Historical Study - The German Campaign in Russia - Planning and Operations (1940 -1942)

Citation preview

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET

No. 20-261a

HISTORICAL STUDY

THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA - PLANNING AND OPERATIONS (1940-1942)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

MARCH 1955

Department of the Army Pamphlets Published in the GERMAN REPORT SERIES No,

20-201 20-202 20-230 20-231 20-232, 20-233 2S-234 20-236 20-240 20-242 20-243 20-260 20-269 20-290 20-291 20-292

TUU

Military Improvisations During the Russian Campaign. ..... German Tank Maintenance in World War II..._____... Russian Combat Methods in World War II_________.Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps—..——_ r ....... Airborne Operations: A German Appraisal____,._-.--J— German Defense Tactics Against Russian Break-Throughs_Operations of Encircled Forces—German' Experiences ui Russia..._i.L. —— _.__ — __._—_____... Night Combat^ ,,___„_____,_____.^_..____ Rear Area Security in Russia—The Soviet Second Front Be hind the German Lines....-.--------..-_---_—-..-i._-uGerman Armored Traffic Control During the Russian Cam paign...,—————. —————. — 1————.li.——V--German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944).. The German Campaigns in the Balkans (Spring 1941)—..... Small Unit Actions During the German Campaign in Russia.Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign. ... ..„—._—. Effects of Climate on Combat in European Russia_____... Warfare in the Far North.... —^__.__._.___L..^,__

Publication dote

Aug 51 Jun 54 Nov 50 Jul 51 Oct 51 Oct 51 Jan 52 Jun 58 Jul 51 J""1 8% Aug 54 Nov 53 Jul 53 Jul 51Feb 02 OetSt

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET

No. 20-261a

THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA PLANNING AND OPERATIONS (1940-1942)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

MARCH 1SSS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 22 March 195,r> Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-261a is published for the information and use of all concerned. [AQ 091 (15 Feb 55)] BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY :

OFFICIAL : JOHN A. KLEIN, Major General, United States Army,

M. B. RIDGWAY, General, United States Army, Chief of Staff.

The Adjutant General. DISTRIBUTION : Active Army:

Gen Staff, DA (5) SS, DA )5) Tec Svc, DA (25) . Admin & Tee Svc Bd (10) CONARC (10) OS Maj Comd (50) Armies (10)

MDW (2) Gen & Br Svc Sch (25) PMST EOTC Units (1) Mil Dist (1) TOE 30-500A (AA-AG) clas (1)

30-600A (AA-AB), Mil Intel Svc Org (1)

NO: State AG (1). USAR: None. Unless otherwise noted, distribution applies to ConUS and overseas. For explanation of abbreviations used, see SR 320-50-1. ii

Clausewitz observed of Kussia that "it was a country which could be subdued only by its own weakness and by the effects of internal dissension. In order to strike these vulnerable spots of its body politic, Kussia would have to be agitated at the very center." In reading this study, the military student will realize how dearly the Germans had to pay for ignoring Clausewitz's advice. The purpose of this study is to describe German planning and operations in the first part of. the campaign against Russia. The narrative starts with Hitler's initial plans for an invasion of Eussia and ends at the time of Germany's maximum territorial gains during the battle for Stalingrad. A subsequent volume will depict the course of events from the Eussian counteroffensive in November 1942 to the capture of Berlin in April 1945. The material for this study was obtained from German military records now in the custody of The Adjutant General, Department of the Army. Monographs by former German general officers who had an active part in the planning and operations provided additional information. The authors of these monographs, prepared for the Historical Division, United States Army, Europe, include Generaloberst (Gen.) Franz Halder, Chief of Staff of the German Army from 1938-42; Generaloberst Gotthard Heinrici, a former corps, army, and army group commander on the Eussian front: and several others. The study was written by Mr. George E. Blau of the Special Studies Division, Office of the Chief of Military History. In his presenta tion, the author made every effort to give an objective account of Germany's initial efforts to conquer Soviet Eussia in World War II.

CONTENTS PART ONE. PLANNING

Chapter 1. Strategic Planning Initial Discussions (July 1940)-. — — — —-- — — — — — — The Marcks Plan (5 August 1940)_______________ Staff Work (August^September 1940) ____________ Admiral Raeder's Suggestions (26 September 1940)------Strategic Survey (October 1940)_____________ _ The Preliminary Plan (November-5 December 1940) ----General Staff and Command Post Exercises (NovemberDecember 1940)____________________ Economic Survey__-_-_-_-_.-_-______.___---.-....-. Directive BARBAROSSA (18 December 1940)_______ S, Operational Planning The Army's Operation Order (3 February 1941)_______ Initiation of Subordinate Staffs (February-March 1941)__ Changes in Plans (March-April 1941)_________.___ Army Group South__—_ ——__---------------Far North__________________________ Delay in the Start_______________________ The Draft of Directive No. 32 (11 June 1941)—..___.. Strategic Concentration (21 June 1941).-.._______ Air Support——..---..__._._.._------.----Other Factors________________________ Estimate of Soviet Strength (June 1941).-. ________ Sources of Information____---....----------Estimate of Red Army Dispositions____-__-------_ Estimate of Soviet Air Force Strength____----._-_--

PART TWO. OPERATIONS IN 1941 Chapter 3. The Initial Operations (22 June-31 July 1941)

D Day————— ———— ———— ——_„ ————————— The Situation on 30 June 1941_ _________ ____ Developments in Early July 1941—.--.._...----------. The Mid-July Estimate..________________. Directive No. 33 (19 July 1941)_____________ __ . The Army's Letter to the Armed Forces High Command-.. The Situation toward the End of July 1941____ _ __ 4. Planning for Future Operations! The Army's Order of 28 July 1941_________ ____ Directive No. 34 (30 July 1941) — — — — . — — — — — Hitler's Vacillation over Strategy-_---- — __---—_ — — The Supplement to Directive No. 34 (12 August 1941).... Developments to Mid-August 1941 _ — — _____--_---—-__ The Army Memorandum of 18 August 1941 __----_- — --. Hitler's Decision (20 August 1941)—. . __ . . —— —— —

Pate 1 6 12 14 14 17 19 20 21 26 32 34 34 36 37 37 38 40 41 42 42 42 42 44 44 45 48 50 53 57 59 61 61 64 65 65 69

VI

CONTENTS

PART TWO. OPERATIONS IN 1941 Continued Chapter 5. The Diversion and Reassembly

The Personnel Situation (End of August 1941) _______ Increasing Logistical Difficulties (Early September 1941). POL————— ——————————— —— ——— ——— — Track-Laying arid Wheeled Vehicles._._..---.-----. Developments to Mid-September 1941..---------------Directive No. 35 (6 September 1941)____________ The Situation at the End of September 1941_ - __ ___ Military-Economic Survey (2 October 1941)-..-_____. The Muddy Period and Its Effect on Operations (October 1941)........--............-.------------------Hitler's Plan for the Seizure of Moscow (12 October 1941). 6. The German Attack on Moscow Strategic Factors........ — — - — — — — — — — — - — - — — Last-Minute Planning and Operations to 13 November 1941-____...___...._______________ The Course of the Offensive (14 November-5 December

1941).. ———————— ——— ——— ————————

The Personnel Situation (End of November 1941)........ Critique. — ._-_...__...._.._...._____

P

71 72 72 72 73 75 77 78 79 81 83 85 86

88 ,88

PART THREE. 1942 THE YEAR OF INDECISION Chapter 7. The Russian Counterqffensive (December 1941 -February 1942)

The First German Eeverses__ — _ — __ — — —— — —— — — Hitler's Directive No. 39 (8 December 1941)_______ The Army High Command Order of 8 December 1941.... Intelligence Estimate....------------------------Plans.____..___________.-_________ The Mission of the Army Groups_---------------Conduct of Operations.._--------_--------------._ Organization.... _ — — __. — — — — — — — - — — — — — The Red Army Seizes the Initiative—— ------------ — . Developments to 25 December 1941 _____..--.-.______-_ The German Crisis in Mid-January 1942. _________. The Crisis Reaches Its Climax (Beginning of February 1942). The Russian Offensive Is Halted (20 February 1942)___ Critique-_______._____._____. ——— __._

91 92 94 94 95 95 96 96 97 99 101 105 106 107

8. Preliminary Planning for a German Offensive in the Caucasus, 1942

Exploratory Steps (July 1940-September 1941)_______ The First Plan for a Caucasus Operation (October 1941)_ Caucasus Planning in November 1941__ — — — — — — — — Effects of the Moscow Setback (January 1942) — ____.. The First Preparatory Orders (February 1942) —.. ____ The Navy's Role (February 1942)_____________ Intelligence Estimate (20 February 1942)__________ Hitler's Preoccupations in Early March 1942__...__..__ The Situation at the End of March 1942..._____.._

109 110 112 113 114 117 117 118 119

9. Preparations for the German Summer Offensive

Directive No. 41 (5 April 1942)- — _______________ Estimates, Delays, and Disappointments in April 1942—— Intelligence Estimate... ——— — — — — — — — — — — —

121 124 124

CONTENTS

vii

PART THREE. 1942—THE YEAR OF INDECISION—Continued Chapter 9. Preparations for the German Summer Offensive—Continued Estimates—Continued

Delay in the Preliminary Operations.— — — — — — — — The Situation at Army Group Center.——————— Chain of Command........r..-.-------------------Transportation_____..._______________. Turkey Remains Neutral_______ __________ Logistical Preparations— —— — ---------------------Timing___________________.._____ Chain of Command————-----------------------Supplies__„—-.-—--------___________ Motor Vehicles______________ __ _____ Rail Transportation.._______________... Summary..— .. ——— --.-.---------------------.. Organizational Problems.... — — ———— ------------Rehabilitation of Units.—_________--------Shortage of Technicians-----------------.--------. Construction of Fortifications.__-_-__________.-____ Oil Brigade Caucasus---------- —— --------------Casualties and Replacements.------------------.-The Participation of Germany's Allies——----------Rear Area Security.... — .--. ——— _ —— .---.--.. Army Group South's Defense Line..___----------The Role of Army Group A————-.—_____. Feint and Counterfeit__________________._ Warning Notes (May 1942)_______________----The Armed Forces Potential in the Spring of 1942_ ----The Preliminary Operations (May-June 1942)..___.Last-Minute Incidents and Impressions (June 1942)..----

P