Historical Examinations and Current Issues in Turkish-American Relations 9783631827932, 9783631830444, 9783631830451, 9783631830468

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Historical Examinations and Current Issues in Turkish-American Relations

Hüseyin Işıksal & Ozan Örmeci (eds.)

Historical Examinations and Current Issues in Turkish-American Relations

Bibliographic Information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available online at http://dnb.d-nb.de. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress.

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Printed by CPI books GmbH, Leck

ISBN 978-3-631-82793-2 (Print) E-ISBN 978-3-631-83044-4 (E-PDF) E-ISBN 978-3-631-83045-1 (EPUB) E-ISBN 978-3-631-83046-8 (MOBI) DOI 10.3726/b17442

© Peter Lang GmbH Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften Berlin 2020 All rights reserved. Peter Lang – Berlin ∙ Bern ∙ Bruxelles ∙ New York ∙ Oxford ∙ Warszawa ∙ Wien All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any utilisation outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without the permission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in electronic retrieval systems. This publication has been peer reviewed. www.peterlang.com

To my family Aliya, Bilgehan İrfan, and Hakan Halil Işıksal whose eternal love, support, and belief have always been unwavering... Hüseyin Işıksal To my family Cansu, Uzay Ege, Oya, Ruhi, Çağla, and Efe Örmeci for their continuous support during the dark days... Ozan Örmeci

Foreword I joined Turkey’s diplomatic service in the early 1960s, when the honeymoon period in Turkey-U.S. relations was about to end. Except for the 1950–1960 period, relations between these two countries can never be characterized as cordial. They always fluctuated, stabilizing from time to time, but deteriorating again. Turkey was an important ally for the U.S., but not as indispensable as Turks believed it was. After the Second World War, Turkey sought the protection of a strong Western state against the threat that it perceived from the Soviet Union. It was relieved after becoming member of NATO in 1952. Problems existed since the very beginning of their relations in mid-18th century; but the textbook examples of the refraction points in Turkey-American Relations are Cuban Missile Crisis of 1961, Johnson Letter of 1964, opium cultivation crisis of the 1970s, and the U.S. embargo on arms sales to Turkey in 1975. A slew of equally important setbacks followed especially after the two Gulf Wars and subsequent turmoil in the Middle East. These setbacks are explained in detail in more than one chapter in this book. The present problems in the Turkey-American Relations are very much reminiscent of their past relations: a low level –or absence– of comprehension of mutual sensitivities, absence of knowledge in the Ottoman State about the decision-making process in the U.S. Senate and administration, reliance in the U.S. on limited sources information to understand the internal dynamics of the Ottoman society, and mutual prejudices. This book offers almost in every page a multitude of subjects of doctoral researches for the younger generation. We learn from Dr. Cenk Özgen’s article in this book that Turkish-American Relations in terms of arms trade have followed an interesting path. In 1995, 80 % of the military equipment in the Turkish Army was of U.S. origin. In 2014, 60 % of the equipment was manufactured in Turkey. Therefore, the share of the foreign origin military equipment fell to 40 %, including the equipment coming from the U.S. Turkey exported 1.6 billion dollar-worth defense and aerospace products and imported from the U.S. 1.2 billion dollars-worth defense equipment. This is a staggering rise for a country like Turkey, because funds allocated to R&D has always been very low. The country also suffered a lot from the brain drain. If Turkey performed well despite these constraints, it partly owes this to the embargo that the U.S. imposed on arms sales to Turkey in 1975 as a result of Turkey’s military operation in Cyprus in 1974. When Turkey was deprived from the supply of spare parts; it had to encourage the domestic industry to manufacture substitutes for them. The most recent threat to the military supply to Turkey came from the U.S. Senate. It is about one of the costliest co-production programs coordinated by the U.S. Eleven countries are manufacturing the most advanced fighter aircraft developed so far, F-35 Lightening II aircraft. The project will cost 391.2 billion dollars. Turkey is a member of the consortium. It is manufacturing several components of the aircraft. It already spent more than one billion dollars for the project and

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supplied to the main contractor, Lockheed Martin, several components. Moreover, Turkey was going to buy more than 100 of these aircrafts. While the project was developing satisfactorily, the U.S. Senate adopted a decision withholding the delivery of the F-35s to Turkey on the grounds that the S-400 air defense system that Turkey will be purchasing from Russia might identify the weaknesses of the F-35. The delivery will be withheld until the Pentagon submits to the Senate a report on the implications of the purchase of the S-400 on the security of the F-35. In other words, Turkey contributes to the manufacture of the fighter aircraft, but it is not allowed to receive the finished commodity. This is another irony in the Turkish-American Relations. If the U.S. maintains this attitude, Turkey may find another substitute for the F-35s, but the bitter feeling that it caused in the mind of the Turkish decision-makers will remain. There are innumerable problems that cast shadows on the Turkish-American Relations, but one of them seems to be more lasting than the others. It is the Kurdish problem. The U.S.  is a strong supporter of the Kurdish cause, for several reasons. First of all, it is because Kurds are the largest group of people in the world that do not have a state. They are scattered mainly in four countries –Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Big powers have several interests in supporting the Kurdish cause to be able to use it as a leverage to contribute to the shaping of the political developments in the region. Secondly, the security of Israel is an important foreign policy priority for the U.S. Israel is surrounded by Arab countries. The U.S. would prefer to see non-Arab countries adjacent to Arab neighbors of Israel. Thirdly, the Kurds proved during the anti-DAESH (anti-ISIS) fight that they were good fighters and a reliable ally for the U.S. Fourthly, Kurds try to portray an image that they are the most secular people in the Middle East. Turkey has legitimate worries about its own security stemming from the possibility of the establishment of a Kurdish entity in the north of Syria either in the form of strengthened Kurdish municipal administrations, Kurdish cantons, Kurdish autonomous region or ultimately an independent Kurdish State. Kurds are the indigenous people of the region. A book titled Sharafnama, written in 1597 by Sharafeddin Bitlisi talks in detail about Kurdish sheikhdoms scattered everywhere from Iran to Antakya. Turkey has to shape its Kurdish policy taking into account this reality and should cooperate with the Syrian Kurds, by also including Damascus into this cooperation. Any policy that disregards this reality is likely to fail. Another new factor that affects Turkish-U.S. relations is the return of Russia to the Middle East. Moscow had already a military presence in Syria during the Soviet era. Now, because of the uncertain U.S. policy in the region, Russia is settling more strongly in Syria. Depending on how the relations between Turkey, the U.S., and Russia will evolve, Turkish-American Relations may be seated on a sounder ground or may get more out of control. Turkey does not need to improve its relations with one of them to the detriment of the other. It has to strike a balance that protects better its own national interests. As the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Parti) started to feel self-confident, in recent years, neo-Ottomanism started to be promoted in Turkey. There

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are supporters of this in the nationalist and conservative segments of the Turkish society. This is a tool that has to be handled with utmost care. It may not affect much Turkey’s relations with the U.S., but it may spoil Turkey’s relations with countries in the old Ottoman geography, that is to say the greater Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. We, the Turks, grew up by being taught at school that the Ottomans brought peace, security, and justice to the Balkans and the Arab world. I happen to be the longest serving Turkish diplomat in the Middle Eastern countries: four years each in Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. My recollection in these countries is that Ottoman rule is remembered more with the negative aspects in the Arab countries. In the Syrian school books, the Ottoman rule is referred to as the darkest period of the country’s history. The 6th of May is the anniversary of the day Djemal Pasha (Cemal Paşa), the Ottoman governor of Syria, hung seven Syrian national activists in 1916 in the Marjah Square, Damascus. It is commemorated as the Martyrs’ Day in Syria and Lebanon. In the early 1950s, the school teachers used to bring their primary school pupils to the square near the Turkish Embassy in Damascus and asked them to stone the Embassy in order to reinforce their hatred for Turks. This background should not be disregarded when neo-Ottomanism is promoted. The importance of the U.S. grew immediately after the Cold War, but the unipolar world dominated by the U.S. proved to be short and unsuccessful. Now with the emergence of China as the biggest economy of the world and Russia regaining a superpower status, the U.S. may not be able to play the role that it played during the Cold War era. The importance of the U.S. will continue, but Turkey’s relations with Washington will be shaped in the light of this and also with the new realities of the changing international landscape. March 1, 2003 is another date when Turkish-American  relations suffered a serious setback, because a motion to let the American soldiers cross Turkey to open a second front in the north -against Saddam Hussein’s forces- was rejected by the Turkish Parliament. To be more accurate, the motion was not rejected; but it could not secure the sufficient number of votes, because there were 533 parliamentarians present in the session on that date. The motion had to be adopted by the absolute majority; that is to say by at least 267 members, which is half of the attending members. 264 parliamentarians voted in favor, 250 opposed the motion, and 19 abstained. The motion was, therefore, considered rejected. If the abstainers were to be absent, the motion was going to be adopted. This unfortunate outcome spoiled Turkish-American Relations to such an extent that it has never recovered to the pre-March 1, 2003 level. In my capacity as Foreign Minister, I was the one who submitted the motion to the parliament. The negative vote could have been avoided if it were to be handled more carefully by the U.S. Washington did not want to listen to Turkey’s legitimate requests regarding the rules of engagement for the Turkish military units that were going to enter Iraq together with the U.S. Army. It belittled the Turkmen community’s status in the future constitution of Iraq. It did not want to understand the size of the economic loss that Turkey was going to suffer because of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The neocon team in Washington blamed the

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Turkish military establishment for the failure of the motion. They said that Turkish military did not play their leadership role during the process. The measures the U.S. took in order to reciprocate Turkey’s attitude further damaged the support for the U.S. in the Turkish public opinion. Downward trend is still going on in Turkey-U.S. relations, but the two countries have so many overlapping interests that, if the wisdom prevails, they may be put back on the rail again. Yaşar Yakış Former Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs (2002–2003) Recipient of French Légion d’Honneur award

Preface The origins of this book lie in a decision that dates back to 2017 when Ozan once again came to me enthusiastically with the idea of an academic project. We had already completed two very successful projects in the past as co-editors. Our first book entitled Turkish Foreign Policy in the New Millennium (2015, Peter Lang) is the broadest possible forum for evaluating and questioning the Turkish Foreign Policy in the new millennium that brings together the areas that had not been fully covered before within the same volume. It includes ten different parts and over forty chapters. Our second edited book also consists of a very comprehensive research that focuses on Turkey-Europe relations and is entitled Mavi Elma: Türkiye-Avrupa İlişkileri (Blue Apple: Turkey-Europe Relations) (2016, Gazi Kitabevi). After these two works, it was now the right time to focus on another important -if not the most important- issue on Turkey’s foreign relations in the contemporary era: TurkishAmerican Relations and their future. Turkish-American Relations have always been special. Due to its geopolitical location, history, and culture, as well as for both domestic and foreign reasons, the significance of the country (Turkey) has risen in recent years. Furthermore, Turkey has been involved in many complex regional issues that have attracted the attention of Political Science and International Relations scholars to the country. On the other hand, the United States has been the leader of the Western world since the First World War and a global ‘superpower’ since the Second World War. Therefore, the relations between these two countries not only affect their mutual relations, but also the political future of the Western world. However, the recent developments and areas of conflict between the two countries have made this topic more important than ever. We noticed that this topic is often misunderstood and thus, needs to be analyzed carefully based on various perspectives and topics. Therefore, it became clear that this was definitely the right time for a new volume with a broad range of contemporary concerns that would contribute to the understanding of Turkish-American Relations in the 21st century and to try to answer the question of “quo vadis” in regard to the direction in which the relations are heading. This book consists of three parts and fifteen original chapters in addition to the Preface part. Writing and editing such a detailed volume is not an easy task. Needless to say, it would not have been possible without the assistance of a number of colleagues and friends. Thus, we would like to take this opportunity to thank those who have kindly provided their help and encouragement throughout this project. First of all, we are very grateful to the authors of the chapters for their valuable contributions. We are also grateful to His Excellency Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Yaşar Yakış for an insightful Foreword. We like to thank Dr. Oğuzhan Göksel for his continuous support throughout this project. We thank Simon Thompson, a committed Spurs fan from Near East University, for his

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assistance with the proofreading. We would also like to acknowledge the gracious support given to us by Dr. Johannes Glaeser, whose suggestions have significantly improved the quality of the manuscript. Another appreciation goes to Professor Russel Hirst and his students Evan Newell, Wyatt Myers, and Madalyn Dillard from University of Tennessee Knoxville for their help and advices in making the manuscript better. We are also thankful to our publisher Peter Lang and its senior acquisitions editor Mrs. Esra Bahşi for their efforts for a quality publication. Much gratitude and appreciation are due to our parents Seval and İrfan Işıksal and Oya and Ruhi Örmeci for their encouragement and ever-present support. We know how lucky we are to be members of these families. Without your support, we would not have become who we are today and this endeavor would not have been possible. We thank you very much for everything from the bottom of our hearts! Finally, we wish to separately note our gratitude to the following people. I (Hüseyin Işıksal) wish to note my gratitude to the following people. The persons to whom I thank with all my heart and personally owe the greatest debt are the members of my family, to whom this book is dedicated. I would like to thank my beautiful wife Aliya for her understanding, encouragement, and everlasting support. Similarly, I am so grateful to my two baby sons Bilgehan İrfan and Hakan Halil for their inspiration and keeping me less busy than usual during the preparation of the book. In this respect, I am so thankful to my mother Seval Işıksal, my mother-in-law Alma Rakhmetullina, and my father İrfan Işıksal for their continuous support and for taking care of my sons. I (Ozan Örmeci) want to thank my wife Cansu Örmeci, my newborn son Uzay Ege Örmeci, my cousins Ceren Durmuş and Görkem Yararbaş, my uncles Hacı Bayram Durmuş and Özdemir Yararbaş, and my aunts Uğur Durmuş and Ülgen Yararbaş for their encouraging remarks about conducting and finishing this book project. Hüseyin Işıksal Nicosia, North Cyprus

Ozan Örmeci Istanbul, Turkey

Table of Contents Foreword ........................................................................................................................... 7 Preface ............................................................................................................................. 11 Ozan Örmeci Chapter 1: Introduction: Washington and Ankara – Ties that Matter ........... 15 Part I: History and Background of Turkish-American Relations Murat Önsoy Chapter 2: Early Encounters Between the New World and the Middle East: Ottoman Empire-United States Relations in the 19th and the Early 20th Century .................................................. 23 Gürol Baba Chapter 3: Turkish-American Relations From the Early Republican Era Until the End of Cold War ............................................................. 41 Ozan Örmeci Chapter 4: Turkish-American Relations in the Post-Cold War Era ................. 61 Part II: Turkish-American Relations in Terms of Identity, Security, Economy, and Development Merve Şıvgın Chapter 5: The Image of the U.S. in Turkey: A Historical View ....................  119 Ömer Kurtbağ Chapter 6: Troubled Period in Turkey-U.S. Security Partnership and Turkey’s NATO Alignment During the 2000s ...............................  145 Gürol Baba Chapter 7: Turkish-American Relations in Terms of Economy and Development .........................................................................................  175

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Cenk Özgen Chapter 8: Turkish-American Relations in Terms of Arms Trade ................  199 Şebnem Udum Chapter 9: Issues in Turkish-U.S. Relations: A Politico-Psychological Analysis Through Problematic Cases ..............................................  221 Part III: Turkish-American Relations in Key Political Areas Hüseyin Işıksal and Qais Khaleel Sallam Maaitah Chapter 10: Turkish-American Relations in the Middle East in the Post-Arab Spring Era: The Bonds That Are No Longer Tight ......................................................................................................  247 Matthew Weiss Chapter 11: U.S.-Turkish Relations Since the Arab Spring: Missteps, Mutual Misunderstandings, and Future Possibilities ................  267 Matthew S. Cohen Chapter 12: The Turkish-Israeli-U.S. Triangle: How Israel Factors into Turkish-American Relations ...................................................  305 Armağan Gözkaman Chapter 13: The Trump Administration: An Impossible Thrust for Turkey-EU Relations .........................................................................  331 Sina Kısacık Chapter 14: Understanding the 21st Century’s Specific Eurasian Regional Security and Energy Security Parameters in the Turkish-American Relationship: A Case Study on South Caucasus and Central Asia ..................................................  347 Hüseyin Işıksal Chapter 15: Conclusion: Turkish-American Relations in the 21st Century: An Uneasy Alliance .................................................  379 Editors ..........................................................................................................................  387 List of Contributors ...................................................................................................  389

Ozan Örmeci1

Chapter 1: Introduction: Washington and Ankara – Ties That Matter

Ever since the second half of the 20th century, Turkish-American Relations have been a hot topic for politicians, academics, strategists, and journalists from both countries. Although the two countries’ historical relations are very limited, mostly because of geographical distance, Turkish-American alliance constantly deepened and rapidly reached the point of “strategic partnership” following the Second World War. Turkey and the U.S. became important partners during the Cold War under the banner of NATO. To use a family analogy, geopolitical risks and military threats caused by Stalin’s Russia in the 1940s directed Ankara to quickly embrace Washington as its new and older step brother who really cares for him and who could protect himself against a very strong kid in the tough neighborhood. American lifestyle and liberal values also sprawled in Turkey quickly. The 1950s were golden years of Turkish-American alliance as the new Turkish political elite (Democrat Party) and Turkish people were charmed and delighted by American values, culture, and democracy. The U.S.  was a critical partner for Turkey during this period since it was providing economic and military aids as well as political support to Ankara. In other words, this new step brother was full of surprises, useful knowledge, and was helping Ankara to grow and become stronger. However, as two countries’ diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations diversified, many problems emerged in bilateral relations in the following decades. First of all, continuing with the family (older step brother) analogy, strong affectionate feelings on the both sides caused jealousy and disappointment in the years to come. While Washington was disturbed and jealous of his little brother Ankara’s self-ordained adventures concerning closer relations with Russia and a tough Cyprus policy in order to protect Turkish Cypriots and to secure the Eastern Mediterranean in the 1970s, as well as a more assertive Middle Eastern initiatives in the 2000s, Ankara also many times felt that his older step brother can be very harsh and irresponsible. The Cuban Missile Crisis, Cyprus Dispute, and the “hood incident” that took place in Sulaymaniyah following the rejection of March 1, 2003 memorandum in Turkish Parliament, all provided clear proofs for Ankara in assuring himself that he cannot completely trust in his step brother who has closer relations with his full brothers and sisters (Israel, European countries, and other more important strategic allies). 1 Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Istanbul Gedik University, Istanbul, Turkey. Email: [email protected] / [email protected]

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Secondly, while the Turkish-American alliance was established as a strategic necessity for both sides in the 1950s, new political, economic, and strategic necessities made the alliance less vital in the 21st century. To explain it more concretely; Turkey’s growing energy needs caused Ankara to become dependent on the Russian Federation and Islamic Republic of Iran, while Washington’s Middle Eastern policies began to be shaped with a more Kurdish-related focus, in addition to an Israel priority, by excluding Ankara’s concerns. Using the family analogy again, two brothers’ relations become distanced as they grew older and engaged in very different social interactions away from each other. The disappearance of the old Soviet threat also changed the security dynamics of the relationship.  Although new threats such as Al Qaeda and ISIS etc. still force both capitals to keep their security alliance, this does not seem like a force majeure as in the days of Cold War. Thirdly, as the two countries still enjoy democratic election mechanisms and both suffer from the religious-nationalist right’s populist tendencies, belonging to different civilizational families began to create problems in bilateral relations. While the U.S. support to Israel and Kurds in combination with American aggression in Iraq forced Turkish politicians and strategists to reconsider ties with Washington, Turkey’s prevailing Islamic identity and its political problems and disputes with Christian nations including Armenians, Greeks, and Greek Cypriots, as well as Ankara’s frequent quarrels and hustles with Israel (people of Jewish heritage), made Turkey an unpopular actor for American public and decision-makers. Fourthly, the two countries’ different political systems began to shape their strategic approaches to problems differently more recently. The U.S., as a federal state, has always tried to promote ethnic or sectarian based federalism in countries like Iraq and Syria. Intimidated by its own Kurdish problem, Turkey -on the contrary- has always supported unitary models in the region. This caused growing anti-Americanism in Turkey, due to the fear of breaking up with the Kurds. Recent political developments in Northern Iraq (Barzani’s failed independence referendum) and northern Syria (de facto PYD/YPG controlled territories) also strengthened Turkish fears and oriented Ankara to develop closer relations and cooperation with important regional actors such as Russia and Iran. Lastly, although in the age of globalization geographical distance lost its meaning, during their 70 years of alliance; Turkish-American Relations could not be developed enough in terms of economic and cultural grounds. This caused a strain on the two nations’ relationship to each other. All public polls show that, along with Israel, the U.S. is the most distrusted country in Turkey, while Turkey is not a popular country in America either. Unlike the current situation; in the 1950s, the U.S. was an unknown, but at the same time a trusted actor for Turks. Turkey also had a positive image in the eyes of Americans as a Muslim nation being a part of the Western bloc. As an inheritor of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey’s exotic nature was also a great positive factor for American and European Orientalists. Moreover, two countries did not have any wars or major problems (except for the Barbary Wars) until that time. However, as two countries became allies, their relationship became closer and entangled at the same time. In time, problems emerged between

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the two allies in many areas. These problems and traumatic experiences such as the “hood incident” created bad memories for two nations that sometimes overshadow rational thinking. Moreover, the lack of communication (read as the lack of intensified cultural, social, and economic ties between two countries) prevented two step siblings from having a stable friendship. This might have been avoided by closer social, cultural, and economic ties; but so far Ankara and Washington could not develop their relations in these areas in order to overcome the image and confidence problem between the two nations. So, as a proverb in both languages suggest; “Out of sight, out of mind” (Gözden ırak olan, gönülden de ırak olur). In order to materialize all these problems and put a light to the background and also to the future of Turkish-American Relations, together with Professor Hüseyin Işıksal, we have decided to prepare and edit a new comprehensive book about Turkish-American Relations. We named the book Historical Examinations and Current Issues in Turkish-American Relations. We have carefully chosen a group of young academics to write necessary chapters for providing a complete picture of bilateral relations. Although all chapters are written by Turkish and American academics (with the exception of our Bahraini colleague Dr. Qais Khaleel Sallam Maaitah), having an academic ethic and universal perspective, contributors of this book have tried to provide a balanced and neutral approach to problems. Moreover, all authors of this book are in favor of Turkey’s deepening integration into the Western world (primarily the U.S.) without spoiling its relations with its neighbors and other countries. In addition, all authors made serious efforts to discover new dimensions of a widely-spoken topic by making research and following contemporary political developments. Although developing a theoretical approach to pragmatism-based and dynamic Turkish-American Relations is a very difficult academic endeavor (not to mention the ultra-pragmatism of two countries’ current leaders Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Donald Trump), we have achieved to provide different models and periodization patterns to better analyze Turkish-American Relations. Thus, I can proudly and confidently say that this will be one of the best books ever written on this subject. Here, it should be also mentioned that although Turkish-American Relations have always been a popular subject in Political Science and International Relations, the number of English-language edited books are very few. Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future (2003, Routledge), edited by Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, is a solid academic work that covers almost all important historical and political issues in terms of Turkish-American Relations, but the book does not contain information about the recent past and contemporary issues. Şuhnaz Yılmaz’s Turkish-American Relations, 1800–1952: Between the Stars, Stripes and the Crescent (2015, Routledge) is probably the most comprehensive academic book written in English language on this subject; but the book covers historical information until 1952. The other books in English language focus on specific issues about TurkishAmerican Relations and do not cover all important aspects of bilateral relations. That is why, I am pretty confident that this book will help academics, researchers, and students to understand the fundamentals and progress of Turkish-American

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Relations with a wider outlook. Thus, I think this work can be used as a textbook as well in many universities having chairs or courses on Turkish-American Relations. This book consists of three parts and fourteen chapters in addition to the Preface and Introduction parts. Following the Introduction, the first part of the book, entitled “History and Background of Turkish-American Relations”, provides a historical perspective for understanding the emergence and the development of the Turkish-American alliance starting from the 18th century up until now in addition to new challenges that make ties between Ankara and Washington less tight in the last few years. The first chapter of the book, written by Dr. Murat Önsoy and entitled “Early Encounters Between the New World and the Middle East: Ottoman Empire-United States Relations in the 19th and the Early 20th Century”, analyzes Turkish-American Relations from political history perspective during the 18th century, 19th century, and the early 20th century. Dr. Gürol Baba wrote the second chapter of the book, “Turkish-U.S. Relations From the Early Republican Era Until the End of Cold War”, which focuses on Turkish-American Relations concerning the early Republican era and the Cold War period. The third and the last chapter of this part is written by me; entitled “Turkish-American Relations in the Post-Cold War Era”, this chapter analyzes Turkish-American Relations after the Cold War by focusing on two different models of Turkish-American alliance as well as different U.S. Presidents’ approaches to Turkey and the most important events that took place during their tenure in office. The study also lists strong and weak aspects of bilateral relations. The second part of the book is called “Turkish-American Relations in Terms of Identity, Security, Economy, and Development” and it contains five original chapters. The first chapter of this part belongs to Dr.  Zeynep Merve Şıvgın. It focuses on the image of U.S. and Americans in Turkey and is entitled “The Image of the U.S. in Turkey: A Historical View”. In his chapter entitled “Troubled Period in Turkey-U.S. Security Partnership and Turkey’s NATO Alignment during the 2000s”, Dr. Ömer Kurtbağ focuses on the security dimension of Turkish-American Relations with a particular focus on NATO alliance. The third chapter, “TurkishAmerican Relations in terms of Economy and Development”, is written by Dr. Gürol Baba and it provides insight to the economic dimensions of bilateral relations. The fourth chapter within this part, “Turkish-American Relations in Terms of Arms Trade”, is written by Dr. Cenk Özgen and it focuses on the history of arms trade between Washington and Ankara. The fifth and the last chapter of the second part, “Issues in Turkish-U.S. Relations: A Politico-Psychological Analysis Through Problematic Cases”, is written by Dr. Şebnem Udum and it offers a new political psychological perspective to problematic issues in Turkish-American Relations. The third part of the book is named “Turkish-American Relations in Key Political Areas” and contains five original chapters. Professor Hüseyin Işıksal, co-editor of the book, together with Dr. Qais Khaleel Sallam Maaitah, in their piece called “Turkish-American Relations in the Middle East in the Post-Arab Spring Era: The Bonds That Are No Longer Tight”, analyzes the very critical Middle Eastern dimension of the Turkish-American alliance with a particular focus on the post-Arab

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Spring (contemporary) period. Authors of this chapter frankly discuss the new challenges and problematic aspects of bilateral relations concerning Washington and Ankara’s Middle East policies. The second chapter within this part, “U.S.Turkish Relations Since the Arab Spring:  Missteps, Mutual Misunderstandings, and Future Possibilities”, is written by American scholar Dr. Matthew Weiss and it focuses on the new challenges in terms of Turkish-American alliance after the Arab Spring. The third chapter of this part, “The Turkish-Israeli-U.S. Triangle: How Israel Factors into Turkish-American Relations”, is written by another American academic Dr.  Matthew S.  Cohen and it focuses on the Israel factor in TurkishAmerican Relations. Dr.  Armağan Gözkaman, in his chapter “The Impossibility of Trump Administration’s Thrust for Turkey-EU Relations”, focuses on the negative effects of Donald Trump’s policies concerning Turkish-European Union (EU) relations, as well as the U.S.-EU relations. The fifth and last chapter of this part, “Understanding the 21st Century’s Specific Eurasian Regional Security and Energy Security Parameters in Turkish-American Relations: The Cases of the South Caucasus and Central Asia” is written by Dr. Sina Kısacık and it analyzes the Caucasia and Central Asia dimension of Turkish-American Relations with a particular focus on energy politics. The book ends with Professor Hüseyin Işıksal’s concluding remarks in his piece called “Conclusion: Turkish-American Relations In the 21st Century: An Uneasy Alliance”. The book is written by Turkish and American academics coming from different backgrounds who are specialized in Turkish Politics and Turkish Foreign Policy. Editors of the book, Professor Hüseyin Işıksal and I, have previously published one of the most comprehensive English-language books over Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkish Foreign Policy in the New Millennium (2015, Peter Lang), and we have worked hard for this project. That is why, I am hundred percent sure that we have done a good job and made a significant contribution to academic literature on Turkish-American Relations that will guide other academics and decision-makers in both countries. Finally, in my opinion, we should not be pessimistic about the future of TurkishAmerican Relations although serious problems and disagreements still exist between the two countries. Moreover, as Americans say, we should “let bygones be bygones” and focus on the future rather than discussing the problematic past. After all, as Shakespeare wrote, “all’s well that ends well”…

PART I:  History and Background of Turkish-American Relations

Murat Önsoy1

Chapter 2: Early Encounters Between the

New World and the Middle East: Ottoman Empire-United States Relations in the 19th and the Early 20th Century Abstract: Due to several regional and domestic developments, the United States (U.S.) and the Ottoman Empire could not establish official diplomatic relations for almost half a century until the latter required foreign aid to rebuild its navy after the catastrophe of Navarino (1828). In the later years, the increasing number of missionaries in the Ottoman domain caused the U.S. governments’ interference in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire to protect the missionaries’ lives and provide guarantees to the secure conduct of their activities. In the second half of the 19th century, relations between Washington and Istanbul became much more tense as new issues are involved in the agenda of the bilateral relations such as the migration of Ottoman subjects to the U.S., the reaction of the U.S. public to the tensions between the Ottoman State and its non-Muslim subjects, and the issue of the American arms sale to the Ottoman Empire. This chapter aims to shed light on the relations between the U.S. and the Ottoman Empire. The first part of this chapter begins with the almost half a century-long encounters of the American merchants and the missionaries with the Ottomans before the start of the official relations in 1830. The second part of this chapter focuses on the developments that took place in the bilateral relations from 1830 until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1922. Keywords: U.S., Ottoman Empire, Turkey, American Missionaries, Armenians.

Introduction Beyond any doubt, the end of the Second World War represents an important turning point in the history of Turkish-American Relations. With the onset of the Cold War, the decades-long friendly, if not very intense, bilateral relations between the two states turned into an alliance. Naturally, much of the literature on the historiography of the Turkish-American Relations concentrates on the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods; yet this dearth of scholarship turned a

1 Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Hacettepe University, Ankara, Turkey. Email: [email protected]

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blind eye to the pre-Cold War period as if there were no noteworthy ties between the U.S. and Turkey or between the U.S. and Ottoman Empire, the predecessor of Turkey. This chapter will trace the origins of Turkish-American Relations back to the late 18th century Ottoman Empire and fill a gap by enlightening this relatively understudied episode of the bilateral relations between the two states. In the aforementioned period during which the two states had their first contact, on the one side of the Atlantic, the newly established United States, deprived of the overseas trade networks it had once enjoyed under the British flag, was at risk of sinking into an economic depression. The U.S. government was encouraging the American merchants to sail to the old continent to find new trade opportunities. U.S.-flag merchant ships first set sail for China and northern European ports. Soon after, they ventured into the lucrative Mediterranean markets; Spain, France, and Italy being among their first ports of call. Their next stop was the Eastern Mediterranean, which was at the time home to the Ottoman Empire, commonly referred to as the “Turkish Empire” or “Turkey” by Westerners. By the time U.S.-flag merchants reached the Ottoman waters, the Ottoman Empire was militarily and economically in a state of gradual decline. Once the strongest state in the world, the Empire of the Turkish dynasty -by the late 18th century- failed to keep up with the changing socio-economic conditions in the Western world under the influence of the Industrial Revolution and capitalism and gradually lost much of its prestige and power. However, it was still one of the influential maritime actors in the Eastern Mediterranean. The early encounters of the two states and their people occurred under such circumstances and as can be understood from the above picture, trade was the key to the development of early relations. The establishment of diplomatic relations was particularly important for the U.S. commercial interests as, at the time, there was no other way of expanding into the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. The first part of the chapter traces the early encounters of the two states and their people, an almost half a century period between the founding of the U.S. and the official start of the relations in 1830s, and discusses why the start of the diplomatic relations between the two states was postponed. The second part focuses on the relations in the post-1830 period. In this period, the bilateral relations gained a new dimension with the increasing activities of the American missionaries in the Ottoman soil and their relations with the Armenian populations of the Empire. The third part concentrates on the U.S.-Ottoman Empire relations in the 20th century, the time when the U.S. temporarily abandoned its non-involvement policy in world affairs and became part of the international politics of the Eastern Question. In the light of the analysis, this chapter identifies trade interests, immigration of the Ottomans to the U.S., and American missionary activities as the key determinants of the bilateral relations between the U.S. and the Ottoman Empire.

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I. Early Encounters: The History of Relations Before the Establishment of Diplomatic Ties At the turn of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was a decentralized power with local rulers holding large amounts of autonomy in their territories. Therefore, the Ottoman central administration was not the only authority in the Eastern Mediterranean. American merchant ships came under constant attack from the pirates of the Barbary States of Tripoli, Algiers, Tunisia, and the independent Sultanate of Morocco (de jure possessions of the Ottoman Empire). Pirates began seizing American merchant ships, holding their crews for ransom, and demanding the U.S. government to pay tribute (Kurat 1964, p. 175). These attacks prevented American ships from trading in Ottoman waters (Erhan 2000, p. 79). The U.S. government’s diplomatic efforts concentrated on the local rulers of the Barbary States, as the Sublime Porte had no power over these semi-autonomous regencies (Özmen 2007, p. 195). The piracy problem was temporarily relieved through the signing of treaties of peace and friendship (Şafak 2003, p. 10) between the U.S. government and Algeria, Tripoli, and Tunisia in 1795, 1796, and 1797, respectively (the treaties were written in Ottoman script). The U.S. government agreed to pay tribute to the rulers of these states in exchange for the security of American ships (Doğan 1996, pp.  17–18). These tributes eventually drained the American economy, necessitating the construction of a stronger U.S. Navy that did not need its security to be guaranteed (Şıvgın 2012, p. 109). A few years later, the new naval fleet took the stage against the Barbary States in the two Barbary Wars of 1801–1805 and 1815, and finally, the practice of paying tribute to the pirate states ended in 1815 (Erhan 2000, p. 79). With the end of the threat posed by pirates, the Eastern Mediterranean became much more secure for American merchants and the number of American ships calling at the ports of the Ottoman Empire, particularly at the port of Izmir, increased. But still, the absence of diplomatic relations deprived American merchants of the privileges that their European counterparts enjoyed in the way of legal and fiscal capitulations. To overcome this imbalanced trade atmosphere, American trade ships that arrived at the port of Izmir were granted the protection of the British Consul in Izmir and the British Levant Company. Thanks to British patronage, the import tax burden of the American merchants decreased from 6 % to 3 % (Avcı 2016, p. 91). This service was not free, however; in return, the British charged a fee equal to 0.25 % of the price of the American goods (Turgay 1982, p. 196). The U.S. government was not willing to leave American merchants’ fate to the mercy of British representatives; thus, it accelerated its efforts to establish formal relations with the Ottoman Empire during this period. Prior to 1830, there had been several attempts to initiate official relations, all of which had failed for different reasons. One of the earliest American attempts came in June 1799 with the visit of Minister Plenipotentiary of the U.S. in London Rufus King to his Ottoman counterpart İsmail Ferruh Efendi.2 During this visit, Rufus King stated 2 Establishing official relations between the U.S. and the Ottoman Empire was on the agenda of the American government as early as the 1770s. In 1774, The First

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his government’s desire to establish friendly relations to İsmail Ferruh Efendi and offered to send an Ambassador to Istanbul as a sign of friendly intentions. However, these efforts proved fruitless as the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain formed an alliance the same year against Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt (Ottoman territory at the time). The Sultan was hesitant to jeopardize this alliance by initiating official relations with Britain’s former colony (Çolak 2011, p. 531). That same year, the Americans also gave up on the idea of sending an Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire as pro-French attitude became dominant among the American public (Kurat 1959, p. 10). In 1802, when the French campaign in Egypt ended, U.S. President Thomas Jefferson nominated an American merchant called William Stewart as the Consul of Izmir. However, his appointment was not approved by the Sublime Porte due to the lack of diplomatic relations between the two countries (Avcı 2016, p. 87). In 1808, the U.S. government dispatched another envoy, Mr. Sloan, to carry out negotiations with the Sublime Porte to open a U.S. Consulate in Izmir. For the same reason, these negotiations also failed. American commercial activities were hampered between 1809 and 1811 due to the British representatives’ decision not to continue its patronage of American ships. In 1811, a temporary solution was found by David Offley, an American merchant stationed in Izmir. Through his efforts, Offley earned the respect of the Ottoman bureaucrats in Istanbul and managed to secure the same privileges for business activities as those held by the British (Howard 1976, p. 292). Later on, he extended these privileges to all of his countrymen by opening an American Trade House in Izmir. In 1821, there were four trade houses in Izmir, and trade increased gradually in the subsequent years (Avcı 2016, p. 88). In 1819, the U.S.  government once again tried to establish diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire. Luther Bradish, an American bureaucrat, was appointed by the U.S. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams to negotiate a treaty of commerce and navigation. Adams met with the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs Halet Efendi. However, negotiations were interrupted in 1821 as a result of the Greek uprisings and finally broke down in 1822 when Halet Efendi was executed on the orders of the Sultan, accused of helping the Greek insurgents. Meanwhile, the Greek revolts led to a surge in Philhellenism in the U.S. The American philhellenes and people from all segments of society argued passionately for U.S. intervention on behalf of the Greeks (Oren 2007). Despite public pressure to help its “Christian brothers” and recognize the newly established Greek State, the reaction of the U.S. government was calculated.3 Secretary Adams did not want to

Continental Congress (represented by John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson) listed the Ottoman Empire among the states with which diplomatic relations should be established. However, plans had to be postponed in the postindependence environment due to insufficient funds. 3 There has been always a contradiction between the American public opinion and U.S. government’s policies toward the Ottoman Empire. From time to time, the

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put the lucrative Mediterranean trade at risk by alienating the Ottoman Empire. At his behest, words praising the Greek insurgents were dropped from the first draft of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 (Erhan 2000, p. 82). U.S.  government’s attempts to establish official relations persisted, but the Ottoman government declined these offers in response to the pro-Greek attitude among the American public. In 1823, George Bethune English was appointed by Adams to deliver a correspondence to Istanbul, communicating the aim of the U.S. government to initiate official relations. It was an undercover mission; the negotiations were hidden from the American public to avoid criticism. English contacted the Admiral of the Ottoman Navy, Capudan Pasha, who asked English to tell his government to authorize the commandant of the U.S.  squadron in the Mediterranean to carry out negotiations. Adams accepted Capudan Pasha’s request and ordered John Rodgers, the commander of the Mediterranean Squadron, to meet with Capudan Pasha. Although Rodgers and Capudan Pasha met as planned, the negotiations fell victim to the changing political atmosphere in the U.S. In 1824, John Quincy Adams, now a Presidential candidate, changed his attitude towards the Greek rebels and began to support Greek independence, a view he retained throughout his Presidency between 1825 and 1829 (English 2015, p. 98). A reversal of the Ottoman attitude towards the U.S.  government occurred in October 1828, when the Ottoman Navy was defeated and destroyed by the allied English, French, and Russian naval forces in Navarino. Twenty days after the destruction of the Ottoman Navy, David Offley received an invitation from the Sublime Porte to initiate negotiations toward diplomatic relations. The Sublime Porte, which had been reluctant to establish formal ties with the U.S., was now approaching the country for both technical and political reasons. From the technical point of view, the Americans had the means to help the Ottomans replace its destroyed navy. From the political point of view, initiating official relations with a non-hostile state like the U.S. would serve as leverage against European powers and was no harm to the Ottoman Empire at a time of crisis.4 David Offley and William Crane, the commander of the U.S. Mediterranean Fleet, were assigned as the U.S.  delegation for the negotiations that lasted two years. Each side had its sine qua non conditions for initiating diplomatic relations. For the Ottoman Empire, it was the construction of a new navy using U.S. technology (Avcı 2016, p. 227). The U.S., on the other hand, sought the “most favored

U.S. government deviated from friendly action to balance the negative attitude of domestic public opinion towards the Ottoman Empire. 4 The French occupation of Algiers, the Egyptian Crisis, the Greek insurrection, and the ongoing reform process within the Ottoman military and administrative structure.

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nation” privileges in the way of trade advantages such as reduced tariffs on imported goods and permission to navigate the Black Sea.5 The first party negotiations failed as the two sides could not agree on the rate of tax to be collected from American vessels. The second party negotiations started in 1829, with two new U.S. negotiators, Charles Rhind and Captain James Biddle, who successfully brought them to an end with the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation6, which was signed in May 1830. The Treaty was proclaimed by the U.S. President on February 4, 1832 and remained in force until the signing of a new and detailed Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in 1862 (Armaoğlu 1991, p. 7). The rather belated Treaty marked the beginning of formal relations between the Ottoman Empire and the U.S. more than 40 years after the founding of the latter. The Treaty was composed of 9 articles, including the capitulations and the most favored nation treatment of American citizens in the territories of the Ottoman Empire. American trade ships were bestowed freedom of commercial passage through the Ottoman Straits, opening the gates of Black Sea trade to them (Howard 1976, p. 294). A secret clause committing the U.S. to rebuild the Ottoman Navy on American soil was later not ratified by the U.S. Senate, as it breached the neutrality declared by the Monroe Doctrine. In order not to frustrate efforts, the U.S. government sent Henry Eckford to Istanbul, a famous naval architect, together with 15 American workers, who were employed by the Ottoman government to supervise the construction of the Ottoman naval fleet (Yılmaz 2015, p. 16). Eckford, who died of cholera in 1832, was succeeded the same year by another architect, Foster Rhodes. The Ottoman Empire rebuilt its navy with the help of the American naval architects and reached the peak of its strength in the 1860s (Howard 1976, p. 294).

II. Relations After Signing the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation An American legation was opened in Istanbul in 1831 and managed at the level of Chargé d’affaires until being elevated to the level of Minister Resident in 1839. David Porter was appointed as the first diplomatic representative to Istanbul. Offley became the U.S. Consul in Izmir. Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire opened its first Consulate in Boston in 1845. Abraham Tibgeoglu became the first Ottoman Consul to the U.S. The first permanent Ottoman representation in Washington, D.C. was opened relatively late, in 1867 (Kuneralp 2011, p. 100). Edward Blacque Bey (Bulak Bey) was the first Ottoman Minister Plenipotentiary to the U.S. The Ottoman Empire was never represented by an Ambassador in the U.S. capital. By the end of the First World War, several other diplomatic representations had been 5 Countries achieving “most favored nation” status are given specific trade advantages, such as reduced tariffs on imported goods. 6 The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation addressed a wide range of diplomatic issues and initiated bilateral relations between states.

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opened in U.S. cities like New York, Baltimore, Chicago, Philadelphia, and New Orleans (Aydın, Erhan & Erdem 2002, p. 248). The amount of trade between the two countries increased after the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. By 1850, the annual value of American-Ottoman commerce totaled $1,000,000 (Erhan 2003, p. 7) and increased seven-fold by 1897, reaching $7,049,573 (Howard 1976, p. 296). The Ottomans traded opium, figs, and raisins from Anatolia with American rum and colonial products (Şahin 2014, p.  59). The U.S.  was also the main arms exporter to the Ottoman Empire in the 1860s and 1870s until the Germans began to dominate the Ottoman market in the 1880s. Aiming to cut its civil war arms stocks, the U.S. government signed an arms sale agreement in 1865, providing the Empire with thousands of rifles (Satış 2011, p. 300).

1. American Missionaries as a Threat to Public Security Besides trade relations, American missionaries and their establishments in the Ottoman domain were a major issue in early relations between the two countries.7 Missionaries had arrived in the Ottoman Empire as early as the 1820s, establishing several institutions including churches, schools, hospitals, and orphanages. American missionaries met with strong opposition by society (Şafak 2003, p. 11). There were complaints by local Christian religious leaders about the stream of converts to Protestantism. According to George H. Boker, the Minister Resident of the U.S. to the Ottoman Empire between 1871 and 1875, the clergy of the native Christians were creating troubles to the American missionaries: “The clergy and the notables of the native Christian sects, who hate Protestanism, which they call atheism, more than the faith of Islam, and who sit in the councils of the local councils of the local communes, in which the Protestants have no representations, often use the pliant Turks as cat’s paws, or carry them along in the current of good-fellowship toward measures directed against the Protestants, or cunningly devised to incite popular odium and even violence against them. I have, however, seldom been called upon to deal with one of those constantly recurring difficulties between the American missionaries and the natives of Turkey which could be traced to a Mussulman origin. Now and then a good-natured Turk blunders into such an affair, but he is usually the surprised victim of a priestly intrigue, and not seldom the most innocent of all the parties concerned, while he is ever a willing, and, if unnoticed, grateful fugitive.” (Boker to Fish, p. 1294)

The complaints of the local Christians about the American missionaries prompted the Sublime Porte to act. Certain measures were taken to prevent missionary activities. According to Mr. Baraczi, measures taken by the Ottoman bureaucrats in Syria against the American missionaries in 1875 were the following:

7 Missionaries were not officially tied to the U.S. government.

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Murat Önsoy “First. The customs-house authorities make great difficulties in letting pass, free of duty, the goods destined for the private use of missionaries. Second. That the government made difficulties about the establishment of a printing press connected with the Bible-house Beirut. Third. That it refused to grant the permission to practice to the graduates of the medical college at Beirut. Fourth. That their elementary schools had been closed by the Ottoman authorities.” (Baraczi to Booker)

However, their power to act was limited, as the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation had established the legal basis for their activities. Missionary activities became much more systematic with the recognition of Protestants as a separate millet by the Ottomans in the 1850s. The number of missionaries residing in the Ottoman Empire in 1861 was 150 (Morris to Seward, pp. 777–778). Meanwhile, resistance from the Orthodox Patriarchy and the Jews forced the American missionaries to close most of their missions in the western regions of the Empire and to concentrate on the Armenian-populated regions (Başaran 1997, p. 42). Operating missionary schools, which principally served non-Muslim children, was another important activity of the missionaries. The first American missionary school was opened in Beirut in 1824, after which their number increased consistently, reaching 400 by the end of the 19th century (Şafak 2003, p. 181). These schools were regarded with suspicion by the Sublime Porte (Thomas & Frye 1952, p. 142). Certain measures were taken to control and limit their activities (Erhan 2000, p. 194). In some cases, schools’ licenses were not extended or licenses were denied to open new schools (Şafak 2003, p. 184). In 1869, the Regulation on Public Education (Maarif Nizamnamesi) put all educational institutions, including those operated by missionaries, under government supervision (Uygun 2003, p.  109). However, it was reported by the U.S.  legation in Istanbul that there were many missionary schools opened without having received the permission from the Ottoman authorities. (Boker to Fish, p. 1294) Further problems arose between the Ottoman authorities and missionaries, as the latter positioned themselves on the side of the Armenians during the clashes that occurred between the Ottoman Empire’s forces and Armenian rebel groups beginning in the 1890s (Şahin 2011, p.  50). Missionaries were accused of instigating Armenian nationalism through propaganda, particularly during the Armenian uprisings of 1894–1896 in the eastern provinces, during which thousands of Armenians died, missionaries including naturalized Armenians were arrested, and the missionary schools in Merzifon, Maraş, and Harput were damaged (Şahin 2011, p.  52). It was also discovered that the missionaries had been discrediting the Ottoman government and praising the Armenian rebels in interviews given to American newspapers (McCarthy 2004). The American representatives were discontented with the activities of the Armenian revolutionaries in Merzifon, which according to Mr. Jewett, Sivas Consul of U.S., was “A special source of danger for the college and its American faculty resulted from the persistent efforts of the

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revolutionary Armenians to create revolutionary sentiments among the students, and it was feared that the revolutionists of the city might do something to injure the college.” (Jewett to Short, pp. 849–850). The damage inflicted on missionary schools during these incidents led to sharp protests and demands for compensation by the U.S.  government (Erhan 2001, pp. 314–317). As these demands were not met by the Ottoman government, the U.S.  shifted to “gunboat diplomacy” by sending the USS Bancroft in 1897 to the shores of Izmir to compel the Sublime Porte to pay. As this demand was only partially fulfilled by the Sublime Porte, the USS Kentucky was also sent to Izmir in 1900 to highlight U.S. dissatisfaction with the compensation case. Finally, in 1901, the Sublime Porte agreed to pay $100,000 to the missionaries (Aydın, Erhan & Erdem 2002, p. 249). The status of Ottoman subjects who were migrating to the U.S. became another source of conflict between the two governments. The naturalization of the Ottoman emigrants by the U.S. caused controversy when émigrés returning to the Ottoman Empire demanded to be treated as U.S.  citizens, and therefore, to be exempt from Ottoman jurisdiction, taxes, and conscription (Americus 1906, p. 699). These developments compelled the Sublime Porte to formulate emigration-related policies. The Ottoman Nationality Law of 1869 denied Ottoman subjects who left the country without permission from taking up the citizenship of another country. This was not accepted by the U.S., which protected the rights of its citizens without distinguishing between naturalized and natural-born citizens. The problem was gradually solved as the Ottoman Empire liberalized its citizenship laws in the subsequent decades. The two governments signed a Naturalization Treaty in 1874 to regulate conflict concerning the status of the Ottoman émigrés. According to the terms of the Treaty, which was not ratified by the U.S. Senate, Ottoman subjects naturalized in the U.S. would automatically be expatriated and would become Ottoman citizens once more if they returned and remained in the Ottoman Empire for two years (Karpat 1985, p. 190). Throughout the 19th century, the U.S. government stuck to the rules laid out in the Monroe Doctrine. As opposed to Britain, France, and Russia, a non-adversarial diplomatic position was adopted towards the Ottoman Empire and the Eastern Question (Yılmaz 2015, p. 32). The predominant imagery among Americans, of Ottoman Muslims, was the “Terrible Turk”8, influenced the U.S. government, which was positioned to balance the anti-Ottoman sentiments of the American public 8 From the very beginning, for the American society, the term “Turk” had a pejorative connotation. Adjectives like “barbarian”, “heathen”, or “ignorant”, as well as the stereotype of the “Terrible Turk” were carried over by settlers of the New World from Europe. Americans’ own experience with the Ottomans in the 19th century, such as the Barbary Wars, and the Greek and Armenian uprisings within the Ottoman Empire, reinforced the existing negative image of the “Terrible Turk”. In addition, the anti-Ottoman stand taken by Ottoman émigrés in the books and journals they published in the U.S. about their country of origin, which told of the oppression and

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and the interests of the U.S. government, necessitating the maintenance of friendly relations with the Sublime Porte.

III. Relations in the 20th Century 1. Relations Prior to the First World War By the early 20th century, the U.S. had abandoned its non-involvement policy and became part of the international politics of the Eastern Question. It began an active economic policy in the Middle East, which later became the major principle of U.S. Foreign Policy under the Presidency of William Howard Taft (1909–1913). With the so-called “dollar diplomacy”, similar to the policies of the Great Powers of the time, the U.S. government encouraged its businessmen to obtain concessions (like the construction of a railway) in certain regions of the Ottoman Empire, which in return would give them the means of economic and political expansion. In this respect, the U.S. legation was raised to the level of Embassy in 1906 for more active representation of American interests in the Empire (Kieser 2010, p. 37) and John G. A. Leishman became the first U.S. Ambassador to Istanbul (Fendoğlu 2002). U.S. involvement in international affairs coincided with the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 in the Ottoman Empire. The introduction of a constitutional government, which would be more open to adopt American institutions and cooperate with the U.S. government in various fields, was well received by the American government (Venzon 2013, p. 426). The U.S. Ambassador Leishman, sharing his views about the Young Turk Revolution with the U.S. Secretary of State said: “The establishment of a constitutional government in Turkey, practically removes the fundamental causes of most of our troubles with Turkey -i.e., missionaries and naturalized citizens of Ottoman origin- and enhances the opportunity of extending our commerce many folds, as the development of the country, which was retarded and almost strangled by the methods of the old regime, will be encouraged to the greatest extent possible by the new Government…” (Leishman to the Secretary of State, p. 749). An extreme optimism was visible in the words of Leishman about the future of the Empire, who said: “It is quite apparent that the decline of the Empire has been arrested; and if one may judge the future by the reforms that have already been instituted, it will not be many years before Turkey will become a highly civilized and progressive nation, and, with her great natural resources, one of the richest, as existing conditions warrant the opinion that the march of progress will be even more rapid than it has been in Japan.” (Leishman to the Secretary of State, p. 749). The Young Turk leaders emphasized economic development and modernization of the Empire’s infrastructure. However, the lack of capital forced them to look to other states for assistance. They believed European capital would be used against

massacre of the Christian population by the Ottomans, molded the “Terrible Turk” image further.

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the Empire; so, capital from American businessmen was seen as a counterweight for European political ambitions (DeNovo 1959, p. 302). In this respect, the retired U.S. Admiral Colby M. Chester and a group of American businessmen established the Ottoman-American Development Company in 1908 in order to acquire railroad and mining ventures in the Empire. With the support of the U.S. Department of State, company representatives negotiated with the Ottoman administration to acquire concessions for the construction of a railroad from Sivas to Sulaymaniyah that ran through areas rich in minerals. The project was not approved by the Sublime Porte due to German opposition (Özyüksel 2016). The first attempt of the U.S. government and American businessman to infiltrate the Middle East thereby failed, and the U.S.  returned to its isolationist policy once more in 1911 (Smith 1967, p. 1). After the Taft administration, the U.S. government returned to its noninterventionist policy towards the Ottoman Empire and the Eastern Question until the Empire’s collapse in the First World War. To avoid the resentment of the European Great Powers, the U.S. did not participate in the Balkan Crises of 1908–1913 despite the Sublime Porte’s demands for mediation.

2. Relations During the First World War The beginning of the First World War allowed the Ottoman government to abolish the capitulations, which was perceived as a sign of Ottoman inferiority vis-à-vis Europe and a barrier to its economic development. The abolition of capitulations implied that the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1830 was unilaterally abrogated by the Ottoman Empire. Henry Morgenthau, the U.S. Ambassador to Istanbul, was instructed to notify the Ottoman government that the U.S. government does not recognize the abrogation of the capitulations (The Secretary of State to Ambassador Morgenthau, p. 1093). The U.S. government protested this unilateral decision and maintained its capitulatory rights until their abolishment was internationally recognized by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. There was no official U.S. reaction to the Ottoman Empire’s declaration of general mobilization on August 2, 1914 (Erhan 2001, p. 388), and the Empire’s entry into the First World War on the side of the Central Powers did not change its neutral position. Two navy ships, the USS North Carolina and the USS Tennessee, were ordered to sail to Istanbul for the protection of the American citizens; however, they were not allowed to pass through the heavily mined Strait of Dardanelles (Çanakkale) (Tamkoç 1960, p. 93). Meanwhile, the U.S. government protested the Sublime Porte’s decision to deport Armenians from war zones to Syria in 1915. As massacres occurred on the way to Syria, American society demanded urgent action from their government. An Armenian Relief Committee was established in New York and funds were raised for the victims. Diplomatic relations between the two countries ruptured in 1917 with the American declaration of war on Germany, the Ottoman Empire’s ally in the First World War. While being affiliated with enemy camps, neither declared war on the other (Yılmaz 2015, p. 29). President Woodrow Wilson resisted public pressure to

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expand the war effort to include the Ottoman Empire, as it would risk the lives of American citizens and American investments. Correspondence between the two states was carried out through the Swedish legation in Istanbul. Neither the Ottoman government, nor the Ottoman society adopted a hostile position against the American enterprises and American missionaries were allowed to operate even after the rupture of diplomatic relations.

3. Relations After the End of First World War The Armistice of Mudros on October 30, 1918 marked the end of First World War for the Ottoman Empire. After the Armistice, the Ottoman military surrendered and the Allied forces occupied the territories of the Empire. The U.S.  was not a party to the Armistice agreement, as it was not at war against the Empire. No diplomatic correspondence was established with the Sublime Porte, but a nonaccredited envoy was stationed in Istanbul in the capacity of a Commissioner to protect the American commercial interests. Earlier in January, President Woodrow Wilson presented his vision for post-war peace in his famous 14 points. Point 12 of his 14 points was concerned with the defeated Ottoman Empire (Venzon 2013, p. 427): “The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.” (President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points). Wilson’s 14 points generated excitement around the Empire, which sought to obtain the best peace terms. On October 1918, a few days before the signing of the Armistice of Mudros, the Sublime Porte sent a message to the U.S.  government saying that they were ready to accept the program laid down by Wilson in his 14 points as the basis of negotiations for peace. In a reply, the U.S. State Department recommended the Sublime Porte to address its appeal to the Allied Military Authorities. The idea of putting Turkey under American mandate was seriously discussed among Turkish society. The Society of Wilsonian Principles was founded in Anatolia, which appealed to President Wilson for his arbitration and application of his principles in the peacemaking process of the Ottoman Empire with the Allies (Ahmad 2011, p. 96). However, this idea later disappeared as the War of Independence became successful. The creation of an Armenian State in Eastern Anatolia and the Eastern Caucasus under American mandate was also considered among American political circles (Vander Lippe 1993, p. 41). There was strong material and moral support among the American public for the formation of an Armenian State, as they were misinformed by the anti-Turkish propaganda promoted by Armenian Americans about the purpose of the War of Independence in Anatolia that started in May 1919 (Tamkoç 1960, p. 99).

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There was no official contact between the U.S. government and the leaders of the independence movement. However, the U.S. Commissioner in Istanbul and several American military personnel9 paid visits to Anatolia and met with Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the independence movement. Their reports, in which they explained first-hand observations and remarks about the Turkish independence movement, were challenging in nature and in contradiction with the anti-Turkish reports of the American relief workers, intelligence officers, and Armenians which were all anti-Turkish. They were all convinced that, contrary to common belief, the Turkish War of Independence was not directed towards Armenians or any other non-Muslim group living in Anatolia. Instead, it was focused on the invading armies of Greece with no other desire than to secure the territorial integrity of Turkish lands. Admiral Bristol, the U.S. High Commissioner in Istanbul, reported that the purportedly unbearable conditions of the Armenians were the propaganda of British and French imperial powers (Malkasian 1984, p. 358). Thanks to these reports, the traditional “Terrible Turk” image and the anti-Turkish sentiments in the U.S. government and society began to be altered and the U.S. government apprehended the real objectives of the war in Anatolia. The wartime assembly and the cabinet of Mustafa Kemal, which had been established in Ankara, now had the U.S. government’s sympathy (Trask 1970, p. 40). However, the U.S. gradually reverted to its isolationist policy in the early 1920s, after the victory of the Republican Party in the 1920 Presidential elections. The new U.S. administration was aloof to developments in Anatolia other than those related to American economic interests and humanitarian issues. The idea of an Armenian State under U.S. mandate also came to an end. The wartime cabinet in Ankara, in search of recognition, attempted to develop diplomatic ties with the outer world. However, it got no return for its efforts from the U.S. government and official relations between the two countries remained interrupted until 1927.

Conclusion The beginning of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the Ottoman Empire date back to the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation in 1830. Despite almost half a century-long of encounters of the American merchants and the missionaries with the Ottomans, the two governments could not establish official diplomatic relations prior to this date. Economic issues dominated the bilateral relations during the first few decades of relations. However, starting with the mid-19th century, the increasing number of missionary activities and the negative attitude of the Ottoman State and the public towards them, caused the U.S. diplomatic staff to take measures in order to protect them. Another source of conflict in the bilateral relations was the status of Ottoman subjects who were 9 Admiral Mark Bristol, General James, Colonel James N. Huskell, and Admiral Colby Chester.

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migrating to the U.S. The naturalization of the Ottoman emigrants by the U.S. created a major problem for the Ottoman Empire as these émigrés when returning to the Ottoman Empire demanded to be treated like U.S. citizens and be tax and military service exempt. The U.S.-Ottoman Empire relations were predominantly shaped by the economic interests of the two countries except for a short period in the early 20th century when the U.S. had abandoned its non-involvement policy based on the Monroe Doctrine and became part of the international politics of the Eastern Question. Other issues that dominated the relations between the two states were the interventionist attitude of the U.S. State in the tensions between the Ottoman State, its non-Muslim subjects, and the issue of the American arms sale to the Ottoman Empire.

References Ahmad, Feroz (2011), “Young Turk Relations with the United States, 1908–1918”, in American Turkish Encounters: Politics and Culture, 1830–1989 (eds. Nur Bilge Criss, Selçuk Esenbel, Tony Greenwood & Louis Mazzari), Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 83–99. Americus (1906), “Some Phases of the Issues between the United States and Turkey”, The North American Review, Vol. 182, No: 594, pp. 689–700. Armaoğlu, Fahir (1991), Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları. Avcı, Ayşegül (2016), “Yankee Levantine: David Offley and Ottoman-American Relations in the Early Nineteenth Century”, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Ankara: Bilkent University. Aydın, Mustafa, Erhan, Çağrı & Erdem, Gökhan (2000), “Chronology of Turkish-American Relations”, The Turkish Yearbook, Vol.  XXXI, No: 2, pp. 247–265. Baraczi to Booker (March 8, 1875), “Legation of the United States, Constantinople, Inclosure in No: 276, U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1875–1876”, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Başaran, Betül (1997), “Reinterpreting American Missionary Presence in the Ottoman Empire: American Schools and the Evolution of Ottoman Educational Policies (1820– 1908)”, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Ankara: Bilkent University. Boker to Fish (March 9, 1875), “Legation of the United States, Constantinople, No: 276, U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1875–1876”, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Cumhuriyet Gazetesi. Çolak, Filiz (2011), “İzmir Limanı Ticaretinde Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin Yeri ve Önemi”, Icanas, 38, 10–15 September 2007, Ankara: İcanas Bildiriler, pp. 531–545. DeNovo, John A. (1959), “A Railroad for Turkey: The Chester Project, 1908–1913”, The Business History Review, Vol. 33, No: 3, pp. 300–329. Doğan, Nuri (1996), Cumhuriyet Öncesi Türk Amerikan Ticaret Antlaşmaları, İstanbul: Turan Yayıncılık.

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McCarthy, Justin (2004), “Missionaries and American Image of the Turks”, in TurkishAmerican Relations: Past, Present, and Future (eds. Mustafa Aydın & Çağrı Erhan), London: Routledge. Morris to Seward (October 25, 1861), “U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1862”, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Oren, Michael (2007), Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present, New York: Norton. Orkunt, Sezai (1978), Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri, İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları. Özmen, C. Özge (2007), “Genç Cumhuriyetin Akdeniz Savaşları, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’yla Yapılan Dostluk ve Ticaret Antlaşması; ya da 19. Yüzyıl Amerikan-Osmanlı İlişkilerinin Amerikan Yazınına Etkisi ve Seyahatnâmeler”, Doğu Batı Dergisi, No: 42, pp. 195–212. Özyüksel, Murat (2016), The Berlin-Baghdad Railway and the Ottoman Empire: Industrialization, Imperial Germany and the Middle East, London and New York: I.B. Tauris. “President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points”, Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, Date of Accession: February 5, 2017 from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp. Robins, Philip (2007), “The Opium Crisis and the Iraq War: Historical Parallels in Turkey-US Relations”, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 12, No: 1, pp. 17–38. Rubin, Barry (1985), “Middle East Policy in Turkish Context”, in The Middle East in TurkishAmerican Relations (ed. George Harris), Washington: Heritage Foundation. Satış, İhsan (2011), “19. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Osmanlı-Amerika Silah Ticareti”, History Studies (ABD ve Büyük Ortadoğu İlişkileri Özel Sayısı), pp. 295–311. Smith, Russell Yates (1967), “James Wood Colt and the Chester Project, 1908–1914”, A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts, The Ohio State University. Şafak, Nurdan (2003), Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri, İstanbul: OSAV. Şahin, Emrah (2011), “Responding to American Missionary Expansion: An Examination of Ottoman Imperial Statecraft, 1880–1910”, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Quebec: McGill University, Montreal. Şahin, Emrah (2014), “Sultan’s America: Lessons from Ottoman Encounters with the United States”, Journal of American Studies of Turkey, Vol. 39, pp. 55–76. Şıvgın, Hale (2012), “Amerika’nın Trablusgarp’a Askeri Müdahalesi 1801–1805”, in ABD’nin Askeri Müdahaleleri 1801’den Günümüze (ed. Haydar Çakmak), İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, pp. 93–109. Tanin Gazetesi. Tamkoc, Metin (1960), “The Question of the Recognition of the Republic of Turkey by the United States”, Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk Yıllığı, Vol. 1, 1960, pp. 92–120. The Secretary of State to Ambassador Morgenthau (September 16, 1914), File No: 7111.673/62a. U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Thomas, Lewis W. & Frye, Richard N. (1952), The United States and Turkey and Iran, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Trask, Roger R. (1970), “The ‘Terrible Turk’ and Turkish-American Relations in the Interwar Period”, The Historian, Vol. 33, No: 1 (November 1970), pp. 40–53. Trask, Roger R. (1971), The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914– 1939, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Turgay, Üner A. (1982), “Ottoman-American Trade during the Nineteenth Century”, Journal of Ottoman Studies, Vol. 3, pp. 189–246. United States Department of State (1944), “Foreign Relations of the United States”, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 10-1, President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, 22 October 1944. Uygun, Selçuk (2003), “Türkiye’de Dünden Bugüne Özel Okullara Bir Bakış (Gelişim ve Etkileri)” [A Glance at Private Schools in Turkey from Past to Today], Ankara Üniversitesi Eğitim Bilimleri Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol. 36, No: 1–2, pp. 107–120. Vander Lippe, John M. (1993), “The ‘Other’ Treaty of Lausanne: The American Public and Official Debate on Turkish-American Relations”, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, Vol. 20, pp. 31–63. Venzon, Anne Cipriano (ed.) (2013), The United States in the First World War: An Encyclopedia, Routledge. Yeşilbursa, Behçet Kemal (2005), The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle East, 1950–1959, London: Frank Cass. Yılmaz, Şuhnaz (2006), “Challenging the Stereotypes: Turkish-American Relations in the Inter-war Era”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No: 2, pp. 223–237. Yılmaz, Şuhnaz (2015), Turkish-American Relations, 1800–1952: Between the Stars, Stripes, and the Crescent, New York: Routledge.

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Chapter 3: Turkish-American Relations From the Early Republican Era Until the End of Cold War

Abstract: Turkish-American Relations from the 1920s to the 1990s cover a vast variety of happy and sad moments. In this period, Turkey changed from being a small power to a proactive middle power. In the same span, the U.S. became a superpower and even a global hegemon. Therefore, the relations between Turkey and the U.S. did not operate on an equal basis. There has always been serious level of ‘asymmetry’ in expectations, motivations, and policy outcomes of these two countries. From the mid-1940s, Turkey particularly aimed to prove to the U.S. that it is not only a staunch ally, but also a strategic partner in the Middle East. For proving this, Ankara governments championed many of U.S. national interests both regionally and globally. Turkey also strived to show that its foreign policy aims, and even in general its national interests, were pretty close to that of the U.S. In adopting this attitude, Ankara’s expectation was to maintain the U.S. security support and American military and financial aid. The U.S., on the other hand, saw Turkey as an important ally with considerable military potential, though in need of modernization, and a dynamic market in need of development and institutionalization. Therefore, Washington did not see Turkey as critical as Ankara considered itself. This asymmetry affected almost every key development in bilateral relations. Keywords: The United States, The Republic of Turkey, NATO, Cyprus, Asymmetry.

Introduction Turkish-American Relations from the early Republican period to the 1990s cover not only quite a large piece of history, but also a vast variety of political and diplomatic developments. This chapter touches upon only the most relevant turning points of this large piece. Wars, the establishment of international organizations, agreements, crises, etc. are all examples of turning points in Turkish-American Relations. Each turning point established, repaired, or stunted relations. This work does not aim to provide a detailed Turkish Foreign Policy analysis; instead, it divides the discussion of bilateral relations into two parts: ‘until 1945’ and ‘from 1945 to 1990’. The end of the Cold War has brought an enlarged and deepened world order; therefore, it exceeded the content of this study. 1 Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Social Sciences University of Ankara, Ankara, Turkey. Email: [email protected]

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This chapter focuses on pre-1945 relations with the early Republican era, beginning with the Armistice of Mudanya (1922). It examines the influence of the Republic of Turkey’s early foreign policy tendencies on Turkey-American Relations. The influence of the Second World War and the effect of Turkey’s neutrality are also elaborated here. Post-1945 relations were characterized by a notable feature: “asymmetry”. With the end of the Second World War, Turkey sought American politico-military support, which meant it became wholly reliant on consent from the American administration. Turkey could not influence U.S.  policy in return, even in situations like the case of Cyprus in the 1960s and 1970s. This period provides a series of serious examples of the asymmetry between the two countries and their motivations, expectations, and capabilities. Particularly in the second half of the 20th century, these asymmetries made it difficult for Turkey to develop a sustainable, independent, and multi-faceted foreign policy. This made American alliance a supra-party requirement of Turkish Foreign Policy. Regardless of political affiliation, almost all Turkish governments have attempted to maintain the stability of this alliance. Given the large historical span under examination, there were also considerable consistencies that have kept the two countries intertwined with one another. Problems that have arisen between them also had politico-psychological parallels. For instance, the Turkish elites have asked for American help particularly in security, technical, and economic realms. Problems have occurred when the Americans have had ultimate control over the transferred assets, which has given them serious leverage over Turkish Foreign Policy. Various degrees of American sympathy towards the Armenians during various eras, as well as towards Greeks and Greek Cypriots, have also caused palpable tensions in relations.

I. Pre-1945 Era 1. Relations in the Early Republican Era The War of Independence ended with the Armistice of Mudanya, signed on October 11, 1922. The next month, negotiations for a peace agreement started in Lausanne, Switzerland, between the victorious Ankara government and the Allies. The U.S. was not a signatory to the Treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923, through which the borders of the Republic of Turkey were internationally recognized. The U.S., instead, sent an observer to the negotiations in order to protect its interests. However, the two sides signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce in Lausanne on August 6, 1923, two weeks after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. This Treaty was meant to form the foundation of normal diplomatic and commercial relations between the two states. However, relations did not proceed as planned. The Treaty was rejected by the U.S. Senate in 1927 after extensive public debates, which were caused by the counter-propaganda of the Armenian Americans (Vander Lippe 1993, pp. 44–49). However, this obstacle was surmounted by a modus vivendi and temporary diplomatic relations began on

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February 1927 through a unique method of exchange of notes not requiring the Senate’s approval (Trask 1971, pp. 59–60). Attempts by Mustafa Kemal, founder of the Republic of Turkey, to create a modern secular state modeled after the example of the Western world, gradually increased the prestige of the country in relation to the rest of the world (Yılmaz 2006, p.  225). The U.S.  was not indifferent to these developments. The first U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Joseph C. Grew, as well as the Department of State and individuals including missionaries, were very responsive to the rapid modernization of Turkey. Effective counter-propaganda started in the U.S.  media to regenerate the negative public image of Turks, emphasizing the success of Mustafa Kemal’s reforms. Several friendship associations were established through the initiatives of Ahmet Muhtar, the first Turkish Ambassador to Washington (Türkmen 2009, p. 110). A new Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was established in October of 1929, forming the basis of economic relations between Turkey and the U.S. (Vander Lippe 1993, p.  62). Ratified this time by the U.S. Senate, the two states granted “most favored nation” status to each other (Armaoğlu 1991, p.  113). Commercial relations increased with the signing of the Treaty. Ranked behind Germany, the U.S. was the second largest buyer of Turkish goods between the years 1933 and 1939. Turkish exports to the country rose from 10 to 19 million Turkish lira in the inter-war period. The worth of Turkish imports from the U.S. also demonstrated a most important increase between the years 1933 and 1937, climbing to 15 million Turkish lira in a four year period. American business investments were most welcome in Turkey, as American businessmen were seen as a politically disinterested force by the Turkish ruling elite (Yılmaz 2006, p.  231). Beginning in the early 1920s, the government was extremely cautious about the presence of foreign capital in Turkey. Based on bad memories of the Ottoman era, the government was skeptical, particularly of capital flow from the European states. For them, a politically disinterested U.S. capital was a far better option for the Turkish economy than European capital, which was believed to have hidden political motives. Until the 1930s, the government attempted to develop the economy with its own resources. However, the economic situation in the late 1920s forced Turkey to allow the entry of foreign capital to the country. Standard Oil, American Tobacco, and Ford Motor Company were among the first American companies to enter Turkey after the signing of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (Trask 1971, p. 72). Reforms were carried out throughout the 1920s and 1930s in every aspect of life in Turkey. However, the absence of necessary know-how and capital were obstacles to success. Turkey was able to overcome some of these difficulties through U.S. contribution to Turkish projects in the way of operations of American commercial and industrial firms in Turkey and employment of technical experts and advisers (Trask 1971, p. 61). At the request of the Turkish government, specialists from the U.S. were recruited by the U.S. Department of State to provide technical assistance in Turkey. The technical experts and advisers were hired under various

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Turkish ministries, such as education, economic development, public health etc. (Yılmaz 2006, p. 231). The peaceful approach of Turkey in its inter-war foreign policy and its emphasis on diplomacy rather than unilateral action, received a favorable response from the U.S. as long as there was no conflict of interests between two sides. As seen during Turkey’s attempts to revise the Lausanne Straits Convention in the mid-1930s, and to change the regime of the Straits, the U.S.  government supported this idea as long as the principle of freedom of commercial passage was not abolished (Yılmaz 2006, p. 233).

2. Relations During the Second World War During the Second World War, an immense pressure was exerted on Turkey from both the Axis and the Allies to enter the war. However, the government was determined to stay out of the conflict, and to that end, Ankara adopted different foreign policy positions including non-belligerency (1939–1941) and neutrality (1941–1945). U.S. involvement in the war from late 1941 was compatible with the Turkish strategy of non-belligerency. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s attempts to open a new front in the Balkans by bringing Turkey into the war was confronted with strong opposition from Washington, which wanted to focus all of its resources on the invasion of northwestern Europe with the operation codenamed “Overload”. Neutral Turkey was an important center of British Economic Warfare efforts against Germany. The U.S. government joined the British efforts in 1942, and the British-American joint program preemptively bought Turkish products such as copper, antimony, woolen rugs, molybdenum, and linseed (Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS] 1943, Vol. 4, pp. 1119–1121, 1135–1137, 1149). The U.S. also worked to prevent the spread of German influence through the Lend-Lease Act when the Allies were unable to respond to economic and military demands. The act enabled the Turkish government to purchase many materials and articles from the U.S. such as airplane spare parts, steel, leather, shell casings, fuses, caps, chemicals, tins, lubricating oil, and ammunition of various sorts, the export of which would otherwise not be allowed. Throughout the war, Soviet pressure on Turkey to negotiate a treaty which would return the northeastern cities of Kars and Ardahan to the USSR and to enable Soviet participation in the defense of the Turkish Straits, was high. In response, the U.S.  adopted a hardline attitude towards the Soviet Union, which was important for Turkey to be able to resist Soviet demands.

II. Post-1945 Era 1. Relations Between 1945 and 1960 Between 1945 and 1960, the foundation of Turkish-American Relations was laid and began to deepen. Before the end of the Second World War, Turkey could not

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find an international platform to formulate an alliance-oriented relationship. Ankara needed an alliance with a Great Power, since a half-unexpected Soviet threat had begun to surface even before the end of the war. Signs of the threat appeared in Roosevelt and Churchill’s private discussion about the possibility that the Turkish Straits would become a subject of Allied bargaining. Roosevelt stated that the Russians would like to discuss the passage rights of the Montreux Treaty (FRUS, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 10–11). Ankara was aware that it would be very difficult to counter such a threat without the help of a Great Power. The U.S., in that sense, was the only option; but for this, Turkey needed to capture Washington’s attention. A  post-war element was necessary, since Turkey had not been a belligerent in the war. The foremost option was the United Nations (UN) discussions. In 1944, Dr. Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, noted the importance of a future UN and his hope that Turkey would be one of the first signatories of the UN Charter (Tanin 31 July 1944). Turkey took the necessary steps to attend the UN discussions and make its voice heard more clearly. According to the Yalta Conference, Turkey needed to declare war on the common enemy by March 1, 1945 in order to be invited to the San Francisco Conference, where the UN would be forged (FRUS The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 943–945). In February 1945, Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan (Ulus 24, 25, 26, 28 February 1945). Accordingly, American Ambassador Laurence Adolph Steinhardt invited Turkey to the San Francisco Conference on March 6, 1945 (Turkish Prime Ministerial Bulletins [TPMB] March 1945, p. 250). The Turkish delegation was not comprehensively grounded in the founding principles or vision of the UN and mainly emphasized the similarities between the UN Charter and Turkey’s founding charter, the National Oath (Misak-ı Milli) (Institute of International Relations of the Faculty of Political Studies at the University of Ankara 1961, p. 82). The delegation wanted to prove, at least in principle that, Turkey could harmoniously work with the U.S. in the formation of the “New World Order” (TPMB December 1945). Yet, the UN was close to covering Turkey’s security needs regarding its weakness against Great Power aggression, particularly with the Soviet Union’s permanent membership and veto power on the Security Council. Turkey needed a particular U.S. guarantee regarding the imminent Soviet threat. In discussions at the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the same concerns about the weakness of the UN were emphasized (Turkish Grand National Assembly Proceedings [TGNAP] 15 August 1945, pp. 160, 167, 172–173). Even if Turkey was aware of the shortcomings of the UN, Ankara did not raise any objections during or after the San Francisco Conference. On the contrary, the Turkish government of the day used the conference as a platform to draw U.S.  attention towards its potential as an ally. A clearer example of Turkey’s efforts to move closer to the U.S. was triggered with Moscow’s declaration that it would not renew the 1925 Russo-Turkish Treaty of Friendship (Cumhuriyet 22–23 March 1945; FRUS 1945 Vol.  8, pp.  1219–1220; League of Nations Treaty Series, p.  355). For the Turkish government, this declaration was a signal “of the inevitable request for a modification of the Montreux

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Convention” (FRUS 1945 Vol. 8, pp. 1220–1222). This was an excuse and a reason for Ankara to show Washington that the Soviets were after a new Straits regime, which would not only put Turkey under pressure, but could also clear a path to the Soviet Union to pursue any future aggressive aim. The U.S.  was aware of Turkey’s concerns. The U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, Laurence Adolph Steinhardt noted that the Turks were looking first for British and then for U.S. support in order to counter Soviet pressure, which would continue as official propaganda and circulate as rumor (FRUS 1945 Vol. 8, pp. 1225–1228). Turkey did not want to escalate the situation before securing support from the U.S. Turkish Foreign Minister Hasan Saka stated that Turkey “accepts the suggestion of the Soviet Government with regard to replacing the expiring pact with another pact more suitable to the present interests of both parties” (FRUS 1945 Vol.  8, p.  1231). Turkey did not want to bring the Montreux Straits regime into discussion either and restricted changes to those within the 1925 Treaty. Turkey’s efforts to neutralize the situation were unsuccessful and the situation was escalated by the talks between Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs and Selim Sarper, Turkish Ambassador to Moscow, between the 7th and 18th of June 1945. Molotov stated that there were “outstanding questions” between Turkey and Russia. These were “cessions of territory made by Russia to Turkey” under the Russo-Turkish Treaty of 1921; the cession of bases by Turkey to Russia in the Straits, initiating negotiations for an agreement between Turkey and Russia “as to the revision of [the] Montreux Convention” (FRUS 1945 Vol. 1, pp. 1017–1018). Sarper’s reply emphasized that Turkey “was not prepared to reopen the question” of the 1921 Treaty, nor “could [Turkey] even consider granting Russia bases in the Straits”. Regarding the Montreux Convention, Sarper repeated that this “was not a matter which could be discussed between the two governments alone” (FRUS 1945 Vol. 1, p. 1018). The first round of discussions did not resolve any issue. On June 18, during the second round, Sarper reiterated that Turkey “could not accept” Molotov’s points “as a basis for discussion”. The second round also ended without a solution. It became clear that, due to the asymmetry between the USSR and Turkey, during the bilateral talks, the Turkish side could not exert enough pressure to challenge the Soviet claims. Ankara needed the support of one of the Great Powers, either Britain or the U.S. Turkish President İsmet İnönü told Turkish Acting Foreign Minister Nurullah Esat Sümer to ask the British and U.S. Ambassadors in Ankara to urge their governments to respond to the Soviet proposals (Gürün 1991, p. 288). The British showed more attention and support than the Americans. The British government declared that Molotov’s statements were in direct conflict with Stalin’s statements at Yalta (FRUS 1945 Vol. 1, p. 1020). The U.S. State Department made no firm statement, rather noting that “the future conversations between” Turkey and the Soviets “will be conducted in accordance with the principles” of the UN (FRUS 1945 Vol.  1, pp.  1027–1028). U.S.  interest was more in peaceful maritime trade through the Turkish Straits, which should be protected by the Turkish authorities only. Negotiations for settlement/resettlement of the Turkish Straits should be

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carried out without a firm statement from the State Department (FRUS 1945 Vol. 1, pp. 1014–1015). The Turkish government, on the other hand, aimed to utilize this perceived “Soviet threat” to attract more American attention. Sarper told U.S. Embassy staff in Moscow that the Soviets were “expected to continue their efforts to bring Turkey under control”, either by blocking non-Soviet bloc Black Sea countries’ free access through the Turkish Straits or by expanding into the Caucasus (FRUS 1945 Vol. 1, p. 1030). Nurullah Esat Sümer also told the U.S. Embassy staff in Turkey that the Turkish government had information about Soviet Army units moving into Bulgaria, and thus, becoming a serious threat to Turkey (FRUS 1945 Vol. 1, p. 1031). In addition to Turkish officials’ efforts, American Ambassador to Turkey, Edwin Wilson, in his summary to the Secretary of State, shared Turkish anxieties and underlined Molotov’s further claims, which had been conveyed to him by Turkish Prime Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu regarding cession of the Turkish territories of Kars and Ardahan, along with bases on the Straits. Wilson particularly emphasized that Soviet claims covered a region much larger than the Turkish territories. This could extend from the Dardanelles to the Mediterranean-Suez-Gibraltar (FRUS 1945 Vol. 1, pp. 1033–1034). For the U.S., the crucial issue was not the Turkish State, but the interplay between the Soviets and the British over Turkey. The American administration would only take action if Turkey’s independence and territorial integrity were endangered against the principles of the UN (Beck 2003, p.7; FRUS 1945 Vol.  1, pp.  1016–1017). In other words, Turkish national interests were in need of a common enemy with the U.S. in order to converge with the American interests. This convergence happened on the Middle East and was catalyzed by American and British officials. After the Second World War, British influence in the region was waning and the Straits could play a considerable role in preventing potential Soviet expansion towards the Eastern Mediterranean. This was something that Washington would not accept (FRUS 1945 Vol. 8, p. 1249). Another catalyst in this convergence was the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires to Moscow George F. Kennan’s note stressing that Moscow aspired to transform the Turkish government into a pro-Soviet one (FRUS 1945 Vol.  8, p.  1251). The British Foreign Office sent several notes and reports to the U.S. State Department about the significance of the Turkish Straits and a pro-Western Turkish region for maintaining Anglo-American interests for the region (FRUS 1945 Vol. 8, p. 1257). Under the influence of these catalysts, in November of 1945, the State Department sent a note to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs that if there were a revision to the Montreux Convention, it should not be only between Turkey and the USSR, but should involve an international committee (FRUS 1945 Vol.  8, p.  1266). Since Turkey was after solid American support, it accepted the proposal half-heartedly (FRUS 1945 Vol. 8, p. 1275). The Turkish and U.S. positions became further closer due to developments in Greece and the Soviet military presence and movements in Iran. The convergence “solidified”, in President Truman’s words. In his conversation with Secretary of the

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State Department James Francis Byrnes on January 5, 1946, the President stated “There is not a doubt in my mind that Russia intends an invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the Mediterranean” (Truman 1955, p.  491). The U.S.  response to Turkey’s position became firmer after this change of mind. On April 6, 1946, the first signal was the visit of the U.S.  battleship Missouri to Istanbul carrying Turkey’s deceased Ambassador Münir Ertegün to Washington (US Department of State Bulletin 17 March 1946, p. 447). Second, and a much stronger signal, was an official and firm rejection of Moscow’s demand to change the Montreux regime with a note on August 7, 1946 (FRUS 1946 Vol. 7, p. 829). Under the influence of American Deputy Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Undersecretary of the Navy James Forestal, and Undersecretary of War Kenneth Royal, President Truman was convinced of the possibility that the USSR aimed to bring the whole Middle East, including Turkey, under its hegemony (Kuniholm 1980, pp. 360–361; Paterson 1973, p. 192). Truman’s conviction was reflected in the U.S. note to the USSR -on August 19- stressing the continuation of Turkish sovereignty and control over the Turkish Straits (Kuniholm 1980, p. 382; Harris 1972, p. 22). With similar emphasis as the British note to the USSR in April 1946, Moscow backed off, announcing that it would be premature to organize a conference on the regime of the Turkish Straits (Harris 1972, p. 22). American interest in Turkey picked up with the influence of American Ambassador to Ankara Edwin Wilson. Wilson, in his notes to Washington, emphasized the acute need for American military and economic aid to Turkey (Kuniholm 1980, p. 363). American interest in Turkey merged with anxiety over Soviet nonabandonment of Iran (Paterson 1973, pp.  183–184), together with the crisis in Greece (for details see:  Lykogiannis 2002). These anxieties became more acute with the economic difficulties that Britain encountered, which made London forcefully convey to the U.S.  that it would not be able to continue its aid to Greece and Turkey. At the same time, the American foreign affairs and defense bureaucracy kept sending reports to the President’s office about the increasing gravity of the situation in Greece, Turkey, and Iran (Kuniholm 1980, p. 429; Freeland 1972, pp. 52–53). Truman believed this. The Truman Doctrine, his iconic speech delivered on March 12, 1947, asserted that if Turkey and Greece were to fall, communism would spread through the whole of the Middle East (Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library). The amount of aid was $400 million, much of which was sent to Greece. Greece was in a more difficult situation; Turkey was secondary (Kuniholm 1980, p. 413; Freeland 1972, pp. 84–87; Harris 1972, p. 26). Yet for Turkey, the monetary aid was less important than the American discretion to help Turkey resist Soviet pressure. This signified the official foundation of the Turkish-American alliance relying on politico-security facts. Such detailed information about the formulation and institutionalization of Turkish-American Relations in the post-Second World War period revealed the asymmetry of the relationship.  Turkey was on the demand and the U.S. was on the supply side. Turkey’s eagerness to develop and deepen the relationship was directly connected to the consent of the U.S. administration. On

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the other hand, whenever the latter demanded, the former was ready to supply. Until the mid-1960s, Turkey was able to harvest U.S.  anxieties and maintain Washington’s attention. After that, it became more complicated. Developments between the Truman Doctrine and the 1990s would prove this. The Marshall Plan was another turning point in the deepening of relations. Turkey, which was not initially included in the Marshall Plan, again tried eagerly to get Washington’s attention and consent. George C. Marshall’s words on June 5, 1947 (US Department of State Bulletin 15 June 1947, pp. 1159–1160) were a proclamation of the European Recovery Program, which aimed to “assist in the return of normal economic health in the world”. It was basically for the recovery of Europe. Turkish Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak criticized Turkey’s exclusion and stressed the reasons why Turkey was in need of such aid. Sadak’s emphasis influenced Walter Wilds, the Acting Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey. Wilds conveyed to the U.S. Undersecretary of State that Turkey should be a recipient under the Marshall Plan, since current American aid was not enough to modernize the Turkish Armed Forces, and since the USSR continued to be a threat (FRUS 1948 Vol. 4, pp.  34–36). Again, Turkish elites were able to attract U.S. officials’ attention because of the perceived Soviet threat. The issue of NATO membership was also a clear example of asymmetry between Turkey and the U.S. Although granting Turkey with its battle-ready 22 military unit member state status would have been advantageous along NATO’s southeastern flank, Ankara needed to work hard to earn American approval for its inclusion (Stearns 1992, pp. 74–75). To that extent, Turkey became the second country to send troops to the Korean War, with a unit of 4,500. The Western powers’ appreciation of this, combined with American anxiety that the USSR might invade Turkey (Stearns 1992, pp. 74–75), ultimately led to its membership in 1952. Turkey’s membership also gave NATO, and indirectly the U.S., a maritime and land route to the oil basin of the Middle East (McGhee 1990, pp. 88–89). NATO membership paved the way for deepening the bilateral relationship between Turkey and the U.S. It was a military alliance, but during the Cold War it signified a politico-cultural alliance. With the intensification of the Cold War in the 1950s, Turkey’s national interests became almost identical to those of the U.S. NATO membership became the platform and the Soviet threat was the politico-psychological motivation. Both the governing Democrat Party (DP) and the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) in Turkey were preoccupied with the issue of maintaining and deepening Turkish-American Relations (Harris 1972, p. 51; McGhee 1990, p. 71). Ankara was even more enthusiastic about protecting American interests in the Middle East and establishing “necessary” institutions to further them. The Baghdad Pact of the 1950s was a good example for this. With the New Look Strategy in 1953 (FRUS 1952–1954 Volume V Part  1, pp.  1579–1751), the U.S.  administration aimed to expand its “containment” strategy, starting with President Truman in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions. For this, staunch allies were utilized as “pivots”. The Baghdad Pact was the Middle Eastern branch of this strategy. Even if the idea was originally American,

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the U.S. was never a member, only a monitor. The natural members in this sense were Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan, none of which recognized Israel at the time. The U.S. declined full membership in order not to jeopardize its relations with Israel; moreover, full membership could have both alienated Arabs following President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt course and provoked the Soviets into establishing similar pacts in the region (For details see: Yeşilbursa 2005). Since Turkey was so ready to forerun any American initiative, it was not demotivated by the U.S. nonmembership. In the formation of the Pact, Washington’s strategic aims were listed in the National Intelligence Estimate dated January 15, 1953 (FRUS 1952–1954 Vol. 9 Part 1, pp. 334–343). The estimate underlined the acute requirement to contain Soviet influence in the Middle East. For this, Washington was in need of a regional alignment (Raleigh 1959, p. 5). U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles delivered the message to the Middle East during his visit from May 9–29, 1953 (FRUS 1952–1954 Vol. 9 Part 1, pp. 1–167). Turkey offered to serve as the backbone of any such security arrangement (FRUS 1952–1954 Vol. 9 Part 1, pp. 139–140). The Baghdad Pact was established in three main steps. The first was the TurkishPakistani Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation for Security on April 2, 1954 (TPMB April 1954, pp. 35–37). The second was the Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Iraq and Turkey on February 24, 1955 (TPMB February 1955, pp.  165–185). The third was the accession of Britain, Pakistan, and Iran to the Pact (TPMB February 1955, pp. 185–187). The Pact, without the full membership of the U.S., did not bring any significant result. Turkey’s relations with the Arab states worsened, and with the USSR became increasingly strained (Gönlübol 1996, pp. 269–271). The Pact was turned into the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1959 with the withdrawal of Iraq (FRUS 1958–1960 Vol.12, pp. 476–479). The path Turkey followed from the Baghdad Pact to CENTO greatly reduced Turkey’s potential bargaining power in the region. Not only were Turkey’s foreign policy aims and interests in line with those of the U.S., but its foreign policy behavior was almost completely controlled by Washington. One example of this was Turkey’s position at the Bandung Conference in 1955. Turkey’s pro-American stance in both foreign policy aims and modus operandi was not really appreciated by other similarly weighted and newly independent powers (Baba & Ertan 2016). The asymmetry between Turkey and the U.S. was on display again, particularly with respect to expectations and aims. Turkey used the conference platform to demonstrate the integrity of its alliance with the U.S. and how wholeheartedly it protected the values of the Western bloc. The U.S.’s expectation was to understand the level of anti-Americanism within the Non-Aligned Movement in order to prevent the formation of any anti-Western organization/ institution (Department of State Conference Files Lot 60 D 1955). The conference increased Turkey’s distance from “Non-Aligned” countries, which made it even more dependent to the U.S. Since the Turkish delegation was not really prepared for the legal and economic arguments of the conveners, it did not comment on the newly emerging concept of non-alignment, and as a result was not adequately

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received by other attendees. In short, the Turkish delegation acted more like a “volunteer envoy” of the U.S. Turkey’s efforts to protect American interests garnered enough attention and appreciation that Washington concluded a Bilateral Cooperation Agreement with it on March 5, 1959, together with Iran and Pakistan (FRUS 1958–1960 Vol. X Part 2, p. 798; Department of State Bulletin 23 March 1959, pp. 416–417). The agreement called for American support in the case of a direct or indirect attack on Turkey. In particular, an indirect attack could have been interpreted by the Turkish government as a domestic pro-communist uprising. As a NATO member, Turkey was already under the protection of the U.S. This agreement in a way opened an extra channel of intervention into the abovementioned countries’ domestic developments, if their governments agreed. Another illustration of the overlapping of Turkish-American foreign and defense policy aims was the deployment of “Jupiter Missiles” to Turkey in 1959. Deploying Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles was seen as a requirement for first strike capability, which became acute after the successful launch of Sputnik on October 4, 1957 (FRUS 1958–1960 Vol. X Part 2, pp. 793–794). Although it would mean a significantly heightened Soviet nuclear threat on Turkish soil, the Turkish Parliament decided to accept the deployment (FRUS 1958–1960 Vol.  X Part  2, pp.  812–813). The Turkish political elites were content to follow the U.S.’s course all the way. Yet some negative signals of Turkish-American Relations began to surface, the “U2 incident” being one of them (For details see: Aldrich 2002; Lashmar 1998). In May 1960, the Soviets took down a U2 U.S. spy plane that had taken off from the U.S. airbase in Adana, Turkey (Incirlik Airbase). The USSR directly threatened the countries involved, which Turkey refuted, but it was only after the U.S. admitted the intelligence-related mission of the flight that Soviet pressure on Turkey was relieved. During the 1950s, Turkish-American Relations enjoyed almost a “honeymoon” atmosphere. Minor hurdles and hiccups did not bother the Turkish administration. Turks used the perceived Soviet threat to increase American support, which successfully resulted in NATO membership and the 1959 agreement, together with increased economic and military aid (Kasapsaraçoğlu 2015, pp. 332–348). Within this atmosphere, the U.S.  requested from Turkey that it acts as a protector of Western, more precisely American, interests on every possible regional and international platform. However, with the 1960s, this honeymoon period came to an end in the face of regional and international developments.

2. Relations in the 1960s and 1970s The coup on May 27, 1960 did not significantly change Turkey’s attitude towards the U.S., but the junta began to consider some rearrangements in bilateral relations. Right after the coup, the junta stressed Turkey’s loyalty to NATO and CENTO, which was welcomed by the U.S. (FRUS 1958–1960 Vol. X Part 2, pp. 888–900). On the other hand, the new Turkish administration had done inter-ministerial studies

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to reframe the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, along with restricting the special privileges of American personnel serving in Turkey (FRUS 1958–1960 Vol. X Part 2, pp. 879–883; 888–900). Yet, the American side took no action; therefore, no achievement could have been reached. Turkish discretion was not strong enough to change the American posture back then. More negative signals were on their way, though. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a real blow to bilateral relations. The details exceed the scope of this paper (For details of the Cuban Missile Crisis see: Nathan 1992; Medland 1988; FRUS 1961–1963 Vol. XI); however, the main element of the crisis which affected Turkish-American Relations was that the Jupiter Missiles in Turkey had become a bargaining chip between Washington and Moscow. As the crisis eased, Turkish leaders supported Washington’s decision to replace the Jupiter Missiles with Polaris submarines. In January 1970, former President of the Republic İsmet İnönü revealed that the U.S. had put Turkish Jupiter Missiles on the table with Russia to alleviate the crisis, adding that this could have pushed Turkey into an “unwanted crisis” (Cumhuriyet 23 January 1970). Turkey’s position in the crisis clearly illustrated the asymmetry in bilateral relations, which was discarded by the Turkish authorities. The Cyprus issue of the mid-1960s and its repercussions were difficult for Ankara to ignore (Hughes-Wilson 2011, pp. 84–93). With the escalation of inter-communal conflict and violence due to the rejection by Greek Cypriots of the 1960 Constitution, Turkey sought to protect Turkish Cypriots’ interests. On the basis of the 1960 Constitution’s Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey sent 14 notes to the Cyprus government between 1960 and 1963, 11 notes to Greece, and 5 notes to Britain in 1962 complaining about Greek Cypriots’ actions and asking others to take precautions (TGNAP 5 May 1964, p. 207). The U.S. was aware of the seriousness of the situation on the island, but believed that the communities should sort their issues out via informal negotiation. Washington did not want to take part (FRUS 1961–1963 Vol.  16, pp.  840–841). The U.S.’s indifference to the issue caused resentment in Turkey, particularly after the serious violence perpetrated on Turkish Cypriots on December 21, 1963 (FRUS 1961–1963 Vol. 16, pp. 918–919). Washington’s continuing apathy pushed Turkey to use the threat of force. Raymond Arthur Hare, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, was notified by Prime Minister İnönü that Turkey would have to intervene if the U.S. did not provide assurances (Ball 1982, p. 341). The Turkish Parliament authorized İnönü to initiate a military intervention into Cyprus (TGNAP 16 March 1964, p. 120), which led him to put more pressure on the U.S. İnönü implied in his message that Turkey could leave its alliance with the U.S. if the latter did not support the Turkish cause (FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 16, pp. 211–213). More pressure was still exerted from the Turkish side when the conflict on the island escalated in May (FRUS 1964–1968, Vol.  16, pp.  241–243) and the Turkish Security Council decided to intervene in Cyprus (Ball 1982, p. 350). The American counter-reaction came swiftly, in the form of a letter from President Lyndon B.  Johnson to Prime Minister İsmet İnönü on June 5, 1964 (FRUS 1964–1968, Vol.  16, pp.  262–263). The significant statement in his reply, which

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underlined the abovementioned -but constantly discarded- asymmetry in bilateral relations, was that if Turkish intervention were to prompt a Soviet attack/intervention, the NATO allies would not help it. Moreover, Turkey was not permitted to use weapons provided by American military aid for such an intervention. This was the clearest illustration that while Turkish Foreign Policy actions could or would support U.S. Foreign Policy aims; the reverse was not also true. Turkey and the U.S. were in an institutionalized military alliance via NATO, but a one-sided alliance working strictly in Washington’s interests. Turkey’s own political concerns were considered only to the extent they affected American political concerns, and were otherwise ignored, as seen in President Johnson’s response to Prime Minister İnönü. Turkey’s disillusionment led it to look for semi-reactive foreign policy options, though none that would cause the U.S. to break off relations with it. It had become clear to the Turkish administration that a mono-faceted foreign policy would not serve Turkey’s foreign policy aims, and could even be dangerous, so it signaled the U.S. of its intention to initiate a multi-faceted foreign policy. To that end, Turkey’s first act was to withdraw from the Multilateral Force (MLF). The aim of the force is to build up multilateral nuclear maritime capability within NATO through the collaboration of volunteer members. This way, contributors would share control over a brand new nuclear force; in return, the U.S.  could prevent France from developing separate nuclear capabilities. NATO unity would be underlined and a new deterrent would be put into place (Kohl 1965, p.  60; Widén and Colman 2007, pp.  179–180; Boulton 1972, pp.  275–276). The first vessel of the MLF was the U.S. destroyer Biddle, which began its tour of duty in June 1964 (Priest 2005, pp. 761–762). This was a shaky time in Turkish-American Relations. Turkey did not reject the MLF offer, but its contribution was limited to one cadet, 10 privates, and 50 million dollars (Priest 2005, p. 780). The MLF did not bring the expected results, particularly in terms of the wholehearted support of members. Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands voiced their reservations regarding the financial pressures. Turkey’s withdrawal, thus, made the U.S.  sufficiently aware of Ankara’s disillusionment while not being alone in its reticence. Turkey’s timing was just right. Two days before the U.S. vessel Ricketts set sail, Turkey conveyed its withdrawal message. The U.S. administration got the message, commenting that the Turkish move was “sudden, unexpected, and damaging” (Priest 2005, p. 782). Turkey continued “distancing” itself from the U.S.  by reorganizing its NATO arrangements. One such effort was to stop all U2 reconnaissance flights, one of which had accidentally crashed into the Black Sea flying over international waters. In December 1965, the new Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel asked to stop flights and they did not resume again until 1975 (Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Bulletin 7 February 1970, pp.  101–106). Additionally, after the 1958 deployment of U.S. marines to join in the Lebanese action without seeking Turkish consent, Turkey began to raise serious opposition (Gönlübol 1996, pp. 315–316; Harris 1972, pp.  66–67). Demirel government pointed out that, under the NATO agreement, joint defense bases could only be used in the case of a direct attack (US Congress

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Senate, 1970). In September 1968, Demirel concluded the Duty Status Agreement (US Department of State 1968 Vol. 19 Part 5, pp. 6317–6322), which formulated the procedures the Turkish General Staff needed to follow if it rejected the duty certificate (Harris 1972, pp. 225–228). With this, Turkish officers achieved the right to object to American duty certificates. The change in this agreement was in line with the refurbishing of Turkish-U.S. bilateral agreements, which had begun a couple of years prior. Demirel government had asked the U.S. in April 1966 to review existing bilateral arrangements (Turkish Government’s Press Release, 3 July 1969, p. 72) and negotiations began in January 1967 (Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Bulletin, 7 February 1970, p. 104). Following a series of technical complications and other communication and bureaucratic issues (Harris 1972, pp. 161–163), a comprehensive Defense Cooperation Agreement was reached on July 3, 1969 (Harris 1972, pp. 229–238). The agreement, however, did not give the Turkish authorities enough influence over American installations and military material. As a more general reaction, Turkey changed the interpretation of the Montreux regime on armed vessels’ passage through the Turkish Straits. Until the beginning of 1966, American vessels with anti-aircraft missiles had been permitted to pass the Straits. The Turkish administration decided to rescind this permission (Cumhuriyet 28 April 1966). The 1970s brought more destabilizing issues to bilateral relations. Opium cultivation was the major issue. Due to the Nixon administration’s escalating fight against drug usage, the U.S. began to accuse Turkey, without reliable evidence, of being the main source of heroin inflow into the U.S. Accordingly, it put pressure on Ankara to stop opium cultivation. Demirel government resisted these pressures, but could not sustain this resistance long due to budgetary constraints. In October 1970, Turkey restricted opium cultivation areas. After the 1971 coup, the Nihat Erim government completely prohibited opium production. Yet, Bülent Ecevit, winner of the 1973 elections, reinitiated production, which rapidly increased the strain between the countries, though not for long (FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 29, p.  1072; Erhan 1996; Robins 2007, pp. 17–38). The escalation of inter-communal relations in Cyprus then came to overshadow the opium issue. By 1974, conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriots had reached its climax. With the support of EOKA-B units, Greek officers’ National Guard carried out a military coup, after which, Nikos Sampson, a leading EOKA-B figure, declared his Presidency (Adams & Cottrell 1968, pp.  8–10). The U.S.  neither stopped the coup nor intervened after (Ülman 1975, p. 50). Afterwards, it could not appease the Turkish reaction, which also had not gotten British support regarding the Guarantee Agreements of the 1960s (Bölükbaşı 1988, p.  191). The Ecevit government initiated an intervention on July 20, 1974, which attracted more serious U.S. attention. According to Section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act, the U.S. Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey. Accordingly, “all military assistance, all sales of defense articles and services (whether for cash or by credit, or any other means), and all licenses with respect to the transportation of arms, ammunitions, and implements of war” to Turkey were suspended. Turkey responded accordingly. In July 1975, the

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Turkish government announced that the Defense Cooperation Agreement of 1969 and all other related agreements were to be passed to the Turkish Armed Forces’ full control and custody. Incirlik Airbase was to be used only for direct NATO purposes (Cumhuriyet 26 July 1975). The U.S. Congress partially lifted the embargo in October, but the U.S. bases did not immediately resume functioning in return (Kuniholm 1980, p.  440). The embargo was lifted completely during the Jimmy Carter administration on August 1, 1978, which followed the Turkish termination of suspension measures implemented at U.S. bases and facilities (Kuniholm 1980, p. 427). The military-oriented actions of the U.S. and Turkey in the 1970s had serious political repercussions, particularly for Turkey. Under the arms embargo, Turkey had developed bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and other neighbors (Girkan 1980). Economic relations with the Soviets were substantial. Between 1974 and 1979, Turkey received approximately $650 million of Soviet credit (Kuniholm 1980, p. 427). In 1978, the Ecevit government signed a friendly relations and cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union, which raised anxieties among Western allies (Boll 1979, pp. 609–631). These actions did not change Turkey’s threat perception against the Soviets, but gave strong signals to the U.S.  about Turkey’s potential to follow a multi-faceted foreign policy, including developing relations with the leader of the enemy bloc.

3. Relations in the 1980s During the 1980s, Turkish-American Relations picked up the pace again. In March 1980, a Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) was signed to implement the NATO Treaty (Comptroller General of the United States 7 May 1982). The U.S. would provide more defense equipment, services, and training; in return, Turkey would provide specified installations to U.S. personnel to carry out military activities. After the 1980 coup in Turkey, the military regime accepted Greece’s readmission to NATO in a show of good will. The U.S., in return, did not criticize the coup, emphasizing instead the terrorism and economic strain that Turkey had been facing (Uslu 2003, p. 254). Turkey, with the escalation of the Cold War under the Ronald Reagan administration, retook its place among the strategic partners of the U.S. According to U.S. calculations, the Turkish Army -the second largest in NATO- required modernization including compensating for Turkey’s losses during the arms embargo (Stearns 1992, p.  40). In 1983, the Pentagon’s estimate for such modernization was $18 million over 13 years (Kuniholm 1980, p. 11). However, with the Armenian lobby’s effect on the U.S. Congress, Turkey was not granted the required aid (McGhee 1990, pp. 168–169). To increase Turkey’s strategic outreach along NATO’s southeastern flank, in October 1982, a co-locator operating bases agreement was concluded (Uslu 2003, p. 259). With the modernization of the current bases, longrange bombers could be accommodated and would become more suitable for rapid deployment. In relation to air force capability, Turkey and the U.S.  initiated a

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Turkish-American co-production of F16s in Turkey (Rubin 1985, p. 92). Although cooperation and trust seemed to be developing on the paper, in practice, bilateral relations were still not as cordial as they were during the 1950s. Keeping an extremely large conventional armed forces has been a heavy burden on Turkey’s budget, with not much of an individual security return. Turkey’s deterrence did not come from its large military, but its NATO membership and close U.S. partnership. That was one of the reasons why the U.S. had always had the final say on Turkish military capabilities. The 1980s were no exception.

Conclusion Given the large historical span under examination, it was clear that two countries did not develop their relations on an equal basis. Understandably, there were fluctuations. Some of them, i.e. Cyprus and the conflicts in the Middle East, were caused because of regional requirements that the U.S. saw differently from Turkey and for some of them, the amount of U.S.  military and financial aid were just because Turkey’s miscalculations of the degree of its indispensability for Washington. Yet there were also considerable consistencies that have kept the two countries intertwined with each other. The “Communism threat”, containing the Soviets, increasing the U.S.  weight in the Middle East, and protecting Western values in international platforms were some of them. In many of such convergence of foreign policy aims and outputs, Turkey felt itself obliged to adopt into the U.S. values, aims, and motivations. The U.S., in few instances, i.e. Truman Doctrine and NATO membership, understood Turkey’s role, potential, and requirements. In addition, in very few instances, i.e. the Cyprus intervention (1974), Ankara reacted to this asymmetry. Turkey always needed American military and financial aid, which kept it “well-behaved”. In short, the concept of asymmetry has always been present in TurkishAmerican Relations. Its level and influence have fluctuated throughout history, but asymmetry has contributed to every turning point. Since Turkey functions as the demand and the U.S. was on the supply side of the equation, this asymmetry may be understandable. What is interesting here is that Turkey tried to reduce the level of this asymmetry during the 1960s and 1970s, yet each time it has attempted to distance itself from the U.S, it always ended up with even closer relations. This clearly indicates that regardless of the kind of strain placed on bilateral relations, the Turkish-American alliance had a mutual strategic value that neither party was willing to discard.

References Adams, T. W. & Cottrell, A. J. (1968), Cyprus between East and West, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press. Aldrich, R. (2002), “ ‘Grow Your Own’: Cold War Intelligence and History Supermarkets”, Intelligence and National Security, 17 (1), pp. 135–152.

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Armaoğlu, F. (1991), Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları. Baba, G. & Ertan, S. (2016), “Turkey at the Bandung Conference: A Fully-Aligned among the Non-Aligned”, International Studies Association (ISA), Hong Kong, 25–27 June 2016. Ball, G. W. (1982), The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs, New York: Norton. Beck, S. V. (2003), “A Small Power’s Place in a Big Power’s World: Turkey, the United States, and the Early Cold War”, Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University. Boll, M. (1979), “Turkey’s New National Security Concept: What It Means for NATO”, ORBIS, 23, pp. 609–631. Boulton, J. W. (1972), “NATO and the MLF”, Journal of Contemporary History, 7 (3/4), pp. 275–294. Bölükbaşı, S. (1988), Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus, New York: University Press of America. Cumhuriyet Gazetesi archives. Erhan, Ç. (1996), Beyaz Savaş: Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Afyon Sorunu, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi. Freeland, R. M. (1972), The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism, New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Girkan, İ. (1980), NATO, Turkey and the Southern Flank: A Mideastern Perspective, New York: National Strategy Information Center. Gönlübol, M. (ed.) (1996), Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi. Gürün, K. (1991), Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri (1920–1953), Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu. Harris, G. S. (1972), Troubled Alliance, Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945–1971, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Institute of International Relations of the Faculty of Political Studies at the University of Ankara (1961), Turkey and the United Nations, New York: Manhattan Publishing Company. John Hughes-Wilson (2011), “The Forgotten War”, The RUSI Journal, 156 (5), pp. 84–93. Kasapsaraçoğlu, M. (2015), “Harmonization of Turkey’s Political, Economic, and Military Interests in the 1950s: Reflections on Turkey’s Middle East Policy”, Turkish Studies, 16 (3), pp. 332–348. Kohl, W. L. (1965), “Nuclear Sharing in NATO and the Multilateral Force”, Political Science Quarterly, 80 (1), pp. 88–109. Kuniholm, B. R. (1980), The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lashmar, P. (1998), Spy Flights of the Cold War, Sutton: Stroud. Lykogiannis, A. (2002), Britain and the Greek Economic Crisis, 1944–1947, Columbia: University of Missouri Press. McGhee, G. (1990), The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection, New York: St. Martin’s Press. Medland, W. J. (1988), The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: Needless or Necessary, New York: Praeger.

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Nathan, J. A. (1992), The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, New York: St. Martin’s Press. Orkunt, S. (1978), Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri, İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları. Paterson, T. G. (1973), Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. Priest, A. (2005), “ ‘In Common Cause’: The NATO Multilateral Force and the MixedManning Demonstration on the USS Claude V. Ricketts, 1964–1965”, The Journal of Military History, 69 (3), pp. 759–789. “President Harry S. Truman’s Address before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947”, Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, Available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp. Raleigh, J. S. (1959), “Middle East Politics: The Past Ten Years”, Middle East Affairs, X (1). Robins, P. (2007), “The Opium Crisis and the Iraq War: Historical Parallels in Turkey-US Relations”, Mediterranean Politics, 12 (1), pp. 17–38. Rubin, B. (1985), “Middle East Policy in Turkish Context”, in G. Harris (ed.), The Middle East in Turkish-American Relations, Washington: Heritage Foundation. Stearns, M. (1992), Entangled Allies: US Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press. Tanin Gazetesi archives. The League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. CLVII, Available at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/. Trask, Roger R. (1970), “The ‘Terrible Turk’ and Turkish-American Relations in the Interwar Period”, The Historian, Vol. 33, No: 1 (November 1970), pp. 40–53. Trask, Roger R. (1971), The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914– 1939, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Truman, H. S. (1955), The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman, 1945: Year of Decisions, Vol: 1, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. Turkish Grand National Assembly Proceedings, “Turkish Government’s Press Release”, 3 July 1969, The Middle East Journal, Winter 1970, 24. Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Bulletin, “Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel’s Press Conference 7 February 1970”. Turkish Prime Ministerial Bulletins. Türkmen, F. (2009), “Turkish-American Relations: A Challenging Transition”, Turkish Studies, 10 (1), pp. 109–129. Ulus Gazetesi archives. United States Department of State, Bulletin. United States Department of State (1944), “Foreign Relations of the United States”, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta. United States Department of State (1945), “Foreign Relations of the United States”, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1943–1945. United States Department of State (1945), “Foreign Relations of the United States”, Vol. 8. United States Department of State (1945), “Foreign Relations of the United States”, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), Vol. 1.

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United States Department of State (1946), “Foreign Relations of the United States”, Vol. 7. United States Department of State (1948), “Foreign Relations of the United States”, Vol. 4. United States Department of State (1952–1954), “Foreign Relations of the United States”, Western European Security, Vol. 5. United States Department of State (1952–1954), “Foreign Relations of the United States”, Vol. 9. United States Department of State (1958–1960), “Foreign Relations of the United States”, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Vol. 10. United States Department of State (1961–1963), “Foreign Relations of the United States”, Vol. 11. United States Department of State (1964–1968), “Foreign Relations of the United States”, Vol. 16. United States Department of State (1968), “Foreign Relations of the United States”, Vol. 19, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements. Uslu, N. (2003), TheTurkish-American Relationship between 1948 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance, New York: Nova Science Publishers. Ülman, H. (1975), “Geneva Conferences”, Foreign Policy, 4 (2–3). Vander Lippe, John M. (1993), “The ‘Other’ Treaty of Lausanne: The American Public and Official Debate on Turkish-American Relations”, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 20, pp. 31–63. Widén, J. J. & Colman, J. (2007), “Lyndon B. Johnson, Alec Douglas-Home, Europe and the NATO Multilateral Force, 1963–64”, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 5 (2), pp. 179–198. Yeşilbursa, B. K. (2005), The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle East, 1950–1959, London: Frank Cass. Yılmaz, Ş. (2006), “Challenging the Stereotypes: Turkish-American Relations in the Interwar Era”, Middle Eastern Studies, 42 (2), pp. 223–237. Yılmaz, Ş. (2015), Turkish-American Relations, 1800–1952: Between the Stars, Stripes, and the Crescent, New York: Routledge.

Ozan Örmeci1

Chapter 4: Turkish-American Relations in the Post-Cold War Era

Abstract: Turkey and the United States (U.S.) have an almost three-quarters of a century old formal alliance since the end of Second World War and Turkey’s membership into NATO. Still being the strongest military, diplomatic, and economic power of the world, the U.S. is the most important actor of world politics, whereas Turkey is an influential regional actor that is a member of G20 and NATO. During this considerable period, the two countries had some significant diplomatic issues, especially the Cyprus Dispute in the 1960s and 1970s and the Kurdish Question in the 1990s and 2000s. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War period, Turkish-American Relations entered into a new period with changing dynamics and global geopolitical structure. This transition period, which is still ongoing, created both new opportunities and new problems. This chapter aims to analyze Turkish-American Relations in the post-Cold War era by establishing a theoretical framework and focusing on the most important events that took place during the terms of different American Presidents as well as positive and negative aspects in bilateral relations. Keywords: Turkish-American Relations, United States, Turkey, Syria, Kurdish Question, Post-Cold War.

Introduction Turkish-American Relations are important not just for these two countries, but also for the Western bloc and for the world order in general. Two countries have a history of almost 75 years of formal alliance since the end of Second World War and Turkey’s entry into NATO in 1952. During this considerable period, two countries had some problems as well. Especially Cyprus Dispute in the 1960 and 1970s and Kurdish Question in the 1990s and 2000s constituted the major disagreement subjects in bilateral relations. Following the fall of Berlin Wall and the end of Cold War period, Turkish-American Relations entered into a new period with changing dynamics and global geopolitical structure. This transition period that is still in the process of making created new opportunities and new problems at the same time. This chapter aims to analyze Turkish-American Relations in the post-Cold War era. The first part is devoted to the general characteristics of Turkish Foreign Policy in the post-Cold War era. The second part consists of the author’s 1 Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Istanbul Gedik University, Istanbul, Turkey. Email: [email protected] / [email protected]

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theoretical framework that is used to explain Turkish-American Relations in the post-Cold War era. The third part discusses the most important issues in bilateral relations during the tenures of different American Presidents. The last part of the article includes strengths (positive aspects) and weaknesses (negative aspects) of the current state of Turkish-American Relations. This research will use literature review and media scanning as its basic methods. Accordingly, this chapter will analyze primary sources (speeches made by Turkish and American statesmen and official documents) and secondary sources (academic books, scientific articles, and newspapers).

I.  Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: General Characteristics According to Sander (2006, p. 71), Turkish Foreign Policy has had a fundamental and very stable characteristic and principle since the foundation of modern Turkey: “Western orientation”. Although during the early Republican era Turkey had to be more careful about the newly emerging superpower Soviet Union and thus, chose to follow a neutral foreign policy, Atatürk’s modernization reforms aimed to westernize Turkish society and make Turkey closer to Western countries (Sander 2006, p. 72). Following Stalin’s territorial demands and threats after the Second World War, Turkey’s Western orientation became stronger and more obvious. Hale thinks (2013, p. 79) that it was not the commitment to liberal democracy, but rather direct threats coming from Soviet Russia that directed Turkey to integrate into the Western bloc. Thus, Turkey became a member of NATO and the Council of Europe after the Second World War. In that sense, Turkey is a unique country2 having a permanent Western orientation while its rich history, Islamic background, and social characteristics make it also an Oriental country. Turkey kept its close alliance with the U.S., Western European countries, and NATO during the Cold War. Turkish Foreign Policy had some advantages and disadvantages during this period. Neighboring a giant state like Soviet Union made high politics a chief concern in Turkey and posed great risks to Turkish democracy. It was no coincidence that three successful military interventions took place in Turkey during the Cold War. On the other hand, communist expansionism provided a very important security role to Turkey in the eyes of its Western partners. Turkey enjoyed being the “best” Muslim country that had a positive image and a privileged status in Europe and America during the Cold War. Moreover, starting from this period, Turkey has often been classified as a “central state” by many geopolitics experts thanks to its close ties with the Western world (Sander 2006, p. 86).

2 Turkey has been defined as a “bridge” by many literary authors and scholars, while some other scholars including Samuel Huntington labeled Turkey as a “torn country” due to its hybrid identity.

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Throughout the Cold War, Turkey kept itself mostly away from the Islamic world and established its foreign policy almost solely within the dynamics of Western bloc, a fact that caused many intellectuals from the Islamic world to blame Turkey for being the “gendarmerie of the West” in the region (Arı 2006/a, p. 701). Following the end of Cold War, Turkish Foreign Policy entered into a new era. As opportunities grew with the fall of the “Iron Curtain” in Caucasia, the Balkans, the Middle East, and Asia, so did risks such as terrorism and radical movements. The post-Cold War era had certain new features; most importantly, as Hale points out (2013, p.  135), Turkey, “having been previously surrounded on three sides by what was, in effect, by a single state (USSR) far more powerful than itself, was now surrounded by smaller neighbors that were weaker than itself both militarily and economically”. In this context, Turkey could have gone through a new era of neutrality as its main foreign policy inclination, but that did not happen due to new security risks related to terrorist movements across the region and the lack of stability outside of the borders of the Western security system. During this period, NATO was quick to redefine itself and find new missions for its members, including Turkey. During this ongoing transition phase, in fact, many Turkish scholars including Uslu (2000, p. 309) and Sander (2006, pp. 116–130) thought that Turkey’s role would be more important in the eyes of its Western partners since ethnic and local conflicts around Turkey increased, the threat of Soviet Russia was eliminated, and Turkey was able to keep itself as an island of stability in a troubled region. However, many others (Pipes 2009; Rubin 2016; Lévy 2018) thought that, Turkey, as a country having more Islamist and pro-Russian orientation in recent years -in addition to its problems concerning security issues, human rights matters, and mass migration- is no longer fit to be a NATO partner and a Western ally. In this new period, Turkey’s energy dependency on Russia and Iran also became a major issue and changed Turkey’s classical pro-Western foreign policy paradigm. In the early 2000s, Turkish General Tuncer Kılınç (then-Secretary of the National Security Council) even advocated for a radical shift from the classical foreign policy paradigm and offered a new Eurasian vision for Turkey, which proposed an alliance with Russia, Iran, and China instead of the West (Hale 2013, p. 136). In addition, the phenomenon of globalization not only changed the international economy, but also had encouraging effects on Turkey’s multi-dimensional foreign policy orientation. Turkey’s multiple identities, including the Middle Eastern (Muslim) and Central Asian (Turkic) background and inner self also became more relevant in this new era. While some analysts saw these identities as source of problems in terms of Western integration, some others, such as Paul Henze, praised these multiple identities and claimed that these are “not contradictory or competitive, they are complimentary” by underlining that these ties could expand American and European influence in the Middle East and Central Asia (Hale 2013, p. 136). Political Islam and Turkey’s Islamic identity became much more influential in this new era while Turkic identity stayed mostly as a utopian tendency.

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II.  Turkish-American Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: Theoretical Framework Throughout the Cold War, Turkish-American Relations were developed based on the pattern of a relationship between a “superpower” and a “medium state” since Turkey was then, and is still, a “middle power” or “medium power” (Baba & Önsoy 2016, pp. 3–20; Oran 2009, p. 29). As Uslu points out (2000, pp. 17–21), (a) Turkey’s search for security against expansionist Soviet Russia, (b)  American economic aids3, (c) strategic reasons (the need to side with a superpower within the polarizing Cold War conditions in accordance with the “Aron paradigm”), (d)  similar official ideology (anti-communism), (e) domestic political reasons, and (f) the risks of a non-aligned foreign policy constituted the backbone of the Turkish-American alliance during the Cold War. However, even during this period, Turkey’s position was above that of a “satellite state” (Uslu 2000, p. 33) and Turkey was able to challenge American policies in some areas, including the Cyprus Dispute, especially in the 1970s. Bal thinks (2006, p. 151) that the Cyprus Dispute, the “Cuban Missile Crisis”, and the “Johnson Letter” were the most important problems in bilateral relations in the 1960s and forced Turkey to adopt a more multi-dimensional foreign policy during the 1970s. Turkey was even subjected to a heavy arms embargo by Washington between 1975 and 1978 after the Cyprus intervention in 1974. This multi-dimensional foreign policy orientation slowed down after the 1980 military coup in Turkey and the classical Cold War paradigm was restored quickly (Erhan 2006, pp. 142–143). To sum up, throughout the Cold War, the Turkish-American alliance kept its dominating and privileged status in Turkish Foreign Policy mostly because of security-based alliance between two countries. According to Sander (2006, pp. 110–111), during the Cold War, Turkish-American Relations were solid and based on mutual interests. The two countries shared a common vision in terms of providing peace and stability in world affairs via the United Nations (UN) system. Both countries objected to Soviet expansionism and the international communist movement and developed common strategies towards the Middle East (Sander 2006, pp. 111–113). However, since the U.S. was a global player and a superpower, and Turkey was an important regional actor, the two countries sometimes had conflicts of interests (Sander 2006, pp. 114–116). In Sander’s view (2006, pp. 116–125), looking from a Realist perspective, certain things are still stable in Turkish-American Relations: (a) Turkey will always be an important country for the U.S. because of its geopolitical location and proximity to Russia and (b) American military aid and military partnership will always be

3 Turkey was benefited from Foreign Military Financing-FMF, Military Assistance Program-MAP, and Economic Support Fund-ESF during the Cold War. Moreover, Washington also helped Ankara for the education and training of military personnel via International Military Education and Training-IMET program (Erhan & Sıvış 2017, pp. 147–148).

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necessary for Turkey due to security threats in the Middle East and geopolitical risks caused by Russia. The end of the Cold War created a new dynamism in Turkish Foreign Policy. Turkey’s rapidly growing economy and increasing “soft power” flourished hopes in Ankara for becoming a “regional power”. At the same time, Turkey’s increasing economic relations with its neighbors, including Russia and Iran, also began to affect Turkish Foreign Policy and reduce the influence of military-political ties with Washington. However, a cordial approach to alliance with the U.S. persisted until recent years. Uzgel asserts (2010, pp.  243–244) that it was actually Washington that actively supported and encouraged Ankara to expand the scope of its foreign policy and to become more active in the Balkans and Central Asia during this period. In this context, two different models emerged in the last few decades in terms of reshaping Turkish-American Relations.4 The first model, “Turkey as a strong military ally”, was in fact the continuation of the Cold War paradigm in the new conjuncture with a stronger role given to Turkey in its own region. This model was mostly defended by military circles in both countries as well as Republicans in the U.S. and secular nationalists/Kemalists in Turkey. For instance, an advocate of this model, pro-secular Turkish diplomat (and former Turkish Ambassador in Washington DC, 1979–1989) Şükrü Elekdağ in the early 1990s claimed that, although the Cold War is over, Turkey still risks a “two and a half front war” with Greece, Syria, and PKK, and classical Turkish security alliance with the West will continue to be the major foreign policy inclination in the new era (Hale 2013, p. 137). This model pointed out the importance of Turkey as a country having the second largest NATO army; being located in a geopolitically critical place between Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, North Africa, and Caucasia; and implementing somehow a secular democratic regime in contrast to the authoritarian and totalitarian Islamic regimes of the Muslim world. This perspective highlighted Turkey’s strength in terms of military capabilities and stressed Turkey’s geopolitical advantages that can be used by Washington in realizing its regional projects. This model was based on the idea that Ankara should actively support the U.S.  and NATO in their military expeditions and in return, Ankara could ask for autonomy in its domestic affairs as well as stronger political support given to Turkey in regional issues (such as the Kurdish Question). This model was very popular in the early 1990s, and it shaped the American look towards Turkey during the George H.  W. Bush administration. However, upon the rejection of the March 1, 2003 military memorandum by the Turkish Grand National Assembly and problems that emerged between the two countries in terms of their Middle East projections (the Kurdish issue, the future of Iraq and Syria as

4 It should be added here that these models were created in order to provide an intellectual background and a direction to Turkish-American Relations and none of these models became the single determinant of bilateral relations.

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well as the Israel-Palestine conflict), this model was gradually weakened and the second model came into fashion.5 The second model, “Turkey as a model country”, was often defended by liberals in both countries as well as Democrats in the U.S. This model highlighted Turkey’s unique structure as a country not only having an almost 99.8 % Muslim population, but also implementing a secular democratic regime and trying to become a European Union (EU) member. This model underlined Turkey’s “soft power” abilities, such as a more moderate interpretation of Islam compared to radical Shiite (Shia) and Sunni doctrines. Another dimension of this model was Turkey’s “energy hub” position as a country that links the East to the West and facilitates the transportation of Eastern energy resources to Europe. Unlike the military partnershiporiented first model, this model was based on Turkey’s growing influence over the Middle Eastern region as well as the Balkans, Caucasia, and Central Asia with more emphasis given to its soft power abilities (economic influence, religious and cultural effect, etc.). In the 1990s, the first theoretician of this model was Turkey’s former Foreign Minister (1997–2002) Ismail Cem with his references to Turkey’s Ottoman past and Ankara’s need to transform this into an asset (Örmeci 2020). However, the leading theoretician of this approach became influential conservative academic Ahmet Davutoğlu, with his chef d’oeuvre Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth) in the early 2000s (Davutoğlu 2001). Davutoğlu pointed out Turkey’s chance to transform itself into a regional power and to lead the Muslim world in a “civilizational dialogue” instead of the “Clash of Civilizations” (as foreseen by Samuel Huntington) with the West (Hale 2013, p. 137). Davutoğlu, during his tenure as Turkey’s Foreign Minister (2009–2014) and Prime Minister (2014–2016), declared his vision of “zero problems with neighbors” in order to transform Turkey into a regional power by solving crises with its neighboring states. During the ongoing Justice and Development Party (AK Parti) era (2002–), the second model became more influential, and Turkish Foreign Policy-makers adopted a moderate (liberal) Islamic approach similar to that of former Prime Minister Turgut Özal instead of the approach of anti-Western hardliner Islamist and former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan (Kurtbağ 2015, p. 522). This is often called as “NeoOttomanism” (Yeni Osmanlıcılık) due to Turkey’s recent rediscovery and use of its Ottoman geography and legacy for countervailing its Western ties although Turkey has never engaged in imperial ambitions until now. Bill Clinton, George

5 However, Turkey’s NATO membership and military cooperation with the U.S. continued and Turkish troops actively took part in NATO military missions such as in Afghanistan (International Security Assistance Force-ISAF), Kosovo (Kosovo Force KFOR), Bosnia (NATO Implementation Force-IFOR/NATO Stabilization Force-SFOR), Macedonia (Amber Fox-Allied Harmony), Libya (Operation Unified Protector-OUP), Sudan (UN-African Union Mission in Darfur-UNAMID), Somalia (Operation Ocean Shield), and Iraq (NATO Training Mission Iraq - NTM-I) (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Genelkurmay Başkanlığı).

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W. Bush, and Barack Obama administrations closely worked with Turkey in order to develop and successfully implement this model, but upon the failure of Arab Spring -except Tunisia- and the disappointment caused by the Muslim Brotherhood movements that took Turkey’s AK Parti government as their role model, this model also seems to have failed in recent years. So, since these two models have seemingly failed, Turkish-American Relations require a new approach for the future in order to keep the alliance strong and prevent a possible breakdown in bilateral relations. This model should be eclectic and realistic in nature, as well as issue-based. Turkey and the U.S. still have a lot of issues that are based on mutual interests, and it is important to formulate a new type of alliance which would include issues that are based on mutual interests and exclude or find middle grounds for issues that create problems. Another option to save the future of relations might be to revitalize one of these two classical approaches.

III. Turkish-American Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: U.S. Presidents and Turkey 1. George H. W. Bush Period (1989–1993) The Fall of Iron Curtain: The end of Cold War created an unclear atmosphere for Turkey’s membership in NATO and the alliance with the U.S.  began to be questioned due to the disappearance of the Soviet threat.6 However, “New World Order” was declared by President Bush in 1991 (Oran 2010, p. 209), and soon it was understood that the new era brought new risks that would continue to make Turkey an important partner. With a strategic concept adopted in 1991, NATO redefined itself and outlined new responsibilities (development of democratic institutions in Europe, establishment of Trans-Atlantic Forum, and preservation of new balances in the region) for the alliance (Erhan & Sıvış 2017, p. 96). Turkey actively supported NATO’s new initiatives and continued to play an important role for the alliance. In this new period, fighting against brutal dictators (e.g. Saddam Hussein of Iraq), terrorism, and extremism gradually became the most important issues in terms of Turkey’s security partnership with the Western world. The end of the Cold War also created a new and optimistic period for Turkey as Turkey’s relations with the Islamic and Turkic world have begun to develop. Turkey’s right-wing leaders, including Süleyman Demirel and Turgut Özal, made reference to a large Turkic Muslim world by using the term “From the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China” (Adriyatik’ten Çin Seddi’ne)7, although in practice, Turkey’s assets, knowledge, and experience were not enough for managing such an assertive foreign policy then.

6 For instance, Oran thinks (2010, p. 210) that Turkey actually lost some of its strategic importance in the West after the collapse of USSR. 7 Güven Sak claim (2017) that it was in fact Henry Kissinger who first coined the term.

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Gulf War: Turkey’s liberal/conservative Motherland Party (ANAP) government in the 1980s was a close American ally, and Prime Minister Turgut Özal thought that Turkey should actively engage in the Gulf War. However, Turkish Armed Forces was not willing to fight with a neighboring Muslim country. Moreover, Turkish Generals were thinking that the disunity of Iraq might lead to an independent Kurdish State that would destabilize Turkey and threaten the country’s own territorial integrity. Although he continued to make reference to Iraq’s territorial integrity (Gözen 2006/a, p.  803), Hale claims (2013, p.  161) that Özal -in fact- hoped the war would result in the fall of Saddam and establishment of a democratic regime in Iraq that could work out a settlement with the Kurds, restore Baghdad’s control in the north of the country, and prevent PKK from using it as a base for its attacks to Turkey. During these days, the disagreement between Özal and the army went to the point of the resignation of the Chief of General Staff Necip Torumtay (Zengin 2016). However, Özal also could not get what he wanted, and Turkey’s support of the Gulf War had to be limited to the opening of Incirlik Airbase to American Air Forces. In the end, Turkey did not benefit from the Gulf War as Prime Minister Özal expected. The trade embargo on Iraq cost the Turkish economy more than $80 billion, and the safe haven created in the Northern Iraq became an untouchable base for PKK militants, which increased terrorist attacks in Turkey (Erhan & Sıvış, pp. 99–100). Another problem was Kurdish migrants (nearly half a million) coming to Turkey from Northern Iraq because of the war. This disappointment later directed Turkey to be more careful about supporting American military operations in the region. Gözen thought (2006/b, p. 755) that Turkey’s hesitation about the Gulf War was understandable since Turkey had strong economic and political relations with the Saddam Hussein regime in Baghdad, in addition to close military and intelligence cooperation with Baghdad against PKK terrorism. He asserted (2006/b, pp.  755–757) that Turkey could have even remained neutral during the crisis; but Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait and NATO policies forced Turkey to give limited support to the U.S. ‘How to Work with Turkey?’: Following the end of Cold War, how to recalibrate Turkey in accordance with the new conditions flourishing in the post-Cold War era became a popular discussion in Washington. In this new period, according to Atmaca (2017, p. 63), “Washington considered Turkey as a ‘bridge’ between the East and the West, an ‘energy hub’ for Western markets, and a ‘model’ for the ex-Soviet republics”. The early 1990s also witnessed a sharp decrease in Turkish-American Relations in terms of military alliance. By the middle of 1994, 8 of the 12 American military bases previously established in Turkey had been closed or handed over to the Turkish forces, and U.S. military aid to Turkey was also scaled down substantially (Hale 2013, p.  159). Moreover, due to problems related to different Middle Eastern visions of two countries, the “Sevres syndrome” (the suspicion that the Western powers were bent on dismantling Turkey territorially) was awakened (Hale 2013, p. 162). Especially among secular groups, anti-Americanism began to develop rapidly due to fears of an independent Kurdish State and unnecessary wars that would be initiated by Washington and negatively affect the Turkish economy.

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That is why; the end of Cold War was a challenging situation, a new geopolitical reality that eventually led to the changing of the nature of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American alliance. As Turkey became a stronger and more important regional actor in this new era and the two countries’ interests began to clash in some issues, one hundred percent harmony with Washington as in the “good old days” of the Cold War became impossible. Tom sum up, the changing nature of the bilateral relationship from “military partnership” model into “model partnership” began immediately after the end of the Cold War and its effects began to increase gradually day by day. However, during the father Bush period, military partnership was still more dominant compared to the newly evolving “model country” paradigm. If two allies could have agreed on an extensive cooperation during the Gulf War, the military oriented first model could have lasted at least for another decade.

2. Bill Clinton Period (1993–2001) Turkish Accession to European Union: Clinton administration had always supported Turkey’s membership into EU (Çakır 2016, p. 136) and played a positive role in the 1999 Helsinki Summit in Turkey’s acceptance as a candidate for full membership (Baba 2016, p. 192). However, as Lesser pointed out (2004, p. 84), American and European approaches to Turkey were not identical; Washington looked at Turkey from a strategic perspective as an ally, whereas Brussels analyzed Turkey from a political and critical perspective as a prospective member. Thus, in time, American support of Turkey’s EU membership reduced and Washington’s approach to Turkey began to be shaped on more realistic grounds and in relation to the Middle East. This has helped Washington to increase its influence over Ankara rather than supporting Brussels’ increasing influence. However, successive American Presidents continued to express their wish for Turkey’s accession to U.S. For instance, in 2004, George W. Bush said during the NATO Summit in Istanbul that the U.S. support Turkey’s accession to the EU since Turkey is a secular country with a mainly Muslim population.8 Even in Barack Obama period, 8 Bush said; “For decades, my country has supported greater unity in Europe – to secure liberty, build prosperity, and remove sources of conflict on this continent. Now the European Union is considering the admission of Turkey, and you are moving rapidly to meet the criteria for membership. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had a vision of Turkey as a strong nation among other European nations. That dream can be realized by this generation of Turks. America believes that as a European power, Turkey belongs in the European Union. Your membership would also be a crucial advance in relations between the Muslim world and the West, because you are part of both. Including Turkey in the EU would prove that Europe is not the exclusive club of a single religion, and it would expose the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ as a passing myth of history. Fifteen years ago, an artificial line that divided Europe –drawn at Yalta– was erased. Now this continent has the opportunity to erase another artificial division – by fully including Turkey in it.” (Erhan & Sıvış 2017, pp. 101–102).

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during which Turkey’s Islamic identity became much more visible, official Washington support for Turkey’s EU membership continued. Clinton’s support for Turkey’s EU membership became a positive factor for Turkish-American Relations and increased American sympathy in Turkish society. Clinton administration supported Turkey’s EU membership process on the basis of strengthening “model partnership” since Turkey adopted more democratic laws during the EU accession period and has began to transform into the leading Muslim country in terms of its democracy, legal system, and economy. Kurdish Question: CIA and American Department of State openly helped Turkey in capturing PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in February 1999 (Hale 2013, p. 163). Then-Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit later admitted that he did not understand why Washington helped him in capturing Öcalan at the time (Pamir 2005). Although the capture of Öcalan in fact made the Kurdish Question even more complicated in the years to come, Turkish people and statesmen were delighted by the American support for Turkey, and there was a revitalization of trust in bilateral relations. After the capture of Öcalan, Washington gradually began to encourage and orientate Turkey for a political solution with the Kurds and Obama administration later openly supported Turkey’s peace process, which involved negotiations between the imprisoned PKK leader and Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MIT). NATO Operations and Military Cooperation: During the Washington Summit in 1999, NATO adopted a new strategic concept, which aimed to enlarge the area of NATO actions and legalize “non-article 5” operations (Erhan & Sıvış 2017, p.  97). In conjunction with NATO’s Kosovo Operation, this aimed to protect NATO members and make the alliance more influential against new threats. Turkey gave its full support to Washington during the Kosovo Operation. During Clinton’s Presidency, Turkish-American cooperation in the defense industry also boosted again. Total arms purchased from the U.S. between 1994 and 2000 reached almost $11 billion, while the total of amount Turkey paid to the U.S.  between 1950 and 1983 was only $1,196 billion (Erhan & Sıvış 2017, p. 97). Moreover, both Washington and Ankara supported NATO’s expansion and welcomed new eastern members such as Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic in 1999. So, NATO partnership continued to be a strong factor for bilateral relations. A new development was the use “humanitarian intervention” in order to legitimize NATO’s military operations (Oran 2013, p. 16). Accordingly, the U.S. engaged in military operations in Bosnia, Somalia, and Kosovo, and Turkey supported all of these operations. A Popular American President in Turkey: Following the shocking earthquake in 1999, Clinton paid a visit to Turkey and became the first American President to be admired by Turkish public long years after John F.  Kennedy. Clinton’s charismatic gestures and his famous encounter with a Turkish baby grabbing his nose were part of a successful PR effort to strengthen TurkishAmerican Relations. American Foreign Policy towards Muslim-dominated countries such as Bosnia and Kosovo also helped Washington to have high credibility in Turkey during these years. Clinton has always praised Turkey as a unique

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example of predominantly Muslim, secular, and democratic country and challenged the “Clash of Civilizations” thesis defended by American neocons (Bağcı 2006, p. 942). Çandar thinks that Clinton was clever enough in taking the support of Turkish people who were offended by snobbish European approach to Turkey (Bağcı 2006, p.  943). In 2005, long after his Presidency ended, Bill Clinton still appeared by far to be the most popular American President in a survey where Turks ranked the U.S. Presidents as follows (Çakır 2016, p.  164):  Bill Clinton (69 %), Ronald Reagan (8 %), George W. Bush (3 %), George H. W. Bush (1 %), Don’t know (19 %). Due to Clinton’s charisma, Turkish-American Relations seemed to have returned to a high degree of warmth as in the 1950s and were formulated as “strategic partnership”, although the term was never officially explained in detail (Hale 2013, p. 164). Turkey as an ‘Energy Hub’: Starting from the Clinton administration, energy politics have also become an important parameter in Turkish-American Relations. Washington actively supported Turkey in becoming an “energy hub” in order to transport Caspian energy resources to the Western markets (Hale 2013, p.  159) in order to balance Russian influence in the region. In fact, many of the energy projects that are not sponsored by Russia (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and TransAnatolian Pipeline more recently) might not be realized without Washington’s political support. Turkey still has a pivotal position in Washington’s energy policy according to Kısacık (2012). To sum up, during Clinton Presidency, new parameters for the “model partnership” began to evolve in terms of the Kurdish Question and energy politics, although the “military partnership” model also kept its heavy weight.

3. George W. Bush Period (2001–2009) 9/11 and the ‘War on Terror’: The 9/11 disaster was a milestone for world politics as well as Turkish-American Relations. The U.S. had to deal with terrorism for the first time in its own territory and the American people were shocked by the degree of hostility posed by radical Islamic militants. Moreover, terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda began operating as transnational actors by recruiting militants and sympathizers around the world due to their sensational and symbolic acts of terrorism. U.S. President George W.  Bush declared a global “War on Terror” and American statesmen began to use concepts such as “preemptive strike” and “homeland security” (Arı 2006/b, p.  742). Ankara fully supported Washington after the attack and joined into the Afghanistan Operation (Operation Enduring Freedom) actively with its troops (Atmaca 2017, p. 64). During this period, Ankara considered Washington’s “War on Terror” as a facilitator for its own fight against PKK terrorism (Erhan & Sıvış 2017, p. 99). A cabinet decree issued on September 25, 2001, that allowed U.S. forces to use Turkish airbase and airspace in support of these operations, and on October 10, 2001, Turkish Parliament endorsed a government proposal to send Turkish troops abroad (to Afghanistan) and receive foreign troops on Turkish soil (Hale 2013, p. 164). However, President Bush’s choice in terminology

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during this period such as “crusade”9 and “radical Islamic terrorism” was not welcomed by Turkish statesmen and Turkish people and it created a convenient substructure on which anti-Americanism could later accelerate during the Iraqi War. Following the 9/11 attack, military and intelligence cooperation against terrorist organizations and military operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia became important issues in bilateral relations and security cooperation continued to shape the two countries’ alliance equally as strong as in the Cold War days, as it was expressed by then-U.S. Ambassador in Ankara, Mark Parris (2001, p. 7). Accordingly, Ankara sent its troops in 2002 to Afghanistan to be part of the ISAF (Erhan & Sıvış 2017, p. 99). However, as Oran underlines (2013, pp. 16–17), President Bush, affected by the neocons in his government, destroyed the successful “humanitarian intervention” legacy by introducing “homeland security” and “New American Century” concepts. In that sense, Uzgel points out (2013, p. 250) that the U.S. began to act unilaterally during Bush Presidency and gradually started to lose its support in the world. In fact, Washington even began to lose its traditional allies in Europe due to its unilateral approach in world affairs (Uzgel 2013, p. 251). Iraqi War: Although Turkey actively supported President Bush’s “War on Terror”, Turkish public opinion and official position were completely against the Iraqi War from the beginning. However, the leader of the newly elected AK Parti government, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan10, gave positive signals11 in Washington to President Bush about Turkey’s support to Washington as a part of the “coalition of the willing” (Vatan 2011). Later, Erdoğan’s failure to pass the memorandum of March 1, 2003 (deploying American troops in Turkey to facilitate Operation Iraqi Freedom) created a serious disappointment in Washington about Turkey’s intentions as an ally (Baba 2016, p. 193). Although on March 20, 2003, the Turkish Parliament decided to open Turkish airspace to U.S.  bombers and missiles, this was not enough to decrease the level of disappointment in Washington (Erhan & Sıvış 2016, p. 100). Then-U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, during an interview, clearly showed his country’s disappointment with the Turkish Parliament’s decision and blamed Turkish Armed Forces for the lack of leadership role during the process (Erhan & Sıvış 2016, p. 100). This was a critical statement because it was showing that instead of blaming Turkish politicians, Washington was blaming Turkish Armed Forces for the failed memorandum process. The 1 March memorandum was a breaking point in the history of Turkish-American Relations both in terms of American support to Kurds (which obviously increased)

9 “9/11 George Bush - This Crusade Is Gonna Take A  While”, Date of Accession: 25.07.2017 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7TRVcnX8Vsw. 10 Erdoğan did not become Prime Minister until 2003 due to his political ban and Abdullah Gül replaced him for a few months. 11 Few weeks after his surprise victory in 2002 November elections, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan went to Washington in December 2002 and gave clear support to President Bush to stop Iraq to use “weapons of mass destruction” (Erhan & Sıvış 2017, p. 99).

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and Turkish Armed Forces (which obviously decreased). According to Kanat (2015, p. 9), the rejection of the memorandum was considered as “treason” by a group of analysts close to the President Bush. As a consequence, in a relatively short period of time, Turkish-American Relations began to be shaped by a different paradigm which emphasized Turkey’s role as a model country that would lead and guide Muslim countries instead of intensive military cooperation with the U.S. The rejection of the memorandum also meant Turkey’s decreasing power on the ground for the future of Iraq and Kurds’ increasing prestige in Washington. So, it would not be wrong to conclude that the 9/11 disaster and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq created a chance to revitalize the paradigm of “Turkey as a strong military ally”, but Turkish public opinion’s strong anti-militarist attitude and Turkish Parliament’s decision to reject the 1 March memorandum led to the strengthening of the second model (Turkey as a model country) instead. This was, in fact, a necessity since otherwise the “Clash of Civilizations” thesis or Eurasianist model might have been emerged as the main paradigm in Turkey due to high anti-Americanism in the world. On the other hand, former Turkish diplomat Deniz Bölükbaşı, who headed the Turkish delegation in the negotiation process with Americans before the Iraqi War, claimed that Turkey still pays the price of rejecting the 1 March memorandum and this is one of the fundamental reasons for current tensions in Turkish-American Relations (Hürriyet 2017/e).12 Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Following the rejection of the 1 March memorandum, Turkish-American Relations were worsened and anti-Americanism began to rise in Turkey. Especially after the event known as the “hood incident” (çuval olayı)13, Turkish public opinion quickly slipped into an anti-American wave (Atmaca 2017, p. 64). According to Kanat (2015, p. 9), the hood incident was one of the worst crises in the history of Turkish-American Relations and it was further deepened by the deeply negative and popular anti-American views around the world due to Iraqi War. Turkish people interpreted American military operation into Iraq as an “invasion”. Moreover, in addition to classical U.S.-skeptical Islamists and leftists, secular groups including Kemalists and nationalists also began to consider American policy towards Iraq as an existential threat due to Turkey’s large 12 However, Bölükbaşı also claimed in his best-seller memoir 1 Mart Vakası Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası (2008) that the memorandum was very risky since it involved the deployment of 62,000 American troops for 6 months in Turkey’s densely Kurdish populated Southeastern Anatolia. 13 On July 4, 2003, over 100 American soldiers attacked the Turkish Information Bureau in Sulaymaniyah- Northern Iraq, arresting 11 Turkish soldiers and accusing them of planning an assassination of the Kurdish governor of Kirkuk. The incident created a huge public reaction in Turkey with demonstrations condemning the American action and demanding the release of the soldiers. Although the soldiers were released after 60 hours of diplomatic correspondence, no apology came from Washington and anti-Americanism in Turkey reached all-time high due to this unexpected hostile attitude coming from an ally (Erhan & Sıvış 2017, p. 101).

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Kurdish population. Human rights violations made by the U.S. Army personnel and photographs of torture in Abu Ghraib Prison also increased Turkish people’s anger towards Washington (Kanat 2015, p. 10). In addition, the strategy adopted by the U.S. -using the pretext of weapons of mass destruction which President Bush himself later admitted was a mistake (The Guardian 2010) in justifying the Iraqi War- caused the strengthening of terrorist groups and anti-American networks around the world (Bal & Laçiner 2006, p. 952). So, Turkey and the U.S. came close to the point of “Clash of Civilizations”, although later both administrations began to work closely in order to prevent a possible breakdown. Greater Middle East Initiative: Known as “Büyük Ortadoğu Projesi” (BOP) in Turkish, the Greater Middle East Initiative was an enigmatic long-term project to reshape the Middle East using then-American Secretary of the State Condoleezza Rice’s words (Atmaca 2017, p.  64). The initiative brought the U.S.  and Turkey together again after the terrible effects of the “hood incident” and Turkey began to be praised by American statesmen, this time as an example of “Islamic Democracy” (Atmaca 2017, p. 64). From then on, there has been an active transformation of “Turkey as a strong military ally” into “Turkey as a model country” paradigm. This became more apparent during Barack Obama’s Presidency, but it started officially during the late Bush period. Then-Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül and Condoleezza Rice signed a document entitled “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership” in July 2006 (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı), which stressed “promotion of peace, democracy, freedom, and prosperity” in the Middle East as common values between the two countries (Atmaca 2017, p. 65). The Greater Middle East Initiative was a savior plan after traumatic events such as the 1 March memorandum and the hood incident. However, the project was reflected as an imperialist plan in Turkey and was used as leverage to promote anti-Americanism. More importantly, the details of this project remained a mystery until now and neither Ankara, nor Washington shared concrete information about this project in which then-Prime Minister Erdoğan was a co-chair (eşbaşkan). Kurdish Question: George H.  W. Bush provided de facto autonomy to Iraqi Kurds with the Gulf War, and his son George W. Bush transformed this reality into a de jure status (Kurdistan Regional Government) with the new Iraqi constitution after the war. Massoud Barzani government of KRG continued to be considered as a danger in Ankara for a while; but increasing economic and political relations between Ankara and Erbil gradually changed Turkish perspective and softened relations.14 So, while PKK has always continued to be seen as a source of menace by the Turkish State and public, Barzani and Iraqi Kurds became legitimate actors for Ankara in time. However, differences between Washington and Ankara in terms of the Kurdish Question continued to be a major source of headache and 14 Barzani was even welcomed in ruling JDP congress in 2012 with the slogan “Turkey Is Proud of You” (Türkiye seninle gurur duyuyor).

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two countries were not able to develop a common Kurdish strategy. Meanwhile, it should be added that Turkey’s new close economic and political relations with the Barzani government in Northern Iraq was a direct success of American policy. Moreover, during these years and until now, Washington never changed its official stance towards PKK and treated it as a terrorist organization. At the same time, it should be noted that -after the capture of Öcalan- PKK terrorism in Turkey fell sharply during the 2000–2009 period (Şener 2010) and a convenient political atmosphere was created for a peace process between the Turkish State and PKK. To sum up, George W. Bush period witnessed the failure of military oriented model due to Turkish people and institutions’ unwillingness to engage in a war with Iraq and the emergence of necessary conditions for model partnership in order to prevent a breakdown in relations.

4. Barack Obama Period: (2009–2017) Model Partnership: “Model partnership” was a convenient model that was created in order to transform Turkish-American Relations from “Turkey as a strong military ally” into “Turkey as a model country” completely. This model, which was based on “soft power” elements and Turkey’s increasing role as an “energy hub”, coincided with President Obama’s peaceful foreign policy understanding and his promises to the American public about removing American troops from Afghanistan and Iraq. Obama paid his first international visits to Turkey and Egypt in 2009, a clear sign of his aim to restore America’s relations with the Sunni Islam world. This was also supported by Obama’s positive image as an African American President who has a Muslim father and has the middle name “Hussein”, an Arabic name that is very popular in Turkey. Moreover, the new administration in Washington embraced a multilateral approach and placed the emphasis on “burden sharing” with regional allies (Atmaca 2017, p. 65) with concepts such as “leading from behind”. According to Sidar (2013), this was also caused by the increasing importance of the Asia Pacific region in America’s foreign policy agenda (Pivot to Asia) because of the rise of China as well as the depreciation of the energy-rich Middle East due to America’s gradual transformation into an energy exporter. This meant a stronger and more assertive Turkey in the Middle East who would be able to shape regional developments together with Washington. This was also in perfect harmony with AK Parti (JDP) government’s Neo-Ottoman vision and then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ambitious personality. Thus, Kurtbağ (2015, p. 515) thinks that “model partnership” was an effort to save Turkish-American Relations after the disastrous Bush legacy and to manage bilateral ties from the so-called “strategic partnership”. Yegin and Özertem think (2016) that “model partnership” was formulated to carry Turkish-American alliance beyond military cooperation and sought to include economic and social spheres as well. The term was first used by President Obama in April 2009 during his first official visit to Turkey (Kurtbağ 2015, p.  533). In the speech he delivered at the TGNA on April 6, 2009, Obama said (Hürriyet 2009), “Turkey and the United States can build a model partnership

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in which we can create a modern international community that is respectful, that is secure, that is prosperous; that there are not tensions, inevitable tensions, between cultures.”15 “Model partnership” was a proper initiative for two main reasons according to Atmaca (2017, p.  67):  first, due to high anti-Americanism during the Bush administration, the U.S. had to be careful not to incite Turkish sensitivities, and second, AK Parti government’s impressive reforms to become a full member of the EU helped Turkey to have a very positive image in the world and flourished democratic hopes in the Islamic world. According to Cook (2016), Obama’s praise of Turkish democracy was no coincidence, and it was in accordance with the “zeitgeist” of the era since Americans believed that as a large, prosperous, democratizing, and predominantly Muslim country, Turkey would “exemplify a more constructive, less belligerent course for U.S. Foreign Policy”. Moreover, during this period, as stated by Jackson Diehl, Islamist-oriented governments in the Middle East were about to become the new normal in a region dominated for long years by secular autocrats and pro-American Generals (Çakır 2016, p. 272). However, as Baba concludes (2016, p. 195), “model partnership” did not become very successful due to divisions in the Islamic world, as well as the ruling elite’s fear of democracy. Kanat on the other hand points out (2016) that “model partnership” stayed largely as an intellectual effort and was never transformed into an institutional and functional framework. Arab Spring: When popular Arab revolts began first in early 2011 in Tunisia, both countries embraced this phenomenon as a democratization wave that could transform the Islamic world. The same optimism continued during the transition in Egypt. Erdoğan and Obama administrations both supported Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, hoping that this trend would lead to a democratic regime in Egypt as seen in Turkey. In fact, this was in perfect harmony with the “model partnership” idea. Oğuzlu thinks (2016) that, during this early phase, “in the eyes of the U.S. elites, there existed a consensus that the kind of Islam practiced in Turkey as well as Turkey’s economic and political accomplishments throughout its Republican history, most notably during the reign of the JDP governments, would offer a credible road map to the Middle Eastern societies which had finally begin to oust their repressive authoritarian rulers from power”. However, when the transition process in Libya led to the death of American diplomatic personnel, Turkey could not completely understand American anxiety about the Arab Spring (Yegin & Özertem 2016). Arab Spring’s optimistic mood began to change with Morsi’s wrong steps and a military coup took place in Egypt in 2013. While Turkey strongly condemned the coup, the U.S. diplomatically recognized General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s administration and continued to convey military and economic assistance to Cairo (Erhan & Sıvış 2017, p. 107). Things became even more complicated when the Syrian transition turned into a bloody civil war which Russia and Iran also engaged. Here, 15 “Obama’s Speaking Turkish Parliament Part 1”, Date of Accession: 25.07.2017 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XYFnJcL10ik.

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it should be added that Turkey’s deteriorating relations with Israel after events such as the “one minute crisis” and “flotilla incident” (Mavi Marmara crisis) also caused some problems in Turkish-American Relations. However, Obama showed strong leadership in 2013, managing to get an official apology from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Erdoğan as well as $20 million of compensation for the relatives Turkish citizens who were killed by Israeli soldiers (Erhan & Sıvış 2017, p. 106). Through this, Obama was also able to bring two allies together again. In terms of the Iranian nuclear program also, Obama achieved a deal (JCPOA) between P5+1 countries and Iran with Turkey’s support and Israel’s reluctant consent. However, in general, Turkey’s activism in the Islamic world was portrayed as an “axis shift” in Washington and Erdoğan was often criticized. To sum up, Obama saw Erdoğan at the beginning “as the sort of moderate Muslim leader who would bridge the divide between East and West” and as a role model for other Muslim leaders, but later considered him “a failure and an authoritarian” (Marcus 2016). In the end, both “model partnership” and “Arab Spring” did not end well in terms of democratization of the region and Turkish-American Relations. Moreover, Arab Spring also led to the strengthening of anti-Americanism. Syrian Crisis: Although both Turkey and the U.S.  supported regime change in Syria in the initial phase of the civil war, Obama administration did not act militarily even after the chemical attacks in Syria, which were largely seen as deeds of Assad’s government. Unlike other countries where Arab Spring became influential (Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya), in Syria, the civil war lasted a long time, and the regime was able to resist. Moreover, the opposition was unable to act as a unified group and present itself as a democratic actor. Thus, according to Barkey (2016), Obama administration, in time, began to consider jihadist terrorist groups such Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS as more important sources of threat compared to the Assad regime and withdrew its support from Syrian opposition.16 However, until ISIS began to hit its own cities, Turkey directed its rhetoric to primarily target the Assad regime. Although Ankara and Washington temporarily came closer after the “jet crisis” that took place between Russia and Turkey in Syria, upon the efforts of then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter (Yazıcıoğlu 2016), this lasted for a very short time and the Syrian civil war negatively affected Turkish-American Relations. Moreover, another problem emerged due to American support to Kurdish organizations such as the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria that are closely affiliated with PKK. Barkey thinks (CFR 2018/b) that Obama administration did not have any other option but to support PYD/YPG since ISIS emerged as a more important source of menace. This problem became more evident in Trump’s Presidency as the collaboration between the U.S. and PYD/YPG quickly deepened to the point where the two would plan and organize joint operations (Barkey 2016). At first, Turkish 16 More recently, CIA announced that it would end its program aiding rebels fighting against Syrian regime (France24 2017/b).

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authorities were blaming lower-ranking American officials such as Brett McGurk for Washington’s pro-Kurdish approach (Dettmer 2016). However, later Ankara began to consider a pro-Kurdish American approach to Syria as a state policy and a direct threat to its own unity. Thus, Turkish statesmen began to target top American policy-makers. For instance, President Erdoğan accused Obama of deceiving Turkey for American support of PYD/YPG (CNNTürk 2017/a). Erdoğan also blamed the U.S. for supporting terrorism in Syria (Reuters 2016). As a neighboring country, Turkey was terribly affected by the Syrian crisis due to 4 million Syrian refugees coming to Turkey as well as increasing security risks, whereas Washington was only partially and indirectly affected from the spillover effects of the civil war. In relation to the Syrian crisis, the real problem was caused by Turkey’s anxiety over the future status of Syrian Kurds; Turkey saw Kurdish autonomy or independence in northern Syria as a direct security threat to its regime since PYD/YPG are PKKoffset organizations for Ankara. Thus, Turkey considered Washington’s policy as a violation of its own redlines and a challenge to its own security. Authoritarian Orientation in Turkey: Although it promoted successive AK Parti (JDP) governments as a model of Muslim democracy in the early years, Obama administration began to criticize Erdoğan’s government after the Gezi Park protests in 2013. This was a turning point in Washington in terms of American perception of Erdoğan. Police brutality, authoritarian rhetoric, and methods of the government as well censorship over the Turkish and international media have become regular issues in American officials’ statements about Turkey after the Gezi Park events. Esbrook for instance wrote (2015, p. 564) that Turkish government’s reaction to the Gezi Park events was a violation of the First Amendment (right to freedom of speech and expression) from the American perspective and seemed to dampen relations in a fundamental or deep manner. Turkey’s approach to Kurdish problem is also considered as a part of the problem by Washington. While Obama praised Erdoğan in early 2013 for launching peace talks with Kurdish separatists, Turkey’s changing attitude towards Kurds and its increasing counter-terrorism measures and military tactics led to a cool reception of Erdoğan by Obama in March 2016 (Nissenbaum & Lee 2016). Failed Coup Attempt in Turkey: On July 15, 2016, Turkey experienced a failed coup attempt made by a junta within the Turkish Armed Forces. Turkish government accuses Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen and his followers for the coup attempt. Since then, Erdoğan’s government initiated a purge against Gülen followers and oppositional voices in the country, and tens of thousands of people were dismissed from the military, police force, bureaucracy, and universities. However, Gülen community and JDP government have a shared history; between 2002 and 2013, these two helped each other in eliminating secular nationalists and the so-called “deep state” from the bureaucracy. Even Erdoğan once confessed that two groups “were going to same direction with different tactics” (DHA 2016). According to Butler and Friedman (2016), “The erstwhile alliance worked well. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan wielded political power; the Gülenists entrenched themselves in the civil service, police force, prosecutors’ offices, and judiciary”. However, relations were

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spoiled when Gülenists tried to interrogate MIT (Turkish National Intelligence Agency) Undersecretary Hakan Fidan in 2012. From then on, Gülenists began to criticize Erdoğan’s regime and his close links with Russia. Thus, starting from 2012, two close political allies became bitter rivals. The coup attempt of July 15, 2016 created a unity atmosphere in Turkey among political parties at the beginning. Oppositional parties including Republican People’s Party (CHP), Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) all supported the government in its resistance against the coup and joined into diplomatic activities in Europe (Çakır 2016). However, soon after, opposition parties began to consider the government’s purges as an effort to establish a one-man regime during the state emergency period. CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu even said the “coup attempt occurred within the knowledge of the government and was therefore a ‘controlled coup’ ” (Hürriyet Daily News 2017). The failed coup attempt left more than 200 dead and thousands injured in Turkey. The Gülen movement has been accused of being the mastermind behind the coup attempt and was officially designated as the Fethullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) by the Turkish State. Nearly 100,000 soldiers, civil servants, judges, police, teachers, and intellectuals linked to FETO have been arrested or dismissed from their positions so far in Turkey during the state of emergency. Notably, following the failed coup attempt, Turkey has turned towards Russia at an accelerated pace. So, the coup attempt further polarized the country and increased Erdoğan’s control over the system, especially after Turkey’s transition into a Presidential system on April 16, 2017, via a controversial referendum and Erdoğan’s decisive Presidential election victory on June 24, 2018. Following the failed coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016, Turkish media and even government officials openly accused the U.S. of being in on the plot (The Economist 2016).17 Although President Obama condemned the coup (Falk 2016) and explained that Washington was not involved in the coup attempt (CNN 2016), Turkish political analysts and people in the street largely believed that Washington was somehow related to the coup.18 This perception is very strong in Turkey since the Turkish people recently witnessed American support to Egyptian military coup in 2013 in a declaration made by then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry (Kanat 2017, p. 333). Immediately after the coup attempt in Turkey, then-Turkish Minister

17 On the night of the coup attempt, retired American Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters said on Fox News that the coup attempt is a positive development for preventing Turkey in slipping into an Islamist dictatorship and he supported the coup (Tanış 2016). Moreover, following the coup attempt, American General and U.S. Central Command Commander Joseph Votel said that Pentagon allies were jailed in Turkey, a statement that was largely perceived in Turkey as Washington backed the coup (Paletta 2016). 18 Yegin and Özertem think (2016) that Washington showed delayed embrace of the elected AK Parti (JDP) government after the coup attempt. Moreover, according to MAK study, 70 % of Turkish people think that U.S. is responsible for the coup.

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of Labor and Social Security Süleyman Soylu said that the “U.S. is behind this coup attempt” (Hacaloğlu 2016). In fact, since the first military coup in 1960, Turkish intellectuals and people have always blamed American governments for being responsible for military takeovers in their country. It is a fact that the U.S. (via the CIA) was heavily involved in Turkey during the Cold War and conducted many operations together with Turkish intelligence (Bezci & Borroz 2016). For instance, Turkish scholar Mehmet Akif Okur concluded that Jimmy Carter administration was aware and had a positive attitude towards the September 12, 1980, military takeover in Turkey (2015, p. 215). However, this gray area is open to conspiracy theories and anti-American propaganda as well and evidence about U.S. involvement in Turkish coups such as the statement of “Our boys in Ankara did it” is often based on media myths and exaggerations.19 After the coup attempt, the worsening of bilateral relations became apparent when the U.S. Department of State announced in July 2016 that American diplomatic personnel in Turkey had the right to leave the country due to increasing security risks and restrictions during the state of emergency (Amerika’nın Sesi 2016/a). U.S.-based influential Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen’s situation and possible extradition also began to be a major issue in bilateral relations. According to Erkmen (2017), the Turkish public commented on America’s unwillingness to extradite Gülen as evidence for America’s role in the coup attempt. Following the coup attempt, anti-Americanism in Turkey rose from 44.1 % in 2016 to 65.5 % in 2017 (Hacaloğlu 2017). Lastly, the failed coup attempt and following purges within the Turkish security bureaucracy also created a negative atmosphere in Washington about Turkey’s military capabilities (Timoçin 2017). Kanat also agrees (2017, pp.  319–320) that 2016 was the worst year of Turkish-American Relations since the Johnson Letter and rejection of the 1 March memorandum. Although there have been many contacts between the two countries after the coup attempt, so far U.S. government lawyers claim that evidence against Gülen’s involvement in the coup attempt is not as strong as Turkish statesmen claim (Cook 2017/c; Sloat 2018). To sum up, after a promising start and good progress period, Turkish-American Relations became more complicated and politically problematic again during Obama Presidency especially after the failed coup attempt in 2016. The failure of “Turkey as a model country” paradigm during Obama Presidency is caused by the failure of Arab Spring to bring democratic Islamic governments to Arab countries, Syrian civil war that overshadowed democratic transition and turned into a vicious war necessitating the use of hard power, and Turkey’s authoritarian

19 This phrase is used by Turkish journalists and academics in the past as evidence to American involvement in the 1980 Turkish military coup. The phrase is said by CIA operative Paul Henze to U.S. President Jimmy Carter and became popular with Turkish journalist Mehmet Ali Birand’s documentary about the coup. However, Henze later claimed that he did not say “Our boys in Ankara did it”, but instead he said “Boys in Ankara did it” to Carter (Dünya Bülteni 2011).

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transformation following the Gezi Park protests and especially after the failed coup attempt in 2016. However, in terms of economic and cultural relations, there was a visible progress during this period.

5. Donald Trump Period (2017–) The future of Syria and Syrian Kurds: When Donald Trump was unexpectedly elected the 45th President of the U.S., Turkish authorities welcomed this development as they saw this as an opportunity to open a blank page and considered Trump’s victory as the “revenge of masses against the establishment”, much like Erdoğan himself had done before (Marcou 2017). Soner Cagaptay even claimed that the Erdoğan-Trump chemistry might work due to the two leaders’ populist, anti-elitist, and right-wing authoritarian styles (Serdar 2017). However, problems that emerged during the Obama period continued in Trump’s administration, and no big progress was achieved so far. Trump administration had to face with the lack of a strategic model in bilateral relations due to the failure of two existing models. Thus, relations could not be improved as it was planned. The most important issue still seems to be the situation of PYD/YPG and the future of Syrian Kurds. Kahl thinks (2017) that although during his campaign he defended some radical views and policies, Trump administration has come to the same position in Syria (supporting Syrian Kurds) as the Obama administration did. On the other hand, Amanda Sloat believes (CFR 2018/b) that both Obama and Trump administrations did not have a concrete Syria policy, which seems to be a fundamental problem for the future of Turkish-American alliance. From the American perspective, Turkey was never fully committed to the war against radical Islamist groups in Syria (especially in the early years of the civil war). Cook thinks (2017/a) that Trump’s approach to Turkey is based on the idea that if Turkey is critical of American support to the Kurdish militia, it should think of its own support to the Sunni militia. In accordance with this view, Brett McGurk, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, even blamed Turkey for helping Al Qaeda elements in Syria (Sputnik Türkiye 2017/a). During the civil war, American officials pressed Turkey to do more to stop jihadist fighters from slipping in and out of Syria to join up with ISIS and other Islamist groups (The Economist 2016). Eventually, Trump administration took a concrete step and made a historic decision in May 2017 to arm Kurdish militia in Syria (BBC Türkçe 2017/c). Looking from Washington, the Kurdish militia is a progressive force that fought actively against ISIS. The U.S. insists on not recognizing PYD/YPG as terrorist organizations, although it has considered PKK as a terrorist group for long years (US Department of State 2017). Turkish government, however, asserts that PKK and PYD/YPG have close links. Accordingly, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu warned Washington that “weapons given to YPG end up in the hands of PKK” (Aliriza 2017). From the early on in their communications, Erdoğan repeatedly told Trump not to support PYD/YPG in Syria (NTV 2017/a, 2017/b); but he was unable to change Trump’s opinion. During his visit to White House in May 2017,

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standing beside Trump, Erdoğan said that Turkey would not consider any plans for these groups to be part of the region’s future (Gaouette2017). Moreover, Lesser underlines (2016) that “Turkish officials and analysts do not share Washington’s view of the PYD as an effective counter to ISIS in Syria”. Turkish officials also warned Washington that they might target the Kurdish militia in Syria, and Washington should decide on which side it would support (Yazıcıoğlu 2017/a). One of the principal consultants of President Erdoğan, İlnur Çevik, even said that there could be accidental military conflicts between American and Turkish soldiers in Syria due to American support to PYD (Birgün 2017). Some American experts and politicians including Michael Doran (Yeniçağ 2017) and John McCain (Daily Sabah 2017) also criticized the American Foreign Policy concerning PYD/YPG and explained that they might create a dangerous escalation in Turkish-American Relations. U.S. Army later deployed armored cars close to Turkey-Syria border in order to prevent a military escalation between Turkish Army and YPG. After heavy Turkish criticism, Trump administration tried to make some policy changes concerning their support to Syrian Kurds. For instance, PYD-dominated opposition group’s name changed into Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). However, this was perceived as a symbolic step and did not satisfy Turkey (Dilek 2017). In addition, then-Deputy Spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State Mark Toner stated that American support for PYD was tactical and the American government do not support PKK (NTV 2016/a). Then-U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis also explained that Washington planned to take back weapons supplied to the Kurdish YPG militia in northern Syria after the defeat of ISIS (Yahoo News 2017/b). In that sense, Nasi claimed (2017/c) Washington offered Ankara to monitor weapons that were delivered to PYD in order to prevent their transfer to PKK, as well as the assurance of YPG leaving Raqqa after its liberation. However, here it should be noted that American decision to help Syrian Kurds was not a temporary and unconscious choice since Turkey previously offered Washington to make a joint military operation against ISIS in Raqqa by excluding PYD/YPG, an offer that was ignored by Washington (AlJazeera 2017/b).20 However, Turkey’s options might be limited against the U.S. in terms of PYD/YPG controversy. For instance, Akgün thinks (2016) that Turkey does not have the luxury to oppose 20 At this point, one should remember that experienced Turkey analyst Soner Cagaptay previously claimed that Turkish offer for joint military operation against ISIS should satisfy Washington and Ankara should convince American decision-makers for complete eradication of ISIS (Serdar 2017). Steven Cook on the other hand claims that Turkey did not help Obama administration’s campaign against ISIS in the early phase of the war and that is why, Washington established ties with Kurdish groups (Timoçin 2017). Cook also claimed (2017/a) that although Turkish government never helped ISIS, it had contacts with Sunni rebel groups during the war and Turkish government always kept fighting with the Assad regime and the PKK as its priority. Moreover, Jamie McIntyre thinks (2017) that Pentagon sees Kurds as the most battlehardened and combat-effective force fighting ISIS.

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American policies in Syria and should work instead on correcting its international image by restarting its Kurdish peace initiative. According to Yetkin (2017/a) on the other hand, American support to PYD/YPG is not haphazard, and Washington has already made its plan B in case Incirlik Base is shut down by Ankara. Yetkin also claims (2017/b) that, although Washington tries to reassure Ankara by saying that weapons delivered to PYD will be taken after the Raqqa Operation, there are disagreements between two sides about the future of Syria. Then-U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on the other hand warned Turkey to act responsibly as a NATO ally and reconsider its close collaboration with Russia and Iran over the future of Syria (Hürriyet 2017/b). More recently, an American military official declared the U.S. plan to establish a new border security force of approximately 30,000 with the SDF, the U.S. backed group that is largely controlled and manned by the PYD forces in Syria (AA 2018). In the two-day visit of then-U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on February 15–16, 2018, two governments engaged in negotiations about Turkey’s ongoing military operation (Operation Olive Branch) to Afrin (a Syrian city controlled by PYD/ YPG forces), in addition to the situation of Manbij (Menbiç). Tillerson met with President Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, and although no clear information was given to the press, by this visit, two governments showed their willingness to cooperate and keep their alliance despite their differences about the future of Kurds in Syria. According to some sources, Turkey proposed joint deployment with the U.S. in Syria and PYD/YPG’s withdrawal from Manbij. Serhat Güvenç thinks that this strategy would not work since Washington has already chosen the Kurds as its privileged partner in Syria, whereas İlter Turan underlines that the two countries would never want an armed conflict in Manbij (Çetin 2018). Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu on the other hand announced that Turkish and American soldiers would control Manbij together after the removal of YPG troops (BBC Türkçe 2018/b). After the dismissal of Rex Tillerson by President Donald Trump, the situation of Manbij seemed unclear for a while. Pentagon spokesperson Colonel Robert Manning later stated that American troops will continue to stay in Manbij and to protect Syrian Democratic Forces (DW Türkçe 2018/b). More recently, the two countries’ Foreign Ministers Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and Mike Pompeo met in Washington DC on June 4, 2018, and endorsed a roadmap for Manbij by underlining their mutual commitment to its implementation, a move that could be seen as a positive step for the future of relations (Gumrukcu & Toksabay 2018). Although the Manbij agreement is a step forward in terms of Turkish-American Relations, the dispute with Syria still exists and there is not an agreed plan between two allies over the future of Syria and Kurds. In November 2018, Turkish and American troops began joint patrols around Manbij on the west bank of the Euphrates River (France24 2018/b). In addition, the U.S.  administration decided to set up new observation posts along the Syria-Turkey border in order to support security and stability in the area and to prevent a military clash between Turkish Army and Kurdish groups (Vasilyeva 2018). However, Turkish President Erdoğan announced in December 2018 that Turkey will soon start a

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military operation towards Kurdish groups in the eastern part of the Euphrates River (Milliyet 2018). In December 2018, President Trump announced his shocking decision (CBS News 2018)  to remove American troops from Syria. This decision was received positively by Turkey, and in his article published in The New York Times, President Erdoğan (2019) supported Trump’s decision by underlining that Turkey could perform the antiterrorism struggle in the region by itself against ISIS as well as PYD/ YPG. Although Trump’s decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria prevented a possible disaster scenario of clash between Turkish and American troops and created a positive atmosphere in Turkey, the two allies’ lack of agreement over the future of Syria, and especially the future of Kurds, continues to be a major source of problem. For instance, in January 2019, President Trump threatened Turkey with an economic disaster if Ankara starts attacking pro-American Kurdish groups including PYD/YPG elements within the Syrian Democratic Forces (Sözcü 2019). Trump also said that President Erdoğan sees Kurds as Turkey’s “natural enemies” and he prevented Turkey from “wiping out all Kurds” (Ahval 2019). This shows that the American side expects Turkey to conduct only a safe zone operation in 20 miles and to reach a political agreement with Kurdish forces, whereas Turkey aims to destroy all armed Kurdish militia groups in Syria. Moreover, although President Trump made a decision to remove American troops, there are still almost 1,000 U.S. soldiers in Syria (CBS News 2019). İlter Turan states that there is a lack of confidence between Washington and Ankara due to PYD/YPG issue, but Washington has not made its final decision (Hürriyet 2017/f). Erhan and Sıvış on the other hand claim (2017, p.  110) that Trump administration eventually will have to make a choice between PYD and Turkey. In July 2019, two countries agreed on establishing a joint operation center in order to coordinate and manage a planned 20 miles (32 km) safe zone in northeast Syria (Reuters 2019/b). Operation “Peace Spring” (Barış Pınarı) started on October 9, 2019 with Turkish Armed Forces’ ground and air strikes towards PYD/YPG targets in Syrian cities including Kobani, Tel Abyad, Ras al-Ain, and Qamishli (Hubbard & Gall 2019). President Trump did not endorse Turkey’s military operation; but gave a green signal to Ankara by pulling U.S. forces back from the border area. According to BBC defense correspondent Jonathan Marcus (2019), Trump took this decision against Pentagon and Department of State’s warnings and this meant a betrayal for Kurds. Upon the agreement made by Erdoğan and Trump, Turkish operation conducted within the previously agreed safe zone and Turkey agreed to undertake the responsibility of ISIS prisoners held in northern Syria. Most recently, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper stated that Washington is preparing to evacuate all troops from northern Syria as soon as possible (Tillett & Brennan 2019). 9 days after the “Operation Peace Spring”, during U.S. Vice President Mike Pence’s visit to Turkey, Ankara and Washington agreed to a ceasefire with the condition of Kurdish forces’ withdrawal from the safe zone (BBC 2019/b). Following this agreement, Turkey also made an agreement with Russia in order to move Kurdish forces from Turkish border. Although this agreement was welcomed by Turkish political elite, President Trump’s threatening letter to

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Erdoğan and his unusual diplomatic style21 became a point of criticism in the following days by Turkish press (The Guardian 2019). Islamophobia Discussion: Due to his harsh anti-immigrant rhetoric during the Presidential campaign, as well as his stereotypical understanding of Muslims as Islamist fanatics22, U.S. President Donald Trump is often portrayed as an Islamophobic figure in Turkish media. As an Islamist leader, Erdoğan was critical of Trump’s anti-immigrant rhetoric, especially his Islamophobic remarks. He publicly denounced Trump for calling for a ban on Muslim travel to the U.S.  during his campaign and had demanded that Trump’s name be taken down from a high-rise building in Istanbul constructed through cooperation between his family and the Doğan Group (Aliriza 2017). However, after Trump’s first international diplomacy tour comprising of Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the Vatican, especially after his historic speech in Riyadh23, many Turkish Statesmen began to perceive him as antiradical rather than Islamophobic. An advisor in Trump’s Middle East policy team, Saygın Şimşek, claimed that, as a secular, democratic, and Muslim-based country, Turkey could have better relations with the Trump administration since the focus and the real target of the new American president would be radicalism, not Islam as a holy religion (Kamiloğlu & Pelit 2017). Soli Özel, however, advised a more cautious optimism for Trump era since his Islamophobic rhetoric might force Erdoğan to react in domestic politics (Çetin 2017). Fethullah Gülen & Andrew Brunson Cases: Donald Trump praised Turkish President Erdoğan’s leadership following the failed coup attempt in July 2016 and did not use pro-Gülen rhetoric (The New York Times 2016). However, retired American General James Clapper said that recent purges in Turkish Armed Forces after the failed coup attempt might weaken the Turkish-American alliance against ISIS (NTV 2016/b). The U.S. State Department’s annual report on terrorism made reference to Fethullah Gülen and his community (FETO) for the first time in 2017, but it did not add the organization into the terrorism list. Instead, the report mentioned

21 President Trump wrote: “Dear Mr. President, Let’s work out a good deal! You don’t want to be responsible for slaughtering thousands of people, and I don’t want to be responsible for destroying the Turkish economy—and I will. I’ve already given you a little sample with respect to Pastor Brunson. I have worked hard to solve some of your problems. Don’t let the world down. You can make a great deal. General Mazloum is willing to negotiate with you, and he is willing to make concessions that they would never have made in the past. I am confidentially enclosing a copy of his letter to me, just received. History will look upon you favorably if you get this done the right and humane way. It will look upon you forever as the devil if good things don’t happen. Don’t be a tough guy. Don’t be a fool! I will call you later. Sincerely, Donald Trump” (The Guardian 2019). 22 During his election campaign that started in New York City and ended in North Carolina, Trump used at least one of the terms -radical Islam, Islamic terrorists, radical Islamic terrorists, Islamic terror- in 47 speeches out of 71 (Erhan & Sıvış 2017, p. 109). 23 “President Trump delivers speech on Islam” (2017), Date of Accession: 07.07.2017 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vNzFRvZvuYQ.

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the Turkish government’s accusations against Gülen and his network and the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s decisions to consider this group as a terrorist organization upon the pressure coming from Ankara after the bloody coup attempt (United States Department of State Publication Bureau of Counterterrorism 2017, pp. 159–160). Most of the Turkey analysts in Washington, including Cagaptay, think that the extradition of Gülen to Turkey seems very difficult unless Turkey provides substantial evidence for Gülen’s involvement in the coup attempt (Serdar 2017). Carol Migdalovitz also thinks that, since the U.S. is a country that is based on the principle of “rule of law”, Turkish government should provide evidence about Gülen’s role in the coup attempt (Cindemir 2016). Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu on the other hand warned Washington that bilateral relations could get worse if Gülen is not handed over to Turkey (Amerika’nın Sesi 2016/b). Many Turkish academics, including Erhan and Sıvış, believe (2017, p.  110) that the extradition of Gülen would have a positive impact in bilateral relations. In 2017, President Erdoğan stated that Turkey could release jailed American pastor Andrew Brunson if Washington extradites exiled Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen to Ankara (Yahoo News 2017/a). The statement was largely understood by Washington that President Erdoğan has the ability to direct judicial decisions in Turkey and he wants to use Brunson as a hostage in exchange to Gülen. Brunson is an American pastor who has lived in Turkey for many decades until recently was blamed for charges of helping the group that Ankara holds responsible for the failed coup against Erdoğan (Reuters 2018). President Trump and dozens of American Senators have previously urged Erdoğan to release Brunson. The Brunson issue has become the focus of polemics between two countries in 2018, and upon the threat of economic sanctions towards Turkey made by U.S. Vice President Mike Pence (BBC Türkçe 2018/a), after the National Security Council meeting on July 30, 2018, Turkish State declared that the threatening language used by Washington was unacceptable (Hürriyet 2018). However, upon the continuation of the long trial period of the American pastor, on August 1, 2018, Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action targeting Turkey’s Minister of Justice Abdülhamit Gül and Minister of Interior Affairs Süleyman Soylu. As a result of this action, any property, or interest in property, of both Gül and Soylu within U.S. jurisdiction was blocked (US Department of Treasury). President Erdoğan responded to that move in a reciprocal way and Turkey blocked U.S. Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke and American Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ assets in Turkey (BBC Türkçe 2018/c). Turkish economy was terribly affected from the “Brunson crisis” and the Turkish lira slumped to a record low against U.S.  dollar and euro in August 2018. However, President Erdoğan, in his article published in The New  York Times on August 10, 2018, insisted that Washington is making unilateral steps and does not respect Turkey’s independent judicial system by inviting the President to intervene into legal process (Erdogan 2018). Soli Özel thinks the Brunson case is symbolic and problems between Ankara and Washington are caused by the two countries’ strategic disaccord concerning their

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projections about the Middle East and the future of Kurds (Aktan 2018). Pastor Brunson was finally convicted by Turkish court of aiding terrorism on October 12, 2018, but released due to his time served in prison (Cunningham 2018). President Trump showcased Brunson’s release as a political victory to American public and met with him in the White House’s Oval Office a day after his release. Following the release of Pastor Brunson, the two countries reciprocally lifted sanctions they imposed on Ministers (France24 2018/a). Kurdish Statehood: Then-KRG President Massoud Barzani announced in 2017 that an independence referendum would take place on September 25 (BBC Türkçe 2017/b). Turkey’s reaction to the independence referendum was not very harsh, but still critical from the beginning. Although Erdoğan made some warnings, he did not use an imperative rhetoric at the outset. President Erdoğan’s advisor İlnur Çevik even said that every nation has right to establish an independent state (Aydınlık 2017). However, after the National Security Council meeting in July 2017, Turkish State officially declared that the referendum’s result could not be legally and effectively implemented, which could lead to undesirable consequences (K24 2017). Spokesperson for Turkish Presidency İbrahim Kalın declared that the referendum is politically and legally wrong and it would not be binding unless it is approved by Iraqi Parliament (Sputnik Türkiye 2017/f). Then-U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis, however, declared that the referendum should be delayed, although he did not call for cancellation (Yazıcıoğlu 2017/b). For a while, Ankara implemented a “wait and see” strategy and developed its ties with other influential actors such as Iran. Cook wrote (2017/b) that although Turkey officially rejected Kurdish statehood, “it is hard to imagine the Turkish military invading Iraq to snuff out Kurdish independence there”. However, Turkey’s reaction to the Kurdish independence referendum became harsher day by day as it approached. Turkey even started a military exercise near the Ibrahim Khalil (Habur) border gate (NTV 2017/e) and continued to bomb PKK targets in Northern Iraq (NTV 2017/d). Nasi pointed out (2017/a) that although there was a significant change in Ankara’s political tone, Ankara did not consider the KRG as an existential threat, but still watched the independence referendum process from a security-based perspective and worried of an independent Kurdish State in Northern Iraq that would foster dreams of a greater Kurdistan in the region. Moreover, in the meeting between Trump and Erdoğan on September 21, 2017, both countries showed their critical stance towards imminent Kurdish independence (NTV 2017/c). The planned referendum was made on September 25, 2017, with 72 % turnout rate and over 90 % “yes” votes for Kurdish independence (BBC 2017/a). President Erdoğan showed a very harsh reaction to the referendum and began to threaten Kurdish authorities. Turkey announced that it might begin to implement economic sanctions against the Erbil government and might even consider military options in case this referendum turns into actual declaration of independence. Iraqi central government and Iran also supported Turkey’s position and did not accept Kurds’ demands for independence. In fact, aside from Israel, all important countries in the region and major world powers seemed to reject the idea of a Kurdish State, at least

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for the moment, due to geopolitical risks. Washington, on the other hand, always made reference to the top priority of the anti-ISIS struggle and tried to convince the Kurds to delay their decision. President Trump recently announced that his country has not taken a side in the feud between the Iraqi central government and the KRG (Sputnik Türkiye 2017/g). The referendum process led to the fall of Kirkuk and the loss of control over its crossing point to Turkey for Kurds, and it diminished Kurdish hopes of independence on Iraqi territory (Aydın 2017). The shocking resignation decision of Kurdish President Masoud Barzani following the backfire of the independence vote shows that Washington has to mediate between Turkey and the Kurds in Iraq as well in the coming years. Brawl during Erdoğan’s Visit and Other Polemics: During President Erdoğan’s visit to Washington in May 2017, a daytime brawl took place between Erdoğan’s bodyguards and protesters. It was a shock for the American press when Turkish bodyguards attacked protesters outside the Turkish Ambassador’s residence. Arrest warrants for the members of Erdoğan’s security team were issued by American police (France24 2017/a). “We are communicating our concern to the Turkish government in the strongest possible terms”, then-State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert said in a statement after the brawl (AlJazeera 2017/c). Even Senator John McCain, known for his pro-Turkey rhetoric, did not hesitate to call for sending Turkish Ambassador Serdar Kılıç back to Turkey after the brawl. The U.S. State Department summoned the Turkish Ambassador in Washington Serdar Kılıç on May 17, 2017, over the brawl. In addition, U.S. House of Representatives voted on a resolution to condemn Turkey which was immediately denounced by Turkish Foreign Ministry (Hürriyet 2017/d). Moreover, members of the U.S. Senate sent a letter to President Erdoğan condemning his bodyguards’ aggressive attitude (Amerika’nın Sesi 2017). This brawl also overshadowed hopes of a new start and refreshment in bilateral relations during the Trump era. Although President Erdoğan defended his bodyguards’ attitudes and considered these protesters as “terrorists” (Diken 2017), American public did not understand why a peaceful protest was crushed in such a violent way. The negative trend in bilateral relations and polemics between the two countries’ statesmen continued after the brawl with the arrest of a U.S. Consulate staff in Istanbul, Metin Topuz, by Turkish security forces (Hürriyet 2017/a) and America’s decision to suspend visa services for Turkey (BBC 2017/b). Other than Metin Topuz, a longtime employee of the U.S. Consulate in Adana, Hamza Uluçay is also jailed in Turkey for being a supporter of PKK (Cook 2017/c). Turkey immediately reciprocated by suspending visa services for American citizens (CNNTürk 2017/b). Former Turkish Ambassador in Washington (2001–2005) Faruk Loğoğlu stated that the American decision to suspend visa services for Turkish citizens was very harsh and a direct warning to Turkish government (Yazıcıoğlu 2017/c). Yinanç claims (2017) that it seems like a retaliation move against the arrest of Metin Topuz on charges of espionage, but it was a disproportionate and wrong decision punishing Turkish people instead of the Turkish government. Cagaptay on the other hand assessed this scandal as “the worst crisis in the last 50 years” (Toroğlu 2017).

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Moreover, then-U.S. Ambassador24 in Turkey John Bass made it clear that the suspension of visa services was the American government’s decision and it had nothing to do with recent Turkish-Russian rapprochement in Syria or Turkey’s decision to buy an S-400 air missile defense system from Moscow (Sputnik Türkiye 2017/d). Finally, towards the end of year, the visa crisis was solved and American missions in Turkey resumed full visa services for Turkish citizens (BBC 2017/c). Iran Controversy: Washington, during Barack Obama’s Presidency, was the architect of the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) agreement made between the Islamic Republic of Iran and P5+1 countries over the Iranian nuclear program in 2015. The agreement was welcomed by all signatory sides and the rest of the world. However, President Trump, during his Presidential campaign, described the JCPOA agreement as the “worst deal ever seen” (BBC 2018). Although Trump’s close associates Rex Tillerson and James Mattis praised Iran’s commitment to the agreement (DW Türkçe 2018/c), Trump continued to criticize the Iranian deal together with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Trump finally decided to cancel the JCPOA agreement on May 8, 2018, and announced that Washington would revive Iran-related sanctions including those targeting Iran’s oil sector and transactions with its Central Bank. Accordingly, starting from August 4, 2018, sanctions targeting the Iranian automotive sector, as well as trade in gold and other key metals, entered into effect. Proposed sanctions will negatively affect European firms conducting business with Tehran as well as Turkey’s oil and gas imports. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu made a statement criticizing Washington (Yinanç 2018) and showed Turkey’s intention to coordinate with European allies about not joining Washington’s sanctions. Then-EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini also said that they will work for the continuation of the Iranian nuclear deal and they still encourage trade with Iran (Habertürk 2018/a). Trump, on the other hand, threatened U.S. allies in a tweet message and warned that “anyone who does business with Iran will not be doing business with the United States” on August 7, 2018 (Haaretz 2018). In November 2018, U.S. agreed to give temporary exemption to 9 countries, including Turkey, China, Japan, India, Greece, Italy, Taiwan, South Korea, and Afghanistan, allowing them to continue buying Iranian oil after it imposes sanctions (BBC Türkçe 2018/d). However, Iran controversy still has the potential to turn into a hot topic in the following months since Iran decided to continue its uranium enrichment program in July 2019. In addition, with the assassination of Iranian commander Qasem Soleimani by a U.S. air strike at Baghdad Airport on January 3, 2020, Iran controversy has turned into a serious geopolitical risk. S-400  & F-35 Crises: Upon Turkey’s decision to buy Russian-made S-400 air missile defense system, the dose of criticism towards Ankara in Washington

24 The appointment of new American Ambassador to Ankara, Mr. David Satterfield was finally approved by the U.S. Senate in June 2019.

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increased again (DW Türkçe 2017/a). Some experts in Washington think that the Russian made system might cause security risks for NATO. For instance, Stein (2019) claims that the S-400 system might collect valuable electronic intelligence about the F-35. As a response, the U.S. Congress has been trying to suspend the delivery of F-35 aircrafts to Turkey (Sputnik Türkiye 2018/b). However, Turkey is among the 11 co-producer countries of the new generation aircraft. On August 1, 2018, the U.S. Congress approved a bill for delaying the delivery of F-35s to Turkey. President Trump signed the defense spending bill to delay the delivery of F-35s to Turkey in August 2018 (Hürriyet Daily News 2018/c). More recently, the U.S. halted the delivery of equipment related to the stealthy F-35 to Turkey (Reuters 2019/a). In addition, some analysts expect an economic sanction from Washington against Ankara in protest of this decision (AlJazeera 2019). Most recently, President Trump blamed the previous U.S. administration (Obama administration) for not allowing Turkey to get the American-made Patriot system and, in a sense, legitimatized the Turkish decision to buy the S-400 system while not mentioning any sanctions against Ankara (BBC Türkçe 2019). However, the U.S.  decided to remove Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet program in July 2019 (BBC 2019/a). To sum up, ongoing Trump era started in ruins due to the failed coup attempt in 2016, which destroyed model partnership and fueled anti-Americanism in Turkey once again. As a pragmatic leader, President Trump tried to follow a balanced policy between Turkey and Kurds and even gave green light to Turkey’s limited military operations. However, in order to deepen Turkish-American alliance, Donald Trump in his second term or the next U.S. President (Joe Biden recently became the official Presidential nominee of the Democratic Party) has to convince Ankara about implementing a not-conflicting Syria strategy and a not contradicting Kurdish policy.

IV. Turkish-American Alliance: Strengths and Weaknesses Turkish-American Relations have entered into a period of troubles in recent years. Some experts like Steven Cook even describe (2017/c) the two countries as “frenemies” now. As mentioned earlier, Turkish-American Relations need a new approach for the future after the failure of the two models (Turkey as a strong military ally and Turkey as a model country) that were tried before. This approach should be eclectic and realistic in nature and necessitates a new issue-based approach since previous efforts of model-based relationships failed. Turkish and American interests are still similar in most of the regional and international disputes, but there are also disagreements and conflicts of interest in some important issues. So, these two countries could work on a roadmap to strengthen their alliance first by deepening their partnership in issues that are based on mutual interests. The two countries need to discuss and negotiate problematic issues and find reconciliatory middle grounds to prevent a possible breakdown.

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Figure 1: U.S. and NATO military presence in Turkey (Zanotti & Thomas 2017, p. 12)

1. Strengths: Military Partnership: Although there are criticisms against Turkey for choosing to buy the S-400 system from Russia as its air missile defense system, the military partnership between the two countries is still very strong. For instance, Turkey is among the 11 countries that will buy F-35 aircrafts from the American firm Lockheed Martin (Sputnik Türkiye 2018/a) in case the crisis is solved. Turkey already announced in 1998 that it would make a $150 billion U.S. dollars arms and military equipment purchase from the U.S. until 2030 (Erhan 2006, p.  148). This shows that military alliance and arms dealings will continue to be a major issue -in a positive way- in bilateral relations. Moreover, American military officials continue to praise Turkey and underline the importance of strategic alliance between Washington and Ankara in recent years. For example, then-U.S. Chief of General Staff Joseph Dunford asserted in 2016 that military partnership between the two countries is “perfect” (Amerika’nın Sesi 2016/c). It should not be forgotten that the U.S.  and Turkey are NATO allies.

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Moreover, there are still many U.S.  and NATO military facilities in Turkey (Figure  1). Ankara and Washington could revive their military partnership in the next years, especially against common enemies. Here, Turkey’s mending relations with Israel could play a positive role. Previous American Ambassador in Ankara John Bass pointed out the positive results of Turkish-American alliance against ISIS (Sputnik Türkiye 2017/d). However, the statement of American General Raymond Thomas about his perception of PKK as a democratic group was a problematic approach that might spoil military partnership in the near future (Sputnik Türkiye 2017/b). The two countries could deepen their military partnership with the sale of F-35s as well as a surprise deal about Patriot system in the near future. Turkey’s Importance: Although there are severe critics against President Erdoğan, almost all people dealing with strategic issues accept that Turkey is a very important ally for Washington. Republican Dan Burton, for instance, thinks (2015) that Turkey is still very valuable to Washington for three main reasons: (1) Its ideal location for basing humanitarian relief operations as well as military interdiction operations, (2) Its anti-ISIS stance and critical role in anti-terror operations, especially since 2014, and (3) Its remarkable economic performance in the past decade. Moreover, Kirişci points out (2017) Turkey’s heavy burden in hosting 4  million Syrian refugees and Washington and the international community’s responsibility in helping Ankara. Danışmaz also underlines (2015) that, for the solution of the Syrian crisis in particular and stability in the Middle East in general, Turkey is still a “critical ally”. In addition, Zanotti and Thomas point out (2017) that “Turkey remains a key regional power that shares linkages and characteristics with the West, which may distinguish Turkey from other Muslim majority regional powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran”. It is obvious that Turkey will continue to be a major player in the region and Washington will not be willing to lose Turkey. In addition, Turkey’s strategic importance is mentioned in a recent critical editorial article towards President Erdoğan that was published in The New York Times on October 13, 2017.25 Michael Singh and James Jeffrey also wrote (2018) that although Turkey is a difficult ally, the Turkish-American alliance is “worth preserving”. Turkey’s Western Orientation: Turkey’s Western orientation and positive strategic look towards Washington has never changed until now. Although there have been times of crisis, Ankara never really considered breaking up with

25 “Turkey has been a vital ally of the United States since World War II. It fields NATO’s second-largest army, after America’s, and anchors the alliance’s eastern flank. It hosts military bases that are central to American operations in the Middle East, including Incirlik, where some 50 tactical nuclear weapons are stationed, and serves as a bridge between the Muslim world and the West.” (The New York Times 2017)

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Washington or quitting NATO by establishing a new alliance. In addition, all major political parties in Turkey do not propose an “exit” from the Western bloc in their party program. Turkey’s multi-dimensional foreign policy orientation, thus, should be interpreted as efforts to gain a degree of autonomy in foreign policy, not as leaving the Western bloc or betraying Washington. Developing Economic Ties: It should be noted that economic relations between the two counties continued to develop during the Obama period and reached the record level of $20 billion recently (Çınar 2015, p. 509).26 U.S. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) also is now over $5 billion, and Turkish FDI has recently reached near $1 billion (Çınar 2015, p. 509). However, looking at the overall picture, for the U.S., Turkey is only the 29th largest export market and 33rd largest import country (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ekonomi Bakanlığı), whereas for Turkey, the U.S. is the 5th largest export market (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu/a) and 4th largest import country (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu/b). Here, Turkey’s integration into the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), a proposed free trade agreement that would integrate the world’s largest economies, would be a positive development that would keep Turkey within the game in terms of its close partnership with the Western world (Lovely 2015). Recently, Turkey also decided to buy 40 Boeing 787–9 Dreamliner jet airliners worth $11 billion from Washington (Gürcanlı 2017). However, U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent decision to implement punitive tariffs on foreign steel and aluminum imports will negatively affect bilateral economic relations and might reduce the volume of trade between the two countries (Hürriyet Daily News 2018/d). Turkey responded to that by implementing extra tariffs on American electronic products (CNNTürk 2018). Most recently, during the U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross’ visit to Turkey in September 2019, officials of both countries declared that they want to increase the level of bilateral trade to $100 billion (Sabah 2019). Although due to coronavirus disease economic relations will get worse in 2020, a quick recovery is possible in 2021. Increasing Cultural Ties and Lobbying Activities: American culture is wellknown and appreciated in Turkey. Especially in terms of cinema (Hollywood, Netlix), music, and sports (NBA), Turkish people are quite familiar with the American culture. The number of Turkish students going to the U.S. for education is also regularly increasing (Milliyet 2013). There is even a city called “Little Turkey” with almost 40,000 Turkish residents in New Jersey, Paterson.27 Ibrahim Mike Baycora recently became the first Turkish-American police chief and began to work in Paterson. Moreover, there are many educational and civil society organizations in

26 Turkish Statesmen often give the more cautious number of $17.5 billion U.S. dollars (TRT 2016). 27 “Amerika’da Küçük Anadolu:  Günde 50 Türk yerleşiyor”, Date of Acces sion: 24.08.2019 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CS9LZtP2heg.

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Turkey promoting American culture and contributing to the Turkish-American alliance. A recent positive development in terms of lobbying was Turkey’s $1.1 million agreement with American PR firm Burson-Marsteller in order to strengthen bilateral relations (Kaytmaz 2017). In addition, President Erdoğan recently opened the Turkish House (Türkevi), a Turkish cultural center in New York (Sabah 2017). It seems like educational and cultural exchange activities will be even more influential and frequent in the future. In addition, although there was a negative trend in the last years due to the failed coup attempt in Turkey as well as increasing security risks in relation to ISIS, touristic activities are also increasing between the two countries and tourism industry analysts are optimistic about the future (Hürriyet 2017/c). However, the two countries have to find solutions to their problems and prevent crises in order to not sabotage economic and cultural relations. Coronavirus crisis will also negatively affect bilateral ties, but hopefully will not have lasting effects by 2021.

2. Weaknesses Kurdish Question: The most important problem in bilateral relations seems to be the Kurdish Question and American support of PYD/YPG for the moment. As Cook points outs (2017/a), most of the Turks see American support to Syrian Kurds as midwifing a terrorist organization on their southern border and against their own interests. Weapons given by Washington to PYD rebels might be used in the near future in the terrorist attacks made by PKK towards the Turkish Army and civilians and this might create a very strong anti-American atmosphere. Former American Ambassador to Ankara James Jeffrey previously warned that arming PYD militia will be considered “treason” by Turkey and Turkey might retaliate by closing down the Incirlik Airbase (Sputnik Türkiye 2017/e). In addition, as a country that hosts (as citizens) more Kurds than any other country in the world, Turkey is clearly afraid of another autonomous or independent Kurdistan in northern Syria after Northern Iraq. Soli Özel thinks (2017) that the Kurdish Question is not caused by the personal problems between American and Turkish leaders, but rather because of the two countries’ contradicting regional policies and the lack of a middle ground in adjusting the two sides. Moreover, the problem is not only limited to Washington’s arms supply to PYD, but rather the two countries’ different perspectives over the future of the Kurdish groups. Starting from the 1980s, many people in Ankara suspected Washington’s long-term plan of creating a Kurdish State.28 Moreover, Turkish statesmen think that high expectations and strong legal position for Kurds 28 American diplomat Robert S. Dillon wrote an important report to the Department of State on October 19, 1965 after a short trip to Turkey’s densely Kurdish populated Southeastern Anatolia. Dillon stated that he closely observed non-Turkishness of the area as well as the colonial nature of Turkish administration in the region and concluded that Kurdish nationalism might be a real threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity in the years to come. This shows that Americans were aware of the potential

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in Syria and Iraq would be a source of motivation for Turkey’s Kurds in demanding federalism. In addition, as Oğuzlu points out (2017), northern Syria might turn into another Qandil, a safe haven for PYD-PKK terrorists due to American policies. So, the two countries have to work together and arrange a joint plan for solving the Kurdish Question and design a roadmap. As Caşın underlines, if Turkey and the U.S.  could not agree on a coherent Kurdish policy, Washington will further distance Ankara from itself, and this might lead to a shift in Turkish Foreign Policy, with Turkey becoming closer to Russia and China (Yazıcıoğlu 2017/d). One positive development in recent days concerning the Kurdish Question was Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu’s statement claiming that President Trump had made a promise in a phone call to his Turkish counterpart President Erdoğan about no longer arming the Kurdish militia in Syria (BBC 2017/d). In addition, James Jeffrey, who has been widely respected by Turkish public, was recently appointed as U.S. special representative to Syria (Hürriyet Daily News 2018/a). Decision made by the Trump administration about withdrawing American troops from Syria also softened two countries’ relations, but there is still not an agreement between two allies about the future of Kurds. Authoritarianism in Turkey: Turkey’s authoritarian transformation in recent years is also an important problem. Turkish President Erdoğan has not agreed with critics coming from Washington about his Islamist and authoritarian style. Turkey now has a more authoritarian Presidential system, but unlike many other post-Soviet Turkic countries, Turkish State also distanced itself from secularism. Pro-secular and moderate Islamist groups have been targeted in Turkey in recent years with unending trials, media censorship, and repression. Turkey’s Islamist and authoritarian domestic policy preferences as a secular country that has always been a Western ally have been strongly criticized by authorities and commentators in Washington in recent years. James Jeffrey for instance states that “the idea of Turkey as a democratic political Islam champion in the region has kind of faded in the last few years” (CFR 2016). Furthermore, American diplomat Philip Gordon underlines that Turkey should not be seen as a reliable partner for Washington anymore due to its Islamist and authoritarian orientation in the last few years (BBC Türkçe 2017/a). In the meeting between U.S. Vice President Mike Pence and then-Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, the issue of arrested journalists and civil activists was mentioned and Turkey’s authoritarian transformation was criticized (DW Türkçe 2017/b). Moreover, on October 25, 2017, a bipartisan group of U.S. Senators sent a letter to President Trump expressing their “grave concern about the continuing erosion of human rights and decline of democratic values in Turkey”, which reflects a growing frustration on Capitol Hill with Turkish President Erdoğan (Cook 2017/c). Taşpınar also believes (2017) that it has become increasingly difficult to pretend that Turkey is a democracy, and the lack of shared values Kurdish problem in Turkey and they began to arrange their policies towards Turkey in accordance with this (Bali 2010, pp. 221–228).

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is a major problem in Turkish-American Relations, which has transformed into a “marriage of convenience” in recent years. In addition, Barkey underlines (CFR 2018/a) that Turkey is not a democracy and in fact never was a real democracy. But aside from these pessimistic critics, Turkey’s political system and political culture is still in many ways closer to European or American models of democracy compared to its eastern neighbors. Lack of Confidence: There is a visible loss and lack of confidence between Ankara and Washington in recent years. This is caused by Turkey’s close economic relations (especially in the field of energy) with the Russian Federation, a traditional American rival that has started to challenge Washington’s policies again, especially in its “near abroad” geography, during Vladimir Putin’s Presidency. Turkey, as a country severely lacking energy to develop its industries, has to cooperate with its energy-rich neighbors including Russia. Thus, it is very plausible that Turkey’s fundamental aim in its foreign policy is to become an “energy hub” in the region. However, Turkey’s close cooperation with Russia in the field of energy (Russia is also establishing a nuclear plant in Turkey – Mersin Akkuyu Nuclear Plant) and military issues (S-400 purchase) disturbs some groups that are more concerned about Russia’s anti-Western foreign policy moves. Turkey’s recent decision to purchase S-400 air missile defense system from Russia was also criticized by Washington. However, Turkish President Erdoğan frequently mentions that Ankara decided to buy the S-400 missile defense from Russia since Washington was not willingly to sell its Patriot missile defense system.29 This shows that the trust deficit between the two countries still continues and American support to the Kurdish militia in Syria seems to be the main reason for this problem. In order to warn Washington about potential problems in the future, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu recently said that Ankara expects more from Washington in order to overcome this lack of confidence (DW Türkçe 2018/a). Anti-Americanism: Another problem is related to the image of U.S. in Turkey. According to a study conducted by Kadir Has University, the U.S. is perceived as the biggest source of threat by 65.5 % of Turkish people in 2017 (Hacaloğlu 2017). Anti-Americanism’s steady rise after the failed coup attempt during the Obama period continued and even accelerated during the Trump period due to popular belief about American involvement in the failed coup attempt and Washington’s pro-Kurdish policy. In the more recent study of Kadir Has University in 2019, results show that the U.S. is perceived by 81.3 % of Turkish people as the biggest threat to their country (Kadir Has Üniversitesi Türkiye Çalışmaları Merkezi 2019),

29 However, more recently, American diplomat and the then-Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Tina Kaidanow announced that Ankara and Washington are in negotiation process for the sale of Patriot system (Habertürk 2018/b). Moreover, in December 2018, the U.S. State Department notified Congress of a proposal to sell the Patriot air missile defense system to Turkey (Capaccio & Wadhams 2018). However, this offer was later withdrawn (Browne 2019).

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which proves that the anti-Americanism in Turkey boomed again after the failed coup attempt. However, as Clinton Presidency and early Obama years prove, successful PR efforts and more coherent policies in terms of regional and global affairs could easily solve this problem. In that sense, Washington should be cautious about arming the Kurdish militia and should find a mechanism to their use against Turkey. President Trump’s most recent decision to move the American Embassy to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv and to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital might also strengthen anti-Americanism in Turkey. President Erdoğan said that this decision completely disregarded the UN resolution of 1980 concerning the status of Jerusalem, and it would throw the region into a “ring of fire” (Haaretz 2017). Erdoğan also labeled Israel as a “terrorist state” and declared American recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital “null and void” (AlJazeera 2017/a). Erdoğan repeated his views a few days before the opening ceremony in Jerusalem and said that this decision was a “huge mistake” (Anderson & Vonberg 2018). Other Problems: In addition to these problems, as Çınar points out (2015, p. 510), Turkey’s developing relations with China and other non-NATO countries (especially Iran), Armenian genocide claims and resolutions in the U.S. Congress, and the rights of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey can be listed as other important sources of disagreement between the two countries. However, since the 100th anniversary of the 1915 events, often seen -unjustly- by the Western countries as a genocide, has scraped through with official “Meds Yeghern” (Great Calamity) statements, Turkey still keeps its pro-Western orientation in many aspects of its political and diplomatic course, and Turkish government has been actively trying to change its classical system in favor or non-Muslim groups30 and other Muslim groups such as Alevis31, these problems might not be biggest political discussions in next years. Sedat Ergin on the other hand points out (2018) Ankara’s problem of not understanding the complex decision-making mechanism in the American system, which creates additional problems concerning bilateral relations. Finally, the detention of Turkish-Iranian businessman Reza Zarrab in the U.S. due to illegal gold trade between Iran and Turkey became an important issue in recent years. Zarrab had close relations with the AK Parti government and Turkish Ministers. For instance, former Turkish Minister of the Economy Zafer Çağlayan was also charged during this investigation (United States Department of Justice). Cook claims (2017/c) that the Zarrab case is dangerous for Erdoğan in two ways: first,

30 Turkish State has been financing the restoration of old Greek and Armenian churches in Anatolia for several years (Dünya 2012; Hürriyet Daily News 2016; Sputnik Türkiye 2017/c). Moreover, historical Bulgarian Church in Balat was recently reopened in Istanbul after 7 years of restoration (Hürriyet Daily News 2018/b). 31 Although it did not satisfy Alevis, Turkish State for the first time in its history added Alevi faith into its official curriculum for obligatory religious education course (Uygun 2017). However, Islamization of the educational system is still considered as a problem by secular groups in Turkey (Cumhuriyet 2017).

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Zarrab has connections in the highest levels of Turkish government and could expose his connections during the case, and second, Halkbank and other Turkish banks might be sanctioned by Washington due to their involvement in the illegal gold trade between Turkey and Iran. Upon the decision of Zarrab to become a repentant, Zarrab’s case eventually turned into Atilla’s case (Mehmet Hakan Atilla, a top executive at majority state-owned Turkish bank Halkbank) and a U.S. jury found Atilla guilty of helping Iran to evade American sanctions (The Guardian 2018). Eventually, Atilla was sentenced to 32 months in prison by the American court for taking part in a billion-dollar conspiracy to violate U.S.  sanctions on Iran (Weiser 2018). U.S.-Turkey Business Council Executive Director Jennifer Miel claims (CFR 2018/a) that Zarrab case might lead to a fine between $2–3 billion against Halkbank and might negatively affect the Turkish economy. Nasi, on the other hand, underlines (2017/b) that, although Ankara has been trying to portray Zarrab’s case as a part of an international conspiracy against President Erdoğan, Washington’s steps are in fact targeting Iran, not Turkey, in accordance with President Trump’s new foreign policy preference. Moreover, Çeviköz points out (2017) a new problem on the side of Washington concerning the Trump period: the difficulty of making decisions and implementing them within the complex democratic system of the U.S. This problem became apparent when President Trump’s recent statement about not supplying arms to Kurdish militia groups in Syria was refuted by a Pentagon statement about keeping the Kurdish alliance alive as long as it is deemed necessary (A Haber 2017).

Conclusion This chapter aimed at analyzing Turkish-American Relations in the post-Cold War period within the perspective of a theoretical framework. Throughout the chapter, it was revealed that -due to disagreements in terms of some key issues- TurkishAmerican Relations lack a strategic vision now and thus, there is an urgent need for creating a new type of partnership. This model should be based on two countries’ national interests and realistic and eclectic in nature. Two countries can easily overcome their problems with mutual respect, trust, and search for consensus. In order to get out from the current purgatory period and return back to the zone of alliance, Washington and Ankara should focus on strategic issues such as the fate of Kurds and the future of Syria, while at the same time trying to improve their social, economic, and cultural relations. All the issues revealed in this piece prove that, although there are many problems in Turkish-American Relations, these problems are not unsolvable if both sides are willing to work on them together and ready to give concessions to each other. This new issue-based realistic perspective might be more successful than previous theoretical based models as long as the two countries do not dare to lose each other and sacrifice their long-term strategic partnership to petty politics. However, in case relations get worse in this manner in the following years, it might be a wiser decision to try to revitalize one of the previous models (“military

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partnership” or “model partnership”). The reason to be optimistic about the future of Turkish-American Relations was once again proven with Turkey’s recent medical supplies to U.S. during the coronavirus disease (Covid-19) and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s thank to Turkish government and people.

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Amerika’nın Sesi (2016/c), “Dunford: ‘İki Ülke Arasında Askeri İlişkiler Mükemmel’ ”, Date of Accession: 07.07.2017 from https://www.amerikaninsesi.com/a/dunford-iki-ulkearasinda-askeri-ilikiler-mukemmel/3585015.html. Amerika’nın Sesi (2017), “Senato’dan Erdoğan’a Mektup”, Date of Accession: 01.08.2017 from https://www.amerikaninsesi.com/a/senato-dan-erdogan-a-mektup/3860984.html. Anderson, Becky & Vonberg, Judith (2018), “Turkey’s Erdogan Calls Jerusalem US Embassy Move ‘Huge Mistake’ ”, CNN, Date of Accession: 14.05.2018 from https://edition.cnn. com/2018/05/09/europe/erdogan-interview-becky-anderson-intl/index.html. Arı, Tayyar (2006/a), “Geçmişten Günümüze Türkiye’nin Orta Doğu Politikasının Analizi ve İlişkileri Belirleyen Dinamikler”, in 21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası (ed. İdris Bal), Ankara: Ankara Global Araştırmalar Merkezi, pp. 695–728. Arı, Tayyar (2006/b), “Türkiye, Irak ve ABD: Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde Basra Körfezinde Yeni Parametreler”, in 21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası (ed. İdris Bal), Ankara: Ankara Global Araştırmalar Merkezi, pp. 729–752. Atmaca, Ayşe Ömür (2017), “Turkey-US Relations (2009–2016): A Troubled Partnership in a Troubled World?”, in Turkish Foreign Policy: International Relations, Legality and Global Reach (ed. Pınar Gözen Ercan), Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 63–82. Aydın, Mustafa (2017), “Post-Referendum Tension in Iraq”, Hürriyet Daily News, Date of Accession: 03.11.2017 from http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/mustafa-aydin/ post-referendum-tension-in-iraq-121748. Aydınlık (2017), “Devlet kurmak herkesin hakkı”, Date of Accession: 27.07.2017 from https://www.aydinlik.com.tr/politika/2017-haziran/devlet-kurmak-herkesin-hakki. Baba, Gürol (2016), “Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkilerinde Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Faktörü: Arka Plan, Diskurlar, Etkileşimler”, in Mavi Elma: Türkiye-Avrupa İlişkileri (eds. Hüseyin Işıksal&Ozan Örmeci), Ankara: Gazi Kitabevi, pp. 177–203. Baba, Gürol & Önsoy, Murat (2016), “Between Capability and Foreign Policy: Comparing Turkey’s Small Power and Middle Power Status”, Uluslararası İlişkiler, Vol. 13, No: 51, pp. 3–20. Bağcı, Hüseyin (2006), “11 Eylül Sonrası Dönemde Türk Dış ve Güvenlik Politikalarındaki Gelişmeler ve Yeni Parametreler”, in 21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası (ed. İdris Bal), Ankara: Ankara Global Araştırmalar Merkezi, pp. 939–944. Bal, İdris (2006), “Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri ve 2003 Irak Savaşı‘nın Önemi”, in 21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası (ed. İdris Bal), Ankara: Ankara Global Araştırmalar Merkezi, pp. 151– 184. Bal, İdris& Laçiner, Sedat (2006), “Küresel Terörle Mücadelede ABD Güvenlik Politikalarının Türkiye’nin İç Güvenliğine Yansımaları”, in 21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası (ed. by İdris Bal), Ankara: Ankara Global Araştırmalar Merkezi, pp. 945–958. Bali, Rıfat N. (2010), Turkey in the 1960’s and 1970’s Through the Reports of American Diplomats, İstanbul: Libra Kitap. Barkey, Henri J. (2016), “Syria’s Dark Shadow over US-Turkey Relations”, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Date of Accession: 07.07.2017 from http://turkishpolicy.com/article/782/ syrias-dark-shadow-over-us-turkey-relations. BBC (2017/a), “Iraqi Kurdistan Referendum: High Turnout in Independence Vote”, Date of Accession: 30.09.2017 from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41394439.

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BBC (2017/b), “Turkey and US Suspend Most Visa Services”, Date of Accession: 09.10.2017 from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41547502. BBC (2017/c), “US Missions in Turkey to Resume Full Visa Services after Row”, Date of Accession: 28.12.2017 from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42505623. BBC (2017/d), “US to Stop Arming Anti-IS Syrian Kurdish YPG Militia – Turkey”, Date of Accession: 25.11.2017 from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42118567. BBC (2018), “Trump on the Iran Deal: ‘Worst, Horrible, Laughable’ ”, Date of Accession: 07.08.2018 from https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-41587428/ trump-on-the-iran-deal-worst-horrible-laughable. BBC (2019/a), “US Removes Turkey from F-35 Fighter Jet Programme”, Date of Accession: 18.08.2019 from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49023115. BBC (2019/b), “Turkey to Suspend Syria Offensive, Mike Pence Announces”, Date of Accession: 17.10.2019 from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50091305. BBC Türkçe (2017/a), “ABD ve Türkiye arasında umut veren ortaklığın sonu geldi”, Date of Accession: 11.10.2017 from http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-41576946. BBC Türkçe (2017/b), “Irak Kürdistan Bölgesel Yönetimi bağımsızlık referandumu tarihini açıkladı: 25 Eylül”, Date of Accession: 27.07.2017 from http://www.bbc.com/turkce/ haberler-dunya-40191041. BBC Türkçe (2017/c), “Trump’tan Rakka operasyonu öncesi YPG’ye silah yardımına onay”, Date of Accession: 07.07.2017 from http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberlerdunya-39865038. BBC Türkçe (2018/a), “ABD Başkan Yardımcısı Pence: Brunson serbest kalana kadar Türkiye’ye yaptırım uygulamaya hazırız”, Date of Accession: 31.07.2018 from https:// www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-44969818. BBC Türkçe (2018/b), “Çavuşoğlu: YPG Menbiç‘ten çekilecek, güvenliği Türkiye ve ABD sağlayacak”, Date of Accession: 13.03.2018 from http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberlerturkiye-43384657. BBC Türkçe (2018/c), “Erdoğan: ABD İçişleri ve Adalet Bakanlarının Türkiye’deki mal varlıklarını donduruyoruz”, Date of Accession: 05.08.2018 from https://www.bbc.com/ turkce/haberler-turkiye-45068867. BBC Türkçe (2018/d), “ABD’nin İran yaptırımları: Türkiye dahil 8 ülke geçici olarak muaf”, Date of Accession: 13.11.2018 from https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberlerdunya-46098231. BBC Türkçe (2019), “Erdoğan-Trump görüşmesi: Erdoğan, ‘İki stratejik ortak arasında yaptırım gibi bir şey söz konusu olmaz’ dedi”, Date of Accession: 08.07.2019 from https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-48810560. Bezci, Egemen & Borroz, Nicholas (2016), “The CIA and a Turkish Coup”, War on the Rocks, Date of Accession: 07.07.2017 from https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/the-cia-and-aturkish-coup/. Birgün (2017), “Cumhurbaşkanı Başdanışmanı: ABD askerlerini vurabiliriz”, Date of Accession: 21.06.2017 from http://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/cumhurbaskanibasdanismani-abd-askerlerini-vurabiliriz-157929.html. Bölükbaşı, Deniz (2008), 1 Mart Vakası Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası, İstanbul: Doğan Kitap.

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Browne, Ryan (2019), “US Formally Pulls Turkey’s Patriot Missile System Offer”, CNN, Date of Accession: 24.08.2019 from https://edition.cnn.com/2019/08/22/politics/turkeypatriot-missiles-us/index.html. Burton, Dan (2015), “Why Turkey Matters”, The Washington Times, Date of Accession: 21.07.2017 from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/19/danburton-why-turkey-matters/. Butler, John & Friedman, Dov (2016), “The Roots of Gulenist Power in Turkey”, Foreign Affairs, Date of Accession: 21.07.2017 from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ turkey/2016-08-02/roots-gulenist-power-turkey. Capaccio, Anthony & Wadhams, Nick (2018), “U.S. Backs Patriot Missile Sale to Turkey in Breakthrough”, Bloomberg, Date of Accession: 19.12.2018 from https://www.bloomberg. com/news/articles/2018-12-19/state-department-backs-missile-sale-to-turkey-inbreakthrough. CBS News (2018), “White House Orders Pentagon to Pull Troops from Syria Immediately”, Date of Accession: 14.01.2019 from https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trumpadministration-to-withdraw-troops-from-syria-immediately/. CBS News (2019), “Nearly 1,000 U.S. Troops Still in Syria Months after Last ISIS-Held Territory Was Liberated”, Date of Accession: 24.08.2019 from https://www.cbsnews. com/news/1000-u-s-troops-still-in-syria-months-after-last-isis-held-territory-wasliberated/. CFR (2016), “What To Do about Turkey”, Date of Accession: 21.06.2017 from https://www. cfr.org/event/what-do-about-turkey. CFR (2018/a), “A Look Inside Turkey”, Date of Accession: 15.01.2018 from https://www.cfr. org/event/look-inside-turkey. CFR (2018/b), “Northern Syria: The United States, Turkey, and the Kurds”, Date of Accession: 06.06.2018 from https://www.cfr.org/event/northern-syria-united-statesturkey-and-kurds. Cindemir, Kasım (2016), “Darbe Girişimi Sonrasında Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri Nasıl Bir Yön Alacak?”, Amerika’nın Sesi, Date of Accession: 26.07.2017 from https://www. amerikaninsesi.com/a/darbe-girisimi-sonrasinda-turkiye-abd-iliskileri-ewd/3447813. html. CNN (2016), “Obama: US Was Not Involved in Turkish Coup Attempt”, Date of Accession: 21.07.2017 from http://edition.cnncom/2016/07/22/politics/obama-turkeyextradition-news-conference/index.html. CNNTürk (2017/a), “Erdoğan: Obama bizi PYD ve YPG konusunda aldatmıştır”, Date of Accession: 20.07.2017 from http://www.CNNturk.com/turkiye/erdogan-obama-bizi-pydve-ypg-konusunda-aldatmistir. CNNTürk (2017/b), “Son dakika… Türkiye’den ABD’ye vize misillemesi”, Date of Accession: 09.10.2017 from https://www.CNNturk.com/son-dakika-turkiyeden-abdyevize-misillemesi. CNNTürk (2018), “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: ‘ABD’nin elektronik ürünlerine boykot uygulayacağız’ ”, Date of Accession: 14.08.2018 from https://www.CNNturk.com/ turkiye/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-abdnin-elektronik-urunlerine-boykot-uygulayacagiz.

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Cook, Steven A. (2016), “Between Ankara and Rojava”, Foreign Affairs, Date of Accession: 25.07.2017 from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2016-03-14/ between-ankara-and-rojava. Cook, Steven A. (2017/a), “Donald Trump Is Repeating Obama’s Errors in Dealing with Turkey’s Erdogan: But There Is Another Way Forward”, CFR, Date of Accession: 25.07.2017 from https://www.cfr.org/blog-post/donald-trump-repeatingobamas-errors-dealing-turkeys-erdogan-there-another-way-forward. Cook, Steven A. (2017/b), “Is the World Ready for “Kurdexit”? Referendum Among Iraqi Kurds Has Middle East on Edge”, CFR, Date of Accession: 14.09.2017 from https://www. cfr.org/blog/world-ready-kurdexit-referendum-among-iraqi-kurds-has-middle-eastedge. Cook, Steven A. (2017/c), “Turkey: Friend or Frenemy? A Tangled Relationship Keeps Getting Worse”, CFR, Date of Accession: 14.11.2017 from https://www.cfr.org/blog/ turkey-friend-or-frenemy-tangled-relationship-keeps-getting-worse. Cumhuriyet (2017), “CHP’nin eğitim çalıştayı raporu tamamlandı: Cemaatlere teslim edildi”, Date of Accession: 16.01.2018 from http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/egitim/838926/ CHP_nin_egitim_calistayi_raporu_tamamlandi__Cemaatlere_teslim_edildi.html. Cunningham, Erin (2018), “Pastor Andrew Brunson released to U.S. diplomatic personnel after being detained by Turkish authorities for two years”, The Washington Post, Date of Accession: 12.10.2018 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/ turkish-court-orders-release-of-us-pastor-andrew-brunson/2018/10/12/a793df78-ccbf11e8-ad0a-0e01efba3cc1_story.html. Çakır, Armağan Emre (2016), The United States and Turkey’s Path to Europe: Hands across the Table, New York: Routledge. Çakır, Arzu (2016), “TBMM Heyeti Paris’te Darbe Girişimini Anlattı”, Amerika’nın Sesi, Date of Accession: 21.07.2017 from https://www.amerikaninsesi.com/a/tbmm-heyetiparis-te-darbe-girisimini-anlatti/3448034.html. Çetin, Tan (2017), “ ‘Trump Türkiye’nin Beklentilerini Karşılamayabilir’ ”, Amerika’nın Sesi, Date of Accession: 07.07.2017 from https://www.amerikaninsesi.com/a/trump-turkyeninbeklentlerini-karsilamayabir/3692984.html. Çetin, Tan (2018), “Güvenç: ‘Ortadoğu’da Türkiye ABD İşbirliği Mümkün Değil’ ”, Amerika’nın Sesi, Date of Accession: 18.02.2018 from https://www.amerikaninsesi. com/a/turk-amerikan-iliskileri-cikmaza-surukleniyor/4251885.html. Çeviköz, Ünal (2017), “Türkiye-ABD ilişkilerinde muhatap sorunu”, Hürriyet, Date of Accession: 01.12.2017 from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/unal-cevikoz/turkiyeabd-iliskilerinde-muhatap-sorunu-40662753. Çınar, Ali (2015), “Turkey-USA Relations”, in Turkish Foreign Policy in the New Millennium (eds. Hüseyin Işıksal & Ozan Örmeci), Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, pp. 505–513. Daily Sabah (2017), “McCain Warns Pentagon of Turkey-YPG Conflict in Syria”, Date of Accession: 07.07.2017 from https://www.dailysabah.com/mideast/2017/03/09/mccainwarns-pentagon-of-turkey-ypg-conflict-in-syria. Danışmaz, Halil (2015), “Turkey: A critical US Ally for Middle East Stability”, The Hill, Date of Accession: 21.07.2017 from http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreignpolicy/239575-turkey-a-critical-us-ally-for-middle-east-stability.

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Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2001), Stratejik Derinlik Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu, İstanbul: Küre Yayınları. Dettmer, Jamie (2016), “Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerini McGurk mü Bozdu?”, Amerika’nın Sesi, Date of Accession: 21.07.2017 from https://www.amerikaninsesi.com/a/turkiye-abdiliskilerini-mcgurk-mu-bozdu/3202063.html. DHA (2016), “Erdoğan’dan FETÖ‘yle ilgili açıklamalar”, Date of Accession: 08.08.2017 from http://arsiv.dha.com.tr/erdogandan-fetoyle-ilgili-aciklamalar_1296581.html. Diken (2017), “Erdoğan, korumalarına tutuklama isteyen ABD’ye öfkelendi: Bu nasıl hukuk?”, Date of Accession: 21.09.2017 from http://www.diken.com.tr/erdogankorumalarina-tutuklama-karari-cikarilmasina-tepkili-bu-nasil-hukuk/. Dilek, Cahit Armağan (2017), “ABD’nin Türkiye’de İç Çatışma Öngörüsü ve Suriye’de PKK/YPG’ye Desteği”, 21. Yüzyıl Türkiye Enstitüsü, Date of Accession: 02.08.2017 from http://www.21yyte.org/tr/arastirma/milli-guvenlik-ve-dis-politika-arastirmalarimerkezi/2017/08/01/8685/abdnin-turkiyede-ic-catisma-ongorusu-ve-suriyede-pkkypgyedestegi. Dünya (2012), “Turkey to Begin Second Restoration of Historical Armenian Church”, Date of Accession: 07.09.2017 from https://www.dunya.com/gundem/turkey-to-begin-secondrestoration-of-historical-armenian-church-haberi-194703. Dünya Bülteni (2011), “‘Our Boys Did It’ öldü”, Date of Accession: 07.07.2017 from http:// www.dunyabulteni.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=162138. DW Türkçe (2017/a), “ABD Türkiye’nin alacağı S-400’lerle ilgili endişeli”, Date of Accession: 01.08.2017 from http://www.dw.com/tr/abd-t%C3%BCrkiyeninalaca%C4%9F%C4%B1-s-400lerle-ilgili-endi%C5%9Feli/a-39913559. DW Türkçe (2017/b), “Beyaz Saray’dan Yıldırım-Pence görüşmesine dair açıklama”, Date of Accession: 10.11.2017 from http://www.dw.com/tr/beyaz-saraydan-yıldırım-pencegörüşmesine-dair-açıklama/a-41322233. DW Türkçe (2018/a), “Çavuşoğlu: ABD’den somut adımlar bekliyoruz”, Date of Accession: 31.01.2018 from http://www.dw.com/tr/%C3%A7avu%C5%9Fo%C4%9Fluabdden-somut-ad%C4%B1mlar-bekliyoruz/a-42199568. DW Türkçe (2018/b), “Pentagon Sözcüsü: Menbiç‘ten çekilmiyoruz”, Date of Accession: 20.03.2018 from http://www.dw.com/tr/pentagon-sözcüsü-menbiçtençekilmiyoruz/a-43041572. DW Türkçe (2018/c), “Tillerson’dan “zorlu dönem” mesajı”, Date of Accession: 15.09.2018 from https://www.dw.com/tr/tillersondan-zorlu-d%C3%B6nemmesaj%C4%B1/a-42964661. Erdogan, Recep Tayyip (2018), “Erdogan: How Turkey Sees the Crisis with the U.S.”, The New York Times, Date of Accession: 12.08.2018 from https://www.nytimes. com/2018/08/10/opinion/turkey--trump-crisis-sanctions.html. Erdogan, Recep Tayyip (2019), “Erdogan: Trump Is Right on Syria. Turkey Can Get the Job Done.”, The New York Times, Date of Accession: 14.02.2019 from https://www.nytimes. com/2019/01/07/opinion/erdogan-turkey-syria.html. Ergin, Sedat (2018), “Türk-ABD ilişkileri buzdolabına konmalı”, Hürriyet, Date of Accession: 31.07.2018 from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/sedat-ergin/turk-abdiliskileri-buzdolabina-konmali-40913321.

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Erhan, Çağrı (2006), “Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Mantıksal Çerçevesi”, in 21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası (ed. İdris Bal), Ankara: Ankara Global Araştırmalar Merkezi, pp. 139–150. Erhan, Çağrı & Sıvış, Efe (2017), “Determinants of Turkish-American Relations and Prospects for the Future”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 19, No: 1, Winter 2017, pp. 89–115. Erkmen, Serhat (2016), “Analiz: ABD-Türkiye ilişkilerinde son perde”, DW Türkçe, Date of Accession: 07.07.2017 from http://www.dw.com/tr/analiz-abd-t%C3%BCrkiyeili%C5%9Fkilerinde-son-perde/a-19532082. Esbrook, Leslie (2015), “Alliance Re-Set? The Course of US-Turkish Relations Post-2012 Elections”, in Turkish Foreign Policy in the New Millennium (eds. by Hüseyin Işıksal & Ozan Örmeci), Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, pp. 559–573. Falk, Richard (2016), “Türkiye-ABD ilişkilerinde ihtiyatlı yumuşama”, AlJazeera Türk, Date of Accession: 21.07.2017 from http://www.AlJazeera.com.tr/gorus/turkiye-abdiliskilerinde-ihtiyatli-yumusama. France24 (2017/a), “US Charges President Erdogan’s Washington Security Team with Assault”, Date of Accession: 07.07.2017 from http://www.france24.com/en/20170615erdogans-security-guards-charged-with-assault-washington. France24 (2017/b), “US Ends CIA Programme Arming Anti-Assad Syria Rebels”, Date of Accession: 27.07.2017 from http://www.france24.com/en/20170721-us-trump-endscovert-cia-programme-arming-anti-assad-syria-rebels. France24 (2018/a), “Turkey, US Lift Sanctions against Ministers”, Date of Accession: 02.11.2018 from https://www.france24.com/en/20181102-turkey-usa-liftsanctions-against-ministers-gul-sessions-nielsen-soylu-brunson. France24 (2018/b), “US, Turkish Forces Begin Joint Syria Patrols as Turkey Continues to Strike Kurds”, Date of Accession: 03.11.2018 from https://www.france24.com/ en/20181102-usa-turkey-patrols-manbij-syria-kurds-sdf. Gaouette, Nicole (2017), “Trump Welcomes Erdogan Amid US-Turkey Strains”, CNN, Date of Accession: 26.07.2017 from http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/16/politics/trumperdogan-visit/index.html. Gözen, Ramazan (2006/a), “Kuzey Irak Sorunu”, in 21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası (ed. İdris Bal), Ankara Global Araştırmalar Merkezi, pp. 797–818. Gözen, Ramazan (2006/b), “Türkiye’nin II. Körfez Savaşı Politikası: Aktif Politika ve Sonuçları”, in 21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası (ed. İdris Bal), Ankara Global Araştırmalar Merkezi, pp. 753–778. Gumrukcu, Tuvan & Toksabay, Ece (2018), “Turkey, US Agree Roadmap to Avert Crisis in Syria’s Manbij, Few Details”, Reuters, Date of Accession: 05.06.2018 from https://www. reuters.com/article/us-usa-turkey/turkey-u-s-agree-roadmap-to-avert-crisis-in-syriasmanbij-few-details-idUSKCN1J01ZC. Gürcanlı, Zeynep (2017), “Trump-Erdoğan zirvesinden sonra 11 milyar dolarlık imza”, Sözcü, Date of Accession: 22.09.2017 from http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2017/gundem/ trump-erdogan-zirvesinden-sonra-11-milyar-dolarlik-imza-2020732/. Haaretz (2017), “Turkey’s Erdogan: Trump’s Recognition of Jerusalem Throws Region into ‘Ring of Fire’ ”, Date of Accession: 10.12.2017 from https://www.haaretz.com/middleeast-news/turkey/1.827446.

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Haaretz (2018), “Trump Warns Europe and Japan, Trade with Iran and You Will Not Trade with U.S.”, Date of Accession: 07.08.2018 from https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/trumptweets-anyone-trading-with-iran-will-not-trade-with-u-s-1.6359478. Habertürk (2018/a), “ABD’ye bir rest daha: Teşvik ediyoruz!”, Date of Accession: 07.08.2018 from https://www.haberturk.com/abd-ye-bir-rest-daha-tesvik-ediyoruz-2093068. Habertürk (2018/b), “Son dakika… ABD Türkiye’ye Patriot satmak istiyor!”, Date of Accession: 16.07.2018 from https://www.haberturk.com/son-dakika-abd-turkiye-yepatriot-satmak-istiyor-2061157#. Hacaloğlu, Hilmi (2016), “Darbe Teşebbüsü Sonrası Türkiye’de ABD’ye Tepki Artıyor”, Amerika’nın Sesi, Date of Accession: 21.07.2017 from https://www.amerikaninsesi. com/a/darbe-tesebbusu-sonrasi-turkiye-de-abd-ye-tepki-artiyor/3421728.html. Hacaloğlu, Hilmi (2017), “Türkiye’de ABD Algısı Giderek Kötüleşiyor”, Amerika’nın Sesi, Date of Accession: 23.07.2017 from https://www.amerikaninsesi.com/a/turkiye-de-abdalgisi-gitgide-zayifliyor/3953895.html. Hale, William (2013), Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774, 3rd edition, Routledge. Hubbard, Ben & Gall, Carlotta (2019), “Turkey Launches Offensive Against U.S.-Backed Syrian Militia”, The New York Times, Date of Accession: 10.10.2019 from https://www. nytimes.com/2019/10/09/world/middleeast/turkey-attacks-syria.html. Hürriyet (2009), “Full Text of the US President’s Speech at Turkish Parliament”, Date of Accession: 26.07.2017 from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/full-text-of-the-us-presidentsspeech-at-turkish-parliament-11376661. Hürriyet (2017/a), “ABD Büyükelçiliği’nden konsolosluk çalışanının tutuklanmasına tepki”, Date of Accession: 09.10.2017 from https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/amp/abdbuyukelciliginden-konsolosluk-calisaninin-tutuklanmasina-tepki-40600567. Hürriyet (2017/b), “ABD’den ilginç Türkiye çıkışı: Onlar bunu size sunamaz!”, Date of Accession: 29.11.2017 from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/son-dakika-abdden-ilgincturkiye-cikisi-onlar-bunu-size-sunamaz-40661450. Hürriyet (2017/c), “Amerikalı turist Türkiye’ye yöneldi, bu yıl rekor bekliyoruz”, Date of Accession: 19.09.2017 from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/amerikali-turist-turkiyeyeyoneldi-bu-yil-rekor-bekliyoruz-40529300. Hürriyet (2017/d), “Dışişleri’nden ABD’ye tepki: Karar tasarısını reddediyoruz”, Date of Accession: 20.07.2017 from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/disislerinden-abdye-tepki-karartasarisini-reddediyoruz-40470009. Hürriyet (2017/e), “Hâlâ 1 Mart tezkeresinin bedelini ödüyoruz”, Date of Accession: 11.10.2017 from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/hala-1-mart-tezkeresininbedelini-oduyoruz-40604056. Hürriyet (2017/f), “Siyaset Bilimi Derneği Başkanı Profesör İlter Turan: ABD halen YPG ile ilişkiyi tartışıyor”, Date of Accession: 01.08.2017 from http://www.hurriyet.com. tr/siyaset-bilimi-dernegi-baskani-profesor-ilter-turan-abd-halen-ypg-ile-iliskiyitartisiyor-40465225. Hürriyet (2018), “Yeni sistemin ilk MGK’sı sona erdi… ABD’ye net mesaj”, Date of Accession: 31.07.2018 from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/yeni-sistemin-ilk-mgktoplantisi-sona-erdi-40913250.

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Hürriyet Daily News (2016), “Historic Greek Church in Istanbul to Undergo Restoration”, Date of Accession: 07.09.2017 from http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/historic-greekchurch-in-istanbul-to-undergo-restoration-.aspx?pageID=238&nid=107674&NewsCa tID=393. Hürriyet Daily News (2017), “Gov’t Slams Opposition’s ‘Controlled Coup’ Claim”, Date of Accession: 21.07.2017 from http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/govt-slams-oppositionscontrolled-coup-claim.aspx?PageID=238&NID=111543&NewsCatID=338. Hürriyet Daily News (2018/a), “Former US Ambassador to Turkey Appointed as Syria Representative”, Date of Accession: 15.09.2019 from http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ former-us-ambassador-to-turkey-appointed-as-syria-representative-135945. Hürriyet Daily News (2018/b), “Historic Bulgarian Church in Istanbul Reopens to Prayers after Seven-Year Restoration”, Date of Accession: 16.01.2018 from http://www. hurriyetdailynews.com/historic-bulgarian-church-in-istanbul-reopens-to-prayers-afterseven-year-restoration-125333. Hürriyet Daily News (2018/c), “Trump Signs Defense Spending Bill to Delay F-35 Delivery to Turkey”, Date of Accession: 14.08.2018 from http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ trump-signs-defense-spending-bill-to-delay-f-35-delivery-to-turkey-135763. Hürriyet Daily News (2018/d), “Turkey, Others Hit Out at Trump Trade Tariffs”, Date of Accession: 12.08.2018 from http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/trump-signs-sweepingtariffs-sparking-outrage-128482. K24 (2017), “MGK’dan “referandum” açıklaması”, Date of Accession: 27.07.2017 from http:// www.kurdistan24.net/tr/news/82fe1869-3626-42ce-b0d2-d0c03743ab77. Kadir Has Üniversitesi Türkiye Çalışmaları Merkezi (2019), “Türk Dış Politikası Kamuoyu Algıları Araştırması”, Date of Accession: 08.07.2019 from https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/334226883_Turk_Dis_Politikasi_Kamuoyu_Algilari_Arastirmasi_-_2019. Kahl, Colin (2017), “The United States and Turkey Are on a Collision Course in Syria”, Foreign Policy, Date of Accession: 21.07.2017 from http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/12/ the-united-states-and-turkey-are-on-a-collision-course-in-syria-trump/. Kamiloğlu, Can & Pelit, Aslı (2017), “Trump Yönetimi Türkiye’den Ne Bekliyor?”, Amerika’nın Sesi, Date of Accession: 07.07.2017 from https://www.amerikaninsesi. com/a/trump-yonetimi-turkieyeden-ne-bekliyor/3736469.html. Kanat, Kılıç Buğra (2015), “Turkey and the US: The Longest of Two Years of the Relations”, SETA, Date of Accession: 21.07.2017 from http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20150630180110_ turkey-and-the-US-the-longest-two-years-of-the-relations-pdf.pdf. Kanat, Kılıç Buğra (2016), “US-Turkish Relations and the Systemic Dimension”, Daily Sabah, Date of Accession: 21.06.2017 from https://www.dailysabah.com/columns/kilicbugra-kanat/2016/05/16/us-turkish-relations-and-the-systemic-dimension. Kanat, Kılıç Buğra (2017), “Türkiye’nin ABD Politikası 2016”, in Türk Dış Politikası Yıllığı 2016 (eds. Burhanettin Duran, Kemal İnat & Mustafa Caner), İstanbul: SETA Yayınları. Kaytmaz, Yiğit Can (2017), “Türkiye’nin ABD elçiliğine 1.1 milyon dolara PR şirketi”, Sözcü, Date of Accession: 07.07.2017 from http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2017/dunya/turkiyeninabd-elciligine-1-1-milyon-dolara-pr-sirketi-1847303/. Kısacık, Sina (2012), “Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin Küresel Enerji Güvenliği Stratejisinde Türkiye’nin Rolü”, Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, Date of Accession: 21.06.2017 from

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Nasi, Selin (2017/c), “What to Expect from Erdoğan-Trump Meeting?”, Hürriyet Daily News, Date of Accession: 27.07.2017 from http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pa geID=449&nID=113000&NewsCatID=570. Nissenbaum, Dion & Lee, Carol E. (2016), “Turkish President Faces a Cool Reception in US Visit”, WSJ, Date of Accession: 21.06.2017 from https://www.wsj.com/articles/turkishpresident-faces-a-cool-reception-in-u-s-visit-1459114068. NTV (2016/a), “ABD’den YPG ve PKK açıklaması”, Date of Accession: 07.07.2017 from http://www.nTV.com.tr/dunya/abdden-ypg-ve-pkk-aciklamasi,a_ UVMoDNPEWRNOShfqzwZw. NTV (2016/b), “TSK’daki FETÖ tasfiyesi ABD’yi endişelendirdi”, Date of Accession: 07.07.2017 from http://www.nTV.com.tr/dunya/tskdaki-feto-tasfiyesi-abdyiendiselendirdi%2cA65xvEe0s0eUcQIKefsbRQ. NTV (2017/a), “Erdoğan: ABD’nin yanına terör örgütünü yakıştıramıyoruz”, Date of Accession: 20.07.2017 from http://www.nTV.com.tr/turkiye/erdogan-abdnin-yaninateror-orgutunu-yakistiramiyoruz,jb2lxm3MQUOwlZ71euusXg. NTV (2017/b), “Erdoğan ile Trump telefonda görüştü”, Date of Accession: 21.07.2017 from http://www.nTV.com.tr/dunya/erdogan-ile-trump-telefonda-gorustu,t75TQs_ fxkmdKVGSVM5esA. NTV (2017/c), “Erdoğan - Trump görüşmesi: ‘Ülkelerimiz hiç olmadığı kadar yakın’ ”, Date of Accession: 22.09.2017 from http://www.nTV.com.tr/dunya/erdogan-trumpgorusmesi-ulkelerimiz-hic-olmadigi-kadar-yakin,CxF2Qg-nd065kUZFyybOPw. NTV (2017/d), “Kandil ve Hakurk’taki PKK hedefleri vuruldu”, Date of Accession: 19.09.2017 from http://www.nTV.com.tr/turkiye/kandil-ve-hakurktaki-pkk-hedefleri-vuruldu,evZrt QnelkaU878IKZ3YVA. NTV (2017/e), “TSK’dan Habur Sınır Kapısı‘nda askeri tatbikat”, Date of Accession: 19.09.2017 from http://www.nTV.com.tr/galeri/turkiye/tskdan-habur-sinirkapisinda-askeri-tatbikat,dGheea7FqUeGE-P-59HArA. “Obama’s Speaking Turkish Parliament Part 1”, Date of Accession: 25.07.2017 from https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=XYFnJcL10ik. Oğuzlu, Tarık (2016), “Turkish-American Relations in Transition: Taking Stock of Obama’s Legacy”, Bilgesam, Date of Accession: 21.06.2017 from http://www.bilgesam.org/ en/incele/2427/-turkish-american-relations-in-transition--taking-stock-of-obama-slegacy/#.WUpkLpLyjIV. Oğuzlu, Tarık (2017), “Turkey and the US: Past, Today and Tomorrow”, AA, Date of Accession: 20.06.2017 from http://aa.com.tr/en/analysis-news/turkey-and-the-us-pasttoday-and-tomorrow/824173. Okur, Mehmet Akif (2015), “The American Geopolitical Interests and Turkey on the Eve of the September 12, 1980 Coup”, CTAD, Year 11, Issue: 21 (Spring 2015), pp. 199–222. Oran, Baskın (2009), “TDP’nin Kuramsal Çerçevesi”, in Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşı‘ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt I: 1919–1980 (ed. Baskın Oran), İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp. 20–53. Oran, Baskın (2010), “Dönemin Bilançosu”, in Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşı‘ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt II: 1980–2001 (ed. Baskın Oran), İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp. 203–242.

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Sak, Güven (2017), “From the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China”, Hürriyet Daily News, Date of Accession: 08.09.2017 from http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/fromthe-adriatic-sea-to-the-great-wall-of-china.aspx?PageID=238&NID=116644&NewsCa tID=403. Sander, Oral (2006), Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası, (ed. Melek Fırat), Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları. Serdar, Seda (2017) “Çağaptay: Trump ve Erdoğan’ın birbirine ihtiyacı var”, DW Türkçe, Date of Accession: 21.07.2017 from http://www.dw.com/tr/%C3%A7a%C4%9Faptaytrump-ve-erdo%C4%9Fan%C4%B1n-birbirine-ihtiyac%C4%B1-var/a-37204751. Sidar, Cenk (2013), “ABD’nin Yeni Doktrini ve Türkiye”, Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, Date of Accession: 01.08.2017 from http://politikaakademisi.org/2013/01/07/abdninyeni-doktrini-ve-turkiye/. Singh, Michael & Jeffrey, James F. (2018), “The US Alliance with Turkey Is Worth Preserving”, Foreign Policy, Date of Accession: 20.03.2018 from http://foreignpolicy. com/2018/03/19/the-u-s-alliance-with-turkey-is-worth-preserving/. Sloat, Amanda (2018), “How to Save the U.S.-Turkey Relationship”, Foreign Affairs, Date of Accession: 12.09.2018 from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2018-07-30/ how-save-us-turkey-relationship. Sözcü (2019), “Son dakika… ABD Başkanı Trump’tan küstah Türkiye açıklaması”, Date of Accession: 14.01.2019 from https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2019/dunya/son-dakika-abdbaskani-trumptan-kustah-turkiye-aciklamasi-3111343/. Sputnik Türkiye (2017/a), “ABD’den Türkiye’ye El Kaide’ye destek suçlaması”, Date of Accession: 01.08.2017 from https://tr.sputniknews.com/abd/201707291029480402-abdturkiye-el-kaide-destek-suclama/. Sputnik Türkiye (2017/b), “ABD’li General Thomas: Ben PKK’ya Marksist değil demokrat diyorum”, Date of Accession: 06.11.2017 from https://tr.sputniknews.com/ avrupa/201711031030864039-abd-general-pkk-marksist-demokrat/. Sputnik Türkiye (2017/c), “Balat’taki ‘Demir Kilise’ 7 yılın sonunda aslına döndü”, Date of Accession: 01.12.2017 from https://tr.sputniknews.com/foto/201711301031207334-balatdemir-kilise-acilis/. Sputnik Türkiye (2017/d), “Bass: Konsoloslukta saklanan hiçbir çalışanımız yok”, Date of Accession: 11.10.2017 from https://tr.sputniknews.com/turkiye/201710111030535698bass-konsolosluk-calisan-yok/. Sputnik Türkiye (2017/e), “Emekli Büyükelçi Elekdağ: ABD’nin asıl hedefi büyük Kürdistan’ı kurmak”, Date of Accession: 01.08.2017 from https://tr.sputniknews.com/ turkiye/201705151028462573-emekli-buyukelci-elekdag-abd-hedef-kurdistan/. Sputnik Türkiye (2017/f), “Kalın: Kürt bölgesinde referandum siyasi ve hukuki olarak yanlış bir karar”, Date of Accession: 01.08.2017 from https://tr.sputniknews.com/ turkiye/201708011029505703-kalin-kurt-bolgesinde-referandum-yanlis-karar/. Sputnik Türkiye (2017/g), “Trump: ABD, Kürtler ile Bağdat arasında taraf tutmuyor”, Date of Accession: 18.10.2017 from https://tr.sputniknews.com/abd/201710161030623415-abdtrump-erbil-bagdat/. Sputnik Türkiye (2018/a), “ABD ile Türkiye arasında F-35 anlaşması”, Date of Accession: 07.07.2017 from https://tr.sputniknews.com/dunya/201706191028944924-abdturkiye-f-35-anlasma/.

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Sputnik Türkiye (2018/b), “ABD Senatosu, F-35 için yaptırım kararı aldı”, Date of Accession: 02.08.2018 from https://tr.sputniknews.com/abd/201808021034564636-abdsenatosu-f35-yaptirim-karari/. Stein, Aaron (2019), “The Day after S-400: The Turkish-American Relationship Will Get Worse”, War on the Rocks, Date of Accession: 08.07.2019 from https://warontherocks. com/2019/05/the-day-after-s-400-the-turkish-american-relationship-will-get-worse/. Şener, Nedim (2010), “26 yılın kanlı bilançosu”, Milliyet, Date of Accession: 21.09.2017 from http://www.milliyet.com.tr/26-yilin-kanli-bilancosu-gundem-1254711/. Tanış, Tolga (2016), “Washington’la Gülen krizi şimdi başlıyor”, Hürriyet, Date of Accession: 01.08.2017 from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/tolga-tanis/ washingtonla-gulen-krizi-simdi-basliyor-40150223. Taşpınar, Ömer (2017), “An Obituary: The Turkish-American Partnership”, Ahval News, Date of Accession: 21.11.2017 from https://ahvalnews.com/node/1224. The Economist (2016), “After the Coup, Turkey Turns against America”, Date of Accession: 07.07.2017 from http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21702337-turkishmedia-and-even-government-officials-accuse-america-being-plot-after. The Guardian (2010), “Bush Memoir: ‘WeGot Things Wrong in Iraq, but the Cause Is Eternally Right’ ”, Date of Accession: 07.09.2017 from https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2010/nov/08/bush-memoir-iraq-war. The Guardian (2018), “Turkish Banker Found Guilty in Iran Sanctions Case Allegedly Tied to Erdoğan”, Date of Accession: 15.01.2018 from https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2018/jan/03/turkey-banker-iran-sanctions-mehmet-hakan-atilla. The Guardian (2019), “Donald Trump’s Bizarre, Threatening Letter to Erdoğan: ‘Don’t Be a Fool’ ”, Date of Accession: 03.11.2019 from https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/ oct/16/trump-letter-erdogan-turkey-invasion. The New York Times (2016), “Transcript: Donald Trump on NATO, Turkey’s Coup Attempt and the World”, Date of Accession: 07.07.2017 from https://www.nytimes. com/2016/07/22/us/politics/donald-trump-foreign-policy-interview.html. The New York Times (2017), “Some Urgent Questions About Turkey”, Date of Accession: 14.10.2017 from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/13/opinion/turkeyerdogan-nuclear-weapons.html. Tillett, Emily & Brennan, Margaret (2019), “U.S. “Preparing to Evacuate” Remaining Troops from Northern Syria, Defense Secretary Says”, CBS News, Date of Accession: 13.10.2019 from https://www.cbsnews.com/news/turkey-syria-mark-esper-secretary-of-defense-uspreparing-to-evacuate-all-troops-from-northern-syria-face-the-nation/. Timoçin, Dilge (2017), “Cook: ‘ABD’nin YPG’yle Çalışma Kararını Türkiye Verdi’ ”, Amerika’nın Sesi, Date of Accession: 25.07.2017 from https://www.amerikaninsesi. com/a/cook-abd-nin-ypg-yle-calisma-kararini-bir-sekilde-turkiye-vermis-oldu/3873540. html. Toroğlu, Mehmet (2017), “Soner Çağaptay: ‘ABD-Türkiye Arasında Son 50 Yılın En Ciddi Krizi’ ”, Amerika’nın Sesi, Date of Accession: 11.10.2017 from https://www. amerikaninsesi.com/a/turkiye-abd-vize-krizi/4063108.html. TRT (2016), “ ‘ABD ve Türkiye arasında 17,5 milyar dolarlık ticaret hacmi oluştu’ ”, Date of Accession: 07.09.2017 from http://www.trthaber.com/haber/ekonomi/abd-ve-turkiyearasinda-175-milyar-dolarlik-ticaret-hacmi-olustu-243431.html.

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www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/barcin-yinanc/how-will-turkey-trade-with-iranwith-sanctions-back-and-halkbank-on-target-134372. Zanotti, Jim & Thomas, Clayton (2017), “Turkey: Background and US Relations in Brief”, CRS Report, Date of Accession: 25.07.2017 from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44000. pdf. Zengin, H. Salih (2016), “Asker direnmeseydi Özal Musul’a girecekti”, Sabah, Date of Accession: 10.08.2017 from http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2016/10/27/askerdirenmeseydi-ozal-musula-girecekti.

PART II:  Turkish-American Relations in Terms of Identity, Security, Economy, and Development

Merve Şıvgın1

Chapter 5: The Image of the U.S. in Turkey: A Historical View

Abstract: The perceptions of the world about the United States (U.S.) are generally in two polar opposites. For some, the U.S. is the sole superpower of the world; the ‘land of freedom’, and opportunities offering the most envied way of life on the planet fascinating with the iconic images of White House, Oval Office, Times Square, Statue of Liberty, and the Hollywood sign. For others, it is an ‘imperialist monster’ with an uncontrollable appetite for war and occupation, the exporter of vulgar consumption culture, and the land of extreme income inequalities. It features startling images of the torture in the Abu Ghraib Prison and homeless people on the streets of the American cities. The picture is not different in Turkey. There are two sides of the coin: admirers and haters; both of which have similar images as the rest of the world. The dual images of the much-admired country of dreams and the land of the devil go hand in hand. These two different perceptions of the Americans have been engraved in people’s minds over many decades and through various means; the most important of them being the printed and visual media. The projection of a strong American image during the Cold War is beyond a doubt the most important reason for a favorable Turkish public opinion toward the U.S. The end of the Second World War is year zero of the Turkish-American alliance; therefore, the actual image building years begin with the Cold War. The major aim of this study is to develop a comprehensive historical perspective on the American image in the Turkish public opinion based on an analysis of the Turkish media. Keywords:  American Image, Turkish Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, Media, Popular Culture.

Introduction It is not possible to talk about a monolithic perception of the Americans and the U.S.  in the Turkish public. Regardless of age, gender, and social class, sympathy towards the American way of life and its key aspects, such as culture, ideas, and business practices, can co-exist with a strong suspicion of U.S. governments’ motives in Turkey. Similarly, a hostile cultural perception can

1 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Fine Arts, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Ankara, Turkey. Email: [email protected] / [email protected]

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appear simultaneously with a supportive attitude towards U.S. government policies. Why and how do Turkish people have different views about the Americans and the U.S.  government? Understandably, the sole superpower of the world has admirers as well as haters. However, the question of how these ambiguous perceptions of the Americans and the U.S.  are engraved in the minds of the Turkish public is hard to answer. The aim of this study is to answer this question through a journey in the Turkish printed and visual media by analysing popular culture products. For this purpose, this study follows the methodological and theoretical footsteps of Daniel Lerner. Lerner, in his work “The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East”, followed the traces of modernization through mass media. In his study, in which Turkey is also widely covered, Lerner considers mass media such as radio, television, magazines, and newspapers as the catalysts of modernization (1968). Lerner’s theory argues that the audiences in the postcolonial world acquainted themselves with the modern West through mass media (Shah 2008, p.1). The mass media provided information about the modern West and vicarious experiences of modern lifestyles to audiences in the postcolonial world (Shah 2008, p.1). Within the framework of this approach, Lerner conducted interviews in Balgat district of Ankara, Turkey’s capital, to test mass media’s potential to create change. In his research, Lerner categorized his interviewees into three categories as “modern”, “transitional”, and “traditional”. According to the results of the research, those categorized as “modern” were “heavily exposed to media influences”, those categorized as “transitional” were “occasionally exposed to media”, and those categorized as “traditional” were “never exposed to media influence or hardly ever show interest in the media” (Lerner 1968, p. 136). Findings of Lerner are of great importance as they reveal that mass media have a major impact on people as the producer of behavioral patterns. In that sense, the main reason for the study of popular culture products is that they do not only produce behavioral patterns, but also reflect them and contain a lot of information about the emotional state of the society in which they are consumed. In the years when Lerner conducted his study, this approach to popular culture was theorized by the scholars working at the University of Birmingham’s Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) that was founded in 1964. Revealing that popular cultural products have become an arena of struggle for cultural domination between different classes, CCCS suggests that in this arena there are mechanisms of both power and resistance (Fiske 1999, pp. 15–16). Cultural studies argue that the resistance against dominant ideologies is embedded in daily life practices, in this sense; it draws attention to the importance of popular cultural products. The fact that they can be produced quickly and consumed quickly helps these products to keep themselves up to date. It also makes many visible “informal” information regarding contemporary. For this reason, this study elaborates the change and transformation in the U.S. image in Turkey within years, through an examination of the popular culture products that left a mark in the periods studied. The fact that popular culture contains both elements of power

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and resistance provides the opportunity to reveal the rapidly changing image of America towards different poles. Theoretically too, this study follows the research framework of Lerner. Lerner points out that the meaning of the term Westernization shifted from “Europeanization” to “Americanization” with the following finding:  “following a century of educational and missionary activity, Americanization became a specific force and the common stimuli of the Atlantic civilization came to be called Westernization… For Middle Easterners, more than ever want the modern package, but reject the label ‘Made in USA’.” (Lerner 1968, p. 45). While the desired modern package represents the admiration towards the U.S., the rejection of the “Made in USA” label is the result of an intimate relation established with an imperial power. These two go hand in hand in Turkey’s case as well. Also the questions that Lerner directed to the participants in the interviews such as “If you could not live in Turkey, where would you want to live?” and the answers given to the question revealed the fact that Turkish modernization gradually gained an American-centered structure. The grocer, who Lerner categorized as modern and who is heavily exposed to media answered to this question as “America” without hesitation. Grocer said “It was in a movie that he had first glimpsed what a real grocery store could be like”, saying that the movies were his avenue to the wider world of his dreams (Lerner 1968, p. 27). The relationship between “Americanization”, which started to rise in the early Cold War period, and the media products, which is revealed in Lerner’s work is important in this sense. In this study, following a similar track, the changing American image is explained through popular culture products. If the American image in Turkey is periodized, it can be roughly divided into the following periods: (1) The American image until the mid-1940s until the 1980s, which was approached with curiosity and sympathy, from the mid-1940s onward an admiration that peaked in the 1950s, but went into a free-fall with the Johnson Letter in 1964 and deteriorating further with the 1975 arms embargo, (2) The American image lived its second “golden age” with Turgut Özal in the 1980s during which full-scale globalization opened the doors of Turkey to Americanization, and (3) American image in the post-Cold War period. During this last period, the same trend in the 1980s continued in the 1990s; however, a steep nose-dive in the American image occurred in the 2000s particularly after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. U.S. President Barack Obama, through the effective use of social media and the abandoning of Islamophobic rhetoric in the foreign policy, restored the image of his country. However, the Turkish public is resentful of the American attitude again since the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016. There is an ever-growing opinion that the U.S. government is behind the plot. As a result of this, the public anger and U.S. antipathy are gradually turning into a hysteria of anti-Americanism. Since then, the consecutive crisis between two governments including the YPG problem in northern Syria, the Zarrab-Halkbank trial, the imprisonment of the Priest Andrew Brunson, S-400 deal with Russia etc. have led to an even-deteriorating image of Americans and the U.S.  in Turkish public opinion.

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This study aims to analyze the image of the Americans in the Turkish public from the late 19th century to the present day with an emphasis on the postSecond World War period. Since the end of Second World War is the year zero of the Turkish-American alliance, therefore, the actual image building process began with the Cold War. Thus, the major aim of this study is to develop a comprehensive historical perspective on the American image in the Turkish public opinion based on an analysis of the Turkish media especially by focusing on the Cold War period.

I. The Turkish Perception of Americans in the Ottoman Era Turkish-American alliance began with the Cold War years, but the roots of Turkish-American Relations, and therefore, the establishment of an American image in Turkey, lies in the late Ottoman era. Ottoman Turks had sympathy for the Americans; people from distant shores that had successfully freed themselves from British imperial rule in 1783. It was first the missionaries who came to the Ottoman Empire with a corps of competent teachers, offering high quality education for the non-Muslim subjects. The Ottoman governors were so impressed by the quality of the education offered in the American missionary schools that they felt themselves compelled to reform the public education system to provide the same standards for the Muslim pupils (Danforth 2008, p. 90). The American contribution to the reconstruction of modern battleships for the Ottoman Navy, which was destructed by the European powers at the Navarino in 1827, generated the public perception of America and the Americans as “superior engineers” (Kurat 1959, pp. 16–17). A major crack occurred in the Ottoman Turkish perceptions of the Americans from the mid-19th century onwards, however, as the number of converts to Protestantism from the non-Muslim millets grew rapidly. The American missionary activities were met with antagonism and were realized to be a threat to the social order by the Ottoman subjects. As a result, the image of Americans as superior engineers, competent teachers, and zealous merchants vanished gradually and Americans began to be perceived as agents of an inferior religion; spreading the religious doctrine of Protestantism to the Ottoman realm (Başaran 1997, p. 44). The American image in the Ottoman Empire deteriorated further during the Armenian insurgencies of 1894–1896. Muslims and particularly the Turks, became more adversarial towards the American missionaries as the links and communications between the American missionaries, the Armenians, and their part in instigating Armenian nationalism became widely known.

II. American Image in the Early Republican Period U.S. friendship was of importance for Turkey in the early Republican period. In contrary to European states, which were unreliable partners, the improvement of

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relations with the politically disinterested country was something desired from the start. According to the Turkish media, the relations that stalled as a result of the U.S. declaration of war to Germany in 1917 were slowly making progress. Despite the isolationist policy of the U.S., the naming of a newly discovered flower species in Nashville, Tennessee after Atatürk was being represented to the Turkish public as the sign of the improving relations (Cumhuriyet 1935/a). The Turkish media was depicting the American lifestyle as a model for the highest level of civilization that Turkey was trying to reach. On the other hand, the exchange of messages between President Roosevelt and Atatürk were presented as signs of a close relationship between two countries (Cumhuriyet 1935/b). This warm relationship between the two statesmen was pointing out a rapprochement between two states ten years after it stalled in 1917. In this decade long period, the revolutionary officers had established the new Turkish Republic after a long independence struggle and have started the transformation process which changed the country entirely. From the American point of view, this transformation played an important role in the rapprochement of bilateral relations (Yılmaz 2003, p. 86). In 1930, Fox Film Inc. was recording the first audio movie of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk after long efforts of the U.S. Ambassador Joseph Grew (Bali 2007, p. 13). Grew’s insistence derived from the support he had given to the will of Turkey to express itself against the anti-Turkish expressions in the American press (Yılmaz 2003, p. 90). In the four-hour movie, Ambassador Grew introduced Mustafa Kemal to the American audience with the following words:”Today, freed by the wise and courageous action of her leader from those retarding treammels, the Turkish State is steadily progressing along the road of modern political and social development and culture independent, idealistic, efficient proud of her achievements and certain of her future happy destiny. For this revolution and high accomplishment one man is primarily responsible. The name of Gazi Mustafa Kemal will forever be associated with the founding and development of the modern Turkish State and indelibly inscribed upon the rolls of history.” In his four-minute speech following the introductory statements of Ambassador Grew, Atatürk talks about “the affection and cordiality” that exists between the Turkish and American people. His words about American democracy are an important reference point about the perception of the Americans in the young republic: “…At the moment when the American people were conscious of her existence, it was democracy that she upheld, and it was democracy she exalted. With this gift in their hands, Americans have joined the human community as an esteemed people and they founded a great national unity.” Atatürk depicted the U.S. as a model country for Turkey, due to its democratic structure. He also idealized the Americans as “civilized, humane, and peaceful” and said that these ideals should also be realized in Turkey. Atatürk’s daughter in law, Afet Hanım, also took part in the movie. She was asked about her opinion on the American women. Afet Hanım replied as follows: “I appreciate and congratulate the American women because they have fully won their political rights. The Turkish women are not satisfied with the right they have at

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present; but I am sure the full right to elect and be elected Deputies to the Grand National Assembly will be secured.” (Bali 2007, p. 13) The degree of admiration and desire for modernity can be understood from the words of Atatürk and Afet İnan. This admiration was the apparent feature between the two countries at that time. As Toker suggests, from the foundation of the Republic to the Second World War, there was neither a reason for hostility between the two countries, nor was there a reason for a close friendship as the interests of the two states were neither conflicting, nor unifying (Toker 1971, p. 10). These were the years when the new Republic, emerging from a collapsing Empire, needed to express itself to the world. Turkey desired to prove to the world that it was a secular and democratic nation-state and that its citizens were free and civilized. Through the friendship of the U.S., it was also possible to erase the “Terrible Turk” image from history. Although the Westernization efforts in Turkey were appreciated, the image of “Terrible Turk” engraved in the minds of the American people, continued to shadow Turkish-American Relations (Yılmaz 2003, p. 86). With the beginning of the Second World War, Turkey, which had been seen in the British sphere of responsibility up until then, had gained a special importance to the U.S. (Barkay 2003, p. 71). Relations with Turkey had begun to evolve as America’s policies for the region were changing. Within the framework of the periodic classification in this study, one of the most important developments that determine the closing of this period is the establishment of Voice of America (VOA). VOA was established in February 1942 after the U.S. involvement in Second World War for supporting the war cause through the means of propaganda (Krugler 2000). The New York Times columnist Frank Stanton, who wrote an article in 1975 about the goals of VOA, argued that it has three main purposes; “to broadcast accurate, effective, and comprehensive news; to portray the variety and uniqueness of American society; to present the foreign policy of the United States” (Stanton 1975). Stanton pointed that VOA “is a tactical tool for policy articulation and, at the same time, a strategic tool for cultural communication”. As underlined by Stanton, VOA became functional as an effective tool and started broadcasting in Turkish the year it was founded. Daniel Lerner’s research titled “Radio Listening in Turkey” also revealed that VOA was one of the most listened radios in the 1950s when the radio listening habit was on the rise (Keloğlu & Analı 2015, p. 88). VOA broadcasts played a significant role in the formation of the American image in Turkey, especially during the Cold War. As it was presented as an argument in the beginning of this paper, the U.S. has a twofold image in Turkey; one being the “country of dreams” and the other being the “imperialist monster”. Since its establishment, the VOA has played an active role in fostering the former. Even today, the official website of the radio has an “American Dream” section in which it promotes immigration from Turkey to America. This section contributes to the reproduction and maintenance of the dream side of this twofold image in Turkey.

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III. American Image During the Cold War 1. 1945–1980 The relations between the U.S.  and Turkey evolved from friendly relations into a strategic and formal alliance with the Cold War. During this period, which is commonly referred to as “the golden age of Turkish-American Relations”, the two states had created a common front against the Soviet threat. For Turkey, the U.S.  was a haven against the communist threat and the territorial demands of Soviet Russia including the rectification of the Turkish-Soviet border in the northeast and a proposed joint Turkish and Soviet control of the Straits. For the U.S., Turkey was an outpost of the policy of containment against the Soviet Union and communism. The visit of the American battleship USS Missouri in 1946 to repatriate the body of Turkish Ambassador Mehmet Münir Ertegün (who died in 1944)  marked the beginning of Turkey-U.S. alliance. At the same time, when the USS Missouri left U.S. waters for Turkey, the U.S. government sent a note to Moscow to protest the retention of Soviet troops in Iran. The arrival of the battleship to Turkish waters was a symbolic gesture of solidarity between the U.S. and Turkey; signaling the place of the country in a post-war world order. The news of the arrival of the USS Missouri to Istanbul caused great excitement in the city and preparations were even made days before its arrival. The question of how the ship should be welcomed occupied the minds of the Turkish public for days. Tekel (The Turkish Monopoly) released Missouri cigarettes and PTT (Republic of Turkey Post, Telegraph and Telephone Administration) released commemorative stamps of the Missouri visit. Istanbul municipality public transport authorities announced that the public transportation would be free for the Missouri crew. The main boulevards of the city were decorated with silver placards giving friendly messages. The buildings in Beşiktaş, Karaköy, and Beyoğlu districts were painted in the same color. Scarves on which “Welcome Missouri” was written were manufactured. The same was written on all sides of the famous Maiden’s Tower (Cumhuriyet 1946/a). “Welcome” signs were also stretched between the minarets of mosques. A  restaurant called “Missouri” was opened in Ankara, which was later renamed as “Washington” (Öymen 2002, p.  514). The reflection of the USS Missouri visit on the Turkish press was very positive and was described as “a bright statement of Turkish-American friendship” (Cumhuriyet 1946/b). Turkey’s Cold War roadmap began to be drawn up after the visit of USS Missouri. The 1950s became the years of the institutionalization of the U.S. hegemony. The accession of Turkey to NATO in 1952, following the sending of Turkish troops to the Korean War2 on U.S. instructions, led to the blowing of pro-American waves 2 The government’s decision to send troops to Korea was not free of criticism. The opposition was criticizing the anti-constitutional way the decision to send troops was taken. Turkey was sending its soldiers to a war in Korea; therefore, according to

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and an improving U.S. image in the Turkish public (Alkan 2003, p. 54). The term pro-Americanism (Amerikancılık) first entered into the Turkish political terminology in these years with the beginning of the multi-party period and the electoral victory of the Democrat Party. As its name suggests, even the name of the party was influenced by the U.S. When Celal Bayar, one of the founders of the Democrat Party was asked by the journalists about the parallelism between his party and the Democrat Party in the U.S., he replied; “I cannot deny the role that the American model played when the party was established, isn’t there a Republican and a Democrat Party in the U.S. as well?” (Toker 1970, p. 111). The pro-American stance of the Democrat Party ruling elite was exposed in the famous “We will make Turkey a little America” slogan, which was frequently used by Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, and later by Turgut Özal in the 1980s who also came from the same tradition (Hürriyet 1999). Admiration for America had no limits in those years. Every child in the 1950s, and the following generations, knew the following nursery rhyme by heart: “One, Two, Threes: Long live Turks, Four, Five, Six: Poland sank down, Seven, Eight, Nine: Russia is a pig, Ten, Eleven, Twelve: England is a fox, Thirteen, Fourteen, Fifteen: America is a brother,” (Tarihten Anektodlar)

The state-led protectionist policies were abandoned and the liberal economic model was adopted after the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Turkey integrated into the global capitalist system and became NATO member in 1952 (Kaynar 2015, p. 14). The entrance of American products to the Turkish markets led to an abundance of goods and U.S.-driven economic programs led to a visible improvement on the living standards of the people. The motto of the Democrat Party “There will be a millionaire in every neighborhood” was, in fact, the summary of the economic policies of the era. American values and a positive American image are promoted in the 1950s in parallel to the economic and political domination of the U.S. Perception of the U.S. in the Turkish society as a “dreamland” and the American culture as a model became part of everyday life (Alkan 2015, p. 595). An intensive exposal of Turkish society to American propaganda, through the means of mass communication, led to admiration of the American culture. Anti-communism, which constituted the ideological basis of the U.S. hegemony in the world, was also the order of the day in Turkey (Bora 2009, p. 156). Every aspect of Turkish society, from daily practices to cultural habits went into a transformation based on this order. Professor Thornburg, who has written a report on Turkey on the orders of the American government to design the American economic aid plans in the country, CHP, the decision should have been taken by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, not by the Democratic Party deputies.

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has mentioned the necessity of increasing the circulation of books and journals in Turkey. According to Thornburg’s report, the circulation of American publications would especially contribute to the spreading of pro-American ideas among the Turkish intellectuals (Oktay 2002, p. 79). Following the report, thousands of books were translated into Turkish with the help of the U.S. government’s book translation program in Turkey. American writers gained currency among Turkish readers. The bookshelves were full of translations of American literature works presenting the American way of life. The American way of life was also praised through popular magazines. Prominent publishing houses like Remzi, Nebioğlu, and Varlık published prominent American novels as well as analyses of American literature, biographies of American writers, and American short stories (Örnek 2013, p. 139). Oktay stated (2002, p. 80) that the magazines published between 1950 and 1970 have assumed the task of meeting the ideological expansions and demands of the bourgeoisie of Turkey and that these magazines encouraged the lower and middle classes to the lifestyle of the ruling class. Stating that the topics covered are not focused on information and lighting, but are focused on amusement, Oktay points out that the prominent ideological element of these magazines is “anti-communism”. In Turkey, while prosperity and abundance have risen based on the American aid, the magazines have also created the visual material of the “American Dream”, which played an important role in reinforcing this lifestyle (Oktay 2002, p. 80). Daily newspapers began to prepare magazine pages and these pages mostly contained news from Hollywood. Newspapers had started to publish American comics and comic strips had begun to be added to the newspaper extras on the weekends. The consumer society, which had begun to develop slowly, had shown an intense interest in everything that originated in America; American culture had begun to infiltrate into everyday life in all aspects. Along with all these developments, the 1950s had been a very important breaking point for Turkey’s perception of “West”. Europe, which represented the West, in other words, the source of civilization and modernity until the Second World War in Turkish perception was now replaced by the United States (Alkan 2015, p. 592).America was now the new and most developed symbol of Western civilization and modernity. The “Friendship Song” sang by Celal İnce, one of the most popular singers of the 1950s, is a good example of the reflection of America as a friend of Turkey at this period. Tens of thousands of copies of İnce’s record, which has the same name, with the song was distributed free of charge in the USA Pavilion in Izmir Fair in 1954 (Alkan 2015, p. 624). The record cover featured some quotes of famous Turks and Americans such as Namık Kemal, Franklin Roosevelt, Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, Patrick Henry, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and Ziya Gökalp (Michalke 2016). In his record, İnce praised the friendship of Turkey and the United States with the following words: “America, America / Turks forever and ever / together with you / in the fight for freedom / This is a song of friendship / echo of brotherhood / we were blood brothers in Korea / the fire of this friendship is unquenchable / we are devoted to living free/ to make peace in the

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world/ Our struggle is always in this direction/ Independence love exists in our soul/ Your New York rises in the sky/ My Istanbul is in the limelight …Turks as long as the world keeps turning / together with you in the freedom of war.”

The friendship winds between Turkey and America had been interrupted after the 1950s, however. The 1960s have been depicted in the history of Turkish-American Relations as the years of crisis. Parallel to that, there has been a radical change in the American image that has settled since the 1930s (Barkay 2003, p. 72). The Cyprus problem was standing at the center of the crisis. Despite the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, the inter-ethnic conflicts were not over. The Turkish government’s determination to protect the unity of the Republic and the rights of the Turks on the island through an intervention led to the reaction of the U.S. In 1964, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson sent a letter to Turkey addressing Prime Minister İsmet İnönü. With the letter, Johnson aimed to prevent an intervention in Cyprus, which he considered to be contrary to the American interests. The letter had a great impact on Turkish-American Relations.3 The letter was published in the Hürriyet newspaper in 1966 and led to a serious deterioration of bilateral relations. The letter stated that the U.S. would be reluctant to defend Turkey against the Soviet Union if a possible action was taken as a result of Turkey’s intervention to the island (Cyprus) and it was also stated that the U.S. would not allow the use of military supplies provided to Turkey in a possible Cyprus operation. Turkey, which had asserted itself under the wings of the U.S.  against the Soviet threat, gave up the idea of intervening in Cyprus after the Johnson Letter. After this letter, the American image of the Turkish public has never been the same again. The newspapers have made headlines such as “Turkey is not Vietnam”, “Quilt Johnson”, and rallies were organized to support the Cyprus case in several Turkish cities (Tercüman 1964). The veterans of the Korean War had begun to return their medals. President Johnson had been referred to as “Texas bear” and “cattle shepherd” (Şahin 1987, p. 14). The letter attracted reaction of almost every segment of the Turkish public. It was found too “arrogant” by the right-wing. For the left, it is considered as proof that the foreign policy of the country was not independent (Sönmezoğlu 1995, p. 16). The Turkish public was greatly disturbed which would have long term results for the U.S. (Armaoğlu 1994, pp. 789–790). On the other hand, the 1960s were the years in which anti-imperialist and antiwar rhetoric was on the rise worldwide, to which Turkey was no exception. Anti-American demonstrations organized by students, syndicates, and non-governmental organizations became part of everyday life. One of them, which was organized by university students in 1969 against the 6th American fleet, is still referred to as one of the most striking protest actions in the recent history of Turkey. Such slogans as “Yankee Go Home” and “A fully independent Turkey against NATO and

3 The full text of Johnson Letter was first published in Hürriyet newspaper on June 13, 1966.

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U.S. imperialism” were shouted during the protest and show the point where anti-Americanism reached in the country. The Turkish production of opium was another subject that became a conflict between the two states. The American government, claiming that most of the drugs used by American youth were derived from the opium produced in Turkey, demanded the prohibition of the plant. Turkey, which has produced opium for many years and even has a city named “Afyon” (Opium), rejected the demand since the prohibition of planting the opium poppy would put thousands of families who traditionally earn their living from this plant in a difficult position. Turkish government limited the production of opium with certain cities, but it was not enough for the U.S.  government. The crisis around the opium poppy continued and finally, Turkey forbade its production in 1972. The prohibition of opium as a result of many years of insistence and the threat of sanctions by the U.S.  has led to an increase in the anti-American sentiments of the Turkish public opinion. The hatred, resistance, and patriotism of the Turkish public could be heard in the songs of the era:  “We will plant poppy, we will kick you out of the land, we will raise the flag of the people, the ugly American dog.”(Alkan 2003, p. 56). Despite all the threats, Turkey started opium production again in 1974. While the American government was preparing to implement an arms embargo on Turkey in response to its decision, Turkey started the Cyprus Peace Operation, which caused further tensions between the two countries (Gönlübol & Kürkçüoğlu 1996, p.  589). The “Cyprus Peace Operation”, which started in July of 1974, was the beginning of the worst period of relations between Turkey and the U.S. In this period, American bases in Turkey were closed and the United States decided to stop the aid given to Turkey. The friendship winds of the 1950s left in its place the embargo of the American government. During the years of embargo, the anti-American rhetoric became widespread which again can be traced in the song lyrics of the era: “Do not mind the embargo my friend, kick the Americans out, let them leave their bases, let them sway to their homeland, these guys take the opium, produce morphine and declare war on you.” (Alkan 2003, p. 56) These and similar records are some major sources from the era which show the extent of anti-Americanism in the public domain. However, parallel to this widespread anti-American rhetoric, an important part of the Turkish society was still admirers of the American culture. This was due to the American monopoly on television programs. By the time TV broadcasting was new to Turkey, the TV contents were mostly American origin. The anarchic atmosphere of the streets in Turkey caused people to spend time at home instead of going out. Under such circumstances, the attractiveness of television increased. With the influence of being the only television channel broadcasting in Turkey from 1968 to 1986, Turkish Radio Television (TRT) publications had been followed by the whole country. Due to the cost of producing domestic programs, TRT exported numerous films and soap operas which were mostly American productions (Çankaya 2003, p.  128). “Popeye the Sailor Man” and “Tom and Jerry” were among popular cartoons. Popular soap operas of the era were “Danger on the Cycle”, “Charlie’s Angels”, “Star

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Trek”, “Colombo”, “The Fugitive”, “Petrocelli”, “Dirty Sally”, “Little House on the Prairie”, “Police Woman”, and “Mc Millan and Wife”. These productions, which were broadcasted during the prime-time, tied Turkish people to the TV screen until the end of the 1970s (Çankaya 2003, p. 136). American popular culture productions were attracting interest and curiosity towards American culture and lifestyle while keeping the Turkish audience away from the problems of everyday politics. This level of interest increased even further with the advent of the first commercial broadcasts in 1972. Television audiences began to identify with ad contents to be among the “people who are enjoying their lives” in Coca-Cola ads or the “recognized people” in blue jean ads (Çankaya 2003, p. 127). In other words, the 1970s were the years of the popularization of the American popular culture in Turkey through the television. Criticisms of the growing dependence of television on the American broadcasting industry have often been expressed in this period, but the content of the broadcasts remained similar throughout the 1970s.

2. The 1980s After the American embargo, which was lifted in 1978, a new and unprecedented episode started between Turkey and the U.S. The 1980s is known in Turkey as the “Özal decade”. Turkey’s former Prime Minister and President Turgut Özal, represented a serious change in the image of the U.S.  in Turkey (Çandar 1993, p. 191). During the Özal period, there was a political and economic rapprochement with the United States that was similar to the 1950s (Barkay 2003, p. 73). The relations which were declined due to the Johnson Letter and the American embargo were restructured and “repaired” in this period. Alliance with the U.S. was the main axis of Özal’s foreign policy (Çandar 1993, pp. 31–33). Özal’s admiration for the U.S. began in New York, a city he visited in the 1950s as a young student. Özal, who went from a modernizing country to “the world of dreams”, was highly influenced from his observations in the city. In 1983, when he became Prime Minister, Özal remobilized the Democrat Party slogan “becoming little America” in his speeches. With the economic policies applied in this direction, Turkey evolved into an active consumer of American products, which it has met in the 1950s. He also played an active role in the implementation of neo-liberal policies. He opened Turkey’s doors to global capitalism, which resulted in a rapid Americanization in every aspect of the society. Turkish society started to inhabit the American global culture as a natural part of its traditional culture. American cultural products ensured the spread of American values, which led to the erosion of Turkish culture and values. As a result of this process, a hybrid culture began to emerge, which was indeed a sign of the transition to the American way of life. This hybrid culture became observable, especially in the food industry. A hybrid culinary culture emerged just after the entering of American fast-food chains into Turkey. McDonald’s, one of the most important symbols of the American global culture, opened its first branch in 1986 in Taksim. The fastfood restaurants were opened one after another in the following years. In a short

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time, Pizza Hut, Burger King, Kentucky Fried Chicken, and many others entered into the Turkish market. The competition between the global fast-food chains and the traditional Turkish restaurants led to the inevitable imitation of the former by the latter in form and content. The traditional Turkish meatballs are sold as “meatball burgers” and döner is sold as “döner special”, both offered in combo menu with Coca-Cola and French fries. This is indeed the most typical example of how the transition occurs from traditional to hybrid and then to the global. Another example of the hybrid culture is the use of traditional terms with English words and expressions. “Steak House” and “Express Kebab” are examples of such hybridization in the service industry. These hybrid terms that entered Turkish through sectorial globalization later became part of the Turkish language. Barış Manço, one of the famous singers of the 1980s and 1990s, satirized the hybridization of Turkish culinary with the song “Lahburger” written in 1985. In his song, Manço talks about the love of “lahmacun” the traditional Turkish-Arabic food and “hamburger” and the fruit of this love “lahburger doll”: “Hamburger, the favorite of the youth, Hamburger, the burnt voice of love, Hamburger, a dream made of double cheddar, Hamburger, there’s no other beauty than that. Wander the world, you won’t find its equal, the pretty and coquettish lahmacun, Prepare your table, the one who doesn’t eat must be full, healthy and kittenish lahmacun, With delicious butter and greenies, the spicy and hot lahmacun, Bake it for five minutes and it’s ready, the gazelle-eyed lahmacun. Every newborn baby means a new world, Open your eyes and welcome, baby Lahburger, They reached the happy end, the future is ours, The one who got the flag in this race was Lahburger.”4

Turkish society began to change with the winds of globalization in the 1980s. The American way of life replaced what is traditional. The shopping malls, supermarkets, colored pages of tabloid magazines, and the arrival of television to every household were important elements of this new way of life. The TV contents of the 1980s were still -to a large extent- coming from the U.S. TV series and cartoon movies like “Dallas”, “Golden Girls”, “The Cosby Show”, “Alf”, “Full House”, “Moonlighting”, “Knight Rider”, and “He-man and the Masters of the Universe” have left their mark on the era. This transition in the way of life was heavily criticized by certain segments of the society who were disturbed by the change. The Dallas TV series, which had a vast audience in Turkey and around the world, was the topic of these criticisms at a meeting held at TRT: “As far as we are concerned, 4 Barış Manço (1985), “Lahburger”, Date of Accession: 08.04.2020 from https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=xGz_-ZoqzQQ.

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Dallas presents the lifestyle of a stinking capitalist family. Alcohol, drugs, gambling, the TV program erodes all our values. Television cameras cannot enter into anyone’s bedroom for the sake of having realistic scenes. Americans are another community, their water is whiskey, their entertainment is gambling, their history is full with the wars against the natives. They can put on sale honor and moral values, they can do it on screen, it is not our concern” (Çankaya 2003, p.  169). It was pointed out that the TV series led to the Americanization of society and it was damaging the traditional structure of the Turkish society, however, an irrevocable process had already started. The society was now demanding more and consuming more. In this process, the state television began to fail to meet the demands of its audience; therefore, plans were made to end the state monopoly over broadcasting and enable the opening of private television channels. One other platform in which the American influence was felt in the 1980s was politics. The use of television advertising in Turkish political campaigns, beginning in 1952 with the U.S. Presidential elections, started with the 1983 general elections (Tokgöz 1991, p.  13). During this election period, Prime Minister Özal carried out an American-style election campaign and used TV very effectively. Political advertising in which the politician is put in the center and advertised like a product became an essential part of the election campaigns in Turkey in the years that followed. In addition to that, by using his style in diplomatic relations, Özal established a close relationship with the U.S. Presidents, which contributed to a positive change in the American image of Turkey. According to the former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Morton Abramowitz, Özal was “the only Turkish leader to have a true personal connection with a U.S. President” (Abramowitz 2001, p. 257). According to the news agencies, during the Gulf War, there was an intense telephone diplomacy between Özal and President George H. W. Bush. The two were talking a few times a day. Kaya Toperi, a close colleague of Özal, described the intense relationship between Özal and Bush with the following words: “The two addressed each other as ‘George’ and ‘Turgut’, and before coming to the main point of their conversation they first inquire after each other’s spouses again with their first names ‘Barbara’ and ‘Semra’” (Dündar 2016, p. 17). Özal also worked for strengthening the commercial ties between the two states. During official state visits, he added the names of businessman to the Turkish delegation list. He founded the Turkish-American Business Council in 1985, which was an important milestone in the commercial relations between the two countries (Çandar 2001, p. 209).

IV. American Image in the Post-Cold War Period 1. The 1990s Turkish-American Relations entered a new phase in the 1990s. The year 1993 was particularly important as Özal passed away and Bush handed over the Presidency to Bill Clinton. The death of Özal, a key figure in the U.S.-Turkish relations, created a vacuum in bilateral relations. The absence of senior U.S. officials at his

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funeral was the sign of the coming of a time of uncertainty in the bilateral relations. “Özal’s dear American friends left him alone” (Çandar 2001, p.  177) was the headline of an anti-American newspaper the next day. Uncertainty about the future of the relations came to an end as Turkey-U.S. relations reached the level of a strategic partnership during Bill Clinton’s Presidency (Kardaş 2009). The Clinton administration considered Turkey as a front-line ally of the U.S.  in the Middle East. Thanks to Clinton administration’s efforts, Turkey made progress in terms of the relations with the European Union as well. Bill Clinton’s telephone diplomacy and the U.S. government’s lobbying activities was very influential in the signing of the Customs Union Agreement in 1995 and the recognition of Turkey’s candidacy in 1999 at Helsinki Summit (Sayarı 2003, pp. 167–176). The improving image of the Americans under the Clinton administration reached a high point in 1999 after Clinton’s five-day visit to Turkey after the devastating earthquakes in August of that year hit the north-west of the country. While touring the earthquakeshattered town of Izmit, Clinton took a baby from his mother’s arms and lifted him to the air. The baby stared Clinton for a while and grabbed his nose. Leaving its mark on Clinton’s trip, this emblematic moment was broadcasted endlessly on Turkish televisions (Kinzer 1999) and his visit was praised by the Turkish media (Abramowitz 2001, p. 269). With his fatherly attitude towards the victims of the earthquake, Clinton won the hearts of the Turkish people. On the other hand, the effects of the cultural change of the 1980s became visible in the social life of the 1990s. A fast-growing entertainment industry developed as a result of the spread of popular culture. Private TV channels that started broadcasting in the early 1990s became an indispensable part of this industry. This process is accompanied with the prioritization of visuality and neglection of the content as a result of which visuality completely surpassed the content of the TV productions of the era. The hegemony of the American TV productions continued in the 1990s. Among the most important TV serials were “Lassie”, “The Young and the Restless”, “The Bold and the Beautiful”, “The A-Team”, “Generations”, “Richie Rich”, “Beverly Hills”, “Denver the Last Dinosaur”, “The Jetsons”, and “Looney Tunes”. Another important factor that contributed to the visualization process of the 1990s was the newly emerging video clip industry. Making video clips in the U.S became highly popular among Turkish singers. The lyrics of the 1990s popsong “America” sang by a Turkish pop singer called Rafet El Roman, had a videoclip made in the U.S. The English translation of the lyrics of El Roman’s song best reflects the American image in Turkey in the 1990s: “Oh Memo, This is New York America, there are skyscrapers everywhere, What a lifestyle, what a time. Oh Memo, people are black, ginger and white, basketball, dance and music are in the streets, What a lifestyle, what a time, America, full of adventures. Oh Memo, barrels on fire at night,

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Smoke and flesh around, there are rappers and rockers here, Oh Memo, This is Texas America, everybody is wearing boots and jeans.”5

The video clip of the song begins in a traditional coffee house of a typical Turkish village. An excited little kid runs towards an old man sitting in the coffee house and informs him about a letter coming from the U.S. The letter was written to a boy called Memo (short version of Mehmet, a name used to represent Turkish soldiers). Shortly after, the boy starts reading the letter which contains the lyrics of the song. Rafet El Roman, who also acted in the video clip, explains his admiration with the height of the skyscrapers and his astonishment with the gathering of the people around burning barrels at nights in the letter. A city (Texas) full of people wearing blue jeans was in fact very interesting for El Roman. According to him, people from different segments of society would approach each other with tolerance in the U.S. He showed his amazement with the U.S. with the words “what kind of life is it?”. This song, and many others, reflects the admiration and a desire to an American way of life, which was visible in all parts of life in Turkey. The effects of Americanization on Turkish society were visible from clothing to city architecture, and lifestyle to human relations in almost every part of life.

2. The 2000s Turkey and the U.S. had a strained relationship for most of the George W. Bush administration (Schleifer 2009). The shift in U.S. Foreign Policy after the 9/11 attacks changed how the Bush administration dealt with Turkey’s neighborhood dramatically. The depiction of the America’s “War on Terrorism” and the struggle against Al Qaeda as a confrontation between the West and Islam disturbed almost every segment of Turkish society. The Islamophobic language used by President George W. Bush in the foreign policy discourse damaged the American image further which was already at an “all-time low” by the end of George W. Bush’s Presidency. The American image in Turkey went into a steep nose-dive particularly after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Ankara was against the invasion of Iraq, which was the Bush administration’s second target after Afghanistan. According to Turkey, the Bush administration’s policy of overthrowing the Saddam Hussein regime would lead to the concentration of an unprecedented amount of political power in the hands of Kurds in Northern Iraq. There had been a sharp decline in the image of the American people, particularly after the humiliating detainment of Turkish soldiers by the American troops in the Northern Iraq city of Sulaymaniyah in 2003. The pictures of Turkish soldiers loaded on a military truck handcuffed from behind and with hoods over their heads led to a public outcry in Turkey. Reminiscent of scenes from the Abu Ghraib Prison and referred to as the “hood incident”, this event 5 Rafet El Roman (1995), “Amerika”, Date of Accession: 08.04.2020 from https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=uGxqtWuUEt8.

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laid the foundations of a deep-seated anti-Americanism sentiment that prevails today. The positive image that President Clinton had created with his 1999 visit disappeared overnight. The extent of anger, humiliation, and frustration in the aftermath of the incident could be traced in numerous Turkish popular culture works. The most important of which was the 2004 best-seller fiction book Metal Fırtına (Metal Storm) and the 2006 blockbuster movie Kurtlar Vadisi Irak (Valley of the Wolves-Iraq). A year after the “hood incident”, the Turkish novel Metal Fırtına (Metal Storm) arrived in book stores. The novel was about the invasion of Turkey in 2007 by the U.S. and a subsequent full-scale Turkish-American war, in which the U.S. government attempts to reenact the Treaty of Sèvres and divide up Turkey between Greece and Armenia. In the novel, the U.S. was led by a nameless President who was pictured as an  Evangelical  zealot. On the other hand, some U.S.  cabinet members of the era such as Condoleezza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld were involved with their names. Reflecting the increase in the level of anti-Americanism, the novel became a best-seller in Turkey and one of the fastest-selling books in Turkish history (Haber7 2005). Starting with the depiction of the “hood incident” in the first scene, the movie Kurtlar Vadisi Irak (Valley of the Wolves: Iraq) tells the story of a Turkish intelligence officer taking the revenge of the “hood incident” from the Americans in the name of the Turks and the Muslim world. In Turkey and the Middle East, the movie became a blockbuster in the early months of its release. Its premiere attracted much attention from the Turkish politicians. Bülent Arınç, former President of the Turkish National Assembly, after watching the premiere with the then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s wife Emine Erdoğan, described it as “an extraordinary film that will go down in history” (Deutsche Welle 2006). For the critics, the movie was “a kind of repayment on the screen” (Deutsche Welle 2006), it was a “sublimated vengeance” (İdiz 2006) of the hood incident delivering “if you put a hood on my head, I put a hood on your head” (Şafak 2006) message to the Americans. One other sign of anti-Americanism in Turkey was the rise in the sales of the Cola Turka, a new Cola flavored drink, which was introduced as a local alternative to Coca Cola and Pepsi. After a massive advertisement campaign in the summer of 2003, the sales of Cola Turka increased rapidly. In 2005, it became the second best-selling company after Coca Cola, leaving behind Pepsi. For Keneş (2003), ColaTurka was a “national upheaval against arrogant Americanism, American cultural imperialism, and coca-colonization or Mc Donaldization”. Things like the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the pictures of systematic torture in Abu Ghraib Prison, reinforced the image of the U.S. as an evil occupier. Anti-American rhetoric was present more than ever, but this time, the anti-Semitism of the Islamists, the conservative nationalists, and the anti-imperialism of the secular classes were embodied in an anti-American rhetoric. George W. Bush’s Presidency years were the lowest point in the Turkish-U.S. relations since the end of the Second World War.

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3. The 2010s Barack Obama, ever since his inauguration in 2008, attempted to repair the harm that was caused by George W. Bush on the American image and Turkish-American Relations. He abandoned the Islamophobic language that was used in the foreign policy and attempted to restore the image of his country through an effective use of social media. Turkey was among the first countries he visited after his inauguration (Sadık 2009, p. 24). His visit was interpreted by the Turkish media as being an attempt “to win back the hearts and minds of ordinary citizens of Turkey – one of the countries where public opinion about America has reached record low levels” (Hürriyet 2009). During his visit, Obama addressed to Turkish Parliament in April 2009. During his speech, he praised Turkey’s democratic achievements and this was well received by the Turkish public. His visit received a warm reaction from the Turkish media. He became so popular in Turkey that, “Garanti”, one of the major banks in Turkey, hired his look-alike Michael Lamar to play in its television commercials to evoke trust for its products. The commercial starts with a scene in which the normal flow of a TV channel is interrupted by the White House for a speech of Obama. In the next scene, Obama announces that he has important news about Turkey. He says “I am sorry. I am truly sorry. I wish I could announce such an economic package for the Americans. Low interest credit, unemployment (benefits), three times (more bonus points) in supermarkets. All combined in one package. I wish we had: but it is a bank in Turkey. It is Garanti. I wish we had Garanti in America.” (Parlak & Tunç 2012, p. 223). The Bank also used Obama’s “Hope” poster, which became the iconic image of his 2008 Presidential campaign. Instead of Obama, in the advertisement of the bank, Michael Lamar was giving the exact pose that Obama has given for his Presidential campaign. So, it can be said that Obama meant “hope” for Turkey. The Obama cult created a major shift in Turkish perception of the U.S. He was Hussein, not Barack for the many in Turkey who believed that he was a hidden Muslim. However, not all the segments of the Turkish society were sharing the same feeling for him. For instance, he was the new face of American imperialism for the members of the Turkish Communist Party (TKP). This positive trend in the American image did not continue long. The “ugly American” image was back just a year after Obama’s visit to Turkey. He made the headlines in Turkey this time with his approval of the so-called Armenian Genocide resolution. Despite the fact that the resolution was not approved in the Senate, the Obama administration was accused by the Turkish media for not doing enough to prevent the resolution. In May, only a month later, a Turkish ship carrying humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip was attacked by the Israeli forces. The reaction of the U.S. government to this incident was very disappointing for Turkey and caused much anger in the Turkish public.

4. American Image after the Failed Coup Attempt On the 15th of July, 2016, units from among the Turkish Armed Forces launched a coup d’état against the AK Parti government. The plot by the Gülenists, the

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supporters of the Turkish cleric Fethullah Gülen, was ultimately defeated by the government through popular support. Large crowds rallied in the city centers in support of the government and the military junta surrendered after a long night in the early hours of July 16, 2016. The Turkish public largely believed that the U.S. government was behind the plot (Kadercan 2016). Conspiracy theories linking the CIA to the failed coup attempt became popular in Turkey soon after the event. Turkish newspapers reported that John F. Campbell, the retired ISAF General, was the mastermind of the plot. These suspicions further fueled by the foot dragging of the U.S. authorities to the urgent calls of the Turkish government for Gülen’s arrest and extradition. Based on the Article 9 of the Extradition Treaty signed between the two governments in 1979, Gülen should have been arrested once the necessary documents were sent by Turkey (Yinanç 2016). However, U.S. officials remained unconvinced by the evidence that was presented by the Turkish officials for the extradition of Gülen (Kadercan 2016). The attitude of the American media towards a person who was, and is, considered a terrorist in Turkey by the majority was disturbing for the Turkish public. Turks are offended by the fact that prominent American newspapers and magazines gave space to the opinions of Gülen and his followers in their pages. For instance, on the first anniversary of the July 15 coup attempt, while the Turkish televisions were broadcasting all day stories of the people’s sacrifices during the failed coup attempt, the leading American daily The Wall Street Journal published an interview with Gülen (The Wall Street Journal 2017). The non-extradition of Gülen had already sparked a reaction against the U.S. in the Turkish public opinion. However, certain developments in the aftermath of the Gülen crisis caused the reaction of the public to grow. Among them, the most salient was the reveal of information about the refueling of the fighter jets that bombed the Presidential complex, Turkish Assembly, and Turkish Special Forces compound by aerial refueling aircrafts that took off from an American military airbase in Adana (Incirlik Airbase) (Hürriyet 2018). The Turkish public was awaiting an explanation and the situation was extremely difficult to explain. On the other hand, the fight that took place in front of the Turkish Embassy during the visit of Erdoğan in May 2017 kept the agenda of the public opinion busy for a long time. A clash occurred between bodyguards and a group of anti-Erdoğan demonstrators during the entrance of President Erdoğan to the Embassy building. An American policeman and eleven demonstrators were wounded, and nine people were taken to the hospital (Diken 2017).While two American citizens of Turkish descent who were involved in the incident were arrested, a legal procedure was started for the 15 bodyguards of Erdoğan who were involved in the fighting (BBC 2017). In September, Erdoğan had to travel to the 72nd General Assembly meeting of the United Nations with different bodyguards and he criticized the decision of the U.S. government very harshly. The trial of Hakan Atilla, former Deputy Manager of the Turkish state-bank Halkbank, in the U.S., was signaling the coming of a storm in the Turkish-American Relations. The Turkish State was tried on behalf of Atilla for allegedly carrying

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out transactions with Iran, in a bid to break the embargo. Erdoğan said, “If Atilla is going to be declared a criminal that would be almost equivalent to declaring the Republic of Turkey a criminal. I  hope it doesn’t yield a result that will completely destroy Turkish-U.S. relations.” (Euronews 2018) Despite Erdoğan’s comments, Atilla received 32 months imprisonment. He was released and sent back to Turkey after he completed his sentence. He was welcomed in Turkey like a hero and he was appointed as the General Director of Istanbul Stock Exchange which was kind of a reward for his sufferings in the U.S. The U.S.  support of the Kurdish guerilla groups fighting against ISIS and Turkey’s decision to buy Russian S-400 surface-to-air missiles were other issues that created tension between the two countries. The tension between the two countries reached another high level recently with the detainment of American pastor Andrew Brunson, who ran a Protestant church in the Aegean city of Izmir. U.S. President Donald Trump’s message from his personal Twitter account on Pastor Brunson’s detainment was rather sharp. Trump said: “The United States will impose large sanctions on Turkey for their long-time detainment of Pastor Andrew Brunson, a great Christian, family man and wonderful human being. He is suffering greatly. This innocent man of faith should be released immediately!” (Trump 2018/a). The message was perceived as a threat and caused the reaction of the Turkish public. A few days after his first tweet, President Trump posted a second one, in which he said, “I just authorized a doubling of tariffs on steel and aluminum with respect to Turkey as their currency, the Turkish Lira, slides rapidly downward against our very strong Dollar! Aluminum will now be 20 % and steel 50 %. Our relations with Turkey are not good at this time!” (Trump 2018/b). Following the message, the Turkish market entered a rapid upward trend and serious fluctuations in the economy have occurred since then. President Erdoğan made a statement on this; Erdoğan said: “There is an economic attack against Turkey. We will boycott electronic goods from the United States. They have iPhone but on the other hand there is Samsung. We have the local brand Venus Vestel, we will use them.” (CNNTurk 2018). Erdoğan also launched a boycott campaign against U.S.-made  electronics. After Erdoğan’s call, a boycott started among the supporters of Erdoğan. People selling their iPhones hit the headlines of the newspapers. Many uploaded videos in which they break iPhones to protest U.S.  sanctions.6 Numerous messages have been shared on Twitter with the hashtags “#boykotiphone”, “#appleboykot”, “#boycotttousproducts”. A social media campaign has been launched, entitled, “Do not give advertisement to U.S. companies” (Sabah 2018). The campaign soon became a trend topic on Twitter with the “#ABDyeReklamVerme” (Don’t Give Ad To U.S. Companies) tag. In 2019, Turkish-U.S. relations reached another low point with Turkey’s purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia. The U.S. authorities used every opportunity to discourage Turkey from buying S-400 missiles. Perhaps the most important of 6 “i-phone Boykotu Büyüyor” (2018), Date of Accession: 08.04.2020 from https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=aLq4ohtZiAk

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all was Turkey’s removal from the F-35 fighter jet program. In July 2019, the long expected step was finally taken by the U.S. and Turkey was out of the program. Even worse than that was the period that started with the onset of Turkey’s military operations in northern Syria. Turkish side was in full alert since U.S. President Donald Trump’s announcement in early January about the U.S. withdrawal from Syria. The U.S. withdrawal would eventually leave a power vacuum in the region and the most likely candidate to fill this vacuum is the YPG unless Turkey did something. The Turkish side, not wanting to have the YPG having the control of the region, began openly declaring that it was going to make an operation to the east bank of Euphrates. The U.S.  on the other hand was not only opposing this; but also sending tens of thousands of containers to arm the YPG militias. By the autumn of 2019, Turkey’s military offensive on the east bank of Euphrates River against the YPG militia started. President Trump threatened (via Twitter) to destroy Turkish economy several times before the start of the operation and continued his threats right after the beginning of the operation: “As I have stated strongly before, and just to reiterate, if Turkey does anything that I, in my great and unmatched wisdom, consider to be off limits, I will totally destroy and obliterate the Economy of Turkey (I’ve done before!). They must, with Europe and others, watch over…” (Trump 2019). Soon after the tweet, on October 16, 2019, a letter was leaked to the news channels which caused a public resentment in Turkey. The letter was written by President Trump to President Erdoğan on October 9, 2019 at a time when Turkey started the Syrian operation. Trump was threatening Erdoğan that he’s going to destroy Turkish economy -by saying he did it before in the Pastor Brunson caseif Turkey makes any military operation into Syria. The letter was written in an extremely informal, undiplomatic, and rude tone that many people thought that it might be a fake one. U.S. media defined the letter as “bizarre”, “extraordinary” with a “brash language”, and “diplomatic missteps” (The Guardian 2019; The Independent 2019; CNN 2019). Turkish public was also shocked by the letter and commonly defined it as a “scandal”, “insolence”, and a sign of “disrespect” not only to President Erdoğan, but also towards Turkish society. The letter inflamed public discussions in Turkey. Different segments of the society unified over the tone of the response letter which should be written back to Trump.

Conclusion Throughout the history of Turkish-American Relations, there have been periodspecific perceptions of the Americans among the Turkish public. These perceptions were determined by the conjuncture of particular periods in time. The official relations that started in the Ottoman period in the 1830s were mostly trade-centered. In this early phase of the relations, the U.S. was perceived as the land of zealous merchants, superior engineers, and competent teachers. This began to change with the increasing American missionary activities in the Ottoman realm. Due to the concentration of American missionary education and religious activities on the

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non-Muslims of the Ottoman Empire, Americans later began to be perceived as agents of an inferior religion; spreading the religious doctrine of Protestantism to the Ottoman realm. This gradually caused the deterioration of the U.S. image. The relations between the two states from the establishment of the Turkish Republic until the end of Second World War were friendly, but not intense. The roots of the sympathy towards the Americans in the Turkish society can be found in the early Republican era. It was the time when the nation-building process based on secularism and the ideals of modernism began: the most important model for the young Republic being the U.S. Right after the end of the Second World War, two states were turning into allies against a common enemy, the Soviets. The onset of the Cold War brought not only the “golden age of relations”, but also economic and political domination of Turkey by the U.S. Domination in these fields brought with it rapid Americanization of the Turkish society and the creation of a positive perception of the U.S., which continued uninterruptedly until the early 1960s. The rising anti-imperialism alongside with the anti-war movements caused the deterioration of the U.S. image worldwide, Turkey being no exception. The onset of debates over Cyprus Dispute and the Johnson Letter of 1964 caused radical changes in the American image in Turkey, creating strong waves of anti-Americanism in the Turkish society. This trend is very much visible in the support given by the public to the anti-American demonstrations of the university students in the late 1960s. Anti-Americanism reached another high level in Turkey with the U.S. arms embargo that started in 1975, following the Turkish intervention in the island in 1974. Anti-Americanism calmed down in the 1980s as Turkey opened its doors to the neo-liberal world order after the military coup of 1980. The traditional Turkish society began to transform with the winds of globalization, replacing what is traditional with modern or better said “American” causing a second wave of Americanism. This trend continued in the immediate post-Cold War period, in which Turkey moved from the role of a Cold War frontline strategic ally to a strategic partner in the Middle East. The 1990s were also the years of European integration for Turkey. Turkish society was thankful for Washington’s role as a facilitator of Turkey’s EU path. In these years the U.S. image has improved gradually in Turkey, as part of America’s global cultural domination. American sympathy reached a peak with Clinton’s visit to the earthquake victims in 1999. Anti-Americanism reached another high point in the 2000s by the Islamophobic language used by President George W. Bush in the foreign policy discourse and more importantly the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The “hood incident” occurred during the invasion caused a serious damage to the Turkish-American Relations of the era and still remembered by the Turkish society with great grief. The rise of anti-Americanism among Turkish society in the post-hood incident period was visible in visual and printed media products of the era as well. Turkish-American Relations entered a much more stable environment during the early Obama administration, who, contrary to his predecessor, abstained from using an Islamophobic language. Despite an improving image of the U.S. globally thanks to the marketing of Obama as a superstar, his approval of the so-called

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Armenian Genocide resolution caused the return of the “ugly American” image back in the Turkish society. Moreover, the July 15, 2016 coup attempt was a major breaking point in the history of Turkish-American Relations. The non-extradition of U.S.-residing Turkish cleric Fethullah Gülen, the perpetrator of the coup, to Turkey, turned into a major crisis between the two countries. Since then, bilateral relations kept going downhill which reached another lowest point with Trump’s October 2019 letter threatening to destroy Turkish economy if Turkish military starts an operation in the Kurdish controlled sections of northern Syria. This letter reminded the Turkish society of the Johnson Letter of 1964 and inflamed the Anti-Americanism once again. The effects of this crisis are felt not only in political and economic spheres, but also in cultural and social realm. Today, the perception of the Turkish public opinion of the American image is extremely damaged.

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Shah, H. (2008), “Lerner, Daniel”, in The International Encylopedia of Communication, Date of Accession: December 19, 2019 from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/ abs/10.1002/9781405186407.wbiecl018. Sönmezoğlu, F. (1995), Kıbrıs Sorunu Işığında Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin Türkiye Politikası (1964–1980), İstanbul: Der Yayınevi. Stanton, F. (1975), “Separating American Messages”, The New York Times. Şafak, E. (2006), “Valley of the Wolves and the Politics of Masculinity”, Date of Accession: September 11, 2017 from http://www.elifsafak.us/yazilar. asp?islem=yazi&id=379. Şahin, H. (1987), Gece Gelen Mektup, Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinde Dönüm Noktası, İstanbul: Cep Kitapları. Tercüman (1964), “Tarihten Anekdotlar”, Date of Accession: August 18, 2018 from http:// tarihtenanekdotlar.blogspot.com/2019/04/975-hatiralar-hayal-oldu.html. The Guardian (2019), “Donald Trump’s bizarre, threatening letter to Erdoğan: ‘Don’t be a fool’ ”, Date of Accession: Novermber 8, 2019 from https://www.theguardian.com/ us-news/2019/oct/16/trump-letter-erdogan-turkey-invasion. The Independent (2019), “ ‘Don’t be a tough guy, don’t be a fool!’: Trump’s extraordinary letter to Erdogan prompts disbelief”, Date of Accession: November 8, 2019 from https:// www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/trump-letter-erdogan-read-turkey-syriaisis-sanctions-a9159201.html. The Wall Street Journal (2017), “Accused Turkish Cleric Assails President on Anniversary of Coup Attempt”, Date of Accession: October 12, 2017 from https://www.wsj.com/articles/ accused-turkish-cleric-assails-president-on-anniversary-of-coup-attempt-1500063885. Toker, M. (1970), Tek Partiden Çok Partiye, İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları. Toker, M. (1971), Türkiye Üzerinde 1945 Kabusu, Ankara: Akis Yayınları. Tokgöz, O. (1991), “Türkiye’de 1983 Seçimlerinde Kullanılan Siyasal Reklamlar”, in Amme İdaresi Dergisi (24), pp. 13–28. Trump, D. (2018/a, July 26), Date of Accession: August 18, 2018 from https://twitter.com/ realDonaldTrump/status/1022502465147682817. Trump, D. (2018/b, August 10), Date of Accession: August 18, 2018 from https://twitter.com/ realDonaldTrump/status/1027899286586109955. Trump, D. (2019, October 7), Date of Accession: November 8, 2019 from https://twitter.com/ realDonaldTrump/status/1181232249821388801. Yılmaz, Ş. (2003), “İki Dünya Savaşı Arasında Türk Amerikan İlişkileri: Korkunç Türk İmajı ile Mücadele”, in Toplumsal Tarih Dergisi (120), pp. 86–91. Yinanç, B. (2016), “US Is Bound to Arrest Gülen According to Deal with Turkey: Justice Minister Bozdağ”, Hürriyet Daily News, Date of Accession: October 13, 2017 from http:// www.hurriyetdailynews.com/us-is-bound-to-arrest-gulen-according-to-deal-withturkey-justice-minister-bozdag.aspx?PageID=238&NID=103306&NewsCatID=338.

Ömer Kurtbağ1

Chapter 6: Troubled Period in Turkey-U.S. Security Partnership and Turkey’s NATO Alignment During the 2000s

Abstract: This chapter seeks to explore how the Turkish-United States (U.S.) security partnership and Turkey’s relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) developed throughout the 2000s. Its chief argument is that the Transatlantic bonds between Turkey and the U.S. and NATO have become increasingly problematic. The March 1, 2003 crisis, the U.S. partnership with PKK/YPG in northern Syria, and Turkey’s recent rapprochement with Russia and Iran over the Syrian Crisis have caused the Turkish-American bilateral security ties to lie in tatters. This unfavorable climate in bilateral relations has had adverse implications for the Turkish-NATO alliance relationship, too. With the arrival of the Trump administration, Turkey has hoped for a better relationship between the two key NATO allies. However, it seems this prospect will be overshadowed for a while by the ongoing problem areas and issues the Obama administration left unaddressed until the Trump Presidency can decide how to respond to the gloomy state of security affairs with Ankara. Keywords: Turkey, United States, Security Relationship, YPG-PKK, ISIS, NATO.

Introduction The objective of this chapter is to examine the course of the Turkish-U.S.  security partnership and Turkey’s NATO alignment from the early 2000s to the present. First of all, it discusses that the Turkish-U.S. security relationship has become increasingly problematic throughout this period, as evidenced by the past and present developments that have drifted the two sides apart. These developments range from the March 1 debacle caused by the Turkish Parliament’s refusal to allow U.S. military deployment in Turkey to invade Iraq from the north and the subsequent Middle East-focused crises such as the Turkish welcome of Hamas leadership and Turkish-Syrian rapprochement, to more recent events such as the U.S.  alliance with the PKK-affiliated People’s Defense Units (YPG) in Syria and Turkey’s recent cooperation with Iran and Russia for a peaceful settlement to the Syrian civil war. On these issues, both countries have disagreed sharply and these 1 Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Erciyes University, Kayseri, Turkey. Email: [email protected]

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disagreements led to a growing deterioration of Turkish-U.S. bilateral security relations, which have also had considerable repercussions on the Turkish-NATO alliance relationship. In this respect, secondly, the study concentrates on the latter by analyzing the developments and crises that harmed Turkey’s alignment with NATO and its allies. This analysis covers a variety of reasons for this, emanating from both the strategies and policies of some NATO allies, as well as Turkey’s security policy priorities and choices. In doing this, the analysis will focus on the recent crises and ruptures between the two sides such as the Turkish efforts to purchase Chinese and Russian air defense systems and the Turkish reaction toward NATO allies’ ambivalent attitudes in response to the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016. The chapter ends with a brief account of whether these troubles in Turkey’s Western security trajectory can be overcome with the arrival of a new administration in the U.S. under Trump based on an analysis of what drove modern TurkishAmerican and Turkish-NATO relationships into trouble.

I. Background of Turkish-American Bilateral Security Partnership During the 2000s The Turkish-American bilateral security partnership suffered from the disastrous George W. Bush legacy during the first decade of the 2000s with regard to managing ties in a framework of so-called strategic partnership, which never reached a truly strategic level during the 2000s. This is related to both countries’ foreign policy understanding and security visions, which differed greatly in many respects, as analyzed below. AK Parti government, which came to power in 2002, has tried to conduct a “multi-faceted” and “Ankara-centered” foreign policy under the leadership of thenPrime Minister Erdoğan and his chief foreign policy advisor Ahmet Davutoğlu. Alternatively, while the process of accession to the EU initially acted as a catalyst for increasing Turkish influence across its geographical neighborhood, it later largely lost its function alongside a significant loss of momentum in negotiations. On the other hand, in addition to the deadlock in the EU accession process, the U.S. indifference under President Bush to PKK terror attacks from Northern Iraq, as well as its political support to Iraqi Kurds, was disappointing and disturbing for Turkish security interests (Oğuzlu 2013/a, p. 208; Larrabee 2008, p. 8). The weakening of the Western link in this way, among other reasons, seemed to have driven Turkey to develop new initiatives and openings in foreign policy. Indeed, from time to time, Turkey has become more “autonomous” and diversified in its foreign relations, bringing with it the criticisms of an “axis shift” and a “neo-Ottomanism” in foreign policy from Western foreign policy circles. This proactive foreign policy understanding and vision carried out by the Erdoğan-Davutoğlu duo have aimed at strengthening relations with the non-Western world, especially Middle Eastern neighboring countries, while Turkey continues its Western/NATO security connection.

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Turkey’s new foreign policy vision, based on principles such as “zero problems with neighbors”, “rhythmic diplomacy”, “multidimensionality”, “freedom-security balance”, and “diplomatic flexibility” (Türkmen 2009, p. 119), was too assertive and ambitious in the sense that it has sought an order-building role in a highly conflictprone region such as the Middle East. With all these aspects considered, the vision was more an ideal put forward with the mission of bringing a new breath and influence to Turkish Foreign Policy in terms of geographical, economic, commercial, cultural, diplomatic, and political dimensions. In regard to the security relationship between Turkey under Erdoğan and the U.S. under Bush, the new Turkish Foreign Policy line was often overridden by Washington, and the tension between the two sides has increased steadily, except for the last two years when the Bush administration acted relatively moderately and multilaterally in foreign affairs. The open inconsistency between the soft-power-based vision of the Erdoğan government and Bush’s hard-power-based and single-minded neoconservative foreign policy approach has been demonstrated on many occasions. Among them, the crisis on March 1, 2003, in which the Turkish Grand National Assembly did not approve the U.S. occupation of Iraq from the north, was one of the most prominent developments that harmed further Turkish-U.S. security cooperation in a regional context (Dalay & Friedman 2013, p. 129; Yılmaz 2011, p. 551). The March 1 incident was followed by other major crises, such as the incident in which Turkish troops serving in Northern Iraq were taken into custody and hooded recklessly by storming U.S.  troops, the intensifying PKK attacks from Northern Iraq, and the Ankara visit paid by Hamas leader Khaled Mashal, who, after winning the Palestinian elections, was welcomed by Ankara in February 2006 (Han 2013, p.  1; Türkmen 2012, pp.  206–207). Further, the fact that Turkey has gradually developed its relations with neighbors such as Iran and Syria in accordance with the principle of “zero problems with neighbors” was not warmly met by the Bush administration (Oğuzlu 2013/a, p. 208). A partial improvement in relations was possible only after 2007 when Washington shifted to a milder approach and drifted from its neoconservative foreign policy. The Bush-Erdoğan meeting on November 5, 2007 can be considered a milestone by which both sides became involved in a more constructive relationship (Yılmaz 2011, pp. 551, 564). Despite this period of partial recovery, it became evident that the military/security-focused and asymmetric relationship developed between Turkey and the U.S. during the Cold War could not be as easily maintained as before. However, the U.S., mostly reluctant to act together with its allies and partners in the Bush era, was not yet ready to accept this new reality. It was hoped that this troubled, and sometimes tense, course of TurkishAmerican Relations in the first decade of the 21st century would be left behind alongside the new wave of optimism about the future of bilateral relations when Barack Obama was elected U.S. President in 2008. The removal of the Bush administration and victory of Obama led to high expectations that disagreements between the two countries would be settled soon. The constructive language and compromising rhetoric Obama used during his visits to Egypt and Turkey in 2009

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also played a key role in these raised expectations. While expressing that the U.S. did not fight Islam, Obama gave the message that he did not use any discriminatory or otherizing language as Bush did to other nations by stating that “You are either with us, or you are with the terrorists” in the post-9/11 global “War on Terror” (Bush, 2001). As Aydıntaşbaş and Kirişçi (2017, p. 1) argued: “At the onset of the Obama administration in 2009, Turkey’s Justice and Development Party -having carried out impressive political and economic reforms at home and then showcasing an unprecedented potential for serving as a transformative political power in its own region- initially looked like a natural ally for Washington.” Meanwhile, Turkey’s recent foreign policy line seemed, at first sight, to fit well with Obama’s foreign policy understanding, which was based on principles such as diplomacy, multilateralism, and engagement (Kurtbağ 2015, pp. 515–516). However, despite these rhetorical similarities, relations were not so smooth during the first term of the Obama administration. Indeed, during Obama’s rule, both countries had difficulty defining the contours of the newly crafted “model partnership” framework upon which their revived relationship would be founded, at a time when Turkey was blamed for pursuing a decentered foreign policy and shifting its axis from West to East (Kurtbağ 2015, p. 516), as it disagreed with the U.S. on some key regional security issues such as Iran’s nuclear program and Israeli policies in the Middle East. The fact that the U.S., under Obama, did not accept Turkey’s will to act “independently” and “assertively” in its neighborhood and beyond had yet again caused a crisis in bilateral relations (Yılmaz 2011, p. 551). Despite initial hopes for a new beginning in the post-Bush era, the two sides could not overcome the troubled period inherited from the Bush administration. Indeed, Turkish-American ties experienced one of the worst periods in 2010. The Turkish-Brazilian nuclear deal with Iran in May, 2010, and the subsequent Mavi Marmara incident that resulted in the heightened tension between TurkishIsraeli relations, followed by Turkey’s “no” vote in the UN Security Council on tougher sanctions against Iran, were among the main Turkish-led developments that led to a deepening fissure in the Turkish-American bilateral relations because of divergent regional security visions (Yılmaz 2011, pp.  568–569; Falk 2014, pp.  11–13; Sayarı 2013, p.  131). The autonomous regional security vision pursued by Turkey was subject to intense criticism, especially by U.S. Foreign Policy pundits, as evidenced by “axis shift” accusations. The Obama administration contributed to this axis shift controversy by putting the blame on the role of the EU’s exclusionary policies in changing Turkey’s direction. However, the policies of the U.S. in the Middle East that sparked the angry reaction of the Turkish public and Washington’s indifferent attitude toward Turkey’s security concerns, namely the PKK attacks, are also factors that explain Turkey’s relatively autonomous regional policy. Then came the Arab revolts, also dubbed the “Arab Spring”, which were unexpected by the Obama administration. Initially, after the outbreak of the Arab Spring and Turkey’s subsequent approval of NATO’s missile defense system, “both Washington and Ankara felt a strong need for better coordination and cooperation in

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responding to unfolding events, even though their divergences on Iran and Israel were still in place” (Kurtbağ 2015, p. 516). In facing the Arab Spring, Obama’s response was at first ambivalent and at times indeterminate, and while the administration did not hesitate to engage in overthrowing Libya’s Qaddafi regime, albeit leading from behind, it distanced itself from intervention in Syria. In this environment, relations with Turkey again escalated to the point of near breakdown during the second term of Obama’s Presidency.

II. The Current Turkish-American Security (Non) Cooperation The security partnership between Turkey and the U.S.  is currently degraded as Ankara and Washington appear only to agree to fiercely disagree on various, and mostly security-oriented, issues. These include the U.S.-YPG alliance in northern Syria, the extradition of U.S.-based expatriate cleric Fethullah Gülen, who is blamed by the Turkish government for plotting the failed coup attempt of 15th July in Turkey, the Turkish-Kurdistan Regional Government rapprochement, as well as the current Turkish-Russian and Turkish-Iranian cooperation on the peaceful solution of the Syrian question (Aydıntaşbaş & Kirişçi 2017, p.  2; The New  York Times 2016). The Syrian civil war is currently the main problem area that adversely affects the Turkish-American security relationship. Washington’s reactive and often inactive attitude under Obama in responding to the brutality of the Assad regime was largely associated with preventing radical Islamists from gaining the upper hand in the post-conflict era. Ankara has difficulty understanding why the U.S. did not make use of its diplomatic leverage and military capabilities in dealing with the Assad regime, whose remaining in power was already disturbing for Turkish prestige and influence in the Middle East, with Turkey all the while shouldering the heavy burden imposed by the flow of millions of Syrian refugees, as well as the security risks that accompany it, none of which was shared equally by its Western partners. Amid these security risks, Washington’s “wait and see” approach in Syria was becoming increasingly harmful for Turkish security interests, as evidenced by incidents such as the shooting down of a Turkish F-4 fighter by Syria in June 2012 and the suicide bombing that severely hit the Turkish border town Reyhanlı in 2013, killing nearly 50 people (Yegin & Ersoy 2013, p. 33; Diriöz 2015, p. 658). After failing to convince the Assad regime to launch political reforms during the early stages of the Syrian uprising, Turkey did not hesitate to back up antiregime forces and made a strong case for the formation of safe havens and a no-fly zone in northern Syria (Sayarı 2013, p.  134) in line with its policy of tightened border security due to large refugee flows from Syria. However, such bold steps were hardly supported by the Obama administration (Yeşiltaş 2015, p. 14). In the end, the enormous security vacuum that emerged in northern Syria was increasingly filled by the Turkish-unfriendly Kurdish YPG forces and Islamic State of Iraq

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and the Levant (ISIS) fighters. Making the situation even more complex for Turkey were separate statehood claims by both terrorist organizations that posed a deadly threat to Turkish regional security interests (Orhan 2014). While Turkey’s and Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army’s strategy remained concentrated on toppling the Assad regime, the chief priority of the Obama administration was to win the fight against ISIS. For Turkey, the main problem in this U.S. strategy was that it mainly involved airstrikes and the dispatch of around three thousand truckloads of arms and advanced military equipment to the PKK’s Syrian affiliate, YPG. In fact, Turkey was concerned that these U.S.-supplied weapon systems would be turned against them one day in the future. The worsening security relationship with Washington was, therefore, a key factor that pushed Turkey further toward behaving autonomously in defense of its own endangered national interests in its local vicinity. While Turkey found Obama’s inaction in Syria too timid and unacceptable, Washington was anxious about Turkey’s open border policy, which was badly exploited by ISIS and other terrorists (Schanzer & Tahiroglu 2014, p. 3). Only the military defeat of ISIS in Syria was arguably a “shared concern” by both countries, but even on this issue, their interests did not converge much thanks to their competing priorities in the war-torn country. The fact that terrorists of Turkishorigin had joined ISIS ranks, coupled with the flow of foreign fighters to Syria via a porous Turkish border, is often cited by those who accused Ankara of its “complacency” about ISIS terrorism (Schanzer & Tahiroglu 2014, p. 17). However, ISIS was actually a direct threat to Turkish national security as proven by ISIS suicide attacks against Turkish border cities as well as its shelling of border towns such as Kilis throughout 2015–2016. It is true that Turkey’s long border with Syria was almost uncontrollable and easily permeable and Turkey was accused by some Western and U.S. pundits of its inability to stop illegal border crossings, weapons smuggling, illegal oil sales, and medical treatment of ISIS fighters in Turkish hospitals (Schanzer & Tahiroglu 2014, pp. 13–15; Kibaroglu & Sazak 2015, p. 100; Bipartisan Policy Center 2015, pp. 11–14). However, it can be contended that other states did not try hard to prevent ISIS fighters from departing from their countries, either. Therefore, to blame only Turkey as if there had not been more fighters originating from European countries was intriguing. When ISIS took Ankara’s Consul General and his crew in Mosul hostage following its seizure of the city, Turkey had to remain elusive in the face of the ISIS threat emerging on its Syrian border. 46 Turkish were eventually freed by ISIS in a prisoner swap deal with Ankara. After that, Turkey had a freer hand in coping with the mounting ISIS threat on the border. As a crucial first step, Turkey decided to open Incirlik Base to U.S.-led antiISIS coalition forces in July 2015 (Kibaroglu & Sazak 2015, pp. 98–99). However, Turkey’s eventual decision to join the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS came with a heavy price, including vulnerability to ISIS attacks like the deadly one that hit Istanbul Atatürk Airport in June 2016. In addition to causing instability along the Turkish-Syrian border, ISIS was also, geopolitically, seeking to undermine Turkey’s military engagements in Iraq and

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Syria. Indeed, ISIS attacks against both the anti-Assad forces of the Free Syrian Army backed by Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq dealt a painful blow to Turkish regional security interests (Orhan 2014, p. 3). Despite the fact that Turkey played no direct part in the emergence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, it was one of the key regional players that were most adversely affected by the ISIS threat. Turkey has sought to respond to the accusations linking it with ISIS through measures such as strengthened border security, deeper intelligence cooperation with ISIS-origin states, increased border patrols and surveillance, and an official declaration of ISIS as a terrorist organization (Yeşiltaş 2015, pp. 14–31). Nevertheless, the contradiction between Turkey’s recent ability to adopt a highly securitized border regime and its incapability to do this in the near past was noteworthy for some analysts (Okyay 2017, pp. 837–838). During the battle in the Syrian town of Kobani where ISIS and YPG forces fiercely fought during October 2014, Ankara also allowed the Kurdish Peshmerga forces a safe passage to Syria via Turkish territory to combat ISIS while opening its border to more than 400,000 Kurds fleeing from the brutality of ISIS, thereby affirming its anti-ISIS stance (Yeşiltaş 2015, p. 9). Further, Turkish security forces conducted preventive operations within suspected ISIS sites in large cities including Istanbul, resulting in a significant decline in ISIS recruitment. Finally, the most conclusive Turkish move toward destroying the ISIS presence in northern Syria was its military incursion, codenamed “Operation Euphrates Shield”. As one analyst put it, “The Turkish military was eager and ready to implement the political will to intervene in the Syrian conflict after calculating the operational risks and regaining its self-respect and confidence following the trauma caused by July 15” (Seren 2017). Indeed, the border area was secured completely from ISIS by the Turkish Army and Free Syrian Army forces, while the military advance of YPG fighters to the West of the Euphrates River to form a “corridor of terror” was also halted successfully (Ülgen 2017). Turkey also intended to establish a de facto safe zone in northern Syria after the elimination of terrorist threats to its border, with more than 60,000 Syrian migrants relocated in this area secured by the Turkish military (Seren 2017). The U.S. genuinely wanted to see YPG forces fill the void left by the ISIS fighters while Turkey was strongly determined to push back the YPG’s territorial gains. In the face of this growing Turkish-American disagreement, Syrian Kurdish militias have emerged as the most “reliable and secular” ally combating ISIS for the sake of the U.S., a fact that makes Turkish-American Relations more complex. As one analyst argued, “In the West, liberal secularism was pitted against democracy, which in turn decreased Western support for the Arab uprisings in general and Syrian opposition groups in particular” (Dalay 2016). Thus, Turkey’s priority in Syria changed from overthrowing the Assad regime at any cost to preventing YPG from gaining the upper hand with the generous military help of the U.S. (Aydıntaşbaş & Kirişçi 2017, p. 10). Obama tried hard to dissuade Turkey from believing that YPG’s military advance toward the west of the Euphrates River during spring 2016 was against the Turkish security interests rather than toward recapturing ISIS strongholds such as Manbij. He even promised that YPG would return to its original bases after

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the liberation of the city. However, YPG’s threatening military presence west of the river was a “redline” for Turkey, who even allowed the U.S. warplanes to use the Incirlik Base during the operation. When this promise by Obama was not honored faithfully, “this made Ankara even more distrustful of the Obama administration, and Turkey began to see the burgeoning military alliance between Washington and the YPG as a threat. The appearance in the media of American soldiers carrying the YPG insignia fueled further distrust.” (Aydıntaşbaş & Kirişçi 2017, p. 6) Nonetheless, the U.S. under Obama was not content with Turkey’s military campaign, which moved deeper into south Syria, resulting in the recapture of Jarablus from ISIS successfully. It was obvious that there was a lack of Turkish coordination with the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition during the military operation, as evidenced by the Washington’s reluctance to support the advance of Turkish and Turkish-backed forces (Ülgen 2017). Turkey did not appear to have any confidence in U.S. commitments in Syria, especially after its unfulfilled promise under Obama concerning YPG forces and their return to east of the Euphrates River. Also, it has asserted strongly that YPG is no different than PKK, which has long been regarded as a terrorist organization by the U.S. and other NATO allies. The U.S. has struggled to explain its security cooperation with YPG, which was renamed the Syrian Democratic Forces in a failing U.S.-led “cover-up” attempt according to Turkish authorities (Aydıntaşbaş & Kirişçi 2017, p. 11), as a necessity rather than a choice. It also made another promise about taking away the arms dispatched to YPG after the defeat of ISIS. However, these security guarantees have not been satisfactory at all for Ankara, with the concern that the establishment of an independent Kurdish State on its Syrian border could threaten national security. As was the case with the Bush administration, which remained largely indifferent to Turkey’s security concerns regarding PKK incursions from Northern Iraq, Turkish-American security ties were again severely strained and Turkish security concerns were rightly doubled not only because of Iraqi-based PKK attacks, but also due to imminent potential for permanent YPG presence just across the Syrian border. In addition, Turkey’s rapprochement with the Kurdistan Regional Government in Northern Iraq led to a problematic relationship with the Iraqi central government under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. This issue itself was another source of disagreement between Ankara and Washington. The Erdoğan government, disturbed by Maliki’s support of the Assad regime, as well as his authoritarian stance and sectarian approach in Iraq, decided to host the former Vice President of Iraq Tariq Hashemi, who was sentenced to death by an Iraqi court. Erdoğan also became close to the Kurdistan Regional Government in Northern Iraq and maintained ties with the disgruntled Sunni leaders (Kubicek 2014, pp. 5–6). After the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq in 2011, Obama’s mild policy toward the Maliki government did not seem to be in sync with Turkey’s Iraq policy. The chief concern of the Obama administration was that Turkey’s closeness with the Kurds could result in the increase in Iranian influence. Without the approval of Baghdad, Turkey’s oil and gas deal with the Kurdish administration was not warmly welcomed in

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Washington (Abramowitz & Edelman 2013, p. 39; Tol 2013). In Turkey’s view, the main issue distorting the territorial integrity of Iraq was U.S.  policies and early U.S. withdrawal, which left the country vulnerable to further Iranian influence. Turkey’s recently close ties with Russia was another serious backlash for Western and U.S. interests in the Middle East, as both countries share the same concerns about the Western-led liberal order and “color revolutions”. Turkey did not take part in the U.S. and EU-led sanctions imposed on Russian banks and other companies during the Crimea crisis of 2014 even though it did not acknowledge the forceful annexation of Crimea by Moscow (Bipartisan Policy Center 2015). The personal rapport between Erdoğan and Putin was also disturbing for the U.S. administration, given that distaste between Obama and Erdoğan became increasingly clearer as the former’s term closed (Park 2015, p. 582). A near breakdown in bilateral relations occurred in the wake of the downing of a Russian military jet by Turkish Air Forces in November 2015. After this event, both Ankara and Moscow pressed the reset button in June 2016, attempting to repair the damage after President Erdoğan released an apology to President Putin regarding the incident (Tol & Goren 2017, p. 2). Putin then ordered to lift some of the trade sanctions imposed on Turkey until June. Putin was also quick to condemn the failed coup attempt, siding with the democratically elected Turkish government. In the immediate aftermath of the normalization of bilateral relations, the Turkish-Russian security cooperation, regarding the Syrian debacle, worked in favor of Turkish security interests since it was the Turkish-Russian deal that made the Turkish military offensive into Syria possible (Özertem 2017, p. 128). This normalization in relations was advanced by the initiation of a new peace movement, called the Astana Process, which was started in January 2017 and was aimed at ending hostilities between the conflicting sides in Syria. The U.S.  was actually sidelined and even marginalized by this Russian-Turkish-Iranian troikaled Astana Talks (Wright 2017). In the words of Özertem (2017, p.  129), “After engaging with Russia over the Syria crisis, Ankara adopted a milder discourse regarding the Baath regime and Assad, which turned out to be another important gain for Moscow vis-à-vis reaching a solution in Syria.” This was truly a test for the Obama administration’s highly measured and non-interventionist Syrian policy. Ties between the U.S. and Russia deteriorated increasingly because of the Syrian civil war, the Ukraine Crisis, and the recent Russian military moves in Eastern Europe. Apart from this, however, the S-400 missile deal talks involving Turkey and Russia in 2016 was the most remarkable achievement. These talks were not favored by the U.S. Department of Defense, which is a matter to be later discussed in the following chapter. Alternatively, the fragility of Turkish-Russian security cooperation in Syria, which seemed -according to Aydıntaşbaş & Kirişçi (2017, p. 14), “a marriage of convenience”- has alleviated Washington’s pain, given the limits in advancing further cooperation and the differences in the respective countries’ interests. For instance, both Russia’s recognition of YPG as a legitimate actor and its non-recognition of PKK as a terrorist organization became alarming issues for Ankara. When three

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Turkish troops were killed and eleven more wounded by an “accidental” Russian air strike in al-Bab during the Operation Euphrates Shield, the limits of military coordination in the field were bitterly made apparent (BBC 2017/a). Also, Turkey’s enthusiastic embrace of the Trump administration’s cruise missile strike in April 2017 bothered the Russians, who found the attack to be a violation of Syrian sovereignty and international law (Hubbard 2017). These issues further complicate the Turkish-Russian relationship, which can be historically characterized as “mutual distrusting”. That said; it is implausible to suggest that Turkey has shifted its axis in foreign policy from its Western vocation to a Russian orbit in which it is unlikely to have much leverage over Moscow’s foreign actions. Turkish-Iranian rapprochement in dealing with Syria was no different than the Turkish-Russian deal in terms of sidelining Western and U.S.  security interests in a regional context. This was also part of the emerging trilateral RussianTurkish-Iranian peace-seeking initiative in Astana. The Turkish-Iranian equation represents the two main fighting factions in the conflict:  the anti-Assad Sunni opposition forces vs. Shiite (Shia) militias fighting side-by-side Assad’s army. Until late 2016, both countries were bitter rivals in Syrian conflict, while Turkey seemed increasingly concerned about growing Iranian influence in the wider Middle East. This was also against a background in which Turkish influence in the same region deteriorated because of then-Foreign Minister Davutoğlu’s ambitious rhetoric, which eventually left Ankara a lonely and isolated regional actor. Indeed, Davutoğlu believed that Assad would be overthrown immediately by the Syrian opposition and thus, pushed assertively for regime change in Syria, hoping the West and the U.S. would take the lead in this effort alongside Turkey. In his speech to the Turkish Parliament in April 2012, he stated that “A new Middle East is about to be born. We will be the owner, pioneer and the servant of this new Middle East.” and then added that “Turkey is no longer a country which does not have self-confidence and is waiting for foreign approval” (Salt, 2018, p. 93). However, as Salt (2018, p. 93) argued, “Within a short time of intervening in Syria, Turkey’s zero-problems policy had turned into an accumulation-of-problems policy”. At first, Turkey did not appear to care about this region-wide isolation as İbrahim Kalın, Erdoğan’s chief advisor, claimed that it is more of a “precious loneliness” (değerli yalnızlık) and a price Turkey should pay thanks to its principled posture and higher morality when compared to other actors’ realpolitik positions (Park 2015, pp.  596–597; Kardaş 2013, p.  70). After Prime Minister Davutoğlu’s resignation and the appointment of Binali Yıldırım as his heir, however, Turkey felt a strong need for a pragmatic reappraisal in its foreign policy declaring “to make more friends and decrease the number of enemies” (Dalay 2016) and denoting a break from the failed Davutoğlu era. After Turkey’s priority in Syria shifted from toppling Assad to preventing YPG from establishing a U.S.-enabled statelet in northern Syria, Ankara did not hesitate to cooperate with Tehran in focusing on containing this threat and in establishing a close partnership on some regional issues. For example, in return for Russian and Iranian acquiescence of a Turkish military incursion into northern Syria, Turkey remained silent and even cooperated with Iran and Russia for the evacuation of

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civilians from Aleppo. These civilians were successfully freed from rebels in late 2016, irrespective of the United States involvement under Obama. Additionally, during the Qatar-Gulf Crisis of summer 2017, Turkey and Iran closely worked to balance Saudi and U.S.  efforts to contain and isolate the gas-rich Gulf country because of its support to “radical” and “terrorist” organizations such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, in a more recent occasion, Turkish-Iranian cooperation in the Kurdistan Regional Government’s independence referendum move in September 2017 was also decisive and fruitful with regard to forcing Kurds to step back in the face of sanctions, which were imposed by Turkey, Iran, and Iraqi central government on the KRG (Hodge 2017). Thus, Turkish security interests and immediate priorities for protecting the territorial and political integrity of Iraq outstripped its strong bilateral security, as well as its diplomatic and commercial ties with KRG in the recent years. During Obama’s reign, Turkish-American Relations took another serious blow by the failed July 15, 2016 coup attempt, which was spearheaded by a Gülenist cabal within the Turkish Armed Forces. As Hanioğlu (2017, p. 70) stated, “U.S.-Turkey relations reached a fever pitch following the July 15 coup attempt. Policy-makers in Ankara, including President Erdoğan, accused the United States of supporting mutineers and sheltering Fethullah Gülen…” The response from Secretary of State, John Kerry, regarding the situation in Turkey was weak and not up to par with Turkish expectations. Despite the U.S. denial of its prior knowledge of the coup and the visit paid by then-Vice President Joe Biden to Ankara in August 2016, Turkish public opinion still believes that the Washington had a hand in this coup attempt. Turkey claims that it has presented all the available evidence, linking Gülen with the coup attempt to the U.S., but there was no investigation launched by the American authorities concerning the Gülenists’ involvement in the incident until the end of the Obama Presidency (Aydıntaşbaş & Kirişçi 2017, p.  19). The subsequent, ongoing purge of thousands of Gülenists from public institutions and the military by the Turkish authorities was also regarded as a violent crackdown on the dissidents rather than a preventive measure to halt another coup attempt. As the Obama era closed in January 2017, the election of President Donald Trump seemed to open a new window of opportunity for a reset in Turkish-American security affairs. The Turkish government’s favorable response to his Presidency was a sign of intention to enter into a dialogue with the new administration, which additionally committed to pursuing an anti-Obama foreign policy. Trump’s unconventional views on U.S. foreign affairs and his transactional style of foreign policy were a serious cause of concern for the Western world, but these same traits looked promising for Ankara, as it hoped to leave the uneasy eras during both the Bush and Obama administrations behind. Even Trump’s anti-Islamic worldview and his steps to ban immigration from several Muslim countries did not constitute a significant barrier to Turkish expectations from him. Given that the new administration inherited “the same set of questions and dilemmas that afflicted relations under the Obama administration” (Aydıntaşbaş & Kirişçi 2017, p.  3); nevertheless, it is not surprising that Turkey’s hopes were dashed when the American engagement

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with the Kurdish proxy YPG persisted and even consolidated under Trump.  In addition, Turkey’s demands to join the Raqqa offensive in Syria were not welcomed in Washington since it was determined to work with the Kurdish forces in liberating the city from ISIS (Peterson 2017). In the wake of recently developing Turkish-Iranian security cooperation in the wider Middle East, Trump also is not likely to attract Turkey to its anti-Iranian regional posture – a posture that aims at containing Iranian influence by setting up counterbalancing coalitions from Sunni countries (Aydıntaşbaş & Kirişçi 2017, p. 18). The extradition of Gülen also remains a thorny issue, despite recurrent Turkish efforts to convince the Trump administration that his organization is a security threat to both countries. The U.S. still considers his extradition a legal matter rather than a political issue, which will ultimately be decided by the American judiciary. The arrest of U.S. Istanbul Consulate staff Metin Topuz, which was part of the postcoup investigation carried out by the Turkish authorities also caused a fierce diplomatic quarrel between Ankara and Washington (The Economist 2017; McConnel 2017). At this point, Cook (2017) claims, “The Topuz case can now be logged into an increasingly long list of conflicts that have challenged the U.S. relationship with Erdoğan’s Turkey over the last few years. It is now clear that Turkey and the United States are less allies and partners than antagonists and strategic competitors, especially in the Middle East.” Indeed, the U.S. regarded the arrest as a “security threat” to its diplomatic missions in Turkey, despite the fact that Topuz was not under the protection of the 1961 Vienna Convention. For Turkey, however, Topuz’s phone records were suspicious enough to prove that he had been collaborating with Gülenists. Thus, this discovery deemed Topuz guilty of criminal activity intended to undermine the Turkish government. This crisis escalated when the U.S. government decided to suspend non-immigrant visa services for Turkish nationals – a move that led the Turkish government to retaliate in the same way. McConnel (2017) argues here that “because of the other problems plaguing Turkish-American affairs, official U.S. behavior in regard to Topuz’s arrest has caused far greater harm to relations between the two NATO allies than might have been the case otherwise.” Therefore, defining a fresh course for the deeply fragmented Turkish-U.S. security ties after Trump’s unprecedented victory has not been an easy task at all, as proven by this administration’s lack of progress. In the wake of this troubled relationship, anti-American public opinion in Turkey is undoubtedly on the rise (Peterson 2017). American authorities believe that Turkey does not do enough to prevent conspiracy theories concerning the U.S. role as a conspirator in the botched coup attempt from gaining ground. However, the strong criticisms by the U.S. media and think-tanks about the growing authoritarianism by the Turkish government is a sign of poor understanding of what Turkish people feel in the post-coup era on the U.S. part. Turkey, which “was touted as an inspirational model for the Middle East” (Aydıntaşbaş & Kirişçi 2017, p. 1) just a few years ago, now is even depicted as an unreliable ally, given that President Erdoğan attempted to silence and supress opposition against his rule, violating human rights outrageously according to the U.S.  narrative. Yet Turkey was not

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the only country that considered the U.S. an unreliable partner. Saudi Arabia and Israel, both of which were concerned about the Iranian nuclear deal between P5+1 countries and Tehran, were equally dissatisfied. Furthermore, it is only Turkey that is held responsible for causing complications in the Turkish-U.S. partnership from the U.S. perspective. While Turkey has ultimately made mistakes concerning the handling of the situation in Syria, the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. is a two-way street. With that being said, Turkey seemed to hold the U.S. responsible for its domestic troubles. In August 2018, Turkish lira suffered heavily from abruptly strengthening the dollar because of the heightened Turkish-U.S. rift over the detention of American pastor Andrew Brunson. Having already doubled tariffs on metal imports from Turkey, the Trump administration threatened to impose more sanctions if Turkey would not release the pastor immediately (Danforth 2018). Turkish government decided that the Turkish economy was ultimately being assaulted, holding the U.S. accountable for the economic war against Turkey. In the words of Erdoğan, dollars, euros, and gold were now “the bullets, cannonballs, and missiles of the economic war being waged against our country” (Batchelor 2018). This spat was not surprising given the ongoing standoff with the U.S. regarding its commitment to back up PKK-YPG. In reference to U.S.  indifference to Turkish security interests in the Middle East during both Bush and Obama administrations, President Erdoğan wrote a letter to The New York Times, stating, “Unless the United States starts respecting Turkey’s sovereignty and proves that it understands the dangers that our nation faces, our partnership could be in jeopardy” (The New York Times 2018). In concluding his letter, President Erdoğan additionally stated, “Before it is too late, Washington must give up the misguided notion that our relationship can be asymmetrical and come to terms with the fact that Turkey has alternatives. Failure to reverse this trend of unilateralism and disrespect will require us to start looking for new friends and allies.” (The New York Times 2018) Turkish Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu also appeared on USA Today with a piece criticizing the recent U.S.  threat and sanctions towards Turkey. A  section of his article stated, “President Trump was right when he called on members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to step up their defense spending. But new  American sanctions targeting Turkey  -and the threat of more to come- alienate one of the few NATO allies that has been ahead of the curve.” (Çavuşoğlu 2018) Under Trump, the U.S. strategy in Syria has not changed considerably, given that it has never ceased to support YPG militarily in the east of the Euphrates River despite ongoing Turkish government protests. With increasing pressure from Turkey, nonetheless, President Trump, while speaking with Erdoğan on phone on December 14, 2018, unexpectedly declared that the U.S. would withdraw from wartorn Syria fully, as the fight against ISIS was coming to a victorious close. President Erdoğan welcomed Trump’s decision and emphasized that Turkey would fight against terrorist organizations with the help of international community. However, it seemed that Trump’s surprise decision was not very well coordinated with the U.S. security apparatus, given opposition from Trump’s then-National Security

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Advisor John Bolton, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and even more remarkably, then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis. Mattis resigned from his post in protest of this abrupt Presidential decision, given that he felt this Presidential decision would undermine the U.S.  campaign against ISIS and would additionally betray U.S. allies in the process (Sullivan 2019). In the months following this decision, this withdrawal ultimately did not even happen. The U.S. security bureaucracy subsequently resisted a complete and swift exit from Syria just because this abandonment of the U.S.  security partner YPG additionally would put long-term U.S.  security interests at stake. Many security analysts also found this decision “short-sighted”, “naïve”, and “premature” and they blamed the Trump administration for repeating the same mistake President Obama made by withdrawing U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011, failing to give any consideration to the implications of such a move (Starr, Browne & Gaouette 2018). In January 2019, the tension between two countries grew again. First, Trump’s National Security Advisor Bolton said that the U.S. would only think to withdraw its troops from Syria if Turkey guaranteed not to attack U.S.-backed YPG fighters. This conditionality was strongly denied by President Erdoğan, who declared that his government would not compromise and additionally would expect the U.S. to honor its strategic partnership with Turkey by giving up its partnership with YPG. President Trump’s tweet on 13 January stated that the U.S. government would devastate Turkish economy if Ankara attacked the Kurds in Syria. This only helped to enhance a negative image of the U.S. in the eyes of the Turkish public (Sullivan & Stark 2019). This threat was presumably the most remarkable split between the two sides on a Presidential level, given the personal empathy between both leaders. Thus, in early 2019, the U.S. concluded that it would only withdraw gradually and not fully, as both the safety of its regional allies was under threat and as Iranian influence in Syria was alarming given the continuation of U.S.  military deployment. Washington also tried to convince its European allies to keep committed in Syria after its withdrawal, but they did not appear to be willing to do so in the absence of the U.S. (Köse 2019). According to Turkish scholar Duran (2019), because it exhausted nearly all available options in Syria, the only viable alternative in favor of U.S. security interests was to establish a safe zone in agreement with Ankara. Nearly a year after the publication of Erdoğan’s New York Times letter, Turkey and the U.S. eventually decided to establish a buffer zone east of Euphrates River in Syria, following days of tough talks in Ankara during the late July and early August 2019. To this end, the two countries also agreed to immediately set up a joint operation center in Turkey, near the Syrian border, in order to coordinate their military efforts. Despite questions, such as the width of this zone and the military that would control it, this agreement was regarded by Turkish officials as a positive step towards the protection of Turkish security interests. Turkey hoped that this deal would allow Ankara to patrol its borders and relocate displaced Syrian refugees in Turkey in a safe manner within this protected zone. After the successive threats by Turkey to launch a military offensive against PKK-YPG in spite of

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the U.S. warnings of not taking any unilateral military action, this deal meant that a military encounter between Turkish and U.S. forces, two NATO allies, would be avoided (Gall 2019). Beyond this, however, the details of the deal have been left blank and will be continuously discussed between the two sides as the events in the field unfold. As Kanat (2019) put it, “…the implementation of the first steps of the agreement led to cautious optimism among many, but it is still short of being a panacea to be considered a real confidence-building measure”. Therefore, it appears that even though Turkey was satisfied with this agreement, it still remained highly cautious about the status of eastern Syria (i.e. the governing structure and security arrangements in YPG-controlled area as well as the effective implementation of the agreement terms there by the CENTCOM). At this point, the disagreements between the U.S. and Turkey still were considerable. As one Turkish analyst (Köse 2019) underlines: “Turkey wants a complete withdrawal of YPG militants from all of eastern Syria. The American side believes that the governing model and the security apparatus formed by the YPG and Democratic Union Party (PYD) is a useful model and should be maintained in areas where Kurds live. Ankara considers this option unacceptable. Ankara wants the moderate opposition led by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and wants armed units authorized by local councils to take more responsibility instead of the YPG. Demographic engineering and the radicalization sponsored by the YPG along its southern border is a matter of concern for Ankara.” The delivery of Russian S-400 missile defense systems to Turkey in July 2019 was another contentious issue that widened the rift between the two sides. Despite the reluctance of President Trump, who put the blame on his predecessor, President Obama, for Ankara’s purchase of S-400s, to impose sanctions on Turkey, the U.S.  government decided in the end to remove Turkey from F-35 stealth fighter program fully while stressing that it remains a key ally and strategic partner (BBC 2019). The White House spokeswoman responded to this delivery by saying that “Unfortunately, Turkey’s decision to purchase Russian S-400 air defense systems renders its continued involvement with the F-35 impossible… Turkey has been a longstanding and trusted partner and NATO ally for over 65 years, but accepting the S-400 undermines the commitments all NATO allies made to each other to move away from Russian systems.” (BBC 2019). The U.S. side claims that F-35s cannot co-exist with the S-400s that are not compatible with NATO systems. Meanwhile, the Turkish side defends the view that the U.S. did not offer an acceptable deal for the purchase of U.S.-made Patriot air defense system and both systems can co-exist without undermining NATO’s integrated air defense. Turkish response to this U.S. decision was defiant in the sense that it found the U.S. reaction as very unjustified. Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hami Aksoy stated that “We are not a customer of the F-35 program, we are its owners. While there’s no apparent justified reason or legal grounds, we are trying to be pushed out. This is not an acceptable situation. If we are pushed out of this process, we will have to try other ways.” (Wilks 2019) In the wake of this predicament, it is expected that the U.S. firms will supply more than 900 plane parts that have been so far produced by Turkish manufacturers (Hürriyet Daily News 2019). Turkey also insisted that a conditional Patriot deal is

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unacceptable as it means disrespect for Turkey’s sovereignty in foreign affairs. In President Erdoğan’s words, “Turkey can buy U.S. Patriots, but we consider offers to buy just Patriots and completely put Russian S-400s aside as an interference in our sovereignty rights.” (Aliyev, Alhas & Morrow 2019) With the exclusion of Turkey from F-35 project, Turkish companies involved in the project such as Roketsan, TAI, and TUSAŞ will thus have lost a great deal of money amounting up to 12 billion dollars. Meanwhile, the U.S. companies such as Lockheed Martin will have to suspend the delivery of 116 F-35s to Turkey and they will definitely face additional costs emanating from Turkish ouster (Wilks 2019). In addition to these mutual revenue losses, the U.S. side also threatens Turkey with further severe sanctions through “Section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Trough Sanctions Act” as well as the non-delivery of critical U.S. weaponry such as Blackhawks and F-16s to Turkey in future. As Kibaroğlu (2019, p. 8) noted, “The severity of these sanctions goes without saying; if imposed on Turkey, they may cause serious damage to Turkey’s defensive capacity and operational capabilities, at least in the short to medium term.” In this climate, Russia was quick to take advantage of this rift between two NATO allies by offering its SU-35 fighter jets to Turkey, who would consider taking this offer seriously if any progress were not made with the U.S. with regard to the return of Turkey to the program in the coming months. To sum up, it can be suggested the Turkish-American Relationship is neither strategic, nor a partnership any longer. “Once a model partnership, the relationship deteriorated into a dysfunctional one with unsatisfactory results for both sides” (Aydıntaşbaş & Kirişçi 2017, p. 2). In the eyes of U.S. administration officials, Turkey under Erdoğan is no longer an inspiring model for the Middle East; it is a liability rather than an asset in terms of U.S. security interests regionally, most notably in Syria. In other words, thanks to its badly failing Syrian policy, Turkey had “become a security consumer” rather than a “provider” (Aydıntaşbaş & Kirişçi 2017, p.  2). Alternatively, from the Turkish perspective, the U.S. became an undependable and unreliable partner beginning in the 2000s, as exemplified by its failing regional policies, incompatible strategies, and unfulfilled promises under the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations, functioning at the expense of Turkey and its security interests. This gloomy outlook in the Turkish-American dyad is similar to Ankara’s relationship with NATO and other allies, as will be outlined below.

III. Turkey and NATO: A Troublesome Security Relationship From the Early 2000s to the Present As seen from the analysis above, Turkey is no longer a dependable ally, nor a reliable security partner from U.S. angle. This viewpoint is also shared by some NATO allies. From this perspective, among the reasons for the recently troubled period in Turkish-NATO relations are Turkey’s attempt to purchase missile systems from China, its shooting down of a Russian SU-24 fighter jet near the Syrian border,

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the July 15, 2016 coup attempt that resulted in the purge of many Turkish NATO officers from their alliance posts, and the approval of their asylum demands by European allies who are also concerned about the quality of the Turkish democracy under the Erdoğan administration. Furthermore, the crisis over the portrayal of the founder of the Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and current President Erdoğan as “enemies” at a NATO drill in Norway in November 2017 and most recently, Turkey’s S-400 surface-to-air missile deal with Russia are other thorny issues that hit the Turkey-NATO relations. However, before turning to these burning issues, it is necessary to outline some background concerning the course of Turkish-NATO ties during the first decade of the 2000s. The NATO alliance has gradually transformed from a regional defense pact to a global security organization in the post-Cold War era, and this gradual transformation has been of great importance for Turkey. During the Iraq crisis in 2003, the alliance was fragmented and the division between European allies such as Germany and France who were opposed to the U.S.-led Iraq war and the U.S. under Bush had increased worries about the integrity and unity of the alliance. New Central and Eastern European alliance members in NATO approached the alliance as a safeguard against Russia. Meanwhile, France and Germany had begun to attach importance to NATO as long as it helped the EU develop its own security and defense identity. The rift within the alliance continued on other issues in the late 2000s, such as the membership of Ukraine and Georgia and the American attempt to build up a missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic. In this changing climate, “…Turkey has embarked on a process to build its relations with NATO on the basis of more pragmatic, and less enduring, common interests and concerns” (Oğuzlu 2012, p.  154). Enlargement of the alliance, the NATO mission in Afghanistan, NATO-EU relations, and the alliance’s growing role in the Black Sea were among the issues that affected Turkey-NATO affairs until 2010 (Oğuzlu 2013/a, p.  211). Turkey granted support to the eastern enlargement and contributed to the NATO mission in Afghanistan while participating in the Rapid Response Force, which has been operational since 2006 (Oğuzlu 2012, p. 154). However, it is clear that Turkey under the AK Parti government also had some concerns over this transformation and the globalization of NATO. “Turkey’s objective in this regard has been to play more effective roles in NATO’s transformation process to ensure that the policies to be adopted by NATO allies do not negatively affect Turkey’s multilateral national identity and multidimensional and multi-directional foreign policy interests.” (Oğuzlu 2013/b, p. 7) In the absence of the Soviet threat, Turkey has wanted to ensure that the transformation has not caused inconveniences for Turkey’s security. For example, Ankara did not respond positively to the U.S. demands for combat roles to be undertaken by the Turkish troops who remained as only performing civilian tasks in Afghanistan. Moreover, in approaching this transformation, Turkey was mainly concerned about its negative repercussions on relations with European countries and close and distant neighbors such as Iran and Russia respectively (Oğuzlu 2013/a, pp. 211, 216). When viewed in the context of relations with Europe, because Turkey itself

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was not an EU member, it contested the emergence of the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy as the essential security organization in Europe in place of NATO. In terms of relations with Russia, Turkey mostly shared Moscow’s concerns about the alliance’s expansion toward the Black Sea region, especially the inclusion of Ukraine and Georgia in the alliance, which would escalate the tension in the Caucasus, as the Russian-Georgian War in August 2008 had proven (Güvenç & Özel 2012, p.  540). Indeed, Turkey, along with Russia, did not hesitate to oppose attempts to strengthen the NATO presence in the Black Sea where the two countries also objected to the U.S. acquisition of bases in Bulgaria and Romania. Naturally, Ankara feared finding itself in the middle of a possible Russian-U.S. (NATO) rift in the Black Sea region. Overall, Turkey, as a medium-sized member of NATO, has had a limited capacity to affect the course of transformation of the alliance. As Oğuzlu (2013/a, p.  211) put it, “Turkish decision-makers took utmost care to make sure that Turkey did not appear as the black sheep within the alliance”. This was evidenced by Turkey’s eventual approval of France’s return to NATO’s military wing in 2009 under Nicolas Sarkozy and the appointment of Anders Fogh Rasmussen, then-Prime Minister of Denmark, as NATO Secretary-General in the same year despite its initial disapproval of him. Indeed Turkey did not sacrifice alliance solidarity to its national interests despite Sarkozy’s obvious opposition to Turkey’s EU membership and his veto over the opening of new negotiating chapters with Ankara (Hürriyet 2009). Similarly, Turkey did not veto the appointment of Rasmussen in spite of his inaction to close down a PKK-linked TV station broadcasting from Denmark, as well as his controversial defense of freedom of speech during the 2006 crisis caused by the Danish cartoons insulting Islamic values (Traynor 2009). However, the real test for Turkey in its NATO affairs was the U.S.-led Missile Shield project and its place and role in it. Turkey’s lack of an air defense system has long been a major cause for concern in terms of defending the Turkish territory against ballistic missile strikes. In the words of Kibaroğlu (2013, p.  231):  “The geographical location of Turkey in the vicinity of the volatile regions, and in a rather hostile environment, requires the deployment of air defense systems all over the country against the threat posed by the missile capabilities in the hands of a number of surrounding countries.” After the first deployment of Patriot systems against the threat from Saddam’s Iraq during the First Gulf War of 1991, Turkey sought to have an anti-ballistic system like Patriots, but it finally decided to strengthen its air offensive capabilities by purchasing F-16 C/D air fighters instead of highly costly Patriots. However, during the second Gulf War of 2003, Turkey needed again to ask for its NATO allies for the deployment of Patriot systems in Southeastern Anatolia in an attempt to defend itself from possible Iraqi missile attacks (Egeli & Güvenç 2012, p. 22). Having taken a lesson from these experiences with its allies including Belgium, France, and Germany who were unwilling to meet Turkish defense needs immediately (Güvenç & Özel 2012, p. 541), Turkey was aware that it had to develop its own air defense capabilities. Ultimately, all these efforts failed during the first decade of the 2000s.

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In 2010, Turkey had to face a security and foreign policy dilemma: to take part in NATO’s missile defense system, known as Missile Shield that was apparently designed for the protection of allied territory from the threat of Iranian missiles or to insist on its “zero problems with neighbors” policy toward Iran who already had ballistic missiles and was developing its own nuclear weapons program, which was also threatening for Turkish national security. In other words, if Ankara refused to acknowledge the NATO missile defense, its NATO membership would be seriously questioned by its fellow alliance members who had no objection to Obama’s new “Missile Shield” project, which broke with his predecessor Bush’s contentious eastern European-based one (Egeli & Güvenç 2012, pp. 25–26). “The novelty of the Obama plan is that the missile defense shield initiative would be created as a NATO project, cover the entire alliance territory, and involve the participation of Turkey as the most appropriate place to deploy its radar components.” (Oğuzlu 2013/a, p. 218) Turkey’s own weakness in air defense and its dependence on NATO in this respect eventually outweighed its rapprochement with Iran as evidenced by the Turkish government’s final decision to host the NATO radar system in Kürecik, Malatya. The only substantial gain for Turkey from this deal was no mention of Iran as a source of threat in the NATO Strategic Concept (Kibaroğlu & Sazak 2015, p. 105; Sayarı 2013, p. 133) although it was apparently an anti-Iranian move. In fact, the Iranians were bitterly critical of Turkey’s hosting of NATO’s X-Band early-warning radars despite its efforts to assuage Tehran that this move was not targeting any country. According to some experts, the real motive behind Turkey’s choice was to counterbalance the expanding Iranian missile and nuclear capabilities that obviously tilted the regional military balance in its favor (Egeli & Güvenç 2012, p. 27). However, “…Turkey had doubts as to whether the United States would really want collaboration on this matter for protecting Turkey, or whether Israel’s security in the face of the threat posed by Iranian missiles would be its real concern.” (Kibaroğlu 2013, p.  231) The comments over whether the radar base in Turkey would also serve for Israel’s security interests and needs were quite worrying for Ankara’s increasingly anti-Israel Middle East policies, and that is why these allegations were vehemently denied by the Turkish side. The radar system in Turkey finally became operational following NATO’s Chicago Summit in May 2012. Therefore, it is arguable that this realistic Turkish approval of the Missile Shield seemed to both raise its “real estate value” for NATO at once and prove its Western identity at a time its Western trajectory was under close scrutiny by its allies because of its “reckless” and “ambitious” foreign policy. In this environment, on the basis of consultations among allies in line with NATO’s article 4, NATO allies U.S., Germany, and the Netherlands2 gave their consent in December 2012 to the deployment of Patriot air defense systems in the south of Turkey once again since the 2003 Iraq War in responding to the threats emanating from the Assad regime’s Scud missiles as well

2 Spanish Patriot batteries replaced the Dutch ones in January 2015.

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as the growing tension between Israel and Iran (Kibaroğlu 2013, p. 231; Ateşoğlu Güney 2016, p. 3). Despite its acknowledgment of the NATO Missile Shield, Turkey’s reaction toward the NATO operation aiming at ousting the Quaddafi regime in 2011 during the Arab Spring was not so consistent with other alliance members. “At the beginning of the crisis, Turkey vehemently opposed any NATO role, fearing that this would negatively impact the image of the alliance in the Islamic world.” (Oğuzlu 2012, p. 162) Turkey’s economic interests in Libya were also at stake while the Turkish nationals working there were needed to be evacuated during the anti-regime uprising. While the Obama administration preferred to give a lower profile, also known as “leading from behind” during the crisis, Paris and London were quick to start the bombing campaign following the UN Security Council resolution 1973. From that point, the Turkish stance was that NATO’s operation must be limited to monitoring the arms embargo imposed on the regime from air and sea in line with the UN Security Council resolution. In the end, Turkey made its facilities available to NATO by joining monitoring of the no-fly zone. “Even so, Turkey suffered some reputational damage with its Western allies as a consequence both of its reluctance and of its unhelpful rhetoric.” (Park 2015, pp. 587–588). In addition to the Libya quandary, Turkey’s attempt to purchase a long-range missile defense system from China in a deal worth three billion dollars in July 2013 was also another issue disrupting Turkish-NATO relations (Kibaroğlu & Sazak 2015, p. 100; Tol & Goren 2017, p. 4). “That Turkey is prepared even to contemplate such a deal with China is regarded by some as an illustration of a transactional approach to its traditional alliances.” (Park 2015, p. 589) Turkey’s decision to purchase Chinese missiles apparently upset U.S. defense circles because not only was the Chinese company CPMIEC producing these FD-2000 missiles under U.S. sanctions thanks to its arms trade links with Iran and Pakistan, but these systems were not compatible with NATO’s sophisticated defense systems at all (Park 2015, p. 589; Bipartisan Policy Center 2015, pp. 20–21; Kibaroğlu 2017). As Kibaroğlu and Sazak (2015, pp.  107–108) argued,“What drove Turkey and its Western allies apart was neither price nor performance, but the double standards Ankara perceived in how its aspirations for long-range missile defense are handled by its Western allies, who are hesitating to offer Turkey the favorable technology-transfer conditions they have offered other allies in much less critical theaters — Australia, New Zealand, Portugal, and Sweden… Turkey’s alliance with China was one of necessity, not preference.” Against this background, possessing an independent defense system was quite reasonable from Turkey’s standpoint that considered NATO’s warnings to be politically motivated rather than based on military and technical sensitivities. However, “in response to the pushback it faced after initially choosing CPMIEC in September 2013, Turkey has wavered” (Bipartisan Policy Center 2015, p. 21). Indeed, the Turkish Ministry of Defense chose in the end not to buy the Chinese systems and instead decided to seek the production of similar systems domestically by local producers (Kibaroğlu 2017).

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Turkey’s role and place in NATO’s defense were seriously questioned in the aftermath of its shooting down of a Russian military jet violating Turkish airspace near the Syrian border on November 24, 2015. This incident immediately provoked a hostile reaction from the Russian leadership just as it described it as a heinous crime. More importantly, with this move, Turkey’s credibility and reliability in NATO’s defense was in alarming danger while the allied countries considered it an irresponsible act at a time the Western-Russian relationship was already deeply troubled and strained because of the Ukraine and Syria crises (Berger 2015). Ankara tried its best to explain the underlying reasons why it acted in this way, but it failed to convince some suspicious allies about NATO defense guarantees toward Turkey. During the Cold War years, too, some allies were of the opinion that Turkish territory would only be defendable by the alliance in case of a Soviet attack, but Turkey was alone in case of any security challenge emanating from its Middle Eastern neighbors. Again, with their doubtful posture about their Article 5 commitments to Turkey’s security during this Turkish-Russian crisis, NATO allies gave only mixed signals toward threatening Russian aggression across eastern Europe, the Baltic, and the Eastern Mediterranean (Kibaroğlu 2016, pp. 5–6). During the Warsaw Summit meeting of NATO in July 2016, the only positive step taken in responding to this incident was to send airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) planes to deter Russian aggression and violations over Turkish airspace as well as monitor Iraqi and Syrian airspaces. Beyond this, however, the Turkish call for setting up a safe zone in northern Syria remain unanswered by the alliance, which was instead focusing on enhancing the military capabilities of countries such as neighboring Iraq and Jordan. Nor was NATO responsive to Turkish demands for the coverage of PKK-affiliate YPG as a terrorist organization by the alliance (Ateşoğlu Güney 2016, pp. 3–5). Turkey made another contentious decision to purchase Russian S-400 air defense systems in 2016. However, this move was mostly considered a severe blow to NATO’s allied cohesion and was made subject to heavy criticism by the NATO defense circles including the alliance’s top Generals as well as the Pentagon (Sharkov 2017). In the words of a U.S. analyst, this was “an extraordinarily provocative move for a NATO country” (Bremmer 2017). Thus, NATO sought to discourage Ankara to purchase systems incompatible with that of NATO again; but with no avail while NATO members U.S., Germany, and the Netherlands, albeit over Turkish objections, had already withdrawn their Patriot system batteries from Turkey in late 2015, leaving Spanish Patriots alone in defending Turkish soil (Tol & Goren 2017, p.  3). Hence, “Frustrated with NATO over what Ankara sees as foot-dragging in response to Turkey’s security concerns, Ankara has turned to Russia” (Tol & Goren 2017, p.  1). After the normalization of ties with Russia in mid-2016, the Turkish government was determined that it needed an effective air defense system irrespective of its compatibility and interoperability with NATO weaponry (Sharkov 2017; Peterson 2017). Given that regional threats to Turkey have been on a steep rise during the Syrian civil war, Turkey was right to obtain such an upgraded system in the absence of an indigenous missile developing and

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producing capability. What was more worrisome for Turkey was that the notwithstanding Turkish reaction, its NATO allies remained mostly silent when the Greek government decided to keep Russian S-300 missiles in store in Crete, which the Greek Cypriots bought from Russia in 1998 in an attempt to shift the strategic balance in the Eastern Mediterranean to its favor. In an apparent double-standard, some NATO members showed a harsher reaction against the Turkish decision and this even amounted to a threatening tone with which Turkey was no stranger to during the Cold War years. In addition, the scope of the NATO missile defense system is limited and does not cover the Turkish territory fully because of technical and geographical reasons despite that it hosts its radar systems in Kürecik (Kibaroğlu 2017; Tol & Goren 2017, p. 3). These reasons seem to explain the Turkish resolution on having a diversified, sophisticated, and autonomous air defense system irrespective of its NATO allies’ reactions and criticisms. Based on these considerations, Turkey did not hesitate to host first parts of S-400 systems that were delivered by the Russian air force in mid-July 2019. With this delivery, Turkey has become the first NATO member nation who has advanced S-400s in its arsenal, a move that caused the Pentagon to cancel F-35 training program for Turkish air and ground force crew based in the U.S. Some experts find the Turkish-Russian missile deal as only a “symbolic” step rather than a realignment on the part of Ankara with a country it does not share much strategically (Peterson 2017). Tol and Goren (2017, p. 6) even underline, “The Russian air defense system acquisition would neither give Turkey the capabilities to independently protect itself against airborne threats nor stop Russia from posing a threat to Turkey geopolitically. On the contrary, the deal is likely to make Turkey more vulnerable to Russian policies.” On this account, given that Turkey is only a junior partner in its partnership with Russia as it has an equal seat with its allies in the NATO Council, it will probably not seek an exit from NATO membership which serves Turkish interests as a balancing asset against its vulnerability to Moscow who are already eager to play NATO allies against each other, nor will it seek new partnerships or alliances beyond the Atlantic community. Speaking of, in an attempt to convince NATO allies, Turkey did a deal with Italy and France in November 2017 for the joint development and production of SAMP/T systems, but the effect of this move on other alliance members does not look promising for Turkey’s sake (Tol & Goren 2017, p. 9). Aside from these troubles reflecting a divergence of interests between Turkey and its NATO allies, another worrisome and fundamental question arises in TurkeyNATO relationship in the post-coup era: Turkey’s identity in NATO as it allegedly drifts toward a more authoritarian and anti-Western trajectory in domestic politics under the Erdoğan administration (Park 2015, p. 583), intensifying especially after the botched coup attempt. In other words, the main question is whether Turkey is still part of NATO as a coalition of shared values based on democracy and the rule of law. Turkey’s worsening domestic record in terms of complying with these principles has caused alarm in NATO corridors and raised eyebrows among Western security experts over whether Turkey still is eligible democratically for NATO

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membership (Beesley 2017). Opposing the dominant narrative on the weakening of Turkey’s democratic credentials as a NATO member, however, Kibaroğlu and Sazak (2015, p. 103) refers here to the past examples of NATO inertia toward the wave of authoritarianism in Turkey by claiming that “Turkey was never a bulwark of liberal-democratic values, but by and large, Turkey’s Atlantic allies were rarely bothered by it. Turkey’s much-maligned constitution, for example, was a legacy of the 1980 junta, which the United States had fully backed.” Despite the fact, the current debate culminated in even calling for “kicking Turkey out of NATO” as it loses credibility and reliability under an increasingly Islamist AK Parti government who has long been leaning toward the East in foreign policy. In this environment, Turkey’s uneasy bilateral relations with some key alliance members such as Germany, Holland, and Austria, who are bitterly critical of the Erdoğan government and his fervent rhetoric, are thought a matter of major concern for the alliance unity. Erdoğan did even call these countries leaderships “the remnants of Nazis” because of their objection to allowing Turkish politicians to attend rallies before the constitutional referendum of April 16, 2017. In parallel to this, “Ankara’s refusal to allow German MPs to visit Incirlik, where Berlin has some 260 troops operating reconnaissance and refueling flights for the anti-ISIS campaign, is also perceived as retaliation for Germany’s decision to grant asylum to purged Turks.” (Beesley 2017) Another fierce controversy aroused in this politically unfavorable climate was a Turkish-Austrian rift in May 2017, which resulted in a Turkish veto over the latter’s partnership with NATO because of its blockage of the Turkish membership bid in the EU (BBC 2017/b). The situation of Turkish officers at NATO headquarters in Belgium and other offices in Europe caused another political crisis between Turkey and NATO allies. Since the July 15, 2016 coup attempt, around 400 of these “pro-Western” officers have been pulled back from their NATO posts by the Turkish government who is suspicious of both their involvement in the putsch and their affiliation with the Gülenism. “The failed coup has already institutionally distanced Turkey from the alliance” (Aydıntaşbaş & Kirişçi 2017, p. 21), as Ankara is increasingly critical of its NATO allies individually since they are not so sensitive in responding to Turkish demands not to harbor the suspected coup plotters who are seeking asylum across Europe. In the wake of the purge in the Turkish military, these officers sought asylum across Europe, from Belgium to Germany and Norway. The eagerness of these countries to grant asylum to these officers has obviously frustrated the Turkish authorities who found its NATO allies’ non-cooperation on such a critical matter unacceptable. According to European allies, the purge in the Turkish military was part of a greater crackdown on the dissidents opposing the Erdoğan administration, which is allegedly showing no respect for democracy, freedoms, and the rule of law. Accordingly, the purge was also perceived by NATO defense experts as an alarming sign of the Turkish military’s weakened operational capability in the absence of nearly half of its Generals involved in the coup attempt (Beesley 2017). Alternatively, pro-government Turkish analysts point to this crisis as part of a larger one between Turkey and the Western states since Turkey under

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Erdoğan has already attempted to act independently from Brussels and pursue an autonomous foreign policy that does not necessarily follow suit with NATO allies in every crisis situation (Yeşiltaş 2017). This is the case not only in terms of security interests, but also in terms of shared values. Nonetheless, even these analysts acknowledge that despite the deepening troubles in the Turkish-NATO relationship, NATO alignment still remains an inseparable and indispensable element of Turkish national security architecture. The accompanying crisis in the already-tense Turkey-NATO affairs came with the depiction of Atatürk, the founder of the Republic, and President Erdoğan as “enemies” on a chart in a joint NATO drill in Norway in November 2017 (The Guardian 2017). While Turkey reacted angrily by pulling all 40 officers back from the drill, NATO’s Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg immediately apologized to Erdoğan for the offense, explaining that the incident was only personally-motivated rather than representing an institutional position toward an alliance member. Norwegian Foreign Minister Frank Bakke-Jensen also apologized and underlined that it was not the official position of Norway, which had already irritated Ankara by granting asylum to the purged Turkish NATO officers in March 2017 (The Guardian 2017). Despite these apologies, the removal of the contracted employee from the drill, and the start of an investigation over the incident, this crisis demonstrated once again how much Turkey’s role and place in the eyes of the rest of NATO members has eroded as an invaluable alliance member. This will likely only weaken security and defense ties further, as the eastern and southern flanks of the alliance are in need of strengthened defensive capabilities. Meanwhile, Trump’s questioning of NATO’s relevance by both claiming that it is obsolete and blaming its allies for not spending sufficiently for defense in accordance with its “America First” approach coincides with Turkey’s deepening suspicion toward the alliance. The U.S.  tries to force the allied countries to increase their defense spending to meet the agreed 2 % threshold of national gross domestic product (GDP) while the spending level of most NATO members, including Turkey, remains below this target (Oğuzlu 2017). However, Trump’s call for greater burden-sharing from its European NATO allies looks ill-timed given the rise of an anti-NATO climate in Turkey because of the coup attempt and Turkish NATO officers who were purged by the Turkish government, but found sanctuary in European allies. In such a distrustful environment, the only remaining areas Turkey may contribute to NATO are missions and operations toward stabilizing Libya or monitoring illegal immigration in the Mediterranean Sea while Ankara is more cautious or even prudent toward anti-Russian NATO moves in the Baltic or Black Sea regions.

Conclusion The gap between Turkish and American security and foreign interests has grown and deepened during the Bush and Obama terms, and even after the onset of new Trump administration, which was met by the Turkish leadership optimistically,

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whether the highly strained Turkish-American Relationship can be healed one day in the near term is an open question. In other words, the embittering partnership between the two sides during the Bush-Obama years has turned into a deeply troubled one. It was argued the Turkish-American Relationship and security partnership have been quite complicated by the recent developments in the Middle East such as the U.S. military alliance with YPG in northern Syria, Turkish-Russian and Turkish-Iranian bilateral security cooperation as well as their common efforts to end hostilities in Syria without U.S. engagement. Turkey is also discomforted by the U.S. hosting of Gülen and his followers, which it sees as a serious security threat. Although the Gülenists’ involvement in the failed July 15, 2016 coup attempt is proven in Turkey’s view, the American indifference to Turkish claims and legal demands for the extradition of Gülen only helps to breed Turkish anti-Americanism and harms further Turkish-American security engagement in a regional context. Against this background, there seems no real progress in repairing the bilateral ties, as both countries have not yet sought a reappraisal of their well-established positions on the most pressing issues dividing them. Actually, Turkey charts a very different foreign and security policy compared to the U.S.  in many areas, while Washington is insistent that its own endangered security interests shape the U.S. course, not the other way around, as was the case with the delivery of S-400s and the subsequent exclusion of Turkey from the F-35 project. When it comes to Turkey’s relationship with NATO, the situation also does not appear favorable. Indeed, Turkey’s recent relationship with NATO allies is increasingly troubled mostly because of NATO’s hypocritical stance on many abovementioned critical issues in which Turkey is involved. Turkey has now a more critical stance in NATO on many security and defense issues involving the alliance, which is dependent on Ankara’s approval that is not taken for granted any longer. Despite its transactional attitude toward the alliance, nevertheless, Turkey is not likely to jeopardize its sensitive position in NATO by a formal exit from it in such an insecure environment in its vicinity, but its contribution to the NATO operations and missions can be expected to be much more limited and cautious in the wake of the growing lack of trust between Turkey and NATO allies, most notably the U.S.

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Sharkov, D. (2017), “Pentagon concerned by Russian missile deal with NATO ally”, Newsweek, Date of Accession: January 18, 2017 from http://www.newsweek.com/russiaturkey-deal-pentagon-concerned-done-missile-deal-nato-ally-644734. Starr, B., Browne, R. & Gaouette, N. (2018), “Trump orders rapid withdrawal from Syria in apparent reversal”, CNN, Date of Accession: August 29, 2019 from https://edition.cnn. com/2018/12/19/politics/us-syria-withdrawal/index.html. Sullivan, K. (2019), “The Trump decision that pushed James Mattis to his breaking point”, CNN, Date of Accession: August 29, 2019 from https://edition.cnn.com/2019/09/01/ politics/james-mattis-trump-breaking-point-syria/index.html. Sullivan, K. & Stark, L. (2019), “Trump threaten ‘devastate’ Turkey’s economy if they attack Kurds in Syria”, CNN, Date of Accession: July 28, 2019 from https://edition.cnn. com/2019/01/13/politics/trump-turkey-kurds/index.html. The Economist (2017), “Ties between Turkey and America are near breaking point”, Date of Accession: October 17, 2017 from https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21730102visa-ban-poisons-relations-between-two-nato-allies-ties-between-turkey-and-americaare-near. The Guardian (2017), “Nato apologises to Turkey after Erdogan and Ataturk appear on ‘enemy chart’ ”, Date of Accession: December 13, 2017 from https://www.theguardian. com/world/2017/nov/18/nato-apologises-turkey-erdogan-ataturk-enemy-chart. The New York Times (2016), “A complicated alliance with Turkey”, Date of Accession: August 12, 2017 from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/26/opinion/acomplicated-alliance-with-turkey.html. The New York Times (2018), “Erdogan: how Turkey sees the crisis with the U.S.”, Date of Accession: August 29, 2019 from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/opinion/turkeyerdogan-trump-crisis-sanctions.html. Tol, G. (2013), “Turkey’s KRG energy partnership”, Foreign Policy, Date of Accession: January 31, 2013 from http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/ posts/2013/01/29/turkey_s_krg_energy_partnership. Tol, G., & Goren, N. (2017), “Turkey’s quest for air-defense: Is the S-400 deal a pivot to Russia?”, The Middle East Institute, Policy Focus 2017-5. Traynor, I. (2009), “Bitter Turkey finally lifts veto on Danish PM as Nato chief”, The Guardian, Date of Accession: February 27, 2020 from https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2009/apr/05/nato-eu-denmark-turkey. Türkmen, F. (2009), “Turkish-American Relations: A challenging transition”, Turkish Studies, 10 (1), pp. 109–129. Türkmen, F. (2012), Kırılgan ittifak’tan “Model Ortaklığa”: Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri, İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları. Ülgen, S. (2017), “Operation Euphrates shield: Aims and gains”, Carnegie Europe Op-Ed, Date of Accession: January 29, 2017 from http://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/01/19/ operation-euphrates-shield-aims-and-gains-pub-67754. Wilks, A. (2019), “Turkey laments exclusion from US training on F-35 jets”, AlJazeera, Date of Accession: August 28, 2019 from https://www.AlJazeera.com/news/2019/07/turkeylaments-exclusion-training-35-jets-190731122038860.html.

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Wright, R. (2017), “Trump to let Assad stay until 2021, as Putin declares victory in Syria”, The New Yorker, Date of Accession: December 13, 2017 from https://www.newyorker. com/sections/news/trump-to-let-assad-stay-until-2021-as-putin-declares-victory-insyria. Yegin, M., & Ersoy, E. (2013), “Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri: Çok boyutlu bir ortaklığa doğru”, USAK Raporları, No: 13-05. Yeşiltaş, M. (2015), “Neighboring a civil war: Turkey’s border security with Syria”, SETA Analysis, No: 17, Date of Accession: November 28, 2018 from http://file.setav.org/Files/ Pdf/20151028162016_analysis_17.pdf Yeşiltaş, M. (2017), “NATO krizinin gösterdikleri”, SETA, Date of Accession: November 28, 2017 from https://www.setav.org/nato-krizinin-gosterdikleri/ Yılmaz, N. (2011), “Stratejik ortaklıktan model ortaklığa: Türkiye’nin bağımsız dış politikasının etkileri”, Türk Dış Politikası Yıllığı 2010, Ankara: SETA Yayınları.

Gürol Baba1

Chapter 7: Turkish-American Relations in Terms of Economy and Development

Abstract: The economic realm of Turkish-American Relations has been a good example of the asymmetry between a superpower and a middle power. The Turkey-United States (U.S.) alliance began to form with the former’s efforts in the 1940s, when their economic relations began. Due to the slowly developing nature of the Turkish economy as well as several domestic and international reasons, this economic relationship for a long time has been in the form of American aid transfers to Turkey. The aid has been in various forms: grants, credits, military/defense elements, and bits of technology transfers. The defense segment has always been the biggest share in these transfers. The amount of aid has been conditioned to the proximity of politico-strategic relations; the closer the relations are, mostly, the higher the amount of aid. With the economic boost Turkey experienced with the AK Parti term, the U.S. began to see Turkey as more of a trade partner and a strategic ally, rather than just a large market for American goods. Trade, as being the weakest part of bilateral relations, has started to recover with the help of the developing Turkish private sector thanks to the help of AK Parti’s economic policies. Yet, this still has not completely eliminated Turkey’s need for American aid particularly in maintaining the operation of currently owned American-made defense elements. Turkey, in the last decade, has been successfully striving to reduce its dependence on America, particularly defense-related aid segments, but it still has some way to go. Keywords: Turkey, United States, Trade, Economy, Development, the Justice and Development Party (AK Parti).

Introduction A full-fledged Turkish-American alliance started in the 1940s. This chapter takes this decade as the kick-starter of economic and developmental realm of bilateral relations. For decades, the economic side of bilateral relations has been the weakest link due to the economic issues Turkey tried to smooth over. In addition to these economic issues, there were several interruptions, i.e. coups and political strains on regional alliance-based issues. Yet, the relations have never been completely broken off. The economic and development realm of bilateral relations has, for decades, been about the American aid transfer. The amount and the kind

1 Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Social Sciences University of Ankara, Ankara, Turkey. Email: [email protected]

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of aid have been in line with Washington’s politico-economic interests rather than Turkey’s demands or requirements, which means there have always been ups and downs. This chapter gives empirical data of financial transfers in Turkey in various forms, i.e. grants, credits, and defense related aspects (military and technical assets and their spare parts for maintenance). The data is given under seven subtitles covering the late Second World War and early Cold War periods and each decade from 1950s to the 2000s as separate sections. Regarding the asymmetrical nature of economic relations and available primary and secondary sources, this chapter concentrates on the character of American aid flow into Turkey. Changes in the amount of aid, the types of aid, and the asymmetries in bilateral commercial relations are the main focus.

I. Late Second World War and Early Cold War Periods The asymmetry in Turkish-American economic relations was highest in this era. Throughout the end of 1940s and all through the 1950s, Turkey was a significant recipient of American aid. Ankara utilized its geostrategic positioning to make itself relevant to Washington’s strategic interests and requirements for containing the Soviets. Regarding the Turkish government’s continuous efforts to show their dedication to protecting Western (and specifically American) global foreign policy aims, with the catalyst effect of British and American bureaucracy, Turkey maintained a sustainable place in Washington’s strategic calculations. Agreement-based bilateral economic relations started with the beginning of 1940s within the framework of lend-lease arrangements. Although United Kingdom did not want to lose its influence on Turkey, due to its financial constraints, it asked Washington to replace its role in helping Turkey. With the British push, Washington accepted Turkish accession to lend-lease aid. Yet, this aid was transferred via Britain (Gökçay 2015, p.  317). Although it was decided in 1941, the framework agreement for the conditions of the aid transfer was not concluded until 1945 (Gökçay 2015, pp.  318–323). The preamble of the Agreement gave an important hint that the U.S. was interested in developing Turkey’s defense capabilities, but not necessarily economic infrastructure. In this sense, the agreement was a good illustration of the Turkish-American economic relations in the coming decades. The U.S. provided aid to Turkey, not only in amounts economically viable and acceptable to the Senate and House of Representatives, but also focusing heavily on developing Turkey’s conventional warfare capabilities. Another important illustration of the agreement was shown in Turkey’s control over the American aid material. The material given within the Agreement was under American control and had to be given back if there were an emergency, which could be spelled out by the U.S. President. Turkey tried to change the merely defensive status of the American aid with its application in October 1945 for $500 million of credit (Gönlübol 1993, p. 212).

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Turkey’s proposal gave a detailed and a scientific plan for the use of such an amount in industrialization projects. The U.S.  found this $500  million request way above what would be covered by Eximbank (Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS] 1945 Vol.  8, pp.  3364–3366). Instead, the U.S.  administration only approved $25 million of credit (FRUS 1946 Vol. 7, p. 2197). This was followed by Turkey’s purchase of 6 trade vessels with a credit of $5 million (FRUS 1946 Vol. 7, pp. 2216–2217). Another development in economic relations at the end of the war was purchasing American “leftover” war materials. The amount of the material was almost $658 thousand (T.C. Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi BCA, 030.10.154.86.8, 3 October 1945). During the process of concluding the payment agreement, the U.S. aimed to get rid of all the war material left in the Middle East and turn them into cash (Gökçay 2015, p. 330). The parties concluded the agreement in February 1946, which came into effect in May 1946 (www.loc.gov). The issue here was that a detailed list of transferred material was never given to Turkey (NARA, M-1292, Roll 11, 867.24/5–846, 8 May 1946), eventhough Turkey was the first country that paid all its debt arising from the lend-lease agreement in cash (NARA, M-1292, Roll 11, 867.24/5–1046, 10 May 1946). After Turkey became a founding member of the United Nations and proved that it would stand against the Soviets, the U.S. got more interested in developing and modernizing Turkish military potential. Yet, this interest did not have a comprehensive financial and administrative scheme until the Truman Doctrine (Gökçay 2015, p. 338). Even if the underlying reason behind the Doctrine was to increase the military and political capabilities of Greece and Turkey against Soviets, the trigger was the economic deficiencies of Britain to militarily and economically aid these smaller allies. The Truman Doctrine aimed to show the Soviets and other potential allies that the U.S.  has the necessary military and economic power to be a determining “ruler” in Europe. In March 1947, President Harry S. Truman, in an emergency joint session of Congress, stated that Turkey had the potential to be the guardian of the Middle East, but it was still underdeveloped and in need of modernization for maintaining its national integrity (US Congressional Record 12 March 1947). The amount of aid carved out of this session was 400 million dollars in total, 100 million of which were given to Turkey. This amount was obviously not as “enormous” as Ankara conceptualized for itself. The aid with the Truman Doctrine came with a Joint American Mission to Aid Turkey (JAMMAT). The mission’s duty was to refurbish and modernize Turkish defense capabilities. The U.S.  administration was aware of the fact the accepted amount of aid and military material transfer would not help Turkey to stand against the Soviets in case of an immediate attack (FRUS 1947 Vol.5, pp. 233–236). Yet, the U.S. aim of modernizing the Turkish military against a Soviet attack continued to be the underlying reason of American aid throughout the Cold War. JAMMAT’s reports emphasized the focus of the forthcoming U.S. aid: the Turkish military. For an effective transfer of military equipment and personnel, the mission highlighted the importance of a well-established road network since building and administering railways were more expensive. The mission also recommended that

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for developing the Turkish economy, agricultural production should be reinforced rather than industrial (Cumhuriyet 6 July 1947). Before 1950, several U.S. research teams came to Turkey for reporting on the most effective use of American aid. One of these teams under Weston Thornburg has a particular importance. His team aimed to comprehensively research Turkey’s economic, social, agricultural, and industrial infrastructure and potential. His aim was to find out the channels for the entrance of U.S. private capital/sectors into Turkey (Cumhuriyet 23 April 1947). His claim, at the end of his preliminary research, stressed the ineffectiveness of statist establishment and the mindset of bureaucracy (Cumhuriyet 3 September 1947). Thornburg’s mission gave another hint about the aims of U.S.  aid in Turkey. For a more efficient operation of the aid, the U.S. attempted to transform Turkey’s economic structure. A more liberal, open, and heavily agricultural economy with much fewer state interventions was Washington’s preference. In the coming decades, the U.S. worked on this transformation. 1947 and 1948 were significant years for relatively considerable inflow of U.S. aid. After the Truman Doctrine’s announcement, the American Reconstruction Finance Corporation transferred $100 million of advanced payment to Turkey (Cumhuriyet 25, 30 May 1947). In March 1948, Turkish Air Force received A-26 light bombardment aircraft from the U.S. (Cumhuriyet 18 March 1948). This was followed by several other shipments of military material throughout 1948 (Hürriyet 4–26 May 1946; Akşam 8 July-6 December 1948). These included various types of conventional weapons, infantry equipment, several transportation vehicles, and spare parts. This was the beginning of the Americanization of Turkish Armed Forces. A following well-known development in Turkish-American economic relations was the Marshall Plan or Marshall Aid. The U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall’s words on June 5, 1947 stated the importance of economic health for political stability and peace. The U.S. aid would be provided on a regional basis unlike the single-country oriented Truman Doctrine. Marshall also emphasized any sort of group, political party, or government attempting to prevent this initiative would face American reaction (FRUS 1947 Vol. 3, pp. 569–573). With this initiative, the U.S. administration formally kick-started its sphere of influence via building up an official alliance network starting in Europe. The plan initially had a European focus, recovering the war-torn, pro-American economies in Europe. The U.S. did not intend for Turkey to be a part of this effort (FRUS 1947 Vol. 3, p. 832; FRUS 1948 Vol. 3, pp. 816–819). Therefore, the organization administering the Marshall Plan was called as Conference of European Economic Cooperation (FRUS 1947 Vol. 3, pp. 794–795; FRUS 1947 Vol. 3, pp. 834–840). Turkey was not satisfied with it since Ankara’s major aim was not only increasing the amount of U.S. aid, but also officially registering itself as a U.S. ally. The U.S. Ambassador in Turkey conveyed to the Secretary of State that Turkish President İsmet İnönü was “dismayed” at news Turkey was “left out”. İnönü stated that countries, which were “economically and industrially” more developed than Turkey, e.g. Belgium, Netherlands etc., were receiving credits and, if  Turkey, “which [was] having resources drained away by

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[the] necessity [of] heavy military expenditures against Soviet threats”, kept away from this “assistance for economic development”, it  “will suffer economic collapse” (FRUS 1948 Vol. 3, pp. 800–803). In economic terms, Turkey’s request for being a part of Marshall Aid was sound. In the first nine months of 1947, Turkey rashly spent its dollars to bring the prices down, which ended up in a loss of $120 million. This jeopardized the payments for American aid material (UK PRO, FO371/72541, Somerville Smith, 28 February 1948). Moreover, the Turkish Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak informed U.S. Ambassador Edwin C.  Wilson that Turkey’s exclusion from the European Recovery Program would create such serious political drawbacks for the current government that “government itself would be in [an] impossible situation before National Assembly and would be subject to most serious attacks from opposition and in [the] press” (FRUS 1948 Vol. 3, pp. 948–950). Such pressure from the Turkish side made Washington change its mind and conclude the bilateral agreement in July 1948 to increase the credit given to Turkey by 39 million dollars (Turkish Republic Prime Ministry Archives, document No: 030.01.00.00.125.801.5.4, 4.1.1952). Turkey made it clear to Washington that the expenditures for its military development had wielded a serious burden, which could not be met without additional financial support. Between 1948 and 1952, Turkey received $352  million, 175  million of which were used for direct sales from American markets. The other $177 million were used for purchases from OECD countries. Marshall Aid did not provide a great contribution to Turkey’s industrial development, but instead to the development of its agricultural sector. Turkey’s development projects were monitored by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which “had put forward that the export of agricultural produce and especially fruit and fishing, should have priority over grandiose projects”. As a result of the Marshall Plan’s Long Term Program, Turkey managed to increase its cereal, textile, fiber, wool, and cotton production. Development of power resources, i.e. power stations and coal production, were given second priority after agriculture (Üstün 1997, pp. 40–44). These facts showed once more that the U.S. projected Turkey’s development in agriculture and textile production. For transporting these products, the Marshall Plan gave a special emphasis on road and railway construction. The Marshall Plan’s development program almost doubled the length of both railways and roads in Turkey (Üstün 1997, p. 45). Unfortunately, Turkish economic and development agencies, with the effect of bad harvests at the end of 1940s, could not implement the Marshall Plan’s Long Term Program. As a result, Turkey in the 1950s became a debtor of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Turkish exports had fallen alongside with commercial difficulties (FRUS 1950 Vol. 5, pp. 1228–1231).

II. 1950s: Fueled Up American Aid With the Democrat Party’s election victory in May 1950, Turkish economy picked up the pace, particularly due to liberalization measures. Under two years of

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Democrat Party rule, Turkey received close to $400  million from the U.S., most of which was in military aid (UK PRO FO1194/7/52G Letter from A.K. Helm to Anthony Eden, 11 February 1952). The 1950s underlined the fact that the amount of aid Turkey received was directly related to its security value in Washington’s eyes. This value was significantly high right after Turkey’s membership to NATO, which ended up with $70 million under U.S. Mutual Security Aid to Turkey for Financial Year 1953. Yet, the new government in Turkey still could not cover the budget deficit the Turkish economy had been incrementally suffering. Turkey, due to the developing of relations with the U.S., conveyed its intention to apply for more American military aid. The U.S. Congress rejected this intention because the aid funds could only be used for “the purchase of items shown to be in direct or indirect support of the defense effort”. The U.S. was interested in Turkey’s military development and modernization for countering any anti-American development in the Middle East. Turkey needed to pay its debt, and the U.S. aid, which became “over a billion dollars since 1947” (FRUS 1952–1954 Vol. 8, pp. 902–905), was mainly given for this aim. In 1953, the U.S. participated in two major Turkish projects: the Zonguldak Coal Basin Development and the Sarıyar Hydroelectric Project. Yet, the American and Turkish sides could not devise an administrative procedure, which could assure that these projects were carried out with maximum efficiency and minimum cost (FRUS 1952–1954 Vol. 8, pp. 920–925). In the same year, Turkey developed legislation for opening foreign corporations to engage in the Turkish petroleum field. Ankara’s expectation was to increase revenues by developing its foreign reserves to help in covering its military aid and its balance of payments. Accordingly, the third major American oil company, the Sinclair Company, indicated interest in prospecting for oil in Turkey. Yet, “the existing Turkish laws would” still “not provide a satisfactory base upon which” the American oil “companies would be willing to invest the large sums” (FRUS 1952–1954 Vol. 8, pp. 920–925). During the mid-1950s, Turkish agricultural efficiency, construction, and maintenance of state railroads and highways showed a bit of advancement. However, the American aid did not provide a comprehensive advancement in Turkish technical and administrative bureaucracy, particularly in industry and management. The American Mutual Security Agency (MSA), which replaced the Marshall Plan’s Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) “looked to place more emphasis on the fields of industry and management through increased training, seminars, and the distribution of instructional materials” (Carver 2011, p. 152). During the mid1950s, Turkey’s economic progress was not that great and Turkish officials did not hesitate to inform the Americans. Turkish Ambassador to Washington, Feridun C.  Erkin, in his conversation with the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, stated that “a shadow is coming across [the] bright picture of Turkey’s progress—the shadow [was] the problem of Turkey’s credits and shortage in foreign exchange”. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes requested $300 million not for “funding the debts but for continuation of the development program”. The Americans were becoming puzzled on Turkey’s rising requirements (FRUS 1952–1954 Vol. 8,

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pp. 950–953). This gap between Turkish requests and American aid in real terms made bilateral relations uneasy. In 1955, American officials were anxious about the continuous deterioration of the Turkish economic situation. To alleviate this, American officials brought up an alternative that “a direct and frank expression of the official U.S. view that unless Turkey adopts and implements a policy of greater internal stability and external solvency, the U.S.  has no choice but to reexamine its support of Turkish efforts in military and economic build-up” (FRUS 1955–1957 Vol. 24, pp. 609–610). Turkey’s debts became massive. For example, the cumulative accounting Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) deficit became 206  million units, which was more than four times bigger than its 50 million-unit quota (Robinson 1953–1954, p. 47). To cover it, Ankara kept looking to promote private investment and increase American aid. Yet, regarding the abovementioned anxieties about Turkey’s economic deterioration, the Eisenhower administration considered curbing Turkey’s funding (Kılıç 1959, p. 147). The second half of 1950s was a concurring scene of miscommunication and tension between Turkey and the U.S. regarding the inadequacy of the American aid for Turkey’s foreign debt. Turkey’s development stagnated gradually due to the domestic economic depression. Turkey aimed to increase the American aid, but the U.S. Presidency “drew the conclusion that the Turks were not yet in shape to take a large amount of new U.S. military equipment”. Thus, “thought the President, it would be better for [the Turks] to use the money for training and men to make effective use of new equipment”. For the economic realm, the solution the U.S. administration had in mind was to “purchase from Turkey strategic minerals for long-term strategic stockpile [chrome ore] in order to assist Turkey to meet its minimum essential civilian and military requirements” (FRUS 1955–1957 Vol. 24, pp. 612–620). This solution indicated that the U.S. administration was prepared to curb the funding drastically. The gap between the American and Turkish understanding of the required aid was quite significant. Menderes, as stated above, requested $300 million, but the U.S.  administration made it clear that there was “no hope for the [U.S.] loan magnitude” of this amount. The U.S. administration had “deep concern over inflationary trends in Turkey and over-ambitious long-range investment projects” (FRUS 1955–1957 Vol.  24, pp.  637–639). Turkey, in the mid-1950s, did not only try to prove its strategic importance to the Americans, but also its economic development goals. Washington did not find Turkey’s efforts reliable. Turkey’s economic depression did not only stagnate its developmental goals, but also its political cohesion. Menderes, in 1955, was “depressed about the political situation”. His mere hope was the “forthcoming” American aid (FRUS 1955–1957 Vol. 24, pp. 644–646), which was not even near the amount he was striving for. Washington gave only $25 million (FRUS 1955–1957 Vol. 24, pp. 653–657). This was not a remedy for the Menderes government. After his third election victory in October 1957, the Menderes government carried out some of the economic recipes American officials proposed, i.e. devaluating the Turkish lira, regulating the bank credit ceiling, and instituting sectorial import quotas. Yet, the Menderes administration could not

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prepare a 3-year development plan, which was Washington’s core demand (FRUS 1958–1960 Vol.  10, Part  2, pp.  753–755). In 1957, Turkey’s strategic significance increased due to the confirmed Russian nascent ability to launch an ICBM attack against Washington. Turkey accepted, without any hesitation, the U.S. proposal to deploy nuclear weapons to its soil as a precautionary measure to such an attack (FRUS 1958–1960 Vol. 10, Part 2, pp. 769–771). The U.S., to relieve the tremendous pressures on the Menderes government and because of Turkey’s increased strategic significance with the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, in Paris, “announced its willingness to provide 100 million [dollars] in aid for Turkey if matched by European loans”. With the consent of the other OEEC nations, a common aid program was approved to assist Turkey in carrying out the economic stabilization program. “The OEEC agreed to provide 100 million [dollars] in loans, the IMF granted Turkey drawing rights of up to 25 million [dollars], and the [US] agreed to provide … with a total of 234 million [dollars] in loans, grants, supplies, and debt waivers” (FRUS 1958–1960 Vol. 10, Part 2, pp. 755–756). In the end, Turkey received $359 million in total (FRUS 1958–1960 Vol. 10, Part 2, pp. 756–757). Regarding the administration of this aid, the U.S. officials focused on specific developmental issues in Turkish political, economic, and technical realms. For example, the U.S. officials emphasized the importance of internal political stability and relieving government restrictions on parliamentary discussions, freedom of assembly and press. For the “magnitude of the Turkish 12-month post-stabilization import quota, U.S.  representative[s]‌in Ankara” were alerted “to the degree to which non-U.S. sources of promised credit are made available”. The “heavy costs of maintaining and operating modern weapons in terms of foreign exchange and personnel” were “explained to Turkish officials”. Turkish military personnel’s general lack of technical knowledge also needed to be increased via technical assistance in the “development of institutions for the mobilization of domestic capital, such as savings, insurance”. For the American officials, the “formation of local private capital over the next few years” was “essential to a successful investment program” (FRUS 1958–1960 Vol. 10, Part 2, pp. 772–784). Menderes, after 4 years and under strict American control, received the amount he repeatedly had been asking for. The problem in Turkey in those years “has been to achieve a balance between Turkish consumption demands, desires for economic development, an adequate military program and available resources including anticipated levels of external assistance” (FRUS 1958–1960 Vol. 10, Part 2, pp. 772–784). Due to the miscalculations about using this aid, his government could not cover the budget deficit. The 1960 budget’s deficit was $377 million (Olcar 2013, p. 46).

III. 1960s: Between the First Coup and the Second Coup After the 1960 coup, the U.S. proposed in 1962 a consortium for economic aid for bringing OECD countries on board with providing aid to Turkey (FRUS 1961–1963 Vol. 16, pp. 1023–1024). In 1963, Turkey was “facing a new experience in planned economic life”. The Five Year Plan was in its first plan, which was an opportunity

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for Turkey to “turn the corner” (FRUS 1961–1963 Vol.  16, pp.  1179–1182). The U.S. wanted to follow the Turkish economic development within the framework of a working plan. Since the technical and administrative elements of Turkish bureaucracy did not have the necessary experience to use foreign aid with a planned economy, Turkish budget deficit kept accumulating. As a part of the Plan, throughout 1963, $650 million of development funds (which was quite a large share) were channeled into the public sector to build up Turkey’s infrastructure and its long-term earnings in the form of roads, harbors, schools, hospitals, and communication networks. Yet, to finance the plan, and ensure 7 % annual growth, the new administration in Ankara raised taxes, which burdened the Turkish lower class and did not increase the private investment (FRUS 1961– 1963 Vol. 16, pp. 1179–1182). In more numeric terms, “overall 7 % target was nearly achieved in spite of the fact that growth rates of both agriculture and industry were below the planned figures, whereas the construction and service industries expanded more rapidly than anticipated.” The improvement in agriculture was expected due to “policies designed to increase yields through irrigation, more intensive and extensive use of fertilizers, and new techniques; neither the total cultivated area nor the proportion of different crops was expected to change significantly.” The agricultural output growth was “about 3 % annually”, which was “a substantial improvement over the previous six years, even though below the expectation”. In industrial output, the average annual increase was about 9.5 %, “considerably below the First Plan’s 13 % target”. The “desired shift to intermediate products and investment goods did not occur”, but there were “substantial investments in some basic materials and investment goods industries” (Snyder 1969, pp. 62–64). In terms of restoring both domestic and international confidence in Turkey’s financial stability and assuring the competitive nature of exports, “price control regulations were largely dismantled” in 1963. The average rise in consumer prices, during the Plan (1963–1967), was about 5 %, “about half of which must be attributed to the price decontrols” of 1963 (Snyder 1969, p. 65). Regarding gross financial assistance, Turkey received $551 million instead of the Plan’s request of 1.006 million. The U.S. made no statements about possible sources of financial assistance other than surplus commodity programs, which were about $300  million. The reason for this gap in the amount of aid was its scattered nature. The amount from the U.S. was $389 million, from the United Kingdom and Germany was about $50 million, from the combined multilateral agencies (IBRD, IMF, and EMA) was $10–20  million. In fact, some Consortium members received more interest payment than their loans. Turkey began to question the Consortium’s usefulness (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, Birinci ve İkinci Kalkınma Planı; Özkan 2006; Bal 2001; Snyder 1969, pp. 67–69). Although the Plan managed to provide substantial economic progress, it did not reduce Turkey’s external debt. At the beginning of the Plan, the debt was up to $1 billion and by the end of 1967, it had accumulated to $1.5 billion (Turkish Central Bank, Annual Reports, 1970). Although the amount of foreign capital that came into Turkey was substantial in the First Plan term, most of it was in the form of aid strictly linked to the Plan. It did not contribute into

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Turkey’s overall economic development. During the First Plan, the U.S. made this clear that the American financial inflow had to be used for accomplishing the Plan. The U.S. administration also noted that the aid would be ceased in 1973. Although it ultimately did not cease, the amount received from the Consortium was cut from $155 million to $106 million (FRUS 1969–1976 Vol. 4, pp. 188–190).

IV. 1970s: Disturbances With the decrease of foreign aid and the pressures from the IMF (IMF, Annual Report 1969), in 1970, Demirel government devaluated Turkish lira from 9 dollars to 15 (66  %) (Dönek 2002, p.  176). The U.S., for relieving the panic in Turkish economy, gave an additional $25 million of aid (FRUS 1969–1976 Vol. 4, pp. 218– 220). For Washington, a serious disturbance in Turkish economy was still a worry. At the beginning of 1970s, the U.S. administration was discussing its intentions to provide $40–70 million in supplementary aid to restore Turkey’s program to its 1971 budget level (FRUS 1969–1976 Vol. 4, p. 235). After the second coup in March 1971, Washington was aiming to stabilize the Turkish economy. At the end of 1971, the bulk of grant funds for Turkey was $100  million (FRUS 1969–1976 Vol. 4, pp. 384–390), eventhough it was cut by the U.S. Congress to $60 million (FRUS 1969–1976 Vol.  4, pp.  427–430). The ban on Turkey’s opium production was imposed in 1971 as a result of considerable American pressure. To relieve the pressure caused by this economic loss, “the U.S. agreed to grant Turkey $35.7 million to compensate and assist the roughly 70,000 farmers who had been earning all or part of their livelihood from opium cultivation” (FRUS 1969–1976 Vol. 30, pp. 657– 659). Even when Ecevit government revoked this ban in July 1974, U.S. officials were still not quite sure they wanted to put extra pressure on Turkey since it would “add another irritant to U.S.-Turkish relations, [which already strained over the opium issue”. This could also “risk totally alienating the Turkish military” (FRUS 1969–1976 Vol. 30, pp. 673–677). The biggest blow to the American contribution to Turkey’s economic development was the embargo decision passed the U.S. Congress in 1975 after Turkey’s Cyprus intervention (FRUS 1969–1976 Vol.  30, pp.  703–712). Although that was an arms embargo, it degraded the image of U.S.-related financial, commercial, military, and even social elements. American officials described this situation as: “The venom injected into U.S.-Turkish relations by the controversy over military aid is likely to poison other important bilateral dealings as well. It will be difficult, for example, to conduct fruitful discussions on sensitive issues like the opium problem.” (FRUS 1969–1976 Vol. 30, pp. 703–712) Washington’s main argument behind the arms embargo was the possible deterioration of the Turkish Armed Forces’ effectiveness and their ability to perform their role in NATO (FRUS 1969–1976 Vol. 30, pp. 703–712). The arms embargo showed the dependence of Turkey on U.S. military aid. Since 1950, the U.S. Military Assistance Program provided over $3 million of military equipment, and an additional $1 billion were program in between 1975 and 1980. Up to 1975: “The U.S. has supplied the Turkish Army with over 95 percent of

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its medium tank inventory, all of its personnel carriers, and all of its post-World War II field artillery. About 85 percent of Turkey’s aircraft have come from the U.S. Almost all major naval combatants are former U.S. vessels supplied through the MAP or built in Turkey under a cost-sharing program. More than 18,500 Turkish military personnel have been trained over the past 25 years with U.S. assistance, nearly all in the U.S.” (FRUS 1969–1976 Vol. 30, pp. 703–712). The short-term result of the U.S. arms embargo was the maintenance problems of the military equipment due to the loss of new supplies of space parts and the strangling of the force modernization program (FRUS 1969–1976 Vol. 30, pp. 703– 712). As an attempt to fix this, Turkey tried to diversify the components of its military capability. Ankara began to focus on domestic production. It also started initiatives to purchase arms from other NATO countries (i.e. West Germany and Italy) and to get “help from wealthy Middle Eastern countries, i.e. Libya and Iran”. Turkey also considered talking to the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries for military supplies (FRUS 1969–1976 Vol.  30, pp.  703–712). Due to the strain that occurred as a result of the embargo, Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel explained his sourness openly to the U.S. President Gerald Ford, stating that: “We bought 40 F-4’s. Sixteen have been delivered and the rest were due to be delivered by August 1975 but they have not been. We are paying installments, we are paying interest and we are asked to pay storage fees. But these have not been delivered. We have 100,000 tons of military materiel in New York and Houston. We are asked to pay warehouse charges for these goods that have not been shipped. How can I explain these things [to the Turkish people]? They are small matters, but they could easily spoil our friendship. Once spoiled, it will be hard to rebuild.” (FRUS 1969–1976 Vol. 30, pp. 739–746) For the U.S., on the other hand, the major issue in mid-1970s was not necessarily Cyprus, but the military base arrangements in Turkey, since “these installations are extremely important intelligence installations”. With the influence of the Demirel government’s desire to renegotiate these arrangements, the U.S. administration began to discuss some amount of grant (up to $50 million (FRUS 1969–1976 Vol. 30, pp. 760–765). The embargo continued until 1978. In those three years, the major discussion in Washington revolved around managing the utilization of over $3 billionworth of U.S.-granted/established military equipment and bases in Turkey. Two major issues in this sense were the Incirlik Airbase and the Defense Cooperation Agreement of 1969, an umbrella agreement related to the overall defense of the western alliance, together with the LORAN-C station, and communication facilities linking all U.S. installations (FRUS 1969–1976 Vol. 30, pp. 778–781). During the embargo, Turkey’s main concern was covering its defense budget, which was a huge drain. Ankara managed to get $100 million from West Germany, which was not a great help. Turkey spent almost $2.5 billion for its defense between 1977 and 1978, approximately 30 percent of its budget (Ayres 2013). This budgetary pressure was increased by the oil embargo of OPEC in late 1973. Since the Turkish economy was dependent on imported oil, the rising of oil prices from 2.3 dollars to 11.60 per was a great shock on the Turkish economy. As a last resort, the Turkish Central

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Bank began printing money and short-term borrowing to maintain government spending. Due to the losses of state enterprises, public sector deficits increased, which fueled the inflation up to 40 percent at the end of 1977 (www.oecd-ilibrary. org). This instability in the Turkish economy made Washington uneasy, especially because of Turkey’s rising defense requirements and a possible weakening of NATO’s southern flank. In mid-October 1977, Carter administration “set in motion the legislative and political work required to reestablish U.S. arms sales to Turkey” (FRUS 1977–1980 Vol.  21, p.  324). At the beginning of 1978, U.S. Department of Defense officials stated to President Carter that the “military situation on the Southern Flank of NATO [was] one which [offered] little comfort”. Therefore, concluding a Defense Cooperation Agreement was “becoming more and more important”. This feeling was aggravated with the “frustration felt by Turkish military leaders due to the disparity between their defense burden as a Cold War front-line army and the poor status of their equipment” (FRUS 1977–1980 Vol. 21, pp. 333–334). Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit emphasized this situation as “the stagnation in relations between the two countries had done great damage to Turkish security and that Turkey could not continue to allow its security to deteriorate”. Ecevit’s point was not the increase in the Soviet threat, but “the rapid increase in armaments in the countries neighboring Turkey on the west, east and south” (FRUS 1977–1980 Vol. 21, pp. 334–343). Ecevit’s main focus was the economy. After he came to power in 1978, he initiated a set of economic stabilization programs, none of which were prepared in consultation with the IMF or the World Bank. His economic stabilization programs focused on foreign investment and price regulations. Under the program, 6 international banks gave $500 million of debt to the Turkish Central Bank. Due to the lack of IMF and OECD’s initial support and their insistence on austerity measures, Ecevit’s attempt failed, which resulted in the loss of $2 billion of state-owned enterprises (Ataay 2005, pp.  141–222; Durmaz 2014, p.  47). At the end of 1978, Turkey’s economic problems and the longstanding NATO force commitments became an acute burden. Accordingly, the U.S. lifted the arms embargo on December 10, 1978, which, unfortunately, did not induce any betterment in Turkish economy. The U.S. government became particularly worried when Ecevit’s government resorted to martial law “to curb the social unrest which originates in political, sectarian, and ethnic rivalries that are aggravated by the faltering economy” (FRUS 1977–1980 Vol. 21, pp. 394–396; 399–400). According to the U.S.  calculations, “the gap between requirements and available resources [of Turkey was] 1.8 billion [dollars], which was estimated as the total gap with up to 500 million [dollars] required in new money to be provided by some form of consortium”. Zbigniew Brzezinski from the White House analyzed Turkey’s situation, saying: “It was important to recognize that the economic situation in Turkey was showing signs of developing into a political crisis. In spite of its inadequacies, he said, the Ecevit government was the best we could hope for in Turkey in the foreseeable future and its collapse could bring a period of political

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confusion which might culminate in military intervention.” (FRUS 1977–1980 Vol. 21, pp. 397–399) Ecevit, himself, particularly appreciated the revitalization of the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. in his letter to President Jimmy Carter. For relieving the urgent economic problems, the U.S. agreed to conclude a Broad Multilateral Cooperation scheme (FRUS 1977–1980 Vol. 21, pp. 401–402). The year 1979 intensified the socio-political strain in Turkey, despite the normalization efforts in both economic and political domains. At the beginning of 1979, the U.S. and Germany, with other 12 countries, announced an aid program (Rustow 1979, p.  98). In late 1979, Demirel came back to power. For economic recovery, he recruited Turgut Özal (FRUS 1977–1980 Vol.  21, p.  440). None of these measures and changes improved Turkey’s situation.

V. 1980s: “The Post-Coup” The 1980s were the most serious bottleneck of Turkey’s politico-economic situation. The conversations between Turkish and American officials during the 1980s revolved around the topics of the “size of military assistance, debt suspension for outstanding FMS loans, the supply of military equipment, and rapid conclusion of the defense cooperation negotiations” (FRUS 1977–1980 Vol. 21, pp. 444–448). Demirel’s minority government was not able to cope with these issues, which were aggravated with political and internal security problems. Turkey’s senior military leaders warned the U.S. officials that time was running out for a democratic solution to Turkey’s problems (FRUS 1977–1980 Vol. 21, pp. 453–454). Demirel, in his conversation with the U.S. Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, stated that, “$800 million was needed this year to keep the forces at the same level and that approximately $4.5 billion would be required over the next five to six years” since “Turkey’s debt covering about $1 billion for all countries in 1981/82’” (FRUS 1977–1980 Vol. 21, pp. 456–463). This turmoil ended up with the 1980 military coup (12 September coup), the leaders of which stressed the continuity of the economic system and external relations. “The Chief, Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, was alerted in advance of the military takeover, and was also assured that the takeover did not signal any change in relations with the United States and that all US citizens in Turkey would be protected” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files). In foreign policy, the new Turkish administration reassured the U.S. regarding American interests and “the continuation of normal bilateral cooperation in the defense area”. Turkish administration also reassured that “the country’s continuing commitment to the economic reform program instituted in February 1980, and subsequent agreements with the IMF and the OECD governments providing balance of payments support” would continue (FRUS 1977–1980 Vol. 21, pp. 468–473). In order to maintain the economic stabilization program, Turkey was in need of $1.7 billion (FRUS 1977–1980 Vol. 21, pp. 476–479). Özal put Turkey’s economic demands succinctly under two headings: • The need for economic help in generous quantities during the coming year,

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• The urgent need for more military help to permit modernization of the Turkish armed forces so that they could play a more substantial role in the region (FRUS 1977–1980 Vol. 21, pp. 479–480). The U.S., on the other hand, needed to stabilize Turkey’s economy and military in order to refurbish its role in Eastern Mediterranean due to the major challenges “in Europe and new fronts in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf”. Accordingly, the bilateral relations were fueled up with the conclusion of Defense and Cooperation Agreement (DECA) (FRUS 1977–1980 Vol. 21, pp. 488–489), which was a reiteration of the “classic” components of Turkish-American Relations. The U.S. would provide defense equipment, their maintenance and training, in return Turkey would allow the U.S. administration to utilize bases. American non-criticism of the 1980 coup was an important signal of the normalization of bilateral relations. The U.S. officials were not completely happy about the toppling down of the civilian regime, but due to Turkish military leaders’ verbal guarantees of returning back to democracy, they seemed satisfied. This normalization restarted the American foreign aid inflow to Turkey (Armaoğlu 1994, p. 297). The early post-coup relations between Ankara and Washington showed a very Cold War fact. The ruling elite of a lesser power needs to be politically proximate to the great/superpower in order to maintain the smooth flow of bilateral relations. Even if the former was an almost indispensable geostrategic ally, its quest for more autonomy was a detriment. During the Cold War, non-Great Powers, like Turkey, needed to move their national interests close to the Great Powers. When it comes to the economic/military aid flow, the closer the better. Such closeness did not bring any symmetry in bilateral relations. Turkey’s new administration’s loyalty to the U.S. gave Washington more influence to exert its terms. During Turgut Özal administration, which came to power in 1983, the U.S. skewed the DECA terms by putting 7:10 ratio regarding aid to Turkey and Greece. U.S. also put conditions related to the Cyprus Dispute, human rights and the claims about the Armenian issues in 1915 for the aid inflow (Armaoğlu 1994, p. 297). Even if Turkey did not completely reject these news terms, it did not prevent the cut in aid from $900 million to $500 million (Henze 1987, p. 82). Regarding the military assistance, the situation was more promising. Turkey, in the final decade of the Cold War, was still in President Ronald Reagan’s priority regarding developing its military modernization. Reagan administration’s estimation was almost $20 billion to upgrade Turkey’s military to NATO standards. Due to the heightened threat perception of Reagan, the U.S. military assistance to Turkey was doubled (Laipson 1985, p. 22). The quantity of U.S. military aid that the Reagan administration proposed to Congress climbed up to its peak by 1985 with a total of $878 million, which was over 4 times the amount in 1979 of $200 million. Yet, due to the Congressional restrictions, it was cut from Turkey’s request of $900 million to $520 million (Stearns 1992, p. 43). The modernization of Turkish military was important for the U.S., but Washington wanted to do it in its own terms. While Turkey’s requests remained as secondary, U.S. threat perceptions and

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the value Turkey had as an ally was primary. With the “Glasnost” process of Gorbachev that started in 1985 and relieved the Cold War tension, the aid given to Turkey was reduced. What is peculiar about this decade’s military aid was their format. They were organized under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) scheme, 40  percent of which was grant and 60  percent was credit. Turkey received $7.5 billions of FMS between 1972 and 1993. FMS were not completely unfavorable for Turkey regarding their 1–10 years of non-payments with 5–14 percent credit (fas. org). Turkey heavily import-oriented economic policies fueled by Özal created a huge burden at the end of 1980s (Arıcanlı 1990; Candemir 1994). Naturally, this burden restricted Turkey’s political maneuvering against the U.S.

VI. 1990s: Early Post-Cold War Closely related to the developing American interests in filling up the power vacuum in ex-USSR territories, Turkey’s geostrategic and, therefore, alliance value increased (Fuller 1993). According to the American think-tanks, Turkey might have had the potential to be a bridge from Yugoslavia to Western China by utilizing its Islamic posture in the Balkans and Turkic posture in Caucasus and Central Asia. During the 1990s, DECA continued to be the major channel for American economic aid. Turkey. In the early 1990s, Turkey intensified its efforts to change, particularly the 7:10 ratio of the agreement, together with commencing technology transfers in defense industries and opening of the U.S.  military training centers to the Turkish military bureaucracy, which did not work. On the contrary, the amount of aid recessed (Gabelnick et al. 1999). Turkey tried to compensate this loss by developing its commercial and economic relations with the U.S. In 1993, U.S.-Turkey Joint Economic Commission (Clinton 1994)  and in 1996 U.S.-Turkey Business Development Council were established (US Department of Commerce 1997). They both aimed to identify commercial opportunities and address obstacles to trade and investment and issues of concern to the U.S. and Turkish business communities. Regardless of their aims on paper, particularly the latter agency considered Turkey as a big emerging market not a real trade partner, which was the general idea of American trade bureaucracy and investors (US Department of Commerce 1997). Regardless of the American perceptions, these agencies contributed to the expansion of trade volume. It rose from $3 billion to $6 billion from 1992 to 1997. U.S.  ranking in Turkey foreign trade also rose to 10 percent. Turkey, on the other hand, did not even have a share of 0.5 percent in the U.S. foreign trade (US State Department 7 August 1998). The asymmetry was obvious; but the U.S. still supported Turkey’s accession to G20 in October 1999 (www.tccb.gov.tr). In military aid, the situation for Turkey was again more promising. In the 1990s, Washington considered Turkey as a nation that “has been a prime beneficiary of surplus U.S.  weapons deliveries, both under the Pentagon’s Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program and through the process of ‘cascading’ weapons that the U.S. took out of service in order to meet its commitments under the Conventional Forces in Europe

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(CFE) Treaty”. In more numeric terms, throughout “the 1990s alone, the U.S.  has given Turkey weaponry with an original acquisition value of over $1.9 billion under the grant EDA program. More than three-quarters of the value of EDA transfers ($1.53 billion) occurred during the Clinton administration.” In terms of equipment, Turkey, via EDA and CFE channels, received 922 main battle tanks, 250 armored personnel carriers, 72 artillery pieces, 145 combat aircraft, 42 helicopters, and 9 combat ships (Gabelnick et  al.). Moreover, in the 1990s, 979 Turkish military personnel attended the Pentagon’s International Military Education and Training (IMET) program (www.dsca.mil). In general, during the 1990s, Turkey was “the biggest recipient of U.S.  military training, outstripping even first-line U.S.  allies like Israel and Egypt” (Gabelnick et al. 1999). The U.S. administration at the end of 1990s was a bit puzzled about Turkey’s value for both bilateral relations and NATO, which found its place in the U.S.  media. “The belief that, Turkey, in exchange for such succor [helping building Turkey’s armed forces into the second biggest in NATO], will be a loyal enforcer of U.S. policy is mistaken” (Los Angeles Times 19 December 1997). Turkey’s problems with Armenia, its peculiar relationship with the Chechen rebels has been curbing the U.S. efforts in the Caucasus (The Washington Post 13 December 1998). During the 1990s, Turkey strived to redefine itself in American strategic calculations. The U.S. also tried to redesignate Turkey’s role in the Balkans and Caucasus. In a very short amount of time, both parties understood that Turkey did not have the capability to be a bridge from West China to the Balkans. America’s reconsideration about Turkey’s capabilities quickly reduced its alliance value, which almost automatically curtailed the amount of aid. Due to the huge difference between Turkish and American economic potential, Turkey’s efforts to develop commercial relations only had a little benefit other than increasing American firms and investors’ weight in the Turkish economy. In short, the asymmetry in relations was still obvious in this era.

VII. 2000s: Under AK Parti’s Proactive Autonomy The hallmark of relations in the 2000s was AK Parti’s election victory in November 2002. In economic terms, AK Parti first relied on then flourished Anatolian conservative bourgeoisie, called “Anatolian Tigers”, which were profited from Özal’s economic openings, particularly from the newly developing competition among various economic actors (Dursun 2007). What’s more important in TurkishAmerican Relations in the new millennium was AK Parti’s political Islamist model. Due to the democratic underpinnings of AK Parti, the new Islamist modernist party fitted quite well into George Bush administration’s Greater Middle East Initiative (BOP) aiming to promote democracy in the region via regional pivots. Turkey, especially during AK Parti’s first term, was a good model to the region. The leader of the AK Parti and the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Washington regarding Bush’s invitation was the kick-start. Parallel to the politico-strategic affairs, which have been mostly ups and downs, economic relations between two countries experienced, and still is, quite

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an interesting figure. Turkey’s economic development between 2002 and 2007, which created the highest average annual per capita growth rate together with the highest cumulative growth rate in the region. Turkey also became a manufactured goods exporter particularly to its neighboring regions (Kirişçi 2009). Turkey’s trade volume with its neighbors rose 125 % (TAIK May 2009). By 2008, Turkey’s foreign trade increased 56–fold since 1979 ($7 billion) and reached to an estimation of $332.9 billion. Exports rose from $2 billion to $131.5 billion and imports from $5 billion to $201.4 billion (TAIK May 2009). Such economic boost uplifted Turkey’s position from a large market to a potential trade partner for the U.S. The heightened U.S.  expectations about AK Parti’s politico-economic performance had a great impact on the American aid. However, this positive impact did only continue for a year. The amount of aid rose from $6.5 million in 2001 to $276 million in 2002 (https://explorer.usaid.gov). The shock occurred by the serious crisis on 1 March 2003 when the Turkish Parliament voted down the Turkish government’s motion to deploy American troops in Turkey and open a northern front into Iraq (Ergin 2008, p. 3; Yetkin 2004, p. 2). This decision had a direct impact on the aid levels. In 2003, the aid level reduced to $28 million and continued until 2012 between $54 to $26 million. Again, with the normalization of relations in 2013, the aid level gradually rose from $81 million to $155 million. With the increased tension regarding the Syrian crisis the aid level radically dropped to $1.1 million. The aid distributed between 26 percent military and 74 percent economic (https:// explorer.usaid.gov). Throughout the 2000s, the U.S.  position in Turkey’s market climbed. The U.S.  became the seventh export and fifth import market of Turkey. The major sector has been defense (TAIK May 2009). This is followed by energy sector. Especially the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline project was the main mutually profitable investment of this era. Regardless of these developments, trade and investment has still been a weak point in bilateral relations. It largely relies on U.S. defense elements, particularly aircraft sales. Both parties have been aware of the weakness of the economic segment. They have been taking several steps to upgrade the commercial relations. In March 2008, the Annual Investment Conference was held in New York City, titled as “Turkey: Beyond 2008” focusing on the future of Turkey as an investment site. In April 2008, the American-Turkish Council, the American Friends of Turkey, and Turkish-American Business Council met in Washington, D.C. discussed the issues of defense and security, commercial ties, agriculture and food, healthcare, European Union affairs, research and development, information and communication technology, construction, and banking and finance (TAIK May 2009). In October 2010, following President Barack Obama’s visit in April 2009, the parties launched cabinet level economic commission called Framework for Strategic Economic and Commercial Cooperation alongside with a TurkeyU.S. Business Council (https://ustr.gov). In 2011, U.S.-Turkey Investment Council met under the auspices of the 1999 bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (https://ustr.gov). In 2012, a ministerial joint statement was released on the Framework for Strategic Economic and Commercial Cooperation. The

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statement listed several aims, i.e. implementing new ways to assist our Small fund Medium Sized Businesses to participate in foreign trade; organization of a U.S. Defense and Aerospace Trade Mission to Turkey and bringing U.S. and Turkish construction and engineering companies together (https://ustr.gov). In 2013, U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman and Turkey’s Minister of Economy, Zafer Çağlayan, launched the new U.S.-Turkey High Level Committee, which aimed to assess ways to liberalize U.S.-Turkey trade and investment (https://ustr.gov). In 2014, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Regional Office opened in Istanbul and U.S. Chamber Executive Vice President and Head of International Affairs, Myron Brilliant, and TOBB President, Rıfat Hisarcıklıoğlu, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (www.usturkeybusiness.com/news). On September 8, 2015, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey launched a joint study highlighting the incentives for two governments to pursue a comprehensive free trade agreement (https://www.uschamber.com). 2016 was the year Turkey has begun to experience serious economic fluctuations due to the coup attempt in July 15, 2016. Production, investment, and domestic demand recessed and international credit rating agencies’ risk assessments heightened. “A government crackdown against companies deemed to have connections to the Gülen movement – reportedly resulting in at least $11 billions of seized assets” (Zanotti & Thomas 2017, p. 13; Financial Times 7 July 2017; The Economist 4 February 2017). Turkish economic elites were aware of the forthcoming economic risks, particularly regarding the U.S. They organized a meeting with the U.S.Turkey Business Council. On August 2, 2016, the U.S.-Turkey Business Council’s Istanbul-based representative Zeynep Güven and leading foreign investors in Turkey with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Ankara to reaffirm Turkey’s commitment to achieving its macroeconomic targets and structural reforms (www. usturkeybusiness.com/news). In 2017, Turkey’s economic posture began to improve due to recuperating global conditions for emerging market economies (Al-Monitor Turkey Pulse 2017). With the export improvements and Turkish government’s fiscal stimulus, in October 2017, IMF announced Turkey’s growth rate as 5.1  % (IMF October 2017). Yet, Turkish economy could not prevent Turkish lira’s depreciation against the U.S. dollar since the 2016 coup attempt. In 2017, particularly Turkish private sector elites, namely Chambers of Commerce, continued their efforts to maintain the bilateral economic relations. On September 12–13 2017, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey emphasized the renewed effort to upgrade the U.S.-Turkey partnership through the auspices of the 1999 U.S.-Turkey Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (https://tr.usembassy.gov). The 2000s bear a significant difference from the previous decades. With AK Parti’s successful economic policies supported by both countries’ private sectors, Turkey managed to uplift its position from being a large market to a trade partner. Several turbulent events in the politico-strategic realm affected economic and military aid from the U.S., and the Turkish private sector concentrated its efforts

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to develop the weakest part of bilateral relations: the economy. Through annual meetings bringing in high-level economic and political figures, organizing conferences, forging framework agreements, and launching high-level committees, they have been trying to keep the interest fresh for their counterparts and American investors.

Conclusion For decades, the economic segment of Turkish-American Relations has been the weakest link. This was not only because of the general, large economic gap between the two countries, but also the slow and turbulent economic development history of Turkey. Since the 1940s, the bilateral economic relations operated mostly via American aid transfers to Turkey, particularly in defense realm. In the first years of economic relations, U.S. economic and military aid was an indication -almost like a signature- of American alliance. For Ankara, at the beginning, more American aid was a sign of a stronger guarantee. Then it became the mere source of a military arsenal and its maintenance, then an ultimate panacea for foreign debt, then the major source of foreign debt and budget deficit, then something to get rid of. The more economic power Turkey managed to build, especially with the AK Parti, the more autonomy it desired from the U.S. For the U.S., Turkey’s value, for years, has been security-oriented rather than economic. During the Cold War, Turkey was necessary, although not completely indispensable, for any sort of Soviet maneuver in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s alliance value determined the amount of aid. This dichotomy in perceptions created a serious gap in American and Turkish understanding of their economic relations. Turkey considered itself more important than it really has been in Washington’s eyes. An obvious proof of this was the gap between the amount of aid Turkey requested and the actual amount it was given. The latter has always been less.The proximity of national interests was another determinant of the aid. The closer the perceptions and interests of Turkish political elites to the U.S. strategic calculation, the more aid Turkey received. The rise in American aid right after the 1980 coup was a good example. Another important aspect of Turkish-American economic relations was its defense-oriented structure. Due to Turkey’s security-related meaning in Washington’s calculations, defense elements of American aid outweigh the commercial/economic components. Due to the huge difference between Turkish and American economies, Turkey’s efforts to develop commercial relations in the 1990s had little benefit other than increasing American firms and investors’ weight/role in Turkish economy. This began to change with AK Parti’s economic policies, which boosted Turkish production and export levels. The Turkish private sector also flourished with the AK Parti and became a support mechanism in developing and maintaining commercial relations with the U.S. in this era as Turkey began to move from being huge market for American products to an equal trade partner. Still, in the year 2018, Turkey’s quest for more autonomy continues.

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References “Agreement between the United States and Turkey Supplementing and Extending the Agreement of March 29, 1980, for Cooperation on Defense and Economy.Effected by Exchange of Letters at Washington, March 16, 1987. Entered into Force March 16, 1987” [Online], Date of Accession: 30 January 2018 from https://photos.state.gov/libraries/ turkey/461177/pdf/ctia5977_001.pdf. Akşam, 8 July-6 December 1948. Al-Monitor Turkey Pulse, 7 July 2017. Arıcanlı, T. (1990), “The Political Economy of Turkey’s External Debt: The Bearing of Exogenous actors”, in (eds. Tosun Aricanli & Dani Rodrik) The Political Economy of Turkey, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Armaoğlu, F. (1994), 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi Cilt 2, Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları. Ataay, F. (2005), “Kriz Kıskacında CHP Hükümeti (1978–1979)”, Yayınlanmış Doktora Tezi, Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Doktora Programı, Ankara. Ayres, R. (2013), “Turkish Foreign Relations”, Journal of Revolutionary Socialists of the Middle-East, Available at: https://libcom.org/library/turkish-foreign-relations. Bal, Harun (2001), Uluslararası Finansman, Dış Borç Yönetimi ve Türkiye, 222, Türkiye Bankalar Birliği. Candemir, B. (1994), External Debt and Internal Transfer Problem the Case of Turkey: 1980– 1990, Ankara: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. Carver, M. M. (2011), “A Correct and Progressive Road”: U.S.-Turkish Relations, 1945–1964”, PhD, Graduate College of Bowling Green State University. Clinton, W. J. (18 April 1994), Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Cyprus Conflict, Public Papers of the United States. Cumhuriyet, 6 July 1947, 23 April 1947, 3 September 1947, 25 May 1947, 30 May 1947, 18 March 1948. Demirel, S. (25.12.1999), “2000’e Girerken Türkiye, 1999 Yılının Gelişmeleri ve 2000 Yılının Hedefleri (Özet)” [Online], Date of Accession: 2 February 2018 from https://www.tccb. gov.tr/konusmalari-suleyman-demirel/1718/4111/2000e-girerken-turkiye-1999-yiliningelismeleri-ve-2000-yilinin-hedefleri-ozet.html. Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, Birinci ve İkinci Kalkınma Planı. Dönek, E. (2002), “Türkiye’nin Dış Borç Sorunu ve 1980 Sonrası Boyutları”, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, 50. Durmaz, M. (2014), “The U.S. Arms Embargo of 1975–1978 and Its Effects on the Development of the Turkish Defense Industry”, Monterey, CA: California Naval Postgraduate School. Dursun, H. A. (2007), Dönüşüm Sürecindeki Türkiye: Aktörler, Alanlar, Sorunlar, Ankara: Alfa Yayınları. Ergin, S. (Autumn 2008), “The Perfect Crisis Revisited: The Story of the 1 March 2003 Motion”, Private View, 13. Financial Times, 7 July 2017.

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Fuller, G. E. (1993), Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China, Boulder: Westview Press. Gabelnick, T., Hartung, W. D. &Washburn, J. (October 1999), “Arming Repression: U.S. Arms Sales to Turkey during the Clinton Administration”, A Joint Report of the World Policy Institute and the Federation of American Scientists. Gökçay, G. (2015), “İkinci Dünya Savaşı‘nın Ardından Türkiye’de Amerikan Yardımları”, Kebikeç, 39, pp. 315–341. Gönlübol, M. (1993), Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919–1990), Ankara: Siyasal Yayınevi. Henze, P. B. (1987), “Out of Kilter: Greeks, Turks and U.S. Policy”, National Interest, 8. Hürriyet, 4–26 May 1948. IMF, 21 September 1969, Annual Report. IMF, October 2017, World Economic Outlook. International Military Education & Training (IMET) [Online], Date of Accession: 2 February 2018 from http://www.dsca.mil/programs/international-military-education-trainingimet. “Joint Statement by the United States and Turkey from the Framework for Strategic Economic and Commercial Cooperation, 26.06.2012” [Online], Date of Accession: 3 February 2018 from https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2012/june/joint-statement-us-turkey-framework-strategic-economiccommercial-cooperation. “Joint Statement on the U.S. - Turkey Framework for Strategic Economic and Commercial Cooperation, 19.10.2010” [Online], Date of Accession: 3 February 2018 from https://ustr. gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2010/october/joint-statement-usturkey-framework-strategic-econ. Kılıç, A. (1959), Turkey and the World, Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press. Kirişçi, K. (2009), “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of Trading State”, New Perspectives on Turkey, Special Issue on Turkish Foreign Policy, 40. Laipson, E. B. (1985), “U.S.-Turkish Friendly Friction”, Journal of Defence and Diplomacy, 3, Los Angeles Times, 19 December 1997. OECD (1978), November 1978 OECD Economic Survey: Turkey [Online], Available at: http:// www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-surveys-turkey-1978_eco_surveystur-1978-en;jsessionid=4scrnarim3p0p.delta. Olcar, A. (2013), “Türkiye’nin Dış Borç Sorunu ve Kriz Etkileri”, MA, Hitit Üniversitesi. Özkan, H. (2006), “Dış Borçların Sürdürebilirliği ve Türkiye Örneği”, MA, Çukurova Üniversitesi. “Readout of the Meeting between U.S. Trade Representative Michael From and Turkey’s Minister of Economy Zafer Caglayan”, 16.09.2013. Robinson, R. D. (July 1953–October 1954), Developments respecting Turkey: a summary of events and statistics with biographical notes, New York: American Universities. Rustow, D. A. (1979), “Turkey’s Travails”, Foreign Affairs, 58. Snyder, W. W. (October 1969), “Turkish Economic Development: The First Five Year Plan, 1963–67”, The Journal of Development Studies, 6.

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Stearns, M. (1992), Entangled Allies: U.S. policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press. T.C. Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi (BCA), in: BAŞBAKANLIK, T. C. (ed.). dated 4.1.1952, document No: 030.01.00.00.125.801.5.4. The Economist, 4 February 2017. The United States State Department (7 August 1998), Country Commercial Guide: Turkey Fiscal Year 1999, Washington, DC. “Treaties and other International Acts Series, Lend-Lease and Claims between the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey, 60 Stat. 1809” [Online], Date of Accession: 3 February 2018 from https://www.loc.gov/law/help/ us-treaties/bevans/b-tr-ust000011-1158.pdf. Tunçkanat, H. (2001), İkili Anlaşmaların İçyüzü, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları. Turkish Central Bank (1970), Annual Reports. Türk-Amerikan İş Konseyi (TAIK) Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu (May 2009), “Turkey Brief: Turkish-US Relations”. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “U.S.-Turkey Business Council”, Date of Accesion: 4 February 2018 from https://www.usturkeybusiness.com/news/. U.S. Congress, “Congressional Record 80th Congress, 1st session, document 171, pt. 2” (12 March 1947), 1980. U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office; Vol. 8, 1945; Vol. 7, 1946; Vol. 5, 1947; Vol. 3, 1947; Vol. 3, 1948; Vol. 5, 1950; Vol. 8, 1952–1954; Vol. 24, 1955–1957; Vol.10, Part 2, 1958–1960; Vol.16, 1961–1963; Vol. 4, 1969–1976; Vol. 30, 1969–1976; Vol. 21, 1977–1980. “U.S. Foreign Aid by Country, Turkey” [Online], Date of Accession: 3 February 2018 from https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/TUR?measure=Obligations&fiscal_year=2002. “U.S. Military Aid and Arms Sales to Turkey, Fiscal Years 1980–1999” [Online], Date of Accession: 2 February2018 from https://fas.org/asmp/profiles/turkey_fmschart.htm. United Kingdom Public Record Office (UK PRO), FO371/72541, Somerville Smith, 28 February 1948. United Kingdom Public Record Office (UK PRO), Letter from A.K. Helmto Anthony Eden, Despatch No: 46. 1194/7/52G. SECRET. British Embassy, Ankara (11th February 1952). “United States and Turkey Work to Strengthen Ties, Expand Trade and Investment Relationship at TIFA Meeting, 15.07.2011” [Online], Date of Accession: 3 February 2018 from https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2011/july/ united-states-and-turkey-work-strengthen-ties-expand. “Upgrading the US-Turkey Commercial Relationship: A Shared Vision towards a U.S.Turkey Free Trade Agreement” [Online], Date of Accession: 5 February 2018 from https://www.uschamber.com/report/us-turkey-trade-and-investment-study. US Department of Commerce (3 October 1997), “U.S.-Turkey Business Development Council: Membership”, in: Federal Register, V., NO: 192, NOTICES, 51831 (ed.). US Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs, Foreign Relations of the United States, Washington, D.C, US Government Printing Office; Vol. 8, 1945; Vol. 7,

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1946; Vol. 5, 1947; Vol. 3, 1947; Vol. 3, 1948; Vol. 5, 1950; Vol. 8, 1952–1954; Vol. 24, 1955– 1957; Vol.10, Part 2, 1958–1960; Vol.16, 1961–1963; Vol. 4, 1969–1976; Vol. 30, 1969–1976; Vol. 21, 1977–1980 US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), M-1292, Roll 11, 867.24/5-846, 8 May 1946. US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), M-1292, Roll 11, 867.24/5-1046, 10 May 1946. “US-Turkey Trade and Investment Framework Agreement” [Online], Date of Accession: 10 February 2018 from https://tr.usembassy.gov/u-s-turkey-trade-investment-frameworkagreement/. Üstün, S. (1997), “Turkey and the Marshall Plan: Strive for Aid”, Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, XXVII, pp. 31–51. Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–82–0217B, Box 18, Turkey 1980, The Washington Post, 13 December 1998. Yetkin, M. (2004), Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü, İstanbul: Remzi Yayınevi. Zanotti, Jim &Thomas, Clayton (2017), “Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief”, Congressional Research Service.

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Chapter 8: Turkish-American Relations in Terms of Arms Trade

Abstract: The backbone of the Turkish-American Relations from the days of the Cold War to the present day has been built on the defense cooperation between the two countries. One of the most important subtopics of the indicated defense cooperation is the arms trade. For many years, Turkey has been one of the most important and leading customers of the United States (U.S.) in terms of arms trade. Turkey also procured a sizable amount of military equipment from the U.S. under various defense aid programs. Today, the military equipment with U.S.-origin has a significant share within the military inventory of Turkish Armed Forces. On the other hand, this picture began to change as a result of Turkey’s recent actions, which include cooperating with other countries in defense industry as well as -and more importantly- steering towards more indigenous solutions in this regard. Even though the level of defense cooperation between the two states experiences a decline, there are still many projects carried out between the two nations. The striking point here is that, in all of the projects, the U.S. plays the role of the seller, while Turkey is the buyer. As a matter of fact, Turkish defense industry recently began to make exports to U.S. as well and the balance of bilateral trade shifted towards Turkey in recent years. However, the sales of the Turkish defense industry are comprised of elements such as subsystems, components, and assemblies, but not main platforms or weapon systems. This study aims to analyze Turkish-American Relations in terms of arms trade, the historical background of the subject, regulations and their implementation aspects, the place of the U.S.-originated military equipment within the inventory of TAF, and current defense projects. The study asserts that the arms trade between Turkey and U.S. shall continue. However, this outlook shall be far from what it was like during the Cold War. Keywords: Turkish-American Relations, Defense Cooperation, Arms Trade, Foreign Military Sales, Direct Commercial Sales, Turkish Armed Forces.

Introduction The arms trade has a special place in Turkish-American Relations and it dates back to the Ottoman era. However, the peak of the arms trade between the two nations came after the rapprochement of both countries in the post-Second World 1 Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Giresun University, Giresun, Turkey. Email: [email protected]

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War settlement period, especially after Turkey had become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. The United States assumed the role of the primary arms supplier of Turkey throughout the Cold War era. An analysis conducted by the U.S. government in 1995 found that close to 80 % of the military equipment in Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) inventory is supplied by the U.S. (US Department of Commerce 1995, p.  286). On the other hand, military imports made by Ankara from Washington began to enter a declining trend as a result of Turkey’s recent cooperation with other countries in the defense industry and more importantly Turkey’s steering towards its own indigenous solutions and efforts for developing its own defense industry beginning in the late 1990s. To elaborate on the statement “steering towards its own indigenous solutions”; in the beginning of the 2000s, while the rate of the domestic fulfillment of the TAF requirements was around 20 %, this figure had climbed up to 60 % at the end of 2014 (Sünnetçi 2015/a, p. 137). Naturally, the U.S. ranks first as one of the countries that are affected from this picture the most. Another outcome of this progress is the initiation of the military equipment sales from Turkey to the U.S. Today, Turkish defense industry undertakes a sizable amount of exports to the U.S. In this regard, the balance has begun shifting in favor of Turkey in recent years. This study aims to analyze Turkish-American Relations in terms of arms trade. This work, which is based on a literature survey, is comprised of four sections. The first section outlines the historical development of the arms trade between the parties from the 19th century to present day. The second section indicates the implementation of the regulations in this respect, while the third section lists the U.S.-originated military equipment in TAF inventory. On the fourth and final section, the current status of the arms trade between the two countries is discussed with data at hand and the ongoing defense projects are explained in detail. Without any doubt, the subject of Turkish-American arms trade has a wide range. In order not to spread out the topic, the study remains limited to the sales of main platforms and weapons. It will mostly focus on land and air forces as well as the navy; thus, the sales, made to the law enforcement agencies and to the other public and private institutions which were kept out of the scope of this study.

I. Historical Background It is assumed that Turkish-American Relations were officially initiated in the era of Sultan Mahmud II. While the Ottoman interest in American weaponry dates back to this era, the arms trade was not a real concern for a long period of time. There was no clause that would make any commerce of arms possible in the initial trade agreements signed between the two nations during the first years of their relations. The U.S. was not known as a noteworthy exporter of arms on the international stage until 1866. Rather, up until that point, the U.S. was known to have a sizeable amount of imports (Gencer et al. 2008, p. 52). However, it should be noted that despite the fact that there was no direct weapons or arms trade, the Ottoman Empire benefited from U.S. weapons technology and know-how. American

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entrepreneur Henry Eckford visited Istanbul in August of 1831 on a ship named “United States” and, as the result of negotiations; the ship was purchased by the Ottoman government for 150,000 U.S. dollars. After the sale was finalized, Eckford took the seat of the shipyard in Istanbul and had another ship built for the Ottoman Navy. After Eckford passed away at the end of 1832, his deputy Foster Rhodes superseded him, and during his tenure until 1839, made the construction of many new vessels possible (Trask 1971, p. 7). In the same period, it is noted that the Ottoman Empire employed American experts for the construction of the land-based weapons. The appointment to the Imperial Armory (Tophane) of John Webster Cochran, who gained recognition with his success in casting cannons, can be given as an example in this regard (Erhan 2001, p. 175). After the American Civil War that began in 1861 came to an end in 1865, U.S. Armed Forces inventory became full of surplus military material. When the stocks held by the U.S. weapons manufacturers are also taken into account, the situation became overly complicated. In the subsequent period, the U.S. government sought to market its surplus military equipment in international markets (Sander & Fişek 1977, p. 25). This pursuit also marks the turning point of the arms trade between the Ottoman Empire and the U.S. In 1865, the Ottoman Empire, which was trying to modernize its small arms, purchased 40,000 Enfield rifles used in the Civil War. However, true and larger scale arms trade began after the Ottoman Embassy was opened in Washington (Erhan 2001, p. 176). On May 10, 1869, Eduard Blacque Bey, first Ottoman Ambassador to Washington, contacted the U.S. Department of State and forwarded his intention to purchase 114,000 Enfield rifles for 4.00 U.S. dollars a piece. After a positive reply from the U.S., the rifles were delivered. Again, in the same year, the Ottoman Empire made a request to purchase 125,000 Springfield rifles for 7.00 U.S. dollars a piece and upon the positive return, this batch was delivered (Sander & Fişek 1977, pp. 25–26). The Ottoman Empire, who purchased rifles directly from the U.S. government in 1869, began placing considerable orders for weapons and ammunition to private manufacturers from that date forward. The arms trade reached its peak during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 (Satış 2011, pp. 301–302). The Ottoman Empire felt the defeat of the war, and as a result, became seriously pressed for financial resources. Naturally, such a status had a negative impact on the arms trade, which was carried out between the two nations for years. Moreover, as Ottomans were now getting closer to Germany, Turkish-American arms trade had the disadvantage posed by the geographical distance in terms of the delivery of the orders. The approach of the U.S. government to the Armenian issue was another factor that negatively affected the arms trade in this regard. Germany, which was getting closer with Ottoman Empire, became a rival to the U.S. in the arms trade and this rivalry resulted in the emergence of the German companies as victors, Krupp being the first (Sander & Fişek 1977, pp. 34–35). While the U.S. share of the weapons and ammunition that Ottoman Empire imported between 1880 and 1882 was 30.4 %, virtual nullification of this share between 1900 and 1902 is an indicator of the change in the market (Satış 2011, p. 307). A battlecruiser, delivered to the Ottoman

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Empire in 1904 was recorded as the last military purchase, made by the Ottoman Empire from the U.S. Though the U.S. put some effort in order to take its former place in the arms business, such attempts were proven to be fruitless (Sander & Fişek 1977, pp. 39–43). It is apparent that the Republic of Turkey, which is considered a successor of the Ottoman Empire, also had an interest in American weaponry. However, this interest did not turn into an intense arms trade until the end of the Second World War (Sander & Fişek 1977, pp. 44–45). Before skipping to the post-Second World War era, where the arms trade really intensified, it should be noted that Turkey received military materials from the U.S.  within the scope of the LendLease Act, approved by the U.S. Senate. The aid, which was received through the United Kingdom (UK) and aimed to boost the defensive capabilities of Turkey against the Axis Powers, brought a new order to Turkish-American Relations (Karakaş 2009, pp. 22–23). Turkey purchased $35 million worth of weaponry from the U.S. throughout the War. This aid, which was not based on any written document, gained a legal basis as the result of the agreement, signed between the states on February 23, 1945. Indeed, the aforementioned agreement stipulated that the U.S. government, when it deemed necessary, could take back the equipment that was not destroyed, lost or spent. However, the U.S., with an agreement, signed on May 7, 1946, revoked this obligation (Aydın 2001, p. 411). The post-Second World War era can be considered the apex of Turkish-American Relations. The Aid Agreement (signed on February 27, 1946), which grants Turkey a lease worth of $10 million on the condition that Turkey would buy the U.S. surplus military equipment (Tunçkanat 1970, p. 28), forms the beginning of the arms trade that picked up speed after the war. However, the real push in this regard came with the Truman Doctrine. This Doctrine, announced to the world by the U.S. President Harry S. Truman via a Senate speech, was an aid plan that stipulated to support Turkey and Greece mainly against the threat of communism. The U.S., within the scope of the Doctrine that entered into effect on May 22, 1947, made a commitment to provide an aid of $300 million to Greece and 100 million U.S.  dollars to Turkey. Turkey then signed an agreement with the U.S., thereby accepting the aid through the Truman Doctrine. However, some sources suggest that the U.S. cut down the amount of the aid to be sent (Erhan 2001, pp. 528–534); but a report disclosed by the Department of Justice indicates that an aid worth of $100 million was made to Turkey within the scope of the Truman Doctrine. In addition, the same report remarks that the aid was assigned to the Land Forces ($48,500,000), Air Forces ($26,750,000), and Naval Forces ($14,750,000) as well as $5,000,000 assigned to the reconstruction of the armories and another $5,000,000 assigned for the construction of roads (McGhee 1990, p. 43). The U.S., aiming to modernize the armies of the Allied states within a legal framework, initiated the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (MDAA) in 1949. MDAA came into effect with the Military Assistance Program (MAP), which would constitute the base of the subsequent aid programs. The MAP helped the modernization efforts of the NATO armies through military grants and indebtment and ensured

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that South Korea and South Vietnam received aids as well. Turkey is one of the countries that have benefited from the MAP, which was succeeded by FMF (Foreign Military Financing) (Adams & Williams 2010, p.  79). Turkey, between 1950 and 2007, received an aid of $3,170,265,000 under the MAP (Defense Security Cooperation Agency 2015, p. 75). Moreover, as it shall be discussed in the next chapter, the aids that Turkey received were not limited to the MAP and large-scale military equipment transfer was made from the U.S. through various programs, some of which are still in effect today. The other aspect of the arms trade between the two states in the post-Second World War is comprised of the direct procurements. Once again, as shall be detailed in the next section, Turkey procured weapons mainly from the U.S. throughout the Cold War. Despite the fact that the military imports from this country declined, the U.S. is still a major player in the Turkish market. Probably, the most striking development that occurred in the arms trade between the two states is that Turkey started selling military equipment to the U.S. in parallel to the progress in the Turkish defense industry. As it shall be detailed in the section regarding the projects, it is seen that the sales, first started with offset agreements, are gradually increasing.

II. Regulations and Implementation Aspect Today, the U.S. government, in line with its national security and its foreign policy goals, controls and regulates the exports of the equipment and material that can be used and utilized in the construction of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missiles. Although there are multiple agencies that are authorized to issue the export licenses, three of them stand out: The Department of State (DoS), the Department of Commerce (DoC), and the Department of Treasury (DoT). The U.S. is a member of various export control regimes including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Zangger Committee (ZC), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group (AG), and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA). As matter of fact, as they are expanded in line with the requirements in national security and foreign policy, three main U.S. export control lists: the Commerce Control List (CCL), the United States Munitions List (USML), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Controls (NRCC) are shaped based on the regimes listed above. In addition, the catch-all practice, which enables the control and regulation of dual-use material, software, and technologies that are not listed amongst the export control regimes but are suspected to be used in the construction of weapons of mass destruction or missiles, can also be implemented (US Department of State n.d.). The cornerstone of the legal regulations that are aimed to control the arms trade in the U.S. is the Export Control Act (AECA). The agreement, implemented by the DoS, is carried out through the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which regulates the licenses and other permits that are required for defense materials and services. The Export Administration Act (EAA) on the other hand, authorizes the DoC in order to regulate the export and reexport activities regarding the U.S.-origin dual-use equipment, software, and technologies. DoC

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enforces this authority via the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). In addition, DoC, through the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), enacts regulations regarding the states, legal entities, and individuals with whom trade and commerce with the U.S. are prohibited (US Department of State n.d.). Today, the U.S. companies undertake the sales of military equipment using two main methods of supply: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). Both methods require the approval of the U.S. Congress for amounts over a certain figure. Here, the base is determined as $25 million for the NATO member states including Turkey, South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Israel, as well as $14  million for the other states (Defense Security Cooperation Agency n.d.a). In both methods, the End-Use Monitoring (EUM) is practiced. The aim here is to monitor for what purpose the transferred military equipment or service is being used (Gilman 2014, p. 12). Apart from the listed methods, it is also possible to purchase military equipment from the U.S. through Leases, Excess Defense Articles (EDA), and Third Party Transfers (TPT) methods. The provisions regarding all five methods detailed here are regulated via AECA and the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). The first program that permits the sales of U.S.-originated defense equipment and services to other states or organizations is the FMS. The responsibility to carry out the program belongs to the Defense Security Control Agency (DSCA) within the Department of Defense (DoD). The process of the procurement as a government to government sale begins when the representatives of the U.S. and the buyer state sign the document titled the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). From this point forward, the sale may be finalized from the U.S. stock inventory directly, or the order may be purchased by the DSCA on behalf of the U.S. government and is subsequently transferred to the relevant state (HERDEM n.d.). While FMS comes with several advantages, the first ones that come to the forefront are the licensing and Congress approval procedures, carried out by the DSCA and addressed the U.S., not a company, creating are latively low chance to experience problems due to the fact that the whole process is under government guarantee (LMDefence n.d.a). Between 1950 and 2015, the total amount of goods and services agreements in the world under the FMS was worth $684,969,316,000. $20,209,438,000 of this figure is attributed to Turkey (Defense Security Cooperation Agency 2015, pp.  2–5). The costs of the sales carried out within the scope of FMS are generally compensated by the buyer state. However, for some countries, financial aid can also be provided subject to Congress approval. Within this context, the program, which is based on providing financial aid or loans to assist in the purchasing of military equipment, services, and training from the U.S., is called the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF). The countries that have received the highest amount of source allocation through this program are Egypt and Israel (Gilman 2014, p. 6). Turkey is also benefiting from this program. The resources, provided within the scope of FMF programs in the world between 1950 and 2015 was worth $177,783,703,000

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and Turkey’s share was equivalent to $7,739,892,000 (Defense Security Cooperation Agency 2015, pp. 31–40). Differing from the FMS, the DCS is a program in which the U.S. is not involved directly. The sales agreement here is signed between the buyer country and the related company and the whole process is managed between the two parties. However, the whole process also runs under the monitoring of the U.S. government. Obtaining the export licenses and the compliance of the indicated sale with the U.S.  national security and the foreign policy targets are also essential. The FMF funds are indeed available within the scope of FMS. However, only under restricted conditions and only for 10 countries (including Turkey), resources can be provided for DCS procurements over the FMF. It should also be noted that there are some cases, which can be referred to as “hybrid sales”, where a part of the products in the package are procured by the DCS method and the remaining parts are procured by the FMS method (Nichols et al. 2014, pp. 19–21). The most important advantages of the DCS are the flexibility it provides in meeting the demands of the buyer, the ability to provide an opportunity to contact the manufacturer directly, decreasing the level of the bureaucratic procedures, and in some cases, a lower payment (LMDefence n.d.b). Between 1950 and 2015, the amount of the DCS licensed sales under AECA in the world was $194,148,766,000. $3,472,618,000 of this figure belongs to Turkey (Defense Security Cooperation Agency 2015, pp. 57–61). AECA also enables that the military equipment in DoD inventory that is deemed surplus is leased to the proper nations or international organizations in line with the national security or the foreign policy goals, rather than proceeding with the sales (Kaidanow 2017). However, it is imperative that such a transaction should not affect the sales of the U.S. defense industry companies in a negative manner (Gilman 2014, p. 10). In practice, the buyer pays the amount that is set forth by the U.S. in case of discards or disposals, and the buyer also covers the costs of the equipment or material to be repurchased. In principle, the leasing does not exceed 5  years. The U.S. President has the authority to call the leased equipment back before the indicated period ends (Kaidanow 2017). FAA grants the U.S. President the authority to transfer the surplus military equipment in the Armed Forces inventory to foreign nations. In this practice called the EDA, the transfer is realized for a small fee or it can be made as a grant. However, when going with option two, this should serve a foreign policy interest and the U.S. defense industry should not be adversely affected by such a grant (Adams & Williams 2010, p. 85). Furthermore, in case of the grants, it is required that the relevant country accepts the conditions regarding the purpose of use, security, and the transfers to third-party countries (Gilman 2014, p. 11). On the other hand, the EDA sales can be realized by the FMS method. The value in the sales under FMS regulation is determined based on the age and condition of the product and varies between 5 % to 50 % of the original price (Defense Security Cooperation Agency n.d.b). The total amount of transfers made in the world between 1950 and 2015 under the EDA was $6,541,247,000, of which Turkey had a share of $855,307,000 (Defense Security Cooperation Agency 2015, pp. 92–93). EDA,

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which decreases storage and disposal costs, seems like a stagnant program during recent years. The final method that can be used in the provision of U.S.-origin military equipment is the TPT. The TPT, which is regulated under AECA and FAA, is in summary, the transfer made by a country using U.S.-origin military equipment to a third country. The transfer may take forms such as sales, swaps, or grants. However, the DoS approval should be obtained in every case and the practice should not violate the U.S. Foreign Policy goals and its concerns regarding the technology transfer (Kaidanow 2017). Just like the U.S., Turkey, pursuant to the international agreements and export regulation regimes that it is a part of, also regulates and restricts the exports of the material and equipment that can be used for making nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missiles. Within this scope, the export of the military equipment, weapons, and ammunition in the WA list and the export of the ballistic missiles that have the capability to carry nuclear, chemical, and biological warheads are subjected to the approval of the Ministry of National Defense (MoND). The dual-use material and technologies in the WA list, the dual-use material and chemical weapon precursors in AG list, and the chemical substances in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) list all require the approval of the Ministry of Economy (MoE), while for the dual-use materials and technology in NSG and ZC lists, the approval of the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEA) is required, just as the approval of the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Livestock (MoFLA) is required for the biological substances in the AG list (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı 2011; Demirel 2005, pp. 52–53). The exports of the defense products from Turkey to the U.S. are also undertaken within the scope of the export regulations indicated above. In addition, the catch-all practice can be implemented in suspicious cases (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı 2011). Due to the fact that the products discussed here in rather fall to the turf of the MoND, a certain act called the “Law on Control of Industrial Enterprises Producing War Vehicles, Equipment, Weapons, Ammunition and Explosives” (No: 5201, Dated: July 3, 2004) should be discussed at this point. The main framework in Turkey in regards to the exports of defense products is formed by this law. Because of this, the exports of the defense industry products are allowed by the MoND after receiving the opinions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in terms of the political aspect, and of the General Staff in terms of the military aspect. Every January, the MoND issues a list regarding the combat vehicles, equipment, weapons, ammunition and explosives as well as their respective parts that are subject to the regulation (T.C. Resmi Gazete 2004). The applications, submitted by the companies regarding the exports of the items in the list are reviewed by the MoND and the ones that are deemed proper are subsequently approved. The following procedures are carried out by the MoE pursuant to the current regulations.

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III. The Place of the U.S.-Origin Military Equipment within the TAF Inventory As the natural result of the long-standing military cooperation, the U.S.-origin military equipment in TAF inventory has an important place both in terms of quality and quantity. Today, the field where the presence of the U.S.-origin military equipment is felt most is the Turkish Air Forces. The U.S.-origin military equipment is intensively used in Turkish Land Forces inventory. Within the three forces, the force that gets the smallest percentage share from the U.S.-origin military equipment is the Turkish Naval Forces. The following sections review the U.S.-origin military equipment within the TAF inventory through the main weapon platforms and weapon systems. No similar analysis for the U.S. Armed Forces was conducted here because the export, made to the U.S.  from Turkey in the field of defense products, consists of items like subsystems, components, and assemblies, but not main platforms and weapon systems. After the membership of the Turkey to NATO, the amount of the U.S.-origin military equipment within the TAF rapidly increased along with the influence of foreign aids and credit sales. As the result, the U.S. played a pivotal role in the modernization requirements during the Cold War era and the majority of the military material within its inventory was supplied from the U.S. On the other hand, the weapons embargo laid down by the U.S. after the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation led to the development of the national defense industry, and due to considerable steps in recent years, the foreign dependency ended to a large extent. Today, U.S.origin military solutions have a significant place within the Turkish Armed Forces’ inventory. On the other hand, it is also true that as a result of cooperation with non-NATO member states such as Israel, China, South Korea, and Pakistan, and more importantly due to the ever-increasing indigenous solutions in this regard, the U.S. influence of the Turkish defense industry is declining by the day. As of 2016, the number of main battle tanks (MBT) within the Turkish Land Forces in active service is 2,504. The backbone of the MBT fleet consists of the U.S.made M48 and M60’s. There are 274 M60A1’s, 658 M60A3’s, and 850 M48A5T1/T2’s in the inventory. In addition, there are over 2,000 M48 MBT’s that were shelved as reserves (IISS 2016, p. 148). In 2002, within the scope of an agreement made by the Israel-based Israel Military Industries (IMI), 170 M60A1 MBT’s were modernized. The indicated tanks, redesignated as M60T’s after receiving the updates, are the most important elements of the MBT fleet along with the Leopard 2A4’s, which have recently been transferred from Germany. It is reported that the M60T’s, after their solid performance in the Operation Euphrates Shield (Fırat Kalkanı), gained the trust of their crews (Sünnetçi 2017, p. 118). Almost the entire tracked armored vehicle fleet of the Turkish Land Forces is made up of U.S.-origin platforms. The inventory includes 650 ACV-300 armored combat vehicles (ACV), 830 ACV-300 armored personnel carriers (APC), 551 ACV300 advanced armored personnel carriers (AAPC), 170 ACV-300 armored mortar carriers (AMC), and 48 ACV-300 armored tow carriers (ATC). Those vehicles,

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which were designed by the U.S.-based FMC (now BAE Systems) in line with the requirements of the TAF, based on the YPR 765 model, were license-built in Turkey by the FNSS (Atalan 2012, p.  137). Apart from the ACV-300 series of armored vehicles in the inventory, there are also 2,813 M113/A1/A2 APC’s (IISS 2016, p. 148). Around 1,000 of the indicated vehicles were modernized in Turkey in the 1990s. Currently, some of them are under modernization works in order to be converted to engineering vehicles or to ambulance units (Atalan 2012, p. 152). As a side note, it should be indicated that the inventory of TAF also includes a high number of M-48, M-60, and M113-based tracked armored combat support vehicles to serve in different mission types. As of 2016, 1,133 self-propelled (SP) artilleries, 760+ towed artilleries and 146+ multiple launch rocket systems (MLRSs) are listed in the Turkish Land Forces inventory. The most popular artillery pieces in the SP class are the T-155 Fırtına’s, which are currently made in Turkey with South Korean technical assistance. However, U.S.-origin artilleries, a portion of which are updated, are also employed intensively, and there are 26 M108T’s, 365 M52T’s, 222 M44T1’s, 36 M107’s, and 219 M110A2’s in the inventory. In towed artillery class, all guns are U.S.-origin with the exception of 6 indigenously manufactured T-155 Panter’s. There are 75+ M101A1’s, 517 M114A1/A2’s and 162 M115’s listed in the inventory. Most of the MLRS’s are domestically manufactured and there are 12 launchers, made by the U.S., which are the first MLRS to enter the inventory, and they stand out for their ability to fire MGM-140A ATACMS Block I (M39) rockets with a range of 165 km (IISS 2016, p. 148). As of 2016, Turkish Land Forces maintain a large land aviation fleet, comprised of 112 fixed wing and 301 rotary wing aircrafts. While the inventory features aircrafts of Italian, France, and Russian origin, the bulk of the fleet is U.S.-made. The U.S.-originated aircrafts in the inventory list include 5 Beech 200 King Air’s, 30 Cessna 185’s (U-17B), 3 Cessna 421 light utility aircrafts, 45 Cessna T182’s, 25 T41D Mescaleros, and 4 T-42A Cochise training aircrafts. In the fleet, there are 18 AH-1P Cobra’s, 12 AH-1S Cobra’s, 6 AH-1W Cobra’s, and 4 TAH-1P Cobra attack helicopters in addition to 134 S-70A Black Hawk utility helicopters, 45 UH-1H Iroquois’s, and 20 Bell 206 Jet Ranger light utility helicopters. 3 OH-58B Kiowa reconnaissance helicopters and 28 Hughes 300C training helicopters were also employed in the inventory (IISS 2016, p. 148). All of the aircrafts listed above were supplied via the direct purchasing method. While this portion of the helicopters in the inventory was acquired via the direct purchasing, another portion was manufactured under license in Turkey. Apart from the main platforms, U.S.-origin weapon systems also have a large part within the Turkish Land Forces inventory. The weapons systems currently in the inventory are; M1, M4, and M16 rifles, M60, M2, and M1919 machine guns, M55 anti-aircraft machine guns, M79 and MK19 grenade launchers, M82A1, M-87R, M-93, and Tac-50 anti-material sniper rifles, M72 (HAR-66) LAW rocket launchers, M30 mortar systems, M18, M20, and M40 recoilless rifles, BGM-71 TOW anti-tank

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missiles and FIM-92 Stinger man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). In addition, U.S.-origin ammunition is also widely used in Turkish Land Forces. Just like in the Land Forces, the structure of the Turkish Naval Forces featured more U.S.-origin platforms after Turkey became a member of NATO. However, the weapons embargo, imposed by the U.S.  after the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, steered Turkey to establish a rather balanced fleet structure. While the arms trade with the U.S.  continued after the operation, the choice in the newly conceived frigate, fast attack craft, submarine, and minesweeper projects was Germany. In addition, second-hand frigates, second-hand minesweepers, training aircrafts from France, sea patrol aircrafts from Spain, and sea patrol aircrafts as well as helicopters from Italy, were also purchased. Some of the indicated systems were manufactured or built in Turkey. More importantly, just as in the National Ship Project (MILGEM), Turkey began commissioning indigenous design platforms. With the exception of some certain platforms, it is safe to say that today; Turkey’s dependency on foreign marine military systems is over. As of August 2017, there are 16 frigates in the force structure of the Turkish Naval Forces (Türk Deniz Kuvvetleri n.d.). 8 of them, considered Gabya class (ex-Oliver Hazard Perry Class), were transferred from the U.S. as surplus items. In addition, 1 ship was purchased to be used for spare part cannibalism (Atalan 2015, p. 155). Turkish Naval Forces modernized the combat management systems of its Gabya Class frigates with the GENESIS project. 4 of the updated platforms were equipped with SMART-S Mk2 3-D Search Radars and were integrated with the MK41 8-Cell Vertical Launch Systems (VLS) for the RIM-162B Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM) (Mönch TR 2016/a, p. 18). The main element of the rotary wing aircraft fleet of the Turkish Naval Forces is the U.S.-made S-70B-28D Seahawk helicopters. Naval Forces, within the scope of the S-70B Seahawk Naval Helicopter Procurement Lot-1 Program, procured 8 helicopters and an additional 17 helicopters within the scope of the Lot II Program. Finally, one more helicopter was obtained from the manufacturer as compensation to make up for a delay in performance. One of the helicopters crashed during a training flight in 2002 (Mönch TR 2013, p. 34). As of August 2017, the number of Seahawks in the Turkish Naval Forces inventory is 24 (Türk Deniz Kuvvetleri n.d.). The other platforms of U.S.-origin in the force structure are 4 F class (ex-Cape class) and 4 S class (ex-Adjutant class) minesweepers, 1 Ertuğrul class (ex-Terrebonne Parish class) landing ship tank (LST), 9 LCM-8 class landing crafts mechanized (LCM), and 1 Çeşme (ex-Silas Bent class) class survey ship (IISS 2016, p. 148). The indicated platforms, of which their service life nears to an end, are expected to be decommissioned in the near future. As stated before, the weight of the U.S.-origin platforms within the Turkish Naval Forces structure has lost its footing as the result of steering towards different nations and indigenous solutions. However, the picture changes when it comes to the weapon systems mounted on the indicated platforms. The U.S.-origin weapon systems in the inventory are intensively employed. The main systems within the U.S.-origin weapon systems are RIM-66 SM-1, RIM-162 (ESSM), RIM-7

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Sea Sparrow, and RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) air defense missiles, UGM-84/RGM-84A/C Harpoon anti-ship missiles, AGM-114 Hellfire II air to surface missiles, Mk-45 guns, Mk15 Phalanx Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWS), Mk 44/46/54 lightweight torpedoes, and Mk 14/23/37 heavyweight torpedoes. Furthermore, new weapon systems are estimated to be included in the inventory. Similar to the other two forces of TAF, the turning point for the Turkish Air Forces to enter into U.S. influence is the membership of Turkey in NATO. However, what separates the Turkish Air Forces from the other forces is that U.S. influence, and as the result, the weight of the U.S.-origin military equipment and material within the inventory, still continues today. Notwithstanding, Turkey accelerated its studies and works toward developing indigenous aircraft, avionics, and ammunition after the second half of the 2000s and produced a number of solutions and products such as the New Generation Basic Trainer Aircraft (HÜRKUŞ), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (ANKA), Targeting Pod (ASELPOD), Stand-Off Missile (SOM), Penetrator Bomb (NEB), Precision Guidance Kit (HGK), and Wing Assisted Guidance Kit (KGK). In addition, Turkey initiated a highly ambitious project called the National Combat Aircraft (MMU/TF/X) to develop a 5th generation combat aircraft. However, despite the given positive developments, the foreign dependency, especially to the U.S., still continues. As a matter of fact, when the ongoing projects are taken into account in this regard, this situation may be expected to continue for the foreseeable future. The combat squadrons of the Turkish Air Forces are equipped entirely with aircrafts of U.S.-origin. The backbone of the fleet consists of the F-16C/D Fighting Falcons, introduced to the inventory within the scope of the Peace Onyx I/II/IV programs. A total of 270 aircrafts (comprised of 160 F-16C/D Block 30/40’s within the scope of Peace Onyx I, 80 F-16C/D Block 50’s within the scope of Peace Onyx II, and 30 F-16C/D Block 50+’s within the scope of Peace Onyx IV, were commissioned (Turkish Aerospace Industries n.d.). As of 2016, 240 of them are in active service (Sünnetçi 2016/a, p. 10). 10 of the aircrafts in the inventory in Block 30/40/50 configuration had undergone avionic modernization under the Peace Onyx II Upgrade Program, as 163 aircrafts in Block 40/50 configuration had undergone avionic upgrading within the scope of the Modernization Serial Assembly Program (Kutluhan 2015, p. 60). 35 pieces of F-16C/D Block 30 aircraft, which has not been modernized yet, are under structural maintenance process under the F-16 Service Life Modernization Program, and 1 F-16C Block 30 is currently receiving avionics upgrades under the Özgür Program (Mönch TR 2016/b, p. 93). Turkish Air Forces plans to replace its F-16 fleet, which is slated to remain in service until the 2040’s with TFX’s. Another aircraft of U.S.-origin that is in Turkish Air Forces combat squadrons is the F-4 Phantom II. A total of 236 Phantom aircrafts entered into the inventory (the first being in 1974) in different batches. 182 of those aircrafts are F-4E fighter/ bomber variants while 54 of them are RF-4E reconnaissance variants (Sünnetçi 2015/b, p. 42). As a result of the agreement made with Israel-based IMI in 1997, 54 F-4E’s underwent structural and avionic modernization (Başara 1999, p. 38). 42 of

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those planes, afterward dubbed as F4E/2020 Terminator, are in active service as of 2016. The F-4E/2020’s, of which the last batch of 20 planes shall be decommissioned in 2020, are slated to be replaced with U.S. F-35’s (Sünnetçi 2015/b, pp. 42–44). One of the main components of the training fleet of the Turkish Air Forces is the U.S.-made T-38A’s. There are 68 T-38A/M’s listed in the inventory as of 2016 (Sünnetçi 2016/a, p. 10). Turkey began upgrading 55 of the indicated type within the T-38 Avionics Modernization (ARI) Project, initiated in 2007. With the modification of the agreement, concluded in 2013, the remaining 13 aircrafts were taken into the scope of the upgrade program (Sünnetçi 2014/a, p.  44). The first of the aircrafts, designated as T-38M after the modernization, were delivered on April 20, 2012. T-38M’s are planned to be in service until the end of 2020s (Mönch TR 2012/a, pp. 33–35). As of 2016, 19 C-130B/E Hercules transport aircrafts are in service in the Turkish Air Forces airlift fleet (Sünnetçi 2016/a, p. 10). As the result of the C-130 Avionics Modernization (ERCIYES) Project, initiated in 2006, 6 C-130B’s and 7 C-130E’s from the inventory of that date were taken into modernization. After the purchase of 6 C-130E’s from the inventory of Royal Saudi Air Forces (RSAF), and while the modernization process was going on, the contract was modified and thus, the newly purchased aircrafts were included in the scope of the modernization package and the first of the upgraded aircrafts entered into service on August 8, 2014 (Sünnetçi 2014/b, pp. 41–45). C-130E/B’s are expected to serve for years to come. There are 4 U.S.-made E-7T Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircrafts in the Turkish Air Forces inventory as of 2016 (Sünnetçi 2016/a, p. 10). The most important mission sensor of the aircrafts, which are modeled after the Increased Gross Weight (IGW) frame model of the Next-Generation (NG) Series of Boeing 737 aircraft within the scope of Peace Eagle (PE) Project, is the L-Band Multi-Role Electronically Scanned Array (MESA) Radar, developed by Northop Grumman. In addition, the aircrafts are equipped with advanced Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), Electronic Support Measures/Electronic Intelligence (EDT/ ELINT), and Signal systems (Sünnetçi 2016/b, pp.  103–105). E-7T’s are the most advanced Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) platform in Turkish Air Force inventory. As of 2016, there are 7 KC-135R Strato tanker aerial refueling aircrafts, made by U.S.-based Boeing in Turkish Air Forces inventory (Sünnetçi 2016/a, p.  10). The first one of the aircrafts, which were purchased out of the U.S. Armed Forces inventory within the scope of the NATO Cascading Program, was commissioned on December 1997 and the last one was entered into service on July 1998. KC-135’s underwent an avionics update called Pacer CRAG. However, it has been reported that metal fatigue began in the airframes, due to the wear and tear of many years of active service. The Turkish Air Force is considering subjecting the aircraft in the inventory to a modernization program called Pacer CRAG Block-45. Replacing the KC-135R’s with a new generation of aerial refueling aircraft is being discussed for the long run. The most probable candidates are Boeing made KC-767 and A-330 MRTT, manufactured by Airbus Military (Metin 2014).

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Other U.S.-based platforms in the Turkish Air Forces inventory consists of 25 Cessna T-41 Mescalero training aircrafts, 1 Grumman Gulfstream IV, 2 Cessna C-650 Citation-VII’s, 2 Cessna C-550 Citation II VIP aircrafts and 30 UH-1H Iroquois utility helicopters. 16 upgraded NF-5A/B 2000’s are in service with the Turkish Stars Aerobatics Team. (Sünnetçi 2016/a, p. 10). Like the other two forces, Turkish Air Forces widely uses weapons systems of U.S.-origin. 8 I-HAWK fire units (24 M192 launchers), which were obtained from U.S. Armed Forces inventory within the scope of the NATO Cascading Program, underwent modernization works and were subsequently upgraded to HAWK XXI level. Within the scope of the indicated program, 8 MPQ-64 Sentinel 3D Air Defense Radars were integrated to the fire units. In addition, 175 MIM-23B HAWK missiles were obtained from the U.S. as a grant (Mönch TR, 2012/b, p. 99). Apart from the HAWK XXI’s, the important weapon systems in the inventory are AIM-9 Sidewinder, AIM-7 Sparrow and AIM-120 AMRAAM air to air missiles, AGM-84 (SLAM-ER), AGM-88 HARM, and AGM-65 Maverick air to ground missiles, AGM154 JSOW, GBU-31/38 (JDAM), GBU-8/10/12, BLU-109, CBU-103/105, and Mark 81/82/83/84 bombs. At this point, it should be pointed out that there is continued work towards converting the Mark series of bombs in the Turkish inventory to smart ammunition by mounting guidance kits to them with indigenous efforts.

IV. Current Defense Projects According to the data obtained from the Defense and Aerospace Industry Exporters Association (Turkish abb. SASAD), the exports of Turkey in defense and aerospace products was $1.678 billion, and its imports were $1.289 billion in 2016. Within this scope, the exports that Turkey made to the U.S. in relation to defense and aerospace products were $585 million and this figure constitutes 34.9 % of the total defenserelated exports revenue. The imports that Turkey made to the U.S. for the defense and aerospace products totaled to $517 million, which translates to 40.1 % of the total imports for that year (SASAD 2016). The U.S., which is the largest defense material supplier of the world, exports billions of dollars of arms and weapons each year. As a NATO country, it is needless to say that Turkey is a strategic market in this regard. However, this situation does not change the fact that Turkey is actually a small market from the U.S. perspective. However, the situation is different from Turkey’s point of view. Turkish defense and aerospace industry generates more than one-third of its total export revenue from the U.S. The U.S. happens to be the largest foreign market for the exports of defense and aerospace products by a margin. In this section of the study, the ongoing defense system procurement projects between two countries shall be analyzed. However, in order to avoid expanding the scope here, the analysis shall be limited to mainstream projects. Otherwise, there are other projects on the table such as the procurement of the Honeywell made LHTEC CTS800-4A turbo shaft engine to be fitted to the T-129 ATAK helicopter. It should also be noted that the projects such as PE in which the E-7T AEW&C aircrafts are procured, or the Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance

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Pod (TARP), in which the DB-110 reconnaissance pods are obtained where the deliveries have recently been completed and/or the post-delivery logistical support period still continues, are not included in the scope either. Currently, the largest and most important defense systems procurement project that runs between the two countries is the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program that includes the development, production, and the logistical support of the F-35 Lightning II aircrafts. With its $391.2 billion cost, the JSF project, rightfully labeled as the largest and most expensive military aviation project of the world, is run by a consortium with 9 partners. These partners include Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the U.S. (Sünnetçi 2015/c, pp. 122–125). The Lockheed Martin plays the role of the main contractor of the project while Northrop Grumman, BAE Systems, and Pratt&Whitney were selected as the sub-contractors (Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı 2017/a). In addition, the companies of the nations that make up the consortium have shares in the workload with varying ratios. The Lightning II is a 5th generation, supersonic, single-seat, single-engine, all-weather, stealth multirole combat aircraft. There are three variants of the aircraft; the F-35A Conventional Take Off&Landing (CTOL), the F-35B Short Take Off/Vertical Landing (STOVL), and the F-35C Carrier Variant (CV) (Sünnetçi 2015/c, p. 122). Considering the need for a new generation of a military aircraft that will arise after the current F-4’s and F-16’s in Turkish Air Forces inventory complete their service life and retire, Turkey participated in the JSF Program beginning with the Concept Demonstration Phase (CDP) in 1999. After signing the International Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on July 11, 2002, Turkey became a third Level Participant during the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase. Upon the selection of the F-35 as the new generation combat aircraft of the Turkish Air Forces on December 12, 2006, Turkey joined the Sustainment and Follow-on Development (PSFD) phase with the MoU, signed on January 25, 2007 (Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı 2017/a). Turkey plans to purchase 100 F-35A variants until 2031. Until this date, 30 aircrafts of the F-35A variant, which will initially replace the F-4E/2020’s, have been ordered and the first batch of 4 aircrafts is slated for delivery to Turkey until 2019 (Sünnetçi 2016/c, pp.  32–34). Turkish defense industry also contributes to the JSF Program and the companies that have been assigned in this regard are; Alp Havacılık, Kale Havacılık, Kale Pratt&Whitney, Aselsan, and Ayesaş (Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı 2017/a). The work packages that the above-indicated companies have undertaken are worth around $7.5 billion. The cost that Turkey will pay for 100 aircrafts is calculated to be $16 billion (Sünnetçi 2013/a, pp. 91–92). The most comprehensive defense project that is conducted between the two nations after the JSF is the Turkish Utility Helicopter Program (TUHP). The project, which entered into effect on June 7, 2016, upon the completion of the export licenses, sets forth the production of the T70 utility helicopter, which will be developed based on the Sikorsky S-70iTM International Black Hawk (IBH) model, at Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) facilities in Turkey. Within the scope of the

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project, a total of 109 helicopters to six different users (Special Forces Command 11, Land Forces Command 22, Air Forces Command 6, Gendarmerie General Command 30, General Directorate of Security 20, and General Directorate of Forestry 20 helicopters) in two different configurations shall be delivered. In addition, there is an option for 191 helicopters (Mönch TR 2016/c, p. 46). The contract stipulates that for each one of the helicopters manufactured, one helicopter will be exported. Therefore, in the case these options are used, the number of helicopters may rise up to 600. While the TAI is the prime contractor and Sikorsky is the major subcontractor in the project, Aselsan, TEI, and Alp Havacılık are the subcontractors. In this project, which was reported to be worth $3.5 billion, TAI got a work share over 40 %, as Sikorsky was assigned with 37 %, Aselsan was assigned with over 14 %, TEI was assigned with close to 14 %, and Alp Havacılık got a share of 0.5 % (Sünnetçi 2013/b, pp. 73–75). The deliveries of the 109 helicopters, ordered under the TUHP, are slated to be complete until 2026 (Mönch TR 2016/c, p. 46). Under the contract that entered into effect on July 4, 2011, Turkey placed an order of 6 CH-47F Chinook heavy lift helicopters to U.S.-based Boeing Company through FMS. The first of the Chinook’s that were ordered in line with a Turkish Land Forces requirement and which are reported to have a similar configuration with the CH-47F’s that were delivered to the U.S. Army is planned to enter into active service in 2016. On the other hand, Turkey placed an additional order of 5 Chinook’s (4 choppers for Special Forces Command and 1 chopper for MoND) on January 7, 2015, thus increasing the number the helicopters to 11. The first 3 of the helicopters were flown to Turkey in July 2016. It is predicted that the deliveries within the scope of the project will be completed at the beginning 2019 (Mönch TR 2016/d, p. 99). Another ongoing project is the F-16 Service Life Extension Program. This project, which was initiated on August 10, 2015, aims to extend the service lives of the airframes of 35 F-16C/D Block 30 aircrafts in the Turkish Air Forces inventory. The prime contractor of the project is TAI, while the subcontractor was selected to be Locheed Martin. 25 of the aircrafts will be modernized at TAI facilities as the remaining 10 will undergo procedures at the 1st Air Supply Maintenance Center. This project, in which the first 2 modernized aircrafts are planned to be delivered at the end of 2018, is slated to be completed by August 2023 (Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı 2017/b). In linewith the requirements of the Turkish Air Forces, various electronic warfare (EW) system projects are also running. One of such projects is comprised of the acquisition of 42 pieces of AN/ALQ-211(V)9 Advanced Integrated Defensive Electronic Warfare Suite (AIDEWS) from the Harris Corporation through FMS to be equipped by 19 F-16D Block 50’s, 13 F-16D Block 40’s and 8 F-16D Block 30’s; none of which feature any EW self-protection system. Another project plans the integration of the HAVELSAN designed EHSIM Countermeasure System to the AN/ALQ-211(V)9 Pods, and HAVELSAN currently provides assistance to Harris Corporation in this matter. The final project, conducted under the title SPEWS-II, calls for the acquisition of 60 AN/ALQ-178(V)5+ Systems from BAE Systems IESI

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in order to bring in EW self-protection capabilities to 53 F-16C Block 50 aircrafts (Sünnetçi 2016/a, pp. 29–30). As the result of the requirements of its Air Force and Navy, Turkey purchased Link-16 Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) Terminals from Viasat. The project covers the acquisition of 135 Link 16 Systems (82 approved orders, 53 optional orders). The deliveries in this project, which were realized through FMS channel, still continue today (Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı 2014). Turkey and the U.S. also carry out weapon systems procurement and modernization projects under various contracts. The U.S. has confirmed the sale of a FGM148 Javelin anti-tank missile system to Turkey through FMS channel which will continue to be delivered to Turkey until 2021 (Vatan 2018). Four pieces of Phalanx Mk-15 Block 1B CIWS are being supplied to Turkish Naval Forces to be equipped in order to surface combat platforms through FMS channel, and 15 pieces of Mk-15 Block 0 are under modernization programs, which will upgrade the systems to Block 1B level (Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı 2017/c). Turkey has also placed a request for the acquisition of the Mk 48 Mod 6 Advanced Technology (AT) heavyweight torpedoes to be used in the Type-214TN class diesel-electric submarines, which will be included in the Turkish Naval Forces inventory soon, through FMS channel (Bosphorus Naval News 2014). Other supply projects, in linewith the requirements of the Turkish Air Forces, are also currently being carried out. The most important ones include; SLAM-ER air to ground missile, AIM-120C-7 AMRAAM air to air missile, and JDAM guidance kit supply projects. Regarding the above-listed defense systems supply projects, one striking subject is that the U.S.  is the seller while Turkey is the buyer or the partner. As a matter of fact, Turkish defense industry made considerable amounts of exports to the U.S., and in recent years, the trade in this direction began shifting in favor of Turkey. However, the Turkish defense industry has not yet reached the maturity to sell main platforms or weapon systems to the U.S. The export is rather based on the subsystem, component, and assembly. Turkish companies undertake manufacturing works for their U.S. counterparts as partners or subcontractors. The production and manufacturing may occur as a share in the workload, or it may occur as direct or indirect offset undertakings. At this point, we need to elaborate the concept of the offsets. The offset practice, which dates back to the F-16 Program (TÜSİAD 1999, p. 26), initiated with the General Dynamics (now LM), has matured into a serious trade volume today. Now, Turkey shows vigorous efforts in order to increase its defense-related sales in the U.S. For this purpose, the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (Turkish abb. SSM) opened up an office in Washington DC in July of 2011 (Mönch TR 2012/c, p. 106).

Conclusion Turkish-American arms trade began in the 19th century and experienced its golden age during the heights of the Cold War. Today, military equipment with U.S.-origin is intensively used in TAF inventory and this scenario is not expected

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to change in the near future. On the other hand, in the post-Cold War era, Turkey began forming collaborations with different countries in the defense industry as well. More importantly, Turkish defense industry has shown great progress in the last decade and reached a level that meets 60 % of the requirements of the TAF. One of the natural results of this progress is the decrease in imports, and in particular to the subject matter, purchasing less military equipment from the U.S. Another result in this regard is that the Turkish companies began selling military material to U.S. companies and this led to a general shift in the balance of defense-related trade in favor of Turkey. In effect, the sales of the Turkish companies are comprised of the products and services such as subsystem, component, and assembly, but not of the main platforms or weapon systems. Though selling military equipment to the U.S. was considered a mere dream not long ago, even this level of development is significant. The Turkish defense industry shows further progression year by year and with its high-tech and indigenous solutions, is being shaped into a competitive force in international markets. While selling main platforms and weapon systems to the U.S. is not quite probable due to the particular market structure of this country; increase in workloads, shared as subcontractors, and developing joint projects, are well within the realm of possibility. Following the determinations discussed up to this point, to what direction the arms trade between the two countries will advance in the 21st century is another topic that should be elaborated on. It is almost certain that the arms trade between the two countries will not reach its former volume, like that experienced during the Cold War, for at least the foreseeable future. The foreign policy choices of the two countries, especially their stance regarding the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East, are as effective in this manner as the developments in the Turkish defense industry. It should be remembered that the real determinant in an arms trade is the bilateral relations. The picture is far from being bright from this point of view. On the other hand, both parties have mutual interests in terms of the arms trade. Political gains aside, the arms trade is a lucrative field for both sides. The matter includes an aspect of technology transfer from Turkey’s perspective. As the result, when the current parameters are taken into account, it is safe to assume that the arms trade between the countries will continue definitely. The most realistic scenario seems that Turkey will be included in the programs that are open to the participation of the allies and will still make imports, albeit in a limited capacity, while the U.S. will employ and utilize the Turkish defense industry in a sub-contractor capacity.

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Şebnem Udum1

Chapter 9: Issues in Turkish-U.S.

Relations: A Politico-Psychological Analysis through Problematic Cases Abstract: Turkey and the United States (U.S.) maintained a long-term security, political, and economic relationship, particularly marked by their alliance in NATO. The tensions in this relationship emanated from the difference in their treatment of issues, such as terrorism, Turkey’s Kurdish problem, Armenian allegations, and arms sales. This piece tackles the problematic cases in Turkish-American Relations from a politico-psychological perspective to find the underestimated variables that caused or prolonged these problems. After introducing Turkey’s security and threat perceptions from a historical and politico-psychological perspective and highlighting its fears and traumas, it provides a review of Turkish-U.S. relations and determines the outstanding issues. It shows that the main factors behind the problems in their relations are state tradition of Turkey, its fear of being partitioned (or the “Sèvres Trauma”) formed after the First World War and the great power psychology still maintained despite the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Keywords: Political Psychology, Turkish-American Relations.

Introduction Turkey and the United States have maintained long-term security, political, and economic relationship.  The most notable one is their alliance in NATO, which has formed the cornerstone of Turkey’s security policy, by providing for its defense and tying Turkey firmly to the Western camp during the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s foreign policy took a new turn, especially towards the Middle East, as a result of the U.S. policy in the region, and they continued cooperation in the military field and trade. The post-Cold War period and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 20012, underlined the significance of relations between the U.S. and Turkey regarding their respective interests and goals in the Middle East, Balkans, Caucasus, and the Mediterranean. They engaged in strategic cooperation during the 1990s and early 2000s particularly against

1 Associate Professor at Hacettepe University, Department of International Relations, Ankara, Turkey. Email: [email protected] 2 Will be referred to as 9/11.

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threats emanating from the Middle East. In the post-9/11 period, bilateral relations came to a low due to two consecutive events in 2003 that made the two countries question the other’s reliability as an ally. First, was in March 1, 2003, when the Turkish Parliament refused the passage of U.S. troops to Iraq through Turkish territory; the second was on July 4, 2003, when the U.S. troops detained 11 soldiers of the Turkish Special Forces by placing hoods on their heads. Only after 2009, relations could be mended. A  closer look at their relations would reveal that the main challenges emanate from issues that put themselves on display either in longstanding or relatively new contentious cases. This piece shows that these issues have in fact resulted in hard cases mainly because of the security and threat perceptions, fears, and traumas of Turkey, which at times were not or could not be communicated to the U.S. Although similar variables on the part of the U.S. may well be involved to lead to miscommunication, this article will look at these issues by focusing on the perceptions, fears, and traumas of Turkey from a historical and politico-psychological perspective. At the same time, it offers a non-traditional perspective for policy-makers and researchers both in its argument and methodology. Due to limitations in space, it limits its scope to Turkish Foreign Policy to understand these issues in Turkish-U.S. relations. There are several works that have studied Turkish-American Relations from a historical perspective, particularly during the Cold War, post-Cold War, and post-September 11 and by looking at their alliance framework and the converging and diverging interests according to issue areas or regions (Türkmen 2009; Aydın & Erhan 2004; Kardaş 2011; Uslu 2003; Çakmak & Güneysu 2013; Daniel 1959; Kaya 2011; Yılmaz 2015). Only few of these, however, included International Relations, Security Studies, and Political Psychology aspects in a single study (Aras & Görener 2010; Gültekin 2017). This article tackles the following as the main research question: “What are the effects of fears and traumas of Turkey on the prevailing issues in Turkish-U.S. relations?”. The sub-questions are: “What are the long-standing issues in Turkish-US relations?” and “What are the politico-psychological variables which may have been underestimated and caused these issues to prevail?”. Accordingly, this chapter is structured as follows: In the first section, it will put forward Turkey’s security and threat perceptions from a historical and politico-psychological perspective and highlight its fears and traumas. Then, in the second section, it will provide a review of Turkish-American Relations and determine the outstanding issues where there is conflict. In the third section, outstanding cases will be tackled:  Armenian allegations, terrorism, and the conflict of interest between Turkey and the U.S. on the former’s decisions regarding military and trade agreements; and it will show why these issues stand out. The study will try to show where psychological factors are at play in Turkish-American Relations by making references to the policy variables presented in the first section. These are; Turkish state tradition, the “Sèvres Trauma”, and the “great power psychology”.

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I. The Determinants of Turkish Foreign and Security Policy in Psychological and Historical Perspective The key determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy are the country’s history, geographic location, vulnerabilities, political ideology of the ruling elite, and the various systemic, regional or domestic variables (Aydın 2003, pp.  307–308), which include inter alia tangible (military and economic power) and intangible (prestige, inter-cultural communication) elements of state power, bureaucracies, and personalities of decision-makers. The guiding principle of Turkish Foreign Policy is “Peace at home, peace in the world” stated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic. It means, for domestic stability, Turkey should work to ensure peace and stability in its region, and for regional stability, it needs to maintain domestic peace. Affected by its history, geography, and location, the general framework of the Turkish security policy is defensive realpolitik (Karaosmanoğlu 2000, pp.  201–202), by being part of alliances, operating with the international community based on UN Security Council resolutions, and avoiding territorial claims. Underlying this policy are the lessons learned during the dissolution period of the Ottoman Empire and the loss of territory as a result of the successive defeats in the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) and the First World War (1914–1918). The invasion and demobilization of the army at the end of the war certified the end of the Ottoman State and its great power status. The Sèvres Treaty (1920), signed by the victors of the First World War and the Ottoman State, foresaw the partitioning of the Ottoman lands and exacerbated the “feeling of loss” by threatening the survival of the state and its people. This “fear of being partitioned” has survived to shape the threat perceptions of the founders and the following generations. This study will tackle the policy variables of state tradition, fear of being partitioned(the Sevres Trauma) and great power psychology, hence will analyze the contentious cases in Turkish-American Relations in a politico-psychological framework. To understand the “fear of being partitioned”, a short visit to Political Psychology is required. Political Psychology refers to the evaluation of the role of psychological factors in the analysis of relations between two groups or nations. For humans to cope with loss, they need to go through the process of grief-that includes the stages of denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance (Kübler-Ross & Kessler). If humans, as well as groups and nations, cannot complete the process of grief, it results in trauma. In turn, the event that results in “loss” becomes a “chosen trauma” and the chosen traumas become a part of the identity of a group at the societal and individual level (See; Volkan 1991; Volkan 2001; Çevik 2010, p.  18). Vamık Volkan states that almost all large groups have a shared mental representation of a traumatic past event during which they suffered loss and/or experienced helplessness, shame, and humiliation in a conflict with another large group. This shared traumatic event is transmitted to next generations because the past generation has been unable to mourn the losses of people, land or prestige, thus, all members in the large group share the mental representations of the tragedies. Eventually, the chosen trauma goes beyond being just a memory, but serve as a

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bond to link the members of the group. It can be dormant, but can be reactivated by leaders to reconfirm or enhance the identity of the group. (Volkan 2001, 87–88) The successors of the Ottoman Empire could not go through all the stages of grief after its defeat at the end of the First World War. As they could drive out the occupying powers and establish a new state in 1923, they denied loss and maintained “great power psychology”, if not status. Hence, the grief process remained at its first stage. The conception of security that guided foreign and security policy for the Republic of Turkey was mainly formed as a result of territorial losses in the early 1900s and, especially with the defeat at the First World War, despite the victory of Gallipoli in 1915. The Ottoman Empire had extended across Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, ruling strategic territories and waterways, and had threatened Europe with the sieges of Vienna. However, its defeat in the War was catastrophic: In 1918, Ottoman State had to agree to the terms of Armistice of Mudros, which included the demobilization of the army and occupation of key strategic points, ports, railways, and any territory in case of “disorder” (Türkgeldi 1948). The Ottoman lands were occupied by foreign powers including Istanbul and Izmir (Gökbilgin 1959, pp. 12, 86). Based on previous experience during the OttomanRussian War and the Balkan Wars, some commanders in Anatolia proposed the establishment of resistance groups. Hence, the resistance movement, first instituted in Western Anatolia expanded to the rest of the country to form the Kuvâ-yi Milliye (National Forces) (Kılınçkaya 2006, pp. 151–152). Mustafa Kemal, who was given the duty to suppress these movements (Lewis 2008, pp. 331–332), used his powers to initiate the military and political struggle to defend the integrity of the country within the borders of Misak-ı Milli (National Oath), which prescribed struggle until the nation gained full independence within the borders defined in the Armistice of Mudros (Lewis 2008, pp. 333–335). The Allies aspired to reach a final agreement with the Ottomans and the decisions of the April 1920 San Remo Conference foresaw a partitioned Anatolia among the Greeks, Armenians, French, British, and the Italians. Upon rejection of its terms, Ottomans were faced with Greek invasion and attack in Anatolia and Thrace. Since they were defeated and were concerned about further losses, the Ottoman delegation signed the agreement with the Allies in 1920 in Sèvres. However, the agreement was not ratified by the Ottoman Parliament or the Sultan (Yılmaz, Baytal & Türkman 2014, pp. 150–153). At the 1921 London Peace Conference, the Ankara government (established on April 23, 1920)  rejected the proposal of the Allied countries, which made only minor changes to Sèvres. As a result, they encouraged the Greek forces for a renewed attack (Kılınçkaya 2006, pp.  201–205). When they were defeated on August 30, 1922, the Armistice of Mudanya was signed between Turkey and Great Britain in October 1922, where they agreed for a peace conference in Lausanne, Switzerland (Kılınçkaya 2006, pp. 216–218). The Lausanne Peace Treaty (The World War Document Archive) annulled Sèvres and thereby, Turkey could secure the Misak-ı Milli borders except for the province of Mosul (northern part of Iraq), with a 1926 decision taken at the League of Nations (for details, see; Keith 1926; Makko 2010). In Turkish history, the period between the Armistice of Mudros (1918) and

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the Lausanne Treaty (1923) is referred to as the “National Struggle” or the “War of Liberation”. By failing to recognize Turkish independence or homeland, the Treaty of Sèvres carried the fear of loss of territory to the peak. Although it was never implemented, its traumatic effect has survived (Aydın 2003, p. 312). The Sèvres Trauma can be defined as the fear that strong foreign powers conspire to weaken and partition Turkey as the “Eastern Question” has not come to a closure (Ulusan 2009). The fact that victorious Western powers could consider partitioning the Ottoman lands was because, for centuries, the Ottoman Empire had been seen as a threat, “the enemy” or “the other”. During the 19th century, the Empire’s loss of territory to nationalist movements was referred to as the Eastern Question. Consequently, the founders of the Republic decided that in order for Turkey not to be seen as “the other”, “a question”, or “an inferior”, it had to belong to the Western society of states and zone of security. Therefore, development and progress had to be directed towards reaching the level of contemporary civilization, which was Western civilization, according to Atatürk. Accordingly, the first sentence of the Turkish Constitution starts with the phrase “this constitution that determines the eternal existence of the Turkish Homeland and the Nation, and the indivisible unity of the Sublime Turkish State…” (The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 1982). The preamble of the Constitution also states that the Republic of Turkey is an equal member of the community of nations that aspires to reach the level of contemporary civilizations, and includes the principle of “Peace at home, peace in the world”. The period of National Struggle eventually established the dichotomy of “Lausanne vs. Sèvres”: Lausanne could be achieved thanks to the nation, which acted in unity and preserved integrity hence survival; thus, any concession from Lausanne would draw Turkey towards Sèvres and lead to its partition, hence demise. Psychologically, a stimulus causes a stronger reaction than expected if it touches traumas. Therefore, any issue thought to weaken Turkey has been treated with suspicion, such as the Kurdish issue, the “Armenian genocide” issue, and the disagreements between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. The new state’s ideology was an important factor in foreign policy-making. Atatürk developed an ideological framework that upheld the independence of the nation-state, the “promotion of Turkey to the level of contemporary civilizations”, and realpolitik. One of the principles he put forward to that end was secularism. This did not mean simply separating the affairs of the temporal and spiritual worlds, but was related to Turkey’s standing in the international community and its foreign policy. If Turkey had a constitution based on religion, it would, according to Islamic belief, perceive Christian states as potential enemies, thereby putting itself in a constant state of war between “believers” and “non-believers”. On the other hand, a democratic state would dismiss the role of the “protector of Islam” and pursue peaceful relations with Christian, that is, Western countries (Aydın 2003, p. 319). A socio-psychological perspective could explain the formation of the new Turkish identity, its positioning vis-à-vis the “East” and its foreign policy. According to Tajfel and Turner (1979, p. 40):

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“The evaluation of one’s own group is determined with reference to specific other groups through social comparisons in terms of value-laden attributes and characteristics. Positively discrepant comparisons between in-group and out-group produce high prestige; negatively discrepant comparisons between in- group and out-group result in low prestige. From these assumptions, some related theoretical principles can be derived: 1. Individuals strive to achieve or to maintain positive social identity. 2. Positive social identity is based to a large extent on favorable comparisons that can be made between the in-group and some relevant out-groups: the in-group must be perceived as positively differentiated or distinct from the relevant out-groups. 3. When social identity is unsatisfactory, individuals will strive either to leave their existing group and join some more positively distinct group and/or to make their existing group more positively distinct.”

In sum, groups compare their social identity with that of the others and define their members as being better than those of the others and thereby gaining a positive sense of the self and boost in their self-esteem. When they are not satisfied with their social identity, either they leave it or define positive features for their group. Similarly, in the process of nation-building and constructing a new “identity” for Turkey, the “East” came to be viewed as “backward”, deserving of secondary status to the Turkish. Conversely, Western identity and values were seen as “superior” and to be aspired to which, ultimately, caused Turkey’s identity problem. Towards the Middle East, Turkey followed a cautious foreign policy. In the early Republican period, Turkey did not pursue alliances with Middle Eastern states, while the policy of “cautious indifference” also guided its relations during the Cold War (Kazan 2002, p. 65). The end of the Cold War opened a new era of opportunities and risks forcing Turkey to change its foreign policy towards the Middle East. It also became more active as a result of the Gulf War (1990–1991) in a field including both regional and international actors. Turkey’s main interest in the region was stability, particularly in its Southeastern Anatolia region and beyond its eastern and southeastern borders. Since the early 1980s, Turkey has been fighting the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), a terrorist organization that mainly carried out attacks in Turkey’s southeast, overwhelmingly populated by Kurds. After the war, it became more difficult to control the border: A no-fly zone was established at the north of the 36th parallel, which ended the Iraqi government’s control over the country’s north and allowed PKK members to find shelter. The brief period of tranquillity after 1999 ended due to the 2003 operation against Iraq, which, like the previous one, allowed the movement of terrorists across the border, resulting in more attacks to military and civilian targets in Turkey. Terrorism has been standing out as one of the main issues between Turkey and the U.S. and it will be tackled in the third section. Before going into the details of the contentious cases, the following section will provide a brief overview of bilateral relations.

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II. Turkish-U.S. Relations: A Brief Overview Turkish-U.S.  relations date back to the 19th century and diplomatic relations started in 1927. The U.S.  started seeing Turkey as a geopolitically significant country after realizing the Soviet expansionist threat in 1946. Turkey received American aid in 1947 under the Truman Doctrine and in 1948 under the Marshall Plan (Satterthwaite 1972; Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Archives 1952). Turkey stayed out of the Second World War, but after the war, it joined the Western camp as it received the American aid, sent troops to Korea in 1950, and became a member of NATO in 1952. The Atlantic alliance provided a nuclear umbrella and Turkey shouldered the defense burden in the southern flank. The strategic significance of the base in Incirlik/Adana remains as it is situated close to land and sea routes in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. During the Cold War, there were three hard cases in Turkish-American Relations. The first one was the removal of Jupiter Missiles as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. This created doubt in Ankara of the commitment of Washington to Turkey’s security. The second was the letter U.S. President Lyndon Johnson sent to the Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü (the Johnson Letter) during the Cyprus crisis of 1964, in which he warned Turkey not to use American weapons in an invasion of Cyprus or the U.S. would not come to Turkey’s help should the Soviet Union react to such a move. Third, when Turkey actually intervened in the events on the island in 1974 and the U.S. Congress imposed an arms embargo (Kirişçi 1998, pp. 18–20). Throughout the Cold War, Turkey chose not to get involved in Middle Eastern affairs. At the end of the Cold War, and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there were conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the Caucasus. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 compelled Ankara to shift foreign policy towards the Middle East and to develop strategic cooperation with the U.S. and Israel (Udum 2003). It started getting more actively involved in peace operations to contain the conflicts in these regions. Turkey is situated amid the regions that have strategic importance for American interests in terms of trade, energy, and security. During the Cold War, Turkey provided military bases and other capabilities as a NATO ally. Its geopolitical location gained significance after the end of the Cold War because of its proximity to the regions of instability and its historical, cultural, and religious ties to the states in the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean, Black Sea, and the Middle East. After the 9/11, the U.S. redefined threat assessment to focus on non-state actors seeking to inflict harm on the country and its allies with sensational attacks, including the intention to obtain chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) material. The response to this threat emerged as “prevention” (The White House 2002) since the adversary’s motivations, political aim, and attack scenarios did not leave room for deterrence. While efforts focused on preventing non-state actors to have access to these materials, addressing conflicts in unstable regions was another strategy. After the 9/11, the U.S.  came up with the term “Greater Middle East”, which later became “Broader Middle East” (Cofman Wittes

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2004; Ottaway 2008) to define the region with predominantly Muslim populations and the potential to threaten the U.S. with terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, smuggling, and failed-states. It was seen that the motivations were critical to making up the threat to U.S. security, which is anti-American and/ or anti-Western ideologies with an eventual aim to destroy the current international political and economic system. It was foreseen that if the U.S. supported and promoted friendly Muslim countries, they would prevent terrorism nourished by religious fundamentalism. Turkey conveyed its readiness to facilitate the efforts towards peace and stability, notably through NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), which was launched at the 2004 NATO Istanbul Summit. The Transatlantic Alliance decided to strengthen its relations with its partners in the Mediterranean Dialogue and with countries in the broader Middle East for cooperation in defense reform, counter-terrorism, and nonproliferation issues (Istanbul Summit Communiqué 2004). With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new security challenges, Turkey’s policy towards the Middle East changed; Ankara lent support to Washington during the Gulf War. One of the main issues in Turkish-American Relations in the post-Cold War was the clash of interest over the Kurds in Northern Iraq. In fact, this issue has grown after the Gulf War and acquired a regional dimension after the civil war in Syria. Turkish-U.S. relations came to a low in 2003, as a result of Ankara’s refusal to allow U.S. troops to pass from Turkey to Iraq’s north and the subsequent detainment of Turkish Special Forces by the U.S.  troops in Iraq. The detainment of an American pastor (Andrew Brunson) after the 2016 failed coup attempt in Turkey also created tension in Turkish-American Relations. The next section will tackle these cases in detail. Despite cooperation in the military field and trade, there are some three issues that form the underlying causes of tension and friction in Turkish-American Relations. The next section will tackle them within the framework of history and Political Psychology. These issues are the allegations that the Ottomans committed “genocide” against the Armenians in 1915 and draft resolutions in the U.S. Senate, support to terrorism, and the dilemma of great power psychology vs. realities reflecting itself on the military, political, and trade relations.

III. Outstanding Cases 1. Armenian Allegations The perception of Muslims and Turks in the West has been negative as a result of the Turkish territorial expansions since the 11th century. While, for Turks, the defeat of the Byzantines in Malazgirt in 1071 and the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 were “chosen victories”, for the Byzantines, hence Christians, these were “chosen traumas” that were inherited by generations (Çevik 2010, pp. 17, 18, 53, 71). One of the main issues that stand out in Turkish-American Relations is the Armenian claims that with a 1915 Ottoman decree, Armenians had been subject

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to “genocide”. Turkish-American Relations go through a recurring tension each time a draft genocide resolution is brought to the U.S. Senate. The U.S., as a policy, avoided using the term “genocide”, when state officials commented (The White House 2017) on the 1915 events in the Ottoman State. Turkey considers the tabling of a resolution as an “irresponsible” move and warns that if the U.S. endorsed these events under the term “genocide”, it would seriously undermine bilateral relations (CNNTürk 2010; Haberler.com 2014). The psychology behind Turkey’s reaction lies in history. The thought of an independent Armenia was stimulated by nationalism movements in the 19th century, the impact of missionaries, and the image of the Ottomans in the West (McCarthy 2006, pp. 129–131). The Ottoman State paid little attention to the turmoil created by Armenian rebels in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. When they captured the city of Van in April 1915, it alarmed the Ottoman political and military leaders. At that time, since they needed to concentrate forces on the Gallipoli campaign, the Ottoman State issued a law called “relocation and resettlement” (sevk ve iskân kanunu) (Erickson 2008). Accordingly, the law did not mention a certain minority’s name, and the State also issued another regulation for how the law would be implemented, including the transportation and relocation procedures (Artuç 1999). Moreover, Turkey argues that the events after the 1915 law do not conform to the UN definition of “genocide”. So, it puts forward that it was not a systemic act against the entire Armenian community, but a policy decision to move Armenians in a specific region to address the domestic turmoil during the First World War (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs). However, the implementation of the decree by the Union and Progress (İttihât ve Terâkki) government resulted in severe impact and the loss in lives and property of the Armenians. During that time, many Turkish people spent efforts to protect the surviving Armenian women and children (Özdoğan, Üstel, Karakaşlı & Kentel 2009, pp. 150–154) mainly through adoption. Çevik argues that Armenian leaders brought relocation of Armenians back on the agenda in order to construct it as “genocide”, especially after seeing international recognition and sympathy towards Jews after the end of the Second World War (Çevik 2010, p. 56). The absence of an independent Armenia motivated them to make references to geographical symbols like the Mount Ağrı (Ararat) or Eastern Anatolia as Greater Armenia. For Turkey, the Armenian state logo that includes the Mount Ağrı, which is within Turkish borders, is considered as a threat to territorial integrity (Çevik 2010, pp. 22, 69). Ankara suspects that the allegations of “genocide” may be used as a step for Greater Armenia and would lead to territorial claims (Sarıahmetoğlu), which trigger the fear of being partitioned. To claim that the relocation decision was taken to commit “genocide” against the Armenians contradicts with the purpose of the decree and more importantly, the great power behavior and self-perception of the Ottoman State. According to the state tradition in the Ottoman Empire, one of the main duties of the Sultan was to guarantee the rights of the subjects (reaya) and to protect them from injustice in return for their taxes (Shaw 2004, p. 150). The reaya, which meant

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“the subjects under protection”, was composed of those except the administrative class (Shaw 2004, p. 191). The Sultan rested at the core of the “Ottoman order” (Shaw 2004, p.  208) and, thus, the survival of the ruler was equated with that of the state. The state was responsible for protecting not just the lives, but also the religious rights of its subjects. According to Islamic law, the non-Muslim communities under the sovereignty of an Islamic state are recognized as zimmet (under protection or security), if they choose to remain non-Muslim after jihad (the Islamic conquest). In return, Muslims are obliged to have peaceful relations with the Zımmîs (those who are under zimmet), to protect them against any external threats, and to compensate for their losses if they cause any (Ercan 2001, pp.  7–8). As part of their culture, the Ottomans endorsed the concept of taking care of an outsider coming into their community (aman) (Shaw 2004, p.  207). Therefore, Turkey and Turks have perceived the claims of “genocide” against Armenians as an “insult” because the Ottoman State could not have had an intention to do so. Specifically, the word “genocide” (soykırım) is also taken as humiliating to the Ottoman past, as it was mandatory for the Ottoman Sultan to “take care” of its subjects in order to fulfill his religious and political duty. More importantly, deportation was a method Ottomans resorted to in times of war to prevent civil war and/or cooperation of the minorities with foreign forces (İnalcık 1954, p. 122–124).

2. Terrorism There are mainly two cases in Turkish-American Relations that fall under the issue of terrorism. First is the separatist terrorism and second is the failed coup attempt in 2016. Both cases have a relation to the Turkish State tradition, which is based on the following principle: “state is eternal” (devlet-i ebed müddet), and it should act on the basis of ancient law (kanun-u kadim), that is, the law that was set by the ancient Turkish rulers (A’gostan & Masters 2009, p. 275). Therefore, priority is always on the state and not on the “subjects” (reaya), because the rights of the people are guaranteed by the state, whose duty is to establish and maintain order. In this context, whoever tries to change or disturb the order is perceived as a threat to the survival of the state. In this sense, rebellions are seen as acts that have to be suppressed, and whoever gives support to such acts are also considered as threats to security. This section will look at the Kurdish issue within TurkishU.S. relations and show the points of contention. For the Turks, the presentation of this issue from the human rights perspective triggers the “fear of the loss of territory” and revives the memories of the 19th century great power politics towards the Ottoman State. The rationale to “protect the rights of the minorities” was put forward to influence nationalist movements and precipitate the eventual decline of the empire and share the remnants of the “sick man of Europe”. The Ottoman State tried to prevent disintegration and collapse by granting rights to minorities through Tanzimat (Reorganization-1839) and Islahat (Reform-1856) Edicts (Güler 2000, pp. 20–24; Sonyel 1985, pp. 651–652).

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Ankara has defined the Kurdish issue as terrorism and a security issue. Since 1984, thousands of people, security forces and civilians alike, were killed in the PKK terrorist attacks, with the eventual political aim of the establishment of an autonomous or an independent Kurdish State. The Kurdish population in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran sit on strategically significant lands, particularly with respect to water, oil, natural gas, and their transportation routes. Turkey protested support to the terrorist organization, particularly in Europe (Hürriyet 2012). For Turkey, recognition of rights for a certain ethnic group would have domestic legal consequences, such as the recognition of a separate identity for ethnic groups. This not only contradicts the Turkish Constitution, but it may also open the way for others to demand similar rights. Thus, it brings back the memories of the period of the collapse of the Ottoman State, the involvement of foreign powers in domestic affairs, and the “fear of being partitioned”. The PKK was taken by sympathy in some Western countries and received political and financial support (The Economist 2004). There were proposals to block arms transfers from the U.S. to Turkey on the basis of human rights (Gabernick, Hartung & Washburn 1999; The New York Times 1995). For Ankara, it had been hard to consider solutions to terrorism other than military. Despite the initiative of the government for a political solution to the issue, called the “Solution Process (çözüm süreci)”, it could not lead to a comprehensive solution due to the circumstances in Northern Iraq, which made terrorist infiltration easier, and domestic political processes in Turkey (Oğur 2015). The most significant blow to Turkish-American Relations in post-9/11 period took place in 2003. It was the “hood incident” on July 4, when the American forces, based on information provided by Kurdish groups, detained 11 Turkish Special Forces soldiers by putting hoods on their heads (Howard & Goldenberg 2003). It caused outrage in Turkey as it was taken as a great “insult” by the Turks, not only because the most important units in the Turkish military, which is a widely respected institution throughout history, were detained in a “humiliating” way, but also, its American allies relied on non-state actors instead of checking first with Ankara regarding the problem with the status of the Turkish Special Forces in Iraq. In fact, this lack of trust had been formed the same year the Turkish Parliament rejected the passage of U.S. troops to Iraq via Turkey on March 1, 2003 while the U.S. had the conviction that Turkey would assist them back in 2002. The security elite and many politicians disliked a U.S. operation in Iraq, worrying that the PKK would find a safe zone in a destabilized region, easily infiltrate and carry out terrorist attacks-which indeed became reality. Economically, Turkey had suffered from the consequences of the 1990–1991 Gulf War, when trade with Iraq was reduced dramatically, particularly with respect to the flow of oil. Turkey wanted to prevent the war, but signaled to the U.S. at the same time that it was being cooperative. Washington demanded that the Turkish military limit operations against the PKK in Northern Iraq to guarantee the cooperation of Iraqi Kurds during and after the war, which made it difficult for the Turkish Army to cooperate with the U.S. (Parris 2002). During the negotiations before the Iraq Operation in 2003, there was a deviation from the traditional diplomatic practices

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between the two countries. As the 9/11 attacks changed the definition of threat and the ways to counter it, Washington expected more cooperation from its allies in its “War on Terrorism”, but it did not manifest enough attention for their interests and concerns. Similarly, the political culture of Turkey and its representatives were not taken as a variable. The U.S. perceived that the ruling party supported U.S. policies in the region, whereas Bülent Ecevit government (1999–2002) was lukewarm to the idea of a U.S. operation. The Foreign Minister of the successive (AK Parti) government, Yaşar Yakış, announced that Turkish airbases would be open to U.S. forces, which was interpreted by Washington as green light. In January 2003, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs received Washington’s demands in a short memorandum, which made the bureaucrats uncomfortable since they were such “that could be asked from a country under mandate” (Bölükbaşı 2008, p. 26). The attitude and haste of the American delegation in the negotiations were perceived as those of “colonial masters” (Bölükbaşı 2008, p. 33). This revived memories of 1918 when foreign powers invaded Ottoman lands after the First World War. The accepted principle at the beginning of the National Struggle was that “any kind of foreign power rule would be rejected” (Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu). The U.S. offered economic benefits in order to encourage Turkey to choose cooperation over inaction. However, negotiations continued with neither side fully able to grasp the other’s concerns and interests. While Turkey was displeased with the war and tried to minimize its costs, the U.S. was getting frustrated and interpreted Ankara’s indecision as an effort to “squeeze the most” out of Washington regarding economic aid. The U.S. regarded the approval of the Turkish Parliament to allow the passage of troops not as a constitutional necessity, but as a bargaining tool. The process was reflected as an “Ottoman style carpet shop haggle” (Smith 2003). Washington also refused a Turkish unilateral action in Iraq against the PKK. It sought to limit the deployment of Turkish troops in Iraq and to put them under U.S. command, which was anathema to Turkey and the Turkish Armed Forces because submission to foreign command structures on or near its territory again made them recall the invasion of Anatolia following the Armistice of Mudros. Eventually, when the Turkish Parliament refused the passage of U.S. troops, Americans were very upset. What further exacerbated the relations was the “hood event” on July 4, 2003 when American soldiers detained 11 soldiers of Turkish Special Forces operating the Iraqi town of Suleymaniyah, by placing hoods on their heads. Due to the Independence Day holiday, coinciding with a Friday, they were detained for almost three days. This caused outrage in the Turkish public and the military, which was a serious blow to Turkish-American Relations (T24 2011). Special Forces is the most prestigious unit in the Turkish General Staff and the way that they were detained was interpreted as “disrespect” and a reprisal to the parliamentary vote of March 1, 2003. The rejection of the March 1, 2003 motion created distrust and, since then, motivated the U.S.  to view Kurds as more reliable “ally” in the region. During the fight against ISIS (The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) in northern Syria, Washington relied on the Kurdish forces, while Ankara fiercely opposed U.S. support to these forces. In fact, in 2016, Turkey carried out the operation Euphrates

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Shield in order to prevent the Kurdish groups from getting a stronghold all through Turkey’s southern border, where Iraqi and Syrian Kurds could inspire Turkey’s Kurds (Sudagezer 2018). Following the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom, the regional Kurdish administration aggravated Turkey’s concerns. Despite the U.S.  recognition of the PKK as a terrorist organization and as a common threat, its support for an autonomous Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq was not well received in Turkey. In order to convey the understanding of a unified Iraq, Turkish Armed Forces preferred using the term “Iraq’s north” instead of “Northern Iraq” (Turkish Armed Forces 2018). After the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 and the death of Osama bin Laden (the leader of al-Qaeda, which carried out the 9/11 attacks), the new threat in the region was the rise of ISIS (CNN 2017). It called itself the “Islamic State” and could attract followers and fighters based on the discourse of “suffering” under the prevailing political and economic system, which does not acknowledge the Islamic way of life. It aims to change the system by creating fear in the societies of the West, through sensational attacks by claiming several lives (CNN 2015). The Twitter posts involving beheadings were one method of shocking the world public opinion. It carried out attacks in European and U.S. cities and demolished antique cities in Syria and Iraq (History.com). The conflict of interest in the region involved the regional powers, soon after the civil war broke out in Syria in 2011. The rivalry between Islamic sects have been represented by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Iran in the region. Coupled with this is the conflict of interest between Russia, the U.S., and Turkey over the future of Syria and that of Bashar al-Assad. Turkey would loathe seeing a “Kurdish belt” by its longest border (the one with Syria), whereas the U.S. relied on the Kurdish forces on the ground, namely the YPG, the armed wing of the PYD and the Syrian affiliate of the PKK. Washington and Ankara were caught between their regional interests. Turkey sought to prevent the YPG, which was fighting against ISIS, to unify the Kurdish-controlled territories, like the one in Northern Iraq. The U.S., on the other hand, wanted to limit the influence of Iran and Russia in Syria after the defeat of ISIS. Turkey demanded from Washington not to support Kurdish groups militarily and politically since it would grow as a bigger threat later (Gümrükçü & Nehme 2018). They could agree on moving the groups in the Syrian city of Menbij to the east of Euphrates in April 2018 (AlJazeera 2018). To show that Turkey was also a player in the region and would not permit the formation of a strong Kurdish entity in north of Syria, Ankara launched the Operation Olive Branch in January 2018 mainly to avoid Kurdish influence in the region of Afrin, by the Turkish-Syrian border (BBC Türkçe 2018). Concerning the threats from Syria, Turkey assesses its security in parallel with its power to prevent the formation of a Kurdish belt in its southern border. Should that happen, it would be problematic for two reasons. It would constitute a physical evidence and a symbol of defeat that those forces, that it would never recognize as “an equal” and were contained militarily, would score a “victory” against Turkey, with the support of Turkey’s key ally. The U.S. offer to keep Turkish troops at the western part of Euphrates and to prevent them from marching to its east

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was not well-received by Ankara. This would allow Turkey to carry out limited operations and would not help to prevail over Kurdish groups. As a matter of fact, the Turkish Armed Forces carried out a series of operations in Iraq’s north, called “Paw”, in May, July and August 2019. (CNNTurk 2019) These operations aimed at not only border security, but also to give a message to Kurdish groups and the U.S.  on how critical this area is for Turkey’s security and its understanding of security. Eventually, in October 2019, Turkish Armed Forces launched Operation Peace Spring against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), composed mainly of the YPG, to end its control in the territories in the in the east of Euphrates. (BBC Türkçe 2019) The operation was carried out as soon as U.S. forces were withdrawn after an unexpected phone call between the Presidents of both countries, which came as a surprise both in Washington and other European capitals (BBC News 2019; Muller 2019). This operation and its conduct revealed that terrorism was a serious concern for all parties: For Turkey, the political aim was to prevent a Kurdish stronghold by its border and for the U.S., the concern was to prevent the free movement of ISIS terrorists who were held captive by the Kurdish forces. The other case related to terrorism is the July 15, 2016 failed coup attempt in Turkey and the extradition of the cleric (Fethullah Gülen) living in the U.S. as the leader behind the putsch. The group that carried out the coup attempt (Gülen community) has been named as a terrorist organization because it used violence to attack the Turkish State. However, Washington reviews the extradition call based on its domestic law and the existence of evidence (Erkuş 2018). For Ankara, since the coup attempt was a direct threat to the state’s survival, America’s refusal was interpreted as ignoring the vital national security concerns of an ally and even “harboring its enemy”. What is more, the imprisonment of an American pastor, Andrew Brunson, who was a missionary in Izmir, on the basis of collusion with both terrorist organizations and Trump administration’s demand for his release caused tension (Fahim 2018) in bilateral relations. Other areas of friction include the stalling of the transfer of F-35 jets due to Turkey’s decision to purchase S-400 missiles from Russia and the American demand from Turkey to limit its energy and trade ties with Iran as part of renewed sanctions after the U.S. withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal. These cases fall into the last issue area, that is, the dilemma of great power psychology vs. realities.

3. Great Power Psychology vs. Realities Dilemma As Turkey could not go through the period of grief after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the defeats and losses of territory during the 19th and 20th centuries, it could not reach the stage where it could accept the loss of its great power status. It is indisputably a regional power, with a strategic geographic location and soft power to wield influence beyond its immediate region thanks to its religious, historical, and cultural ties. As a “middle power”, its alliance with the U.S. is significant for its military, political, and economic interests, and Ankara has given special importance to relations with Washington. When the demands of the

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U.S. contradict with Turkey’s national security interests, it finds itself in a position to balance both. With respect to the style of communication, imposing one’s will through the language of power is unwelcome in the Turkish political culture. It makes Turks feel like a country under colonization or invasion, such that it receives orders from a foreign power. In this case, the great power psychology may at times push Turkey to react from a position of power. It creates a dilemma; because while the elements of state power may not necessarily exist for such a reaction and it may be costly at the end, indifference to or accommodation with a great power’s demand would mean the endorsement of being “inferior”. This is a seemingly unbearable cost that relates to the need for social approval. Therefore, the loss of face is perceived costlier than the real costs that may be incurred, such as soaring trade relations or domestic economic impact. The cases that stand out in this category are related to Turkey’s decisions on military, political, and economic fields. Turkey has been working for a more independent and self-sustaining defense industry (See; The Strategic Plan 2007–2011; The Strategic Plan 2017–2021) as a result of feeling insecure despite its NATO membership. For Turkey, the nuclear umbrella and the defense guarantee of NATO are key issues. However, they were questioned particularly during the 2003 Iraq Operation when the decision to send defense capabilities was blocked by three allies, which disappointed Turkey (Rotella 2003). In 2017, Ankara announced the decision to purchase S-400 anti-ballistic missiles from Russia as an extension of its policy of diversification to reduce dependence in the military field, hence foreign political influence (Woody 2017). The Russian missiles also had a technical advantage; their range is wider than U.S. Patriots and they would be deployed to deter hostile countries or groups within Ankara’s definition of regional threats. At the same time, Turkey signed a contract with the U.S. to purchase and develop some components of F-35 stealth jets. The U.S. Senate blocked the transfer of F-35s on the basis of military, political, and human rights reasons. Militarily, the Pentagon was worried about the combination of Russian S-400 missiles with American F-35 jets because Russians may secretly study the stealth jet and rearrange their air defense systems accordingly while Turkey is using them both (Roblin 2018). The S-400 debate intensified as Turkey did not step back from the decision. Although the American officials mentioned sanctions against Turkey should Ankara follow suit with the decision, the U.S. would refrain from applying heavy sanctions that would distance Turkey from itself, thereby jeopardizing U.S. interests in the region (Çopur & İleri 2019). Turkey, on the other hand, would not engage in a relationship with Russia to the extent that it would withdraw from the West and act along with the interests of Russia. The nature of the relationship between the two yielded the expected result. Despite the rise of tension, Presidents of both countries met at Tokyo G-20 Summit and it marked the point where officials of both sides started to work to address the tension (Hacaloğlu 2019). Moreover, any decision to use military force against Turkey’s neighbors by NATO or the U.S.  would involve the use of Turkish territory where military

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equipment would be considered to be deployed (NATO Review Magazine). This would inevitably make Turkey a direct target of its neighbors. So, Turkey found itself working towards lowering tension with its neighbors on the one hand and pursuing decisions taken by the Transatlantic alliance on the other. Even worse, Ankara, at times, comes under U.S. pressure to act against its national and regional interests. For instance, Turkey wants to avoid conflict and tension in its region, especially with Iran. After Trump administration withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018, the U.S. exerted pressure on Turkey to cut off or lower its trade ties. This included not buying oil or natural gas from Iran (Jones 2018) in order to reduce Iran’s income and make it agree to another deal with Washington. The period preceding the JCPOA was critical for Turkey, as it was also concerned about a military operation against Iran, which would have affected Turkey’s security the most. The great power psychology was at play during the Iran nuclear talks in 2010. Turkey took the initiative for an interim deal with Iran as a confidence-building measure that would lead to a comprehensive agreement. Along with Brazil, Turkey engaged in intensive talks with the Iranian delegation in Tehran and struck a deal for a uranium swap in May 2010 (DW 2010). At that time, Turkey was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Under former Foreign Minister and then-Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Ankara redefined foreign policy perspective beyond the limits of the traditional one. Davutoğlu preferred to pursue a proactive foreign policy instead of a reactive one, and prioritized cooperative security in the region through trade and mainly underscoring historical and cultural ties (Aras & Görener 2010, pp. 85–86). Soon after the Tehran agreement, the UN Security Council decided to impose sanctions on Iran, thus, negating the deal. This made Turkey very upset, because it not only ignored the efforts and success in a short time, but also tarnished its psychology of being a regional great power which could play a pivotal role in the solution of a regional and international problem. After 2010, Turkey, became a member of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) and highlighted the establishment of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East during NPDI meetings. While acknowledging the right of nuclear energy for peaceful use, it showed its opposition to nuclear proliferation in the entire region. The legal case concerning the colluding of the American pastor, Andrew Brunson, with terrorist organizations, is related to the Ottoman tradition of guardianship of subjects and the reaction of the state when they act against state authority. Turkey replied harshly to the U.S. (BusinessHT 2018) when the demand for his release was linked with other issues, such as the delivery of F-35 jets (Zengerle 2018). In his tweets, President Trump called pastor Brunson as “a great Christian family man” and “innocent man of faith”, and described his imprisonment as “persecution” and “being held hostage” (Trump 2018, April 18; Trump 2018, July 19; Trump 2018, July 26). The American Center for Law and Justice stated that “he was wrongfully imprisoned in Turkey for his Christian faith” (Sekulow 2018). The construction of the link between Brunson’s religion and his imprisonment indicates the presumption of “Christian vs. Muslim” dichotomy, which was mainly shaped by the “fear of

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Islam”. This fear has its roots in the “fall of Constantinople”, the capital of the Byzantine Empire, in 1453, when the Ottomans took control of the city. From then on, the Ottoman advances in the Balkans and Eastern Europe were taken as “Muslim expansion to Christian lands” (Kumrular 2012, pp. 17–20), which created and reinforced the “chosen trauma” of 1453 for Christians. Fear of Islam in Christian societies has been revoked mainly due to the influx of refugees to Europe following the Syrian civil war. The election campaigns in European countries and the U.S. reinforced the perception that refugees and “migrants” coming from Muslim countries were “a threat” (Yardım 2017). Turkey, on the other hand, welcomed Syrian refugees despite the enormous financial and social burden, which further exposed the great power psychology. The Ottoman Empire had certified its grandeur when it provided shelter or assistance to the suffering communities, regardless of their faith, such as to Jews expelled from Spain in 1492 (Lewis 1996, pp. 132–140) or to Ireland when the country was struck with famine in 1847 (Murray 2010). Thus, claims of “hostage-taking” because of one’s faith would contradict with Turkey’s identity and self-perception.

Conclusion This piece has tackled the impact of threat perceptions, fears, and traumas of Turkey on the prevailing issues in Turkish-American Relations by looking at the long-standing issues in bilateral relations. In doing so, it demonstrated the policy variables that were under-studied and caused these issues to prevail. It focused on the cases of Armenian allegations on “genocide”, terrorism-related cases, namely separatist terrorism, and the July 2016 coup attempt, tension between the two countries over defense policy, and regional foreign policy course. It revealed that these cases are standing out and prevailing mainly due to the politico-psychological variables, namely, the fear of being partitioned/the Sèvres Trauma and great power psychology. This study excluded the psychological factors in American foreign and security policy, and domestic and individual-level variables due to limitations in space. It will be timely to make a foreign policy analysis for both countries based on these variables. Yet, this piece concludes that both countries need each other for regional stability and national interests covering military, political, economic, and cultural areas.

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The Economist (2004), “Turkey’s Kurds: Freedom Calls”, Date of Accession: August 28, 2018 from https://www.economist.com/europe/2004/06/10/freedom-calls. The New York Times (1995), “America Arms Turkey’s Repression”, Date of Accession: August 29, 2018 from https://archive.nytimes.com/query.nytimes.com/gst/ fullpage-9A03E3D81039F934A25753C1A963958260.html. The Strategic Plan 2007–2011, “Undersecretariat of Defense Industries of the Republic of Turkey”, Date of Accession: July 25, 2018 from https://www.ssb.gov.tr/Images/Uploads/ MyContents/F_20170606155729646061.pdf. The Strategic Plan 2017–2021, “Undersecretariat of Defense Industries of the Republic of Turkey”, Date of Accession: July 25, 2018 from https://www.ssb.gov.tr/Images/Uploads/ MyContents/F_20170606155720342529.pdf. The White House (2002 September), “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, Date of Accession: July 7, 2018 from https://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/63562.pdf. The White House (2005, April 24), “President’s Statement on the Armenian Remembrance Day”, Date of Accession: September 14, 2018 from https://georgewbush-whitehouse. archives.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050424.html. The White House (2014, April 24), “Statement by the President on Armenian Remembrance Day”, Date of Accession: August 29, 2018 from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ the-press-office/2014/04/24/statement-president-armenian-remembrance-day. The White House (2017, April 24), “Statement by President Donald J. Trump on Armenian Remembrance Day 2017”, Date of Accession: August 29, 2018 from https://www. whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-donald-j-trump-armenianremembrance-day-2017/. The World War I Document Archive, “Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923”, Date of Accession: August 27, 2018 from https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/ Treaty_of_Lausanne. Trump, D. J. (2018, April 18), Twitter, Date of Accession: September 15, 2018 from https:// twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/986432143189512192?lang=en. Trump, D. J. (2018, July 19), Twitter, Date of Accession: September 15, 2018 from https:// twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1019757603570806785?lang=en . Trump, D. J. (2018, July 26), Twitter, Date of Accession: September 15, 2018 from https:// twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1022502465147682817?lang=en. Türkgeldi, A. (1948), Mondros ve Mudanya Mütarekelerinin Tarihi, Ankara: Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü. Turkish Armed Forces (August 10–16, 2018), Press Information Notes, Date of Accession: August 27, 2018 from http://www.tsk.tr/Home/Detay/1164. Türkmen, F. (2009), “Turkish-American Relations: A Challenging Transition”, Turkish Studies, 10 (1), pp. 109–129. Udum, Ş. (2003), “Missile Proliferation in the Middle East: Turkey and Missile Defense”, Turkish Studies, 4 (3), pp. 71–102. Ulusan, Ş. (2009), “Şark Mesesi’nden Sevr’e Türkiye”, ÇTTAD, VIII/18–19, pp. 229–256. Uslu, N. (2003), TheTurkish-American Relationship between 1947–2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance, New York: Nova Publishers.

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Uyar, M. & Erickson E. J. (eds.), (2009), A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO. Volkan, V. D. (1991), “On Chosen Trauma”, Mind and Human Interaction 4, pp. 3–19. Volkan, V. D. (2001), “Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: An Aspect of Large-Group Identity”, Group Analysis, 34 (1), pp. 79–97. Yılmaz, Ş. (2015), Turkish-American Relations, 1800–1952: Between the Star, Stripes and the Crescent, New York: Routledge. Woody, C. (2017), “Turkey Has Completed Its Purchase of Russia’s Advanced Missile System, and Relations with NATO Are Still Tense”, Business Insider, Date of Accession: August 27, 2018 from https://www.businessinsider.com/turkey-russiaeurope-nato-missile-defenses-2017-11. Yardım, M. (2017), “Aşırı Sağ ve Çokkültürlük: Avrupa’da Ötekileştirilen ‘Göçmenler’ ”, Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi, 12 (2), pp. 217–234. Yılmaz, S., Baytal, Y. & Türkman S. (eds.) (2014), Atatürk ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi, Ankara: Nobel. Zengerle, P. (2018), “U.S. Senate Defense Bill Would Bar Turkey from Buying F-35 Jets”, Reuters, Date of Accession: September 15, 2018 from https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-usa-defense-congress-turkey/u-s-senate-defense-bill-would-bar-turkey-from-buyingf-35-jets-idUSKCN1IP3Q8.

PART III:  Turkish-American Relations in Key Political Areas

Hüseyin Işıksal1 and Qais Khaleel Sallam Maaitah2

Chapter 10: Turkish-American Relations in the Middle East in the Post-Arab Spring Era: The Bonds That Are No Longer Tight

Abstract: This article analyzes Turkish-American Relations in the Middle East in the postArab Spring Era by focusing 5 major conflicting issue areas namely; the YPG/PKK problem, the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict , conflicting approaches towards political Islam and the Arab Spring revolutions, contradictory perceptions towards Iran and Russia, and the different standing towards the FETO terrorist organization. By explaining the roots of each crisis, the aim is to provide an understanding of the framework of the contemporary Turkish-American ‘uneasy relations’ that will also shape their future relations. It is simply argued that the new political and economic realities changed the dimension of the strategic partnership and Turkey-American Relations deteriorated in the post-Cold War era. Turkey’s recent security concerns and energy needs along with the United States (U.S.) support for the YPG/PKK have brought Turkey closer to Russia. On the other hand, the U.S. has not yet accepted Turkey’s will to act independently. In consequence, Turkish-American Relations not seem as strategic partnership in current form and the ‘bonds’ between the two countries are no longer ‘tight’. Keywords: Turkish-American Relations, Middle East, Turkey, Arab Spring, Syria, YPG/ PKK, Palestinian-Israeli Conflict , Political Islam, FETO.

Introduction Turkish-American Relations in the post-Cold War era have been oriented towards alignment and strategic partnership.  The Cold War concerns and privileges of Turkey’s political elite have played a major role in the construction of this alliance. Against the Soviet threat, the Western coalition and security umbrella were seen as vital for the survival of the country. In consequence, as a result of Turkey’s status quo and balance of power-based foreign policy, the country opted to be within the Western sphere of international politics and institutions and supported the Western-inspired international system, institutions, policies, and international law (Işıksal 2015/b, p. 300).

1 Professor, Department of International Relations, Near East University, Nicosia, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Email: [email protected] 2 Assistant Professor, College of Law, Applied Science University, Bahrain. Email: [email protected]

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Having said this, it would not be absolutely correct to suggest that the two actors’ relations were completely problem-free. Anti-Americanism has been strong in Turkey for almost half a century.3 The two sides have had significant confrontations when their interests have clashed on some key areas. One of them is the Cyprus issue, which had a negative impact on the Turkish-American Relations after the (in)famous “Johnson Letter” that U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson sent to the Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü in 1964. In the letter, Johnson warned İnönü in an aggressive tone, underlying that any military action by Turkey in Cyprus would not be welcomed by the U.S. and they would not feel obligated to defend Turkey against Soviet aggression. In consequence, the Turkish government was forced to cancel its military intervention plan for Cyprus. The new political and economic realities changed the dimension of the strategic partnership and Turkey-American  relations deteriorated in the post-Cold War era. Particularly, the occupation of Iraq by the U.S. in 2003 have demonstrated that Turkey’s relations with the U.S. can no longer continue on the basis of the Cold War-era parameters (Kapsis 2005). From this incident on, Turkey started to see that its interests do not always converge with those of the U.S. (Oğuzlu 2008, p. 8). Arguably, the main reason at the heart of the issue is the fact that Turkish Foreign Policy has become more assertive regarding its own policy priorities and has gained a more “strategic perspective” during the under the Justice and Development Party (hereafter AK Parti), rule. In other words, AK Parti decision-makers are reluctant to unconditionally comply with American policies as in the Cold War era. Particularly after 2007, that was AK Parti’s second term, Turkey tried to bring a new regional order in the Middle East with Turkey playing a leading role in strengthening regionalism (Oğuzlu 2020, p. 134). During 2007–2011 era, Turkish Foreign Policy role regarding the Middle East in the pre-Arab-uprisings could be defined as “mediator”, “defender of regional peace and stability”, “good neighbor”, and “trading state” (Özdamar, Halistoprak & Sula 2014, p. 102). The Obama administration decision to scale down the American presence in the Middle East also have motivated Turkey to play a more assertive role in the region (Krieg 2016). Similarly, although Turkish policy-makers initially thought that the Arab Spring revolts could increase the regional role of Turkey (Öniş 2012), the calculation made at home did not go as planned in the market. In the post-Arab Spring era, not only Turkey’s aforementioned roles have declined, but also the structural and conjectural factors forced Turkish policy-makers to pursue more security-oriented politics. The growing geopolitical rivalry between Shia and Sunni powers, Russia’s military involvement in Syria, the emergence of the so-called the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), and resurgence of PKK-PYD affiliated terrorism etc. all reinforced this process. Furthermore, Turkey’s recent security concerns and energy needs along with the U.S. support for the YPG/PKK have brought Turkey 3 For the analysis of anti-Americanism in Turkey, see; Zeynep Merve Şıvgın “The Image of the USA in Turkey: A Historical View” in this volume.

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closer to Russia and Iran. The Trump administration, which wants to play a more assertive role in Middle East and aims the new “dual containment” of Russia and Iran’s influence in the region, has further aggravated Turkey’s security concerns. Deriving from these preliminary remarks, this article analyzes TurkishAmerican Relations in the Middle East in the post-Arab Spring era.The diverging interests between the two actors are most prominent in regard to 5 major issue areas in the contemporary era, namely; the YPG/PKK problem, the PalestinianIsraeli Conflict, conflicting approaches towards political Islam and the Arab Spring revolutions, contradictory perceptions towards Iran and Russia, and the different standing towards the FETO terrorist organization. In this chapter, these 5 conflicting issues are briefly elaborated by explaining the roots of the crises. In this way, the aim is to provide an understanding of the framework of the contemporary Turkish-American “uneasy relations” that will also shape their future relations.

I. Turkey’s PKK/YPG Problem and Concerns There is no doubt that the terrorist group known as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (hereafter PKK) and its Syrian affiliate called the People’s Protection Units (hereafter YPG) is the most crucial security problem that Turkey has faced in the contemporary era. The PKK is a violent terrorist organization whose activities are not only restricted to the southeast of Turkey, but have also extended to the major cities. Since 1984, the organization has transformed itself into a paramilitary organization with the claim of struggling for a separate Kurdish State. The fight with the terror organization caused the deaths of more than 55,000 people since the beginning of the conflict. During the Syrian conflict, an offshoot of the PKK, the YPG, has controlled a large proportion of the area along the 800 km Turkish-Syrian border. Consequently, with the reescalation of the fight with the PKK, Turkey has become further threatened by and subjected to terrorist attacks emanating from the YPG-controlled northern Syria. In other words, the power vacuum caused by the weakening of the Assad regime has been filled by the YPG and ISIS forces, which presents a clear and imminent danger for Turkey’s security (Işıksal 2018/a, p. 27). Following the dismantling of ISIS, the YPG became the strongest political actor on Turkey’s southern border. Arguably, this development represents the core problem within contemporary Turkey-American Relations. While Turkey considers the YPG as a terrorist group, the U.S. administration perceives it as a strategic partner and official ally in the region (Barkey 2015). The cooperation between the YPG and the U.S.  forces has intensified over the years. The YPG receives significant military aid and political support from the U.S. From the U.S. perspective, Kurds are reliable partners in the region. They proved their loyalty to the U.S. during the occupation of Iraq in 2003 by fighting alongside the coalition forces against Saddam Hussein. In the contemporary era, the U.S. has also defined the YPG as a reliable partner in the fight with ISIS. The Obama administration supported and ultimately armed the YPG between 2014 and 2016, when the U.S.-YPG cooperation intensified

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against the rise of the ISIS. Although Turkey allowed Peshmerga forces to cross over into Syria to repel the ISIS siege of Kobane in 2014, Turkey’s contribution to the fight against ISIS did not seem sufficient by the U.S. administration. Therefore, the American policy-makers perceived the YPG as more committed military force to rolling back the presence of ISIS in the region. In this connection, arguably, it is very common to see exaggerations on the role of the YPG in the defeat of ISIS. Another reason that makes the Kurds and the YPG viable partners for the U.S. is the security of Israel. Israel’s security is among the main objectives of the U.S. in the Middle East. For this purpose, U.S.  policy-makers have been searching for a non-Arab regional ally in the region since the establishment of Israel in 1948 (Işıksal 2018/b, p. 96). During the Shah era, Iran successfully fulfilled this role. Nevertheless, after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, a stable ‘non-Arab’ ally has still not been found by the U.S. Although it was a loyal and strategic ally during the Cold War era, under the AK Parti rule, the Turkey is no longer perceived as a reliable partner by many in the U.S. In this respect, there is no doubt that the U.S. would prefer to see Kurdish autonomy as a counter-balance to the supremacy of Shia dominated Iraq, as the country previously acted as the leader of pan-Arabism and one of the most threatening actors to Israel. Although, unlike Israel, the U.S. was seemingly opposed to the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) independence referendum, a prospective Kurdish State in the north of contemporary Iraq and Syria could be used as strategic military base in the heart of the Middle East. Iran, the U.S.  and Israel’s long-term enemy, could be surrounded and Bashar Assad’s regime that remains as the only confronting state in the war with Israel could be passivized. Furthermore, the U.S. and Israel could contain Russia in Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon. From the economic point of view, a Kurdish State ruled by a friendly regime that has access to the Mediterranean could be a strategically significant country. It could provide an alternative path for the rich hydrocarbon resources in Northern Iraq. In this connection, the viable and relatively underdeveloped Kurdish economy could be supervised by American and Israeli companies as an ideal market for exports. On the other hand, this scenario remains out of the question for Turkey. Fracturing Iraq and Syria for the formation of a sovereign, quasi, or semi-autonomous Kurdish State is a highly threatening move to the integrity of the Turkish State. Given the rise of cross-border PKK attacks, Turkey’s demographic sensitivity, and regional balances, it is not surprising that such support for an independent Kurdistan has not been well received in Ankara. It is these motives and particularly the prevention of a possible fait accompli state by the YPG that forced Turkey to launch military operations in Syria. The anti-ISIS operations led by the U.S. and Russia made the YPG the strongest political actor on Turkey’s southern border. As a result of Operation Euphrates Shield (Fırat Kalkanı), Turkish forces had secured an area of more than 2,000 km2 from ISIS and YPG terrorist groups by the end of 2016. When the operation was successfully completed in March 2017, the Turkish forces completely controlled the west of the Euphrates River, the ISIS forces were completely eliminated from the Turkish-Syrian border, and the YPG withdrew

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to the east of the Euphrates River. With this operation, Turkey also formed safe havens in northern Syria and at least 100,000 Syrian refugees living in Turkey returned back to these areas (Işıksal, 2018/b, p. 98). The second and more comprehensive operation called Operation Peace Spring (Barış Pınarı Harekâtı) began on October 9, 2019. It aimed to expel the YPG forces from the Turkish border and to create a 30 km-deep safe zone in northern Syria. Turkey officially declared many times that it would never accept the formation of a corridor run by a terrorist group on its border and therefore the establishment of a safe zone is a requirement. Secondly, it is planned that 300,000 Syrian refugees living in Turkey could return to this secured zone. Furthermore, the operation aims to liberate the Syrians living in that region from the tyranny of the YPG that has altered the demography, and to enable Kurds, Arabs, Christians, and other minorities that have fled from the region to return. Finally, the operation aimed to eliminate the threat to Syria’s territorial integrity and political unity. In consequence, the Turkish Armed Forces and their allies achieved great military success by capturing an area of 4,820 square kilometers with 600 settlements, including the strategic M4 highway. It should be noted that the U.S. administration did not welcome neither of these operations as evidenced by the reluctance of the U.S. to support the advance of Turkish forces and the lack of coordination between the Turkish forces and the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition. Instead, as the continuation of long-term U.S. policy, the U.S. provided full support and supplied advanced military equipment to the YPG in Syria. Stating in different words, the U.S.  opted to fill the vacuum left by ISIS with the YPG forces. The main justification for the U.S. administration was to empower the YPG forces against ISIS. In this respect, the Turkish government is rightfully concerned that the U.S.-supplied weapons could be used against Turkey after the defeat of ISIS. To summarize, the greatest dilemma at the heart of the issue is that although the PKK is considered to be terrorist organization by the U.S.  and other NATO countries, the U.S. has continued to support the PKK-affiliate YPG in Syria. This growing disagreement has made the Turkey-American Relations more complex and complicated than ever. Turkey’s greatest security concern in the contemporary era is the permanent YPG presence on the Turkish-Syrian border. On the other hand, the U.S. administration has never fully understood Turkey’s sensitivity on this issue and support for the YPG has been further consolidated under the Trump administration. The U.S. administration defines the YPG as a strategic ally against the fight with ISIS. However, this justification has no more grounds after Turkey completely dismantled ISIS in northern Syria via Operation Euphrates Shield. Furthermore, although Turkey defined the YPG’s military presence to the west of the Euphrates River as a “redline”, the Obama and Trump administrations have not kept their promise that the YPG forces would return to the east of the Euphrates River and would be disarmed after the defeat of ISIS. This situation also highlights the U.S. ignorance on the division among the Kurds and the division between the YPG and other Kurdish groups. This organization is not the only Kurdish group in the region and it is evident that it has clashed militarily on many occasions with

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other Kurdish groups in the past, including the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Peshmerga forces. In consequence, the current situation presents an interesting dilemma. Considering the fact that Turkey is fighting directly with the U.S.-backed YPG terrorists on the battlefield, it would not be wrong to argue that there is a sort of “proxy war” between the Turkish and U.S. forces. This fact is embedded at the very core of Turkey-American Relations and has further increased Turkey’s distrust of the U.S.

II. Palestinian-Israeli Conflict The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict is among the other major conflicts of interest between Turkey and the U.S. Although new problems have emerged in the Middle East, such as the ISIS threat, the Syrian War, and the Yemeni War, there is little doubt that the major problem in the region is still the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. Arguably, it is this conflict that directly or indirectly feeds the other problems in the Middle East. The limits of this article do not permit the analysis of the roots and implications of this long-standing problem in the Middle East in detail. Nevertheless, it is significant to highlight the different perceptions of Turkey and the U.S. The security of Israel has always been considered as one of the most important foreign policy objectives of the U.S. since the establishment of the country in 1948. The unconditional and unquestioned political, military, and economic support provided by the U.S. to Israel is particularly promoted through the UN Security Council. Through the Security Council, the U.S. legitimates its Middle East policies, facilitates the expansion of its hegemonic rule, and absorbs the counter ideas.4 For instance, the U.S.  rejected and blocked almost all the UN Security Council resolutions regarding condemnation of Israeli policies in Palestine and those that called for the withdrawal of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. Particularly the Camp David Accords that is signed in 1978, has started the “Post-Camp David Order” in the region making Israel as the most key partner of U.S. in the region, after losing Iran in 1979 after the Islamic Revolution. On the other hand, Turkey’s relations with Israel have experienced many fluctuations. Turkey was among the first states that recognized Israel in 1948. In the following years, Turkey’s alignment with the U.S. and NATO also reflected the Turkey-Israel relations. As mentioned above, as a part of the U.S.’s Middle East

4 For the valuable discussion on role of the international institutions on hegemonic world orders, see; R. W. Cox (1981), “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”, Millenium, 10, pp.  127–155; R.  W. Cox (1983), “Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations Theory: An Essay in Method”, Millenium, 2, pp. 162–175; R. W. Cox (1993), “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An essay in method”, in S. Gill (ed.), Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 49–66.

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policy, a non-Arab ally in the region seemed essential for the security of Israel. Until the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran under Shah regime fulfilled this duty. After 1979, Turkey became the only candidate in the region as a partner of Israel as a non-Arab country. The military rule and pro-Western governments ruled by the secular elite in Turkey also cemented this alliance. In other words, since the 1980s, Turkey’s secular central military and civil bureaucracy has stood as main reason and vanguard behind the Turkey-Israel rapprochement. These groups thought that the Western and Israeli alliance was crucial to protect the secular system in the country. In the mid-1980s, when Turkey’s European Union membership bid revived under the leadership of Turgut Özal, Turkey’s cooperation with Israel gained greater importance due to Israel’s powerful lobbies and networks (Lewin 2000, p. 240). Therefore, during that time, the Turkish ruling elite had strong faith that Israel would support Turkey’s EU membership. There has also been a belief that Israel would support the Turkish government in its fight against radical Islamists and Kurdish separatist terrorists. Having said this, Turkey-Israel relations were never completely problem free. At the heart of the issue, problems have existed since the establishment of Israel. Although Turkey’s polarization in the Western camp and pro-Western governments eclipsed these problems, it did not completely eradicate them. Therefore, the Turkey-Israeli alliance formed based on aforementioned mutual interests failed to take into account the impact of the intrinsic structural problems between the two countries. Stating alternatively, these fundamental problems remain inactive volcanoes ready to erupt when the most suitable time arrives. First of all, Turkey and Israel have had conflicting views regarding the political future of Iraq from the very beginning. As mentioned above, Israel and the U.S. favor the independent Kurdish State in Northern Iraq and the disintegration of Iraq. This is due to two main reasons. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, both the U.S. and Israel prefer a non-Arab ally in the region. The KRG, with its strategic location, significant energy sources, and the underdeveloped economy, could be a viable satellite state for the U.S. and Israel for various purposes. Furthermore, Israel could further contain and pressurize Iran. Secondly, both the U.S. and Israel would like to see a divided Iraq, which was previously a strong Arab country promoting anti-Israeli views and sentiments to the region. One other fundamental clash between Turkey and Israel is in regard to Hamas. Turkey and particularly the AK Parti governments have always welcomed and recognized Hamas as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians as the elected government. On the other hand, the U.S. and Israel have defined Hamas as a terrorist organization, ignoring the fact that it is chosen by the Palestinians through democratic elections. Related to this issue, Israel’s asymmetric and extreme use of violence against Palestinians and the status of Jerusalem are uncompromised issues between the two sides. These two issues and particularly the status of Jerusalem are within the redlines of Turkish Foreign Policy. Turkey will never recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel before the final solution of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict and the mutual acceptance of the sacred city as the capital of both countries.

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There is a strong public consensus on this issue and it represents the ultimate psychological threshold for the Turkish society (Karaman 1996, p. 50). After the 2000s, the bilateral relations between Israel and Turkey deteriorated with the rise of the AK Parti government in Turkey and Ariel Sharon in Israel. The failure of the Oslo Peace Process, Sharon’s provocations at the Al-Aqsa Mosque (considered the third holiest site in Islam), subsequent bloodshed during the Al-Aqsa Intifada in the early 2000s, and the Gaza Massacre in 2008–2009 that resulted in the killing of 1,417 people (PCHR 2009) further increased anti-Israeli public opinion in Turkey. The Mavi Marmara incident that took place on May 31, 2010, caused the relations to reach their lowest point. Nine Turkish activists were killed and many were wounded by Israeli soldiers as a result of the controversial operation carried out on the Mavi Marmara flotilla in international waters. In March 2013, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu apologized for the Gaza Flotilla incident and in December 2016, a reconciliation agreement was announced between two countries that was approved by the parliaments in both countries (Haaretz 2016). According to this agreement, Israel accepted to allow Turkey to advance humanitarian projects in the Gaza Strip and pay $20 million as compensation for the families of those who died and were injured in the raid. Afterward, the two countries renormalized their relations by reappointing Ambassadors. However, Turkish-Israeli relations were not completely restored, as witnessed by new diplomatic crises in May 2018, when Israeli soldiers fired on Palestinian protestors in the Gaza Strip following the announcement of the decision of the U.S. to move its Embassy to Jerusalem. Once again, Turkish President Erdoğan accused Israel of being a “terrorist state” (The Independent 2018). This event once more demonstrated that for the complete normalization of Turkey-Israeli relations, there should be progress in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Only in this way can the foundational problems between the two sides be resolved. On the other hand, Israel’s alliance with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus on hydrocarbon projects in the Eastern Mediterranean creates a new tension between Turkey and Israel. The problem of the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the unilateral actions of the Greek Cypriot government to explore and exploit hydrocarbon resources around the island may even lead to military conflict in the future.

III. Different Approaches Towards Political Islam and the Arab Spring The two sides also have different approaches towards political Islam and the Arab Spring demonstrations. In order to further explain this point, it is necessary to briefly elucidate both actors’ positions regarding the Arab Spring uprisings.5 Basically speaking, the AK Parti government supported the Arab Spring revolutions in 5 For a detailed discussion of Arab Spring and Turkish foreign policy, see; Hüseyin Işıksal (2018), “Turkish Foreign Policy, the Arab Spring and the Syrian Crisis: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back” in Işıksal, H. & Göksel, O. (eds.) Turkey’s Relations

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Tunisia and Egypt. The main reason behind this was that these revolts appeared to be people’s revolutions against pro-Western authoritarian regimes that did not represent the majority of their society. In other words, it was believed that the strong status quo in the Middle East that was formed by the powerful extraregional powers and their regional collaborator regimes could have collapsed with these uprisings. It is worth underlining that the driving force behind these revolutions was Islamist parties, namely the Ennahda movement in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. In this connection, the AK Parti government provided full support to the Islamist parties. In this way, it was hoped that not only long-term resentment with Egypt could be ended, but also the AK Parti’s North Africa opening could be successful through the development of political and economic relations. Stating differently, considering the legitimacy and cohesion problems between the Arab regimes and their people, the Arab Spring was seen as an opportunity for further cooperation in economic and political spheres between the new democratically elected regimes and Turkey (Işıksal 2018/a, p. 22). As envisioned by the AK Parti, in the post-2011 period, the Muslim Brotherhood movement won electoral victories in 2011–2012. In Tunisia, the Ennahda Movement won the 2011 Tunisian Constituent Assembly elections with 40 % of the votes. Moreover, in Egypt, the leader of the Islamist Freedom and Justice Party, Mohamed Morsi, was elected as the fifth Egyptian President in the 2012. The Islamist Bloc that was led by the Salafist Al-Nour Party came second in the 2011– 2012 Egyptian elections with 28 % of the votes. All these elections were the first democratic elections in the history of both countries, which were welcomed by the AK Parti policy-makers. After the initial shock of the Arab Spring revolutions, the counter uprisings supported by the U.S. and Israel aimed to create a new status quo in the Middle East. Needless to say, the most important step in achieving the new status quo was the overthrown of Egypt’s first democratically elected President, Mohamed Morsi, who was the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood. The military coup led by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in July 2013, who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces at that time, removed Mursi from political power. The coup was followed by the mass arrests of Muslim Brotherhood members and mass killings of Morsi supporters by security forces in the summer of 2013 (Kingsley, 2014). The most prominent killing was the Rabaa massacre, which took place on 14 August 2013. Over 1,150 protesters were shot in Rabaa Square in Cairo by Egyptian police and Army forces under the command of Sisi (Human Rights Watch 2014). The U.S. and its Western allies tacitly supported the coup. On the other hand, Turkey strongly condemned the military coup from the very beginning. Among the top Turkish officials, then-Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan openly criticized the Western countries “double standards” on democracy and support for Sisi (BBC 2013/a). Similarly, then-Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu with the Middle East: Political Encounters after the Arab Spring, New York: Springer, pp. 13–31.

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clearly stated that a military coup was unacceptable in Egypt regardless of the reason (BBC 2013/b). In the meantime, the revolts were canalized to overthrow the two remaining anti-Western regimes in the Middle East, namely Libya and Syria. Since assuming political power in 1969, Libyan Leader Muammar Gaddafi had pursued anti-Western policies. When demonstrations reached Libya, the Western powers supported the anti-regime opposition. In order to neutralize the government forces’ air force advantage and to secure victory for the opposition who had superior land forces, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 that mandated a no-fly zone over Libya. Two days after this resolution, the U.S.-led military coalition initiated an attack against Libyan government forces, resulting in the collapse of the Muammar Gaddafi regime in June 2011. However, Turkey did not give support to the NATO operation against the Gaddafi regime in 2011, arguing that the operation should be limited to monitoring the arms embargo in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution. Therefore, Turkey did not contribute to the military operation and limited its actions to monitoring the no-fly zone over Libya. Similarly, the Assad regime in Syria remained the main confrontational state against Israel in the region. As such, there is no peace treaty between Israel and Syria. More importantly, the strategic Golan Heights, which is an area rich in water resources, still remains under Israeli occupation. Israel occupied the area during the Six-Day War in 1967 and annexed the region in 1981. Although the UN Security Council Resolution 242 declared that the Golan Heights was illegally occupied by Israel, the occupation still continues. The Assad regime is a long-standing and key strategic ally to Russia and Iran, which stand as regimes that are hostile to the U.S. and Israel. It is evident that the Iran-Syria alliance undermines the U.S. and Israel’s interests in the region. Therefore, it is not surprising that the U.S. and Israel supported anti-Assad regime forces in Syria and mainly the YPG. To summarize, Turkey-U.S.  relations become increasingly problematic in the post-Arab Spring era. The AK Parti government supported the Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt because they appeared to be revolutions against the pro-Western authoritarian regimes’ established status quo by the Islamist parties. On the other hand, the U.S. and its Western allies have a completely different vision and objectives in the Middle East than Turkey. The U.S. does not politically favor the breaking of the long-established status quo in the region and are clearly against the radical Islamist governments in the region. More importantly, while the U.S. successfully canalized the revolts to Libya and Syria as the only two remaining anti-Western regimes in the region, the two countries’ relations further worsened because the Arab Spring turned into the Turkish Winter via the conflict in Syria.

IV. Turkey’s Rapprochement with Russia and Iran One of the recent areas of political conflict between Turkey and the U.S. emerged in relation to Turkey’s rapprochement with Russia and Iran. Russia is a long-term strategic competitor of the U.S., while Iran has been defined as the most dangerous “rogue state” in the region since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. As a part of the AK

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Parti government’s multi-dimensional foreign policy, Turkey aims to strengthen relations with the non-Western world, especially Russia and Iran. In this respect, new emphasis is given to these formerly estranged neighbors (Işıksal 2015/a, p. 18). The main dynamic that led to this rapprochement actually came from the U.S. itself, since Turkey, Russia, and Iran share a common interest in a multi-polar world order. All three countries do not approve of the U.S. omnipotent power and unilateral regional policies. Simply stating, Turkey is not happy with the U.S.’s alliance with the YPG, Russia is not happy with the U.S.’s political and economic influence and interference in its neighboring countries and in Syria. Similarly, the U.S.’s long-term adversary Iran is not happy with U.S.’s isolation and embargos on Iran along with the U.S.’s interference tin Middle East in general and in Syria in particular. In this connection, Turkey has supported Russian foreign policy decisions in many cases, particularly after the mid-2000s. Turkey shared Russia’s concerns about NATO’s expansion towards the Black Sea region through the attempts to include Ukraine and Georgia into the alliance, which resulted in the RussianGeorgian War in August 2008 and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that has been ongoing since 2014. Both Russia and Turkey opposed the NATO membership of Georgia and Ukraine along with the U.S. bases in Bulgaria and Romania. Similarly, Turkey did not participate in the U.S.-led sanctions imposed on Russian banks and companies during the Crimean Crisis of 2014 (BPC 2015, p. 7). Having said this, following the downing of a Russian military jet by Turkish forces on Turkey’s Syrian border in November 2015, the relations between the two countries reached a low point. Russia imposed sanctions on Turkey that cost around $10 billion in lost trade, adversely affecting the Turkish tourism, construction, and food export sectors (Girit 2016). The hostile relations lasted almost a year until Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan apologized to Russian President Vladimir Putin in June 2016. From that date on, the relations between the countries have improved every passing day, especially in the post-coup attempt era, and have been further cemented with new political and economic agreements. Putin was one of the first world leaders to condemn the coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016, and clearly sided with the democratically elected Turkish government, while the U.S. did not demonstrate a strong reaction to the coup attempt. This rapprochement is unsurprising because Turkey and Russia share common interests in the region. Both countries have been victims of radical terrorist organizations and share a general interest in maintaining regional stability in the Middle East. In other words, both countries are well aware that regional stability has a direct impact on their internal security. After the normalization of bilateral relations, both countries were involved in comprehensive security cooperation in Syria. Turkey, Russia, and Iran took the initiative to find a solution to the Syrian crisis through the Astana Process (Astana Talks). In consequence, with the consent of Russia and Iran, Turkey was given a green light to intervene militarily against the YPG targets in Syria via Operation Euphrates Shield (Özertem 2017, p. 128). Furthermore, Russian air strikes helped the Turkish Armed Forces to completely

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dismantle ISIS from the West of the Euphrates in January 2017. Turkey further strengthened its alliance with Russia by purchasing Russian S-400 air defense systems that cost to Turkey $9 billion (AlJazeera 2019). This purchase was subject to heavy criticism from Washington. At this instance, it is worth stressing that it was the U.S. that withdrew the Patriot system from Turkey in 2015 (Tol & Goren 2017, p. 3). Therefore, it could be suggested that the U.S. ignored Turkey’s security concerns, which forced Turkey to search for alternative air defense systems. Furthermore, Turkey also need to buy a new air defense system, because the scope of the NATO missile defense system only partially covered Turkish territory and the decision to use it was not only at the discretion of Turkey (Kibaroğlu 2017). Furthermore, the recent crises in the Eastern Mediterranean also made it a necessity for Turkey to buy S-400 defense system. There is a significant clash in regard to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) between Turkey, Greece, and the RoC (Republic of Cyprus). While Greece and the RoC claim that Turkey’s EEZ is 41,000 km2, Turkey claims that it is 145.000 km2.. Hence, there is almost 3.5 times difference between each side claims and this dispute could lead to a military conflict in the region. In this connection, S-400 air defense systems also cover and defend the EEZ that Turkey claims. Turkey and Russia also share economic interests, particularly in the energy sector. Russia owns almost 27 % of the world’s proven natural gas reserves and Turkey imports nearly 65 % of its natural gas from Russia. Turkey aims to be an energy hub country and Russia (and also Iran) prefers to export their oil and gas via Turkey. In this connection, the Turkish Stream (Türk Akımı) natural gas pipeline project, which was completed December 2019, will enable gas to flow from Russia to Turkey under the Black Sea and then to Europe through the Turkish-Greek border. In this way, both sides will mutually gain from this project. Turkey’s strategic importance will increase as an energy hub and the country will become the main distributor of Gazprom, while Russia will bypass Ukraine in terms of its gas exports to the EU; thus, economically and politically weakening Ukraine. Furthermore, Turkey and Russia are cooperating on the construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, which will become Turkey’s first nuclear plant costing around $20 billion. The Turkish-Iranian rapprochement was also part of the emerging trilateral Russian-Turkish-Iranian alliance. Historically speaking, Turkish-Iranian relations were generally stable, as evidenced by the fact that the Turkey-Iran border stands as one of the oldest in the world. Since the Kasr-ı Şirin Agreement (also known as the Treaty of Zuhab) in 1639, the borderline between the two countries has remained the same for almost four centuries. There is no doubt that this fact is more significant than simple historical data as it represents the stability between the two countries in such a volatile region. Nevertheless, the bilateral relations between the two countries decayed gradually following the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. The secularist bureaucratic establishment in Turkey supported by a strong military always defined Iran as one of the key security threats to the country, as a country that tries to undermine Turkey’s secular system. Despite Turkish

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Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan’s efforts6 to reconcile both countries’ hostilities, the tension between the two countries peaked during Erbakan’s Premiership in January 1997 following the Jerusalem Memorial Night held in SincanAnkara. Sincan’s mayor invited the Iranian Ambassador, Mohammed Reza Baqeri as a guest speaker, where he criticized Israel in his speech. In the immediate aftermath of this event, the Turkish military forces entered Sincan and Baqeri was later declared persona non grata and eventually expelled from the country (Aydındağ & Işıksal 2018, p. 302). The bitter relationship between Turkey and Iran lasted until the AK Parti rule. The AK Parti’s new foreign policy initiative  –the so-called zero problems with neighbors’ policy– initially aimed to “normalize” the foreign relations with the neighboring countries and then sought to develop relations through constructive initiatives based upon political, economic, and socio-cultural relations (Işıksal 2018/c). As an important step in this policy, Turkey began cultivating closer economic and political ties with Iran. Against Iran’s international isolation, Turkey pursued a balanced and empathic stance. Turkey actively worked to find alternative ways to the UN sanction plans on dealing with Iran’s nuclear program and acted as a mediator to find a peaceful solution to this conflict. Moreover, Iran became the second largest energy supplier for Turkey after Russia during the AK Parti government. The last major crisis between the two countries remaining from Turkey’s Western-oriented security perception was the U.S.-led missile shield project. As mentioned above, Turkey’s lack of an air defense system made the country vulnerable against ballistic missile strikes. In that sense, the Obama administration’s new Missile Shield project offered Turkey to deploy its radar components in Malatya in the Eastern Anatolia region (Kibaroğlu & Sazak 2015, p. 105). There is no doubt that the main intention of this move was not to protect Turkey from a possible attack, but rather to monitor neighboring Iran. Stating alternatively, the real concern of this move was not the Turkish, but the Israeli security in the scenario of any possible Iranian missile attack (Kibaroğlu 2013, p. 231). The radar system became operational in December 2012. However, in 2015, the U.S. withdrew its weapons and only Spanish weapons remained in Turkey. Today, the aim and purpose of this missile shield remain under question in Turkey, particularly following the rise of anti-Americanism and anti-Israel sentiments in the country. Turkey’s and Iran’s main concern of interest in the contemporary era is the war in Syria. While Turkey supports the anti-Assad Sunni opposition forces, Iran is actively involved in the war by supporting Assad’s army through the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Following the shift of Turkey’s priority in Syria from toppling the Assad regime to preventing the YPG from controlling northern Syria, the two countries

6 For an analysis of Erbakan era relations with Iran and securitization and desecuritization attempts towards Iranian threat in Turkey, see; D. Aydındağ & H. Işıksal (2018). “(De)Securitization of Islam in Turkey”, Revista: Review of Research and Social Intervention”, Vol. 62, pp. 294–305.

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initiated closer partnership in regional matters. In this connection, following the Kurdistan Regional Government’s independence referendum in September 2017, both countries agreed to impose sanctions against the KRG in order to isolate it and step back from an independence decision. Both countries have significant Kurdish populations and have similar concerns over Kurdish secession attempts. Similar to the PKK threat in Turkey, there is a terrorist Kurdish separatist organization in Iran that is called the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK). The PKK and the PJAK are affiliated and share bases and infrastructure in the Qandil Mountains of Northern Iraq. In this regard, Iran supported Turkish attacks against the PKK camps in Qandil, while the U.S. administration continues to ignore Turkey’s battle against the YPG and PKK in Iraq and Syria. Therefore, both countries’ security priorities once more merged on protecting the territorial integrity of Iraq. Both Turkey and Iran believe that Iraq’s unity serves to suppress Kurdish separatism and preserve their respective territorial integrity. Turkey and Iran also had a similar attitude during the Qatar Crisis of 2017. They rejected the Trump-led coalition formed by the Gulf countries against Qatar. The reason behind the alliance was based on the claim that Qatar supports “terrorist” organizations including Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. Nevertheless, both Turkey and Iran are well aware that the main reason behind this alliance is the Qatari Emir’s statements underlining that the Gulf countries are facing economic problems because of the huge military spending and there is a need for greater cooperation in the region including Iran. Moreover, similar to Qatar, Turkey and Iran have also not defined Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist organizations but as elected legitimate governments of their countries. To summarize, it is not wrong to suggest that disappointment with the U.S. and the EU inevitably forced Turkey to search for alternative allies. To this end, mutual benefits with Russia and Iran led to the trilateral Russian-Turkish-Iranian alliance. The U.S.’s omnipotent power and unilateral regional policies further consolidated this alliance. It is evident that Russia and Iran demonstrated a more empathic stance towards Turkey’s security concerns than the U.S., particularly during the civil war in Syria.

V. Conflicting Standings towards the FETO Terror Organization The U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gülen and his terrorist organization (FETO) are held responsible by the Turkish government for plotting the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016. As the most significant political development in contemporary Turkey, Turkish democracy and state institutions have been faced with serious challenges as a result of this attempted coup. Although it did not receive the required attention in the media in Western countries, it was one of the most significant turning points in modern Turkish history. After the coup attempt, the Turkish government initiated an extended campaign to clean the roots of the FETO terrorist organization from the Turkish military, judiciary, bureaucracy, and academia. As the

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operation deepened, the extent to which the organization was powerful and penetrated into almost every sector in Turkey became evident. Therefore, the military coup attempt was actually the visible tip of the iceberg, whereby FETO and its leader posed a serious danger to the Turkish State. Nevertheless, the U.S.’s ambivalent attitude in responding to the failed coup attempt and continuous support to FETO has further strained Turkish-American Relations. Turkish officials even accused the U.S. of supporting the coup attempt, mainly because the U.S. administration insisted on hosting Gülen in Pennsylvania and refused Turkey’s legal demands for the extradition of Gülen, although it is has been proven that FETO is behind the coup attempt. Instead, the U.S. administration and media preferred to explain the decaying Turkish-American Relations by the growing authoritarianism in Turkey. It has been claimed that the Turkish government treated coup plotters unfairly and these were President Erdoğan’s attempts to suppress the opposition by using the event as justification. Moreover, as Turkey becomes more critical of the U.S. administration, it is further suggested that the failed coup has institutionally distanced Turkey from NATO (Aydıntaşbaş & Kirişçi 2017, p. 21) and has led to an anti-Western stance in domestic politics under the Erdoğan administration (Park 2015, p. 583). In other words, from the U.S. point of view, Turkey has lost its credibility and reliability under an increasingly Islamist and anti-Western AK Parti government and the harsh competition with FETO proves this point. Inevitably, the clash between the two sides regarding FETO turned to diplomatic crises through individuals. For instance, the arrest of the U.S. Istanbul Consulate employee Metin Topuz, who is of Turkish origin, related to the investigation into the coup attempt by the Turkish authorities caused a diplomatic crisis between the two countries in 2017. The U.S. government suspended non-immigrant visa services for Turkish nationals and Turkey responded in the same way. In the same vein, American pastor Andrew Brunson was arrested in October 2016 on charges related to FETO and the PKK terror organization and faced up to 35 years of imprisonment. In response, Washington doubled its tariffs on steel and aluminum imported from Turkey and froze the assets of the Turkish Interior and Justice Ministers, who had leading roles in the detention of Brunson (U.S. Department of Treasury). Although the sanctions and tariffs imposed on Turkey were lifted one month after Brunson was released in October 2018, this incident proved demonstrated that Turkey could face serious economic sanctions from the U.S. in the event that the interests of the two countries clashed. More importantly, conflicting standings towards the FETO terrorist organization will continue to be a source of conflict between the two countries, as the U.S. administration has shown no willingness to extradite Gülen to Turkey for trial.

Concluding Remarks The Turkish-American Relations were relatively stable until the end of the Cold War. The main reason for this was the existence of the common enemy (Soviet

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Union) and mutual interests. Considering Turkey’s comparative weakness and inferiority, it could be suggested that the relations were asymmetric in favor of the U.S. In the post-Arab Spring era, Turkey and the U.S. no longer have a single common enemy as it was the case during the Cold War era. More importantly, both countries have completely different political views on many issues and clashing interests in the contemporary era. In particular, the U.S.’s indifferent attitude toward Turkey’s security concerns is the main reason behind the deteriorating relations. Turkey-American Relations have entered into an era of crises and have become more complicated than ever. The recent developments in the Middle East including the U.S. military alliance with the YPG in northern Syria, Turkish-Israeli resentment, Palestinian-Israeli Conflict and Jerusalem issue, conflicting approaches towards political Islam and the Arab Spring rebellions, Turkey’s increasing cooperation with Russia and Iran, and the U.S. hosting of Gülen, who is defined as the most prominent contemporary security threat to Turkey, have further deteriorated the relations. Arguably, the main reason at the heart of the issue is the fact that Turkish Foreign Policy has become more assertive regarding its own policy priorities and has gained a more “strategic perspective” during the AK Parti rule (Işıksal 2018/c, p.721). In order to pursue the country’s strategic objectives, Turkey has actively engaged in all the neighboring regions, particularly in the Middle East. However, as commented by Richard Falk, the U.S. has not yet accepted Turkey’s will to act “independently” and “assertively” in its neighborhood and beyond (2014, pp. 11–13) and expected Turkey to unconditionally comply with American policies as in the Cold War era. The new political and economic realities changed the dimension of the strategic partnership and Turkish-American Relations deteriorated in the post-Arab Spring era. Both the structural and conjectural factors forced Turkish policy-makers to pursue more security-oriented politics. From the Turkish point of view, the U.S. became an unreliable partner during the 2000s due to its failing regional policies, incorrect strategies, and unfulfilled promises to Turkey. On the other hand, the U.S. perspective envisions Turkey as no longer a “model country”, although it is still the unique secular and democrat country in the region, and Turkey has lost its credibility and reliability under the increasingly Islamist and anti-Western AK Parti government. To summarize, Turkish American relations in the Middle East, particularly in the post-Arab Spring era, have become fractured and it seems that there is no longer a strategic partnership in current form. Simply stating, the bonds between the two countries are no longer tight and the factors that kept both countries politically together are fading away every passing day. More dramatically, there seems to be no real progress in repairing the bilateral relations and solving the problems that are pushing the two actors apart. The causes of the conflict between the countries are particularly serious and profound, with a minimal if not nonexistent hope for a solution.

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Işıksal, H. (2015/b), “The Four Stages of Turkish Position in Cyprus: The Elements of Continuity and Change”, in H. Işıksal & O. Örmeci (eds.) Turkish Foreign Policy in the New Millennium, Oxford: Peter Lang, pp. 297–312. Işıksal, H. (2018/a), “Turkish Foreign Policy, the Arab Spring and the Syrian Crisis: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back”, in H. Işıksal & O. Göksel (eds.) Turkey’s Relations with the Middle East: Political Encounters after the Arab Spring, New York: Springer, pp. 13–31. Işıksal, H. (2018/b), “Political Chaos in Iraq, ISIS and Turkish Foreign Policy: The High Cost of the Westphalian Delusion”, in H. Işıksal & O. Göksel (eds.) Turkey’s Relations with the Middle East: Political Encounters after the Arab Spring, New York: Springer, pp. 83–103. Işıksal, H. (2018/c), “Conclusion: Turkey and the Middle East in an Age of Turbulence”, in H. Işıksal & O. Göksel (eds.) Turkey’s Relations with the Middle East: Political Encounters after the Arab Spring, New York: Springer, pp. 211–220. Kapsis, J. (2005). “From Desert Storm to Metal Storm: How Iraq Has Spoiled US–Turkish Relations,”Current History, 104 (685), pp. 380–389. Karaman, M. L. (1996), “Tarihin çarpık bir biçimde ‘yazılımı‘ kutsal-topraklar (Filistin ve Kudüs) üzerindeki örneği: İsrail’in doğuşu ve gelişmesi”, Yediİklim, 10 (75–76), pp. 48– 53. Kibaroğlu, M. (2013), “Turkey’s Place in the ‘Missile Shield’ ”, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 15 (2), pp. 223–236. Kibaroğlu, M. (2017), “Double Standards Mar NATO’s S-400s Stance”, Anadolu Ajansı, Date of Accession: July 15, 2017 from http://aa.com.tr/en/analysis-news/double-standardsmar-natos-s-400s-stance/870791. Kibaroğlu, M. & Sazak, S. (2015), “Business as Usual: The U.S.-Turkey Security Partnership”, Middle East Policy, 22 (4), pp. 98–112. Kingsley, P. (2014), “Egypt’s Rabaa Massacre: One Year On”, The Guardian. Date of Accession: September 15, 2018 from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/16/ rabaa-massacre-egypt-human-rights-watch. Krieg, A. (2016), “Externalizing the Burden of War: The Obama Doctrine and US Foreign Policy in the Middle East”, International Affairs, 92 (1), pp. 97–113. Lewin, A. (2000), “Turkey and Israel Reciprocal-and Mutual- Imaginary in the Media, 1994– 1999”, Journal of International Affairs, pp. 239–261. Oğuzlu, T. (2008), “Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?”, Turkish Studies, 9:1, pp. 3–20. Oğuzlu, T. (2020), “Turkish Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order”, All Azimuth, 9 (1), pp. 127–139. Öniş, Z. (2012), “Turkey and the Arab Spring: Between Ethics and Self-Interest”, Insight Turkey, 14 (3), pp. 1–19. Özdamar, Ö., Halistoprak, B. T., & I. E. Sula (2014), “From Good Neighbor to Model: Turkey’s Changing Roles in the Middle East in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring”, Uluslararası İlişkiler, 11 (42), pp. 93–113. Özertem, H. S. (2017), “Turkey and Russia: A Fragile Friendship”, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 15 (4), pp. 122–134.

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Matthew Weiss1

Chapter 11: U.S.-Turkish Relations

since the Arab Spring: Missteps, Mutual Misunderstandings, and Future Possibilities Abstract: Despite a long track record of cooperation during the Cold War, the frequency, intensity, and duration of crises between the United States (U.S.) and Turkey have markedly increased in recent years. This invites consideration of what best accounts for the seemingly unstable equilibrium into which U.S.-Turkey relations have descended and whether discord has become the “new normal” in their relations. This chapter makes the case that a more comprehensive picture of the tense tenor of contemporary relations between the U.S. and Turkey requires scholars to take stock of the larger regional and international environment in which Turkish-American Relations are embedded. To this end, the repercussions for Turkish-American Relations of recent significant changes in the international system, including the decline of Pax Americana and the emergence of a more multipolar order, as well as changing dynamics in the Middle East regional order, including those resulting from the Arab Spring, are analyzed in depth. Key events, such as the Syrian civil war and the 2013 coup in Egypt, are examined to shed light on these sources of change and how they have contributed to discontinuity, instability, and policy divergences in Turkish-American Relations in recent years. A secondary purpose of this chapter is to highlight salient differences between the U.S. administrations of Barack Obama and Donald Trump in their conduct of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East and how these differences in turn have shaped TurkishAmerican Relations. Among other findings, the analysis reveals that Trump has been far more inclined to take ideologically motivated and partial stances in regional disputes that have tended to favor Turkey’s regional rivals and further polarized relations between the U.S. and Turkey. This chapter argues that prospects for regional stability and the quality of Turkish-American Relations could be substantially improved were the U.S. to play a more constructive role in conflict resolution and stay above the fray in disputes that pit Turkey against rival Sunni states. Keywords: Turkish-American Relations, Turkey, Syria, Kurdish Question, Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.

1 Assistant Professor, Department of Public Affairs and Security Studies, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, Edinburg, Texas (USA). Email: [email protected] / [email protected]

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Introduction Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, relations between the U.S.  and Turkey have ebbed and flowed. Even during the Cold War, when both countries were animated by a shared strategic quest to halt the expansion of Soviet influence and cooperation peaked, crises periodically erupted that strained alliance ties, most notably over the divided island of Cyprus. Some observers and experts, such as Cook (2017) argue that the closeness of the relationship between the two allies during the halcyon days of the Cold War has been greatly exaggerated and even romanticized. In his view, there was never any real glue that bound the U.S.  and Turkey together, beyond their common membership in NATO and the momentary imperative of containing the Soviet threat. Cook (2017) argues that the values and interests of the two countries were never truly aligned and their commonalities receded while their inherent incompatibilities were brought into sharper relief by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Even to the extent that the U.S.  and Turkey share broadly similar objectives for the Middle East, such as non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, countering terrorism, and a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, he argues that a consensus on how to achieve these goals is fundamentally lacking (Cook 2017). Therefore, the U.S. and Turkey may be more accurately viewed as “strategic competitors” or even “antagonists” than “allies” or “partners” (Cook 2017). From a complementary perspective, Danforth (2019) argues that despite the outward appearance of a robust and durable alliance, Turkey resented being “Washington’s junior partner” during the Cold War and these slights and resentments bubbled up to the surface once the Soviet threat disappeared, leaving in its wake a deeply rooted anti-Americanism among Turks, which President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan often manipulates to excite the fervor of his conservative Islamist and nationalist base. In a somewhat similar vein, Reynolds (2019), in analyzing the historical underpinnings of the recent Turkish-Russian rapprochement, asserts that Turkey’s foreign policy conduct has always been motivated by a thoroughgoing realpolitik. Therefore, even during the reign of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey oscillated between Russia and West in its alliance choices, flexibly aligning with whatever great power was seen as most supportive or least obstructive of its drive for “uncompromised sovereignty and total independence” (Reynolds 2019). While the aforementioned observers may be essentially correct that a deeper affinity between Turkey and the U.S.  has been chronically and conspicuously absent, a strong case can be made that Turkey remains anchored in the postwar liberal international order that the U.S.  ushered in after the Second World War, even if this anchor is dragging (Sazak 2018). Nonetheless, recent events have fueled speculation that even this lowest common denominator in Turkish-American Relations is fraying. The frequency, intensity, and duration of crises among the two countries have markedly increased in recent years. Competition and conflicts of interest seemingly overshadow periods of cooperation, which are more fleeting and tactical than strategic. Sharp disagreements over issues such as U.S. military

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support for Syrian Kurdish groups and Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system have appeared increasingly intractable. In sum, recent years have witnessed a fundamental shifting of the ground beneath the feet of an alliance that was once regarded as one of the few constants in the perennially turbulent and volatile Middle East. Has discord displaced consensus and cooperation as the norm in Turkish-American Relations? What best accounts for the seemingly unstable equilibrium into which U.S.-Turkey relations have descended? This chapter makes the case that while the tense tenor of contemporary relations between U.S. and Turkey can be attributed in part to mutual misunderstandings, missed opportunities, and lack of sensitivity to each other’s vital security interests, this dominant actor-oriented perspective fails to take into account the larger regional and international environment in which Turkish-American relations are embedded. A  more comprehensive picture of these changing dynamics requires scholars to identify and account for the overarching systemic factors that have contributed to the growing discontinuities, instabilities, and policy divergences in Turkish-American Relations of recent years. To this end, this chapter highlights the repercussions for Turkish-American Relations of alterations in the Middle East regional order, including the Arab Spring, whose consequences continue to play out, and recent changes in the international system, including most notably, the shifting priorities of the U.S., the partial retrenchment of the U.S. from the Middle East, and the emergence of a more multipolar international order. The chapter will basically argue that these significant vectors of change have intensified the long-standing volatility and uncertainty within the region and spilled over into Turkish-American Relations. Amidst such flux in the international and regional systems, the U.S and Turkey, among other key players in the region, face a constantly changing matrix of opportunities and threats, and find it increasingly challenging to coordinate their expectations and align their behavior. The instability that these changes have wrought and their deleterious impact on Turkish-American Relations will be examined through key cases, such as the Syrian civil war, the 2013 coup in Egypt that brought Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to power, the Gulf Crisis of 2017 and the blockade of Qatar by the “Quartet” group of countries, and the international diplomatic crisis that ensued in the wake of Saudi dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s assassination in October 2018. A  secondary purpose of this chapter is to highlight salient differences between the administrations of Barack Obama and Donald Trump in their worldviews and conduct of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East. The analysis then proceeds to examine how these differences in turn have shaped Turkish-American Relations. Though both Presidents sought to reduce the American military footprint in the region and avoid entangling alignments, the manner in which they pursued these goals vastly differed. Most conspicuously, Trump has demonstrated a far greater inclination to assign the responsibilities of safeguarding perceived American national interests to regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel. While all of these countries are more or less perceived as reliable allies of the U.S., they all rank among Turkey’s most significant strategic competitors in the region.

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Therefore, the degree to which Trump has come to depend upon them adds yet another irritant to the already severely strained Turkish-American Relations. Also, contrary to Obama, Trump has dabbled in a brand of divisive identity politics that frequently arouses the sensitives of Turkey, a nation which has under the rule of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, increasingly staked its legitimacy on rallying solidarity with Muslim states and peoples.

I. The Decline of Pax Americana and Its Impact on Turkish-American Relations As covered extensively in other chapters in this volume, Turkish policy-makers initially welcomed the inauguration of U.S. President Barack Obama in January 2009, believing that this would herald a dramatic transformation for the better in Turkish-American Relations, which took a decidedly negative turn under the previous administration of President George W. Bush. Bush’s legacy was defined by the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, a momentous decision that the Turkish society and parliament, the Turkish Grand National Assembly, opposed from the outset for fear that it would destabilize the region and create a favorable environment for the Kurdish militant group, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Kerkeren Kurdistan or the PKK), to establish a safe haven in Northern Iraq from which it could stage attacks against military and civilian targets in Turkey with impunity. The misgivings that Turkey harbored were richly borne out by the aftermath of the war, which featured prolonged Sunni-Shia sectarian strife in Iraq. Moreover, the PKK, likely seizing on the security vacuum created by the American invasion, violated a five-year unilateral cease-fire and resumed its attacks against Turkey in 2004. Obama, who was elected partly on the promise of withdrawing from Iraq and responding to the demands of a war-weary American public, seemed to provide the perfect antidote, in Turkey’s eyes, to the unilateral, hard power-obsessed policies of George W. Bush and the accompanying cowboy-esque mentality that eschewed diplomacy and multilateral engagement with regional partners such as Turkey. The partial exception to this was the Greater Middle East Initiative, a vague blueprint advanced in Bush’s second term to encourage the spread of democracy in the Middle East, with Turkey cast in a leading role. This initiative appeared to herald a partial return to multilateral cooperation and an implicit disavowal of the efficacy of military power for promotion of democratization. However, the plan foundered on suspicions that it was part and parcel of a neoconservative agenda (the same one that drove the war in Iraq) to reshape the region in line with American objectives and priorities. On the other hand, President Obama, at least in his first term in office, brought a fresh approach to international affairs that appeared at first blush to be overwhelmingly complementary with Turkey’s interests. First, Obama seemingly made good on his promise of bringing an end to misbegotten American military adventures in the region by announcing an end to the U.S. military

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presence in Iraq in 2009, followed by the actual withdrawal of American forces in 2011. Secondly, Obama’s vigorous efforts to repair relations with the Arab and Muslim worlds, which were in tatters after the universally unpopular invasion of Iraq, were greeted enthusiastically by Ankara. Obama’s diplomatic charm offensive vis-a-vis the Muslim world culminated in landmarks speeches delivered before the Turkish Grand National Assembly in April 2009 and the American University of Cairo in June of the same year. Infused with themes such as diplomatic solutions to problems, an equitable resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and investments in the educational and technological development of Muslim-majority countries, Obama’s addresses carried a great deal of resonance with the Turkish government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Under Erdoğan’s leadership, Turkey played an active role in fostering the very kind of diplomatic and soft power initiatives that Obama championed. In its broad outlines, Obama’s diplomatic outreach to the Muslim world, which included conciliatory Nowruz messages delivered to an Iranian audience, dovetailed with Turkey’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy, a policy which sought to transform Turkey’s traditionally uneasy relations with neighboring states such as Syria and Iran in more cooperative direction. However, it was Obama’s military-strategic concept towards the Middle East that would prove to be problematic for Turkish-American Relations. If Obama came to power with any all-encompassing grand strategy towards the Middle East, it was to minimize the U.S. military’s involvement in the region, avoid becoming drawn into any new conflicts, and shift resources and attention to Asia to counter a rising China, a strategy known as the “Asia Pivot”. This combination of gradual military disengagement and expansion of diplomatic and soft power initiatives suited Turkey’s interests well as long as there were no upheavals or major wars brewing in the region. However, the string of pro-democracy revolutions that overturned long-standing, entrenched authoritarian regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, and other Arab countries from 2010–2011, collectively known as the “Arab Spring” and the violent turn that the regime-opposition clashes took in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, brought all of the contradictions of Obama’s Middle East strategy to the fore, with negative consequences for Turkish-American Relations. As the violence in Libya and Syria escalated, Obama was subjected to intense cross-pressures. On one hand, he faced an American electorate that had little to no appetite for further Iraqi-style, open-ended military commitments in the region. On the other hand, he was surrounded by a coterie of more hawkish foreign policy advisers such as then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who lobbied Obama to employ American military might, especially in Libya, with a view towards tamping down any new sources of instability (Phillips 2017, p. 41). To a degree, Obama was anxious about the prospect that American inaction in the face of the festering conflict in Syria could produce the ingredients of a failed-state and in turn provide fertile ground for Islamist extremist groups such as Al Qaeda to organize and launch attacks against the U.S. However, this was tempered by his greater fear that a U.S.-aided overthrow of the regime of Bashar al-Assad would hasten Syria’s slide into anarchy and transformation into a safe haven for jihadist groups, an assessment propelled

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by his belief that there was no credible, unified opposition that could be prepared to take the reins of governance, and certainly not one with democratic bona fides. At the same time, the American public’s reluctance to use military force to shape the course of the revolutions meshed with Obama’s own non-interventionist instincts. The net result of these conflicting impulses and cross-pressures is that the Obama administration adopted a half-in, half-out approach to Syria that sent mixed signals to regional partners such as Turkey who were bent on achieving Assad’s ouster. According to Malley (2019, p. 43), Obama sought to calibrate American involvement in Syria by for instance, backing rebel groups fighting both the Assad regime and ISIS, but claiming not to be pursuing regime change. However, the delicate balance that Obama sought to strike between placating regional allies like Turkey and Saudi Arabia and avoiding being drawn into an open-ended Iraqi-style commitment was both unconvincing and unimpressive to Ankara. The Turkish government lamented Obama’s reticence and demanded that the U.S. provide the kind of robust support to the anti-Assad rebels that was necessary to alter the balance of forces on the battlefield decisively in the opposition’s favor.2 As a front-line state that bore the brunt of the spillover consequences of the Assad regime’s brutal crackdown on the opposition in the form of massive refugee flows, Turkey expected and demanded a more resolute approach from the U.S. that would turn the tide against the Assad regime. However, Obama, who was wary of the consequences of external regime change, and in Ankara’s eyes, shackled by a rigid concept of military disengagement from the region that was ill-suited to the urgency of the moment, was either unable or unwilling to deliver the results Ankara sought. As a result, Turkish-American Relations were marred by mutual disappointment and dashed hopes and expectations. This was most evident in the abortive redline that Obama declared in August 2012 around the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime, which he implied would be met with U.S. military force (Phillips 2017, p.  41). Obama’s resolve was put to the test in August 2013, when Ghouta, a rebel stronghold and suburb of Damascus, was struck by chemical weapons in an attack where the evidence overwhelmingly pointed to the Syrian government as the culprit. In order to enforce the redline, the Obama administration was poised to launch retaliatory air strikes against Syrian regime targets. However, as Obama was anxious for an off-ramp from a confrontation that he feared would draw the U.S. into another military morass in the Middle East, he

2 According to one source, an irony presented itself in the fact that despite the Obama administration’s tepid support for the anti-Assad rebellion in practice, the intensity of its rhetoric, especially Washington’s declaration in late Summer 2011 that Assad must go, was greeted in Teheran with alarm and jolted the Iranian regime into significantly stepping up its military and financial assistance to Assad’s forces in order to shore up a regime that it regarded as a key conduit of its influence in the region (Phillips 2017, p. 40).

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accepted a deal offered by Russian President Vladimir Putin in August-September 2013 to disarm Assad’s chemical weapons arsenal peacefully (Phillips 2017, p. 41). Obama’s U-turn bred great disillusionment among Turkey and the other Sunni allies of the U.S. in the region who nurtured the opposition to Assad. In their view, the Obama-Putin deal was anathema, a Faustian bargain that enabled the Assad regime to evade accountability for its previous uses of chemical weapons and cling on to power. Turkey was especially incensed, as it felt that the Obama administration, which had earlier pushed Ankara to break with the Assad regime and throw its weight behind the Syrian opposition, had pulled the rug out from under it. The Sunni regional powers’ expectations of imminent and decisive U.S. military intervention against Syria were buoyed by both the declaration of the redline visà-vis Assad and the U.S.-led intervention in Libya in the spring of 2011. According to Phillips (2017, p.  41), the NATO-supported operation that led to the toppling of long-time Libyan strongman Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s regime “convinced many, both for and against Assad, that the United States was back in the business of regime change in the Middle East”. However, Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, the three Sunni allies of the U.S. who were among the foremost proponents of regime change in Syria, fundamentally misread the lessons that Obama drew from the Libya intervention. Far from emboldening Obama to export the Libyan model to Syria, the anarchy into which Libya lapsed following the downfall of Gaddafi only vindicated his original aversion to U.S.-led military interventions aimed at regime change. As Kadercan (2019) states, “What the Turkish government failed to assess was the reluctance of the United States: The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had already worn down America’s taste for further adventures in the Middle East, and the chaos that ensued in Libya after Muammar Gaddafi’s fall ensured that Washington would not be willing to go to great lengths in order to take down Assad.” In essence, for Obama, Libya became the exception that reestablished the rule. The fallout of the Libyan operation reinforced his innate caution around the use of large-scale military force in the Middle East to advance policy objectives. It was a gamble that Obama himself conceded he lost, ushering in a host of negative unintended consequences and ranked among the biggest disappointments of his Presidency. The lack of American willingness to seize what Turkey viewed as a prime opportunity to alter the regional balance of power in the Levant in the U.S. and the Sunni states’ favor through a direct intervention against Assad added to the long list of accumulated grievances that Turkey harbored and still harbors towards the U.S. As Phillips (2017, p. 42) states: “Despite this lack of understanding of the President and his regional policy, however, all three [Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar] still based their Syria policy on the assumption that eventually the U.S. cavalry would arrive. This proved a disastrous misjudgment that exacerbated the civil war further and placed serious strain on U.S. relations with all three powers.” The upending of the regional order that the Arab Spring precipitated, against the backdrop of the decline of Pax Americana and the newfound American ambivalence surrounding the utility of massive military interventions, epitomized in Obama’s decision-making calculus, introduced radical discontinuities into

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Turkish-American Relations, and widened the expectations gap among the two allies. The prolonged instability that accompanied the raging Syrian civil war created a new matrix of threats and opportunities on which neither Turkey nor the U.S. were aligned, leading to a fundamental divergence of policies which has yet to be bridged. On the threats side of the ledger, the Obama administration was at odds with Turkey over the magnitude of the danger posed by Assad to regional stability. While sharing Turkey’s view that the Assad regime was illegitimate and did not deserve to play a role in the transition period following the conclusion of a peaceful political settlement in Syria, American policy-makers asserted that the metastasizing spread of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) eclipsed the Assad regime as a security threat, and thus took precedence, a view with which Turkey vehemently disagreed (Barkey 2015). The Obama administration maintained that ISIS represented an independent threat in its own right and was not simply a symptom of the Syrian civil war and Assad’s refusal to relinquish power, as Turkey claimed (Akyol 2014). The allies’ disagreement over the urgency of removing Assad from power was front and center in the tense and protracted negotiations that occurred in late 2014 in the midst of ISIS’ brutal siege of the northern Syrian Kurdish-majority border town of Kobane (or Ain al-Arab). Seeing the Assad regime as the preeminent threat to itself and the region, Erdoğan urged the U.S.  and other Western allies to set up a buffer zone in northern Syria within which Syrian rebel factions could be freely trained, equipped, and organized to fight Assad, and a safe haven for refugees could be established, free of any Syrian government or military presence (Arango & Yeginsu 2014). Risking a substantial breach in relations with a NATO ally, Erdoğan rebuffed the Obama administration’s insistent requests for the counter-ISIS coalition to be granted permission to use the airbase at Incirlik for airstrikes against ISIS, and for Kurdish fighters from Turkey to be allowed to cross over into Syria to fight ISIS. Erdoğan conditioned Turkey’s assistance to Kobane’s Kurdish defenders and a more active role in the U.S-led coalition against ISIS on the Obama administration’s consent to the buffer zone proposal, which he identified as imperative (Fahim & Shoumali 2014; Landler, Barnard & Schmitt 2014). The Turkish government insisted that the coalition focus its military resources on the elimination of the Assad regime (or otherwise step up its support for rebel groups committed to this goal), which it regarded as the root cause of the turmoil in Syria and ISIS’ rise to prominence (AlJazeera 2014/b; Arango & Yeginsu 2014; Christian Science Monitor 2014; Landler, Barnard & Schmitt 2014). For its part, the Obama administration, which already had its hands full with ISIS, resisted the buffer zone proposal, the imposition of which it feared would put it on a slippery slope towards a direct confrontation with the Assad regime, an eventuality that it was intent on avoiding at all costs.3 Obama’s hesitation was in keeping not only 3 The risk that the establishment of a buffer zone in Syria would put the U.S. on a collision course with the Assad regime stemmed from the fact that it would require

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with the lessons he drew from Libya, which sobered him up to the risks of regime change through military force, but also with his desire to husband what he saw as finite American military resources for the fight against ISIS, whose international jihadism he regarded as a greater menace to U.S. security than “Assad’s brutal but national agenda” (Phillips 2017, pp. 41–42). Turkey and the U.S.  were also worlds apart on the opportunities side of the ledger in Syria. Whereas the U.S., under Obama, adopted in many respects a realist and risk-averse approach towards the Arab Spring uprisings in Syria and other countries, one that flowed in part from his preference for a shift in strategic attention and American diplomatic and military resources towards Asia, the toppling of old-guard authoritarian regimes raised the ambitions of Ankara (Danforth 2019). The latter saw the regional upheaval, coupled with the partial U.S. retrenchment from the region and the transition to a more multipolar order, as presenting a rare opportunity for it to reconfigure the political landscape of the Middle East in its image (Phillips 2017, p. 37). However, a source of tensions with Washington arose from the irony that while Turkey and other ambitious Sunni powers such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar enjoyed greater room for maneuver by virtue of the U.S.’ partial disengagement from the Middle East and sought to capitalize on the opportunities thus created, they could only go so far in achieving their goals without active U.S.  assistance. This put them in the paradoxical position of demanding a more active role from Washington at the same time that the U.S. sought to carefully circumscribe its regional involvement (Phillips 2017, p. 37). As discussed above, the disjuncture between Ankara’s expectations and Washington’s commitments was most evident in the contentious bargaining over the enforcement of the redline around Assad’s use of chemical weapons and the establishment of a buffer zone in Syria. However, it was also brought into sharper relief by Ankara’s aggressive promotion of then-ascendant political parties and factions associated with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) once the uprisings sparked in Tunisia and Egypt gained momentum. Turkey’s governing party, the AK Parti, has its roots in the same brand of activist, bottom-up political Islam as the MB adheres to. Therefore, AK Parti saw the rising tide of MB influence as an auspicious development that would elevate Turkey’s own stature and influence in the region. Accordingly, Turkish government lavished the popular Islamist movement with material and diplomatic support in order to enable it to firm up its grip on power in Egypt and Tunisia, while boosting its fortunes in other Arab states that were in the throes of revolution or political transitions (Danforth 2019). In Syria, Turkey assiduously worked to bolster the influence of MB-aligned factions within the ranks of the opposition to Assad. All in all, Turkey threw its weight behind the MB and positioned itself (along with Qatar) as the key patron of the movement, because it viewed the MB as a the enforcement of a no-fly zone and air strikes to neutralize Syria’s anti-aircraft systems (Arango 2014).

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fellow Islamist actor, as an ideological kindred-spirit and natural ally in its ambitious quest for primacy in the post-Arab Spring regional order. As Ibish (2016, pp.  15–16) states, regarding Turkey’s motivations for hitching its wagon to the MB as closely as it did, “Many also argued that, by championing ascendant Muslim Brotherhood parties, Turkey would become the leader of a regional ‘Green Wave’ that would transform Arab republics like Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria into not only Islamist states, but also Turkish allies and possibly clients.” In contrast, the U.S.  and the Obama administration did not have the direct stake in the success of the Muslim Brotherhood or the “Islamist project” as Turkey did. The Obama administration’s support for Egypt’s elected President, Mohammed Morsi, who hailed from the MB, was tepid at best. Its public backing for Morsi masked deep misgivings about the competence of his government and his compatibility (and that of the MB on the whole) with American interests in the region (Kirkpatrick 2018). The Obama administration’s support was motivated primarily by a pragmatic desire to avoid alienating a movement with immense popular appeal that represented the most potent force at the ballot box in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring. Therefore, Morsi’s downfall in July 2013, only a year after his election to the Presidency, in a coup d’état that was spearheaded by his own Defense Minister Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, was met with muted opposition in Washington, and was in fact quietly welcomed in some quarters of the White House, who saw Morsi as feckless and unreliable.4 In contrast, Turkey and its regional ally, Qatar, fiercely condemned the putsch and rallied behind the deposed and detained Morsi. The position they took in this crisis pitted them against not only Washington, but also the UAE and Saudi Arabia, who not only enthusiastically backed the coup (and according to some observers, helped orchestrate it), but also pledged billions of dollars of financial aid to Sisi in order to aid his consolidation of power and stabilize Egypt’s wobbly economy.5 4 According to David Kirkpatrick (2018), a prominent New York Times reporter, many of Obama’s most influential foreign policy advisers and military leaders, such as former Secretary of State John Kerry, former Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, and then-Head of Central Command James Mattis, were pessimistic about the prospects that Egypt’s democratic transition would succeed and embraced the narrative peddled by leading Persian Gulf allies, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, about the purported dangers posed by the MB and political Islam. Therefore, they felt a sense of palpable relief when Morsi was deposed. This was clearly evident in the fact that Kerry lobbied and ultimately prevailed on Obama to refrain from designating Morsi’s ouster a coup, which under U.S. law, would have required a cutoff in aid to the Egyptian military. Instead, the Obama administration moved to recognize the Sisi regime and economic and military assistance to Egypt continued to flow, except for a temporary moratorium on the delivery of four F-16 fighter planes to the Egyptian Air Force, a move designed to demonstrate “displeasure” with the coup that was more symbolic than substantive. 5 According to official figures, in the wake of the coup, Saudi Arabia pledged $5 billion in aid to Egypt, the UAE $3 billion, and Kuwait $4 billion. However, in a leaked

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Turkey’s and the U.S.’ diametrically opposed reactions to the coup reveal how leery the Obama administration was towards Turkey’s unconditional support for the MB as the centerpiece of its strategy for carving out a preeminent position in the region. To a certain degree, the U.S. was willing to take a chance on Islamist forces in Egypt and Syria, if for no other reason that it did not want to be seen as defying the wishes of the “Arab street”. However, as soon as the MB wobbled and was then toppled in Egypt, the Obama administration, like its predecessors, retreated to the familiar comfort of backing, along with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, status quo-oriented, “security states” of the type Sisi’s regime in Egypt represents. Another reason why the Egyptian coup and its aftermath drove a wedge between Turkey and the U.S. is because it occurred against the backdrop of the Gezi Park anti-government protests that erupted in Turkey in May 2013, an event in which the Turkish government suspected that the U.S. had a hidden hand. Erdoğan and other Turkish officials accused the U.S. of applying a blatant double standard for on one hand, denouncing the Turkish government’s suppression of the Gezi Park protests, while on the other hand, acquiescing in Sisi’s illegitimate seizure of power from a democratically elected government in Egypt (Danforth 2019; Johnson & Gramer 2019).

II. The Rupture Over the YPG and ISIS As contentious as the bilateral disputes over the issues of regime change in Syria and the fate of the Islamists were, they paled in comparison to the rift that developed between the U.S. and Turkey over American support for the Kurdish-dominated Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat or PYD) and its armed wing, the People’s Protection Forces (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel or YPG) in the military campaign waged against ISIS in northern Syria along the Turkish border. The PYD is the Kurdish group that rushed to fill the power vacuum left by the retreating Syrian Army in the predominantly Kurdish-inhabited areas of northern Syria at the outset of the uprising in 2011. As of January 2015, it had set up three autonomous cantons in Jazira, Kobane, and Afrin (often collectively referred to as Rojava or Western Kurdistan) that Turkey feared might be a stepping stone towards fullfledged statehood. The PYD and its armed wing, the YPG, are an offshoot of the PKK, which has waged an on and off-again insurgency against Turkey since 1984. The conflict inside Turkey has claimed over 50,000 casualties from PKK terrorist attacks against Turkish civilian and military targets as well as massive Turkish counter-insurgency operations, some of which have featured large-scale village clearing operations and the forcible displacement of waves of Kurdish inhabitants of the Kurdish-dominated southeastern region of Turkey to the western cities of Istanbul, Izmir, Adana, and Mersin. recording of a conversation with his office manager, Sisi claimed that the aid from the Gulf monarchies amounted to as much as $39.5 billion (Başkan 2016, pp. 125–126).

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Given this background, Turkey regards the PKK and its offshoots as the most persistent and pernicious threat to its internal security and territorial integrity. Therefore, the burgeoning presence of a branch of the PKK across the border in Syria in late 2014 set off alarm bells among policy-makers in Ankara. The PYD and YPG’s territorial and political advances triggered Turkey’s existential anxieties that a successful Kurdish autonomous region in northern Syria administered by the PYD would become a state-in-waiting and rekindle secessionist ambitions among its own Kurdish populace (Tol 2012). Turkish fears are magnified by the prospect, however distant, of a Kurdish mini-state in Syria drawing the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the autonomous governing body of Northern Iraq, into its orbit, which would leave Turkey hemmed in by a “Greater Kurdistan” (Gunter 2014, p. 174). Turkey’s sense of encirclement was only exacerbated by U.S. support for the PYD and YPG, which began in earnest around 2014 and quickly expanded from political support and close air support for ground operations against ISIS to regular supplies of heavy weapons and advanced military equipment. The Obama administration and later the Trump administration justified their deepening partnership with the YPG as necessitated by the exigencies of the campaign against ISIS, claiming that the YPG was by far the most reliable, effective, and committed fighting force against the extremist group, especially given the PYD and YPG’s staunchly secular identity (Yayla & Clark 2018). Whether the YPG’s capabilities were overexaggerated is debatable. However, the Obama administration’s efforts to train and stand up an alternative force dominated by Syrian Arab rebels to fight the ISIS fell into disarray, due to rampant problems such as corruption, defections to extremist groups like the Nusra Front and sheer incompetence (Seligman 2019). Episodes like these were used to justify the rationale that the outreach to Syrian Kurds only came after all other alternatives were exhausted. Turkey, for its part, contended that it was both willing and capable of shouldering the burden of combatting ISIS (Erdoğan 2019). Moreover, Turkey drew a moral equivalency between ISIS and the PKK and the YPG, insisting that terror could not be eradicated in the region if one terrorist group, ISIS, was decimated, while Turkey was forced to fight another terrorist network, the PKK and its regional affiliates, with one hand tied behind its back. Undeniably, U.S. support for the PYD and YPG in northern Syria has become the most bitter fault line in relations between the U.S. and Turkey. Turkish policymakers were vexed that the U.S. could not or would not understand how deeply haunted Turkey was by the specter of the formation of a transnational Kurdish State and Turkey’s determination to prevent such an outcome (Johnson & Gramer 2019). They charged the U.S. with being indifferent or at the very least, willfully oblivious to, the acute dangers posed by the continued arming of the YPG to Turkey’s security and territorial integrity, especially the risk that weapons transferred by the U.S. to the YPG would eventually end up in the hands of the PKK and be used against Turkey once ISIS was defeated. Added to this is the fear of Turkish policy-makers that a Kurdish mini-state in Syria will eventually morph

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into a launching pad for cross-border raids into Turkey by the PKK, much like the Qandil Mountains of Northern Iraq were transformed into a sanctuary for the PKK in the 1990s and 2000s as the Kurds carved out an expansive form of autonomy there under the leadership of the KRG. For Turkey, the nascent alliance between the U.S.  and Syrian Kurdish groups was not merely a minor irritant to bilateral relations, but in the words of one State Department official, “a nuclear bombing waiting to go off” (Seligman 2019). In a parallel fashion, Kadercan (2019) maintains that it was all but inevitable that U.S. support for the PYD and YPG would sow the seeds of an acute crisis between Washington and Ankara, stating “That the United States has been the single most important patron of the People’s Protection Units fuels the narrative that Washington has long intended to create a Kurdish State in the region at the expense of Turkey and was collaborating with the Kurdish militia in order to accomplish this goal.” Against this backdrop, the territorial advances that Kurdish fighters made in northern Syria in late 2014/early 2015 at the expense of ISIS raised TurkishAmerican tensions to a fever pitch. While Washington narrowly interpreted these Kurdish victories as a defeat for ISIS and a win-win situation for everyone else in the region, Turkey saw more sinister forces at work. The capture of the Syrian border town of Tal Abyad in June 2015 from ISIS offers a key example of the increasingly zero-sum prism through which Turkey viewed the Kurdish-led, American-backed campaign against ISIS. Far from welcoming the events in Tal Abyad as an auspicious development in the fight against ISIS, Turkey feared that a virtual nightmare scenario was unfolding. Not only did the PYD, backed by YPG fighters, managed to acquire control over a key border crossing that could be utilized as a “Kurdish corridor” for the cross-border movement of fighters and supplies, but the YPG’s conquest of ISIS-held territory also enabled it to fuse together the previously isolated cantons of Kobane and Jazira (Hubbard & Samaan 2015), thereby significantly enhancing the territorial viability of a Kurdish mini-state in Syria. Turkey’s ire about the developments in northern Syria was not reserved solely for the PYD/YPG. Rather, the brunt of Erdoğan and the Turkish government’s anger was unleashed against the U.S., which it accused of aiding and abetting the PYD’s perceived drive to carve out a separate Kurdish State and which it argued, if allowed to come to fruition, would ultimately embolden the restive Kurdish population of southeastern Turkey to follow suit. The alarm with which Turkey greeted the gains of U.S.-sponsored Kurdish groups in Syria fed into the “Sèvres Syndrome”, an age-old phobia whereby any outside support for regional Kurdish groups is interpreted by Turks as part and parcel of a master plan to fragment Turkey and ultimately dismember it.6 Reflecting this mentality, Erdoğan bluntly accused the

6 Drawing upon traumatic memories of the abortive Treaty of Sèvres of 1920, in which the victorious European powers of the First World War unsuccessfully conspired to carve up the Turkish-speaking heartland of the defeated Ottoman Empire, “the “Sèvres Syndrome” refers to the “lingering fears of Turks that external powers’ demands

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U.S.-led coalition of launching airstrikes against the Arabs and Turkmen of Tal Abyad “and settling the PYD and PKK terror organizations in their places”7. A strong case can be made that the Obama and Trump administrations alike failed to exercise due sensitivity to the legitimate security concerns of a traditionally ally and allowed Turkey’s mortal enemy to flourish on its southern border, with access to a steady stream of U.S. funding and weapons transfers. Nonetheless, valid questions can also be raised as to whether Turkey unwittingly pushed the U.S. into an alliance with the PKK’s Syrian affiliate through its own actions or as some might say, inaction vis-à-vis ISIS at critical junctures. Some observers, such as Danforth (2019), have argued that Turkey’s view of ISIS as the lesser of two evils compared to the Syrian Kurds made the nightmare scenario of an explicit alliance between the U.S. and the PYD and YPG a self-fulfilling prophesy. He opines that “Ankara’s willingness to sit back and watch in the hopes that the Islamic State would defeat its Syrian Kurdish rivals ultimately helped make a longstanding Turkish conspiracy theory a reality” (Danforth 2019). Just as the U.S. downplayed Turkey’s anxieties about the ambitions of the PYD and YPG, and the risks that a U.S.-YPG/ PYD partnership posed to Turkey’s security, Turkey demonstrated a certain degree of tone-deafness to the concerns of the Obama administration regarding the explosive growth of ISIS in the crucial period from 2014–2015. As Kadercan (2019) opines, “the Turkish government failed to comprehend the extent of the panic in the United States over ISIS, which led Ankara to remain focused on Assad and not on the would-be caliphate.” According to various policy-makers and observers (Cook 2019; Malley 2019), the organic partnership that developed between the U.S.  and the PYD/YPG in the fight against ISIS may have been forestalled, or at the very least, evolved into an arrangement of far more limited scope and duration, had Turkey engaged in more forthright cooperation with the U.S. in confronting ISIS when the extremist group conquered huge chunks of Iraq and Syria in 2014, and began to morph into a regional menace. Turkey’s mixed motives towards ISIS were most prominently on display in its reaction to ISIS’ siege on the Syrian Kurdish border town of Kobane in late 2014 and the related dispute over demands for the U.S and its’ partners in the anti-ISIS coalition to gain unfettered access to the airbase at Incirlik for attack missions against the jihadist group.  In the face of ISIS’ devastating assault on Kobane, Turkey denied permission to Turkish volunteers of Kurdish origins to deploy to Syria to relieve the Kurdish defenders of the town, whose ranks were dominated by the YPG. Turkey also stationed tanks and soldiers on its border crossings to prevent them from reaching the town, which was surrounded on three sides by ISIS

for Turkey to recognize the rights of ethno-linguistic minorities such as the Kurds is motivated by neo-imperial ambitions to lay claim to Turkish territories”. 7 Erdoğan also expressed concerns for the repercussions for Turkey’s territorial integrity of the PYD’s gains in Tal Abyad, stating that “[this] could lead to the creation of a structure [independent state] that threatens our borders” (Dettmer 2015).

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militants (Tanchum 2014). Ultimately, Turkey, which could not afford to defy the U.S.’ wishes altogether, allowed a token force of 200 Kurdish Peshmerga fighters from the KRG to cross over into Syria to shore up Kobane’s defenses and repel the ISIS assault (Fahim & Shoumali 2014). Turkey adopted this decision as a means of threading the needle between, on one hand, the escalating pressures the Obama administration was exerting upon it to adopt a more active role in the counter-ISIS coalition and rescue Kobane from ISIS’ onslaught, while on the other hand, taking steps to avoid empowering the YPG and PKK-affiliated groups.8 The intricate compromise that Turkey struck with the U.S. over the defense of Kobane, one of many that the U.S. and Turkey have fashioned over their conflicting priorities in the Syria conflict, might have appeared at first glance to placate the Obama administration. However, bilateral tensions were exacerbated over the Erdoğan government’s spurning of the Obama administration’s repeated appeals for Turkey to allow coalition airstrikes against ISIS positions in northern Syria to be launched out of Incirlik (Fahim & Shoumali 2014; Landler, Barnard & Schmitt 2014), while ruling out the engagement of Turkish ground troops or warplanes in combat operations against the extremist group (Seibert 2014).9 The U.S. viewed Turkey’s denial of access to Incirlik and other facilitates located on its territory for strike operations against ISIS, a decision that was not reversed until July 2015, as especially damaging to the alliance, because it hampered the operational effectiveness of the anti-ISIS campaign. By withholding permission to operate out of Incirlik, which is only 60 miles from the Syrian border, the U.S. Air Force and its coalition partners were compelled to launch sorties against ISIS from bases in the Persian Gulf or from carriers in the Mediterranean, “making it difficult to respond quickly against a nimble and unconventional adversary” (Barkey 2015). The lax border security policies that Turkey adopted on its southern border with Syria in the first several years of the Syrian civil war, which helped create a propitious

8 When Kurdish defenses in Kobane appeared to be on the brink of collapsing, the Obama administration’s exasperation with Turkey reached a fever pitch, as indicated by the following widely publicized statement: “There’s growing angst about Turkey dragging its feet to act to prevent a massacre less than a mile from its border”, a senior administration official said. “After all the fulminating about Syria’s humanitarian catastrophe, they’re inventing reasons not to act to avoid another catastrophe. This isn’t how a NATO ally acts while hell is unfolding a stone’s throw from their border.” (Barnard & Landler 2014). 9 As of late 2014, Turkey had opted for a low profile role in the anti-ISIS coalition, which included opening its airspace and allowing its airbases to be used for logistical operations and humanitarian flights (e.g., saving the lives of U.S. pilots), provision of intelligence/reconnaissance support, and pledges to stem the uncontrolled flow of fighters from ISIS and other Islamist extremist groups into Syria and crack down on ISIS’ black market oil sales in Turkey (Al Jazeera 2014/a; Seibert 2014). However, Turkey stopped short of consenting for its territory to be used as a launching pad for strike missions against ISIS.

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climate for ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra (currently Hayat al-Tahrir al-Sham or HTS) and other Islamist extremist groups to gain a foothold in Syria and move fighters and supplies across the border in a virtually seamless fashion, only reinforced American and Western perceptions that Turkey was an unreliable ally in the campaign against ISIS. Articles around that time were replete with references to the transformation of Turkey’s border cities into a “jihadist super-highway”, which extremists aspiring to enter Syria and Iraq to join ISIS and other militant groups transited through, found safe haven in, and exploited for logistics and resupply purposes (Barkey 2015; Johnson & Bulos 2016; Yayla & Clark 2018). Yayla and Clark (2018) also claim that the Turkish government fueled the expansion of ISIS via the provision of various forms of “passive support”. These forms of support included, among others, the treatment of high-ranking ISIS militants for free at hospitals across southeastern Turkey, black market purchases of oil extracted in ISIS-controlled territory, and the turning of a blind eye to the cross-border flow of components used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices by ISIS (Yayla & Clark 2018). Some of the aforementioned claims may be exaggerated and whether the various forms of support ISIS received within Turkey were a byproduct of a chaotic situation, aggravated by porous borders, or of official collusion10, is open to debate. However, there is little doubt that the Turkish government pursued a permissive, “open-door” border security policy towards ISIS and like-minded Islamist militant groups until July 2015, when this lax approach spectacularly and unambiguously backfired. In July 2015, a suicide bombing in the Turkish-Syrian border town of Suruç and a lethal attack against Turkish Army patrols along the Syrian border prompted Turkey to abruptly change course and take decisive measures to choke off the flow of extremist fighters and war material supporting the activities of jihadist groups in Syria. The crackdown was manifested in stepped-up raids against ISIS cells and arrests of suspected militants, the construction of a concrete

10 Some sources have taken a more sympathetic view of Turkey’s position towards ISIS, claiming that Turkey never intended to empower ISIS and like-minded Sunni extremist groups and took determined action to confront them as soon as it became cognizant of the magnitude of the danger they posed. For instance, according to Didem Aykel Collinsworth, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, “At the beginning of the war, like the rest of the world, Turkey wasn’t aware of the extent to which the jihadi threat existed in Syria. Turkey allowed support for all elements that had any promise of ousting President Bashar al-Assad – Turkey’s primary goal. In the last year and a half or more, Turkey has realized the threat jihadists pose to its security and has changed their policies to acknowledge the threat.” (Montgomery 2014) On the other hand, there are various reports to the contrary that suggest that Turkey saw some of the jihadist groups, albeit not necessarily ISIS itself, as a useful counterweight to the PYD and YPG and abetted their actions against the Syrian Kurdish groups. For instance, in November 2012, Turkey reportedly enabled the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra (the Nusra Front) to infiltrate Syria from its safe haven in Turkey and attack the PYD (Karaveli 2013; Pope 2013; Tanchum 2014).

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wall along the Syrian border, and the enforcement of a “shoot to kill” policy for attempted border breaches (Arango 2015). Even after pivoting towards an unequivocally confrontational policy towards ISIS aimed at neutralizing the threat to its own homeland security, Turkey’s belated and allegedly half-hearted response to ISIS’ siege of Kobane, its hard bargaining over the terms of the counter-ISIS coalition’s access to Incirlik, and its initial reluctance to become a full-fledged partner in the fight against ISIS created a crisis of confidence between the two allies. Moreover, the corrosive impact of these developments, combined with the YPG’s successes in dislodging ISIS from strategically significant territory in Syria, set into motion a certain path dependence whereby the U.S. came to rely on the YPG as the centerpiece of its anti-ISIS campaign almost by default. Robert Malley, Obama’s Middle East advisor from 2014 to 2017, argued that within the Obama administration’s foreign policy brain trust, there was a consensus that “Ankara was always promising far more than it would deliver in the fight against ISIS” (Johnson & Gramer 2019). He added that Obama only turned to the YPG as a last resort, “when, in the administration’s judgment—rightly or wrongly—it appeared that Turkey was not prepared to do enough and that the only party on the ground willing to decisively take the fight to ISIS was the YPG” (Johnson & Gramer 2019). Steven Cook (2019) maintains that Turkey’s commitment to the U.S.-led counterISIS coalition’s military campaign has been halfhearted at best. He argues that it has consistently taken a backseat to Turkey’s overarching priority, the destruction of the PYD’s fragile experiment in self-governance in northern Syria (Cook 2019). The school of thought that for Turkish policy-makers, the goal of defanging the PKK and its Syrian affiliates has taken precedence over the defeat of ISIS is even shared by some Turkish analysts, such as Halil Karaveli, a senior fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute in Stockholm, who opined that “Turkey is ultimately using the no-fly zone and talk of taking part in the coalition against ISIS as a cover for seeking international legitimacy for what they actually want to do, which is to crush the Kurds” (Arango 2014). Likewise, Semih İdiz (2015), citing an anonymous diplomat, wrote: “Turkey has a right to respond to the PKK, but the way this is being done is bound to generate doubts in the West as to what is really behind these Turkish airstrikes and to raise concerns that the AK Parti’s political agenda may diminish its resolve against IS.”11 More recently, Yayla and Clark (2018) leveled criticism at the Olive Branch Operation that the Turkish Army launched against the PYD/YPG-held enclave in Afrin in early 2018. The authors claimed that the attack “was a preemptive strike against the Syrian Kurds for Turkey’s own purposes” that was launched under the guise of protecting Turkey from terrorism and creating conditions conducive to a political settlement and the flow of reconstruction assistance to Syria (Yayla & Clark 2018). Regarding the possible ulterior motives behind Turkey’s late conversion to the anti-ISIS campaign, it is worth noting that of the 1,300 people Turkish authorities 11 IS or the Islamic State is used interchangeably with ISIS and ISIL.

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detained in the post-Suruç crackdown in July 2015, 847 of those arrested were accused of ties to PKK, whereas only 137 were linked to ISIS (Al Mukhtar & Wallace 2015).12 This invites consideration as to the role of the breakdown of the TurkishKurdish peace process within Turkey as a contributing factor to Turkey’s policies towards the PYD and YPG in Syria. An argument can be made that had Turkey made more sincere and determined efforts to advance the “solution process” with the PKK and the pro-Kurdish political movement with which the PKK is loosely affiliated, Turkey may not have seen the political and territorial gains of the PYD and YPG in Syria through as much of an adversarial, zero-sum prism. Alternatively, it is possible, if not probable, that the PYD may have acquiesced to some constraints on its territorial advances and moves towards de facto statehood in Rojava had Turkey been able to leverage a positive relationship with the PKK to exert indirect pressure on the PYD to make certain concessions, such as not advancing west of the Euphrates River, an enduring redline of Turkey’s. However, a vital opportunity was lost and the peace process was dealt a significant setback when in February 2015, Erdoğan disavowed a preliminary framework for peace negotiations agreed to between his own negotiators and a delegation from the pro-Kurdish HDP (Halkların Demokratik Partisi or the Peoples’ Democratic Party), acting in its capacity as an interlocutor for the PKK, at a meeting held in Istanbul’s Dolmabahçe Palace (Taştekin 2015). Erdoğan denounced the agreement, insisting that he was not properly consulted and informed of the details of the meeting, an account disputed by his own Former Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç, who maintains that the Turkish delegation was given wide berth to negotiate and reach an agreement (Akyol 2016). This was preceded by Erdoğan’s distancing himself from other peace steps agreed to earlier with the HDP, including a ten-point road map and the establishment of a joint monitoring committee and South Africa-style Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Whether the hopeful developments of that time would have culminated in a peaceful resolution of the 30 year-plus conflict is open to question. However, Erdoğan’s backtracking disrupted the momentum of the process at a time of rising resentment among Turkey’s Kurdish population over the Turkish government’s perceived indifference to the fate of Kobane and its reluctance to render assistance to the YPG forces defending the besieged town (Phillips 2017, p. 43). The fallout from the stunted diplomatic breakthroughs and the events in Kobane became fused together in the minds of many Kurds as evidence of bad faith from Turkey and set the stage for a broad backlash and a series of triggering events that contributed in short order to the demise of the peace process.

12 Moreover, the fact that those arrested included mayors and other Kurdish political figures with no apparent connection to acts of separatist violence (Nazish 2015) only fueled suspicions that Turkey’s participation in the anti-ISIS coalition was less about decisively confronting the Islamist militant movement than gaining a free hand to chip away at the PYD and YPG’s territorial and political gains in northern Syria.

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These triggering events included four days of clashes in October 2014 pitting protesters against police and PKK supporters against rival street fighters from the Kurdish-Islamist Hür Dava Partisi (Hüda Par) across Turkey, a series of disturbances which claimed 40 lives (Mackey 2014), the issuance of threats by HDP figures to end the peace process if Kobane fell to ISIS (International Crisis Group 2014), and the reaction that ensued in the wake of the suicide bombing perpetrated by ISIS against a Kurdish cultural center in Suruç on July 20, 2015 (Akyol 2015). The Suruç bombing, which claimed 33 lives, was inextricably intertwined with Kobane in the minds of many Kurds, an association aided by the fact that the purpose of the gathering of Kurdish activists that was targeted was to raise funds for the reconstruction of Kobane (Weiss 2016). Against the backdrop of Turkey’s initial unwillingness to facilitate military intervention in Kobane, the Suruç attack fueled accusations of Turkish complicity (Çandar 2015; Yeginsu 2015; Weiss 2016). Despite the absence of any credible evidence of actual Turkish government orchestration of the attack, the Kobane events sparked a new grievance narrative that predisposed many Kurds to harbor the worst suspicions of Turkey’s intentions and Suruç became the “last straw” for them (Weiss 2016). The assassination of two off-duty Turkish police officers in an attack staged by PKK operatives days later, which the perpetrators justified as retaliation for the Suruç bombing (Marcus 2015), and which served as the coup de grace of the Turkish-Kurdish peace process, demonstrates the extent to which the process became a casualty of the events in Syria. The converse can also be argued that the empowerment of the Kurds in the Kurdish autonomous enclaves of northern Syria had a demonstration effect on the Kurds of southeastern Turkey, inspiring them to emulate the example of their ethnic kin across the border and emboldening them to take steps towards autonomy. Rojava furnished a model of empowerment to Turkey’s Kurds outside of the confines of the peace process. At worst, it may have inspired the pro-Kurdish HDP to adopt provocative extralegal measures that were antithetical to the spirt of peace and reconciliation, such as declarations of self-governance, non-payment of taxes and utility bills to the central government in Ankara, and the digging of ditches around government buildings and along major roads opposite police stations (Yavuz & Özcan 2015, p. 81).13 However, if the territorial and political gains of the PYD and YPG altered the “opportunity structures” for Turkey’s Kurds and contributed to the undermining of the peace process, the Turkish government’s and especially Erdoğan’s lack of commitment to the process had the unintended consequences of legitimizing the Rojava model in the eyes of many Turkish Kurds and exacerbating the negative spillover effects of the events in Syria. Proper consideration, however, must also be given to the fundamental misjudgments made by American officials throughout both the Obama and Trump 13 The PKK/KCK has been similarly accused of acting as “a state within a state” in the past through such activities as levying taxes on businesses, setting up courts to punish dissidents, and operating checkpoints in Kurdish areas (see e.g., Akyol 2015).

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administrations, but especially the latter, concerning Turkey’s redlines around the support of the PYD. First, there was the misguided notion that Turkey would find the American relationship with the PYD and YPG more palatable and fall into line if the YPG was not comprised exclusively of Kurdish fighters and expanded its ethnic makeup to encompass a larger cross-section of Syrian society. Therefore, under American prodding, the YPG brought Arabs and Christians into its ranks and rebranded itself as the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) in 2015. However, Turkey saw the addition of non-Kurdish forces as little more than a fig leaf for the continued domination of the YPG (Kadercan 2019). Reynolds (2019) characterizes the name change as disingenuous in light of the fact that “the commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command, General Raymond Thomas, acknowledged in public that U.S. officials had asked the group to ‘rebrand’itself for the sake of camouflaging its status as a Kurdistan Workers’ Party militia.” Even if one assumes this to have been a well-intended move on the Obama administration’s part to placate a valued ally, Turkey saw this as a cynical ploy to lull it into complacency about the degree of threat posed to it by the YPG, and as a result, it only exacerbated rather than eased the Turkish government and society’s deepening suspicions of the U.S.’ motives. A pattern has played out whereby the U.S.  has made a series of laboriously constructed compromises with Turkey designed to elicit Turkish acquiescence to the presence of the YPG or SDF in Syria. However, all of these compromises have proved to be untenable because they have ignored the unalterable reality that Turkey will pay virtually any price for the removal of Kurdish forces, including risking a rupture in long-term alliances (Seligman 2019). Emblematic of this are the complex arrangements that the two countries fashioned with respect to Manbij, a Syrian city on the west bank of the Euphrates River that is under the control of the SDF. The YPG/SDF presence there was and still is anathema to the Turks; because it violates a long-standing redline against any Kurdish forces being stationed west of the Euphrates River. With the goal of forestalling a Turkish offensive aimed at the eviction of Kurdish forces while giving the SDF breathing space to go after ISIS, the U.S. began conducting joint patrols with Turkey on the outskirts of Manbij in November 2018, as part of the road map designed to establish a new modus vivendi between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds (Seligman 2019). This move was complemented by the establishment by the U.S.  of observation posts along the Syria-Turkey border to support the fight against ISIS and establish a buffer between Turkish and Kurdish forces in order to avoid escalating tensions among them from spiraling out of control (Reuters 2018). This ostensible compromise was doomed to failure and did not represent a happy middle ground in Turkey’s eyes, because its redline on the presence of Kurdish forces west of the Euphrates River was sacrosanct and nonnegotiable, and it was determined to enforce it at all costs. According to Seligman (2019), this fundamental misunderstanding was itself embedded in a larger misconception of how Turkey viewed its interests in Syria relating to the belief that Turkey would not go forward with an invasion to expel the SDF, because “Erdoğan would rather have the

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United States and the SDF on his border than Russia and the Assad regime.” In fact, all of the bargains that the U.S. arrived at with Turkey on the presence of SDF forces were Pyrrhic victories, as they failed to recognize that in the final analysis, Turkey could not abide the presence of Kurdish forces in strategically sensitive locations in Syria. Furthermore, there was no compensatory mechanism that could be brought to bear to soften Turkey’s objections to their presence. The major cross-border military incursions launched by the Turkish Armed Forces into northeastern Syria in October 2019, curiously named Operation Peace Spring (Barış Pınarı Harekâtı), which was aimed at ridding the region of Kurdish forces, exposed the brittleness of the prior security arrangements worked out between the U.S. and Turkey. Apart from the clear policy differences among competing factions within the Trump administration over balancing relations between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds, President Trump himself, in keeping with his mercurial personality and erratic decision-making style, has sent wildly conflicting messages to Turkey about the U.S.’ Syria policy and lurched from one end of the spectrum to another within very short time spans. A  prime example of this can be witnessed in the volley of tweets that Trump fired off following his abrupt announcement on October 6, 2019 that the remainder of the U.S. troops in northern Syria would be withdrawn and the U.S. would not stand in the way of a planned Turkish cross-border invasion, the aforementioned Operation Peace Spring. This was widely interpreted as an endorsement of Turkey’s impending offensive and a wholesale retreat from prior American commitments to the Syrian Kurds. However, the announcement lent anything but clarity to Turkey and the PYD and YPG/SDF. As Hintz (2019) explains, Trump sent a bewildering array of conflicting messages, contradictorily portraying the Kurds as “special people and wonderful fighters”, while also referring to them as Turkey’s “natural enemies”. At the same time, Trump threatened to “totally destroy and obliterate” the Turkish economy if the Turkish military went too far with Operation Peace Spring, the same operation that Trump had presumably greenlighted just days earlier (Hintz 2019). The haphazard messaging of the Trump administration, of which the preceding example was only the most egregious case, has only compounded the difficulties in the Turkish-American Relationship and sowed greater confusion and mistrust among Turkish society and governments officials concerning the U.S.’ willingness or lack thereof to coordinate its policies and harmonize its interests with them.

III. Differences in Obama’s and Trump’s Approaches In one sense, for all of their personal animosities and political and ideological divisions, Obama and Trump shared a similar inclination to reduce the degree to which the U.S. was enmeshed in the affairs of the Middle East and avoid getting sucked into more Iraqi-style maelstroms. However, for each, their common desire to reduce the burdens of American hegemony can be attributed to a different worldview. For Obama, emphasis was placed on maintaining robust regional and international engagement, while replacing the hard-power foundations of Pax

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Americana with a foreign policy where soft power instruments and multilateralism were far more prominent, and attention and resources were shifted towards Asia, which was identified as the new strategic locus of opportunities and vulnerabilities. On the other hand, Trump’s foreign policy was animated by neo-isolationism, which he branded as “America First”. However, among the many other contradictions of both administrations’ approaches to the Middle East, Trump’s conception of isolationism did not translate into relative impartiality and equidistance from the many schisms and conflicts of the region, nor even a reduced reliance on hard power. In addition to reinvigorating animosities with Iran in May 2018 by walking away from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) curbing Iran’s nuclear program that his predecessor, Barack Obama, and five other global powers (the P5+1) concluded, and embarking on a maximum pressure campaign aimed at isolating Iran and forcing it to make concessions, Trump also waded into the growing intra-Sunni schism that has pitted Turkey and Qatar against Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and its allies. The central fault line between the two competing Sunni camps, often referred to as a “New Cold War”, revolves around Turkey and Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and the model of “bottom up”, reformist political Islam it champions, grounded in notions of popular sovereignty and mass participation in politics vs. the top-down model of quietist Islam favored by the conservative monarchies of Saudi Arabia and the UAE that emphasizes the absolute obedience of the citizenry to their rulers (Oktav 2018, p. 120). Rather than maintaining his distance from what could have been seen as a “family dispute” or at least seeking to be an impartial mediator, Trump has often put his thumb on the scales in these quarrels in ways that have explicitly favored the positions of Saudi Arabia and the UAE and slighted Turkey’s interests. The Trump administration’s heavy reliance on Saudi Arabia and the UAE (as well as Israel) to be the caretakers of American interests in the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions is reminiscent of the policies of the Nixon administration, which looked to then-monarchical Iran and Saudi Arabia as the pillars of regional security and supplied abundant quantities of advanced weaponry to them as a substitute for a heavy U.S. military footprint, consistent with an offshore balancing strategy (U.S. Department of State Archive). Turkey, on the other hand, has not been an essential element of the Trump administration’s regional strategic concept so far. The diplomatic crisis that arose over the “Quartet” group of states’ blockade of Qatar in 2017 and the fallout from the assassination of Saudi-insider-turned-dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018 represent two key instances in which the U.S., under Trump, played favorites among competing Sunni powers, to Turkey’s great chagrin. Seizing on reports that appeared on the Qatar News Agency web site containing remarks attributed to the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, that were sympathetic to Iran, but were likely doctored to paint Qatar in a negative light14, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt promptly withdrew their 14 There has been widespread speculation that the Qatar News Agency web site was hacked and the reports were planted with the express purpose of discrediting Sheikh

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Ambassadors from Doha in June 2017 and severed all ties. They bluntly accused Qatar of supporting terrorist organizations and cozying up to Iran. Going well beyond the punitive steps they undertook in an earlier crisis in 2014, the “Quartet” group of states imposed a blockade on Qatar that involved a host of draconian measures, including the closure of Qatar’s only land border with Saudi Arabia, the denial of the use of the four countries’ airspace for outbound flights from Qatar, the suspension of maritime navigation to and from Qatar, and the mandatory departure of all Qatari nationals within two weeks (Kabalan 2018, p.  33; Yeşilyurt 2018, p.  32). The Quartet announced that the blockade would only be lifted once a list of 13 demands was met, including, inter alia, the closure of the international media network AlJazeera, the severance of Qatar’s ties with all “terrorist groups” (an expansive list, which included, among others, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Hizbollah), the downgrading of Qatar’s diplomatic relations with Iran, and the closure of a Turkish military base and cessation of all military cooperation with Turkey. The list of demands, presented as an ultimatum, was so extensive and onerous that Qatar could not have possibly accepted them without creating the perception that it had forfeited its sovereignty and right to determine its own course in international affairs (Kabalan 2018, p. 36; Ulrichsen 2018, p. 13). As evidenced by the list of demands, relations between Turkey and Qatar loomed large in the 2017 crisis. Not only was Turkey’s growing military cooperation with Qatar a thorn in the side of the Quartet countries that they were determined to force an end to at all costs. Turkey also proved to be an indispensable ally in supporting Qatar throughout the crisis (which continues to this day) and in alleviating the pain of the sanctions Qatar faced (Danforth 2019). The most consequential measure that Turkey took to demonstrate its solidarity with Qatar was the decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on June 7, 2017 to expedite the ratification of an implementation agreement for the Turkish military base in Qatar that was concluded in December 2014. This move paved the way for the deployment of several hundred Turkish troops and armored vehicles to Doha

Tamim and driving a wedge between Qatar and its Gulf Arab neighbors. According to Ulrichsen (2018, p. 12), who categorically concludes that the web site was hacked and the news stories were “fake”, “in July 2017 The Washington Post reported that U.S. investigators suspected that the hack of the Qatar News Agency had, in fact, been orchestrated by the UAE with the use of Russia-based hackers”. In his alleged remarks, the Qatari Emir harshly criticized the language of a U.S.-Gulf summit meeting held days earlier in Riyadh that condemned Iran’s “destabilizing activities” and praised Iran for playing a benevolent role in the region (Yeşilyurt 2018, p. 32). While Qatar, like Turkey, has less hostile relations with Iran than Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain does, the authenticity of the Emir’s statements was suspect, because they wereso starkly incongruous with past public comments made by Qatari officials that were extremely critical of Iran’s regional behavior and which largely hewed to the consensus of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

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in the weeks that followed (Gurbuz 2017, p.  1). Furthermore, the two countries carried out joint military exercises in Qatar in early August (Yeşilyurt 2018, p. 33). Turkey’s deployment and show of force on behalf of its ally was clearly meant to convey to the four Arab countries its resolve to defend Qatar in the event of either an overt attack or a campaign to destabilize Emir Tamim’s regime from within.15 Turkey also sought to compensate for the shortage of essential goods which Qatar was suddenly forced to endure by sending Doha foodstuffs and other supplies by sea and air (Yeşilyurt 2018, p. 33). Even though the crisis did not directly involve the U.S., it endangered Sunni unity at a time that the U.S was still involved in a military campaign to oust ISIS from territory in Syria and Iraq, an effort that relied on the maintenance of a coalition with a host of regional partners, including all of the states who were embroiled in the Gulf crisis (Kabalan 2018, p.  42). Therefore, it was within the Trump administration’s vested self-interest to defuse tensions among Qatar and its Sunni adversaries through diplomatic measures, and restore their relations to a workable status quo. However, rather than soothing these tensions, Trump dramatically entered the fray with a series of harshly critical remarks towards Qatar that were bound to exacerbate tensions and embolden the Quartet group of countries, while heightening the vulnerability of Qatar and its key ally, Turkey. On June 9, 2017, four days after the Quartet group of countries decided to sever all ties with Qatar, Trump made a statement at a joint press conference with the Romanian President, in which he embraced the demands of the anti-Qatar alliance. In this statement, the U.S. President accused Qatar of being a “major source of support for extremism” and even claimed credit for the Quartet’s decision to punish Qatar, suggesting that the impetus for this move was the urgency of the message he delivered at a summit in Riyadh days earlier for Gulf states to do more to rein in terrorism financing (Kabalan 2018, pp. 35–37; Ulrichsen 2018, p. 13). However, Trump’s statement was starkly incongruous with the thrust of the messages delivered by his leading foreign policy advisors, especially then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis, whose strenuous efforts to find a peaceful, negotiated solution to the crisis and an alleviation of the pressure campaign against Qatar were upended by Trump’s untimely and uncoordinated intervention (Gurbuz 2017, p. 4; Kabalan 2018, p, 37; Oktav 2018, p. 114; Ulrichsen 15 Turkey’s coming to Qatar’s rescue in its hour of need may be seen as a form of symbolic recompense for Qatar’s offers of assistance to Turkey following an incident in 2015 whereby Turkey shot down a Russian jet in Syria that it claimed had strayed into Turkish airspace. In light of its inordinate economic dependence on Moscow, Ankara faced significant economic damage as Russian-Turkish relations soured and Russia retaliated against it economically. In order to shore up Turkey’s economy against the fallout from the dispute, Qatar offered approximately $3 billion in financial support to make up for Turkey’s loss of Russian tourism, and promised gas export guarantees if Russia decided to withhold natural gas supplies as a punitive measure (Gurbuz 2017, p. 2; Oktav 2018, p. 114; Ulrichsen 2018, p. 15).

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2018, p. 14). The more balanced position undertaken by Tillerson, Mattis, and other elements of Trump’s foreign policy brain trust were driven by their overarching anxiety surrounding the potential disruption that an indefinite blockade against Qatar and a schism within the heart of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) posed to the campaign against ISIS, especially in light of the central role that al-Udaid Airbase in Qatar has played in the anti-ISIS aerial bombardment campaign (Kabalan 2018, p. 37; Oktav 2018, p. 114). On a visit to Doha in July 2017, Tillerson directly contradicted his boss when he stated, “I think Qatar has been quite clear in its demands, and I think those have been quite reasonable” (Kabalan 2018, p. 38). This statement, along with Tillerson’s praise of Qatar for entering into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that covered restrictions on the financing of terrorism (the first Gulf state to do so), was consistent with the statements of other State Department officials. For instance, Dana Shell, then-U.S. Ambassador to Qatar, credited Doha for making “real progress” in curtailing financial support for terrorism, a message echoed by military officials associated with the U.S. Central Command (Kabalan 2018, pp.  37–38). Therefore, Trump’s pro-Saudi and pro-Emirati tilt placed him at odds with virtually the entirety of the U.S. Foreign Policy establishment and military command. As the crisis wore on, Trump abruptly shifted course from condemning Qatar for its alleged bankrolling of terrorist groups to offering to mediate the conflict between Qatar and its antagonists in the Gulf region, and entering into a strategic dialogue with Qatar, which culminated in explicit American commitments to protect Qatar’s territorial integrity and guarantee its security (Kabalan 2018, pp. 43–46).16 Despite the wholesale transformation in Trump’s position, the mixed messages from the American administration in the early stages of the crisis cemented the perception in the eyes of both Qatar and its ally, Turkey, that the U.S. was not a reliable partner, and deepened the crisis of confidence with Turkey. Perhaps viewing the Trump administration’s abandonment of Qatar in its hour of need in the same light as the tepid support that the U.S., under Obama, extended to Erdoğan as the abortive July 15, 2016 coup attempt against him unfolded (Johnson & Gramer 2019), Gurbuz (2017, p. 1) explains that “following the official line, Turkey’s pro-government media presented the current Gulf rift as an American plot and accused the U.S. President of sowing divisions in the Muslim world.” Wittingly or unwittingly, in the early stages of the crisis, Trump was enlisted in the agendas of Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s ambitious crown princes, Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed respectively, to aggressively roll back Qatari and Turkish influence in the Gulf.

16 Adding to the picture of a schizophrenic policy response on the part of the Trump administration to the Gulf crisis is the fact that despite Trump’s insinuations that Qatar’s policies posed a grave danger to the region by virtue of its alleged status as a leading financier of terrorism, a $12 billion arms deal was implemented with Doha at the height of the crisis involving the sale of dozens of F-15 fighter jets (Oktav 2018, p. 115).

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Trump’s perceived pro-Saudi and pro-Emirati alignment in the crisis deepened the siege mentality of Turkey vis-à-vis the U.S. and further soured relations between the two allies. In fact, the intended audience of the signal sent by Turkey’s deployment of several hundred troops and armored vehicles to Qatar in August 2017 was as much Trump as it was Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and its allies. In other words, Turkey acted to deter the Quartet group of countries from being emboldened by Trump’s initially supportive tweets to escalate the crisis by resorting to military action against Qatar (Ulrichsen 2018, pp. 13, 15).17 The diplomatic fallout from the brutal slaying of Saudi dissident and Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018 at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul represents another seminal event that laid bare the growing rift among fellow Sunni states Turkey and Saudi Arabia whereby the Trump administration deferred to the Saudis at Turkey’s expense. This complex international affair involved a hit team of 15 Saudi nationals who reported directly to high-level advisers of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. According to the findings of an independent investigation conducted by The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights special rapporteur Agnes Callamard, the highest levels of the Saudi government, including the Crown Prince, were complicit in what it termed the “premeditated extrajudicial execution” of Khashoggi (BBC 2019; Hubbard 2019). CIA also concluded that there was a high likelihood that the killing and dismemberment of Khashoggi’s body was explicitly authorized by bin Salman (AlJazeera 2019). At the same time, Turkish intelligence officials, who conducted their own investigation, leaked a steady stream of forensic evidence and audio recordings that led them to conclude that Khashoggi was a victim of a premeditated murder orchestrated by the Saudi government (AlJazeera2019; BBC 2019). However, against the consensus of European allies, American intelligence agencies, and even Republican allies in Congress, Trump and his Secretary of State Mike Pompeo bolstered the Saudi narrative that the assassination was a rogue operation for which the Crown Prince bore no direct responsibility (Pitel 2018). The Saudis conducted a trial which culminated in December 2019 in the handing down of a death sentence against five men charged with involvement in the killing, while three other defendants were sentenced to 24-year prison terms. However, the vast majority of 17 It is worth noting that my argument is not that Trump sought to encourage the Saudis, the Emiratis, and their allies to take military action against Qatar. In fact, as Ulrichsen (2018, p. 15) makes clear, “U.S. officials have suggested that there were concerns that military action was on the table in the immediate aftermath of June 5 and that these reports were deemed credible enough to warrant a warning to the Saudi and Emirati leadership not to escalate the issue.” Rather, this author is making the claim that Trump’s impulsive tweets and ham-handed approach to the crisis led the Gulf states to believe that they had a green light (or at least an amber one) from the U.S. President to utilize military force against Qatar and as Ulrichsen (2018) maintains, it took a combination of Turkish deterrence and energetic shuttle diplomacy by the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, to forestall such military action.

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independent observers regard the trial as a whitewash, as premeditation was ruled out and punishment was confined to low-level operatives, while members of bin Salman’s inner circle who were widely believed to have planned and ordered the assassination were exonerated (Hubbard 2019). At best, the Trump administration’s handling of the Khashoggi affair reveals a certain naivete regarding how the event inevitably became entangled with the schism that pits the austere form of Sharia practiced by Saudi Arabia against Turkey’s “milder interpretation of Sunni Islam” (Akyol 2018). At worst, the Trump administration ran roughshod over Turkey’s sensitivities and clearly signaled its preference for Saudi Arabia as its ally of choice in the region over Turkey. Regarding the former possibility, some analysts (e.g., Alsaafin 2018; Dorsey 2018/a; Dorsey 2018/b) have speculated that the reason that Turkey opted to stealthily leak intelligence regarding the details of Khashoggi’s disappearance and murder to the media rather than make the evidence public was to embarrass Saudi Arabia and discredit Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s reputation as a progressive reformer, without pushing Saudi-Turkish relations to the breaking point. According to this line of reasoning, Turkey was engaged in a delicate diplomatic dance vis-à-vis both Saudi Arabia and the U.S. whose goals were two-fold: first, to corner Saudi Arabia into a face-saving solution whereby some degree of official complicity in Khashoggi’s assassination would be acknowledged while bin Salman would be absolved of ultimate responsibility; and secondly, to enhance the value of Turkey as an ally in the eyes of the Trump administration by negotiating a resolution of the diplomatic crisis that would spare Saudi Arabia as well as Trump, whose personal financial dealings with the House of Saud were under intense and growing Congressional and public scrutiny, further embarrassment (Alsaafin 2018; Dorsey 2018/a; Katulis 2018). Ultimately, Turkey hoped that the Trump administration would be left feeling that it owed a debt of gratitude to Turkey so substantial that it would swap out Saudi Arabia for Turkey as its closest ally in the Middle East (Alsaafin 2018; Dorsey 2018/a). If indeed Turkey harbored such a master plan, there is little evidence that the Trump administration was even remotely aware of such ambitions. On the other hand, even if such a sophisticated calculus was driving Turkey’s behavior and it was seeking to “manage tensions [surrounding the Khashoggi crisis] to its advantage” at the outset of the crisis (Dorsey 2018/a), Saudi Arabia’s stonewalling of Turkey’s efforts to enlist their cooperation in the investigation of Khashoggi’s killing (Hubbard 2019) hardened Turkey’s position towards Saudi Arabia. This factor made it virtually impossible for the Trump administration to steer a happy middle ground between the two regional Sunni rivals. In other words, the irreconcilability of the two Middle East countries’ positions over the Khashoggi affair left Trump little choice but to choose sides. Ultimately, the benefit of the doubt that the Trump administration accorded to Saudi Arabia, as manifested in its refusal to impose an arms embargo against the kingdom (Dorsey 2018b; BBC 2019), its equivocation on the question of bin Salman’s direct responsibility for the killing, and the surprising candor with which Trump admitted that Saudi Arabia

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was too indispensable to American national security and world oil prices to risk rupturing relations with through the imposition of meaningful sanctions (Pitel 2018)  drew Turkey’s ire. Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, accused Trump of “turning a blind eye” to Khashoggi’s assassination and prioritizing expediency over principle (Pitel 2018). In the final analysis, “the blank check Trump has offered to Saudi Arabia”, as Brian Katulis put it, and the excessive deference he has accorded to the House of Saud in the wake of the Khashoggi affair, has further soured Turkey’s relations with the U.S.

IV. The Impact of Ideology and Identity Politics on the Turbulent Relations between Turkey and the U.S. in the Trump Era One likely factor behind the Trump’s administration’s growing identification with Saudi and Emirati foreign policy preferences at the expense of Turkey and Qatar is Trump’s susceptibility to domestic pressure groups in Washington who have sought to formally designate the Muslim Brotherhood, a group enthusiastically backed by Turkey and Qatar, as a terrorist organization (Gurbuz 2017, p. 4). The push to delegitimize the Muslim Brotherhood and make any dealings with it taboo dovetails with the interests of the UAE and Saudi Arabia. As part of an ongoing game of one-upmanship with Turkey, Mohammad bin Salman has sought to curry favor with the Trump administration and cast doubt on Turkey’s value as an ally of the U.S. One tactic by which bin Salman has sought to accomplish this aim is to lump together Turkey, Iran, and what he labels “Islamic militant groups” as an “axis of evil”, as he did in an interview with an Egyptian journalist (Oktav 2018, p. 18). As evidenced by his posture at the outset of the Gulf crisis, Trump has at times proven receptive to this brand of hostile messaging emanating from the Saudis and Emiratis that appears designed to manipulate and channel his known antipathy towards “radical Islam” against Turkey and Qatar (Oktav 2018, p. 117). The amenability of the Trump administration to the “othering” of Turkey and Qatar can be attributed in part to ideological factors and particularly the worldview of Trump’s former chief adviser, Steve Bannon. As Kabalan (2018, p. 41) explains, Bannon was influential in amplifying the “Clash of Civilizations” thinking to which Trump was already predisposed. This worldview, which sees the U.S. as engaged in an existential war against “radical Islam”, is often loosely defined to also encompass more moderate groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and the states with whom they enjoy good relations, particularly Turkey and Qatar (Kabalan 2018, p. 41). The case of American Evangelical pastor Andrew Brunson and Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel represent two other issues that highlight the divisive identity politics Trump has frequently embraced. Due to the religiously charged manner in which Trump handled both issues, which aroused the sensitivities of Turkey as a staunch and at times overzealous defender of a range of

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Islamic causes, their politicization further polarized relations between the U.S. and Turkey. The case of Andrew Brunson involved an American Evangelical pastor who led a small congregation in the city of Izmir for 20 years and was detained in the Turkish security forces’ broad crackdown followed the failed coup attempt against Erdoğan in July 2016 (Sadar 2018). The crackdown was criticized by many human rights groups and foreign governments for casting the net too widely. Various political opponents, civil society activists, and political figures drawn from Turkey’s Kurdish minority have been subjected to legal harassment and/or arrests despite having little to no plausible association with the presumed mastermind of the coup, Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen, who is living in exile in the U.S. state of Pennsylvania. Brunson, who was charged with espionage and for being affiliated with the Gülen movement and/or the PKK, was among those whose detention appeared to be politically motivated, with Erdoğan suggesting at one point that Brunson could be useful as a bargaining chip whereby his freedom would be granted in exchange for Washington’s extradition of Gülen to Ankara (Maza 2018). Given the pastor’s detention on dubious charges, the Trump administration could hardly be faulted for pressing the Erdoğan government for Brunson’s release. However, the zeal with which Trump, Vice President Mike Pence and others in his administration took up Brunson’s case was intertwined with Christian identity politics, specifically their desire to fire up Trump’s Evangelical Christian base, in advance of the 2018 midterm elections (Sadar 2018). This drove a greater wedge in relations with Turkey than might have otherwise been the case had these identity politics not been present. This is clearly evident in the fact that Trump, Pence, and other administration figures disproportionately focused on Brunson’s plight, mostly ignoring that of other American citizens who had been swept up in the post-coup crackdown (Sadar 2018). They also turned him into a cause celebre, resorting to politically charged and exaggerated rhetoric infused with religious overtones that portrayed Brunson as a “persecuted Christian” (Sadar 2018). Brunson’s detention became further politicized when the Trump administration slapped sanctions against Turkey’s Minister of Justice Abdülhamit Gül and Minister of Interior Affairs Süleyman Soylu in August 2018, precipitating a sharp slide in the value of the Turkish lira, and triggering reciprocal Turkish sanctions against the Trump administration’s then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions and Minister of the Interior Ryan Zinke (Arslan, Dost & Wilson 2018; Middle East Eye 2018). Brunson was eventually released in October 2018 and the titfor-tat sanctions were lifted by both sides. Another dispute between the U.S. and Turkey that became inflamed, because it had civilizational overtones and was also designed to ingratiate himself with the Republican Party’s Evangelical Christian base was Trump’s decision in December 2017 to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s united capital and relocate the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. While successive American Presidential administrations of both political parties have found themselves at odds with Arab and Muslim states at times as a result of their unconditional support of Israel, the issue of Jerusalem was always seen as a redline. Jerusalem has been suffused with

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symbolism in the long-running Israeli-Palestinian conflict not only by virtue of the presence there of the Muslim holy sites of the Dome of the Rock and the Al Aqsa Mosque, but also due to the fact that the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital is seen as one of the pillars of a viable two-state solution to the conflict.Therefore, the Trump administration’s endorsement of Israel’s laying claim to Jerusalem as its “eternal, indivisible capital” was widely viewed by Palestinians and the Muslim world as tantamount to destroying the very essence of a peaceful solution to the conflict. This groundbreaking shift from what had been a long-standing bipartisan consensus in the U.S. had especially negative reverberations in Turkey. Since its ascent to power in 2002, the AK Parti has positioned itself as a standard-bearer for the Palestinian cause, in keeping with its Islamist roots and its intense interest in the affairs of the Muslim world, especially as relations with Israel soured following the Mavi Marmara affair of 2010. Consistent with these ideological inclinations, Erdoğan became the “leader of the Islamic denunciation” of Trump’s endorsement of the relocation of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem and recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital (Dorsey 2018/a). The polarizing effect of Trump’s position on Jerusalem and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process on Turkish-American Relations cannot be attributed to the substance of the issues alone, though, but also to the players involved. Specifically, Turkey’s focused opposition against the U.S. was also aroused by the fact that Trump, with the help of his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, enlisted Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain in a plan to squeeze the Palestinian Authority and pressure it into supporting terms for negotiations that were tilted overwhelmingly in Israel’s favor. This was evident in a number of statements made and actions taken by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and its allies in the wake of Trump’s Jerusalem decisions. For example, the Bahraini Foreign Minister stated that Palestine was a marginal issue, while in a clear snub towards the Turkish government, the Saudi-allied bloc of Gulf States refused to send any high-ranking delegations to the emergency Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) summit that Turkey convened in Istanbul in December 2017 to organize the Islamic states’ condemnations of Trump’s Jerusalem moves (Oktav 2018, p. 118). The dynamics by which the maneuvering on this set of issues played out both reflected and reinforced the Saudi-Turkish rivalry for leadership of the Muslim world (Dorsey 2018/a). In many respects, Turkey viewed Trump’s pro-Israel moves and Saudi-Emirati complicity through the prism of the blockade of Qatar that had transpired just months earlier. Ultimately, Turkey feared the specter of a tightening of a Saudi-Emirati-American axis that “sought to reshape the region according to Israeli interests” (Oktav 2018, p. 117) and leave Turkey and its ally, Qatar, out in the cold.

Conclusion Based on the preceding analysis of the various factors and developments that have influenced the course of relations between the U.S. and Turkey over the last decade, it is difficult to predict the likely short-term trajectory, let alone long-term

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arc of relations between the two countries, if only because momentous geopolitical shifts in the international system as a whole are coinciding with a Middle East region in constant flux and instability. At minimum, it appears likely that relations will be dominated by continued discord and divergence of policies and objectives. This is partly a function of the mercurial personalities and the all-too-frequent dramatic, abrupt policy reversals of the leaders of the two countries concerned (though arguably an insight that is more applicable to Trump’s behavior than to Erdoğan’s, who appears to have a more coherent worldview). Though many speculated that the transactional approach to problem-solving that each leader brought to the table would make it easier for bilateral conflicts of interest to be managed, if not resolved in the Trump era, as contrasted with the Obama era, the tenor of relations since Trump was elected in November 2016 has not borne this prediction out. Trump’s decision to withdraw American troops from northeastern Syria and distance itself from the SDF and the Syrian Kurdish groups aligned with the PKK in October 2019 bodes well for the resolution of one of the bitterest chapters in Turkish-American Relations. However, the absence of a meeting of the minds regarding the future shape of a post-conflict Syria and of the status of the Kurds may continue to fuel sharp tensions between the two countries. Building on the factors prioritized in this analysis, it is possible to recommend certain policies or approaches that may help Turkey and the U.S.  at least avoid and/or mitigate the worst tensions in their bilateral relations. First, focusing on the systemic dimension, especially in the context of an evolving international system in which it is no longer clearly dominant as it once was on either the global or regional level, the U.S. needs to clarify its objectives and roles in this new international dispensation. As one incisive commentary in Daily Sabah pointed out, American policies and actions in the Middle East have only obscured rather than clarified its basic short-term and long-term objectives in the region, with the result that the meaning and content of the American-Turkish alliance has become murkier (Kanat 2016). While the Daily Sabah’s (Kanat 2016) analysis was written in the twilight of the Obama administration and took aim at its actions, the same criticisms can be leveled against the Trump administration’s policies, as seen in its haphazard approach towards the Turkish-Kurdish imbroglio in northern Syria. In their posture towards the Middle East in general and Turkey in particular, the last two administrations have appeared to be strategically adrift. To rectify this situation going forward, the challenge is less about crafting a grand strategy, which tends to homogenize and oversimply disparate challenges, as well as drive counterproductive policies that often spur backlashes from allies and adversaries alike (former President George W. Bush’s “War on Terrorism” being a prime example of this) than about delineating priorities around specific issues and problem sets (e.g., Turkey’s air defense needs and capabilities), as well as formulating tailored strategies to address them (Fuchs 2019). Secondly, as long as the U.S. is trying to find its bearings in a more multipolar world that has moved in that direction partly as a result of its own earlier missteps and strategic overreach, it would arguably be far better served by adopting a more

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balanced and neutral stance when schisms arise among its allies. In this regard, Trump’s decidedly pro-Saudi and pro-Emirati posture at the outset of the Gulf crisis arising from the blockade of Qatar in May 2017 undermined its credibility and failed to reassure Turkey (let alone Qatar) of American intentions at a time when the rancor among Turkey and the U.S.  was already intensifying on many fronts. Even Turkey, despite its burgeoning alliance with Qatar, made efforts to engage in shuttle diplomacy between Qatar and Saudi Arabia in a bid to preserve good relations with the GCC as a whole (Oktav 2018  p.  115). Trump may well have cultivated substantial goodwill in the eyes of Turkish policy-makers had he sought to bolster those efforts rather than back Turkey and Qatar into a corner and inadvertently embolden Saudi Arabia and the UAE to the point that an invasion of Qatar became a real possibility. The combination of Trump’s pro-Saudi/Emirati tilt in the Gulf crisis, willful dismissal of the evidence Turkey presented pointing to high-level Saudi complicity in the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi, and ideologically-motivated indulgence of Israel’s expansionist ambitions undermined Turkey’s vital interests and deepened its sense of encirclement. To the extent that the U.S. is seeking to retrench or at least substantially reduce its military footprint in the Middle East, both the prospects for the future stability of the region and the relationship between the U.S.  and Turkey would be enhanced by the U.S.  genuinely attempting to play a more constructive role in conflict resolution and repair the many fault lines of the region. Carving out a reputation for being an honest broker in regional conflicts may even serve to shore up the U.S.’ declining hegemonic position. Given the oftendivergent worldviews, histories and geostrategic interests of the two countries and their leaders, adherence to these prescriptions would not necessarily guarantee smooth sailing ahead for the U.S. and Turkey. However, at least the relationship may avoid entering even stormier waters and running aground on the shoals of escalating tensions and misunderstandings.

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Cook, Steven A. (2019), “Turkey Is Lying about Fighting ISIS”, Council on Foreign Relations, Available at: https://www.cfr.org/article/turkey-lying-about-fighting-isis. Cook, Steven A. & Ibish, Hussein (2016), “Turkey and the GCC: Partnership Persists Despite Diverging Interests”, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, Issue Paper #1, Available at: https://agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/GCCTurkey_ONLINE. pdf. Çandar, Cengiz (2015), “Is Ankara Headed toward All-Out War with Turkey’s Kurds?”, Al Monitor, Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/turkeyunited-states-kurds-pkk-peace-process.html. Danforth, Nick (2019), “Why Turkey Doesn’t Trust the United States”, Foreign Policy, Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/15/why-turkey-doesnt-trust-the-unitedstates/. Dettmer, Jamie (2015), “Turkey Warns U.S. about Kurdish Advances in Syria”, Voice of America, Available at: https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/turkey-warns-us-aboutkurdish-advances-syria. Dorsey, James (2018/a), “Turkey Plays Khashoggi Crisis to Its Geopolitical Advantage”, The Real News Network, Available at: https://therealnews.com/turkey-plays-khashoggicrisis-to-its-geopolitical-advantage. Dorsey, James (2018/b), “MBS: Riding Roughshod or Playing A Risky Game of Bluff Poker”, Global Village Space, Available at: https://www.globalvillagespace.com/mbs-ridingroughshod-or-playing-a-risky-game-of-bluff-poker-james-m-dorsey/. Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip (2019), “Erdoğan: Trump Is Right on Syria. Turkey Can Get the Job Done”, The New York Times, Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/07/opinion/ erdogan-turkey-syria.html. Fahim, Kareem & Shoumali, Karam (2014), “Turkey to Let Iraqi Kurds Cross to Syria to Fight ISIS”, The New York Times, Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/21/ world/middleeast/kobani-turkey-kurdish-fighters-syria.html. Fuchs, Michael H. (2019), “America Doesn’t Need a Grand Strategy”, Foreign Policy, Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/28/america-doesnt-need-a-grandstrategy-big-think-trump/. Gunter, Michael (2014), “Unrecognized De Facto States in World Politics: the Kurds”, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 20, No: 2, pp. 161–178. Gurbuz, Mustafa (2017), “Turkey and the Gulf Crisis: Erdoğan’s Most Difficult Game?”, Arab Center, pp. 1–6. Hintz, Lisel (2019), “Policy Roundtable: The Future of Turkey’s Foreign Policy – No One Lost Turkey: Erdoğan’s Foreign Policy Quest for Agency with Russia and Beyond”, Texas National Security Review, Available at: https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policyroundtable-the-future-of-turkeys-foreign-policy. Hubbard, Ben (2019), “Saudi Death Sentences in Khashoggi Killing Fail to Dispel Question”, The New York Times, Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/23/world/ middleeast/jamal-khashoggi-murder-sentence.html. Hubbard, Ben, & Samaan, Maher (2015), “Kurds and Syrian Rebels Storm ISIS-Held Border Town”, The New York Times, Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/world/ middleeast/kurds-and-syrian-rebels-push-to-evict-isis-from-border-town.html.

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International Crisis Group (2014), “Turkey and the PKK: Saving the Peace Process. ICG Europe Report No: 234”, Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/ western-europemediterranean/turkey/turkey-and-pkk-saving-peace-process. İdiz, Semih (2015), “Is Turkey Really Committed to Fighting IS?”, Al Monitor, Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/turkey-syria-pkk-kurds-diluteefforts-against-isis.html. Johnson, Glen & Bulos, Nabih (2016), “Islamic State Claims It Killed American Working at Air Base in Turkey”. Los Angeles Times, Available at: https://www.latimes.com/world/ middleeast/la-fg-turkey-american-killed-20160616-snap-story.html. Johnson, Keith & Gramer, Robbie (2019), “Who Lost Turkey?”, Foreign Policy, Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/19/who-lost-turkey-middle-east-s-400-missiledeal-russia-syria-iraq-kurdish-united-states-nato-alliance-partners-allies-adversaries/. Kabalan, Marwan (2018), “The Gulf Crisis: The U.S. Factor”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 20, No: 2, pp. 33–49. Kadercan, Burak (2019), “Policy Roundtable: The Future of Turkey’s Foreign Policy – The Role of Perception and Misperception in U.S.-Turkish Relations”. Texas National Security Review, Available at: https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-future-ofturkeys-foreign-policy. Kanat, Kılıç Buğra (2016), “U.S.-Turkish Relations and the Systemic Dimension”, Daily Sabah, Available at: https://www.dailysabah.com/columns/kilic-bugra-kanat/2016/05/16/ us-turkish-relations-and-the-systemic-dimension. Karaveli, Halil (2013), “Turkey: the Unhelpful Ally”, The New York Times, Available at: http:// www.nytimes.com/2013/02/27/opinion/turkey-the-unhelpful-ally.html. Katulis, Brian (2018), “Turkey’s Blank Check Diplomacy Is Remaking the U.S.-Saudi Relationship”, Foreign Policy, Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/23/trumpsblank-check-diplomacy-is-remaking-the-u-s-saudi-relationship/. Kirkpatrick, David (2018), “The White House and the Strongman”, The New York Times, Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/27/sunday-review/obama-egypt-couptrump.html. Landler, Mark, Barnard, Anne & Schmitt, Eric (2014), “Turkish Inaction on ISIS Advance Dismays the U.S.”, The New York Times, Available at: https://www.nytimes. com/2014/10/08/world/middleeast/isis-syria-coalition-strikes.html. Mackey, Robert (2014), “Clashes Across Turkey as Kurds Demand Relief of Syrian Kin Besieged by ISIS”, The New York Times, Available at: https://www.nytimes. com/2014/10/08/world/europe/clashes-across-turkey-as-kurds-demand-relief-of-syriankin-besieged-by-isis.html. Malley, Robert (2019), “The Unwanted Wars: Why the Middle East Is More Combustible Than Ever”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 98, No: 6, pp. 38–46. Marcus, Aliza (2015), “Turkey’s Kurdish Guerillas Are Ready for War”, Foreign Policy, Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/31/turkeys-kurdish-guerillas-are-readyfor-war/. Maza, Cristina (2018), “U.S. Pastor Could Be Jailed in Turkey for 35 Years Because Erdoğan Wants to Use Him as A Bargaining Chip”, Newsweek, Available at: https://www.

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Matthew S. Cohen1

Chapter 12: The Turkish-Israeli-U.S.

Triangle: How Israel Factors into TurkishAmerican Relations Abstract: This chapter examines the role that the relationships between Turkey, the United States (U.S.) and Israel (Turkish-Israeli-U.S. Triangle) play in the state of bilateral TurkishAmerican Relations, and how bilateral ties among the three nations underlie and contribute to the deterioration in the diplomatic status between the U.S. and Turkey. It examines a range of issues, including American perceptions, diverging regional goals, the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, and security dimensions. While differences regarding relations with Israel have harmed TurkishU.S. ties, the chapter concludes with ideas on how the three nations can improve their relations. Keywords: Israel, Turkish-American Relations, Turkish Foreign Policy, U.S. Foreign Policy, Middle East.

Introduction The state of the relationship between the United States (U.S.) and Turkey is currently poor. There are numerous reasons why Turkish-American Relations have soured and this book has examined many of them. One component, as the editors mention, worthy of detailed examination is the important role that the complex relationships between Turkey, the U.S., and Israel play in the state of bilateral Turkish-American Relations. This chapter will explore how bilateral relations among the three nations underlie and contribute to the deterioration of relations between the U.S. and Turkey. On its face, it would seem that these three countries should get along. They share similar interests in regional stability, a desire to solve the crisis in Syria, a hope of bringing peace to the Middle East, and they have trade and economic ties. However, the U.S. and Turkey have never trusted each other, which makes any disagreement even more important and damaging to the relationship. There is little trust not just between leaders, but between the populations of both nations as well. While there were always strains in the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey, relations took a noticeable turn for the worse following the 2003 Iraq War. On the U.S. side, there was anger over Turkey’s reluctance to support the U.S. war effort. However, after a concerted effort, particularly on the Turkish side, some of the issues were able to

1 Assistant Professor of Practice, Merrimack College, USA. Email: [email protected]

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be repaired (Erhan & Sıvış 2017, pp. 101–102.) Following the Arab Spring uprisings, Turkey began to assert itself more forcefully in the region in an attempt to shape the outcomes in a way that would support its preferences. Notably, Turkey expressed its discontent with the regional order, an order that the U.S. had been instrumental in creating. Further damaging relations was that many people in the U.S. government began to perceive Turkey as moving from support for key U.S. backed nations (Israel and Saudi Arabia) to support for nations opposed to U.S. interests (Russia, Qatar, and Iran) (Kamrava 2018, pp. 605, 609; Smith 2019; Ward 2019). There is also a perception in the U.S.  that Turkey -under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan- is moving away from democracy and becoming an authoritarian state that holds anti-Western, anti-secular, and more extreme Islamic political values (Ward 2019). Despite periods of tensions and stresses between the nations, the U.S. and Israel, unlike the U.S. and Turkey, have long enjoyed close and positive relations. In fact, ensuring Israel’s security is a key component of America’s Middle East policy (Hamdi 2018, p. 252). There is generally a bipartisan commitment to working with Israel and supporting its security needs and the Trump administration and current Congress have continued this longstanding strategic decision (Hunter 2015, p.  115; Kamrava 2018, p.  600; Krieg 2017, p.  152; Lynch 2016, p.  136). This is in part because the U.S. and Israeli military and security agencies frequently work closely together. They conduct joint training exercises, share intelligence information, and build joint regional strategies (Hamdi 2018, p. 252; Lynch 2016, p. 136). They have even crafted advanced cyber-space technology and weapons, such as Stuxnet, together (Cohen, Freilich, & Siboni 2016). Two nations also share a similar vision for the regional order of the Middle East. In particular, the leaders of the current governments, U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, appear to have developed particularly close relations and share very similar visions (Lynch 2016, p. 136). Israel, unlike Turkey, wants to see the U.S. continue to play a central role in the region to bolster its security situation (Kamrava 2018, p. 605). Israel and the U.S., along with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, share a regional vision and actions that block the rise of Iran, a country that has seen improved relations with Turkey in recent years (Kamrava 2018, p. 606; Krasna 2018, p. 74; Strauss 2019). In the case of Israel and Turkey, prior to the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Parti) rise to power in 2002, Turkey and Israel shared a unique diplomatic, economic, and military relationship, leading some to speak of a strategic alliance (Cohen & Freilich 2014; Fuller 2004, p. 60; Gurfinkiel 2007, pp. 30, 34; Walker 2006, pp. 60–61, 74–75, 76, 77, 80, 81, 83, 84, 86). In 1949, Turkey became the first Muslim majority nation to recognize Israel and establish diplomatic relations. Following the Madrid Peace Conference, two nations established full diplomatic relations, paving the way for a strategic partnership in the 1990s (Altunisik & Cuhadar 2010, p.  373; Bengio 2009, p.  44; Cohen & Freilich 2014; Tur 2012, p.  52). Three central reasons account for the ties that evolved. One was a shared strategic outlook regarding the Middle East, focused on preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and the rise of Iraq and Iran, (Bengio 2009, p. 45;

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Bir & Sherman 2002, p.  25; Inbar 2005, p.  593) complemented by their cultural connections to the West, making them outsiders in their region (Cohen & Freilich 2014). A  second was military. The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) was the driving force behind Turkey’s improved relations with Israel (Inbar 2005, p. 598). Turkey found itself periodically unable to purchase weaponry from Western allies due to allegations of human rights abuses (Tur 2012, p. 47); so, it turned to Israel for help modernizing its armed forces, making large-scale purchases of frontline weapons and in many cases the technology to produce them (Bir & Sherman 2002, p. 25; Cohen, M. & Freilich, D. 2014). Israeli military and the TAF also shared information and worked together in fighting terrorism. In addition, the TAF viewed an alliance with Israel as a domestic issue, as it viewed the alliance with Israel as a way to demonstrate to Islamist political parties, which opposed working with Israel, as well as to Western nations, that Turkey would remain a secular and pro-Western nation (Balci & Kardas 2012, p. 103; Bishku 2006, p. 117; Cohen & Freilich 2014; Fuller 2004; Fuller 2008, pp. 116–117). Israel benefited from a significant influx of cash to its defense industries and a variety of cooperative operational programs, such as joint naval and aerial exercises (which are difficult to conduct in a country as small as Israel), and heightened intelligence cooperation (Inbar 2011, p.  133). The third was that economic ties between the two nations flourished (Cohen & Freilich, 2014). When the AK Parti came to power, there were signs that the new leaders wanted to continue having a positive relationship with Israel. In fact, AK Parti and Israeli leaders visited each other’s countries, and former Israeli President Shimon Peres even addressed the Turkish Parliament in 2007 (which was the first time an Israeli President had addressed a parliament in a Muslim majority country) (Cohen & Freilich 2014). However, Turkey’s relations with Israel since 2008 have undergone a sharp downturn on the diplomatic, military, and economic levels. Israel and the U.S. both perceive that the AK Parti likely pursued this change for both domestic political and foreign policy reasons. The reasons for this downturn in relations will be discussed in the chapter. Hastening the downturn in relations between Turkey and the U.S. have been shifts in the broader Middle East that have opened new possibilities for its more powerful states, including Turkey. A  combination of the Arab Spring, President Barack Obama’s cautious and limited approach to engagement with the Middle East (Krieg 2017, p. 143), and President Donald Trump’s inconsistent and unpredictable policies in the region, have led to a situation where America’s allies and adversaries have seen opportunities to enhance their own positions both in their own neighborhood and on the international scene. This has led to new alliances that have emerged in the wake of the collapse of governments in numerous Middle Eastern states. Among the parties jockeying for power are Saudi Arabia (an American ally), Iran (an American adversary), Turkey, and Israel (Kamrava 2018, p. 599). This competition and the inevitable diplomatic and military conflicts that arise from it have placed a major strain on Turkish-American Relations. The next sections of this chapter will explore how relations with Israel have negatively impacted the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Turkey.

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I. Israel and Turkey’s “Axis Shift” There is a growing concern among many American policy and decision-makers that Turkey has undergone an “axis shift” during the AK Parti rule and has moved away from a democratic, secular, pro-Western country, to a nation that is authoritarian, based in Islam, and opposes Western interests (Cohen & Freilich 2014). American policy-makers had long viewed Turkey as an example of a model country that could show the Muslim majority Middle Eastern nations how to be modern, secular, democratic, and Western while maintaining their Muslim traditions and beliefs. Earlier in his term, President Obama went so far as to speak of a partnership with Turkey that could improve relations between the East and West, with Erdoğan-lead Turkey serving as a role model for other Muslim states (Erhan & Sıvış 2017, pp. 89–90, 104; Marcus 2016). This was not to last, however. In the U.S., Turkey is now generally perceived as pursuing a “neo-Ottoman” approach that aims to enhance Turkey’s position in the Middle East at the expense of traditional Western allies and the abandonment of strategic goals that Turkey and the U.S.  had recently shared (Kamrava 2018, p. 605). Erdoğan is viewed to have taken the country in an authoritarian direction, abandoning Turkey’s already flawed, but developing democratic credentials that had made it appealing to the West. Further, Turkey is now often seen as showing solidarity with the Muslim world against the West (Prakash & Ilgit 2016, p. 138). This shift in Turkish policy has been received with suspicion and disappointment and has been heavily criticized in the U.S. To the U.S., Turkey has lost its position as a country that could serve as a model to other Muslim majority nations, as Obama and many others touted it to be in the past (Cohen & Freilich 2014). In fact, by the end of his term Obama viewed Erdoğan as an authoritarian and had lost faith in building any meaningful partnership with him or Turkey (Marcus 2016). One way this axis shift manifests is in regards to relations between Turkey and Israel. As noted above, in the past, Turkey had maintained good relations with Israel. Since the late 2000s, those relations have collapsed. AK Parti and its leadership have harshly criticized Israel; including referring to Israeli policies as “state terrorism” that are no different than what Adolf Hitler did (Tur 2012, p. 53), arguing that few Israelis have actually been killed by terrorists, that Israelis cannot be trusted, that the Star of David should be equated with the swastika, and more (Zalewski 2010/2011, p. 100). Furthering the tensions, high ranking AK Parti officials have frequently refused to meet with top Israeli officials (Balci & Kardas 2012, p. 114; Cohen & Freilich 2014; Tur 2012, p. 54). Turkey grew increasingly angry with Israel after each Gaza conflict, with Erdoğan even accusing Israel of hypocrisy and of betraying Turkey after Israel launched Operation Cast Lead in 2008, soon after then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had visited Turkey (Prakash & Ilgit 2016, pp. 139–140). Former Turkish Prime Ministers Ahmet Davutoğlu and Turgut Özal both identify the deterioration in relations with Israel as a key component in the U.S. viewing Turkey as becoming hostile to Western interest (Prakash & Ilgit 2016, pp. 140, 147). Turkey, as this book’s editors note, has become an unpopular

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actor in America, in large part due to this shift under the AK Parti. There are a number of reasons Turkey’s shift regarding Israel has led to this negative view in the U.S. Turkey’s positive relations with Israel had been viewed in the U.S. as evidence of Turkey’s status as a model nation that could bridge the gap between West and East and helped create the image of Turkey as a reliable partner that could have good relations with not just the U.S., Europe, and Muslim nations, but as a Muslim country that could have positive relations with everyone, including a Jewish majority nation (Prakash & Ilgit 2016, pp.  139–140). Turkey’s shift regarding Israel reflected broader trends that were troubling to the U.S. Turkey had already made its objections to Bush’s invasion of Iraq clear and viewed the threats posed by Iran and Syria differently than the West. Turkey’s interests no longer always aligned with those of the U.S. A central component of this shift was that Turkey desired to play a larger role in the Middle East and it was difficult to maintain relations with both Israel and the Arab world (Fuller 2008, p. 116; Kardas 2010, p. 118; Walker 2006, p. 61). Criticizing and attacking Israel, while also repeatedly downgrading relations, gave Turkey a big boost in the Arab world, at least among the citizenry. Erdoğan’s championing of the Palestinian cause further helped Turkey’s image in the Middle East. Thus, the attacks on Israel gave Turkey the opportunity to pursue a regional leadership role, but one at odds with the U.S.  interests (Balci & Kardas 2012, p.  112; Fuller 2008, p. 116; Prakash & Ilgit 2016, pp. 138–140, 145, 147; Walker 2006, p. 61). Coupled with the criticisms of Israel, and further harming relations with the U.S., Erdoğan made comments that were not particularly veiled direct criticisms of the West for their support of Israel. In one example, Erdoğan claimed Turkey’s positions regarding Israel aimed to “establish the rule of law and justice, bring peace to the region, and stop bloodshed and tears” (Prakash & Ilgit 2016, p. 145), implying the U.S. position aimed to do the opposite. Turkey’s decision to downgrade relations with Israel has other impetus as well. The AK Parti’s actions are very likely driven by a genuine anger over Israeli policies regarding the Palestinians and personal animosities between leaders (Cohen & Freilich 2014). Even more damaging to Turkish-U.S. relations is that the AK Parti is taking these actions to appease domestic Turkish groups supporting an increased role for Islam in Turkey. These Islamic groups have always opposed ties with Israel and sentiment regarding ties with Israel is a key divide between secular groups and more Islamic groups in Turkey. The leadership of the AK Parti comes from a long line of Islamic political parties in Turkey and they appear to share the beliefs of those groups regarding Israel (Cohen & Freilich 2014, Gorener, A. & Ucal 2011, p. 374; Prakash & Ilgit 2016, p. 139; Sever & Oguz Gok 2016, p. 1164, 1171; Zalewski 2010/2011, p. 101). This shift in policy is therefore viewed in the U.S. as a sign that Turkey is abandoning its Western orientation. Furthering this perception is Turkey’s relationship with Hamas, a group that is considered a terrorist organization around the world, including in the U.S., Israel, and the EU. Despite this, Turkey has allied itself with Hamas. In 2006 and again

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in 2013, the AK Parti invited various Hamas leaders, including Khaled Meshaal, to Ankara (Cook 2012; Keinon 2013). When Hamas rose to power in Gaza in 2007 in a bloody takeover after it had won elections in 2006, Turkey embraced Hamas rule. Turkey remains one of the only nations to recognize Hamas government and even hosts a representative from Hamas in Turkey (Freedman 2017, pp.  258–259; Tur 2012, p.  53). Defending this decision, Erdoğan has explicitly argued that Hamas is legitimate because it was elected by the Palestinian people and that recognizing Hamas makes sense because peace talks cannot make progress without them. However, Hamas continues to launch terror attacks and deny Israel’s right to exist. Further, in accusing Israel of provoking Hamas into violence via the blockade of Gaza, Erdoğan appears to be excusing Hamas’ terror attacks on Israeli civilians (Inbar 2011, pp. 137–138; Prakash & Ilgit 2016, p. 145; Singh 2010). This is a position directly at odds with the U.S., Israel, the EU, and even many nations in the Arab world (Altunisik & Cuhadar 2010, p. 385). Further calling into question the AK Parti’s intentions, in 2010, Turkey offered its support for the terror group Hezbollah as the legitimate democratically elected leaders of Lebanon, a position at odds with the U.S.  and Israel, both of which have been victims of Hezbollah terror attacks (Inbar 2011, p. 137). These actions have greatly increased skepticism and distrust of Turkey in the U.S. Turkey’s desire to improve relations with the Palestinians was by no means inherently anti-Israel, but the choice of Hamas was, and to many in the U.S., this choice is a clear example of Turkey’s axis shift. Instead, the AK Parti could have directed its support towards Fatah, which leads the large Arab population of the West Bank and hopes to regain authority in Gaza. Turkey and the U.S. have also clashed over Israel at the United Nations (UN), furthering the sense in the U.S.  that Turkey’s policies towards Israel reflect a broader axis shift. Turkey was elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the years 2009 and 2010. While on the Security Council, Turkey frequently brought up issues related to Israel and/or the Palestinians (Sever & Oguz Gok 2016, pp. 1163, 1165). In the UN General Assembly, Turkey has been increasingly active in sponsoring or co-sponsoring draft resolutions relating to Israel and/or the Palestinians. These resolutions have focused on assistance to the Palestinians, support for Palestinian self-determination, opposition to Israeli settlements, and criticism of Israel on human rights issues (Sever & Oguz Gok 2016, pp. 1166–1167). Turkey’s voting record is largely in line with those of Arab states and diverge heavily from the votes by the U.S. and Israel (Sever & Oguz Gok 2016, p. 1167). This reflects Turkey’s desire to use its downgrade in relations with Israel to strengthen its ties to the Arab Middle East, which comes at the expense of U.S. interests as well. Further exacerbating this divergence, Erdoğan has been directly critical of the West and the U.S.  for supporting Israel. In one instance saying that Western “inattentiveness” has directly led to “Israel’s inhumanity” has led to the failure of peace talks, and has led to violence in the region (Prakash & Ilgit 2016, p. 148).

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II. Important Contemporary Issues in Turkish-Israeli Relations and Their Effect on Turkish-American Relations 1. Divergence and Convergence Regarding the Gaza Conflicts There have been three major conflicts between Israel and Hamas, in addition to numerous other smaller incidents of violence, in Gaza since Hamas came to power in 2007: Operation Cast Lead in 2008–2009 that lasted three weeks, Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012 that lasted eight days, and Operation Protective Edge in 2014 that lasted seven weeks. The impact of these conflicts on TurkishAmerican Relations is complicated, as in each of these conflicts Turkey and the U.S. found themselves supporting opposite sides, though at the same time they found ways to work together to try to end the conflicts. Starting with Operation Cast Lead, the U.S. and Turkey diverged on their opinions of the conflicts. In each case, the U.S. made clear that it supported Israel’s right to self-defense and while urging restraint by Israeli forces, supported Israel’s right to take action (Freedman 2017, p.  259). Turkey, on the other hand, backed Hamas and condemned Israel’s bombings and military actions in Gaza. Operation Cast Lead provides a clear picture of this difference. The U.S. understood Israel’s decision to take action to attempt to prevent Hamas from continuing to fire rockets that were targeting Israeli civilians. Many other nations expressed similar understanding, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Cohen & Freilich 2014; Inbar 2011, p. 138). Turkey, however, openly expressed support for Hamas, including placing all the blame for the conflict on Israel, ignoring the fact that Hamas was targeting Israeli civilians with rocket fire (Inbar 2011, p.  138; Prakash & Ilgit 2016, p.  145). Turkey’s then-Foreign Minister, Ali Babacan, warned of a very serious response if Israel invaded Gaza (The Economist 2010) and Erdoğan made statements appearing to threaten to sever relations with Israel (The Economist 2009/a; The Economist 2009/b). In a famous incident, Erdoğan and Peres were scheduled to appear together on stage in a moderated discussion of Gaza at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2009. On stage, Erdoğan surprised the audience and Peres by angrily attacking both Israeli policies and Peres personally before storming off stage. There have been suggestions that, in fact, Erdoğan had planned to do this all along and it was not a spontaneous expression of anger (Primor 2012). Either way, Erdoğan’s actions showed a sharp divide with Israel and with the U.S. policy preferences. Despite this divergence in interests, in Operation Cast Lead, the U.S.  and Turkey worked together, along with Qatar and Egypt, to attempt to broker a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. The four nations did so with little input from either Israel or Hamas. Israel rejected the plan, partly because of this (Freedman 2017, p.  260). The incident represented a moment of alignment between the U.S.  and Turkey and in opposition to Israel’s interests. This dynamic between Turkey and the U.S., in which incidents in Gaza have presented both tensions

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and opportunities to improve relations, has played out more than once (Prakash & Ilgit 2016, p. 145). Arguably the most famous and important was in regard to the “Mavi Marmara crisis” or the “flotilla incident”. In 2010, a flotilla organized by a group in Turkey named İnsani Yardım Vakfı (İHH) set out from Turkey ostensibly to deliver humanitarian aid and to attempt to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza (Egypt also maintains a blockade on Gaza, but only Israel was targeted) (The Economist 2010). Israel viewed the attempt to break the blockade as a threat to its security. Instead, Israel offered to let the ships unload their goods in an Israeli port for transport to Gaza after inspection, but the flotilla members turned down the offer (Turkel 2011, p. 10). When Israel made clear it would not allow the ships to break the blockade, all but the Mavi Marmara turned back. Israeli forces ended up boarding the ship to prevent it from continuing on to Gaza. When they did, İHH activists attacked the Israeli soldiers with knives, clubs, and possibly firearms. In the ensuing conflict, 9 İHH members were killed (The Economist 2010). Turkish-Israeli relations suffered a severe downturn over this incident and the legacy of the event is part of why relations remain poor between the two countries. Turkey expelled Israel’s Ambassador, froze all military cooperation, tried to block Israel from international forums, filed lawsuits in Turkish courts against Israeli military commanders involved, and even stated the flotilla incident was a cause for war (Balci & Kardas 2012, p. 109). Israel responded that AK Parti could have blocked the flotilla from leaving, and should have done so, given that they knew the flotilla would be boarded before reaching Gaza. AK Parti responded they could not have done so, given that İHH was a non-governmental organization, but as the AK Parti has frequently interfered with groups it opposes, this argument holds little weight (Turkey would even block a second attempt by İHH in 2011) (Duncan & Doby 2006/2007, pp. 42–44; Eligur 2012, p. 449; Freedom House 2012; The Economist 2010). The two sides agreed the UN should investigate and attempt to repair relations, which culminated in 2011’s Palmer Report that found the blockade was legal, that Israel was within its rights to board the ship, and that the soldiers were entitled to defend themselves, but it also concluded that Israel used excessive force (Palmer 2011, pp. 3–6). Turkey immediately rejected the findings (Gurel 2011), and no progress was made towards restoring relations. This incident had an impact on Turkish-American Relations as well, both in negative and positive directions. The U.S.  did not want to pressure Israel over the Mavi Marmara incident, which was in direct opposition to Turkey’s position (Erhan & Sıvış 2017, p. 106). This placed the U.S. and Turkey in a tense and difficult position. Making matters worse, the U.S. State Department argued that the links between İHH and Hamas were “worrisome” and 87 U.S. Senators issued a statement supporting Israel’s right to self-defense and pushed for İHH to be added to the list of organizations the U.S. considers terrorist groups (Prakash & Ilgit 2016, p. 143). Further heightening tensions, Erdoğan announced his intention to personally visit Gaza despite Israeli objections. The U.S. explicitly stated its objections as well and tried to pressure him not to do so (Behorin 2013). In the

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end, Erdoğan did not attempt to enter Gaza, but that may have been due to an increase in tensions between Egypt and Turkey and not due to the U.S. pressure (JPost Staff 2013) In addition, as noted above, İHH attempted to launch another flotilla. The reason it did not set sail was that the U.S. and others in the international community pressured Turkey not to allow it to do so (Eligur 2012, p. 449). As a result of these tensions, many U.S. officials became increasingly distrustful of Turkey and wanted it to prove its commitment to being a reliable ally and a partner with the U.S. and the West (Prakash & Ilgit 2016, p. 144) This would help open space for Turkey and the U.S.  to work together to find a solution to the crisis. In March 2013, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu issued an apology for the incident and in December 2016, two countries reached a reconciliation deal (relations still remain nowhere near as positive as before the incident). The deal required both sides to make concessions. Israel lifted some aspects of the blockade on Gaza, but not most, Turkey was allowed to engage in some humanitarian reconstruction work and Israel paid $20 million in compensation to the families of those killed. Turkey was required to drop all lawsuits and require that all future aid attempts headed to Gaza go through the Israeli port of Ashdod (Erhan & Sıvış 2017, p. 106; Kanat & Hannon 2017, p. 67). This deal did not come easily and only came about due to the efforts of the U.S.  and personal efforts of President Obama. Turkey and Israel both desired his help in solving the impasse and reached out to the U.S.  to seek its help, and Obama placed pressure on both countries to find a solution. Israel offered its apology and agreed to work towards a deal after Obama visited the country in early 2013 (Cohen 2013; Kanat & Hannon 2017, pp. 83–84; Prakash & Ilgit 2016, p. 143). Obama’s engagement with Turkey and Israel to find a solution to the crisis is a positive sign for Turkish-American Relations and shows that the U.S.  still values Turkey (Arda 2015, p. 218). However, following the incident, relations between the three countries changed. Turkey no longer engages in trilateral relations, but instead views each relationship separately (Kanat & Hannon 2017, pp. 8–84). Many Israelis and Americans also perceive that Turkey had been looking to downgrade relations with Israel before the incident and that Turkish anger over Operation Cast Lead is nothing more than an excuse to do something they were already planning to do (Ben-Meir 2010). Providing support to their views, Erdoğan worked to convince the people of Turkey that he embarrassed and humbled Israel in the deal (Cohen 2013).

2. Trump Recognizes Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel In December 2017, President Trump announced that the U.S. would be moving its Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and in May 2018 the U.S. opened its Embassy in West Jerusalem. The move was greeted with joy in Israel and a number of other countries have since followed suit in moving their embassies to Jerusalem. On the other hand, the announcement was not received warmly in much of the

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world and especially in Muslim majority nations. Turkey was one such country (Cohen 2018; Hamdi 2018, p. 267; Kirecci 2018, p. 67). The declaration also came on the heels of Trump’s decision in November 2017 to force the Palestine Liberation Organization’s mission in Washington, D.C. to close, another move greeted with anger in Turkey (Hamdi 2018, p. 267; Wanis-St. John 2019, p. 109). Turkey responded quickly to Trump’s Jerusalem announcement and made it clear that it considered the move illegitimate and unacceptable and that it would take diplomatic action to try to prevent the U.S.  from moving the Embassy. Erdoğan, and many other leaders, had been anticipating Trump’s announcement and in the days leading up to it had been contacting other world leaders to build a consensus against it. In addition, Erdoğan called for a special meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which was convened soon after Trump’s announcement in December, to develop a strategy to have the UN General Assembly condemning the decision (Kirecci 2018, pp. 69–70). At the UN, Turkey and Yemen (the head of the Arab Group) requested an emergency session (Kirecci 2018, p. 73). In the session, Erdoğan spoke forcefully against the U.S.  decision. In the end, the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to condemn the U.S. Embassy move. In the days following the decision, Erdoğan was vocally critical of Trump’s decision. Erdoğan has made numerous statements blasting the U.S. decision, such as stating that the Embassy move is “not valid in our understanding, in our mentality and in our conscience” (Kirecci 2018, p. 71), “null and void” (AlJazeera 2017), a “huge mistake” (Anderson & Vonberg 2018), and that “the United States has chosen to be part of the problem rather than the solution” (Ozkan & Butler 2019). In addition, Erdoğan threatened economic sanctions and measures against any country that follows the U.S.  lead and moves its Embassy to Jerusalem (Ozkan & Butler 2019). Erdoğan went so far as to suggest that Turkey might open an Embassy for Palestinians in East Jerusalem (this is not possible without Israel’s permission as Israel has control over the entirety of Jerusalem) (Cohen 2018). Not surprisingly, Trump administration, and many members of Congress, did not respond favorably to Turkey’s statements and actions. More generally, the U.S. expressed their displeasure with nations criticizing the move, stating that no foreign government had any businesses telling the U.S. where it was allowed to place Embassies. In addition, the U.S.  blasted the nations that voted against the Embassy move calling the votes “disrespectful” and threatening that the U.S. would not forget who had criticized the move and voted against it (Kirecci 2018, p. 72). In a similar situation, in March 2019, Trump administration announced that it was recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights (Strauss 2019), which Israel had won from Syria in a preemptive war in 1967 as Syria and other Arab states were preparing to attack Israel. Erdoğan quickly condemned this move as well. At a meeting of the OIC, Erdoğan stated, directly criticizing the U.S. decision, that the world “cannot allow the legitimization of the occupation of the Golan Heights” (Trew & Batchelor 2019). These incidents related to Israel have caused additional damage to Turkish-American relations.

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3. The Middle East Peace Process and Its Influence on TurkishU.S. Relations The relationship between Turkey and the U.S.  is impacted in both positive and negative ways by negotiations between Israel and the Arab world. Despite some important differences (discussed below), prior to the election of Trump, Turkey and the U.S.  had similar general views regarding the peace process and how to address outstanding issues. While little real progress was made, there was general consensus around the basic territory and sovereignty questions, as well as issues such as refugee resettlement, during the Bush and Obama administrations (Hamdi 2018, p. 263). Trump’s election created a marked shift in the U.S. position. The U.S. position has moved away from these past understandings and towards a position that is much more similar to Israel’s position than that of Turkey or the Palestinians (Krasna 2018, p. 73). This has driven a further wedge between Turkey and the U.S. Under the AK Parti rule, for years, Turkey worked to become a central country in Arab-Israeli peace talks, in part to boost its importance in the region and the world. In 2007, Turkey was invited to take part in these talks by the U.S., EU, Israel, and Palestinians (Bolme 2007, p. 5). This invitation was extended because up to that point Turkey had taken a fairly even-handed approach and was growing quickly in regional importance. At the talks, however, Turkey did not stick to that approach, and instead insisted that any deal include “justice to the Palestinian’s rights” (Everts 2004) and began demanding Israel make additional concessions. As a result, Turkey was not a productive part of the negotiations. AK Parti countered that Israel was not allowing Turkey to play a constructive role and that Israel had disrupted negotiations (Primor 2012). In recent years, Erdoğan has criticized the U.S. role in these talks saying that it can “no longer act impartially” as a mediator and that other nations should take over that role (Kirecci 2018, p. 71). Despite that criticism, Trump administration has attempted to bring Turkey back into future negotiations. Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who serves as Senior Advisor to the President, has met with President Erdoğan on ways to move the peace process forward (Ozkan & Butler 2019). It is not yet clear what, if anything will come from that effort. However, President Erdoğan’s early reaction to the “Deal of the Century” was negative.

4. Security and Military Cooperation As discussed above, before AK Parti came to power, and even for a brief time afterwards, Israel and Turkey engaged in close and high-level military and security cooperation, along with training exercises. These often included the U.S.  as well. In recent years, these nations have seen a marked decrease in such cooperation. One such example is the Anatolian Eagle air force exercises which are hosted by Turkey and allow Turkey’s air force to train alongside other nation’s

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pilots. Historically, the U.S. and Israel had been frequent participants. In 2009, at the last-minute, Turkey cancelled the exercises, ignoring strenuous U.S. objections (Prakash & Ilgit 2016, p. 142). Erdoğan denied the cancellation was political, but the cancellation came on the heels of Erdoğan’s criticisms of Israeli policies in Gaza and the incident at Davos. In another incident, Turkey was scheduled to purchase from the U.S. brandnew F-35 fighter jets in 2019. Before that sale occurred, however, Turkey agreed to a deal with Russia to purchase the S-400 missile system, which is an anti-aircraft weapon. As a result, under U.S.  law (the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act-CAATSA), any nation that purchases weapons systems from Russia is subject to U.S. sanctions and cannot purchase U.S. military technology. This includes Turkey. Turkey attempted to assure the U.S. that the purchase presented no threat and that the U.S. should go ahead with the sale. While Trump has seemed interested in proceeding, U.S. Congress has not been willing to allow the sale to move forward, thus blocking it (Bar’el 2019; Stafford 2019). Israel has been lobbying behind the scenes in Congress to ensure that this outcome occurs. The reason Israel is doing so appears to be that it will ensure that Israel maintains its qualitative military edge in the region (Daily Sabah with AA 2019; i24News 2019; Stafford 2019; Times of Israel Staff 2019). In the past, Israel often helped Turkey obtain more modern weaponry, but the downturn in relations between the two states has made it harder for Turkey to obtain the weapons it desires from the U.S. Another example of the impact Israel has on Turkish-U.S. security relations was in 2010 when NATO and the U.S., in particular, were pushing for Turkey to accept a missile defense system, known as the “Missile Shield”. The stated purpose of the Missile Shield was to expand early warning radar systems and defend a greater number of NATO countries, including Turkey, from incoming missiles (Egeli & Güvenç 2012, pp. 25–26; Kibaroğlu & Sazak 2015, p. 105). It is widely suspected, however, that while the stated goals were likely true, the central purpose of the Missile Shield was to make it easier to spy on Iran. For that reason, Turkey feared that agreeing to join the program would harm its relations with Iran and place Turkey in greater danger. In Turkey, there was additional strong suspicion that the Missile Shield was also being deployed to protect Israel, which would mean that Turkey would be compromising its security to improve security for Israel (Kibaroğlu 2013, p. 231). In the end, Turkey did agree to have the system in its territory and it was up and running in December 2012, but the delay, partly over issues related to Israel, strained Turkish-American Relations. The U.S.  ended up withdrawing its weapons from the Missile Shield in 2015 (Spanish weapons remain), which upset many in Turkey and added additional support to questions regarding what the true purpose of the program was, particularly as 2015 was also the same year the Iran nuclear deal was struck. As these examples illustrate, overall, the downturn in relations between Israel and Turkey has led to a downgrading in relations between Turkey and the U.S.

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5. Differing Paths on Iran Regarding Iran, Turkey has a very different vision and approach than the U.S. and Israel, which share a very similar view. The U.S. and Israel see Iran as a threat to their national securities, with Israel in particular viewing Iran, which has threatened to annihilate Israel, as a real existential threat. Turkey, on the other hand, views Iran as a regional rival, but one with which Turkey can work, and if carefully handled, a relationship from which Turkey can benefit (Tur 2012, p. 59). The most important example of this is Iran’s nuclear weapons program and the different approaches the three nations have taken regarding it. All three nations oppose Iran obtaining nuclear weapons, but the intensity of that feeling and the actions they are willing to take to try to prevent it from occurring have differed significantly. These differences have led to tensions between each dyad at different points. Overall, however, it can generally be said that the U.S. and Israel share similar goals and strategies while Turkey does not share those goals. This is particularly true under the current Trump administration. Of the three nations, Turkey made the first significant attempt to address Iran’s nuclear weapons program, back in the late 2000s. Turkey and Brazil were able to negotiate a deal in May 2010 that would involve a low enriched nuclear fuel swap with Iran (Ayman 2014, p. 12; Gurzel & Ersoy 2012, p. 143; Sever & Oguz Gok 2016, p. 1174). The deal, however, was dead on arrival at the UN and the Security Council rejected the deal. Only Turkey and Brazil voted for the deal and to prevent additional sanctions on Iran. The international community, including the U.S. and Israel, viewed the deal as a tactical move by Iran rather than a real solution (Sever & Oguz Gok 2016, p. 1176). The U.S. was additionally angered by Turkey’s negotiating a deal without consulting the U.S. and without working with additional U.S. allied nations that any arrangement would have impacted (Erhan & Sıvış 2017, p. 106; Ozcan 2017, p. 15). More generally, the U.S. and Israel pursued a much more aggressive approach towards Iran’s nuclear program, including famously launching Stuxnet, the world’s first ever cyber-attack that caused physical damage (see Cohen, Freilich, & Siboni 2016 for more details). Turkey and the U.S. were briefly in alignment regarding how to handle Iran’s nuclear program. This came in 2015, when a deal was struck between Iran and the so-called P5+1 countries (the UN Security Council permanent members   – U.S., France, United Kingdom, Russia, and China, plus Germany), known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The deal was a negotiated path that aimed to temporarily halt Iran’s progress towards building nuclear weapons; and it was greeted with excitement in much of the world, including in Turkey (Kanat & Hannon 2017, p. 74). One of the nations that did not support the deal was Israel, which very vocally made its opinion known and attempted to stop the deal from taking effect, arguing it did not do enough to prevent Iran from making progress towards nuclear weapons (Ayoob 2015, p. 46; Kanat & Hannon 2017, p. 74). When Trump was campaigning for President, he expressed the same view as the Netanyahu administration and called the JCPOA the “worst deal ever seen” (BBC 2018). A little over a year after his inauguration, on May 8, 2018, Trump withdrew the

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U.S.  from the deal and reinstituted sanctions (Yinanç 2018). Trump threatened that any company or country doing business with Iran would be subject to these sanctions, even allied nations and those still a part of the JCPOA. These sanctions will likely have an impact on European and Middle Eastern business, including Turkey’s growing trade relations with Iran. The U.S.  decision to withdraw from the Iran deal drew sharp international condemnation, including in Turkey (Jones 2018). Since the withdrawal from the agreement was announced, Turkey has been vocal in its objections. For instance, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu criticized the decision and Turkey indicated its desire to work with European nations to ensure that other nations did not withdraw from the JCPOA and to prevent the implementation of sanctions on Iran or on countries doing business with Iran (Yinanç 2018). Turkey stands to benefit from trade with Iran, particularly in the energy field, so the U.S.  action could substantially harm Turkey’s economy (Mitchell 2019). After discussions, the U.S. allowed nine countries to avoid the implementation of U.S. sanctions on them if they did business with Iran, and Turkey was one of them. Despite this, relations between the Turkey and the U.S. and Israel were harmed, with Israel pushing for the withdrawal from the deal, Turkey objecting, and the U.S. siding with Israel. Turkey’s opposition to the U.S. action and its objections to sanctions on Iran at numerous points have also damaged Turkish-Israeli relations, with Israel believing Turkey is ignoring Israel’s legitimate security concerns (Ben-Meir 2011). More generally, beyond Iran, the issue of the spread of nuclear weapons has harmed Turkish-U.S. relations at other times, with Israel again playing a role. Turkey has on occasion pushed for modifications to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as well as for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons around the world. They have been frequently opposed in such efforts by a number of countries, including both the U.S. and Israel (Sever & Oguz Gok 2016, p. 1174). Turkey’s overall relations with Iran, not just concerning the nuclear program, have also proven to be divergent from and problematic in the Turkish-American Relations. In recent years, Turkey and Iran have improved their bilateral relations. For a long time, Turkey and Iran had opposing systems of government. Iran was a country governed by a theocratic system, while Turkey had a hardliner secular government that oppressed the expression of religion in some ways. While Turkey is still far from a theocracy, the rise of the AK Parti has dramatically decreased such tensions (Fuller 2004, p. 60). Turkey and Iran remain rivals for power in the Middle East, but both share a sense that they should pursue their own interests, even if those interests do not align with what the U.S. desires. Further, Turkey and Iran share priorities more in line with Iran’s interests than with the goals of America and allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia (Kamrava 2018, p. 610). In fact, Turkey and Iran have improved cooperation in the military and security realms. For example, they have worked together to halt Iran’s Kurdish population from aiding the PKK separatist group in Turkey (Fuller 2008, p. 112; Larrabee 2007, p. 109) and in 2010, Turkey appointed a man with -allegedly- pro-Iranian sentiments to be the head of its intelligence service (Inbar 2011, p. 134). It is mainly in regards to economics and

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energy that Turkey and Iran have greatly improved their relations with trade dramatically increasing in recent years. (Ayoob 2015, p. 52; Fuller 2008, p. 112; Kanat & Hannon 2017, p.  73; Larrabee 2007, p.  109; Mitchell 2019; Sever & Oguz Gok 2016, pp. 1176–1177). Turkey has few natural resources, so it often relies on foreign supplies, which Iran can provide (Ozel 2012). These economic interests have been a crucial driving factor in the divergence in the views of how to deal with the Iranian nuclear program between Turkey on one side and the U.S. and Israel on the other (Inbar 2011, p. 140). Relations with Iran have been a central force behind the downturn in relations between the U.S. and Turkey. While this rift was evident during Obama’s Presidency, this is in large part due to the current administration in the U.S., which has looked to take a much more aggressive approach towards Iran (Krieg 2017, p. 146). Trump administrations positions are largely in line with those of Israel and in keeping with diplomatic efforts and outreach by the Netanyahu government and its allies (Krasna 2018, p. 73).

6. The Kurdish Component Turkey and the Kurds have been engaged in a struggle over Kurdish independence since Turkey was founded in 1923. The Kurdish population of Turkey has been seeking either greater autonomy in Turkey or separation from Turkey, taking much of Turkey’s southeastern territory to form Kurdistan. Turkey, therefore, views support for Kurdish groups in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, or Iran as a fundamental threat to its national territorial integrity. This has been a violent struggle in which some Kurdish groups, mainly the PKK, have launched terror attacks and waged guerrilla war on Turkey, while Turkey has committed human rights abuses against Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. Against this background, Turkey is highly sensitive to any policies or decisions by outside powers regarding the Kurds. The struggle between the Turks and Kurds has created tensions with the U.S., particularly in Syria. The U.S., up until October 2019, had formed an alliance with Kurdish groups in Syria to fight ISIS. The U.S. provided weapons, training, air support, and on the ground advisors to the Kurds, while the Kurds served as the frontline soldiers taking on ISIS. In addition, the U.S. had tacitly supported the Kurds in gaining territorial control of the northeastern region of Syria bordering Turkey in which they had set up their own governmental structures. Particularly troubling to Turkey was that the U.S. allied with a group known as the YPG, which Turkey claims is a terrorist organization tied to the PKK (Barton 2018, p. 1; Erhan & Sıvış 2017, pp. 108–109; Krasna 2018, p. 71; Krieg 2017, p. 154; Mitchell 2019; Nakhoul, Coskun, & Evans 2019; Pamuk 2016; Waldman 2019, p. 167; Wanis-St. John 2019, pp. 108–109; Ward 2019). Further escalating tensions between Turkey and the U.S., Turkey was accused of allowing jihadist groups to freely cross its border with Syria in order to allow these groups to target Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces as well as Kurdish groups. Turkey also blocked the U.S. from using the Incirlik Airbase in Turkey, which the U.S. used for decades to assist in the fight against ISIS and Assad (Park 2016, p. 456).

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Israel plays a role in tensions between Turkey and the U.S. regarding the Kurds as well. Israel has had positive relations with the Kurds for a long time. This can be seen in statements from Israeli Prime Ministers, including Ehud Olmert and Netanyahu (Lee 2017; Sulaivany 2018). Israel has offered support to the Kurds in numerous fields. Despite denials, Israel appears to have offered military training to Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq and may have supported covert operations by Kurdish groups in Iraq after the 2003 Iraq War (Abdelhadi 2006; Hersh 2004). It also appears that Israel has, and likely still is, purchasing oil from the Kurdish government in Northern Iraq. Ironically, the oil appears to be transported in part via Turkish pipelines through Turkey (Atkins 2017; Cohen-Tzemach 2018; Lee 2017; Park 2016, p.  459; Udasin 2015). In 2017, Israel was the first state that publicly supported a referendum in Northern Iraq on the creation of an independent Kurdistan (Avraham 2019; Lee 2017; Reuters News Agency & Telegraph Foreign Staff 2017; Sobelman 2014), with Netanyahu issuing a statement saying Israel “supports the legitimate efforts of the Kurdish people to attain a state of its own” (Lee 2017). The referendum overwhelming passed, but it came to little effect as much of the world opposed it, including Turkey and the U.S. (Associated Press 2019). Israel seeks out positive relations with the Kurds for a number of reasons, but a primary one is that the Kurds and Israel share a similar negative view of Iran and both seek to limit Iran’s influence (Avraham 2019; Lee 2017; Reuters News Agency & Telegraph Foreign Staff 2017). The U.S. and Israel have a number of overlapping goals that make their interest in maintaining positive relations with the Kurds worthwhile. As Hüseyin Işıksal argued in his chapter in this book, the U.S.  has long looked for non-Arab allies in the Middle East. Such an ally would offer many benefits to the U.S., including economic opportunities and military support. It would also make it easier for the U.S. to contain rivals in the region, including Iran, Syria, and Russia. In containing Iran and Syria, both of which have directly threatened Israel’s survival, Israel’s security posture would be improved as well. In addition, such an ally could develop positive relations with Israel, which could normalize its presence in the region and lead other nations to accept it. The Kurds can fill this role and it appears that the U.S.  and Israel have been attempting to build such a relationship as both countries have positive relations with Kurdish governments and groups around the region. As Kurdish groups grow stronger and gain the support of the U.S.  and Israel, it limits Turkey’s influence and room to maneuver (Strauss 2019). To this point, Kurdish groups appear willing to accept Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, as Trump has done (Avraham 2019). As discussed above, this is a position Turkey vehemently opposes and illustrates the role U.S.-Israeli relations can have on Turkish-American Relations. Recent developments have modified the calculations in the regions somewhat. In October 2019, Trump announced that the U.S. forces that had been supporting Kurdish groups in Syria would be withdrawn. In the days after the announcement, Turkey began military operations in the area aiming to weaken or remove Kurdish forces and create a buffer zone along the Turkish border. Trump announced a retreat

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from Syria and the abandonment of U.S.-backed Kurdish groups after Erdoğan spoke with him and placed pressure on Trump to withdraw (Dag 2019; Krasna 2018, p.  76). This decision was greeted enthusiastically in Turkey; but in Israel, it caused great concern and upset. Aside from damage to an ally, the Kurds, the withdrawal makes it easier for Iran to expand its influence, stretching from its own borders across to the Mediterranean Sea in both Syria and Lebanon (Issacharoff 2018). Opposing this decision by Trump, other American policy-makers and foreign policy experts widely condemned the withdrawal (Edmondson 2019). This illustrates that more broadly, within and outside the administration, there is widespread continued support in the U.S. for Kurdish groups over Turkey’s concerns.

III. Turkey’s Ability to Lobby in the U.S. Israel has developed a strong lobby in the U.S., fueled in part by its hard work, in part by the U.S. community of Jews and historically aided by widespread positive views of Israel in both the Republican and Democratic parties. There are many groups in the U.S.  that have as a part or the entirety of their missions to boost U.S.-Israeli cooperation and U.S. support for Israel, and they exist across the political spectrum, including AIPAC, The Israel Project, Stand with Us, J Street, and many others. The aim of these groups is to promote the interests of both Israel and the U.S. through the creation of government policies leading to enhanced cooperation between the nations in security, economics, technology, medicine, and more. These efforts extend from non-governmental organizations run and funded by Americans to warm ties between leaders in both countries. Turkey, by contrast, has not been able to build an effective lobbying organization or effort in the U.S. so far. When Turkey and Israel enjoyed positive relations, Israel would frequently lobby on behalf of Turkey’s causes and interests (Cohen & Freilich 2014). Israel helped Turkey gain high level diplomatic access to officials in Washington (Kanat & Hannon 2017, p. 64). Israel also helped Turkey combat negative reports regarding human rights issues in Turkey (Tur 2012, p. 47). “The Israel lobby was in effect a limited Turkish lobby, something Turkey lacked” (Cohen & Freilich 2014). Overall, Israel used its influence in the U.S.  to improve Turkish-American Relations. Following the collapse of Turkish-Israeli relations, pro-Israel groups halted their efforts on behalf of Turkey, which has made it difficult for Turkey to achieve its goals regarding the U.S. and has harmed relations. As a result, since the AK Parti rose to power in the early 2000s, Turkey has been working hard to build its own lobbying capabilities. Turkey has turned to its citizens and countrymates in the U.S. to try to improve Turkey’s image with U.S.  policy-makers (Koser & Bayraktar 2017, pp.  138–139, 154–155; Ozcan 2017, p. 17). It does not appear, however, that these efforts have been successful. Overall, American decision-makers have tended to have a negative view of Turkey. Turkey’s failure to obtain the F-35 jets is an example of growing distrust. A negative U.S. assessment of Turkey is evident most recently in a resolution and a bill passed by the U.S. House of Representatives, in late October 2019. In the resolution, which

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overwhelming passed by a vote of 405 to 11, the House stated that it was recognizing the Armenian Genocide, which Turkey has strenuously opposed for years. The bill called for widescale sanctions that would badly damage Turkey’s economy and targeted Erdoğan personally as well (Shesgreen 2019).

Conclusions: Reasons to Believe Turkish-American Relations have rarely been truly warm or comfortable, but they have taken a turn for the worse over roughly the past decade. There are many drivers behind this shift, including a rise in anti-Muslim sentiment in the West, partly based on extremist Islamist attacks, disagreements over policies in the Middle East, and most recently the Trump administration’s idiosyncratic shifts on policies in the region (Krasna 2018, p. 66; Lynch 2016, pp. 134–135). The change in the goals of Turkey’s leaders, leaning away from the West and secularism, has also been a factor. In addition, it is clear that Turkey’s bilateral relations with Israel and U.S. bilateral relations with Israel have played a role in the downgrade in ties between the U.S. and Turkey, as well. Turkey had maintained relations with Israel in part to improve relations with the U.S. (Tur 2012, p. 61). After the AK Parti came to power, Turkey’s goals began to diverge from the U.S. and Turkey grew more confident as an actor. At the same time, in the early portion of the Obama administration Turkish-American Relations improved, which led Turkey to feel it needed Israel less to help boost relations. This calculation, however, does not appear to have been correct. Despite the gloomy picture painted in this chapter, we can, as Bruce Springsteen says, “find some reason to believe” (Springsteen 1982). There are three main fields in particular in which these three nations would benefit from enhancing cooperation, with the hope that such cooperation will lead to a longterm improvement in ties. The three areas are; economics, security, and the peace process. In the economic sphere, increased ties could benefit each of the nations. Turkey’s economy has largely been growing in recent years but in an inconsistent manner. One way in which the U.S. could improve relations with Turkey would be to help boost Turkish economic growth, for example, by increasing trade. This would be an economic benefit to America as well (Ward 2019). Israel can play a role in this effort. In fact, despite the downturn in diplomatic relations between Israel and Turkey, trade and economic relations have remained strong (Cagaptay & Evans, 2012; Efron 2018, p. 15).Working together, the U.S., Israel, and Turkey could aim to boost trilateral trade. Doing so could boost the economy of all three nations, and equally importantly, it could serve as a method to improve diplomatic relations between each dyad. The high levels of trade between the three states gives reason to hope this might occur. A trade pact could appeal to all parties. In the security realm, three countries have much to gain from working together. All three nations have powerful and advanced militaries. As discussed above, Turkey, Israel, and the U.S.  once worked closely together and conducted joint training exercises. Such cooperation has largely ceased. In 2011, Turkey halted

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all military contracts with Israel. In 2013, Turkey closed its airspace to Israeli military flights (Inbar 2009, p. 28; Meliha & Martin 2011, pp. 573–574; Meral & Paris 2010, p. 83). Israel, in turn, has largely refused to sell advanced military goods to Turkey since 2011 and has been highly reluctant to cooperate in any sensitive military or intelligence areas (Inbar 2009, p. 41). The U.S. has also decreased cooperation with Turkey, as the incidents discussed earlier illustrate. In turn, Turkey has turned increasingly to Russia to obtain advanced weaponry, deepening the distrust. Despite this, there are still hopeful signs. In the past few years, Turkey and the U.S. have been working more closely on counter-terror efforts and on boosting both nations’ security situations more broadly (Carter 2017). Counter-terrorism is an area in which Turkey and Israel have historically cooperated closely, as both regularly face terror attacks. Despite the downturn in relations, Turkey and Israel have continued such efforts when situations called for it. In addition, all three countries are currently facing terror threats from the same groups, including ISIS (Kanat & Hannon 2017, p. 71). This gives reason to hope that the fight against terrorism could provide a pathway to improve relations. There is also room for the three countries to work together regarding the dangers posed to each by Iran. All three nations hope to prevent Iran from expanding its influence in the region and from obtaining nuclear weapons. Turkey and Israel have both made their concerns known regarding Iran’s efforts to grow as a regional power and expand its influence, as well as in regards to Iran’s support for sectarian and extremists groups in the region that threaten both Turkey and Israel. There is a clear opportunity for the two nations to work together, and to involve the U.S., on this issue (Kanat & Hannon 2017, p. 74). Relatedly, all three states want to see Assad removed from power and for a stable and peaceful Syria to emerge. The U.S. could help improve relations with Turkey and between Turkey and Israel by working with both Turkey and Israel to help achieve that goal. Each of the three nations would stand to gain from improved ties. For Turkey, improved ties with Israel can lead to better ties with the U.S., as past close ties between Turkey and Israel have shown. For Israel, improved relations with Turkey would give it greater support in the international community, because Turkey is a country whose regional influence and world clout has been growing. For the U.S., boosting relations with Turkey would provide it with improved standing with a longstanding partner and a partner with important regional connections in the Middle East. For each of these countries, improved relations with the others will allow them to be more successful in promoting their interests and influence and furthering their diplomatic goals. In a hopeful sign, despite a more general downturn in relations, Trump has referred to Erdoğan as a “friend” (Hernandez 2019). There are many others in the U.S. State Department and in the U.S. Congress who would like to see improved relations. Turkey, the U.S., and Israel also each stand to gain by working together on the Arab-Israeli peace process. Turkey has long desired to be a part of the peace process, in part as a way to boost its regional stature. While past efforts with Turkey were not successful, inviting Turkey to take part in talks might be a way to show a

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desire to improve relations by both the U.S. and Israel. The U.S. has been attempting to help craft a peace plan for decades now and the addition of countries willing to offer constructive help is valuable and may increase the odds of success. Given its location and its relationships, a role for Turkey makes good sense. If a deal can be reached, it will obviously be a boost for Israeli security. Turkey’s participation may increase the odds of a deal being struck. Turkey’s relationship with, and support for, Hamas and Fatah, in particular, may give them the credibility to help the Palestinian groups accept a compromise with terms they may not like, which is always a part of negotiations, while the U.S. can do the same with Israel. If Turkey plays a constructive role, whether or not a deal is struck, it could improve relations with Israel. The same is true of relations with the U.S. If these countries can find a way to work together on creating peace, that could go a long way to boosting the stature and security of all three countries and improve all of their complex relationships.

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Park, B. (2016), “Regional Turmoil, the Rise of Islamic State, and Turkey’sMultiple Kurdish Dilemmas”, International Journal, Vol. 71, No: 3, pp. 450–467. Prakash, D. & Ilgit, A. (2016), “More than a Feeling: Emotional Responses to International Criticism in Erdogan’s Turkey”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 43, No: 1, pp. 130– 151. Primor, A. (2012), “A Postcard from Ankara: Turkey Is Not Looking to Reconcile with Israel”, Haaretz, Date of Accession: November 8, 2019 from http://www.haaretz. com/opinion/a-postcard-from-ankara-turkey-is-not-looking-to-reconcile-withisrael-1.473125. Reuters News Agency & Telegraph Foreign Staff (2017), “Israel Becomes First State to Back an Independent Kurdistan”, Date of Accession: October 1, 2019 from https:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/09/14/israel-becomes-first-state-back-independentkurdistan/. Sever, A. & Oguz Gok, G. (2016), “The UN Factor in the “Regional Power Role” and the Turkish Case in the 2000s”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 29, No: 3, pp. 1150–1185. Shesgreen, D. (2019), “ ‘Double Whammy’: House Approves Sweeping Turkey Sanctions Bill, Recognizes Armenian Genocide”, USA Today, Date of Accession: November 3, 2019 from https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2019/10/29/syria-lawmakers-targetturkish-president-erdogan-sanctions-bill/2473819001/. Singh, M. (2010), “The Real Choice Turkey Has to Make When It Comes to Israel”, Foreign Policy, Date of Accession: October 3, 2019 from http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/ posts/2010/11/05/the_real_choice_turkey_has_to_make_when_it_comes_to_israel. Smith, E. (2019), “Trump-Erdogan Meeting Could Result in Sanctions on Turkey If It Turns Fiery, Analyst Says”, CNBC, Date of Accession: October 3, 2019 from https://www.cnbc. com/2019/06/28/trump-erdogan-meeting-could-result-in-sanctions-on-turkey-if-itturns-fiery.html. Sobelman, B. (2014), “Netanyahu Expresses Support for Kurdish Independence”, Date of Accession: September 27, 2019 from https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fgnetanyahu-israel-iraq-kurdistan-20140629-story.html. Springsteen, B. (1982), “Reason to Believe”, Nebraska (Music Album), Columbia Records. Stafford, E. (2019), “Recent Moves by Trump, Netanyahu a Foreshadowing of Consequences Facing Turkey”, Ahvalnews, Date of Accession: October 4, 2019 from https://ahvalnews. com/turkey-usa/recent-moves-trump-netanyahu-foreshadowing-consequences-facingturkey. Strauss, B. (2019), “Trump and Israel”, Strategika, Issue: 58, Hoover Institution, Date of Accession: October 3, 2019 from https://www.hoover.org/research/trump-and-israel. Sulaivany, K. (2018), “Former Israeli PM says Israel will continue to support ‘needs, aspirations’ of Kurds”, Kurdistan24, Date of Accession: October 1, 2019 from https:// www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/c3fd74d7-82a4-400f-908d-b991ea332605. The Economist (2010, June 12), “Is Turkey Turning?”. The Economist (2009/a, January 31), “Bad New Vibrations”. The Economist (2009/b, January 31), “Temper Tantrums”.

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Times of Israel Staff (2019), “Erdogan Says Talks Started with Trump Over Purchase of Patriot Missiles”, Date of Accession: October 1, 2019 from https://www.timesofisrael. com/erdogan-says-holding-discussions-with-trump-over-purchase-of-patriot-missiles/. Trew, B. & Batchelor T. (2019), “World United in Condemnation of Trump Over Call to Recognise Israel’s Claim to Golan Heights”, The Independent, Date of Accession: October 1, 2019 from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/trump-israelgolan-heights-iran-turkey-russia-syria-erdogan-a8834636.html. Tur, O. (2012), “Turkey and Israel in the 2000s – From Cooperation to Conflict”, Israel Studies, Vol.17, No: 3, pp. 45–66. Turkel, J. (2011), “Report of the Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010”, Turkel Commission Report. Udasin, S. (2015), “Report: Majority of Israeli Oil Imported from Kurdistan”, The Jerusalem Post, Date of Accession: September 30, 2015 from https://www.jpost.com/Businessand-Innovation/Israel-importing-77-percent-of-its-oil-from-Iraqi-Kurdistan-reportsays-413056. Waldman, T. (2019), “Strategic Narratives and US Surrogate Warfare”, Survival, Vol. 61, No: 1, pp. 161–178. Walker, J. (2006), “Turkey and Israel’s Relationship in the Middle East”, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 17, No: 3. Wanis-St. John, A. (2019), “Fumbling Abdication: Make America Diplomatic Again”, Negotiation Journal, January, pp. 107–110. Ward, A. (2019), “How America’s Relationship with Turkey Fell Apart”, Vox, Date of Accession: September 30, 2019 from https://www.vox.com/world/2019/4/11/18292070/ usa-turkey-trump-erdogan-s400. Yinanç, Barçın (2018), “How will Turkey trade with Iran with sanctions back and Halkbank on target?”, Hürriyet Daily News, Date of Accession: September 30, 2019 from https:// www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/barcin-yinanc/how-will-turkey-trade-with-iranwith-sanctions-back-and-halkbank-on-target-134372. Zalewski, P. (2010/2011), “The Self-Appointed Superpower: Turkey Goes It Alone”, World Policy Journal, Vol. 27, No: 4, pp. 97–103.

Armağan Gözkaman1

Chapter 13: The Trump Administration: An Impossible Thrust for Turkey-EU Relations

Abstract: Historically, the support coming from the United States (U.S.) has been a very important factor in Turkey’s relations with the European Union (EU). Nevertheless, the current U.S. administration is possibly in the worst position to bolster Turkey’s EU bid, and perhaps this support became absent at a time when Turkey needs it the most. There are essentially two grounds to explore the reasons for a lack of thrust that constitutes the research question. First, it is difficult to say that Donald Trump is a friend of the EU. Second, Turkish-American Relations are not at their best. Keywords: Turkey-EU Relations, Donald Trump, European Union, Turkish-American Relations.

Introduction This chapter is intended, as its title suggests, to analyze the impact of the United States (U.S.) administration presided by Donald Trump upon Turkey’s relations with the European Union (EU). The main thesis is that the U.S. administration led by Donald Trump cannot have a positive impact on EU relations. Based on this ground, the present research is built on two avenues. The first being that it is difficult (or even impossible) to view the U.S. as an asset for Turkey’s EU bid. The second concerns the unfavorable juridico-political and strategic environment for Turkey-U.S. relations. At the beginning of the study concerning the 45th President of the United States, two observations on his personality (that pose, to some extent, a hurdle for the research) deserve to be highlighted. First, Donald Trump is a President that is unprecedented in his unpredictability, a fact that risks a long-term research fall into disuse. Hence, although referring to both primary and secondary sources is expected to provide some robustness to social science researches, making solid predictions based on factual analysis remains difficult due to the changing mood of the person situated at the center of analysis – especially when this person is vested with governmental power as the head of a strong executive system. The second observation is related to Donald Trump’s oversimplification of the matters that require in fact a deeper analysis. For him, the world is in a black and 1 Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Beykent University, Istanbul, Turkey. Email: [email protected]

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white setting where the justification of his decisions is easy, most often without the need of resorting to multi-dimensional considerations. This is accompanied by an inclination to easily choose (or even prefer) confrontation as a tool of foreign policy without exhausting more conciliatory approaches. This puts U.S. relations with other states on shaky ground, where no capital in this world is immune to the degradation of relations with Washington.

I. The “Trump Factor” in the U.S.-EU Relations At the time of writing this article, almost three years have passed since the 45th President of the United States took office. His election victory came much to the surprise of many observers and led to the broadly shared expectation that his term would not be an ordinary one. During his candidacy, he used controversial language that was incompatible with political traditions. Despite the rather candid expectations that his statements would match the seriousness required by his post after he took the Presidential oath, he carried on disregarding political correctness in his speeches. At times, he was even unequivocally vulgar – a fact that used to be almost unimaginable in democratic societies. It is difficult to deny that the election of Donald Trump as the President of the U.S. has opened a new era for U.S.-EU relations. This peculiar relationship may be explained by focusing on two operating assumptions. First, the President –vested by the U.S.  constitutional system with significant powers in the field of foreign policy– has a rather negative view of the European Union. Second, there are substantial disagreements between the administration led by Trump and the decision-making circles of the European Union.

II. Donald Trump’s Negative Views Towards the EU on Grounds of Political Psychology It is common practice to refer to state leaders in order to study states’ foreign policies (Malıcı 2017). One can easily observe in the scholarly literature that there has been a non-negligible interest in the leaders’ personality and cognitive approaches (Walker 1983; Winter 1992, 2003, Gallagher & Allen 2014), Presidential character (George 1974; George & George 1998; Fishman, Pederson & Rozell 2001, Pederson & Williams 2001), emotions (Crawford 2000; Hymans 2006; Mercer 2013; Welch Larson & Shevchenko 2014), ideas and beliefs (Goldstein 1988; Goldstein & Keohane 1993; Walker, Schafer & Young 1999), along with their choice of advisors (Garrison 2001; Glad 2009). On this conceptually fertile ground, it seems appropriate to remind ourselves of the privileged place that the President occupies in the U.S. political system. The U.S. Constitution assigns a significant level of responsibility to the Presidency in the realm of foreign policy. In the past, American Presidents have justified their assertiveness in foreign policy by evoking the peculiarity of their office and the

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universal suffrage that brought them to power (Nelson 2012, p.  176). Compared to other democracies, the U.S. Congress has unequaled power in foreign policy. In practice, however, the latter remains a “privileged domain of action for the executive” (Kandel 2011, p. 20). As Samuel Huntington makes the point, people’s worldviews are “indispensable guides to international politics” (2011). Hence, references to Donald Trump’s worldview will be made in the following sections. At this point, it may be important to define the concept of “operational code”. Robert Merton introduced it in 1940 to indicate “the values, world view, and response repertoire which an individual acquires and shares with other members of an organization”. Nathan Constantin Leites defined this code as a “set of axioms, postulates, and premises that appear to constitute the foundation of more specific beliefs and practices” (1951). In a later study, Alexander L. George maintained that Leites’ definition was alluding to a “set of general beliefs about fundamental issues of history and central questions of politics as these bear, in turn, on the problem of action” (1969, p. 191). In the same vein, the psychological profile is also a key point of foreign policy analysis. In research on Donald Trump’s leadership style, Immelm depicts the President’s “propensity for a superficial grasp of complex issues” and his predisposition to “act impulsively without fully appreciating the implications of his decisions or the long-term consequences of his policy initiatives” as potential weaknesses (2017, p. 11). Some studies go even further by pointing to a threat posed by Trump. A French scholar rightfully reminds us that, despite the decades-long consensus among American psychiatrists not to publicly share political figures’ psychological diagnostics in the absence of personal (clinical) examination, many of them feel the obligation to warn the public opinion about the danger that Donald Trump represents for the country (Nardon 2018, p. 12). The domestic aspect of the abovementioned “danger” posed by the U.S. President goes beyond the scope of this study. With regard to the American Foreign Policy vis-à-vis the EU, however, there are at least four points that deserve to be highlighted. First, Trump does not believe in the virtues of multilateralism (Vimont 2017, p.  68). He gives strong signals of disinterest in the international cooperation mechanisms through his concept of “America First”. This hypothesis is factually supported by his announcement of withdrawal from landmark international covenants. Besides, the federal budget shows a substantial reduction for international undertakings and organizations “whose missions do not substantially advance U.S. Foreign Policy interests or for which the funding burden is not fairly shared amongst members” (Office of Management and Budget 2018, p. 71). Second, he does not veritably understand the European integration and has a distorted image of it. His statements on the EU are often disparaging, hostile, and reactionary (EPSC 2017, p. 4). He also perceives the Union as a rival bloc that built up to compete with the U.S. (Schatz 2016). If his unwillingness to appoint a permanent representative to Brussels is not indicative, his “congratulations” on Brexit may display his feelings. During his Presidential campaign, he claimed that

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the EU was built up to “beat the United States when it comes to making money” (Jacobs 2016). Third, the team that he prefers to work with represents discomfort for the supporters of European integration. Indeed, the U.S. administration is not exclusively composed of anti-EU figures, but two nominations deserve special attention.2 One of them concerns the post of Secretary of State. The U.S. President removed Rex Tillers and to nominated Mike Pompeo in his place. This decision was based mainly on a number of issues. Two of them touched upon those that garnered support from the EU side. Tillerson was against the U.S. abandonment of the climate and Iran deals. For his part, Pompeo advocates the rapid cancellation of the multilateral nuclear agreement by depicting it as “disastrous”, in complete parallelism with his President. His earlier statements also resonate with Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement of December 2015. Another nomination that is relevant for this study pertains to John Bolton’s replacement of H. R. McMaster as the National Security Advisor of the President. Richard Gowan pictures the new landscape by considering that Mr. Bolton is someone who hailed the Brexit referendum as “a true populist revolt” and called the UN Secretary-General “a former socialist Prime Minister of Portugal, a great believer in the European Union” (Gowan 2018). It is also difficult to ignore his warning that the new Secretary of State will shrug off the EU objections to the hardline U.S. positions on Iran and North Korea. Besides, the Trump administration gave the impression –for some time– that it had tapped Ted Malloch as the Ambassador to the EU.3 Had that been true, this choice would have been very unfortunate: Malloch once compared the EU to the USSR, and he said the bloc needed “taming” (BBC 2017). He also affirmed that the failure of the EU project should be “self-apparent” to everyone (Malloch 2017) and called on all the member states to leave the EU (Hinshaw, Norman & Schwarts 2017). For his statements, he received strong criticism from European circles, especially from various groups represented in the European Parliament (The Guardian 2017). Fourth, Donald Trump is unpredictable. Unsurprisingly to the general public, he regularly makes contradictory statements. As David Frum pointed out, intellectual 2 For instance, the U.S. Vice President Mike Pence has not shied away from assuring the Europeans of the “permanence of cooperation” (Ducourtieux 2017). 3 According to an article in The Wall Street Journal, Federica Mogherini (then-High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the Commission) brought up the “Malloch issue” in her February 2017 meetings with the then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson (in Washington) and Vice President Mike Pence (in Brussels). Without being briefed in detail, she was informed that no decision on the EU Ambassador assignment had been taken yet (Hinshaw et al. 2017). It is interesting to note that, although Malloch has never been officially tipped for the position, the possibility of his candidacy has been enough to create uproar on the EU side. Donald Trump himself paved the way for such a broad criticism by failing to nominate an Ambassador to Brussels – the U.S. is still represented there by a chargé d’affaires.

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people endeavor in vain to find some coherence in the ideas of Donald Trump (Nardon 2017, p. 12). In the presence of contradicting statements, some positive mentioning of the EU does not leave room for optimism on the future of U.S.-EU relations. An illustration of Trumpian flip-flops is his latest declaration on a U.S.North Korea bilateral summit that went against all expectations due to Trump’s previously hawkish position on the North Korean nuclear program.

III. Donald Trump: A “Threat” for EU-U.S. Relations? Even before the inauguration of Donald Trump as President in January 2017, it was obvious that the U.S. and the EU would drift away on many issues. Many decisions of Trump’s administration have received criticism from the EU; European capitals are understandably feeling uncomfortable. After all, a President whose choices ignore the long-upheld principles and institutions of the Western community since the end of the Second World War took office. A letter that Donald Tusk addressed to the representatives of the European Council reflects the pessimism on the new U.S. administration: “The change in Washington puts the European Union in a difficult situation; with the new administration seeming to put into question the last 70 years of American Foreign Policy. (…) We cannot surrender to those who want to weaken or invalidate the Transatlantic bond, without which global order and peace cannot survive.” (European Council 2017)

As the European Political Strategy Centre states, it is difficult to foresee the strategic consequences that will emanate from this shift. It was unexpected, and the EU was not prepared for it. For the first time, a U.S. President is counted amongst the threats to Europe by a senior-level EU representative. The depiction is all the more significant as it was echoed by other politicians around the continent. The then-French President François Hollande portrayed the Trump administration as a “challenge to the EU” (AFP 2017). Senior politician and MEP group leader Guy Verhofstadt also believes that Trump threatens the EU model. French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Yves Le Drianhad also reacted to Trump’s call into question of multilateralism and pointed to the difference of global security visions (Le Figaro 2017). The “trade wars” that have occupied the transatlantic agenda since early 2018 is another illustrative problem. The conflict intensified in March 2018, when the U.S. President announced via Twitter -a medium that he prefers to the official Presidential communication platforms- that he would impose tariffs on steel (25 %) and aluminum (10 %). Trade deficit and unemployment are the two points that preoccupy Trump, but his remedy may lead to further complications. It did not take the EU long to riposte. Among many promises of swift and effective reaction to Trump’s tariff pledge, one can evoke those made by the EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström, Financial Affairs Commissioner Pierre Moscovici (Reuters 2018), President of the European Commission Jean Claude Juncker (BBC 2018), French

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President Emmanuel Macron (L’Opinion 2018), German Chancellor Angela Merkel (La Tribune 2018), and French Economy Minister Bruno Le Maire (BBC 2018). The trade conflict has motivated Trump to seek the framework of a deal with the European Union. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations had already failed in 2016 -during the Obama administration- and, in the early stages of his term, Trump was openly against the agreement in line with his “America First” slogan. He later wanted to renegotiate the agreement with the EU. However, the EU officials have the right to be skeptical of discussing new set of rules with the U.S. President – especially in a context where they are seen as “foes” by him.4 The EU is suspecting that Trump is seeking to put an end to the World Trade Organization system (Hanke 2018). In the current environment of distrust, it is difficult to expect a broad trade agreement between the transatlantic partners. The fact that the EU will consider the Paris Climate Accord as a prerequisite for future trade agreements does not lead to optimism either, with the issue of climate change being another bone of contention. Donald Trump disregards the scientific consensus on the dangers of global warming. He also picked climate skeptics for high-level administrative positions (Schreurs 2017, p. 193; Holden 2018). Together, they tend to disregard the scientific evidence that global warming has man-made causes. Their conviction is that the targets set out by the Paris Climate Accord constitute a threat to the U.S. economy. In this vein, Trump announced his intention to withdraw the U.S. from the accord and renegotiate a lighter version. Disappointed, the EU rejected the offer. The outright refusal to renegotiate the agreement was unambiguously voiced by key figures, including the European Commission’s President and the European Commissioner for climate action. An immediate FrancoItalian-German statement made by the leaders of these three states was on the same wavelength as well.5 At this point, it is important to remark that not all the EU member states are fully satisfied with the dispositions of the climate agreement reached in Paris. Coaldependent states such as Poland – or regions such as the ones in Germany – voiced their concerns on the issue. Nevertheless, these demands have not led to absolute rejection of the agreement by the EU (or its members). Instead, they have focused on solutions to achieve clean energy transition in a cooperative spirit (Schreurs 2017, p. 193). Donald Trump could have chosen to stick to the agreement instead of turning his back to it simply because climate change is a global threat and the

4 Trump is reported to have depicted the EU as a foe for what the Europeans do to the U.S. in trade (Holland & Mason 2018). 5 Besides, on the 1st of June 2017 -the day Trump decided his country’s pullout from the Paris accord- French President made a reactionary “Make our planet great again” speech  – alluding to his American counterpart’s motto “Make America great again”. The speech of Emmanuel Macron is available on the website http:// makeourplanetgreatagain.fr.

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U.S. has a key position for the fight against it. This choice would give the U.S. a more respectful place as a partner of the EU in the resolution of global problems. A point should also be made on the nuclear deal with Iran. The European Union perceives the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)6 as the successful outcome of a highly challenging multilateral process – the best possible settlement with Tehran. According to the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy: “The deal is working; it is delivering on its main goal, which means keeping the Iranian nuclear programme in check and under close surveillance. (…) It is crucial for the security of the region, but also for the security of Europe. It is in our key strategic security interest as Europeans. (…) The European Union remains committed to support the full and elective implementation of the agreement.” (European External Action Service 2018)7

In stark contrast with his allies, Trump is reported to describe it as the worst possible arrangement during his election campaign.8 In October 2017, he announced his decision to decertify the deal, but stopped short of abandoning it completely. In January 2018, he issued a waiver on sanctions against Iran, stating that it would be the last one unless Tehran agrees to “radical changes” (Borger 2018). His statement was not clear, and it is difficult to see if the U.S. President was leaving the door open for renewing the waiver or preparing the public opinion for a future crisis. The EU would prefer the first scenario to the second because Iran will feel bound by the JCPOA dispositions if the U.S. remains party to it. The abovementioned conflicts have led the European decision-makers to give up hope on bilateral cooperation on important issues. The EU decision-makers may have difficulties in accurately analyzing U.S. Foreign Policy. It is therefore not surprising to hear Angela Merkel calling on European partners to take their destiny into their own hands. Despite the entire dire picture drawn above, some still believe that the Transatlantic relations are more important and enduring than the existing disagreements.9 It seems, however, difficult to extend relations between 6 The JCPOA was signed in Vienna on July14, 2015. Iran, the five permanent members of the UNSC, Germany, and the European Union are the parties to the agreement. 7 The EEAS documents also highlights that all of the EU Foreign Ministers expressed their support to the nuclear agreement in October 2017. Within this framework, a joint statement depicts the JCPOA as the outcome of 12 years of diplomatic efforts in which the EU has also contributed. It also refers to the agreement as the “key element of the nuclear non-proliferation global architecture” and “crucial for the security of the region”. 8 During his Presidential campaign, he called it “the worst deal ever” and pledged to quit it (Kianpour 2018). 9 A similar comment was made by Donald Tusk as a reaction of Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement. In his statement, the President of the European Council underscored the preponderance of strong Transatlantic ties over the “unfortunate decisions” of Trump administration (Connolly & Asthana 2017).

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the two sides of the Atlantic beyond a very limited number of pressing issues (such as the fight against terrorism) as long as the Trump administration is in power.

IV. Challenges for the U.S. Support to Turkey’s EU Accession After the U.S. Presidential elections of November 2016, Turkish decision-makers had some optimism over the future of Turkish-American Relations. After a difficult period during Obama’s Presidency, they perceived the new American administration as an opportunity to refresh strained relations. After all, both states had common interests in providing security and stability in the region. Ankara’s position in the fight against international terrorism was certainly privileged. Traditionally, the Turkish government expected the security dimension to predominantly feature bilateral relations with the U.S. Within this perspective, Ankara’s hopes concerned a new impetus for the relations with the EU as well. Alas, hopes have rapidly faded away. In contrast to the above-mentioned upbeat expectations, Turkish-American Relations are in serious decline. The objective here is not to focus on all the disagreements that have tainted the partnership between Ankara and Washington. The reasons why it is difficult to anticipate the U.S. administration’s support to Turkey’s EU bid will be discussed under two sections: problems of the post-coup-attempt period and regional divergences.

1. Problematic Issues That Have Led to Confrontation between Ankara and Washington The Turkish government has demanded the U.S. authorities to extradite Fethullah Gülen, whom Ankara blames for orchestrating the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016. Yet, this demand has fallen on deaf ears. Maintaining that Turkey has not provided solid evidence of the involvement of Gülen, the Trump administration has constantly rejected the requests of extradition. The coup attempt had various ramifications over Turkish-American Relations. Possibly the most important one is related to the accusation made by high-level figures in Turkish administrative circles that Washington is behind the plot. The U.S. officials’ recurring denial has not produced any improvement on Turkish perception. The corollary is that mistrust defines the relations since the failed coup d’état orchestrated by Gülen. The Turkish government’s fight against Fethullah Terror Organization (FETÖ) has led to large-scale operations across the country. American citizens and Consulate officers have also been arrested. As a reaction, Washington stopped issuing nonimmigrant visas in Turkey based on its concern over “the security of U.S. mission facilities and personnel”10. Ankara reciprocated the accusation on the grounds that 10 The statement from the U.S. mission to Turkey is available at: https://twitter.com/ USEmbassyTurkey/status/917075367575384064, Date of Accession: 31 March 2018.

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the U.S.  administration was endeavoring to conceal its role in the failed putsch attempt. It also suspended non-immigrant visa services by issuing a statement mirroring that of the U.S. Embassy. The crisis ended after almost three months, in December 2017, following an agreement between the two capitals. The tension between Ankara and Washington has further aggravated due to the trial of Turkish-Iranian gold trader Reza Zarrab, who was charged by the United States District Court for violating sanctions against Iran. In his testimony, Zarrab affirmed that he bribed the Turkish Minister of Economy. He also said that when Tayyip Erdoğan was the Prime Minister, he could have his and the then-Treasury Minister Ali Babacan’s support for the authorization of two Turkish state-banks in order to make transactions with Iran (Pierson 2017). The uproar in Turkish governmental circles has come as no surprise. The President and some members of the government described the court case as a conspiracy where Zarrab is forced to cooperate with prosecutors in order to avoid conviction. The general belief in Ankara is that the ongoing judicial process in the U.S. is in fact the extension of a Turkish conspiracy – both being arranged by FETÖ. According to Erdoğan, the U.S. delivers “a chain of plots” that are of legal and economic nature (Reuters 2008). Another tension between the two NATO allies originated from Ankara’s refusal to release Andrew Brunson, an American pastor who is blamed for being involved in the coup attempt of 2016 and having connections with the PKK. He was thus accused of terrorism and spying charges by a court in the Izmir province, where he used to lead a small protestant community. In late July 2018, the court denied Brunson a release and decided to put him under house arrest. From the early stages of the judicial process, Donald Trump has exerted pressure on Turkey for the pastor’s liberation – but not without resorting to his famous tweets. Furthermore, he has retaliated by imposing sanctions on Turkish Ministers of Justice and Interior Affaires. Besides, in August 2018, Donald Trump doubled the existing customs duties on steel and aluminum, bringing the level of taxing to 50 % and 20 % respectively. Trump’s announcement has further aggravated Turkish lira’s depreciation against foreign currencies. Measures adopted by the government proved inadequate, the decrease in the value of lira having reached 45 % between January and August 2018. “Stabbed in the back”, Erdoğan’s (and the government’s) reactions to the crisis were not of a kind to ease its effects. The boycott of U.S.-origin brands or the increase of customs duties of American products has indeed not caused any improvement in the Turkish economy. Some commentators believe that, in a larger framework, the head of the U.S.  government has instrumentalized the pastor’s incarceration (and later, house arrest) to advance economic protectionism. Donald Trump has thus put his country in a commercial war against the rest of the world, and Turkey has not been spared from being in this battlefield. While it is difficult to conceive that such an antagonism would somehow favor the U.S. economy, the U.S. President seems to put his own slogan of “America First” – which is in fact harmful for the American state – before American interests. In such a framework,

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the allies have difficulties in building (and maintaining) healthy communication channels with Donald Trump.

2. Parallel Regional Objectives, Different Alliances The political preferences of the new administration in Washington reveal that the two states’ regional security interests do not fully match up – a fact that can be justified by diverging alliance preferences. While the U.S.  emphasizes the fight against the so-called “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIS) with the support of Kurdish fighters in Syria and Iraq, Turkey perceives the latter as a security threat. This leads the government of Ankara to single out Syrian opposition groups –especially the Free Syrian Army (FSA)- for alliance. As one scholar points out, Syrian conflict leads to national security concerns in Turkey and is destined to have an impact on U.S.-Turkey relations (Stein 2017). The operation “Euphrates Shield” (Fırat Kalkanı) that was conducted by Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) -mostly during Obama’s term of Presidency- is a case in point. TAF units crossed the Syrian border in order to push back terrorist fighters (ISIS and PKK) from the region and prevent the formation of an YPG-controlled area, which Turkey regards as an extension of the PKK. Turkish troops completed the operation with the support of the FSA amidst U.S. reactions over their clash with the YPG. Washington’s support of Kurdish groups has caused discontent in Turkey. Embarrassed by the Trump administration’s plan to establish a Kurdish-led force along Turkish-Syrian frontier, TAF launched “Olive Branch” (Zeytin Dalı) operation to the Syrian province of Afrin in January 2018. The operation reveals that the disagreements remain the same. Washington voiced a similar criticism over Turkish attack on YPG forces. Turkey has little doubt that the U.S.  will continue to support the Kurdish groups in the region. Against this background, the Turkish government announced that one of the objectives of the “Olive Branch” was to “prevent the U.S. support to terror organizations” (CNNTürk 2018). This statement reflects the reciprocal nature of the mistrust between the government of Ankara and the administration in Washington. Perhaps the reason why Turkey cooperates with Iran and Russia on the Syrian question is linked to this lack of trust to her NATO ally. Erdoğan, Vladimir Putin and Hassan Rouhani held a meeting in Istanbul to seek ways to resolve the conflict in Syria despite their apparent divergences on the issue. The problems have reached such an extent that “moving forward” without being stuck in the past will obviously not be very easy. A meeting between the Turkish Foreign Minister and his American counterpart held in February 2018 seems to have justified this assumption. Although the rhetoric encompassed the determination to act together on and work through the problematic issues, a change in the long-held positions was not perceptible in the statements that were made. In response to Çavuşoğlu’s resentment over Gülen’s dwelling in Pennsylvania, Tillerson reiterated that so far, the U.S. courts have not received any evidence that connects this person to the coup attempt of 2016 (Morello & Cunningham 2018).

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One can observe, however, an attitude of Donald Trump that affects TurkeyU.S. relations: he does not accuse Turkey of disrespecting human rights or freedom of the press – a thorny question for the dialogue between Ankara and Brussels. While commenting on the failed coup, Trump had said that the U.S. cannot “lecture other countries about what they do inside their borders” because the civil liberties are not fully protected on its soil either (Intellinews 2016). Nevertheless, one should underscore the fact that the U.S. Congress is vocal on the issue. The estrangement between Turkey and the U.S. seems to drive the government of Ankara into new cooperation schemes, where Russia stands out as a new partner  – and there are solid grounds to assume that she will remain so for long time. This is particularly true in Turkish endeavors to deal with the Syrian crisis, where Russia is an indispensable actor for meeting the objectives of Turkish Foreign Policy. It was also reported in the media that Turkey and Russia finalized the missile defense system agreement that was concluded in September 2017. It is important to remark that the deal was reached much to the consternation of NATO members. In the U.S. Congress, debates on possible sanctions against Turkey over her purchase of the missile have taken place (Sputnik Türkiye 2018)  and eventually Turkey was removed from the stealth fighter F-35 program. The “outsider” systems’ incompatibility with that of the alliance is the reason why the member states are discouraged to buy them. Besides, with the installment of S-400 systems, Russia could gain significant intelligence opportunities concerning all NATO combat aircrafts in Turkey, particularly the F-35 (Sputnik France 2018). Furthermore, Russia can legitimately expect political gains from the highly profitable deal with Turkey. Ankara’s overall dissatisfactions with NATO being convenient for Russian exploitation, the military deal could also provide further political rapprochement between the two states.

Conclusion Progress in Turkey-EU relations seems unlikely in the near future. The membership quest being more elusive than ever, it would be a source of satisfaction for Ankara to be supported by the U.S.  administration. Yet, it would be unrealistic to anticipate such a support for at least two reasons. First, Trump has a rather negative attitude towards the European integration process. This attitude does not allow him to endorse Turkey’s membership to the Union. Besides, if such an endorsement existed, the EU would not take it seriously into account: their present relationship would not allow the EU (and its member states) to seriously take into account Washington’s supportive policies. Second, due to the reasons evoked earlier, it is not possible to expect a substantial improvement in the Turkey-U.S.  relationship.  In the past, the relations between Turkey and the European Community/European Union have occupied the U.S. Foreign Policy agenda in differing degrees. As an astute scholar makes the point, except during the periods of Lyndon B. Johnson and Jimmy Carter, all

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U.S. administrations (both in the pre and post-Cold War periods) have had considerable influence upon these relations (Çakır 2016). The Trump era, however, will be remembered as a period of time when the relationship between Turkey and the EU reached a historic low. Relations between the two sides have been marred by various problematic issues, with too little – if any – cooperative action potentially conducive to U.S. support on Turkey’s EU bid.

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of Personality in Politics, Collegeville & St. Joseph, Date of Accession: 19 January 2018 from http://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/psychology_pubs/107/. Intellinews (2016), “Turkey Looks to US as EU Relations Worsen”, Date of Accession: 31 March 2018 from http://www.intellinews.com. Jacobs, Ben (2016), “Donald Trump: EU Was Formed ‘to Beat the US at Making Money’ ”, The Guardian, Date of Accession: 30 March 2018 from http://www.theguardian.com/ us-news/2016/jul/24/donald-trump-eu-was-formed-to-beat-the-US-at-making-money. Kandel, Maya (2011, March/April), “Obama et la politique étrangère américaine”, Esprit, pp. 18–36. Kianpour, Suzanne (2018), “Iran Nuclear Deal: Trump’s High-Stakes Balancing Act”, BBC, Date of Accession: 31 March 2018 from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-uscanada-42653789. La Tribune (2018), “Donald Trump dispense l’Union européenne de taxes sur les métaux”, Date of Accession: 29 March 2018 from https://www.latribune.fr/economie/ international/donald-trump-dispense-l-union-europeenne-de-taxes-sur-lesmetaux-772859.html. Leites, Nathan Constantin (1951), The Operational Code of the Politburo, New York, Toronto, London: McGraw Hill Book Company. Le Figaro (2017), “Trump est dans une logique de ‘rapport de forces’(Le Drian)”, Date of Accession: 18 January 2018 from http://www.lexisnexis.com/. L’Opinion (2018), “Guerre commerciale de l’acier et aluminium: Macron met en garde Trump”, Date of Accession: 29 March 2018 from https://www.lopinion.fr/edition/ economie/guerre-commerciale-l-acier-aluminium-macron-met-en-garde-trump-144426. Malıcı, Akan (2017), “Foreign Policy Belief Systems and Operational Code Analysis”, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Date of Accession: 24 January 2018 from http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore9780190228637-e-459. Malloch, Ted (2017), “The US View of European Integration”, The Parliament Magazine, Date of Accession: 12 January 2018 from https://www.thepdarliamentmagazine.eu/ articles/opinion/ted-malloch-us-view-european-integration. Mercer, Jonathan (2015), “Emotion and strategy in the Korean War”, International Organization, 67 (2), pp. 221–252. Morello, Carol & Cunnigham, Erin (2018), “Turkey and the US Agree to Move Forward, Not Dwell on Past Differences”, The Washington Post, Date of Accession: 31 March 2018 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/turkey-and-the-us-agreeto-move-forward-not-dwell-on-past-differences/2018/02/16/96ea2a58-6d07-4d58-830bb02ecdbe4a87_story.html. Nardon, Laurence (2017), “Les États-Unis dans un monde à l’état de nature”, Esprit, JulyAugust, pp. 11–15. Nardon, Laurence (2018), “Politique étrangère américaine : la sombre vision de Monsieur Trump ”, Etudes, 3, pp. 7–18. Office of Management and Budget (2018), “Major Savings and Reforms: Budget of the US Government. Fiscal Year 2018”, Date of Accession: 21 March 2018 from https://www. whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/msar.pdf.

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Chapter 14: Understanding the 21st

Century’s Specific Eurasian Regional Security and Energy Security Parameters in the Turkish-American Relationship: A Case Study on South Caucasus and Central Asia Abstract: Eurasia has been of great importance for many centuries due to its possession of strategic trade routes and energy resources. Within this context, several states within this region, as well as outside powers, have been placing unique significance to this region in their foreign policy considerations for many decades. Countries that have been placed in South Caucasia and Central Asia were ruled by Soviets until 1991 and then gained their independence following the dissolution of the Soviet Empire. After gaining independence, these states have become more important actors in global politics due to their strategic positioning in Eurasia, reemergence of frozen conflicts between them, and most importantly, the possession of huge hydrocarbon resources in this region. In that sense, Turkey, having close political, economic, cultural, and religious links with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and all Turkic speakingCentral Asian states, has been following a multi-dimensional foreign policy towards this region. The United States (U.S.) on the other hand, as the world’s only superpower left, has also been attaching special importance and following multi-dimensional strategies towards South Caucasia and Central Asia within the context of its “Wider Eurasian Strategy”. In addition, both Ankara and Washington pursue these multi-dimensional foreign, security, and energy policies by considering the Russian Federation’s foreign, security, and energy policy priorities, since Russia is still the dominant power in the region. Keywords: Eurasia, Turkish-American Relations, Security, South Caucasus, Central Asia, Energy, Russia.

Introduction Eurasia has been geostrategically, geopolitically, geoeconomically, and geoculturally vital not only for the countries in this region, but also for the global powers for many centuries. This region’s possession of strategic trade routes and 1 Ph. D., Political Science and International Relations. Lecturer at Özyeğin University, Institute of Social Sciences, Department of Public Law, Energy Law M.A. Program, Istanbul, Turkey. Email: [email protected] / [email protected]

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energy resources as well as its unique cultural heritage have always attracted the attention of Great Powers and also caused conflicts between both regional actors and outside powers. Within this region, the South Caucasus and the Central Asia have gained geopolitical significance following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Thereafter, these two regions have been much more closely followed not only by the regional powers, but also by the global powers due to vast hydrocarbon resources in this region. Within these parameters, one can consider Turkey as one of the regional powers in Eurasia since it holds widespread strategic, political, security, economic, and cultural affiliations with influential regional actors such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, and also with Central Asian Turkic states. One can also see the importance of these two regions for the U.S. in order to develop and pursue a comprehensive foreign policy as part of its inclusive “Wider Eurasian Strategy” in the 21st century. However, one has to recall that both Ankara and Washington are primarily obliged to take into the account the foreign, security, and energy strategies developed by Russia toward these geographies since Moscow is still the only hegemonic power in these regions. Based on these abovementioned parameters, this chapter elaborates on the significance of the South Caucasus and Central Asia for the foreign policy evaluations of Ankara and Washington within the context of their Eurasian security parameters in the 21st century. It first examines how Ankara and Washington approaches to South Caucasia in terms of regional security by focusing on their different stances on the Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute and South Ossetia-Abkhazia Question. Secondly, the research discusses the importance of Central Asia in terms of Turkish and American foreign and security policies toward this region by concentrating specifically on the military activities of Washington and Ankara. Thirdly, this chapter inquires the energy dimension of Turkish-American Relations in terms of South Caucasia and Central Asia.

I. The Position of South Caucasia in the Foreign Policy Parameters of Turkey and the U.S. in the 21st Century 1. South Caucasia Policy of the U.S. Political developments taking place in South Caucasia since the eruption of the Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute in 1988 have caused the alteration of the Washington’s policy preferences towards this region. The U.S.  does not recognize the Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent and sovereign state. The U.S.  also supports the preservation of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and favors the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia (Azer News, 2016). The U.S. is one of the co-chairs of Minsk Group together with Russia and France. In this context, Washington evaluates that this conflict shall be resolved in accordance with the Minsk Group format. Washington’s approach to South Caucasia is shaped both by internal and external developments. To exemplify the influence of domestic politics, one can

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easily notice the effect of the Armenian lobby in the U.S., which forces Washington to behave in a partisan manner from time to time and, therefore, results in the implementation of unjust embargos towards Baku. Especially during the election times, the influence of Armenian diaspora can be clearly seen in the approaches of the candidates, wishing to benefit from the voting potential of that group. But when the pragmatist structure of American politics is taken into consideration, it is necessary to underline that pre-election commitments can easily be invalidated when American national interests are at stake. It is also possible to discuss and analyze the changes taking place in Washington’s foreign policy in recent years as a result of Azerbaijan’s emergence as a new and influential energy producer and exporter within this region. In the post-Cold War era, Washington has realized the value of this region for Moscow and in this way it has begun to develop necessary strategies and policies. While Washington and Moscow are together within the Minsk Group, they have been also trying to maximize their national interests over this region. However, it has to be highlighted that the mediation and influence of Washington over the region in terms of a final peace agreement via Minsk Group is limited when compared to Moscow (Caşın & Kısacık 2017, pp. 127–135). Here it will be useful to discuss the analyses of Cavid Veliyev, an expert on these issues at the Center for Strategic Studies in Baku, in order to better understand the main foreign policy parameters of Washington toward the South Caucasus. At the end of 2016, with the Donald Trump’s unexpected election as the 45th U.S. President, high expectations emerged from the perspective of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. But it should first be mentioned that, as of 2016, all of these South Caucasus states celebrated only their 25th anniversary as independent countries in the international arena. In the succeeding 25 years, numerous issues have held straight or ancillary influence over Washington’s South Caucasus policy. The foreign policy primacies of Washington, this geography’s geostrategic prominence for U.S. interests, Washington’s relationships with Teheran and Moscow, the expansion of NATO, the Nagorno-Karabakh Question between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the closed border between Turkey and Armenia (closed in 1993 owing to the Nagorno-Karabakh Question) all do have huge effects on the United States’ bilateral dealings with regional states and its foreign policy regarding the South Caucasus. For U.S. officials, three main topics mark the policies of the White House over South Caucasus states: (1) democracy and human rights, (2) energy, and (3)  security. Conversely, prioritizing these topics would alter based on the urgencies of innumerable administrations since 1991 (Veliyev 2016). During the Bill Clinton administration, energy remained at the uppermost of Washington’s South Caucasus policy in that shipping the Caspian basin’s energy resources to Western markets stood precedence. During George W. Bush’s tenure in office, security stayed at top of the U.S. Foreign Policy program due to the 9/11 incident and Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. During Barack Obama’s Presidential term on the other hand, Washington pursued a more liberal interventionist (with more focus on soft power instruments rather than hard power or military instruments) foreign policy strategy towards this region. Yet, the position of these three topics

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would remain diverse in the separate circumstances of Baku, Tbilisi, and Yerevan. The White House’s commitments and policies into this region were more dynamic in the Clinton and Bush administrations when compared with Barack Obama’s Presidential term (Veliyev 2016) since the U.S. focus shifted towards Asia-Pacific during Obama years (especially during his second term). During the George W.  Bush term, conflict between Washington and Teheran had negative impacts throughout the area. The Bush administration endeavored to station military bases within the South Caucasus in order counterbalance to Iranian power. However, regional states -even the most pro-American country Georgia- opposed to this due to security risks related to Russian aggression. During Obama’s Presidential term, Tehran signed the nuclear agreement (known as JCPOA) with the P5+1 states and Western countries abandoned several sanctions against Iran. The new situation did have an affirmative effect for regional security and for bilateral relationships between Iran and the South Caucasus states. However, the current U.S. President Donald Trump, starting from his Presidential campaign, defined the JCPOA deal as a “catastrophe” and asserted to pull apart the agreement. Trump did what he promised after being elected; eventually, the U.S.  quitted the JCPOA and began to implement heavy sanctions on Iran. During the Obama administration, the U.S. “reset” had a remarkable influence on the policy of Washington toward South Caucasus, which was seen as “leaving the South Caucasus”. Then in Obama’s second term, the reset policy altered and the Ukrainian and Syrian crises negatively affected the relations between Moscow and Washington. Consequently, the geopolitical conversion of the South Caucasus has begun with Yerevan’s refusal of an Association Agreement with the European Union in 2013 and instead decision to become a member of the Moscow-led EurAsEc (Eurasian Economic Community) in 2015. Baku on the other hand continued to its unique foreign policy within the line of the Non-Alignment Movement; meaning its choice to stay out of any military bloc, upholding its stable and independent foreign policy within the region’s geopolitical challenges. Baku did not become a member of EurAsEc or tried to become a NATO member like Georgia. Aside from this, the U.S.  restriction in the region negatively affected Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As one of the co-chairs of the OSCE-Minsk Group, which was established specifically for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, it is anticipated from Washington to remain more dynamic in the course of conflict resolution by the parties to the conflict. The U.S.  played a more important role throughout the Clinton and Bush administrations. Nonetheless, quiet policy concerning the region under the Obama Presidency resulted in the deterioration of the situations as it was observed with the eruption of the professed April War in the region. Baku hopes for more initiatives from the co-chairs of the Minsk Group. Baku’s anticipations in the Trump Presidency stand for more dynamic and just commitment by Washington in terms of the confrontation. During Bush’s second term and Obama’s Presidency, Azerbaijan encountered with more liberal internationalist foreign policy conducted from the White House, which damaged

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bilateral affiliations. On the contrary, Trump maintains an allegedly anti-liberal interventionism stance, advocating that Baku’s sovereignty will affirmatively affect the bilateral affiliations. Another anticipation of Baku’s from the Trump’s Presidency is situated in growing Washington’s sponsorship for the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), which, too, stands essential for the energy security policies of the European Union (Veliyev 2016). In general, Armenian governments expect two central things from the U.S. Presidents, namely; (1)  the acknowledgment of the “Armenian Genocide” allegations and (2)  making the opening of the border between Turkey and Armenia easier with political pressure on Turkey. However, none of the U.S. Presidents have been successful in meeting these anticipations so far. Notwithstanding the two diverse protocols signed between Turkey and Armenia in 2009 in Zurich for the establishment of consular affiliations and the opening of the border, the process was doomed to failure due to reactions in both countries and stayed unsuccessful. Following this, Obama administration miscalculated Baku’s reactions towards the rapprochement between Ankara and Yerevan. Unlike Obama, throughout the electoral campaign, Donald Trump did not make any comments over the Armenian Genocide allegations, resulting in the uneasiness of American Armenians. Yerevan and Armenian diaspora anticipate backing up from the Trump administration for the acknowledgement of the Armenian Genocide and the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border. American Armenians also worry about Trump’s business relationships and close contacts with Turkey and Azerbaijan. It should be also mentioned that, so far, President Trump has not made any comments with regard to the energy topics or the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Trump’s projected strategies regarding the South Caucasus, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia stay unclear. The distress, nonetheless, stands that Trump’s team may, perhaps in advance, lessen Washington’s connection within the region, which may end up with regional instabilities (Veliyev 2016).

2. South Caucasia Policy of Turkey In 1990, there were huge protests against the Soviet Union in Baku. Due to these demonstrations, the Red Army marched on to Baku on January 19–20, 1990, which resulted in the governing of Baku by the Red Army for several months. This operation turned out to be a massacre and hundreds of people were killed. This event is still being commemorated in Azerbaijan, and it is named “The Black January” (Kara Ocak). At the end of this event, Azerbaijan organized a referendum and announced its independence in 1991, which was first recognized officially by Turkey. After the declaration of independence, Azerbaijan has always been in struggle with Armenia in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute. Despite all efforts to resolve the conflict, the Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute has been continuing for several years. The war militarily ended in 1994; but since then, it has turned into border conflicts between the two states. Given the existence of the UN Security Council and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) resolutions, Nagorno-Karabakh

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and several other Azerbaijani territories are under the occupation of Armenia according to international law. On the other hand, the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic still continues to exist as a “de facto state” (Caşın & Kısacık 2017, pp. 66–195). The ending of the Nagorno-Karabakh War has created a playing field and a chance for the development of the Ankara-Baku relationship. This relationship appears to be promising, consolidating, and being efficient as the two countries try to improve their bilateral relations in every field (Özlü 2015, pp. 430–431; Tüysüz 2018, pp. 403–425). According to Ahmet Davutoğlu, who has been shaping Turkish Foreign Policy during the ongoing Justice AK Parti and Development Party era until recently, the divisive neo-nationalism after the dissolution of the Cold War has created serious crisis zones in the vast lands of former Soviet Union. In terms of ethnic diversity, the Caucasus region, similar to the Balkan Peninsula, is another sensitive region (Davutoğlu 2018, p. 107). Ankara sees Baku as its most important ally in the Caucasia. Turkey openly advocates that Azerbaijan’s stability and territorial integrity are vital for the implementation of regional energy projects. Ankara has used all possible diplomatic channels for the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute before the UN and the OSCE. However, Yerevan rejects the mediator role of Ankara in Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute because of Ankara’s official policy of supporting Baku. The non-resolution of this dispute has also prevented the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations despite the presence of a reconciliatory atmosphere following the 2008 Russian-Georgian War. The closure of the Armenian-Georgian border during this war has negatively affected the Armenian economy. This has forced Yerevan to reconsider its relations with Ankara. In 2008, the then-Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan invited the thenTurkish President Abdullah Gül to watch a football match between the Turkish and Armenian national teams. With the acceptance of this invitation, Gül became the first Turkish President to pay an official visit to Yerevan. This visit, for sure, increased hopes for the betterment of bilateral relations and the resolution of Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. These developments led to the signing of the “Turkish-Armenian Framework Agreement” for the improvement of bilateral relations on April 22, 2009 (Caşın & Kısacık 2017, pp. 132–134). The agreement required parliamentary approval in both countries, but ultimately did not get approved. Moreover, Ankara and Yerevan have subsequently blamed each other for trying to alter the agreement. For instance, the Armenian President’s press service stated that: “As a result of discussions, President Serzh Sargsyan signed a decree and National Security Council approved a procedure of annulling protocols which have been signed on October 10, 2009. Armenia did everything not to leave the burden of the settlement of relations between Armenia and Turkey on the shoulders of future generations. But Ankara did not even make a single step towards ratification and implementation of protocols, but also left no doubt that it was not intending to do it. Armenia was ready to cooperate

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with Turkey in the future, if there would be the same willingness from the Turkish side.” (Mkrtchyan 2018)

Map I: Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Council on Foreign Relations (2017), “Renewed Conflict Over Nagorno-Karabakh”, Contingency Planning Memorandum No: 30, Date of Accession: 04.09.2018 from https://www.cfr.org/report/ renewed-conflict-over-nagorno-karabakh.

Turkey’s official position on the Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute has been officially explained by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during his visit to Baku for the ceremonies marking the anniversary of the establishment of the Islamic Army of the Caucasus and the freeing of Baku (1918–2018) on September 15, 2018 as follows: “Turkey and Azerbaijan are united in joy, pride, and sorrow. Azerbaijan’s problem is our problem. Nagorno-Karabakh, the biggest source of problem for Azerbaijan, is a big source of problem for us as well. As Turkey, we will continue to support the efforts of Azerbaijan to resolve the problem. There are over 1 million people longing for their homeland and we want their sufferings and tears to come to an end. Those who occupy 20 percent of our brothers’ lands and prevent over 1 million Azerbaijanis from returning to their homeland should not expect Turkey to open its borders. Turkey’s stance on this issue is clear, definitive and well-known. Those who must take the first step is the occupiers. Surely, we want to establish and maintain good relations with all our neighbors. However, the solution of the Upper Karabakh issue is sine qua non for mending relations with Armenia. Those who have not answered for what happened in Khojaly 26  years ago, the massacre in Upper Karabakh, and have declared the killers heroes, cannot give us any kind of history lesson.” (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 2018/a).

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3. The Approaches of Turkey and U.S. on Relations with Georgia Georgia, with its 114 kilometer border, is Turkey’s most concrete and direct land connection with Russia, Azerbaijan, and the Central Asia. Azerbaijan and Armenia-centered geopolitical developments have increased the importance of Tbilisi for Ankara in recent years. Thus, Ankara wondered how the foreign policy of then-Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, coming into the power with the Velvet Revolution in 2003, would be in those terms. However, during his Turkey visit, Saakashvili underlined the framework of Tbilisi’s relations with Ankara by emphasizing the importance and prioritization of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway projects. Following this, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then-Prime Minister of Turkey, paid an official visit to Tbilisi and stressed Turkey’s comprehensive support to Georgia on Abkhazia and South Ossetia issues. Erdoğan stated that Turkey could be a bridge as well as a mediator for the resolution of these issues by stressing the presence of 70,000 Abkhaz living in Abkhazia and 300,000 Abkhaz living in Turkey. This offer was rejected by Tbilisi and Turkey did not pressurize Georgia (Tüysüz 2018, pp. 409–410). With Vladimir Putin’s takeover in Russia, Moscow has been primarily trying to keep Western states away from the regions defined in its “near abroad” (Tüysüzoğlu 2019, pp. 75–91). It is a fact that, the increase of Western interests and investments in Georgia in the 1990s and 2000s resulted in the axis shift of this country’s classical foreign policy inclination. This was perceived by Moscow as an important threat to its national security. Through the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008, the U.S. and Poland called for yielding a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia. Yet, the offer was rejected by numerous states under the leadership of Germany and France. These states rejected Georgia’s membership in NATO due to the encountering of separated regions of Georgia. Therefore, in the current circumstances, Tbilisi does not have any MAP. Until now, the current U.S. President Donald Trump has also opposed to the further expansion of NATO in terms of Georgia (Veliyev 2016). Within that context, 2008 was the year with the most important political developments in terms of bilateral relations (Erkan 2016, pp.  317–318). The Russian-Georgian War took place in August 2008 as a result of the Russian intervention into the confrontations that occurred in separatist regions located within Georgian territories. This war was caused by external reasons, namely; Kosovo’s independence and Georgia’s decision to join NATO. However, this has nearly resulted in almost the breakup of the Moscow-Tbilisi relationship. By this war, Moscow has showed to both the West and Tbilisi that the problems in the former Soviet regions can be resolved only with the participation of the Kremlin. In addition, Kremlin prevented NATO’s further enlargement by opposing Ukraine and Georgia’s membership bids. Kremlin has clearly shown its opposition to the interventions of external powers into this region and has proved that this kind of disagreements could easily turn into hot conflicts as in the case of Georgia. Tbilisi’s open concessions to Washington, the acceptance of military and economic aids, as

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well as the open declaration of Tbilisi to join NATO, verified Moscow’s concerns. The 2008 Russian-Georgian War, on the other hand, proved that Russia can exert influence and dictate its will in its “near abroad” geography by different methods, including hard power instruments (Derman 2016, pp.  471–481; Kısacık 2018/a, pp. 898–904; Güneylioğlu & Savaş 2018, pp. 281–295). One of the important issues in that regard has been the development of cooperation between Ankara and Moscow on the protection of the Montreux Straits Convention against American ambitions in the Black Sea (Tüfekçi 2018, pp. 150–151). While Ankara was behaving sensitively to protect its impartiality during the 2008 Russian-Georgian War, it was trying to help Georgians in terms of humanitarian issues. Despite its long presence in the Western bloc since 1952 (Turkey’s membership into NATO), Turkey did not hesitate to fully apply the Montreux Straits Convention during the war and preserve its impartiality; a move that was noticed and respected by Moscow. Within that context, Ankara rejected Washington’s demand for the passage of two hospital warships totaling 140,000 tons for ‘assistance’ to Tbilisi with the reason of violation of the Montreux Straits Convention. Ankara, however, allowed the passage of three smaller ships from the Straits afterwards (Kısacık 2018/b, pp. 149–150). Furthermore, during the AK Parti era (2002–), given the importance attached to the territorial integrity of the South Caucasian states, Ankara proposed and initiated the “Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform” (Tüfekçi 2018, p. 151) in order to find peaceful resolutions to regional problems and to develop regional cooperation. However, this offer was rejected by Tbilisi due to the continued Russian military presence in Georgia. Therefore, Ankara’s initiative for increasing the regional stability and cooperation became unsuccessful as a result of Russian recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states (Tüysüz 2018, pp. 410–411). Russian President Vladimir Putin, speaking towards Russian diplomats from around the world who gathered in Moscow on July 20, 2018, has stated that: “There was a need to restore trust in Europe. We will respond appropriately to NATO’s aggressive steps to deploy new bases and military infrastructure near Russia’s borders, which pose a direct threat to  Russia. Our colleagues, who are trying to aggravate the situation, seeking to include, among others, Ukraine and Georgia in the orbit of the alliance, should think about the possible consequences of such an irresponsible policy.” (The Moscow Times 2018).

On August 7, 2018, the Euro-Atlantic bloc (the U.S., NATO, and the EU) declared a condemnation on the Kremlin’s continuous military existence in Georgia and restated their support on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of this country. Before this, on August 6, 2018, in parallel with Putin’s latest statements on GeorgiaUkraine-NATO relations, then-Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev sent a severe warning to NATO that Tbilisi’s possible membership to the Euro-Atlantic military alliance may well become a “horrible” new confrontation. In an interview with Kommersant FM Radio, Medvedev also underlined that NATO’s long term plans for offering membership to Tbilisi were “unquestionably reckless” and

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Map II: U.S. and Russian Troops Near NATO Nations Heritage.org (2019), “Russia”, Date of Accession:  01.04.2020 from https://www.heritage.org/ military-strength/assessing-threats-us-vital-interests/russia.

“precarious to peace” (Kısacık 2018/b, p. 149). On May 26, 2018, the then-Turkish National Defence Minister Nurettin Canikli was in the Georgian capital Tbilisi to attend a ceremony for the country’s 100th anniversary of its foundation. Canikli, in a meeting at the Georgian Parliament, has underscored that: “Turkey’s opinion is that Tbilisi’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia questions can be resolved within the context of Georgia’s officially accepted borders by the international community. As Turkey, we believe that the disputes on Abkhazia and South Ossetia will be solved within Georgia’s internationally recognized borders and on the basis of the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Turkey is still supporting Georgia’s NATO membership and integration to other Europe Atlantic organizations.” (Özer 2018)

On May 30, 2018, the Syrian government announced that they will be ready to interchange recognition and establish “Embassy-level diplomatic affiliations” with Abkhazia and South Ossetia as two separate sovereign states from Georgia annexed by Moscow in 2008. In 2015, Putin declared an “integration” treaty with both separate regions; allowing Russia the privilege to govern the regions’ national security and borders. The confrontation of Georgia’s sovereignty constitutes the latest crisis between Ankara and Damascus. Moreover, it forms a new conflict in the increasingly comprehensive Ankara-Moscow relations holding deep economic interests in pursuing friendly affiliations, but has followed very different policies

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regarding the Syrian Civil War (Wayne 2018). Turkey’s official response to this Syrian initiative is as follows: “The decision recently taken by the Syrian regime to recognize the so-called independence of Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and to establish diplomatic relations with these regions is an open violation of international law, the Charter of the UN and the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council. As it was emphasized on many occasions, Turkey supports the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Georgia.” (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018).

II. Central Asian Republics in the Foreign Policy Parameters of Turkey and the U.S. in the 21st Century 1. Turkey’s Policies towards Central Asian Republics since the 1990s With the end of the bipolar world system, prominent Turkish decision-makers evaluated the independence of Turkic Republics in Central Asia as a historical moment due to deep-rooted kinship relations with the Turkic people of this region and Turks in Turkey. Turkey, as the first state to recognize the independence of the Central Asian Republics (CARs) in 1991, has made commitments challenging its capacities in Central Asia since then. On the other hand, the adoption of secular state systems close to the Western countries and their transformation into modern independent nation-states has been encouraged by the West, primarily by the U.S. However, these states’ lack of experience as independent political entities and the continuing Russian influence in the region posed many problems to these states. In that sense, Turkey has been often presented as a “model country” to these states by many Western strategists. However, due to the 1994 and 2001 economic crises and weak coalition governments inside, as well as increasing terrorist attacks in Turkey throughout the 1990s and Turkey’s primary aim to become a member of the European Union in the early 2000s, Turkey’s attention has shifted from the CARs (Sarı 2018, pp. 357–359). For Davutoğlu, the situation in Central Asia is different from the classical separation issues caused by ethnic identities. The main challenge faced by the communities within this region is to form an upper identity category, not the reinvention of ethnic identities. The reason for this situation is the originating of Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Turkmens, and Kyrgyzs from the same cultural, religious, and language roots. These similarities can help to abolish the subidentities encouraged by Soviet leaders, which are dividing the region into the parts and preventing these groups from constructing a common identity that can resist against the revolutionary socialist (Bolshevik) culture. A real democratization to be experienced within this region might present new opportunities to these states concerning the formation of a superior identity category and a more unified society (Davutoğlu 2018, pp. 107–108).

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Based on these parameters, with the coming into the power of the Justice and Development Party (AK Parti) on November 3, 2002 in Turkey, a new era has begun in terms of the relations between Ankara and the CARs thanks to the presence of a strong and stable single-party government rather than weak coalition governments. This has transformed Turkish economy into a rapidly growing and profitable market after the 2001 economic crisis and led to Turkey’s search for new energy producers in order to support its economic development. After the election of Abdullah Gül as the President of Turkey in 2007, both by then-Prime Minister Erdoğan and then-President Gül increased high level visits to Central Asia. Before AK Parti, institutionally, the Turkish Speaking Countries Summit was already held for the first time in Ankara with the participation of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Turkey, with the initiatives of thenPresident Turgut Özal and then-Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel on October 30, 1992. However, the Summit had continuity and under-representation problems since 2006. When all Turkish States except Uzbekistan participated in the Summit held on October 2–3, 2009 in Nakhchivan, an institutional structure named as Council of Turkic Speaking Countries (Türk Konseyi or Türk Keneşi) was formed by the Nakhchivan Treaty. The Treaty included the decisions to establish an Istanbulcentered permanent Secretariat, Astana-centered Turkish Academy, and Bakucentered Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic Speaking Countries (TÜRKPA). In addition, TÜRKSOY, an organization that was already established, became responsible for the cultural activities linked to this Council (Sarı 2018, pp. 359–361). Turkey has always supported the memberships of CARs into international and regional organizations since the 1990s. Ankara has also backed up Astana’s termPresidency of the OSCE in 2010 and its membership to the UNSC in 2016. In the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit held in Beijing between June 6 and June 7, 2012, Turkey acquired the status of “Dialogue Partner” thanks to the support of the Central Asian Republics. Moreover, for 2017, Turkey held the Presidency of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Energy Club. This has mostly a symbolic meaning for the moment, but it is still important since Turkey’s relations with the Western countries have developed in a negative way in recent years. Within this perspective, Turkey’s increasing relations with international organizations such as the China-led SCO poses a serious political alternative and a challenge to classical Western orientation of the Turkish Foreign Policy (Kısacık & Denizelli 2018, pp. 878–884). Apart from the SCO, it is important to mention that Turkey’s possible membership into the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) was also proposed by then-Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Primarily Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries have thought that Turkey’s participation into organizations such as the SCO and EEU might lower the pressures of Moscow and Beijing on the Central Asian states. This might also be suitable with Turkey’s political target of becoming a more influential country in Central Asia. However, China and Russia assess Turkey’s interest into these institutions as temporary and rather

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tactical due to Ankara’s strongly rooted position in Western political and military alliances (Sarı 2018, p. 362). Another regional institution proposed by then- Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev and established with the cooperation of Turkey and Kazakhstan is the “Conference on Interaction and Cooperation and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia” (CICA). This organization aims to promote confidence-building measures and cooperation in Asia. Kazakhstan held the Presidency of CICA between 2002 and 2010. After that, Turkey became CICA’s President between 2010 and 2014. Turkey has also encouraged the participation of Central Asian Republics into the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and OIC. On April 14–16, 2016, President Erdoğan and leaders of Central Asian countries convened in the OIC Summit held in Istanbul under the Turkey’s Presidency. In Erdoğan’s meeting with Nazarbayev, a consensus was reached for the establishment of “Islamic Solidarity Spirit” and the handling of proactive role by the OIC in the peaceful resolution of existing problems (Sarı 2018, p. 362). The 6th Summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States was held in Kyrgyz Republic on September 3, 2018 with the participation of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic Sooronbai Jeenbekov, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of the Republic of Tatarstan of the Russian Federation Rustam Minnikhanov, and Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orban. After this Summit, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has shared the following statements: “The Turkic Council is the product of shared efforts, vision and dreams, as the symbol of a joint ideal. Turkey attaches special importance to the Turkic Council working in coordination with the OIC, the ECO and other multilateral platforms. Moreover, we also support the member states’ efforts to deepen their cooperation with Euro-Atlantic organizations. We, as the Turkic states, are to display cooperation and solidarity among ourselves and this will contribute to the working of the international system in a fair manner. We attach great importance to the Trans-Caspian East-West Middle Corridor, which reaches China passing through the Caucasus and the Central Asia. The most important leg of this project, known as ‘Modern Silk Road-Middle Corridor’, is the BTK Railway project, which we undertake with Azerbaijan. Thanks to this project, a train which sets out from Western Europe will, without interruption, reach the Caspian cost, and from there, Shanghai and Seoul via Port Aktau. This important line of transportation will serve to enhance our peoples’ prosperity and to deepen our relations. We assign the importance of cooperation in the field of energy in which the BTC Crude Oil Pipeline and the BTE Gas Pipeline are the most important fruits of this cooperation. TANAP, the backbone of the Southern Gas Corridor, was inaugurated back in June. Turkey expresses its happiness over the signing of the Convention on the Status of the Caspian Sea. Turkey will continue to make every effort in their power for the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue within the framework of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. Also Turkey calls for support and solidarity for the advancement of the ties between the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkic World.” (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey 2018/b)

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2. The Security Dimension in Relations between the U.S. and Central Asian Republics Prior to 2001, in terms of CARs, Washington was more concentrated on issues such as the democratization, the establishment of free-market systems, and huge hydrocarbon reserves. The U.S. has increased its security role in this region through the launching of military bases in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to prepare for a military operation in Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In December 2001, the then-Assistant Secretary of State A. Elisabeth Jones outlined U.S. priorities in terms of Central Asia as to prevent spread of terrorism, to assistance Central Asia’s political and economic reform, and to safeguard the security and apparent advancement of Caspian energy resources. In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Washington’s central security concern in Central Asia became the spread of former Soviet nuclear weapons by regional countries, particularly by Kazakhstan. Attaching special importance to Russia in the post-dissolution period of the Soviet Union, Washington stressed that only Moscow could have a nuclear arsenal capacity. Moreover, political factors such as representing a predominantly Muslim country, concerns on probable subjection to international isolation apart from the Islamic world, and environmental issues affected and encouraged Astana to abandon its nuclear arsenal. Also, security assurances granted by the three big powers also affected on Astana’s decision. These assurances included Beijing’s declaration that it would not have any territorial allegations on Kazakhstan, the contracting of mutual security deals with Russia, and a letter verifying “Washington’s obligations” in the event of a risk of nuclear attack. Although the Clinton administration did not want Russia to gain much strength in the field of energy, it was assumed with the policy of “Russia First” that regional security and stability would be provided by Russia. Even though Washington transferred Central Asia from the responsibility of European Command to Central Command in October 1999 and performed joint military exercises with the regional countries at that time, the U.S. military did not highlight the regional security issue until 9/11. Before this incident, the CARs tried to prevent terrorist attacks organized by radical fundamentalist groups either by themselves or with the assistance of Moscow (Akatayeva 2016, pp. 504–505). In that regard, Elizabeth Jones, then-U.S. President Bill Clinton’s Special Representative for the Caspian Region (she later became the Deputy Foreign Secretary as well) declared that Washington would not militarily intervene in stopping the radical fundamentalist groups that were sweeping across Central Asia at those times. This case verifies that “the Central Asia case will increasingly come into the forefront just in case of emergency situations within the context of national security”. 9/11 terrorist attacks turned Central Asia (particularly Afghanistan) into a source of threat and a primary security concern for Washington. Within that framework, Washington’s aim to integrate the ex-USSR Republics into the Greater Central Asia Project was directly linked with the White House’s security concerns in Afghanistan rather than its energy interests. Washington wished from the regional

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countries to cooperate with itself concerning Afghanistan, where it failed to provide the stability. This initiative represented a serious movement in maintaining the temporary American existence, relying on the military bases opened for the Afghanistan Operation (Nogayeva 2016, pp. 507–508). In the post-9/11 period, Central Asia has transformed into a significant strategic base given the use of military airbases by Washington and its allies; not just for their military operations in the south and for benefiting from airspaces as well as refueling, but also for the delivery of humanitarian and other assistance needed for the development of Afghanistan after the war (Beehner 2005). Moreover, Washington collaborated with these countries in its struggle against illegal drugs, weapons, and human trafficking. In the post-9/11 period, White House lingered its activities in Central Asia within the context of bilateral agreements and NATO, which opened 19 more military bases in the countries encompassing Turkey (Izmir and Adana). Now, one can mention that the U.S.  and NATO’s military activities in Central Asia already started in 1995 within the context of Regional Cooperation Organization and accelerated after the 2001 Afghanistan Operation (Nogayeva 2016, pp. 508-509). In addition, NATO troops’ (mostly American) military equipment began to be provided by the military bases in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan (Manas), and Tajikistan. These bases are not only beneficial for the U.S. to have control over Afghanistan, but also help to facilitate the control over Indian-Pakistani border and Western China. It is also mentioned that the American troops are totaling approximately one thousand and five hundred. After the transportation of “American A-10 assault aircraft and French Mirage 2000 fighter planes” in Kyrgyzstan’s Kant Base (Pillalamarri 2014) to Afghanistan, there existed nearly fifteen F-16 aircrafts belonging to Denmark and the Netherlands at the Gansi Base. Although a similar decision was taken for the base in Kyrgyzstan after the closure of the military base in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz government allowed the US to continue its military activities under the name of Transit Center and this indicates that the US intends to have a long-term presence in the region (Ghafouri & Davand 2018). However, Washington closed its sole Central Asian airbase in Manas, Kyrgyzstan; the airbase has lawfully turned in 2014 into the control of Bishkek, which has been steadily bringing itself into line with Moscow, meaning the end of an era in the region (Dzyubenko 2014). Another important issue in terms of the security dimension of U.S.-Central Asian Republics (CARs) relations is the SCO memberships of some countries in the region. For some analysts, SCO is a type of organization similar to the Warsaw Pact of the Cold War period. But the main difference between these two is that, when compared to the confrontation in bipolar system, in today’s world, China, Russia, and other members of this organization are respectful towards Western values such as democracy and human rights. The organization was established by China and it aimed at providing border security, regional security, and economic interests. In other words, just like the member and observer states have some political, economic, and security interests in SCO membership, Beijing has also some specific political targets including the control of Central Asian and Russian energy

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Map III: U.S. Military Bases in the Middle East and Central Asia surround Iran “US Military Bases in the Middle East and Central Asia Surround Iran”, Date of Accession:  01.04.2020 from http://war-in-middle-east.blogspot.com/2012/08/us-military-bases-inmiddle-east-and.html.

resources as well as transforming the SCO into a market for its cheap products and a platform for its excessive working power. In case of a rapprochement between Russia and Euro-Atlantic bloc, this might fuel the competition between Beijing and Moscow and therefore, this might enable the organization dysfunctional (Ekici 2016, pp. 487–488; Örmeci & Kısacık 2018, pp. 34–39). The U.S. has significant policies concerning the Central Asia and it carefully observes regional or international organizations established within this region. Although SCO officials have been repeatedly emphasized their non-military status, the acceptance of Iran as an observer state, the refusal of Washington’s demand to have an observer status as well as SCO’s demand from Washington to determine a timetable for the evacuation of its military bases on member states’ territories in 2005 Astana Summit and the official demand made by Uzbekistan from the U.S. to withdraw from K2 Base on its territories, have increased suspicions between two sides. Moreover, the fear of allegedly Washington-backed “color revolutions” in this geography has directed regional leaders to cooperate more with Russia and China instead of the U.S. Meanwhile, the potential of SCO to become an energy monopoly and the success of 2007 Peace Exercise, the most comprehensive one made up until then, resulted with the increasing concerns on

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the side of Washington and other NATO members (Ekici 2016, p. 495). The military moves of Iran, having an observer status in the SCO, and its possible membership into the organization are closely followed by the NATO, which sometimes makes firm statements on this issue. The U.S. is annoyed by the military expenditures made by Moscow and Beijing in addition to the great accumulation of arsenal on the side of Russia coming from the past (Korolev 2018, pp. 25–38). Another great concern for Washington is the holding of important amounts of hydrocarbon reserves by the SCO members. In this manner, the idea of an alternative OPEC led by Russia and Iran and having a strong voice in gas reserves has begun to be spoken. For instance, the Energy Club project of the SCO has been closely followed in the U.S. While the U.S.  and European countries see the SCO as an opposite political tool and categorize this organization as “New Dictators Club,” the success of this organization will largely depend more on economic and social issues (Kısacık & Denizelli 2018, pp. 857–888). Within this context, it will be useful to point out the opinions of Ariel Cohen, a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and the director the Center for Energy, Natural Resources and Geopolitics, at the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, regarding the possible fundamental parameters of the U.S. Foreign Policy toward Central Asia in Donald Trump’s Presidential term. “The United States needs to view the changes in Eurasia as a set of political-military, diplomatic, and economic opportunities. The two previous U.S. administrations obsessed about Afghanistan and viewed the region through the prism of that war. Washington needs to get beyond that. The C5+1 framework, which brings the United States and the five Central Asian countries together, is a good start. The Trump administration needs to build on the success of C5+1 and the working groups it has launched. Beijing is heavily subsidizing ‘One Belt, One Road’ infrastructure projects to absorb the excess capacity it has built to construct ports, railroads, airports, and fiber-optic cables. However, U.S. can and should play to its strengths and concentrate on software —banking, finance, IT, legal services, and securities brokerage. Nevertheless, increasing U.S. cooperation with Kazakhstan should be relatively easy. With the China-Russia collaboration, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization expansion, and the Beijing-led ‘One Belt, One Road’ reformatting Eurasia as we know it, the United States cannot afford to just sit and look on from the bleachers. It needs to get onto the field and play. Without a clear strategy for economic and security involvement, Central Asia will remain what I called it in my 2005 book Eurasia in Balance — ‘a bridge too far’. That is not an option. With the world getting smaller and major security competition afoot in Eurasia, the Trump administration should not remain a bystander…” (Cohen 2017)

It should also be indicated in this regard that there are some reasons why Moscow and Beijing follow anti-Washington policies within the SCO (Ekici 2016, p.  497; Örmeci & Kısacık 2018, pp. 175–192): i. The nuclear competition among the U.S., Russia and China, continuing since the Cold War, has not been fully resolved yet.

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ii. Russia, as the successor of Soviet Union and the world’s rising power China are dissatisfied with the global leadership of Washington in today’s world. iii. Rogue states and Taiwan are another problem. Beijing and Moscow are trying to strengthen their bilateral economic relationships with Pyongyang, Tehran, and Baghdad through selling weaponry systems as well as establishing nuclear reactors in these countries (Erdal 2018, pp. 63–69). However, three countries have already declared by Washington as the “Axis of Evil” with the reasoning of holding weapons of mass destruction. In a similar vein, despite China’s opposition, the U.S. sells weaponry systems to Taiwan. iv. The recent trade wars, experienced in terms of custom tariffs and quotas increase competition between Washington, its European allies, and the RussiaChina axis (Sputnik International 2018). v. The lack of confidence by Washington towards the human rights records of the regimes in Moscow and Beijing. vi. The spying allegations among these three states (Strobel & Landay 2018; Swaine 2018).

III. Fundamental Parameters of Energy Security Policies of the Turkey and U.S. toward South Caucasus & Central Asia since the 1990s In the changing energy geography, Turkey, as the newest, dynamic, and proactive actor holding structural features, plays a central role in providing regional security including the transportation of clean and reliable energy resources. Ankara’s close proximity to such a geography where more than 70 % of proven hydrocarbon resources in the world exist is why the region is described as the “Silk Road of 21st Century” encompassing the world’s prominent energy producers namely, Russia, the Caspian Basin, the Middle East, and European consumer markets (Caşın & Kısacık 2018, pp.  104–105). Turkey is positioned as a key country between rapidly increasing energy markets and the world’s leading energy producers. Turkey imports approximately 70  % of its energy resources from external suppliers, which yearly cost almost $60 billion. Consequently, it can easily be described as an energy-dependent country. Within the framework of existing energy security demands, Ankara is obliged to propose comprehensive policies for meeting its energy requirements from reliable and environmentally friendly resources at a reasonable cost with an uninterrupted supply (Örmeci & Kısacık 2018, p. 411). The Caspian Sea is a critically significant sea basin for Ankara’s opening to Central Asia. It is very important for Turkey to form collaboration between Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to establish counter-stabilizing factor towards the Kremlin. At that point, it is equally important for Washington to address that as Moscow seeks dominant direct foreign access to Central Asian energy exports; Ankara’s extending regional role can facilitate the joint collaboration with

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Map IV: EU-Russia pipeline game Frank Umbach (2017), “Turkey’s Energy Dilemma:  Brussels or Moscow?”,GiS  – Geopolitical Intelligence Services, Date of Accession:  02.04.2020 from https://www.gisreportsonline.com/ turkeys-energy-dilemma-brussels-or-moscow,energy,2416.html.

Baku and Tbilisi for Europe’s unconstrained access to Central Asia’s hydrocarbon through the Caspian Sea (Kısacık & Avcı 2015, p. 467).

1. Turkish-American Relationship within the Context of Eurasian Energy Security in the 1990s and the 2000s Baku’s 7 billion barrels of recoverable oil and 1.3 trillion cubic meters (tcm) of gas reserves are significant for both itself and for the global energy supply. Other South Caucasus countries apart from Azerbaijan, namely Georgia and Armenia, are also important for the transportation of these resources to world markets because of their positioning. In this process, Moscow has endeavored to prevent the Western energy firms’ intensive interests in Baku’s hydrocarbons. “The $8 Billion – Production Sharing Agreement of Azerbaijan Oil Resources” was signed on September 20, 1994 between SOCAR and international energy firms. Moreover, the formation of the Azerbaijan International Oil Company (AIOC) on the oil exploration, production, and sharing in Azeri-Çırak-Güneşli (ACG) fields in the Caspian Sea has played an important role in realizing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) project. Washington and Ankara, aimed at resource diversification, decreasing the dependence on Moscow and contributing to the independence of Azerbaijan, have initiated the adoption of the Baku-Supsa line together with a Moscow-proposed

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Map V: Caspian Oil Transportation Routes (existing and proposed) “Oil and Gas Infrastructure of Georgia: Ongoing and Prospective Projects” (2015), Date of Accession:  03.04.2020 from https://www.slideshare.net/ITEoilgas1/oil-and-gas-infrastructure-ofgeorgia-ongoing-and-prospective-projects.

pipeline (Pamir 2017, pp. 605–619). The intergovernmental framework agreement providing an official status to BTC was signed between the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey during the OSCE Summit on November 19, 1999, under the auspices of the then-U.S. President Bill Clinton (Cheterian 2017, pp. 407–408). The ground-breaking ceremony of BTC occurred on September 26, 2002. Thanks to this, Azerbaijan’s political and economic independence have further been consolidated. By this way, Ankara and Tbilisi have further increased their strategic significances. Ukraine represents a critically important transit country, not only for Moscow, but also for Europe’s energy security because almost 70 % of the Kremlin’s gas resources are transported to Europe via Kyiv. Russia was applying a discounted price for Ukraine which was $50 for 1,000 cubic meters of gas between 1991 and 2004. But the Orange Revolution in 2004 completely changed the Russian approach to Ukraine. When Viktor Yushchenko came into the power in Ukraine, he started to follow pro-Western foreign policies prioritizing his country’s memberships into NATO and the EU. Moscow strongly criticized Ukraine for that and, in response, declared the validation of market rules in energy relations with Ukraine. The Kremlin also stopped subsidizing Ukraine on energy and demanded that Ukraine pay its previous gas debts, a demand that was rejected by Kyiv. Moscow responded to this by halting gas supplies to Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, which seriously affected the European continent as well. After the occurrence of these energy

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Map VI: Europe’s Gas Pipeline Ties to Russia S&P Global Platts (2018), “Insight from Brussels:  Europe’s Nord Stream 2 Opponents Now Looking to ‘Plan B’ ”, Date of Accession:  04.04.2020 from https://blogs.platts.com/2018/07/24/ europe-nord-stream-2-plan-b/.

crises, both Russia and EU have begun to prioritize the development of alternative gas pipelines aiming to bypass Ukraine, especially in the post-2009 period (Örmeci & Kısacık 2018, pp. 419–422). Because of rising gas consumption volumes in Europe and the augmenting dependence of European countries on Russian gas, Azerbaijani gas has emerged as a new alternative in terms of resource diversity. The abovementioned RussianUkrainian crisis has further increased the importance Baku’s gas volumes. Shah Sea Basin is known for holding important reserves around 1.2 tcm of gas. Although the production in the Shah Sea II field was projected to begin in 2014, its start-up date was postponed until 2018 due to the confrontation between Ankara and Baku on the gas prices in the Shah Sea I field because of Turkey’s fluctuating policies during its “Armenian Opening” process. The extra gas to be drilled from the Shah Sea II field would be transported firstly to Turkey via the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline Project (TANAP), passing through whole country, and then with the TAP (Trans Adriatic Pipeline Project) to Europe (Telli 2015, pp.  358–359). After the negotiations between Ankara and Baku in the context of High Level Strategic Cooperation Council on October 25, 2011, the TANAP agreement was signed. Turkey intends the transportation of Turkmen gas to European markets through TANAP. For this aim, Turkey and Turkmenistan settled a memorandum on the gas export to Europe in Turkish President’s Erdoğan official visit to Ashgabat at the beginning of November 2014. In this way, Turkey will also offer an alternative transportation route for Caspian gas into the energy-hungry markets of Europe.

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TANAP will correspondingly help in Turkey’s goal to be one of the central energy hubs for Europe (Caşın & Kısacık 2018, pp. 202–203). On June 12, 2018, the TANAP project was inaugurated with the participation of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the President of Republic of Turkey, Ilham Aliyev, the President of Republic of Azerbaijan, Aleksandr Vučić, the President of Serbia, Petro Poroshenko, the President of Ukraine, Mustafa Akıncı, the President of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), and the related officials in Eskişehir, the pipeline’s domestic exit point in Turkey. This pipeline is strongly supported by the U.S. in terms of provision of its European allies’ energy security which is also underscored by Sandra Oudkirk, Deputy Assistant Secretary in the U.S. Bureau of Energy Resources, as follows: “TANAP would bring diversification of supply and energy security to European countries and to Turkey. TANAP is a strong additional element for energy security for Turkey and Europe. The U.S. government supports the project on a policy basis. We are supporting it even though there is no direct investment in it. The launching of TANAP on Tuesday is really good news. TANAP is universally good. We consider energy security for ourselves and our allies as very important. Two criteria are central when the U.S. considers support for a European gas project; the first being the effect of the project on Ukraine and the second related to energy security. Turkey is a big country and economically diversified. Turkey with its many energy resources is very different to that of other European countries like Bulgaria that is 100 % reliant on Russian gas. When we look at the projects such as the Nord Stream 2, Turk Stream’s second line and the former South Stream, we consider two things. First, we look at the effect on Ukraine as the Russian government no longer wants to transit gas through Ukraine. That would be very bad news for Ukraine. The second thing, we look at the energy security for countries in Europe. We fully support diversification of energy supplies.” (Temizer & Erdoğan 2018)

The importance of TANAP and Ankara-Baku relations is expressed by the President Erdoğan of Republic of Turkey with the words of: “Azerbaijan have adapted to the changing geopolitical landscape and rapidly become the shining in its region. The projects we jointly have conducted such as the Baku-TbilisiCeyhan Oil Pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline, the Baku-TbilisiKars Railway, and TANAP are leaving their mark on the entire region. Turkey is one of the biggest investors in Azerbaijan. Hopefully, Azerbaijan will soon become one of the biggest investors in Turkey as well.” (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey 2018/b)

Similarly, the significance of TANAP is expressed by the President Aliyev of Azerbaijan Republic as: “Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum oil and gas pipelines, the inauguration of TANAP this year are historic projects. By implementing joint projects, Azerbaijan and Turkey redraw energy and transport map of Eurasia. The importance of our countries is growing.” (Trend News Agency 2018)

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On July 13, 2018, another strong support from Washington toward the Southern Gas Corridor was put forward by Vincent Campos, Spokesperson of Bureau of Energy Resources U.S. Department of State saying: “We are working closely with our European partners to improve energy security by helping to diversify fuel supplies in terms of its types, routes and supplier countries. For example, the United States strongly supports the Southern Gas Corridor project (which includes the Trans-Anatolian (TANAP) and Trans-Adriatic (TAP) gas pipelines), which will diversify gas imports in Europe by means of large gas supplies to the region through the Caspian Sea in 2019–2020.” (Azer News 2018)

In that sense, it will be beneficial to set forth the evaluations of Richard Morningstar, Founding Chairman of the Global Energy Center and board director at the Atlantic Council. He stayed as the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Azerbaijan from July 2012 to August 2014. He has shared the following opinions on the SGC within the context of Ankara-Washington relations: “Successful development of Shah Deniz, a very difficult, technologically complex project, as well as the efficiency and cost savings achieved during the construction of TANAP pipeline were also instrumentally important. This project is truly impressive and is needed proof of the viability of large-scale projects in an era when many large infrastructure projects have faced difficulties. The final decision to develop TAP to transport the gas to Europe was also a major breakthrough. This contribution to European gas supply is an important element. Turkey’s role is obviously crucial. Turkey has been hugely supportive of the TANAP pipeline and was able to successfully negotiate with all the parties on transit fees. These relationships are very important and have proved durable and lasting. No matter the ups and down in the U.S.-Turkey relationship, energy has and continues to be a key area of cooperation and shared interest. Turkey has long expressed its interest in being a key country for energy transit and an energy crossroads linking regions. The success of gas through TANAP helped prove its credibility in this respect.” (Morningstar 2018)

On July 2, 2019, the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) declared the completion of TANAP, to be a key part of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) that will transfer Azerbaijani gas to Turkey and Europe and also improve its readiness to carry Azerbaijani natural gas unswervingly to Europe as of July 1, 2019. In this statement, SOCAR has addressed that: “After the completion of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), the last section of the SGC, natural gas produced in Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz-2 field will be delivered to Europe via TANAP and TAP, which will increase Azerbaijan’s revenue and make a major contribution to Europe’s energy security. TANAP, which is now fully ready to transport natural gas to Europe, is the longest and widest natural gas pipeline in Turkey, Middle East and Europe. Next year, after the completion of TAP, which connects with TANAP on the Turkish-Greek border, Azerbaijan will start delivering gas to European markets.” (Daily Sabah Energy 2019)

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Map VII: Elements of the Southern Gas Corridor GiS  – Geopolitical Intelligence Services (2018), “GIS Dossier:  How Turkey Scored Big in the Gas Pipeline Game”, Date of Accession: 05.04.2020 from https://www.gisreportsonline.com/gisdossier-how-turkey-scored-big-in-the-gas-pipeline-game,energy,2706.html.

As the latest development regarding this issue, the inauguration of TANAP’s European connection, the fundamental component of the Southern Gas Corridor was realized on November 29, 2019 within the measurement point in Edirne Ipsala, Turkey. President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey, Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia of Georgia, Ministers of Turkey, Northern Macedonia, Qatar, and Bulgaria, high-level officials of Italy, Greece, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and the European Union, senior managers of SOCAR, BOTAŞ, and BP, and also noteworthy business persons would participate the international ceremony (Europetrole 2019). SOCAR President and Chairperson of TANAP Rovnag Abdullayev have underscored the importance of this issue as follows: “Today TANAP is fully ready to deliver natural gas to Europe. The construction of this historic infrastructure extended from the East to the West throughout Turkey was finished within time and to a high standard. On completion of the construction of Trans Adriatic Pipeline, which will be connected with TANAP at the Turkish-Greek border, Azerbaijani natural gas will be transported directly from the Caspian basin to European markets for the first time in history. We look forward to becoming not only Europe’s gas supplier, but the second biggest gas supplier to Turkey. We fulfilled this significant project of TANAP together with our partners. This was the first complex project managed and completed by SOCAR outside the country, we are proud to have achieved a high level of efficiency in the construction work. The international

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consultants estimated the project at $11.7 billon, but with effective management, the project actually came in under this and cost $6.5 billion: a total saving of 45 %. Completing the TANAP work within due time and to a high quality, SOCAR managed to reduce the costs, saving $5.2 billion for the pipeline shareholders, including Azerbaijan and Turkey.” (Europetrole 2019)

Within the framework of marketable processes, TANAP has conveyed 3.3 bcm of natural gas to BOTAŞ up until November 18, 2019 and stands anticipated to supply 4 bcm to Turkey between June 2019 and June 2020. Turkey will obtain 6 bcm per annum starting by the end of June 2020. Azerbaijani gas will be transported to European markets from 2020 and grasp 16 bcm shipping capacity, 10 bcm of it will be shipped to Europe from 2020. TANAP’s capacity stands projected to increase to 31 bcm with/ in the aftermath of extra investments (Europetrole 2019). This part of the paper will be concluded with the statements of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Ilham Aliyev made in this official opening of TANAP’ European connection on November 29, 2019. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has highlighted the significance of this project as follows: “A dream of supplying 16 billion cubic meters of Azeri natural gas to Turkey and Europe has come true. TANAP is the most important part of the 3,500–kilometer (2,174–miles) energy corridor which extends from Azerbaijan to Europe. Turkey sought to contribute to the regional prosperity with the conclusion of the project. While guaranteeing our country’s energy needs with TANAP, we also aimed at contributing to the safety of Europe’s energy supply. Bulgaria, Greece, North Macedonia, Albania, Serbia, and Bosnia Herzegovina would also benefit from the mega project. The TANAP was a project of ‘regional peace’. This project has made it this far thanks to Turkey and Azerbaijan’s relations based on mutual trust. A total of 16 billion cubic meters of gas would be delivered through the project and the delivering capacity of the TANAP is projected to climb to 24–31 billion cubic meters over time.” (A News 2019)

In parallel with these remarks, Ilham Aliyev, the President of Azerbaijan, has stressed the importance of TANAP as follows: “The TANAP project will pave the way for boosting ties between the two nations. Today is a historic one. I hope the TANAP is going to last long, and Turkey, Azerbaijan, and other neighboring countries will benefit from TANAP. TANAP is an international cooperation project that essentially unites seven countries on the Southern Gas Corridor. This project brings cooperation, stability, and long-term agreement. The TANAP was more than just an energy project. The strength of Turkey is the strength of ours. The mega projects achieved by both countries would boost ties. After all, economic power transforms into political power.” (A News 2019)

Conclusion After the fall of the Soviet Union, several states within it have gained their independences. The South Caucasian and Central Asian Republics were among

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them. Following this incidence, political developments in these states have been closely monitored not only by the neighboring states of these two regions, but also by the external powers due to existing frozen conflicts and vast volumes of hydrocarbon resources in this region. Washington has been developing multidimensional foreign and security policies towards these two regions since the 1990s. In terms of the South Caucasus, Washington has been involved in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute between Baku and Yerevan by being one of the three co-Presidents of the OSCE Minsk Group. This group has been unsuccessful on the peaceful resolution of this problem until now since its format is heavily criticized by Turkey and Azerbaijan. For Washington, the complicated and indecisive policies on this issue are mostly caused by the Armenian lobby in the U.S. In terms of the South Ossetia-Abkhazia Question also, Washington has also been unable to prevent the separation of these two regions from Georgia as a result of the war in 2008. When we come to the Central Asian policies of Washington, it has to be stated that these policies have encountered transformations from time to time and are based on the conjunctural developments. Before 2001, the U.S.  was focused on the economic development and democratization processes in these states. At those times, Washington also prioritized the transportation of huge Turkmen gas resources to Europe via the Trans-Caspian Pipeline. But this has turned out to be unsuccessful due to Russian counter-initiatives and regional states’ insistence on the determining of the legal status of the Caspian Sea. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Washington has shifted its attention to the struggle with terrorism especially in Afghanistan. After that, it has established several military bases in this region for its military and organized civilian operations in Afghanistan. It should be underlined in that manner that most Central Asian states, Russia and China are the members of the SCO. In that context, the growing regional, geopolitical, and geostrategic role of this organization has resulted in the closure of Washington’s airbases in this region. Also, the China and Russia-dominated SCO has been a following wide-range of anti-American policies within this region in recent years in order to counterbalance Washington’s unilateral foreign and security policies toward the Eurasia in the 21st century. When it comes to the policies followed by Turkey toward the South Caucasus, it can be said that it has altered from time to time. Within the context of relations with Azerbaijan, Ankara and Baku’s sui generis multidimensional affiliations are defined in the international arena as “One Nation – Two States”. Ankara strongly supports Baku’s policies in order to reverse the invasion of 20 % of its territories by Yerevan since the independence of Azerbaijan. As a member of the OSCE Minsk Group, it has been making efforts for the peaceful resolution of this problem in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions, OSCE resolutions, and the principles developed by this group. Despite the existence and acceptance of Armenia’s invasion in Azerbaijani territories by the international law, Yerevan has not been backpedalling from its stance on this issue. This situation paves way

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for further strengthening of the Ankara-Baku relationship and further exclusion of Yerevan from regional strategic economic projects. This has devastating effects over the Armenian economy as well. One can consider BTK Railway, BTC, BTE, and TANAP projects as clear proofs on this issue. These projects are also supported by Washington in line with its strategic interests. Ankara has been working on further consolidating and expanding the scopes of its relations with Baku. Examining the case, Turkey has initiated widespread policies towards this country as well. When the Russian-Georgian War in August 2008 erupted, Ankara tried to resolve this issue by the initiation of the “Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform”, which was unsuccessful due to Tbilisi’s declaration condemning the continuing presence of the Russian Army in the South Ossetia-Abkhazia as well as the acceptance of the independence declaration of these regions from Georgia by the Kremlin. In that sense, Ankara’s insistence on the preservation of the status of the Montreux Straits Convention principles during this war has been welcomed especially by Russia at the time of the war. One can describe Ankara’s relations with Central Asian nations as “multidimensional” and “transformational”. From 1990 to 2002, Turkey’s Central Asia policies have been full of failure due to the former’s lack of institutional, political, economic, and diplomatic capacities as the well as the former Turkish governments’ failure to keep promises. The institutions aimed at developing affiliations with Turkic speaking states have been strengthened after AK Parti came to power in 2002. In the years after 2002, Ankara has been developing multi-dimensional strategic, political, economic, and cultural relations with these states. In that manner, the Turkic Council has been playing a very significant role. Thanks to the support of Turkic speaking states within the SCO, Turkey has been holding the observer state status in the SCO and has further been working on developing relations with this organization in every possible manner (for instance granting of the termPresidency of the SCO Energy Club to Turkey in 2017). But it has to be underlined that Turkey’s advancing relationships with the SCO can be thought of within the context of Ankara’s multilateral foreign policy pursued by the ruling AK Parti and can be evaluated as an important component of its newer foreign policy described recently by the then-Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım as “Decreasing the number of enemies, increasing the number of friends”. However, these foreign policy initiatives of Ankara should not be reflected as an alternative to its stable position in the Euro-Atlantic alliance system. Based on these evaluations and regarding the importance of South Caucasia and Central Asia for Ankara and Washington within the context of their Eurasian security parameters in the 21st century, it can be concluded that when developing policies toward South Caucasia and Central Asia, both Turkey and the U.S. will have to take into consideration of Russia’s foreign, security, and energy policies as well since Russia is still the only hegemonic power in these regions.

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Ekici, K. D. (2016), “Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü ve Güvenlik”, in H. Çomak, C. Sancaktar, & S. Demir (eds.), Uluslararası Güvenlik: Yeni Politikalar, Stratejiler ve Yaklaşımlar, İstanbul: Beta Basım Yayım Dağıtım. Erdal, S. (2018), Uluslararası Hukuk Perspektifinden İran’ın Nükleer Programı, Ankara: Adalet Yayınevi. Erkan, A. Ç. (2016), “Güney Kafkasya’da Enerji Çatışması: ABD-Rusya Mücadelesinde Gürcistan Örneği”, in H. Çomak, C. Sancaktar & S. Demir (eds.), Uluslararası Güvenlik: Yeni Politikalar, Stratejiler ve Yaklaşımlar, İstanbul: Beta Basım Yayım Dağıtım, pp. 307–326. Europetrole (2019), “The European Connection of TANAP, the Major Segment of the Southern Gas Corridor Is Now Reality”, Date of Accession: March 24, 2020 from https:// www.euro-petrole.com/the-european-connection-of-tanap-the-major-segment-of-thesouthern-gas-corridor-is-now-reality-n-i-19807. Ghafouri, M. & Davand, M. (2018), “The U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East and Central Asia”, The Asia Dialogue, Date of Accession: September 5, 2018 from http:// theasiadialogue.com/2018/05/04/the-u-s-military-presence-in-the-middle-east-andcentral-asia-2001-2009/. GiS – Geopolitical Intelligence Services (2018), “GIS Dossier: How Turkey Scored Big in the Gas Pipeline Game”, Date of Accession: April 5, 2020 from https://www. gisreportsonline.com/gis-dossier-how-turkey-scored-big-in-the-gas-pipelinegame,energy,2706.html. Güneylioğlu, M. & Savaş, C. (2018), “Karadeniz’de Rusya’nın Askeri Müdahalelerinin Uluslararası Hukuk Açısından Değerlendirilmesi: Abhazya ve Güney Osetya Örnekleri”, in H. Çomak, C. Sancaktar, V. Tatar & B. Ş. Şeker (eds.), Karadeniz Jeopolitiği, İstanbul: Beta Basım Yayım Dağıtım, pp. 281–295. Heritage.org (2019), “Russia”, Date of Accession: April 1, 2020 from https://www.heritage. org/military-strength/assessing-threats-us-vital-interests/russia. Kısacık, Sina (2018/a), “21. Yüzyılda Karadeniz Jeopolitiği Bağlamında Rusya Federasyonu’na Rakip Bir Oluşum Olarak GUAM”, in H. Çomak, C. Sancaktar, V. Tatar &B. Ş. Şeker (eds.), Karadeniz Jeopolitiği, İstanbul: Beta Basım Yayım Dağıtım, pp. 889– 917. Kısacık, Sina (2018/b), “Türkiye-Rusya Federasyonu İlişkileri”, in G. Tüysüzoğlu &A. Özkan (eds.), Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Türkiye’nin Kafkasya ve Orta Asya Siyaseti, Ankara: Detay Yayıncılık, pp. 133–222. Kısacık, Sina & Avcı, Tülin (2015), “An Assessment of the Pipeline Projects for the Transportation of Caspian Basin Hydrocarbons within the Context of Energy Strategies of the United States, the Russian Federation, and Turkey”, in Hüseyin Işıksal & Ozan Örmeci (eds.), Turkish Foreign Policy in the New Millennium, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, pp. 463–502. Kısacık, Sina & Denizelli, Şeniz (2018), “21. Yüzyılda Karadeniz Jeopolitiği Bağlamında Jeostratejik Bir Yapılanma Olarak Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü (ŞİÖ)”, in H. Çomak, C. Sancaktar, V. Tatar& B. Ş. Şeker (eds.), Karadeniz Jeopolitiği, İstanbul: Beta Basım Yayım Dağıtım, pp. 857–888. Korolev, A. (2018), “Beyond the Nominal and the Ad Hoc: The Substance and Drivers of China-Russia Military Cooperation”, Insight Turkey, 20 (1), pp. 25–38.

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Morningstar, R. (2018), “The Legacy of the Southern Gas Corridor”, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Date of Accession: August 29, 2019 from http://turkishpolicy.com/article/931/ the-legacy-of-the-southern-gas-corridor. Mkrtchyan, H. (2018), “Armenia Scraps Deal with Turkey Designed to Normalize Relations”, Reuters, Date of Accession: September 2, 2018 from https://www.reuters. com/article/us-armenia-turkey/armenia-scraps-deal-with-turkey-designed-tonormalize-relations-idUSKCN1GD5BX. Nogayeva, A. (2016), “Security Issue in Central Asia: Military Bases and Partnership”, in H. Çomak, C. Sancaktar & S. Demir (eds.), Uluslararası Güvenlik: Yeni Politikalar, Stratejiler ve Yaklaşımlar, İstanbul: Beta Basım Yayım Dağıtım, pp. 507–516. “Oil and Gas Infrastructure of Georgia: Ongoing and Prospective Projects” (2015), Date of Accession: 03.04.2020 from https://www.slideshare.net/ITEoilgas1/oil-and-gasinfrastructure-of-georgia-ongoing-and-prospective-projects. Örmeci, Ozan & Kısacık, Sina (2018), Rusya Siyaseti ve Rus Dış Politikası: Teorik ÇerçeveTarihsel Arka Plan-Örnek Olaylar, Ankara: Seçkin Yayıncılık. Özer, S. (2018), “Turkey Supports Georgia’s territorial integrity”, Anatolian Agency English, Date of Accession: August 30, 2018 from https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkeysupports-georgia-s-territorial-integrity/1157670. Özlü, U. S. (2015), “Turkey-Azerbaijan Relations in the 21st Century”, in Hüseyin Işıksal & Ozan Örmeci (eds.), Turkish Foreign Policy in the New Millennium, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, pp. 427–437. Pamir, N. (2017), Enerjinin İktidarı: Enerji Kaynaklarını Elinde Tutan, Dünyayı Elinde Tutar!, İstanbul: Hayykitap. Pillalamarri, A. (2014), “The United States Just Closed Its Last Base in Central Asia: What the Closure of Manas’ Transit Center Means for Central Asia’s Future”, The Diplomat, Date of Accession: September 5, 2018 from https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/the-unitedstates-just-closed-its-last-base-in-central-asia/. Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2018/a, September 15), “Turkey Is Azerbaijan’s Most Important Partner in Trade, Economy and Culture”, Date of Accession: September 16, 2018 from https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/98586/-turkey-is-azerbaijan-s-mostimportant-partner-in-trade-economy-and-culture-. Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2018/b, September 3), “President Erdoğan Attends the 6th Summit Meeting of the Turkic Council”, Date of Accession: September 4, 2018 from https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/96394/President-erdogan-attends-the-6thsummit-meeting-of-the-turkic-council. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018, May 30), “SC-41, 30 May 2018, Statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hami Aksoy, in Response to a Question Regarding the Recognition of the So-Called Independence of Georgia’s Regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by the Syrian Regime”, Date of Accession: August 30, 2018 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sc_-41_-suriye-rejiminingurcistanin-abhazya-ve-guney-osetya-bolgelerinin-sozde-bagimsizliklarini-tanimasihk-sc_en.en.mfa. S&P Global Platts (2018), “Insight from Brussels: Europe’s Nord Stream 2 Opponents Now Looking to ‘Plan B’”, Date of Accession: April 4, 2020 from https://blogs.platts. com/2018/07/24/europe-nord-stream-2-plan-b/.

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Sarı, Y. (2018), “Türkiye-Orta Asya İlişkilerinde Sınırlı İşbirliği”, in K. İnat, A. Aslan, & B. Duran (eds.), Kuruluşundan Bugüne AK Parti: Dış Politika, İstanbul: SETA Kitapları, pp. 357–380. Sputnik International (2018), “Trade War with US Gives New Opportunities for RussiaChina Cooperation-Prof.”, Date of Accession: September 5, 2018 from https:// sputniknews.com/analysis/201807201066554651-trade-war-opportunities-russia-​ china/. Strobel, W. & Landay, J. (2018), “Exclusive: U.S. Accuses China of ‘Super Aggressive’ Spy Campaign on LinkedIn”, Reuters, Date of Accession: September 5, 2018 from https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-linkedin-china-espionage-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-accuseschina-of-super-aggressive-spy-campaign-on-linkedin-idUSKCN1LG15Y. Swaine, J. (2018), “Maria Butina: Ties Emerge between NRA, Alleged Spy and Russian Billionaire”, The Guardian, Date of Accession: September 5, 2018 from https://www. theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/26/maria-butina-nra-svetlana-nikolaeva-konstantinnikolaev. The Moscow Times (2018), “Putin Warns NATO against Including Georgia and Ukraine”, Date of Accession: August 31, 2018 from https://themoscowtimes.com/news/putinwarns-nato-against-including-georgia-and-ukraine-62303. Trend News Agency (2018), “President Ilham Aliyev: By Implementing Joint Projects, Azerbaijan and Turkey Redraw Energy and Transport Map of Eurasia”, Date of Accession: September 16, 2018 from https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/2952195.html. Telli, A. (2015), “Azerbaycan Enerji Diplomasisi”, in H. Çomak, C. Sancaktar & Z. Yıldırım (eds.), Enerji Diplomasisi, İstanbul: Beta Basım Yayım Dağıtım, pp. 347–372. Temizer, M. & Erdogan, H. (2018), “US Strongly Backs TANAP for Energy Sec.: US Official”, AA English, Date of Accession: June 12, 2018 from https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/ us-strongly-backs-tanap-for-energy-sec-us-official/1172823. Tüfekçi, Ö. (2018), “İş Birliği ve Kriz İkileminde Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri”, in K. İnat, A. Aslan & B. Duran (eds.), Kuruluşundan Bugüne AK Parti: Dış Politika, İstanbul: SETA Kitapları, pp. 135–153. Tüysüz, Ü. (2018), “Güney Kafkasya ile İlişkilerde İmkân ve Sınırlar”, in K. İnat, A. Aslan & B. Duran (eds.), Kuruluşundan Bugüne AK Parti: Dış Politika, İstanbul: SETA Kitapları, pp. 403–425. Tüysüzoğlu, G. (2019), “Rusya’nın Karadeniz Stratejisi: Sebepler ve Uygulamalar”, in G.Tüysüzoğlu & S. Kurt (eds.), Uluslararası Politikada Karadeniz, Ankara: Detay Yayıncılık, pp. 67–96. Umbach, Frank (2017), “Turkey’s Energy Dilemma: Brussels or Moscow?”, GiS – Geopolitical Intelligence Services, Date of Accession: April 2, 2020 from https://www. gisreportsonline.com/turkeys-energy-dilemma-brussels-or-moscow,energy,2416.html. “US Military Bases in the Middle East and Central Asia Surround Iran”, Date of Accession: April 1, 2020 from http://war-in-middle-east.blogspot.com/2012/08/ us-military-bases-in-middle-east-and.html. Veliyev, C. (2016), “Can Trump Shake Up the South Caucasus?: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia All Expect Different Things”,The National Interest, Date of Accession: August

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28, 2019 from https://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-trump-shake-the-southcaucasus-18774. Wayne, S. (2018), “Turkey Rejects Russian Claims in Georgia”, Georgia Today, Date of Accession: August 30, 2018 from http://georgiatoday.ge/news/10574/Turkey-RejectsRussian-Claims-In-Georgia.

Hüseyin Işıksal1

Chapter 15: Conclusion: Turkish-American Relations in the 21st Century: An Uneasy Alliance

Since their inception, Turkish-American Relations have always been special. The United States (hereafter U.S.) could be proclaimed as the leader of the Western world since the First World War and a global “superpower” since the Second World War. On the other hand, since the establishment of modern Turkey in 1923, the country has given the utmost importance to Westernization and modernization and opted to stay within the Western political sphere. During the Cold War era, Turkey’s perceived threat from the Soviet Union brought the country closer to the West. Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, an act that solidified Ankara’s alliance with the U.S. and the Western world. All of these factors made the U.S. and Turkey natural and traditional allies. While the presence of the Soviet Union maintained the strength of the TurkishAmerican alliance throughout the majority of the Cold War period, and with the collapse of the Soviet Union, “the pragmatic glue” that had brought Turkey and U.S.  together started to weaken. The initial and most important breakdown witnessed in bilateral relations was the occupation of Iraq by the coalition army in 1990. Despite Turkey’s political concerns that the disunity of Iraq might lead to a Kurdish State that could destabilize Turkey and threaten the country’s territorial integrity, a no-fly zone was established in the northern part of Iraq that established a ‘safe haven’ for the Kurds with the efforts of the U.S. This was the first serious blow to Turkey-U.S. relations in the post-Cold War era. The occupation and later imposed trade embargo on Iraq not only severely damaged the Turkish economy, but also escalated the PKK terror threat in Turkey. Northern Iraq became a base for the bloody terrorist activities of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (hereafter PKK) militants. Turkey also encountered serious immigration problems emanating from the instability in Northern Iraq when nearly half a million Kurds fled to Turkey during the war. All these factors motivated Turkish decision-makers to be more cautious in supporting the U.S.-led military operations in the region. Turkish-American Relations entered into an entirely new phase under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AK Parti). Since 2002, Turkey has adopted an assertive and interventionist Middle East policy by taking sides within the

1 Professor, Department of International Relations, Near East University, Nicosia, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Email: [email protected]

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domestic affairs of Arab states via supporting democratic and moderate Islamic groups. In the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings (Arab Spring), the U.S. even suggested that Turkey was a “model country” for the Middle East and for the broader Muslim world by virtue of its supposed achievements in economic development, secularization, and democratization. However, the post-2011 era and the outbreak of civil war in Syria seem to have marked the “beginning of the end” for the Turkish model. Since then, both countries have seemingly developed quite divergent views and positions regarding major regional issues such as the military coup in Egypt, the ongoing civil war in Syria, the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict , the containment of Iran, and above all, on the most crucial national issue of Turkey: the role of Kurds and the PKK-YPG in the region in particular. Deriving from these points, this edited book entitled Historical Examinations and Current Issues in Turkish-American Relations aims to analyze the roots of the Turkish-American Relations and the direction in which it is going. It focuses on the political, economic, social, identity, and security interaction between the two actors. In this way, it aims to contribute to the scholarly literature on this field with original chapters on selected themes, especially in these unsettling and interesting times. The book is composed of fifteen chapters. In order to improve its consistency and reliability, the volume is based on a chronological and thematic study of Turkish-American Relations. Meticulous consideration has been given to the categorization and presentation of the contributions in order to ensure that the study operates in a relative manner, and the topic is categorized and narrowed down suitably. For this purpose, the volume is divided into three main parts and it maintains that each section’s contribution retains analytical cogency and descriptive relevancy to the preceding sections. Part I  discusses the history and background of Turkish-American Relations with the aim out of laying out the historical background of the analysis detailed in the rest of the research. For simplicity and better elucidation of the topic, this part’s analyses are based upon chronological study starting with the early encounters during the Ottoman Empire to the post-Cold War era. Deriving from Part I, Part II and Part III include specific discussions on Turkish-American Relations from different topics and areas. Part II analyzes Turkish-American Relations in terms of identity, security, economy, and development, while the last part (Part III) analyzes Turkish-American Relations in terms of key political areas. In the “Introduction” chapter, Ozan Örmeci progressively summarized the background of the Turkish-American Relations. Örmeci mentioned that the TurkishAmerican partnership transformed into the ‘alliance’ during the Cold War era as a “strategic necessity” for both sides in the 1950s. The partnership was further solidified with the economic, military, and political support of the U.S. administration to the Turkish political elite. Örmeci noted that the two countries’ relations began to decline when Turkey’s self-ordained foreign policy in Cyprus in the 1970s clashed with the U.S. interests. Furthermore, Turkey’s assertive Middle Eastern policy initiatives in the 2000s began to increase the mistrust between the two countries. In contemporary times, this alliance is less vital and more problematic. Moreover, Turkey’s growing

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energy needs have made the country more dependent on Russia and Iran, which are considered as rival states by the U.S. In addition, the pro-Israeli and pro-Kurdish oriented Middle Eastern policies of the U.S. mostly excluded Ankara’s concerns and have distanced the two allies in recent years. This caused growing anti-Americanism in Turkey that is fueled by recent political developments in northern Syria where the PKK-YPG has controlled the area through American support. As I have mentioned above, the first part of the book analyzes the history and background of Turkish-American Relations with chronological analysis. In this connection, in Chapter 2, Murat Önsoy elucidated the early encounters between the Ottoman Empire and the U.S. in the 19th and the early 20th centuries. Önsoy noted that the beginning of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the Ottoman Empire dates back to the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation in 1830. Although economic issues dominated the bilateral relations during the first few decades of the relations, by the mid-19th century, some problematic political issues had started to emerge. The increasing number of missionary activities in the Empire and the negative attitude of the Ottomans towards them as well as the naturalization of the Ottoman emigrants by the U.S. caused problems between the two actors. In the early 20th century, the interventionist attitude of the U.S. in the tensions between the Ottoman State and its non-Muslim subjects and the issue of the American arms sales to the Ottoman Empire dominated the agenda of the two countries relations. Following on from Önsoy’s contribution, in Chapter  3, Gürol Baba evaluated Turkish-American Relations from the early Republican era until the end of the Cold War. In this period, Turkey moved from being a small power to a proactive middle power, while the U.S. became a superpower. Therefore, the relations did not operate on an equal basis and the concept of “asymmetry” has always been present in Turkish-American Relations. In other words, there has always been asymmetry in the expectations, motivations, and policy outcomes of both parties. Baba also underlined that Washington did not perceive Turkey to be as critical as Ankara considered itself and this asymmetry affected almost every key development in bilateral relations. In conclusion, Baba made a notable observation that although Turkey tried to reduce the asymmetry during the 1960s and 1970s, each time it has attempted to distance itself from the U.S., it always resulted in even closer relations. As the last chapter of this part, in Chapter 4, Ozan Örmeci discussed the TurkishAmerican Relations in the post-Cold War Era. Örmeci suggests that the TurkishAmerican Relations are not only important for these two countries, but also for the Western bloc and for the world order in general. In the post-Cold War era, the Turkish-American Relations entered into a new period with changing dynamics that created new opportunities along with new problems at the same time. Örmeci argues that, in this era, Turkish and American interests are still similar in most of the regional and international disputes, which demonstrates that military alliances and arms deals between the two countries will continue to be a major issue in bilateral relations. On the other hand, the most important problem in bilateral relations seems to be the American support for the PKK-YPG. Ankara is concerned that,

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with the weapons provided by the U.S., PKK-YPG could attack Turkey and Turkish citizens. Moreover, anti-Americanism is rising again in Turkey due to the popular belief about American involvement in the failed coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016. In conclusion, the lack of confidence between the two countries has led Turkey to have closer relations with Russia. Following the first part, Part II analyzes Turkish-American Relations in terms of identity, security, economy, and development. In Chapter 5, Zeynep Merve Şıvgın evaluated the image of the U.S. in Turkey. Şıvgın observed that, in recent years, Turkey has been among the least popular countries in the U.S. Similarly, the recent American political and military involvements in the Middle East and the clash of American and Turkish national interests in the region led to the rise of anti-Americanism in Turkey. The July 15, 2016 coup attempt was a major breaking point in the history of Turkish-American Relations, which may indeed reach a critical juncture. Şıvgın suggests that Fethullah Gülen residing in the U.S. and his non-extradition turned into a major crisis between the two countries. The effects of this crisis are not only felt in in political and economic spheres, but also in the cultural and social realm where the American image in Turkish public opinion is extremely damaged. In Chapter  6, Ömer Kurtbağ analyzed the troubled period in the TurkeyU.S. security partnership and Turkey’s NATO alignment during the 2000s. Kurtbağ argues that the Transatlantic bonds between Turkey and the U.S.  have become increasingly problematic in contemporary times due to two key reasons: (1) The U.S.  partnership with PKK/YPG terrorists in northern Syria and (2)  Turkey’s recent rapprochement with Russia and Iran. According to Kurtbağ, both sides are experiencing a growing crisis of confidence. In consequence, the gap between Turkish and American security and foreign interests has grown and deepened during the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations. The Turkish-American Relationship and security partnership also became more complicated as a result of the recent developments in the Middle East. In particular, the U.S. indifference to Turkish claims and legal demands for the extradition of Gülen breed anti-Americanism in Turkey and further harm Turkish-American security engagement in a regional context. Kurtbağ concluded that, under these conditions, there seems no real progress in repairing the bilateral relations as both countries have not yet sought a reappraisal of their well-established positions on the most pressing issues dividing them. Following identity-culture and security-based analysis, in Chapter 7, Gürol Baba elucidated the Turkish-American Relations in terms of economy and development. Baba points out that the economic realm of Turkish-American Relations has been a good indicator of the asymmetry between a superpower and a middle power relationship. The bilateral economic relations between the two actors were in the form of grants, credits, military aid, and technology transfers. Due to Turkey’s security-related orientation on Washington’s policy calculations, defense always outweighs the financial aid. Baba noted that the amount of aid has been conditioned to the proximity of politico-strategic relations. With the economic boost Turkey experienced under the early years of AK Parti rule and with the help the

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developing Turkish private sector, however, the U.S. began to see Turkey more as a trade partner and a strategic ally, rather than a large market for American goods. Therefore, it could be suggested that the more economic power Turkey is able to achieve, the less dependent it will be on American aid. Nevertheless, Baba suggests Turkey still needs American aid, particularly in the defense sector. After the security-related analysis, Chapter 8 is focused on Turkish-American Relations in terms of the arms trade. Cenk Özgen once more highlighted that the backbone of the Turkish-American Relations since the Cold War era has been based upon defense cooperation between the two countries. Turkey has always been among the most important customers of the U.S. in the arms trade. Özgen envisages that the arms trade between Turkey and the U.S. will continue in the future, but in a different form. The progress made in the Turkish defense industry in recent years has reduced the arms imports from the U.S. and Turkish companies have even begun to sell military material to the U.S. companies in the form of subsystem products and services. Özgen argues that both countries have mutual interests from the arms trade and with its high-tech and indigenous solutions, Turkey is becoming a competitive force in international markets. This suggests that the arms trade between these two countries will continue in the future and the U.S. could employ and utilize the Turkish defense industry in a sub-contractor capacity. The last contribution in Part Two, Chapter  9, is Şebnem Udum’s politicopsychological analysis of issues in Turkish-American Relations through problematic cases. Udum named Armenian allegations on 1915 events, PKK terrorism, FETO and the July 15, 2016 coup attempt, and Turkey’s S-400 deal with Russia among the problematic cases. Udum argues that the main policy variables that have shaped Turkey’s reactions to these cases are state tradition in Turkey, fear of partition (or the Sèvres Trauma) in the country, and Turkey’s approach towards Great Powers. Udum concludes that, for a better relationship between the two countries, Washington needs to demonstrate a more empathic stance towards Turkey’ security concerns because both countries need each other for regional stability. After discussing the history and background of Turkish-American Relations and both countries’ relations in security, economy, and development, the last part of the book is focused on Turkish-American Relations in key political areas. In the first chapter of this part, in Chapter 10, I and Qais Maaitah analyzed TurkishAmerican Relations in the Middle East in the post-Arab Spring era through 5 major issue areas, namely; the YPG/PKK problem, the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, conflicting approaches towards political Islam and the Arab Spring, contradictory perceptions towards Iran and Russia, and the different standing towards the FETO terror organization. We argued that in the post-Arab Spring era, both countries have completely different political views on many issues and Turkish-American Relations have fractured. In consequence, there is no longer a strategic partnership in its current form and it became evident that when the two countries interests have clashed, they have had significant confrontations. Arguably, the U.S.  military alliance with the YPG in northern Syria and the indifferent attitude of the

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U.S. toward Turkey’s security concerns are the main reasons behind the deteriorating relations. This has made Turkey-American Relations more complicated than ever. We also put forward that another reason behind the weakening relations is Turkey’s recent active policy in the Middle East. However, having said this, it is evident that the U.S. has not yet accepted Turkey’s will to act “independently” and “assertively” in its neighborhood and beyond. Consequently, the causes of the conflict between the countries are particularly serious and profound, with a minimal if not non-existent hope for a solution. In the second chapter of this part, in Chapter 11, Matthew Weiss elaborated on the Turkish-American Relations since the Arab Spring by focusing on the missteps, mutual misunderstandings, and future possibilities. Weiss examined the contribution of the key events such as the Syrian civil war and the 2013 coup in Egypt to discontinuity, instability, and policy divergences in Turkish-American Relations in recent years. Weiss argued that despite a long track record of cooperation during the Cold War, the frequency, intensity, and duration of crises between the U.S. and Turkey have increased in recent years on many fronts, and in consequence, discord has become the “new normal” in their relations. Weiss also highlighted the differences between the Obama and Trump administrations in their approach to U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East and how these differences have shaped Turkish-American Relations. According to Weiss, Trump’s ideologically motivated and partial stances in regional disputes that have favored Turkey’s regional rivals such as Israel, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, further polarized relations between the U.S.  and Turkey. In this connection, Weiss puts forward that prospects for regional stability and the quality of Turkish-American Relations could be substantially improved if the U.S. reduces its military presence in the Middle East, assumes a more constructive, balanced, and neutral stance when schisms arise among its allies, and in conflict resolution in the Middle East. Weiss concluded that the divergent geostrategic interests of the two countries show that their relations will be dominated by continued discord and divergence of policies and objectives in the near future. In the third chapter of this part, in Chapter 12, Matthew S. Cohen analyzed the Turkish-Israeli-U.S.  triangle and how Israel factors into Turkish-American Relations. Cohen conducted his analysis on a range of issues including American perceptions, diverging regional goals, the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, and security dimensions. Cohen argues fading relations between Turkey and Israel along with a rise in anti-Muslim sentiment in the West, disagreements over policies in the Middle East, Trump administration’s idiosyncratic shifts on policies in the region, and the change in the goals of Turkey’s leaders, leaning away from the West have deteriorated the Turkish-American Relations. Cohen noted that, during AK Parti era, Turkey’s goals began to diverge from the U.S. and Turkey grew more confident as a regional actor. Furthermore, during the Obama administration, Turkey felt that it needed Israel less to help boost Turkish-American Relations. Cohen concluded that despite the current impasse, in three fields, namely; economics, security, and the peace process, this trio could benefit from enhancing cooperation. The U.S. could

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improve relations with Turkey to boost Turkish economic growth by increasing trade. Similarly, the three countries could cooperate in security because all are currently facing terror threats from the same groups, and all three countries hope to prevent Iran from expanding its influence in the region and from obtaining nuclear weapons. Finally, all countries could work together on the Arab-Israeli peace process and if Turkey plays a constructive role, it could improve relations with Israel. In Chapter  13, Armağan Gözkaman discussed the impossibility of Trump administration’s thrust for Turkey-EU relations. Gözkaman argues that Trump’s government is possibly in the worst position to bolster Turkey’s EU bid when Turkey needs it most. Gözkaman based his argument on two points. First of all, the U.S. administration already has declining relations with the EU because of Trump’s policies and Trump has a negative attitude towards the European integration. Secondly, Turkish-American Relations are not at their peak and there is no reason for Trump to endorse Turkey’s membership to the Union. In the last Chapter, that is Chapter 14, Sina Kısacık analyzed Eurasian regional security and energy security parameters in Turkish-American Relations. Eurasia has always been of great importance due to its possession of strategic trade routes and energy resources. In this connection, both Turkey and the U.S. have close economic interests in the region. Additionally, Turkey has close cultural and political links with Azerbaijan and other Turkic speaking Central Asian countries in the region in particular. Sina argues that, because of these reasons, both Turkey and the U.S. are closely interested in Eurasian security parameters in the 21st century. Nevertheless, as Sina concluded, both Turkey and the U.S. will have to take into consideration Russia’s foreign security and energy policies while formulating their policies, because Russia is still the only hegemonic power in the region. To summarize, as all the contributions have underlined to a lesser or greater extent, three significant interrelated points identify the characteristics of the Turkish-American Relations. First of all, considering Turkey’s comparative weakness and inferiority, the relations are always asymmetric in favor of the U.S. Turkey has moved from being a small power to a proactive middle power over the years, while the U.S.  became and stayed a superpower. In consequence, the TurkishAmerican Relations did not operate on an equal basis and there has always been asymmetry in terms of the expectations, motivations, and policy outcomes of both countries. Secondly, for the U.S., Turkey’s value has always been security-oriented rather than economic or political. In other words, the U.S. fully understood Turkey’s role and potential in only very few instances. On the other hand, particularly from the mid-1940s onwards, Turkey aimed to prove to the U.S. that the country is not only an ordinary ally, but also a strategic partner, especially in the Middle East. In this connection, Washington did not perceive Turkey to be as critical as Ankara considered itself and this feature affected almost every key development in bilateral relations. Thirdly, Turkish Foreign Policy has become more assertive regarding its own policy priorities and has gained a more ‘strategic perspective’ under AK Parti rule.

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On the other hand, the U.S.  has not yet accepted Turkey’s will to act ‘independently’ in its neighborhood and beyond. Related to this point, it is evident that the more economic power Turkey manages to build, Turkish-American Relations will be based upon more symmetrical grounds. In contemporary times, Turkey-U.S. relations have entered into an era of crises and have become more complicated than ever. It is evident that there is mistrust and differentiated strategic interests between the two countries. Most importantly, the U.S. is trying to create an area of influence on Turkey’s southern border by using terror organizations like the YPG, which is completely unacceptable for Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey’s purchase of S-400 missile of the advanced air defense systems from Russia caused U.S. sanctions as initially Turkey suspended to participate the production of hi-tech F-35 fighter jets program. All these recent developments suggest that “the bonds are no longer tight”, the causes of the conflict are profound, and there seems to be no real progress in repairing the bilateral relations. The main reason for this is that both countries have not yet sought a reappraisal of their well-established positions on the most pressing issues dividing them. Therefore, the question at the heart of the issue is “Quo Vadis Turkish-American Relations in the 21st Century?”… History has shown us that each time Turkey has attempted to distance itself from the U.S., it has always resulted in even closer relations. This fact alone demonstrates that the Turkish-American alliance has a mutual strategic value and neither party is willing to completely discard the relations. Furthermore, Turkey’s limited alliance with Russia, as witnessed in the direct military confrontation between the two sides in Libya and Syria, also demonstrates that Turkey cannot completely forsake its alliance with the U.S. Hence, only time can show whether this scenario will once more be repeated or whether we will be amazed by the new developments in these interesting and turbulent times. The main challenge faced in this volume is the highly politicized nature of Turkish Politics and Turkish Foreign Policy. By recognizing the complexity of this problem, the highest consideration is given to the presentation and editing of the chapters. In this way, it is attempted to make a modest contribution to the critical understanding of Turkish Foreign Policy in general and to Turkey-American Relations through critical examinations. Hopefully, this study can encourage other scholars to adopt fresher and differentiated perspectives on this topic regardless of the interpretations that we present in this volume.

Editors Curriculum Vitae (Hüseyin Işıksal) Professor Hüseyin Işıksal was born in 1977 in Famagusta, North Cyprus. He was graduated from the British College (Türk Maarif College) in Nicosia. He achieved B.A.  degree as a high-honor student from the department of International Relations at Eastern Mediterranean University in 1998. He completed his M.A.  at the University of Warwick in the United Kingdom where he studied as the “Chevening Scholar of Cyprus,” awarded by the British Council Foreign Ministry & Commonwealth Office to the most successful graduate of the year. He had his first Ph.D. from the Keele University-United Kingdom, department of Politics and International Relations with the thesis entitled “Asymmetric Negotiations: Dichotomous International Order and Turkey-EU Relations”. He achieved his second Ph.D. from the Middle East Technical University-Turkey, department of International Relations with the thesis entitled “The Subordination of the Arab Regional System: The Cases of Egypt & Iraq”.Since 2002, he is full-time lecturer in various universities in Turkey, England, and Cyprus. In 2014, he became Associate Professor in the field of International Relations. In January 2020, he became Full Professor in International Relations. Currently, he works as Professor in the Department of International Relations at Near East University, Cyprus. He has over 50 publications written in English and Turkish in various peer-reviewed academic journals and as book chapters. He is the co-editor of the 5 important books including Turkish Foreign Policy in the New Millennium, Mavi Elma: TürkiyeAvrupa İlişkileri, Turkey’s Relations with the Middle East: Political Encounters after the Arab Spring,and Cyprus: Alternative Solution Models. In 2014, Işıksal has been appointed as one of the members of the Consultative Committee of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Presidency for the negotiations. Professor Hüseyin Işıksal is Near East University Representative of TRNC Higher Education Supervision and Accreditation Board International Relations Planning and Coordination Group. Professor Işıksal also frequently provides opinion on national TV and radio channels, and newspapers in Turkey and North Cyprus mainly on Middle Eastern Politics, Turkish Foreign Policy, European Union-Turkey Relations, and Cyprus Politics.

Curriculum Vitae (Ozan Ӧrmeci) Dr. Ozan Örmeci was born in 1981 in Bornova-Izmir. His father’s family is from Senirkent-Isparta. He finished primary school in Izmir Turk College (ITK) and had middle school and lycee education in Izmir Saint-Joseph French College. He graduated from Bilkent University’s Political Science and Public Administration Department in 2004 as high-honour student. In 2011, he earned PhD degree from

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Bilkent University Political Science Department with his thesis entitled “Portrait of a Turkish Social Democrat: Ismail Cem”, under the supervision of Dr. Berrak Burçak, from a distinguished jury composed of Prof. Metin Heper, Prof. Ergun Özbudun, Prof. Ayşe Güneş Ayata, and Dr. Nur Bilge Criss. He worked as a lecturer in Uşak University Public Administration Department between 2009 and 2012. Between October 2012 and January 2016, he worked as an assistant professor and headed the Department of Political Science and Public Administration (English language) in Girne American University (GAU) in Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Between March 2016 and September 2018, he worked as an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration (English language) in Beykent University in Istanbul. He became an associate professor in May 2018. He began to work as an associate professor in the Department of International Relations (English language) in Istanbul Gedik University in September 2018. He was appointed an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration in Istanbul Gedik University in June 2019 and served as the head of the Department for a while. He has previously published many scientific books and articles in Turkey and abroad. He is the editor of some academic books specialized on Turkish foreign policy including Turkish Foreign Policy in the New Millennium (Peter Lang, 2015), Mavi Elma: Türkiye-Avrupa İlişkileri (Gazi Kitabevi, 2016), and Historical Examinations and Current Issues in Turkish-American Relations (Peter Lang, 2020). In addition, he wrote Turkish books analyzing the political system and foreign policy of countries including the United States, Russian Federation, People’s Republic of China, France, and the United Kingdom. He is able to speak fluently and write academically in French and in English. He also works as a specialist for Turkish Political Psychology Association (PPD). Dr. Örmeci is the founder and coordinator of UPA (International Political Academy) initiative. His main research interests are: global politics, comparative politics, Turkish political history, political psychology, Leftist movements in Turkey, and Turkish foreign policy. Dr. Ozan Örmeci is married to Cansu Örmeci (Karakoç) since 30 September 2011 and is the father of one child. He is also a congress member of Karşıyaka Sports Club.

List of Contributors Baba, Gürol Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Social Sciences University of Ankara, Ankara, Turkey.

Ӧnsoy, Murat Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Hacettepe University, Ankara, Turkey.

Cohen, Matthew S. Assistant Professor of Practice, Merrimack College, USA.

Ӧrmeci, Ozan Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Istanbul Gedik University, Istanbul, Turkey.

Gözkaman, Armağan Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Beykent University, Istanbul, Turkey. Işıksal, Hüseyin Professor, Department of International Relations, Near East University, Nicosia, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Kısacık, Sina Lecturer, Institute of Social Sciences, Department of Law, Energy Law Program, Istanbul Özyeğin University, Istanbul, Turkey. Kurtbağ, Ӧmer Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Erciyes University, Kayseri, Turkey. Maaitah, Qais Khaleel Sallam Assistant Professor, College of Law, Applied Science University, Bahrain.

Ӧzgen, Cenk Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Giresun University, Giresun, Turkey. Şıvgın, Zeynep Merve Assistant Professor, Faculty of Fine Arts, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Ankara, Turkey. Udum, Şebnem Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Hacettepe University, Ankara, Turkey. Weiss, Matthew Assistant Professor, Department of Public Affairs and Security Studies, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, USA.