Homo Theomorphicus Et Theophoricus: A Receptive-Responsive Theory of Spirituality (Conflict, Ethics, and Spirituality) 9042937912, 9789042937918

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C O N F L I C T, E T H I C S , A N D S P I R I T U A L I T Y   8

Homo Theomorphicus et Theophoricus A Receptive-Responsive Theory of Spirituality

Andrzej Jastrzębski

PEETERS

HOMO THEOMORPHICUS ET THEOPHORICUS

CONFLICT, ETHICS, AND SPIRITUALITY 8

Series Editors / Collection dirigée par Martin Blais Manal Guirguis-Younger Marie-Rose Tannous

CONFLICT, ETHICS, AND SPIRITUALITY

8

Homo Theomorphicus et Theophoricus A Receptive-Responsive Theory of Spirituality

by

Andrzej Jastrzębski

PEETERS

LEUVEN – PARIS – BRISTOL, CT

2019

This book was first published in Polish: Homo theomorphicus et theophoricus. Studium z receptywno-responsywnej teorii duchowości, Polskie Stowarzyszenie Teologów Duchowości, Lublin 2015. Translated by Andrzej Jastrzębski, Martin Blais and Urszula Gozdowska.

Nihil obstat Richard Jaworski, CC Censor Deputatus 20th March 2019 Imprimatur Monseigneur Terrence Prendergast, S.J. Archbishop of Ottawa 25th March 2019 Solemnity of the Annunciation

Biblical excerpts are from New Revised Standard Version Bible: Catholic ­Edition, copyright ©1993 and 1989 by the Division of Christian Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in U.S.A.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm or any other means without written permission from the publisher © Peeters, Bondgenotenlaan 153, B-3000 Leuven (Belgium) ISBN 978-90-429-3791-8 eISBN 978-90-429-3792-5 D/2019/0602/57

Table of contents Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

vii

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Chapter 1. An adequate anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Chapter 2. The denial of nature’s receptivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Chapter 3. Affirmation of the receptivity of human nature . . . . . 69 Chapter 4. Receptivity in grace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Chapter 5. The responsiveness of human nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 Chapter 6. Responsiveness in grace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

Foreword This book is the result of extended and intense research and was originally published in Polish. The work of translating it was a major endeavor and resulted, to some extent, in a new book based on the Polish original. I tried to take into account all comments and suggestions received in response to the Polish edition so that the English version would benefit from these recommendations. The English translation is also somewhat different because any translation is an interpretation. I am aware of that fact because of my own years of experience as a translator. Preparing the English edition required major decisions regarding the use and usefulness of some Polish references. In the end, I decided to make the English version more readable by dropping references that I felt would not be helpful to a reader who is not familiar with the Polish milieu. One of the greatest challenges was to do justice to Karol Wojtyła’s (John Paul II’s) philosophical thought. In order to do so, I had to acquaint myself with the English translation of his major anthropological work Osoba i czyn (The Acting Person). Presenting Wojtyła’s work was challenging but, in my opinion, entirely worthwhile. This book is written by a believer, a Roman Catholic priest and religious. It concludes in the realm of theology but it is not addressed exclusively to Catholics. In its earlier parts it is a study based on neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy and is faithful to scientific methodology, so one may choose to read these parts exclusively. That being said, the study of human spirituality is a topic that has become an essential part of today’s humanistic and even scientific debates. The discipline of “neurotheology” is a useful framework for doing so, as it draws on the science of the brain and nervous system with reference to religious experience. This book tries to shed some light on spirituality in this context, opening up new spaces for spiritual thought, and bringing the reader a bit closer to understanding its mystery. My hope is that it does so with some success. I am immensely grateful to all the people who encouraged me and supported this work. My special thanks go to the faculty of Human Sciences of St. Paul University in Ottawa, who came up with the proposal for this translation, and to Celeste Woloschuk, Melissa Monette, Michael Rock, but especially to Claudette Gravelle and professor James Thomas who took on the difficult task of editing this text in English.

Introduction To Him of Whom one cannot speak, to Him one must pray.1

The human being is the subject of research for sciences ranging from the natural, to social, to human. This research has led to a massive expansion of our knowledge of the human person. Nonetheless, we cannot say that we are satisfied with what we know. For as we learn more and more about ourselves, new discoveries bring about new and unresolved challenges – ad infinitum. One of the central dimensions of human life, and a compelling topic for study, is our spirituality – our spiritual existence, the organic structure, the genesis and destiny, the very foundation of our existence. For thousands of years, people have identified certain signs and intuitions, and developed philosophical arguments that have led to the acknowledgement of a spiritual dimension to our existence. Beyond what our own reasoning can discover, there is God’s revelation, but nowadays there is both a strong resistance to accepting it as a valuable source of knowledge about human beings, as well as a tendency to promote some rather reductionistic explanations. In research on human nature, we come by different paths to discover a special “form” in ourselves, prepared to enter into relationship with God. The human being appears as capax Dei or homo theomorphicus, someone shaped in the depths of their being in a way that allows them to be open to the presence of their Creator, and to enter into an intimate relationship with God. Although not always in a conscious way, this relationship is the foundation for the spiritual dimension of human life. While receiving God’s grace, His presence in life, the human being gradually becomes an image (icon) of God – someone in whom the presence of God can reveal itself – and in this way become a homo theomorphicus. The word “spirituality” is ambiguous and, for that reason, needs to be carefully defined. Many spiritual phenomena cannot be clearly 1  V. E. Frankl, The Will to Meaning. Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy, New York: Meridian, 1988, 146. This is Frankl’s theistic translation of Wittgenstein’s Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.

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INTRODUCTION

assigned to a specific set of designates of the term “spirituality.” It may be defined in many ways: – as a fundamental dimension of our existence, as a specific sort of experience;2 – as a deeper union with the universe, as a higher meaning of life; – as a balanced and tolerant attitude towards life, developing such characteristics of being as humility, joy, and compassion; – as a humble and loving self, reaching the essence of existence; or simply – as a natural way of living. One may add that such spirituality would always be accompanied by an appropriate praxis.3 Saint Paul, addressing himself to the Corinthians states that “this is what we speak, not in words taught us by human wisdom but in words taught by the Spirit, interpreting spiritual truths to those who are spiritual” (1 Cor 2:13). Spirituality for him is an opening to the Holy Spirit.4 “Those who are spiritual” differ from others, because they act under the influence of the Holy Spirit and not of nature alone.5 The contemporary understanding of spirituality encompasses a very diverse range of personal phenomena. It is related to prayer, or spiritual exercises, but is not confined to the Christian tradition. It may pertain, for example, to the spirituality of various models of religious life, or to the “inner life” of someone who through prayer and asceticism is trying to achieve greater excellence. Furthermore, spirituality describes the whole experience of faith, and even the fullness of one’s personal life, along with its many dimensions: somatic, psychic, even socio-political.6 In philosophy, the concept of spirituality has long been synonymous with immateriality, and more recently with immortality. For many Greek  S. M. Schneiders, “Spirituality in the Academy,” Theological Studies 50 (1989), 678.  M. Chmielewski, “Duchowość, duchowość chrześcijańska, duchowości zakonne,” in S. C. Napiórkowski and W. Koc (eds.), Duchowość świętego Franciszka, Niepokalanów: Wydawnictwo Ojców Franciszkanów, 2001, 31-48; M. Chmielewski, “Duchowość,” in M. Chmielewski (ed.), Leksykon duchowości katolickiej, LublinKraków: Wydawnictwo “M,” 2002, 226-232; J. B. Rubin, “Psychoanalysis and Spirituality,” in D. M. Black (ed.), Psychoanalysis and Religion in the 21st Century: Competitors or Collaborators, New York: Routledge, 2006, 132-153. 4  J.  O. Wiseman, Spirituality and Mysticism: A Global View. Theology in Global ­Perspective Series, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2006, 2. 5  Schneiders, “Spirituality in the Academy,” 681. 6  Schneiders, “Spirituality in the Academy,” 679. 2 3



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philosophers, what is true is spiritual and the opposite of materiality. They therefore considered immateriality to be fundamental to the human spirit.7 In the early medieval period, spirituality is no longer, as in St. Paul’s writings, opposed to human sensual and carnal tendencies, but opposed more generally to whatever is material.8 St. Thomas placed spirituality in the field of moral theology (Summa Theologiae, part 2), which drew its principles from dogmatic theology.9 It was not until the sixteenth century – the golden age of mysticism – that the term “spirituality” began to refer to the inner human life, and, above all, to prayer.10 By contrast, in contemporary philosophy we are dealing with very different concepts of spirituality. For example, Richard Rorty describes it from a pragmatic viewpoint, reducing spirituality to a matter of one’s personal preference.11 In turn, Charles Taylor proposes to recognize ­spirituality as a discourse of wisdom, referring to the ethical and moral dimension of life.12 According to Józef Tischner, spiritual life is focused on service to God, the giver of goodness and grace – leading us from despair to hope.13 Henri Bergson considered human spirituality in reference to the lives of the Christian mystics.14 Nowadays, it is difficult to say whether or not we can find any comprehensive compendium of the anthropological issues pertaining to human spirituality. In the field of philosophy, we would find a reflection on religion rather than on spirituality. Isolated attempts have been made to develop a true psychology of spirituality. One of the pioneers in this field is Adrian van Kaam. He tried to create a kind of metalanguage as a basis for developing a universal “humanistic spirituality.” Creating a  T. Špidlik, I. Gargano, V. Grossi, Duchowość Ojców Kościoła, trans. K. FrancJ. Serafin, K. Stopa, Historia duchowości, vol. 3, Kraków: Homo Dei, 2004, 10; M. Chmielewski, “Czym jest życie duchowe chrześcijanina?,” in P. Kantyka, J. Czerkawski, T. Simieniec (eds.), Kościół — komunia i dialog. Księga pamiątkowa ofiarowana księdzu biskupowi Kazimierzowi Ryczanowi w 75. rocznicę urodzin, Kielce: Jedność, 2014, 187-195. 8  Wiseman, Spirituality and Mysticism, 2-3. 9  Schneiders, “Spirituality in the Academy,” 685. 10  Schneiders, “Spirituality in the Academy,” 681; M. Chmielewski, “Od teologii ascetyczno-mistycznej do teologii duchowości,” Studia Diecezji Radomskiej 2 (1999), 89-102. 11  Z. Zaborowski, Człowiek jego świat i życie. Próba integracji, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie “Żak,” 2002, 382. 12  Ch. Taylor, Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989, 35, 50. 13  J. Tischner, Spór o istnienie człowieka, Kraków: Znak, 1998, 287. 14  K. A. Wojcieszek, Na początku była rozpacz… Antropologiczne podstawy profilaktyki, Kraków: Rubikon, 2005, 94. 7

zyk,

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INTRODUCTION

general science of spirituality should not, in his opinion, be related to any particular religious system (e.g. Christianity, Islam, Buddhism). Van Kaam’s theory was to be organic and holistic, and its purpose, to show the human capacity for transcending one’s own limitations.15 Another example of this approach is the work of Daniel Helminiak, who defines spirituality broadly as a thoughtful engagement of a human person within the process of full growth in humanity.16 Likewise, David Elkins differentiates the following dimensions of spirituality: the desire for something divine, transcendent; the desire to relate our existence to something beyond; the desire for an object that is not oneself, or a part of onself, but a separate and higher reality.17 Spirituality conceived, in the strict philosophical sense, entails separateness from matter, i.e. immateriality. In substantial and noteworthy terms, it points to the spiritual element in the human being. In the classic Aristotelian sense, immateriality means being a “form,” a permanent nature; but in modern terms, immateriality is opposed to the empirical, it goes beyond purely sensory cognition.18 Spirituality can be conceived both bottom-up and top-down.19 The first approach, the anthropological, humanistic approach (that of philosophy, psychology, etc.), shows the structure of being (ontology) and the dynamism of the human person (phenomenology). These are conditions for the acceptance of grace (the receptivity and responsiveness of nature to God’s grace). They indicate that virtually all human life has a spiritual dimension. A second approach, the dogmatic, Christian approach, attempts to define spirituality in light of sanctifying grace descending on the human person, the grace of deification (theosis). We will describe this approach later (in terms of the receptiveness and responsiveness of nature to grace). We want to combine both approaches and emphasize their parallelism and complementarity. Karol Wojtyła teaches that the exploration of the human person’s spiritual dimension should draw on transcendental experience of an active nature. He maintains that the concept of the spirit does not 15  A. Jastrzębski, “O pewnej próbie stworzenia meta-psychologii. Adrian van Kaam post mortem,” Roczniki Psychologiczne 2 (2010), 67. 16  D. A. Helminiak, “Confounding the Divine and the Spiritual: Challenges to a Psychology of Spirituality,” Pastoral Psychology 57 (2008), 162. 17  D. N. Elkins, Beyond Religion: A Personal Program for Building a Spiritual Life Outside the Walls of Traditional Religion, Wheaton, IL: Quest Books, 1998, 31. 18  R. Darowski, Filozofia człowieka, Zarys problematyki, Kraków: WAM, 2002, 66-67. 19  Schneiders, “Spirituality in the Academy,” 682.



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denote only something immaterial, i.e. solely a negation of materiality. Transcendence is an activity of the human person. It is the full expression of human existence. It includes freedom, responsibility, and commitment. These in turn reveal the actual relationship of the human being to the truth, both in thought and in morality.20 In the first part of this book, from the philosophical standpoint, we will find in “spirituality” the capacity for self-transcendence. This is a concept developed both by Wojtyła and Frankl. It is also the definition of spirituality we find in the work of Sandra Schneiders, described as a conscious experience of integrating one’s life, not by isolating the spirit, but by going beyond oneself (self-transcendence) toward what one perceives as something of ultimate value.21 Self-transcendence does not mean a better adaptation to the environment, but targeting something of ultimate value. As we’ve seen, this is also the view presented by Daniel Helminiak; self-transcendence is the power source of human life, its spiritual core. It makes spiritual growth possible. The presence of God provides an opportunity for our spiritual nature to unfold. Otherwise, mystical experience would simply amount to being the result of our own mental functioning.22 On the other hand, Peter van Ness, defining spirituality, says that it is the realization of our “truest” self.23 Likewise, Ursula W. Goodenough, a biologist and geneticist, treats spirituality as an opportunity to transcend one’s “daily” self.24 From a Christian perspective, spirituality is understood as a form of religious life leading to union with God the Father through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit. Christian spirituality covers piety, asceticism, mysticism, but also morality (ethos). More generally, spirituality means a life in which one accepts the sacred as something of ultimate value and shapes one’s own existence accordingly in the pursuit of some completeness or perfection.25 The spiritual nature of the human person is expressed in rationality, and more specifically, in one’s mental faculties – the intellect and will. 20  K. Wojtyła, The Acting Person, trans. A. Potocki, Analacta Husserliana X, Dordrecht-Boston-London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979, 182; M. Chmielewski, “Personalistyczno-chrystologiczna terminologia duchowościo­wa w nauczaniu papieskim,” Duchowość w Polsce 15 (2013), 19-36. 21  Schneiders, “Spirituality in the Academy,” 684. 22  Elkins, Beyond religion, 69, 98-99. 23  Wiseman, Spirituality and Mysticism, 5. 24  Wiseman, Spirituality and Mysticism, 24. 25  M. Daniluk, “Duchowość chrześcijańska,” in Encyklopedia katolicka, 4, Lublin: TN KUL, 1985, 317-330; S. Witek, “Duchowość religijna,” in Encyklopedia katolicka, 4, 330-334; M. Chmielewski, Duchowość, 226-232.

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INTRODUCTION

Some thinkers emphasize the intellect, others the will.26 Over time, more emphasis has been placed on consciousness, rather than intellect. The modern debate about the mechanisms of consciousness opens up a perspective from which one sees the possibility of a genuinely spiritual dimension of human existence – this will be the first point of our analysis. In this study, we will start by developing the concept of spirituality from the perspective of the humanities – philosophy or psychology (“bottom-up” anthropology) – and then enrich this image through the exploration of a theological perspective (“top-down” anthropology), especially in those areas where we can discover the suitability and complementarity of these two approaches. This is the task of the receptiveresponsive theory of spirituality. The philosophical part of the book will be concerned with metaphysics. This first section involves finding the objective explanation of spirituality as human reason’s act of self-transcendence, the goal being to recognize the human being as a spiritual and bodily compositum. This leads into the second, theological part of the book through the theme of “receptive-responsive spirituality.” The term “receptive” comes from the Latin recipere, receptio, and may refer to spirituality in that, figuratively speaking, the basis for the disclosure of spirituality in the human person is “the earth ready to accept the seed,” the created human nature. The idea of reception is also connected with conception (conceptio), the beginning of life. Receptivity expresses readiness,27 the ability to receive something from the outside, something that, in this case, does not come from human nature itself – but does not however imply complete passivity. Describing spirituality from the receptive side, we understand the human person to be an entity capable of receiving the grace of God, or more philosophically, someone capable of discovering in themselves and in the world the presence of the Other, of Transcendence. According to the famous expression of Saint Augustine we always desire something more and our heart remains restless until it rests in God. Here lies the innate human tendency or ability to lead a spiritual life, to encounter sacrum. It is an openness to God, the human being as capax Dei. In turn, in reference to spirituality, the term “responsive” (from the Latin respondere, responsum) is taken to mean acts initiated in response 26  W. Granat, Osoba ludzka. Próba definicji, Lublin: TN KUL, 2006, 280. Spirituality pertains here indirectly also to the affectivity and sense experience of the human being. 27  This dimension Professor Marek Chmielewski suggests calling “antropogenical spirituality”: “Personalistyczno-chrystologiczna terminologia duchowościowa w nauczaniu papieskim,” Duchowość w Polsce 15 (2013), 19-36.



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to our own nature, and later in response to grace (reception). It means getting to know our own essence, and then accepting grace as a call to make choices that lead to self-transcendence – transcending our limitations, and weaknesses. The fruit of this process is the development of cardinal virtues and ultimately may lead to the intentional sacrifice of one’s life (oblatio). Only the existence of both elements of spirituality in the life of a human being – the reception of God’s grace and our response to it – results in true sanctification, i.e. deification (theosis). The concept of “responsoriality” (i.e. responsorial psalm) expresses the dialogical dimension of spiritual life, that is, its dynamic relationship with God, which contains alternately elements of reception, receiving grace or the Word of God, and those of response, the relevant human reciprocation. In the receptive-responsive theory of spirituality, we first look for a more fundamental anthropological (philosophical and theological) basis of spirituality, which is a prerequisite for dialogical dynamics. Thus, we would like to arrive at an adequate description of the foundations of spiritual experience, on both natural and supernatural levels. As an experiential axis of human spirituality, the receptive-responsive process is extremely dynamic, at times continuous, at others, discontinuous. That is the way spiritual development takes place in a particular human being, that is, through the process of spiritual flourishing. One must note, however, that the initial reception and response are essential. This is a moral choice of a fundamental nature. Receptivity is a special potentiality, created and used by God to initiate a deep and mysterious relationship with us. It is upon this relationship that faith will be based. Receptivity is therefore the basis for recognizing the mysterious presence of God in each human’s life. This presence is a mystery, since the discovery of the Other, the Creator, the Transcendent, is not an easy process. It is at the very least ambiguous. Frankl aptly described this ambiguity by saying that the arguments and counterarguments for believing are perfectly balanced, but the one who chooses between believing or not throws on the scales the weight of their own existence. That decision does not depend on knowledge, but on faith, and faith is not thinking minus the reality of the thing conceived, but thinking multiplied by the existence of the thinker.28 Frankl describes this situation from an existential point of view where faith is often asked to intervene. Nowadays, many scientists maintain  V. E. Frankl, Homo patiens, trans. R. Czarnecki, J. Morawski, Warszawa: PAX, 1976, 225. 28

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INTRODUCTION

that observing the created world gradually enables us to come to know its Maker. Despite our knowledge of the world, we are always free to choose or reject God. Freedom is a condition sine qua non for the existence of both dimensions of human spirituality: in its receptive aspect, that is, in the acceptance of God’s action, and above all in its responsive dimension, that is, in the active human response. Keeping in mind the theory as well as experience, we can separate the two basic elements of spiritual flourishing: the receptive and responsive. What the human being receives as an existential gift remains unfinished as an open task of internal development sustained by the effect of God’s grace. Receptivity is based precisely on that process. A human person is open to God, even hungry for Him as the Supreme Good and Ultimate Truth, and experiences this yearning more or less consciously. Receptivity points to an unfinished dimension of the human being, which naturally leads us to accept the gift of grace, and then to respond to it. The dangers of epistemic distortions (difficulties in getting to know the truth) and distortions in the moral sphere (a sensation of being lost) indicate the need for in-depth analysis of the anthropological foundation of spirituality, both in its receptive and responsive dimensions. These analyses are intended to show the adequate anthropological foundations of spiritual flourishing, that is, to answer the question of who the human being is and who they are to become from the perspective of spiritual flourishing. This is a task of great importance and today we are fortunate to observe a genuine upsurge of interest in spiritual phenomena. The author was led to develop a receptive-responsive theory of spirituality over many years of interdisciplinary research on the human being that started from personalistic metaphysics, continued in the fields of both humanistic and existential psychology, then in neurotheology,29 and finally found its culmination in spiritual anthropology, theology, and spirituality. This personal itinerary turned into a research method, which is presented in this study, where theology appears as the arrival point of scientific research. The author’s earlier studies included in this book were properly reworked and expanded. They are clearly indicated in the text.30 Many themes are revisited between chapters partly due to the fact that they were 29  A. Jastrzębski, “Neuroteologia czy neuromitologia? O próbach neurobiologicznego badania modlitwy,” Duchowość w Polsce 15 (2013), 235-244. 30  I have presented an outline of research issues and the related research program to the community of the theologians of spirituality in Poland: A. Jastrzębski, “Receptywno-responsywne ujęcie duchowości. Zarys problematyki,” Duchowość w Polsce 16 (2014), 167-178.



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originally published independently, but also because similar issues are analyzed through different fields of study: psychology, philosophy, and, finally, theology. Some of the conclusions run parallel, though developed through these different perspectives; this is why they are discussed first under the heading of “nature” and subsequently “grace.”

Chapter 1

An adequate anthropology At its core, the receptive-responsive theory of spirituality represents our spiritual existence, and its flourishing. The point of the theory is to describe the anthropological foundations of spiritual life. A natural basis of spirituality seems to be independent of the material substrate for human mentality, independent even of consciousness. This is Karol Wojtyła’s concept of spirituality, and also Victor Frankl’s concept of unconscious spirituality. In a similar optic, one can compare this vision of spirituality to Antoni J. Nowak’s concept of genotypic religiosity.1 First and foremost, outside of theology, spirituality is linked in common understanding to the immateriality of the human mind, and by and large to its immortality – its eternal existence. This recognition of an immaterial human mind,2 intellect and will, as well as acts of cognition and love, is the first step in the building of a foundation for the receptive-responsive theory. What is an adequate anthropology? I suggest that it is an anthropology that sees the individual as a person. It reveals fully our complexity and the fascinating ability we have of describing our humanity. Adequate anthropology3 is extracted by John Paul II from three sources: the Bible, theology, and philosophy. Its general perspective consists in the defense of a large and holistic concept of our existence in opposition to all contemporary reductionistic accounts. Sketching an adequate anthropology appears to be at once both a huge challenge and a research program without clear limits. This endeavour is not a new one, however. It is as old as Western civilization if we accept that European culture began in  A. J. Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, Rzeszów: WSI-E 2010, 180.  It was so, for example, in classical Greek philosophy: Špidlik et al., Historia duchowości, 10. 3  The author of the term “adequate anthropology” is St John Paul II. He used it in his catechesis: Mężczyzną i niewiastą stworzył ich, Vatican City: Libreria Editrice ­Vaticana, 1986, 54-55. An adequate anthropology interprets our existence in essentially human, rather than reductionist, terms. In the following sections, I will work extensively to develop this approach. 1

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ancient Greece. At Delphi, the visitors to the temple of Apollo were told: “know thyself!” (gnothi seauton) – the Socratic maxim. Without doubt, modern times have seen huge developments in the sciences of human nature. Within the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences, new disciplines have emerged, bringing abundant discoveries to bear on the study of human nature. Each having specific goals and methodologies, they complement each other in the understanding of their ultimate object. Every individual is unique, and can be studied by different sciences: biology, medicine, physics, natural anthropology, ethnology, sociology, psychology, etc. Philosophical anthropology aims at studying the human being as a specific type of being, considering the global configuration and the totality of our very personhood. This leads it to describe the essential traits that constitute the uniqueness of our existence. Developing an adequate anthropology will enable us to discover the very truth about ourselves. While considering the results of scientific research, it never loses sight of revelation. It is through revelation that the Creator of our being gives us the best insights into ourselves. Experts in contemporary physics and chemistry have received much praise due to their competent work and above all for their efficiency in mastering nature. Their coming to represent the pinnacle of knowledge, and their challenge to established authority, are tied up in a rather complex way with the perennial temptations of the philosophical lecturer or the priest in dealing with the question of human nature. Yet, there is, in the natural sciences, little room for those everlasting queries. Philosophers and theologians, who for centuries have reflected on the meaning of life and the destiny of the human being, have been relegated to the margins of science and replaced by scientists trying to extend the authority of natural and experimental science into the humanities and even into theology. Questions regarding the meaning of life can and should remain outside the fields of physics and chemistry. These questions are perhaps more suited to biology, which has some interest in the beginning and development of life as well as its definition. However, every science of human life will have something to say implicitly – and sometimes explicitly – about the origin and meaning of human life. The thoughtless acceptance of the view that it is a product of entropy begs the question in favour of an ontological concept that really needs to be justified. You could raise similar concerns about the thesis that human beings are either the products of inner impulses or of the external



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environment, or again, the thesis that consciousness is only a function of the nervous system. The human being transcends its own nature, since it is a being in constant search of values and meaning, a dialogical being, always placing itself in relation to Someone (to some ultimate reality). The human being is a personal being, a bio-psycho-spiritual entity.4 As we discuss the natural basis of spirituality and the anthropology that can accurately describe our situation, we have to keep in mind the subject’s experience as one who genuinely feels disposed to develop a spiritual life, one who is capable of entering into a relationship with Abba, God the Father, and of spiritual flourishing.5 An adequate anthropology in its theological dimension must consider the Incarnation. It must relate us to the Incarnate Word, to Jesus Christ, who has shown us what it means to be a perfect human being.6 It must grasp the importance of every human being, in a dynamic way. The question of the meaning of our existence is simultaneously one of its development and history.7 A major aim of both philosophical and theological anthropology must be to seize the essence of humanity. However, theological anthropology always keeps in view the divine act of creation, while some philosophical anthropologies do not.8 In a neo-Platonic perspective, the main goal of our lives is to return to God, to be united with God. Every act of spiritual purification can foster this process, by leading the soul to become a “god,” i.e. to recover its pure identity. The Platonic viewpoint conflicts in many ways with Christian anthropology, which insists on God’s transcendence and personality. In Plato’s perspective, God is not a person, and even the personhood of our own self is always provisory. The appearance of humanity in the world is ever-changing. In the Bible, God is quite content to have created us, whereas Platonic authors see our coming to be on earth as both our fall and punishment. Also, matter, in the Platonic perspective, has no independent existence. It is only a manifestation of the 4  K. Popielski, “Logoteoria i logoterapia w kontekście psychologii współczesnej,” in K. Popielski (ed.), Człowiek – pytanie otwarte. Studia z logoteorii i logoterapii, Lublin: RW KUL, 1987, 29. 5  If the process of spiritual ontogenesis is grasped as one of assimilation to Christ, we can also talk about “christoformization” (A. J. Nowak). 6  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 50. 7  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 51. 8  M. Grabowski, Historia upadku, ku antropologii adekwatnej, Kraków: WAM, 2006, 16.

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emanative process.9 The link between essence and matter is perceived negatively. In the Christian perspective, God is a person and the human being is another person progressing toward God. We never lose ourselves in God, never have to abandon our distinctiveness. Uniting with God does not mean that God absorbs us; rather, God is respectful of our human development, including the materiality that affects every aspect of our personal existence – since God is the creator of everything that exists. Another difference concerns the image of God within the human being. For Platonic thinkers, our existence is a microcosm, a mirror of the whole world, in which divine and human elements are interwoven. The image of God within the human being is located in the soul, in the mind (nous). It is the divine spark. The journey of spiritual purification leads this spark to reflect on its source. Another difference between ­Platonism and Christianity lies in the way God can be encountered. For the ancient Greeks, the encounter with God has to be accomplished through a process of becoming like God, whereas the Bible teaches that God will reveal Himself to us mainly through acts of love. In Platonism, we come to know God through the endeavour of better self-­understanding, but in Christianity, God communicates Himself to us.10 Wojtyła offers an excellent synthetic view of the task of an adequate anthropology: But certain questions always remain: Are these two types of understanding the human being – the cosmological and the personalist – ultimately mutually exclusive? Where, if at all, do reduction and the disclosure of the irreducible in the human being converge? How is the philosophy of the subject to disclose the objectivity of the human being in the personal subjectivity of this being? These seem to be the questions that today determine the perspective for thinking about the human being, the perspective for contemporary anthropology and ethics. They are essential and burning questions. Anthoropology and ethics must be pursued within this challenging but promising perspective.11

9  Aquinas taught that the creation of the world from nothing depends on the ‘emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God’ (The Collected Works of St. Thomas Aquinas. Electronic Edition. Summa Theologiae, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Charlottesville: InteLex Corporation, 1993, I, q. 45, a. 1), and ‘from which emanation matter itself is not excluded’ (I, q. 44ad 1). 10  L. Bouyer, Introduction to Spirituality, trans. M. P. Ryan, New York: Desclee Company, 1961, 144-148. 11  K. Wojtyła, Person and Community. Selected Essays, trans. T. Sandok, New York: Peter Lang, 1993, 216; M. Chmielewski, “Ciało a duchowość. Zarys problematyki,” Ethos 4 (2008), 47-57.



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Holistic anthropology Today, in a period often depicted as postmodern, anthropology in itself has not received serious reflection. We use an abundance of surveys of diverse types to study the human condition. This research takes place in several different disciplines such as psychology, history, neurology, philosophy of mind, to name but a few, but neglects the integral human being. Each of these scientific disciplines comes with a specific, yet reductionist, concept of the human being. For centuries, in the humanities and social sciences, we have had reductionist concepts of ourselves and the evolutionary view of morality. This is not useful, as evolution leaves no room for stable, ultimate values: they become no more than by-products of the struggle to survive. None of these disciplines – whether biology, sociology, or psychology – can be the source of a proper philosophy of life, because they do not address the ontology of human life and are marred by the scientific bias of historical or psychological methods.12 Emerging from this scientific ideology is a new and secularized anthropology that dismisses our communal nature. It conceives of us as the products of various processes including socialization, evolution, technology, or “personal” choices.13 Unfortunately, this anthropology is taken to supply the basis for informing politics and education. It is more correct to say that humanity is the imago Dei, a spiritual being, who cannot be reduced to an animal, even the most developed one. A negative anthropology leads to Marxism and nihilism14 which reduce us to a series of accidental causes. Negativity here lies in the reductionism of human existence to the processes of nature, and the failure to define what should be seen as right and what should be considered wrong. We need an appropriate anthropology to secure our rightful, transcendental dignity. The current stage in history should ignite reflections on how to correct this incoherent vision of our lives. The evolutionary concept of human life contains the same flaws that plague the theory of evolution itself. Even though human nature is dynamic and changing, it has little in common with evolution. Its dynamism is more the result of freedom than naturalistic determinism.15 The paleontologist, Niles Eldredge, recognizes that we have neither an 12  N. Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, London: Geoffrey Bles-The Centenary Press, 1945, 20-21. 13  V. Possenti, L’Ouomo postmoderno, Genova-Milano: Marietii, 2009, 109. 14  R. Buttiglione, “Towards an Adequate Anthropology,” Ethos 2 (1996), 237-246. 15  Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 52.

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a­ rgument for the theory of evolution nor a clear view of the origin of life from the standpoint of the natural sciences.16 From the perspective of psychology, the human being remains a very small fragment of the world. This type of thinking is “anthropological transcendentalism” (if not subjective idealism). It studies the transcendental human being, a philosophical construct. The real, living human being cannot be manipulated artificially for the sake of science – as proposed by Edmund Husserl with his phenomenological method. Every attempt to objectify our nature blocks any adequate contact with ourselves, because it is only through contact and communion that one can really see and understand a person.17 Take psychotherapy, for example. It is always built on a specific worldview which provides a better or worse picture of our existence and personality. We have an empty, meaningless vision of ourselves in this scientific realm dominated by the Machine Model or the Rat Model (Allport).18 The human being is neither solely the transcendental self nor reducible to a succession of mental events. Epistemology establishes our status as mere objects of knowledge and leaves the rest to psychology or sociology. Yet we can only know ourselves from the point of view of ontology and spirituality. Otherwise, if perceived exclusively from the standpoint of psychology or sociology, we become incomprehensible to ourselves.19 According to Emmanuel Mounier, the human being is equally a spiritual and a material entity. By this, he means that we’re neither simply a body (materialism) nor simply a soul (angelism). Life, as we experience it, brings us to recognize these separate dimensions of our existence.20 We can say in more philosophical terms that, even though our spiritual life is always associated with corporeal reality, both cognition and love are expressions of the soul. The spiritual life is the essence of our existence, as a “borderline case” (or a “liminal case”), as an entity full of tension between the limitations of matter and the freedom of the soul. This tension incites us to transcend ourselves and to journey towards the  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 49-50.  Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 8-9. 18  Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 15-16. 19  Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 10. 20  E. Mounier, Manifesto al servizio del personalismo comunitario, Cassano: Ecumenica Editrice, 1975, 65-66. 16 17



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wholeness of our being. We are conscious of being a part of this world, as well as different from it. Through intellectual knowledge and love, we clearly transcend the natural world.21 Without this ability, we risk reducing ourselves to mere minds without love, because intellectual knowledge brings the possibility of treating ourselves as objects or even as inferior animals. The spiritual soul constitutes the human person. That is why we cannot fully explain spirituality within the categories of biology or psychology alone. As spiritual beings, we express ourselves through our personalities and spiritual deeds. Our ultimate fulfillment is Jesus Christ – that is, in truth, goodness, happiness, freedom, and love.22 Thus, Hans Urs von Balthasar proposes that, to understand human existence, it is necessary to consider the meaning of life. Yet, it is possible to see our role in the cosmos as one of fundamental questioning, and, on this basis, develop an anthropology with little concern for the ultimate meaning of life as such, but rather for the questioning being itself. This being is capable of questioning its very existence, here and now, and as a result, of questioning existence in general. But it is only after establishing such questioning that the shift from natural anthropology to philosophy may occur. Many forms of psychoanalysis (Freud, Jung, Adler) have remained branches of the same introspective psychological tradition that tried to reduce the question of meaning to a more psychological one. By no means, however, has it considered the meaning of existence. In this it differs from Frankl’s logotherapy in which the recovery of the person depends on this type of questioning.23 We will return to these reflections later in this work. We will see that it is impossible to separate concerns of existence and knowledge. From God’s perspective they are one and the same. In the divine science, everything is spiritual. Everywhere there is the presence of the creative power of the Creator; and this leaves no possibility of separating nature from grace. The whole of creation is pervaded by God’s sanctifying presence – in the theological tradition, a creatio continua. It is only on the human side that a logical, or formal, distinction can be drawn between the order of being and the order of knowledge.  Z. Zdybicka, Człowiek i religia, Lublin: TN KUL, 1993, 164-165.  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 241. 23  H. U. von Balthasar, Epilogue, trans. E. T. Oakes, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004, 20-21. 21

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Metaphysical anthropology The human sciences have become highly specialized. The proof of this is the number of subdisciplines concentrating on various aspects of our nature. When it proves impossible to grasp some specific aspect – for instance the occurrence of self-consciousness – a dangerous pattern emerges of acknowledging or denying our “personhood” altogether. A distinctive dimension of metaphysical anthropology consists in this: the human condition is not considered from a specialized point of view. Philosophical anthropology nonetheless needs something definitive and concrete as a starting point. A key principle here is one taken from general metaphysics which opposes the authenticity of vague or contradictory statements in reference to our nature. To achieve a clear understanding, one first needs to get to know and describe the reality of the human being correctly, as someone’s reality (revealed phenomenologically). Although we cannot ignore the data gathered by the natural sciences, it must be recognized that they often trade in ad hoc hypotheses, selected facts, mathematical models, or just plain idealizations that only approximate to reality. Also, the sciences today rest mainly on quantitative and measurable aspects of things. Since such theories are generally erected on the principle of prima facie inference, they need to be received with great care. Philosophical anthropology is a distinct science that aims at remaining in the realm of solid conclusions, and has developed its own conceptual apparatus and methodology. We do not have scientific knowledge of the self. We can only have such knowledge indirectly, through our actions. Only when we discover that many of our actions have an immaterial source, do we further see this dimension of the self. In this instance, we can only “feel” it; this approach to the discovery of the self is through the “intuition of being.”24 According to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, there is no way for us to get to know someone directly, and completely. Even when we become aquainted with someone, we see only their generic characteristics. Only God has an immediate integral knowledge of our nature (as he knows all dimensions of our being). The Christian tradition distinguishes between the partial knowledge we have on earth (“as if in a glass darkly,”  J. Maritain, A Maritain Reader; Selected Writings. Edited with an Introduction by Donald and Idella Gallagher, Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1966, 78-90. 24



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1 Cor 13:12) and the more complete one we will have after death. The substantial form that connects all of us is the same for every human being; what distinguishes us one from another is the matter that this form comes to and moulds – but above all this distinguishing factor is the singular act of existence. The anthropology of the encounter To get to know another human being, one needs to possess a capacity for sympathy that is just the reverse of the trend towards objectivization in contemporary science. Sympathy implies the acceptance of the other who always transmits some message.25 Along with a multifaceted point of view, sympathy is another characteristic of adequate anthropology. The sympathetic discovery of another person occurs only in a relationship, as the discovery of another “Thou.” We meet the self as a living person in authentic encounter with a “Thou.”26 According to ­Martin Buber, a major flaw of contemporary anthropology lies in the exacerbation of individuality. As a result, we’ve lost sight of the complete picture of selves. Buber opposes the practice of breaking a person down into parts and investigating the parts separately. This gives us the wrong idea of our nature. Openess to an encounter, to meeting another then, is of the utmost importance. The human being is not exclusively a self nor do we possess a self, but, as subjects of experience, we escape all forms of objectification. The self exists in relation to other selves and to objects – the first type of relationship implies openness to another’s existence while the second is closed to another self. Since we’re always moving between these two types of relationship, with persons and with objects, we are continually in statu fieri. But those who respond to the meaning and life of the world take responsibility both for the world and for themselves. They reject the temptation of indifference, to reify the other. Indifference comes with being “outside” of the other’s life without any commitment to the fate of the other. A person cannot be solely in a relationship with objects (I-it). Being caught up in the order of objects makes it impossible to  M. Buber, I and Thou, trans. W. A. Kaufmann, New York: Scribner, 1970.  M. Buber, Eclipse of God: Studies in the Relation Between Religion and Philosophy, Atlantic Highlands, NY: Humanity Books, 1988, 44-45. 25

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become truly human. Full human development is only possible with the courage to reach out to another self, the courage of encounter. Among the most important problems of our contemporary world, however, is alienation, the inability to connect with others. Throughout our lives we define ourselves by the way we enter into dialog with other similar people, the created world, and providence. Often, dialog with others or with the world gives us no accessible and precise definition of ourselves and we are left with fragments. Indeed, if I can try to say what is harmful for the human person, it must be what prevents us from encountering another person in an authentic relationship. An authentic relationship between people depends on their viewing each other as having the same, ultimate value. To develop a good understanding of ourselves, we have to consider the categories of dialog, the I-Thou relationship. Properly understood dialogism (not solipsism) leads to the act of self-transcendence that takes us beyond ourselves. And for this, I and Thou must both be unique. Genuine encounter is not the meeting of two identical monads, but a sharing of sense and meaning. This means a sincere reciprocal attention, transcending people’s “ontological deafness” – their inability to listen to one another.27 The full discovery of our identity takes place through contacts with other persons. In more concrete terms, it starts with the encounter of another person and with the acknowledgement of this person as a gift. This is the real basis of individual freedom. The encounter with God as a person is of crucial importance. Entering into a profound relationship with God often leads to a transformation of one’s life, and to an experience of infinite love. In fact, the most profound experience a person can have occurs in and through love, because it is the only way to encounter another Thou. Buber says that someone is a person only because surrounded by others similar to themselves.28 The existentialist psychologist van Kaam would say that “every encounter, makes the other be in some way. The way in which I make the other be is very much determined by the kind of encounter we have.”29  Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 8‑9.  M. Buber, The Writings of Martin Buber. Selected, edited, and translated by Will Herberg, New York: Meridian, 1956, 63-88; M. Theunissen, Personalismus, in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Band 7, Basel: Schwabe, 1989, 339 29  A. Van Kaam, The Art of Existential Counseling, Wilkes-Barre, PA: Dimension Books, 1966, 46. 27 28



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Van Kaam goes further:

It is totally impossible for me to think about any mode of being in which I am perfectly alone. All my modes of being in the world are influenced by the existence of others. Others make me be, and I make others be. The reality which I am is not an isolated reality independent of others. I can only understand myself as born from the other, or as nourished and educated by the other, as speaking the language the other speaks, as wearing clothing that is created by others, or as having customs generated by many others before me.30

The point for van Kaam is that each of us must stay in open dialog with reality. This dialog would mean being open to the world as it reveals itself in our daily circumstances. Otherwise, the lack of such dialog would close us off from reality – a rejection of its voice, which is ultimately the voice of truth.31 Similarly, Rollo May insists on the need for dialogism in human existence, saying that the authentic encounter with another person always drastically reorganizes the world of our relationships as well as our comfortable, quiet lives, and leads to the issue of our openness and readiness for change.32 Paul Tillich adds that being a person means questioning our own existence and living according to the answers we give.33 To summarise, let us turn to Wilfrid Stinissen who postulates that we discover ourselves only when we can see ourselves in the loving eyes of another person. It is very difficult to get to know ourselves while living alone.34 Personalist anthropology The human person and God reveal themselves as beings of totally different natures. It is not easy to overcome such a huge difference; to establish a relationship with God is a great challenge. Such a relationship is possible, however, since we are both persons. The belief in our personhood  Van Kaam, The Art of Existential Counseling, 48.  Van Kaam, The Art of Existential Counseling, 73. 32  R. May, “The Emergence of Existential Psychology,” in R. May (ed.), Existential Psychology, New York: Random House, 1961, 11-51. 33  P. Tillich, Pytanie o Nieuwarunkowane, trans. J. Zychowicz, Kraków: Znak, 1994, 81. [Die Frage nach dem unbedingten Schriften zur Religionsphilosophie, Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1964]. 34  W. Stinissen, Człowiek prawdziwy, trans. J. Iwaszkiewicz, Poznań: W drodze, 2013, 80. 30 31

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is the key to spirituality, since it upholds our immateriality. O ­ therwise, it would be difficult to explain the undeniable quest for God and eternal happiness in His presence.35 The concept of a person has gone through several developments in the history of thought. In the classical tradition, a person is considered to be a substance. This is Boethius’s understanding of a person as “an individual substance of a rational nature.” In modernity, John Locke brought forward the notion that social existence and consciousness are the most salient properties of a person. In this book, we will rely mainly on the classical understanding of Boethius. The appeal of personalism has always been its opposition to the treatment of people as obscure elements of the greater world, to be manipulated unquestioningly. The dominant techno-pragmatic culture of our time, with its undisputed accomplishments, seems set to remain the highest authority on the nature of ourselves and our aspirations as persons. But we want to be considered unique and valuable, and not simply elements of a large, complex social machine. 36 In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries this has supported a terrible phenomenon that has cost many people their lives: the cult of personality. Using the most recent results of social psychology and the massive leverage available to some political systems, dictators have subjugated peoples and turned them against each other, to the detriment of human dignity. Another type of threat to humanity, today, is the new and globalized society that has stripped people of their will, largely by their own consent. They have become involved with pleasure and competition in a variety of ways established by social convention or current fashion. Personalism should be seen as an antidote offered to the contemporary world, to help us preserve our uniqueness, dignity, and autonomy. To a large extent, contemporary humanity is frustrated, turned inwards, left alone and deprived of subjectivity. Modern psychology doesn’t help us to haul ourselves out of this confined world or give us spiritual maturity. The litmus test for such maturity is the capacity to engage in a deep and nurturing relationship with another person. The lack of spiritual maturity can be masked by activities that limit us to the world of things, and when they vanish we are faced again with our loneliness.  Wojcieszek, Na początku była rozpacz, 93, 95.  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 45.

35

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Ultimately, theological personalism reveals our true personal nature, that of others, and of God. It unites these three into one indissoluable whole. For God is not only the creator of the world, and of ourselves, but also a loving friend. Another development has been an existentialist personalism that focuses on self-actualization. It agrees with the definition of a person offered by Boethius. However, it fails to underline the communion expressed most fully in love. First initiated by existentialist philosophers, and further developed by psychologists, it reflects on liberty and personal responsibility in regard to one’s major choices, and the importance of becoming truly human. The encounter with another is often seen by existentialist thinkers more as a threat than an opportunity. While communitarian personalism also insists on the importance of individual freedom, it understands the need to connect with and take responsibility for another Thou. Without love, freedom can be destructive. Many types of personalism have developed along with the world and its history, but first and foremost, in oppositon to the nature and the role of the human body. They represent the temptation to escape into “spiritualism,” an overestimation of human spirituality. It is easy to illustrate and defend a privileged position for the human mind, flowing from the dignity humanity has, in comparison with the entire world of nature. These types of personalism see our carnality with suspicion, viewing it as being in conflict with true spiritual existence. A more adequate concept of our existence is twofold: carnal and spiritual. It has to be the entire human being who loves and not simply the pure spirit. Though the human body can become the anchoring point for a materialist theory, it is nonetheless an element in the structure of the whole human being. The absolutization of the body is dangerous, but so too is the absolutization of the spirit. The body receives indirectly its personal dignity, being instrumental to interpersonal relationships, and consequently the community. The body enables the soul to express love in the full sense of its emotional energy; however, the body needs to be educated in a specific way.37 Contemporary personalism has been under constant threat from instrumentalism – be it social or scientific – in the undisguised tendency to control reality with more and more inventions and increasingly efficient tools.38 37  B. Häring, Personalismo in teologia e filosofia, Edizioni Pauline, 1979, 41-42; A. Jastrzębski, “(Nie)obecność ciała w wybranych koncepcjach psychologicznych i filozoficznych,” in E. Starzyńska-Kościuszko, A. Kucner (eds.), Człowiek – Medycyna – Wartości, Olsztyn: Instytut Filozofii UWM, 2014, 195-210. 38  Häring, Personalismo in teologia e filosofia, 11.

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Multidimensional anthropology We propose to acknowledge Victor Frankl’s concept of multidimensionality as an important characteristic of an adequate anthropology. Frankl considered that only philosophy has the capacity to provide a complete account of human existence.39 The natural sciences offer only very specific and narrow accounts doomed to failure. Even though they pretend to produce a full vision of our existence, their outcome invariably leads to reductive accounts – an organism, a mechanism, or a process of socialization. Frankl is emphatic on this common tendency in the sciences, while acknowledging their contribution to knowledge. Frankl has conducted a quite interesting philosophical analysis of human existence that has greatly surpassed the other accomplishments of psychology. It is sometimes called “metaclinical analysis.” His philosophy offers a more comprehensive account of our existence than psychology. Philosophy can help psychology in the task of establishing and improving standards for the study of human nature. To better present his concept of the human person, Frankl sets out the two laws of what he called “dimensional ontology.”40 He explains the first law of dimensional ontology as follows: when we project from a cylinder onto two flat planes facing the top and the side, we get a twodimensional circle on one of these planes and a rectangle on the other. This enables us to understand the highly specialized nature of contemporary science. We have two distinct pictures, yet both are true. To integrate these two aspects into a more adequate concept of human existence we need to climb over them and reach a higher level and see everything in a much larger perspective, as we do in philosophy. Consistent with the second law of dimensional ontology, three different solid figures look alike when projected from the base onto a single two-dimensional plane: a cylinder, a cone, and a ball all appear as a two-dimensional circle. In this way Frankl explains the incapacity of the sciences within the scope of their own standards and practices to consider all aspects of our existence. As an example, Frankl looks at religion: on a psychological plane, it is reduced to a psychic phenomenon. The fragmentary concepts of human existence – such as behaviourism, psychoanalysis, or Pavlovian conditioning – represent lower levels 39  Of course, even an even fuller picture of the human condition gives us theology. Therefore, every time Frankl talks about philosophy, you have to keep this in mind. 40  Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 23.



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of description. They do not stand in opposition to the holistic concept, as they cannot provide an account of the wholeness of human existence. Only a three-dimensional concept provides a complete picture.41 The significance of the second law of dimensional ontology can be illustrated with the example of neurosis. According to Frankl, this pathology can have several sources, several etiologies. There are, for instance, psychogenic neurosis, somatogenic neurosis, and noogenic neurosis (i.e. in Frankl’s approach, we discover a spiritual neurosis of life’s meaning). The latter Frankl relates to spiritual problems, moral conflicts, and problems concerning the meaning of life expressed through the need to overcome existential emptiness.42 Opting for a two-dimensional or a uni-dimensional approach to suffering impacts negatively on our dignity as human beings. The mechanical model of human existence treats us as objects to be fixed, and not as a self-conscious subject of experience.43 The significance of the second law of dimensional ontology can be illustrated with reference to Joan of Arc. Keeping in mind the voices she heard and the frequent hallucinations she had, it would be possible to diagnose the saint as a clear case of schizophrenia. Only from a threedimensional perspective, can we see her real meaning in history and theology. In this perspective, Joan of Arc appears with a much larger stature than that of a schizophrenic.44 A higher level of description obviously allows a better view of reality because it contains in itself the lower levels. We obtain a better account of the lower level from the higher one (in which the former remains somewhat hidden). From this standpoint, we can say that biology is better explained by psychology, psychology by noology, and noology by theology.45 Theological anthropology The Christian theological conception of human existence has its source in revelation. Other sciences of humankind lack this advantage, simply because they are developed through the natural capacities of the human  Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 26.  Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 27. 43  Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 28. 44  Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 29. 45  V. E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Ultimate Meaning, New York: Basic Books, 2000, 16.

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intellect.46 As it articulates an answer to the existential questions, the meaning of life, the anthropology of the incarnation surpasses philosophical anthropology. It leads to an understanding of the dignity and value of the human person, grounded in the incarnate Word of God.47 The fathers of the church have not left us with comprehensive teachings in regard to anthropology. Gregory of Nyssa stands alone with his treatise On the Making of Man.48 The most pressing question for the fathers pertained to the relationship of the soul to the body. The carnality of the person has been the object of many reproaches throughout history. Plato understood the body as a prison for the soul. In the Christian tradition, the body was initially created as “good.” But the human being decided to reject God, that rejection being understood as sin, which sometimes is played out as the conflict between the spiritual soul and its psychophysical body. This was never a part of divine intention, though it may be in the plan of God’s providence.49 The true understanding of our existence cannot come from our earthly nature but needs to respect the reality of God’s act of creation. In Christianity, it is crucial to our self-actualization to undergo union with God through love. This union is fulfilled in a supernatural order and is a gift from God. This dimension of spiritual experience infinitely surpasses the realm of nature, even if the latter is presupposed by it. The path to union with God opens itself to us in a mysterious way. This union only happens within a relationship to God, but one that we often misunderstand, see as remote, or ignore altogether. However, this relationship is fundamental to our spiritual development in the receptive-responsive theory of spirituality, which largely makes sense of both philosophical and psychological anthropologies. One cannot fully grasp the essence of our spirituality without its supernatural dimension, i.e. it must be considered in relation to soteriology, the eternal joy of the human person, the personal and intimate encounter with the loving God. This only happens at the level of theological anthropology. Each scientific concept of our existence – the anthropological, sociological, and psychological perspectives – offers its own grain of truth. They tell us that the human being is a rational being, motivated by values; our bodies are condemned to ephemerality, and we suffer from  Wojcieszek, Na początku była rozpacz, 94.  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 240. 48  P. Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, trans. A. P. Gythiel, Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1994, 31. 49  Bouyer, Introduction to Spirituality, 145-146. 46 47



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conflicts between the id, the ego, and the superego. Yet, none of these concepts can grasp the substance of our experience. Christian anthropology, which considers the entirety of our existence – our beginning and our destiny – is the only type of anthropology that adequately understands our existence. The following commitments form the basis of Christian anthropology: – We were created in the image and likeness of God; – God became a man: Jesus, the son of God, appeared before us as a human being; – We have been called to serve and work in cooperation with the Creator; and – The human being is not merely a sinner, not merely a social animal, not merely a locus of interior (unconscious) conflicts but, first and foremost, a creative being.50 The narrative of creation is an anthem to the glory of God, but also to the glory of humanity, since we bear in ourselves the image and likeness of God. The human person is and will remain a mystery, because it has in itself a reflection of God’s mystery. The human being is elevated by God above all of creation, as we are the image of God in the world. In an amazing way, God and the human being illuminate each other, and a humanistic understanding of our existence, lacking this mutual commitment strips us of our greatest profundity. Left alone, we begin to take a negative view of ourselves, for instance, by thinking that we are merely an accident of evolution.51 Yves Congar concludes even more boldly that there could be no philosophical anthropology that is not Christian and mystical, because we have no established nature outside of the image of God, or even of the whole Holy Trinity. This pertains especially to Eastern Christianity.52 Theological anthropology is committed to a conception of the human being as a creative entity, who intrinsically carries the image and likeness of the Creator. This establishes the premise of our individual freedom. It makes us spiritual, capable of rising above nature and of mastering it, even though after the first sin we became divided in ourselves and now desperately desire wholeness.53 Although God is revealed throughout the  Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 53.  Stinissen, Człowiek prawdziwy, 39-40. 52  Y. Congar, “Człowiek i przebóstwienie w teologii prawosławnej,” Znak 20 (1968), 844. 53  Stinissen, Człowiek prawdziwy, 49. 50 51

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entire universe, it is only in our own nature that God is revealed as an image. An intuitive knowledge of our spirituality is essential to our existence, a constitutive element of human nature.54 The science of our nature must involve not only the material but also the religious and moral features of our existence, including our eternal destiny. With the help of revelation, Christian anthropology is more complete than either a naturalistic or humanistic understanding of ourselves.55 To have value and to be blessed, a life must have a meaning. Meaning is not a by-product of natural processes, even those of the highest quality, but something that stands beyond them. We have to acknowledge the difference between a true life and a false and failed one. Life reaches its apogee when it relates to something greater than itself. This implies that life can be interpreted equally in terms of biology or in terms of spirituality. The spiritual elevation to God, to a life with God, constitutes the highest value we can achieve. A spiritual life does not stand in opposition to, nor does it imply the destruction of the intellectual or biological. Rather it brings them to a higher level.56 A Christian anthropology will be an ascending anthropology that starts by reflecting on our existential situation (one of a corrupt nature), the splintering of God’s image. Among others, St. Augustine decided to follow such an existential path. This kind of anthropology begins with the first sin and ends with the final judgement. It may also have its starting point in God and in the incarnate Word as the model of full personhood. This is the path St. Gregory of Nyssa decided to follow.57 Oriental Christianity thus tends to attribute greater value to ontology and the order of grace (the formal cause, the level of being) while Western Christianity insists on the order of action (the efficient cause). The reason is obvious if we look at their respective understandings of grace. In the Western tradition, grace is understood as a new power added to nature as well as a principle for developing new behaviour (Thomas Aquinas’ habitus).58 For oriental Christianity, grace is God’s imprint in us, a more perfect image of God, and a modus of existence.59 In the  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 182.  T. Paszkowska, Psychologia w kierownictwie duchowym, Lublin: KUL, 2014, 95. 56  Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 22. 57  Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 42. 58  J.-P. Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas. Volume 2. Spiritual Master, trans. R. Royal, Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003, 178-183. 59  Congar, “Człowiek i przebóstwienie w teologii prawosławnej,” 858-859. 54 55



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Western tradition we tend to see a moral anthropology (one of psychological, aesthetic, and mystical experience) while in oriental Christianity we tend to see an anthropology that is ontological, religious, and mystical. In the oriental tradition human nature bears the ontological image of God while in the Western tradition, the image of God brings the possibility of ethical action (leading to happiness).60 For oriental Christianity it has a formal causality, while for the Western tradition it possesses an operating causality.61 These assertions will be developed further on in this book. Cataphatic-Apophatic Anthropology Athanasius of Alexandria, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, and other fathers of the church tried to purify the theology of the Hellenistic tradition. They developed a Christian apophaticism that aimed to turn speculative thinking towards the contemplation of the mystery of the Holy Trinity. In apophatic theology, God remains hidden – Deus absconditus.62 As the image of God, the deepest nucleus of our existence, our spiritual existence, likewise remains hidden to us. We could speak, analogously, of homo absconditus or of apophatic anthropology.63 The theory of receptive-responsive spirituality responds to this aporia in our approach to God, which is the consequence of an artificial division of the ontological and epistemological orders. Left to ourselves and being at the same time the inquirer and the object of inquiry, we do not have the necessary distance for scientific objectivity in regard to ourselves. This explains why it is so easy to make serious mistakes concerning the understanding of our existence. Only a superior spiritual being could take a fully objective view of human nature – and here I’m referring specifically to God. A distant echo of the difficulty we have of getting to know our true nature is found in Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy. As we cannot in the same moment know the location and the speed of an electron, so we cannot know at once the pure self (­Husserl) and its content. We are, likewise, an enigma to ourselves, as it is in our nature to be witness both to the whole world and to our  Congar, “Człowiek i przebóstwienie w teologii prawosławnej,” 860.  Congar, “Człowiek i przebóstwienie w teologii prawosławnej,” 864. 62  V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, trans. Fellowship St. Alban and St. Sergius, London: James Clarke, 1957, 50. 63  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 44. 60 61

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r­elationship to it. By itself, our existence is a good illustration of the discontinuities and of the incompleteness of the world of nature where we are directed to a higher reality than ourselves. Since we are thus related to two different orders – the ontological and epistemological – we have the ability to self-transcend, but without theological knowledge, it only makes us a paradoxical entity, full of inner contradictions and of conflicts between several tendencies. The human person can be both compassionate and cruel, clever and stupid, just and greedy, free and unfree. We possess a distorted nature but we have also a memory of our divine origins, because our roots are in God, and we are advancing towards God more or less consciously. As humans, we are not exclusively a by-product of blind natural forces, and we remain part of nature. We are still linked to some biological determinism, despite the fact that we can transform or bypass it. In our actions we become creators, creators of nature, creators of culture and of a new value in the natural world, which is why it is impossible to solve the problem of our nature by relating it solely to the results of natural science, without any relationship to God. We cannot understand ourselves with reference only to something “lower.” The human being is the imago Dei, both as a fallen and as a ransomed creature.64 St. Augustine opposed the attempt to define our nature, because every such attempt is inevitably frought with the risk of reductionism, be it by oversimplification or through the neglect of constitutive elements. We cannot describe our personal nature from the outside with the help of Aristotelian categories. Augustine says that such a procedure leaves no room for mystery; we should turn to God in order to understand our nature “without any eclipse.”65 Gabriel Marcel elaborated on this point as follows: If this is so, it must be seen that the personality cannot in any way be compared to an object of which we can say it is there, in other words that it is given, present before our eyes, that it is part of a collation of things which can, of their essence, be counted, or again, that it is a statistical unit which can be noted in the calculations of a sociologist employing the methods of an engineer. Or again, if we no longer consider things from outside but from within, that is to say from the

 Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 45-46.  St.  Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augustine. Transalted and Annoted by J. G. Pilkington, with Biographical Introduction, New York: Liveright Publishing, 1943, 80-82. 64

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point of view of the person himself, it does not seem that strictly speaking he can say “I am” of himself. He is aware of himself far less as a being than as a desire to rise above everything which he is and is not, above the actuality in which he really feels he is involved and has a part to play, but which does not satisfy him, for it falls short of the aspiration with which he identifies himself.66

For Marcel, as for Augustine, the human being remains a mystery. This does not mean that we cannot know ourselves, but rather that there always looms the possibility of “degrading” the mystery of our existence or of transforming it into a “problem,” a problem to be resolved by our own efforts. Marcel sees this as a fault of contemporary academic mentality.67 With our science we do not create values, but we revive and embody them. Through our subjective experience, we seem to shape ourselves, that is, we seem to establish our personal values, but, from an ontological point of view, they were ours from the very beginning. We can only expand on this knowledge. We are, as I suggested earlier, homo absconditus. Only the discovery of the revealed truth about our nature allows us to live more fully.68 Philosophical anthropology, theological anthropology, and adequate anthropology must limit themselves in regard to the mystery of the human being, mysterium personae. However, theological anthropology illuminates, complements, and accurately identifies the humanist intuitions concerning human nature. We shall see, in the following chapters that every anthropology remains at the threshold of the mystery of spiritual existence. Ignoramus et ignorabimus. This human fallibility indicates that the other can be right, and this leads to humility.69 The cataphatic side of Christian anthropology (the assertive conception) coexists with an apophatic side that admits the mystery.

66  G. Marcel, Homo Viator, trans. E. Craufurd, London: Victor Gollancz, 1951, 25-26. 67  G. Marcel, Being and Having, trans. K. Farrer, London: Collins, 1965, 185-189. 68  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 49. 69  Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 65-66.

Chapter 2

The denial of nature’s receptivity Several different approaches can be taken to the understanding of human nature. In some, our spiritual dimension, our nature’s spiritual ­receptivity is denied. This can be seen for instance in many critical approaches to religion as in Sigmund Freud, Karl Marx, Ludwig Feuerbach, and most materialist thinkers. Sometimes these authors mention our immateriality, but consider the idea to have originated in matter itself, albeit as the highest and most sublime occupation of matter. The denial of spirituality is a characteristic of these approaches, which consequently describe religion in a very critical way. Religion is always related to other vital needs or to some inner comfort. The reality of the objects of religious belief is, in general, not taken into account. The fundamental basis of this approach to spirituality is the reductionist tendency of human understanding. I will illustrate with a few examples. The critique of religion in psychoanalysis Among the most recognized reductionist theories of spiritual experience and religiosity stands Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis. It is the first clear, concrete example of the denial of spirituality in modern science. Freud’s views The classic reference for Freud’s negative view of spirituality is The Future of an Illusion. Freud compares religion to an infantile neurosis that humanity must overcome. Religious doctrines are necessarily connected to the fear of abandonment. The opposition of religion to reason and experience seals its fate. According to Freud it must vanish. Religion is an illusion, a collective delirium developed by humanity to provide a defense against fears and suffering. Humanity’s poor, ignorant, and enslaved ancestors needed it to cope with their despair. We too are children expecting a strong father to defend us, an almighty God. Religious institutions are well organized to appease our existential and moral fears.

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Facing death, it is easier to believe in life after death; and the experience of injustice is lessened by the conviction that the guilty will be accountable to God. For Freud, these are the qualities that have made religion such a huge success.1 During the first century of psychoanalysis, the great majority of analysts discredited or ignored religion.2 Freud‘s attacks on religion revealed its very fragility, and not many believers could defend their beliefs against such a critique. In the Abrahamic religions particularly, you could easily find infantile attitudes towards God. Freud himself was unable to accept that religious attitudes have both infantile and mature modes of expression. He condemned religion saying “our science” for psychoanalysis and “illusion” for religion. He nonetheless thought of subjective experience as susceptible to scientific investigation. Today, that position is challenged by many philosophers (Karl Popper among others).3 After Freud’s death, some psychoanalysts began to look at religion with more openness. For instance, Erik Erikson spoke of his observation that many people were proud to live without religion, whereas their own ­children were unable to do without it.4 Erich Fromm concluded his famous book Fear of Freedom with an invitation to faith, calling it the most powerful manifestation of the human mind. It is faith in life, truth, and freedom that contributes the most to the realization of the human self.5 Donald Winnicott and Wilfred Bion were even more open toward r­ eligion. Post-Freudian approaches to religiosity In 1979, Ana-Maria Rizzuto published a study of factors giving rise to the image of God in human evolution (The Birth of the Living God). In this theory, God is conceived as a “transitional object” (Winnicott), similar to a child’s beloved toy. God is a teddy bear left behind in human life’s corner when other objects take on real meaning. According to ­Rizzuto, the death of a sibling or a similar event can push us to make 1  D. M. Black, “Introduction,” in D. M. Black (ed.), Psychoanalysis and Religion in the 21st Century. Competitors or Collaborators?, The New Library of psychoanalysis, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, 3; S. Freud, Future of an Illusion (1927), The Standard edition, J. Strachey (ed.); idem, Civilization and its Discontents (1930), The Standard edition, J. Strachey (ed.). 2  Black, “Introduction,” 7. 3  Black, “Introduction,” 4-5. 4  E. Erikson, Childhood and Society, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965, 243. 5  E. Fromm, Fear of Freedom, London: Routledge, 1942, 238.



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momentary contact with the abandoned toy until it is no longer needed, in which case it is forgotten again thereafter.6 Shortly after, in 1984, William Meissner published Psychoanalysis and Religious Experience. In this work, he presents a series of periods in human religious development, starting in animism and magical thinking, moving towards intense conflicts of a moral nature, and ending at the stage of wisdom and balance, morality and responsibility. According to Meissner, even though Freud’s concept of religion is correct, it only considers a limited aspect of the human religious experience and thus artificially abstracts from the complex nature of human spirituality. Meissner argued further that faith contains in itself a relationship to transcendental reality that is more than mental, although revealed through the mental, and that it designates something broader than the child’s simple trust.7 Among postmodernists, several attempts have been made to comprehend religious experience. Yet, everyone is thought to be entitled to their own specific narrative. Spiritual matters are, of course, also implicated in this narrative. But the therapist cannot question the validity of someone’s convictions since everyone has the right to their “own truths.” The therapist should only look at the way these beliefs contribute to the integrity of someone’s mental life. From a philosophical point of view, the therapist should take a pragmatic approach to religious experience.8 The therapist is unconcerned with the truth of religious belief. Questions pertaining to the existence of God or life after death have no therapeutic importance. So, as much as Freud openly criticized religion, postmodernist psychotherapy has relativized it.9 Some contemporary psychodynamic schools of psychotherapy, those that have distanced themselves from psychoanalysis, see religion and spiritual experience as a normal, positive, and healthy phenomenon. However, this does not change the fact that psychoanalysis counts as among the most openly atheistic views in psychology. Most analysts are 6  A.-M. Rozzuto, The Birth of the Living God, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, 179. 7  W. Meissner, Psychoanalysis and Religious Experience, New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 1984, 158, 183, 226. 8  Of course, the therapist, with some exceptions, is not a theologian and the role of the therapist is not that of evangelism. This is simply to note that, because of the above characteristics, the postmodern approach to spirituality should not be the ultimate reference point for the Christian believer. 9  J. L. Griffith, M. E. Griffith, Encountering the Sacred in Psychotherapy, New York: The Guilford Press, 2003.

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non-believers. For instance, Otto Fenichel wrote that after significant progress in their analysis, his patients used to experience more freedom from religion. Helene Deutsch had to admit with regret that a religious woman, whose neurosis she successfully cured, could not have undergone a full recovery because she refused to disavow religious authority.10 An ongoing effort is being made within contemporary psychoanalysis and psychology to conduct new assessments of the role of religion in life. This has led to a distinction between mature and immature religion. Theories of psychoanalyis and psychology that focus on self-experience have also tended to judge any religious experience positively. Those founded on the idea of illlusory and transitional objects may still view religion positively, but without focusing on the authenticity of these objects, such as the existence of God. Psychoanalysts have therefore encouraged highly personal, idiosyncratic forms of religion, with no particular link to rites, authority, or institutional structure, and have had a particular disdain toward fundamentalism, dogmatism, and restorationism in religion.11 The objective existence of God was especially problematic for Freud because it stood beyond mental reality. Psychoanalytic theory i­nvestigates a limited domain of reality. Although not, of course, limited to the world of material things, the perspective of psychoanalysis is forced to view the existence of purely mental objects as purely speculative.12 According to Berdyaev, therefore, psychoanalysis cannot pretend to investigate a metaphysical dimension of life. It cannot possess the ultimate truth about the human being, and its practice has proven in many cases to be quite damaging.13 Its therapeutic method insists on the sexual life of the patient instead of pulling him or her away from this thematic. It turns the soul upside down and divides it artificially in order to establish itself as a substitute for confession. For the most part, psychoanalysts do not know anything about the mystery of the forgiveness of sins and healing of the soul. They lecture us on morality and criticise our sins but know nothing of their nature or source. Freud insisted, perhaps too heavily, on our lack 10  R. B. Blass, “Beyond Illusion. Psychoanalysis and the question of religious truth,” in D. M. Black (ed.), Psychoanalysis and Religion in the 21st Century. Competitors or Collaborators?, The New Library of psychoanalysis, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, 26. 11  Blass, “Beyond Illusion,” 28-29. 12  Blass, “Beyond Illusion,” 30, 39. 13  This approach one can also find in the work of Dutch psychiatrist Anna Terruwe: A. A. Terruwe and C. W. Baars, Psychic Wholeness and Healing: Using All the Powers of the Human Psyche, Staten Island, NY: Alba House, 1981.



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of awareness of the unconscious. As human beings it is in our nature to know that we are sinners and that humankind has fallen. We are even more conscious of that when we realize that we have been created by God. The great merit of Freud, however, is in drawing our attention to the negative tendencies of the human mind expressed particularly in our defence mechanisms.14 The issue of reductionism According to the logical empiricists, reduction allows us to deduce the laws of specific theories from other more basic ones, using a nexus of logical relations to link the two levels. Normally, the cornerstone of explanation is at the lower level. A good example of this is the relationship of psychology and neurobiology.15 Today, the attempt to reduce the whole of psychology to neurobiology is thought to be unrealistic. On the contrary, the most fruitful heuristic now appears to be interdisciplinary research. The various disciplines offer different scientific visions and explicative strategies. It is therefore preferable to rely on simultaneous input from these different scientific theories rather than on reduction.16 There is much more to be discovered by the combined laws and mechanisms of sociology, biology, and psychology than by simply reducing each to the lowest levels of scientific explanation.17 A so-called “ruthless” reductionism is, broadly speaking, the endeavour to find the sources of every mental state at the cellular level. It is “mechanistic” in that it respects the systematic nature of organized matter.18 The basic research strategy of ruthless reductionism can be described in terms of two distinct procedural steps: intervention at the level of nerve cells and the observation of behavioural changes following interventions at the molecular level. Everything must be maintained within  Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 74.  R. N. McCauley, “Reduction: Models of Cross-Scientific Relations and Their Implications for the Psychology-Neuroscience Interface,” in P. Thagard (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007, 108-109. 16  McCauley, “Reduction,” 141. 17  McCauley, “Reduction,” 150. 18  W. Bechtel, “Molecules, Systems, and Behaviour: Another View of Memory Consolidation,” in J. Bickle (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 14-15. 14 15

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a controlled experimental framework, and the results obtained will express direct relations between neuronal activities and behaviour.19 Mechanical reductionism works by developing a succession of such connections aimed at identifying the specific components of the overall mechanism. It focuses on the individual’s behavioural patterns, and looks for their localization in the organized body.20 Ontological reductionism, typical in the philosophy of science, holds, for example, that all mental events are epiphenomenal to physical events, which remain the primary source of causality. It asserts, for instance, that neuronal states constitute the primary causes of thinking. Like many versions of reductionism, it is based on the possibility of transferring the terminology developed by one science to another, or of transferring specific laws identified by one discipline to another field of inquiry. This approach has epistemological implications in terms of the more basic theory explaining a wider range of phenomena.21 Functionalism in the philosophy of mind follows this approach. Firstly, it is proposed that the phenomena of mental life need to be reduced to descriptions of functional states of the organized body, which means the formulation of links and relationships in cause-consequence categories. Secondly, the newly formatted functionalist frame of reference must be translated into concrete empirical experiments to be conducted at the lowest level of scientific description. The discovery of causal relationships must then be re-applied to functonalist notions of mental life.22 A supporter of a much stronger form of reductionism, aimed at moving away from the discourse of mentality altogether, Patricia Churchland asserts that neurobiology, in spite of the fact that it has accumulated a huge amount of knowledge on molecular structures and their functioning, is still far from explaining most identified psychological functions; in other words, we still do not possess a solid macro-neurological t­ heory.23 Against these reservations about functionalist reductionism in particular, 19  Bechtel, “Molecules, Systems, and Behaviour,” 19; see also: A. J. Silva, J. Bickle, “The Science of Research and the Search for Molecular Mechanisms of Cognitive Functions,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience, 120. 20  Bechtel, “Molecules, Systems, and Behaviour,” 27. 21  A. Chemero, C. Heyser, “Methodology and Reduction in the Behavioural Neuroscience: Object Exploration as a Case Study,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience, 70. 22  Silva, Bickle, “The Science of Research and the Search for Molecular Mechanisms of Cognitive Functions,” 120. 23  P. S. Churchland, Neurophilosophy, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986, 82; P. S. Churchland, Brain-Wise, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003, 193.



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some have formulated a strong version of the thesis of multiple realization in neurobiology, i.e. MMR (massive multiple realization), which asserts that the same psychic functions are accomplished by various neurobiological replications at various levels.24 Neuroscientific experiments show that many molecular features are determined at the atomic level, that many characteristics of cells are developed at the molecular level, and that the characteristics of tissues are developed at the cellular level. Because many macro-level characteristics can be traced to micro-level features, many argue that the thesis of multiple realization can be brought forth to explain psychological characteristics in functionalist terms.25 The same thesis of multiple realization accounts for the occurrence of individual differences in mental functioning, for instance, on the basis of differences observed in the brain: its weight, its size, its density, its structure. Technological developments in brain-imaging have confirmed the thesis through in vivo surveys.26 Yet, more and more scientists would accept that the mind also exerts a strong influence on the biochemistry of a person. For instance, oncologists will admit that the psychological condition of a patient is a major factor to be considered while diagnosing and treating cancer.27 At the end of the day, reductionism ignores the human dimension of phenomena, rejecting them as epiphenomena and reducing them to the rank of subhuman phenomena. Reductionism may be called “subhumanism.” It paints the picture of all phenomena being reducible to their smallest workings, their atomic features, and ignores what makes us human. Take, for example, love or conscience. These are very human phenomena. They demonstrate the uniqueness of a human being, as well as our capacity to transcend that very being. We can transcend our individual being by directing ourselves toward the uniqueness and irreplaceability of another human person, in love, or through the realm of meaning in conscience, recognizing what is good and what is wrong in particular contexts – the affective and cognitive dimensions of our existence. While our physical being may be rooted in the ways reductionist theses say that they are, we cannot find transcendence, i.e. the human elements of these phenomena, in our atomic make-up.28  K. Aizawa, C. Gillett, “Levels, Individual Variation, and Massive Multiple Realization in Neurobiology,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience, 540. 25  Aizawa, Gillett, “Levels, Individual Variation,” 558. 26  Aizawa, Gillett, “Levels, Individual Variation,” 564-565, 567-569. 27  F. Parot, M. Richelle, Wprowadzenie do psychologii, trans. U. Basałaj, R. Abramciów, Kraków: WAM, 2008, 256. 28  Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 18-19. 24

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These words of Sir John Eccles, a winner of the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine, may serve to summarize our reflections concerning reductionism: I maintain that the human mystery is incredibly demeaned by scientific reductionism, with its claim in promissory materialism to account eventually for all of the spiritual world in terms of patterns of neuronal activity. This belief must be classed as a superstition. […] We have to recognize that we are spiritual beings with souls existing in a spiritual world as well as material beings with bodies and brains existing in a material world.29

Materialist concepts of mind Another example of anthropological reductionism is found in the materialist theories of the mind.30 The endeavor to understand the nature of our minds, i.e. particularly in the field of cognitive science, requires reconciling several layers of knowledge developed by quite different reductive sciences. Creating a hierarchy is a way to address such a proliferation of ideas. This consists in classifying major scientific contributions to the problem of the mind in terms of levels, starting with concepts of mind as a whole and leading down to the analyses of the smaller parcels. Theories describing the functioning of the mind as a whole can be labeled personal-level theories. Those that consider its components could be labelled as subpersonal-level theories. Note that, for now, the specific meaning of the word “person” is not the object of discussion. It will be considered later. We can divide the most general levels of explanation along two planes, horizontal and vertical.31 A horizontal analysis will study the phenomenon of specific and unique mental events as they occur at very precise moments in time. It will look diachronically at several components of this phenomenon. It will not however provide full-fledged explanations (the question: why?) and will limit itself to description (be it neurobiological or phenomenological). Vertical analysis on the other hand will 29  J.  C. Eccles, Evolution of the Brain Creation of the Self, London-New York: ­Routledge, 2005, 241. 30  A. Jastrzębski, “Spór o naturę umysłu ludzkiego,” in A. Maryniarczyk, K. Stępień, A. Gudaniec (eds.), Spór o naturę ludzką, Lublin: PTTA, 2014, 173-190. 31  J. L. Bermúdez, Philosophy of Psychology. A Contemporary Introduction, New York: Routledge, 2009, 32-33.



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attempt to bring in explanations (answer the question: why?), as it will try to make connections between several levels of research.32 At the highest level, we find interpretations of human behaviour using concepts of rationality or morality. This is the type of interpretation used in daily life to anticipate others’ behaviour. It takes the form of lawlike generalizations similar to scientific generalizations (theory-theory). At the lowest level, these patterns of generalization can be realized by an almost infinite number of biological states or physical phenomena.33 How is it possible, then, to link the many different levels of explanation? How can we link “folk concepts” used in the everyday understanding of rationality or morality to cognitive science and neurophysiology? In other words, how can we connect the subpersonal to the personal level? Some materialists support the autonomy of the personal level. At the same time, they also accept the existence of subpersonal levels as a necessary condition of the existence of the personal, but not as a part of the explanation as such. Functionalists see systemic links at the different levels as the basis for their understanding of mental life. Representationalists look at these same concepts from the point of view of the interior language of thought. This is said to be used by the mind to develop the socalled “propositional attitudes.” Finally, neurocomputationalists focus on the absence of any full theoretical connection between the neurophysiological and personal levels. In this last perspective, the understanding of the higher or personal level must be fully disconnected from scientific explanation.34 Some phenomena appear real, however, only at the level of the knowing subject – illusions, hallucinations, or mental completions of incomplete geometrical forms. They have no place in the stronger forms of realism that focus exclusively on the totally independent existence of objects outside of the knowing subject. Historically, attempts to solve this dilemma have included idealism, which associates every form of knowledge with the subject’s mind. The external world is simply another form of thinking activity, another state of mind, subjectively experienced. Dualism, by contrast, affirms the existence of two independent types of reality. A third solution consists in the materialists’ attempts to reduce states of subjectivity to those of the nervous system.35 32  A. Jastrzębski, W obronie integralności człowieka. Próba adekwatnego ujęcia filozofii psychologii, Warszawa: Eneteia, 2011, 127-143. 33  E. R. Valentine, Conceptual Issues in Psychology, London: Routledge, 1992, 119. 34  Bermúdez, Philosophy of Psychology, 36-39. 35  M. Bunge, R. Ardila, Philosophy of Psychology, New York: Springer, 1987, 91-92.

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We can circumscribe the personal level of mind with the following criteria:36 – Accessibility to consciousness – we are dealing with a potentially conscious process.37 – Cognitive penetrability – the capacity of the individual to be influenced by their assertive-judgemental system, bringing about changes in the individual’s propositional attitudes. – Inferential integration – the capacity of the subject to connect different cognitive states into a system or propositional network. The explanation at the personal level, according to its supporters, does not therefore seem to need a link with explanation at lower levels. This is an example of horizontal explanation taking place solely within the margins of one level. Vertical explanation is necessary in this case only in order to justify human behaviour at the highest level (personal, mental). Among the supporters of a distinct analysis at the personal level we find John McDowell. He holds that propositional attitudes require a specific type of explanation that simply considers our relationship to those aspects of rationality that influence our actions. It is a kind of hermeneutics of rational behaviour.38 Those who support the autonomy of the personal level of explanation of human behaviour thus use a set of descriptivenormative categories and focus on the individual’s need to act rationally. To account for personal autonomy, a weakened form of reductionism is espoused by the materialists, asserting that mechanisms belonging to the subpersonal level make human action at the personal level possible, even if they will not necessarily be referred to in the explanation of human behaviour. Two approaches of this type can be distinguished here. The first one will be opposed to any role given to the subpersonal theory in the explanation of human conduct (McDowell, Hornsby, Davidson), whereas the second will consider correlations between mental and neuronal states. Donald Davidson states that human behaviour can be considered rational not because we can provide (sometimes clever) justifications of our actions, which is known in psychology as “rationalization” (a basic defense mechanism), but because our beliefs and desires constitute the  Bermúdez, Philosophy of Psychology, 30-31.  J. Searle, “Consciousness, Inversion, and Cognitive Science,” Behavioural and Brain Sciences 13 (1990), 585-596. 38  J. McDowell, “Functionalism and Anomalous Monism,” in E. Lepore, B. P. McLaughlin (eds.), Action and Events, Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1985, 389. 36 37



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real impulse for our conduct. We can see in it a form of a causal explanation.39 Davidson has called his approach “anomalous monism.” Monism, because it holds that mental events must ultimately be considered physical events; anomalous (unusual), however, because these mental events cannot be cast in the domain of causal regularities in physics. More exactly, they are described with the language of psychology. In a nutshell, we cannot understand the behaviour of an individual without taking into consideration their system of beliefs. This is also the case with their verbal behaviour.40 Davidson’s anomalus monism is a way to justify the autonomy of explanation at the personal level and to maintain the existence of causal and propositional relationships without referring the latter to non-personal levels of explanation. In this way, he approaches a causal effectiveness of human attitudes.41 Another form of support for the autonomy of mind in a materialist philosophy of mind is the counterfactual theory of mental causation. This is an attempt to establish mental causality without reference to physical laws. The key element is that in order to explain a specific behaviour, we need only refer to a combination of mental states. If the precise combination is not present, the behaviour will not occur and, by the same token, but perhaps more decisively, it will occur if the same combination of mental states is present, even though there might be other external conditions. This theory can be called ‘counterfactual’ because it makes a connection between causal links and the validity of conditional sentences of the form: “what would have occurred if the starting conditions had been different.”42 The validity of these sentences is not established within the real world but within possible worlds. The greatest challenge to this theory therefore lies in defining the existential status of these possible worlds. In that regard, some philosophers have displayed a radically realist stance, while others have preferred to insist only on their potentialities. Theories of mind may take several possible forms: spiritual monism, material monism, and dualism. There are two versions of dualism: one being methodological (the weak version) and another being metaphysical (the strong version). 39  D. Davidson, “Actions, Reasons and Causes,” The Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963), 685-700. 40  D. Davidson, “Psychology as Philosophy,” in D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, 230-238. 41  Bermúdez, Philosophy of Psychology, 153. 42  Bermúdez, Philosophy of Psychology, 164.

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Spiritual monism, as represented for example by George Berkeley, holds that material substances have only an appearance within the world of phenomena, and remain strictly a projection of spiritual substances (for instance, persons). In this approach only the spirit would exist, and the brain would barely be a phenomenon of any kind, even though, of course, it is a phenomenon well grounded in the perceptions of singular subjects. Nowadays scientific intuition rejects such a conception because of its great simplification. Research in quantum physics nonetheless shows similarities with spiritual monism although in the language of modern physics, as it talks of waves and energy. We must remember that physics is still struggling with the definition of matter, as biology is with the definition of life, and psychology with the nature of consciousness. Materialist monism, if it even considers the nature of the human mind, is the theory of the identity of mental and neuronal states (­according to Armstrong among others). It appears not to be too popular. Radical materialists hold that we can always somehow account for human m ­ ental states in physical/chemical categories. Materialist monism is established on this principle. The most popular approach among scientists is presently the weak, methodological version of dualism. In general, scientists are forced to admit that, even if not in a metaphysical sense, as Descartes postulated in his substance dualism, at least in the explanation of the nature of the human mind, we are still obliged to use two types of approach: the analysis of language, and the observation of causality. Earlier, we gave specific examples of such reasoning, as well as arguments to support it. Theories granting autonomy to the conscious subject, or better to the person, clearly show that the human being is still an insufficiently understood subject of research that ultimately defies scientific understanding – in particular the materialist reduction to neurobiology. Promissory materialism In the modern world, materialism is among the most widely promoted reductionist concepts. However, it can take many forms. In each of these, we find many postulates not always well established scientifically. Nevertheless, a prevailing view in contemporary science is that a materialistic explanation of the human being will one day be developed. The



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issue primarily concerns the existence of the human mind, above all its spirituality. Materialism and metaphysics It is difficult to accept that the scientific worldview may really be developed independently. Multifarious and distinct representations of the world have always inspired a diversity of metaphysical and theological views. Science today promotes the doctrine of scientific realism – a unified vision of the world existing independently of the observer and any language or interpretation the observer may use, i.e. a picture of the world as existing objectively in itself.43 The choice of a worldview is often the result of temperamental traits, as happens when a number of scientific theories are available to explain the same phenomenon. Although it is widely believed that the ultimate sources of evidence in science are the facts, reality points to materialistically biased scientists accepting an ideology of scientific materialism. Their point of view is defined by the metaphysical principles of objectivity, monism, universalism, reductionism, physicalism, and the principle of a complete, closed system.44 The principle of objectivity means recognizing the independence of scientific observations and paying attention strictly to these phenomena, “uncontaminated by subjectivity.” The principle of a closed system means the sufficiency of one set of reasons to explain all kinds of phenomena. The latter is the principle that particularly guides modern neuroscience, which does not accept the possibility of any non-physical bases for human psychology. However, the use of this principle in psychology distances us from a fuller understanding of mental phenomena. Contemporary philosophers and psychologists take classical materialism as their model for science, based on nineteenth-century physics, namely the laws of mechanics. Meanwhile, modern physics, especially quantum theory, undermines any such model. The image of a machine working on the principle of the precise connection of its parts is no longer suitable for describing most of the processes we find in the universe. Why, then, would this approach be applicable to the description of the human brain or mind? 43  B. A. Wallace, The Taboo of Subjectivity. Toward a New Science of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 19. 44  Wallace, The Taboo of Subjectivity, 21.

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To account for these conflicting views, Daniel Helminiak distinguishes two kinds of epistemology: firstly a sensate-modeled epistemology, and secondly an intelligence-based one. On the basis of this sensate-modeled epistemology, the mind could not be real because it is invisible. By the same token, however, it is instructive to note, the quarks and leptons, the forces and fields, of current physics […] could not be real either because none of them is perceptible. […] In contrast, for an intelligence-based epistemology, the real is what can be reasonably affirmed on the basis of relevant evidence. Not perceptible encounter, but validated insightful understanding determines what is real. […] Quarks and leptons are deemed real, but in no way are they palpable. To posit them is to provide reasonable accounts of the available, relevant data of the senses. Imperceptible in themselves, these physical entities are the conclusions of reasoning; they are meanings that must be affirmed to coherently account for the relevant evidence. Not palpability, then, but meaning reasonably grounded in relevant evidence is the criterion of the real, explicitly so in Lonergan’s theory and implicitly in twentieth-century physics. […] On this basis of a reasonable account for relevant data, both mind and matter are real – although they are different kinds of reality, different kinds of being, different expressions of what can accurately be affirmed to exist. The challenge in understanding human consciousness is that the human being is a remarkable composite of many different kinds of being, but the material body and its physical senses, because they are palpable and develop early, tend to dominate our theories. […] As best I understand them, current studies of consciousness in philosophy, psychology, and computer science aim toward some scientific account; yet the presuppositions of this enterprise run counter to contemporary science in its most successful forms – physics and chemistry.45

Morover, in describing the work of the mind, space has no meaning. Similarly, time must be understood differently. Our minds are not made up of atoms. No organ in the human body (such as heart or lungs) has much to do with consciousness, nor does the diffusion of particles or the metabolism in our bodies – which makes our mental unity all the more remarkable.46 Indeed, the world of material objects has no consciousness of time. They each exist isolated from other objects, which they do not perceive, each being locked in the “here and now.” There is neither past 45  D. A. Helminiak, “Clarifying the Conception of Consciousness: Lonergan, ­ halmers, and Confounded Epistemology,” Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro C Sciences 8 (2015), 61-62. 46  E. Harth, The Creative Loop: How the Brain Makes a Mind, London: Penguin Books, 1995, 7.



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nor future. About the future only a knowing subject can say anything, and only once they have applied the appropriate model (for example, a system of equations).47 Some constants in this universe also seem to be rather arbitrarily adopted, such as the ratio of the mass of the proton to the neutron in the nucleus. If it differed only slightly from the one known to us, our world would look completely different, and if gravity itself were only slightly different, we would not have the planets, nor the stars or even the atoms – nor life itself as we know it. This has led some scientists (such as the astrophysicists John Barrow and Frank Tipler) to claim that the world was created to enable the appearance of human beings.48 Physics, because of its very concrete explanations, has nonetheless become the supreme tribunal of science. What cannot be included in its laws and hypotheses appears devoid of existence in general. But keep in mind the various orders and levels of scientific explanation. If a Beethoven sonata cannot be reduced to elementary physical particles, this doesn’t mean that we deny its existence. The same applies to the Gothic cathedrals, the European economy, and the constitution of the Republic of Poland. These are just realities that we need to look at in a more appropriate perspective. We have to look to a level of organization much higher than that of physics. The laws of physics are no more objective than those of sociology and can be just as true or false. Each of these sciences explores reality at different levels of organization. The point of view of physics has practically no relation to the regularities studied in history or psychology. Is a financial crisis something interesting for physics? The same applies to the physical foundations of consciousness. Is it possible to construct a machine to measure the human mind, or social trends? Ultimately, a program to reduce all of the sciences to physics, as proposed by the Vienna Circle, could not be implemented. For instance, neuroscience can study the neuronal processes that accompany visual perception. They constitute the material basis of the conscious phenomenon. However, the correlations obtained by induction are incomplete and prone to falsification and we cannot go directly from neuronal processes to conscious phenomena.49 The thesis that everything depends on matter does  Harth, The Creative Loop, 9.  Harth, The Creative Loop, 12-13. 49  A. Jastrzębski, “Ograniczenia badań neuroobrazowych mózgu,” in K. Jasiński, Z. Kieliszek, M. Machinek (eds.), Mózg – umysł – dusza. Spór o adekwatną antropologię, Olsztyn: Wydział Teologii UWM, 2014, 13-26. 47 48

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not have to lead to the conclusion that a human being can be reduced to the material basis of their existence in the central nervous system. This also applies to the mind itself. A human being consists of different parts, organs, which are themselves composed of chemicals, but not identical to their components. As human beings we do not live in our skulls, but in our homes. Our appearance, social status, economic situation, and biography are not attributes of our brains, and the attributes of our brains are not those of ourselves as human beings.50 Louis Pasteur showed that life can only come from life. Each of the cells that we examine is derived from other living cells. In the same way, protoplasmic memory goes back to time immemorial and there is no basis to claim that a single living cell emerged from inanimate matter.51 Scientific materialism makes a lot of metaphysical assumptions, which have a theological origin and become a substitute for natural religion (in Durkheim’s sense). This is not to simply endorse the cliché that scientists are the “priests of nature” (Playfair), or at least religiously oriented people (Einstein).52 What is taken to be scientifically objective is increasingly a matter of specialist interpretation. For example, the uninitiated, looking through a microscope cannot discern certain chemical particles. The scientist, however, is expected to have the appropriate training for this task, which can also be seen as a kind of indoctrination. Here we have to deal with a form of compliance with the prior expectations of science.53 Hilary Putnam thus admits that the structure of language (or simply mind) permeates everything that we call reality to such an extent that it would be a fatal mistake to talk as if the knowing subject were a kind of graphic designer who drafts a map of reality.54 The belief that one day science will lead us to know the world as it really is requires no less faith than belief in the afterlife. It is a faith to be fulfilled in the future. Science of the future is supposed to provide us with the objective vocabulary, and with the new theories, needed to replace our current talk of mental states (desires, beliefs, and the like). Aversion to the study of subjective states of consciousness is very strong – to the extent that we do not even try to study them empirically. Any possible new empirical facts of subjective consciousness are discredited in advance. 50  M. R. Bennett, P. M. S. Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, ­Malden: Blackwell, 2003, 259. 51  Harth, The Creative Loop, 18. 52  Wallace, The Taboo of Subjectivity, 33, 37. 53  Wallace, The Taboo of Subjectivity, 62. 54  H. Putnam, Representation and Reality, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988, 113.



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For example, for almost half a century behaviourists denied the existence of mental states. But unlike behaviourism, mental states have survived in science.55 Promissory materialism is a scientific movement that has taken on the features of a religious faith.56 It is based on a strong belief that finding conclusive evidence of a materialistic worldview, or the reduction of the human mind to matter, is only a question of time and of obtaining the appropriate equipment, which we still do not have. Unfortunately, popular science media publicize each new discovery even if it is quite controversial in terms of the methodology of research. The scientists themselves constuct the most fantastical future sine fundament in re, for example the hypothesis of a “God gene,” or “God’s module in the brain.” Others have tried to account for free will and morality. Evolutionary psychology is supposed to “explain” the origin of such characteristics of human mental life in terms of the neurology needed to adapt to the environment of our ancestors, and if scientists fail to design appropriate experiments that “always” support these hypotheses, they “promise” to do so in the future. Any attempt to question the results of such “experimentation,” “analysis,” or “exploration” meets with censure as it is fundamentally designed to promote a particular vision of the world. This approach requires the rejection of normal human beliefs about ourselves and the refusal to question the assumptions of a materialist worldview.57 The failure of evolutionary psychology Evolutionary psychologists have extended the theory of evolution to the idea of memes, that is, self-replicating units of social trends and information considered the cultural counterparts of genes in the evolution of society, also sometimes compared to viruses. Supporters of evolution favour Darwin’s theory to such an extent that if any other hypothesis fails to cohere with it, they reject it in advance. Yet Darwin’s theory, according to David Stove, has offered no adequate explanation of any era of human development in recorded history. The error of evolutionary psychologists involves the relegation of human spiritual experience to the animal nature and to the mechanisms of its survival. It is doubtful  Wallace, The Taboo of Subjectivity, 140.  Promissory materialism – term coined by Karl Popper in K. Popper, J. C. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain, London-New York: Routledge, 1984, 97. 57  D. O’Leary, M. Beauregard, The Spiritual Brain, A Neuroscientist’s Case for the Existence of the Soul, Toronto: HarperCollins, 2007, 41-56. 55

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whether such an explanatory strategy will ever shed light on spiritual experience.58 Proponents of evolutionary psychology argue that the human brain is shaped by the psychological mechanisms of adaptation – that is, on the principle of natural selection – aimed at the survival and reproduction of a particular organism. According to that theory, religious experiences can be explained in the same way. This thesis is based on several assumptions: that the human brain consists of separate functional modules; that these modules assisted in the survival of our ancestors of the huntergatherer culture in the Pleistocene era; and that this has led to the creation of a universal human nature prone to religious beliefs. Evolutionary psychology remains very popular, despite the lack of evaluation and falsifiability of its theses. We can only guess at what happened thousands of years ago.59 Among the most controversial of scientific hypotheses of this type is the alleged discovery of the place in the brain that through evolution has led to the emergence of the religious instinct. It was called “the place of God.” This finding was made by Jeffrey Saver and John Rabin at the University of Los Angeles in 1997.60 The theory of the existence of genetically encoded religious inclinations (the “God gene”) was authored by Matthew Apler. While it is possible that certain genetic characteristics predispose certain humans to religious experience, mass media have made this theory out to be an explanation of belief in the existence of God. The study showed, however, that in only 1% of people who responded to a questionnaire investigating the factor called self-transcendence (meaning any kind of a sublime human experience) was there any noticeable difference in the gene, VMAT2 (vesicular monoamine transporter 2). It is now widely accepted that single traits are often comprised of thousands of genes.61 Some neuroscientists (for example, Ramachandran) try to put religious experience down to some form of temporal-lobe epilepsy. This theory is objectionable for several reasons: – There is no clear documentation of the presence of ecstatic or intellectual aura in seizures and these episodes are almost always unpleasant for patients, usually accompanied by a feeling of fear.  O’Leary, Beauregard, The Spiritual Brain, 215-216, 224, 290-292.  O’Leary, Beauregard, The Spiritual Brain, 213-214. 60  O’Leary, Beauregard, The Spiritual Brain, 35. 61  O’Leary, Beauregard, The Spiritual Brain, 50.

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– The factual data are typically overinflated; a sense of irreality does not necessarily mean religious experience. Actually, the responses of patients are very ambiguous in this regard. – The data are only partially supported by case histories, and the rest is based on guesswork. – The number of cases studied is very limited. – Religious experiences in specific populations are so frequent that it is not surprising they can be related to experiences of seizures. – Most people who have a religious experience are not epileptics, and therefore it cannot be said to be direct cause.62 An excellent example of such faulty research is the experiment using a device called “God’s helmet” created by Michael Persinger at the Laurentian University of Sudbury (Ontario, Canada). This is a form of headgear, which employs a magnetic grid to allow the exposure of the temporal lobes to a small magnetic field. It is supposed to induce a religious experience.63 Persinger’s work gained great notoriety in the media, but not in the scientific community. After some time, a group of scientists from Sweden, headed by Pehr Granqvist, negated the results of Persinger’s experiments, showing major errors in his research methodology. They concluded that the subjects of Persinger experiment likely fell victim to the mechanism of psychological suggestion.64 Elswhere, a neuroscientific study conducted on Carmelite nuns in Montreal, by Mario Beauregard, has shown that there is no particular “God’s spot” in the human brain. The results indicate that religious (or mystical) experience involves many different parts of the brain normally responsible for self-awareness, emotion, body representation, and motor imagery (the insula, parietal lobe, temporal lobe, and the cingulate gyrus). Spiritual experiences are therefore by their nature very complex.65 Quantum physics At its basic level, the universe is governed by quantum laws that are not purely deterministic – as many would wish – but rely largely on the possibilities available to the observer. In neurobiology, the brain is not  O’Leary, Beauregard, The Spiritual Brain, 70-71.  M. A. Persinger, Neurobiological Bases of God Beliefs, New York: Praeger, 1987,

62 63

9-51.

 O’Leary, Beauregard, The Spiritual Brain, 95-99.  O’Leary, Beauregard, The Spiritual Brain, 284-285.

64 65

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therefore determined mechanically.66 And in quantum physics the decision to continue the observation of the particles actually helps to sustain them in their existence.67 On the basis of the latter, conscious human effort is said to affect the organization of the central nervous system (CNS), through this nonmechanical process. Making a conscious decision or focusing our attention collapses, the “quantum wave function,” resulting in the realization of one of several possible outcomes for the CNS. Quantum physics allows new insights into the functioning of the CNS.68 This applies, primarily, to the very act of measurement, which mediates the transition from potentiality to actual existence. Quantum physics tells us more about the correlations and symmetry of interactions in the brain than unilateral causality. Traditionally, materialists have relied on classical physics to support their assertions, but as physics has developed to include quantum theory, it has ceased to be a good reference point for materialists, who, as a result, have remained in the era of classical physics.69 Discoveries in the field of quantum mechanics show that the principle of the conservation of energy is not always strictly maintained, which supports theories proposing the outside influence of the mind on socalled matter. Nobel laureate, Steven Weinberg, claims that in physics, particles are no longer a constituent element of the universe, and matter loses its privileged place, which is now taken over by the principles of symmetry, that is, patterns of relationships whose existence independent of the mind of the investigator may be questioned.70 Another well-known physicist, Werner Heisenberg, believes that atoms are not things; and Henry Stapp, advances that the elementary particles of physics do not exist independently, but are constituted by sets of relationships. In turn, Richard Feynman asserts that we have no knowledge of what energy is, stating further that mathematical equations do not exist in the objective world, and are not observable in the brain. Hence, it seems that our understanding of matter cannot do without a subjective element. Since the very concept of matter is a function of the  O’Leary, Beauregard, The Spiritual Brain, 32.  J. M. Schwartz, H. Staap, M. Beauregard, “Quantum Theory in Neuroscience and Psychology: A Neurophysical Model of Mind/Brain Interaction,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 360, no. 1458 (2005), 1309-1327. 68  O’Leary, Beauregard, The Spiritual Brain, 33. 69  K. C. Cole, Mind over Matter: Conversations with the Cosmos, Harcourt: Houghton Mifflin, 2004, 110. 70  Wallace, The Taboo of Subjectivity, 142-143. 66 67



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mind, there is a full circle in the materialist’s explanation of mind. In this respect, neither matter nor mind can take precedence in existence or in causality. They remain in a reciprocal interdependence.71 With the dominance of the ideology of materialism in the institutional setting of scientific projects, however, all attempts to investigate or scientifically justify alternative approaches to the study of mind are doomed to failure, or are at least silently resisted. Everything opposed to the materialistic creed will be rejected, and often condemned as “unscientific,” which should rather be read as “non-materialistic.” It seems a whim of fate that scientific materialism is challenged from the perspective of physics, which to date has been the most important pillar of materialist ideology. Despite the emergence of significant doubts and important discoveries in quantum physics, these doubts do not become the subject of general reflection or enter any curriculum; they are deliberately ignored because they do not fit into the prevailing view in science – its materialist ideology.72 The influence of the mind on the body The research team of Jeffrey Schwartz proved that the mind can have a direct impact on the physiology of the brain. The team demonstrated that cognitive behavioural therapy, indeed, any psychiatric treatment not based on the use of drugs, can change defective chemical reactions in the brain. These effects were achieved only by changing the mindset of patients.73 Other studies have also indicated the possibility of correcting brain connections with cognitive-behavioural therapy. This was so, for instance, in the case of patients with arachnophobia (fear of spiders), depression and obsessive-compulsive disorder. After treatment (without the use of drugs) a PET neuroimaging study revealed local, metabolic brain changes as a result of purely mental interventions.74 Another argument for the influence of the mind on the body and the brain is research on the placebo/nocebo effect. In many cases, belief in the healing power of using very effective or “potent” medications leads to a significant improvement in the health of those who, surprisingly, 71  R. Feynman, R. B. Leighton, M. Sands, The Feynman Lectures on Physics, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1963, 42. 72  Wallace, The Taboo of Subjectivity, 166. 73  J. M. Schwartz, S. Begley, The Mind and the Brain: Neuroplasticity and the Power of Mental Force, New York: Regan Books, 2003, 90. 74  O’Leary, Beauregard, The Spiritual Brain, 130.

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are part of the control groups in the testing of new drugs (i.e. those subjects not treated but led to believe they were). The placebo effect is a major challenge for materialistically minded scientists. The existence of a placebo effect has been confirmed by research on people suffering from Parkinson’s disease. Similar action is exhibited by a nocebo (“harm”) effect. Patients, who are convinced that they are going to die, actually die in many cases during surgery.75 Moreover, other studies show that religious faith has a positive effect on people’s health.76 For an adequate interpretation of the mind’s influence on the brain, we should develop a new non-materialistic scientific conceptual framework. One such possibility is PTH – the psychoneural translation hypothesis. This hypothesis assumes that the immaterial mind and the material brain are two aspects of one reality that can interact with one another. Mental processes such as desire and belief, as well as decisions, are expressed in the appropriate electrochemical activation of neurons, but not reduced to it. An interesting example of the PTH approach is psycho-immunology. It deals with the relationship between the mental states of patients, their brains, and their immune systems. It postulates a relationship between these spheres called the “psychosomatic network.” This science examines both the positive and negative impacts of mental states on the brain and the body. For example, fear stimulates the release of adrenaline; and joy, endorphins. These mechanisms can allow us to deliberately influence the functioning of the CNS, and as such, make us aware that we are not simply robots implementing the program of evolution, nor are we reduced to being defined merely by our genetic code. We can, on the contrary, create our own social environments, and above all, develop ethical lives that defy neuroscientific explanation.77 Another field of research, which has not yet been taken seriously, but that has begun to slowly enter the textbooks of psychology, is parapsychology, which deals with phenomena such as telepathy, telekinesis, and clairvoyance. These effects, especially telepathy, have been experimentally confirmed; they occured at statistically significant levels over about 2,000 experimental sessions, using techniques involving Ganzfeld sensory deprivation. These studies have shown that people can sometimes pick up a small amount of information at a distance without directly  O’Leary, Beauregard, The Spiritual Brain, 141-147.  P. S., Mueller, D. J., Plevak, T. A., Rummans, “Religious Involvement, Spirituality, and Medicine: implications for Clinical Practice,” Mayo Clinic Proceedings 76, no. 12 (2001), 1225-1235. 77  O’Leary, Beauregard, The Spiritual Brain, 150-153. 75

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using their senses. A meta-analysis of research on telepathy, for the years 1974-97, showed that the probability of it being the result of pure chance is estimated at a million billion.78 Psychic phenomena indicate that the space-time constraints imposed on the mind by materialistic science are not sufficiently rigorous, and that the mind’s scope of influence transcends the body, along with the brain itself. Perhaps it has to do with quantum effects, which remain largely unknown to us.79 Also, research into pain shows that the magnitude of its effects on us depends on our beliefs, desires, and emotions. The processes of tolerance, learning and motivation influence our ability to deal with pain. The more one believes that one can control pain, the less one experiences it.80 Scientific evidence shows that spiritual experiences are not dependent on a single gene, that they are not the result of neurological pathologies, that they cannot be artificially (technically) induced, that human consciousness cannot be broken down into its material substrate. We also know that people who have spiritual experiences receive lower scores on scales of pathology and higher scores on those of well-being. On the other hand, there is no evidence that the hallucinations or delusions caused by faulty operations of the CNS lead to long-term positive change, such as psychospiritual transformation; they actually lead to negative change. As William James discovered long ago, the brain does not in fact generate spiritual experience, and is only the substrate of these and other mental processes.81 We cannot point to any particular part of the human brain that would be the cause of our psycho-spiritual activity. Culture and art are not the unique quintessence of the physical-chemical functions of the CNS.82 It turns out that there is no simple translatability of brain tissue atrophy into specific intellectual deficits. Some people with extensive atrophy of the brain show normal cognitive abilities, and others, with no apparent structural changes in the brain, have a high level of intellectual disability. The degree of correlation of damaged brain tissue with cognitive disabilities remains relatively low.83 78  D. I. Radin, The Conscious Universe. The Scientific Truth of Psychic Phenomena, New York: HarperCollins, 2009, 91. 79  Radin, The Conscious Universe, 317-318. 80  V. G. Hardcastle, C. M. Stewart, “FMRI: A Modern Cerebrascope? The Case of Pain,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience, 190. 81  O’Leary, Beauregard, The Spiritual Brain, 281-282, 290, 292. 82  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 131. 83  K. W. Walsh, Understanding Brain Damage: A Primer of Neuropsychological Evaluation, Edinburgh: Livingstone, 1991, 94.

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Wilder Penfield aptly summarizes the state of our understanding of the human mind: For my own part, after years of striving to explain the mind on the basis of brain-action alone, I have come to the conclusion that it is simpler (and far easier to be logical) if one adopts the hypothesis that our being does consist of two fundamental elements. If that is true, it could still be true that energy required comes to the mind during waking hours through the highest brain-mechanism. Because it seems to me certain that it will always be quite impossible to explain the mind on the basis of neuronal action within the brain, and because it seems to me that the mind develops and matures independently throughout an individual’s life as though it were a continuing element, and because a computer (which the brain is) must be programmed and operated by an agency capable of independent understanding, I am forced to choose the proposition that our being is to be understood on the basis of two elements. This, to my mind, offers the greatest likelihood of leading us to the final understanding toward which so many stalwart scientists strive.84

Penfield was surprised by the fact that patients receiving electrical stimulation of the brain claimed that they did not perform induced limb movements. At the same time, none of the stimulations resulted in induced opinions or decisions that could be understood as coming from outside of the patient. Penfield was convinced that the mind has some kind of energy, thanks to which it can affect the CNS. This energy is available to the mind during normal waking hours. Even if the mind is “silent,” it is potentially able to activate the brain.85 Assessing promissory materialism Promissory materialism can be ascribed many weaknesses: – Its aim is primarily to defend materialism in science, not to support a reliable search for answers to troubling human questions. – It rigidly adheres to materialism, which leads to significant gaps in explaining the problems of the mind. – It introduces untestable hypotheses. – Instead of dealing with the existing problems, it formulates impractical research programs pertaining to an unspecified future. 84  W. Penfield, The Mystery of the Mind: A Clinical Study of Consciousness and the Human Brain, Princeton, NJ: Princeston University Press, 1975, 80. 85  Bennett, Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, 61-63.



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– It challenges the possibility of understanding the human mind. – It fails to comply with the latest developments in quantum physics.86 John Eccles says explicitly that

Promissory materialism is a superstition without a rational foundation. The more we discover about the brain, the more clearly do we distinguish between the brain events and the mental phenomena, and the more wonderful do both the brain events and the mental phenomena become. Promissory materialism is simply a religious belief held by dogmatic materialists [...] who confuse their religion with their science. It has all the features of a messianic prophecy […].87

We can also make the case now for the non-identity of thoughts with neural states: – Two people may feel exactly the same conviction, while the neural states of their brains may be quite different. – Neuronal states cannot reveal a logical consequence of propositional sentences. – We cannot say there is a 1:1 correspondence of software to hardware in the metaphor of the mind and the computer. The same electronic processes within one computer can be implemented physically quite differently in another.88 There is no real possibility of precisely identifying human psychic experiences with neural states. We have no rules to unite these two orders. It is hard to imagine a future opportunity to reduce mental phenomena to neural states, if only because we do not have nomological laws describing human behaviour. We do have insight into the source of some routine human behaviour (rationality, good reasons), but it does not allow for strict predictability. Neuroscientific research can shed light on automatic or irrational behaviour, especially in pathological states of the psyche. It can also explain the conditions for being rational, but it cannot explain the rationality that guides us in our lives. As social sciences, economics or sociology describe and explain various phenomena of interest to us just as physics describes the behaviour of matter in a magnetic field. In their distinctive fields of interest, they comply with the proper scientific standards. Even history, a purely  O’Leary, Beauregard, The Spiritual Brain, 120-123.  J. Eccles, D. N. Robinson, The Wonder of Being Human: Our Brain and Our Mind, Boston-London: New Science Library, 1985, 35. 88  Bennett, Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, 360-361. 86 87

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humanistic science, speaks competently about what did and did not happen. It is incredible to think of reducing historical interpretation to the laws of physics, and yet none of these disciplines in the humanities is considered a pseudoscience.89 We will never achieve full knowledge of the world in physics, in the combined researches of physics and chemistry, or through biology, let alone by way of mind and spirit if these are considered independently of God. The brain could never be reduced to a static organ (Edelman), or a kind of computing machine, for it is subject to constant change, dynamically linked to a particular individual’s experiences and personal history, including but not limited to one’s choices, memories, and degree of attention. Each of us has our own unique history of development, reflected in the individualized development of the CNS. From the vantage point of personal experience, the physical world will always be largely underdetermined, for through our cognitive acts (attention), we help to determine our world and its characteristics. The functioning of the brain was first imagined in the likeness of hydraulics, using electrochemical concepts – the physics of a given era. Today the workings of the brain may relate to “chaotic” dynamic processes, quantum effects, and in the future, probably, to a yet to be developed quantum theory of gravity, but even trillions of neural connections couldn’t begin to describe the thoughts that arise in the human head.90 The classical understanding of space is inapplicable to a neural network because the conventional understanding of distance does not apply to neurons. It is not because of any lack of physical proximity, but because of the path that a specific electrical impulse has to travel from one neuron to another and because of the mediators on the way. Sometimes the physical proximity of neurons ensures quick contact, but this is sometimes illusory, because the signal goes by a circuitous route through other neurons. The inadequacy of classical concepts of space applies even more to the mind where everything appears as flat and equidistant.91 Testing individual neurons through electrodes must be conducted with due caution. The observation that two neurons are activated simultaneously does not mean that they are linked together in a single functional system. Time flows differently in the brain than for the external observer. So we could talk about a possible description of the brain from the perspective  Bennett, Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, 373-374.  Harth, The Creative Loop, 89. 91  Harth, The Creative Loop, 91. 89

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of an outside observer, if only we had simultaneous access to all neurons. This seems to be physically impossible.92 Events in the world of neurons and the human mind are much less predictable than those in the world of material things. Is it possible, then, to speak of any strict predictions? Only to some extent. The reason for this is chaos. Chaotic (dynamic) systems exhibit a property of disproportionately amplifying even a small input signal in their output. Thus, despite our knowledge of initial conditions, it is very difficult to predict the outcome of processing in the CNS. Dynamic systems work in such a way that even seemingly insignificant influences (for example, the butterfly effect in meteorology), may be important for the future state of the system – thus making long-term predictions virtually impossible.93 With the development of scientific knowledge, some phenomena previously regarded as subjective, become objectified. This has happened, for example, with sound, taste, and smell. As yet, we have found no way of objectifying human consciousness. The use of the term “qualia” has brought little new content. In terms of materialism, mental phenomena can be explained in only two possible ways: they are simply unknown properties of matter – or conscious experience does not exist at all. The theory of identity proved to be the most popular among neuroscientists, but it introduces more questions than answers.94 If the brain is considered to be the basis of the functioning of consciousness, it is not necessarily its maker. James considered that our stream of consciousness may be a different element than the brain itself. Obviously, human consciousness, throughout life, remains related to the brain, though it is on consciousness itself that personal identity and memory depend. At the present stage of empirical research, none of these claims about the independence of consciousness can be denied. However, on a priori grounds, scientific materialists choose a materialistic point of view, without reference to any empirical evidence. So we have a situation in which scientists, in formulating their research programs, are guided by philosophical dogmas rather than by experimental data.95 Even if artificial perceptual experience can be generated by activating the relevant parts of the brain, we cannot talk about a false functioning of the brain but only about false perceptions. Scientists can stimulate the  Harth, The Creative Loop, 92.  Harth, The Creative Loop, 95-97, 99. 94  Wallace, The Taboo of Subjectivity, 123, 127. 95  Wallace, The Taboo of Subjectivity, 129. 92 93

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pleasure centres of the brain, but they cannot cause real joy, which is always relative to the outside world. Meaning and truth can thus be attributed to mental states, but not to neuronal states. Again, there seems to be a blockage or ideological taboo in neuroscience against the empirical study of consciousness as subjective experience.96 Although we can imagine an instrument by which we could observe water as a liquid, then with an appropriate close-up of water as a set of molecules, then even the individual atoms, we do not have an instrument with an appropriate change of perspective to enable us to observe both the brain and the mind. Although we can say that an emergent property of the brain cells is their gel consistency, we cannot likewise say that consciousness is a property of the brain. And even if we could consider consciousness a property of the brain, it would be different from any other such property in nature. Mental states are ontologically irreducible to neurological states; they exist as first person, subjective phenomena, almost always endowed with some content. The alternative would be Cartesian dualism, that mental states should be considered both physical and mental, but it becomes virtually impossible to explain their relationship.97 Throughout decades, science, in a very small way, has contributed to the understanding of such human phenomena as meaning-making. The distinction between the objective and subjective world has nonetheless been completely ignored in research programs, and everything that it is impossible to objectify has been removed from the field of science. Yet it is inconceivable to deny the widespread belief in the existence of two opposing objective and subjective worlds.98 The classic (materialist) scientific outlook is full of “-isms.” All these “-isms” seek to emphasize that the human mind is nothing more than a machine. However, other contemporary theories – relativity, quantum mechanics, chaos theory, and non-linear systems – are becoming increasingly dissonant with the materialist outlook. Aptly summarizing this state of affairs are two physicists Paul Davies and John Gribbin: “Many people have rejected scientific values because they regard materialism as a sterile and bleak philosophy, which reduces human beings to ­automatons and leaves no room for free will and creativity. These people can take heart: materialism is dead.” 99  Wallace, The Taboo of Subjectivity, 131-132.  Wallace, The Taboo of Subjectivity, 136, 151-152. 98  Radin, The Conscious Universe, 22, 4. 99  P. Davies, J. Gribbin, The Matter Myth, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992, 13; in Harth, The Creative Loop, 171. 96 97



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Fruits of the denial of receptivity Recognized only as a product of natural evolution, and with its operation reduced to the laws of biology, chemistry, or physics, the reductive concept of ourselves leads us to despair of our own dignity. The effect of such reduction is the loss of hope and the lack of support in difficult existential crises. Human life loses its internal and unique personal sense and takes on utilitarian or pragmatic features. Given the finite horizon of one’s life and the overbearing forces of nature and society, one feels extremely helpless. The existential emptiness of postmodernity In today’s postmodern society, we are encouraged to sustain such values as individual self-actualization, maximal self-awareness, unlimited access to one’s own emotions, and high levels of autonomy and creativity. In this society, scientists and therapists become the new moral authorities, or even “secular priests” judging what is good and what is bad in the name of science.100 Very often, the result of our reductive self-concepts is emptiness, because when the ideal is maximum self-sufficiency, then a lonely self can very easily become an “empty self,” characterized by mental fragility and a feeling of being caught between a sense of superiority and inferiority, a classic case of contemporary neurosis. Consequently, we end up dealing with a shallow personality and fragmented society with no place for intentional self-sacrifice or suffering for the sake of others.101 What is the “empty self” for contemporary individuals? The “empty self” is the way of being of someone who experiences personal emptiness and is trying to overcome it by means of consumption and stimulation. The “empty self” greatly complements the capitalist economy, which is forced again and again to seduce potential consumers into wanting, and supposedly needing, superfluous goods. Otherwise the entire economic system would lapse into stagnation. Psychotherapy in Western society seems often to treat the inevitable side effects of an “empty self,” without, however, healing its roots, i.e. consumerism. Here we are dealing 100  F.  C. Richardson, “Psychotherapy and Modern Dilemmas,” in B. D. Slife, J.  S. Reber, F. C. Richardson (eds.), Critical Thinking About Psychology. Hidden Assumptions and Plausible Alternatives, Washington, DC: APA Press, 2005, 18-19. 101  P. Cushman, “Why the Self is Empty,” American Psychologist 5 (1990), 599-611.

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with the philosophy of self-sufficiency and individualism. Psychotherapy, as it exists within this system, uses the language of self-liberation while unknowingly reproducing or amplifying the same disorder that it was meant to heal.102 “Selfist” psychology is thus heavily linked to the urban economy, which has already entered its decadent stage. Selfist culture, with its hostility towards discipline, obedience, and deferment of gratification, serves Western consumerist economies very well.103 Today’s society often suffers a disastrous dissociation between the depth of being and the surface of existence. This process gradually takes on a schizophreniform nature.104 Modern life is marked by a constant rush, often leading to exhaustion. Once we lose touch with our spiritual core, our lives begin to lose any consistency, and turn into a “heap of rubble.”105 As a result of this process, a “false self” comes into being, employing contrived strategies to achieve happiness. The need for acceptance or for emotional warmth is good as such, but these needs cannot be combined with human freedom, because in each case we become dependent on the mercy of unconscious drives.106 Figuratively speaking, a false self is an ego kidnapped on an airplane gone off-course, with a substitute pilot who is not communicating with the control tower, i.e. with the self. The false self provides a system of protection against existential anxiety. This is due not only to the ego, but also to the self-system that the ego is involved in and the diversion of its attention from true happiness to things that ultimately disappear and leave behind only disappointment.107 The false self-system is a pattern of emotional strategies geared to achieving happiness; it becomes a source of motivation and perpetuates itself through a complex process of socialization and the excessive tendency to identify with prevailing cultural trends. In this case, our thoughts, feelings, and reactions show this false self at every level of operation.108 Fortunately, the ego can connect with the deep self – even if most of its energy has been taken up by the false self. One barely 102  P. Cushman, Constructing the Self, Constructing America: A Cultural Story of Psychotherapy, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1995, 6. 103  P. C. Vitz, Psychology as Religion. The Cult of Self-wroship, Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1977, 62. 104  J. B. Lotz, Wdrożenie w medytację nad Nowym Testamentem, trans. J. Zychowicz, Kraków: WAM, 1985, 16. 105  Lotz, Wdrożenie w medytację nad Nowym Testamentem, 18. 106  T. Ryan, Four Steps to Spiritual Freedom, New York: Paulist Press, 2003, 46. 107  Ryan, Four Steps to Spiritual Freedom, 53. 108  T. Keating, Invitation to Love, New York: Paulist Press, 1997, 10.



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retained connection to a genuine way of life is enough to enhance individual human consciousness. It can then break free of the false self. One of the most effective ways to restore the vital link between the ego and the deep self is human suffering, that particularly associated with the loss of those things which earlier distracted us from our human identity.109 Modern Western society is often referred to as relativistic, as tolerance grows in it into a dogma and liberalism acquires the characteristics of individualism, consumption, urbanization, industrialization, moral emptiness, isolation, alienation, and secularism.110 Frank Richardson calls this condition ontological individualism (a breaking with social existence) or utilitarian individualism. This is well depicted in classical psychoanalytic theory, where ego is understood as a pragmatic calculator of possible gratification amid strict social rules. Another version of this approach is Heinz Kohut’s so-called “healthy narcissism.” 111 In modern society, an individual is very likely to feel frustrated if they don’t achieve high standards. At the same time, it has undermined traditional values and virtues, the role of redemptive suffering, coming to terms with one’s own fate, preserving traditions and a wise asceticism.112 The human person is marked by anxiety. In our thoughts and actions we are devoid of peace and unsatisfied. We want to go beyond what has already been achieved, setting up new goals. We experience division, look for peace, and endure anxiety. We search for fulfillment and we remain unsatisfied. Human existence appears to us as absurd, because it brings suffering from which, apparently, we cannot escape.113 Continuing the diagnosis of contemporary Western society, we can also point to an erosion of values such as dedication and altruism. Selfishness seems to be the fruit of an individualistic understanding of human nature. Always coming first becomes the highest value of a liberal society made of success and competition, in which altruism may be accepted as a hobby (philanthropy), but certainly not as a life attitude. Under these circumstances, even ordinary good deeds must be valued primarily for the benefits they bring those who carry them out. Actual  Ryan, Four Steps to Spiritual Freedom, 55.  J. Sugarman, J. Martin, “Toward an Alternative Psychology,” in B. D. Slife, J.  S. Reber, F. C. Richardson (eds.), Critical Thinking about Psychology. Hidden Assumptions and Plausible Alternatives, Washington, DC: APA Press, 2005, 264. 111  Richardson, “Psychotherapy and Modern Dilemmas,” 26, 28, 30-31. 112  J. Frank, Psychotherapy and the Human Predicament, New York: Schocken Books, 1978, 7. 113  Lotz, Wdrożenie w medytację nad Nowym Testamentem, 37-38. 109 110

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sacrifice, in the sense of losing something or declining goods due to us, does not seem to be a widespread practice.114 In the so-called “golden age of psychotherapy” (1960-80), therapists could play the role of liberators from cultural and religious burdens perceived as too rigid. This ultimately led to excessive emancipation or the eradication of the self, and often resulted in indifference towards one’s family responsibilities and a tendency to rationalize one’s own self-interest. To summarize, it led to a culture of selfish attitudes and behaviors.115 Given the above diagnosis, it is not surprising that, in place of virtue, modern society has tried to introduce alternative notions of value and personality. These new concepts are supposed to ensure moral neutrality. Perhaps this was done with the intention of contributing to science, however, it put into parentheses many important features of the human being. The concept of virtue is gradually returning to moral psychology (e.g. Doherty), social psychology (Snyder), and even developmental psychology (Walker and Pitts). It is also finding its way back into philosophical debates.116 As a result of these socio-cultural trends, and the general lack of proper moral and spiritual scaffolding, society has produced more narcissists than therapists could ever receive for therapy. A return to the idea of self-transcendence could become an antidote to the “empty self” emerging in the context of postmodern society. The false self is an illusion of egocentric human desires. Unfortunately, for many people, the false self is and remains the basis of life, with the result that they are trying to adapt the whole world to it. To genuinely become oneself we must, paradoxically, cease to be the one we always wanted to be, that is, in the words of Jesus, we have to die in order to truly live.117 Existential emptiness as the source of Frankl’s noogenic neurosis An “empty self,” existential frustration, may cause a type of neurosis. Victor Frankl uses the term “noogenic neurosis” (German: noogenne Neurose) 114  H. Lacey, B. Schwartz, “The Formation and Transformation of Values,” in W. O’Donohue, R. F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology, London-­Thousand Oaks-New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1996, 319-338. 115  W. Doherty, Soul Searching: Why Psychotherapy Must Promote Moral Responsibility, New York: Basic Books, 1995, 11. 116  S. J. Sandage, P. C. Hill, “The Virtues of Positive Psychology: the Rapprochement and Challenges of an Affirmative Postmodern Perspective,” Journal for the Theory of Social Beha­viour 3 (2001), 242-243. 117  Ryan, Four Steps to Spiritual Freedom, 19.



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to distinguish it from neurosis in the more traditional sense, i.e. psychogenic neurosis. Noogenic neuroses have their source in the “noological” (rational, intellectual) dimension of human existence. They are not situations resulting from intrapsychic conflict, but rather from our existential problems, where the meaning and/or loss of life as well as moral conflicts and existential crises are of particular importance.118 As pope Benedict XVI notes, the cause of some neuroses is of a spiritual nature, remarking that it is not easy to remove emptiness and suffering from the human soul.119 In the case of noogenic neurosis, the most appropriate means of help would be one that dares to encroach on the human dimension of existence.120 This pathology manifests itself when we do not find the meaning of our existence – we experience a lack of fulfillment, and we dispense with any further effort to give meaning to our lives.121 Our internal moral conflicts are also revealed in the form of so-called “conscience neurosis,” which is born of the fear of one’s own conscience. Sigmund Freud seemed to consider those who ask about the meaning of life to be eo ipso mentally ill. Frankl argued the opposite, saying that one who does not ask about or seek the meaning of life is mentally ill.122 To describe the pathological functioning of the human being, Frankl uses the following terms: existential frustration, existential emptiness, noogenic neurosis, Sunday neurosis, or the pathology of the spirit of the time. They are characterized by the following symptoms: cynicism, resignation, a sense of boredom, a loss of interest in higher values, an attempt to escape from life or a loss of a sense of responsibility.123 According to Frankl, existential emptiness is a very widespread phenomenon in modern society. It is not difficult to understand why. Existential emptiness refers to a double loss we have experienced from the time we became fully human. At the beginning of our history we lost some of our basic animal instincts, which normally guaranteed the safety of animals. This sense of security, like paradise, was irrevocably lost, which forced us to exercise free choice. Then, at a later stage of d ­ evelopment, we 118  Z. Juczyński, “Nerwica noogenna w ujęciu V. E. Frankla i jej miejsce w systematyce zaburzeń nerwicowych,” in K. Popielski (ed.), Człowiek – pytanie otwarte. Studia z logoteorii i logoterapii, Lublin: RW KUL, 1987, 268. 119  Benedict XVI, Caritas in veritate, no 76. 120  V. E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, trans. I. Lasch, Boston: Beacon Press, 2006, 102-103. 121  Juczyński, “Nerwica noogenna w ujęciu V. E. Frankla,” 270. 122  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 40. 123  K. Popielski, “Logoteoria i logoterapia w kontekście psychologii współczesnej,” in K. Popielski (ed.), Człowiek – pytanie otwarte, 31.

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suffered another painful loss due to the rapid disappearance of tradition, which had defined the guidelines for our behaviour up to that time. Unable to rely on instinct or tradition in shaping our behaviour, we are often uncertain of what to say, think, or do. The result of this process is either a desire to do as others do (conformism) or to do what others expect us to do (totalitarianism). One of the main characteristics of existential emptiness is a state of perpetual boredom, aptly diagnosed by Arthur Schopenhauer. He claimed that, as humans, we are apparently doomed to oscillate between the extremes of despair and boredom. In modern society, boredom is the cause of more problems than despair. These are likely to play an increasingly important role as the greater automation of life leads to a greater need to dispose of leisure time.124 To describe modern society and its existential emptiness, Frankl coined the term “Sunday neurosis.” This is, in his view, a type of depression that affects people who, once a week of work and activities is coming to an end, do not know how to fill their free time, and simultaneously become aware of their existential emptiness. The experience of this emptiness leads to a considerable number of suicides. Without taking into account the phenomenon of existential emptiness, it would be difficult to understand the widespread nature of pathologies such as depression, aggression, addiction, and pensioners’ psychological crises. Existential emptiness can take many forms. Sometimes a sense of meaninglessness may be indirectly compensated for by the most primitive form of the will to power – the will to make money. In other cases, frustration over the meaning of life is taken over by the search for pleasure. Hence existential emptiness is often compensated for by sexual behaviour. A similar situation exists in regular neurosis. Observations of these symptoms indicate that they are located in existential emptiness. This is why they often have an intensely existential nature.125 Analyzing further, we can say that existential emptiness has a theological explanation. Hans Urs von Balthasar presents this in a most interesting way. He says that each time existential emptiness is born in a human life, it is a result of turning away from God and turning to oneself.126 The bold glorification of one’s self is in explicit contradiction with the call of Jesus to lose oneself. The life and teaching of Jesus is  Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, 106-107.  Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, 107. 126  H. U. von Balthasar, The Christian and Anxiety, trans. D. D. Martin, M. J. Miller, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000, 133-134. 124 125



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definitely not a model for self-actualization. For believers, this can be a serious obstacle on the path to holiness, particularly because of the sin of pride. Correcting such an attitude requires acts which in the light of psychology seem to be a denial of self-actualization: contrition, repentance, humility, and trust in God.127 Rather than fix our eyes on God, we turn our focus towards ourselves and to the created world, making ourselves the measure of reality. When we cease to recognize our dependence on God, we begin to lose ourselves and as a consequence of this loss, we feel fear. The emptiness that thus arises is a place filled with our own obsessions.128 Paul Tillich adds that the human being is characterized by a tension between being and nonbeing. We undoubtedly belong to being and its power is in us, otherwise we would not be. But at the same time we are also separated from being; we do not have it to its fullest extent. In the end, we are a mixture of being and not being.129 According to Tillich, the human being has an inclination towards evil. This stems from the first human fall, a story recounted in the Bible. This situation of the constant threat of evil, of non-being, i.e. human weakness, needs to be incorporated into the set of theses describing the human being that is anthropology.130Another feature of human existence underlined by Tillich is anxiety. Despite the fact that we are capable of the courage to transcend non-existence, we are aware of our situation and the continuous threat of non-being. Anxiety does not mean fear. Anxiety is often transformed into fear, it becomes objectivized, because in this way we become familiar with it and in the end, bravely overcome it. Anxiety is much worse than fear, because it reveals pure non-being. We are a being in which the spiritual is inextricably connected with the things of the flesh, i.e. there is nothing purely spiritual in us, just as there is nothing purely biological. Every cell in our body participates in our freedom and spirituality, and every act of our spiritual creativity feeds on the vital dynamism of the whole human being. The principle of being is love, but the principle of life beyond all principles is God. We are exposed to three types of anxiety: anxiety in the face of fate and  Vitz, Psychology as Religion, 129.  A. Cirelli, “Facing the Abyss: Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Reading of Anxiety,” New Blackfriars 97 (2011), 711. 129  P. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967, Vol. 1, 12. 130  K. Sikora, “Męstwo bycia – P. Tillicha koncepcja bytu ludzkiego,” in M. Opoczyńska (ed.), Wprowadzenie do psychologii egzystencjalnej, Kraków: Wydawnictwo UJ, 2004, 139-147. 127 128

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death, anxiety over the loss of meaning, and anxiety over guilt and condemnation. These anxieties always accompany us but may take the form of neurotic disorders that paralyse our existence, leading to our social isolation. Closing ourselves off (isolation) in turn causes more anxiety and can lead ultimately to despair, which indicates the severity of the ultimate anxiety of guilt and condemnation, its boundless intensity. These bear the weight of infinity and we cannot remove them by any finite human act. This determines the hopelessness of despair, because we cannot escape from it.131

 P. Tillich, The Courage to Be, London: Yale University Press, 1952, 41, 49.

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Affirmation of the receptivity of human nature Deciphering human nature is not an easy task. Apart from the abovementioned reductionist descriptions of human nature, other theories attempt to include more than the materialistic and biological, but in doing so reduce the whole human person to these characteristics. To reach an adequate anthropology, we need to represent human existence in all its physical, mental, and spiritual complexity. The human self Interest in the internal structure of our existence and the continuing search for its essence surely indicates how much its transitory nature has been on our minds since the very early days of science. Numerous conceptions of human existence and its internal complexity have been part of this reflection. The term “self” has been used in this inquiry in many different ways, from philosophy to psychology and theology. As a result, we have begun to talk about the true self, or the real self, which, in turn, has helped to integrate every feature of our existence. Clinical phenomena such as multiple personality disorder, pathological narcissism, and the various dissociative disorders have started to be referred to considerations of the self.1 Lively discussions have taken place around this issue. These investigations are nonetheless chaotic and difficult to classify, since the term “self” is the object of study of numerous disciplines. A theory of the self appears to be required to explain some psychological phenomena. Assuming, for example, the existence of multiple personalities, we accept the existence of human beings who possess many separate selves, each having their own plans, making decisions, and, consequently, acting differently. Still, the various selves cannot be simply identified with the body, because the many selves have only the one body. Occasionally, the attempt is made to establish a deeper self that could become a unifying agent for all these others.  E. Erwin, Philosophy & Psychotherapy, London: Sage Publications, 1997, 35.

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Presenting the various theories of the self, researchers usually have different realities in mind, as all these conceptions of the self lead to metaphysical questions: Is the human person the mind, brain or maybe something else? What is the basis of self-identity? Who is the human person? What makes a true human being? What is our essence? Is a part of us capable of existing separately from the body? Undoubtedly, these are extremely important and intriguing questions. From the philosophical point of view, the problem of the self is connected with our understanding of the person. Currently, many researchers reject the concept of a person as having a separate, clearly distinct nature. Instead, the nature of a person is reduced to a combination of social and cultural factors without a clearly defined existential centre. It is constantly subject to change and redefinition. This is how a person is defined in narrative, cultural, feminist, pragmatic, and other approaches.2 Accordingly, the self has no substantial reality, except for a particular way that humanity has of appearing and acting in the world. But in subjective experience, the self is manifest through a sense of meaning and through the phenomenal experience of being present in the world as a unique individual. Through this experience of the self, the human being discovers their physical, socio-cultural, and psychological dimensions. Despite being subjective, mental phenomena are not lacking in reality – a fact highlighted by the influence of our decisions about ourselves, others, and the general environment. Again, from a philosophical point of view, the following issues are connected with the theory of the self: the nature of subjective first-person experience, self-consciousness or selfawareness, the experience of one’s existence in a particular place and time, and the possibility of a self-theory, self-comprehension (self-image), a sense of identity, continuity of existence in time, as well as the status of the non-transferable knowledge of oneself, i.e. self-experience “as if from the inside.” Philosophical approaches to the self Several philosophers suggest we can get to know the self through introspection. However, this is not taken to be the predominant way of 2  J. Martin, J. Sugarman, “A Theory of Personhood for Psychology,” in D. B. Hill, M. J. Kral (eds.), About Psychology. Essays at the Crossroads of History, Theory, and Philosophy, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003, 76-77; L. Lovlie, “Postmodernism and Subjectivity,” in S. Kvale (ed.), Psychology and postmodernism, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1992, 120.



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knowing the self directly, but a means of knowing different forms of the self expressed or revealed in the empirical world. Although a number of forms of subjective mental activity are considered irreducible to physical events, pure Cartesian dualists remain in the minority. Philosophical analyses of the self have a very long history. In ancient times, Plato distinguished three types of human soul. Aristotle furthered the discussion by describing their unique domains. Only in modern times has a fuller study of the self been brought forward that includes the whole structural richness of its interiority.3 First, the word ‘self’ (Greek ἐγώ and Latin ego) was used to point to the spatiotemporal placement of the speaking subject. Plato laid the foundations for a substantial understanding of the soul-self as an independently existing spiritual subject. This approach was followed by Christian philosophers such as St. Augustine, and then recalled in modern times by Descartes. The foundations for the current understanding of the self were laid by John Locke in his work on identity theory. According to Danziger, up to the time of James, Locke’s theory was the most important reference point on the ‘self’ in English-speaking countries. Some researchers emphasize the significance of Locke’s predecessor, Thomas Hobbes, who presented the human person as a set of material and physiological mechanisms.4 Gottfried W. Leibniz understood the self to be the “monad,” the principle of unity and identity. According to this concept, the self is the internally perceived unity of the cognitive subject and likewise the form responsible for that unity. When we think of ourselves, we recognize ourselves as a substance, something both simple and complex, material and non-material.5 An opponent of the interpretation of the self as a substance was David Hume, who directly questioned its substantiality and defined it as a habit formed from the use of language, calling it an unnecessary and self-contradictory concept. For him, only particular impressions possess real existence. The subject (self) was a construct created on the basis of its associations.6 Today, John Searle agrees that we do not need to ­mention

3  A. Jastrzębski, “Ja-self. Fragment filozofii psychologii,” Newsletter Precarpathian National University named after V. Stefanyk Pedagogics 45 (2013), 167-174. 4  Martin, Sugarman, “A Theory of Personhood for Psychology,” 75. 5  T. Kobierzycki, “‘Ja’ i jaźń jako podmiot i przedmiot w filozofii nowożytnej,” in H. Romanowska-Łakomy (ed.), “Esencja człowieczeństwa,” Warszawa: Eneteia, 2010, 47. 6  Kobierzycki, “‘Ja’ i jaźń jako podmiot,” 45.

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the self and if we do accept it for formal reasons, it should be understood as the organizing principle of the central nervous system.7 The path of British empiricists, Locke and Hume, was followed by Immanuel Kant who stated that the existence of the subjective self (soul) remains a postulate rather than a metaphysical thesis that it is possible to prove. He distinguished three types of self: phenomenal, transcendental, and noumenal (though this third one was never accurately characterized). In the formal aspect, like Hume, Kant understood the self to be the principle uniting impressions, whereas the material aspect of the self was simply a group of unrelated impressions. The ‘self’ as a phenomenon was, for Kant, the sum of our interior impressions and experiences. However, the transcendental self was the specific subject of our impressions, experiences, and thoughts – the subject of consciousness itself. Kant claimed that we do not have direct cognitive access to this transcendental self, yet we know the meaning of the word “self.”8 Thus, Kant differentiated between the self and the ego. The self was the cognitive subject that remains in contact with phenomena, but not with things in themselves. The ego was, according to Kant, the transcendental self belonging to the realm of things in themselves, the existence of which we can logically infer but cannot know directly. The ego was only the abstract principle of the unity of consciousness. In the end, Kant agreed with Hume’s questioning of the existence of the subject of consciousness, reducing it to a bundle of perceptions. Referring to Kant’s approach, Edmund Husserl distinguished the following structures of the human self: the empirical, the ideal, and the pure self. In his opinion, the empirical self represented a way of perceiving the world from a specific person’s point of view. He said that the self seems to be constantly present, belonging to every experience. On the other hand, the pure self appears to be a basic necessity, as something absolutely stable despite all real change, and under no circumstance may it become an effective part or moment of experience.9 Referring to Husserl, Roman Ingarden also differentiates three types of the self in the human being: the pure self, which represents “the performer of the acts of consciousness,” the self as the centre of the person, and the self that includes the whole of our existence. According to ­Ingarden, this 7  M. Bennett et al., Neuroscience and Philosophy. Brain, Mind, and Language, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, 121. 8  Kobierzycki, “‘Ja’ i jaźń jako podmiot,” 48-49. 9  E. Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. F. Kersten, T. E. Klein, W. Pohl, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1980-, 186



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last self possesses the spiritual nature of the soul. The self does not begin as an effect of the stream of consciousness, as some would suggest, but it is the spiritual depth, centre, and axis of our existence.10 The dissection of the self was also accomplished in an interesting way in the work of Henri Bergson. He distinguished the superficial from the deep self, allowing that only some of our experiences express the deep self. Yet, one unique experience is sufficient to achieve that level of depth. The deep self is not given to us directly. Its discovery requires substantial intellectual effort. The superficial self is basically a shadow of the deep self, merely reflected in daily life. The superficial self meets the requirements of social life, while the deep self is born as a result of an internal process. It is this process that led Bergson to talk of the “élan vital.”11 The deep self should thus be understood as enduring and creative12 and, in Bergson’s later views, he even acknowledged it as being the spiritual and immortal soul.13 Karl Jaspers in turn claimed that there are at least two selves. The first is the empirical self playing its “role” in the world. This may be the object of psychological examination, because it is biologically and historically determined. Hence its behaviour may be, to some degree, predictable. The second, the authentic self, sometimes called the transcendental self, cannot be presented empirically and remains out of reach of scientific psychology. It is the source of the meaning of life, which allows for significant life decisions as well as internal freedom in difficult existential situations.14 The existence of the authentic self is revealed in a variety of ways through the internal experience of retrospection, introspection, memory, self-awareness, etc. Everything that the human being experiences as the authentic self is included in our stream of consciousness, particularly through the historicity and temporality of the human person as well as by way of our immersion in the past and present as we look toward the future. Figuratively speaking, we live in the present time and always experience ourselves in the first person (“I”). This means we take the experience of our mental acts to be our own. Because of this, we can discover this self as the subject – and to some extent the author – of our  Granat, Osoba ludzka, 177, 195, 197  H. Bergson, L’Évolution créatrice, Paris: Alcan, 1907. 12  Granat, Osoba ludzka, 177. 13  Granat, Osoba ludzka, 187. 14  C.  E. Beck, Philosophical Foundations of Guidance, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1963, 120. 10 11

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thoughts, memories, and so on. This subject appears to be something permanent and self-identical, despite changes brought on by events and experiences; it is also separate from or externally related to these events and experiences. It is due to this enduring identity that we understand our past actions and thoughts to be our own. Even after loss of consciousness, for example as in fainting or sleeping, our self-identity returns spontaneously. Even in the case of serious mental disorders – with altered states of consciousness or psychoses – self-identity does not completely disappear, although it can break down considerably. Therefore, the self proves itself to be somewhat independent. It transcends its experiences and is revealed as their continuous subject, but one that cannot be classified as a process. It is the performer of our acts of consciousness. The stream of consciousness is composed of experiences, or mental acts and states together with their content. How can we describe mental actions? First, they are real actions. Second, we can analyse them. Third, they belong to a concrete self: they are “someone’s” mental acts. Moreover, they are non-spatial (only some mental acts might be said to exist in an imagined space), although somewhat connected with the specific body of a conscious subject. As mental states, they are, we could say, “monosubjective,” meaning that, in both their experience and process, they have only one subject. In this sense, they are not intersubjective. The human person is directly recognized through symbols (language, imagery, music, etc.), which causes some distortion of these experiences. Together, monosubjectivity – which can be viewed as a certain kind of moral solitude – and intersubjectivity make up the two poles of our existence. Generally, we can identify mental actions with those related to the intellect (knowledge) and to the will or emotions. But there are sensual as well as intellectual mental acts. We should, for example, differentiate between sensual qualities that are perceived and those only imagined. Clearly, sensual and intellectual mental states coexist in functional unity; as a rule, though, we have no difficulty telling them apart. Purely intellectual actions do not have sensual characteristics, and they do not occur in the modalities of colour, extent, weight, etc. Though human experiences undoubtedly have as their subject not only the mind, but also the material body that we share with all living beings, consciousness can be described using more than physical terminology. Moreover, we define the self as an active subject provided with a range of strengths, dispositions, and talents organized around its identity. This unchangeable identity is the existential core of the self encountered and recognized from the perspective of experience. Yet through experience,



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the self remains unchanged, because it is not merely a derivative of the stream of consciousness in which all these phenomena take place. The material body participates in this unchangeable existence. Physical change in the body is irrefutable. Physiologists tell us that every cell in the body is replaced over time. Yet we can still recognize friends even after long absences. Fingerprints, pupil structure, and genetic codes do not change, which is an advantage in criminology, for example, in confirming a criminal’s identity. In sum, the self appears to be the constant, unchangeable, and individual subject of mental phenomena, which consciously experiences itself and remains identical to itself, despite the abundance of elements included in the stream of consciousness (the empirical self, the superficial self, and the phenomenal self), with some elements finding an origin directly in this unchangeable self. This self remains in a special relationship with our body, affecting its identity.15 Also, this self does not limit itself to its acts, but has the independent existence of the subject, called by several philosophers the deep, transcendental, pure, or even the authentic self. The deep self continues in time, due to its relationship to its own mental acts, but cannot be represented in time and space, because it is essentially unchangeable. We can best describe the deep self as the timeless existence of the causally efficacious, but spiritual being (aevum), unchanged, yet connected with some of the consequences of its acts.16 The subjective self is the unique expression of the spiritual soul. Its existence is a necessary condition of the subjective consciousness of a durable subject.17 The mind remains timeless, although it is attached to a specific, material body. The human soul indirectly changes in time due to the body; however, as a spiritual substance, the soul is timeless.18 The self in psychology Probably the most important suggestions related to the understanding of the self can be found in the chapter “Consciousness of Self,” in the 15  We have to add at this point that today we address not only human identity as such, that is, the meaning of the self, or of human or personal spirituality, but also new distinctions that address the sources of male and female identity: A. Rybicki, “Wiara mężczyzny. Aspekty antropologiczne i duchowe,” Roczniki Teologii Duchowości 4 (2012), 137-147; Wąż i gołębica, Lublin: Gaudium, 2011; Lew i Baranek, Lublin: Gaudium, 2014. 16  Granat, Osoba ludzka, 186. 17  Granat, Osoba ludzka, 200. 18  Granat, Osoba ludzka, 271.

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Principles of Psychology, by William James. Subsequently, barring humanist psychologists (e.g. Rogers), few have thoroughly explored the issue of the self. Only recently have important theoretical studies in psychology been conducted on the issue (Danziger, Gergen, Markus and Nurius, McAdams, Hermans et al.).19 Although the term “self” is most visible in the psychological literature on personality, it is also included in the fields of health, social, and clinical psychology, as well as in other fields of psychology. Relying on Kant’s concepts, William James distinguished between the self and the ego. He sometimes mentioned the self-as-knower, and on other occasions, the self-as-known. These are the two ways of experiencing the self. James’ theories contributed to later classifications of the self and self-image. Wilhelm Wundt defined the self (selbst) as the consciousness of the unity of our experiences.20 Sigmund Freud appeared to see the self and ego as identical. Percival M. Symonds, however, differentiated between the two: the ego was the thinking, perceiving, and acting subject, but the self was our growing consciousness of the ability to control our environment.21 With the evolution of psychoanalysis, the term ego changed in meaning from the definition offered by Kant.22 Freud laid the foundations for our current understanding of the self. Unfortunately, he did not use this term consistently. He would occasionally use it to refer to the whole human being (including the body), and in other contexts, only to a select part of the mind. Among later psychoanalysts, self-theory appears to be mostly indepted to the object relations theory, particularly in the work of Hans Kohut on narcissistic personality. Otto Kernberg, in turn, developed the theory of self-formation, based on the child’s unconscious experience of early objects (important relations): the self first emerging from the ego and the id, finally becoming identical to the ego. Indeed, in the psychoanalytic tradition, it is difficult to differentiate between the self and the ego, or personality as such. Sometimes the self is equated with personality or even the whole mental apparatus: id, ego, and superego. Some psychoanalysts identify various selves in other terms: the real, the nuclear, the bipolar, the divided self, etc. In psychoanalysis, we can also  Martin, Sugarman, “A Theory of Personhood for Psychology,” 73-74.  J. Fahrenberg, “Die Wissenschaftskonzeption der Psychologie bei Kant und Wundt,” e-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie 10 (2008), http://www.jp.philo.at/texte/ Fah­ren­bergJ2.pdf (30.5.2011). 21  P. M. Symonds, The Ego and the Self, New York: Appleton, 1951, 86. 22  Greer, Self-Esteem and the Demoralized Self, 93-94. 19

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find the following interpretations of the self: a person; the ego; the mental apparatus; a personality; the core of one’s personality; a set of selfrepresentations; an inner agent.23 Carl G. Jung defined the self in the following way: “self designates the whole range of psychic phenomena in man. It expresses the unity of the personality as a whole.” 24 The self is characterized by a large degree of continuity and self-identification. The ego, in turn, is the conscious self. The unconscious self is like the substrate (das a priori Vorhandene) of the ego, which evolves from the self.25 In humanistic psychology, Carl Rogers’ theory is of particular importance. In his later works, he dealt with the interior of the human being, developing the theory of the real and ideal selves. Yet, Rogers was also inconsistent in his handling of the self. At times, the self simply meant the whole human person, at other times, it was a technical term that meant one’s “understanding of oneself” or “self-image.” Finally, he defined the self as the awareness of being26 and he related it to the existence of an internal subject that we are able to reach when we remove the exterior masks. This last description is closest to the philosophers’ notion of the deep self. The internal subject, as postulated by several theories of the self, was rejected by Barrhus F. Skinner and other behavioural psychologists, with the result that it became no longer necessary to answer questions of a metaphysical nature. Albert Bandura attempted to explain the role of the self, but only in an empirical way. Behaviourists preferred to use terms like “organism” and “person” rather than the self in order to avoid suggesting the existence of a non-material subject. Thus, in psychological research after James, we can note the disappearance of the very notion of the self. Eventually, it was behaviourism that prevailed. The term “self” then reappeared in client-centred therapy, or more broadly in applied and humanistic psychology (e.g. Allport, Rogers, Maslow). This was due to the weakening of the positivist tradition in psychology. The term “self” took on the sense of one’s own value (self-esteem), as well as one’s self-image (self-concept). But there was  Erwin, Philosophy & Psychotherapy, 41.  G. Jung, Psychological Types, trans. H. G. Baynes, New York: Routledge, 2017,

23

24

422.

25  The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, H. Read, et al. (eds.), New York, 1953-1979, vol. 11, no. 93, 391. 26  C. Rogers, Client-centreed Therapy: Its Current Practice, Implications and Theory, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951, 498.

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never any consensus as to the meaning of these terms, and researchers used the terms self and self-concept interchangeably.27 Another approach is to see the self in the subjective experience of self – one’s relation towards oneself.28 In assuming this point of view, we may venture to say that the self is the ego mirrored in the act of selfreflection, the object of self-cognition. In classical philosophy, the first of such acts of self-cognition (self-reflection) is recognizing, or rather, discovering the existence of one’s self, which would include both the ego and the self. The self is expressed in the phrase “I am.” This discovery of the act of our own existence is spontaneous. The next stage of the self-referring cognitive act is the discovery of who we are, i.e. perceiving the content of our existence. Such self-reflective acts are necessarily indirect. What we can directly access in self-cognition is all that is “mine,” to use James’ term, i.e. our own acts, together with their nature and characteristics. The ego is this individual, active, and intentional expression of the human self. Without the emergence of the ego, the self is unable to properly develop its potential. The relation of self to the ego is thus similar to the relation of a tree trunk to the upper branches of a tree. Both are expressions of subjectivity. The tree trunk represents the great potential of consciousness, which is always present to the ego – although largely hidden in the subconscious. The ego is rooted in and emanates from the self, and is mostly directed towards the world, meaning it is conscious. It lends a sense of identity to our existence as a whole and is the actor of our history. The self is frequently expressed in the language of visions, dreams, and intuitions. On the contrary, the language of the ego, reflects the culture where we are formed, and the experiential building blocks of our identity. In short, the ego is the individual, personal consciousness of a human being. The psychological self-image depends on the conscious human ego.29 To put the point more empirically (psychologically), the underlying experience of the self is a constellation of perceptions and memories consisting of the visual image of one’s body, the auditory sound of one’s name, and the kinaesthetic experience of one’s body, including muscle tone and the memory of life events.30  Greer, Self-Esteem and the Demoralized Self, 89-90.  L. Grzesiuk, Psychoterapia, Warszawa: Eneteia, 2005, 43. 29  Ryan, Four Steps to Spiritual Freedom, 43. 30  D. P. Ausubel, Theories and Problems of Child Development, New York: Grune & Stratton, 1959, 273. 27 28



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Similarly, Hubert Hermans,31 representing “narrative psychology,” characterizes personality as a self-system: On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we conceptualize the self in terms of a dynamic multiplicity of relatively autonomous I positions in an imaginal landscape. In its most concise form this conception can be formulated as follows. The I has the possibility to move, as in a space, from one position to the other in accordance with changes in situation and time. The I fluctuates among different and even opposed positions. The I has the capacity to imaginatively endow each position with a voice so that dialogical relations between positions can be established. The voices function like interacting characters in a story. Once a character is set in motion in a story, the character takes on a life of its own and thus assumes a certain narrative necessity. Each character has a story to tell about experiences from its own stance. As different voices these characters exchange information about their respective Mes and their worlds, resulting in a complex, narratively structured self.32

William James formulated the foundations of this process of self-description. He differentiated between the I and the me. The “I” is the knower, ensuring the self’s continuity and identity – the unity and separateness of the self. The me, the self as known, is at the interface of the I and the mine. James, contrary to Descartes, included the body – the organism – in the self-system. The I’s self-knowledge extends to one’s home, possessions, and relationships. It is thus constantly reworking its experience of the me. Like Hubert Hermans, Theodore Sarbin developed James’ understanding of the self in such a way that the I became the author of a narrative, and the me the actor in the narrative. The I can review its own story and create projections of possible futures, it acts to ensure the continuity of this whole self-story.33 James also coined the term “potential self.” E. Tory Higgins distinguished the “actual,” the “ideal,” and the “ought” self.34 Similarly, Karen Horney pointed out the role of the ideal self in personality.35 The 31  A. Jastrzębski, “Huberta Hermansa koncepcja self,” Studia Philosophiae Chris­ tianae 1 (2008), 164-175. 32  H. Hermans, et al., “The Dialogical Self: Beyond Individualism and Rationalism,” in American Psychologist 1 (1992), 28-29. 33  T. Sarbin, “The Narrative as a Root Metaphor for Psychology,” in T. Sarbin (ed.), Narrative Psychology: The Storied Nature of Human Conduct, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986, 3-21. 34  E. Higgins, “Self-Discrepancy: A Theory Relating Self and Affect,” in Psychological Review 3 (1987), 319-340. 35  K. Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth: The Struggle Toward Self-Realization, New York: Norton & Company, 1950.

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­ istinction between the real and ideal self also appears in Carl Rogers. d For Rogers, the self is initially but a segment of the individual’s phenomenological field. Then, the self-concept emerges, that is, the self’s qualities and relations. This concept is only potentially available to consciousness. It fluctuates, so it is in a process, although at particular points in time, it presents a certain coalescence.36 The self, for Gary S. Gregg, has many points of view, and not only the central one. The self is “multi-voiced.”37 Each point of view of the self has its own narrative and its own centre of observation. Yet, these different vantage points of the self are not of equal importance. Generally, an individual identifies mostly with one of them. This can be seen clearly in expressions like: “It was not me” or “This is the real me.” Empirically, the self appears to be able to navigate between different view points. Hermans says that this “dialogical” perspective of the self allows the widening of its boundaries in such a way that the points of view excluded from it under normal circumstances are taken back as part of the expanded, multi-voiced self. The self actively moves around between different, contradictory or even conflicting points of view, which results in this expansion or contraction of the self to a greater or lesser degree. Additionally, Hermans says that the relation of the self to its own points of view resembles that of a composer inspired by other composers or performers. These are the different voices of the self. In Hermans’ view, one of these voices can dominate the stage of the self for quite some time. Not only is the sequence of the situations important, but also the perspective with respect to different actors on the stage. A lot of unpredictables may also be drawn into the narrative.38 In terms of clinical practice, an example may be drawn from the phenomenon of self-division in schizophrenia to explain the functioning of the self-system. People suffering from schizophrenia experience a lack of contact with their own self. The separation of the self from the body (“derealization,” depersonalization) gives them a sense of security. The individual starts to function in accordance with two selfsystems. The true self remains deeply hidden and is not disclosed to 36  C. Rogers, Client-centered Therapy: Its Current Practice, Implications and Theory, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951. 37  G. Gregg, Self-Representation: Life Narrative Studies in Identity and Ideology, New York: Greenwood Press, 1991. 38  H. Hermans, E. Hermans-Jansen, Autonarracje: Tworzenie znaczeń w psychoterapii, trans. P. Oleś, Warszawa: Pracownia Testów Psychologicznych PTP, 2000, 172.



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the outside world, causing the human being to function at the level of a false self. This leads to a sense of meaninglessness in life and, consequently, to the feeling of a dying of self as life unfolds as if “illusive.” To compensate for this state of affairs on the level of the true self, the individual remains faithful to some higher ideals, in an attempt to remain true – at least to themselves. These efforts cause further division of the self. While the true self is busy fantasizing about its own greatness, the person remains a passive observer of the outside world, constantly questioning (and becoming frustrated with) the experience of developing fantasies about the true self’s greatness. The false self remains responsible for contact with the outside world. It lives like a slave, meeting the expectations of other people. The true self hates the false self and remains subordinated to it until it gains sufficient energy to resist. That is usually the onset of psychosis.39 From a spiritual point of view, the self-concept is not the same as the true self. The self-concept is rather “the empirical self,” not the hidden, mysterious spiritual self apparent to the eyes of God. The ego remains immersed in the world and views itself as part of it. The internal self, having a spiritual nature, is always in one way or another related to Christ. For some, the discovery of their internal self will only happen after death. In the meantime, they may have a false self, an organized system of emotions and thoughts to help them to survive without the experience of boundless, unconditional love. The very existence of the ego is not as problematic as its formation in the context of conditional love, i.e. the deprivation of needs, the hurts and traumas of early childhood. The false self is then the self-defence mechanism of the ego.40 The notion of the self thus occurs more frequently in theoretical studies than in empirical research. Even if empirical research is undertaken on the self, it focuses on self-esteem or self-concept, hence on the practice of self-evaluation. Empirical research has emphasized the self-­ reflexive relationship of the subject to itself (Markus & Nurius).41 Keeping James’ earlier approach in mind, we can state that the current research in empirical psychology is limited to only one dimension of the self, namely the self-as-known. Because of the nature of the situation, the self as the knower seems to evade empirical research.  Psychoterapia, Praktyka, L. Grzesiuk (ed.), Warszawa: Eneteia 2006, 211-212.  Ryan, Four Steps to Spiritual Freedom, 45. 41  Greer, Self-Esteem and the Demoralized Self, 92. 39

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Historically, this led to a loss of holistic outlook. As a result of this process, the self of the human being was redefined in terms of a more behaviouristic self-concept. The “ideographic” (clinical) gave place to the “nomothetic” (general) approach. The self was no longer considered the knower but a system of self-acceptance. Clearly, such an approach to the self made conducting research based on statistics much easier.42 Still, reducing the self to a self-concept did not resolve every difficulty for empirical research. Using open-ended questions (“projective” methods) – for example, asking people what they think about themselves – turned out to be very difficult to standardize and interpret. It is difficult to construct empirical models of the self on this basis. Psychologists therefore began to focus on how self-evaluation could be expressed and influenced behaviourally. Self-esteem may become a good predictor of one’s social functioning, of doing well in school, etc. Yet, an issue remains. Using statistical methods gives us knowledge of group characteristics (samples) rather than those of individuals. Self-esteem is thus “co-­created” (co-defined) by the use of statistical methods.43 The issues related to the self are developed at present mainly in North American personality psychology. In practical terms, this should require refocusing research on the self related to individual differences. The various self-concepts become personality traits, like extroversion, openness to experience, and the likes. The notion of the self has thus evolved from that of a timeless knower to one of a changeable personality. Philosophy and early psychology used terms such as “subject,” “intentionality,” and “consciousness” (Leibniz, Kant, Husserl, Freud, James). This made it possible to define the self as a subject for morality. Current studies of the self in personality psychology do not deal with these aspects of the human person. These are not empirical issues. Yet, it is difficult to claim that self-concept and self-esteem are personality traits, as personality traits are not the product of thinking or perception. They are rather a result of the reflexive nature of consciousness. Morover, with the development of cognitive psychology and models of computing, the notion of intentionality has lost noteworthiness in the hierarchy of information processing. The self is reduced to one dimension – the product of information processing (self-concept, the system of possible selves). Contrary to this trend, Józef Tischner has reminded

 Greer, Self-Esteem and the Demoralized Self, 97-98.  Greer, Self-Esteem and the Demoralized Self, 99.

42 43



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us that the ontological area of the human self is defined by the values with which a human being identifies profoundly.44 While it may be noted that, from 1901 to 2001, the word “self” appeared about 50,000 times in the titles of psychological articles, with 25,000 of these coming after 1990, and that this may suggest that psychologists have, by now, agreed on a consistent definition of the self, this is very far from the truth. Early psychology raised an important question about the nature of the human being. Does self-esteem include a moral dimension? Absolutely. We evaluate our actions as good or bad, competent or inadequate, free, or restricted. In cognitive approaches, the moral dimension is obscured by the language of computers. However, it is difficult to rid ourselves of the moral dimension when defining our nature. Without mention of morality, we cannot discuss our identity or the meaning of our existence (Heidegger, Taylor). A full understanding of the value of human existence must be related to morality as well as to social and historical influences. Ultimately, this is about the meaning of life, existence, suffering, being-inthe-world, and the discernment between right and wrong. Human nature Is human nature good, bad, or neutral? Is it passive or active? What are its foundations in the structure of human existence? The etymology of the word “nature” or “natural” suggests it is something innate, in contrast to something extrinsic, acquired or learned; something spontaneous, in contrast to something pretended or imitated. Theoretical reflection on human nature often starts by pointing to such characteristics shared by all human beings, which are common and general. However, it is primarily a question of who is qualified to speak about human nature: a philosopher, or a biologist? or should it be a psychologist? For a human being, defining what constitutes human nature must involve such interpretations of oneself and one’s place in the world.45 Because it is a reflection on ourselves, it is difficult to find the appropriate methods to discover anything specific about human nature or even an adequate general perspective. Strict experimental methods cannot be

 J. Tischner, Świat ludzkiej nadziei, Kraków: Znak, 1975, 167.  Valentine, Conceptual Issues in Psychology, 4.

44 45

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used to verify these types of theses.46 Moreover, it is hard to imagine a meta-human point of view in this matter; of how a “non-human being” (an angel-for instance) would best describe our nature.47 Using the means of perception available to us (the senses and introspection), we are fairly limited in our study of human nature. We cannot see our nature directly, just as we cannot see gravity, yet we know it exists from its effects. We simply do not possess the appropriate faculty to perceive it. Despite our lack of direct perception, we can measure it. But we have only managed to develop theoretical models pertaining to it. In the case of ourselves and the study of human nature, the perception of it is even more complex because the perceiver and the object of perception are one and the same.48 As Gustav Fechner stated, it is as if the observer is in the middle of the circle, and is able to see only one part of it at a time.49 To answer the question regarding human nature, we first need to describe the general meaning of nature, then develop a more complete definition. Based on such a definition, more detailed questions may arise. Undoubtedly, philosophy is more general than empirical psychology. However, nothing stands in the way of psychology developing general philosophical theses into greater detail. As we do this, let us keep in mind that theology is in the most helpful position to reveal the mystery of human nature. This may lead us to see a circular connection between these ways of defining human nature (knowledge) and its actual content. The understanding of human nature is thus in an ongoing state of development as history evolves. Nonetheless, most philosophical views regarding human nature crystallized in antiquity. For example, the materialistic approach to human nature comes from Democritus of Abdera (atomism). Currently, this approach is expressed in the identity theory where states of mind are linked directly to neuronal states.50

46  B. Schwartz, H. Lacey, Behaviourism, Science and Human Nature, New York: W. W. Norton, 1982. 47  R. B. MacLeod, The Persistent Problems in Psychology, Pittsburgh: W. W. Norton, 1975, 44. 48  S. Murawiec, “Neuropsychoanaliza – omówienie podstawowych założeń teoretycznych,” Psychoterapia 3 (2009), 21-29. 49  G. Fechner, “Elements of Psychophysics,” in R. J. Huber et al. (eds.), ­Cornerstones of Psychology, Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt, 2000, 48. 50  J. N. Eacker, Problems of Metaphysics and Psychology, Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1983, 235-252.



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Aristotle gave another definition of nature (Greek, physis – φύσις), speaking of it as a thing which possesses in itself the source of motion.51 The cause of natural motion in nature is “form.” Animate beings moved by the soul or form are natural. Their nature is their soul or form, but when we define it from the cognitive point of view, it becomes their “essence.” Animate beings are moved from the inside. Three basic definitions of nature appear in traditional philosophy. The first identifies nature with the natural environment – the whole created world: “Nature belongs to those things which, since they exist, can in some way be apprehended by the intellect.”52 In other words, this definition is about substances and their characteristics. In the second, nature is defined by genus and species, or substantial form: “Nature is the specific difference that gives form to anything.”53 Thirdly, nature is the source of determinate action: “Nature is the principle of movement, per se and not accidental.”54 The first definition of nature relates to the environment, the collection of all that is not made by human beings, e.g. flora and fauna. Then, in the second we have a less familiar definition of nature as a “type.” Yet, the third definition, what Krąpiec describes as a “constant structure that is the source of regular actions,” is the most significant for the meaning of our existence.55 According to Plato, a human being is an intelligent entity, the knower of reality. Apart from the mind, irrational factors, from the vegetative and sensative souls, also influence our behaviour. The task set for us is to control these irrational impulses (lower parts of our nature). Plato’s three-layer definition of human nature was later significantly reworked by Freud. But Plato’s concept greatly influenced the Christian approach to human nature, which understood the soul to be imprisoned in the body. For instance, St. Augustine followed this way of defining human nature, primarily emphasizing one’s spirituality. Aristotle, however,  Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. H. Tredennick, Loeb Classical Library 271, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956, 223 [V.v. 8]: φύσις, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις καὶ τὸ φύεσθαι τῷ ἀπὸ ταύτης εἶναι κινήσεις. καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως τῶν φύσει ὄντων αὕτη ἐστίν, ἐνυπάρχουσά πως ἢ δυνάμει ἢ ἐντελεχείᾳ [1015a]. 52  Boethius, Theological Tractates. The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, S. J. Tester, Loeb Classical Library 74, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973, 79: Natura est earum rerum quae, cum sint, quoquo modo intellectu capi possunt. 53  Boethius, Theological Tractates. The Consolation of Philosophy, 81: Natura est unam quamque rem informans specifica differentia. 54  Boethius, Theological Tractates. The Consolation of Philosophy, 81: Natura est motus principium per se et non per accidens. 55  A. Krąpiec, Ja – człowiek, Lublin: TN KUL, 1986, 384. 51

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described human nature as not very different from that of other ensouled beings. In his view, the essence of the human being is the soul-form, which is responsible for our development, which takes place in the material (natural) world. Aristotle nonetheless followed Plato’s view of the rationality of the human soul, and influenced several generations of philosophers, theologians, and psychologists. Aristotle’s view was somewhat modified by Thomas Aquinas, who more emphatically articulated his beliefs about the immortality and the immateriality of the human soul, and its divine origin and destiny, thus demonstrating that human nature consists of material elements as well as of those instilled in us directly by the Creator. Philosophical definitions of human nature are frequently rational, or deductive. Starting with certain theses considered necessary and solid, a philosopher continues to develop the analysis, preferably using the laws of classical or formal logic, eventually coming to conclusions that base their certitude on the truth of the initial evidence. These initial theses have frequently been accepted by philosophers as true due to the rule of self-evidence (Descartes). A psychologist, however, most frequently comes to conclusions based on induction, that is, as a result of generalizing empirical data gathered from observations and tested in experiments. Each approach has its strengths and weaknesses. With the help of this type of cognitive approach to human nature, we can provide its basic characteristics, which can be expressed in an appropriate definition describing the essence of the human being. Aristotle was thus the first to define a human being as a rational animal – ζῷον λογικόν. This is important, as nature, understood in this way, becomes the basis of the assessment of acts performed by us – a kind of arbitrator or conscience. Initially, we ask whether these acts are rational, since this characteristic of human nature defines the goal toward which we strive. By exploring human nature, or its characteristic ways of acting, we can eventually create the basis of ethics and personal morality. That being said, in classical philosophy, a human being is a rational animal. We share characteristics of the body with other animals, together with its impulsiveness and needs, but go beyond the world of flora and fauna due to the rationality of our minds and the subjectivity of our souls, which go beyond matter. Body and soul are indissolubly united. The highest authority is in our spiritual functions –the intellect and the will, which may be influenced by our upbringing. Taking only Aristotle’s approach, however, it is difficult to evaluate our moral efforts. He treated morality like a kind of schedule of innate



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development. It indicated how we should develop to achieve our optimal potentiality – our entelechy (Greek ἐντελέχεια). Yet, Aristotle did not hesitate to say that a great effort would be needed to acomplish this. St. Thomas Aquinas describes this process of achieving potentiality in animals. He explains it in terms of the vis aestimativa, the faculty of evaluation (instinct) responsible for the formation of the animals’ concrete, individual notions of experience. In the human being, however, this faculty is supported by the intellect and becomes the vis cogitativa (particular reason) in which some reference is made to general knowledge. At the highest cognitive level, the characteristic feature of human knowledge is its universality; it is mental quality of cognition that distinguishes us most from other animals. St. Thomas Aquinas solves the problem of the concreteness of nature by pointing to the role of the individual act of being. In our attempts to answer the query regarding our nature, we should remember to focus on the substantiality, individuality, and rationality that define a “person” (Boethius),56 as well as the types of reflexive relations emphasized by the prefix “self.” For example, each being that possesses the features of self-consciousness, self-knowledge, and self-control is a personal being. This is our phenomenological self-knowledge. This finding clearly comes closest to those of psychology. A stable point of reference in our nature is also revealed by research in cultural anthropology, which advances that all cultures, for example, are found to have the same perceptions of colour, based on the physiology of the eye and the structure of the central nervous system. It has turned out that the studies designed to learn the intercultural differences of colour have led to the discovery of their universalia.57 From the biblical perspective, there is no longer any leftover dualism in the understanding of our nature in either the Greek or Cartesian sense. A human being is created by the Creator as a unit, a “living soul.” The individual human being is both the body and the soul. The human being is also the psyche (psyche, nephesh). Taken as a whole, a human being is entirely good. Evil appeared near the beginning of our history from the spiritual sphere and since then has remained with us. Evil finds its entry point in the “cracks” of our existence, but not through our attachment to 56  Boethius, Theological Tractates. The Consolation of Philosophy, 84: Persona est naturae rationabilis individua substantia. 57  T. A. Gregor, “Human Universals and Human Nature,” in V. P. Gay (ed.), Neuroscience and Religion. Brain, Mind, Self, and Soul, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009, 207-208.

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matter, as Plato claimed.58 In other words, human nature is, as a whole, theophoric since we are made in the image of God, bearing the ontological likeness of God. At least, that was our nature at the beginning. Although a very complex and contingent combination of elements like all other beings, our nature is eternal. The functional unity is so great that we attempt to explain both our spiritual and physiological actions with the same material reasons. Undoubtedly, the spheres of the object (my body) and the subject (the “I think”) affect each other, but through the body, we are subject to numerous limitations we do not experience in our thoughts; – if we choose to do so, for example, we can keep our thoughts inaccessible to other people. Yet, the body is intrinsically connected with the network of social relations necessary to survive, even if this connection is sometimes a direct threat to our survival. The psyche constantly manifests itself through body language: in our facial expressions as well as our body movements and gestures. The body also enables us to more fully know ourselves through an analysis of our behaviour as mirrored back to us by other people. Clearly, the body and the spirit are meant to serve each other.59 Gabriel Marcel helps us to understand how necessary it is to restore a rightful place to the human body. The integral connection of the self and body is the fundamental dimension of human existence, which may be defined as incarnation. Only from this perspective can we accurately describe our nature. What I have been trying to say is that the personality is only realized in the act by which it tends to become incarnate (in a book, for instance, or an action or in complete life), but at the same time it is of its very essence never to fix itself or crystallize itself finally in this particular incarnation. Why? Because it participates in the inexhaustible fullness of the being from which it emanates. There lies the deep reason for which it is impossible to think of personality or the personal order without at the same time thinking of that which reaches beyond them both, a supra-personal reality, presiding over all their initiative, which is both their beginning and their end.60

Human existence is “incarnate,” first in the sense that our body is part of this world and secondly, in its existential openness to others: community with other human beings and the absolute Thou.61 The body  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 39.  Kobierzycki, “‘Ja’ i jaźń jako podmiot,” 52. 60  Marcel, Homo Viator, 26. 61  G. Marcel, Journal méthaphysique, Paris: Gallimard, 1927, 322. 58

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enables us to interact with the environment. The basis of any human action is this nature (humanity) which permeates the whole dynamic of our existence, and is the basis of its intrinsic coherence.62 What then is the modus vivendi, the way of living of a human existence? Each human being is a person, and has a personal form of existence; consequently, any dynamism in human existence is connected to the whole of our humanity, both the nature and the subject, and remains truly personal.63 There is no place for the true affirmation of human nature without acknowledging the undeniability of these two sides of our nature, as well as their right to existence. As Emmanuel Lévinas has also stated, the human body is not merely the cause of our falling into captivity or of our dependence on the outside world. It also allows us to relate to the material world through work and the ownership of goods. Moreover, the body makes it possible to cope with adversity and to experience the temporal nature of being. It is the point of reference, a place of meeting and communication, a tool for going beyond the individual’s own subjectivity. The body, together with the language we use, channels our contact with others, and defines our boundaries as well. We are our bodies, in which we experience the interface of the interior and exterior, and the immanence and transcendence of our being.64 Again, in the case of the body and soul, Henri Bergson accepts neither the materialistic nor idealistic points of view, but relies on common sense, which confirms both the object’s independence of consciousness and its sameness with the consciousness of sensory data. The object is thus seen as a truly existing sensory image. The human body itself is a very special kind of sensory image. It occupies a privileged place while influencing other sensory impressions.65 As an important part of the person, the organic body is, somehow, a person’s property, something over which they have control. Possessing a body is basically a model for the ownership of things in general.66 As can clearly be seen, many researchers opt for the integral treatment of  Marcel, Journal méthaphysique, 131.  Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 91. 64  B. Forte, “La persona come essere di domanda e di trascendenza: Lévinas, Rahner, Mounier,” in A. Pavan (ed.), Dire persona. Luoghi critici e saggi di applicazione di un’idea, Bologna: il Mulino, 2003, 57. 65  N. Abbagnano, Storia della filosofia, III, Torino: UTET, 2007, 472. 66  M. Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values; A New Attempt Toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism, trans. M. S. Frings, R. L. Funk, ­Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973, 479-480. 62 63

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humanity in its bodily and spiritual features. It appears that neither mentalism nor behaviourism is an adequate approach to the whole of our existence, which encompasses both. The consequences of our actions are material and spiritual. An adequate description of our existence should maintain a balance of both its mental and bodily functions, without favouring one or neglecting the other. In reality, every meaning is inherently the meaning of a human body, the intention become flesh. Taking us outside of ourselves into the world, the body is the expression of an of incarnate meaning.67 We continually experience the fact of “possessing” our body, or acknowledging its presence, and the experience of pain clearly shows the inseparability of the body and the mind. Despite bodily consciousness, we can cognitively distance ourselves from our body and make it the object of intellectual study, treating it as if it were not our own bodies. Our own (and only our own) body is also a datum of interior sense perception (kinesthesia) through impressions originating directly in the organism. This is the kind of experience that makes this specific body “mine” and gives me the feeling of “being this body,” that is, the sense of an integral connection with it. With the help of the body, the human being can connect with other human beings and the outside world. Thanks to our own body, we can live in society, and interact in various ways with other human beings. Despite the close connection with our body, we discover, on reflection, that the self is not the body. The fundamental category of the self is rather this non-spatial consciousness. Through the analysis of this aspect of our existence, we come across the truth that we are created. This includes both our spiritual and bodily existence. So, the human soul is revealed through bodily features such as facial expressions and other forms of non-verbal communication. The most important affective messages, motivations, intentions, and passions are communicated non-verbally.68 Body language is a way of expressing the spiritual, the means of intimate communication between human beings.69 However, the body veils the spirit and, to some degree, makes it impenetrable to knowledge. The soul manifests itself through the body in an ambiguous way. Getting to know it requires the appropriate analysis. 67  P. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, trans. D. Savage, New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 1970, 382. 68  B. Goya, Psicologia e vita spirituale. Sinfonia a due mani, Bologna: Edizioni ­Dehoniane, 2001, 44-45. 69  K. Tarnowski, Usłyszeć niewidzialne. Zarys filozofii wiary, Kraków: Instytut Myśli Józefa Tischnera, 2005, 76.



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Based on its acts, we get to know the existence and the nature of the soul. Yet the body, which appears to be fragile and susceptible to injury and illness, presents many challenges, specifically in its ability, or lack thereof, to control the inclinations and urges that originate within it.70 Even in Christ’s life, the body played a very important role. His passion was closely connected with the “mystery of the body.” As Hans Urs von Balthasar remarks, spiritual pain is humanly possible only as a result of bodily existence. Even if this pain has purely spiritual causes, the way we understand it results from the bodily element, the immersion of the soul in the body.71 Person and personality The phenomenon of the person is studied in different fields such as biology, psychology, sociology, pedagogy, hermeneutics, history, and philosophy.72 Over time, a more significant part has been played by psychology, which originated from philosophical anthropology which, earlier on, dealt primarily with the soul, the mind, the will, and the interior world of human experience.73 Polish philosophers have remained predominantly faithful to this tradition of classical metaphysics and opposed to “trendy” postmodernism. To fully understand this debate, it is necessary to compare the theory of the “person” and the theory of “personality.” According to Tadeusz Kobierzycki, attempts to omit the concept of the person by personality theorists, as well as endeavors to neglect the psychological theories of personality by philosophers of the person, weaken contemporary reflection on human nature.74 The analysis of the informal use of the words ‘person’ and ‘personality’ shows that they often mean something different. The word ‘person’ indicates the human being, the individual, while ‘personality’ represents the set of emotional qualities, ways of behaving, etc., that makes a person different from other people, a human being in its originality. Psychology accepts the informal understanding of the term ‘personality’. For a  Goya, Psicologia e vita spirituale, 44-45.  von Balthasar, Epilogue, 99-101. 72  A. Jastrzębski, “Osoba a osobowość. Psychologiczne koncepcje osobowości w świetle klasycznej antropologii filozoficznej,” Roczniki Filozoficzne 1 (2009), 29-48. 73  C. S. Bartnik, Personalizm, Warszawa: O.K., 2000, 33. 74  T. Kobierzycki, Filozofia osobowości, Warszawa: Eneteia, 2001, 246. 70 71

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­ sychologist, a person is simply an individual who belongs to the species p Homo sapiens, who behaves, experiences, and thinks. In other words, a person is a possible object of empirical study.75 As we will see, it is different in philosophy, where the definition of the term ‘person’ has a very long tradition. Person The word ‘person’ (persona) comes from Etruscan φersu meaning a ‘mask’, like the Greek word prosopon means what is before (pros) one’s regard, or face (ope). Accordingly, it is wrong to define the word persona, as Boethius does, from the verb personare (sound), i.e. from the technique practiced by actors in the Greek theatre due to their use of masks. Persona may also mean per se una or “one through itself.” The term ‘person’ eventually started to be used to signify a character the actor decided to play – a protagonist “personified.”76 In ancient Rome, the word persona was introduced into legal language, and used by Cicero in the following expressions: personam gerere (to represent someone), personam civitatis gerere (to represent the state), sua ipsa persona (on one’s behalf), and ex persona (by one’s mouth). The last expression has its equivalent in St. Justin where the divine Logos speaks ex proposou (by the mouth of) Christ. Both in ancient Greek and Latin, the person meant the individual who is subject to law in reference to the consciousness of and responsibility for their own actions. Christianity emphasized the individuality of the human person even more as an object of God’s act of salvation.77 However, the term is only really clarified by the Christological disputes of the third and fourth century.78 Tertullian was the first one to use the word ‘person’ in reference to the Holy Trinity and state that there are three persons (tres personae), but one substance (Greek ousia). The person may be characterized by the external manifestation of their personality through their actions, but the substance refers to their essence, i.e. their underlying common nature.79  A. S. Reber, E. S. Reber, Słownik Psychologii, Warszawa: Scholar, 2005.  E. Berti, “Il concetto di persona nella storia del pensiero filosofico,” in Facoltà Teologica dell’Italia (ed.), Persona e personalismo. Aspetti filosofici e teologici, Padova: Fondazione Lanza, 1992, 43. 77  For example, the parable of the lost sheep, the lost drachma, the prodigal son. 78  A. Maryniarczyk, Zeszyty z metafizyki (III), Lublin: SITA, 1999, 90. 79  Berti, “Il concetto di persona,” 44. 75

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In the Eastern tradition, Origen explained God’s internal life in a different way. Being Plato’s disciple, he solved the Holy Trinity “dilemma” through the use of differences in degrees of divinity. According to Origen, there are three hypostases or subsistences. In response to these disputes, the Council of Nicaea (325) described the Son of God as consubstantial (homoousios) with the Father. The Son and the Father possess the same being (ousia), but they are revealed in different hypostases (hypostaseis). There is no difference in the degree of participation in the common essence of Divinity. Finally, St. Basil of Caesarea’s suggestion was accepted – there is one ousia and three hypostases. This is translated into Latin by Pope Damasus (369) as una substantia, tres personae and accepted as a dogma by the First Council of Constantinople (381), where hypostasis is explained with the words prosopon, persona. It had thus made clear that hypostasis is equal to the person and ousia to the being or nature which subsists in all three persons of the Trinity. The same terminology was later accepted by the Council of Chalcedon (451), during which it was stated that Christ had two natures (ousiai), but one person (hypostasis). Later, St. Hilary of Poitiers defines the person as res sibi subsistens.80 For St. Augustine, the person or substance is “a generic as well as a specific name”81 or “this particular man.”82 Understanding the person as the substance, due to his famous definition, is confirmed by Boethius (Contra Eutychen et Nestoriam). He states that persona est naturae rationabilis individua substantia – the person is an individual substance of a rational nature.83 Nature takes the place of essence (ousia) and substance is replaced by hypostasis. Boethius’ definition has two important elements: human nature is rational (spiritual); and the model for the person is the person of God, and not the human person. Although Boethius himself followed the Neoplatonic tradition, he refers to the peripatetic tradition in his definition of the person and states that it is an individual substance – i.e. concrete being in itself (“first substance” according to Aristotle) – participating in a rational nature (species). The fact that human beings have a rational nature means that rationality is an important part of us. Whether or not rationality is evident in  Berti, “Il concetto di persona,” 45.  Augustine, On the Trinity, trans. S. McKenna, Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1963, 231. 82  Augustine, On the Trinity, 237. 83  Boethius, “De persona et duabus naturis,” in Patrologia Latina Cursus Completus, J. P. Migne (ed.), Paris, 1847, vol. 64, c. 1343. 80 81

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our acts of love, knowledge, or language use is immaterial. Rationality is innate in human beings. How it develops and manifests itself depends on different internal and external factors.84 The term ‘individual substance’ gives the human being the dignity of existing as a subject independently of how well or poorly we manifest that nature. Less classical, compared with Boethius, is John Damascene’s definition of the human person. Damascene states that “a person is one who expresses himself by his actions and properties, reveals himself in a way that distinguishes him from others by his nature.”85 This definition emphasizes the expression of a person through their actions, rather than their substantiality or individuality. Undoubtedly, the best-known development of Boethius’ classical definition is in the work of St. Thomas Aquinas who clarified that person “signifies what is most perfect in all nature – that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature.”86 And he adds that the human person is an individual substance possessing a rational nature, made concrete by the act of existence: “Therefore ‘person’ in any nature signifies what is distinct in that nature: thus in human nature it signifies this flesh, these bones, and this soul, which are the individuating principles of a man, and which, though not belonging to ‘person’ in general, nevertheless do belong to the meaning of a particular human person.”87 St. Thomas Aquinas is aware of the difficulties that occur while applying Boethius’ definition to the Divine Persons and reminds us that, in this case, we apply this definition only analogously, somewhat “substantializing” the relation of the Trinity. Otherwise, we would fall into the heresy of denying Christ’s divinity. According to St. Thomas, therefore, ‘subsistence’ is the key term enabling us to understand how, among the categories traditionally acribed to God, essere in se, essere per se, and essere a se, only the first two may be applied to human beings.88 The last category is special to God because it refers to an existence independent of anything or anyone else (ex alio), that is, an existence originating from one’s self (ex se). However, the first two categories, which describe both  On this subject we will say more in later chapters.  S. Joannes Damascenus, “Dialectica,” in Patrologia Graeca Cursus Completus, J. P. Migne (ed.), Paris, 1847, vol. 94, c. 613. 86  Summa Theologiae, I, q. 29, a. 3: persona significat id quod est perfecissimum in tota natura, scilicet subsitens in rationali natura. 87  Summa Theologiae, I, q. 29, a. 4: Persona igitur, in quacumque natura, significat id quod est distinctum in natura illa: sicut in humana natura (persona) significat has carnes et haec ossa et hanc animam, quae sunt principia individuantia hominem. 88  Forte, “La persona come essere di domanda e di trascendenza,” 67. 84 85



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the Divine Persons and the human being, remain crucial to our understanding of ourselves. Essere in se means being in and for oneself (propter se) and not in or for another being (propter aliud), i.e. substance, a subject of properties, the end and not the way to that end. Therefore, the human being, although dependent on God through creation, remains an individual subsistence, a being in and for itself (per se existens), but not originating from itself. The Divine Persons are both subsistences and beings a se.89 Thanks to St. Thomas, the classical picture of “the person” is complete. The person is a being with their own act of existence, oriented to realizing their potential, dependent for their being on God, and on society for life’s needs and for survival. It should be noted that this theory of the person is the culmination of Aquinas’ philosophical research, and not the starting point of his reflection. It follows metaphysics, theodicy, and anthropology. In his distinctive way, St. Thomas was able to combine the intuitions of Boethius and St. Augustine, who emphasized the relational nature of the Divine Persons although without providing the appropriate ontological basis for it. To understand the unique combination of subsistence and independence in the Divine Trinity was the original achievement of St. Thomas Aquinas.90 Today, William Stern also speaks in favour of the concept of the person as subsistence. In his view, the most important traits of a person are individuality, substantiality, and causality. Following the same trend, Mieczysław A. Krąpiec defines the person as self-existing, someone who shapes their own nature.91 For Aristotle, the important thing is the species and not the individual. Only Boethius’ definition of the person gives dignity to each individual of the Homo sapiens species. Both for Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, however, matter is understood in relation to form. However, to express their different views quite succinctly, for Aristotle, in a simplified view,92 the soul remains the natural and mortal form, while for St. Thomas, the soul is spiritual and immortal. For St. Isidore, persona meant per-se-una, which underlined the aspect of individuality and dignity. Richard of St. Victor reformulated Boethius’ definition in the following way: Persona est i­ntellectualis naturae 89  Persona igitur divina significat relationem et subsistentem: Summa Theologiae, I, q. 29, a. 4. 90  Forte, “La persona come essere di domanda e di trascendenza,” 67. 91  Krąpiec, Ja człowiek, 376. 92  There has been much discussion whether there was an immortal form or not.

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incommunicabilis existentia.93 For Duns Scotus, this was better than the original formula because it allowed him relate the actual person to conclusions about the separate soul (anima separata). Boethius’ classical definition was accepted in Christian works for several centuries because it kept the theological unity of the Son of God by emphasizing the individuality of the person, even at the expense of the relationality.94 John Locke questioned the classical theory, denying to the person the status of substance, the very concept of which appeared unclear to him (substratum obscurum). Locke limited the person to mere consciousness, to being aware of oneself, and said that without consciousness, there is no person.95 Defining the human person with the help of consciousness alone, Locke faced the problem of the person’s identity. If it is not protected by the existence of a lasting substance, the constant subject of the changeable traits, then it is necessary to search for continuity somewhere else. To some extent, memory, or the consciousness of the continuing of the self in time, becomes the substance. Leibniz did not deny the substantiality of the person, although he understood it in terms of activity. He nevertheless came to the same conclusions as Locke and based the individual person’s identity on the unity of consciousness, the internal perception of oneself. In both cases, it is justifiable to ask what happens to someone’s identity while sleeping or after losing consciousness. Another way of defining a person is through its relationships: with God, other persons, variously understood structures or, finally, oneself.96 This path was followed by Augustine, Duns Scotus, and later also by Charles Renouvier and the existentialists. From this path emerged the relational and dialogical concepts of the human person. Martin Buber, for example, stated that a person is a person only because surrounded with other persons similar to themselves.97 Occasionally, the person is defined as a heuristically open reality, in statu fieri, as the key-person and the fact-person; conversely, where the person is a closed reality, they are called a box-person.98 93  A. Półtawski, “Słowo wstępne,” in M. Harciarek, Podstawy psychologii realistycznej według Karola Wojtyły, Katowice: KOS, 2008, 13. 94  A. Scola, G. Marengo, J. P. López, Osoba ludzka. Antropologia teologiczna, trans. L. Balter, Poznań: Pallottinum, 2005, 202. 95  J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, P. H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon, 1975, II, 1, §11. 96  M. Gogacz, Wokół problemu osoby, Warszawa: PAX, 1974, 16. 97  Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, J. Ritter (ed.), Basel: Schwabe, 1989, 339. 98  A. Pavan, “Dire persona nell’età globale dei diritti umani,” in Dire persona. Luoghi critici e saggi di applicazione di un’idea, 468.



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Kant moved the discussion from metaphysics (ontology) to the legalethical arena. Leaving aside substantiality, he stated that the person is basically the subject of laws (as in ancient Rome). Explaining this with his famous saying “act in such a way …” and in this context, the person is assigned the dignity, and status of ‘the end’ and not ‘the means’. Despite the sublime characteristics of the person, Kant deprives it of a philosophical foundation, only focusing on moral order and ethical pragmatism. Similarly, for Nicolai Hartmann, the person is the subject of good and evil, the meeting place of values and existence.99 Combining the two approaches to defining the person (substantialistic and relationalistic), we may affirm that we are, according to a dialectical principle, both the “being in itself” and a “being for.” From the Christian point of view, the fullness of this dialectical unity is the Holy Trinity, where esse in and esse ad are an ontological unity. If in God, the relationship identifies the person, so, in the case of the human person, personal communion remains the end of fieri. The person is a fullness of being and cannot be fully described taking partial approaches: we are neither just the self nor the subject, neither the individual nor consciousness. The person is neither the individual alone nor the community, neither the soul alone nor the matter.100 There is in us a tension between our three spiritual dimensions: what constitutes the body, what lifts the human being up, and what horizontally leads toward the community, toward participation with others. Accordingly, embodiment, calling, and involvement become the three dimensions of the human person.101 According to Jacques Maritain, the human person possesses something divine, a spirit, due to which we are above the material world because we, ourselves establish the ends and the means to control the sphere of senses (self-transcendence).102 In sum, we can state that the human person is a separate individual, essere in se, self-aware, essere per se; inclined towards others, essere ad aliud; and intended for community, essere cum alio. Essere in se means that the person is the source (suppositum) of all their acts and their own unique act of existence. Ultimately, this is also the basis of the personal dignity of a human being. Essere per se refers to the consciousness and freedom  N. Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 50.  Pavan, “Dire persona nell’età globale dei diritti umani,” 464, 467. 101  Granat, Osoba ludzka, 107. 102  Granat, Osoba ludzka, 120.

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of our acts. This is the dimension of mental and intellectual life, enabling us to differentiate self and non-self, subjectivity and objectivity, i.e. the world with its content. The boundary separating the two dimensions of our existence is the physical body and one’s relationship to it. However, this is not about dualism, but the unity of the spiritual and physical suppositum. Essere ad aliud expresses our existential openness to others. Existence in and for ourselves prepares us for the dynamics of transcendence, which means going beyond oneself and communicating with others. Only these acts enable us to have an authentic existence and to realize our spirituality. Essere cum alio introduces the human being to reciprocal, responsible relationships with other persons, leading to a solidarity that shows itself in concrete acts and in time. Being a gift, self-transcendence is the culmination of one’s personal existence. This way, the human person possesses dialectic characteristics, the synthesis of the interior (essere in se et per se) and the exterior (essere ad aliud et cum alio).103 Personality The term ‘personality’ (Latin personalitas) first appeared in a theological context in the works of Thomas Aquinas. Personalitas is the entity or nature possessed only by one person, that person’s particular way of existing or acting. St. Thomas used this term to define the Holy Trinity or personalitas of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.104 The change in the understanding of the term ‘personality’ happened in modern times as a result of so-called rational psychology. For John Locke, personality was self-consciousness and the basis of identity, a person’s continuity in time.105 In turn, for Étienne B. Condillac, personality was the consciousness and memory of the self.106 Kant was the first to compare the notions of ‘person’ and ‘personality’. He understood the person to be the ultimate goal towards which the whole world is striving, a being who has rights and moral responsibility. Personality, in turn, is the unity of law and freedom in the moral being, which differentiates us from the rest of nature. According to Kant, the purpose of personality is self-determination and taking responsibility  Forte, “La persona come essere di domanda e di trascendenza,” 69-75  Tomasz z Akwinu, Suma teologii, I, 39, 3-4; por: I, 29, 1. 105  J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, 27, §17. 106  E. B. Condillac, “Traité des sensations,” in Œuvres philosophiques, G. Le Roy (ed.), Paris 1947-51, vol. 1, 238. 103

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for decisions.107 In morals, the person strives for the sake of personality,108 which was life’s task. Johann G. Fichte developed Kant’s concept by adding the historical dimension to personality. He claimed that in its historical development, personality expresses the reality of the self more fully. It is a process that is endless.109 Modern times give examples of scholars who dealt with personality not only from the philosophical point of view, but also as psychologists and psychiatrists. Karl Jaspers is one such scholar. His understanding of personality takes on more of an empirical characteristic, while remaining intrinsically tied to the historical development of humanity.110 Wilhelm Wundt was the first psychologist to define personality. In his view, it existed as a unity of perception, thinking, and wanting.111 In psychology, the term ‘personality’ developed toward the idea of an individualized structure of various traits, physical features, habits, and other types of operationalization of the concept for the sake of research. Personality psychology gradually took the place of the characterology that had dominated the field since ancient times, finally absorbing it completely and elevating the term ‘personality’ to the role of one of the most important technical terms in psychology. There are various personality typologies and approaches to defining personality: type theories (as in Hippocrates); trait theories (e.g., Cattell); psychoanalytical and psychodynamic theories, with a strong orientation in developmental psychology; behaviourism, with learning theory; the humanistic approach, with emphasis on self-realization; social learning theory, with elements of cognitive psychology; the situationism of Mischel; and eclectic interactionism.112 Various aspects of personality psychology may be further classified, based on the so-called “personsituation” controversy, where the person is either understood in terms of constant traits established in their genetic make-up or in terms of socio-environmental variables affecting the formation of behaviour.113 According to a contemporary handbook in psychiatry, personality is 107  W. H. Werkmeister, “Changes in Kant’s Metaphysical Conception of Man,” in T. O. Buford, H. H. Oliver (eds.), Personalism Revisited. Its Proponents and Critics, Amsterdam-New York: Rodopi, 2002, 315-317. 108  I. Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Riga, 1788, I, 1, 3. 109  J. G. Fichte, “System der Sittenlehre,” in I. H. Fichte, Nachgelassene Werke, vol. 3, Bonn, 1834, 51. 110  K. Jaspers, Allgemeine Psychopatologie, Berlin, 1913. 111  W. Wundt, Ethik, Stuttgart, 1886, 385. 112  Słownik Psychologii, 491-492. 113  P. Oleś, Wprowadzenie do psychologii osobowości, Warszawa: Scholar, 2003, 115-273.

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a multifactor, dynamic structure that integrates and regulates human behaviour and one’s relations with the outside world.114 According to Carl Rogers, who, among others, takes the latter approach, personality is a “structure” immersed in experience, which, due to its flexibility and openness to experience remains fluid throughout the changing organization of the self. In modern narrative psychology, one even claims that there is a subpersonality viewed as the semi-permanent structure of the self. These are thought of as separate voices in a debate or as various actors on a stage. We discussed these issues at great length while analyzing the human self. 115 Allport’s approach Gordon Allport, who helped distinguish personality psychology as a separate field, is the author of one of the classic and best-known definitions of personality: “Personality is the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment.”116 In presenting the human being, Allport emphasizes the individuality and uniqueness of each person. Although this intuition is included in Boethius’ definition, Allport adds that the person is a paradoxical unity of opposites: Nature’s heavy investment in individuality stands forth chiefly in homo sapiens. While we may recognize individual differences among dogs or varying strains of temperament among rats, still their lives in all essential particulars are regulated by their membership in a species. Man alone has the capacity to vary his biological needs extensively and to add to them countless psychogenic needs reflecting in part his culture (no other creature has a culture), and in part his own style of life (no other creature worries about his life-style).117

Allport underscores the fact that the individual person is basically free in their actions, these actions being motivated to a large extent by their chosen values. Hence, he wants to present the human individual in their personal uniqueness (this individual), and not just in traits generally characteristic of the species. According to Allport, the unique self-consciousness of a human 114  A. Jakubik, “Zaburzenia osobowości,” in A. Bilikiewicz (ed.), Psychiatria, ­Warszawa: PZWL, 2000, 344. 115  C. R. Rogers, On Becoming a Person, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961, 189. 116  G. W. Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation, New York: Holt, 1937, 48. 117  G. W. Allport, Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality, New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 1955, 22.



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individual is not a natural trait but the result of development, maturity and learning. It is characterized by taking ownership and responsibility for one’s self – particularly the acts of desire, will, feeling, etc. Selfhood is the main principle of human psychology.118 Allport was most interested in creating an independent field of scientific research on personality. To a large extent, he succeeded. He indicated the shortcomings of existing concepts of human nature in traditional theories of learning and motivation, particularly their failure to recognize the uniqueness of each human individual. Though many of Allport’s innovations remained theoretical in his works, they were later acccepted in psychology and may fortuitously inspire some of the changes needed in other fields.119 According to Allport, human activities are not random, and previous psychology could not grasp this fact, taking our individual traits instead to average out into general laws. The uniqueness of some human behaviour was confined to the margin of statistical error. Thus, the psychology of individual differences apparently dealt only with the individual. In fact, we would not exist at all, if something did not make us different from others.120 Allport thus emphasized the idiographic (science of specific facts) in contrast to the nomothetic (science of general laws) approach to research. In time, he changed this emphasis to one of the “morphogenic” in contrast to the “dimensional.” He defined the “morphogenic” more widely than the idiographic approach, including scientific procedures that apply to the concrete reality of a human being. As we saw, Allport is the author of an historically important definition of personality in terms of the “psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment,”121 and later in terms of those that determine their “characteristic behaviour and thought.”122 Although like Freud, Allport spoke of “psychophysical systems,” he made no attempt to place them in a specific area of the brain. Personality is not innate but comes into being through a process of differentiation and integration. First, the child attempts to differentiate itself from its  G. W. Allport, Personality and Social Encounter, Boston: Beacon Press, 1964, 34.  A. Jastrzębski, “Gordon W. Allport’s Concept of the Human Person. On a Possible Dialog Between Philosophy and Psychology,” The Pluralist 1 (2011), 71-86. 120  A. Nelicki, “Psychologia jednostki Gordona W. Allporta,” in A. Gałdowa (ed.), Klasyczne i współczesne koncepcje osobowości, Kraków: UJ, 1999, 144. 121  Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation, 48. 122  G. W. Allport, Pattern and Growth in Personality, New York: Holt, 1961, 28. 118

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e­ nvironment. When this is achieved, an integration follows and personality traits begin to be established. Personality develops from the psychophysical constitution of the child (i.e. body structure, temperament, and intelligence). These innate qualities interact with the environment and through these changing configurations, personality, together with its various individual traits, comes into being. Allport provides three types of human development: – random (chance) – uncontrolled genetic and social factors, – adaptable (opportunistic) – the development of adaptable behaviours and strategies, – targeted (oriented) – somewhat later, connected with the strengthening of the psyche. As human development progresses, the influence of hereditary/social factors decreases in favour of those of personality. Clearly, not all behaviour originates from personality alone, but it is in some mesure integrated by it. Integration usually accompanies the process of development, and low integration levels point to pathology.123 A mature personality possesses a lot of different traits making up one unique individual – we are not schematic. However, the personality is integrated around the subject, in Allport’s language the proprium. Thus, all the elements of the personality system tend towards one’s centre, and, consequently, to integration. The proprium (“what is one’s own”) is the very root of personality. Allport claims that both the very fundamental terms “ego” and “self” should be allocated to philosophy. When used in psychology, they suggest the existence of a personality within the personality, although some constant subject appears to be necessary. Yet, Allport nowhere clearly defines the term proprium. At times, he speaks of its cognitive ability; at times, of its self-reliance; and then again, of its determining basic reactions. Due to the functioning of the proprium, the human psyche is nonetheless both objectified and personalized. The human being is an autonomous subject. The environment, of course, affects its formation, but when it is formed, the subject itself forms the environment. But psychology is not a normative field of study and cannot define values that ­enable the individual to create their own personality.124  Nelicki, “Psychologia jednostki Gordona W. Allporta,” 155.  G. W. Allport, Osobowość i religia, trans. H. Bartoszewicz, A. Bartkowicz, I. Wyrzykowska, Warszawa: PAX, 1988, 82. 123

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Allport nevertheless differentiates between the self as the subject of personal, intentional causality and the subject for the causality of chance. All fully human acts come from the specific nature of the person, from their personal existence. Although the human being shares a part of its nature with the lower species, it is capable of future-oriented intentional acts. Thus, Allport accepts a double causality in the human being, and he describes intentionality as “a process that controls transitory impulse and opportunistic adjustment in the interests of long-range aims and consistency with the self-image.”125 Accepting a double causality – personal and biological – allows Allport to find enough space to defend human freedom. In his view, the human being possesses functional autonomy, and when we choose among the given elements of culture, when we follow our conscience, or decide in favour of our system of values, we always address the issue of freedom,126 not absolute freedom. For our freedom is limited by the structure of personality, social context, relationships, culture and education. In spite of this, a person can behave in accordance with a hierarchy of values and independently chosen goals. “Having long-term goals, viewed as essential for somebody’s existence, distinguishes human beings from other animals, adults from children, and, in many cases, the healthy personality from the sick.”127 Person and personality in the theory of spirituality We tend to understand the person as the subject, and to present personality in a more dynamic way. Krąpiec, for instance, defines “personality” as a constant manner of acting resulting from the organization of spiritual acts. Personality may change; nevertheless, it has a unifying function in our lives.128 This unifying function should be viewed as a process in which the self accepts all of its acts (both material and spiritual) as fully its own. A mature personality demonstrates traits such as unity, identity, and autonomy. The ability to synthesize the spiritual and material points of view in a personality depends on genetic, psychological, and social factors.129  Allport, Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality, 68.  Allport, Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality, 82. 127  Allport, Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality, 51. 128  Krąpiec, Ja człowiek, 372. 129  M. A. Krąpiec, Psychologia racjonalna, Lublin: RW KUL, 1996, 266. 125

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One way to differentiate the two terms would be to say that the person is “given for” us and personality is “given to” us (as a task). That the person “is given” means that we do not create it.130 The person is a rational form of existence, and personality is this form of existence reflected in many different ways, acts, and relationships with the world and with other human beings.131 In Czesław Bartnik’s opinion, personality is our way of either expressing our existence (cognition and self-knowledge), or the principle of our external acts. This is similar to the view that a person’s nature is the basis of self-expression and manners of acting.132 Personality may also be described as a concrete way of being, expressive of an independent, rational nature.133 Through personality, we discover our identity – first, in getting to know our own personality and then the mysterium of personal existence. The person is a unified whole, whereas personality viewed as a structure is divisible, and it is in this way that it is studied and described by psychology. The person cannot be acquired or disposed of. The person is a metaphysical datum. Personality, on the other hand, may develop or regress, or may even develop only slightly. An American philosopher, Peter Bertocci states that personality is revealed when the person enters into relationships with other persons; it is the person’s more or less unfailing response to themselves, to others, and to their whole environment in light of what they really are.134 Although inherently a person, the human being is revealed as such through their personality.135 According to Frankl, by negotiating with the character one “has,” and desiring to transform it, the person continues to form this character and to take on the resulting personality. When we shape our destiny, the person we are forms our character and the personality that we come to have.136 Contrary to the real ‘self’, the specific nature of someone’s personality is optional. The notion of the self as personality encompasses all the the possibilities for ourselves, namely our sense of fulfillment, the realization 130  A. C. Knudson, The Philosophy of Personalism, New York-Cincinnati-Chicago: The Abingdon Press, 1927, 244-245. 131  Although one sometimes speaks of “becoming a person,” in the current study we will maintain the view that the person is our existence and only talk about the development of a personality and relationships with other people. If we speak of becoming a person, it must be understood in more of a moral than an ontic sense. 132  Bartnik, Personalizm, 177. 133  A. Podsiad, Słownik terminów i pojęć filozoficznych, Warszawa: PAX, 2001, 602. 134  P. A. Bertucci, The Person God Is, London-New York: Allen & Unwin, 1970, 95. 135  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 110. 136  Frankl, Homo patiens, 65.



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of values, and the major opportunities that appear when we confront the necessities of fate. Whoever deprives us of these opportunities, takes away a part of our selves – the space of the acting personality.137 The idea of personality always implies the substantiality of a person. This underlying reality is expressed explicite or implicite.138 Yet, in the modern era, Hume clearly negated the substantiality of the person, and many psychologists have accepted this way of understanding. James followed this path in his famous concept of the stream of consciousness. A struggle between the substantialistic and anti-substantialistic approaches has strongly marked research in the human sciences. The whole debate comes down to the existence and nature of the subject of mental phenomena. These terms, “person” and “personality,” share a common source, prosopon, which, as previously stated, originally referred to an actor’s mask. We could say that personality is the mask, the person is the actor, and human life the theatre. Personality is a feature of each person’s embodiment in matter, by which we can be encountered and known by other embodied persons and by ourselves.139 Personality, then, has a relational and dynamic character. It is basically understood in this way by both philosophers and psychologists. The person must be understood differently. It is only by participation in the act of a person’s existence that a personality exists at all, even if, in some cases, we cannot identify the act of existence expressed through a mature personality. Human dignity is based on this personal act of existence of a rational substance, which results in the existence of the body and psyche. Nowak could thus claim that the human person possesses an absolute dignity regardless of external factors or performed functions.140 With its bodily component, human nature is the appropriate environment to realize spiritual values, and humanize the world in which we live. We are spiritual beings, constituted as such by the combination of our subsistence and independence. Subsistence is fulfilled through our voluntary acceptance of a hierarchy of values assimilated and experienced in a responsible involvement and constant transformation. In this way, all of our activities are united in freedom and developed through creative  Frankl, Homo patiens, 16-17.  Oleś, Wprowadzenie do psychologii osobowości, 30. 139  S. Judycki, “Samoświadomość i unikalność osób ludzkich,” in P. Gutowski, P. Gut (eds.), Z dziejów filozoficznej refleksji nad człowiekiem. Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Profesora Jana Czerkawskiego (1939-2007), Lublin: KUL, 2007, 409-429. 140  A. J. Nowak, Psychologia eklezjalna, Lublin: KUL, 2005, 109. 137 138

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acts expressive of an individual calling.141 The person is first and foremost the substantiality of a spiritual act of being, and secondarily the dynamic of moral development. This latter characteristic is the person understood as a project, as an ethical task. According to Mounier it is this quality that may be defined as the personality. Personality develops thanks to one’s calling, one’s embodiment, and the communion one enjoys with others. The human being cannot grow other than in community be it spiritual or physical. Community, therefore, has more meaning and value than the society in which the person lives. One’s calling is the power which unifies human life and gives it meaning. One’s embodiment first brings an openness to other persons. This openness can develop into interests as wideranging as concern over world’s events. This is made possible due to the bodily nature of our existence. As community takes on more meaning, it may lead to communion; this demands the highest degree of selflessness and is the greatest gift one can share. For this reason, we can conclude that embodiment happens through involvement in the issues of the world, while breaking away from oneself, enabling true community (communion) with others.142 As each human being is inherently a person, we cannot talk about the dissociation of the person (schizophrenia), but rather about the dissociation of the personality. Even the most seriously sick human being always remains a person, which is the basis of their value and dignity. Personality, however, has an empirical origin, insofar as it represents the organization of the psychophysical system, and refers to behaviour that may be anywhere from mature to psychotic or neurotic. As we develop throughout life, we learn specific behaviours, and thereby acquire a unique personality. The development of the personality is affected by several factors, each researched by particular social sciences: the upbringing, environment, genetics, etc. It is through personality that the person reveals themselves to the outside world.143 The person is expressed and manifested through and in a concrete form of personality.144 These philosophical/psychological beginnings in the understanding of human existence are completed by analyses in theology, where we can draw on God’s revelation and experiences of the mystics. The relationship between what was called the deep self and the superficial self, or in  Mounier, Manifesto al servizio del personalismo communitario, 65-66.  M. Fazio, Storia delle idee contemporanee, Roma: Santa Croce, 2005, 215. 143  A. J. Nowak, Osobowość sakramentalna, Lublin: RW KUL, 1997, 57-59; Psychologia eklezjalna, 109. 144  Nowak, Psychologia eklezjalna, 110. 141

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other words, between the person and the personality, as described by numerous philosophers, seems particularly interesting in this context. From this distinctive viewpoint, interesting analyses can be found in the works of Catholic writer, Wilfrid Stinissen, who is both a theologian and a philosopher. As an existentialist philosopher, he writes that we tend to aspire to promote ourselves, probably as a result of low self-esteem. This may be caused by the fact that we often live on the surface of our being and it is here that we build our identity. Yet, there lies hidden within us a more basic constituent of the human being that remains part of all that exists, making questions about the superior and inferior assessments of our value as humans futile. Lower self-esteem can only occur when we compare ourselves with others, when we distinguish “mine” from “yours.” Through love, however, we are united with others, and there can be no question of inferiority or superiority. Clearly, the human being possesses an observable external personality as well as a deeper, more obscure component. The psychophysical resources of our nature studied by psychology make up this external personality. It is a combination of genetics and social factors. From this perspective, we classify the human person as being young or old, ugly or beautiful, wise or foolish, choleric or phlegmatic. The external human being is simply an individual with specific traits that become evident in the results of psychological testing. In fact, as human beings, we attempt to present ourselves as best we can, making our outer image ingratiating and neglecting the potential depth of our interior life. Human existence is frequently a process of identification with an external image, which may definitely be real but does not include the whole of human existence. The discovery of our human depths results in a decrease in the importance of the external personality and the disappearance of any need to defend it. If someone tried to attack this external façade, they would be striking at a void because we would no longer be there.145 No human being is able to define for another person what they are really like. Even the most empathetic and affirming statements can only tell another person who they seem to be to someone who appreciates or even loves them. As long as we, as human beings, do not discover our true identity, we will be unable to find the ultimate meaning of our apparently accidental presence in this world, and on that basis, form an idea of our calling. Without discovering our identity, we are left to  W. Stinissen, Ani Joga, ani Zen, Poznań: W drodze, 2000, 36-37.

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r­ elative, temporary, mutual relationships, where acceptance is given, and then taken away.146 We can find our true identity only in God. For Balthasar, we reach this goal by following Christ’s example. Finding our human identity consists in gradually surrendering ourselves to the mission given to us by God. Through this task, we can discover our true selves and identity, both as individual and as active members of society.147 Interestingly, according to Stinissen, leaving external features aside brings about a more fully developed human being, as focusing inward results in hidden personality traits showing externally. However, for many, it is difficult to be in touch with their interiority. It appears that a lot of human beings prefer their sickness and captivity to true freedom. Their life evolves within the confinement of safe habits. And yet, the human being who is truly aware of who they are knows true freedom and simply bursts with love.148 To answer the question “who are you?” our first inclination is to simply share our personal information: first and last name, date and place of birth, social status, etc. If encouraged to do so, we may go on to mention a few personal character traits. But in order to share more completely about ourselves as human beings, we may feel the need to have recourse to psychology or psychiatry. Thanks to research accomplished in these areas, we may feel able to reach the hidden parts of our subconscious such as repressed feelings and conflicts, and even discover the underlying structure of our personality. But this does not introduce us to the deepest essence of our human nature. We should recognize that in the event that someone exhibits developmental deficits or complexes, or fails to demonstrate a sufficient degree of social adaptation, this does not affect their deepest self which originates in God and returns to God.149 Who are we really in the eyes of God? The human being is the temple of God (1 Cor 3:16), the new creation (2 Cor 5:17), the house of God through the Spirit (Eph 2:22). The outer layer of a human being is connected with their first and last name, while the inner person possesses a new name given by God, which, according to the Book of Revelation, is written for us on a white stone (Rev 2:17). The source of the inner person 146  H. U. von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory III. Dramatis Personae: Persons in Christ, San Francisco: Ignatius, 1992, 205. 147  von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory III. Dramatis Personae, 270-271. 148  Stinissen, Ani Joga, ani Zen, 38-39. 149  Stinissen, Ani Joga, ani Zen, 40-41.



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can always be found in the depths of any human being. It is just necessary to reach it. As John Paul II presented it in the poem, “Roman Triptych,” a human being is someone searching for the source of their existence.150 A place is prepared in us ready to welcome God’s Spirit. It is the appropriately formed human spirit (pneuma) that recognizes that we are “from His family” (Acts 17:28) and wants to become a participant in God’s nature (2 Peter 1:4). Pneuma then is this part of ourselves that originates in God and returns to God. Therefore, we are truly paschal, homo viator, partaking in the continuous passage as well as the unfolding of our spiritual journey. The real choice to be made is not between matter and spirit, but faith and non-faith, homo animalis and homo spiritualis.151 We will discuss this issue in detail further on in the book. Horizontally, we are called to develop our humanity and human personality until they reach full maturity. Vertically, however, our theandric (divine-human) structure is called to develop the Christlikeness in ourselves (Gal 4:19) – until “the measure of greatness according to the fullness of Christ” (Eph 4:13) materializes.152 We get to know ourselves and shape our personality thanks to other human beings. Yet, complete self-knowledge occurs only through the union with the divine “Thou” at the height of personal self-awareness or in the deepest areas of ourselves, where with the help of grace we discover our divine origin. The development of a personality takes place around the metaphysical self of the human being.153 The person is free, but the personality is determined in a variety of ways. The person is the spirit and the human personality is related to the functioning of our body and psyche, which is to some extent determined by heredity. Due to their genotype, the spiritual person shapes their personality which reveals itself as a developed phenotype. It seems to be clear then, that the character is created, while the person is existential and creative.154 Von Balthasar expresses the priority of person over personality in the directive to go from living “in personality to the life in the person” or living according to God’s plan, which we discover in a personal relationship with Christ. “The personality has to die” – the human being has to  Stinissen, Ani Joga, ani Zen, 47-49.  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 40. 152  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 53; M. Chmielewski, “Duchowość a horyzontalizm społeczeństwa europejskiego,” Soter 17 (2006), 19-26. 153  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 46. 154  Frankl, Homo patiens, 247. 150 151

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die to “untruth” within ourselves, to everything that is in opposition to God, for example, pride. The human personality needs to be cleared of all obstacles which stand in the way of becoming Christ-like – or, as von Balthasar would say, by “becoming truly the person.” The human being achieves this goal when our understanding of ourselves is in accord with God’s knowledge of us. When the soul is so steeped in God’s truth and lives only in this truth, having surrendered its own ideas, concerns, and expectations, the soul becomes truly humble, because humility is simply participation in God’s truth. Humility is one of the key signs that the human being is becoming Christ-like, that they have overcome the superficiality of their personality and become a person fulfilling and revealing God’s will in their lives.155 Ideally, baptism should see us leave our external personality behind to return to the internal person, where our similarity to God is revealed. The external personality should melt in the warmth of God’s love which springs forth from the very depths the person, because the most important thing is to find life (John 11:26)!156 Spirituality as described in philosophy While our relationship with God has been amptly decribed in theological literature, especially the theology of the internal life or, from the contemporary standpoint, the theology of spirituality, the issues of spirituality continue to remain of interest to philosophy, which studies the natural conditions of our relationship to God. In this way, philosophy (sometimes called the philosophy of mysticism) is an important complement to theology as it shows the existential-structural conditions of this relationship, describing both God’s and the human being’s natures and persons.157 God’s invitation to enter into a relationship cannot negate our existential structure, our cognitive and affective potential, and, most importantly, our free will. The input from philosophy is therefore crucial to the correct understanding of human spirituality. It is Karol Wojtyła’s perspective that spirituality can be viewed either on the level of phenomenology or ontology. On the phenomenological 155  V. S. Harrison, “Personal Identity and Integration: Von Balthasar’s Phenomenology of Human Holiness,” The Heythrop Journal 40 (1999), 430. 156  Stinissen, Ani Joga, ani Zen, 54-55. 157  Wojcieszek, Na początku była rozpacz, 96-97.



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level, that is, on the level of experience, spirituality is revealed through the transcendence of a person’s act of existence. From the ontological perspective, spirituality emerges through our inner core which we can reach by analyzing the nature of human acts.158 Wojtyła, with great passion, discussed the pure and spiritual self. The experience related to the transcendence of the person refers us to the spiritual self of the human being which goes far beyond the body.159 Wojtyła is not the creator of the next personalism, because every “-ism” is a reduction of the human being; rather he is a personologist or founder of personology because, for him, the person is the starting point of all philosophical and theological reflection.160 Victor Frankl presents a similar view of spirituality. Both Wojtyła and Frankl were inspired by Max Scheler’s anthropology. Therefore, we will begin our philosophical investigaton of spirituality with a general outline of Scheler’s views. Max Scheler’s philosophy of the human being According to Scheler, the person is the being and concrete unity of various of our acts as well as their basis. In our every act, the whole person acts, although we are not completed in individual acts. The person is not reducible to consciousness or the object of interior perception, nor to the self viewed as the opposite of the other self, or the outside world, because the word “self” describes the relationship of the subject to the objects of the outside world. Although God can be described as a person, we cannot call God a “self” since the outside world does not exist for God. For example, the person acts, goes to the cinema, but the self cannot do that, although in informal language, we express ourselves this way. The person remains beyond the opposites “self/you,” “exterior/ interior,” or “mental/physical.” In Scheler’s opinion, the person cannot be viewed on the basis of their outer actions or experiences. The reverse process, however, is possible: when we understand who the person is, we can understand their acts. Each person is a unique individual, different from others, who is never introverted (closed in on oneself). The complete person is basically a member of some community which, in turn, is a part of a higher level 158  Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 185; M. Chmielewski, “Duchowość według Jana Pawła II. Studium na podstawie encyklik i adhortacji,” Biblioteka Teologii Duchowości 3 (2013), 84-102. 159  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 128. 160  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 35.

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of social organization. The person as a spiritual individual is a part of the eternal community, which goes beyond all earthly levels of the social organization. The essence of the person as an individual is founded within us and is expressed through our appropriate acts (our world), including social acts due to which we are seen as “social persons.” Hence, everyone possesses an individual “interior person” and a “social person” who remains in a constant relationship with some other.161 The individual person is aware of the fact that they are unable to fully comprehend society as the sum of the persons making it up, and society is unable to fully understand the individual person. Rather, the person possesses the world as their equal in such a way that one world is subordinated to each person. In this approach, the truth, understood traditionally as the correspondence of judgment with reality, undergoes a process of personalization and becomes the truth of the person (the monad). This is not about the relativity of the truth; it is about truth’s human dimension. In the face of phenomenological assumptions concerning the uniqueness of each self, it is difficult to talk about a unified world of experience if we do not assume the existence of a perfect and spiritual being whose acts of consciousness exhaust all the possible acts consciousness of finite persons. For Scheler, this concept of God becomes the real world’s principle of unity and identity.162 Although essential, the organic body is the property of a person, the entity we have some control over, and the fact that slavery in ancient times eliminated the status of the person, even with consciousness (the soul), is for Scheler, proof that neither consciousness nor character makes the person. The person is not connected to characterological changes. As we have seen even mental disorders basically do not touch the person. We can only state that in extreme cases, mental disorders make the person invisible on the outside.163 Following Heidegger’s concept of the human as an all transcending being, Scheler found the essential principle of our existence in our development. This is not a pure movement towards its end, but the journey of becoming a person, reaching a way of existence different from that of other beings. Thanks to becoming a person, the human being takes its proper place in the cosmos,164 marked by the aforementioned ability to transcend  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 543.  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 411. 163  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 505. 164  M. Scheler, Pisma z antropologii filozoficznej i teorii wiedzy, trans. S. Czerniak, A. Węgrzecki, Warszawa: PWN, 1987. 161

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what is encountered in one’s self and the world. In brief, the essence of human existence is not to be a substance, but rather the very personal life of our spiritual acts. In Scheler’s view, the person is an “acting structure,” a configuration of acts that reach beyond space and time.165 Scheler’s main point is that being a person is not given from the very beginning, but by gradual becoming. If this is the case, then how do we become a person? Scheler claims that it is necessary to have full use of our mental faculties in order to act from within our spiritual centre. It is also imperative to have the ability to distinguish the self from others and to control the appearance of ourselves to others, i.e. the body. For Scheler, the body has the energy needed to express ourselves externally. In this vision, the body is something below the person. The person can resist bodily impulses and mental functions and can even choose to cut itself off from them. By becoming a person, we become fully free, ready to use our spiritual will to make our own decisions and choices. The ultimate horizon of a person is, for Scheler, those objective values that are eternal and independent of us. Getting to know this axiological dimension of reality makes our full development possible. Yet, while discussing the development of a person, Scheler evidently has in mind what we call here the personality. The assumption that a human being is not a person from the very begining is very dangerous. As long as we can indirectly point to the development of a human being, revealing their spiritual constitution and moral progress, we cannot deny them the dignity of personal being right from the very begining. Can there be more being or less? Scheler clearly refers to the ethical dimension of humanity which is realized by the virtues of personal existence. It is a relevant dimension, but, at the same time, the ontological level cannot be omitted. Knowing God, according to Scheler, is based on sensing the value of the “infinitely sacred” or “divine.” Thanks to its ability to experience the value of the “sacred,” the human being is theomorphic, and has the highest value among created beings. This is true of all human beings regardless of religion.166 Wojtyła comments on Scheler’s approach and says that Scheler, like Kant, builds his philosophy on an a priori analysis of what is given to consciousness. For Kant, the same given is of a rational nature, whereas 165  M. Scheler, Istota i formy sympatii, trans. A. Węgrzecki, Warszawa: PWN, 1986, 336. 166  K. Wojtyła, Wykłady lubelskie, Lublin: TN KUL, 1986, 165.

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for Scheler, it is an emotional nature. In both cases, the human being is viewed as the subject and not as an object of consciousness. The existence of the human being is somewhat “immersed” in consciousness and absorbed by it.167 Furthermore, Wojtyła claims that using a set of experiences to define human existence greatly disintegrates it because it removes the substantial subject of that existential unity. Nature normally constitutes the principle of the unity of human existence. Reducing it to the sum of various experiences or phenomena causes great disintegration, so it no longer exists in an existential unity.168 In Scheler’s view, we can see a strong element of formalism because a person lives only in their acts and the result is a formal unity. Transcendence only exists in an a priori reference to an immanent unifying law of experience. Separating the person from the self-subject, from the substantial soul and not recognizing the person’s permanent being of any kind, reduces them to a formal unity of mental acts.169 According to Scheler, the person is not a substantial being, but rather the unity of experiences. Thus, he ignores a dynamic aspect of subjective unity.170 The emotional life of a person culminates in the act of love, which should be understood as the maximum readiness and maturity to experience value.171 Wojtyła follows Scheler’s intuitions closely, but not in respect to the substance of human existence. In so doing, he remains faithful to the classical approach of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas.172 Although Frankl, too, fails to clearly emphasize the substantiality of the spiritual dimension of human existence, seeing it rather as a relational being (to be discussed in later analyses), Frankl has in mind a sense of existential suppositum or a subject. According to Scheler, the human person exists, and yet must be perfected. The person exists, however, thanks to a personal act of existence. As a principle of vegetative, sensual, and rational acts in connection with one’s body, the person may not be fully developed from the very beginning. But this is not merely about the development of the body or personality, which also characterizes animals and is under the control of our  Wojtyła, Wykłady lubelskie, 72-173.  Wojtyła, Wykłady lubelskie, 285, 287. 169  Granat, Osoba ludzka, 30. 170  Wojtyła, Wykłady lubelskie, 25, 35. 171  Wojtyła, Wykłady lubelskie, 159. 172  A. Jastrzębski, “Kardynała Karola Wojtyły koncepcja człowieka,” Teologia i Człowiek 12 (2008), 123-137. 167 168



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genetic makeup and environmental conditions. Personal development is about free moral choice, during which a person makes decisions by and for themselves: they learn how to behave and in what direction to develop. Free decisions are those made without any pressure, and they help to define one’s future. In this sense, we have a task to create ourselves, to answer the calling to become fully human and move beyond, to the calling to sainthood.173 The phenomenology of spirituality The primary experience of a human being is, as subject, the experience of our own behaviour or acts. Knowing the nature of these acts is selfknowledge. First and foremost, our acts are revealed in our phenomenological self, and additionally, our own self. The basis of the self, understood as the conscious experience of the subject, is the self in terms of personal subjectivity (the personal act of existence). Our consciousness discovers the existence of the self and attempts to identify with it, but it is only a reflection of the self, understood as the sum of its acts of selfknowledge. Personal subjectivity remains different from consciousness, as the foundation of consciousness reflected in it through the experience of the self. Self-awareness is the result of objectifying our self-knowledge, making the self the object of study, but it needs to be stressed that it is the subject (the self) that is the source of cognitive activity, and consciousness is only a screen to project the effects of that activity. Consciousness is the intuitive act of the ego towards itself. It helps us to remember our experiences and to distinguish the self and non-self. Consciousness contains our relationship with the world, but, at the same time, transcends it. The self can become self-aware only thanks to the principle that takes consciousness beyond itself. Consciousness is personal, or connected with the person, community-related, and surpasses both the personal and social, in a metaphysical sense.174 Consciousness is the gate to human spirituality, making it possible for us to experience both our outer existence and inner capacity to act spiritually. Yet, the source of our spirituality is beyond direct experience. We get to the ontological structure of spirituality through the use of rational analysis. Spirituality also possesses an experiential, phenomenological side when it is manifested by various signs, for instance, by prayer. In fact,  J. F. Donceel, Philosophical Psychology, New York: Sheed & Ward, 1955, 347.  Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 69.

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all human experiences remain constitutively related to consciousness. This is particularly true for so-called interior experiences, which are cognitive and rooted in consciousness, which, in turn reflects their nature.175 A well-functioning nervous system is required for the development of consciousness and spirituality, but by itself, is neither the former or the latter. It is merely a tool to help reveal both consciousness and spirituality, neither of which is merely imaginary.176 Many of the processes underlying consciousness also take place independently of consciousness itself. These unconscious phenomena are classified by Frankl as impulsive and spiritual. Frankl denies Freud’s conception of the impulsive unconscious as the only source of mental activity. He points to the suppression of some impulses, which cannot be explained by the impulses themselves. The ego must be something outside the sphere of impulses. Hence, in Frankl’s opinion, the spiritual may counter the strength of our impulses. We do this almost unconsciously. In this way, Frankl formulates his famous theory of unconscious spirituality. From the very beginning of our lives as humans, we do not show that we are spiritual persons through any exterior behaviour that can be observed. As a pianist learns to play the piano, however, so the spiritual person gradually reveals itself. Ultimately, the human body is the potentiality, the psyche is its realization, and spirituality can be seen thanks to the presence of the psyche in the body. The spiritual person develops only in relationships, and although this type of development is not the essence of a spiritual person, it takes its presence for granted. The self-awareness of our own existence appears in the context of our relationships. For Wundt, therefore, consciousness equals the soul, and conscious actions equal spiritual actions. This type of approach in psychology is called actualism.177 In examining our experience, we have access only to their effects, which lead us to search for an adequate cause. We first experience our spirituality, and only after that are we able to define it rationally. The content of spiritual experience is a combination of each component of a person’s transcendence in action: conscience, duty, responsibility, freedom, truthfulness, and self-determination. However, the soul’s experience is more than this content, because it also defines the very  Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 47-48.  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 137. 177  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 138. 175

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spiritual self of the human being. This is the beginning of spiritual metaphysics as well.178 The body is the means of expressing the human soul, yet it is the spiritual soul that is the ultimate principle of the integrity of the human being as a person.179 While analyzing the existential situation of the human being, Wojtyła points out two levels of dynamism: the vegetative, which has a lower degree of awareness (for example, the heartbeat); and the experiential, where we see that consciousness seems to be the basis of undertaking responsible actions. Wojtyła describes the division made in classical philosophy between actus humanus and actus hominis as imprecise, because each human act (actus humanus) is, at the same time, the act of the human being (actus hominis). What helps one understand the meaning of the two terms is the fleeting awareness of being causative, or the ability to experience the fact of being simultaneously the doer and the cause of one’s own actions. In this way, actus hominis includes actus humanus because each conscious act involves the whole of one’s existence. The experience of being causative also appears to be the criterium with the help of which we can differentiate between the passive element in our nature (in Wojtyła’s words, the activation of nature), and the proper act of a person (the act). The moral nature of a human being, particularly, becomes the first material (the object) of their own causative quality (creativity). Frankl also accepts the basic assumptions of phenomenology, specifically, the intentionality of human consciousness which he transposes onto the whole of our existence, adding those spiritual components beyond consciousness. In reality, for Frankl, it is in our nature to be open to a world filled with other beings who can be met, as well as with meanings that can be fulfilled. But values play an important role in the intentional orientation of human existence and its hierarchy. The human being becomes the carrier of values when living a life based on those values, through their lifestyle and even through their internal attitude towards the world. Frankl considered those values related to our attitude towards the world to be the most important. This essential feature of a human being is most completely revealed in situations of suffering and how we cope with them. This includes “no-fault” suffering, such as the suffering associated with sickness, but also suffering “chosen” for the sake of higher values. Suffering makes sense if it is not fruitless. The highest  Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 186.  Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 201-202.

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meaning of life is life itself, one’s very existence. Yet, freeing the human being from the necessary suffering would be inhuman. The human being has the right to suffer their pain; similarly, they have the right to die their own death and the right to repent their faults.180 The individual is unique both in essence and existence. One cannot be replaced by another. Sooner or later, however, the life of a human being comes to an end, and consequently, the unique opportunity that was given to them. The ontology of spirituality We owe our spirituality to the unity of our acts. This is evident phenomenologically. Now we move from the phenomena of spirituality to the ontological principle, the spiritual element in the human being that determines the unity of our existence. Phenomenologically grasped, the human capacity for transcendence leads us to a metaphysics of spirituality, where, as an ontological principle, it unites the whole of our existence in agency and responsibility, self-determination and conscience, that is to say, freedom and truth.181 The notion of spirituality as a dynamism and potentiality unlocks the complexity of human nature, uniting our two elements to enable a spiritual life. Phenomenological experience, in turn, shows the unity of a human being as a person. From the phenomenological point of view, spirituality presents the person’s transcendence in action. From the ontological perspective, however, spirituality is the principle of unity and the source of our existence.182 The significant turn in anthropology occurred through the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas who, while not distancing himself from ancient Greek views, also referred to those of St. Paul. Aristotle’s purely biological interpretation of the soul being unacceptable to St. Thomas, he established it as the substantial, immortal, spiritual, and indestructible form of the body. Yet, he followed Aristotle with respect to the individuation of the soul in the substantial form of a concrete body. In this way, St. Thomas brought back the biblical unity of human existence, in which the body goes somewhat beyond its limits thanks to the soul.183  Frankl, Homo patiens, 196.  Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 185. 182  Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 185-186. 183  Bouyer, Introduction to Spirituality, 152. 180 181



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The metaphysical roots of our existence are in God. The principle of our identity is the hand of God. That is why it is impossible to adequately define our nature without reference to God. We owe our existence to God and should be constantly thankful for it.184 The fundamental truth about us is that we are first the existential being and, second, the acting one. We must first of all be in order to act. Although, in the cognitive order, we infer the existence of the subject from the act, the ontological order is the reverse, esse is primary to acting. Wojtyła refers to the teachings of St. Thomas to distinguish a being from its existence, pointing out at the same time how much being is accidental to the latter. Existence occupies a privileged place in relation to acting; specifically, it precedes it, it is the primordial one. All the dynamisms that occur in the human being as a subject remain secondary to the primary dynamism, existence (esse).185 By means of their body the human being falls under the laws of nature, they remain in time and space, and thus separated from other beings. Although the human being is itself the unity of various dimensions, this unity is far from perfect or balanced. The spiritual person is above time, perfectly present in themselves, present in the body, but also transcendent to it. Each human being is ultimately the revealed mystery of their existential essence. We can say that being an acting subject as well as a value (gift) presupposes an earlier existing ontological structure. Hence, the axiological must be preceded by the ontological understanding of our nature. All the actions of a human being (operari) are integrated in the person.186 The element that connects happenings (occurrences) in the human being and the person’s acts, as mentioned above, is existence (esse) itself. The operari analysis of self-transcendence leads to the discovery of our esse. In order to get beyond ourselves, it is necessary to just be. Frankl speaks in the same spirit. He introduces the spiritual dimension of the human being and the related issue of the existence of the soul that had been missing in scientific discourse. Furthermore, he opposes the reduction of humanity to a machine pushed by impulses and social conditions. Often unconsciously, we give meaning to our existence, which has its source beyond us, in the unknown You/Thou, God. We measure ourselves by something greater than ourselves. According to  Stinissen, Człowiek prawdziwy, 14, 16.  A. Wójtowicz, Osoba i transcendencja (Karola Wojtyły antropologia wiary i Kościoła), Wrocław: Wydawn. Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1993, 153. 186  Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 90-91. 184 185

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Frankl, we only begin to show our spiritual dimension (the ability to self-transcend) when our spiritual layer takes control over the psychophysical. Only then do we completely manifest who we can be. Our dignity is inseparably connected with our spiritual dimension. No sickness can decrease our spiritual, immaterial existence. Frankl says it can only be “covered up.” Since the spiritual person has to use their organism to communicate with the world, their handicap will result in a certain inertia, but not the annihilation of their existence. In our essence there remains an openness to the world filled with other beings who can be met and with meanings needing to be fulfilled.187 Frankl claims that life is a task and the whole of our existence is the way to answer it. Life is always posing questions to us and urging us to give answers, mostly in acts. There are no ready answers and each human being has to find them independently, accepting responsibility for their own freedom. In Frankl’s approach, this constitutes the responsiveness of our nature. To formulate his anthropology, Frankl relies on Scheler, Christian teaching, and existential philosophy. For Frankl, spirituality is the ontological foundation of anthropology. He does not provide a definition of the term “personality,” saying only that a human being is the person, and takes on a form of personality by shaping their own character.188 We discussed the topic of personality earlier in this chapter. Frankl’s most important contribution is to have recognized the independence of our own psychophysical features. Human behaviour cannot be presented in a deterministic way, because we ourselves shape it. The psychophysical factuality forms the boundaries within which we can modify it, not only superficially but also essentially, to the degree that we become responsible for shaping ourselves.189 He also postulated that the somatic and psychic aspects are separable and operate relatively independently of one another.190 We can talk about the four layers in the human being: the physical, and organic, the world of the soul, and the world of the spirit.191 The physical world and the mental worlds are somewhat parallel. As humans, however, we have various attitudes to our psyche. One melancholic person, for example,  Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 113.  Frankl, Homo patiens, 70. 189  A. Nelicki, “‘Metakliniczna’ koncepcja osoby V. E. Frankla,” in A. Gałdowa (ed.), Klasyczne i współczesne koncepcje osobowości, Kraków: Wydawnictwo UJ, 1999, 178. 190  Frankl, Homo patiens, 153. 191  Frankl, Homo patiens, 154. 187

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sinks into deep melancholy, and another one attempts to cope with it, somehow rises above it and distances themselves internally from their psychophysical condition.192 The difference between Wojtyła and Frankl is also clear. Although both of them use M. Scheler’s assumptions and come to similar conclusions about human spirituality, they differ around the point of the ontology of spirituality. Wojtyła refers us to the classical interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas, in which the human being is described as a close unity of the body and soul. Yet, Frankl talks about the trichotomy of the human being: body, psyche, and spirit. This type of division was present in the early Christian tradition, but it is hard to determine whether or not this was the source of Frankl’s inspiration. The issue of the trichotomy of the human being, according to the Fathers of the Church, will be discussed in Chapter 4, in “The Spiritual Core of the Human Being.” In Frankl’s view, despite being multilayered, the spirit is the inner axis of the human being, around which, first, the layer of the psyche, and next, the bodily aspects of the human being are concentrically placed. These layers differ from each other not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. Frankl calls the spiritual layer of the human being noetic.193 The spiritual person appears to be immortal. It is not created by one’s parents and can exist beyond any psychophysical conditions. Spirituality does not simply mean consciousness because, clearly, there is also the spiritual unconscious expressed in the non-reflective performance of spiritual acts. Actual consciousness is closely connected with the condition of the organism. We can imagine that the spirit possesses some type of transcendant life to which we do not have, and will probably never have, any direct conscious access.194 Frankl encourages us to imagine the body, the psyche, and the spirit as related to one another concentrically (the body on the very outside, and the spirit on the very inside) and introduces the principle that the lower layer cannot be the cause of the higher. The layers, however, are interrelated, and the biological layer creates conditions for the mental, although it does not produce it. The body is the biological-physiological layer of the human being. The soul is the psychological-sociological layer. The spirit is the noetic layer. The life processes common to plants,  Frankl, Homo patiens, 154.  Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 22. 194  Frankl, Homo patiens, 232-233. 192 193

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animals, and human beings occur in the biological-physiological layer and the experiences and reflexes typical of both animals and human beings originate in the psychological-sociological layer, while the conscious thinking, choices, and inner attitudes of the human being take place in the spiritual layer.195 Frankl also claims that these layers of the being differ from each other essentially and should be distinguished from one another, although, in reality, they are inseparably connected and can be separated only heuristically and artificially. The human being is a unity, a physical, mental, and spiritual whole, and the spiritual in us, the spiritual person, is the complex basis and guarantee of this unity and completeness.196 Responding to brain localization studies, Frankl states that they allow us to establish the location of damage to a particular area of the brain that may cause disturbances to specific mental functions. So, as the body affects the psyche, the psyche affects the spirit (spirituality). The healthy psyche is nonetheless the sine qua non condition of the empirical manifestation of the spiritual person. The physical organism is the instrument through which the spiritual person organizes the psychophysical organism as a whole.197 Without the psychophysical organism, the spiritual person would have no chance of being revealed, but the organism itself is not and cannot be the cause of our spirituality. We are spiritual from the very beginning, and the natural sciences cannot explain the fact of our coming into being, the appearing of one’s self as a person. Based on science, we know only one thing: the origins of the bodily conditions for spiritual existence. These conditions, the chromosomes, come from our parents, but were only minimally required for our existence. For the wholeness of our existence, including the spirit, they would be inadequate. According to Frankl, the spirit has to come from outside of the body and the soul. But even when this happens, the spiritual dimension is still concealed. It is still silent; it waits to reveal its presence, to be able to break the silence, to break through the overt layers of its psychophysical constituency.198 Frankl further claims that the spiritually cognitive subject ‘possesses’ the others as the objects of cognition. Spiritual existence 195  K. Popielski, M. Wolicki, “Antropologiczno-filozoficzne podstawy analizy egzystencjalnej i niektóre jej aplikacje do teorii osobowości,” in K. Popielski (ed.), Człowiek – pytanie otwarte. Studia z logoteorii i logoterapii, Lublin: RW KUL, 1987, 101-106. 196  Frankl, Homo patiens, 84. 197  Frankl, Homo patiens, 219. 198  Frankl, Homo patiens, 173.



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is our ultimate concern. We do not want to exist at any price, but what we really want is to live a meaningful life. For existence, the reliable and decisive factor is not its continuation but its wholeness.199 Properly speaking, in the trychotomic point of view, the human being possesses the body and soul, but is the spirit. Yet, in reality, all these elements remain perfectly united. We do not “consist of” the body, the soul and the spirit, but “are” all of these simultaneously since our spiritual dimension is the connecting link of our existence and determines our dignity. The hierarchic layers of the structure of our being do not come from interior division, but from the mutual relationship of body, soul, and spirit. The spiritual person is constantly related to their body and soul, and is only formally, or conceptually, divided from either one.200 In Frankl’s view, the spirit is the pure dynamic of existence; it has an existential status. In this way, Frankl follows Scheler. Freedom needs a psychophysical factor, including impulses, as a context for it to fulfill itself and establish a bar for it to rise above. Frankl calls this state of affairs the facultative, noopsychic antagonism and finds its essence in our ability to distance ourselves from our own psychophysical organism. This is just the humanity of the human being. Unlike other animals, we can distance ourselves from our impulsiveness and do not have to identify with it.201 Contrary to Scheler, Frankl deems that the spiritual person is not transformed into something else, unlike the body whose atoms are used again in the structure of other beings. The spirit cannot be anything other than the person. As we know, the human being is not a pure spirit. That is why our self-consciousness is never complete and always contains the consciousness of something other than ourselves. With a damaged sensory apparatus, we would be unable to know the material world, especially our own existence. Our spirit remains connected to matter which is the source of substantial tension and suffering. William James argued that although the stream of consciousness may disappear with the death of the brain, the very being and foundation of that consciousness may remain untouched and become the basis of another type of consciousness, which would basically mean its continuity after death.202  Frankl, Homo patiens, 76.  Frankl, Homo patiens, 206. 201  Frankl, Homo patiens, 252-253. 202  W. James, Essays in Religion and Morality, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989, 87. 199

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According to both Scheler and Frankl, mental illnesses, like neurosis or psychosis, do not threaten the spiritual life. Frankl adds that illness may become the impulse, the challenge leading to a deeper spiritual reflection. Even if neurotic disorders push us towards religion, our religious experiences can be very authentic, and in the long term they may become a healing factor. Consequently, we cannot assume that neurotic symptoms make it impossible to experience authentic religiosity. Jesus says that ultimately it is the truth that sets us free. For Frankl, it does not mean that deep and mature faith automatically guarantees the healing of neurotic disorders or that the freedom from neurosis automatically guarantees a rich spiritual life.203 Frankl is also opposed to identifying strict locations of particular mental functions in specific parts of the brain. We can only speak of the somatic conditions of their existence. Furthermore, we cannot locate the soul of the human being. It is obvious that damage in some parts of the brain can cause the handicap of particular mental functions, but it does not mean that those functions are located there. Talk of the “habitat of the soul” and searching for it in the brain, is nonsense. Equally nonsensical is the general assumption of the brain and mental processes being identical. Mental processes are conditioned by physical ones, but they are not induced by them. Only the disruptions of psychic functions can be induced.204 In this way, Frankl sensed intuitively what has been confirmed by neurobiological research mentioned in the second chapter of this book, in the section entitled “Promissory Materialism.” Somatic illness distorts psychic function, and pharmacotherapy only removes this distortion. Spiritual phenomena are not induced by the biological factor, but only conditioned by it. What illness makes impossible, recovery makes possible again.205 What is spiritual in us cannot be modified with the help of surgery because the spiritual layer is in itself unaffected by bodily factors. Bodily features constitute the condition required to reveal spirituality, but are not the cause of its existence. ­Illness limits the opportunity for the spiritual personality to develop, and healing recreates optimum conditions for the spiritual layer to thrive. Clarifying the role of illness thus provides the insight into the conditions needed to reveal the spiritual layer.206  Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 133.  Frankl, Homo patiens, 184-185. 205  Frankl, Homo patiens, 186. 206  Frankl, Homo patiens, 197. 203

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For Frankl, the spiritual person relates to their organism as the musician to their instrument. The musical piece cannot be played without either the musician or the instrument. This is not a perfect image, as spirit and matter are on different planes of existence. We cannot see the spirit in the way we see the pianist because the spirit is essentially invisible. It nonetheless helps us to see what happens to the body and the spirit in illness. When the instrument is out of tune, even the most highly skilled virtuoso will not be able to perform a musical piece properly. Only tuning the piano, or curing the illness, makes the proper performance of the musical piece possible. Yet tuning the piano is no substitute for a skilled performance. A poor musician will not play beautifully, even on the well-tuned instrument. Although we participate to some degree in the suffering of our organism, the spiritual person does not suffer from illness, but the organism (instrument) does. Frankl concludes that we cannot say that the spiritual person is healthy or sick, but that they are true or false.207 The mentally ill suffer from an instrumental inertia and expressive invisibility of their person, but, in spite of that, should not be regarded as having lost their dignity. The spiritual person is unchanged by psychophysical processes and their dignity is beyond the biology level. In mental illness, we only seem to lose our dignity because of the loss of our social usefulness (utilitarian dignity), but not because of the way we exist. We continue to exist as spiritual persons. Probably, a better way to express this is to say that human beings differ from one another in respect to their social value, but they do not differ from each other in view of their dignity, the dignity of the human person. The human person cannot be destroyed, although we may be distorted in our external aspect. However, to some degree, serious mental illness precludes the possibility of continued spiritual growth for the spiritual person.208 When we reflect on this topic in theological terms, following Berdyaev’s train of thought, we can say that the person is not born; they are created by God and connected with eternity. The person is an axiological category, they are wholeness and unity, possessing absolute and ­eternal value. The individual may lack such unity; they may be disintegrated, but the person remains untouched. The person does not come into being through evolution or a process of socialization and cannot be adequately described in biological or sociological terms. The person is a  Frankl, Homo patiens, 198-200.  Frankl, Homo patiens, 201-202.

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spiritual being, the highest value in the created world, and is the carrier and transmitter of spiritual values.209 Homo capax Dei We come into this world with an intrinsic propensity to search for the sacred.210 We are given the experience of existential inadequacy and the desire to overcome it. Philosophically, we may say this experience is due to the contingency of our existence: we experience ourselves as existing, but also as dependent and “unfinished.” Every day, we experience our existential fragility, which is expressed through feelings of anxiety and fear, particularly in the situations that Jaspers called ‘limit situations’ (Grenzsituationen), for example suffering or death. The fact of our dependence is also evident in our need for other human beings and things in order to fully develop ourselves. This experience of existential fragility leads us to the desire of selftranscendence, finding the solid basis of our happiness. The human being, then, is by nature open to the more substantial, transcendental Thou.211 By nature, the human spirit, having originated in God, strives to be united with God and to participate in God’s life. Just as the part needs the whole, and finds in it the reason for its existence, so we strive for God as our “destination” and fulfillment.212 According to von Balthasar, it is in our nature to spontaneously enter into a relationship with everything that is, and ultimately, with God. To conform to reality, we experience both passive and active moments. First, we experience the external ‘impression’, i.e. of something acting towards ourselves, and, then, moments of self-expression in the outside world. It is important to note that God is not related to us as a specific exterior object of experience, but rather is revealed in the depth of our being that naturally relates to God as our foundation, most frequently in an unconscious way.213 Balthasar, then, agrees with St. Thomas’s statement that “all things naturally seek God implicitly, though not explicitly.”214  Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 55.  K. I. Pargament, Spiritually Integrated Psychotherapy. Understanding and Addressing the Sacred, New York and London: The Guilford Press, 2011, 70. 211  Z. Zdybicka, Człowiek i religia, 162-163. 212  M. Rusecki, Istota i geneza religii, Lublin-Sandomierz: Wydawnictwo Diecezjalne, 1997, 203. 213  H. U. von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, vol. 1: Seeing the Form, trans. E. Leiva-Meriikakis, San Fran­cisco: Ignatius Press, 1983, 245. 214  Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 22, a. 2: omnia naturaliter appetunt Deum implicite, non autem explicite. 209 210



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The existential openness of the human being to God was also described by Frankl in his concept of unconscious religiosity. This should be viewed as the original reference to Transcendence, characteristic of humanity. It is the relationship between the immanent self and transcendental Thou. The human being is always related to something that can be called the “transcendental unconscious.” This means that we are constantly in relationship with Transcendence, even if it is on an unconscious level. Because we call the other term of this unconscious relationship “God,” consequently, we can talk about the “unconscious God.”215 Though it may remain “unconscious,” it is a necessary relationship, connected with our ontological status. This means that each of us can discover and develop our relationship with God.216 As St. Augustine stated, God is more inside of us than the most personal of things. God, remaining transcendental, is the most inner sphere. We can meet God by entering our interior depths. The closer we are to the centre of the person, the closer we are to God because, in our heart, is the gate to the mystery of God. St. Thomas, moreover, claimed that we have a natural desire to see God (visio Dei) which can become reality only with the help of God’s grace.217 Henri de Lubac tells us that at the source of our desire of God, the human heart, we find God alone, although somewhat anonymous. This desire has a supernatural character because it is, in its essence, a permanent action of God in the human being, of the God who constantly creates human nature.218 For Hans Urs von Balthasar this is not an abstract notion but something experienced by each of us in the depth of our essence as the hunger we feel for the goal and meaning of life, the truth about ourselves. Each of us feels deeply that we lack something because we were created in such a way that we cannot satisfy ourselves, but find the only true fulfillment in our relationship with God. In accordance with Balthasar’s Christocentric anthropology, there is a moment in human development (but not necessarily a single moment) when we, if we are honest with ourselves, discover that the ultimate truth about ourselves cannot be found in the depths of our own self or in the world that surrounds us.219  Frankl, Man’s search for Ultimate Meaning, 61-62.  W. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, New York: Library of America Paperback Classic, 2010, 248, 461. 217  Scola et al., Osoba ludzka, 213. 218  H. de Lubac, Surnaturel. Estudes Historiques, Paris: Aubier, 1945, 487. 219  V. S. Harrison, “Homo Orans: von Balthasar’s Christocentric Philosophical Anthropology,” The Heythrop Journal 40 (1999), 284. 215

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The Ultimate truth and the Highest good can be found only in God, not in created human nature. Separating ourselves from God is the cause of our inability to reach the fulfillment of our being. Despite this, even when we move away from God through sin, we are still “oriented” towards our ultimate goal and source of fulfillment in Christ. This is how God’s grace works in us.220 The human being possesses a paradoxical existence. We become ourselves when we relate to something (Someone) infinite and limitless. Without such striving for eternity, we lose our proper purposefulness. We harbour feelings of absurdity when limited to our nature only. Naturally, as humans, we desire to surpass ourselves towards Transcendence, we desire to see God. There is this ontological structure in our nature responsible for our openness to God, and God reveals his own existence by calling us to, and supporting us in our existence.221 Although there is an unconscious striving of our nature towards God, this God is a Person, and not some impersonal Force, as mistakenly stated by Carl Gustav Jung. However, Jung deserves credit for indicating the existence of unconscious religiousity. Yet, he made the mistake of placing it in the sphere of impulses and instincts and not in the sphere of personal existence, with the result that religiosity would never be an object of conscious deliberation. Jung agreed only that something in us is religious, but we do not deal with it in a way that falls under any responsibility. In Jung’s opinion, unconscious religiosity takes part in the collective unconsciousness and is connected with archetypes, something in our nature. Yet, Frankl maintained that religiosity is something very personal because it is at once crucial and deliberate and even if it occurs unconsciously, it remains irreducible to an impulse. Religiosity is either existential or nothing at all. The spiritual unconscious is something existential, ultimately free of psychophysical factuality, but connected with the subjectivity of the spiritual person. It is discovered through religious tradition and is not biologically inherited.222 For Frankl, one piece of evidence for the reality of unconscious religiosity is that even professed atheists at times have religious dreams.223 The sources of authentic religiosity should be sought outside of the human psyche. To be complete, our relationship to God has to include  Harrison, “Homo Orans,” 285.  Zdybicka, Człowiek i religia, 166-167. 222  Frankl, Man’s Search for Ultimate Meaning, 72. 223  Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 150. 220 221



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both the cognitive component (the philosophical Absolute) and the emotional (the Highest Person). Frankl postulates that God should be called the supra-person to avoid any anthropomorphism. As created, the human being is accidental and unnecessary, with its cause in God, because only God is the Autonomous Being. Our natural inclination to refer to our source and search to connect with God is not surprising. The beginning of our relationship with God lies in our admiration for the world of reality as well as in our encounters with other contingent beings, which progressively lead to the discovery of the Autonomous Being for whom we yearn.224 As Thomas Aquinas observed, we can completely remigrate back to ourselves, or progress towards the deepest foundations of our actions, where we find our Creator.225 In the very centre of our heart we find metaphysical anxiety, which works to restore us to our primary calling, an orientation towards communion with God. This is our human condition, whether or not we realize it or even choose to acknowledge it. In our hearts we experience a tremendous force of attraction that draws us more to God than to any created being or object. The result of experiencing this force is that we are unable to find fulfillment anywhere other than in God. Without this unity with God, we constantly feel this metaphysical anxiety.226 Some philosophers – such as Blondel, Lévinas, and Tischner – mention a “metaphysics of desire” in this connection. This is not directly about the desire for God, but about finding an original goodness, the desire to love and be loved. This goodness towards us seems to be at once invisible, and inconceivable. Yet, it constantly calls to the human heart awakening within it a constant insatiable desire.227 As created beings, we come across various types of limits to our existence, but thankfully, as spiritual beings, we can go beyond these limits. The soul is open, particularly to God. Although not identical with God, it possesses something of the divine absoluteness. It is similar to a limitless empty space that needs to be filled. The soul will never be satisfied with something smaller than God. The anxiety of the human being originates in the desire for infinity.228 De Lubac claims that in the soul there is a constant longing for God.229  Wojcieszek, Na początku była rozpacz, 92.  Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 1, a. 9. 226  Lotz, Wdrożenie w medytację nad Nowym Testamentem, 38. 227  Tarnowski, Usłyszeć niewidzialne, 150. 228  Stinissen, Człowiek prawdziwy, 72. 229  H. de Lubac, Surnaturel, 483. 224 225

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To explain the fact that the human being is capax Dei, homo theomorphicus, Antoni J. Nowak suggests a classification of religiosity as genotypic and phenotypic. We do not become religious just when we get in touch with Transcendence but when we search for everything somewhat blindfolded, including God.230 The essence of the human being includes not only the consciousness of ourselves and of the world, but also of the need for the Absolute expressed in the spontaneous search for God.231 Genotypic religiosity is not the fruit of cultural or historical changes. It is the constant, deeply rooted inclination of our nature. We are created in the image and likeness of God who continually invites us to a dialogue.232 In the words of John Paul II, genotypic religiosity may be called a religious sense which is bound to the intellect. It is neither purely philosophical reasoning nor purely the gift of grace, but is rather a preparation for receiving it (receptivity).233 We cannot deny the empirical evidence of genotypic religiousity without seriously falsifying crucial elements of our nature. Jung argued that atheism is a form of neurosis occurring in big cities, and Erik Erikson maintained that human beings who consider themselves unreligious are like children in the dark who possess their own cruel religion. The existence of homo religiosus is, in large part, confirmed by psychologists. Yet, it could be argued that religion as a phenotype will always be false (not completely true) because the image of God that is shaped through culture and religious upbringing will always be contextualized. The only antidote to the lack of phenotypic religion is relying on the direct revelation of God in Jesus Christ.234 Genotypic religiosity is only the basis of phenotypic religiosity which develops from it.235 From this development, from genotypic religiosity researched by psychology, in Christianity, a new human being is to develop, who, in the sacrament of baptism, becomes the image of the Son of God, Christ. This is a concrete historical image. The development in faith consists in self-consciously shaping oneself in the image of Jesus Christ (Gal 4:3–9).236  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 179.  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 180. 232  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 181. 233  Jan Paweł II, Wierzę w Boga Ojca Stworzyciela, Città del Vaticano, 1987, 82. 234  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 191. 235  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 186. 236  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 189. 230 231



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The foundation of phenotypic religiousity is thus genotypic, embedded in human nature. Genotypic religiosity may be expressed as a kind of sacrament of nature and an acceptance of Christ’s grace, as the sacrament of grace (sacramentum naturae, sacramentum gratiae).237 If religiosity was not in our nature, Christianity would undoubtedly not exist because the foundation for the grace of faith would not be there. Christianity suits our nature and is therefore intelligible for each of us.238 Freeing ourselves from the ego brings us a new consciousness and immerses us in the grace of the Spirit, and, in time, it gifts us with the recognition in oneself of the mysterious presence of the risen Christ.239 After the dissolution of the false, illusionary self, there is space in us for the emergence of the deep, authentic self, immersed in the presence of God and capable of recognizing the resurrected Christ in itself.240 St. Augustine argued that the soul should separate itself from the world and immerse itself in the image of God in order to find itself. To meet God, the soul must go beyond itself241 because God is interior intimo meo et superior summo meo – higher than my highest and more inward than my innermost self.242 This was particularly emphasized by Dionysius Areopagus who mentioned the necessity of the soul’s ecstasy or the soul’s separation from itself and from all created things. These issues are summed up extraordinarily well by Hans Urs von ­Balthasar who, like St. Augustine and St. Thomas before him, accepts that the original form of the created spirit produces a will, a very need to search (Acts 17:27), supported and guided by pre-existing grace (or the Supernatural existence). Then in order to move towards what cannot be achieved solely by nature, in a manner set by God’s free initiative (in affirming and fulfilling Revelation), we find ourselves on a higher level: gratia non destruit sed elevat et perficit naturam – grace does not destroy nature but fulfils its potential. At this point, we advance the hypothesis of a natura pura assuming the apparent paradox of a nature oriented to understanding God – such nature is known to be unable to achieve this knowledge solely with its own innate strengths or to go beyond this paradox through “purely natural” freedom, without the grace of God’s self-uncovering, which radiates throughout history.243  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 193.  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 194. 239  L. Freeman, Pielgrzymka wewnętrzna. Podróż medytacyjna, trans. A. Ziółkowski, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Homini, 2007, 50. 240  Freeman, Pielgrzymka wewnętrzna, 51. 241  Bouyer, Introduction to Spirituality, 150-151. 242  Confessiones 3, 6, 11, PL 32, 688. 243  von Balthasar, Epilogue, 17-18. 237 238

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Spirituality and culture Facing the puzzle of life’s mystery, we appear to be entangled in internal contradiction, caught between life’s fleetingness and fragility, the contingency of our existence, the continuity of historical processes, and the goals related to these.244 Culture is the omnipresent background that gives meaning to our lives and is passed down from generation to generation. It influences philosophy and politics, spirituality and daily life, ruling a group’s eating, dressing, and communicating, creating cultural behaviour. Its influence is as omnipresent as the air we breathe. The act of visiting other places in the world allows us to become fully aware our own culture.245 Social inheritance decreases the effort connected with making decisions, while reducing the range of individual freedom.246 We are absolutely free, but free only relative to the world, understood as the sum of historical experiences, the world of meanings, that has come down to us mostly through culture and tradition.247 Ernst Cassirer remarked that we do not live only in the physical world, but also in the symbolic world, made up of language, myth, art, and religion.248 It both limits one’s freedom and provides the opportunity for existential dialogue.249 Experimental research shows that culture even influences our perception of reality, in terms, for example, of geometric figures. Socialization is a process of absorbing various views of the world, as well as the attitudes, and norms of behaviour characteristic of the specific culture of one’s birth. In this process, there occurs, a “humanization” of the individual.250 Realizing that no one is an island allows us to accept tradition and culture with a sense of gratitude. We are linked in a chain begun by our ancestors and continued through generations. It would be a huge misunderstanding to pretend that this is not true and to attempt to separate ourselves artificially from our cultural and traditional roots. Accepting that humanity is not a pure product of blind forces of nature is a good starting point for understanding the true nature of freedom. 244  W. Dilthey, Budowa świata historycznego w naukach humanistycznych, trans. E. Paczkowska- Łagowska, Gdańsk: słowo/obraz terytoria, 2004, 289. 245  Dilthey, Budowa świata historycznego w naukach humanistycznych, 339. 246  A. Kępiński, Melancholia, Warszawa: Państwowy Zakład Wydawnictw Lekarskich, 1974, 191-192. 247  Van Kaam, The Art of Existential Counseling, 107. 248  E. Cassirer, Esej o człowieku, trans. A. Staniewska, Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1977, 80. 249  Cassirer, Esej o człowieku, 108. 250  Bunge, Ardila, Philosophy of Psychology, 229-232.



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The development of freedom is culturally conditioned, even within the perimeters of the mature personality, because our being is a co-being, our existence is a co-existence, and our living is a co-living. Tradition is the place where trans-generational, co-existential wisdom is stored and using freedom responsibly occurs precisely in an existential dialogue with this wisdom.251 Each of us has the task of finding our own way of attaining existential fulfillment, by following in the footsteps of the numerous generations before us who undertook that same task, and left their share of perennial wisdom. Freedom, then, means a brave search for one’s own way of spiritual fulfillment, without rejecting the unquestionable wisdom that previous generations included in their culture and tradition. This means understanding and integrating into one’s own life project all that has worked well in the past to achieve the same goal, as for instance spiritual and ascetical practices like prayer and fasting. Ultimately, as humans, we should use culture and tradition in a constructive and creative way. Historical time determines human existence. It is at the centre of our experiences and perception. Time is the moving of the present moment from the past into the future. However, the meaning of life is in the present. The human being lives in real time, not in an ideal time but in an experiential time. Time itself is not given to us directly. What we experience is the continuity and change that are related to the self who gives meaning to the past, present, and future and combines them.252 This linking is subordinated to the principles of meaning, but not to chronology. The system of personal meanings is the basic organizational unit in the human personality, giving specific value to our experiences and perception. Smaller elements are related to the larger whole. Selfconsciousness makes it possible for us to go beyond the present moment, i.e. the memory of the past and the imagining or planning of the future. Rolo May wrote: “Man does not live by the clock alone.”253 The human being is a historical entity who may draw conclusions based on past events and, to a greater or lesser extent, influence the course of history, particularly in the local environment. The future is in the structure of one’s personality, and makes it dynamic. A future goal is impossible to reach without the perspective of future time. Human hopes, wishes, and plans are always connected with the future. If we take away the future from the human being, we also take away hope.  Van Kamm, The Art of Existential Counseling, 110f.  Dilthey, Budowa świata historycznego w naukach humanistycznych, 312. 253  R. May, Man’s Search for Himself, London: Souvenir Press, 1975, 256. 251

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More generally, the relationship we have with the world is reflexive: the world shapes us and we shape our world. The world of human life is divided into the natural environment (Umwelt), society (Mitwelt), and interiority (Eigenwelt). This classification comes from Heidegger. Our likelihood of influencing the world is based on our taking responsibility for our own actions.”We are capable of becoming self-aware and, therefore, are responsible for our existence254 and in the same way, we shape our spirituality.

 R. May, The Discovery of Being: Writings in Existential Psychology, New York: Norton & Company, 1983, 85, 129-130. 254

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Receptivity in grace The current chapter will move from classical philosophy to philosophy inspired by revelation, as developed by early Christian writers. They lived in an environment well provided with masters of ancient philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, to name but a few. They used this awareness afforded to them as a tool to describe the reality of spiritual truth revealed to us by God through Holy Scripture. They tried to be faithful to strict philosophical argument and for that reason we may look to them to complement our philosophical study of human nature. The following analysis will develop the many helpful parallels between philosophical issues and theological concepts. Image and likeness The theological concepts of image and likeness may be used to inform the philosophical issue of person and personality. The human being was created in the image and likeness (betsalemenu kidemoutenu) of God. For the Hebrew people, whose thought process was concrete rather than abstract, the word ‘image’ (sel) made truly present whatever could be seen in the image. It was neither subject to division into parts, nor to change. However, the word ‘likeness’ (demouth) could be read more dynamically.1 In this context, the Hebrew term semach, which means grain or seeds, is also important, as it indicates the purpose of the human being: to develop and bear fruit.2 The first chapter of Genesis (1:26-28) must be understood in this way, that the human person is the image of God in their totality: in their relation to the world, to other people, and to God.3 St. Athanasius saw the image of God in the mind (nous), which is capable of knowing God (teognosis). Gregory of Nazianzus put more emphasis on the indestructibility of grace within human nature. For this reason, we  This is the approach of Eastern theology.  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 62. 3  Scola et al., Osoba ludzka, 149. 1

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are “related to God” (St. Macarius of Egypt); we are God’s family. For his part, Gregory of Nyssa saw the image of God in friendship, and held that God wants to bestow this friendship on us, to help elevate our wisdom and love to the level of divine life. In doing so, Gregory of Nyssa accorded great importance to the human capacity for self-determination.4 According to the Eastern tradition the image of God is a constitutive feature of our existence. It is part of our original nature.5 According to Clement of Alexandria, however, we are similar to God because we have nous, which is the actual image of God. Furthermore, it is the Divine nous, the Logos. Primordially, the image of God is the Person of the Word of God, and only secondarily the human person. We can therefore say that we are the image (reflection) of the Image.6 Also, St. Irenaeus in chapter 22 of Epideixis wrote that the proper image of God (imago Dei)7 is the Son, and it is only in the image of the Son that human beings are created.8 Hans Urs von Balthasar adds that, in the free person of Jesus, we find the “paternal pre-image.”9 St. Basil of Caesarea also claimed that the image of God in the human being is our mind, through which we can direct other creatures. On the other hand, our likeness to God is achieved through becoming truly Christian by virtue of the power of God, given us through free choice.10 The Catechetical School of Alexandria, closer to Platonism (Clement, Origen), saw the image of God in the soul of the human being. However, Irenaeus11 and Maximus the Confessor insisted that one has to include the human body in the image as well because understanding it otherwise could damage the authentic Christian life and diminish the importance of Christ’s humanity.12 For some, the Alexandrian image of God was not so  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 57-59.  W. Hryniewicz, “Współczesna antropologia prawosławna,” Analecta Cracoviensia 4 (1972), 225. 6  A. Eckmann, Przebóstwienie człowieka w pismach wczesnochrześcijańskich, Lubin: TN KUL, 2003, 92. 7  Scola et al., Osoba ludzka, 154. 8  K. Matuszewski, “Idea udziału człowieka w życiu Bożym w pisamch Ireneusza z Lyonu,” in A. Uciecha (ed.), Studia Antiquitatis Christianae, Series Nova 10, Katowice: Księgarnia Św. Jacka, 2010, 40. 9  von Balthasar, Epilogue, 90. 10  Eckmann, Przebóstwienie człowieka, 101. 11  Matuszewski, “Idea udziału człowieka,” 40. 12  The likeness of the new man to Christ, through the body, will be revealed fully only in the resurrection of the body, when it will be transformed. J. Kowalski, “Człowiek jako obraz Boży w świetle konstytucji Gaudium et spes,” Częstochowskie Studia Teologiczne 1 (1973), 126. 4 5



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much the soul, as was its highest part, the nous, logos, or hegemonikon (the highest part of the heart or spirit alone). Those who saw the most important task of a spiritual life to be contemplation stressed the importance of the mind; those, in turn, who stressed moral responsibility, put emphasis on the importance of free will. The second trend was represented in Antioch. In this approach, the human person is the image of God because they are the ruler of the created world. In both understandings, the image of God in the human being is always the work of the Holy Spirit. It is beyond the physical, because it also includes grace, and its beauty depends on the degree of spirituality present in the human person.13 Although the image of God must be traced through the various human spiritual powers, sooner or later, we have to acknowledge that humanity, that is imbued with His Spirit, bears the image of the ­Creator. The whole human being is called to God to satisfy our deepest longing.14 Through “the excess of his love and kindness,” God gave Himself to the human person, creating each one of us as a unique being, endowed with an immortal soul, and calling us to our existence in His own image and likeness.15 St. Gregory of Palamas said that by being in the image of God, we are superior to the angels, but in our likeness to God, we are lower than them, because in us, this likeness happens to be weak and unstable. After sin, the human person had not ceased to be the image of God, but only lost the likeness.16 These aspects of the image of God are highlighted in the Constitution, Gaudium et Spes (§12),17 on the basis of Genesis 1:26-27: “In the image of God he created them,” meaning we can know and love the Creator; “Let them have dominion over all beings,” meaning we are the masters of all creatures; and “Male and female he created them,” meaning we become fully a person only in social relations.18 The human person is not conformed to God simply when well off or successful in realizing certain goals; we are conformed so only if we follow the path marked out by Christ. God delights in the little ones, the lame, the poor, and the suffering. They are like God in a special way.19  Špidlik et al., Historia duchowości, 69-70, 73.  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 63-64. 15  Rusecki, Istota i geneza religii, 203. 16  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 63-64. 17  The full text in English on the Vatican Web site: http://www.vatican.va/archive/ hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_ en.html. 18  Kowalski, “Człowiek jako obraz Boży,” 113. 19  Stinissen, Człowiek prawdziwy, 49. 13

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In the second account of creation, God acts as a potter and shapes man out of the dust of the earth. Here we can see that the human being remains in close relationship with the earth, is earthly because we are molded from the earth, and from the beginning marked by weakness, instability, and fragility. The Bible often uses the image of dust while describing our condition (Job 10:9; Ps 103:14 et seq.).20 We are created from dust and from the breath of God and, therefore, consist of both material and spiritual elements, body and soul. The human person is an immortal spiritual being, but that is expressed and perceived through the body. However, it is not merely expressed through matter, as in the dust from which we are made and to which we will return, but rather by means of spiritualized matter. Only by this admission is it possible to do justice to our own God-given truth. The human body has gained additional honor from the incarnation of the Son of God. God wanted to take on the form of a human body, and thus the human body was introduced into the life of the Trinity; because of this, God is now able to say “my body.” Because of Christ’s incarnation, the human body is endowed with a special dignity.21 St. Thomas Aquinas says that one cannot speak of a human being as an imago Dei without reference to the unity of soul and body.22 St. Hildegard of Bingen (1098-1179) affirms that, by having flesh, the human being is a more faithful image of God than are the angels. If our life of faith were based only on some internal intuition, we would risk closing ourselves off in pure subjectivity, without contact with the world; but the Bible refers to the world and the human body. We would not have a body if we did not have a soul, which is the principle of our formation and life. With the immortal soul, which is also spiritual and non-material, we are open to the whole of reality. The spiritual soul makes us thirst for knowledge of the world. Moreover, we bear in ourselves an extraordinary longing for “something more,” a longing that seems unceasing. Therefore, the object of its fulfillment cannot be other than limitless, it must be God.23 God is always ready to remind us of who we really are, when evil tries to steal our true identity. Jesus is the best example of who we are as  Stinissen, Człowiek prawdziwy, 66.  Stinissen, Człowiek prawdziwy, 68-69. 22  Scola et al., Osoba ludzka, 175. 23  Stinissen, Człowiek prawdziwy, 70-71. 20 21



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persons created in the image of God. God’s grace wants to lead us to the discovery of this image of God.24 As called to life by God’s creative act, we can see both aspects of our spiritual journey: theomorphic (God-shaped-ness) and theophoric (Godbearing-ness). Our God-shaped-ness explains both the fact that grace is something very “natural,”25 and that nature is complementary to grace.26 It is most brilliantly visible in Christ, the perfect man and God. We are the only creatures that God willed for their own sake, and everything else has been created because of us.27 Thanks to the image of God in us, we are constantly looking for personal fulfillment. However, apart from Christ, our likeness to God remains without its fullest impact, because sin corrupts our soul’s intentionality. If intentionality is understood as a conscious relationship, then the lower faculties of the soul, apart from Christ Himself, are deprived of the higher faculties.28 The soul then finds a certain fulfillment in worshipping idols, distorting its desire, and becoming detached from its own basic principle.29 We cannot fully explain God’s creation of the human being. We can probably say that the act of creation leads us beyond worldly boundaries and closer to mystery.30 The essence of this mystery is that we are created by God and that we have received our life from His life.31 Our likeness to God is closely associated with the person of the Holy Spirit who is in us through the “breath of life.” In turn, the Son of God makes us into “the image” of God.32 In the horizontal dimension, we are called to develop a fully human personality, and in the vertical, we are called to foster the growth within ourselves of a theandric structure, until the full stature of Christ is revealed in us (Gal 4:19), until we come “to the measure of the fullness of Christ” (Eph 4:13). We attain a likeness, either as an icon of God (the face of an angel), or as its demonic distortion (the mask of a beast).33  Ryan, Four Steps to Spiritual Freedom, 35-36, 41.  It is about the grace in a broad, objective sense, resulting from the creation, in contrast to the saving grace for which the foundation will become the paschal mystery of Christ. C. S. Bartnik, Dogmatyka katolicka, vol. 1, Lublin: RW KUL, 1999, 320f. 26  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 67-68. 27  Gaudium et spes, no 24. 28  L. Balter, “Problem interpretacji skutków grzechu pierworodnego w człowieku,” in L. Balter (ed.), Zło w świecie (“Communio,” vol. 7), Poznań: Pallotinum, 1992, 247f. 29  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 70-71. 30  Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 30. 31  W. Hryniewicz, “Współczesne dyskusje na temat poligenizmu,” Roczniki ­Teologiczno-Kanoniczne 16 (1969), 128. 32  Matuszewski, “Idea udziału człowieka,” 42. 33  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 53-54. 24 25

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God created us, and therefore our nature exists in relation to Him, and was revealed most fully in Jesus Christ, God who became man. In this context, the Fathers of the Church repeated time and time again that the human being is created in the image of the Son, and in the Son. Yet human nature should not be understood solely as the material of which one is “made.” The main human attribute, in the economy of creation, is the breath of life, which is a personal gift of God to every human being. We are the “word” of our Creator, which, thanks to the breath of life, comes into being.34 The human being is similar to God, but also, through the incarnation, God becomes human,35 by “entering” into His own image. It was not our sin that “caused” the incarnation, but rather the incarnation was present in God’s plans from the very beginning.36 From all eternity, God wanted to make us His sons and daughters and to deify us. According to Jung, the image of God in us acts predominantly as a prophecy and enables our full self-realization, as if calling the incarnation into our lives, because it is the very essence of our being. God’s image in us is an invitation and a manifestation of the main thrust of God’s desire for us. In Christ we, along with God, find ourselves in a situation that is similar to mirroring each other.37 The dynamic aspect of the human likeness to God was expressed in the Book of Genesis, where there are two terms: the image (Hebrew Selem, Greek Eikon) and likeness (Hebrew Demut, Greek Homoiosis). The Hebrew terms are not as distinct semantically as are the Greek. In Hebrew, we would say a “likening image.” In the Greek concept, a larger dichotomy was introduced between the earthly (image) and the spiritual (likeness). Thanks to Origen, the Christian tradition assimilated the Greek concept according to which every one of us receives the dignity of being made in God’s image and likeness, and this is to be fully  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 67-69.  Clement of Alexandria, Stromata Liber IV, c. IX, PG 9, 293b. 36  In the Middle Ages there was a dispute between Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus on this issue. Aquinas was of the opinion that the main motive for the incarnation of Christ was the existence of the first sin, and consequently, if there were no sin, there would be no incarnation. On the other hand, Duns Scotus maintained that the incarnation is a central moment in God’s plan, because the Son of God is the culmination of humanity. Therefore, sin cannot be the motive of incarnation, as the greatest work of God would then be dependent on chance, that is, on the fall of the first humans. In this book we take the second approach. S. Piotrowski, Emmanuel – Bóg z nami, Białystok: Ag-Bart, 1995, 66-67. 37  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 56-57. 34 35



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a­ ctualized by following Christ.38. From this perspective, the image is the beginning of full likeness in Christ.39 This dynamic resonates better with the receptive-responsive theory of spirituality, where the image is aligned semantically with likeness.40 In terms of this theory, Luther could speak of mortal sin as the total loss of divine grace, the loss of the image of God in the human being. Yet the Eastern Christian tradition spoke of a veiling of the image, in itself indestructible. Sin shades the image of God in us and covers it with an ugly veil.41 This is a very important element in our understanding of our spiritual condition. The theology of the Catholic Church interprets the problem in a similar way. Original sin Original sin puts into question the image and likeness of God. The receptive-responsive theory of spirituality brings resolution to this plight. There are many metaphors of sin: burden, debt, darkness, stain, a leaving of the narrow path, misguidance, rebellion, aberration, or passing into a far and foreign country. In Judaism, sin is not the transgression of some abstract principle, but a violation of a covenant between persons. Grace is perseverance in communion with God and sin is separation from God, and abuse of freedom.42 The Word of God gives us the opportunity to understand this basic moral rupture of which we ourselves are the authors by excessive attachment to ourselves. With the acceptance, in faith, of this painful truth about our sinfulness, we can become more and more theophoric by understanding the gift of self or intentional sacrifice as a way of love. Somehow, the loss of original innocence through original sin gave impetus to the development of spiritual life at a higher level, because the human being was thus invited to enter the path of heroic struggle with sin. Kierkegaard, in fact, saw it as a source of human existential fear.43 38  S. T. Zarzycki, “Antropologia teologiczna a rozwój duchowy,” Duchowość w Polsce 12 (2010), 44-45. 39  Špidlik et al., Historia duchowości, 70-71. 40  Kowalski, “Człowiek jako obraz Boży,” 114. Gaudium et spes uses primarily the term “image” but also says that Christ has restored to the children of Adam the divine likeness disfigured by the first sin (no. 22); also it speaks of conscience as a dimension of the image of God in the human being (no. 16). 41  Špidlik et al., Historia duchowości, 71. 42  Ryan, Four Steps to Spiritual Freedom, 25. 43  Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 41.

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In the classical Protestant understanding, original sin completely destroyed human nature, darkened the intellect, deprived us of freedom and made us completely dependent on the grace of God. Given this perspective, human nature could never be transformed and naturalism was victorious. The Orthodox approach to the problem of original sin emphasizes the image and likeness to God and the fact of our spiritual existence. There is not only the old Adam, but also the New AdamChrist, the God-Man. The human being had been created by God, then had moved away from God, and finally received God’s grace – this is the crux of Christian anthropology.44 Looking at it from a theological point of view, we also need to acknowledge the reality of personal sin. Such is the human condition. Sin is a very personal act, but cannot be reduced solely to the act of an individual, or to the sum of their acts. Each sin involves an attitude towards the other (the social dimension), which shapes our general form of life. Sin interferes in our relationship with the whole of creation, including the world of spirits, and ultimately with God. The source of sin is pride, which reveals a desire to live independently from God (to be self-determining), and take His place; it often expresses itself as a desire to experience immediate pleasure. We are still tempted to make the world our first idol, despite feeling its inadequacy and limitedness.45 Original sin does not destroy the image of God in us; this image remains the basis for the receptive dimension of spirituality. Sin, however, veils the image of God in us. Coping with the effects of original sin becomes an open space for human activity, a place for our response, while providing an explanation of the responsive dimension of spirituality: first there is the gift of God – subsequently the human response. John Chrysostom says that in nature, understood as a creation of God, there can be no shadow of evil; therefore, evil is not a part of our nature. It is sin that defiled it. Adam’s flaw spread to all people. Original sin therefore relates to human nature in general. The human being is fully a person when related to the Other, to God. The fallen spirits rejected this relationship, selfishly closing themselves off from a full personal relationship with God. If a person realized their full potential through a loving relationship, as in the Trinity, reference exclusively to oneself is impossible. Love, as the full realization of a person, involves  Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 47.  Bouyer, Introduction to Spirituality, 156-159.

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relating to someone else and being free. Each person is free and this freedom diversifies us. Each person is unique.46 Perhaps a certain analogy to the role of original sin could be found in the “cave metaphor” in Plato’s philosophy, where people create a picture of reality based only on the shadows of things casted by the light of a fire on a cave wall. In any case, without the acceptance of grace, only selective and distorted self-knowledge is available to us. This epistemological distortion in the sphere of morality, is transformed into a feeling of being lost, which translates, in practice, into our being prone to erroneous choices instead of choosing to follow the plan of God to the fullness of life. Though the ability to be conformed to God’s likeness remains perpetually alive, the first fall (from paradise) clearly distorted the image of God in us. For the Greek Fathers the perversion of human nature goes so deep that it breaks down even our contact with grace (i.e. with our true nature), and the miracle of conversion is needed to restore it.47 Original sin is original not only in the historical sense, but also because it touches the very depths of our nature, where we set ourselves above God, even though God “formed” us out of love.48 The “sickness” affecting humanity may be its well-developed subconscious life, for psychopathology can tell us a lot about ourselves, although the final verdict does not belong to psychopathology. Psychological findings about various pathologies of human life may be closely linked with the Christian doctrine of original sin.49 Sin is one of the issues that have, or should have, modern interdisciplinary interpretations taken from theology, psychology, and philosophy. It pertains to the problem of evil in the world,50 and much more. Existential anxiety, according to Hans Urs von Balthasar, is born in an empty “space” which opens between God and ourselves, when we encounter the Infinite. The emptiness that causes this fear arises in the human heart, when one moves away from God and turns to one’s self. Because original sin was such a turning away from God, the feeling of  Bouyer, Introduction to Spirituality, 160-162.  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 71. 48  Stinissen, Człowiek prawdziwy, 27-28. 49  Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 68. 50  A. Rybicki, “Współczesne interpretacje pokusy szatańskiej,” in J. M. Popławski (ed.), Aniołowie i demony (“Homo meditans,” vol. 28), Lublin, 2007, 303-320; “Współczesne interpretacje De octo spiritibus malitiae Ewagriusza Pontyjskiego,” Roczniki Teologii Duchowości 57 (2010), 95-118. 46 47

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emptiness that we experience becomes that of a radical absence of God. The perception of God as foreign and threatening to us is a result of a lack of faith and trust in God within conscious human life. Hence it is easy to turn away from God. Yet even those who turn to the Mysterious Presence still experience some difficulty in crossing the border of fear. Every time sin renders the “veil” between God and ourselves opaque, it deepens our existential fear.51 In philosophy, one accepts the existence of the so-called pure nature, which can be known by the intellect while in theology one speaks of the fallen nature (natura lapsa), which reflects the consequences of sin. Through sin we not only fall from grace, but even our natural inclinations are corrupted by evil.52 This insight is a very significant theological contribution to philosophical anthropology. The injury of human nature is manifest in so-called lust, which can be defined as the sum of disordered reflexes, instincts, and impulses – i.e. the gaps between the faculties of the human psyche. If we interpret this abject condition in the light of the catechism, then we can talk about the seven deadly sins. In such a wounded state, we come into the world, having an innate weakness and a tendency towards evil. On this innate wound, other injuries will be superimposed as a result of personal experiences that are part of our history, and more often than not, from that of our childhood. The original inflection of human nature is deepened both because of our own sins and those of the world around us.53 Original sin, at the psychological level, is expressed through a life of psychic illusions, focusing on our own selves, and experiencing unreal idealizations. Through the discovery of the unconscious, psychology allowed us to look at the spiritual condition of the human being in a new way. For instance, many psychological theories discuss co-­dependence or describe dysfunctional families.54 The freedom of someone today is not the freedom of someone in the state of pure nature. The human being is fallen and redeemed. Philosophy cannot comment on that historic event; philosopher and psychologist may, however, observe disorders in human nature, and the theologian explains these in terms of original sin. Before the fall, the human intellect and will were in harmony with the propensities present in our ­personalities.  Cirelli, “Facing the Abyss: Hans Urs von Balthasar’s reading of Anxiety,” 708.  Špidlik et al., Historia duchowości, 49. 53  A. Jastrzębski, “Człowiek grzeszny powołany do doskonałości,” Zeszyty Formacji Katechetów 1 (2014), 34. 54  T. Keating, The Human Condition, New York: Paulist Press, 1999, 12. 51

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The human being was intrinsically free, but now we have to struggle to sustain that freedom. Catholic dogma says that we are unable, in the long run, to persevere in this state, free from any serious moral disorder, without the help of grace. In psychological language, this means that we cannot, without the support of grace, fully control our impulsiveness as we are continually subjected to it. In short, without the help of God, we cannot achieve our natural ideal, which includes full freedom.55 We experience a sphere of interior “darkness” within the human personality which is a mixture of chronic negative emotions such as disappointment, abandonment, anger, sadness, depression, stress, inferiority, guilt, jealousy, and envy. Most people attribute these feelings to the outer context of their lives, as well as to various difficult events, but rarely do they notice that this darkness comes from their inner being and is caused by the unfathomable power of sin. In Christianity, it is believed that sin is only an act carried out in the consciousness of guilt. This is called personal sin but, this consciousness of guilt forms only a part of human sin. We can confess the actions we regret and be released from the guilt related to them. This is not true of evil human tendencies, which lie much deeper within us and easily escape our conscious perception. The human being is too often simply powerless against them. Moreover, most people do not hold themselves responsible for a tendency that feels interiorly natural, because it seems that one does not consciously make these choices. Sin is only conceived as something that is knowingly and voluntarily committed. However, there is also a tendency to sin that remains in us in spite of redemption (lust). This tendency is not a sin, but the result of sin, and also leads to subsequent sins (“concupiscence, or an incentive to sin”).56 In practice, it is difficult for us to separate original sin from voluntary personal sin, because the one leads to the other.57 Original sin has destroyed the unity within us and with others, as expressed on many levels of social life: familial, political, cultural, and economic. It is a kind of schizophrenic pathology that disregards the basic human vocation to live in truth. This lack of unity inside and outside of ourselves is a source of great suffering, and indicates a disorder  Donceel, Philosophical Psychology, 258-259.  The Council of Trent, The Fifth Session, The canons and decrees of the sacred and oecumenical Council of Trent, Decree Concerning the Original Sin, trans. J. Waterworth, London: Dolman, 1848, 24. 57  F. Jalics, Contemplative Retreat, trans. L. Wiedenhoever, Maitland, FL: Xulon Press, 2003, 142; A. Jastrzębski, “Pomoc psychologiczna a modlitwa o uzdrowienie wewnętrzne,” Roczniki Teologiczne 41 (2014), 79-98. 55

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or distortion in our nature. We are not fully what we are called to be. In this context, human life becomes the drama of one’s moving away from one’s destiny, and we become victims of our own disordered desires as well as agents of violence to others. Trying to keep our identity, or rather seeking it again, we cause suffering to others and to ourselves. Our relationships are often unhealthy and destructive. Sin causes us to be unable to live in harmony with ourselves or with others.58 After original sin, the human person can no longer adequately come to know reality, much less re-create its harmonious image, either internally or externally.59 Without turning toward God, the heart vibrates like a compass needle that can no longer determine the direction of the magnetic North.60 Metaphysical optimism is a theory that assumes the world and human beings are good, that nature is good. The cause of the goodness of nature is that it is God’s creation. In turn, historical pessimism reflects the reality of sin, which has distorted our spiritual life and violated the natural harmony in our relationship with the world. Sin does not reside in matter, but in the mind where both the intellect and the will can say “no” to God.61 The spiritual core of the human being The search for the true human self in philosophy and psychology, which we illustrated in earlier chapters of this book, finds its full theological expression in the spiritual core of the human being. The spiritual centre is the “place” within us that God has reserved for Himself. Such is the experience of all mystics. This is a unique form that can be filled only by God. When the human person surrenders to God, through the workings of the Holy Spirit, an interior source of healing energy appears; that is the source of eternal life. In the conversation with the woman of Samaria (John 4:14) Jesus describes this kind of person as someone who will no longer yearn. The aim of the Spirit of Jesus is not the removal of our humanity but a call to gradually put on Christ’s own nature (Rom 13:14).62  I. M. Rupnik, Dire l’uomo, Persona, cultura della Pasqua, Roma: Lipa, 2005, 70-72.  Paszkowska, Psychologia w kierownictwie duchowym, 341. 60  Paszkowska, Psychologia w kierownictwie duchowym, 342. 61  Bouyer, Introduction to Spirituality, 143. 62  D. & K. Montgomery, Trusting in the Trinity. Compass Psychotheology Applied, Montecito: Compass Works, 2009, 78. 58

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Authentic human existence is based on our spirituality and not on our instincts. In some occurances of the spiritual life, it is not even important whether this happens consciously. It is more important to simply not follow impulses, but make free decisions and accept responsibility for them. We are often so absorbed in the fulfillment of spiritual acts that our real being is not subjected to reflection and there is no means to instigate this reflection. In the case in point, spiritual existence, and consequently the authentic self (the so to say the “self in itself”) remains beyond reflection, for just like the reality of the inner act, “it exists” only in its accomplishments.63 The deep self is subject to both the unconscious and the conscious ego, the latter being a source of mental activity. These are two ways of experiencing the self. The self is the human spirit present in all human activities, and the ego is a conscious dimension of the self in its incarnate condition.64 In existential psychology, the search for an authentic self is talked about, but nowhere are we given an indication as to what factors affect the formation of an authentic self. The attempt is made to overcome what is “inauthentic” in our temperament, growth, and intelligence in order to reach a “pure spiritual life force,” although it is not strictly defined. In fact, many psychologists in their research remain divorced from the spiritual centre.65 An individual human life is organized around a spiritual core, which is the spiritual person and the centre of its activities (Scheler). This spiritual core is surrounded by an outer layer, the psyche, as well as by corporeality. According to Frankl, we should not talk about the spiritual, mental, and physical factuality, but rather about a spiritual person and their psychophysical coating. Thanks to the spiritual core, the human being is integrated. Only the spiritual person provides the unity of the whole human being: the spirit, psyche, and body. We have to remember, however, that all of these elements together constitute the totality of the human being. Although the body and psyche already constitute a certain unity, it is only within a spiritual person that it becomes whole.66 While it is said that the self has an isolated and introverted interior, a deeper self is united with God and open to God. God communicates with us in the foundation of our soul but always remains infinitely  Frankl, Man’s Search for Ultimate Meaning, 32-34.  Ryan, Four Steps to Spiritual Freedom, 57. 65  Vitz, Psychology as Religion, 54. 66  Frankl, Man’s Search for Ultimate Meaning, 34. 63

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greater than us.67 To illustrate, the spiritual core is a kind of axis running through layers of the conscious and unconscious, surrounded by concentric psychic and bodily layers.68 As the core of the human spirit, like the “blind spot” in the pupil of the eye, is unable to see itself, so the spiritual person cannot directly “see” this more genuine self and consequently lacks self-awarness in this area.69 A Christian mystic, John Ruysbroeck, called the deep part of ourselves the “basis” (Grund), while the outer part of the human “personality,” which tries to grab everything for itself, leads us to loneliness. The openness to love is only way out of this situation. In God’s essence, God is love, and interiorly we also inherit this spark of love, which means having both the openness and the ability to intentionally sacrifice oneself.70 This love demonstrates deep respect for the other person and gives permission to them to be unique and to disclose whatever is their deepest reality (the anthropology of encounter). We cannot give another person more joy than by accepting everything they have to offer.71 The true depth of an individual, however, is their level of relationship with God in which love is poured into their heart through the Holy Spirit who was given to us (Rom 5:5). From an outside perspective, it is difficult to distinguish the human spirit from the Holy Spirit at this depth. The biological life we experience is analogous to that of animals and at this level, blood is important as its medium (carrier), but the human spirit originates directly from God.72 The human person is created in Christ by baptism, even “possessed” by Him, and failure to recognize Christ in ourselves is a great negligence, because the deepest human dignity lies in the fact that we are an icon of Christ. The depth of the human heart enters into the depths of the heart of Christ. This is not an area of the soul that can be accessed by so-called “depth psychology”; the true depth of the human heart is created by God. For a Christian, encountering the very core of human existence will always be an encounter with Christ. This is not to be taken metaphorically, but as the fundamental metaphysical principle of our existence. The life of Jesus brings out in us who we actually are called to be. For a Christian believer, this reality cannot be seen, anymore that the  Lotz, Wdrożenie w medytację nad Nowym Testamentem, 32-33.  Frankl, Man’s Search for Ultimate Meaning, 34. 69  Frankl, Man’s Search for Ultimate Meaning, 37. 70  Stinissen, Ani Joga, ani Zen, 42. 71  Stinissen, Ani Joga, ani Zen, 43. 72  Stinissen, Ani Joga, ani Zen, 44-45. 67 68



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presence of Jesus can be seen in the Holy Eucharist. Both are matters of faith. Thus a baptized person is able, by the grace of God, to become theophoric, but in order to recognize it one needs faith. This requires a real “vision” of faith, which goes beyond human exteriority, the perception of the body, and the specificity of one’s personality to reach the very centre of one’s being, in which we are a “branch of the vine” (John 15), and the image of a transfigured Jesus.73 Our interior is the “place” where God touches us and continues to create us anew. The presence of God in the human heart is His essence. It is a metaphysical presence, not affected by physical or biological influences. It cannot be grasped with the tools of psychology, as to a large extent, it escapes our consciousness.74 Laurence Freeman talks about the self as the centre of a person associated with God. We can find this deeper self within ourselves and remain “hidden” in it. It is simultaneously liberation from the illusions of the ego and an adoption of the transforming light of love.75 The spiritual life is fulfilled in a transforming communion with God. The first sign of this communion is the existence of the human self. We become conscious of this communion with God by integrating the conscious ego within the deeper self. The more the ego harmonizes with the self, the more we realize that our lives have no meaning outside of this communion with God, because in our depth, we are created for this communion.76 We discover the meaning of our lives not only by exploring who we are, but through communion with God and with other persons, i.e. through a gift of oneself to others.77 In the Catholic approach, even the human self, which is capable of mystical union with God, remains distinct from God. Human nature does not change into the Divine. Perfect unity between God and the person does not mean a confluence of natures but the experiencing of acts of love.78 The whole meaning and practice of the spiritual life is to open up and become receptive, at both existential and conscious levels, to communion with God, who is the deepest human reality.79 When we descend  Stinissen, Ani Joga, ani Zen, 209.  A. Louf, Łaska może więcej. Towarzyszenie duchowe, trans. A. Frej, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Księży Marianów, 1999, 39. 75  Freeman, Jezus wewnętrzny nauczyciel, 295. 76  Ryan, Four Steps to Spiritual Freedom, 59. 77  Gaudium et spes, § 24. 78  T. Merton, in A Thomas Merton Reader, T. P. McDonell (ed.), New York: Doubleday, 1974, 515. 79  Ryan, Four Steps to Spiritual Freedom, 60. 73

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into the depths of our own spirit and reach our personal centre, we face the fact that the very foundation of our existence is this continuous and indissoluble contact with the infinite power of God.80 The inner self of the human being therefore takes part in the existence of God, while remaining distinct from Him. Though the self does not exist outside of God, it should not be identified with Him. When the communication of ego and self with God becomes more enduring, the results are twofold and simultaneous: the human person slowly begins to understand what it means to live in abundance and to the fullest, and the role of the ego tends to become as authentic as it can: honest, accepting, and humbly associated with the truth. This can happen through various spiritual practices.81 The spiritual core of the human being is neither feeling nor psyche nor intellect. It is another level that may be dormant, but does not die. There, Christ awaits us. It is God who removes all fear.82 Regarding the unconscious, we should not think in terms of an isolated neurocognitive system, but rather of something distributed throughout the body as in a plane on automatic pilot with all its complexities. The unconscious manages thousands of bodily functions from sleep cycles, to nutrition, to building millions of cells. The language of the subconscious is more than electrical discharges in single neurons. The unconscious in its communication, bypasses the conscious self but uses the language of excitation and inhibition, perception, emotional states, sensory and motor coordination twenty-four hours a day, during the whole of our lives.83 For the most part, psychoanalysis sees the human psyche as a set of separate parts, i.e. different drives, which, in turn, consist of smaller components. The analysis of the psyche becomes something like the dissection of its anatomy. In doing this, we destroy the human being as a whole. Certain psychoanalysts depersonalize the person, while they personalize, and sometimes even demonize the different parts of the psyche (id or superego).84 Freud drew attention to the existence of unconscious impulse. Frankl added that there is also an unconscious part of the spiritual in us. In his  Ryan, Four Steps to Spiritual Freedom, 63.  Ryan, Four Steps to Spiritual Freedom, 64-65. 82  S. Pacot, Droga wewnętrznego uzdrowienia, trans. M. Jaroszewicz, Poznań: W drodze, 2002, 63. 83  Montgomery, Trusting in the Trinity, 82. 84  Frankl, Man’s Search for Ultimate Meaning, 27. 80 81



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view, the whole of human existence is essentially unconscious, because the foundation of our existence cannot be fully captured in an act of cognition, and thus cannot be fully conscious.85 We have a valuable inner core. Franz Jalics describes it as follows: This is our present situation: we have an inner good core through which we could experience who we ourselves are in God, how we are loved and carried by him – that we are children of God, temples of the Holy Spirit and members of Christ – how the Holy Trinity dwells in us. Around this healthy core lies the dark and painful layer of sin which keeps us at a distance from the good core. In fleeing from our dark layer, we set up a barricade which I call here an outer rind. It’s intended to protect us from our shadow and enable us to live with less pain. The price of our protection is that we are also separated from our true inner being, our deepest identity in God.86

We see that above our valuable spiritual core there is a layer of sin, which prevents us from accessing this core. In order to distance ourselves from our dark layer, we raise a barricade, which we can metaphorically call a “shell”; this, however, does not change the fact that the inner core of our being is still incomprehensibly priceless. Thomas Merton also discusses this worthy core of our nature. In his opinion, it is beyond the reach of sin and is free and indestructible. He compares it to a pure diamond glowing with the “invisible light of heaven.” This core is in all of us, forming a “blaze of sun” that can make all the dark corners and cruelty of life disappear without a trace.87 We discover in our depths a divine origin (image), which is constantly present, even if we are not aware of it. Contrary to God’s revelation, philosophical concepts of human nature are often based on dualistic mechanisms that do not adequately reflect the spiritual and moral dimension of our existence and often reduce it to something purely moral in nature. God’s revelation and the experience of mystics direct us most powerfully to some mysterious centre of our being, which defies conceptual analysis altogether. This is the core of a person, which is personal and unique to each of us; it brings everyone into the whole of creation and, above all, to the Source of Life. Through this spiritual centre, the full freedom and unity of life is revealed.  Frankl, Man’s Search for Ultimate Meaning, 31.  Jalics, Contemplative Retreat, 142. 87  T. Merton, Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, New York: Image, 1966, 155-156. 85

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The deep self is constantly immersed in the present and this is where God’s presence is revealed. Furthermore, the deep self is truly free from the constraints of time and the distractions of the ego. Just as it is difficult to enclose God in any single concept, it is difficult to grasp the deep self as a pure personal existence. Yet the foundation of human existence is a place that is most sensitive and receptive to the grace of God founded in a relationship with the Creator. All human abilities (ego) are subordinated to the deep self because from it, they derive focus and energy. When the ego ceases to focus on itself, it becomes open to gentle calls from the deep self and receives new energy. In time, the light coming from the self, also called the nucleus of the soul, penetrates the human being’s outer layers, which makes it difficult to determine the border between the personal centre and the ego. What was previously foreign becomes integrated; what was sick is healed; what was bound becomes free. What is most noble in us permeates all layers of our being. We are finally home.88 The spiritual core is sometimes referred to metaphorically as the “heart.” In the Bible, the heart does not mean the psychological habitat of the emotions, but something much deeper. The heart is linked with reason, intuition, and will. Contact with our own heart reveals our moral conscience illuminated by the Word of God. From the heart, the most hidden part of us, energy flows, penetrating our entire being. The depth of the heart remains inaccessible. The deep self transcends all its external manifestations. Consciousness has a limited range. The conscious self can recognize its own acts, but not itself. Only through mystical intuition, illuminated by the light of God, can we see our inner core, which after all is the image of God.89 By the term “heart,” we mean the innermost depths, the personal centre, and true self90 in which we exist. Here, we own ourselves and order ourselves to enter into full freedom. It is the spiritual core of the human being in which mind, will, and emotion (all human powers) are at once one and intertwined. In this spiritual core we discover our vocation, our unique mission in life. We can say that the heart is the foundation of the soul.91  Ryan, Four Steps to Spiritual Freedom, 88.  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 42-43. 90  S.  T. Zarzycki, Dietricha von Hildebranda filozoficzno-teologiczne podstawy duchowości serca, Lublin: RW KUL, 1997, 76, 158. 91  Lotz, Wdrożenie w medytację nad Nowym Testamentem, 27-29. 88

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In addition to its literal anatomical meaning, in the New Testament the heart (kardia) is spoken of metaphorically and means the place of one’s spiritual life (2 Cor 5:12; 1 Thess 2:17). In the heart, one can locate the spiritual powers such as the intellect, will, and feelings, the latter being understood as good or bad movements of the soul. In the heart there is the self, and the heart expresses the person; sometimes it is even synonymous with the whole individual. The heart expresses our most intimate desires and aspirations; it may also be equated with conscience. It is the most intimate part (nucleus) of the human person, in which we meet and get to know God (1 Cor 4:5; Rom 8:27; 1 Thess 2:4). The Bible says that God penetrates the human heart (Rom 8:27; 1 Thess 2:4). It is here that God increases our faith (Rom 6:17; 2 Thess 3:5) and it is in the heart that we contemplate the word of God (Luke 8:15).92 Macarius of Egypt, the teacher of Evagrius, claimed that the centre of the soul is not the mind (nous), but, according to biblical tradition, the heart, which contains the psychophysical unity of thought and will, as well as the spiritual and emotional life. Sanctification, in this perspective, will involve the human body and it will not signify release from the body.93 The heart is also the engine of a physical life. It is the place where mind and body meet. Nicodemus the Hagiorite says that the heart is the centre of our existence, a hotbed of spiritual, psychological, and biological forces. The heart is the mediator in our meeting with all that exists. The heart is the root of everything (Isaac the Syrian) and the throne of grace. Almost all the Eastern Fathers agree with the fact that the heart is the spiritual and psycho-corporeal centre of the human being, in which all elements of this triad meet. Against temptations of spiritualization, the Fathers also always emphasize the physicality of the heart, on whose bodily tablet the Spirit of God writes. The heart is the place where the layers of human existence are unified, and hence can be called the supernatural centre of our existence (Nicodemus the Hagiorite).94 During the sacrament of baptism, the process of adopting the Logos into the human heart, the process of Christianizing and deifying of the heart, begins with the entrance into it of the transcendent Logos. Old Christian logotheology remains closely linked to the theology of baptism. Clement of Alexandria said that whoever takes Logos into their  J. Kudasiewicz, Matka Odkupiciela. Medytacje biblijne, Kielce: Jedność, 1996, 68.  Bouyer, Introduction to Spirituality, 150. 94  Kudasiewicz, Matka Odkupiciela, 72-73. 92 93

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heart becomes similar to Him, similar to God. One has to imitate the life of Christ in one’s own life as much as possible by adopting His ways and preserving them in one’s heart. Origen adds that a baptized person has become a child of the Logos formed on God’s own model.95 This issue will be the subject of a more detailed analysis later in the book. The human heart is the deepest human identity and the “altar of God” (Saint Seraphim): a place created to receive God. Human identity is shaped by love, not by thinking; instead of saying, “I think, therefore I am,” we should say, “I love, therefore I am.” The heart, understood in this way, is the most important element in the structure of the human being.96 We find this conviction in the theological development of Wojtyła’s concept of spiritual potentiality and Frankl’s concept of the spiritual unconscious. The heart is a conscious entity and the essence of human interiority, which is able to recognize the presence of God. God continually offers us the ongoing existence (creatio continua) of unity between Himself and the human ego. The presence of God covers the whole human person which includes our body. It is through this occurrence that we are able to experience God, who is inherently present in us. While we and God remain two separate entities, we are united with God at all times because of God’s gift of existence to us.97 With respect to this issue, we have to be very careful not to fall into the error of pantheism. In the Hindu tradition, it is said, “I am a god,” whereas in Christianity we should speak about a union with God and not about being God. According to the philosophy of the Far East, we are like a wave rising for some time over the ocean and then returning, because spiritual depth lies in discovering our own divinity. In Christian thinking, the ontic difference between Creator and creature is underlined, because God is the Giver of human existence and the human ego remains aware of receiving this gift from the Creator. The human being can be concurrently defined as a child of God or a son in the Son (Christ) or as a creature and a sinner. Each of these terms contains significant content relating to Christian anthropology. I am a creature and therefore I am united with God. I am a child of the Most High. I am a sinner and therefore I do not identify with God, as we are separate beings.98 95  B. Zenkowsky, H. Petzold, Das Bild des Menschen im Lichte der orthodoxen Anthropologie, Marburg an der Lahn: Oekumenischer Verlag Dr. R. F. Edel, 1969, 74. 96  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 44. 97  Ryan, Four Steps to Spiritual Freedom, 21. 98  Ryan, Four Steps to Spiritual Freedom, 22.



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Saint Ignatius of Loyola strongly emphasized that human identity is rooted in being a creature, dependent at all times on the love and grace of the Creator. Each person is unique in God’s eyes, but we are also mortal and fragile, finite, and weak.99 The development of the spirituality of the heart is complex, mysterious, and unpredictable. We want to have control over what happens, but in this case acceptance, trust, and surrender are required. Getting to know the heart and its changes occurs throughout the journey of life. It is impossible to grasp the freedom that is born of maturity. Spiritual development is like the rhythm of a flower bud opening daily or the coiling of a spiral. Although our road goes ever upward, there are moments of an apparent return to previous states. On this road there are ups and downs, recurring cycles of repentance and rebirth of the heart, which tends to enter into all kinds of bondage. We feel like perpetual beginners, but in reality we are further along in our development because with time, our heart becomes more sensitive and thus more open to God’s grace.100 The heart is a “dwelling place” in which God is present, hidden in its centre, beyond the grasp of our own intellect and of our other faculties: only the Spirit of God can fully penetrate our heart. It is the place of our innermost aspirations and the source of life and death decisions. The heart is the place of encounter because the image of God in the human being introduces us to relationships; and it is foremost a place where a solemn covenant can come into being.101 All too often, God has not spoken to people directly, so it would be difficult for us to say, “Here God is speaking, or there.” Typically, He talks to us in an indirect way, in the depths of our hearts, or through our intellect searching for truth. It is the deep essence of the human being. Apart from the voice of God, there are many other superficial voices and desires that block out God’s voice.102 Origen was the first to mention the existence of spiritual senses. Most likely we are equipped with some kind of spiritual sense, so that we are able to perceive spiritual things, coming from God. For example, Saint Catherine of Siena writes that through the spiritual senses we can taste  Ryan, Four Steps to Spiritual Freedom, 23.  G. G. May, Addiction and Grace: Love and Spirituality in the Healing of Addictions, New York: Harper and Collins, 2007, 218. 101  Catechism of the Catholic Church, no 2562. 102  W. Stinissen, Żyć w głębokiej relacji z Bogiem, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Karmelitów Bosych, 2003, 44. 99

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the body of Christ in Holy Communion.103 The model of action of the spiritual senses is the body of Christ after the resurrection: it has no boundaries or barriers, and remains totally open to God.104 We are created as people called to union with God. This vocation can be drowned out by sin, but because it is our essence it cannot be completely lost. We can, and in fact, repeatedly try to deny this calling, but in our deepest core, we continually discover this longing for God. Any attempts to otherwise satisfy this basic yearning of the human heart eventually lead to inner turmoil because they deny the true essence and vocation of human life.105 Through the discovery of the spiritual dimension of our existence, we enter into the foundation of our soul, our personal centre and spiritual core; there the grace of baptism retains its relentless action; there, thanks to the Eucharist, the Son of God is already one with us and there we adore God in Spirit and Truth.106 The trichotomy of spirit, soul, and body In St. Paul’s teachings ontology passes through ethics, especially where he speaks of the “new” and “old” man (Eph 4:22-24) “internal” and “external” ways of our existence. The dichotomy of body and soul coincides with the trichotomy of spirit, soul, and body.107 We can say that the soul animates the body and the spirit spiritualizes the whole human being. The spirit enriches both the psyche and the matter of the human body. The spirit penetrates our entire existence and opens it up to the presence of God. Though physicality and the psyche are distinct levels of being, they are interdependent. In a radically dichotomous perspective, spirituality is not an additional, third dimension of human existence, but rather the principle that reveals itself in both physicality and the psyche. Our ascetic efforts, then, have to make our physicality and psyche more sensitive to the promptings of the Holy Spirit.108  Stinissen, Żyć w głębokiej relacji z Bogiem, 116-117.  Stinissen, Żyć w głębokiej relacji z Bogiem, 118. 105  Stinissen, Ani Joga, ani Zen, 52. 106  F. Jalics, W szkole Jezusa. Cztery etapy duchowego rozwoju, trans. J. Poznański, Kraków: WAM, 2015, 149. 107  D. A. Helminiak, The Human Core of Spirituality. Mind as Psyche and Spirit, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996, 24-25. 108  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 41-42. 103

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The internal division of human nature was frequently conceptualized by the Greeks as the body (soma), soul (psyche), and the mind (nous). Along with Aristotle, Poseidonius of Apamea pointed to the role of the mind. Gregory Nazianzen had already presented this division as generally accepted. To some extent, this idea echoes the understanding of St. Paul. It should be noted that when the Semites talk about the body, soul (nefesh), and spirit (ruah), they present these as dimensions of human existence taken as a whole. One is the body, because one passes away; the soul, because one has the breath of life; and the spirit, because one is open to God. These are not components of the human being, but aspects of our existence depending on the life situation in which we currently find ourselves.109 Only once does St. Paul expressly mention the trichotomous concept of the human being, “May the God of peace himself sanctify you entirely; and may your spirit and soul and body be kept sound and blameless at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ” (1 Thess 5:23). In this trichotomy, spirit (pneuma) is not directly an offshoot of human nature. The spirit is transcendent to created human nature because it is God’s breath (ruah). However, in God’s economy, one of the most important issues is our adoption, which means giving us the Holy Spirit. This gift for us is of utmost importance to God the Father. In a theological sense we only achieve our full identity when we receive the Spirit of God. This gift makes the believer a “Temple of the Holy Spirit,” which animates the believer from within. The Spirit will never become a human being, but we can become more spiritual. In the classical sense, it is said that the soul (psyche) revives the body (soma), so the Spirit can transform the soul. The Spirit is an undeserved gift from God that we were created to receive. The Spirit does not become part of our soul, but a point of reference towards which our soul gravitates and through which it transcends itself. The relationship of the soul with the body, and the spirit with the soul, is analogous. As the body is animated by the soul and the meaning of its existence is bound to it, so the soul is created to live in communion with the Spirit, and the body itself has to be spiritualized in this relationship.110 In St. Paul’s allocation, pneuma (spirit) means a supernatural human life or the soul who lives such a life. The soul (psyche), in Paul’s teaching, usually means a human being as a living creature or, generally speaking,  Špidlik et al., Historia duchowości, 75.  Bouyer, Introduction to Spirituality, 144-145.

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refers to one’s earthly life. The division he is referring to concerns the less than perfect human sphere, such as its sensuality. The term “body” (soma) is the body capable of good and bad deeds. St. Paul, however, does not develop this division further.111 Balthasar maintains that Christ came to transform human nature and reconnect the human soul, which has been subjected to the effects of original sin, with God’s Spirit. Jesus came to create a new intellect, a new psyche, and new eyes and ears in the spiritual person. With the death and resurrection of Christ the old human being dies and the new, spiritual one is born.112 The Greek and biblical terminology in the description of the human being suited the differences between the internal and external life. We meet this approach in St. Paul (Rom 7:22; Eph 1:16; 2 Cor 4:16), in Plato, in the rabbinical writings, in Philo, the Stoics and in Plotinus.113 Platonism had a great influence on Christianity through its identification of the soul’s spirituality and immateriality. Thomas Aquinas developed the doctrine of the immateriality of the soul on the basis of Aristotle’s anthropology. He maintains that the soul is a form of the body: undivided within itself, but spiritual and immaterial. However, among the first Fathers of the Church there are Stoic influences. For example, Clement of Alexandria speaks of “the soul of the flesh,” or about the “fleshly spirit.”114 In the anthropology of the Eastern Church Fathers, the human being is regarded, along the lines of St. Paul’s teachings, as a trichotomy (trymeria) – body, soul, and spirit – in which there is both a hierarchy and an inseparable unity of elements. Together, these constitute the whole human being. The body is not the soul’s prison (Plato), but a full-fledged part of human nature.115 In the first three centuries of Christianity, the Church Fathers still hesitated between the reception of either a dichotomous or a trichotomous model. This is seen, for example, in St. Justin, Origen, and D ­ idymus the Blind. The spirit was most likely the animating factor for them, which 111  J. Stępień (ed.), “Listy do Tesaloniczan i Pasterskie. Wstęp – przekład z oryginału i komentarz,” in E. Dąbrowski, F. Gryglewicz (eds.), Pismo Święte Nowego Testamentu, Poznań-Warszawa: Pallottinum, 1979, 204-205. 112  H. U. von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord. A Theological Aesthetics, Vol. 1: Seeing the Form, trans. E. Leiva-Merikakis, Edinburgh: Clark, 1982, 366. 113  Špidlik et al., Historia duchowości, 76. 114  Špidlik et al., Historia duchowości, 77. 115  Zenkowsky, Petzold, Das Bild des Menschen, 78.



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through the human soul animates the body. Before original sin, the unity of these elements was perfect, after sin it became distorted.116 The trichotomy of the human spirit, soul, and body is accepted by the majority of the Eastern Church Fathers, but also occurs in Western Church Fathers. There are some differences within the terminology. Some define spirit as a higher power of the soul. The trichotomy of the human being is believed to correspond to the three Persons of the Holy Trinity, thus confirming that not only the spirit and soul, but also the body constitutes the likeness of the human being to God. The whole person as a unity of these elements bears the image of God, because everything that God created was “very good.” From the beginning, the Church was against spiritualism in the form of gnosis, in which the human body was not seen as valuable. The dogma of the resurrection of the body finally gave appropriate dignity to the human body. The Church distanced itself from the Platonic and neo-Platonic theories, where the body was viewed negatively. The Christian approach has become both independent and original.117 Clement of Alexandria (who also spoke of a trichotomy of monads), followed by Origen, Athanasius, Dionysius, Isaac the Syrian, and others advocated the trichotomous view of human nature. We are fully human only when these three elements are brought together, when the spirit mixes with the soul and unites with the body. We are a unity of these elements. St. Irenaeus also explains Paul’s words in this way (1 Thess 5: 23). The Spirit, soul, and body that remain in unity shall obtain salvation together.118 Irenaeus emphasizes that the Spirit is a divine element in us, and is identical with the Holy Spirit who grants us likeness to God.119 Origen, on the other hand, does not equate the human spirit with the Holy Spirit in this trychotomous division. This spirit is rather a gift of God to us made in order to attract us to Himself. Modern scholars (J. Dupuis, H. Crouzel) even speak about the trichotomous spiritual anthropology of Origen.120 In the human triptych, the leading element is the spirit, analogously to the Father in the Holy Trinity, because the spirit is most closely united with God. The human spirit, when it loses contact with God, 116  M. Szram, Ciało zmartwychwstałe w myśli patrystycznej przełomu II i III wieku, Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2010, 209. 117  Zenkowsky, Petzold, Das Bild des Menschen, 56-57. 118  Zenkowsky, Petzold, Das Bild des Menschen, 57-58. 119  Szram, Ciało zmartwychwstałe, 217. 120  Szram, Ciało zmartwychwstałe, 264.

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becomes the subject of the soul and body. The power and grace of God go progressively to the human spirit, from the spirit to the soul, and from there to the body.121 Olivier Clément discusses this subject in a very suggestive way, saying that in the tradition of the Church, before the division, we find it stated very clearly that we were created to be united with God with our whole being: spirit, soul, and body. The Spirit is not some special faculty, but a centre unifying all faculties, where we transcend ourselves; in short, it is etched into the totality of human nature, our vocation as persons.122 We connect more and more with the sphere of the spirit when we try to overcome our corporeality. The spiritualization of the human body leads to true life. The internal integration of the human being, by the power of the spirit, becomes possible only through the birth of Christ – the Logos. In Christ, the human spirit units perfectly with itself in soul and body, introducing a new harmony between matter and spirit. Hence our task is to become like Christ, that is, to prepare our human nature for the arrival of Christ and for spiritual union with the transcendent Logos.123 The spirit is the element in the human being closest to God because its essence corresponds the most to the essence of God. It is a reflection of the essence of God. The human spirit is qualitatively similar to the spiritual essence of angels and is somehow an embodied angel. Speaking of the human spirit, the Fathers sometimes use the word pneuma, sometimes nous, or logos. The nous is the spiritual reason, logos is the spiritual will, and pneuma is the spiritual power or spiritual sense. We can also see the spirit as the unity of these three elements and, in this case, they correspond to the following persons of the Trinity: nous, the Father; logos, the Son; and pneuma, the Holy Spirit.124 In the spiritual triad (nous, logos, pneuma), the first element, reason, occupies the highest place. It is a kind of spiritual “antenna” which allows us to receive inspiration from God. Reason reflects the eternal Logos, the person of the Son of God. However, reason often has to struggle with the task at hand because its spiritual purpose is to align one’s sensuality with the soul. Nous has to be, according to Clement of Alexandria, something like the “helmsman” of the human being.125  Zenkowsky, Petzold, Das Bild des Menschen, 59.  O. Clément, “La Priere de Jesus,” in J. Serr, O. Clément, La Priere du Cœur. Spiritualité Orientale no 6bis, Bégrolles: Abbaye de Bellefontaine, 1977, 59. 123  Zenkowsky, Petzold, Das Bild des Menschen, 60. 124  Zenkowsky, Petzold, Das Bild des Menschen, 60-61. 125  Zenkowsky, Petzold, Das Bild des Menschen, 61-62. 121

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The second element of the spirit is the spiritual word or spiritual will. The third, in turn, is the spiritual power. All these elements correspond to the action of God’s will and power, and they are a manifestation of the human spirit. Their function is, among other things, that of raising the soul to the heights of the spirit.126 In the tripartite division of the human being, the soul is not always perceived by the Fathers as an immortal part. The soul can die if we surrender to sin. For example, Justin Martyr speaks of the death of the soul, which has not proved to be worthy of God. He also says that only God is truly immortal. The soul is not life itself, but receives this life from God. Gregory of Nyssa states that the soul, as a living being, gives life to the human body.127 The soul and body are an inseparable unit and the human being is viewed in this way. Nevertheless, the soul and body are not identical with each other, but belong to each other and are so intimately and inseparably united that their mutual relationship exceeds the limit of human death. Their unity is also reflected in the mind of God.128 The soul and body are reliant upon each other, because in this process, the soul creates a tool for its purposes. It takes on the role of a contractor and the body is like the contractor’s instrument (Irenaeus). As the one who reigns over the body, the soul also has the task of leading the body to spirituality and deification. It is the link between the spiritual world and the material world. Turning towards the spirit it becomes noble; turning toward the flesh it becomes more material. Macarius also claims that as the soul is cleansed of lusts and is fused with the spirit it becomes imbued with spiritual light.129 Inside the soul, the Fathers also distinguish three elements: logos, epithymia, and thymos. The manager of the soul remains the power of reason. This time it is not nous, but the mental ability to judge and infer. Spiritual reason immediately grasps ‘psychic reason’ and achieves this through painstaking analysis. Epithymia is the equivalent of spiritual will. It is the desire of the soul, but may be influenced by lust. It is an expression of the natural taste of the soul, which may desire both God and created things. The ideal situation is to direct the desires of the soul according to the spiritual. Thymos is the life force of the soul, sometimes  Zenkowsky, Petzold, Das Bild des Menschen, 63.  Zenkowsky, Petzold, Das Bild des Menschen, 65. 128  Zenkowsky, Petzold, Das Bild des Menschen, 66. 129  Zenkowsky, Petzold, Das Bild des Menschen, 68-69.

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referred to as courage, anger, or desire. Since the last two faculties of the soul remain in close proximity to the body, we must persevere with great patience in their formation, the effort of which will lead them to ever fuller perfection.130 In seeking knowledge of the internal composition of the human being, we may now turn to a contemporary theologian, Bernard ­Lonergan. According to Lonergan, consciousness is the highest dimension of the human mind, which the Fathers called nous. The spirit is one of the dimensions of the mind. The second dimension of the mind is the soul (psyche). Thus, the human mind consists of soul and spirit, and the whole human being would be composed of an organism (the body), the soul and the spirit.131 Furthermore, according to Lonergan, the spirit is a dimension of the mind, which can be experienced as a kind of miraculous phenomenon, something that arouses our admiration. The basis of this admiration is the ability for self-reflection, that is, the cognitive distance between what we already know as our knowledge and the actual subject of this knowledge (me-I).132 In Lonergan’s view, in addition to the spirit, another part of the mind is the soul (psyche).133 The soul contains emotions, imagination, and memory, but also a personality structure.134 The soul is a stabilizing counterweight to the spirit. In the case of a mature soul, it is the context for the development of the spirit. For example, anxiety, sadness, excessive elevation of oneself, and the like, obscure the human spirit and make it less alert. But when the soul is in a state of peace and trust, it supports the acts of self-transcendence, which flow from the human spirit. In this way, psychic integration results in expanded spiritual awareness and the ability to respond to the spiritual dimension of our mind. It is this ability to respond (responsiveness) that is the principle of the integration of our existence and its spiritual development. Living in a responsive attitude allows us to be habitually open to the spiritual dimension of our existence, which, in the language of mysticism, is called enlightenment. Responsiveness, as an existential attitude of openness to the spirit, often results in the appearance of spiritual gifts, and supernatural talents.135  Zenkowsky, Petzold, Das Bild des Menschen, 69-70.  B. J. F. Lonergan, Collected works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992, 230. 132  Helminiak, “Confounding the Divine and the Spiritual,” 170. 133  Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, 481. 134  Helminiak, The Human Core of Spirituality, 132. 135  Helminiak, “Confounding the Divine and the Spiritual,” 172. 130 131



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For Lonergan, the four dimensions of the human spirit are conscious experience, understanding, judgment, and decision. The first three relate to the learning process, classically understood as the intellect, and the last one to the will. These four dimensions constitute the structure of the human spirit, and their interaction is essential to its functioning.136 The dimensions of spiritual functioning are always interactive: knowledge conditions my decisions, which subsequently affects the availability of data for experience, and data in turn condition my knowledge and understanding.137 The spirit is the dynamism of human self-transcendence, which directs itself naturally to what can be known and loved. The spirit is not designed to be enclosed in itself, but to go out into the world and to other persons.138 Authentic being means having full spiritual development, which, according to Lonergan’s four dimensions of spirituality, means being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. These constitute the transcendental and formal principles of development involved in the structure of our existence and, as such, can lead to selftranscendence becoming a normative principle.139 We will return to this issue in the following chapters. Descriptions of the internal structure of our existence are very diverse and often difficult to reconcile. This does not mean that only one of them is complete. Various concepts and names of our interior structure arise due to the different ways of reaching the knowledge of our spirituality. Some of them are based on reasoning, some on our reflections about revelation, and still others are a record of the spiritual experiences (even mystical) of their authors. The richness of the concepts of our spiritual make-up leads us to a very important feature of an adequate anthropology, its ‘apophaticness’ (apophatic nature). There are moments when we need to stand in silent awe before the mystery of human existence.

 Helminiak, “Confounding the Divine and the Spiritual,” 175.  D. A. Helminiak, “The Role of Spirituality in Formulating a Theory of the Psychology of Religion,” Zygon 1 (2006), 211. 138  Helminiak, “Confounding the Divine and the Spiritual,” 176. 139  Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, 53. 136 137

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The responsiveness of human nature Already on the natural level, we are able to discover our spirituality (the receptivity of our nature). This receptivity was the subject of analysis in previous chapters. From the receptivity of nature comes also its responsiveness. Discovering our spiritual interior, we are capable of responding to what we discover in our own nature and take appropriate action to receive and nourish it. The highest level of our spiritual nature is its responsive dimension and is played out by acts of self-transcendence. Conscience In Wojtyla’s approach, the human person reveals itself not only through self-possession and self-mastery, but also through a tendency towards self-realization. To be a human person is to be open to the world, not closed within one’s own subjectivity. Self-awareness may be expressed by turning towards oneself, but the capacity for self-transcendence proves the ontological inclination of the human person to move outside of themselves, towards reality. Self-fulfillment remains closely associated with self-transcendence. In metaphysics, transcendence is a movement to a reality beyond all categories; in anthropology it means going beyond one’s limits to ­reveal oneself in the totality of human existence and activity (esse and operari). Self-transcendence has its foundation in a personal entity and reflects the spiritual nature of that entity. In other words, self-transcendence is an expression of spirituality. One of the privileged places of its disclosure is in our experience of conscience, which gives its character to all human actions.1 According to Frankl, we discover the spiritual layer of our nature through two otherwise inexplicable phenomena: awareness and responsibility. A particular revelation of spirituality is thus the voice of conscience, of a clear, moral self-evaluation. That it can err does not change  Wojtyła, Person and Community, 232-233.

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the unequivocal fact that a person receives it. When we enter into a dialogue with conscience, it reveals to us the existence of a Superior Power and the existence of Transcendence.2 Conscience and responsibility are the primary phenomena of human nature, and the basis for self-determination. Conscience is a pre-logical reality, a pre-scientific way of understanding morality, a pre-moral intuition of values.3 Conscience basically functions intuitively. To anticipate something that does not yet exist, conscience must necessarily be based on intuition. Because of this, we can even say that conscience is both non- and over-rational.4 According to Frankl, human development occurs in the dialectical relationship of “I-world” and the transcendence of oneself through reference to values. In the human being, there is a specific need to look for value, which at once becomes the motivation for action and its expression in the experience of “I should.”5 Where Antoni Nowak says that every culture has its own linguistic phenotype, the same is true of its conscience. There is a genotypic capacity within conscience to perceive ethical nature (synteresis) and a cultural ability to do the same (syneidesis). The latter, phenotypic conscience, can be configured incorrectly, but not necessarily as a fault of our nature.6 Jung understands conscience to be the deepest part of the self (das wahre Selbst), to which one comes through the process of individuation. This inner part of ourselves can be considered a kind of sanctuary, a harbour for God’s grace. This is where we are the image of God, and the discovery of the imago Dei leads us to develop a full personality. An immediate expression of this deepest part of ourselves is the ethical conscience, which has a genotypic character, while the “moral” conscience is just the Freudian superego.7 The human person comes into the world with genotypic ability to distinguish good from evil. This genotypic dimension of the human conscience is natural. Thanks to education, the human person learns how to distinguish good from evil and in doing so, a phenotypic conscience will be born, which is culturally and religiously conditioned.8  Frankl, Man’s Search for Ultimate Meaning, 64.  Frankl, Man’s Search for Ultimate Meaning, 39. 4  Frankl, Man’s Search for Ultimate Meaning, 40. 5  Z. Uchnast, “Koncepcja człowieka jako osoby w psychologii humanistyczno-­ egzystencjalnej,” in Człowiek – pytanie otwarte. Studia z logoteorii i logoterapii, 95. 6  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 160. 7  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 162. 8  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 170. 2 3



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Only conscience is capable of translating the eternal moral law into the unique situation of a concrete person. It concretizes the requirements of the general moral law by applying it to the specific situation.9 Conscience, as part of our unconscious spirituality, should be brought to the surface and become well known, to then be resituated in the unconscious but this time as a habitus, a fixed mode of perception and moral action.10 It is said that the individual is the slave of their conscience. If that is the case, the voice of conscience must be something other than their own voice. Conscience must be transcendent to me. Only then does it make sense to talk about being obedient to the voice of conscience. Reducing conscience to some form of structure in the psyche deprives us of the dimension of transcendence. If we want to have a place for dialogue, we need two sides to the dialogue; otherwise, we are dealing with a monologue. Conscience only reveals the transcendent nature of unconscious human spirituality. The psychological aspect of conscience is only a part of its entire nature.11 In the same way that the self cannot be identified with the ego, so conscience cannot be identified with the superego. Both the existential nature of the self and the transcendent nature of conscience are irreducible to anything else, especially not to pure instinct.12 Moreover, the self cannot be responsible to “oneself,” because it receives guidance from the Transcendent.13 Frankl understands human life in a double way. On the one hand, it is the given individual, and on the other, it is that which is being given (a task), that is, someone whose development is a duty for which they are responsible. Human nature is a task, which is experienced subjectively as a duty. Wojtyła says that conscience plays a very important role because it internally binds a person in relation to good, thus becoming a kind of collateral criterion and verification of an individual’s fulfillment or failure.14 Conscience also plays a very important role in that it reveals the dependence of freedom on truth, enabling our acts to be self-dependent, i.e. self-determined. In fact, people transcend themselves in action. It is not just about self-dependency, but also about a dependency on the  Frankl, Man’s Search for Ultimate Meaning, 42.  Frankl, Man’s Search for Ultimate Meaning, 44. 11  Frankl, Man’s Search for Ultimate Meaning, 60-61. 12  Frankl, Man’s Search for Ultimate Meaning, 63. 13  Frankl, Man’s Search for Ultimate Meaning, 64. 14  Wojtyła, Person and Community, 234. 9

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truth until it finally shapes the freedom of the individual. Fulfillment is not realized by manipulating the truth, but the opposite: only the dependence on truth provides fulfillment. With these features, conscience becomes an internal authority, which in Christianity is also referred to as “the voice of God.”15 Through the activities of conscience there arises a reality founded upon norms, be they moral or ethical. Conscience is essentially the subjective experience of a norm, for example, belief in the veracity of a certain goodness contained in a specific norm, followed by a desire to put it into practice. Only those norms that pertain to action (for example: “Good is to be done and evil to be avoided”) apply directly to the person, while other norms define science and technology, and those areas do not directly involve the person. Proceedings consistent or inconsistent with ethical norms are conditions of fulfillment or failure for the human person. Only a human person can reach their full potential, that is to say, can become “somebody.” This fulfillment of the person depends directly on conscience, that is, on its judgement in the axiological and ethical dimensions. The basis of the work of conscience is to be found in the ontology of person and act, particularly relative to the unique dependence of freedom on truth – the centre of human spirituality. The ability to surrender our will and actions to the truth, which is clearly revealed in the activity of conscience, belongs to the potentiality of personal existence. Therefore, we can say that the human person has a “rational nature,” has the power to distinguish between moral good and evil. This distinction has its truth in the mind, the habitat of the discerning moral faculty.16 Mental cognition enables us to distinguish between truth and untruth. We are interiorly attached to truth and compelled to look for it. This fact clearly illustrates the transcendent nature of the human subject. Having a role in our transcendence, the mind becomes a proficient agent of knowledge – the in-depth knowledge of the truth. Veracity itself, more so than consciousness, is the basis for the mind to share in personal transcendence. The point here is primarily about the cognitive effort of the mind directed towards the truth, that is, its activity. The truth becomes the 15  J. Galarowicz, Człowiek jest osobą: podstawy antropologii filozoficznej Karola Wojtyły, Krakow: Wydawn. Nauk. Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej, 1994, 212-214. 16  J. Galarowicz, Imię własne człowieka: klucz do myśli i nauczania Karola Wojtyły - Jana Pawła II, Krakow: Wydawn. Nauk. Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej, 1996, 151.



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desired goal and the mind is subordinated to the truth by the fact that the mind has such a natural need of its inquiry.17 Dynamic subordination to truth is, metaphorically speaking, the light of human reason: Far from being but a passive mirror that only reflects objects, man acquires through truth as a value a specific ascendancy over them. This “superiority,” which is inscribed into the spiritual nature of the person, is connected with a certain distance or aloofness toward mere objects of cognition.18

Through conscience, thanks to its moral value, the action of knowledge persists in the person.19 In conscience is revealed the dependency of freedom on truth. This is the very centre of human spirituality and its capacity for self-transcendence.20 It has often been stressed that the function of the conscience is to judge of the moral value of an action, of the good or the evil contained in the action. This interpretation though correct does not seem to be fully satisfactory. It seems impossible to grasp the specific totality of the conscience without first outlining the structure of the person, the structure of self-governance and self-possession. Against the background of these structures we can perceive and interpret the dynamism of self-determination with parallel dynamism of fulfillment – and it is there that conscience is rooted.21 The creative role of the conscience coincides with the dimension of the person; it is wholly internal and applies to the acting, as well as to the moment of the person’s fulfillment of himself. Indeed the creative role of the conscience consists in tha fact it shapes the norms into that unique and unparalleled form they acquire within the experience and fulfillment of the person.22

When we speak of obligation, it is always in connection with some value. Hence responsibility is associated with values: Responsibility, as an intrapersonal fact that man has the experience of an intimate relation with his conscience, seems to presuppose the specific dynamism of the will […].The analysis of choice and decision with their own originality then led us to the conclusion that the will consisted in the ability to respond independently to a value rather than in the ability to strive for an object because of its value.

 K. Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 158-159.  Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 159. 19  Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 160. 20  Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 159. 21  Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 160. 22  Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 165. 17 18

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The ability to respond to values integrates in its own special manner man’s acting and impresses it with the mark of personal transcendence.23

Freedom Philosophy examines the phenomenon of human freedom, by trying to grasp and explain its essence. It does not deal with specific applications of freedom and the related subjective experiences. This is a topic for psychology, which examines the degree of one’s dominion over one’s being; it observes the control one has over one’s behaviour and identifies possible disorders within that behaviour, moving between the norm and pathology. In philosophy, we affirm the fundamental truths of free will. We say that the human will is free, but not absolute, as is God’s. The human person does not have an absolute causal power. The human will is always directed towards the good corresponding to itself and ultimately turns towards the good of the Most High, which is, for many philosophers, God. Philosophy does not express its view on the concrete goods, goals, and desires of the acting human will. It gives only a conditional rule, saying that intermediate goals should lead to the achievement of the ultimate goal which we have already mentioned. A concretization of it takes place in ethics, but to a limited extent, because the basis of ethics is a reading of human nature itself and its objectives; concretization takes place to a much greater extent in moral theology, which already has a much broader point of departure in the form of readily available commandments. Although flesh remains a basic component of the human person, the latter only attains full realization through freedom and spirituality.24 Among the different disciplines, psychology adds an abundance of subjective data that concretize the understanding of freedom relative to particular persons. Philosophical anthropology indicates the most general and universally binding characteristics of human freedom; ethics and moral theology develop these characteristics, giving specific, though objective, standards for the application of this freedom. Eventually, it is psychology that shows the extent to which this freedom may be subjectively lived. Freedom is rooted deeply in our nature. It cannot be completely eliminated by the various circumstances or determinants of mental  Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 170.  Goya, Psicologia e vita spirituale, 43.

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health, no matter how intractable they seem. A truly free individual can transform any of the suffering and trials of the material life into a positive development of personality.25 The will is a mental power of a spiritual nature and is not itself subject to change. What changes is the power of the will, which is also related to the sensuality of human life, to its propensities and inclinations. Thanks to this factor, the power of the will may be increased or reduced. A strong will is one that is capable of continuous efforts in the direction chosen by the person, pushed by the motivation provided by the person themselves as opposed to that of any external influence.26 An adequate understanding of free will is an important prerequisite for the understanding of the human person in general, since the understanding of human free will may become distorted. The will may be mistakenly understood to independently take charge of the decisionmaking processes in the human being, some kind of Supreme Court for decisions for which there is no appeal. It is inappropriate to grant existential or functional autonomy (which is to have its own power) to the human will. In this approach, personality is seen as an amalgam of unrelated elements and independently operating parts. One should accept that the whole human being is a willed person, otherwise we must assume that the human being is only shaped by its desires. A person is someone whose way of life is in interaction with their own environment. This means, above all, that they desire to enter into dialogue with others and to be open to the whole reality of the world. As a person, an individual, can only become truly free over time and only then be able to take responsibility for their words and actions, as Gabriel Marcel remarked: I claim to be a person in so far as I assume responsibility for what I do and what I say. But to whom am I responsible, to whom do I acknowledge my responsibility? We must reply that I am conjointly responsible both to myself and to everyone else, and that this conjunction is precisely characteristic of an engagement of the person, that it is the mark proper to the person.27

Marcel believed that a person can cultivate their nature. The points of reference for such growth are higher values, which reach beyond any one individual person. Only thanks to these objective values can we  Van Kamm, The Art of Existential Counseling, 52.  Donceel, Philosophical Psychology, 187-188. 27  Marcel, Homo Viator, 21. 25

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fully understand the human endeavour and assess whether we are maturing in the right direction. Marcel also claimed that the person is naturally free but only becomes truly and totally free when participating more fully in their own act of existence. Such freedom, in his opinion, is also possible for us in the face of determination by external constraints. According to Rollo May, in order to achieve true freedom, the human person must first break through the resentment found in contemporary culture, emerging from a repressed hatred towards the apparatus of social conformity. Freedom should not be confused with rebellion, but rebellion can sometimes lead to freedom. Freedom is man’s capacity to take a hand in his own development. It is our capacity to mold ourselves. Freedom is the other side of consciousness of self: if we were not able to be aware of ourselves, we would be pushed along by instinct or the automatic march of history […].28 In his deliberations on the issue of freedom, May does not overlook the problem of determinism. He admits that the human being is subject to many kinds of determinism, such as the limitations of one’s body, the economic situation of society, one’s place of birth, and nationality to name but a few. He strongly emphasizes that there is always a margin of freedom, even in a situation subject to a number of determinants. As long as someone is aware of these constraints, they remain free to choose the activities by which they respond to each new situation, even if it contains many restrictions on their acts. Freedom must therefore also express a free acceptance of reality.29 Freedom does not necessarily lead us to try to live solely on our own, without reference to others. It is more about the ability to enter into a responsible relationship with the world and primarily with other people. May would conclude that freedom of choice must have a positive side, even worth sacrificing one’s life for. Freedom should lead to a choice, and not to emptiness and futility, because it is associated with good, however we understand it. Both freedom and responsibility flow from self-awareness. This is a task we should not ignore. We are free, but that freedom does not mean the total absence of determination. This is even more so, when confronting existential anxiety where we are tempted to flee from choosing in

 R. May, Man’s Search for Himself, New York: Dell Publishing, 1973, 160.  R. May, Psychology and the Human Dilemma, New York, 1967, 20.

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order to escape from anxiety. A special expression of self-consciousness is the ability to stop in time and evaluate ongoing events: Consciousness of self gives us the power to stand outside the rigid chain of stimulus and response, to pause, and by this pause to throw some weight on either side, to cast some decision about what the response will be.30

Freedom is a task; we can only approach the state of freedom through a process based on the achievement of self-awareness. The nobility and dignity of the human person reside in their freedom of choice, between being and not being, between life and death. These choices are ours to make. The authentic person is constantly growing in freedom. Failure to use their freedom of choice wisely results in a person lacking in authenticity. One comes to the realization that freedom is not absolute. We are inextricably linked with our personal history of development, that is, with the history and circumstances of the maturation of our own personality: family environment, education, and genotype – to mention but a few. For van Kaam, [m]aking the impersonal become personal, rooting the unrooted, assimilating the unassimilated, ratifying the unratified, therefore, is as much an essential part of the process of discovering freedom as the transcendence of perceptions and behaviour which are incompatible with the totality of one’s personality.31

In other words, everything about ourselves that is developed through the principle of socialization in early childhood is to be re-verified, and to be consciously integrated into the system of an adult. This means that an attitude taken during the educational process does not necessarily have to be denied, but only reworked, reflected on, or simply consciously chosen. Freedom is a process of discovery that leads to the eventual transcendence of all that is in line or not in line with the ideal of the self, and of the development of one’s personality. Freedom is the courage to discover the truth, to enter into dialogue with reality, and to adequately respond to it. Freedom is not given to a person at birth. It is rather a developmental task. Behavioural reconditioning occurs through reading a meaning to life situations, discovered through freedom.32 A free individual is someone who is capable of  May, Man’s Search for Himself, 161.  Van Kaam, The Art of Existential Counseling, 66-67. 32  Van Kaam, The Art of Existential Counseling, 64. 30 31

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responding to reality, not just reacting to it. In many ways, without freedom one remains determined by public opinion, social requirements, body chemistry, or neurosis; this renders a person incapable of giving free answers to what is happening in their life. A free person recognizes both their physical and mental limitations, and yet is capable of making active decisions in response to circumstances (responsiveness); they remain in constant dialogue with reality and manage to evade the overarching influence of circumstance. A free person is characterized by existential wanting, which is, according to Van Kaam, “openness and affirmation of all manifestations of reality” or “fundamental readiness to face and affirm reality as it reveals itself to [someone] in his daily situation.”33 “Authentic freedom is not based on belief in one’s own strength, but on joyful surrender to life with all the risks which it implies.”34 Free will results from a freely chosen objective and plan of action with or without knowledge of the possible consequences. An activity or mental process is free when its beginning is inside the body and is based on conscious awareness, but not external conditions (determination, constraint), or organic drives (internal program). The concept of free will has both ontological and ethical implications.35 If we could prove the existence of an executive function of consciousness, and break the chain of physical causes, we could reject the physical hypothesis against free will. Neuroscientific experiments do not put into question the idea of an ex post free will in contrast to the automatic brain processes. If we accepted this executive function of consciousness, we would then have a free “no,” a veto of law.36 Radical behaviourism, however, denies the existence of this additional function of consciousness, and accordingly holds every action to be completely determined.37 Only then can we discover the conditions of our determination that in turn show our belief in the freedom of will to be a simplification of reality. The only freedom possible would be the power afforded by knowledge of these determinations, as postulated by Benedict de Spinoza. On the other hand, thanks to our own will, the human person can be seen to  Van Kaam, The Art of Existential Counseling, 93.  Van Kaam, The Art of Existential Counseling, 182. 35  Bunge, Ardila, Philosophy of Psychology, 216. 36  R. M. Bellino, “Free Will in the Eye of Neuroscientific Reductionism: The Need for a Philosophical Foundation of Moral Neuropsychology,” History & Philosophy of Psychology 11 (2009), 15. 37  W. O’Donohue, R. Mangold, “A Critical Examination of The Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct,” in W. O’Donohue, R. F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology, London: Sage, 1996, 371-380. 33

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have the power to stand up to the psychophysical body and find meaning in the most adverse existential situations, because a spiritual person has in such cases, the decisive vote. We are dependent both on our hereditary tendencies and on the environment, but we can move freely within the framework set by either one.38 The human person usually chooses what they consider to be good for themselves, and no one normally chooses what they considered to be evil. The will itself is “indiscriminate” and takes “guidance” from the intellect. All that is recognized by the intellect as good is then almost automatically chosen by the will. The intellect’s recognition of good directs the focus of one’s free will, which in turn commits to the choice of that perceived good. The human person recognizes good that meets the standards they have adopted with regard to good. However, because they do not find an absolute good, the will is never completely determined. The decisionmaking process and moral reflection are impacted by strong emotions, mental illness, and passions. In extreme cases, free will can even be completely abolished. Psychology finds that the will always follows the strongest motive. The decision taken by a person is by no means the result of a purely intellectual process. It is influenced by upbringing, social pressures, health status, and other factors.39 Morality can be conceived as a system of rules adopted by society; ethics is a critical reflection on morality. In this context, we can talk about the common moral convictions called “folk moral psychology.”40 Among the common beliefs regarding morality, one of the most important pertains to the existence of free will, which is the basis of liability. Today, neuroscience, making use of sophisticated experiments, tries to prove that free will is only a form of perception (illusory) based on brain processes.41 The basic objection to this approach stems from the question of the ability to translate philosophical problems into neuroscientific ones. In addition, the neuroscientific explanation is far more complex than the philosophical one and the experiments undertaken are burdened with a significant amount of inaccuracy. Objectifying the human being does not lead to true knowledge (knowledge of an apophatic nature). Such knowledge is made only  V. Frankl, Psychoterapia dla każdego, trans. E. Misiołek, Warszawa: PAX, 1978, 136.  Donceel, Philosophical Psychology, 248-252. 40  Bellino, “Free Will,” 12-16. 41  B. Libet, “Do We Have Free Will?” Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (1999), 47-57. 38

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through communion, as the understanding of justice is a communion with justice, and engages one in a commitment to live justly. The human person transcends all forms of objectification and operationalization. The moral life is not an event in nature, but presupposes the freedom of the subject, i.e. spirituality.42 We recognize the existence of God, not because doing so requires our rationality, but because our world is limited by a mystery, which remains impenetrable to our rational thinking.43 Freedom is an essential ingredient of the moral life, freedom to choose between good and evil. Without freedom to do evil we cannot talk about morality at all. This makes human existence tragic. Tragedy is an essential element of morality and of ethics, says Berdyaev.44 Freedom is expressed by our ability to adopt different spiritual attitudes towards life situations. Although often obstructed by the presence of exterior conditions, the spiritual attitude manifests clearly that there really is freedom: the ability to act independently of these very conditions. Doctors bear witness to the constraints limiting our freedom, and yet they also point to spiritual freedom that, despite these limitations, supports a certain freedom of action. This demonstrates a hidden spiritual power through which we can transcend our psychophysical limitations. This is the spiritual power of resistance. Metaphorically speaking, we could say that the virtuoso can bring out beautiful sounds even from an instrument that is out of tune.45 This is one of Frankl’s favorite images. The sciences dealing with human psychophysical nature (biology, psychology) should always leave the door open for spiritual freedom. That which is natural (pure possibility) needs a soul for its realization, as well as the spirit for its accomplishment. Metaphorically, we could say that the piano does not play by itself, but just allows a performance. The performer realizes the possibilities of an instrument, but must necessarily fulfill (keep) the form of artistic expression.46 By comparison, existence may well be authentic even when it is unconscious. We exist authentically only when we are not driven but responsible. Authentic existence is present where a self is deciding for itself, not where an id is driving it.47 Frankl notes that spirituality, by definition, indicates an element of freedom. One is called a “person” in general only when one can behave  Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 13.  Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 24. 44  Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 19. 45  Frankl, Homo patiens, 204. 46  Frankl, Homo patiens, 205. 47  Frankl, Man’s Search for Ultimate Meaning, 32. 42

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freely towards any state of affairs. The spiritual person is one who can at any time argue with and oppose external but also internal conditions (such as personality traits). The spiritual person is the very nature of the soul. The person is free, but the character itself is not free; character remains the dimension in relation to which the person is free. This is due to the fact that the human person is a spirit, while character is something psychic, which, as we know, remains linked to hereditary tendencies. We are potentially free from our inborn factuality and our existential situation.48 The human being is free, because it is essentially a spiritual being, and where it is not actually free, it is potentially free; it is ideally suited to reach that potential freedom. The human person is thus a “non-conditioned” being i.e. a “conditionally unconditioned” being. They do not have to be this or that, but they may be this or that and should be one of these. We can understand grace in this context, to be the freedom to make use of our freedom.49 Similarly, as Allport earlier, Frankl is very critical of reductive concepts of human nature, which deprive us of free will. He is convinced that for all too long, psychiatry, psychotherapy, and psychoanalysis have described the human person as composed exclusively of reflexes, or of a bundle of instincts, as conditioned, produced, and defined by the Oedipus complex or other complexes, by a sense of lower self-esteem and other similar feelings. Those approaches pictured the human being as “nothing but” something totally explained by biology, psychology, or sociology. In this way, biologism, psychologism, or sociologism always neglected the spiritual roots of our existence. In contradiction to these reductive concepts, Frankl underlines that the human being is more than a psychophysical organism – it is a person. As such, it is free and responsible – free from its psychophysical organism and free to discover and integrate values in order to fulfill the meaning of human existence. The essence of a spiritual person is to struggle for the value and meaning of their existence.50 To emphasize the organic relationship of freedom and responsibility, Frankl suggested that the Statue of Liberty on the east coast of the United States should be complemented by a Statue of Responsibility on the western shore.51  Frankl, Homo patiens, 245, 247, 248.  Frankl, Homo patiens, 265. 50  Frankl, Homo patiens, 265-266. 51  Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 49. 48

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According to Wojtyła, responsible freedom is one of the most important conditions of the being (esse) of the human person, the one who has the ability to intentionally self-sacrifice. Any encounter creates for us an opportunity to demonstrate this kind of freedom. Justice defines some boundaries to freedom, because each person is limited by the freedom of another. Pope John Paul II goes so far as to say that: “The freedom of the individual is inseparable from the freedom of all other people. [...] There is no freedom without solidarity.”52 As previously mentioned, according to Wojtyła, we, as spiritual beings, actualize ourselves through the moral goodness of personal actions. What is more, without reference to God (responsibility before someone) we cannot protect liberty against fraud. Human freedom is a condition whereby it is possible to praise God through others, in dialogue with another “you”; God, for his part, does not delete human freedom, but he raises it to the peaks of perfection.53 Self-transcendence Self-transcendence is the axis of the responsive dimension of human nature, and also the very essence of its spirituality. This is the unanimous conclusion of both Frankl and Wojtyła. The spiritual nature of the human person defies biological determinism. We can act contrary to impulsive tendencies and go beyond the boundaries of pathological conditions. It is this phenomenon of freedom which is the essence of spirituality and its fullest expression. To a large extent, the spirit manifests itself independently of the flesh; it has great autonomy in spite of depending on the body. This autonomy is so obvious that on its basis we can recognize the spiritual nature of human existence; we can also place it in a concrete existential situation: that of appealing to freedom simultaneously with one’s sense of responsibility.54 The human person can transcend the data of their own consciousness, their own existence, and even virtually everything they find in the world in the direction of “Being” (Heidegger) or the “all-embracing” (Jaspers). 52  Jan Paweł II, “Przemówienie przed Bramą Brandenburską. Berlin, 23 VI 1996,” in J. Poniewierski (ed.), Przemówienia i homilie Ojca Świętego Jana Pawła II, Kraków: Znak, 1997, 127. Original in German: http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/de/ speeches/1996/june/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19960623_berlino.html (18.06.2018), no 5. 53  John Paul II, Redemptor hominis, no 12. 54  Frankl, Homo patiens, 203.



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They can transcend themselves and become another unique person. This degree of radical self-transcendence has an ethical character. Self-­ transcendence precedes the desire to find meaning, the kind of restlessness of the heart described by Augustine.55 Others, including Ludwig Binswanger asserted that the capacity to transcend the world manifests itself in the structure of “über-die-Welt-hinaus-sein” (to-be-beyond-the-world).56 For his part, Dietrich von Hildebrand stated that the capacity to transcend one’s limitations is one of the most important marks of being a person; in this work, our focus is on the thought of Wojtyła and Frankl. Spirituality is related to consciousness because through it we cross over from the “here and now,” as well as from any physical limitations. That is why we also talk about self-transcendence as a property of the human mind. It is an ability proper only to the human person and forms the basis of our spirituality.57 At this point, theology would add that God created this mind and sustains its existence.58 Frankl states explicitly that to be human means to go beyond oneself. Hence the essence of our existence is self-transcendence. Being human means to be directed towards something or someone, to be devoted to a work, to which we intentionally sacrifice ourselves, another human person that we love, or God, whom we serve.59 We discover outside of ourselves the world of values, and by realizing their potential, we perform acts of self-transcendence. Frankl definitely distinguishes acts of self-transcendence, which focus the self on objective values, from the process of self-actualization, which is guided more by the principle of pleasure associated with actualizing one’s potentialities. Self-actualization should be, according to Frankl, a side effect of selftranscendence.60 Asking what the justification could be for the acceptance of our spiritual nature, Frankl points out that despite identical initial conditions, due to specific psychiatric pathologies, some people are able to deal with these conditions using mature internal attitudes and not give in to, for example, depressive moods.61  Tarnowski, Usłyszeć niewidzialne, 67-68, 71.  Popielski, “Logoteoria i logoterapia w kontekście psychologii współczesnej,” 35. 57  Helminiak, “Confounding the Divine and the Spiritual,” 168. 58  Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I q. 9 a 2 Body Para 1/3. 59  Frankl, Homo patiens, 135. 60  Uchnast, “Koncepcja człowieka jako osoby w psychologii humanistyczno-­ ­egzysten­cjalnej,” 96-97. 61  Frankl, Homo patiens, 203. 55

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Unlike motivation based on meeting needs, motivation associated with the search for meaning through the choice of values is characterized by attraction rather than exertion. Values attract us, but we are not bound to them. Each person has the freedom to choose them or not. Human actions are not a simple consequence of psychic mechanisms. The essence of the human being resides in the choice that a spiritual person makes to use somatic and psychic faculties in achieving chosen objectives. A spiritual person is able to block behaviour that automatically flows from their psychophysical nature. Frankl admits that, in some situations, the body or psyche may prevent the operation of the spirit, but in his opinion, they are the pathological exceptions. By nature, we seek the meaning of our existence and the meaning of everything known about it. This search is not free from error. For example, some values may be absolutized. Absolutizing is based on the false perception of a value, assigning to a relative value (even to health) an absolute status, which normally should be granted only to God. A spiritual person is not identical to their empirical manifestations. The existence and the destruction of the body cannot influence the existence and the disintegration of a spiritual person. Death is only the end of the empirical disclosure of a person. The human person is not shaped by their physicality and “psychicity” (psychology), but only conditioned by them, i.e. made possible, but not created. We can define ourselves by reference to the objective world of values and meaning. A spiritual person emerges from the convergence of “transcendence” and “absolute spirit.”62 The purpose of the body is to define the boundaries of the spiritual life. In any case, the spiritual life transcends all dimensions of the body, which, for its part, only reduces the possibilities of perception and action (e.g. movement).63 The human person can rise above the necessity of nature. Even if one does not reach one’s optimal development (as saints), one remains an essence that transcends natural necessity and this defies strict determinism. There are few things that go beyond the ability of a human being, and we regularly exceed the limits of necessity making use of our freedom.64 The imagination and our genotypic ability to use symbols allow us to transcend sensory experience. We transcend our natural e­ nvironment

 Frankl, Homo patiens, 240.  Abbagnano, Storia della filosofia, III, 473. 64  Frankl, Homo patiens, 241. 62 63



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to live in an open world, and although we receive sensory stimuli, we are not limited to them.65 Frankl argues further that a spiritual person is one who can defend themselves against psychosis. This clearly proves the presence of one’s spiritual existence, because nothing physical or mental could, by itself, oppose distinct mental processes. One person is able to resist suicidal thoughts, and the other is not; one person loses themselves to a disease (for example, chronic sadness) and another bravely confronts it – even for religious reasons.66 What ultimately decides the outcome is the attitude of a spiritual person towards situations encountered in life.67 To put it more existentially, the human person faces the task of adopting fate and making it into their own destiny. Acceptance of fate is at the same time the shaping of this fate. On the other hand, the rejection of one’s own destiny is destructive to one’s life. Suicide does not remove the “sins of the fathers” (e.g. a child of an alcoholic), or remove faults. Original sin cannot be redeemed by one’s own penance. We are always and forever saddled with consequences that impede our spiritual freedom. We can, at best, be rid of the consciousness of this self-blame for indefinite periods of time.68 The spiritual person is never lost in any situation so long as they can establish a distance between themselves and the situation in order to be able to take the appropriate attitude towards it: to agree to it or oppose it. Thanks to this distance, a freedom is born in us, and only thanks to this freedom can we make decisions against the pull of natural impulse or inclination.69 The existence of this optional noo-psychical antagonism70 is, according to Frankl, a condition sine qua non for the possibility of effective psychotherapy. Only a spiritual person is able to resist psychosis because the spiritual person is, in fact, beyond any possibility of psychosomatic illness or mortality.71 Wojtyła adds to this that the deepest meaning of spirituality manifests itself in the ability to reach self-transcendence. Spirituality is the integrating principle of the emotive dimension of our lives. Nevertheless, the spiritual cannot be reduced to the psychic, i.e. to what is emotive and sensual.72  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 98.  Frankl, Homo patiens, 258-259. 67  Frankl, Homo patiens, 257. 68  Frankl, Homo patiens, 264-265. 69  Frankl, Homo patiens, 245. 70  In this way, Frankl sometimes describes the human capacity for self-transcendence. 71  Frankl, Homo patiens, 260. 72  Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 226-227. 65

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According to Frankl, the human person finds sense in life by creating something new, performing good deeds, experiencing goodness, truth, or the beauty of nature or culture, and by encountering the unique person of another and offering them love. However, the highest manifestation of meaning may be realized by those deprived of the possibility of these types of meaning. Through their attitudes, they are able to transcend themselves and transform their suffering into achievement, and triumph, even going as far as transforming it into an act of heroism. This can be accomplished thanks to: creative values, which we give to the world, experiential values that we receive from the world, and finally through attitudinal values, which means to take up a brave stand towards our own often involuntary and innocent suffering.73 According to Scheler, we are no different from other animals biologically. What distinguishes us is the spiritual dimension. We are humans by the fact that we express ourselves and have a spiritual existence. We are beings who transcend both ourselves and the existing world through a kind of continuous protest against reality. Scheler clearly separates life from the spirit. The latter is responsible for new ideas, although by nature it remains in passive receptivity. The presence of the spirit in us challenges the theory of evolution. Sometimes it seems that we are going backwards. For example, our self-reflective consciousness has weakened in us the instinctual faculties and the sharpness of sensory perception.74 Frankl postulates that we should replace the term “objective” with the term “trans-subjective.” Trans-subjectivity is the basis of self-transcendence. Human persons transcend themselves towards a meaning that is something other than themselves and moves them towards other human persons.75 The expression of human self-transcendence, according to Paul ­Tillich, is courage. It should be understood both in a usual way as in an ethical endeavour, but also as an ontological act. Courage as a common and important affirmation of being is ontological. The courage to be is also an ethical act in which we affirm our own existence in spite of everything about it that condemns it.76 Only the human person is capable of self-affirmation: ontologically – capable of coping with one’s own fate (death); spiritually – capable of  Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 69-70.  Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 48. 75  Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 60. 76  Tillich, The Courage to Be, 12-13. 73

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fighting for the meaning of life; morally – capable of facing the guilt and fear of damnation. Self-affirmation does not remove the fear, but helps us to overcome it. The only alternative that remains is despair.77 Józef Tischner speaks of the bravery of hope. We are capable of overcoming obstacles in our path that we transform into a stimulus to our development. Bravery is also a courageous facing of threats of death in order to protect the most important values. When our hope opens to the transcendent it becomes, according to Tischner, a spiritual hope that is able to overcome all evil and even death.78 Tillich sees the world of technology as a threat to self-affirmation. In the modern world, we have to deal with the processes of dehumanization, loss of the human self, and blurring of individuality. The courage to be, in this context, is the ability to be oneself, that is, the courage to be a person. Excessive individualism on the other hand leads to alienation and despair. Accepting that a person can continually experience God, in spite of their imperfections, provides protection against the final defeat of our efforts on the path to overcoming fear. This vision is neither pessimistic nor overly optimistic; it is simply a reflection on human existence. Taking up the issue of human self-transcendence, Mieczysław A. Krapiec lists the following features of personal being: intellectual cognition, love, freedom, obedience to the law, wholeness, and dignity.79 The first three relate to the transcendence of nature, and the others to the transcendence of the community. Krapiec shows that the same entity, the human person, fulfills both vegetative (physiological) tasks and spiritual activities (mental); the same entity fulfills both tangible and intangible (material and immaterial) tasks. However, the self transcends even its own spiritual acts.80 The ability to overcome psychophysical limitations and conditions reveals itself both under the influence of intrinsic motivation, as well as under extremely difficult conditions. It proves that the human being is not a homeostatic system, but rather heterostatic one, a system capable of generating proactive motivation, of changing, of finding the meaning of life, and of growing and maturing.  Tillich, The Courage to Be, 68-70.  Tarnowski, Usłyszeć niewidzialne, 93. 79  Subjectivity to lows means the relationship to another human being, whose action or inaction is owed that person due to their proportion of the common good. Under concrete circumstances, it aims at the optimal spiritual development of each human person. M. A. Krąpiec, Ja – człowiek, Lublin: TN KUL, 1986, 384. 80  M. A. Krąpiec, Człowiek jako osoba, Lublin: PTTA, 2005, 12-13. 77 78

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The human being has the desire to make a greater sense of itself and of the world. This is not the self-actualization promoted by modern society, but rather a type of innermost motivation, a desire to seek the purpose of life, and in the end to find and fulfill this purpose. The purpose of human life is not actualizing oneself, but rather transcending oneself, or reaching beyond oneself on the way towards achieving objective goals and values.81 One of the most ardent promoters of the concept of self-transcendence was Karol Wojtyła – Pope John Paul II. In his most important philosophical work, The Acting Person, he showed self-transcendence and transcendence of our own action to be the essential basis and the expression of our spirituality. Wojtyła argued that one can speak of spiritual potentialities. To some extent, the concept is similar to Frankl’s unconscious spirituality. There is a certain dynamism in manifestations of human spirituality. Self-transcendence is expressed in the experience of self-determination and conscience. Spirituality must have a dynamic character, and if so, there is also potentiality to it. Wojtyła understands spirituality in terms of the classical concept of the human mind, i.e. the intellect and will. The dynamic of the intellect (reason) is its attribution to the truth, while the dynamic of the will is to bind human freedom to this truth.82 According to Wojtyła, both the centre of transcendence of the person in action and the centre of one’s spirituality are a dependence of freedom on truth. This dynamism at the level of experience takes place in one’s conscience.83 Somehow, we have access to our spirituality in the interiority of our consciousness. This does not mean, however, that spirituality can be reduced either to mere psychicity or sensuality.84 Our corporeality is a way of expressing our spiritual dynamism, which, by its nature is immaterial, and ultimately, by our spiritual existence, we are capable of transcending both our psyche and body.85

81  Abraham Maslow near the end of his life wrote a paper to show that there is an aspect of self-transcendence that he omitted about the person: M. E. Koltko-Rivera, “Rediscovering the Later Version of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs: Self-Transcendence and Opportunities for Theory, Research, and Unification,” Review of General Psychology 4 (2006), 302-317. 82  Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 184. 83  Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 160. 84  Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 47. 85  Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 204-205. The body as a way of expressing the person John Paul II described in more detail in his catechesis on marriage.



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In addition, Wojtyla differentiates horizontal and vertical transcendence. Horizontal transcendence is essentially intentional acts, i.e. directing ourselves (for example, in cognitive acts) to other objects, while vertical transcendence is the transcendence of the person in action, i.e. overpassing our human limitations.86 Both forms of transcendence have their share in spirituality. We are spiritually mature to the extent that we are capable of selftranscendence. This applies particularly to psychophysical limitations. The very word “existence” (Latin existere) indicates a movement outside (ex). It may be said that only the one who is capable of such a movement truly exists, because in this way the human being is fulfilled, especially in being for others.87

 Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 124-125.  Stinissen, Żyć w głębokiej relacji z Bogiem, 40.

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Responsiveness in grace As we have already shown, responses to the discovery of spirituality in human nature are acts of self-transcendence. These are particularly effective when the human person is strengthened by the gift of God’s grace. Our ability to achieve self-transcendence comes as a response to this gift from God, mainly through our spiritual development, the fruit of which is the deification of the human being; this, in turn, enables us to perform acts of charity, among which some may move one to intentionally sacrifice oneself in the performance of acts of heroism that radically exceed the potentiality of human nature. Spiritual growth Human development is complete when the Holy Spirit is allowed to work in our interior, which leads us to become Christ-like. In this process, the aim is not to simply mimic Jesus’ behaviour; it consists in “putting our trust in the Father” as well as being attentive to the voice of the Spirit in the innermost part of our being.1 Each human person was created within a relationship and for a relationship. The Creator desires that we should be totally fulfilled in a loving relationship with Him that encompasses all of our earthly relationships. Otherwise stated, and whether or not we are conscious of it, the object of our deepest desire is God, and the deepest desire of God’s own heart is to be in a relationship of love with the human person, for God’s boundless love, through its excess, is motivated to continue giving. God’s love is always present and ready to remind us of who we really are, of our identity in Christ, especially when evil brings us to falsify this true identity. Jesus Christ is the best example of what our deepest identity is, as created in the image of God, and the grace of God is meant to lead us to discover this infinite gift within ourselves.2  Montgomery, Trusting in the Trinity, 52.  Ryan, Four Steps to Spiritual Freedom, 35-36, 41.

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In his mercy, God creates the human being by sowing in us the seed of immortality, a desire for heaven and the fullness of love. In the course of a human life, God continues fueling this desire, because it helps us to fulfill his commandment to love God and neighbor. The actualization of this commandment is the fulfillment of our deepest longing. The creation of the human being is also the aim of our whole itinerary – paradise and eternal life with God. The sanctity of creation is to be complemented by the moral sanctity of the human person. Irenaeus said that, the “glory of God is a living man; and the life of man consists in beholding God”;3 in turn, Augustine expresses the thought in his own way: “You have made us for yourself, O Lord, and our hearts are restless until they rest in you.”4 The result of original sin is a rigid self (described in the Bible as a “stiff neck”5). Only when this stiffened self becomes supple, and is in the process of transcendence, does the spiritual person begin to fully emerge. Within the Homo sapiens species, there is a struggle for self-assertion. The struggle for development has both a spiritual and a social nature, since we are at once an animal socialis and a spiritual being. Because of this melding of our nature, we should not be morally determined solely by society6. According to Christian revelation, human nature is capable of receiving supernatural life, which consists in sharing the very nature of God. The good that ultimately fulfills human nature is objectively God, but subjectively it is the option we are offered of living in union with Him. This is the complementarity of the philosophical approach of Aristotle and St. Thomas, when they speak of the actualization of rational human nature by aiming at pure goodness.7 Yet the soul does not exist before the body, nor does it emerge with the body’s development (successive animation). We deal rather with a mutual-coming-to-be of body and soul, meaning that the human soul is directly created by God. This gives us an infinite dignity. We are not simply a product of the forces of nature.8 Gregory of Nyssa addresses the problem of human development in an original way. He says that, according to the teaching of St. Paul, there  Irenaeus of Lyons, Adversus haereses IV, 20, 7.  Augustine, Confessions, I 1. 5  Acts 7:51; Ex 32:9; Ex 33:3, 5; Ex 34:9; Deut 9:6, 13. 6  Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 58. 7  Wojtyła, Wykłady lubelskie, 175. 8  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 132. 3

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is an inner and an outer person. The human being develops like a seed, gradually revealing its potential. Nothing significant at this time of development comes from the outside world, apart from nourishment. The human being develops from its own potentialities and inner power, which is the soul. In human development, the soul gradually shows its dominion over the body, through which it begins to be seen.9 With each person who comes into the world, something fundamentally new appears that did not exist before, something completely new and unique. Each person is called to develop this unique and exceptional quality.10 Every human person senses this power within its nature, and even as life itself is offered to them, it is given as a task. To become fully human, we must certainly make a number of efforts. In short, this is not an automatic process but involves human consciousness. May asserts: The acorn becomes an oak by means of automatic growth; no commitment is necessary. The kitten similarly becomes a cat on the basis of instinct. Nature and being are identical in creatures like them. But a man or woman becomes fully human only by his or her choices and his or her commitment to them. People attain worth and dignity by the multitude of decisions they make from day by day. These decisions require courage.11

The spiritual development of a human person takes place in the clearly defined situation of salvation history, which brings with it both the means and the tools to grow (for example, the sacraments), as well as multiple and diverse challenges. We live in a period between creation, the first sin and redemption, and the second coming of the Lord. One of the contemporary exponents of the developmental conception of human nature was Karol Wojtyła – Pope John Paul II. In his view, the human person is in statu fieri – constantly becoming. This becoming is not only limited to the biological level. Every good executed by us remains inside and changes us. One of the most important factors in this development is love: doing good for itself, for the ultimate fulfillment it brings, is the highest good. Fulfilling oneself has a moral character because one is both the creator and material intended for creation. We are the potential for our future development. In each individual there is already an act, which in turn causes the next actualization of ­potentialities  Zenkowsky, Petzold, Das Bild des Menschen, 67.  M. Buber, The Way Of Man: According to the Teaching of Hasidism, New York: Citadel, 2000, 16. 11  R. May, The Courage to Create, New York: W. W. Norton, 1975, 14. 9

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stored within human nature. The nature (essence) of an individual is revealed gradually, beginning with marginal elements and moving toward the most significant, which is spiritual, from the action of the senses, to self-awareness. If spirituality is a dimension of human nature, per consequentiam, every human activity is spiritual, because, again, according to Wojtyła, each human activity is ultimately a personal one. Each human mental activity is spiritual as every physical action is also spiritual. However, in certain regrettable cases, containing elements of spiritual behaviour, the spirit is somehow absorbed by the senses and their workings. The human spirit reveals itself by creating a world of meaning inspired by values. Without the meaning, values and ideals, visions and virtues it represents, we cannot speak of the complete realization of our nature, as the whole of our existence is based on our spiritual becoming.12 If we look at it from the point of view of pure functionality, the physiological aspect presents the basis for the sensual, and this in turn for the intellectual. Through this progression, we slowly grow towards the recognition and acceptance of higher values. If reference to values and to the specific direction that spiritual development should take point to the normative dimension of spirituality, then how much more will a Christian approach lead to the values and principles of spiritual development, which cannot be freely chosen, but are rather presupposed.13 According to the biblical message, as created in the image of God, the human person is called to make the necessary effort to attain maturity in their spiritual development without which one would not become fully oneself. In the process of becoming fully human, there are inevitable failures, challenging experiences, and internal crises. Despite this, it is both the most spontaneous and profound of processes. Development of the potentialities inscribed in human nature does not take place either automatically or fully instinctively, but is a process involving consciousness and free will. A lack of development of personal potentialities is a sign of pathology, while their development is a source of great joy for the human person. Spirituality can be seen as a dimension of the human mind, as an internal rule of self-transcendence and an ontological opening. It is a

 Helminiak, “Confounding the Divine and the Spiritual,” 172.  Helminiak, “Confounding the Divine and the Spiritual,” 174.

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­ imension of our nature which directs us beyond ourselves, towards a d potentially endless development.14 For Henri Bergson, our spiritual existence is one of continual change, a continuous and uninterrupted stream of consciousness, and all states of consciousness are combined within it seamlessly. Memory is not a faculty of the subject, but a factor that constantly enhances the spiritual being, engraving within itself everything that it is witness to. Memory is also creative. The present moment is the result of all the previous ones, but also receives a whole new quality. For a conscious being, existence means change, change as becoming and becoming as creating oneself. The spiritual life is ultimately, in Bergsonian terms, self-creation and freedom.15 Nonetheless, it must be remembered that the human being is not entitled to the capacity for absolute self-creation. Spiritual development is to be carried out in cooperation with God’s grace. Frankl divides our development into two phases. The first is a psychophysical maturing aimed at preparing the instrument (the piano) which will then be used by the spiritual person (the pianist). Frankl does not specify exactly when the process is supposed to be complete. This can be assessed only on the basis of one’s intentional activity. The second step is the development of a personality, i.e. becoming oneself. One’s development is based on one’s potentialities and is done through spiritual growth. This process is never-ending and is only interrupted by death, for the human person never just “is,” but rather becomes.16 Frankl also emphasizes our moral development. Nor can we ever say that the person simply “is not,” because from the standpoint of metaphysics, spiritual existence is the consistent and durable basis of our development. We can only say that a spiritual person is increasingly revealed through the psyche and the body. Healthy human development requires a harmonious balance between self-preservation and the ability to self-transcend by giving and receiving. The Holy Spirit enables the human person to respond to the call of God, and lead a life in accordance with His will. God can reveal himself to the human person through intuition, dreams, the heart’s desire, or by external circumstances. Through it all, God invites us to do two things: provide a response to him during our life and learn to trust Him with all that we are.17 It is thus inherently a receptive–responsive process.  Helminiak, “Confounding the Divine and the Spiritual,” 171.  Abbagnano, Storia della filosofia, III, 479. 16  Frankl, Homo patiens, 63. 17  Frankl, Homo patiens, 58. 14 15

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Parents transmit to children their genetic material but they cannot give them a spirit (soul). Parents provide the psychophysical structure of the human being but do not produce the spiritual person. Inheritance determines what we possess but not who we are. With each human being coming into the world, there are completely new and unique attributes being born; they form the new person’s spiritual existence. The existence of the human person cannot be actualized without reference to another existence. A spiritual person reaches beyond themselves. This is the existential pre-phenomenon tilting us towards communion with another, and especially, with God.18 Nowadays, that the human being is religious in the genotypic sense, is no longer a subject of debate: human nature is religious by nature (cf. ­Catechism of the Catholic Church 28, 44). We do not meet with any religious phenomena in the world of animals. It is impossible, however, to talk about the genotypic grace of faith. It does not have its source in body and blood (cf. Mt 13:17). Each person was conceived outside the community of the Church, even though they may have had the most holy and pious Christian parents. Since we are by nature religious beings, it means that we have been provided with the ability to accept the grace of faith.19 Although the spiritual element cannot be inherited, the power of the soul is co-creative in the whole process of rearing. Spirit is actualized in a particular existence.20 Both the appearance in the world of a spiritual person, and their disappearance remains a mystery. People spontaneously comprehend their own existence and the existence of other people as a phenomenon reaching far beyond temporality.21 The development of the human person should be recognized as a process of progressive personalization in a historical and cultural context. Personalization means accepting to live in a constant state of receptivity toward both the outside and the internal world. Major differences are shown in human development in comparison to other species.22 It is a slow and gradual opening up of the self to everything that exists. The most important factor is contact with other people, because we develop substantially in relation to them. Because of our nature, we are capable of entering into a relationship with another self and, above all, with the Transcendent Thou.23  Frankl, Homo patiens, 210-211.  Nowak, Psychologia eklezjalna, 113. 20  Frankl, Homo patiens, 216. 21  Frankl, Homo patiens, 226-227. 22  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 61. 23  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 63. 18

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The human being exists as a spiritual person. This existence is expressed in a threefold way: it is always one (indivisible), it is whole (cannot be combined with others), and it is unique (non-transferable). Based on scientific data, we cannot explain the origin of the human spirit. We can only determine the psychophysical conditions of its appearance. Spirit must somehow come to the body (and to the soul – if with Frankl we accept the trichotomy of human nature) from the outside. Even in the case of a mature person, the spirit remains concealed from direct knowledge or, as it were, “silent.” This is even more clearly visible in the case of small children. The spiritual layer is waiting to manifest itself, to break the silence, as if to come through the veil of psychophysicality. It takes time for the spiritual person to master the body as a tool of expression.24 For spiritual development, the general rule is that the healthier and more mature one is in their mental and moral life, the easier it is to develop a spiritual life. A healthy nature makes it easier to be affected by grace, which does not destroy nature but perfects it.25 Belief in God does not exempt anyone from the obligation of achieving maturity or of developing one’s talents. Union with God and personal happiness also depend on the degree of integration of one’s personality along with the quality of one’s interpersonal relations. Because grace facilitates the maturation of the human psyche, a fully mature Christian will also normally be a mature person who has defeated their egocentrism and opened up to Transcendence and to solidarity. The Gospel proposes both a new dignity as a child of God and the ability to intentionally sacrifice oneself in love.26 Spiritual growth is actualized through a constant, reciprocal influence within supernatural communion. The gift of God’s grace and the specific human personality become a gift made of a combination of grace and human effort. Each person has unique gifts and abilities, and is shaped by influences from the environment that the individual lives in. Maintaining an appropriate direction in the development of their gifts and abilities requires unceasing effort on the part of the individual.27 By its actions, each being reveals its nature, which manifests itself in its own intentional acts compatible with its unique nature. The nature  Frankl, Homo patiens, 214-215.  Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 2, ad Ium. 26  Goya, Psicologia e vita spirituale, 50-51. 27  Goya, Psicologia e vita spirituale, 53. 24

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specific to each person is also the target of one’s own actions and becomes the actualization of one’s existence. The ultimate and natural goal of all beings’ actions is God. What distinguishes the human being from other beings are the intellect and the will, to which freedom is attributed. Freedom must admit to the possibility of committing errors while discerning what is good for us. Analysing the operations of the intellect and will allows us to discover the purpose and the fulfillment of these faculties, hallmarks of the complete human being. The will naturally seeks to achieve the fullness of good, the ultimate good; the intellect searches to know the fullness of truth. Neither of these faculties will reach peace (fulfillment) until they find supreme good and fullness of truth, to which they will forever cling. For various reasons, and notably due to the shortcomings of our limited nature in the order of cognition, this undertaking is known to fail within the framework of our earthly life. Nonetheless, this fulfillment is attainable.The sine qua non for complete fulfillment of the individual is the existence of Supreme Good and Truth, to which the human being can forever cling. Through intellect and will, the human person leans naturally towards eternity, in the context of which one can achieve full happiness. If such a possibility did not exist, we would be self-contradictory beings because we would desire infinite happiness that we could never achieve. In this life, the human person is unable to achieve the fullness of happiness because there is a cross inscribed in our existence. We will still yearn for the fullness of happiness because any earthly satisfaction is only partial and transient, and the fullness of felicity can only be reached in God.28 Human development (ontogeny) involves a progressive personalization, that is, the gradual penetration of a personal form of existence through successive layers of one’s humanity. It is important to highlight that, strictly speaking, the human being does not become a person; each of us is a person from the very beginning. If we talk about development, or becoming a person, we do so in a metaphorical way (analogy).29 An important step in this development is the transition from the u­ nconscious  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 208.  The attempt to understand human existence encounters an aporia in this issue, since it is commonly said that the soul of the human person is subject to development, whereas in fact the whole person develops as compositum, and we can only speak of the soul or person developing in an analogous way, or indirectly. Many authors struggle with this conception, because we don’t rely on the appropriate metaphysics of human existence. Interestingly Frankl takes up this issue while asserting that a change in a spiritual person occurs depending on whether the change is true or false (moral development). For more details see the previous footnote. 28

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to the conscious self, from heteronomy to autonomy, and from the passivity of nature to the activity of a person. A unique manner of human behaviour is revealed gradually through one’s personality. The person expresses themselves through their personality,30 as we have already explained in previous chapters. Spiritual development should be seen as a progressive unification of elements of morality in the personality of the believer, given that human existence reaches its highest point in clinging to God as the Highest Good. Our aim is not only that of self-improvement (asceticism, an increase in the virtues), but, without ignoring these aspects, that of an intrinsic orientation towards Christ. We are called to embrace His aspirations and way of thinking as our own, thanks to the graces flowing from the sacraments provided by the Savior to fulfill our spiritual development. This transformation, which takes place in the believer, includes theological, moral, ecclesial, and psychological elements, leading ultimately to holiness. Spiritual development is assumed to be realized through the human psyche, its processes and structures. This assumption allows us to develop an adequate anthropology that takes into account the day-to-day life of each particular living person, not just the sublime ideals we are sometimes so fond of.31 The development of a human personality does not take place solely at the instinctive level, but in a certain tension in relation to a future aim or in search of higher values. Many authors have agreed that, to a certain extent, the human person is the author of their own development, of which two of the most important features are the search for one’s own identity as well as faithfulness to one’s chosen ideals.32 There are several models of human development at the psychological and spiritual levels. (1) Parallelism assumes a fundamental correlation between the processes of mental development and spiritual progress, making the second a form of the first. Human maturity would be a necessary condition for the development of holiness. (2) Contrast implies that too much mental well-being may result in the conviction of one’s own self-sufficiency and spiritual pride. God may then be said to delight in the poor of heart and the powerless. His power shines most brightly through the strength and courage of the martyrs. At times, God can more easily be seen to show the wonders of His grace through weak  Nowak, Osoba. Fakt i tajemnica, 216.  Goya, Psicologia e vita spirituale, 54-55. 32  Goya, Psicologia e vita spirituale, 57. 30 31

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personalities, or at least through humble ones. The problem with this approach is the emphasis on the exceptional manifestations of God’s grace. (3) Coexistence assumes that God’s grace and human freedom have to encounter each other and work together. Some moments of conflict cannot be avoided; certain shortcomings in mental maturity may coexist with a sincere commitment to spiritual growth, and support the effort of opening one’s self up to the actions of the Holy Spirit.33 Religious development is associated with the free choice of certain moral attitudes. At their outset, these choices are dictated by fear of God’s punishment; then the desire to please God becomes the focus of the person; finally, this desirability leads one to choose God as the ultimate value, around which one’s whole life begins to evolve. To a certain degree, growth in the spirit remains similar to one of psychological maturity. It does not take place only on the basis of cumulative achievements, but also on a road strewn with losses and dark nights. This is the concept of the spiral development found in Langer, which allows for the possibility of transformation in Christ. This is not always simple or easy, but it evolves through the sum of intermittent processes, and involves a journey through peaks and valleys, rapid and radical progress as well as slow changes.34 Approaching God makes it easier to get to know oneself and to discover one’s own identity. We have to accept that grace also works secretly in the human person by touching their unconscious layers. Psychology itself is called to open up progressively to an integral understanding of the human being, and subsequently to develop adequate research on certain aspects of it. Psychological tests are very valuable, but apply only to selected issues of development and we have to use these tests with this awareness.35 Psychology, and even more psychotherapy, has to help a person come to such a degree of control over their behaviour that they will be able to benefit fully from free will and take full responsibility for their decisions. Psychology also shows how, in the course of their development, a person comes to fully disclose their spiritual faculties: the intellect and the will. At the beginning, this development is determined by biological drives, subsequently by education, that is, the assimilation of our parents’ v­ alues,  Goya, Psicologia e vita spirituale, 63-64.  Goya, Psicologia e vita spirituale, 70-72. 35  Goya, Psicologia e vita spirituale, 74. 33

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and finally by reaching the level of self-governance and self-determination, that is, the fullness of freedom and responsibility. The human being’s birth and growth on this earth is made up of a process that develops slowly, step by step. The tools of this transformation during earthly life are primarily the three theological virtues – faith, hope, and love. Faith gradually transforms the human mind and enriches it with new clarity and understanding; hope touches our too mundane, sober realism, allowing us to live with great expectations; and love transfigures our tendency to seek justice, so that we stop constantly wanting to know who is right, but instead begin to give, to give with inexhaustible generosity and compassion.36 Christ came to reveal who we are, because he is the true prototype of what a human should be. When God created us, he had Jesus in mind, therefore He created us according to His image. Each of us only becomes fully human when we discover that we too are both human and divine.37 The Vatican II Council states that the human person is the only creature on earth which God willed for their own sake,38 meaning that the human person was in no way an afterthought for God the Creator. We understand this better through the prism of salvation, while experiencing the grace of God, and informed by the light of the new creation. Reaching the perfection of the image of God in humans also means entering into full communion and reconciliation with other people. People do not only live in a moral community, but in ontological communion. Relationships with others cease then to be only external, and one creates with others a one-multiplicity fellowship, as sketched in the philosophy of transfigured humanity by Vladimir Solovyov.39 Homo deificatus By deification40 (Greek theosis, theopoiesis; Latin deificatio) theologians, particularly from the Orthodox faith, are trying to express the new state of the human person who relies on the internal presence of the Holy Spirit leading them towards holiness, making them like God (homoiosis  Stinissen, Człowiek prawdziwy, 232.  Stinissen, Człowiek prawdziwy, 235-236. 38  Gaudium et spes, no. 24. 39  Congar, “Człowiek i przebóstwienie w teologii prawosławnej,” 844. 40  A. Jastrzębski, “Homo deificatus,” Wrocławski Przegląd Teologiczny 1 (2015), 7-18. 36 37

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theo). This does not mean that one becomes God or even equal to Him, but that one becomes a participant in His life. God’s image (eikon) is an indispensable part of human nature, but through the Holy Spirit‘s transforming presence, the human person rejoices in participating in the blessed life of God and becomes God-like. It is in this image of God that the hidden spiritual powers of intellect and will have fertile ground for theosis. God’s greatest desire for us is deification.41 Deification is not a gift added to our nature. It is, however, an important element of transformed human nature, where it reflects its original model, having become a full image of the Triune God.42 Deification is an act of self-transcendence and transformation through which the human person not only surrenders to the redemptive work of Christ, but is actively involved in the discovery of their true destiny.43 The Christian concept of the human person is factual, not symbolic. It recognizes transfiguration and enlightenment of created human nature, which enables the individual to achieve a higher quality of life and not just be a symbolic representation of ultrahuman values in a human being. According to Berdyaev, the central theme of Christian anthropology is that of Divine humanity. Christianity leads to the deification of the human being, and not to angelization of our animal nature: Christ was the God-man, and not the God-angel.44 Clement of Alexandria introduced the word “deification” into the language of theology. This term has been used to express the situation of the Christian redeemed by Christ. Theosis was of a pagan origin, which is why some Fathers of the Church preferred to use other expressions, such as adoption, kinship with God, intimacy, community of nature, participation, or rebirth.45 Deification, as a concept, has its theological basis in the teachings of the Old Testament with respect to the image of God in the human being.46 On this basis and on the basis of the teaching of St. Paul about the new life in Christ (“it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me,” Gal 2:20),47 the Fathers of the Church created the term  Z. J. Kijas, Przebóstwienie człowieka i świata, Kraków: PAT, 2000, 132-133.  Hryniewicz, “Współczesna antropologia prawosławna,” 225-226. 43  D. Robinson, Understanding the “Imago Dei”: The Thought of Barth, von Balthasar and Moltmann, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011, 57. 44  Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 82. 45  Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 47. 46  Eckmann, Przebóstwienie człowieka, 226. 47  All biblical references are taken from: The Holy Bible. New Revised Standard Version, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 41

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theopoiesis.48 John Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa maintained that the human being is a microcosm, a synthesis of the universe.49 Paul Evdokimov believed, in turn, that the human being is a microtheos because it is the only entity in the universe that bears the image of God.50 There are also many direct references to deification in the Bible. In 2 Peter 1:4 we read: “Thus he has given us, through these things, his precious and very great promises, so that through them you may escape from the corruption that is in the world because of lust, and may become participants of the divine nature.” The phrase “participants of the divine nature” sounds very clearly, philosophically, like a sharing of God’s nature, as being united with Him, in an active way. Elsewhere, we are reminded of transfiguration (Rom 12:2; 2 Cor 4:18), perfection (Mt 5:48; 2 Cor 7:1; Eph 4:13; Col 1:28), riches (Eph 2:4-7), and of being created in the image and likeness of God (Rom 8:29; 1 Cor 15:49). The human person, created in the “image and likeness” of God, reaches their fulfillment in the natural process of deification. It represents an actualization of a gift entrusted to us: becoming the likeness of our Creator. To accomplish this task, we are already endowed with a special aid from God: the grace of the Holy Spirit.51 We stand in awe of one of the mysteries of God, that cannot be adequately expressed in human concepts: a God who, though completely surpassing us by his transcendence, lovingly granting Himself to us, while not absorbing us into His Being and not depriving us of our individual distinctiveness. Here, there is no room for pantheism; there is rather a place for the sanctification of the body and its resurrection.52 The Holy Spirit, who dwells in the human soul, is responsible for the process of deification. Deification is made possible by the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ because deification is actually a new life in Christ.53 The Greek Fathers went so far as to say that the Son of God became man so that the human person could enter into the realm of God and literally become God (Irenaeus, Athanasius). It was an essential part of the Christian message. Deification, becoming one with God, was thought of as the most deeply felt of human longings. Rarely, in our day and age,  Eckmann, Przebóstwienie człowieka, 67.  A. Kijewska, “Renesans karoliński: Alkuin, Eriugena,” in A. Kijewska (ed.), P ­ rzewodnik po filozofii średniowiecznej, Kraków: WAM, 2012, 111. 50  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 42. 51  Kijas, Przebóstwienie człowieka i świata, 149. 52  Bouyer, Introduction to Spirituality, 153-154. 53  Kijas, Przebóstwienie człowieka i świata, 146. 48

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do we acknowledge this because there is a strong Hellenic influence in the idea of deification.54 Today, the concept of deification must always be understood in an anthropological and ontological perspective, that is, in the spirit of our place and vocation in the whole economy of God’s actions, including His plan for our salvation.55 The Christian tradition has always attributed this natural longing (desiderium naturale) for God to us. In this life, it is a yearning that can only be fulfilled through God’s grace. This is at once deification, and the fullest “humanization of the human being.” This hunger can only be satisfied by God himself: there are no possible substitutes. Although in seeking to satisfy our inner hunger, we deify many created things of this world” (idols), our true happiness lies in God. Seeking felicity outside of God always leads to disappointment and to a sense of futility.56 Deification of the person introduces us to a new road previously unknown, but subconsciously longed for. We expect to see it realized in our lives, because it is the proper fulfillment of our nature. We yearn for union with our Creator, because we sense that only in Him are we able to realize all our desires and achieve any real good. Deification is the de facto actualization of the deepest vocation of the human person; through this process, we begin to understand the truth about ourselves, as created in the image of God. We finally realize that we are called to conform ourselves to Him. To achieve this, we find joy in performing acts of self-transcendence, we accept suffering, and are able to do away with lower values that hinder our journey towards deification, in order to reach the ultimate value, which is God.57 Deification and adoption reside, above all, in a relationship with God that is born thanks to the incarnation of the Word of God, His death and resurrection. Deification also contains an ethical dimension, as it demands from us a new ethical depth in our everyday life. The Holy Spirit introduces harmony between soul and body, which manifests itself in good deeds. Another fruit of the action of the Holy Spirit is peace in the midst of passion (apatheia), which is the actual beginning of theosis.58

 Ch. Schönborn, From Death to Life: The Christian Journey, San Francisco: ­Igniatius Press, 1995, 41. 55  P. R. Hinlicky, “Theological Anthropology: Toward Integrating Theosis and Justification by Faith,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 34 (1997), 38-74. 56  Schönborn, From Death to Life, 61. 57  Kijas, Przebóstwienie człowieka i świata, 134-135. 58  Łosski, Teologia mistyczna Kościoła Wschodniego, 43. 54



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This will only be fully realized in eternity,59 in eschaton (St. Athanasius),60 or in the second resurrection (St. Augustine).61 Christoph Schönborn suggests that what destroys us is not the immensity of our longing, but its perversion. Human longing that is focused on our own goals can only destroy us. The only effective response to our deepest human aspiration is found by opening our heart and life to the ultimate goal, God. Doing so allows us to truly accept felicity from God in whom all human expectations will be met beyond imagining.62 We can distinguish two roads of false deification (self-deification). The first is gnosis, or the attempt to make ourselves gods by the discovery of our alleged divine nature. The human being is seen here as someone unaware of their divinity. Deification would be limited in this case to a full knowledge of ourselves. This kind of “divine being” is present in many philosophical systems. The second form of misguided approach to deification is the radical negation of one’s features, acccepting that the human person appears to be finite and imperfect. Gabriel Marcel described this attitude as a type of pride, “exaggerated humility,” where the human person is considered to be a completely autonomous entity. Both approaches are marked by negation of any cooperation with God’s grace.63 In the gnostic movement of an earlier time, we find that God created us as human beings and not to be unconscious of our own divine nature as gods. Comprehending the fullness of our own humanity we become more and more like God, and realize that this is, in fact, the only way to become fully human.64 This false gnosis is disputed especially by St. Irenaeus. He did not agree with giving a place in human nature to a divine principle or element. The Gnostics treated the term “god” very literally and applied it to the human person, indicating that there is no fundamental difference between God and human beings. Irenaeus strongly opposed such a doctrine.65 The human person is imago Dei, while the real image of the Creator is the Christ, the Son of God. We will never be equal to God, nor will  Eckmann, Przebóstwienie człowieka, 232.  Eckmann, Przebóstwienie człowieka, 190. 61  Eckmann, Przebóstwienie człowieka, 224. 62  Schönborn, From Death to Life, 63. 63  Schönborn, From Death to Life, 59-60. 64  Schönborn, From Death to Life, 45. 65  Matuszewski, “Idea udziału człowieka,” 78. 59

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we be the same as God.66 St. Ambrose says that the human being comes to participate in the divine nature through the Son of God.67 Augustine and Ambrose limit human deification to becoming similar to angels, because we can never become really “like God.”68 Deification should never be perceived as a human’s accomplishment, that is, as self-deification. It takes place by the power of God’s grace, the purpose of which is understood in some respects as a “deifying process.”69 Deification is the realization of a likeness to God, the ontic completion of the human being needed to deepen our innate and constitutive likeness to God, and the gift of sharing God’s way of existence, an illumination progressively transforming the very nature of our existence.70 Deification is a pure gift of God. Self-deification, or natural deification, is impossible.71 Deification is the result of an extraordinary exchange between ourselves and God. God “humanizes” Himself in order for us to become more “godly.” Deification is the response of everlasting divine love to the deep unquenchable yearning which characterises human love. The road to deification is actually “the embodiment of God’s love in our lives.” Theosis is not humans attempting to be transformed according to our own delusions of God or the projection of our own imagination. Between the “imaginary omnipotence of God and our own disgusting powerlessness,” it is easy to be caught in the devil’s trap.72 Maximus the Confessor said that by deification we receive from God all that we have, with the exception of substantial identity. Perhaps this seems to be an exaggeration, but the grace of deification was, at one time, understood in this way. It is full participation in divine life, which is the goal of human existence, and is created on the basis of God’s Divine Life. John Damascene adds that by the grace of deification we become what God is by nature, and St. Paul links it to sonship – theopoiesis becomes hyiothesia; we become sons in the Son.73 St. Augustine, agreeing with Paul that the essence of deification is to become “sons in the Son,” explains further by saying that it means to live in Christ and  Eckmann, Przebóstwienie człowieka, 138.  Eckmann, Przebóstwienie człowieka, 160. 68  Eckmann, Przebóstwienie człowieka, 220. 69  Schönborn, From Death to Life, 56. 70  Congar, “Człowiek i przebóstwienie w teologii prawosławnej,” 859. 71  Eckmann, Przebóstwienie człowieka, 230. 72  Schönborn, From Death to Life, 57-58. 73  Schönborn, From Death to Life, 49. 66 67



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be in close union with Him.74 In Christianity, this state ultimately became recognized as a personal relationship with God in love.75 God the Father shapes us in the image of his Son and gradually forms His face in us, until it begins to shine through us and the Father can find His full delight in us.76 In Western thought, Augustine devoted a great deal of space in his writing to the notion of deification (deificatio). The idea originated from the mystery of Christ’s incarnation. Moreover, an important point of reference for Augustine is the verse from Psalm 82:6, “I say, ‘You are gods, children of the Most High, all of you.’” From this passage Augustine derives the notion of deification, deificatio hominis.77 Divinization happens through divine action in us and endures in us through our ethical endeavors and through the sanctifying work of the Spirit. This state leads us to the ultimate goal which is God.78 According to St. Augustine deification (deificatio) belongs to the field of mysticism, because it points to a complete union with God, in which one is somehow transformed in God. Human beings do not stop there to simply become more perfect, but also want to become a homo deificatus, although they cannot actually become God (Deus).79 The term “deification” expresses the transformation of the deified essence that is filled with God to such an extent that He can penetrate our existence and act through our activities. In Western language, one traditionally calls this “sanctifying grace.”80 In the opinion of Gross, theopoiesis of the Greek Church is equivalent to what we now mean by sanctifying grace. Augustine himself connects deificatio with iustificatio.81 St. Thomas introduced the concept of a created grace, a way of God giving Himself to the human soul. This is not a kind of “super-nature” added by God but a new property of the soul itself, which enables us to live the life of God without destroying or changing our essence. Created grace enables us to conform to God, so that the new creation surpasses the first. What is substantial with God is realized accidentally in the deified human being, and grace becomes a structure that makes us akin  Eckmann, Przebóstwienie człowieka, 177.  Eckmann, Przebóstwienie człowieka, 236. 76  Lotz, Wdrożenie w medytację nad Nowym Testamentem, 50. 77  Eckmann, Przebóstwienie człowieka, 107. 78  Eckmann, Przebóstwienie człowieka, 115. 79  Eckmann, Przebóstwienie człowieka, 234. 80  Stinissen, Człowiek prawdziwy, 171. 81  Eckmann, Przebóstwienie człowieka, 235. 74 75

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to God (deiformis). The way in which the Spirit of God becomes the spirit of the human soul remains a mystery.82 In the East, St. Gregory Palamas came out about 100 years later with a theory similar to Thomas’s. It is St. Gregory Palamas’ understanding that we must distinguish the essence of God from the powers by which He grants Himself to creatures. These energies are uncreated and divine, and thanks to them, human beings are transformed. Transformed also is human corporeality. God’s energies are portrayed as the light of Tabor, which penetrates both Moses and Elijah. These energies are available to anyone who manages to open themselves up to them.83 Along with Augustine, St. Irenaeus undertook to clarify the idea of adoption (adoptio). He argued that the basis of adoption is the uniting of God and human nature in Jesus Christ, because God the Father thus recognizes the face of his beloved Son in every one of us.84 By deification we are somehow “absorbed” by the Spirit, and all of our earthly aspirations are subordinated to God; in the end, our ultimate destiny is union with God. Original sin caused the human vocation to be perverted, to be “dimmed with the mist of desire.” Metaphorically speaking, human nature leaned towards the earth and its affairs, forgetting its vocation to be united with God. Our innate predisposition to turn towards the Creator can be replaced by many mundane goals. Despite the contamination of sin, even if we are not fully aware of our desire to seek God, the full vocation to become a divinized being continues to exist within us.85 St Ignatius of Antioch tells us that when Christ comes into someone’s heart, they become a bearer of Christ. St. Paul expresses this even more explicitly in his letter to the Galatians: “it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me” (Gal 2:20). Thanks to the presence of Christ in our heart, we receive all the spiritual gifts we need for sanctification. Likeness to God, lost by original sin, is restored to us by the grace of baptism. We now have to protect this likeness and develop it until Christ will be fully formed in us and our deification will come about, that is, our complete union with God. Then our heart overflowing with God’s love becomes the temple of His glory and the mirror of His essence, even before the beatific vision in eternity.86 We then become fully theophoric.  Bouyer, Introduction to Spirituality, 153.  Bouyer, Introduction to Spirituality, 154. 84  Matuszewski, “Idea udziału człowieka,” 73-74. 85  Kijas, Przebóstwienie człowieka i świata, 140. 86  Zenkowsky, Petzold, Das Bild des Menschen, 75. 82 83



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The essence of deification is becoming like Christ, taking on a closer union with Him, mainly through the sacraments. It is through the embodiment of Christ’s death and resurrection in ourselves that we are introduced to a new life, especially in Baptism and the Eucharist. Through the sacraments, we die with Christ in order to be born into his resurrected life. Through baptism the Christian receives their new existence, through confirmation the spiritual dynamism of the Spirit, and through the Eucharist the very life of God. Objectively, deification becomes true by the power of the Holy Spirit; through the sacraments of the Church, subjectively, it becomes true by adopting forms of asceticism such as prayer, fasting, and almsgiving.87 Thanks to the union of God with humanity in Christ, we are each called by grace to become personally deified. This is a supra-essential transformation, a trans-phenomenological holiness.88 Everyone who is formed in the likeness of Christ, through participation in the sacramental life, is called explicitly by Christ to make promoting peace and justice, rediscovering and doing good, being affectionate towards others and learning to forgive, the focus of their life, in order to become free to live the life of a Chrisitian.89 Deification leads to full freedom in Christ. It is a paradoxical freedom because it is essentially obedience to Christ. Christ alone is freedom; he frees us to live the freedom of the sons of God (Gal 3:4). “Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom” (2 Cor 3:17). Christ frees us primarily from internal slavery, which is the consequence of sin. He alone is the true guarantee of internal freedom and human identity. Christ brings us freedom from our most diverse entanglements and existential fears. The baptized are focused on Christ insofar as they live within His Mystical Body, that is, as long as they live the sacramental life. Only Christ can fully animate each member of the Church because where the Eucharistic Christ is, there is the life of grace. Sacraments are a Christian school for bringing the presence of God into the joys and sorrows of our dealings with other people as well as into the life of the entire human community. The sacraments have a significant impact on the formation of our personality so that we become capable of appropriate behaviour in the various situations of life. Sacramental life  Congar, “Człowiek i przebóstwienie w teologii prawosławnej,” 845.  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 47. 89  Nowak, Osobowość sakramentalna, 36. 87 88

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should be expressed in concrete terms as in love of both neighbour and enemy alike.90 Accepting Christ into our lives through baptism should result in developing a specific behaviour. It must be remembered here that when we enter into the process of becoming Christ-like, we are not excluded from the impact of psychological, sociological, or biological laws. We still experience joy and suffering, perhaps even more intensely. The baptized are still vulnerable to all kinds of diseases, and are familiar with mental disorders too.91 According to Clement of Alexandria, a baptized person is actually already deified; they are a perfect being, a new creation. This is not an automatic process, and it requires cooperation on our part. God’s grace takes the first initiative and is then complemented by human cooperation i.e. the receptive-responsive process. The gift of the image entrusted to us calls for our cooperation in developing our likeness to God, which is complemented by a “perfectioning gift of love.”92 The state of deification is the result of cooperation between the human person and the grace of God. It involves the participation of human nature in a quality of divine life. This is the realization of the likeness to Jesus Christ in us, and takes place, without our merit, but as a gift of God’s grace (cf. 1 Peter 1:3-4).93 We are fully the image of God when we actualize the intimate union of body and soul with the Divine Spirit that is heavenly and perfect. Serious sin causes separation from the Spirit while good deeds restore unity with Him.94 Deification assumes perfect human development, a radical actualization, and fulfillment of the gift of likeness in image. This happens in relation to Jesus Christ, who himself is the perfect prototype of which every human person is called to become the likeness.95 In the age of the Church Fathers, baptism was called enlightenment, because it opened the eyes of the human person to Christ. Baptism anchors us in Christ, frees us from original sin, roots us in the Paschal Mystery of Christ, and makes us ontically new, which leads us to a deeper knowledge of God. Baptism opens us up to the possibility of developing a new moral-spiritual existence in Christ.96 We are ­potentially  Nowak, Osobowość sakramentalna, 39-41.  Nowak, Osobowość sakramentalna, 44. 92  Schönborn, From Death to Life, 51-54. 93  Kijas, Przebóstwienie człowieka i świata, 136. 94  Eckmann, Przebóstwienie człowieka, 87. 95  Kijas, Przebóstwienie człowieka i świata, 141. 96  Nowak, Osobowość sakramentalna, 65. 90 91



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incorporated into the realm of divine life, as was received at the time of creation. The image of God, as a gift, carries with it obligations to develop divine life in us, and to acquire immortal purity.97 The resurrection of Christ powerfully reveals the importance of the image of God in us and the imperative of living the virtues attached to this gift of likeness. Here lies the uniqueness of the Passover that shows a clear vocation for the human person – the passage from death to life – and its realization in the person of the incarnate Son of God.98 The spiritual process of unification with God is launched in this life, but it is fully realized only in our resurrection. During this process, human nature is being transformed, and the corruptible gradually becomes indestructible, as it is more immersed in eternity.99 We are called to deification, that is, to become, thanks to the grace of God, what Jesus is by nature. In Paul it is described as hyiothesia, adoption, becoming a child of God. It is not so much about deification, which we experience under the creative act of God (image), and which emerges during the baptism received as a child, but more about maturation, leading us to become like God. Finally, we are invited to a mystical union with God. By building a strong personality, we learn to entrust our nature to God’s wisdom and grace. In that way our nature is created by God to be a place of action (Adrienne von Speyr).100 John of the Cross differentiates between three powers in the human being: intellect, memory, and will. Each of them becomes a place to entrust oneself to God and his kingdom. Deification is the transition from individual autonomy and activity to dependence and passivity. The faculties of the soul should become sensitive receivers of God, able to capture the movements of the Holy Spirit, allowing Him to enlighten and attract. The deification of reason is accomplished by faith. From God’s perspective, faith is enlightenment granted to reason through Revelation (through the Church). As for the human being’s response, faith is an opening of the mind to the inspirations of the Holy Spirit, and ultimately, an entrusting of one’s reason to God. In order to take inspiration from God there is no need for holiness. It is enough just to be open to Him, here and now, and to truly rely on Him. In such cases, God can use reason as a light that helps to seek wisdom. It is perceived  Kijas, Przebóstwienie człowieka i świata, 138.  Kijas, Przebóstwienie człowieka i świata, 142. 99  Kijas, Przebóstwienie człowieka i świata, 137. 100  Stinissen, Człowiek prawdziwy, 139. 97 98

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as a kind of urgent encouragement from the Spirit, and is not the result of speculative work on the part of the person’s reason.101 Wilfrid Stinissen states that, usually, while living out the grace of deification in our reason, we easily notice if what we read was written under the guidance of the Spirit, or if it comes only from a human source. If the writers let God guide their thoughts, we feel a spiritual space around their words. We gain and “see” more than what the word is able to express directly. The words under the inspiration of the Spirit open the gates leading to spiritual reality. They lead to silence and peace in God. The Spirit speaks to the spirit within us.102 The superficial human will is rooted in the superficial self; profound will, in the deep, true self. We can also talk about superficial reason, i.e. limited to its natural discursive abilities. Reason becomes profound when it is united with Christ, who is the Logos, Wisdom. Resigning from the autonomous use of our reason, we create space for God. His light brings us the knowledge we really need.103 Understood in this way, contemplative wisdom is available to everyone. We have only to truly believe to have access to it. This kind of wisdom or consciousness, is an ineffable gift that truly lies beyond words.104. Reason is subject to deification by faith, and memory, by hope. You can imagine memory as a kind of “granary” in which we gather our treasures. The more we empty the granary, the more there will be a place for God, the only true wealth. Memory is thus made to break away from all forms and messages in order to receive the light of God’s grace through hope.105 Deification of the will in turn leads us to reject wrongful things, and to want to detach from their hold on us. With our will we say “yes” to God and try to atune ourselves to his will. Thanks to this, a kind of harmony develops between God’s and our will. A suitable method for submission to the will of God is our acceptance of what we are not able to change, what God has apparently permitted, though perhaps did not literally want. An active way of aligning oneself with the will of God consists in doing what God requires. There are different tasks, but they always take root in love, and when we execute them, we utter a “yes” to  Stinissen, Człowiek prawdziwy, 138, 140-141, 143, 146.  Stinissen, Człowiek prawdziwy, 144. 103  Stinissen, Człowiek prawdziwy, 148-149. 104  Stinissen, Człowiek prawdziwy, 150-151. 105  Stinissen, Człowiek prawdziwy, 157.

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God. Here we also need to be attentive to discern what He expects from us.106 Today topics related to deification are re-emerging. An example of this is the monograph of Norman Russell,107 along with several others.108 In these approaches, the basis for deification becomes the image of God discovered in human nature and the mystery of the incarnation. Deification also involves the concepts of knowledge, virtue, and the light of Glory, participation, and unification. Some authors direct our attention towards the sacraments as being “channels” of human deification. In this context, the use of human faculties such as the intellect and the will is significant when enabled to operate in love. Although in relation to the concept of theosis, there are various concepts of human corporeality, we find a broad consensus regarding our participation in divine nature through immortality. In this way, deification, implies human efforts through continual practice of the virtues. To come to union with God and to love Him, always remain free gifts of God’s grace; their perfection in us can only be achieved fully in eternity.109 Self-transcendence, love, and intentional sacrifice What should our response be to the free gift of God’s grace? To begin with, it should be a grateful acceptance of the gift of being itself; further, it should be an acknowledgement of both the immanence of God and of his transcendence in our lives, which is recognition of a reality that transcends what is described by science. Our response would have a cognitive dimension and imply acceptance of revealed truth. The next step would be the recognition of our freedom and responsibility. One would need to undertake fuller acts of self-transcendence, which would eventually result in readiness to intentionally sacrifice oneself even unto giving one’s very life, if need be.  Stinissen, Człowiek prawdziwy, 162-163.  N. Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 108  M. J. Christensen, J. A. Wittung (eds.), Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions, Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2007; S. Finlan, V. Kharlamov (eds.), Theosis: Deification in Christian Theology, Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2006. 109  A. N. Williams, The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, 31-32. 106 107

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On the one hand, we selfishly desire the Supreme Good; on the other, coming closer to this Good purifies us of selfish tendencies, which would have expressed themselves in keeping this Good to ourselves. God compels us directly by His example, because he gives Himself first. This gift brings us to a clear awareness of conscience, and we become ready to selflessly give to others. At the spiritual level, there is good in both the one who anticipates giving, or gives, and the one who receives but who is also ready to give. This is freely motivated by an awareness of conscience in both. The essence of good is, therefore, the gift of oneself.110 According to Balthasar every person is endowed with natural purposefulness, a given telos, and is hence a teleological being. Through prayer we open up to God who reveals to us the real purpose of our existence. Accepting our own telos is brought about through a mission entrusted to us by God. It is expressed in the personal vocation of every human person (die Sendung), which is, for the Swiss theologian, the essence of Christian discipleship, i.e. conforming ourselves to Him and in doing so finding our deepest identity.111 The human being thus finds their highest fulfillment by submission to God. This fulfillment exceeds the potentiality of human nature. Human fulfillment in God is like finding our own identity, our unique mission in Christ. In this way, life becomes fully productive. A human person, faithful to their mission, becomes fulfilled existentially in a way that could never be achieved by simply turning towards the depths of our being, towards the subconscious, superego, or any other part of our own nature.112 To Balthasar, taking on the form of Christ means acquiring the image of Christ, to become at once a full believer and fully redeemed; it also means to have discovered our true self, on which the Heavenly Father looks with love. To be holy is to have grasped the true image of oneself, which is hidden in the “heart” of God. This process is realized through personal faithfulness to our own individual vocation.113 In practical terms, taking up a likeness to Christ means fulfilling the Father’s will, just as Jesus did. Being an obedient Son of the Father was the sustenance of Christ – so it has to be, in the life of anyone who journeys towards holiness. We get to know the will of the Father in  von Balthasar, Epilogue, 69-70.  Harrison, “Personal Identity and Integration,” 424. 112  H. U. von Balthasar, Prayer, trans. A. V. Littledale, London: SPCK, 1961, 48-49. 113  Harrison, “Personal Identity and Integration,” 425. 110 111



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prayer. Becoming a saint means labouring obediently in the works that the Father has commissioned for us114. The most important elements in our life are meaning, value, and going beyond oneself. In this context, Frankl does not see self-actualization as the ultimate goal of genuine development, but as its side effect. Neither the development of the body nor of the psyche is the ultimate human goal. However, it is found in the completion of spiritual acts. Somehow, without our assistance, psychophysical development takes place. It is valuable insofar as it enables the actualization of the spiritual person. In this sense, pleasure or joy may accompany spiritual growth. But it can also be the opposite. Discovering the meaning of life and taking responsibility can lead to psychological and physical suffering, and in extreme conditions, lead us to intentionally sacrifice our lives. This was the case of the martyrs. The human person cannot exist without sacrifice and love, without reference to another person, a friend, the one whom they love.115 The fundamental human desire is self-transcendence in favour of the world, of others, and of God. Only those who have developed the dynamism of going out of themselves towards others are capable of such transcendence.116 The most beautiful and most enjoyable attractions of the world, such as material goods, exotic travel, and the tastiest dishes, are unable to fulfill the deepest longings of our heart. These pleasures only satisfy human desires to a certain degree, but these are inherently limited; nothing less than the love of God can satisfy the deepest desires of our hearts. Confirmation by God of human identity surpasses any other source of fulfillment. Only God gives life in abundance. Trust in God is only the pre-emptive opening of our centre to the Holy Spirit, to a mysterious dialogue with God. Human development in this context has to go beyond the preoccupation with oneself and slavish dependence on temporal things. We must learn to love, help, and serve others in God’s Name and participate in his positive action in the world. Our first motivation is often egocentric, and autonomous, driven by curiosity and the need for self-actualization. God, however, is guided by the truth, goodness, and beauty present in Him. He continually invites us to find a balance between seeking ourselves and self-transcending.117 The knower  Harrison, “Personal Identity and Integration,” 427.  Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 57. 116  W. E. Conn, The Desiring Self, New York: Paulist Press, 1998, 5. 117  Montgomery, Trusting in the Trinity, 42-43. 114 115

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transcends the subject known. Knowledge always means the transcendence of the subject matter and the creative possession of it. We cannot, however, creatively possess God, we can only unite with Him, serve Him with our creative works, and respond to his call.118 The best solution for us is to lose our own self and to become an instrument of God’s love. The selfish, egoistic self should be abandoned. Although it is not easy, it is essential for human life to become an instrument of God’s love, and the grace of God is always present to transform our intellect and will (theosis). For some people, this process is very short, as a sudden conversion; in others it takes years of difficult struggle with one’s own weakness. In this process, one should rely more on intellect and will than on feelings and emotions, which often stimulate one’s egocentrism.119 The core of the human being is connected to the Spirit of the Creator, that is, to creative Love. Two separate dimensions of our nature are constituted by the psyche and the body. The love present in someone’s core penetrates into the psychic and somatic realms. Thus remaining at the service of love, we can enter into good relations with the world and with others, eventually becoming fully ourselves by opening up to creative Love. This does not mean the assimilation of any (even noble) model or ideal invented or imposed from outside; it requires surrender to love, which calls for the constant transcendence of selfishness, selfsoteriological or self-affirmative tendencies, through which one seeks above all one’s own advantage.120 The reductionist approach upholds that love is just the sublimation of sexuality, and conscience a form of superego. According to Frankl, however, love cannot be merely the result of sublimation of impulsive energy. We can only claim to truly love when we humbly turn to others in compassion and service; thanks to this transformation, both ego and id are integrated in love.121 From this perspective, falling in love becomes the discovery of our existence as reflected and affirmed in the existence of another person; it is a way of knowing the whole world as reflected and illuminated through the existence of the beloved other. A particular expression of the communal way of being human is the period of fetal life, when one human being is totally dependent on the other. This close  Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 14.  Vitz, Psychology as religion, 127-129. 120  Jalics, Contemplative Retreat, 75-79. 121  Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 19. 118

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relationship shows the dynamism behind all human relationships, in the centre of which is always an acceptance of responsibility for the life of the other person. We can say, making further use of the same image, that one person carries the other in their heart in order to give birth to the good and truth of their existence and to experience the same in themselves – to be reborn to live in truth and love.122 Paul Evdokimov says that the more love avoids all limiting rules and mediations, the more it turns out to be internally conditioned by itself, by the spirit of renunciation and sacrifice. That which is inspired (­in-spirare) only through a complete gift of oneself to another person, has nothing of determinism in itself. This giving undermines all forms of limitation, since sacrifice is the proper name of freedom – the source from which all goodness flows. We cannot come to know truth except through inner freedom. In return, truth gives positive content to any form of freedom within us. Truth fills the soul, directs one’s will, and thus actually triggers freedom. Through an act of faith, we explain ourselves to ourselves, and voluntarily and completely we endorse our own religious truth.123 This cannot be done outside the boundries of community. Community represents something with stronger ties among its members than those found in wider society. Incarnation means connecting with others and taking into consideration the problems of the world around us as well as those of the world at large. This behaviour becomes possible thanks to our embodiment. The resulting communion is the highest degree of rejection of selfishness; it denotes forgetfulness of oneself, the gift of self. Our incarnation is accomplished by involvement in worldly affairs, and freedom from oneself (asceticism); it allows us to enter into true community (communion) with others.124 The human being is ontically marked by the Highest Good in such a way that one cannot actualize oneself otherwise than through boundless (limitless) love and responsibility. Wojtyła says that “to fulfill oneself is almost synonymous with felicity, with being happy. But to fulfill oneself is the same thing as to realize the good whereby man as the person becomes and is good himself.”125 Our world of values and our reference to it determine our felicity.126  Buttiglione, “Towards an Adequate Anthropology,” 245.  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 35-36. 124  M. Fazio, Storia delle idee contemporanee, Roma: Santa Croce, 2005, 215. 125  Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 174. 126  Wojtyła, Wykłady lubelskie, 210. 122 123

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Truth and freedom, two closely related gifts, are the two conditions required for fulfilling the human person and for preparing their readiness for intentional sacrifice. Following in the footsteps of Wojtyła, we can conclude that “[t]he fulfillment of the person in action depends on the active and inwardly creative union of truth with freedom.”127 This is the anthropological basis for ownership of ourselves. The very experience of liberty (“I can – I do not need to”) does not yet lead to the ability to intentionally sacrifice oneself but is the condition sine qua non for this to happen. It is not about the very possibility of being autonomous, but about liberating oneself in order to fulfill one’s human existence through the truth: To fulfill freedom in truthfulness – that is to say, according to the relation to truth – is equivalent to the fulfillment of the person. It is the fulfillment that plies the role of creating the state of felicity of the person.128

“Fulfillment” is distinguishable from “becoming” and from the completion of one’s existence. “Self-fulfillment” expresses a subjective disposition of oneself – despite unrealized personal potentialities – to strive toward one’s aspirations and hopes through one’s own efforts. On the other hand, “becoming” expresses a precise use of one’s abilities, because “fulfillment” is richer than the self-actualization commonly promoted in humanistic psychology. Fulfillment of the human being as a person reveals itself in freedom and responsibility. The human being as a person is fulfilled if they use their freedom well – that is, if they do so in the light of truth and the true good reflected in a good conscience. Freedom is realized through the desire and the choice of true good. We are called to attain victory over ourselves, over what hampers our free will and makes it impossible to live in truth and love. Victory over self is the condition necessary to attaining self-fulfillment through acts of moral goodness. Truth and freedom are the basis for the possibility of sacrificing oneself through love of God and of another human being.129 We know from experience that we tend to seek felicity outside ourselves. However, just as inner happiness is the key to surpassing oneself, so inner responsibility proves itself to be indispensable in the pursuit of felicity. It is essential for the human person’s felicity to have relationships with other people, because participation (solidarity in being human)  Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 175.  Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 175. 129  John Paul II, Veritatis splendor, no 34. 127

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unites people; this particularly brings about felicity – to the highest extent, when the relationship is with God. The highest form of felicity for the Christian is union with God in love, and total surrender into his hands. The ability for intentional self-sacrifice is acquired through experiencing the very structure of action, which in itself provides the person with a means of transcendence. Responsible freedom is the prerequisite to one’s ability to intentionally sacrifice oneself for love of God and others. Such freedom, freedom oriented towards truth, is often acquired with great difficulty. As Pope Francis tells us: “Reaching a level of maturity where individuals can make truly free and responsible decisions calls for much time and patience.”130 We can express this truth yet differently and perhaps more profoundly: one cannot be truer than by love and responsible freedom. Freedom without responsibility is the antithesis of love, that is in itself a great call to the affirmation of the human person: oneself and neighbor. A radical act of love leads to the fullness of freedom, most fully expressed through the intentional sacrifice of oneself. The meaning of human existence depends largely on this fullness of freedom and willingness to intentionally sacrifice oneself out of love.131 Our nature yearns to be fulfilled and this happens by making ourselves a gift to others.132 We only possess ourselves when we become our own masters, by giving ourselves to others. The internal fulfillment of the human person is actualized in the space of intersubjectivity between “you” and “me,” a space outside of ourselves, in the outside world. The beauty of our ability to self-transcend is that we can go beyond our own self-love for the sake of serving others, in all humility and discretion. For the Christian, transformation of the ego from that focused on oneself to that of uniting with God is accomplished from within by Jesus, the Anointed One of God.133 We cannot live without love. We remain unto ourselves an incomprehensible being, a meaningless individual, if someone does not reveal to us true love, if we do not encounter love, if we do not experience it, if we ourselves do not love, if we do not participate in it with our entire  Francis, Ewangelii Gaudium, no 171.  K. Wojtyła, “Mysterium życia – mysterium miłości,” Colloquium Salutis 10 (1978), 19. 132  Vatican II, Gaudium et spes, no 24. 133  Ryan, Four Steps to Spiritual Freedom, 82. 130 131

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being.134 Love is the most important content of human existence, which can be read from our nature. Because of our nature, being human requires being in community and is most fully expressed in the encounter between “me” and “you,”the highest form of which is love rooted in Christ.135 As creatures, we still encounter all sorts of limitations to our existence. As spiritual beings, we are able to transcend many of these limitations. The human spirit is open – especially to receiving God. The soul is not identical with God, but it has something of the divine limitlessness, a kind of “infinite empty space” which demands to be filled. The human person will never be satisfied with anything less than God Himself, nor with anything less than a total gift of oneself.136 The ability for intentional self-sacrifice in the name of Christian charity is one of the most beautiful signs of holiness. This ability is not itself a ready-made gift, which we would receive upon arriving into the world. It is rather a task to perform, a goal to be achieved – always with the help of God’s grace. As we illustrated earlier in this study: first comes human existence (esse), and only from the form of human existence comes any human action (operari). The highest human action is love; and more specifically, the ability to intentionally sacrifice oneself in and through love of God and neighbor. Given the complex human esse, achieving readiness for intentional self-sacrifice is a task that really never ends. The primary step in the task of spiritual flourishing is to achieve the ability to possess oneself, and to be disposed to give of oneself, to attain authentic freedom. Freedom should be responsible and bound by truth, especially the revealed truth. At first, and in cooperation with God’s grace, we only occasionally become capable of deeds flowing out of love, or of intentionally sacrificing ourselves in certain situations. Slowly we become capable of specific acts of oblation. As we grow in freedom and truth, through which we increasingly take possession of ourselves, we gradually come to maintain oblative attitudes and live in a constant disposition of giving ourselves in love to God and neighbor. The highest expression of an oblative attitude is the kenosis of Christ on the cross. This was an act of perfect sacrifice to God in and through love. This act of total self-giving, fulfilled by the Son of God, enables us  John Paul II, Redemptor hominis, no 10.  Popielski, “Logoteoria i logoterapia,” 37. 136  Stinissen, Człowiek prawdziwy, 72.

134 135



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to build up our freedom towards an everimproved readiness for intentional self-sacrifice. The Power of Christ’s Cross thus becomes the power of the human oblation.137 A very important background to spiritual life is the affective sphere. First, affectivity helps, for example, in the interpretation of religious paintings, but finally goes on to more significant tasks such as defeating narcissism and reaching the point of oblative attitudes, i.e. readiness for intentional sacrifice.138 Healthy affectivity supports a healthy spirituality. Emotions that support love serve to better express love for both God and neighbor. However, the emotional unconscious can become either a force generating necessary change or one distorting spiritual and other conscious motivation.139 Possessing ourselves in offering ourselves causes a felicity that flows from the oblative attitude. The joy of giving is the result of a long process of maturation in the Christian life, which reaches its fulfillment in personal holiness. Evdokimov says that in this context, faith is never a simple expression of intellectual consent, but the fidelity of one person towards another. When we love, we do something completely different than when we surrender to someone – we give ourselves completely.140 The nature of love is the desire to entrust ourselves to be guided by the one who loves us. In this sense, obedience is part of human nature.141 Possessing ourselves, we can keep a distance from our psychophysical dimension; we can transcend our nature by directing ourselves towards the fullness of being through acts of intellectual cognition and love. Existentially opening up to others in cognition and love makes us fully realize our nature and become even more as persons. This existential opening up to another “you” is realized especially in our opening up to the invisible and all-powerful “Thou.”142 Naturally we live cyclically. Every one of us experiences mild or even severe changes of mood, which are also reflected in the spiritual realm. Each new discovery of trust in God usually leads to renewed enthusiasm. Feelings do not last forever and gradually dim or even surfeit. Only machines are able to work tirelessly and uniformly – we as living beings pass through various “seasons” of life. God takes this human reality into  von Balthasar, Epilogue, 74-76.  Goya, Psicologia e vita spirituale, 67. 139  Goya, Psicologia e vita spirituale, 73. 140  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 51. 141  Stinissen, Żyć w głębokiej relacji z Bogiem, 39. 142  Zdybicka, Człowiek i religia, 168. 137 138

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account and never requires from us more than we can do, but there is always something we can offer to Him.143 The greatest challenge is finding the confidence to live, i.e. trusting our destiny and finding meaning in life. This challenge should always be taken up in reference to the personal mystery of the Cross. Only the Gospel has the answer to our existential questions and only when we turn to God can we come to know what we always looked for: goodness, love, light, knowledge, and fullness of life.144 The Word of God does not bring suffering to the world. The human person is its author. The Word of God gives us the ability to accept this basic division, of which we are the author because we are too attached to our selves. Through accepting this painful fact in faith, we can, through love – understood as a gift of oneself – become more and more the image of God in this world: theophoric beings. We do not need to choose between asceticism and humanism. We are inevitably confronted with our own finitude and suffering. If in this situation we rely solely on the strength of the human self, we will not be able to escape the despair and threat of our annihilation. The best solution is then seen as the most stoical, an attitude of indifference and consent to what fate has in store for us. However, if we begin to transcend our own selves and take the risk of serving in love, a new meaning to our existence appears – one that “the world cannot take away.”145

 Zdybicka, Człowiek i religia, 42.  Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, 82-83. 145  Bouyer, Introduction to Spirituality, 162. 143

144

Conclusion Reflection on spirituality leads us to the conclusion that we are formed both as a vessel to receive the grace and presence of God, as well as to be the bearers of God’s image, which is expressed most fully in acts of self-transcendence. In such an approach, the human being emerges as homo theomorphicus et theophoricus. To this approach to our nature, we match an equivalent perspective on our spirituality, resulting in a conception of its receptive-responsive nature. Spiritual receptivity we associate with “God-shape-ness,” our state of being formed in the image or likeness of God, that is, theomorphism; and responsiveness with “God-bearing-ness,” that is, theophorism. Discovering in ourselves the desire for God, we realize that our origin is “from the days of eternity” and that our beginning is also our final end. This has in effect already been written about human nature not only in theology, but also in the humanities and in the social and natural sciences. Faith tells us that there should be no contradiction in the reading of human nature by different sciences. But the reality of science turns out to be very complex, and as a result we see many different images of the human being, that is, different descriptions of human nature. That is why we should not limit ourselves to only one dimension of our existence, but try to recognize this nature in all its complexity. We have tried to illustrate this process in this book. Coming to know the human being from a single, arbitrary aspect (for example, the body), we always arrive at some form of reduction, in which the human being becomes “nothing other than” a cluster of atoms, a counting machine, an animal, and the like. Nowadays, there is no shortage of such concepts. Some of these, such as the physiological and psychological, we have characterized more fully. Reductive concepts of human nature result in a reductive view of spirituality. This may be found, for example, in the neurobiological, evolutionary, political, and pragmatic-psychological approaches. In these concepts, one excludes the real existence of Transcendence and spirituality, or if it is accepted at all, it is degraded to different functional roles: securing well-being, removing existential fear, or meeting some of our socio-psychological needs. Approaching the human person holistically in the actual conditions of human life, that is, assuming the existence of our biological, mental,

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and spiritual dimensions, we develop a receptive-responsive theory of spirituality – in fact, an adequate anthropology that soundly grasps our created nature. Only an adequate description of our nature allows a true understanding of human spirituality, because none of the partial or clearly reductionist concepts allows for a complete understanding of human spirituality. Ultimately, in addition to reliable concepts derived from the sciences and humanities, it is necessary to develop a theological approach too. The receptive-responsive theory of spirituality should contain all these elements. The structure of the text was intended to illustrate this. What conclusions can be drawn from this study? Today we are dealing with a variety of approaches to the understanding of human life and destiny. Very often the diverse concepts are mutually exclusive. It is hardly surprising, since anthropology always becomes a theoretical basis for ideology, politics, and law. Reading human nature is a critical endeavor for the organization of our lives, granting or depriving us of certain rights, self-determination in our development, and consequently, in our educational programs. The understanding of human nature pertains thus to the most important issues. Despite attempts to undermine the recognition of spirituality, through all kinds of nihilistic and reductionist anthropologies, the human person still surprises itself. It turns out that every one of us bears the desire of Infinity, the desire for God. Modern ideologies are sometimes victorious over us in that they can delay the moment of full revelation of this desire and cover it up quite successfully for a long time. The spiritual dimension cannot, however, be completely suppressed and is often disclosed in the most difficult and unexpected situations. It turns out that the character of homo theomorphicus is profoundly embedded in human nature. We have finally to agree with St. Augustine and repeat after him that the human heart will not find peace apart from God. Having discovered that we are created in the image and likeness of God and called to such a life, which makes us akin to Him, we are faced with a very serious choice. Despite the awareness of God’s call we can reject this invitation. Human history gives enough examples of such decisions. But when we respond positively to human nature’s intrinsic desire to be united with God, the desire for Truth, Goodness, and Love, we become with time homo theophoricus, someone carrying God’s presence inside of one’s life. Becoming theophoric is obviously a long process, which has been extensively described in this book. It is a process of the deification of a human being, becoming holy on the pattern of



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the One who alone is Holy. This happens not only on the ontological level, where the grace of God through the process of deification transforms us internally, but also on the moral level, where we are already supposed to cooperate actively with God’s grace. Surely, “channels” of God’s grace are the sacraments of the Church. The human person for its part responds to God’s grace through acts of self-transcendence, intentional sacrifice, and love, becoming a saint in the moral dimension. The image of God in us, our natural theomorphism, is the beginning of our spiritual journey, and achieving likeness to God, theophorism, is its end. This study, which develops a receptive-responsive theory of spirituality, does not pretend to be an exhaustive or final text on the theme of the human being in the perspective of a spiritual life. Nevertheless, the author hopes that it can become an inspiration for further research, with directions already set, for the most part, by the present study.

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Index A Abba, 13  abilities, human (ego), 152  Abrahamic religions, 34  Absolute, the philosophical, 129  absolutization of the body, 23; absolutizing, 180  absurdity, feelings of, 128  acting structure, person as, 113  action, ethical, 29  acts, intentional, 193  actualism, 116  actus humanus and actus hominis, 117  Adam’s flaw, 142  adaptation, psychological mechanisms of, 50  addiction, 66  adoption (adoptio), 204  adversity, 89  aggression, 66  alienation, 20, 183  all-embracing (Jaspers), 178  Allport, Gordon (1897-1967), 100, 101, 103, 177  altruism, 63  Ambrose, Aurelius (c. 340-397), 202  analysis, horizontal and vertical, 40  angelism, 16  angelization, 198  animal socialis, 188  animism, 35  antagonism, facultative, noopsychic, 123; noo-physical, 181  anthropology, adequate mysterium personae, 11, 19, 31, 165; bottom up and top-down, 6; cataphatic-apophatic, 29; Christian, 27, 28; Christocentric, 127, ethics, contemporary, 14; foundations of spiritual life, 11; holistic, 15, of the encounter; metaphysical, 18, Max Scheler’s, 111; moral, 29; multidimensional, 24; nihilistic, 220;

personalist, 21; philosophical, 12, 18, 31, 170; reductionist, 220; significant turn in, 118; spiritual, 8; theological, 13, 25, 26, 27, 31 anthropomorphism, avoiding of any, 129; anxiety, 63, 67; existential, 62, 129, 143, 172; anxiety, ultimate, of guilt and condemnation, 68 apophatic anthropology, 29; nature, knowledge of, 175; side of Christian anthropology (admits mystery), 31 aporia, 29, 194  approaches, “nothing but,” 177; substantialistic and anti-substantialistic, 105  Aquinas, Thomas (1225-1274), 14, 18, 28, 86, 87, 94, 95, 98 114, 119, 121, 126, 129, 138, 140, 158, 188  Aristotle (384-347 BC), 18, 71, 85, 86, 95, 114, 135, 157, 188; anthropology, 158; categories, 30 ascetic efforts, 156; asceticism and prayer, 2, 63 assumptions, metaphysical, 48; phenomenological, 112  Athanasius of Alexandria (296-373), 29, 159, 199  atheism, 130; views in psychology, 35  atomic make-up, 39 atrophy, 55  attitude towards life, balanced and tolerant, 2; oblative, 216; attitudes, 182; propositional, 41  attraction to God, 129  Augustine, St. (354-430), 6, 71, 179; and restless hearts, 188, 202, 203, 204, 220  authenticity, encounter, 21; self, deep, 131 Autonomous Being, 129  autonomy, 22  awe, silent, 163  axiological category, 125 

236

INDEX

B Bandura, Albert (1925-), 77  baptism, 206  Bartnik, Czesław (1929-), 104  Basil of Caesarea (330-379), 29, 93  basis (Grund), 148  becoming and “fulfillment,” 214; spiritual, 190  behaviorism, 24, 49, 77, 90; radical, 174  being, and non-being, 67; being for, 97; in itself, 97; authentic, 163; awareness of, 77; intuition of, 18; structure of our, 123; temporal nature of, 89  Benedict XVI, Pope (1927-), 65  Berdyaev, Nikolai Alexandrovich (18741948), 198; train of thought, 125 Bergson, Henri (1859-1941), 3, 73, 89, 191  Berkeley, George (1685-1763), 44  Bertocci, Peter (1910-1985), 104  Binswanger, Ludwig (1881-1966), “being-outside-world,” 179; biologism, 177  blind-spot, 148  body, absolutization of, 23; biologicalphysiological layer of human being, 121; language, 90; soul’s prison (Plato), 158; spiritualization, 160  Boëthius, Anicius Manlius Severinus (477-524), 42, 87, 92, 93, 100  bondage, 155  borderline case, 16  boredom, 65, 66  bottom-up and top-down, 4  box-person, 96  brain, imaging, 39; localization studies, 122; mind’s influence on, 54  Buber, Martin (1878-1965), 19, 96  butterfly effect, 59  C calling, individual, 106, 107; primary (communion with God), 129  cancer, 39  capax Dei, 1, 6  cardinal virtues, 7  carnality, 26  Cartesian dualism, 60  Cassirer, Ernst (1874-1975), 132 

Catechetical School of Alexandria, 136  Catherine of Siena (1347-1380), 155  causality, formal, 29; operating, 29  causation, 43  cause-consequence categories, 38  causes, accidental, 15  cave metaphor, 142  central nervous system (CNS), 52, 72 centre, personal, 152; spiritual, 151  chaos theory, 59, 60  character, 112, 177  choice, freedom of, 173  Christ, fundamental metaphysical principle of existence, 148  Christ, to become like, 160  Christian anthropology, 142, 198; mystics, 3; writers, 135  Christianity and Platonism, 14  Christianity, Eastern, 27; oriental, 28  chromosomes, 122  Chrysostom, John (c. 309-407), 142 Church Fathers, 206; Eastern Christianity, 27, 153, 159 Churchland, Patricia (1943-), 38  Cicero (106-43 BC), 92  clairvoyance, 54  Clement of Alexandria (150-215), 136, 153, 158, 159, 160, 198, 206  Clément, Olivier (1921-2009), 160  closing ourselves off (isolation), 68  Congar, Yves (1904-1995), 27  co-dependence, 144  cognition and love, 16; mental, 168  cognitive acts (attention), 58; science, 40, 41; penetrability, 42 cognitive-behavioural therapy, 53; commitment, 19  common sense, 89  communitarian personalism, 23  community, 106, moral, ontological, 197  compassion, 2 competition and success, 63  compositum, 194; spiritual and bodily, 6  concept, of the spirit, 4; ontological, 12; reductionist, 15, 177 concupiscence, incentive to sin, 145  conditioning, Pavlovian, 24  conflicts, internal moral, 65 



INDEX

conforming to Christ, 200  conformism, 66; social, 172  conscience, neurosis, 65  conscience, 39, 168, 169, 184; creative role of, 169; dialogue with, 166; functioning intuitively, 166; moral, 152, 166; phenotypic, 166; shaping norms, 169; voice of, 165 consciousness, 6, 11, 22, 42, 59, 78, 112, 123; challenge in understanding human, 46; function of nervous system, 13; gate to human spirituality, 115; human, 55; intuitive act of ego, 115; loss of, 74; no way of objectifying, 59; stream of, 73, 74; subjective states of, 48; unity of, 72  contemplation, 137  contingency of existence, 132  contrition, 67  conversion, 143  core, valuable inner, 151; worthy of our nature, 151  corporeality, human, 209  cosmos, 112; role in the, 17  Council of Chalcedon (451), 93  Council of Nicaea (325), 93  counterfactual, 43  courage to be, 183  courage, as ethical endeavour, ontological act, 182  covenant, violation of a (sin), 141  creatio continua, 17  creation, divine act of, 13; God’s act of, 26  creativity, 60  Christocentric anthropology (von Balthasar), 127  Cross, Power of Christ’s, 217  cult of personality, 22  culture, and art, 55; dominant technopragmatic, 22; hunter-gatherer, 50; selfish attitudes and behaviours, 64; spirituality, 132; of  cynicism, 65  D Damascene, John (676-749), definition of human person, 94; 199, 202  damnation, fear of, 183 

237

darkness, interior, 145 Darwin’s theory, 49  Davidson, Donald (1917-2003), 42  Davies, Paul (1946-), 60  de Condillac, Étienne B. (1714-1780), 98  de Lubac, Henri (1896-1991), 127, 129  deafness, ontological, 20  death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, 199  death, 180, 182, 183; continuity after, 123; facing, 34  decision-making process, 175; and choices, 113  defense mechanisms, 37  dehumanization, 183 deification, de facto, actualization of deepest vocation of the human person, 200; essence of, 202, 203, 205; expressing transformation, 203; false (self-deification), 201; Greek theosis, theopoieses, Latin deificatio), 197, 198, 199, 200; John of the Cross (1542-1591), 207  delusions, 55  Democritus of Abdera (c. 460-370 BC), atomism, 84  dependence and passivity, 207  depression, 53, 66  depth psychology, 148  Descartes, René (1596-1650), 71, 86  desire, egocentric human, 64; metaphysics of, 129; natural to see God (visio Dei), 27  despair, 66, 183; to hope, 3; hopelessness of, 68; one’s own, 61  destiny, the human being, 12, 181; true, 198  determination, biological, 30, 178; naturalistic, 15; total absence of, 172  Deus absconditus, 29  Deutsch, Helene (1884-1982), 36  development, by assimilation of education, parents’ values, self-governance, self- determination, i.e., fullness of freedom and responsibility, 196-197  development, personal, 115; spiritual, 155  dialogical, perspective on the self, 80  dialogism, 20, 21

238

INDEX

dialogue, existential, 132  Didymus the Blind (c. 313-398), 158  dignity, 22, 105, 120, 125; deepest human, 148, 188; human beings, 25, 26; personal, 97; and worth, 189; dimensions, axiological and ethical, 168  Dionysius Areopagus (1st century-1st century AD), 131, 159  disabilities, cognitive, 55  discovery, of another person, sympathetic, 19  disorders, dissociative, 69; neurotic, 124  dissociation, 62  distinctiveness,  distortion, demonic (mask/beast), 139; epistemic, 8  Divine humanity, 198; Persons, 95  Donald Winnicott (1896-1971), 34  dreams, 78  drives, unconscious, 62  dualism, 41, 43; Cartesian, 60  Duns Scotus (1266-1308), 140  dying of self, 81  dynamics, dialogical, 7  E earthly (image), spiritual (likeness), 40  Eccles, Sir John (1903-1997), 40  economy, capitalist society, 61, 62; God’s, 157; urban, 62  efficient cause (order of action), 28  ego, 62, 78, 81, 131; transformation, 215; unconscious and conscious, 147  egocentric human desires, 64; egocentrism, 193, 212  Einstein, Albert (1879-1955), 48  élan vital, 73  Eldredge, Niles (1943-), 15  electron, speed, 29  emotions, negative (disappointment, abandonment, anger, sadness, depression, stress, inferiority, guilt, jealousy, envy), 145; emotions, strong, 175  empiricists, logical, 36  emptiness, existential, 25, 61, 64, 65, 66, 143, 144  empty self, 61, 64 

encounter, anthropology of the, 19; authentic, 21; genuine, 20; with God, 20; encounter, openness to an, 19 endorphins, 54  energy, 52; emotional, 23; healing, 146  enlightenment (in language of mysticism), 162  entelechy (ἐντελέχεια), 87  enthusiasm, 217  entropy, 12  environment, external, 12-13; social, 54  ephemerality, 26  Epideixis, 136  epilepsy, temporal-lobe, 50  epiphenomena, 39  epistemology, 16; distortion in sphere of morality, 143; two kinds, 46 epithymia (ἐπῐθῡμῐ́ᾱ - spiritual will), 161  equations, mathematical, 52  equations, system of, 47  Erikson, Eric (1902-1994), 34, 130  escaping from life, 65  eschaton (Athanasius), 201  esse in and esse ad, 97  essence (ousia), 93; and existence, 118; and matter, link between, 14  eternity, from the days of, 219  ethical action, 29; lives, 54; nature (synteresis), 166  ethos, 5  etiologies, 25  Eucharist, 156  Evagrius Ponticus (345-399), 153  Evdokimov, Paul (1901-1970), 199, 213, 217  evidence, scientific, 55  evil, 87, 142; as innate weakness, tendency towards, 144; freedom to do, 176; inclination towards, 67; problem of, 143  evolution, 15, 16 evolutionary psychology, failure of, 49  existence as a microcosm, 14 concerns of, and knowledge, 19 existence of God, 35  existence, affective, cognitive dimensions of 39, 217; authentic human,



INDEX

147, 176; carnal and spiritual, 23; dynamic of, 123; privileged place, 119; paradoxical, 128; spiritual dimension, 122, 156; uniqueness of our, 12  existential, emptiness, 25; moral fears, 33; opening up to another “you,” 217; philosophy, 120; psychologist, 20; questions, 218; suppositum, 114  existentialists, 96 expectations, 81  experience, faith, 2; human psychic, 57; interior, 116; kinaesthetic, 78; religious, 51, 55; spiritual, 50, 116; subjective, 34; transcendental, 4  experiments, empirical, 38; experiments, neuroscientific, 174  exteriority, human, 149  F faith (Rom. 6:17; 2 Thess. 3:5), 153  faith, development of, 130; experience of, 2  fall, first, 143  false self, 62, 64, 81, 131  families, dysfunctional, 144  fate, shaping, 181; task of adopting, 181 fear, 54, 67, 143; existential, 141, 144 Fechner, Gustav (1801-1887), 84  felicity, 200; fullness of, 194  Feynman, Richard (1918-1988), 52  Fichte, Johann G. (1762-1814), 99  final judgement, 28  fingerprints, 75  First Council of Constantinople (381), 93  flourishing, spiritual, 11, 13; two basic elements of spiritual elements: receptive and responsive, 8  folk, concepts, 41; moral psychology, 175  forces, blind, 132  formal causality, 29; level of being, 28  formalism, 114  fragility, existential, 126  Francis, Pope (1936-), 215  Frankl, Victor (1905-1997), 7, 11, 104, 111, 114, 116, 119, 122, 124, 125, 127, 128, 147, 150, 165, 166, 167, 176, 177,

239

178, 179, 181, 182, 184, 194, 212; development of two phases: psychophysical maturing / intentional activity; moral development / becoming oneself), 191  free will, 60; importance of, 137; and love, 23 freedom, 170; authentic, 174; born of maturity, 155; courage to discover the truth, 173, dependence on truth, 184; developmental task, 133, 173; human, 103; individual, 27; margin of, 172; responsible, 215; responsibility and commitment, 5; soul, 16 Freeman, Laurence, OSB (1951-), 149  Freud, Sigmund (1856-1939), 65, 76, 150  Fromm, Erich (1900-1980), 34  frustration, existential, 64, 65  fulfilling oneself, 129, 139, 168, 189; in God, human, like finding our own identity, our unique mission in Christ, 210; lack of, 65; and “becoming,” 214 fulfillment, ultimate (in truth, goodness, happiness, freedom, love) 17  functionalism, 38, 41  G Ganzfeld sensory deprivation, 54 Gaudium et Spes (#12), 137  genetic codes, 75  genotype, 173  genotypic ability, 180; character, 166  globalized society, 22  gnosis (italics), 201; movement, 201 Gnostics, 201  God, becoming human, 140; dependence on, 67; desire for, 220; “destination” and fulfillment, 126; encounter with, 20; gene, 49; existence of, 35, 50; good, Highest, 128; helmet, 51; highest good, 195; “humanizes” Himself, 202; knowledge of us, 110; image (eicon), 38; like (homoiosis theo), 197-198; module in the brain, 49; as person, 14; place of, 50; quest for, 22; revelation, 1; trust in, 67; unconscious, 127; Godbearing-ness (theomorphism), 219 

240

INDEX

God-shape-ness, 219  good, highest, 128  Goodenough, Ursula W. (1943-), 5  grace, 141, 145, 193; created (Aquinas), 203; loss of divine, 141; sanctifying, 203  granary, memory as a kind of, 208  gratification, deferment of, 62  Greek Fathers, 143, 199  Gregory of Nazianzus (329-390), 29, 135, 161, 199  Gregory of Nyssa (335-394), 26, 28 Gribbin, John R. (1946-), 60  guilt, 183  H habit, 71; habitus, 28, 167  habitat of the soul, 124 hallucinations, 55  happiness, 29, 62, 126  Hartmann, Nicolai (1882-1950), 97  heart (kardia), 153; as “altar of God” (St. Seraphim, 1754-1833), 154; foundation of the soul, 152; mediator, 153; supernatural centre of our existence, 153; restless (St. Augustine, 354-430), 188; Confessions, I, 1  Heidegger, Martin (1889-1976), 112, 178  Heisenberg, Werner (1901-1976), 52  helmsman (nous), 160  Hermans, Hubert J.M. (1937-), 79  hermeneutics, of rational behaviour, 42  heroism, acts of, 187  hierarchic layers, 123; hierarchy, creating a, 40  Higgins, E. Tory (1946-), 79  Hilary of Poitiers (c. 310-376 AD), 93 Hildegard of Bingen (1098-1179), 138 Hindu tradition, 154  Hippocrates (c. 460-c.375 BC); type theories, 99  Hobbes, Thomas (1588-1679), 71  holiness, path to, 67  holistic outlook, 81  Holy Communion, 156  Holy Spirit, 199; given to us (Rom. 5:5), 148  holy, becoming, on the pattern of the One who alone is Holy, 220-221 

homo, absconditus, 29, 31; capax Dei, 126, 129; deificatus, 197; religiosus, 130; sapiens, 92, 100, 188; theomorphicus et theophorphicus, 1, 219, 120; viator, 109  homoousios, ousia, hypostaseis, 93  hope, loss of, 61; spiritual, 183  horizontal analysis, 40; dimension, 139  Horney, Karen (1885-1952), 79  human, behaviour, 120; body, 23; conditionally unconditioned, 177; creative entity, 27; development, 14, 101, 187, 191; dignity, 22; existence, 69; four layers (physical, organic, world of the soul, world of the spirit), 120; going beyond oneself, 179; healthy, 191; mentality, 11; person, 17, 70; mind, privileged position, 23; nature, mystery its, 84; nobility and dignity of, 173; objectifying, 175; ontic completion of, 202; philosophical concepts, 151; religious by nature 192; responsive dimension of, 178; remains a mystery, 31; self, 69; soul, 71; spirit, 148, 160; task, 33, 69, 83, 167; sciences of, 12; spirit (pneuma), 109, 148, 160; spirituality, will, 170; transcends its nature, 13; true, 70; will, 170  humanistic spirituality, 3; understanding of existence, 27 humanity, contemporary, 22; essence of, 13; imago Dei, 15; machine pushed by impulses and social conditions, 119  humanization of the human being, 132, 200  Hume, David (1711-1776), 71, 105  humility, 2, 31, 67; exaggerated (type of pride), 201  Husserl, Edmund (1859-1938), 16, 29, 72, 82  hypostasis, 93  hypotheses, untestable, 56  I I love, therefore I am, 154  I, and the me, 79  id, ego, superego, 27 



INDEX

idealism, 41; subjective, 16; unreal, 144  identity, criminal’s, 75; human, 63, 59, 154, 155; principle of our, 119; sense of, 70, 78; theory, 71, 75, 84, 104, 146; true, 107 ideologies, modern, 220  idols, 200  Ignatius of Antioch (35-108 AD), 204  Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556), 155  ignoramus et ignorabimus, 31  I-it, 19  illness, somatic, 124  illusions, of ego, 149; psychic, 144  illusive, 81  image (Hebrew selem, Greek Eikon, εἰκὼν), 140; (icon) of God, 1, 14, 166, 197; likeness of God, 135, 199; ontological, 29  images of human being, different, 219  imagination, 180; 201  imago Dei, 30, 166, 201  immateriality, 18, 22, 2, 3, 4, 22, 33; human soul, 86  immortality, 11, 188 impressions, David Hume, 71 impulse(s), 123, 145, 147; products of inner, 12; unconscious, 150 incarnation, 13, 140; anthropology of, 26  in statu fieri, 189  in vivo surveys, 39  indeterminacy, Heisenberg’s principle of, 29  indifference, temptation of, 19  individual, a person, 11  individualism, 62; excessive, 183; ontological, 63; utilitarian, 63  individuality, 19; blurring of, 183  individuation, of the soul, existence,118, 166  indoctrination, 48  inertia, instrumental, 125  inferential integration, 42  infinite love, 20  infinity, the desire of, 220  Ingarden, Roman (1893-1970), 72  injustice, 34  inner, agent, 77; human life, 2, 3; person, 108 

241

insights into ourselves, 12  instinct, 147; bundle of, 177; religious, 50  instrumentalism, 23  intellect (knowledge), 74  intellect, human, 25-26; mental faculties, 5; will and freedom, 194  intentionality, 82, 103, 139, 193; sacrificing one’s life, 211  interior, Holy Spirit, 187; place where God touches us and creates us anew, 149 interiority (Eigenwelt), 108, 134; of consciousness, 184  interpersonal relationships, 23  intersubjective, 74  introspection, 73  intuition, 1, 78; of being, 18; mystical, 152; knowledge of our spirituality, 28  invisibility, expressive of the person, 125  Irenaeus, Saint (140-202 AD), 159, 199, 201, 204  Isaac the Syrian (c. 613-c. 700 AD), 159  isolation (closing ourselves off), 68 I-Thou relationship, 20  J James, William (1842-1910), 55, 71, 76, 79, 105, 123  Jaspers, Karl (1883-1969), 73, 99, 124; allembracing, 178 Jesus Christ, 13, 17; and truth, 124  Joan of Arc (1412-1431), 25  John of the Cross (1542-1591), and deification, 207  John Paul II (1920-2005), 11, 109, 130  joy, 2, 54  judgement, final, 28  Jung, Carl G. (1875-1961), 77, 128, 140, 166  justice, 176, 178  Justin Martyr (100-165 AD), 92, 161; divine Logos, 158 K Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804), 72, 98, 113; metaphysics (ontology), 87  kenosis of Christ, 216 

242

INDEX

Kernberg, Otto (1928-), 76  Kierkegaard, Søren (1813-1855), 141  kinesthesia, 90  know thyself! (γνῶθι σεαυτόν, gnothi seauton), 12  knowledge, 212; intellectual, 17  Kobierzycki, Tadeusz (1947-), 91  Kohut, Heinz (1913-1981), 63, 76  Krąpiec, Mieczysław Albert (1921-2008), 183 

(desiderium naturale), 199, 200; that seems unceasing, 138  loss of the human self, 183  love, 39, 216; cognition, 16; freedom, 23; the full realization of a person, 142; infinite, 20  lust (sum of disordered reflexes, instincts, and impulses), 144; seven deadly sins, 144  Luther, Martin (1483-1546), 141 

L language, structure of, 48  law of experience, imminent unifying, 114 laws, of mechanics, 45; of nature, 119; nomological, 57  learning, 55  Leibniz, Gottfried (1646-1716), 71, 96  Levinas, Emmanuel (1906-1995), 89  life attitude, 63; always posing questions, 120; events, memory of, 78; fleetingness and fragility, 132; metaphysical dimension of, 36; situations, spiritual attitude towards, 176; life, as a task, 120  likeness, 140  liminal case, 16  limit situations (Grenzituationen), 126  limitations, human capacity for transcending, 4; of matter, 16  limitlessness, divine, 216  litmus test, 22  living soul, 87  Locke, John (1632-1704), 22, 71, 96, 98  Logos, 136, Logos, 160; transcendent, 153, 160; Wisdom, 208  logotheology, 153  logotherapy, 17  loneliness, 22, 148  Lonergan, Bernard, 162, 163; four dimensions of human spirit (conscious experience, understanding, judgment, decision / being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible), 163; theory, 46; human spirit, longing for God, constant, 129, 201; human

M Macarius of Egypt (300-391), 136, 153, 161  machine model, 16  macro-neurological theory, 38  magical thinking, 35  magnetic field, 57  make-up, atomic, 39 man, “new” and “old” (Eph. 4:22-24), 156  manager of the soul (power of reason), 161  Marcel, Gabriel (1889-1973), 30, 88, 171, 201  Maritain, Jacques (1882-1973), 18, 97 martyrs, 211  Marxism, 15; and nihilism, 15  mask (and person), 92  materialism, 16, 56, 59; dead, 60; ideology of, 53; metaphysics, 45; promissory, 40, 44, 49, 56; scientific, 48; sterile and bleak philosophy, 60  materialist theory, 23, 42, 52, 59  materiality, 14; negation of, 5  mathematical equations, 52  matter, Platonic perspective, 13; quantum mechanics, 52; spiritual, 35; spiritualized, 138 maturity, spiritual, 22  Maximus the Confessor (590-662), 136, 202  May, Rollo (1909-1994), 21, 133, 172, 189  McDowell, John (1941-), 42  meaning and truth, 60  meaning of life, 2, 12, 17, 25, 26, 28, 39, 65, 66, 73, 123, 133, 183, 211; frustration over, 66; inspired by values, 190; sense of, 70; that is something other, 182  meaninglessness, 66, 81 



INDEX

mechanical model of human existence, 25  mechanics, laws of, 45  mechanisms, dualistic, 151  mechanist, 37  Meissner, William (1931-2010), 35  memory, 59, 73, 191; as a kind of “granary,” 208; protoplasmic, 48  mental acts, 75; apparatus, 77; causation, 43; disorders, 74; illness, 124, 175; processes, 54; reality, 36; states, 74  mentalism, 90  mentally ill, 125 Merton, Thomas (1915-1968), 151 metaclinical analysis, 24  metaphysics, 6; general, 18; materialism, 45; personalistic, 8; spiritual, 117  method, phenomenological, 16  microtheos, 199  mind (nous, νοῦς), 14; autonomy of, 43; influence on body, 53; intellect and will, immateriality of the human, 11; materialist concepts of, 40; materialist philosophy of, 43; negative tendencies of the human, 37; philosophy of, 15; spiritual dimension, 162; theories of, 43; timeless, 75  mindset, 53  mission of Jesus: create a new intellect, a new psyche, and new eyes and ears in the spiritual person, 158  MMR (massive multiple realization), 39  models of human development, psychological and spiritual levels (parallelism, contrast, coexistence), 195  modern society, 64  modus of existence, 28 molecular features, 39  monad, 71  monism, anomalous, 43; material, 43, 44; spiritual, 43, 44  monosubjective, 74  moral, character, 189; conflicts, 25; dimension, 83; life, 176  morphogenetic, 101  motivation, 55; intrinsic, 183  Mounier, Emmanuel (1905-1950), 16, 89, 106  multiple personality disorder, 69 

243

Mysterious Presence, 144  Mysterium, personal existence, 104; spiritual existence, degrading, 31  mystery, existence, 31, 40, 176; limited by, 176  mystical experience, 5  mysticism, golden age of, 3, 203  mystics, 106, 146; Christian, 3  N narcissism, healthy, 63; pathological, 64, 69  natural, environment (Umwelt), 134; ­sciences, 122  nature, disorder or distortion, 146; cultivating one’s (Gabriel Marcel), 171; and grace, 9; definitions of, 85; efficiency in mastering, 12; fallen (natura lapsa), 144; ontological structure, 128  Nazianzus, Gregory (329-290), 29  necessity of nature, 180  negation of materiality, 5  negative anthropology, 15; negativity, 15  neo-Platonic perspective, 13  nervous system, v, 4; well-functioning, 116  neurobiology, 44, 51; and psychology, 37  neuronal states, 57  neurophysiology, 41  neuropsychology, moral, need for philosophical foundation, 174  neuroscience, v, 45, 47, 54  neurosis, 25, 65, 124; Frankl’s noogenic, 64; infantile, 33; noogenic, 25, 65; psychogenic, 25, 65; somatogenic, 25; spiritual, 25; Sunday, 65  neurotheology, v, 8  New Adam-Christ, the God-Man, 142  Nicodemus the Hagiorite (1749-1809), 153  nihilism, Marxist, 15 nocebo (harm), 54  noetic, 121  nomothetic (science of general laws), 101  noogenic neurosis, 25, 64, 65  noological (rational, intellectual), 65  norms, moral or ethical, 168  Nyssa, Gregory of, (335-394 AD), 188 

244

INDEX

O object, transitional, 34  objectivization, 19  oblatio, 7; oblative attitude, 216 obligation, 169  obsessions, 67  obsessive-compulsive disorder, 53  Oedipus complex, 177  ontology, concept, 12; dimensional, 24; epistemological, 30; human life, 15; person and act, 168; structure of being, 4; St. Paul’s teachings, 156; spirituality, 16, 118 openness, encounter, 19; existential, 127 opposition of religion to reason, 33  optimism, metaphysical, 146  organic body, 89  organism, 77  orientation, intrinsic, towards Christ, 195  Origen of Alexandria (184-253), 93, 140, 154, 158, 159  original sin, 141, 143, 144, 146, 159, 181, 204 Orthodox approach, 142; Protestant understanding, 142  Orthodox faith, 197  Otto, Fenichel (1897-1946), 36  P pain, 55, 90, 91, 118, 151 Palamas, Gregory (1296-1359), 137, 204, 209  pantheism, 154  parapsychology, 54  Parkinson’s disease, 54  Paschal Mystery of Christ, 206  passion (apatheia), 200  passions, 175  Passover, 207  Pasteur, Louis (1822-1895), 48  paternal pre-image, 136  pathology, neurological, 55, 190; scales of, 55; schizophrenic, 145; spirit of the time, 65 pattern, becoming holy, based on the One who alone is Holy, 220-221  Paul, St. (c. 5-64/67 AD), 118, teaching, 188 

Pavlovian conditioning, 24  perceptions, bundle of, 72  perfect human being, 13  perfection, 199  Persinger, Michael (1945-2018), 51  person, acting structure, 113; authentic, 173; dialogical being, 13; historical roots, 92; human, 17, 30, 174, 175, 182, 220; inner and outer, 189; interior, 112; spiritual individual, 112; whole, 159 personhood, 18  personality traits, 82, 91 personal being, dignity of, 113; features (cognition, intellectual, freedom [transcendence of nature], obedience to the law, wholeness, in dignity [transcendence of the community]), 183  personalism, 22; communitarian, 23; theological, 23  personalist, anthropology, 21; psychology, 82 personality, 88, 98; cult of, 22; definitions of, 100; given as a task, 104; human, 133; mature, 101; narcissistic, 76; self-system, 79; the term, 99 personalization, meaning of, 192  personhood, key to spirituality, 21-22  persons, social, 112  pessimism, historical, 146  PET neuroimaging, 53  pharmacotherapy, 124  phenomena, psychic, 55; subhuman, 39  phenomenology, 117; dynamism of the human person, 4  philosophy, inspired by revelation, 135; life, 15; of mind, 15  physicality and psyche, 156, 180  physics, 47; contemporary chemistry, 12; elementary particles of, 52; laws of, 47; modern, 45  placebo effect, 54  Plato (c. 470-399 BC), 26, 71, 85, 135  Platonic thinkers, 14  Platonism, Christianity, 14; Clement, Origen, 136  pleasure, 66 Plotinus (203-270 AD), 135 



INDEX

political systems, 22  Popper, Karl (1902-1994), 34  Poseidonius of Apamea (c. 135 BC - c. 51 BC), 157  postmodern society, 15, 35, 64  potentialities, spiritual, 184  Power of Christ’s Cross, 217  praxis, 2  prayer, 3, 115; and asceticism, 2  presence of God, 5, 7  pride 67, self-determining, 142  principles (Lonergan), transcendental, formal, 163; priority of, over personality, 109  promissory materialism, 40, 44, 49, 56, 57; prophecy, 140  proprium, 101  prosopon, 105  providence, God’s, 26  psyche (psyche, nephesh), 87; human, 101; maturation of the human, 193  psychiatry and reductionism, 177  psychic phenomenon, 24  psychicity (or sensuality), 180, 184  psychoanalysis and reductionism, 177  psychoanalysis, 24, 76, 150; critique of religion in, 33; theories of, 36  psychogenic neurosis, 25  psycho-immunology, 55  psychologism, 177  psychology, atheistic views in, 35; existential, 147; folk moral, 175; humanistic and existential, 8; narrative, 79; neurobiology, 37; positivist tradition in, 77 psychopathology, 143  psychophysical, factor, 223; processes, 125; systems, 101  psychophysicality, 193 psychosis, 74, 124; 181 psychosomatic network, 54  psychotherapy, 16; effective, 181; golden age of, 64; reductionism, 177; Western society, 61 PTH (psychoneural translation hypothesis), 54  purification, spiritual, 13, 14  purposefulness, 128  Putnam, Hilary (1926-2016), 48 

245

Q qualia, 59  quantitative and measurable aspects of things, 18; inference, 18; anthropology, philosophical, 18  quantum effects; laws, 51; mechanics, 60; physics, 44, 51, 52, 57; theory, 45; wave function, 52  quest for God, 22 questioning, fundamental, meaning of life, ultimate, 17; questions, existential, 26, 218  R rat model (Gordon Allport), 16  rationality, 5, 42 rationalization, 42  realism, 41; scientific, 45  reality, 21, 25, 67, 70, 209; axiological dimension of, 113; higher, 30; inadequately knowing, 146; mental, 36; conforming to, 126; readiness to face and affirm, 174; revealed phenomenologically, 18; simplification of, 174; substantial, 70; transcendental, 35 realization, multiple, in neurobiology, 39  receptive-responsive, process, 191; theory of 6, 26, 29, 141, 142; 220; spirituality, 11  reconditioning, behavioural, 173  reduction, “nothing other than,” 219  reductionism, 30, 37, 39, 42; mechanical, 38; ontological, 38; ruthless, 37; scientific, 40  reductionist, accounts, 11; approach, 212; concepts, 15; contemporary tendency, 33, 61; moral, 175 reflexes, human person, composed exclusively, 177  relationship, authentic, 20  relativity, 60  religion, mature and immature, 36  religiosity, authentic, 124, 128; conscious (Frankl), 127; genotypic and phenotypic, 11, 130, 131; post-Freudian approaches to, 34; unconscious, 128  religious experience, v Renouvier, Charles Bernard (1815-1903), 96 

246

INDEX

repentance, 67  representationalists, 41  research, experimental, 132; neurobiological, 124; neuroscientific, 57  resentment in contemporary culture, 172  resignation, 65  responsibility, 169; loss of a sense of, 65  responsiveness, v, 7, 8, 33, 60, 120, 130, 135, 162, 165, 187; denial of, 61; dimension of human nature, 178; expressing readiness, 6; spiritual, 219 restlessness, 179  resurrection (Augustine), 201, 156, 207  retrospection, 73  revelation, 12; God’s, 106  riches, 199  rigid self, 188  Rizzuto, Ana-Maria (1932-), 34  Rogers, Carl (1902-1987), 77, 80, 100 role, in the world, 73  Rorty, Richard (1931-2007), 3  Russell, Norman (1967-), 209  Ruysbroeck, John (1293-1381), 148  S sacrament of nature, 131  sacraments, “channels” of God’s grace, 205, 221, 209; human deification, 202, 209  sacred, search for the, 126  sacrifice, intentional, and self-transcendence, love, 209; intentionally sacrificing one’s life, 211  saint, becoming a, 211  sanctification, 153  sanctuary, 166  Sarbin, Theodore (1911-2005), 79  Scheler, Max (1874-1928), 120, 123, 124, 147, 182 schizophrenic, 25  schizophreniform nature, 62  Schneiders, Sandra (1936-), 5 Schopenhauer, Arthur (1788-1860), 66  Schwartz, Jeffrey (1951-), 53  science, contemporary, 24  sciences, natural, 12; disciplines, 15; evidence, 55; explanation, lowest levels of, 37

Scotus, Duns (1266-1308), 96  Searle, John (1932-), 71  seasons of life, 217  secular priests, 61  self, 69, 71, 72, 76; actual, the ideal, the ought, 79; ego, 76; active subject, 74; authentic, 73, 75; bipolar, 76; conscious, 152; deep, 73, 147, 152; divided, 76; empirical, 81; existential core, 74; ideal, pure, 72; illusionary, 131; in psychology, 75; multi-voiced, 80; nuclear, 76; phenomenal, transcendental, noumenal, 72; phenomenological, 115; philosophical approaches to, 70; potential, 79; principle uniting impressions, 72; real and ideal, 77; rigid, 188; selbst, 76; selfish and egoistic, 212; subjective, 75; superficial, 73; transcendental, 72, 73; true, 152; unconscious, 77  self, -actualization, 23, 26, 61, 67, -affirmation, 182, 183; -assertion, 188; -awareness, 61, 73, 115, 148, 172, 173; behaviouristic, 82; co-created (codefined) by statistical methods, 82; -cognition 78; -concept, 77, 78, 80, 81; -esteem, 77, 107; -consciousness, 98, 100, 123, 133, 173; -defense mechanism, 81; -dependent, 167; -determination, 136, 166, 169, 184; -division, in schizophrenia, 80; -experience, 36, 70; -expression, moments of, 126; -formation, 76; -fulfillment, 214; -governance, 169; selfhood, 101; -identity, 74 (basis of, 70); -image, 77; -improvement, 195; -knowledge, 115; phenomenological, 87; psychological, 78; -possession, 169; -realization, 140; -referring cognitive act, 78; -reflection, 78, 162; -representations, 77; -sacrifice, intentional, 61, 178, 215; -soteriological, 212; -sufficiency, 62; -system, 62; -tendencies, 212; -theory, 76; -transcendence, 5, 6, 20, 30, 50. 64, 97, 98; -understanding, 14 selfish attitudes, behaviours, culture of, 63, 64, 212  selfist psychology and culture, 62



INDEX

self-transcendence, 169, 178, 179, 182, 183, 184, 187, 211, 219; desire of, 126; human, 163; side effect of self-transcendence (Frankl), 179, 184; transformation, 198  sensory deprivation (Ganzfeld), 54  sensuality (or psychicity), 184  seven deadly sins, 144  sexual behaviour, 66  shape-ness, God-, 219; shaping of fate, 181  sharing of sense and meaning, 20  Shönborn, Christoph (1945-), 201  sickness, affecting humanity, 143  silent awe, 163 sin, 151; first, 27, 28; Judaism, 141; metaphors of (burden, darkness, stain, at leaving of the narrow path, misguidance, rebellion, aberration, passing into a far and foreign country), 141; original (Protestant understanding), 142; shades image of God, 14; social dimension, 142; seven deadly, 144 Skinner, Barrhus F. (1904-1990), 77  social, conformity, 172; existence, 22; inheritance, 132; value, 125  socialisation, 15, 132  society, globalized, 22  sociologism, 177 solipsism, 20  Solovyov, Vladimir (1853-1900), 197  somatic, illness, 124; psychic aspects, 120  Someone, in relation to some ultimate reality, 13  something beyond, 4; something more, 6, 138  Son of God, 199  soteriology, 26  soul, body, relationship of, 26; centre of, 153; freedom of, 16; human, indirectly changing in time, 75; immateriality of human, 86; psychologicalsociological layer, 121; spiritual and immortal, 17, 73; time, 46, 75 space, inadequacy of classical concert, 58; time constraints, 55  spark, divine, 14 

247

Spinoza, Benedict de (1632-1677), 174  spirit, 193; absolute, 180; concept of the, 4; human, 126, 148; inner access of the human being, 121  spiritual, “antenna,” 160; becoming, 190; being, 15; beings, 40; cognitive subject, 122; core of the human being, 62, 146, 148, 150; development, 187, 193, 195; dimension (ability to self-transcend), 1, 4, 11, 120, 122, 182; existence, mystery of, 31; flourishing, 11; growth, 187; layer, 193; life (self-creation and freedom), 191; matters, 35; maturity, 22; neurosis, 25; person, 176, 180, 181, 193; responsiveness, 219; senses, 155; soul, 17; unconscious, 121  spiritualism, 23; in form of gnosis, 159 spirituality, 1, 2, 5, 8, 11, 45, 116; centre of human, 168; Christian, 5; conscious experience of integrating one’s life, 5; culture, 132; denial of, 33; dimension of human nature / mind, 190; ­discovery in human nature, 187; dynamism and potentiality, 118; fundamental anthropological basis, 7; general science of, 4; heart (requires acceptance, trust, surrender), 155; humanistic, 3; integrating principle of emotive dimension of our lives, 181; internal rule of self-transcendence and ontological opening, 190; intuitive knowledge of, 28; metaphysics of, 118; normative dimension, 190; ontology, 16, 118, 121; ontological foundation of anthropology, 120; phenomenology of, 115; receptive dimension of, 142; receptive-responsive nature, 6, 219, 120; reductive, 219; theory of, 103; unconscious, 167 Stapp, Henry (1928-), 52  states of consciousness, 74  Statue, of Liberty, 177; of Responsibility, 177  Stern, William (1871-1938), 95  stimuli, sensory, 21 Stinissen Wilfrid (1927-2013), 21, 107, 181, 208 Stove, David (1927-1994), 49 

248

INDEX

stream of consciousness (empirical self, superficial self, phenomenal self), 25  striving, unconscious, 128  structure of being (ontology), 4, 123  subconscious, 78, 108, 143, 150, 200, 210  sub-humanism, 39  subject, cognitive, 71  subjectivity, deprived of, 22; personal, 115  substrate, 77  success and competition, 63  suffering, 61, 63, 118; no-fault, 117; redemptive, 63; trials, 171; transforming into achievement, 182 suicide, 66, 181  Sunday neurosis, 65, 66  superego, Freudian, 166  suppositum, existential, 114  supra-person, 129  symbolic world, 132  symmetry, principles of, 52  Symonds, Percival M. (1893-1960), 76  sympathy, 19  syneidesis, cultural ability, 166; ethical nature, 166  systems, chaotic (dynamic), 59; homeostatic and heterostatic, 183; non-linear, 60; political, 22  T taboo, ideological in neuroscience, 60  Taylor, Charles (1931-), 3  technology, 15  telekinesis, 55  telepathy, 54  telos, 210  temptation of indifference, 19  tendencies, self-affirmative, 212  tension and suffering, 123  Tertullian (160-220 AD), 92  theandric structure, 239  theological anthropology, 25  theology, 8 theomorphism (God-shaped-ness), 139  theophorism (God-bearing-ness), 219  theophoric, 88; becoming, 149; long process, 220 theory, materialist, 23 

theosis, 4, 7; adoption, kinship with God, intimacy, community of nature, participation, or rebirth, 198  therapy, cognitive-behavioural, 53  Thou, 19; substantial, transcendental, 126  thought, interior language of, 41; non-identity of, 57  thymos, life force of the soul, 161  Tillich, Paul (1886-1965), 21, 67, 182  time, 133; free, 66; space, 46; 75  Tischener, Józef (1931-2000), 3, 82, 183  tolerance, 55  totalitarianism, 66  tradition, 133  tragedy, 176  trait theories, 99  traits, temperamental, 45  transcendence, 4, 5, 39, 114, 118, 128, 130, 165, 166, 167, 180, 188, 193, 219; centre of, 184; characteristic of h ­ umanity, 127; horizontal, 185; human capacity for, 118; in action (conscience, duty, responsibility, freedom, truthfulness, self-determination), 116; vertical, 185 Transcendent You, 192  transcendental experience, 4; transcendentalism, anthropological, 16  transfiguration, 199  transformation, of one’s life, 20, 215; of the ego, 215; psycho-spiritual, 55; tools (faith, hope, love), 197  transitional object, 34  trans-subjectivity, 182  triad, the spiritual (nous, logos, pneuma), 160  trichotomy, 158; of spirit, soul, body 156; of the human being (body, psyche, spirit), 121  Trinity, Holy, 27, 29, 92, 93, 95, 97, 138, 142, 146, 150, 151, 159, 160; Divine (Aquinas), 95; “substantializing” the relation of, 94 (Aquinas) Triune God, 198  trust in God, 67  truth, dependency on, 167-168; dynamic to, 169; human dimension, 112; Jesus, 124; community, 213; compelled to look for it, 168; interiorly



INDEX

attached to, 168; meaning, 60; role in our transcendence, 168; shaping freedom, 168; ultimate, 127, 128  U unconscious, 144, 150; God, 127; spirituality, 121, 184; transcendental, 127  union with God, path to, 26 uniqueness, 22  unity, 125; lack of, 145  universalia, 87  V value of human person, 26; values, 117; eternal, 125; and meaning, 13; loss of interest in higher, 65; spiritual, 125  Van Kaam, Adrian (1920-2007), 3, 20, 21, 173, 174  Vatican II Council, 197  veracity, 168  vertical analysis, 40  Vienna Circle, 47  Victor, Richard of Saint (1110-1073), 95  virtue, 64; cardinal, 7  visions, 78  VMAT2 (vesicular monoamine transporter 2), 50 vocation, 152; basic human, 145  von Balthasar, Hans Urs (1905-1988), 17, 66, 91, 108, 109, 110, 126, 127, 131, 136, 143, 179; original sin, 158 von Hildebrand, Dietrich (1889-1977), 179 

249

W wanting, existential, 174  Weinberg, Steven (1933-), 52  well-being, 55  Western Church Fathers, 159  wholeness, 122, 125; of human existence, 25; journey towards, 16-17  will to power, 66  will, free, 174; human, 170; importance of, 137; kind of Supreme Court for decisions, 171; mental power of a spiritual nature, not subject to change, 171  wisdom, contemplative, 208  Wojtyła, Karol (1920-2005), v, 4, 11, 14, 110, 113, 114, 117, 119, 167, 178, 181, 184, 185, 189 Word of God, 13, 26, 88; incarnate, 88 world, creation from nothing (Aquinas), 14; incompleteness of, 30; objective and subjective, 60  worldview, 16, 45 worth and dignity, 189  Wundt, Wilhelm (1832-1920), 76, 99, 116  Y yearning for fulfillment, 200, 215; of the human heart, 156 

You/Thou, God as unknown, 119

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