R. Matthews (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1969) 152. 24. Ibid, 153. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid, 154-55. 27. Ibid, 156. 28. Ibid, 163. 29. Anthony Palmer, “Characterizing Self-Deception,” Mind, 88 (1979) 50. 30. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964) 73-74. 31. See Shirlee Taylor Haizlip, “Passing,” American Heritage (February/March 1995). 32. This term is Kittay’s (op. cit.). We discuss this concept in a few contexts in this book, but the most detailed discussion is in Chapter 9, Section D. 33. We discuss the relationship between hypocrisy and tolerance in more detail in Chapter 10 of this book.

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2 Remarks on Method “There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies.” 1 ludwig wittgenstein

A. Method of Examples Our attempts to shed light on the phenomenon and concept of hypocrisy employ the method of examples. We use examples not only to describe diverse members of the family of hypocrisies but also to unearth and illustrate conceptual features. Perhaps even more significantly, the examples are the engine of our analysis and interpretations. Whatever light is thrown on hypocrisy is partly generated by and filtered through these examples. Important questions have been raised, however, about this methodology on two fronts. First, there is the basic question of how to identify cases as examples of hypocrisy. This perplexity is a variant of what might be called the Meno problem: “How will you look for something when you don’t in the least know what it is? How on earth are you going to set up something you don’t know as the object of your search? To put it another way, even if you come right up against it, how will you know that what you have found is the thing you didn’t know?”2 Two general and exclusive approaches have been suggested by philosophers to solve this problem of identification: the definitionalist and anti-definitionalist. Definitionalists3 offer theories of hypocrisy and assume that it is on the basis of these theories or essentialist definitions that we identify cases of hypocrisy. We do not, however, have in hand an adequate definition, and we will in due course argue that so far the proposed definitions all appear deficient in one way or another. Since none of this in general impairs our ability to identify cases of hypocrisy, it seems unlikely that we identify cases of hypocrisy by the method of an essentialist definition. Anti-definitionalists,4 on the other hand, take these definitionalist failures as evidence for the claim that hypocrisy cannot be essentially defined and remains an open concept. Furthermore, they argue that the way we identify cases is on the basis of “family resemblance.”5 As it stands this approach is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. The claim that hypocrisy is indefin-

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able does not follow from the fact that past attempts at definition have all failed. Moreover, since there have been only relatively few such attempts, given the small but growing literature on the subject, the claim does not have strong support. Nor is hypocrisy a wide open concept, for then its ascription would always be contestable and its use arbitrary. What is promising about the anti-definitionalist approach is not only the negative suggestion that we do not identify examples by means of an essentialist definition, but also the positive one that we have another method for such identifications. However, this other method cannot be that of “family resemblance” — which is usually interpreted simply as collecting “similarities” between a new candidate for hypocrisy and an accepted case. For that approach would still have the unsatisfactory result that many things that are distinct from hypocrisy, such as mere weakness of will, a simple change of mind, or any kind of deceit, would be classified as necessarily hypocritical, since there are many similarities between them and hypocrisy.

B. A Historical Narrative Approach The approach we take in this book is an “historical narrative approach,” which seeks to identify historical narratives and paradigm cases, for use in teaching and learning the concept’s applications in a moral tradition.6 Normal ordinary cases of hypocrisy are related to the tradition so effortlessly that it almost seems as if they find their way to the conventional schemas. On the other hand, a controversial new case is revelatory in that the role of identifying narratives and the moral tradition are suddenly in the foreground. In such cases what we are urged to see as hypocrisy will have to be related to these historical narratives and paradigm cases by showing how it has emerged from the same sort of thinking, acting and attitude that is already familiar in the practice of moral criticism. This alternative approach we adopt brings out the significance of the genealogical sketch of the concept of hypocrisy we have provided. We are aware that it is an uncivilized error, known as the “genetic” or “etymological” fallacy, to assume that the source or origin of a word or concept must determine its current meaning. Meanings as well as things change. Nevertheless, one important feature of the concept of hypocrisy seems to be the very fact that it develops. Later uses of the concept are in some way related to earlier uses, though other features may change. Tracing its historical development — how it was used in the past in different conditions — reveals its possibilities in action and hence it is an important way of getting at a fuller

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understanding of the concept. That something is so because it has so come about7 may sound humdrum but it can be illuminating. Our genealogical sketch gives some appreciation of the twists and turns in the complex history of the concept and traces its various applications under different conditions. It includes the uses of Greek theatre, with the connotation of play-acting, and Judeo-Christian moral criticism, as well as its modern adaptations and innovations. We tried to retrieve the conditions of power, the concerns and questions that gave rise to the forging of the concept and its adaptations. This approach thus broadens the notion of “family resemblance” to include the idea of “descent.” Yet, while noting how the term has changed over time, this process may also help to reveal the common core of the concept, if there is one. This is one way of approaching the question of whether there are features that every proper use of the term must have, which is to say it is one way of searching for a definition. At the same time, this approach helps guard against the tendency to force the concept into some a priori mould. Possible adaptations and innovations of a concept can be found in places other than its genealogy, however. Other approaches include exploration of the concept’s uses in fiction and literature, as well as its possible applications in actual or imagined alien cultures. If to imagine a language is to imagine a way of life,8 then to imagine the language game of hypocrisy is to imagine an appropriate web of practices, attitudes, beliefs and concerns in a moral tradition. Comparing and contrasting possible uses of the concept under different conditions, while relating them to the narratives and paradigms in the moral tradition, helps with the task of identification and understanding. Linguistic intuitions also constitute an important resource for this investigation, perhaps supporting Wittgenstein’s advice that for a large class of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language.9 Our genealogical/historical narrative approach acknowledges and explains conceptual development and innovation — which is a reasonable construal of the claim that hypocrisy is an open concept — in terms of a conversation between the creative moral innovators and the voices of the moral tradition. Such a conversation consists of narratives that relate the new use of “hypocrisy” to the old ones by showing that it is an original or insightful contribution to, or extension of, the moral tradition in which they are situated. This conversation about descent and changing conditions not only allows for creative acts to open up the concept, but also guards against the chaos of wide open texture. Any such conversation about possible new uses of hypocrisy must have a bearing on what has gone before.

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Our sketch may suggest that there is no singular use of “hypocrisy”: that there are many uses, including past ones, which are distinct, yet each has a legitimate claim to the term. Even if this is true, it does not mean that nothing systematic can be said about the resulting “family resemblance” discerned among the variety of uses. Families can be described, even though their members do not all look alike. In this case, the sketch of a concept aims to provide a dwelling or home for the concept, to which its various uses, conventional, adaptive or innovative, need to be shepherded. Although the historical/ narrative approach has its origins in the “family resemblance” tradition, we believe it is friendly to the possibility of sketching the broad outlines and foundations of the concept, including an account of the central features of its architecture. Such an account, even though more contingent and provisional than hitherto thought, is presupposed in any meaningful dialogue between the voices of the moral tradition and moral innovation. We bring analytical tools to bear on the historical narrative throughout this text, and thus are able to identify some features that do indeed seem necessary for a case to qualify as “hypocrisy.” For example, we argue that hypocrisy always involves deception of some sort (including self-deception), and that it always involves trying to appear better than one is in terms of a prevailing norm. We approached this topic with an eye to exploring a large variety of uses, leaving equally open the possibility that they could be combined through the identification of necessary and sufficient conditions, and the possibility that they would end up sharing only family resemblances (of whatever degree of vagueness). What is more, we aimed to involve the reader in this process of exploring a variety of cases, while trying to figure out whether there are any features that unify them. Perhaps it is worth observing that if there are unresolved methodological tensions that remain in the book — which is likely — they probably reveal the differences in the philosophical leanings and temperaments of the co-authors. One of us is more sympathetic to “definitionalism” while the other is more appreciative of “anti-definitionalism.” In an attempt to resolve this tension and go beyond it, we offer the historical narrative approach which, by highlighting the importance of paradigm narratives and scenarios, gives the nod, as it were, to the needs that drive “definitionalism.” It also takes seriously the needs of “anti-definitionalism” in the sense that it leaves room for the creative extension of the concept through dialogue. Finally, the historical narrative approach acknowledges the importance of contingency: context, circumstance and story. Whether this method (or cluster of methods) is worth adopting is to be judged by the fruit it bears in the course of our investigations.

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C. The Nature and Role of Examples in Ethics In order to apply the historical narrative approach, it is necessary to make considerable use of examples. Several important questions have been raised about the method of examples, however, particularly within the context of ethics. Thus it is necessary to say a few words about how we view the nature and role of examples in ethical investigation. Mary Warnock early on issued cautionary remarks about the use of examples in moral philosophy: It is impossible to predict what kind of books moral philosophers of the future will actually write. But the examples which they contain will necessarily have to be long, complicated, and realistic. . . . Moral philosophy will be much more difficult, perhaps much more embarrassing to write than it has been recently, but it will be far more interesting to read.10 Warnock was concerned that the common philosophical examples of her time tended not to engage the moral realities of our lives, and thus distorted our understanding of morality. She holds out the hope, however, that philosophers will be able to change the nature of the examples they use, and will thereby make their practice more relevant and informative. Martha Nussbaum has recently taken up this complaint about lack of realistic examples in ethics, and has given it a more challenging twist by claiming that there is something essentially amiss with philosophers’ examples. She writes: “Schematic philosophers’ examples lack the particularity, the emotive appeal, the absorbing plottedness, the variety and the indeterminacy of good fiction; they lack, too, good fiction’s way of making the reader a participant and a friend.”11 Then she goes on to recommend literature for ethical insight, in particular the novels of Marcel Proust and Henry James, and claims, “many serious dramas will be pertinent as well, and some biographies and histories — so long as these are written in a style that gives sufficient attention to particularity and emotion, and so long as they involve their readers in relevant activities of searching and feeling. . . .”12 We partially accept Nussbaum’s criticisms, but believe she goes too far in concluding that philosophical examples are essentially flawed. We believe that understanding the moral life does indeed require use of the conceptual tools philosophers bring, and that examples can profitably provide illustrations of relevant points in this process. This is evident from classroom discussions, where students become engaged and their ears perk up when philosophical

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examples are produced to illustrate, provoke or challenge. They can often be a stimulus and a start to serious discussion and probing. Furthermore, we think that the philosophical practice of introducing new examples, or constructing counter-examples, involves a creative aspect that is more like poetic acts than like the skills of analysis and argument highlighted in conventional descriptions of philosophical practice. Accordingly, examples lend a noble element that enriches the entire activity of engaging in philosophy, and indeed involves the reader as “a participant and a friend.” Nevertheless, Nussbaum’s warnings deserve to be taken seriously. There are indeed ways in which the use of examples can be distorting, or can fail to provide the desired insights. Care must be taken concerning which examples are chosen, and how they are used. To understand more about what is required, it is worth considering in more detail what Nussbaum’s criticism might amount to. We begin by noting one possible criticism of philosophers’ examples which cannot be what Nussbaum intends. It might be argued that these examples are useless because what they narrate did not really happen or exist. But Nussbaum recommends fiction for moral insight, which also clearly involves things that did not really happen or exist, so this cannot be her criticism. What we need to do in order to understand the criticism is to identify features that good fiction has and that philosophical examples tend to lack, that make fiction a better tool for learning about moral life. There are several features one might identify, and accordingly several different ways to interpret the criticism of philosophical examples. We consider four such criticisms below, and after each we discuss how we strive to avoid the hazards Nussbaum rightly points out. One way to interpret the objection to philosophical examples is that they are so fanciful as to be unrealistic. We might think that principles that apply to remote science-fiction scenarios may not apply in real-world situations, and thus that examples that are too fanciful cannot serve to assist with understanding genuine moral life. Perhaps, for example, the examples rely on intuitions which are useful within their intended parameters, but simply cannot stretch to the sort of case described. The first thing to note about this objection is that it presupposes a line between the purely fanciful and the realistic that may not be easy to draw. Technology has often shown that things once thought to be flights of fantasy can become reality, much faster than most people would have thought possible. Hence the fanciful may not be as removed from real moral life as we might think, and hypothetical decisions about extreme examples may in fact become realistic choices.

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Even if there are examples dreamt up by philosophers that are completely unrealistic in the way the objection suggests, that is surely not an objection to all philosophers’ examples. So long as examples are restricted to things that could plausibly occur in everyday life, there does not seem to be any risk of stretching the principles involved beyond their breaking points. Accordingly, we try in this book to utilize realistic examples, of a sort readers will be able to recognize themselves in. Many of these, indeed, are taken from real life. What is more, we make use of a broad range of examples, so that principles elicited in some of the more far-flung examples can be tested, in a sense, by reference to more everyday cases. This reduces the risk that the principles suggested by our examples will be irrelevant to real moral life. The breadth of examples we utilize will also help respond to another objection to philosophers’ examples that can be read into Nussbaum’s text. It might be objected that philosophers will focus on examples that suit the case they are trying to make, and thus present moral issues as being more onesided than they really are. We acknowledge this danger, but believe that using a wide variety of cases can help to avoid putting forward such a skewed view. Indeed, although there are countless examples of what may be hypocrisy that we do not consider, we cannot be accused of simply cooking up a number of cases to prove our points. We draw our cases from real life, from history and biography, from literature, and from other philosophers, as well as from our own creativity. Our goal is to open up the concept and reveal its wide application, rather than to consider a narrow range of cases. Accordingly, we again believe that we are able to escape the very real danger this objection suggests. A third explanation of why philosophers’ examples are essentially flawed is that they are not sufficiently deep. It could be argued that moral issues standardly arise in complex situations, in which the agent is aware of several background features. By providing only a sparse sketch of the circumstances, philosophers may be leaving out details that would be crucial for decisionmaking. Again, this is a serious danger, and one to which philosophers do indeed often fall prey. We do not believe, however, that it is an unavoidable flaw in philosophical examples. Indeed, identifying which types of additional information would be required is part of the process of coming to understand the moral issue at stake. In the examples we consider, we try to explore the relevant background. Sometimes, we point out what gaps remain in examples that have been proposed, and illustrate how different ways of filling in these gaps can lead to different moral conclusions. A single bare-bones case may be transformed into a clear case of hypocrisy, or alternatively a case of weakness of will, or of some non-hypocritical form of deception, depending on how

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the details are filled in. Accordingly, we generally play variations on a theme when considering examples, adding depth as we go, and thereby showing the relevance of background considerations for identifying moral concepts. Furthermore, by playing these variations and filling out a number of rough examples, we invite and encourage readers to develop their own scenarios, thereby involving them “in relevant activities of searching and feeling concerning their own possibilities as well as those of the characters.”13 Even if some of our examples are left in a sketchy form, then, it is hoped that we will have shown the way for readers to consider various ways of broadening the picture, and thus use the examples as spurs to moral understanding. There is one further interpretation of the objection that requires attention. This is the claim that moral decision-making is a feature of the emotions at least as much as of the intellect, and thus that examples must engage the emotions in order to cast light on real moral life. If philosophers’ examples do not engage the emotions, then they will clearly be lacking in this regard, in a way that good literature can be presumed not to be. Again, there is considerable force to this objection, and it is one philosophers may not be entirely able to meet. Although we consider examples from real life and from literature that may be expected to engage the reader’s emotions to some extent at least, the nature of philosophical discussion may preclude the sort of sustained emotional involvement one can derive from reading good literature. And yet we do not believe that this shows that the philosophical examples are without value. We reject the suggestion that emotion alone gives good moral guidance.14 Although emotion may play a crucial role, it must nevertheless be accompanied by critical analysis. Similarly, too much detail may overwhelm and confuse, obscuring the most important features of a situation. Accordingly, if we provide some of the relevant critical analysis, we have contributed something of importance to the moral undertaking in any case. Even if this is not sufficient, it may still be of considerable value. Perhaps all that is required is that readers take in the arguments offered here, but consider the matter still open until they have been supplemented by readings from literature, or reallife experience. We would be quite happy with such an outcome — indeed, it is one of the ways in which philosophical examples can be seen to spur the pursuit of moral understanding. We do not claim that philosophical examples can provide everything one needs to know about the richness of morality, but we do claim that they can make a useful contribution to understanding that domain. In fact, the very subject matter of this book may be helpful in avoiding the pitfalls Nussbaum points out. There can be no straightforward ostensive defi-

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nition of “hypocrisy,” for we do not teach the use of this word, as we do the meaning of “red” or “table,” by simply pointing at objects. When we point out hypocrites in real life or literature, we always tell a story or provide an explanation. So to understand “hypocrisy” we need to tell stories, and these stories need to be long enough to include description and a background for interpretation and accusation. Mary Warnock was right, at least concerning “hypocrisy,” for this phenomenon cannot be taken in at a glance, but rather requires the construction of a narrative of sufficient length and complexity to interpret an amalgam of words, deeds, motives and perceptions as hypocrisy. The story of hypocrisy is more like the story of cowardice or murder than the story of a killing. Accordingly, our exploration of it cannot help but involve examples that are more well rounded than the sketches sometimes used in philosophy. In summary, our view is that stories and examples are a necessary part of good philosophy, but they are not sufficient: they need interpretation, explanation and commentary. Thus throughout we flag what we discern as conceptually and/or morally relevant, “directing the reader’s attention to salient features of the texts, clarifying and representing perspicuously the insights, and drawing affinities to, and differences from, other texts”15 and examples. These tasks are akin to the roles moral philosophy has traditionally played. Furthermore, through emphasizing the creation of scenarios and interpretations as crucial to discerning hypocrisy, writers and readers become increasingly aware of the roles their own attitudes and motives play in accusations of hypocrisy; in seeing people, including themselves, as hypocrites. This leads to the thought that the sketched examples are pointers to real life, are meant to lead into life, and perhaps this explains Lady Warnock’s thought that present moral philosophy (her moral philosophy of the future) is “more embarrassing” to write.16 This could be true because the writer, in a moment of Socratic self-understanding, recognizes himself or herself in the realistic or imagined examples. Now if this is true of the writer, it is likely to be true of the reader — except in the latter’s case the embarrassment is private. As the authors of moral philosophy die of embarrassment on the page, the birth of the moral philosopher as reader occurs.

Notes 1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963) 51e. 2. Plato, Meno, trans. W.K.C. Guthrie, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964) 80d.

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3. People whose approaches to philosophy appear to fall into the definitionalist camp include, among others, Eva Feder Kittay (“On Hypocrisy”), Christine McKinnon (“Hypocrisy, with a Note on Integrity”) and Dan Turner (“Hypocrisy,” Metaphilosophy, 21 [1990] 262-69). 4. Those writers on hypocrisy whom we classify as anti-definitionalists are a mixed bag. Roger Crisp and Christopher Cowton (“Hypocrisy and Moral Seriousness,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 31 [1994] 343-49) seem to describe various species of hypocrisy, rather than single-mindedly preoccupying themselves with trying to capture the concept by a single definition. Piers Benn (“What is Wrong with Hypocrisy?” in International Journal of Moral and Social Studies, 8, 3 [1993] 22335) follows a similar line. In this respect they echo Béla Szabados’s treatment of the concept in his article “Hypocrisy” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 9 (1979) 195-210. 5. The “family resemblance” approach is generally associated with Ludwig Wittgenstein. See his Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), paragraphs 65-67, for a cryptic, but suggestive, general description of the approach. 6. For the roots of this approach, aside from the Wittgenstein passage already mentioned, see Noel Carroll, “Art, Practice and Narrative,” The Monist, 71 (1988) 140-56. See also Maurice Mandelbaum “Family Resemblances and Generalization Concerning the Arts” (The American Philosophical Quarterly, 2, 3 [1965]). While Mandelbaum critiques Wittgenstein, what he says about the importance of characteristics that are not manifest or directly exhibited, e.g., the requirement for ancestral connections, actually opens up the possibility of a deeper interpretation of Wittgenstein’s views on “family resemblance.” 7. As Hans-Georg Gadamer puts it in his Truth and Method (London: Sheed & Ward, 1975, translation edited by Garrett Barden and John Cumming) 6. 8. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, paragraphs 19 and 23. 9. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958) 4. 10. Mary Warnock, Ethics Since 1900 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960) 206-07. 11. Martha Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) 46. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. Nussbaum seems to give the impression that feeling plays a primary role in moral guidance. See pp. 45-49 of Love’s Knowledge. 15. Nussbaum, op. cit., 49. 16. Warnock, op. cit., 207.

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3 A Catalogue of Cases “General precepts learned at the feet either of priests or philosophers, or even drawn from one’s own resources, are never so efficacious as an example of virtue or holiness. . . . We need intuitions . . . to verify the reality of our concepts. . . .; if the concepts are practical, relating to conduct, the intuitions are called examples.” 1 immanuel kant “A main cause of philosophical disease — a one-sided diet: one nourishes one’s thinking with only one kind of example.” 2 ludwig wittgenstein Since examples constitute a large part of the raw material for our investigations, and play such a significant role in them, we depart from the usual practice of relegating them to an appendix at the end of the book, and put a list of cases right up front. Even though the sheer number and variety of cases may at first seem a little overwhelming, we suggest that the reader begin with those that s/he finds intuitively appealing and return to the others periodically in the course of our journeyings. We are aware that the examples are in very sketchy form here. The text to follow will demonstrate our conviction that examples must be filled out with appropriate attention to context and background. Nevertheless, these cases are presented here to demonstrate how puzzling and broad the concept of hypocrisy is, and thereby to inspire the reader to work with us throughout the rest of the text in trying to understand this concept. Some of the cases in this catalogue serve as reminders of paradigms through which we learn to use the concept and help hone our conceptual/ moral intuitions. Others are more problematic or challenging, and are intended to test the limits and boundaries of the applications of the concept. Hence, some of the cases in the list might strike the reader as clear cases of hypocrisy, others as clearly not hypocrisy, and others as being in a murky territory in between. The lens of analysis and interpretation needs to attend to these cases with care, and theories are needed to survey them and put them into perspective. Here they are, gathered from imaginative literature, from history and biography, from the history of philosophy, from contemporary philosophers,

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as well as from our own imagination, and gathered into rough and ready categories. Many of these cases will be taken up in more detail and contextual enrichment in the text below, often with consideration of how varying a few key details can affect our categorization of the case.

A. Philosophers’ Examples and Thought Experiments 1. Sexist Employer A sexist male employer hires a well-qualified woman for a traditionally male position in his firm in order to impress some other woman with his “openmindedness.” The employer treats the woman with proper respect, even though he believes a woman can’t do the job as well as a man.3

2. Cunning Politician A politician makes promises to clean up government and eliminate corruption. Through such promises, this politician gains election to a very powerful position. Once that has occurred, he or she removes from office several corrupt officials, who have been stealing money from the public coffers, in the process securing even more power. Eventually, this politician might be able to use the power thus obtained to behave in a more corrupt way than anyone had done previously, yet cover this up by grandiose yet insincere condemnations of such corruption.

3. German Jew Passing as Aryan Franck, a German-born Jew in Nazi Germany, must pass as Aryan to survive. In order to be accepted as Aryan, he occasionally has to adopt anti-Semitic attitudes and profess beliefs he does not hold.4

4. Nepotist Top Bureaucrat A top civil servant, jealous of his privileges and power, finds that “politically correct” rules and regulations about hiring for government jobs are encroaching on his domain. He realizes that he needs to endorse the official policy. Yet when a vacancy arises in his bureaucracy, he does not conduct an open search for the job, even though he preaches the desirability of this to other executives. He gives the job to a friend of proven competence, thus avoiding an open search.5

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5. Ingratiating Fund-Raiser A woman is raising funds for a cultural centre for underprivileged urban native teens. She is told by a reliable source that a wealthy unpleasant socialite is likely to contribute a substantial sum, but only if she appears to share his crude brand of right-wing politics. Concealing her distaste, the woman gives a false impression of her political values to ingratiate herself and obtain a donation.

6. Vegetarian’s Lapse? I believe that it is morally wrong for people in ordinary situations to eat red meat. I am persuaded by arguments based on the view that the pleasure of eating red meat does not outweigh such suffering as those animals experience. However, occasionally, in ordinary situations I eat red meat.6

7. Teacher With Bad Habit A teacher tells his students not to put their hands in their pockets because it looks slovenly and ruins one’s clothes and yet always has his own hands in his pockets.7

8. Lawyer With Political Ambition A lawyer harbours a secret belief that poor people are responsible for their own poverty and that people are entitled to no greater advantages than those for which they themselves are responsible. Nevertheless she volunteers to assist with a legal aid clinic for the poor, and works hard at performing the required duties there, with the goal to acquire a reputation for generosity to the poor so as to enter politics later on.

9. The Over-Polite Guest The guest at dinner deliberately refrains from saying what comes to his lips, that the Hollandaise sauce is badly botched up, while pretending to say frankly, “This is rather nice Hollandaise sauce.”

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10. Agnostic Accountant An agnostic accountant joins a church in order to provide some human contact, a sense of community and social standing, for his wife who is desperately isolated.

11. Didactic Nicotine Addict A nicotine addict says: “I admit I am a hypocrite because I smoke, but I urge you not to smoke. It is a terrible thing that no one should do.”

12. Tomorrow’s Egalitarian An announced egalitarian says: “I am an egalitarian. If egalitarianism triumphs I would be willing to give up two-thirds of my salary in taxation. But until then, as long as the present social order persists, it is perfectly legitimate for me to pay only a quarter of my salary in taxes. I am all for changing the rules, but why should I now be the only one to pay?”8

13. Erotically Overcharged Teacher An erotically overcharged teacher in a small prairie town believes that it is part of her inner core to have strong sexual desires, and even to act on them when possible. She also believes that if these desires or behaviours were detected or exposed, others would not consider her worthy of respect. Since she desires the respect of others, she sets out to mislead others about her inner core or behaviour. She even accuses others of the very sorts of behaviour she engages in herself, as a way of sheltering herself from the criticism of others.

14. Charitable Man A man makes charitable contributions and preaches that people should do so for goodness’ sake, yet whenever out of earshot of an audience, he asks for receipts for income tax deductions.

15. Anti-Racist with Relatives An anti-racist activist visits some relatives whom she has never met and who are unaware of her anti-racist activity. After meeting them she discovers that they are virulent racists and she feels

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threatened by them. So she hides her anti-racism and pretends to go along with her relatives, though she would never participate in overt racist practices and would continue secretly to work against racism if she had to stay with them.9

16. An Excess of Sociability Suppose I am greeted with a “hello” by a person I do not know, yet I immediately respond and even ask her how she is, quickening my steps as I do so. When she tells me about her ailing mother I pretend to be concerned and express my sympathies, though I still have no idea who she is.

17. Ironic Political Dissident Consider a political dissident living under an oppressive regime who makes a speech saying things such as “This is a wonderful country we live in. Everyone enjoys prosperity and freedom. Our leaders are wise and compassionate. We are lucky to be here, and I hope nobody ever tries to change a thing.”

18. Sarcastic Guest at Barbecue A guest attends a barbecue at which the host serves generous T-bone steaks — burnt to a crisp. Suppose that the host is well known for his selfproclaimed expertise at cooking. “Another triumph, my friend,” remarks the guest, well within earshot of the others.10

19. Brown-Nosing Employee or Flak-Catcher? An employee, at a business meeting, makes unfounded self-deprecating remarks so that his/her boss’s positive traits will be thereby enhanced.

20. Subtle Spousal Criticism at Tupperware Party Suppose that Dick, basically a good-natured fellow, always says as he goes out, “I’ll be back early, well in time for dinner,” but he regularly returns home late. Suppose that one day his wife Jane has guests over, perhaps for a North American Tupperware party of the 1960s. As Dick is on his way out for the evening, Jane may say ironically “I expect you home early as usual, dear.”

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B. History of Philosophy 1. Gyges’s Ring and Plato’s Perfectly Unjust Man Suppose one had the ring of Gyges, which renders the wearer invisible and thus assures him/her exemption from punishment. This makes Plato’s perfectly unjust man possible. In the first place, the unjust man must act as clever craftsmen do. A first-rate pilot or physician, for example, feels the difference between impossibilities and possibilities in his art and attempts the one and lets the others go, and then, too, if he does happen to trip, he is equal to correcting his error. Similarly, the unjust man who attempts injustice rightly must be supposed to escape detection if he is to be altogether unjust, and we must regard the man who is caught as a bungler. For the height of injustice is to seem just without being so. To the perfectly unjust man, then, we must assign perfect injustice and withhold nothing of it, but we must allow him, while committing the greatest wrongs, to have secured for himself the greatest reputation for justice, and if he does happen to trip, we must concede to him the power to correct his mistakes by his ability to speak persuasively if any of his misdeeds come to light …11

2. Aristotle’s False Friend Aristotle distinguishes between friendship of utility and friendship proper. He approves of both, placing a higher value on friendship for its own sake. However, he does think that there is something wrong about pretending to a friendship for its own sake, when in fact the friendship is one of utility: “So when a man has made a mistake and has thought that he was being loved for his character, when the other person was doing nothing of the kind, he must blame himself; but when he has been deceived by the pretences of the other person, it is just that he should complain against his deceiver.”12

3. Locke’s Deterrent to Religious Pretenders But however, that some may not colour their spirit of persecution and unchristian cruelty with a pretence of the public weal and observation of the laws; and that others under pretence of

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religion, may not seek immunity for their libertinism and licentiousness; in a word, that none may impose either upon himself or others, by the pretences of loyalty and obedience to the prince or of tenderness and sincerity in the worship of God, I esteem it above all necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion …13

4. Hume’s Patron “A man that has lost a friend and a patron may flatter himself, that all his grief arises from generous sentiments.”14

5. Kant on False Humility Humility in comparing oneself with other men (and indeed with any finite being, even a seraph) is no duty; rather, trying to equal or surpass others in this respect, believing that in this way one will get an even greater inner worth is a kind of ambition, which is directly contrary to one’s duty to others. But belittling one’s own moral worth merely as a means to acquiring the favour of another, whoever it may be (hypocrisy and flattery) [Heuchelei and Schmeichelei] is false (lying) humility, which is contrary to one’s duty to oneself since it degrades one’s personality.15

6. Kant’s Vain Author “An author asks one of his readers, ‘How do you like my work?’ One could merely seem to give an answer, by joking about the impropriety of such questions. But who has his wit always ready? The author will take the slightest hesitation in answering as an insult. May one then say what is expected of one?”16

7. Kant’s Polite Letter Writer “Can an untruth from mere politeness (e.g., ‘Your obedient servant,’ at the end of a letter) be considered a lie?”17

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8. Kant on Devotional Hypocrisy Devotional hypocrisy consists in the habit of identifying the practice of piety not with well pleasing actions in the performance of human duties but with direct commerce with God through manifestations of awe. This practice must then be classified as compulsory service, except that it adds to this superstition the fanatical illusion of imagined supersensible heavenly feelings. . . . All these devout attestations of awe involve the danger of producing nothing but hypocritical veneration of God instead of practical service of Him — a service which never consists in mere feelings.18

9. Kant on Being Surprised in an Act of Devotion The more upright a man is, the more readily he is ashamed if surprised in an act of devotion. A hypocrite will not be ashamed, but on the contrary, will let himself be seen. When the gospel tells us: “When thou prayest, go into thy chamber,” this is merely to avoid the appearance of being a hypocrite; for a man is ashamed if another thinks ill of him, even though he has committed no fault. For example, if something is found missing in a group of people, and inquiries are made, and someone is looked at, he blushes. The first reason for shame, therefore, is lest one be taken for a hypocrite. The second, however, is this: We know God, not by intuition, but through faith. We are thus able to speak of God, as of an object of faith, to the effect that: If God in His goodness were so to guide the children in their upbringing, that they, etc., and one will not then be in the least ashamed of such a wish, and we may also speak of it in company. Suppose, though, that someone in the company were to lift his hands and pray, even if he said nothing, it would strike us very much. What is the reason for this? The object of faith is being made into an object of intuition. To be sure, faith is just as strong as intuition; but, after all, God, once again, is an object, not of intuition, but of faith, and hence I must address Him as such. So why, then, do we pray? If I pray by myself, I can imitate an intuition and compose my soul. But in church, prayer has something pathetic about it, in that the object of faith is turned into an object of intuition. Even a preacher, though, can pray to God, as to an object

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of faith, given that in such an assembly the pathema (religious feeling) may quite well be aroused. In other company, however, it would be highly fantastic.19

10. Kant’s Self-Deceived Atheist “Someone tells an inner lie, for example, if he professes belief in a future judge of the world, although he really finds no such belief within himself, but persuades himself that it could do no harm and might even be useful to profess in his thoughts to one who scrutinizes hearts, a belief in such a judge, in order to win His favour in case He should exist.”20

11. Kant’s Fearful Theist “Someone also lies if, having no doubt about the existence of this future judge, he still flatters himself that he inwardly reveres His law, though the only incentive he feels is fear of punishment.”21

12. Wittgenstein’s Last Judgment “God may say to me: ‘I am judging you out of your own mouth. Your own actions have made you shudder with disgust when you have seen other people do them.’”22

C. Imaginative Literature 1. Dickens’s Uriah Heep In Dickens’s novel, David Copperfield, Uriah Heep constantly reminds others what a “very ’umble person” he is, all the while plotting to gain Wickfield’s confidence so as to be in a position to steal from him and marry his daughter. Though I had long known that his servility was false, and all his pretences knavish and hollow, I had no adequate conception of the extent of his hypocrisy, until I saw him with his mask off. The suddenness with which he dropped it, when he perceived that it was useless to him; the malice, insolence and hatred he revealed; the leer with which he exalted, even at this moment, in the evil he had done — all this time being desperate too, and at his wit’s end

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part i Origins, Method, and Cases to get the better of us — at first took even me by surprise, who had known him so long and disliked him so heartily.23 “There now,” said Uriah, looking flabby and lead-coloured in the moonlight. “Didn’t I know it! But how little you think of the rightful umbleness of a person in my station, Master Copperfield! Father and me was both brought at a foundation school for boys, and Mother, she was likewise brought up at a public sort of charitable establishment. They taught us all a deal of umbleness — not much else that I know of, from morning to night. We was to be umble to this person, and umble to that, and to pull off our caps here, and to make bows there, and always to know our place, and abase ourselves before our betters. And we had such a lot of betters! Father got the monitor-medal by being umble. So did I. Father got made a sexton by being umble. He had the character, among the gentlefolks, of being such a well-behaved man, that they were determined to bring him in. ‘Be umble, Uriah,’ says Father to me, ‘and you’ll get on.’ It was what was always dinned into you and me at school; it’s what goes down best. Be umble, says Father and you’ll do! And really it ain’t done bad! When I was quite a young boy, said Uriah, I got to know what umbleness did, and I took to it. I ate umble pie with an appetite. I stopped at the umble point of my learning, and says I, ‘Hold hard!’ When you offered to teach me Latin, I knew better. ‘People like to be above you,’ says Father, ‘keep yourself down.’ I am very umble to the present moment, Master Copperfield, but I’ve got a little power!”24

2. Molière’s Tartuffe Molière’s Tartuffe poses as a model of faith and humility who worms his way into the confidence and trust of his wealthy and pious host Orgon. Tartuffe’s manipulations lead Orgon to distrust and disinherit his own wife and family, although eventually Tartuffe is unmasked when he tries to seduce Orgon’s wife.25

3. Molière’s Alceste in The Misanthrope In Molière’s The Misanthrope Alceste demands complete honesty in all the realms of life: “There is nothing I detest like the contortions of all these great dispensers of lip service, spreading their arms for insincere embraces, over-

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flowing with useless courtesies, trying to win a war of compliments, treating alike the gentleman and the fool . . . A man should be a man, and dare to show the substance of his spirit, and never mask his genuine feelings in vain compliments.” In his relentless pursuit of transparency, Alceste loses the woman he loves, insults his friends and is eventually reduced to a recluse.26

4. Hamlet’s Advice: Pretend to a Virtue If You Don’t Have It . . . Mother for love of grace, Lay not that flattering unction to your soul, That not your trespass but my madness speaks. Whiles rank corruption, mining all within, Infects unseen. Confess yourself to heaven, Repent what’s past, avoid what is to come, And do not spread the compost on the weeds To make them ranker. Forgive me this my virtue. For in the fatness of these pursy times Virtue itself of vice must pardon beg, Yea, curb and woo for leave to do him good. queen O Hamlet, thou hast cleft my heart in twain. hamlet O, throw away the worser part of it, And live the purer with the other half. Good night — but go not to my uncle’s bed. Assume a virtue, if you have it not. That monster custom, who all sense doth eat Of habits evil, is angel yet in this, That to the use of actions fair and good He likewise gives a frock or livery That aptly is put on. Refrain to-night, And that shall lend a kind of uneasiness To the next abstinence; the next more easy; For use almost can change the stamp of nature, And either . . . the devil, or throw him out With wondrous potency. Once more, good night …27

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5. Aesthetic Snob Consider the case of Mme. De Cambremer and Poussin’s paintings in the Louvre, an example from Marcel Proust’s Cities of the Plain. She has an unfavourable opinion of Poussin’s work. Then it is casually remarked that Degas is very fond of the Poussins at Chantilly: “Indeed? I don’t know the ones at Chantilly,” said Mme. de Cambremer, “. . . but I can speak about the ones in the Louvre, which are appalling.” — “He admires them immensely too.” — “I must look at them again. My impressions of them are rather distant.” She replied after a moment’s silence, as though the favourable opinion which she was certain, before very long, to form of Poussin would depend, not on the information that I had just communicated to her, but upon the supplementary and, this time, final examination that she intended to make of the Poussins in the Louvre in order to be in a position to change her mind.28

6. Gurov’s Double-Life in Chekhov’s “Lady with Lapdog” . . . he kept thinking that he was going to meet his mistress and not a living soul knew about it. He led a double life: one for all who were interested to see, full of conventional truth and conventional deception, exactly like the lives of his friends and acquaintances; and another which went on in secret. And by a kind of strange concatenation of circumstances . . . everything that was important, interesting, essential, everything about which he was sincere and did not deceive himself, everything that made up the quintessence of his life went on in secret, while everything that was a lie, everything that was merely the husk in which he hid himself to conceal the truth, like his work at the bank, for instance, or his going to anniversary functions with his wife — all that happened in the sight of all. He judged others by himself, did not believe what he saw and was always of the opinion that every man’s real and most interesting life went on in secret, and perhaps that was partly the reason why civilized man was so anxious that his personal secrets should be respected.29

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7. Santayana’s The Last Puritan Of course Mrs. Alden might have remained single and been proud to be Miss Harriet Bumstead for better or for worse: but in her it would have been selfish. It was imperative not to let the really good families die out, especially now that the country was being swamped by inferior races. A Daughter of the American Revolution could not prefer her own claims to the claims of posterity. Such were her professions; as to her practice: She had decided to have no more children. She already had one. Of course, as a rule, and especially for people of good old American stock, she believed in large families; but in this special case she was sure it wouldn’t be scientifically safe. Her son Oliver himself seemed the child of an old man; she had read of grave dangers in that direction — for her, too, child-bearing would be too great a strain. Any woman might bear children; a person with a mind should be left free to improve it. . . . She had taken every precaution after Oliver’s birth never to have another child; and as she publicly approved of large families, especially when of pure native stock, she let it be understood that her less fortunate lot was due to her husband being so much older than herself — he was eight years older — and having such a broken constitution. Superior as she thought herself, she was far from suspecting that the foundation of morality and intelligence had been sapped in her, and in her tribe. She had lost the blind physical courage normal in all animals and necessary to keep the world going.30

8. Orthodox Mother and Gay Son Reciting Kaddish A scene from Harvey Fierstein’s film Torchsong Trilogy: Arnold the gay protagonist and his mother are at the cemetery where the mother is standing at her husband’s grave, and Arnold at his (Arnold’s) lover’s grave. They are both reciting the Jewish prayer for the dead. Mother: “What do you think you are doing?” — Arnold: “I am doing the same thing you are doing.” The mother outraged: “No, you are not! I am reciting Kaddish for my husband — you are blaspheming your religion!”

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D. Biography and History 1. Oversexed Tolstoy When Tolstoy was nearly seventy he one day expressed to Aylmer Maude his conviction that despite difficulties and repeated failures, one should never cease to aim at chastity; and he added: “I was myself a husband last night, but that is no reason for abandoning the struggle; God may grant me not to be so again.”

2. Victorian Pretensions The culture of middle-class Victorian England chose to ignore, or pretend in public not to know about, the existence of suffering and evil right in front of their eyes, while at the same time advocating concern for others and belief in social progress which would benefit all. Similarly, their pretence to chastity, monogamy etc., was at odds with the flourishing of subterranean prostitution and brothels, which they conveniently managed to ignore or be oblivious to.

3. Political Promise A political party instituted and defended a tax, and an opposing political party made a commitment to eliminate it. The opposing party comes to power, and not only fails to eliminate the tax, but denies having promised to do so in the first place.

4. An Aboriginal View of Canada’s Reaction to Chinese Migration The first boatload of uninvited migrants landed on our shores about 4000 years ago. Jacques Cartier and his friends “discovered” the Gaspé Peninsula — and things went downhill from there . . . Immigrants today must prove they deserve refugee status. Otherwise, they must be considered economic migrants who want to come to Canada to improve their economic life. Somehow this is considered wrong. The hypocrisy of this is that most of those politicians and critics tend to forget that their ancestors were economic migrants too. It is too bad that the rules are not retroactive — otherwise all the economic migrants and their descendants could be deported.31

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5. Callous Convict Clifford, having committed crimes involving brutal violence against the young and vulnerable, is found guilty and is subsequently imprisoned. He bitterly, even persuasively, complains about the “injustices” he suffers at the hands of other prisoners as the prison authorities look the other way. While he shows outrage and indignation at these “injustices,” he does not show the slightest remorse for having inflicted categorically worse violence on his former victims.32

6. Schindler as Moral Hero? In the late 1930s Oskar Schindler joined the German intelligence service to avoid military conscription. Posted to Poland, he became successful through his war-related business activities. When the Nazis occupied Poland and began rounding up Jews to ship them off to death camps, Schindler protected thousands of Jews by employing many more in his factory than was necessary for production. Rather than following the practice of working them to death, and then replacing them with new ones, Schindler kept his workers relatively well nourished and healthy. He cared about the particular Jews he came to know and the Nazi policies struck him as abhorrent. To succeed in his project of saving Jews, it was necessary to deceive Nazi officials that he was devoted to production for the war effort and “he would play the somber, baffled, manufacturer whose profits were being eroded.” He also pretended to be affable to, and friendly with, repugnant characters such as the head of the local labour camp. He maintained this deception at great personal risk to himself, having been arrested several times and eventually losing his entire personal fortune. Although to begin with Schindler thought he could save Jews as well as make a fortune, having both morally worthy as well as self-interested motives, in the final years his commitment to saving Jews seems to have become his central motivation.33

7. Loyal Functionary? A Soviet functionary exhorts people to inform the authorities about dissidents and earnestly denounces those who help dissidents — “Loyalty to the Party comes first” — then he engineers the escape of his dissident brother-in-law.

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8. Closet-Gay Politician An appointed public official who was a practising lesbian wanted to keep her sexual orientation private since its public disclosure was likely to threaten her office as the Queen’s representative. Whenever she appeared in public, she put on a mask of heterosexuality by showing up with a man on her arm and even encouraged rumours of an impending engagement. Apart from anchoring, cultivating, and challenging our conceptual/moral intuitions, these cases are also intended as spurs to encourage moral creativity: the imaginative construction of cases of hypocrisy involves relating them to the identifying narratives of the moral tradition, as well as prompting such crucial questions as what is missing here, what needs to be added or subtracted there. Often contextual enrichment is needed, whether from the work of literature from which the case is extracted, or from history, real life, or our imagination. While these endeavours are crucial for better understanding, the fragments often need the atmosphere of moral theory to take them up into the world of sharper ethical significance, and to keep them from collapsing into mere pieces of anomalous behaviour or conflicting judgment. To see these fragments as cases of hypocrisy requires something the eye cannot descry — an atmosphere of moral theory, even if adumbrated rather than explicit, as well as a knowledge of the moral practices and values of the community. It is on this terrain that the presumed basis for the critical stance can be located. So we now turn to historically dominant moral theories to gain a better understanding of the place, status, and roles allotted to hypocrisy. We want to see how, if at all, these theories handle our considered shared intuitions, and what guidance they can offer in situations where our intuitions conflict — when we are on the horns of a dilemma. In the process, we explore what a rich moral concept like hypocrisy reveals about the adequacy or inadequacy of these theories.

Notes 1. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), see paragraphs 32 and 59. 2. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 155e. 3. Example from Kittay, “On Hypocrisy,” 277. 4. Example from Kittay, op. cit., 287-89. 5. Example from Dan Turner, “Hypocrisy,” 267-68. 6. Example from Dan Turner, op. cit., 263-64. 7. Example from Roger Crisp and Christopher Cowton, “Hypocrisy and Moral Seriousness,” 345.

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8. Example from Saul Smilansky, “On Practicing What We Preach,” American Philosophical Quarterly (1994) 73. 9. Example from Turner, op. cit., 267. 10. Example from Clyde Lee Miller, “Ironic or Not?” American Philosophical Quarterly, 13, 4 (1976) 311-12. 11. Plato, Republic, 361. 12. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Book 9, Chapter 3, 1165b7-12. 13. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, with an Introduction by Patrick Romanell (Indianapolis: The Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill, 1955) 17. 14. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in Philosophical Works, vol. 4, ed. T.H. Green and T.H. Grose (London, 1882) 269-70. 15. Immanuel Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue, in The Metaphysics of Morals, Introduction, Translation and Notes by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 231. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, translated with an Introduction and Notes by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1960) 172. 19. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, translated by Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 119-20. 20. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 226. 21. Ibid. 22. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980) 87e. 23. Charles Dickens, David Copperfield. 24. Ibid. 25. Molière, Tartuffe. 26. Molière, The Misanthrope. 27. William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene 4, lines 145-71. 28. Marcel Proust, Cities of the Plain, in Remembrance of Things Past, trans. C.K. Montcrieff and Terence Kilmartin (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981) 841. 29. Anton Chekhov, Lady with Lapdog and Other Stories (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962) 278-79. 30. George Santayana, The Last Puritan. 31. Doug Cuthand, Commentary, The Leader Post, Regina, Saskatchewan. 32. The case of Clifford Olson is notorious in the criminal records of Canada for both his crimes and his outrageous complaints from prison. Piers Benn describes a similar but fictional case. See his essay “What is Wrong with Hypocrisy?” in International Journal of Moral and Social Studies, 8 (1993) 227. 33. Thomas Keneally, Schindler’s List (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).

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part ii

Moral Theory

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4 Virtue Ethics: Hypocrisy After Aristotle “There is no vice so simple, but assumes Some mark of virtue on his outward parts.” 1 william shakespeare

A. Introduction “Hypocrisy” is a term that can be applied both to particular actions and to character traits. If one is a supporter of a consequentialist or deontological moral theory, one is likely to think that the primary usage is to describe particular acts as hypocritical in nature. The description of a person as a hypocrite would then be derivative, referring to someone who commonly engages in hypocritical actions, or at least has done so on some specific occasion in question. Frequently, however, hypocrisy is thought of primarily as a vice. Thus the term would be thought to apply most directly to settled states of character — people either are or are not hypocrites. On this sort of “virtue ethics” view, hypocritical actions are those which a hypocritical person is prone to engage in, and people can occasionally engage in hypocritical behaviour without thereby becoming hypocrites, just as one may be an honest person even if one occasionally tells a lie. We will consider what each of these major moral theories has to say about hypocrisy, but since many people think of the concept first and foremost as a vice, it seems natural to begin our discussion of its place in moral theory with virtue ethics. And since Aristotle is hailed as the primary source for the modern interest in virtue theories, it seems appropriate to consider the place of hypocrisy in Aristotle’s moral theory.2 This is all the more appropriate, since several recent attempts to provide a philosophical account of hypocrisy, have, understandably, looked to Aristotle for inspiration. For example, Jay Newman develops a sustained account of fanaticism and hypocrisy as Aristotelian opposites3 and Christine McKinnon suggests that hypocrisy might be understood as a sort of opposite of a notion often associated with Aristotelian-inspired virtue theories, namely integrity.4 In one recent contribution, Roger Crisp and

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Christopher Cowton argue that it is not possible to understand hypocrisy in terms of Aristotle’s notion of virtues as means between two associated vices, a vice of excess and a vice of deficiency. Ultimately, we think their conclusion is correct. However, we believe that they dismiss the possibility too quickly, and do not give sufficient consideration to the available ways in which it might fit. Accordingly, they miss out on an opportunity to go a long way toward clarifying the nature of hypocrisy. Although we agree that hypocrisy does not fit well into the Doctrine of the Mean, we believe that the improved understanding of hypocrisy provided by the attempt suggests other ways in which hypocrisy might fit within an Aristotelian morality. Drawing on some specific passages in Aristotle, we consider the contrasting views that Aristotle would see hypocrisy as one of the things which is simply “itself bad,” and that from the ancient Greek perspective hypocrisy would not be seen as a vice at all. We go on to suggest that if a moral system such as Aristotle’s is to provide a full account of morality, it needs to find room for some important elements which cannot be understood within the doctrine of the mean, such as integrity and moral weakness. We argue that hypocrisy belongs to this family of elements. Finally, we offer a sketch of an account of hypocrisy which makes use of Aristotelian resources, but is not confined to them. Before embarking on the main argument, however, a disclaimer is in order. This chapter is not, as it might appear to be, an essay on Aristotle as such. Significantly, we do not invoke textual debates or contested readings from Aristotle scholarship. Rather we focus on recent contributions to the literature on “hypocrisy” and aim, for a start, at a critical revision of their sometimesimpressionistic attempts to give an “Aristotelian” account of hypocrisy. While Aristotle himself says little if anything explicitly about hypocrisy, we engage him in the spirit of philosophia perennis, to see what can be teased out of him as the father of virtue theory for understanding our notion of hypocrisy. Furthermore, we not only unravel some confusions about Aristotle which philosophers who took up the matter of hypocrisy engendered, but also retrieve and attend to unnoticed or neglected texts of Aristotle relevant to a distinctive treatment of hypocrisy. While we are not committed to an account of hypocrisy in Aristotelian terms, we nevertheless critically explore different possibilities of giving such an account. Our goal is to improve the philosophical analysis of hypocrisy, while in the process also offering something of interest to contemporary friends of Aristotle.

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B. The Challenge Consider first, then, the argument provided by Crisp and Cowton. They state that: unfortunately, hypocrisy, like justice, seems to be one of those character traits that causes a problem for Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean. Consider two central Aristotelian virtues, generosity (eleutheriotes) and even-temper (praotes). Each has its own respective sphere, viz. the giving and taking of money, and feeling anger. There does not, however, seem to be any neutrally describable act or passion that the hypocrite does or feels at the wrong time, towards the wrong people, or for the wrong reasons.5 The central claim of Crisp and Cowton’s argument seems to be that there is no neutrally describable sphere in which hypocrisy can take its place as an excess or deficiency, along with an opposite vice and corresponding virtue. But how do Crisp and Cowton know that there is no such sphere? Their brief remarks contain no argument to this effect. One way to support the conclusion that there is no such sphere would be to say that no such sphere is possible in connection with hypocrisy. In order to assess this possibility, it is necessary to consider what Aristotle might have meant by such a “sphere” of a virtue.6 Aristotle speaks of virtues as “concerned with passions and actions.”7 The idea is that for each virtue there is some emotion or action in whose sphere the virtue belongs. An action in turn can be seen as manifesting some emotion in a way that reveals character.8 If a person is disposed to exhibit such an emotion to the right amount, at the right time, towards the right persons, and so on, then there is virtue. If the emotion is exhibited too much or too little, at the wrong time, or towards the wrong people, and so on, then there is vice. Briefly, then, Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean is that virtue or excellence of character (ethike arete) is a disposition, concerned with passions (pathé) and actions, which is in a mean. Given this background, it is difficult to see how one could argue that there could not be, in principle, a sphere of action or emotion within which hypocrisy might have its home. One would have to argue that there is no characteristic disposition or emotion associated with hypocrisy. It is certainly not obvious that there can be no such disposition or emotion, and it is not clear how one could go about proving its non-existence. Thus there does not seem

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to be any straightforward conceptual argument to rule out the possibility that hypocrisy can be understood in terms of the doctrine of the mean. In the absence of a conceptual argument showing that there could not possibly be a sphere in which hypocrisy could find its home, the best way to support such a conclusion would seem to be by exploring several possible such spheres, and seeing whether they do in fact fit the bill. Crisp and Cowton, however, do not undertake this task. This cannot be explained by a complete lack of plausible candidates for such a sphere, for there are several. Among these are “commitment,” “concern for the opinions of others,” and “honesty.” Perhaps, then, Crisp and Cowton’s brief comments are best regarded as an invitation for a more patient exploration of the possibility of an Aristotelian approach.

C. Spheres In Which the Vice of Hypocrisy Might Find a Home 1. Hypocrisy as a Deficiency of Commitment Consider “commitment” first. Jay Newman utilizes this sphere to provide a little-noticed Aristotelian account of hypocrisy in his book Fanatics and Hypocrites. For Newman, fanaticism and hypocrisy are “perversions of the virtue of healthy, socially constructive commitment.”9 Bearing Crisp and Cowton’s concern in mind, we might first wonder whether the action one performs in committing oneself to a cause or a way of life can be described in the required neutral manner. It seems it can. When we say that a person is a committed vegetarian, this does not appear to be a “thick” description, in the sense that we are not expressing any moral judgment about whether it is good or bad (or indifferent) to be a vegetarian. We need not be evaluating the person either positively or negatively. Hence commitment seems to be a neutrally describable type of action. Accordingly, commitment meets at least the basic requirements to become a candidate for being the sphere in which a virtue and its vices can occur. Presumably the virtue would then be called something such as “proper commitment,” and (if Newman is right) fanaticism and hypocrisy would be the vices of excessive and deficient commitment. One may want to stop the investigation right here, on the basis that “proper commitment” is not a real virtue, for if it were, we would have a word for it as we do for such concepts as justice, generosity, and courage. It is well to note, however, that Aristotle himself does not believe that our everyday language provides us with an exhaustive moral vocabulary and a complete

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language for virtue and vice. For example, when Aristotle discusses some virtues and vices that appear in social intercourse, he quite explicitly says, “now most of these states also have no names, but we must try, as in the other cases, to invent names ourselves so that we may be clear and easy to follow.”10 Perhaps we should be willing to follow Aristotle’s lead, and simply allow moral language and conceptual complexity to grow and develop as needed. In any case, there is no need to worry that the discussion here will lose touch with everyday moral language since the terms for the vices (hypocrisy and fanaticism) are both firmly-anchored everyday moral terms. It seems “proper commitment” is the sort of thing that could be considered as a candidate for an Aristotelian-type virtue. Newman claims that fanaticism and hypocrisy have parallel structures. While fanaticism involves over-believing, over-emoting, and overvaluing, hypocrisy involves under-believing, under-emoting, and undervaluing. To call someone a fanatic is to make an ethical, not an epistemological judgment. For it is not necessarily the case that the fanatic believes something false or wild or extravagant. Rather, it is his or her excessive certitude or emotionality that leads to callous and contemptuous behaviour toward other human beings and their interests.11 On Newman’s portrait, the structure of hypocrisy mirrors that of fanaticism. The hypocrite’s commitment is “weak” and “deficient.”12 He or she is marked by emotional impoverishment, lack of energy and vitality, by conspicuous emotional restraint. The essential feature of deficient commitment is evident by the hypocrite’s undervaluing: he or she does not act in accordance with his or her true values. Moreover, this may be not an occasional lapse but a settled disposition to flout professed values. The link between fanaticism and hypocrisy may be supported by the fact that each is often used in connection with religious faith, wherein fanaticism could naturally be viewed as an excess of faith, and hypocrisy as a deficiency of faith. But this account can be easily extended to the moral life by secularizing faith as trust in our fellow human beings, our shared moral principles and practices. The account Newman offers is instructive, but careful analysis reveals that “commitment” cannot after all provide the sphere in which the vice of hypocrisy has its home. For one thing, the description of hypocrisy as a failure to act in accordance with one’s own true values does not seem correct. A person might believe (as Plato’s Thrasymachus appears to)13 that “morality” itself is something that is to be twisted and used for one’s own interests. Such a person may pretend to accept popular moral principles, while secretly preferring other, more egoistic, principles. Although such a person would indeed

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not be committed to the socially shared values, his or her actions would in fact be actions consistent with the person’s true values. Yet such a person could quite naturally be described as a hypocrite, and indeed it seems such a description might apply well to some of the best-known literary hypocrites such as Molière’s Tartuffe and Dickens’s Uriah Heep. It is hard to see how hardened hypocrites such as Tartuffe and Heep display any lack of commitment to the principles they in fact endorse, as opposed to those they profess to accept. This is not to say that lack of commitment to some socially shared values may not be a necessary condition — even though it is clearly not a sufficient one — of hypocrisy. Perhaps some account of hypocrisy might be offered which formulated more carefully the conflict between word, belief, and deed it involves, but the proffered account of hypocrisy as a failure to act in accordance with one’s true values is clearly inadequate as it stands. There is an even deeper problem with the analysis of hypocrisy as deficiency of commitment. Fanaticism and hypocrisy are not simply flaws in the manner of commitment, but also, and equally importantly, in the content and extent of commitment. Consider a person who is an avid believer in a religion that requires both sexual restraint and “good neighbourliness.” Suppose this person persecutes his or her neighbours because of their promiscuity, thereby attempting to appear morally superior to them or more pious. This person might well be described as a fanatic because of the zeal with which he or she criticizes the neighbours’ sexual morality, yet at the same time we might say these actions betray a kind of hypocrisy, in that the person falls short of the requirements of neighbourly love which his or her own professed religion calls for. So this person is a fanatic and a hypocrite at the same time! If it is possible to be both a hypocrite and a fanatic at the same time, and in virtue of the same action, then surely they cannot be Aristotelian opposites. One cannot be both deficient and excessive with regard to the same thing at the same time.14 Indeed, hypocrisy can be found in the person who has no commitment to principle, but also in the self-righteous moral fanatic, and even in the allegedly Aristotelian “person of moderation,” who is willing to ignore social evils for the sake of maintaining his or her privileged lifestyle. It seems that the flaw of fanaticism is not really a matter of excessive commitment after all. Rather, it should perhaps be understood as a lack of sensitivity to other values. Perhaps commitment to something such as promoting proper sexual ethics becomes a vice only when that commitment blinds one to other commitments which have as great a call on one in the circumstances. If the religious person were able to campaign for improved sexual ethics without violating the obligations he or she has to respect others, there might well be no fanaticism, even though such a person might feel the wrongness of sexual

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misconduct just as keenly as the fanatic described above. That is, this person may have just as much commitment to the belief. Such a person may be mistaken about what is or is not morally required, but such a mistake is not a basis for allegations of fanaticism. It seems the attempt to describe hypocrisy as the Aristotelian opposite of fanaticism is doomed, but the possibility of such an account has shown that the notion of an Aristotelian account of hypocrisy cannot be dismissed quickly. Perhaps other candidates can be found for the neutrally describable sphere in which hypocrisy appears.

2. Hypocrisy as an Excess of Concern for the Opinion of Others One characteristic of the hypocrite seems to be that he or she is concerned about the opinions of others, and indeed presents a public face designed to give a more favourable impression than the hypocrite really deserves. Although again there is no convenient name for it ready-made in our moral vocabulary, perhaps this “concern for the opinions of others” could be another candidate for the sphere in which the vice of hypocrisy has its home. It does seem to be a neutrally describable type of passion, so if it is possible for there to be an excess, a deficiency, and a right amount of concern for the opinions of others, that could be where hypocrisy fits in. Hypocrisy, seen in this light, would have to be an excess of concern for the opinions of others. Its opposite would then have to be showing too little concern for the opinions of others. That does indeed seem like a candidate for an Aristotelian vice. A person who does not care at all what others think cannot be a good member of the community. Perhaps “disdain” will do as a name for this vice. And although “proper concern” is not a very catchy name, it seems plausible that there would be some amount of concern between the two extremes which could be considered “just right,” and therefore virtuous. Although there does indeed seem to be a candidate for an Aristotelian sphere of virtue and vices here, the problem with this account is that the vice of excess it describes does not after all correspond well with our understanding of the concept “hypocrisy.” It is true that hypocrites tend to exhibit this feature, but that does not establish that everyone who exhibits this feature is a hypocrite. For example, some people might be willing to bend over backwards to please others. Such people may be extremely sensitive to the needs and desires of others, and extremely self-denying in catering to those needs and desires. These people could be motivated by a desire to get the high opinion of others, but it does not seem appropriate to label them “hypocrites,” because they are willing to earn this reputation by good actions. If we were intent on

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coming up with a vice to describe their behaviour, we might describe it as “obsequiousness,” but that does not seem quite the same as “hypocrisy.” Another problem with the proposed account is that the hypocrite may not be concerned with the opinion of others at all. A person who cannot face up to some personal failings might deceive himself or herself into believing that those failings are not present. Such a person may be unable to bear a low opinion of his or her own self. This insincerity and pretence about the self could be considered a form of hypocrisy.15 Note, however, that in this case the corresponding virtue could not really be thought of as being part of a good community in which each is concerned with the opinions of others without being enslaved by their opinions. Here the corresponding virtue would seem to be something like “self-knowledge,” but that suggests the vice of hypocrisy cannot be directly linked with concern for the opinions of others.

3. Hypocrisy as a Deficiency of Honesty Consider, as another candidate, the notion of “honesty” or “truthfulness.” In fact Aristotle mentions truthfulness (aletheia) as one of the “nameless virtues.”16 It seems that people can indeed show a deficiency or an excess of honesty. The deficiency could be shown by lies and deception, and the notion that a person who is dishonest demonstrates a vice is probably not very controversial. It also seems natural to think that hypocrites are dishonest, pretending to be something they are not, so this deficiency might seem to be linked to the vice we are looking for. The claim that one can be excessively honest may require a bit more explanation, but careful examination reveals some plausibility to it. Sometimes telling a person your honest negative opinion of him or her would cause pain and achieve no good end. Indeed, there could be times when “constructive criticism” of one’s friends or loved ones is not appropriate, for example, if the person being criticized is already lacking self-confidence. Furthermore, it is at least not obvious that telling people truths about other people is always morally right; say, if you learn that a friend’s life partner is keeping a secret from your friend, it would not always seem appropriate to divulge the secret. So it does seem there can be both an excess and a deficiency of honesty. Perhaps the virtuous “right amount” could be called “tact.”17 The main problem with this attempted account is that hypocrisy cannot be understood after all simply as a deficiency of honesty. If hypocrisy necessarily involves deceit at all,18 it must be a particular kind of deceit. Perhaps hypocrisy is a form of “‘self-referential deception,’ a deception in which one pretends to be other than one is, or pretends to hold beliefs, have feelings, motives or attitudes other than those one truly has or adheres to.”19

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Suppose it is right that hypocrisy must be deception about oneself. Then the opposite vice cannot be being painfully honest as in the examples offered above. The opposite of deceiving about oneself would have to be “revealing too much about oneself.” We might metaphorically call revealing too much about oneself being “too transparent,” and being deceptive or hypocritical being “too opaque.” But does it make sense to say that being too transparent is a vice? We might well think that a person who reveals too much is foolish. Such a person makes himself or herself vulnerable to others, which may suggest a certain sort of naïve trust that others will not use this information to hurt him or her. Such a person also runs the decided risk of becoming a bore — others may just not be interested in hearing that much about him or her. These do not seem to be parallel vices with hypocrisy, however. There may be something morally significant lurking here, but it does not seem to be the Aristotelian account of hypocrisy we have been looking for. In any case, there is another problem with this account of hypocrisy. A person who is hypocritical may not be self-consciously dishonest at all. Consider the example of “a teacher who tells his pupils not to put their hands in their pockets because it looks slovenly and ruins one’s clothes and yet always has his own hands in his pockets.”20 A somewhat similar case is that of a person who believes it is morally wrong for people to eat meat, and says so, but who occasionally eats meat.21 In both of these cases, charges of hypocrisy might be levelled, but it is not clear that there is any deception at all. Even if there is a sense in which such people are deceiving — for example, the teacher may be said to deceive about his rule’s applicability to himself — it seems clear that this need not be conscious or deliberate deception. It may be that the mere inconsistency between word and deed is enough to warrant prima facie the label “hypocrisy,” even in the absence of deceit.22 Perhaps, in light of these sorts of cases, we should understand hypocrisy as a conflict between how one really is, and how others are led to perceive one. Yet this account is too broad as it stands. It would apply to con artists and spies, for example, but these people seem to be distinguishable from hypocrites.23 It would also cover people who make promises they find they cannot live up to, such as “I will finish my book manuscript by the end of the month.” Perhaps it can be refined to something such as “advocating as a norm, through word or deed, a kind of behaviour one does not in fact embody in one’s own behaviour or beliefs.” This type of account would need to be developed further, but in any case this account of hypocrisy is no longer the one that tried to link that vice to the virtue of honesty. It is also not easy to see what other neutrally describable sphere would be needed to make sense of the vice

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as now being described. The opposite could not very well be leading others to perceive one too accurately, too much as one really is, for this does not make sense as a vice. Although the nature of the vice seems to be getting clearer, the possibility of giving it the desired sort of Aristotelian treatment seems to be getting more and more remote.

D. Hypocrisy as Something “Itself Bad” The upshot of our discussion so far is that, in spite of our best efforts, we have been unable to give an adequate account of hypocrisy in terms of Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean. In one interesting passage, however, Aristotle seems to suggest that there are types of passions or actions that matter morally, but to which the notion of the mean does not apply. If there can be things which are “themselves bad,” and to which excess and deficiency do not apply, then perhaps hypocrisy is one of those things. If so, perhaps we are here given an explanation of the wrongness of hypocrisy that accounts for the inability to locate it in terms of a mean. The passage from Aristotle in question here is as follows: But not every action nor every passion admits of a mean; for some have names that already imply badness, e.g. spite, shamelessness, envy, and in the case of actions adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike things imply by their names that they are themselves bad, and not the excesses or deficiencies of them. It is not possible, then, ever to be right with regard to them; one must always be wrong. Nor does goodness or badness with regard to such things depend on committing adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the right way, but simply to do any of them is to go wrong.24 If this passage is applied to hypocrisy, it might be thought that hypocrisy simply refers to something that is bad in itself, without requiring reference to the mean. In this case, ascriptions of hypocrisy necessarily imply a negative moral evaluation, and the sentence “hypocrisy is bad” is a moral truism like “murder is bad.” Perhaps each concept carries the notion of being unjustified as part of its very meaning. There are important questions to be addressed before accepting this as an adequate Aristotelian account of hypocrisy, however. First of all, it is not clear that Aristotle really meant to suggest that there are areas to which the doctrine of the mean does not apply. If he did not, then we have still not found a place

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in which hypocrisy can appear. Even if it turns out that there are such areas, it is not clear that hypocrisy belongs there. For one thing, we are given no guidance as to how to identify things that might belong in such an area, and the examples are not conclusive in this regard. For another thing, if it turns out that hypocritical actions are sometimes morally right, then it is hard to see how one could claim that hypocrisy is something which is “itself bad.” The first question concerns whether Aristotle is really suggesting, in the passage at hand, that there are areas to which the notion of the mean does not apply. The words do seem to suggest this, but perhaps they should not be interpreted so straightforwardly. In this connection, consider the commentary offered by W.F.R. Hardie: The opening words of this passage might suggest that Aristotle was asserting or admitting that there are exceptions to the doctrine of the mean, ranges of actions or passions to which it does not apply. But he is making a purely logical point which arises from the fact that certain words are used to name not ranges of action or passion but determinations within a range with the implication, as part of the meaning of the word, that they are excessive or defective, and therefore wrong. Thus envy is never right and proper because “envy” conveys that it is wrong and improper. Again it does not make sense to ask when murder is right because to call a killing “murder” is to say that it is wrong. . . . In our vocabulary for referring to actions and passions there are words which name misformations; and, in such cases, there is no sense in asking what is the right formation of the object named. This, and no more than this, is what Aristotle means when he says that “not every action nor every passion admits of a mean.”25 So perhaps the mean does apply to these concepts after all, and Aristotle is claiming merely that certain words are used to describe the excesses or deficiencies. This seems to fit with the rest of the quoted passage, in which Aristotle goes on to say “It would be equally absurd, then, to expect that in unjust, cowardly, and self-indulgent action there should be a mean, an excess, and a deficiency; for at that rate there would be a mean of excess and of deficiency, an excess of excess, and a deficiency of deficiency.”26 Aristotle may be saying simply that it is enough to divide spheres of passion or action into three parts — a vice of excess, a virtuous mean, and a vice of deficiency — and that there is no need to subdivide the vices into three further parts. Everything

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within the realm of the vice is a vice, and there is no need to reapply the notions of excess, mean and deficiency within that realm. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the examples Aristotle uses here include “envy” and “shamelessness,” which are themselves listed elsewhere as vices corresponding to a typical “mean” virtue.27 So perhaps Aristotle does not think after all that there are some areas exempt from the doctrine of the mean. But in that case, in light of the failure of our best efforts to find a neutrally describable sphere in which hypocrisy (together with its corresponding virtue and opposite vice) can find its home, the problem concerning hypocrisy remains. What if Aristotle does mean to suggest a separate area to which the mean does not apply, however? This interpretation might be bolstered by focusing on the actions Aristotle cites as examples in the passage under discussion. All three kinds of actions (murder, theft, and adultery) are morally bad instances of a neutrally describable type of action (killing, acquiring, and having sex). Interestingly, however, none of these bad actions seems to be distinguished from its morally acceptable parallel through reference to an excess or a deficiency.28 Murder is not killing too much or too little, it is merely killing in the absence of conditions such as war, punishment, or self-defence which might render the killing justifiable; theft is not acquiring too much, it is just acquiring that which does not belong to one; and adultery is not having too much sex, it is just having sex with the wrong person. So perhaps there is a separate area here after all, which cannot be captured neatly by the doctrine of the mean. Even if this is true, it is not clear that hypocrisy can be captured within this area. For one thing, the boundaries of the area are very poorly defined, and we are given no guidance as to how to identify actions or passions that belong within it. Assuming that we could find a neutrally describable type of action of which hypocrisy could be an unjustifiable instance, what should we look to in order to distinguish hypocrisy from the acceptable instances? The examples provided are little help here, because the stories we need to construct to explain why a particular action is unjustifiable are not generalizable to other actions. For example, the explanation of the wrongness of adultery might well involve a story about the value of committed monogamous relationships that would not go far in explaining the wrongness of theft or murder. Stating simply that hypocrisy is “itself bad” like these other actions does not really provide much of an account of hypocrisy. We still would not know what type of action it is, what type of emotion causes it, nor what characteristics distinguish it from its morally acceptable cousins. This category of things “themselves bad” is too vaguely defined to help much with the desired account of hypocrisy.29

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There is one further significant worry about the notion that hypocrisy might belong in this separate category of things “themselves bad.” If there can be morally acceptable instances of hypocrisy, then it is hard to see how it could be described as “itself bad.”30 While we agree that hypocrisy is part of the language of moral criticism, and a prima facie wrong, we believe that there can indeed be morally acceptable cases of hypocrisy.31 To take what is perhaps the starkest sort of case, consider people who might be called “victim hypocrites.”32 Broadly speaking, these are people who deceive others about their true beliefs so as to protect themselves. Consider an example suggested by Eva Feder Kittay, concerning a man called Franck, a German-born Jew in Nazi Germany, who must pass as Aryan to survive. Kittay says of him: “Franck, in order to be accepted as an Aryan German, may occasionally have to adopt mildly anti-Semitic attitudes and profess beliefs he does not hold. In that case, Franck would be a hypocrite, for he would be apparently assuming the prevalent set of beliefs thought to be good — the prevalent ideological good — and masking his true beliefs.”33 In this sort of case, the behaviour of the “victim” does indeed seem to have the same sort of structure as cases where we would normally attribute hypocrisy, and as a result, it seems reasonable to call Franck’s behaviour hypocritical as well. Yet it would seem very harsh indeed to attach any moral blame to Franck in these circumstances. Accordingly, this seems to be a case in which hypocrisy is morally acceptable. It might be suggested that the hypocrisy is still “itself wrong” here, but is less wrong than the alternatives. Similarly, it might be argued that murder, theft, or adultery could be justified if the alternatives were sufficiently dire (stealing to feed one’s starving children may be the clearest example here, but one could imagine cases in which one is told that if one does not murder, say, or commit adultery, then thousands of people will be tortured and then killed). The instances of acceptable hypocrisy need not involve such extreme consequences, however. Indeed, some people have labelled as hypocritical some of the polite insincerities that many people take to be valuable for oiling the wheels of social intercourse.34 In any case, there is enough doubt about whether hypocrisy is necessarily morally wrong that it does not seem to fit easily into the category of things which are themselves bad. This is especially true in light of the uncertainty about how to decide which things belong in this category in the first place. It appears, then, that the passage in which Aristotle raises the possibility that some things are simply “themselves bad,” does not cast much light on the concept of hypocrisy. First of all, it is not clear that Aristotle really meant to suggest the existence of a category of such things that are exempt

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from the doctrine of the mean. Even if there is such an Aristotelian category, however, no account of hypocrisy is forthcoming which could link it directly to Aristotle’s stated examples, or even to an explanation of why it should be thought of as something itself bad. Finally, there seem to be cases in which hypocrisy is morally acceptable, which does not fit well with the description of it as “bad in itself.” This perspective, too, seems to fail to provide an Aristotelian account of hypocrisy.

E. Is Hypocrisy a Modern Rather than an Ancient Vice? Throughout the discussion so far, it has been assumed that hypocrisy is at least prima facie a bad thing. It is possible, however, that Aristotle would not have seen hypocrisy as being morally problematic at all. It is important to remember the differences between the social and political contexts of Aristotle’s moral concepts, on the one hand, and our contemporary moral outlook on the other. Perhaps these differences in context would result in the view that hypocrisy as we understand it would not have been seen as a vice at all by Aristotle. One reason for thinking Aristotle would not have seen hypocrisy as a vice has to do with the etymology of the word. As discussed previously,35 hypocrisy has its etymological roots in the Greek words hupokrasis and hupokrinesthai, the former meaning a reply or acting a part, and the latter meaning to speak in a dialogue or to act on a stage. The Greek words, unlike ours, had a neutral use and were not part of the language of moral criticism until the evangelists used them in a religious context. Acknowledging these creative evangelical efforts to forge a new term for moral criticism should not make us forget the theatrical basis for the word’s extension, namely, that the hypocrite is often like an actor pretending to be what he or she is not, acting out a part to which he or she has only momentary, if any, allegiance. Of course, the fact that the word was used differently in ancient Greece does not prove that the concept it now represents had not yet entered into use at that time. Indeed, the ancient Hebrew prophets often offered moral criticism of behaviour we would term hypocritical, as Nathan’s criticism of David illustrates, and even Plato can be understood at times to be condemning what we would consider hypocrisy, as is evident in his portrait of the perfectly unjust man. Whether the same term was used or not, there is reason to think that the concept of hypocrisy was in use long before the time of Aristotle. It is still possible, however, that the term as it is currently used has been influenced by Judaeo-Christian morality. For example, the recognition

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of hypocrisy seems to play upon the difference between what the person really is — what God sees — and what he or she presents himself or herself as being — what we see. Perhaps, despite Plato, there needs to be a thousand years of the practice of confession and examination of conscience to reach the stage where truthfulness about the self is so great a concern that hypocrisy becomes a vice. Aristotle may not have admired self-knowledge or truthfulness about oneself in the way modern and medieval thinkers tend to. There is reason to think, however, that Aristotle did value self-knowledge and truthfulness about oneself. First of all, when he discusses social virtues, which “are all concerned with intercourse in words and actions,”36 he distinguishes between those concerned with truth and those concerned with social pleasantness. He states: With regard to truth, then, the intermediate is a truthful sort of person and the mean may be called truthfulness, while the pretence which exaggerates is boastfulness and the person characterized by it a boaster, and that which understates is mock modesty and the person characterized by it mock-modest.37 This evidence that Aristotle does see truth about oneself as a virtue is bolstered by some of his remarks about friendship. He states that friends who love each other help each other “to keep from error” and grow in self-knowledge.38 He goes on to state, however, that there might well be ground for complaint about a certain sort of “friend” “if, when he loved us for our usefulness or pleasantness, he pretended to love us for our character.”39 It is not that he thinks there is anything wrong with friendships of utility and pleasantness, but he does think that something is wrong about pretending to a friendship for its own sake when in fact the friendship is one of utility. Concerning the assignment of blame, he writes: So when a man has made a mistake and has thought he was being loved for his character, when the other person was doing nothing of the kind, he must blame himself; but when he has been deceived by the pretences of the other person, it is just that he should complain against his deceiver.40 Although of course Aristotle does not use the word hypocrisy, his condemnation of a person who seeks to gain an advantage through pretending affection could quite naturally be seen as condemnation of hypocrisy in friendship.

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It is interesting in this context to consider also what Aristotle has to say about flattery. Aristotle does not seem at all upset by flatterers — they appeal to our self-love and so produce pleasure.41 This might indicate again that Aristotle does not seem to share Plato’s concern for self-knowledge, and that truthfulness about the self does not loom large for him as it does for Plato. If some sorts of flattery are akin to hypocrisy, this might provide another reason to think that hypocrisy does not loom large for Aristotle, either. The case is more complicated than this, however. Consider the following remarks: With regard to the remaining kind of pleasantness, that which is exhibited in life in general, the man who is pleasant in the right way is friendly and the mean is friendliness, while the man who exceeds is an obsequious person if he has no end in view, a flatterer if he is aiming at his own advantage, and the man who falls short and is unpleasant in all circumstances is a quarrelsome and surly sort of person.42 Aristotle here refers to a case of flattery motivated by ulterior purposes such as gaining an advantage and classifies this as a vice of excess. He also marks this off from similar conduct that has no such ulterior motivation. The former sounds much like a species of flattery with the dimension of hypocrisy as a specific difference. Take as an example paying false compliments to the boss to facilitate one’s promotion. It seems that the sorts of flattery that contain a tinge of hypocrisy are exactly the sorts that Aristotle wants to condemn morally. One last bit of textual evidence that Aristotle did not see hypocrisy as a vice in the way contemporary thinkers do is to be found in the Rhetoric. He makes comments there about the necessity of the forensic arguer’s presenting the appearance of being the right kind of person, because people are persuaded by appearances.43 The tone of these comments might be read as a tactical recommendation of hypocrisy. In such circumstances, it is not sufficient for a person to present good arguments, but he or she must do so in an appropriate and authoritative way, so that his or her personal idiosyncrasies do not stand in the way of achieving the rhetorical goals. For example, the speaker should not be light-hearted or frivolous when the occasion or subject matter is serious. There must be a fit between style and demeanour on the one hand, and occasion on the other. Is Aristotle really recommending hypocrisy as a tactical device for forensic argument here? It would seem that his real intention is not that the forensic

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arguer present the appearance of knowing what he is talking about even when he does not, but rather that he must not only know but also be seen as a person who knows. There need be no deception or pretence involved here. The analogy is seen in the dictum “justice must not only be done but it must also be seen to be done.” The upshot of this is that Aristotle did see hypocrisy as a vice and that arguments which insert too great a distance between him and us show at most that hypocrisy did not have such a great importance for him as it did for Judaeo-Christian morality. The latter aimed to discount appearance and accent the state of one’s soul (the inner, what God sees) in a way alien to Aristotle. Yet it seems Aristotle, too, would have wanted to claim that hypocrisy is generally morally bad, and we have still not uncovered a way in which an Aristotelian account can make sense of this moral badness.

F. Morality Beyond the Mean? There is one other significant prospect to examine. It is possible that some concepts necessary to a complete theory along Aristotelian lines do not fit into the doctrine of the mean. Such concepts might include “integrity” and “moral weakness.”44 Hypocrisy appears to have an affinity with these concepts, and thus it seems plausible that hypocrisy, too, might find its conceptual home in Aristotelian morality somewhere outside the doctrine of the mean, if at all. Integrity seems to be an important concept within our moral framework, and particularly within contemporary virtue ethics which often looks to Aristotle for inspiration.45 Integrity does not, however, seem to be the kind of thing that fits into the model of the “mean.” It is hard to see how one could have too much integrity, or how we could find some neutrally describable sphere, which allows of both deficiency and excess, and has integrity as the mean. Perhaps integrity should be seen as a sort of “meta-virtue,” which involves the relationships between other virtues. Similarly, although it is notoriously difficult to provide an adequate account of weakness of will either within or without an Aristotelian schema, it is possible to suggest that moral weakness operates in a fundamentally different way from such typical “mean” vices as cowardice or stinginess.46 Failure to act in accordance with any particular virtue could be traceable to weakness of will, for it does not seem to be tied down to any particular sphere. If there could indeed be such elements of morality which cut across the “mean” virtues and associated vices, then it is possible that this is where hypocrisy will find its moral home. Indeed, this possibility is strengthened considerably by the observation that philosophical attempts at characterizing

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hypocrisy have often, either explicitly or implicitly, suggested connections with these other concepts. In what follows, we will compare these other concepts with hypocrisy, highlighting points of contact, yet maintaining that hypocrisy is a distinct concept that resists the attempts of some philosophers to characterize it purely in terms of these other concepts. Consider again the cases discussed above, of the hands-in-pockets teacher and the meat-eating supporter of vegetarianism. Although it is quite natural to describe such cases as cases of hypocrisy, filling in the details in the right ways might make the cases seem more like cases of weakness of will.47 For example, suppose the teacher puts his hands in his pockets out of habit, without thinking about it, or the supporter of vegetarianism is simply unable to resist the aroma of a well-cooked steak. We might well describe such behaviours in terms of weakness of will. Weakness of will and hypocrisy do not appear to be identical here, but the fact that cases of one can be turned into cases of the other simply by changing a few crucial details suggests that there are important conceptual links between them. A similar conceptual parity appears when we consider hypocrisy in contrast to integrity. To see the conceptual link here, note first that Aristotle believed, as did many others in the ancient Greek world, that moral virtue is necessary for one’s well-being. Thus he states, “it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without moral excellence.”48 Someone might believe, however (wrongly, in Aristotle’s view) that it is sometimes acceptable (and possible!) to indulge one’s self-interest at the expense of virtue. Such a person might know which actions are virtuous (that is, in accord with the mean), but reject any direct inference from that fact to the view that these actions are obligatory. Perhaps the fact that hypocrites can pay lip service to one conception of morality while acting on another indicates that hypocrisy is this sort of moral failing. Clearly this sort of moral failure would not appear to be a vice as such, on the model of the mean, but rather a different sort of failure. A person who has integrity, on the other hand, must be a person who acts in accordance with what he or she believes to be right, even at a cost to himself or herself. More generally, a person of integrity must take moral reasons for action to be overriding. Indeed, the etymological conception of a person with “integrity” as one who is “whole” seems to stand in clear contrast to the sort of division between words, actions, and beliefs one associates with hypocrisy. Christine McKinnon is one philosopher who has tried to provide an account of hypocrisy in comparison to integrity.49 Following Bernard Williams, she describes the person of integrity as follows:

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One guiding second-order constraint with which she operates when confronted with decisions to make, is to ask herself whether certain proposed options would be consistent with her considered valuations. It is important to her that she act only from those motives which she deems to be truly her own, those that identify herself as the moral agent she is. She values this honesty of intention and homogeneity of purpose in herself and others, even when she does not share with others all their firstorder desires.50 McKinnon goes on to say that integrity is “so unlike other virtues as not to be in the running with them in any ranking of the virtues according to importance or merit,”51 and that hypocrisy is similarly unlike other vices. She also offers a direct comparison of a hypocrite, who is seen to allow the desire to appear virtuous to outweigh the desire actually to be virtuous, with the person of integrity, who is concerned with substance rather than appearance.52 McKinnon’s insights suffice to establish a sort of parity between integrity and hypocrisy, which suggests they do indeed belong together in an area of morality beyond the doctrine of the mean.53 However, although one can certainly see the appeal of her suggestion that we should understand hypocrisy as a lack of integrity, careful consideration shows that this account is inadequate. Hypocrisy needs to be recognized as a moral notion related to, but distinct from, lack of integrity. Although hypocrisy shares with integrity a resistance to characterization in terms of the doctrine of the mean, it should not be seen merely as lack of integrity. To see why this is true, notice that integrity seems to require not just acting in accordance with one’s moral beliefs, but also taking care in deliberating about those beliefs.54 A person who unthinkingly accepts and acts upon values might well be said to lack integrity, but would not be considered a hypocrite, so hypocrisy cannot simply be a lack of integrity. Perhaps more significantly than that, however, a thoroughgoing hypocrite such as Tartuffe or Uriah Heep may be internally consistent, as suggested earlier, and in that sense have a high degree of integrity. Our condemnation of such individuals does not seem to depend on attributing to them the view that their deeply held moral views can be ignored. On the contrary, we condemn them for pretending to endorse shared moral norms while following too effectively deeply held egoist moral views which we believe to be seriously flawed. If some of the most thoroughgoing hypocrites can be seen to possess integrity, then clearly hypocrisy cannot be a lack of integrity.55 As with weakness of will, lack of integrity has a close conceptual link with hypocrisy, but must be seen as distinct

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from it. This further supports our contention that hypocrisy is an independent concept that nevertheless belongs to the same family as these other concepts. In trying to characterize hypocrisy, Crisp and Cowton offer yet another concept of this type. They suggest that we understand hypocrisy as a failure to take morality seriously.56 On their view, a hypocrite can be one who “fails to make himself and his view of morality open to others” or is “unready to assess himself, to make himself and his real view of morality open to himself ” or who “fail[s] to live up to the moral prescriptions that he himself believe[s]” or is “satisfied too easily with [his] moral self and therefore unwilling to consider whether the demands of morality [are] greater than [he] took them to be.”57 As an account of hypocrisy, this does indeed seem like an improvement on the integrity model, but it too seems inadequate to the task. First of all, there could be people who set such high, even “saintly,” standards for themselves that they inevitably fall short, and end up being hypocrites because they take morality too seriously. Furthermore, there could be people who do not take morality seriously, and make it quite clear that they do not (e.g., avowed egoists), and such people could hardly be considered hypocrites. If one can be totally lacking in moral seriousness and yet not be a hypocrite, clearly at least some other element must be included in the account of hypocrisy. So it seems that Crisp and Cowton too have failed to provide an adequate characterization of hypocrisy. The obviously close connection between hypocrisy and the meta-virtue of moral seriousness, however, merely supports our claim that hypocrisy must find its home somewhere beyond the mean, together with such concepts as integrity, moral weakness, and moral seriousness. Philosophers have found it particularly difficult to provide an adequate account of these concepts which fall outside the doctrine of the mean. Hypocrisy is no exception.

G. Conclusion We are left with the question of how useful the Aristotelian framework is for developing an account of hypocrisy. No less a philosopher than Bernard Williams has gone so far as to suggest that “the doctrine of the Mean is better forgotten,”58 since it “oscillates between an unhelpful analytical model . . . and a substantively depressing doctrine in favour of moderation.”59 The advocacy of amnesia, in the history of moral philosophy or elsewhere, strikes us as fraught with danger. But apart from that issue, Williams’ assessment is partly wrong. For the Aristotelian framework, as we have shown, can be use-

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ful in exploring hypocrisy’s conceptual terrain and its complex motivational underpinnings, whether or not it can ultimately provide an adequate account. We have seen that hypocrisy does not fit readily into the Aristotelian mean-oriented approach, since it does not appear as one extreme along a continuum of emotion and action, whether it be commitment, concern for the opinion of others, or truthfulness. Our pre-analytical intuitions have suggested that hypocrisy might be better understood as a sort of meta-vice. But perhaps we should venture at least a stab at a more detailed sketch of an account of hypocrisy, which makes use of the resources provided by Aristotle, but is not confined to them. Hypocrisy is a vice. There are classic literary examples of thorough hypocrites, such as Molière’s Tartuffe and Dickens’s Uriah Heep. But it is important to demythologize the conception of hypocrisy, and recognize that it is an ordinary vice, common and difficult to avoid.60 It is also important to note that one need not be a “pan-hypocrite” — many of us are hypocritical with respect to particular aspects of our lives, such as religion, politics, or sex. One important aspect of Aristotle’s moral theory that can be applied so as to improve our understanding of hypocrisy concerns the relationship between character and action. Aristotle makes feeling or emotion central to virtue and vice. It would be a mistake to conclude from this that hypocrisy is merely an inner matter, however, for Aristotle also insists on the performance of actions appropriate to the feeling or emotion in question. Accordingly, a person’s actions can be used by others (the “audience,” as it were) to make judgments about a person’s virtues or vices. Hypocrisy is particularly problematic in this regard, however. The ascription of hypocrisy implies a contrast between a person’s actions or speech and state of mind.61 There is a central Aristotelian insight which is directly relevant to this characteristic of hypocrisy. This insight is that doing the correct thing is truly virtuous only if it is done for the “right reason,” or “for the sake of that which is noble” (tou kalou heneka; dia to kalon).62 For example, one who behaves courageously simply to show off is not truly courageous. Similarly a hypocrite who does the right thing simply to get a reputation for virtue is not being truly virtuous. It is important to note, however, that the Aristotelian elements of “right reason” and “for the sake of that which is noble” cannot be unpacked in the language of quantity. Acting “for the right reason” or “in the right spirit” is not a matter of acting for just the right number of reasons, rather than too many or too few, but for the right reasons. A hypocrite, then, is typically someone who, even when doing the right thing, does not do it for the right reasons. What does motivate the hypocrite

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to behave in ways that conform with what is morally required on many occasions? Typically, hypocrisy involves a pretence of being better than one is in terms of the prevailing standards, and this appearance of virtuousness enables hypocrites to better pursue their self-serving goals or vices with impunity. This explains why in hypocrisy, unlike in weakness of will, there is no regret or remorse, but rather special pleading and rationalization to cover up the fact that what is preached and what is practised do not dovetail. What motivates all this is largely a pursuit of self-interest. It would be a mistake, however, to think that hypocrites are necessarily self-consciously deceitful or selfish. Think of the morally complacent who ignore or deceive themselves about social evils so as to maintain their privileged way of life, yet still manage to think of themselves as good.63 Again, think of the self-righteous hypocrite who feels morally superior to others, and uses the pretence of moral superiority to manipulate those around him or her. Our analysis is in keeping with the adage that hypocrisy is the homage vice pays to virtue,64 and hence in line with treating hypocrisy as a meta-vice. Whereas for the moral person being moral is an end, the hypocrite inverts this, and typically uses the appearance of morality as a means to promote selfserving goals. So much for a sketch of hypocrisy which builds upon Aristotelian elements, but goes beyond them. Several Aristotelian insights prove helpful in developing an adequate account of hypocrisy. First of all, although the doctrine of the mean seems ultimately unable to accommodate the concept of hypocrisy, the lessons about how it fails enrich our understanding of hypocrisy. Furthermore, Aristotle’s understanding of the relationship between character and action, and his insistence on things being done with “right reason,” in “the right spirit,” and “for the sake of the noble,” all help illuminate the nature of hypocrisy. As with its conceptual cousins, integrity, moral weakness and moral seriousness, in the end we must go beyond Aristotle’s framework to provide an adequate account of hypocrisy. The quantitative language in which Aristotle’s discussion of the doctrine of the mean is couched cannot easily be made to accommodate the sort of pretence and deception about being moral itself which hypocrisy requires. If a new word is like a fresh seed on the ground of the discussion,65 then our hope is that the “new word” we have introduced to the Aristotelian ground of discussion nourishes Aristotelian scholarship as well as moral understanding. One natural way to go beyond Aristotle’s framework to provide an account of hypocrisy is to consult the resources offered by modern moral philosophy — in particular by consequentialism, which has been one of its dominant forms. This is a challenging route, some might even say ironic,

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since this form of modern moral philosophy has been generally criticized as inherently corrupt in the sense that it countenances the most unspeakable evil as long as it is beneficial: a veiled charge of hypocrisy. Moreover, it has been claimed in particular, that utilitarianism is intrinsically unable to deal with integrity as a virtue, and by implication, unable to deal with hypocrisy as a vice. These charges have been merely suggested, or at any rate, have not been adequately argued. Hence we now proceed to explore whether consequentialism can explain and deal with the moral status of hypocrisy.

Notes 1. William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, Act III, scene 2, line 81. 2. Of course, by focusing on Aristotle in this section, we cannot claim to have addressed virtue theory as a whole. Much interesting work has been done recently on the nature of character, and on how choices of character traits are related to leading a good life. We hope only that our explorations of Aristotelian virtue theory in particular will point out some of the issues that arise for virtue theories in connection with hypocrisy, and will serve as a spur for others to take the next step of considering hypocrisy in light of alternative conceptions of virtue ethics. 3. Jay Newman, Fanatics and Hypocrites (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1986) 18-27 and passim. 4. McKinnon, “Hypocrisy,” 327-29. 5. Roger Crisp and Christopher Cowton, “Hypocrisy and Moral Seriousness,” 346. 6. We follow Crisp and Cowton in using the common translation “sphere.” J.O. Urmson uses the term “field”; see his “Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 10, 6 (1973) 223-30. 7. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by W.D. Ross, revised by J.O. Urmson. In Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Vol. 2, Book 2, Chap. 6, 1106b17 and 1106b24-25 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 1747. We are aware that there is a large body of literature on the relationship between actions and emotions in Aristotle’s philosophy. We are in no position to weigh into these debates here. In our discussion, we generally follow the interpretation of J.O. Urmson, a well-respected Aristotelian scholar. We do not see actions and emotions as being in any way opposed within Aristotelian theory, but in our discussion here we focus more on emotion than action. 8. This is the interpretation offered by Urmson, “Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean,” 224. Urmson interprets Aristotle as committed to the thesis that for each virtue there corresponds just one emotion whose field or sphere it is. But Aristotle nowhere says this. In fact, when discussing courage, Aristotle refers to two emotions — fear and confidence — in whose field it belongs. See Rosalind Hursthouse, “A False Doctrine of the Mean,” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 81, 57-72, for a critical perspective on Urmson’s views. For some new essays on Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, see Richard Bosley, Roger Shiner, and Janet Sisson, eds., Aristotle, Virtue and the Mean (Edmonton: Academic, 1995). Martha Nussbaum, in “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach,” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 13 (1988) 37, offers a

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somewhat different account, according to which “the reference of the virtue terms is fixed by spheres of choice, frequently connected with our finitude and limitation, that we encounter in virtue of shared conditions of human existence.” On this account, it would be even harder to see how one could establish the impossibility of a sphere in which hypocrisy has its home. 9. Newman, Fanatics and Hypocrites, 11. 10. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2, Chap. 7, 1108a16-19, p. 1749. Aristotle paradoxically names the virtues and vices he calls “nameless.” The paradox disappears if we understand him to mean that the Greek terms are not really adequate to capture the virtues and vices he intends to describe. It is interesting to note that the examples Aristotle offers of “nameless” virtues are all in the realm of social relationships which are concerned with the ways one should present oneself and treat other people, and the ways one should accept their treatment of oneself. See Paula Gottlieb, “Aristotle’s ‘Nameless’ Virtues,” Apeiron, 27, 1 (1994) 1-15. 11. Newman, Fanatics and Hypocrites, 42-48 passim. This suggests “feeling sure” as a candidate for the emotional sphere or field characteristic of the virtue of proper commitment and its associated vices — namely, hypocrisy and fanaticism. On this picture the fanatic feels too sure and the hypocrite does not feel sure enough, given the same belief supported to the same degree. 12. Ibid., 88-100 passim. 13. See Socrates’ argument with Thrasymachus in Plato, The Republic, Book I, 338c-354b. 14. Roger Crisp has pointed out to us that this is not straightforwardly true for Aristotle. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle suggests that the opposite vices of prodigality and meanness may in fact occur together. That is, one who spends too much on some people (prodigality) may not have enough left to give to those who really deserve it, thus demonstrating meanness as well. Ordinarily, however, this will not be possible — for example, it does not seem that one could be both foolhardy and cowardly at the same time, with regard to the same action. Accordingly, we believe that the occurrence of two vices at the same time with regard to the same action is at least usually an indication that they are not vices that share a common sphere within Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean. Hence the occurrence of hypocrisy and fanaticism together, as stated in the text, does support the conclusion that they are not corresponding vices, even if this evidence is not entirely conclusive. 15. We discuss this aspect of hypocrisy in more detail in Chapter 13 of this book. See also Szabados, “Hypocrisy,” 206-10. 16. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2, Chap. 7, 1108a19-23, p. 1749. 17. Thanks to David Johnson for this “mean” suggestion. 18. We discuss this in detail in Part IV of this book, and conclude that hypocrisy does indeed necessarily involve deception. 19. Kittay, “On Hypocrisy,” 278. 20. Crisp and Cowton, “Hypocrisy and Moral Seriousness,” 345. 21. Dan Turner, “Hypocrisy,” 263. 22. Ibid., 265-66. Turner holds that the fundamental feature of hypocrisy is just such an internal conflict or disparity, involving some of the following: genuine beliefs, pretended beliefs, desires, words, and deeds. He acknowledges that the account as given is too broad, failing as it does to distinguish hypocrisy from changing one’s mind, but he views it as a merit of his account that hypocrisy does not always turn out to be bad. We consider his position in more detail in Chapter 14 of this book.

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23. It is a shortcoming of Kittay’s account of hypocrisy in “On Hypocrisy” that she does not provide an adequate method for distinguishing these cases. See Kittay, 278-79. 24. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2, Chap. 6, 1107a17-21, p. 1748. 25. W.F.R. Hardie, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) 137-38. 26. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2, Chap. 6, 1107a17-21, p. 1748. 27. See the list of virtues and vices Aristotle offers in his Eudemian Ethics, translated by J. Solomon, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. 2, Book 2, Chap. 3, 1220b37-1221a13, p. 1933. 28. Urmson provides a broad interpretation of the doctrine of the mean, according to which these actions can indeed be seen as excessive or deficient (“Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean,” 228). If his interpretation is correct, then Aristotle simply faces the problem we have already addressed concerning the application of the mean to hypocrisy. 29. One might also doubt that hypocrisy fits into Aristotle’s category of “things themselves bad” if one thinks that it involves a defect of character in a way different from Aristotle’s examples of murder, theft, and adultery. Note, however, that Aristotle also mentions envy and shamelessness, which clearly involve defects of character, as “things themselves bad.” 30. It might be said that murder, theft, and adultery can also be morally acceptable under some circumstances. If this is correct, then Aristotle’s entire category of “things themselves bad” becomes problematic, and all hope of accommodating hypocrisy here evaporates. 31. “Acceptable” here is meant to include both “morally justified,” meaning that the action is not wrong, and “morally excusable,” meaning that the action is wrong, but because of extenuating circumstances we do not blame the agent for doing it. We discuss the question of whether hypocrisy can ever be morally justified in some detail in Chapter 9 of this book. 32. This term is from Kittay. See “On Hypocrisy,” 287-89. We discuss this sort of case in more detail in Chapter 9 of this book. It is worth noting here, though, that this may be one of the cases in which the distinction noted at the beginning of this chapter between hypocritical actions and hypocritical persons is relevant. A virtue ethicist might want to say that people who engage in the sort of “victim hypocrisy” discussed here are committing hypocritical acts but do not thereby become hypocrites, in that these acts do not necessarily make hypocrisy a settled character trait for them. 33. Ibid., 287. 34. See, for example, Judith Shklar, “Let Us Not Be Hypocritical,” in Ordinary Vices (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984) 45-86, passim. 35. See Chapter 1, Section A of this book. 36. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2, Chap. 7, 1108a11-12, p. 1749. 37. Ibid., Book 2, Chap. 7, 1108a19-23, pp. 1749-50. 38. Ibid., Book 8, Chap. 1, 1155a12, p. 1825. 39. Ibid., Book 9, Chap. 3, 1165b4-5, p. 1842. 40. Ibid., Book 9, Chap. 3, 1165b7-12, p. 1842. 41. Aristotle, Rhetoric, translated by W. Rhys Roberts, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Book 1, Chap. 11, 1371a22-25, p. 2182. 42. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2, Chap. 7, 1108a26-30, p. 1750. 43. Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book 2, Chap. 1, 1377b21-1378a6, p. 2194.

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44. “Justice” is another moral concept that is notoriously difficult to fit into the structure of the mean (though Aristotle tries to do so). 45. Bernard Williams deserves much of the credit for bringing this concept to the fore in contemporary ethical debate. See Bernard Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” in J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, eds., Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). Other important works on this topic include Stephen L. Carter, Integrity (New York: Basic Books, 1996); Mark S. Halfon, Integrity: A Philosophical Inquiry (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989); Eric Mack, “Integrity, Recognition, and Rights,” The Monist, 76 (January 1993) 101-18; Gabriele Taylor, “Integrity,” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 55 (1981) 143-59; and Gabriele Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) Chap. 5. Although Aristotle himself does not talk of “integrity,” he speaks of “practical wisdom” and “general justice,” both of which have the common feature of the “actual exercise of virtue.” Consider: “A man has practical wisdom not by knowing only but by acting” (Nicomachean Ethics, Book 7, Chap. 10, 1152a8-9, p. 1820). Also, Aristotle says of general justice: “It is complete excellence in its fullest sense, because it is the actual exercise of complete excellence” (Nicomachean Ethics, Book 5, Chap. 1, 1129b30-31, p. 1783). It is hard not to see in these words that Aristotle conceived of something which was at least an approximation of our concept of integrity. 46. Aristotle distinguishes weakness of will (or “incontinence”) from vice by saying that the former is contrary to choice and regretted by the agent, while the latter is in accordance with choice and without regret (Nicomachean Ethics, Book 7, Chap. 8, 1151a5-8 and 1150b29-31, p. 1818). It is tempting to think of this as a sharp distinction unless we attend to the backtracking engaged in, when he says after his pronouncement that weakness of will is not a vice “though perhaps it is so in a qualified sense” (ibid.). This qualification, coupled with his remark that “of moral states to be avoided there are three kinds — vice, incontinence, brutishness” (Nicomachean Ethics, Book 7, Chap. 1, 1145a15-17, p. 1808), supports our suggestion that weakness of will, at least in the moral realm, may be seen to fit into an Aristotelian framework as a meta-vice. But it is important to keep in mind that we are talking about our notion of moral weakness which is a species of the general notion of weakness of will and this is largely considered a vice in our moral framework. 47. We discuss the relationship between hypocrisy and weakness of will, and the ways in which our assessment of which is in play can change with subtle changes of the background context, in more detail in Chapter 14 of this book, especially sections D and E. 48. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 6, Chap. 13, 1144b30-32, p. 1808. 49. McKinnon, “Hypocrisy,” 327-29. 50. Ibid., 327-28. 51. Ibid., 328. 52. Ibid., 327. 53. It should be noted that this parallel suggests that the conception of hypocrisy will also share with integrity the problem of determining how the meta-level vices and virtues are related to particular actions. We do not attempt to answer this complicated question here. 54. One account of integrity which stresses this element of moral reflectiveness can be found in Carter, Integrity.

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55. Crisp and Cowton offer a somewhat different argument to the same conclusion — that hypocrisy cannot be merely an absence of integrity. See Crisp and Cowton, “Hypocrisy and Moral Seriousness,” 346-47. 56. Ibid., 347. 57. Ibid. 58. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985) 36. Roland Puccetti has offered sustained argument toward the kind of claim Williams makes. See “Aristotle’s Golden Tautology,” Ratio, 6 (1966) 161-67. 59. Ibid. 60. See Shklar, “Let Us Not Be Hypocritical.” 61. Kittay, “On Hypocrisy,” and McKinnon, “Hypocrisy,” take this aspect of hypocrisy to be crucial for understanding its moral importance. 62. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1115b12-13 and 1116b31. 63. Shklar offers as an example of this sort of hypocrite Victorians who behaved as if the Mayhew slums of London did not exist. See “Let Us Not Be Hypocritical,” 54-55. 64. An insight of La Rochefoucauld. See his Maxims (New York: Haworth Press, 1931), 65. “L’hypocrisie est un hommage que le vice rend à la vertue.” 65. As Ludwig Wittgenstein remarks in Culture and Value (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980) 2e.

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5 Consequentialism and Hypocrisy “The ultimate sanction, therefore, of the principle of all morality (external motives apart) being a subjective feeling in our own minds, I see nothing embarrassing to those whose standard is utility in the question, What is the sanction of that particular standard? We may answer, the same as of all other moral standards — the conscientious feelings of mankind.” 1 john stuart mill “It really is of importance, not only what men do, but what manner of men it is that do it.” 2 john stuart mill “The utilitarian lives within a moral horizon which cannot be explicated by his own moral theory.” 3 charles taylor

A. Introduction It has been argued that consequentialist theories are unable to provide an appropriate place for hypocrisy.4 The suggestion seems to be that theories that can accommodate some of our key moral concepts easily thereby gain an edge over those that cannot do so. Hence, this purported difficulty in dealing adequately with hypocrisy is taken to constitute a serious shortcoming in consequentialism as a moral theory, in much the same way as its well-known alleged difficulties in dealing with concepts such as “justice” or “integrity.” Like all tests of moral theories, this method has its limitations,5 but exploring how a given moral theory can try to accommodate a key moral concept is, at the very least, often revealing of some of the complexities of morality as we understand it. The alleged problem for consequentialism in dealing with hypocrisy stems from the fact that hypocrites often try to deceive others about their own selfishness through the use of words or deeds which themselves have good consequences. It might seem that consequentialists must therefore approve of

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such words or deeds, and are accordingly unable to attribute to them the sort of moral condemnation hypocrisy is often taken to carry. “[C]onsequentialist moralities lack the machinery to count hypocrisy as wicked . . . there is nothing in [the hypocrite’s] method of reasoning or in her mode of operation which the consequentialist should find in the least offensive.”6 We consider several ways in which a consequentialist might try to deal with this problem. Separating the evaluation of agent and action, evaluating dispositions directly, and focusing on long-term consequences such as reliability and erosion of trust, all prove inadequate to the challenge. Nevertheless, we do not ultimately agree that consequentialist theories are unable to provide an appropriate place for hypocrisy. We argue that a version of consequentialism which values the fulfillment of desires,7 rather than mental states, is able to explain why hypocrisy is generally wrong, and can also provide compelling explanations in cases where the normal moral evaluations do not seem appropriate. In any case, we believe that the effort to see how consequentialist theories can try to accommodate hypocrisy illuminates many features of both hypocrisy and consequentialism.

B. Stating the Problem The argument against consequentialism hinges on the notion that hypocrites, in many standard cases, try to deceive others, through word or deed, into thinking that they accept a norm they do not in fact accept, so as to appear “better” in the eyes of those who are deceived.8 Understanding the wrongness of hypocrisy, then, is said to require looking not only at actions performed, but also at the internal mental attitudes from which those actions stem. Since consequentialism is said to be concerned only with actions and their consequences, ignoring internal mental attitudes, it is said to miss this key feature of hypocrisy.9 This sort of argument has often been made against consequentialism in connection with features of the moral landscape such as integrity or friendship.10 The problem may be even more acute in the case of hypocrisy, because here consequentialism is accused not only of failing to register a key element of our moral world, but actually of valuing it incorrectly, by positively evaluating hypocritical actions that have good consequences. To clarify the nature of the problem posed by hypocrisy, suppose that there are certain behavioural norms prevailing within a society. Suppose further, for the sake of the present discussion, that these norms are consistent with a considered consequentialist position — suppose, for example, that they are the sort of norms a rule utilitarian would advocate. Consistent with our sketch above, then, a hypocrite can be understood against this background as a person who

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does not accept the prevailing norms, but tries to deceive others into believing that s/he does. In the standard case, a hypocrite will be a selfish person who tries to lead others to underestimate the extent of his/her selfishness. Now what should a consequentialist say about the account to this point? Insofar as the hypocrite is willing to indulge his or her own interests at the expense of those of others, the hypocrite is clearly not reasoning along consequentialist lines. The consequentialist might conclude that hypocrisy is essentially a species of egoism, and as such can be condemned as being incompatible with consequentialism.11 This simple consequentialist account of the wrongness of hypocrisy will not do, however. Even leaving aside questions about whether hypocritical aims could happen to do a better job of maximizing the good than direct pursuit of the consequentialist goal would,12 there is still a problem. This stems from the fact that consequentialism should be able not merely to state which actions or dispositions are best, but also to rank the ones which are not best from better to worse. To see how consequentialism seems to fail in this task with respect to hypocrisy, consider one particularly illuminating comparison. This comparison is with a person who is selfish but, unlike the hypocrite as described above, makes no effort to appear to be anything else.13 We might call such a person an “acknowledged egoist.” Intuition strongly suggests that the hypocrite is the greater offender, and the long history of condemnations of hypocrisy indicates that this is a common and deeply grounded perception.14 After all, the hypocrite is not only selfish, but a deceiver as well. If the consequentialist cannot account for this difference in our moral evaluations of the two types of persons described, that would seem to be a problem for the theory. A consequentialist can claim to have given an adequate account of the wrongness of hypocrisy only if he or she is able to discriminate between these two types of person, on the basis of his or her theory. The difficulty consequentialists have in meeting this challenge emerges when we think carefully about what the hypocrisy is likely to consist in. It was suggested that the hypocrite uses word or deed to convince others that he or she accepts a norm he or she does not in fact accept. These, then, are the areas in which the hypocrite differs from the acknowledged egoist. But can the consequentialist condemn the sorts of words or deeds that the hypocrite uses to convey a false impression? To answer this question, we need to know what sorts of words or deeds they are likely to be. Presumably, ones which tend to support the prevailing consequentialist norms. If one wants to convey the impression that one accepts certain norms, one obvious thing to do would be to speak out in favour of such norms. Assuming the norms in question are indeed conducive to the consequentialist good, however, it is hard to see how

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pronouncements in favour of them could have bad consequences. Thus, for example, if a preacher is sleeping with prostitutes, contrary, let us stipulate, to the prevailing consequentialist norm, it is hard to see how that same preacher’s pronouncements in support of the worthy norm can themselves be said to have bad consequences. Of course we can condemn the preacher for violating the norm, but where is the harm in the hypocritical pretence of accepting it?15 Similarly, the only way to convince others, through action, that one supports a particular norm is to perform actions that conform to the norm in the presence of witnesses. But such actions that conform to the norm are, by hypothesis, actions that tend to have good consequences. So it seems that the words and actions which are hypocritical, in the sense that they are used to cover up the agent’s egoism, are in fact words and actions of which the consequentialist should approve. In comparing the hypocrite with the acknowledged egoist, far from explaining the unique wrongness of hypocrisy, it seems the consequentialist has to say that in the only areas of difference between the two types of person, the hypocrisy is to be applauded rather than condemned. The problems for the consequentialist stemming from this surprising conclusion are compounded when we observe that the benefit that the hypocrite seeks for him or herself may not be at the expense of the overall good at all. Consider the following clear and thought-provoking example: Consider, for example, a male employer who, although an unregenerate sexist but desiring to impress some woman with his “open-mindedness” hires a well-qualified woman for what is traditionally a man’s position. Let us say further, that he manages to treat the new employee with proper consideration and respect. Why does it matter that in his “heart of hearts” he believes her to be naturally inferior to a man in a comparable position? If he successfully but hypocritically hides his sexist views, is he not morally superior to the outright sexist who would deny the woman that job and that same outward respect?16 Notice that in this case the good consequence the hypocrite seeks for himself is not one that detracts in any straightforward way from the overall good. The sexist employer seeks merely the approval of another. There is no obvious way in which it detracts from the overall good if one person has a bit more approval than would be the case if all the facts were known, especially since approval is not the sort of thing of which there is a fixed limited quantity to be distributed.

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Another, similar, example might help illustrate the point. Suppose a lawyer harbours a secret belief that poor people are responsible for their own poverty (e.g., they are simply too lazy to work hard and improve their situation), and that people are entitled to no greater advantages than those for which they themselves are responsible. If people in general value generosity to the poor, such a lawyer might nevertheless want to gain a reputation for generosity, and accordingly might volunteer to assist with a legal aid clinic for the poor and genuinely work hard at performing the required duties there. (Assume that volunteering one’s services in such a way conforms to the prevailing consequentialist norms.) There are several ways in which the reputation thus gained might benefit the lawyer. Perhaps, as in the case of the sexist employer, the lawyer is sexually attracted to someone who is working for the legal aid clinic, and sees this as an opportunity to spend more time with that person and to gain some affection from that person for being so “good-hearted.” Or perhaps the lawyer has a group of friends who are all more sympathetic to movements to help the poor, and the lawyer wants to be seen to be on the same side as a way of keeping their friendship. Or again, maybe the lawyer simply thinks that having such a service on his or her resumé will improve the chances of some day getting an appointment as a judge, or at least get more high-paying clients to bring their cases in. This lawyer clearly performs actions with good consequences, and arguably does more in this regard than most people, yet the lawyer is also clearly trying to deceive others as to his/her true motivations, and as such seems to be a good candidate for the title “hypocrite.” In these cases, and others like them, a person is pretending to a motivation he or she does not in fact have, so as to appear better in the eyes of others. This seems to be enough to characterize them as cases of hypocrisy, yet the actions in which the hypocrisy resides are ones which themselves seem to have good consequences. Thus it seems the consequentialist must do some work either to explain how the theory condemns such behaviour after all, or to persuade opponents that no such explanation is required.

C. A Methodological Response One response available to the consequentialist is to deny the significance of hypocrisy as a test. The objection has been that consequentialists cannot accord to hypocrisy the moral stigma it carries in our ordinary moral discourse. If it should turn out that hypocrisy is not in fact, or should not be, accorded much importance anyway, then the apparent inability of consequentialist theories to provide an important place for it will cease to be a problem.

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Specifically, it might be claimed that hypocrisy is too unimportant or too vague a concept to use in criticism of a moral theory. It is difficult to know what sort of evidence would settle the question of whether a concept is important or clear enough to use in testing a moral theory. A complete consideration of this reply would require more detailed consideration of the standards of suitability for moral theories than this book can take on. In what follows, we will merely provide reasons to think that hypocrisy does meet these criteria, and that therefore consequentialists would do better to look elsewhere for a reply to the problem of hypocrisy. Does “hypocrisy” meet the twofold criteria of moral importance and conceptual clarity required of a concept fit to be used in testing a moral theory? Let us begin with moral importance. The number of relevant passages we refer to throughout this book amply attests to the fact that hypocrisy is a concept widely condemned in our moral tradition. Its theoretical import is elegantly captured by the statement that “the exposure of hypocrisy is certainly the most ordinary and it may also be the most important form of moral criticism.”17 Even recent writers who seek to downplay the prominence of hypocrisy generally aim only to make us more circumspect in our use of the term, not to deny that it can have important legitimate uses.18 Does “hypocrisy” meet the requirement of conceptual clarity? To some extent, that question is at the core of this entire book. For this purpose, however, it may be enough to say that, though the concept is vulnerable to a certain degree of murkiness and contestability, this is no more true of hypocrisy than of a number of other moral concepts. Given this, the requirement of clarity of understanding, if interpreted too strongly, would bring in its wake a certain paralysis in moral theorizing and reflection. It seems we have a firm enough grasp of the concept to explore its roles in our larger moral perspectives. It seems then that the consequentialist cannot simply dismiss the problem posed by hypocrisy on the grounds that the concept is insufficiently clear or important. In the next sections, we will consider some promising ways in which consequentialists might try to provide an appropriate assessment of hypocritical behaviour, and argue that they are ultimately inadequate. We will then put forward the one consequentialist response to the problem that does seem to us successful.

D. Agents and Actions One way in which consequentialists might try to deal with the problem posed by hypocrisy is by distinguishing the evaluation of agents from the

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evaluation of actions. It might be claimed that consequentialism has room for each kind of evaluation, and that this allows us to condemn hypocrites while admitting that many of their actions are good, in the sense of having good consequences. The separate evaluation of an agent and of that agent’s action could be based upon a distinction between subjective and objective19 — on what would have been right if the facts had been as the agent believed them to be, and what was in fact right given all the facts, including ones unknown to the agent at the time. Alternatively, the separation may be based upon a more complex account of what space there is within consequentialism for the evaluation of motives and dispositions independently of (or at least in addition to) the actions they give rise to in a given particular circumstance. Consider first the subjective/objective distinction. One well-known hypothetical case along these lines involves a person who sees another person drowning, and decides to save that person. It later turns out that the person saved was a young Hitler, who goes on to be the cause of dreadful consequences for millions of people.20 The act of saving the drowning Hitler could be seen to have been a very bad act, since its long-term consequences were terrible. Few would want to attach any moral blame to the poor person who saved Hitler’s life in the example, however. For all that person could reasonably have known, the act of saving the life of a drowning person was one that was likely to bring about good consequences. We might, therefore, want to separate our evaluation of the agent here from our evaluation of the action. Hence, we might say the agent did the right thing, even though it turned out to be a very bad thing. Alternatively, we might say the agent was good, but the agent’s act was bad. Perhaps we can similarly say of hypocrites such as the sexist employer mentioned above that their actions are good, but the person who performs them is bad. Some critics of consequentialism believe that the need for separate evaluations of rightness depending on whether one looks at the matter subjectively or objectively creates problems for the theory. The argument might be that it is nonsensical to reach two opposite moral conclusions in regard to a single person performing a single act. The fact that consequentialism seems to be saddled with a need for such a nonsensical conclusion is seen as a mark against that theory. Reflection suggests, however, that this is not such an awkward situation after all, and there are perfectly understandable everyday analogies to it. For example, suppose somebody offers you an even-money bet on a long shot. Say you know that there is only a one-in-twenty chance that the next marble drawn out of an urn will be white, and someone offers you an even-money

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bet according to which you win so long as the white marble is not drawn. Assuming each agent is driven by self-interest, it would seem that this would be a good bet for you to accept. It might turn out, however, that the white marble defies the odds, and is in fact the next one drawn. If you took the bet and lost, would that mean that it was not a good bet after all? Well, in a sense it would, yet at the same time this happenstance would not really affect our assessment of the rationality of accepting the bet in the first place. Here, too, it seems we can make two opposite judgments about the same action. It was subjectively right to accept the bet, yet objectively it turned out to be a bad thing to do. The existence of such perfectly understandable analogies suggests that consequentialism may not have much of a problem with separate evaluations of the agent’s subjective judgment and the objective results of that judgment after all. Insofar as consequentialist theories try to provide guidance for action, they must approve to at least some degree of actions which are intended to bring about good consequences, even if they fail.21 A perfect moral agent would be one who intends to bring about good consequences, and is gifted with perfect prescience, but of course we are all only human and cannot have complete knowledge of what the consequences of our actions will be. So consequentialists need not be embarrassed by a need to evaluate separately the subjective judgments of agents and the objective consequences of their actions. Once this distinction is drawn between the evaluation of an agent and that of the agent’s action, it might seem possible to argue that hypocrites can be condemned as bad people even though their hypocritical actions are often good, in that they have good consequences. There is an important difference, however, between the case of the hypocrite and cases such as that of the drowning Hitler. In fact, this difference is enough to show that consequentialists cannot after all solve the problem of hypocrisy by using the subjective/objective method of obtaining separate evaluations of agent and action. The difficulty is that the hypocrite typically does not lack knowledge in the way that creates a gap between subjective and objective evaluations. The facts need not be other than what the hypocrite believes them to be, and hypocrites may know full well that the actions which constitute hypocrisy will have the good consequences they in fact have. If the actions were indeed good, it would seem we need after all to approve of the hypocrite, since he or she intended to bring about those good consequences. The notion of evaluating decisions separately from a subjective or objective perspective does not seem to provide a way out for the consequentialist here after all.

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E. Counting Dispositions Directly As noted above, there is another way in which consequentialists might try to distinguish between evaluations of agents and evaluations of the actions those agents perform. This other way involves providing space for treatment of motives and dispositions as themselves objects of consequentialist evaluation.22 There are a number of ways in which consequentialists have tried to do this. One such way is to adopt a theory such as “motive utilitarianism”23 (also known as “trait” or “disposition” utilitarianism). The idea here might be that it should be determined which dispositions are most likely to lead to good consequences, and that “good” actions should then be understood as those which emanate from (or at least are consistent with) these best dispositions. On this account, conformity to the best dispositions is seen as the criterion of rightness of an action. That is to say, a good action is seen as one that emanates from (or is consistent with) the disposition which, if generally accepted,24 would tend to have the best consequences, even if in a particular situation such an action does not have the best consequences. A slightly different view maintains that people should try to bring about in themselves dispositions that are most likely, in the actual world, to lead them to consequence-maximizing actions. On this view, in those unusual cases where actions emanating from such dispositions would fail to bring about the best consequences, we could say such actions are not really good. Nevertheless, we might say that the person who has incorporated such dispositions has adopted the proper decision procedure, and we might thus be reluctant to condemn the person. In this case, again we might maintain that the person is right to act in accordance with the dispositions which were most likely to lead to good consequences, even though in a particular case acting in accordance with those dispositions might amount to doing a bad act (one which fails to lead to good consequences). That is, we might be able to reach a positive evaluation of the agent while maintaining a negative evaluation of the action performed by the agent (or vice versa). In whichever form seems most defensible in the end, such theories might seem to have an advantage in terms of their ability to accord a place to values such as integrity, while still claiming that the ultimate basis of value judgments is good consequences. Indeed, in telling us how to decide which dispositions to try to foster, this kind of theory seems to answer a key problem for virtue ethics. That problem is one of how we are to tell which dispositions are virtues, and which are vices. The disposition utilitarian explains which are which in terms of their likely impact on human happiness.

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In the present context, the important question is whether this method of deriving separate evaluations of agents and the actions they perform will enable consequentialists to solve the problem posed by hypocrisy. If the actions in which hypocrisy resides are ones that tend to bring about good consequences, can a consequentialist nevertheless condemn the hypocrite’s character by creating space within the theory for separate evaluation of motives and dispositions? Can hypocrisy be condemned as a negative character trait, without need of any further argument about the consequences of hypocritical actions? This consequentialist approach seems particularly well suited for responding to the way in which Christine McKinnon presents the problem posed by hypocrisy. Following the sort of argument put forward by Bernard Williams,25 McKinnon uses hypocrisy to suggest that consequentialism is unable to find suitable space for the evaluation of inner states, yet claims that some of our most important moral evaluations (including that of hypocrisy) are of that nature. McKinnon contrasts the hypocrite with the person of integrity in terms of the relationship between a person’s actions and motives. She says of the person of integrity: “It is important to her that she act only from those motives which she deems to be truly her own, those that identify herself as the moral agent she is,”26 which contrasts with “the lies told and the dissembling regarding motives involved in hypocritical behavior.”27 Consequentialist theories are then held to be unable to recognize the moral importance of these concepts because “with all the attention — and value — placed on consequences, it makes no sense to accord any independent merit to a person’s commitment to her goals or values. It matters not to the consequentialist who performs a particular beneficial action, nor does it matter whether the action arose from some deeply-held convictions; it matters only that it be performed.”28 Consequentialists who have allowed space in their theories for the independent evaluation of motives and dispositions might respond to this sort of objection simply by denying that their theory must ignore questions about the source of actions. If we are to count as good only those actions which emanate from dispositions that would bring about good consequences, or if we are to value the decision procedures consequentialism recommends separately from its ultimate criterion of the good, then we can indeed criticize a person who does the right thing but without the right motive or disposition. We might be able to claim that certain dispositions, such as hypocrisy, are themselves wrong, even if the actions that flow from them tend to have good consequences. The argument here might be that, although hypocrites may tend to do things that have good consequences, their motivation for doing so is something other than the desire to bring about those good consequences. That

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is, some cases of hypocrisy seem to be ones in which people do the right thing, knowing it to be so, but do it for the wrong reasons. If motives and dispositions are to be evaluated on their own, then consequentialists may indeed be able to condemn such reasons for action, while lauding the actions themselves. Although consequentialist theories which provide space for separate evaluation of motives or dispositions seem able to use these extra resources to deal with the problem of hypocrisy, other problems remain for such views. First of all, there are questions about the defensibility of such views in general. For one thing, it is not clear how much control we have over fostering dispositions, nor whether making the attempt is worthwhile in consequentialist terms. Next, it is not clear whether we must always follow our dispositions, or if it is possible to act “contrary to our nature” occasionally. If it is possible to act contrary to our dispositions, then these sorts of consequentialism might face problems analogous to those posed for their better-known cousin, ruleutilitarianism. If the theory recommends adopting certain dispositions as most likely to lead to good consequences, then problems might arise in unusual situations in which one believes that acting in accordance with one’s good disposition would, on this occasion, not maximize happiness. What reason could one possibly have for acting in accordance with one’s disposition anyway in such a situation? Perhaps your dispositions should be seen as general guidelines, but of a sort which should be abandoned when other considerations indicate that utility would be maximized by doing so. This is suggestive of the alleged “collapse” of rule-utilitarianism into act utilitarianism.29 Alternatively, if one is considering a theory in which it is held out simply as the criterion of rightness that an action follow from the right sort of motives or dispositions, regardless of its actual consequences, the disposition theories might be vulnerable to criticisms analogous to the charge of “rule-worship” levelled against rule-utilitarians.30 Even if one is confident that such consequentialist theories are defensible against these sorts of problems, it is not clear they will be able to deal adequately with the problem of hypocrisy. They seem to offer a promising avenue, but the case is not a clear one. The consequentialist here must offer some further guidelines as to which motives and dispositions are to be approved of, and which to be disapproved of. It is not obvious that these guidelines, when spelled out, would lead to the desired result that hypocrisy is to be condemned. It may well turn out, for example, that because of the good consequences of the actions in which hypocrisy consists, hypocrisy would be a better disposition to foster in oneself than, say, straightforward selfishness. In other words, it is not enough here for the consequentialist to say that we

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can evaluate actions separately from motives or dispositions. We must also be provided with a reason to think that this particular sort of motive or disposition (hypocrisy) would be condemned, in spite of the good actions it may give rise to.31 At the very least, there is still a great deal that must be said before this sort of approach could be thought of as having solved the problem of hypocrisy. This is not the place to enter a full discussion of the merits and disadvantages of consequentialist theories which try to create space for evaluations of motives and dispositions. If one finds them too problematic to defend in general, then clearly one will not after all believe they provide an adequate way of dealing with the problem hypocrisy poses for consequentialism. Even if one is sympathetic to the approach in general, there is still a problem in explaining how it would yield the desired results in the case of hypocrisy. In any case, we will argue that it is not necessary to accept this version of consequentialism in order to deal with the problem of hypocrisy. We will offer what we consider to be a preferable alternative below.

F. Long-Term Consequences: Reliability One further line a consequentialist might take to deal with the problem of hypocrisy involves the notion of long-term consequences. It might be claimed that hypocritical actions seem good when we look at them in isolation, but that they lose much of their appeal when we look at their long-term consequences. One important possibility along these lines, which again touches on considerations of character, involves the notion of reliability. In cases such as that of the sexist employer, we might say that the current act is good, but we cannot count on the agent to perform good actions reliably in the future. This is so because the hypocrite is assumed to be motivated primarily by self-interest. If the hypocrite’s perceived self-interest conflicts with what morality requires at some future time, then he or she will presumably not do the right moral thing at that time. Thus the hypocrite is now acting in accordance with the norm, but may not in the future, whereas one who truly accepted the norm would.32 Even if this is true, and can explain some of our moral discomfort with the person who does the right thing but for hypocritical reasons, it does not provide an explanation with which a consequentialist can be fully satisfied. If the person indeed acts in a straightforwardly selfish manner in the future, then s/he will in effect no longer be acting hypocritically. Even though we can see the seeds of such behaviour in the current motivations of the hypocritical behaviour, it seems odd to condemn the hypocrite on the basis that s/he may

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cease to be a hypocrite in the future! Notice also that these future “unreliable” actions do not destroy whatever good effects the current hypocritical actions may have. The consequentialist might be able to make a stronger case here, however, by pointing to a different sort of distant consequence. It might be argued that actions such as the hiring of the female employee, or the work at the legal aid clinic, have an impact on the attitudes other people take toward the people who perform them. We do indeed use evidence about how others behave as a basis for judgments about them, and then use these judgments to help determine what sorts of roles to assign to people. We want the people in positions of power and influence in our lives to be people who will use that power and influence well. It is reasonable for us to use judgments of character to determine who will fill important roles in our lives, such as becoming our friends, lovers, doctors, lawyers, and politicians. Perhaps the wrongness of hypocrisy can be understood against the background of this use of judgments of character. Hypocrites may use the good will they obtain from actions and words conforming to the norm to get into positions where they will be better able to indulge their self-interest. To put it crudely, perhaps hypocrites use their good deeds to cover up for, or create the conditions for, other actions (past or future) which will serve their interests even more. In doing so, hypocrites seem to exploit our judgments of character for their own purposes. Consider, as an example, a politician who makes promises to clean up government and eliminate corruption. Through such promises, this politician gains election to a very powerful position. Once that has occurred, he or she removes from office several corrupt officials who have been stealing money from the public coffers, in the process securing even more power. Eventually, this politician might be able to use the power thus obtained to behave in a more corrupt way than anyone had done previously, yet cover this up by grandiose yet insincere condemnations of such corruption. We might well think that the condemnation of corruption and removal of corrupt officials, in and of itself, is a good thing, but if it makes possible this even worse abuse of power, it is clearly not a good thing, all things considered. It seems consequentialism has a straightforward explanation of the wrongness of hypocrisy in this sort of case. Although the hypocritical act (e.g., removal from office of a corrupt official) seems good in consequentialist terms when viewed in isolation, a look at the bigger picture suggests this is not so. Indeed, if that act makes possible the future act which has worse consequences, we might argue that the future act is itself partly a consequence of the original hypocritical act. The earlier was not itself a sufficient cause of the later act, but it created

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the conditions under which alone the later act was possible. Therefore, if one were to look at all the consequences of the act, one could see quite clearly why the hypocritical act could be condemned from a consequentialist perspective. The act could be seen to have both good and bad consequences, with the bad outweighing the good. It may not always be this easy for the consequentialist to explain the wrongness of hypocrisy, however. Consider a slightly different case in which the newly elected official’s corruption is no worse than that of those who preceded him or her. Perhaps the same amount is to be skimmed from the public coffers either way, and it is simply a question of who will get the money. Indeed, the newly elected politician might even take less money from the public coffers. The consequentialist cannot use the same reply here as in the previous case, in which the immediate good effects of speaking out against corruption and removing corrupt officials from their posts were dwarfed by their less direct bad effects (making possible the much worse corruption of the newly elected official). In the present case, more money is left in the public coffers under the new regime, so the end state seems to be better than what had existed before. Would this mean that such hypocrisy was justified after all, on consequentialist grounds? If so, it would seem that consequentialism still has a problem.

G. Risk of Discovery and Loss of Trust A consequentialist might argue that the phenomenon of hypocrisy has not yet been adequately described. In particular, it might be pointed out that the discussion so far has proceeded as if the hypocrisy could be successfully maintained indefinitely. But hypocrisy always carries with it a chance of discovery, of exposure. Maybe the prospects for consequentialist accounts of hypocrisy’s harm seem less gloomy once we subtract Gyges’ ring from situations of hypocrisy, thereby adding a dose of realism to them. In this way, we might add a further type of long-term consequence to the discussion — that which accompanies discovery or exposure of hypocrisy. There are two ways in which discovery of hypocrisy could occur. Either the hypocrite could deliberately “lift the mask,” as it were, or the hypocrisy could be exposed by another, against the wishes of the hypocrite. Consider first the possibility of the hypocrite’s own decision to drop the pretence. A hypocrite might decide to drop the mask if wearing it is not having the desired effect. For example, in the sexist employer case, he was described as having hired the woman as his employee so as to impress some woman with his “open-mindedness.” But what if the employer decides that the stratagem

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is not working? What if the woman he hopes to impress is not convinced of his good nature (even if she cannot explain this sudden act of good judgment on his part!), and he despairs of ever winning her over. Is he not likely then to invent some excuse to discriminate against the woman he hired and pretend that he is doing so for the “right reasons”? The deceptions will continue and the competent employee will be dropped, with no further good consequences in sight. These certainly do not seem like the best possible consequences, but the case is still not clear-cut. It is easy to see as morally wrong the action of firing the woman because her employment is no longer seen as likely to have the desired consequence, while pretending she is being fired for some other “good” cause. The employer is performing an action with bad consequences, and the badness of those consequences is not lessened in the least by the pretence concerning the reasons for the action. But notice how little this shows about the earlier hypocritical action, that of hiring the woman in the first place. Can that act be said to be bad, simply because it created the conditions of the possibility of this later act? Certainly the employee involved might be hurt at being fired unjustly, but is she necessarily worse off than if she had not had the job in the first place? If she is not worse off, and the employer is not worse off, and the woman he hoped to impress was never taken in, then where are the bad consequences? Perhaps the answer to this question lies in a consequence that this sort of case shares with the case where the hypocrisy is exposed by another, who recognizes the hypocrite’s disguise. This possible consequence of the discovery of hypocrisy is a general loss of faith in human nature and the morality of the world, or a general erosion of trust. The consequentialist might agree with the statement that “trust is a social good to be protected just as much as the air we breathe or the water we drink. When it is damaged, the community as a whole suffers; and when it is destroyed, societies falter and collapse.”33 It seems also true that “trust in some degree of veracity functions as a foundation of relations among human beings” and that “whatever matters to human beings, trust is the atmosphere in which it thrives.”34 If trust is indeed an important component of human well-being, and if hypocrisy tends to undermine trust, then it seems consequentialists may have a way to condemn hypocrisy after all. Indeed, the argument about hypocrisy here might parallel one sort of argument that has been mounted concerning lying, to the effect that the wrongness of lying can be found in its tendency to undermine trust.35 The case is not quite this simple, though. Lies tend to undermine trust only if they are discovered. The same is true of hypocrisy. Of course, any act of lying or hypocrisy carries with it a risk of discovery. People might

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disagree about how much risk there is, but perhaps even a small degree of risk is enough for the consequentialist. Even a small risk of a major harm can win out, in the consequentialist calculus, over a large chance of a small gain. If we assume that the good consequences the hypocrite hopes to gain for him or herself are relatively minor when compared with the important value of trust, with its important consequences for the entire community, the consequentialist can say that this is a risk which should not be taken. The hypocrite might be seen as acting morally incorrectly because he or she is being reckless. André Gombay puts it as follows: [I]n standard cases of lying or deceit, to be discovered is — for the liar or the deceiver — the failure of his enterprise. He didn’t pull it off . . . Surely you want to ask: why blame people for untoward consequences attending the failure of their enterprise — presumably they aimed to succeed, not to fail? Aeroplane crashes erode public confidence in flying; we do not on that account regard the travel industry as criminal. You reply: “ah, but we do blame people for failing — if there is a good chance that they will, and if the cost of failure is high relative to the cost of not engaging in the activity in the first place. For example, pilots of aeroplanes will be faulted if they take off with only half the engines working: in legal parlance, their crime is recklessness.” All right, then; shall we say that the liars’ [and hypocrites’] fault is that they show reckless disregard of the risk of harm to public trust? They are bound to know, aren’t they? that the risk is very often substantial, and that the harm attendant on failure almost always exceeds the benefit to be gained from success. So that is their crime — they are reckless with trust.36 Neither Gombay nor we are content with this conclusion, though. The claim that the wrongness of hypocrisy lies in its recklessness with regard to trust sounds plausible, but there are at least three paradoxical implications of this claim. First of all, if this is right, it seems we should view a person who acts hypocritically but takes great pains to cover up the hypocrisy as somehow morally better than someone who is hypocritical but is easily found out. After all, the person who takes great pains to cover up, even if this means piling up deception upon deception, is being less reckless with regard to the putative real danger here, the discovery of hypocrisy.37 Yet of course the normal moral reactions are the reverse — the more steps one takes to cover up one’s deception, the worse the offence becomes.

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Furthermore, if it is the discovery of hypocrisy that has bad consequences, it seems we would need to attach moral blame to anyone who makes an effort to expose a hypocrite. The course likely to have the best consequences, it would seem, would be to avoid situations in which one might learn, even inadvertently, that someone is a hypocrite. A person who accuses others of hypocrisy would seem to be a threat to society, no matter how accurate the accusations may be. Finally, it should be noted that the undermining of trust could take place even in the absence of any deception. There is an obvious sense in which this is true — violent crimes can undermine people’s trust in human nature, even if there is no deception involved, as indeed can thoughtless remarks, revealed secrets, and behaviour others see as obscene. As Gombay points out in connection with acts of violence, “They will certainly damage public trust, make one suspicious of strangers. Yet I take it, no one would — even for an instant — want to say that the wrongness of them resides in that fact. The explanation would look puny, or upside down. Of course these acts damage public trust; but they do so because they are — in themselves — bad, horrible.”38 Indeed, it might be said it is because such actions harm people that they undermine trust, not the other way around. But there is another, perhaps less obvious, reason why the undermining of trust can take place even without any deception. That is that the mere suspicion of deception can undermine trust, even if that suspicion is ill-founded.39 To illustrate the application of this point to hypocrisy specifically, consider the following remarks of Eva Feder Kittay in which she tries to summarize the particular evil she takes hypocrisy to constitute: Insofar as our actions are sincere expressions of our inner states. . . . we can make moral judgments concerning the inner state by reading overt (expressive) acts. The hypocrite severs the act from the intention, for the hypocrite is not sincere. . . . Because the hypocrite demonstrates that the facade can stand without the dwelling, he undermines our belief in the appearance as being anything other than appearance.40 The problem with this account of the wrongness of hypocrisy emerges when we consider what it is that the hypocrite reveals. As Kittay puts it, “the hypocrite demonstrates that the facade can stand without the dwelling.” But it can! In this case, the hypocrite demonstrates that appearances can be deceiving when it comes to human actions and intentions, and it is this recognition that undermines trust. But appearances can be deceiving, and it seems that

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failure to recognize this is simple naïveté. If the hypocrite merely leads people to recognize something that is indeed a fact about human nature — that we are not transparent — it is hard to see how conveying this knowledge can be a bad thing.41 It seemed there was a promising angle for the consequentialist here, arguing that the hypocrite undermines the important value of trust, itself crucial for a number of elements of well-being. But now it appears that it is not hypocrisy as such which undermines trust, but rather the discovery (or indeed, mere suspicion) of hypocrisy. And even here, it seems that things that undermine trust (e.g., violent crime) are not bad because they undermine trust, but independently of their causing distrust. So if the consequentialist is to make a case here, it seems it must be on the basis that hypocritical acts harm others, independently of the damage to trust in general. Can such a case be made?

H. Desire Fulfillment to the Rescue We believe that a case can be made for the claim that hypocrisy harms others directly, independently of the damage to trust in general, but only on a particular type of consequentialist account. This would have to be the sort of account which does not focus on states of mind as the relevant sort of consequences. We suggest instead subscribing to a version of consequentialism which focuses on the fulfillment of desires.42 If I have a desire to know the truth, then someone who deceives me is frustrating my desire, even if I believe that I have indeed been informed of the truth. This would be true even if I never found out about the deception. To borrow an example from James Griffin,43 suppose I have been involved in a romantic relationship for a number of years. Suppose further that my partner and I have an understanding that this relationship should be a monogamous one, and it is important to me that it be so. Suppose, however, that my partner decides to have an affair, and is able to carry it off so that I never have the slightest suspicion that it is going on, and so that I am always treated in all other ways exactly as I would have been had there been no affair. Has my partner harmed me? If the only consequences which matter are states of mind, it seems the answer would have to be “no.” My mental states are no different than if my partner were not having the affair, since I never know that he or she is. If we are allowed to count the frustrations of desires, however, then we can claim that my partner has indeed harmed me by having the affair, since doing so has frustrated my important interest in having a monogamous relationship. Of course there are many arguments about what sort of account of well being should be used in a consequentialist theory,44 and this is not the place

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to settle all the disputes. Notice, however, how much more success a “desire” account can have than a “mental state” account when dealing with the problem of hypocrisy.45 At least in standard cases, hypocrites deceive people. If (as seems likely) these people have a desire not to be deceived, then a desire account can claim that such deception just is a harm to those people, independently of any further consequences. And of course there may be many members of the community who are taken in by the deception, in which case the harm would be to many people. Since harms are cumulative, this would be enough to show that hypocrisy in general is indeed a moral evil.

I. Why Not Dispense with the Consequentialism? We have argued that an informed desire account of hypocrisy is able to explain why hypocrisy is generally wrong and thus enable consequentialists to provide an appealing account of this important moral concept. It might be objected, however, that we have purchased this success at too high a price. In focusing on the notion that deception is generally wrong, perhaps we have abandoned anything distinctively consequentialist. Deontologists and virtue ethicists might be just as able to claim that it is the deception involved in hypocrisy that makes it wrong. Having shown that there is a version of consequentialism that can accommodate hypocrisy, it remains to be seen, then, whether it does a better job of doing so than its leading rivals. Suppose it is true that several different moral theories could explain why hypocrisy is generally wrong. Would that indicate that we have exhausted the usefulness of hypocrisy as a test of moral theories? Not necessarily. If it were to turn out that the wrongness of hypocrisy varies from case to case, then we might still use it to evaluate moral theories by checking whether they can account for this variation. We believe that such a test can indeed be employed, and that consequentialism fares very well in such a comparison. This method of testing moral theories in terms of how they deal with varying evaluations of hypocrisy could be used in its starkest form if it were the case that some forms of hypocrisy are not morally wrong at all. If that were the case, then theories that were able to explain why hypocrisy is generally wrong could be further tested to see if they can explain why it is not wrong in those cases where it is not. Thus, for example, a Kantian deontological view might have to assert that there is a duty to abstain from hypocrisy at all times, since it is akin to lying and there is a duty not to lie.46 A consequentialist view need not take such a hard line, however. A consequentialist could allow that the bad consequences of hypocrisy are sometimes outweighed by worse consequences of not engaging in hypocrisy. If those are the cases in which hypoc-

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risy is not morally bad, this would provide some support for consequentialist theories as being best able to accommodate hypocrisy. There do indeed seem to be some instances of morally acceptable hypocrisy. Perhaps the clearest of these are cases we may classify as “victim hypocrisies.”47 Broadly speaking, these are cases in which people deceive others about their true beliefs so as to protect themselves. Kittay offers as one such example a man whom she calls Franck, a German-born Jew in Nazi Germany, who must pass as Aryan to survive. She says of him: “Franck, in order to be accepted as an Aryan German, may occasionally have to adopt mildly antiSemitic attitudes and profess beliefs he does not hold. In that case, Franck would be a hypocrite, for he would be apparently assuming the prevalent set of beliefs thought to be good — the prevalent ideological good — and masking his true beliefs.”48 What is more, he would be doing so for self-interested reasons. In this sort of case, the behaviour of the “victim” does indeed seem to have the same sort of structure as cases where we would normally attribute hypocrisy, and as a result it seems reasonable to call Franck’s behaviour hypocritical as well. Yet it would seem very harsh indeed to attach any moral blame to Franck in these circumstances. Accordingly, this seems to be a case in which hypocrisy is not morally wrong. There may be other types of acceptable hypocrisy as well. Some of the kinds of politeness that grease the wheels of social discourse may amount to hypocrisy, but be acceptable nevertheless.49 There may also be cases in which a person comes to see that some of the practices with which he or she was brought up are unacceptable, and makes an effort to act contrary to his or her inclination. Until the self-education process is complete, people who in this way act contrary to their real inclinations mislead others about their true beliefs, thereby perhaps meeting the criteria of hypocrisy.50 Yet again, this sort of behaviour seems morally acceptable, if not praiseworthy. Finally, there might be cases of what we can call “emotional hypocrisy” — pretending to others or ourselves that we have a morally more appropriate emotion than we actually have with a purpose to appear morally better than we are.51 Such a pretence could consist in acting and speaking as if we have the better emotion. For example, people might pretend to grief when they do not really feel it. This could be done for a variety of reasons, but in at least some cases it seems the hypocritical deception could be morally acceptable. Even if one does not agree that all of these are cases of morally acceptable hypocrisy, the existence of even one such case is enough to make the point. Although some moral theories will have considerable difficulty in explaining such cases of acceptable hypocrisy, consequentialists need not be embarrassed by their presence. If there are any such cases, then, it might seem that conse-

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quentialism not only has no problem accommodating hypocrisy, but in fact is able to do so better than at least some of its rivals.52 In conclusion, we have seen that consequentialism has an advantage over many rival moral theories in that it is able to account for cases in which hypocrisy is morally acceptable. On the other hand, it may have trouble explaining why hypocrisy is wrong at all, except in a few limited cases. This is because the words or deeds that hypocrites use to try to deceive others about their own selfishness often turn out to have good consequences. It is not merely that actions generally thought wrong might sometimes turn out to be right on consequentialist grounds (as has been argued in connection with torture, punishment of the innocent, etc.). Consequentialism seems to get the evaluation of hypocrisy wrong through and through, since the actions or words which have good consequences are the very ones in which hypocrisy consists. What is more, consequentialist appeals to separate evaluation of agent and action, the direct evaluation of dispositions, reliability, and erosion of trust proved inadequate to the challenge posed by hypocrisy. On the other hand, we have suggested a version of consequentialism which can explain the wrongness of hypocrisy after all. This version involves taking, as the good to be brought about, something other than mental states. If people generally have a desire not to be deceived, and hypocrisy generally involves deception, then hypocrisy works against the fulfillment of many desires. A version of consequentialism which values the fulfillment of desires, rather than mental states, will therefore be able to explain why hypocrisy is generally wrong. At the same time, however, it will be able to explain how hypocrisy can sometimes be right — whenever the amount of well-being bound up with avoiding deception can be outweighed by other sorts of well-being which can be obtained only through deception. A subtle version of consequentialism, then, is able to afford hypocrisy a proper place in moral discourse, and thereby gain an advantage over some rival moral theories. In order to be confident of this conclusion, however, it is important to examine more carefully what rival theories have to say about hypocrisy. Having already considered an important representative of the virtue ethics approach, it is now fitting to consider a representative of the deontological approach. Accordingly, in the next chapter we turn to an in-depth treatment of the somewhat surprising (and, we argue, important) things that Immanuel Kant has to say about hypocrisy.

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Notes 1. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, edited by George Sher (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979) 28. 2. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, edited and introduced by Elizabeth Rapaport (Indianapolis: Hackett) 56. 3. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989) 31. 4. For arguments of this kind, see in particular Christine McKinnon, “Hypocrisy, With a Note on Integrity,” and Eva Feder Kittay, “On Hypocrisy.” 5. For example, even if the theory is found to be at odds with some feature of our intuitive moral evaluations, it is unclear whether to conclude that the theory is flawed, or that the intuitive evaluations are. We discuss the limitations of this method in more detail in section C below. 6. Christine McKinnon, “Hypocrisy, with a Note on Integrity,” 328. 7. In particular, of the sort James Griffin has called “informed desire accounts.” See his Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 8. A related kind of hypocrisy might involve cases where a person is known to have stated or otherwise endorsed moral, religious, aesthetic, or political values as applying to everyone including himself or herself, yet on some crucial occasion violates these values in his or her behaviour for self-interested or ideological reasons, and then conceals such deviations so as to appear better in the eyes of those to be deceived or in his or her own eyes. This kind of hypocrisy seems to allow for less self-consciousness about the project of deception, and allows for various degrees of self-deception. We discuss such “double standards” hypocrisies in Chapter 11 of this book. 9. Thus, for example, Eva Feder Kittay argues that the hypocrite is one who “deceives about herself in just those matters where one’s sincerity, the genuineness of one’s attitudes, beliefs and actions really matters” (“Hypocrisy,” 279), and that “Insofar as sincerity is truly valued, it is valued in those areas where the inner state . . . is of primary importance and the outward acts are read as signs” (“Hypocrisy,” 280). That she thinks consequentialist theories will be unable to attend properly to these inner states is evident from her claim that “without a powerful consequentialist ethics to inform us otherwise, we consider actions as virtuous only insofar as we consider them expressive of a good will, and our moral judgments are reserved not for the consequences of the actions, but for their intent” (“Hypocrisy,” 280). Christine McKinnon expresses a similar concern by arguing that the hypocrite is disapproved of because “she threatens to undermine morality by severing the connection between intentions . . . and actions, and then misrepresenting her intentions” (McKinnon, “Hypocrisy, with a Note on Integrity,” 328). She also makes it clear in the same passage that she thinks consequentialists, by focusing on actions and not intentions, will not be able to recognize the serious threat constituted by hypocrisy. 10. These sorts of criticisms were perhaps most clearly raised by Bernard Williams in connection with utilitarianism’s difficulties with integrity. See Bernard Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” in J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).

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11. There is one tradition which sees egoism as a type of consequentialism, aiming at good consequences for the individual rather than the wider good. Sidgwick might be seen as one who makes such a connection between the two approaches, describing egoism and utilitarianism, respectively, as “egoistic hedonism” and “universalistic hedonism” (Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics [London, 1907]). The distinction suggested in the text is clear and common enough however. If one insists on seeing egoism as a species of consequentialism, then the subject of this chapter can simply be redescribed as “Hypocrisy and Non-Egoistic Consequentialism,” and nothing of the argument will be damaged. We discuss hypocrisy and egoism in more detail in Chapter 7 of the book. 12. This possibility depends upon the now well-known distinction within consequentialism between a criterion of rightness and a decision procedure. (See e.g., Peter Railton, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, xiii (1984); Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); and Roger Crisp, “Utilitarianism and the Life of Virtue,” Philosophical Quarterly, xlii (1992). It could be that the best way to maximize good consequences is to do something other than aim at them. If this is a possibility, then one cannot conclude simply from the fact that hypocrites do not aim directly at maximizing the good that their actions do not in fact maximize the good. As will be argued below, there is indeed good reason to think that the actions in which hypocrisy consists may tend to have good consequences. Consequentialists in this case might have to offer two different evaluations of hypocrisy, at least one of which would be favourable. The possibility of such a “double evaluation,” and the scope it might offer consequentialists for resolving the problem posed by hypocrisy, is discussed more fully below. 13. There is an argument to the effect that egoists can never admit that they favour that position. This would be true if it would never be conducive to one’s well-being to have others know one to be an egoist, for example, because then they would not be willing to engage in social cooperation with one. Even if this is true, it is merely empirically so, and it remains at least conceptually possible that there could be such an acknowledged egoist, which is all the argument in the text requires. 14. Of course, it is likely that there have simply been more hypocrites than acknowledged egoists, and this might account for some of the discrepancy in terms of amounts of condemnation each has received, but we think there is more to it than that. 15. Saul Smilansky has provided an interesting recent contribution (“On Practicing What We Preach,” American Philosophical Quarterly, xxxi (1994) 73-79) which argues that people who say they will practise what they preach only if others do so as well are essentially hypocritical. His work, too, suffers however from a failure to explain why the person who preaches one thing and practises another is worse than someone who practises the same thing but does not preach the contrary. 16. Kittay, “Hypocrisy,” 277. 17. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic, 1977) xv; see also 19f. 18. This is particularly true of Judith Shklar, in her “Let Us Not Be Hypocritical.” One of the few voices that does seem to argue for the removal of hypocrisy from our moral language is Thomas Hurka, in his “Hypocrisy: Not All It’s Cracked Down to Be,” in his Principles: Short Essays on Ethics (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1994). We argue in Chapter 12 of this book that he is able to make such claims largely because

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he fails to distinguish hypocrisy from distinct concepts such as weakness of will. We discuss those relationships in more detail in Chapter 14. 19. This distinction might also be referred to in the well-known terminology of “expected” and “actual” utility, but the terminology in the text emphasizes the fact that the primary interest here is in one way of evaluating the agent as opposed to the agent’s action. 20. See J.J.C. Smart, “Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism,” Philosophical Quarterly, vi (1956) 344-54; revised version in Theories of Ethics, ed. P. Foot (Oxford, 1967) 171-83. 21. Conversely, consequentialists must disapprove to some degree of actions that do not aim at the good, but somehow accidentally achieve it. 22. Recent interesting discussions of this possibility have included Robert Merrihew Adams, “Motive Utilitarianism,” Journal of Philosophy, lxxiii (1976); Railton, “Alienation”; Parfit, Reasons and Persons; Peter Railton, “How Thinking about Character and Utilitarianism Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism,” Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue, ed. P. French, T. Uehling and H. Wettstein, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, xiii (1988) 398-416; Conrad Johnson, “Character Traits and Objectively Right Action,” Social Theory and Practice, xv (1989); and Crisp, “Utilitarianism.” 23. See Adams. 24. There is a variety of ways to formulate “general acceptance” — universal compliance, a simple majority, some number in between (e.g., 90 per cent of people), and either counting or not counting the costs of education and conversion, etc. The debate about this might parallel the discussion of how rule-utilitarians should formulate their theory. It is not necessary for present purposes to settle on one of these possibilities. 25. See Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” esp. 108-18. 26. McKinnon, “Hypocrisy, With a Note on Integrity,” 327. 27. Ibid., 321. 28. Ibid., 328. 29. For a sustained argument about this well-known argument, see David Lyons, The Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965). 30. J.J.C. Smart has famously levelled this accusation. See Smart, “Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism,” revised version, 176-77. 31. Indeed, Peter Railton (“How Thinking About Character …”) offers an account of “character utilitarianism” whereby it is “a theory of the rightness of individual acts . . . [which] no more than act utilitarianism makes the moral evaluation of an act depend upon the motive from which the act was actually performed” (400). On this account, the actions of the hypocrite are right so long as they would also be done by someone with the disposition which would be best in consequentialist terms, even if those actions are not done out of those dispositions. 32. In addition to the response in the next paragraph, we might also want to question the implicit comparison here. The “reliability” point invites comparison of the hypocrite with a good moral agent (one who is always motivated by the right sort of moral reasons). But in offering her example, Kittay (“Hypocrisy”) clearly invites a different comparison, as we did above. This other comparison is with the person who admittedly acts against the norms — in this case, an unregenerate sexist. In that comparison, the hypocrite comes off well; if anything, he or she will perform good actions more reliably. And again, consequentialists should be able to do more than simply say which possibility is best; they should be able to rank the others as well.

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33. Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (New York: Vintage, 1978) 26-27. 34. Ibid., 31. 35. Ibid., esp. 24-27. It should also be noted that this tendency to undermine trust may be in a sense self-defeating, because hypocrisy (like lying) is much more difficult to practise once others’ trust has been undermined. 36. In a paper entitled “Taking on Trust,” delivered at the Canadian Philosophical Association Conference in St. Catherine’s, Ontario, June 1996, 4. Much of the argument of the next few paragraphs is indebted to Gombay’s insightful paper. 37. One might bear in mind here, however, Bok’s observation (25) that “it is inevitable that more frequent lies do increase the chance that some will be discovered.” 38. Gombay, 7. 39. Bok, too, in effect acknowledges the role of merely suspected deception when she refers to “the impact of discovered and suspected lies on trust and social co-operation” (30, emphasis added). She does not appear to appreciate the importance of this for her general argument, however. 40. Kittay, “Hypocrisy,” 285. 41. Acknowledging this fact about human nature does not commit us to the view, all too often taken, that people who are taken in by others are somehow to blame for being too naïve. It is important to trust others, at least sometimes, even if one is aware that trusts can be betrayed, and it is no part of our intention to exonerate those who betray others’ trust. One can acknowledge that the capacity to deceive is part of human nature without advocating a “buyer beware” approach to human interactions in general. 42. One persuasive version of such an account is offered by Griffin (Well-Being). The term “fulfilment” is here being used in a technical sense, in which it stands opposed to “satisfaction.” (This distinction has been drawn by W.D. Ross, in his Foundations of Ethics [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939] 300, and utilized by Joel Feinberg in his Harm To Others [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984] 84.) If one has a desire for x to be the case, the desire is fulfilled if and only if x does come to be the case; the desire is satisfied if and only if one believes that the desire has been fulfilled. Again, it should also be understood that the desires in question may need to be qualified through being “informed” in some ways. The desire accounts are not the only alternative to mental state accounts here, and as Brad Hooker has pointed out to us objective list accounts (to borrow a term from Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 466, 493, and 499, and Griffin, 33-34) may have the same advantages as desire accounts when it comes to dealing with the problem of hypocrisy. We believe desire accounts to be preferable to objective list accounts on other grounds, but that debate is not crucial to the current discussion. 43. See Griffin, 19. 44. Some important contemporary works in this area include Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), esp. ch. 13; Parfit, esp. Appendix I; Griffin, esp. chs. 1-2; T.L.S. Sprigge, The Rational Foundations of Ethics (London: Routledge, 1988) chs. 5-6; and L.W. Sumner, “Welfare, Preference, and Rationality,” in Value, Welfare, and Morality, ed. R.G. Frey and W. Morris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 45. For a criticism of our proposed solution (and an argument that in any case it is not needed), see William H. Shaw, “Is Hypocrisy a Problem for Consequentialism?” Utilitas, 11, 3 (1999) 33-35.

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46. See the next chapter for a more nuanced account of what Kant both does and should say about hypocrisy. 47. This name for it comes from Kittay, who offers a short but interesting discussion of the phenomenon, “Hypocrisy,” 287-89. We discuss this type of case in several places in the book, but the most sustained treatment of the subject is to be found in Chapter 9. 48. Ibid., 287. 49. That great literary critic of hypocrisy, Molière’s Alceste (The Misanthrope, in The Plays of Molière, trans. A.R. Waller [Edinburgh, 1926], V.), seems to consider social niceties hypocritical and condemn them in the strongest terms. It is easy to read the work as a criticism of Alceste’s excessive anti-hypocrisy (as indeed Shklar does, see “Let Us Not Be Hypocritical,” 52-53), but doing so is tantamount to allowing that some hypocrisy may be morally acceptable. We discuss the possibility of there being acceptable hypocrisy of such a broad sort in more detail in Chapter 9 of this book. 50. One such individual might be Peter Railton’s “sophisticated hedonist” (or a consequentialist cousin) who is trying to cultivate non-instrumental friendships. Railton says of this individual: “He could then attempt to focus more on his friends as such, doing this somewhat deliberately, perhaps, until it comes more naturally” (“Alienation,” 144). 51. On the moral significance of emotions, see William Neblett, The Role of Feelings in Morals (Washington, DC: Rowman & Littlefield, 1981) and Justin Oakley, Morality and the Emotions (London: Routledge, 1993) ch. 2. 52. It is informative in this regard to consider Saul Smilansky’s attempts to give a more or less Kantian account of the wrongness of failing to live up to one’s pronouncements. There are frequent references throughout the article to “certain limited exceptions” (“On Practicing What We Preach,” 73), which are dismissed simply as being less frequent than might be supposed. The existence of any exceptions is problematic for the Kantian, however, and indeed an examination of the cases discussed seems to reveal that when exceptions do need to be made, it is on consequentialist grounds.

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6 Kant and Hypocrisy A. Introduction One perspective from which hypocrisy must be examined, if we are to understand its nature and its fit with the major ethical theories, is that of deontology. Here we are rather fortunate in that our discussion does not need to be as speculative as in our treatment of other moral theorists/theories. Immanuel Kant, who is the leading figure in the deontological camp, is also the only major traditional moral philosopher who explicitly takes up the subject of hypocrisy and has something to say about it. He gives examples of it and discusses its moral status. Hence we can draw directly on relevant texts to illuminate the nature of hypocrisy from a deontological perspective. However, the texts in which Kant discusses hypocrisy tend to be his later, more “anthropological” works, which have traditionally been less commonly studied to understand his moral views. There seems to be a growing recognition within the philosophical community of the importance of these texts, and we here want to add our voices to those suggesting that attention to these texts forces some reinterpretation of Kant’s overall moral views.1 We believe that exploring these texts not only furthers our immediate interest in hypocrisy, but also opens the door to reading Kant as a consequentialist deontologist. If one were to look at the writings available in English of Kant’s critics or commentators, it would not be obvious that Kant had anything at all to say about hypocrisy. Even those who purport to present or discuss a Kantian account of hypocrisy2 seem, puzzlingly, to be unaware of, or unconcerned with, what Kant may have had to say about the subject. We, of course, do not want to suggest that Kant should be taken to have the definitive statement on the subject, even from a deontological view. His account may need to be revised, updated, or even rejected. But surely unearthing and commenting on what Kant himself had to say about hypocrisy is a good way to open a discussion of a Kantian account of the subject, even if it may try a little the reader’s patience with exegesis. As is the case throughout, we here draw on elements of the history of moral philosophy to illuminate, in a valuable way, contemporary concerns about the nature of the subject. The fact that we are not Kant scholars makes

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us tentative in our suggestions, but certainly does not prevent us from retrieving Kant’s marginalized texts, or considering their bearing on the usual understanding of his moral philosophy.

B. A Brief Overview of Kantian Ethics The basic elements of Kant’s moral philosophy, as traditionally understood, are well known, but we will provide a short summary here. He argues that the only thing that is good without qualification is a good will, meaning a will that acts out of respect for the moral law. He also believes that reason tells us this law, and thus dictates to us our moral duty, and does so in exactly the same way for all rational beings. We do not necessarily follow our reason, however, because we are also subject to, and motivated by, inclination. Accordingly, the moral law presents itself to us in the form of a command that applies to us without exception, or a “categorical imperative.” Kant provides several formulations of this categorical imperative but claims that they are all essentially the same in meaning, and that they all prescribe the same moral duties. Although scholars disagree about exactly how many distinct formulations there are, there appears to be agreement that there are at least three. These are: 1) the “universal law” formulation (act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law),3 2) the “ends-in-themselves” formulation (act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end),4 and 3) the “autonomy” formulation (“the idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law”).5 It might seem that, once one has established the conditions under which an action has moral worth, it is clear how one should live. Given that morality has priority over everything else, it would seem that Kantian agents should endeavour to follow the moral law in all their actions. This is indeed what Kant is generally interpreted to have meant. However, we want to suggest another interpretation of how one should live that is not foreclosed by this account. It could be that, rather than always doing one’s own duty, morality might require that one try to improve the conditions for people’s doing their moral duties overall. This might be described as a sort of consequentialist deontology, since the goal is to maximize duty-doing overall, rather than simply to do one’s duty.6 These two interpretations could come into conflict if the best way to promote the conditions for people’s following the moral law were to do something that conflicted with one’s duty. We believe that there are pas-

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sages in Kant’s writings, particularly in those involving subjects connected to hypocrisy, that support the second, unorthodox reading. In practice, these two versions of deontology might amount to the same thing, depending on what the conditions for people’s acting morally actually are. Indeed, on the orthodox reading of Kant, there is nothing anyone can do that can promote the ability of others (or even themselves) to follow the moral law. This is because all that is needed to follow the moral law is reason. Any rational agent is always capable of representing the moral law and acting out of respect for it (since it is merely conformity of the will to the law that determines moral worth, even if one is physically unable to do that which one wills). Indeed, this ability can be seen as the basis of Kant’s insistence that human beings have a free will, even though our actions appear to be determined by the physical world in the same way as mere objects.7 On this view, although human beings have not merely reason but also inclination, it is only reason that is relevant to moral behaviour. Critics of Kant (in print and in the classroom) have often argued that this aspect of Kant’s account makes his view too abstract and formal, detached from (and even inimical to) ordinary human life. He has been depicted as a strict austere moralist whose perspective and attitude mirror the authoritarianism of the Prussian military state. These critics seem to have the impression that Kant has no understanding of human nature, and no sympathy for the variations in moral interpretation that are provided by circumstances. One can certainly understand where the critics get this impression. The Kant of the Metaphysics of Morals and Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals repeatedly makes statements emphasizing that morality must be grounded solely in reason, without making any concessions to human nature or to particular circumstances within which actions are taking place. The following passages will serve to support this point: [T]he ground of obligation . . . must . . . be sought not in the nature of man nor in the circumstances of the world in which man is placed, but must be sought a priori solely in the concepts of pure reason . . . Every other precept which is founded on principles of mere experience . . . can indeed be called a practical rule, but never a moral law.8 Or again: Empirical principles are wholly unsuited to serve as the foundation for moral laws. For the universality with which such laws

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ought to hold for all rational beings (the unconditioned practical necessity imposed by moral laws upon such beings) is lost if the basis of these laws is taken from the particular constitution of human nature or from the accidental circumstances in which such nature is placed.9 And finally: [A]ll moral concepts have their seat and origin completely a priori in reason . . . They cannot be abstracted from any empirical, and hence merely contingent, cognition.10 So Kant does indeed at times insist on a morality grounded in pure reason, without taking any account of human nature or the circumstances of human action. On this view, although inclination is a significant aspect of human nature, it can have no role in morality, since it is separate from reason, and not all rational beings can be assumed to be subject to inclination. (Kant himself contrasts our will with the notion of a “Holy Will” such as God or angels would have, which is free of any inclination to act contrary to the moral law.)11 Indeed, on this view inclination is seen as frequently undermining our attempts to follow the moral law, by rendering a law which in fact applies to us with necessity merely contingent from a subjective perspective.12 Despite these statements confirming the orthodox reading of Kant as an uncompromising moralist who makes no concessions to human nature, we are going to uncover texts that suggest a softer side, if you will — a perspective that makes more allowances for ordinary human nature. There seem to be passages in which Kant does not maintain his strict view, and indeed seems to suggest that empirical conditions can indeed have an impact on one’s ability to act out of respect for the moral law. What is more, these passages often arise when Kant is discussing hypocrisy and various concepts connected with it. If inclination is allowed to play this more prominent role in human affairs, then the possibility for a consequentialist deontology, as outlined above, is also opened up. On this view, there may indeed be things one can do in the world to create the conditions under which people’s ability to follow the moral law will be maximized. If there are, as we will argue, incompatible passages within Kant’s writing, there are still several available ways to interpret this fact. One, of course, is that he simply changed his mind as time went on. Perhaps he realized later in life, when considering concrete cases, that the strict view of the Grounding was untenable. If so, one might have expected him to make an explicit statement to

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this effect, openly pronouncing the alternative view. He never did this — the alternative view is only hinted at in some of his writings. What is more, some of these hints arise side by side with the statements of the orthodox view, in works such as the Grounding. Another possible explanation of the inconsistencies, if they exist, is that they are mere slips of the pen. Kant may have “really” accepted the orthodox view, but failed to notice that certain passages conflicted with this. As such, they should be seen as mistakes, and a charitable reading of Kant would simply ignore the passages that seem at odds with the orthodox reading. We prefer another explanation. The fact that he wavers from the orthodox view, particularly when trying to determine how people should act in concrete situations, may indicate that the strict Kantian account really is untenable. Even he could not make it work consistently, try though he might. As such, we will argue that Kant’s writings on hypocrisy suggest that a compelling and defensible version of Kantian deontology turns out to be a version of consequentialist deontology that takes account of the importance of inclination to human moral behaviour. This may even suggest that it is hypocritical for Kant to insist on presenting the strict view as the true one, when even he is not able to hold to it.

C. Hypocrisy as a Violation of the Categorical Imperative Let us turn, then, to a consideration of how hypocrisy should be treated from within the Kantian system. At first glance, it seems that hypocrisy violates the categorical imperative, and thus should be seen as one moral violation among others. As we shall see, however, this is not the whole story from Kant’s point of view. There are indications that he thought, not only that hypocrisy was a particularly common moral failing, but also that it had special status as a fundamental vice. At the same time, there are certain forms of hypocrisy that he seems to have thought not only permissible but laudatory. We shall consider each of these perspectives in turn. According to the “universal law” formulation of the categorical imperative, would-be hypocrites should consider whether they could will that the maxim they are acting on should become a universal law of nature. Willing that everyone present a false view of himself or herself seems similar to other familiar violations of this law, as willing that people make promises they do not intend to keep, and simply lying.13 And insofar as hypocrisy often involves making an exception of oneself with respect to some rule, it is clear that this

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could not be universalized, for if everyone made an exception of him/herself, the rule would cease to exist (a contradiction of logic). Similarly, it is clear that hypocrites standardly fail to treat others as ends in themselves. If I present a hypocritical façade so as to gain some benefit from you, I am clearly using you as a way of obtaining that benefit, thereby failing to show the required respect for you as an end-in-yourself. Indeed, Jonathan Robinson has argued that what is wrong with hypocrisy is exactly that it involves “using” other people, which violates the principle that we should never use others (apparently meant to be equivalent to the principle that we should never treat others merely as means).14 We do not accept the view that using other people is always forbidden, and its moral acceptability may be reflected in several song lyrics, such as, “I used her, she used me, but neither one cared. We were getting our share.”15 Perhaps the problem here stems from ignoring Kant’s insistence that it is treating people only as means that is problematic — it is acceptable to treat people as means (and thereby “use” them) so long as they are simultaneously treated also as ends in themselves. At first glance, this might seem to mean that one is not being “used” so long as one consents to the treatment. That this cannot in fact be Kant’s meaning is made clear by the examples he provides in the Grounding, however. For example, he claims that committing suicide amounts to treating oneself merely as a means,16 but presumably one has consented to the suicide. Here he relies on the different notion of acting in a way that harmonizes with the humanity within oneself. It is far from clear how best to interpret this notion, however. If one has a perfectionist understanding of human nature, as Kant may well have, then it may simply be that actions consistent with what one takes the good of human beings to consist of are what “harmonize with humanity,” but such a perfectionist view stands in need of considerable defence. Even more problematic for Kant is what he says about making one’s actions harmonize with humanity in connection with the duty of benevolence.17 Here he states that “the natural end that all men have is happiness,” and that everyone must “strive, as much as he can, to further the ends of others.”18 It would be easy to take this passage to indicate that treating people as ends in themselves means maximizing happiness, with the happiness of each counting equally. This is, of course, what the utilitarian wants to do, and so on this interpretation, Kant essentially turns out to be a utilitarian, even though his theory is often cited as a leading alternative to utilitarianism.19 Regardless of such complications of interpretation, however, it seems clear that hypocrisy in general violates the requirement that one always treat others as ends-in-themselves. Finally, the formulation in terms of autonomy affords perhaps the clearest condemnation of hypocrisy. According to Kant, one is truly autonomous

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only insofar as one follows the rule one gives oneself as necessary, which is to say the moral law as recognized by reason alone. If one acts on the basis of inclination, then one is allowing the objects of one’s desires to lead one. Since these objects are outside of oneself, this is heteronomy, not autonomy. Hypocrisy seems to be driven, in at least most cases,20 by a desire for a positive opinion from others or the desire to get away with some selfish action unscathed by the punitive opinion or actions of others. Accordingly, it seems to be driven by inclination, and thus fails to be autonomous, thereby failing the test of the third formulation of the categorical imperative. So it seems that hypocrisy violates the categorical imperative in any of its formulations. Accordingly, engaging in hypocrisy qualifies as a failure to do one’s moral duty. As such, it seems to have the same status as other such failures (e.g., murder, theft, promise-breaking, or lack of benevolence). There is some reason, however, to believe that hypocrisy has a special status for Kant that renders it more than a case of a garden-variety failure of moral duty. We now turn to consider some other ways a Kantian (and indeed Kant himself!) might look at hypocrisy.

D. Hypocrisy in Interpersonal Comparisons: Hypocritical Humility First of all, although this is not the aspect that gets most directly at the special status of hypocrisy, it should be noted that Kant thinks of hypocrisy as a particularly common moral failing. Kant believes that hypocrisy is likely to arise whenever people compare themselves with others, which is frequently.21 In particular, Kant is concerned with the common view that people are naturally inclined to pride, but should assume an attitude of humility instead, according to which they see themselves, or at least present themselves, as less worthy than others. Kant sees this as a fertile ground for hypocrisy. As a starting point here, it is reasonable to consider what the objective worth of different individuals is. Kant asserts that there is a fundamental equality between persons. He states: man regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of a morally practical reason, is exalted above any price; for as a person (homo noumenon) he is not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in himself; that is, he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect from all other rational beings in the world. He can

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measure himself with every other being of this kind and value himself on a footing of equality with them.22 Right after the passage cited claiming moral equality between persons, in a section of The Doctrine of Virtue dealing with servility, Kant writes: Humility in comparing oneself with other men (and indeed with any finite being, even a seraph) is no duty; rather, trying to equal or surpass others in this respect, believing that in this way one will get an even greater self-worth is a kind of ambition (ambitio), which is directly contrary to one’s duty to others. But belittling one’s own moral worth merely as a means to acquiring the favour of another, whoever it may be (hypocrisy and flattery) is false (lying) humility, which is contrary to one’s duty to oneself since it degrades one’s personality.23 He continues: True humility follows from our sincere and exact comparison of ourselves with the moral law (its holiness and strictness). But from our capacity for internal law-giving and from the natural man feeling himself compelled to revere the moral man within his own person, at the same time there comes an exaltation and the highest self-esteem, the feeling of his inner worth, in terms of which he is above any price and possesses inalienable dignity which instills in him respect for himself.24 In these passages, humility, understood as an unfavourable comparison of oneself with others with regard to moral worth, is seen to proceed from ambition, an inclination, and thereby as lacking moral worth. Kant does, however, hold out the possibility of another (presumably less common) sense of humility, according to which we compare ourselves, not with others, but with the moral law directly. That is to say, in “true humility” we become aware of our own tendency to fail to act on the basis of the moral law. Yet he argues that, in such cases, we also become aware of our ability as rational beings to act out of respect for the moral law. Accordingly, the appropriate response to this awareness is not a feeling of one’s own lack of worthiness, as is commonly assumed with regard to humility, but rather “an exaltation and the highest self-esteem.”

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Beyond observing that humility is not generally as wholesome as it is taken to be, and that the appropriate attitude engendered by it is self-esteem rather than self-denigration, Kant also warns against the ease with which hypocrisy can enter into the picture here. Sometimes people pretend to be humble (to have a low sense of themselves) so as to gain the favour of others. (Uriah Heep and Tartuffe are perhaps the clearest literary examples of this.) In such cases, Kant argues that there is a further moral wrong at work, which is both serious and common. This “false humility” involves hypocrisy, and the example of hypocritical humility shows how a person can reduce humanity in him/herself to a mere means. Such a person belittles him/herself so as to gain the favour of another person — uses him/herself as a mere means to try to achieve, per impossibile, greater inner worth. This is contrary to one’s duty to oneself, since it degrades one’s own personality. This is what happens in hypocritical flattery, when we deliberately belittle ourselves, and sing another’s praises at our own expense, so that we may appear humble and thereby virtuous. How then does hypocritical humility offend against the duty of love and benevolence? By using others under the guise of benevolence to pursue one’s own selfish ends. How does it offend against respect? By reducing the other to a thing or tool. The hypocrite thereby diminishes others or himself by robbing them of their inner freedom, of their autonomy. Thus hypocrisy is seen as likely to enter whenever people try to compare their own moral worth with that of others, even when they project (genuinely or not) the view that they are less worthy than others. This seems to make hypocrisy an uncommonly prevalent vice, in Kantian terms. Yet in another context, Kant assigns to hypocrisy an even more important role, appearing to argue that it is, in a sense, the root of all immorality. To explore this even more important aspect of Kant’s discussion of hypocrisy, it is necessary to consider first his views about lying and deception.

E. Kantian Views of Lying Lying, of course, is also a violation of the moral law, under any version of the categorical imperative. At times, however, Kant seems to put it in a class by itself, as a particularly bad moral wrong. This is made clear in the following passage: By a lie a man throws away and, as it were, annihilates his dignity as a man. A man who does not himself believe what he tells another (even if the other is a merely ideal person) has even

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part ii Moral Theory less worth than if he were a mere thing; for a thing, because it is something given and real, has the property of being serviceable so that another can put it to use. But communication of one’s thoughts to someone through words that yet intentionally contain the contrary of what the speaker thinks on the subject is an end that is directly opposed to the natural purposiveness of the speaker’s capacity to communicate his thoughts, and is thus a renunciation by the speaker of his personality, and such a speaker is a mere deceptive appearance of a man, not a man himself.25

Lying, Kant seems to be saying, is moral suicide in that it necessarily involves throwing away one’s inner worth, one’s moral dignity. One reduces oneself to something worse than a mere object, to nothing — since the liar is neither a moral consciousness nor a useful object. Surely no other violation of the moral law can do worse than reducing the perpetrator to a status lower than a mere object. Many people would want to distinguish different sorts of lies, and argue that some are morally permissible. These would be the so-called “white lies,” in which the liar’s intention is benevolent and the consequences of telling the truth are horrendously harmful to those affected by it. Yet on the traditional interpretation of Kant, he would have no room for such a distinction, since the consequences of one’s action are thought to be irrelevant to its moral status. Kant does distinguish between a legal and an ethical sense of “an intentional untruth.”26 In law, an intentional untruth is called a lie only if it violates another’s right. But in ethics, it is clear that “no intentional untruth in expressing one’s thoughts can refuse this harsh name.”27 If I say “I like this pudding” when in fact I do not, what I say is not a lie in the legal sense, since it does not violate any rights of those around me. In law there is always a question of what harm is done to a particular person or group by the utterance of a particular intentionally untrue utterance. Although such a statement is not a lie in the legal sense, it would still be considered a lie in the more important moral sense. Kant states, “But in ethics, where no authorization is derived from harmlessness, it is clear of itself that no intentional untruth in the expression of one’s thoughts can escape being correctly called a lie.”28 Indeed, Kant is quite clear that beneficial consequences or benevolent intentions cannot make a lie justifiable, and thus that even “white lies” are impermissible. This is made obvious in the following passage: Lying (in the ethical sense of the word), intentional untruth as such need not be harmful to others as such in order to be repudi-

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ated; for it would then be a violation of the rights of others. It may be done out of frivolity or even good nature; the speaker may even intend to achieve a really good end by it. But his way of pursuing this end is, by its mere form, a crime of man against his own person and a worthlessness that must make him contemptible in his own eyes.29

F. External and Internal Lies Although Kant makes it clear that all lies are impermissible, there is still a distinction he draws that affects the degree of moral wrongness of a lie. This distinction is between “external” and “internal” lies, or lies to others as opposed to lies to oneself. Kant claims that internal lies are even worse than external lies. “By an external lie a man makes himself an object of contempt in the eyes of others; by an internal lie he does what is still worse: he makes himself contemptible in his own eyes and violates the dignity of humanity in his own person.”30 Given that lies reduce one to a status lower than mere objects and thus appear to be the worst sort of moral wrong, the worst form of lies seem to have a status all their own among moral wrongs. We will argue that these “internal lies” are essentially linked to hypocrisy, and thus that hypocrisy can be thought of as being uniquely wrong in Kantian terms. What reasons does Kant provide for thinking internal lies have this worst possible status? He seems to offer two types of arguments. The first is startling to encounter in Kant, because it seems to suggest the sort of consequentialist element to his theory that he is traditionally seen as rejecting totally. As we will discuss, this occurs frequently in the lesser-known texts of Kant’s in which he discusses hypocrisy, thus opening the door for some important questions about the correct interpretation of Kant’s moral philosophy. The second argument is in fact better designed to establish his conclusion in this case, but will also serve to highlight the link between this worst wrong of internal lies and hypocrisy. The first argument Kant offers for the claim that internal lying is particularly bad involves one feature that is so surprising that it takes us aback. Consider: “But such insincerity in his declarations, which a man perpetrates upon himself, still deserves the strongest censure, since it is from such a rotten spot (falsity) that the evil of untruthfulness spreads into one’s relations with other men as well, once the highest principle of truthfulness has been violated.”31 Here the reader who has been brought up on the traditional interpretation of Kant as a strict ethical deontologist is astonished at what

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seems to be an appeal to consequences and subsequent harm in Kant’s arguments against self-deception. He condemns it because it is likely to spread falsehood. Although this could be simply an isolated error — a slip of the pen, as it were — it is also possible to see Kant as invoking here a richer set of considerations in his moral thinking than simply the categorical imperative. He actually brings into consideration consequences, human needs, social and communal factors. This is the first place where our investigation of the lesserknown texts concerning hypocrisy suggests the need for an interpretation of Kant different from the standard classroom account. On this view, he no longer regards the moral life in an abstract way, where context is excluded on principle. We will return to this theme below. In any case, it is worth noting that this argument does not do much to establish that internal lying really is particularly bad. This argument suggests its wrongness lies largely in its making some other action more likely. But this suggests that the other action is the more serious wrong, and internal lying derives much of its badness from its contribution to this more serious wrong. If internal lying really were the most serious moral wrong, it would be hard to see how it could be made significantly worse by contributing to some other wrong. Kant’s claim, therefore, should be seen as relying more on a separate argument he offers, according to which internal lying is described as a central characteristic of the “author of evil.” To begin our exploration of this perspective, consider the following passages: The Bible (the Christian portion of it) denominates the author of evil (who is within us) as the liar from the beginning, and thus characterizes man with respect to what seems to be the chief ground of evil in him.32 And again: [It is] noteworthy that the Bible dates the first crime through which evil entered the world, not from fratricide, (Cain’s) but from the first lie — for even nature rises up against fratricide — and calls the author of all evil a liar from the beginning and the father of lies.33 In these passages, lying is described as not simply evil, but as “the chief ground of evil.” But why is it given this special status? To understand this, it is necessary to consider the kind of lie Kant has in mind here. It seems he is

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referring to a particular sort of internal lie — a lie to oneself about the motivation for one’s action, which he also considers to be a form of hypocrisy. More specifically, he appears to be referring here to the tendency to believe that one is acting out of respect for the moral law, when one is in fact following mere inclination. That this is how he sees the matter is made evident by the following passage: All homage paid to the moral law is an act of hypocrisy, if, in one’s maxim, ascendancy is not at the same time granted to the law as an incentive sufficient in itself and higher than all other determining grounds of the will. The propensity to do this is inward deceit, i.e., a tendency to deceive oneself in the interpretation of the moral law, to its detriment.34 In this sense, it is easy to see how internal lying could be seen as a particularly heinous moral wrong. In Kant’s terms, all violation of the categorical imperative stems from substituting one’s inclinations for one’s duty (as prescribed as necessary by reason), and thus this sort of internal lie is indeed at the root of all wrongdoing. It is significant for our purposes that Kant here refers to the sort of internal lie in question as “hypocrisy.” The fact that he uses hypocrisy as interchangeable with the notion of an internal lie is further supported by a passage in which he states: “Reason can assign no further ground for man’s propensity to hypocrisy, although this propensity must have been present before the lie.”35 And as we shall see, there are good reasons for drawing this equivalence. But if this sort of internal lie is the source of all wrongdoing, and is equivalent to hypocrisy, then it seems hypocrisy has a central place in Kantian moral philosophy! The link between lying and hypocrisy is made even more evident when Kant discusses the puzzling nature of “internal lies,” and offers a few examples. In noting the puzzling nature of these lies, Kant is essentially addressing the “problem of self-deception” that has so preoccupied analytical and existentialist philosophers in the second half of the twentieth century. This gives his discussion a surprisingly “modern” feel. Furthermore, his approach to this topic through examinations of examples suggests a sensitivity to context and subtlety of interpretation that many of his critics have refused to recognize. Although Kant cannot deny the evidence that internal lies occur, he is aware that there is something puzzling about the very possibility of their existence. “It is easy to show that man is actually guilty of many inner lies, but it seems more difficult to explain how they are possible; for a lie requires

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a second person whom one intends to deceive, whereas to deceive oneself on purpose seems to contain a contradiction.”36 Nevertheless, he provides and discusses several examples, drawn from religious and moral life. Here is his first example: Someone tells an inner lie for example, if he professes belief in a future judge of the world, although he really finds no such belief within himself, but persuades himself that it could do no harm and might even be useful to profess in his thoughts to one who scrutinizes hearts, a belief in such a judge, in order to win his favour in case He should exist.37 It is striking how many features of hypocrisy are present in this example. First, the person pretends to him/herself (and probably to others) that s/he believes when s/he in fact does not. Further, s/he has to persuade him/ herself by producing non-truth-centred considerations, i.e., rationalizations. And there are the additional features of hypocrisy: the useful advantage of the belief in the liar’s own life with disregard for the evidence, and the favour to be gained by it. To clinch the matter, the person pretends that s/he believes because of truth-centred considerations. This is much like the case of the “godless at heart” we encountered earlier in our biblical excavations. In short, the example Kant offers of an internal lie seems to be an example of religious hypocrisy par excellence. The second case of internal lying that Kant considers is a variant on the first. Someone also lies if, having no doubt about the existence of this future Judge, s/he still flatters him/herself that s/he inwardly reveres His/Her law, though the only incentive s/he feels is fear of punishment.38 This is a case where a person deceives him/herself by redescription: s/he is aware of his/her feeling of fear, but pretends to him/herself that what s/he feels is reverence. All this is done in order to appear better than one really is — to oneself and to others. This example thus appears to recognize another feature crucial to hypocrisy — the notion of deception including self-deception. It is worth noting that Kant appears to assume that a lie, whether to others or oneself, includes the intention to deceive. As we will see later, the relationship between lying and deception is a complex one for Kant. For now, we will explore further the notion of “internal lying,” which Kant describes as worse than external lying (which is itself apparently the worst kind of moral wrong). We will look in more detail at why he thinks it is such an important wrong, and will also argue that such internal lying is to be associated with hypocrisy, thus giving hypocrisy a unique position within Kant’s moral scheme.

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G. Deception and Human Motivation: Acceptable Deceptions As we saw in the previous section, Kant believes that a particular sort of internal lie is the worst type of moral wrongdoing, and the chief ground of evil in general. Furthermore, we have seen that this sort of internal lie is also a type of hypocrisy. Kant’s argument hinged on an ability to deceive oneself about one’s motivations. It is therefore quite relevant to consider Kant’s other remarks about human motivation, and our ability to understand it. Given how clearly Kant denounces lying and hypocrisy, identifying them as the ground of all evil, one might expect that he would equally condemn all forms of deception and pretence. Surprisingly, this is not the case. As we shall see, Kant allows or even approves of deception in a variety of cases, including polite statements of things one does not really believe (e.g., “your obedient servant,” or “it’s so nice to see you”), the playing of social roles, pretending to believe that others are acting as morally as they present themselves as doing, and even concealing information about oneself. Indeed, although we have argued that he sees hypocrisy as the worst vice, there are some cases of what might be considered hypocrisy that are held by him to be completely blameless, or even laudatory. If even white lies are to be condemned, and he wants to insist on “the highest principle of truthfulness,”39 how can he tolerate these departures from complete honesty and openness? In addressing these puzzles, and exploring the variety of different justifications he gives in the different cases, we hope to draw attention to some subtle distinctions that seem to lie behind Kant’s thinking, though they are not made explicit and thus have generally completely escaped notice. First of all, consider the case of niceties that are less than completely honest, but which Kant seems to approve of. As he puts it, “Can an untruth from mere politeness (e.g., ‘your obedient servant’, at the end of a letter) be considered a lie? No one is deceived by it.”40 Kant seems to want to say such polite departures from strict honesty are permissible, and the explanation offered is that “no one is deceived” by them. In effect, then, he wants to deny that these are cases of deception at all. Kant applies a similar sort of reasoning to polite social role-playing. As he puts it: “Men are, one and all, actors — the more so, the more civilized they are. They put on a show of affection, respect for others, modesty and disinterest without deceiving anyone, since it is generally understood that they are not sincere about it.”41 Again, Kant seems to approve of the pretence, considering it a sign of civilization, ostensibly on the ground that it is not actually deceptive, since everyone knows about it.

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Observe that Kant here assumes an understanding of the social conventions of politesse and etiquette. Kant is making a tacit appeal to what the members of the audience know and how they have been socialized. There could, of course, be people who do not understand the relevant conventions (children, or foreigners, or people who are mentally weak). In that case, it would not be true that “no one is deceived,” though it might still be true that the truth is “generally understood.” Is the fact that most people are not deceived enough to establish that the acts are not deceptive? This may come down to a question of verbal intuitions. In any case, though, that question is probably not crucial for Kant. Although he states that the key feature is whether anybody will be deceived, it would seem to fit better with his general approach if the key were rather whether the person acting intended to deceive anyone. After all, one can say something one believes to be true and still deceive people, if one is mistaken. Condemning this would be putting too much weight on consequences, from a Kantian perspective. What has moral worth, he insists, is the will, not its results. Thus it seems the central question should be whether one intends to deceive, not whether one actually does. It might be instructive here to draw a parallel with cases of irony.42 If I say to my neighbour, “It’s another beautiful day” when in fact it has been cold and miserable for a week, I am saying something that is not strictly true. On the other hand, I presumably expect my audience to “see through” the words and understand that my true meaning is the opposite of what I say. If one thinks such irony is morally acceptable, it is presumably because of the absence of any intention to deceive. Note that here, too, there are certain assumptions made about the audience, and it is possible that the other does not in fact understand my meaning. Thus, for example, my neighbour may go in to his/her partner and say, “Our weird neighbour is even more peculiar than we thought. That old goat actually likes weather like this!”43 Yet it seems that cases in which people intend to be ironical share with the cases of politeness Kant raises the fact that the speaker does not intend to deceive. The analogy between irony and polite words that fall short of complete honesty is not exact, however. In irony, one intends one’s audience to understand that one means the opposite of what one says. If I write “your obedient servant” at the end of a letter (in times when such a closing is common, and not taken to be intended ironically), I surely do not mean the person who receives the letter to think I am the opposite of an obedient servant! (What would that be: an overbearing master?!) So if the person knows that I do not mean what I say, but is not entitled to infer the opposite either, what does s/he think I do mean? Why say it at all, if the words are not going to be believed? Presumably what is actually being conveyed is an altogether different

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message — something about my willingness to treat the other civilly, even if that does not go so far as a willingness to act as a servant to the other. So the message, and its relationship to the prevailing conventions, is more complicated than it might seem. Now let us consider another interesting parallel. Consider the world of television advertising. A famous person appears as a spokesperson for some product on TV. We all know the person is being paid to make this appearance. We can imagine worlds in which people nevertheless believe that the person making the endorsement must really appreciate this product. If that is not true, perhaps we would want to condemn the famous person for engaging in deception. On the other hand, if this goes on for some time, and famous people endorse products they do not really prefer, eventually it will become widespread knowledge that advertisements are not to be believed, and that the fact that someone endorses a product for a fee provides no reason to believe that the person actually prefers that product. When society has gotten cynical in this way, should we say that it is no longer unethical for people to engage in such behaviour, because “nobody is taken in by it,” and thus there is no genuine deception? Similarly, suppose there is a society in which voters have become cynical about politics, believing that their leaders will say anything that they think will help them to get elected, whether they believe it or not. When politicians in such a society say things they do not believe, or make promises they do not intend to keep, should we forgive them on the grounds that nobody is taken in by the pretence, and thus no genuine deception has taken place? If we still think there is something amiss in the cases of television advertising and politics, then perhaps the same is true of the social niceties Kant supports. Perhaps we should think, not that the individual cases are unethical because they are deceptive, but rather that the whole practice within which they exist should be condemned for allowing such a lack of honesty to become the norm. But note that this could be said of the system of social niceties, as well. If Kant wants to insist that politesse should be allowed, because not really deceptive, this seems inconsistent with some of his other remarks. As noted above, Kant condemns all forms of lies, even those that are motivated by benevolence, or are likely to have good consequences, because they mark a falling off from “the highest principle of truthfulness.” Why are these social niceties he wants to allow any different from white lies and other harmless lies? One way in which Kant might try to explain his different assessment of these apparently similar cases would be by drawing a distinction between

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lying and deception. If this is a tenable distinction, then it might be argued that lying is always forbidden, even if it is of a trivial or beneficial sort, whereas mere deception may be permissible under some circumstances. As we shall see, there is evidence that Kant did indeed draw such a distinction, but it is not clear that he does so convincingly, or, even if he does, that it will help him distinguish the cases in question here. To establish that Kant did indeed see a distinction between lying and deception (or, perhaps, “pretence,” if this is taken to be something different from deception), consider the following passage: I can make a pretence, and give expression to something, from which the other may deduce what I want him to; but he has no right to infer from my utterance a declaration of intent, and in that case I have told him no lie, for I never declared that I was opening my mind to him; if I pack my bags, for example, people will think that I am off on a journey, and that is what I want them to believe. . . .44 The suggestion here seems to be that, in cases of deception, I am providing some information from which the other might reasonably draw an inference, but in a sense they are responsible for reaching their own wrong conclusions. This is contrasted with the case of lying, in which the speaker presents the wrong conclusions directly, and the listener has no comparable responsibility.45 Furthermore, in deception, everything that one presents is true — it is just that one withholds another part of the truth that one knows would change the other’s interpretation. In a lie, however, what one presents is not true. Further evidence that Kant sees a clear distinction between these concepts can be found in some remarks he makes distinguishing sincerity from candour. He writes, I can admit, though it is much to be deplored, that candour (in speaking the whole truth which one knows) is not to be found in human nature . . . but we must be able to demand sincerity (that all that one says be said with truthfulness), and indeed if there were in our nature no predisposition to sincerity, whose cultivation is merely neglected, the human race must needs be, in its own eyes, an object of the deepest contempt.46 Although he here suggests that complete candour is to be preferred, he clearly makes allowances here for concealment of some facts, so long as the ones

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presented are true. It is only a short step from this to a claim that pretence and deception are morally acceptable in a way lying is not. The distinction Kant tries to draw here is a fine one indeed, and there is good reason to call it into question. First of all, it seems to hinge on a distinction between speech acts (lying) and other sorts of acts (e.g., packing one’s luggage and putting it by the door for the neighbours to see). It is far from clear that any such distinction can be maintained. Language also involves physical acts. Messages can be conveyed with parts of the body other than the mouth just as clearly, or just as ambiguously, as with spoken language. If someone asks me “Who did this?” and I point at the guy next to me, is that any less clear a communication than if I had said “He did”? Indeed, would I not normally use both the words and the gesture to get my meaning across? And what of sign languages, or universal hand gestures (such as one for “halt”) that convey meaning without spoken language? In cases of both lying and deception, one provides evidence upon which some other is intended to rely in order to derive a faulty conclusion. The conclusion may seem more immediate in the case of language, but in fact there is still a process of interpretation on the part of the hearer. Furthermore, as noted above, Kant’s claims that “no one is deceived by it” rely upon certain assumptions about the audience. Surely such assumptions are made in connection with language in general (e.g., that the others will understand one’s language), and thus both lying and deception seem to rely on conventional understandings for their effect. In any case, in Kantian terms it is the agent’s intention and not the consequence of an action that matters. If what one intends is that another come to believe something one knows to be false, then it seems one is failing to treat that other as an end-in-him/herself, regardless of the means one is using to bring about that end. Notice here that deception or pretence of the sort involved in Kant’s example of packing one’s luggage is different from mere refusal to divulge information, as may occur in the context of protection of privacy.47 In ordinary cases of privacy, one may not know what the truth is concerning another, but neither does one believe that one does know. Deception, on the other hand, involves leading the other to think that s/he does know the truth, when in fact s/he does not. So it seems that one can grant with Kant that absolute candour is not required, without thereby accepting his further suggestion that deception (short of lying) is acceptable. If Kant wants to insist on the highest possible standards of truth, then he cannot consistently maintain that intentional deception is morally acceptable. Even if the proposed distinction between lying and deception were entirely defensible, it is not clear that it would help Kant explain why polite

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untruths are permissible. If I say to you “I am your obedient servant” when in fact I do not think of myself that way, it seems plausible to consider this a kind of lie, in that it is a speech act I know to be untrue. And if Kant wants to insist that false statements are acceptable so long as “no one is deceived,” then it is hard to see why white lies would not also be allowed. If my host asks me “How do you like the soup?” and I say “It’s delicious, thank you,” surely my host knows that the conventions require me to say this, even if I can barely stomach it. Accordingly, although the host may get some reassurance from my answer, it is not clear that this depends upon my host’s being deceived in any meaningful sense. So again, it is hard to see how Kant can use the distinction between lying, on the one hand, and mere deception or pretence, on the other, to explain the discrepancy between his condemnation of all dishonesty, and his allowance of social niceties that contain untruths. One line that Kant might pursue would be to argue that social niceties should be allowed because they contribute to the smooth flowing of society and thus contribute to overall well-being. Indeed, Kant at times seems to make such an argument: In human social life, the principal object is to communicate our attitudes, and hence it is of the first importance that everyone be truthful in respect of his thoughts, since without that, social intercourse ceases to be of any value. Only when a person voices his opinions can another tell what he thinks, and if a person declares that he wishes to express his thoughts, he must also do it, for otherwise there can be no sociality among men. Fellowship among men is only the second condition of sociality; but the liar destroys this fellowship, and hence we despise the liar, since the lie makes it impossible for people to derive any benefit from what he has to say.48 When looked at carefully, this argument turns out to be surprisingly unKantian in spirit. The suggestion is that we must support things that tend to promote fellowship and sociality. It is hard to avoid thinking, however, that this amounts to promoting overall well-being. That, of course, is what consequentialists favour, but is something Kant is usually understood to be opposing. It is hard to see how Kant could consistently avail himself of such a consequentialist type of argument. There is a similar line of argument available, however, that might provide Kant with his most consistent explanation of his permissive attitude toward untruths in the service of politesse. This argument hinges on the idea that

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these untruths promote, not well-being as such, but rather the conditions under which people are most likely to act morally. There is textual evidence to support this interpretation. In fact, the following passage shows Kant putting forward an argument of this sort side by side with a version of the argument that there is no deception involved because no one is taken in: Courtesy (politesse) is a semblance of graciousness that inspires love. Manifestations of deference (compliments) and the whole of courtly gallantry, along with the warmest verbal protestations of friendship, are not always the truth. (“My dear friends: there is no such thing as a friend.” Aristotle) But this still does not make them deception, because everyone knows how to take them, especially because these tokens of benevolence and respect, though empty at first, gradually lead to real attitudes of this kind.49 Similarly, Kant argues that we should pretend to believe that others are acting virtuously, even when we do not believe it. All human virtue in circulation is small change: one would have to be a child to take it for real gold. — But we are better off having small change in circulation than no money at all; and it can eventually be converted into genuine gold, though at a considerable cost. It is high treason against humanity to issue these coins as mere counters having no value at all, to say with the sarcastic Swift: “Honour is a pair of shoes that have been worn out in the mud,” or to slander even a Socrates, in order to prevent anyone from believing in virtue . . . We must value even the semblance of good in others; for out of this play with pretences, which wins respect but may not deserve it, something more serious can finally develop.50 How are we to understand these passages? Presumably the “small change” refers to outward shows of virtue. Everyone but children and the naïve know, however, that often this show is not accompanied by real virtue. We are only being realistic about human conduct if we say that there is much less virtue than there appears to be. Kant admits this as we have seen. What does it mean to say that the small change can be turned into real gold? One way to read this is that we can separate out the genuine currency from the widespread counterfeit. Yet Kant does not seem to think we should try to do this. Why not? Why

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should we not take the appearance of virtue and test it right there and then, or convert it into real gold? Kant warns that there is a “considerable cost” to doing so — it would involve some big loss for humanity. What is this loss? It cannot be simply an open wide-eyed awareness of the scarcity of genuine virtue, since we already know this. Rather, it is a “betrayal of humanity” — a loss of rational faith in the possibility of moral progress itself, a loss of the promise and hope for humanity. A person who perceives appearances of goodness and virtue as mere chips to cash in, will suspect hypocrisy in any particular context. It colours his/her attitude, and prevents the very possibility of looking at another as a genuine human being with moral concerns. Such an attitude starts out with disrespect, insists on proof or evidence (that in the nature of the case can never be clinching), and in rare cases grants virtue. But imagine bringing up a child that way, or as a general attitude to our neighbours and fellow travellers! The result is likely to be decay and moral chaos! Kant’s analogy with money is worth discussing a little. Even if there is a lot of counterfeit and little genuine currency, it would be disastrous for the economy to perceive all money as counterfeit. The reason for this is that then money would be seen as generally worthless, hence we could not use money as a means of purchase or commercial transaction. Those who insist that the thing to do is to determine in each particular case whether the coin is really genuine advocate a practice which in fact would paralyze economic exchange — the whole process would result in so much doubt and suspicion that it would undermine the necessary trust which makes such exchange possible. Presumably, testing each apparently virtuous act to see if it involves genuine virtue would have a similarly corrosive effect on the trust and respect for the dignity of others that morality requires. In short, Kant here observes that virtue is scarce, hence agreeing to some extent with the moral skeptic that appearances are deceptive. All that morally glitters is not virtue. As far as the truth goes, the skeptic is probably correct more often than not, Kant seems to suggest. But adopting a general distrust on this basis not only does injustice to the rare virtuous person, but also removes the very condition of the possibility of the moral life and its cultivation, which requires a secular faith, as it were. What Kant seems to be advocating is that we pretend that other people are virtuous even when we may know that they are merely putting on a show of virtue. He seems to suggest that we should acknowledge the outward signs of virtue in others even when, for all we know, they are not accompanied by the appropriate inwardness, because this is the route to reinforcing and bolstering virtue and morality. One might object that this course of action merely multiplies the instances of hypocrisy. It allows people to pretend to be virtuous

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when they are not, and also implicates the person who, knowing otherwise, publicly credits those deceivers. Yet it is such a “play of pretences,” such mutual or reciprocal hypocrisies, which Kant apparently takes to be a condition for the possibility of morality and virtue. Is this view consistent with the main thrust of Kant’s morality, and what does it tell us about how his views in general should be interpreted? On the surface, it is puzzling indeed. Hypocrisy is condemned as the worst vice, and yet seems to be endorsed here as a sort of foundation for morality in general. Yet we will argue that there is an interpretation that makes sense of these surprising statements by Kant, though it also suggests an alternative reading of some of his better-known writings. Kant’s argument here seems uncharacteristically consequentialist in nature. It seems we are supposed to engage in pretence, and let the hypocrisy of others pass, because doing so will have some sort of good consequence. What is more, it might be thought that what Kant advocates here conflicts with the very core of his moral theory, the Categorical Imperative. If we pretend to others that we think them virtuous when we do not, are we not acting deceptively, and thereby using the others as means? Well, not necessarily. The person who values even the semblance of goodness in others does not merely use the others to maximize virtue, but also treats them as ends, looks upon them as persons worthy of dignity, rather than as people who have to prove that they are worthy of such treatment. So there is no violation of the Categorical Imperative here at all, it seems. We treat them as means, but also as ends in themselves. The puzzling consequentialist element can be similarly understood. It is true in a sense that our pretence is taken to be justified by its good consequences. But it is a particular sort of consequence that is at stake. If Kant is right, then the upshot of all this pretence is that moral action itself will be maximized. That is the “something more serious” that Kant hopes will develop. Accordingly, this passage suggests a reading of Kant different from the most common one. Although he is usually read to mean that one should always do one’s duty and allow others to look after their own morality, it appears here that one should take responsibility for trying to maximize moral actions in general. This in turn suggests a hybrid of consequentialist and deontological theories. It is still the case that actions are right when they accord with duty, as deontologists insist, but now the agent is supposed to maximize duty-doing overall, rather than simply in his/her own actions. Indeed, the fact that one can engage in a form of deception in order to accomplish this, may suggest that one should try to maximize duty-doing overall, even when the means to achieving this involves a failure to do one’s own duty.

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H. Acceptable Hypocrisy? Kant applies the sort of reasoning just outlined in defence of another form of pretence as well, which is even more striking, given our current interest in hypocrisy. This involves presenting oneself as virtuous, even when one is not. Kant welcomes the presentation of a dignified bearing, or the appearance of modesty, even when this is in fact an “illusion,” or a case of “disguising” oneself. That is to say, if one presents oneself as better than one is, in terms of the standards of morality, Kant believes one is doing what one ought to do. But on one standard reading, this is exactly the sort of behaviour that is considered hypocritical. It appears, then, that Kant approves of at least some forms of hypocrisy! In order to preserve virtue, or at least lead us to it, nature has wisely implanted in us a tendency to give ourselves over readily to illusion. A dignified bearing is an outward show that instills respect in others (keeps them from being too familiar). It is true that women would not like it much if men seemed to pay no attention to their charms. But modesty, a self-constraint that conceals passion, is still most salutary as an illusion that keeps the sexes sufficiently far apart so that one is not degraded into a mere tool for the other’s enjoyment. — In general, all that we call propriety is this sort of thing — simply a handsome show.51 Note that again the proposed justification for such posturing is the tendency for it to “preserve virtue, or at least lead us to it.” That is, once again deception is seen as justifiable when it is likely to bring about an overall increase in moral behaviour. The concept seems to be that we will begin by pretending to have a specific virtue, but then will find that the demands of the pretence will lead us actually to have the virtue in question. This is similar to what Elster has called the “civilizing force of hypocrisy.”52 Indeed, the concept can be found at least as far back as Shakespeare’s day. Consider the following passage from Hamlet, in which the prince is advising his mother: Good night — but go not to mine uncle’s bed; That monster custom who all sense doth eat, Of habits devil, is angel yet in this, — That to the use of actions fair and good He likewise gives a frock or livery That aptly is put on. Refrain to-night;

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And that shall lend a kind of easiness To the next abstinence; the next more easy; For use almost can change the stamp of nature, And either curb the devil, or throw him out With wondrous potency. Once more, good night …53 This same message is conveyed again in the following lengthy passage from Kant: Man has an impulse towards holding himself back and disguising himself. The former is concealment, the latter pretence. Man holds back in regard to his weaknesses and transgressions, and can also pretend and adopt an appearance. The proclivity for reserve and concealment rests on this, that providence has willed that man should not be wholly open, since he is full of iniquity; because we have so many characteristics and tendencies that are objectionable to others, we would be liable to appear before them in a foolish and hateful light. But the result, in that case, might be this, that people would tend to grow accustomed to such bad points, since they would see the same in everyone. Hence we order our behaviour in such a way that in part we conceal our faults, and in part also put a different face on them, and have the knack for appearing other than we are; so other people see nothing of our sins and weaknesses beyond the appearances of well-being, and hence we habituate ourselves to dispositions that produce good conduct. Hence nobody, in the true sense, is open-hearted. Had it been as Momus wanted, that Jupiter should have installed a window in the heart, so that every man’s disposition might be known, then men would have had to be better constituted, and have good principles, for if all men were good, nobody would need to hold anything back; but since this is not so, we must keep our shutters closed. When domestic nastiness is confined to the privy, and a person is not invited into the bedroom where the chamber pots are, though he knows we have them, just as he does himself, we refrain from these things lest we get into the habit of it and corrupt our taste. In just the same way, we conceal our faults, and try to give a different impression, and make a show of politeness, despite our mistrust; yet by this we grow used to politeness, and at length it becomes natural to us, and we thereby set a good example, at least to the eye; if

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part ii Moral Theory this were not so, everybody would neglect these things, finding nobody the better for them. So by this endeavour to look well we actually end up doing so, later on. If men were all good, they could afford to be open-hearted; but not at present.54

Here again Kant suggests that we should hide our sins and weaknesses, hypocritical though that may seem, since by doing so we “habituate ourselves to dispositions that produce good conduct.” He seems confident here that by making a show of politeness we become genuinely polite, and by looking virtuous we come to be virtuous. What is more, these important results apparently justify the somewhat duplicitous means required to achieve them. In other words, Kant seems to maintain that hypocrisy is excusable or justifiable if it advances the cause of real virtue, and the substantive moral values of human dignity, respect and autonomy. It is surprising to see Kant portray some forms of hypocrisy as praiseworthy, given the argument cited earlier to the effect that hypocrisy is the worst form of evil. This apparent contradiction can be resolved fairly easily, however. Kant appears to be referring to two different kinds of hypocrisy. The hypocrisy he approves of here involves presenting an image of oneself to others, which might be considered “outer” hypocrisy. In fact, Kant does not use the term “hypocrisy” to describe this sort of deception, though it is commonly known by that term in everyday conversation. He reserves use of that term for the different vice he outlined in the passages cited earlier, which involves a sort of “inner lie,” as we discussed before. In order to appreciate this distinction fully, it will be useful to look more carefully at how Kant understands moral motivation, and the role self-deception plays in it.

I. Inner and Outer Hypocrisy and the Dear Self As we have seen, there are times at which Kant condemns lying to oneself, or self-deception, in the strongest possible terms. One interesting passage in which he makes this sort of claim about declarations one makes to oneself reads as follows: But such insincerity in his declarations, which a man perpetrates upon himself, still deserves the strongest censure, since it is from such a rotten spot (falsity) that the evil of untruthfulness spreads into one’s relations with other men as well, once the highest principle of truthfulness has been violated.55

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Although the consequentialist nature of this argument (that what is wrong with the untruthfulness is that it will spread to relations to others) is a bit surprising, the general message that self-deception “deserves the strongest censure” is by now a familiar one. But contrast that passage with another, in which Kant seems to accept self-deception as praiseworthy. After noting, as in the passages discussed in the previous section, that people play social roles in which they may be less than genuine, Kant states: And it is a good thing that this happens in the world. For if men keep on playing these roles, the real virtues whose semblance they have merely been affecting for a long time are gradually aroused and pass into their attitude of will. — But to deceive the deceiver within ourselves, inclination, is to return to obeying the law of virtue; it is not a deception but an innocent illusion of ourselves.56 The closing sentence of this passage is particularly revealing. Here Kant is again referring to self-deception, but this time in a way that does not condemn it in the least. Indeed, Kant suggests that the type of self-deception involved does not really deserve the name of deception at all — it is rather “an innocent illusion.” To understand what makes the difference between such an “innocent illusion” and the “rotten spot” of the previous passage that deserves our strongest censure, it is useful to return to some fundamental features of Kantian ethics. Kant believes that actions have moral worth only if they are done out of respect for the moral law, which is given to us by reason. Since we are not perfect beings, we are not always motivated by reason, however. Sometimes inclination gets in the way, and we act on that rather than following the dictates of reason. This is clear when inclination prompts us to do something that is contrary to the moral law, but Kant insists that the problem can arise even in cases where one’s actions do not contravene the moral law. To take Kant’s example,57 a merchant may decide not to overcharge his customers. This conforms with his duty — to overcharge would be a form of cheating or thievery, and thus a violation of the moral law. At the same time, however, a prudent merchant will realize that overcharging some customers is bad for business — one may get a reputation for dishonesty, which will make people reluctant to visit one’s shop. Accordingly, in this case the merchant will have a self-interested reason to do that which accords with the moral law. If the merchant is motivated by this element of self-interest58 rather than pure respect for the moral law, Kant wants to insist that the action has no moral worth. As

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Kant puts it, ends that derive their worth from “a specially constituted faculty of desire in the subject” cannot be universal and necessary for all rational beings, and thus cannot count as the moral law.59 Again, “everything empirical is not only quite unsuitable as a contribution to the principle of morality, but is even highly detrimental to the purity of morals.”60 With this feature of Kant’s moral approach in mind, it is possible to understand why he treats the cases of self-deception outlined above so differently. In the type of inner deceit Kant wants to condemn in the strongest terms, one convinces oneself that one is acting out of respect for the moral law, when one is in fact motivated by inclination. If we see the self as divided into these two parts, these are cases in which inclination is tricking reason. In the cases Kant approves of, on the other hand, the opposite is happening. Kant says that what is being deceived in these cases is “the deceiver within ourselves, inclination.” And since what justifies this deception is the hope of “a return to obeying the law of virtue,” we might here say that it is reason that dictates that our inclination be tricked. Although this does make sense of some of the apparent contradictions in Kant’s writings, there are still some problems to resolve. First of all, it is obvious from this statement that inclination is not in fact the only deceiver within ourselves, if something else is tricking it. If it is acceptable to deceive a deceiver, and reason can sometimes be a deceiver, then it seems it should be allowable to trick reason, as inclination is said to do. Presumably it is not simply because inclination deceives that it is legitimate to deceive it — it is rather that inclination has no intrinsic worth, whereas acting from reason alone does, in Kantian terms. More significantly, we might be struck by a radical difference between how Kant would have us treat others, and how we should treat ourselves. Kant argues that we should pretend that others’ outward signs of virtue are genuine, even when we know or suspect that they are not. On the other hand, although he allows a certain amount of hypocritical pretence to virtue in our dealings with others, he harshly refuses to allow such pretence when we engage in selfexamination. It is only the semblance of good in ourselves that we must ruthlessly wipe away: we must tear off the veil with which self-love covers our moral defects. For if we delude ourselves that our debt is cancelled by what has no intrinsic moral content, or reject even this and persuade ourselves that we are not guilty, the semblance deceives us — as when we depict death-bed repentance for

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our evil deeds as real improvement, or deliberate misdeeds as human frailties.61 This difference between treatment of oneself and treatment of others might seem to violate Kant’s insistence on universalization. The first formulation of the categorical imperative, which states that one must be willing to act as if the motive one were acting on were to become a universal law, seems to suggest that one should not make an exception of oneself. Yet in this regard Kant is recommending the use of a sort of double standard, according to which one treats oneself differently from others. It must be acknowledged that this double standard seems to work in reverse, since the usual case is that one treats others badly and oneself well, whereas this is the other way around. Nevertheless, the case calls out for explanation. If the argument we have followed is correct, the explanation must lie in Kant’s expectations about what sorts of behaviour are likely to maximize the conditions for people’s behaving morally. Presumably Kant believes that little hypocrisies toward others will tend to lead them or oneself toward acting morally in the future, whereas allowing inclination to deceive reason is likely to have the opposite effect. It is possible, of course, to wonder whether Kant is right about this. If there is benign deception, surely there is benign self-deception as well. For example, if the president of a university credits the motives behind a Christmas gift given by an ambitious faculty member as affection, rather than softening him/her up to curry favours later on, s/he treats the faculty member respectfully and also cultivates the practice of gift giving and a sense of solidarity, surely prima facie goods. To question his/her motives would humiliate and embarrass, and possibly contribute to a loss of self-respect. But can convincing oneself that a gift is genuine not similarly result in the development of a disposition to the future giving of gifts in oneself as well? And can it not lift one’s low self-esteem so that one feels as if one were on equal footing with others? Furthermore, if one holds oneself to a very high standard, is it not likely that one will come to apply the same standards to others, thereby treating them more harshly than they deserve in the future? Finally, if Kant is concerned about culpable failure in self-knowledge and self-understanding, then, without impugning the value of self-knowledge, we may note that there is an analogous problem about a culpable failure of knowing and understanding others, or at least a kind of weakness in appraising others. Which is more culpable is not straightforwardly decidable unless we take the situation and its features into account. Kant seems unaware of the fact that we may deceive

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ourselves about others — about one’s loved ones, friends as well as about the likelihood of strangers’ turning out to be of good characters. Perhaps these considerations are beside the point, however. These amount to questions about how to apply a specific principle, and the answers to these questions hinge on empirical facts about human nature. Even if Kant is wrong about all these empirical facts, however, the principle he is trying to support with them might still be valuable. That is to say, it could be that he is right to recommend however much hypocrisy and tolerance is compatible with maximizing overall moral action, even if he is wrong about which types of hypocrisy and tolerance will actually bring about this result. There is a further problem with his insistence that we harshly scrutinize our own motives when it comes to moral actions, however. This further problem stems from the fact that, in other passages, he does not hold out much hope for our ability to learn much about ourselves through such scrutiny. It is in fact absolutely impossible by experience to discern with complete clarity a single case in which the maxim of an action, however much it conforms to duty, rested solely on moral grounds and on the conception of one’s duty. It sometimes happens that in the most searching self-examination we can find nothing except the moral grounds of duty which could have been powerful enough to move us to this or that good action and to such great sacrifice. But from this we cannot by any means conclude with certainty that a secret impulse of self-love, falsely appearing as the idea of duty, was not actually the true determining cause of the will. For we like to flatter ourselves with a pretended nobler motive while in fact even the strictest examination can never lead us entirely behind the secret incentives, for, when moral worth is in question, it is not a matter of actions which one sees, but of their inner principles which one does not see.62 Or again: . . . . Out of love of humanity I am willing to admit that most of our actions are in accordance with duty; but, if we look more closely at our own thoughts and aspirations, we everywhere come upon the dear self, which is always there, and it is this instead of the stern command of duty (which would require selfdenial) which supports our plans. One need not be an enemy of virtue, but only a cool observer who does not confuse even the

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liveliest aspiration for the good with its reality, to be doubtful sometimes whether true virtue can really be found anywhere in the world. . . . Our concern is with actions of which perhaps the world has never had an example, with actions whose feasibility might be seriously doubted by those who base everything on experience, yet with actions inexorably commanded by reason. For example, pure sincerity in friendship can be demanded of every man, and this demand is not in the least diminished if a sincere friend has never existed. . . .63 These are insightful, deeply moving, yet at the same time disconcerting, passages. First off, how can Kant consistently object to the possibility of benign self-deception on the ground that it obscures further whatever selfknowledge we may have? If we have no access to our motives and springs of action even after the most thorough introspection, then there can be, as Kant says, no reliable knowledge what our and other people’s motives and reasons for action are. However, in that event, no self-deception is required to confuse or obscure access to our motives and reasons for action, for there is none. So Kant seems to give the impression that there is such access, and simultaneously that there is not. One response Kant may have here is that there is still some room for self-deception, namely, a person may deceive himself or herself that s/he knows people’s motives and reasons for action when in fact they can not. This in fact may be what is wrong with a judgmental person: s/he suffers from the affliction that s/he thinks s/he knows more than s/he can possibly know. If this is right, then Kant wriggles out of one apparent inconsistency, but seems to slide into another. For what can possibly be his basis for making those judgments of hypocrisy that he makes when he gives and discusses examples? Furthermore, he throws into doubt the whole language game of hypocrisy as moral criticism and accusation, a game he participates in frequently even as he rejects it. It seems to follow from what he says that we should refrain from judgment about the moral worth or character of persons, including judgments about our own self since we are never in a position to make such judgments reliably. Neither in the case of others nor in our own case is complete transparency possible, or desirable for that matter, as we have noted. This perspective has devastating effects not only for moral knowledge, but the whole discourse and language game. If Kant insists on the overriding and uniquely determining function of moral considerations, then it seems self-defeating to assert that we can never really have adequate justification

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for saying that we acted out of respect for morality. Even Hume, who is often thought of as the arch-skeptic, never denied the possibility of moral judgment or character assessment, but insisted that they are based on instinct and our natural reactions and customs. Compare this with Kant’s bold reiteration of his skepticism about human motives and intentions in a footnote in the Critique of Pure Reason: The real morality of our actions, their merit or quality, even that of our own conduct, thus remains entirely hidden from us. Our imputations can refer only to their empirical character. How much of this character is ascribable to the pure effect of freedom, how much to mere nature, that is, to faults of temperament for which there is no responsibility, or to its happy constitution, can never be determined; and upon it therefore no perfectly just judgments can be passed.64 How is Kant saved morally from the likely corrosive effects of this skepticism? By leaving this sort of moral epistemology in the background and putting “love of humanity” in the forefront. “. . . Out of love of humanity I am willing to admit that most of our actions are in accordance with duty.” But notice that this redemptive gesture, this “charity of interpretation” is immediately followed by the alleged recognition that “. . . if we look more closely at our thoughts and aspirations, we everywhere come upon the dear self, which is always there, and it is this instead of the stern command of duty (which would often require self-denial) which supports our plans.” We may ask, however, how can Kant know this or believe it with such confidence, if he holds the view that our thoughts, intentions, and motives are really in principle opaque to us? Moreover, if he is prepared to assert that the incessant machinations of the “dear self ” disguise themselves in moral clothes, why does he assume without question that this deceptive traffic flows along a oneway street? Surely it could be that in some decent people the moral motives are disguised in the robes of egoism? A person may exercise his/her virtuous dispositions, yet conceal them from others whenever s/he can so as not to embarrass them, or make demands on them that they cannot meet. If with Kant we keep together these two thoughts about love and gathering evidence, then there can be only ambivalence in our attitude to the other as well as our selves. The situation is analogous to the problem of other minds. If you are looking for evidence before you are prepared to accept the belief, you are ontologically challenged and will remain so. If you are looking for evidence

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for people’s morality, you will remain morally challenged. Evidence will not get you there in general. It would seem that Kant’s axiological dualism gets the better of him in the end by placing, as it were, value out of this world. To draw such a sharp dichotomy between the universe of fact and a higher world of value is to place the domain of the intrinsically moral beyond the scope of human grasp. Hence no absolute moral judgment of people is possible; whereof one cannot judge, thereof one should remain silent. This resulting non-judgmentalism about virtue and good will naturally slides into the sphere of judgments about the consistency or inconsistency between what we profess and practice; between word and deed. Hence hypocrisy is confined to this gap, and to the sphere where we pretend to know the purity or impurity of people’s motives and intentions, other people’s or for that matter our own.

J. Promoting Conditions of Moral Action We have argued that Kant’s apparently inconsistent statements about pretence and deception can be reconciled if we interpret his theory in such a way that what he recommends is not that individuals always aspire to follow the moral law in their own actions, as usually assumed, but rather that individuals should promote the conditions that will make moral action possible, whether on the part of themselves or others. Indeed, this, more than anything else, may explain why Kant recommends that one treat oneself so much differently than one treats others. People are simply differently situated in terms of what they can do to promote the conditions of their own acting morally, as opposed to those of others doing so. Presumably we can control our own actions, exercising our free will, but all we can do for others is provide them with conditions for the possibility of acting morally — it is up to them whether they take advantage of the opportunity. Although there is considerable appeal to this account, it poses a problem for another aspect of Kant’s analysis. This problem becomes clear when we ask what the conditions are that will promote moral behaviour. In putting the problem this way, we do not mean to repeat the merely empirical problems Kant encounters in making his bold claims about what will and what will not have this good effect. The problem that arises here is a deep conceptual one. Kant insists that every rational being is always capable of representing to him/her/itself the moral law, and recognizing it as necessary. Furthermore, we have free will (at least when viewed as noumena), and are capable of autonomy, in the sense of being guided by nothing other than the moral law that we give ourselves.65 Matters of inclination can interfere with one’s doing

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one’s duty, but have no real bearing on moral action. Indeed, if one acts in a morally appropriate way only because the circumstances in which one acts make the morally appropriate action accord with one’s inclination, then Kant insists one’s action has no moral worth. To have moral worth, an action must not only be in conformity to the moral law, but must be done for the sake of the moral law, which is to say it must be done purely from reason’s recognition of its duty, without any reference to inclination. If this is correct, though, then the only “condition” that must be present in order for one to act morally is that one is a rational being.66 If all that is required for people to act morally is that they listen to their reason, and they are capable of doing this no matter what their circumstances, then it seems the only thing that could possibly promote the conditions of people’s acting morally would be making them rational, which is clearly something we lack the power to do. His suggestions that we can somehow through our actions create conditions that will lead people to act morally simply seem inconsistent with the account he offers of the basis of morality and the relationship between reason and inclination. One might conclude at this point, despite the evidence presented, that our interpretation of Kant must be wrong — he must not after all be recommending that people promote the conditions of moral action. But that perspective is deep-seated within Kant’s writing. Consider the following passage from the Grounding: To secure one’s own happiness is a duty (at least indirectly); for discontent with one’s condition under many pressing cares and amid unsatisfied wants might easily become a greater temptation to transgress one’s duties.67 Although this seems to reflect the human condition accurately enough, it does not fit well with the firm distinction Kant tries to draw between acting on the basis of reason and acting out of inclination. If one resists temptation only because one is happy (and one would otherwise have given in to it), then one is not acting purely out of respect for the moral law, and hence, in Kant’s terms, one’s action has no moral worth! It might be argued at this point that Kant’s goal, in urging us to use pretence in ways that will create desirable conditions, is not to establish the conditions of moral action, as such, but only of action in conformity with the moral law. That is, he might concede that, if through pretence we get people to develop habits of acting in appropriate ways, what one acquires thereby is not something that has real moral worth. Nevertheless, he might claim it

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is worth doing, because we should encourage at least action that conforms with the moral law, especially given that (as discussed in the previous section) there may never have been a case of a human action that had genuine moral worth. Hence, Kant’s recommendations about pretence might be aimed, not at promoting the conditions of morally worthy action, but only the conditions of action that conform to the moral law. This is not a very appealing interpretation, however. What Kant is advocating is a form of pretence and deception. This appears to be a violation of the moral law. Thus Kant is recommending that people, who as rational beings could act out of respect for the moral law, do something different instead. On the interpretation we have offered, such a violation may be justifiable if it brings about an increase in overall moral worth — that is, if it promotes the conditions that will allow people to act in ways that are morally worthy. It is hard to see, however, how such a violation could be justified merely by contributing to actions that conform to the moral law, but that have no moral worth at all. Since Kant believes that genuine moral action has incomparable value, it is implausible that it could be sacrificed in this way for anything other than more genuine moral action.

K. Conclusions We have argued that Kant’s advocacy of certain sorts of pretence, deception, and hypocrisy make sense only if one reads him in an unorthodox way, as a sort of consequentialist deontologist. On this view, individuals should act in ways that will promote the conditions for moral behaviour, their own or others’. Yet we have now seen that this interpretation seems inconsistent with Kant’s insistence that moral behaviour must stem from reason alone, without any taint of inclination. One might take this as a reason to think our interpretation must be mistaken, but we would like to propose an alternative resolution — rejecting the other inconsistent principles. It is clear from Kant’s repeated statements of the principle that it genuinely was a part of his theory that people possess both reason and inclination, and that genuine moral behaviour required somehow transcending the aspect of inclination and acting on the basis of reason. We do not propose any alternative reading of the many passages that assert this. What we want to suggest instead is that Kant was simply mistaken about this. Indeed, the passages we have cited in which he seems to suggest that some other conditions might make genuine morality possible, or at least easier, indicate that even he could not consistently maintain this position. And we find the position implausible from the start. We are not convinced that there is any such thing as pure rea-

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son, objectively correct and identical in all rational beings. What is more, we believe that inclination and reason are not radically separate in the way Kant would advocate — they influence each other, and both play a role in guiding moral actions. To conclude, then, we have investigated what Kant has to say about hypocrisy, and have found some surprising things. First of all, he does not merely condemn it as a vice, but argues that it is the worst vice, and the ground of all evil. It turns out, however, that these remarks apply only to a certain sort of hypocrisy (which might be considered “inner hypocrisy”) that deals with attempts to act on the basis of inclination while convincing oneself one’s actions have moral worth. Other cases of what could commonly be considered hypocrisy, such as presenting oneself in public as more moral than one is, are not only not condemned by Kant, but are positively recommended. We have argued that the best way to interpret this puzzling recommendation is by reading Kant as what might be called a “consequentialist deontologist,” rather than the strict deontologist he is often portrayed as. That is to say, we read him as advocating, not strict adherence to duty on one’s own part, but rather actions that one believes will promote the conditions for general adherence to duty. In pushing this line, however, we also discovered that Kant’s recommendations in the passages dealing with hypocrisy and deception seem incompatible with his insistence that moral worth comes from reason alone, without any input from inclination. We concluded by suggesting one final, but significant, revision to the traditional understanding of Kant. That is, we argued that Kant’s attempt to draw a clear line between reason and inclination should ultimately be rejected, and that the fact that he strays from this distinction in some of his own writings suggests that he himself at some level recognized the shortcomings of the framework he had imposed on himself. Thus Kant’s little-noticed writings on hypocrisy not only help to illuminate that concept, but also open the door to some significant revisions to the traditional understanding of Kant’s moral theory. Do moral theories, including Kantianism and consequentialism as well, not take too high a road for trying to deal with hypocrisy? For they seem to neglect if not erase an important fact about human nature that hypocrisy makes salient, namely, that human beings are inclined to act on the basis of what they perceive to be their self-interest. It might be said then that what is called hypocrisy is simply an indication of the primacy of self-interest in human motivation and a generally natural and useful way of protecting and defending one’s individuality and particularity against excessive social pressures to conform to dominant norms. It would seem then that the theory that would best articulate the voice of the so-called hypocrite would be the theory

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of egoism, since it takes the individual self and self-interest as its focal points. Moralistic societies create and encourage the human tendency to conceal selfinterested action by dressing it in altruistic moral discourse and invent moral rationalizations for it. To counter these “moral illusions,” and thus even deflating perhaps the amount of hypocrisy, the egoist might be able not only to show why many cases of hypocrisy are useful ways of behaving, but also perform the Socratic service of undeceiving and accepting ourselves. These perhaps surprising questions bring us to a discussion of the theory of egoism in its various forms and its relation to hypocrisy.

Notes 1. For example, several contemporary virtue theorists claim Kant as one of their own — after all, he did write The Doctrine of Virtue. To mention one such theorist: in “Kant after Virtue,” Onora O’Neill argues that “what is not in doubt . . . is that Kant offers primarily an ethic of virtue rather than an ethic of rules.” (Philosophy, 26, 387-405). 2. E.g., Saul Smilansky who provides hints for a Kantian account of hypocrisy, without any references to Kant’s writings on the subject. See p. 76 of his “On Practicing What We Preach,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 31, 1 (1994) 73-79. Eva Feder Kittay also gives indications of sympathy for a Kantian perspective, but makes no allusions to what Kant actually said about the matter. See “On Hypocrisy,” Metaphilosophy, 13 (1982) 277-89. 3. Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981) 421, standard pagination. Kant gives what he seems to regard as an alternative formulation on the same page: “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature.” Some scholars, e.g., Sir David Ross, think that there is a real difference between these two wordings. See his crisp classic Kant’s Ethical Theory: A Commentary on the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954) 43-44. 4. Ibid., 429, standard pagination. 5. Ibid., 432, standard pagination. For present purposes, we are treating this formulation as equivalent to the “Kingdom of Ends” formulation (“A rational being must always regard himself as legislator in a kingdom of ends rendered possible by freedom of the will, whether as member or as sovereign.” Grounding, 434, standard pagination.) 6. R.M. Hare has provided perhaps the best-known argument to the effect that Kant should be seen as some sort of consequentialist (R.M. Hare, “Could Kant Have Been a Utilitarian?” Utilitas, V [1993]; also in part III of his Sorting Out Ethics [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997]), but see also David Commiskey, Kantian Consequentialism (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Daniel Weinstock, “Critical Notice of David Commiskey’s Kantian Consequentialism,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 30, 2 (2000) 315-39. Note that there are two different senses in which Kant might be seen as a deontologist — one is that his dictum that people must be treated as ends in themselves amounts to the same thing as what consequentialists (in particular, utilitarians) advocate. We discuss this possibility

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below. Here, the suggestion is rather that Kant’s view supports a sort of hybrid of consequentialism with deontology. 7. Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 452 of the standard pagination (Hackett edition, 53-54). 8. Kant, Preface to the Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals, 389 in the standard pagination, (Hackett edition, 2-3). 9. Kant, Grounding, 442 of the standard pagination (Hackett edition, 46). 10. Ibid., 411 of the standard pagination (Hackett edition, 22-23). 11. Ibid., 412-14 of the standard pagination (Hackett edition, 23-24). 12. Ibid., 413 of the standard pagination (Hackett edition, 24). 13. We will consider below whether this case really is analogous to the others mentioned. Note also that, although universal hypocrisy might make it impossible to judge anyone’s true beliefs from their words or actions, it is not obvious how much of a contradiction would exist in such a world. 14. See his “Conscience and Hypocrisy,” in Duty and Hypocrisy in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977) 99-130. 15. Bob Seger, “Night Moves.” 16. Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 429 of the standard pagination (Hackett edition, 36). 17. Ibid., 430 of the standard pagination (Hackett edition, 37). 18. Ibid. 19. For arguments that Kant should indeed be seen as a utilitarian, see Hare, “Could Kant Have Been a Utilitarian?” and Weinstock. 20. We consider below the interesting case of self-deceptive hypocrisy, in which it is positive opinion from oneself that is sought. 21. It is instructive to compare Kant’s observations on this topic with those of a thinker whose writings are known to have influenced Kant — Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau believed that comparison of oneself with others is the source of “amour propre,” perhaps the earliest corrupting influence of civilization, since it involves an inevitable but regrettable loss of pure integrity. For an interesting discussion of this notion of Rousseau’s in connection with hypocrisy, see Ruth W. Grant, Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). 22. Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue in The Metaphysics of Morals, Introduction, Translation and Notes by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 231. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid., 225-26. It is worth noting that Kant’s argument here for the moral wrongness of lying appeals to the substantive moral values of dignity, autonomy and self-respect, without mentioning violation-of-the-universal-law formulation of the categorical imperative. 26. Ibid., 225 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid., 226. 30. Ibid. The repetition of “contempt” in this passage reminds one of the legal charge of “contempt of court,” which is not at all out of line with the traditional interpretation of Kant’s moral theory as a sort of formalist proceduralism.

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31. Ibid., 227. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, translated with an introduction and notes by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1934/1960) 37, footnote. 35. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 227. 36. Ibid., 226. 37. Ibid. It would be hard to miss the parallel between this case and Pascal’s Wager argument for the existence of God, but Kant reaches a very different conclusion. Kant views with horror Pascal’s counsel that we should give reason and consciousness a break and cede to our desire for conviction. In his view, this would be tantamount to surrendering our autonomy. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid., 227. 40. Ibid. 41. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, translated with an Introduction and Notes by Mary J. Gregor (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff ) 30. 42. We discuss irony and its relationship to hypocrisy in detail in Part V of this book. 43. In Chapter 15, we suggest that part of the reason people engage in irony in the first place is that it carries the possibility of “splitting” the audience into those who do and those who do not “get it.” In that case the possibility of failed uptake is playing a bigger role than it might seem to be, even in a rather trivial case such as the given one concerning the weather. 44. Kant, Lectures on Ethics, translated by Peter Heath, and edited by Peter Heath and Jerome Schneewind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 202. 45. This sort of analysis follows that provided in Joseph Ellin, “Lying and Deception: The Solution to a Dilemma in Medical Ethics,” in Thomas Mappes and Jane Zembaty, eds., Biomedical Ethics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981). 46. Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, 178. 47. See Chapter 9 of this book for a detailed discussion of privacy and its relationship to forms of deception, including hypocrisy. 48. Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 200-01. 49. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 31. 50. Ibid., 32. 51. Ibid., 31. 52. Jon Elster, editor, Deliberative Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 12. We discuss this notion also in Chapter 10 of this book. 53. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene 4, lines 161-71. 54. Kant, Lectures on Ethics, translated by Peter Heath, edited by Peter Heath and J.B. Schneewind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 201. 55. Ibid., 227. 56. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 30-31. 57. From Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 397 in the standard pagination, (Hackett edition, 10). 58. In this passage, Kant actually distinguishes between a “selfish purpose” and “immediate inclination,” but for present purposes we can take “selfish purpose” to be a sort of refined, long-term species of inclination.

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59. See Kant, Grounding, 427-28 in the standard pagination (Hackett edition, 35). 60. Kant, Grounding, 426 in the standard pagination (Hackett edition, 34). 61. Kant, Anthropology, 32. 62. Kant, Grounding, 22-23. 63. Ibid., 24. 64. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1953) 475, footnote a. 65. See Kant, Grounding, Third Section. 66. Kant’s view here is directly contrary to Aristotle’s view in the Nicomachean Ethics that habit and upbringing are crucial to moral action. 67. Kant, Grounding, 399 in the standard pagination (Hackett edition, 12).

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7 Egoism and Hypocrisy “Nor does there appear to be any reason to wish self-love were weaker in the generality of the world than it is. . . . The thing to be lamented is, not that men have so great regard to their own good or interest in the present world, for they have not enough; but that they have so little to the good of others. . . . Upon the whole, if the generality of mankind were to cultivate within themselves the principle of self-love,. . . it would manifestly prevent numberless follies and vices.” 1 joseph butler “Any one man will always do better if he is prudent.” 2 david gauthier “Hypocrisy is the most difficult and nerve-wrecking vice that any man can pursue: it needs an unceasing vigilance and a rare detachment of spirit. It cannot, like adultery or gluttony, be practiced at spare moments; it is a whole-time job.” somerset maugham

A. Introduction What is the relationship between hypocrisy and egoism? The classic image of a cynical hypocrite is one of a person who relentlessly pursues his or her own self-interest, and who appears to endorse other-regarding moral principles only as a ruse to further that self-interest. This rational estimation and pursuit of self-interest seems to suggest that hypocrites are egoists. We do not believe that all hypocrites are egoists. They may be guilty of allowing self-interest to win out over their altruistic obligations, but this need not be due to a belief that it should, or that it inevitably does, do so. There may be people who are complacent, or self-deceived, for example, who believe that it is both possible and appropriate to live up to altruistic principles, but fall short in various ways. Nevertheless, their complacency or self-deception may amount to hypocrisy.3 Similarly, there may be people who are hypocritical only within one “local”

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area, and who act quite altruistically in other realms.4 Nevertheless, there seems to be a close connection between “cynical hypocrisy” and “egoism,” and spelling out this connection might cast light on both concepts. In order to understand the connection between hypocrisy and egoism, it is important to distinguish various forms of egoism. Although the basic categorization we follow is quite familiar, the comparison with hypocrisy serves to highlight several features of the classification that are not often noticed.

B. Self-Interest and Psychological Egoism The first version of egoism to be noticed is the version commonly known as psychological egoism. This view is characterized by the belief that everyone as a matter of fact behaves in a self-interested fashion, and that to do otherwise is either a psychological impossibility or a dangerous aberration. Philosophers have raised a number of now-familiar objections to psychological egoism: that it lacks factual support, that it relies on a mistaken reductionism about human nature, and that it implicitly confuses a trivial thesis about the origins of voluntary action and a substantive thesis about the specific goal of human action.5 Although these well-known critiques are quite convincing, it is worthwhile to see what else can be learned about psychological egoism by looking at it through the lens of a consideration of hypocrisy. Suppose someone, in spite of the well-known objections, believes that psychological egoism is true. Such a person may or may not make this belief public. Indeed, if the theory is true, then the person will express the belief only if it appears to be in his/her best interest to do so. At first glance, it seems unlikely that it would be in a person’s interest to express a belief in psychological egoism, assuming most other people do not accept this theory.6 This is because the psychological egoist’s audience is likely to interpret the endorsement of psychological egoism as an autobiographical remark, indicating that the person making the remark will act solely on the basis of self-interest. Since the members of this audience believe that other people are willing to sacrifice their self-interest for the benefit of others, in appropriate circumstances, the members of the audience may choose to trust and co-operate with people other than the psychological egoist, and to be vigilant and on the alert when dealing with him/her. Assuming that it is not in a person’s interest to be denied opportunities to work in trust and cooperation with others, this would mean that it would not generally be in one’s interest to acknowledge a belief in psychological egoism. Hence the advocacy of psychological egoism seems either to be based on a severe miscalculation, or to be self-refuting.

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But this is too quick. There are several ways one could argue that professing belief in psychological egoism might turn out to accord with self-interest after all. First, perhaps others will not after all react in the suspicious manner suggested, and thus there will be no loss of the benefits of cooperation. It may be, for example, that others will be impressed by the honesty of the avowal of an unpopular belief, and draw the conclusion that the psychological egoist is honest and trustworthy. “If s/he is honest about this unpleasant topic,” they may reason, “s/he will certainly be honest about everyday matters.” This may be bolstered by the possibility that enlightened self-interest is best served by cooperating with others in a reliable manner. This possibility has been put forward by many contractarians as the sole basis of what we think of as “morality.”7 If people take the psychological egoist to subscribe to such a view, then they might be reassured about the individual’s adherence to moral obligations, even when they do not appear to accord with self-interest. Thus it could be argued that the risks of losing the benefits of trust and cooperation by expressing belief in psychological egoism are much smaller than they first appeared. Perhaps more interestingly, the psychological egoist may be able to argue that it is after all likely to be conducive to self-interest to advocate the theory — if one uses a sufficiently broad conception of self-interest. For example, the person who professes belief in psychological egoism might enjoy the notoriety that goes with defending an unpopular position (i.e., being known on the circuit as “that one who defends psychological egoism”). Such a person might also credit him/herself with an exceptional degree of intellectual insight and of the courage needed to accept whatever that intellectual insight leads to. In that way, the psychological egoist might have a flattering self-image as a Socratic figure who strips away the complex layers of human self-deception about goals and motives for action, removing the web of illusions called morality. Furthermore, the person may have an interest in contributing to philosophical or psychological debates, and may see the defence of psychological egoism as a way of making such a contribution. It may be thought that, if interests of the sort sketched in the previous paragraph are considered to be part of self-interest, the concept is becoming unacceptably broad. This would seem particularly so, for example, if the egoist values contributing to philosophical debates partly because that seems like a way to further others’ understanding of human nature by revealing our true, if conventionally misconceived, human nature and springs of action. This goal of furthering others’ understanding seems more in keeping with altruism and traditional morality than with self-interest. If we are to count, in effect, an interest in doing the right moral thing as part of self-interest, then it is not

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clear that psychological egoism has any real content.8 But this merely echoes one of the standard philosophical critiques of psychological egoism, as noted above. Indeed, it is a familiar observation that psychological egoists need to utilize a very broad account of self-interest, if they are to maintain that people who take themselves to be acting selflessly (e.g., by throwing themselves on grenades to save fellow soldiers) are in fact acting out of self-interest. Psychological egoists are undoubtedly not entitled to as broad an account of self-interest as they require. Indeed, this can serve as a reminder that, in dealing with egoism in general, it is important to pay attention to the account of self-interest being used by the theory, since the plausibility of the theory may hinge on this to a great degree. It is instructive in this context to notice how flimsy the border is between motivations that are self-interested and those that are not. One may not be able to judge even in one’s own case whether or not self-interest is the primary motivating factor.9

C. Hypocrisy and the Complex Role of Self-Interest Questions about the best conception of self-interest arise in connection with hypocrisy as well. Hypocrites need not be cynical, isolated, scheming villains — they may be members of the community who have been socialized into its ways. As a result, the role that self-interest plays in hypocrisy becomes very complex and subtle. This is true particularly because it can be in one’s interest to suffer hardship on behalf of others, especially if those others are loved ones or constitute part of one’s support system. An example might serve to bring out the complexities here. Suppose there is an accountant who has been recently recruited to work in a small town. Suppose further that he is married, and his wife feels desperately isolated and needs social connections in the community. In order to help her achieve some human contact, a sense of community and social standing, he decides to join a church, even though he does not believe in God. His religious professions and participation in religious rituals amount to a deliberate and self-conscious exploitation of the outward signs of religiosity to achieve his goal. Is this sufficient to establish his behaviour as hypocritical? If hypocrisy necessarily involves the deliberate pursuit of narrow self-interest, then it would appear this person is not acting hypocritically, since he is motivated by concern for someone else’s interests, namely his wife’s. But this merely complicates the picture by forcing us to address the conception of self-interest at work. Suppose first that, because his wife is lonely and bored, it constitutes a significant drain on him to keep her entertained. Perhaps she incessantly calls

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his office during business hours, and requires constant efforts to cheer her up during his spare time. Perhaps he thinks that helping her to acquire a wider social life will relieve him of the burden of entertaining her. He may calculate that the long-term benefits of thus being relieved of his burdens outweigh the short-term inconvenience of having to attend Sunday services and make a show of piety. In this way, joining the church might be seen to be motivated by a prudent, long-term view of his self-interest. Perhaps he is no more concerned for his wife than the cynical bank executive who gives a cheque to a needy native cultural college to improve the bank’s public image or to get a tax reduction. The accountant’s behaviours and motives here have some moral merit to the extent that he takes his wife’s interests into account, and tries to help her out of her isolated and miserable state. To the extent that the accountant puts his own interests first while rationalizing this to his wife and others as “this is best for her,” we have reason to think him to be a hypocrite. As suggested above, it is virtually impossible in real life cases for anyone, even the person acting, to determine the extent to which one’s actions are motivated by self-interest.10 Yet hypocrisy seems to require the use of pretence to further one’s own interests. Perhaps cases like that of the accountant indicate that the conception of “one’s own interests” at work can be a very broad one when it comes to making judgments about moral categories such as hypocrisy. To the extent that it is in the accountant’s interest for his wife to flourish, it becomes possible for him to be called a hypocrite for deceiving others so as to further this goal. It is important to notice here that the kind of deception involved in the hypocrisy shifts in the variations on this example. In the first instance, what the accountant really deserves in terms of the prevailing norms of the community is reproach as a heathen. He is trying to get an unmerited “glory” through being seen as a pious churchgoer. As such, his hypocrisy depends on the deception of the members of the community. In the case where he wants to relieve himself of the burden that his wife’s loneliness imposes on him, however, he adds a layer of deception, this time with his wife as the victim. Here what he is hypocritically pretending to is not only piety, but also concern for her, and the unmerited “glory” he seeks is not just that of loyal churchgoer, but also that of loving husband. Notice that his wife may be aware that he is not really pious, and she may not be among those he hopes will be taken in by that hypocritical pretence. Nevertheless, he may be hypocritical toward her in a different way, though at the same time and through the same actions, if he knowingly sets out to appear better than he is in terms of what she values — here, his love, concern, and devotion to her.

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Of course, the accountant may be quite straightforward with his wife about the situation. He may tell her that her demands for attention, though understandable, are placing a burden on him, and that he will go to church not only because she wants him to, but also because he hopes it will get him some relief from her dependence upon him. In this case, there is no deception of her, and thus apparently no hypocrisy so far as she is concerned (though of course the hypocrisy stemming from the deception of the rest of the congregation is still intact). This suggests that it is not the presence of self-interest alone that is crucial for hypocrisy, but rather the use of deception to gain an unmerited self-interested reward. To expand the example, suppose now that our accountant arranges a visit to the pastor, in which he describes his situation, acknowledges his own agnosticism, and asks if he and his wife would be welcome to attend and participate. This complicates things somewhat in that now the accountant does not conceal his inner nature, does not pretend to deceive the pastor, and thus becomes a less likely candidate for hypocrisy. On closer examination, however, it can be seen that the accountant here is indeed still trying to gain an advantage through deceptively appearing to conform to prevailing norms. It is simply that the pastor is no longer included in the group of people who are being deceived. If it were not the case that the members of the congregation were still being deceived, the accountant would have no reason to go through the motions of participation in church activities. It may be useful here to consider another example, which does not seem to involve hypocrisy. This is the case of a visiting head of state, who takes off a hat during the playing of the host country’s national anthem. Here the gesture is generally required of citizens as an indication of loyalty or allegiance to the home country. The visiting head of state presumably does not mean to express such loyalty, since if the interests of his/her own nation conflicted with those of the one being visited, there is no doubt that the leader would try to further the interests of his/her own nation. What prevents this from being an act of hypocrisy is the fact that there is a convention governing the person’s actions, which helps others to interpret them in a non-deceptive way. Taking off the hat is here understood as a gesture of respect of a sort that falls short of allegiance, and since everyone understands it in this way, the gesture appears not to contain any deception and thus no hypocrisy. Thus it seems that what is crucial for hypocrisy is not that one be motivated by pure self-interest, but rather that one seek to earn an unmerited reputation for moral principle through deception of others. Now let us return to the relationship between hypocrisy and the various species of egoism. As we have seen, the psychological egoist is characterized

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by an empirical view about human nature. If this empirical claim were true, then the psychological egoist would have good reason to suggest that most people are hypocritical, insofar as they deny a crucial fact about themselves. In proclaiming their altruism while really (inevitably) acting in a self-interested manner, people might be seen as projecting an image of themselves as better than they really are. This could be considered a form of hypocrisy, in much the same way as the Victorians’ denial of their physicality — that is, of their natures as beings who sweated and had sexual urges.11 In both cases, the hypocrisy lies in the pretence to transcendence of human limitations. In proclaiming belief in psychological egoism, the egoist might simply be trying to avoid the hypocrisy into which the rest of us fall so naturally. If psychological egoism were true, then those of us who pretend to the “higher” state of altruism would all be hypocrites of a sort. But psychological egoism, understood as the view that all human actions stem from self-interest, must ultimately be rejected, for reasons mentioned above. Does that mean that we have all escaped the charge of hypocrisy, on this count? Not yet. Psychological egoism may still contain a grain of truth that bears on this question. Even though we deny that all human action is essentially self-interested, we can acknowledge that self-interest is a more extensive source of human action than is conventionally thought, and indeed in some cases people may be self-deceived when they think they are acting altruistically. Accordingly, people who smugly assert, or simply believe, that they are acting in an altruistic manner might in fact be attributing to themselves better and nobler motives than they actually have. In thus pretending to be better than they are, they may after all be leaving themselves open to charges of hypocrisy.

D. Individual and Universal Ethical Egoism Our discussion of psychological egoism and hypocrisy has shed some light on the nature of self-interest and its relationship to each. There is no need for hypocrisy to be particularly linked to the psychological version of egoism, however. In fact, a hypocrite, unlike the psychological egoist, could quite consistently believe that most people are motivated by altruism, at least much of the time. There are two other forms of egoism to be considered, however. One of these, identified in the history of moral philosophy as “individual ethical egoism,” holds that everyone should act so as to promote my interests exclusively. The other, known as “universal ethical egoism,” holds that every person should maximize his or her interest and, in case of conflict, s/he should disregard the interest of others. This contrasts with psychological egoism in that such a universal ethical egoist acknowledges that it is possible to act

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altruistically, but insists that it is morally appropriate to act in a self-interested manner. What are the relationships between these two kinds of egoism and hypocrisy? Since individual ethical egoism requires immense self-sacrifice by others on behalf of the privileged egoist, it naturally gives rise to the question of why this person’s interests should take priority over anyone else’s. “Why you rather than me?” (or “What’s so special about you?”) is a question unlikely to find a rationally compelling answer. Indeed, although the fact that it is an action-guiding principle has allowed it to claim the title “ethical,” the complete absence of universalizability makes it questionable whether individual ethical egoism is really an ethical theory at all. What is more, it seems virtually impossible for someone who genuinely accepted this view to admit as much publicly. Others would be unlikely to be convinced that they should be devoted solely to the well-being of the egoist, and they would merely consider the egoist self-deluded, megalomaniacal, or perhaps simply untrustworthy. It is not clear how much of a problem it is for an ethical theory that an adherent to it dare not proclaim that adherence publicly,12 but in any case it is difficult for anyone to provide compelling arguments for individual ethical egoism. But the individual ethical egoist may not be concerned with convincing others that his/her position is the right one — just in trying to arrange things so that others do in fact contribute as much as possible to his/her own interests. It might seem that cynical hypocrites are best understood as individual ethical egoists. In trying to get others to treat them as if they lived up to a high standard without actually doing the work to earn such a reputation, these hypocrites are in a sense using others to serve their own interests. Such people act in a self-interested manner, and pretend to have other motivations precisely because admitting their true motivations would not be most conducive to their interests. Yet universal ethical egoists would do the same, insofar as they think that what they should do is promote their own best interests, just as everyone else should. How are we to tell whether the hypocrite is an individual or universal ethical egoist? It seems the key difference between the two views lies, not in the person’s behaviour, but rather in the person’s belief about how others should act. The individual ethical egoist believes others should pursue his/her interest, while the universal ethical egoist believes they should pursue their own. Does cynical hypocrisy commit one to one or the other of these views? Universal egoism seems to have a foot in the moral camp, as it were, since in acknowledging the primacy that self-interest has for each rational agent, it advocates a sort of universalization. Everyone should promote his/her own interest, according to this view. But this gives rise to a built-in tension: since

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egoists think what people should do is promote their own interests, egoists should try to get them to accept ethical egoism. On the other hand, if others reject ethical egoism, this is likely to be in the best interests of the egoist, since others will thereby sometimes put the egoist’s interests ahead of their own. Accordingly, since the egoist should do whatever is in his/her own best interests according to the theory, the egoist should try to get others to reject egoism. Thus it seems the egoist should both get others to accept the theory and get them to reject it! Before concluding that this is an insuperable difficulty for the theory, it should be noted that other ethical theories may face a similar difficulty. Deontologists, for example, may face a comparable dilemma. If I am a deontologist, then I presumably think that everyone should do his/her duty. This of course means that I too should do my duty. But what if I find myself in a situation in which the best way to get others to do their duty would be to violate my own duty? If my goal is to maximize duty-doing (as it were), then I should fail to do my own duty. On the other hand, one might introduce the notion of integrity, and claim that I am responsible only for what I do. Accordingly, I should always do my duty, and if others fail to do theirs (and in this sense the world is a worse place as a result) that is a problem for which I bear no responsibility. A universal ethical egoist can make use of the same reasoning. In a sense there are two theories here. One says one should maximize ethical behaviour; the other says one should engage in ethical behaviour to the greatest degree possible. An egoist of the first sort should try to get others to accept egoism, while an egoist of the second sort might not. There is one potentially important difference between this case and that of the deontologist. This is that even the deontologist who thinks it best to focus on one’s own ethical behaviour will want others to do their duty, and will be willing to do anything to bring this about short of violating his/her own duty. The egoist who focuses on his/her own ethical behaviour, however, might try to discourage others from doing what universal egoism says they should do, whenever doing so is in the egoist’s own interests. Thus the inconsistency between the two versions of egoism is more pronounced than that between the two versions of deontology. Nevertheless, it is not obvious that an egoist who is committed to one or the other of these views is being inconsistent.

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E. Is Hypocrisy Consistent with Universal Ethical Egoism? In this light, hypocrisy seems to be consistent with universal ethical egoism, of the sort that says one should focus on applying the theory in one’s own case, rather than being concerned that others follow the theory. That is to say, a hypocrite could consistently believe that what it is right for others to do is act in their own interests, even though the hypocrite’s behaviour is not aimed at getting them to do so, but rather at using them and any other means available to further the hypocrite’s own interests. Since the key difference between universal and individual ethical egoists has been seen to lie in their beliefs about how others should act, we can now see that hypocrites could be universal ethical egoists. Suppose that a hypocrite (person A) discovers that someone else (person B) is a hypocrite, too. Will person A judge person B harshly, on the ground that B should have been promoting A’s interests and failed to do so? It seems unlikely. It is more likely that A will think B is acting within the limits of morality as A understands it, even though regrettably B’s actions do not further A’s interests. That is the judgment we would expect of a universal ethical egoist, however, not of an individual ethical egoist. Accordingly, it seems that while hypocrisy is consistent with either form of ethical egoism, in practice the hypocrite is more likely to be a universal ethical egoist than an individual ethical egoist. It is worthwhile to consider further, however, the circumstances under which a universal ethical egoist will act hypocritically. The short answer, of course, is that universal ethical egoists will act hypocritically whenever they think doing so is in their own best interests. Generally speaking, hypocrites try to get a reputation for living up to moral principles they do not in fact live up to. This will be in one’s interest whenever a reputation for living up to moral principles is valuable, and can be obtained more easily through this hypocritical pretence than by actual conformity. It will generally be in one’s interest to have a reputation for adhering to specific values whenever one wants to have the advantages of being a member in good standing of a community that generally accepts those values. Thus hypocrisy seems parasitic upon the presence of a community of people who hold shared values and generally adhere to them. In this way, hypocrisy is unlike egoism — an egoist should promote his/her own best interest regardless of the ethical views and behaviour of others. But all this means is that hypocrisy will be an appropriate strategy for an egoist only under certain conditions. Since those conditions commonly apply in the real world, however, it remains true that hypocrisy will be a common

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strategy for egoists. Of course, this is true only when one judges it easier to get the desired reputation through pretence than through actual conformity to the prevailing norms. Given the costs of avoiding detection, this may be less likely than it first appears.13 Again, however, this seems to be merely a question about how effective hypocrisy will be as a strategy for the egoist. It remains true that an egoist will act hypocritically when the conditions are right, although it may be that several would-be egoists are mistaken about whether hypocrisy really is conducive to their own best interests.14 Having benefited from a sustained look at hypocrisy from the perspective of moral theories, perhaps it is time to move on to a more explicit examination of the practical contexts in which hypocrisy functions, and where hypocrisy’s grip on our interests is likely to be most lively or at least most acutely felt.

Notes 1. Joseph Butler, Preface, Sermons, in British Moralists, edited by L.A. SelbyBigge (La Salle, IL: The Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill, 1964) 194. 2. David Gauthier, “Morality and Advantage,” The Philosophical Review (1967) 469. 3. We discuss such cases of hypocrisy in more detail in Chapter 13 of this book. 4. See the discussion of this distinction in Chapter 13, Section B of this book. 5. For classic objections to, or refutations of, psychological egoism, see Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons, Preached At The Rolls Chapel (London, 1726). The relevant sections are reprinted in Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, as well as in William K. Frankena and John T. Granrose, eds. Introductory Readings in Ethics (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1974) 49-58. See also C.D. Broad’s “Egoism as a Theory of Human Motives,” in his Ethics and the History of Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952), and Kai Nielsen’s contemporary classic “Why Be Moral?” in Frankena and Granrose, op. cit. 6. If most other people do accept the theory, there might be an interest in conforming that would be served by expressing a similar belief. Note that this would work only if one knew that others accepted the theory. In order to reach that stage, somebody would have had to have expressed a belief in the theory without the knowledge that others also accepted it — which is similar in all important respects to the case discussed in the text. 7. This tradition goes back at least as far as Hobbes, and modern variants can be found in the writings of David Gauthier and Jan Narveson, among others. 8. It is worth noting that, on this account, no less a thinker than Plato appears to be an egoist, since it is a central tenet of his philosophy that acting morally is in one’s interests. 9. As we saw in Chapter 6, this fact is crucial to understanding Kant’s condemnation of hypocrisy. For more on this uncertainty about motivation, see the following: C.D. Broad, “Egoism as a Theory of Human Motives”; Béla Szabados, “Hypocrisy,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 9, 201-06; Daniel Statman,

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“Hypocrisy and Self-Deception,” Philosophical Psychology, 10 (1997) 62-68; and G.C. Rosenwald, “Hypocrisy, Self-Deception and Perplexity,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 49, 682-703. 10. This point becomes even more striking in light of the moral education of children. The primary goal involves inculcating a general disposition to consider other people’s interests on the same footing as one’s own, yet the socialization process relies heavily upon punishments and rewards, including the withholding or bestowing of parental approval. 11. We discuss the Victorians and their hypocrisy in more detail in Chapter 13, Section C of this book. 12. Arguments that this need not be devastating for a theory can be found in the literature on utilitarianism. For a classical source, see Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics. For a thorough contemporary treatment of this issue, see Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons. 13. Several philosophers have argued that deceit and hypocrisy are much less likely than commonly thought to be effective egoistic policies. Early on Philippa Foot observed: “Philosophers often speak as if a man could be a very cunning liar and actor, combining complete injustice with the appearance of justice: he is prepared to treat others ruthlessly, but pretends that there is nothing further from his mind . . . But the supposition is doubtful, and in any case the price in vigilance would be colossal.” See her “Moral Beliefs,” reprinted in Ethics, eds. Judith J. Thomson and Gerald Dworkin (New York: Harper and Row, 1968) 259. See also the insightful discussion by Daniel Statman, “Hypocrisy and Self-Deception.” 14. It should be noted that, in claiming that egoists will be hypocrites under the right circumstances, we are not committed to the view that all hypocrites are egoists. Indeed, as we discuss below there may be several ways in which hypocrites are not self-conscious or thoroughgoing in the way egoists are here depicted. For example, hypocrites who are self-deceived, or who are hypocrites only in specific, localized areas of their lives, will not be “cynical” in the way discussed here.

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part iii

Privacy, Tolerance, and Social Justice

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8 Politics and Hypocrisy “No one ever doubted that truth and politics are on rather bad terms with each other, and no one, as far as I know, ever counted truthfulness among the political virtues.” 1 hannah arendt “Moral philosophy, as a whole, can be just as well applied to a common and private existence as to one of richer stuff.” 2 michel de montaigne

A. Introduction What is the relationship between politics and hypocrisy? The claim that politicians’ deeds do not always match their words is hardly startling or new. But does this necessarily mean that they are guilty of hypocrisy? It is certainly common enough for accusations of hypocrisy to arise in the realm of politics, but some philosophical work suggests it is inappropriate to apply this kind of moral criticism to the realm of politics. This could be so because conventional moral concepts such as hypocrisy do not apply to the political sphere, being appropriate only in the realm of private morality. Alternatively, it could be that hypocrisy is a genuine moral shortcoming within politics, but accusations of hypocrisy are still inappropriate. Perhaps such accusations are inherently empty, arising only when a lack of shared morality renders one’s target inaccessible by any other means of criticism. Or, worse still, the accusation itself may have such bad consequences that it would always be morally better not to make the accusation. On the other hand, it might be maintained that accusations of hypocrisy in the political realm appeal to important fundamental values, thereby reinforcing them, and help both to induce individuals to conform to the rules governing the political system, and to point the way toward improvements of that system. In this chapter, we explore some of these puzzling questions about the relationship between politics and hypocrisy.

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B. Hypocrisy as Mistaken Political Criticism Hypocrisy is, as a matter of fact, part of the language of moral criticism that is widely employed by citizens assessing the performance of their elected government as well as by politicians of different stripes criticizing each others’ rhetoric and behaviour. All we need to do is look, see, and listen to confirm this. For example, if a politician makes a promise as a central part of an election campaign, then does not act on it, and when challenged pretends not to have made the promise in the first place, such a politician is a likely candidate for accusations of hypocrisy. Similarly, if a politician who denounces corruption and patronage on the part of the ruling party is elected, and then appears to engage in these same practices, that politician is also a likely candidate for accusations of hypocrisy. Furthermore, if a particular individual or group is getting a great deal of sympathetic press, and the public is rallying in support, politicians who add their voices of sympathy may be accused of doing so simply because it is “politically correct” to do so. Acting on the basis of political expediency rather than (or out of proportion to) genuine conviction in such cases may be seen as hypocritical. It would seem that there is no problem in applying the notion of hypocrisy to politics. Yet some philosophical work suggests that there should be a problem. Why is this? One type of argument deals with the relationship between politics and morality in general, suggesting that ordinary moral concepts simply do not apply to the realm of politics. There are several arguments that might be thought to support this view, but we do not find any of these arguments convincing. Although we cannot hope to settle the entire question of the relationship between morality and politics here, it may be useful to comment on a few specific arguments to indicate the general line we would want to take on this issue. First of all, it has been observed that there is no formal code of ethics for politics as there is for the professions, such as law, medicine, or accounting.3 This might be taken as an acknowledgement that ethical concerns do not apply here as they do in those other areas. This conclusion is unwarranted, however. First of all, there is a sense in which political positions often do carry with them formal ethical obligations, enshrined in the oaths officials swear, agreeing to fulfill certain broadly defined duties. But in any case, ethical considerations can apply even in the absence of a formal code, and in fact a formal code may be introduced in the future, even if one has not traditionally been present. Another argument that has sometimes been put forward for the inapplicability of morality to politics has to do with the notion of “dirty hands,”4

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according to which politicians sometimes “for the sake of public purposes violate moral principles.”5 Although this seems to suggest that moral principles are irrelevant when political matters are at stake, many mainstream ethical theories may be able to explain easily these occasional moral departures. Most obviously, utilitarians can claim that rules that generally promote overall wellbeing should be ignored when the circumstances are such that they will not in fact maximize happiness. Virtue/situational ethics also should have no problem accommodating cases where the particular situation calls for behaviour of a sort that would normally be inappropriate. So the fact that politicians might sometimes have to get their hands dirty may simply reflect how morality applies to their situation, rather than suggesting that it does not apply at all. A more serious argument to the effect that moral concepts do not properly apply to politics can be found in the Hobbesian tradition. According to this perspective, individuals are seen as fundamentally self-interested, but able to use reason to calculate long-term interests. Because people promoting their own interests are likely to interfere with the interests of others, each has an interest in limiting the ability of others to promote their interests. The account goes on to suggest that the only effective way in which people can convince others to limit the pursuit of their interests is to agree to limitations on their own pursuits as well. “Morality” is then understood as the result of this compromise, and is thus seen as the outcome of a “social contract” between individuals. Furthermore, this social contract creates the “sovereign,” or government, which is then responsible for ensuring that individuals comply with their obligations. Since the sovereign is seen as the sole arbiter of what is good or moral within the state, and (according to Hobbes) cannot be a party to the contract that creates morality, this view entails that it is conceptually impossible for conventional morality to apply in the political realm.6 Even if a contract were possible, those with power (including political power) would have to make fewer concessions to procure the cooperation of others, and so would not agree to the same moral restrictions on their behaviour that would apply to the general populace. It is not possible within the present context to provide a thorough criticism of the Hobbesian approach.7 Suffice it to say that we do not accept the account of human nature provided by this account, and do not believe that the resulting contract would be as stable as it needs to be if this really were a good account of human nature. There is also a question of why citizens put up with the unrestricted selfishness of their leaders on this account. The Hobbesian answer is that there is no alternative other than the chaos of a “war of all against all.” In other words, people reason that the harm done by politicians is (barely) outweighed by the benefits to society of some semblance of order.8

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Alternatively, as suggested above, people may simply be powerless to stop the marauding “leaders.” More plausibly, however, they simply have a sense of powerlessness, for which the remedy is the raising of consciousness, and the eventual overthrow of the state.9 If, as we believe, citizens do not need to accept self-aggrandizement on the part of their political leaders, then this argument for the claim that morality does not apply to politics will prove unsuccessful. Even if political life in general does not occupy a sphere beyond conventional morality, there is some reason to think that the vice of hypocrisy, in particular, may not apply to the realm of politics. One argument to this effect has its basis in a kind of cynicism. It might be thought that being a politician involves playing a role with its distinctive conventions, no less than being an actor. Since everyone who is reasonable knows the name of the game, it could be argued that the so-called “hypocrisy” is misnamed, since there is no genuine deception involved. On this view, the politician represents the interests of his or her constituents and his or her party, much like the actor Olivier playing the part of Lear, represents Lear. Imagine the ludicrous complaint from a member of the audience at a performance of Lear that Olivier is a hypocrite because he is not himself but pretending to be another! The situation is like that of television advertisements. Someone, often a famous person, endorses a product, but questions of sincerity are not broached. Everyone is acting and the viewers are aware of the conventions: the actor is being paid to help sell a product. He or she tries to get people to believe things about the product regardless of what he or she really thinks. So it is with political discourse and argument: its aim is to persuade one’s fellow citizens.10 Another way to understand this view is in terms of the ancient Greek distinction between dialectical and rhetorical argument — between speeches aimed at uncovering truth, and those aimed primarily at persuasion.11 Perhaps political discourse is a pliable and flexible instrument falling in the sphere of rhetorical arguments rather than in the sphere of dialectical arguments. Modifying the distinction found in Plato and Aristotle, we might say that citizens of liberal democracies have different expectations from political/ rhetorical arguments than from arguments aiming at factual truths. Matters of truth are a mere backdrop to the play of politics where the citizens constitute the audience and their votes or approval constitute the applause. What in the moral life is hypocrisy is strategy in the life of politics. What in the moral life is a search for truth and self-knowledge is in the political life mere self-indulgence and abdication of one’s responsibilities as a politician. The electioneering politicians can be seen as open or hidden persuaders, much like Gorgias and other sophists in Plato’s dialogues.

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The major problem with this view is that the methods used to persuade and thereby acquire power would not be effective unless the majority of people believed that politics had more substance than this. We can understand why people might go to the theatre, even when they realize that the views and feelings expressed by the actors may not be ones those actors actually have at the time. It may be more difficult to understand why advertisements are effective, when everyone knows that the people involved stand to gain financially by saying what they do, but perhaps there is the belief that people have too much integrity to say something merely for financial gain. After all, pointing out that the well is poisoned is considered a fallacy, and is not itself a reason to reject what the person says. But why would people continue to give real and considerable power over their lives to politicians if there were no lingering belief that at least some of them will use that power for good, in the interests of the community? And why would people be persuaded by anything a politician said, if they believed that it was all just a way of getting elected? Does any voter really think “Well, these politicians don’t mean a word they say, but I liked this one’s prose — the creativity of the lies and the way the sentences hung together”? In any event, perhaps the dichotomy between persuasion by dialectical argument and persuasion by political rhetoric is not as extreme as it is presented to be. In the former case the arguer offers reasons for accepting the belief in question. Then the accepted belief can be supported with reference to the reasons given. In the latter case, the politician persuades by subjecting citizens to psychological and emotional considerations which result in the acceptance of ungrounded beliefs. But this way of putting the matter does not shed light on political practice. Surely rhetorical persuasion and political discourse aim to persuade by giving reasons although such reasons often turn out to be rationalizations. And finding out that such reasons are rationalizations is the consequence of critical and moral reflection, that involves unearthing factual truths, criticism of argument and the discernment of special interests and stakes involved. In any event, this sort of argument does not establish that morality cannot or should not be applied to politics. It is also interesting to note in this connection a certain sort of hypocrisy that may be peculiar to the realm of politics. In the democracies of ancient Greece, where decisions on most matters were made by obtaining the support of a majority of the entire political community,12 some members of the general public became concerned that they might be swayed by skill at argument, even when the speaker lacked substance to support his position. Accordingly, people who were particularly skilful at arguing persuasively were eyed with a certain amount of suspicion. It came to be fashionable, therefore, for speakers

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to deny that they had any skill at public speaking, and indeed speakers would try to outdo each other in terms of who was the worst speaker. (It should be noted that some of this tradition is still with us, as politicians claim to be simple ordinary folk, unaccustomed to public speaking.) They might say something such as “my opponent is a very skilled speaker, and unfortunately I lack his skill, but I have right on my side, and so here’s my view.” This is an interesting ground for hypocrisy. The speaker is in a sense pretending to be worse than he is, which is contrary to the usual structure of hypocrisy.13 Nevertheless, by aiming to get a reputation as being better than one is in another sense (more honest, perhaps, or more committed to genuine competition of ideas rather than techniques), this does indeed seem to be a species of hypocrisy that is distinctive in the realm of politics. Another argument to the effect that hypocrisy, in particular, has no place within politics bears consideration. This stems from the writings of Machiavelli. On this perspective, there are indeed moral standards that apply to political life, but they are a distinct set of standards from those that apply in our private life. Political morality, he suggests, involves a consequentialist morality, and there should be no squeamishness about violating the sort of principles (e.g., about friendship, or justice) that are appropriate in personal relations, whenever doing so will bring about the desired results. The acquisition and continued maintenance of power, prosperity and order are chief political aims, argues Machiavelli.14 The rules of political morality are simply technical rules for achieving such aims. To see how this might connect with hypocrisy in particular, consider the following definition of hypocrisy: “The hypocrite is a self-referential deceiver whose pretence is not bounded by conventionalized role playing, who feigns conformity to some positively valued norms, ideals, expectations, thereby pretending to be better than he is, in domains of life where sincerity really matters, for example, piety, virtue, love and friendship.”15 It might be said, however, that such values as piety, virtue, love and friendship are beside the point when it comes to politics. And so, then, is sincerity about such values. On this view, hypocrisy as a charge in political life is always inappropriate. It is a naïve category mistake to use “hypocrisy” as political criticism. To use “hypocrisy” in this way is to misunderstand the concept of hypocrisy or the idea of politics or to have a confused idea of both. Although the arguments to this point have not been entirely conclusive, we will assume here that it is not inherently inappropriate to apply moral evaluations to the political realm. What is more, we will assume that hypocrisy is one of the moral concepts that can be relevantly applied within this sphere.

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That still leaves considerable room, however, in which to question when it is appropriate to accuse politicians of hypocrisy.

C. Pluralism and Accusations of Hypocrisy On one view, then, hypocrisy is a more or less subtle form of sabotage, wherein our important shared moral resources are eroded and undercut. The hypocrite subverts our system of morality by deliberately misrepresenting the evidence upon which we base our judgments.16 On this view, political hypocrisy constitutes a serious moral wrong because it undercuts the very possibility or basis of politics. For our liberal democracies have no other resource for legitimization than their moral promise and its history. The politician who betrays this promise calls into question the very enterprise of politics. This view seems to presuppose that there is considerable agreement about values within society, and that hypocrisy threatens this common moral fabric. If this is correct, then the moral condemnation of political hypocrisy may serve an important role in protecting the shared moral values societies depend upon. It could be argued that both hypocrites and their accusers implicitly reaffirm shared values.17 Hypocrites do so by making efforts to conceal their misdeeds, and there is some evidence of this in the conduct of soldiers and politicians during wartime.18 When critics expose the inconsistency between their words and deeds, they explicitly affirm our shared moral resources and ideals. It is possible to see the whole interplay between hypocrites and their accusers as a sign of shared moral knowledge. On this view, the exposure of hypocrisy shows that both the critic and his/her target share at least some “commitments that go deeper than partisan allegiance and the urgencies of battle.”19 It would therefore clearly be appropriate to point out violations of these deep commitments, and to meet the offering of lame excuses with accusations of hypocrisy. There are reasons to think, however, that accusations of hypocrisy are not so beneficial after all. It can be argued that such accusations are less likely to express moral harmony than to express and even contribute to disharmony. Indeed, it can be argued that such accusations are not just ineffective, but positively dangerous, tending to set up a nasty spiral of hatred, cruelty, and suffering.20 Although “hypocrisy” is clearly a de facto part of the language of critical political discourse, one could argue that the charge of political hypocrisy has lost its moral force as criticism. Politicians would then be seen as being caught in a mudslinging contest in which the discrediting of one’s opponent is a standard tool in service of the only goal, namely, success in the election. Accusing the other of hypocrisy then becomes simply one way of

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accomplishing this goal. In this process “Each side looks for the psychological soft spot of the other and aims at that. . . . [E]ach one tries to dismiss and devalue the other by calling him or her a hypocrite.”21 Such accusations of hypocrisy imply no shared moral knowledge whatsoever but merely highlight “mutual inaccessibility.”22 If this view is right, then attributions of political hypocrisy, far from revealing shared moral knowledge, actually show up a gaping absence of shared moral commitments and reveal basic differences. This view is grounded in the assumption that the normal situation in liberal democracies is pluralism and political groups in conflict do not even see the same moral scene. “They lack in moments of confrontation shared moral knowledge of any kind whatever.”23 Rather than bringing the divergent political factions together in a common moral space, accusations of hypocrisy are seen as alienating them even further. The use of the word “hypocrisy” can no longer function as criticism with a genuine moral force but becomes a term of mere personal and political abuse. In this portrayal of hypocrisy’s role in political discourse and life, several major features of the situation are left out. For example, when attributions of hypocrisy are seen as weapons used against opposing political ideologues, the account seems to strangely forget the role of ordinary citizens who do not necessarily take a partisan view of disagreements and issues. In real political life, politicians do not simply need to explain and justify their sincerity and actions to each other or their own “tribal” group, but to citizens at large who are not partisan and who do recall “the moral promise,” based on shared moral values of electioneering.24 Indeed, unless there is a tacit all-around assumption of adherence to campaign promises, our system of representative government comes apart at its very seams. Politicians need to take into account the limits of what sorts of hypocrisy citizens will tolerate, and to what extent, or they risk losing all the benefits they derive from the political system. Accusations of hypocrisy in particular, as opposed to other kinds of moral critique in the realm of politics, have another interesting feature which is easy to miss:25 accusations of hypocrisy amount to accusations of a kind of inconsistency. They might reveal moral character, but they may also have an impact on truth claims. If one is arguing for a particular conclusion, and can show that an opposing argument is internally inconsistent, one then has provided a kind of support for one’s conclusion. Similarly, pointing out an opponent’s hypocrisy can be seen as a way of providing evidence for one’s own position. Suppose one party has instituted and defended a tax, and an opposing party makes a commitment to eliminate it. If the opposing party comes to power, and not only fails to eliminate the tax, but denies having promised to do so in

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the first place, that party might well be accused of hypocrisy. This accusation can even be seen as a way of defending the claim that the tax was a good idea in the first place. The suggestion might be that the new governing party has a reason to eliminate the tax, having promised to do so. If it does not do so, that must be because there is an even stronger reason on the other side. The most plausible candidate is a recognition that the tax serves a useful purpose in society. That is to say, the party originally in power was right and the other party wrong. But notice that the accusation has a further implicit message. This is that the newly elected party may have known all along that the tax policy they ran on would be unworkable, but they put it forward anyway because they knew it would be popular. In this way, they are represented as not only mistaken, but dishonest and manipulative as well. Let us take one more look at the claim that accusations of hypocrisy arise when there is a complete absence of any more substantive moral values to appeal to. It might be thought that politicians accuse their opponents of hypocrisy, rather than stupidity, because it is thought to be more hurtful as criticism.26 Even if one grants that it is more offensive to be called a hypocrite than an imbecile (perhaps because it touches on that which is taken to be within one’s control), this is not the only available interpretation. Suppose that it is glaringly obvious to you what the best policy is on a particular political issue. If others publicly favour an opposite policy, one might find it hard to believe that they do not see the obvious flaws in their policy. Accordingly, one might suspect that they are merely claiming to prefer the other policy, because they think they stand to gain something (e.g., votes) by endorsing it. That is, they are hypocritically concealing their true views so as to obtain some personal advantage. Note, however, that this does not after all reveal a total lack of shared morality. On the contrary, the whole process begins with the assumption that the other cannot sincerely hold a view so much at odds with the accuser’s sense of morality.27 Here again it seems the accusation assumes a certain sort of shared morality. In support of the view that accusations of hypocrisy reflect a lack of common moral ground, Judith Shklar draws upon an observation about the period of World War II. She claims that there were few accusations of hypocrisy within the English-speaking world during this period in which people were unusually unified through their opposition to Hitler. Her interpretation of this purported fact is: “When the normal situation of pluralism is upset and some degree of moral unity prevails, the cry of hypocrisy is no longer heard, because no one is out to ‘psychologically annihilate’ or unmask the opposition.”28

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If there were indeed few accusations of hypocrisy among those on the same side, this can easily be explained without claiming that it is always general moral agreement that prevents such accusations. During the war, people might quite reasonably have believed that the primary goal was to unite to defeat the enemy and thereby secure their way of life. Under such circumstances, one might well decide to overlook the flaws of one’s allies, recognizing that there will be time to sort them out when the crisis has passed. Furthermore, when the majority of people believe some cause is imperative, they may be more likely to impose hardships on opponents in a time of crisis. Accordingly, opponents of that cause may seek to avoid courting public displeasure by being more timid than usual about expressing their disagreement. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that there would be fewer expressions of opposition at such times.29 So it has not been established that accusations of hypocrisy reveal a lack of moral common ground. Even if they are not empty and divisive in this way, such accusations may be more damaging than beneficial. For one thing, those who accuse others of hypocrisy are prone to a kind of moralizing perspective which can itself be damaging. Such moralistic accusers may tend to be oblivious to, or negligent about, the possibly different interests and moral views of others. They may lecture and preach to others as if those others were passive and ignorant. Such critical discourse marginalizes the others, drowns their voices, ignores their claims and interests. What is more, those who put forward such accusations may leave themselves out of the picture: their interests, their possible axe to grind. In presenting themselves as pure, objective truthseekers, who apparently have no interests of their own at stake, such accusers may in fact be perpetrating a kind of hypocrisy themselves. It must be noted, however, that these observations about the dangers moral critics are prone to are not confined to those who accuse others of hypocrisy in particular. It seems to be a feature of any moral criticism. Surely this tendency cannot be taken as a reason to abandon moral criticism altogether. Indeed, accusations of hypocrisy might be less prone to this tendency than other forms of moral criticism. After all, part of the point of a charge of hypocrisy is to claim that the other stands accused in terms of his or her own avowed principles. To make such a claim, one at least has to be aware of what the other’s principles are, which seems to militate against ignoring the other’s morality altogether. Certainly the critics of accusations of hypocrisy are right to warn that not all such accusations are genuinely aimed at truth, and that sometimes such accusations can themselves be grounded in self-interest and divisiveness. No doubt there are cases in which the motivation of the anti-hypocrite is hatred

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and cruelty — attempt to shame and humiliate disguised as regard for truth. In the end, however, it seems that these points cannot completely undermine the usefulness of accusations of hypocrisy in the political realm. Indeed, in speaking out against these sorts of accusations of hypocrisy one might be condemning a sort of hypocrisy, since the accusers pretend to a different motivation than they really have. Furthermore, the simple fact that such accusations are thought by the accusers to carry some weight indicates that there may after all be a shared moral basis of evaluation, which can be reinforced by attention to the accusation. In addition, some attributions of hypocrisy are warranted, truth regarding, and should shame and embarrass. For some political hypocrisies cause great harm all around and, on balance, their exposure is justified even when we allow for the hurt and humiliation of the hypocrite and his/her group. Finally, there is something comforting about this reassertion of moral criticism over political life, of the moral basis for politics. After all, theories themselves have political consequences and it would be harmful to advocate a theory that would seem to remove one of the most common forms of moral criticism we have to use in connection with politics. While not itself a sufficient reason to accept one theory rather than another, the fact that holding one view would have better consequences than another is a comforting companion to the arguments in favour of that view.

D. Two Concepts of Hypocrisy To some extent, the disagreement about the morality of accusations of hypocrisy may be traceable to a conceptual problem with the concept of hypocrisy. Sometimes hypocrisy is seen as a self-serving inconsistency, or a deliberate misrepresentation of oneself, so as to appear better than one is in terms of the prevailing norms. (This might be called the “narrow sense” of hypocrisy.)30 Politicians might be seen as engaging in this sort of hypocrisy when they say things they do not really believe, simply so as to gain election and the benefits which go with that: power, good salary, fame, etc., and perhaps further personal benefits to be gained through the abuse of power. At other times, however, any sort of failure to live up to one’s own principles is seen as hypocritical. (This might be referred to as hypocrisy in the “broad sense.”) Such gaps are not always, or even necessarily most often, caused by deliberate self-serving misrepresentations. They can also arise from changes in circumstances, weakness of will, or simple improvements in factual understanding (i.e., politicians may honestly believe they will be able to accomplish some goal, and then learn that it is in fact not possible). There may even be cases in which the gap is created by deliberate deception, but the deception

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is grounded in a concern for the public interest rather than self-interest. This is most obvious if one accepts a somewhat paternalistic view of politics as evidenced, perhaps, by Plato’s famous doctrine of the “Noble Lie.”31 Even if one rejects such paternalism, however, there may be cases in which the masses must be kept in the dark for their own good. For example, there may be no way to reveal the truth to the citizens of a nation without simultaneously revealing it to enemies of the nation who could use the information to their own advantage, for instance, to gain a military edge, or an economic one.32 Hypocrisy in the narrow sense seems to be a more serious failing than hypocrisy in the broad sense. Indeed, it may seem humanly impossible to avoid hypocrisy in the broad sense. Furthermore, it is possible that greater leaders are more prone to hypocrisy in this sense. Using Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt as examples, Judith Shklar states that they “raised the level of moral and political expectations. They failed to fulfill the standards they had themselves revived. Other presidents were not expected to achieve so much, but they had also made fewer claims for the political order with which they were identified. Hence the endless accusations of hypocrisy that pursue the most capable statesmen.”33 Here a president does as much as others have done or more, but fails to live up to raised expectations and is labelled a hypocrite as a result. Perhaps the mere presence of a gap between word and deed should not be taken to constitute hypocrisy at all in the realm of politics.34 In support of this view, Judith Shklar writes of the Victorians, “Did they not wish to be what they proclaimed everyone ought to be? To fail in one’s own aspirations is not hypocrisy. In fact, they really believed in chastity, monogamy, thrift, charity, and work. If many did not achieve these, many others did, at considerable psychic cost.”35 If narrow hypocrisy is the more serious wrong, then it might seem appropriate to accuse people of hypocrisy only when it is hypocrisy of the narrow sort. This is not necessarily valid, however. First of all, it is not an either/or situation — if both types of hypocrisy are seen as bad, then it is probably appropriate to point out both when one sees them. After all, the fact that murder is worse than theft does not mean that one should not point out theft when one encounters it. And although people may not be able to avoid broad hypocrisy altogether, they may have some degree of control over the extent of it in their lives, and accusations may serve to keep this sort of hypocrisy to a minimum.36 On the other hand, if people are accused of hypocrisy when they have transgressed only in the relatively minor manner of broad hypocrisy, this might dilute the effectiveness of our moral criticism in cases of hypocrisy in the narrow sense. In general, it does seem reasonable to discourage people from hurling accusations of hypocrisy when the hypocrisy was only of the

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broad sense. On the other hand, accusations of narrow hypocrisy seem always appropriate, provided they are not motivated solely by hatred of the opponent, a need to unmask, or a hope of personal gain. There are a couple of other important points that apply to accusations of hypocrisy in the political realm. First of all, it may not be obvious to the observer which type of hypocrisy has occurred in a particular case. If a person has promised to do something and then not done it, it may be difficult to know whether or not the person genuinely intended to do it at the time of making the promise. The individual’s response when the failure is pointed out may be revealing in this regard. For instance, did the minister resign immediately as she had said she would? Did the leader deny having made the promise in the first place? But inevitably there will be mistakes when people try to interpret the intentions of others. Perhaps all we can say is that accusations of hypocrisy are morally acceptable when the accuser honestly believes that there has been hypocrisy in the narrow sense, but otherwise such accusations should be resisted. This insistence on honesty fits with the earlier claim that morality does apply to politics. Dishonesty for the sake of political gain alone can be branded as morally bad, and it does not matter whether what one is dishonestly saying is that another is guilty of hypocrisy. Furthermore, in restricting the scope of the criticism to honest accusations of narrow hypocrisy, we might also be able to explain what is wrong with the condemnation of accusations motivated by hatred, simple unmasking, or the hope of personal gain. Careful distinctions between narrow and broad hypocrisy, hypocrisy itself and accusations of it, and honest as opposed to self-interested accusations, seem to provide room for condemnation of spiralling accusations,37 while also accommodating the observation that accusations of hypocrisy may actually protect shared communal values.38 To conclude, then, we maintain that properly backed accusations of hypocrisy have not lost their moral force in political discourse. The kind of moral criticism that political hypocrisy implies remains one of our central, powerful ways of calling politicians to give an account of themselves with regard to particular political actions at stake. It is a way of holding them responsible for commitments and words of promise they made to those who elected them. It is important to attend, however, to the type of hypocrisy being alleged, and to the question of whether the allegation is honest, or motivated by hatred or self-interest.

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Notes 1. See Hannah Arendt, “Truth and Politics,” in Philosophy, Politics and Society, Third Series (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969) 104-33 for an insightful and historically sensitive treatment of the tensions between the idea of truth and the practice of politics, even though the particular issue of hypocrisy receives little attention. The quotation is from p. 104. 2. Michel de Montaigne, Essays (London: Penguin Classics, 1958) 236. 3. Bernard Williams is one person who has made this observation, in his “Politics and Moral Character,” in Stuart Hampshire, ed., Public and Private Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) 56. His explanation of this is in terms of the fact that “the circumstances in which [politicians] are able to run a cartel are circumstances in which they have little motive to keep it respectable” (56-57). This is certainly not the only explanation available, however. For example, one might point out that being a politician is often not a career in the same way as being a lawyer, doctor, etc. Many people are elected to public office for a few years, then lose an election and return to their previous careers. Indeed, elected officials come from a number of different backgrounds, and may well have absorbed different systems of professional ethics in their education. There may also be a perception that politicians need to keep in view the good of the whole in a way which distinguishes them from, say, doctors and lawyers, who can focus largely on individual patients or clients. Perhaps the goal of attending to the big picture goes against the notion of having a set of formalized rules or principles, since the circumstances of politicians’ decision-making are often novel and unexpected. 4. This name for the phenomenon originates, we believe, with Jean Paul Sartre’s play “Dirty Hands” (in No Exit and Three Other Plays, trans. Lionel Abel [New York: Vintage, 1960]). See p. 224 where Sartre describes a revolutionary leader as having “dirty hands right up to the elbow.” Philosophical treatments of this phenomenon have included B. Williams, op. cit., and Dennis F. Thompson, Political Ethics and Public Office (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1987). 5. D.F. Thompson, op. cit., 11. 6. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, edited with an Introduction by Michael Oakeshott (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). See especially the first and second parts. 7. See, however, Chapter 7 of this book for some critical discussion of this theory from the perspective of its relationship to hypocrisy. 8. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapters 13 and 14. 9. This notion of raising consciousness and overthrowing the state is commonly associated with Karl Marx, but note that even the relatively conservative John Locke advocated a similar course of action when the sovereign had violated the social contract. 10. For an interesting and sustained discussion of persuasion in politics, see Randal Marlin, Propaganda (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2002). 11. Both Plato and Aristotle discuss the merits of each kind of argument. See Plato, Sophist, Gorgias, Meno, and Aristotle, Rhetoric. 12. It should be understood that “entire political community” does not mean the same thing here as “entire population,” or even “entire competent adult population,” since women and slaves were considered incapable of participating in the matters of state, and thus were deprived of a political voice.

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13. We discuss this sort of hypocrisy in more detail in Chapter 16 of this book. 14. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince and The Discourses, trans. Luigi Ricci (New York: Random House, 1940). 15. Eva Feder Kittay, “On Hypocrisy,” 282. 16. Such claims about the nature of hypocrisy can be found in Kittay, op. cit., 286, and Christine McKinnon, 326-27. 17. Michael Walzer is one person who makes such an argument, and much of the argument in this paragraph is based on his work. See his Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), esp. xv and 19-20. 18. This evidence is compiled by Walzer in Just and Unjust Wars. 19. Ibid., xv. 20. The arguments in this paragraph are based on those presented by Judith Shklar in “Let Us Not Be Hypocritical.” 21. Ibid., 80-81. 22. Ibid., 81. 23. Ibid., 80. 24. Shklar herself seems to recognize the importance of shared moral values to representative democracy in general, yet she seems to ignore this when focusing only on political players of different stripes. 25. Shklar, for example, seems to miss this point. 26. Shklar says of people who have deep-seated disagreements that, “since [they] do not see the same moral scene, they can charitably blame each other for blindness or imbecility, which seems hardly adequate. . . . Therefore, each one tries to dismiss and devalue the other by calling him a hypocrite, which is more offensive” (81). 27. In Chapter 15 of this book, we argue that a similar assumption is at work in cases of irony. 28. Shklar, “Let Us Not Be Hypocritical,” 82. 29. Some further remarks Shklar makes in the course of this discussion are revealing of another flaw in her argument. She observes in passing that Hitler’s violation of his promise not to invade the Soviet Union was itself not described as hypocritical, and ventures the following interesting explanation of that fact: “As for Hitler, his sincerity was hardly an issue. When one really knows that someone is evil, one has no time for his possible hypocrisy” (83). Does this last sentence not merely boil down to the claim that one does not make accusations of hypocrisy in the absence of any convergence on moral principles? Shklar seems here to have unwittingly supported the view she was trying to criticize — that accusations of hypocrisy presuppose an element of moral agreement. 30. We discuss the distinction between narrow and broad senses of hypocrisy in more detail in the next chapter (Chapter 9) of this book. 31. See Plato, The Republic, 414c; 382 and 388 are also pertinent. 32. It should be noted that it requires keen judgment to determine in a given case whether the public good is better served by revealing information or concealing it. Since politicians may well be more prone to err on the side of excessive secrecy, there may be good reason to accuse politicians of hypocrisy whenever such concealments come to light. This might mean that public condemnations of politicians may be justified, even in some cases in which the actions of the politicians were themselves justified! 33. Shklar, “Let Us Not Be Hypocritical,” 69-70. 34. We argue to this effect about hypocrisy in general in Chapter 12 of this book.

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35. Shklar, 54. Shklar is not entirely consistent in her application of this definition of hypocrisy, however. For example, in her conclusion she states that, “the only voice that damns hypocrisy to some purpose is one that laments that the society in which we live does not live up to its declared principles, promises, and possibilities” (86). Although such condemnation may indeed do some good, it is not a condemnation of hypocrisy at all, on the account Shklar has offered in connection with the Victorians. 36. We present an argument along these lines in more detail in the next chapter (Chapter 9) of this book. 37. This seems to be one of Shklar’s main concerns. 38. As Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars) has argued.

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9 Privacy and Hypocrisy “We all have our private lives, so we must have our secrets.” 1 anton chekhov “I’ve always believed that man is one and indivisible and that only the petty bourgeois divides him hypocritically into public self and private self.” 2 milan kundera

A. Introduction Both hypocrisy and protection of privacy involve people concealing or hiding something about themselves. Intuitively, however, they are very different concepts. People often speak of a “right to privacy,” but it seems ridiculous to suggest that there might be a corresponding “right to hypocrisy.” When we refer to something as “hypocrisy,” the implication seems to be that the behaviour is to be condemned morally, while we do not similarly condemn the protection of privacy. This intuitive distinction is more complicated than it appears, however. In this chapter, we will argue that the relationship between hypocrisy and protection of privacy is a complicated one, and in particular that one should not assume that protection of privacy is morally acceptable while hypocrisy is not.

B. Is Hypocrisy Necessarily Morally Wrong? Consider hypocrisy first. Is it the case that hypocrisy is always morally bad? Hypocrisy has been the subject of religious and literary writings for centuries,3 which have for the most part been condemnatory. Yet the limited amount of recent philosophical literature is not univocal about its value. Some recent philosophers do indeed uphold the tradition of condemnation. Thus, for example, Christine McKinnon says that “what is so heinous about the hypocrite” is no less than that he or she “subverts our system of morality,”4 and Eva Feder Kittay warns of a “special threat” posed by the hypocrite: “in feigning sincerity just when sincerity really matters, he undermines the very

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conception of that to which he pretends, be it piety, virtue or friendship.”5 Similarly, Judith Shklar finds it appropriate to devote a chapter to hypocrisy in her search for the worst of our “ordinary vices,”6 and Michael Walzer has said, “that the exposure of hypocrisy is certainly the most ordinary and it may also be the most important form of moral criticism.”7 On the other hand, there are philosophers who are much more forgiving of hypocrisy. For example, Thomas Hurka argues that, “hypocrisy gets a worse press than it deserves. Its common forms aren’t that terrible, and it’s never that morally important,”8 and Dan Turner offers an analysis of the concept according to which hypocrisy “does not imply deception or any obviously morally repugnant feature.”9 To some extent, the resolution of these philosophical disputes can be aided by carefully separating hypocrisy from related concepts, such as weakness of will, or lack of integrity.10 Even once hypocrisy has been carefully distinguished from such related concepts, however, questions remain about its moral standing. We have already seen that it is useful in this context to distinguish two conceptions of hypocrisy that can be identified in the literature, which might be called the “broad” and “narrow” conceptions. Now we shall elaborate this distinction in more detail. The broad conception is grounded in a romantic ideal of transparency, complete openness and self-disclosure, and holds that there is hypocrisy any time there is a gap between how one appears and how one really is.11 The narrow conception requires that further elements be present, such as that the gap be created deliberately, and that it have the effect of selfishly misrepresenting the person as better than s/he is in terms of some realm to which important norms apply, such as morality or religion.12 At first glance, it seems that hypocrisy of the narrow sort will necessarily be morally bad, but that this need not be the case with hypocrisy of the broad sort. The picture is not quite that clear, however. Reasons can be provided for believing that hypocrisy even in only the broad sense is bad, and yet there are also cases that appear to qualify as hypocrisy on both the broad and narrow accounts that are not obviously morally wrong.

C. Broad Hypocrisy Social critics have often levelled the accusation that a given society encourages its members to indulge in excessive pretence and deception. Victorian society is perhaps the clearest example of a society that has been thus criticized, but such criticism can be found in great literature from many places and times, and indeed our own society is not immune. It is possible to see in some such criticisms an implicit comparison with an ideal of complete transparency,

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which is sometimes captured through the use of such evaluative terms as “authenticity” and “integrity.” On one understanding of this ideal, there is a genuine inner, private, “romantic ego” that underlies all the social roles one might play, and one should always be “true to oneself.” On this conception, “hypocrisy is seen as the denial of that inner self, of the source of sincerity and common humanity.”13 Presumably the term “hypocrisy” is used here because of its normative connotations, to signify that the lack of transparency is seen as a fall from an ideal. To distinguish this conception from other uses of the term “hypocrisy,” we will refer to any gap between how one appears to others and how one really is as hypocrisy of the broad sort, or simply “broad hypocrisy.” Those who think broad hypocrisy to be a serious moral failing can point to a number of accepted values which it may threaten. By being less than truly honest with others, one may fail in one’s duty of respect to them, and undermine their ability to make informed decisions, thus interfering with their autonomy. Such failures might also, through their use of deception, threaten the possibility of genuine communication between individuals. Furthermore, it might be thought that societies that allow such gaps to flourish are failing in their obligation to improve the character of their members. This could be true, for example, if such gaps are generally driven by unworthy motives such as self-interested desire for approval from others. In literature, an intriguing advocate of complete transparency is Moliere’s character Alceste. The following speech illustrates Alceste’s repugnance for both the lack of complete transparency and its impact on character. There’s nothing I detest like the contortions Of all these great dispensers of lip service, Spreading their arms for insincere embraces, Overflowing with useless courtesies, Trying to win a war of compliments, Treating alike the gentleman and the fool … A man should be a man, and dare to show The substance of his spirit in his words. A man’s true self should speak, and never mask His genuine feelings in vain compliments.14 Several responses are available for critics of the ideal of complete transparency. One important response is to deny the conception of the “romantic self ” on which the ideal appears to be based. Even if that conception is accepted, however, critics of the ideal of complete transparency can point out

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that both polite insincerity (e.g., pretending to be happy to see people when you secretly do not like them) and the withholding of opinions on certain controversial topics can be necessary or at least desirable for the smooth running of society. Furthermore, it may be impossible to avoid some such gaps. One reason for this is simply that our limited interactions with others do not permit complete self-disclosure. For example, if I am buying a ticket for a movie, I do not feel compelled to tell my life story to the ticket vendor. Furthermore, the possibility of self-deception presents problems. If I am self-deceived, then I do not know my genuine self, and thus in conveying my genuine perception of myself to others, I am in fact creating a gap between how I appear and how I really am. If people cannot help but be hypocritical in the broad sense, then it might seem inappropriate to blame them for their broad hypocrisy. Upon consideration, then, it appears that complete transparency cannot after all be accepted as a moral ideal. Although the social criticisms pointing out pretence and deception are often morally very important, they should be understood as calling for a higher degree of transparency than is prevalent, but not necessarily for complete transparency. This observation, however, merely reveals an important question about the extent to which people are obliged to reveal themselves to others. It is at least possible that the limits of this obligation are intimately implicated in the attempt to draw a distinction between privacy and hypocrisy. Before exploring this in detail, it will be useful to consider what conclusions can be drawn about the moral standing of broad hypocrisy. The recognition that some failures of complete transparency are either desirable or beyond the individual’s control might be thought to indicate that it is inappropriate to describe them with the normative term “hypocrisy.” This conclusion does not follow as straightforwardly as one might think, however. First of all, it might sometimes be desirable to use a term of moral condemnation to refer to a general class of actions, even if one believes a minority of actions within that class might in fact be morally acceptable. This could be true, for example, if we are not able to tell with sufficient precision which cases are acceptable, and we think that the condemnation might encourage people to avoid the undesirable actions. In the case of broad hypocrisy, we might believe that people who engage in soul-searching and self-examination, even when this is painful or difficult, will avoid a considerable amount of selfdeception. We might thus condemn all self-deception as hypocritical, even though some of it in fact could not have been avoided. Similarly, we might condemn the insincerity involved in playing social roles as a way of discouraging people from thereby avoiding direct contact with others even though some lack of transparency is inevitable in our social interactions.15

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There is another way to argue that the use of the term “hypocrisy” is appropriate to describe these inevitable or morally acceptable failures of complete transparency. This would be to claim that hypocrisy is not necessarily a normative term. One might then claim that the structural similarity of these cases to some paradigmatic ones does make it appropriate to refer to them as hypocrisy, but argue that they are examples of morally acceptable hypocrisy. It will be easier to see whether this is a useful way to use the term or not if we consider the question of whether hypocrisy in the narrow sense is always morally bad.

D. Narrow Hypocrisy The strong moral condemnation many people associate with hypocrisy seems easier to understand if we think of hypocrisy in the narrow sense. For one thing, whereas treating broad hypocrisy as a vice seemed to run into the problem of blaming people for things they cannot control, the same is not true of narrow hypocrisy because narrow hypocrisy involves deliberate and selfinterested behaviour, which presumably is voluntary. Nevertheless, there are cases that raise questions about whether even narrow hypocrisy is necessarily morally wrong. One type of case that seems to pose a serious problem for the claim that we should always blame people for their hypocrisy involves people whom we might refer to as “victim hypocrites.”16 Examples would be Jews in Nazi Germany who use insincere public pronouncements in favour of the prevailing Nazi ideology as a way of avoiding detection as Jews. Such people are trying to deceive others into thinking they are “better” than they are in terms of the prevailing political morality, and are doing so for self-interested reasons, thus qualifying as hypocrites on either the broad or the narrow conception, yet many people would be reluctant to criticize such people morally. Does this mean that narrow hypocrisy is not necessarily morally wrong after all? The literary hypocrites who have served as paradigms of the vice in our moral education, such as Tartuffe or Uriah Heep, are mostly villains who selfishly do others down or unfairly exploit them. Such vicious characters contrast sharply with the so-called victim hypocrites described above, since the behaviour of the latter is not aimed at getting undeserved goods at the expense of others but is aimed at assuring the victim’s survival at the violent hands of the Big Other. So-called victim hypocrites are trying to secure what is rightfully owed to them — fair and equal treatment as human beings. What should we say of the “victim hypocrites” then? That their actions are structurally just like hypocritical actions, except for the element of moral

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wrongness? That amounts to stipulating moral wrongness as part of the meaning of “hypocrisy,” thereby defining away any counter-examples. Notice, too, that this approach makes the ascription of hypocrisy depend upon a judgment about whether the person involved was striving for merely his/her fair share, or rather for more than what s/he was entitled to. Such judgments will not always be easy, since it is often difficult to establish who has a just entitlement to what. But perhaps there are other available interpretations of the “victim hypocrites.” It might be thought that the consequences of the victim hypocrite’s behaviour make a difference. For example, in the case of the closet Jew who endorses Nazi beliefs as a mode of self-protection, we might wonder whether this person’s pronouncements contribute to the oppression of other Jews. If other Jews suffer or die at the expense of this individual’s attempt at self-protection, then we might be much more likely to condemn it. It should be noted, however, that it is questionable whether it is appropriate to impose this sort of consequentialist framework on the concept of hypocrisy.17 Indeed, there might seem to be something wrong with the behaviour of the victim hypocrites, even if no specific identifiable harms can be seen to have sprung from it. Perhaps this could be viewed in terms of concerns about integrity. We might believe that, in endorsing the views of the Big Other, even if insincerely, victim hypocrites are contributing to its evil. “If you’re not part of the solution, you’re part of the problem,” we might say. And since they do not really believe the views they endorse, we might claim that they after all lack the courage of their convictions, and are demonstrating a lack of integrity in their weakness. This might seem harsh, however, if the person is facing terrible risk. Who are we to judge, for example, how a Jew who is facing the holocaust should behave? But perhaps there is a sort of compromise that can be reached with regard to our moral judgment here. Perhaps we can make use of the legal distinction between justifying and excusing conditions. If we are willing to allow that there could be actions that are hypocritical, but not morally wrong, then we might say that the actions of victim hypocrites are of a sort which is generally wrong, but that there could be special circumstances which justify behaviours that would generally be wrong. On the other hand, if we want to maintain the claim that hypocrisy is necessarily morally wrong, then presumably we will also have to maintain that the behaviour of the victim hypocrites is morally wrong. Nevertheless, we might claim that, under the circumstances, the person involved had no real choice but to do that which was morally wrong. Accordingly, we might say that the person did wrong, but should be excused for doing so. Thus we could refuse to attach moral blame to victim

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hypocrites such as the Jews in Nazi Germany, yet hold on to the view that hypocrisy must necessarily be a term of moral condemnation. In any event, if these sorts of unusual and extreme circumstances are the only ones in which hypocrisy escapes moral condemnation, then it might be said that the thesis that hypocrisy is not always bad is less interesting or compelling than it initially appeared to be. However, another type of case, certainly not uncommon, provides stronger support for the thesis. Consider the case of “the ingratiating fund-raiser.” Suppose Edith is raising funds for a worthy cause, say, in support of a cultural centre for underprivileged aboriginal urban teens. She is told by a reliable source that a wealthy, if unpleasant, socialite is likely to contribute a substantial sum, but only if she appears to share his crude brand of right wing politics. Concealing her distaste, Edith gives the impression of acceding to such politics by a judicious use of the “nod” and the “aha.” To the extent that she gives a false impression of her political values to ingratiate herself and obtain a donation, Edith appears to be hypocritical. It is far from clear, however, that what she is doing is morally wrong or is to be condemned. Rather, the case seems to be an instance of morally acceptable hypocrisy. What sways our moral judgment towards approval in such a case? Unlike paradigmatic hypocrites who engage in false pretences for the sake of purely personal gain, the ingratiating fund-raiser has a genuine moral goal and motivation. Nor is the donor being tricked about the relevant “worthy cause,” but only about the irrelevant issue of the personal politics of the fund-raiser, which the socialite has no right to know or intrude on. Hence the fund-raiser is justified in concealing it. There is one other possibility concerning the cases of “victim hypocrites” and the “ingratiating fund-raiser” which deserves consideration, namely the possibility that what they do is not structurally similar to what paradigm hypocrites do after all. Perhaps there are key elements which must be present for something to count as hypocrisy, but which are missing in the above two cases. Even if we want to claim they lack courage or integrity, that does not seem to be sufficient for hypocrisy. Moreover, it is not simply the consequences of the hypocrite’s behaviour that govern our accusatory ascriptions. In paradigm cases, the hypocrite does something more: he or she denounces or denigrates others who are in the same position he or she is in, thereby harming them, as well as deflecting criticism from him- or herself. If this deceptive moral inconsistency is a distinctive feature of paradigm cases, then perhaps cases which lack this feature (such as those of the “victim hypocrites” or of the “ingratiating fund-raiser”) do not have the structure required for hypocrisy at all. It would be necessary to examine a wide array of other cases,

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however, in order to determine whether this characteristic should be taken to be an essential feature of hypocrisy.18 This discussion has suggested that it is difficult to give an unequivocal answer to the question about whether or not hypocrisy is necessarily morally wrong. It may depend upon whether one is thinking solely of narrow hypocrisy, or wants to include broad hypocrisy. It also may make a difference whether one is willing to allow examples such as that of the “victim hypocrites” to count as hypocrisy. Of course, it remains possible to stipulate a meaning for the term that restricts it to cases in which one wants to express moral disapproval. In doing so, however, one risks arbitrarily stipulating one aspect of a multi-faceted term to be the “true” one. This may be necessary in any case, since it is possible that the term is simply not used consistently in everyday speech. Stipulating this definition rather than some other could be justified if it turned out that this definition is useful in some way. One such way would be if it enabled us to distinguish hypocrisy from protection of privacy. In order to serve that purpose, however, it is necessary not only to show that hypocrisy can reasonably be taken to entail an element of disapprobation, but also that protection of privacy involves no such element. We now examine the prospects of establishing this further claim.

E. Is Protection of Privacy Necessarily Morally Legitimate? Privacy is a complex concept which has proven remarkably elusive for those seeking to provide legal and philosophical analysis. While it has been claimed that the proper use of the term “privacy” necessarily involves a normative component insofar as it connects with autonomy and respect for persons, not all thinkers have shared the view that it is a particularly important moral value. Some have argued that its protection must be limited in ways not always recognized. Others have argued that privacy should not be viewed as morally valuable at all, and hence it is inappropriate to insist on a moral right to privacy.19

1. Critiques of Privacy Perhaps the most common sort of argument against privacy does not really deny the inherent value of privacy, but rather warns that we must beware of acquiring that value at too high a price. It seems clear that competing values can sometimes outweigh the value of privacy. Consider, for example, a person who is worried about losing privacy because neighbourhood children like to

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sneak up to the windows and peek in. Such a person might discourage this practice by placing land mines around his or her property. Even if we think the person involved has a legitimate claim to privacy at stake, we would be unlikely to consider this a morally acceptable method of protecting it, effective though it might be. Even if privacy has inherent value, that value is not likely to be absolute, and there can be cases in which the costs of protecting it are simply too great. A related problem involves knowing how much to value privacy when its protection would harm interests others have in knowing certain information. For example, although one’s medical condition is often considered a central realm of privacy, there may be cases in which the interests of others in knowing certain medical facts about one might be thought to extinguish the “right to privacy.” Consider the case of an airline pilot with a drinking problem, or a bus-driver with epilepsy. We would be reluctant to say that people who concealed these conditions were merely legitimately protecting privacy. This is presumably because of the clear threat the conditions present to the important interests of others, whether thought of simply in physical terms (the well-being and very lives of potential passengers), or in terms of their autonomy (the need for information on which to base autonomous decisions, such as whether or not to board the vehicle). Different thresholds of competing interests might be required when dealing with different sorts of private information (for example, information particularly important to autonomous personhood might require particularly important competing interests to overcome), but in principle this approach sees privacy as a value which can lose out in competition with other values. Historically, critics of privacy have often accepted this framework, but argued that privacy should lose out to competing values much more often than is commonly supposed. This view still permits a clear contrast between protection of privacy and hypocrisy. First of all, it portrays privacy as something that has a small but not negligible inherent value and is thus morally right to protect so long as no greater value is endangered by doing so, while hypocrisy inherently lacks value and thus does not deserve even this limited protection. Moreover, it suggests a way to differentiate the types of concealments entailed in protection of privacy and hypocrisy. If people have no right to know a certain sort of fact, we might say that that sort of fact falls within the realm of privacy. People who conceal such facts are then presumably legitimately protecting their privacy. On the other hand, if people conceal information which others do have a right to, then they might be said to be letting themselves in for accusations of hypocrisy. Thus the border between protection of privacy

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and hypocrisy would depend upon how much information one thinks others deserve to know. So far we have considered the view that privacy may sometimes, contingently, threaten other values, and that it may not be legitimate to protect it when this occurs. Some critics of privacy have argued, however, that the protection of privacy involves violations of other values so systematically as to make it questionable whether privacy should be valued at all. Thus, for example, one might think that it is impossible to have privacy without opening the door for hypocrisy and deceit, since the right to privacy may be seen as “creating the context in which both deceit and hypocrisy may flourish: It provides the cover under which most human wrongdoing takes place, and then it protects the guilty from taking responsibility for their transgressions once committed.”20 Notice that accepting the view that privacy “creates the context” for hypocrisy and deception suggests that they are conceptually distinct, yet intimately connected. The relationship, presumably, is not that hypocrisy inevitably follows from every instance of protection of privacy, but rather that the general practice of protecting privacy makes hypocrisy possible. In any case, if we accept the view that it is impossible to have privacy without opening the door for hypocrisy and deceit, we will then have to decide whether we are willing to pay that price in order to have privacy. Obviously, people might disagree about this, depending on how much they value privacy and how odious they consider hypocrisy and deception. There are also arguments that attack the value of privacy more directly. One such argument stems from a particular conception of privacy as an ability to shield oneself from the judgment of one’s fellow human beings. The essence of this conception is nicely captured in the following passage: Characteristically, the presence of another person forces us to take into account the fact that our behavior is being observed, and that we are being judged from another’s vantage. This profoundly affects people as social beings. Such a situation forces an individual to acknowledge a different perspective on himself. If a person wishes to behave in a way free from such scrutiny and judgment, respecting that person involves affording a moral presumption to that preference. That is to say, unless we have reasons of a certain sort for observing an individual against his or her will, we ought not to do so.21 It is possible to discern at least two related critiques of privacy that have their origin in this account of the private as an area within which one should

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be immune from the judgment of others. One of these merely notes the oddity of creating a world in which the most important aspects of people’s lives take place in a way which is hidden from view, while a sham public face is maintained to keep up appearances. A second of these criticizes society for being so judgmental in the first place, and for making individuals believe that they need to live up to standards which are in fact unrealizable. This strain may be carried even further, to suggest that the need for people to create a public persona, distinct from what they are “privately,” in their own thoughts or with select others, threatens the cohesion and integrity of one’s sense of self. The first sort of critique of privacy as a shield from the judgment of others notes how odd it is that the most interesting and important aspects of people’s lives are often the parts which are considered “private,” and thus the parts which people feel least able to share with others. Anton Chekhov’s “Lady with Lapdog” provides a fascinating and multi-layered exploration of this critique of privacy. This story is about a middle-aged married man (Dimitry Gurov) and a young married woman (Anna Sergeyevna, the “lady with lapdog”) who have an affair, which results in a great love which they must conceal from everyone. The peculiarity of the role of privacy is brought out perhaps most clearly in a passage describing the thoughts of Gurov: . . . He kept thinking that he was going to meet his mistress and not a living soul knew about it. He led a double life: one for all who were interested to see, full of conventional truth and conventional deception, exactly like the lives of his friends and acquaintances; and another which went on in secret. And by a kind of strange concatenation of circumstances . . . everything that was important, interesting, essential, everything about which he was sincere and did not deceive himself, everything that made up the quintessence of his life went on in secret, while everything that was a lie, everything that was merely the husk in which he hid himself to conceal the truth, like his work at the bank, for instance, or his going to anniversary functions with his wife — all that happened in the sight of all. He judged others by himself, did not believe what he saw and was always of the opinion that every man’s real and most interesting life went on in secret, under cover of the night. The personal private life of an individual was kept secret, and perhaps that was partly the reason why civilized man was so anxious that his personal secrets should be respected.22

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It is clear in Chekhov’s story that Gurov and Sergeyevna feel trapped by social conventions which do not allow them to reveal their deep love for each other. The facts that they live within a particularly regimented society, and that what they are seeking to conceal is not simply something which takes place in private, but an illicit affair of a sort society condemns, merely adds a further layer of complexity to Chekhov’s rich story. Part of the reason this story has such resonance is no doubt that the experience it describes of being stifled by social expectations is a common one. Indeed, it may be that any “civilized society” which involves social roles and expectations is going to give rise to such experiences, perhaps explaining the apparent inevitability of Gurov’s observation that secrecy accompanies civilization.23 This may indeed mean that some of the more important elements of one’s life will inevitably be shielded from the eyes of most of humankind, in a way which might well strike us as peculiar. The second strain of the critiques of privacy as a shield from the judgments of others is familiar from the rhetoric of those who criticize prevailing moral systems as oppressive, such as advocates of the “sexual revolution,” or of the “counterculture.”24 The suggestion is that cultural mores deem many things to be dirty or shameful, but not because they are inevitably so. What is more, it is suggested that it is harmful for the members of society to have things in this way unnecessarily labelled shameful. This will be especially true if the society projects an unrealistic ideal of humanity, and labels as shameful aspects which individuals inevitably experience. Thus, for example, an ideal of humanity that holds that reason should always triumph over the baser urges could be criticized as failing to acknowledge the important ways in which elements such as desire and emotion can contribute to human well-being. When individuals, in societies that accept such an ideal, are not able to exercise complete control over their emotions or desires, they may well feel tremendous shame or guilt over falling short of the ideal. Moreover, they may feel unable to talk about their perceived reality with anyone because of the stigma attached to such feelings by the society. This may have the effect of driving a wedge between members of the society, in this way contributing to feelings of isolation and alienation. Indeed, some people may believe that, since others do not complain about the situation, others must not be having the same difficulties in living up to the ideal. Hence these people may feel an additional burden of shame and fear because they perceive themselves as abnormal, whereas in fact they are merely being true to human nature. This point is related to the common psychological observation that people sometimes experience it as liberating to recognize that aspects of themselves that seemed to them disturbingly abnormal are in fact common features of human experience. It might

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therefore be thought that, if society placed less emphasis on privacy, people would come to know more about their fellow human beings and in the process come to recognize that they have more in common with them than they realized. This might go a long way toward easing some people’s guilt and fear. A variation of this critique of privacy goes even further, and maintains that the effort to perpetuate distinct public and private selves can threaten individual integrity and sense of self. As Richard Wasserstrom puts it: Individuals see themselves as leading dual lives — public ones and private ones. They present one view of themselves to the public — to casual friends, acquaintances, and strangers — and a different view of themselves to themselves and a few intimate associates. This way of living is hypocritical because it is, in essence, a life devoted to camouflaging the real, private self from public scrutiny. It is a dualistic, unintegrated life that renders the individuals who live it needlessly vulnerable, shame ridden, and lacking in a clear sense of self.25 Indeed, it could be argued that, as the number of roles one occupies within a society multiplies, this diffraction of the self increases. Hence modern complex societies, in which people occupy a variety of social roles, and in which privacy is especially valued, are particularly prone to the malaise of fragmented selves, and to the accompanying mental health problems. These observations may not amount to a total condemnation of the value of privacy, but they do suggest a need to revise the role it is afforded within society. The claim might be that we should adopt a more realistic notion of human nature, and be less prone to judge things as shameful. If people perceive less of their lives as shameful in the eyes of others, they will feel less need to hide behind the shield of privacy, or to wear different faces for different people. There is even reason to think there might be several benefits of a more open society. For one thing, as people gain more access to the lives of others, they may increasingly see ways in which these others resemble themselves. Besides decreasing feelings of isolation, this may encourage people to be less judgmental, and to become more respectful listeners to the experiences of others. Furthermore, if everyone’s activities were open to the sight of all, people might lead better lives (do fewer things of which they might be ashamed), and show more moral courage in acknowledging the principles they believe in. Furthermore, although some have claimed that privacy is necessary in order for love and friendship to flourish,26 it can be argued that the envisioned

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reduction in perceived need for concealment and privacy would make possible relationships which are more honest and open than have hitherto been possible. Finally, if people did not have expectations of privacy in the first place, they would not be disappointed at perceived violations of their privacy. In short, this line of critique envisions a world in which there will simply be less need for privacy, and in which people lead healthier and less vulnerable lives.

2. Replies We have seen that there are several important reasons for thinking that protection of privacy is dangerous for society. There may also, of course, be reasons to reject these arguments. One line of reply might be to argue that the costs outlined, though real, do not outweigh the benefits provided by privacy. Another might be to say that, although privacy as historically understood has indeed given rise to the problems outlined, it is possible to offer an improved understanding of how privacy should and should not function that would avoid the difficulties. These replies will be examined in turn. As noted above, one line of critique concerning privacy allows that it has some value, but claims that its value has usually been exaggerated, while its costs have been underestimated. Defenders of privacy might challenge this assessment by emphasizing the value of privacy. One promising way of doing this is by drawing a bleak picture of what life would be like, or has been like, in societies that do not value privacy. In this mode, totalitarian societies have often been cited as examples of societies that do not respect privacy. These are also, of course, commonly regarded as nightmarish societies. If what characterizes these societies really is a lack of privacy, then anyone who is appalled by them will have a powerful emotive reason for attaching considerable value to privacy. Another important line of defence of privacy turns the same sort of strategy back on the critics of privacy. Many of the critiques outlined above have highlighted undesirable features of societies that have valued privacy. The defender of privacy might concede that many, or maybe all, societies that have valued privacy have had such undesirable features, but claim that these undesirable features are not an inevitable accompaniment to the concern for privacy. Perhaps every society in history that has valued privacy has had a faulty conception of it, or has gone too far in trying to protect it. Maybe privacy should not be taken to extend as far as it has often been taken to extend, and perhaps a more limited form of it can avoid the suggested drawbacks. Indeed, it might turn out to be impossible for there to be a society without some conception of privacy or other, in which case the issue would not be whether to

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allow space for privacy within society, but rather which conception of privacy to allow. In effect then the claim is that societies that value privacy have had a variety of associated problems, but societies that do not have them as well. Views may differ as to which problems are the most serious, but what emerges from the present discussion is that the real question concerns identifying those problems that are inextricably bound with privacy (or its lack) from those that are not. Where the problems are found to be inseparable from privacy (or its lack), decisions will still need to be made about how to balance the costs and benefits against each other. It remains to be seen whether it is possible to provide a new account of privacy which captures the features its supporters value, while avoiding the pitfalls noted by its critics. The major task of providing such a new account will not be attempted here. For our purposes, it is enough to note that the claim that protection of privacy is morally acceptable is far from obvious.

F. Conclusions and Speculations Our approach has been to pair the concepts of hypocrisy and privacy, and suggest that we can learn more about each of these concepts by considering the relationships between them together, rather than treating each in isolation. It has been seen that hypocrisy and protection of privacy are each complex concepts and the connections between them are morally complicated, both conceptually and more substantively. Not only are they more closely intertwined than one would expect, but sometimes one and the same instance of concealing information about oneself may involve both hypocrisy and protection of privacy. Furthermore, attempts to distinguish them on the basis of their conventional moral standing seem to fail, since, as we have argued, they do not lend themselves to quick and ready moral evaluation as “acceptable” or “unacceptable.” Indeed, the many intricate connections between the two concepts that our investigation has revealed make it in retrospect unsurprising that it is difficult to provide uniformly different moral evaluations of them. Perhaps some additional speculations about their similarities and differences may be illuminating. One approach that might shed some light on these concepts would be to consider them in the light of the expectations of others. Hypocrisy does seem to require a sort of “audience,” and the expectations of that audience may be crucial in determining whether a given pronouncement or behaviour is hypocritical rather than, say, ironic or sarcastic.27 Social conventions and expectations seem crucial in relation to privacy as well, as indicated by the

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often-noticed differences between cultures in conceptions of what is private.28 Yet the role of social expectations seems different in the two cases. Perhaps the difference is that, in hypocrisy, there is always a sort of deception involved, in the sense that people are led to believe they know something about a person but are mistaken. In cases of privacy, on the other hand, people may know that they do not know certain sorts of facts, and in this case might be merely ignorant rather than deceived. This approach fits well with the account of the private as an area within which society has agreed not to inquire about individuals’ activities.29 Indeed, even if one’s activities are well known, it may be thought inappropriate to discuss them in public, thus giving rise to what is sometimes referred to as an “open secret.”30 Thus we might say that one’s sexual activities, one’s conversations with close friends, or one’s excretory functions are private, at least in modern western culture. Of course, this does not mean that people do not have sexual activities, conversations with close friends, or excretory functions, but merely that others do not inquire about the exact nature of them. Presumably others assume that there are specific details about one’s life, within these established areas, but are aware that they do not know these details. If this analysis is correct, then it might be possible to define hypocrisy in terms of somehow going beyond the veil allowed for by privacy. One way in which this could be done would be by concealing details about one’s life that do not fall within the areas that have been acknowledged by convention to be “private.” Thus, for example, one might conceal facts about one’s moral character that are of a type not recognized as private. Alternatively, one might somehow bring it about that others move from not knowing details about one and realizing that they do not, to not knowing details but falsely believing that they do. This might be done by making pronouncements which appear to let others in on one’s private life, but do so in a misleading way. This distinction is not as straightforward as it might appear, however. For one thing, it is not clear how the “social agreement” that is suggested as the basis of privacy is brought about, expressed, or recognized, given the absence of any formal procedures. This also gives rise to questions, familiar within political philosophy, about the extent to which those who did not, and would not, consent to such an agreement should be bound by its terms, as well as questions about how such conventions are to be understood when the society is dynamic and expectations are constantly changing. Further complications to the proposed analysis are introduced when one considers the possibility that hypocrisy might involve self-deception rather than deception of others.31 Nevertheless, this seems a promising direction to pursue for distinguishing the concepts.

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As suggested above, there may be other features that are crucial to hypocrisy, which might serve to distinguish it from protection of privacy. For example, although both hypocrisy and protection of privacy might seem to be characteristically motivated by self-interest, hypocrisy might involve a further element of seeking to gain an unfair advantage over others, or obtain a better reputation than one deserves. On the other hand, it might be argued that privacy is also used to obtain a better reputation than one deserves. The claim might be that the shield of privacy is used to protect one’s reputation, so that one has a better reputation than one would if all one’s dirty secrets were known. Another feature that might be thought crucial to hypocrisy, as opposed to protection of privacy, is a sort of privileging of oneself, or “double standard.”32 Perhaps hypocrisy consists in applying principles to others but excusing oneself from their application, without there being a relevant reason for doing so. By contrast, the person who protects privacy might be perfectly willing to respect the privacy of others, and thus apply the same principles to them. This appears to be another promising avenue for distinguishing the two concepts. Finally, it might be suggested that it is simply a matter of perspective whether a given concealment of personal information is a case of hypocrisy or mere protection of privacy. Consider, for example, an elected figure who is secretly a practising homosexual. It might be that whether or not one considers this person a hypocrite for concealing his or her sexual orientation will depend upon one’s moral evaluation of homosexuality. This could be true even if one thinks that, in general, sexuality is a realm to which privacy applies. The problem would arise if one thinks members of the public are entitled to information about the moral worth of those who are candidates for positions of leadership. If so, then it might be thought hypocritical for politicians to portray themselves as living up to a higher moral standard than they actually do. Yet clearly people disagree as to whether homosexuality is immoral. Those who think it is might claim that politicians who conceal their homosexuality are presenting themselves as better than they really are in just the way thought characteristic of hypocrisy. Those who think there is nothing immoral about homosexuality, however, might see this simply as a case of protecting one’s privacy, and exercising one’s right to avoid discrimination on the basis of a morally arbitrary feature. Indeed, it is possible that concealing such information is a case of both protection of privacy and of hypocrisy, presenting further complications to the project of distinguishing the concepts. Another interesting borderline case33 involves a situation in which a person’s spouse is cheating on him or her, and other people are aware of this

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cheating. On the one hand, since this involves sexuality and intimate relationships, this seems like a clear case where privacy should apply. Accordingly, it might seem these others should say nothing about the illicit affair, unless one of the parties directly involved brings it out in the open. If the cheated-upon spouse is aware of the infidelity, then this policy of others’ not bringing up gives him/her power over whether to acknowledge the “open secret,” thereby facing up to the accompanying shame and sympathy. On the other hand, suppose the cheated-upon spouse chooses not to acknowledge the affair, and endeavours to present to the public the appearance of a happy, problem-free relationship with his/her spouse. This could be seen as a case of deceptively appearing better than s/he really is (in the sense of being better at forming a solid romantic relationship), which could be seen as hypocrisy. Furthermore, if I am aware of the infidelity, but decide to keep silent until and unless the victimized partner openly acknowledges the situation, I too might be guilty of a type of hypocrisy, in pretending to be ignorant of facts I am actually well aware of. Of course, there is the further complication in such cases that an outsider may well be unsure about whether the victimized spouse is aware of the infidelity or not, and may be further uncertain about whether telling someone who does not already know it that his/her spouse is having an affair is helping that person or not. The relationship between hypocrisy and protection of privacy is clearly a complex one. Our opening quotations suggest that it is difficult to tell whether or not they should each be seen as inevitable features of human society, and also suggest that the very attempt at drawing relevant philosophical distinctions may engage us in hypocrisy. There are many questions about hypocrisy and protection of privacy left unanswered by this chapter, but several important aspects have been explored. In particular, it has been argued that it is a mistake to believe that one can provide any simple moral evaluations of these multi-faceted concepts. Although it is to be hoped that this exploration has been illuminating, it is inevitable that some of the authors’ thoughts and speculations remain private — hypocritical though that may be.

Notes 1. This quotation is from the script of a Russian film adaptation of Anton Chekhov’s short story, “Lady with Lapdog.” For the original version see Lady with Lapdog and Other Stories (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964) 279. 2. Milan Kundera, The Joke (New York: Harper Collins, 1992) 21. 3. As discussed in Chapter 1 of this book, moral condemnations of what we would call hypocrisy go back at least as far as the prophets Amos and Isaiah, and the

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word was used in its current sense by the time of the Gospels (see Matthew 5:21-22; 27-28). 4. Christine McKinnon, “Hypocrisy With a Note on Integrity,” 326-27. 5. Eva Feder Kittay, “On Hypocrisy,” 286. 6. Judith Shklar, “Let Us Not Be Hypocritical.” 7. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, xv. 8. Thomas Hurka, “Hypocrisy: Not All It’s Cracked Down to Be,” in his Principles: Short Essays on Ethics (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1994) 265. 9. Dan Turner, “Hypocrisy,” 266; see also 262. 10. Those who minimize the moral significance of hypocrisy, such as Hurka and Turner, tend not to distinguish it clearly from weakness of will. For a careful analysis of the relationship between these concepts, and how it affects such moral claims, see Chapter 14 of this book. 11. One of the clearest proponents of such a view is Molière’s Alceste (The Misanthrope, in Morris Bishop, Trans., Eight Plays by Molière [New York: Random House, 1957]) especially as discussed by Rousseau (see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Letter to M. d’Alembert on the Theatre, translated as Politics and the Arts by Allan Bloom [Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1960]), but more contemporary treatments of this perspective can be found in the mentioned writings of Judith Shklar and Dan Turner. 12. Accounts of this nature can be found in the writings of Eva Feder Kittay and Christine McKinnon. 13. Shklar, Ordinary Vices, 77. 14. Molière, The Misanthrope, Act I, p. 255. 15. It might also be worthwhile to note our failures of complete transparency as a way of attending to our relative inferiority to a perfect, all-knowing, supreme being, since our inevitable hypocrisy might be seen as an instance of our fundamental imperfection. 16. See Kittay, “On Hypocrisy,” 287-89. 17. For arguments that consequentialism cannot make sense of hypocrisy, see Kittay and McKinnon, op. cit. For an argument that it can, see Chapter 5 of this book. 18. We discuss issues surrounding this sort of “double counting” in Chapter 11 of this book. 19. Examples of diverse recent philosophical treatments of privacy can be found in the excellent collections, Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy, edited by Ferdinand D. Schoeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) and Nomos XIII: Privacy, edited by S.R. Pennock and J.W. Chapman (New York: Atherton Press, 1971). 20. Schoeman, Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy, 1. 21. See Schoeman, 19; and 223-44 for Benn’s, “Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons.” 22. Chekhov, Lady with Lapdog, 278-79. 23. Thomas Nagel also makes this claim, though he does not provide much argument to support it. See his interesting paper, “Concealment and Exposure” in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27 (1998). 24. Richard A. Wasserstrom provides an extremely insightful account of how “counterculture” perspectives on privacy differ in his, “Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions,” in Schoeman, 317-32. 25. Wasserstrom, in Schoeman, 331. Notice in particular Wasserstrom’s suggestion that privacy is inevitably hypocritical.

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26. See for example Charles Fried’s, “Privacy: A Moral Analysis,” in Schoeman, 203-22. 27. We discuss the relationship between hypocrisy and irony (and, to a lesser extent, sarcasm) in Part V of this book. 28. Although note H.J. McCloskey’s interesting argument against the view that privacy is entirely constituted by social expectations in his, “Privacy and the Right to Privacy,” Philosophy, 55 (1980) 17-39. 29. See Nagel, “Concealment and Exposure,” 12. 30. Compare in this context Stanley Benn’s observation that what is “private” may be considered improper for one to share, as in the traditional notion of “private parts” as parts of one’s body which one is forbidden to show in public. See Benn in Schoeman, 244. 31. Discussions of the relationship between hypocrisy and self-deception can be found in Chapter 13 of this book. 32. We discuss hypocrisy and double standards in Chapter 11 of this book. 33. This is an example we owe to David Crossley.

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10 Tolerance and Hypocrisy “Let us agree to each serve God, you in your way, and I in His.” source unknown “Toleration, we may say, is required only for the intolerable. That is its problem.” 1 bernard williams

A. Introduction One ground on which liberalism has often been defended is that it promotes a reduction in the vice of hypocrisy. In the hierarchical systems that preceded liberalism, the need to obtain the support of the more powerful was associated with insincerity, flattery and hypocrisy, perhaps most clearly characterized by the image of people fawning at the royal court. By contrast, it was believed that a liberal democratic process could provide an equality of power and an opportunity for open discussion that would continuously reduce the need for the political use of compromise, caution, and calculation, and thus eventually render hypocrisy unnecessary in politics.2 Furthermore, toleration,3 a notion often hailed as a leading virtue of liberalism, has also been defended as necessary for reducing hypocrisy. Some contemporary writers, however, have argued that liberalism not only cannot escape the hypocrisy that is inevitable in any political system, but indeed that it is particularly prone to it. Furthermore, it has been suggested that toleration in particular entails a certain sort of hypocrisy. These writers do not necessarily condemn liberalism and toleration for promoting hypocrisy. In fact, some of them go so far as to suggest that hypocrisy can be a social benefit, and under some circumstances even a virtue. On this view, the presence of certain sorts of hypocrisy within the political process is actually an advantage for liberalism. In this chapter, we will consider the merits of these two different perspectives: the view that hypocrisy is a vice — and liberalism is to be congratulated for limiting it — and the view that although liberalism fails to limit hypocrisy, this does not constitute a significant failing because hypocrisy is not neces-

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sarily a vice. We will argue that, although such contemporary critics make a number of important points, these points do not lead to the strong conclusions they think they do. On the other hand, we will argue that the liberal value of tolerance is an intrinsically problematic concept, and that there is an interesting conceptual link between it and hypocrisy. Accordingly, there is a further way of seeing hypocrisy as endemic to liberalism that has not previously been suggested. In the end, however, we will suggest that what appears to be hypocrisy here may simply be the sacrifice of some values, in cases of conflict, for a greater underlying substantive value which liberalism cannot do without.

B. Locke’s Arguments in Favour of Toleration Toleration is commonly taken to involve allowing others to live their lives without interference, and in particular a willingness to refrain from using force.4 What makes it a problematic virtue, however, is that it involves more than this. If one approves of what another is doing, or is indifferent to it, and refrains from interfering, then one is not strictly speaking “tolerating” the other. In order for the non-interference to count as tolerance, one must disapprove of the other or the other’s actions.5 Thus if it is accurately said that I tolerate my roommate’s lack of personal hygiene, I must not be simply indifferent to it, but disapprove of it, while putting up with it. In the classic case one believes another is worshipping a false god, yet decides not to interfere in a way that might lead the person toward what one views as the correct religious view. As one writer puts it, “There is something deeply puzzling about the claim that toleration is a virtue, or a good in itself, for it is in the nature of the case that it is a virtue which can be displayed only towards what is found disagreeable, or distasteful, or immoral.”6 Nevertheless, liberals have consistently emphasized the importance of toleration. For present purposes, John Locke will serve as the representative liberal defender of toleration. Locke’s many arguments in favour of toleration can be loosely categorized as either pragmatic or moral. Although it is the moral arguments that particularly concern us here, a brief glance at the pragmatic arguments will help illustrate Locke’s overall perspective, and thus we begin with them.

1. Pragmatic Arguments Locke argued that toleration is usually conducive to the public interest. Thus, for example, he argued that Huguenots7 should be welcomed into England,

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despite their differences from the common English way of life, because it would be economically beneficial for the country to have them there.8 Similarly, he warned against discrimination on the basis of physical appearance because in alienating such individuals one would be contributing to civil strife and rebellion. This perspective is revealed clearly in the following passage from his A Letter Concerning Toleration: Suppose this business of religion were let alone, and that there were some other distinction made between men and men, upon account of their different complexions, shapes, and features, so that those who have black hair, for example, or gray eyes, should not enjoy the same privileges as other citizens; that they should not be permitted either to buy or sell or live by their callings; that parents should not have the government and education of their own children; that they should either be excluded from the benefit of the laws, or meet with partial judges; can it be doubted but that these persons, thus distinguished from others by the colour of their hair and eyes, and united together by one common persecution, would be as dangerous to the magistrate, as any others that had associated themselves merely upon the account of religion?9 What is perhaps most noteworthy about these arguments is how limited they are as defences of toleration, even though they contributed to a positive and progressive social force in Locke’s day. If intolerance were more conducive to the public interest, then these pragmatic arguments would seem to call for intolerance.10 Thus, for example, if the influx of immigrants were not after all good for the economy, then the immigration of groups such as the Huguenots should presumably be opposed. Indeed, one of the leading contemporary alternatives to liberalism would hold that the presence of people with significantly different ways of life in our midst threatens the underlying shared values that hold together the social fabric,11 and thus that tolerance of immigrants with different ways represents a significant threat to the well-being of our society. Similarly, if one were to heed Machiavelli’s advice, and ensure that the groups to be persecuted are either completely purged or harmed so significantly that they will never be able to retaliate, then it would seem that persecuting people on the basis of such characteristics as hair, eye, or skin colour need not lead to social strife. Accordingly, the argument for tolerance is extremely vulnerable insofar as it relies on such empirical, pragmatic claims.

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Indeed, Locke himself was willing to allow pragmatic considerations to place limitations on the extent of tolerance. First of all, some types of actions were thought harmful to society and thus not to be tolerated. Indeed, many such cases, for instance intolerance of killing and assault, seem uncontroversial. But Locke did not intend this class of activities to be limited to those we now understand in light of Mill’s “harm principle”12 — he was willing to include prohibition of other “victimless” crimes such as various forms of sexual activity.13 What conflicts even more sharply with our image of Locke as a leading advocate of tolerance are his views about Roman Catholics and atheists.14 Locke believed that Catholics, through their acceptance of the authority of the Pope, had in effect declared allegiance to another sovereign and thus could not be tolerated within civil society. Similarly, he believed that the oaths and pledges of atheists could not be relied upon, since they had no divine sanction to back them up. Since he also believed that society was based upon a “social contract” which required such pledges, atheists could also not be tolerated within civil society. Thus Locke was not in favour of toleration for Catholics and atheists. Yet this fact is not as surprising as it may first appear, once one recognizes the extent to which Locke’s advocacy of toleration was based upon pragmatic justifications.

2. Moral Arguments As mentioned earlier, however, Locke’s support of toleration did not rely entirely on pragmatic arguments, and the moral arguments he presented provide at least the seeds of a broader understanding of toleration. The first such arguments to be considered were intended by Locke to apply to religious toleration in particular. Locke believed that there had to be a separation between church and state, with the state responsible for regulating people’s outward behaviour, while the church looked after people’s moral development insofar as it was reflected in belief, attitude, and ritual observance. Indeed, Locke thought this distinction was necessary in order to avoid a particular sort of hypocrisy, whereby some people, who in fact were motivated by self-aggrandizement, pretended to be motivated by concern for the souls of others. Without a clear separation, these people might confiscate the property of others and subject them to violence, citing moral/religious righteousness and the desire to redeem them for heaven as justification. The following is worth quoting in full: But however, that some may not colour their spirit of persecution and unchristian cruelty with a pretence of care of the public

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weal and observation of the laws; and that others, under pretence of religion, may not seek impunity for their libertinism and licentiousness; — in a word, that none may impose either upon himself or others, by the pretences of loyalty and obedience to the prince, or of tenderness and sincerity in the worship of God, I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion …15 Locke thus thought it necessary to separate church and state to prevent a certain sort of hypocrisy, but his argument did not stop there. A further argument stemmed from his insistence that the beliefs people hold are not subject to their own voluntary control. Since religion is concerned primarily with one’s beliefs, Locke claimed that it is not only unwise, but also impossible, for a state to command adherence to any particular religion. Although a state might compel outward adherence to the words and rituals of a given religion, actual belief in it can never be imposed from outside. As Locke put it, “Speculative opinions, therefore, and articles of faith as they are called which are required only to be believed, cannot be imposed on any church by the law of the land. For it is absurd that things should be enjoined by laws which are not in men’s power to perform; and to believe this or that to be true does not depend on our will.”16 If the state were not tolerant, then people would provide the required outward adherence without genuine acceptance of the religion in question. But outward adherence without genuine acceptance amounts to hypocrisy, and hypocrisy undermines character and autonomy. Consider: “All the life and power of true religion consist in the inward and full persuasion of the mind; and faith is not faith without believing. Whatever profession we make, to whatever outward worship we conform, if we are not fully satisfied in our own mind that the one is true, and the other well pleasing unto God, such profession and such practice, far from being any furtherance, are indeed great obstacles to our salvation. For in this manner, instead of expiating other sins by the exercise of religion, I say, in offering thus unto God Almighty such a worship as we esteem to be pleasing unto Him, we add unto the number of our other sins those also of hypocrisy and contempt of His Divine Majesty.”17 Now since the vice of hypocrisy is to be avoided, and intolerance leads to hypocrisy, Locke argues that it is necessary for a state to adopt a policy of religious toleration. Locke’s observations of the pointlessness of imposing religion are quite compelling (although one might wonder how they would be affected by the possibility that brute outward adherence might eventually breed acceptance, if not in this generation then in succeeding ones). Could the case be extended

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for racial and ethnic background and for sexual orientation? Indeed, in a state that represses or discriminates on the basis of race, ethnicity and sex, there will be incentives offered for the sorts of hypocrisy called “passing” — passing for white when in fact black, passing for heterosexual when in fact homosexual, and so on. Here, too, there are characteristics that lie beyond one’s control,18 yet which one might be able to pretend not to have at all. Through “passing,” one may avoid certain forms of persecution, and achieve a sort of social equality, but at the cost of pretending to be what one is not. Although one may decide to try to pass partly out of a desire for acceptance, the attempt is doomed to failure. What is accepted will not be what one really is, but merely what one pretends to be,19 which is in fact of a sort already accepted within society. Passing in fact reinforces the standard cultural norms and contributes to prejudice and to deforming of identities. What is more, such an attempt to deceive others into thinking one is better than one is in terms of the prevailing norms appears to be a form of hypocrisy. Perhaps this can be excused when one’s very survival or some similarly important interest is at stake (e.g., a Jew passing as Gentile in Nazi Germany),20 but in general “passing” in these various areas seems tainted by hypocrisy in much the same way mere outward religious conformity was condemned by Locke. If we are genuinely concerned to avoid creating the circumstances in which hypocrisy will flourish, it seems Locke’s arguments should be extended to include tolerance of differences in race, ethnicity and sexual preference as well. This conclusion fits well with another plank of the moral argument for tolerance, which is not stated explicitly by Locke but seems to have emerged more clearly in later liberalism. This further argument involves the notions of moral equality and autonomy. Liberalism has been understood as beginning from the assumption that individuals are equal, and that each individual is entitled to act in accordance with his/her own decisions about what constitutes the good. Tolerance is then understood as a way of respecting the moral equality and autonomy of others. Although we will provide further discussion below about how these moral arguments affect the relationship between tolerance and hypocrisy, let us turn now to a consideration of how these claims, among others, have led some contemporary critics to believe that liberalism is particularly prone to hypocrisy.

C. Recent Liberal Theory: Hypocrisy as a Handmaiden to Tolerance Judith Shklar has provided several arguments to the effect that liberalism actually enhances hypocrisy, one of which hinges on this liberal emphasis on

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equality and autonomy. Shklar’s discussion begins with a contrast between two conceptions of the self, one of which sees the self as the sum of one’s social roles, while the other holds that there is a true inner, private, “romantic ego” that underlies all the social roles one might play. Shklar goes on to suggest that the liberal belief in equality of persons hinges on an acceptance of the romantic ego. If we are merely the sum of our social roles, then people who play unequal roles could not be said to be equal. The self that is equal to others must be one that is apart from social definition, perhaps a rational endin-oneself of the sort advocated by Kant. The hypothesized equal self then comes to be identified with the genuine, inner, romantic self. Shklar goes on to argue that a particular conception of hypocrisy is associated with this conception of the self. “Hypocrisy is seen as the denial of that inner self, of the source of sincerity and common humanity …”21 Yet to some extent the denial of the inner self is involved every time people take on social roles. This is one regard in which every social system, including liberal democracy, can be seen to involve some hypocrisy, since role-playing is a feature of every society. Shklar goes on to argue that liberalism faces particular difficulties in this regard, both on account of the social mobility it enables, and, more significantly, because of the principles of equality and respect for autonomy it endorses. Social mobility fosters hypocrisy because: “The true inner self is identified with one’s childhood and family, and regret as well as guilt for having left them behind may render new ways artificial, false, and in some way a betrayal of that original self.”22 But although the consequences of social mobility may be of some concern to liberals, the arguments concerning equality and autonomy seem to strike more closely at the core of the theory. Shklar argues that total frankness, understood as “the display of a primary inner self,”23 is incompatible with our commitment to equality and to the acceptance of human diversity. She states that, “The democracy of everyday life . . . is based on the pretence that we must speak to each other as if social standings were a matter of indifference in our views of each other. That is, of course, not true.”24 In thus pretending that characteristics such as others’ religion, sexuality, ethnicity, profession, or economic standing make no difference to our judgment of them, we engage in hypocritical deceit. Even if we generally believe that some of these characteristics should be irrelevant to our judgment of others, the fact that this is not true of all characteristics constitutes the basis of the virtue of tolerance. As noted above, mere indifference is not tolerance — in order to tolerate something, it must be something of which one disapproves. Shklar claims that people who are inclined to harbour harsh judgments of particular others in private will feel constrained to avoid expressing such

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judgments in public speech. Indeed, liberal toleration of different conceptions of the good life seems to require this. In this way, liberalism imposes higher expectations of us in our public roles than in our private ones. If liberals are indeed committed to viewing anything short of total frankness as a betrayal of one’s true self and thus as a form of hypocrisy, then this liberalism is particularly prone to hypocrisy. Shklar accepts this implication, but does not see it as a criticism of liberalism. She suggests that hypocrisy thus “may be indispensable if we are ever going to fully accept human diversity in all its manifestations.”25 Furthermore, she maintains that the assumption of a “sugary grin” is “a very necessary pretence, a witness to our moral efforts no less than to our moral failures,”26 and that public sincerity would be devastating to liberal democracy. Thus insincerity and hypocrisy are necessary as a means for dealing with difference within pluralistic societies. The upshot of Shklar’s argument seems to be that social and political hypocrisy allows us to create a shared public space in which we can move, and in which we can carry on discourse and make decisions on matters in which we have a stake, leaving our differences in abeyance. Revealing our genuine private selves might just cause silence and embarrassment when what is needed is dialogue and confidence about matters of shared concern. Thus tolerance requires hypocrisy, which should therefore be welcomed into our political landscape. Another political theorist, Ruth Grant, also argues not only that “hypocrisy is a necessity in politics,”27 but also, more ambitiously, that “some forms of hypocrisy may be perfectly acceptable or even laudable,”28 and indeed that “the practice of liberal politics is improved by a certain sort of hypocrisy, even though liberalism understands itself as an alternative to hypocritical politics.”29 Although Grant’s arguments parallel Shklar’s in many regards, she brings several additional insights about liberalism to the fore. For Grant, “The argument for hypocrisy, whether as simply necessary or as the preferred alternative, depends on a critique of the possibility of honest political relations.”30 She finds such a critique in the writings of Machiavelli.31 Briefly stated, Grant argues that hypocrisy is inevitable, given certain ordinary features of the human condition, which indeed also seem to reflect the conditions under which tolerance becomes a necessity: “Hypocrisy will arise in relations of mutual dependence among people with conflicting interests who cannot be relied on to adhere to moral prescriptions.”32 Under these circumstances, the opinions of others are crucial to us in protecting our own interests. The need to protect our reputations then leads directly to concealing one’s shortcomings, and to expressing adherence to prevailing norms even when one does not fully accept them, which amounts to a strategy of deliberate deception and hypocrisy. “Dependence, vanity, moral discourse, and

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hypocrisy are interwoven threads of the political and social fabric.”33 What is more, Grant argues that such hypocrisy is especially prevalent in liberal democracies because they place additional requirements of interdependence upon their citizens. “The problem of hypocrisy is pressing in democratic politics because of the new kinds of dependencies that it produces. Where all are equal, no one can go it alone.”34 Grant echoes Shklar in portraying hypocrisy as the alternative to a complete frankness that can be cruel and corrosive. In this sense, hypocrisy seems roughly equivalent to civility, and polite deception is thought necessary to keeping liberal democratic societies moving smoothly. But Grant wants to provide a further role for hypocrisy as well. Grant’s main argument for the desirability of hypocrisy begins with a loose division of liberals into two camps, that might be called the idealists and the cynics.35 The idealists view the political process as a rational debate between people who are genuinely concerned with truth and justice, and are willing to adhere closely to principle in support of whatever policies emerge from the democratic process. The cynics view the political process as one of compromise between essentially self-interested individuals, who negotiate by any means available to obtain acceptance of policies that work in their favour. Grant claims that neither camp gives hypocrisy its due. The idealists are criticized for naïvely ignoring the prominent role self-interest and hypocrisy play in human interactions, and thus failing to recognize how things “really work.” The cynics see hypocrisy as just one strategy among many that people might use in pursuit of their own interests. In general, however, the open acknowledgement of self-interest and the use of free trade are thought to render hypocrisy a strategy of negligible importance. Grant claims that, in reducing everything to self-interest, the cynical viewpoint fails to recognize the role ideas, norms, and opinions play in democratic politics. Since hypocrisy depends upon such norms and opinions, it might be inferred that, through failing to appreciate their role, the cynics also fail to acknowledge the important role of hypocrisy in politics. Grant’s main argument to the effect that “liberal political practice might actually be improved by the sort of political hypocrisy it generates,”36 seems rooted in a conception, reminiscent of La Rochefoucauld, of hypocrisy as a sort of homage to virtue. The decision-making process in liberal democracies is understood to be one of providing reasons that may persuade others to adopt one’s favoured policies. If these reasons are not genuine — that is, if one favours a given policy because it serves one’s own interests, but argues for it on some other basis which is thought more likely to garner approval — then the result is a sort of hypocrisy. Grant suggests, however, that it is worthwhile to maintain the public requirement of principled decisions that opens the door

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for such hypocrisy. She argues that at least some limitation is imposed on unbridled self-interest by the need to provide reasons others might find compelling, and that people who engage in such political hypocrisy might emerge with a greater respect for the political process, and the interests of others, than they had when they began. This feature of liberalism has been provocatively referred to by Jon Elster as “the civilizing force of hypocrisy.”37 The key passage in Grant reads as follows: Every act of hypocrisy involves a pretence of virtue, which necessarily includes public acknowledgement of moral standards for political action, and sometimes, that public statement is the best that can be done. Moreover, even the pretence can serve as a genuine constraint. If the pretence is to rationalism, people are constrained to give evidence and to defend their position in the light of generally agreed-upon criteria. There is a limit to what can be proposed; in order to be defensible, a proposal must often actually be in the other’s interest at least to some extent. Moreover, people who initially adopt a pretence of rationalism in order to advance their own interest are sometimes led to appreciate the ways in which the ethic of rationalism, which the necessity of the pretence presupposes, functions for the general good. At best, they may be led to a genuine openness to reasonable persuasion.38 The claim seems to be that, given that people will generally act in a purely self-interested way, it is better to require them to disguise their self-interest than to pursue it openly. A system in which people are at least constrained to pay lip service to principles beyond their self-interest is preferable to a system in which people are baldly self-interested, even though the former system is more prone to hypocrisy. Even if Grant is right about this, she claims more than she is entitled to. To say that sometimes we have to lie or be hypocritical to avoid a greater evil is one thing — to say that hypocrisy is a virtue is quite another. The confusion between these two claims poses a threat to the clarity of our moral and political thought. Grant still wants to condemn most forms of hypocrisy, but applaud some forms of it. There is room to wonder whether creating such a schism between our moral and our political normative evaluations is advisable. She also opens the door for criticism on another score. She suggests, in relation to self-interest, that open acknowledgement of self-interest might lead to an increase in its motivational force. A similar result could arise from her

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treatment of hypocrisy. Open acknowledgement of the possibility that hypocrisy can be good may make some people less reluctant to engage in hypocrisy. Thus Grant’s argument in favour of hypocrisy, if widely disseminated, could lead to an increase in hypocrisy. And there is no guarantee that the new cases of hypocrisy that arose would all be of the benign sort — her argument might well also increase instances of the vicious sort of hypocrisy, which she wants to condemn. In any case, it is not clear Grant is correct in her claims. Her argument for the alleged virtue of hypocrisy seems to portray it as the only alternative to an openly cynical form of political discourse. It is not obvious, however, how this came to be the only alternative, given her earlier discussion of two liberal camps. Presumably, the idealist camp has been abandoned as having naïvely misjudged human nature. One reply to this, it would seem, would be to argue that human nature has greater potential than it is here given credit for. This is not the place to engage in such a discussion of human nature. But Grant has another argument in the background here, which might explain why she rejects principled adherence to justice as a possible alternative to political hypocrisy. Grant argues that honesty and strict adherence to principle simply leads to a different kind of hypocrisy, which she calls “righteous hypocrisy.”39 People who rigidly adhere to principles, refusing to get their hands dirty or to compromise with others, are, Grant claims, dangerous in many ways. For one thing, they may use the appearance of adhering to principle and aiming at what justice, religion, or the best interests of others require as a way of increasing their own standing. Grant argues that this could constitute hypocrisy, even if the people involved are self-deceived or in some such way unaware of what they are doing.40 Furthermore, these people’s refusal to compromise may lead to an unnecessarily adverse political outcome, and yet in failing to acknowledge their own responsibility for the poor outcome, these people may engage in a further sort of hypocrisy. We agree that hypocrisy of the righteous variety exists, and can be extremely dangerous. It is far from clear, though, that honesty and adherence to principle always entail such hypocrisy. Perhaps this should be taken as a warning to be alert to the possibility of principled stands becoming corrupt, either within ourselves or others. But that simply amounts to a warning that the vice of hypocrisy is easy to fall into. It certainly does not establish Grant’s stronger claim that hypocrisy can be a virtue. Perhaps what we should do is aim for honesty and principled pursuit of justice, while remaining alert to the danger that we and others may lapse into the vice of hypocrisy.

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So it appears that Grant’s arguments fall short of her goal of demonstrating that hypocrisy is actually a virtue in some circumstances. What is more, both Grant and Shklar argue in part that society cannot endure complete frankness, but that anything short of complete disclosure of what one thinks in one’s private, genuine self is hypocrisy.41 It is not clear that concealing private thoughts does amount to hypocrisy, however. Even though it can be seen as a form of deception, not all deception is hypocritical. For one thing, hypocrisy typically involves using deception to gain some advantage for oneself. If one disapproves of another but does not say so openly, one might well be motivated by concern for the other — by a desire to avoid causing psychological pain or discomfort. A little bit of deception in the service of such motivations does not seem to amount to hypocrisy. When Grant and Shklar point out deceptions that go beyond this (such as currying favour with those upon whom one depends, for personal advantage), they may indeed be describing a form of hypocrisy. But even though they may be right that such cases are common, perhaps particularly within liberal democracies, they have failed to make out their case that these forms of hypocrisy are morally acceptable or praiseworthy. When they restrict themselves to the cases that are positively useful for society, they seem to be describing not hypocrisy, but either a simple falling short of one’s principles, or the distinct virtue of civility. Although they have failed to make out the case that hypocrisy can be a positive feature of liberal democracies, the appearance of “civility” in this context brings us back to the question of the relationship between toleration and hypocrisy.

D. Tolerance and Hypocrisy There is a further way in which liberal toleration might appear as a species of hypocrisy. If one is committed to particular beliefs about what is good or bad, or right or wrong, it is normally understood that one should do what lies within one’s power to bring about what is good or right, and prevent what is bad or wrong. Integrity seems to demand no less. Yet in tolerating another, we seem to be doing less. We proclaim belief in a particular principle, yet we do nothing to prevent its violation by others. What is more, in the interests of the smooth functioning of society, we may not even voice our disapproval. Toleration might be taken to involve a reluctance even to let others know that one thinks less of them for engaging in behaviour one considers immoral or impious. Tolerance, surprisingly enough, seems to violate what we owe to others: truth, correction, setting them on the right path. What is more, tolerance standardly occurs within the normative sphere. Does one, can one, tolerate flat-earthers? It seems not. So the tolerant person disapproves of x, yet

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does not act on this judgment: he or she has a principle or rule, usually within the normative sphere, but does not practise it. But having one’s preaching and practice out of joint seems to be characteristic of hypocrisy. Yet tolerance is commonly considered a virtue, albeit a puzzling one. Some remarks by Joseph Raz might help to explain why this is so. Raz writes: “Toleration is a distinctive moral virtue only if it curbs desires, inclinations, and convictions which are thought by the tolerant person to be in themselves desirable. Typically a person is tolerant if and only if he suppresses a desire to cause to another a harm or hurt which he thinks the other deserves.”42 As a definition of tolerance, this does not seem completely adequate. Suppressing one’s desire to hurt another when one thinks the other deserves it is not sufficient for tolerance, since one may simply be unwilling to administer the punishment for reasons such as fear, squeamishness, cowardice, a kickback, or other entirely self-regarding motives. Nevertheless, Raz’s remarks interestingly highlight both what is problematic about tolerance, and why it might nevertheless be considered a virtue. In standard cases of virtues, one curbs desires and inclinations that one judges to be undesirable.43 In the case of toleration, strangely enough, the inclinations curbed are ones one judges desirable. What the other is doing is considered wrong or repulsive, and thus the urge to stop it is praiseworthy. Yet one refrains. Indeed, the virtue might be thought to reside exactly in this self-restraint. Intolerance is here seen to involve a lack of self-restraint or selfcontrol, aiming at controlling or manipulating the other. Why should refraining from manipulating others be a virtue, however? If one is manipulating another for one’s own benefit (e.g., through fraud), then refraining from the manipulation certainly seems to be morally better than engaging in it. In the case of intolerance, however, it may be that one is manipulating the other for the other’s benefit. If I think I have some responsibility for the welfare of others, and, say, I really believe that others will get to heaven only if they practise religion in a particular way, then it makes sense I would do everything I can to ensure that others practise religion in the right way. Bernard Williams has claimed44 that Europeans were able to stop the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries only because they became less confident of the claim that people would go to heaven only if they practised religion in a particular way. He suggests that some came to believe that God’s will was less knowable than they had thought, and thus that we could not be sure a particular form of observance was required. Others maintained the belief that we could know God’s will, but concluded that what God wills is observance of some form or another, not observance of any particular form. In either case, the end result was not so much toleration as we understand

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it, but increased indifference to contrary forms of worship. Thus it remains puzzling why there could be anything wrong with intolerance if one really believes what the other is doing is wrong or harmful to that person. The answer to this question must lie in the same considerations that lead us to think paternalism is generally wrong. My obligation to help others, or to provide them with truth and correction, might simply lose out to another obligation, the obligation to respect their autonomy. I may owe this obligation even if I believe that the other is making a mistake, or doing something I find distasteful. The importance of toleration to liberalism can be understood only if one understands liberalism to have a commitment to an underlying substantive value: the value of autonomy.45 With this in mind, it is possible to draw a number of contrasts between tolerance and hypocrisy. In tolerance, the other is typically a beneficiary while in hypocrisy the other is a victim. Tolerance disagrees with the other, but has regard for, or includes, the other, while hypocrisy uses the other as a mere means to the villain’s own ends. Tolerance may often speak its mind: I believe this, you believe that; I am right, you are mistaken, but I am willing to put up with it. On the other hand, deceit is essential to hypocrisy, and to make one’s hypocritical project explicit is to destroy it. Granted, deception may sometimes be required for tolerance as well. For example, upon meeting a gay couple, a person who thinks homosexuality is immoral might be required to pretend to an indifference s/he does not really feel. This deceptive silence, however, is motivated by regard for the autonomy of others, not self-interest. Tolerance respects the autonomy and equal standing of others, while hypocrisy does not. Before leaving this topic, it is worth noting that what people tolerate often says more about them than about others, and may suggest a need for self-transformation. For example, racists may have to “tolerate” the presence of members of the hated race in their communities. They may, for example, have to work with members of the race in question even though they believe that members of that race should not have been given the job in the first place. In this case, the racist might exercise tolerance by refraining from expressing his or her racist views. The fact that one has to exercise tolerance here reveals a strong and unhealthy prejudice, and what would be best would be to work on a different attitude toward the other, rather than exercise valiantly one’s condescending tolerance. This, however, is consistent with the virtue of tolerance outlined above. Tolerance is to be respected only when it accommodates the autonomy of others, against a background assumption of moral equality. Where tolerance merely serves to cover up a rejection of the assumption of

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moral equality, it takes on a condescending tone which makes its status as a virtue questionable at best. In conclusion, we have argued that the relationship between toleration and hypocrisy is a complex one, but that their connections are not as morally problematic as some critics would suggest. Although writers such as Shklar and Grant have certainly highlighted ways in which any political system might be prone to hypocrisy, and have cast a revealing light on the dangers of hypocrisy for liberalism in particular, they have failed to make out the claim that hypocrisy can actually be a virtue within a political system. Furthermore, although the problematic virtue of toleration appears to involve the vice of hypocrisy, this appearance turns out to be misleading. Once one accepts respect for autonomy as a substantive liberal value, it becomes possible to appreciate why toleration is a virtue within liberalism, and how it can after all be clearly distinguished from hypocrisy.

Notes 1. Bernard Williams, “Tolerance: An Impossible Virtue?” in Toleration: An Elusive Virtue, edited by David Heyd (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996) 18. 2. See, for example, John Morley, On Compromise (London: Watts, 1933), cited in Shklar, “Let Us Not Be Hypocritical,” 67-68. 3. In this chapter, “tolerance” and “toleration” will be used interchangeably. 4. A useful proposal for a definition of this term can be found in Peter Nicholson, “Toleration as a Moral Ideal,” in John Horton and Susan Mendus (editors), Aspects of Toleration (London: Methuen, 1985). For a careful critique of this definition, see Mary Warnock, “The Limits of Toleration,” in Susan Mendus and David Edwards (editors), On Toleration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), see especially pp. 125-127. 5. The disagreement must also apparently be of a cognitive sort. If you like chocolate ice cream and I prefer vanilla, it would be a strange usage to say that I “tolerate” your eating chocolate, even though I disapprove of it at some level. Mere differences of taste do not generally seem to require anything as weighty as “tolerance.” 6. Susan Mendus, in the introduction to Susan Mendus and David Edwards (editors), On Toleration, 3. 7. This term refers to French Protestants, particularly of the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, who were facing considerable persecution in their own country. 8. One way he supported this claim was through the controversial argument that new immigrants would increase the labour force, which would result in lower wages, which would be good for the overall economy by lowering the cost of living. Many modern trade unions would vehemently object to the economic assumptions here, again demonstrating how vulnerable Locke’s pragmatic arguments for toleration are. Note that such economic disagreements continue to influence people’s attitudes about whether to “tolerate” new immigrants into the country to this day.

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9. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, with an Introduction by Patrick Romanell (Indianapolis: The Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill, 1955) 54. 10. Susan Mendus has made this point clearly in her discussion of the “argument from prudence,” in her introduction to Mendus and Edwards, On Toleration, 5. 11. Rousseau put forward one of the strongest arguments for the claim that members of a society need to share a way of life if the community is to flourish (see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, translated by Maurice Cranston [Baltimore: Penguin, 1968]), though the idea goes back at least as far as Aristotle’s Politics. Charles Taylor has presented a compelling modern version of the argument, using it against liberalism in particular. See in particular his The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992) and Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition,” edited by Amy Gutman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). 12. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty. 13. J. Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, 39. 14. See A Letter Concerning Toleration, 15 and 52. For an interesting discussion of these views, see Maurice Cranston, “John Locke and the Case for Toleration,” in S. Mendus and D. Edwards, On Toleration. 15. J. Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, 16-17. 16. Ibid., 45. 17. Ibid., 18. That Locke saw hypocrisy as a vice is also evident from his discussion in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter XXII, Section 2. 18. Of course the claim that one’s sexuality is beyond one’s control has been frequently disputed, but when all is said and done, the evidence that people do not choose to be gay (for example) seems compelling. 19. It must be acknowledged that this discussion glides over some intriguing and complex questions about what is and is not essential to one’s identity. For example, it might be claimed that a person who passes for white is not denying anything essential to his or her identity — that these are merely socially constructed categories that are or should be incidental to whether one is accepted as a person. Unfortunately, we are not able to pursue these complex issues at this time. Suffice it to say that the hypocrisy will be greater the more central a given characteristic being denied is to one’s identity. 20. Eva Feder Kittay has called such individuals “victim hypocrites” and offered some interesting insights into the phenomenon in her article, “On Hypocrisy.” We discuss such cases in several contexts in this book, but see in particular Chapter 9. 21. Shklar, Ordinary Vices, 77. 22. Ibid., 76. 23. Ibid., 77. 24. Ibid., 77. 25 . Ibid., 77. One might also think here of members of parliament referring to others as “the honourable member,” even when they are rising to call into question the motives and judgment of the other, or colleagues at a university referring to “my distinguished colleague” when they impugn the other’s learning and ability. 26. Ibid., 78. 27. Ruth W. Grant, Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997) 175. 28. Ibid., 2. 29. Ibid., 178-79. 30. Ibid., 18.

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31. A considerable portion of her book is then devoted to exploring how Rousseau who, she claims, accepted and admired Machiavelli’s critique, and thus agreed with the inevitability of vanity and hypocrisy in human beings qua social beings, could still place such emphasis on the value of integrity. 32. Ibid., 29. 33. Ibid., 176. 34. Ibid., 176. 35. This is our terminology, not Grant’s. 36. Ibid., 177. 37. Jon Elster, ed., Deliberate Democracy, 12. We discuss this notion also in Chapter 6 of this book. 38. Grant, Hypocrisy and Integrity, 180. 39. See Ibid., 64 ff. 40. Indeed, Grant claims the more commonly discussed deliberate and self-aware form of hypocrisy “is arguably the least interesting as well as the least significant for politics” (171). For further reflections on the possibility and importance of selfdeceived hypocrisy, see Szabados, “Hypocrisy,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 9 (1979) 195-210, Statman, “Hypocrisy and Self-Deception,” Philosophical Psychology, 10 (1997) 57-75, and Chapter 13 of this book. 41. We provide some discussion of such “broad hypocrisy” in Chapter 9. 42. Joseph Raz, “Autonomy, Toleration and the Harm Principle,” in Susan Mendus, ed. Justifying Toleration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 162. 43. This claim is complicated by the observation that, on some accounts of the virtues (such as Aristotle’s), the virtuous person is one who is not even tempted to do the wrong thing. Although such a person cannot accurately be described as curbing desires or inclinations, we are confident that it is possible to formulate the point made in the text in a way that accommodates this interpretation of the virtues. 44. In Bernard Williams, “Toleration: An Impossible Virtue?” in David Heyd, ed. Toleration (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996) 20. 45. This suggests that we should reject the view of some liberals, such as Rawls, that liberalism is “political not metaphysical” and involves no substantive conception of the good at all (“Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.14, 3, 223-51). For a good overview of the arguments for rejecting this view, see Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2nd edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).

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11 Double Standards and Equality “God may say to me: I am judging you out of your own mouth. Your own actions have made you shudder with disgust when you have seen other people do them.” 1 ludwig wittgenstein

A. Introduction As we have seen,2 there is disagreement about the moral status of hypocrisy. On what might be called the “Standard View,” hypocrisy is seen as a vice, deserving of moral condemnation. This condemnation is generally based on the notion that hypocrisy involves deliberate deception, of a sort which threatens our confidence in others’ sincerity and in our ability to reach accurate judgments about their internal beliefs and attitudes.3 On the other hand, the “New View” holds that hypocrisy requires merely any sort of discrepancy between things such as a person’s avowed principles and practice.4 On this view, hypocrisy is not necessarily seen as being morally wrong at all. Missing from this debate, however, is another potential argument against hypocrisy. This is that it offends against our sense of fairness and moral equality. It is this neglected additional aspect that we aim to examine in this chapter — namely how the use of “double standards” explains this sense of affront that the hypocrite poses. Hypocrites can be seen as displaying one set of standards in their preaching, and another in their practice. What is more, they may condemn others for motives or actions which they themselves indulge in. This seems to amount to the application of different standards to different people, or what might be called “double standards.” Yet it is not clear whether such use of double standards is either necessary or sufficient for hypocrisy. In this chapter, we shall use examples to explore the possibility that this sort of unfairness or moral inequality is what is morally wrong with hypocrisy.

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B. Scriptural Warnings Against Double Standards It may be useful here to return to the biblical usage of the term “hypocrisy” for insight into its function as a term of moral criticism. The relevant passages in Matthew seem to indicate two things. First, Jesus criticizes the Pharisees as hypocrites on the basis that they do not really practise what they preach, since they neglect the weightier aspects of the law: justice, mercy and good faith. The criticism targets an attitude of complacency as well as the gap between profession and performance. Here we can witness the explicit forging of hypocrisy as a tool of moral and social criticism, mainly of others’ conduct and character. Second, when Jesus warns people that not only murder and adultery but also anger and lust will be subject to judgment, he is criticizing the self-righteous who pretend to a moral superiority by feigning a purity of motives few have — a reminder of our shared human nature. For we are hypocrites if we condemn others for acting from motives we ourselves have and conceal. Here we have a powerful source of moral criticism of others, as well as ourselves, and one which seems to involve a sense of double standards. There is a problem however about how to understand these insights. On the one hand, we are provided with a powerful tool of moral and social criticism to hold people to their announced moral principles and commitments. And this presupposes moral discernment, comparison and judgment in the light of common standards. On the other hand, there also seems to be a global repudiation of judgment and criticism of others, since they are seen as a form of hypocritical pretence. How is this pair of apparently incompatible positions to be coherently interpreted? “Judge not, so you will not be judged”5 may be read as a global repudiation of moral judgment of any sort, whether it be the public or private assessment of persons or their actions. If taken to mean that we should not make the judgment that certain types of acts are immoral, this is clearly absurd. The Bible consistently tries to provide guidance as to which types of actions we should engage in and which are forbidden. In other words, the Bible itself presents us with a framework for moral judgment. It would be terribly inconsistent for it also to tell us not to make use of this framework. Presumably, if it is to be meaningful, the admonition must be against making the judgment that another person has violated one of the rules or principles one has reasonably judged to be morally applicable. One reason for being leery of this, of course, is simply that we cannot know for certain the intentions or mental states of others, and if morality is really about intentions and mental states (as the deontologically-oriented Bible suggests), then we are simply too prone to error to make useful moral judgments. Only God,

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who can see into people’s hearts and discern their secret thoughts, could be in a position to make such judgments accurately and effectively, and thus we should leave it to God. A further problem can be found in the fact that it may not be possible for us to follow this recommendation. Even if we could avoid public judgment of persons by exercising exceptional restraint, how could we avoid having private opinions about what was done or why it was done? Perhaps the Bible is here providing an impossibly high standard. It is not clear, however, whether that is a reason to reject this interpretation of the injunction. Perhaps the Bible should be understood as providing ideals at which to aim, even if we will inevitably fall short. And through keeping this ideal in mind, we can perhaps train ourselves to become genuinely less judgmental of others — not merely less openly so. It is interesting to note, however, that in the process of trying to attain this higher, less judgmental state, one will inevitably be engaging in behaviour that could be construed as hypocritical. One will be privately judging one’s fellow human beings, while publicly presenting a non-judgmental face. There is a further worry about this injunction to avoid judging others. This involves, not whether it is possible to avoid such judgment, but whether it is desirable. It may be that the “cure” for hypocrisy is worse than the disease. It may be important for us to maintain all available resources for making relevant moral distinctions. Furthermore, it may be necessary for society to administer punishment in some cases, which seems to require an element of judgment of others. Perhaps this biblical injunction should be interpreted to mean that we should avoid judgmentalism rather than moral judgment as such — for who wants to reject wise or judicious judgment? Such judgmentalism not only condemns what was done, but tends to have as a collaborative companion a self-righteous attitude in that the judge pretends to be of a higher moral species than the wrongdoer. What do these formative fragments reveal about the distinctive basis of “hypocrisy” as moral criticism? Could it perhaps be the use of double standards by the hypocrite? Note that in the first instance the Pharisees are criticized for displaying two sets of standards: one manifest in their preaching, another displayed in their behaviour, and the two are at odds with each other. In the second instance, the judgmental and self-righteous are criticized for using double standards: a demanding set of standards for the harsh judgment of others, a lenient set of standards for judging themselves, although they prefer to dispense with self-criticism altogether. The moral message is: be prepared to be judged by the same standards you use to judge others. This seems to

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be a message of moral consistency and fairness, a warning against double standards. This points to the surprising conclusion that the distinctive basis for the moral criticism of hypocrites is not simply their insincerity or deception (as the Standard View suggests) but the use of double standards. If this is so, then the New View, rather than erasing the moral dimension of hypocrisy, suggests a different location for its basis, even though it fails to elaborate it.

C. Two Senses of Double Standards The line of thinking we have been tracing suggests that the use of double standards is the essence of hypocrisy. The question that needs pressing then is whether the use of double standards is necessary and/or sufficient for hypocrisy. To begin, let us ask how the expression “the use of double standards” is to be interpreted. Suppose we understand it simply as two sets of standards we apply respectively to assess people. On this broad interpretation, using double standards does not seem sufficient for hypocrisy, since there are cases where one set of standards is explicitly set aside for one group of people and another set for another group of people. For example, we use one set of standards for judging children and their conduct, and another for judging adults and their conduct. Again, there are explicitly spelled-out policies of affirmative action which are intended to facilitate the entry of some historically disadvantaged group’s members, say natives or women, into professions from which they were excluded in the past. It may be said that in such cases we have a clear use of a double standard in the broad sense, yet no hypocrisy necessarily obtains. Notice then that the use of two sets of standards may be adopted because of relevant differences between the groups of people for whom such standards are deemed appropriate. Obviously there are such relevant differences between children and adults, which warrant different standards for holding them morally responsible, as well as for the way we treat them. Again, supporters of preferential treatment of natives or women attempt to justify such policies by reference to relevant differences between such groups and the dominant group, based on a history of unequal opportunities and unfair exclusion which have had consequences for the present generation of natives and women. Once children are grown up or equal opportunity has been achieved for minorities, the use of double standards is presumably abandoned, since they can no longer be justified. While this is a complex and difficult area which has received much attention in the discussion of concrete social issues and policies, our main concern here is simply to make the general point that the use of double standards as such does not guarantee hypocrisy.

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It might be thought, then, that it is the unjust use of double standards that constitutes hypocrisy — a failure to treat different cases differently and like cases alike. Even this unjust use of double standards is not enough to constitute hypocrisy, however. The bigot who wants to deny natives or women positions, for example, is clearly applying unjust double standards, but the wrongdoing here is more plausibly described as racism or sexism than as hypocrisy. After all, there are open and outspoken racists and sexists. Indeed, it is only if such a bigot decides to act in a “politically correct” manner and treat natives and women as equals while not really believing them to be so — or if the bigot’s actual unjust use of double standards is deceptively rationalized — that charges of hypocrisy might seem appropriate. Perhaps, then, a yet more limited domain for double counting will provide the required link to hypocrisy. Perhaps we should add to the unfair, discriminatory use of double standards a further feature suggested by the word “double.” This term seems similar in meaning and moral taint to “double-dealing,” and “double-faced.” The assumption behind such moral accusations of double standards is that there is one announced set of moral standards serving as the basis for comparison or judgment, yet we have the deceitful or insincere use of double standards, which unfairly favour some at the expense of others, for no morally justifiable reason.6 Since in such cases there is a more or less knowing use of such standards to unfairly discriminate against some people and to favour others, there may be greater or less blame attached to these practices. For example, the conformist tendency to follow indiscriminately the practices of a complacent society may reduce culpability, unless a person has reasons to think such practices unfair and ignores them or does not accord these reasons the significance they deserve.7 It is possible to observe and identify the distinctive motivation of the “strong” use of double standards in situations of shifting power, whether it be in interpersonal, social or political relations. In such situations the relevant differences that were invoked to justify the use of double standards have dropped out of the picture. Yet those who aim to retain power and control over the individuals or groups now unfairly discriminated against, pretend that the relevant differences still obtain, thus warranting different treatment. Or they may invoke double standards not so much to preserve the status quo, as to gain power over others by pretending that there are no relevant differences for differential treatment, when in fact there are and they know of them.

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D. Power-Shifts: Hypocritical Parents and Bureaucrats with Double Standards Let us take a closer look at scenarios of power-shifts through some examples, and see how the concrete details in turn help to shed light on some general points. The relationship between parents and children is a paradigm of an unequal interpersonal relation. Clearly there are relevant differences of a cognitive, emotional and experiential sort which warrant a double standard and a parental monopoly on power. However, such monopoly on power and control is challenged in adolescence. If we walk along the borderline of adolescence, along the line of the cut that both distinguishes children from adults, and unsettles that distinction, we witness the erosion of the relevant differences that justified the use of double standards. Parents are inclined to pretend to the existence of such differences long after their disappearance to maintain the adolescent’s inferiority. No doubt, this reluctance to grant autonomy is also often motivated by love and fear for the safety of young people, even though they tend to resent this, and complain of unfairness. While some parents give up power over the young too early, and some too late, a reasonable course is to have a transition period of increasing autonomy and equality. Parents who pretend to a complete lack of relevant difference prematurely, without overseeing the young’s activities, abandon their responsibilities.8 In such transitional periods in unequal power relations, the unfair, deceptive use of double standards, as well as hypocrisy, is likely to thrive. But it is worth noting that if such parental impeding of adolescent striving to a greater voice in decision-making over their own lives is motivated by benevolent, but excessive, concern for the teenager’s well-being, rather than the desire to retain control disguised as strict, responsible parenting, charges of hypocrisy seem misplaced. Unlike excessively or obsessively concerned parents, hypocrites are typically motivated by a desire to advance their own interests at the expense of their victims, rather than being benevolently concerned with their victims’ well-being. Again, hypocrites are typically after social approval, concealing their true motivation so as to seem morally better than they really are, and use this social approval to unfairly pursue their own partisan interests over those of others. So, some parents of teenagers are hypocritical because they use double standards to unfairly and deceptively maintain the inferiority of teenagers, perhaps to retain unpaid domestic contributions, such as babysitting, meanwhile seeking social approval as strict responsible parents. Some other parents, on the other hand, grant autonomy prematurely because of laziness or indifference, and pretend that there are no longer morally relevant differences,

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when in fact there are. Thereby they pretend to be liberated and cool parents, while in fact they really abandon their responsibilities. Families tend to avoid such unreasonable extremes by working out a middle way: gradually granting greater autonomy and at the same time requiring greater accountability. This middle way provides an expanding horizon of experience with more time for reflection and a maturing of teenage judgment. Consider now a rather different power shift. Suppose that a top civil servant, jealous of his privileges and powers, finds that “politically correct” rules and regulations about hiring for government jobs are encroaching on his domain. He is intelligent enough to see that he needs to tow the official line and express endorsement of the official policy. Yet when a vacancy arises in his bureaucracy, he does not follow due process of an open search for candidates for the job, which he insists on whenever a similar situation arises affecting others. He gives the job that involves working closely with him to a friend of proven competence, thus avoiding an open search. Such a person is clearly guilty of having and using double standards. Here we have a preserve of power of top bureaucrats eroded by the adoption of clear criteria for hiring, preceded by an open search. Our man endorses the new standards, insists that everyone follow them, yet he makes an exception of himself when he ignores the rules in hiring his friend. Notice that he seeks social and political approval when he endorses and enforces the “politically correct” standards, yet follows another standard which allows him to maintain a hold on his traditional powers. When challenged, our bureaucrat may pretend to relevant differences between this and other jobs. This seems like a clear case of the hypocritical use of double standards, and is blameworthy9 even if the friend he hired is very good for the job, since the bureaucrat knowingly violated the lawful processes and procedures for hiring while pretending to uphold them. If he had made explicit to himself what he was doing, he might have said to himself: “Quod licet jovis, non licet bovis.” (“What is permitted to the gods is not permitted to cattle.”) The use of double standards and a holier-than-thou attitude are both evident in this Roman adage. This is but a crude version of the bureaucrat’s attitude in our example. If the bureaucrat had conducted an open search and followed due process, he would have had the opportunity to point out that his friend and candidate has the required qualities, skills and experience for the job, besides their having had an excellent working relation in the past. No accusation of hypocrisy or blameworthiness is appropriate in such a situation.

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E. Is Double Counting Necessary for Hypocrisy? So far, it appears that there is indeed a link between hypocrisy and double counting, but that not just any sort of double counting amounts to hypocrisy. First of all, the double counting must unfairly distinguish between people, treating like cases differently. Secondly, the double counting must be done out of a distinctive form of deceitful, power-seeking motivation. Although this analysis casts light on an important strand of hypocrisy, there are two sorts of difficulties with the assertion that even this sort of suitably qualified double counting is necessary for hypocrisy. First, there may be some sorts of hypocrisy which do not involve invidious moral comparisons between oneself and others, and hence a reference to double standards. Consider, for example, cynical moral con artists such as Tartuffe and Uriah Heep. They do not so much have or use double standards as pretend to a unique moral superiority in order to manipulate others so as to gain an unfair advantage over them. If they are nevertheless to be considered hypocrites, then double standards are not even a necessary condition for hypocrisy. A more realistic example makes the same point. Suppose that a recently recruited careerist academic pretends to be especially research oriented and collegial for ulterior reasons, being aware that these are traits that weigh heavily with those on the tenure committee. As soon as s/he is granted tenure, s/he curtails his or her scholarly activities to a bare minimum. Suppose further that when s/he detects the same pattern of behaviour and motivation in an incoming junior colleague, s/he simply notes this but without censure or condemnation. Now insofar as s/he deceives the peers, for selfish reasons, about relevant aspects of his or her character that are deemed important by those who are to share an academic life with him/her, s/he is a good candidate for hypocrisy, even though s/he is not using double standards at all. Second, even if hypocrisy is basically social in that it assumes and targets an audience, there are derivative forms of it, where the hypocrisy is internal in the sense that one is one’s own audience and pretends to oneself that one has a unique moral status. A person who thus deceives him/herself need not judge others at all, or s/he may be tolerant, condescending or patronizing toward others, without condemning them. Since such hypocrites appear not to use double standards, they offer further reason to doubt whether double standards are necessary for hypocrisy. Although the analysis of double standards seemed to cast light on an important and broad range of hypocrisies, there seem then to be counterexamples to the claim that double counting is necessary for hypocrisy. Unless the problems posed by these counter-examples can be surmounted, it may be

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appropriate to claim merely that double standards are symptoms of the moral vice of hypocrisy.10

F. Conclusion We have argued that “hypocrisy” is a multi-faceted term of moral criticism. Besides being insincere or morally subversive, hypocrites provoke our moral condemnation because, in standard cases, they offend our sense of fairness and moral equality. We explored, through examples, the manipulative and unfair use of double standards to gain advantage over others, and claimed that this feature may partly explain an additional aspect of the peculiar moral opprobrium usually attached to the term. We further argued, however, that having and using two sets of standards is not sufficient for hypocrisy. The hypocrite does not simply use two sets of standards in his/her judgments but s/he uses them: a) unfairly to discriminate against others, b) deceptively, to increase or preserve his/her power and control over others, c) to seek social approval through a rhetoric of his/her own moral superiority, d) which is often expressed in his/her moral censure or criticism of others. Even at this, however, the use of double standards does not seem equivalent to hypocrisy. There seem to be cases of hypocrisy that do not involve double standards at all. Accordingly, the most appropriate conclusion may be that double counting of the sort identified is an important symptom of hypocrisy, or even a characteristic of some central cases, and is probably responsible for much of the moral opprobrium usually attached to hypocrisy, but that it cannot provide necessary and sufficient conditions for hypocrisy.

Notes 1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, translated by Peter Winch (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980) 87e. 2. Discussion of this theme appears throughout the book, but see in particular Chapter 9. 3. Leading advocates of this view include Eva Feder Kittay, “On Hypocrisy,” and Christine McKinnon, “Hypocrisy, With a Note on Integrity.” 4. Leading advocates of this view include Dan Turner, “Hypocrisy,” and Thomas Hurka, “Hypocrisy: Not All It’s Cracked Down to Be.” 5. Or its companion warnings, such as, “He who is without sin among you, let him be the first to throw a stone at her” (John 8:7) and “Why do you look at the speck that is in your brother’s eye, but do not notice the log that is in your own eye?. . . You hypocrite, first take the log out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to take out the speck that is in your brother’s eye” (Luke 6:41-42. See also Matthew 7:3-5).

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6. Notice that, if this really is why double standards draw moral accusations, then there is a sort of deception at work after all, in pretending to use standards other than what one in fact uses. We discuss the importance of deception for hypocrisy in detail in Part IV of this book. 7. This observation seems to fit well with the judgment that people who have suffered from a particular form of wrong, such as prejudice, may have more obligation than others to be sensitive to such wrong, and to avoid imposing that harm on others. For more discussion of complacency and hypocrisy, see Crisp and Cowton, “Hypocrisy and Moral Seriousness,” and Chapter 13 of this book. 8. A similar problem arises concerning the treatment of old, dependent parents by their now adult children. 9. Turner (“Hypocrisy”) gives a sketchy, similar example and, after providing a sparse discussion, declares such a case to be an unblameworthy case of hypocrisy — a somewhat puzzling moral judgment to say the least. 10. Piers Benn cryptically speaks of “the crude application of double standards being a frequent symptom of hypocrisy.” See his “What is Wrong with Hypocrisy?” in International Journal of Moral and Social Studies, 8 (1993) 228.

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part iv

Deception: Aspects and Roles

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12 Hypocrisy and Deception “We often do good to be able to accomplish evil with greater immunity.” 1 la rochefoucauld “When we and the hypocrite have learned how hypocrisy is exposed, we might have to cope with the second order hypocrite, the doublebluffer who has learned how not to act like a hypocrite.” 2 gilbert ryle

A. Introduction That hypocrisy necessarily involves deception has struck some writers as so obvious that it has been put forward without argument as a shared basic intuition.3 Indeed, hypocrites are commonly characterized as falsely professing to be virtuously inclined; as assuming a false appearance of virtue or goodness while dissimulating their real character or inclinations; as feigning virtue that they do not have, or pretending to be more virtuous than they really are. So there is good reason to think that deception is essential to hypocrisy.4 Nevertheless, it is possible to have doubts about this conventional picture. Perhaps it is shaped and nourished by an overly narrow diet of examples, which are ultimately unrepresentative of the broad range of hypocrisies. Perhaps deception is characteristic of only a small, albeit striking, range of cases. It is in this spirit that some philosophers have lately denied the necessity of any sort of deception or insincerity for hypocrisy, arguing for example that persons who openly admit to not practising what they preach are still correctly called hypocrites.5 In this chapter we examine such arguments and claim that, even though they point to neglected or unnoticed parts of the conceptual landscape, they sabotage their very goal by oversimplifying the nature of deception and the various roles it can play in hypocrisy.

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B. Hypocrisy as Inconsistency Those who deny that deception is essential to hypocrisy generally offer an account of hypocrisy that centres on inconsistency — on a failure to live up to one’s own principles. The etymological history of this usage, as we have seen, goes at least as far back as the accusations of Jesus against the Pharisees that they are hypocrites because “they do not practice what they preach.”6 Several philosophers have followed this usage and, since inconsistency does not imply deception, these philosophers need not take deception to be essential to hypocrisy. Thomas Hurka is one philosopher who takes inconsistency to be the essence of hypocrisy, saying, “Hypocrites don’t walk their talk: they profess one thing and do another.”7 It is largely this account of hypocrisy that allows Hurka to claim of hypocrisy that “its common forms aren’t that terrible, and it’s never that morally important.”8 Roger Crisp and Christopher Cowton do not, as Hurka does, define hypocrisy in terms of inconsistency, but they do identify a specific form of hypocrisy they call “the hypocrisy of inconsistency.” They define this as “the uttering of some overriding moral requirement that does apply to oneself and then failing to live up to it.”9 They also make it explicit that this account allows the possibility of hypocrisy with no deception, stating that “one can indulge in the most flagrant hypocrisy of inconsistency without pretence.”10 Another philosopher who discusses this form of hypocrisy is Judith Shklar. She suggests that, in modern pluralist democracies, hypocrisy is used in this sense of inconsistency when people want to criticize others with whom they share no common moral or political ground. Presumably, in such a case there is no point naming what one sees as a specific moral shortcoming in one’s opponents, because they with their different value systems will not recognize it as a criticism. The charge of hypocrisy as inconsistency still has bite, however, since everyone wants to be consistent in his or her beliefs, no matter how diverse those beliefs. Indeed, pointing out such an inconsistency may be a way of indirectly supporting one’s own perspective. The suggestion would be that the reason one’s opponents are unable to follow their beliefs consistently is that those beliefs are false, unlike one’s own. In any case, Shklar says that in such cases, “both sides measure the distance between assertion and performance and then both say ‘hypocrisy.’”11 She is here clearly pointing to a use of “hypocrisy” as inconsistency. Finally, Dan Turner offers an account of hypocrisy that focuses on “disparity pairs,” such as words versus deeds, pretended beliefs versus genuine beliefs, or beliefs versus desires.12 Turner claims that this model of properly restricted disparity pairs captures shared basic intuitions about hypocrisy,

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without legislating away conflicting ones, and “is enough to generate most, if not all, of the central structure of the notion.”13 Moreover, and significantly for our present purpose, Turner sees it as a virtue of his account that it does not presuppose or entail any sort of deception or insincerity, nor that hypocrisy is always a bad thing.14 Although there are noteworthy differences in the details of these accounts of hypocrisy, our primary focus is the negative claim they have in common: that hypocrisy need not involve deception or insincerity of any sort. We will argue that this claim is mistaken. For one thing, we will argue15 that philosophers who focus on an account of hypocrisy as inconsistency have difficulty explaining how hypocrisy differs from what appear to be distinct forms of inconsistency, such as weakness of will, change of mind, or mere forgetfulness. It is instructive in this context to note how readily such accounts blend hypocrisy with weakness of will. Consider, for instance, what Thomas Hurka asserts in the following passage: “In a common form of hypocrisy, you believe the moral principles you state and wish you could live up to them. But you can’t — you’re weak willed.”16 First, however, let us consider some of the examples defenders of the inconsistency accounts of hypocrisy put forward in support of their conception. We will argue that, when cases are treated with sufficient depth, it emerges that only the cases that involve deception at some level are clear candidates for hypocrisy.

C. Out-of-the-Closet Hypocrites and Other Cases that Appear Not to Involve Deception — But Do Dan Turner offers an argument in the form logicians call modus tollens for the conclusion that hypocrisy need not involve deception. First, he states that “if hypocrisy is a form of deception, then there can be no ‘out-of-the closet’ hypocrites.”17 He goes on to say that there are, however, “out-of-the-closet” hypocrites. Therefore, hypocrisy is not a form of deception. Clearly, the force of this argument depends on the claim that there are “out-of-the-closet” hypocrites. Since this expression does not wear its meaning on its sleeve, it is necessary to consider what Turner means by it. The expression is used by Turner to describe people who openly and “freely acknowledge that they do not always practice what they preach.”18 Such alleged hypocrites are intended to provide a contrast to hypocrites who conceal their failure to practise what they preach, who are still in-the-closet. The expression “out-of-the-closet hypocrite” is provocative, for it resonates with the figure of speech now used to describe homosexuals who are open about their sexual orientation and publicly identify themselves as gay.

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Since they no longer conceal their sexual identity, they no longer pretend to be what they are not — hence, they no longer hide in-the-closet. The analogy only needs to be made explicit to see that it is misleading. A gay person, whether s/he is in- or out-of-the closet, is still gay. It is far from clear, however, whether a person who openly and freely declares that s/he does not practise what s/he preaches is still a hypocrite. This is a crucial dissimilarity, and Turner owes us a much more compelling case for the existence of “out-of-the-closet hypocrites” before helping himself to this analogy. Turner provides two examples which he thinks are appropriately described as “out-of-the-closet” hypocrisies, as hypocrisies without any sort of deception or insincerity. One of these, which concerns a vegetarian who sometimes eats meat, we will consider in detail in a later section.19 For now, consider Turner’s case of a cigarette smoker, who says, “I admit I am a hypocrite because I smoke, but I also want to urge you not to smoke; it is a terrible thing that no one should do.”20 The first interpretation of this case that comes to mind might be that the person involved is a nicotine addict. As such, the case can be generalized to include addictions to alcohol, drugs, gambling, or whatever. An addict who desperately needs a fix may say, in the middle of getting that fix, “whatever you do, don’t get yourself into this mess by becoming addicted,” thereby apparently satisfying the requirement for “out-of-the-closet” hypocrisy. Yet we would argue such cases are not plausible as hypocrisy. There are relevant differences between addiction and hypocrisy. One is that calling someone a “hypocrite,” laden as that term is with moral overtones, suggests that the person could have behaved differently, and could have practised what s/he preaches. An addict, on the other hand, can preach but cannot practise. As Crisp and Cowton observe, “it may be that the smoker is addicted to nicotine to the point that she really cannot do anything about it. In this case, she would be misusing the term ‘hypocrisy’ . . . If the smoker is unable to give up, then she cannot be required to give up, since ‘ought’ implies ‘can,’ to use Austin’s phrase.”21 If this is correct, then the defender of the inconsistency view needs a case where a person says, “I’m a hypocrite because I do what I’m telling you not to do,” but the reason for doing it is not that one is unable to do otherwise. But then what is the reason the person does what s/he advises others not to do? One other sort of case worth considering here involves people who are not strictly addicted, and could do otherwise, but are in the habit of acting in a particular way. A useful example along these lines is that of “a teacher who tells his pupils not to put their hands in their pockets because it looks slovenly and ruins one’s clothes and yet always has his own hands in his pockets.”22

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Presumably we would not say such a teacher is “addicted” to putting his hands in his pockets. But it is not obvious whether the teacher “could have done otherwise.” Bad habits are hard to break, although presumably not impossible. Perhaps this case is not different in essence from the case of the addict after all. If that is right, then the critics have again failed to provide a case in which a person could have lived up to his/her stated principles but does not. Of course, establishing the conditions under which people could have acted differently than they did would require us to address the issue of free will in a way that lies beyond the scope of this project, but if we are right that hypocrisy must involve the ability to have done otherwise, then we do not yet have here a compelling case of hypocrisy without deception. Even if we ignore the “could have done otherwise” argument, there are other reasons for thinking that people who do not practise what they preach are not necessarily hypocrites. For one thing, hypocrites are typically after social approval, cultivating the appearance of being principled persons by their preaching. The admitted miserable condition of the addict or habit-bound person is, by contrast, an object lesson as to why people should not smoke (or perhaps more convincingly, should not do crack-cocaine). Finally, the inconsistency between the addict’s statements and behaviour may be more apparent than real. If the statement “Don’t smoke” is taken to be an elliptical way of saying “Don’t start smoking,” then the addict’s ongoing behaviour is not after all contrary to the universal prescription. The addict may believe that it is acceptable for those who are already addicted to cigarettes to continue to smoke, but not acceptable for those who are not to start. But if this is the general proposition, then the addict’s behaviour in continuing to smoke does not after all contradict his/her stated principles, (the addict is not, after all, starting to smoke), and thus there need be no inconsistency.23 Although such people might commonly be referred to as hypocrites, we argue that this description may be inaccurate even if we count mere inconsistency as sufficient for hypocrisy, let alone if, as we maintain, use of the term should be reserved for cases in which there is deception of some sort involved. Of course, to say that hypocrisy and addiction are distinct is not to say that it is impossible to be both a hypocrite and an addict. We are not referring here to con artists who pretend to be addicts to embezzle funds, say, from the Addict’s Aid Society. Indeed, such a person is not really an addict at all, and may not be a hypocrite either. Rather, the hypocritical addict is a person who uses his/her public confessions of failure and apparent concern for others, to establish his/her reputation as a crusader against smoking or to deflect blame or criticism from his/her own conduct. The simple addict engages in self-disclosure when s/he openly admits to not practising what s/he preaches. The

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hypocritical addict uses such openness to conceal motives s/he thinks others would find unworthy of respect or unacceptable. Such people come out-ofthe-closet only to hide in another, perhaps more difficult to detect, closet. This is indeed a compelling case of hypocrisy, but notice that it also involves some sort of deception or insincerity. While in standard cases of hypocrisy, the deception often consists of concealing the gap between the preaching and practice, the “out-of-the-closet” sort of hypocrite, we suggest, has learned how such standard hypocrisy is detected or exposed, and how not to act like a standard hypocrite. S/he openly acknowledges the gap, yet continues to deceive or be insincere about his or her motives or inner core. Hence, these addict/ hypocrites, when properly described, direct attention to a neglected range of hypocrisy and help us to better understand the concept, but do not provide an example of hypocrites who are not deceivers. A classic example along these lines arises in Molière’s play Tartuffe (the alternate name of which is The Hypocrite). The title character is a man who pretends to extreme religious piety so as to work his way into the home of a man named Orgon, where he is not only fed and sheltered, but generally fawned upon and treated as an honoured guest. Tartuffe takes advantage of his host’s hospitality, and even goes so far as to make advances on Orgon’s wife, Elmire. Orgon’s son, Damis, reports this scandalous behaviour to his father, in Tartuffe’s presence. The key passage for our present purpose is Tartuffe’s reaction, speaking to Orgon, when thus accused: Yes, brother, I am wicked, I am guilty, A miserable sinner, steeped in evil, The greatest criminal that ever lived Each moment of my life is stained with soilures; And all is but a mass of crime and filth; Heaven, for my punishment, I see it plainly, Would mortify me now. Whatever wrong They find to charge me with, I’ll not deny it But guard against the pride of self-defence. Believe their stories, arm your wrath against me And drive me like a villain from your house; I cannot have so great a share of shame But what I have deserved a greater still. Ah! Let him speak; you chide him wrongfully; You’d do far better to believe his tales. Why favour me so much in such a matter? How can you know of what I’m capable?

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And should you trust my outward semblance, brother, Or judge therefrom that I’m the better man? No, no; you let appearances deceive you; I’m anything but what I’m thought to be, Alas! And though all men believe me godly, The simple truth is, I’m a worthless creature.24 Is Tartuffe being hypocritical in this passage? If deception is crucial for hypocrisy, then it might seem the answer has to be no, since what he says is true. He tells Orgon that he is a scoundrel — which we know to be true — and further warns Orgon not to be taken in by appearances, because he is anything but the godly man he is thought to be. Now, if all this is intended as a genuine confession, then it seems there cannot be any hypocrisy involved on Tartuffe’s part. However, there is reason to think this is not after all a genuine confession. First of all, the very fact that Tartuffe does seem to be a thoroughgoing scoundrel makes us suspicious of any sudden transformation, and his later behaviour in the play (e.g., by again trying to seduce Orgon’s wife) confirms these suspicions. Even more telling, however, is Orgon’s reaction to Tartuffe’s speech. Orgon takes this confession as yet one more indication of Tartuffe’s piety. He not only gets angry at Damis for accusing such a saintly man of wrongdoing, but tries to earn Tartuffe’s forgiveness for the slur of his character by offering him the deed to his home, and his daughter’s hand in marriage. Since Tartuffe’s entire success is based on playing upon the sensibilities of his gullible host, it seems most likely that Tartuffe intended his speech to bring about exactly the sort of reaction it did. In that case, he says things that are true, in the confidence that they will not be believed, and will be viewed instead as a poignant demonstration of the virtue of humility. If this reading is correct, does the resulting situation amount to hypocrisy? It certainly has the element of trying to obtain a better reputation than one deserves, and thus we are surely tempted to consider this speech hypocritical. But again, what Tartuffe says in this passage is true. Accordingly, this might seem like exactly the sort of test case we were looking for. This appears to be a case of hypocrisy without deception, unless one merely stipulates it away, claiming it is not hypocrisy solely because it does not have this feature taken to be essential. On more careful consideration, however, it can be seen there is deception here after all. It is true that the words are literally true.25 Nevertheless, part of what is communicated through the speech is not true at all. Tartuffe is deliberately conveying the idea of someone who scrutinizes himself carefully for fault, and chastises himself soundly when he finds it, with genuine remorse.

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Yet he is none of this. He is indeed full of what the world considers fault, but even when he becomes aware of this, he has no interest in changing. He apparently believes that being a scoundrel is exactly the right way to be, especially if one can take advantage of others’ gullibility, to one’s own selfish advantage. Thus the appearance of remorse and humility that Tartuffe conveys in this speech is indeed deceptive, even though the words are literally true. And it is exactly this deception that provides an advantage for Tartuffe, gaining for him benefits that he could not obtain if people knew the truth. This does indeed seem to be a case of hypocrisy, then, but it is a case that turns out to support rather than undermine the account of hypocrisy as deception aimed at getting a better reputation than one deserves. So far, those who want to maintain that there can be hypocrisy without deception have failed to provide a compelling case. Some of the proposed cases, such as those involving addicts (or people with bad habits) who advise others to avoid the same predicament do not amount to hypocrisy. Other cases, such as that of Tartuffe, turn out to involve deception, though at a more subtle level than is immediately obvious. There are still other cases to consider, however. Another group of people who do not practise what they preach consists of those who believe that rules that apply to most people do not apply to them. Although this seems to meet exactly the definition of hypocrisy as inconsistency, we will argue that such cases often cannot plausibly be considered hypocrisy at all. Consider, for example, a person who has special skills or abilities that make it unlikely that s/he will be hurt by actions that would be very risky for others. This is the point behind examples where people on TV say things such as “Don’t try this at home, kids,” or “Remember, I’m a trained professional.” But surely there is no reason to think such people are hypocrites. If the general rule is that “only individuals with characteristic x can or should do action a,” then a person who has characteristic x is not being hypocritical in saying to those who do not, “I am going to do this, but you should not.” Similarly, society may authorize some individuals to do things that are prohibited to the general public. For example, emergency workers are entitled to drive through red lights when the rest of us cannot. If such emergency workers say as they drive by “I’m doing this, but you shouldn’t,” they are displaying the kind of inconsistency Turner and others identify, but surely nobody would think they were being hypocritical. Even if people are mistaken about their beliefs — even if they do not really have the skills that will shield them from injury, for example, or are simply deluded as to whether they are emergency workers, their failing to practise what they preach would not amount to hypocrisy. People who genuinely believe they are exempted

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from a rule in light of some specific characteristic are not being hypocritical if they act contrary to the rule while still recommending it to others. What would make such an individual a plausible candidate for hypocrisy would be if that person’s reason for being exempted boiled down to nothing more than “I don’t have to do that, and you do, because I’m me and you’re not.” Beside failing any plausible version of a universalizability test of morality, a person taking such a stance is likely to be doing exactly what we are arguing is crucial for hypocrisy — engaging in deception. People who simply assert that they are special, and that ordinary moral rules do not apply to them, are not likely to have much credibility. Accordingly, people who think this way are not likely to make their view explicit. They will publicly endorse the rule, urging others to follow it as if they think it applies to everyone, and keep secret their belief that it does not apply to them. Such people are indeed strong candidates for hypocrisy, and their failure to practise what they preach is crucial for identifying them as such, but notice that they are also deceivers. They deceptively suggest that they think the rule applies to everyone including them, when they really think it applies to everyone except them. We have argued that cases of “out-of-the-closet” hypocrites26 are candidates for hypocrisy only if there is some sort of deception or insincerity also involved. Deception in hypocrisy often takes the form of concealing from others a breach between one’s preaching and practice. However deception may take other forms too. The modified versions of “out-of-the-closet” hypocrites we elaborated show that a person may acknowledge or confess a failure to practise what s/he preaches, and deceptively use this apparent “openness” to evade moral censure or blame. The deception here is about inner motive or intention and this suggests that people may be hypocrites, even though they practise what they preach — if they pretend to be motivated by certain considerations while in fact being motivated only by a desire to appear to be motivated by those considerations. Here again, however, it seems that situations can only properly be described as involving hypocrisy when there is deception present.

D. Rigging One’s Principles: “Counterfactual Hypocrisy” There is another adaptive variation of hypocrisy that needs to be considered when searching for “hypocrisy of inconsistency” without deception. This variation involves people who make the actions of others a condition for practising, saying “I’ll follow this principle only if others join in.” An example, provided by Saul Smilansky, is that of a person who says: “I am an egalitarian. If egalitarianism triumphs I would be willing to give up two-thirds of my

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salary in taxation. But until then, as long as the present social order persists, it is perfectly legitimate for me to pay only a quarter of my salary in taxes . . . I am all for changing the rules, but why should I now be the only one to pay?”27 Smilansky claims that, although such an individual readily admits she does not practise what she preaches, she “is no less a hypocrite than her more immediately recognizable partner”28 who conceals her actions so that the failure to practise what she preaches is not noticed. If Smilansky is right, perhaps we have here an example of a person who is hypocritical in light of inconsistency alone, without appeal to deception. There are two reasons Smilansky cites to support his claim that this amounts to hypocrisy. The first is that “(with certain limited exceptions) one is obliged to practice what one preaches irrespective of the degree of acceptance of this preaching by others.”29 This reason has a kind of Kantian resonance in that it suggests that principles are categorical imperatives, and anyone who qualifies them with “ifs and buts,” or compromises them by conditions, is already well on the way to the hypocrisy allegedly inherent in consequentialism. This reason, let us note, is only as sound as the Kantian theory it presupposes, and there are reasons for serious misgivings about the latter. Indeed, the difficulty of maintaining this approach is indicated by Smilansky’s need to qualify the assertion by allowing “certain limited exceptions.” He would, for example, allow deviating from the path one advocates when “doing one’s bit in the direction of one’s preaching, without the support or parallel action of others, would be more or less suicidal,”30 such as might be true of an advocate of gun control in “the Wild West or Beirut.”31 Similarly, he allows deviation from one’s preaching when “the achievement of the social aim depends on mass conformity, since one individual’s contribution, when it is quite certain that others will not join in, is insignificant or nonexistent.”32 After such qualifications, which we agree are necessary, the Kantian claim no longer seems as striking or powerful. The second, and more powerful, reason Smilansky gives for believing that the person who says “I’ll do so only if others join in” is a hypocrite will not in fact help the person looking for an example of hypocrisy without deception. Smilansky claims that, contrary to appearances, there is deceit going on in such cases: “The deceit follows from the fact that there is a pretence of principle being declared, together with the knowledge that it is highly unlikely that the principle will be put to the test. Making the actions of others a condition for one’s actions pretty much guarantees that.”33 In other words, the person is in a sense stating a conditional of the form “If others do x, then I’ll do x, too.” If one knows the antecedent is false, however, then it seems the only reason to make such a statement is that one hopes to gain a reputation for being willing

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to do x, without the cost of actually having to do it. We agree that in such cases there is a plausible, even compelling, case of hypocrisy, of a sort that might be called “counterfactual hypocrisy.” Note that, if the antecedent condition were miraculously to be met, such people might or might not carry through on their commitment to x. Although the one who does not do x when others have x’d is the clearer hypocrite, having made a blatantly false counterfactual statement, arguably even one who does do x when the circumstances call for it — perhaps to avoid further damage to one’s reputation — may be considered a hypocrite. This might be true, for example, if the person would never have made the statement in the first place, if s/he had realized there was a chance of actually having to carry through on it. So we agree with Smilansky that people who make insincere counterfactual claims about what they would do if others behaved as we know they won’t are engaged in a form of deception and thereby qualify as hypocrites. But Smilansky seems to have described the case too broadly. Although he has identified an important and neglected area in which hypocrisy might arise, we believe that not all cases fitting his basic mould are in fact hypocritical in this way. Consider again the case of the egalitarian who does not conceal his or her present practice, acknowledging that s/he pays only as much tax as presently required by law. Suppose that s/he formulates the egalitarian principle clearly, and preaches it in a manner that explicitly spells out the conditions for practice, as well as giving, so Smilansky himself says, “a principled set of reasons for not practicing what s/he preaches.”34 Consider then the above egalitarian, plus the following relevant new information. S/he knows that it is very unlikely that the preaching will be put to the test of practice in his or her lifetime, and says so. However, s/he works hard toward the realization of those conditions, investing considerable time, effort and money in the process. The “principled reasons” for not practising what s/he preaches are fairly applied and s/he does not demonize others who disagree. This person’s arguments suggest a genuine interest in a better society; s/he is not privileging his or her own role, but sees him or herself as one in a group of like-minded people. This person satisfies all of Smilansky’s requirements for hypocrisy, yet s/he seems like a genuine and realistic social reformer. We believe that it is the total lack of pretension in this case that makes us reluctant to label the egalitarian in question a hypocrite. Smilansky’s basic sketch of the egalitarian-as-hypocrite is that of someone who not only conditionalizes his or her practice on the co-operation of others, but rigs those conditions in such a way that they in fact sabotage the goals of the principle itself. Furthermore, suppose that s/he flaunts the ideals, yet

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makes invidious judgments about those who live conventional lives — like him/herself — but do not avow egalitarianism. It is natural to see such a person as a hypocrite, since in this case there is pretension to principle and deceit going on. To sum up our point then: To preach, not practise, openly admitting the breach, and conditionalizing one’s practice on the co-operation of others, does not necessarily involve deception, and does not as such amount to hypocrisy. Whether such a scenario adds up to hypocrisy depends on what these conditions are and how they are specified. If the latter are deceptive, we have good reason to suspect hypocrisy. In any event, there are diverse cases, requiring different treatment. For example, the successful practice of chastity does not generally require the co-operation of others, while bringing about an egalitarian society does. Accordingly, it is almost certainly hypocritical to say “I would be chaste if other people were, but they’re not, so I won’t be either,” but the comparable case of the egalitarian we have described need not be hypocritical at all. In any event, we have argued that cases of the “I will only if others do” sort are hypocritical only when the principles are “rigged,” and there is thus deception involved. We have argued that the defenders of the “hypocrisy as inconsistency” theory have not yet provided a compelling case of hypocrisy, in which one could have acted on one’s stated principles and did not, that does not involve deception of some sort. We have yet to provide a positive argument to the effect that deception is required to distinguish hypocrisy from other forms of inconsistency, such as weakness of will, forgetfulness, or changes of mind. Before proceeding to this positive argument, however, we need to consider one more range of cases of potential counter-examples to our claim that hypocrisy does require deception. We will argue that these cases also involve deception, but that the deception involved is of a particular sort. In the next chapter, we consider the relationship between hypocrisy and self-deception.

Notes 1. La Rochefoucauld, Maxims (Haworth Press, 1931). 2. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949) 174. 3. See e.g., Eva Feder Kittay, “Hypocrisy,” 277-89. 4. On this view, all that remains to be done is to explain how hypocrisy is to be distinguished from other forms of deception. 5. People who argue in this fashion include: Judith Shklar, Ordinary Vices; Dan Turner, “Hypocrisy”; Roger Crisp and Christopher Cowton, “Hypocrisy and Moral Seriousness,” 343-49. 6. Matthew 23:3.

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7. Thomas Hurka, “Hypocrisy: Not All It’s Cracked Down to Be,” in his Principles: Short Essays on Ethics, 264. 8. Ibid. 9. Crisp and Cowton, 345. 10. Ibid. 11. Shklar, 79 and 81. 12. Turner, 265. 13. Ibid., 266. 14. Ibid., 266 and 286. 15. In Chapter 14 of this book. 16. Hurka, 266. 17. Turner, 265. 18. Ibid., 264. 19. See Chapter 14, Sections D and E of this book. 20. Turner, 265. 21. Crisp and Cowton, 345. 22. Ibid. 23. We owe this insight to Leanne Kent, a former student. 24. Jean Baptiste Poquelin Molière, Tartuffe; Or, The Hypocrite, Act III, Scene 6 (Harvard Classics, Vol. 26, Part 4, on-line edition). 25. It is interesting to compare this case with cases of irony. In standard cases of irony, the speaker says something that is false, expecting the listener to take it in the opposite way, understanding that what is meant is not what is literally said, but the reverse. In the present case, the speaker again expects the listener to take what is said in the opposite way, but in this case the words are literally true, and the expectation is that the reader will invert it and come to a false belief on that basis. We discuss irony in more detail in Part V of this book. 26. Note that we discuss Turner’s other case, that of the meat-eating vegetarian, below, in Chapter 14 of this book. 27. Smilansky, “On Practicing What We Preach,” American Philosophical Quarterly, (1994) 75. 28. Ibid., 77. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid., 75. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid., 74-75. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid.

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13 Self-Deceptive Hypocrisies: The Complacent, the SelfRighteous, and the Cynical “The hypocrite will suppose himself to be the one who is acting genuinely and cannot but utterly reject the reproach of hypocrisy.” 1 dietrich bonhoeffer “One puts oneself into mauvaise foi as one goes to sleep and one is in mauvaise foi as one dreams.” 2 jean-paul sartre

A. Introduction One argument for the claim that no deception or insincerity is necessary for hypocrisy has its source in the observation that some hypocrites are the last persons to know that they are hypocrites. Such people seem surprised, even astonished, when reasonably accused of hypocrisy, and not all of them feign such surprise. Now the argument goes that deception is a matter of having certain intentions, and we do have knowledge of our own intentions. Therefore, people who are engaged in deception must know that they are. Thus if hypocrisy always involved deception, then hypocrites would always know that they were engaging in hypocrisy. Since they do not, there must be some hypocrisy that does not require deception. This picture is misleading in that it assumes an overly narrow conception of deception. We should not accept the claim that deception is necessarily a self-conscious matter, requiring certain intentions. First of all, people can deceive by mistake, simply because they do not know how others will interpret their words or actions. Thus we clearly need the distinction between deceiving in fact and attempting to deceive.3 Suppose though, as may well be the case, that we can adequately distinguish accidental cases from deliberate ones, and maintain that the agent must know when s/he is deliberately deceiving others. It would still be premature to say that unselfconscious hypocrisy

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cannot be a form of deception. It is possible that such hypocrisy involves, not deception of others, but rather self-deception, which may not similarly involve knowledge that one is engaged in deception.4 Perhaps a culpable failure of self-knowledge could explain cases in which one is genuinely surprised to hear reasonable accusations of hypocrisy. If one is allowed to include the possibility of self-deception, then one can acknowledge the existence of cases in which people are genuinely surprised to learn they have been hypocritical, without thereby conceding that there can be cases of hypocrisy that do not involve deception. But should one be allowed to include self-deception as a sort of deception giving rise to hypocrisy? Some writers seem to reject the possibility outright. For example, in his discussion of hypocrisy, Saul Smilansky writes, “We might of course have a case of self-deception, but such matters are not our concern here.”5 But surely one is entitled to a principled reason for excluding self-deception. Judith Shklar is one writer who attempts to provide such a reason. Shklar argues that allowing self-deception to count would result in a regrettable proliferation of accusations of hypocrisy. She incisively asks, “Is every self-deception, insincerity and inauthenticity hypocritical, even when these are states of mind and not acts to deceive others? . . . Could anyone escape being a hypocrite if we see hypocrisy through such eyes?”6 Part of the point here is that such a conceptual conflation between self-deception and hypocrisy results in seeing it everywhere, in an inflation of hypocritical antihypocrisy, in a victimization of people by targeting them for constant moral critique. Such a view unsettles the delicate balance between individuals and society by licensing constant suspicion of others and relentless social critique of individual blemishes. Furthermore, the term becomes useless as a tool of moral criticism if it can be applied to everyone. To prevent these undesirable developments, Shklar thinks we need to distinguish hypocrisy from self-deception and other forms of insincerity by stipulating “acts designed to deceive others” as a necessary feature of hypocrisy. Unless we do this, “hypocrisy” is severed from its moorings and becomes available as ad hoc ideological insult. Hence it can no longer be part of the language of responsible moral criticism. There is much that is true in what Shklar claims, but she is not careful enough in drawing her conclusions. When looked at carefully, they do not after all provide a compelling reason for thinking that the basis of hypocrisy can never lie in self-deception. First of all, Shklar’s remarks seem to have been intended against a background view that all self-deception involves hypocrisy. Some writers do indeed seem to have endorsed this view,7 on the basis that people engage in self-deception so as to be able to pretend to themselves that they are morally

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better than they really are, which smacks of hypocrisy. We do not accept this view, however. For one thing, there are obvious counter-examples. If one deceives oneself about the chances of one’s winning the lottery, for example, that is hardly a compelling case of hypocrisy. So even leaving aside Shklar’s concerns about the moral implications of accepting such a conflation of selfdeception with hypocrisy, there are compelling reasons to reject it. This does not affect our claim, however. Our claim that some cases of hypocrisy are also cases of self-deception in no way logically entails the claim that all cases of self-deception are cases of hypocrisy. Shklar has a somewhat different reason for rejecting the claim that all selfdeception is hypocritical, however, and this reason deserves consideration. She argues that, while hypocrisy is prima facie bad, self-deception, like deception, is neither always bad nor always blameworthy. It is for this reason that calling all self-deception “hypocrisy” would lead to a regrettable expansion of moral criticism to cases which are not in fact blameworthy. Yet Shklar is again being too hasty to suggest from this that hypocrisy must involve “acts designed to deceive others” rather than self-deception. There may be another way to restrict the accusations of hypocrisy. Indeed, we believe that self-deception is sometimes culpable and sometimes not, and that it is only culpable forms of self-deception that can give rise to hypocrisy. By restricting the concept in this way, we can accommodate cases that appear to us compelling instances of hypocrisy grounded in self-deception, while still avoiding the problematic proliferation of accusations of hypocrisy Shklar is worried about, since not everyone who engages in self-deception would qualify as a hypocrite. In the following sections, we examine a number of cases ranging from Victorian England back through David Hume to the biblical King David. In discussing these cases, we identify separate forms of self-deception that carry with them distinctive types of hypocrisy. Indeed, we argue that what distinguishes cases of hypocrisy from cases where there is no hypocrisy is often the feature of self-deception. This lends support to our claim that all hypocrisy does indeed involve deception — so long as we allow self-deception to count as a form of deception. Finally, we discuss the bearing self-deception has on the important question of moral culpability in cases of self-deceptive hypocrisy. Before embarking on these discussions, however, we want to consider a distinction that may be useful to better appreciate how self-deception may aid and abet complacent, self-righteous or cynical attitudes. This is a distinction between pan- and local hypocrites.

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B. Pan- Versus Local Hypocrites Classic literary hypocrites such as Molière’s Tartuffe or Dickens’s Uriah Heep have a whiff of Platonism about them in that their hypocrisy and deception, like that of Plato’s “perfectly unjust man,” extends to their entire character. Let us call these characters pan-hypocrites. On the other hand, the reach of local hypocritical pretence, unlike that of their exotic pan-cousins, does not extend to a person’s whole life or character, but is confined to some special area or segment of it, say, sex, religion, or political correctness. Such local hypocrites may in general be as moral or altruistic as others, yet when it comes to certain areas or aspects of their lives, they are perhaps more inclined to deny or disavow hypocrisy precisely because they are right to believe that they are generally decent people. Therefore, casting aspersions on their entire character — i.e., accusing them of pan-hypocrisy — deflects them from further self-examination and provides them with material for complacent or self-righteous assessment of themselves. They cannot recognize themselves in such a wholesale condemnation, and dismiss it, perhaps saying “I am basically a decent person and this vitriolic moralistic critic has no idea what sort of person I am.” Hence, the charge of pan-hypocrisy, where what is at issue is local hypocrisy, may engender complacency about one’s moral standing. Alternatively, such wholesale accusations may in turn fuel cynicism about other people’s motives, as well as lead to further attempts to deceive others to protect oneself from unfair criticism, possible embarrassment or shame. Before turning to a detailed examination of the role self-deception may play in fostering complacent and self-righteous attitudes, let us look at a case of local hypocrisy involving the deception of others. Consider, for example, the case of a generally moral, and erotically overcharged teacher in a small town. Suppose she believes that if part of her inner core — consisting of her intense, unconventional sexual desires and behaviour — is detected or exposed, then this would make important others think she is unworthy of respect. Motivated by her desire to keep their respect, she sets out to deliberately mislead people about her inner core — by pretending to conventional sexual attitudes and behaviour — when it appears to her that the people whose respect she wants to gain or retain would judge it as out of line. In thus deceitfully seeking their respect, such a self-conscious hypocrite may in general be moral, even altruistic, since she need not do others down by getting that respect — just getting that respect in such and such ways, and wanting to get it through deceit, is enough to make her a plausible candidate for hypocrisy. Observe, however, that her hypocrisy does not invade her entire life or character, but is confined to the domain of her sexuality where she feels

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especially vulnerable in light of the conventional sexual mores of the small community she happens to inhabit. If the teacher is now charged with being a pan-hypocrite, she will be rightly indignant and it would be natural for her to deflect the particular criticism, whatever its merit, by indignantly justifying herself in terms of her good character in general and/or probing the character flaws of the accuser. Now if the self-aware local hypocrite is prone to such indignation, then the self-deceived local hypocrite is liable to be even more so, since s/he is not (fully) aware of his or her hypocrisy. The likely result is a further entrenchment of the disposition to complacency or self-righteousness. The distinction between pan- and local hypocrites and its importance in moral criticism is implicit in Joseph Butler’s discussion of self-deceit and hypocrisy. The relevant passage is worth quoting in full, since it is psychologically perceptive in its observations, offering insights as to how self-deception may play a role in complacent and self-righteous attitudes, as well as giving good advice for the practice of moral criticism: In some there is to be observed a general ignorance of themselves, and wrong way of thinking and judging in everything relating to themselves; their fortune, reputation, everything in which self can come in: and this perhaps attended with the rightest judgment in all other matters. In others this partiality is not so general, has not taken hold of the whole man, but is confined to some particular favourite passion, interest or pursuit; suppose ambition, covetousness or any other. And these persons may probably judge and determine what is perfectly just and proper, even in things in which they themselves are concerned, if these things have no relation to their particular favourite passion or pursuit. Hence arises that amazing incongruity, and seeming inconsistency of character, from whence slight observers take it for granted, that the whole is hypocritical and false; not being able otherwise to reconcile the several parts: whereas in truth there is real honesty, so far as it goes. There is such a thing as men’s being honest to such a degree, and in such respects, but no further. And this, as it is true, so it is absolutely necessary to be taken notice of, and allowed them; such general and undistinguishing censure of their whole character, as designing and false, being one main thing which confirms them in their self-deceit. They know the whole censure is not true; and so take it for granted that no part of it is.8

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Note then that the moral critic who mistakes local hypocrisy for panhypocrisy is not only a shallow observer of human nature, but is guilty of the logical fallacy of composition: s/he infers, perhaps carelessly or maliciously, from what is true of an aspect of an individual’s character to the entire character. On the other hand, if the local hypocrite thus accused complacently infers from the fact that basically s/he is a good person to the claim that there is nothing amiss with the particular aspect of his or her character or conduct in question, s/he is guilty of the fallacy of division. Keeping these observations in mind, we are now perhaps better prepared to turn to our discussion of cases of complacent, self-righteous, and cynical hypocrisy, and how they may relate to self-deception.

C. Complacent Hypocrisies: Past and Present Victorians The morality and attitudes of Victorian England are often condemned as intrinsically hypocritical. While we have serious reservations9 about the attribution of a collective mindset to an epoch or passing wholesale moral judgment on it, there may nevertheless be several distinct reasons for thinking “the Victorians” to be hypocritical. At least one reason has to do with their failures to live up to their stated ideals of chastity, charity, hard work, and so on. In some cases, no doubt, the Victorians put forward these ideals without sincerely believing them, or while making exceptions of themselves, in a straightforwardly hypocritical manner. We will argue, however, that at least sometimes Victorian hypocrisy is based on pervasive self-deception of a sort we will refer to as “complacent hypocrisy.”10 Judith Shklar, ever suspicious of accusations of hypocrisy, questions whether the Victorian middle classes really were hypocritical at all. She defends them thus: “They wished to be what they proclaimed everyone ought to be. To fail in one’s own aspirations is not hypocrisy. In fact the Victorians really believed in chastity, monogamy, thrift, charity and work. If many did not achieve these, many others did at considerable psychic cost. Self-repression and emotional silence, however, are self-inflicted wounds, not social crimes or hypocrisy.”11 Shklar goes on to observe that “only their refusal to admit that the endless slums of Mayhews London existed — that is, only their complacency — was hypocritical.”12 The suggestion is that the Victorians were hypocritical in that they chose to ignore, or pretended in public not to know of, the existence of suffering and evil right in front of their eyes — well, a bit further. This is supposed to be very different from their attitude to chastity, monogamy, thrift, work, since these ideals they believed in and worked

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towards even if they failed to achieve them. With regard to these ideals, the Victorians made no attempt to deceive others. Hence, even if there is selfrepression, there is no hypocrisy, no social crime. If, however, we look more closely at the instance of the Victorian attitude toward the Mayhew slums, which Shklar acknowledges as hypocritical, we may see more parallels than she recognizes between it and the cases where she denies hypocrisy exists. It was in the interests of the Victorians to ignore, or refuse to admit, the existence of the Mayhew slums, since this would have been an obstacle to their belief in progress and social redemption through work and thrift. The slum-dwellers and their children worked long hours a day, yet their conditions and prospects were desperate. Acknowledging this fact would have unsettled their cheerful and easy optimism. This hypocritical complacency consisted in the pretence that things were socially better than in fact they were — in the teeth of the existence of the vast slums of Mayhew. This allowed them to think better of themselves than they deserved, for example by thinking that they were helping to maintain a just society, and that they must be entitled to whatever material advantages they had because material advantages accrued justly to whomever earned them through hard work. Thus their complacency involved an element of self-deception, which served the self-interested purpose of allowing them to maintain a positive outlook about themselves and their society. But now consider the Victorian attitudes concerning chastity and monogamy. It is possible to trace these attitudes to a belief concerning the relationship between the body and the mind or soul. Victorians appear to have thought that the body, with all its urges and emotions, simply got in the way of the purity and rationality of the mind/soul. Women were thought to be particularly tied up with their bodies in the form of emotions, and thus unable to reason as clearly as men. Men, on the other hand, were prone to sexual desires, but fortunately these could be mastered, to the point where the ideal was not to feel such unpleasant urges at all. In short, Victorians wanted to identify themselves only with the pristine purity of mind and soul, and become almost entirely separate from their bodies. Indeed, physical bodies were considered so shameful by some that even the “legs” of pianos had to be covered up in some “respectable” homes. In order to convince themselves that they really were these pure rational or spiritual beings, Victorians had to ignore a large amount of evidence to the contrary. They had to refuse to acknowledge things such as their own sexual desires, and the fact that both men and women perspire (and do not merely glisten), and they had to turn a blind eye to transgressions such as their frequent secret peccadilloes.

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There is a parallel then between Victorian social complacency in pretending that the Mayhew slums did not even exist, and their spiritual state: the “Mayhew slums” may be seen as analogous to the sexual slums of the Victorian soul. In both cases, acknowledging the evidence would have required them to give up their cherished self-conceptions. It may be argued that if the attitudes toward the Mayhew slums count as hypocritical complacency, so does their apparently sincere pretence to chastity, monogamy, etc., in spite of the flourishing of subterranean prostitution and brothels, which they conveniently managed to ignore or be oblivious to. In both cases, self-deception is involved in a culpable way, being used to allow one to maintain a more flattering view of oneself than one deserves. If the objects of self-deception, that is to say, what we deceive ourselves about, connect up with our self-conceptions, then it is not difficult to see that, to protect our self-conception, we would ignore, neglect or suppress evidence that suggests that all is not well with our smug, self-satisfied self-image. Hence a complacent hypocrite is likely to deceive him/herself that “God is in his heaven and all is well with the world and my moral character,” ignoring or not taking sufficiently seriously the demands that moral principles press on us. Such culpable self-deceptions usually have as a collaborative companion the suspension of one’s self-critical faculties. It is worth noting that, in the cases described here, deliberate deception of others may play no role in the hypocrisy, although of course they may be deceived indirectly if a person projects his/her false but genuinely believed selfimage. The techniques/mechanisms of wilful ignorance, biased interpretation, selective focusing, or rationalization, together with a natural inclination to an easy conformism, may be the resources out of which social hypocrisy is generated. If this is so, then to speak of self-deception as isolated from one’s behaviour, as a mere state of mind, while seeing hypocrisy as connected to one’s actions, is misleading. As we have seen, Victorians’ actions and behaviours are revelatory of their self-deceptive hypocrisies and of their complacent self-image — the former serving as a device for protecting such a comforting moral self-image. Their culpable epistemic negligence, their not looking, or refusal to look and acknowledge matters/evidence that had the potential to disconfirm or invalidate their smug moral self-conception, was productive of an attitude of pervasive complacent hypocrisy. Such middle-class Victorian complacency is iconic of their age as well as ours — since our Mayhew slums are the urban and Third-World poor, the native reserves next door. What we have argued so far is that there can indeed be forms of hypocrisy that do not involve direct acts of deceiving others, and thus that the attempt to draw a sharp separating line between hypocrisy and self-deception does

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not work. We also suggested that the attitude of complacency is one fertile ground for self-deceptive hypocrisy. Thirdly, we struck the chord that resonates throughout our piece, and which we develop as we go along, that concepts such as self-deception are not homogenous but have diverse forms which need careful discussion and illustration. We suggested that in complacent hypocrisy, self-deception takes the form of epistemic negligence in seeking out, facing up to, or appreciating, evidence that would undercut or conflict with our comfortable moral self-image.

D. Self-Righteous Hypocrisy: Hume’s Grieving Friend If self-deception is heterogeneous, and if certain distinctive attitudes are fertile soil for self-deceptive hypocrisy, does self-deception take more active forms when motivated and sustained by more aggressive attitudes? An affirmative answer to these questions can be discerned in cases where a hypocrite supposes him/herself to be the one who is acting genuinely, and cannot but utterly reject the accusation and reproach of hypocrisy. In such cases, hypocrites not only suppose that all is well with their own moral state, but manufacture and believe their own propaganda when confronted with reasonable accusations of hypocrisy. If there are such self-deceiving hypocrites, how are they possible? This question raises the problem about the coherence of this hybrid concept. If genuineness and sincerity are partly to be explicated in terms of one’s beliefs about one’s own states of mind, and if a person believes what s/he is saying or thinks him/herself to be sincere, then his/her sincerity seems to be guaranteed. But hypocrisy seems to be a form of insincerity. So the idea of a hypocrite who believes his/her own propaganda boggles the mind, since such a person’s sincerity is insincere. What is required is some description of how self-deception functions in complex cases of hypocrisy. To unboggle the mind then, consider a Humean case. “A man that has lost a friend and a patron, may flatter himself, that all his grief arises from generous sentiments.”13 Suppose now that he proceeds to denounce Smith, to whom the dead man was also a benefactor, saying that Smith’s grief is hypocritical: “It is the loss of money, not the loss of a friend, that really makes you grieve.” We believe that such a morally self-righteous man is a good candidate for a hypocrite who thinks himself to be sincere, and we will call this sort of hypocrisy “self-righteous hypocrisy.” However, before we can confidently say “Hypocrite,” such a man has to be marked off from someone who is merely thoughtless. To rule this out, let

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us add the following: His wife wondered aloud how it is that when an even better friend, but poor and thus no patron, had died years earlier, her husband grieved but his grief was not paraded so much as for his patron. He overhears this and the observation disturbs him. There is a dim recognition of its truth. Yet he refuses to entertain the idea. He dismisses thoughts about what really makes him parade his grief so much. When doubts recur, he persuades himself that money does not really enter into it, that he is not that sort of person, and so on. And then he goes to the funeral where he denounces someone else, perhaps rightly, as a hypocrite. Such a self-righteous hypocrite feels morally inferior to others, and thus tries to compensate for this by making invidious comparisons between the quality of his own grief and that of others. Hence the hypocrite and the self-righteous anti-hypocrite may have much in common. These additional features also rule out the idea that our man is merely ambivalent or conflicted about what really explains his grief. At one stage, he is not sure whether it is the loss of a friend that entirely explains his feelings. At the next stage comes the deliberate, perhaps wilful, shift of attention away from a disturbing thought or interpretation unfavourable to oneself, then more or less clever efforts to explain away doubts, to persuade oneself to believe in the construal favourable to one’s moral self-image. All these attempts at moral cosmetics and spin-doctoring are natural enough, for no one who is morally concerned the least bit likes to think of him/herself as the sort of person whose grief at the death of a friend is merely regret at the loss of an income, that is to say, grief for oneself. So, to depict a comprehensive picture of the roles that self-deception can play in instances of hypocrisy, we must recover for attention the frequent complexity and dissonance of inner experience and its manifestations. Our man’s state of mind is a complex one. The fact that he thinks himself to be sincere, that he is grieved by the loss of his friend, is to be taken into account when describing his state of mind. On the other hand, the fact that he has intermittent doubts whether that alone accounts for the extreme show of his grief or whether patronage figures in it as well, must also be brought out in an accurate description of his state of mind. His attempts to persuade himself that patronage had nothing to do with his parading his grief, while in the case of the other fellow in the same situation, patronage had everything to do with the show of grief, are two features of self-righteous, self-deceptive hypocrisy: invidious comparisons of oneself with others, and accusations of others, accompanied by self-justification. These facts are reasons for saying he is insincere. So, he is not entirely sincere, or if you will, his sincerity is insincere. He tries to appear better than he really is by scapegoating the other!

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While an argument has been made for self-deception, it may not yet be clear how hypocrisy comes into it. Just as all cases of hypocrisy are not also cases of self-deception, so not all cases of self-deception are cases of hypocrisy. This point calls for bringing out features that help us mark off the mere self-deceiver from the self-deceptive hypocrite. To begin with, note our grieving man’s self-righteous denunciation of Smith, a man like himself in relevant ways. Recall his accusation of Smith as a hypocrite: “It is the loss of money and not the loss of a friend that makes you grieve so much.” Here we witness our man setting himself up as a paragon of purity of heart, when in fact he is also a blatant offender in this particular instance. The use of double standards, a frequent symptom of hypocrisy,14 suggests that he is culpable for his failure to reflect on his own motivation, and for pretending to himself, and indirectly to others in his audience, that he is a genuine griever for a friend, to be differentiated from those others who merely grieve for themselves. This is a variation on one large theme of hypocrisy: to advocate the acceptance of a moral standard or rule publicly and hold others to it, yet more or less unwittingly break it when it is to one’s own advantage. When the use of double standards is pointed out to such a hypocrite, s/he engages in special pleading and self-justification, pretending to him/herself and to others that the standard does not apply to him/her since his/her case is different. One who is merely self-deceived about one’s motives for grief does not have this public dimension as a feature — such a person does not morally denigrate the other, to lift him/herself up.

E. David’s Thoughtless Complacency The self-deception involved in hypocrisy need not be active in the sense of self-justification and rationalization. Consider the biblical case of King David, who committed adultery with Bathsheba and sent off her husband to battle to be killed.15 Nathan brings this offence to light, and in effect charges David with having done wrong by his own principles. Is the offence here hypocrisy? The parable told makes it evident that David’s conduct involves the use of a double standard, yet he is unaware of it due to a culpable failure at selfreflection and self-examination. Nathan says to him, There were two men in one city; the one rich, and the other poor. The rich man had exceeding many flocks and herds; but the poor man had nothing, save one little ewe lamb, which he had bought and nourished up; and it grew up together with him, and with his children; it did eat of his own meat, and drank of his own

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part iv Deception: Aspects and Roles cup, and lay in his bosom, and was unto him as a daughter. And there came a traveler unto the rich man, and he spared to take of his own flock and of his own herd, to dress for the wayfaring man that was to come to him; but took the poor man’s lamb, and dressed it for the man that was come unto him.16

The biblical account continues: And David’s anger was greatly kindled against the man; and he said to Nathan, As the Lord liveth, the man that hath done this thing shall surely die; and he shall restore the lamb fourfold, because he did this thing, and because he had not pity. And Nathan answered Thou art the man.17 This example shows how even generally good people can be self-deceptive hypocrites. King David committed an injustice without even taking notice of it, without condemning himself, yet he was morally outraged that someone else had done a similar thing. There is a clear-cut use of a double standard involved in the case. There is both a rigorous moral standard for judging and punishing the other, and a convenient forgetting to apply such a standard to one’s own case. Self-deception of this sort often works in the service of self-regard, of complacency. The assumption of the complacent is that all is well in one’s own moral house, in one’s own spiritual state. This sort of smug moral self-satisfaction deters and deflects the crucial tasks of self-examination and self-criticism, and proceeds to the examination and criticism of others. In the latter task such people display an assiduity to collect all the relevant evidence and bring moral principles to bear upon the case with insight and perspicuity — their grasp of moral standards and concepts is thereby evident. What we have here is a culpable failure of self-knowledge. The lack of the relevant self-awareness is motivated by an anxious desire to seem good or better than others. One is too lazy or reluctant to look, anxious that one’s own moral identifications are at risk.

F. Cynical Hypocrisy and Self-Deception Thus far we have argued that, in several types of cases where there is no deliberate deception of others, hypocrisy hinges crucially on culpable selfdeception, and thus that the claim that hypocrisy always involves deception of some sort is more defensible than has often been thought. In this section, we

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put forward the additional suggestion that even in some clear cases of hypocrisy involving deception of others, self-deception may also play a role. One pervasive image of the hypocrite is that of what has been called the “cynical hypocrite.” Such people are supposed to plan the inconsistency between preached ideals of conduct or motivation and actual conduct or motivation, and to be fully self-conscious of their aim to gain an undeserved moral reputation. Literature is generously salted with such hypocrites, from Molière’s Tartuffe, through Shakespeare’s Iago, to Dickens’s Uriah Heep. Such hypocrites present themselves to others as they are not, seeming to work toward benefiting others, while making it explicit to themselves that they are really aiming only to expand their own authority. The lucidity and selfawareness of such people is the very opposite of self-deception,18 since their very success depends on their not ignoring or distorting the evidence about themselves which they observe in other people’s reactions. However, contrary to such literary depictions of the hypocrite as a larger than life, extremely knowledgeable villain, such “cynical” hypocrites are liable to end up self-deceived, even if they do not in the first instance deceive themselves. Since this is surprising and often missed in discussions of the topic, let us note how it is likely to happen. Having a reasonable degree of self-knowledge requires that we take the reactions and observations of others about ourselves into account. Selfknowledge in this sense is not tantamount to introspection, but grows out of material also provided by people we interact with. Now if the self-aware hypocrite, fully conscious of what s/he is doing, is reasonably successful, then the evidence potentially provided by the reactions of others will be relevant and bear upon the persona or role s/he presents to them, rather than to his/ her genuine commitments and evaluations. Hence the evidential resources for self-knowledge that might be provided by others are not available to such a hypocrite. By isolating themselves thus, these so-called cynical hypocrites are likely to slip unwittingly into self-deception — they are vulnerable in precisely the area where they have been thought strongest. But why have such hypocrites been called “cynical”? Where is the “cynical” in this description of hypocrisy? It seems to be missing altogether, since there is no reference to central features of a cynical attitude, namely, the distrust or denial of the apparent goodness of human motives, especially those of others, and the display of this attitude by sneers, sarcasm, and the appraisal of others’ actions in the worst possible light. Such an attitude again is fertile ground for self-deceptive hypocrisy, since it leads to a one-sided, narrow view of human motivation that results in blind spots and a refusal to appreciate the rich complexity of human action and motivation. The cynical hypocrite may

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be reading his/her own suspicions about his/her own motives into those of others, covering up his/her own particular faults by spreading those faults to human beings at large. Such hypocrites are, of course, as likely to be mistaken about their own motivation by taking this pervasively negative view, as they are about others’. This form of hypocrisy is best distinguished from the lucid, self-aware hypocrite, since a cynical attitude is not something that we are necessarily aware of.

G. Moral Culpability and Self-Deceptive Hypocrisy The idea of self-deceptive hypocrisy, while intrinsically interesting, raises important questions concerning the assignment of blame and responsibility. In general, we seem to be confronted with a moral quandary. If hypocrisy involves self-deception, then to some extent hypocrites do not really know what they are doing. It might be thought that, to the extent that they are ignorant of what they are doing, they are not really culpable, since we tend to assign culpability on the basis of the agent’s degree of knowledge of what s/he is doing. On the other hand, it might be thought that the self-deceived hypocrite, far from being a candidate for exculpation, is even more deeply inculpated. Since s/he is a hypocrite and self-deceived about it, s/he is committing multiple wrongs, and therefore twice condemned, once for each vice. But these general considerations fly too high over the moral landscape. Perhaps the only general relevant moral consideration here is that if the self-deception is culpable, and it may not be, then the moral blameworthiness is greater. But assigning blame is a case-by-case affair, requiring looking at and seeing the particular details of each moral situation. If, for example, the complacent Victorian, aware of the plight of the hardworking poor, refuses to discuss or implement urban renewal, s/he is culpable when s/he hypocritically preaches social progress through sheer work and thrift. Such a person knows better, yet pretends to the contrary. Concerning the self-righteous we might say that they are culpable for the motivated deflection of evidence that counts against their rosy self-appraisal and their hurting of others through accusations. And the more evidence the cynical hypocrite has for the damage his/her perspective causes to his/her personal relationships, the more s/he is culpable for causing it.

H. Conclusion In this chapter, we have been exploring the complex relation between hypocrisy and self-deception. We identified three attitudes that constitute

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fertile soil for self-deceptive hypocrisy. After briefly discussing the conceptual problem inherent in the idea of self-deceptive hypocrisy, we argued that such hypocrisy is not only possible, but also a common fact of life that makes the moral life even more difficult. We claimed that the idea of self-deceptive hypocrisy is not the idea of some one thing, but is heterogeneous and takes diverse forms. Then we proceeded, after making a distinction between panand local hypocrites, by way of description and example, to discuss the roles that self-deception plays in complacent, self-righteous and cynical hypocrisy. These roles range from culpable ignorance or thoughtlessness, through wilful ignorance and biased interpretation, to rationalization. We pointed out the risk of ending up self-deceived, even in cases of self-aware, deceitful hypocrisy. Finally, we argued that self-deception can be culpable and it is only cases of culpable self-deception that contribute to and enhance the blameworthiness of self-deceptive hypocrisy.

Notes 1. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, translated by N.H. Smith (London: SCM Press, 1955) 164. 2. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, translated by Hazel Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956) 68. 3. Note that the intention to deceive may not result in any actual deception. People might “see through” the attempted deception, and it may be that nobody is actually fooled. 4. For some work on the problem of self-deception, see Herbert Fingarette’s Self-Deception; Béla Szabados, “Self-Deception,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy (1974); the essays in Mike Martin, ed., Self-Deception and Self-Understanding (Laurence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1985); Annette Barnes, Seeing through Self-Deception (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Alfred Mele, Self-Deception Unmasked (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 5. Smilansky, “On Practicing What We Preach?” 78, footnote 2. 6. Judith Shklar, Ordinary Vices, 47. 7. Joseph Butler, J.J. Rousseau and I. Kant seem to subscribe to such a view. See Butler’s Sermon, “Upon Self-Deceit,” from Fifteen Sermons Upon Human Nature; see Rousseau’s Letter to D’Alembert; also see I. Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue, 94-95. 8. Butler, 153-54. 9. For a refreshing recent view of “the Victorians” as post-modernists whose “hypocrisy” is really nothing but the ability to cope and live with often incompatible social and moral demands, see A.N. Wilson, The Victorians (London: Hutchinson, 2002). 10. This terminology follows Crisp and Cowton. See “Hypocrisy and Moral Seriousness,” 345. 11. Shklar, 54-55. 12. Ibid.

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13. David Hume, “Of Self-Love,” Appendix 2 to An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in Philosophical Works, Vol. 4, ed. T.H. Green and T.H. Grose (London, 1882) 269-70. 14. We discussed the relationship between double standards and hypocrisy in more detail in Chapter 11 of this book. 15. We discussed this case in Chapter 1 of this book. 16. Nathan’s parable to David. Samuel 2:11-12. 17. Ibid. 18. Herbert Fingarette seems to draw a rather sharp distinction between hypocrisy and self-deception. He exclusively disjoins the two claiming that the former has explicit spelling out or full consciousness as a feature, while there is no spelling out or full consciousness at all in the latter. See Fingarette, 56-57 for a sketch of what he takes to be cynical hypocrisy.

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14 Hypocrisy, Change of Mind, and Weakness of Will “There comes a time . . . when intelligent argument over rival doctrines must be postponed and critical attention directed instead to the crucial moral concepts themselves.” 1 joel feinberg “Give me chastity and continence, but not just now.” 2 augustine

A. Aims So far we have argued that philosophers who claim that there can be hypocrisy without deception have failed to provide any compelling cases to support their claim. Many cases of hypocrisy that at first appear not to involve deception turn out to do so when considered more carefully. Furthermore, by including self-deception as an important form of deception, one is able to understand more fully an array of types of hypocrisy that might otherwise seem problematic. It is methodologically impossible, however, to consider every possible case of hypocrisy and demonstrate how deception enters into it. Therefore, no matter how convincing the arguments so far have been, they cannot remove a slight possibility that somebody will some day uncover a case of hypocrisy that does not involve deception, even in the ways we have outlined. This chapter seeks to make even that slight possibility fade, by presenting a more positive argument. The argument unfolds by considering examples that all involve a gap between word and deed. We argue that such a gap is not sufficient for hypocrisy, since it is also characteristic of what appear to be distinct phenomena, such as “change of mind,” or “weakness of will.” We also argue that those philosophers who take a gap between word and deed to constitute the essence of hypocrisy are left unable to distinguish hypocrisy from these other phenomena. It is possible, of course, that these are not really distinct phenomena, despite commonly being thought of as separate. Perhaps

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people simply use different descriptions depending on their moral evaluation of the situation: for example using “hypocrisy” as an epithet to hurl at one’s political opponents. Although it proves surprisingly complex to understand the conceptual links and differences between hypocrisy, change of mind, and weakness of will, we believe distinguishing characteristics can be found. By presenting a number of variations on several examples, we demonstrate that subtle differences in the background scenarios can make the difference in regard to the category each belongs to. What is more, it turns out that an element of deception does indeed turn out to be crucial for distinguishing hypocrisy from these other concepts.

B. The “Disparity Pairs” Account of Hypocrisy We will take as our main opponent here the comprehensive and methodologically attractive account of hypocrisy offered by Dan Turner, which takes disparity or conflict to be the essential core of the concept. On this model, disparity pairs, such as words versus deeds, pretended beliefs versus genuine beliefs, or beliefs versus desires, are our resources for generating hypocrisy.3 But not just any disparity pair will do. For one thing, the disparity must be attributable to a single individual, since a disparity between the words of one person and the deeds of another cannot constitute hypocrisy.4 Furthermore, the disparity pair involved must express values. Presumably a person who merely forgets to do what s/he had said s/he would do is not a hypocrite.5 The claim is that this model of properly restricted disparity pairs captures shared basic intuitions without legislating away conflicting ones, and “is enough to generate most, if not all, of the central structure of the notion of hypocrisy.”6 Furthermore, it is thought to be a virtue of this account that it “does not presuppose that hypocrisy is always a morally bad thing or that it always involves insincerity.”7 Turner goes on to acknowledge one weakness in his account as it stands. This is that his definition is a bit too broad, since it would capture changes of mind, whereas Turner maintains that “cases of changing one’s mind do not properly count as cases of hypocrisy.”8 Turner thinks that some suitable further condition, which he does not even attempt to provide, would help us rule out cases of changing one’s mind, and that with this we would possess a general account. We shall argue that this matter of providing a further condition to distinguish hypocrisy from changes of mind is more difficult than Turner suggests. This is so not only because it may be difficult to identify the further condition, but also because some cases of changing one’s mind may in fact amount to

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fourteen Hypocrisy, Change of Mind, and Weakness of Will [ 273 ] hypocrisy. This suggests that hypocrisy and changes of mind are not merely different species of the genus “disparity,” but rather distinct and overlapping concepts which need to be understood in terms of independent distinguishing features. We propose to explore some examples as a way of identifying these features.

C. Hypocrisy and Changes of Mind A literary example will serve well to introduce the complexities of the relationship between changes of mind and hypocrisy. Consider the case of Mme Cambremer and Poussin’s paintings in the Louvre, a rich and interesting example from Proust’s Cities of the Plain. She has an unfavourable opinion of Poussin’s work. Then it is casually mentioned that Degas thinks well of the Poussins at Chantilly. This gives her pause: “Indeed? I don’t know about the ones at Chantilly,” said Mme de Cambremer, “. . . but I can speak about the ones in the Louvre, which are appalling.” “He admires them immensely too.” “I must look at them again. My impressions are rather distant,” she replied after a moment’s silence, as though the favourable opinion which she was certain before long to form of Poussin would depend, not upon the information that I had just communicated to her, but upon the supplementary, and this time final, examination that she intended to make of the Poussins in the Louvre in order to be in a position to change her mind.9 This passage lends itself to a number of interesting interpretations. What is clear is that Mme de Cambremer has expressed one opinion at one time, and will express a different one at a later time, and that the information that Degas likes the paintings will play a crucial role in bringing about this change. There is still considerable room to speculate, however, about what that change signifies in terms of Mme de Cambremer’s moral psychology, and exactly what role the information about Degas plays in bringing about the change. Consider first the possibilities most charitable to Mme de Cambremer. Perhaps she is moved by a respect for Degas’ critical eye. In this case, she could have said, “Degas’ taste in these matters is impeccable. His eye is unerring. I must have missed something when I looked at the Poussins. I defer to his judgement.” This would have been forthright enough, and morally unproblematic. Her change of mind could have been explained simply by an

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unwillingness to set herself up as an expert. But she does not do this. In stating that she must look at them again herself, she refuses to relinquish her image as an independent critic who will rely ultimately only on her own judgment. This feature is crucial to understanding the situation described, and to the intimation that there seems to be some hypocrisy involved here, as will be explored below. The insistence on accepting only her own judgment is not by itself morally problematic. Suppose that after this conversation, she goes to the Louvre to see the Poussins, perhaps looking more carefully this time. Suppose she is struck and moved by them; she sees how innovative and fresh they are, how they complete and break away from a line of thinking. Then, on this basis, she changes her mind. There is nothing amiss here. Degas’ opinion would indeed have been the spur that led to her change of mind, but this seems to be a clear case of a change of mind without any taint of hypocrisy. Again, suppose she asks for Degas’ reasons for liking the Poussins. She admits that they seem like good reasons for approval. But she says “I have to see them myself.” She goes to the Louvre, sees what Degas meant and she is taken and moved by the paintings. No one could ask more of an honest change of mind. Again the change of mind can be traced to Degas’ remark, but not in a way which leaves any hint of hypocrisy hovering over Mme de Cambremer. But of course Proust’s description of her saying she will have to look at the paintings again suggests a course of events much less flattering to Mme de Cambremer. There are still several possibilities to explore, however. These all hinge on the fact that her remarks give rise to expectations about her as a person who has standards for aesthetic appreciation, who does not arrive at her appraisals on the basis of the most recent critical fashion, or on anyone else’s likes or dislikes. First of all, it could be that Mme de Cambremer genuinely has this image of herself, and values the traits it exemplifies. Accordingly, we can envision a scenario whereby she does go to look at the Poussins again, and somehow convinces herself that she likes them more than she previously had. There might be a sort of self-deception at work here. Degas was the then-current guru of French painting, and a man whose opinion Mme de Cambremer respected. After hearing his opinion, she might have felt the stirrings of a desire to reach the same opinion as a sort of vindication of her aesthetic taste. She may also have had a lot invested in her belief that she was a woman of independent taste, however. To hold steadfastly to her original opinion would have called her taste into question by putting it at odds with Degas’. To simply relinquish that opinion would mean surrendering the independent image, however. The only way to bring these competing desires into harmony would be to look at the paintings again, and this time come to a different conclusion.

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We have no trouble understanding this “solution” in human terms, and yet from the observer’s perspective there is clearly something amiss. If we know that this is the true motivation, then we also know that she is not after all exercising her independent aesthetic judgment. In holding on to that aspect of her self-image, Mme de Cambremer is deceiving herself, and also anyone else who observes this but does not understand the true motivation. In this case, we still clearly have a change of mind, yet there also seems to be an element of hypocrisy, in that Mme de Cambremer does not live up to the image she projects. Perhaps this sort of hypocrisy is not a serious moral failing, but it certainly involves the sort of internal conflict Turner takes to be the essence of hypocrisy. At the same time, however, it suggests that it will be difficult indeed to distinguish changes of mind from hypocrisy in the way Turner confidently suggests can be done, since here we seem to have a case of both! A natural way to try to mark the distinction is to introduce some form of insincerity as typical of hypocrisy — but this option is not available to Turner who rejects the view that insincerity is essential to hypocrisy.10 There are still other interpretations of the example available, however, and some of them may cast further light on the relationship between changes of mind and hypocrisy. First of all, consider a case much like the previous one, but in which Mme de Cambremer is a little more self-aware. Perhaps because she is unable to identify any feature of the paintings which struck her differently upon re-examination, she comes to wonder about her own change of mind. Perhaps she comes to believe that it came about in just the sort of way described above: from the need to bring two disparate desires into harmony. This version of Mme de Cambremer is no longer self-deceived, but then what does she say to her friends? How does she explain her changed opinion of the paintings? Of course she could simply tell the truth as she now understands it, but that would be embarrassing. It would not be an example of unusual moral weakness if she were to conceal this embarrassing truth. Thus she might pretend to the world that her change of mind was due solely to her second, more careful, critical look. Perhaps she will say something such as “I had not previously appreciated the way Poussin uses colour.” This small fib is aimed at deceiving others about her status as an art critic. As such, Mme de Cambremer pretends to be better than she really is, by posing as a detached, autonomous, impartial appraiser of art, untouched by the vogues of artistic fashion yet blessed with an unerring eye. This sort of pretence seems exactly the stuff hypocrisy is made of, and its deliberate nature may make it seem even more morally culpable. Yet again, there is also a genuine change of mind here about the value of the paintings.

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We can imagine yet other interpretations that involve hypocrisy, but do not include this sort of change of mind, however. Suppose that Mme de Cambremer does not truly value independent aesthetic judgment but realizes that others do, and wants to be thought well of by others. It might then be important to her to obtain a reputation for being an autonomous, reliable appraiser of art. One way to do this, of course, would be to take pains to develop the relevant skills. But that might seem too difficult or unreliable a path, and Mme de Cambremer might seek to obtain the reputation without having to do the hard work of earning it. Again, this seems to be a paradigmatic case of hypocrisy. She might think that a few well-placed statements of opinion will get her what she wants, and her anticipated pronouncement that she likes the Poussins might be just such a statement. To see why this could be a case of hypocrisy that does not involve change of mind, notice the distinction between having an opinion and expressing an opinion. There is no trouble with the notion that a person might have an opinion but not express it. This case suggests the slightly more problematic possibility of a person’s expressing an opinion, but not having one. Mme de Cambremer’s initial assertion that she disliked the Poussins may have been merely a remark calculated to bring about the desired reputation, without being backed by any genuine conviction. Thus there need not have been any genuine opinion about the paintings in the first place, and thus no change of mind about them. Clearly, she says one thing at one time and a contradictory thing at another time, and thus it would be natural for an observer to infer that she has had a change of mind. And Mme de Cambremer might take care to engage in the sort of behaviour which might lead to a change of mind, such as a re-examination of the paintings, although she may not even bother looking at them again if she thinks no one will be the wiser. But this is all part of the hypocritical pretence, and the perception of others that she has changed her mind about the paintings does not make it so. But perhaps there is a change of mind here after all. At one time, Mme de Cambremer believes that the best way to get the reputation she craves is to express one opinion. Then later she decides that she will stand a better chance of getting the desired reputation by saying something different. She has indeed changed her mind then, but not about the paintings: she has changed her mind about the best means to obtain the reputation she is interested in. In this case, Mme de Cambremer would be deceiving others, not about whether she’s had a change of mind, but about what it is she’s had a change of mind about. It is interesting to note, however, that her hypocrisy does not really lie in this change of mind, although it is in a sense revealed by it. Even if Mme de Cambremer’s opinion of the Poussins had never changed, she could have

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fourteen Hypocrisy, Change of Mind, and Weakness of Will [ 277 ] been acting hypocritically. The crucial question is whether she was trying to pass off her opinion as the result of a nobler process than the one that really formed it — whether she was merely pretending to aesthetic taste. Thus it is clear that the hypocrisy could have existed without any change of mind. Different interpretations of this passage have revealed that there can be changes of mind without hypocrisy, hypocrisy without changes of mind, and also cases in which there is both a change of mind and hypocrisy. What structural differences between the concepts can be gleaned from the example? First of all, changes of mind require an inconsistency involving different times, whereas hypocrisy seems able to exist at a single time, though events over time may help to reveal it. Furthermore, hypocrisy seems to require the presence of an audience whose esteem is desired, in a way changes of mind do not. This audience puts a demand on a person to adhere to presumed shared standards. For example, if there are standards for changing one’s mind, then a person who pretends to change his or her mind because of those standards, but in fact does so because of factors deemed unworthy or unacceptable by the social group, is a hypocrite. In general, pretending to be motivated by certain considerations, while really being motivated only by a desire to appear to others to be motivated by those considerations, seems to constitute hypocrisy. There is much more here than value-expressive disparity between the words and actions of the same person. Specifically, it seems that some form of deception, directed toward others or oneself, typically plays a role in cases of hypocrisy,11 although of course such deception is not necessarily successful.

D. Hypocrisy and Moral Weakness: Case Histories The account of hypocrisy as the presence of a value-expressive “disparity pair” within a single individual also fails to differentiate hypocrisy from moral weakness. Exploring some variations on an example Turner provides will serve to illustrate this point and help clarify whether there is a need to draw such a distinction. His example is as follows: I am a vegetarian in the sense that I believe that it is morally wrong for people in ordinary situations to eat (red) meat. I am persuaded by arguments based on the view that the pleasure of eating meat does not outweigh such suffering as those animals experience. I am not just barely persuaded either — I think the case can be made in a way that is solidly convincing. However, occasionally, in ordinary situations, I eat meat. Am I a hypocrite?12

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Turner goes on to point out that this sort of situation does not fit dictionary definitions of hypocrisy, since I do not falsely profess vegetarianism, nor merely pretend to have vegetarian beliefs. Yet he seems confident that there is hypocrisy here nevertheless, stating, “insofar as I have any intuitions left on the matter, it seems to me that indeed I am a hypocrite.”13 Indeed, the gap between moral belief and behaviour here does seem to exemplify the kind of “disparity pair” which Turner takes to be definitive of hypocrisy. We will argue that some scenarios fitting these basic facts do constitute hypocrisy, as Turner contends, but that other such scenarios do not. Exploring which features need to be present in order to turn this basic sketch into an instance of hypocrisy will help to highlight the shortcomings of Turner’s attempted definition. Let us begin with a case, following Turner’s sketch, in which the protagonist is a clear-cut candidate for the label “hypocrite.” Consider Henry, who is quite vocal about his vegetarianism, frequently criticizing those around him for failing to live up to his high moral standards. Suppose Henry goes home for the holidays, and that his father has prepared vegetarian dishes for him, and meat dishes for the other people present. We, as invited guests, offer to fetch something from the kitchen, and find Henry there, hovering over the meat dish, mouth full. At first he denies that he was eating the meat, and makes feeble attempts to save face, such as saying “I was just dipping a bit of broccoli into the sauce.” When it is clear that we do not believe these denials, he admits that he ate some of the meat, but claims that there was nothing wrong in doing so, and seems to be casting about desperately for arguments that will justify his behaviour. It does seem plausible to consider Henry a hypocrite, and thus there is reason to think that Turner has indeed sketched an area in which hypocrisy may arise. It is not clear, however, that the justification for labelling Henry a hypocrite can be found solely in the gap between professed beliefs and behaviour. To see which other features of Henry’s situation influence the judgment that he is a hypocrite, consider some alternative scenarios involving the same basic features. Consider now the case of Delia, a vegetarian who again is home for the holidays. Delia’s aging mother, however, is unaware of her vegetarianism, and has prepared specially for her the dish she enjoyed most as a teenager — meatloaf. Delia is on the horns of a little dilemma, and resolves it in favour of her mother. She eats the meatloaf to please her mother — well, she enjoys it too. In this case, there is clearly the gap between profession and performance that Turner describes. Notice, though, how much less we are inclined to offer moral criticism of Delia than of Henry. Of course, the absence of moral criticism would not convince Turner that there is no hypocrisy here, since he

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fourteen Hypocrisy, Change of Mind, and Weakness of Will [ 279 ] claims that hypocrisy is not necessarily a term of moral condemnation. But some of the richness of our moral vocabulary would be lost if we were unable to distinguish this case from that of Henry. Perhaps Turner could distinguish the examples by arguing that there is no conflict between principle and performance in Delia’s case at all — we have simply been given an incomplete account of her principles. A richer account would include the ranking of her vegetarianism among her moral principles, and then it might emerge that eating the meatloaf in this situation is the only thing which fits her moral principles, since, let us say, not harming humans, and especially her mother, is ahead of not harming non-human animals. Remember that the vegetarian principle, as stated, included the proviso that it is wrong to eat meat “in ordinary situations.” Although that phrase conjures up images of people otherwise facing starvation and so on, perhaps the case described here involves a situation which is not ordinary, in that there is a competing moral principle at stake. If so, then perhaps Delia is not a hypocrite after all, even on Turner’s definition, and his account has so far successfully distinguished the hypocrite from the non-hypocrite. But he is not yet out of the woods. Let us call our next vegetarian Victor. Now suppose Victor goes home for the holidays, and his thoughtful mother has prepared vegetarian dishes for him, but has prepared meatloaf for the rest of the family. Suppose further that his mother’s meatloaf was his favourite meal as a teenager. Amidst the nostalgia of being home with his family, Victor has a sudden longing for meatloaf and has a forkful. Subsequently he feels remorseful and embarrassed for violating his principles and confesses his shame to his family. He explains that he had such a strong appetite for the meat that all he could think of was how tasty it would be, and just impulsively went for it. On this description, Victor seems like a prototypical sufferer from moral weakness. He is overcome by bodily temptations, and does something he believes to be wrong. Problematic as such moral weakness has been for philosophers, this does not at first seem like a case of hypocrisy. Yet note that Victor’s case shares with Henry’s the professed commitment to vegetarianism and the observed failure to act in accordance with that commitment which Turner takes to be constitutive of hypocrisy. We believe, however, that it would be a mistake to lump these examples together under the single heading of hypocrisy, because important moral distinctions would be lost in doing so. Let us compare the two cases, looking for differences which may help to locate a more appropriate definition of hypocrisy. First of all, Henry and Victor react very differently after the “lapse” from their vegetarianism. Whereas Victor demonstrates remorse, Henry makes excuses and struggles

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to justify his behaviour. Henry’s response raises questions about the way he holds this moral belief. In making excuses, he seems overly concerned with how he appears to others and insufficiently concerned with his internal moral standing. This might lead us to suspect that his vegetarianism itself has been adopted largely so as to appear morally upright in the eyes of others. Others might respect him for his vegetarianism, even if they do not themselves accept that moral standard, so long as they see it as a case of depriving oneself, on the basis of one’s morality, of a good which others commonly enjoy. Thus in becoming a vegetarian, Henry might indeed be creating the impression of one who is a particularly moral person. Our suspicion that this is merely an impression, though, might be further supported by his loud proclamations of his principles and criticisms of others who do not follow his standards. This sort of concern for reputation does indeed seem characteristic of hypocrisy. Victor, on the other hand, appears to be concerned with his internal moral standing, and to be more sincere about his principles, even though he has failed to live up to them. His failure seems to lie in a sort of impulse that has escaped from his rational control, and has thereby set up a genuine inner turmoil. In short, Victor’s case seems to be one of weakness of will, and it loses much of the richness of our moral vocabulary if we lump his case in with Henry’s under a common label — “hypocrisy” — simply because they share some structural similarities.

E. Hypocrisy and Moral Weakness: Differences In some cases of hypocrisy, the words and beliefs are paraded rather than really meant or held. Instead of the inner struggle that one might expect from a conflict of value, we find ulterior motives and a subtext of self-interest. Instead of irrationality where the subject’s behaviour defeats his or her best intentions, we discern a rational strategy to grind the hypocrite’s own axe. Instead of harm caused to the subject by the subject, we discover that the hypocritical subject managed to gain something from his or her unwitting audience. Instead of openness and forthrightness about his or her lapse, we witness efforts to hide and conceal the distance between word and deed. Instead of lack of self-control, we find rather calm, cool and calculating behaviour. All this contrasts rather typically with the concept of weakness of will, with its notorious features of incoherence, its self-harm, its helpless embarrassments, its diminished sense of agency. Witnesses to weakness of will, if there be any (and there need not be), are apt to be perplexed, possibly sympathetic observers rather than entrapped victims. The hypocrite is likely to be embarrassed only when exposed.

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This series of contrasts is intended to render salient the conceptual differences between paradigm cases of hypocrisy and weakness of will. None of what we say is meant to deny that weakness of will or cowardice may be a cause of hypocrisy. Consider an academic at a faculty meeting where a powerful faction advocates a course of action s/he disapproves of, yet s/he goes along with it, even pretends to believe in it publicly, because of weakness of will or fear of reprisal. Yet the resulting behaviour is essentially deceptive, and is motivated by a concern to look good in the eyes of others, and therefore seems to qualify as hypocritical as well. It might be tempting to distinguish these concepts by saying that, while the weak-willed person does not have the psychological power to act on his or her principle, the hypocrite does have that power.14 Indeed, weakness of will seems to involve some lack of self-control, while the hypocrite exhibits not only self-control but an attempt to control “the other” as well. The problem with this way of drawing the distinction lies in the obscurity of the notion of “psychological power.” Neither the hypocrite nor the weak-willed person does what s/he advocates. Yet the claim that one and not the other could have done so requires more information about the sense in which it is possible for people to do something other than what they do. This issue is more than can be approached in this work; even without it, however, there is reason to distinguish between the concepts. To see the distinction, it might be helpful to consider some slight variations on the cases already offered. Suppose Henry has adopted vegetarianism for exactly the sort of reasons suggested above: he wants to appear to take the moral high ground and thereby gain the moral approval of others. Unlike in the previous case, however, suppose he never violates this adopted rule by eating meat. Perhaps, if he could be assured that nobody would find out, he would eat meat in a second, but he abstains because he is so worried about his moral reputation that he does not want to take the risk of losing it. In this case, Henry would clearly be deceiving others about his moral beliefs, and doing so to gain a sort of advantage — their moral respect. Even though there is no gap between his belief and his behaviour here, there is good reason to accuse Henry of hypocrisy. Indeed, this version of Henry would still have the sort of “disparity pair” Turner takes to be crucial to hypocrisy, here between announced belief and actual belief. But notice how implausible it is to attribute weakness of will to Henry under this description. So, clearly, not all cases of hypocrisy are also cases of weakness of will. Now consider a slight re-description of Victor’s case. Suppose that Victor has become convinced that vegetarianism is morally required, but has not told anyone of this decision. He resolves to eat only the vegetarian dishes when

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home for the holidays, but to do his best to conceal this, so as not to offend his mother, who went to so much trouble preparing dishes. Then he is overcome by the aroma of the meatloaf and has a forkful. In this case, it is still plausible to attribute weakness of will to Victor, but in the complete absence of a moral “audience,” it seems difficult to attribute hypocrisy. It appears, then, that hypocrisy requires others who are meant to convey a better-than-deserved reputation in a way weakness of will does not, and weakness of will requires a gap between belief and behaviour which is not necessary for hypocrisy. Clearly, then, these are distinct concepts. This is not to say that the boundary between these two concepts is rigidly demarcated. There is fluidity enough here so that akrasia (as the Greeks called it) can pass over into hypocrisy. This may happen when the weak-willed person tries to disguise his or her lapse. Concerned with how one appears to others, one may, by special pleading, redescribe one’s situation so that one’s image as a moral agent is restored in front of actual or imagined others. Alternatively, one might pretend to be suffering from weakness of will as a way of covering up some other moral failing. Consider the rather curious case of Tolstoy and chastity as it is recounted by Aylmer Maude. “When he was nearly seventy, he one day expressed to me his conviction that despite difficulties and repeated failures, one should never cease to aim at chastity; and he added: ‘I was myself a husband last night, but that is no reason for abandoning the struggle; God may grant me not to be so again.’”15 This case again lends itself to several different interpretations. Indeed, if one takes a cynical view of the fact that Tolstoy himself allegedly related this tale, one may suspect that he was simultaneously trying to get a reputation for high moral ideals, and for a sexual heartiness that allowed him, even at his advanced age, to be found desirable by women, and to perform sexually (in an epoch without Viagra!). Perhaps Tolstoy wants to have his sexual peccadilloes as well as his ideal of chastity. He would begin advocating the moral ideal of chastity for everyone, hence committing himself to act in accordance with this ideal. Yet when he realizes that this is an obstacle in his pursuit of sexual pleasures, Tolstoy would make an exception of himself while still advocating the ideal for everyone else. He might say that his sexual desires and needs are greater and more intense than those of most others. Instead of acting as he should — in a chaste manner — Tolstoy’s surrogate for moral action is a feeling of remorse or guilty conscience after the sexual transgression. This is carefully arranged to occur in retrospect. For if Tolstoy were to feel guilty in anticipation of this transgression, then this guilty conscience at the very thought of the sexual encounter would serve as a deterrent to the act. But our modified Tolstoy knows what he is going about when he does this. It is essential to the success of this

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manoeuvre that the feeling should not be prior to the action, or too strong for that matter. It is worth returning to Turner’s example of the lapsed vegetarian one more time. Turner suggests two explanations for the gap between this individual’s announced moral views and behaviour, which have not yet been considered.16 One of these is that the person merely forgot the moral principle or how it was to be applied. The other is that the individual thought there were moral reasons to abstain from eating meat, but self-interested reasons to indulge in it, and simply had the view about ethics that self-interested reasons can at least sometimes be allowed to win out over moral reasons. Turner suggests that this person can still be considered a hypocrite, because of the gap between utterance and performance. Clearly these are not cases of change of mind or weakness of will. But should they be considered hypocrisy? One insight into this question can be found in a proposed definition of hypocrisy as a failure to take morality seriously enough.17 Certainly one who simply forgets to do what is morally required, or who says in effect “I think it is OK to do this just because I want to, even though I know it’s wrong,” could be accused of not taking morality seriously enough. But if the person is straightforward about this, and in the second case has reached this conclusion at the end of a long, careful process of philosophical reflection, it is hard to see how we can claim that the moral shortcoming amounts to hypocrisy. Consider first the case of the forgetful vegetarian. Suppose s/he is at a transitional stage in a vegetarian’s career which involves the process of adjusting one’s practice to one’s new beliefs. S/he openly admits the discrepancy. Here we are inclined to credit the excuse “I forgot my vegetarian beliefs” — better still, “I forgot myself.” While this is evidence of some lack of moral seriousness, such lack of attentiveness is not sufficient for hypocrisy. For hypocrisy is not lack of moral seriousness simply, but must also involve giving the impression of such moral seriousness. Consider now the case of people who are morally less than serious, and who keep forgetting their vegetarian beliefs. Even though such people may openly say, when challenged, that they do not practise what they preach, they do not appear to be hypocrites. The only thing that would make them hypocrites would be insincerity about their attitude to the general expectation that holding a moral belief commits one to act on it, in the absence of good reasons to the contrary. What appears as openness may in fact be a deeper sort of insincerity. For the hypocrite’s strategic silence about not following tacit shared conventions enables him or her to unfairly benefit from others acting on the basis of the convention, while s/he makes an exception of him or her self. Another dissimilarity between the morally unserious (but above-the-

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board) person, and the hypocrite is that the latter finds others’ lack of moral seriousness unbearable, excoriating and castigating them, yet expecting others to bear with equanimity his or her own lack of moral seriousness. Let us now turn to the case of the individual who, having engaged in moral reflection, has solid reasons for believing that eating meat in ordinary situations is morally wrong. While s/he preaches this, s/he does not practise it and explains the gap by claiming that self-interested reasons can outweigh moral ones. Is this a morally serious person, and if so, can s/he still be a hypocrite? There is a sense in which this person takes morality seriously, since s/he engages in moral reflection. On the other hand, there is a sense in which s/he does not take morality seriously, since we (as observers) might say that s/he does not give moral considerations as much weight as s/he should. We might say this especially when we suspect that the relevant conclusions were reached through a kind of rationalization. For example, if s/he is really motivated by the desire to appear “politically correct,” and the moral arguments are mere self-deceptive rhetorical props, then s/he is a plausible candidate for hypocrisy. So, even if one has some degree of moral concern, this does not rule out the possibility of hypocrisy. In fact, a sort of hyper-morality provides fertile soil for hypocrisy, much like a hyper-rationality is often a source of irrationality. In any event, perhaps the failure to take morality seriously enough generally appears as hypocrisy simply because others mistakenly assume that one takes morality as seriously as they do, and thus one has a reputation for being “better” in their eyes than one deserves. This appears to be a theme running through all clear examples of hypocrisy. It seems that there must be an “audience” of some sort that attributes to the individual a nobler standing than its members would if they knew the facts. In this sense, the hypocrite, if not exposed, benefits from a sort of deception of others. But this makes it sound as if hypocrisy has more to do with the faulty inferences of its victims and less to do with the hypocrite’s own actions or omissions, which is plainly false — since such faulty inferences in his or her favour are precisely the strategic goals of the hypocrite. While a gap between what one says and what one really believes or does may be the most common indication of such a misunderstanding in one’s favour, we have seen that this is not after all the distinguishing characteristic of hypocrisy. For changes of mind and weakness of will also exhibit this feature, without thereby becoming hypocritical. Furthermore, there can be hypocrisy even if one lives up to one’s stated principles, if the reasons for doing so are something other than a genuine endorsement of those principles, and if one pretends otherwise. Some form of deception or insincerity appears to be a requirement for hypocrisy, whether,

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as in cases of cynical hypocrisy, it be the deliberate and fully self-conscious deception of others about one’s moral character, or, as in cases of complacent or self-righteous hypocrisy, it be the less than explicitly conscious, even unselfconscious ways of self-deception.

F. Conclusion What then are the lessons to be harvested from our discussion of some of the challenging contributions to the literature on hypocrisy? By trying to eliminate any sort of deception or insincerity as essential to hypocrisy, these authors have compelled us to explore deception and its role in hypocrisy more deeply. We have argued for a tighter connection than usual between hypocrisy and insincerity. Such insincerity, we claimed, cannot be reduced to, or exhausted by, the self-conscious acts of deliberate other-deception, since it is not uncommon for self-deception to play a role in complacent or self-righteous hypocrisy, nor is unconscious hypocrisy unheard of. In cases of motivational overdetermination, we may strategically, if thoughtlessly, parade the motive that makes us look better, even though we are guilty of a failure of self-knowledge. And this kind of self-deception may be part of the hypocritical picture. We also argued that the interesting notion of “out-of-the-closet” hypocrisy needs deception as a required feature, and that making the actions of others a condition for one’s own practice counts as hypocrisy only if some form of insincerity is involved. Finally, we have argued that the feature of deception of some sort is needed in order to distinguish cases of hypocrisy from cases of what might at first appear to be hypocrisy but are instead merely forgetfulness, changes of mind, or weakness of will.

Notes 1. Joel Feinberg, editor, Moral Concepts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969) 4. 2. Augustine, Confessions, VIII, 7. 3. Turner, “Hypocrisy,” 265. 4. Ibid., 266. 5. It is worth noting here that simply forgetting can nevertheless express, or carry, value. One may be morally culpable for forgetting, for example, if others are counting on one, or if one has promised to do something. Even here, although surely Turner is on to an important feature of hypocrisy, his account fails to characterize that feature with enough precision. Indeed, it should be noted that when Turner discusses a case in which there is a gap between what one preaches and what one practises, he gives as one possible explanation that one might simply forget, yet he seems to

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consider this a case of hypocrisy nevertheless. This raises questions about whether he even consistently applies his own definition. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid., 262 and 268. For a further discussion of the moral status of hypocrisy, see the chapters in Part II of this book. See also Piers Benn, “What is Wrong with Hypocrisy?” in International Journal of Moral and Social Studies, 8, 3, 223-35. 8. Turner, 266. 9. Marcel Proust, Cities of the Plain in Remembrance of Things Past, translated by C.K. Montcrieff and Terence Kilmartin (New York: Penguin Books, 1981) 841. 10. Turner, 268. 11. See Chapters 12 and 13 above. See also Béla Szabados, “Hypocrisy,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, ix (1979) 197 and 206-10. 12. Turner, 263. 13. Ibid. 14. R.M. Hare is one person who has drawn a distinction along these lines, writing, “the typical case of moral weakness as opposed to that of hypocrisy, is a case of ‘ought but can’t.’. . . Nor will it do to quote cases in which a man goes on saying he ought, but fails to act, even though he can act, in every sense of ‘can.’ For this is the case of what I called purposive backsliding, or hypocrisy, and these are allowed for.” R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963) 80 and 82 respectively. 15. Aylmer Maude, in his introduction to one of Tolstoy’s works in the World Classics Series of Oxford University Press. 16. Turner, 263-64. 17. Crisp and Cowton, “Hypocrisy and Moral Seriousness,” 347.

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part v

Irony, Hypocrisy, and Socrates

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15 Irony and Hypocrisy “Irony travels in an exclusive incognito, as it were, and looks down from its exalted station with compassion on ordinary pedestrian speech.” 1 søren kierkegaard “Since . . . Erich Heller, in his Ironic German, has already quite adequately not defined irony, there would be little point in not defining it all over again.” 2 d.c. muecke

A. Introduction One concept that must be considered if we are to mark off hypocrisy from its close conceptual neighbours is irony.3 Both the hypocrite and the ironical person are commonly described as saying what they do not mean, pretending to be what they are not, professing what they do not practise. Yet in spite of these salient descriptive similarities between them, they are generally accorded strikingly different moral evaluations: hypocrites are generally condemned and despised, while irony is commonly seen as morally neutral, and often positively evaluated as a desirable, even philosophical, trait. It is important then for a thorough understanding of hypocrisy to consider it in comparison with irony, and to try to understand the basis of these different moral evaluations.

B. A Brief Review of the Philosophical Literature Few philosophers have directly addressed the comparison of hypocrisy with irony. Two philosophers who do make the attempt, at least briefly, are Eva Feder Kittay and Christine McKinnon, who offer fairly similar accounts. Their investigations are marred, however, by the fact that they consider only a single representative case of irony — that of Socrates. Socrates, of course, is a cultural icon for us, and Socratic irony is important for understanding philosophical method in general. However, the very fact that he plays this

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crucial role might make it a difficult case from which to discern the key features of irony. We shall return to this important case, and shall argue that both his character and the ways in which he uses irony are more complicated than are often recognized. Before considering Socrates in detail, however, we shall examine a wide range of other cases we hope will cast light on the relationship between irony and hypocrisy. In keeping with our general practice, we shall note how attention to detail affects judgments about whether a particular case is an instance of hypocrisy, irony, neither, or possibly both. Despite the limitations just mentioned, the accounts offered by Kittay and McKinnon serve as a useful starting point for our exploration, and may help guide the selection of cases to be considered. We shall first quote each author, and then try to summarize the distinctions as they understand them. McKinnon offers the following account of the comparison: How closely related are the hypocrite’s desires and actions to the ironical person’s? One glaring difference is that the ironical person’s behavior is not meant to go unnoticed. By ostentatiously flaunting what she takes to be corrupt prevalent norms, the ironical person intends us to recognize the deficiencies of our conventions. Socrates acted provocatively, and in a manner which was designed to lead his contemporaries to judge him to be morally delinquent. But he had the further aim of getting people to question the accepted norms. His actions and his reasons for actions are thus markedly different from the hypocrite’s: the ironical person pretends to be worse, not better, than she is, according to accepted standards, and she intends to be unmasked, so as to expose the inadequacies of these same standards.4 Kittay’s account is as follows: Socrates flaunts conventional morality and wisdom to demonstrate how ill founded conventional attitudes are. By refusing to adopt conventional morality and conventional wisdom — that is, to pretend to be “bad” given the set of values which appear to be “good” — the ironic figure with an alternative and genuine set of values behaves as a genuinely good person. In so doing he confronts society with its moral deficiencies.5 In these passages, there appear to be four main features that are thought to distinguish hypocrites and ironic persons. First, the ironic person’s self-

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referential pretence aims to be penetrated (is “not meant to go unnoticed”), while the hypocrite’s aim presumably is to conceal and deceive. Second, the ironist’s goal is to “demonstrate how ill founded conventional attitudes are.” The ironist as described “confronts society with its moral deficiencies,” thereby “getting people to question the accepted norms.” The hypocrite, presumably, does not have such lofty aims, and does not challenge accepted norms in the same way. Third, we are told that “the ironical person pretends to be worse, not better, than she is, according to accepted standards,” whereas the hypocrite presumably pretends to be better than s/he is. Finally, there is a suggestion here that irony is a tool of the morally courageous, who risk their own well-being for the greater good, while hypocrisy is essentially self-interested, and perhaps cowardly.6 These comparisons seem promising, but they deserve careful assessment. We will argue that, when considered in the light of a variety of examples, these proposed contrasts appear over-drawn. With regard to the first point, we argue that hypocrisy does indeed necessarily involve deception of an “audience,”7 whereas irony requires that there be an audience that is intended to understand that the agent does not mean what s/he appears to mean, and thus is not deceived. However, we will suggest that irony can also involve the deception of those who are less epistemologically privileged, and thus that one must be very careful in how one describes this distinguishing feature. With regard to the second feature, we deny that irony need have such lofty goals, and indeed suggest that irony often serves to reinforce prevailing morality rather than to challenge it. Concerning the third feature, we argue that it is simply not possible to distinguish hypocrites from ironic figures on the basis of whether they pretend to be better or worse than they really are. Finally, although we agree that hypocrisy must be self-interested, we suggest that there is nothing inconsistent about using irony in a self-interested manner. Accordingly, although these features provide a challenging starting point, we argue that they do not ultimately suffice to distinguish these important concepts.

C. Irony and Deception Consider first the suggestion that, while the ironic person and the hypocrite each engage in self-referential pretence, the ironic person intends that pretence to be penetrated, while the hypocrite does not. This does indeed seem a promising way of distinguishing the concepts. We have already argued 8 that hypocrisy involves deception, so if irony requires an absence of deception,

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then there seems to be a real difference here. It becomes crucial, then, to determine whether irony, of the deliberate sort, involves deception. At first glance, it seems that the ironist’s intention cannot be to deceive. Irony seems to involve the use of words to say something other than what the words literally mean, but with the expectation that one’s audience will be able to make use of the context so as to discern one’s true meaning. The audience, then, will “see through” the words to the actual meaning and not be deceived. Indeed, in an influential discussion of Socratic irony, Gregory Vlastos has argued that irony and deception are incompatible in just this way. He offers an example of a visitor to Los Angeles calling his wife in the midst of a downpour. As Vlastos points out, if this visitor were to say “The weather is fine over here,” he would either be deceptive, expecting her to believe the false statement, or ironic, intending her to understand the contrary, but not both.9 Vlastos concludes, “if he had meant to speak ironically he could not have meant to deceive. Those two intentions are at odds; in so far as the first is realized, the second cannot be.”10 And yet Vlastos, McKinnon, and Kittay have all missed an important factor here. Certainly hypocrisy and irony each require an audience of some sort, but it is not necessarily the case that the audience will be homogeneous. When the ironist utters a falsehood, there may well be people in the audience who are not in the know, and who do not recognize the irony. When these people interpret the speaker’s words literally, they are thus deceived. Vlastos is aware that there may be cases in which people miss the irony altogether, particularly when the irony is presented as a “riddle,” or as a sort of test of someone’s intelligence and good sense. He uses the example of a man with a ring whose stone he knows to be fake, asking his daughter, “Luv, can I interest you in a diamond ring?”11 as a sort of test of whether his daughter, too, can recognize it as false. If she fails to recognize that fact, Vlastos says that the correct interpretation would be that “the deception occurred contrary to the speaker’s intent.”12 No doubt this is often the right explanation, but not always, and not as straightforwardly as suggested here. It is quite possible that the person speaking ironically intends simultaneously that some people will interpret the words literally, and thus be deceived, while others will “get it,” and understand that the speaker in fact believes the opposite of what is being said. Thus the intention to deceive and the intention to speak ironically can coexist in a single speaker at a particular time with regard to a single speech act. For example, suppose there is a person who is quite full of himself, and holds forth at great length about professional basketball, though he in fact has never played the game seriously and knows virtually nothing about it. One could imagine this

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person at a party attended by some genuine basketball players. One of them might decide to poke a bit of fun at this person, by saying “I hear you are quite informed about the ways of basketball, and I would really like to learn a few things from you, since you are so wise.” Now, in a sense these remarks can be seen as ironic — the other basketball players present will know that the speaker does not genuinely respect the opinions of the self-proclaimed expert, and does not expect to learn anything. However, it could well be that the person addressed in this way will take the words at face value, and will make a fool of himself by holding forth on this subject at length, thinking that his opinions are held in high regard, while missing the stifled giggles and shared knowing glances of his audience. If we are right that there can be single speech acts that are intended to deceive some of the hearers but not others, then the claim that the ironist intends the pretence to be penetrated while the hypocrite does not is too quick. Although we agree that the ironist must intend the pretence to be penetrated by someone, ironic remarks may be intended to deceive people as well. If this is the right kind of deception, this might suggest that some remarks are both ironic and hypocritical — but in that case the proposed contrast clearly needs to be modified. This splitting of the audience into those who do not understand the irony and are thus deceived, and those who are in the know, and “get it,” and thus avoid deception, may turn out to be a more central feature of irony than this example might suggest. To see this, let us consider why people engage in irony at all. Why follow this tortured path, rather than issuing a direct statement or reminder? Although there can no doubt be many possible explanations, the following story seems plausible for explaining at least some cases: perhaps the person engaging in irony is indirectly reinforcing the bonds holding a group together, by relying on their common underlying understandings. Consider a banal case, following Vlastos, of a person in the midst of a downpour saying “The weather is lovely today,” intending at least some hearers of the remark to understand that the person in question means the opposite of what is said. But if that is the intended meaning, why not just say “the weather is lousy today”? A look into the mechanics of how irony works may help answer this question. How do listeners come to understand ironic communication? In this case, it appears that the speaker requires the listeners to engage in a process of reasoning something like this: “You say the weather is lovely today. It’s raining heavily. If you mean what you say literally, then you must enjoy downpours. I don’t enjoy downpours, and you and I are essentially the same. Therefore you must not enjoy downpours, either. Therefore, you must not mean what you say literally.”13

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In terms of logical structure, it seems that ironic communication involves a sort of argument of the form called reductio ad absurdum. This argument proceeds: “Suppose that you claim to know that p, and that if p then q; but q is evidently false; so how can you possibly claim that you know that p?” Irony dispenses with the steps in the reductio, since the conclusion is staring the real audience right in the face, or at any rate, it assumes that the real audience has the resources to make the correct inferences using easily available information as premises. Irony then is much like an enthymematic form of the reductio with its own rhetoric. We still have the question of why people present their claims in this fashion. Why require one’s listeners to go through this reasoning process? One reason may be that it is in a way flattering to do so. Communicating in this way carries with it an implicit acknowledgement that the listener is clever enough to go through the reasoning process correctly and understands one’s true meaning in spite of the complex manner of delivery. Note that hypocrisy, by contrast, does not appeal to available evidence, nor is it intended to provoke the members of the “audience” to use their powers of reasoning. We would like to suggest that there is also another reason for communicating in an ironic fashion, and that this further reason has both a benign and a sinister side. This reason is that such a communication can serve to reinforce bonds between speaker and listener. It is crucial to the reasoning as outlined above that one include a premise such as “you and I are essentially the same.” It is on this basis alone that one can conclude, when somebody says something one takes to be false, that the other person must take it to be false as well, and thus must not mean what s/he says. Thus the ironic statement can serve to reinforce the bonds between people, emphasizing their similarities. There is a kind of smug self-assurance involved with irony, stemming from the fact that the people involved can communicate in a way that almost transcends words, since they understand each other even when they say the opposite of what they really mean. The sinister side of this lies in the possibility that, by emphasizing such bonds between speaker and intended audience, irony also implicitly draws a contrast with some other group of people who are not similar in the relevant ways, and thus not part of the community that could understand the irony. Just as it may be impossible to define oneself except by contrast with the “other,” so there is at least a strong tendency, when incorporating some people into a group of “us,” to simultaneously exclude those who are “not us,” who are “different.” The ironist and his/her intended audience are thus reminiscent of a group of children who have collectively engaged in naughtiness, but, when

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confronted by a responsible adult, deny all knowledge of who the responsible parties might be. This implicit division between “us” and those who are “not us” is particularly clear, and perhaps sinister, in cases in which the speaker deliberately intends that the audience will be “split,” in the way we described above. In such a case, ironists direct the revealing truth to those in the audience who can understand the real meaning of their message, and let the naïve audience continue to be in the dark about the situation. It is as if they are reminding those members of the audience who do not really need it, and concealing the truth from those who could really benefit from it. Thus ironists make the epistemically rich richer, and the epistemically poor poorer. Surely a bizarre situation! Even if one does not expect one’s words to be heard by anyone not “in the know,” the appeal of irony as a form of communication may lie partly in its exclusion of a hypothetical “other” who would mistakenly take the words literally. Thus the potential, at least, for splitting the audience seems inherent in the very structure of irony. If, as we have argued, this splitting of the audience suggests deception, then the contrast between irony and hypocrisy on the basis of whether the pretence is meant to be penetrated must be made very carefully indeed. It is appropriate to add here one further feature of irony and hypocrisy that is relevant to the discussion of deception. This is the feature of the need for an audience. We argued earlier that hypocrisy seems to presuppose an audience of some sort,14 and in the discussion so far have assumed that the same is true of irony. After all, if verbal irony is understood as a mode of communication, one would expect there to be an “audience” to whom the speaker is communicating. Nevertheless, it is instructive to entertain the possibility that such an audience may not be strictly necessary for irony. Can an expression be ironic if the hearers cannot recognize what the speaker is getting at by his/her anomalous utterance? To explore this issue, let us subtract the audience or arrange for an audience of small children or of the mentally challenged. In such situations, it might seem that, even if the speaker intends to be ironical, his/her attempt is misplaced or misfires, since there can be no uptake.15 There can be no expectation that the point and fit of the utterance is appreciated against the actual situation, nor that the peculiar, playful and anomalous way of putting the point will be grasped. Even if the cognitive and social norms are shared and available to the audience, the verbal playfulness and ingenuity may be missing. There may be some doubt about this though. Suppose that a person is an orderly in an institution where the patients have lost touch with reality and language. He is kind and considerate in looking after them and does his best,

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saying, “There but for the grace of God go I.” However, he keeps himself sane or amused by a constant playful irony in the mode of Monty Python. Perhaps he frequently asks the patients to participate in activities of which he knows they are incapable, or asks their advice on matters he knows they cannot understand. Here there is no uptake, nor even the possibility of uptake, but is it obvious that he is not being ironical? For comparison here, suppose he talks to the patients in a straightforward way, but again knowing they will not be able to understand, as for instance some people talk to their pets. Is such a person “talking to” or “communicating with” the other? To take this case to the extreme, suppose there are no other living beings around at all. Suppose, for example, that a woman broke up with her lover, then went in to work, made a horrible blunder and got fired, and then is driving home in the rain when her car breaks down. Sitting by herself in the car, she might say something such as “This is just a great day!” There is no animate audience there whatsoever, and yet would we not be inclined to say that this statement is ironic? Presumably the answer here is that either the person involved imagines an understanding audience, or is his/her own audience. So apparently we need to include imaginary audiences, or a sort of splitting of the individual into speaker and listener, to make sense of the irony in such situations. This seems consistent with hypocrisy, in which we argued that there must be an audience that is to be deceived, but that since self-deception qualifies, that audience could consist of oneself alone. There is one further observation to make on this topic, and this further point might after all suggest a contrast between irony and hypocrisy. It has been said that the hypocrite even tries to hoodwink God.16 The ironist, on the other hand, cannot be thought of in this way. To the extent that an allknowing being can be the intended audience of one’s remarks, the ironist must expect such a being to understand that the words are not meant literally, and that in fact the speaker means the opposite of what is actually said. Thus, although we have suggested irony can involve deception, and that this may even be part of the ironist’s intention, in the end the ironist must have in mind an audience of some sort that will “get it” and see through the pretence, while the hypocrite would want to deceive even God, if s/he could.

D. Irony as Social Criticism McKinnon and Kittay each claim, not only that ironic people refrain from deception, but also that they ostentatiously draw attention to themselves. Surely this goes too far — there could be such a thing as subtle irony. One need not

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draw special attention to oneself in order to say things that are not to be interpreted literally. But perhaps they are led to this suggestion by the second feature they take to distinguish irony from hypocrisy: that the ironic person must be using irony for the purposes of challenging prevailing norms within the society. According to Kittay and McKinnon, the ironic figure, unlike the hypocrite, refuses to adopt conventional morality and conventional wisdom, acts on an alternate and genuine set of values, and confronts society with its moral deficiencies. This claim about the nature of irony seems too strong in several regards, however, and seems to constitute a case in which these authors are clearly misled by their reliance on the single example of Socrates. To see the shortcomings of this characterization of irony, consider first the fact that, although irony may presuppose a normative context, it is not always directed at anything so lofty as the criticism of our norms or conventions. Furthermore, its purposes need not be to make a moral point, or to educate others. Irony may be much more mundane than that, and can arise in discussions of virtually any topic. As suggested above, even a simple statement such as “The weather is lovely today” could be made ironically, though there is surely no deep social criticism to be gleaned from such a remark. An example suggested by Clyde Lee Miller will provide a richer context for examining in detail how irony is related to prevailing norms.17 Miller asks us to consider a guest who attends a barbecue at which the host serves generous T-bone steaks — burnt to a crisp. Suppose that the host is well known for his self-proclaimed expertise at cooking. “Another triumph, my friend,” remarks the guest, well within earshot of the others. What is crucial to notice here is that the phrase “another triumph” is transparently false and its conventional use of asserting what is uttered is out of the question. The utterance is used to assert the exact opposite of what the conventional use is typically used to assert, and here it means instead, “You have really botched up this splendid cut of meat.” Accordingly, this remark seems to qualify as an ironic one. Notice also that the purpose of the speech act, when it is ironic, is exactly the opposite of what it would be if the words were intended literally. In this case, words that would amount to praise if interpreted literally become a means of conveying blame instead. This inversion of value also seems to be characteristic of irony. Observe that this case does not seem to incorporate any broad assessment of norms. The only norm it invokes is one about how well done steaks should be in order to taste good. This is clearly not the sort of assertion that challenges society for its moral deficiencies. What is more, it does not suggest an alternative norm to the prevalent one. On the contrary, it seems to presuppose the norm in question, namely, that steaks should not be burnt, and simply

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points out that the norm has not been lived up to in the current instance. It points this out in an indirect way, however. If the person had simply said, “these steaks are not cooked in accordance with the prevailing norm against burning them,” or words to that effect, there would be no irony. What makes the statement appear ironic is that the exact opposite is stated — it is suggested that the steaks were cooked in accordance with the prevailing norms of excellence. As mentioned above, this feature of stating the opposite of what one really believes seems to be characteristic of irony. It might be claimed that there is another norm at work in the steak-burning case, which is the norm that one should be polite to one’s host. The guest in this case is indeed challenging that norm — the remark could be construed as a rude insult of the host. But notice that the manner of challenging this norm is not really ironic. The guest simply acts contrary to the norm, but not in a way that involves any deception or intent to have the “real” meaning penetrated. It is not that the guest is pretending to criticize the host, expecting others to understand that the criticism is not meant literally. The brute fact of the situation is that the steaks are burnt, and the guest is pointing that out in an ironic fashion. As such, criticism really is being expressed, just in an ironic way. These remarks about the apparent rudeness to the host do provide grounds for wondering whether this is really a case of irony after all, however. Perhaps this is instead an instance of a related type of practice, namely, that of sarcasm. Sarcasm might be understood as being essentially the same as irony, but with the additional feature of an intention to wound or humiliate another, perhaps conveying blame or condemnation as well. If so, however, and if the guest at the party was indeed insulting the host, or perhaps correcting the host’s inflated self-image, then it appears the guest was being sarcastic rather than ironic. But perhaps this is a mere surface difficulty. Irony and sarcasm appear to have the same basic structure, involving the making of statements with the expectation that others will understand that the words are not meant literally.18 If this is correct, then the presence or absence of an additional feature of intending to insult or injure someone with the remark is not likely to be relevant for distinguishing irony or sarcasm from hypocrisy, and thus for present purposes it seems the distinction can be ignored. A couple of variations on the burnt steak case can serve to highlight some further features of the relationships between irony and norms. These have to do with the possibility that audiences may be split, not only because of differences in how much people are “in the know” and therefore “get it” when the speaker uses irony, as discussed above, but also because of differences in the norms accepted by members of the audience. This may also affect their reactions to irony.

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Suppose that, within a particular community, there has been tremendous fear about health hazards conveyed by eating beef, and suppose that the popular view is that it is unhealthy to eat this meat unless it has been cooked a very long time. Suppose that an outsider, unaware of this popular concern or the accepted means of dealing with it, is served a steak which, under other circumstances, would have been thought overcooked. The outsider might remark, “Another triumph, my friend,” just as in the previous case, intending to be ironic. Here, however, the remark does not issue in a shared assessment and amusement, but rather reveals the speaker to be ill-informed and out of touch with the local zeitgeist. Those in the know may smile sadly, or even respond with irony of their own, saying, “You are obviously up to date with our livestock problems, my friend.” There is an interesting difference here from normal cases of irony, since in such cases it is the epistemically advantaged who are amused and delight in the expression of a shared assessment in language opposite to that expected. In our case, however, those in the know fail to be amused, even though they get the remark’s point and message, because of the realization that its crucial assumption is false. Now the culinary norm is to burn the steaks somewhat as an important safety precaution. In this case, it is the person who makes the attempt to be ironical who is ignorant — specifically about the new norm. Although this observation does not have a direct impact on our question of whether irony serves to challenge or support prevailing norms, it does reveal another way in which norms and irony are intertwined. There is another important way in which differing norms can affect appreciation of irony. People may simply attach different valuations to the sort of verbal playfulness instantiated by irony. That is to say, there may also be norms about the use of irony itself. Consider the burnt steak example again. The person speaking obviously thinks that it is acceptable to criticize one’s host, and that irony is a legitimate tool to use in this process. Indeed, this person might think that one’s host can be criticized only through irony, since the humour involved might be thought to soften the blow a bit, or at least provide some separate redeeming value. There might be other guests at the gathering with different attitudes, however. Some might think it is a terrible breach of etiquette to criticize one’s host at all. These people may think that it is better to ignore certain little truths, whose expression would infringe on politeness or cause embarrassment. Of more immediate interest, however, are people who believe that it is permissible to criticize one’s host, but deny that irony is a legitimate tool for doing so. These people prefer direct communication, and may even have an aversion to verbal play. They may think that those who have something to say should put it right up front rather than beat around

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the bush, or set verbal puzzles for their interlocutors.19 These differences in norms may strongly affect whether people understand or appreciate irony. For contrast, it may be instructive to consider another variation on the burnt steaks case. Unlike the cases discussed above, this case does not appear to involve irony, real or attempted, at all. Suppose that the host of the barbecue is the manager of a business, who has invited his/her employees and their significant others over for supper. Suppose further that one of the employees prefers his/her steaks rare, and that this fact is known to that employee’s spouse, who is present. When the steaks are served burnt, this employee might nevertheless say, “Boss, these are the best steaks I have ever eaten. What sauce do you use, and do you marinate them first?” This person appears to be an ambitious and competitive self-promoter, willing to use deception to promote his/her own interests. Presumably the hope is that the boss will be flattered, and that the good feeling thus generated will turn into advantages for the employee that would not be available if the guest gave a more honest opinion about the steaks. That makes this guest’s remarks sound more like hypocritical flattery than like irony.20 It is worth noting the features that seem to make the difference here. The guest here seems to be using deception, for the purpose of making someone else think highly of him/her. Note, however, that this case as described does involve a splitting of the audience, which we have argued is characteristic of irony. Since the spouse is “in the know,” the deception is not thoroughgoing. This suggests that such a splitting is not sufficient for irony, even if it is a common, or even necessary, feature. Furthermore, it is worthwhile to note the roles that norms play in this example. Although McKinnon and Kittay claim that hypocrisy merely accepts and uses prevailing norms, there is some ambiguity about that here. The employee in this case likes rare steaks, which could be interpreted as meaning that s/he accepts a particular norm about how steaks should be cooked. The employee is also here apparently assuming that the host accepts a different norm, and likes steaks done nearly to a crisp. The deception lies in pretending to accept a norm for how steaks should be done that the employee does not really accept. And yet, in a sense, there is no norm here at all — people like steaks better or less well done, depending merely on taste, with no “right” or “wrong” answer. So pretending to like steaks better done than one really does cannot be seen as supporting a prevailing norm that one secretly rejects. Indeed, we do not even know here whether the boss who cooked them likes steaks better done — s/he may simply have gotten distracted and left them on the grill too long. Similarly, although the spouse is “in the know” in a way the others gathered presumably are not, we do not know what the spouse’s normative evaluation of the situation is. S/he may approve or disapprove of

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this use of flattery for advancement (or be indifferent to it). The question of whether the speaker is acting in accordance with prevailing norms does not seem particularly relevant here to determining whether s/he is acting hypocritically (or ironically), and so again this does not seem a promising way to distinguish hypocrisy and irony. We are now in a position to draw some conclusions about the relationship between irony and the prevailing norms of the society in which the ironic remark is made. The example of the burnt steaks has shown that a person engaging in irony need not be concerned with profound social criticism of the sort McKinnon and Kittay have in mind. Irony may be fairly mundane, and essentially unconcerned with prevailing norms. To the extent that irony does draw attention to prevailing norms, we have suggested that it may be in a way that does not challenge them at all. In fact, irony may even presuppose some agreement on the norms. If the logical structure of irony is as we outlined above, then the members of the audience need to be able to supply the suppressed premise that contradicts the stated claim, and they can do this only by sharing norms with the speaker. Thus it seems the intended audience could recognize the remarks as ironic only if they reason from a basis of shared norms. In fact, it seems irony can be used to draw attention to ways in which individuals are falling short of the ideals, and in this way actually serve to support the prevailing norms. For a related reason, irony can be used to puncture hypocrisy. The gap between the words and deeds of the hypocrite may be effectively revealed by a sharp ironic remark. As the promiscuous preacher sermonizes to his congregation, “Those who live in glass houses should not throw stones,” an ironic member of the audience may say: “Spoken truly, brothers and sisters, by someone whose house is as close to brick as anyone’s.” In this case, irony is being used, not to question the norms of fidelity and so on, but rather to convey the notion that the preacher may fail to live up to those very norms. This hypocrisy-puncturing irony then does not so much work as a form of social criticism, but rather as a way of reinforcing the prevailing norms by drawing attention to those who transgress against them. Even in cases in which irony is being used as a tool of social criticism, it need not be in the constructive, educational manner McKinnon and Kittay suggest. The ironic criticism of society may be more modest, even nihilistic. The goal may be to point out flaws in the conventional wisdom, but without offering any alternative set of norms of which the ironist is confident. This appears to be what Richard Rorty, for example, has in mind when describing the ironic critic of society.21 On his view, “all that critique can or should do is play off some elements in ‘what the ordinary person believes’ against

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other elements. To attempt to do more than this is to fantasize rather than converse.”22 Unlike Kittay’s and McKinnon’s ironic critic who “refuses to adopt conventional morality and conventional wisdom,” Rorty’s ironist critique “does not wish to free itself from the opinions of the community.”23 Unlike Kittay’s and McKinnon’s critic who “confronts society with its moral deficiencies by demonstrating how ill founded conventional attitudes are,” and thus offers “an alternative and genuine set of values,” all that Rorty’s ironist critic or “writer on justice” can do is point out our inconsistencies and hypocrisies “to remind us of the failure of our institutions and practices to live up to convictions to which we are already committed by the public and shared vocabulary we use in daily life.”24 Far from drawing attention to a “genuine set of values” as Kittay and McKinnon suggest, such a person may not believe that there is any single objective set of genuine values, yet that should not stop us from describing the person as ironic. In practice such a critic tacitly accepts the public moral vocabulary despite theoretical misgivings about the possibility of its justification. Nihilism may creep in, as in the case of some post-modern, radical deconstructors, when the critic is globally ironic about the moral vocabulary, including his or her own, trying to implement the post-modern manifesto to be “incredulous toward all master narratives,”25 including that of morality. Such critics deprive themselves of the necessary resources for social criticism: they seem to reduce criticism to ad hoc personal abuse, or their discourse becomes so “playful” that they cannot be taken seriously, even by themselves. This sort of ironist criticism may turn into a form of morally corrosive nihilism. Either way, it may be seen as ironical, but it is unlikely to function as an effective tool of social criticism. In short, it is not necessarily the case that irony is used to challenge prevailing norms. It may be too mundane to involve norms in any serious sense at all. Where norms are involved, it seems the logical structure of irony requires that there be some shared norms the audience can “get” in order to see through the deception. Often the irony actually reinforces these norms, by attracting critical attention to those who have transgressed against the norms. Even when irony does criticize norms, it is not necessarily so as to replace them with preferred norms. Although there can certainly be norms about the use of irony, and differences in norms may affect how well irony is understood or appreciated, it does not seem promising to distinguish irony and hypocrisy in terms of their relationships to prevailing norms. It is appropriate, then, to move on to one of the other features that has been suggested for distinguishing irony from hypocrisy, which is the role of pretending to be better or worse than one really is.

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E. The Role of Pretending to Be Better or Worse The third feature identified by Kittay and McKinnon for distinguishing hypocrisy from irony is that of hypocrites’ pretending to be better than they are, according to the conventional standards, in contrast to the ironists’ pretence to be worse than they really are. We will argue that both ironists and hypocrites may pretend to be worse than they really are, and thus that this bald fact cannot be used to distinguish the cases. Rather, one must attend to features such as one’s motivation for engaging in the pretence, and the nature of the rewards that might be obtained through it. Consider first the case of a person exhibiting false humility.26 Such a person plays up his/her faults, which, according to Kittay and McKinnon, suggests an ironic person. Yet we shall see that there is good reason to think that such a person can in fact be a hypocrite. If that is correct, then the proposed distinction between these concepts in terms of pretending to be better or worse than one is cannot work. By playing up their faults, the falsely humble are indeed appearing to be worse than they really are in regard to some norms within their society, rather than better. To see why these people may nevertheless be considered hypocrites, it is important to consider why they are engaging in false humility. Presumably, they do so to appear to live up to another prevalent norm — the norm of humility. Thus such people are trying to appear worse than they are in some ways, so as to appear better than they are in another. What is more, they might hope that their “audience” recognizes the falseness of the pretence in the sense that the self-assessment is recognized as incorrect or unusually harsh. In this way, they can acquire a reputation for a new virtue — humility — without seriously jeopardizing their reputations for living up to other norms. Indeed, if others point out the falseness of the pretence, saying in effect “don’t be so hard on yourself, you’re not guilty of any of these faults,” the falsely humble person gains in addition the pleasure of being praised by others. In short, the person who offers insincere and inaccurate self-criticisms may have very good self-interested reasons for doing so. Accordingly, this turns out to be a pretence designed to gain an undeserved good opinion from others, and thus appears to qualify as a case of hypocrisy, and not irony. In other words, pretending to be worse than one is in terms of some prevailing norms, while intending the pretence to be seen through (in the way the ironist is alleged to do) is used to promote yet another pretence that is not meant to be seen through, in a way that can be seen as hypocritical. This case supports the suggestion that hypocrites try to appear better than they are, but shows how the suggested contrast with ironic persons who try to appear worse than they are is vastly oversimplified.

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Consider another case along similar lines — that of an employee who, at a business meeting, makes unfounded self-deprecating remarks so that his/her boss’s positive traits will be thereby enhanced. Suppose, for present purposes, that the self-deprecating remarks are not likely to enhance the reputation of the employee in the eyes of the others at the meeting, so that we do not simply repeat the false humility example. Again, on a simplistic reading of Kittay’s and McKinnon’s accounts, this person might appear to be an ironic person, since s/he is pretending to be worse than s/he is, rather than better. Yet we might think that such a person is in fact a hypocritical brown-noser, trying to curry favour with the boss. Or it may turn out that this person is neither ironic nor hypocritical. Clearly it is worthwhile considering the case in more detail. In order to provide a thorough examination of the case, it is important to note a couple of variations on the theme. In the first scenario, suppose that the employee has engaged in this deception out of an expectation that the boss will be grateful, and will provide some sort of advantage later to express that gratitude. This is perhaps the clearest example of a brown-nosing employee. But there are a couple of other possibilities worth considering. First of all, it could have been an explicit expectation of the employee’s job that s/he would do just such things. For example, the boss may have said at some earlier time, “I’m looking for someone who can accompany me to business meetings, and if anything is amiss, can accept responsibility so that my own ability to deal with my business associates is not clouded. I will pay handsomely for someone to take on this role. Are you interested?”27 In this case, we might be tempted to say that the employee is “just doing his/her job as flak-catcher,” and is not really engaged in hypocrisy (or irony) at all. Another scenario involves a person whose boss is very ill-tempered, and who calculates as follows: “If Boss gets the blame for this bungling, Boss will be in a foul mood for days. Boss is no fun to be around when in a foul mood. It would be better for me in the long run to accept the blame now, and not have to put up with that foul mood.” In this case, the employee need not think that the boss will appreciate or even recognize the cover-up.28 Notice that all three cases involve a deceptive pretence to being worse than one is, which is allegedly typical of irony, but in all three cases the employee engaging in this pretence is doing so for self-interested reasons, which is allegedly linked to hypocrisy. It is therefore difficult to know how to classify these cases, which suggests that the proposed distinguishing characteristics are not up to the job. Clearly a more thorough examination of the cases is needed before reaching such a conclusion, however. In what follows, we provide such an examination, but argue that it shows the cases to be, if anything, even more puzzling than they appear at first glance, and certainly supports the claim that

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the “better than one is/worse than one is” distinction fails to do the job of distinguishing adequately between irony and hypocrisy. Consider first the case of the brown-noser — the employee who shields the boss by pretending to be the one who has acted incorrectly, and who does so in the hope that the boss’s gratitude will be reflected in some sort of reward.29 It is important to notice here what appears to be a significant dissimilarity between this case and standard cases of hypocrisy. In standard cases of hypocrisy, not only is there self-referential deception and the hope of gaining some selfish advantage thereby, but the person(s) deceived is expected to be the same as the person(s) providing the advantage. Thus, for example, if one pretends to be more pious than one is, those who are taken in by the pretence will afford one the benefit of a better reputation than one deserves. In the case of the brown-noser, however, the people who are deceived are not the ones who provide the benefit. It is one’s boss who is expected to provide the benefit, yet presumably the boss knows who really messed up — otherwise there would be no reason to expect gratitude from the boss for shouldering the blame. So in this case, the benefit to be derived does not come from the person deceived, and so this case may seem not to fit the mould of hypocrisy after all. Is it plausible to consider this person an ironist? It might seem not, since there is no intention that those who hear the deprecating claims will see through the pretence, or understand that the speaker does not mean them literally. On the other hand, it is not quite true that the hearers are not meant to see through the pretence. One of them is supposed to understand that the deprecating claims are false and not meant literally — the employer, who may later show gratitude. As we have seen, this dividing of the audience into those who believe the speaker’s pronouncements at face value, and those “in the know” who realize the speaker does not mean what is being said, is in fact common in cases of irony. So perhaps the brown-noser currying favour with the boss is an ironic person after all. Or perhaps this person is lacking some other characteristics crucial for irony, and thus is neither a hypocrite nor an ironist. Consideration of further cases may help us decide how to describe this case most adequately. Let us proceed, then, to the second case noted above, in which it is simply part of one’s job to accept blame for things for which one is not in fact responsible. Note that this case shares with the first case the fact that the people being deceived are not the same as the person providing the benefit, thus raising questions as to whether this is really a case of hypocrisy. Furthermore, the nature of the self-interested reward may be important here. Ordinarily, the selfish reward involved in hypocrisy is something like an inflated esteem from others (which might, of course, be used for other benefits as well). In this

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case, however, the reward for one’s deception is straightforwardly monetary. One is being paid to deceive, and even though the deception is self-referential, this fact might make this seem more like a case of straight-out lying than hypocrisy, though this distinction is admittedly a little vague.30 The third scenario suggested above, that of the employee who shields the boss simply to avoid the unpleasantness of the boss’s grumpy mood when criticized, is in some ways the most difficult to analyze. Here it could be that one of the people deceived is indeed the one who will provide a benefit. This would be true if the boss takes the employee’s shouldering of the blame at face value, and then provides the “benefit” of a more pleasant work environment than would otherwise be the case. The employee is engaged in deception, of a sort that is not intended to be seen through, so as to promote his/her own self-interest. This sounds like a case of hypocrisy. And yet it is not obvious that this is really a case of hypocrisy. First of all, as noted, the benefit is gained by appearing worse than one is rather than better — which is thought by Kittay and McKinnon to be a characteristic of irony rather than hypocrisy. Furthermore, the nature of the self-interested reward is not like that of paradigmatic cases of hypocrisy. In standard cases of hypocrisy, the hypocrite aims to gain an enhanced reputation, and in doing so tries to reap a reward that s/ he does not actually deserve. In this case, the anticipated reward is not related to the employee’s reputation at all, enhanced or otherwise. What is more, one might plausibly claim that the reward sought is no more than the employee deserves. We might maintain that people are entitled to a pleasant work environment, and in preventing the boss from becoming grumpy and ruining that environment, the employee is simply protecting what is legitimately his/hers. Thus there are reasons for thinking this is not a case of hypocrisy after all, but it does bring to the fore questions about whether it is typical of an act’s being hypocritical that it involve pursuit of a particular sort of benefit for the person engaged in it. One further type of case may be instructive to consider. Suppose there is a person whose family is having a large gathering. Suppose further that this person loves his/her family members, but finds them a bit overwhelming after a while, and wants to stay at the family gathering only for a short while. However, this person worries that telling the family members this will be hurtful to them. Suppose further that this person has a life-partner, who is also invited to the family gathering, and who is aware of all these facts. Suppose the life partner forms and executes a plan to go to the gathering, wait what is judged to be a suitable length of time, then pretend to be very tired (or sick, etc.), and ask the family member to take him/her home. This is calculated to allow the loved family member a graceful way to escape the family without

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incurring as much anger. Furthermore, whatever anger there still is will most likely be directed at the life-partner instead. This might be considered preferable because, since the life-partner is not embroiled in the bonds of bloodrelations, s/he is in some ways immune to the anger. In this case, the life-partner is again arguably pretending to be worse than s/he really is in terms of some norm (less durable, or even less interested in that particular family), but in a manner that is not primarily self-interested.31 Is there any hypocrisy or irony in this person’s actions? At first glance, it would seem not. But suppose the person the life partner intends to rescue from his/her own family knows that the partner is not really tired, but gratefully leaps at the chance to escape the family gathering. Suppose further that this person conveys the impression that s/he would really like to stay at the gathering, but is compelled to leave because of a stronger obligation to help the life-partner. This person might be accused of hypocrisy on the basis that s/he is deceptively trying to get an undeserved reputation for being a “good family member.” These examples demonstrate that it is not after all promising to distinguish hypocrisy or irony on the basis of whether one is pretending to be better or worse than one really is. Some cases of pretending to be worse than one is may be ironic, but others may be hypocritical, and some may be neither. It seems that in making their broad claims, Kittay and McKinnon failed to pay sufficient attention to details such as the manner in which one pretends, the motivation for doing so, and the nature of the “reward” one hopes to gain through the pretence.

F. Irony and Self-Protection The final suggestion made by Kittay and McKinnon for marking off irony from hypocrisy is that irony is a tool of the morally courageous, who risk their own well-being for the greater good, while hypocrisy is essentially selfinterested. The suggestion is that the ironist brings attention to the jarring incongruity in his/her remarks and behaviour, warning the audience that none of this is to be taken at face value. In this way “the ironic person acts provocatively,” opposing the prevalent conception of the ideological good, in sharp contrast to the hypocrite who acts “self-protectively.”32 This may, however, be another of the places in which these authors were misled by their reliance upon the single case of Socrates. The suggestion is that, like Socrates, the ironic person is necessarily morally courageous and unselfish, if not self-sacrificing, since he or she is ready to incur risks for the sake of important values, such as truth and understanding.

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Among these incurred risks are the loss of the good opinion of one’s complacent audience and punishment by the authorities in power. In sharp contrast to this, it is implied that hypocrisy is the tool of the coward and is essentially self-interested. We will argue that these contrasts are overdrawn, and that although hypocrisy does indeed seem to require an element of self-interest, irony is not necessarily courageous and self-sacrificing. It is sometimes used in contexts where there is no risk to the speaker in any case, and may even be used in a self-interested manner, chosen over direct criticism partly out of fear and prudence. First of all, as noted above, irony can often be quite banal. The person who comments on the weather, or the condition of the steaks being served for dinner, by saying the opposite of what is really meant, appears to be speaking ironically, but is generally not taking any great personal risks. Nor does such a person necessarily display any great love of truth for which s/he is willing to make sacrifices. Accordingly, irony may be used in a way that involves too small a scale to be considered heroic in the manner McKinnon and Kittay suggest. We want to go even farther, however, and suggest that not only can there be irony that involves no great personal risk, but in fact it is possible for irony to be peculiarly well suited for furthering one’s own self-interested goals. Consider a political dissident living under an oppressive regime who makes a speech saying things such as “This is a wonderful country we live in. Everyone enjoys prosperity and freedom. Our leaders are wise and compassionate. We are lucky to be here, and I hope nobody ever tries to change a thing.” The intended audience may well understand that these pronouncements are all ironic, and that the speaker in fact believes the opposite of what is being said and wants the real audience to believe the opposite as well. This person challenges the regime insofar as the praise is seen by those “in the know” as transparently hollow. Yet there is also room left for protecting himself/herself and his or her interests which is not available to the person using the discourse of direct criticism. If the authorities harass the speaker for his/her unpatriotic attitudes, the speaker might say, “How could I possibly have offended? Look at what I did say.” By thus using irony and then denying that one has done so, one might be able to get one’s evaluations heard and understood by one’s real audience, and at the same time protect oneself from charges of “bad” behaviour from the powerful few. Once again, the above-noted tendency for irony to split the audience makes it difficult to contrast irony with hypocrisy, not only because there is often uncertainty about whether there’s an intention to deceive, but also because it is difficult to determine whether or not this behaviour should be seen as self-interested.

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Our moral evaluations of this use of irony may vary with the circumstances, but it is interesting to note parallels here with hypocrisy. On the one hand, we might claim that people who use irony in this way lack the courage of their convictions, and thus are acting in a cowardly, self-protective way that is typically associated with hypocrisy. On the other hand, we may sympathize with speakers who are not allowed to speak with impunity under the circumstances, yet feel they must speak out, and we may admire their cleverness. Out of this condition of powerlessness, the peculiar compromise of irony may be born. Yet it is interesting to observe that in this sort of case, where one is likely to be sympathetic to the ironic figure, the irony has similarities to cases of victim hypocrisy.33 Indeed, if the dissident, upon being challenged by the authorities, insists on the literal rather than ironic meaning of the words, the irony may seem to have been transformed into hypocrisy — unless the insistence itself is also seen as ironic. Perhaps the above case is excessively charged morally speaking, and inclines us to view it in terms of heroes and villains. So perhaps the points we want to make are better brought out in a homely case. Suppose that Dick, basically a good-natured fellow, always says as he goes out, “I’ll be back early, well in time for dinner,” but he regularly returns home late. Suppose that one day his wife Jane has guests over, perhaps for a North American Tupperware party of the 1960s. As Dick is on his way out for the evening, Jane may say ironically “I expect you home early as usual, dear.” Notice that Jane manages to criticize her husband’s behaviour politely, without causing public embarrassment in front of her guests, which would have been impossible had she put the point bluntly. Let us suppose the norms of mutual spousal respect and politesse were so strong at the time as to prohibit public spousal acrimony or criticism. Jane’s ironic remark then may be seen by those “in the know” — namely her husband and, perhaps, her best friend in whom she previously confided — as reproving her husband for his habitual lateness and not keeping his word. At the same time, her remark is seen by those in the audience who are not “in the know” as praising Dick for his reliable punctuality — thus giving the impression of complete domestic peace and upholding the norms of social decorum. For our purposes, this homely example of irony is noteworthy, since questions of moral courage and risking one’s own well-being for the greater good do not seem to arise. For one thing, Jane has nothing to fear from her husband, but is in fact anxious about her reputation for social tact and decorum. For another thing, the truth about his habitual lateness, despite his words to the contrary, is hardly a candidate for the “the greater good,” and is of little interest to anyone in the audience. A further crucial feature of this case is that

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Jane does not intend that her “masquerade be penetrated” by everyone — nor does she “intend to be unmasked”34 by everyone, as Kittay and McKinnon would have it. Only by some. She uses irony in a self-protective manner, veiling from most of the others her criticism of her husband, in order to preserve her image as a person beyond social reproach. Hence this example runs counter to Kittay’s and McKinnon’s suggestion that irony, unlike hypocrisy, is never self-protective or self-interested, fearful or timid. In light of the variety of examples discussed, we conclude that the sharp contrasts between irony and hypocrisy sketched by Kittay and McKinnon, although initially promising, are over-drawn and thus may mislead. Our hope is that our discussion has resulted in a better understanding of the two concepts and their relations. For typical cases of hypocrisy we have seen that it is not enough that an action involve deception and be self-interested — it seems the self-interested goal to be achieved must involve the speaker’s reputation, must be more than the speaker deserves, and the person or people deceived must be the same as the one(s) who provide the benefit. With regard to irony, we have seen the importance of keeping in mind the double meaning of the ironic utterance, and the split in the audience. Together with the normative background, these are factors that render irony and its relationship to hypocrisy complex and dynamic, enabling irony and hypocrisy to co-occur. For example, the ironic wife makes the criticism in public, albeit in a veiled form, thus subverting the prevailing norms. At the same time, however, her words appear to endorse those norms. Her remarks may be seen as ironical or hypocritical, or tinged with a bit of both as she is playing to two audiences. As indicated by the Greek word eiron, meaning dissemble, she appears more or less as she really is, depending on the perspective of the audience. Having said all this, we are now prepared to consider in more detail the case of a different sort of wife — a Greek intellectual midwife — namely Socrates, and his rather peculiar form of irony.

Notes 1. Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, with Constant Reference to Socrates, translated with an introduction and notes by Lee M. Capel (New York: Harper & Row, 1965). 2. D.C. Muecke, The Compass of Irony (London, 1969). 3. The contrast drawn here is with verbal irony. We believe that the account offered here could be extended to cover other sorts of irony, such as dramatic irony, or ironic turns of events, but we will not attempt that extension here. 4. Christine McKinnon, “Hypocrisy, With a Note on Integrity,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 28 (1991) 324-25.

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5. Eva Feder Kittay, “On Hypocrisy,” Metaphilosophy, 13 (1982) 281. 6. It should also be noted that these analyses implicitly restrict the discussion to cases of deliberate irony. If a speaker is unaware that s/he is saying the opposite of what s/he means, we have mere verbal slippage or a malapropism that may be interpreted as ironical but was not intended as such. In what follows, we are happy to restrict our discussion in a similar fashion to cases of deliberate irony. 7. As was argued in Chapter 12 of this book. 8. In Part IV of this book. 9. Gregory Vlastos, “Socratic Irony,” in his Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991) 22. 10. Ibid., 22. 11. Ibid., 22-23. 12. Ibid., 22. 13. Interestingly, the reasoning seems parallel to that involved in certain sorts of understatement, such as if the temperature is –40° and one remarks: “It is a bit chilly today.” There one does not mean the opposite of what is said, and thus this does not appear to be ironic, and yet the expectations of the audience are very similar. 14. See Chapter 14 of this book. 15. For a pioneering discussion of “uptake,” and “illocutionary and perlocutionary force,” see J.L. Austin’s, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). For a more recent and technical, but less inspired, treatment, see John Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). 16. William Hazlitt, “On Religious Hypocrisy,” in The Round Table (London: Dent, 1964) 128-31. 17. The example is discussed in Clyde Lee Miller, “Ironic or Not?” American Philosophical Quarterly 13, 4 (1976) 311-12. 18. Clyde Lee Miller gives a very different account of the nature of sarcasm, suggesting that anything said with the intent of hurting or offending another is sarcastic, even if the words are intended literally as stated (see “Ironic or Not?” 313). In this sense, the guest being served the burnt steak would have been exhibiting sarcasm in saying “Done to a burn, eh?” This simply does not agree with our linguistic intuitions about the nature of sarcasm, however, and seems to needlessly conflate sarcasm with nastiness. 19. These differences to some extent parallel the debates we discussed in Chapter 9 of this book over whether to understand hypocrisy in a broad or a narrow sense. Those who want to condemn all hypocrisy, even of the broad sort, can be seen as preferring directness with no hint of deception. This view has an affinity with the irony-haters we refer to here, who also clearly prefer a direct and fully honest approach. Those who object only to narrow hypocrisy, however, seem parallel to those who think irony an acceptable approach, since these people are willing to tolerate something less than complete direct “calling it like it is.” 20. To draw the desired comparisons here, it is not important to establish whether this case has all the features necessary to qualify as hypocrisy. 21. See Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) xv; especially the essay “Private Irony and Liberal Hope,” 73-95. 22. Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 30. 23. Ibid., 29.

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24. Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, xiv. 25. See Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Post Modern Condition, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984) xxiv. 26. We discuss the hypocrisy of the falsely humble also in our chapter on Kantian ethics, and, with regard to the specific example of Tartuffe, in Chapter 12 of this book. 27. We have heard a story, probably apocryphal, about a major department store that hired someone for just such a role. Whenever a customer had a complaint and demanded to see the manager (so the story goes), the manager would apologize, call in a person whom the manager stated was the culprit in the case, and fire the culprit on the spot. In fact, this was simply an employee whose job it was to get called in and apparently be fired several times a year. 28. A fourth possibility, of an employee who simply loves the boss, cannot bear to see the boss come to any harm, and sacrifices his/her reputation purely out of loyalty, is excluded from this discussion because there is no obvious element of self-interest involved, and no desire that the deception will be “seen through,” and thus not even the appearance of either hypocrisy or irony. 29. It may be worthwhile here to note two sub-cases, distinguished on the basis of who the “others” are before whom one deceptively accepts blame. They might be representatives of a rival company considering doing business with the brown-noser’s own company, or they might be the boss’s superiors, wondering what is going on in their own company. This distinction does not affect the structure of the situation, as analyzed in the text, but may affect intuitions as to whether there is a case of hypocrisy here. 30. Note that Kittay herself tries to distinguish lying from hypocrisy, but her distinction is less than compelling. See Kittay, “On Hypocrisy,” 278. 31. Unless one takes a very broad conception of what constitutes the “self.” We discuss this in more detail in Chapter 7. 32. Kittay, 278. 33. We discuss “victim hypocrites” in several places in this book, but see in particular Chapter 9. 34. See Kittay, 281 and McKinnon, 324-25.

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16 The Complex Figure of Socrates “It is . . . far more useful, when I hear the character of a Socrates, for example, whether it be fancied or true, depicted as perfectly virtuous, to seek to render this image more perfect still, rather than that I should hunt for flaws in it. It elevates my soul, after all, to the emulation of such virtue, and is an incentive to me.” 1 immanuel kant

“Is the Socratic irony an expression of revolt, of mob resentment? Does Socrates, as a creature suffering under oppression, enjoy his innate ferocity in the knife thrusts of the syllogism? Does he wreak his revenge on the noblemen he fascinates? As a dialectician a man has a merciless instrument to wield; he can play the tyrant with it; he compromises when he conquers with it. The dialectician leaves it to his opponent to prove that he is no idiot; he infuriates, he likewise paralyzes. The dialectician cripples the intellect of his opponent. Can it be that dialectics was only a form of revenge in Socrates?” 2 friedrich nietzsche

A. Preamble As noted above, Kittay and McKinnon each draw a stark contrast between the hypocrite and the ironic person, and use Socrates as the paradigmatic example of the latter. Now that we have a sketch of the complex relationship between irony and hypocrisy, we are in a position to return to the figure of Socrates, and try to achieve a deeper understanding of the nature of his irony.3 In doing so we will highlight the ways in which Kittay and McKinnon have both simplified, and in some ways even misunderstood, Socrates’ irony, but we will also reveal our ambivalent identifications with the pioneering figure of moral philosophy. Consider what Kittay says about Socrates as an ironic figure:

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part v Irony, Hypocrisy, and Socrates Socrates flaunts conventional morality and wisdom to demonstrate how ill founded conventional attitudes are. By refusing to adopt conventional morality and conventional wisdom — that is, to pretend to be “bad” given the set of values which appear to be “good” — the ironic figure with an alternative and genuine set of values behaves as a genuinely good person. In so doing he confronts society with its moral deficiencies.4

Socrates is certainly sometimes ironic (and, some would argue, the author, Plato, is as well, in other ways),5 and certainly sometimes challenges prevailing morality, but we want to suggest that these two features of the character of Socrates do not go together in the way suggested in this passage.

B. An Instructive Parallel To see this, consider first a comparison with Kittay’s example of the victim hypocrite.6 Kittay describes a Jew in Nazi Germany who pretends to accept the prevailing anti-Semitic ideology, and in fact explicitly speaks in favour of it, as a way of concealing his own Jewish identity. Although of course we would be very hesitant to blame this person under the circumstances, since we assume the Nazi anti-Semitic views were wrong, Kittay suggests that his actions have the structure of hypocrisy: pretending to accept the prevailing view for a self-interested motive. She therefore calls him a “victim hypocrite.” What sort of behaviour would constitute irony under the same circumstances? Kittay describes the ironic figure as one who refuses to adopt conventional morality, and behaves in accordance with “an alternative and genuine set of values.” Such a person might thus refuse to adopt the Nazi view that anti-Semitism is laudable, and act in accordance with an alternative and genuine set of values — say egalitarian ones. Such a person might, then, speak out publicly against the prevailing Nazi ideology, at great personal risk. This would indeed indicate an admirable adherence to a “genuine set of values,” and would “confront society with its moral deficiencies.” But wherein lies the irony? In what sense is this person doing what Kittay suggests in her parenthetic remark, pretending to be “bad” given the prevailing values? Is it not the case that this person simply is being bad according to those values, but good according to our preferred set of values? This does not seem to be a case of irony at all. What might make this case ironic would be if the person involved were making statements that appeared to support the prevailing morality, when assigned their literal meaning, but which in fact were meant to be critical of

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the prevailing morality. Thus a person known to have egalitarian sympathies might say something such as “Nazi Germany is a wonderful model of a just state that treats all members of society fairly.” But notice that this is exactly the sort of thing the victim hypocrite might say as well. Are the ironic figure and the hypocrite identical here? No, and indeed this case allows us to see clearly the contrast. As McKinnon and Kittay observe, the ironic figure intends to be discovered, whereas the hypocrite does not. The victim hypocrite may well hope that all his/her hearers will take the voiced support of the Nazi regime to reflect a genuine belief. The statement becomes an ironic one only when the speaker anticipates that at least some members of the audience will recognize that s/he does not mean what is said. Thus it seems that a speaker’s expectations of his/her audience are crucial for determining whether a statement the speaker does not believe to be literally true is ironical or hypocritical. This fits well with our discussion7 of why acting, for example, is not hypocrisy in the modern sense, even though actors may say things that are not literally true of the person speaking. In that case, the speaker can depend upon a set of conventions to ensure that the audience will understand that the speech is not to be taken literally. So too, in the case of irony, it seems crucial that the speaker expect at least some hearers to understand that what is said is not literally meant.

C. Return to Socrates: Complex Irony Let us return now to the figure of Socrates. Observe first that Socrates often makes use of irony in ways that have nothing to do with the sort of ironic figure described here. For one thing, some uses of irony by Socrates do not hinge on particular statements at all, but rather depend upon the dramatic context. Thus, for example, there seems to be irony involved in the Meno when Socrates suggests that Anytus would be a good person with whom to discuss virtue.8 The basis of this claim is that Anytus is the son of a virtuous man and is popular among the Athenians. But Socrates goes on to argue that virtuous men cannot pass on their virtue to their sons, and that the opinion of the masses is not to be trusted when it comes to virtue. Hence Socrates undermines the basis of his own claim and in the process mocks Anytus. The irony is made all the more stark because the attentive reader knows that Anytus is one of Socrates’ accusers in the Apology, demonstrating grave flaws in his moral outlook. Thus sometimes the context needed in order to understand a remark as ironic is not available at the time the remark is made, but emerges only through subsequent dramatic developments or background events.

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Even if we restrict our discussion to situations in which Socrates’ remarks are more straightforwardly ironic, when he criticizes prevailing morality he does not do so in the manner of the ironic figure identified above. It is unfortunate that neither Kittay nor McKinnon provided references to specific textual passages in which they think Socrates exhibits irony in a way designed to challenge conventional morality. Since it is clearly not possible to consider every aspect of Plato’s writing for these purposes, we will have to speculate about where Socrates might be seen to be doing this. Accordingly, we will merely examine one of the most obvious passages in which Socrates challenges Athenian morality, and consider whether his discussion takes the form identified as ironic in the discussion above. Perhaps the most obvious instance in which Socrates criticizes conventional morality is in connection with the chain of events culminating in his conviction and subsequent execution. Socrates was accused of failing to respect the gods, and of corrupting the youth. Did Socrates state support for the principles of respecting gods and leaving youth uncorrupted, while intending people to realize he did not really accept these principles? Surely not. He did not reject those principles at all — he merely denied that he was contravening them. He believed, for example, that getting youth to question things for themselves was valuable, even if that included questioning authority and convention. So he disagreed with the majority about whether encouraging youth to question amounted to corrupting them. It is important to notice that his challenge to prevailing morality here was not so much in terms of its principles as in their application. Socrates really is encouraging youths to question authority and convention, and does not pretend otherwise. Thus he really is violating the conventional interpretation of the principle forbidding corrupting the youth, but not his own interpretation of that principle. It seems he means exactly what he says here, and thus is not really being ironic. If there is irony here, it must be of the form Gregory Vlastos says is typical of Socrates, which he calls “complex irony.” As Vlastos describes it: In “simple” irony what is said just isn’t what is meant: taken in its ordinary, commonly understood, sense the statement is simply false. In “complex” irony what is said both is and isn’t what is meant: its surface content is meant to be true in one sense, false in another.9 For clarification of the idea of both meaning and not meaning something, consider an example Vlastos cites from Xenophon’s depiction of Socrates, in

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which Socrates maintains that his notoriously ugly facial features are in fact beautiful. As Vlastos says: [W]hen he says that his flat, pushed-in nose, his protruding eyes, and his large flaring nostrils are beautiful, he does not, and yet does, mean what he says. In the ordinary sense of the word he would be the first to deny that they are. But if by “beautiful” he were allowed to mean “well made for their required function” (5.4), then he would have us know that his particular sort of eyes and nose are superlatively beautiful: unlike the deep-set ones of fashion-models, his can see sideways, not merely straight ahead; his nose is a more efficient vent than that of the currently admired profile (5.5-6).10 In fact, in this instance Socrates seems to be playing on an ambiguity within the word “beautiful.” Usually, something described as “beautiful” is thought to be both pleasing to the eye and desirable. Socrates here adroitly points out that things can be desirable for reasons other than being pleasing to the eye, and indeed suggests that this is not the most important reason for something’s being desirable. By utilizing the double meaning of the word “beautiful,” he can both mean and not mean what he says, if what he says is true with respect to one meaning but not the other. There seems to be something very similar going on when Socrates challenges the prevailing morality. He both is and is not corrupting the youth, depending on how that phrase is meant. That phrase can mean leading the youth to follow an objectively wrong moral path, or leading them to question the conventional interpretation of the right path. The two will coincide only if one makes the assumption that the prevailing morality has correctly identified the objectively right moral path. Socrates is indeed challenging this, by suggesting that his actions that are corruptive in the conventional sense are not corruptive in the objective sense. Thus Socrates seems to be engaging here in complex irony.

D. Ethical Doubts about Pretended Ignorance When people discuss irony in the context of Socrates, they commonly have in mind a different aspect of his thought, however. It is often thought that the essence of Socratic irony lies in his claiming that he has no knowledge or ability to teach when in fact he demonstrates that he has quite a bit.11 Indeed, the association of Socrates with this particular form of irony has become so

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pervasive that the term “Socratic irony” can be found in many dictionaries with definitions such as “pretended ignorance or willingness to learn from others assumed for the sake of making their errors conspicuous by means of adroit questioning.”12 It is commonly assumed that Socrates is doing something morally good (or at least acceptable) when he engages in this sort of irony. McKinnon and Kittay apparently want to endorse such a view, since they paint the ironic figure of Socrates as a heroic anti-hypocrite who punctures pretensions to knowledge and wisdom anywhere he finds them. It is not obvious that this pretension to ignorance is as wholesome as this picture would have us believe, however. Paul Friedländer offers the following portrayal of Socrates’ uses of irony: “The concept of irony may waver between dissimulation, hated or despised, playful hide and seek, a common idiom of the intellectually brilliant and critically suspicious society of democratic Athens, and a dangerous concealment, feared and admired. Indeed, friends as well as enemies of Socrates could talk about Socrates’ irony with very different meanings.”13 Indeed, it could be suggested that Socrates’ irony in fact shades over into hypocrisy. It is important for us, then, to consider in more detail the question of the ethical status of “Socratic irony.” In our earlier discussion14 we highlighted a rarely-noticed feature of irony, involving the heterogeneity of its audience. The Socratic dialogues offer many layers of such heterogeneity. Frequently Socrates is talking to a particular person, but in the presence of a larger audience (not to mention the even larger potential audience of readers). It is not uncommon for his interlocutor to believe that Socrates intends to say exactly what his words literally mean, whereas those who know his thought better realize that he cannot mean exactly that, and look for an alternative interpretation of his words. That amounts to saying that Socrates makes use of the inherent ambiguity of words to divide those who “get it,” and thus become insiders, from those who do not and are left on the outside. Although we are of course supposed to admire Socrates’ intellectual superiority, this way of presenting it could be seen as arrogant. What is more, the unwitting audience is not only deceived but also mocked, ridiculed, or in general indirectly diminished in the eyes of the knowing audience or the reader. On the other hand, the knowing audience is flattered. Although Socrates’ irony can be appreciated by those in the know, those on the outside may see it as objectionable deception and even cruel mockery. Thus it could be argued that Socrates should be criticized for being arrogant, two-faced, and mean. Surprisingly, the view that there is something morally objectionable in Socrates’ use of irony gets support from a couple of sources within Plato’s

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writings themselves.15 First of all, the Greek word from which our term “irony” was derived was generally used, even within Plato’s writings, in a negative sense, meaning dissembling or deceiving.16 It is interesting17 to note that, in a sense, our language has reversed the meanings of “hypocrisy” and “irony” from their Greek roots. In the original Greek, “hypocrisy,” as “playing a part on the stage,” was a normatively neutral concept, referring to the making of statements that, though false, were made in a context in which the audience would not be deceived, whereas irony involved ethically objectionable deception. In modern English, on the other hand, it is irony that is considered acceptable, because the audience has an opportunity to avoid being deceived, whereas hypocrisy has become the negatively valued concept. In any event, the association of Socrates with irony in Plato’s texts may seem to support a negative evaluation of Socrates, given the negative connotations of irony in the common parlance of the time. On the other hand, just as Socrates makes use of the ambiguity of language in an ironic way within the dialogues, Plato may be making ironic use (in our modern sense) of the Greek concept of irony here. Plato’s texts contain another ground for questioning the moral status of Socrates’ use of irony that deserves consideration. In Book I of the Republic, Thrasymachus actually accuses Socrates of feigning ignorance or dissembling his understanding. In what follows, we consider some passages that indicate the nature of this exchange. First, Thrasymachus suggests that Socrates has realized that it is easier to ask questions than to answer them, and thus assumes the role of questioner as a way of making himself look good by comparison. He further suggests that Socrates’ unwillingness to venture an account of the concept at hand (in this case justice) suggests that he is not genuinely interested in knowing the truth about it after all.18 Socrates responds that this is too harsh a criticism since it is “our lack of ability that is at fault,”19 and he goes on to say that “it is pity,” rather than such severe accusations, that is appropriate from “clever fellows.”20 He thus in effect insists that his ignorance is genuine. Then Thrasymachus, “on hearing this, gave a great guffaw and laughed sardonically and said, Ye gods! Here we have the well-known irony of Socrates, and I knew it and predicted that when it came to replying you would refuse and dissemble and do anything rather than answer any question that anyone asked you.”21 A little later Thrasymachus elaborates the accusation further by saying: “Oh yes, of course, said he, so that Socrates may contrive, as he always does, to evade answering himself but may cross-examine the other man and refute his replies.”22

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It is evident that Thrasymachus is here rather bluntly accusing Socrates of dissembling in an immoral manner when he denies having knowledge. As Vlastos puts it, Thrasymachus suggests that Socrates certainly has an answer to the question he is putting to others, but “pretends he hasn’t to keep it under wraps so he can have a field day pouncing on ours and tearing it to shreds while his is shielded from attack.”23 Moreover, when we look at the situation through Thrasymachus’ eyes, we see Socrates as assuming that he is entitled to determine the rules of the game and assign himself whichever role he prefers (questioner rather than answerer). Even if this is appropriate when educating children, it might not be appropriate for dealing with people such as Thrasymachus, who sees himself as being on an equal footing with Socrates. To be sure, passages such as this in which other characters perceive Socrates’ irony in disavowing knowledge as immoral, and perhaps even hypocritical, are scarce and isolated in Plato’s dialogues. Nevertheless, they can be found. Nor should they be explained away or otherwise rationalized, in the way even such a deep and otherwise insightful scholar as Gregory Vlastos appears to be doing. Vlastos suggests that irony is incompatible with deception, because the ironic figure must expect others to see through the words to grasp the real meaning.24 Thus Vlastos sees irony as incompatible with the intent to deceive. The fact that the Greek eironia hovers between the senses of the English words “irony” and “dissembling” is significant in this context. Indeed Plato may use the word in either one of these senses, but he may also use it as mixing the two. Indeed, if we are right to suggest that irony can divide its audience into “insiders” and “outsiders,” there is no reason why a single remark cannot be both ironic and deceptive — it may be intended that some people will understand the speaker’s real meaning, while others will not. The remarks made by Socrates and his responses to his partners in conversation are hardly of a simple sort where what is said is immediately refuted by the unsaid, as in the case of the burnt steaks discussed above.25 Thus, seeing Socrates as Thrasymachus does, allows us to recognize in his denials of knowledge an element of manipulation and deception. Finding this element of deception and manipulation in the paradigmatic ironic figure makes it even harder to see a clear contrast between irony and hypocrisy in general. It is worth noting here one further aspect of the exchange between Socrates and Thrasymachus in the Republic. This concerns a passage in which Socrates raises concern about whether Thrasymachus means what he says. Socrates, in narrating how the exchange went, reports the following: I mustn’t flinch from following out the logic of the inquiry, so long as I conceive you to be saying what you think. For now,

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Thrasymachus, I absolutely believe that you are not “mocking” us but telling us your real opinions about the truth. What difference does it make to you, he said, whether I believe it or not? Why don’t you test the argument? No difference, said I …26 On the one hand, of course, Thrasymachus is right. One can evaluate the philosophical merits of an argument, regardless of whether the person raising the argument sincerely believes it. Otherwise, it would be impossible for someone to “play devil’s advocate.” And Socrates is apparently conceding this point at the end of the passage. But on reflection, more perplexing issues arise here. Given that, as we are discussing, Socrates often uses the technique of saying things he does not literally mean, it is odd that he shows any concern at all about whether his interlocutor is sincere. Why does he raise this in the first place? One possible explanation is that Socrates is trying to get away with a bit of hypocrisy here. He appears to be advocating the rule that people should say what they mean, while exempting himself from being bound by that rule whenever it suits his interests to do so. Since irony involves the statement of things one does not really mean, Socrates might be read here as suggesting that only he is allowed to use irony. In this light, his later concession that it makes no difference whether or not Thrasymachus is sincere can be seen as a sort of retreat from his hypocritical stance, once his opponent had called him on it. We should consider other possible explanations before adopting this one, however. What other reasons might Socrates have had for being concerned about Thrasymachus’ sincerity? Another comes to mind if we accept the assumption of Socrates’ supporters that his main goal in entering into discussion with others is to help those others proceed on the path of self-knowledge through philosophical reflection. If his interlocutor is not being sincere, then Socrates’ responses to the arguments put forward will not lead to any genuine insight and self-improvement. Indeed, in this case the discussion takes on the air of mere verbal gymnastics of the sort in which the Sophists engage, and for which they are condemned. So it is crucial to the true goal of philosophical discussion that people engage in it honestly. But if this is the case, we are left with the puzzle of why Socrates concedes that it makes no difference whether or not Thrasymachus is sincere. If the whole point of the discussion is defeated if he is not, then why say it makes no difference, and continue anyway? Perhaps the answer is that, as also suggested in the text of this passage, Socrates believes that Thrasymachus is not

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joking and really believes what he is saying here. Presumably what is needed for fruitful philosophical discussion is only that one be sincere, and not that one further acknowledge that one is being sincere. Given the near impossibility of establishing whether someone else is being sincere in such a setting, it may be that Socrates is merely pragmatically deciding not to argue the point, and is simply proceeding as if it had been established. Note, though, that if this is the correct interpretation, Socrates’ claim that he thinks it makes “no difference” is not strictly true — it is rather that he thinks it makes a difference, but is simply assured that the situation is as it should be, and thus not worth discussing further. Would such a statement that is not meant literally as stated constitute another instance of Socratic irony? Although these speculations do help us to understand the role of Socratic irony, there is another possible explanation of this passage which seems both simpler and more sympathetic. This is that there may simply be a sort of ambiguity in Socrates’ claim that it doesn’t matter. If the goal is to analyze the strength of arguments, then it makes no difference whether or not anyone is sincerely swayed by those arguments. If the goal is to achieve true self-understanding, then it does. Thus it either does or does not make a difference, depending upon one’s purpose in engaging in philosophical discussion. This interpretation seems in keeping with the Socratic use of complex irony discussed above — Socrates does mean what he says here, if it is taken in a particular way, and simultaneously does not mean it, if it is taken in a different way. Before leaving this passage, it is interesting to note one other possible interpretation. Perhaps by stating that it makes no difference whether or not Thrasymachus is sincere, Socrates is in effect excluding him from any further genuine serious discourse. This sort of move seems almost post-modern in its denial of voice to one of the interlocutors. In that sense, it seems to resonate with another sense of irony, in vogue among certain post-modernists who critique the use of any notion of truth that goes beyond the expression of one’s unique voice. We offered a brief discussion of this post-modern usage of “irony” in the previous chapter.27

E. Defending Socratic Irony We have seen several reasons, particularly stemming from the discussion with Thrasymachus, for thinking that Socrates’ uses of irony may not be as wholesome as is commonly supposed by his supporters. Friends of Socrates have a variety of available ways in which to defend their hero, however.

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Consider first the accusation that Socrates is merely trying to shield his own answer from criticism, while ruthlessly attacking others that are brought out into the open. One response to this charge is simply to note that at various times in the dialogues Socrates does indeed present and defend his own views. In fact, after Thrasymachus subsides, Socrates goes on to defend a conception of justice in the remainder of the Republic. Thus the texts suggest that it is simply not true that Socrates always plays the role of questioner and never provides answers of his own. Nevertheless, there do seem to be many cases in which Socrates withholds his answer while examining an interlocutor’s. His friends generally argue that such ingenuousness is justifiable, on the basis that it is a teaching technique, enabling those who hear him to use the opportunity to think things through for themselves. In effect, the unsavoury nature of the deception may be justified by its good effects — the end may justify the means. It is reasonable to wonder here what irony contributes to the Socratic goal of getting others to “turn toward philosophy”28 and begin down the path of philosophical self-investigation. One possible answer is that the ambiguity of irony by itself leads people to question themselves to see whether they understand what is being said. Simply knowing that there is such a thing as irony might force people to think carefully about what they hear, so as to decide whether it was meant literally or ironically. It is for this reason that Vlastos identifies a “riddling variety” of irony, according to which a teacher says something as a sort of test of whether the student will take it literally, or understand enough of the context to see the hidden meaning.29 One might argue that this “riddling” is still unfair to Socrates’ interlocutors, since they do not know the rules of the game, as it were, and do not understand that they are being presented with a riddle. This is not always the case, of course. For example, Thrasymachus indicates that the game is indeed well known to him when he says, “here we have the well known eiron of Socrates.”30 So Thrasymachus is not so much an innocent who does not understand the game, as a subversive challenging its very rules. Thrasymachus suggests that the game is sterile because it yields no conclusions, and that it is rigged in Socrates’ favour. But one must understand the game, in order to raise such objections to it. Still, it is possible that some interlocutors really do not understand the game. Should we pity them, and accuse Socrates of being unfair in such cases? To defend Socrates, it seems that the best strategy would be to argue that these people should understand the game. At the very least, they should realize that all is not as it seems when it comes to dealing with Socrates, and ask themselves whether there might not be something worth considering lurking

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behind the appearance. In a sense, saying this simply asserts that everyone, including these interlocutors, should adopt a philosophical perspective. What is perhaps most distinctive of the philosophical perspective is a worry that one’s assumptions may be flawed, and that it is worthwhile to call one’s ideas into question. By using the ambiguity inherent in irony, Socrates seems to be applying this principle to communication itself. One should not assume that one really understands what another says — one should be alert to the possibility of meanings and ideas lurking behind the surface, of which one can become aware only upon reflection. In a sense, one should always consider the possibility that others’ communication is ironic. In this way, Socrates’ use of irony can be seen as one method Socrates uses for getting his interlocutors to “turn toward philosophy.” Even if we share Socrates’ view that a philosophical perspective is ethically required, it might still seem inappropriate to hint at it ironically rather than explicitly spelling out the game for the interlocutors. But of course, part of Socrates’ claim is that one has to get there by oneself. When Socrates says something, he “leaves you free to take it in one way though you are meant to take it in another, and when he sees you have gone wrong he lets it go. What would you say? Not, surely, that he does not care that you should know the truth, but that he cares more for something else: that if you are to come to the truth, it must be by yourself for yourself.”31 In a sense, Socrates is being cruel when he lets others continue to make mistakes without pointing them out in a clearly understandable fashion. His friends might claim, however, that it is sometimes necessary to be cruel in this way.32 There is room for further debate about whether this method is always, or even ever, in fact justified, but presumably Socrates would argue that the goal is so incomparably great that considerable sacrifices to achieve it would be justified. If this is the only or best means available, then it appears it would be justifiable. In the previous paragraph, it was suggested that friends of Socrates might defend his use of irony, even when it appears manipulative and mocking toward his interlocutors, as ultimately being in their own best interests, whether they realize it or not. This amounts to saying that Socratic irony might be seen as a sort of justifiable paternalism.33 Even assuming that paternalism is sometimes justifiable, there is a potential difficulty here. If one believes one is justified in acting paternalistically, one must think one knows better than others what is in their best interests. Perhaps this is where Thrasymachus’ charges that Socrates maintains an attitude of smug superiority has some bite. Indeed, if Socrates’ goal in the game is in part the self-interested one of enhancing his own reputation for wisdom and making himself appear as the superior puppet master leading the conver-

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sation, then perhaps the deception involved in Socratic irony in fact has an element of hypocrisy to it. Friends of Socrates might respond by saying that this is not hypocrisy because Socrates does not attempt to receive a reputation he does not deserve. The claim might be that Socrates simply is superior to other people — that though he does not have all the answers, he is indeed farther along in the inquiring life. In this sense, the claim to superiority is not hypocritical, it is merely factual. Note that this claim seems to imply, rather oddly, that a person who acted exactly like Socrates but was mistaken about what constituted moral superiority would be a hypocrite, based solely upon this factual error. Jill Gordon has pointed out yet another level of irony within Plato’s writings, which she suggests can be used in defence of Socrates’ use of irony in pursuit of moral education. She argues that the irony must be seen as applying not only to Socrates’ interlocutors, but to us, Plato’s readers, as well. Through Socratic irony, Plato engages the reader in a manner that mimics Socratic irony’s effects on the interlocutor, and he thus aims at turning them toward the life of philosophy or at least some deeper self-knowledge. . . . The reader feels that she understands something the interlocutor does not, and so has insider status vis-à-vis Socratic irony. So “getting it,” on the part of the reader requires, at least at first, a distancing from, and a sense of superiority to, the interlocutor. It requires that the reader occupy a position different from the interlocutor, a position from which the reader sees and understands what the interlocutor does not. But, if the reader maintains that distance from the interlocutor and falsely believes that she is essentially different in character from the interlocutor, and better than the interlocutor, then the joke is truly on her! Ironically, the reader must both distance herself from, and then identify with, the interlocutor in order really to get it, in order to see that she too can benefit from the Socratic lesson.34 If this is right, then irony really is a tool used remarkably adeptly by Plato. He uses it, not so much to get across specific teachings to either interlocutors or readers, but rather to demonstrate the general philosophic need to call things into question and reflect on whether one really knows what one thinks one knows.

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F. Conclusions We have argued that Socratic irony is deceptive insofar as it involves a doubling in meaning and audience, an ambiguous mixture of provocation and self-protection, a conversational implicature of superiority of understanding in the guise of self-deprecation.35 Hence its structure hovers between irony and a hypocritical gesture of deference. Both friends and foes then have under-appreciated the multi-faceted nature of Socrates’ irony. Foes have consistently ignored the benign pedagogical purpose that drove Socrates’ dissembling and dissimulation of better understanding, as well as his aversion to, and dismissal of, didactic teaching. His playful dialogical hide and seek was meant to engage the interlocutor so that the latter would perform the activities of thinking — “the soul talking to itself ” through the other. In this way Socrates wanted to provide his interlocutors with the resources needed to improve the ethical state of their soul, which no didactic instruction or imposition could accomplish. The dissimulation and dissembling are needed not only to break the habit of reliance on the conventional authority of the sophist, but also to bring out the ideas of the interlocutors to see if they survive the test of question and answer, upon which supervenes eros, the sort of longing for truth, always elusive and not yet, upon which the whole enterprise of philosophical activity is predicated. The playful concealment of cognitive power makes its lively presence even more evident than it would be if it were to proclaim itself. Of course such a proclamation would undercut the Socratic method of teaching by invoking closure and thus bring about the smugness of conventional “sophistical” philosophizing — the death of Socratic reflection. When Socrates converses with the epistemically pretentious and uncooperative, his hypocritical posture of disavowing knowledge is sarcastic and is understood by those “in the know” as deflationary and as part of the norms of the Socratic procedure. On the other hand, when Socrates converses with facile followers who say “Yes, Socrates” too readily, he proceeds, at least in his best and most exemplary moments, to explore with them problems of ambiguity and argument so as to achieve a greater understanding of the problems. At the same time, friends of Socrates have too readily dismissed concerns that his ingenuous remarks or verbal riddles were morally problematic. Our aim in the above remarks has been to make room for a dimension of hypocritical posturing in Socratic irony which has hitherto been disallowed. We have said enough to make it plain that simplistic pictures of Socratic irony not only give a misleading idea as to the relationship between hypocrisy and irony by drawing a very sharp boundary between the two concepts, but also underestimate the rich and playful character of Socrates.

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Notes 1. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, translated by Peter Heath, edited by Peter Heath and J.B. Schneewind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 103. 2. Friedrich Nietzsche, “Early Greek Philosophy and Other Essays,” in The Philosophy of Nietzsche, edited with an Introduction, by Geoffrey Clive (New York: The New American Library, 1965) 189. 3. In saying this, we do not mean to suggest that we are intending to provide a detailed scholarly account of the evolution of the Greek term and its inclusion into English and other languages via Latin, as for example Gregory Vlastos has done, nor to enter into the detailed scholarly debates about translation and interpretation of Plato. We are interested in Socrates only insofar as he represents the concept of the ironic person, and thus provides a useful illumination of this concept, and its relationship to hypocrisy. 4. Kittay, “On Hypocrisy,” 281. 5. On this, see for example Jill Gordon, Turning Toward Philosophy: Literary Device and Dramatic Structure in Plato’s Dialogues (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999) 128. 6. We have discussed this example in several places in the book, but particularly in Chapter 9. 7. In Chapter 1, Section A, and in Chapter 8, Section B of this book. 8. Plato, Meno (90 a-b). This example is brought to our attention by Jill Gordon’s discussion in Turning Toward Philosophy, 117-18 and 123-24. Gordon also points out (p. 124) another interesting use of irony from the Meno that does not seem to fit with Kittay’s and McKinnon’s discussions. Socrates says to Meno that, if the slave boy had not recognized his ignorance, he might have made grand speeches before large audiences conveying faulty information (84 b-c). In saying this, Socrates is using essentially Meno’s own words from earlier in the dialogue (80 b) to make a point about how Meno’s speeches before large audiences on the subject of virtue were misguided. There appears to be a kind of irony at work here, but not of the sort currently under discussion. 9. Gregory Vlastos, “Socratic Irony,” in his Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 31. 10. Ibid., p. 31. 11. Vlastos argues that Socrates’ “disavowal of knowledge and of teaching” should also be seen as a form of complex irony. His remarks are as follows: “When he professes to have no knowledge he both does and does not mean what he says. He wants it to assure his hearers that in the moral domain there is not a single proposition he claims to know with certainty. But in another sense of ‘knowledge,’ where the word refers to justified true belief — justifiable through the peculiarly Socratic method of elenctic argument — there are many propositions he does claim to know. So too, I would argue, Socrates’ parallel disavowal of teaching should be understood as a complex irony. In the conventional sense, where to ‘teach’ is simply to transfer knowledge from a teacher’s to a learner’s mind, Socrates means what he says: That sort of teaching he does not do. But in the sense which he would give to ‘teaching’ — engaging would-be learners in elenctic argument to make them aware of their own ignorance and enable them to discover for themselves the truth the teacher had held back — in

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that sense of ‘teaching’ Socrates would want to say that he is a teacher, the only true teacher; his dialogue with his fellows is meant to have, and does have, the effect of evoking and assisting their own effort at moral self-improvement” (Vlastos, 32. Emphasis omitted. Footnotes in the original omitted). 12. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1971) 2163. It is interesting to note that this meaning is also the first definition offered in the same dictionary for “irony” simpliciter, supporting Vlastos’ thesis that Socrates virtually single-handedly changed our understanding of the concept of irony. 13. Paul Friedländer, Plato, Vol. 1 (New York: Harper & Row, 1964) 138. 14. In Chapter 15 of this book. 15. It should be noted that, in “Socratic Irony,” Vlastos argues against those scholars (such as Burnet, Wilamowitz, and Guthrie) who believed that Plato’s use of the term must have been intended to convey the standard negative sense. See 25ff. 16. So Vlastos argues (23-24). In fact, he claims that it is Socrates himself who is responsible for the transformation of the evaluative content of the term “irony,” from purely negative to our more accepting usage. 17. And perhaps even ironic, though in a different sense from that being discussed here. 18. The passage we are drawing from here is Plato, Republic, 336c (translated by Paul Shorey, Loeb Classical Library, 1930; reprinted in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns [New York: Pantheon, 1964]), which reads, “But if you really wish, Socrates, to know what the just is, don’t merely ask questions or plume yourself upon controverting any answer that anyone gives — since your acumen has perceived that it is easier to ask questions than to answer them — but do you yourself answer and tell what you say the just is.” 19. Republic, 336e. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid., 337a. 22. Ibid., 337e. 23. Vlastos, 24. 24. See Vlastos, 22-23. We discussed this view of the relationship between irony and hypocrisy in detail in Chapter 15, Section C of this book. 25. In Chapter 15, Section D of this book, where we present several variations of a case suggested originally by Clyde Lee Miller, in “Ironic or Not?” 26. Republic, 349a-b. 27. See Chapter 15, Section D, of this book. 28. This is the phrase Jill Gordon uses to describe Plato’s aims, and in fact she uses a version of it as the title of her book. Jill Gordon, Turning Toward Philosophy. 29. Vlastos, 21-23. 30. Plato, Republic, 337a. 31. Vlastos, 44. Footnote omitted. 32. Vlastos provides a stark illustration of this presumably justifiable cruelty on Socrates’ part in discussing that part of the Symposium in which we learn that Socrates “led on” the youth Alcibiades, who thought he could exchange sexual favours for learning. Vlastos writes: “Over and over again before that night Socrates would have had ample opportunity to explain that Alcibiades was making a fool of himself, duped by his own wishful thinking. Yet Socrates said nothing. Day after day he watched and kept still. Why so? The only reasonable answer is that he wanted Alcibiades to find out the truth for himself by himself. The irony in his love for Alcibiades, riddling

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from the start, persisted until the boy found the answer the hard way, in a long night of anguished humiliation, naked next to Socrates, and Socrates a block of ice” (42). 33. For a couple of excellent works on justifiable paternalism, see G. Dworkin, “Paternalism,” in Morality and the Law, edited by Richard A. Wasserstrom (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1971) and J. Feinberg, “Legal Paternalism,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1, 1 (1971) 105-24. It might be noted that this suggestion that Socrates is acting paternalistically seems quite consistent with the explicit meaning of the muchdiscussed “noble lie” of the Republic (415 a-c). In that instance, the suggested method is not potentially deceptive irony that challenges the listener to understand more than what is said, but rather an outright lie (about metals, and their relationship to justifying social hierarchies). Nevertheless, there appears to be an element of paternalism at work in each case. 34. Gordon, Turning Toward Philosophy, 128-29. Emphasis omitted. Footnotes omitted. 35. For an explication of the idea of conversational implicature, see Lecture III of H.P. Grice’s William James Lectures in 1966: “Logic and Conversation” in Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3, Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan, eds. (New York: Academic Press, 1975) 41-58.

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17 Socrates, Style, and Us “Writing the right style means, setting the carriage straight on the rails.” 1 ludwig wittgenstein

A. Socrates as Cultural Icon The sense of an ending is likely conjured up when there is a return to origins. By invoking and discussing Socrates, we returned to the beginnings of ethical reflection and signalled an ending. As we mentioned before, Socrates is a cultural icon for us, and perhaps it behooves us to spell out the reasons for this affiliation, in case it is mistakenly perceived as a trick to lend authority to our investigations. Furthermore, we shall say a few things about how “he who does not write”2 surprisingly stimulated us to forge a style for writing about hypocrisy. One way in which our discussion was inspired by Socrates has to do with its subject matter. At the heart of Socrates’ inquiry was the basic question about how one should live. We went back to Socrates’ general question, with a special focus on a particular issue, namely, hypocrisy. There is a desire, perhaps peculiar to an area such as moral philosophy that has a long history and a vast literature, to begin afresh. This longing for a fresh start is especially intensified by the sense that the literature, through its increasingly abstruse and overly technical nature, has perhaps strayed from, or become forgetful of, some aspects of that central and apparently simple question. We wanted to take an important moral concept, then reflectively query common sense and our own moral intuitions concerning it, without carrying the heavy baggage of a vast literature and looking over our shoulders at our philosophical precursors. While this primordial desire is impossible to satisfy without selfdeception — if one is properly trained in the area — nevertheless perhaps we partly succeeded in doing this to the extent that we chose a subject on which professional moral philosophers have written relatively little. And hypocrisy seems to meet the criterion of being important. When we discuss hypocrisy, what we are talking about is how we should or should not live, and that, as Socrates said ironically understating the matter, is not a trivial question.3

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B. An Old Style Made New? Another respect in which we went back to Socrates is that we tried to forge a style of writing moral philosophy in a way that aims to involve readers not incidentally, but as active participants in the philosophical activity. Perhaps the starkness of words on a page militates against this goal to some extent, since it seems to present “truths” that need no further questioning. To this extent, Socrates was wise not to commit anything to writing, although there seems to be an irony to the fact that, without Plato’s accounts of him, Socrates would not have been able to lead nearly as many people along the philosophical path. But in committing our ideas to paper, we nevertheless believe we are following Socrates’ lead and taking seriously his practice of conversation and dialogue. There is more conversation and many more different voices and diverse figures in the few Socratic dialogues than in vast tracts of modern moral philosophy. We have tried to forge a style of writing that also is polyphonous, in that it includes many different voices through different narratives and cases. This effort was at the same time a struggle for us to clarify what we are trying to do — the very nature of the task we were engaged in. Furthermore, these words are intended as an invitation for the reader to assess what we should be trying to do, as well as how successfully we do it. Other reasons for affiliation with Socrates stem from his critical examination of available views and theories, coupled with a reluctance to lay down the “law” or impose rationality through a reductive theory of his own, as if it was waiting in the background all along. Similarly, we subjected to critical scrutiny available views and intuitions, even formulated passing theories for this purpose, without extinguishing the voices and concerns through reducing them to some dubious rational consensus. Like Socrates, we have tried to open up the concept, even though appearing to try to close it down through the search for conceptual definition or final moral assessment. We also returned to Socrates in our efforts to make our ethical investigations into hypocrisy’s nature and moral status existential and particular. For while he said that “it is the argument itself that I wish to probe,” he immediately added, “though it may turn out that both I who question and you who answer are equally under scrutiny.”4 Our philosophical investigation into hypocrisy was intended to bring each reader to participate in the activity or practice of moral philosophy. This way each particular reader as participant is likely to grow in self-understanding insofar as his or her own beliefs and attitudes become subject for examination. Furthermore, since others’ beliefs, actions and judgments are also reflected on, there may also be an increased understanding of “the other.” To be sure, this takes effort, and perhaps it is

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worth reiterating that Socrates only said that the unexamined life was not worth living, not that the examined life is easy or spares us the struggle involved in moral living. We also suggested that Socratic irony has some bearing on philosophical method. Irony has some structural similarities to an important form of argument called reductio ad absurdum and his ironical “know nothing” approach disarmingly lends itself to initiating conversation and to collecting the raw materials for reflection, leaving room for an openness of argument and criticism without the interlocutor having the uneasy feeling that there is some view being imposed on him or her. While some may see this ironical stance as a defect in the virtue of truthfulness — the vice of the self-deprecator5 — in the context of the Socratic dialogues it is better seen as a means of securing a temporary detachment that allows for self-examination as well. There is another way that there has been a turn back to Socrates. It is no secret that for Socrates doing moral philosophy was a hazardous business — his insistence on engaging in moral philosophy even when it led him to unpopular conclusions eventually led to his execution at the hands of an intolerant society. We, of course, do not anticipate any comparable dangers, though there are places in the world in which people still face grave physical threats for saying the “wrong” thing on moral matters, and one can never be sure what the political tides may bring to one’s own country. Nevertheless, as some philosophers, such as Bernard Williams, have come to realize, there are hazards inherent in doing moral philosophy.6 One such hazard is reflected in Lady Warnock’s already-mentioned anticipation that the moral philosophy of the future will be more difficult if only because more embarrassing to write.7 Because the examples will be more concrete, their choice and particularity will be revealing of the writer. Furthermore, the diversity and complexity of the examples and their treatment is likely to reveal the writer’s own limitations and inadequacies more so than in other parts of philosophy, thereby providing further grounds for embarrassment. And there is a potentially more serious hazard for the would-be moral philosopher: despite our best efforts, some of what we put forward may be mistaken. If readers are moved by our mistaken words, they may in fact be led down the wrong moral path. Even telling readers to be alert to the possibility of mistakes as well as irony in one’s writing, does not completely alleviate this danger. Writing about moral philosophy, then, involves a risk of causing a very great harm indeed. Thus we share with Socrates an element of hazard in our endeavours, though our risks pale in comparison with what Socrates faced in his quest for how one should live. Having said all this, it is of course impossible to go back to Socrates. You have to start from where you are. It is not possible to ignore the traditions and

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tools modern moral philosophy has developed. We have helped ourselves to these resources whenever the need arose, in what we hope is an open and nonpartisan spirit. After all, what we aimed at throughout was to better fill out the complex moral reality concerning hypocrisy and what moral philosophy can say and do about it. If philosophy is at least partly a working on oneself, and through this a putting up of guideposts for concerned others, nowhere is this more true than in moral philosophy. To the extent that we fall short, our limitations, not to speak of residual hypocrisies, no doubt show themselves. In any event, may others come, and do better.

Notes 1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980) 39e. 2. As Nietzsche ambivalently alluded to Socrates. 3. Plato, Republic, 352d. 4. Plato, Protagoras, 333c (W.K.C. Guthrie translation). 5. When Aristotle discusses the virtues in his Nicomachean Ethics, he takes eironia, the vice of the self-deprecator, to be a defect of the virtue of truthfulness (see Book 4, Ch.7). As Alasdair MacIntyre points out, the use of this word could not have been accidental, since it is closely associated with Socratic irony — Socrates’ claim to ignorance. See his A Short History of Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1966). 6. Bernard Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972) 9. 7. Mary Warnock, Ethics Since 1900 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960) 206-07.

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Concluding Reflections It is customary in a traditional philosophical book to end by summing up the overall argument and stating the general conclusion. Such a conclusion is usually a theory crystallized in a definition, and if the concept is a moral concept, as it is in this case, such a definition is grounded in some preferred moral theory. This conventional expectation puts us in a rather embarrassing position in bringing this investigation to conclusion. With no overarching theories or arguments in our hands, how can we write a conclusion? On the one hand, we offer no comprehensive theory, either conceptual or ethical, with which to arm ourselves and readers to take on all and sundry. On the other hand, we do not come with empty hands, but offer different goods. Unlike a philosophical Virgil, we do not sing of men and arms, but of how to live with moral ideas. Perhaps this book is best thought of then as a kind of journeying, or rather a series of journeyings. But the initial disconcerting question reasserts itself, for even though it is commonly said that it is the journey not the arrival that counts, sensible journeys have destinations and arrivals. What are these arrivals then as far as our journeyings go, and what has been accomplished? While there is no grand tour on offer, each chapter is a journey crisscrossing the terrain of hypocrisy, de-familiarizing it, yet hailing landmarks with surprising renewed recognition and, we hope, with added insight. While we do not sculpt a sharply edged theory, each chapter raises fresh questions, critically assesses relevant positions and “passing” theories, makes distinctions, offers descriptions and explanations, discerns and resolves conceptual and moral perplexities/dilemmas. Readers are fellow travellers, recognizing that as they are sketching the concept of hypocrisy they are sketching aspects of their own moral forms of life. What is presented is a portrait of hypocrisy where the subject is restless during the many sittings and moves around while its two painters try to capture its movements and its many faces. In view of this then we choose an ending that recounts the highlights of our journeys. We began by sketching a biography of the concept of hypocrisy, its twists and turns from classical Greek and Hebrew times through the dominant Christian era to our postmodern period — from a neutral use, through its use as utter moral condemnation, to attempts to displace it from our vocabulary of moral criticism. This provides the necessary background and shows how the concept is partly rooted and used in related moral traditions. Then we

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considered method and opted for a method of examples eventually grounded in historical narratives and dialogue. Even though it may not be possible to look at a phenomenon without theory, it is still true that the best way to first look at a phenomenon in moral psychology is with as little theoretical baggage as possible. This is why next we collect and present a wide range of cases of possible hypocrisy, from history, biographical and imaginative literature, politics, and real life. These are meant to offer firm grounding, or at any rate ground that shifts slowly, like tectonic plates. Since these cases are already embedded and receive their significance from some moral tradition, we proceeded to see if rival official ethical theories can shed additional light on, and sharpen the significance of, the concept of hypocrisy and the roles it plays in the moral life. At the same time we also tested rival normative ethical theories that compete for adherents, to see if they can explain the moral status of hypocrisy. Curiously, references to hypocrisy in discussions of normative ethical theory seem almost entirely absent, and we tried to remedy this. We did not always entirely agree with each other’s leanings concerning moral theory. Nevertheless, as we worked on this project, we came to think that our disagreements were not as sharp as they had first appeared. We could certainly agree that hypocrisy poses interesting problems for each theory, and that practitioners of each would have had trouble resolving these problems, even if they had made sympathetic efforts to find more of a place for it than denunciation and abhorrence, and to weave it into the body of their specific theories. In any case, it became clear that considerations of several different sorts of factors (such as virtue, disposition, consequences, duties, and public agreement) all have something to contribute to understanding this complex concept. If any single theory is to prove adequate, it will need to be a sophisticated one that does not attend rigidly to only one factor of the moral equation. Since hypocrisy is commonly considered a vice, we looked first to virtue theory to understand this concept. We argued that hypocrisy does not fit well into an Aristotelian-type model of a vice with an opposite vice and a virtuous mean between them. If anything, it appears to be a sort of meta-vice, operating on an entirely different level, as it were. What is more, even at this level, virtue theory seems baffled by the fact that some cases of hypocrisy may appear to be morally neutral, excusable, justifiable, or even benign in their motives and consequences. Indeed, hypocrisy may sometimes be seen as an expected and accepted coping strategy, which no person moving in society can or should do without. After all, the politesse and civility that make social life bearable are not to be ignored, and yet they may be considered little hy-

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pocrisies. This leaves open the question why hypocrisy is generally classified as a vice and traditionally regarded as unadulterated evil. One common argument against virtue ethics in general is that one can decide which character traits are “virtues” only in terms of some independently valued category, which thus becomes more morally fundamental than the virtues themselves. One prominent version of this holds that ultimately character traits are valued only insofar as they tend to promote states of affairs we judge to be desirable, which in turn would make virtue ethics parasitic upon a more fundamental theory — consequentialism. Accordingly, we next turned our attention to how that theory fares at providing an account of hypocrisy. Consequentialist theories face an embarrassing problem when it comes to hypocrisy, because the attempt to keep up a hypocritical façade may lead people to utter words or engage in actions that in fact have better consequences than those the person would otherwise undertake. Thus it seems consequentialists have trouble accounting for the negative evaluation standardly attached to hypocrisy, which some philosophers have taken to be a fatal flaw. We considered several ways in which consequentialists might try to deal with this problem, such as separating the evaluation of agent and action, evaluating dispositions directly, or focusing on long-term consequences such as reliability and erosion of trust, but we argued that none of these approaches ultimately saves consequentialism from its problem with hypocrisy. We further argued that only a version of consequentialism that values the fulfillment of desires rather than mental states is going to have much chance at rescuing the theory. Even at this, consequentialism may have trouble with hypocrisy. Indeed, some deontologists might argue that hypocrisy is endemic to consequentialism, in that the theory tells us to do a thing for one reason, while at the same time also insisting that we do it for another. What is more, it can be argued that consequentialism allows people too much latitude to make exceptions of themselves or favoured others. Kantians and other deontologists seek to counter this by insisting on a requirement of universalizability or the strict following of rules, which promises to block the sort of making an exception of oneself involved in many cases of hypocrisy. Yet they often come across not only as fanatical, cruel, or intolerant, but as incapable of giving us the resources we need to solve even little moral dilemmas we confront in our everyday lives. Ironically, the gap between their high-minded theoretical demands and the practical demands of our lives threatens to engulf Kantians in the quagmires of hypocrisy, turning them into hypocritical rule-worshippers whose rhetoric is given moral primacy, while their practice is intolerant of moral difference and devoid of human compassion.

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Such crude conventional Kantian interpretations encouraged us to retrieve Kant’s neglected texts dealing with the subject of hypocrisy. In these texts Kant gives examples of hypocrisy and discusses their moral status in a humane and sensitive manner that belies conventional Kantian views. He seems to allow for cases of permissible hypocrisy and deception, yet this move generates a tension between his high-flying general pronouncements concerning the moral status of hypocrisy and his actual treatment of such permissible cases. We have argued that Kant’s acceptance of certain sorts of hypocrisy makes sense only if he is read in a revised unorthodox way as a sort of consequentialist deontologist — as advocating actions that one believes will promote the conditions for general adherence to duty. We have also discovered that Kant’s recommendations in the passages dealing with hypocrisy and deception seem incompatible with his claim that moral worth comes from reason alone. So we also argued that Kant’s sharp dichotomy between reason and inclination should be rejected. Thus our retrieval of primary sources — of Kant’s littlenoticed writings on hypocrisy — paid handsome dividends: it not only helped to illuminate the concept, but also opened the door to some significant revisions to the traditional understanding of Kant’s moral theory. Having seen how problematic hypocrisy is in terms of the traditionally dominant approaches to moral theory, we also considered it in light of egoism and contractarian theories. The classic image of a cynical hypocrite is of a person who relentlessly pursues his or her own self-interest, and who appears to endorse other-regarding moral principles only as a ruse to further that self-interest. Although this rational estimation and pursuit of self-interest seems to suggest that hypocrites are egoists, we argued that most ordinary hypocrites do not appear to be egoists. For one thing, people are often hypocritical in some areas but not others, and their hypocrisy may stem from a sort of self-deception that fits poorly with the standard image of a rationally selfinterested egoist. Furthermore, much will hinge on whether one interprets the “self ” the egoist is promoting broadly, so as to include loved ones and other members of the agent’s community. Nevertheless, after sketching a few different types of egoist theories, we argued that hypocrisy may indeed be consistent with ethical egoism, particularly of the universal sort. Still, we claimed that there seems to be a difference in that hypocrisy depends on a community of people with shared values in a way that egoism does not. After learning what we could about both hypocrisy and moral theories by exploring what room the theories had for accommodating hypocrisy, we turned to investigating the roles hypocrisy plays in political and social contexts. We put it side by side with such generally valued traits as the protection of privacy, the practice of tolerance, and benevolent use of double standards to

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correct systemic injustice, as in cases of reverse discrimination. Surprisingly, as we examined particular problematic cases, these phenomena and concepts got de-familiarized and they emerged structurally looking almost like hypocrisy, except for the positive evaluation of the situation. This made us cautious not only about the global generalization that all cases of hypocrisy are intrinsically bad, but also about the concept and its apparently sharp boundaries. This naturally brought us to the analysis of the concept itself. Here our concerns were twofold. First, how to distinguish hypocrisy from neighbouring concepts such as weakness of will, change of mind, forgetfulness, the mere deception of others, or self-deception. Second, how to classify different types of hypocrisy and resist homogenizing the concept, given the human, all too human, inclination to moralize. So we took pains to differentiate among cynical, complacent, and self-righteous, as well as among self-conscious, selfdeceptive, and unconscious hypocrites. We also explored the complex possible motivations in hypocrisy, and attended to cases where the hypocrite is a victim and not a villain, thus resisting the sharp dichotomizing of the moral tradition. With this in mind we did manage to discern a distinctive physiognomy, to uncover some recurring elements of hypocrisy, such as the need for an audience, an element of deception (whether of oneself or of others), and an element of self-interest (typically a concern for a good reputation in terms of prevailing norms, with the benefits to be provided by the same people who were deceived). Importantly, throughout our explorations we noticed that slight changes in scenarios could make a huge difference to whether or not they could be characterized as cases of hypocrisy, and we kept on reminding ourselves that the moral life has a lot to do with drawing relevant distinctions. The discussion of the similarities and differences between hypocrisy and irony we saved to the last for several reasons: because of their complicated relationship, because of irony’s significance for postmodern life and culture, and because of irony’s salience for philosophical method both at its beginnings (Socratic irony) and in our post-modern times (Rorty’s ironist critic and alleged radical deconstructors). We argue that the two concepts are more difficult to mark off than usually thought; that the role and heterogeneity of the audience is crucial, yet has been neglected; that depending on who does the listening, Socrates may be seen as hypocritical as well as ironic; and that the postmodernist proposal to erase hypocrisy from our vocabulary of moral criticism fails. Like our cultural icon Socrates, we tried out various passing theories or definitions which purport to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of “hypocrisy,” even aiding in the task of repairs, yet ultimately these definitions proved to be unsatisfactory, since they were vulnerable to

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counter-examples or had other sorts of flaws. This is not to say that they are not useful as working hypotheses that provide some initial orientation to the conceptual landscape in which hypocrisy moves. Our discussions may even provide a foundation upon which others may build a secure account of necessary and sufficient conditions. But we employed these definitions as points of departure for our explorations and discussions, carefully keeping in mind that the philosophical need in this area is not so much generality, but a focus on particular cases which can be used to show how human beings live with moral ideas in all their particularity. Hence in our discussions and reflections we engaged with specific instances of hypocrisy in various areas of our lives. While the varieties of hypocrisy are in the foreground, we took pains to connect them with the moral ways of life and tradition, including moral theories, that serve as background. A natural consequence of this strategy was that a certain ambivalence and frustration marked our discussions. It is not exactly conducive to peace of mind to philosophize in the space between grand theory on the one hand, and diverse particular cases and needs on the other. However, our feelings of frustration were appropriate as well as expressive of the genuine difficulties involved in the moral/conceptual problems of hypocrisy: their slippery texture and chameleon-like elusiveness. We felt like this mainly because each time a striking new application or innovative use of hypocrisy occurred to us in response to a theory of hypocrisy that we were examining or putting forth (if only in passing), it would become evident to us that the theory in question was altogether too simple or unworkable, even if it traced some of the contours of an important feature of the concept. Each time a theory neatly organized the motley uses of hypocrisy, a new use emerged from life, literature or our imagination, that seemed to undercut it. The complexities of moral life and language, it seems, could always make surprising and unforeseen demands that unsettled the theory’s crystalline purity and structure. Perhaps this is as it should be. It might be suggested that moral philosophy itself has been hypocritical, and that through idealizing morality, western moral traditions have engaged in excessive and pretentious moralizings that require some deflation. Although we never altogether abandoned the hope of finding a strong and clear theory, we also could not completely overcome a suspicion that theories are really just crude but useful maps in guiding us in a terrain where “look and see” or “imaginatively identify” approaches cannot be replaced. On this view, one might say that theories are useful things and everyone should have a few in their pocket. As we continued to move back and forth between the abstract and the concrete, the general and the particular, the homely and strange, without

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abandoning the importance of either, we came to accept the fact that this was constitutive of our enterprise. Furthermore, as the approach paid dividends by providing insight into hypocrisy’s cognate concepts including change of mind, weakness of will, protection of privacy, self-deception, and irony, and showed how, with some changes in circumstances, these concepts could turn into hypocrisy, we realized its potential for bearing fruit. This was Socrates’ predicament too as he searched relentlessly for a definition which would capture the essence of a concept, such as religious piety or knowledge. However, he was too ready, when given a particular instance or use, to dismiss it out of hand, saying roughly: “What I asked you for was not an instance but what is common to all instances.” Thereby he deprived himself and his interlocutors of the nourishment that attention to particularity and context may provide. Variety and difference seem to have filled him with such angst that he did not make full use of the resources that his conversations afforded him to discern the face or character of the concept he was after. So here we took a different route. However, it is well to notice that whenever it came to moral judgment of action or responsibility, few were more attentive to details and more exacting in searching out the answers to relevant questions than Socrates. His close questioning of the misguided moral fanatic Euthyphro, who is charging his father with murder, not only shows that Euthyphro lacks a grip on the concept of piety, but also displays his outrageous disregard for the particular facts relevant to the case. In this we follow in Socrates’ footsteps. In closing, we want to raise and respond to a disconcerting question: Why go on at this length about a vice, a moral deformity that diminishes us? After all, hypocrisy, like all evil, can be seen as just a privation, an absence of the good, as Saint Augustine remarked.1 Why not dwell on some virtue, on some good that we can set our eyes on as a goal? We respond that our investigations and journeyings guide and shed light on moral considerations throughout; we hug the moral shore and are oriented by it, like sailors are by the beacon of the lighthouse. Moreover, the methods we use to treat hypocrisy are revelatory of the moral structure that it depends on. Therefore, we hope that this discussion of hypocrisy may help our readers, as it has helped us, with the task of forming discerning and balanced judgments of others and ourselves.

Note 1. “Nothing evil exists in itself, but only as an evil aspect of some actual entity.” For an elaboration of the view of evil as a privation, see Augustine’s Confessions, Book VII, chapters 3-5; and Enchiridion, chapter 4, in Confessions and Enchiridion, translated and edited by A.C. Autler (London and Philadelphia, 1955).

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Select Bibliography Aristotle. The Nichomachean Ethics. Trans. W.D. Ross, revised by J.O. Urmson in The Complete Works of Aristotle. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. Benn, Piers. “What Is Wrong With Hypocrisy?” International Journal of Moral and Social Studies 8 (1993): 223-35. Crisp, Roger, and Christopher Cowton. “Hypocrisy and Moral Seriousness.” American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1994): 343-49. Grant, Ruth W. Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997. Kant, Immanuel. Lectures on Ethics. Trans. Peter Heath. Ed. Peter Heath and Jerome Schneewind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. ——. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. James W. Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981. ——. Anthropology from A Pragmatic Point of View. Trans. and Ed. Mary J. Gregor. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974. Kittay, Eva Feder. “On Hypocrisy.” Metaphilosophy 13 (1982): 277-89. Martin, Mike. Self-Deception and Morality. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986. McKinnon, Christine. “Hypocrisy, With a Note on Integrity.” American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1991): 321-30. Miller, Clyde Lee. “Ironic Or Not?” American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (1976): 30913. Newman, Jay. Fanatics and Hypocrites. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1986. Plato. The Collected Works. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. New York: Pantheon Books, 1961. Robinson, Jonathan. “Conscience and Hypocrisy.” Duty and Hypocrisy in Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Mind. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977. 99-130. Shklar, Judith. “Let Us Not Be Hypocritical.” Ordinary Vices. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984. 45-86. Smilansky, Saul. “On Practicing What We Preach.” American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1994): 73-79. Statman, Daniel. “Hypocrisy and Self-Deception.” Philosophical Psychology 10 (1997): 57-75. Szabados, Béla. “Hypocrisy.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1979): 195-210. Turner, Dan. “Hypocrisy.” Metaphilosophy 21 (1990): 262-69. Vlastos, Gregory. Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991. ——. Socratic Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

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Index acceptable deception, 135–44 acceptable hypocrisy, 79–80, 113, 115, 144, 197 Kant’s views on, 145–46 acknowledged egoist, 97–98 act utilitarianism, 105 acting, 19, 21, 80 actions moral, 153–54 separated from agents, 96, 100, 104, 115, 337 separated from intentions, 111 addicts, 244–46, 248 aesthetic snob example, 58, 277 affirmative action, 339 as double standard, 232 agent and action separate evaluation, 96, 100, 104, 115, 337 (See also subjective/objective distinction) agents (Kantian), 122 agnostic accountant, 50, 164–66 akrasia, 282 aletheia, 74 altruism, 161, 163, 167 ambition, 128 anti-definitionalism, 37–38, 40, 46n4 anti-racist with relatives, 50 appearances, 29, 201 as deceiving, 111, 142 Arendt, Hannah, 175 Aristotelian accounts of hypocrisy, 70 Aristotelian framework, 86 Aristotelian opposites, 72–73, 75, 336 Aristotelian “person of moderation,” 72 Aristotelian vice, 73 Aristotle, 68, 71, 74, 79, 83, 87, 178 doctrine of the mean, 68–70, 76–78, 80, 83, 86, 88 on flattery, 82 virtue theory, 67 Aristotle, Politics, 19 Aristotle’s false friend, 52, 81 artificiality, 24 audience, 205, 236, 277, 282, 292, 295, 339

assumptions about, 136 divided, 305, 320 expectations of, 315 heterogeneity of, 318 split, 293, 298, 300, 308 Augustine, Saint, 271, 341 authenticity, 193 autonomy, 193, 198–99, 216–17, 224 autonomy (categorical imperative), 122, 126, 153 bad consequences, 111 “bad faith,” 21 benevolence, 126, 129 “better than one is/worse than one is” distinction, 303–7 Bible, 20–23, 26 as framework for moral judgment, 230 Jesus and the Pharisees, 19–27, 230–31, 242 King David example, 265–66 Law of Moses, 25 Big Other, 195–96 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, 255 broad hypocrisy, 185–86, 192–94 brown-nosing employee or flak-catcher?, 51, 304–5 Butler, Joseph, 28, 30, 161, 259 callous convict, 61 categorical imperative, 122, 125, 127, 129, 143, 149, 250 change of mind, 271–77, 285, 339, 341 vs. hypocrisy, 273–77 character. See also moral judgment assessment, 152 excellence of, 69 judgments of, 107 traits, 67 charitable man, 50 Chekhov, Anton, 191 Chekhov, Anton, “Lady with Lapdog,” 58, 201–2 Christianity, 20

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church and state, 214–15 Cities of the Plain (Proust), 58, 273 closet-gay politician, 62, 207 commitment, 70–72 common moral fabric. See shared moral values common sense, 331 complacency, 28, 161, 230, 258, 265 King David (biblical case), 265–66 complacent hypocrisy, 260, 262. See also selfdeception complex irony, 315–17, 322 concern for the opinion of others, 70, 73 conscience, 31 consciousness, raising of, 178 consequences and consequentialism, 95–115, 132, 337 and acceptable hypocrisy, 114–15 bad consequences, 111 desire fulfillment, 112–13, 115 distant, 107 evaluation of inner state, 104 good consequences, 98–99, 101–5, 110, 115 long-term, 96, 106, 108, 337 and overall good, 98 and risk of discovery, 109 and separate evaluation of agent and action, 102 for victim hypocrites, 196 consequentialist deontology, 122, 124, 155–56 contractarians, 163 conventional morality. See prevailing morality conventions, 140, 166, 315. See also politesse and civility; shared moral values conventions (politics), 178 conventions (social), 205–6 “counterculture,” 202 counterfactual hypocrisy, 249, 251 Cowton, Christopher, 68–70, 86, 244 Crisp, Roger, 67, 69–70, 86, 244 Critique of Pure Reason (Kant), 152 cunning politician example, 48, 107 cynical hypocrisy, 162, 168, 267–68, 338 Dante Alighieri, Inferno, 28–30 David Copperfield (Dickens), 55 dear self (Kantian), 150, 152 deception, 165–66, 178, 194, 206, 222, 277. See also lying; self-deception acceptable, 135–44 conscious or deliberate, 75

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and irony, 291–95 as necessary to hypocrisy, 40, 134, 241–43, 245–49, 252, 257, 266, 272, 285 definitionalism, 37, 40, 46n3 deontology, 123 dependence, 218 depersonalization, 29 desire account of hypocrisy, 96, 112–13, 115, 337 devil’s advocate, 22, 321 dialectical vs. rhetorical arguments, 178–79 Dickens, Charles, David Copperfield, 55 Dickens’s Uriah Heep, 31, 55–56, 72, 85, 87, 129, 195, 236, 258, 267 didactic nicotine addict, 50 “dirty hands,” 176 disdain, 73 disparity pairs, 242, 272, 277–78, 282 disposition utilitarianism. See motive utilitarianism dispositions, 105 distant consequences, 107 doctrine of the mean, 68–70, 76, 78, 80, 83, 86, 88 exceptions to, 77 The Doctrine of Virtue (Kant), 128 dominant culture or group, 32, 232 double standard, 24, 149, 207 affirmative action, 232 biblical warning, 28, 230–31 hypocritical parents, 234 as necessary and/or sufficient for hypocrisy, 232–37 parent and child, 231–32, 265–66, 338 “strong” use of, 233 unjust use of, 233 drowning Hitler example, 101 duty of benevolence, 126, 129 egalitarianism example, 249–52 egoism, 71, 97–98, 152, 158, 338 acknowledged egoists, 97–98 psychological, 162–64, 166–67 relationship with hypocrisy, 161–71 “romantic ego,” 217 universal ethical, 167–70 eleutheriotes, 69 Elster, Jon, 220 emergency workers, 248 emotional hypocrisy, 114 emotions, 41, 87 in moral decision-making, 44

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Index ends-in-themselves, 217 ends-in-themselves (categorical imperative), 122, 126 Enlightenment, 31 “envy,” 78 equality moral, 128, 216, 224, 229, 237 erotically overcharged teacher, 50, 258 ethike arete, 69 Euthyphro, 341 even-temper (praotes), 69 everyday language, 70 examples from biography and history, 60–62 catalogue of, 47–62 from history of philosophy, 52–55 from literature, 55–59 method of, 37–38 nature and role of, 41–45 use of, 336 excellence of character (ethike arete), 69 excess of sociability, 51 external moral authorities, 31 fairness, 229, 232, 237 fallacy of composition, 260 fallacy of division, 260 false humility, 129, 303 family resemblance, 37–40, 46n5 fanaticism, 70 as opposite to hypocrisy, 71–73 Fanatics and Hypocrites (Newman), 70 feigning ignorance, 319 Feinberg, Joel, 271 fiction, 42 Fierstein, Harvey, Torchsong Trilogy, 59 flattery, 82, 300–301 force, 212 Foucault, Michel, 19 fragmented selves, 203 free will, 123, 153 fresh start, 331 Friedländer, Paul, 318 friendship, 81 Aristotle’s false friend, 52, 81 Hume’s grieving friend, 53, 263–64 gap between word and deed, 271–72 Gauthier, David, 161 genealogical sketch, 38. See also historical narrative generosity (eleutheriotes), 69

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“genetic” or “etymological” fallacy, 38 German Jew passing as Aryan, 48, 79, 114, 195–97, 216, 314. See also victim hypocrisy goals ironists vs. hypocrites, 290 God, 81, 124, 215, 230–31 God’s will, 223 Gombay, André, 110–11 good consequences, 98–99, 101–5, 110, 115 good will, 122 Gordon, Jill, 325 Gorgias and other sophists, 178 Grant, Ruth, 218–22 Greek theatre, 19, 80 Griffin, James, 112 Gurov’s double-life in Chekhov’s Lady with Lapdog, 58 Gyges’ Ring, 52, 108 Hamlet (Shakespeare), 144 Hamlet’s advice, pretend to a virtue, 57, 144 Hardie, W.F.R., 77 harm principle, 214 hatred, 187 historical narrative approach, 38–40 Hobbesian tradition, 177 holier-than-thou attitude, 235 honesty, 70, 221 human nature, 123–24, 126, 150, 177, 202–3 Hume, David, 152 Hume’s grieving friend, 53, 263–64 humility, 127–29, 303 hupokrasis, 80 hupokrites, 19 Hurka, Thomas, 192, 242–43 hyper-morality, 284 hypocrisy as an excess of concern for the opinion of others, 73 bad press, 192 biblical, 20–28, 335 broad sense, 185–86, 192–94 counterfactual, 51, 249 in Dante’s Inferno, 51 as deficiency of commitment, 70 as deficiency of honesty, 74 as deliberate misrepresentation, 185 as denial of inner self, 217 as essentially self-interested, 307 as failure to take morality seriously, 283–84

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as fundamental vice, 125 Greek, 19, 80, 319, 335 grounded in self-deception, 257 as homage to virtue, 219 as inconsistency, 242–43 as “itself bad,” 76–78 as lack of complete transparency, 195 as meta-vice, 88, 336 modern vs. ancient, 80 morally acceptable cases of, 79–80, 144–46 as morally neutral, 19, 80, 319, 335–36 as morally unimportant, 242 narrow sense, 185–86 as necessary for toleration, 218 in politics, 211, 218–19 as prima facie wrong, 79 righteous, 221 and risk of discovery, 108, 111–12 separate evaluation of agent and action, 100–104 as social benefit, 211 as test of consequentialism, 95, 100, 113 tradition of condemnation, 191 and universal ethical egoism, 170 as vice, 87 as violation of categorical imperative, 125, 127 as virtue, 220–22 The Hypocrite (Molière), 246 hypocrite-villain, 31 hypocritical parents, 234 Iago (fictional character), 31 inclination, 124, 127–28, 133, 147–48, 153–54, 156 inconsistency, 182, 248 as essence of hypocrisy, 242–43 as sufficient for hypocrisy, 245 indifference, 33, 224 individual ethical egoism, 167–68 individualism moral, 32 indulgences, sale of, 25 Inferno (Dante), 28–30 ingratiating fund-raiser, 49, 197 “insiders” and “outsiders” in irony, 320 insincerity, 24, 263, 275 integrity, 67–68, 83–84, 86, 88, 95, 104, 169, 192–93, 196 McKinnon on, 85

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intentions, 28, 111, 136 intentional untruth, 130 separation of act from, 111 internal lies, 28–29, 31, 131–34, 156. See also self-deception root of all wrongdoing, 133 internal mental attitudes, 96 intuition, 47, 54, 331 inward hypocrisy. See internal lies; selfdeception ironic political dissident, 51 irony, 33, 136 and ambiguity, 323–24 and attention to oneself, 296–97 audience, 293–94, 296 challenge to prevailing norms, 297, 299–302, 314 and deception, 291–95 exclusion of hypothetical other, 294–95 intent to be discovered, 315 inversion of values, 297 meaning in Greek, 319 and moral courage, 291, 307, 309 as morally neutral, 289 reinforcing bonds between speaker and listener, 294 relationship with hypocrisy, 290–308, 310 as self-interested, 308 used to puncture hypocrisy, 301 isolation, 203 James, Henry, 41 Jesus and the Pharisees, 19–27, 242 double standards, 230–31 Jovial Friars (in Dante’s Inferno), 30 Judaeo-Christian morality, 80, 83 judgmentalism, 33, 231. See also moral judgment justice, 95 Kant, Immanuel, 47, 121–57, 313 acceptable deceptions, 135–43 axiological dualism, 153 as consequential deontologist, 155–56, 338 consequentialist arguments, 140, 143, 147 criticisms of, 123–24 distinction between lying and deception, 138–40 on humility, 128 on hypocrisy, 127–29, 144–46, 156 on lying, 129–34 Kant on being surprised in an Act of

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Index Devotion, 54 Kant on devotional hypocrisy, 54, 134 Kant on false humility, 53 Kant’s fearful theist, 55 Kant’s polite letter writer, 53 Kant’s self-deceived atheist, 55 Kant’s vain author, 53 Kierkegaard, Søren, 289 Kittay, Eva Feder, 79, 292, 300, 306–7, 310 act separated from intention, 111 on irony, 289–90, 296–97, 301–2 on Socrates, 313–14, 316, 318 special threat posed by hypocrite, 191 on victim hypocrites, 314 Kundera, Milan, 191 La Rochefoucauld, 219, 241 “Lady with Lapdog” (Chekhov), 58, 201–2 late modernity, 32 Law of Moses, 25 lawyer with political ambition, 49 A Letter Concerning Toleration (Locke), 213 liberalism, 216–18, 220, 224 reduction of hypocrisy, 211 liberals (cynics), 219 liberals (idealists), 219, 221 lies, 109. See also deception internal lies, 131–34 “Noble Lie,” 186 “white lies,” 130 Lincoln, Abraham, 186 literary hypocrites, 72, 195, 258 literature for ethical insight, 41, 44 local hypocrisy, 260 local hypocrites, 258–59 (self-aware), 259 (self-deceived), 259 Locke, John defence of toleration, 212–16 moral arguments (on toleration), 214–16 pragmatic arguments (on toleration), 212–14 Locke’s deterrent to religious pretenders, 52 long-term consequence, 108 long-term consequences, 96, 106, 337 loyal functionary, 61 Luther, Martin, 25–26 lying, 129–34. See also deception as chief ground of evil, 132 link with hypocrisy, 133 vs. deception, 138–40

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Machiavelli, Nicolò, 180, 213, 218 Maude, Aylmer, 60, 282 Maugham, Somerset, 161 Mayhew slums, 260–62 McKinnon, Christine, 289–90, 292, 307 on hypocrisy, 67, 104, 191, 300–301 on integrity, 84–85 on irony, 296–97, 302, 306, 310, 315 on Socrates, 316, 318 Meno problem, 37 mental state, 113 meta-vice, 88, 336 meta-virtue, 83 Metaphysics of Morals and Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant), 123–26, 154 Mill, John Stuart, 95 harm principle, 214 Miller, Clyde Lee, 297 minority group responses. See victim hypocrisy Mme Cambremer (from Proust’s Cities of the Plains), 273–76 Molière, The Misanthrope, 56 Molière’s Alceste, 56, 193 Molière, Tartuffe, 246–49 Molière’s Tartuffe, 31, 56, 72, 85, 87, 129, 195, 236, 258, 267 Montaigne, Michel de, 175 Monty Python, 296 moral action, 153–54 moral common ground. See shared moral values moral consistency, 185, 232, 242–43 moral discourse, 218 moral disharmony, 181 moral duties, 122 moral equality, 216, 224, 229, 237 moral evasion, 33 moral individualism, 32 moral intuitions, 47, 331 moral judgment, 26–28, 152, 231. See also judgmentalism global repudiation of, 230 of others, 151, 153, 230–31 moral language, 71 moral law, 123–24, 147, 155 moral seriousness, 86, 88 moral virtue Aristotle’s view of, 84 moral vocabulary, 70

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moral weakness, 68, 83, 86, 88, 275, 279. See also weakness of will moral worth, 123, 128, 136, 147, 154 moral wrongdoing, 21 moral wrongness, 196 morality, 163 applicability to politics, 176, 179–80, 185, 187 external moral authorities, 31 morally acceptable hypocrisy, 79–80, 113–15, 144–46, 197 motivation, 99, 104, 133, 135 motive utilitarianism, 103 motives, 25 separate evaluation of, 105–6 Muecke, D.C., 289 murder, 78 nameless virtues, 74 narrow hypocrisy, 187, 195 native reserves complacent hypocrisy and, 262 nepotist top bureaucrat, 48, 235 New Testament, 20 New View hypocrisy, 229, 232 Newman, Jay, 67, 70–71 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 32, 313 nihilism, 301–2 “Noble Lie,” 186 noumena, 153 Nussbaum, Martha, 41–44 Old Testament, 20 “open secret,” 206 orthodox mother and gay son reciting Kaddish, 59 ‘ought’ implies ‘can,’ 244 “out-of-the-closet” hypocrites, 243–44, 246, 249 over-polite guest, 49 overall good, 98 overall well-being, 140 oversexed Tolstoy, 60 overthrow of the state, 178 pan-hypocrisy, 87, 258–60 parent/child double standard, 232 particular actions, 67 particularity, 41 “passing,” 48, 79, 114, 195–97, 216, 314 passions ( pathé ), 69 paternalism, 186, 224, 324

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pathé, 69 Pharisees. See Jesus and the Pharisees Plato, 71, 82, 178, 314, 316, 318–19, 325 concern for self-knowledge, 82 doctrine of the “Noble Lie,” 186 Plato’s perfectly unjust man, 52, 80, 258 “playing a part” Greek concept of, 19, 21, 80 pluralism, 32–33, 181–83. See also tolerance politesse and civility, 79, 114, 140, 166, 194, 219, 262, 336 Kant’s view on, 135, 137 political correctness, 32, 176, 233, 235, 284 political dissidents, 308 political morality as consequentialist morality, 180 political promise, 60, 176 political/rhetorical arguments, 178 politics, 23, 175 accusations of hypocrisy, 187 paternalistic view of, 177–87 Politics (Aristotle), 19 post-modernism, 32–33, 302, 322, 339 power shifts and double standards, 234–35 practice vs. preach double standard, 248, 252, 279, 301 praotes, 69 preferential treatment. See affirmative action pretence, 165, 171, 194, 276 ironists vs. hypocrites, 291 Kant’s view of, 138–39, 141, 143, 153–55 in tolerance, 217 pretended ignorance ethical doubts about, 318 prevailing morality, 316–17 irony and, 314 pride, 127 principle rigid adherence to, 221 privacy, 338, 341 arguments against, 198 benefits, 204 as creating context for hypocrisy, 200 critiques of, 201–3 as immunity from judgment of others, 200–201 rights of others, 199, 208 social agreement re, 206 privacy vs. hypocrisy, 194, 205–8 intuitive distinction, 191 Proust, Marcel, 41

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Index Cities of the Plain, 58, 273 psychological egoism, 162–64, 166–67 public and private selves, 203. See also fragmented selves public display, 24 public interest, 212–13 vs. self-interest, 186 pure reason, 155 raised expectations and accusations of hypocrisy, 186 Raz, Joseph, 223 reason, 31, 123–24, 127, 147, 154 pure reason, 155 right reason, 87–88 recklessness, 110 reductio ad absurdum, 333 reliability, 96, 106–7 religious toleration, 214–15 repression, 32 Republic (Plato), 320, 323 respect for persons, 198 reverse discrimination, 339 Rhetoric (Aristotle), 82 “riddling variety” of irony, 323 right reason, 87–88 right to privacy. See privacy “righteous hypocrisy,” 221 risk of discovery, 108, 111–12 role of pretending to be better or worse, 276, 303–7 “romantic ego,” 217 “romantic self,” 193 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 186 Rorty, Richard, 301–2 rule-utilitarianism, 96, 105 rule-worship, 105 Ryle, Gilbert, 241 Santayana, George, The Last Puritan, 59 sarcasm, 298 sarcastic guest at barbecue, 51, 297 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 255 Schindler as moral hero?, 61 self, 217 dear self, 193 fragmented, 203 romantic self, 193 sense of, 203 self-deception, 33, 40, 74, 194, 206, 256, 259, 339, 341. See also internal lies complacency and, 161, 263, 266

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culpability and, 257 as distinct from hypocrisy, 256 Kant on, 132, 134, 146–48, 151 self-deceptive hypocrisy, 28, 30–32, 265 moral culpability, 268 self-interest, 23, 25, 84, 156, 161, 165, 186–87, 207, 219–20, 304 irony, 308 Joseph Butler on, 30–31 psychological egoism, 162–63, 166–67 role in hypocrisy, 88, 164, 195, 280, 307, 338–39 self-justification, 31, 264 self-knowledge, 149 Aristotle on, 81–82 self-righteous attitude, 230–31 self-righteous hypocrisy, 263–64 self-transformation, 224 selfish interest, 22 separate evaluation of agent and action, 96, 100–104, 115, 337 separate evaluation of motives or dispositions, 105–6 sexist employer, 48, 98, 106, 108 “sexual revolution,” 202 Shakespeare, William, 67 Hamlet, 144 Shakespeare’s Iago, 31, 267 “shamelessness,” 78 shared moral values, 181–84, 187, 338 Shklar, Judith, 183, 186, 192, 216, 218, 222, 242, 256–57, 260–61 sincerity, 23, 26, 264 insincerity, 24, 263, 275 skepticism, 20 Smilansky, Saul, 249–51, 256 “social agreement” as basis of privacy, 206 social contract (Hobbesian), 177 social conventions. See under conventions social hypocrisy. See politesse and civility social mobility, 217 social roles, 217 Socrates, 297, 307, 313, 333, 341 charge of smug superiority, 324 complex irony, 315–17, 322 conventional morality, 290, 314 conversation and dialogue, 332 as cultural icon, 289, 331, 339 deception and manipulation, 320 defence of, 323 exclusion of the unwitting, 318

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goal, 324 prevailing morality, 316–17 Socratic irony, 289, 292, 322, 333 element of hypocrisy, 325 ethical status, 318–19 as paternalism, 324 sovereign (Hobbesian tradition), 177 special circumstances, 196 special skills exemptions (practice what you preach), 248–49 spontaneity, 30 “Standard View” hypocrisy, 229, 232 subjective/objective distinction, 101–2 subtle spousal criticism at Tupperware party, 51, 309–10 suicide Kant’s views on, 126 Tartuffe (fictional character). See Molière’s Tartuffe Tartuffe (Molière), 246–48 Taylor, Charles, 95 teacher with bad habit, 49, 75, 84, 244–45 television advertising, 137 theatre. See Greek theatre things “themselves bad,” 78–79 Thrasymachus, 71, 319–23 tolerance, 32–33, 150, 217–18, 338 and autonomy, 216 conceptual link with hypocrisy, 212, 222, 224 moral equality, 216 need for self-transformation, 224 racial and ethnic background, 216 reduction of hypocrisy, 211 religious, 214–15 sexual orientation, 216 truth and, 222 as virtue, 223 Tolstoy and chastity, 282–83 tomorrow’s egalitarian, 50, 249–50 Torchsong Trilogy (film) (Fierstein), 59 totalitarian societies lack of privacy, 204 trait utilitarianism. See motive utilitarianism transparency, 192–95 true values, 72 trust, 96, 108, 110–12, 115 foundation of relations, 109 truth, 178, 222 truthfulness, 74, 131, 137 truthfulness about oneself Aristotle on, 81–82

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Turner, Dan, 192, 242–44, 272–73, 275, 277–79, 283 ulterior motives, 26, 82, 280 unexamined life, 333 unfair advantage, 207, 236 universal ethical egoism, 167–69 relationship to hypocrisy, 170 universal law (categorical imperative), 122, 125, 149 universalization, 168 unmerited reputation, 166 unself-conscious hypocrisy, 255 urban and Third-World poor complacent hypocrisy, 262 Uriah Heep (fictional character). See Dickens’s Uriah Heep Urmson, J.O., 89n7 “us” and “not us,” 294–95 utilitarianism, 177 Kant’s relation to, 126 vanity, 218 vegetarian’s lapse, 49, 75, 84, 278–84 vice, 67, 69, 71–72, 87, 103 of excess, 82 victim hypocrisy, 32–33, 91n32, 114, 197, 309, 339 victim hypocrites, 79, 195–96, 314–15 Victorian pretensions, 60, 192, 261 complacent hypocrisies, 260–62 virtue ethics, 67, 337 virtue/situational ethics, 177 virtues, 69, 71, 103, 142–43 Vlastos, Gregory, 292–93, 316–17, 320, 323 Walzer, Michael, 192 Warnock, Mary, 41, 45, 333 Wasserstrom, Richard, 203 weakness of will, 33, 38, 83–84, 192, 271–72, 280, 285, 339, 341. See also moral weakness vs. hypocrisy, 272, 280–85 “white lies,” 130 will, 136 God’s will, 136 good will, 136 Williams, Bernard, 84, 86, 92n45, 104, 211, 223, 333 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 37, 39, 47, 229, 331 Wittgenstein’s last judgment, 55 “worse than one is” pretence, 303–7

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