Housing and Domestic Abuse: Policy into Practice 9781003002055

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Housing and Domestic Abuse

Housing and Domestic Abuse provides an analysis of how housing policy has been historically utilised in responding to domestic abuse. The authors trace the history of policy from the feminist roots of the refuge movement to the use of ‘anti-social behaviour’ legislation to address abuse, and the current proposals are being considered. The UK Government and devolved governments in Scotland and Wales are currently making significant changes to the ways they address domestic abuse, including involving housing policy in their responses. This book provides details of the differential approaches of the Scottish and Welsh Governments and proposes a ‘whole housing approach’ to addressing abuse. Readers will gain a detailed knowledge of historic and current policy and practice in this area. They will also benefit from insights from two of the leading scholars in their respective fields of housing and domestic abuse policy and practice. This book will be of interest to academics, policy makers and practitioners across the fields of housing and domestic abuse policy and practice as well as students studying social policy more broadly. Yoric Irving-Clarke is a policy and practice officer for the Chartered Institute of Housing and author of Supported Housing: Past, Present and Future (2019). Kelly Henderson is Co-founder of the Domestic Abuse Housing Alliance (DAHA) and Honorary Research Fellow at Durham University.

Routledge Advances in Sociology



Housing and Domestic Abuse

Policy into Practice

Yoric Irving-Clarke and Kelly Henderson

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 Yoric Irving-Clarke and Kelly Henderson The right of Yoric Irving-Clarke and Kelly Henderson to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in- Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in- Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978 - 0 -367- 43249-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978 -1- 003- 00205-5 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by codeMantra

Yoric dedicates this book to C, T and my family. Kelly dedicates this book to V and my family. Both authors dedicate this book to all survivors of, and those who have sadly lost their lives to domestic abuse

Contents

Acknowledgements

ix

PART 1

Putting the book in context 1 Introduction 2 Implementation and isomorphism

1 3 10

PART 2

The history of housing domestic abuse policy in Great Britain

27

3 Feminism and the early refuges

29

4 The conservatives, new labour and domestic abuse policy

35

5 Current proposals – a return to specialism?

55

PART 3

Domestic abuse and wider housing policy issues

71

6 (Social) housing policy and domestic abuse

73

7 Housing policy – wider contexts

86

8 Scotland and Wales – the (dis) United Kingdom

118

9 The impact of housing providers on women experiencing abuse

133

viii Contents PART 4

Industry responses

163

Appendix 1: Useful resources and information Index

179 181

Acknowledgements

Yoric would like to thank Dr Peter King for his continued support and helpful comments on early drafts and colleagues at CIH and DAHA who have wittingly or unwittingly contributed to the book through their writings and/ or conversations. Finally, thanks to Cheri, Tash and my family for their love, and support with all that I do. Kelly would like to thank DAHA and all my supportive colleagues at the Centre for Research Into Violence and Abuse (CRiVA).

Part 1

Putting the book in context

Chapter 1

Introduction

In March 2018, both authors attended a seminar organised by the Department of Criminology at the University and Essex and the Chartered Institute of Housing (CIH) on the role of housing policy in addressing domestic abuse. There were papers from a wide range of academics and practitioners on the various ways that housing policy can and should be used to address abuse. One thing became apparent during the day, there, is much valuable research being done into this, but often in criminology or sociology departments or practitioners, and on individual aspects of the response. There is very little research being done within housing departments or organisations, Henderson (2019) being an honourable exception. This is despite ‘housing’ being a key site of perpetration of abuse, and housing providers, especially social housing providers, being ideally situated to identify and respond to domestic abuse. This book is an attempt to remedy this situation by placing responses to domestic abuse within a ‘housing policy’ context. Over the last 40 years, there has been increasing awareness of domestic abuse as a social issue (Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Pizzey, 1974; Walby, 2002). It is widely acknowledged that feminists have worked tirelessly to transform domestic abuse from a ‘private matter’ into a social issue which now is to varying degrees on the agenda of local, national and international governments (Hague & Malos, 2005). One of the concerns of the feminist movement in the 1970s was the need for safe, emergency accommodation in recognition that domestic abuse was a legitimate reason for homelessness and that housing was a particular issue to women fleeing domestic abuse (Binney et al, 1981; Mama, 1989). This continues to be an important issue today. Whilst housing is understood to be a key issue for victims, much of the discourse and research has focused on safe, emergency and ultimately temporary accommodation to enable women to leave abusive homes, with little discourse on permanent homes or the role of registered providers in recognising and responding to domestic abuse. Housing is an important factor in responding to domestic abuse in several ways, for example, at crisis point in providing emergency, safe accommodation, housing providers understanding the signs of abuse; to the impact on

4  Putting the book in context

feelings of safety, feeling settled and the impact this can have on recovery. Whilst there is now some awareness of the role of housing in responding to domestic abuse, it remains the case that many interventions over recent years have tended to focus primarily on the criminal justice system (CJS). However, as Harne and Radford (2008) point out that the needs of victims of abuse are multi-faceted with only a few of those needs falling into the remit of the CJS; whilst Holder (2001) highlights that legal sanctions alone are not the answer, arguing that the CJS whilst is a resource is not a solution. Research has consistently shown that housing is a key resource enabling women to end violence from partners and ex-partners, and that a major reason why women stay in or return to violent relationships is lack of access to safe, long-term, independent, affordable accommodation (Charles, 1994; Hague & Malos, 1993; Mooney, 1994; Pahl, 1985). For Dobash and Dobash (1992) housing is crucial, The importance of housing cannot be overestimated it ranks as one of the crucial factors affecting women’s ability to find viable alternatives to a violent relationship. (p. 61) The position of social housing within the welfare state has become increasingly ambiguous over previous decades with an ideological shift from public to private provision and management. The increasing residualisation of social housing defined by Malpass and Murie (1990) has resulted in public housing providing a safety net for those because of poverty, age or infirmity are unable to secure accommodation that is suitable in the private sector meaning that it is often seen as the tenure of last resort. Linking this concept of the ‘tenure of last resort’ to victims of domestic abuse further reduces their “space for action” (Kelly, 2003) and makes it crucial that housing providers are able to recognise and respond to domestic abuse effectively, to support women to stay in their home or move to a new home or place of safety that meets their needs. Women and children feel reluctant at having to move home away from family, schools and other support networks into temporary accommodation and frequently to a new area because of the perpetrator’s behaviour (Abrahams, 2007; Saunders, 1995). Indeed, they often feel a sense of injustice at having to contemplate such a move as a result of their partner’s abusive behaviour (Bossey & Coleman, 2000). This especially impacts upon women who may already face financial barriers meaning that housing choice is an issue of real concern – in some areas, the scarcity of social housing means the possibility of losing or must relinquish a social (secure) housing tenancy to move to place of safety, further compounded by the problem of women fleeing domestic abuse being forced to live in sub-standard temporary or private-rented accommodation (O’Campo et  al., 2015). Whilst previous studies (Scottish Women’s Aid, 2015; Solace Women’s Aid, 2014)

Introduction 5

have primarily focused on women presenting as homeless as a result of domestic abuse and on help seeking, they have not focused specifically on their experiences of support or help seeking from a housing provider. The current cross-government Violence against Women and Girls (VAWG) strategy (VAWG) (Home Office, 2010) and Action Plan (HM Government, 2013) highlighted four key areas of focus to the Government’s cross-cutting response to VAWG; these are on outcomes across prevention, provision, protection and justice. The Plan sets out clear actions for a range of sectors including criminal justice and health, but included none for the housing sector. In fact, the whole of the 27-page document makes only one passing reference to housing, in the context that many victims do not report to police and may want to access support from other sources; including housing. This strongly suggests that the wider role of housing was overlooked at that time with no convergence of the two policy areas. The updated VAWG Strategy (2016–20) (HM Government, 2016) does at least refer to housing as part of the chapter entitled ‘Partnership Working’ (p. 38). Regrettably improved access to housing and an improved recognition and response to domestic abuse by housing providers is still not highlighted as one of the outcomes for 2020 despite over nine million people living in social housing (over 3.9 million households) in England alone (MHCLG, 2017). The Conservative governments elected in 2015 and 2017 headed by Theresa May as Prime Minister introduced a domestic abuse bill to parliament and made proposals to introduce new funding and strategic planning processes for housing and support for women experiencing abuse. Following a third general election in 2019, the incumbent government (headed by Prime Minister, Boris Johnson) has committed to passing the bill into law (the second reading of the bill was heard in Parliament in May 2020 and is going through the committee stage at the time of writing) and continuing with the changes to the funding and administrative changes (these are both covered in detail later in the book). It is also true that since the devolution of powers to governments in Wales and Scotland, these countries have pursued very different legislative and policy courses to England, and indeed, to each other. These differences are also covered in detail in a later chapter.

Defining domestic abuse For clarity, we accept and use the current cross-government definition of domestic violence and abuse. Our focus throughout the book is in relation to intimate partner domestic abuse. The Government defines domestic abuse, controlling behaviour and coercive behaviour as follows: Any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive, threatening behaviour, violence or abuse between those aged 16 or over who are,

6  Putting the book in context

or have been, intimate partners or family members regardless of gender or sexuality. The abuse can encompass, but is not limited to: • • • • •

Psychological Physical Sexual Financial Emotional

The current definition defines controlling behaviour as: Controlling behaviour is a range of acts designed to make a person subordinate and/or dependent by isolating them from sources of support, exploiting their resources and capacities for personal gain, depriving them of the means needed for independence, resistance and escape and regulating their everyday behaviour. And coercive behaviour as: An act or a pattern of acts of assault, threats, humiliation and intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, punish, or frighten their victim. Whilst the current definition focuses on a pattern of behaviour, the Government proposes to not limit the definition so that a single incident could prevent action being taken in what appears to be a one-off. The VAWG Strategy (Home Office, 2010) and action plan (HM Government, 2016) establish the gendered nature of domestic violence. The Domestic Abuse Bill (HM Government, 2019), before Parliament at the time of writing, gives the following definition expected to pass into law during 2020. Domestic abuse is defined as occasions where behaviour by a person (“A”) towards another person (“B”) if: a b c d e f g

A and B are each aged 16 or over and are ‘personally connected’, and the behaviour is abusive behaviour is “abusive” if it consists of any of the following physical or sexual abuse violent or threatening behaviour controlling or coercive behaviour economic abuse (any behaviour that has a substantial adverse effect on B’s ability to acquire, use or maintain money or other property or obtain goods or services psychological, emotional or other abuse

The bill also makes clear that A’s behaviour may be behaviour ‘towards B’, despite the fact that it consists of conduct directed at another person (for example, B’s child).

Introduction 7

For the purposes of the Act, two people are ‘personally connected’ if any of the following applies a b c d e f g

They are, or have been, married to each other They are, or have been, civil partners of each other They have agreed to marry one another (whether or not the agreement has been terminated) They have entered into a civil partnership agreement (whether or not the agreement has been terminated) They are, or have been, in an intimate personal relationship with each other There is a child in relation to whom they each have a parental relationship They are relatives

Governments in both Scotland and Wales have placed their own definitions within their own legislation – these definitions are given and discussed in a dedicated chapter.

Structure The book is structured into four parts with several component chapters within each part. Part 1 comprises this introduction to the book and the following chapter setting out a framework the analysis of policy herein. Part 2 comprises three parts looking at the histories of (social) housing policy and the history of refuge provision from the early feminist model of refuges and then the changes wrought to the sector by the policies of various governments from the 1970s to the present day. These chapters are intended to provide both a narrative of the development of the sector and context to the third part of the book. Part 3 covers the several aspects of housing policy that affect people experiencing abuse, the differential policies relating to domestic abuse in Scotland and Wales and current proposals for housing and domestic abuse. The book closes by detailing several sector responses to the issue of domestic abuse, including a blueprint for the future of housing provision for people experiencing abuse. The ‘Whole Housing Approach’ to domestic abuse has been formulated by organisations across the housing and domestic abuse sectors with leadership from the Domestic Abuse Housing Alliance (DAHA). The housing policy response to domestic abuse has been brought into sharp focus in recent years by the campaigning work of (now former) presidents of the CIH, Alison Inman, OBE and James Strang, and CIH’s resulting ‘Make a Stand’ campaign (see CIH, 2017, 2020). This has been alongside the work of the ‘Domestic Abuse Housing Alliance’ (of which Kelly Henderson is a founder) in raising the profile of housing policy in addressing domestic abuse and providing an accreditation framework for housing providers to measure how they recognise and respond to domestic abuse. It is the context

8  Putting the book in context

of these developments that we think that this book is both a timely and substantive addition to both the literature and discussion around this literally lifesaving subject. Yoric Irving-Clarke & Kelly Henderson May 2020

References Abrahams, H. (2007) Supporting Women after Domestic Violence, Loss, Trauma and Recovery, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, London. Binney, V et  al. (1981) Leaving Violent Men: A Study of Refuges and Housing for Battered Women, Women’s Aid Federation, Bristol. Bossey, J. & Coleman, S. (2000) Womenspeak: Parliamentary Domestic Violence ­Internet Consultation, Women’s Aid Federation of England, Bristol. Charles, N. (1994) The housing needs of women and children escaping domestic violence, Journal of Social Policy, 23(4) pp. 456–87. CIH (2017) Make a Stand, CIH, Coventry. CIH (2020) How to … Make a Stand, CIH, Coventry. Dobash, R.E. & Dobash, R. (1979) Violence against Wives: A Case against the Patriarchy, The Free Press, London. Dobash, R.E. & Dobash, R. (1992) Women, Violence and Social Change, Routledge, London. Hague, G. & Malos, E. (1993) Domestic violence, social policy and housing, Critical Social Policy 14(42) pp. 112–25. Hague, G. & Malos, E. (2005) Domestic Violence: Action for Change, New Clarion Press, Gretton. Harne, L. & Radford, J. (2008) Tackling Domestic Violence: Theories, Policies and Practice, McGraw Hill, New York. Henderson, K. (2019) The Role of Housing in a Coordinated Community Response to Domestic Abuse, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Durham. HM Government (2013) A Call to End Violence against Women and Girls, HMSO, London. HM Government (2016) Ending Violence against Women and Girls: Strategy 2016–2020, HMSO, London. Holder, R. (2001) Domestic and Family Violence: Criminal Justice Interventions: Issues Paper 3, Australian Domestic and Family Violence Clearing House, New South Wales. Home Office (2010) Call to End Violence against Women and Girls: Strategic Vision, HMSO, London. Kelly, L. (2003) The wrong debate: reflections on why force is not the key issue with respect to trafficking in women for sexual exploitation, Feminist Review 73 pp. 139–44. Malpass, P. & Murie, A. (1990) Housing Policy and Practice (3rd Edition), ­MacMillan, London. Mama, A. (1989) Violence against black women: gender, race and responses, Feminist Review 32(1) pp. 30–48.

Introduction 9 MHCLG (2017) English Housing Survey 2017, HMSO, London. Mooney, J. (1994) Violence, Space and Gender: The Social and Spatial Parameters of Violence against Women and Men, Middlesex University, London. O’Campo, P.O. et  al. (2015) Violence by male partners against women during the childbearing year: a contextual analysis, American Journal of Public Health 85(8) pp. 1092–97. Pahl (1985) Private Violence and Public Policy: The Needs of Battered Women and the Response of the Public Services, Routledge, London. Pizzey, E. (1974) Scream Quietly or the Neighbours Will Hear, Penguin Books, London. Saunders, D.G. (1995) Prediction of wife assault, in J.C. Campbell (ed.), Assessing Dangerousness: Violence by Sexual Offenders, Batterers, and Child Abusers, SAGE, Thousand Oaks, CA, pp. 68–95. Solace Women’s Aid (2014) Finding the Cost of Freedom, Solace Women’s Aid, London. Walby, S. (2002) Feminism in a global era, Economy and Society 31(4) pp. 533–57. Women’s Aid (2015) SOS: Save Refuges, Save Lives – Data Report on Specialist Domestic Violence Services in England, Women’s Aid, Bristol.

Chapter 2

Implementation and isomorphism

Policy implementation is far from an exact science, and policies are implemented for several reasons: to create change, to stifle change or to benefit or discriminate against some groups or individuals (Drake, 2001). This chapter examines several areas of theory in relation to the rest of the book; first, the various ways in which the implementation of policy has been theorised. From the top-down – government policy makers identify policy need and take action to effect change via both the government structures and policy networks. Bottom-up – where local staff delivering services create policy with their interactions with the public, and there is also a synthesis of the two, where policy makers can control the policy agenda and, to a degree, the implementation, but must also pay mind to events at the ‘coalface’ and allocate resources to those parts of the system that can have the greatest effect on the target group (see, for example, Elmore, 1980). Related to this discussion of implementation, there have also been important changes to the structures used to implement policy. In the years, post-Second World War until 1979, social policy was largely implemented via the organs of the state. Central and local authority housing, education and social security departments provided services to the public entirely under the control of government. Utilities, gas, water and electricity were also provided via government-managed corporations as were the railways. Mainly, since 1979, but before this as well, policy came to be delivered via networks of government, voluntary sector, charity and private organisations – this meant that the policy process became hugely more complex. As this has had major implications in the women’s sector and refuges (discussed later), there is also discussion about these changes. Finally, because the refuge sector has operated in a policy environment that funds and regulates organisations in similar ways, many organisations have come to look very similar in their management and governance structures to meet the funding and regulatory requirements. This is known as ‘organisational isomorphism’. We open then, with top-down implementation.

Implementation and isomorphism  11

The top-down approach Top-down implementation theories are useful in that they place government at the forefront of the process and in democracies (such as the UK). Why should policymakers not be able to control the actions of those charged with implementing policy? After all, it is the government who will be held to account should the policy fail and not those charged with implementing the policy. Top-down theorists see policy implementation as a process that starts with policy formulation at government level with those implementing policy (administrators) following through on policy intentions and delivering services that meet these intentions. Van Meter and Horn (1975) define the implementation process as: Those actions by public or private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions. (p. 445) Top-down thinkers emphasise the importance of separating formulation and implementation processes and then concentrate on what can go wrong between policy formulation and delivery of outputs and how policy makers can control this. Looking at implementation within the American federal system, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) spend much time analysing the extent to which implementation depends upon relationships at local level. They argue that even a small number of relationship breakdowns at this level can mean large deficits in the success of implementation; hence they introduce the idea of “implementation deficit”. Their prescription is that the degree of cooperation between implementing agencies must be close to perfect for implementation to be considered successful. Minimising this “implementation deficit” is the task in hand. Hood (1976) theorises that we can do this by: … thinking about what perfect administration would be like … perfect administration could be defined as a condition in which ‘external’ elements of resource availability and political acceptability combine with ‘administration’ to produce perfect policy implementation. (p. 6) Once this model is realised, we are then able to compare the reality of implementation systems in order to diagnose the ‘implementation deficits’ that Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) theorise. A good example of this approach is the 10 preconditions (summarised below) necessary to achieve the perfect implementation model set down by Gunn (1978) and revised by Hogwood and Gunn (1984).

12  Putting the book in context

Hogwood and Gunn’s (1984) pre-conditions for perfect implementation are as follows: • • • • • • • • • •

External circumstances do not pose any significant constraint to the implementing agency Adequate time and sufficient resources are available for the programme Combination of resources is actually available The actual policy is based upon a valid theory of cause and effect and isn’t irrational Relationship between cause and effect is direct with few/no intervening links Dependency on other agencies/organisations is minimal Understanding and agreement regarding objectives Tasks are fully specified in the correct sequence Perfect communication and co-ordination Perfect obedience – those in authority can demand and obtain perfect compliance

These ten preconditions are concerned with eliminating the implementation downfalls highlighted by both Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) and Hood (1976). However, it is not useful to think in such absolute terms, success or failure, perfection or imperfection. Policies by their very nature are complex and must interact with human beings, the most unpredictable of creatures. If the goal is to produce perfection, you will surely always fail and merely continue pulling processes apart and putting them back together in a fruitless attempt to achieve the unachievable. Whilst it is useful to have a model to compare implementation to in some regards, perfection is not that model and for that reason that suggested by Hogwood and Gunn (1984) has limitations. First, it champions the interests of policymakers over the interests of those implementing the policy. Although from an accountability point of view this may be desirable, it cannot really be believed that a small group of policy makers in government can understand the subtle complexities and issues of front-line practice and the interaction of the public with implementers/administrators. This approach is also open to criticism for its lack of flexibility in dealing with complex social issues. When it becomes apparent that a given policy is not working in the intended fashion, how can the process be amended without recourse to policy makers again? How long might this take and what guarantee is there that their subsequent attempts will fare any better? The “top-down” approach then identifies that policy implementation is imperfect and that there may be some pre-conditions necessary for success. It also has some significant weaknesses in that it oversimplifies the process into one of cause (input) and effect (output) and does not take into account

Implementation and isomorphism  13

the complexities of inter-relationships between government, implementers and those being acted upon (usually the public). Those studying implementation were beginning to move away from seeing top-down approaches as the norm and moving to towards another understanding of the process.

The bottom-up approach Top-down approaches had dominated thus far due to the prevalence of monolithic government departments being responsible for delivering policy objectives (in the UK at least), thus (theoretically) allowing a large (but not total) degree of control of implementation by political masters. However, in federal systems, such as the United States, policy was being implemented by a variety of agencies external to government. This section, therefore, looks at an approach that attempts to improve upon “top-down” approaches and bring a different perspective to bear. The bottom-up approach emphasises that those delivering policy on the ‘front line’ often does not behave in the ways desired or intended by their political masters and indeed often circumstances sometimes mean they are unable to do so. Lipsky (1980) puts forward a theory of “street level bureaucracy”. This states that people working on the front-line formulate policy in their interactions with the public, although he does not place the power of implementation totally in their hands. Instead, he sees those implementing policy on the ground or the “street level bureaucrats” as an alienated group (p. 76) and decisions made at street level as often being a result of coping mechanisms they are forced to employ as an overworked and underfunded workforce. Lipsky’s (1980) work makes the point that it is futile to study top-down implementation when greater efforts to control from the top only serve to frustrate those at the bottom and cause greater problems. Therefore, other ways are needed to secure the accountability and cooperation of those at street level, including the public that policy will ultimately affect. Even Wildavsky (cited in Hill, 1997) came to see that it was mistaken to think that implementers were working with something solid called a policy. This development is crucial as it introduces the idea that those delivering policy are more than just drones doing as they are told but play an active role in implementing policy and may also deliberately frustrate policy makers or subvert policy. Barrett and Fudge (1981a, 1981b, 1981c) developed Lipsky’s (1980) idea of policy being created at street level. They argue that studies of implementation must take account of the formal and informal relationships between implementing agencies and the actions of those at street level. Hjern (1982) acknowledges the role of wider networks in implementation and is keen to emphasise that the resources to implement policy do not only lie with government. He is also critical of hierarchical methods for implementing policy in that there is a difference between obtaining perfect obedience from implementers (as per Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979)

14  Putting the book in context

and delivering policy objectives – top downers tend to treat these as one and same. Likewise, Barrett and Fudge (1981a, 1981b, 1981c) acknowledge that compromise by policy makers can be a tool to deliver policy objectives, whereas top-downers would view such an action as a loss of control and therefore a failure. The ‘bottom-up’ approach then sees that implementation is necessarily complex and requires a much more nuanced and pragmatic approach to implementation than prescribed by the “top-down” school. The next section looks at the next development of implementation studies.

Synthesis A third school of thought has sprung from the two discussed above, perhaps inevitably, this next stage in the development of theories of implementation was an attempt to synthesise the top-down and bottom-up approaches taking the best of both and accepting that it was necessary to use both in order to make sense of essentially complex implementation processes. Theorists such as Lipsky (1980) and Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) questioned whether implementers were merely this or whether they were creating policy via their interactions with each other and the public. They also questioned where the policy process stopped, and the implementation process started and if they could even be separated in such a manner. The two are interlinked and influence one another in a circular relationship. Richard Elmore (1978, 1980) (the first of the synthesisers) took his cue from a study of the Cuban missile crisis (see Allison, 1971) and suggests that the study of complicated events requires the use of a more than one theoretical approach in order to understand what happens. Governments are in a position of authority and will necessarily attempt to impose their will via the policy process. The reality that implementation is complex and influenced by a wide variety of people and organisations, and that in any analysis, this cannot always be controlled by top-down edict. Elmore (1980) is critical of other theorists’ willingness to criticise but reticence to offer solutions. He attempts to remedy this by suggesting two models (Forward and Backward Mapping) through which policy makers can anticipate problems and take pro-active steps to avoid them. Forward mapping is essentially the top-down school of implementation. Elmore (1980) states that this is the process that “… most readily comes to mind when one thinks about how the policy maker might try to affect the implementation process” (p. 602). This model begins at the top of the process with a statement of intent from the policy maker(s) and then goes on to outline the regulations, administrative actions and division of responsibilities between actors necessary to implement the policy; each implementing agency would thus have a clearly defined mission. There would then be a stated outcome, usually in terms of an, “… observable effect on a target population, consistent with the initial purpose of the policy makers” (Elmore, 1980, p. 603).

Implementation and isomorphism  15

Backward Mapping is Elmore’s (1980) attempt to propose an alternative “… Backward Mapping is, in all important aspects, the opposite of Forward Mapping” (p. 604). It starts at the lowest possible level of the implementation structure (where administrative actions intersect with personal choices) with a statement of the specific behaviour that generates the need for a policy. Only once this is done does the analysis state a policy objective, this is given as a set of organisational operations and then as outcomes that will stem from these operations. The analysis then backs up through the implementation structure asking two questions at each level. • •

What is the ability of this unit to affect the behaviour that is the target of the policy? What resources does this unit require to have that effect?

The task of the policy maker is then to devise a policy that directs resources at the units likely to have the greatest effect. What Elmore (1980) is observing is the necessity to see implementation as something that happens at the front line without forgetting that policy makers have an interest in ensuring that they can influence outputs. Whilst Elmore (1980) acknowledges that there are both top-down and bottom-up pressures on implementation, his suggested model focuses on the allocation of resources rather than the achievement of objectives and that ‘policy’ is the best method of achieving objectives. As the ideas discussed suggest, over time, there has been a change in ideas about how policy can best be implemented. However, this has not happened in isolation but is inextricably linked to wider ideological changes in Government and social policy. The next section discusses some of these changes in so far as they apply to the subject in hand.

Government to governance & policy networks The ways in which public policy is implemented in Britain have changed. Weberian ideas about classical bureaucracy and accountability (government) faded, and theories about how government could set up and manipulate networks (governance) became the new orthodoxy. Rhodes (1997) notes that this move to a “differentiated polity” (p. 4) has been in train since 1945. Indeed, one can see that the “top-down” vs. “bottom-up” debate was very much the product of this change with the “top downers” seeing implementation in terms of government control of the implementation process whilst “bottom uppers” emphasised the role of policy networks and the influence of those delivering policy on the front line as important. Hill and Hupe (2002) note that these ideas are particularly important to the British experience as UK Government has a history of fostering policy networks in order to implement its policy goals – an attempt to deal with the problems seen by top-down theorists by putting continuity at the heart of

16  Putting the book in context

these relationships. Ideas about using policy networks to implement policy are welcome but ignore the fact that with fragmented structures to implement policy must come dispersed power to implement policy. Where Elmore (1980) mentions the distribution of resources, he should also address the distribution of power across networks. Policy processes are necessarily complex. Ripley and Franklyn (1982) regard policy deficits (see above) as inevitable and explore these implementation processes. They recognise that the implementation process is inevitably politicised and that this means the different players in the game have their own agendas and that although there is a flow from top to bottom, that interactions between implementers are neither hierarchically structured nor logical. Implementation processes involve many important actors holding diffuse and competing goals who work within a context of an increasingly large and complex mix of government programs that require participation from numerous layers and units of government and who are affected by powerful factors beyond their control. Ripley and Franklyn (1982, p. 9) These changes represent the change from government to governance. Or as Osbourne and Goebler (1992) put it “The transformation of the public sector involves less government (rowing) but more governance (steering)” (p. 34). Hill and Hupe (2002) offer several different definitions and types of governance from the basic to the complex but all agreeing that the basic definition is a super-system (as mentioned earlier) intended to deliver outcomes via a set of sub-systems. Hill and Hupe (2002) settle on the following definition from Milward and Provan (1999): Governance … is concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rules and collective action, often including agents in the private and non-profit sectors, as well as within the public sector. The essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms – grants, contracts, agreements – that do not rest solely on the authority and sanctions of government. Quoted in Hupe and Hill (2002, p. 3) This provides for (at least) two options regarding the changing role of the state (Newman, 2001). First, that the state has suffered a “hollowing out”, there has been a decline of the power of the state driven from above by globalisation causing reduced capacity for the state to control its own economy and from below as power structures become more fragmented and the power of the state is challenged. Alternatively, these same factors could be seen as state power being merged with non-state and non-public bodies; that the state operates a softer form of power in its relationships with non-governmental organisations by choosing how and when to support

Implementation and isomorphism  17

policy proposals arising from networks or by deciding when and how to use coordinating mechanisms or regulating interactions (Newman, 2001). The implications of policy networks for the students of implementation are clear. There is no longer a clear line of accountability between policy makers and service delivers (if there ever was!). Instead, there is a huge complex panoply of policy makers, statutory, voluntary and private sector service deliverers, think-tanks, politicians, service user groups and service users, regulators, funders and other interested parties that play a role in the delivery of services, in this case, supported housing/living services. The consequences of these changes are several. Hill and Hupe (2002) note a necessity to now distinguish between government and governance, structures and processes, institutions and activities and between locus and focus. This means that for the researcher looking at implementation, there is no longer a linear policy to delivery connection rather the multiplicity of actors means that relationships operate up, down and across networks, and therefore there is a need to define fairly precisely who they are looking at, what they are supposed to be doing and how this impacts upon the end service user in conceptualising any study or part thereof. Or as Hill and Hupe (2002) note, governance is now broadened into a “… multidisciplinary, multi-level and multi-focus exercise looking at a multiplicity of actors, loci and layers” (p. 16).

New public management Alongside, but connected to the changes described above, the election of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister in 1979 brought the monetarist theories of Milton Friedman (amongst others) to the political mainstream. Monetarist thinkers believed that public servants (and others) act in their own self-interest and that “public interest” or its wider ideology is a fallacy: the only true democracy being that of the market. Therefore, the use of a quasi-market-based mechanism to procure and manage public services could be used to ensure that public sector managers focused on the needs of consumers rather than themselves. Public Choice Theory developed as the underpinning idea behind Thatcher’s new polity. This theory relies on two key drivers; first, the consumer acting selfishly to fulfil their own needs/desires and exercising choice between services thus driving the “market”. The second driver would be created by Government imposing requirements and targets upon officials, thus driving them to act in their own self-interest in fulfilling these targets. As Seddon (2008) puts it, Public sector managers have a surrogate profit motive, a target that defines success, and the incentive to earn investment in their organisation and recognition among their peers. (p. 7)

18  Putting the book in context

Savage and Atkinson (2001) postulate that the “public choice” school paved the way for reform to public services across the world and never more so than in the UK noting Margaret Thatcher as one of the key protagonists of the theory. They go on to draw a direct parallel between public choice theory and the emergence of “New Public Management” (NPM) in the UK between 1979 and 1997. (They note the term New Public Management as having been coined by Pollitt (1990).) NPM was distinguishable from public administration in several key respects, first, and perhaps most importantly, it moved away from the thus far dominant ideas of Weberian bureaucracy where there is seen to be a direct line of accountability between elected politicians and their civil servants. The implementation process in the traditional model was governed by established rules and procedures that separate clearly personal interests from those of the role of the civil servant. Savage and Atkinson (2001) also cite the following sources as noting the key attributes of NPM. First, NPM pays greater attention to results or outputs and the personal responsibility of individual managers (from Hughes, 1999); it emphasises a move from tall hierarchies to flatter, more flexible and devolved management structures with more flexible terms of employment (from Horton and Farnham, 1999), institutional and individual objectives are clearly defined and include the establishment of key performance indicators against which to measure delivered outputs (from Horton and Farnham, 1999; Hughes, 1998). There is greater attention to economy, efficiency and effectiveness that includes a greater commitment to procedures such as market testing and compulsory competitive tendering (from Elcock, 1991; Hughes, 1998). Finally, there is a general commitment to reducing the role of the state in the disposal of gross national product and the provision of services in favour of privatised companies and the establishment of a market in areas previously viewed as the preserve of natural monopolies or public administrators (from Hughes, 1998; Massey, 1993). Rhodes (1997) identifies the following as key attributes: the introduction of management processes, standards and management of performance and incentive structures such as market competition to services, the disaggregation of bureaucracies and greater competition via contracting out, quasi-markets and consumer choice. These concepts are important to us as they informed the governmental approach to all services including refuges and the women’s sector. The approach is reflected in the move to create and fund housing associations in place of local authority (council) provision, a variety of charitable and other funding sources and a distinct regulatory regime for public services. In the 1990s, the Supporting People very clearly showed the move for local authorities from the role of provider to that of commissioner and regulator of services – this is discussed in detail later in the book. These changes meant that organisations providing services to women had to change to adapt to

Implementation and isomorphism  19

the new reality. The following section addresses one of the main consequences of those changes.

Organisational isomorphism In his work on the development of bureaucracy, Weber (1952, 1968) contends that the rationalist order under a capitalist mode of production had become an iron cage in which humanity was trapped. He considered bureaucracy such a powerful force in controlling the behaviour of people that once established would become irreversible. For Weber, the development of bureaucracy stemmed from three related causes: competition amongst capitalist firms in the marketplace, competition amongst states, leading to an increasing need for rulers to control the citizenry and bourgeois demands for equal protection under the law. He considered the ‘competitive marketplace’ the most important of these. In revisiting the ‘iron cage’, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) further contend that the rationalisation and bureaucratisation of corporations and the state are now complete but that organisations continue to look increasingly homogenous, driven not by the need for greater efficiency via rationalisation but by other factors. In short, over time, organisations look increasingly similar in structure, culture and output because they are operating in the same organisational environment. Later in this book, we contend that several of the processes described by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have attempted to shape the structure, culture and output of the refuge and ­women’s sector. This process of refuge providers becoming a ‘field’ or ‘sector’ is key to this process. Previous work on organisational isomorphism (Barnouw, 1966– 1968; DiMaggio, 1981; Katz, 1975; Tyack, 1974) has established the dominance of organisational models where an organisational field develops as a result of the activities of a set of diverse organisations. Not only do these organisations become increasingly homogenous; new entrants to the sector are also forced to comply once the field is established. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) define a field as “…those organisations that constitute a recognised area of institutional life”. Once a group of organisations is structured into a ‘field’, it becomes increasingly difficult for organisations and therefore the wider field to change. Indeed larger, older organisations are able to dominate their environment rather than adjusting to changes. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify that the best concept to explain this homogenisation is ‘isomorphism’. Hawley (1968) (quoted in DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 149) defines isomorphism thus, “…a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions”. This definition has been extended by Hannan and Freeman (1977) who argue that isomorphism occurs as sub-optimal organisational forms are ‘weeded out’ out the field or where decision-makers

20  Putting the book in context

learn which are the appropriate responses and change their decision-making accordingly. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) follow Meyer (1979) and Fennell (1980) in maintaining that there are two types of organisational isomorphism: competitive and institutional. Hannan and Freeman (1977) deal extensively with competitive isomorphism in this and other work. They explain that where free and open competition exists, organisations begin to resemble one another as they search for efficiency and legitimacy in the marketplace. This has some application to the refuge sector as it has become subject to some degree of market competition via government policy, in particular the results of the NHS and Community Care Act 1990 and Supporting People programme (see Irving-Clarke, 2019 for a full discussion). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) find that this does not present a full picture of these processes though and supplement the above with ‘institutional isomorphism’ which they attribute to Kanter (1972) and Aldrich (1979). The latter stating that as well as market and economic status, organisations must also compete for political and institutional legitimacy for social as well as economic fitness. This can help us understand the politics and ceremony that “…pervade much modern organisational life” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 150). This could be said to be evident in the ways that small women’s sector providers have been forced to adopt the cultural, social and bureaucratic norms of larger housing associations and group structures to gain legitimacy within those structures and the wider sector. Mechanisms of isomorphic change DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify three mechanisms of change, coercive, mimetic and normative. Coercive change occurs as a result of formal and informal pressures from other organisations in the field or cultural pressures from the wider society. In some cases, this type of change is a result of direct government mandate e.g. environmental laws, accountancy rules or health and safety laws and regulations. This would apply, for example, to refuges providers changing their organising structures and principles to meet fire regulations and therefore secure legitimacy from local authorities. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) point out that such changes may sometimes be only ceremonial in nature, but that does not mean that they are inconsequential. They also state that common legal (and regulatory structures) has a profound effect upon organisations. Weber (in DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) pointed out the profound effects of contract law on organisational behaviour. Other considerations such as accounting and budget cycles also have an effect. Witness how many organisations change their accounting year to meet with the official April to March year, even though there is no legal requirement to do so. These politically constructed environments have two key features (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). First, that the politicians making

Implementation and isomorphism  21

the decisions are not faced directly with the consequences of them, and political decisions are often applied across the board to entire classes of organisation, thus making such decision-making less flexible and less adaptable. Such influences can also be seen beyond the government level, for example, Sedlak (1981) documents how the United Charities (in the United States) homogenised the structures, methods and philosophies of the social services agencies that relied on them for support. The same can certainly be argued in the UK context with reference to charities such as Comic Relief and the National Lottery in relation to the refuge sector. Likewise, Coser et al. (1982) state that subsidiary organisations are commonly subject to the standardised reporting mechanisms of parent companies and group structures. Mimetic processes Coercion is not the only force that can cause isomorphic processes. March and Olsen (1976) found that uncertainty can also play a major role, when goals are ambiguous or where the operating environment creates uncertainty, and organisations may model themselves on other organisations that they perceive to be dealing with the environment more successfully. This can provide a viable solution with little expense (Cyert and March, 1963). This modelling may be done intentionally, or aspects of organisational structure or culture may be diffused by transfer of staff (probable in a relatively closed sector such as refuges), or by use of consultancy firms or industry association. The housing sector has relied heavily on the use of (management) consultants in recent years and a plethora of trade bodies exist (e.g. National Housing Federation, National Federation of ALMOs, Chartered Institute of Housing, etc.). The sector also has significant crossover with other professional bodies such as CIPD for HR, the Health and Safety Executive and the Charities Commission, that may drive mimetic processes. Despite the constant search for diversity, there is little to be found. New organisations model themselves after the old across the economy, and managers constantly seek examples on which to model their operations (Kimberly, 1980). Although, in the years, since the emergence of new technologies and resulting start-ups, e.g. Apple, Google or Amazon (now major concerns) may challenge this assertion, not to mention near ubiquitous talk of ‘disruptors’. As Dimaggio and Powell (1983) observe, organisations tend to model themselves after similar organisations they perceive to be more successful or legitimate. Normative processes These processes stem mainly from professionalisation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), a process that has unquestionably occurred in the women’s sector. Following Larson (1977) and Collins (1979), Dimaggio and Powell define

22  Putting the book in context

this as the process of members of the profession to define the conditions and methods of their work – to control the “production of producers” (Larson, 1977, pp. 49–52) and to “…establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy” (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 152). The increasing professionalisation of the women’s (and other) sector(s) has bound up the success of individuals with the organisations that employ them, thus rendering obsolete the conflicts between organisational commitment and professional loyalty. The various kinds of professionals in an organisation may differ substantially from one another, but still closely resemble their counterparts in other organisations, still ensuring a high degree of isomorphism. Dimaggio and Powell (1983) discuss two aspects of professionalisation that they see as important sources of isomorphism. First, the creation of a ‘cognitive base’ (a knowledge base rooted in empirical knowledge) by university specialists and the growth and elaboration of professional networks across organisations but across which new models and ways of working diffuse rapidly. Universities and professional training bodies are important sources of organisational norms in each profession. Professional bodies and trade bodies also offer an important source of the creation of normative rules and professional behaviour. Perrow (1974) contends that these mechanisms create a pool of essentially interchangeable individuals that occupy key roles within a profession and therefore provide a key source of isomorphism. Dimaggio and Powell (1983) content that filtering personnel is also a key process via which isomorphism occurs. Recruiting staff from a limited pool of people or prescribing certain qualifications or knowledge (whilst legitimate) can service to stifle new ideas or innovation in each sector: a great example of this can be found in Hardman (2019). Spectator journalist Isabel Hardman details “Why we get the wrong politicians” – a limited recruiting pool being a key cause. Later in the book, we discuss the move of refuge providers from independent agents to being part of large, highly professionalised organisations and the effects this has had in this regard.

Concluding comments In this opening chapter, we have detailed the concepts and processes that readers will need to be aware of while reading the rest of the book. Our contention is that the refuge sector has moved from a genuinely grass roots movement started by a committed group of feminists to a highly organised and professional field of knowledge and practice enabling entry from non-specialists. This has brought with it both advantages and disadvantages. Changes in the ideological, governmental and regulatory environments have had profound effects on the women’s sector. The change from ‘government’ to ‘governance’, the exponential growth of ‘policy networks’ and inclusion of women’s services in wider funding and regulatory frameworks have all led to a homogenisation of the sector, from a genesis of true

Implementation and isomorphism  23

innovation and grass roots, radical activism. This has been tempered more recently with signs that recent and the incumbent government(s) are arguably minded to enable the sector to become more specialist again with the announcement of new funding and planning structures in the domestic abuse bill currently making its way through parliament.

References Aldrich, H. (1979) Organisations and Environments, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Allison, G.T. (1971) Essence of Decision, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, MA. Barnouw, E. (1966–1968) A History of Broadcasting in the United States, Oxford University Press, New York. Barrett, S.M. & Fudge, C. (1981a) Examining the policy action relationship, in S.M. Barrett & C. Fudge (eds), Policy and Action: Essays on the Implementation of Public Policy, Methuen, London, pp. 3–34. Barrett, S.M. & Fudge, C. (1981b) Reconstructing the field of analysis, in S.M. Barrett & C. Fudge (eds), Policy and Action: Essays on the Implementation of Public Policy, Methuen, London, pp. 249–78. Barrett, S.M. & Fudge, C. (eds) (1981c) Policy and Action: Essays on the Implementation of Public Policy, Methuen, London. Collins, R. (1979) The Credential Society, Academic Press, New York. Coser, L. et al. (1982) Books: The Culture and Commerce of Book Publishing, Basic Books, New York. Cyert, R.M. & March, J.G. (1963) A Behavioural Theory of the Firm, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. DiMaggio, P.J. (1981) Cultural entrepreneurship in 19th century Boston: part 1 the creation of an organisational base for high culture in America, Media, Culture and Society 4 pp. 33–50. Dimaggio, P.J. & Powell, W.W. (1983) The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organisational fields, American Sociological Review 48(2) pp. 147–60. Drake, R.F. (2001) The Principles of Social Policy, Palgrave, Basingstoke. Elcock, H. (1991) Public Administration in the 1990s, Longman, London. Elmore, R.F. (1978) Organizational models of social programme implementation, Social Policy 26(2) pp. 185–228. Elmore, R F. (1980) Backward mapping: implementation research and policy decisions, Political Science Quarterly 94(4) pp. 601–16. Fennell, M.L. (1980) The effects of environmental characteristics on the structure of hospital clusters, Administrative Science Quarterly 25 pp. 484–510. Gunn, L. (1978) Why is implementation so difficult?, Management Services in ­Government 33(4) pp. 169–76. Hannan, M.T. & Freeman, J. (1977) The population ecology of organisations, American Journal of Sociology 82(5) pp. 929–64. Hardman, I. (2019) Why We Get the Wrong Politicians, Atlantic Books, London. Hill, M. (1997) The Policy Process in the Modern State, Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead.

24  Putting the book in context Hill, M. & Hupe, P. (2002) Implementing Public Policy, Sage Publications, London. Hjern, B. (1982) Implementation research—The link gone missing, Journal of Public Policy 2(3) 301–08. Hogwood, B.W. & Gunn, L. (1984) Policy Analysis for the Real World, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Hood, C.C. (1976) The Limits of Administration, John Wiley, London. Horton, S. & Farnham, D. (1999) Public Management in Britain, Palgrave, London. Hughes, O.E. (1998) New Public Management in Public Management and Administration, Palgrave, London. Irving-Clarke, Y. (2019) Supported Housing: Past, Present and Future, Routledge, Abingdon. Kanter, R.M. (1972) Commitment and Community, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Katz, M.B. (1975) Class, Bureaucracy and Schools: The Illusion of Educational Change in America, Praeger, New York. Kimberly, J. (1980) Initiation, innovation and institutionalisation in the creation process, in John Kimberly & Robert Miles (eds) The Organisational Life Cycle, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA, pp. 18–43. Larson, M.S. (1977) The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis, University of California Press, Berkeley. Lipsky, M. (1980) Street Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services, Russell Sage Foundation, New York. March, J.G. & Olsen, J.P. (1976) Ambiguity and choice in Organisations, Universteitsforlaget, Bergen. Meyer, J.W. (1979) The Impact of the Centralisation of Educational Funding and Control on State and Local Organisational Governance, Stanford University, ­Stanford, CA. Milward, H.B. & Provan, K.G. (1999) How Networks are Governed, Workshop paper, University of Arizona. Newman, J. (2001) New Labour, Policy and Society, SAGE, London. Osbourne, D.E. & Goebler, T.A. (1992) Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA. Perrow, C. (1974) Is business really changing?, Organisational Dynamics, 3(1) pp. 31–44. Pfeffer, J. & Salancik, G. (1978) The External Control of Organisations: A Resource Dependence Perspective, Harper & Row, New York. Pollitt, C. (1990) Time, Policy, Management: governing with the Past, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Pressman, J.L. & Wildavsky, A. (1973) Implementation, University of California Press, Berkeley. Rhodes, R.A.W. (1997) Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability, Oxford University Press, Buckingham. Ripley, R.B. & Franklyn, G.A. (1982) Bureaucracy and Policy Implementation, Dorsey Press, Homewood, IL. Sabatier, P.A. & Mazmanian, D.A. (1979) The conditions of effective implementation: a guide to accomplishing policy objectives, Policy Analysis 5(4) pp. 481–504. Savage, R. & Atkinson, S. (2001) Public Policy Under Blair, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke.

Implementation and isomorphism  25 Seddon, J. (2008) Systems Thinking in the Public Sector, Triarchy Press, Axminster. Sedlak, M.W. (1981) Youth Policy and Young Women 1950–1972: The Impact of Private Sector Programmes for Pregnant and Wayward Girls on Public Policy, Paper presented at National Institute for Education Youth Policy Research Conference, Washington DC. Tyack, D. (1974) The One Best System: A History of American urban education, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA. Van Meter, D. & Horn, C.E. (1975) The policy implementation process: a conceptual framework, Administration and Society 6(4) pp. 445–88. Weber, M. (1952) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Scribner, New York. Weber, M. (1968) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Bedminster, New York.

Part 2

The history of housing domestic abuse policy in Great Britain

Chapter 3

Feminism and the early refuges

Most policies are driven from Governmental level in response to a perceived need for intervention in a given policy area, following the identification of a policy need. The history of refuge provision (in the UK) provides something of a counterpoint to this narrative, with the inception of services for women being driven pro-actively from the community level. The state only took a formal role relatively recently in response to grass roots campaigning rather than policy makers identifying and responding to a policy need. This section outlines the trajectory of the refuge movement by looking at the roots of refuge services and early provision and then moves on to look at the ways in which these services have been pulled into local authority control, gaining funding and security but at the cost of losing their original feminist ethos to a large extent. Further, the increasing use of generic commissioning systems by local authorities has meant that refuges have often been treated as generic supported housing rather than the small-scale, local, specialist provision they originated as. Recent government proposals (MHCLG, 2019) have, however, signalled a possible move back towards specialist commissioning processes for refuges and other domestic abuse services. A later chapter looks more specifically at the role of housing policy in relation to addressing domestic abuse.

The feminist period The refuge movement has a relatively short history with its genesis in the late-1960s and early 1970s, inspired by, and coinciding with the radical feminist or ‘women’s liberation’ movement. This period of feminist refuge provision is shorter still if we consider that it was rapidly undercut by local authorities pulling services into their regulatory orbit and by the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979, bringing an end to the post-war consensus. Theorists such as Kate Millet (1970) and Germaine Greer (1970) proposed the concept of ‘patriarchy’ to explain women’s position in society, stating that stereotypes about women as passive, emotional and concerned with appearance were a construction of men. Women had therefore become

30  Housing domestic abuse policy in Great Britain

socialised into their traditional roles, rather than pursuing their true natures. As Grayling (2019) points out, the family is a key zone of concern about equality and justice for women and further is often seen as a social unit rather than a social construction with its own internal points of view and complexities. The family has been treated as a private unit that “…encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage. Motherhood, procreation, and child rearing…” (Jaggar quoted in Grayling, 2019) in ways that militate against the rights and needs of women. Beyond this, there has also been a neglect of female points of view across many social issues. Because most conversation, theorising and writing about equality and justice have been done by men, the point of view of women has been excluded. These factors provide at least a partial explanation for the lack of services for women experiencing abuse, and for the fact that until the middle of the 20th century, it was barely acknowledged or discussed as a serious issue. Feminist thought has a longer history than this of course, in writers such as Mary Wollstonecraft (1792), Simone de Beauvoir (1952) and Betty Friedan, and male writers such as Charles Fourier, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (see Engels, 1884, for example). These writers share the point of view that women’s position in society is defined by their subjugation by men into passive domestic and political roles. Engels and Fourier go so far as to conceptualise the family unit itself as the primary site of female oppression and suggest that society must evolve to a point where child-raising becomes a communal activity, and women (and men) are therefore freed from the tyranny of the ‘traditional’ family unit. An understanding of the dynamics of abuse is embedded in this history and the history of services set up by women to enable self-determination; this morphed the activists to pursue legal, policy and practical changes in making interventions (Turgoose, 2016). In tandem with Millet’s (1970) and Greer’s (1970) ideas about patriarchy, Dobash and Dobash (1979) theorised that abuse was not spoken about openly because of dominant beliefs about the sanctity of the family as a protective and nurturing setting: one great source of happiness and fulfilment (Watson, 2003). At least partly because of this during the 1970s, and before, local authorities were reticent to break up families even in cases of abuse, frequently telling women who presented that they had left home ‘voluntarily’ and that they were under no obligation to assist save for taking children into care if necessary (Ashby, 1974). The National Women’s Aid Federation (c.1975) quoted one local authority as saying “…to encourage families to break up so that they need two lots of accommodation instead of one looks like madness”. The early 1970s saw the recognition of “women’s fear” (Warrington, 2003) and of domestic abuse, leading to the set up of the first refuges (ibid). There was a broad context to this movement with a range of women involved. Some groups setting up refuges had strong links to women’s groups in universities whilst others were rooted in more practical feminism with

Feminism and the early refuges  31

women wanting to do something about the abuse others were suffering. Activism was also rooted in the wider labour political movement, based on the Marxist view that some sections of society were oppressed and/or disadvantaged. The women’s movement in the 1970s campaigned for equal rights across a range of areas e.g. pay, discrimination and reproductive rights and highlighted domestic abuse via the media and in wider campaigning (Turgoose, 2016). The resurgent feminist movement adopted tactics from the wider radical, political movements of the 1970s (including the black liberation movement [see Hague & Malos, 1993; Mama, 1996]). Marches, rallies, squatting, lobbying, negotiating with local agencies and disseminating information about abuse all featured in campaigns to meet the goals of the movement (Warrington, 2002). Dobash and Dobash (1992) identify three such goals in this context; assisting victims, challenging male violence and changing women’s position within society. Small numbers of groups looked at issues regarding women’s societal oppression; the ideology of the movement is rooted in these (Hague & Malos, 1993). Early refuges (such as those set up in East Anglia) ran on shoestring budgets with groups of highly committed women volunteering as workers (men were explicitly excluded as it was thought that victims needed an environment in which dependence on men was challenged (Hoff, 1990)). The housing crisis of the 1960s led to a ‘squatting movement’ where groups occupied unused buildings, taking advantage of squatting laws that allowed this (Turgoose, 2016). The first refuge for women and children fleeing domestic abuse opened in Chiswick in 1971, utilising just this method (Spinney, 2007; Turgoose, 2016). Early refuges depended on fundraising methods such as jumble sales, street collections and market stalls to fund themselves and were often run in small premises owned by the local authority with poor facilities and second-hand furniture (Turgoose, 2016). Local businesses also donated to the early refuges (Spinney, 2007). In keeping with their roots in left-wing politics, refuges were run in an egalitarian fashion and attempted to put the principles of the movement into practice (Pahl, 1985). They were run along non-hierarchical, collective lines with an ‘open-door’ policy and decision-making made collectively via regular meetings (Pahl, 1978). Empowerment was at the core of the movement with volunteers forming an ‘alliance’ with victims of abuse rather than a paternalistic relationship where the person in receipt of help feels beholden to the helper. Hand in hand with this, early refuges and their workers were free of oversight from local authorities, regulation or practices of more traditional institutions, giving them a level of freedom from bureaucracy or the interference of professionals (Dobash & Dobash, 1979). Spinney (2007) states that there was conflict between the authorities and refuges as early as c.1974. Hounslow Council contributed funding to a refuge but made conditions (on the funding) concerning overcrowding and fire regulations that

32  Housing domestic abuse policy in Great Britain

were at odds with the ethos of never turning any woman away. The standoff between the Council and the refuge founder, Erin Pizzey, famously lasted some months (ibid). Early refuge provision then was characterised by small groups of highly motivated and committed women recognising a need for a service and employing the tactics of wider radical political movements; these can very much be categorised grass-roots social movements of women, coming together to enable and empower other women to escape abuse (Turgoose, 2016). There was little interest from national or local government, but this came with the advantage of little to no official or bureaucratic interference. The women that set up and ran refuges were unencumbered by the professional beliefs and theories that characterised other more formal services, they were also not committed to reproducing patriarchal structures but rather were pragmatic in providing refuges for women (Dobash & Dobash, 1979). Local authorities reticent to provide refuge accommodation did attempt to exert control over the nascent refuge movement, however. Withholding of funds, threats to prosecute for overcrowding and breaches of planning rules were all used as tools for local authorities to “…exert their power and discretion” (Spinney, 2007, p. 174). Following this flurry of activity in the 1970s, the exponential take-up of refuge provision had led to the setting up of both Scottish Women’s Aid and the National Women’s Aid Federation; by 1978, there were 150 refuges in the UK (Spinney, 2007). Women’s Aid had campaigned for refuges but also for greater protection for women from the courts. They saw refuges as a desperately needed back up where legal measures proved insufficient (Spinney, 2007). This campaigning was largely successful between 1971 and 1978 when the first refuges were set up and the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 and the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 were passed. Both made key changes regarding the protection of women from abuse (Spinney, 2007). Living conditions improved rapidly and considerably in early refuge provision (Warrington, 2003). As the movement became more widely recognised (and environmental rules and legislation tightened), once common practices such as room-sharing and shared cooking and bathing facilities became rare. Most refuges now had communal space, gardens and a laundry; the squalor of the original refuges was certainly a thing of the past. Several workers Warrington (2003) spoke to emphasised the importance of quality facilities in raising the self-esteem of residents. Refuge staff also worked in improved conditions with most refuges having designated office space and proper equipment. Staff became professionalised with most undergoing at least a basic level of training and they were now paid. Warrington (ibid) states that the need to employ workers became rapidly apparent due, at least partly, to overwhelming demand for refuge services; a need for professional

Feminism and the early refuges  33

levels of support also became clear. Because of this, refuges quickly gained a professional image and recognition from other professional services, working much more closely with them. However, such developments can be seen to have been made at a price. This rapid expansion, driven by the need for more refuge space, led to refuges employing more professional, trained staff causing a move away from their original ethos based on communal decision making and mutual support by volunteers. Warrington (2003) states that although there were positives e.g. stronger partnership working and improved reputation amongst other agencies, a more critical lens should also be applied. Ferraro (1981) found that refuges in the United States were increasingly operated by professional staff and that they did not always identify as feminists. This had led to pioneers of the movement resigning. She also noted an increasing presence by men in the running of refuges and the introduction of hierarchical and bureaucratic structures that saw refuge residents as inadequate and therefore not to be involved in the operation of refuges. Whilst government funding brought welcome stability, funding requirements have required refuges to take therapeutic approaches that conform to a treatment perspective (Schechter, 1988). She also argues that important principles of the original refuge movement had been undermined with refuges increasingly controlled by social services agencies, who have no history of a feminist ethos. In short, the drive to fund services and make them stable compromised the original feminist vision. Rose (1985) writing in the UK context agrees that local authority grant conditions have meant that refuges have been required to implement clear management structures, thus compromising the original ethos of the movement for even the most modest levels of funding. Lupton (1994) draws on the US example, pointing out that the funding requirements for such hierarchical management structures may force refuges towards more traditional, masculinist management practices. Warrington (2003) notes that in one area, it was not considered appropriate for those that had fundraised and campaigned for a service to further be involved, let alone employed for the reasons discussed here. Between the setting up of refuges and the end of the 1970s, refuges had moved from being small-scale projects, often in squats, run by committed groups of women and run along egalitarian lines to being much more professionalised. This was driven partly by the need for funding from local authorities and therefore needing to comply with funding rules and requirements; and partly by the scale of women coming forward to refuges for protection from abusive husbands, driving the need for specialist support and a more professionalised service. The general election in 1979 was to provide an epochal change in the wider political environment. This is covered in the following section.

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References Ashby, J. (1974) Women’s Aid and the Problem of Battered Women, Women’s Aid, London. de Beauvoir, S. (1952) The Second Sex, Knopf, New York. Dobash, R.E. & Dobash, R.D. (1979) Violence Against Wives: A Case Against Patriarchy, Free Press, New York. Engels, F. (1884) The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, Zurich. Ferarro, K. (1981) Processing battered women, Journal of Family Issues 2(4) pp. 415–38. Friedan, B. (1965) The Feminine Mystique, Penguin Books, London. Grayling, A.C. (2019) The History of Philosophy, Penguin Books, London. Greer, G. (1970) The Female Eunuch, Harper Collins. London. Hague, H. & Malos, E. (1993) Domestic Violence: Action for Change, New Clarion Press, Cheltenham. Hoff, L. (1990) Battered Women as Survivors, Routledge, London. Lupton, C. (1994) The British refuge movement: the survival of an ideal, in C. Lupton & T. Gillespie (eds) Working with Violence, MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 55–74. Mama, A. (1996) The Hidden Struggle: Statutory and Voluntary Sector Responses to Black Women in the Home, Russell Press, Nottingham. MHCLG (2019) Support to Victims of Domestic Abuse within Safe Accommodation, HMSO, London. Millet, K. (1970) Sexual Politics, Doubleday, New York. National Women’s Aid Federation of England (c.1975) Domestic Violence and Housing, National Women’s Aid Federation of England, Bristol. Pahl, J. (1978) A Refuge for Battered Women, HMSO, London. Pahl, J. (1985) Private Violence and Public Policy: The Needs of Battered Women and the Response of the Public Services, Routledge, London. Rose, H. (1985) The development of women’s aid in Up against the Welfare State, Social Work and Community Work and Society, Open University Press, Milton Keynes. Schechter, S. (1988) Building bridges between activists, professionals and researchers, in K. Yllo & L. Bograd (eds) Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse, Sage, Newbury Park. Spinney, A. (2007) A Comparative Study of Homelessness Policy in England and Australia, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield. Turgoose, D. (2016) Victim support services and the world of commissioning, in S. Hilder & V. Bettinson (eds) Domestic Violence: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Protection, Prevention and Intervention, Palgrave MacMillan, London, pp. 107–130. Warrington, M. (2003) Fleeing from fear: the changing role of refuges in meeting the needs of women leaving violent partners, Capital and Class 27(2) pp. 123–50. Watson, D. (2003) Sample attrition between waves 1 and 5 in the European community household panel, European Sociological Review 19(4) pp. 361–78. Wollstonecraft, M. (1792) A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Thomas & Andrews, Boston, MA.

Chapter 4

The conservatives, new labour and domestic abuse policy

Introduction As we outlined in Chapter 2, the theory of ‘organisational isomorphism’ states that over time (in a variety of ways), large organisations begin to look the same (or very similar) due to them operating in the same funding and strategic environment. In the last chapter, we detailed the inception of the refuge movement from its feminist origins, with the first refuges being operated in squats and along communitarian lines, with open door policies and decisions made by committee. We also began to detail the ways in which these first refuges became subject to local authority enforcement of fire safety and environmental regulations and that this began to change their ethos. For example, the ‘no woman turned away’ ethos of these first refuges rapidly fell victim to regulation around overcrowding and fire safety. This chapter continues this narrative into the Thatcher and New Labour era detailing the wider changes in the economic and policy environments and the impact of these changes on the refuge sector. We begin this chapter, then, with the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979.

The conservatives and refuge provision Following a glut of activity throughout the 1970s, the refuge movement experienced something of a lull during the 1980s and early 1990s; indeed, Spinney (2007) argues throughout the entire period of Conservative government (1979–97). There were very few developments in policy with only a few new refuges opening their doors (Warrington, 2003). Those refuges that did open at this time were the result of victim-led campaigning (Turgoose, 2016). Four of the five refuges that opened during the 1990s were the result of grass roots campaigning by women, and the other was a pragmatic move by a local authority rather than the result of such coordinated campaigning (Warrington, 2003). During this time, there remained a reticence from local authorities (and others) to acknowledge domestic violence (as it was then termed) as an issue,

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despite the years of publicity and awareness raised by activists. This was in stark contrast to the recommendation of the Select Committee on Violence in Marriage that one refuge place be provided for every 10,000 people in the general population (this has not been achieved to this day). Although on a positive note, most funding for refuges was now coming from a combination of government bodies, local authority housing departments, social services departments and special housing association projects (Hague & Malos, 1993). The differential experiences of black and Asian women were also being recognised at this time (Carby, 1997; Davis, 1981; Parmar, 1982); Southall Black Sisters was formed in 1979, for example. Alongside these developments, the wider way that the country was governed was also changing, bringing new challenges to the women’s sector. The election of the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher in 1979 saw a determination to break up the ‘monolithic’ local authorities that were the result of post-war central planning of housing, health and education and allow the voluntary sector a greater role in providing public services. This can broadly be thought of as a move from government to governance from rowing to steering (Hill & Hupe, 2009; Irving-Clarke 2016, 2019) and borne of a distrust of local authority spending ambitions (Baggott, 2004). Until this point, those campaigning for refuge provision had only had to deal with one agency, the local housing authority; they now found themselves having to be involved with local housing authorities, housing associations, the police, health authorities and a plethora of other voluntary sector organisations. Warrington (2003) notes that this caused considerable problems for activists looking to set up refuge services as they now had to garner the support of several different organisations, and staff within these often changed. This meant that support for their cause often depended on the personal commitment of individuals, and this could change with whoever was in a given post at any given time. Although governance networks had been in train for some years (Rhodes, 1997), Thatcher’s determination to roll back the state and reduce the role of local authorities in people’s lives meant that particularly in-housing (which was pivotal to the refuge movement) large-scale change was taking place. Although this is covered in some detail in the following chapters, to cover the main changes in brief here, the ‘right to buy’ policy enabled local authority (council) tenants to purchase their property at a discount. The longer they had been a tenant, the greater the discount up to a maximum set by the government; this maximum has been changed by different governments but broadly used as an incentive for tenants to purchase (clearly the higher the level of discount the greater the incentive) – the policy has now been discontinued in Scotland and Wales. The effects of these policies were manifold, widespread and continued to the present. The “right to buy” policy caused a large number of, often the best, quality council housing out of council ownership and into the owner-occupied

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sector. It could be argued that this removal of so much stock from council ownership, coupled with increasing demand, limited the stock available for local authorities to allocate for refuge space. It also significantly lowered the number of properties available for local authorities to house women and children fleeing abuse (Turgoose, 2016). The deregulation of private-rented sector rents led to these rising beyond the means of women fleeing abuse. The Conservatives also made changes to the subsidy structure in place for public housing, removing subsidy for building of new homes (object subsidy) and favouring individual subsidies based upon household income (subject subsidy) – the consolidation of the ‘rent rebate’ system into the now familiar Housing Benefit/Universal Credit system[s] (Mullins & Murie, 2006). This, alongside other changes to the ways that local authorities could manage their finances e.g. using most of their capital receipts to pay off their debts meant that the ability of local authorities to develop new housing was severely curtailed (King, 2006). The role of Housing Associations in providing social housing was expanded. Some local authorities began to transfer their housing stock to Housing Associations to attempt to circumvent the changes to housing policy noted above (King, 2006), and alongside this, as part of their drive to limit the role of councils, the Government encouraged Housing Associations to build via the subsidy system. As (virtually) the sole developers of new social housing, Housing Associations became the only organisations able to work with activists and others to provide accommodation for refuges. In many ways, this was positive as Housing Associations were able to use Supported Housing Grant (SHG) to build new, purpose-built refuge premises. Housing associations had existed for some years, and both main parties had shown interest in them as a ‘third arm’ of housing provisions (but for different reasons) (Mullins & Murie, 2006). However, the Conservative governments of the 1980s saw them as an alternative housing provider that could take the place of the ‘monolithic local authorities’ they so distrusted (Baggott, 2004?). They also used the Housing Act 1988 to reposition housing associations as an entrepreneurial, independent sector whose borrowing did not count as government debt. Prior to this, housing associations had received their capital finance from public funds (Lund, 2017). Despite these changes to the capital subsidy system, that in some ways benefitted refuge providers, revenue grant to cover running costs remained unstable. Warrington (2003) notes that refuge providers were often subject to cuts in grant from statutory sources (p. 135) and were constantly seeking new funding streams. She notes that Comic Relief and the National Lottery had become significant sources of funding for organisations providing refuges; but that the time and resources expended in researching and writing applications were considerable. Warrington also notes that such funding comes with conditions and that refuge providers, in an echo of earlier struggles, had to compromise on fundamental principles in meeting these

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conditions; indeed, some had lost out on funding by refusing to do so. On a positive note, a national helpline for victims of abuse was established in 1987, and there was wider recognition of the need for wider support e.g. therapeutic services and outreach and wider practical and emotional support empower recovery (Abrahams, 2007, 2010). There were further symbolic milestones throughout the 1990s. The Children Act 1989 enshrined the welfare and safety of children as paramount in legal proceedings, whilst rape within marriage was finally criminalised in 1991. There was also a recognition of the statutory rights of all victims of crime via the ‘Victim’s Charter’, this was not legally binding but symbolically recognised the wider human rights of crime victims. Finally, changes to the way that social services departments worked were perhaps the strongest signal of the direction of the government away from local authorities being direct providers of services but being commissioners of them from an expanded voluntary sector. The NHS and Community Care Act 1990 built upon the Griffiths Report (DHSS, 1983) and subsequent White Paper (DHSS, 1989) making key changes to the role of social workers. Although the Act did not appoint a ‘Minister for Social Services’ nor ring-fence funding as Griffiths had recommended it did make key strategic changes. First, it made local authorities the arrangers and purchasers of care rather than providers. The Act did this by giving social workers responsibility for • • •

Carrying out an appropriate assessment of an individual’s care needs in concert with other concerned agencies before deciding what services should be provided Designing a package of care suitable to the individual’s needs assessment and identifying a responsible ‘care manager’ to facilitate this Securing the delivery of services, not only by direct provision but also by purchasing services via contracts with voluntary sector providers

There were some successes, the desired “needs led, but cash limited” (Means et al., 2008 p. 82) system of funding was introduced and social services departments transformed themselves into commissioners of services, limiting their role as direct providers (ibid). Means et al. (2008) state that both older, frail people and younger people could now have a greater choice and control over the delivery of their care and support. However, the lack of a ringfence on what limited funding there was remained controversial (Means et al., 2008), the role of care managers as gatekeepers for local authorities made their role as much about rationing services and limiting expenditure as anything else (Irving-Clarke, 2019); this made it hard for them to promote choice and self-determination as envisaged (Rummery, 2002). Training and retention of qualified and competent staff was also an issue (see Hadley & Clough, 1996) as was the bureaucratic way that many local authorities

The conservatives, new labour and domestic abuse policy  39

implemented the new system. This proved confusing and difficult to navigate for those trying to access services (Hawley & Hudson, 1996). Refuges and the wider women’s movement then had to navigate a changing and more complex system in their efforts to provide services for women that needed them. Despite the lull in refuge activity during this period (Turgoose, 2016; Warrington, 2003), it was a key time of change for the movement and wider society. Organisations that wished to provide refuge provision were facing a much more fragmented environment where they had to deal with a panoply of organisations to set up refuges, whereas previously, they had only to work with the local housing department and possibly social services. The Right to Buy and changes to the subsidy structure for building new housing meant that the ability of local authorities to build and maintain housing was severely curtailed whilst the role of housing associations was expanded. Dealing with social services departments also became more complex for the reasons discussed above. The funding environment also became more complex with refuge providers turning to charitable sources e.g. Comic Relief and Children in Need, etc. in place of reducing government funding. This had two key effects: the first was to drive many providers into isomorphic structures (see DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), organisational arrangements that were very similar in order to meet funding requirements. The process began in the 1970s but now continuing apace. The government’s push for local authorities to act as commissioners of services rather than providers was reflected in their changes to role of social services departments (discussed above). Second, it increased the time and resources required to identify opportunities and complete funding applications, taking time away from providing front-line services. This is an area that has been specifically criticised subsequently and has been stated as a driver of the need for change (Audit Commission, 1998; MHCLG, 2019a).

New Labour, the supporting People programme and domestic abuse provision As with the significance of the election of 1979, the election of a Labour government in 1997 was to have important consequences for refuges and the wider supported housing sector. Before moving on to talk about the major changes to the funding and regulation of the wider supported housing sector (and therefore refuges), there are some other changes that are worthy of note here. First, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 created a network of ‘Crime and Disorder Partnerships’ to attempt to embed partnership working at the core of the response to crime. The Morgan Report (1991) had set down principles for such joint working built on the premise that no one organisation could or should be responsible for complex issues such as community safety; it was never fully implemented (Turgoose, 2016). These new partnerships

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included domestic abuse forums although these were unfunded and therefore struggled to drive any longer-term change. On a more positive note, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, alongside a wider preoccupation with managing high risk offenders, led to increased joint working between the police, probation and social services departments and specialist domestic violence courts were established in 1999. The Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 introduced Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) boards, the effect on domestic abuse services, although unforeseen, was to be significant (Turgoose, 2016). Beginning in Cardiff in 2004 and rolled out nationally from 2006, Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conferences (MARAC) were heavily influenced by MAPPA processes; victim-centred and targeted the highest risk cases, MARAC also inspired the inception of Independent Domestic Violence Advocates (IDVAs); specialist, independent advisors to help and support victims through often complex processes and the plethora of services available to them. Spinney (2007) notes that New Labour took a twin-pronged approach to domestic abuse by taking steps to further criminalise abuse alongside an expansion of the supported housing sector, including refuge provision. They also introduced target-hardening processes such as ‘sanctuary schemes’ to enable women and children to remain in their own homes. Most significant for refuges was the Supporting People programme, a new funding and regulatory regime for the entire supported housing sector. Suppor ting People As noted above, Housing Associations had become the main providers of refuge accommodation, largely because they were the sole developers of social housing and had access to grant funding. Their social mission also meant that refuges were a natural fit for them. This is important in the current context as it rendered refuges subject to a major review of the supported housing sector by the Labour government elected in 1997; indeed, the New Labour government treated refuge provision as part of a generic-supported housing sector. For example, several other types of supported accommodation e.g. hostels and sheltered housing were also included as were any projects where rent, eligible service charge and related support were funded via housing benefit. Shortly after the 1997 election, the Audit Commission produced a report entitled Home Alone (Audit Commission, 1998); the report noted that the supported housing sector, of which refuges are part, had grown in a largely unstrategic fashion with voluntary sector providers and local authorities accessing ad-hoc funding streams as they were able (Irving-Clarke, 2016, 2019). This sat alongside a 1997 Divisional Court judgement that Housing Benefit could only be used to fund support in so far as it related to the upkeep of buildings (Griffiths, 2000). This threatened the existence of

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supported housing schemes as hitherto Housing Benefit had been used to cover the cost if core rents, service charges and the cost of support, including employing support workers. The Government’s response to these drivers was the Supporting People programme, a full review of supported housing provision (DSS, 1998) proposed the new policy and a ‘policy into practice document’ (DETR, 2001) set out the programme in full. The programme fitted with the Government’s wider policy direction and their expansion of Local Authorities’ role as community leaders (see Better Care, Higher Standards Charters for Local Authorities, Care Standards Act 2000, Local Government Act 2000, Housing Green Paper and subsequent Housing Statement “The Way Forward for Housing” and Best Value (see DETR, 1998). Watson et  al. (2003) also note wider links with the Rough Sleeper’s Initiative, work by the Social Exclusion Unit on teenage parents, Local Community Safety Boards and Social Inclusion Partnerships. This is rehearsed briefly here as understanding this process is key to understanding the full effect of the programme on refuge provision. The broad thrust of the Supporting People policy was to create a regulated, quasi-market-based system similar to that created by the social care reforms of the Thatcher government of the 1980s and 1990s (see Means et al., 2008). Local Authorities were to become commissioners of services in addition to being providers in many cases. There was a clear plan to regulate the marketplace via the local authority, thus granting them power as both regulator and funder. This was to be achieved via local authorities assessing existing supply in their area, assessing existing supply and then using a commissioning process to model supply to meet the assessed need. Very close to what is being proposed by the Government for accommodation-based domestic abuse services at the time of writing. The implications for the domestic abuse sector fell across three domains: funding, regulation and commissioning. Funding A court ruling that meant that Housing Benefit could only be used to pay for ongoing support in limited circumstances. The Government introduced a two-step implementation system, introducing Interim Housing Benefit (IHB), paid to providers on the same basis as Housing Benefit in order to maintain the stability and viability of support services whilst a permanent solution was formulated. To manage the transfer to Supporting People (SP), the Government introduced Transitional Housing Benefit (THB). They acknowledged that services for vulnerable people (which included refuges) were underfunded, therefore. THB funding was a ring-fenced, unlimited sum. It allowed each provider to send a form (signed by the service user) to the Office for the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) for each individual they engaged with. ODPM

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would then pay the agreed charge for each service user (the amount paid was usually based upon legacy funding) into the SP grant for the relevant local authority. The Government looked on as their estimates were surpassed by actual expenditure. Robson Rhodes (2004) produced a report, and this was commissioned by the Government in response to the exponential growth of the SP funding amount under THB. The original estimate of a maximum of £700m across Great Britain proved to be grossly below the revised estimate of £1.4bn (December 2002), and the final “platinum cut” figure of £1.8bn (SITRA, 2013). Robson Rhodes (2004) acknowledged that there was an expectation and an intention that funding for support services would increase under the THB arrangements but also that the growth that came was neither anticipated nor planned (p. 5). Robson Rhodes (2004) looked at the legacy funding issues and why the ­final “platinum cut” was so much more than estimated at the outset. Their findings drove an impetus for funding reductions; “crisis” and “retrenchment” ­ were in the air (Foord, 2005, p. 3). The debate on the total amount of grant and the way it should have been allocated was dominated by history (legacy) rather than linked to known needs or outcomes required by different government department or the need to protect efficient and effective services and potential cost benefits (Audit Commission, 2005; Robson Rhodes, 2004). The general consensus was that the scheme was overfunded; Robson Rhodes (2004) states that £1.8bn was too much to pay for legacy provision and that this should be reduced going forward; although they also say it was not clear that this was “…too much to pay for the needs of vulnerable groups…” (p. 18), thus clearing the way for additional spending on new services. Interestingly, this qualification is absent from the subsequent ODPM report (ODPM, 2004). In response, the focus in all authorities was on cutting expenditure rather than long-term planning or quality; stakeholders believed that this was the main barrier to progress (Audit Commission, 2005). At the time of this report, there was no indication when downward pressure upon the grant sum would end. The report cites the lack of an inflationary uplift for 2004 and then year upon year reductions in the grant sum as evidence of this. There were also concerns from providers that quality and service user fit were being abandoned in favour of the lowest cost services. This was particularly true where large-scale, generic floating support contracts were expanding rapidly at the expense of accommodation-based, intensive support services, although the Commission found no evidence of this at inspections. For some client groups, refuges included, accommodation is important. Regulation Prior to the introduction of Supporting People (SP), there was fragmented to no scrutiny of supported housing services or how the money was spent

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(Audit Commission, 2005) “no one has responsibility for ensuring adequacy of support for vulnerable people” (DSS, 1998, p. 2). Funded by public money, Supporting People was opened to public scrutiny; the programme provided a consistent framework for quality assurance and accountability. For example, Supporting People strategies were “…a public statement of local priorities against which the members of commissioning bodies [could] be held to account” (Audit Commission, 2005, p. 19). The government also produced a “…common national standards framework (which) will apply to all services, based on the National Housing Federation’s Framework for Housing with Support” (DETR, 2001, p. 121). The final document was entitled to the “Quality Assessment Framework” (QAF) (see CLG, 2009). Local authority Supporting People teams monitored local services via the QAF and related service agreements and scheme reviews. Agreements between the local authority and providers specified monitoring and quality requirements including management information, standards and validation checks (DETR, 2001). DETR committed that this would be a simple process that did not duplicate the work of other inspection regimes particularly in view of the Housing Corporation’s role in regulating RSLs. On DETR’s (2001) suggestion, local authorities adopted a system of accrediting providers. Local authorities could elect to continue to use any existing system they had in place or where local authorities “…develop a system of accreditation…” (DETR, 2001, p. 84). There was also a commitment to developing “simple” mechanisms for validation and accreditation of providers/services (ibid, p. 122). Most, if not all, authorities adopted some form of accreditation (most adopted the government’s suggested one). However, many failed to use the ‘passporting’ ability they had that would have enabled successful accreditation in one authority to act as a ‘passport’ in others, thus negating duplication by providers. This meant that some providers had to go through a bureaucratic process in several different authorities, even where their presence was minimal (Irving-Clarke, 2016). Only a minority of authorities was found to have made effective joint arrangements in this regard; Audit Commission (2005) acknowledged that this had cost providers and authorities considerable time and money in duplication (Audit Commission, 2005). The monitoring system for Supporting People required all providers to be accredited and for services to be self-assessed and validated against the QAF. All services were to be formally reviewed by April 2006 before interim contracts (awarded in 2003) could be replaced by “so-called steady state contracts” (Audit Commission 2005, p. 53). Regular submissions of monitoring information covering costs, staffing and client information were also required (using a nationally designed electronic workbook). Providers were subject to the QAF that provided minimum standards, and many providers welcomed it and said that it had improved service quality (Irving-Clarke, 2016).

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Commissioning Supporting People was also designed to deal with the lack of coordination in national and local policy in relation to supporting vulnerable people. “Home Alone” (Audit Commission, 1998) concluded that the work of government departments had not always been well coordinated and problems in delivering services at local level originated, in part, from the fragmented evolution of funding arrangements and the statutory framework. It was also unclear who owned many of the problems. The existing policy framework had gaps that could fail to ensure service provision for the most vulnerable clients. In response, the government gave responsibility to local authorities for assessing supply, need and demand in their respective areas and remodelling services to meet the assessed demand, thus ensuring greater coordination in funding, planning and delivery of services (many of which were provided by third-sector organisations). SP teams were required to produce a shadow strategy providing a comprehensive map of service supply in their areas, identifying gaps in provision for consolidation and development of services, developing a strategy for service user consultation. This was to be produced having visited a range of local service providers and in discussion with them about change or continuation of services (DETR, 2001). Supporting People teams were then required to develop a full five-year Supporting People strategy (backed by annual reviews) in place for the formal launch of the programme in April 2003. The full strategy was required to review the analysis of supply produced by the Supporting People team including a strategic review of performance against desired outcomes in each service area and agree on aims, objectives and priorities to facilitate the use of Supporting People funds in the authorities’ other programmes (including the Health Improvement Programme, Housing Strategy and Community Plan). There was also a requirement to set out cross-authority arrangements, make links with other authorities and agree a strategic approach to capital investment. Reviews could be done as part of a wider Best Value review but must be done in consultation with providers and following a methodology consistent with DETR (2001) guidance and appropriate to local circumstances. The guidance was clear that Supporting People teams should enter into early dialogue with providers about schemes and services and that providers should not “…live in fear of a service review in 2,3- or 4-years’ time that will unexpectedly remove funding from their service” (DETR, 2001, p. 63). Review processes must have taken into consideration the strategic relevance (including strategies other than SP), assessment of need, location, performance, quality and effectiveness, value for money, comparisons, views of service users, type of scheme and provider. Also, reviews must have made use of all information available and service users fully consulted at every stage.

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Following the review process, there were several options: first, no change was required, and a service agreement awarded; second, a change in the service was required and that this be resolved via negotiation with the existing provider or a tender process; or third, that there was “cause for concern” and that improvements be negotiated or finally that the service agreement is terminated, and notice is served. Where this option is pursued action would be taken to protect service users, this does imply that this is only a course of action where the service is of such poor quality that service users are at risk (DETR, 2001). There was now a need to purchase and commission existing and new services in line with the quasi-market structure developed. The government expected this to happen balancing the need for continuity with the need for quality and innovation (DETR, 2001). Local area agreements As if all this wasn’t challenging enough, the Local Government and Public Involvement Act 2007 required all unitary authorities and County Councils to produce a Local Area Agreement (LAA) to support the local area in achieving local priorities; partner organisations were placed under a duty to cooperate with these (SITRA, 2014). The Audit Commission (2005) was positive about LAAs and the increased flexibility and funding they might have brought. Noting the concerns of many stakeholders that the relaxation of grant conditions would result in funding being directed into statutory services and away from HRS, they suggest withholding LAA status until a track record on strong partnership working has been established as a possible solution. The government provided a refreshed national strategy for Supporting People, Independence and Opportunity (CLG, 2007) that attempted to link the programme into wider government policy. Subsequent research (SITRA, 2014) found a number of problems with this new structure. First, that housing and support providers lacked understanding of the LAA framework and so struggled to engage. Smaller organisations were more likely to lack this knowledge than larger ones. SITRA (2014) also found that LAAs represented a risk to HRS that was increased when the only two relevant KPIs (NI 141&142) were not included in the LAA. This led to further concerns that providers would have to make additional efforts to prove the value of their services in area where these KPIs were not selected. This meant that providers would have to invest considerable resource in realigning themselves to and engaging with influencing a wider agenda. Finally, there was a concern that there would be conflict between the LAA framework and other policy drivers. There is no shortage of evaluative studies of the Supporting People programme (see for example Irving-Clarke, 2016, 2019; Audit Commission 1998, 2005, 2009; Cameron, 2009; Craigforth, 2008; Cm1770 (2010); CSCI,

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2006; CLG, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d, 2009; Eliot & Hamilton, 2009; Fyson et  al., 2007; Goldie, 2004; Henderson, 2019; Holman, 2008; Irving-Clarke, 2016, 2019; Scragg, 2008; Watson et al., 2003). One needs to only read any of these documents to get a picture of the positives and negatives of the programme and the way it was implemented. The key point for us in this context is that because of historic funding and regulatory factors, under the programme, many (if not most) were forced into a generic funding and regulatory environment that will have further diluted not only the specialist nature of their services but also their original feminist ethos. The focus on ‘best value’ and ‘value for money’ will doubtless have led to smaller, specialist providers being unable to compete for services and larger less specialist or generic services winning contracts to provide these services. Reductions in funding of the programme will also have hit refuge provision hard as local authorities often made ‘across the board cuts to funding (Audit Commission, 2009; Irving-Clarke, 2016, 2019), the demise of the programme also often meant the disbanding of specialist housing-related commissioning teams in favour of generic commissioning teams that procured all council services. This undermined whatever specialist expertise had been built up during the programme. The following section looks at the commissioning environment from this point to the present.

Post-Supporting People to the present day The Supporting People programme was suffering death by a thousand cuts from the removal of the ring-fence coupled with the introduction of LAAs in 2009/10. Funding that was notionally for Supporting People was still going to local authorities, but this was increasingly being used to fund other areas where they had a statutory duty to provide services e.g. social care (see Audit Commission, 2009 & SITRA, 2014 for example). Service providers also valued the role of expert commissioning teams in the supported housing sector and the improved strategic planning of these services (Audit Commission, 2005, 2009). This benefit was also to be lost in the cuts to SP funding and de jure (if not de facto) wind down of the programme. The commissioning structure in the post-SP world looked very different. The financial crisis in 2008 led to a sector-changing and ongoing reduction in public spending. Although the necessity for this reduction was recognised by the incumbent Labour government who did begin to reduce spending, it was the election of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition under the Prime-Ministership of David Cameron in 2010 that was to prove more significant. Cameron had fought the election campaign on the basis of Labour’s fiscal irresponsibility and promised to restore the nation’s finances to surplus. Whilst the link is not explicit, Turgoose (2016) finds that this coincided with the introduction of a “…barrage of funding and commissioning guidance, co-commissioning models and Social Return on Investment (SROI)

The conservatives, new labour and domestic abuse policy  47

methodologies emerged[ing] in the UK” (p. 116). Funding reductions since 2011 and continued by Conservative governments elected in 2015 and 2017 have led to domestic abuse services having to engage in analysis of their value and impact e.g. resourcing, practice and outcomes, in an unstable funding environment (Refuge & NEF Consulting, 2013). The same research found that measured outcomes often included victim expectations in entering the service e.g. increased safety, enhanced feelings of well-being, etc. Although many services also engaged in outreach and awareness-raising work, the impact of which is much harder to gauge (Turgoose, 2016). Imkaan (2014) and Women’s Aid (2013, 2014) found evidence that the commissioning environment coupled with the ongoing spending cuts from the UK Government had had a disproportionate impact upon smaller providers and that this had resulted in a postcode lottery of services and less effective interventions for women. Likewise, Walby and Towers (2012) found that smaller specialist providers had suffered an average of 70% cuts in funding compared with only 29% for larger generic, non-specialist providers. Because of this retrenchment of funding, smaller providers were forced to access funds from many sources, some as many as 40 different funders for ‘small scraps’ of funding (Howard, 2010). Some had also invested in fundraising capability as a core part of the infrastructure. A return to the pre-Supporting People model of funding – indeed, a key driver for the SP programme was the contention that providers were expending time and resources on multiple funding applications rather than concentrating on providing support (Audit Commission, 1998; Irving-Clarke, 2016). As the Audit Commission (1998) found previously regarding supported housing services, the process of applying to several funding streams is costly in terms of time, money and other resources and detracts from the possibility of improvement and expanding services because of a “hand to mouth, short term cycle of existence” (Turgoose, 2016). Turgoose (ibid) also states that often providers have continued to try to provide services without funding, using capital reserves, volunteers or have been forced to close. The effects of these changes in the funding environment on refuges have been several. First, many have had to put in place specific infrastructure to gather data and provide evidence of the impact and efficacy of the services provided. Wood and Leighton (2010) found that these systematic reviews and SROI methodologies have tended to be used by larger organisations e.g. Safe Lives or Refuge whilst smaller providers have found that this not to be practically affordable. Coupled with this, open tendering frameworks have allowed larger, non-specialist providers to bid for contracts, meaning the closure of smaller specialist providers. Second, the ability of many refuge facilities to house women from outside their local area has been threatened by ‘local connection’ requirements in some tender specifications for refuge provision. Women’s Aid (2015) found that some local authorities were placing requirements for as much as 80% of refuge places to be reserved for local

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women and children. This change fails to comprehend the nature of abuse and is fundamentally at odds with a key tenet of the refuge movement; that refuges work across these boundaries to enable victims to their local area. As an illustration of the impact of this, Quilgars and Pleace (2010) found that 70% of refuge referrals come from out of area; previously, the network refuges had worked in concert to provide these services across administrative boundaries (Bowstead, 2013). Third, Turgoose (2016) suggests that despite the rhetoric in favour of service-user need, there has been a prioritisation of short-term, crisis interventions over longer-term trauma-informed services (Abrahams, 2010). SafeLives (2015) have found an increase in the demand for IDVA services, and whilst this may be a result of increased reporting, Turgoose (2016) finds that this may also be a result of a lack of early interventions meaning that cases of DV reach crisis point before intervention is made. The sector has radically changed some of its practices to meet the changing requirements of the environment in which it finds itself (Turgoose, 2016). For example, the UK ‘on track’ referral system allows providers to collate information about service user needs, support provided and outcomes, thus meeting the requirements of the commissioning environment whilst maintaining a high quality of front-line service (Women’s Aid, 2014). The sector has also increased the use of volunteers in reaction to reduced funding. Of course, volunteers have played an integral part in the development of the sector since its inception; however, Women’s Aid (2014) found that more than half of all services in the sector had increased the use of volunteers in their services. More recent research by Women’s Aid (2015) has found that the change in the balance between trained, professional staff and volunteers has changed service models and delivery. Austerity and changes in the funding environment As part of the wider ‘austerity’ agenda (see Farnsworth & Irving, 2017), the UK coalition government and subsequent Conservative governments introduced a raft of policies designed to limit expenditure on welfare. Wider changes to the welfare system included the ‘Removal of the Spare Room Subsidy or Bedroom Tax as it became known (see Gibb, 2015 for an early evaluation), proposed changes to secure and assured tenancies in councils and housing associations, respectively (see CIH, 2016), and a cap on the level of benefits any one household could receive (see CIH, 2017) at the median housing income (c.£26,000) as well as wider increased conditionality in the welfare system (see Watts & Fitzpatrick, 2018 for a comprehensive account). In contrast, these changes led to reduced incomes for many households in need of assistance and potentially in need of refuges or other domestic abuse services. However, the Conservative government elected in 2015 made some very specific recommendations on the funding of supported housing (see

The conservatives, new labour and domestic abuse policy  49

Chapter 4 of Irving-Clarke, 2019 for a full account) that would have serious consequences for the refuge sector if implemented. The government announced that the housing benefit available for supported housing would be limited to the Local Housing Allowance (LHA) rate for the area, and a year upon year 1% funding reduction (applicable to all social housing rents) (see CIH, 2016). However, in response to concerns raised by the sector, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions made a written statement to the House of Commons (HCWS154) postponing these measures until 2019/20 pending a review of funding for supported housing (including refuges). The government made the proposal that from 2019/20 supported housing be subject to the LHA cap (where rents were paid via housing benefit or universal credit) but that they would not be subject to the Shared Accommodation Rate (SAR) (a lower rate of housing benefit paid to people under 35 years of age as it is thought they can live in shared accommodation). In recognition of the sector’s concerns that there are inherently higher costs in providing supported housing, the government also proposed giving local authorities a ring-fenced fund to enable them to ‘top-up’ the rents paid to providers. This amount would take account of projected need and the additional costs of administering it. It should be noted here that this fund was to provide additional funding for rents and accommodation charges and nothing to do with the cost of providing additional support. The government also committed to a full review of the supported housing sector to ensure that funding took account of projections of future need, administration costs and that service were adequately and proportionately monitored and funded. Following this review, the government came back with proposals for three distinct areas of the sector that they had identified from the review: sheltered housing, long-term supported housing and short-term supported housing. We rehearse the proposals for short-term services briefly here as the clear majority of domestic abuse services fall into this description. For a full account of the proposals, see CIH (2016, 2017) or Irving-Clarke (2019). The proposal for short-term services was probably the most radical of the three. Short-term services are defined as those provided for less than years (CIH, 2017; DETR, 2001) and in response to situations that are resolvable over a short period of time, as opposed to chronic conditions. The proposal was to put in place a locally commissioned ring-fenced grant administered by the local authority alongside a new planning and oversight regime. Funding would be placed with Tier 1 (county or unitary) authorities and a duty to co-operate placed upon Tier 2 councils (where these exist). These proposals had several important implications for refuges (and other services). First, the proposals were for the funding of the accommodation rather than the individual resident. This took the payment of funds outside the ambit of housing benefit thus breaking the link between demand-led (and theoretically unlimited) funding, administered by the local authority and into a

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cash-limited and ring-fenced grant from central government. It is easy to see how this is attractive to a government intent on limiting expenditure and making future costs predictable. More importantly and one of the sector’s chief concerns, it breaks the link between an individual right to claim funding and to have a service provided to them. Concerns were also raised about the huge diversity of the sector and whether this could lend itself to such ‘one-size fits all’ approach; local authorities, whilst broadly supportive, also raised concerns about administrative costs. In response, the government backed down on the proposals committing to funding short-term services via the existing welfare system but committed to formulating a new and robust system of oversight and a review of service charges. At the time of writing, we await their proposals. Whilst we await the government’s proposals on the funding of more general supported housing, there is a commitment and funding available for refuge provision or support within safe accommodation-based services (MHCLG, 2019a) during 2020 and 2021. Following the general election in late-2020, the victorious Conservative Party (by some 80 parliamentary seats) has committed to continuing to implement the ‘2016–20 Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG)’ strategy, outcome of the ‘Future Delivery of Support to Victims and their Children in Accommodation-Based Domestic Abuse Services’ and Domestic Abuse Bill from the previous parliament. Recognising that refuges play a key role in addressing abuse and to cover the period until the full proposed duty comes into effect, the government has made £15 million available for the provision of accommodation-based services during 2020–2021. Applications to the fund must be led by the local authority in partnership with local providers. Applications to the fund must have the support of the chief executive of the local authority, the information pack (MHCLG, 2019b) is clear that best applications should also show partnerships with the local Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) and Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG). This is intended as a ‘stop gap’ measure until the implementation of the new duties contained within the Domestic Abuse Bill (Home Office, 2019), the implications of the bill for housing providers are covered fully in.

Concluding comments In this chapter, we have detailed the development of the wider economic and policy environments that refuges have operated within and the ways in which these have driven these services to look very similar to one another (isomorphism). From their inception as informal, community-led services, refuges have somewhat bucked the usual policy process of ‘top-down’ recognition of a policy issue and governmental action to intervene in a given area. Instead, refuges (and wider domestic abuse policy) has very been driven from community level with government becoming involved first as

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a limiting factor via regulation but then as the major funder and enabler of refuge and wider domestic abuse services. These changes, however, have come at a price, and that price is the necessity to conform to rules around funding and other regulation. This has come both from the Government, first as regulation around health and safety, but also from other places e.g. the charities commission (where providers are registered as such) and charitable funders such as Comic Relief or the National Lottery. These processes have forced providers into very similar management structures that are often seen as patriarchal and the need to partner with local authorities and housing associations to provide services has compromised the ‘for women, by women’ approach of the early services. Instead, senior management roles in these partner agencies have often been occupied by males thus diluting the influence of women over these services. Decision-making processes therefore have also had to conform to the formal governance structures of these bodies and decisions made via formal management structures rather than along communitarian lines, involving service users fully. The following chapter looks specifically at policy in relation to social housing as this has been a key partner to the domestic abuse sector. Housing policy, particularly in relation to the provision of social housing, has had a profound influence upon domestic abuse services and therefore deserves further discussion.

References Abrahams, H. (2007) Supporting Women after Domestic Violence: Loss, Trauma and Recovery, Jessica Kingsley, London. Abrahams, H. (2010) Rebuilding Lives after Domestic Violence: Understanding Longterm Outcomes, Jessica Kingsley, London. Audit Commission (1998) Home Alone, Audit Commission, London. Audit Commission (2005) Supporting People, Audit Commission, London. Audit Commission (2009) Supporting People 2005–2009, Audit Commission, London. Baggott, R. (2004) Health and Healthcare in Britain (3rd Edition), Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke. Bowstead, J. (2013) What if anything is local about domestic violence? Safe 47 p. 10. Cameron, A. (2009) Working across boundaries to improve health outcomes: a case study of a housing support and outreach service for homeless people living with HIV, Health and Social Care in the Community 17 pp. 338–95. Carby, H. (1997) White women listen! Black feminism and the boundaries of sisterhood, in H.S. Mirza (ed) Black British Feminism, Routledge, London, pp. 110–128. CIH (2016) What You Need to Know about the Future Funding of Supported Housing, CIH, Coventry. CIH (2017) What You Need to Know about Government Proposals to Fund Supported Housing, CIH, Coventry.

52  Housing domestic abuse policy in Great Britain CLG (2007) Independence and Opportunity – Our Strategy for Supporting People, HMSO, London. CLG (2008a) Changing Supporting People funding in England, CLG, London. CLG (2008b) Needs Analysis – Commissioning and Procurement for Housing Related Support, CLG, London. CLG (2008c) Housing, Care, Support – A Guide to Integrating Housing Related Support at Regional Level, CLG, London. CLG (2008d) Research into the Effectiveness of Floating Support Services for the Supporting People Programme, CLG, London. CLG (2009) Quality Assessment Framework: Core Service Objectives, CLG, London. Cm 1770 (2010) Government Response to the House of Commons & Local Government Select Committee Report into the Supporting People Programme, TSO, London. Craigforth (2008) A Report Detailing the Findings from an Evaluation of a Pilot across 7 Local Authorities of the Distanced Travelled Framework for Supporting People Services, Scottish Government, Edinburgh. CSCI (2006) Supporting People: Promoting Independence – Lessons from Inspections, CSCI, London. Davis, A.Y. (1981) Women, Race and Class, The Women’s Press, London. DETR (1998) Improving Local Services through Best Value: Consultation Paper, DETR, London. DETR (2001) Supporting People: Policy into Practice, HMSO, London. DHSS (1983) Griffiths Report on the NHS, HMSO, London. DHSS (1989) Caring for People (White Paper), HMSO, London. DSS (1998) Supporting People: A New Policy and Funding Framework for Support Services, HMSO, London. DiMaggio, P.J. & Powell, W.W. (1983) The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organisational fields, American Sociological Review 48(2) pp. 147–60. Eliot, J. & Hamilton, N. (2009) Supporting people and the future of housing related support, Housing, Care & Support 12 pp. 30–35. Farnsworth, K. & Irving, Z. (2017) Social Policy in times of Austerity, Policy Press, Bristol. Foord, M. (2005) Introduction: supported housing and community care: towards a new landscape of precariousness in M. Foord & P. Simic (eds) Housing, Community Care and Supported Housing – Resolving Contradictions, CIH, Coventry, pp. 2–19. Fyson, R. et al. (2007) Support for Living: The Impact of the Supporting People Programme on Housing and Support for Adults with Learning Disabilities, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York. Gibb, K. (2015) The multiple policy failures of the UK bedroom tax, International Journal of Housing Policy 15(2) pp. 148–66. Goldie, N. (2004) The Supporting People Programme and Mental Health, Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health, London. Griffiths Report (1988) Community Care: An Agenda for Action, HMSO, London. Griffiths, S. (2000) Supporting People All the Way: An Overview of the Supporting People Programme, JRF, York. Hadley, R. & Clough, R. (1996) Care in Chaos: Frustration and Challenge in Community Care, Cassell, London.

The conservatives, new labour and domestic abuse policy  53 Hague, G.M. & Malos, E.M. (1998) Domestic Violence: Action for Change, 2nd ed, New Clarion Press, Gretton. Hawley, R. & Hudson, B. (1996) Community Care and the Prospects for Service ­Development, King’s Fund, London. Henderson, K. (2019) The Role of Housing in a Coordinated Community Response to Domestic Abuse, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Durham. Hill, M. & Hupe, P. (2009) Implementing Public Policy, Sage, London. Holman, P. (2008) Putting the support in supporting people, Learning Disabilities Today pp. 20–22. Home Office (2019) Domestic Abuse Bill (HC Bill 2), HMSO, London. Imkaan (2014) Supporting Black and Minority Ethnic Women and Girls, Imkaan, London. Irving-Clarke, Y. (2016) Supporting People: How Did We Get Here and What Does It mean for the Future? Unpublished PhD Thesis, De Montfort University, Leicester. Irving-Clarke, Y. (2019) Supported Housing: Past Present and Future, Routledge, Abingdon. King, P. (2006) Choice and End of Social Housing, IEA, London. Lund, B. (2017) Understanding Housing Policy, Policy Press, Bristol. Means, R. et al. (2008) Community Care: Policy and Practice (4th Edition), Palgrave, Basingstoke. MHCLG (2019a) Future Delivery of Support to Victims and their Children in Accommodation-Based Domestic Abuse Services, HMSO, London. MHCLG (2019b) MHCLG 2020–2021 £15 Million Fund for Support to Victims of Domestic Abuse, and Their Children, within Safe-accommodation, HMSO, London. Morgan Report (1991) Safer Communities: The Local Delivery of Crime Prevention through the Partnership Approach, Home Office, London. Mullins, D. & Murie, A. (2006) Housing Policy in the UK, Palgrave, London. ODPM (2004) A Review of the Supporting People Programme, ODPM, London. Parmar, P. (1982) Gender, race and class: Asian women in resistance in H. Carby (ed) The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in the 70s, Routledge, Abingdon pp. 212–235. Quilgars, D. & Pleace, N. (2010) Meeting the Needs of Households at Risk of Domestic Violence in England, University of York, York. Refuge & NEF Consulting (2013) Social Valuation of Refuge Services for Survivors of Domestic Violence, NEF Consulting, London. Rhodes, R.A.W. (1997) Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability, Open University Press, Buckingham. Robson Rhodes (2004) An Evaluation of the Supporting People Programme, Robson Rhodes, London. Rummery, K. (2002) Disability, Citizenship & Community Care: A Case for Welfare Rights, Ashgate, Aldershot. Safelives (2015) Getting it right first time http://www.safelives.org.uk/sites/default/ files/resources/Getting%20it%20right%20first%20time%20-%20complete%20 report.pdf, Accessed 10/7/19. Scragg, T. (2008) Reflections on supporting people: a case study of Outreach3way, Housing, Care & Support 11 pp. 9–16.

54  Housing domestic abuse policy in Great Britain SITRA (2014) Navigating the Maze – Housing Related Support: A Guide on Engaging and Influencing Local Governance and Commissioning Structures, SITRA, London. Spinney, A. (2007) A Comparative Study of Homelessness Policy in England and Australia, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield. Turgoose, D. (2016) Victim support services and the world of commissioning in S. Hilder & V. Bettinson (eds) Domestic Violence: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Protection, Prevention and Intervention, Palgrave MacMillan, London, pp. 107–130. Walby, S. & Towers, J. (2012) Measuring the Impact of Cuts in Public Expenditure on the Provision of Services to Prevent Violence against Women and Girls, University of Lancaster, Lancaster. Warrington, M. (2003) Fleeing from fear: the changing role of refuges in meeting the needs of women leaving violent partners, Capital and Class 27(2) pp. 123–50. Watson, L. et al. (2003) Supporting People: Real Change?, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York. Watts, B. & Fitzpatrick, S. (2018) Welfare Conditionality, Routledge, Abingdon. Women’s Aid (2013) A Growing Crisis of Unmet Need: What the Figures Alone Don’t Show You, Women’s Aid, Bristol. Women’s Aid (2014) Annual Survey; Domestic Violence Services, Women’s Aid, Bristol. Women’s Aid (2015) SOS: Save Refuges, Save Lives – Data Report on Specialist Domestic Violence Services in England, Women’s Aid, Bristol. Wood, C. & Leighton, D. (2010) Measuring Social Value – The Gap between Policy and Practice, Demos, London.

Chapter 5

Current proposals – a return to specialism?

At the time of writing (April 2020), the Conservative Party had recently been returned to government with a significantly increased parliamentary majority. During the previous parliament, they had consulted on and committed to implementing a new Domestic Abuse Bill (HM Government, 2019) and placing a new duty on Tier 1 local authorities to provide safe accommodation and services for women and children fleeing abuse (MHCLG, 2019a). They recommitted to doing this in the Queen’s Speech (Prime Minister’s Office, 2019) following their election win. The previous Conservative administration had launched a consultation in May 2019, and the consultation document (MHCLG, 2019b) sought views on the following matters • • • • •

Defining accommodation-based services and support Leadership and responsibilities Local and national accountability Publication of Guidance Supporting all victims of domestic abuse

In the consultation, the Government proposed to impose a statutory duty upon Tier 1 (county and unitary authorities and the Greater London Authority [GLA]) to provide accommodation and support to women and children (and others) fleeing domestic abuse. To do this, they proposed creating a cross-departmental, national steering group to oversee the implementation and operation of the new system, chaired by a government minister and to include the new ‘Commissioner for Domestic Abuse’. Under the proposals, local authorities are required to either create a new commissioning body for domestic abuse services or specify which existing body will take on the new responsibilities. Tier 2 (districts and boroughs) will have a statutory duty to cooperate in delivering services to meet the new duty. Meeting the duty will involve taking these steps: •

Carrying out an assessment of the need for domestic abuse services in their area

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• • •

Carrying out an assessment of the supply of domestic abuse services in their area Using a commissioning process to reshape supply to meet the assessed need (including working with neighbouring authorities to co-commission services where desirable) Reporting to the National Steering Group on compliance (possibly via a standardised reporting process)

There will also be new mechanisms in place to measure value for money and service quality. Observant readers will notice the similarities between these proposals and the Supporting People programme (discussed in Chapter 4), and in many ways, these proposals can be seen as the Supporting People programme, in microcosm, for domestic abuse services; the lessons from the programme are therefore of some relevance. The government has now published its response to the consultation feedback (MHCLG, 2019a). This chapter details the response and the proposals the government has made to carry this agenda forward. It follows the format of the consultation and the subsequent government response.

Accommodation-based services The consultation proposed a general definition of ‘accommodation-based domestic abuse services’ to encompass services that could meet the diverse range of needs of people experiencing domestic abuse, including children as well as taking account of those at low-to-medium risk to prevent their needs escalating. The definition was as follows: •

• • • •

Specialist refuge accommodation, including refuges that provide dedicated support to victims with protected characteristics and/or complex needs. These may include refuges for black and minority ethnic (BAME), LGBT and disabled victims and their children Dispersed accommodation Properties with Sanctuary Schemes or other enhanced security measures Other forms of emergency accommodation – e.g. respite accommodation or temporary accommodation Move-on and second-stage accommodation

The consultation found strong support for the definition as it covered a wide range of services that would give people experiencing abuse greater options and enable local authorities to better meet their needs (MHCLG, 2019a). Some respondents raised concerns that the definition was too broad and would incentivise the commissioning of non-specialist services that are primarily accommodation-based rather than specialist domestic abuse services. Some were concerned that it was drawn too narrowly and focussed

Current proposals  57

too strongly on accommodation and survivors having to leave their home to receive support. There was a widespread concern, however, that all services commissioned to provide services must be specialist domestic abuse provision rather than generic support services. In their response, the government has listened to these concerns and changed the definition from ‘accommodation-based domestic abuse services’ to ‘domestic abuse safe accommodation’. They state that this will make it clearer that the services that fall under the definition are specialist services that provide safe accommodation for survivors of abuse. The government also acknowledges the diversity of the sector and says that they will maintain a broad definition to include accommodation-based services and dispersed accommodation. There is also acknowledgement that the definitions of different service types may differ at local level. The government therefore proposes to specify definitions in regulations, supported by statutory guidance; these definitions are as follows (MHCLG, 2019a, p. 13): •

•

•

•

•

Refuge accommodation – a refuge offers accommodation and intensive support that is tied to that accommodation. Victims, including their children, must be refuge residents to access specialist emotional and practical support Specialist safe accommodation – safe accommodation services that provide dedicated specialist support to victims with protected characteristics and/or complex needs, such as specialist refuges for BAME, LGBT and disabled victims and their children Dispersed accommodation • Safe, self-contained accommodation with the same level of specialist domestic abuse support as provided within a refuge but which may be more suitable for victims who are unable to stay in a refuge with communal spaces due to complex support needs or for families with teenage sons, for example • Safe, self-contained ‘semi-independent’ accommodation which is not within a refuge but with floating support for victims who do not require the intense support offered through refuges Sanctuary Schemes – properties within Sanctuary Schemes or other similar schemes which provide enhanced security measures. A Sanctuary Scheme is a survivor-centred initiative which aims to make it possible for survivors of domestic abuse to remain in their own homes, where it is safe for them to do so, where it is their choice and where the perpetrator does not live in the accommodation. This is done by providing additional security – ‘installing a sanctuary’ – to the victims’ property or perimeter Move-on and/or second-stage accommodation – interchangeable terms for projects temporarily accommodating victims, including families who no longer need the intensive level of support provided in a refuge, but would still benefit from a lower level of domestic abuse specific

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•

support for a period before they move to fully independent and permanent accommodation. There is no expectation that every victim will require this. Many victims are ready to move straight to a permanent new home from refuge. However, move-on and/or second-stage accommodation may be helpful in some cases Other forms of domestic abuse emergency accommodation – i.e. a safe place with support. To give victims an opportunity to spend a temporary period to consider and make decisions in an environment which is self-contained and safe. This would include access to wrap around support and specialist support for victims with complex needs (including mental health needs and substance misuse)

The sector will no doubt welcome these changes in so far as they make clear that these will be specialist, domestic abuse services. The added focus on specialist services for BAME, LGBT and disabled people and their children is also welcome, and greater emphasis on this was a specific ask of some responses to the consultation.

Support In the consultation, the government proposed that support be defined as, “…the expert help provided to victims by the specialist staff in domestic abuse safe accommodation services”. They also acknowledged that this encompasses a wide breadth of services provided both in accommodation-based services and as outreach or community-based services. To try and capture the breadth of this support, the government proposed a definition of this support that encompassed the services provided by (MHCLG, 2019a, p. 15): • • • • • • • •

Service managers Refuge staff Key workers, including those which provide dedicated support or counselling/therapy to victims with protected characteristics and/or complex needs Children’s support workers Outreach workers providing housing-related support in safe accommodation Advice services Translators and interpreters Counsellors and therapists (for both adults and children)

In response to the consultation, many in the sector supported the proposed definition and the need to keep the definition broad to encompass the range of services provided. MHCLG (2019b) found that many responses stated that the definition is unclear and would be better framed

Current proposals  59

using the types of support people could receive rather than the job roles of those providing them. The government has taken these criticisms on board and agreed to amend the definition to one based on types of support, rather than job titles. Again, this is to be welcomed. A criticism of the Supporting People programme was that the definition of support and how it was provided was too tightly drawn and prevented some effective interventions (see Irving-Clarke, 2019). The commitment of the government to ensure that vital support is not seen as ‘out of scope’ by over prescriptive definitions is welcome. The new definition is as follows: • • • • •

• • •

Overall management of services – management of staff, payroll and maintaining relationships with the local authority, financial management of service (often undertaken by a service manager) Support with the day-to-day running of the service – i.e. organisation of days e.g. times for counselling, group activities, etc. Advocacy support – development of safety plans, liaison to other services (e.g. GPs and social workers, welfare benefits) Domestic abuse support – emotional support, support to assist victims to recognise the signs of abusive relationships, to help them remain safe (including online) and to prevent re-victimisation Specialist support for survivors with protected characteristics and/or complex needs. e.g. translators and interpreters, faith services, mental health advice and support, drug and alcohol advice and support, and immigration advice Children’s support – including play therapy and child advocacy Housing-related support – providing housing-related advice and support e.g. securing a permanent home and advice on how to live safely and independently Counselling and therapy for both adults and children

One area of disappointment to the sector will be that Independent Domestic Violence Advocates (IDVAs) and Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conferences (MARACs) are not included in the revised definition; this was a request of some respondents. In response, the government states that these have not been included in order to provide local authorities maximum flexibility in providing support and that IDVAs and MARACs are community-based interventions and therefore out of scope.

The statutory duty Perhaps, most importantly, the government proposed that Tier 1 (county and unitary) authorities be placed under a statutory duty that frames the delivery of support to people experiencing domestic abuse. This is to be welcomed as

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research (Irving-Clarke, 2016, 2019) has shown (in relation to supported housing generally) that duties produce action, where permissive powers often have not. The government proposed a four-part duty: 1

2 3 4

A duty on lead authorities to convene a multi-agency ‘Local Domestic Abuse Partnership Board’, which must perform certain specified functions, as outlined and explained in statutory guidance. These are to • Assess the need and demand for accommodation-based support for all victims, including those who require cross-border support • Develop and publish strategies for the provision of support to cover the locality and diverse groups of victims • Make commissioning/de-commissioning decisions • Meet the support needs of victims • Monitor and evaluate local delivery • Report back to central government A duty for lead authorities to have regard to statutory guidance in exercising these functions A duty on the Secretary of State to produce the statutory guidance A duty on Tier 2 district, borough and city councils and London Boroughs to co-operate with the Local Domestic Abuse Partnership Boards

The vast majority of responses were in favour of introducing such a duty and that it should be placed upon Tier 1 authorities – including the majority of Tier 1 and Tier 2 authorities (district and borough councils) that responded to the consultation. There was also wide agreement that Tier 2 authorities should be placed under a ‘duty to cooperate’ with Tier 1 authorities in meeting the duty. Indeed, some responses went further suggesting that Tier 2 authorities should be able to commission services using their local knowledge and expertise. There were also calls for the duty to extend to services outside of ‘safe accommodation’. In response, the government has stated that it will proceed with its plan to place the overall duty with Tier 1 authorities as it considers these bodies best placed to take a strategic view of their areas. Tier 2 authorities will be placed under a ‘duty to cooperate’ in order to ensure that their “…additional and more specific knowledge is fed into the area’s approach” (MHCLG, 2019a, p. 20). Further, under the new duty, Tier 2 authorities will be required to provide data to Tier 1 authorities in order to inform needs assessments and contribute to the overall development of the local strategy; they will also be required to report on outcomes where they have commissioned services. The government is clear that they expect Tier 2 authorities to play a key role in the delivery of the duty and that this will be made clear in the statutory guidance. In addition, it will be left open for Tier 1 authorities to delegate commissioning decisions to Tier 2 authorities by mutual consent.

Current proposals  61

Local partnership boards – representation In the consultation document, the government sets out a vision for a local partnership board to oversee and implement the local strategy. The consultation suggested that boards should be made up of representatives from the Tier 1 and relevant Tier 2 authorities, service providers, the police, health and other interested parties. The majority of responses agreed with the proposal to convene local partnership boards. Many responses stressed the importance of representation from local specialist domestic abuse services on boards, particularly from services supporting survivors from minority or marginalised communities. The necessity of hearing the voice of survivors was also highlighted by respondents. In response, the government will maintain the duty on Tier 1 authorities to convene a partnership board. However, the government will be content for local authorities to decide whether they use, expand or amend existing structures to carry out the duty. In responses to the consultation, many local authorities said that they had an existing body e.g. health and well-being boards, homelessness partnership boards or community safety partnership boards that could carry out this role. In allowing this flexibility, the government is also clear that the selected approach must be able to carry out all the requirements of the statutory duty and expectations of the forthcoming statutory guidance. The government also makes clear that whether new or existing, boards will be expected to have representation from specialist domestic abuse services in their area as well as the police, health and other relevant bodies. The government also commits itself to working with local authorities in setting up boards and sharing good practice examples where it identifies that the boards are working well.

Local partnership boards – accountability In recognition of the importance and value of partnership working between local authorities and other agencies involved in providing services to those experiencing domestic abuse, the government proposes the creation of partnership boards that will have a duty to • • • •

Assess the need for local services Develop a strategy to address the needs identified Commission services in line with the strategy Report back to government

Most respondents to the consultation agreed with the role and remit of the partnership board, although some said that boards must have a wider remit to encourage a more holistic approach to providing support. Respondents

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also raised the necessity for boards to look beyond their own borders and work across these boundaries to ensure that people crossing into another local authority to flee abuse receive the services they need. In response, the government has committed to developing the role of the board based on the proposals in the consultation. The government has also recognised that many people experiencing abuse cross local authority boundaries to seek help and support. The government will therefore make clear the expectation that local authorities have the systems and services in place to ensure that survivors crossing into other local authorities receive appropriate services.

Strategies The government has recognised that there is a strong correlation between those authorities that have a ‘domestic abuse’ strategy and those that prioritise providing services to survivors, particularly specialist, safe accommodation. This is the basis for the proposal that all Tier 1 authorities be required to put in place a strategy. They also acknowledge that this may mean Tier 1 authorities developing existing arrangements or starting from scratch, depending on their current arrangements. Respondents highlighted the need for adequate resources, including funding and staffing for local authorities to make this happen. Some respondents went further stating that secure, ring-fenced funding would be required. The government says that they are currently working with several local authorities to identify the cost of delivering the new duty and publish a “…full new burdens assessment in due course” (MHCLG, 2019a, p. 27). In their response, the government also commits to work with local authorities in order to identify the additional resources required to implement the new duty. The government also acknowledges that local authorities will require support and guidance in setting up the new systems and so commits to publishing “comprehensive guidance … this will include a standardised needs assessment and associated guidance” (MHCLG, 2019a, p. 27).

Needs assessments It was proposed that Partnership Boards should produce a local strategy for domestic abuse services. It was noted that a lack of robust, reliable data in many areas would make this problematic for some local authorities to plan services. To assist, the government proposed introducing a standardised needs assessment form. Most respondents to the consultation agreed with the proposal for a standardised form, commenting that it would help to ensure a fair allocation of resources and greater consistency across the country. However, in agreeing with the principle, some raised the need for the form to be designed

Current proposals  63

in a way that would allow local variations to be taken into consideration. Others pointed out that it would be regrettable if an over-prescriptive approach prevented some local authorities from carrying out a robust assessment. In terms of the frequency of re-assessment, respondents were split with some preferring an annual re-assessment, others saying this should be done every three years and some thought that there should be flexibility to allow for local differences. In response, the government stated that they will produce a standardised form for the needs assessment, accompanied by guidance that makes clear what is expected to be captured and how it should be completed. The government has also committed to working with stakeholders to ensure that it includes all relevant areas, is deliverable on the ground and is flexible enough to take account of local variations. In terms of frequency, the government will expect assessments to be carried out every three years but refreshed or updated annually. Local authorities will, however, be free to conduct needs assessments more frequently than every three years, should they so wish. The government will get a national picture of need and provision via local authority reporting.

Commissioning support services The government proposed that Tier 1 authorities should have responsibility for commissioning services in line with the local needs assessment and strategy. In recognition that local expertise lies within both Tier 1 and Tier 2 authorities, the government also proposed that decisions should be made in partnership with Tier 2 authorities. Respondents generally agreed with the proposal, but some raised concerns that lines of accountability could become “…lost and confusing” (MHCLG, 2019a, p. 31) and that government should make clear where overall responsibility lies. In response, the government proposes that Tier 1 authorities will act as convener and chair of the local partnership boards, but with a requirement that they pay due regard to the strategy and working with Tier 2 authorities, in recognition of their local expertise. In addition, it will be open to Tier 1 authorities to delegate commissioning decisions to Tier 2 authorities – where this is mutually agreed. The statutory guidance will make clear that where commissioning decisions are so delegated, adequate funding to fulfil the agreed requirements must also be forthcoming. Overall responsibility for fulfilling the duty will remain at Tier 1. Tier 2 authorities will be under a duty to provide Tier 1 authorities with any relevant data they have that will help the Tier 1 authority fulfil its statutory duty. Whilst it is acknowledged that specialist domestic abuse service providers have a key role to play on partnership boards, the government also states that it would be inappropriate for them to be present when commissioning decisions are made; this will ensure that such decisions are made on an open, fair and transparent basis.

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Reporting on outcomes To support the standardised needs assessment, the government also proposed standardised reporting to enforce stronger accountability on local authorities. The suggested themes for this reporting were • • • •

Evidence of an adequate needs assessment Evidence of commissioning decisions being informed by needs assessments Impact of decisions locally Evidence of adequate provision for all victims MHCLG (2019a, p. 33)

Most respondents to the consultation agreed with both the proposal for a standardised needs assessment and the suggested themes. However, many raised the need to ensure transparency in reporting and that the needs of service users are represented. Likewise, there were suggestions that service outcomes and the voice of service users inform the reporting themes. The government has therefore committed to developing a standardised reporting format, stating that this will help central government understand what is happening locally, what the challenges are, where funding is being best used, good practice and hold authorities accountable where the needs of people experiencing abuse are not being met. The government acknowledges the need to further develop the reporting themes and explore the need for additional themes to ensure that the views and experiences of service users are considered. Central government will also use this information to build up a national picture of service provision, identify areas they may require further support, identify best practice and ensure value for money at national level. Summary data will be presented to a national steering group that will monitor and evaluate progress.

National oversight The government proposes to create a ministerial National Steering Group to oversee and evaluate delivery of the new duty. Membership of the group might include representatives from local government, the police, health bodies and specialist domestic abuse services. Other parts of government would also be represented to ensure a joined-up approach, including the domestic abuse commissioner. Most respondents agreed with the role and remit suggested for the steering group. However, a significant number of responses indicated that whilst they were largely happy with the role and remit, they thought that the steering group needed greater powers in order to be effective. There was also wide agreement with the proposed membership of the

Current proposals  65

group but with many respondents calling for membership to be widened to include the Ministry of Justice; Police; and departments of Education, and Health and Social Care to ensure a truly cross-governmental approach. In response, the government has committed to develop and publish ‘terms of reference’ to clarify the role and remit of the steering group. This will include setting out the desired delivery outcomes and expectation about which bodies will form the group. The government also acknowledges the view that other government departments should be represented and commits to ensuring that the membership of the group ensures cross-departmental working – including working with the domestic abuse commissioner and Home Office to define their roles. The group will be expected to carry out the following tasks: • • • • • •

Review the operation of local needs assessments and provision of ‘­domestic abuse safe accommodation’ across the country (England) Consider, specifically, services for people who share one of more protected characteristics and where these serve a national rather than local need Monitor deliver of progress by comparing data and outcomes yearon-year Consider where monitoring information indicates that an area(s) needs support in order to deliver the duty Consider where changes to the statutory guidance are necessary Publish an annual report summarising progress across the country, sharing best practice and setting service standards

Statutory guidance MHCLG proposed setting statutory guidance in order to set a clear vision for the delivery of safe accommodation and the priorities for these services. Most responses to the consultation agreed strongly with the suggestion for statutory guidance. Many responses mentioned the requirement for adequate and sustainable funding to support meeting the requirements of the statutory duty. Some respondents also said that they would like to see the guidance broadened to include support provided outside of safe accommodation. In response, the government commits to producing statutory guidance to underpin the duty and that they will require all local authorities to have ‘due regard’ to this guidance. It will also be made clear that all services commissioned under this duty should meet clear quality standards along the lines of the Violence against Women and Girls National Statement of Expectations and MHCLG’s Priorities for Domestic Abuse.

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Providing support to all victims The government is clear in the consultation document that they want to ensure that all people experiencing abuse receive the services they need to recover from trauma and move on with their lives; this includes children. Many respondents to the consultation agreed that the proposed policy would help meet the needs of all people experiencing abuse. However, a significant number thought that more needed to be done in this regard. In particular, these respondents said that more needs to be done in respect of people with disabilities and LGBT+ people and people from BAME backgrounds and that there should be greater linkage with wider community-based, domestic abuse services. In response, the government reiterates its commitment to ensuring that all people experiencing abuse received the services they need. MHCLG will continue to work with all government departments to ensure that services are joined up and to explore the cross-governmental approach to tackling abuse. The statutory guidance will make clear that partnership boards will be required to take steps to understand the additional barriers that people with protected characteristics face in accessing services. Local strategies will also need to clearly show how Tier 1 authorities working with and through the board will address the barriers they identify. The government will also encourage local authorities to work in partnership and pool funding to provide services that address the needs of people experiencing abuse. There is also acknowledgement that some migrants experiencing domestic abuse do not have immediate access to support services. There is a commitment therefore to follow the recommendation of the Joint Committee on the Draft Domestic Abuse Bill to undertake a review into the overall response to migrants experiencing abuse. Assessment of whether the support needs of all people experiencing abuse are being addressed will be a standing agenda item for the national steering group.

The Domestic Abuse Bill 2019 In the recent Queen’s Speech (Prime Minister’s Office, 2019), following the 2019 general election, the incoming Conservative government committed to carrying forward the Domestic Abuse Bill (HM Government, 2019) into the new parliamentary session. The Bill is based on work by the previous administration and stems from commitments to address domestic abuse and Violence against Women and Girls (VAWG) by Theresa May MP, first as Home Secretary then as Prime Minister. Whilst this book is about housing and the policy responses to domestic abuse, we give an outline of the measures proposed in the bill here.

Current proposals  67

The stated purpose of the Bill is to transform the response to domestic abuse to better protect victims and their children, ensuring that they have the support they need, and offenders are brought to justice (Prime Minister’s Office, 2019). The same document gives the main benefits of the Bill as • • •

Changing the justice system to better serve victims of domestic abuse Reducing offending and re-offending by perpetrators Strengthening the support for victims and their children provided by local authorities and other statutory agencies

In order to do this, the Bill will create a statutory definition of domestic abuse that emphasises that domestic abuse is not just physical or sexual violence, but can also involve emotional, coercive or controlling, and economic abuse. A new ‘domestic abuse offence’ will be created in Northern Ireland in order to criminalise coercive or controlling behaviour. The role of the Domestic Abuse Commissioner will be placed on a statutory footing; their role will be to • • •

Stand up for victims and survivors of abuse Raise public awareness of abuse Monitor the responses of local authorities, the justice system and other statutory agencies and hold them to account in tackling domestic abuse

The Bill will also introduce new injunctions to better protect people experiencing abuse. Domestic Abuse Protection Notices and Domestic Abuse Protection Orders will enable the Courts to place restrictions and other requirements on perpetrators. As detailed above, the Bill will place a duty on Tier 1 local authorities in England (County Councils, Metropolitan and Unitary Authorities and the GLA) to provide support to victims of domestic abuse and their children in refuges and other safe accommodation. Where cases of abuse go to criminal trial, there will be a statutory presumption that survivors of domestic abuse are eligible for special measures in the criminal courts (for example, to enable them to give evidence via a video link). Perpetrators of abuse will also be prevented from cross-examining their victims in person, in the family courts. In addition, guidance supporting the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme (Home Office, 2016) (Clare’s Law) will be placed on a statutory footing. Finally, the Bill will extend the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the UK courts so that, where appropriate, UK nationals and residents who commit certain violent and sexual offences outside the UK may be brought to trial in the UK.

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A return to specialism? As we have detailed in the previous chapters, original refuge provision was provided by women for women along a feminist ethos. Over time, these refuges, provided in squats, were made to comply with fire and other safety regulations, and local authorities also provided premises for refuges as a result of pressure from the women’s sector. Local authorities used their leverage in this area to bring the nascent refuge movement into their ambit, thus diluting the original ethos. During the 1980s, the ‘right to buy’ and ending of local authority investment in council housing meant that housing associations became the (almost) sole vehicle for new refuge provision. This meant that refuges were further drawn into what were seen as ‘patriarchal’ management structures and that senior managers in housing associations, with responsibility for overseeing refuge provision, were very often male; a specific feature of early refuge provision was that they were a ‘women only space’ and that men were expressly excluded. The New Labour years were marked by the Supporting People programme, a general funding and regulatory framework for ‘housing-related support services’. Refuge provision fell within the remit of the programme and so was subject to its generic requirements on quality and service provision. Whilst the programme brought welcome, secure funding, it also continued the pattern of making refuge services increasingly generic, and the commissioning structures enabled non-specialist providers to tender to provide services. This slide towards generic provision was further exacerbated by the financial crash (in 2008) and removal of the ring-fence on Supporting People funds (in 2010), as local authorities increasingly decommissioned specialist services and relied more heavily on generic ‘floating support’ teams (see Irving-Clarke, 2019). The current proposals at least herald an acknowledgement that domestic abuse is a specialist service area that requires a range of services provided by expert providers. Whilst it may be too late to reverse many of the changes wrought by the Thatcher and New Labour reforms to the wider environment, the proposals in the consultation response (MHCLG, 2019a) and Domestic Abuse Bill (HM Government, 2019) do at least acknowledge the necessity of a specialist response to domestic abuse due to the unique nature of it and the gravity of its impact on the lives of the people who experience it.

References HM Government (2019) Transforming the Response to Domestic Abuse Consultation Response and Draft Bill, HMSO, London. Home Office (2016) Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme (DVDS) Guidance, Home Office, London.

Current proposals  69 Irving-Clarke, Y. (2019) Supporting Housing: Past, Present and Future, Routledge, Abingdon. MHCLG (2019a) Domestic Abuse Services: Future Delivery of Support to Victims and Their Children in Accommodation-based Domestic Abuse Services: Consultation Response, MHCLG, London. MHCLG (2019b) Domestic Abuse Services Future Delivery of Support to Victims and their Children in Accommodation-based Domestic Abuse Services, MHCLG, London. Prime Minister’s Office (2019) The Queen’s Speech, Prime Minister’s Office, London.

Part 3

Domestic abuse and wider housing policy issues

Chapter 6

(Social) housing policy and domestic abuse

The role of (social) housing policy in doing this has a relatively short history with the major advances in addressing domestic abuse coming from activists and voluntary organisations. Our main thesis in this chapter is that social housing and housing policy more generally has a key role to play in addressing domestic abuse. And, ironically that at the time when council housing was at its zenith (1968–79) (Stephens et al., 2018), domestic abuse (the term used then being domestic violence) violence was hardly on the policy agenda at all. As domestic abuse has made it onto the main policy agenda, the residualisation of and stigma around social housing coupled with a singular focus on anti-social behaviour has side-lined its role in addressing domestic abuse. In arguing this case, the first question to answer is why should we care? What contribution can housing policy make to addressing domestic abuse? This is where we begin.

The role of social housing policy Research by SafeLives (2015) has highlighted that victims of domestic abuse accessing support from Gentoo (a housing provider in the North East of England) had, on average, experienced abuse for three years prior to engaging with the service. This is compared with four years on average in the national data set (ibid). (The national data set is made up of 40 services that are largely specialist domestic abuse services.) Housing and related support can have a positive impact on people’s lives. For example, Menard (2001) has shown that the availability of safe, affordable and stable housing makes a difference to the ability to escape an abusive partnership and remain safe and independent. Likewise, Websdale and Johnson (1997) show that appropriate services and support can have a positive impact on women’s ability to end abusive relationships. Zweig and Burt (2007) found that women felt that the services were more helpful when they experienced positive staff behaviour meaning that they felt in control in their interactions with staff. They (Zweig & Burt) make the case for housing providers being trained to recognise and respond to domestic abuse.

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Housing providers, then, can have an important role to play in addressing abuse and could be a key source of assistance from outside the criminal justice system. To fully understand the role of social housing policy in relation to domestic abuse, it is necessary to understand the origins of policy in this area and the factors that have influenced and shaped its current position. Therefore, the chapter opens by giving a brief history of social housing and related policies before offering a definition of social housing in the present. In this book, we argue that the focus of housing policy has been around anti-social behaviour (ASB), and as such, housing providers are often not equipped to recognise and respond to domestic abuse. We further contend that when the housing sector does respond to domestic abuse, it often does so in an anti-social behaviour framework, and this does not offer an adequate or appropriate response. In the late-1990s, a ‘moral panic’ (Cohen, 2011) around social housing and ASB led to a singular focus on it within housing policy, and the resulting quasi-legislative framework focused upon domestic abuse as a facet of ASB rather than a distinct issue with its own logics, dynamics and solutions. This chapter is intended as a grounding in social housing policy as a contextual basis for reading the rest of the book. We open then with a history of social housing.

A brief history of social housing … Social housing has a relatively short history in the UK with much of it being constructed as part of the post-war welfare state (c.1945–79). Prior to this housing for the poorest people was via Houses of Industry or Correction, workhouses or ‘lunatic asylums’ (see Irving-Clarke [2016, 2019] for a full account). There were also pockets of charitably provided housing, for example almshouses provided by religious groups or the mercantile class (see Pannell & Thomas, 1999). The origins of social housing, as we think of it today, are commonly traced back to the early 20th century and Octavia Hill’s efforts around the London slums. Her overall aim was to make “lives noble, homes happy and family life good” (www.octaviahill.org). Her moralistic and paternalistic approach was that properties should be left to tenants at a high standard, and in return, tenants would be expected to ‘moderate’ (change) their behaviour. This approach is still in evidence today in both housing and welfare policy. For example, Carr et al. (2007) see crime control in relation to housing as a new problematisation of the housing crisis, adding that this has echoes of the foundations of housing policy in the 19th century and Victorian concerns around pauperised deviance (Cowan & McDermont, 2006). Watts and Fitzpatrick (2018) outline the use of welfare policy as a paternalistic tool to drive behaviour change especially since 2010 first by a Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition and then solely Conservative governments. They argue

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that these governments have pursued welfare policies that further residualise housing as a welfare provision as well as introducing a punitive welfare system designed to drive behaviour change in claimants. Using policy in this way has a long history; see Irving-Clarke (2016, 2019) and Mead (2001) for example. The Housing and Working Classes Act 1890 empowered local authorities in London to build housing for poorer communities and charge reasonable, fair rents. This was the first time the state had played a role in the provision of housing to a noticeable extent. Councils had to re-house a least half of the people displaced by these slum clearances. A decade later, the Housing of the Working Classes Act 1900 extended the 1890 Act to areas outside London and allowed councils to buy land outside their own districts. This led to the roll out of the subsequent ‘Homes fit for Heroes’ (Yorke, 2017) via the Housing and Town Planning Act 1919 which introduced a national housing programme that highlighted the shortage of good quality homes for men returning from First World War. At the start of First World War, nearly 90% of households lived in the ­private-rented sector, with most of the remainder being owner occupiers (King, 2006). The outbreak of the war led to large-scale demographic change as working-age men were conscripted to fight, and there were gaps in the labour force. The need to produce munitions and other war supplies meant that those left (mainly women) moved en masse to cities in order to work in factories. Construction of new homes was also at a standstill as materials were directed to the war effort; this led to a shortage of urban housing, and as a result, rents increased dramatically. This led to a number of “rent strikes” in areas such as Glasgow (whose shipyards were vital to the war effort); in response, the government introduced fixed rents and mortgage interest at 1914 levels via the Rent and Mortgage Interests (War Restrictions Act) 1915. The housing shortage was only made worse after the war ended as soldiers returned and started families (King, 2006). Burnett (1993) argues that these factors were pivotal in terms of post-war social policy, and there was an acceptance for the first time that private enterprise would not be able to produce enough quality homes at affordable prices and that the state had a role. Ironically, this very issue is reflected in the current debate around housing supply some 100 years later. The idea that the market could not provide homes for all led to a ‘safety net’ provided by the state to provide for those who were unable to access the market. However, the interwar years saw an explosion in owner-occupation as wages rose in real terms, house prices remained static and the creation of building societies with high levels of liquidity allowed a stable, secure base for investment. Thus, the sector with the highest growth between the wars was owner-occupiers and at a time of cuts to local authority grants. The Second World War had a dramatic effect on the provision of housing by the state. The government was faced with the two-pronged problem

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of a housing shortage (caused by bomb damage) and, again, returning soldiers and the related “baby-boom” and growth in household formation (Irving-Clarke, 2016). The Beveridge Report (1942) introduced the concept of a comprehensive state safety net to protect its citizens from the five giant evils in society (squalor, ignorance, want, idleness and disease) from cradle to grave. With the words of Beveridge ringing in its ears, the Labour government, led by Clement Atlee, chose to meet the demand for new homes mainly via large-scale local authority building programmes. House building numbers remained at over 150,000 units per annum right through the 1950s and were still above 80,000 per annum throughout the 1970s. It was in good financial shape with many older council properties were free of debt enabling reductions in rent or used to subsidise further building. By 1971, councils housed almost one in three households (and would do so until the early 1980s), owner occupation was also growing and fewer than one in five households were privately renting – this number would continue to fall. In addition, two-thirds of working-age social renters were in fulltime jobs, the broad tenant base and strong position of social housing could have been a springboard for further expansion (Stephens et al., 2018). However, Tucker (1966) argues that the high-volume building for slum clearance did not have the earlier post-war commitment on building quality homes resulting in both the standard and status of social housing falling. At the same time, the link between housing and its impact on all areas of life was established. Housing was promoted as a crucial political issue; the manifesto on which the Conservatives fought the 1951 election, which stated that: Housing is the first of the social services. It is also one of the keys to increased productivity. Work, family life, health and education are all undermined by crowded houses. Therefore, a Conservative and Unionist Government will give housing a priority second only to national defence. Conservative Party (1951) Despite seeing housing as second only to national defence at the 1951 General Election, the Conservative government of Harold Macmillan (1957–63) was the first to challenge the ‘post-war consensus’ by questioning the mass provision of housing by the state. Housing is often cited as ‘the wobbly ­pillar’ under the welfare state (Torgerson, 1987, pp. 116–26) because of the partial extent in which it has been considered as a responsibility of government and of social policy. The ideological debate about the state’s role in mass housing provision and the encouragement of those who could do so to move out of social housing was twinned with the fact that social housing was becoming less easily available. Local authorities were encouraged to allocate council housing on need rather than desert following the Cullingworth Report (1969) meaning that the essence of social housing was changing. Mullins and Murie (2006)

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point out that council housing had always been provided to those who could afford the rent, e.g. the more affluent working class and that those who could not afford to pay were residualised in the sub-standard private-rented sector (or worse). In 1979, 20% of families in the top decile of income distribution lived in social housing compared to almost zero by 2004/2005. Prior to the 1970s, council rents were directly linked to the actual cost of provision (as opposed to being market driven), and there were no “­subject subsidies” e.g. compulsory rent rebates or housing benefit to assist with housing costs (ibid). These were not introduced until the early 1970s (King, 2006). The introduction of compulsory rent rebates in the Housing Finance Act 1972 broke the link between the cost of provision and rents charged and began the residualisation of the poorest people in council housing by removing the cost of a social rent as a disqualifying factor. Residualisation is defined by Malpass and Murie (1982, p. 174) as: The process whereby public housing [and other social housing] moves towards a position in which it provides only a ‘safety net’ for those who for reasons of poverty, age or infirmity cannot obtain suitable accommodation in the private sector. Until this point, council housing had been an aspirational tenure for the relatively wealthy working class (CIH, 2018a). Prior to the 1972 Act, local authorities did have the power to charge a subsidised rent on a discretionary basis, but as Cowan and Marsh (2018) point out, the lack of security of tenure (only introduced in Right to Buy legislation during the 1980s) left households vulnerable to eviction at the whim of local authorities, and withdrawal of subsidised rent could be used as a lever to produce a desired result e.g. moving to a smaller property in cases of under-occupation (CHAC, 1953, p. 14). Although Cowan and Marsh note that this was not a common practice. The Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 continued the residualisation of the poorest people in council housing, local authorities now had a duty to house people considered vulnerable under the law and provide financial assistance to help them afford the rents. Council housing was thus used to discharge this duty, and the introduction of compulsory rent rebates (subsequently Housing Benefit and now the housing element in Universal Credit) meant that, as stated previously, affordability was no longer a disqualifying factor; although Malpass and Victory (2010) find that this residualisation was implicit in and result of housing policy throughout the 20th century. The election of a Conservative government under Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher in 1979, altered the course of housing policy permanently. Her adherence to the monetarist policies of Milton Friedman, which prescribed limited state intervention in a ‘self-correcting’ free market, drove housing policy during the 1980s and well beyond (Irving-Clarke, 2016, 2019). Gough (1980) argues that an ideological attack on welfare was firmly cemented by

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the Thatcher government, although he suggests this was largely initiated by the Labour governments of Wilson and Callaghan in 1975. He further argues that the qualitative shifts in social policy were aimed at reasserting individualism, promoting self-reliance and family responsibility and ultimately dismantling the ideology of the collective social provision of the post-war era (Henderson, 2019). The Conservative mantra focused on setting people free from government constraints on their lives by rolling back the state. The Conservative government re-emphasised a commitment to market provision of housing, promoting a revival of the private-rented sector and a belief in extending home ownership with social housing being aimed only at those who could not compete in the market. Clarke et al. (2000) argue that this was a permanent revolution impacting on the scale, forms and social relationships of welfare. Gough (1980) argues that the emergence of neo-liberal policy represented a sea change in the ideological approach to welfare and housing. Driving policy was the government’s preference for home ownership over other tenures (see Gurney, 1999) depicted in the Housing Act 1980 which introduced the controversial, flagship ‘Right to Buy’ policy. Local authority tenants could now purchase their property at a discount dependent on how long they had been a tenant. The policy proved extremely popular with voters and has never been fully repealed by successive governments of either party in England, although the Housing Act 2004 introduced stricter regulations including a tighter time frame in which tenants could sell after purchase and with less discount to buy. The Scottish Government and the Welsh Assembly have both ended it in a bid to protect social housing stock from further reduction and ensuring that the state can provide safe, secure accommodation to those who are unable to buy or rent their own home (­discussed fully later). The effects of the ‘Right to Buy’ policy were manifold and widespread; it removed much of the most desirable and sought after stock from the social housing sector, without a replacement building programme (Forrest & Murie, 1988). This point is borne out by Manns (2017) who stated that since the introduction of the policy, it is estimated that over two million properties have been moved into private ownership. This depletion of stock has an adverse effect on women fleeing domestic abuse and is discussed later in the chapter. It also served to deepen the divide between owner occupation and the social-rented sector. Lund (2011, p. 142) argues that Right to Buy and other policies resulted in a continued concentration of low-income households in the social housing sector with those accessing social housing increasingly in the greatest housing and social need. Social housing was becoming more synonymous with welfare, and a clear polarisation of the housing market was established. Hills argues that housing policy hardly existed anymore but survived within the welfare state, “mainly as an adjunct of

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social security (through Housing Benefit) or as part of wider city regeneration policies” (Hills, 1998, p. 13 quoted in Tunstall, 2015). The Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s continued the doctrinaire repositioning of state-controlled housing out of the government arena via the Housing and Planning Act 1988 which gave councils the option of transferring all or part of their housing to another landlord, such as a Registered Social Landlord (RSL). The 1988 Act allowed council tenants (as a whole) to choose to transfer their existing homes to another landlord, either a separate housing association (large-scale voluntary transfer [LSVT]) or arms-length management organisation (ALMO), operated by the local authority but managed autonomously. The election of a Labour government (under Tony Blair) in 1997 saw some change in the fortunes of social housing. Although they continued the policy of seeing home ownership as the pinnacle of housing, but also initiated a major investment in the social housing stock under the Decent Homes Programme, they invested in housing-related support via the Supporting People programme and made major inroads into tackling homelessness and rough sleeping. However, the Thatcherite ‘right to buy’ policy continued as did LSVTs and creation of ALMOs to transfer housing stock out of direct local authority control. These measures further residualised social housing as a tenure for those on the lowest incomes (CIH, 2018a). Malpass and Victory (2010) argue that the trajectory of welfare reform continued under the New Labour governments, although there was recognition that welfare and housing policies needed to be better aligned. Pawson and Mullins (2010) argue that New Labour perceived council housing as a ‘redundant project’ with low demand, poor quality stock and saw the issue through the lens of poverty and limited life chances and opportunities, not merely as a matter of giving tenants more choice of landlord. Labour recognised that there was a stigma attached to the widening difference between homeowners and those living in estates with low demand and poverty, with the term ‘sink’ estate becoming used by many commentators. Tony Blair stated in “Bringing Britain Together – a national strategy for neighbourhood renewal”: Over the last two decades the gap between these worst estates and the rest of the country has grown…It shames us as a nation, it wastes lives and we all have to pay the costs of dependency and social division. Cm 4045 (1998, p. 1) The stigmatising of social housing tenants and the individual impact was outlined by Hanley in her experience of growing up in social housing and the impact it had on her life, “Estates is a bruise in the form of a word: it hits the nerves that register shame, disgust, fear and, very occasionally, fierce

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pride” (Hanley, 2012, p. 20). She goes on to summarise the feeling of social exclusion in social housing for many: Estates mean alcoholism, drug addiction, relentless petty stupidity, a kind of stir craziness induced by chronic poverty and the human mind caged by the rigid bars of class and learned incuriosity. Hanley, (2012, p. 7) In conjunction with stigma of social housing put forward by Hanley, there is also the juxtaposition of its scarcity. The truth is that council housing is a living tomb. You dare not give up the house because you might never get another but staying is to be trapped in a ghetto of both place and mind. Hutton (2007) New Labour did, however, recognise the need to improve the housing product on offer. The Housing Green Paper, “Quality and Choice: A Decent Home for All” (DETR, 2000), aimed to bring all social housing into decent condition by 2010. It required authorities with remaining stock to undertake an options appraisal to identify how they would secure resources to meet the new Decent Homes Standard. For many, the only option in raising funds to improve homes was to consider an LSVT. This continued the Conservative approach of removing housing from the public sector with almost a million homes removed from local authority ownership via LSVT between 1997 and 2009. New Labour reflected the Conservative approach in that it saw the state in an enabling role in relation to housing as opposed to necessarily providing and managing it. In describing the effects of policy on social housing, theorists reference the terms residualisation (Forrest & Murie, 1983, 1988; Malpass, 1990), privatisation (Forrest & Murie, 1983, 1988; Ginsburg, 2005), transformation (Hickman and Robinson, 2006) and restructuring (Pawson, 2006) which they see as descriptors used in “‘a discourse of decline’ in that social housing became more focused on housing the least well off ” (Malpass & Victory, 2010). This is closely linked to the development of policy in the field of ‘anti-social behaviour’ which is discussed fully in a later chapter.

Defining social housing in the present As CIH (2018a, 2018b) points out, the answer to this question appears self-explanatory. Many people have a priori assumptions about this, but as is pointed out in these documents, many of these assumptions are mistaken. The nature and role of social housing has changed and continues to change across space and time. As a descriptor, it is unusual in that it may be used

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to describe the overall concept, the homes themselves and the group of organisations that provide it (CIH, 2018a). A variety of organisations provides homes for social rent, market rent, outright sale, shared ownership and (­so-called) affordable rent (rented at up to 80% of the market rate) (ibid). For the purposes of this book, we are generally talking about housing let for “social rent” (about 60% of the market rate) although some other tenure types e.g. Affordable Rent (up to 80% of the market rate) and Shared Ownership (a tenure where a social landlord and the inhabitant share ownership) are also sometimes included. The state’s emergency response to domestic abuse, refuges and related accommodation falls under the rubric of supported housing (see Irving-Clarke, 2016, 2019). Discussions about social housing are especially relevant to the English context as it has a comparatively large social housing sector at some 17% of all dwellings (Fitzpatrick & Watts, 2017; Wilcox et al., 2015). Hills (2007) gives the following definition “…housing that is provided, normally at sub-market rents, by not for profit landlords” (p. 18), with profits reinvested back into supply (CIH, 2018a). Hills also ascribes values to social housing that is easily recognisable, higher quality for a lower price, protecting affordability and having a leading role in neighbourhood renewal and regeneration. Fitzpatrick and Stephens (2007) agree that social housing is normally let at below market rents adding that it is often allocated by an administrative process rather than market mechanisms. This has been challenged by the emergence and expansion of Choice-Based Lettings (CBL) since 2000 (Brown & King, 2005; Marsh et al., 2004) although the former argues that CBL retains many of the administrative features of allocation-based systems with only an illusion of choice. Social housing then can broadly be thought of as housing that is provided at lower than the market rate, allocated by some administrative process (as opposed to market mechanisms), has some wider social or community purpose and provided by organisations that seek to reinvest their surpluses into further provision, rather than paying dividends to shareholders. However, the nature and role of social housing is not static and, as we have tried to show, has changed significantly over time and space. Malpass and Victory (2010) suggest that the changes have been from “public” to “­social” housing (p. 7) from municipal to residual, local authority ownership with local democratic accountability to managerialist with heavy regulation from the centre. Alongside this, Fitzpatrick and Watts (2017) argue that social housing has moved from being a secure tenure for a range of households to an “ambulance service” for those in the most need or having been ‘welfare-ised’. Following a general election in late-2019, the Conservatives were returned to government with a parliamentary majority of some 80 seats. Whilst we await their detailed policy proposals regarding housing, the manifesto made several commitments in this area (CIH, 2019; Conservative Party, 2019).

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First, to bring forward a white paper that sets out measures to empower tenants and support the continued supply of social homes and second to build one million homes over the five years of the parliament. There are also commitments to support home ownership by introducing long-term, fixed-rate mortgages, deposits of only 5% of a house’s value and expanding the ‘First Home Programme’ (CIH, 2019, p. 2) for local buyers to access a 30% discount. The Right to Buy scheme for Councils is to be continued and joined by a similar scheme for Housing Association homes (following a successful pilot [Conservative Party, 2019]). Private renting will also be reformed by enabling lifetime rental deposits, ending Section 21 (no fault) evictions and making changes to the balance of power between tenants and landlords in favour of the former (where they adhere to the terms of the tenancy). There were also commitments to continue with the role out of Universal Credit, increase funding for social care and invest considerably in local, social infrastructure e.g. community centres, libraries, youth clubs and a ‘safe streets fund’.

Concluding comments This, alongside the preceding chapters in the part, has tracked the definition of the refuge movement from its inception in the 1960s and 1970s, through the Thatcher, Major, Blair and Brown governments of the 1980s and 1990s to the present. Drawing on the policy implementation literature and theory of ‘organisational isomorphism’, we have tried to show that whilst the refuge began as a genuine grass roots, bottom-up movement, it has been irrevocably shaped by the necessity to adapt to the economic and regulatory environment it operates in. This began to occur from the earliest days of the movement. The requirement to meet fire safety regulations and other health and safety rules soon compromised the ‘no woman turned away’ ethos of the early refuges. These refuges were also often based in squats where the women and children often lived in very poor conditions, and fire safety equipment was not available. The price of securing funding or premises from local authorities was compliance with these and other rules that compromised the original feminist ethos. This continued into the 1980s under the Thatcher government, and housing associations became the main providers of housing and only organisations with access to government grant funding to build bespoke refuge provision. Working with housing associations on improving existing refuges or building new provision meant becoming part of the management structures of the sector. These were hierarchical in nature rather than the collectivist decision-making processes used in the first refuges. They were also largely made up of men, thus compromising the ‘for us, by us’ ethos. There were also wider forces at work. As discussed in Chapter 2, the emphasis was now upon using policy networks to deliver policy objectives – the

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existence of housing associations as non-governmental delivery bodies is evidence of this. Organisations running refuges now had to work with omnibus partners in delivering services. Access to funding and these partnership arrangements meant falling in line with the management orthodoxies of the time. Funding too was now provided not via the government or local authorities but in many cases via charities e.g. the National Lottery or Comic Relief. The governance and performance management frameworks used by these organisations continued pushing all organisations to look similar in structure. This direction of travel perhaps reached its zenith under Blair and Brown’s New Labour. The Supporting People programme funded refuges alongside hostels, floating support, probation, health and other services. It had a distinct regulatory and funding structure of its own that meant that refuge providers had to conform in order to obtain funding, even when this compromised their ethos. In a ten-year longitudinal study (1995–2005) of a London domestic abuse partnership, Harvie and Manzi (2011) noted a transformation in service delivery from an approach that was strongly influenced by feminist ideology towards one focused on legalism and bureaucratic politics. They concluded that although it was the government’s intention to empower the local community, in practice, working in a multi-agency setting led, instead, to a reduction in power of local women’s groups. More recently, and in response to pressure from the sector, the (Conservative) government has made moves towards refuges and other ‘violence against women and girls’ (VAWG) organisations becoming more specialist in their outlook and provision. This is covered fully in the final part alongside the ‘whole housing approach’ – the sector’s desired outcome for these services.

References Brown, T. & King, P. (2005) Allocations and lettings: tasking customer choice forward in England?, European Journal of Social Policy 5(3) pp. 343–57. Burnett, J. (1993) A Social History of Housing 1815–1985, Routledge, Abingdon. Carr et al. (2002) Positive behaviour support: Evolution of an applied science, Journal of Positive Behaviour 4 pp. 4–46. Central Housing Advisory Committee (CHAC) (1953) Transfers, Exchanges and Rents, HMSO, London. CIH (2018a) Rethinking Social Housing, CIH, Coventry. CIH (2018b) Rethinking Social Housing: Review of the Evidence, CIH, Coventry. CIH (2019) What You Need to Know about Housing and General Election 2019, CIH, Coventry. Clarke, J. et al. (eds) (2000) New Managerialism, New Welfare?, SAGE Publications, London. Cm4045 (1988) Bringing Britain Together: A National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal, Social Exclusion Unit, London.

84  Domestic abuse and wider housing policy Cohen, S. (2011) Folk Devils and Moral Panics, Routledge, Abingdon. Conservative Party (1951) General Election Manifesto, Conservative Party, London. Conservative Party (2019) Get Brexit Done: Unleash Britain’s Potential. The Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto 2019, The Conservative Party, London. Cowan, D. & Marsh, A. (2018) A perennial problem? On underoccupation in English Council Housing, Housing Studies 34(2) pp. 319–37. Cowan, D. & McDermont, M. (2006) Regulating Social Housing, Routledge, Abingdon. Cullingworth Report (1969) Cullingworth Committee Report on Council Housing: Purposes, Procedures and Priorities, HMSO, London. DETR (2000) “Quality and Choice: A Decent Home for All”, HMSO, London. Fitzpatrick, S. & Stephens, M. (2007) An International Review of Homelessness and Social Housing Policy, CLG, London. Fitzpatrick, S. & Watts, B. (2017) Competing visions: security of tenure and the welfarisation of English social housing, Housing Studies 32(8) pp. 1021–38. Forrest, R. & Murie, A. (1983) Residualization and council housing: aspects of the changing social relations of housing tenure, Journal of Social Policy 12(4) pp. 453–68. Forrest, R. & Murie, A. (1988) Selling the Welfare State: The Privatisation of Public Housing, Routledge, London. Ginsburg, N. (2005) The privatisation of council housing, Critical Social Policy 25(1) pp. 115–135. Gough, I. (1980) Thatcherism and the welfare state: Britain is experiencing the most far-reaching experiment in ‘new right’ politics in the western world, Marxism ­Today pp. 7–12. Gurney, C. (1999) Pride and prejudice: discourses of normalisation in public and private accounts of home ownership, Housing Studies 4(2) pp. 163–83. Hanley, L. (2012) Estates: An Intimate History, Granta Books, London. Harvie, D. & Manzi, T. (2011) Interpreting multi-agency partnerships: Ideology, discourse and domestic violence, Social and Legal Studies 20(1) pp. 79–95. Henderson, K. (2019) The Role of Housing in a Coordinated Community Response to Domestic Abuse, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Durham. Hickman, P. and Robinson, D. (2006) Transforming social housing: taking stock of new complexities, Housing Studies 21(2) pp. 157–70. Hills, J. (2007) Ends and Means: The Future Roles of Social Housing in England, CLG, London. Hutton, W. (February 18, 2007) Open the gates and free people from Britain’s ghetto, The Observer. Irving-Clarke, Y. (2016) Supporting People: How Did We Get Here and What Does It Mean for the Future? Unpublished PhD Thesis, De Montfort University, Leicester. Irving-Clarke, Y. (2019) Supported Housing: Past Present and Future, Routledge, Abingdon. King, P. (2006) Choice and End of Social Housing, IEA, London. Lund, B. (2011) Understanding Housing Policy (2nd edition), Policy Press, Bristol. Malpass, P. (1990) Reshaping Housing Policy. Subsidies, Rents and Residualisation, Routledge, London. Malpass, P. & Murie, A. (1982) Housing Policy and Practice, MacMillan, London.

(Social) housing policy and domestic abuse  85 Malpass, P. & Victory, C. (2010) The modernisation of social housing in England, Journal of Housing Policy 10(1) pp. 3–18. Manns, J. (2017) The housing crisis will only get worse until England scraps the right to buy https://www.theguardian.com/housing-network/2017/oct/11/housing-crisisengland-scrap-right-to-buy-help-to-buy, Accessed 18/2/20. Marsh, A. et al. (2004) Piloting Choice Based Lettings: An Evaluation, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, London. Mead, L.M. (2001) Beyond Entitlement: The Obligations of Citizenship, Free Press, Doncaster. Menard, P.A. (2001) Domestic violence and housing: key policy and programme challenges, Violence against Women 7(6) pp. 707–20. Mullins, D. & Murie, A. (2006) Housing Policy in the UK, Palgrave, London. Pannell, J. & Thomas, C. (2000) Almshouses into the Next Millennium: Paternalism, Partnership, Progress?, Policy Press, Bristol. Pawson, H. (2006) Restructuring England’s social housing sector since 1989: undermining or underpinning the fundamentals of public housing? Housing Studies 21(5) pp. 767–83. Pawson, H. & Mullins, D. (2010) After Council Housing: Britain’s New Social Landlords, Palgrave MacMillan, London. Safelives (2015) Getting it right first time http://www.safelives.org.uk/sites/default/ files/resources/Getting%20it%20right%20first%20time%20-%20complete%20 report.pdf, Accessed 10/7/19. Stephens, M. et al. (2018) UK Housing Review, CIH, Coventry. Torgerson, U. (1987) Housing: the Wobbly Pillar under the Welfare state, Scandinavian Housing and Planning Research 4 pp. 116–26. Tucker, J. (1996) Honourable Estates, Gollancz, London. Tunstall, R. (2015) The Coalition’s Record on Housing Policy, Spending and Outcomes 2010–2015, Centre for Housing Policy, York. Watts, B. & Fitzpatrick, S. (2018) Welfare Conditionality, Routledge, Abingdon. Websdale, N. & Johnson, B. (1997) Reducing woman battering: The role of structural approaches, Social Justice 24(1) pp. 54–81. Wilcox, S. et al. (2015) UK Housing Review 2015, CIH, Coventry. Yorke, T. (2017) Homes Fit for Heroes: The Aftermath of the First World War 1918–1939, Countryside Books, Newbury. Zweig, J.M. & Burt, M.R. (2007) Predicting women’s perceptions of domestic violence and sexual assault agency helpfulness: what matters to program clients? Violence Against Women 13(11) pp. 1149–78.

Chapter 7

Housing policy – wider contexts

In addition to the perspectives discussed thus far, there are several other issues adjacent to the housing policy lens that are relevant to the subject. This is because they are either intrinsically closely linked to housing policy, for example homelessness, or have been closely linked to housing by implementation strategies e.g. anti-social behaviour (ASB). This has two potential effects, first, ASB is largely socially constructed. That is to say that individuals and communities are encouraged to report behaviour that they find a ‘nuisance’ rather than that which is objectively illegal. Where a court agrees, criminal sanctions can then be attached to breach of an order to desist, without the initial action being illegal. Where domestic abuse is occurring and treated as ASB, the protracted nature of investigation and court process often means the abuse is not dealt with appropriately. Second, ASB is often constructed as a ‘moral failing’ of an othered group of people. The effect of this is to include people suffering abuse is in the category of ‘other’ and this appears to have influenced not only their individual cases, but the way housing organisations perceive domestic abuse more widely. There are several, widely publicised cases where people experiencing abuse have been dealt with as perpetrators of ASB and sometimes sanctioned because of this and the abuse not addressed. We also address the issues of perpetrators and how we can address the actual problem of abuse rather than dealing with the symptoms. It is very often the case that it is the victims of abuse that leave the family home, leaving the perpetrator in situ. The chapter moves on to discuss homelessness and housing instability as key factors in addressing domestic abuse. Again, there are several reasons why this is appropriate. The lack of provision of adequate refuge accommodation, community support and truly affordable housing to enable people to move on from abusive relationships is of paramount concern. For many years homelessness legislation in England did not specifically reference domestic abuse as a cause of ‘vulnerability’ and therefore ‘priority need’ for temporary and permanent accommodation. The women’s sector has long campaigned for a change in the law to make this the case. Wales and Scotland have both gone some way towards this, and England has only

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just done so (May 2020). Women also often lack access to the financial resources necessary to leave abusive relationships; indeed, research has often found lack of resources or fear over homelessness or inadequate housing to be key reasons why women remain in abusive relationships. We open with tenancy agreements.

Tenancy agreements Tenancy agreements are the legal documents that create a right to reside and confer responsibilities on both tenant and landlord for the lifetime of the agreement. In the UK, there are three main types of tenancy agreement in operation: secure, assured and assured shorthold (short tenancies in Scotland). Each of these agreements has its own set of obligations on the landlord and tenant; this section discusses these in terms of the provisions for ending the agreement – this is nearly always the most problematic area of a tenancy in cases of abuse. Tenancy agreements in social housing (local authority and housing association) often specifically highlight domestic abuse as a breach of tenancy and abuse is therefore grounds for eviction in and of itself. These grounds, in most cases, do not rely on criminal proof but are based on civil grounds which use the balance of probability rather than the criminal burden of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. In scenarios where domestic abuse is not an express term of the agreement, there will be implied terms for the tenant to not act to cause nuisance or annoyance to others and to behave in a tenant-like way during the term of the lease. In the context of some forms of domestic abuse, a housing provider may argue that such behaviour breaches those implied terms too. Tenancies can generally end in one of three ways, the tenant gives notice to end the tenancy, the landlord gives notice to end the tenancy or the landlord acts against the tenant due to breach(es) of the conditions of tenancy. The law sets down a number of circumstances or ‘grounds’ under which a landlord can take possession proceedings against a tenant(s); we limit ourselves to those regarding domestic abuse here; however, the ‘Shelter legal’ website is an excellent source on tenancy law (https://england.shelter.org.uk/ legal). We begin with definitions for the main tenancy types and how they may be ended. Secure tenancies Created by the Housing Act 1988, secure tenancies are generally only in use by local authorities and are the main tenancy agreements used by them. Secure tenancies give security of tenure to tenants, that is to say that the tenancy can only be ended either voluntarily by the tenant(s) or by the landlord on specific grounds set out in the tenancy agreement – breaches of the

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terms of tenancy. Generally, such breaches include non-payment of rent, anti-social behaviour by the tenant or a member of their family or damage to the property. These ‘grounds for possession’ are set out in law. In terms of domestic abuse, ground 2A gives local authorities the ability to evict a tenant based on the perpetration of domestic violence; there are, however, conditions attached. First, one partner of a married, civil partnered or cohabiting couple must have left the property because of threatened or actual violence towards them or another family member (this MUST have been the cause of them leaving), and must be unlikely to return. Shelter (2019) note that this ground is usually used once the person(s) experiencing abuse has been rehoused to remove a perpetrator. It should also be noted that this is a ‘­discretionary’ ground for possession – this means that a court has discretion about issuing a possession order even where it accepts the conditions for possession have been met. Assured tenancies Again, created by the Housing Act 1988, assured tenancies are generally used by housing associations, co-ops and other social landlords, although they are available to others, including private landlords. As with secure tenancies, assured tenancies give security of tenure and can only be ended either voluntarily by the tenant or by a court granting a possession order to the landlord. Again, as with secure tenancies, the grounds for possession are set out in law. Ground 14a gives landlords the ability to evict on the grounds of ‘­domestic violence’ – although this ground is currently only available to private registered providers of social housing (formerly registered social landlords [RSLs]) or charitable housing trusts. As with secure tenancies, one partner in a married, civil partnered or co-habiting couple must have left the property because of threats of, or actual violence to them or a family member – again, this MUST have been the cause of them leaving and they must be unlikely to return. Where a landlord is seeking possession and the partner who has left is a non-tenant (they are not named on the tenancy agreement), they must also be served with a ‘notice of seeking possession’ (NoSP) unless the court decides it is ‘just and equitable’ to not do so. It should also be noted that there is no requirement for the parties to be living together at the time of the threats or actual violence – only that they are in a relevant relationship. There is a mandatory two-week notice period for proceedings under this ground; again, this ground is a discretionary one – a court has discretion to grant it, even where the grounds for possession are proven. Assured Shor thold Tenancies Created by the Housing Act 1988, Assured Shorthold Tenancies (ASTs) are mainly used by private landlords renting out property, although many

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housing associations use them as ‘introductory’ or ‘trial’ tenancies. These tenancies, generally, have an initial ‘assured’ period (usually 6 or 12 months) and then revert to being rolling ‘periodic’ tenancies of a month at a time. Landlords can bring these tenancies to an end during the assured period using some of the grounds specified for assured tenancies; although as stated under ‘assured tenancies’, private landlords do not have access to Ground 14a (domestic abuse). However, once the initial period has expired, landlords are able to end an AST by issuing a Section 21 notice. Under Section 21, a landlord does not have to prove or even provide a reason for ending the tenancy. Furthermore, a Section 21 notice is a mandatory ground for eviction – a court has no discretion to delay or not grant possession. The previous Conservative government consulted on changes to Section 21 and rebalancing the relationship between landlords and tenants in the private sector (MHCLG, 2019). Their proposals are to abolish Section 21 and remove this as a ground for possession and to make Ground 14a (domestic violence) more victim-centred. MHCLG asked the following questions in relation to this ground (MHCLG, 2019, pp. 35–36). • • • •

Should a revised Ground 14a be open to all landlords and not only registered providers? Should landlords be able to evict only a perpetrator rather than the whole household? In the event of a perpetrator ending a tenancy, should the victim have additional protections to remain in the tenancy/property? Should a victim of abuse be able to end a (joint) tenancy without the consent of the perpetrator?

The sector has responded to the consultation (see CIH, 2019a; National Housing and Domestic Abuse Policy and Practice Group, 2019 for example) and raised significant concerns about the proposals (whilst being supportive of some). Responses point out that these changes to tenancy law, whilst welcome, are not the optimum way to address this issue. Instead, they urge that new provisions are made to make it easier, in certain circumstances, for a tenancy (joint or sole) to be transferred into the name of the remaining person where that would be more appropriate. The proposal is for a new general mechanism whereby a survivor can apply to a court for the transfer of the perpetrator’s tenancy rights to the survivor solely, regardless of marital status or the presence of children, where the survivor shared or shares a household with the perpetrator and the perpetrator is the sole tenant, or the joint tenant with the survivor. This should apply equally to social tenancies (secure or assured) and to private sector tenancies. The National Domestic Abuse Policy and Practice Group (2019) and CIH (2019a) agree that additional provisions should be made to protect the survivor’s tenancy rights. Women often stay due to feeling ‘trapped’ in the

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relationship or in the property. The latter can sometimes be due to lack of awareness of their rights, but also due to misinformation from professionals that they must stay to end of tenancy or having explained their abuse to their landlord but failing in being allowed to leave the tenancy early. Following a general election in November 2019, the resulting Conservative government has committed to fulfil its manifesto commitment to abolishing Section 21 evictions (Conservative Party, 2019); at the time of writing, we await their proposals to do so. Joint tenancies & domestic abuse Although joint tenancies are not a specific tenancy type in and of themselves (a joint tenancy can be a secure, assured or assured shorthold tenancy), they are particularly problematic in cases of domestic abuse. A joint tenancy means that both parties have individual and joint rights and responsibilities under the terms of the tenancy agreement. Both tenants are responsible for paying rent and adhering to the conditions of the tenancy agreement; both parties have the right to stay in the home and one party cannot exclude the other e.g. change the locks or make the other party leave. It is important that rent is still paid whilst decisions are made as to ending the joint tenancy as it could affect a future tenancy if rent arrears are incurred. If one joint tenant gives notice to the landlord, the agreement will be ended for both/all tenants (as confirmed in Hammersmith v Monk) (Hammersmith and Fulham LBC v. Monk [1992] AC 478). There are three general scenarios when a tenancy ends where a couple are co-habiting and domestic abuse is occurring. First, where there is a sole tenancy and the person experiencing abuse is the tenant, in this case they have the right to have the perpetrator removed from the property and can take out an injunction to keep them away from both the property, and themselves and their family. Second, where the perpetrator is the sole tenant. In this case, the person experiencing abuse has few rights and must generally leave the tenancy. It is possible to get a tenancy transferred by a court, but this can be time-consuming and costly – this is discussed in further detail later in the chapter; third, where there is a joint tenancy, both parties are named on the tenancy agreement. This is by far the most complex situation and the hardest to resolve. In cases of domestic abuse, a joint tenancy can be used by the perpetrator to control the victim on a variety of levels; for example, the perpetrator could end the tenancy, which ends the tenancy for both parties, thereby rendering the victim homeless. Given that both tenants are responsible for paying the rent; if a perpetrator ceases paying the rent then the rent arrears would be pursued against both tenants, which could lead to eviction action. Rent arrears and having an eviction order granted against a person can cause problems in securing another social housing tenancy and checks made

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by private sector landlord could mean that a tenancy in the private-rented sector would also be difficult to acquire. Tenancy breaches other than rent arrears are also problematic in joint tenancies. Where one party could breach the tenancy agreement, for example through anti-social behaviour, action would be taken against both tenants and not only the tenant breaching the tenancy agreement. Again, where enforcement action has been taken in cases of a joint tenancy this could provide problems for either party securing a future tenancy. Whilst housing providers may seek to support a victim of domestic abuse in a joint tenancy, they are not required to specifically enquire around domestic abuse when a joint tenancy ends or when pursing rent arrears action, missing an opportunity to recognise and respond to domestic abuse. If one party wishes to end the tenancy and the other joint tenant wants to stay in the property, the landlord may • • •

Give the remaining tenant(s) a new tenancy at the same property Not give them a new tenancy, whereby the property could be offered to someone else (i.e. a family) If joint tenants can’t agree on who gets the tenancy, a court can decide this

When a perpetrator gives notice to quit (on a joint tenancy), this leaves the survivor (and remaining occupier) wholly reliant on the good will of the landlord in granting a new tenancy. The only current means for preventing a notice to quit by the perpetrator is for the survivor to obtain an injunction to prevent the perpetrator serving notice. However, this mechanism is also open to the perpetrator to prevent the survivor serving notice. This means that women who have fled abuse and secured a refuge space can be prevented from ending a tenancy where they are a joint tenant, thus opening up the opportunity for a perpetrator to deliberately ‘run up’ rent arrears, commit anti-social behaviour, etc., as a controlling mechanism over their victim. Where a joint tenancy is terminated, and the landlord grants a new sole tenancy to the survivor, this depends on the goodwill of the landlord and may see the survivor losing some of the benefits accrued under the previous joint tenancy. The tenancy may also be assigned via a court order to the sole name of the survivor – although this is subject to the limited mechanisms described below. Cour t orders & transfer of tenancies It is possible to transfer a tenancy either from the perpetrator’s sole tenancy to the survivor’s sole tenancy, or from a joint tenancy to the survivor’s sole tenancy, but a court order is required. There are currently three mechanisms by which this can be done, but only in particular circumstances, and

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the process is uncertain, complex and potentially costly. A court injunction preventing termination of a tenancy (as discussed above) is a short-term solution and requires the survivor to obtain legal assistance very rapidly. This type of injunction is usually in preparation for an application for transfer of tenancy, but the mechanisms for this are currently complex and limited and need to be addressed more fully. If the parties are married, an application under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 can be made but only if they are in divorce proceedings. It can take over a year, using this process, to obtain a transfer; even then, this does not take effect until the granting of a ‘decree absolute’. For those who are unmarried, the Children Act 1989 provides a route for the tenancy to be transferred for the benefit of the children (their welfare being the paramount concern) but again necessitates bringing expensive and contentious court proceedings, polarising parties who may otherwise have been able to reach agreement over many aspects of their children’s care. The transfer in these cases is further complicated by the fact that it is only for the benefit of the children, so where the children are close to reaching maturity, this remedy may not help. Third, both married and unmarried survivors, with or without children, can apply for a transfer under the Family Law Act 1996; however for married couples, the court will insist on divorce proceedings having been commenced and will divert them down the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 route (above) in many cases. Where the parties are unmarried the route through the Family Law Act 1996 necessitates lengthy court proceedings with often two or three hearings at a cost in court time in excess of £10,000 and in legal aid costs of a similar amount for either party represented. The Family Law Act 1996 is the only emergency remedy to prohibit the perpetrator from serving a notice to quit but if ignored or breached the remedy for serving a notice cannot bind a non-party so that this is a deterrent only. The economic barriers to these remedies are significant. A recent report by the University of Bristol (Hester & Walker, 2019) showed that the Family Law Act 1996 remedies are expensive and slow to obtain for survivors, often creating ­further debt through legal fees as many of those living in private accommodation are not eligible for legal aid due to the means test requirements. The study also found that many survivors in paid work did not have the means necessary to pay for crucial legal services due to economic abuse.

Anti-social behaviour policy and domestic abuse In his seminal review of the role of social housing, Hills (2007) reported that over a fifth of social tenants reported the presence of drug users or dealers and the general levels of crime, fear of being burgled, vandalism and litter as a serious problem. Eighteen per cent of social tenants stated they felt unsafe when alone at home or even outside in daylight. This feedback led to

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Labour MP Frank Field to coin the term ‘Neighbours from Hell’ – a term which has become an everyday phrase, with a plethora of TV Programmes and media stories further demonising social housing tenants and portraying them as feckless. Cooper (2005) describes this as labelling those as ‘other’, as deviant and outside of societal norms. Likewise, Crossley (2017) argues that there is a committed othering of poor people linked to moral inferiority. He raises the point that Cameron, on the back of the 2011 riots, said that most of the rioters came from post-war social housing estates or ‘sink estates’, as they are sometimes described. The rise of Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB) as a housing policy phenomenon has built capacity and competence in social landlords to deal with it, partly because of this and partly because no other tools were available, ASB policies have been used to address domestic abuse. The effects of this have been to treat people experiencing abuse as ‘othered’, rather than as ‘victims’, and to address abuse using incorrect and ineffective processes. This section details the main policy developments relating to ASB and why addressing domestic abuse via these tools is mistaken. Thatcher, new labour and ASB During the 1980s, the (Thatcherite) idea that the post-war housing model was not working coincided with rhetoric on anti-social behaviour and people living in social housing gaining traction. There was a growing perception amongst politicians and social landlords that anti-social behaviour was an escalating problem and causing much distress to local communities (Field, 2003; Pawson et al., 2005). It can be argued, however, that there was an element of moral panic to this. The term moral panic was coined by Cohen (1972) who illustrated how reactions to mods and rockers in the 1950s influenced the formation and enforcement of social policy and law, and how a society perceives threats. Cohen argued that labelling deviants as such could serve to amplify their perceived deviance. Drislane and Parkinson (2016) further argue that moral panics attract people to them as they connect with people’s fears using specific events or problems as symbols of what many feel represents all that is wrong with the nation. Crossley (2017), in his research on the Government’s ‘Troubled Families’ programme (discussed later), highlights the conflation of poverty with criminality argues that it serves to draw a line between them and us (also reflected in studies of stigma [Goffman, 1990; Link & Phelan, 2001]). Crossley draws heavily on the work of Bourdieu (1984) who argues that symbolic power is granted to those in authority such as politicians who can construct a reality where they can shape other people’s perceptions of the world and create a vision of division. The Conservatives introduced ASB into housing policy via the Housing Act 1988. This introduced the power for local housing authorities to obtain injunctions against the perpetrators of anti-social behaviour, with a power of arrest to be attached to injunctions where there was actual or threatened

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violence. Social landlords could apply to court to demote an assured tenancy on the grounds of ASB where there was, Conduct that is capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to some person (who need not be a particular identified person) and that directly or indirectly relates to or affects the landlord’s housing management functions. Housing Act, 1988 (c.68) This step cemented anti-social behaviour as an issue that impacted on housing management functions and has resulted in a continued focus by landlords ever since. To further regulate anti-social behaviour, the Housing Act 1996 introduced a new regulatory framework for Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) and gave local authorities discretion to use introductory tenancies for all new tenancies which made it easier for them to evict tenants who exhibited anti-social behaviour within the first year of their tenancy. There was no reference to domestic abuse within this legislation. Rose (1999) and Field (2003) argue that the political rationalities around ASB see it as being “ fundamentally caused by a lack of respect for other ­people” (Home Office, 2003, p. 7). This perceived lack of respect was key to the government’s approach. However, the focus on ASB did not pay heed to the structural inequalities in society nor the unique dynamic of domestic abuse and largely framed social housing and tenants as the problem. Watts and Fitzpatrick (2018) argues that successive UK Governments have pursued increasing conditionality within social housing tenancies in a bid to influence the behaviour of those households considered ‘anti-social’, ‘welfare dependent’ or otherwise ‘deviant’ (Flint and Nixon, 2006). A reflection of the original approach of Octavia Hill at the turn of the century, where renting a property was dependent on behaviour modification (Whelan, 1998). The focus on anti-social behaviour continued into and accelerated under New Labour governments (1997–2010). One of the first actions of the Labour government elected in 1997 was to establish the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU). They defined social exclusion as, A shorthand label for what can happen when individuals or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime environments, bad health and family breakdown. SEU (1997, p. 1) Their approach arguably linked housing policy into the wider welfare agenda more widely than had been previously seen. Tony Blair on his first morning as Prime Minister, from the Aylesbury (social housing) estate, spoke about “the poorest people in our country [who] have been forgotten

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by government” (Vallely, 2005). There seemed to be some recognition that previous housing policy had resulted in polarised communities, with policies impacting on fragmented neighbourhoods with little buy-in from local people. Despite the name of the new unit and whilst there was some attempt to address structural issues; the focus remained strongly on anti-social behaviour and its effects on communities. The introduction of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (one of the first pieces of New Labour legislation) redefined ASB as behaviour that causes “harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as the person”. This Act also introduced the Anti-social Behaviour Order (ASBO) which became synonymous as defining the state of modern Britain (Squires, 2008). The Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003 (Section 12) amended the Housing Act 1996 to place a duty on social landlords to publish their anti-social behaviour policies and procedures (this came into force in 2004), so that tenants and members of the public could have information about the measures that landlords would use to address ASB issues. ASB was accepted as part of the language with housing and increasingly became part of the apparatus to address it; housing workers were seen as visible authority figures alongside the Police. The Home Office established the ‘Anti-Social Behaviour Unit’ with the aim of formulating policies and tools to tackle the issue. The government also launched the TOGETHER campaign in England and Wales describing it as “a stand against anti-social behaviour and puts[ing] the needs of the local community first” (Millie et al., 2005, p. 4). The campaign included an ASB helpline for the public and an ASB academy of practitioners. Blair (2003) stated, “We’ve given you the powers, and it’s time to use them” (Millie et al., 2005, p. 5). The coalition and the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 In the General Election of 2010, a coalition government was elected in the UK with the Conservatives as the majority partner and the Liberal Democrats in the minority. The coalition government had a markedly different approach to ASB than their Labour predecessors (Heap, 2016). The coalition under the Prime Ministership of David Cameron with Theresa May as Home Secretary pursued a strategy based upon families and individuals as the primary victims of ASB, Labour had concentrated far more on communities as a whole (ibid). There was a twin-pronged approach with Cameron championing families via the ‘Troubled Families Programme’, whilst May emphasised the individual and repeat victims of ASB. Heap (2016) notes that this was in sharp contrast to their predecessors Blair and Blunkett who worked closely together to define Labour’s approach (Garrett, 2007). Interestingly, Cameron’s troubled families’ initiative was based within the then Department

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for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) whilst May’s ‘vulnerable victims’ theme was rooted in the Home Office thus splitting the emphasis of policy in this area. Housing (as a policy area) was also placed within DCLG and the link between ‘troubled families’ and domestic abuse may give another clue as to why ASB powers have been used to address domestic abuse rather than the criminal law (based at the Home Office). As an example of the scale of ASB, Rose (2012) estimated that social landlords in England and Wales dealt with around 300,000 reported cases of ASB in 2011/12 alone and at a cost of £300 million. The numbers and costs were not determined specifically for categories of ASB; it is however, possible that cases of domestic abuse were included within it (Henderson, 2019). This spending on ASB provided a backdrop to the introduction of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 which gave housing providers increased powers. The Act replaced the Anti-Social Behaviour Injunction with the ‘Part One Injunction’ that could be used against a person aged 10 or over if two conditions were met, first, that the court was satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent had engaged or threatened to engage in anti-social behaviour (ASB) and second, that the court considered it just and convenient to grant the injunction for the purpose of preventing the respondent from engaging in ASB. ASB is defined in the Act as, • • •

Conduct that has caused, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to any person Conduct capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to a person in relation to that person’s occupation of residential premises, or Conduct capable of causing housing-related nuisance or annoyance to any person

A Part One Injunction can require the respondent to do anything described in the injunction (positive requirements). It can also include the power to exclude persons from the home in cases of violence or risk of harm regardless of tenure. A range of agencies can apply for an injunction including a local authority and a housing provider and a chief officer of police for their area. Such an injunction allowed landlords to work closely with their tenants by imposing positive requirements as injunction terms, which could enable landlords to take effective action to address behaviour. Positive requirements may include attending a substance misuse treatment organisation for assessment and support and could also include a requirement to attend a domestic abuse perpetrator programme for assessment of suitability for the programme. A local authority or housing provider could apply for an injunction against a perpetrator that contained a positive requirement to engage in a programme to address their behaviour. Breaching the terms

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of such an injunction gives rise to a mandatory ground for possession of the property. However, a court would expect that informal approaches had been initiated before formal, legal action was taken; although the legislation recognises that where professionals get to the point that formal action is necessary, they should have the ability to take that action quickly. Such an injunction relies only on the civil burden of proof (balance of probabilities). Current regulation of social housing & ASB As well as the law around ASB, it is important to understand the current social housing regulation in relation to anti-social behaviour. Social Housing (in England) is regulated by the Regulator for Social Housing (established in 2018 from what was previously the Homes and Communities Agency). The body regulates social housing and continues to monitor the economic and consumer standards that social housing providers must adhere to via a statutory Regulation Committee. There are four consumer standards, • • • •

Tenant Involvement and Empowerment Standard Home Standard Tenancy Standard Neighbourhood and Community Standard

The Neighbourhood and Community Standard covers how registered providers deal with anti-social behaviour. This standard does not require registered providers to resolve all instances of anti-social behaviour, only to work in partnership with other agencies in an attempt to do so. The regulator makes no reference at all to domestic abuse in the two-page document that sets out expectations in relation to the Neighbourhood and Community Standard. The Guide establishes that registered providers must publish an ASB policy and how they work in partnership to prevent ASB, Registered providers shall keep the neighbourhood and communal areas associated with the homes that they own clean and safe. They shall work in partnership with their tenants and other providers and public bodies where it is effective to do so. Homes and Communities Agency (2012, p. 1) The regulatory standards and associated powers in social housing have historically had a strong focus on ASB which has meant that providers are well versed and accomplished in dealing effectively with it. Conversely, housing providers have never been mandated or regulated in relation to domestic abuse; consequently, they often fail to have the same level of confidence in recognising and responding to domestic abuse. The focus can be described as being concerned with outside space and the impact on the community,

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i.e. the housing function, rather than being primarily concerned with ­individual’s safety per se (although the coalition focused more in individuals). Consequently, this legacy means that when housing providers do take action in relation to domestic abuse it is often done so with a view on impact to the community as opposed to a tenancy breach which impacts on an individual. The availability of safe, affordable accommodation is a key determinant of women staying or leaving abusive homes. Housing providers are not regulated in their response to domestic abuse and there is no requirement to produce and publicise a domestic abuse policy so that tenants have a clear understanding of the response they can expect. Whilst the government’s consultation on the forthcoming Domestic Violence and Abuse Bill (Home Office, 2019) makes reference to housing providers having a role in identifying domestic abuse, it will be interesting to see if the Bill paves the way for any mandatory measures imposed on housing providers, reflecting those in place in relation to anti-social behaviour. The current Social Housing Green Paper ‘A New Deal for Social Housing’ (MHCLG, 2018) is underpinned by five key principles: a safe and decent home; improving how complaints are handled; empowering tenants so that landlords are held to account; tackling stigma and lastly building social homes. MHCLG are publishing a ‘Call for Evidence’ alongside the Green Paper which will inform changes within the regulatory framework. The Green Paper announced that it is considering introducing a new key performance indicator to help tackle anti-social behaviour but makes no reference to regulation in relation to domestic abuse throughout the document. Impact of using the ASB frame Haworth and Manzi (1999) assert that housing management has always played a role in monitoring conduct of tenants and it can be argued that there is a link to the concept of the deserving and underserving in the case of social housing. This was true from the inception of social housing in philanthropic housing exemplified by Octavia Hill’s approach. On this theme, Flint and Nixon (2006) note that discourses on anti-social behaviour in the UK are embedded within a wider politics of conduct, steeped in concepts of “citizenship, self-regulation, welfare conditionality, obligations to communities and rights and responsibilities” (pp. 939–955). Sampson (2004) and Atkinson (2006) see the centrality of the citizen in dealing with anti-social behaviour pointing out that the language of anti-social behaviour is readily understood by the community. Arguably, this forms an important part of a coordinated community response (in relation to ASB). Driver and Martell (1997, p. 27) see this focus on community in dealing with ASB as New Labour’s hangover cure to the Conservative focus on individualism. Home Secretary, David Blunkett stated,

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Communities are empowered when they play an active role in establishing the boundaries of what is acceptable. The law-abiding majority is put at the heart of the solution, not just at the receiving end of the problems. Cited in Millie et al. (2005, p. 33) Flint (2010) argues that discourse concerning the governance of anti-social behaviour in the UK has emphasised the spatial concentration of disorder on particular social housing estates. He maintains the policy response to this has been to devolve management of the processes of social control to local neighbourhoods. In this devolution of social control, Brown (2004) makes the point that the concept of anti-social behaviour is a product of housing management with social landlords replacing the police as the main agency of social control in relation to incivility. This can be viewed via the strengthening of original powers of the Housing Act 1996 in the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, which stipulates that housing providers must publish their anti-social policy and procedures. Flint and Nixon (2005) suggest there has been significant realignment in the roles of various actors in policing residential areas and they argue this raises fundamental questions about the link between conduct, citizenship rights and the scope and ambition of governance interventions aimed at reducing anti-social behaviour at individual and community levels. This change has resulted in social housing playing a central role in what they term the contemporary ‘governance of incivility’ in the UK. This point was further demonstrated by Brown (2004) and Burney (2005) who found that ASB interventions were disproportionately applied against those who resided in the social-rented sector, highlighting the apparatus firmly established in the social housing sector to see it as core business. Burney (2005) sees that New Labour’s approach to ASB was a right idea that went wrong from the start. She is critical of the way the Labour government created and developed the concept of ASB, arguing that scapegoating individual perpetrators of neighbourhood disturbance and destruction gave authorities a way to avoid the acknowledgement of the social and economic decline of such neighbourhoods. Such behaviour might be seen as a symptom or response to this decline. She suggests the introduction of the term ‘anti-social behaviour’ came into usage in terms of public order enforcement as result of the New Labour government of 1997. Moral panic was created by newspaper coverage of ‘yobs’ on social housing estates and reported that police could not charge them with criminal activity as they were not by definition doing anything specifically criminal. She argued that there was a real enforcement message entrenched with rhetoric that continued to give the impression that country was seriously afflicted by anti-social behaviour. Reelected in 2005 the New Labour government reasserted its stance on ASB stating it as a priority. But as Tonry (2004, p. 57) asserts this had unforeseen consequences,

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By making anti-social behaviour into a major social policy problem, and by giving it sustained high visibility attention, Labour has made a small problem larger, thereby making people more aware of it and less satisfied with their lives and their government. Tonry (2004, p. 57) Anti-social behaviour is well established and has become a key part of the housing management response to domestic abuse, with agreed ways of working, language and customs; this approach has been aided by legislation around joint working with Police, the community and by sector regulation. The housing sector response, when it does recognise and respond to domestic abuse, is often framed in an ASB context. Disappointingly, social landlords, in the main, have not utilised the powers afforded to them in the ASB legislation in relation to domestic abuse (Henderson, 2019). There was a real opportunity to use the injunction in the case of perpetrators of domestic abuse to mandate them to attend an assessment for a perpetrator programme. Failure to attend or to engage with the appointment could put the person’s tenancy at risk. Given the long-standing commitment to tackle ASB and enshrined in regulation, it can be said that housing providers are, in the main, confident in their role in responding to anti-social behaviour (ASB), they are not always well equipped to understand what might not be ASB but where domestic abuse is the underlying issue. For example, Jackson (2013), in her study of one Welsh housing provider found that just 9% of all tenants had ASB complaints made against them, compared with 40% of tenants who were experiencing domestic abuse. The same study found that 15% of all tenants had rent arrears to the Notice of Seeking Possession (NoSP) stage compared to 63% of those tenants who were victims of domestic abuse. Highlighting the dominance and maturity of the ASB frame in comparison to the domestic abuse frame, Henderson (2019) found that almost twothirds of respondents stated that their organisation’s response to domestic abuse was situated within an anti-social behaviour context and in many cases there was not a separate policy for supporting people experiencing domestic abuse. Almost three-quarters of providers stated domestic abuse was a tenancy breach, but only just over half had taken some form of action against perpetrators, highlighting a clear gap between policy and action. The dominance of the ASB frame meant that where action was taken against perpetrators of domestic abuse it was often through this lens based on the impact on the community as opposed to the individual experiencing abuse. It is worth pointing out this was sometimes seen as a way to ensure success as courts, some housing providers did not see taking out injunctions in relation to domestic abuse as a core housing management, but did view ‘impact on the community’ as part of this function (Henderson, 2019).

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By contrast, the domestic abuse context is in its infancy lacking a legislative or regulatory framework that offers clear guidance to housing providers, without such regulation or a legislative framework; housing providers revert to utilising practice from the ASB context and adapt it in cases of domestic abuse (Henderson, 2019). For example, acting against domestic abuse perpetration by using the impact on the community and impact on the housing management function as the driver for action and not the impact on the actual abuse victim. Henderson (2019) found that housing providers have a number of routes to identify victims of domestic abuse through ‘core’ business activities: e.g. repairs, rent arears, considering the possibility of domestic abuse when responding to anti-social behaviour and simply asking the customer if they felt safe in their home on every customer contact, irrespective of the original reason for that contact. Housing providers have a unique relationship with their tenants in that it is less formal than statutory services and is not issue specific i.e. specialist domestic abuse services. This relationship is built up over time and exists prior to a time of crisis, and may last for some time afterward and therefore differs from approaching a statutory or specialist domestic abuse service for support. This was a useful factor in women’s help seeking and in experiencing a positive response when disclosing domestic abuse. Henderson (ibid) identified some differences in agency between women she interviewed living in refuges and women interviewed in their homes. Women who received support from their housing provider had greater agency in making choices and received a higher level of advocacy. This reflected the fact that women had an existing relationship with their housing provider but did not have to access statutory services such as presenting as homeless; a response via the statutory duty provides a more limited set of choices. Women supported by their housing provider had greater choice in deciding whether to move (and where to) or to remain in their home. Henderson also found that where housing providers did respond to domestic abuse, they often took a victim-led approach, meaning that their actions were very victim centred but did not always demonstrate a strong focus on simultaneously responding to perpetrators of domestic abuse.

Domestic abuse and homelessness The Housing Act 1996 sets out that if a person is eligible for public funds, has a local connection (as defined in that authority’s ‘allocations scheme’) and is unintentionally homeless, then they will be classed as statutorily homeless. This means that the local authority has a duty to house them and they will be placed on the ‘housing register’ or waiting list for housing. Local authorities in England operate a mix of points-based and/or choice-based systems for allocating housing (see Brown & King, 2005; CIH, 2019b for critiques). In either case, there must be some method for ascertaining and granting

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‘priority need’ to households who meet the requirements. This priority need element includes a set of criteria of vulnerability including ‘other special reason’. However, as the assessment takes sequential steps, perpetrators of domestic abuse are unlikely to meet the criteria of being unintentionally homeless as it will be considered they have made themselves homeless by their own actions. Even where applicants pass the ‘intentionality’ test, a single homeless person (whether survivor or perpetrator) with no dependent children is unlikely to be seen to be in priority need, unless they are deemed particularly vulnerable. While some categories will automatically meet the test, others need to show that they are ‘vulnerable’ in some way in order to meet the criteria. The Homelessness Act 2002 did refine the law (Housing Act 1996 part 7) to make people who are vulnerable as a result of ‘ceasing to occupy accommodation because of violence from another person or threats of violence from another person which are likely to be carried out’ (see Irving-Clarke, 2019) in priority need. However, decisions under this criterion revolve around whether applicants are vulnerable as a result of having left their accommodation, giving cash-strapped local authorities a ‘way out’. Research into local authority responses to such applicants is discussed below. The test commonly used to establish if someone is vulnerable and, therefore, in priority need has become known as the Pereira test. The Court of Appeal, in Pereira v Camden Council, held that a person is vulnerable if their circumstances are such that they would suffer more when homeless than ‘the ordinary homeless person’ and would suffer an injury or other detriment that the ordinary homeless person would not. The issue of vulnerability has been the subject of more recent case law where the Supreme Court considered three cases for example Hotak v London Borough of Southwark (2015) which highlighted a duty may be owed (to investigate) if the person was more vulnerable than the ordinary person. The test for ‘vulnerability’ remains, but the Supreme Court clarified that ‘vulnerability’ should be judged against an ‘ordinary person’ becoming homeless, not an ‘ordinary homeless person’. This means that a person’s individual circumstances should be considered in their entirety when a local authority assesses vulnerability. The threat of homelessness has been consistently identified as a barrier that prevents victims from leaving an abusive relationship, homelessness of the perpetrator can also be a risk in escalating domestic abuse. The Westminster government announced on May 2, 2020, that households applying to local authorities for housing assistance will automatically be considered in ‘priority need’ once the Domestic Abuse Bill (HM Government, 2019) passes into law. This removes the requirement for applicants to show they are vulnerable as a result of fleeing abuse or threats of abuse.

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Implications for survivors Single women fleeing domestic abuse are unlikely to be deemed in priority need under the existing homelessness legislation unless they have other circumstances that mean they are deemed so. For women with children the situation is better as they will be deemed to be in priority need by virtue of the fact that they have dependent children. Domestic abuse is among the leading causes of housing instability and homelessness for women and children (Baker et al., 2003; Tomas & Dittmar, 1995) and safe, appropriate housing and the economic resources to maintain it are key concerns for women wanting to esca­p e domestic abuse (Chung et al., 2000). The All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Ending Homelessness (2017) found that, In 2016, 90% of women in refuges were reported to have housing needs and in 2015/16, 6,550 people became homeless because of a violent relationship breakdown, accounting for 11% of all homeless acceptances. In 2015, 35% of female rough sleepers left their homes due to domestic violence. (p. 3) However, these figures could be the tip of the iceberg given many women state other reasons when presenting as homeless. St Mungo’s have previously stated that 32% of women they worked with in 2013 cited domestic abuse as a factor contributing to their homelessness, compared to just 8% of men. 35% of women stated they had slept rough to esca­p e domestic abuse. Women who had been made homeless due to domestic abuse often referred to the difficulty of accessing housing and other types of support (Pawson et al., 2007). Mullins and Niner (1996) highlight some of the difficulties that led to a gap between policy and practice which in turn would impact on homeless acceptances. Many housing authorities had homeless policies which did not require proof or evidence of domestic abuse having taken place and stipulated taking the person’s word. However, in practice this was not always the case. They found that many women presenting as homeless had been asked to provide high levels of proof, a point also found by Kelly et al. (2014). Pressures in local authority homelessness teams were referenced by Rashleigh (2005) who surveyed housing officers and found that 66% felt under pressure to minimise homeless acceptances (gatekeeping), the majority felt the pressure emanated from central government. Echoing this Burgess et al. (2011), in their research into domestic abuse assistance for adults without children, found evidence of gatekeeping by local authorities (whereby a local housing authority does not accept a homelessness application and/or provide accommodation when they have a legal duty to do so). They also found people

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were being directed to other local authorities and being advised that they were safer if they moved away. This often did not reflect individual circumstances, with women in some cases being advised to seek assistance elsewhere by the reception desk, without being given any consideration under homelessness legislation. They also found that 25% of housing authorities said that a quarter of homeless acceptances were due to domestic abuse and that refuge interviews illustrated that 80% of women in refuges apply to housing authorities as homeless. The study found that women had often tried other solutions before approaching the housing authority as homeless. More recently (2017), Channel 4’s Dispatches programme carried out an undercover investigation in relation to gatekeeping by local authorities and found this still happening, illustrating a long-standing problem. This theme was further demonstrated by Women’s Aid (2017a) who found that local housing authorities prevented almost a fifth (19%) of survivors in their study from making a valid homeless application. Reasons given for being prevented from making a valid homeless application involved in some cases being given more than one reason for refusal. In 17.95% of cases women were advised to call the National Domestic Violence Helpline instead with no activity to assess their homeless presentation. The joint second highest reasons (15.4%) for being prevented from making a homeless application were that they did not have a local connection (which is not required in cases of domestic abuse) and linked to this; women being advised to submit an application at another borough. Shockingly, in 10% of cases women were told to return to the perpetrator. Local authorities lack understanding of the dynamics of domestic abuse. For example, in Yemshaw v LB Hounslow (2011), when presenting as homeless, Yemshaw disclosed she was experiencing verbal abuse and was worried that her partner would use violence against her. Despite the duty they had given she was threatened with violence Yemshaw was advised to come back once she had actually experienced physical violence. This highlights a clear lack of understanding, by the local authority, in relation to their legal duty or of the dynamics of domestic abuse. On this issue of understanding the dynamics of domestic abuse, Mullins and Niner (1996) found discrepancies in domestic abuse training in local housing authorities. Nearly 75% of housing authorities stated that staff had undergone training on domestic abuse, but when they asked refuge staff whether they thought housing staff had undergone training, only 29% concurred. As well as the lack of understanding from staff in the dynamics of domestic abuse when women present as homeless, Kelly (2014) found that many women reported that housing officers were unsympathetic and seemed ‘uninterested’ in their domestic violence histories, or in some cases did not understand and/or assumed that women were lying. Scottish Women’s Aid (2016) found that over half (58%) of staff agreed that some women claim domestic abuse when they have not experienced it. A point that was felt by

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some victim interviewees in terms of them not being believed when presenting as homeless. In contrast to England, the established link between homelessness and domestic abuse has long been acknowledged in Scotland, where there is a requirement, introduced by the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001, for local authorities to produce homelessness strategies which could effectively be integrated with their domestic abuse strategies. Unfortunately, this has not been replicated in England. However, even in Scotland, where women were able to make a homeless presentation, the experience of presenting as homeless was highlighted as a distressing one made worse by a lack of privacy. Trust is a big massive thing as well. You don’t want to go to the council and say, ‘Oh hi hen’ in the office here everybody can hear you or somebody hears office workers discussing your case when they’re not meant to either. Not enough private confidentiality things with that. Scottish Women’s Aid (2016, p. 38) This lack of privacy in making a homeless presentation is commonplace with some local authorities directing those presenting as homeless to a telephone line in an open plan office. They are asked a series of questions by a person from a contact centre to establish if they are eligible for a homeless interview. There has been some progress in England, however. The Homelessness Reduction Act 2017 came into force in April 2018 placing a duty on housing authorities to work with statutory and non-statutory service providers to identify groups at particular risk of homelessness. It stipulates that all eligible people who are found to be homeless or threatened with homelessness are entitled to more tailored support from the housing authority, whether they are in priority need and regardless of intentionality. Implications for perpetrators Whilst the issue of survivors and housing is underrepresented in the domestic abuse literature, the issue of perpetrators and housing is an even more neglected area and presents a clear gap in knowledge. Many housing providers indicate that they do not tolerate domestic abuse and stipulate it as a breach of tenancy agreement. However, Scottish Women’s Aid (2016) found, in their research with Fife Housing Partnership, that two–thirds of service providers did not know if housing services could take action against a perpetrator of domestic abuse and 28 out of the 80 staff surveyed stated that they did not consider it their job role to take action against a perpetrator of domestic abuse. Nearly half (47%) of service providers said they were not confident about giving information about how to exclude an abusive partner, or what

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action could be taken against a perpetrator. Whilst its worth acknowledging in some cases a decision is taken not pursue action in accordance with the victim’s wishes, the response of housing providers and other agencies is often to move the woman and children into refuge accommodation or a new tenancy leaving the perpetrator in the family home. In their research on perpetrators and early intervention Westmarland and Gangoli (2006) identified housing in relation to perpetrators as a gap in services. Workers who were interviewed highlighted that it is most often the woman who goes into refuge accommodation as there is nowhere suitable for the perpetrator. Another interviewee identified that often the housing needs of the perpetrator can be the reason some women stay in the relationship because the perpetrator has nowhere else to go. Perpetrators of domestic abuse will not usually meet the criteria for a duty to be owed under homeless legislation. The Australian Royal Commission on Family Violence (2015) cited the case of Greg Anderson who was homeless when he killed his 11-year-old son, Luke, in 2014. Police argued that Anderson’s homelessness made him difficult to track down. Clarke and Wydall (2015) highlight the importance of housing for perpetrators suggesting that re-housing perpetrators can have positive outcomes for both perpetrators and victims. In their study of the Making Safe Project which provided support and alternative housing for perpetrators of domestic abuse, they found that in addition to the respite from the daily fear and anxiety caused by the controlling presence of the perpetrator, living in alternative housing provided the men with an opportunity to illustrate they could address their problems and change their behaviour. This is turn gave women the feeling of being in a stronger bargaining position than previously. The same research also illustrated the positive impact of perpetrators being housed as men who wanted to be part of a family, and to return to family home, had an opportunity to make the necessary changes within themselves; that space was instrumental. Because if I did have a big argument with her, I just go back to the flat and I’m by myself, you know, and I don’t want to die a lonely man. So yeah, I do want my family. It is up to me…it is my choice. Foundation Housing, Tenant: A

Affordability and housing instability Whilst domestic abuse is experienced across the whole of society, (Holtzworth-Munroe et al., 1997) the issue of intersectionality whereby gender, sexuality, race and social class combine to cause multiple levels of discrimination (Crenshaw, 1989) is a greater issue for women suffering abuse. The issue is not only one of affordability but also instability. Clough et al. (2014) point out that few studies examine the interaction between domestic

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abuse and housing instability (See also Burman & Chantler, 2005; Pavao et al., 2007; Rollins et al., 2012). Kushel et al. (2006, p. 73) define housing instability as, Difficulty paying rent or a mortgage; being denied housing because of past credit or rental history problems; eviction threats or notices; moving frequently; living in over-crowded conditions, or ‘doubling-up’ residence with family or friends. Studies of women’s experiences of domestic abuse have consistently shown that a major reason why women stay in, or return to, violent relationships is lack of safe, affordable, independent accommodation (Aguirre, 1985; Horn, 1992; Shepard & Pence, 1988). Further, Fitzpatrick and Pawson (2016) argue that radical welfare reform and changing housing agendas since 2010 have weakened the safety net role that housing benefit and social housing used to offer. Further, Fahmy et al. (2016) argue that women experiencing domestic abuse often become single parents with limited capacity to earn independently and are therefore more likely to experience financial difficulties, compounded by continuing financial abuse from abusive former partners withholding child support payments. Economic insecurity creates patterns of interpersonal dependency and thereby traps people in abusive relationships and places a financial penalty on those escaping domestic abuse. Towers (2015) agrees that there is a connection between economic inequality and domestic abuse against women, concluding that reduced access to economic resources is an important risk factor. She found that women living in households with low incomes were 3.5 times higher more likely to have reported domestic abuse in the preceding year compared to women living in high-income households. This is not to suggest that domestic abuse is a phenomenon of social housing or people living on low incomes and add to the existing negative discourse on social housing tenants. It should be acknowledged that domestic abuse is a factor in all tenures and social classes. Towers (2015) makes a crucial point that economic inequality is an important factor in terms of barriers to leaving an abusive relationship. Her findings can perhaps be partially explained by acknowledging that those living in low-income households have fewer resources at their disposal to enable them to leave an abusive relationship, so consequently had higher odds of experiencing domestic abuse. In short, the resilience of victims of domestic abuse is being compromised due to lack of access to structural, and especially economic, resources (Walby & Towers, 2017). Using data from the Crime Survey for England and Wales, Walby and Towers (2017) highlight the relationship between violence, economy and society arguing that the more serious forms of domestic violence have greater impact because of the reduced resilience of the victim and their lack of

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access to economic resources. In relation to repeated domestic abuse and economic inequality, two-thirds of domestic abuse victims lived in rented accommodation (social and private rented), compared to one-third (34%) of the population (owner occupation). They observed that as the number of repeated domestic violent crimes increased, the percentage of female victims living in rented accommodation also did (66% for a single crime to 67% for two to ten crimes, and rising to 84% for more than 10 crimes). Walby and Towers (2017) found that in terms of employment status and housing tenure, victims of domestic abuse were more likely to have access to fewer economic resources compared to the overall population. They found the economic resilience of the victim as a more important source of variation in the frequency and seriousness of domestic violence than the gendered motivation of the perpetrator. Put succinctly, housing is a key resource affecting rates of domestic abuse (Walby & Towers, 2018). Walby and Towers (2018) make a crucial point when they argue that minimum standards for access to housing as more important than increasing criminalisation of domestic abuse, the evidence (e.g. Walby et al., 2016) challenges perspectives focused on perpetrators and is consistent with perspectives focused on the material situations of victims (see also Dugan, 2003). Some 20 years previously, Pascall and Morley (1996) had argued that women without men are disadvantaged in access to housing with many unable to afford owner occupation meaning less housing choice. Pascall and Morley’s arguments can be further demonstrated by figures from the Fawcett Society (2012), indicating that that women experience a full-time pay gap of 14.9% and citing 64% of low paid workers are women meaning that housing costs can be a barrier to women leaving abusive relationships and having the opportunity to seek a variety of housing options. The English Housing Survey Report 2016–17 (MHCLG, 2017) showed that the social-rented sector accounted for 3.9 million households or 17% of all households. Among those social renters, 43% were working, with 29% in full-time work and 13% in part-time work. One in five (21%) social renters were classified as ‘inactive’ (including those who have a long-term illness/disability and those who were looking after the family or home). As the above figures suggest, the economic resources at the disposal of many women in the social-rented sector are already narrow meaning that options for women to readily access other housing options to escape abuse are limited. Given this, housing providers need to be better equipped to recognise and respond to victims and perpetrators of domestic abuse. More recently, Croucher et  al. (2018) for Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) found that 43% of social renters were in poverty after housing costs, compared with 29% before housing costs. They refer to Stephens et  al. (2014) who found that people with settled social renting housing pathways experienced much higher rates of chronic poverty than those with other pathways. These factors can present further barriers to women attempting

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to leave an abusive relationship. Croucher et al. (2018) found that half of the social renters in their study, across all age groups, had moved into the sector as a result of one or more significant adverse life events, including domestic violence. There has also been an increase in people renting privately, increasing from 8% to 19% with rent increasing by up to 33% (IFS, 2017). Twinned with the insecurity of the private-rented sector and spiralling rents means that social housing is very often the only option available for some women fleeing abuse. As well as the impact affordability has on tenure choice, Bell and Kober (2008) found whilst the act of leaving the relationship meant that victims were no longer experiencing the violence: leaving their home, re-establishing their family and furnishing a new home placed considerable strain on often limited financial resources. Sharp (2008) and Bell and Kober (2008) argue that many women encounter further hardship and have to give up employment; some may have debts incurred from financial abuse within the past relationship. It changed my whole life, I found it very difficult to pack up everything I had for so long, move it all and start afresh, this was very hard emotionally mostly due to the fact that I was already stressed due to abuse but that I had to start again decorating a new place and buying furniture with very little money. Scottish Women’s Aid (2016, p. 47) O’Campo et al. (2015) and Ponic (2007) highlight in their research on housing instability that many women stated that their housing was stable in terms of things such as being at risk of eviction or arrears in mortgage and rent payments, but that it was actually the violence, and associated consequences that made housing unstable for them. Women said they felt trapped, isolated or controlled in their homes which in turn made their housing psychologically unstable (O’Campo et al., 2015). O’Campo et al. (2015; p. 7) included one woman’s experience of economic abuse which had included lies about finances and resulted in her and her partner’s eviction. I’ll never forget the day that I found out that we were evicted. I found the eviction notice in the glove box. He had been lying to me since October that he was paying the rent. We were in March. He got the eviction notice back, I believe it was end of February or early March. I got the letter like March 5. For those women who are employed or have some financial means, securing accommodation may have less financial impact but those women who need to access a refuge for their safety can often find that the high cost of living in refuge accommodation mean it is not financially viable as an option.

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Clough et al. (2014) found women who had experienced domestic abuse referred to the lack of housing resources in their community as having some impact on their ability to leave or stay safe from their abusive partners. Thinking I could continue working was really not a good idea. There was an altercation and I wasn’t offered any assistance, there was a scene, just walked out of the grocery store and couldn’t come back. From that point on, ah, employment was more than difficult because of moving to so many different places. O’Campo et al. (2015 p. 10). O’Campo et al. (2015) argue their findings highlight the importance of the psychological aspects of housing instability and that studies of domestic abuse and housing regularly ignore such connections (see also Pavao et al., 2007). In addition to the psychological aspects of housing instability, Pavao et al. (2007) found in their study of housing instability that domestic abuse was also an important predictor of, Difficulty paying rent, mortgage, or utility bills; frequent moves; overcrowded living conditions; doubling up with family or friends; and having to live somewhere that they do not want to. (2007, pp. 43–46) For many women, it is not simply a case of finding a new home. The importance of access to settled housing for those who have left their homes because of domestic violence has been shown to be key to their recovery (Menard, 2001). Whilst there has been much focus on women’s experiences of interventions at the point of crisis, less is known about the process of moving on. Kelly et al. (2014) tracked 100 women and their children who had used a range of domestic abuse services over a three-year period (2011–2014) with a view to understanding the process of rebuilding lives post-violence and identifying longer-term support needs. Based on themes identified in their research, Kelly et al. (2014) argue that for women and children their home and rootedness (or not) in local communities was critical to their (un) safety and freedom. In addition to the violence they have experienced, the loss of home is a serious part of the trauma that women in an abusive relationship suffer. The loss of a home can be further compounded by the uncertainty of re-housing if they decide to leave.

Access to refuge and temporary accommodation Access to settled housing is often only secured after accessing emergency accommodation such as a specialist refuge at the point of crisis. However, many women state that specialist refuge accommodation is not always

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available. Women have reported differing experiences in terms of the ease of refuge or other specialist accommodation not been able to access provision immediately. For example, Quilgars and Pleace (2010) point out one woman in their study said that she had tried to leave a violent situation previously but was unable to as she could not access a refuge place. Access to specialist refuge accommodation can provide an essential safe space to start recovery. This woman’s experience is by no means rare. The Women’s Aid Annual Survey (Women’s Aid, 2017a) suggested that refuge provision is extremely stretched. Community-based services that responded to the survey reported declining roughly one in five referrals to their service in 2015–16. Only a quarter of women attempting to access a refuge space could be accommodated in suitable refuge space. The Women’s Aid Nowhere to Turn Report (Women’s Aid, 2017b) found that some women give up looking for a refuge space and remain with the perpetrator (7%). The Nowhere to Turn Report for 2018 (Women’s Aid, 2018) highlights that one in ten women slept rough while waiting for a refuge space and that 60% of referrals to a refuge were turned away in 2016/17. The report also highlights that the number of places in refuges that offered 24-hour staffing had had fallen from 796 to 737 in 2016/17. There is a direct relationship between this, reductions in Supporting People (SP) funding and the removal of the ring-fence on these funds. The Bureau for Investigative Journalism (BIJ) found that funding for refuges has been reduced by local authorities by a quarter since 2010 (from £31.2 million 2010/2011 to £23.9 million in 2016/7), again a reflection of reductions in and the removal of the ring-fence from SP funding and also general reductions in public spending. For example, Chelsea and Westminster Council have cut the budget for refuge accommodation by 45% since 2010 (BIJ). Not surprisingly, such funding reductions are seeing refuges having to increasingly turn women and children away. The Women’s Aid Nowhere to Turn Report (2017b) found that for one day in 2016 a total of 78 children and 78 women were turned away from refuges. Women’s Aid (2017a) state one-fifth of specialist refuges have closed since 2010, the report makes a clear case that difficulty finding refuge space was particularly acute where women had higher specialist support needs. Disabled women (28%) and women with mental health support needs (26%) feature highly amongst the women supported by the caseworkers rather than being accommodated in a refuge. Whilst some local authority areas have Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG) commissioners in place, local commissioning of refuge accommodation has in some cases been problematic given the process is often undertaken by generic commissioners with no understanding of domestic abuse. This has resulted in non-specialist, generic organisations being commissioned to operate domestic abuse refuges and services. The importance of refuges and safe housing in relation to women’s safety when fleeing domestic abuse can be demonstrated by figures from the Femicide Census. It

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identified that 62.7% (586) of women killed by men from 2009 to 2015 were killed by a current or former partner. Of the 200 women known to have been separated before they were killed, 76% were killed within the first year that followed their separation and 65 women were killed in their own home or the home they shared with a partner. Unfortunately, the Femicide Census does not include the housing tenures of the women or perpetrators. Whilst the Census details key recommendations for agencies, such as the UK Government, to place reducing femicide at the centre of its work to reduce violence against women, such as Police, judiciary and employers, there are no specific recommendations for housing providers or local housing authorities. Research has also found that the experience of living in refuge or temporary accommodation can be stressful and stigmatising for both women and children (Jones et al., 2002). Fitzpatrick et al. (2003) highlight some of the tensions involved in the provision of shared accommodation, particularly where there is a shortage of move-on accommodation. In addition to the tensions involved in living in shared accommodation, Hague and M ­ alos (2005) comment that refuge accommodation can merely be a charade if there is no permanent safe accommodation afterwards for women to rebuild their lives. For some women, accessing refuge accommodation is not a viable option and given the scarcity and uncertainty of securing accommodation in an area they want to be in, it is perhaps understandable why this is not always the most suitable choice. Families who are forced to flee domestic violence must often leave the home without their personal possessions, which can exacerbate the stress and difficulty of trying to resettle (Pleace et al., 2008). I had to leave all my possessions and friends I feel as if I have lost everything and am struggling with the isolation of living in a strange area, away from all my supports. Scottish Women’s Aid (2016, p. 48)

Summary Domestic abuse is a key feature in the homelessness of women, and a major factor for people who experience repeat homelessness (Pawson et al., 2001). In addition to settled housing, outreach and resettlement support has been shown to play an important role in preventing recurrent homelessness for victims of domestic abuse (Pawson et al., 2007). This can take the form of financial and legal advice, support with claiming welfare benefits and help with accessing educational courses or entry into employment. Moving home is one of a limited number of options available, for some women staying in their home is important as it means they have existing support mechanisms around them, and it means not having to uproot children from schools. For many, moving to another area without their existing close

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community ties would further increase their isolation. Kelly et al. (2014) assert that for over four decades women’s organisations have advocated for re-housing rights and interventions which might enable women and children to stay ‘at home’ safely, citing Hague and Malos (2005). Whilst there can be obvious benefits to staying in their home when the perpetrator has left, post-abusive relationship has been identified as a time of particular danger and vulnerability for women, with many suffering post-separation violence (Humphreys and Thiara, 2003). Flasch et al. (2015) state there has been very little research into recovery process of survivors following domestic abuse. She adds most literature focuses on the immediate needs of women such as refuges and agencies focused on safety and crisis management (see also Allen & Wozniak, 2010). Tjaden and Thoennes (2000) argue it is well documented that survivors can often endure long-lasting trauma from abuse that can be both physical and mental that have negative career and educational outcomes with an increased risk of experiencing additional abusive relationships. Allen and Wozniak (2010) stipulate that recovery after an abusive relationship is “a social, spiritual, cultural, and psychological process” (p. 37).

References Aguirre, B.E. (1985) Why do they return?: Abused wives in shelters, Social Work 30(4) pp. 35–54. Allen, K.M. & Wozniack, D. (2010) The language of healing: women’s voices in healing and recovering from domestic violence, Social Work in Mental Health 9(1) pp. 37–55. All-Party Parliamentary Group for Ending Homelessness (2017) Homelessness Prevention for Care Leavers, Prison Leavers and Survivors of Domestic Violence, APPG for Ending Homelessness, London. Atkinson, R. (2006) Spaces of discipline and control: the compounded citizenship of social renting, in J. Flint (ed) Housing, Urban Governance and Anti-social Behaviour: Perspectives, Policy and Practice, Policy Press, Bristol, pp. 91–116. Australian Royal Commission into Family Violence (2015) Report of the Australian Royal Commission into Family Violence, Australian Royal Commission into Family Violence, Victoria. Baker, C.K. et al. (2003) Domestic violence, housing instability, and homelessness: a review of housing policies and program practices for meeting the needs of survivors, Aggression and Violent Behaviour 15 pp. 430–39. Bell, K. & Kober, C. (2008) The Financial Impact of Domestic Violence, Family Welfare Association/Gingerbread, London. Brown, A.P. (2004) Anti-social behaviour, crime control and social control, The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice 43(2) pp. 203–11. Brown, T.J. and King, P. (2005) The power to choose: effective choice and housing policy, European Journal of Housing Policy, 5(1), pp. 59–75. Burgess, G. et al. (2011) Domestic Violence – Assistance for Adults without Dependent Children, Department of Communities and Local Government, London.

114  Domestic abuse and wider housing policy Burman, E. & Chantler, K. (2005) Domestic violence and minoritisation: legal and policy barriers facing minoritized women leaving violent relationships, International Journal of Law Psychiatry 28(1) pp. 59–74. Burney, E. (2005) Making people behave: Anti-social Behaviour, Politics and Policy, Willan Publishing, Cullompton. Bordieu, P. (1984) Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Chung, D. et al. (2000) Home Safe Home: The Link between Domestic and Family Violence and Women’s Homelessness, University of South Australia, Adelaide. CIH (2019a) Response to ‘Support for Victims of Domestic Abuse in Safe Accommodation, CIH, Coventry. CIH (2019b) Rethinking Allocations, CIH, Coventry. Clarke, A. & Wydall, S. (2015) Creating a safe space?, Criminal Justice Matters 99(1) pp. 20–21. Clough, A. et al. (2014) ‘Having housing made everything else possible’: affordable, safe and stable housing for women survivors of violence, Qualitative Social Work 13(5) pp. 671–88. Cohen, S. (1972) Folk Devils and Moral Panics, Routledge, London. Conservative Party (2019) Get Brexit Done: Unleashing Britain’s Potential, Conservative Party, London. Cooper, C. (2005) Places, ‘folk devils’ and social policy, in P. Somerville & N. Springings (eds), Housing and Social Policy: Contemporary Themes and Critical Perspectives, Routledge, Abingdon, pp. 69–102. Crenshaw, K. (1989) Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: a black ­feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics, University of Chicago Legal Forum 1 pp. 139–67. Crossley, S. (2017) In Their Place: The Imagined Geographies of Poverty, Pluto Press, London. Croucher, K. et al. (2018) Housing and Life Experiences: Making a Home on a Low Income, JRF, York. Drislane, R. & Parkinson, G. (2016) Online Dictionary of the Social Sciences, Open University of Canada, Canada. Driver, S. & Martell, M. (1997) New labour’s communitarians, Critical Social Policy 17(52) pp. 27–46. Dugan, L. (2003) Domestic violence legislation: exploring its impact on the likelihood of domestic violence, police intervention, and arrest, Criminology and ­Public Policy 2(2) pp. 283–312. Fahmy, E., Williamson, E. & Pantazis, C. (2016) Evidence and Policy Review: Domestic Violence and Poverty, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York. Fawcett Society (2012) The Impact of Austerity Upon Women, Fawcett Society, London. Field, F. (2003) Neighbours from Hell: The Politics of Behaviour, Politico’s Publishing, London. Fitzpatrick, S. & Pawson, H. (2016) Fifty years since Cathy Come Home: critical reflections on the UK homelessness safety net, International Journal of Housing Policy 16(4) pp. 543–55. Fitzpatrick, S. et al. (2003) Refuges for Women, Children and Young People in Scotland, Scottish Executive, Edinburgh.

Housing policy – wider contexts  115 Flasch, P. et al. (2015) Overcoming abuse: a phenomenological investigation of the journey to recovery from past intimate partner violence, Journal of Interpersonal Violence 32(22) pp. 1–29. Flint, J. (2010) Faith and housing in England: promoting community cohesion or contributing to urban segregation?, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36(2) pp. 257–74. Flint, J. & Nixon, J. (2006) Governing neighbours: anti-social behaviour orders and new forms of regulating conduct in the UK, Urban Studies 43(5) pp. 939–55. Gangoli, G. & Westmarland, N. (eds) (2006) International Approaches to Prostitution: Law and Policy in Europe and Asia, Policy Press, Bristol, pp. 1–20. Garrett, P.M. (2007) Sinbin’ solutions: the ‘pioneer’ projects for ‘problem families’ and the forgetfulness of social policy research, Critical Social Policy 27(2) pp. 203–30. Goffman, E. (1990) Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity, Penguin, London. Hague, G. & Malos, E. (2005) Domestic Violence: Action for Change, New Clarion Press, Cheltenham. Haworth, A. & Manzi, T. (1999) Managing the ‘underclass’: interpreting the moral discourse of housing management, Urban Studies 36(1) pp. 153–65. Heap, V. (2016) Guest editorial – coming of age: developments, dilemmas and debates about anti-social behaviour, Safer Communities 15(4) pp. 173–75. Henderson, K. (2019) The Role of Housing in a Coordinated Community Response to Domestic Abuse, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Durham, Durham. Hester, M. & Walker, S.J. (2019) Narrowing the Justice Gap for Victims of Gender-based Violence, University of Bristol, Bristol. Hills, J. (2007) Ends and Means: The Future Roles of Social Housing, London School of Economics, London. HM Government (2019) Transforming the Response to Domestic Abuse: Consultation Response and Draft Bill, HMSO, London. Holtzworth-Munroe, A. et  al. (1997) Violent versus non-violent husbands: differences in attachment patterns, dependency and jealousy, Journal of Family Psychology 11 pp. 314–31. Home Office (2003) Respect and Responsibility: Taking a Stand against Anti-social Behaviour, HMSO, London. Home Office (2019) Domestic Abuse Bill (HC Bill 2), HMSO, London. Homes and Communities Agency (2012) Neighbourhood and Community Standard, Homes and Communities Agency, London. Horn, P. (1992) Beating back the revolution: domestic violence’s economic toll on women, Dollars & Sense 182 pp. 12–22. Humphreys, C. & Thiara, R. (2003) Mental health and domestic violence: ‘I call it symptoms of abuse’, British Journal of Social Work 33(2) pp. 209–26. IFS (2017) The Cost of Housing for Low Income Renters, IFS, London. Jackson, R. (2013) Domestic Abuse and Housing in Wales, CIH Cymru, Cardiff. Jones, R.P. et al. (2002) The characteristics of domestic violence in a child protective service caseload, Families in Society: The Journal of Contemporary Social Services 83(4) pp. 405–15. Kelly, L. et al. (2014) Finding the Costs of Freedom, CWASU and Solace Women’s Aid, London.

116  Domestic abuse and wider housing policy Kushel, M.B. et  al. (2006) Housing instability and food insecurity as barriers to health care among low-income Americans, Journal of General Internal Medicine 21(1) pp. 71–77. Link, G. & Phelan, J.C. (2001) Conceptualising stigma, Annual Review of Sociology 27 pp. 363–85. Menard, A. (2001) Domestic violence and housing: key policy and program challenges, Violence against Women 7(6) pp. 707–20. MHCLG (2017) English Housing Survey 2016–17, ONS, London. MHCLG (2018) Social Housing Green Paper: A ‘New Deal’ for Social Housing, MHCLG, London. MHCLG (2019) A New Deal for Renting: Resetting the Balance of Rights and Responsibilities between Landlords and Tenants, MHCLG, London. Millie, A. et al. (2005) Anti-social Behaviour Strategies: Finding a Balance: Project Report, Policy Press, Bristol. Mullins, D. and Niner, P. (1996) Common Housing Registers: An Evaluation and Analysis of Current Practice, The Housing Corporation, London. National Housing and Domestic Abuse Policy and Practice Group (2019) Response to ‘Support for Victims of Domestic Abuse in Safe Accommodation, Unpublished. O Campo, P. et  al. (2015) The Neighbourhood Effects on Health and Well-Being (NEHW) study, Health & Place 31 pp. 65–74. Pascall, G. & Morley, R. (1996) Women and homelessness: proposals from the Department of the Environment: 1 Lone mothers, Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 18(2) pp. 189–202. Pavao, J. et al. (2007) Intimate partner violence and housing instability, American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 32(2) pp. 143–46. Pawson, H. et  al. (2001) Repeat Homelessness in Scotland, Scottish Homes, Edinburgh. Pawson H. et al. (2005) Learning Lessons from the Estates Renewal Challenge Fund, ODPM, London. Pawson, H. et  al. (2007) Evaluating Homelessness Prevention, Communities and ­Local Government, London. Pleace, N. et al. (2008) Statutory Homelessness in England: The Experience of Families and 16–17 year olds, DCLG, London. Ponic, P. (2007) Embracing Complexity in Community-based Health Promotion: ­Inclusion, Power, and Women’s Health, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC. Quilgars, D. & Pleace, N. (2010) Meeting the Needs of Households at Risk of Domestic Violence in England: The Role of Accommodation and Housing-Related Support Services, Communities and Local Government, London. Rashleigh, B. (2005) Keeping the Numbers Down, ROOF, London. Rollins, C. et al. (2012) Housing instability is as strong a predictor of poor health outcomes as level of danger in an abusive relationship: findings from the SHARE study, Journal of Interpersonal Violence 17(4) 623–43. Rose, N. (1999) Governing the soul: The Shaping of the Private Self, Free Association Books, London. Rose, N. (2012) Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Housing policy – wider contexts  117 Sampson, R. (2004) Neighbourhood and community: collective efficacy and community safety, IPPR Progressive Review 11(2) pp. 106–13. Scottish Women’s Aid (2016) The Women’s Aid Annual Survey 2016, Women’s Aid Federation of England, Bristol. Sharp, N. (2008) What’s Yours Is Mine, Refuge, London. Shelter (2019) This Is England: A Picture of Homelessness in 2019, Shelter, London. Shepard, M. & Pence, E. (1988). The effect of battering on the employment status of women, Affilia 3 pp. 55–61. Social Exclusion Unit (1997) Social Exclusion Unit: Purpose, Work Priorities and Working Methods, TSO, London. Squires, P. (2008) ASBO Nation: The Criminalisation of Nuisance, Policy Press, Bristol. Stephens, M. et al. (2014) What Will the Housing Market Look like in 2014?, JRF, York. Tjaden, P. & Thoennes (2000) Prevalence and consequences of male-to-female and female-to-male intimate partner violence as measured by the national violence against women survey, Violence Against Women 6(2) pp. 142–61. Tomas, A. & Dittmar, H. (1995) The experience of homeless women: an exploration of housing histories and the meaning of home, Housing Studies 10(4) pp. 493–515. Tonry, M. (2004) Punishment and Politics: Evidence and Emulation in English Crime Control Policy, Willan Publishing, Cullompton. Towers, J. (2015) Making the links between economic inequality and intimate partner violence, SAFE: The Domestic Abuse Quarterly, Spring 2015, pp. 22–25. Vallely, P. (2005) He visited in the glory days of ’97, but has Blair kept his vow to the Aylesbury Estate?, The Independent, 12 April 2005. Walby, S. & Towers, J. (2017) Measuring violence to end violence: mainstreaming gender, Journal of Gender-based Violence 1(1) pp. 11–31. Walby, S. & Towers, J. (2018). Untangling the concept of coercive control: theorizing domestic violent crime, Criminology & Criminal Justice 18(1) pp. 7–28. Walby, S. et al. (2016) Is violent crime increasing or decreasing? British Journal of Criminology 56(6) pp. 1203–34. Watts, B. & Fitzpatrick, S. (2018) Welfare Conditionality, Routledge, Abingdon. Whelan, R. (ed) (1998) Octavia Hill and the Social Housing Debate: Essays and letters by Octavia Hill, IEA, London. Women’s Aid (2017a) The Women’s Aid Annual Survey 2017, Women’s Aid Federation of England, Bristol. Women’s Aid (2017b) Nowhere to Turn 2017, Women’s Aid Federation of England, Bristol. Women’s Aid (2018) Nowhere to Turn 2018, Women’s Aid Federation of England, Bristol.

Chapter 8

Scotland and Wales – the (dis) United Kingdom

Thus far, we have discussed housing policy responses to domestic abuse through the lens of a national housing and welfare policy, and it is against this general backdrop that domestic abuse policy and its link to housing have developed. Until the early 2000s, policy across the UK was broadly the same; however, since devolution to the Scottish and Welsh Parliaments, there have been marked differences in housing and welfare policies in both the devolved nations, as they sought to soften the various blows of coalition and Conservative policies. The approach to domestic abuse has also varied greatly. There has been an increasing devolution of powers to the Scottish Government and Welsh Assembly, respectively (we do not discuss Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland), the powers devolved to these bodies by no means mirror one another. Scotland maintained its own legal and educational systems with some administrative devolution following the Act of Union 1707 and establishment of the Scottish Education Department in 1872 and Scottish Office in 1885, respectively (Stephens, 2019). Following a referendum held in 1999, the Scottish Parliament was created and given powers over several policy areas including housing and some limited welfare powers. The Scottish Parliament has powers to make primary legislation except in areas specifically reserved to Westminster. The Commission on Scottish Devolution (Calman Commission) (2009) granted some further legislative powers to the Scottish Parliament although this was soon overtaken by the Scottish independence referendum in 2014. During the referendum campaign, UK politicians promised further devolution to the Scottish Parliament, the subsequent Smith Commission (2014) led to the Scotland Act 2016 and the devolution of additional powers in relation to welfare and taxation amongst other areas (housing policy and building control are fully devolved matters). Scotland has taken a distinct approach to public policy based on the Christie Commission (2011) principles of reducing duplication, increasing efficiency, partnership and co-production, promoting an asset-based approach and reducing inequality (Gibb, 2014).

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Wales has enjoyed fewer devolved powers than Scotland reflecting the impact of the loss of a distinct legal system in the 16th century (Stephens, 2019) and “…the country’s effective merger with England” (ibid). As in Scotland, the Welsh Assembly was established in 1999 following a referendum on devolution. Initially, the Assembly was granted only powers to make secondary legislation in limited, devolved areas. In 2007, the National Assembly for Wales (the legislature) and the Welsh (Assembly) Government (Executive) were separated and the Assembly given limited primary legislative powers. Twenty areas of policy are currently devolved including housing, planning, health, education and social welfare.

Housing & welfare policy Housing policy and housing-adjacent policy has diverged across the three nations in several important ways (Stephens, 2019). Here, we discuss major policy differences, before moving on to discuss tenancy law. Right to Buy This is perhaps the area of widest divergence (Stephens, 2019). During the last period of Labour governance, the three (Great British) nations were all controlled by Labour administrations with Right to Buy policies moving in lockstep i.e. reduced discounts and rising qualification periods: an attempt to stem sales without formally abandoning the policy. The election of the Conservative-led coalition government in 2010 saw Right to Buy policy diverge significantly. In an attempt to reinvigorate Right to Buy, the coalition returned the maximum discount to 2007/2008 levels and reduced the qualification period to two years. Conservative governments (elected in 2015 and 2017) have engaged in an effort to extend the Right to Buy to housing association tenants. But, during a pilot (HM Treasury, 2016), according to a freedom of information request by Inside Housing, fewer than half the tenants eligible to apply to purchase their homes (following a ballot) did so. Also, the government’s preferred policy of paying for the scheme via the sale of high value, local authority properties has also encountered some resistance that has rendered the future of the policy uncertain. However, the Conservative Party manifesto (Conservative Party, 2019) recommitted the party to extending the Right to Buy to housing associations. Scotland and Wales have both taken very different paths to England. The Scottish Government withdrew Right to Buy from new tenants in 2011 and ended it altogether in 2016. The Welsh Government published a White Paper on the future of the policy in 2015 (Welsh Government, 2015); following the consultation, it announced a reduction in the maximum discount level (by half) and introduced legislation to end the policy. The Right to Buy and

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associated rights ended in Wales on January 26, 2019, following the passing of the Abolition of the Right to Buy and Associated Rights (Wales) Act 2018 (Welsh Assembly, 2018). Limiting tenure The UK Government attempted to introduce measures aimed at limiting tenure in council and housing association properties in the Housing and Planning Act 2016. First, the ‘pay to stay’ scheme required that social tenants earning higher incomes would have to pay market or near-market rents to reflect their increased means (CIH, 2016). However, the scheme was abandoned (Stephens, 2019) not least due to resistance from the sector itself; instead, the government committed to ensuring that social housing is available to those needing it most via other measures (Conservative Party, 2019; HM Treasury, 2016). A second measure from the same Act is still operational although facing problems. Fixed Term Tenancies (FTTs) had already been used (voluntarily) by some housing associations, mostly to manage stock in high demand areas or as longer ‘introductory’ tenancies for ‘high risk tenants’ (see CIH, 2017); the government’s intention was to make their use mandatory for local authorities. However, this has also been abandoned following local authorities’ reticence to use the enabling powers to do so, introduced in 2012 (Fitzpatrick & Pawson, 2014). Some Housing Association landlords that introduced ‘fixed term tenancies’ are now abandoning them as they have not led to the policy outcomes promised; in many cases, they have led to increased bureaucracy as landlords are required to review tenancies at the end of the fixed period (CIH, 2017). Homelessness Thus far, the UK has been distinct from many countries in that it has enshrined a legally enforceable duty for homeless people who are unintentionally homeless and in a ‘priority need’ category to be allocated settled accommodation. Historically, this has been delivered solely via social housing owned and managed by local authorities or housing associations, although there has been divergence here also. Policy in England has shifted further towards the ‘ambulance service’ model (Fitzpatrick & Pawson, 2014; Stephens, 2019) by permitting local authorities to discharge their duty to provide settled accommodation to the less secure private-rented sector. England has also introduced a duty to prevent homelessness via a private member’s bill tabled by Bob Blackman MP and supported by the government. The Homelessness Reduction Act 2018 places strengthened duties on local authorities to provide advice and assistance to all households threatened with homelessness and to take steps to prevent homelessness where possible.

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The Scottish Government has taken measures to extend the duty to house to all ‘unintentionally homeless’ households by abolishing ‘priority need’. The most important aspect of this has been to extend protection to single and childless households who were not considered a priority previously. Although introduced in 2004, it was phased in to allow local authorities to adapt to the change; it is also only possible due to the greater availability of social housing in Scotland. Wales too have opted to extend protections for households, but not by abolishing ‘priority need’. Instead, Wales has chosen to extend the duty on local authorities to be more pro-active in preventing homelessness in the first place (via the Housing Act [Wales] 2014 and the Renting Homes [Wales] Act 2016). The Bedroom Tax and Discretionary Housing Payments (DHPs) Perhaps, the most controversial measure taken in relation to housing is the ‘Removal of the Spare Room Subsidy’ known colloquially as the ‘Bedroom Tax’. This is the policy of reducing housing benefit payments to social tenants if they are under occupying their property. This policy is controversial for several reasons; first, local authorities generally have a shortage of single-bedroomed accommodation meaning those affected cannot escape the impact of the measure. This is especially unfair as social housing already houses many of the poorest people in country who can scarcely afford the additional cost. Second, several court cases brought by people with disabilities that required them to have an additional room, dialysis patients who required an additional room for their treatment and parents needing additional space for children highlighted the iniquity of the measure, albeit often unintended. The ‘bedroom tax’ policy failed across several of its aims (see Gibb, 2015 for a full discussion) but remains in place across the UK. DHPs provide a way of mitigating the worst effects of the ‘bedroom tax’ and other welfare policies. They have formed part of government policy welfare for several years in recognition that there are sometimes situations in which hardship is caused unintentionally by welfare policy. However, they have increasingly been used by local authorities, at the behest of central government, to ameliorate the worst effects of the ‘bedroom tax’; indeed, multiple court cases have found that it is only the use of DHPs that keep the ‘bedroom tax’ lawful (see Meers, 2018). In England, the use of DHPs persist; however, research by the Chartered Institute of Housing (CIH, 2019c) showed that councils in England were allocated almost £53 million in DHPs by central government in 2017–2018 to support people affected by the benefit cap, but spent only £37 million, and 242 out of 274 councils failing to spend their allocation – including 71 in the areas that were worst affected by the benefit cap.

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In the case of Scotland, the ‘Bedroom Tax’ became bound up with the independence referendum with those campaigning for independence making the point that only by leaving the UK could Scotland escape the effects of the ‘bedroom tax’. It was clearly in the interests of the UK Government to demonstrate otherwise. In May 2014, the UK Government passed an order devolving the cap on DHPs to the Scottish Government (Scottish Government, 2015), the Scottish Government has decided to allocate such amounts as to be able to mitigate the effects of the ‘bedroom tax’ policy. This sum currently dominates Scottish welfare spending (Stephens, 2019). In the longer term, the Scottish Government plans to use its powers to vary the housing element of Universal Credit to provide mitigation. Welsh local authorities receive funds from the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) to operate DHP schemes. However, this sum is not enough to fully mitigate the costs of the ‘bedroom tax’. Neither has the Welsh Government sought to do so. It has made modest sums available from its Homelessness Prevention Fund to be used to achieve long-lasting change by addressing the root problems behind people’s circumstances (Welsh Government, 2014).

Court orders, housing & domestic abuse Previously, we have detailed the legal mechanisms for ending tenancies with a focus on domestic abuse and joint tenancies. A mixture of distinct legal systems and powers being granted to Scotland and Wales following devolution has meant that their administrations have been free to follow their own paths in relation to housing and domestic abuse policy. The following section therefore covers the legal differences and legislative developments in these jurisdictions. Scotland Scotland has maintained its own legal system which differs in several significant ways from that of England and Wales, including distinct arrangements in relation to tenancy and family law – key intersecting areas. First, under Scottish law, a tenant who experiences domestic abuse may have the right to stay in their own home and have an abusive partner removed. Their right to do so will depend on whether they and/or their partner have occupancy rights. In England, no such protection exists; the only circumstance under which this is possible is where the person experiencing abuse is named as the sole tenant. Persons not named on a tenancy agreement have few rights (in England), and joint tenancies can be ended by notice from either tenant – often used as a tool of further abuse. Where the person experiencing abuse is married or in a civil partnership with the perpetrator, Scottish law provides an automatic right for them to

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stay in the home (if that is their wish) regardless of whether they are named on the tenancy agreement or not, or whether it is a sole or joint tenancy. This means that a perpetrator has no right to put a partner out of the home or deny them entry. Tenancies can also not be ended or transferred without the written permission of both occupants. These differences provide a significant level of protection for people experiencing abuse that tenants in England do not have as they prevent perpetrators taking punitive action against their victims using the tenancy as a tool of abuse. The situation is different where co-habitees are not married or in a civil partnership, however. In this circumstance, occupancy rights are only automatic if the person experiencing abuse is either the sole tenant or named as a joint tenant on the tenancy agreement. Further, if the person experiencing abuse is the sole tenant or named as a joint tenant, an abusive partner has no legal right to stay in the home, and a court order is not necessary to make them leave. The Police can be called to eject a perpetrator or in extremis an application for an ejection order can be made to the courts. Where the person experiencing abuse is not a sole or joint tenant, they do not have automatic occupancy rights but they do have the right to go to court to get such rights granted to them for six months at a time. The law in Scotland also provides other protections for people experiencing domestic abuse. A tenant with occupancy rights (see above) can apply to a court for an exclusion order and interdict to remove and abusive partners right to stay in the house and force them to stay away from it. Where the perpetrator has already left the property, the person experiencing abuse can apply solely for an interdict to force them to stay away from the property. To summarise, • • •

An exclusion order is a court order that suspends the right of a married person, civil partner or cohabitee to live in the family home An interdict is a court order that tells someone that they can’t do certain things such as approach or contact a particular person A non-harassment (restraining) order is a court order which tells someone to stop behaving in a certain way

At the time of writing, the Scottish Government was planning to consult on a new form of ‘emergency barring order’. Where the local authority is the landlord, it can use its powers under paragraph 15 of schedule 2 of the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 to transfer a tenancy to the tenant’s spouse or former spouse, or a person who has been living with the tenant as a spouse (this has been interpreted to include samesex couples). The potential transferee must apply to the landlord for transfer because of relationship breakdown. It should also be noted that these powers can only be used where the sheriff is satisfied that it is reasonable to evict the perpetrator and that alternative accommodation is available for them.

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Despite developing some of the most forward-thinking policy in the world on domestic abuse, a recent guidance document from the Association of Local Authority Chief Housing Officers (ALACHO), CIH Scotland, the Scottish Federation of Housing Associations (SFHA), Shelter (Scotland) and Women’s Aid (Scotland) voices concerns that housing policy and practice continues to fail people experiencing domestic abuse and that work on domestic abuse and its intersection with homelessness is lagging (ALACHO, 2019). First, and importantly, the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018 creates a specific criminal offence of domestic abuse. The Scottish Government has recently expanded the definition of domestic abuse in the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018, this came into law on April 1, 2019 (Scottish Parliament, 2018). The main thrust of the Act is to redefine domestic abuse from single incidences of assault or other behaviours, to recognise that it often forms a pattern of ongoing behaviour that either causes harm directly or is so reckless as to cause harm. In cases of domestic abuse, it is therefore necessary to show • •

• •

That there was a course of behaviour and occurred repeatedly over a period of time That the behaviour was committed against a partner including spouses, civil partners, couples who live together, or any other close, intimate relationships, such as boyfriends or girlfriends. The new offence is entirely gender neutral, meaning it can apply to relationships between any two people That the perpetrator intended to cause harm or was reckless as to whether they were causing harm That a reasonable person would consider the behaviour likely to cause harm: This is an objective test, meaning that an outsider looking at the situation would consider the behaviour likely to cause harm. The actual impact of the behaviour on the victim is not relevant (Excerpt from ALACHO, 2019)

Domestic abuse is therefore seen to be a pattern of controlling, coerciving, threatening, degrading and/or violent behaviour, including sexual violence, by a partner or an ex-partner. Behaviour can mean any violent, threatening or intimidating act against a partner. It can also mean acts towards a partner, child or another person which have one of the following effects: • • •

Making a partner dependent or subordinate, such as denying them access to money, bank cards or other resources Isolating a partner from friends, family or other support Controlling, regulating or monitoring a partner’s day-to-day activities, such as accessing their bank statements or calling them excessively to find out where they are and punishing them for not answering

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• •

Depriving or restricting a partner’s freedom of action, such as not allowing them to have keys to the house Frightening, humiliating, degrading or punishing a partner, such as insulting them on a regular basis or fabricating stories, such as false illness, to cause them alarm.

The Act also provides an aggravation to the offence where the behaviour is carried out in the presence of a child. Aggravating factors make an offence worse and may result in a longer/more serious sentence. In cases of domestic abuse, a child need only be present and witnesses the behaviour, and the child does not need to be physically harmed themselves. The Act allows one justificatory defence in cases of abuse that the ‘­behaviour’ was reasonable in the circumstances. Although this may seem counter-intuitive, it is designed to protect people taking reasonable measures against a partner where, for example, they suffer from an addiction or illness; for example, withholding access to money or bank accounts from a partner who has a serious gambling addiction or misuses drugs. The Scottish legislation also recognises the gendered nature of domestic abuse that is to say that in most cases, it is experienced by women and children and is perpetrated by men. The definition also applies to men, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender people and gender non-binary people (LGBT+) affected by domestic abuse. Importantly, the definition also recognises that children who live with domestic abuse are, themselves, experiencing abuse. The Act also makes several changes to criminal procedure by • • • • • •

Creating a standard bail condition prohibiting a person accused of a domestic abuse offence from conducting precognition of the complainer other than through a solicitor Prohibiting an accused person in a domestic abuse case from personally conducting the defence in court Permitting certain expert evidence relating to the behaviour of the complainer in domestic abuse cases Applying the same rules for the benefit of vulnerable witnesses as apply to other serious offences Requiring the court, when sentencing a person convicted of a domestic abuse offence, to have regard to the aim of ensuring that the victim is not subject to further abuse by the offender Placing a duty on the court to automatically consider whether to make a non-harassment order against a person convicted of a domestic abuse offence

Rather than set specific reporting requirements on domestic abuse, the Scottish Government has chosen to incorporate this into its wider national performance

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indicators. These cover a variety of well-being, community-based, cultural and other social issues (Scottish Government, 2019). Wales Due to the (mostly) shared legal system between England and Wales, the law as it relates to tenancies is similar to England. This means that (unlike in Scotland) a person only has rights under a tenancy agreement if they are named on it. This means that at the time of writing, • • •

If the person experiencing abuse is the sole tenant, they have the right to have a perpetrator removed from the property as they have no legal right to reside there Where the person experiencing abuse is not named and perpetrator is the named tenant, then the former has few rights to remain or have the tenancy transferred to them Where there is a joint tenancy, both are jointly liable for paying the rent, any damage, etc., and the tenancy can be ended by either party without the agreement of the other

However, in 2016, the Welsh Government passed the Renting Homes (Wales) Act 2016 with the aim of making it simpler and easier to rent a home in Wales; CIH Cymru states that the changes brought in by the act will affect virtually all existing Welsh tenancies (CIH Cymru, 2016). The act makes several changes to the legislative framework that impact directly on how domestic abuse can be addressed. Although passed in 2016, the powers in the act are not yet in force and are expected to be introduced between 2020 and 2021. First, the Act allows a joint tenancy to continue for the person who remains in a property where the other joint tenant leaves. This is ostensibly to reduce the risk of homelessness for joint tenants who remain in their property but will also have great utility for people experiencing abuse as they will be able to remain in the tenancy where the preparator leaves or is removed. Second, and more pointedly, the Act allows perpetrators of abuse to be targeted for eviction and enabling those experiencing abuse to remain in their homes. This step is explicitly in support of the aims contained in the Women, Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence Act 2015 to provide preventative, protective and supportive mechanisms in the delivery of services. Last, the act introduces an ‘anti-social behaviour (ASB) and other prohibited conduct’ clause that states that the contract holder must not engage in or allow a visitor to engage in conduct capable of causing nuisance

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or annoyance. Whilst not specifically aimed at addressing domestic abuse and domestic abuse should not be addressed as ASB, this clause could be used to sanction tenants for their behaviour or their visitor’s behaviour in cases of suspected abuse and where other measures are thought to be unviable. Wales has also introduced mandatory licensing and registration of private landlords, placing a stronger duty on local authorities to prevent homelessness and reforming the Housing Revenue Account (HRA) subsidy system. As in Scotland, the Welsh Assembly has used its devolved powers to pass legislation in the areas of both housing and domestic abuse. In both cases, Wales has extended the protections available to people experiencing abuse beyond those available in England. Due to the shared legal system, Wales uses the UK Government definition of domestic abuse, which is: Any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive or threatening behaviour, violence or abuse between those aged 16 or over who are or have been intimate partners or family members regardless of gender or sexuality.” This can encompass but is not limited to the following types of abuse: • • • • •

psychological physical sexual financial emotional

Controlling behaviour is: a range of acts designed to make a person subordinate and/or dependent by isolating them from sources of support, exploiting their resources and capacities for personal gain, depriving them of the means needed for independence, resistance and escape and regulating their everyday behaviour. Coercive behaviour is: an act or a pattern of acts of assault, threats, humiliation and intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, punish, or frighten their victim. This definition, which is not a legal definition, includes so called ‘­honour’ based violence, female genital mutilation (FGM) and forced marriage, and is clear that victims are not confined to one gender or ethnic group. Crown Prosecution Service (2019) The Violence against Women, Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence (Wales) Act (2015), sets out a revised definition of abuse and a number of duties and requirements on local authorities and others to take action to support the

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bill’s objectives. The definition of domestic abuse in the Act is as follows (taken from Welsh Women’s Aid, undated): In this Act—“abuse” means physical, sexual, psychological, emotional or financial abuse; “domestic abuse” means abuse where the victim of it is or has been associated with the abuser “gender-based violence” means— a violence, threats of violence or harassment arising directly or indirectly from values, beliefs or customs relating to gender or sexual orientation; b female genital mutilation; c forcing a person (whether by physical force or coercion by threats or other psychological means) to enter into a religious or civil ceremony of marriage (whether or not legally binding); 2 A person is associated with another person for the purpose of the definition of “domestic abuse” in subsection (1) if a they are or have been married to each other; b they are or have been civil partners of each other; c they live or have lived together in an enduring family relationship (whether they are of different sexes or the same sex); d they live or have lived in the same household; and for this purpose, a person is a member of another person’s household if i the person normally lives with the other person as a member of his or her family or ii the person might reasonably be expected to live with that other person; e they are relatives; f they have agreed to marry one another (whether or not that agreement has been terminated); g they have entered into a civil partnership agreement between them (whether or not that agreement has been terminated); h they have or have had an intimate personal relationship with each other; i in relation to a child, each of them is a parent of the child or has, or has had, parental responsibility for the child. It is unclear which of these definitions has primacy, but it is thought that, in delivery and implementation of the Act in Wales, then the Welsh definition applies, but in the wider context, then the UK statutory definition would apply, particularly in terms of its application to non-devolved areas. The Act requires ministers to prepare, publish and review an overall national strategy to Violence against Women and Girls, domestic abuse and sexual violence (Welsh Women’s Aid, undated). This is supported by

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requirements for the ministers to appoint a national advisor to support them with domestic abuse policy and carry out and publish research, reports and an annual plan/report on the conduct of their role. The national advisor also has the power to request information from relevant bodies in relation to their role, these bodies must comply with such requests for information, under the reviewing role of the advisor. The Act also specifically mentions taking inequalities into account in relation to violence against women and the other protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010. People and organisations exercising ‘relevant functions’ (defined in Section 2 of the Act) must also have due regard to minimising factors that increases the risk of Violence against Women and Girls or exacerbates the impact of that violence (Welsh Government, 2015). The Act also places a duty on local authorities and Local Health Boards to publish a local strategy for their areas. Actions within the strategy can be carried out by either public bodies or by voluntary organisations or other groups or persons who are able to contribute to the objectives of the Act. The organisations/people should agree to the inclusion of these actions in the strategy, however (Welsh Women’s Aid, undated). Whilst local authority education functions are not included in this duty, there is a power for ministers to require local authorities to publish information about how their education function (including in schools) is being exercised to promote the purpose of the Act. There is also a power for ministers to issue guidance to a ‘relevant authority’ on how it must action its functions to contribute to the purpose of the Act. For the purposes of this Act, ‘relevant authority’ means a local authority, local health board, fire and rescue authority or NHS Trust. The Act specifies such guidance as including how professionals deal with disclosures of abuse (known as ‘ask and act’), a national training framework for training public and specialist sector staff and in relation to domestic abuse champions. The Welsh Government has also indicated that it will issue guidance on a ‘whole education approach’ and in relation to working with perpetrators (Welsh Women’s Aid, undated). Welsh ministers must also publish national indicators and a national report to monitor progress of the Act. Local authorities and local health boards must also publish an annual report (each financial year) on progress against the objectives specified in their own local strategies. Thus far, the Welsh Government has issued guidance to relevant authorities in the following areas (from Welsh Government, 2019), •

•

Commissioning violence against women, domestic abuse and sexual violence services – Commissioners of support services for violence against women, domestic abuse and sexual violence (VAWDASV) must follow this guidance Violence against women, domestic abuse and sexual violence: guidance for local strategies – Advice for local authorities and health boards on how

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• •

• •

• •

• • • • •

to develop strategies to tackle violence against women, domestic abuse and sexual violence Domestic abuse: safeguarding older people – A guide to help professionals support older people who are experiencing or who have experienced domestic abuse Identifying violence against women, domestic abuse and sexual violence: Ask and Act – Assists public sector workers to identify violence against women, domestic abuse and sexual violence and to provide specialist support Violence against women, domestic abuse and sexual violence: guidance for governors – A guide to help school governors develop a policy on recognising signs of abuse eLearning on violence against women domestic abuse and sexual violence: guidance for line managers – Provides guidance to line managers about how to staff about the eLearning in group 1 of the violence against women, domestic abuse and sexual violence (VAWDASV) National Training Framework Domestic abuse and sexual violence: how to get help – How to get help about domestic abuse and sexual violence Violence against women, domestic abuse and sexual violence (­VAWDASV) educational toolkit – Provides primary, secondary and further education providers with a range of best practice materials to use within education settings Domestic abuse practice guidance for Cafcass Cymru practitioners – Guidance to aid and assist Cafcass Cymru practitioners with cases that feature the domestic abuse of children Female genital mutilation: guidance for professionals – Information and guidance on what to do if someone is at risk of female genital mutilation (FGM) Guidance for Cafcass Cymru practitioners about children experiencing domestic abuse – Information for Cafcass Cymru practitioners about how domestic abuse can impact children who have experienced it Domestic abuse, sexual violence and slavery: guidance for professionals – Guidance for workers and professionals in the field of violence against women, domestic abuse and sexual violence (VAWDASV) National Training Framework on violence against women, domestic abuse and sexual violence: statutory guidance – A guide to the statutory requirements for training across the public service and specialist third sector

References ALACHO (2019) Domestic Abuse: A Good Practice Guide for Social Landlords, ALACHO, Edinburgh.

Scotland and Wales – the (dis) UK  131 Christie Commission (2011) Commission on the Future Delivery of Public Services, Public Services Commission, Edinburgh. CIH (2016) What You Need to Know about the Housing and Planning Act 2016, CIH, Coventry. CIH (2017) Sector Showcase: Fixed Term Tenancies, CIH, Coventry. CIH (2019a) Benefit cap having ‘profound impact’ on people’s lives – while new analysis shows families could be missing out on vital funding http://www.cih.org/ news-article/display/vpathDCR/templatedata/cih/news-article/data/Benefit_ cap_having_profound_impact_on_peoples_lives_-_while_new_analysis_shows_ families_could_be_missing_out_on_vital_funding CIH (2019b) Response to the Consultation on the Delivery of Support to Victims and Their Children in Accommodation-based Domestic Abuse Services, CIH, Coventry. CIH (2019c) Rethinking Allocations, CIH, Coventry. CIH Cymru (2016) Housing in Wales Factsheet: The Renting Homes (Wales) Act 2016, CIH Cymru, Cardiff. Commission on Scottish Devolution (Calman Commission) (2009) Serving Scotland Better: Scotland and the UK in the 21st Century, Scottish Government, Edinburgh. Conservative Party (2019) Get Brexit Done: Unleash Britain’s Potential, Conservative Party, London. Crown Prosecution Service (2019) https://www.cps.gov.uk/domestic-abuse, Accessed 16/10/19. Fitzpatrick, S. & Pawson, H. (2014) Ending security of tenure for social renters: transitioning to ‘ambulance service’ social housing?, Housing, Theory and Society 29(5) pp. 597–615. Gibb, K. (2014) What Works: Scotland and the Housing Sector http://whatworks scotland.blogspot.com/2014/12/normal-0-false-false-false-en-gb-x-none.html, Accessed 11/2/2020. Gibb, K. (2015) The multiple failures of the UK bedroom tax, International Journal of Housing Policy 15(2) pp. 148–66. HM Treasury (2016) Autumn Statement 2016: Policy Costings, HMSO, London. Inside Housing (2019) RTB pilot: more than half of tenants drop out after ballot https:// www.insidehousing.co.uk/news/news/vrtb-pilot-more-than-half-of-tenantsdrop-out-after-ballot-61452, Accessed 13/10/19. Meers, J. (2018) Awarding discretionary housing payments: constraints of time, conditionality and the assessment of income/expenditure, Journal of Social Security Law 25(2) pp. 102–119. MHCLG (2019) A New Deal for Renting, MHCLG, London. National Housing and Domestic Abuse Policy and Practice Group (2019) Response to the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government’s Consultation on ‘A New Deal for Renting Resetting the Balance of Rights and Responsibilities between Landlords and Tenants’, Unpublished. Scottish Government (2015) Welfare Reform (Further provision) (Scotland) Act 2012 – Annual Report 2015, Scottish Government, Edinburgh. Scottish Government (2019) https://nationalperformance.gov.scot/measuring-progress/ national-indicator-performance, Accessed 16/10/19. Scottish Parliament (2018) Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018, Scottish Parliament, Edinburgh.

132  Domestic abuse and wider housing policy Shelter (2019) https://england.shelter.org.uk/legal/security_of_tenure/secure_ tenancies/ending_a_secure_tenancy/grounds_for_possession_secure_tenancies/ discretionary_grounds_secure_tenancies#2, Accessed 22/10/19. Smith Commission (2014) Report of the Smith Commission into Further Devolution of Powers to the Scottish Parliament, The Smith Commission, Edinburgh. Stephens, M. (2019) Social rented housing in the (DIS)United Kingdom: can different social housing regime types exist within the same nation state?, Urban ­Research & Practice, 12(1) pp. 38–60. Walker, J. & Hester, M. (2019) Policy Evidence Summary 4: Justice, Housing and Domestic Abuse, the Experiences of Homeowners and Private Renters, University of Bristol, Bristol. Welsh Assembly (2018) http://www.legislation.gov.uk/anaw/2018/1/enacted, Accessed 13/10/19. Welsh Government (2014) Evaluation of Additional Discretionary Housing Payments Funding Provided by the Welsh Government to Local Authorities in Wales for 2013/14, Welsh Government, Cardiff. Welsh Government (2015) Violence against Women, Domestic Abuse and Sexual ­Violence (Wales) Act 2015, Welsh Government, Cardiff. Welsh Government (2019) https://gov.wales/violence-against-women-domestic-abuse, Accessed 25/10/19. Welsh Women’s Aid (Undated) Welsh Women’s Aid Briefing: The Violence against Women, Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence (Wales) Act 2015, Welsh Women’s Aid, Cardiff.

Chapter 9

The impact of housing providers on women experiencing abuse

Introduction A key part of the genesis of this book was the PhD undertaken by Kelly ­Henderson looking specifically at the housing sector’s policy responses to domestic abuse (Henderson, 2019). This chapter details the findings from the semi-structured interviews she undertook with victims of domestic abuse in Sunderland and London as part of her study. The purpose of its inclusion here is to highlight the very practical ways that housing providers can respond and have responded to domestic abuse thus further building a case for the national implementation of the measures discussed in the final chapter. This chapter is also intended to bring the voice of survivors of abuse to the fore in the book. The women interviewed as part of the study were at varying stages in their recovery, and their ages ranged from early 20s to mid-70s. Interviews were carried out at the victim’s home, over the telephone and in a local refuge, respectively, and the interviews were on a one basis, and a group interview with women in a local refuge was also conducted. The group interview with women in the refuge added an extra layer of information and highlighted important, differential experiences and insights compared to women who had not spent time in a refuge. The chapter opens by looking at women’s routes to and experiences of support, the practical and emotional factors involved in moving or staying put; and perceptions of the impact up on children. It then highlights the differences between generic and specialist support and explores the women’s hopes for the future in the light of the interventions they were part of. The names of the women involved in the study have been changed to protect their privacy.

Routes into support from the housing provider The routes to accessing support from a housing provider identified in the interviews with women who had experienced domestic abuse were varied. Despite the housing providers’ promotion of the support they could offer customers experiencing domestic abuse, interviews highlighted that women

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often accessed that support via non–support-related routes i.e. not by directly contacting their provider about support with their abuse. The routes into accessing support are, nevertheless, varied. Some access available support via the repairs service, for example requesting a lock change, or in other ways, for example making a noise complaint. Although not always specifically approached, the provider identified the possibility of abuse and acted. In some cases, contact is made when the housing provider is notified by the Police about abuse or abuse comes to light following a complaint. Some of the women Kelly interviewed said that they had not previously considered disclosing to the housing provider that they were experiencing domestic abuse. The case following examples below highlights some of the issues involved in disclosing abuse, but also some of the varied routes into accessing support. ‘Sally’ One interviewee, ‘Sally’, explained that her housing provider became involved after a notification from the Police, she had also simultaneously reported repairs which had alerted the housing provider to consider that domestic abuse could be an issue (this is clearly dependent on providers having an awareness of the signs of abuse and commitment to doing something about it). Housing officers also have a key role in addressing abuse. ‘Sally’ had a good relationship with her housing officer as she had been able to talk to her when she had left a previous abusive relationship and was re-housed from a local refuge. Although Sally had a good relationship with the housing officer, she had not wanted to talk to anyone at all about the abuse, let alone a housing support worker that she had not previously met. … well, me [sic] housing manager came out because the police had informed them, and they got us in touch with a support worker [names support worker]. The housing officer subsequently made a referral to a support worker. Sally remembered feeling uncomfortable at their initial meeting because she did not have an existing relationship with the support worker. I didn’t want … I was all right talking to [housing officer] but because I didn’t know [support worker] and I didn’t feel very comfortable talking to [support worker name]. ‘Mary’ ‘Mary’ had sought help from her housing provider after a visit from a housing officer to carry out an annual customer survey. Mary and her husband

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had always paid their rent on time, and kept their property and garden in excellent condition, in fact exemplar tenants; so, would not have necessarily come to the attention of their housing officer otherwise. The survey provided the opportunity to access their home. The Housing Officer left a Tenants’ Handbook which included a wide range of information on services and support that the organisation could provide to customers from be-friending support with money advice to support for anti-social behaviour and domestic abuse. Mary had experienced domestic abuse much of her married life (over 40 years) and had not been aware that she could seek support from her housing provider for domestic abuse. However, this chance of conversation with someone in the organisation and then reading the handbook was a catalyst for her to seek help: I phoned up and asked for an appointment and … I don’t know if I phoned up or if I actually went down … and they let me see somebody straight away. I think they must have been in a bit of a … I must have been wandering the roads. ‘Emily’ Emily had made a complaint about noise from an upstairs neighbour and received a visit from the housing provider to discuss her complaint in more detail. She had not previously informed them she was experiencing domestic abuse, and her contact with the provider was about the noise nuisance complaint. Well, it’s really random actually, I had a new Estate Manager knock on the door just to introduce herself. The week prior I put in a complaint about a neighbour upstairs that was banging constantly on the walls. The Estate Manager’s warm approach in asking how she was made Emily feel she could disclose to her and soundly illustrates the importance of the manner of initial contact and its effect to elicit the confidence of a victim to disclose domestic abuse. So when the lady knocked on the door I thought it was that she just said ‘Hi, I’m such and such, how are you today … and I burst into tears and she was like ‘Do you mind if I come in? In this case, the Estate Manager listened and advised that although she didn’t have the necessary skills to help her best, she would ensure that she got the right person to support her. Whilst the Estate Manager was not an expert, her supportive approach demonstrated that she had enough knowledge to

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provide immediate support and provide Emily with access to more appropriate support. … and bless her she was like ‘I’ve not got the skills or the experience to help you but I do know somebody that has, can you give me the rest of the day and I promise you I’ll get somebody to give you a call back. ‘Carrie’ Carrie sought help after she had left an abusive relationship. She sought help from her housing provider on a non–housing-related matter when her ex-partner picked up her child from school without her knowledge. She didn’t know where else to turn and contacted her housing provider for advice and help. She had left her abusive partner without the input from the housing provider but was still feeling she was being abused via ongoing child contact. Something … basically … when I did leave the situation, I left the situation on my own but I was still going through it because I had a child, so due to the child contact it felt like I still was experiencing even though I wasn’t in the actual situation anymore. So basically, one day he just … he went to pick up my daughter from school without me knowing. ‘Sally’s’ example above highlights the importance of the repairs service as a route to accessing support. Her property had been attacked by her ex-­ partner meaning that she felt she had to report the damage to the housing provider. Another interviewee, ‘Trudy’, came to access support via reporting repairs when she reported being unable to get into her house after the locks on her doors had been changed by her husband without her knowledge. This meant that she could not access the property which was a joint tenancy with her husband. The repairs call handler reported the request for a lock change to the Support Team in line with the organisation’s policy. Consequently, Trudy was referred to a support worker to see if she needed any support which led her to disclose the abuse she was experiencing: Yeah, I was a joint tenant, yeah, and obviously they put me in touch with [named support worker] because that had came up on the system that it was some kind of alert or ‘cause for concern’ and obviously within the same day the police were alerted and then obviously on [date] I then went and saw [support worker] and they kind of knew the whole situation at that point. Conversely, some interviewees said that they found it easier to disclose to a housing professional, and it was sometimes a case of them being in the

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right place at the right time (Emily and the Estate Manager for example). A key factor in disclosure can be the relationship and attitude of the housing officer and the opportunity of being able to talk to someone who is not a family member, for fear of upsetting them. In her interview, ‘Emma’ said: And so we was talking I just told her, basically it had to come out and she just happened to be somebody … and I think because I had … I didn’t know her, in a way it meant that I didn’t have that fear of sometimes when people are close to you sometimes they’re more honest and it can be more hurtful and it all just spilt out. These examples highlight the problem for those experiencing abuse and housing providers in bringing cases of abuse into the open. Those experiencing abuse do not always want to talk to their housing provider about it, even where they have a good relationship with them, and many housing providers are not aware of the signs of abuse and what to do about it. They also highlight the range of behaviours that are abusive. In all these cases, the women had not originally contacted the housing provider about support but because the provider was aware of the potential for abuse and had trained staff to know what they could do about it, these women received the services they needed to end their abuse and embark upon a recovery from it. This demonstrates the vital importance of housing provider awareness and training around domestic abuse. We now move on to discuss some of the key routes into support.

Expectations of support from housing providers As we have established above, it can often be difficult for women to disclose abuse to their housing provider, a family member or indeed anyone. A recurring theme throughout interviews was the low expectation of the level of support that would be provided from the housing provider when women initially accessed it. Women, in some cases, had not considered seeking support from their housing provider because they didn’t think that they could which led to low expectations of the quality and type of support they would be provided with when they did access it. For example, ‘Sally’ said that she had not considered that a housing provider would offer support around domestic abuse. Other interviewees expressed a level of surprise at the extent and level of support given and that it had exceeded their expectations. Not at all, not at all, like I knew … as far as I was concerned it was just a landlord and you paid your rent and that was it, I didn’t know nowt about what they done till I actually got involved with them, do you know what I mean. ‘Sally’

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Yeah, well she helped me like quite a bit and then like I wasn’t going to have much … like obviously when I went to go and see her on the [date] I didn’t have much faith, I just thought ‘Okay, you know, just go to somebody to talk to. Anon ‘Emma’, who initially disclosed her abuse to her Estate Manager, was referred to a support worker who called her on the same day and arranged to see her. Emma felt that she was understood by the support worker and that she provided everything she needed in terms of support provided. I always say [support worker name] was like an earth angel, she was a lovely woman, she was so understanding, caring, she was … just her nature, just her way, she’s got a softly spoken, she’s really understanding, she gave me cuddles the first time she met me. I was upset, I was crying, she was just really friendly, she told me all the other people I could go to like National Domestic Violence, the domestic violence team in [area she lived], contacting like a solicitor, police. ‘Trudy’ had spoken to her support worker and initially thought that it was someone to talk to and accepted the support, not expecting much. However, on accessing the service, she felt that her support worker had provided a huge level of support, and the worker really invested herself into the process. Trudy talked about how invaluable that support was when she was giving evidence at court against her husband on an attempted murder charge (of her). She highlighted that support was also provided to members of her family which she felt ultimately benefitted her. Because obviously I had my mam and dad there and I wanted someone that was … obviously she’d been there the whole time, so in a way like she’s kind of invested her time as well. I know it’s her work and obviously she’s got to like … to a degree, that’s what she’s got to do but I did really appreciate the fact that she came, she put herself out but also it meant that because she was there it calmed my mam and dad, it calmed like … like she was on my side but it was a professional, so it still kept everything to … ’cause obviously my mam and dad, you know, they mean well but my mam and dad. In some cases, women had not sought housing provider support themselves but were referred from other agencies, such as the Police. This shows some knowledge and expectation of services from other agencies about the support housing providers can offer. Interviewees expressed that the support they received was like having ‘someone backing you up’ and having ‘­someone in your corner’. This feeling gave women the confidence to

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leave their abusive partners, and, in some cases, the confidence to pursue a criminal justice outcome that they would not have necessarily considered otherwise. Well that’s it, you are and you’re blaming yourself, do you know what I mean? You’re thinking … and I think if I never had that support at the time Kelly I probably wouldn’t have took him to court, I wouldn’t have said I was going to press charges but because I had plenty of people around me saying I was saying the right thing, backing me up, you know what I mean, that was a massive thing, like I say. Sally Mary said that the most important thing about the support provided was just having somebody she could go to and know that they would back her up. So, I was having to … I couldn’t be in my own home because of … so if [names housing provider] hadn’t been there … think the most important thing was that you had somebody in your corner. You know, that somebody that … if [names housing provider] wasn’t there where would I be today? Doesn’t, doesn’t bear thinking about, ’cause I don’t think I would have made it, I think he would have destroyed me completely [Crying]. Mary Interviewees spoke about the care and support they received from specialist staff and in many cases where this had exceeded their expectations. This care had made them feel valued and cared for and women also spoke about the difference that practical support had meant to them, whether it was helping them with food parcels or explaining the court process in easier terms than that of the solicitor. [Support worker] took us for a … what do you call it? A food parcel, just got like, it was a week after Christmas and I was skint, do you know what I mean? Sally For some women, having support to understand the complexities of Criminal Justice System was invaluable. But she was just so helpful when like, even when I had papers from court and sometimes I didn’t understand them and she was like reading through everything, ’cause she’d been there, done it, she’d explain it like ‘Well this is this’ but it’s not, it’s this. Carrie

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The implications of moving As stated above, the support that housing providers can deliver can be key to women leaving their abusers and sometimes to pursuing criminal proceedings against them. Barriers to women leaving abusers are numerous with real implications for women to consider. These implications could be practical such as simply having basic equipment and utilities or familial in that they will be leaving their homes and the impact on children and other relationships. This section highlights some of the ways that housing providers have supported women to overcome these barriers and leave abusive relationships. Interviewees spoke about moving after experiencing domestic abuse and the practicalities and difficulties this entailed. For some, their housing provider supported them with very practical help in moving. … when I moved [names housing provider] got me a cooker ’cause I never … my cooker was fitted in me previous property, so I couldn’t have took that with me. And they got it from the [mentions housing provider] fund or something like that they got me a cooker out of the [housing provider funded] fund. Sally Mary talked of not being able to take any of the possessions she had bought with her husband from the joint tenancy they had shared for over 40 years. She remembered the difficulty she faced in trying to move the possessions she was permitted to take and how her support worker had been on hand to help her with this very practical task on the day of her moving to her new property. Mary had declined a refuge space arranged by her support worker and was living in the property she shared with her husband until her new property became available. On the morning that he heard I got the keys and everything and I was getting the electric on, he said to me ‘I want you out of this house now.’ I said, ‘I haven’t got a bed to sleep in though’, couldn’t care about that, you know. So [support worker] and one of her colleagues came with a car and got my boxes and one thing and another and brought them down here for me. So, I do not know where I would have been, I really wouldn’t. Mary Whilst some women highlighted these very practical implications and concerns about moving, such as the financial costs associated with moving and re-building a home, some women discussed the impact that moving had on their recovery. For some, it was a positive step, and they felt that the move

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represented a new start for them (and their children). Interviewees particularly spoke about the feeling of safety and security that they enjoyed in the new homes; for some, the effect was immediate. Oh I … I mean, you know, like coming into a strange, a new area, a new house, I’ve been able to go to bed and know that I’m … I feel really protected in this house. Emily Well I knew when I walked in that the house just felt … the first night my daughter came up from [names area daughter lives], the first night we slept here, this house wraps itself round you, it really does. Mary However, interviewees also spoke about the frustration at having to move and having to seek a new home whilst living at a refuge, when they felt that more could have been done to keep them home. he doesn’t live with me so it’s like I wish I could have just gone back to it and just put an injunction and then it’s not it’s like I’m picking areas I don’t even want for the sake of just getting out. Anon Choice was a key factor for some of the women, and they spoke about the positive and therapeutic effects of moving. Carrie spoke of moving as a cathartic experience in that she was for the first time able to make choices that impacted on her life. … and I was in a very controlling environment where I had no choice in a lot of things, so having the choice of actually just moving and doing something for myself was beneficial for me, yeah. Carrie In moving to new locations, having a support network was of key importance to many women in terms of their hopes and plans for recovery, overriding even familial support connections. ‘Nicky’ said that she couldn’t live near her mother (who was an important source of support for her and her child) as the perpetrator knew where her mother lived, so she feared that moving close to her mother would result in her abuser finding her. In deciding where to apply for housing, her support worker discussed options on areas where she had some existing support so would not feel so isolated. In an ideal world it would be next to my mam in [names area] but it’s probably not the safest place for me to be as he knows … I know that

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with chats with [support worker] we’ve discussed that the best place is probably with other support network which would be on the other side of the water so like [names area]. Nicky Anonymity in a new area was also of value to some. ‘Emma’ discussed how she felt safer in her property after moving to a new area. She had started to re-build her life including starting to make new friends. The people in her new area would be aware of someone new (i.e. her ex-partner) which gave her confidence. I’ve made friends with a couple of the mums and I feel safer in that environment that the fact that these people recognise who I am, my friends and family and they would notice if somebody shouldn’t be here. Emma Deciding to move, often away from support networks or areas the women originated from or knew well, was an understandably a difficult decision to make. ‘Sally’ spoke about how she resisted moving for some time as she had previously moved (with her children) following a previous abusive relationship and didn’t want to go through the upheaval of starting over again. She spoke about her resistance to moving as a kind of defiance at first, that she wouldn’t let her perpetrator push her out of the area where she had a strong support network and her children went to the local school. Aye, it’s like at the time it was like … that wasn’t another thing like why I wasn’t moving, it was like everything he’d done it was to make me move and I thought no, you know, I’m not backing down and things just got worse and worse and I thought ‘no chance’ and then in the end I realised I’m the only person who I’m spiting is myself, it’s me who I’m causing more damage to by stopping. Sally The experiences discussed above show the difficult weighing up of factors ranging from the practical to the support and ultimately their safety. They also highlight the different decisions that survivors make for themselves and for their children and often for very different reasons. The complexity of individual cases and the chosen responses of survivors show the need for housing providers (and other services) to take a flexible and person-centred approach. As discussed above, domestic abuse does not only affect the victim but also their children. Children are very often victims of abuse in that they are not directly abused but witness abuse. Deciding whether to move or

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to stay in the current home following domestic abuse is a decision that focuses on practical concerns such as the financial costs of moving home and the impact of moving home on children. Sally’s case acutely illustrates this. ‘Sally’ had originally resisted moving remembering having to move home previously after domestic abuse, said she was worried about the long-term impact on her children of yet another move. The kids struggled, do you know what I mean, when we first moved to [names area] those kids on the estate just picked on them and things like that and they didn’t make friends at school and things like that and I think it was past experiences that put us off doing it again. Sally Because of her previous experiences, Sally decided against moving in the first instance. Her housing provider supported her by fitting a ‘safe room’ and other target hardening equipment, such as CCTV cameras (which were fitted in the property prior to the perpetrator being released from prison). She was keen to keep some normality for the children and did not want to feel that she had to move at that point. Sally spoke about the impact on her well-being and her ability to parent on the release of the perpetrator and the proximity of his family close by. In retrospect, she felt her original decision not to move at the time of the perpetrator’s release from prison had perhaps impacted negatively on the children, with them worrying about her when they were at school which manifested in their behaviour (at school). The feeling of responsibility for the welfare of her children in moving previously and then deciding to stay at her current home more recently was palpable in Sally. The level of responsibility she felt for either decision demonstrated the difficult decisions faced by women and the impact this must have on their recovery. I’m not sure whether it was just me, Kelly, and the way I was going on. Like I say when I was at home I was a mess and then she was going to school, and say if the teacher would nag her for being late or not having her tie on or something like that, she’d break down and cry and swear and just walk out. Or she’d text me in her lessons, she’d just text me anything ridiculous, I think she was just texting me to see if I was alright. Sally Practical security and safety measures were a common theme highlighted by victims that housing providers were able to assist with. Sally felt that the safe room was the most useful thing that her housing provider did in the support given.

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Aye, beforehand I knew he’d kick me door in. It would take seconds, do you know what I mean and there’s no way the police would get there or … like, do you know what I mean? I got a lot of support from [names provider] when he was due out from jail. I got the safe room put in; I got a lot of security measures in place. [Names provider] got us [me] a two-year exclusion order, which the courts wouldn’t give me … something to do with his human rights, [housing provider] got us [me] the two year exclusion order. Emily highlighted the rapid response of her support worker in target hardening the property when she disclosed domestic abuse. Emma’s ex-partner had attempted to set her property on fire, so the Support Worker arranged for Fire Service to visit to check her safety. The minute I spoke to [support worker] she was like ‘There are things that we can do to help straight away.’ The fire brigade came round, they checked my fire alarm, they put on a special post-box so that if anything fire was put through … to get out before that and they checked it and made sure that my windows and doors shut properly and that the fire door was okay. For Trudy, the support worker arranging to have the locks changed and extra locks added including to her garden gate meant that she felt safe to leave her back door open when her dog was in the garden. PARTICIPANT:  

‘Yeah, [names neighbour] has her door open I’m totally fine with it is because I know no one can get in because there’s all the locks’ INTERVIEWER:   ‘Everything’s locked?’ PARTICIPANT:   ‘Like yeah’ Trudy had not wanted to move home although the opportunity to move had been offered to her. She pointed out that she was keen to stay in her home with safety measures in place. So obviously I feel more secure in here and I don’t really want to move … I would only want to move for something better … obviously at the moment I can’t see getting any better. Those who had moved talked about the importance of the move in relation to their feelings of safety and associated recovery. Emma spoke about her previous flat and how the lack of security in the block impacted on her feelings of safety. I did have security to a point but … in our block, because it was in a much larger estate and it was in a much larger block, people … you

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just had to ring buzzers and eventually somebody would just let you in ­willy-nilly. Like where I am now everybody sort of knows everybody and they’re very cautious as to who they are letting in, like who they let in and if they’re not sure they won’t let you in, which … I’d much rather miss a parcel than have … than knowing he could get into the property again. Whilst moving for some women represented a fresh start and improved their feelings of security and safety, this did not always come without some emotional cost. Emily spoke about the feelings of blame she experienced from her child for leaving her partner and moving. cause she sort of … I felt that she blamed me, I don’t know if she did, she was still young at the time but I just thought that she sort of blamed me for us not being together no more. Emily This feeling was reiterated by Sally who also felt blame and guilt for uprooting her children when she did make the decision to move. Do you know what I mean, so I think they … at the time when I said ‘We’ll move’ and they said ‘Oh no Ma’ it’s like my kids they knew we’d have to move one day, it’s just up the road, blah de blah de blah, and they’re like ‘No, no I don’t want to move’, We’ve got to, you know what I mean? Sally As previously mentioned, Sally had felt some guilt at staying in her home and the impact on the children worrying about her safety she also felt guilty for uprooting her children and moving a few miles away. She concluded that, on reflection, she could see that the move had been a positive thing for them as a family. Her decision to move after her initial reticence had positively impacted on the well-being of her children in that her stress notably decreased as a result of the move. Life’s changed for them, really, do you know what I mean, apart from … well they’ve got their own bedrooms now so that’s a plus, which, you know, but they are settled and are … home’s happier because I’m not stressing them out, you know, they’re not seeing me upset all the time, which is … before it was a massive thing, it was like every day, do you know what I mean? Sally Sally explained that she was now able to reflect and realise that she was in shock following the abuse, and this in turn impacted on her home life with her children and her ability to make decisions.

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They’d speak to us [me] and I just wouldn’t hear, do you know what I mean, it would just echo through us, I was that … shocked, do you know what I mean, and they’d just, walk away and not even say it again because they must have just thought ‘What’s the point? And it’s like now, do you know what I mean, it’s like mad. I go in their rooms and I dance and that and they’re like ‘Mam get out’ but like before it’s … you know? It’s totally changed. Whilst Sally agonised over the impact of a move on her children, the decision to move was felt by some to have a positive effect on their children early on, in that it was symbolic of a fresh start. Yeah, my house like feels like, I know it sounds weird, but my house is not tarnished with any arguments, nothing bad has happened here, it just feels like it’s new for me and my daughter. Emma The cost of moving and other practicalities also impacted on rebuilding a home. Mary spoke about this process, the time involved and the cost of rebuilding a home after leaving with just a handful of things from the home she had shared with her husband for over 40 years. She was not permitted to have many of the things she had bought for the family home. And I asked for my bedroom furniture, I wanted by BBQ, my gas bottle and my nice sun lounger, so he’s come back and said … oh and I’ve got some designer handbags that I’d never got picked up. So, he’s decided that I can have my personal things, I can have the BBQ and the sun lounger but that’s it! So, I had to obviously buy a new bed, but I just wanted my bedroom furniture to finish the house off, but he said, ‘You can’t have the bedroom furniture because I need it for when my brother stays.’ So, he needs a dressing table and mirror, you know. Mary Mary also talked in detail about the long process of building her new home to the level she wanted. During the interview, she was keen for me to see what she had done in the property and discussed how she had bought her furniture, the experience of seeing it in a shop window and then going into the shop and buying it, painting her own pictures and she had undertaken much planting in the garden. The making of a beautiful and comfortable home appeared to be a very therapeutic process for her. She had very obvious pride in the hard work she had undertaken. Mary had also talked frequently about having been “a good wife” and had taken pride in being an excellent home maker.

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Well I’ve been in here ten months now and I have one more job to do … and then I’m all done. And it’s a job I can’t do on my own, which I find so frustrating, but I’ll have to get somebody in, a joiner, to do it. I can’t get my heavy winter curtains up because they’re catching the blind, so I need some wood across and an extending bracket, but I just need to get that sorted before … I think I’m very lucky that I can do lots of things myself but you do struggle for a handyman and you don’t like always asking your friends or neighbours to … you know what I mean?

The housing situation of the perpetrator The housing situation of the perpetrator, for one woman, was key to her ongoing contact with the perpetrator. Nicky said that she had a sole tenancy with her housing provider, in her name, but when she attempted to end the relationship with the perpetrator who had lived at the property with her (although was not a joint tenant), she felt pressurised to let him stay over as he told her that he had nowhere else to stay. Whilst Nicky had wanted the relationship to end, she was still concerned about him having nowhere to live so felt under pressure to let him stay over. PARTICIPANT:  

‘No he was stopping from place to place when I got the property that’s when it sorted of ended anyway but he just wouldn’t leave me alone so he’d keep coming back because he was stopping from place to place’ INTERVIEWER:   ‘So he didn’t have a property?’ PARTICIPANT:   ‘No and that’s why he would sort of make me feel sorry for him and let him stop a couple of nights.

Waiting for an offer of property There are also times when housing officers can use their knowledge and experience of the systems, policies and procedures to assist people experiencing abuse. This is not something people working outside housing could easily do. This is well illustrated by ‘Nicky’s’ case. ‘Nicky’ had moved into refuge accommodation, arranged by her housing provider and whilst she felt that she needed a place in the refuge whilst waiting for another property, she didn’t understand why the support worker had advised her that she needed to keep her old tenancy live, given that she could not go back to it for fear for her safety. This was a case of the support worker using this as way to negotiate the system so as to allow her to be offered a property as a Direct Allocation (also known as a Management Transfer). This would not result in losing her tenancy status (if Nicky had ended her secure tenancy and then some months later accessed a new tenancy, it is likely that it would have been a starter or introductory tenancy). The issue of survivors of abuse losing tenancy security when they leave an abuser has

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been highlighted by Kelly et al. (2014). They found that of the 121 women who came into and exited Solace refuges in 2015, 22% had a secure tenancy on arrival, whilst only 13% did on departure and 87% of those women left the refuge for continued temporary accommodation. When a property becomes available to rent, the housing provider decides how it is to be allocated, i.e. • •

Advertised via Choice Based Lettings (where applicants registered actively bid for a property) or allocated from the Housing List for those providers who don’t operate Choice Based Lettings systems; or Direct Allocation or Management Transfer (where the provider allocates the property directly to someone for a reason outlined in the Allocations Policy, for example, domestic abuse)

By ensuring that Nicky was suitable for a direct allocation (by maintaining her existing tenancy), the housing provider could try and find a property suitable for her and her child near to existing support networks. If Nicky had given up her tenancy and presented to the local housing authority as homeless, then she would have been made one reasonable offer of a property whereby the housing authority would have discharged its duty. Nicky said that she would like some time to get her new property ready so claimed dual housing benefit on her new property and the property she was unable to return to. This would not have been possible had she given up her existing tenancy. The Secure Tenancies Act 2018 has now placed a duty on local authorities to maintain tenancy security for people leaving abusive relationships.

The role of the housing support worker in recovery Interviewees, in some cases, highlighted the positive experience they had in relation to their support workers and other housing staff in their overall recovery as well as the support given at crisis point. Some women talked about positive referrals to other helpful agencies that they would not have accessed independently. One woman spoke about the support by the housing provider to access other services they provided and the positive impact this had on their recovery. This reflected the wider range of services available to customers; for example, volunteering and work and learning programmes that some customers felt had greatly added value to their recovery. And then they got us volunteering, which was a big thing for me. I started volunteering for [names provider] and that built my confidence, me self-esteem and things like that and it give me routine. So I was keeping myself busy, so while I was keeping myself busy my mind wasn’t [noise to imply racing], do you know what I mean? Sally

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Whilst Sally may have sought other volunteering opportunities of her own volition, the opportunity to take part in a programme run by the housing provider gave her the confidence to volunteer as a befriender with the housing organisation and in a work placement to gain experience for her CV. Sally felt that this support was crucial in moving forward in her recovery. Life’s just totally changed round, which a few year back I wouldn’t … if you’d have said it a couple of year back what I’d be doing now I would have laughed at you, do you know what I mean? [Laughter] I’d probably tell you where to go. But it’s like … I don’t know, it’s mad how things have changed. If I hadn’t had the support that I did have it wouldn’t have happened, do you know what I mean? Whilst interviewees talked positively about the specialist support received when experiencing abuse or in the aftermath, not all victims experienced follow-up care to the level they would have liked. Emily spoke of the outstanding care she had received whilst disclosing domestic abuse but felt once she moved to another property (with the same housing provider) she would have liked someone to check in with her to see how she was, rather than the support just ending once she had moved. This raises an important point in recognising that recovery is not merely a one-dimensional process simply about providing practical solutions in isolation, such as a house move. This raises the importance of the victim having input in when they feel that their case is ready to be closed. Maybe just the fact that just someone just seeing if you’re okay, if everything is fine or maybe an actual … the fact that at the beginning you get to see somebody and at the end you just get like a random phone call to see if they did okay. So maybe actually seeing somebody. Emily Interviews illustrated that support workers provided much practical and emotional support, an important part of that support was, according to some women, in signposting and actively referring them and their children to specialist services. This highlights the importance of housing providers being engaged with Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG) specialist services and VAWG Partnerships to ensure that they have knowledge of such specialist services and can refer confidently. Yeah, they put you through to different trusts and stuff like that. I mean I got help from Hestia, is I think the women’s group … yeah, Hestia, at the same group, they did a thing for children where they actually … it’s like a ten, is it ten, a ten-week course. So once a week they’ll go to a programme and it will just for them to sort of understand what a … because

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a lot of children in domestic violence actually blame the mothers and they think they’re wrong, so it’s just for them to understand what wrong is and what right is. Mary had problems with her original solicitor and discussed her frustrations with her support worker who was able to recommend a firm they had a good relationship with in terms of domestic abuse cases. For many women, dealing with solicitors was a new experience full of uncertainty and worrying in choosing a suitable firm. So, then I was dealing with solicitors … and this is what point I want to make with solicitors really, it was a recommendation of solicitors from [names housing provider. Interviewees were asked if they would recommend accessing support from a housing provider to other women. The women overwhelmingly said that they would recommend seeking support from a housing provider. In responding, many women highlighted that support available was largely unknown to tenants and more needed to be done to highlight this. Definitely, because I didn’t know that was an option in life, it’s not known. Trudy Oh good grief, I think more people need to … it needs to be really … [Laugh] I mean it’s not something you expect after forty-five year, it’s not a situation you … but by God if I hadn’t known that you were there. Mary I think their team is fantastic and they’re very compassionate and I think if all housing providers could be like that I think lots will benefit from that from them, yeah. I haven’t got no major criticisms to say about the experience that I’ve had. Carrie

Fragmentation between specialist support roles and generic roles Interviewees in the main stated the support they received from their housing provider was positive and often exceeded their expectations; this however was not always reflected in the organisation as a whole. Women gave examples of their negative experiences with non-specialist housing staff. Trudy stated letters she received about a garden tenancy breach on the grounds of having overgrown grass (the tenancy agreement included that

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tenants must maintain the garden). Whilst she spoke about the fantastic support from the specialist support worker, she felt that there was a lack of a joined-up approach across the organisation which led to a lack of understanding of her circumstances. She pointed out that she was undergoing the trauma of going to court (accompanied by the housing provider support worker) to give evidence against her ex-partner who was on trial for attempted murder whilst simultaneously receiving letters about a tenancy breach about her grass being uncut which caused her much concern in that she may lose her property. And obviously I was explaining to them that I’d been part of the like domestic support and obviously I’d lost my means of doing it, I’d lost my in-law, I’d rather it been like that, I’d rather have long grass than be in the current situation I was in but it was still quite … well you were stuck between a hard place and a rock leave it or not. Trudy Following the arrest of her husband, Trudy was the only person living at the property resulting in only one wage and had at the same time had her hours at work cut meaning she was in a difficult financial situation with no disposable income to pay someone to undertake the work or buy garden equipment like a lawnmower to do it herself. Yeah, even though like I put … there was a note on the system to say that my husband had left and there was like … like a dramatic change in money as well and obviously there was the whole domestic thing around that, so it was kind of like … in that way I couldn’t … but it was only … I said to them I’d just appreciate a one-off cut and I can try and maintain it myself or go round with the shears because I mean it was really long. This fragmented approach was further emphasised by Emma who was liaising with the Lettings Team and viewing a property after being offered a Direct Allocation on the grounds of the domestic abuse she experienced. The perpetrator had previously set fires outside of her flat and through her letterbox, in viewing another property, she naturally wanted to consider the safety of her and her children as she had concerns that the perpetrator would find her again. She was shown a flat in a block and wanted to feel assured that the block was secure in case her partner was able to gain access to the block via the communal door being left open, the perpetrator following a tenant into the block before the door closed or tenants releasing the door if someone was pressing the intercom saying they had mistakenly pressed the wrong buzzer. The Lettings Team were aware of the reason for her move, but she felt that they did not understand how she might be feeling and the reality of her

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worries. In essence, if the perpetrator found her new address and could gain access to the block, then Emma’s life could be at risk, and consequently, she was likely to need re-housing again. There seemed to be no acknowledgement of the need to understand if she would feel safe in accepting the property. She remembers asking: Is there not any other property that I could look at because … just to compare’ and he was just basically like ‘You either take this’ and that and it’s just … I think when the handover was given to the housing team that they need to be sympathetic to the fact that I’m not just being difficult that. Yeah, I just think they need to know and just be a bit sympathetic to what your needs are and that we might seem a bit more difficult but it’s just because we’re coming out of a situation that we certainly don’t want to get ourselves back into.

Thoughts on how housing providers improve their support Interviewees were asked what would have improved their experience with housing providers. Those who responded with ideas about improvements largely focused on practical measures that housing providers could offer rather than specifically about the quality of the support they had experienced. As mentioned previously, Trudy had received letters about a tenancy breach regarding the condition of her garden, and this was something that had greatly worried her. For her, hiring equipment such as lawnmowers or offering cost-effective practical services such as gardening or simply grass cutting would have eased the tension around receiving letters about a tenancy breach. I said to them well even if you were to bring somebody out and like hire them or whether it was part of my housing agreement or ’cause obviously you have like to a degree where repair men come out and they say it’s like I don’t know is the garden kind of classed as that or in like under exceptional circumstances. But because they said the only exceptional circumstances they’ve got is the elderly and disabled and they thought that maybe they should maybe expand it a bit. Mary who was in her mid-70s and felt that she could not have moved into a refuge when she was offered the option. She had refused the refuge place and opted to stay in the home she lived in with the perpetrator whilst awaiting an offer of a property. Mary felt that there was a gap in suitable temporary accommodation for those leaving an abusive partner and spoke about the impact of waiting for a property to become available. The issue of good quality, safe, temporary accommodation for those who didn’t want a refuge

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place but wanted to leave whilst awaiting an offer of property was also highlighted in the interviews with housing professionals who felt frustrated about the lack of safe, emergency accommodation for those customers who don’t want to access a refuge. Mary spoke about the wait for a property and the uncertainty and stress this caused at various points in the interview: You know, like … [support worker] said I could have gone into a refuge. Now that for me … [shakes head and indicates it was not for her] I mean, there obviously had to be a time factor in getting a home. But maybe if there was a temporary- well I think, you know, like in the darkest days you’re thinking ‘Ee my God where am I going to end up?’ I think it’s the wait. But I know you can’t do anything about that, that’s quite … that’s very understandable. Nicky made a similar point; she accessed refuge accommodation via her housing provider and still had her tenancy. Nicky was waiting for another property to become available as she could not return to her existing tenancy as the perpetrator had since been released from prison. Nicky advised that she had needed support when she first came to the refuge and it had been useful but now she was waiting for a property whilst residing in the refuge purely as she had nowhere else to go which she felt was holding her back from getting on with her life. Whilst many comments focused on the lack of housing options available other than refuge, Sally highlighted the lack of a joined-up approach when many agencies are involved. Sally described one of the frustrations she had felt was about the number of support agencies involved and how this could sometimes be rather overwhelming and illustrated a lack of coordination between agencies. I think like I said earlier just trying not to … well it’s not so much pestering me but the level of contact, do you know what I mean? When they keep phoning you, maybes they could go through like [domestic abuse charity] or the police, do you know, rather than … like I say, rather than everyone phoning you, keep repeating yourself. Interviewees spoke about the pressure of waiting to be offered a property, and there was a difference in this impact between women in a property and those in a refuge. The women who took part in the group interview in the refuge and Nicky (who was living in a refuge) expressed experiencing a greater lack of control in their housing situation. A key point emphasised by the women in a refuge was a feeling of being ignored and a sense of being ‘done to’. Women expressed frustration at not having any real control, knowledge or choice over pursuing their housing options. The point was made that women felt that they had to take the first property offered as they

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were afraid of the repercussions if they didn’t accept that property – making them wonder if there would be another offer, would it be better or worse? There was a feeling of having to accept a property, even if they felt that it was unsuitable and being powerless in some cases to refuse a property. In effect, by having some feeling of choice in choosing a home would in effect mean that the tenancy would be more likely to be sustained and had a major part in recovery. And like you’re in fear of well if you refuse it then that’s it, they’re not going to come back to you. Val Aye, you’ll go to the bottom of the list, won’t you? Jenny In addition to this worry, accepting an offer of property had other impacts, including finance-related concerns. Well I did in the past and I accepted one that was in the middle of nowhere and I struggled, was stranded and like food was expensive ’cause there was only one local shop but it was the thought that ‘Ee God, how long am I going to wait for the next one? Val This uncertainty had a negative impact in that women were unsure of their rights in refusing a property and what they could expect throughout the process. The uncertainty of waiting for an offer of property also meant that women felt that they were often unable to begin to move on in life and make plans. Just been stuck on the waiting list for a while and it’s just … waiting … what’s more frustrating is waiting for people to get back to you for information to see where you’d more or less stand. Jenny Yeah, it really is stressful, the length of time you have to wait, and you are more or less stuck in limbo, it’s like … you can’t exactly plan anything. Val In the refuge interview, there was a view that barriers such as rent arrears prevented re-housing in many cases. This was despite the fact that many housing providers state that they accept women with rent arrears in domestic abuse cases where there is an agreement to pay arrears at an affordable rate (despite the fact that arrears can often be caused by the perpetrator).

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I’ve seen women in here and they’ve like had rent arrears, sometimes they’re more interested in that than the stress that the women are under and then sometimes they don’t realise maybe these arears were caused by these partners, you know what I mean? Jenny Moreover, women had been told that they couldn’t access a property because of the arrears and the problem in paying back arrears they could not afford. … they can’t really afford to be paying these arrears back and then on top of being told you can’t get a house because you’ve got these arrears. Sue

Hopes for the Future Interviewees were asked about their hopes for the future and where they expected to be in a year’s time. They spoke about recovery in terms of building confidence and being able to pursue education and employment goals. In a year’s time I think it’s just for me to be … have the confidence to be in full time employment. I’m very lucky to be in a good area so I’m very happy where I am living and it’s just to stop blaming myself and … yeah, just stop blaming myself and actually have the confidence to actually move forward. Carrie Trudy was planning to go to university to pursue her dream of becoming a teacher and continue living in her property. Probably, probably still be living here, I know it sounds really strange but what is it, like July next year well, since I’ve arranged to go back to university. A PGC with a PCET [teaching qualifications] in September and obviously it’s always something that I wanted to do but … but for some reason I just kept that put on hold, like it wasn’t … there was always an excuse not to do it or, you know, we can’t afford to do it, you need to work, you can’t suddenly like … so obviously now. Nicky spoke of pursuing her dreams of child nursing, and her main aim was to have a home and pursue qualifications to obtain a place on a nursing degree at university. Sally stated that she was happy to take each year as it came, she now felt settled in her home and had dreams for her future. One of her dreams was to pursue driving lessons: I’ve been saying I’ll do for about ten year like, I will do it eventually, I know I will. But … like I say I’m just happy to have each year as it comes.

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Sally also took time to reflect how far she had come and the positive changes in her life. She now worked for the housing provider who had supported her, loved her job and was getting some support worker experience by shadowing support-related roles with a view to eventually pursuing this role: Life’s just totally changed round, which a few year back I wouldn’t … if you’d have said it a couple of year back what I’d be doing now I would have laughed at you, do you know what I mean? [Laughter] I’d probably tell you where to go.

Discussion The women interviewed all highlighted that they had an overall positive experience of support from their housing provider in terms of specialist workers and highlighted the importance of staff understanding domestic abuse and providing advocacy. In essence, housing providers are ideally placed to recognise and respond to victims of domestic abuse. It is interesting to note that, in some cases, women accessed support from their housing provider by chance and chose to disclose the abuse when the opportunity presented where they felt that the person would be receptive. Websdale and Johnson (1997) highlight the effects that appropriate services and support can have a positive impact on women’s abilities to end abusive relationships, whilst Kernic et al. (2005) assert that women often seek help from many informal and formal networks without necessarily disclosing their victimisation. This was a theme identified by some women who disclosed their abuse when the housing provider was visiting for unrelated issues. Cattaneo et al. (2007) point out that survivors experience abuse differently with seeking help as a process which evolves over time. As well as help seeking changing over time, Kaukinen (2004) argues that women employ multiple help-seeking strategies, involving friends and family as well as help from police and social services. The less formal (i.e. non-statutory) relationship with individual housing staff seemed to be an important factor in women disclosing their experience of abuse to staff. Some women actively sought help for related issues such as being locked out of the property when the perpetrator changed the locks or to directly request help to escape the abuse. Zweig and Burt (2007) found, in their research, that women felt that services were more helpful when they experienced positive staff behaviour meaning that women felt in control in their interactions with staff. This was a point reflected by women in this chapter who had positive experiences of support staff. Two women detailed experiences where non-support staff or approaches were not helpful and did not reflect an understanding of their situation, for example Emily highlighted her experience with a Lettings Officer and Trudy spoke of receiving tenancy breach letters in relation to her garden. Both women highlighted that they had received excellent support

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from their support worker where they felt understood and supported; the negative experiences were disappointing to them. Moe (2007) suggests that women are very active help seekers and that the failures of agencies to adequately assist them mean that women are trapped in abusive relationships, echoing a point made previously by Gondolf and Fisher (1988). This point was illustrated in the case of those women who actively sought help such as one woman contacting her housing provider when an ex-partner had picked up her school, and Mary, who after learning her housing provider could provide support for those experiencing domestic abuse, sought help the next morning. The unique relationship that housing providers can have with tenants, where they are not a statutory agency and perhaps the more informal nature of support was seen as key in them seeking help. The importance of well-trained staff to facilitate any disclosure is crucial, according to Waldrop and Resick (2004), who argue that women who receive supportive responses from those they first tell about the violence are likely to have increased confidence and be more likely to seek support and help in future. In addition to the initial disclosure, the ongoing trusting relationship with support workers played an important role in women’s experiences and examples given seemed to illustrate a wider remit than typical advocate or Independent Domestic Violence Advocate roles (IDVA) roles. The IDVA role in the UK was established in 2005 to provide advice and support to women who were considered at high risk of further abuse. The role of IDVA is aimed at providing support at crisis point, typically for fairly short time frames and principally focused on addressing a victim’s high-risk situation. The role is an advocate on behalf of victims to access relevant services (Howarth & Robinson, 2015; Robinson, 2009). A key foundation in the development of advocacy was that women were frequently presented with very limited options to address the multiple complexities facing them and that in seeking formal assistance, they encountered myriad procedures and barriers in accessing what they needed from organisations that did not understand domestic abuse. Consequently, in the face of such barriers, many women abandoned their help-seeking efforts (Barran et al., 2003; Dobash et al., 1985; Stark & Flitcraft, 1996). The women interviewed in their homes generally received high levels of support from housing provider specialist support roles, regardless of whether they were deemed high risk (according to the SafeLives Risk Indicator Checklist) or not. The impact of austerity measures on specialist domestic abuse services has, in many areas, seen a reduction in staff coupled with increasing caseloads. This has meant that many specialist services are in the unenviable position of having to ‘ration’ services to those deemed at most risk. Given that the risk is not static, this presents problems in many women not receiving much needed support. Women interviewed in their home highlighted typical examples of advocacy, such as referrals to specialist support services, but also where this went

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beyond advocacy such as helping one women moving her belongings from the home she had shared with the perpetrator and taking another woman for food parcels as opposed to simply making a referral to a food bank. Interviewees highlighted some differences in moving or staying put in terms of their recovery. The women had very individual reasons for staying put or moving home, meaning that it would be hard to draw any meaningful conclusions other than a woman’s determinant as to having some agency in deciding to move or to stay as important to her recovery. Alexander et al. (2009) point out that the nature of recovery is very individual given that experiences of domestic abuse are diverse meaning that it is a crucial research and practice to avoid overly prescriptive approaches. By contrast, women interviewed who were living in the refuge had less agency and were waiting for a property which they felt some pressure to accept even if it was not in an area they wanted to live in. Much of this was down to the women not knowing how the homeless system worked, what to expect and how much of ‘their story’ they should disclose when presenting as homeless. It is well documented that a lack of alternative housing and income are a major reason why women leave refuges and return to an abusive partner (Johnson, 1992; Menard, 2001; Schechter, 1982); Champion et al. (2009, p. 3) argue: Moving between various types of accommodation that lacked security of tenure and/or failed to provide a sense of safety. . .directly impacted on the women’s ability to obtain a life free from violence. Whilst none of the women spoke about returning to their ex-partner in this research, the lack of certainty in their housing situation made it easy to understand why this is a possibility. The women who took part in the group interview in the refuge did not have access to an IDVA but could seek support from refuge staff. However, they felt that staff were so busy that they did not want to keep bothering them. Women who had support from their housing provider had far greater agency and received higher levels of one to one, bespoke support. This included the woman residing in the refuge who was still receiving support from her housing provider. As well as being uncertain as to how the homeless system worked some women in the refuge perceived barriers to accessing housing that they wanted to live in, for example having existing rent arrears. Although this should not prevent them being offered a property under homeless legislation, they felt that it would hinder their chances of being offered a property as they believed that some housing providers would not accept them. The difference in advocacy compared to the women in their homes was a key difference noted. Women interviewed in their homes may have had the same

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gap in knowledge in relation to housing options, but had an important advocate meaning that they did not need to have an understanding that women in the refuge felt was needed. Women often continue to face barriers after leaving abusive relationships in terms of finances, housing, recovering from the abuse and re-building self-confidence (Belknap, 2007). Women highlighted the practical support the housing provider had offered such as food parcels, accessing a solicitor to pursue a divorce, moving belongings to a new home and it was felt that these individual acts were very meaningful to the women and made them feel that they had someone in their corner or somewhere to turn for practical help. In terms of recovery, there was a noticeable difference between women in the refuge and those interviewed in their home. There are various theories relating to recovery post-domestic abuse most of which highlight levels or stages (Merritt-Gray & Wuest, 1995). Interviews highlighted the differing stages women were at in their recovery and regaining their identity in some cases. For some women, moving from the home they had shared with the perpetrator was key to their recovery, and a new home for others was the catalyst to begin their recovery. Mary spoke about the house wrapping itself around her on the first night in her new home, and Emily felt that her new house was not tarnished by the violence that had occurred in her previous home. For some women, staying in their home was an important part of their recovery as it provided important support networks for them and where the perpetrator was recognised, meaning that neighbours could sound the alert if the perpetrator was seen in the area. For these women, target hardening represented an important element in their feelings of safety. As well as the emotional cost in deciding to move home, women highlighted the financial cost this presented. Although rebuilding a home for Mary was an important part of her recovery and something she could take pride in, the financial element was of concern to women. Mary spoke of the loss of much-loved possessions and leaving a beautiful home, but was proudly rebuilding another beautiful home in her mid-70s. She spoke of buying new furniture from a local charity shop and how she was adept at seeking out good quality items at a reasonable cost. Women spoke about their plans for the future including going back to college or university, volunteering or learning to drive after feeling their life had perhaps been on hold whilst in the abusive relationship, Merritt-Gray and Wuest (1995) term such actions as ‘reclaiming self’ by creating a physical distance from their past, in this case, via new housing, education or learning to drive. One woman felt a strong desire to use her experience to help others experiencing abuse, and all women’s reasons for taking part in the research were framed to various degrees in a desire to help others who may be in their situation.

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Summary This chapter has presented main themes from the in-depth semi-structured interviews with women in their homes and a group interview in a refuge, carried out as part of Kelly’s PhD. The interviews with women in their homes highlighted some excellent experiences from specialist support staff from their housing providers. Despite this, the understanding of domestic abuse and its dynamics was not always recognised by staff in a non-specific support role such as lettings/allocations or housing management. The lack of support was at odds from the specialist support women had received. For example, in the case of the housing officer sending letters about a tenancy breach relating to grass cutting where in this case, only specialist support staff had access to information pertaining to domestic abuse. This could have been counteracted by adding a note to the housing management system to speak to the support officer before pursuing any tenancy breach action. The women in the refuge had, in many cases, left their social housing and were waiting for an offer of property after presenting as homeless due to domestic abuse. Obviously, in some cases, women do need to move for safety; but for some, it would have been more effective to provide early support and seek to offer a management transfer to a new home with the same provider. The final chapter discusses two of the housing and domestic abuse sectors’ responses to these issues.

References Alexander, P.C., Tracy, A., Radek, M. & Koverola, C. (2009). Predicting stages of change in battered women, Journal of Interpersonal Violence 24 pp. 1652–72. Barran, D., Botham, C. & Brookes, M. (2003). Charity Begins at Home: Domestic Violence, New Philanthropy Capital, London. Belknap, J. (2007) Culturally focused batterer counselling, Criminology and Public Policy 6(2) pp. 337–40. Cattaneo, L. et al. (2007) Longitudinal helpseeking patterns among victims of intimate partner violence: the relationship between legal and extra-legal services, American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 77(3) 467–77. Champion, T. et al. (2009) The Impact of Housing on the Lives of Women and ­Children: post-domestic violence crisis accommodation, NSW Women’s Refuge Movement Resource Centre and University of Western Sydney, Sydney Australia. Dobash, R., Dobash, R. & Cavanagh, K. (1985) The contact between battered women and the social and medical agencies, in J. Pahl (Ed.) Private Violence and Public Policy: The Needs of Battered Women and the Response of the Public ­Services, Routledge, London. Gondolf, E.W. & Fisher, E.R. (1988) Battered Women as Survivors: An Alternative to Treating Learned Helplessness, Lexington Books, Lanham, MD. Henderson, K. (2019) The role of housing in a coordinated community response to domestic abuse, Unpublished PhD thesis, Durham University.

Impact of housing providers on women  161 Howarth, E. & Robinson, A. (2015) Responding effectively to women experiencing severe abuse: identifying key components of a British advocacy intervention, Violence Against Women 22(1) pp. 41–63. Johnson, I.M. (1992) Economic, situational and psychological correlates of the decision-making process of battered women, Families in Society, 73 pp. 168–76. Kaukinen, C. (2004) The help seeking of female violent crime victims: the direct and conditional effects of race and the victim-offender relationship, Journal of Interpersonal Violence 19(9) pp. 967–90. Kelly, L. et al. (2014) Finding the Costs of Freedom: How Women and Children Rebuild their Lives after Domestic Violence, Solace Women’s Aid, London. Kernic, M.A. et al. (2005) Children in the crossfire, Violence Against Women 11(8) pp. 991–1021. Menard, A. (2001) Domestic violence and housing: key policy and program challenges, Violence against Women 7 pp. 707–20. Merritt-Gray, M. & Wuest, J. (1995) Counteracting abuse and breaking free: the process of leaving revealed through women’s voices, Health Care for Women ­International 16, pp. 399–412. Moe, A.M. (2007) Silenced voices and structured survival: battered women’s help seeking, Violence Against Women 13(7) pp. 676–99. Robinson, A.L. (2009) Independent Domestic Violence Advisors: A Process Evaluation Funded by the Home Office, School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK. Schechter, S. (1982) Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Struggles of the Battered Women’s Movement, South End Press, Boston, MA. Stark, E. & Flitcraft, A. (1996) Women at Risk, Domestic Violence and Women’s Health, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. Waldrop, A.E. & Resick, P.A. (2004) Coping among adult female victims of domestic violence, Journal of Family Violence 19 pp. 291–302. Websdale, N. & Johnson, B. (1997) The policing of domestic violence in rural and urban areas: the voices of battered women in Kentucky, Policing and Society 6(4) pp. 297–317. Zweig, J.M. & Burt, M.R. (2007) Predicting women’s perceptions of domestic violence and sexual assault agency helpfulness: what matters to program clients?, Violence Against Women 13(11) pp. 1149–78.

Part 4

Industry responses

Chapter 10

Industry responses

Introduction Previous chapters have given background in terms of housing, domestic abuse, how policy has emerged and its influences. We have also discussed the innovations in place in Wales and Scotland in relation to the social housing, homeless and refuge sectors. This chapter details three recent innovations that bring together the policy arenas of housing and domestic abuse – the Whole Housing Approach (WHA), Make a Stand and the DAHA Accreditation Framework. These approaches are based upon insights from professionals working in the domestic abuse and housing sectors and have been developed via partnership working between the two sectors. We begin then, with the ‘Whole Housing Approach’.

The Whole Housing Approach (WHA) Note – The authors would like to thank Rebecca Vagi (Whole Housing Approach Programme Manager) for her assistance with, and additional information in, this chapter. The WHA developed from initial conversations between the domestic abuse and housing sectors’ who were working to improve practice related to housing and domestic abuse. Both sectors recognised the need to connect their efforts, as outlined by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, Nicole Jacobs, in the introduction to the Whole Housing Approach Toolkit (DAHA, 2020). The crux of the issue emanating from conversations between sectors was that there wasn’t a universal housing-related policy response for those experiencing domestic abuse. A national group of housing and domestic abuse organisations developed the approach with the aim of endeavouring to improve the housing options and outcomes for people experiencing domestic abuse and to enable them to achieve stable housing, live safely and overcome their experiences of abuse. The initial WHA pilot project was delivered in three areas from October 2018 to the end of March 2020 and was recently awarded another year of

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funding until 2021. Six specialist domestic abuse organisations and a civil society organisation have been working with ten local authorities to establish comprehensive and consistent housing practices and deliver the WHA. The pilot areas are Cambridge, London (Covering Hammersmith, Kensington, Westminster and Chelsea boroughs), and Stockton on Tees. Funding from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) was awarded to explore the housing-related needs of those experiencing domestic abuse and to develop domestic abuse initiatives and practices across a range of accommodation settings and tenure types (social, private-rented and privately owned). Some of these initiatives are existing housing options whilst others are tailored to allow a person to stay in their home with an improved feeling of safety or include initiatives aimed at engaging perpetrators of abuse in a prevention programme. The 3 pilots have focused on different components within the 12 options outlined as part of the WHA. Each pilot area analysed local needs and strength of partnership to deliver the components. The toolkit provides an overview of the current context for victim/survivors in each housing tenure and accommodation type for the first time in one place. Whilst each of the components has an individual toolkit, it is anticipated that learning from each of the pilots will inform future learning and develop further good practice and has potential to influence future policy direction. As we have established in previous chapters, the role of housing is central to responding to the needs of abuse victims/survivors and creating the opportunity for them to form a life post-abuse. If anything, it has highlighted that there is not a single ‘one size fits all’ housing-related solution that would meet the myriad individual needs of domestic abuse victims/survivors. The WHA acknowledges this and seeks to offer a range of options and solutions. This approach focuses on the housing situations and barriers faced by all victims, across all housing options. Importantly, it does not simply restrict itself to housing tenure, but includes those factors that can contribute to a victim remaining in their home. That could be being supported with a sanctuary room to remain in the property, or their landlord taking action against a perpetrator of domestic abuse meaning that the victim can remain in their home (where it is safe to do so). The WHA is an approach with the safety of the victim/survivor at its centre, and it seeks to take a preventative approach to stopping further harm. Crucially, it seeks to give the service user an element of control and some choice in the housing options available to them. The aims of the WHA are to: • •

Create earlier identification and intervention for domestic abuse through mobilising social and private landlords and key institutions involved in private ownership Reduce the number of people who are made homeless as a result of domestic abuse

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• •

Increase tenancy sustainment options so that those experiencing domestic abuse can remain safely in their home when they prefer to and those who do re-locate do not lose their tenancy status as a result In social housing, this also includes allowing victims to remain in homes by landlords taking action to remove perpetrators from properties through enforcement where appropriate and safe to do so

Figure 10.1 depicts the WHA with the pale upper, lighter circles illustrate forms of accommodation including the three main tenure types (social, private-rented and private ownership) and temporary accommodation settings (i.e. refuge services and supported accommodation). The darker circles are those initiatives designed to support victims/survivors of domestic abuse and provide the choice of remaining in a property or relocating to new accommodation. The WHA comprises 12 individual components which fall within three themes. Tenure and Accommodation • •

Refuge accommodation Social Housing

Figure 10.1  D  iagram of the Whole Housing Approach.

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• • • •

Supported/sheltered schemes DAHA accreditation for social landlords Private-rented sector (PRS) Privately owned housing

We have already detailed in the emergence of refuges in the UK and pointed out that they operate as a national network, enabling women and children to move across local authority boundaries in order to be safe. The WHA sees refuge accommodation as central to providing safe, emergency accommodation for those fleeing domestic abuse, whilst vital, it does not adequately represent all housing options that victims of abuse require. The WHA toolkit makes the point that refuges provide essential protection to around 13,000 women and 14,000 children every year (Women’s Aid, 2020). Previous chapters have already touched upon the demand for refuge places’ outstrips supply, and the WHA seeks to make inroads into the over-reliance on refuge accommodation as the only option. The Social Housing section of the toolkit includes homelessness legislation relating to domestic abuse and aims to inform those working at the front line, highlighting those cases which have not been considered correctly under homeless legislation. We have already discussed this at length in previous chapters and so do not give further detail here. The WHA acknowledges the role that the private-rented sector (PRS) can play in meeting the housing needs of domestic abuse victims. The PRS element includes building on training delivered nationally to specialist to landlord bodies such as Residential Landlord Association and published guidance for private landlords on recognising domestic abuse. It also includes specialist training for local authority teams who oversee standards in private-rented accommodation so that they can recognise and respond to domestic abuse and disseminate learning to local landlord associations to ensure that they are aware of the helpline number and understand that rent arrears, property damage and ASB complaints could be signs of domestic abuse. Supported or sheltered housing is usually provided for people who have support needs, including older people, disabled people, those with alcohol or substance use problems, people who have experienced homelessness have mental health support needs, as well as those who have fled domestic abuse (see Irving-Clarke, 2019). Whilst this type of accommodation was not funded by this project, St Mungo’s and the National Housing Federation produced a toolkit section for homelessness accommodation settings that offers guidance to engender a better response. The privately owned housing (POH) element refers to anyone who owns their home, whether they have a mortgage or own the property outright; this work seeks to shine a light on the issues and barriers victim/survivors

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encounter in these tenures. Nationally, the approach has been to work with banks and building societies to increase their understanding of the barriers victims may face. As Surviving Economic Abuse (SEA) points out in the WHA toolkit, perpetrators of abuse can exert control by not contributing to mortgage payments meaning that the victim has to pay all payments or risk the mortgage being defaulted. In addition, the perpetrator can exert control with their refusal to sell the property and withholding consent for mortgage holidays. Specialist refuge provision and outreach work • •

Mobile advocacy/co-located housing advocacy Housing First (women and homelessness)

Mobile advocacy is delivered by an expert, specialist domestic abuse service. The provision of specialist domestic abuse support is essential for the effective development, implementation and delivery of all aspects of the WHA – areas must work in partnership with their local specialist domestic abuse services to deliver this. Mobile advocacy is a form of community-based domestic abuse advocacy that focuses on victim’s/survivor’s self-identified needs. A mobile advocate can offer direct support to the victim/survivor in a range of community settings, or the service may come to the victim/survivor in their home. Help is offered with securing emergency and also longer-term stable housing, which includes exploring options for remaining in an existing property or relocating, if needed, for safety reasons. Co-located housing advocacy is a service delivered from the office of a local authority housing options team and offers direct support to victims/­ survivors who present as homeless because of domestic abuse. It may include co-location at another housing provider or service such as a housing association or homelessness service. As well as supporting victims/­survivors, it also offers case management support and training to staff based at the host service. ‘Housing First’ is a relatively new approach to providing housing and support but there is a rapidly growing evidence base that suggests that this is a successful approach. It has its origins in Finland where they have largely eradicated all forms homelessness including that caused by domestic abuse. Housing first is based upon the idea that safe and secure accommodation is the basis of ending homelessness and addressing the support needs of clients. Accommodation is therefore provided free of cost and few or no requirements on clients regarding accommodation. Support and other help are provided in a service-user-led way, with clients only engaging when they feel able and willing to do so.

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A suite of housing options and interventions that all aim to improve safety to victims • • • •

Flexible funding Sanctuary Scheme Managed Reciprocals Perpetrator management

The involvement of domestic abuse services is key for effective and safe delivery and for offering victims/survivors specialist support. Flexible funding is a fairly new initiative that offers funds to help victims/survivors to access safe housing. The initiative was used with success in the United States and forms a part of the WHA in the UK and is being piloted at the Cambridge and London sites. Flexible funds may be used to overcome any barrier preventing access to secure housing, including rent deposits, car repairs (which may prevent a person from getting to work and thereby put their employment at risk), removal costs or school transport costs. It is designed to give victims/survivors more control over their housing situation and reduces the likelihood that they will need to access emergency housing options. While some local domestic abuse services already offer emergency or hardship funds, they often entail very specific requirements. This is the first time that genuinely flexible funding, with the aim of supporting victims/survivors to access stable housing, has been available. Access to flexible funding does not require proof of domestic abuse and seeks to give the victim autonomy over what they need to do to improve their housing situation. Sanctuary Schemes are a multi-agency victim/survivor-centred initiative that aims to enable households at risk of violence to remain in their own homes and reduce repeat harm. Sanctuary Schemes are the addition of extra security measures in a home, and this could be alarm systems, reinforced doors and locks, fire proofing or a range of other measures. They are installed in circumstances when the perpetrator is no longer living in the home to provide a safe environment for the survivor. Within the WHA, this option is made available to households across tenures and where the installation of security measures is not in breach of the tenancy agreement or property rights under the agreement. Managed Housing Reciprocals are voluntary collaborations between local authorities and housing associations that are coordinated by an independent third agency. The aim is to enable those tenants in the social housing sector who are at risk of abuse to move to a safe area without losing the associated rights of their existing social tenancy. The coordinating agency keeps track of moves to ensure that the system is fair for all housing providers involved and works closely with domestic abuse specialist services to ensure that victims/survivors are supported through their relocation.

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The perpetrator management element of the toolkit considers the existing legislation for anti-social behaviour and domestic abuse that social landlords can utilise to address behaviour. This includes positive engagement strategies and enforcement activities that involve working with other agencies to deliver a coordinated community response in relation to perpetrators of domestic abuse. Impact of the WHA pilots Since the initial project activities began in April 2019 until December 2019, the project supported a total of 1,740 victim/survivors directly and 2,134 children indirectly. This has included: • • •

1,377 victim/survivors receiving support from a mobile advocacy or co-located housing advocacy domestic abuse service 107 victim/survivors receiving flexible funding to help them secure more stable accommodation 256 victim/survivors having Sanctuary Scheme installations, with the majority having security enhancements made to an existing home in order to prevent them from having to relocate or become homeless

The full WHA toolkit sets out guidance and advice meaning that other areas could establish the approach. At the time of writing, the pilots have recently concluded their first year and received funding for the second year. This presents an interesting case study about how each area implements this policy choice and their interpretation of what this policy approach means for their area. This ‘enabling’ approach to policy allows experimentation and looks at outcomes in a multi-dimensional way rather than to dogma to be blindly followed. The WHA operates with a Board for each pilot area comprising partners who deliver the responses. This partnership approach to implementation of the WHA is not new, and the landscape of the 1980s and 1990s saw an introduction of new frameworks and partnerships which gave more scope for ‘bottom-up’ approach to influence policy. New Labour argued that social issues were multi-dimensional, and as such, no single agency could effectively provide a solution, but rather, there were multiple players and the response lay in local coordination. The WHA pilots allows the agencies in local areas to determine what they will focus on representing a real role for front-line workers in changing policy and using findings on the ground to influence policy direction. The funding from MHCLG signifies this chiming with a governmental willingness to explore options developed from the bottom-up. It remains to be seen if

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the evaluations of the pilots influence future policy directions in relation to domestic abuse and housing.

Make a Stand Managing cases involving domestic abuse is a key part of delivering a high quality, customer-focused housing management service. To support housing providers to do this, the Chartered Institute of Housing (CIH) launched the Make a Stand pledges in June 2018 (CIH, 2018), in partnership with the Domestic Abuse Housing Alliance (DAHA) and their 2018 presidential charity partner, Women’s Aid. Each year, CIH elects a president from its members to act as an ambassador for the organisation. Although the role of president is not a formal part of the governance structure, it is an extremely important role for the organisation and carries a great deal of prestige in the housing sector and beyond. Each year, the elected president leads a campaign and fundraising appeal for a part of the sector that they particularly passionate about and supportive of. Past CIH presidents have chosen homelessness, equality and diversity or mental health, for example. The Make a Stand campaign was part of the presidential campaign of Alison Inman OBE to raise awareness of the role that housing providers can play in addressing and ending domestic abuse and raising money for Women’s Aid. Housing organisations house and employ millions of people across the UK and that means that they house and employ many thousands of people affected by domestic abuse. As Alison herself often says, these are “…our homes, our people and this is our problem”. Following Alison’s presidency, the succeeding president James Strang chose to continue with the theme of domestic abuse, he often speaks of the domestic abuse his mother and family suffered, and this was the reason why he chose to continue the campaign during his own presidency. On signing up to Make a Stand, housing providers agree to implement four pledges that provide a basic standard of provision for working with people experiencing abuse. The four pledges for housing providers are 1 Put in place and embed a policy to support residents who are affected by domestic abuse 2 Make information about national and local domestic abuse support services available on your website and in other appropriate places so that they are easily accessible for residents and staff 3 Put in place a human resources policy, or amend an existing policy, to support members of staff who may be experiencing domestic abuse 4 Appoint a champion at a senior level in your organisation to own the activity you are doing to support people experiencing domestic abuse

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These commitments are designed to enable housing providers to show that they take domestic abuse seriously and are acting to demonstrate this commitment to addressing domestic abuse within their communities. Following the launch of the Make a Stand pledges, CIH was contacted by several organisations who do not provide housing but worked closely with those that did. These organisations wanted to sign up to the commitments but could not as they had no way of meeting commitment 2, to provide information for tenants and residents. In response, CIH launched the ‘Supporter’s Pledge’, designed for non-housing providers. The ‘Supporter’s Pledge’ has three commitments: 1 Make information about national and local domestic abuse support services available on your website and in other appropriate places so that they are easily accessible for staff, your members, customers or clients 2 Put in place a human resources policy, or amend an existing policy, to support members of staff who may be experiencing domestic abuse 3 Appoint a champion at a senior level in your organisation to own the activity you are doing to support people experiencing domestic abuse and promote the campaign with your members, customers or clients Impact examples The below examples are from organisations that have taken the Make a Stand Pledge and are included here to give some context to the commitments and what they mean in practice. CIH has also produced a best practice guide entitled “How to … Make a Stand” (CIH, 2019), which can be found on their website (http://www.cih.org). Calico introduced ‘Safe Leave’ which is an extra two weeks leave to anyone experiencing domestic abuse. They are committed to encouraging men and boys to speak out against gender-based violence and their male CEO who is a senior domestic abuse champion. Following adoption of the pledge, One Housing Group saw an increase in reports of domestic abuse after updating their website and residents realising, and they have dedicated staff as points of contact in relation to domestic abuse. Derwent Living saw a big culture change after adopting the pledge with staff sharing their own experiences of abuse resulting in an overwhelming openness to talk to each other about domestic abuse in the organisation. An anonymous housing provider signed the Make a Stand pledge at a time where they were starting to consider how they could respond to the varying needs of customers. The push to sign the Make A Stand pledge came from a passionate member of staff who had been raising the issue of domestic abuse for some time.

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Signing the pledge had a positive impact on the whole organisation in feeling part of a momentum across the sector to make a difference – there was a commitment in signing the Make A Stand pledge that the organisation wanted to provide a meaningful response to customers and staff ensuring that this is embedded across the organisation. The pledge signing was agreed at a chief executive level and provided a foundation to ensure that the organisation was on board with driving change, it really engaged the organisation in looking at how it could meet the four areas within the Pledges and resulted in them going even further and really considering how it could ensure that its customers had the best response they could give. The staff member recalls feeling like one of a handful of people at the time who understood domestic abuse and the Pledge allowed colleagues to build their knowledge and ask questions – some colleagues disclosing personal experiences of abuse and receiving support for the first time. The commitment of the organisation to take the pledge seriously has resulted in an increase in residents seeking support, and this has re-configured the services offered introducing new roles into the organisation. The offer to residents originally focused on supporting victims of abuse, and this has led the organisation to seek to form a greater understanding of domestic abuse and work with respect-accredited organisations to address the abusive behaviour of some customers which they believe will ultimately have a positive impact on victims.

The Domestic Abuse Housing Alliance (DAHA) accreditation framework Note – The authors are grateful to the Domestic Abuse Housing Alliance for additional information taken from the DAHA website. DAHA is a partnership between three agencies: Gentoo (Sunderland-based housing provider), Standing Together Against Domestic Violence (domestic abuse charity) and Peabody (London-based housing provider) all who have a long-standing commitment to tackling domestic abuse, working in partnership and developing good practice and innovation in the field. Launched in 2014, DAHA’s mission is to improve the housing sector response to domestic abuse via three main ways: 1 Lobbying government and the housing sector 2 Providing an Accreditation Service for housing providers 3 Disseminating good practice and undertaking research In its bid to improve the housing sector response to domestic abuse, DAHA offers housing organisations an accreditation service. DAHA accreditation is aimed at housing associations, Local Authority housing teams and

Sector responses  175

homelessness providers across the UK to help them improve their response to domestic abuse. DAHA accreditation is the UK benchmark for how housing providers should respond to domestic abuse and is recognised in the government’s Ending Violence against Women and Girls Strategy: 2016–2020. DAHA states its aims of the accreditation service include: • • • • •

Improving staff confidence in identifying and responding to domestic abuse Standardising a process across sector to ensure people experiencing domestic abuse get right response from housing every time Increasing skills and interaction with local services and mechanisms including specialist domestic abuse services and MARAC Reduce costs to housing providers from domestic abuse-related repairs, turnover of stock and rent arrears Reduce cost to public purse via earlier interventions by housing providers

And most importantly: •

Saving lives and improve an organisation’s response to individuals experiencing domestic abuse

The accreditation standards consist of eight priority areas to address domestic abuse responses across organisations providing housing. The assessment for accreditation includes a site visit to the housing provider where staff are interviewed on the organisation’s approach to recognising and responding to domestic abuse. DAHA also undertakes case audits, analysis of policies and procedures and training on domestic abuse. The accreditation of eight priority areas is divided into the following categories, with several requirements within each that providers must fulfil to achieve DAHA accreditation. • • • • •

Policies and Procedures – includes assessing policies and procedures on how the organisation recognises and responds to domestic abuse for staff and customers and how well this is embedded across the organisation Case Management – assesses how the organisation support and advice to people experiencing domestic abuse with a non-judgemental, believing approach and how well cases of domestic abuse are managed. Risk Management – examines awareness of risk indicators how staff can identify when a case is high risk and that the organisation ensures that staff who carry out risk assessments are trained to do so. Inclusivity & Accessibility – assesses that the organisation can demonstrate that their service is accessible and available to all customers. Perpetrator Management – investigates the organisation’s approach to responding to perpetrators of domestic abuse, examining if they are

176  Sector responses

•

•

•

willing to take legal action against perpetrators where appropriate and what support they offer them to address their abusive behaviour Partnership Working – scrutinises how involved the organisation is in partnerships to tackle domestic abuse such as MARAC, Community Safety Partnership and safeguarding adults and children’s boards. It examines how they work with key agencies with specialist domestic abuse organisations and Police Training – inspects the organisation’s approach to training on domestic abuse, considering if there is a levelled approach to training depending on roles and if the organisation’s approach is included in induction for all new staff as well as inspecting training plans Publicity and Awareness – examines how the organisation ensures that customers are made aware of help and support available including what support it can provide and what information is on display in communal areas for staff, residents, people who are experiencing and/or perpetrating domestic abuse. This standard also considers the content of the organisation’s website, newsletters and involvement in any partnership publicity on domestic abuse

Impact example Hull City Neighbourhoods and Housing were delighted to achieve DAHA accreditation in 2019. It created fresh momentum to tackle the issue of domestic abuse across the service, allowing us to focus on ensuring that all staff are equipped to provide excellent services to survivors. Front-line staff are extremely proud of our accreditation and we believe that external endorsement of our approach has set a new, higher standard that staff strive to achieve in their day to day work.

Concluding comments These initiatives represent a good example of a policy response being formulated from the bottom-up, that is to say, by organisations providing services to people experiencing domestic abuse. In previous chapters, we have discussed the origins of services for women and children experiencing abuse, in services provided by activist women themselves, as the states were not acting to deal with the issue. We have also discussed the development of these services and the impact of housing policy upon them. The isomorphic processes around these services have meant that they have been pulled away from their activist roots and into the ambit of government. But this has also meant that services have lost their original feminist ethos and have been drawn into more conventional management arrangements, which some see as patriarchal, whilst the original communitarian/egalitarian nature of the original refuges has also been lost.

Sector responses  177

Many of these changes have been in relation to prevent overcrowding and to enforce fire safety and other regulations. Services have also become professionalised; staff and managers are now trained and paid (although volunteers still play an essential role); refuges are mostly of a good standard and safe. Funding for services has also increased although as we point out that this has been in decline in recent years, and additional funding for services that have proven effective is sorely needed. We have also addressed the need to work with perpetrators of abuse to address their abusive behaviour. The approaches discussed in this chapter can contribute to these goals. The domestic abuse and housing sectors have come together, in partnership, to plan and implement a series of initiatives to maximise the impact that housing providers can have on people experiencing abuse. In addition, the government seems committed to addressing this most serious of issues via the Domestic Abuse Bill 2019–2021 (at committee stage in the House of Commons at the time of writing) and proposals for planning and funding services. We hope that this book has provided you with an interesting and stimulating read and contributes to both the academic and policy and practice debates around domestic abuse.

References CIH (2018) Make a Stand: Our Homes, Our People, Our Problem, CIH, Coventry. CIH (2019) How to … Make a Stand, CIH, Coventry. DAHA (2020) Whole Housing Approach Toolkit, DAHA, London. Irving-Clarke, Y. (2019) Supported Housing: Past, Present and Future, Routledge, Abingdon. Women’s Aid (2020) The Domestic Abuse Report 2020: The Annual Audit, Women’s Aid Federation, Bristol.

Appendix 1

Useful resources and information

CIH Make a Stand Pledge Information http://www.cih.org/makeastand CIH Housing Rights website https://www.housing-rights.info/index.php The Domestic Abuse Housing Alliance website https://www.dahalliance.org.uk/ National Domestic Abuse Helpline 0808 2000 247 (24 hours) https://www.refuge.org.uk/get-help-now/phone-the-helpline/ Women’s Aid provide direct services including a live chat helpline, the survivors’ forum and the survivor’s handbook https://www.womensaid.org.uk/ & [email protected] Refuges provide support and advice to survivors of abuse as well as research and policy and practice advice https://www.refuge.org.uk/ Home Office guidance: Domestic Abuse – How to get help https://www.gov.uk/guidance/domestic-abuse-how-to-get-help#domesticabuse-in-a-relationship-recognise-it Shelter advice and guidance on Domestic Abuse and tenancies (England and Wales) https://england.shelter.org.uk/legal/relationship_breakdown/domestic_ violence/options_in_domestic_violence_cases Shelter advice and guidance on Domestic Abuse (Scotland) https://scotland.shelter.org.uk/get_advice/advice_topics/families_and_ households/domestic_abuse Men’s Advice Line (Confidential helpline to support male victims of domestic violence) 0808 801 0327 (Monday–Friday 10 am–5 pm) http://www.mensadviceline.org.uk/

180  Appendix 1: Useful resources and information

Forced Marriage Helpline 0800 5999 247 (not 24 hours). Forced Marriage Unit 020 7008 0151. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/forced-marriage#forced-marriage-unit Karma Nirvana (providing support for people experiencing forced marriage and honour-based violence) 0800 5999 247 https://www.karmanirvana.org.uk/ Galop (for LGBT+ people who are experiencing domestic violence) 0800 999 5428 www.galop.org.uk or [email protected] Rape Crisis (provides co-ordination for the rape crisis movement in England and Wales – the website lists local centres) 0808 802 9999. https://rapecrisis.org.uk/ REACH (Rape examination, advice, counselling and help) 0191 221 9222. http://www.reachsarc.org.uk/ The National Stalking Helpline provides guidance and information 0808 802 0300 (run by the Suzy Lamplugh Trust) https://www.suzylamplugh.org/Pages/Category/national-stalking-helpline Paladin – National Stalking Advocacy Service 020 3866 4107 https://paladinservice.co.uk/ NSPCC (Confidential number for children and young people) 0808 800 5000. Victim Care (independent charity helping people cope with the effects of crime, by providing free and confidential support and information) 0303 0401 099 (9am– 8pm Mon to Fri, 9am -5pm Sat) http://victimcareandadviceservice.uk Action on Elder Abuse (Action on Elder Abuse work to protect and prevent the abuse of vulnerable older adults) 0808 808 8141 http://elderabuse.org.uk/england/ Support for perpetrators 0808 802 4040 http://respect.uk.net/ Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). It is mandatory to report suspected cases of FGM. If you suspect someone is at risk call the Police on 101.

Index

Note: Italic page numbers refer to figures. Abolition of the Right to Buy and Associated Rights (Wales) Act 2018 120 abuse: domestic 90–91, 92–101, 101–6; and family 30 access: to refuge accommodation 110–12; to temporary accommodation 110–12 accommodation: refuge 110–12; temporary 110–12 accommodation-based domestic abuse services 56–58 Act of Union 1707 118 affordability and housing instability 106–10 Aldrich, H. 20 Alexander, P.C. 158 Allen, K.M. 113 All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Ending Homelessness 103 Anderson, Greg 106 anti-social behaviour (ASB) 86, 93; coalition and Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 95–97; current regulation of social housing 97–98; defined 96; frame, impact of using 98–101; impact of using ASB frame 98–101; social housing and 74; Thatcher, new labour 93–95 Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 95–97, 96 Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 95, 99 Anti-Social Behaviour Injunction 96 Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) 95 anti-social behaviour policy: and domestic abuse 92–101

arms-length management organisation (ALMO) 79 Association of Local Authority Chief Housing Officers (ALACHO) 124 Assured Shorthold Tenancies (ASTs) 88–90 assured tenancies 88 Atkinson, R. 98 Atkinson, S. 18 Atlee, Clement 76 Audit Commission 40, 47 austerity, and funding 48–50 Australian Royal Commission on Family Violence 106 backward mapping 15 Barrett, S. M. 13–14 Beauvoir, Simone de 30 Bedroom Tax 121–22; Scotland 121–22; Wales 121–22 behaviour: coercive 6, 127; controlling 6, 127 Bell, K. 109 Blackman, Bob 120 Blair, Tony 79, 94, 95 Blunkett, David 95, 98 bottom-up approach 13–14; synthesis 14–15 Brown, A.P. 99 bureaucracy 19; street level 13 Bureau for Investigative Journalism (BIJ) 111 Burgess, G. 103 Burnett, J. 75 Burney, E. 99 Burt, M.R. 73, 156

182 Index Calico 173 ‘Call for Evidence’ alongside the Green Paper 98 Cameron, David 46, 93, 95 Cattaneo, L. 156 Channel 4’s Dispatches programme 104 Chartered Institute of Housing (CIH) 3, 89, 121, 172 Chelsea and Westminster Council 111 Children Act 1989 38, 92 Choice-Based Lettings (CBL) 81 Christie Commission 118 CIH Cymru 126 CIH Scotland 124 Clarke, A. 106 Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG) 50 Clough, A. 106, 110 coercive behaviour 6, 127 Cohen, S. 93 Collins, R. 21 co-located housing advocacy 169 Comic Relief 37 Commissioner for Domestic Abuse 55, 67 Commission on Scottish Devolution (Calman Commission) 118 Conservatives 35–39; elections 35–39; subsidy structure on public housing 37 controlling behaviour 6, 127 Cooper, C. 93 Coser, L. 21 court orders: Scotland 122–26; and transfer of tenancies 91–92; Wales 126–30 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 39–40, 95 ‘Crime and Disorder Partnerships’ 39 Crime Survey for England and Wales 107 Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 40 criminal justice system (CJS) 4 Crossley, S. 93 Croucher, K. 108–9 current regulation of social housing & ASB 97–98 Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) 95–96 Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) 122

Derwent Living 173 DETR 43, 44 Dimaggio, P.J. 19–22 Discretionary Housing Payments (DHPs): Scotland 121–22; Wales 121–22 dispersed accommodation 57 Dobash, R.D. 4, 30 Dobash, R.E. 4, 30 domestic abuse: accommodation services 56–58; anti-social behaviour policy and 92–101; defined 128; defining 5–7; and homelessness 101–6; and housing 3–4; implications for perpetrators 105–6; implications for survivors 103–5; joint tenancies and 90–91; needs assessments 62–63; as social issue 3; strategy 62 Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018 124–25 Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence (Wales) Act 2015) 127 Domestic Abuse Bill 6, 50, 55, 66–67, 102, 177 Domestic Abuse Commissioner see Commissioner for Domestic Abuse domestic abuse emergency accommodation 58 Domestic Abuse Housing Alliance (DAHA) 7, 172; accreditation framework 174–76; aims of accreditation service 175; impact example 176; launched in 174; mission 174 Domestic Abuse Protection Notices 67 Domestic Abuse Protection Orders 67 Domestic Violence and Abuse Bill 98 Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 32 Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme 67 Drislane, R. 93 economic resilience 108 Elmore, Richard 14–15, 16 empowerment, and women 31 Ending Violence against Women and Girls Strategy: 2016–2020 175 Engels, Friedrich 30 English Housing Survey Report 2016–17 108 Equality Act 2010 129

Index 183 Fahmy, E. 107 family: and abuse 30; and women 30 Family Law Act 1996 92 Fawcett Society 108 Femicide Census 111–12 feminist movement 31 feminist period 29–33 Fennell, M.L. 20 Field, Frank 93, 94 Fife Housing Partnership 105 ‘First Home Programme’ 82 Fisher, E.R. 157 Fitzpatrick, S. 74, 81, 94, 107, 112 Fixed Term Tenancies (FTTs) 120 flexible funding 170 Flint, J. 98–99 forward mapping 14 Fourier, Charles 30 Franklyn, G.A. 16 Freeman, J. 20 Friedan, Betty 30 Friedman, Milton 17 Fudge, C. 13–14 Future Delivery of Support to Victims and their Children in Accommodation-Based Domestic Abuse Services 50 Gangoli, G. 106 “gender-based violence” 128 generic roles, and specialist support roles 150–52 genital mutilation (FGM) 130 Gentoo (Sunderland-based housing provider) 174 Goebler, T.A. 16 Gondolf, E.W. 157 Gough, I. 77–78 governance and policy networks 15–17 government: governance and policy networks 15–17 Grayling, A.C. 30 Greater London Authority (GLA) 55 Greer, Germaine 29 Gunn, L. 11–12 Hague, G. 112–13 Hannan, M.T. 20 Hardman, Isabel 22 Harne, L. 4 Haworth, A. 98 Heap, V. 95

Henderson, Kelly 3, 100, 101, 133 Hill, M. 15, 16, 17 Hill, Octavia 74, 94, 98 Hills, J. 92 Hjern, B. 13 Hogwood, B.W. 11–12 Holder, R. 4 “Home Alone” 44 homelessness: domestic abuse and 101–6; housing & welfare policy 120–21; Scotland 120–21; Wales 120–21 Homelessness Act 2002 102 Homelessness Prevention Fund 122 Homelessness Reduction Act 2017 105 Homelessness Reduction Act 2018 120 Home Office 95 Hood, C.C. 11 Horn, C.E. 11 Hotak v London Borough of Southwark 102 Hounslow Council 31–32 Houses of Industry or Correction 74 housing: and Conservative government 48–49; and domestic abuse 3–4; short-term services 49 Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 32, 77 Housing Act 1980 78 Housing Act 1988 37, 87, 88, 93 Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 105, 123 Housing Act 2004 78 Housing and Planning Act 1988 79 Housing and Planning Act 2016 120 Housing and Town Planning Act 1919 75 Housing and Working Classes Act 1890 75 Housing Associations 37, 40 Housing Benefit 41 Housing Benefit/Universal Credit system 37 housing & domestic abuse: Scotland 122–26; Wales 126–30 Housing Finance Act 1972 77 ‘Housing First’ 169 housing instability: affordability and 106–10; defined 107 Housing of the Working Classes Act 1900 75 housing policy: access to refuge and temporary accommodation 110–12; affordability and housing instability

184 Index 106–10; anti-social behaviour policy and domestic abuse 92–101; domestic abuse and homelessness 101–6; overview 86–87; tenancy agreements 87–92 housing providers: expectations of support from 137–39; routes into support from 133–37; supporting women experiencing abuse 152–55 Housing Revenue Account (HRA) subsidy system 127 housing support worker: role in recovery 148–50 housing & welfare policy 119–21; homelessness 120–21; limiting tenure 120; right to buy 119–20; Scotland 119–21; Wales 119–21 Hull City Neighbourhoods and Housing 176 Hupe, P. 15, 16, 17 implementation deficit 11 implementation process 11 Independent Domestic Violence Advocates (IDVAs) 40, 59, 157–58 industry responses: domestic abuse housing alliance (DAHA) 174–76; making a stand 172–74; overview 165; whole housing approach (WHA) 165–72 Inman, Alison 7, 172 Inside Housing 119 Interim Housing Benefit (IHB) 41 introductory tenancies 89 isomorphism: defined 19; organisational (see organisational isomorphism) Jackson, R. 100 Jacobs, Nicole 165 Johnson, B. 73, 156 joint tenancies & domestic abuse 90–91 Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) 108 Kanter, R.M. 20 Kaukinen, C. 156 Kelly, L. 103, 104, 110, 113, 133–34, 148, 160 Kernic, M.A. 156 Kober, C. 109 Kushel, M.B. 107

Labour Government 39–46; refuge provision 40; Supporting People programme 40–41 large-scale voluntary transfer (LSVT) 79 Larson, M.S. 21 Leighton, D. 47 Lipsky, M. 13, 14 Local Area Agreement (LAA) 45 Local Government and Public Involvement Act 2007 45 Local Health Boards 129 Local Housing Allowance (LHA) 49 local partnership boards: accountability 61–62; domestic abuse accommodation services 61–62; needs assessments 62–63; representation 61 lunatic asylums 74 Lund, B. 78 Lupton, C. 33 Macmillan, Harold 76 Make a Stand campaign 7, 172–74; impact examples 173–74 Make a Stand pledges 172–74 Making Safe Project 106 Malos, E. 112–13 Malpass, P. 4, 77, 79, 81 Managed Housing Reciprocals 170 Manns, J. 78 Manzi, T. 98 mapping: backward 15; forward 14 March, J.G. 21 Marx, Karl 30 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 92 May, Teresa 95 May, Theresa 5, 66 Means, R. 38 Menard, P.A. 73 Merritt-Gray, M. 159 Meyer, J.W. 20 Millet, Kate 29 Milward, H.B. 16 mimetic processes 21 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) 89, 166 mobile advocacy 169 Moe, A.M. 157 ‘moral panic’ 74 Morgan Report 39 move-on and/or second-stage accommodation 57–58 Mullins, D. 76–77, 79, 103, 104

Index 185 Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) 40 Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conferences (MARACs) 40, 59, 175–76 Murie, A. 4, 76–77 National Assembly for Wales 119 National Domestic Abuse Policy and Practice Group 89 National Domestic Violence Helpline 104 National Housing Federation 168 National Lottery 37 National Steering Group 64–65 National Women’s Aid Federation 30, 32 needs assessments, domestic abuse 62–63 Neighbourhood and Community Standard 97 ‘Neighbours from Hell’ 93 “New Public Management” (NPM) 18 NHS and Community Care Act 1990 20, 38 NHS Trust 129 Niner, P. 103, 104 Nixon, J. 98, 99 normative processes 21–22 Notice of Seeking Possession (NoSP) 88, 100 O’Campo, P. 109–10 Office for the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) 41–42 Olsen, J.P. 21 One Housing Group 173 organisational isomorphism 10, 19–22; mechanisms of isomorphic change 20–21; mimetic processes 21; normative processes 21–22 Osbourne, D.E. 16 Parkinson, G. 93 ‘Part One Injunction’ 96 Pascall, G. 108 ‘patriarchy’ 29 Pavao, J. 110 Pawson, H. 79, 107 Peabody (London-based housing provider) 174 Pereira v Camden Council 102 perpetrators: housing situation of 147; implications for 105–6

Perrow, C. 22 Pizzey, Erin 32 Pleace, N. 48, 111 Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) 50 policy implementation: bottom-up approach 13–14; top-down approach 11–13; and UK government 15–17 policy networks and governance 15–17 Pollitt, C. 18 Ponic, P. 109 Powell, W.W. 19–22 Pressman, J.L. 11, 12, 14 privately owned housing (POH) 168–69 professionalisation 21–22 Provan, K.G. 16 Public Choice Theory 17 public housing, and subsidy structure 37 “Quality and Choice: A Decent Home for All” 80 Quilgars, D. 48, 111 Radford, J. 4 Rashleigh, B. 103 refuge accommodation 57; access to 110–12 refuge movement 29 refuge provision 35–39; Labour Government 40 Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) 79, 94 Regulator for Social Housing 97 ‘Removal of the Spare Room Subsidy’ see Bedroom Tax Rent and Mortgage Interests (War Restrictions Act) 1915 75 Renting Homes (Wales) Act 2016 124–26 ‘rent rebate’ system 37 Resick, P.A. 157 Residential Landlord Association 168 Rhodes, R.A.W. 18 Right to Buy policies 36–37, 78, 82, 119; housing & welfare policy 119–20; Scotland 119–20; Wales 119–20 Ripley, R.B. 16 Robson Rhodes 42 Rose, H. 33 Rose, N. 94, 96 SafeLives 47 Sampson, R. 98

186 Index Sanctuary Schemes 57, 170 Savage, R. 18 Scotland: Bedroom Tax and Discretionary Housing Payments (DHPs) 121–22; court orders, housing & domestic abuse 122–26; homelessness 120–21; housing & welfare policy 119–21; right to buy 119–20 Scotland Act 2016 118 Scottish Education Department 118 Scottish Federation of Housing Associations (SFHA) 124 Scottish Parliament 118 Scottish Women’s Aid 104 see Women’s Aid secure tenancies 87–88 Secure Tenancies Act 2018 148 Seddon, J. 17 Sedlak, M.W. 21 Select Committee on Violence in Marriage 36 Shared Accommodation Rate (SAR) 49 Sharp, N. 109 Shelter (Scotland) 124 Smith Commission 118 Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) 94 social housing 4, 87; and anti-social behaviour (ASB) 74; current regulation of 97–98; funding 41–42; history 74–80; and Housing Associations 37; present definition of 80–82; regulation 42–43; and World War II 75–76 Social Housing Green Paper ‘A New Deal for Social Housing’ (MHCLG) 98 social housing policy 73–74 Southall Black Sisters 36 specialism 68 specialist refuge provision and outreach work 169 specialist safe accommodation 57 specialist support roles and generic roles 150–52 Spinney, A. 31, 35, 40 squatting movement 31 standardised reporting, of local authorities 64 Standing Together Against Domestic Violence (domestic abuse charity) 174

statutory guidance, for safe accomodation of domestic abuse victims 65 Stephens, M. 108 Strang, James 7, 172 strategy and domestic abuse 62 street level bureaucracy 13 suite of housing options improving safety to victims 170–72 support: domestic abuse accommodation services 58–59; for domestic abuse victims 66; services, commissioning 63 Supported Housing Grant (SHG) 37 Supporting People (SP) funding 111 Supporting People programme 40–41, 43, 44–46; criticism 59; described 68 Surviving Economic Abuse (SEA) 169 survivors, implications for 103–5 Tansitional Housing Benefit (THB) 41–42 temporary accommodation 110–12 tenancies: assured 88; assured shorthold 88–90; court orders & transfer of 91–92; joint 90–91; secure 87–88 tenancy agreements 87–92; assured shorthold tenancies 88–90; assured tenancies 88; court orders & transfer of tenancies 91–92; joint tenancies & domestic abuse 90–91; secure tenancies 87–88 tenure and accommodation: whole housing approach (WHA) 167–69 Thatcher, Margaret 17, 18, 29; election of 36–39; and housing policy 77–78; new labour and ASB 93–95 Thoennes 113 tier one (county and unitary) authorities: accommodation-based services 56–58; statutory duty 59–60; support 58–59 Tjaden, P. 113 TOGETHER campaign 95 Tonry, M. 99 top-down approach 11–13; synthesis 14–15 Towers, J. 107–8 transfer of tenancies: court orders and 91–92 ‘trial’ tenancies 89 ‘Troubled Families’ program 93, 95 Tucker, J. 76 Turgoose 46, 47

Index 187 United Charities 21 University of Bristol 92 Van Meter, D. 11 VAWG action plan 5, 6 VAWG Partnerships 149 victims of domestic abuse: overview 133; suite of housing options and interventions improving safety to 170–72 Victory, C. 77, 81 violence against women, domestic abuse and sexual violence (VAWDASV) 129–30 Violence against Women and Girls Strategy (VAWG) 5, 6, 50, 111, 149 Walby, S. 47, 107–8 Waldrop, A.E. 157 Wales: Bedroom Tax and Discretionary Housing Payments (DHPs) 121–22; court orders, housing & domestic abuse 126–30; homelessness 120–21; housing & welfare policy 119–21; limiting tenure 120; right to buy 119–20 Warrington, M. 33, 36 Watts, B. 74, 81, 94 Weber, M. 19, 20 Websdale, N. 73, 156 Welsh (Assembly) Government 119 Welsh Parliament 118 Westmarland, N. 106 WHA pilots: impact of 171–72 Whole Housing Approach (WHA) 7, 165–72; aims of 166–67; components of 167, 167–72; impact of the WHA pilots 171–72; specialist refuge provision and outreach work 169; suite of housing options and

interventions improving safety to victims 170–72; tenure and accommodation 167–69 Whole Housing Approach Toolkit 165 Wildavsky, A. 11, 12, 14 Wollstonecraft, Mary 30 women: and empowerment 31; and family 30; movement 31; stereotypes about 29 Women, Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence Act 2015 126 women experiencing abuse: expectations of support from housing providers 137–39; hopes for the future 155–56; housing providers improve their support 152–55; housing situation of perpetrator 147; implications of moving 140–47; overview 133; role of housing support worker in recovery 148–50; routes into support from housing provider 133–37; specialist support roles and generic roles 150– 52; waiting for an offer of property 147–48 Women’s Aid 32, 47, 48, 104–5, 172; Nowhere to Turn Report 111 Women’s Aid (Scotland) 124 Women’s Aid Annual Survey 111 Wood, C. 47 workhouses 74 World War I 75 World War II 75–76 Wozniack, D. 113 Wuest, J. 159 Wydall, S. 106 Yemshaw v LB Hounslow 104 Zweig, J.M. 73, 156