Human Rights, Language and Law: Proceedings of the 24th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Beijing, 2009, Volume II 3515100822, 9783515100823

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Human Rights, Language and Law Edited by Thomas Bustamante and Oche Onazi

archiv für rechts- und sozialphilosophie archives for philosophy of law and social philosophy archives de philosophie du droit et de philosophie sociale archivo de filosofía jurídica y social Herausgegeben von der Internationalen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (IVR) Redaktion: Dr. Annette Brockmöller, LL. M. Beiheft 131

Human Rights, Language and Law Proceedings of the 24th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Beijing, 2009 Volume II Edited by Thomas Bustamante and Oche Onazi

Franz Steiner Verlag

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek: Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über abrufbar. Dieses Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig und strafbar. © Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2012 Druck: Druckhaus Nomos, Sinzheim Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. Printed in Germany. Franz Steiner Verlag: ISBN 978-3-515-10082-3 Nomos Verlag: ISBN 978-3-8329-7430-5

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Thomas Bustamante / Oche Onazi Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     7 I  Human RIgHts and JustIce In a global PeRsPectIve Jacob Dahl Rendtorff Cosmopolitanism and Politics:   Double edges and tensions between human rights and justice   . . . . . . . . . . . . .   11 Akihiko Morita A Difference in the Conceptions of the Self as the Subject of   Human Rights between the West and Japan: Can Confucian Self   be strong enough to exercise positive liberty in an authoritarian society?  . . . . .   23 Carla Faralli / Sandra Pattaro Frontiers of Genetics: Human Rights and the Right to Health   . . . . . . . . . . . . .   35 II  PublIc PolIcy, economIcs and socIal RIgHts Álvaro Filipe Oxley da Rocha Human Rights and Justice in Brazil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    47 Klaus Mathis Discounting the Future? Cost-Benefit Analysis and Sustainability   . . . . . . . . . .   63 III  law, language and lIteRatuRe Alberto Vespaziani Towards a Hermeneutical Approach to Legal Metaphor   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    79 E. Irem Aki / Wojciech Zaluski Pathologies of Legal Reasoning or Legal Reasoning as a Pathology?   Two Interpretations of The Stranger  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   93 Cheng Zhaoyang Killing Me Softly with Your Words?   – An Analysis of Power Dynamics in Chinese Court Mediation Discourse  . . . .   99

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Table of Contents

Iv  tRansfoRmatIons In legal dogmatIcs and PRIvate law Marcos Vinício Chein Feres / Denis Franco Silva Public intervention in contracts:   Is it the end of private law as we know it?   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Pompeu Casanovas / Marta Poblet / José Manuel López Cobo Relational Justice: Mediation and ODR through the World Wide Web   . . . . . . 145 Murray Raff / Anna Taitslin Private Law in the Shadow of Public Law:   A Legacy of 20th Century Marxism and the Soviet Legal Model  . . . . . . . . . . . .  157 Authors   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

tHomas bustamante  / ocHe onazI InTroduCTIon In  this  volume,  which  contains  the  2nd  issue  of  the  Proceedings  of  the  24th  IVR  World Congress, held in Beijing in the year of 2009, the reader will find a selection  of papers presented at that International Congress on the general theme of “Human  Rights,  Language  and  the  Law .”  Even  though  these  papers  share  a  general  topic,  each of them will approach it in very different ways . Under the first heading, “Human Rights and Justice in a Global Perspective,” the problems of the foundation of  Human Rights and the legitimacy of the Political Power occupy the centre of the  debate . The first two papers discuss the legitimacy of the Political Power in a more  general way, either in the context of a Global Society – in case of Rendtorff ’s paper  – or in the case of states in which there is a tension between a liberal legal system  and an authoritarian society – in case of Morita’s paper, which analyses the practice  of the Japanese legal system . Still under the first section, the next paper, written by  Carla Faralli and Sandra Tugnoli, views the Human Rights as a “historically shaped  creation” and sheds light into some of the most controversial aspects of the right to  Health in contemporary societies, which is heavily influenced by the development  of new technologies in Genetics and Biological research .  The second section, in turn, comprises two papers and deals with Public Policy,  Economics and Social Rigths . Firstly, da Rocha’s paper explores the concept of citizenship in Brazilian law and analyses some of the social conditions necessary for its  achievement . In particular, the author is concerned with the difficult task of balancing  individual  rights  and  collective  interests  both  in  legal  dogmatics  and  in  the  practice of the Brazilian courts . Second, Mathis’ paper proposes a model to assess  the value of public projects by means of a cost-benefit analysis of the sustainability  of public policies . The third section, whose title is “Law, Language and Literature” deals with some  of the multiple ways by means of which Law can relate to Language . In this sense,  Vespaziani’s paper furnishes a profound analysis of Legal Metaphors from the point  of view of Hermeneutics and traditional Rhetorics . From a different perspective, in  turn, Ari and Zaluski’s paper takes up Camus’ book The Stranger and offer two different interpretations of the critique that Camus addresses to the legal practice . As  the authors point out, Mersaud’s case can be viewed either as a “pathological” form  of legal reasoning (i .e . a “pathology in legal reasoning”) or, in a more radical interpretation of the case, as a way to show how pathological legal reasoning often is .  Finally, Zhaoyang’s paper contains the result of an empirical research undertaken at  Chinese Mediation courts with a view to demonstrate, as it in fact does, that the  process  of  mediation  is  necessarily  driven  by  power  relations  that  influence  any  court’s mediation activities . The fourth and final section, in turn, deals with some of the most important  recent transformations in Legal Dogmatics and in Private Law . On the one hand,  Feres and Silva’s paper analyses the theoretical implications of the public intervention of contracts from the point of view of the theories of law and society developed  by Taylor, Habermas and Dworkin . In particular, the authors are concerned with the  re-interpretation of the institutions of Private Law that are entailed by the recent 

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Thomas Bustamante  / Oche Onazi

developments of legal dogmatics and constitutional law . On the other hand, from a  different perspective, Murray and Taitslin’s paper analyses how 20th Century Soviet  Legal Culture has shaped Private Law and rearranged its norms, concepts and institutions .  Finally,  Casanovas,  Poblet  and  López  Cobo’s  contribution  explains  how  novel techniques of legal development are being developed under the World Wide  Web . In fact, it is claimed that Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) is now a new type  of source of law which needs to be clarified both by legal theorists and legal practitioners .  The editors would like to thank the authors of the contributions compiled in  this volume for the help in the revision of the manuscripts of their papers, as well as  Prof .  Zenon  Bankowski  and  the  dedicated  members  of  the  Chinese  Law  Society,  who worked very hard to select the papers comprised in this volume amongst hundreds of papers received for this publication .

I Human rIgHTs

and JusTICe In a

global PersPeCTIve

Jacob daHl RendtoRff CosmoPolITanIsm and PolITICs: double edges and TensIons beTween

Human rIgHTs and JusTICe

InTroduCTIon The concept of cosmopolitanism is one with many implied double edges, tensions,  and possible contradictions, but traditional cosmopolitanism—the project of the law  of the world citizen—involves overcoming these tensions and double edges through  mediations . Indeed, the cosmopolitan project can be conceived as a philosophical  project of mediations: one leading to developing norms based on a vision of the  relation between individuals in a global civil society . The double edges of cosmopolitanism can be seen in the ontological foundations of cosmopolitan norms . This project of cosmopolitanism can be seen already  in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant—cosmopolitanism plays an important role in  the natural right tradition—where an implied fundamental tension, or double edge,  exists  between  the  duty  of  hospitality  (Weltbürgerrecht)  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  right that governs the relation between nations on the other . 1 Kant argued for a law  of world citizenship limited to conditions of “universal hospitality,” meaning that  as national laws are developed, the conditions for a perpetually peaceful Westphalian legal order require protections for individuals .2  The tension implicit in the concept of cosmopolitan norms is that, as ethical  norms,  they  go  beyond  the  legal  order  of  the  state,  while  simultaneously  being  based on the positive norms of state sovereignty . One could conceive of cosmopolitan norms as “the right to have rights,” and at the same time they refer to the  right of universal hospitality . In this sense, cosmopolitan norms shape the rights of  the republican state, although they come from outside this republic and as such do  not have any formal legitimacy . Thus, a perceptible tension exists between the rise  of an international human rights regime and the fact that there is no sovereign to  enforce these rights .  This tension between national sovereignty and universal human rights principles is evident in the limited right of the international community to intervene in  local affairs . Moreover, there is a similar tension between sovereignty and hospitality in the sense that the norm of hospitality does not have any direct basis in the  sovereignty of the state . As a consequence of these tensions, there are many iterations and transformations of traditional concepts of political community connected  to the emergence of the vision and philosophy of cosmopolitanism in our international and globalized society .

1  2 

Kant, Immanuel: Zum Ewigen Frieden, Otfried Höffe (Hg .), Berlin: Akad .-Verl . 2004 . Kant (note 1) .

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Jacob Dahl Rendtorff

I wHaT

Is CosmoPolITanIsm?

One simple concept of cosmopolitanism defines it as “the idea of the whole world  as a frame of human life; the idea that it is more important to think in the name of  humanity than in its parts: nationalities, ethnic groups, cultures .”3 This conception  prioritizes the basic fact of being human over belonging to a specific community .  Cosmopolitans say: “Human first and after this citizen”4 In this sense the concept  of cosmopolitanism is both a moral and a political category related to human rights;  to diverse moral, political, and religious systems; to the UN and EU; to globalization and multiculturalism; to a number of proposals to reform international relations; and to educational programs in states and in the international community . The cosmopolitan is a citizen of the world society, evoking the Hellenic ideal of  the cosmopolis in the world community . The cosmopolitan is supposed to mediate  and transcend dialectical double edges in the creation of the norms of the international  community,  thus  releasing  herself  from  distinguishing  between  friend/enemy, them/us, outside/inside, or citizen/stranger .  Historically, there are two important origins of the concept of cosmopolitanism: 1) in Stoic philosophy as a culmination of the reflections of antiquity and 2) as  a Roman justification for universal power . What is important and common in these  ancient ideas is the universalization of the dignity of the human being beyond a  specific national context .  Kant’s use of the concept can be found in his reflections on the international  state system in Zum Ewigen Frieden .5 In fact, we must not forget that the Kantian  concept of cosmopolitanism is double edged in the sense that it appears in the context of discussing the international law of sovereign states . Moreover, there might be  a  limitation  to  the  Kantian  concept  of  cosmopolitanism  because  he  reduces  the  cosmopolitan right to the right of the individual to hospitality . At the same time,  Kant mobilized the concept as a criticism of his contemporary society dominated  by colonialism and the force of the strongest .  Today,  Stoic  and  Kantian  conceptions  are  very  present  in  the  debates  about  globalization, liberalization, and human rights . We may ask the question: What really is the relation between globalization and cosmopolitanism? In fact, sociologists  such as Ulrich Beck and David Held emphasize that cosmopolitanism and globalization represent difficult challenges to the social sciences . For example, some version of the project of combining globalization with new political structures can be  seen in the process of creating the European Union . Indeed, the formation of Europe contains all the problems of cosmopolitanism at what may be called a regional  level .  A fundamental element of the concept of cosmopolitanism is the idea of tolerance . It can be argued that the concept of hospitality in the idea of cosmopolitanism  implies the recognition of the “otherness of the other”:6 a fundamental right to be  as one wants to be in a society with many forms of life . In an increasingly globalized  3  4  5  6 

Thorup, Mikkel & Mads p . Sørensen: Slagmark. Tidsskrift for idéhistorie, Kosmopolis, Århus, Efterår  2004, 7 . Ibid, 7 . Kant (note 1) . Derrida, Jacques: Cosmopolites de tous les pays, encore un effort! Ed . Galilée, Paris 1997 .

Cosmopolitanism and Politics

13

world that requires dealing with different cultures and nationalities, the importance  of tolerance as a fundamental requirement for cosmopolitan society becomes apparent . Still, in the European context it is a double edge to talk about the cosmopolitan  identity as a way to express a tolerant lifestyle . Is tolerance the only content of cosmopolitanism? Or is it meaningful to imagine cosmopolitan individuals who live in  the world without a particular identity? According to a sociologist like Ulrich Beck  it is a paradox that the European Union holds cosmopolitanism as a fundamental  project while at the same time being constituted by nation-states that defend their  values on nationalist grounds .  Perhaps the European Union is, after all, very far from cosmopolitanism . Even  though cosmopolitanism is a part of the European project, arguably little has been  done to integrate and develop Europe in cosmopolitan terms . Denmark provides an  example of the contemporary importance of the nation-state within the EU . The  Danish nationalist political movement is so strong that many Danes vote for movements and parties that are against the European community when electing members  for European Parliament . For Beck and others, the challenge becomes how to conceive Europe, not from the point of view of a federation, or a community of nations, but in terms of cosmopolitan principles . David Held approaches the double edge of cosmopolitanism more globally . He  argues  for  a  political  transformation  towards  a  political  cosmopolitanism  in  the  global community . According to Held, the current world is not constituted by “national communities of destiny” alone, but rather “overlapping communities of destiny” with shared concerns for issues like climate change, economy, culture, communication, war, et cetera .7 At the international level, these shared concerns increasingly connect people into a cosmopolitan community, which transcends the limits  of hospitality and necessitates international political structures . Held argues that the global community requires governance and decision-making that are appropriate from a cosmopolitan point of view . From this perspective,  the fundamental questions of cosmopolitanism become: What kind of governance  do we need in the international community? How do we formulate an alternative to  the neoliberal idea of total pluralism and freedom? How can we define an integrated  and more just international world order? What is world governance: federation or  international civil cooperation? What is the role of civil society in this new community of international world governance? Does it really give meaning to talk about  a cosmopolitical democracy? And what does such a democracy contain? Moving the political interpretation of cosmopolitanism beyond the ethical idea  of  hospitality,  civil  society—where  many  forms  of  non-state  actors  contribute  to  creating the cosmopolitan sphere between the states—becomes a very important element in the development of the global cosmopolitan order . International nongovernmental organizations, such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch, as  well as corporations—despite their bad reputation—are important actors in the formation of international civil society . Indeed, non-state actors are essential for forming and developing the cosmopolitan agenda for an international political community beyond nation-states .

7 

Held, David . Cosmopolitanism: A Defence . Polity Press, Cambridge 2003 .

14 II HIsTorICal

Jacob Dahl Rendtorff double edges In THe ConCePT of CosmoPolITanIsm

As alluded to above, the historical dimensions and double edges of cosmopolitanism can already be seen in ancient Greek thought . Indeed, Ulysses can be said to be  a cosmopolitan, with his travel around the known world of the time . Diogenes’s  declaration, “I am a world citizen,” is a clear statement of cosmopolitan values . We  see that it is essential for the concept of cosmopolitanism to demonstrate that the  self does not belong to a particular community in order to show the consequences  of the international approach to citizenship . In ancient Greek society, the order of the known world was expressed by the  term cosmos (kosmos) . Polis is the concept combining the city and the state; therefore, the cosmopolis is the global state or city . The Greek city-state was local, and  one could argue that human beings belong to the polis, as sociable “political animals .”  On  the  other  hand,  according  to  later  Stoic  interpretations,  Socrates  conceived himself as world citizen: a member of the world community . The search for  wisdom  and  the  intellectual  virtues  of  the  educated  philosopher  go  beyond  the  participation in the city-state . Accordingly, Socrates argued from the perspective of  cosmopolitanism, that is, from the point of view of universality and universal reason . Here is evidence of the beginning of a double edge .  This conception of the cosmopolis was present all through the development of  Stoicism,  culminating  with  the  works  of  Seneca  and  Cicero .  Fundamentally,  the  Stoic argument for cosmopolitanism was a moral one based on reason . In particular,  rationality and nature expressed universal dimensions of human dignity, which in  Stoic philosophy were given a foundation in the cosmological participation of human beings in the totality of the world . The Stoics argued that there is a fundamental order of humanity that goes beyond participation in the political community of  the state . According to Stoic natural law theory, humanity is searching to conform  to the cosmic order of reason and striving towards cosmic unity . Humanity is thus  defined by the fact that human beings are intersubjectively related to the logos of  cosmos and the world . One could say that human beings belong to the common  universal cosmos of reason and dignity .  Stoic natural law stands as a correction to the Aristotelian philosophy of practical  wisdom  and  judgment,  where  morality  and  politics  are  based  on  ethics  and  practical reason within a particular society . It is in the cosmic dimension of natural  law that one finds the basis of its universality, whereby the particular becomes the  universal . In this sense, the Stoics wanted to solve the double edge and tension between the particular and the universal by arguing for a convergence between the  laws of the polis, the political community, and of the universal law of cosmos .  In order to solve the double edge of the universal and the particular the Stoics  argued that the universal natural law is incarnated in the customs and ethics of each  human culture, which are an expression of common humanity . As both citizens and  individuals, human beings have a universal significance that points to their position  in the cosmopolitical order beyond the particular state . It is a basic moral principle  (according to the Stoics) that particular human beings should, in all their actions,  see themselves as inscribed within a larger social order . The idea of world citizenship  expresses this moral responsibility of individuals to transcend their particular point  of view and see the world from the perspective of common humanity .

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The Romans conceived an early manifestation of the idea of a global community as a common world state, world institutions, and governance . Emperor Marcus  Aurelius, for example, wanted to create such a Stoic world community, arguing that  human beings belong to two cities: 1) the community within the state, and 2) the  community within the world . Seneca saw cosmopolitanism as a unity of the duties  of  citizenship  with  the  duties  of  membership  in  the  world  community .  In  other  words, if you have no duties as a citizen you nevertheless have duties as a human  being . The  Stoics  were  also  aware  of  the  potential  solitude  of  cosmopolitan  human  beings . This is perhaps an existentialist double edge of cosmopolitanism . There is  the danger of a rootless loneliness where no locality remains . Further, there is the  danger that this feeling of belonging nowhere can lead to the nostalgic search for a  group or a state as a means of escaping loneliness .  As a development of the Stoic approach, Christianity provides a continuation  of this connection between humanity, society, and the fraternity of community, by  emphasizing the universality of human dignity beyond participation and belonging  to a particular community . The Christian approach was very important to establish  the concept of cosmopolitanism as an important concept for the modern world .  The potential tension between the universal and particular, which was present  in Stoic philosophy, is repeated in the Kantian concept of cosmopolitanism . Still,  Kant went beyond the somewhat superficial cultural cosmopolitanism popular during his time and extended earlier philosophical approaches toward a more fully developed theory of world citizenship .  Kant was critical of this cultural cosmopolitanism because it did not go deeply  enough into its moral and political consequences . The European cultural cosmopolitans saw (and still see) cosmopolitanism as a way of life . They travel, they read,  and are interested in other cultures . This concept of cosmopolitanism can be linked  to tolerance and humanism in the French Enlightenment tradition from the seventeenth century, when travel around the world appeared as an aristocratic ideal . This  cosmopolitanism expresses the double edge of the concept because there is a potential  tension  between  cosmopolitanism  and  patriotism .  Many  people  at  the  time  (indeed  of  today)  were  worried  that  cosmopolitanism  would  destroy  patriotism .  Many people also argued—harkening to the concerns of the Stoics—that cosmopolitanism destroyed the sense of belonging to a community such that the human being  becomes a detached individual lost in relation to history and culture .  Kant’s moral and political cosmopolitanism is a fundamental argument against  this double edge of cultural cosmopolitanism . In Zum Ewigen Frieden Kant argues  for a cosmopolitan political and legal order and he argues for cosmopolitan citizenship . The basis for this law of world citizenship is universal human rights, where the  rights of individuals in the international community should be protected because of  universal values and the dignity of common humanity . According to Kant, it is very  important to recognize respect for public human rights as a fundamental step towards perpetual peace in the world community .  In his formulation of such universal human rights, Kant argues for the right of  world citizenship but also restricts this right to the right of hospitality . In this sense,  due to his submission to state sovereignty, he is still marked by the double edge of  cosmopolitanism . The right to visit and to be recognized as a visitor and respected 

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as a stranger is a central dimension to the cosmopolitan vision of citizenship . Accordingly, Kant argues that the laws of peoples must be based on hospitality and the  right to visit a foreign country . From the Kantian perspective, international law and  the law of world citizenship are not the same . State citizenship is not a condition  for world citizenship . The fundamental moral rights of human beings go beyond  the  rights  of  citizens  as  members  of  the  nation-state .  So  the  Kantian  concept  of  cosmopolitan rights is potentially very weak . It seems like it is nothing more than  some version of respect for international humanitarian rights . It is characteristic of  the Kantian notion of the laws of peoples that despite arguing for a global political  and legal order with peace among states, it is limited to the right to moral humanitarian rights . Kant’s conception does not encompass a vision of total legal and political rights of individuals in the international community as a world state . Maybe  Kant proposes this limitation as a critique of the Western concept of colonialism  where states became so powerful in ruling over the world .  The Kantian concept of cosmopolitan rights does, however, go beyond the legal  right of hospitality, arguing for human belonging to the realm of freedom, which  goes beyond the limitations by the state . Indeed, both Kantian and Stoic cosmopolitanism justify human dignity and rationality beyond the limits of the nationstate .  Kant  and  the  Stoics  both  understood  the  separation  of  human  beings  into  particular communities, but were equally aware of the importance of uniting human  beings in a common vision . Stoic cosmopolitanism arguably requires adults with  strong capacities to be themselves, which is an idea also present in Kantian cosmopolitanism . One could say that the Kantian search for eternal peace was inspired by  the Stoic conception of cosmopolitanism . In both philosophies dignity and freedom are universal ideas for the development of humanity that go beyond the politics of the identity and culture of a particular community .  III double

edges and THe new CosmoPolITanIsm

The new cosmopolitanism of today, and its attendant double edges, is inspired by  the Stoics and Kant . Today, we combine individual dignity and rights with political  concern  for  the  global  community .  In  this  sense  the  new  cosmopolitanism  is  a  search  for  global  responsibility .  There  is  a  search  for  universality and  “one  single  humanity” with a common goal, problems, and challenges .8 The world citizen lives  in the cosmopolis, seeing the world as her home . Further, she is responsible for the  world and engaged in world affairs . The world citizen sees common problems of  humanity at the world level as our basic social and political problems .  Highlighting common political challenges on a global level is seen by some as  an unrealistic solution to overcoming the tensions inherent in the concept of cosmopolitanism . One oft-repeated criticism is that the idea of moral world citizenship  is less about feeling at home everywhere but rather feeling superior everywhere . It is a  lonely and arrogant person who no longer belongs to or is engaged by a particular  community . The old concerns about solitude and rootlessness are recast as a kind of 

8 

Held (note 7) .

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new nihilism: Cosmopolitans are egoistic individuals or lonely wanderers who find  no real meaning in their lives . This criticism originates from a critique proposed by the political cosmopolitans of the cultural cosmopolitans, who can be divided into groups: free travelers  (i .e .,  voluntary  migrants  and  tourists)  and  forced  travelers  (i .e .,  refugees  and  vagabonds) .9 Only the voluntary cosmopolitan—who has the ability and freedom to  make a conscious choice about how to engage with the world—seems to be a fair  object  for  this  criticism .  Tourism  has  the  potential  to  destroy  the  cultures  of  the  world rather than opening to new insights, and in many ways the tourist may be  blind on her travels . The forced traveler cannot properly be conceived as a cosmopolitan precisely because their migration is forced .  A further criticism of the new cosmopolitism is that it is a betrayal of national  culture . In turning toward the international community one necessarily turns away  from a home country, thus destroying the unity of national culture . The Marxist  critique  argues  this  point  by  claiming  that  cosmopolitanism  is  an  expression  of  bourgeois ideology . It is the attempt of the ruling classes to justify imperialist destruction  of  nation-states .  From  this  perspective,  liberalism  and  globalization  express a movement of cosmopolitanism, which contributes to the destruction of national cultures .  In Cosmopolites de touts les pays, encore un effort! Jacques Derrida (1997) stakes a  theoretical position that takes these criticisms into account .10 He points to the problems of new cosmopolitanism through his development of the idea of hospitality,  by suggesting that there is an element of totalitarianism in the idea of “one humanity .”  So there is an implicit tension between ownership and generosity in the concept  of hospitality . We may translate this into the double edge between sovereignty and  openness to the other in the cosmopolitan vision . In order to have hospitality one  needs to be the master of the house, country, or nation . This power is necessary in  order to be able to give hospitality to the other . So hospitality, like generosity, presupposes power and self-identity . Moreover, in order to demonstrate hospitality the  host may be able to have power over the person that he or she receives in society .  Thus, closed boundaries, nationalist sentiment, and the like may be a condition for  the ability to show hospitality . Without such boundaries there would be no hospitality and we could not open our society to refugees . This hospitality based on residence in a house, country, or nation can be called unconditional hospitality . But we  can also perceive that hospitality sometimes must be based on the ability to give up  power, thus there is a tension between the need for and a desire to relinquish ownership and control . In order to avoid an imperialist politics of identity only a philosophy  of  hospitality,  with  respect  for  the  other,  can  solve  this  double  edge  of  new  cosmopolitanism . There is an aporia in hospitality because genuine hospitality presupposes that we can invite the other into something that we can call our own . Derrida addresses the issue of international justice and nationalism in light of  this concept of hospitality . He takes into account Kant’s concept of hospitality— the  Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences, Columbia University Press, New York  1998 . 10  Derrida (note 6) . 9 

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right of the stranger not to be treated as an enemy, as well as not to be destroyed .  The hospitality to strangers is, according to Derrida, the most important manifestation of cosmopolitanism . The openness of cosmopolitan hospitality is not based on  calculation but on a genuine willingness to suspend power and open oneself unconditionally  to  the  other .  The  fundamental  cosmopolitan  openness  of  meeting  the  other  implies  that  I  welcome  the  other  without  asking  for  any  documentation .  I  open myself to the other in my home, my house, my language, my culture, and my  nation . Such unconditional hospitality is a transgression that seems to go beyond  even the Kantian concept of hospitality . Hospitality as the openness to the other  becomes a fundamental ethical principle .  If we link Derrida’s concept of cosmopolitanism and hospitality with Giorgio  Agamben’s  concept  of  the  relation  between  humanity  and  sovereignty  we  gain  a  deeper understanding of the double edges of cosmopolitanism . While Derrida investigates the role of the person who receives, in Homo sacer: Sovereign power and bare life,  Agamben  investigates  the  role  of  the  person  who  is  to  be  received .11  From  Agamben’s perspective, the Kantian concept is a limited way of understanding the  reality of the cosmopolitan demand . He requires going beyond Kant to search for  concepts of hospitality and world citizenship that are not marked by contradictions  between sovereignty and unconditional openness to the other .  Agamben proposes a deconstructive reading of human rights and the possibility  of perpetual peace, and cosmopolitanism with respect for naked human life beyond  biopolitical  condition .  Agamben  is  inspired  by  Derrida,  but  his  philosophy  also  implies a critical reply to both Kant and Derrida . A human being is characterized by  nudity, in other words in a condition that exists as pure humanity not belonging to  any  particular  community  (homo sacer),  which  is  opposed  to  the  utopia  of  strong  rationality in the Kantian vision of cosmopolitanism .  In Agamben’s thought, one can perceive how the double edges of cosmopolitanism seem to be even more radicalized than in the work of Derrida . Agamben  draws attention to the concept of the refugee and emphasizes how the refugee expresses the nudity of the human being that needs to be protected in the cosmopolitan  condition .  Agamben  argues  that  we  could  never  build  a  political  philosophy  based on citizenship rights in relation to sovereignty because this reduces the individual, and their right to have rights, to belonging to a particular nation-state . In  order to build his radical cosmopolitan foundation for political philosophy, Agamben argues that we must instead go beyond the nation-state towards the nudity of  the human being that does not belong to the political community . It is from this  position that we can build a new political philosophy . Iv overComIng

double edges:

Towards

a sITuaTed CosmoPolITanIsm

How tenable is this radicalized cosmopolitanism, which does not accept that sovereign states are important for world community? There is a problem with Agamben’s  position that naked human beings are isolated from the sphere of the biopolitical  sovereignty  of  the  state .  The  naked  human  being  seems  to  live  in  isolation  from  11  Agamben, Giorgio Homo Sacer: sovereign power and bare life, Stanford, 1998 .

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political community, in a kind of permanent state of exception that is so severe that  it seems impossible to survive . The double edges cannot be reconciled by choosing  one dimension of the extreme, but rather by dealing with both aspects of the cosmopolitan double edge, in other words the individual and state sovereignty .  A new cosmopolitanism has to present itself as a situated cosmopolitanism, one  based  in  a  society  or  culture .  It  is  a  neoliberal  and  globalized  cosmopolitanism  where one has no home . There is, however, a danger of aggressive nationalism and  this may be an argument for cosmopolitanism without roots . This situated cosmopolitanism  is  linked  to  political  cosmopolitanism  conceived  philosophically  as  a  universal  notion  of  justice  and  governance,  such  as  within  the  framework  of  the  United Nations .  It is in this context that one may turn to the philosophy of Hannah Arendt in  order to respond to the radical positions of Derrida and Agamben . Arendt’s work  presents  a  critical  discussion  of  Kantian  cosmopolitanism .  She  presents  views  on  human rights and the rights of citizens, and discusses the possibility of an international tribunal to deal with crimes against humanity . Also, her philosophy implies a  critical reply to a naive juridification of international relations as marked by legal  structures . Arendt proposes a way to reintegrate wrong-doers into the political community after the fight is over . The international political community needs a dimension of civil society, as proposed by Arendt, and with this we find a possible mediation of the double edges of cosmopolitanism . We can argue that Arendt understood  the importance of the political foundation of the respect for the naked human being  beyond  the  political  relations  of  the  nation-state .  This  is  what  Arendt  argued  for  when she coined her famous term of the foundation of human rights as the “right  to have rights .”12 In Another Cosmopolitanism, Seyla Benhabib seems to propose a version of this  position . According to Benhabib, modern cosmopolitanism is not only about hospitality but also about the political and legal institutions that govern our world in  order to deal with the flow of persons, capital, commerce, pollution, information,  labor,  goods,  viruses,  et  cetera .  Cosmopolitanism  is  about  building  political  relations at the international level, so that people can enjoy the right to have rights in  the international community .  We have talked about universalism, but conceived political actors as bounded  by  community .  Following  Benhabib’s  argument,  these  communities  need  to  be  transcended to avoid ending up in impossible ideological positions and totalitarian  ideas . Benhabib defines human rights as universal ethical obligations that extend  beyond national sovereignty but are legally formulated .  Benhabib argues that the challenge is the construction of a jurisprudential theory that is able to reconcile the universality of human rights with the partiality of  positive law .13 She deals with the problem similarly to Arendt, by focusing on the  rights of persons who reside within a state but who are excluded from the polity:  legal and illegal aliens .14 Benhabib takes up the challenge of the double edges by  arguing  for  a  legal  foundation  for  cosmopolitan  citizenship  beyond  positive  law .  12  Arendt, Hannah: Eichmann in Jerusalem. Essay on the Banality of Evil, New York 1964 . 13  Benhabib,  Seyla:  Another Cosmopolitanism,  edited  by  Jeremy  Waldron,  Bonnie  Honig  &  Will  Kymlicka, The Berkeley Tanner Lectures, Oxford University Press 2006, 3 . 14  Ibid .

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She draws upon Kant’s doctrine of cosmopolitan rights, which she attributes to his  thesis that the law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal  hospitality .15  In  this  sense,  hospitality  covers  the  relationship  between  states  and  strangers . Because the law of hospitality intersects with the positive law of the state,  the double edge of cosmopolitanism lies within the confrontation between republican national law and international relations . On the one hand we have the republican opening towards the international community in the republican public sphere  and on the other we have the mediation between the cosmopolitan norm and the  republican  community .  Benhabib  focuses  on  the  point  of  intersection  between  these two dimensions .  Benhabib’s work provides a possible solution to the tension of the double edge  by arguing for a cosmopolitan law that emerges from increasingly conscious public  debates in democracies where the norms of cosmopolitanism are accepted as basic  human rights . In this sense universal norms are mediated by the will of democratic  societies  such  that  cosmopolitan  norms  become  integrated  into  the  republican  framework of democracy . An illustration of this kind of democratic development of cosmopolitan norms  and of the “democratic iteration” is, for example, the European Union, where citizenship is expanded in a cosmopolitan direction . The contradiction between the  universality of ethics and the particularity of law can, however, never fully be overcome and there is always room for national sovereignty where laws are made . When  we  talk  about  a  civil  justification  for  the  emergence  of  cosmopolitan  norms,  we  can  argue  that  this  justification  of  cosmopolitan  hospitality  emerges  within the framework of democratic community because people are becoming more  and more acquainted (and respectful) of others’ cultures and norms beyond their  national borders . From this perspective there is the hope that cosmopolitan norms  are becoming internalized in local cultures, democracies, and populations . Benhabib sees this as inadequate . Cosmopolitan norms must also be based on  a  legal  framework;  however,  within  a  given  legal  framework  with  specific  public  discourses on democracy there is the hope that cosmopolitan norms will emerge .  Staying with the European example, Benhabib sees the proposal of European citizenship as an example of the movement towards the development of such cosmopolitan norms . There is the danger of a cosmopolitan stateless future where there is  no local community but only a world of international relations . Benhabib also argues that we should imagine a future where “civil, social, and some political rights”  are not related to national belonging . In this context, universal cosmopolitanism is  situated between law and ethics, universality and particularism, national and international community .16 When we search for a philosophical foundation for these cosmopolitan norms  we can return to Arendt . Her book Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil was fundamentally about cosmopolitanism and international law, in particular  when dealing with genocide as a crime against humanity, or rather a crime against  humanness or the right to be human . Our question of double edges, of what can  mediate legal structures and moral universalism, can be answered by reference to  15  Benhabib (note 13) . 16  Benhabib (note 13) .

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the Eichmann trail . This trial marks the beginning of cosmopolitan norms, moving  beyond traditional legal positivism . If we look more closely at the Eichmann book, it is arguable (keeping Benhabib  in mind) that it is not only from Arendt’s correspondence with Karl Jaspers—a Kantian cosmopolitan—that she came to add civic republication into her vision of political self-determination as the foundation of true hospitality in cosmopolitanism .  We can also see how cosmopolitanism and a vision of an international law of human rights emerges as the basis for the international community . We can see the  emergence of her philosophy of civic republicanism and her argument for the relation between republicanism and cosmopolitanism . The emergence of global civil  society as the movement from international to cosmopolitan norms of justice can  only be accomplished as long as it draws upon principles of civic republicanism .  Benhabib insists on the necessary mediation between the moral and the ethical,  and the moral and the political, in her interpretation of cosmopolitanism from the  perspective of Hannah Arendt’s philosophy . Crimes against humanity represent a  violation of the humanity of one person . The important insight of Kant, Jaspers,  and Arendt is, according to Benhabib, that cosmopolitanism is built on civic recognition within republican democracy of the right of the other to have rights .  Arendt’s concepts, such as “the right to universal hospitality” and “the right to  have rights,” owe a debt to Kantian cosmopolitanism—these concepts should have a  binding  power .17  They  must  be  enforceable  not  only  for  individuals  but  also  for  states and governments . The idea is that the right to have rights indicates the right  of universal hospitality . The foundation of such a cosmopolitan right is that it triumphs over positive law while being within it . This is possible because it is founded  on republican self-governance and autonomy . So we need more than formal political construction of the cosmopolitan norms  of human rights . An international human rights regime, crimes against humanity,  humanitarian interventions, and transnational migration norms should all be based  on  civic  republican  recognition  of  the  right  to  have  rights .  Cosmopolitan  justice  must be based on a kind of international laws of peoples where the tension between  sovereignty and hospitality is overcome through the act of self-legislation as an act  of self-constitution . Benhabib says that “liberal democracies must learn to negotiate … [this paradox] between the spread of cosmopolitan norms and the boundedness of democratic communities” .18 The development of cosmopolitan norms is characterized by  democratic iterations between the local, the national, and the global . What is characteristic of the new cosmopolitanism according to this view is that  citizenship and political membership are no longer based on culture and collective  identity . As is the case in the European Union, the conflict between sovereignty and  hospitality is no longer so important . According to Benhabib, a new discussion of  politics implies the search for new forms of political agency in cosmopolitan times  where we recognize what she calls the democratic iterations of the concept of democracy and citizenship .

17  See Arendt (note 12) . 18  See: Benhabib (note 13) .

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Following Arendt, we can argue that cosmopolitanism emerges as the power of  democratic forces within a global civil society . This helps the construction of international norms beyond the tension between cosmopolitanism and national sovereignty .

akIHIko moRIta a dIfferenCe In THe ConCePTIons of THe self as THe subJeCT Human rIgHTs beTween THe wesT and JaPan: Can ConfuCIan self be sTrong enougH To exerCIse PosITIve lIberTy In an auTHorITarIan soCIeTy?

of

I InTroduCTIon Charles Taylor raised the following question: “Can people who imbibe the full Western human rights ethos, which reaches its highest expression in the lone courageous individual fighting against all the forces of social conformity for her  rights, ever be good members of a “Confucian” society ?”1

The modern Western discourse on rights involves a certain philosophical view of  humans and their society, of which the cornerstone concept is that of the subjective  right .2 In this article, I would like to take up the cultural difference regarding the  conception of the self as the subject of human rights between the West and North  East Asia, particularly Japan, in order to explore a plausible means to incorporate  the human rights norm, which I believe is universal in nature, into non Western  society such as Japan . Toward this end, I will follow Taylor’s distinction between human rights as legal  language and its underlying philosophical foundation .3 I also accept Taylor’s contention that every society has its own social moral order in which each member can  develop  and  retain  his  or  her  unique  identity .4  I  will  also  follow  the  ecumenical  approach articulated by Joseph Chan, which is the idea that universal human rights  can and should be justified by different cultures through their own terms and perspectives, with the expectation that overlapping consensus on the norms of human  rights  may  emerge  from  those  self-searching  exercises  and  mutual  dialogue .5  My  goal in this exploration is to present one plausible approach, based on the existing  Japanese way of thought, that may serve as the underlying philosophical foundation  for the human rights norm in Japanese society . I present my propositions in advance as follows: 1)  While the Japanese state is relatively liberal, Japanese society is not . 1  2  3  4  5 

Charles Taylor, “Conditions of an unforced consensus on human rights” in Joanne R . Bauer and  Daniel A . Bell eds ., The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, Cambridge University Press, 1999,  129 . Taylor, Sources of the Self – The Making of the Modern Society, Harvard University Press, 1989, 11 . “The notion of (subjective) rights both serves to define certain legal powers and also provides  the master image for a philosophy of human nature, of individuals and their societies,” C . Taylor, Conditions of an unforced consensus on human rights, 127 . Taylor, Sources of the Self – The Making of the Modern Society, 28 . Joseph Chan contrasted the ecumenical approach with the fundamentalist approach, which is  that there are universal values and moral principles that can justify human rights to all reasonable persons . Joseph Chan, A Confucian perspective on human rights for contemporary China,  in Joanne R . Bauer and Daniel A . Bell eds ., The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights .

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2)  The major Northeast Asian societies – China, Korea and Japan – share the Confucian tradition even though Japan has never strictly been Confucian state . 3)  Every  society  has  own  social  moral  order,  embracing  its  own  conception  of  humans and society, supported by and developed in its history and traditions . 4)  The  Neo-Confucian  conception  of  the  self,  articulated  by  Tu-Weiming  as  a  center  of  relationships  and  as  a  dynamic  process  of  spiritual  development,6is  compatible with the modern Western conception of the self as the subject of  human rights . 5)  Likewise, the modern Japanese conception of the self can be formulated in a  way that is compatible with the notion of the self as the subject of human rights  although its composition might be different from the other North East Asian  societies . 6)  The most challenging task for the contemporary Japanese society is to develop  and establish a universal value system, compatible with the human rights norm,  one that fully utilizes the intellectual resources available in the East Asian tradition and embraces multicultural liberal principles . II ConCePTual

framework and THe ToPIC To be foCused

Lam Peng-Er contends the following: “While the Japanese state is relatively liberal, Japanese society is not . Japanese state and society  are unlikely to accept the notion that a democratic Japan should embrace distinct, autonomous,  and equal Okinawan and Ainu nations within a multicultural country .”7

Peng-Er highlights the Japanese myth of its ethnic homogeneity and strong group  orientation as obstacles and concludes that Japanese society is illiberal in the sense  that  a  majority  believes  that  assimilation  is  the  best  approach  for  foreigners  and  minorities .8 I basically agree with his analysis with one reservation, namely, I would maintain that any society can change . As Peng-Er anticipated, the dominant one-party  system in Japan has finally broken down, following Italy, Sweden, Mexico, India  and Taiwan . However, I also have to admit that a considerable number of the Japanese people feel uneasy about the underlying philosophy of human rights as it originated in  the West, particularly its individualistic nature, and are reluctant to accept any efforts toward adopting and incorporating this idea into the modern social imaginaries in Japan, even though both the government and the people are ready to accept  human rights as legal norms . 

6  7  8 

Tu  Wei-Ming,  Confucian Thought: Selfhood As Creative Transformation,  State  University  of  New  York, 1985,113 . Lam Peng-Er, At the Margin of a Liberal-Democratic State: Ethnic Minorities in Japan, in Will  Kymlicka & Baogang He eds, Multiculturalism in Asia, Oxford University Press, 2005, 224, 243 . Lam Peng-Er, At the Margin of a Liberal-Democratic State: Ethnic Minorities in Japan,224–225,  232 .

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Without accepting the principle of the equality of each individual in terms of  dignity and rights, it is difficult to embrace different ethnic groups as equal members of the society .  Thus, it is apparent that in order for Japanese society to be able to embrace different nations within a country, it needs to change its social imaginaries, embracing  those currently missing or underdeveloped within it . Social imaginaries, in Taylor’s  account,  are  the  common  understandings  which  make  common  practices  and  a  widely shared sense of legitimacy possible .9  In the West, the ideas of the modern society were articulated as the theory of  Natural Law in the 17th century mainly by Grotius and Locke . This theory is based  on a certain conception of human being and society, one which holds that individuals, by making their own judgments, voluntarily come to agreement with each  other and form society in order to promote mutual benefit . Individuals, as the subject of rights, are regarded as endowed with natural rights . The modern self, as the  autonomous and rational agent, is supposed to take a disengaged stance from the  world, including its own self, and to be able to act as a sovereign person, formulating commonly elaborated opinion in the public sphere while managing to make a  living as an independent agent in the market economy .10 Such a concept of the human being, that is the self as subject of rights, is the  cornerstone idea in the modern social imaginary of the West .11 This modern self is  considered equal in dignity and rights to all others, as formally stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 .  It was Masao Maruyama who criticized Japanese intellectual tradition from this  Western perspective, insisting that Japanese society lacks an axial intellectual system  comparable  to  Christianity  and  the  tradition  of  independent  subjects  or  autonomous minds that can face the objective world and extract concepts from it, which  could reach the transcendent level .12  I don’t fully agree with Maruyama’s claim and would instead argue that the different conceptions of the self in the West and in Japan represent different positions  along the same spectrum .  I would like to defend this idea by employing terms presented by Taylor . In A Secular Age, Taylor presents his idea that the transformation from the pre-modern,  enchanted world to the modern, disenchanted one can be viewed as a shift from the  “porous self ” to the “buffered self ” . In the pre-modern world, meanings were held  to be not only in the mind, but residing in things outside of the mind to which the  porous self is open and, in a sense, vulnerable . On the other hand, the buffered self  can form the ambition of disengaging from things outside of the mind and of giving  autonomous order to its life .13 On Taylor’s account, the buffered self has developed 

9  Taylor, A Secular Age, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007, 171–172 . 10  Taylor, A Secular Age, 159–211 . 11  Taylor explained the meaning of subjective right as something which the possessor, subject of  right, can and ought to act on to put it into effect . C . Taylor, Sources of the Self – The Making of the Modern Society, 11 . 12  Mikiso Hane, Translator’s Preface in Masao Maruyama, Studies in the intellectual history of Tokugawa Japan, Princeton University Press, 1974, ix . 13  Taylor, A Secular Age, 34–39 .

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discipline  and  self-control  and  has  seen  itself  more  and  more  as  an  individual,  a  conception which emerged from the process of Reformation .14  What distinguishes Western modernity from others is that the process was accompanied by a growing sense of unease toward church-controlled collective rituals  and magic and the secularization of the West has thus involved negation of magic  and of collective religious rituals . This, in my view, can best explain why the modern  Western self has had to completely enclose its boundary .15 On the contrary, in Japan, where collective rituals are not considered negatively,  the porous self did not feel the necessity to completely close itself off to the world .  This, and the fact that the porous self, by its nature, is more vulnerable to intervention from the outside world in the form of collective rituals, might be one reason  why the Japanese people were so easily brainwashed in the pre-war period by the  imposition of certain forms of collective .16 So, from the viewpoint of selfhood as an  ideal types, Japan can be characterized as a society in which the self remains partially  porous even after it is institutionally modernized . In this connection, it should be noted that the partially porous self is not necessarily an unreflective self . Apparently, as Michael Sandel has commented, a completely embedded or porous self can not reflect itself and thus cannot exercise the  positive liberty to reform itself and its society .17  However, it seems to me possible for partially embedded and hence partially  reflective self to develop and maintain its autonomous power in the society in which  individual reflective capacity or freedom of expression is well respected and protected .18  If my interpretation is correct, the modern Japanese self can be described as a  partially porous and partially buffered self, while the Western self is fully buffered,  speaking in terms of ideal types . By employing these models of the self, we may  distinguish  between  the  West  and  Northeast  Asia,  not  in  terms  of  an  individualoriented society versus a group-oriented one, but rather in terms of different variations on the concepts of the modern self and modern society .19 Of course, by presenting this conception of the modern Japanese self, I do not  intend to refute the generally accepted argument that individualism accompanied  by a strong sense of respect and commitment to democracy was not fully developed 

14  Taylor, A Secular Age, 539–541 . 15  Taylor  holds  that  this  very  clear-cut  distinction  (between  ‘this  world’,  or  the  immanent,  and  the transcendent) is itself a product of the development of Latin Christendom . Charles Taylor,  “Forward What is secularism ?” in Geoffrey Brahm Levey and Tariq Modood eds ., Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship, Cambridge University Press, 2009, xvii-xix .  16  In my interview with Charles Taylor on Nov . 15th 2008, appeared as Religion and Democracy  – Multiple Secularizations in the quarterly magazine, KAN(環), No . 37, Fujiwara shoten, May  2009 . 17  This comment by Michael Sandel, Harvard University, was addressed to my question if there  is any difference in the conception of self between the West and East Asia, particularly Japan at  the International Conference on Public Philosophy at Chiba University on March 20–21, 2009 . 18  Tatsuo Inoue, University of Tokyo, called it “partially embedded and partially reflective self ” at  the same International Conference . 19  Regarding this argument on culturally different ideal types of modern self, I would like to stress  that culture and tradition is not static state but dynamic process .

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in pre-war Japan and that this was one of main reasons why Japan fell into irrational  ultra-nationalism at that time .  I wish only to insist that this paradigm can make it possible to compare different  modernities at the same level, that is, at the level of selfhood .20  For instance, the model of the self presented by Tu Wei-Ming as a center of relationships and a dynamic process of spiritual development can be considered as a  sort of partially porous and partially reflective self that is embedded in human relationships while taking responsibility for its own spiritual development .  According  to  this  framework,  modernization  at  the  level  of  selfhood  can  be  generalized as the movement from the completely embedded self at one end, to the  completely buffered self at the other end; however, as explained above, the notion  of the completely buffered self is not considered as ideal or ultimate end . A certain  range in the axis can be considered modern as long as the self is sufficiently reflective so as to maintain autonomy and confidence in its own capacity to reform itself  and its society . However, Maruyama was right in maintaining that modern nationalism failed  to develop in Tokugawa Japan because the society was divided into two classes, the  ruling and the ruled:21 ‘When it came to the critical question of who was ultimately responsible for national independence, the public at large outside the feudal ruling class was, as the Mito school reveals in typical  fashion, excluded from the discussions .’22

In Maruyama’s account, the fact that the Meiji Restoration was carried out without  the active participation of the popular classes had a decisive effect on the character  of the Meiji innovations intended to give rise to a modern nation-state .23 This task was, in a sense, successfully accomplished by the ruling elites in prewar imperial Japan by their creation of the myth or political ideology of Kokutai (国 体)(national polity or identity) – according to which the Emperor was regarded as  the  Father  of  all  Japanese  families,  in  an  unbroken  descent  from  Amaterasu,  the  supreme sun-goddess, and combining this myth with the Confucian ethics of absolute loyalty of children to their parents .24 This “Shinto” Confucianism is neither the  natural descent from the Confucian schools of the Tokugawa period nor authentic  Shintoism . Rather, Shinto Confucianism was an invention formulated by the Meiji  Government as the spiritual axis of the new nation-state based on its observation  that Japan did not have a religious tradition that would be viable as such a spiritual  axis while the West did have a strong religious tradition as the spiritual backbone of  the people .

20  Taylor, Hegel, Cambridge University Press, 1975, 6 . 21  Mikiso Hane, Translator’s Preface in Masao Maruyama, Studies in the intellectual history of Tokugawa Japan, xi . 22  Maruyama, Studies in the intellectual history of Tokugawa Japan, 365 . 23  Maruyama, Studies in the intellectual history of Tokugawa Japan, 367 . 24  Fundamentally, it is questionable if the original teachings of Confucius contain the absolute  obedience in familial relationship . Joseph Chan, A Confucian perspective on human rights for  contemporary China, in Joanne R . Bauer and Daniel A . Bell eds ., The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, 222–226 .

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We  should  recall,  in  connection  with  this,  the  insight  of  Lafcadio  Hearn,25  which he expressed when he visited the Izumo shrine in 1891, that the reality of  Shintō lives not in books nor in rites, nor in commandments, but in the national  heart, of which it is the highest emotional religious expression, immortal and ever  young26 .  The Japanese ruling elites subtly utilized the aesthetic attitude of ordinary Japanese people, which often appears as an emotional rather than a rational sense of  attachment to the social groups to which they belong .  Thus, it will be necessary to articulate the underlying and foundational Japanese  conception of human rights as one that embraces the indigenous basis of the social  norms of ordinary Japanese people and the principle of liberal multiculturalism . Before exploring this topic, I would like to briefly trace the Western intellectual  history in order to identify the points on which I should focus in this project . Taylor holds the following: “The modern subject is self-defining, where on previous views the subject is defined in relation  to a cosmic order . Now the shift that occurs in the seventeenth-century revolution is, inter alia,  a shift to the modern notion of the self . The Epicureans and Sceptics achieved a notion of selfdefinition by withdrawing from the world … . By contrast the modern shift to a self-defining  subject  was  bound  up  with  a  sense  of  control  over  the  world  –  at  first  intellectual  and  then  technological .”27

Taylor maintains that the shift to the modern notion of the self can be understood  as a revolution in the basic categories by which we understand the self .28 The modern self, in Taylor’s account, has the active capacity to shape and fashion its world,  both natural and social; and it had to be actuated by some drive to human beneficence, which means it had to produce some substitute of agape .29  It seems to me that as the concept of the modern self has evolved in the West  with a growing sense of confidence to grasp in the self ’s ability to objectively grasp  and control the world (including humans), similar development toward the concept  of the modern self can be observed in non-Western states such as China, Korea and  Japan although their resources, trajectories and contemporary forms vary from culture to culture .  For instance, the intellectual history of China recently presented by Yuzo Mizoguchi and his colleagues refuted the traditional perception of Chinese history as  a persistent continuum of dynasties that was finally turned down in 1911 Revolution (Xinhai Revolution) . Instead, they describe Chinese intellectual history as the  process  of  penetration  by  Confucian  thought  into  the  wider  social  classes  which  eventually prepared the way for the 1911 Revolution . According to their new account, Chinese history has four epochs . The first one was the establishment of the  25  Patrick Lafcadio Hearn also known as Koizumi Yakumo (小泉八雲) . Born in Greece in 1850  and grown up in England and U .S . He had stayed in Japan since 1890 until his death in 1904  as English teacher and writer . Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan (First edition published in 1894 by  Houghton Mifflin Company), Charles E . Tuttle Publishing Co ., Inc ., 1997, Japan: Attempt at Interpretation (Originally published in 1904 by The Macmillan Company), ICG Muse, Inc ., 2001 . 26  Hearn, Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan, 209–210 . 27  Taylor, Hegel, 6–7 . 28  Taylor, Hegel, 5 . 29  Taylor, A Secular Age, 27 .

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centralized dynasties in the Qin and Han Dynasties; the second was the transformation to the meritocratic society based on the imperial examination system (科挙) in  the Tang and Song dynasties; the third was the development of local communities  from the late Ming dynasty to the Qing Dynasties; and the fourth was the 1911  Revolution . According to Mizoguchi, each epoch represents the beginning of a new  era in which Confucianism penetrates the wider social classes . Confucianism was  established as sole legitimate belief system in the Qin and Han Dynasties, widely  exercised by bureaucrats for moral training in the Song Dynasty and disseminated  more widely in the local communities in the Ming and Qing Dynasties .30 We can  observe the growing confidence of the people in their capacity to reform the society  on their own lying behind the Chinese history in which Confucianism has taken a  leading role although it did not take the form of the disengagement of individuals  from hierarchical community that it did in the West . I would like to take up another example presented by Taylor . Taylor contrasts  Theravada Buddhism with the Western modern discourse of human rights and democracy . According to Taylor, in nineteenth century Thailand, there were several  attempts to reinterpret the majority religion of Theravada Buddhism, attempts that  were described by the Sri Lankan anthropologist, Gananath Obeyesekere, as a “protestant Buddhism” . One of the major facets of this reform movement was a return to  the original core of Buddhist teaching, about the unavoidability of suffering, the  illusion  of  the  self,  and  the  goal  of  Nibbana .  The  reformers  tried  to  separate  the  search for enlightenment from the seeking of merit through ritual, being very critical of the whole metaphysical structure of belief that had developed in mainstream  Buddhism about heavens, hell, gods, and demons, a structure that was a large part  of popular belief .31  Taylor summarizes the two major principles in this reform movement, ones that  created a basis for democratic society and human rights, in this way . “The first is the notion, central to Buddhism, that ultimately each individual  must take responsibility for his or her own Enlightenment . The second is a new application of the doctrine of nonviolence, which is now seen to call for a respect for  the autonomy of each person, demanding in effect a minimal use of coercion in  human affairs .”32  Taylor concludes that while both democracy and human rights, along with the  exclusive humanism, were furthered in the West through the stressing of the incompatible  importance  of  the  human  agent  in  the  West,  convergence  on  a  polity  of  defense of human rights and democratic development in Thailand took a different  path, but came to the same norms .33 However, there are certain common aspects in the above-mentioned cases . As  Tu Wei-Ming holds: “The full development of human rights requires their ability to creatively transform the Enlightenment mentality into a thoroughly digested cultural tradition of 

30  Yuzo Mizoguchi, Tomohisa Ikeda, Tsuyoshi Kojima, Chinese intellectual history (Chuugoku shiou  shi)(中国思想史)、University of Tokyo Publishing Company, 2007 .  31  Taylor, Conditions of an unforced consensus on human rights, 133 . 32  Taylor, Conditions of an unforced consensus on human rights, 134 . 33  Taylor, Conditions of an unforced consensus on human rights, 135–136 .

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their own, this, in turn, is predicated on their capacity to creatively mobilize indigenous social capital and cultural assets for the task .”34 The Enlightenment mentality in this context means, in my understanding, the  confidence in the self ’s capacity to reform itself and society on its own, accompanied by a sense of responsibility for self development and respect for the autonomy  of each individual, which is arguably the underlying foundation of the modern self  as the subject of human rights . I would like to turn now to the Japanese case . III exPloraTIon

of JaPanese underlyIng foundaTIon for Human rIgHTs

The preceding argument indicates that in order to formulate an underlying Japanese  foundation for human rights, it is necessary to explore the seed concepts in the intellectual history of the ordinary Japanese people, which can be utilized as a basis  for a sense of individual responsibility and respect for individual autonomy . Toward  this end, I would like to look into the early Meiji period in which the concept of  human rights was introduced into Japanese society for the first time . Fukuzawa Yukichi, the most influential intellectual leader then, introduced human rights as ‘KEN RI TSUU GI(権理通義)’ or ‘KEN RI(権理)’ .35 Fukuzawa explained ‘KEN RI TSUU GI(権理通義)’ as the great principle of justice(大義) that  people should respect life, preserve property and care for honor . Although Fukuzawa was a severe critic of Confucianism, he tried to utilize the Confucian terms  and their connotations that were widely disseminated and accepted by the Japanese  people at that time .36 According to Fukuzawa’s account, human rights means the  great justice or public justice beyond private principle and that’s why he employed  the term ‘RI(理)’, which, according to the philosophy of the Chu His school, refers  to the ultimate principle beyond Heaven and Earth, which also exists in each individual thing . ‘KEN(権)’ originally means measure and is interpreted as a proper response to events occurring along with us,37while ‘GI(義)’ means justice .38 The fact that ‘GI(義)’ and ‘RI(理)’ were so widely accepted as the social norms  also reminds us of another term ‘GIRI(義理)’, originally the Chinese term consisting  of ‘GI(義)’ and ‘RI(理)’, meaning “righteous way of life” . This term had been popularized, acquiring quite different meanings in the Tokugawa period and remaining  an  influential  social  norm  among  the  ordinary  people  through  the  Meiji  period  until quite recently .

34  Epilogue: Human Rights as a Confucian Moral Discourse, in WM . Theofore De Barry & Tu  Weiming eds ., Confucianism and Human Rights, Columbia University Press, 1998, 301, 304 . 35  Fukuzawa Yukichi (1935–1901), Gakumon no susume (An Invitation to learning), originally published in 1872–1876, Iwanami-shoten, 2005, 21–22 36  Hiroshi Watanabe, “They are almost the same as the ancient three dynasties”, in Tu Wei-Ming  ed ., Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity, Harvard University Press, 1997, 129–131 . 37  “There are some with whom we may study in common, but we shall find them unable to go  along with us to principles . Perhaps we may go on with them to principles, but we shall find  them unable to get established in those along with us . Or if we may get so established along with  them, we shall find them unable to weigh occurring events along with us .” Analects IX: 29 .  38  ‘To see what is right and not to do it is want of courage’ Analects II: 24 .

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In order to explore this term, it is worth looking into the Chrysanthemum and the SWORD  by  Ruth  Benedict39  as  the  starting  point  and  the  studies  that  followed,  particularly the works of Ryōen Minamoto,40the most prominent scholar of Japanese intellectual history . Benedict  described  ‘GIRI(義理)’  as  a  moral  norm  with  no  possible  English  equivalent nor an equivalent in any strange categories of moral obligations which  anthropologists find in the culture of the world . Benedict asserted that ‘GIRI’ is a  Japanese category and it is not possible to understand courses of action without taking it into account .41  Inspired by her work, intensive studies have been conducted by Japanese scholars on ‘GIRI’ since then, including the ones by Minamoto . Although some of characteristics identified by Bendict as unique to the Japanese have already faded away,  ones such as absolute loyalty to the Emperor, duty to one’s parents, and the terror  of  not  repaying  one’s  moral  debts,42  we  can  still  observe  the  persistent  nostalgia  among the Japanese people toward ‘GIRI’ as well as ‘NINJO(人情)’ .43 This seems  useful to examine its connotations in order to identify the spiritual heritage of the  ordinary  Japanese  people  which,  may  be  utilized  as  resource  for  formulating  an  underlying Japanese foundation for human rights . Benedict  presented  two  distinct  categories  of  ‘GIRI’,  one  called  ‘giri  to  the  world’,  one’s  obligation  to  repay  on44  to  one’s  fellows  and  another  called  ‘giri  to  one’s name’, the duty of keeping one’s name and reputation unspotted by imputation .45 Inspired by Benedict’s study, Minamoto thoroughly examined the Japanese intellectual history and identified the origin and its diversification process of ‘GIRI’ .  According to Minamoto’s account, the term ‘GIRI’ did not exist in Japan before  it was introduced from China in the 9th century although the social norm which was  later formalized as ‘GIRI’ has existed since time out of mind . Minamoto holds that  the origin of this de-facto social norm of ‘GIRI’ was the natural human response to  another person’s kindness and could be found in any relatively closed and stable  community in which human relations were able to be sustained for long periods  without unexpected interruption in this sense, ‘GIRI’ is not specifically Japanese .46  39  Ruth Benedict (1887–1948) was an American anthropologist . She has received Ph .D . in anthropology from Columbia University in 1923 and was assigned to the study of Japan in 1944 by  the Office of War Information .  40  Ryōen Minamoto (1920~), Professor Emeritus Tohoku University Japan, has studied and published  seminal  books  about  the  Japanese  intellectual  history  of  the  Tokugawa  period  (1603– 1867) . He has also developed the study of GIRI . GIRI and NINJO, Chūoh-Kouron sha, 1969 .  GIRI, Sansei do, 1996 . Pls also refer Donald Keene, Characteristic Responses to Confucianism  in Tokugawa Literature, in Peter Nosco ed ., Confucianism and Tokugawa Culture, University of  Hawai’I Press, 1997, 122–123 . 41  Ruth Benedict, the Chrysanthemum and the SWORD, A Mariner Book, Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005,133 . 42  Ian Buruma, forward to the Mariner Books Edition, in R . Benedict, the Chrysanthemum and the SWORD, xii .  43  NINJO(人情) is human feeling, particularly a sense of caring for others . 44  “On (恩) is obligations passively incurred such as ko on, On received from the Emperor and oya  on, On received from parents” . Benedict, “the Chrysanthemum and the SWORD”,116 . 45  Benedict, the Chrysanthemum and the SWORD, 134 . 46  Minamoto, GIRI and NINJO, 26–28 and 59–60 .

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Minamoto also argues that another form of the de-facto social norm of ‘GIRI’,  a deviation from the original ‘GIRI’ form discussed above, emerged in the late Sengoku or Warring states period, from the late 1400’s until early 1600’s . He describes  this form as the human response to another person’s trust . Minamoto supposes that  this second type of ‘GIRI’ developed among warriors who were struggling to survive  in unstable and highly competitive circumstances by counting on those whom they  trusted . This type of ‘GIRI’, Minamoto stresses, developed among relatively equal  warriors as a personal principle and it was accompanied by the sense of empathy or  NINJO(人情) . Minamoto further identifies a third form of the de-facto social norm of ‘GIRI’,  the sense of obligation in keeping one’s name and reputation, which can also take  the form of ‘IJI’(意地)(pride) . This third type of ‘GIRI’ is distinct from the former  other two forms – those created by the sense of fear of losing face in small closed  communities or in personal human relations by not responding to the others’ trust  and kindness of others .47  These de-facto social norms of ‘GIRI’ were acknowledged as the term ‘GIRI’,  adapting the Confucian concept in the early Tokugawa period .48  However, when the Tokugawa regime – a centralized feudal system with a seclusion policy – was gradually established, these norms could not be preserved in their  original forms . As objective ethical codes were gradually introduced and established,  the original norms of GIRI based on personal trust and empathy (NINJO), which  were not supposed to contradict each other, had been transformed into a formal  code in which ‘GIRI’ was regarded as the obligation to repay to on, contradictory to  ‘NINJO’ as Benedict described it . However, the emotional attachment to the original forms of ‘GIRI’, forms compatible with ‘NINJO’, had survived in Japan as a kind of nostalgia among the ordinary people until quite recently49, and moreover had functioned as the underlying  foundation of social norms .  The genuine defect of this social norm is that it is particularistic, based on personal and emotional attachment to rather small social groups to which the person  believes he or she belongs, and hence has no universal or transcendental dimension .50  The persistency of the Japanese belief in its ethnic homogeneity and its strong  group orientation arguably stems from the nature of this Japanese social norm .51  Globalization and the accompanying multicultural liberal norms and standards,  embodied  in  the  international  human  rights  regime,  has  finally  been  penetrating  into and transforming the way of thinking of the Japanese people, particularly their  Minamoto, GIRI and NINJO, 60–64 . Minamoto, GIRI, 64–66 . Minamoto, GIRI, 99–105 . “He (Masao Maruyama) questioned whether the particularism of Japan, its tendency to concentrate loyalty on particular groups and their leaders, form the emperor and the nation down  to the family, could really be, as I (Robert Bella) had argued, an adequate substitute for ethical  universalism”, Robert Bella, Introduction to the Paperback Edition, 1985, in Tokugawa Religion – The Cultural Roots of Modern Japan, originally published in 1959, The Free Press, 1985, pp . xiiixiv . 51  Chie Nakane, Japanese Society, University of California Press, 1998 . 47  48  49  50 

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33

perception of Japan as homogenous society, which was the central schema in Shinto  Confucianism . An important moment in this transformation was the adoption of a resolution  asking the government to recognize the Ainu people as an indigenous group by the  Japanese Diet in June 2008, a resolution influenced by the United Nations Declaration  on  the  Rights  of  Indigenous  People  adopted  at  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly in September 2007 . Johan Galtung, founder of the discipline of peace and  conflict studies, has also observed that the younger generations in Japan tend to see  other Asians as equals while the older generations still retain their hierarchical perspective .52  In order to further these development, it is worth looking at the Japanese intellectual history so as to identify the resources which can strengthen the positive attitude . Minamoto refers to some Japanese pioneers who tried to develop the concept  of ‘GIRI’ as a universal ethics, including Tōju Nakae53 and Sōseki Natsume .54 Tōju  Nakae insisted that the true understanding of kō (孝)(filial piety) entails a perception  of man’s identity with the universe55, and referred to ‘GIRI’ as righteous way of life  originating  in  the  universe .  Sōseki  Natsume  also  used  the  phrase,  ‘GIRI  to  the  Heaven’, implying a sense of noble obligation to one’s genuine vocation, in explaining his passionate desire to quit his teacher and become novelist to his old friend,  Kyoshi Takahama the poet .56 Minamoto comments that Natsume’s ‘GIRI’ was not  ‘GIRI’ in the traditional Japanese sense, but beyond it .57 Unfortunately, the social  environment of their age could not allow either of them to fully develop their ideas,  but the recent global diffusion of multiculturalism as a new framework has created  a more favorable environment for such endeavors .58 In this connection, I would like to point out a possible role that Confucianism  may play .  Tu Wei-Ming explains the East Asian social norm in the following way: ‘The sense that one is obliged to, and responsible for, an ever-expanding network  of  human  relatedness  may  not  be  a  constraint  on  one’s  independence  and  autonomy . On the contrary, since personal dignity is predicated on one’s ability not  only to establish oneself but also to take care of others, one’s level of independence  52  Johan  Galtung  (1930~),  The method of imagination for peace building (Heiwa  wo  Tsukuru  Hassōjutsu), Iwanami booklet No .603, Iwanami-shoten, 2005, pp . 26–27 . 53  Tōju Nakae (1608–1648) abandoned his post as retainer to his feudal lord to look after her ailing  mother in  his  native village  without his lord’s permission .  Then,  he  developed  his own  philosophy, influenced by the philosophy of Wang Yang-Ming, dedicated to teaching and became  known as the sage of Ōmi province in which he lived . Beatrice Bodart-Bailey, Confucianism in  Japan, in Brian Carr and Indira Mahalingam eds ., Companion Encyclopedia of Asian Philosophy,  Routledge, 1997, 741 . 54  Sōseki Natsume (1867–1916), the most influential novelist in the Meiji era .  55  Bellah, Tokugawa Religion – The Cultural Roots of Modern Japan, 79 . 56  Donald  Keene,  translated  by  Takao  Tokuoka,  History of Japanese Literature (Nihon Bungaku no Rekishi), No .11, Chūō-kōron-sha, 1996, 189 . The original English title is Dawn to the West, Japanese Literature of the Modern Era, 2vols, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1984 . 57  Minamoto, “GIRI”, 126–127 . 58  Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys – Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity, Oxford University Press, 2007 .

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and autonomy is measurable in terms of the degree to which one fulfills obligations  and discharges responsibilities to family, community, state, the world, and Heaven .  The psychological mechanism reflected in the fear of losing face in public, which is  often accompanied by a profound sense of personal guilt, is deduced from this .’59 I would argue that the sense of personal dignity embedded in the human sense  of relatedness can be compatible with liberal multiculturalism if it embraces a universal and transcendental dimension such as Heaven . In  this  connection,  Minamoto  holds  that  the  major  difference  between  the  ‘GIRI’ of Chinese Confucians and the ‘GIRI’ of the ordinary non-Confucian Japanese people is that the latter has no transcendental dimension beyond the ethics of  personal relations .60 Thus, the universal or transcendental nature of the ‘‘GIRI’ of  Confucianism, developed through Neo-Confucianism and advocated by contemporary  scholars  such  as  Tu  Wei-Ming,  may  provide  the  Japanese  people  with  the  conceptual impetus for transforming their traditional particularistic ethics of ‘GIRI’  to more universal and open social norm . Iv ConClusIon Taylor refers to Heidegger’s view of time: “Heidegger’s time is lived time, organized by a sense of the past as the source of a given situation, and the future as what my action must co-determine .”61

I fully agree with Taylor’s account that the future is what our actions can determine  with our past as resources .  So, to return to the initial question, whether the Confucian conception of the  self can be strong enough to exercise the positive liberty in an authoritarian society,  I  have  argued  that  yes,  it  can,  provided  that  we  succeed  in  formulating  our  own  underlying  philosophical  foundation  for  human  rights,  fully  utilizing  intellectual  resources available in the East Asian tradition and embracing multicultural liberal  principles .

59  Tu Wei-Ming, Confucian Tradition in East Asian Modernity, 8 60  Minamoto, GIRI, 28–34 . 61  Taylor, Sources of the Self – The Making of the Modern Identity, 463 .

caRla faRallI / sandRa tugnolI PattaRo1 fronTIers

of

geneTICs: Human rIgHTs

and THe

rIgHT

To

HealTH

PremIse This paper proceeds from the problem of the fundamental human rights, and from  the basic premise that human rights are a product of human civilization and not of  nature; that they are historically relative and changing—they are so as the outcome  of a historical process, and insofar as they are situated in specific sociopolitical contexts—and, finally, that they are heterogeneous and sometimes even antinomic . An  absolute foundation for human rights would be impossible to find . All we can do is  take note of the fact that certain rights have become established which we understand to be fundamental insofar as they have been recognized as such by agreement  (these rights are qualified as fundamental or universal rights) . The basic ideas just outlined will be developed in this article as follows . We will  first argue the view of human rights as a historically shaped creation (this is what  gives them their connotation), and we will thus illustrate the ways in which the right  to health has historically become an integral part of these rights . The new frontiers of genetics are appreciably changing the possibilities we have  when it comes to protecting our right to health, providing diagnostic, preventive,  therapeutic, and regeneration tools that would have been unthinkable only a few  decades  ago .  In  this  new  landscape,  the  right  to  health  can  no  longer  be  framed  broadly by reference to the need to protect our “physical and psychological” wellbeing in general, but needs to be accurately specified in relation to the technological  tools now available, as well as to different relational contexts and to the other fundamental human rights . I Human rIgHTs Human rights can be presented as a threefold question, having a moral, a legal, and  an  epistemological  aspect .  It  is  a  moral  question  in  that  it  calls  on  us  to  decide  whether there are any absolute, inalienable values belonging to humans as such, and  if so, we have to decide what these values might be . It is a legal question in that it  calls on us to decide whether, and if so how, these values should translate into law,  on a national as well as on an international level . And it is an epistemological question in that the moral and legal questions entail a background solution to problems  such as the foundation, universality, and justification of the values we take up as  rights . We will proceed in this discussion from the view on the nature of rights that has  been put forward by an Italian legal and political theorist, Norberto Bobbio (1909– 2004) . 1 

Sections 1 and 2 are by Sandra Tugnoli Pàttaro; Sections 3 and 4 are by Carla Faralli . Translated  by Filippo Valente .

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Carla Faralli / Sandra Tugnoli Pattaro

The question of the foundation of rights was framed by Bobbio as follows:2 (i) What is the problem we pose when we speak of the absolute foundation of human rights? (ii) Is an absolute foundation at all possible? And (iii) If such a foundation is in fact possible, is it also desirable? Bobbio answered these three questions by way of two theses, the first of which consisted in denying the possibility of anything like an “absolute foundation” for human rights, or anything like an irrefutable argument, one that no reasonable person could reject. It is quite illusory to hope you can find such a foundation, for example in nature or in human rationality (the latter term described by Bobbio as a “pure hypothesis”). What matters is not so much that human rights be grounded as that they be protected, and to this end it does not suffice to claim they exist: we also have to take steps to defend them, as by enacting legislation. The second thesis is that, as much as there may be no proper foundation for human rights, contemporary society does give us evidence strong enough to prove their importance. This evidence is historical, and to appreciate it we need only consider that declarations of fundamental rights are no longer specific to this or that country (as in the case of the American and French Revolutions) but are the subject of agreement among countries, which have begun drawing up common lists, beginning with the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, representing the “historical conscience that humanity has of its own fundamental values in the latter half of the twentieth century.”3 Human rights, then, are the product of human civilization, not of nature. Their foundation lies in historical consensus. Only on such an understanding of the fundamental human rights can we justify their distinctive features, which Bobbio singles out as consisting in (i) their indeterminacy, in that there is no single or unambiguous way to determine their content; (ii) their relativism, in that the list of rights changes over time; (iii) their heterogeneity, in that the claims they entitle us to are disparate; (iv) the antinomies or incompatibilities they may enter into (social rights, for example, can come into conflict with individual rights); and (v) their universality, in that they have national as well as international recognition. The theoretical orientation based on Bobbio’s approach has singled out several generations of rights. Of course, this classification is established by convention, but it nonetheless gives theoretical service, for it makes it possible to ascribe peculiarities to different kinds of rights in close connection with the theoretical, scientific, and sociopolitical context in which such rights have established themselves. We thus have first-generation rights, consisting of freedoms (protection of individual rights) and entailing a nonintervention or “nonaction” on the part of the state: these rights can roughly be traced back to the declarations of rights of the late eighteenth century. Then we have second-generation rights, consisting in powers and entitlements (social rights), which do entail some form of action on the part of the state (examples being the right to education, the right to work, and the right to health). These rights find universal recognition in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While commentators agree on these first two generations of rights, 2 3

See N. Bobbio, L’età dei diritti (Turin: Einaudi, 1990), part 1. Cf. The Age of Rights, trans. A. Cameron (Cambridge: Policy, 1996). See M. Bovero, “Norberto Bobbio (1909–2004): A Short Guide to a Great Work,” Ratio Juris, 18, no. 2 (2005): 271–84. Bobbio, L’età dei diritti, 28–29.

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the third and fourth generations are an object of some disagreement .4 Third-generation rights are identified with so-called solidarity or subsidiarity rights, whose addressees are the socially vulnerable, meaning those human groups who find themselves in difficult situations (the sick, the elderly, the disabled, children) or who for  historical reasons are socially discriminated (minorities and women, for example) .  These rights are an outgrowth of those belonging to the earlier generations, specifying those earlier rights by reference to select classes of persons, and for this reason  some commentators do not view them as making up a generation of its own . In the  fourth generation of rights (which according to this line of thought should instead  belong with the third generation) we find those rights proper to the age of technology, the ones tied to the new forms of communication and the new technologies .  Here we have an open catalogue, not easy to set down in any definite manner, where  we find a variety of claims ranging from the right to genetic integrity to the right to  privacy from the intrusion of information technology . II THe rIgHT

To

HealTH

As was mentioned in the previous section, the right to health belongs with the second generation of rights, alongside several so-called social rights . Formal recognition  of  this  right  can  be  found  internationally  in  Art .  25  of  the  1948  Universal  Declaration of Human Rights, as well as in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome 1950) and the subsequent protocols, in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine:  Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Oviedo 1997), in the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Nice 2000), and most recently in the  Universal  Declaration  on  Bioethics  and  Human  Rights  (UNESCO  2005) .  These  more  recent  texts  are  noteworthy  for  the  meaning  they  confer  on  the  expression  right to health (where health is understood in a physical as well in a psychological  sense) .  Thus,  for  example,  the  Universal  Declaration  on  Bioethics  and  Human  Rights (UNESCO 2005) states that “health does not depend solely on scientific and  technological research developments but also on psychosocial and cultural factors,  also bearing in mind that a person’s identity includes biological, psychological, social, cultural and spiritual dimensions .” In light of the documents just mentioned, the right to health can be understood  to have at least two components as (1) a social right and (2) a concept that is not just  biological but also cultural . Let us take up the following definition of health found in the constitution of the  World  Health  Organization  (WHO),  a  definition  adopted  by  the  International  Health Conference held in New York in 1946: “Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity .  The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief,  4 

It  was  only  the  first  two  generations  of  rights  that  Bobbio  discussed  in  1990,  otherwise  just  mentioning the emergence of “new rights” (Bobbio, L’età dei diritti, XIII–XIV) .

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economic or social condition. […] Governments have a responsibility for the health of their peoples which can be fulfilled only by provision of adequate health and social measures.” It clearly emerges from this definition that the right to health can properly be located in the second generation of rights, which Bobbio described as powers or entitlements, and so as rights requiring the state to assertively take action as a responsible supporter and promoter of this right. The WHO also offers this pronouncement in its website: “In the 21st century, health is a shared responsibility, involving equitable access to essential care and collective defence against transnational threats.” That entails a change whereby the state, hitherto understood as tasked with simply making services available to its citizens, takes on a more robust role in managing health care, with a duty to intervene in enabling all citizens to actually benefit from those services. The responsibilities in question—resting not just with the state but also with the individual—are invoked by a broad understanding of the right to health as a concept having not just a biological but also a cultural component. Indeed, new social and ethical problems have emerged with the fast pace at which science and technology have been advancing, bringing to us medical possibilities we could not have anticipated even only a few decades ago. There are two paradigmatic ways in which health can be understood in light of these changes: on the one hand we have the traditional understanding, where health is viewed as embedded in the order of nature and in the social order; and on the other hand we have the technological understanding, where health is viewed through the lens of increasingly sophisticated medical technologies, making it possible to refashion our familiar concepts of life and death, so much so that when a patient won’t recover, that is perceived more as a technical failure than as an inevitable event set firmly in the order of nature. It follows that the meaning of health is apt to change not only in light of the science that supports it but also in light of its sociocultural context: health is understood not only by reference to a person’s clinical state or biological condition, but also by the connotation acquired through the sociocultural environment. Evidence of this can be found by considering the changes that have taken place over time as concerns the clinical or pathological conditions we choose to call diseases, or the shift that medicine has seen from a paternalistic approach to the current therapeutic alliance and to defensive medicine, or the now-widespread idea that just “living” will no longer do, in that we should also be able to choose how to live (quality of life). If that is how things stand, then we must recognize individuals as protagonists, or as having a specific capacity for self-determination: individuals take on an active role in decisions concerning their existence in general and their health in particular. This is referred to as a principle of autonomy, understood to mean that we each have a capacity to determine ourselves, and are held responsible in this regard, and that we are each entitled to make decisions for ourselves when it comes to the interventions we want to have done to our bodies, or the way in which to go about managing our health or a health condition (such as a disease), or the way in which we should use the information that science makes available as concerns our bodies. Of course, there are certain limits within which this right of self-determination can

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be exercised, and this is precisely the crux of the matter as concerns the bioethical  and legal implications that follow from a principle of autonomy so described . In short, if the fundamental rights have their foundation and justification in a  choice we have made to civilly coexist in a pluralist global society, then each individual with respect to his or her specific situation, as well as each government, must  be entrusted with identifying and protecting the rights in question, and must accordingly be recognized as having a responsibility in that regard . These problems  show their full complexity in regard to the developments of genetics . As was mentioned, as early as 1990, in the introduction to L’età dei diritti, Bobbio registered new needs for protection that had been emerging in response to a  number  of  phenomena,  among  which  “the  increasingly  unsettling  effects  of  biological  research,  which  will  make  it  possible  to  manipulate  each  person’s  genetic  heritage .”5 As is known, a Human Genome Project was started in the late 1980s which drew  the public’s attention to a revolution begun a few decades earlier, in 1953, with the  discovery of the DNA’s double-helix structure . As the name suggests, the purpose of  the project was to map the human genome by describing the structure, position,  and function of the genes that characterize the human species . This research has been amplified and distorted under the pressure of great economic interests, among other factors, and has been touted as the culminating phase  in  the  quest  for  the  biological  Grail,6  revealing  what  it  means  to  be  human,  and  having the potential to change our philosophical self-understanding, by showing us  how life works . This research has given rise to great expectations as to the use it can  be put to in diagnosing, treating, and preventing many diseases, this on the basis of  the assumption that every aspect of our individual and social life can be traced to  our genes . More recent studies have underscored the significant role of nongenetic factors  in an organism’s formation and behaviour, and what is to account for this, among  other reasons, is the complexity of the processes by which genes, proteins, and the  environment interact . Further, as much as genetic testing may make it possible for  us to detect, before or after birth, genetic anomalies responsible for a disease now in  progress or potentially in the making, and may also make it possible to locate defective genes in DNA, there is nothing like a therapy in most of these cases, because  there is still too wide a gap between progress in diagnosis and available therapy . Even so, we have witnessed in recent years a dramatic increase in the use of genetic  testing,  from  which  genetic  data  is  extracted,  and  unlike  any  other  type  of  personal data, this data is structurally shared, permanent, and transmissible, that is,  it pertains not to a single person but to the biological group this person belongs to, 

5  6 

Bobbio, L’età dei diritti, XV . This remark can be found in W . Gilbert, “A Vision of the Grail,” in The Code of Codes: Scientific and Social Issues in the Human Genome Project (Cambridge, Mass .: Harvard University Press, 1992) .  Some of the most critical commentary can be found in R . Hubbard and E . Wald, Exploding the Gene Myth (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993); D . Nelkin and M .S . Lindee, The DNA Mystique: The Gene as a Cultural Icon (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995); and R . Lewontin,  It Aint’s Necessarily So: The Dream of the Human Genome and Other Illusions (New York: New York  Review of Books, 2000) .

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and it further makes available information not only about what we are but also about what we could become. This data identifies for each of us our genome, which cannot be modified at any point in our lifetime: it captures something about us as unique individuals, and it uniquely relates us to other individuals; so, too, it functions as a direct biological linkup between generations, and as such it is “immortal”—it is so unlike all other biological traits, which are phenotypic (relating to an organism’s physical appearance as distinguished from, albeit connected with, its genotype), and they accordingly become extinct when the individual dies. As Stefano Rodotà argues,7 this explains the special status and centrality that genetic data has come to have in the realm of personal data. III  MaIn noRMaTIve DocuMenTs  on  The subjecT  of geneTIcs The legal definition of genetic data in Europe can be traced to a 1997 recommendation of the European Council, No. R(97)5, stating that the term “refers to all data, of whatever type, concerning the hereditary characteristics of an individual or concerning the pattern of inheritance of such characteristics within a related group of individuals.” The main point emerging from this definition is that, as was noted a moment ago, unlike all other kinds of personal data, genetic data is structurally shared, permanent, and transmissible, which entails some important consequences in regard to at least two issues, the first having to do with the fact that genetic data makes it possible to identify one’s membership in a group, and the second concerning the rights of the different persons in such a group. Our membership group consists of our biological family, which does not coincide with our legal family (thus, for example, the group does not include a spouse or an adoptive parent, though it will include gamete donors in cases involving medically assisted procreation, or it will include a mother giving birth on condition of anonymity). Some theorists have also gone to the extent of hypothesizing in this biological membership group the inclusion of future generations, a class that gives cause for concern from a legal and theoretical point of view, given the difficulty of regarding as rights-holders beings who do not even have a potential existence, in that we do not know whether, and if so how, they will exist. The issue we confront as we consider this biological membership group is that of the rights their members should be entitled to—such as the right to access information about other members in the group or the right to privacy (which in this case includes the right not to know)—along with the related issue of how such rights should be exercised, as well as that of the faculty to use and share the group’s data. As can clearly be appreciated, we have to do here not only with traditional problems—such as the protection of individual rights, the balance between individual and social interests, and the relation between the private and public sphere—but 7

Stefano Rodotà was one of the first civil lawyers in Italy to address the question of genetic data, well ahead of his time as he anticipated contemporary legal doctrine by arguing for the exceptional status of such data. This is a view he first set out in Tecnologie e diritti (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1998) and then amplified in La vita e le regole: Tra diritto e non diritto (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2008).

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also with new problems and new rights stemming from the scientific and technological developments that have revolutionized our communications and have made  it possible manipulate life in ways unthinkable only a few decades ago (examples  being artificial insemination, organ transplant, and genetic engineering) . It is international law that offers the earliest examples of frameworks by which  to regulate this whole area of activity in protecting fundamental rights .8 The first  such document is considered to be the Nuremberg Code, the outcome of the guilty  verdict issued by the International Military Tribunal in 1947 over the course of the  Subsequent Nuremberg Trials, after which came other fundamental declarations, up  to the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, adopted  by UNESCO in 1997; the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine; and  the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights . The Universal Declaration on  the Human Genome and Human Rights starts out in its preliminary matter “recognizing that research on the human genome and the resulting applications open up  vast prospects for progress in improving the health of individuals and of humankind  as a whole, but emphasizing that such research should fully respect human dignity,  freedom and human rights, as well as the prohibition of all forms of discrimination  based on genetic characteristics .” Having proclaimed in Art . 1 that the “human genome […] in a symbolic sense  […] is the heritage of humanity,” the document sets down in Art . 2 the principle  that “everyone has a right to respect for their dignity and for their rights regardless  of their genetic characteristics” and “that dignity makes it imperative not to reduce  individuals to their genetic characteristics and to respect their uniqueness and diversity .” And Art . 6 states, “No one shall be subjected to discrimination based on genetic characteristics that is intended to infringe or has the effect of infringing human  rights, fundamental freedoms and human dignity .” In 2003, UNESCO relied on  this document for its own International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, setting forth principles for the collection, processing, use, and storage of such data,  which it recognizes in Art . 4 as having a special status, for it “may have a significant  impact on the family, including offspring, extending over generations, and in some  instances on the whole group to which the person concerned belongs .” The  Convention  on  Human  Rights  and  Biomedicine,  for  its  part,  and  as  is  known, was the outcome of a long and laborious process begun in 1991, and not  until  1997  did  it  come  into  force,  when  numerous  states  signed  it  in  Oviedo .  It  codifies  preexisting  yet  fragmentary  pronouncements  the  Council  of  Europe  had  issued to the member states beginning in 1970 with the aim of achieving international cooperation on medical ethics, and it also codifies some (likewise fragmentary) recommendations on genetics dating to the 1980s, beginning with Recommendation No . 934, on genetic engineering . Chapter 4 of this convention is devoted to the human genome, with four articles prohibiting discrimination in any form against anyone on account of their genetic heritage (Art . 11); allowing genetic testing only for medical purposes and for  research, and only with appropriate genetic counselling (Art . 12); permitting inter8 

For  a  condensed  yet  accurate  discussion  of  international  law  in  this  regard,  see  I .R .  Pavone,  “Diritti dell’uomo e genetica,” in Enciclopedia giuridica Treccani, updated vol . 15 (Rome: Istituto  dell’Enciclopedia  Italiana,  2007) .  Cf .  E .  Stefanini,  Dati genetici e diritti fondamentali: Profili di diritto comparato ed europeo (Padua: CEDAM, 2008) .

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vention on the human genome only for preventive, diagnostic, or therapeutic purposes, and only if its aim is not to modify the genome of any descendants (Art. 13); and prohibiting the use of medically assisted procreation for the purpose of choosing a child’s sex, unless such use is necessary to avoid a serious hereditary disease related to sex (Art. 14). So we have here a series of provisions affirming a right to an individual genetic identity—this by way of a corollary, as it were, of the rights to life and health. In 2008, a protocol to the convention was issued on genetic testing (its full title being “Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes”), setting forth some fundamental principles, among which an obligation to ensure adequate genetic counselling when doing genetic testing, and the right not to be informed. Particularly interesting in this regard is Art. 13 of the protocol, introducing an exception to Art. 10 of the Oviedo convention, on the protection of those who cannot consent: the exception states that genetic testing may be carried out on someone lacking the capacity to consent if such testing is undertaken for the benefit of family members, this so long as certain conditions are met, including the condition that the benefit gained is important for the health of this person’s family members, or otherwise that the test allows them to make an informed choice with respect to procreation, and that certain criteria are met ensuring minimal risk for the person subject to the test. The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights—signed in Nice in 2000, and now referenced in the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force on 1 December 2009—includes genetic features in Art. 21 in a full list of prohibited grounds of discrimination: “Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.” Iv  TowaRD  a new foRM  of DIscRIMInaTIon The special emphasis that discrimination receives in the documents just briefly discussed shows that genetic discrimination has now made its way into the open menu of forms of discrimination, and yet it differs from these other forms in at least two respects. In the first place, considering the nature of genetic data as previously discussed, discrimination based on genetic features is discrimination affecting not the single individual but the biological family the individual belongs to. This biological membership group makes it necessary to carefully consider the question of who makes up this group and what rights they each have, as concerns, for example, the ability to access information about other members of the group, or the privacy of those concerned (including under this heading the right not to know), and the right to use data pertaining to the group. Clearly, there are profound implications for our individual personality once we find out what our genetic destiny will be as revealed through a predictive test (and it should be mentioned in passing from the outset that these tests are reliable only for monofactorial genetic diseases, and that in the vast majority of cases the disease will instead be polifactorial, making it impossible to predict its onset). But in any

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event, the information so gained can lead us to take a preventive strategy designed  to reduce or minimize the risk involved, but it can just as easily act as a source of  anxiety and may even lead to depression or to tragic choices (the most frequently  cited case in this regard is that of Huntington’s disease, which tends to have a late  onset) .  Whence  the  need  to  respect  everyone’s  right  to  decide  whether  to  be  informed about genetic test results and what they imply . On a philosophical level, the  right not to know comes into conflict with the principle of responsibility, to be sure,  but it is certainly a component of the right of self-determination, or the right to  freely make choices in life . Stefano Rodotà comments in this regard that the possibility of predicting our  biological future paves the way for greater control on our part, enabling us to freely  make choices in situations hitherto treated as necessitated, such that what is now left  to chance will at some point be a matter of freedom . We are in this way working  toward situations facilitating us in deliberately designing our biological future: this  opens up the prospect of an “antidestiny,” where the human being governs situations  rather than sustaining them . In the second place, genetic discrimination differs from all other forms of discrimination in that it may target an individual not on the basis of a current condition,  but  on  the  basis  of  the  risk  (or  what  is  presumed  to  be  the  risk)  that  such  a  condition may at some point develop, even though it may not develop at all . This is because, unlike any other kind of personal data, genetic data provides  information not only about what someone is, but also about what he or she could  become . As Rodotà comments, this expands the range of possibilities for classification by introducing concepts such as “prediction,” “susceptibility,” and “at-risk person .” But these interpretive classes—consider that a cautious use of them is already  being recommended even in predictive medicine—can give place to perilous misunderstandings if “tapped” from mainstream genetics and made to spill over into the  realm of social policy . Indeed, we incur the risk of taking a potential condition, or  worse, a hypothetical one, its likelihood often determined on the basis of statistical  methods, and turn it into an unchangeable predestination, thus fostering an environment receptive to an entire spectrum of consequences, involving matters ranging  from the legal treatment of those concerned to our social perception of them, and,  perhaps  even  more  alarmingly,  involving  the  world  of  work  and  insurance,  by  threatening to usher in a caste society with a class of people regarded as such a “risk”  or a “liability” that they become “unemployable” and “uninsurable .” It  is  against  the  background  of  these  potential  risks  that  a  trend  has  recently  developed in genetic research with the emergence of so-called genetic reductionism,  a sort of modern avatar of the biological reductionism championed by Francis Galton (1822–1911) and Cesare Lombroso (1835–1909) . This brand of genetic research  has received strong criticism, though, with a firm stand taken against it by many  geneticists, not least of whom Craig Venter and Francis Collins, the promoters of  the Human Genome Project, who have observed, “We’re clearly much, much more  than the sum total of our genes .”9 For which reason, as has been underscored by  9 

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, press release of June 26, 2000, “Human Genome Project Information,” http://www .ornl .gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/  clinton2 .shtml, site sponsored by the U .S . Department of Energy Office of Science, Office of  Biological and Environmental Research, Human Genome Program .

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another great American geneticist, Victor McKusick, it would be a grave mistake to think we have understood everything about ourselves just because we have sequenced our own genome, and likewise grossly misguided would be the idea that the human condition is simply a direct and inevitable consequence of our genome. I would like to conclude with a quote from Barbara Duden: “The entry of the gene into common parlance, this growing presence of the gene, nurtures an unanticipated kind of fatalism that might be described as a ‘gene-driven enslavement’.”10 This leads to an effacement of the self: the self singles out something unique, a person in flesh and blood, body and soul with a history in the background; the gene, by contrast, is something you can’t see, touch, or hear—and yet it’s perceived as an entity that determines the self, a sort of horoscope, a prophecy that comes true in the self. When the gene is linked to the self, it winds up acting in lieu of personality and morality, replacing our uniqueness as individuals having our own mode of being and our own behaviour, with a biological interpretation of our way of going about life. The gene-talk that has been such a growing presence in our common parlance would have us believe that these things have all been planned out in advance: it strikes out the self, casting it in the guise of a nonthing, devoid of flesh and blood, no longer having anything to do with the soma, the body. I do not share Duden’s conclusion that if we are to counteract the oblivion our body is so precipitously being consigned to, we must embrace a radical “a-genetism.” I do think, however, that we ought to firmly resist relying on genetic data alone in evaluating people, without also taking into account the complexity of the natural and social processes such data is part of, because doing so would give us a distorted picture of the person by collapsing biography into biology, as has been argued, for example, by James Rachels and Ronald Dworkin.

10

B. Duden, Die Gene im Kopf – der Fötus im Bauch: Historisches zum Frauenkörper (Hannover: Offizin-Verlag, 2002).

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I InTroduCTIon The present article aims to shed some light on a topic that has been developed in  research . It is concerned with the problem of achieving citizenship in Brazil, its relationship with the national judicial reform,1 and the way in which the modifications proposed by the 45th Constitutional Amendment can be understood in relation to the need to implement the so called “new rights”2 of the citizens3 . These new  rights are seen herein as legal instruments for use in the judicial task of attempting  to achieve  a balance between  individual  and  collective  interests within  the social  dynamic, which is implicit in the objective of promoting the well-being of all, in  accordance with the first part of the Clause IV of the Third Article of the Federal  Constitution of 1988 . To achieve this, it is necessary to know the content of the 45th Constitutional  Amendment, which has produced extremely significant modifications to the structure of the Judiciary, and that will necessarily be reflected in the way in which judges  reach their decisions in the near future . For the limits of this article, we propose to  present and analyze the implications of only some of the points contained in the  45th Amendment, those that we consider most directly relevant to the achievement  of citizenship in its broadest sense .4 The points we detect are: a) the reasonable duration of the judicial process, b) the establishment of a Conselho Nacional de Justiça –  CNJ (National Council of Justice), c) the obligation that a candidate for the position of judge should prove to have been engaged in judicial activities for at least  three years, d) the linkage effect of Direct Actions of Unconstitutionality, e) Itinerant Courts, f) the placing of Crimes against Human Rights within the jurisdiction  of the Federal Justice System, g) the creation of specialist courts for land issues, and  h) the autonomy of Public Defenders . Consequently, given that the achievement of  the citizenship in a broad sense includes the “new rights”, or “citizen’s rights”, which  are intended to employed in attempting to achieve the balance between individual  and collective interests, which, in turn represents the constitutional task of the Judiciary, we also propose highlighting and commenting on these rights, in particular  those of children and adolescents, women, indigenous peoples, the problem of racism, the rights of the elderly, consumer law/rights, environmental law/rights, biolaw  and the impact of the spread of information technology and the dynamic of a new  1  2  3 

4 

Agra, Walber de Moura (Coord .) et al ., Comentários à Reforma do Poder Judiciário . Rio de Janeiro:  Forense, 2005 . Note that the Federal Constitution, due to the influence of German constitutional theory, uses  the term “Fundamental Rights” within the debate on human rights . See  Wolkmer,  Antonio  Carlos  and  Leite,  José  Rubens  Morato  (Orgs .)  Os “Novos Direitos” no Brasil: natureza e perspectivas: uma visão básica das novas conflituosidades jurídicas . São Paulo:  Saraiva, 2003 . Oliveira Júnior, José Alcebíades (Org .) . O novo em direito e política . Porto Alegre:  Livraria do Advogado, 1997 . For a complete commented view of the EC nº45, see Agra (note 3) .

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information society on the new rights . Finally, we propose briefly considering the  logic of attempting to achieve citizens rights through the judicial route, with its advantages and limitations, since one of the assumptions of common sense with regard the achievement of such rights, which is typical of the dynamic of transition of  conception from a liberal State to a social State, is the avoidance of or flight from  this complex problem of social transformation in Brazil and in Latin America, in  which the responsibility for achieving such rights is transferred, almost entirely to  the Judiciary alone . This arises or emerges as a problem,5 as it merely contributes  towards strengthening the old idea of a systemic autonomy of the law, resulting in  the traditional stagnant responses – the Judiciary is not the place for innovation, but  the Legislature is – and also in an unnecessary and repetitive effect of legitimization6 of judges and the judicial system, impeding effective changes in the action of  these agents, towards the realization of the rights of citizenship in the country .7 II wHICH CITIzensHIP? The concept of citizenship, from the traditional juridical, and therefore Brazilian,  point of view, is linked primarily with the condition of living within a city, and by  extension,  within  a  country,  so  demonstrating  the  effectiveness  of  residence .  Accordingly, the individual born within a national territory has natural citizenship and  can participate in the political life of the country, in contrast to the foreign individual, in a special situation in the territory, but also the holder of rights, though  limited, including that of obtaining Brazilian citizenship, denominated legal citizenship, though many positions and rights remain reserved to the so-called native born  citizens .  This  meaning  of  the  word  citizenship  is,  then,  linked  to  the  exercise  of  political  rights,  such  as  voting  and  the  right  to  stand  for  election8 .  In  this  rather  limited sense, it is common to cite the case of illiterate individuals that become active citizens when registered as voters, but are unable to become passive citizens as  they  are  not  electable,  which  means  they  cannot  stand  for  political  office .  Many  juridical conceptualizations do not go beyond this point in the debate, and so fail  to offer a broader discussion of the concept . How is it possible, then, to arrive at a broader concept of citizenship? Today it  is common to hear this expression used when referring to participation in the decision-making processes that affect the collective, especially before large popular gatherings . The notion appears to be spreading, especially through the media9, that citizenship is a kind of right to immunity against authoritarian actions . At the same  5  6  7  8  9 

See  Saavedra,  Giovani  A .  Jurisdição e Democracia:  an  analysis  base  don  the  theories  of  Jürgen  Habermas, Robert Alexy, Ronal Dworkin and Niklas Luhman . Porto Alegre: Livraria do Advogado, 2006, p . 67 . Luhmann, Niklas . Legitimação pelo Procedimento . Brasília: Editora da UnB, 1980, 202 p . See Flickinger, Hans-Georg . Direitos de Cidadania: uma faca de dois gumes . In: Em nome da Liberdade: a critique of contemporary liberalism . Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, 2003, p . 153 . See . Ferreira Filho, Manoel Gonçalves (op . cit ., note 10) . The social and political role of the media is, therefore, quite questionable . See Rocha, Álvaro  F .O . Direito e Mídia: uma convivência difícil . In: Revista da AJURIS – Associação dos Juízes do  Rio Grande do Sul ., vol . 93, março de 2004, p . 25 .

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time, this problem reflects on that of income distribution, establishing, based on  purely economic criteria, an idea of hierarchical social ‘classes’, in reality only two  – one the holder of income and political power which is able to enjoy the good life  associated with these conditions, and the other ‘class’ not only in relation to these  two factors, but to everything that affects the possession of financial resources, such  as housing, health, etc ., and more fundamentally, without access to suitable education and, therefore, without access to the social life of a citizen10 . With due proportion, debate on this concept has existed since the formation of  the roots of European thought . While remembering that the meaning of democracy  in ancient Greece was not the same as that given to the word today,11 we can cite the  work of Aristotle, in which the he questions who might be a citizen, stating that “a  citizen is that person who has a legal part in the deliberative authority and in the  judicial authority of the city”,12 given that the Assembly in which the citizen participates has the power to decide as well as legislate and judge . Participating in an  assembly meant being seen by others as one among equals, enabling the participant  to make use of the word in order to criticize, propose and give opinion, transmitting  by all means his concern/interest in the present and future of the city . Similarly, it  would be possible to assume positions in the public administration, as part of the  condition of being a participant, while not meaning, in reality that, he would have  rights that might limit the power of the Assembly, but merely that, upon accepting  to participate, he would also accept the duty of submitting to decisions of any nature that might be made by the collective .13 The Romans broadened the concept of  citizenship (civitas), beginning with the recognition of peers and all the other rights  of civil life, including, in the private sphere, the rights of property, family and contracts and, in the public sphere, the right to political participation14 . At the beginning of the 18t century, however, the definition of citizenship again  became important, because as fruits of the Enlightenment, the French Revolution  and the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America recognized  the equality of rights of all men, establishing the ideal of liberty as a basic concept  upon which all other rights would be established, as Kant was later to state in his  work . This author sought to base the Law upon liberty, proposing the issue or problem of achieving harmony between individual liberty and that of the others, which  continues, therefore, in debate .15 Habermas16 takes up the debate once more, in affirming that it is not possible  to achieve citizen rights without a sphere of liberty, while arguing, however, that this  can only be opposed by the existence of a community that holds means of political  participation . 10  The social and political role of the media is, however, quite questionable . See Rocha, Álvaro  F .O . Direito e Mídia: uma convivência difícil . In: Revista da AJURIS – Associação dos Juízes do  Rio Grande do Sul . N°93, março de 2004, p . 25 . 11  Finley, Moses I . Democracia antiga e moderna . Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 1988 . 12  Aristóteles . A Política . Port . Trans . Roberto Leal Ferreira . São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1991 . 13  Habermas, Jürgen . A Inclusão do Outro . São Paulo, Edições Loyola, 2002, p . 272 . 14  See Gilissen, John . Introdução Histórica ao Direito . Lisboa: Calouste Gulbenkian, 1995, p . 82 . 15  Kant, Immanuel . Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes . Lisboa: edições 70, 1995 . 16  Habermas, Jürgen . Direito e Democracia: entre faticidade e validade . Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasileiro, 1997 . p . 124 .

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The broad concept of citizenship only comes to acquire the form that we know  today in the central countries with the establishment of a new paradigm: the idea  that there is a social element17 inserted within this concept, which originates with  the transition of the Liberal State to the Social State, which occurred in Europe in  the period from the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century . This element  included concepts such as social well-being, participation in the social inheritance,  and especially that of having the life of a civilised being, in accordance with the  standards of the current society; and points to institutions more linked to this element such as the public education system and social services . The effect of this notion on social thought was to make it apparent that there is no citizenship in a broad  sense without the existence of a set of democratic mechanisms, backed by a solid  judicial order, which permit the individual, or subject, to be included in all spheres  of social life . It should be pointed out, however, that these historical facts have had little effect in Brazil, and as a consequence, Brazilian law firmly retains the traditional strict  concept and, although many jurists recognise the need to broaden the interpretation of the citizenship rights18, in the country, it can be seen that the discussion on  the broad concept has not yet modified the legal texts, that continue associating the  term citizen mainly with political participation . This terminological limitation, nevertheless, is unable to close the debate . On the contrary, a sociological approach19  shows that, by generalising the broad concept, it is likely that the legal texts, and  even the constitutional norm will be adapted in the future, as the resistance is in  large part due to the particularities of the judicial field20, which in order to maintain  its legitimacy, will find ways to adapt, by appropriating the results of this social dynamic  within  its  discourse21,  coming  to  impose  them  ‘normalising  them’  and,  as  always, assuming the authorship 22 . III CITIzensHIP

In THe

brazIlIan ConsTITuTIon

The Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988, however, does not adopt a single meaning for the term “citizenship” . The meaning given in the text can be strict, as described above, or broad, as we intend to show below . In the former meaning, it is  restricted to the condition of elector, by the exercise of the vote, or by candidature  for an elected political post . When this meaning is adopted exclusively, the scepticism of some political scientists who suggest that currently there is only democracy  on election-day may be considered well founded . This instrument is known as suf17  Marshall, T .H . Cidadania, Classe Social e “Status” . Rio de janeiro, Zahar, 1969, p . 64 . 18  See, for example, Vieira, Oscar Vilhena . Direitos Fundamentais . (op . cit ., nota 12) . 19  See Rocha, Álvaro F .O . O Direito na obra de Pierre Bourdieu: os campos jurídico e político . In:  Revista Estudos Jurídicos – UNISINOS . V . 38, n° 1, janeiro–abril 2005, p . 46 .  20  See Rocha, Álvaro F .O . A linguagem jurídica . In: Sociologia do Direito: a magistratura no espelho .  São Leopoldo, Ed . UNISINOS, 2002, p . 42 . 21  Bourdieu,  Pierre .  O  que  falar  quer  dizer .  (What  means  to  speak)  In: A Economia das Trocas Lingüísticas . São Paulo: Edusp, 1998 . 22  Bourdieu, Pierre . A força do Direito . (The strenght of Law) In: O Poder Simbólico . Lisboa: DIFEL,  1983, p . 209 . 

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frage or the vote . It is necessary to suppose that the citizens believe that political  representation will be exercised, that is, that the elected representative will always  place the interests of his/her electorate above those of any other group or individual, including his/her own . This belief is the basis of the legitimacy of the system,  which places the representative posts in a hierarchy, from Mayors and councillors,  who should act in the municipal chambers, to the Governors and State Congressmen in the State Assemblies and arriving at the Presidency of the Republic, Senators  and National Congressmen . The vote, then, is the “juridification” of citizenship, by  which means the State is legitimated through system of democratic political representation23, without which this would not be possible . This system is adopted within  the Brazilian constitution, which in this way also seeks to have an “educational” effect on the population, given our authoritarian tradition and lack of affection for  democratic debate . The exercise of the vote has legal requirements, such as Brazilian  nationality, military service, a minimum age of 16 years in the case of optional vote,  and 18 years in the case of the compulsory vote . Some debate has arisen around the  possibility of making the vote non-compulsory, although the risks involved in such  a change have not been sufficiently clarified . At the same time, the value of the vote  is relativised, as due to the limitation of the political representation of each state  within the National Congress (minimum of 8 and a maximum of 70 congressmen),  the most populous and developed states find themselves artificially levelled to the  least populous and least developed states, for which reason the national Legislature  faces considerable difficulties . The Law also establishes the conditions for the candidature of the above mentioned political positions, excluding illiterate individuals,  and independent candidatures . This means that each candidate must be affiliated to  a political party . Accordingly, the political parties are established as agents of the  social forces, having the duty, regardless of their ideological positions, to play the  role of mouthpiece of the social interests . In the second meaning, the broad concept of citizenship can be seen as an entitlement of fundamental rights, the preservation of dignity as a human being, and  the participation in the political processes, based on reciprocal duties in relation to  the other citizens . These terms are not, however, referred to in the constitutional  text of the Clause II of the 1st Article of the Federal Constitution, which leaves the  concept  of  citizenship  open,  without  conditioning  it  on  any  of  the  above  mentioned requirements . It is also necessary to note that, beyond the fundamental rights  foreseen in the 5th Article of the Constitution, and the material conditions for the  exercise of citizenship, it also depends on other rights and obligations that, as mentioned  above,  seek  to  provide  a  balance  between  the  interests  of  each  individual  citizen and those of the collective of citizens: the “new rights”, that we will deal with  below .

23  For a far from idealist (or for a realistic) view of this system, see Bourdieu, Pierre . A representação política: elementos para uma sociologia do campo político . (sociology of the political field)  In: Bourdieu, Pierre . O Poder Simbólico . Lisboa: DIFEL, 1989, p . 163 .

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Álvaro Filipe Oxley da Rocha THe

ConsTITuTIonal amendmenT

For years the proposal for a general reform of the judiciary has been debated within  the country . It was even proposed that the matter be considered as a compulsory  item to be dealt with by the Constituent National Assembly, responsible for proposing and approving the then new Federal Constitution of 1988, which in fact did not  occur . On the contrary, the most urgent changes were promptly dealt with, as points  of consensus, while some of the main points of controversy regarding the reform  were avoided, such as the establishment of an external administrative control mechanism  for  this  Power,  and  confronting  the  ethical,  administrative  and  procedural  problems related to the slowness of the judicial services, with particular emphasis on  the proposal for jurisprudential linkage, the so-called binding precedent (stare decisis) . In 2004, the 45th Constitutional amendment was finally passed, bringing with it  a large number of alterations, especially in relation to the Judiciary and the institutions related to the administration of Justice .  It  is  legitimate,  then,  to  question  the  effects  of  those  modifications  on  the  achievement of the ‘new rights’ and, for the achievement of citizenship in its broad  sense, though it can be said that little time has gone by, in legal and social terms,  since the legal implementation of the above mentioned modifications . At the same  time, due to the fact that many interests have been affected, there are a number of  points of view regarding the reform of the Judiciary, and the manner in which the  modifications proposed by the 45th Constitutional Amendment relate to the need  to implement the so-called “new rights”24 . Here, we seek to make some observations regarding the modifications that we  consider most relevant for the achievement of citizen’s rights in Brazil, while stressing that we do not seek to exhaust the debate, as it is really very wide and complex  in nature, and also because it is not possible to fully explore the subject within a  single article25 . The  first  topic  we  deal  with  concerns  the  reasonable  duration  of  the  judicial  process, which is contained in the 78th Clause (LXXVIII) of the Federal Constitution  of 1988 . Although, due to practical difficulties, time limits are not established, the  idea of reasonableness suggests there cannot be any loss of meaning or of procedural  objective due to excessive delay of the process . There leaves room for great controversy, given that the time of the law26, and its need to understand and ponder ideas  does not coincided with the perception of the fast we live in today . There is also the  need for the legitimisation of the judicial field and, therefore, of the influence of its  agents27,  who,  by  this  mechanism  tend  to  reject  any  external  pressure,  forgetting  that the legitimisation of this group no longer occurs merely among public agents,  but  to  a  great  degree  is  conditioned  upon  the  achievement  of  citizenship .  This  means a judicial service of quality, performed in due time . The other measures contained  within  Constitutional  Amendment  45/04,  such  as  itinerant  courts,  decen24  See Wolkmer, Antonio Carlos and Leite, José Rubens Morato (Op . cit ., nota 4) .  25  For more detailed information on this specific topic, see Agra, Walber de Moura (Coord .) et al .,  Comentários à Reforma do Poder Judiciário .(op . cit ., nota3) .  26  See Ost, François . O Tempo do Direito . (Timing of the Law) Bauru, SP: EDUSC, 2005 . 27  See Bourdieu, Pierre . A força do Direito (op . cit ., nota 29) .

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tralisation of the Federal Regional Courts and State Courts, as well as the creation  of specialised courts for agrarian issues and the autonomy of the Public Defenders,  follow the same lines . The creation of the National Council of Justice, in Clause I-A of Article 92 of  the Federal Constitution of 1988, represented a great advance in institutional terms,  given that the supervision of the Judiciary was, until then, in the hands of the Judiciary itself, with all the risks inherent in such a situation . Many judges opposed the  establishment of this organ, alleging that it would undermine the autonomy of the  Judiciary, and would lead to political control of judicial decisions . The corporativism expressed in this discourse, however, did not prevail, given the political context  that  included  several  corruption  scandals  involving  judges,  which  permitted  that  this administrative and financial rationalisation measure entered the statute books .  It should be emphasised that it is not the role of the National Council of Justice to  interfere in the legal functions of the judges, but to accompany the judicial process,  to ensure the fulfilment of the functional duties of the judges and that ethical standards are met . Although the exact idea of what might be a suitable ethical standard  for judges remains the subject of debate in Latin America28, and despite the fact it  is not the main function of the National Council of Justice, it has a role along these  lines . Its attributions include overseeing the legality of the administrative and financial acts of the members of the Brazilian Judiciary, as well as inspecting the performance of the judges . The requirement, contained in Clause I of Article 93 of the Federal Constitution of 1988, that a minimum of three years of legal activity be necessary in order  to enter the magistracy is a healthy measure that, though frequently attacked and  delayed,  corroborates  the  democratic  course  of  the  judicial  reform .  Opinions  regarding the amount of “experience”29 necessary in order to exercise the functions of  a judge have existed since antiquity, are repeated exhaustively among lawyers, solicitors, and members of the Public Ministry, and appear in detailed surveys30 . The  lack of such a requirement went unnoticed prior to the massive expansion of education in Brazil, from the 1960s onwards, as the small number of Law degrees were  awarded each year and the very high level required to pass, in the few Law schools  ensured a more mature profile among the candidates, and a greater number of acceptances of candidates from traditional families, who had ignored the legal requirements of age in order to ensure the effect of social reproduction . However, with the  enormous expansion in population in Brazil during the same decade, the demands  made on the Judiciary naturally grew, and with it the demand for more judges . Concurrently, this massification led to a abrupt fall in the quality of higher education,  not only in Law, hindering still further the acceptance of candidates with the minimum level of performance required for the position of judge . The successive economic crises during the 1970s and 80s also restricted the pool of options of the re28  See Zan, Julio de . La ética, los derechos y la justicia . (Ethiscs, Rights and Justice) Montevideo: Fundación Konrad-Adenauer Uruguay, 2004 .  29  It would be necessary to rescue the lost virtue of wisdom, so highly valued by the Greeks in the  past, and that today is completely out of fashion: it consisted in knowledge tempered by experience over time and not merely filling out the memory . 30  See  Vianna,  Luiz  Werneck  et  al .  Corpo e alma da magistratura brasileira .  (Body  and  soul  of  Brazilian’s Magistrature) Rio de janeiro: REVAN, 1997 .

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cent  entries  into  the  universities,  who  began  to  prepare  for  public  examinations  from a younger age in order to guarantee, immediately following graduation, a place  in the Judiciary, which represented a position with a good financial and social prospects31 . Thus,  the  magistracy came to  acquire an  excessively  young and inexperienced profile32, which was frequently incompatible with the function33, and inconsistent with the standards of the Western judicial traditional34 . The result is that today it is possible to be a judge in Brazil at 23 years of age .  At the same time, there is the problem of ‘nepotism’ within the Judiciary35 . This  can be seen in cases where the position of judge is occupied through generations  within the same family36, which also represents a social strategy aimed at protecting  the  offspring  especially,  but  also  the  extended  family  and  favoured  individuals37  among the friends and family from the ferocious competition in the restricted work  market in the country . Fruit of the medieval view of the State as private patrimony38,  this remains a common practice, which is contrary to democracy and the achievement of citizenship based on equality of opportunity among citizens . This aspect,  nonetheless, is ignored by those concerned and, due to the low level of education,  by most of the population . It is necessary to note that only an education oriented  towards democracy39 together with the establishment of a strong market economy  in the country, which would make private activity more rewarding than positions  within the State, will be capable, perhaps, of modifying this manner of conceiving  social relations in Brazil, as well as the use of public patrimony . One of the indicators by which it might be possible to perceive this change, should it occur, would be  the extinction of the so-called appointed posts in the Brazilian public administration, at the municipal, state and federal levels, and the adoption of the altruistic  31  The  symbolic  response/answer,  in  this  case  is  the  social  “status”,  and  the  material  response/ answer, money . See Bourdieu, Pierre . As razões práticas: (The Practical Reasons) sobre a teoria da  ação . Campinas – SP: Papirus, 1996, p . 91 . 32  See Faria, José E ., “Ordem legal x mudança social: a crise do Judiciário e a formação dos magistrados” . (Judicial crisis and raisin of the Brazilain Judges) In FARIA, José E . (org .) In: Direito e justiça – a função social do Judiciário . São Paulo: USP, 1997 . Furthermore, it is noted that there  are other problems related to legitimacy: among some jurists/lawyers this generation of judges  is referred to informally as the “nappy/daiper generation” . 33  This “shocking” new rule had been noted by Plato in the 5th century BC, for whom “The judge  should not be young, but aged” . See Plato . República . Lisboa: Calouste Gulbenkian, 1990, III,  409 b . 34  See Cappelletti, Mauro . Juízes Legisladores? Porto Alegre: Fabris, 1988 . 35  This term is placed between inverted commas because its pejorative interpretation is not at all  methodologically  suited  to  scientific  research .  Its  current  meaning  refers  to  “the  practice  of  appointing relatives to public positions” . For further clarification, see ROCHA, Álvaro F .O . O  Judiciário e o nepotismo . In: Sociologia do Direito: a magistratura no espelho . São Leopoldo, Ed .  UNISINOS, 2002, p . 87 . 36  Idem, nota 52 . 37  See Da Matta, Roberto . The family as value: non-familial remarks/considerations on teh Brazilian family . In: Almeida, A .M . et al . (org .) Pensando a Família no Brasil: da colônia à modernidade .  Rio de Janeiro: Espaço e Tempo / Editora da UFRJ, 1987 . 38  See Bourdieu, Pierre and Passeron, Jean-Claude . La elección de los elegidos . In: Los herederos:  los estudiantes y la cultura . Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Editores Argentina, 2003, p . 11  39  See Badie, Bertrand and Hermet, Guy . Política Comparada, México: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1993 .

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conception of the occupation of public posts, which has never been implemented  in accordance with its original European model40 .  The introduction of the binding precedent of the decisions taken by the Federal  Supreme Court, in Article 103-a of the Federal Constitution of 1988, came about as  a result of the great pressure placed upon the Judiciary due to the slowness of its  services, and high cost of its administrative structure, among other problems . As a  solution, many jurists suggested establishing a link between the rulings made in the  lower courts and those reached by the High Courts . This issue generated great controversy  among  the  legislators  and  judiciary,  as  this  instrument  had  no  history  within Brazilian judicial tradition, though it appeared attractive as a possible means  of ‘unblocking’ the Judiciary, including the high Courts, of the excessive number of  cases related to matters upon which rulings had previously been made . Approved,  as part of Constitutional Amendment No . 45/04, it is fitting to remember, however,  that such an instrument is not necessarily in line with the North American doctrine  of stare decisis, and appears to represent a step back in terms of classical metaphysics .  The cause of great debate, this measure may represent, in this sense, a threat to the  effective achievement of citizenship . The situation remains unclear, however, due to  the short period since its introduction . Of the measures introduced in the Constitutional Amendment 45/05, Itinerant  Courts  and  the  decentralisation  of  the  Regional  Federal  Courts  are  of  particular  importance for the achievement of citizenship in the country, as they promise to  break the traditional inertia of the Judicial Power of the elite, making access to judicial services much easier for the poor, while permitting some members of the Judiciary and obliging others to have greater contact with such citizens, who legitimate  their functions and pay their salaries, in order that such judges understand and attend to their real needs . However, this project does not only represent a policy of  bringing together the members of the Judiciary with isolated communities, but of  creating the expectation that an ‘educational effect’ might occur among the population, which would permit the bonds of social isolation to be broken, so that they  might become aware of their rights and, it is hoped, of their duties as citizens . By  placing  cases  of  violation  of  human  rights  within  the  competence  of  the  Federal  Justice  System  as  stipulated  in  Paragraph  5  of  Article  109  of  the  Federal  Constitution of 1988, it was intended to fulfil the constitutional commitments of  the Brazilian State . Up until then the country was severely criticised and harmed in  terms of its image abroad and consequent political and economic interests . Internally, this measure has had very positive repercussions for citizenship, as it  makes it possible to speed up and follow cases in a more neutral manner, by limiting  regional political influences and pressure . The creation of specialised courts for agrarian issues, contained in Article126 of  the Federal Constitution of 1988, also represents an important step forward in institutional terms for the achievement of citizenship, given that the problem of land  reform has dragged on over the decades without solution . Free of other demands,  the judge acting in this area will be able to be fully aware of the historical and social  context involved in the agrarian issue, which is based on the entry within the constitutional text of the conception or interpretation of the “social function of prop40  See Avritzer, Leonardo . A moralidade da democracia . São Paulo: Perspectiva, 1996 .

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erty”, which relativises the traditional concept of property and, therefore, requires  that it be assessed in completely different terms, that is, in the sense of achieving the  Democratic State of the Rule of Law, which necessarily supposes the achievement of  citizenship, in its broad sense . The  financial  autonomy  of  the  Public  Defenders  (Legal  Aid),  found  in  paragraph 2 of Article 134 of the Federal Constitution of 1988, is one of the most positive measures for the achievement of citizenship in its broad sense . Those citizens of  little or no financial resources are normally the most penalised by the indifference  or negligence of public agents, and often suffer losses or even injustice in court cases  because they are unable to pay for private lawyers . In Brazil, the situation is no different . The establishment of the Public Defenders (Legal Aid) allows such citizens to  break through this barrier, and with the new financial autonomy, the financial resources available should increase and with it the reach and strength of this organ .  Furthermore, with this measure it has acquired greater protection against the direct  or indirect interference of agents from other organs of the State . The elements of the Brazilian Judicial reform reviewed up to this point are of  particular importance as, from our point of view, they contribute most towards the  achievement of citizenship in the broad sense in Brazil . However, it is not an overstatement to say that the text of the reform as a whole has this objective, as the Judiciary acquires more elements at its disposal that allow its agents to remain focused  on the their social function . However, in order to complement this subject there is  a need to examine the ‘new rights’, the development of which complement the contents  of  articles  5  and  6  of  the  Federal  Constitution  of  1988,  allowing,  as  stated  above, the individual interests of each citizen to be balanced with the interests of  the collective . It is not our intention to analyse them fully, for reasons of space, and  also because each one of them constitutes in itself a new area of study, not merely  juridical but in all the social sciences . v THe “new

rIgHTs” of CITIzensHIP In

brazIl41

The rights referred to here, which can also be included among the so-called ‘human  rights’,  arise  from  the  Federal  Constitution  of  1988,  having  been  elaborated  and  proposed based upon a new view of the State, that emerges from the displacement  of the Liberal State by the Social State . Although this transition has encountered  real obstacles, besides those that are properly juridical42, the struggle for the introduction of these rights in the social and political culture of Brazil is a fundamental  part of the achievement of citizenship, in which the Judiciary has a central role to  play in guiding this dynamic . Accordingly, we refer to those ‘new rights’ that we  consider most relevant, which are the following: the rights of children and adoles41  See Badie, Bertrand . L’État Importé . Paris: Fayard,1992 . We refer to these rights between quotation marks because many of them are long-time political claims which were introduced into the  legal system years ago, although this does not mean that they have already been implemented . 42  These rights are referred to between inverted commas, due to the fact that many of them constitute old demands/claims, and have been in the national legal order for years, which necessarily  means  that  they  have  been  fully  implemented .  See  Carvalho,  José  Murilo  de .  Cidadania no Brasil: o longo caminho . Rio de janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2002 .

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cents, women’s rights, indigenous people’s rights, the problem of racism, the rights  of the elderly, consumer law/rights, environmental law/rights, biolaw and the impact of the spread of information technology and the dynamic of a new information  society on the new rights . It is true that a thorough approach to these areas of law  using the juridical dogma would require a review of the theory of law43, the discussion of which, however, would not fit in the limited space of this article . Firstly, in referring to the rights of children and adolescents, we can note that  this does constitute a new right, as, since Brazil’s independence there has been legislation,  organs  and  public  agents  dedicated  to  the  subject .  The  relevance  of  the  topic for the achievement of citizenship is explained in detail in Law nr 8 .069/90,  elaborated from the criteria adopted by the Federal Constitution of 1988 . We emphasize the doctrine of full protection44, which means the option for the maintenance of special specific rights, given that we are dealing with citizens in development and, therefore, worthy of special attention not only from the Judiciary, but in  all aspects . Women’s rights, which are still fragile in Brazil, arise from the attempt to put  into effect the constitutional principle of equality before the Law . In historical and  sociological terms, it can be seen that the rupture with the traditional division of  social roles inherited from the western Judo-Christian tradition is very difficult . The  Brazilian constitutional and infra-constitutional legislation only very slowly adopted  the modifications that would culminate in the equality currently existing in the judicial  arrangement45,  and  lead  to  Judicial  concern  with  the  issue .  It  should  be  pointed out, however, that social behaviour is altered by the modification of the  law, and much has yet to be done with respect the rights of women in Brazil . The topic of indigenous people’s rights is particularly relevant in Brazil, as, since  the period of the Portuguese colonisation there has been concern with disciplining  the  relations  with  the  native  peoples,  though  in  the  sense  of  organisation  of  the  Portuguese colonial society, with no interest in the establishment of rights or in the  cultural specificities of these peoples46 . Later legislation, prior to the Federal Constitution of 1988, dealt with the topic, but always with the view of the Indian in a  position of inferiority . With the new Constitution, however, these views were modified, especially with the aim of assimilating the native peoples, recognising their  right to “be different”47, a relevant aspect of the Judiciary . Nevertheless, the tradition of Brazilian State in dealing with these peoples is still very backward, and as a  consequence, impedes the effective application of this new posture, which also depends on social maturity and the adoption of public policies, primarily in educa43  See Carvalho, José Murilo de . Cidadania no Brasil: o longo caminho . Rio de janeiro: Civilização  Brasileira, 2002 . 44  See  Wolkmer,  Antonio  Carlos  and  Leite,  José  Rubens  Morato  (Orgs .)  Introdução  aos  fundamentos de uma nova teoria dos “novos direitos” In: WOLKMER, Antonio Carlos e LEITE,  José Rubens Morato (Orgs .) Os “Novos Direitos” no Brasil … (op . cit ., nota 4) . Ver VERONESE,  Joseane R .P . Os Direitos da Criança e do Adolescente . São Paulo: LTr, 1999 . 45  See Veronese, Joseane R .P . Os Direitos da Criança e do Adolescente . São Paulo: LTr, 1999 . 46  See Tabak, Fanny, and Verucci, Florisa . (Orgs .) A difícil igualdade – os direitos da mulher como  direitos humanos . Rio de Janeiro: Relume-Dumará, 1994 .  47  See Cunha, Manuela Carneiro (Org .) História dos Índios no Brasil . São Paulo: Companhia das  Letras, 1992 . 

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tion,  for  a  citizenship  that  highlights  the  recognition  of  the  indigenous  peoples,  their rights and differences . The problem of racism in Brazil encounters similar problems, in its specificity,  also  linked  to  the  Brazilian  social  tradition,  until  recently  based  on  slavery,  and  therefore accustomed to the notion of differentiation and privileges of social groups,  as well as with a racial aspect48 . With the Federal Constitutions of 1988, the attempt  to implement affirmative action, such as the policy of quotas49, has produced great  controversy, with radical arguments on both sides . There appears to be, however,  concern not to repeat the proposals that are legally unsustainable, and that have  already failed in other countries50, and which would seem to have little chance of  success  in  Brazil .  Nowhere  is  the  topic  a  simple  one,  and  specific  studies  are  required  for  the  specific51  reality  of  each  country .  On  the  other  hand,  within  the  Brazilian tradition of cultural importation, and possibly due to the lack of domestic  literature  on  the  subject,  it  is  possible  to  identify,  in  the  few  examples  of  locally  produced material published on the subject currently available, traces of the influence of categories of foreign thinking, especially that of North American authors,  which are not suited to the Brazilian case . It can be seen that the publication and  distribution of such literature in Brazil appears to be leading to the importation of  a discourse based ‘racial hatred’ that is implicit in these works, as it results from the  intolerance characteristic of that society, directed also at other ethnic groups, and  not only towards Afro-Americans . Brazilian racism is disguised, but not violent; it  does not contain, and does not need this element, that, nonetheless, has been maliciously propagated by non-governmental organisations and some politicians, apparently with the aim of gaining financial and electoral benefits . Jurists, congressmen  and intellectuals should be aware, as the lack of both public debate and an extensive  national academic research into the subject, it appears to us, can lead to the “invention” of non-existent conflicts, and greatly impede the enhancement of social and  juridical relations in racial terms in the country . The rights of the elderly became a reality with their adoption in the text of the  Federal Constitution of 1988 . Brazilian social behaviour in relation to the elderly  remains barely civilised, as there has never been in our history a real concern with  the aged, and until recently the number of young people was large and always growing, leading the subject to be forgotten, which appears to be new among us . The  recognition of the problem, following the constitutional guidelines, led to the passing of a new Law, known as the Statute of the Elderly, which aims to objectify the  constitutional guidance on the subject52 . It is worth noting, however, that the Brazil48  See Souza Filho, Carlos Frederico . O renascer dos povos indígenas para o direito . Curitiba, Juruá,  1999 .  49  See Skidmore, Thomas E . Raça e nacionalidade no pensamento brasileiro . Trad . Raul de Sá Barbosa .  Rio de Janeiro: paz e Terra, 1976 .  50  See Silva Jr ., Hédio . Anti-racismo: coletânea de leis brasileiras: federais, estaduais e municipais .  São Paulo: Editora Oliveira Mendes, 1998 . See BARZOTTO, Luis Fernando . Justiça social: gênese, estrutura e aplicação de um conceito . In: Direito e Justiça – Revista da Faculdade de Direito  da PUCRS . V . 28 – ano XXV – 2003/2, p . 109 . 51  See Barzotto, Luis Fernando . Justiça social: gênese, estrutura e aplicação de um conceito . In:  Direito e Justiça – Revista da Faculdade de Direito da PUCRS . V . 28 – ano XXV – 2003/2, p . 109 . 52  See Bertulio, Dora Lucia de Lima . O “novo” direito velho: racismo e direito . In: WOLKMER, 

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ian population is growing at a slower rate53, and aging considerably . This makes this  right an important subject for reflection by the Judiciary, and a relevant point to be  developed and introduced into the social and judicial culture of the country .  Consumer Rights is one of the main ‘new rights’ that came into being with the  Federal Constitution of 1988, which has been extensively elaborated by Brazilian  legal experts and jurisprudence . It has been consolidated, by the Law 8 .078/90, the  ‘Consumer Code’, as an instrument for the enhancement of the social and juridical  relations of consumption, which characterise complex modern societies, and which  represents  a  difficult  subject,  but  one  which  it  is  necessary  to  understand .  Many  authors note that today the population considers consumption to be a major factor  of social inclusion54 . This definition is extremely perverse in countries, such as Brazil, where the majority of the population is poor . Being a citizen would mean having access to consumption, which exposes the great part of the population, unwittingly, to search for  false satisfaction through the most pathological aspect of capitalism, and consumption55 . It is in this sense that the necessity to understand the relations of consumption and their meaning for the State has led to the development of research areas  related to the subject, not only among jurists, but also among anthropologists, sociologists and economists, as well as the development of interdisciplinary research . Of  particular interest today, in Brazil is a new research subject, Consumer Education56,  which is concerned with the problem of the awareness of the citizen consumer, not  only with regard their rights, but in relation to the formation of the awareness of  their real needs, in contrast to the discourse of consumer media, which favours the  profitable consumerism and the collection of taxes, but which is frequently harmful  to the citizen . The subject is new in local terms and needs considerable further development . Environmental Law has also become an extremely important subject within the  ‘new rights’, as it has become practical and necessary to develop social awareness of  the need to conserve the vast environmental patrimony of the country . The discussion is not new, but it is also highlighted in the Federal Constitution of 1988 . The  emergence of this topic and, consequently its juridical objectification is also linked  to the disappointment of the new generations with the traditional state and religious  responses in relation to the social dynamic57 . Accordingly, to conserve the environment is also to conserve a part of our humanity, especially against the national and 

53 

54  55  56  57 

Antonio Carlos and Leite, José Rubens Morato (eds .) Os “Novos Direitos” no Brasil … (op . cit .,  nota 4) . See Ramos, Paulo Roberto Barbosa . Fundamentos Constitucionais do direito à velhice . Florianópolis:  letras  contemporâneas,  2002 .  See  Berquó,  Elza .  Algumas considerações demográficas sobre o envelhecimento da população no Brasil .  In:  Anais  do  I  Seminário  Internacional  Envelhecimento  Populacional: uma agenda para o final do século . Brasília: MPAS/SAS, 1996, p . 16–34 . See Berquó, Elza . Algumas considerações demográficas sobre o envelhecimento da população no Brasil .  In: Anais do I Seminário Internacional Envelhecimento Populacional: uma agenda para o final  do século . Brasília: MPAS/SAS, 1996, p . 16–34 . See Hirschman, Albert . De consumidor a cidadão . São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1983 . See Canclini, Nestor Garcia . Consumidores e cidadãos: conflitos multiculturais da globalização . Rio de  Janeiro; Ed . Da UFRJ, 1996 . Senger, Viviane . Educação e Cidadania no consumo: na busca de saberes docentes . UNISINOS,  dissertação de mestrado, 2005 .

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world capitalist vortex that justifies the destruction of the natural and human environment by the increase in political and financial profit58 . To avoid that the Law  becoming  an  instrument  of  restraint  or  regression  in  the  environmental  issue  is,  therefore, a fundamental task of the Judiciary59 . It is particularly important because  of its great capacity to form citizens who are aware of the need for a solution that  allows the environment to be conserved today for future generations . The so-called bio-law brings to light within the Brazilian juridical environment  the debate on the ethics in relation to human life60, as a result of the problems arising from the development of genetic research and the advance of health procedures  for the preservation of life . This new branch seeks to develop a new assessment of  the  social  role  of  science  and  technology61,  raising  questions  regarding  the  basic  rules of democracy, while seeking to confront the rule of the majority, in this precise  case62 . Issues such as euthanasia, the use of human embryos in research, and other  extremely controversial issues are worthy of their attention, as discussion on such  subjects instrumentalists the Judiciary, making it possible to advance towards the  achievement of citizenship in the broad sense . Finally, the repercussions of the diffusion of information technology and of the  dynamic of the new information society on the new rights are highlighted . The notion of the network of information, today known as the internet is already part of  the public domain in Brazil63, but its juridical implications, and its consequences  for  the  citizenship  are  not  clear64 .  There  is  talk,  for  example  about  ‘digital  inclusion’, as it would be fundamental for the citizen to have access to the internet, because of its power to inform and clarify . On the other hand, the same internet is  instrumental in inciting the practice of crimes and offences, which makes it ambiguous in this sense65, hence a great deal of attention is required on the part of society  and in particular of the Judiciary . More studies are required within the country in  order to clarify the relationship between this technology and the public interest, in  order that its characteristic as a service is placed always in favour of the achievement  of citizenship .

58  See Ost, François . A natureza à margem da lei: a ecologia à prova do direito . Lisboa: Piaget, 1997 .  59  Caubet,  Christian  Guy .  A  irresistível  ascenção  do  comércio  internacional:  o  meio  ambiente  fora da lei? Revista Seqüência, v .39, dez . 1999, p . 58 . Sanches, Sydney . O Poder Judiciário e a tutela do meio ambiente . Arquivos do Ministério da Justiça . Brasília: Subsecretaria de Edições Técnicas,  n°47, jan/jun 1994 . p . 171 . 60  Sanches, Sydney . O Poder Judiciário e a tutela do meio ambiente . Arquivos do Ministério da Justiça .  Brasília: Subsecretaria de Edições Técnicas, n°47, jan/jun 1994 . p . 171 . Bernard, Jean . Da biologia à ética . Campinas: Psy II, 1994 . 61  Bernard, Jean . Da biologia à ética . Campinas: Psy II, 1994 . BUNGE, Mario . Ética, Ciencia y Técnica . Buenos Aires; Editorial Sudamericana, 1996 . 62  Bunge, Mario . Ética, Ciencia y Técnica . Buenos Aires; Editorial Sudamericana, 1996 . 63  Oliveira, Fátima . Bioética: uma face da cidadania . São Paulo: Moderna, 1997 . 64  Castels, Manuel . A Sociedade em rede . São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1999 . 65  Filho, Adalberto . (Coord .) Direito e Internet: aspectos jurídicos relevantes . São Paulo: Edipro, 2000 .  Hindle, John . A internet como paradigma: fenômeno e paradoxo . Rio de Janeiro: Expressão e Cultura, 1997 .

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vI ConClusIon In the present article we have attempted to present the issue of achieving citizenship  in Brazil in its broad sense, through the perspective of the new constitutional role  of  the  national  Judiciary,  beginning  with  its  reform,  through  achievement  of  the  ‘new rights’ . This is a very extensive subject, as the research that gave origin to this  article is destined to be used in a number of papers, since they give rise to, as we  believe we have shown, numerous highly complex debates, for which it would be  necessary a great deal more time and dedication . We begin with the need to have  present in the juridical world, the notion that it is no longer possible to limit citizenship to the strict concept, in the legal texts, but to understand that its achievement  in the broad sense is of fundamental importance . This has implications for the understanding of the constitutional fundamentals, and also for the social consequences  of the action of the State through its public policies, and through the clear action of  its agents, in this case the judges, but also all the other public agents . Therefore, the  fundamental role of a democratic political environment has been highlighted, without which this objective would be impossible . It is necessary to understand the reach  of democratic life in all these dimensions, among which the juridical dimension is  central . Accordingly, the constitutional aspect of citizenship should be taken as a  programme of social accomplishment . The idea needs to be established, especially  among jurists, that the achievement of rights on paper means nothing: what is written on paper or in electronic files as legislation are merely ideas for standards of  behaviour . Furthermore, it is necessary to develop the awareness that only human  social action modifies reality in all its aspects . The role of the Judiciary, then, gains  importance  and  stands  out  because  of  the  force  of  the  State  represented  by  the  judges . The mechanisms of complacency of the agents that have permitted many to  neglect or avoid their social role need to done away with . It is with this aim that the  45th Constitutional Amendment has been analysed, with regard the aspects considered pertinent to the achievement of citizenship, while noting that the content of  the reform of the Judiciary is directed along these lines . Nevertheless, the focus of  this new judicial instrument is directed, in this initial stage of the dynamic of the  construction of citizenship in its broad sense in the country, to the achievement of  ‘human rights’, or of citizenship, here referred to as the ‘new rights’ . We believe that  we have made it clear that this objective is not accomplished with achievement of  these rights, but presupposes an extensive social transformation, in the sense of the  maturing of Brazilians as citizens, among whom the judges and other jurists find  themselves . We would like to note, however, at the same time, that there is no sense  in  seeking  social  development  without  emphasising  that  it is only possible with an economic development that incorporates social justice, especially income distribution . In  this sense, reform of the economy means permitting the growth of the private labour market, doing away with the State monopoly of the function of offering the  best positions and salaries in the job market . This modification, that is slowly taking  place, leads to real development of the population, which achieves the conditions  required to mature, without the permanent tutelage of a body of public agents, who  can and should be concerned with the higher, more complex, levels of the social  dynamic, which are not achievable among people with little or no education, who  can aspire to only the most basic levels of citizenship .

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Álvaro Filipe Oxley da Rocha

It  needs  to  be  remembered,  furthermore,  that  to  place  the  responsibility  for  achieving citizenship in the broad sense entirely with the Judiciary, is to limit its  possibilities for development, since, as noted above, the judiciary is primarily a state  agency  for  the  resolution  of  conflicts  and  maintenance  of  rights,  with  very  little  room for innovation, the social space for which is in fact, the Legislature, as it acts  in the name of the population . The action of the Judiciary for the achievement of  citizenship is fundamental, yet, this process also demands that society as a whole  matures, and results from the raising of the level of awareness of its citizens, mainly  through better economic and, consequently, educational conditions .

klaus matHIs dIsCounTIng THe fuTure? CosT-benefIT analysIs and susTaInabIlITy I InTroduCTIon When decisions are made about public projects, cost-benefit analysis is an important instrument for evaluating the corresponding investment . As part of this, the  discounting of benefits and costs is a practice that most economists take for granted  almost  unquestioningly .  Philosophers,  on  the  other  hand,  despite  Birnbacher’s  claim that they rarely agree on anything, do seem to agree that there is no conceivable  justification  for  discounting .1  This  position  is  generally  supported  with  the  argument that placing a lower value on the interests of future generations is incompatible with the principle of impartiality . However, many differences of opinion are based on misunderstandings and unclear definitions . In this connection, Hampicke aptly coined the term “discounting  fog” .2 The aim of the following analysis will therefore be to disperse as much of this  fog as possible . To this end, the paper begins by explaining how a cost-benefit analysis is conducted (II) . Next it discusses the reasons usually cited for discounting (III) .  It then tries to shed light on the real crux of the matter and propose a solution for  reconciling economic rationality with the ethical postulate of intergenerational justice (IV) . Finally, the conclusion will summarise the results of the analysis (V) . II CosT-benefIT

analysIs

Cost-benefit analysis is the most important economic instrument for assessing the  economic usefulness of any kind of project that a society proposes to undertake,  from construction projects to environmental investments or regulations . Essentially  it involves two phases: quantifying the expected costs and benefits and then evaluating the results of the overall calculus against some particular decision-making criterion . In the first phase, the anticipated annual costs and benefits are determined for  the full duration of a project . Fundamentally these are calculated according to the  willingness to pay principle . On the benefit side, this is measured according to the  maximum amount that the gaining party would pay for the benefit gained . Costs  are measured according to the minimum amount that the losing party would accept  in compensation . Where goods are traded in competitive markets, it is also possible  to use market prices as a simpler means of measuring costs and benefits . However, this  1  2 

Dieter Birnbacher, Intergenerationelle Verantwortung oder: Dürfen wir die Zukunft der Menschheit diskontieren?, in: Umweltschutz und Marktwirtschaft: aus der Sicht unterschiedlicher Disziplinen, ed . Reiner Kümmel / Jörg Klawitter, Würzburg 1989, 101 ff . (cited as Verantwortung), 103 Ulrich Hampicke, Neoklassik und Zeitpräferenz – der Diskontierungsnebel, in: Die ökologische Herausforderung für die ökonomische Theorie, ed . Frank Beckenbach, Marburg 1991, 127 ff . (cited as  Diskontierungsnebel), 127

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gets more difficult no markets exist for the goods in question, which is frequently  the case in the environmental sphere . Although the costs and benefits are less easy  to  determine  here,  the  definitive  criterion  is  still  the  principle  of  willingness  to  pay .3 Before the benefits and costs are balanced up, interest on the annual payment  streams must be added or deducted up to a particular point in time . Usually all payment streams are discounted to the present time (or the start of the project) . In this  case, future payment streams are divided by the factor (1+r)t, where r represents the  rate of interest and t the number of years over which the investment is discounted .  The balance of all payment streams discounted to the present day is known as the  net present value (NPV) . The second stage of cost-benefit analysis consists of applying the evaluation criterion,  according  to  which  an  investment  should  only  be  entered  into  if  the  net present value is positive .  In  the  case  of  several  mutually  exclusive  alternatives,  the  project which achieves the highest net present value should be selected . This is especially true if budget constraints mean that not all investments can be realised at the  same time .4 One drawback of net present value is that projects of different size and  duration are difficult to compare . In that case, it is also possible to refer to another  metric,  the  internal rate of return  (IRR) .  Instead  of  fixing  a  discount  rate  and  then  calculating the net present value, this is determined by setting the net present value  to  zero  and  calculating  what  return  the  investment  yields .  Projects  with  a  higher  internal rate of return should be given preference over those with a lower internal  rate of return . It must also be borne in mind that the cost-benefit analysis is oriented to the  criterion of allocative efficiency . But this does not mean Pareto efficiency whereby  a change is not allowed to leave anyone worse off, but rather Kaldor-Hicks efficiency,  according to which the discounted benefits of a project, on balance, are greater than  the discounted costs . It makes no fundamental difference who makes a profit and  who loses out, as long as the gainers value their gains more highly than the losers  value their losses . In other words, the gainers would have to be able to compensate  the losers hypothetically; actual compensation is not required, however .5 The consequence of discounting is that when benefits and costs which only occur in the future are discounted to the present day, their value is lower than if they were incurred immediately. The higher the discount rate r and the larger the number of discounting periods t, the more this effect will be magnified . For example, a sum of $ 1,000 in 10  years’ time, discounted at a rate of 5 % is worth 1,000/(1+0 .05)10 = $ 614 today . By  the  same  method,  $ 1,000  in  a  hundred  years’  time  is  worth  1,000/(1+0 .05)100  =  $ 7 .60 today . The same sum in two hundred years’ time equals just 58 cents when  discounted to the present day . What discounting appears to do is to favour preceding over succeeding generations . Tyler Cowen and Derek Parfit illustrate this argument with the following example: 3  4  5 

Robert C . Lind, Intergenerational equity, discounting, and the role of cost-benefit analysis in  evaluating global climate policy, Energy Policy, vol . 23 (1995), 379 ff . (cited as Equity), 381 Lind, Equity (note 3), 381 See Klaus Mathis, Efficiency Instead of Justice? Searching for the Philosophical Foundations of the Economic Analysis of Law, New York 2009 (cited as Efficiency), 38 ff .

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“Imagine finding out that you, having just reached your twenty-first birthday, must soon die of  cancer because one evening Cleopatra wanted an extra helping of dessert .”6

In any event, discounting opens the door to harming the environment at the expense of future generations, since the corresponding future costs are weighted lower  in the cost-benefit analysis than they would be if they were incurred today . From  our present perspective, even the most apocalyptic disaster would make little or no  difference to our balance sheet if it will only occur in the very distant future .7 III reasons

for dIsCounTIng

In the literature a number of reasons for discounting are generally discussed, namely  uncertainty about the future, pure time preference, increasing prosperity and social  opportunity costs .8 These reasons will now be discussed in more detail . 3.1  unceRtaInty about tHe futuRe One of the functions of discounting is to take account of prognostic uncertainty, i .e .  to incorporate risk and uncertainty factors into the assessment of present actions  with future relevance .9 The working assumption is that present costs and benefits are  more certain than future ones, and therefore preferable if both are otherwise equal .10  Birnbacher considers that such risk discounting not only justified but necessary, and  this function should be declared as such .11 Even Rawls who takes a critical view of  discounting considers it justifiable to take account of uncertainties or changing circumstances .12 O’Neill, however, doubts whether any known probability function for future  events exists . Often, he argues, the problem is that we are not dealing with risks, for  which the probability of the event is known, but with uncertainty, where this probability is unknown . Consequently, it usually makes no sense to undertake risk discounting .13 That aside, he sees no reason to assume, as discounting does, that risk  and  uncertainty  would  correlate  systematically  with  intertemporal  distance .  He  points out that much of the damage that might occur in the distant future is perfectly predictable, whereas many of the benefits attributed to the immediate future  are very uncertain .14 6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 

Tyler Cowen / Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in: Justice between Age Groups and Generations, ed . Peter Laslett / James Fishkin, New Haven/London 1992, 144 ff ., 145 Dieter Birnbacher, Lässt sich die Diskontierung der Zukunft rechtfertigen?, in: Zukunftsverantwortung und Generationensolidarität, ed . id . / Gerd Brudermüller, Würzburg 2001, 117 ff ., 118 Likewise e .g . John O’Neill, Ecology, Policy and Politics. Human Well-Being and the Natural World,  London/New York 1993, 49 ff . Birnbacher, Verantwortung (note 1), 105 John O’Neill / Alan Holland / Andrew Light, Environmental Values, London/New York 2008, 58 Birnbacher, Verantwortung (note 1), 105 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge 1971 (cited as TJ), § 45, 295  O’Neill (note 8), 50 f . O’Neill/Holland/Light (note 10), 58

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3.2  IncReasIng PRosPeRIty A  further  argument  in  favour  of  discounting  rests  on  the  assumption  that  future  generations will be better off than we are . If we also accept the law of diminishing  marginal utility, discounting would be justified because we derive more utility from  a unit of money today than in the future .15 Lind therefore considers discounting  necessary for reasons of intergenerational justice: “Can we justify current generations sacrificing 2–3 % of GWP [gross world product] to increase  the wealth of future generations who even  after  deduction for  the  high damage  scenario  are  2–15 times richer than the present generation? The answer is clearly no on the basis of intergenerational equity, which must weigh in favour of the current generation .”16

This is a problematic argument, however, because whether future generations will  enjoy higher prosperity is questionable; the true outcome might be just the opposite .17 Furthermore, the definitive criterion would not be utility as such, but prices,  i .e . willingness to pay for utility-bringing goods . Since willingness to pay tends to be  higher in a wealthier society, even taking account of diminishing marginal utility  there is no reason for it necessarily to be lower in future than it is today . 3.3  PuRe tIme PRefeRence A further argument is based on individual time preference . According to Robert W .  Hahn, this is the most important reason for discounting: “The basic rationale for discounting is that consumers are not indifferent between consuming a  dollar’s worth of a good today and one dollar next year; discount rates are necessary to reflect  this preference .”18

Yet, of all arguments, pure time preference is the most fiercely criticised . This goes  back as far as Henry Sidgwick, who in “The Methods of Ethics” (1874) emphatically  defended the view that future utility and present utility should be weighted equally;  intertemporal distance should not have any effect:  “[T]he mere difference of priority and posteriority in time is not a reasonable ground for having  more regard to the consciousness of one moment than to that of another .”19

Following  in  this  tradition,  John  Rawls  makes  reference  to  Sidgwick  and  clearly  states: “Unlike the principle of equality, time preference has no intrinsic ethical appeal .”20

Rawls considers a time preference irrational at the level of the individual, and unjust  at the level of society: 15  16  17  18 

O’Neill (note 8), 51 f . Lind, Equity (note 3), 384 O’Neill (note 8), 52 Robert W . Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation: A Response to the Critics, The University of Chicago Law Review, vol . 71 (2004), 1021 ff ., 1026 19  Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn . 1907, unedited reprint 1981, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1981, 381 20  Rawls, TJ (note 12), § 45, 294

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“In the case of the individual, pure time preference is irrational: it means that he is not viewing  all moments as equally parts of one life . In the case of society, pure time preference is unjust: it  means (in the more common instance when the future is discounted) that the living take advantage of their position in time to favour their own interests .”21

Pure  time  preference  can  also  be  discussed  in  terms  of  individual  impatience  or  short-sightedness  (myopia) .  These  appear  to  be  universal  qualities,  as  Eugen  von  Böhm-Bawerk  rightly  commented  in  his  famous  treatise  “Capital  and  Interest”  (1884/89): “How many an Indian tribe, with careless greed, has sold the land of its fathers, the source of its  maintenance, to the pale faces for a couple of casks of ‘firewater’! Unfortunately very much the  same may be seen in our own highly civilised countries . The working man who drinks on Sunday the week’s wage he gets on Saturday, and starves along with wife and child the next six days,  is not far removed from the Indian . […] Which of us has not been surprised to find that, under  the pressure of momentary appetite, he was not able to refuse some favourite dish or cigar which  the doctor had forbidden — knowing perfectly that he was doing an injury to his health […]?”22

Even though such behaviour may be rational in the short term, it often causes people to do themselves harm in the long term . Of course it would be more beneficial  to spread consumption evenly over a longer time span instead of consuming everything immediately . The short-sighted person realises this as well, which is why he  always regrets his short-termist behaviour in retrospect – and he most of all, because  at any given moment he would always like to be consuming a lot .23 Myopic individuals harm themselves in two respects: In return for the option of choosing the  path of consumption, which already reduces utility, they deprive themselves of a  further share of their resource allocation by giving it away in the form of interest .24  Myopic behaviour is therefore inconsistent, and in that sense, not rational .25 3.4  socIal oPPoRtunIty costs What economists mean by opportunity cost of an action is the sacrificed utility of  the next-best alternative use of the resource in question . An efficient allocation of  capital takes place when it is utilised to achieve the highest return . Not just economists  but,  for  example,  philosophers  such  as  Rawls  therefore  favour  the  use  of  a  discount rate in order to allocate the limited resources available for investment .26 Because these resources are scarce, their use gives rise to opportunity costs . The  opportunity costs of an investment are measured fundamentally in terms of the return  on  alternative  possible  investments .  Or  to  put  if  another  way:  if  there  is  a  positive rate of interest r, then more goods can be bought with a unit of money to21  Rawls, TJ (note 12), § 45, 295 22  Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, Kapital und Kapitalzins. Zweite Abtheilung: Positive Theorie des Kapitales,  2 vols ., 4th edn ., Jena 1921 (cited as Positive Theorie), vol . 1, 332 f .; quotation after id . and William A . Smart (trans .), The Positive Theory of Capital, London, 1891 23  Hampicke, Diskontierungsnebel (note 2), 129 24  Ulrich  Hampicke,  Ökologische Ökonomie. Individuum und Natur in der Neoklassik – Natur in der ökonomischen Theorie, part 4, Opladen 1992, 258 25  Hampicke, Diskontierungsnebel (note 2), 130 26  Rawls, TJ (note 12), § 45, 295

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day than with the same unit of money in one year’s time; one money unit x can be  invested at interest rate r and in one year it will be worth (1+r)x . The positive interest rate is a fact that can be observed in every market economy . The main explanation for its existence is the productivity of capital .27 Assuming  a  perfect  competitive  market  –  free  of  market-distorting  taxes  and  imperfections of the capital market – then there is one sole market interest rate r at  which economic actors can borrow and lend money .28 The opportunity costs of a  public investment, if the state has to incur debt in order to finance it, are fundamentally measured according to the interest rate the state has to pay on government bonds . If  the state investment “crowds out” more profitable private investments, however, the  definitive factor is this higher return and not the interest rate .29 The opportunity  cost approach also implies that returns yielded by the investment can consistently be reinvested at the opportunity cost interest rate . This presupposes that appropriate followon investments are available . Iv dIsPersIng

THe fog

4.1  wHat Is dIscounted? The dispute between philosophers and economists can partly be defused by clarifying, to begin with, what is being discounted . Philosophers think mainly of welfare,  i .e . utility in a utilitarian sense, whereas economists mean goods that are valued in  terms of prices or willingness to pay .30 In his study on discounting, Broome has already drawn attention to this important distinction: “Economists  typically  discount  the  sorts  of  goods  that  are  bought  and  sold  in  markets  […] .  Philosophers are typically thinking of a more fundamental good, people’s well-being .”31

In fact there is largely agreement – even among economists –, that discounting, and  hence down-valuing, the welfare of future generations contradicts the principle of  impartiality and cannot therefore be justified . It is a different matter when discounting is applied to monetary streams, i .e . goods, or the associated profits and losses .  The instrument of cost-benefit analysis works with this kind of discounting .32 This important distinction will be illustrated with the example of the economic  valuation of human life . To determine the “value of life”, there are various possible 

27  Böhm-Bawerk, Positive Theorie (note 22), vol . 1, 338 ff . 28  Lind, Equity, 381; in greater depth in Robert C . Lind, A Primer on the Major Issues Relating to  the Discount Rate for Evaluating National Energy Options, in: Discounting for Time and Risk in Energy Policy, ed . id . et al ., Washington 1982, 21 ff ., 24 ff . 29  E .J . Mishan / Euston Quah, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 5th edn ., London/New York 2007, 149 30  Cf . Hans-Peter Weikard, Soziale Diskontrate, intergenerationelle Gerechtigkeit und Wahlmöglichkeiten für zukünftige Generationen, in: Naturschutz – Ethik – Ökonomie: Theoretische Begründungen und praktische Konsequenzen, ed . Hans G . Nutzinger, Marburg 1996, 155 ff . (cited as Diskontrate), 158 31  John Broome, Discounting the Future, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol . 23 (1994), 128 ff ., 128 f . 32  Parfit therefore expressly states that his critique of discounting is not meant to be aimed at the  discounting of monetary values . Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Oxford 1984, 480

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methods33 which seek to establish either how much money an individual is willing  to spend on measures to reduce the risk of death (the willingness-to-pay approach),  or  how  much  compensation  they  require  in  order  to  take  the  risk  of  death  (the  willingness-to-accept approach) .34 The following two examples are intended to explain this approach: •  Willingness-to-pay approach: Let us assume that out of 10,000 car drivers, one  will die as the result of a traffic accident, i .e . each driver faces a statistical death  risk of 1:10,000 . Let us further assume that by paying $ 500 every one of them  could eliminate the risk of death, thus reducing a risk of 1:10,000 to 0 . Supposing that all of them were prepared to pay this amount, it would add up to a total  of $ 5 million, which corresponds to the “value of life” in this situation .35 However, since our general experience of the world tells us that there will always be  some residual level of risk in road traffic which cannot be eliminated, we will  assume  below  that  by  fitting  an  airbag  at  a  cost  of  $ 500,  the  motorists  concerned can only reduce their own risk of death by half . Anyone who is willing  to pay this amount values his or her life at no less than $ 500/(0 .5* 1/10,000) =  $ 10 million . •  Willingness-to-accept approach: Suppose that job X pays a salary of $ 100,000  and job Y a salary of $ 120,000 . In job Y, however, the risk of a fatal occupational accident is 1 % higher than in job X . Anyone who is willing to accept job  Y at the stated salary must implicitly place a value of at least $ 20,000/0 .01 = $ 2  million on his or her life . Most philosophers reject an economic valuation of human life on principle, believing that the value of a human life is infinite and should not therefore be monetarised . Due to the universal scarcity of resources, however, when the state comes to  assess the cost-efficiency of regulatory measures for accident prevention, it has no  choice but to carry out a cost-benefit analysis, in the course of which it has to put a  value on the lives potentially saved or lost as a result of the measures . The costs of  the measures to be assessed are consequently weighed against the value of the human lives concerned .36 The debate between philosophers and economists about the permissibility of  valuing a human life thus revolves around a purely terminological problem which  can  easily  be  resolved  by  talking  about  valuing the reduction of life-threatening risks rather than the value of life .37 For the aim is simply to determine empirically the  amount that people are willing to pay in order to reduce fatal risks, or what amount 

33  The  most  commonly  used  methods  are  the  “revealed  preferences  methods”  (labour  market  analyses) and “consumer market behaviour methods” (product market analyses) . On the various methods, see e .g . Ike Brannon, What Is a Life Worth?, Regulation, vol . 27/4 (2004), 60 ff . See  also Balz Hammer, Valuing the Invaluable? Valuation of Human Life in Cost-Efficiency Assessments of Regulatory Interventions, in: Efficiency, Sustainability, and Justice to Future Generations,  ed . Klaus Mathis, New York 2011, 211 ff . 34  Carsten Merten, Die Bewertung menschlichen Lebens im Haftungsrecht, Frankfurt a . M . 2007, 179 35  W . Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life in Legal Contexts: Survey and Critique, American Law and Economics Review, vol . 2 (2000), 195 ff ., 201 36  Brannon (note 33), 60 37  Likewise  Eric  A .  Posner / Cass  R .  Sunstein,  Dollars  and  Death,  The University of Chicago Law Review, vol . 72 (2005), 537 ff ., 557

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of compensation they would require in order to accept such risks . Richard A . Posner  puts it well: “So while valuing human lives sounds like an ethical or even a metaphysical undertaking, what  actually is involved is determining the value that people place on avoiding small risks of death  and the transformation into a ‘value of life’ is done simply to determine how large the award of  damages in a lump sum must be in order to be equivalent .”38

It would also be completely wrong to derive a normative statement from empirical  data: that would be committing a naturalistic fallacy . It should also be pointed out  that the aim is not to determine the value of a certain specific human life, but that  of a statistical life of the people potentially affected by the measure in question . And  this is why the expression “the value of a statistical life” is often used in the relevant  literature .39 The cost-benefit analysis is not therefore differentiating intertemporally  between the value of human lives; only monetary amounts are being discounted, not lives as such . 4.2  oPPoRtunIty cost veRsus socIal dIscount Rate As we have seen, the arguments against discounting are mostly wide of the mark  once  we  recognise  the  difference  between  discounting  welfare  and  discounting  monetary values . But there still remains the question of the “right” discount rate . Among economists it is undisputed that for private investments, opportunity  costs are the definitive factor . What is disputed is whether decisions about public  projects should likewise be based on the interest rate on the capital market, or on an  artificially determined rate known as the “social discount rate” . The concept of the  social discount rate is based on the Ramsey formula:40 rt = δ + η(Ct)*Ċt/Ct Under this formula there are two components to the social discount rate rt: the pure  rate of time preference δ and the product of the marginal utility of consumption  η(Ct) and the growth rate of consumption Ċt/Ct .41 This takes account of the effect  of declining marginal utility with rising income .42 Nordhaus refers to this as “growth  discounting” .43 Some economists suggest setting the pure rate of time preference to zero and  paying attention to growth discounting only .44 Along the same lines, Samida and  38  Richard A . Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 7th edn ., New York 2007, 197 39  See Viscusi (note 35), 196 and 201 . 40  For a more detailed examination of this issue, see Partha Dasgupta, Resource Depletion, Research and Development, and the Social Rate of Discount, in: Discounting for Time and Risk in Energy Policy, ed . Robert C . Lind et al ., Washington 1982, 273 ff ., 279 . 41  Lind, Equity (note 3), 386 (Ċt denotes the derivative with respect to t) 42  Eric Neumayer, Weak versus Strong Sustainability. Exploring the Limits of Two Opposing Paradigms,  2nd edn ., Cheltenham/Northampton 2003, 30 43  William  D .  Nordhaus,  Managing the Global Commons: The Economics of Climate Change,  Cambridge 1994, 123 44  For example, William R . Cline, Give Greenhouse Abatement a Fair Chance, Finance and Development, vol . 30 (1993), 3 ff ., 4

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Weisbach also call for the long-term discount rate to be oriented to long-term economic  growth .45  The  suggestion  of  a  reduced  discount  rate  is  well  meant,  but  in  practice it leads to inconsistencies since a lower discount rate – or no discounting at  all – would result in more investments, which would require a significantly higher  saving rate .46 Furthermore, the use of a reduced discount rate carries the risk that unprofitable  investments will be made . In this respect a public investment is no different from a  private one . Hence, future generations could even be harmed by a lower discount  rate .47 The World Bank supports this point of view: “[W]e feel that meeting the needs of future generations will only be possible if investible resources  are  channeled  to  projects  and  programs  with  the  highest  environmental,  social,  and  economic rates of return . This is much less likely to happen if the discount rate is set significantly lower than the opportunity cost of capital .”48

Arbitrary  political  setting  of  the  social  discount  rate  is  problematic  from  an  economic perspective, too, because it infringes the principle that economic parameters  should  reflect  the  valuations  of  market  participants  (the  principle  of  consumer  sovereignty) .49 And it is by no means the case that if the projects are realised, they will necessarily  burden  future  generations  with  costs  alone .  Projects  that  emerge  positively  from  the  cost-benefit  analysis  achieve  a  return  which  is  higher  than  the  discount  rate, otherwise they would not show any net present value . Hence the cost-benefit  analysis  ensures  that  only  profitable  projects  are  realised .  The  returns  yielded  by  these  projects  multiply  social  welfare,  and  society  can  pursue  a  path  of  growth,  which in turn increases the stock of social capital . Future generations will categorically attain a higher level of prosperity than they would have done if the projects  had not been realised . 4.3  tHe Real PRoblem But this line of argument, that any damage that future generations are likely to suffer can be compensated by the increase in welfare, has a small catch: the cost-benefit analysis works on the tacit assumption of the substitutability of natural capital with  other types of capital . In other words, it is based on the paradigm of weak sustainability .50 It is in this paradigm, and not in discounting, that the real problem of costbenefit analysis lies . The concept of weak sustainability demands the preservation of the entire capital  stock .  Put  simply,  this  means  that  living  off  capital  assets  is  not  allowed .  The  45  Dexter  Samida / David  A .  Weisbach,  Paretian  Intergenerational  Discounting,  The University of Chicago Law Review, vol . 74 (2007), 145 ff ., 169 46  Neumayer (note 42), 35 47  See also Cass R . Sunstein / Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money,  and Intergenerational Equity, The University of Chicago Law Review, vol . 74 (2007), 171 ff ., 174 . 48  Nancy  Birdsall / Andrew  Steer,  Act  Now  on  Global  Warming  –  But  Don’t  Cook  the  Books,  Finance and Development, vol . 30 (1993), 6 ff ., 6 49  Cf . Mishan/Quah (note 29), 172 50  O’Neill (note 8), 58; Neumayer (note 42), 37 ff .

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capital stock K can be subdivided into natural capital KN, mechanical capital KM  and human capital KH . Therefore: K = KN + KM + KH = const . Natural capital includes raw materials, energy, nature reserves and landscapes, and ecosystems generally . Mechanical capital consists of capital in the narrow sense, e .g . tools, machinery,  buildings  or  transport  infrastructure .  Human  capital  refers  to  human  knowledge,  skills and abilities .51 The different forms of capital can, in principle, be freely substituted (empirical  interpretation) – and may indeed be substituted (normative interpretation) . It follows that natural capital may be consumed if mechanical and/or human capital are  commensurately  increased .  The  rents  from  the  consumption  of  natural  resources  must therefore be reinvested (known as the Hartwick rule) .52 The concept of weak  sustainability tends to be combined with optimism about technology: an assumption is made that technological progress will overcome resource constraints .53 This  viewpoint is predominant among traditional economists . The proponents of ecological economics are less optimistic in this respect . They  doubt the ability of the market to bring about adequate substitution and innovation  effects  by  means  of  price  adjustment  mechanisms .54  In  any  case,  they  consider  natural capital to be fundamentally unsubstitutable: they argue that ecological systems are not simply production factors that can be replaced with others; they are the  very foundation of all life and economic endeavour . On this rationale, a concept of  strong sustainability is required .55 Accordingly, what should be preserved is not just  the entire capital stock K, but specifically also the stock of natural capital: KN = const .56  A loss of natural capital cannot be balanced out by a greater stock of mechanical  and/or human capital . A more sophisticated view of strong sustainability is that only certain parts of  the natural capital must be physically preserved, namely those which are effectively  unsubstitutable .  This  is  known  as  critical natural capital .  Use  of  non-renewable  resources would be permissible if part of the rent is invested in renewable energies .  Destruction of the Amazon rainforest, on the other hand, would be unacceptable  and the diversity of animal and plant species would need to be conserved . The general principle is to ensure that the functions of nature remain intact .57 The whole debate over discounting is therefore skirting around the real problem . The critical issue is not the quest for the “right” discount rate, but to ensure  that projects meet the requirements of strong sustainability . O’Neill hits the nail on  the head:

51  Hans-Peter Weikard, Wahlfreiheit für zukünftige Generationen. Neue Grundlagen für eine Ressourcenökonomik, Marburg 1999 (cited as Wahlfreiheit), 54 f . 52  Weikard, Wahlfreiheit (note 51), 55 f . 53  Neumayer (note 42), 23 54  Hans G . Nutzinger, Langzeitverantwortung im Umweltstaat aus ökonomischer Sicht, in: Langzeitverantwortung im Umweltstaat, ed . Carl Friedrich Gethmann / Michael Kloepfer / Hans G . Nutzinger, Bonn 1993, 42 ff ., 71 55  Robert Costanza / Herman Daly, Towards an Ecological Economics, Ecological Modelling, vol . 38  (1987), 1 ff ., 2 f . 56  Weikard, Wahlfreiheit (note 51), 55  57  Neumayer (note 42), 25

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“It is not that discount rates should be zero, negative or positive, but that they are on the whole  irrelevant to the discussion of the policy one should adopt to the future . There are good principles that govern our dealings with the future – that we minimize resource depletion, that we  avoid irreversible changes, that we engage in sustainable economic activity and so on .”58

So, the underlying assumption of cost-benefit analysis is that future generations can  be compensated financially – for the consequences of global warming, for example,  or the loss of natural habitats or animal species . But it should be self-evident that  this makes no sense in relation to the resources that support life itself . O’Neill once  again: “What matters is not a nominal sum of wealth, but the goods, in particular the environmental  goods, it can be exchanged for . What does it profit a man who gains a fortune and yet loses the  world .”59

Even if one believes this compensation to be possible, there would have to be some  way of making sure it is transferred from generation to generation, since it only takes  a single spoilsport generation to consume the transfer, thus squandering the compensation .60 Therefore non-discounting is totally inappropriate as a means of guaranteeing  sustainable development . But equally, the idea of a “correct” social discount rate  also turns out to be a chimera . The discounting fog only starts to lift once it has  been recognised that cost-benefit analysis implies perfect substitution of all types of  capital . What is needed, therefore, are additional restrictions such as the preservation of critical natural capital . Talbot Page: “In the intergenerational context we use both majority and potential Pareto improvement as  decision criteria . But we use both with constraints . As a constitutional matter we may require  that certain things – for example, First Amendment rights – be a part of everyone’s picture, regardless of the choice over some particular project . […] In the intergenerational context the  obvious constraints have to do with the quality of the resource base that is passed on from one  generation to the next . This quality defines the basic opportunities that each generation has to  work with, its means of survival, and, to a large extent, its well-being .”61

But a lower discount rate, or even non-discounting, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient  condition  for  the  preservation  of  natural  capital .  Quite  the  opposite:  if  it  makes  investments  profitable  which  would  have  been  unprofitable  under  market  conditions, the danger of destroying natural capital is all the greater . Furthermore, it  is by no means inevitable that normal discounting will only result in projects that  are  detrimental  to  future  generations .  In  some  circumstances  it  can  also  prevent  environmentally  harmful  projects,  since  fewer  projects  will  pass  the  cost-benefit  analysis .62

58  O’Neill (note 8), 59 59  O’Neill (note 8), 59 60  See Klaus Mathis, Future Generations in John Rawls’ Theory of Justice, ARSP, vol . 95 (2009),  49 ff ., 54 . 61  Talbot  Page,  Intergenerational  Equity  and  the  Social  Rate  of  Discount,  in:  Environmental Resources and Applied Welfare Economics: Essays in Honor of John V. Krutilla, ed . V . Kerry Smith, Washington 1988, 71 ff ., 88 62  Cf . W . Kip Viscusi, Rational Discounting for Regulatory Analysis, The University of Chicago Law Review, vol . 74 (2007), 209 ff ., 215 f .

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4.4  a two-stage decIsIon-makIng PRoceduRe As we have established, state investments like any others should be strictly oriented  to the opportunity cost principle . The use of a reduced social discount rate may be  a pragmatic way to favour projects from which future generations will benefit . Theoretically, however, this solution is not convincing . The  cost-benefit  analysis  should  give  us  information  on  whether  a  project  is  profitable . If the discount rate is manipulated for non-economic reasons, the costbenefit analysis can no longer answer even that question . And either way, it cannot  help with the question of distributive justice . What purpose can it serve then? It tells  us nothing useful, from an economic point of view or from an ethical point of view .  Therefore the question of discounting should not be mixed up with the requirement for sustainability and other ethical questions . Ethical arguments should be presented as such in a participatory and transparent decision-making process: “A complementary approach is to incorporate noneconomic values through participatory decisionmaking after the strictly economic costs and benefits have been calculated and made public .  But in neither case is it necessary or helpful to lower the discount rates .”63

By openly declaring the ethical arguments alongside the cost-benefit analysis, it is  possible to articulate the trade-offs between economic efficiency and ethical arguments and reveal the opportunity costs of the different alternatives .64 The political  decision-makers can then engage in an open discourse on the economic and ethical  arguments . The use of a reduced discount rate, on the other hand, masks the value  conflicts and shifts power in the direction of the technocrats who carry out the costbenefit analysis and determine the “right” discount rate .65 There is also a danger that  the  ethical  arguments  could  become  submerged  in  the  overall  calculation  of  the  cost-benefit analysis .66 Equally, either discounting at a lower discount rate or non-discounting are not  capable of eliminating the fundamental problem of cost-benefit analysis – the assumption that natural capital is substitutable . In addition to a cost-benefit analysis,  therefore, all public projects should also be subject to a separate sustainability assessment . Investments that infringe upon critical natural capital are a priori not permissible, and consequently there is no need to carry out a cost-benefit analysis at all .67  On the other hand, if investments do not infringe on critical natural capital, there  is no objection to a cost-benefit analysis with discounting in accordance with the  opportunity cost approach .

63  Birdsall/Steer (note 48), 7 64  On the concept of this trade-off, see Mathis, Efficiency (note 5), 195 ff . 65  Cf . William D . Nordhaus, Discounting and Public Policies That Affect the Distant Future, in:  Discounting and Intergenerational Equity, ed . Paul R . Portney / John P . Weyant, Washington 1999,  145 ff ., 158 66  Likewise Robert C . Lind, Discount Rate & Social Benefit-Cost Analysis in Energy Policy Decisions, in: Discounting for Time and Risk in Energy Policy, ed . id . et al ., Washington 1982, 443 ff ., 457 67  In a similar vein, see Douglas A . Kysar, Discounting … on Stilts, The University of Chicago Law Review, vol . 74 (2007), 119 ff ., 138

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v ConClusIon The dispute between philosophers and economists over the question of discounting  can be defused, to begin with, by clarifying what is actually being discounted . Philosophers, by and large, base their assumptions on welfare, i .e . utility in a utilitarian  sense, whereas economists mean goods that are valued in terms of prices or willingness to pay . An additional consideration of pivotal importance is that cost-benefit  analysis  implies  the  perfect  substitutability  of  all  types  of  capital  (natural  capital,  mechanical capital, human capital) . It is herein, and not in discounting, that the real  problem lies . Consequently, restrictions are necessary in order to preserve critical  natural capital . For this reason, public projects should not only be subject to costbenefit analysis but also to a separate sustainability assessment . Acknowledgement I am grateful to Springer Publishers for their kind permission to reprint this article,  first published in: Efficiency, Sustainability, and Justice to Future Generations, ed . Klaus  Mathis, New York 2011, 165 ff .

III law, language

and

lITeraTure

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“Normative language is metaphorical .”1 With these words, Italian scholar Alessandro Giuliani called upon legal scholars to venture into the field of metaphor studies,  in order to deepen their awareness of legal terms and doctrines . Legal practitioners  and  scholars  work  with  words  to  resolve  disputes  and  pursue  justice,  but  also  to  obscure,  mislead  and  promote  unspoken  interests .  The  inevitable,  sometimes  insidious use of metaphor reflects the ambiguous nature of law and of language; metaphors can be used to further communication and clarification, but also to produce  disinformation and confusion: “The entire history of legal thought could be studied from the standpoint of language as a sequence of metaphors: it would be enough to examine any ordinary controversy in legal scholarship to see that the different arguments are conditioned upon the accepted metaphors, analogies and the use of examples . We can see the demonstration of Blumenberg’s theory of the existence of key terms as absolute metaphors, which  cannot be further broken down  into  logical  terms: the impossibility of agreeing on the meaning of the term “law” is an example of this fact .  The task of legal analysis is the correction of metaphors and the clarification of language .”2

Giuliani thus suggests that legal experts ought to study rhetoric . The purpose of this  is not to sharpen our oratorical skills or our ability to employ seductive metaphors;  the purpose in studying rhetoric derives from the fact that legal language is intrinsically metaphorical, for better or for worse . The ethical task of legal thought thus  consists in uncovering the ideological projects hiding behind – or even within – legal metaphors .  The classic objection to the discussion of metaphors, raised by the traditional,  professional, legal academic is that they are the concern of literature, maybe even  philosophy, but have nothing to do with the life and practice of the law .3 Underlying this belief is the assumption that legal language may be cleansed of the sentimental imperfections of poetry and literature, of the base materialism of economics  and of the senseless mental gymnastics of theory and philosophy . But this assumption is not  only epistemologically naïve; it  also serves  ideologically to justify the 

1  2  3 

A . Giuliani, La “nuova retorica” e la logica del linguaggio normativo, Rivista Italiana di Filosofia  del Diritto, 1970, 379 . See also Logica (teoria dell’argomentazione), Enc . Dir . A . Giuliani, La “nuova retorica” … (note 1), 379 . The provocative aspect of metaphor studies has been well-described by Severo Sarduy, Metafora  al quadrato su Góngora, in G . Conte (ed .), Metafora, Milan, 1981, 187: “Metaphor is the point at  which language’s plot thickens, the point at which it takes on such importance as to render the  rest of the sentence flat and innocent . Like a yeast bubbling at language’s continuous surface,  metaphor  confers  a  certain  degree  of  denotative  purity  on  all  that  comes  near  it .  Purity .  Let  us underscore the moral implications of this word: metaphor as extraneous to the “nature” of  language, like an illness; it impugns every rhetorical figure, dragging it into the forbidden zone,  so much that Saint Thomas boasted of having no use for metaphors at all” .

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legal profession’s project of manipulating the sentiments and interests of others for  economic gain, political power and social privilege . The legal thinker that instead accepts Giuliani’s suggestion to travel down the  uneven  path  of  clarifying,  reframing  and  correcting  legal  metaphors  will  have  to  critically examine the values underlying legal terms and expressions, as well as the  power relationships implicit in legal doctrines’ choices of words . For example, if we  ask “why do we say ‘sources of law’? Why do we use this hydraulic metaphor?”, we  will begin to analyze the presumed nature of the ‘product’ of a legal norm: the norm  originates  somewhere  underground,  and  then  gushes  out  of  a  kind  of  mountain  spring (a pristine place presumably, this site of political power condensation), ready  to be bottled and delivered to judges, government lawyers and other faithful servants passively carrying out orders received from on high, without asking too many  questions about their content or value . Notice how the hydraulic metaphor of the  source  gives  rise  to  the  imperative  and  anthropomorphic  metaphor  of  the  ‘lawmaker’, which leads to the bureaucratic and military metaphor of the civil servant .  Similar considerations follow when expressions like ‘head’ of state, constitutional  ‘organ’, electoral ‘body’ (to mention a few of the most obvious organic metaphors  in constitutional law) are viewed through the lens of metaphor studies . Another classic objection against the study of metaphors appeals to the correctness  of  the  literal  meaning  as  opposed  to  the  vague  arbitrariness  of  metaphor .  A  precise, professional judge might argue that when it comes to interpreting the meaning of a legal provision, we must focus on the original meaning of the text as intended  by  the  legislator .  This  anti-hermeneutical  presumption,  which  denies  the  relevance of interpretation in service to an idea of objective meaning and thus denies the interpreter’s own subjectivity, can be found in every legal culture, in every  area  of  the  law,  at  every  level  of  legal  sophistication  and  at  every  ideological  extreme . The myth or prejudice of literal interpretation is perhaps one of the most ideologically resistant of metaphors: it’s simple suggestion of an uncontaminated source  of meaning in a distant act carried out by someone else, and its call to neutralize the  subjectivity of decision-making, serve every jurist’s latent desire to escape from freedom .  Now,  from  the  hermeneutic  perspective,  it  is  clear  that  there  is  literally  no  such thing as a literal interpretation . The sequence of l-e-t-t-e-r-s does not produce  nor does it evoke meaning . Literal interpretation suggests that normative language  is like a mosaic, while a hermeneutical approach sees it more like an organism . To  willfully not see the forest for the trees, as the literal approach does, means to effectively deny that a qualitative, ideological or strategic choice is being made . As  anyone  who  has  crossed  the  shadowy  valley  of  translation  knows,  translating  a  phrase  from  one  language  to  another  is  nothing  like  taking  apart  a  mosaic  and  putting the pieces back together somewhere else; translating a legal concept from  one cultural context to another is more like transplanting a whole tree in a different  soil . Still, the belief persists that behind words there are things, that behind logic  there is being, that behind abstract norms there are concrete interests, that behind  appearance there is substance, that behind form there is content and that behind  the  metaphor  there  is  the  concept .  These  beliefs  are  so  archetypal,  and  thus  so  deeply-rooted (and as such, they are advantageous, reassuring and forgiving) as to  force a hermeneutical approach to justify itself again and again, to set forth its par-

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ticular assumptions and announce its particular critical project: normative language  is  metaphorical  language;  metaphorical  language  is  ordinary  language;  and  metaphor is not just a rhetorical form but the very structure of language . Moreover: the  supposed opposition between a literal interpretation and a metaphorical one is itself  a metaphor, the metaphor of language as a series of letters . While metaphor studies have flourished in semiotics, semantics, comparative  literature,  rhetoric  and  political  theory,4  Italian  legal  scholarship  has  not  developed a specific interest in this subject . Beyond the comments of Giuliani, there have  not been searching examinations of the use of metaphor in Italian constitutional  discourse . The reasons for this prolonged silence can be located in: 1) the prevalence  of positivism, which conceives of legal language as normative and imperative; 2) the  prevalence of formalism, which seeks to purify forms of their content; and 3) the  decline of rhetoric as an allied field of legal education . According to Giuliani: “The devaluation of metaphorical and figurative language has become a tacitly accepted dogma  in modern legal thought: and it is the intersection of profoundly contrasting positions, which  depart from realistic or nominalistic assumptions . This devaluation is connected to the corruption of the authentic dialectical tradition . At its root is a nervous suspicion of opinion and of  any analysis that is not based on compelling, demonstrative evidence . This has produced the  reduction of prescriptive language to imperatives, because only these forms of prescription seem  to belong to the domain of the rational . The other forms remain irremediably consigned to the  domain of persuasion, rhetoric and the irrational .”5

According to Giuliani, the decline of metaphorical language in the law is the consequence of our expulsion from the dialectical paradise of antiquity . Apart from his  dubious conceptualization of an “authentic” dialectical tradition (a curiously undialectical image of dialectic, so insulated from discussion, purified of contamination  and restored to its ancient and original splendor), one can ask whether Giuliani’s  Aristotelian conception of metaphor is satisfying, or whether instead the reduction  of metaphor to a mere trope is not partially responsible for its consequent marginalization . From the perspective of Italian constitutional scholarship, the first instinct of  one who sets out to discuss metaphors and law is to put forward the canonical (as  well as metaphorical) excusatio propter infirmitatem: the field is too vast to try to cover  it in the scope of this examination, a complete study of the role of metaphors in law  has yet to be written, the literature is endless . Richards, after having evoked the intuitions of Shelley and Bentham, and having “glanced for a moment at these deep  waters into which a serious study of metaphor may plunge us”, located in the “fear  of them […] one cause why the study has so often not been enterprising and why  Rhetoric  traditionally  has  limited  its  inquiry  to  relatively  superficial  problems .”6  Moreover:  “The neglect of the study of the modes of metaphor in the later 19th Century was due, I think,  to a general feeling that those methods of inquiry were unprofitable, and the time was not ripe  for a new attack . I am not sure that it is yet ripe in spite of all that Coleridge and Bentham did  towards ripening it . Very likely a new attempt must again lead into artificialities and arbitrariness . If so, their detection may again be a step on the road . In this subject it is better to make a  4  5  6 

V .F . Rigotti, Metafore della politica, Bologna, 1989 and Il potere e le sue metafore, Milan, 1992 . A . Giuliani (note 1), 382 . I .A . Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Oxford, 1936, 91 .

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I would like to put forward a few considerations in favor of a hermeneutical conception of metaphor in legal discourse . The assumptions from which I proceed are that:  law is language, legal language is metaphorical, metaphorical language is ordinary  language, legal language is as specialized as it is common, the meaning of legal discourse can be grasped only through a process of interpretation, metaphors work by  essentially  transacting  between  contexts,  and  comparative  law  –  whose  basic  and  difficult task is translation – is in a privileged position to study their function . Metaphor studies and translation studies intersect in the zone of critical hermeneutics:  in contrast to the other approaches to metaphor, only hermeneutics is concerned  with the historical embodiment of the subject which is interpreting a text . It takes  two ideas to make a metaphor, and so there are no metaphors in the dictionary, but  only in discourse . The function of a critical study of metaphor is to suggest a technique for liberating ourselves from the defects of the interpretative traditions that  we have received but not interrogated . This paper will proceed in four steps: first, I will summarize the origins of the  reduction of metaphor to a rhetorical trope, then I will discuss three main currents  in modern metaphor studies: the semantic paradigm, the structuralist paradigm and  the hermeneutical paradigm .8 I intend to argue that (1) language in general, and thus legal language in particular, is constituted by a mobile army of metaphors, by metaphors that point to other  metaphors; (2) a non-metaphorical language does not exist; and (3) there are a series  of prejudices, laden with ideology and false conscience, that resist this hermeneutical vision, such as the illusions: of an objective substance underlying subjective appearances, of an ontological reality underpinning linguistic formulations, of an economic structure giving rise to a legal superstructure and of a scientific rigor that is  superior to a poetic indeterminacy . II THe

orIgIns of a rHeTorICal ConCePTIon of meTaPHor

“Men in fact are affected in the same way by style as by foreigners and compatriots .  So the discourse must be made to sound exotic; for men are admirers of what is  distant, and what is admired is pleasant .”9 In his work on rhetoric Aristotle casts an  image of distance as a vehicle of eloquence . Of all the brilliant figures that can be  expressed in speech, metaphor stands out for its iconic ability to ‘make visible’ . Aristotle believes that metaphor translates speech into images, making it more beautiful  and  thus  more  persuasive .  This  is  the  basis  of  an  ornamental  conception  of  metaphor:  metaphors  can  bring  inanimate  things  to  life .  Finding  beautiful  meta7  8 

9 

Ibid., 115 . Like all classifications, this one is ultimately arbitrary and subject to criticism . As Barthes reminds us, “The passion for classifying always seems Byzantine to one who does not share it […]  and yet it is usually normal . The taxonomic option implies an ideological one: there is always a  placed in the place of things: tell me how you classify and I will tell you who you are”, R . Barthes, La retorica antica, Milan, 2006, p . 53 . Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, H .C . Lawson-Tancred (tr .), London, 1991, Chapter 3 .2, 1404b .

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phors means knowing how to see and how to grasp the similarity between different  things .  Metaphors  have  a  manipulative  character,  which  leads  Aristotle  to  advise  drawing  them  “from  related  but  not  obvious  things  …  Most  witticisms  are  also  produced through metaphor and an additional illusion; for what the hearer hears  becomes clearer to him through its being the opposite to what he thought, and the  mind  seems  to  say,  “How  true,  and  I  was  wrong .”10  Metaphor’s  persuasive  effect  comes  from  manipulation,  and  Aristotle  sets  forth  a  taxonomy  to  organize  this:  “metaphor is the imposition of a name on another thing: either the name of the  genus applied to the species, or the name of the species applied to the genus, or the  name of one species applied to another, or an analogy .”11 Metaphor  emerges  from  this  analytical  reduction  as  a  figure  of  speech,  supported by a prejudice in favor of image, and potentially dangerous for its deceptive  potential . According to Ricoeur, Aristotle sealed the destiny of metaphor “for centuries to come: henceforth it is connected to poetry and rhetoric, not at the level of  discourse, but at the level of a segment of discourse, the name or noun .”12 Metaphor’s  environment  is  defined  as  language,  itself  already  ordered  into  genus  and  species and playing by already-determined rules . The rhetorical work of metaphor  consists thus in the violation of this order and the rules of this game: to call the  genus by the specie’s name, and vice versa, means simultaneously recognizing and  undermining the logical structure of language .  Cicero  also  viewed  metaphor  (translatio)  as  “a  small  similarity  reduced  into  a  single word,”13 whose function is essentially ornamental: “There is a vast application for the use of metaphor: while arising out of necessity, from the  poverty and limits of vocabulary, metaphor then acquired popularity for its pleasant character .  Like clothes, which were invented to protect us from the cold but then began to be used to  decorate the body, so also metaphor, created to compensate for the lack of words, came to be  commonly used for pleasure .”14

While classical rhetoric is interested in the displacement of meaning from the real  to the figurative triggered by metaphor, the new rhetoric situates metaphor within a  theory of argumentation . Reducing metaphor to a trope, Perelman defines it as “a  condensed analogy, resulting from the fusion of an element of the fora with an element of the theme .”15 Like Aristotle, Perelman considers metaphor to be a concentration of the analogical process: “any analogy – except those which present themselves in a rigid form, like allegory and parable – spontaneously becomes metaphor .”16  Even in the new rhetoric metaphor remains an argumentative device .17 10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17 

Ibid ., 1412a . Poetics, III, 2, 1457b . P . Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, London, 1977, p . 14 . Cicero, De oratore, III, 39: “Similitudinis est ad verbum unum contracta brevitas” . Id., III, 38 . C . Perelman and L . Olbrechts-Tyteca, Trattato sull’argomentazione, Turin, 1989, 421 . Id., 425 . Cf . J . Derrida, La mitologia bianca. La metafora nel testo filosofico, in G . Conte (ed .), Metafora, Milan, 1981, 247: “Every time that rhetoric defines metaphor, this implies not only a philosophy  but a conceptual web within which the philosophy is constituted . Moreover, every thread in this  web forms a turn of speech, one could say a metaphor if this notion were not too derivative in this  context . The defined is thus implied in the defining of the definition” .

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The rhetorical point of view gives way to the semantic one when “metaphor is transferred into the framework of the sentence and is treated not as a case of deviant denomination, but as a case of impertinent predication .”18 An exclusively rhetorical conception of metaphor, whether classical or modern, depends upon the attribution of  a privileged position to the word, to the name . A semantic analysis, by contrast,  treats the phrase as the primary unit of meaning . Whereas rhetoric treats metaphor  as a trope or a device which changes the meaning of a word through an analogy with  another word, semantics regards metaphor as an unusual attribution at the level of  the phrase or the discourse . A seminal work articulating the semantic conception of  metaphor is Richards’ Philosophy of Rhetoric . Richards conceives of rhetoric as a study  of  verbal  understanding  and  misunderstandings .  He  thus  begins  his  examination  with  a  look  at  the  dark  side  of  communication,  confusion,  and  then  focuses  on  manipulation and language disturbances . For Richards, rhetoric becomes a study of  verbal equivocations and their relative corrections . He declines to set forth a taxonomy,  precisely  because  he  aims  to  reassert  the  primacy  of  discourse  over  the  word . For Richards, language is not just a system of signalling . And words are not  tools for copying life, but for ordering it . Words are the places where experiences,  which could never encounter each other at the level of feeling or intuition, somehow come together . They are the opportunity and the means for the mind’s relentless attempt to order itself . Metaphor is not just another figure of speech, but an  omnipresent principle of language . It is through metaphor that words, passing from  one context to another, change meaning . But there is no fixed, original, inherent  meaning . The meaning of a word always depends upon the use that one makes of it  and the purpose for which it is used . An exclusively rhetorical conception is insufficient, because metaphor must be situated within a process of interpretation . Richards thus puts forward a hermeneutical proposal: the theory of language may have something to learn, not much but a little, from  the way in which the physicist envisages stabilities . But much closer analogies are  possible with some of the patterns of biology . The theory of interpretation is obviously a branch of biology – a branch that has not grown very far or very healthily  yet .  To  remember  this  may  help  us  to  avoid  some  traditional  mistakes  –  among  them the use of bad analogies which tie us up if we take them too seriously . Some  of these are notorious; for example, the opposition between form and content, and  the almost equivalent opposition between matter and form . These are wretchedly  inconvenient  metaphors .  So  is  that  other  which  makes  language  a  dress  which  thought puts on . We shall do better to think of a meaning as though it were a plant  that  has  grown  –  not  a  can  that  has  been  filled  or  a  lump  of  clay  that  has  been  moulded .19 While a theory of rhetoric is impossible, we can study the development of certain  metaphors  in  order  to  understand  the  values  that  they  further .  A  theory  of  metaphor is also impossible because every metaphor implies a comparison .

18  P . Ricoeur, op. cit., 4 . 19  I .A . Richards, op. cit., 12 .

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What is a comparison? It may be several different things: it may be just a putting  together of two things to let them work together; it may be a study of them both to  see how they are like and how unlike one another; or it may be a process of calling  attention to their likenesses or a method of drawing attention to certain aspects of  the one through the co-presence of the other . As we mean by comparison these different things we get different conceptions of metaphor .20 Thus  Richards,  in  criticizing  the  sterility  of  a  rhetorical  and  taxonomic  approach, offers us a comparative vision of language and metaphor . Our way of perceiving and describing the function of a particular comparison/metaphor depends  upon its purpose . While rhetoric views metaphor as a simple displacement of words,  semantics views it instead as an exchange of thoughts, a transaction between contexts . As constitutive principles of language, the metaphors that we avoid shape our  thought just as much as those we accept . The creation of metaphor is so marvellous  and enigmatic that human attempts to describe and comprehend it are necessarily  incomplete .  But  by  observing  the  function  of  metaphor  from  the  assumption  of  incomprehension, we can correct for the abuse of metaphor, by which it is used in  order to conceal unspoken interests . Our skill with metaphor, with thought, is one thing – prodigious and inexplicable; our reflective awareness of that skill is quite another thing – very incomplete,  distorted, fallacious, over-simplifying . Its business is not to replace practice, or to  tell us how to do what we cannot do already; but to protect our natural skill from  the interferences of unnecessarily crude views about it; and, above all, to assist the  imparting of that skill – that command of metaphor – from mind to mind . And  progress  here,  in  translating  our  skill  into  observation  and  theory,  comes  chiefly  from profiting by our mistakes .21 Richards’ insights were later taken up by Max Black . In his classic work, Models and Metaphors,22 Black articulates three conceptions of metaphor . First of all, there  is the substitutive theory: in metaphor, one word substitutes another by virtue of its  analogous meaning . According to the substitutive vision, metaphor is used to communicate a meaning that could have been expressed literally . If the writer substitutes  L with M, the reader’s job is to invert this substitution, using the literal meaning of  L as a clue to understanding the literal meaning of M . Comprehending a metaphor  is like decifering a code or solving a puzzle . Next, there is the comparative theory of  metaphor,  which  is  really  a  kind  of  substitution . This  is  an  update  of  the Aristotelean vision of the metaphor as a condensed analogy (recall Quintilian, for whom  “a simile is when I say that a man has behaved ‘like a lion’, a metaphor is when I say  that a man ‘is a lion’”) .23 While the substitutive vision says that ‘Achilles is courageous’, the comparative vision says that ‘Achilles is like a lion’ . One vision mentions  courage, the other assumes it without saying so . Lastly, there is an interactive theory  of metaphor: the reader or listener of a metaphorical expression is required to connect two ideas . Every metaphor contains two different ideas that act against each  other, and meaning is the product of this interaction . If I say that the lion is the king  of the jungle, I say both that the lion is on the highest level of a hierarchy, and also  20  21  22  23 

Id., 120 . Id., 116 . M . BLACK, Modelli, archetipi, metafore, Parma, 1992 . QUINTILIANO, Istituzione oratoria, VIII, 6, 9 .

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that monarchy is a necessary institution, even for animals (implying that animals are  not capable of establishing a republic) . The interactive theory imagines metaphor as  a filter: the main subject is ‘seen through’ the metaphorical expression; the image of  Achilles is filtered through the icon of the lion . To call a man a lion means framing  him in a special light, and also makes the lion seem more human! Studying the metaphors, models and archetypes that structure scientific theories  or legal doctrines does help us to appreciate the value of the imagination . But even  if the rhetorical and semantic paradigms succeed in illuminating metaphor’s function, they fail to say anything about the subject who is interpreting them . Neither  rhetoric nor semantics widen the scope of the metaphorical field so far as to comprehend the fusion of horizons sought by the hermeneutical vision . Iv THe

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But before examaning the hermeneutical paradigm, we must consider the structuralist critique of metaphor . The structuralist attack is pointed: making metaphor the  constitutive  principle  of  language  is  both  intellectually  lazy,  because  it  seeks  to  avoid the work of analyzing the differences between its tropes, as well as aphasic,  because it ignores the parallel work of metonymy .  Taking up Richards’ suggestion to study the pathological side of communication, Jakobson concentrated his attention on language disturbances . As the observation  of  children  enables  us  to  understand  how  language  is  acquired,  so  does  the  observation of aphasics enable us to understand how language is lost . Linguistics is  interested in language in all of its aspects: language in practice, language in development, language being born, language in dissolution . Following Saussure, Jakobson  observes how every linguistic sign implies two faculties: combination and selection .  In  combination,  constitutive  signs  combine  with  each  other  and  then  with  other  signs; combination and contextualization are two aspects of the same process . In  selection, alternative signs are chosen which can then substitute each other; selection  and substitution are two aspects of the same process . While speaker has no freedom  in the combination phase, because language is a predefined, indispensible, culturally-given code, there is more freedom in the selection phase, where it is possible to  choose between multiple expressions . Observing aphasic disturbances, Jakobson notices that there can be two types of regression, which correspond to these two phases  of language: a loss in the capacity of combination and a loss in the capacity of selection .  Someone  who  loses  the  ability  to  contextualize  mobilises  only  substitutive  resources, and thus works only with similies, identifying things in a metaphorical  way .  Someone  who  loses  the  ability  to  select  mobilises  only  contextualizing  resources, and thus identifies things only in a metonymic way (for example, calling a  telescope a microscope or a lantern fire) . The varieties of aphasia are numerous and diverse, but all of them lie between  the  two polar  types just  described . Every  form of aphasic disturbance  consists in  some impairment, more or less severe, either of the faculty for selection and substitution or for combination and contexture . The former affliction involves a deterioration of metalinguistic operations, while the latter damages the capacity for maintaining the hierarchy of linguistic units . The relation of similarity is suppressed in 

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the former, the relation of contiguity in the latter type of aphasia . Metaphor is alien  to the similarity disorder, and metonymy to the contiguity disorder .24 Speech regression, like its development, unfolds along two different semantic  axes, the metaphoric and metonymic . In the same way, we see that different historical epochs or cultural movements show a preference for metaphor or metonymy . In  painting, it is clear how Cubism was inspired by a metonymic orientation, while  surrealism preferred a metaphorical language . In film, Griffith favored a metonymic  montage, varying the angle, the perspective and the center of the frame, while Chaplin  preferred  a  metaphoric  montage,  introducing  gradual  dissolves .  In  literature,  Romanticism  favors  metaphoric  expressions,  which  Realism  prefers  metonymic  ones .  Similarity in meaning connects the symbols of a metalanguage with the symbols of the language referred to . Similarity connects a metaphorical term with the  term for which it is substituted . Consequently, when constructing a metalanguage  to interpret tropes, the researcher possesses more homogeneous means to handle  metaphor, whereas metonymy, based on a different principle, easily defies interpretation .  Therefore  nothing  comparable  to  the  rich  literature  on  metaphor  can  be  cited for the theory of metonymy … Not only the tool of the observer but also the  object of observation is responsible for the preponderance of metaphor over metonymy in scholarship . Since poetry is focused upon the sign, and pragmatical prose  primarily upon the referent, tropes and figures were studied mainly as poetic devices  … Thus, for poetry, metaphor, and for prose, metonymy is the line of least resistance and, consequently, the study of poetical tropes is directed chiefly toward metaphor . The actual bipolarity has been artificially replaced in these studies by an amputated, unipolar scheme which, strikingly enough, coincides with one of the two  aphasic patterns, namely with the contiguity disorder .25 Gérard  Genette  shares  Jakobson’s  idea  that  the  preponderence  of  metaphor  studies is due to a scientific afasia . He argues that privileging metaphor over metonymy implies a restriction of rhetoric . From the structuralist point of view, metaphor is only one form among many others, and its promotion to the status of analogy par excellence results from a kind of violence . Arguing against those who affirm  that metaphor is the central figure of any rhetoric, Genette asserts that “thus, by  virtue of an apparently universal and irrepressible centricism, the heart of rhetoric  – or what is left of it – is no longer defined by the polar opposition between metaphor and metonymy, in which some air could still enter and some fragment of a  great game could still circulate, but rather by the unadorned metaphor, frozen in its  useless regality .”26 The structuralist critique of the semantic approach to metaphor  thus reduces metaphor to one trope among many . In this way, metaphor gets reabsorbed back into rhetoric . An attempt to widen the horizons and functions of metaphor is put forward in  the cognitivism of George Lakoff .27 For Lakoff, metaphor permeates daily life, not  only in language but also in thought and action . Examining ordinary language, we  can locate some recurring metaphors . For example, expressions like ‘attack’ a view,  24  25  26  27 

R . Jakobson and M . Halle, Fundamentals of Language, Paris, 1971, 90 . Id., 95–96 . G . Genette, La retorica ristretta, in G . Conte (ed .), Metafora, Milan, 1981, 220 G . Lakoff and M . Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, London, 1980 .

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‘defend’ a thesis, argumentative ‘strategy’, ‘gain’ or ‘lose territory’, suggest a common metaphorical reference to argumentation understood as war . Expressions such  as ‘wasting’ time playing, ‘gaining’ time with a gadget, ‘investing’ time in a study,  ‘having’  time  at  hand,  suggest  a  common  metaphorical  reference  to  time  understood as money . In the classic, Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson present a  metaphorical taxonomy, classifying the valences of metaphorical expressions . Arguing against objectivist conceptions, which presuppose a real meaning of words, Lakoff advances a constitutive vision of metaphor, which holds the meaning of words  is produced .  Lakoff concentrates above all on the role of metaphor in political communication .28 The art of framing, which means choosing the right slogan for introducing  certain themes into the public debate, strongly conditions the substantive value of  the matter in discussion . To speak about ‘abortion’ is different from speaking about  the ‘voluntary interruption of pregnancy’, tilting us more in favor of the fetus’s right  to life than the mother’s right to self-determination . Another example can be seen  in the choice between ‘euthanasia’ and ‘the right to death with dignity’ (or “the right  not to be subjected to aggressive therapy”): euthanasia accents the egoistic and hedonistic pleasure of the relativist who seeks escape from the inevitable suffering of  life, while rights give value to the dignity of the autonomous decision to avoid useless, tragic suffering in the terminal phase of one’s own existence .  Legal language provides cases of metaphorical transformations that reflect shifts  in underlying political perceptions . An example from Italian law is the widespread  practice of calling parliamentary laws by the name of their sponsors, which has the  effect  of  reinforcing  the  personification  of  the  political  power  and  depriving  the  parliament as a whole of responsibility for its product . If the immigration law becomes the ‘Bossi-Fini’, the immigration policies of the Italian state become the target of sympathies and antipathies towards two individual politicians, who in turn  become the Italian state (a case of selective aphasia with a regression along the metonymic  axis) .  Another  example  is  the  practice  of  calling  some  laws  ‘arbitration’,  thus marking a public legislative act by a private law term; the law thus loses that  civilizing veil of hypocrisy which portrayed it as an abstract provision aimed at protecting  the  general  interest,  to  instead  take  on  the  brutal  appearance  of  a  private  agreement aimed at protecting the very particular interests of individuals . In calling  a law an ‘arbitration’, the politician who has rendered service to his boss gets linguistically promoted to the status of peace-maker who has successfully ended a conflict  (a case of combinative aphasia, with a regression along the metaphorical axis) . Both the structuralist critique of metaphor and the cognitive revaluation of it  shake up taxonomies in order to put metaphor in its proper place . While the structuralists  reduce  metaphor  to  a  rhetorical  figure,  the  cognitivists  confine  it  at  the  center  of  language .  While  structualism  divides  language  into  langue and  parole,  hermeneutics  sees  every  speech  act  as  an  event .  The  truth  of  metaphors  cannot  emerge from the mechanical analogizing of the structuralist taxonomies, which reduce meaning to the identification and the reassignment of labels . Language is not  just a code or a system, but a place in which human beings concentrate the meaning  of their own experience . 28  Cf . G . Lakoff, Don’t Think of an Elephant!, White River Junction, VT, 2004 .

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Only with a hermeneutic approach can we hope to understand ourselves as standing  before  a  world  that  reflects  us,  our  prejudices  and  our  convictions .  The  hermeneutics of metaphor requires not only an interpretation of the metaphor in light of  the text, but also an interpretation of the text in light of the metaphor . Only in this  way  can  the  metaphoral  word  acquire  meaning  and  value  in  a  metaphorical  discourse . Metaphor generates a fusion of horizons and an opening of the world, which  tears the subject out of the self-referentiality of his own assumptions and traditional  prejudices, requiring instead (and making possible) the imagination “no longer understood  as  the  faculty  of  deriving  ‘images’  from  sensory  experiences,  but  as  the  capacity to let new worlds construct our self-understanding . This power will not be  given by new images, but by new meanings in our language . The imagination will  then be regarded as a dimension of language . And a new relationship between imagination and metaphor will appear”29 . Only a hermeneutic conception of metaphor places metaphor within the hermeneutic circle, which is not limited to figures  of speech or structures of language, but embraces the horizons of received cultural  traditions and the existential practices of a subject who interrogates a text by attributing meaning and value to it .  The pioneer of contemporary metaphor studies, Hans Blumenberg, synthesized  both  the  semantic  and  structural  conceptions  of  metaphor  while,  in  a  Hegelian  fashion, he superceded them . While semantic views employed ‘paradigms’ to focus  on the mechanisms for displacing meaning, structural approaches studied the classifications of metaphor’s persuasive and coercive effects . For Blumenberg, by contrast, only a hermeneutic conception could do justice to the value of metaphor: a  metaphor is not just an enunciation that can be reduced into concepts, nor a disciplinary strategy making use of manipulative rhetoric to subordinate individuals, but  rather a point of condensation for historically-conditioned cultures and traditions .  So, for example, European metaphors are more organic, while American metaphors  are more mechanistic . The rhetorical origin of metaphor corresponds to its original  ambiguity: “metaphor undoubtedly has its roots in the ambivalence of ancient rhetoric:  the  orator  can  let  the  truth  ‘appear’  in  its  legitimate  splendor,  but  can  also  make the false assume the same appearance as the truth .”30 The ‘literal meaning’ is in fact the flood lands formed by the disaggregation and  commingling of the old  metaphorical rocks . According to Blumenberg,  there  are  thus  some  archetypal  metaphors,  continually  invoked  in  order  to  designate  phenomena for which there is no specific figure and that cannot therefore be reduced  to conceptual terms (such as law, the force of law, constitution, state, sovereignty) .  From the hermeneutical standpoint, metaphor’s value is not objective and intrinsic,  but rather depends on the context in which it is inserted and on the tradition from  which it emanates . In  his  masterpiece,  The Rule of Metaphor,  Ricoeur  argues  for  a  hermeneutical  conception: “metaphor presents itself as a strategy of discourse that, while preserving and developing the creative power of language, preserves and develops the heu29  P . Ricoeur, Metafora e ermeneutica, in G . Conte (a cura di) Metafora, Milan, 1981, 170 . 30  H . Blumenberg, Paradigmi per una metaforologia, Bologna, 1969, 114 .

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ristic power wielded by fiction .”31 “Through metaphor, subjectivity opens up to the  tension of the truth, required by the fictitious aspect of the category or the concept .  This is obviously a metaphorical, comparative truth, which interrogates the meaning of translation .”32 In the great majority of studies dedicated to metaphor, be they rhetorical or semantic,  we  do  not  see  a  due  respect  paid  to  the  insuperable  contribution  of  Nietzsche’s early essay on truth and lying . A master of metaphor, Nietzsche reflects on  the birth and development of language in the phase of his own life in which he left  philology to pursue the fusion of poetry and philosophy that would mark his unmistakable style . Nietzsche imagines a scene very much like the beginning of 2001: A Space Odyssey: “in some remote corner of the universe, poured out and glittering  in  innumerable  solar  systems,  there  once  was  a  star  on  which  clever  animals  invented  knowledge .”33  This  fable  imagines  that  the  invention  of  language  corresponds to the original sin of the claim to truth: the word is the result of three metaphorical leaps of translation: a nerve stimulus is translated into an image, an image  into a sound, a sound into a word . Words cannot correspond to things, because they  are the product of these leaps in the sensory realm . Even when comparing words in  different languages that are supposed to mean the same thing, we come up against  the ultimate impossibility of translation, and must disabuse ourselves of the false  pretense of actually grasping the noumenous, ontological essence of things: “The different languages, set side by side, show that what matters with words is never the truth,  never an adequate expression; else there would not be so many languages . The “thing in itself ”  (for that is what pure truth, without consequences, would be) is quite incomprehensible to the  creators of language and is not at all worth aiming for . One designates only the relations of  things to man, and to express them one calls on the boldest metaphors . A nerve stimulus, first  transposed into an image – first metaphor . The image, in turn, imitated by a sound – second  metaphor . And each time there is a complete overleaping of one sphere, right into the middle  of an entirely new and different one .”34

Nietzsche  is  not  simply  making  the  nihilistic  argument  that  there  is  no  truth .  In  emphasizing  the  importance  of  translation  in  the  transformation  of  sounds  into  images and then into words, Nietzsche advances the paradoxical idea that the very  “nature” of truth claims is metaphorical, that there is only metaphorical truth: “What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms – in  short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically  and  rhetorically,  and  which  after  long  use  seem  firm,  canonical,  and  obligatory  to  a  people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors  which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and now  matter only as metal, no longer as coins .”35

While metaphorical creativity is the pulse of life, the conceptual order is created and  imposed by subjects incapable of abandoning themselves to artistic, mythological  31  P . Ricoeur, op. cit., 6 . 32  P . Ricoeur, Metafora e ermeneutica, in G . Conte (ed .), Metafora, Milan, 1981, 152 . 33  F . Nietzsche, On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, from the Nachlass . Compiled from translations by Walter Kaufmann and Daniel Breazeale . http://www .geocities .com/thenietzschechannel/  tls .htm . 34  Id . 35  Id .

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or onirical ecstasy . The metaphorical style is a sign of the fullness of life, just as the  ‘demonstrative’  style  suggests  its  impoverishment .  Nietzsche  lavishes  particular  scorn upon those who (like myself) make a profession out of scientific research, for  having fled from metaphorical heights to seek refuge in dead concepts: “We have seen how it is originally language which works on the construction of concepts, a labor  taken over in later ages by science . Just as the bee simultaneously constructs cells and fills them  with honey, so science works unceasingly on this great columbarium of concepts, the graveyard  of perceptions . It is always building new, higher stories and shoring up, cleaning, and renovating  the old cells; above all, it takes pains to fill up this monstrously towering framework and to arrange therein the entire empirical world, which is to say, the anthropomorphic world . Whereas  the man of action binds his life to reason and its concepts so that he will not be swept away and  lost, the scientific investigator builds his hut right next to the tower of science so that he will be  able to work on it and to find shelter for himself beneath those bulwarks which presently exist .  And he requires shelter, for there are frightful powers which continuously break in upon him,  powers which oppose scientific truth with completely different kinds of “truths” which bear on  their shields the most varied sorts of emblems .”36

For Nietzsche, therefore, every metaphor is intuitive and singular and incommensurable, thus eluding any classification . Notwithstanding this, because the genial creator of metaphors does not learn from his own experience, reason seeks incessantly  to reify metaphorical life in conceptual abstractions . Doing this, the rational mind  imagines an ontological substance lying behind a nominalistic appearance and seeks  refuge in a conceptual order, presented as objective, neutral or natural, but which is  really arbitrary, value-laden and partial . A theory of metaphor is impossible because  it reduces metaphor to theory when its very nature is metaphorical . What then is the point of speaking around, through or by means of metaphors?  According to Nietzsche, “the new philosopher does not use metaphors in the rhetorical sense, but rather subordinates them to a correct language or a strategic aim:  he uses non-stereotypical metaphors in order to reveal the deeper metaphors that  constitute  every  concept”37 .  It  is  in  this  way  that  the  hermeneutics  approach  to  metaphor has a meaning for the law: the goal of legal analysis is to become aware of  the metaphorical nature of normative language, to show the values contained and  furthered by legal metaphors and to call attention to the abuse of metaphor committed by apparently neutral and impartial concepts . While rhetoric, semantics and structuralism do not consider the historical embodiment of the interpreting subject, hermeneutics regards the individual’s being in  time and his critical evocation of his own traditions as necessarily creative of meaning . For a hermeneutical approach, the classification of legal metaphors can serve as  a first step in a serious study of them . But the ultimate goal is to narrate the genealogies of legal metaphors and critically analyze the values that they serve . The genealogical reconstruction of a metaphor is not itself sufficient because “hardening  and congealing of a metaphor guarantees absolutely nothing concerning its necessity  and  exclusive  justification .”38  So,  in  the  face  of  historically  embedded  metaphors, we come back to considerations of the uses and disadvantages of metaphor 

36  Id. 37  Cf . S . KOFMAN, Nietzsche et la métaphore, Paris, 1972, 31 . 38  F . NIETZSCHE, op. cit.

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for  life .39  If  the  legal  scholar  is  active  and  ambitious,  he  will  tend  to  construct  a  monumental historicity; if he seeks to preserve and revere, he will tend to construct  an antiquated historicity; if he suffers and seeks liberation, he will tend to construct  a critical historicity . A critical hermeneutic of metaphor examines the history of legal doctrines, without instrumentalizing them to serve a contemporary debate or  venerating them for a glorious future . It renounces the aspiration of explaining how  law is created and how it functions, in order to focus on metaphorical expressions’  potential for distortion and abuse . I would like to conclude with the important admonition of Richards: “It is an old dream that in time psychology might be able to tell us so much about our minds  that we would at last become able to discover with some certainty what we mean by our words  and how we mean it . An opposite or complementary dream is that with enough improvement  in Rhetoric we may in time learn so much about words that they will tell us how our minds  work . It seems modest and reasonable to combine these dreams and hope that a patient persistence with the problems of Rhetoric may, while exposing the causes and modes of the misinterpretation of words, also throw light upon and suggest a remedial discipline for deeper and more  grievous disorders .”40

39  F . NIETZSCHE, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, in Untimely Meditations (R .J .  Hollingdale, trans .), Cambridge, 1983 . 40  I .A . RICHARDS, op. cit., 136 .

e. IRem akI / woJcIecH załuskI PaTHologIes of legal reasonIng or legal reasonIng as a PaTHology? Two InTerPreTaTIons of THe sTranger I InTroduCTIon The Stranger by Albert Camus naturally attracts the attention of legal philosophers:  this  is  arguably  the  most  frequently  commented  novel  by  the  proponents  of  the  Law and Literature movement .1 The reason why The Stranger arouses great interest  among legal scholars is that one of the important layers of this multilayered novel is  a sophisticated critique of law or legal system . What is not clear, however, is how  profound this critique is, i .e ., how it should exactly be interpreted . The aim of our  paper is to attempt to answer this question: we shall propose two different interpretations  of  this  critique,  compare  them  and  try  to  decide  which  of  them  is  more  plausible . Let us briefly present these two interpretations . According to the first interpretation,  The  Stranger  provides  a  non-radical  critique of law:  it  reveals  some  pathologies of legal reasoning but does not imply that legal reasoning is inherently  pathological, whereas according to the second interpretation, The Stranger provides a radical critique of law: it does much more than just reveal pathologies of legal reasoning  – it implies that legal reasoning is inherently pathological . Before we turn to a more detailed presentation of these interpretations, let us  mention some ‘non-legal’ readings of The Stranger . For instance, the novel can be  read as revealing threats which society poses for an individual, or as describing the  alienation of human beings in the modern world of powerful institutions and political  systems,  or  as  presenting  the  conflict  between  the  Epicurean  form  of  life  (which can arguably be assigned to Mersault – the novel’s protagonist) and the conditions of the modern society . These readings of The Stranger seem neither mutually  exclusive nor exclusive with the ‘legal’ readings to be presented in the following sections; in order to give justice to the novel’s richness, one would have to combine  those  ‘non-legal’  and  ‘legal’  readings  in  some  way  (the  task  which  is  beyond  our  scope in this article) . II InTerPreTaTIon I:

PaTHologIes of legal reasonIng

As we have already mentioned, the first interpretation asserts that The Stranger provides a non-radical critique of law: it points to some avoidable pathologies of legal  reasoning . Let us now develop this interpretation at greater length . According to the  1 

See, e .g ., Weisberg . R . 1975–1976 . Comparative Law in Comparative Literature: The Figure of  the  ‘Examining  Magistrate’  in  Dostoevsky  and  Camus .  29  Rutgers Law Review,  29:  237–258;  Carroll . D . 2004–2005 . Guilt by ‘Race’: Injustice in Camus’s The Stranger, Cardozo Law Review,  26: 2331–2344; Richard, Posner . 2002 . Law and Literature, Cambridge: Harvard University Press;  and Dwight, Newman . 2000 . Existentialism and Law: Toward a Reinvigorated Law and Literature Analysis . Saskatchewan Law Review, 67: 87–117 .

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dominant – and, arguably, plausible – account of legal reasoning, in the process of  legal decision-making the duty of judge is to be ‘within law’ . This means that a judge  should base his/her legal decisions only on legal rules and principles . One type of  rules excluded by this account of legal reasoning are various social conventions and  other evidently extra-legal elements (e .g ., the fact of having or not given religious  convictions) . There are two main reasons for the exclusion of such elements from  among those elements that constitute the basis of legal verdicts . First, given the fact  that social conventions are often not universally accepted by the members of a society and may change relatively fast, to let them be allowed for in the process of legal reasoning would arguably violate such important principles of law as objectivity  and predictability, and, consequently, the principle of the rule of law . Second, social  conventions do not have a moral character: their infringements do not constitute  mala in se, or, to put it alternatively, they do no harm to other people . Now, one  admissible way of reading The Stranger is that this novel provides a critique of legal  reasoning in so far as it is based on this kind of conventions . Mersault – the aforementioned novel’s protagonist – committed a crime – homicide . However, in the  course of legal proceedings Mersault is in fact judged also for his having failed to  comply with social conventions unrelated to his crime, e .g ., for his not having behaved properly, i .e ., in accordance with social conventions, after his mother’s death,  or for his firm rejection to accept any religious convictions . The questions posed to  Mersault in the course of legal proceedings clearly illustrate this problem; it may be  worthwhile presenting some of those questions . Mersault’s lawyer finds it important to know whether the charge of Mersault’s  callousness during his mother’s funeral is true: “You must understand,” the lawyer said, “that I don’t relish having to question you about such  a matter . But it has much importance, and, unless I find some way of answering the charge of  ‘callousness,’ I shall be handicapped in conducting your defense .”2

Mersault can hardly discern the connection between his case and his mother’s funeral, but the lawyer insists that from the standpoint of the law such a connection  exists: “When  I  suggested  that  Mother’s  death  had  no  connection  with  the  charge  against  me,  he  merely replied that this remark showed I’d never had any dealings with the law .”3

Indeed, the lawyer’s remark was true . It is confirmed by the further course of the  legal process . During the process of Mersault is more or less openly accused of not  loving his mother, not shedding tears on her funeral, having a liaison with a woman  just after the funeral . To put it generally: he is accused of flouting social conventions  which in fact have nothing to do with his crime .  Mersault was finally sentenced to death . It is clear that extralegal social conventions unrelated to his crime played an important role in passing this sentence . This  is pathology of legal reasoning – an obvious violation of the rule of law . The rule of  law requires that legal rules and principles upon which legal verdicts are to be passed  should be defined as precisely as possible . It is clear that they cannot be defined  with absolute precision – contrary to what some positivistic legal philosophers have  2  3 

Camus, Albert . 1946 . The Stranger, transl . Stuart Gilbert, New York: Vintage Books, 41 . Ibid .

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claimed . However, it seems equally clear that this legal basis cannot be defined as  broadly and vaguely as it is in fact defined in the course of Mersault’s process . Three additional points may be in order here . First, our first ‘legal’ interpretation of The Stranger does not imply that extra-legal elements should never be allowed  for by judges in the course of legal process . It is clear that some of them should be  to some extent: it is impossible to pass a just verdict focusing on an accused person’s  deed  alone  and  neglecting  his  personality  traits,  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  knowledge of personality traits is often indispensable for defining the very character  of the deed (say, whether it was premeditated or not); and in order to determine  these traits, it may be necessary to know how the person tends to behave in various  situational contexts . However, these elements should not become a basis for legal  decisions as they in fact do in the course of Mersault’s process . Second, this interpretation does not imply any answer to the question as to how great is Mersault’s guilt,  or,  to  put  it  another  way,  who  ‘he  really  is’:  a  passionate  and  disinterested  truth  seeker  (the  first  reading),  or,  rather,  an  alienated  man,  deeply  estranged  from  the  society and living an empty and unreflective life (the second reading) . The first reading, arguably closer to Camus’s intentions, implies the view of society as a threat to  an individual which bars, by imposing on him various arbitrary requirements and  expectations, his free and full development . On this reading, which does not seem  very plausible to us, Mersault is a hero of truth who refuses to accept falsities which  the society requires its members to accept and is sufficiently courageous tell unpalatable truths, e .g ., “All normal people, I added as on afterthought, had more or less desired the death of those they loved, at some time or another.”4 Third, this interpretation does not  imply that legal reasoning is necessarily bound to be pathological: if it is conducted  correctly, it can be non-pathological – it can lead to just decisions . This is the reason  why we have dubbed ‘non-radical’ the critique of law under this interpretation: it  does not imply that legal reasoning is ‘by nature’ or inherently pathological . III InTerPreTaTIon II:

legal reasonIng as a PaTHology

We have already mentioned that according to the second interpretation The Stranger  provides  a  radical  critique  of  law:  it  points  at  an  unavoidable  pathology  of  legal  reasoning . This interpretation of The Stranger’s critique of law can be called ‘radical’, as it assumes that legal reasoning is inherently pathological: it always – or at  least usually – leads to unjust decisions . The source of legal reasoning’s pathological  character lies in its generality – its being based on general rules intended to apply to  classes of situations similar in all relevant aspects . However, according to this interpretation,  such  classes  do  not  exist:  each  concrete  situation  from  such  a  putative  class is in fact different from any other situation from this class not only in its irrelevant aspects but also in its relevant aspects . In other words, each situation to be decided by law constitutes its own – one-element – class . This means, in consequence, that  no general rules can ever be rightly applied to concrete situations . Each situation  needs to be judged according to a unique rule constructed by a judge only with the  intention to decide this concrete situation . A judge should examine each concrete  4 

Ibid, 41 .

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case in its uniqueness and concreteness, and not through the prism of abstract and  general  rules,  since  the  latter  perspective  leads  inevitably  or  almost  inevitably  to  unjust judgments . The conception of ethics which can be appealed to buttress this  critique of law is ‘situational ethics’ . According to this conception of ethics any view  of ethics assuming that normative reasoning consists in the application of general  and abstract rules to concrete cases is deeply mistaken, as it neglects the complexity  of concrete cases – the complexity on account of which these cases’ essential features can never be captured by this kind of rules . Since situational ethics was accepted by many existentialist thinkers (though it should be stressed that it is doubtful whether this conception of ethics can be ascribed to Camus), the second interpretation can be called ‘existentialist’, whereas the first interpretation can be called  ‘non-existentialist’, as it does not rely on any specifically existentialist assumptions .  What arguments can be put forward to support the claim that The Stranger can be  interpreted along the above presented line? Arguably, one of the most striking impressions the readers of The Stranger are likely to have while getting to know the story  of Mersault is the impression of great incongruence between the concrete situation of Mersault and the law according to which he is judged – between the individual case of Mersault and general legal categories to which the prosecutor and the judge must fit this  case . The following quotation is relevant here: “At one moment, however, I pricked up my ears; it was when I heard him saying: “It is true I  killed a man .” He went on in the same strain, saying “I” when he referred to me . It seemed so  queer … It seemed to me that the idea behind it was still further to exclude me from the case,  to put me off the map . so to speak, by substituting the lawyer for myself . Anyway, it hardly  mattered; I already felt worlds away from this courtroom and its tedious “proceedings .””5

This incongruence, so this second interpretation goes, does not stem merely from  the fact that legal reasoning made by legal actors who deal with Mersault’s crime is  based on extralegal social conventions which have little to do with this crime (as the  first interpretation suggests) but from the inherent feature of legal reasoning – its generality and abstractness . These features of law make it function in a way highly disconnected  from  human  reality .  Law  is,  then,  a  dehumanizing  entity,  as  it  objectifies  human  subjects .  Clearly  this  radical  interpretation  admits  of  a  more  and  less  extreme reading . The former one implies that legal systems, for the aforementioned  reasons, can never generate just verdicts with respect to concrete cases, whereas the  latter  reading  implies  that  legal  systems,  for  the  aforementioned  reasons,  usually  generate unjust verdicts, and that if they generate just verdicts, it happens as if ‘by  luck’ or ‘contingently’ . Iv ConCludIng

remarks

The problem of the plausibility of the two interpretations, with which we would like  to deal in this section, falls into two more specific questions . The first question is  about which of the two interpretations is ‘more true’ to the novel, i .e ., better reflects the  author’s intentions . The second question is about which of the two interpretations im-

5 

Ibid, 65 . 

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plies more plausible claims about the law . Let us deal successively with these two questions .  As for the first question, it may be plausibly argued that the second interpretation is ‘more true’ to Camus’s intentions (though, to repeat the point made in the  preceding section, it is rather doubtful whether situational ethics – one of the conception of ethics which can be used to justify this interpretation – can be assigned  to Camus): if Camus did intend to convey any legal-philosophical message in The Stranger, it was rather the message that the law – as a system of general and abstract  rules and a manifestation of the dehumanizing power of political institutions – may  constitute a threat to individuals than the message that judges ought not to take into  account in the process of legal-decision making social conventions and other extralegal elements .  Before we tackle the second question, let us at first emphasize that a detailed  analysis of these two interpretations as the claims about the law goes beyond the  scope of this article . We shall just confine ourselves to formulating several general  remarks without developing them at greater length . As we have already noticed in  Section 2, the first interpretation seems to convey an apt message about the law:  legal verdicts should be passed upon as precisely determinate a basis as the characteristics of legal discourse (e .g ., the vagueness of legal language, the role of values in  legal reasoning) allow . This is a simple requirement flowing directly from the idea of  the rule of law . However, the claim about the law implied by the second interpretation (both in its more and less extreme form) seems to be untenable . This is so because this claim seems to rely on the presupposition that that law is unnecessary for  maintaining social order – that law is in fact superfluous or redundant . This extravagant claim can be refuted by a commonsense argument that there seems to be no  better way of maintaining order in large societies than by means of formal law (i .e .,  composed of general and abstract rules and secured by institutionalized sanctions) .  Having said this, though, we would like to note that one can find a ‘rational core’  or ‘plausible core’ also in the second interpretation . This core is a simple intuition  which says that legal verdicts should be as adequate to concrete cases – as little removed from them – as it is possible .  At the end of this article, let us devote a few words to the problem of the compatibility of the two interpretations as the claims about the law . Clearly, these two  interpretations,  when  taken  literally,  are  not  compatible  because  the  first  one  assumes  that  the  law  is  not  inherently  pathological  (it  may  have  some  defects  but  these defects are removable), whereas the second one assumes that it is inherently  pathological . However, it is possible to combine the requirement with regard to law  that stems from the first interpretation with the ‘rational core’ of the second interpretation . Thus constructed ‘compound’ requirement with regard to law can be expressed in the following manner: legal verdicts should be passed upon as precisely  determinate a basis as possible and should be as adequate to concrete cases – as little  detached from human reality – as possible . Clearly, the realization of this requirement is difficult, as these two demands – the demand of the generality and the demand of concreteness – remain in a strong tension, and finding a ‘golden mean’  between them (the task to be realized jointly by legislators and judges) is more like  an art than as some kind of mechanical process .

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Acknowledgement This paper was earlier published on the website of the Italian Society for Law and Literature as part of the volume collecting papers presented at the special workshop on Law and Literature held at 24th IVR World Conference in Beijing. We would like to thank the editor of this volume – Prof. Paola Mittica – for permission to publish this paper in a printed version.

cHeng zHaoyang kIllIng me sofTly wITH your words? – an analysIs dynamICs In CHInese CourT medIaTIon dIsCourse*

of

Power

An  important  manifestation  of  power  relations  is  language  behavior .  The  manner  in  which  power and authority are exercised through language is a significant issue in the study of language and the law .—John Gibbons1

I InTroduCTIon Mediation or reconciliation, as a traditional Chinese method of dispute resolution,  attracted  much  attention  and  vigorous  discussion  during  the  ADR  movement  in  western countries, and since then it has been known worldwide as the “eastern experience” or “eastern flower” because of its efficiency, economy, and convenience in  conflict settlement . To date, however, the debates in the mediation field have centered on mediator qualification and process outcome mostly from the angle of a  macro legal-system analysis . For lack of substantial support from a detailed micro  study of a specific mediation practice, to some extent it is hard to say that the claims  and proposals brought up from those debates are well-grounded and convincing . In view of the above considerations, this paper adopts a micro linguistic-interaction analysis approach, with an aim to reveal some significant aspects of power  dynamics in China’s court mediation discourse . It consists of three parts: Part 1, a  survey of different sociological definitions of power; Part 2, discourse analysis of  various strategic uses of power by mediators; Part 3, reflections on the stereotypical  model of power operation in court mediation process and its ensuing consequences  and implications for the disputing parties as well as the mediator . In the first part, I  will argue that although the term “power” is a controversial notion, most scholars  define it as the ability and capability of a person or persons to perform an act or use  resources to impose some particular influence or effect on others in order to achieve  certain interests or goals . According to this definition and the relevant theories by  Michel Foucault and Dennis Wrong, it is reasonably believed that discourse in institutional  settings  tends  to  serve  as  a  strong  instrument  or  resource  of  persuasion,  control,  and  even  coercion,  taking  the  same  characters  and  functions  as  power .  Since mediation is carried on and done with words, certainly there is an interactive  relationship between discourse and power—the power dynamics in mediation discourse, where the second part of this paper comes in . In this part, I will focus on  various discursive strategies used by mediators in China’s court mediation system in  the hope of revealing some important aspects of power dynamics in court mediation—how the mediator uses “power to” and “power over” to elicit, induce, or force  the disputing parties to accept his or her suggestions as a pre-established framework  to shape and reshape their expectations of dispute endings . Those discursive strate* 

1 

The  author  would  like  to  express  his  deep  appreciation  to  Professor  Timothy  Endicott  and  especially his daughter Naomi for her thorough revision of this paper . Gibbons, J .P ., 2003, Forensic linguistics: An Introduction to Language in the Justice System, UK: Blackwell Publishing, p . 75 .

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gies include turn taking and turn management, topic control, the uses of interruption, overlap, repetition, powerful utterances, comments, reformation, strategic use  of certain types of questions, and so on . Based on those micro discourse analyses, I  will conclude in the final part that China’s court mediation discourse is a power  talk, which manifests power, power relationships, and power use . In China’s court  mediation  interaction,  mediators  have  much  more  discursive  resources  and  are  tempted to use them as acute weapons to exert (use and abuse) their judicial discretion and other institutional powers to achieve their own goal—to resolve the dispute  in question in the way they expect . Some very important questions arise here: Is the  mediator acting as a neutral and objective arbitrator as prescribed in state statutes?  Is the mediation process and outcome really a natural result of disputing parties’  self-reliance and autonomy? What should an ideal mediation look like in terms of  language use? To answer those questions we have to reconsider the nature of mediation, the well-known merits of it and, most importantly, its optimal role and position  in  China’s  current  construction  of  a  harmonious  society .  That  is  another  equally important topic of this paper . 1.1  a bRIef RevIew of cRItIcal study of language Since the 20th century’s “linguistic turn” in western philosophy, philosophers and  linguists are increasingly unsatisfied with regarding language as only a thinking and  communication tool . They have become increasingly aware of the relationship between language and power, as well as the interfering role of language in social process and personal life . For instance, Selden (1985) has pointed out sharply that the  most serious mistake that writers are capable of making is to presumptuously claim  that language is a natural and transparent medium through which readers can approach a reliable and unified “truth” or “reality” .2 Perse is also opposed to the idea  that language is only a tool serving for mutual exchange of information or meanings, because the theory of language as a tool assumes that information and meaning exist independently of language . Moreover, Lacan – from a psychoanalytic point  of  view  –  describes  the  relationship  between  the  signifier,  the  signified,  and  the  speaker, arguing that the signifier has an active function in deciding some effects:  “This passion of the signifier now becomes a new dimension of the human condition in that it is not only man who speaks, but that in man and through man it  speaks (ca parle), that his nature is woven by effects in which is to be fond the structure of language, of which he becomes the material” .3 Although Lacan emphasizes  the  passive  nature  of  the  speaking  subject,  he  indirectly  denies  the  concept  that  language is a transparent medium, suggesting that language speaks through the subject rather than the subject through the language . As Heidegger says, it is language  speaking, rather than people speaking . At this point, it also reminds us of Gadamer’s  concept of “language game”: the characteristic of the game is that it has an independent system of rules which cannot be deflected by the players’ personal wishes .  2  3   

See Selden, R ., 1985, Contemporary Literary Theory, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky . See Xin-Bin, 2005, Critical Linguistics: Theory and Applications, Shanghai: Shanghai Foreign Language Education Press, p . 4 . (辛斌著：《批评语言学：理论与应用》，上海外语教育出版社，2005年，第4页) 

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The players can get engaged in and enjoy the game only by adapting to and abiding  by the rule system . Gadamer therefore argues that the subject of game is not the  players, but rather that the game is manifested by the performance of players .4 Philosophers’ view of the linguistic function has resonated with a number of  linguists .  For  example,  Halliday  once  put  forward  the  “Instrumental  Linguistics”  concept,  and  advocated  the  study  of  language  for  the  purpose  of  understanding  other things, such as social systems . Fowler and other critical linguists56 once said,  is to change or even eliminate those conditions which are believed to tend to lead  to untrue or distorted consciousness, making what had previously been covert apparent–thereby  starting  a  process  of  reflection  among  individuals  and  groups  of  people in order to obtain a kind of liberation from past repression and domination .  I agree with this sort of critical attitude of discourse analysis, and try in this article  to adopt such an approach, using some examples of utterances to make a preliminary description, analysis, and interpretation of the operation of power in China’s  court mediation discourse, with a view to revealing certain aspects of the relationship between language and power in China’s current court mediation and conciliation activities . 1.2  InteRPRetatIon of tHe concePt of PoweR Power has always been a fundamental issue of various theoretical research programs,  especially in the fields of politics and sociology . However, different theorists with  different values and beliefs have put forward divergent views and opinions about its  definition, nature and sources . For example, in political philosophy and political  theory power is often understood as “both a generalized capacity to attain ends that  is unequally distributed among the members of a society as a result of the structure  of its major institutions on the one hand, and an asymmetrical social relation among  persons manifested directly in social interaction or indirectly through anticipated  reactions, on the other .”7 With further development of the study of power, “in recent  years,”  according  to  Dennis  Wrong,  “power  has  tended  to  become  an  even  more diffuse and far-reaching notion in social and political theory, partly as a result  of  the  influence  of  Michel  Foucault  and  the  Nietzsche  revival  his  writings  have  helped promote .” He thus concluded, “Power has always been one of those words  that everybody uses without necessarily being able to define satisfactorily .”8 Or just  as  Stephen  Dedalus  put  it,  “power”  is  an  “essentially  contested  concept” .9  “It  is  claimed therefore that there cannot be any commonly accepted or even preferred  meaning so long as people differ on normative issues as they are likely to do indefi4    5  6    7  8  9 

Wang Yi-Chuan, 1994, Language Utopia, Kunming: Yunnan People’s Publishing House, p . 205 . (王一川：《语言乌托邦》，云南人民出版社，1994年，第205页) . Fowler, R . et al, 1979, Language and Control, Routledge . See Xin-Bin, 2005, Critical Linguistics: Theory and Applications, Shanghai: Shanghai Foreign Language Education Press, p . 7 . (辛斌著：《批评语言学：理论与应用》，上海外语教育出版社，2005年，第7页)  See Wrong, Dennis H ., 2000, Power: It’s Forms, and Uses, Transaction Publishers Rutgers, p . xxii . Ibid ., p . viii . Ibid .

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nitely,  if  not  forever .”10  Similarly,  Max  Weber  also  asserted  that  the  concept  of  ‘power’ is amorphous in the field of sociology .11 A variety of assumable personal  qualities and diverse situations can make a person able to implement his or her own  will under particular circumstances . It is, according to some scholars, at least partly  because  when  we  discuss  power  from  the  theoretical  perspective,  we  are  actually  discussing the ways the whole social world works – that is, we are expressing a view  of the world .12 So in short, up to the present, it may seem safe to say that all the theories of  power as a matter of fact are only different versions of conceptual interpretations of  the meaning of the term, rather than substantial theories exploring the causes and  effects of power in depth . In summary, their main points are confined to the following several aspects: A . Power, in a generic or basic sense, can be conceptualized as the capacity of  some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others . That is to say, it  is  a  capacity  or  ability  of  some  people  to  take  action  in  order  to  achieve  certain  benefits or goals or to intentionally exert specific influence and produce actual effects on others by using particular resources . It can be divided into “power to” and  “power over” . The former refers to the ability of people to take action and make  something take effect or change for the purpose of pursuing their own goals and  interests; the latter refers to the ability to control and dominate the actions of others . B . Power is often “treated both as a quality or attribute possessed by individuals,  groups or larger social structures and as an indicator of an active or interactive process or relation between individual or collective actors .”13 That is, it is not only a  separate  resource  of  wealth,  status,  skill,  etc .,  but  also  the  activation  of  these  resources in order to pursue goals or outcomes . C . Power and the allocation of resources in society exist in and help to maintain  a specific relationship . On the one hand, power can be reduced to the allocation of  other  resources  such  as  wealth,  knowledge  or  status,  and  thus  can  be  explained  through it . On the other hand, power itself can be seen as a kind of resource which  is able to win over or control the use of other resources . As the quantity of available  resources and their kinds are different, the “power to” and “power over” that people  have are different as well to some extent . D . Power is a facet of various unequal relationships which are always in a state  of flux, and determines such unequal social relationships: Among two persons, if  one  is  in  the  position  of  the  dominator  and  the  other  is  in  the  position  of  the  dominated,  then  we  can  say  that  the  former  has  power  in  relation  to  the  latter . 

10  Ibid . 11  Weber, Marx, 2004, Economy and Society, Volume 1, (Chinese)Tans by Ling Rong-yuan, Beijing:  The Commercial Press, p . 81 .   （德）马克思·韦伯著，林荣远译：《经济与社会》上卷，商务印书馆，2004年，第81页) 12  Waters, Malcolm, 2000, Modern Sociological Theory, (Chinese) Tans by Yang Shan-hua, Beijing:  Huaxia Press, p . 263 .  （澳）马尔科姆·沃特斯著，杨善华等译：《现代社会学理论》，华夏出版社，2000年， 第263页) 13  See Wrong, Dennis H ., 2000, Power: It’s Forms, and Uses, Transaction Publishers Rutgers, p viii .

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Therefore, power in real life is always associated with a particular relationship on the  basis of people’s intent, purposes or goals . After  a  survey  of  the  sociological  theories  of  power,  this  paper  will  take  the  opinion that power is the ability or skills of a person or persons to take action in  order to achieve certain benefits or goals, or to intentionally exert specific influence  and produce actual effects on others using particular resources . It is the ability of  some persons to make others do something or the behavior of some persons leading  to the behavior of others . In this sense, as Dahl said, if person A is able to make  person  B  do  something  that  person  B  would  not  otherwise  do,  then  we  can  say  person A possesses power towards person B .14 That is, “If an action is to count as  an  exercise  of  power,  it  must  be  calculated  to  cause  some  other  person(s)  to  do  something that they would not otherwise do, and meant to result in some advantage  to someone” (Terence Ball) . Power and power relations are not immutable and absolute, but involve social interaction between people: “it is not something that can  be obtained or won or shared, not something that can be gripped firm or let slip  away .”15 The amount and availability of power ultimately depends on those who  support it or resist it . Only in the process of particular social interactions with others  can  power  be  used,  achieved  or  challenged,  and  increase  for  one  person  and  decrease for the other in terms of quality and quantity . As Wartenburg16 has pointed  out, even in social institutions, when one person exercises his powers against the  other, such power also depends on the support of other persons or groups, or on  their concerted action with him . In this sense, the judge in court mediation activities has power in relation to the disputants involved . The judge’s acts of convincing,  advising, educating, etc . are manifestations of power and power use . 1.3  a bRIef descRIPtIon of tHe data The examples used in this paper involve four court mediations, of which three were  conducted prior to the court trial in Fangshan District Court of Beijing and one was  done after the court trial in Tiantai County Court of Zhejiang Province . All the four  court mediations were fully recorded with the permission of the presiding judges,  and the recordings were then carefully transcribed word by word and used here as  the materials for the present study .  A . The first mediation concerns an upbringing dispute, in which the plaintiff – a  14-years-old school girl – charged her father for his ignorance of her and failure to  take good care of her both in life and in education, asking for the custody to be in  the charge of the mother instead of the father . Here, her mother acted as her legal 

14  Waters, Malcolm, 2000, Modern Sociological Theory, (Chinese) Tans by Yang Shan-hua, Beijing:  Huaxia Press, p . 256 . （澳）马尔科姆·沃特斯著，杨善华等译：《现代社会学理论》，华夏出版社，2000年， 第256页)  15  Foucault, M ., 1978, The History of Sexuality, New York: Pantheon Books, p . 94 . 16  See Xin-Bin, 2005, Critical Linguistics: Theory and Applications, Shanghai: Shanghai Foreign Language Education Press, pp . 23–24 .   (辛斌著：《批评语言学：理论与应用》，上海外语教育出版社，2005年，第23–24页) .

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agent . This case was mediated in Fangshan District Court of Beijing, ending in an  agreement . B . The second mediation involves a support-for-parents dispute, in which the  plaintiff – an over 60-years old mother – demanded her four grown-up children to  support her living expenses . This case was tried in Tiantai County Court of Zhejiang  Province and settled finally through mediation by the presiding judge at the end of  the trial, resulting in an agreement that each of the defendants, her three sons and a  daughter, offers 200 yuan per month to support their old mother’s living in a local  old folks’ home . C . The third mediation, also conducted in Fangshan District Court of Beijing,  deals with a case of insurance claims . In this case, the plaintiff – the owner of an  insured  minibus  which  was  heavily  damaged  later  in  a  serious  traffic  accident  –  claimed compensation for his losses from the local branch office of the insurance  company, PICC . Their dispute focused on the property’s value and the amount of  damage . Through court mediation, both parties reached an agreement . D .  The  fourth  mediation  case  involves  a  dispute  on  a  house  rental  contract .  Under the rental contract, the complaining party – i .e . the legal representative of a  trade center – rented a house belonging to the center to the defendant for use as a  grocery store, and charges rent monthly . However, the defendant refused to pay rent  four months ago on the grounds that the landlord didn’t fulfill his obligation to  maintain  the  house  and  make  repairs  when  necessary .  After  the  mediation  conducted  by  Fangshan  District  Court  of  Beijing,  the  accused  paid  the  delayed  four  months’ rent and the plaintiff carried out the needed maintenance work . It is to be noted that all the examples (transcript excerpts from the corpus) used  in the body of this paper have been translated into Standard English . The word-byword English translations with their Chinese originals are put at the end as appendix  for reference . II THe

oPeraTIon of Power In CourT medIaTIon

The major theme of this article is about the reflective relationship between mediation discourse and its institutional context: the social meanings of court mediation  discourse are produced by the participants in mediation activities, while the mediation discourse activities are always carried out in a specific context of that moment  which functions as the basis and precondition of discourse activities . The form of  power exhibited through language use – known in this paper as discourse power – is  context-dependent and composed of a whole set of resources and acts available to  speakers, whose extent and effect depend on who is the speaker and what discourse  context he or she is under at that moment . From this point of view, the power in a  discourse can be observed either at the structural level through analyzing the turntaking  and  the  opportunity  given  or  available  to  speakers,  or  at  the  interactional  level  through  analyzing  what  the  speakers  can  do  effectively  within  their  turns .  Therefore, this study of mediation discourse and power is mainly from the perspec-

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tive of Fairclough’s so-called “power in discourse” rather than his “power behind  discourse” .17 It is necessary to note that power, of course, is not just a problem in institutional  discourse .  However,  it  is  the  fact  that  the  question  of  power  in  institutional  discourse is much more common and noticeable, and thus much more easily felt, observed and analyzed than it is in other general discursive contexts . In view of this  fact, people sometimes cannot help but doubt whether in this world there is any  institutional discourse which occurs between completely equal parties or is not purpose-driven  and  goal-oriented  in  some  way .  If  power  is  a  kind  of  phenomenon  which can be observed at all levels of social interactions, then – as Foucault put it  – it will definitely be able to be observed and analyzed from any form of discursive  interactions between participants on any occasion . According to the analysis in this  paper, an important difference between everyday ordinary conversations and institutional discursive interactions is that in institutional discourse, the speakers’ identity and their institutional role and relationships have been established and specified  beforehand by the institutional context . In contrast, in everyday conversational interaction, the social role of the participants may not have been defined so clearly  and specifically by its context . Institutional discourse is the starting point for the  study of mediation discourse and power in this paper . 2.1  tuRn allocatIon and tuRn management Throughout the whole process of court mediation or conciliation, the judge’s institutional role as mediator grants him power over the allocation and management of  turn . Basically, the disputants involved in court mediation have no such power, resulting  in  either  obedience  or  resistance .  In  court,  under  the  specific  context  of  court mediation sessions, cases in which the disputants involved resist the judge’s  use of such power are quite rare according to my observation . For example: Text 1 (From Case A): (J = Judge, PR = Prosecutor, PA = Plaintiff’s Agent, P = Plaintiff, D = Defendant, M = Male, F = Female, the same below) 1  J (M, to PA): That is to say, the child (P of the case) is raised by her father (D of the case), isn’t she? (4 secs.) Is she raised by him alone, or do you share the raising  costs? 2  PA (F): At the beginning, he raised her by himself, and later his mother raised  her . 3  J: Uh-huh . 4  PA: And then he asked me for 270 yuan every month . 5  J: He requested that you give him 270 yuan every month? 6  D (M, to J): She has offered that money for three months .

17  Fairclough has distinguished power as the power in discourse and the power behind discourse .  See Fairclough, N ., 2001, Language and Power, Longman, p . 36 .

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7  J (to D): You just listen to me when I am asking her questions, is that ok? We  must have a sequence of turn taking . During the process of my asking others  questions,  you  (polite form)  first  listen,  when  you  (polite form)  are  questioned,  then you come back to answer me . Is that ok? 8  D: Yes . In the example above, turns were originally distributed between the judge and the  plaintiff ’s agent during the mediation discourse . The accused party was supposed to  wait for his turn to come but did not appear to have patience . He was eager to express  his  view  on  the  current  topic,  and  therefore  inserted  a  comment  into  the  conversation between the judge and the plaintiff ’s agent (see utterance 6) . This was  obviously not expected by the presiding judge and was considered a violation of the  discursive turn-allocation rule of normal institutional discourse . So the judge interrupted the defendant immediately and clearly reiterated the rule (see utterance 7),  rectifying the variation of turn so as to make it return to the normal state . Another example:  Text 2 (From Case A): 1  J (M, to D): Have you read the indictment? What’s her request, have you read  it? 2  D (M): Oh … (5 secs.) I don’t agree with her (P of the case) . 3  J: No? 4  D: Because her mother (PA of the case) doesn’t have any financial resources, she  cannot afford to take care of her child . 5  J: Right .   (6 secs.) 6  D: But, about her (P’s) request of the right of abode expressed in the third article  of the indictment, I want to say, my house is also her (P’s) house, thus I feel a  bit suspicious about her request . What right of abode do you want? Now …  (…), (4 secs.) I suspect that it is not her idea . Enjoying the right of residence,  what do you mean by this? (To P) You can go home right now and study hard . I  won’t give up taking care of you . 7  PA (F): But you don’t allow our child  8  D:   You shut up . 9  J: Well, well, you two don’t quarrel here . When we are talking, we should all  mind our tone . Shall we? 10  D: Yeah, this is the Court . In text 2, the turns were originally distributed among the judge and the accused, but  half way through the plaintiff ’s agent (the child’s mother) interrupted with a line of  words, then was herself immediately interrupted by the defendant (the child’s father) in a brutal way with “You shut up” . This is because at that moment, the defendant  believed  that  the  behavior  of  the  plaintiff ’s  agent  (interrupting  and  inserting  before her turn was given) was a violation of the normal rules of turn taking, and  that he had good grounds and even the power to stop her . Here, his strong use of  power even goes beyond the principle of respect for politeness . However, his behavior of inserting and interrupting her was also violating the rules and was not allowed 

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by the judge, for it was not his business to do so, but the judge’s . Finally the judge  used his power to stop both of them . In general, from this discourse section, we can  see  that  the  male  defendant  used  power  on  the  female  plaintiff ’s  agent,  and  the  judge as a mediator – residing at the highest level of power – used power on both of  them . 2.2  InteRRuPtIon and oveRlaP According to John Gibbons18, “Turn taking is an interesting manifestation of power  relations . In the court room the most powerful person, the judge or magistrate can  speak and interrupt at will, so judges can take a turn almost whenever they wish . The  least powerful people, observers, can be punished, imprisoned even, for contempt  of court if they speak at all or even laugh . Witnesses are given a ‘turn’ at talking, but  they have little control over when they speak, and over what they say .” Here Gibbons obviously is making comments on the court trial discourse . Is it the same case  in the court mediation discourse? Let’s look at an example: Text 3 (From Case A): 1  J (M, to P and D): …… As for this case, it is in my charge . My name is Huang  ××, the acting judge of this case . Today’s recording work will be done by the  judicial clerk, Liu ×× . In addition, we have invited the people’s mediator Chen  ×× to participate in today’s mediation . About such arrangement, do you have  any requests and comments? 2  PA (F): No . 3  J: (To PA): Plaintiff ’s agent? You said you don’t, right? (To D) What about you? 4  D (M): No . But actually I was worried  5  J:   Just wait a minute, ah, uh … (3 secs.) First, let me  ask, you have received the indictment, haven’t you? 6  D: Yes, I have received it . The above scene was a procedural Q & A section initiated by the judge, which usually  takes  place  at  the  beginning  of  the  mediation .  Through  this  procedure,  the  presiding judge establishes whether the involved parties have any objection to the  institutional arrangements of the mediation to come, giving them the opportunity  to express dissent and check the known facts . In terms of the organization and arrangement of turns, the judge basically has the control of the distribution and development of them . Particularly, it should be noted that when the judge asked the  involved parties whether they had any questions about the staff arrangement for the  mediation, the defendant did not stop after answering “no” as the plaintiff did, but  tried to maintain his turn and go on talking until he was interrupted and stopped by  the judge . The judge used the public power entrusted to him by the institution and  took the turn back to start a new turn of talk, carrying on the regular procedures and  maintaining the normal structure of turns by moving on to ask whether the defend18  Gibbons, J .P ., 2003, Forensic linguistics: An Introduction to Language in the Justice System, UK: Blackwell Publishing, p . 93 .

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ant had received the indictment . The defendant did not express or show any opposition or resistance towards the judge’s interruption but accepted and obeyed it .  According  to  my  observations  of  four  situated  court  mediations  and  their  transcripts, the disputants involved would rarely challenge, oppose or resist the mediating judge’s interruption, either explicitly or implicitly . (They do not dare to risk an  open confrontation with the judge unless either they have been specifically empowered  or  authorized  to  do  so,  or  they  believe  that  they  are  confident  and  strong  enough to accept any corresponding outcomes from the mediation .) So, here the  interruptions by the judges fully reflect the inequality and asymmetry between the  judge and the defendant in turn-taking, which in turn is a manifestation of the imbalance of power between different institutional roles at court settings . This kind of  inequality, asymmetry, and imbalance of power and other resources are specifically  and fully revealed through the linguistic details of the court mediation discourse . Overlap refers to two (or more) speakers talking at the same time and thus sharing the same turn due to the insertion by the other party while one party is talking  in a conversation . It is a violation of normal turn rules, and therefore does not last  long . Once one party or both parties involved recognize this violation, he or they  will voluntarily stop or be interrupted to stop, thus coming back to the normal state  of turn . In this sense, overlap can be deemed as a special form of interruption, a  situation in which the interrupted party maintains the turn and continues talking .  From the side of the interrupter, overlap is a “weak interruption”, i .e . a kind of interruption which has not achieved or not fully achieved the original purpose of interrupting . Overlap and interrupting are both a scramble for the turn of talking . In the  court mediation discourse, overlap – as well as interruption – is basically initiated by  the presiding judge as a tool and resource to control topics and turns so as to dominate  the  disputants  in  order  to  achieve  their  own  purpose .  They  are  not  only  a  manifestation of inequality of power between the mediator and the disputants, and  of the performance of power by mediator on disputants, but also a strengthening of  such an unequal relationship between them, that is, the control and domination of  mediator over the discursive acts of the disputants . 3.3  RePetItIon Liao Meizhen19 in his book “A study of courtroom questions, responses and their  interaction” cites an example of an arson trial during which the prosecutor repeatedly questioned the defendant before the defendant provided the information the  prosecutor expected (carrying a bucket to set fire to the car): Text 4: 1  PR (M, to D): When you got off the vehicle, what did you hold in your hands?  What did he give you? 2  D (M): When I got off, he gave me a pair of gloves . 3  PR: What else? 19  Liao,  Meizhen,  2003,  A study of courtroom questions, responses and their interaction,  Beijing:  Law  Press, p . 328 . (廖美珍：《法庭问答及其互动研究》，法律出版社，2003年，第328页) .

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D: He said “It’s cold outside, so you bring them with you .” PR: What else? D: Nothing else, he only handed me a mask on the spot . J: What else? D: He handed me a mask on the spot, nothing else . PR: I ask you one more time, what else was there? D: He was carrying a plastic bucket (containing petrol), I couldn’t see it clearly  at that moment .

When the defendant refused to answer the question about what his brother gave  him when getting off the vehicle, the prosecutor repeated the question “What else?”  four times . It seemed that the prosecutor would not give up until he achieved his  purpose, that is, until he got the information that he was expecting . A deliberate use of repetition is able to produce a stress of words and a psychological tension in the other party – the listener . Thus it is a manifestation of the use  of power . Although the judge’s use of repeated questioning in court mediation is  not as prevalent as in a court room trial, it still can be found frequently . For example,  in  the  following  extract,  the  judge  repeatedly  asked  the  question  “Any  more  evidence to submit?” which is a typical use of power by the judge in the court room . Text 5 (From Case D): 1  2  3    4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18 

J (M, to P): Have you brought the contract with you? P (M): Yeah . J: Give it to me . (The plaintiff submits the contract to the judge. The judge takes a quick look at it.) J (to D): Is it your signature on the contract? D (M): Yes, I have already  J:   It’s your signature, isn’t it? Do you have any more evidence  to submit? D: More evidence? No, not yet for now . I only have this . P (to J): I tell you, in that contract, although  J:   Just wait a minute, eh? (To D) Well, do you  (polite form) have any evidence to submit to the court? D: Me? J: Yes . D: I have no way of presenting any evidence now . I just came back from the  downtown of the city yesterday  J:   Well, you (polite form) now answer me . Do you  (polite form) have any evidence to submit right now? D: I can clearly say that I have no evidence for today . J: No evidence for today? D: No, not for today . J: This is what you meant? D: Yes .

The question “Do you have any more evidence to submit?” was first raised in utterance 6, and then the same question was repeated by way of interruption and inser-

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tion respectively in utterances 9 and 13 . In the first repetition in utterance 9, the  leading statement “just wait a minute” sounded like a command or request, with  some  discursive  power  or  force  to  stop  the  other  party’s  ongoing  speech  and  attempted speech . At the same time the original use of the casual form of “you” was  replaced by the polite form of “you” . Through this courteous form of address, the  judge attempted to attract the other party’s attention and focus . When the judge  interrupted the defendant by the second repetition of the same question, there were  some  further  changes  in  his  expressions .  In  addition  to  hanging  on  to  the  polite  form of “you” in “You now answer me”, he used such meta-discourse to request the  addressee  to  answer  the  repeated  question  more  formally  and  more  straightforwardly . Here repetition – together with interruption and courtesy – gave the defendant nowhere to escape and no chance for further delay, forcing him finally to submit  to pressure and give a clear answer as the judge wished . In this instance judge had a  variety of discursive resources available for his free choice, while the discursive resources available to the defendant were relatively simple and deficient . Therefore,  the  mediation  judge  ultimately  controlled  and  dominated  the  development  and  direction  of  the  whole  sequence  of  discourse  with  an  overwhelming  power,  and  dominated the defendant as well by way of such discourse . 3.4  PoweRful sPeecH and PoweRless sPeecH On the basis of the corpus of transcripts of four court mediations used in this paper,  I found that when answering questions or making statements in the court mediation  process, the disputants tend to use a number of terms or phrases expressing hesitation or uncertainty, or mitigating/softening the tone, such as “it seems …”, “it looks  like …”, “a little/bit”, and “somewhat”, “something like that”, “it should be so”, “I  think”, “I guess”, “probably”, “ba” (a particle often used after a statement to mitigate  the tone of certainty), etc ., or frequently ask questions expressing their doubts and  uncertainty or revealing their trust and reliance upon the knowledge and skills of the  mediating judge . If they are needed or even required to come up with a clear and  categorical answer or statement to their own advantage, then such expressions will  put them at a disadvantage . In contrast, the mediating judge rarely uses powerless  speech of this kind . More often than not, he or she uses a relatively powerful speech,  such as giving direct orders or stating specific requirements . For example: Text 6 (From Case C): 1  J (M, to P): So, at this moment, I want to ask you again – you said the automobile you bought was a second-hand one, right? 2  P (M): Yes . 3  J: You bought the automobile on the used auto market . How much was it worth  according to the estimation on the used auto market at that time? Or was the  price set between you two through negotiation and bargaining? 4  P: It went through the normal procedure on the market . The price was set by the  used auto market . 5  J: What price did the used auto market set?

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P: Maybe a little more than ten thousand yuan . J: At that moment, when the price was set, were you there? P: Maybe, I don’t remember, because it was 3 or 4 years ago now . J: Right . P: About this matter, I don’t remember . J: In your impression, at that time it was sold at the price of a little more than  ten thousand yuan on the used auto market? P:  Yes .  Maybe  …  they  took  it  back,  only  giving  me  a  certificate  of  property  rights . J: Just now you (polite form) said 12 thousand yuan (the plaintiff once said he paid 12 thousand yuan for the price of the second-hand car on the used auto market)? The  money you paid was 12 thousand yuan? P: Yes . J: So, at that moment, when you (polite form) signed the contract with the insurance company, did you ever mention anything about the automobile? That is,  when buying insurance for this automobile, did you ever talk anything about  the value of the automobile? P: About this question, maybe …, I remember, maybe I talked about it with  him, with this salesman Li ×× . I said to him that I had had this automobile for  a year, and afterwards I found him and bought the insurance from him .

It  is  a  case  concerned  with  property  (automobile)  insurance  claims,  in  which  the  plaintiff ’s insured automobile was damaged in a traffic accident, and the plaintiff  thus claimed compensation from the insurance company in accordance with the  agreed terms of the insurance policy . The focus of the dispute is on the value of the  automobile . The above section is mainly about the investigation into the automobile’s purchase price under the auspices of the judge . Around some key facts, the  plaintiff did not provide clear and affirmative answers, although, in the situation at  that time, giving clear and affirmative answers is apparently beneficial to the plaintiff because the automobile had been completely destroyed and later abandoned so  that  the  plaintiff  could  not  evaluate  its  exact  value .  However,  the  plaintiff  used  “maybe” five times, “I don’t remember” twice and the mitigating particle “ba” (omitted  in  above  Standard  English  translation)  four  times  in  his  answers .  The  use  of  these terms expressed the plaintiff ’s uncertainty about the relevant facts and his lack  of self-confidence, thus greatly reducing the authenticity, reliability and credibility  of what he said and putting him at a relative disadvantage . 3.5  comment Making comments on other people’s words and deeds from a moral, legal or value  point of view demonstrates in itself that the commentator is more qualified or considers himself/herself as a model in these respects . Therefore such comments, as an  indirect criticism and negation of the listener’s words and actions, usually carry and  impose a sort of power of domination and influence in an authoritative and instructive way . For example, in the last utterance of Text 7 below, “I feel you are not a 

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qualified father at this point” and the quoted saying “to feed without teaching, is the  father’s fault” are both comments made by the presiding judge: Text 7 (From Case A): 1  J (M, to D): I tell you (polite form, the same below), your idea, 2  D (M): No, I just have this idea, really . 3  J: I think your idea will ruin the child completely . 4  D: I have no way about that . 5  J: I feel you are not a qualified father at this point . Statements 1–4 make no sense With the comment “I feel you are not a qualified father at this point”, the judge asserted his moral superiority to the defendant while placing the other at a lower position on the scale of morality, which imposed certain pressure upon the defendant .  In the following example, the defendant recognized the power of discourse in such  comments and made an immediate resistance soon after hearing the judge’s comment “To support parents’ living is a matter of course, not to mention she is your  own mother who gave birth to you and brought you up” . Text 8 (From Case B): 1  J (M, to D): To support parents is a matter of course, not to mention she is your  own mother who gave birth to you and brought you up . 2  D3 (M): I have never said I don’t want to support her . (2 secs.) I have just said  that I agree to let her come and live in my home . She can eat whatever meals we  prepare . 3  J: Yet your mother believes that it’s better for her to live in the old folks’ home  and with each of you giving her 200 yuan per month for the living costs . Another example: Text 9 (From Case A): 1  J (M, to D): Since you both have brought the issue to the court, let’s be frank  with each other, shall we? As a child, she has her own problems . But in your  part, as a father, is there anything wrong with you? In fact, in China there is an  old saying – Three Character Classic says very clearly – ”to feed without teaching” … 2  D (M):   “is the father’s fault”, it’s right . 3  J: “is the father’s fault”, right? So, at this moment, you need to have a reflection,  don’t you? Why has your child become like this? Is there anything wrong with  your educational ways and methods? 4  D: Um . Here the judge in charge of the mediation quoted an old saying “to feed without  teaching is the father’s fault” from Three Character Classic to comment on the defendant’s conduct . By doing so, the judge criticized the defendant indirectly . He  provoked  the  defendant  to  reflect  on  the  educational  methods  he  used  with  his 

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child, to discover whether there was anything wrong with them . His words sounded  reasonable and thus had a convincing power of persuasion . The defendant’s agreement  with  those  comments  and  his  acceptance  of  them  proved  that  the  judge’s  criticism had taken effect and met its purpose . 3.6  tHe management and contRol of toPIcs Julie Diamond20 argues that successfully introducing a topic and making the other  party accept it is a powerful speech act . Generally speaking, the involved parties in  the  court  mediation  process  enjoy  more  freedom  of  expression .  However  on  the  whole, the judge presiding over the mediation continues to keep control of the topics, which is a sign of the exercise of certain power by the judge in charge during the  court mediation . Look at the following fragment of a court mediation discourse in  the process of a court trial . Text 10 (From Case B): 1  J (M, to PA and D): Well, since both the plaintiff and the defendants agree to  have  a  court  mediation,  let’s  start  the  process  of  court  mediation  right  now .  …… (A couple of utterances are omitted here) You plaintiff speak first . 2  PA (M): You presiding judge, the plaintiff insists that living in old folks’ home  is the best solution . According to the lowest expenses standard of Tiantai Kangle old folks’ home, the living expenses add up to at least eight hundred yuan a  month . This is the lowest amount . 3  J: Please tell us how you are going to use this 800 yuan . 4  PA: Ok . … … (PA starts listing the items of relevant costs, the author here omits this section of the discourse) All the five items of costs add up to 800 yuan, which is the  minimum amount required for a 70-year-old to maintain a normal standard of  living . The plaintiff requests that her four children take the equal shares, that is,  each of them shares 200 yuan per month . 5  J:  All  you  defendants,  what  do  you  think  of  this  proposal?  Defendant  Chen  Libiao (defendant 1)? 6  D1 (M): I agree to pay 200 yuan every month . 7  J: Defendant Chen Guihua (defendant 2)? Do you agree with this proposal? 8  D2 (F): I have already said, if you (plural form) ask me to offer money, can I say  no? The issue has already been brought to the court! Hum . (4 secs.) They are not  afraid of disgrace, but I am afraid of being ridiculed by others! 9  J (to D2): You defendant, we are now mediating between two sides, you don’t  need to talk about other unrelated matters . To say more will hurt the amicable  feelings among you . You are all one family . (2 secs.) Aren’t you? The court is now  asking for your opinion, do you agree or disagree on the proposal? 10  D2: What I am talking about is the fact, they  11  J:   As for the facts, you talked about them just  now in the investigation stage . What you are talking about now is just a part of  20  Diamond, J . 1996, Status and Power in Verbal Interaction, John Benjamins Publishing Company,  1996 .

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those mentioned facts which we all know . Now, please answer the court’s question . Do you agree to let your mother go to live in the old folks’ home and pay  200 yuan every month? 12  D2: Anyway, she is our old mother . If you (referring to her brothers) want me  as a daughter to support her, if you don’t feel ashamed as her sons, what can I  say? 13  J: Then, Chen Guihua (D2), no matter what, you agree to pay 200 yuan a month,  don’t you? 14  D2: Um . Is this a yes or a no or is it meant to be ambiguous? First of all, the mediation process was initiated by the judge with “Let’s start the  process of court mediation right now”, which is a powerful speech act, establishing  a  completely  new  topic  and  launching  another  sequence  of  utterances  different  from the previous one . In the eighth utterance Defendant 2 attempted to deviate  from the topic they were focusing upon, but was stopped by the presiding judge in  time: “You defendant, we are now having the mediation between you two sides, you  don’t need to talk about other unrelated matters .” However, Defendant 2 did not  come to a halt, going on with a further refutation: “What I am talking about is the  fact”, which surely was interrupted by the judge immediately: “As for the facts, you  talked about them just now in the investigation stage . What you are talking about  now is just a part of those mentioned facts which we all know .” This time, the judge  could not help directly dragging her (Defendant 2) back to the topic in question:  “Now, you please answer the court’s question . Do you agree to let your mother go  to live in the old folks’ home and pay 200 yuan every month?” Through direct interference and effective use of power in court room, the judge firmly maintained the  topic in hand and did not let the discourse go beyond it, hence limiting the choice  of topics for the involved parties . 3.7  RefoRmulatIon Reformulation means that the judges in court restate or reinterpret the utterances of  the other party according to their own understanding of them . Therefore, reformulation has at least two functions: (A) it can further clarify or reaffirm the meaning  that the other party has expressed or wants to express, which helps the other party  to express himself or herself clearly and specifically, avoiding any vagueness or false  pretenses  in  his  or  her  expressions  for  the  purpose  of  shirking  responsibility;  (B)  since it is a means of restating and paraphrasing the utterances of the other person,  the reformulator may take the opportunity to impose his own ideas or his subjective  and  arbitrary  understandings  upon  the  other  party,  or  replace  the  other  party’s  meaning with a meaning of his own thereby taking his own meaning as the other  party’s,  or  use  his  understandings  to  reshape  the  other  party’s  understandings  or  guide him or her to think the same way as the reformulator . Therefore, reformulation as a powerful means of ideological control is often used in court by the presiding judge and defense lawyer . In court mediation, the mediating judges also tend to  use this approach to make the mediation unfold as they have expect it to .

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Text 11 (From Case B): 1  J (M): Ok . Then, what about you, defendant Chen ×× (D3)? 2  D3 (M): I won’t offer 200 yuan a month . If our mother is willing to come to live  in my home, it’ll be no problem . 3  P (F, to D3): To live in your home? Last time, when the Street Office said it’s  your turn and ×× took me to your door, how did you treat me? You and your  wife were so tough and brutal to me, I was so scared . 4  J (to P): You plaintiff, you mean you are not willing to go and live at Chen ××’s  home? 5  P: I dare not to go, I will be scared, scared to death . The plaintiff did not explicitly say that she would not live at the defendant’s home,  but talked about her feeling of fear . The presiding judge interpreted her utterances  to mean that the plaintiff was not willing to live at the defendant’s home, and reformulated them with his own understanding . In fact, the expression “not willing to”  is different from “scared to” in meaning . The two phrases can not replace each other  as substitutes, but the judge inferred arbitrarily that the plaintiff was “not willing to”  live with the defendant, from her stating that she was afraid to do so, thus making  the two expressions equivalent in meaning . Even so, the plaintiff had no objections  to it . That means she accepted the judge’s use and its ensuing effect of reformulation  as a power and a pragmatic technique .  3.8  QuestIons and QuestIon foRms Some researchers have found that in cross-examination in a court room, “the sequence of acts related to such tasks as rebuttal or criticism are managed through the  questions  and  answers .”21  Liao  Meizhen,  through  analyzing  and  studying  a  large  corpus of transcripts of China’s court trials, found that the whole trial process in  China’s court rooms is fundamentally constituted by the question and answer pattern so that it can be said to be a question and answer process . Just as he proposed  in  his  book  “A  study  of  courtroom  questions,  responses  and  their  interaction”,  “power is exercised and performed through the process of questions and answers”,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  “power  is  also  granted  and  implemented  through  the  questions and answers”22 because asking questions is a proactive and positive behavior that requests information, and answering questions is a passive and negative responding behavior of providing the required information . In addition, asking questions can open new turns and establish new topics, making the questioner seize the  initiative; however, to answer questions leaves the answerer in a relatively passive  position . Due to the differences  in  question  forms  and the extent  of  their “openness”,  different questions may create a different degree of pressure and binding upon those  21  Atkinson, J .M . and Drew, p ., 1979, Order in Court: The Organization of Verbal Interaction in Judicial Settings, London: Macmillan, p . 105 . 22  Liao,  Meizhen,  2003,  A study of courtroom questions, responses and their interaction,  Beijing:  Law  Press, p . 523 . (廖美珍：《法庭问答及其互动研究》，法律出版社，2003年，第523页) .

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being  questioned,  thus  offering  the  answerers  different  degrees  of  freedom  in  responding and different ranges of choices . According to Grice’s Cooperative Principle, a basic underlying assumption we make when we speak to one another is that  we are trying to cooperate with one another to construct meaningful conversations .  In other words, we as speakers try to contribute meaningful, productive utterances  to further the conversation . It then follows that, as listeners, we assume that our  conversational  partners  are  doing  the  same .  As  stated  in  H .P .  Grice’s  “Logic  and  Conversation” (1975): “Make your conversational contribution such as is required,  at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged .”23 Though phrased as a prescriptive command, the principle is intended as a description of how people normally behave in conversation . The cooperative principle is further broken down into the four Gricean maxims:  (1)  Quantity: (a) make your contribution as informative as required, i .e . don’t  say too much or too little, and (b) make the strongest statement you can; (2)  Quality: (a) do not say what you believe to be false, and (b) do not say that  for which you lack adequate evidence;  (3)  Relation: be relevant, i .e . stay on topic;  (4)  Manner: (a) avoid obscurity of expression, (b) avoid ambiguity, (c) be brief,  i .e . avoid unnecessary prolixity, and (d) be orderly .24 These conversational maxims proposed by Grice under his Cooperative Principle  describe specific rational principles observed by people who obey the Cooperative  Principle . These principles enable effective communication in conversation in common  social  situations .  Accordingly,  on  the  basis  of  Grice’s  Cooperative  Principle  and his conversational maxims, when listeners become speakers by answering the  judge’s questions in court mediation discourse, they are expected to cooperate with  the judge and answer the questions as the judge wishes . Therefore, the questioning itself exerts certain constraints or dominating power  on the listeners or answerers . However the power of different modalities of questioning is not the same . It is generally believed that the controlling and dominating  power of questioning is closely related to the information the questions aim to obtain . The more information included in the question – and therefore the less information requested – the greater the questioner’s power and control of the information, so the answerer can contribute less new information . John Gibbons25 argued  that according to the modality of questioning, questions can be divided into direct  forms and indirect forms in expressing information . A question ‘Has he arrived yet?’  can be framed indirectly in the linguistic form of a statement ‘I wonder if he’s arrived yet .’ In this example the other person’s autonomy is preserved by not mentioning him or her, the question taking the form of an inquiry addressed inwards to  the speaker rather than outwards to the addressee, thereby reducing overt pressure  to answer . Although such questions can take direct and indirect forms and vary on  the modality parameter, they do not vary on the information parameter . For exam23  Grice, H .P ., 1975, Logic and Conversation . In Martinich, A .P . (ed) . Philosophy of Language, New  York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp . 165–175 . 24  ibid . 25  Gibbons, J .P ., 2003, Forensic linguistics: An Introduction to Language in the Justice System, UK: Blackwell Publishing, p . 100 .

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ple, ‘Can you tell me what color that nightdress was?’ contains and demands the  same information as ‘What color was that nightdress?’, but the first is less coercive  than the second, giving slightly more scope for non-compliance with the demand  for information . Therefore Gibbons points out that “a methodological tool to examine the nature of coercion is to look at the grammatical structure of questions  from the powerful parties … to see what kind of answer they license .”26 On the basis  of the grammatical structure he then listed 16 forms of questions, which are roughly  ranked on a spectrum from less controlling – the question of broad request for narrative – at one end, to more controlling – tag questions – at the other . Liao Meizhen27  believes that by taking into consideration the information contained and requested  in the questions, they can be divided into two categories of open and closed questions . The open questions (which mainly are particularly-referred questions) can be  subdivided further into wide-type and narrow-type in accordance with the levels of  specificity of answers demanded . He believes that according to the amount of information demanded, a variety of questioning can be arranged in descending order as  follows: particularly-referred questions (broad open questions  narrow open questions)  alternative questions  A-not-A questions  yes-no questions  tag questions . Therefore, different forms of questioning can be arranged on the spectrum of  power of coercion in a continuum from weak to strong as follows: particularly-referred  questions  (broad  open  questions    narrow  open  questions)    alternative  questions  A-not-A questions  yes-no questions  tag questions . While it is possible for the answerer to answer a question in a way that is not  expected by the question, or challenge the question itself – particularly its assumptions – some researchers (e .g . Dunstan28) reckon that there is no necessary link between the forms of questions and control or coercive power, and thus they should  not be analyzed interrelatedly and correspondingly . But I believe that the form of  discourse has a certain degree of autonomy and relative independence, and some  linguistic forms of language hold greater power or control in relation to other linguistic forms, although such power can only be revealed in practical use . The  presiding  judge’s  language  behavior  in  court  mediation  is  constituted  mainly by the speech acts of questioning, which exhibit to some extent the exercise  of power through the use of different forms of questions . Take some tag questions  ended with “shì ba” (……, is it? / ……, are you? / ……, do you? / ……, shall we?)  in my corpus of transcripts as examples: Text 12 (From Case D): 1  P (M, to D): You have gone back on your word, I cannot put up with its negative  consequences to me . 2  D (M, to P): I have gone back on my word? 3  P: Yes .

26  Ibid . 27  Liao,  Meizhen,  2003,  A study of courtroom questions, responses and their interaction,  Beijing:  Law  Press, p . 66 . (廖美珍：《法庭问答及其互动研究》，法律出版社，2003年，第66页) . 28  Dunstan, R ., 1980, Context for coercion: Analyzing properties of courtroom questions, British Journal of Law and Society, 6:61–77 .

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4  J (M, to P and D): Well, I think, since we are here negotiating for an agreement,  let’s stay calm, shall we? 5  P: Yes, that’s right . Text 13 (From Case A): 1  J: So, at this moment, you need to make a reflection, will you? Why has your  kid become like this? Is there anything wrong with your educational ways and  methods? 2  D: Um . ??? In text 12, the utterances “ since we are here negotiating for an agreement, let’s stay  calm, shall we?” is ostensibly a question to seek the listener’s views, but is actually a  request that he keep calm . Similarly, in text 13, “you need to make a reflection, will  you?” is a request for the listener to engage in self-examination . In the public context of a court room, such reasonable requests are very difficult for the listeners to  reject, who have almost no other choice but to accept them . As I mentioned earlier  in this paper, there are still quite a lot of such tag questions ending with “shì ba”  (……, is it? / ……, are you? / ……, do you? / ……, shall we?) in the mediation  discourse, indicating the mediator’s preference of using that form of questioning to  exert his power of control or even coercion over the listeners . Of course, the power  of control or coercion in such questions is decided by other factors as well, such as  the  questioner’s  intonation,  his  social  role  and  status,  the  secondary  speech  acts  before and after, etc . If combined with and accompanied by an appropriate intonation and some secondary speech acts, it is possible to enhance the coercive power of  questioning itself . III ConClusIon: Is

medIaTIon really neuTral?

Because of the differences in role, identity, status, knowledge, and background of  the participants, and the purposes of the activities in court mediation, the pragmatic  resources available to the parties involved (especially the mediator and the disputants) are different in their quantity distribution and quality composition . There is  inequality, imbalance and asymmetry in power relationships and power use . This  unequal  power  movement  is  reflected  in  a  variety  of  specific  details  of  the  court  mediation  interactive  discourse .  Language  use  (discourse  and  speech  acts)  is  not  only a tool of power, but also the result and outcome of power . On the one hand,  power is performed, enforced and exercised through the intentional and purposeful  use of language, simultaneously enabling power to be renewed and strengthened .  On the other hand, power also determines that some people tend to favor particular  kinds of utterances or discourse, while others prefer to use other kinds of utterances  or discourse . All of this can be expressly observed, discovered and revealed in depth  only through detailed analysis of interactive discourse . The phenomenon of power in the court mediation discourse can be analyzed  from the two levels of discourse structure (form) and discourse interaction (content/ function),  that  is,  from  its  static  and  dynamic  aspects .  In  other  words,  the  grammatical structure and form of discourse as an available resource to accomplish an act 

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is a potential power or a potentiality of power . When the speaker simply employs a  certain structure and form of discourse to speak – that is, to do things with words  – power is actually exercised, deployed and achieved . The effect and impact of this  power rest upon the role, identity, status of speakers and listeners, and the context  of time and place, among other factors . The exercise and employment of power are  mainly manifested in the control of turns and topics, as well as a number of specific  uses of pragmatic strategies with a view of manipulating, controlling and dominating the listener in the form and contents of discourse and its ideological effect, so as  to achieve the speaker’s aims and goals . At this point, we have to reflect on the following fundamental questions: what  is  mediation?  Is  mediation  practice  in  real  life  in  accordance  with  the  mediation  concept and system requirements in books? Scholars generally believe that mediation in the modern sense is essentially a sequence of discursive activities in which  the disputing parties achieve a settlement of their disputes through their own efforts  and in accordance with their own wills . So mediation is premised on the autonomy  of the parties involved . The whole process, from the start of mediation to the accomplishment of an agreement and its acceptance, is voluntarily determined simply  by those parties . From start to finish, the mediator can only play a “neutral” and  “empowering” role, forbidden to impose his/her own will on the parties . “Neutral”,  “objective” and “empowering” apparently are the professional ethics and normative  values which the mediator must comply with . However, in reality, is this the actual  practice of mediation discourse? American scholars Conley and O’Barr, based on their own research, have concluded that “the neutrality of mediators is sometimes more of an ideal than a reality .  Mediators  can  and  do  employ  a  variety  of  language  strategies  to  shape  both  the  process and the outcome of mediation sessions” .29 They say, “Conversation analysis has demonstrated the existence of linguistic strategies through which ostensibly  neutral mediators can exert subtle but significant influence on the process .”30 In this  article, through micro linguistic analysis of the details of the court mediation discourse, we have now seen in very concrete terms that actual mediation process is  biased and power inclined, and the role orientation of mediators of so-called neutrality and empowerment is in fact not realized in many cases (in the strict sense, at  least not completely) . The objectivity and neutrality of mediation may only be an  ideal or ideal type for scholars and system designers, like a castle in the air, forever  out of reach . However, even if the requirement of mediators’ neutrality and disputants’ autonomy is only a utopian ideal for people to pursue and accomplish in their  efforts, its existence still has some value and role . It provides us with an evaluation  of standards of behavior, and therefore to some extent limits the exercise of power,  avoiding the common and normal forms of abuse of power . Perhaps this is where  the charm of the ideal lies .

29  Conley, J .M . and O’Barr, W .M . (1998) Just Words: Law, Language, and Power, University of Chicago Press, p . 56 .  30  Ibid . p . 58 .

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aPPendIx a: noTe    ‖‖  (2 secs.)  (italicized words)  …    (…)   …… 

on TransCrIPT symbols

Interruption Overlap Silence for some specified seconds (here 2 seconds) Editorial comments Drawling Utterances omitted it inaudibility Omission

aPPendIx b: word

by word

englIsH

TranslaTIon of THe daTa examPles

Text 1: 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8   

J: 也就是说，孩子是由孩子的父亲，这个，也就是本案的被告来抚养。 （4秒）是自 行抚养，还是你这一方负担抚养费？ also just be say, child be by child’s father, this, that be this case’s defendant  come to raise . (4 seconds) be by himself raise, or you this side share raise fee? PA: 开始是自己抚养，后来由他的母亲抚养， first be himself raise, later by his mother raise,  J: 嗯哼 Uh-huh PA: 然后他起诉我，要求每个月给270块钱 then he accuse me, demand every month give 270 yuan money J: 每个月给270块钱。嗯 every month give 270 yuan money . um D: 给了3个月了。 give PTL (particle, the same below) 3 month PTL . J: 先听我问话，好吗？咱们总得有个先后顺序。这个呢，咱们在相互询问 过程中，您首先是听，询问到您的时候您再来回答。好吗？ first listen to me ask questions, ok? we should have a first last sequence . this  PTL, we in ask each other process, you first be listen, when ask you, you again  come answer . Ok? D: 嗯 um

Text 2: 1    2    3    4   

J: 你看起诉书了吗？她的请求是什么，你看了吗？ you see indictment PTL? her request be what, you see PTL?  D: 哦…（5秒）我不同意她 Oh … (5 seconds) I not agree her J: 嗯。 Um . D: 因为她母亲没有经济来源，照顾不了她孩子 because her mother no economic resource, take care no PTL her child

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7    8    9    10   

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J: 嗯。 um （6秒） (6 seconds) D: 可是那第三条，本人的家就是她的房，她的这个请求我觉得有点怀疑。 你们想什么居住权？现在就…（听不清），（4秒）我怀疑这不是她的，我 怀疑这不是她的想法。享有居住权是什么意思啊？你现在就可以回家，好 好学习，我又不是，不是不管你。 but that third article, myself PTL home be her room, her this request I feel a  bit suspicious . you want what reside right? Now … (inaudible), (4 seconds) I  doubt this not be hers, I doubt this not be her thought . enjoy reside right be  what meaning? you now can go home, good good study, I again not, not be  not care you . PA: 可是你不是不让咱这孩 but you not be not let our this child D:  你住嘴。 you stop mouth J: 行，行，你们双方不要争。啊，说话，咱们说话都要注意一点方式， 啊？ ok, ok, you both not need fight . ah, speak, we speak all need mind a bit way,  ah? D: 这是法院 this be court

Text 3: 1  J: …… 这块儿的工作呢，是由我来负责，我叫黄××。本案的代理审判员。 担任今天记录的是书记员刘××，另外呢，咱们还邀请了人民调解员陈×× 来参与我们今天的调解。对这些，你们双方有没有什么要求和意见？   …… this piece of work PTL, be by I come charge, I call Huang ×× . this case  PTL acting judge . undertake today record PTL be clerk Liu ××, moreover PTL,  we also invite PTL people mediator Chen ××come engage our today’s mediation . to these, you two side have not have what demand and suggestion? 2  PA: 没有。   no 3  J: 法庭代理人？没有，是吗？你们这一方呢？   PA? no, be PTL? you this side PTL? 4  D: 没有，我其实也着急▲   no, I actually also worry 5  J:   稍微等一下，嗯，呃 ……（3秒）。首先咱们请问一 下，这个，起诉书你收到了，是吗？   slightly wait a moment, um, er …… (3 seconds) . first we please ask a moment,  this, indictment you receive come PTL, be PTL? 6  D: 收到了。   receive come PTL .

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Text 4: 1  PR: 下车的时候都有什么东西？给, 都给你什么东西了？   get off vehicle PTL moment all have what thing? Give ⊥ all give you what  thing PTL? 2  D: 下车就给过一手套。   get off vehicle just give PTL one glove . 3  PR: 还有什么？   also have what? 4  D: 天气冷，你带上点。   weather cold, you take up little . 5  PR: 还有什么？   also have what? 6  D: 没有什么，到现场就递我个面罩。   not have what, come spot just pass me PTL mask . 7  PR: 还有什么？   also have what? 8  D: 到现场就递给我个面罩，什么也没有了。   come spot just pass me PTL mask, what also not have PTL . 9  PR: 我再问你一遍，还有没有东西？   I again ask you one time, also have not have thing? 10  D: 他提着一个塑料桶(装有汽油)，我看不清，当时   he hold PTL one PTL plastic bucket (containing petrol), I see not clear, that  time  Text 5: 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 

J: 合同带了吗？ contract bring PTL PTL? P: 呃。 er . J: 提交一下。 submit one time . J: 合同这上面是您签字的吗？ contract this on be you signature PTL PTL? D: 是，我都那个 be, I all that PTL J:  是哈？还有没有什么证据提交？ be hah? also have not have what evidence submit? D: 证据，现在还没有。就只有这个。 evidence, now yet not have . just only have this PTL . P: 我跟您说啊，那个合同里面，虽然说 I with you say ah, that PTL inside, although say J:  稍微等一下，啊？那么您这一方有没有什么证据需要向法院 提交呢？   slightly wait one moment, ah? then you this side have not have what evidence  need toward court submit PTL? 10  D: 我啊？

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  11    12    13    14    15    16    17    18   

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me ah? J: 嗯。 um . D: 我这个现在没办法，昨天啊，我从市里面回来 I this PTL now no method, yesterday ah, I from city inside come back J:  那，您现在回答我您现在有没有证据提交？ then, you now answer me you now have not have evidence submit? D: 我可以明确地说今天是没有。 I can clearly say today be not have . J: 今天没有？ today not have? D: 嗯，今天没有。 um, today not have . J: 是这意思吧？ be this meaning PTL? D: 嗯。 um .

Text 6: 1  J: 那么这会儿再问一下啊，就是你们，你讲你买的这个是二手车，是吧？   then this moment again ask one time ah, just be you, you speak you buy PTL  this be second hand vehicle, be PTL? 2  P: 对   right 3  J: 这买车的时候是经过，呃，这个，啊，旧车交易市场为你这个车做的评 估是多少钱？还是你自己定的、两人商量的个价？   this buy vehicle PTL time be through, er, this, ah, old vehicle trade market for  you this vehicle do PTL assess be how much money? also be you self set PTL,  two person negotiate PTL one price? 4  P: 这是由, 这走的是正常手续。是旧货市场说的价。   this be by, this walk PTL be normal procedure . be old commodity market say  PTL price . 5  J: 旧货市场作的什么价？   old commodity make PTL what price? 6  P: 好像是一万多一点吧。   as if be ten thousand more a bit PTL . 7  J: 那个作价你当时在吗？   that PTL make price you that moment present PTL? 8  P: 这好像，不记得了，现在，因为这车到现在可能已经三四年了吧。   this as if, not remember PTL, now, because this vehicle come now possible  already three four year PTL PTL . 9  J: 嗯。   um . 10  P: 这个方面我不记得了。   this PTL aspect I not remember PTL . 11  J: 你的印象当中当时是在旧车交易市场作的是一万多一点。

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your impression in middle that time be on old vehicle trade market make PTL  be ten thousand more a bit . P: 对。好像 … 他们收回去了吧，只给了一个产权证明书。 right . as if … they take back go PTL PTL, only give PTL one PTL property  right certificate . J: 刚才您说的一万二是怎么着，您交的这个钱是一万二？ just now you say PTL twelve thousand be how PTL, you give PTL this money  be twelve thousand? P: 对。 right . J: 啊。那么您当时和这个保险公司签合同的时候，讲没有讲这车，就是上 这个保险的时候讲没讲这个车的价值情况？ ah . then you that time and this insurance company sign contract PTL time,  speak not speak this vehicle, just be up this insurance PTL time speak not  speak this vehicle PTL value situation? P: 这个，好像 …，我记得好像给他说过吧。就是这个业务员李惠齐，我 说这车已经买了一年了吧，然后我找他上的保险。 this, as if …, I remember as if give him speak PTL PTL . just be this clerk Li  Hui-qi, I say this vehicle already buy PTL one year PTL PTL, later I find him  up PTL insurance . 

Text 7: 1    2    3    4    5   

J: 我跟您说，您这种想法， I to you say, you this kind idea, D: 不，我就这种想法，真的 no, I just this kind idea, really J: 我觉得啊，您这种想法啊，您整个会把孩子给毁了， I feel ah, you this kind idea ah, you whole will PTL child give ruin PTL . D: 那没办法， that no method, J: 我觉得您这不是一个合格的父亲。 I feel you this not be a qualified father .

Text 8: 1  J: 赡养父母是天经地义的事，更何况她是生你养你的亲生母亲。   support parents be natural matter, moreover she be born you raise you PTL  own mother . 2  D3: 我又没说过不愿意养她！（2秒）我刚才说过了，同意到我家来住。什 么饭熟了，就吃什么。   I also not say PTL not will support her . (2 seconds) I just now said PTL, agree  come my home come live . what meal ready, just eat what . 3  J: 但是你母亲认为她住到养老院比较好，你们每个人每月出200元的生活 费。   but your mother think she live come raising old home relatively good, you  each person every month offer 200 yuan PTL life fee .

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Text 9: 1  J: 咱们啊，既然是你们双方，啊，把问题谈到法庭来，咱们这该讲也要 讲，是不是啊？作为孩子，有孩子的问题，作为您来讲，作为一个父亲来 讲，是吧？实际上，中国有句古话，三字经里说得多清楚，“养不 教”…   we ah, since be you two sides, ah, PTL question talk to court come, we this  should speak also want speak, be not be ah? as child, have child PTL question,  as you come speak, as a father come speak, be PTL? in fact, china have sentence old utterance, three character bible in say PTL much clear, “raise not  educate” … 2  D:  “父之过”，说得对     “father’s fault”, say PTL right 3  J: “父之过”，对吧，呃。那么这会儿，咱们也要有一个反思，是吧？你为 什么孩子这种状况？咱们在教育方式方法上有没有不妥的地方   “father’s fault”, right PTL, er . then this moment, we also want have a reflection, be PTL? you why child this situation? we in education way method have  not have inappropriate place 4  D: 嗯   um Text 10: 1  J: 好的。原被告双方均同意在法庭主持下进行调解，现在开始法庭调 解。…… 现由原告方发言。   good . plaintiff defendant two parties both agree uner court preside proceed  mediation, now begin court mediation . …… now by plaintiff party speak . 2  PA: 审判长，原告坚持认为去养老院住是最好的解决办法。我们根据天台 康乐养老院的收费标准，按照最低标准最后算出800块钱一个月。这个费用 已经是最低的了。   presiding judge, plaintiff insist believe go raise old home be best PTL resolve  method . we according to Tiantai Kangle raise old home PTL charge standard,  according to lowest standard finally calculate out 800 yuan money a month .  this fee already be lowest PTL . 3  J: 请原告方再陈述一遍这个800块钱的用处。   please plaintiff party again state one time this 800 yuan money PTL use place . 4  PA：好的。…… 这五项费用加在一起共800元，这已经是一个70多岁的老 人维持正常生活的最低费用了。原告主张由四个子女平均分担，每人每月 200元。   good . …… this five items fee add together totle 800 yuan, this already be a 70  more year PTL old man maintain normal life PTL lowest fee PTL . plaintiff  claim by four son daughter average share, each person every month 200 yuan . 5  J: 被告各方有什么意见？被告陈立彪？   defendant every party have what suggestion? defendant Chen Li-biao? 6  D1: 我同意每个月支付200元。   I agree every month pay 200 yuan . 7  J: 被告陈桂花？你同意这个方案吗？   defendant Chen Gui-hua? you agree this scheme PTL?

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Cheng Zhaoyang

8  D2: 我都说讲过了，你们要我出钱我还能说不吗？都闹到这个地方来了！ 哼。（4秒）他们不怕丢人，我还怕‖别人笑话呢！   I all say speak PTL PTL, you want me out money I also can say no PTL? all  trouble go this place come PTL . hum . they not fear lose person, I also fear  other person joke PTL . 9  J: ‖被告，现在我们在组织双方进行调解，其他无关的就不用讲了。说多 了伤和气，大家都是一家人嘛。（2秒）你说是不是？法庭现在询问你的意 见，同意还是不同意？   defendant, now we on at organize two side proceed mediation, other no  relation PTL just not need speak PTL . 10  D2: 我讲的是事实，他们   I speak PTL be fact, they  11  J:  事实刚才已经在法庭调查阶段让你们讲过了，有关 情况，就是事实部分，我们都已经知道了。现在请回答法庭的问题，你是 否同意每个月支付200元钱，让你母亲住到养老院里去？   fact just now already at court investigation stage let you speak PTL PTL, related situation, just be fact part, we all already know PTL . now please answer  court PTL question, you be not agree every month pay 200 yuan money, le  you mother live to raise old home in come?  12  D2: 反正是自己的老母，要我做女儿的来养，做儿子的不觉得丢人，我还 能说什么呢？   anyway be own old mother, want me do daughter PTL come raise, do son PTL  not feel disgraceful, I also can say what PTL? 13  J: 那 …，陈桂花，不管怎么样，你是同意每月支付200元？   that …, Chen Gui-hua, not care how, you be agree every month pay 200  yuan? 14  D2: 嗯。   um . Text 11: 1    2   

J: 好的。那被告××呢？ ok . that defendant ×× PTL? D3: 200元钱是没有的。如果老母愿意到我家来住，‖那没问题。 200 yuan money be not have PTL . if old mother willing come I home live,  that no problem . 3  P: ‖到你家住？上回街道说轮到你了，××把我送到你家门口，你是怎么 待我的？你和老婆那么凶，我怕都怕死了。   to you home live? last round street say turn come you PTL, ×× PTL me send  you home door, you be how treat me PTL? you and wife so fierce, I fear all  fear death PTL . 4  J: 原告，你的意思是不是说不愿意到陈××家住？   defendant, your meaning be not be say not willing to Chen ×× home live? 5  P: 不敢去，吓都吓死了。   not dare to, scare all scare death PTL .

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Text 12: 1    2    3    4   

P: 你出尔反尔的代价，我受不了。 you back and fill PTL price, I bear not PTL . D: 我出尔反尔？ I back and fill? P：嗯。 um . J: 这样吧，我觉得，既然协商嘛，大家呢，还是心平气和。是吧？ this way PTL, I feel, since negotiate PTL, you guys PTL, still calm and cool . be  PTL?

Text 13: 1  J: 那么这会儿，咱们也要有一个反思，是吧？你为什么孩子这种状况？咱 们在教 育方式方法上有没有不妥的地方。   then this moment, we also want have a reflection, be PTL? you why child this  situation? we in education way method have not have inappropriate place . 2  D: 嗯   um

Iv TransformaTIons

In

legal dogmaTICs

and

PrIvaTe law

maRcos vInícIo cHeIn feRes1 / denIs fRanco sIlva PublIC InTervenTIon In ConTraCTs: Is IT THe end of PrIvaTe law as we know

IT?2

I InTroduCTIon It is now commonplace to assert that private and public law has merged into one  due to societal transformation and technological development which have jeopardised private autonomy as far as contract law is concerned . In this context, it seems  relevant to study this public intervention in the law of contracts taking as a unit of  analysis the informed consent in pharmaceutical trials involving human beings . As  a matter of fact, this paper aims to salvage the liberal perspective of human rights,  that is, our basic liberties, from its contemporary imperfect state . However, this paper does not defend a project for reinstating the original negative status of rights,  but  is  rather  deposed  to  reconciling  liberty  and  equality  as  fundamental  human  rights .  In  an  instrumental  society,  human  beings  are  free  to  establish  obligational  bonds with whomever they want, in whatever circumstances the law does not forbid . Nevertheless, freedom of contract has been endangered because of inequality  of resources . Economic power is a relevant factor which causes free will and obligational bond to be distorted . As originally conceived, contracts could be defined as  a means of attributing duties and rights instantaneously once the obligational bond  has been formed . In fact, this is the classic format of any contract .  The development of post-industrial capitalism contributed to the dissemination  of standardized contractual clauses which left very little space for negotiation and  free  will .  The  demand  for  public  intervention  in  contracts  generated  a  profound  mutation in private contractual law . The greater part of the doctrine condones the  merging of public and private law . However, the main purpose of this paper is to  prove that public intervention in contracts is not an expression of a merger between  public  and  private  law .  On  the  contrary,  this  kind  of  intervention  is  seen  as  the  proper affirmation of private law in a context where public and private law are cooriginally conceived to reaffirm the basic liberty of contract . In fact, there is not a  fundamental change in the relationship between private and public law . The aim of  public  intervention  is  to  protect  one  of  the  oldest  private  institutions,  contracts .  Bearing all this in mind, it is interesting to move forward into the discussion of a  utilitarian analysis of law . Great developments require sacrifice . Although that was  not the former concept of utilitarianism, most of the deleterious effects of post-industrial capitalism are due to the basic utilitarian principle: in order to achieve a  1  2 

I would like to specially thank Dimitrios Kyritsis for the remarkable comments on a previously  written paper on Dworkin’s legal theory . I am totally responsible for mistakes I insist on making  after Dimitrios’s relevant and thoughtful remarks . This paper has the financial support of FAPEMIG (Fundação de Amparo da Pesquisa do Estado  De Minas Gerais) and CNPq (Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico) .

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greater good, it is justifiable to tolerate a few losses along the way . Armed with this  assumption, atrocities against humans have been committed, not only by multinationals, but also by national governments . Thus, the fundamental issue here is to  discuss the following questions: how legitimate is the use of formal informed consent in pharmaceutical trials involving human beings? Is public intervention in contracts sufficiently effective in this particular situation? It is crucial to base the answer  to these questions on substantial legal theory . In order to discuss this specific topic  of informed consent in contracts, it is necessary, firstly, to construct the theoretical  basis to understand the reality of certain legal agreements, such as the aforementioned . Therefore, the main objective of this paper is to formulate the theoretical  basis for the application of private law in a context of human rights protection .  In addition, establishing adequate parameters for this discussion enables one to  understand how legal and social theory can effectively contribute to a critique of the  utilitarian approach used by scientists, economists, jurists and politicians in postindustrial society . It is not a matter of demonising the economic system, yet it is  necessary  to  propose  a  theoretical  basis  on  which  to  reflexively  construe  morally  acceptable  decisions  for  limiting  the  abuse  of  economic  power .  In  this  context,  Dworkin’s legal theory and Taylor’s critique of utilitarianism will be used as theoretical points of departure for reaffirming the potential of private contractual law .  Furthermore, the theory of relational contract will also play an important role in the  elaboration of a sustainable explanation for the change in any private obligational  bond .  Based on the underpinnings of this theoretical framework, the first major step  in  this  paper  is  to  reconstruct  the  critique  of  utilitarianism  according  to  Charles  Taylor’s social theory . Secondly, Dworkin’s proposal of law as integrity plays a relevant part in this theoretical framework, not only because he fiercely criticises the  utilitarian tools used in judicial decision-making, but also because he presents a legal theory based on justice, fairness, procedural due process in which a criterion of  coherence and integrity, morally and institutionally conceived, determines ‘the dimension of fit’ when applying the law . Thirdly, the relational contract theory, according to MacNeil’s former idea of a new theory for contractual law, involves a  natural mutation in the formation of obligational bond . The focus is not the instantaneously formed obligational bond, but the private relationship established in a  certain social environment . In conclusion, the theoretical framework intends to reconstrue a new interpretation of private contractual law and its relationship with  public law intervention, taking into consideration the conflicts between sustainable  economic development and human rights . II THe

Idea of law as IdenTITy

– Taylor’s

ProPosal of Human IdenTITy

According to Taylor,3 individualism, instrumental rationality and soft despotism are  the  three  major  malaises  of  modern  society .  Following  this  theoretical  track,  it  is  possible  to  construct  the  basis  for  the  application  of  the  identity  of  a  self  in  the  3 

Charles Taylor, The ethics of authenticity, ethics of authenticity, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University  Press, 1991 .

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domain of human rights . Understanding the moral sources as a means of revealing  the construction of the identity of a human being is of great importance when measuring the exact influence of moral frameworks in the legal system . Furthermore, the  notion of identity is a paramount concept to give density to Dworkin’s idea of law  as integrity and its specific moral elements, such as the notion of fraternal attitude  and personified community as an association of principle . Bearing this in mind, the  theoretical path will consist of presenting Taylor’s idea of identity and its critique of  utilitarianism so as to consistently define the relations between morality and law .  Taylor4 asserts that the dark side of individualism involves an increasing centring on the self . In this scenario, an individual leads a life less concerned with society and others . Due to the growing difficulty to make strong moral evaluation, the  individual may experience a disturbing ‘loss of meaning in life’, for his choices are  made in accordance with immediate results, quantitative preferences . It is not unordinary to say that the utilitarian philosophy was responsible for the rejection of all  qualitative distinctions of worth . The quest for an autonomous individual engenders more concern for calculation as well as causing the reduction of all qualitative  moral evaluation to quantitative appreciation of human desires . Taylor defends that  “the utilitarian strand in our civilization would induce us to abandon the language  of qualitative contrast, and this means, of course, abandoning our strong evaluative  languages” .5 In a utilitarian perspective, it is crucial to reject strong evaluation in  order to achieve a social system in which choices and preferences can be made, executed and forged objectively based on a cost-benefit analysis . Indeed, the utilitarian source of reason is exclusively founded on a means to an end approach .  In this context, Taylor6 recognises a significant change of preference analysis,  pinpointing  that  people  may  not  make  their  choices  based  on  highly  qualitative  moral evaluation, but on weak evaluation aiming at immediate outcomes . There is,  here, a drastic reduction of practical reason to calculation (instrumental rationality) .  This will cause a search for a distorted ideal of authenticity . In other words, the postindustrial society has promoted an interesting search for the inner source of a human being, based on a self-referred being, neglecting an important issue here: the  recognition of the identity of a self depends on a web of interlocution . This means  that one’s identity is fully dependent on the recognition by others of what he (she)  really  is .  In  this  vein,  Taylor  confirms  that  “my  discovering  my  identity  doesn’t  mean that I work it out in isolation but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly  overt,  partly  internalized,  with  others .”7  Subsequently,  he  concludes  that  one’s  identity depends on the dialogical relations with others . The identity of the self can  be determined by the dialogical expression of a moral stance in a physical space .  Taylor8 explains that: “my identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame and  the horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or  4  5  6  7  8 

Charles Taylor (note 3) . Charles Taylor, Human agency and language: philosophical papers I . Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, 21 . Charles Taylor (note 3) . Charles Taylor (note 3), 47; 48 . Charles Taylor, Sources of the self: the making of the modern identity . Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1989, 27 .

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Marcos Vinício Chein Feres / Denis Franco Silva what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose . In other words, it is the horizon within  which I am capable of taking a stand .”

Taylor9 criticises the way that disenchantment in the world has erased many traditional moral horizons . The development of a naturalistic disengaged reason generates what is called the ‘punctual self ’, whose aim is to master its physical and mental  abilities in accordance with an instrumental rationality perspective . This ‘punctual  self ’ will fulfil its ordinary task, lead an instrumental life, have its identity defined  by the role it plays in society and, thus, confirm the scientistic way of living . Selfreferred, this individual develops preferences and goals towards “the satisfaction of  private life .”10 In this social environment, instrumental reason will be internalised as  a major achievement of the modern age . At the same time, it will be used as a powerful tool in the conquest of scientific neutrality as well as a pattern of excellence in  individual behaviour . In fact, instrumental reasoning is responsible for the construction of a punctual self whose comportment is based on the best cost-output ratio .  Taylor expresses his fear of the dissemination of instrumental reasoning with its application  to  all  the  different  domains  of  human  life:  “the  fear  is  that  things  that  ought to be determined by other criteria will be decided in terms of efficiency or  cost-benefit analysis, that the independent ends that ought to be guiding our lives  will be eclipsed by the demand to maximize output .”11 Taylor12 manages to criticise the dissemination of instrumental rationality drawing one’s attention to what he calls the “eclipse of ends”– badly-informed choices  resulting in morally questionable goals – such as equating personal happiness with  the capacity to consume . This kind of cost-benefit reductionism derives from the  absence of a specific moral horizon or inescapable moral frameworks . In spite of  Taylor’s clear preference for a Christian morality, his precise description of the distorted conception of authenticity, caused by the internalisation of instrumental rationality in human lives, serves as a relevant point of departure to understand the  fragilities of social system with great effect on human rights . One should not overlook Taylor’s option for Christian morality as a means of diluting the deleterious  social  effects  of  a  cost-benefit  mode  of  action .  However,  Taylor13  has  excelled  in  mapping  out  the  sources  of  morality  in  the  modern  age .  From  original  theistic  grounding and naturalism of disengaged reason to Romantic expressivism and modernist visions, Taylor is capable of reconstructing the sources of modern identity,  taking as a point of unity the “agreed intuitions about what is right .”14 Taylor,15 in  fact, elucidates that his map is overschematic and those historical maps of moral  sources  are  influenced  by  each  other .  The  historiography  developed  by  Taylor  in  “Sources of the self ”16 demonstrates that moral standards are necessary, in spite of  varying in accordance with the constitutive goods elected by peoples throughout  different ages . The affirmation of morality in different moments of the modern age  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16 

Ibid . Charles Taylor (note 8) . Charles Taylor (note 3), 5 . Charles Taylor (note 3) . Charles Taylor (note 8) . Charles Taylor (note 8), 496 .  Charles Taylor (note 8) . Ibid .

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serves to prove that the identity of a self is interwoven with a moral stance in determined,  yet  continuous,  time  and  space .  Criticising  disengaged  instrumentalism,  Taylor clearly convinces one that the absence of strong moral evaluation and the  lack of qualitative distinction of worth tend to “empty life of its richness, depth and  meaning .”17 Focusing exclusively on dubious individual ‘goals’ creates political alienation which, in turn, may logically lead to an increasing loss of freedom caused  by an absence of participation in political decision-making . Here lies the essence of  “soft despotism” – the expression belongs to Alexis de Tocqueville quoted by Taylor .18 Taylor argues that “a society in which people end up as the kind of individuals  who are ‘enclosed in their own hearts’ is one where few will want to participate actively in self-government .”19 Self-absorbed individuals tend to concede their right  of participating in political decisions to ‘tutelary power’ . Absorbed by the search for  satisfaction in his private life, the individual will accept an increasing loss of participation in political decision-making as long as the state provides his individual  needs . An updated soft despotism can be viewed as the political reflexion of individualism and instrumental rationality, causing the narrowing and flattening of the  public sphere .20 At this stage, one might question the relevance of this sociological assertion for  the study of legal theory . Taking into account the Habermasian idea of law as means  of reconnecting the lifeworld to the various social systems, such as, economy, politics, family etc .,21 it is important to consider the relevance of Taylor’s historiography involving the construction of modern identity . Detecting the aforementioned  malaises of the modern age, Taylor elucidates the moral sources of human identity .  Above all, Taylor centres his argument on the fact that, so as to overcome individualism and instrumental rationality, one should make strong evaluation about the life  that is worth living . In the search for sources of the self, Taylor will, indeed, demonstrate the imperatives of morality in the individual’s daily life . Morality is an inescapable path which should be followed so as to redefine the essential components  of  the  identity  of  self .  The  idea  of  identity  as  something  constituted  by  a  moral  horizon, which defines the choices a self makes in life, is, undoubtedly, a necessary  complement for the idea of integrity in law . Taking into account that law and morality are interwoven, it is fundamental to incorporate the component of the identity  of a self to substantiate the association of principles and the fraternal attitude as an  inescapable  moral  framework,  strong  moral  evaluation,  that  will  justify,  from  an  external point of view, the ‘dimension of fit’ in any judicial controversy . In spite of  dealing with a morally pluralistic society, the demand for qualitative distinction of  worth requires a sense of unity in legal justification . The merger between identity  and integrity serves to corroborate an unavoidable relation between morality and  law . Furthermore, so as to avoid the contamination of the legal system by instrumental rationality or by a cost-benefit ratio, it is urgent to reconnect the legal theory  17  18  19  20 

Charles Taylor (note 8), 500 . Charles Taylor (note 3) . Charles Taylor (note 3), 9 . Jurgen Habermas, Between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy .  Translated by William Rehg . Cambridge: MIT, 1996 . 21  Habermas (note 20); Id . The theory of communicative action: lifeworld and system: a critique of  functionalist reason . Translated by Thomas McCarthy . Boston: Beacon, 1987 .

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with a moral theory in which qualitative distinction, as Taylor proposes, will inform  the nature, the procedure and the justification of a juridical decision beyond the  conventionalist structure of legal system . Only with this specific theoretical apparatus can public intervention in contracts be perceived by this qualitative distinction  of worth as a means of reinforcing the private autonomy of an individual . Public  and private law are intertwined . Indeed, the origin of public intervention is essentially  correlated  to  the  reaffirmation  of  private  rights .  Nonetheless,  this  will  be  cleared up as soon as the theory of law as integrity is explained above . III dworkIn’s

THeory of law as InTegrITy

First and foremost, Dworkin’s theory of law is of great importance to establishing  the philosophical underpinnings for applying the idea of identity to the juridical  praxis . Habermas clarifies that “Dworkin’s theory of rights is premised on the claim  that moral arguments play a role in adjudication because positive law has unavoidably absorbed a moral content” .22 Following this reasoning, Habermas23 emphasizes  that Dworkin will develop a deontological concept of rights in order to satisfy the  requirements of both legal certainty and rational acceptability . In addition, Habermas indicates that Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity “consists of rules and principles  secures  [sic]  via  discursive  adjudication  the  integrity  of  relations  of  mutual  recognition  that  guarantee  equal  concern  and  respect  to  each  citizen” .24  Understanding  this  Habermasian  approach  to  Dworkin’s  theory  signifies  that  Dworkin  operates  a  relevant  turn  in  the  concept  of  legal  theory  for  he  intends  to  insert  a  substantive moral content as the necessary justification in the ‘dimension of fit’ .  Moreover, as Habermas25 makes it clear in his philosophical argumentation of  Dworkin’s legal theory that, applying a constructive and creative interpretation in  the matter of adjudication and legislation means absorbing as a fundamental issue  the rational reconstruction in the application of Law . The analysis case by case, in  Dworkin’s account, and the exact fit of a certain normative species can be the perfect correspondent of the critical reconstruction elaborated between the empirical  and the abstract in the Habermasian perspective . Obviously, in this context of legal  theory,  there  is  nothing  wrong with  correlating the notion  of  identity  in Charles  Taylor’s theory and the idea of integrity in Ronald Dworkin’s Empire of Law . Thus,  the first step here is to understand the Dworkinian idea of an association of principles as embedded in a personified community . Then, it is necessary to elaborate the  Dworkinian idea of integrity in law . Finally, the relationship between identity and  integrity is sketched out as a first draft of a substantial legal theory .  So as to be acquainted with the idea of law as integrity, a preliminary question  must be raised: What is the concept of law? Dworkin presents a preliminary answer  to this question in the beginning of “Law’s Empire” . According to him, law is an  interpretive concept, not semantically structured, but constructively and creatively  forged .  In  this  context,  the  author  elaborates  a  comparative  text  between  social  22  23  24  25 

Habermas (note 20), 204 . Habermas (note 20) . Habermas (note 20), 210 . Habermas (note 20) .

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practice and artistic interpretation . Both of them share a common ground of evaluation  as  far  as  interpretation  relates  the  purpose  with  the  object  of  both  a  social  practice and a work of art . Moreover, it is not the case of discovering some meaning  or some new structure of a social practice or a work of art, but more so a case of  reconstructing the object and the purpose of it so as to make of it the best, one can  arguably come up with . In this particular point lies the essential grounding of rational reconstruction in legal theory .  Conceiving the community as a working personification, Dworkin26 elaborates  his theory of law as integrity in such a way as to demystify the relationship between  law and morality, considering it neither as something static nor as something innate .  Actually, law is intertwined with morality due to the fact that the moral agent, the  community, consists of an association of principles . It represents the political morality of all its members . Yet it is not the sum of individual and personal moralities .  Ideally, the community makes its own moral choices for which its members are responsible, not individually but communally .  Dworkin asserts that “a political society that accepts integrity as a political virtue  thereby becomes a special form of community, special in a way that promotes its  moral authority to assume and deploy a monopoly of coercive force” .27 Integrity is  the bond that significantly assists conflict resolution involving matters of justice and  fairness, in spite of the possible contradiction between these two values that may  arise in hard cases . ‘The dimension of fit’ is reconstructed in each hard case founded  on this fundamental ground known as integrity . The basis for applying law as integrity to legislation and adjudication should be  the existence of a true community . According to Dworkin “the responsibilities of a  true community deploys are special and individualized and display a pervasive mutual concern that fits a plausible conception of equal concern .”28 It may be asked  why Dworkin cares so much about the community, and, why this concept plays a  relevant role  in his  theory  of law  as  integrity . Simple  as it may seem,  the answer  demands a full understanding of Dworkin’s theoretical concern . In order to achieve  coherent and articulate consistency in the legal system, he devises a concept of law  whose underpinning for precisely elaborating ‘the dimension of fit’ is the idea of  ‘fraternal attitude’ .  The concept of true community is not an isolated point in Dworkin’s theory of  law . Indeed, a true community is an essential structure which serves as a point of  departure for elaborating and applying integrity in law . Having a solid community  does not engender the constructive interpretation proposed by Dworkin . In fact, the  most relevant issue here is to consider the importance of establishing community as  something prior to justice, fairness and due process, for these elements are to be  construed  taking  into  consideration  a  particular  political  moral  institution  of  a  group . However, it is not a political group based on the rulebook model or de facto  circumstances . It is a community based on an association of principles . Dworkin  elucidates that “members of a society of principle accept that their political rights  and duties are not exhausted by the particular decisions their political institutions  26  Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Oxford: Hart Publishing Press, 1986 . 27  Dworkin (note 26), 188 . 28  Dworkin (note 26), 201 .

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have reached, but, depend, more generally, on the scheme of principles those decisions presuppose and endorse .”29 This means that the community forged according  to a coherent set of principles is not created and consolidated by political compromise . In this context, the model of principle satisfies the conditions of a ‘morally  pluralistic society’, according to Dworkin .  It may be asked how this community of principles fulfils the requisites of a morally pluralistic society . Obviously, Dworkin is the one who gives the precise answer  to this question . This community is formed by citizens who respect the principles  of justice and fairness which are part of the political arrangement of a certain society  and, beyond that, these citizens are subjected to the same commands which make  responsibilities in this community not only special, but also personal . In addition,  the community of principle requires deep, constant, pervasive equal concern for all  its members based on a coherent conception of what that means . This community  does more than merely accept integrity; it truly embraces the nature of this concept .  In fact, in the name of fraternity, one is deeply committed to the principles which  found the basic structure of this political association . Nonetheless, it is a tricky path  one must follow so as to comprehend the essence of mutual concern in a political  community of principle . Whenever Dworkin reveals his deep respect for fraternity  as a means of achieving integrity in law, he is not protesting for a merger of personalities, just as, it may occur between lovers, or among close family members . He is  quite incisive when he contests this misinterpretation of his theory . Mutual concern  is not love at all . Although being akin to love, it cannot be confused with it . Love is  a special, rare kind of mutual concern, which may eventually happen among lovers,  true friends, siblings, parents and their offspring . For this reason, one must not confuse the level of mutual concern that integrates a political community with the most  intense and ultimate concern that expresses love in the most intimate human relationships . It is impossible to disagree with Dworkin, for the basis of integrity, while  coming very close to love, is not so intensely personal . This difference empowers  and gives greater significance to the mutual concern which the members of a true  community of principle ought to share . Risking imprecision, I proffer a concise definition of integrity . Integrity means  nurturing equal concern for all those who belong to a community based on principles . Similarly, Dworkin confirms that integrity is a key to the constructive interpretation of legal practices and hard cases in law . Integrity demands coherency from  judges and legislators both when treating like cases alike and when deciding or legislating according to the best view of the legal standards of their political community . At this point, it is possible to grasp the true meaning and importance of this  political community for Dworkin . He does not see politics as a means to an end . On  the contrary, he makes a true attempt to portray a moral entity whose primary goals  are rights and duties, as a matter of principle . This specific part of his theory is extremely relevant for those seeking arguments against rigid conventionalism and all  kinds of relativism . Integrity sheds new light on legal theory, for it enables one to  reconstruct the meaning of legal practices within a reflexive and critical approach  which represents consistency in principle and, likewise, a great leap towards taking  rights seriously .  29  Dworkin (note 26), 211 .

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Studying Dworkin’s legal theory leads to considerations of the comparison between literature and adjudication in law . Explaining integrity in law means thinking  of the chain of law just as writers and critics evaluate the chain novel . In order to  decide a hard case, a judge should take as a role model the idea of writing a chain  novel . In fact, integrity requires respect for previous judicial decisions in a context  of intrinsic awareness of justice, fairness and procedural due process as principles  which consolidate the particular political association . The comparison with a chain  novel rests on an author’s ability to write a new chapter without losing track of the  plot and those chapters already written . The similarity is quite impressive, for the  judge should write his (her) decision taking as a point of departure a coherent system of law in a particular association of principle as well as the history of precedents  in  the  judicial  system .  It  is  not  a  political  compromise  with  former  decisions  in  previous cases, but it is a way of considering them without disregarding the association of principle as a tool which analyses not only the factual circumstances of a  case but also the precedents .  Some critics accuse Dworkin of formulating an obscure concept of integrity in  law where anything fits the idea of integrity, making the principle of adjudication  vague and hollow . Nonetheless, a cautious scholar would disagree with such a critique, for Dworkin is extremely precise when he points out that “judges who accept  the interpretive ideal of integrity decide hard cases by trying to find, in some coherent set of principles about people’s rights and duties, the best constructive interpretation of the political structure and legal doctrine of their community .”30 It is not  an imprecise, vague definition of integrity in law, but a theory based on morality .  Law and morality intertwined, de facto, demand a total commitment to a coherent  set of principles which identify a particular political association as well as its choices  for moral values as the underpinning of rights and duties of members in this community . Here, one can see the intrinsic relationship between the ‘dimension of fit’  and the moral content in law consolidated under the auspices of integrity . In Dworkin’s legal theory, there is plenty of scope for strong evaluation, as defined by Charles Taylor .31 A judge who is part of an association of principles cannot  decide a hard case if he is not capable of analysing his choices, his values and, above  all, the kind of life it is worth living . The same must be applied to the legislator . All  decisions in law are to be entirely made in such a way that mutual and equal concern are not vague terms, but universal standards for applying attitudinal respect,  described by Taylor,32 to all intricate judicial matters . The other is not a nameless,  faceless stranger, irrelevant to one’s existence . In fact, fraternal attitude represents a  means of valuing the individual identity, the self as part of the political association .  Mutual concern is not a hollow expression . On the contrary, it reveals a necessary  inclusion, sympathy and solidarity for others whose interests and projects may not  coincide with yours in the short term, but, indeed, ought to be closely observed,  thoroughly understood and above all, considered as important as your own .

30  Dworkin (note 26), 255 . 31  Charles Taylor (note 9) . 32  Charles Taylor (note 9) .

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The relational theory of exchanges, proposed by Ian MacNeil, can undoubtedly be  conceived as a relevant critique of utilitarian philosophy . This theory embraces and  materialises not only the proposal of identity as a dialogical concept, but also the  underpinnings of law as integrity . Understanding the obligational bond as a continuous and dynamic relation which minimises the idea of a contract as reduction  of transaction costs is a relevant step toward the implementation of identity and  integrity in the law of contracts . With this purpose, first of all, a short draft of the  main points of MacNeil’s theory will be sketched out . Then, a brief comment will  be made on the application of MacNeil’s theory and the aforementioned theories in  the case of informed consent in contracts between pharmaceutical companies and  individuals . According to Campbell,33 the correct reading of MacNeil’s social theory of exchanges requires one to understand that MacNeil is not replacing the existing classical format of contracts by a new species of contract – the relational ones . Indeed,  MacNeil conceives, in a broader sense, a relational theory of exchanges which will  bear out the interpretation of both discrete and relational contracts . Furthermore,  MacNeil truly brings to knowledge that any kind of contract, discrete or relational,  is  elaborated  as  an  expression  of  social  relational  exchanges .  Campbell  precisely  observes that “the main intended thrust of his [MacNeil’s] work is not so much to  distinguish the relational from the discrete contract but to reveal the relational constitution of all contracts” .34  Campbell considers that “MacNeil’s stress on contract as an instrument of social co-operation is intended to reject the individualist understanding of exchange .”35  Obviously, the understanding of a contract as an instrument of social co-operation  enhances an interpretation of exchange relations in which the identity of a self is  recognized as essential for the development of social interaction . All kinds of dialogical relations with others, even social exchange relations, constitute the identity  of a self . No one will doubt that a contract, a means of fulfilling one’s personal autonomy, can be defined by a dialogical relation among free selves . Moreover, the  relational contract theory, also denominated essential contract theory by MacNeil,36  is compounded by ten basic principles: role integrity, reciprocity, implementation  of planning, effectuation of consent, flexibility, contractual solidarity, expectation  interests, power norm, propriety of means and harmonisation with social matrix .  These basic principles are derived from the very essence of the concept of contract  formulated by MacNeil . In this sense, MacNeil states that ““contract” means relations among people who have exchanged, are exchanging or expect to be exchanging in the future – in other words, exchange relations .”37 Therefore, these exchange  relations require a free commitment of a self whose identity is necessarily implicated  in this juridical instrument of co-operation . 33  David Campbell (ed .), The relational theory of contract: the selected works of Ian MacNeil . London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2001 . 34  Campbell (note 33), 5 . 35  David Campbell (note 33), 46 . 36  David Campbell (note 33) . 37  David Campbell, (note 33), 366 .

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Basically, MacNeil38 draws one’s attention to the fact that the above-mentioned  behavioural patterns are not intended to be exhaustive or overly sophisticated . In  fact, this is a relevant point in MacNeil’s theory, for he gives his interpreter a free  pass as far as the application of these patterns is concerned . Knowing that contracts,  as exchange relations, are complex and involve internal conflicts, the act of interpretation requires the use of integrity in law which can be clearly related to the patterns  listed above, for example, role integrity (articulate consistency in contracts), contractual  solidarity  (fraternal  attitude),  harmonisation  with  social  matrix  (personified  community as an association of principles can influence the fit of contract norms to  the reality of exchange relations) . As the listed pattern are not to be understood as  something overly sophisticated, it is also convenient to relate the propriety of means  and effectuation of consent in an exchange relation to a fairly possible manifestation of attitudinal respect and strong moral evaluation (identity in law) at the very  moment of drawing-up a contract as well as solving conflicts involving relational  and discrete contracts . In  this  context,  the  obligational  bond  in  itself  is  conceived  as  a  relationship  which implies duties and rights over a certain period of time . In this new contractual  context, public ‘checks and balances’ are imposed upon any private contractual relation in order to sustain a desirable environment for the exercise of free will of an  individual . In MacNeil’s theory, it is rather improbable to infer a merger between  public and private law . The social exchange theory reinforces the nature of private  law: the protection of a free individual in society . Contracts will be translated as a  means to exercise the free will of an individual . The constant manifestation of private  power  which  develops  inequality  in  social  relations  ought  to  be  limited  by  public law ‘checks and balances’ through inescapable intervention . The idea of public intervention is to provide an alternative to a self in exchange relations so as to  restore the natural balance necessary to construct stable relations based on equality  and fairness . Consequently, MacNeil’s behaviour patterns above mentioned are interpretive  canons  which,  up  to  a  point,  can  be  considered  the  essential  tools  to  provide the exact amount of public intervention in a contract, for they can, first,  detect the real status of the exchange in practice, and, then, reconstruct it in accordance with the legitimate standards provided by the notions of integrity and identity  in law applied to the idea of relational theory of contracts . The purpose here is to  rationally reconstruct the exchange relations and the contract norms so as to make  the best of the contract and of private law and public intervention one can come up  with . Finally, so as to evaluate the importance of full, satisfactory, and not formal,  informed consent in contracts involving pharmaceutical trials in human beings, it is  crucial to use the theoretical propositions developed above . In a constant search for  efficiency in pharmaceutical industries, human beings are submitted to a series of  tests  which  may  cause  permanent  health  damage .  Although  the  pharmaceutical  companies formally give the necessary amount of information to the individuals,  the exchange relation, in this specific case, is still unbalanced, because the individuals lack the basic medical knowledge as well as the necessary cause and effect reasoning to understand the consequences of their permission for invasive drug testing .  38  David Campbell (note 33) .

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There is, here, a distortion in the behavioural pattern known as effectuation of consent . The consent here is vitiated from the beginning .  In this context, consent cannot be restricted to the availability of generic medical information but it must derive from a total comprehension of the causes and the  consequences of pharmaceutical trials . The idea of contractual solidarity requires an  open  dialogue  between  the  individual  and  the  pharmaceutical  company .  The  exchange relation will be corrupted from the very beginning if there is not any propriety of means to achieve the final contractual goals . Testing drugs in human beings is  not  only  an  ethical  issue  but  also  a  complex  and  delicate  exchange  relation  that  must be restricted by both the ‘dimension of fit’ (contract norms) and the fraternal  attitude (moral matrix) . In this particular circumstance, the risk of using, in a utilitarian approach, highly immoral means to achieve morally questionable results must  be submitted to the control of public institutions and public law . If this obligational  bond, in itself a relationship, is not submitted to efficient public intervention, the  core of private law will be irreversibly corrupted by the failure of the exchange relation . Based on integrity in law and qualitative distinction of worth, public and private  law  are  co-originally  constituted .  Private  law  remains,  after  all,  autonomous .  The existence of public intervention serves to reinforce the idea of private law as we  have long known it . v ConClusIon After establishing the theoretical frameworks for analysing a specific exchange relation, such as, informed consent in pharmaceutical contracts involving drug testing  in human beings, it is necessary to answer the questions proposed at the beginning  of this paper . So as not to repeat much of what has already been discussed above,  the intent here is to briefly answer the questions below .  1 . How legitimate is the use of formal informed consent in pharmaceutical trials  involving human beings? It has been largely proved that the use of formal informed consent in pharmaceutical trials involving human beings is illegitimate from the perspective of a legal  theory whose underpinnings are integrity and qualitative distinction of worth . This  theoretical construction serves the purpose of overcoming the limits of a conventionalist judicial structure in which formal consent is acceptable as long as the essential information is passed on the individual, in spite of his not understanding it  fully . Moreover, one of the purposes here was to prove that a pragmatist approach  may jeopardise the idea of full and complete informed consent, considering that, in  a utilitarian approach, it is fairly convenient to sacrifice the well being of some individuals in order to achieve a greater good . A necessary rational reconstruction of  informed consent ought to be implemented by any jurist . This means that, with the  full comprehension of a relational theory of contracts, it is easy to conclude that an  exchange relation, such as, informed consent, ought to be oriented by an open dialogue between the two parties in a contract . Obviously, an open dialogue requires  the pharmaceutical company to explicitly inform the test patient of all side effects  and all possible health damage they may suffer in virtue of the specific drug testing .  Furthermore, it is necessary to have a complete application form for the guidance of 

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a patient whose intent is to take part in drug testing . The pharmaceutical company  must have minimum evidence that the patient is aware of all the possible side effects  of experimental drug testing .  2 . Is public intervention in contracts sufficiently effective in this particular situation? From a conventionalist and a utilitarian point of view, public intervention in  contracts is quite effective in this particular situation . In the first case, the mere existence of a document formally expressing the will of the individual in conformity  with public ‘rulebook’ is sufficient for the protection of the exercise of private autonomy . In the second case, even if informed consent does not represent the actual  will of an individual, it is publicly justifiable to accept this kind of distortion, taking  into account the possibility of developing a more efficient drug which may contribute towards saving more human lives in the future . Nonetheless, from the viewpoint  of integrity in law and a qualitative distinction of worth, the purpose of public intervention in contracts is to rationally reconstruct the actual will of an individual,  contributing to the full understanding of the causes and the effects of drug testing .  In this specific case, there is still much to be done so as to achieve informed consent  which derives from basic behavioural patterns, such as, role integrity, contractual  solidarity and, above all, effectuation of consent .

PomPeu casanovas / maRta Poblet / José manuel lóPez-cobo relaTIonal JusTICe: medIaTIon and odr

THrougH THe

I relaTIonal JusTICe, odr

and THe

world wIde web

“meTroPolIs

model”*

We  live  in  an  overruled  and  changing  legal  world,  where  the  “legal  information  flood” increases exponentially .1 However, some of the new trends rely heavily on  the  ancient  forms  of  dialogue  —the  subject-matter  of  dialectical  systems .2  Mediation and negotiation are becoming legal functionalities that have been incorporated  in the daily routine both of large firms or soloist lawyers .3  Technology both fosters and participates actively in this process . Legal drafting,  contracting, sentencing and administrative management have been enlarged with all  the Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) initiatives and new forms of self-regulation  and  access  to  justice .4  Besides,  the  web  fosters  personalization .5  Citizens  require  a  greater participation and faster and more effective ways of facing their legal activities . We will refer to these legal forms as relational justice . In  a  broad  sense,  relational justice  (RJ)  may  be  defined  first  as  the  justice  produced  through  cooperative  behavior,  agreement,  negotiation,  or  dialogue  among  * 

1 

2 

3 

4  5 

The table and analysis of the existing ODR services offered in this paper have been updated in  Chapter 16 of the Catalan White Book on Mediation (2010) . The interested reader is invited to  consult and download freely its final results (Llibre Blanc de la Mediació a Catalunya; Libro Blanco de la Mediación en Cataluña, Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona, 2010, 1189 pp . Catalan version; 1204 pp ., Spanish version) at http://www .llibreblancmediacio .com .) . The Spanish version  of CWBM includes in Annex a program of the legal electronic institution for mediation . There  is an English version of the Conclusions . The original project ONTOMEDIA has been adapted  for mobile technologies (Android) at the UAB IDT lab (2011) . Joost Breuker, Pompeu Casanovas, Michael C .A . Klein, Enrico Francesconi, Introduction: The  Flood,  the  Channels  and  the  Dykes:  Managing  Legal  Information  in  a  Globalized  and  Digital World, in: Law, Ontologies and the Semantic Web. Channelling the legal information flood, ed . J .  Breuker et al ., IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2009 . On the taxonomy of dialogues see Douglas Walton, The Place of Dialogue in Logic, Computer  Science, and Communication Studies, Synthese 12 (2000), 327–346, slightly modified by Giovanni Sartor, A Teleological Approach to Legal Dialogue, EUI Working Paper LAW 28 (2006) . A  dialectical system is a dynamic structure in which inferences may change according to the new  information added to the system . Thus, arguments may be treated following a non-monotonic  logic . See Jaap Hage, Dialectical models in artificial intelligence and law, AI & Law 8 (2000),  137–172 .  BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) is perhaps the most well-known model  among lawyers . On the Harvard model of mediation, see Robert Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes. Negotiating Agreement Without Giving in, New York, 1981; Robert Fisher and Daniel  Shapiro, New York, 2006 . BATNA is defined as the result that it can be obtained without negotiating .  See Law via the Internet. Free Access, Quality of Information, Effectiveness of Rights, ed . G . Peruginelli  and M . Ragona, Florence, 2008 . Mathieu  D’Aquin,  Enrico  Motta,  Marta  Sabou,  Sofia  Angeletou,  Laurian  Gridinoc,  Vanessa  López, Davide Guidi, Toward a new Generation of Semantic Web Applications, IEEE Intelligent Systems (2008), May/June, 20–28 .

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natural  or  artificial  actors .  The  RJ  field  includes  Alternative  Dispute  Resolution  (ADR) and ODR, all forms of mediation (in commerce, labor, family, juvenile and  adults’ crimes, victim-offender mediation …), restorative justice, transitional justice,  community justice, family conferencing, and peace processes .6 From a technological point of view, RJ may be defined as well as the substantive  and formal structure that allows end users, in the most broader sense (as citizens,  consumers, customers, clients, managers, officials …), to participate in the making  of their own regulation and legal outcomes through all the mixed and plural strategies of what is known as the Semantic Web .7 This implies the coexistence of legal and  social norms, rights and duties to be shared by subjects (artificial or natural agents)  in a flexible and dynamic structured environment .8 From a theoretical point of view, we assume broadly that relational justice intersects with relational law (RL) .9 This concept goes back to the American scholarship  tradition . It was coined by Roscoe Pound, and reused by many Law & Society scholars on empirical grounds . It refers to the concrete social and economic bonds among  the parties in business, companies, corporations or other organizations .10 Thinking  6 

See Pompeu Casanovas and Marta Poblet, Concepts and Fields of Relational Justice, in: Computable Models of the Law: Languages, Dialogue, Games, Ontologies, ed . P . Casanovas, G . Sartor, N .  Casellas, R . Rubino, LNAI 4884, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008, 323–342 .  7  The Semantic Web is an evolving development of the WWW in which data, information and  knowledge can be exchanged and shared between humans and machines . It is conceived as a  stack  of  building  languages  (XML,  XML-schema,  RDF,  RDF-schema,  OWL) .  A  preliminary  vision may be found in Tim Berners-Lee, James Hendler, and Ora Lassila, The Semantic Web,  Scientific American (2001) May 284, 34–43 . The best technical tutorial is contained in Grigoris  Antoniou and Frank van Harmelen Semantic Web Primer, Cambridge MA . 2004, 2nd ed . 2009 .  From  this  perspective,  a  great  bulk  of  work  has  been  already  done  within  the  legal  field  in  some EU F6 and F7 Projects . See Giovanni Sartor, Pompeu Casanovas, Núria Casellas, Rossella  Rubino, Computable Models of the Law and ICT: State of the Art and Trends in European  Research, in P . Casanovas et al . (note 6), 1–20 . See as well Pompeu Casanovas and Pablo Noriega, Introduction: Legal Knowledge, Electronic Agents, and the Semantic Web, in: Trends in Legal Knowledge, the Semantic Web and the Regulation of Electronic Social Systems . Papers from the  B-4 Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Law . May 25th–27th 2005 . XXII World Congress of  Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. IVR 05’, Granada, May 24th–29th 2005, ed . P . Casanovas, P . Noriega, D . Bourcier, F . Galindo, Florence, 2007, 15–40 . A first outline was carried  out in: Law and the Semantic Web. Legal Ontologies, Methodologies, Legal Information Retrieval, and Applications, V . Benjamins, P . Casanovas, J . Breuker, A . Gangemi eds ., LNAI 3369, Heidelberg,  Berlin, 2005 .  8  A wider explanation is offered in Pompeu Casanovas, The Future of Law: Relational Law and  Next Generation of Web Services, in: The Future of Law and Technology: Looking into the Future. Selected Essays, ed . M . Fernández Barrera, P . de Filippi, N . Nuno Andrade, M . Viola de Azevedo  Cunha,  G .  Sartor,  P .  Casanovas,  Florence,  2009,  137–156 .  The  term  has  been  used  recently  in the Restorative Justice movement as well, referred to the social implications of crimes . See  Michael  Schluter,  What  is  Relational  Justice?,  in:  Relational Justice: Repairing the Breach,  ed .  J .  Burnside and N . Baker, Winchester, 1994, 17–27, reprinted in: A Restorative Justice reader. Texts, sources, context . Ed . G . Johnstone, Cullompton, Devon, 2003, 301–311 . 9  Ibid . section 5 . We assumed in there that relational justice is a subset of relational law . However,  this would imply that all forms of RJ are legal, or an extension of law to all regulatory forms .  This kind of implications should be avoided . 10  See Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, Francestown, NH, 1921; Stewart Macauley,  Non-contractual  relations  in  business:  a  preliminary  study,  American Sociological Review  28  (1963), 55–67; Ian Roderick . MacNeil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 

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in this way the link between the two concepts (RJ, RL) goes not without problems .  But we will not consider them in this paper . We think that user-centered strategies of the next Semantic Web generation fit  into a legal approach in which there are rights to be protected and duties to be put  in place . These rights and duties occur in a technological environment . They imply  new regulatory forms and belong to a new regulatory framework as well, because the  networked information environment has definitively transformed the marketplace .  The  Internet  is  evolving  towards  a  network  of  things  (contents),  and  not  only  of  linked websites . It seems that cooperation, multiple use of mobile phones, crowdsourcing11 and services orientation constitute the next step for the World Wide Web . This has been recently referred as to the Metropolis model: “businesses are shifting  from a ‘goods-dominant’ view, in which tangible output and discrete transactions  are central, to a service dominant view, in which intangibility, exchange processes,  and  relationships  are  central” .12  In  the  Metropolis  model,  service-dominant  logic  views customers not as passive but as proactive agents, prosumers, “as co-creators of  value” .13 This  new  landscape  is  the  social  environment  of  the  relational  justice  field,  where scenarios and contexts are shaped from a hybrid use of different technologies  by a multitude of different users (citizens, customers, officers, agents or MAS, MultiAgent Systems) . However, we contend too that, at the local level, this kind of technological developments must be strongly grounded in a wide social knowledge on  the nature of conflicts and disputes to be managed . Not all conflicts can be solved;  and not all disputes fit into the requirements of an ODR management framework . In the following sections, we will situate the Ontomedia Project among ODR  developments . First, in the next section, we will address the issue of how ODR fits  into Web 2 .0 . Section 3 outlines the Catalan White Book on Mediation (CWBM)  and the architecture, functionalities and ontology of Ontomedia . Finally, to end up  this article, it will follow in section 4 a discussion of some implications for the theory of justice and some assumptions on rationality . II odr

and

web 2.0

For some years now, ODR has gained a solid reputation in a number of online and  offline domains . The ICANN Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy  Wisconsin Law Review 3 (1985), 483–525; Phillip I . Blumberg, The Transformation of Modern  Corporation Law: The Law of Corporate Groups, Connecticut Law Review 37 (1995), 605–615 .  11  Crowdsourcing: ‘Technological advances in everything from product design software to digital  video cameras are breaking down the cost barriers that once separated amateurs from professionals . Hobbyists, part-timers, and dabblers suddenly have a market for their efforts, as smart  companies in industries as disparate as pharmaceuticals and television discover ways to tap the  latent talent of the crowd . The labor isn’t always free, but it costs a lot less than paying traditional employees . It’s not outsourcing; it’s crowdsourcing .’ Jeff Howe, ‘The Rise of Crowdsourcing’, Wired 14 (2006) http://www .wired .com/wired/archive/14 .06/crowds .html . See also: http:// www .crowdsourcing .com/ (accessed January 15th 2010) . 12  Rick Kazman and Hong-Mei Chen, The Metropolis Model . A New Logic for Development of  Crowsourced Systems, Communications of the ACM 52, 7, (2009) July, 76 . 13  Ibid . 77

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has, since 2000, managed the resolution of over 20,000 domain name disputes .14  Representatives at eBay claim to be handling over 40 million disputes annually .15 In  Israel,  the  online  arbitration  service  Benoam  is  dealing  with  the  vast  majority  of  subrogation claims over property disputes, then “becoming the authority charged  with  addressing  lacunae  through  the  generation  of  new  norms” .16  These  are  only  well known examples of how ODR is the most preferred forum to deal with specific  types of disputes, both at the global and at the local level .  Generally, the current platforms that populate the ODR market have in common some basic features: proprietary software, stable versions, PC-based, and predetermined roles (i .e . the services provider, the mediator, the parties, etc .) . Beyond  these common traits, ODR services differ in scope (either addressed to specific domains  or  open  to  any  type  of  dispute),  techniques  offered  (assisted  negotiation,  mediation,  conciliation,  recommendation,  arbitration,  etc .),  degree  of  sophistication  (from  facilitating  online  forms  and  procedures  to  case  management,  assignment of online mediators, or professional training), communication channels (synchronic, asynchronic, or both) and business models . Recently, some fifteen ODR  service providers have been reviewed by the CEN in order to facilitate interoperability schemes (CEN 2009) Table 1 below summarizes basic features of twenty ODR  providers from our own research .17

14  ICANN (2010) . Search Index of Proceedings Under the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, available at http://www .icann .org/cgi-bin/udrp/udrp .cgi 15  Colin  Rule,  Making  Peace  on  eBay:  Resolving  Disputes  in  the  World’s  Largest  Marketplace,  The PON Dispute Resolution Forum, October 19, 2008, available at http://www .pon .harvard .edu/ events/making-peace-on-ebay-resolving-disputes-in-the-worlds-largest-marketplace/  (accessed  18 May 2009) .  16  Orna Rabinovich, Reflecting on ODR: The Israeli Example, in: Expanding the Horizons of ODR: Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Online Dispute Resolution (ODR Workshop’08), ed .  M . Poblet, CEUR Workshop Proceedings Series, 2008, Vol . 430, 13–22 . Available at http://ftp1 . de .freebsd .org/Publications/CEUR-WS/Vol-430/,  IDT  Series  1,  available  also  at  http://www . huygens .es/site/service4 .html 17  Marta Poblet, Pablo Noriega, Carlos López del Toro, ODR y Mediación en línea: estado del arte  y escenarios de uso, in: Materiales del Libro Blanco de la Mediación en Cataluña, ed . P . Casanovas,  J . Magre, M . Poblet, Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament de Justícia, Centre d’Estudis i Formació Especialitzada, Barcelona, 2009, 159–169 . 

Table 1: Basic features of ODR service providers . Source: CWBM, Poblet, Noriega and López (2010) .

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Interestingly enough, ODR services do not only provide the framework, the tools,  and the procedures to deal with disputes, but also create their own “soft law”, precedents, and even enforcement mechanisms: in eBay, buyers and sellers may submit  their dispute to the Paypal Resolution Center, which will be able to block the money  transfers until a consensual decision is reached or the Center delivers a final decision; in the Wikipedia, where mediation is normally used for disputes about article  content and arbitration mostly applies to disputes about user conduct, editors can  temporarily or indefinitely blocked depending on the seriousness of the case .18 The Wikipedia dispute resolution system is perhaps one of the few hallmarks of  ODR 2 .0: processes are highly flexible, interactive, and collaborative . But, how may  other ODR initiatives benefit from both the trends and opportunities of Web 2 .0?  Colin Rule predicted in 2006 that “ODR will be one of the biggest beneficiaries of  these new technologies, because they are squarely aimed at ODR’s core functionality  areas:  communication,  collaboration,  and  interactivity” .19  However,  he  also  warned that “too many ODR providers rely on outdated platforms and technology  because they are reluctant to make the investments in time and resources needed to  bring their platforms up to Web 2 .0 standards” .20 Sanjanah Hattotuwa went a step  further anticipating unwanted consequences of ODR lagging behind the curve of  Web 2 .0,  “[T]he most obvious being that ODR itself may cease to exist . With the ubiquity of broadband  wired and wireless connectivity, the ability to roll-out dispute resolution service online is possibly going to be seen as a normal service provision of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)  service providers, just like automated online tech support is now part and parcel of customer  support mechanisms of many large software companies .”21

The Ontomedia project is an attempt to incorporate state-of-the-art Web technologies to offer, use, and organize IT supported mediation services online . The main  aim of Ontomedia is to provide a domain independent platform for both mediation  services  and  users  flexible  enough  to  adapt  to  multiple  mediation  sub-domains,  procedures, and cases . With Ontomedia we expect to comply with the Web 2 .0 gold  rule that “it gets better the more people uses it” . This Project is linked to a broader  one, the Catalan White Book on Mediation (CWBM) .

18  The process goes as follows: (i) negotiation (request for comment, third opinion, ‘Wikiquette’  alerts), (ii) first step: informal mediation (volunteer Wikipedians providing unofficial, informal  mediation), (iii) second step: formal mediation (Mediation Committee), (iv) third step: arbitration (Arbitration Committee) . An advocate may be requested at any time, although according  to  the  Wikipedia  policies,  is  better  to  consider  this  option  in  the  later  stages  of  the  dispute  resolution . There is a group of advocates-users (the Association of Members Advocates, AMA)  who have offered to solve disputes .  19  Colin  Rule,  ODR  and  Web  2 .0,  available  at  http://www .odr .info/colin/smu/odr%20and%20 web%202 .doc (accessed 11 May 2009) 20  Ibid . 21  Sanjana Hattotuwa, The Future of Online Dispute Resolution (ODR): Technologies to Keep an  Eye On, Crystal Ball Session at the 2008 Online Dispute Resolution Forum, June 22, 2008, available  at http://ict4peace .wordpress .com/2008/06/ (accessed 13 May 2009) . 

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The CWBM22 is a large research project aiming at the implementation of mediation  as defined by the EU Directive 52/2008 .23 There are good reasons for this . One of  the findings is that a range between 18 % and 20 % of the population in Catalonia  (over 7,5 million people) has pending cases in the Courtrooms . Heavy caseloads and  chronic shortage of judges and magistrates, on the one side, and increasing social  problems on the other (especially large immigration rates and the emergence of all  kind of violence in families, schools, hospitals and institutions) have fostered the  need to draw a map of dispute resolution techniques in the country, before drafting  a general statute .24 The main idea is conceiving mediation not only as an Alternative  Dispute Resolution (ADR) device, but as a set of tools operating near the communities, Courts and Administrations, and well adapted to the nature of conflicts arising  within the different environments . How to apply technology to the different settings is one of the issues . A twofold  strategy leading to two separate models is being followed: (i) building up mediation  as a Legal Electronic Institution (LEI)25; and (ii) building up a general platform for  citizens,  administrations,  institutions  and  professionals .  The  first  strategy  (LEI)  models the performative structure of procedural rules . The second one (Ontomedia)  allows users and professional mediators to meet in a community-driven Web portal  (in which contents are provided by users and annotated by the ODR web platform) .26 22  See http://idt .uab .es/llibreblanc/index .php?lang=english 23  Art . 3 .a . ‘Mediation means a structured process, however named or referred to, hereby two or  more parties to a dispute attempt by themselves, on a voluntary basis, to reach an agreement  on the settlement of their dispute with the assistance of a mediator’; art . 3 .b . ‘Mediator means  any third person who is asked to conduct a mediation in an effective, impartial and competent  way, regardless of the denomination or profession of that third person in the Member State  concerned and of the way in which the third person has been appointed or requested to conduct  the mediation .” It is worth to mention R . (9): ‘This Directive should not is in any way prevent  the use of modern communication technologies in the mediation process .’ 24  Cfr . P . Casanovas et al . 2009 (note 17) .  25  Electronic  Institutions  (EIs)  organize  interactions  by  establishing  a  restricted  environment  where all interactions take place (e .g . e-commerce, e-learning, or ODR) . They create a virtual  environment  where  interactions  among  agents  in  the  real  world  correspond  with  illocutions  exchanged by agents within this restricted environment . When an EI is entitled to perform legal  acts, or at the end of successive steps may produce a result with legal value, or an agreement  that  can  be  alleged  in  Court  or  before  other  appropriate  ruling  institutions,  we  face  a  Legal  Electronic Institution (LEI) . See Pablo Noriega, Regulating Virtual Interactions, in: ed . P . Casanovas, P . Noriega, D . Bourcier, F . Galindo, 2007 (note 6) . See also http://e-institutions .iiia .csic . es . 26  See for a more detailed analysis, Pablo Noriega and Carlos lópez, Toward a platform for Online Mediation . In: Proceedings of the Workshop on Legal and Negotiation Support Systems 2009, in conjunction with the 12th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law (ICAIL 2009), ed .  M . Poblet, U . Shield, J . Zeleznikow, Barcelona, June 12th (2009), IDT Series 5, 67–75 http:// www .huygens .es/site/service4 .htm; for a comparison of the grounds of LEI and Ontomedia, see  Pompeu Casanovas, Legal Electronic Institutions and ONTOMEDIA: Dialogue, Inventio, and  Relational Justice Scenarios, in AI Approaches to the Complexity of Legal Systems (AICOL I-II) The Semantic Web, multilingual ontologies, multiagent systems, distributed networks, ed . P . Casanovas, U .  Pagallo, G . Sartor G, Ajani, LNAI 6237, Heidelberg, Berlin, 2010, 184–204 .

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The sections of Ontomedia are tailored on the domains previously identified  within the CWBM: commercial and business disputes, consumer complaints, labor  conflicts, family, restorative justice (adult and juvenile mediation in criminal issues),  community  problems,  local  administration,  health  care,  environmental  management, and education (See Fig . 1) .

Figure 1: Layered Diagram of Ontomedia Mediation Platform

Let’s go into it . The Ontomedia project combines multiple technologies . One of  them, as we said before, is the Semantic Web . According to Spivack, “there is in fact  a natural and very beneficial fit between the technologies of the Semantic Web and  what Tim O’Reilly defines Web 2 .0 to be about (essentially collective intelligence)” .27  From these cross-roads between Web 2 .0 and the Semantic Web emerges what is  being known as Web 3 .0 . Web 3 .0 is about bringing the connective intelligence against  the already established collective intelligence brought by the Web 2 .0 .28 So, Web 3 .0 is,  in words of Spivack “about connecting data, concepts, applications and ultimately  people” .29 The use of semantic technologies is what allows that connectivity through 

27  Spivack, Nova, The Semantic Web, Collective Intelligence and Hyperdata (2007), available at  http://novaspivack .typepad .com/nova_spivacks_weblog/2007/09/hyperdata .html  (accesed  13  May 2009) .   http://thenextweb .com/2008/06/03/video-nova-spivack-making-sense-of-the-semantic-web/ 28  Thomas O’Reilly, Web 2 .0 Compact Definition: Trying Again, available at http://radar .oreilly . com/archives/2006/12/web-20-compact .html (accessed 12 May 2009) 29  Cfr . Spivack, 2007 (note 27)

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devices,  multimedia  elements,  text  and  any  other  Web  resource  by  means  of  the  hyperdata .30  From the Ontomedia standpoint, we believe that Web 3 .0 can make significant  advances into the ODR field, helping professionals in gathering valuable resources  that are relevant to the mediation services they are providing, and helping users as  well to share and contribute to harness the connective intelligence about ODR that  can be found on the Web . As Web 2 .0 implied the massive contribution of content from people, in Web  3 .0 people will still be contributing with content, but this content will be automatically  annotated  to  its  further  use  by  software  agents,  connecting  one  resource  to  another as the expression of a relationship described in a formal model, known as  ontology .31 We  have  described  elsewhere  the  functionalities  of  Ontomedia  (information,  repository, training, communication, management)32 and its core-ontology .33 Fig . 2  shows a fragment of it (phases of mediation):

Figure 2: Fragment of the ontology: successive stages .

30  Hyperdata is about data that links to other data, as opposed to hypertext which is text linking to  other text . Metadata are data referring to other object-data . 31  An ontology is a shared, machine-readable and reusable formal specification of a conceptualization: ‘a 4-tuple (C, R, I, A), where C is a set of concepts, R a set of relations, I a set of instances,  and  A  a  set  of  axioms  (Staab  and  Studer,  2004)’,  Paul  Warren,  Rudolf  Studer,  John  Davies,  Introduction, Semantic Web Technologies. Trends and Research in Ontology-based Systems, Chichester,  2006 . 32  Marta Poblet, Pompeu Casanovas, José Luis López-Cobo M, Alvaro Cabrerizo, Juan Antonio  Prieto, Mediation, ODR, and the Web 2 .0: A Case for Relational Justice, in P . Casanovas et al .  ed . 2010 (note 26) . 33  Marta Poblet, Núria Casellas, Sergi Torralba, Pompeu Casanovas, Modeling Expert Knowledge  in the Mediation Domain: A Mediation Core Ontology, in: LOAIT-2009. 3rd Workshop on Legal Ontologies and Artificial Intelligence Techniques joint with 2nd Workshop on Semantic Processing of Legal Texts ., ed . N . Casellas et al ., Barcelona, IDT Series n . 2 . available at http://www .huygens .es/site/ service4 .html

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There are other interesting features: (a) Access to justice Ontomedia facilitates a faster and cheaper citizens’ access to justice . Any kind of  devices may be used to access the portal (computers, mobiles), and in any format  suitable for their purposes (text, speech, video, pictures) . (b) Metadata All types of metadata will be automatically extracted, secured, and stored to be further used within the mediation process .  (d) Social communities Ontomedia encourages users to exploit the advantages of sharing information and  experiences with others . In this way, users will be able to tag and store content that  are useful or interesting to them, and to find similar cases . In doing so, they will be  able to create social communities of people with common interests . (iv) Multimedia analysis The multimedia analysis is devoted to enhancing the information a mediator possesses during a mediation session, capturing mood changes of the parties and any  other psychological information that can be useful for mediators, just as if they were  in a room with the users of the mediation service . Iv dIsCussIon

and furTHer work: enHanCIng relaTIonal JusTICe

We have been describing so far some changes in the WWW environment, and the  structure and features of ODR tools . However, stemming from legal philosophy,  perhaps several of the most interesting issues rely on the theoretical assumptions on  rationality and argumentation underlying relational justice . Relational justice focuses on the interaction and emerging properties that comes  out from human behavior . This is the reason why procedural rules alone are not  enough to regulate the whole legal process through the Web . Pragmatics, flexibility  of heuristics, and visual computing are also required . The architecture of the platform  and  the  according  processing  devices  must  reflect  and  fulfill  these  requirements . One side effect of this user-centered approach is the discussion of the current  argumentation theories, because we could use models able to take into account the  pragmatic content of the interaction . Toulmin’s model of the structure of the argumentation and Alexy’s procedural  approach are the two preferred strategies in AI and Law to model argumentation  and dialogue .34 Walton’s perspective on “argumentation schemes”35 and Lodder’s  modelization of dialogue36 follow the same way of focusing on the rationale of the  34  See Argumentation (2005) 19, 3, Special Issue: The Toulmin Model Today; Chris Reed and Thomas Norman, Argumentation Machines. New Frontiers in Argument and Computation, Dordrecht,  2004; on the use of Alexy’s approach, see Thomas F . Gordon, The Pleadings Game. An Artificial Intelligence Model of Procedural Justice, Dordrecht, 1995 .  35  See above note 2 36  Arno R Lodder, DiaLaw. On Legal Justification and Dialogical Models of Argumentation, Dordrecht,  1999 .

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argumentation process . Dialogic properties of a rational interchange are set out as  required conditions to achieve an outcome, and to evaluate it according with standard procedures (avoiding fallacies) .37 This rational trend has been enriched in the field of multi-agents systems (MAS),  where progress is being achieved by incorporating human capabilities to the interactive behavior of agents .38 LEIs39, as an ODR device, model an iterative cycle —negotiation, conciliation,  mediation, arbitration— that fits into the procedural rule-bound patterns of the interaction, helping users through the dispute resolution process . Lodder & Zeleznikow  describe a three-step ODR model as well, matching dialogical tools with the structuring of the information disputants may have at hand .40 All these strategies are negotiation or mediatee-centered, taking into account the  interests of the parties, giving them some tools to reach a rational end, or setting up  a structured environment . To do so, they need to mirror human behavior . In contrast, Ontomedia offers a complementary view: it is a mediator-centered platform as  well, setting up a safe meeting space where mediators may conduct the mediation  process online and on real time bases . Instead of rationality or reasoning —acknowledging their value— we work out the social interactive process . Managing mediation is far from easy . Empathy, emotions, culture and professional practice matter . It has been much discussed recently whether computer-mediated communication alters face-to-face interactions .41 We think that, cognitively, it  situates and intensifies the strength and the content of the communicative flow .  A virtual space of agreement is a space of disagreement as well, and it is important to know “how to disagree”, following Paul Graham’s suggestion of a disagreement  pyramid .42  This  is  not  new .  A  pragmatic  reconstruction  of  a  disagreement  37  Walton and Lodder propose the use of a Rational Rule (RR) to act as a sort of cooperative conversational maxim between opponents . See Douglas Walton and Arno Lodder, What Role can  Rational Argument Play in ADR and Online Dispute Resolution, in: Second International ODR Workshop, ed . J . Zeleznikow and A . Lodder, Tilburg, 2005 . 38  An attentive vision on microfoundations is offered in Christiano Castelfranchi, Francesca Giardini and Francesca Marzo, Relationships between rational decisions, human motives, and emotions, Mind & Society 5 (2006), 173–197 . 39  See above note . 25 . 40  The process goes at follows: (i) ‘the calculation of a BATNA (see above n 3) to inform the parties  about their chances in an eventual court proceeding’; (ii) ‘the attempted resolution of disputes  through use of a dialogue tool’ (iii) ‘further attempts at dispute resolution through the employment of compensation strategies and trade-offs constructed by a negotiation support system’ .  Arno R . Lodder and John Zeleznikow, Developing an Online Dispute Resolution Environment:  Dialogue Tools and Negotiation Support Systems in a Three-Step Model, Harvard Negotiation Law Review 10 (2005), 237–288 .  41  For a review of recent literature, see Marta Poblet and Pompeu Casanovas, Emotions in ODR,  International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 21, 2 (2007), 145–155 . 42  Graham identifies seven layers of disagreement in computer mediated communicaton before  reaching the core of it: (i) name-calling (‘you are a …’), (ii) ad hominem arguments (attacking  the writer), (iii) responding to tone (criticisms to the tone of the writing), (iv), (iv) contradiction (stating of the opposing case, with little or no supporting evidence), (v) counterargument  (contradiction and backing with supporting evidence), (vi) refutation (explanation of a mistake,  using quotes), (vii) refuting the central point . See http://www .paulgraham .com/disagree .html  (march 2008) .

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space had already been explicitly proposed by Sally Jackson, Scott Jacobs and Mark  Aakhus, focusing both on the everyday practices of mediators and on the “collaborative  design”  of  the  mediated  dialogue .43  Tools  for  the  pragmatic  web  are  welcomed .44 What  we  are  building  up  in  Ontomedia,  then,  are  some  devices  to  visualize  emotions through facial reading, and some ways to reconstruct the visual abduction  of narratives .45 In this way, the mediator may have some additional non-intuitive  information  about  the  distance  of  the  agreement  and  the  feelings  of  the  participants .  Still, empowering professional mediators’ skills is not an easy task, and we have  no evidence yet about whether or not these tools will be useful and used . Moreover,  this attempt is not free of ethical issues and concerns about privacy, neutrality and  impartiality .  However, even in this exploratory stage, we think that this is the kind of knowledge that is needed to enhance relational justice through the web . aCknowledgemenTs The research presented in this paper has been developed within the framework of  two  different  projects:  (i)  ONTOMEDIA:  Platform  of  Web  Services  for  Online  Mediation, Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce (Plan AVANZA  I+D, TSI-020501-2008, 2008-2010); (ii) ONTOMEDIA: Semantic Web, Ontologies  and ODR: Platform of Web Services for Online Mediation (2009–2011), Spanish  Ministry of Science and Innovation (CSO-2008-05536-SOCI) .

43  Sally Jackson, Disputation by Design, Argumentation 12 (1998), 83–198; Scott Jacobs, Maintaining neutrality in dispute mediation: managing disagreement while managing not to disagree,  Journal of Pragmatics  34  (2002),  1403–1426;  Mark  Aakhus,  Neither  Naïve  nor  Critical  Reconstruction:  Dispute  Mediators,  Impasse,  and  the  Design  of  Argumentation,  Argumentation  17  (2003), 265–290 .  44  Aldo  de  Moor  and  Mark  Aakhus,  Argumentation  support:  from  technologies  to  tools,  Communications of the ACM 49, 3 (2006), 93–98 . 45  Ciro  Gracia,  Xavier  Binefa,  Marta  Poblet,  Emotional  Speech  Analysis  in  the  Mediation  and  Court Environments, in: Intelligent Multimedia. Managing Creative Works in a Digital World, ed .  D . Bourcier, P . Casanovas, M . Dulong de Rosnay, C . Maracke, Florence, 2010, 365–379 .

muRRay Raff / anna taItslIn PrIvaTe law In THe sHadow of PublIC law: a legaCy 20TH CenTury marxIsm and THe sovIeT legal model

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The civil law served as a description of the human social order in the 18th century  natural law vision . Visions of law held by Hegel and Savigny were rooted ultimately  in this natural law model . The disintegration across the 19th and 20th centuries of the  natural law vision of law pre-eminently as a body of civil or private law is the focus  of this paper . In it we pursue two main objectives . The first objective is to review theoretical steps in the metamorphosis of law’s  image of society from a civil law that was dominant within the post-Enlightenment  modern natural law cosmos to one dominated by public law and institutions in the  hands of a powerful state . The conception of 18th century civil law was a development of Roman law, regardless of whether we consider its natural law underpinnings  to have remained rooted in the classical Roman tradition or to have followed the  revolutionary direction of secular modern natural law . The most significant sway of  modern natural law theory was in making individual man and his natural rights the  starting point of legal analysis . This analysis emphasised demarcation of the civil law  as an autonomous sphere of relations between private individuals . With  legislative  depiction  of  the  natural  law  vision  in  national  Civil  Codes,  passed by parliaments rather than enjoying the status of ius commune, the civil law  itself appeared dependent on the state, endangering the premier place of the civil  law in the natural law cosmos . With encapsulation of the natural rights of man as  constitutional  civil  rights  in  the  course  of  the  American  and  French  revolutions  their natural law authority declined . This capture of the civil law world by public  institutions was accompanied by rising exaltation of the power of the state, especially in France and Prussia . The result was a remarkable shift in law’s syllogism by  the end of the 19th century from the private assertion of rights horizontally in society to a new enthusiasm for top-down public regulation . This shift was accompanied  by a strong trend, especially in French and German legal philosophy, principally  Ihering, Jellinek and Duguit, to emphasise “social function” in law and the role of  public law at serious cost to the prestige of the civil law . The second main objective is to explain the theoretical transformation of Marxist thought about the role of law in ideal communist society and to trace correlative  shifts in the Marxist view of the civil law – public law dichotomy in the context of  western legal trends . The early Marxian perception of the private-public law divide  was  rooted  in  the  Hegelian  vision,  which  was  in  turn  strongly  influenced  by  the  world of 18th century natural law . However, late 19th century Marxism was uncomfortable with a vision of law in which individualistic civil law reigned and the main  role of public law was mere legitimation of it . With conflation of bourgeois law and  civil law, the end of bourgeois law would bring with it the end of law itself and ultimately the end of the state . Still, in line with French and German trends, the late  19th century exaltation of the state and its institutions and the parallel trend to public law as an instrument for the correction of dysfunction in 19th century political  economy entered the Marxist projection of the future of law .

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A powerful role for the state and the abolition of civil law were unquestionable  objectives in the aftermath the Bolshevik revolution in Russia . After experimentation in the New Economic Policy [NEP] and debate around Pashukanis’ exchange  theory, by the early 1930s socialist law had been redefined in crudely positivist ways  which effectively converted all Soviet law into public law instruments and institutions . Although this experiment failed and a measure of civil law was reintroduced,  Soviet civil law and the broader Soviet legal model remained deficient in this respect and at the mercy of public law . Transplantation of the Soviet legal model to  the newly declared socialist states of the post-war period generated the fundamental  challenge of a deficient private law sphere in Eastern Europe, which today has implications for priority setting in post-Soviet transition . I rooTs

of THe

modern naTural law

vIsIon

The great Renaissance and Enlightenment developments in European legal systems  were almost entirely feats of the civil law, stimulated by rediscovery and dissemination of the Digest of the Eastern Roman Emperor Justinian in the 11th century in Italy  and  the  unfolding  of  its  implications  over  several  centuries  that  followed .1  As  described by Ulpianus, Roman law distinguished between the ius privatum, which concerned “… the advantage of individuals …” and was gathered from natural precepts,  precepts of nations, or civil precepts, and the ius publicum, which was confined to  concerns of the Roman state and matters expedient to be dealt with publicly, such  as religion and the magistrates .2 The distinction between private law and public law  was of secondary importance . Indeed, when one thinks of the legal works of the  Justinian, one thinks almost exclusively of the civil law . The feudal law of medieval  Europe, in comparison, did not draw a coherent distinction . The 13th century witnessed the efforts of civil lawyers, the Glossators, to elucidate the corpus iuris as ratio scripta .3 In the 14th century the Commentators, the most  significant  of  whom  were  Bartolus  (1314–57)  and  Baldus  (1327–1400),  set  about  synthesising the Roman law and contemporary feudal law, developing the basis of  the ius commune .4 The law of the feudal era made no clear distinction between private and public law, a point well illustrated by the conflation of sovereignty, lordship (seigniory) and ownership within feudal systems of land tenures . The Commentators’ novel distinction between dominium directum and dominium utile, corresponding to the feudal realities of divided ownership between lord and dependant tenant,  well illustrates this adaptation at an early point in the process .5 1  2  3 

4  5 

G . Dulckeit, F . Schwarz & W . Waldstein, Römische Rechtsgeschichte, 8th ed ., C .H . Beck, München,  1989, 303–9; see also generally, M .E . Tigar & M .R . Levy, Law and the Rise of Capitalism, Monthly  Review Press, New York, 1977 . Ulpianus,  D .1 .1 .1 .2 .  Latin  text  can  be  accessed  at  www .thelatinlibrary .com/justinian/digest1 . shtml . See also Papanian, D .2 .14 .38 .  On  the  Glossators’  methods:  Franz  Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe,  Clarendon  Press,  Oxford,  1995,  36;  R .C .  van  Caenegem,  An Historical Introduction to Private Law,  Cambridge University Press, 1992, 48–52 . On the Commentators’ methods: Peter Stein, Roman Law in European History, Cambridge University Press, 1999, 46–48, 58; R .C . van Caenegem, 52–55 . Stein, 72; van Caenegem, 52–55; Wieacker, 57–58 . Wieacker, (note 3), 58 .

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Legal humanism of the 16th century paved the way for reappraisal of the Commentators’  grasp  of  the  Roman  law .  Humanists  identified  the  classical  period  of  Roman law as the 2nd and 3rd centuries AD . They exposed how the nature of feudal  law was alien to the classical Roman law .6 Hugues (Doneu) Donellus (1527–1591)  retained the Roman law division of law into legal persons, things and actions, but  already observed that actio meant a legal proceeding and should be distinguished  from obligations .7 In his voluminous Commentaries, Donellus divided the rights of  private law into rights of personal freedom and property and distinguished them  from rights derived through obligations .8 Donellus also attempted to free the Roman notion of dominium as indivisible ownership from medieval customary feudal  divided ownership .9 1.1  exPonents of tHe modeRn natuRal law vIsIon The 17th century saw modern natural law theory emerge as a revolutionary universal  world view beyond historical particularities of Roman law . The intellectual tradition  of the exponents of natural law nevertheless lay deeply rooted in Roman law scholarship . Grotius aimed to trace eternal principles of natural law through observation of  the customs and laws of different countries . His exposition of Roman-Dutch law  sought to identify the general patterns of legal institutions within the positive law of  a particular country as law of nations – ius gentium . In The Jurisprudence of Holland10  Grotius explained that his subject was those rights which corresponded to property,  by virtue of which the thing is said to be ours, in contrast to public law .11 Grotius  described the laws of Holland as they were moulded by ius commune, including the  concept of divisible ownership which he interpreted through Roman law categories  of servitude, use, usufruct, with emphyteusis12 adding a separate category of feudal  tenure . In his major work De iure belli ac pacis libri tres (1623)13 Grotius developed his  argument for the existence of natural law constraints on sovereigns by analogy to  corresponding principles of civil law . For example, he recognised one mode of acquiring  sovereignty  by  analogy  to  acquisition  of  res nullius  as  the  original  natural  mode of acquiring property, as in Roman law, leading Grotius to recognition of the  naturalness of possession,14 which was important in the revolutionary construction  of a right to property as a natural right .15 6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 

Stein (note 3), 78–9 . Lc, 81 . Lc, 81 . Lc, 82 . Hugo Grotius, The Jurisprudence of Holland, tr . Lee, R .W ., vol . 1, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1926  . Lc, 75 . Emphyteusis was a very long lease involving reciprocal duties rather than recurrent payments . Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace [De Jure Belli ac Pacis], Book 1, Vol . 2, tr . Kesley, The  Classics of International Law, Clarendon, Oxford, 1925 . 14  John Salter, Hugo Grotius: Property and Consent, Political Theory vol . 29, 4 (2001), 537–555;  Wieacker (note 3), 231 . Grotius (note 10), II 8 para 26 . 15  For John Locke property arose naturally from one’s property in one’s own person and one’s own 

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Pufendorf questioned Grotius’ inductive method of finding evidence of general  principles of natural law in the particular . He explained in De iure naturae et gentium (1672) that natural law was to be deduced by logical sequence from prime and true  principles dictated by right reason in accord with the properly observed and examined nature of things (2 .III .13) .16 Pufendorf saw the natural law manifested not just  in natural rights but also in natural duties . Pufendorf ’s natural law theory embraced  a general theory of responsibility centred on reciprocal relations that approximate  contract . He accepted Grotius’ principle of sociability [societas] as a crucial principle  of natural law (2 .III .15) .17  Pufendorf drew the basic distinction between property and ownership (4 .IV .2) .18  He contrasted ownership with lordship (6 .III .7) .19 Lordship, he noted, is a power to  rule over others, involving obligation toward one who rules and limits on the right  to rule . In contrast, ownership of material things includes a right to use, waste or  consume (utendi and ubutendi) the thing for one’s own advantage at one’s discretion .  Although  such  plenary dominium,  denotes  full  power  to  dispose  of  one’s  possessions, this power and its benefits might be limited by civil law or the nature of the  thing, or it might be alienated or limited by agreement (4 .IV .2) .20 As an example of  a limitation stemming from the nature of the thing, abuse of power over animals  deserves reproach as it harms all human society, just as improper use of one’s own  property is against the interests of every state (4 .III .6) .21 Pufendorf endorsed Grotius’ presumption of an original human state without  property,  which  Pufendorf  defined  as  a  negative  community  of  property  (De iure naturae 4 . IV .9) but insisted that any appropriation was subject to convention .22 God  gave men an indefinite right to things, leaving the extent of this power to the judgement and disposition of men . Distinctions in possessions were created later, as the  peace of human society demanded it (4 .IV .4) .23 Although Pufendorf allowed that a  social contract with respect to property could arise independently and prior to the  existence of a social contract with respect to sovereignty (8 .V .2), he did not doubt  the power of the state to pass laws regulating the use property for the welfare of the  state; or to impose taxes for the state’s defence of lives and property (8 .V .4) .24 Still,  his starting point was the individual and the individual’s natural drive to self-preser-

16  17  18  19  20  21 

22  23  24 

acts of labour with it, if only the act of picking the thing up or cultivating land: Second Treatise on Government (1690), paras 26, 27, 32, 44 . S . Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium (1672), tr . Oldfather, C . & Oldfather, W ., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Reprint 1964, vol . 2, 203 . Lc, 207–8 . Lc, 533 . Lc, 938 . Lc, 533 . Lc, 531; Cf Samuel Pufendorf, De officio hominis et civis iuxta legem naturalem libri II (1673), Book  One,  Chapter  XXII,  § II .  Compare  translations  from  the  Latin  edition  in  S .  Pufendorf,  The Whole Duty of Man, According to the Law of Nature (1691), tr . Tooke, A ., Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 2003, 128, and the German text (S . Pufendorf, Über die Pflicht des Menschen und des Bürgers nach dem Gesetz der Natur: Bk 1, Ch . 12, § 3 tr . & ed . Luig, K ., Insel Verlag, Frankfurt Am Main,  1994, 106) in Murray Raff, Private Property and Environmental Responsibility – A Comparative Study of German Real Property Law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2003, 128 . Salter (note 14), 546–8 . Lc, 536–7 . Pufendorf (note 16), 1276–9 .

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vation, leading to a social contract . Even Hobbes’ defence of Leviathan was based  upon the premise of a social contract . Hobbes’ ideas on declaration of will and the  binding force of contract (De cive I .2) made an impression on Pufendorf and natural  law theory in general .25 Christian Wolff (1679–1754) advanced “… a jurisprudence of duties and rights  that was consistent with the modern natural law philosophy of the Age of Reason, the  binding force of which followed ultimately from nature herself .”26 He insisted that  human powers are not to be exercised arbitrarily,27 and that a moral capacity, as a prerequisite for a right, implies the need for an action that is correct with respect to the  nature and essence of humans and of things .28 So the incorrect use of a right is a  misuse of the right and a misused right is no right at all .29 A right, moreover, entitles  one to call upon another to fulfill a duty, including a contractual duty .30 For Wolff, as  for Pufendorf, rights of property entail responsibilities .31 According to Wolff, freedom  means an exercise of one’s powers of self-determination in accordance with the rules  of reason within nature’s order . Because nature drives us to pursue our destiny and the  perfection of the world, for Wolff there was no contradiction between duty and freedom within the constraints of nature .32 Wolff already saw the state as responsible  through its bureaucracy for health, education and labour protection, in addition to  external and internal security .33 The natural law of Pufendorf and Wolff, built around duties and responsibilities  as well as rights and freedoms, greatly influenced the modern natural law Prussian  Code of 1794, explored further below, but do not appear to have influenced the later  French liberal modern natural law codification . However, the duties derived by Pufendorf and Wolff from natural law were consistent with Roman law, although it was  largelyconstructed around rights and, accordingly, rights became the main structural  feature of the new codes . Although the works of Grotius and Pufendorf were rooted in the ius commune,  with its antecedents in divided title to property, they were already engaging with a  unitary and abstract concept of private property . This notion constituted one of the  lasting legacies of the natural law thinkers . The natural lawyers followed the humanists in reviving the Roman conception of dominium as full and undivided control  over the thing and discarding the feudal concept of property in land divided between tenure holders within a feudal hierarchy .34 This helped to untangle property 

25  Wieacker (note 3), 241–2 . 26  Raff (note 21), 130 . See also B . Winiger, Das rationale Pflichtenrecht Christian Wolffs, Duncker &  Humblot, Berlin, 1992, 179 . 27  Winiger, 192–3; K . Luig, Die Pflichtenlehre des Privatrechts in der Naturrechtsphilosophie von  Christian Wolff, in: Römisches Recht, Naturrecht, Nationales Recht, ed . Luig, K ., Keip Verlag, Goldbach, 1998, 278 . See also Raff, 131 . 28  Winiger, 206–7; Raff, 131 . 29  Winiger, 210 . One should not waste what is exhaustible: see Luig (note 27), 259, 261, 275; Raff,  131 . 30  Winiger, 211–15; Luig, 263 . 31  Winiger, 274; Raff (note 21), 131 . 32  Winiger, 286–8; Raff, 131 . 33  C . Clark, Iron Kingdom – The Rise and Downfall of Prussia 1600–1947, Penguin, London, 2007, 240 34  The hierarchy of tenancy is also referred to in this text as “divided ownership” .

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relations from feudal relations based on personal subjection, thus contributing to a  more orderly modern private law structure . Habermas described the process as follows, “… [although] the modern history  of private law did not start with the eighteenth century transformation of natural  law into positive law … the received Roman law, which was understood as ‘private’  at first only in contrast to canonical law, nevertheless did not begin to develop into  the law of emancipated civil society before the dissolution of the traditional legal  forms of … [the old] estates .”35 The striving of natural law theories for principles of  universal validity gave impetus to the unification of law and promoted rational revision of existing laws . Nevertheless, in Zimmermann’s view, “the impact of natural  law on the actual content of private law was rather limited . It could be used to make  a choice between two or more conflicting solutions, to streamline traditional doctrines or to generalise and round off trends of legal development that had been going on for centuries . But the ratio naturalis of natural law did not normally oust the ratio scripta of the Roman law .”36 1.2  natuRal law and codIfIcatIon In 1756 the first European code in the modern style, the Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus civilis came to life . It was more a restatement of the usus modernus Pandecrarum  than a remaking of the existing legal order .37 Nevertheless, it allowed a supplementary  role  for  the  ius commune .38  According  to  the  Code,  knowledge  of  the  law  of  nature is to be gained through the exercise of reason; it strove to depict men’s obligations toward God, themselves and other men (II .2 .4) .39 But the law must be made  known publicly so that everyone might learn about their responsibilities (I .1 .6) . Part  I set out the law in general, its classification and the law of persons; Part II focused  on the law of things, including ownership and its acquisition, pledge and servitudes;  Part III dealt with succession; and Part IV concerned contracts and other personal  obligations . In 1794 the General Prussian Code, the Allgemeine Landrecht für die preussischen Staaten [ALR or “Prussian Code”] was published after a half century of effort devoted to its compilation . The Prussian Code was to supersede all preceding laws . It  contained a general introduction defining basic principles, such as the doctrine of  legal personality .40 The first part of the Code described the law relating to persons,  stating general principles of the relationship between a citizen and law of the state,  and the law of property, including the acquisition and loss of property, common  35  Habermas also mentioned the roles of the old ruling estates and town based occupational status  groups [guilds] (Berufsstände): Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,  1991, 76 . 36  Reinhard Zimmermann, Civil Law in European Codes, in: Regional Private Laws & Codification in Europe, ed . MacQueen, H .L ., Vaquer, A ., Espiau, S .E ., Cambridge University Press, 2003, 27 . 37  O .F . Robinson, T .D . Fergus, W .M . Gordon, European Legal History, Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2000  (“ELH”), 256 . 38  van Caenegem (note 3), 123 . 39  ELH (note 37), 257 . 40  ELH, 257 .

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ownership, and real and personal rights .41 The owner was defined as one who by his  own power could himself or through a third person dispose of the thing to the exclusion of all others (ALR I .8 .1) . Full ownership (volles Eigentum) was defined as a  right to possess, use and dispose of things (ALR I .8 .2; and I .8 .8) . Divided ownership  remained a feature of the Prussian Code in its effort to describe the “natural” structure of the Prussian estates and aristocracy . The second part of the Prussian Code  infused public and private law in its treatment of the relations of the subject as a  member of associations, including the family, corporations and the state, the last of  which  included  an  excursus  on  constitutional,  administrative  and  criminal  law .42  The  approach  of  the  ALR  derived  from  the  natural  law  works  of  Pufendorf  and  Wolff .43  The  view  of  natural  law  through  “rationally”  defined  human  duties  had  pitfalls . The Code became notorious for its intention to leave nothing to chance: it  even contained a regulation for a healthy mother to suckle her child and for a father  to decide when to wean the child .44 The Code was pervaded by paternalism . Still, it  was paternalism with a “private property” face and the state was obliged to compensate for private sacrifices of property to the common good . The  1804  Code Civil des Francais,  the  “French  Code”  or  “Code  Napoleon”,  emerged from the energies of the French revolution, which overthrew the legal system of the ancient regime, and the French humanist tradition of the previous two  centuries, from Domat to Pothier .45 It recognised the equality of citizens before the  law, religious tolerance, freedom of contract and a modern concept of private property, extended to landed property freed from burdens imposed by feudal and church  law .46 It was entirely a Code of the civil or private law and comprised three books .  The first Book dealt with persons, including civil rights, as well as marriage, divorce  and paternal power . Book Two dealt with property, including ownership and lesser  real rights . Book Three defined modes of acquisition of ownership as well as obligations . Art 544 of the Code defined property as a right to enjoy and dispose of things  in the most complete manner, provided that it was not against the law or regulations . The definition in the Code followed the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, according to which property was the right to enjoy and dispose at will of the  fruits of one’s own labour and industry . The Code thus set forth a liberal modern  natural law unitary concept of ownership . In 1811 the Allgemeine Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch für die deutschen Erblände (ABGB or  “Austrian Code”) came into force . The Austrian Code set out the natural law principle that man is born with rights, recognised the citizen’s equality under the law and  prohibited serfdom and slavery . It dealt with private law and contained no public  law . The Code was divided into the three parts: the first concerned the law of persons; the second set out the law of things, including real rights, such as possession  and ownership, pledge, servitudes and succession and embraced also the law of ob41  Wieacker (note 3), 264 . 42  It included relationships, such as of marriage, parent and child, master and servant (das Gesinderecht), societies and corporations as well as rights and duties of peasants, nobility, civil servants, soldiers, universities, and the Church: ELH (note 37), 259 . 43  van Caenegem (note 3), 124 . 44  ELH (note 37), 259 . 45  van Caenegem (note 3), 6–7 . 46  van Caenegem, 7 .

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ligations, including personal rights, contractual and delictual obligations; and the  third part, which contained the general part, defining the acquisition, alteration and  discharge of rights and obligations .47 The Code defined the right of ownership as  the right of the owner to dispose of the substance and the fruits of the thing at discretion, to the exclusion of others,48 however it also included a distinction between  full and “incomplete” or divided ownership .49 The striking differences between the civil codes of the German sphere and the  Code  Napoleon,  illustrated  by  their  diverging  definitions  of  property  and  treatments of divided ownership, may, perhaps crudely, be sheeted back to the social and  historical positions of their authors . The drafting of the former was undertaken with  faith in the “naturalness” of the right of kings and the nobility to rule and to retain  their estates,50 while the compilation of the latter sought to implement the natural  rights  of  the  individual  and  his  or  her  labour  asserted  in  revolution .  The  Soviet  civilist Venediktov noted the contribution made by Thibaut through the call for a  return to the Roman law usage of ius in re aliena that he made in his Versuche, first  published in 1798–1801 . Venediktov explained the demise of the idea of divided  ownership as stimulated by replacement of the feudal order with the bourgeois order .51 Van Caenegem remarked that in Germanic lands the citizens were the product  of the law, whereas in France the law was the product of the citizens .52 However,  Savigny could be invoked as a counter example with respect to Germany: he did not  wish for the state to become a legislator of civil law and did his best to counter the  vocation of his age for codification . II THe 19TH CenTury debaTe of THe sTaTe

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The distinction between public and private law gained crucial significance during  the 19th century . The immediate result of codification was a nationalisation of the  legal system with new power accruing to the nation state .53 The law in general came  to be seen as a product of national legislation and thus subject to the will of the  legislator . Van Caenegem noted that, while natural law was invoked to justify new  rules during the Revolution, its role ended with the enactment of the Code .54 The  constitutional entrenchment of natural rights as a result of the French Revolution of  1789  paradoxically  contributed  to  an  impression  of  obsolescence  of  natural  law  theory .55 The Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen transformed natural rights into  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55 

ELH (note 37), 261 . § 354 ABGB . § 357 ABGB . Divine right of monarchs and natural rights of the aristocracy were still points of reference at the  Congress of Vienna . See generally Adam Zamoyski, The Rites of Peace: The Fall of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna, Harper Collins Publishers, 2007 . A .V . Venediktov, Gosudarstvennaia sotsialisticheskaia sobstvennost’, Moscow, 1948 http://download . nchti .ru/libr/books/Right/ClassicOfRussianCivilistic/Elib/1662 .html .  van Caenegem (note 3), 126 . van Caenegem, 144 . van Caenegem, 9 . Kant’s role in the decline of natural law is a matter of debate . According to Reimann, “… Kant’s 

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civil rights protected by the sovereign people,56 embodied in the political community of the nation .57 Thus, by virtue of public law legislation, civil rights had become grounded in public law . This new idea of public law guarantees for private  rights  had  superseded  the  old  natural  law  idea  of  the  naturalness  of  private  law  rights, making it superfluous to appeal to the natural law to justify natural rights .  This process bolstered the prestige of the state by posing as the carrier and protector  of human rights .58 2.1  tHe HIstoRIcal scHool Savigny and the ius commune Codification and the trend to constitutional entrenchment of natural rights were  successes of natural law theory, yet, paradoxically, they reduced its relevance . However,  both  natural  law  theory  and  codification  had  adversaries .  The  Historical  School, led by Savigny, attacked the idea that there was a practical law of nature, law  of reason, or ideal legislation for all times .59 In contrast to the natural law theorists’ 

   

56 

  57    58  59 

critical philosophy had destroyed the faith in the premises and methods of natural law that had  dominated the previous centuries …” M . Reimann, Nineteenth century German legal science,  Boston College Law Review, vol .31 (1990), 837, 843, 845) . Kant’s assertion of duality of nature and  morality and the faculties of understanding and reason implied duality of laws of nature and  morality (L . Krieger, Kant and the Crisis of Natural Law, Journal of the History of Ideas, vol 26, 2  (1965), 195–6) . The duality of nature and morality was recognised by Suarez in his natural law  theory as reflected in the scholastic intellectualist/voluntarist divide (on the source of obligations under natural law) . Kant attempted to find a resolution of the nature/moral duality in  his  (1797)  Metaphisischen Anfangsgruende des Rechtslehre  (Fundamental  Principles  of  Science  of  Right),  which  comprised  the  first  part  of  Metaphysik der Sitten .  Kant  recognised  a  provisional  natural right to property which would become a legal right under civil union or political state  (Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as the Science of Right (1796), tr . Hastie, W ., Clark, Edinburgh, 1887, pars 1–36 http://oll .libertyfund .org/index .php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show .php%3Ftitle=359&  layout=html . Kant  understood  private  law  as  law  which  does  not  need  external  promulgation,  that  is,  as  natural law . In contrast, public law needs to be promulgated . However, although the subjectmatter of private law remained the same, it had taken the juridical form of public law under  the constitution (par 41) . Thus Kant also departed from the traditional private law – public law  distinction, perhaps due to Kant’s loyalty to the French Revolution, with its idea of public law  expression and protection of natural rights (Krieger, 205, 207–9) . Jellinek pointed out that the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen was significant for the  development of the concept of public rights of the individual as legal claims against the state:  G . Jellinek, The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens: A Contribution to Modern Constitutional History [1895], tr . Farrand, M ., Henry Holt and Co, New York, 1901; http://oll .libertyfund .org/index .php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show .php%3Ftitle=  1176&chapter=104811&layout=html . P . Costa, The Rule of Law – Historical Introduction, in: The Rule of Law. History, Theory and Criticism, ed . Costa, P . & Zolo, D ., Springer, 2007, 79–81 www .springerlink .com/content/u5j51tx50u285248/fulltext .pdf . A posture adopted by Napoleon as liberator of Europe and by other heads of state at the Congress of Vienna: see generally Zamoyski (note 50) . F .C . von Savigny, Of the Vocation of our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence, Littlewood, 1831, 23 .

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condescending view of positive law, the Historical School, asserted that positive law  reflects “the spirit of the people” and this is the only immutable foundation of law .60  Savigny argued that law, like language, is grounded in the character and common  consciousness of the people (Volksgeist) .61 It is developed first by custom and popular faith and next by jurisprudence, rather than by the arbitrary will of a law-giver .62  Savigny objected to codification of civil law as an attempt by the state to validate  and conserve the existing law . He did not oppose compilation of the law by private  jurists .63 Savigny reacted against rationalist aspects of the French revolution, with its  notion of the will of the legislature as the ultimate source of law, and defended the  German “common law” tradition64 – das gemeine Recht . Despite his rejection of natural law theory and codification, and his appeal to  the spirit of the people, Savigny by no means disavowed the Roman law .65 On the  contrary, the Historical School dictum “back to the sources!”, meaning the classical  Roman law sources, prompted further revision of the heritage of the European ius commune, which had served as the common law of Germanic lands since its reception .66 According to Savigny, the scholarship of Roman law could bridge the widening gap between theory and practice .67 Savigny’s focus was on the continuing legal  institutions of authentically Roman origin .68 His concern was exclusively the private  law, ius civile, as the exclusive science of a iuris consultus, or jurisprudence proper, and  more precisely with substantive private law, to the exclusion of the law of procedure .69  Savingy  referred  to  the  common  law  that  prevailed  in  Germany  as  “the  modern Roman law” .70 The Germanists within the Historical School, such as Otto Gierke, criticised the  reception of Roman law in Germany as an alien influence that was responsible for,  among other things, the rise of the absolutist state and the suppression of traditional  liberties .71 Indeed, the Romanist Savigny was a conservative and supported the Prussian monarchy during the revolution of 1848 . Savigny even characterised the state  as  the  corporeal  form  of  the  intellectual  national  community .72  Nevertheless,  60  Reimann (note 55), 879 . 61  Savigny (note 59), 27–28 . 62  Lc, 30 See also F .C . von Savigny, System of the Modern Roman Law (1839), vol . 1, Hyperion Press,  Westport Connecticut, 1978 (reprint of 1867), xi, 35 . 63  Savigny, lc, 35 . 64  H .  Berman,  Towards  an  Integrative  Jurisprudence:  Politics,  Morality,  History,  California Law Review, vol . 76 (1989), 790 . 65  Venediktov pointed out that the German Romanists led the attack against the concept of divided  ownership  http://download .nchti .ru/libr/books/Right/ClassicOfRussianCivilistic/Elib/  1663 .html . In contrast, Germanists such as Gierke argued in favour of the concept, seeing it as  a specific feature of German property . 66  H . Coing, German ‘Pandektistic’ and its Relation to the Former ‘Ius Commune’, American Journal of Comparative Law, vol . 37, 9 (1989), 13–14 . Peter Stein noted the indebtedness of Savigny to  Donellus, with Savigny following in footsteps of Donellus’ efforts to clear Roman law of feudal  infusions: Stein (note 3), 119 . 67  Savigny (note 62), xi . 68  Savigny, lc, 1 . 69  Lc, 2 . 70  Lc, 4 . 71  Reimann (note 55), 870 . 72  F .C .  v  Savigny,  System des heutigen Römischen Rechts,  1840,  I,  22;  Klenner,  Herman,  Savigny’s 

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Savigny’s work exhibited a limited concept of the state in that its prerogatives were  peripheral to private law, as most exponents of natural law did .73 Gierke’s conception of the social task of private law Although  Savigny  is  widely  attributed  with  almost  single-handedly  delaying  German  codification  for  nearly  80  years,  his  own  Romanist  wing  of  the  Historical  School gave rise to the German Pandectistic School which provided an important  source of scholarship for the German codification . In Wieacker’s view, Pandectism  took its basic concepts, its system and method from “the law of reason”, though  rather exceeding it in formalism, and its legal ethics from Kant .74 Those ties, however,  did  not  restrain  Windscheid,  the  author  of  the  famous  work  Pandektenrecht  (1862–70) from stating that by the middle of the 19th century the dream of natural  law was at an end .75 The first draft of the German Civil Code, published in 1887, bore clear marks of  Pandectist legal science . It met with a furious attack by the Germanists, led by Otto  Gierke . In Gierke’s view, the first draft of the Code was far too greatly influenced by  the  Roman  law  and  did  not  absorb  the  Germanic  legal  tradition  of  “social”  lawmaking .76 For Gierke, the relationship between public law and private law was one  of the crucial questions of the times .77 He viewed the emerging poles of absolutist  public law and individualistic private law as incompatible with the Germanic notion  of the unity of the law .78 Gierke traced the distinction between private and public  law to the Roman law text of Ulpian .79 Gierke stressed the role of the Roman law in  separating “sovereignty of the person” from “sovereignty of the state” .80 This trend,  in his view, had culminated in natural law, enlightened absolutism and the French  Revolution .81 However, Gierke did not question that public law institutions may,  ultimately, limit private law rights . Gierke called for a breath of natural law freedom in the public law and a drop  of socialist “oil” in the private law .82 Gierke characterised the struggle for the law of  the future as a struggle between Roman and Germanic legal traditions .83 Gierke was  content to keep the juristic form developed by the Roman law but the spirit [Geist]  dwelling in that form should be that of the Germanic law .84 This new ordination of 

73  74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81  82  83  84 

Research Program of the Historical School of Law, American Journal of Comparative Law, vol . 37  (1989), 69 . To Savigny, private law denoted the sphere “inside of which the existence and activity of the  individual enjoys a secure and free space”: Savigny, lc, I, 331–2; Reimann (note 55), 892 . Wieacker (note 3), 297, 328 . “Der Traum des Naturrechts ist ausgeträumt”: quoted from van Caenegem (note 3), 141 . Otto von Gierke, Die soziale Aufgabe des Privatrechts [The Social Task of the Private Law], Vittorio  Klostermann, Frankfurt Am Main, 1948) . We are grateful to Ms Anna Pastuhkova for her work  in translation of Gierke . Gierke, 9 . Lc, 10 . Lc, 4 . Lc, 5, 7 . Lc, 7 . Lc, 7 . Lc,12 . Lc, 12 .

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private law, in Gierke’s view, called for a social role for the private law in contemporary society .85 The social task for private law was, in Gierke’s view, called for particularly in  relation to private landed property .86 Gierke was against the unconditional dissolution of divided ownership and the big landed estates .87 Gierke conceived property  rights as relationships between human wills rather than between the isolated will of  one  person  and  the  thing,  the  object,  without  will  of  its  own .88  The  private  law  should proceed from the assumption that no right could exist without commensurate responsibility . So, even within a private law framework, property must entail  higher social responsibility .89 It is in Gierke’s view a task of the private law to defend  the weak and the common good against individual egoism .90 It is interesting that  these views would be held by one of such conservative origins . Gierke is remembered for his late 19th century articulation of the principle of  social responsibility that pervades the concept of property in the German legal tradition . To Gierke, individual rights were rooted in the community’s social framework .  Jellinek noted that Gierke attempted to insert “social law” between public and private law .91 Gierke was an enduring member of the Germanic faction of the Historical School, opposed to the Romanist faction led by Savigny . His nostalgia for old  Germanic legal traditions, including rejection of a unitary concept of ownership, led  to  marginalisation  in  his  own  time .  The  traditional  approaches  that  he  favoured,  based  on  a  civil  law  concept  of  responsibility,  were  insufficient  on  their  own  to  regulate landed estates, the industrial labour force and its safety, and environmental  excesses of the 19th century and this view was overtaken in the emergent trend toward public  law  regulation .  Although  his endeavour to re-popularise a Germanic  framework of civil law responsibility was overshadowed in the rush to regulate, his  views merged with the influence of German natural law theorists, such as Pufendorf  and Wolff, in the juristic background of the drafting of the German Civil Code and  are cited today in discussion of the principle of responsible proprietorship found in  Art 14(2) of Germany’s 1949 Constitution . 2.2  tHe modeRns The 19th century also saw a new level of contemporary theorisation and critique,  reaching  beyond  the  traditional  conception  of  the  legal  discipline  and  into  the  emergent fields of sociology and political economy, which contrasted to the romantic retrospection of the Historical School . Savigny acknowledged the state but did  not consider its structure and functions to be a matter of legal science92 – only pri85  86  87  88  89  90  91 

Lc,12 . Lc,13 . Lc,19 . Lc,14 . Lc,14 . Lc, 23 . Georg Jellinek, Obshchee uchenie o gosudarstve [General Theory of State], tr . Gessen, V . & Shalland,  L ., Yuridichesky Center Press, St Petersburg (reprint of first Russian edition, 1903), 131 . 92  Reimann (note 55), 857 .

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vate  law  could  be  legal  science .  The  theory  of  Rudolf  Ihering  and  other  modern  theorists, in contrast, would take the conception of the state into a whole new dimension and displace the natural law conception of the citizen, the law and society .  This work was very influential in Russia, as it was in Europe generally . Ihering and the purpose of law In his most prominent work, Der Zweck im Recht,93 Ihering advanced his view of law  as an institution with social purpose that was adapted to social engineering . Ihering’s view met the need of the time, justifying a welfare role for the state . The law  was not an end in itself but only a means to an end, the final end being the existence  of society .94 In Ihering’s view, Wilhelm von Humboldt and John Stuart Mill shared a “fundamental error” in the modern natural law view that the state and society could be  built  up  from  the  standpoint  of  the  individual .95  Humboldt  considered  that  the  state should not interfere in the private affairs of citizens any further than necessary  to prevent injury of the rights of one by the other and by external enemies .96 Within  this liberal framework, the state was only a subordinate means, to which the true end,  human well-being, must not be sacrificed . For Ihering on the contrary, we also exist  for others – society also has a claim upon us to further its purposes as it has helped  to further ours .97 Ihering described a historical progression in society, a historical step-ladder of  social purposes from (1) individual to (2) association to (3) the state . Ihering considered that the transition from private society to political society was achieved through  public association, association being the form of organisation of society in general .98 Private law partnership remained within the sphere of the individual because  the partners are exclusionary and they deal with their partnership shares as individuals .  In  associations  on  the  other  hand,  the  members  do  not  have  shares  that  are  proprietary  in nature99  and  expansion is  the  essence of association because every  new member raises its power .100 In addition to partnerships there are societies, fellowships, unions, the church and the state .101 To illustrate the historical step-ladder,  Ihering considered a purpose like the care of the poor: this purpose was first taken  up by individuals, then by associated interests and finally by the state .102 In comparison with other associations, the state has an absolute monopoly over the right  93  R . Ihering, Law as a Means to an End, tr . Husik, I ., Kelley, A .M ., New York, 1913; http://socserv . mcmaster .ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/ihering/LawMeansEnd .pdf .  The  work  was  published  in  multiple  editions in Germany between 1877 and 1883 . Der Zweck im Recht [Law as a Means to an End] was  translated into Russian in 1881 . 94  Ihering, VIII . 2, 188 . 95  Lc, VIII . 13, 399 . 96  Citing W . Humboldt, Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staates zu bestimmen,  Breslau, 1851 . 97  Ihering (note 93), VIII .13, 400–401 . 98  Lc, VIII . 7, 223, 228 . 99  Lc, VIII . 7, 225 . 100  Lc, VIII . 7, 226 . 101  Lc, VII . 8, 162 . 102  Lc, VIII . 7, 230 .

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to coerce,103 including the authority to set up the rules that regulate it – the law .104  In a state under the rule of law [Rechtsstaat]105 the law has bi-laterally binding force,  implying subordination of the state authority itself to the laws it has issued .106 Ihering stressed the extension of legal limitations on the individual in the interest of society .107 Thus, the liberal private law view that property is under the unlimited control of the owner is wrong .108 Otherwise, the resistance of a single person  could prevent the construction of a public road . So ownership does not imply an  absolute  power  of  disposition .  According  to  Ihering,  society  cannot  tolerate  and  never has tolerated property in such a form .109 Ihering linked the “incorrect conception” of private property to the “last remnant of that unhealthy concept of the Law  of Nature” .110 The principle of inviolability of property would deliver society into  the hands of unrestrained egoism of the individual: the interests of society were, in  reality,  also  the  individual’s  interests .  The  law  must  reconcile  the  interests  of  the  owner and of society through expropriation of, or injunction on the owner’s right .111  Accordingly, all private rights should have a social character . One day, Ihering conjectured, society would no longer recognise the alleged right of one individual to  hold landed possessions upon which hundreds of independent farmers might live .  While regarding “socialistic and communistic ideas” as “vain folly”, Ihering believed  that exerting pressure on private property would prevent its excessive accumulation  by diverting the surplus into the state treasury, to distribute the goods in accord with  the interests of society .112 Ihering  listed  three  immediate  services  of  the  state:  protection  against  attack  from without; protection within, through the law of property and of the person;  and, public arrangements and plans in the interests of society .113 While a politically  immature nation regards the state as its opponent, a mature one regards the state as  its protector .114 Social coercion is necessary, nevertheless, because of a deficiency of  understanding  that  the  common  interest  is  one’s  own,  due  to  near-sighted  egoism .115 In sum, Ihering provided a justification for increasing intervention by the state  in the affairs of individuals and expansion of the public law at the expense of the  private law realm . Ihering did not see private law as a self-sufficient domain of law .  He took on the private law, as if to demonstrate that within private law itself the  103  Lc, VIII . 9, 238 . 104  Lc, VIII . 8, 233 . 105  The German constitutional concept of Rechtsstaat is translated in this paper as a state under the  rule of law, or simply “rule of law state” . On Ihering’s concept of Rechtsstaat: see Ihering, VIII  11, 289, 290–1, 305, 315 . 106  Ihering (note 93), VIII 11, 267 . 107  Lc, VIII . 13, 384 . 108  Lc, VIII . 13, 386 . 109  Lc, VIII . 13, 389 . 110  Lc As mentioned above, not all natural lawyers shared this view: Pufendorf is the most obvious  example of the other view: Raff (note 21), Ch . 3 . 111  Ihering, VIII 13, 389–395 . 112  Lc, VIII . 13, 396 . 113  Lc, VIII . 14, 413–414 . 114  Lc, VIII . 15, 417 . 115  Lc, VIII . 15, 420 .

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instrument of its own destruction arose – the private law institution of association,  which had emerged out of partnership, and which would inevitably grow into the  exercise by the state of an all-encompassing role . In similar vein, Ihering commenced  his social analysis from the individual and his egoistic nature . But he strove to find  a way to overcome egoism: through the growth of associations towards the state,  which, with its powers of coercion, could at last effectively tame “egoistic man” . Law  was, in Ihering’s framework, a manifestation of social interest – “law being a union  of the far-sighted against the near-sighted” .116 Thus, the law, meaning the public law  of the state, could be used to override, if not abolish, “obsolete” civil law notions,  such as unbounded property rights, for the purpose of public welfare . Legal positivism Demise of the natural law tradition was hastened even further by the rise of legal  positivism, which also displaced the influence of the Historical School . As the idea  of the state under rule of law117 gained currency, it lent itself to a new preoccupation  with establishing a “strict legality” in law and a method of finding and applying law  devoid of arbitrariness or subjectivity . The notion of the state under rule of law developed in the middle of the 19th  century in Germany in response to the need for a stronger underpinning for the  protection of civil and private law rights .118 Robert von Mohl developed his contribution to the concept of the rule of law state in reaction against the police state .119  Mohl presumed, at least in the early years, the existence of a self-defined sphere for  private  law  with  Rechtsstaat  providing  order  for  people  to  live  together .  In  1841  Mohl pointed out that an “… atomistic view of life and state has at least the advantage of preventing the crippling of all individuals by a wrongly conceived aim of the  community .”120 In comparison, his contemporary Julius Stahl saw the rule of law  state as one that would act in a legal form, establishing the lines and boundaries of  its own actions and providing for the free ambit of the citizen according to law .121  It followed that the private law sphere would be defined by public law . By confining  the measure of legality to formal law Stahl contributed to the foundation for legal  positivism . Legal positivism thus undermined the natural law conception of an autonomous body of private law, let alone the universal vision of law and human relations modelled on the civil law . In line with the broader positivist movement, Carl  Gerber and his pupil Paul Laband sought to separate legal analysis from political or  116  Lc, VIII . 15, 420 . 117  Rechtsstaat, see above note 105 . 118  Rudolf Gneist saw the concept of Rechtsstaat as grounded in the system of judicial and other  review  of  administration  to  hear  citizens’  complaints  against  the  state  administration  and  to  counter the central bureaucracy and the enduring form of communal self-government headed  by unsalaried country bailiffs, modelled on the system of Justices of the Peace appointed by the  King . 119  G . Dietze, Two Concepts of the Rule of Law, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1973, 20 . Dietze noted  Mohl’s shift with time to a more conservative position: at 23 . Compare the first edition of his  Polizeiwissenschaft [Police Science], at I, 7, with his second edition of 1844, at I, 7, note 1, and third  edition of 1866, at I, 12–3: quoted in Dietze, 23, note 35 . 120  Mohl, Polizei, in: C . von Rotteck and C . Welcker, Staats-Lexikon oder Enzyklopädie der Staatswissenschaften, Vol . XII, 644; quoted in Dietze (note 119), 23–24 . 121  F .J . Stahl, Philosophie des Rechts II, Part 2 . See also, Costa (note 57),19; and Dietze (note 119), 26 .

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sociological approaches . Gerber was a pupil of George Puchta, Savigny’s close associate and fellow Romanist . For Puchta already, “the law itself is a system” .122 Gerber  himself  was  a  Germanist  but  also  an  adherent  of  conceptualism .123  Gerber  transferred the conceptual legal [begriffsjuristisch] method of the Historical School to the  emerging discipline of public law, so that both public and private law could be defined  through  systematically  coordinated  concepts .124  From  this  new  perspective  Gerber redefined individual rights as a series of public law effects .125 For Laband,  similarly, private law rights emanated from public law: “basic rights” were protected  only in so far as their violation required clear statutory permission and they were  subject to adjudication . Laband’s “statutory positivism” was attacked by Gierke . For  Gierke, individual rights were rooted in the community’s social framework .  The  legal  positivist  movement  thus  substantially  contributed  to  the  trend  of  Continental  thought  in  the  late  19th  and  early  20th  century  toward  the  predominance  of  public  law  over  private  law  and  of  the  state  over  the  individual .  When  private right was seen as derived from or guaranteed by public law, then the whole  sphere  of  private  law  fell  to  the  mercy  of  the  public  law .  Georg  Jellinek  had  attempted  to  develop  a  legal  positivist  concept  of  the  state  and  public  law  which  would escape the accusation of arbitrariness . Jellinek’s subjective rights of public law In his work The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens: A Contribution to Modern History126 Jellinek contrasted two views of the relationship of the state and the  individual, first, that the rights of the individual are the product of state concession  and permission, which followed from the idea of state omnipotence, and, secondly,  that the state not only engenders the rights of the individual but also leaves to the  individual that measure of liberty that it did not itself require to limit in the interests  of the whole . Such liberty was not created . It was recognised in self-limitation by the  state . What was to remain was not so much a right but a limitation on the exercise  by the state of its powers .127 The state thus separates its own domain from that of  private  action,  subjecting  itself  in  many  cases  to  private  law .128  By  virtue  of  self-

122  Reimann  (note  55),  860 .  Puchta  also  abandoned  Savigny’s  historical  Roman  Law  focus  (Reimann, 869) . Puchta gave an impulse to ‘Pandects’ science, which assimilated Roman law concepts to construct the modern private law system . 123  Gerber, together with Ihering, was an editor of the Yearbook for the Dogmatics of Modern Roman and German Private Law: Reimann (note 55), 870 . 124  Carl  Friedrich  Wilhelm  Gerber,  Über öffentliche Rechte  [On Public Rights],  Mohr,  1913  [1852];  Grundzüge eines System des deutschen Staatsrechts  [Main Features of a System of German State Law]  Laupp,  1876–1882;  Armin  Bogdandy,  The  Past  and  Promise  of  Doctrinal  Constructivism:  A  Strategy for Responding to the Challenges Facing Constitutional Scholarship in Europe, International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol . 7, (2009), 372–3 . 125  Costa (note 57), 95 . 126  G . Jellinek, The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens: A Contribution to Modern Constitutional History (1895), tr . Farrand, M ., Henry Holt & Co ., New York, 1901; http://oll .libertyfund .org/ index .php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show .php%3Ftitle=1176&chapter=104811&layout =html . 127  Lc . 128  Lc .

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limitation the state changes from a physical to a moral force, rising from an unlimited power to a power legally limited in regard to other legal and natural persons .129 In Allgemeine Staatslehre [General Theory of State],130 Jellinek further developed his  theory of the self-limitation of the state as a foundation of his concept of public law  and, in turn, the whole law . In his view, when the state acts by fixed rules which can  only be established and changed by means of juridical forms, these rules presume  the subordination of state organs to them . Jellinek also put forward a public law  theory  of  the  welfare  state .  Jellinek  considered  that  the  state  should  take  control  over the “solidarity interests of man” .131 Thus the state should look after the post,  railways, insurance and so forth .132 He saw a trend in the direction of socialisation  and centralisation [Verstaatlichung], in which the state was taking other spheres of  individual human activity .133 Jellinek stated that all private rights were related to the  public law claim for recognition and protection, with the whole private law being  based upon public law .134 Jellinek  postulated  the  existence  of  public  law  private  rights  grounded  in  the  “status” of the person in relation to the state135 To Jellinek, recognition of the individual as a person, which depended upon the existence of individual public rights,  was a foundation of all legal relations, including private law .136 Jellinek conceded  that  certain  individual  rights  to  freedom,  such  as  freedom  of  conscience,  press,  meetings, and so on, formed a sphere free of state intervention .137 Still, civil status  was determined, according to Jellinek, by recognition of an individual as a member  of the state .138 Today Jellinek’s resounding significance lies in his elaboration of a conception  of the state under the rule of law as a state limited by its own laws . Jellinek’s presumption  of  individual  rights  that  are  dependent  upon  recognition  by  the  state  could have reflected the realities of Imperial Germany at the time, perhaps explaining his emphasis on the state limiting itself . However, to say that the state will abide  by its own laws is not to say that the autonomy of private law will be respected . At  best, Jellinek’s rule of law state could guarantee the orderly transformation of private  law rights only when the public law sanctioned it . Thus, Jellinek’s public law vision  still reinforced the trend to treat the private law as a sphere ultimately at mercy of  public law institutions . Jellinek also foresaw ever-growing expansion of the state into  those spheres of formerly private activity that he defined as spheres of “solidarity  interest” . Thus, whether the civil law was considered to emanate from public law  directly or presumed to be rooted in the “social law” of the community, the common tendency was to consider private law rights ultimately to be under the control  129  Lc . 130  G . Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre [General Theory of State], 3rd ed ., Springer Verlag, Berlin, 1922  (“AS”) . 131  AS, 3rd ed ., 259 (Chapter 8: Doctrine of the Purpose of the State, Part 3); 1st Rus . ed . (note 91),  264 . 132  AS 3rd ed ., 260, 1st Rus . ed . (note 91), 264–265 . 133  AS 3rd ed ., 261; 1st Rus . ed ., 265–266 . 134  AS 3rd ed ., 385 (Chapter 12: The System of Public Law); 1st Rus . ed ., 374 . 135  AS 3rd ed ., 418 (Chapter 13: The Legal Status of the Elements of the State); 1st Rus . ed ., 405 . 136  AS 3rd ed ., 419, 1st Rus . ed ., 405 . 137  AS 3rd ed .,419–420; 1st Rus . ed ., 406 . 138  AS 3rd ed .,421; 1st Rus . ed ., 407 .

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of public law . The notion of a self-binding rule of law state, advanced by Ihering and  Jellinek, was intended to combat arbitrariness in the public law not its pre-eminence  and a significant effect was to perpetuate the decline of the natural law vision and  decline of the significance of the civil law . Duguit’s social functions Duguit’s theory of social function provided a further progressive alternative to the  natural law vision of a world ordered primarily by the civil law . Duguit was not a  legal positivist . His methodology was rooted rather in the French brand of positivism as developed by Auguste Comte . Duguit’s theory provided a less radical alternative to the Marxist analysis of social roles defined by class interest . His work ranged  widely and still retains very considerable status in European juristic circles . Duguit paid much attention to what he called the “German theory”, referring to  the work of Ihering and Jellinek . Duguit argued that according to the German theory139 the rule of law only exists where there is a state with objective law, conceived  as a command of the state backed by coercion .140 For Duguit the ideas of sovereignty and subjective rights were obsolete .141 The public law no longer derived from  the state as a sovereign whose role is to command . The basis of public law had become “organisation” rather than “command” .142 The state’s new role would concern  public  services  to  the  people,  such  as  educational  services,  the  Poor  law,  public  works, lighting, postal, telegraphic and telephone systems .143 In Duguit’s conception,  the  state  was  a  system  of  public  services  guaranteed  and  controlled  by  the  government,144 which he defined as any governmentally regulating and controlling  activity indispensable to the realisation and development of social solidarity so long  as it could not be assured save by governmental involvement .145 Private law is no  longer based on individual right or the autonomy of private will, but upon the social functions required of private persons according to their situations in society .146  For Duguit, the ownership of property carried with it a social function .147 In the  Duguit view, law is simply the formulation of a rule, the product of a group of social  facts which government deems to be necessary . Law is, above all, a law of public  service . Government is legally obliged to ensure the operation of public utilities, to  issue general rules called laws to serve the ends that government sets itself .148 Gov139  L . Duguit, Theory of Objective Law Anterior to the State (translation of chapters viii-xi from  L’État, le droit objectif et la loi positive (1901)), in: Modern French Legal Philosophy, ed . Fouillée, tr .  Scott, F .W ., & Chamberlain, J .O ., Augustus, M ., Kelley Publishers, New York, 1968 (reprint of  1916 edition), 309 . 140  Lc, 309–310 . 141  L .  Duguit,  Law in the Modern State  (1913),  tr .  Laski,  F .,  &  Laski,  H .,  George  Allen  &  Unwin,  London, 1921, 10–12, 164, 166–7, 168 . 142  Lc, 49 . 143  Lc, 30–31 . 144  Lc, 91 . 145  Lc, 48 . 146  Lc, 49 . 147  L .  Duguit,  Les Transformations générales du droit privé depuis le Code Napoléon  (1912)  published  as  Changes of Principle in the Field of Liberty, Contract, Liability and Property, in The Progress of Continental Law in the Nineteenth Century, Little, Brown & Co, Boston, 1918 . 148  Duguit (note 141), 50 .

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ernmental power can maintain itself in a durable fashion only while subjects maintain belief that their rulers perform their functions .149 Public services are those activities that the government is bound to perform .150 The traditional governmental  functions of national defence, maintenance of internal security, order and justice,  were for Duguit, no longer sufficient .151 As external relations between peoples became essential, government became responsible for ensuring the stability of those  relations .152  Increased  state  intervention  might  be,  in  Duguit’s  view,  counterbalanced by decentralisation in the provision of those services, by vesting authority in  autonomous groups of officials, technical experts and private citizens or even private companies operating under governmental control .153 But even if the state itself  manages the particular service, it organises itself upon an industrial basis through  administrative and financial autonomy .154 Duguit was not, as Ihering might have been, concerned to show the emergence  of a welfare state as an evolutionary development germinated within private law itself . His point of reference was, as Jellinek’s was, entirely public law . He did not have  Jellinek’s “scruples” to denote a sphere of self-limitation for the state with at least  some individual rights to be left undisturbed . For Duguit, the protection of individual rights was to be vested in a public law institution, the administrative courts .  Duguit  envisioned  not  disappearance  of  the  institution  of  private  property  but  rather a new understanding of the civil law conception and the emergence of public  law limitations on such institutions, as Ihering had before him . Although concerned  with centralisation, Duguit, did not envisage public enterprises as potentially less  effective than private ones . Nevertheless, Duguit’s influence was a moderating influence, particularly on Marxist thought . It showed the possibility of not abolishing  private property but steering property owners toward use of their property in ways  that are consistent with public purposes . Duguit’s views remain very influential .155 Marxist legal thought in the 19th century: the private law or no law? The Marxist tradition had its earliest roots in the neo-Hegelian movement led by  Feuerbach .  The  neo-Hegelians,  in  their  turn,  connected  to  Hegel’s  vision  of  civil  society and the civil law as a domain of private transactions . Hegel’s vision of civil  society, governed by individual interest, resembled the natural law theoretical understanding of his milieu . It was nevertheless supplemented by his allegiance to the  Prussian state and the state bureaucracy . In his history of Prussia, Clark put it this  way, “… the philosopher’s writing provided exalted legitimacy for the Prussian bureaucracy” with Hegel himself steering an uneasy path between doctrinaire liberalism and restorational conservatism .156

149  Lc, 50 . 150  Lc, 44 . 151  Lc, 45 . 152  Lc, 46 . 153  Lc, 52–53, 59 . 154  Lc, 53 . 155  D . Baumgartner, Sozialbindung des Eigentums und Enteignung in Frankreich, Doctoral Dissertation,  Faculty of Law, Universität Bonn, 1976, 96–97 . 156  Clark (note 33, 432 .

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Likewise for Marx, private law was an embodiment of the economic relations of  “egoistic man” . As an extension of this vision, public law was to provide political  underpinning for the economic relations reflected in private law: “This man, the member of civil society, is thus the basis, the precondition, of the political state .  … Hence man was not freed from religion, he received religious freedom . He was not freed  from property, he received freedom to own property . He was not freed from the egoism of business, he received freedom to engage in business . The establishment of the political state and the  dissolution  of  civil  society  into  independent  individuals  –  whose  relations  with  one  another  depend on law, just as the relations of men in the system of estates and guilds depended on  privilege – is accomplished by one and the same act . Man as a member of civil society, un-political man, inevitably appears as the natural man … The real man is recognised in the shape of  egoistic individual, the true man is recognised only in the shape of the abstract citizen .”157

Marx envisioned the production relations and their legal expression as civil society .158 So, for Marx the state was held together by civil life, not vice versa .159 There  was, therefore, a drift between civil society and the state expressed in the distinction  between  subjective  right  and  objective  law .160  Subjective  right  was,  to  Marx,  the  characteristic trait of the egoistic man as “a member of civil society, an individual  withdrawn into himself, into the confines of his private interests and private caprice,  and separated from the community” .161 Objective law was, on the other hand, expression of the bourgeois state as a whole, which “feels itself to be a political state  and asserts its universality only in opposition to those elements of its being” .162 Pashukanis later stated that, the problem of subjective right and objective law was the  general philosophical formulation of the more concrete problem of public law and  private law .163 This conception of law as bourgeois civil law and the state and public law as the  ultimate expressions of bourgeois civil society led to expectations that under socialism, with disappearance of bourgeois society, the state and the law would also disappear . This vision was most famously formulated by Engels in Anti-Duhring: “The first act by virtue of which the state really constitutes itself the representative of the whole  of society – the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society – this is, at  the same time, its last independent act as a state . State interference in social relations becomes,  in one domain after another, superfluous, and then withers away of itself; the government of  persons is replaced by the administration of things, and by the conduct [direction] of processes  of production . The state is not “abolished” . It withers away .”164

157  Marx, On the Jewish Question, in: K . Marx & F . Engels, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Works, Progress Press, Moscow, 1970 (“MECW”), vol . 3, 166–167; quoted from: M . Cain & A .  Hunt, Marx and Engels on Law, Academic Press, London, 1979, 136–7 . 158  Marx, Preface to the Critique of Political Economy, in: MECW, vol . 1, 503 . 159  Marx, The Holy Family, in: MECW, vol . 4, 120–121; E . Pashukanis, Law & Marxism: A General Theory, tr . Einhorn, B ., Ink Links, London,1978, 92 . 160  In German, as in Russian, ‘law’ and ‘right’ could be expressed by the same word “Das Recht”  (“pravo”) . Law is denoted as “objective right” and a right as “subjective right” . 161  Marx, On the Jewish Question, in: MECW, vol . 3, 164; Pashukanis (note 159), 102 . 162  Marx (note 159), 153 . 163  Pashukanis (note 159), 102 . 164  Engels, Anti-Duhring, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1959, 386–387; in Cain &  Hunt (note 157), 163–164 .

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These expectations of the withering away of state and law did not sit comfortably  with the socialist vision of a centralised economy . Engels went on to state that “…  [the capitalist mode of production] forces on more and more the transformation of  the vast means of production, already socialised, into state property .”165 This transformation of productive forces would mean the centralisation of industry . According to Engels in The English Ten Hours Bill, “… the first result of proletarian revolution in England will be the centralisation of large-scale industry in the hands of the  state, in other words, in the hands of the ruling proletariat …”166 This Marxist vision of socialist centralised economy brought about a bitter divide between the Marxists and the anarchists led by Bakunin, who questioned the  feasibility  of  abolishing  the  state  by  means  of  centralisation  and  universal  stateownership .167 Marxian legal thought of twentieth century struggled to reconcile the  vision of a withering away of the law and the state with the ideal of a centralised  state-run planned economy . At the same time, the writings of Marx and Engels revealed  no  further  guidance  on  how  a  socialist  legal  system  should  be  developed .  These gaps in the Marxist conception of socialist society and theory of socialist law  were filled by reference to the apparently progressive trend toward public law that  overtook Continental legal thought . As explored above, this trend was fostered by  many forces and many writers, among them Ihering, with his concept of law as social purpose or interest, Jellinek with his concepts of positive public law and Duguit,  with his conception of state, law and private roles as social functions . Renner’s private law in the service of public law Karl Renner (1870–1950), the distinguished representative of Austro-Marxism, attempted to develop a concept of law suited to the conditions of the 20th century . He  put  forward  a  fusion  of  Marxian  and  positivist  legal  frameworks  which  retained  some traditional private law institutions, such as property and contract . Renner argued  for  positive  legal  analysis,  through  which  legal  institutions  would  be  constructed from their constituent norms, in accordance with formal legal characteristics .168  Law,  thus,  could  sometimes  continue  unchanged  in  changing  economic  conditions .169 However, in his view, a complete theory of law can be developed only  when positive legal analysis is supplemented by an investigation into the origin and  social function of the law .170

165  Lc, 386–387 . 166  Engels, The English Ten Hours Bill, in: Articles on Britain, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1971,  107–8; in Cain & Hunt (note 157), 249 . 167  Bakunin put it this way, “… revolutionary anarchists are the enemies of all forms of state and  state organisations … and believe that people can only be happy and free, when organised from  below by means of its own autonomous and completely free associations, without the supervision of any guardians …” (Bakunin, Marxism, Freedom and the State, Freedom Press, London,  1951, 63) . 168  K . Renner, The Institutions of Private Law [first ed . 1904], Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, [tr .  of 2nd ed . 1928] 1949, 49 . 169  Lc, 57 . 170  Lc, 54 .

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Renner’s analysis, similar to Duguit’s theory of social functions, centred upon  the social functions of production, consumption and distribution .171 According to  Renner, the law is an organised whole determined by the needs of society with every  legal institution a part of it, relating to all others through its function . Thus every  institution of private law has its counterpart in public law, to guarantee the full efficacy of the private institutions .172 According to Renner, the distinction between  public and private law was disappearing .173 The rights of ownership concealed the  limitations of private law .174 The rights of the capitalist are a form of delegated public authority, conferred indiscriminately upon the person who would use it for his  own benefit . The relation of employment is a public obligation of service . Just as  property had developed into public utility, the private contract by means of collective agreement and the labour market, with its registers of prospective employees,  social insurance and the like, had become an institution of public law .175 In other  words,  the  content  of  private  right  had  assumed  a  public  nature,  although  legal  doctrine still conceived it in the terms of private law .176 Renner saw the public use of privately owned facilities, such as a private railway,  as the acquisition of the privilege to make use of a public utility against payment of  a fee fixed by public law . In this way private property had been transformed into  public utility, although it had not yet become public property .177 Instead, the legal  institution of property became a title to surplus value, rather than title to the property-object . Every establishment that owed to the public certain services against the  payment of specified and advertised fees had become a public utility . Private property was becoming accessible to the public at large .178 For Renner, the development  of private property into the substratum of public utility was the first unavoidable  step toward the nationalisation of private property .179 In Renner’s view, property-objects tended to amalgamate into either an aggregated object of ownership, such as joint property or a partnership, or, in the case of  legal transfer of ownership, into a corporation .180 Even in the case of an association  with legal personality, where ownership is legally surrendered to the association, the  owner still retains a form of title to surplus-value . As a rule, associations performed  a function of realising capital – to be profitable for the owners – pushing the capitalist method of production to the socialist climax of its development .181 In Renner’s  opinion, the social function of property in the form of the corporation was to deprive the economic owners of their function, as if bringing about the self-abolition  of [private] property . Even at law, “the owner” was no longer owner, but merely one  among a multitude of shareowners without influence . The result was a transfer of  the  capitalist  organisational  function  to  paid  managers,  with  the  contract  of  em171  Lc, 75 . 172  Lc, 76 . 173  Lc, 115 . 174  Lc, 119 . 175  Lc, 119 . 176  Lc, 115 . 177  Lc, 119 . 178  Lc, 120 . 179  Lc, 121 . 180  Lc, 216 . 181  Lc, 219 .

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ployment taking over the contract of property . Although Renner insisted that even  processes of concentration would not abolish property, at least as “economic property” or surplus value, or capitalism,182 he considered that complementary institutions of the public law were forcing private law institutions into the background .183 In conclusion, Renner was the most noted Marxist legal theoretician outside of  Russia before the First World War and between the two world wars . He attempted to  synthesise  both  Ihering’s  notion  of  association,  as  an  original  private  law  institutiondeveloped into the crucial public law association, and Duguit’s theory of social  function, of transforming private law institutions, with Marx’s concept of capital as  the essential category of the capitalist mode of production . His views on the privatepublic divide differed markedly from those of the Soviet Marxists of 1920s, who  worked in the aftermath of the dismantling of War Communism, such as Pushukanis and Stuchka . First, Renner re-interpreted the Marxian concept of capital as  surplus  value  by  emphasising  the  “eternal  quality”  of  capital  accumulation  and,  thus, property understood as capital . Secondly, Renner, in sharp contrast to Pashukanis, disregarded Marx’s Hegelian vision of civil society as a sphere of private law .  In comparison, for Pashukanis, in an almost libertarian way, public law was an instrument of the distortion of private law, leading to the dilemma of either tolerating  bourgeois [civil] law or of creating a world with no law – the socialist plan . Renner was a Social Democrat, whose world view was rooted in late 19th century  German social democratic ideology and the broader continental legal tradition . For  him, public law was a means for the transformation of the capitalist economy into  a socialist economy . Like Hilferding,184 he believed there was a trend to the centralisation of industry and accumulation of capital . Renner saw the joint stock company  as  a  stepping  stone  in  a  managerial  shift  to  public  control .  The  distinctive  characteristic of Austro-Marxism was in its vision of a socialist economy as a centralised one . But in comparison to early Marxism, it quietly disposed of the expectation  that the state and the law would wither away in the foreseeable future . Moreover,  Austro-Marxism happily took over German legal positivism’s presumption of the  pre-eminence of the public law over the private law in apparent contradiction of the  early Marxist concept of law . 2.3  tHe Resonance of modeRn legal tHougHt In RussIa It is difficult to gauge the impact in pre- and post-revolutionary Russia of the works  of Ihering, Jellinek, Duguit and Renner, and others, through which we have traced  above the overthrow of the reigning position of the natural law vision and the vital  place of the civil law in it . Prominent citations of their work, and the speed with  which Russian editions and reprints appeared, indicates strongly that they rapidly  joined the Russian intellectual milieu .

182  Lc, 287 . 183  Lc, 296 . 184  R . Hilferding, Die Aufgaben der Sozialdemocratie in der Republik, Rede auf dem Parteitag der  SPD zu Kiel, Berliner Volksblatt, 1927; in: The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, ed . Kaes, A ., Jay, M . &  Dimendberg, E ., University of California Press, 1995, 68–72 .

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Ihering Ihering’s earlier works quickly became available in Russian . Ihering’s Der Geist des römischen Rechts  [Spirit of Roman Law]  (1852–1865)  was  translated  into  Russian  in  1875 . Der Kampf um’s Recht [The Struggle for Right] (1872) was translated into Russian  in 1874 . Der Zweck im Recht [Law as a Means to an End] (1877–1883) was translated  into Russian in 1881 . One of the leading Russian legal philosophers of the 19th century, Boris Chicherin (1828–1904), associated Ihering’s teachings with the crises of liberalism and the  general obfuscation of legal consciousness .185 On Chicherin’s reading, Ihering’s Der Zweck im Recht  provided  theoretical  justification  for  state  interventionism  in  the  economic sphere .186 Chicherin moreover claimed that if law, as legal positivism assumed,  is  a  coercive  command  flowing  from  the  sovereign’s  political  power,  the  division between private and public law would not make sense . Private law, protecting individual freedom, would be swallowed up by public law, directly subordinated  to the purposes of the body politic . Everything would become a matter of public  concern, subject to control from the point of view of the public good and public  morality .187 Civil society would thus become part of an all-embracing political organisation and lose its autonomous existence .188 Legal positivism paved the way for  attempts to use law for socialist purposes in Chicherin’s view . Pavel Novgorodsev, a leader of the Moscow neo-Kantians at the beginning of the  20th century, praised Ihering for his view of law as the emanation of purpose and  sympathised with the view of state socialism that he attributed to Ihering .189 Leon  Petrazycki, a founder of the Psychological School at the turn of the 20th century,  disapproved Ihering’s “realism” and criticised his “practical interests” as especially  dangerous for Russia because Russia could not afford to tolerate such “fashionable  slogans” about “interests”, but should observe existing laws, even if bad .190 In the post-revolutionary period, Reisner attacked Ihering for his identification  of law with the state and his deduction of all of the binding force of the law from  state constraint . In his work General Doctrine of Law, Stuchka referred to Ihering as  the most daring and outspoken representative of bourgeois legal science . Stuchka  also referred to the opinion, attributed to Ihering in Geist des römischen Rechts, that  according to the original view of legal science, law had its origin in statute and only  in the 19th century were custom and the national spirit advanced to the rank of a  source of law . Golunskii and Strogovich, in their work Theory of the State and Law  (1940), interpreted Ihering’s concept of law to be an interest defended by the state,  inseparable from the force of the state, which creates and is the source of law and 

185  A . Walicki, Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987, 144 . 186  B .N .  Chicherin,  Sobstvennost’ i gosudarstvo  [Property and the State],  Moscow,  1882–83,  vol . 2,  172–3 . 187  Lc, 212 . 188  Walicki (note 185), 144 . 189  P . Novgorodsev, Istoricheskaia shkola iuristov, Moscow,1896, 143 and 152–8, 160; cited in Walicki  (note 185), 302–3 . 190  L . Petrazhitskii (Petrazycki), Vvedenie v politiku prava, Kievskii universitetskie izvestia, 1896, No  8; 1897, No 9–10; Walicki, 228–9 .

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noted that Ihering’s teachings provided a basis for state intervention into economic  relations .191 Jellinek Georg  Jellinek  received  significant  attention  in  pre-revolutionary  Russian  legal  thought . Jellinek’s work The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens: A Contribution to Modern History (1895)  was  published  in  Russian  translation  in  1905  and  again in 1906 . His Allgemeine Staatslehre was first published in Russian in 1903 and  the second edition was published in translation in 1908 . It was published again in  Russian in 2004 . Novgorodsev referred to Jellinek’s work, for example when he interpreted state  autonomy as limitation of the will of the state by the will of the state, rather than by  higher legal norms above the state, such as norms of natural law .192 Kistiakovsky,  another pre-revolutionary philosopher of “scientific idealism”, embraced Jellinek’s  theory of public legal subjective rights as developed in System der öffentlichen Rechte .193 Kistiakovsky followed Jellinek in stressing the growing importance of public  law individualism at the expense of private law rights .194 For Kistiakovsky, Jellinek’s  conception of public law subjective rights had shown that the existing rule of law  state was laying foundations for the future socialist state, just as the existing capitalist economy was laying foundations for a socialist economy .195 In his 1917 paper on the revolution and the courts the Commissar for Education, Lunacharskii, cited Jellinek’s work Verfassungsänderung und Verfassungswandlung  (1906) in support of a concept of revolutionary legality .196 Stuchka referred to Jellinek in his work A General Doctrine of Law .197 In his paper on the Marxist conception  of law and state, Krylenko weighed and ultimately discarded Jellinek’s definition of  law .198  Golunskii  and  Strogovich  attacked  Jellinek’s  view  of  law  as  the  minimum  morality when arguing that law was then becoming part of morality .199 Vyshinsky  referred to Jellinek as one of the outstanding bourgeois scholars, citing a passage  from Jellinek’s work The Law of the Modern State in support of his assertion about the  unsatisfactory position of doctrine concerning the state .200 In his work The Relationship between State and Law (1945), Trainin referred to the work of Ihering, Laband and  191  S .A . Golunskii & M .S . Strogovich, The Theory of the State and Law in: Soviet Legal Philosophy,  ed . Hazard, J .N ., tr . Babb, H .W ., Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass .), 1951, 414–5 . 192  P . Novgorodsev, Gosudarstvo i pravo (1904) [State and Law], 74 n . 4; Walicki, 313–5, 431–5 . 193  G . Jellinek, System der subjectiven offentlichen Rechte, 1892 . 194  B . Kistiakovsky, Sotsial’nye nauki i pravo, Moscow, 1916, 541, 585–6; Walicki, 369 . 195  B . Kistiakovsky, Gosudarstvo pravovoe i sotsialisticheskoe, Voposy filosofii i psichologii, vol . 85,  (1906), 504 n .1; Walicki, 370 . 196  A . Lunacharskii, The Revolution, Law and the Courts, in: Soviet Political Thought – an Anthology,  ed . & tr . Jaworskyj M ., Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1968, 55 . 197  P . Stuchka, A General Doctrine of Law, in: Stuchka, Selected Writings on Soviet Law and Marxism,  ed . & tr . Sharlet R ., Maggs P . & Beirne P ., M E Sharpe Inc, Armonk, 1988, 56 n . 77 . 198  N .V . Krylenko, Toward a Marxist Conception of Law and State, in: Soviet Political Thought (note  196), 145 . 199  S .A . Golunskii, M .S . Strogovich, The Theory of the State and Law, in: Soviet Legal Philosophy  (note 191), 377–378 . 200  A .Y . Vyshinsky, Fundamental Tasks of the Science of Soviet Socialist Law, in: Soviet Legal Philosophy (note 191), 321–322 .

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Jellinek when arguing that the German school of law (sic), formed from the middle  of the 19th century, recognised that the state has predominant importance . Duguit Duguit’s work Le droit social, Le droit individuel, et l’ etat [Social Law, Individual Law and the State] (1908) was published in Russian in 1909 . The first edition of his Traite de droit constitutionnel (1911) was first published in Russian in 1908 .201 Duguit’s La transformation generale du droit privé (1912) was first published in Russian in 1919 .202 Duguit’s rejection of the notion that society, the collective or the individual has  natural rights was cited repeatedly in Russian legal literature of the 1920s .203 Pashukanis noted Duguit’s rejection of conventional notions of sovereignty, the state as  subject and subjective rights, advocating instead an “objective” concept of law based  upon  ideas  of  social  solidarity .204  Accordingly,  the  state  became  the  organisation  which “does the work” rather than simply exercising the power of command .205 III PragmaTIC formulaTIon of PolICy PosT-revoluTIonary russIa

In

revoluTIonary

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In the immediate aftermath of the October 1917 Revolution, in the early days of the  revolutionary Bolshevik government, no area of government or commerce remained  untouched by its Decrees . Norbert Reich revealed that it was, indeed, the civil law  itself that was to be overthrown,206 and with it private ownership, as with inheritance, gift, employment law, family law and the civil court jurisdiction . Socialist relations of production would be distinguished by “organisation of labour according to  the plan” .207 So far as law was needed at all, and surely then only in the period of  transition  to  true  communism,  the  dialectical  antithesis  of  bourgeois  private law  would be social law,208 the promised right to work would be its opposite, a duty to  work .209  Liberated  society  would  be  completely  managed  by  the  plan,  developed  under the auspices of the state . The ability of citizens to hold each other to account horizontally within a legal  paradigm of rights, so far as it had existed in Tsarist Russia, was thus completely replaced by vertical structures of power . In this way the revolution embraced the rising  201  L .  D’ugi  [Duguit],  Konstitutsionnoe pravo. Individual’noe pravo. Preobrazovanie gosudarstvo,  Moscow, 1908 . 202  L .  D’ugi,  Obshchee preobrazovanie grazhdanskogo prava co vremeni Kodeksa Napoleona,  Moscow,  1919 . 203  L . Uspenskii, Economic Rights under Socialism, in: Soviet Political Thought (note 196), 230–231;  F . Kornilov, A Critical Review Of Soviet Theories of Law, in: Soviet Political Thought, 211 . 204  E . Pashukanis, Obzor ocnavnyhk napravlenii vo frantsuzkoi literature gosudarstvennogo prava,  in: Izbrannye proizvedenia po obshchei teorii prava i gosudarstva, Moscow, 1980, 219–223 . 205  Lc, 220 . 206  N . Reich, Sozialismus und Zivilrecht – Eine rechtstheoretisch-rechtshistorische Studie zur Zivilrechtstheorie und Kodifikationspraxis im sowjetischen Gesellschafts- und Rechtssystem, Athenäum Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1972 . 207  Lc, 81 . 208  Lc, 114–121 . 209  Lc, 81 .

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concept of the state and recent theory about the capacity of public law and instruments of the public sphere to govern modern society . The trials of the civil law in the early post-Revolutionary years reveal scepticism  about all law . Rather than replacing the substance of law within the “superstructure”  of the state, the ultimate intention was to abolish law altogether . The civil law was  consigned to irrelevance . The ability of citizens to challenge each other within society on a legal basis was replaced by vertical claims and responsibilities in the public  sphere . If the law in general was to fall away in the course of social evolution to a  higher plane, the civil law was to be systematically abolished with utmost urgency . The reason for this strategic attack on the civil law appears to have been that the  concept of civil law, the rights of private citizens in respect of each other, was entirely conflated with bourgeois law, perceived as a system of laws that maintained the  elite position of the upper social classes . This conflation is understandable when we  consider the substantive civil law of Russia at that time . Property law was contradictory with communal land tenures that constrained many in effectively unfree peasantry . Employment law still permitted corporal punishment of employees . Family  law was tied to the Orthodox Church . The role of the civil law in maintaining the  interests of the oppressive Tsarist government, and the upper classes it supported,  obscured the distinction between the higher theoretical place of the civil law as a  horizontal system that required citizens to take responsibility for their private actions toward each other, from the content of its principles which could be changed . In addition, the progress of social evolution foreseen by revolutionary historical  materialists, the agents of history, the midwives of the birth of the new order and the  end of history from the womb of the past relations of production, left no future for  bourgeois law . The generation of 1917 had seen society move from a horse and cart  world to one that knew flight, motor vehicles, steamships, radio, photography and  motion pictures, sound recording and amazing skills in surgery that put back together the victims of explosives and the machine gun in ways never seen before, and  all this could be attributed to science . Ultimately, the human future was to be a society guided by basic laws (processes) of economics and sociology identified by relevant sciences, not the texts of human lawmakers . Social law, as the antithesis of  private  law,  would  embody  this  progress  for  a  transitional  period,  particularly  in  relation to family law and employment law, creating vertical responsibilities of the  socialist state to the individual and the individual to the socialist state as surrogate  for a future broader communist society . Until 1921 and the era of the New Economic Policy [NEP] no one advocated an idea of socialist civil law .  In 1917 progressive voices of the science of human society adulated the state  and with it public law . With the prophets of the inevitable revolution, Marx and  Engels, virtually silent on the way to be taken forward by the dictatorship of the  proletariat, it is hardly surprising that the latest authoritative theory on the role of  the state was drawn upon to fill in the gaps . The science of planning also figured  largely . Rather than the anarchy of the invisible hand of commerce and the market,  human activity and use of resources could be planned to achieve common goals .  When  everyone,  including  or  especially  Ministries  and  State  Owned  Enterprises  [SOEs],  behaves  according  to  the  rational  and  systematic  plan,  what  need  could  there be for law? The Russian Revolution had transferred theoretical questions of  the abolition of bourgeois law and state-run economy into practical matters . During 

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this period of War Communism (1917–1920) a blizzard of Decrees swept through  Bolshevik controlled organs of state leaving no part of the civil law untouched, as  mentioned . Many were repetitive and contradictory . However, this attempt to uproot commodity exchange brought widespread ruin . The concept of a transitional period, during which commodity exchange would   co-exist  within  a  civil  law  framework  and  state-run  economy,  was  developed  and  implemented as the New Economic Policy [NEP] (1921–1929) . During this period  even a Civil Code was developed for Russia and the new socialist state coexisted  uneasily with the partially reanimated private commodity market . However, as the  dominance of Pashukanis’ exchange theory in the 1920s showed, a future role for  the civil law in true communism remained barely a possibility – a role for law in true  communism was not even conceded in theory . But following collectivisation and  the shift to the central planning from 1929 onwards the NEP increasingly became a  thing  of  the  past .  The  Stalinist  Constitution  of  1936  and  Vyshinsky’s  1938  announcement of a new attitude to socialist civil law reflected a new reality, which  spelled the end of the original Marxian view that the law, including civil law, would  wither away together with market exchange . Iv PosT-revoluTIonary marxIsT legal THeory 4.1  PasHukanIs and tHe Hegemony of tHe PRIvate law Pashukanis’ theory of law rose to become the theory of the post-revolutionary time .  Pashukanis developed his theory in the General Theory of Law and Marxism (1923) . To  Pashukanis, any law was reliant upon the exchange of commodities, with bourgeois  law being the most developed system of law . Moreover, any law was for him civil  law . All economic relationships outside of commodity exchange between socialist  enterprises were not civil law relations but rather organisational “technique” . Pashukanis based his theory upon Marx’s thesis that capitalism is the most developed type  of commodity production . He argued that all law is bourgeois law . The Soviet law  was passing through the stage of “bourgeois law without a bourgeoisie” and would  gradually  disappear .210  In  the  period  immediately  after  the  Revolution  the  rapid  achievement of a classless society still seemed possible but with the introduction of  the NEP the traditional “bourgeois” forms of law had resurfaced for a time .211 The  main social relation reflected in the bourgeois form of law was ownership .212 For  Pashukanis, the logics of legal concepts corresponded to the logics of the social relations of a commodity producing society .213 As he saw it, the basic premise of legal  relations  was  the  presence  of  a  monetary  commodity  economy,  where  clashes  of  210  K . Zweigert & H . Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, tr . Weir, T ., North-Holland Publishing Co, Amsterdam, 1977, Vol . 1, 297 . 211  Lc  . 212  Pashukanis, Theory of Law and Marxism, in Soviet Legal Philosophy (note 191), 138 . There is also  another English translation of Pashukanis’ work: see note 159 . 213  Pashukanis (note 191), 149 . Capacity to act (Handlungsfähigkeit) by means of legal action is derived from a capacity to have rights (Rechtsfähigkeit) – to be a subject with rights and obligations  (lc, 165; 165 n . 74) . 

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interests  brought  to  life  the  legal  order,  or  superstructure .214  The  legal  order  was  distinguished from every other social order by being based upon private isolated  subjects .215 Pashukanis distinguished “objective” law and “subjective” rights, as external authoritarian regulation and internal framework of private autonomy respectively .216  To Pashukanis, subjective right, rooted in material interest and existing independently of external regulation, is the primary sense of law .217 He saw the attempt to  make the idea of external regulation the basic logical element of law as leading to  identification of law with the social order as imposed by the authority .218 Subjective  rights concern the private interests of members of civil society, while objective law  expresses  the  universal  interest  of  the  whole .219  To  Pashukanis  the  dichotomy  of   subjective  right  and  objective  law  corresponded  to  the  dichotomy  of  private  and  public law .220 To him, public law could either exist as a reflection of private law form  in the sphere of the political organisation or cease to be law .221 A characteristic feature  of  bourgeois  society  was  a  separation  and  opposition  of  general  and  private  interests .222 To Pashukanis, disappearance of the divergence of individual and social  interests in society would necessarily bring about disappearance of the legal form so  that  a  “norm”  would  become  merely  a  “rule”  of  organisation .223  To  him,  a  legal  power, or law, could not exist without a private interest .224 Morality, law and state  were, to Pashukanis, the forms of bourgeois society .225 The social man of the future,  who must for a time co-exist with the moral man, will eventually merge his ego with  the collective, liberated from all private property relations with the final re-education of mankind in a spirit of communism .226 Pashukanis denied the possibility of a “social” theory of law that would respond  to the interests of the proletariat .227 The seizure of political authority by the proletariat was a fundamental prerequisite for socialism .228 However, to replace market  exchange and to move to production and distribution through planned organisation would take time .229 Until then, as long as the market bond between individual  entrepreneurs and groups of enterprises remained in force, the form of law would  continue to exist .230 Meanwhile, the “production programs” and plans, as expressions of administrative-technical direction or instruction, were to co-exist with the  214  Lc, 147 . 215  Lc, 153 . 216  Lc, 150, making reference for Duguit . 217  Lc, 152 . 218  Lc, 153 . 219  Lc, 154  . 220  Lc, 154–155 . 221  Lc, 156 . 222  Lc, 156 . 223  Lc, 156 . 224  Lc, 158 . 225  Lc, 201 . 226  Lc, 201 .  227  Lc, 177 . 228  Lc, 177 . 229  Lc, 177–178 . 230  Lc, 178 .

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framework and rules of legal intercourse between autonomous subjects governed by  the civil code, courts, boards of arbitration and so on .231 Pashukanis conceded that  the production program might be seen as a sort of a public law norm, having its  origin in state authority, having a power to create rights and obligations, thus, taking  on the form of a force alien to man and standing above him .232 Still he added, under  the  proletarian  dictatorship,  irrespective  of  market  exchange,  the  real  contrast  of  interests  was  abolished  in  nationalised  industry  and  the  autonomy  of  individual  economic units was preserved merely as method, with quasi private-enterprise relations confined within the limits determined by the success attained in the sphere of  planned construction .233 The most noted legal positivist of the 20th century, Kelsen,  challenged the notion that private law is the one true law, as advanced by Pashukanis, as well as some German jurists before him .234 Pashukanis’ theory of law and Marxism lost favour in the early 1930s . Pashukanis attempted to adjust to the new reality in which, despite the apparent fading  away of commodity exchange, neither the state nor its law were withering away . He  had no choice but to discard the crucial building blocks of his theory . Despite Pashukanis’ prognoses, the shrinking of economic relations based on private property  and exchange resulted not in waning of legislative activity but rather in booming  regulation of economic relations between state enterprises .235 In 1930 Pashukanis  was forced to admit as a mistake his identification of the bourgeois state with “the  state”, in contrast to the view that it is only one of the forms of state .236 He accepted  that  even  decisive  victory  by  one  class  would  not  result  in  disappearance  of  the  state . In the case of victory by exploitative classes, the state would be needed even  more to secure their dominance, while in the case of victory by the proletariat, the  state would be preserved temporarily as the most important means of building socialism .237 Another vulnerable aspect of Pashukanis’ theory was his disapproval of soviet  or proletarian law . In 1930 he was still holding fast to his denial of what he regarded  as a meaningless concept, “proletarian law”, arguing that the transitional period did  not constitute a special social-economic stage, so did not have a corresponding special state of law .238 He allowed that with disappearance of contractual relations law  would not immediately end; so pure organisational “technique” would take its place  only alongside law, keeping pace with disappearance of the division of labour, the  antithesis of intellectual and physical labour, the conflict of individual and common interests and state coercion .239 Pashukanis conceded that the legislation for the  transitional period should possess maximum elasticity as the structure of the pro231  Lc, 178–179 . 232  Lc, 179 In the 1923 edition of the work Pashukanis even used the expression “proletarian state  capitalism” (lc, 179 n . 98) . 233  Lc, 179–180 . 234  Hans Kelsen, The Communist Theory of Law, Stevens & Sons Limited, London,1955, 95 235  O .S . Ioffe, Izbrannye trudy po instorii grazhdanskogo prava: Iz istorii tsivilicheskoi mysli, Statut, Moscow, 2000; http://civil .consultant .ru/elib/books/3/page_25 .html . 236  Pashukanis, The Soviet State and the Revolution in Law, in: Soviet Legal Philosophy (note 191),  263–264 . 237  Lc, 264–265 . 238  Lc, 269–271 . 239  Lc, 273 .

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duction relations continued to be transformed through the medium of proletarian  policy .240 To him, now tellingly, policy was above law, with the policy shaping the  law .241 In this context he seemed to use “policy” interchangeably with “state” . When  Stuchka asked him about “revolutionary legality”, referring to collectivisation; he  replied that the problem was mainly a political one .242 In the 1930s Pashukanis also denied a distinction between private and public  law under socialism, since no limitation on state intervention in any sphere of economic  activity  could  be  contemplated .243  In  a  sense,  Pashukanis  was  true  to  his  former views . Socialist law is not a form of law as he had previously defined it after  all; it is merely a tool of party policy clothed as a compulsory legal norm . Still, it was  an  undisguised  shift  to  legal  positivism  in  a  crude  form:  whatever  the  sovereign  willed to be a law would be the law, with public law swallowing private law .  Pashukanis’ attempt to remain faithful to the early Marxist notion of law had no  chance of success . Still, his boldness in pressing his view, that beyond the realm of  civil law there was no law, was remarkable . Accordingly, private commodity producers and state owned enterprises held similar civil law rights within a market framework . Even his “perverse” position of the 1930s, that Soviet law was merely the party  directives, was simply a radical manifestation of his view of civil law as the only immutable legal framework . v ConClusIon We have followed the disintegration of the Enlightenment natural law vision of law  as preponderantly the civil or private law . This process was paralleled across the 19th  and 20th centuries by strengthening of the role of the public law and institutions  amid growing adulation of the state . These trends strongly influenced Marxist theory and shaped the Soviet legal model . We have observed this progression through  three main themes . First, we traced the historical ascendancy of the civil law: from the Commentators’ assimilation of Roman law into the feudal law and consequent emergence of  the ius commune, progressing through the emergence of humanism, and culminating  in the rise of modern natural law . The main legacy of natural law theory was in making individual humans and their natural rights the basis of legal analysis . This analysis  demarked  the  civil  law  as  an  autonomous  sphere  of  relations  between  private  individuals . Our second theme was the decline of the natural law paradigm in the 19th century . We noted that the legislative expression of the civil law in the “natural law”  national Civil Codes paradoxically undermined the natural law paradigm by placing  240  Lc, 279 . 241  Lc, 280 . 242  Lc, 280 . The exchange between Pashukanis and Stuchka was about the enforcement of collectivisation, with Stuchka expressing concern about the methods used . Following the theorising  and politics that surrounded the drafting of the 1936 Constitution, Pashukanis was compelled  to denounce himself, declared a parasite on the people in a process initiated by Vyshinsky and  executed: N . Reich, Sozialismus und Zivilrecht (note 206), 255–262 . 243  Lc, 330 .

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Murray Raff / Anna Taitslin

the civil law under the authority of public institutions and law . This supplanting of  the role of the civil law by public law was accompanied by rising power of the state  and decline in the standing of civil law key principles . Re-orientation toward the  public sphere displaced the enforcement of civil law rights between private subjects  on the horizontal social plane, leading to a new enthusiasm for top-down public  regulation and bureaucratisation, in pursuit of which, for example, the idea of public law regulation of property became almost commonplace by the end of the 19th  century . In the third theme we have seen that progressive theory of the state and public  rights  and  institutions,  from  the  pens  of  Ihering,  Jellinek  and  Duguit,  also  influenced Marxism, Renner being one example . The early Marxian vision adopted the  perception of the private-public law divide that was implicit in the Hegelian vision,  itself strongly influenced by the 18th century natural law identification of social relations with civil law relationships . The Marxist identification of bourgeois law with  civil law meant the end of bourgeois law and inevitably the end of law itself, and ultimately the end of the state . When private law was seen to be firmly set in place as  the paradigm for all law, socialist reformers had no choice but to proclaim their opposition to law as such when critiquing the conservative legal basis of 19th century  European social hierarchy . Chicherin prophetically noted that positivism had conveniently  paved  the  way  for  attempts  to  use  law  for  socialist  purposes .  With  the  advent of legal positivism the reformers saw the possibility of advancing public law  against the private law realm . The contradiction of, on one hand, achieving a true communist society without  a state or laws and, on the other hand, centralising industry in the hands of the state  for  the  victorious  proletariat,  was  relieved  by  the  idea  of  a  transitional  phase  in  which the centralised economy would give way to true communist society . Historically, this contradiction haunted the Bolshevik revolutionaries until, under Stalin,  the dominance of the state and public control were assured . In the early years the  Bolshevik revolutionary government set out to assemble a socialist legal system, on  which there was virtually no guidance in the writings of Marx and Engels . The period of War Communism (1917–1920) saw the most radical efforts to abolish civil  law altogether . Encouraged by the New Economic Policy of the early 1920s, Pashukanis  sought  to  revive  the  early  Marxian  vision  of  law  as  civil  law  to  be,  in  due  course,  supplanted  by  technocratic  organisational  technique .  This  vision  became  unsustainable with the rapid transition to a centrally planned economy in the 1930s .  The new Soviet orthodoxy of the 1930s took up the legal positivist definition of law  as a system of state engendered norms . The Soviet legal tradition embraced with vengeance the continental legal trend  toward expansion of public law . The result was severe curtailment of the role of the  civil law and disproportionate reliance on public law planning, directives and regulations . Although the early ambition to abolish civil law failed, Soviet civil law remained  deficient  in  the  Soviet  legal  model  that  emerged .  Transplantation  of  the  Soviet legal model to the newly declared socialist states of the post-war period generated the fundamental challenge of a deficient private law sphere in Eastern Europe .  This has implications for priority setting in post-Soviet transition with respect to  rebuilding capacity for horizontal enforcement of the law between private citizens  within the paradigm of the civil law and its institutions .

auTHors E . Irem Aki Ankara University Faculty of Law Cebeci 06590 Ankara Turkey E-mail: iremaki@gmail .com Thomas Bustamante Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais Faculdade de Direito Avenida João Pinheiro, 100 Belo Horizonte, MG CEP 30 .130-180 Brazil E-mail: thomas_bustamante@yahoo .com .br Pompeu Casanovas UAB Institute of Law and Technology Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Cerdanyola del Vallès 08193 Barcelona  Spain E-mail: pompeu .casanovas@uab .cat Marcos Vinício Chein Feres Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora Faculdade de Direito Campus Universtiário, s/n Martellos Juiz de Fora, MG CEP 36 .036-900 Brazil  E-mail: mvchein@gmail .com Prof . Carla Faralli CRSFIL Universtià di Bologna Via Galliera, 3 I-40121 Bologna Italy E-mail: carla .faralli@unibo .it

190 Denis Franco Silva Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora Faculdade de Direito Campus Universtiário, s/n Martellos Juiz de Fora, MG CEP 36 .036-900 Brazil E-mail: denisfrancosilva@yahoo .com .br José Manuel López Cobo playence KG Penthouse office Soho II – Top 1 Grabenweg 68 6020 Innsbruck Austria E-mail: ozelin .lopez@playence .com Prof . Dr . iur . Klaus Mathis University of Lucerne  Frohburgstrasse 3 P .O . Box 4466 CH-6002 Luzern Tel . +41 (0)41 229 53 80 Fax +41 (0)41 229 53 97 E-mail: klaus .mathis@unilu .ch Prof . Akihiko Morita Shokei Gakuin University 2-2-11-103 Tomioka Urayasu Chiba  279-0021 Japan Tel/fax 81-47-381-4337 E-mail: a_morita@shokei .ac .jp Oche Onazi University of Dundee School of Law Dundee DD1 4HN United Kingdom E-mail: o .onazi@dundee .ac .uk

Authors

Authors

Marta Poblet ICREA Researcher UAB Institute of Law and Technology Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Cerdanyola del Vallès 08193 Barcelona  Spain  E-mail: marta .poblet@uab .cat Murray Raff Faculty of Law Building 6 University of Canberra ACT 2601 Australia E-mail: Murray .Raff@canberra .edu .au Jacob Dahl Rendtorff Department of Communication, Business and Information Technologies Roskilde University, Denmark Email: jacrendt@ruc .dk Álvaro Filipe Oxley Rocha PPGCCRIM – PUCRS Av . Ipiranga, 6681, P .11, sala 1030 Porto Alegre – RS – BRAZIL E-mail: alvaro .rocha@pucrs .br Anna Taitslin Faculty of Law Building 6 University of Canberra ACT 2601 Australia E-mail: Anna .Taitslin@canberra .edu .au Prof . Sandra Tugnoli Pàttaro Universtià di Bologna Dipartamento di Filosofia Via Zamboni 38 40126 Bologna Italy E-mail: sandra .tugnoli@unibo .it

191

192 Alberto Vespaziani Università degli Studi del Molise – Facoltà di Economia Corso di Laurea Magistrale in Scienze Politiche e di Governo via Mazzini, 8 86170 – Isernia, Italia tel: (+39) 0865478909 fax: (+39) 0865478929 email: alberto .vespaziani@unimol .it Wojciech Zaluski Jagiellonian University Bracka Street 12, 31-005 Krakow Poland E-mail: zaluskiwojciech@gmail .com Cheng Zhaoyang School of Law Yantai University Yantai 264005 China E-mail: unclesam0506@sina .com

Authors

The book comprises a selection of papers delivered at the 24th IVR World Congress, divided into four sections. The first, Human Rights and Justice in a Global Perspective, centres on the problems of the foundation of Human Rights and the legitimacy of Political Power. The second deals with Public Policy, Economics and Social Rights. In the section called Law, Language and Literature the focus is on the multiple ways in which Law can relate to language, discourses and literature. The fourth and final section analyses some of the recent Transformations in Legal Dogmatics and in Private Law.

These topics are all of capital importance in contemporary societies, which reflect the complexity of pluralism and the increasing expansion and transformation of the law, which no longer seems to be comprehensible by a merely positivistic model of the “sources of lawʮ. In order to understand the nature of law and the requirements to interpret it as well as to adjust it to the needs of contemporary states and communities, a theorist or analyst needs to embark on an interdisciplinary approach, which can be found in all of the essays in this volume.

www.steiner-verlag.de Franz Steiner Verlag

ISBN 978-3-515-10082-3