Hermias: On Plato Phaedrus 245E–257C 9781350051928, 9781350051959, 9781350051935

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Hermias On Plato Phaedrus 245E–257C

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Ancient Commentators on Aristotle GENERAL EDITORS: Richard Sorabji, Honorary Fellow, Wolfson College, University of Oxford, and Emeritus Professor, King’s College London, UK; and Michael Griffin, Associate Professor, Departments of Philosophy and Classics, University of British Columbia, Canada. This prestigious series translates the extant ancient Greek philosophical commentaries on Aristotle. Written mostly between 200 and 600 ad, the works represent the classroom teaching of the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic schools in a crucial period during which pagan and Christian thought were reacting to each other. The translation in each volume is accompanied by an introduction, comprehensive commentary notes, bibliography, glossary of translated terms and a subject index. Making these key philosophical works accessible to the modern scholar, this series fills an important gap in the history of European thought. A webpage for the Ancient Commentators Project is maintained at ancientcommentators.org.uk and readers are encouraged to consult the site for details about the series as well as for addenda and corrigenda to published volumes.

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Hermias On Plato Phaedrus 245E–257C

Translated by Dirk Baltzly and Michael Share

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BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA 29 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2, Ireland BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2023 Copyright © Dirk Baltzly and Michael Share, 2023 Dirk Baltzly and Michael Share has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. Cover design: Terry Woodley All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: ePDF: eBook:

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Acknowledgements The present translations have been made possible by generous and imaginative funding from the following sources: the National Endowment for the Humanities, Divison of Research Programs, an independent federal agency of the USA; the Leverhulme Trust; the British Academy; the Jowett Copyright Trustees; the Royal Society (UK); Centro Internazionale A. Beltrame di Storia dello Spazio e del Tempo (Padua); Mario Mignucci; Liverpool University; the Leventis Foundation; the Arts and Humanities Research Council; Gresham College; the Esmée Fairbairn Charitable Trust; the Henry Brown Trust; Mr and Mrs N. Egon; the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NOW/GW); the Ashdown Trust; the Lorne Thyssen Research Fund for Ancient World Topics at Wolfson College, Oxford; Dr Victoria Solomonides, the Cultural Attaché of the Greek Embassy in London; and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The editors wish to thank John Dillon, Michael Griffin, Harold Tarrant, and Sarah Klitenic Wear for their comments; Dawn Sellars for preparing the volume for press; and Alice Wright, Commissioning Editor at Bloomsbury Academic, for her diligence in seeing each volume of the series to press.

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In memory of John Colman (1942–2020), philosopher at the University of Tasmania and Michael’s long-time friend.

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Contents Conventions Abbreviations Introduction 1. The Phaedrus’ theological centre of gravity 2. Hermias’ reading strategies (a) Illustration 1: The form of the soul (b) Illustration 2: The lowered wings (c) Illustration 3: The inventory of lives 3. Competing theotaxonomies for the Phaedrus? (a) Proclus’ theotaxonomies of the Phaedrus (i) The intelligible-intellective gods (ii) The hypercosmic-encosmic gods (b) Hermias’ theotaxonomy in the Phaedrus (c) Conclusion: The context of performance

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Departures from Lucarini and Moreschini’s Text

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Translation

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Notes Bibliography English–Greek Glossary Greek–English Index Subject Index

151 209 215 221 237

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Conventions [. . .]

Square brackets enclose words or phrases that have been added to the translation for purposes of clarity and our expansions of Hermias’ lemmata.

(. . .)

Round brackets, besides being used for ordinary parentheses, contain transliterated Greek words or references to the text of the Phaedrus or of Hermias’ commentary itself.

Angle brackets enclosing text contain additions to Lucarini and Moreschini’s text. Those enclosing three stops indicate points at which they assume a lacuna in the Greek text.

In addition to their normal uses, italics are used to identify direct quotation of the Phaedrus. The page and line numbers of Lucarini and Moreschini’s edition are printed in the margins of the translation and the page numbers of Couvreur’s edition are printed in bold and in round brackets in the text.

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Abbreviations Ast

Bernabé

Bernard

Couvreur Diels

Hackforth Kern Lampe LCL LSJ

Lucarini and Moreschini Majercik

Friedrich Ast, Platonis Phaedrus recensuit Hermiae scholiis e Cod. Monac. XI . suisque commentariis illustravit, Leipzig: Schwickert, 1810. A. Bernabé, Poetae epici Graeci: testimonia et fragmenta. Pars 2, Orphicorum et Orphicis similium testimonia et fragmenta, Monachii; Lipsiae: Saur, 2004. Hildegund Bernard (tr.), Hermeias von Alexandrien, Kommentar zu Platons Phaidros, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997. P. Couvreur (ed.), Hermiae Alexandrini in Platonis Phaedrum scholia, Paris: Librairie E. Bouillon, 1901. H. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, griechisch und deutsch, 6th edn, ed. W. Kranz, 3 vols, Berlin: Weidmann, 1951-2. R. Hackforth (tr.), Plato’s Phaedrus, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952. O. Kern, Orphicorum fragmenta, Berlin: Weidmann, 1922. G. W. H. Lampe (ed.), A Patristic Greek Lexicon, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961. Loeb Classical Library H. G. Liddell and R. Scott (comps), A Greek-English Lexicon, rev. H. Jones, with a New Supplement, 9th edn, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. Carlo Lucarini and C. Moreschini (eds), Hermias Alexandrinus: in Platonis Phaedrum Scholia, Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2012. Ruth Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles: Text, Translation and Commentary, Leiden: Brill, 1989.

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PT Rowe Ryan Scully

Smyth

TLG Waterfield Yunis

Abbreviations

H. D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink, Proclus: Théologie platonicienne, 6 vols, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1968-97. C. J. Rowe, Plato, Phaedrus, Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1986. Paul Ryan, Plato’s Phaedrus: A Commentary for Greek Readers, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012 Stephen Scully, Plato’s Phaedrus: A Translation with Notes, Glossary, Appendices, Interpretative Essay and Introduction, Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing / R. Pullins Co., 2003. Herbert Weir Smyth, Greek Grammar; rev. Gordon M. Messing, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956; repr. 1966. Thesaurus Linguae Graecae [CD Rom]. Robin Waterfield, Phaedrus, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Harvey Yunis, Plato, Phaedrus, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011

Any otherwise unattributed references to ‘vol. 1’ refer to the first volume of the translation of Hermias’ commentary in Baltzly and Share 2018.

Introduction

1. The Phaedrus’ theological centre of gravity The level of exegetical energy dedicated to the portion of Plato’s dialogue that is discussed in this volume of Hermias’ Phaedrus commentary explains why the Neoplatonists assigned it a particular role in their programme of reading Plato. The Neoplatonists grouped Plato’s Phaedrus and Symposium together as dialogues that are concerned particularly with gods. In the Iamblichean reading order, they occupy the eighth and ninth positions, immediately before the synoptic Philebus (which was alleged to investigate the good as immanent) and immediately after the Sophist and the Statesman (which were taken to deal with nature).1 Both Phaedrus and Symposium are also among Plato’s most dramatically complex dialogues. While the latter has a host of speakers, the Phaedrus has a host of voices that are introduced through the two speakers, Socrates and Phaedrus. These include the absent Lysias, whose speech in praise of the non-lover prompts the discussion between Phaedrus and Socrates (230E–237A). This speech elicits from Socrates another speech, ostensibly agreeing with Lysias about the perils of involving oneself with someone who is in love (237A–243A). Socrates’ divine sign intervenes both to prevent his departure back to the city and also to prompt a second speech on love from Socrates – the palinode or ‘counter-song’ that makes restitution for the terrible things seemingly said about love or the god Eros in his first speech (244A–257C). The final and longest part of the dialogue reflects on the practice of giving, and particularly writing, speeches such as those that Socrates and Phaedrus have provided (257C–279C). The dramatic complexity of the Phaedrus afforded its Neoplatonic interpreters considerable scope for theories of its structure and purpose. This means that not all parts of the dialogue get equal attention. 1

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While Hermias’ commentary on the Phaedrus is the only one that is extant, we can tell from the Platonic Theology of his classmate Proclus that the palinode was the part of the dialogue that attracted the most exegetical attention. Of the 308 citations of the Phaedrus in his Platonic Theology, only 18 fall outside Stephanus pages 244A–257C (i.e. outside the palinode). When Proclus refers his readers to what we assume to be his commentary on this dialogue, he at one point simply says, ‘my notes on the palinode’ (in Remp. 2,12,1–5). So Proclus’ attention in that work was clearly focused on the palinode. Moreover, Hermias’ classmate took the Phaedrus to have a high relevance to the theological project of the Platonic Theology. The citations of the Phaedrus in the Platonic Theology are outnumbered only by citations of the Timaeus. They eclipse citations even of the Parmenides. So Proclus clearly took this dialogue to be one highly relevant to the understanding of Plato’s account of the various ranks of gods. Hermias similarly treats the palinode in greater detail than any other part of Plato’s dialogue. But as we shall see, even within the palinode, some passages prompt more detailed and extensive exegesis than others. The pattern of this detailed commentary reveals the sense in which the Neoplatonists took the Phaedrus to be particularly concerned with gods. Moreover, much of Hermias’ exegetical energy is expended in pursuit of showing that Socrates’ poetic description of the gods in the palinode is consistent with the teachings of two other inspired poet-theologians: Orpheus and Homer.2 The extent of Hermias’ theological preoccupation in the Phaedrus becomes clear when we consider some facts about the structure of his commentary. This volume of our translation of Hermias’ commentary resumes the exegesis of Socrates’ palinode from Phaedrus 245E2, where Socrates makes the transition from the argument that all soul is immortal and indestructible. It ends with Socrates’ prayer to Eros – an episode that concludes the palinode at 257B6. Before turning to a general description of Hermias’ interpretation of the palinode, it will perhaps be useful to rehearse the structure of Socrates’ speech since Hermias’ audience would have known it very, very well.3 A. 243E9–245A8 Introduction and the four kinds of madness B. 245B1–C4 Transition to the nature of soul C. 245C5–246A2 Proof of the soul’s immortal and indestructible nature as arkhê of motion

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D 246A3–D5 The structure or idea of the soul E. 246D6–247C2 The celestial procession of twelve divine souls led by Zeus F. 247C3–E6 Description of the place outside the heavens G. 248A1–E3 Descent of human souls and the laws governing their initial incarnation H. 248E3–249D3 The temporal periods for the cycles of incarnation I. 249D4–250E1 Return to the topic of erotic madness – memory and the sight of beauty J. 250E1–252C2 The corporeal experience of love for those who have become corrupt K 252C3–C6 The corporeal experience of love for those who are not corrupted L. 253C7–254B5 The horses’ response to visible beauty M. 254B5–255A1 The charioteer’s struggle with the horses in their response to visible beauty N. 255A1–256A6 The response of the beloved to the lover and the backflow of beauty O. 256A7–E2 The lives and afterlives of philosophic lovers versus lovers of honour P. 256E3–257A2 Summation of the benefit of erotic madness Q. 257A3–B6 Concluding prayer to Eros Hermias’ commentary is divided into three books. The division between Book 1 and Book 2 roughly matches the start of the palinode (244A3), while Book 3 begins with the return to the topic of erotic madness at 249D4 (section I above). The page extent of the three books is roughly equivalent with the longest (Book 3) exceeding the shortest (Book 1) by only 13 pages. But the division of these roughly equivalent books into sections is radically different. Book 2 contains only 49 sections, while the portion of Book 3 that deals with the remainder of the palinode contains 98. So Hermias’ commentary devotes nearly half of its pages to exegesis of the palinode (243E9–257B6) – an episode that takes up roughly a quarter of the pages in Plato’s dialogue. Moreover, within that exegesis, the interpretation of 246A3–249D3 (sections D–H above) is the most detailed. The treatment of subsequent lemmata in Book 3 is far, far

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more abbreviated. Nor does the interpretation have the same synthesising scope as witnessed in Book 2. After the comments on 249D3, Hermias’ text sort of runs out of steam. When we look at the content of that part of Plato’s dialogue, the reason becomes clear. In this part of the work, Socrates describes divine souls – their nature and their activities. We can draw a useful parallel with the dialogues in the Iamblichean curriculum that precede Symposium and Phaedrus – that is, Sophist and Statesman. It may strike modern readers of Plato as odd that these should be considered dialogues on nature. But when we look at the patterns of citation in the extant works of the Neoplatonic commentators, we can see that they are overwhelmingly focused on relatively short segments of these dialogues. In the case of the Sophist, we can see that the Neoplatonists paid a great deal of attention to the description of the sophist as a maker of images – a sub-lunary demiurge.4 In the case of the Statesman, nearly all citations deal with the myth of cosmic reversal.5 These are dialogues ‘on nature’ in the sense that they contain relatively short episodes that admitted of an interpretation in these terms. Similarly, the Phaedrus is a ‘theological’ dialogue because at several points it describes gods both within and beyond the heavens. Of course, the Phaedrus discusses many other things too and most of them receive comment in Hermias’ work. But the theological content gets the lion’s share of attention and this surely explains the Neoplatonists’ categorisation of this dialogue as ‘theological’.

2. Hermias’ reading strategies So how should a reader make sense of the theology that is putatively revealed in Plato’s dialogue? Hermias’ reading of the palinode in the Phaedrus often, but not inevitably, falls into a certain pattern. Frequently he focuses on a term that he regards as particularly important and in many cases this isolated term or phrase is one that is not regarded by contemporary commentators on Plato’s dialogues as particularly meaningful. The exegesis of these key terms frequently leads on to a division or mapping of either the text itself or some aspect of reality that Hermias takes the text to be concerned with. Finally, Hermias often aligns or relates the ensuing division to other Platonic texts. So while the narrative arc of Hermias’ commentary is guided by the discourse of Socrates,

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within that narrative arc we frequently find this pattern of isolated term, exegesis into a division, and inter-textual relations.

(a) Illustration 1: The form of the soul When Socrates pivots from the argument for the immortality of soul to his description of what the soul is like at 246A2, he uses a Greek word that is, in many contexts, properly translated as ‘form’ (idea). But in this specific context it is likely to mean no more than ‘structure’ or perhaps – relating idea to its root in the verb ‘to see’ (idein) – the way it looks, metaphorically speaking. Plato’s Socrates goes on to tell us that the soul looks like a charioteer driving a team of two horses. Hermias, however, sees idea here in a technical sense. This naturally raises a question: if Socrates is now shifting to discussing the soul’s form (in the technical sense), what aspect of the soul was he discussing prior to this? The sense of priority is not merely that of the order of discussion. It is assumed that the order of discussion must mirror the metaphysical order of the things under discussion. If the description of the soul as a winged chariot team describes the soul’s form, then – by Hermias’ lights – the previous discussion of the soul’s immortality must have been about something prior to the soul’s form and this could only be the soul’s one (126,17–21). Hermias reconciles the order of metaphysical and textual priority by insisting that the immortality demonstration (245C5–46A2) concerns ‘the one of the soul’. The soul’s own one is less expressive of plurality than its form. The soul’s form is – at least in contrast to the soul’s one – more pluralised and is characterised by Hermias as a one-many or a unity-in-plurality. The more pluralised character of the soul’s form is presumably meant to explain why Socrates now characterises the idea of the soul in terms of the charioteer and the two horses. So Hermias has promoted what is very probably a non-technical use of one of Plato’s words for ‘form’ into a technical one and in light of this promotion reads the presence of ‘the one of the soul’ into Plato’s text. Hermias ingeniously connects the soul’s one with its form through its definition. At 125,19 we are told that the soul is ‘an incorporeal, self-moved substance capable of knowing things’. Now, the demonstration of the soul’s immortality proceeds – at least on Hermias’ reading – through two demonstrative syllogisms that share a common premiss, C1

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C1: Soul is self-moved. Combining this premiss with other premisses for the A-syllogism yields A1: All that is self-moved is perpetually moved. A2: All that is perpetually moved is immortal. So, soul is immortal. Combining C1 with the premisses of the B-syllogism yields B1: Everything self-moved is a first principle or arkhê of motion. B2: Every first principle of motion is ungenerated. B3: All that is ungenerated is imperishable. B4: all that is imperishable is immortal. So, the soul is immortal. Selected terms from these demonstrations are chosen to illuminate the soul’s one – the concentrated cause of all these features. The soul’s one is self-moved and in virtue of this is also perpetually moved and immortal. These latter features stand to the self-moved as the self-moved stands to the unmoved – an unmoved first principle which is prior to all life and movement (126,26). So in the triad: self-moved, perpetually-moved, and immortal, the self-moved is first. What is immortal, then, is closer to the lifeless, material things that are moved-by-another or hetero-motive. After all, immortality – what is athanatos – is a privation or lack of mortality, just as what is lifeless and hetero-motive is characterised by what it lacks. This leaves ‘perpetually moved’ as a middle term in this triad. Having discovered this ordered triad implicit within the one of the soul, Hermias is then free to correlate its elements with three other significant triads. The first of these, naturally, is the triad of the charioteer, the noble horse and the unruly horse which we find in the palinode itself. Beyond that, however, we find a correlation with the constituents out of which the World Soul is constructed in the Timaeus. Finally, we find that the Iamblichean threefold division between substance, power, and activity looms large in the interpretation of the palinode. This last division is a staple of later Platonism and structures Iamblichus’ own account of the soul in his De Anima. Proclus’ exegesis of the psychogony in the Timaeus similarly locates this threefold division first in the Demiurge’s blending of the ingredients of the World Soul from the divisible and indivisible

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kinds of Being, Sameness and Difference (the soul’s substance, Timaeus 35A1– B1); then in the powers of circles of the Same and the Different (Timaeus 36C6–D7); and finally in the animating and cognitive activities of the World Soul (Timaeus 36D8–37C5). Hermias similarly supposes that it frames the textual division of the Phaedrus. The argument for immortality corresponds to the soul’s substance, while Phaedrus 246A6–B4 concerns the soul’s powers (symbolised by the charioteer and horses). Hermias supposes that 246B6 marks a transition to Socrates’ discussion of the soul’s activities (135,15–19). The correlations between these triads are not a simple one-to-one matching, for Hermias argues by elimination for the conclusion that the charioteer and horses must be understood in terms of the soul’s powers – not its activities or substance (127,10–20). So, when we relate the charioteer and the horses to the great kinds or megista genê mobilised in the soul’s construction in Timaeus, the charioteer is correlated with power of Being, while the noble horse is correlated with the power of the circle of the Same, and finally the less noble horse is correlated with the power of the circle of the Different (128,24–9). In addition to the correlations noted above, Hermias adds that we can also read the image of the charioteer and horses in terms of cognitive powers that are familiar from the Republic, matching the charioteer with intellect or nous (whose activity is, of course, noêsis), the better horse with discursive thought or dianoia, and the worse horse with opinion or doxa. It is also possible to shift the centre of interpretive attention up a notch to the soul’s highest union with the intelligibles and the gods – the soul’s one. Having made this shift, both the charioteer and the better horse can be seen as ‘always longing for the intelligibles’, while the less noble horse ‘attains them only by inference and division’. Alternatively, we can shift down to read the image at the level of the power of opinion, in which case the charioteer becomes discursive thought or dianoia, the better horse opinion that longs for discursive thought, and the lesser horse corresponds to ‘the power that longs to govern lower things’. These correlations are further complicated by the fact that Hermias takes Socrates to be describing the nature of both divine and human souls in these initial stages of the palinode. This, of course, is not unreasonable since the myth of the Phaedrus does, in fact, describe the souls of the gods as likewise composed of a charioteer and horses. The Athenian school gives all souls, both human and divine, vehicles and the Platonic licence for this comes from the

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Phaedrus, as well as the Timaeus.6 While the vehicles of divine souls contain only the highest forms or first principles of the irrational soul, humans are composed of both an immortal and rational soul and the irrational and mortal soul that is created for them by the Younger Gods at Timaeus 42D–E. When we descend to consider the image in relation to the irrational aspects of the human soul, then the charioteer aligns – not with reason or logismos – but rather with opinion, while the better and worse horses correspond to the more familiar spirited and appetitive parts of the soul from the Republic (130,31–2). Hermias concludes the intertextual connections of the Phaedrus’ charioteer and horses with a largely undeveloped gesture towards the Epinomis – a foundational text for all subsequent Platonic theories of daimons and other beings intermediate between humans and gods.7 Hermias claims that the identity of the charioteer and the horses changes depending upon the spheres and elements involved (131,3–9). The idea is not developed, but it seems that we are intended to see the image from the Phaedrus differently depending on whether we are thinking of souls that are angelic, daemonic, or heroic. The first phase of Hermias’ exegesis thus conforms to the pattern indicated above. The occurrence of the Greek word ‘idea’ at Phaedrus 246A2 seems to him to demand a reading that contrasts the soul’s form with some prior topic of discussion – the soul’s one. This, in turn, leads Hermias to impose a division or framework upon Plato’s text. Elements within this framework are subsequently correlated with other divisions in other Platonic dialogues or in the Platonic tradition more widely. Hermias’ (or Syrianus’) interpretive ingenuity is exhibited in this sequence of (a) finding a key phrase in the text and following the alleged implications of its presence, (b) integrating these implications into some view about the structure of the dialogue, and finally (c) relating these insights to other dialogues.

(b) Illustration 2: The lowered wings The Greek word ‘hupopteros’ provides a somewhat similar example of how a single word on Plato’s part can lead to creative interpretation by Hermias. In this case, the isolated word similarly reinforces a textual division, but it does

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not really prompt Hermias to seek to align the Phaedrus with other Platonic dialogues. Plato uses both hupopteros and pteros (and cognate terms) to mean ‘winged’ or ‘feathered’. The second is by far more common, but there are two occurrences of the first form. There is, however, no real reason to think that these are anything other than synonyms in Plato. Hermias, however, is keen to draw a contrast between one of the uses of hupopteros and Plato’s more common vocabulary for ‘winged’. (He ignores the second occurrence of hupopteros.) When he first introduces the winged horses and charioteers that exhibit the form of all souls at 246A7, Plato writes ‘hupopteros’. Shortly thereafter, he describes the chariot of the great leader Zeus as winged with the use of ptêros – without the hupo- prefix (246E5). Hermias supposes that some significance must attach to this different vocabulary and uses his account of that difference in terminology to shed light on the long-standing question of the soul’s descent. As noted above, there was a disagreement between Plotinus and subsequent Platonists about whether the soul ever really descended from on high. Among those who rejected Plotinus’ ‘unfallen soul’ there was also a dispute about the nature of the descent.8 Was the soul changed in its substance when it entered the realm of Becoming? Did it lose some of its powers? Or did it retain those powers, even if their exercise or activity was impeded by embodiment? Hermias’ view is the last of these options and he uses hupopteros at 246A7 as another piece of evidence for its correctness (131,10–31). This word can be used at 246A7 because the image of the winged chariot can be applied to all souls – whether human or divine. Sometimes, however, the wings of human souls are lowered. (That is alleged to be the force of the hupo in hupopteros.) We always have the power of the soul’s wings, which is the power of ascent. But, unlike the gods, our power of ascent is not always actualised. When Plato says later at 251B7 ‘for formerly it was winged’, Hermias takes this to mean that its wings are lowered: its power of ascent is still present, but cannot now be actualised until it is nourished by sensible beauty which prompts recollection of the sights seen above. Zeus is described, therefore, as having a winged chariot because the powers of gods are always actual. The success of this interpretive stratagem (as Hermias would doubtless have seen it) makes it plausible that the textual division between substance, power, and activity noted in the previous section is really present in Plato. In

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the distinction between substance or form, powers and activities, the Phaedrus’ image of the wing corresponds to a power, while the journeys undertaken by winged souls correspond to activities. Plato’s deliberate use of hupopteros alerts the sufficiently discerning reader to his real position on the descent of the soul.

(c) Illustration 3: The inventory of lives Hermias’ adventures in inter-textual connections between the Phaedrus and other Platonic dialogues are not inevitably prompted by casual variants in vocabulary like the distinction between hupopteros and pteros or the presence of the word idea. Sometimes the questions emerge quite naturally from the contents of the different dialogues. In some cases, the resolution of the question about the relation of the Phaedrus to other dialogues exhibits Hermias’ creativity. Phaedrus 248D2–E3 lists a series of nine lives into which souls who descend into Becoming may be initially incarnated. Those who have glimpsed the most of the intelligibles will (of course!) enter into the birth of a man who is to be a philosopher or a lover of beauty. Second place is the life of a lawful king and so on through to the tyrant who comes ninth. This notion of a range of lives or ways of life on offer to souls immediately recalls the choice of lives in the myth of Er in Republic 618A–619D. Both Hermias and Proclus address the relation between the selection of lives depicted there, where souls freely choose the lives that they will go on to live in their incarnated state, with the assignment of lives here at the initial incarnation.9 The question of the relation between these two texts is obvious to any reader who knows both so it is perhaps unsurprising that the Neoplatonic interpreters of both dialogues should address it. Both Proclus and Hermias distinguish the choice of lives in the two dialogues in the same way.10 The Phaedrus rewards souls in their initial incarnation in proportion to their achievement in viewing intelligible reality. The Republic’s choice of lives involves souls who have lived in the realm of Becoming already in previous incarnations. In the former, we see the operation of the law of Adrasteia. In the latter, souls choose wisely or unwisely not only among a much wider range of more specific forms of life, but, in addition, these lives come with fortunes or fated events attached to them. These fortunes constitute something rather like the ‘fine print’ in what each soul selects. The

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soul who quickly grasps the life of the tyrant may realise, prior to his drinking from the river of forgetfulness, that he is also fated to experience terrible things, like eating his own children (Rep. 619B7–C1). While this connection between the Phaedrus and the Republic is obvious enough, there is another puzzle about the two dialogues that is less obvious and it is one that Hermias takes up at 172,4. What is the relation between the spectrum of psychic constitutions in the Republic and the nine kinds of life into which a soul may be initially incarnated according to the Phaedrus? The Republic treats the philosophical, timocratic, oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical ways of life as the result of different relations among the three parts of the soul: reason, spirit, and appetite. So one might reasonably suppose that the permutations among the psychic parts determine the kinds of lives that are possible. But the Phaedrus’ list of nine ways of life does not easily map onto the five lives of the Republic. Hermias’ response to this (172,4–175,12) is twofold. First he implicitly introduces a fourth part of the soul, alongside reason, spirit, and appetite. Second, he makes some lives imitations of others. The first four lives in the Phaedrus list (at least as Hermias explains them) are as follows 1. 2. 3. 4.

The philosophical The kingly or military The political or commercial The gymnastic and medical

These lives result from the soul living ‘in accordance with’ (kata) one of four psychic parts or aspects: reason, spirit, appetite, or nature (phusis). In the case of these lives, the person lives in accordance with one of these parts, but with reason in charge. The additional part that is not familiar from the Republic is nature or the principle of the body. The person who dedicates himself to this part of the soul (with reason in charge, of course) conveniently aligns with practitioners of the sciences of the body: gumnastikê or physical training and medicine. For the Neoplatonists, nature is the final form of life that derives from the One. Below nature in the order of being, there is only matter. So it marks a kind of end point. So how does Hermias manage the remaining five ways of life? The next life identified in Plato’s text is the life of ritual and prophecy – the telestic or mantic life. Hermias uses the fact that nature is the final living

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emanation from the One to his advantage here. The life below the one that is lived in accordance with nature has no power of its own. So it must turn back upon the gods for its power – just as the person who plays the role of the seer turns to the gods for his or her power of seeing the future. Hence the fifth, telestic life corresponds to the phase of reversion in the metaphysics of remaining, procession, and reversion. Hermias is quick to point out that the ritualistic and prophetic life here is not the kind that involves one of the kinds of divinely inspired madness. After all, it is the philosopher – who is also characterised as a lover of beauty and poetical at 248D3 – who shares directly in the divine gift of madness. Rather, the telestic life that is in fifth place is one that involves the human skill of ritual purification or divination.11 Hermias thus draws a line between the divine gifts of ritual and prophecy at Phaedrus 244B ff. and the fifth-placed life. The remaining four lives are: 6. 7. 8. 9.

Poet or some other kind of imitator Craftsman or farmer Sophist or demagogue Tyrant

All these lives Hermias characterises as like imitations or images (mimêtikos kai eidôlikos) of those that ‘come before them’ (173,1–3) although, contrary to what you might initially expect, it appears that he actually means only of the first two of the initial four, the sixth and seventh being ‘true imitations’, the eighth and ninth imitating their models ‘for the worse’. The sixth and seventh are distinguished from one another by the manner of imitation. The poet is expressly said to imitate the philosopher and the king by means of words, while the craftsman imitates them by deeds. So each of these two ‘true imitators’ seems to have two paradigms: both the philosopher and the king. Nothing is explicitly said of poets imitating the lives that are in third or fourth place. Hermias merely notes that the imitators involved in the sixth way of life are ‘three removes from the truth’ and include not only poets, but also painters (173,12–16). However, when Hermias expands on what it means for the seventh-ranked lives to imitate ‘those before them’ his brief remarks suggest that he has philosophers and kings as his paradigms for craftsmen and farmers. The former, in their wood working or leather working ‘bring things into being

Introduction

13

from non-being’, while the latter manage nature to bring forth produce or animals that are healthy. The image of the statesman as shepherd of the hornless, bipedal herd of humans at Statesman 267A–C seems likely to be a salient Platonic touchstone for the idea that farmers correctly imitate the secondranked kingly life. The last-placed lives are imitative too, but not truly so since they include ‘dissimilarity’. Here too, the eighth and ninth lives are delineated by the familiar contrast between words (sophists and demagogues) and deeds (tyrants). Moreover, Hermias distinguishes the two lives subsumed in eighth place by their aims: while the sophist wants to be a teacher of virtue and of decent customary behaviour (nomos), the demagogue wants to orate to the mob. Perhaps, then, Hermias supposes the sophist to be a defective imitator of the philosopher while the tyrant is a defective imitator of the king or statesman. In fact, this way of relating the four ways of life would align Hermias’ reading of the Phaedrus conveniently with the conclusion of the Sophist. There both the sophist and the demagogue are people who belong to the sub-branch of the imitative art that has merely opinion and not knowledge. What distinguishes sophists from demagogues is whether they address themselves to the many in long speeches or to private individuals in short speeches. Immediately prior to the concluding summary, the Eleatic Stranger distinguishes the philosopher from the sophist and the demagogue from the statesman (268B–C). Hermias’ attentiveness to the potential for connecting Phaedrus 248D–E to other dialogues is matched by this attentiveness to the details of the text itself. When Socrates describes the first of the nine lives, he doesn’t simply describe it as that of the philosopher but includes other options, saying that the soul that is to be born into it will be planted ‘into the seed of a man who will become a lover of wisdom or of beauty or [someone] who will be cultivated in the arts or prone to erotic love’.12 The second- to fifth-ranked lives are characterised in terms of two options – for instance ‘lawful king or military commander’. The same holds true for all the lives listed except for the last: the tyrant. Moreover, Socrates’ method of enumeration changes midway through his list of nine, from the use of accusative to the dative case. Hermias uses all these facts as clues to which specific intelligibles the souls were able to see prior to their descent into bodies (173,32 f.). Recall that at 247D6 Socrates says that the souls who follow gods will see Justice, Moderation, and Wisdom in the place above the heavens. Hermias

14

Introduction

seizes on the presence of Wisdom here to suppose that the soul who has seen this will enter into the life of a philosopher. While Beauty is not mentioned in the triad of sights seen at 247D6, it is subsequently contrasted with Justice and Moderation at 250B1–C1 in terms of the obviousness of its earthly imitations. So Hermias – not unreasonably – assumes that souls will have glimpsed it above. It is the vision of this intelligible that is distinctive of those who enter into the other options enumerated under the first-ranked life. Hermias reduces what seems to be four options – ‘a lover of wisdom or of beauty or [someone] who will be cultivated in the arts or prone to erotic love’ – to three by dint of treating the cultivated (mousikos) person and the erotic person as specific ways in which a soul can be a lover of beauty. While the philosopher has glimpsed Wisdom above, the two kinds of lover have seen Beauty. What specific intelligible vision distinguishes those who, having seen less, enter into the second-ranked life of a lawful king or military commander? Hermias mobilises etymological reasoning to argue that it must be some of the five greatest kinds or megista genê from the Sophist. He relates the word for ‘king’ (basileus) to base (basis) and stability (to hedraion), thus confirming that souls who enter the second rank have seen Rest. But kings and military commanders initiate (kinein) things and generally get stuff done. So they have similarly seen Motion. In their treating all as the same before the law and in fending off alien intruders, we can see in the lives of the king or the military commander the evidence that their souls have glimpsed Sameness and Difference. Hermias cannot – or at least does not – sustain this analysis at length. Those who enter the third-ranked lives of political and commercial activity either have partial views of what the kingly soul has seen or are more concerned with Justice. The fourth-ranked life concerned with medicine or physical training has seen Health or the Body Itself, while the fifth-ranked life of mantic or telestic activity belongs to souls who have viewed the ‘elevating gods’. Recall that the lives ranked sixth to ninth are regarded as images of the first four – a fact that Hermias presumably supposes is signalled by the shift from accusative to dative case in their enumeration. Those that are true imitators have seen more of Sameness, while those that imitate their paradigms but with an admixture of dissimilarity witnessed Difference prior to their descent into Becoming. Finally, Hermias subjects the nine ways of life to a numerological interpretation and aligns it with the twelve gods who lead the souls in their

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15

tour of the intelligibles. While Hermias notes other possible divisions, he spends some time in considering the nine lives as three triads. The first triad (composed of the philosophical life, the kingly or military life, and the political or commercial life) is Zeusian since Zeus is a philosopher, a king, and the statesman of the cosmos. But this Zeusian triad can also be understood in terms of Athena (philosophy), Ares (war), and Hera (royalty). Somewhat less plausibly, the second triad is Apollonian since it includes the mantic role (Apollo) and physical training – a role that Hermias connects with competition and thus with Hermes. The third triad belongs to Hephaestus since it is concerned with the making of appearances. This complex interpretive confection is not likely to win the approval of many modern interpreters. But this example, along with the previous ones, illustrates the way in which Hermias uses the text of the Phaedrus as the occasion for the performance of ‘Platonic literacy’ – the capacity to weave together threads from this dialogue with other dialogues or to accepted Platonic principles (e.g. the metaphysics of reversion) in such a way as to manifest the non-discursive wisdom or noetic insight that the Platonic curriculum was thought to cultivate. After all, in the Platonic curriculum, the Phaedrus is supposed to communicate the ‘theoretic virtues’ (which are closely allied to nous and to noetic activity). More specifically, the dialogue comprises the theological aspect of the theoretic virtues. It thus seems likely that what the Phaedrus was thought to teach could not be set out as a simple body of information that could be conveyed discursively. So a dazzling performance of synthesis in the context of teaching perhaps served as an external sign of an inward condition – the possession of these highest levels of virtue. If this is so, then we should treat Hermias’ commentary in something more like the manner in which we treat the encomia of Themistius or Julian the Apostate. We can, of course, ask whether Themistius’ Oration 1 accurately describes the deeds and character of its subject, the Emperor Constantius. But if we only asked that, we would deprive ourselves of other important reflections on how the oration demonstrates Themistius’ rhetorical and philosophical education or the effect that it likely produced in its intended audience. Similarly, if we simply measure Hermias’ reading of Plato’s dialogue against the standard of likely correpondence to Plato’s authorial intent, we overlook the way of life in which it was produced, as well as the moral or intellectual goals of that way of living. So we urge

16

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readers to ask not what Hermias can do for our understanding of Plato’s Phaedrus, but ask instead how Hermias’ notes on this text give insight into the way Platonism was performed in late antiquity.

3. Competing theotaxonomies for the Phaedrus? While Hermias’ scholia constitute the only surviving sustained work on the Phaedrus, we have some reason to believe that his companion, Proclus, either wrote a commentary on the work or at least an extended essay in which he interpreted the palinode in detail.13 Though this work by Proclus is lost to us, we are reasonably well informed about his understanding of the palinode by virtue of things that he says about the Phaedrus in his Platonic Theology and the commentary on the Parmenides. While Proclus certainly has things to say about the order of lives and reincarnation in both the Republic commentary and the Timaeus commentary, these remarks do not stand out as radically different from what we find in Hermias’ Phaedrus commentary. Nonetheless Proclus’ treatment of other elements from Phaedrus 246D–247E in the Platonic Theology at least seems to diverge in important respects from the account that Hermias provides. Both Hermias and Proclus isolate similar features of the text to interpret. It matters to both of them to determine which order of gods Zeus, who leads the procession, belongs to. It matters to them why Socrates identifies twelve gods, and what Hestia’s remaining behind signifies. They similarly isolate triadic aspects of Plato’s text for symbolic interpretation. It matters to both philosophers how we should understand the relation between the place beyond the heavens, the sub-celestial arch, and the Ouranos or heaven. Both Proclus and Hermias give detailed interpretation of the nature of the place beyond the heavens: that it is true Being that is without colour, without shape, and intangible (247C6–7). Each is concerned to integrate these textual elements into a theotaxonomy – an account of the kinds of divinities under discussion and their relation to both superior orders of gods and those divine beings that come after them. The theotaxonomies that result from Hermias’ and Proclus’ common interpretive concerns at least appear rather different though. Hermias’ reading

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17

of many of these key elements correlates them with divinities in the Orphic tradition, while references to the Chaldean Oracles are largely absent. By contrast, Proclus’ reading of the same elements in the Phaedrus yields a theotaxonomy that identifies some of them with what he calls ‘intelligibleintellective’ gods and ‘hypercosmic-encosmic’ gods.14 This vocabulary is not found in Hermias. Moreover, Proclus often attempts to correlate the gods described by this new vocabulary with elements in the Chaldean Oracles.15 In what follows we will summarise and contrast the theotaxonomies we find in Proclus and in Hermias. Saffrey and Westerink, in volumes 4 and 5 of their edition of Proclus’ Platonic Theology, have given the question of the relation between the two authors the most consideration. Unlike us, they are happy to assign the views expressed in Hermias simply to Syrianus – a subject on which we think it is better to remain agnostic. With respect to at least some of the divergences, Saffrey and Westerink supposed that Proclus went well beyond his teacher, Syrianus. Of course, they credit Syrianus with significant innovation in the interpretation of the Phaedrus too. While Iamblichus and Theodore of Asine had sought to correlate elements of Phaedrus 246E–247E with higher principles in their metaphysical systems, they assign to Syrianus the idea of rigorously aligning gods in the Orphic genealogy with distinct features of Plato’s myth. Proclus, on their view, takes this insight yet further and aligns Syrianus’ Orphic Phaedrus theotaxonomy with the Athenian school’s interpretation of the Parmenides and, moreover, with the Chaldean Oracles.

(a) Proclus’ theotaxonomies of the Phaedrus (i) The intelligible-intellective gods Proclus takes some elements of the palinode as evidence for an order of gods that is intermediate between those that are intelligible and those that are intellectual. This intermediate order is called ‘intelligible and intellectual’ and it forms the subject of Book 4 of the Platonic Theology.16 Elsewhere Proclus indicates convergence with the views of his teacher Syrianus on the fact that this order of gods is discussed in the Phaedrus. Divine Knowledge is celebrated also by the Socrates of the Phaedrus (247D), when he pictures the ascent of the universal souls to the intellectual and intelligible orders, and relates that they contemplate there Justice itself and

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Moderation itself and Knowledge itself, being joined in essence with the median rank of these gods; and there, he also declared, is Truth, which proceeds from the intelligibles and shines intelligible light upon all the median classes of gods, and he linked that knowledge to that Truth. These things were fully discussed by my teacher and myself in our investigations of the divine insights of Socrates in the Phaedrus. (in Parm. 944,6-18, trans. Morrow and Dillon 1987)

Within Platonic Theology Book 4, Chapters 4–26 consist in an elucidation of the three triads of intelligible-intellective gods identified on the basis of Proclus’ reading of elements within the palinode, and in particular 247B-248C. The first triad of intelligible-intellective gods is identified with the ‘place beyond the heavens’ or ‘super-celestial place’ (Phaedrus 247C3–7) seen by the divine souls standing atop ‘the vault of heaven’ (247B7–C1). The place below the vault of heaven – hupouranios apsis or ‘sub-celestial vault’ as it is often translated – is the third triad of the intelligible-intellective order.17 Appropriately enough, the heaven – or more specifically its circulation – which lies intermediate between the place beyond the heaven and the arch under it, is the middle triad.18 Proclus gives attention to aspects of Plato’s text that concern each. Thus, the description of the place beyond the heavens in privative terms (‘colourless, shapeless, and intangible’, 247C6–7) is treated as a kind of apophatic description of this triad in Platonic Theology 4, Chapter 12, while the Forms that the souls see (Justice, Moderation, and Knowledge) are treated as positive affirmations about this triad in Chapters 13 and 14, as are ‘the plain of truth’ at 248B6, the ‘meadow’ and ‘the nourishment of souls’ (248C1–2) in Chapter 15. In the midst of this exegesis of the Phaedrus, Proclus spends a chapter correlating what he regards as Plato’s system of triads of intelligibleintellective gods with the teachings of the Chaldean Oracles.

(ii) The hypercosmic-encosmic gods Proclus interprets the text of the palinode at length again in Book 4 of the Platonic Theology in order to shed light on a different order of divinities. The exegesis of the Phaedrus in Platonic Theology Book 4 centres on quasi-locations at the very edge of the myth (so to speak). The intelligible-intellective gods are explained via the place beyond heaven, the heaven, and the arch below the heaven, as well as elements of the myth associated with these places. Book 6

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concentrates on the theological significance of Zeus and the other gods who lead the squadrons of souls up to these places and afford them the opportunity to see things beyond the heavens (246E4–247C2). It is important to remember that in the myth these gods are themselves souls. After all, they are depicted in Socrates’ speech as having a structure analogous to a charioteer driving a team of horses, just as human souls are. The divine souls differ from human souls, of course, in only having horses who are good in nature. Unlike human souls, they never fail to feast upon the sight of the intelligibles beyond the heaven, but they belong to the psychic order nonetheless. Accordingly, Chapters 15–24 of Book 6 of the Platonic Theology examine a class of divine souls19 that are simultaneously hypercosmic and encosmic. These hypercosmic-encosmic souls, like the intelligible-intellective gods, provide an intermediary between Proclus’ order of purely hypercosmic divinities and the encosmic gods equated with the stars and planets. The purely hypercosmic divinities are also called ‘leading gods’ and their role is to assimilate the visible cosmos and all that it contains to its intellectual causes. The Phaedrus does not figure as prominently in Proclus’ exegesis of this order of divinities as other Platonic dialogues do. However, having discussed the hypercosmic, leading gods in Platonic Theology 6, Chapters 1–14, Proclus turns to the intermediaries between the leading gods and the encosmic ones in Chapter 15. The justification for introducing these gods as intermediaries between the encosmic gods and those that are hypercosmic is based on the text of the Phaedrus itself. At 246B7–C2, the divinely possessed Socrates relates that soul, in one form or another, governs the entire cosmos. Yet the encosmic gods have individual allotments over which they exercise providence. Hence there must be, above the encosmic gods, an order of divine souls that are not so individualised in their providence. These are the hypercosmic-and-encosmic gods who are sometimes also called ‘liberated gods’. The distinctness of the hypercosmic-and-encosmic gods from the merely encosmic ones is established in Platonic Theology 6, Chapter 19 when Proclus clarifies the identity of the ‘great leader Zeus’ (Phaedrus 246E4). The Zeus in question cannot be among the intellectual or noeric gods, since that Zeus is identified with the Demiurge of the Timaeus and it is not possible that he should be coordinate with, or belong to the same rank as, Hestia as the Phaedrus suggests. Nor can the Zeus in question in the Phaedrus be a purely encosmic

20

Introduction

Zeus, for Socrates calls him the great leader. But when Diotima calls Eros a great daemon in the Symposium, Proclus insists that this means that Eros is above the other daemons. So, by parity of reasoning, if Socrates calls Zeus ‘great’ in the palinode of the Phaedrus, this must similarly place him above the encosmic gods. Yet it is not possible, Proclus argues, that we should make Zeus hypercosmic and the rest of the gods in the palinode encosmic, for then our twelve gods are not uniform and we really have eleven plus one – not twelve. The remaining alternative then, is that the gods in question belong to a rank of divinities that is both hypercosmic and encosmic. These mediate between the purely hypercosmic or leading gods and the purely encosmic ones. It is inevitable that, in a form of Platonism that locates its roots in Pythagoreanism, the fact that at Phaedrus 246E4–6 Socrates identifies twelve gods should occasion comment. Proclus claims that the number of liberated gods is, in fact, an unlimited plurality that is innumerable by human conceptions (PT 6, 85, 6–9). Yet the number twelve is fitting (prosêkein) to this order of divinities because it is a number that is complete or perfect. This practice of using what appears to be a determinate number symbolically is one that Proclus supposes that Plato also made use of in the Timaeus. On the one hand, there is a dividing of the souls ‘in number equal to the stars’ (Timaeus 41D8–E1). But then, subsequently to the Demiurge revealing to them the laws of fate, there is a sowing of the souls into the Earth, the Moon, and the other organs of time, i.e. the planets (42D4–5). But of course the stars are not the same in number as the planets. So Proclus is anxious not only to deny that any one-to-one matching is implied, but to regard these numbers as not the kind of thing that one counts on one’s fingers (PT 6, 86, 20–2). This, in general, is his approach to Platonic numbers, like the Timaeus’ Great Year, that other interpreters wish to calculate. Proclus thinks that it is better to consider these numbers symbolically. Even where he computes particular numbers, as in the case of the nuptial number in the Republic, he is keen to stress the non-literal, symbolic significance of the numbers arrived at. The symbolic significance of the twelve assigned to the gods of the Phaedrus is that of ‘all-perfect procession’ for, on the one hand, these gods mark the limit of the invisible and transcendent powers of the cosmos, on the other hand, they ride upon or preside over the celestial gods (PT 6, 86, 25–87, 3). Like Hermias, Proclus distinguishes Zeus and Hestia among the twelve gods and represents their sum as two monads and a decad (PT 6, 85, 19–23).

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But he also relates their number to the Assimilative or Leading gods that come prior to them.20 Within the Assimilative order Proclus distinguishes four subdivisions: 1) paternal or demiurgic; 2) prolific or generative; 3) elevating or responsible for reversion; 4) undefiled and protective. The twelve gods of the Phaedrus are divided into four groups of three corresponding to these four sub-divisions. Zeus is, of course, singled out at the head of the paternal order and reverts upon the prior causes of the Liberated gods. Hestia belongs to the undefiled order and corresponds to a being’s reversion upon itself. Each triad is ordered, with a monad at its head and an intermediate between this first term and the final term. As a result, we have the following groupings: Paternal

Prolific

Elevating

Guardian

Zeus Poseidon Hephaestus

Demeter Hera Artemis

Hermes Aphrodite Apollo

Hestia Athena Ares

We noted in the previous section that Proclus dedicates a chapter to aligning the intelligible-intellective gods with the teachings of the Oracles (PT 4, ch. 9). There is no similarly sustained interpretation of the hypercomic-encosmic order with the Oracles. Instead, we find pervasive quotation of and allusion to the Oracles throughout Book 6 of the Platonic Theology.21 While we find Orphic material used to elucidate the order of leading gods that is prior to the hypercosmic-encosmic order, it is not invoked in the chapters in which Proclus reveals the hypercosmic-encosmic gods hinted at in the Phaedrus.

(b) Hermias’ theotaxonomy in the Phaedrus Hermias’ commentary shows evidence of many of the same orders or ranks of divinities that Proclus’ work does. In particular at 139,31 we find the following orders: 1) intelligible, 2) intellectual, 3) hypercosmic, and 4) encosmic. This enumeration includes some members of Proclus’ ranks, but omits others and one of those omissions is particularly salient to each author’s exegesis of the twelve gods who are introduced at Phaedrus 247A2. As noted previously, Proclus inserts between the hypercosmic and encosmic gods a class of gods who are simultaneously hypercosmic-and-encosmic. By contrast, the theotaxonomy that Hermias aligns with the important elements of the myth in

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Phaedrus 246E-248E includes Orphic elements that are absent from Proclus’ treatment of the same text in Platonic Theology 4 and 6. It perhaps misses the point to become fixated upon differences in the presentations of the theotaxonomy among members of the Athenian School. Commenting on what he took to be Eduard Zeller’s22 fastidiousness in these matters, Michael Allen observed: Zeller’s . . . fretfulness stems from a commitment to consistency in an area where the Neoplatonists felt no need for it and where they projected alternate theotaxonomies on the assumption that a philosopher would find different arrangements suitable for different occasions. Indeed, they created a theistic algebra precisely because it enabled them to incorporate a large number of Greek or pseudo-Greek deities and subdeities; to accommodate the perennial controversies over who constituted the Olympian dodecade; and to experiment with a variety of divine relationships and thus elaborate on the basic Plotinian conception of the gods mediating the emanatory flow from the One down through the intellectual to the material world.23

This is a view of the construction of theotaxonomies that is consistent with our idea that the activity of commentary writing aims to develop a kind of ‘Platonic literacy’ not too different from late antique paideia. This involves, inter alia, the ability to improvise upon accepted ways of connecting sacred texts, such as those of Plato, Homer, and the Orphic poems. So in the course of outlining the Orphic theotaxonomy that Hermias presents in his exegesis of the Phaedrus, we will also consider how the text of the Phaedrus provides a suitable occasion for a performance of this synthesis and how it differs from the reading of Plato’s text that Proclus provides in his Platonic Theology. There may be doctrinal differences between Proclus and Hermias (or Syrianus) as well. But if one is willing to entertain the possibility that the commentaries provide evidence of performances of Platonic literacy, then it may be equally fruitful to consider the text of the Phaedrus as something like the score of a jazz standard like Summertime that different artists perform in different ways. In what follows, we pursue the idea of studying Platonic literacy by considering how Hermias’ reading mobilises the semantic affordances of Plato’s text and those that were regarded as Orphic. Among the Orphic gods classified in Hermias’ theotaxonomy, Phanes is the highest one that is discussed in any detail. He is elder to Zeus, to Zeus’ father

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Kronos, and to Zeus’ grandfather Ouranos (148,17–20). Hermias mentions in passing Orphic deities that are prior to Phanes, but this is for the purpose of equating Phanes with the tetrad. Ether will be the monad, Chaos the dyad, the Egg (for it is perfect) the Triad, and Phanes the tetrad – as Orpheus also says: ‘With four eyes, glancing hither and thither’. (144,15–17)

In Proclus’ theotaxonomy in his Cratylus commentary, Ether, Chaos, and the Egg are likewise prior to Phanes, but in between these we find the Robe and the Cloud, corresponding to the second intelligible triad of his Platonic system. Damascius’ presentation of the Orphic order also seems not to place Phanes in fourth place, so this presentation in Hermias seems to be tailored to make Phanes correspond to the tetrad – a number that figures conspicuously in Hermias’ interpretations of the twelve gods that Socrates discusses at Phaedrus 246E4–247A4. The particular salience of Phanes to the exegesis of the Phaedrus lies, first, in the fact that Phanes is a winged god (148,25). Given that the divine souls that lead the hosts upwards are likened to flying charioteers with horses, a satisfying reading of Plato’s text in relation to the Orphic theotaxonomy requires that Phanes be situated relative to them. Second, there is the association of Phanes with a source of illumination and thus with colour. When Socrates describes the super-celestial place at Phaedrus 247C, it is colourless and visible only to the mind. Phanes, in Hermias’ exegesis, ‘beams an intelligent light upon the intellective gods’ (159,12–13).24 As the source of this light, Phanes illuminates Ouranos first, while remaining himself ‘beyond colour’ (155,5–17). This alignment of Phanes with the colourlessness of the super-celestial place permits Hermias to perform a bit of interpretive virtuosity in relation to an Orphic fragment that seemingly identifies Phanes as visible light that is brightly coloured: as first-born nobody set eyes on him [sc. Phanes], save holy Night alone; all the others looked in amazement at an unexpected light in the ether; so brightly gleamed the colour (khroos) of immortal Phanes. (Bernabé fr. 123; Kern fr. 86)

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Since Phanes is prior to Ouranos and Ouranos is the first thing that is visible, his brightly gleaming colour cannot be light and colour in any visible sense. Situating the Orphic text in relation to the Phaedrus 246E6–7 triad of colourlessness, shapelessness, and invisibility allows the audience to see that Phanes’ intrinsic illumination is surely an intellectual – not a visible one – in spite of what the surface meaning of the Orphic verse might suggest to the uninitiated. Subordinate to Phanes, Hermias places the Nights. At least one of these seems to be, like Phanes, associated with the ‘super-celestial place’ of Phaedrus 247C3 (cf. 153,1), as well as the ‘plain of truth’ of 248B6 (cf. 153,27–154,4). Similarly, when the human souls that struggle up to the super-celestial place catch a glimpse of Justice, Moderation, and Knowledge at 247D6–7, Hermias interprets these too in terms of the Nights (161,7–20). There are three Nights corresponding to two of the typical three phases of emanation: one remains, while another goes forth (i.e. procession), but instead of reversion we have one that is intermediate between the others. The first of the Nights that remains is said to prophesy (and is thus aligned with Knowledge by Hermias), while the intermediate one is ‘reverent’ or aidoios (which Hermias equates with Moderation Itself). The third, which is presumably the one that goes forth, ‘brings Justice to birth’. Hermias’ commentary records that both he and Proclus asked questions of Syrianus about these Nights and their relative proximity to Justice, Moderation, and Knowledge – the sights glimpsed by souls gazing upon the super-celestial place. Proclus’ own use of the three Nights at in Tim. 3,88,18 (= Kern fr. 99) suggests a certain elasticity in the placement of these divinities in his own theotaxonomy.25 Below the Nights, Hermias presents three orders of gods: the order of Ouranos, the order of the Cyclopes, and the Hundred-handed Giants (155,2–3). Ouranos and Gê, or Heaven and Earth, emerge first from Phanes (155,5–6). Ouranos is illuminated by the light of Phanes, but is not to be identified with the Heaven in the sense of the visible universe or even its highest regions. Rather, Ouranos is an ‘intellective god’ who is the father of Kronos and grandfather of Zeus. Hermias uses the Orphic theotaxonomy as part of his argument that we should not understand the ‘many blessed sights’ and the pathways of the gods ‘within the heavens’ at Phaedrus 247A4–5 as referring to the visible heavens (149,19–24). The phrases ‘sub-celestial arch’ and ‘vault of

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heaven’ are significant for Hermias’ commentary (as they are for Proclus’ exegesis in his Platonic Theology). The identification of Ouranos or Heaven with the intellectual order of gods permits Hermias to justify a similarly nonspatial interpretation of the convex and concave surfaces of the heaven. These are not spatially defined places at the inner and outer limits of the visible heavens, but rather these quasi-locations signify the gods dependent upon, and so ‘below’ Ouranos and the all-embracing intellectual realm of Ouranos respectively (151,29–152,6). Hermias similarly takes the distinction between sights seen outside and inside the heaven in terms of this order of gods. Those that are ‘within the heaven’ are identified with ‘the realm of Kronos and the midmost manifestation (ekphaneia) of the intellective gods’ (152,22–24), since Kronos is the intermediate term in the sequence Ouranos-Kronos-Zeus. The Cyclopes and the Hundred-handed Giants who follow after the order of Ouranos play a relatively minor role in Hermias’ interpretation of Plato’s text. At 155,20–5, he uses their character to interpret the fact that the place beyond the heaven is ‘without shape’(Phaedrus 247C6). The Cyclopes, with their round eye, are identified as the first principle or arkhê of shape, while the Hundred-handers – here identified as Handworkers or tektonokheiroi rather than Hundred-handers or hekatonkheiroi as at 155,3 – are such as to perfect shape. Since the order of Ouranos which contains intellective gods is prior to the visible universe, so too the place beyond the heaven of Plato’s text is without shape. The Cyclopes, as first principles of shape, are the Orphic key to this insight. The interpretation of Socrates’ claim that the place beyond the heavens is ‘intangible’ (247C7) yields to a similar stratagem, but it is the Hundredhanders who are the key. The most detailed exegesis of Plato’s text through the Orphic theotaxonomy concerns Zeus as the ‘great leader’ of the twelve gods described at Phaedrus 246E4–247A4. The question of the identity of Zeus the great leader seems to be one posed and answered by Iamblichus, who identified Zeus with the Demiurge of the Timaeus.26 As is often the case with members of the Athenian school, Hermias seems reluctant to reject the reading of the divine Iamblichus outright. So he complicates the picture by introducing a plurality of Zeuses. There is, on the one hand, the transcendent, demiurgic monad who is rightly identified with Zeus. (If we may assume agreement with his classmate Proclus on this matter, then this transcendent Zeus is one that Hermias identifies as an

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intellective god – not a hypercosmic one.) In any event, the text of Plato’s Phaedrus must be understood to allude to a series of Zeuses on a lower level than the demiurgic one and only the first of this series is called Zeus. The other two are known as Poseidon and Pluto (142,25–9). Orphic authority for this notion of three Zeuses is not openly quoted at this point: the view of Zeus as triple is simply stated. When, a few lines later, Hermias provides ancient theological authority for this doctrine it is Homer to whom he turns quoting selectively from Iliad 15.187–95. There Poseidon notes that the three are all sons of Kronos and urges Zeus to keep to his third share of their father’s kingdom. But of course this is plausibly the very passage that Plato alludes to at Gorgias 526A when he discusses the three kingdoms of Zeus, Poseidon, and Pluto. This Platonic connection, moreover, is sufficient to remind his audience of Laws 715E8, where Plato clearly alludes to some ancient version of an Orphic verse well-known to members of the Athenian school: ‘Zeus the origin, Zeus the middle, all things result naturally from Zeus’ (Kern fr. 168, line 2). Indeed, his companion Proclus quotes exactly this line in relation to the Laws passage. Thus, at least for an audience that is well-versed in these texts, Hermias recruits Homer to the cause of Orphic theology by means of Plato’s Gorgias and Laws as middle terms. This recruitment is plausibly a kind of pressganging. As Manolea notes, while the Homeric poems portray Zeus as the most important of the gods, there is no evidence that he is triple or that Poseidon and Pluto are manifestations of Zeus.27 Nonetheless, connecting these various authors in this way is an impressive feat of Platonic paideia for an audience equipped to appreciate the performance. What then of the gods who follow the great leader, Zeus, at Phaedrus 246E5–247A2? Hermias’ explanation of this part of Plato’s text does not initially make reference to the Orphic taxonomy. Like Proclus, he divides the gods into four squadrons of three divinities each classified according to function. The group comprised of Zeus, Poseidon, and Pluto are, of course, demiurgic. Another group of all male gods is ‘protective’ (phrourêtikos), while two groups are made up entirely of female divinities: the life-producing and those responsible for reversion (epistreptikos). Hermias does not give us the membership of these groups, but we can tell by their sex segregation (143,20– 2) that the groups differ from the similar arrangement found in Proclus, namely:

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Paternal

Protective

Life-producing

Elevating

Zeus Poseidon Pluto

Hestia Athena Ares

Demeter Hera Artemis

Hermes Aphrodite Apollo

This divergence between Hermias and Proclus is probably not particularly important. Each is working with the factors of the number twelve (2 × 6 and 3 × 4). Hermias’ two groupings in terms of sex and in terms of function coincide exactly, while those of Proclus do not but are instead motivated by other considerations related to the particular gods in question. Orphic ideas enter into Hermias’ exegesis again when one considers ‘Why only twelve in the first place?’ After all, Hermias himself will shortly introduce an additional god (Dionysus) who might plausibly claim a thirteenth place in the list of very important divinities. But twelve’s completeness or perfection is confirmed not only by numerological considerations but by appeal to the four-eyed nature of Phanes (144,17). He forms a tetrad after the Ether as monad, Chaos as dyad, and the Egg as a perfect triad. This sort of complex interplay between purely numerological interpretation and justification by reference to theological authority seems to be Hermias’ preferred method. At 145,5–12 he is critical of interpretations that focus exclusively upon the properties of numbers in their attempts to understand the order of gods (e.g. making Poseidon third because of his trident). Rather, Hermias insists, we should look to the inspired theological texts in order to understand the powers of the gods. He then quotes Homer, Iliad 5,428–9 where Zeus says to Aphrodite ‘Not to you, my child, are given warlike deeds; instead, occupy yourself with the delightful business of marriage’. This sort of revelation from Homer the theologian, and not merely her sex, is presumably what justifies Hermias in assigning Aphrodite to the group of three life-giving goddesses. Abstracting from the welter of detail in Hermias’ theotaxonomy, the following patterns emerge. As Saffrey and Westerink argued, the identification of the key elements of the Phaedrus myth that stand in need of interpretation is shared with Proclus. Moreover, both authors reach across to other Platonic works to compare or contrast these elements in the Phaedrus with analogous or similar items in other dialogues. However, in Hermias, the extra-Platonic material that is used to illuminate Plato’s theology is Homeric and Orphic. The

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Oracles are absent. Moreover, while the Parmenides plays a very important role for Proclus’ theotaxonomy, Hermias invokes it only once in relation to his Orphic-Phaedran taxonomy. Proclus’ vocabulary of intelligible-intellective or hypercosmic-encosmic is absent, but the commitment to a coherent and uninterrupted order from higher and more universal orders of divinities to lower and more particularised ones is also visible in Hermias.

(c) Conclusion: The context of performance Saffrey and Westerink’s understanding of the similarities and differences between Hermias’ and Proclus’ treatment of the palinode is basically doctrinal. They suppose that while Hermias’ commentary conveys the philosophical doctrines of their teacher, Syrianus, Proclus’ Platonic Theology conveys a picture of Proclus’ development of these underlying ideas to new levels of complexity and higher degrees of synthesis with other Platonic dialogues. Such an understanding presupposes that these philosophical texts exist principally in order to record the author’s philosophical doctrines or – as Saffrey and Westerink suppose – in the case of Hermias, to record his teacher’s doctrines. Doctrines are, of course, crucial to post-sceptical Platonisms, but – given the role of non-discursive awareness or noêsis in the post-Hellenistic tradition – we should perhaps be cautious of falling into thinking that they are exhaustive of Platonism. As the various lives of Neoplatonist philosophers show, being a Platonist involved more than learning and accepting a body of doctrine. Indeed, according to their own doctrine, the highest levels of ethical (and thus cognitive) achievement are characterised by the Platonist’s relation to entities whose natures outrun the limitations of language and discursive thought.28 Moreover, we know from their doctrines that the exegesis of Plato’s dialogues was conceived as a pathway to the achievement of the cognitive-ethical virtues that enabled these non-discursive epiphanies. Elsewhere we have recommended the view that the teaching contexts from which our Plato commentaries emerge might be thought of as performances of what we called ‘Platonic literacy’ – the capacity to creatively synthesise the texts of the Platonic canon so as to live in and through the metaphors and images authorised by those texts.29 This kind of Platonic literacy we take to be analogous in important ways to late antique paideia. Paideia was the product of the intensive literary

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and rhetorical training that formed the shared background of much of the social and intellectual elite of the late Roman Empire. The beneficiary of such an education could work quotations from Homer into his written and oral communications with other elites in ways that were novel, clever, and suited to the context. Paideia was an ability that was performed throughout life as a way, inter alia, of making a claim to treatment of a kind befitting one’s station as an educated person. By contrast, we take Platonic literacy to be performed principally for oneself rather than others. It consists in living differently through seeing things differently, and seeing things differently through internalising associations of ideas that are in many ways contrary to those recommended naturally to us by our experience as embodied creatures. Conceived within this framework, the commentaries that emerge from teaching contexts may be seen as performances for learners to emulate – not merely as bodies of doctrine to be learnt and accepted. The teacher weaves together Plato’s insights with, say, Orphic insights so as to reveal a coherent and systematic ‘way of seeing things’. Given the nature of what is seen (i.e. the order of intelligibles grasped noetically and all-at-once), it is plausible that there might be many such ways of seeing whose (inevitably partial) discursive specifications might be superficially different. There can similarly be many different performances of a jazz standard like Summertime, all of which reveal new connections and possibilities within the original score. Part of what makes a jazz standard a standard is the seemingly inexhaustible possibilities for valuable ‘true’ – and yet different – performances, each of which can manifest the players’ excellence as jazz musicians. If we see Proclus’ Platonic Theology and Hermias’ (or Syrianus’) Phaedrus commentary in this light, then differences in the context of the performance emerge. Some vestiges of the ‘live’ performance of the Phaedrus commentary are still visible (whatever one may suppose about later additions or changes to the text). By contrast, Platonic Theology attempts to synthesise a complete account of Plato’s views on the various levels of gods from all the dialogues. To return to the analogy of music, the Hermias text is a performance of a single dialogue (which may or may not have had some sound engineering back in the studio in Alexandria!). By contrast, Platonic Theology is more like a series of lectures in music theory – albeit one in which the teacher illustrates his points with many examples of performances. The former provides a single, sustained performance of Platonic

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literacy in relation to a single dialogue. The latter provides riffs and chords that a player could weave together into the performance of an exegesis of any of the dialogues in relation to which these techniques are illustrated. The doctrinal and performative perspectives on the works of the Neoplatonists are not, of course, mutually exclusive. Surely they are both records of philosophical doctrines justified by argument and also illustrations of the teacher’s Platonic literacy manifested in relation to one or more dialogues. Attending to both perspectives, and not confining ourselves merely to their doctrinal content, gives readers new questions to pose about them. When we view Hermias’ exegetical performance of the palinode, we can say the following: it is one that creatively exploits the affordances of the Orphic rhapsodic theogony so as to weave it together with a Platonic dialogue in which movement is primary. The dynamism of Hermias’ synthesis ranges from the simple emphasis on winged Phanes (‘with four eyes, glancing hither and thither’), to the proliferation of Night into three goddess-phases corresponding to the phases of remaining, procession, and reversion. The static and numerically distinct status of gods in relation to one another is also undermined by the proliferation of Zeuses (the one a monad, the other coordinate with Poseidon and Pluto). This dynamic performance of the Orphic taxonomy is orchestrated with the reading of a Platonic dialogue in which journeys feature prominently – not only the character’s journey to the riverbank where the conversation is situated, but the soul’s journey in company with its own god in the palinode.30 Like the Symposium with which it is linked in Iamblichus’ reading order of the dialogues, the Phaedrus also has multiple voices, with one speech revising the understanding of the previous one, as when the palinode rewrites Socrates’ first speech. Viewed from the point of view of Platonism as a way of life, what could such a dynamic reading of the Phaedrus hope to achieve? In the palinode, the human soul is imaginatively placed so as to have the spectacle of intelligible reality set before it beyond the heavens. Moreover, according to Platonic doctrine, that intelligible reality is alive and, in fact, alive with a life that is more unified and purer than that of the star-gods whose movements we see in the very heavens that we are imagined to transcend. What must such a life be like? How is it to be thought of as life? It must be a form of life that involves

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movement without space and plurality that is without separation. We submit that Hermias’ performance of the palinode invites the audience to metaphors and semantic associations that better equip them to think the life of the intelligibles. We also note that Hermias’ performance of an Orphically-inflected palinode from the Phaedrus makes significant use of passages from Homer.31 In particular, it uses Homeric passages as justification for claims about the Orphic theology which he integrates into his reading of the Phaedrus. This element of Hermias’ performance, we think, points forward to the concluding sections of the dialogue in which Socrates and Phaedrus discuss writing and composition. In the final volume of our translation we propose to supplement the remaining sixty pages of the Phaedrus commentary with a translation of an interesting introduction to Hermogenes’ On Style which is attached to Syrianus’ commentary on that work but is probably by one Phoebammon. In presenting these works together, we will conclude our case for a closer integration of rhetorical and philosophical themes in studying the texts of the Neoplatonists.

Notes 1 cf. Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy chs 24-6 with Westerink 1962, xxxvii–xl and Tarrant 2014. 2 The other source of inspired theological authority – the Chaldean Oracles – is largely absent from Hermias’ commentary on the Phaedrus. By contrast, Proclus dedicated a chapter of his exegesis of the palinode to correlating details of Socrates’ description of the place outside the heavens with the order of gods in the Oracles; cf. PT 4, 27–31. For Proclus and the Oracles more generally, see Spanu 2021. 3 A-C were translated in vol. 1 of our translation and the present volume ends with Q (Baltzly and Share 2018). 4 cf. Steel 1992. For a list of relevant passages in Proclus where the Sophist is discussed, see Guérard 1991. 5 cf. Dillon 1995. 6 That Hermias’ views on psychic vehicles are properly assimilated to those of his classmate Proclus is shown in Finamore 2019. 7 Timotin 2012, 86–93. 8 cf. Steel 1978. 9 cf. Proclus, in Remp. 2,185,23–186,6; 282,15–17; 305,1–18; and especially 319,25–330,4.

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10 Compare Hermias 171,19–172,3 with Proclus, in Remp. 2,185,23–186,6 and 305,1–18. 11 A distinction that Hermias had already drawn at 104,19–29. 12 Trans. Nehamas and Woodruff 1997. 13 We find specific references to writings on the palinode at in Remp. 2,309,20–1; 312,3; 339,15–16; and in Parm. 949,38–9 and 1088,26–7. Elsewhere both Proclus and Philoponus refer to hupomnêmata on the Phaedrus. For a discussion of the nature of the work or works by Proclus, see Saffrey and Westerink 1968-97, vol. 4, xxxviii–xxxix and, more recently, Rashed 2016. 14 PT 1, 25, 11–14 foreshadows the Phaedrus as the principal source of information about these two orders of divinities. 15 These two facts – the prominence of the Oracles in Proclus’ exegesis of the palinode and the vocabulary of ‘intelligible-intellective’ – may in fact be related. Book 4 of the Platonic Theology which discusses this order of gods and in which we find Proclus’ fullest remaining treatment of the Phaedrus introduces the intelligible-intellective order by reference to Majercik fr. 77. 16 Proclus’ exegesis of the palinode and of Phaedrus 247C6–D1 in particular is carefully examined in Fortier 2020. 17 cf. PT 4, chs 23–6. 18 cf. PT 4, ch. 20. 19 cf. PT 4, 51, 15-20. In truth, the leading gods that are prior to the hypercosmicand-encosmic gods have the psychic nature ‘in a concealed manner’ – as they must, since they are among the causes of the psychic nature of the intermediate gods. 20 For the fourfold division of the Assimilative gods, see 93,7–25. For the grouping of the Liberated gods into four triads, see PT 6, ch. 22. 21 Indeed, one name for the order that is prior to the hypercosmic-encosmic gods – that is to say, ‘leading gods’ – is justified by reference to a convergence between the Phaedrus and the Oracles. cf. PT 6, ch. 2. 22 Zeller 1863. 23 Allen 1980, 122. 24 As in Proclus’ Platonic-Orphic correlations, Phanes is well placed to do this since he sits at the lower limit of the intelligible order of gods, immediately prior to the intellectual gods. Here Hermias’ theotaxonomy seems to accord with that of his classmate in the latter’s Cratylus commentary and in his Timaeus commentary. In the latter, Proclus identifies Phanes with the Living-Being Itself and credits Phanes with shedding intelligible light; cf. in Tim. 1,430,15–18. 25 cf. Baltzly 2013, note ad loc. 26 142,16–18 = Iamblichus, in Phaedr. fr. 6a; cf. Proclus, PT 3, 188, 15 ff. For Syrianus,

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see in Tim. fr. 7 (= Proclus, in Tim. 1,314,22–315,4) with commentary in Wear 2011, 80–4. Manolea 2004, 169. In separate but linked contributions, d’Hoine and Gavray argue for the centrality of the Phaedrus to the Neoplatonists’ hermeneutic approach, first, to the dialogic form of Plato’s writings (d’Hoine 2020) and, second, to the allegorical interpretation of myth (Gavray 2020). With respect to the latter, Gavray finds a Neoplatonic rule of interpretation for myth that ‘relates them [sc. the elements in the myth] to powers superior to the material world, which implies going beyond appearance and likelihood and rising to a level of reality impossible to convey in words because of its radical transcendence’ (169, our emphasis). We agree entirely, but ask in addition, ‘What then separates the discursively inexhaustible import of myth from the non-mythic elements of Plato’s dialogues?’ We reply, ‘Nothing’. We should see Neoplatonic interpretations of all texts as having both doctrinal and performative aspects – the latter being necessitated because the subject matter about which the interpreter of Plato’s dialogues seeks to inform his audience simply cannot be contained by any single discursive account. The true grasp of these matters is something that could only be shown and not fully said and is, we claim, variously exhibited in performances of Platonic literacy. Baltzly and Share 2018, 34–6. Baltzly 2020. Manolea 2004 argues that the use of Homer as a philosopher in his own right, whose views accord broadly with those of Plato, is the innovation of Syrianus.

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123,27 126,14 126,29 130,2 134,19 137,20 145,5 149,6 164,8 170,18 171,3 171,6 176,26 177,28 179,10 183,1

Changing legôn to legei, retaining de, and changing aiskhunas heauton to aiskhuneis seauton. Retaining hen polla, the reading of the manuscripts, in preference to the emendation hen kai polla. Retaining akinêton, the reading of the manuscripts, in preference to the emendation akinêton. Emending tôn pronoêtikôn to tên pronoêtikên rather than assuming a lacuna. Assuming a lacuna. Retaining apo, the reading of the manuscripts, in preference to the emendation epi. Emending dekatôi to dekadi. Filling the lacuna with tas hupo tên, as suggested in Lucarini 2012. Emending legôn to legei. Correcting diaitethêi to diaitêthêi. Retaining pantêi, the reading of the manuscripts, in preference to the emendation pantôn. Translating the obelised text. Emending aei to dei with Bernard. Emending tôi phasmati to tois khasmasi. Placing the opening bracket before mê ontôn rather than before ti gar as Lucarini and Moreschini do. Reading oupô for katô and translating katakratêsasai, which Lucarini and Moreschini obelise.

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Hermias

Adding anagomenou after ekeina, as suggested by Lucarini in the apparatus. Emending idonta to idonti, as suggested by Couvreur, and anapempazomenon to anapempomenôi. Emending to tou pterou kallos to ton tou pterou kaulon. Translating ginetai, which Lucarini and Moreschini bracket. Translating kai akratous, which Lucarini and Moreschini bracket, and repositioning toutesti peri anagôgou to follow tou alêthinou erôtos. Emending horatikon to horaton. Translating toutesti ean kai diabeblêmenos tês sunousias tou erastou hoti ou sômatikês kharitos heneka eplêsiasen autôi alla ôpheleias psukhês tote paradidôsin heauton kataphronêsas tôn tas diabolas legontôn, the text of the manuscripts. (Lucarini and Moreschini emend kai to êi and make a major transposition in the middle of the sentence.) Adding hothen hôrmêthê after epi to. Changing legein, which Lucarini and Moreschini obelise, to ekhein with Bernard. Emending psukhên to epithumian with Bernard.

Hermias On Plato Phaedrus 245E–257C Translation

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10. [Now that] it is clear that [that which is moved by itself] is immortal, [anyone saying that precisely this is the essence and account of soul will experience no shame. For every body for which being moved [comes] from outside is soulless, but [every one] for which [it comes] to it from within, from itself, is ensouled inasmuch as this is the nature of soul. And if this is how it is – [that] that which moves itself is nothing other than soul – soul will necessarily be something both ungenerated and immortal] (245E2-246A2) So far he has proved by means of the two syllogisms1 that the self-moved is immortal without anywhere mentioning soul except [where], at the outset, he stated the conclusion in advance. And so [only] with regard to the self-moved has it been demonstrated that it is immortal. But now he adds the first and narrowest premiss to them [sc. to the two syllogisms], [namely,] that the soul is self-moved, and will indicate (hupomimnêiskein)2 what applies to it [sc. to the soul] on the basis of (ek) what follows from them [sc. the two syllogisms plus the premiss]. He says it is clear, that is, has become manifest and quite plain (for that is the sense in which the Athenians used to employ the word). He says (eipein)3 self-movement is the essence and account of soul in lieu of [saying its] ‘definition’.4 Nobody saying this of it [sc. of the soul] will experience the shame of having been in error,5 since it is possible to view the definition both in relation to the thing itself and in relation to the account. That is to say, ‘rational, mortal living being’ can be viewed as a thing present in the human being, or, better, as itself being the human being and the form of human being, and can also be considered as a verbal account (prophorikos logos). For this reason he too has said both.6 [Anyone] saying [that exactly this is the essence and account of soul] will experience no shame: he says this first and foremost7 in relation to himself (and you do above all embarrass yourself), for such a definition8 of soul will not give him cause for regret; and in the second place in relation to others, since he will remain unrefuted by them.9 He shows10 that soul alone is self-moved by means of the [consideration that] everything other-moved is soulless. He syllogises [this] as follows: All soul and [soul] alone provides bodies with a source of motion; that which

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provides bodies with a source of motion is self-moved; therefore soul is selfmoved. He is indicating (hupomimnêiskein) [this] on the basis of what is [self]evident and obvious. For if the ensouled body differs from the soulless one by being moved by itself and from within (for we call whatever (119) we see being moved by itself ‘ensouled’), then it is a fortiori evident that it is after having moved itself and exerted itself to move the living being that it [sc. the soul] has moved it [sc. the body it enlivens]. We won’t be concerned that we may be describing as immortal those souls of living beings that we normally call mere animations (empsukhia)11 and entelechies (worms and gnats for example), for the soul places a source of motion in bodies either by being present itself, as with us, or by providing a kind of image (indalma) of itself [as in their case].12 ‘So how is it’, someone may ask, ‘that we see soulless body moving to destruction of its own accord or fire travelling upwards and a clod of earth downwards?13 For either the body that is travelling to destruction really is completely soulless and soul is not the cause of all motion, or it is ensouled and the soul that gives everything else life and being will be a cause of destruction’. We shall say that this so-called ‘soulless’ body is called ‘soulless’ as compared to the individual soul, since it does not have a [separate] soul of its own but receives animation from the [soul] of the universe. Because it is in an ensouled thing, [namely,] the cosmos, every body in it is in a manner ensouled, just as the waste products inside us, as long as they are in us, partake of a degree of vital heat, but once they have emerged grow cold. Thus body too, since it is in the cosmos, has a trace of soul, which both moves it and in a sense makes it exist. And [it is] for this reason [that] fire travels upwards and a clod of earth downwards, [I mean] as being moved by the soul of the universe. And even nature, through (kata) which they move, is an image of soul. We call them ‘soulless’ when focusing on the individual soul; for because we do not see them having a [separate] soul of their own, because they are animated through [being] in the universe, we call them ‘soulless’. And one shouldn’t be surprised if soul becomes a cause of destruction. We said earlier14 that it produces movements with an eye to its own15 advantage and to the good of the universe. And in fact even here [on earth] we see a good man starving the body, if that is advantageous to him, [and] at times even causing its death (phtheirein). So in the same way, when the individual soul leaves the body, the soul of the universe dissolves it [sc. the body] and resolves

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it into its elements – for it doesn’t profit the universe for it to hold together any longer – just as nature in us combines some humours (khumos) and separates others, striving for what is advantageous for the whole of our body. Each of the two stated syllogisms proves both [of the following]: that the soul is not destroyed from within itself; and that it is it not destroyed by things external [to it] either. However, the first of them more the first, the second more the second. Because of this he has made the premiss (120) that states ‘the soul is self-moved’ common to both syllogisms, not simply for the sake of dialectical proof, but because this self-movement, being the essence of soul, is, this being so,16 the cause for it [sc. for soul] both of [its] not being destroyed [itself] and of other things living and being preserved through it [sc. through soul]. Therefore both arguments are demonstrative. For both have been taken from the definition of soul and all of the terms are in accord with the thing itself and qua the thing itself,17 on which account they are also convertible one with the other. Some criticise the definition on the ground that it includes neither a genus nor differentiae but only uses a definitional word, [namely,] self-moved. But [in fact] the philosopher should have been admired in the highest degree here because he has supplied what is most characteristic of soul and most of all its own, leaving aside what it has in common with other things. You can see this very thing by completing the definition; for soul is ‘an incorporeal, self-moved substance capable of knowing things’.18 So you [can] see that with regard to everything else it displays commonality with many [other things], but as far as self-movement is concerned, it above all is characterised [by it]. For even that which seems to belong most of all to it, being capable of knowing things, that too belongs not a jot less to sense perception, for this too is able to know things within its sphere (suzugos).

11. Concerning its [sc. the soul’s] immortality [that is enough (hikanôs); concerning its form one must say the following. . . . It resembles19 then the combined (sumphutos) power of a team (zeugos)20 of horses and a charioteer with lowered wings (hupopteros).21 Now the gods’ horses and charioteers are all both good themselves and from good stock, but the [quality] of the others is mixed] (246A3-B1)

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Plato has testified [to this] adequately (hikanôs) in his account, for nowhere has he insisted so strongly on the immortality of the soul as here. [And] in fact he has said that enough (hikanôs) has [here] been said concerning its immortality. He means (lambanein) the everlasting kind of immortality; for we are accustomed to call ‘everlasting’ that which has not come to be at an earlier time and is not going to perish at a later. [This is] what is immortal in the strict sense, although we also call what is not going to perish in the future ‘immortal’, as if one should say ‘you are immortal’.22 But he [sc. Plato] means immortal in the strict sense, the kind that is everlasting in both directions, i.e. that which is ungenerated and imperishable. The earlier argument, the one that establishes immortality from selfmovement and the principle of motion, dealt with (theôrein) the procession, as it were, of the soul and its relationship to what comes after it, while the present one, the one concerning its form (idea) (246A3-4),23 [deals] with its return, as it were, to its causes and the limit assigned it from there. For, when processing, it appears as limitless, as it were, life, but when returning to intellect it receives limit from there. So what does the form of soul mean here? If (121) he is talking about its paradigm, [it has] nothing in common with the soul.24 Indeed, it is not part of his programme to talk about Forms. And if the form of soul means its essence, given that the soul is a simple and immaterial form (eidos) and it is not the case that part of it is like a substrate, part like a form, but the soul and being-a-soul (to psukhê einai)25 are the same thing, he will [then] be talking about the essence of soul twice. We shall say then that the essence of each thing is the one that is in it or [its] most unified part,26 as it were (this is the one that belongs to each thing,27 being as far as possible28 not expressive of plurality). The form, on the other hand, already displays the plurality and the elements, so to speak, of the thing and29 indicates the one many30 of it; for the soul is one and many, since it is neither simply and purely one nor a dispersed plurality. The previous argument, the one that establishes its [sc. the soul’s] immortality, focused on its essential one, [while] the one now about to be stated, the one concerning its form, has to do with [its] plurality and [its] elements; for this is what the horses and the charioteer mean. Earlier he presented the essence of the soul to us in a unified and rather concentrated form; for its being, since it is self-moved, perpetually moved and

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immortal, is a kind of one, as it were, and the first [of these three] is always, in a sense, more of a cause for the second and the second for the third, for the self-moved is the cause of the perpetually moved and the perpetually moved of the immortal. For, there being these two things, the unmoved, which is superior to all movement and life, that is to say, the One beyond being and the first henads, and the other-moved, which is inferior to and lower than all life and movement, the self-moved is closer to the unmoved (for the self-moved always wants to preserve itself, just as the unmoved31 is always the first principle), and the immortal [closer] to the other-moved (for by being expressed in terms of the privation of death,32 it is at once closer to othermoved things), and the unmoved things are also above the immortal and immortality is a kind of life, being a kind of exhalation (pnoê), as it were, of the essence of soul.33 We have observed, then, that this triad runs together into a kind of one in the soul. And in what follows too, dealing with matters connected with [the soul’s] form (idea), he will again take a triad, one that is analogous to the triad already discussed but which is seen with more variance (heterotês). For just as the number three, as it processes, advances, and progresses into greater extension (diastasis) and variance and in procession becomes inferior to itself, while always remaining three (that is to say, though becoming a square [number] (tetragônos) and then a cube number (kubos),34 always retaining the particular character of three), so too does the soul, from its condition of existing in a unified manner (which itself is, in a more concentrated fashion, a ‘one-three’), after processing further and being made different,35 again becomes a ‘one-three’, [but now] seen with greater extension, I mean in the [extended form] of the charioteer and the two horses.36 But what are the charioteer and the horses? (122) And first one must consider with regard to them whether one should class (tattein) them as (kata) the essences, as the powers, or as the activities [of souls], for people have had different views. I for my part say that it is as [their] powers. It wouldn’t be as [their] activities because the horses are represented as active and there aren’t activities of activities, and [also] because the activities of souls are different at different times but the horses are always the same ones (for it [sc. the soul] does not receive one lot of horses then another but always has the same ones). Nor [would it be] as [their] essences, because even in our case our essences

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remain unharmed, for the essence of the soul does not suffer damage, for then it would also be destroyed; it is its powers that are harmed, and much more so [even], its activities.37 Moreover Plato himself says the gods’ horses and charioteers are all good themselves and from good stock, but of ours that they suffer damage and shed their wings. If then the essence of our soul remains undamaged but its powers suffer distortion and at times are even in abeyance,38 they would with good reason be classed as powers. And Plato himself states this loud and clear, saying: it [sc. the soul] is like the combined (sumphutos)39 power [of a team of horses and a charioteer]. And should someone say that good themselves and from good stock means ‘from good causes’,40 what follows will tell against him, for our [horses and charioteers] too are from good [origins] in the sense of [good] causes, and so on that basis all [the horses and charioteers] will be good, whereas he says that ours suffer damage. Plato was not the first to make use of a charioteer and horses: those among the poets who were inspired, [namely,] Homer, Orpheus, [and] Parmenides, did so before him.41 But by them, inasmuch as they were inspired, they were sung of (erein) without [any stated] reason (aitia), for they were speaking under divine inspiration. But since Plato admits nothing into his philosophy that could not be assigned a reason, we should state the reasons, even if he himself, because he advances his arguments with greater dignity (axiôma),42 omits to mention [those] reasons, and [also] because, up to a point (teôs), the [writers who came] before him also seem to take the charioteer and horses for powers [of the soul]. In Homer,43 for instance, Zeus uses the horses that Poseidon is said to release, and is not always depicted as using them but sometimes as sitting on a throne.44 But if it were the essence of Zeus to be conveyed by (123) horses and Zeus were just what the charioteer is, he would always act as a charioteer. As it is, he is also depicted doing other things. So it seems that the horses and the chariot are sung of as [representative of] different powers of his. And, thus far (teôs), the accounts of the divine and of the human soul must be one and the same (koinos). Further, Plato himself says45 in the Timaeus that the Demiurge, in framing soul simpliciter,46 i.e. the essence (ousia)47 of soul, took from among the kinds of existence (on) being (ousia), sameness, [and] otherness, clearly [meaning], as he himself says, intermediate being (which is between ‘indivisible being and the divisible being associated with (peri) bodies’ – the divisible being associated

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with bodies is irrational life, and nature, and animations),48 and, again, intermediate sameness (which is between indivisible sameness and the divisible sameness associated with bodies), and, similarly, intermediate otherness. And, having mixed these three together, he says, he framed the essence of soul. But those [sc. the essences] of the divine [souls] were from pure kinds, ours not: [in our case,] when mixing [them], he poured, he says,49 not entirely pure [ingredients] but seconds and thirds. Now, the the horses and charioteer are powers of these three. And the single power of the soul, [the power] that is productive of these three powers, is its form. The power of existence, that is, of the being of the one of the genera,50 is the charioteer, the power of sameness, the better of the horses, the power of otherness, the inferior horse. Further, if we think of two horses and a charioteer and fuse them together, the single power which is generative and productive of both the charioteer and the horses is the form itself of soul. (‘Power’ (dunamis) should be understood in the manner of the geometers, in the sense [in which] they are accustomed to say that the straight line can (dunasthai) [produce] the square.) In the earlier section (logos) (245C5-246A2), then, he has discoursed on the essence of the soul, which contained within itself both self-movement and immortality (for these three were at the same time one), but here he is talking about the powers of the soul. In what follows51 he will also discourse on its activities. There being, then, these three things, [namely,] essence, self-movement, immortality, these three powers, [namely,] the form, the horses, and the more particular [phases of the] lives of the horses, are here taken as analogous (analogon) to them: the form of the soul, which is the single power of the whole soul [and which is] productive of the three powers of the charioteer and the [two] horses, has been taken as analogous to the single essence of the soul, which holds in a unified manner [its] self-movement and [its] immortality;52 the horses have been taken as analogous to [the soul’s] self-movement on account of their self-movement; the more particular [phases of the] lives of the horses, that is, the ascents and descents of the soul and the sheddings and sproutings of wings, [have been taken as analogous to the soul’s] immortality. But why has he called the power of the Same and the Other ‘horses’ and the power of the being of the one of the genera a ‘charioteer’? Well, (124) that all partake of one another is clear, but each is referred to by what dominates. The

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being is what has been used for the construction of the soul, the highest and most perfect [element], and for that very reason set over the rest. Accordingly the soul is not compelled to move of its essence. The other two, the powers of the Same and of the Other, as being seen in motion and revolutions, have been represented by horses. The wheels [of the chariot] are the same [things], [i.e.] the Same and the Other. For, insofar as they travel out around the intelligible they [sc. the Same and the Other] are horses, insofar as they return [to their starting point], wheels.53 And the better wheel is the circle of the Same, the one that circles around the intelligibles and contains the elevating power of the soul, and which for this very reason is called ‘smooth-running’.54 And the other [wheel is the circle] of the Other, the one that is also generative, the one that circles around the objects of sense and opinion, and which is called ‘right’55 when it has its own virtue and thus possesses an indication of the right and the straight [way], at which time it reports on the objects of sense without distortion. (For instance, if opinion wants to view one of the objects of sense, deliberation takes the lead and arouses and tautens the pneuma and it, to take [sight as] an example, sends the [visual] rays out through the eyes, and they impact the sense-object, and the sense-impression (aisthêsis), bending back through them [sc. the eyes], reports to the pneuma and from there to opinion. And thus the bending back is not strictly a circle, but a straight line, by running a double course, mimics a circle, and this whole [process] is a true (orthos) circle.)56 But when [this circle] reports in a distorted manner (diastrophôs) it is said to have all manner of distortions (klasis).57 This [sc. the circle of the other] also contains the downwards-leading and generative power of the soul, and in the case of the divine souls, the one [sc. the power] that exercises providential care over [its] inferiors.58 The above account59 is sound and this is how one should believe things are.60 But it is also possible to divide as follows and to say that the intellective part of the soul, i.e. the intellect, is the charioteer and say that the discursive (dianoêtikos) soul is the circle of the Same or the better horse, and the opinionative [soul] the worse horse or [the circle] of the Other. But one should be aware that discursive thought (dianoia) also participates in the Other and opinion in the Same, for any part of the soul you take participates in both. When you consider the horses and the charioteer in relation to the very highest part of the soul, the highest union of the soul, the [union] with the

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intelligibles and the gods, will be the charioteer, the better horse [will be the part] of it [sc. of the soul] that always longs for the intelligibles, the inferior horse [the part] that attains to intellections (noêsis) by means of division and inference.61 That is how it will be if you see the charioteer and the horses as pertaining just to the discursive (dianoêtikos) soul. But if [we see it] as pertaining to the opinionative [soul], we shall take discursive thought as the charioteer, the power of the (125) opinionative [soul] that is always longing to be ranked with discursive thought as the better of the horses, and that of its powers that longs for [the sphere of] generation and the governance of lower things (ta deutera) as the worse horse. It is also possible, by taking the charioteer as referring to the combination, [I mean] discursive thought and opinion [together], to assign the better of the horses to the discursive [faculty] alone and the inferior one to the opinionative. For one should understand that when the soul has devoted itself to better things, opinion too devotes the whole of itself to discursive thought and wants to belong to it, but at times it tires and wants to operate on its own. The above applies if we consider the horses and the charioteer in the case of rational soul alone, but since the soul descends so far that eventually even the irrational is woven into it and each of the horses pulls against the other in the interwoven irrational kind (eidos) of soul, let us not overlook these [horses]. For the soul had the earlier ones in accordance with its eternal procession from the Demiurge alone, but those I’m going to talk about now, which it receives as an addition from the young gods,62 [are] from the added mortal type (eidos) of soul.63 The charioteer, then, will correspond to (kata) opinion, the better of the horses will be the spirited part [of the soul], the worse desire. And when opinion is right [the soul] produces the average (mesos) and conventional (orthodoxastikos) person and an average charioteer, but when [opinion] is warped it produces a warped person and then it resembles a charioteer who is dragged along by his horses. The [well]-trained horses and charioteer of opinion (doxastikos), then, produce for us the best kind (akros) of [ordinary] citizen (politikos), those of discursive thought (dianoêtikos) the person who devotes himself to contemplation (theôrêtikos).64 These horses and the charioteer change according to the spheres, according to the elements, and according to every kind of life.65 In the [sphere] of the sun they are solar, in that of Zeus, Zeusian, in that of Ares, Arean, and, in short, they

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always conform to the particular nature of the god involved (ekeinos): if to the nature of the divine species, [they become] divine, if to the nature of the angelic, they too are angelic, and if they conform to the daemonic species of life, they too become daemonic, and if to the heroic, heroic, and similarly in all cases.66 But what does ‘with lowered wings’ (hupopteros) (245A7)67 convey? First let’s look at what ‘wing’ (pteron) means. [The] soul’s wing is its elevating power, which is especially seen in the better of the horses – just as from a certain point of view we also call it [sc. the better horse] a wheel, or better, the circle of the Same, because it is a lover of the beautiful and desires the intelligibles and never pulls against the charioteer but shares in both his correct decisions and his errors. The other horse, its [sc. the soul’s] downwards-leading and generative power, weighs [them] down towards the ground and tugs against the charioteer. They all, then, have wings, for they all, [I mean] both the charioteer and the horses, have all the powers. But in the case of the divine souls these wings are always erect and easily deployed, because of which they are (126) described as ‘winged’ and not ‘with lowered wings’,68 while with us, the human souls, we do not always keep these wings open (proballesthai) but at times have them closed and idle, at times in use.69 For we [always] possess their power (since we never lose powers), but we don’t always maintain (ekhein) their actualisation. For this reason ‘with lowered wings’ is more appropriate in our case, since we have the power but not always its actualisation, and ‘winged’ [more so] in the case of the gods, since they keep both powers and actualisations active, so to speak. On account of this in what follows he says of our soul ‘for formerly it was winged’.70 So, wanting to make the language used of our souls and the divine ones [here] common [to both], he has used ‘with lowered wings’. After all, all souls have the elevating power, even if some have it always active, others [only] at times. Alternatively,‘with lowered wings’ might also be properly said both of the divine souls and of ours; of the divine ones because the wings have to do with (peri) their more superficial and lowly powers (their activities are always located among the intelligibles), while in the case of our [souls] this whole term ‘with lowered wings’ is appropriate because ‘winged’ is not strictly true of it except occasionally.

12. What kind of thing it is [is in absolutely every respect a matter for a divine, and lengthy, account71 . . . It resembles the combined power of a team of horses and a charioteer with lowered wings] (246A4-7)

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It is possible to construe in absolutely every respect either with what precedes it or what follows it, [giving] either What kind of thing the form of soul is in absolutely every respect (that is, in reality) is a matter for a divine, and lengthy, account, or What kind of thing the form of soul is is in absolutely every respect a matter for a divine, and lengthy, account. Divine because it is those who are the most [divinely] inspired with regard to such great matters who uncover the truth about them for us, lengthy because if someone, operating on the level of intellect, is to make the form of soul known to us, there is need of much exercising (exeligmos) of the mind (noêsis) for him to grasp it adequately; for there will be need of the entire psychogony in the Timaeus, of the harmonic ratios, and of the bending of the straight [strips] and of everything of that kind.72 Plato himself has clearly indicated that one must understand the horses and charioteer in terms of powers by saying it is like the combined power. [By] a team73 of horses with lowered wings he certainly doesn’t mean two horses. The gods, depending on their own particular character, are traditionally represented as using a varying number of horses, some [being conveyed] on [a chariot drawn by] four, others on [one drawn] by six or eight, but since at this stage he wants first to impart the common feature of divine and human souls, he has on that account said, without [further] specification, a (127) team of horses with lowered wings. We have already commented on with lowered wings above, [explaining] that both the charioteer and the horses have wings but that the gods also always keep them active (which is why they would be ‘winged’), while we also [have] them idle at times (which is why [we are] ‘with lowered wings’). And since we act on the basis of the same powers as the gods do (for the gods themselves also have the power of the wing), on that account, applying the locution equally [to both us and them], he has said a team of horses and a charioteer with lowered wings.

13. Now the gods’ [horses and charioteers are all good themselves and from good stock, but the [quality] of the others is mixed] (246A7-B1) From this point on he presents the distinctive properties of both divine souls and human ones, having already stated their common ones.

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Now the gods’ horses and charioteers are all good: [this is] because all their powers are good and projected (proballein) from good essences.74 The [quality] of the others, he says, is mixed (246B1), by of the others meaning ours, since he is accustomed to indicate things in our sphere (peri hêmas) by the indefiniteness of ‘other’. It is not because our substance is mingled with evil that he has said is mixed but because it is a lesser good, as indeed we also see in the case of light, for you would say that the light in the sun is light-itself or pure light and the light of the sun that is in the air a lesser light not because it is mixed with [its] opposite but because it is not like that in the heaven, much less like that in the sun itself.75 (On the other hand, you would readily say that the light in shadow is mixed with [its] opposite.)

14. In the first place, [our]76 ruler [drives a pair, and secondly one of his horses is noble and good and from like stock, but the other from the opposite and the opposite [of good]; difficult indeed and troublesome of necessity is the driving in our case] (246B1-4) In the case of the divine souls (for these are what he means by ‘gods’) he has not said that [the ruler] drives a pair but has left it indefinite on account of their immeasurable and boundless power. But the theologians77 suggest, as I said,78 according to the particularities and associations of the [various] gods, different [numbers of] horses for different ones, assigning this or that (tis) number appropriately to each of the gods; and you [can] see that they depict the sun riding on a four-horse chariot and other numbers [of horses] in the case of other [gods]. And they quite appropriately depict the sun mounted on horses, [thereby] indicating his being the motive power for the whole of nature, which is under his sway; and the moon [mounted] on bulls, on account of its being the overseer of generation and generation being closely dependent on it (indeed the bull is a symbol of generation);79 and [in the case of] those [they depict] with wings, Love, Nike, and Hermes, for example, [thereby] indicating their elevating (128) power. As I said, then, in the case of the divine souls he has left the number of horses undefined, but in the case of our souls he has delimited (metrein) the horses numerically on account of it [sc. our soul] having power which is limited (metrein) and inferior. For the dyad is the cause of procession and departure, for which reason the Pythagoreans used to call it

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‘daring’ (tolma) as having departed from its own origins and come to be elsewhere.80 Our ruler will mean either the ruler that is in us (for it certainly isn’t outside of us) or, better, whoever becomes a kind of (tis) ruler in this human race of ours and is established in the position of ruler of our rational soul, that is to say, the ruling element in it. And of his horses, he says, one is noble (kalos) and good and proceeds from an essence of the same kind,81 [i.e.] noble and good; for the power of the Same always desires noble and good things and the elevating power of the soul always follows the charioteer as he leads [the way] to the intelligible and never pulls against him. Some have understood opposite as referring to the less good and indeed produce the Pythagoreans as witnesses, who, constructing two columns, called one of them [the column] ‘of evil’, [which must be] equivalent to ‘of the less good’, for why is the oblong82 bad and not also good [like the square]? After all, if there weren’t inequality in things, nor would the [present] variety of species exist. One must vote83 for this interpretation. But one must also say this: that [the second horse] is said to be opposite in the [realm of] the intelligibles, on the one hand, as rejoicing in the transition from forms to [other] forms (for this holds for divine souls too, but much more so for ours), in the sensible sphere, on the other hand, as being generative – in which [sphere] opposition is opposite-making.84 What, then, is this horse, that is, the generative and downwards-leading power of the soul and delighting in this,85 on account of which we do not always restrain it, for it too wants to be active in accordance with its own power. The opposite and from the opposite [kind]86 does not mean the contraries of the noble and good, by which the better of the horses was characterised, [and] that this [horse] is therefore both base and evil. After all, the soul has not yet become bad, and nor has he told of its shedding of its wings, which comes about through activities of that kind on its part, but is still talking about its powers, which it possesses qua (129) good87 and for good [purposes]. Therefore it is opposite to itself and from the opposite [kind of stock] because, of and for itself, it springs from opposite powers, delighting always in difference. For this

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reason driving becomes difficult and troublesome for our charioteer, the elevating power desiring the things above and the unity of things there, the downwards-leading and generative, or other-making, one [desiring] separation and the activity of transition [from form to form].88 With divine souls all their powers are always active at once, for they are both united with their causes and exercise providential care over the cosmos. This is sometimes also the case with our [soul] when it is perfect, but in the case of the great majority of souls these two [activities] occur by turns because they are unable to ascend and to exercise providence at the same time. One must also attend to [the nature of] the description, for he has not expressed [himself as he does] without a reason. In the case of the gods, since all things are united up there (ekei),89 he has also employed a unified and concentrated description, saying the gods’ horses and charioteers are all good; but in our case, given that [with us] there is much division and otherness, he has broken up the description, saying that of the others and in the first place, our ruler [and] then one of the horses is of such and such a kind, the other of another.90

15. [We must attempt to explain] just how it is that [living being has been called] both mortal and immortal. [All soul has care of all that is soulless and traverses the whole heaven, appearing in different forms at different times. When it is perfect and [still] winged, it travels on high and governs the whole cosmos, but a [soul] that has shed its wings, travels [down] until it takes hold of something solid. [And] having settled there and taken an earthy body, which seems to move itself thanks to its [sc. the soul’s] power, the whole, soul and body joined together, was called a living being and received the additional designation ‘mortal’. But ‘immortal’ [is applied] without a single reasoned argument]91 (246B5-C7) 15

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puts it, to where93 it takes hold of something solid (246C2-3). Therefore it is with reason ‘called’ a living being. And consequently we speak with knowledge94 of both its genesis and of its appellation. But how the heavenly living being comes to be we humans cannot say, [and] because of this he reproaches those who talk of ‘divine living beings’. Therefore he said has been called with reference to them as well (koinos). But let’s look at what he says. All soul has care of all that is soulless. He certainly95 isn’t saying that each [soul has care of] all [that is soulless], for instance that even my [soul] at this moment (nun) has care of the whole cosmos, but that every part of the whole (to pan) is certainly governed by some soul or other, and so all (pan) [of it] by all [of them]. But if he also means that each [soul] has care of the whole, this would be reasonable on account of what is added next. When it is perfect, (130) he says, and [still] winged, it travels on high and governs the whole cosmos. One must judge them [sc. souls] from their perfection, not from their falling away [from it], for having devoted itself to the universe (ta hola) along with its own god,96 it [sc. the soul] governs the whole (to pan) along with it [sc. the god] in accordance with the particular nature of that [god]. For each of the responsible gods cares for the whole cosmos, and not just its own sphere, in accordance with its particular nature, the Sun in a solar manner, Ares in a martial manner, and similarly for the rest – just as the general in a city, even though he is appointed to look after the army in particular, is nevertheless concerned for the whole city and looks after the citizens in his own manner (in the manner of a general), and a judge is likewise concerned for the whole city, though in the manner of a judge.97 Appearing in different forms at different times is equivalent to (anti) settled in one or another of its guises (logos),98 or in all of them variously at different times, in a lunar manner or a solar manner, for example. This most of all fits the individual soul, which changes its form to such an extent as to even become unrecognisable thereafter. So then, as long as it is winged and ensconced with its causes, it governs all things along with the cosmic soul, both it and all the souls of stars, each [soul], in accordance with its own limits, travelling out around the whole of the intelligible99 and the forms within it, discursively contemplating different [forms] at different times. Having shed its wings and grown weak (khalatonein),100 it travels [down], he says, to where it takes hold of something solid. He has derived an opposite from

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[its] opposite: from ‘winged’, ‘having shed its wings’.101 That which is sprouting wings and that which is shedding wings, [i.e. things] which are either beginning to sprout wings or to shed them, are in between the already winged and the already wingless. [A soul], then, that is shedding its wings and beginning to jettison [them] often restores itself and races back up to its own principles, but one that has already shed its wings and sunk down is thereafter eager for settlement (enoikêsis) in the oyster-like [body].102 Since he has called what is enmattered ‘solid’ (stereos), he clearly doesn’t think it right to call the everlasting vehicle of the soul (which is not three-dimensional but planar (epipedos), as being fine and immaterial) ‘solid’; hence he exhorts [us] not to add depth (bathunein) to the planar and make it earthy and damp through a base way of life.103 And perhaps stereos is used on account of its [sc. the enmattered’s] being by nature deprived (stereisthai) of life of the bodily kind;104 for it is [only] after first ensouling it [sc. matter] and irradiating it with life that it [sc. soul] then descends into it. Our [soul], then, is borne down into bodies, being itself greedy for them. The (131) divine souls, on the other hand, do not themselves approach their everlasting bodies, but their bodies, as being well-rounded (eutrokhos),105 approach the souls themselves and are always fastened to them. Again, he has used having settled in an emphatic sense106 (emphantikôs), as [equivalent to] ‘having entered’, ‘having been plunged’ down into it [sc. body]. Some have taken earthy body to apply to the whole of the generated [sphere] (for the whole of the sublunary [sphere] is indeed said to be earthy body), others as applying to this earth. However, this oyster-like body [of ours] would be properly called an earthy body since the greater part of it is earth. Which seems to move itself: because it is [only] apparent self-movement and the last reflection (indalma) of self-movement, it isn’t the actual genuine (kuriôs) self-movement and life of the soul. But one should be aware that the soul receives in exchange the opposite of the things it shares with the body; for after sharing life with it, it is infected with absence of life by it, and after sharing knowledge with it, it is itself filled with ignorance by way of the senses. However, just as the things it gives to the body are apparent and not real (onta), so too do the things it receives in exchange enter it [merely] as far as (akhri) appearance and seeming and only require cleansing.107 How is it that he says that the whole that is [formed] from soul and body is called a living being even though we distinguish between a living being108 and a

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man? It is because he is currently talking about the first generation and framing of the living creature, in which [sc. in the living being] even the rational soul is only seen qua living, [its] reasoning power being shackled109 within it; for, [only] with difficulty, the rational soul in it [sc. in the living being] eventually wakes up and awakens its own intellectual processes, at which point, being mounted [as it is] upon the living being and using it to its own advantage, it also reveals that a human being is different from a living being. It [sc. the living being] was called mortal from110 [its] body, as having mortality within itself; but should you also understand this in relation to [its] soul, then [it will be] because it too thinks mortal thoughts at that time.111 But ‘immortal’ [is applied] without a single reasoned argument: we humans, he is saying, talk of an immortal living being without adducing a single good (orthos) argument [for there being such a thing]. He won’t be directing this at laymen (most people have no ideas at all about the origin of such entities), but at certain philosophers who have such a warped understanding that [according to them] divine living being is produced from the mating of divine soul and divine body, the soul inclining towards the body.112 What? Aren’t there immortal living beings then? And yet he (132) himself, in the Timaeus, clearly wants the stars to be living beings and has moreover added the reason [for this]: they came into being, he says, as living beings bound by ‘indissoluble bonds’.113 And why should it be surprising if they are living beings seeing that he even wants them to be gods and says of the cosmos ‘he created it as a blessed god’ and says ‘gods [children] of gods’ of things [sc. the heavenly bodies] that have a body attached from eternity? We say, then, that he is castigating a warped interpretation here. He wants their vehicles and attached bodies, being well-rounded,114 to have approached the souls of the stars from eternity of their own accord on account of their suitability and to have clung to them, not the soul of a star to have approached a body and to have given itself over, as our [soul does], to the completion of the living being. Conjoined (sumphuein) (246D2) also shows this, for divine bodies do not, as our bodies do, have acquired life, but have inborn (sumphutos) life inherent in them from eternity.

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16. But as for these things, [let them be and be said to be] as pleases the god (246D2-3)

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As for these [issues] concerning divine living beings, he says, let [things] remain in whatever way they have been disposed by the gods and as it pleases them [for them] to be called; for to know what a god is lies beyond the scope of the instruction in hand, for the present goal is to celebrate love and teach [us] of what great goods for us it is the cause.

17. But the reason for the loss of [the soul’s] wings . . . (246D3-4)

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He has come to the shedding of wings on the part of our soul, considering the cause of [this] shedding of wings, for he has said it travels [down] until it takes hold of something solid (246C2-3). [This is] so that, having brought it down to the extremity of evil from the shared revolution it was performing along with the gods, governing the whole cosmos and gazing upon the intelligible forms, he can send it back up through the agency of love to the encosmic gods and the heaven and the ‘place beyond the heaven’ (247C3) and the divine and unchanging (atremês) sights [there] and show of what great goods love is for it [sc. for the soul] the cause. He has not used loss in reference to the wing in its strict sense. The soul never loses the wing it has received from eternity from the Demiurge, for the soul possesses the power both to elevate and to lower from eternity. Rather, loss is [here] equivalent to neglect or want of use.

(133) 18. It is the nature of the power of a wing [to carry up what is heavy, elevating it] . . . (246D6-7) [The] wing of the soul [is what] we called its elevating power. It is therefore opposed to that which weighs the soul down. And what weighs it down is the power which is generative and leads the way down to generation – which [weight] the soul, when furnished with wings, contracts and causes to be borne upwards, and it too, although heavy, is, because the whole of the soul is [now] aligned with its elevating power, also elevated, just as we see the sun evaporate and elevate moisture, which is by nature heavy and travels downwards. If, then, this happens even in the case of bodies, one must suppose that it takes place much more so in the case of the incorporeal powers.

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And you see that here too, just as we took [him to do] in the case of the charioteer and horses, he has now taken the wing of the soul as referring to [its] power, saying: it is the nature of the power of a wing. One should not understand up simply in a local sense but in relation to life and value and excelling in worthiness; for this is [what] elevating [conveys].

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19. . . . to where the race of the gods dwells (246D7) The ‘dwelling of a god’ would mean the station (taxis) and particular nature of each, its hearth and remaining (monê);115 for each god is not in a separate [dwelling] in the way that we are said to be in a dwelling, but is in itself. So its remaining and its particular nature is its dwelling.116

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20. And, [in a way,] it [most of all among the things connected with the body] has a share of [the divine] (246D7-8) This is rather difficult to sort out but should be understood as follows. (It will be necessary to start [our] account from the top.) The powers and activities of the gods are in the first place in them, but some are also all around the whole cosmos, but directly around intellect. Again, the powers of intellect are all around soul; for they surround soul on all sides and keep it safe. Again, [of] the powers of soul, there are some that reach up to the things higher than it, and there are those that are proper to it qua soul, by (kata) which it contemplates itself, and there are those that are around body, exercising providential care over body and taking care of it. Of the powers of the soul connected with the body, then, the power of the wing most of all has a share of the divine in that it raises [us] up to the gods.

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(134) 21. And the divine is beautiful (kalos), [wise, and good, and everything else of that nature] (246D8-E1) These three [qualities] are seen to range through everything there is. They are in the intelligible [gods], in the intellective, in the hypercosmic, and in the encosmic, in its own manner (idiôs) in each case.117 So, in the intelligible gods, if you consider the stated [qualities] in relation to their intellects, since in intellects there are intellect, intellection, intelligible, though all in intelligible

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mode, the beautiful will relate to intellect, in which [is located] the beauty of the forms and [their] variegated loveliness (it is in relation to this that there is the possibility of reversion), the wise will relate to intellection (for understanding, knowledge, and wisdom are seen in intellection), while the good will relate to the intelligible (for it is this, as being perfect and desirable, that completes the intellect; for in the Philebus118 too he said that these, [i.e.] the perfect, the sufficient, and the desirable, are the elements of the good – he means by ‘sufficient’ that which gives a share of goodness to other things).119 But if you should consider the beautiful, the wise, and the good in relation to what is above their [sc. the gods’] intellect, this is what one should say. There is a kind of light that emanates from the good which he [sc. Plato] has, in assigning causes (aitiologia), called120 ‘truth’. And he has also stated in the Philebus121 that it is impossible for human thought (dianoia) to grasp the form of the good by simple direct apprehension (epibolê). Since, then, the aforesaid light emanates immediately from the good, it remains even above form and simplicity. So it is impossible to encompass it by means of a single act of direct apprehension or circumscription, but, by dividing it up in thought, he says, we will more easily discern it. Accordingly he views it as something threefold: as loveliness insofar as, by flashing on all other things, it makes them beautiful; as truth insofar as it is the cause of their knowing or being known for [all] other things; as simplicity122 insofar as it is the cause of measure for all other things – for measure is simple, on account of which in the Laws he has called123 god the measure of all things; and indeed simplicity and measure are characteristic of the good, for the good measures all things. And everything else of that nature means (anti) anything else there may be akin to these three, as for instance the simple, the proportionate, the perfect, the overflowing, and anything else like these.

22. Now by these [above all] is [the soul’s plumage] nourished [and strengthened, but through the ugly, the evil, and the [other] opposites, it withers and perishes] (246E1-4) The nourishment of the soul is the perfection that comes down to it from [its] superiors; it is not like [the nourishment] among us that involves (kata) excretion and qualitative change. Beautiful and good things and intellective

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knowledge, then, are always proffered by the gods, (135) and the soul brings itself to them and distances itself from them. And when it brings itself to [them], it is strengthened and is active with regard to all of its powers and comes to be at its most powerful; but when it keeps away, it is straitened and weak and becomes a slave of those things over which, when it travelled around with the gods, it exercised providential care. And if it approaches the ugly (to aiskhron) (which means matter) and the evil (which means to give itself to multiplicity and division and to have associated with those things that are ignorant and foolish, which means with bodies), it shatters the power of its wings and render them idle; for withers indicates this. Perishes because the fall into a body is death of the soul, for it is then inactive with regard to its highest activities. He hasn’t called the ugly, the ignorant, and the evil the opposites of the beautiful, the wise and the good that are [found] among the gods (there is nothing that is opposite to those up there), but has called them the opposites of beautiful and wise and good things here among us – in the way that darkness is the opposite of the light down here. For it certainly isn’t [the opposite] of the light in the sun; rather, it is of the light among us and [here] on earth [that] the darkness here is the opposite.124

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23. The great leader [in heaven, Zeus, driving a winged chariot, goes first, ordering and taking care of all things; and him the host of gods and daemons follows] (246E4-6) First, let’s examine the continuity of what is said here with what precedes it, for it seems to be detached, so to speak, [from it]. We shall say that since he earlier said of soul that when it is perfect and [still] winged, it travels on high and governs the whole cosmos, but a [soul] that has shed its wings travels [down] until [it reaches a place] where it takes hold of something solid (246B7-C3), he wants here to present the gods responsible for ascent – how they are leaders of the whole cosmos, and how they turn all things towards the intelligible, and [how] when the soul has devoted itself to these very [gods], then it too governs the universe and is led up to the intelligible and contemplates the things outside the heaven, but when it stands aloof from them it is borne down.

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At this point we need to ask who Zeus is and who the twelve gods are. Some125 have understood [them to be] the twelve spheres of the cosmos, [namely,] that of the fixed [stars], the seven planetary ones,126 and the four elements, and have placed Zeus in the region of the fixed [stars] because he guides everything and Hestia on earth because of her immobility. Others [have taken them to be] the souls of these spheres, [still] others,127 in a yet more pared back manner (136) (katharôteron) than these, as the intellects mounted upon these souls. Against these people one must say that each of the twelve is said to govern the whole cosmos, whereas each soul, constituting as it does, along with its own sphere, a single living being, for that very reason is not compelled to care for the others but is in fact itself dependent on the universe (ta hola). And anyway, how is it that they say that the earth’s soul, or its intellect, is immobile? There is no ground for that. Is it perhaps that the earth, which is immobile, is attached to them [sc. to its soul and intellect]? But in the first place not even the earth itself is immobile, for part by part it comes to be or is destroyed, grows or dies, and undergoes qualitative change. And secondly Hestia is the cause of their remaining (monê) for the gods that participate in [it] – and [besides,] what effect could the corporeal nature of the earth have on the other gods? There are [also] those128 who interpret [the passage] as follows: they take Zeus to be the sun and say that the whole cosmos is subordinated to him; and they say that Hestia is the sign of the zodiac (dôdekatêmorion)129 in which the sun is situated, because it lingers (menein) in it,130 and that the other eleven zodiacal signs are co-creators with it; and they take the host to be the decadarchic gods131 and the fate-guiding daemons. But these people don’t grasp the full theory either, even though they do all say something that resembles it; for these things have been distributed (diairein) in the cosmos [by them] in a manner that resembles the truth. However, the divine Iamblichus, seizing upon the name of Zeus, transfers the account to the one Demiurge of the cosmos, who is talked of in the Timaeus.132 We, marvelling at the insight (epibolê) of the man in these matters too, add only this much, that one should not simply understand Zeus as the one and transcendent Demiurge, for this transcendent Demiurge does not have his own division of the host which is distinguished from other divisions of the host, and nor is he more akin to these, less to those, but is equally present

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to all.133 But we [were] associated with (peri) Zeus here, others with another of the gods.134 We, then, following Plato and the theologians, maintain this.135 After the demiurgic monad, the one transcendent Zeus, there are three Zeuses, [namely,] Zeus, Poseidon, Pluto, this [constituting] a kind of Zeusian triad [following] after that transcendent monad, the Zeus before these three.136 And each of these three has four gods under him, one that provides being, one [that provides] life, one that is the cause of guardianship and unwavering permanence – a kind of guardian god – and one that is the cause of reversion and of things that proceed reaching back up to their own origins. So there are three [gods] that are the (137) cause of their being and existing for all things, for bodies, for souls, and for intellects, three [that are the cause] of [their] having life, three of their being guarded and remaining unshaken, and three of their reverting upon their own origins. In this way three lots of four become twelve, a perfect measure and the entire number of the gods, for this twelfth among the numbers is born when the third, which is perfect, and the fourth which is generative,137 have been multiplied together and commingled. Now, of the three gods among the twelve who provide being the first is Zeus. For just as, after the first and transcendent monad, the Zeusian, in the next triad, which is wholly Zeusian, the very first of the three is called by the name Zeus, but theology has altered the names of the others, calling the one Poseidon, the other Pluto,138 so too, although the twelve gods are all Zeusian, [only] the very first of them is called by the name Zeus. And, while being of the same rank as the other eleven, he has a leadership role of the kind [that is found] among those of the same rank, on account of which he is called the great leader in heaven. And these twelve [gods] are leaders of all the rest – of the encosmic gods and of the angels and of all of the other kinds [of beings] that the philosopher has indicated by [his reference to] the daemonic. And these twelve [gods] are divided into six males and six females, for it is thus that they were honoured at Olympia too, having six altars and being honoured in pairs. And the philosopher states these things as coming from [his] Attic forebears. And of the six male [gods], three are demiurgic, three protective, of the six female, three lifeproducing, three responsible for reversion (epistreptikos).139 Zeus and Hestia [both] lead them all, but Zeus specifically the males, Hestia the females. That Homer too knew these three Zeuses, the transcendent one, the first among the three, and the first among the twelve, and the sole (autos) goddess

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Hestia [too], he shows through the following verses.140 ‘Nor did anyone dare / abide his coming, but they all stood up before him’.141 There he is talking about the one and transcendent Zeus.142 He has Poseidon say, (138) ‘for we are three sons of Cronus’; ‘and Zeus was allotted the heaven’; ‘and powerful though he be, let him keep to his one third share’.143 And there he is clearly talking about the three Zeuses.144 [In] the [verse] ‘on the twelfth day he will come back to Olympus’,145 and [the verse] ‘for Zeus [went] to Oceanus, to the blameless Ethiopians’146 he is talking about the Zeus of third emanation (apostasis),147 the one among the twelve [gods], by ‘Ethiopians’ indicating the entire unseen and intelligible. That this Zeus leads all things up to the intelligible, Plato also states as follows, concordantly with this: and him the host of gods and daemons follows. Since the twelfth number has been produced from the perfect number, the third, and the generative one, the fourth, in combination, embracing the whole divine order (diakosmos) of the gods, and [since] the principles of the third and fourth [numbers] are a monad and a dyad, the ether will be the monad, chaos the dyad, the egg (for it is perfect) the triad, and Phanes the tetrad – as Orpheus also says: ‘with four eyes, glancing hither and thither’.148 It is one thing to say that the whole order of the gods is completed at the dodecad as being a perfect number and being produced from the first numbers in combination, and whatever else is usually said, but another again to say that the leaders of the cosmos are twelve as being observed to be of the same rank (for they are all hypercosmic, and Hecate is said to bring the twelve together,149 as defining the limits of the whole divine number and Dionysus to have been allotted the thirteenth [place] as coming after the gods and being one of the divinised150 [gods]). Here the twelve are not in one but [present] in a different manner which is indicative of the order in all of them. The order is not like other kind[s] in other things but the being of the gods itself is their order. And order is threefold: either qua transcendent, like that in the transcendent Zeus, from which order that in the twelve is also (139) derived; or as in the ordered things themselves, like that in the twelve themselves; or, third, as that in bestowal, like that bestowed upon inferior things and upon the entire cosmos from the twelve themselves.151 Some have applied the numbers in the decad arithmetically to each [member] of the decad152 (having excluded the two monads, the Zeusian,153 and that of Hestia), assigning the monad to Apollo, the dyad to Hera, the triad

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to Poseidon (hence he is ‘trident-wielding’), the fourth number to Hermes, the fifth to Ares, the sixth to Aphrodite, the seventh to Athena, the eighth to Demeter, the ninth to Artemis, the tenth to Hephaestus. But one should not simply read [the passage] arithmetically in this way but should [see] that each [of the gods] creates and exercises providential care according to its own particular character, one in the manner of Ares, one in the manner of Apollo, and the others in other ways.154 What the particular character of each [of the gods] is one must learn from theology. One must learn it from both their causes and their rank (taxis) (since often they [sc. the gods] derive from the same causes), from both their essences and the powers they receive, from the agencies that have produced them, from their activities, and from their good order (eutaxia) and the like. The words of Zeus, for example, are bestowals of certain powers, as when he says to Aphrodite: ‘Not to you, my child, are given warlike deeds; / instead, occupy yourself with the delightful business of marriage’.155 There are, then, certain characteristics [present] in the numbers that replicate (apomimeisthai) the characteristics [present] in the gods, which is why they are dedicated to them. Purity (to akhranton), for instance, [is present] in the seventh [number] (for the seventh [number] neither generates nor is generated), because of which it is dedicated to Athena.156 And perfection [is present] in the twelfth, because of which it is devoted to the liberated (apolutos) gods – the twelve [gods] currently under discussion are individually (idiôs) liberated, [but] jointly (koinôs) hypercosmic [gods] who perfect the entire cosmos; hence, although they are numberless, they are said to be twelve and each of them is one-twelve, for twelve is a symbol of perfection.157 Great shows his superiority to the other [gods] – ‘Why does that great god command me?’ [says Thetis in the Iliad]158 – and Leader [shows] his transcendence and his sovereignty, for it is possible to be great but not transcendent, and transcendent but not greater than the [other] leaders, for which reason Plato has used both, saying great leader. (140) In heaven because, even though the whole cosmos benefits from him, the heaven does so much more in that it is more akin [to him] and more adapted to participating in the god. Chariot and horses of the gods should be understood as their secondary and tertiary powers (which [their] primary [ones] direct), by which Zeus leads

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upwards both himself and the whole host of gods and daemons which is subjected to him, and, in a word, everything that is dependent on him. And if one also wants to mount him on a vehicle,159 one would mount him on Olympus, that is, the firmaments160 above the [sphere of] the fixed [stars], which is yet more winged161 than [the sphere of] the fixed [stars]. He said winged, not ‘with lowered wings’ on the ground that he is always elevated and takes all else along with him. Driving stands for directing and elevating and ordering all things. Goes first because, journeying to the intelligible himself and establishing himself among his own origins, he takes everything else along with him. Ordering stands for creating. Taking care of stands for deeming worthy of providential care (pronoia). For it is both the case that his providential care creates and that his creating exercises providential care (pronoein); but there is a difference in the notions, for the one has the role of giving existence to things, the other of preserving [them].

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The twelve are leaders of the whole host and, in accordance with the [number of] leaders, the host itself is divided into twelve. But since the company under Hestia is seen to be at rest and not in motion, he has with reason said that those who follow, in that they are seen to be in motion and ascent, are marshalled in eleven sections (meros). For, given that there are twelve leaders and twelve companies, one under each [leader], and that Hestia alone of the leaders along with her host is conceived to be at rest and in a state of immobility, eleven companies (including the company of Zeus himself) are with reason said to follow Zeus. But why isn’t Hestia also led up? The other gods also remain and have a hearth (hestia)162 and a resting-place [like her]. Well, one must say that the two [sc. going up and remaining] are in each of the gods – or, rather, the three, for each of them remains and proceeds and reverts, being led back up to its beginnings – but each [of them] is characterised by a different [one of the three] and Zeus is the cause of all things being led upwards; and Hestia of all

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things being established and remaining in their own order, [the order] to which they were assigned, and of their being established in their own beginnings; and Hera and the life-producing gods163 of their procession. He has said ‘host’ in the (141) singular and not ‘hosts’, indicating their shared organisation and oneness and unity. And he has not called it a ‘troupe’ (khoros) but a ‘host’, [thereby] indicating its invincibility and coherence and its being led upwards displaying (meta) endeavour and zeal.164 For their creative acts producing (eis) secondary things are called ‘amusements’,165 whereas the ascent to the intelligible is likened to an expedition (stratia);166 for these above all are the pursuits of the gods. But what is in eleven sections meant to indicate? Well, one must say that he has divided this dodecad in two, into a monad and a hendecad, where he says marshalled in eleven sections, for Hestia alone remains in the dwelling-place of the gods; and, moreover, into three, into two monads – that of Hestia and that of Zeus, since the latter leads all things upwards and the former settles all things [in their place] – and the decad of the remaining leaders, which is itself a kind of perfect monad.167 The division into a monad and a hendecad indicates that things remain in position (histasthai) in just one way (monakhôs) but are led upwards in many ways and with respect to all their powers. And in fact the monad (monas) was so named from [the verb] ‘to remain’ (menein), for the monad qua monad, and the uncompounded qua uncompound, will never move (kineisthai).168 So since eleven has both a monad and a decad in it, the former containing in a concentrated and unified manner the forms of all the numbers, the latter [containing them] in a plurified and unfolded manner, in such a way that each of them [sc. the monad and the decad] is perfect,169 but as the decad is nonetheless defined through the monad, on account of this he used in eleven [sections] as equivalent to: ‘their ascent to the intelligible takes place in a perfect manner’. For their primary, their intermediate, and their last powers are led upwards and are all ensconced there; and thence empowered, they then lead and take care of the things that come after them. The threefold division into monad, decad, and monad, on the other hand, indicates that all things (onta) both (1) remain in their own causes, and (2) proceed from them, and (3) return again to their causes and reach up to their own beginnings. And by Hestia he understands their stability and the cause of

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their ensconcement (enidrusis); and by Zeus they170 understand the cause of return and ascent, and by the remaining decadic monad the cause of the demiurgic procession; for procession and division are more indicative of the plurified nature of both them [sc. of the gods of the decad] and the Zeuses,171 for different things enter into being in different ways [and] through different agencies, since all [of the gods] create all things, but each in his own way (oikeiôs) according to his particular nature. And if some say that Hestia is the earth one must be aware that it [sc. the earth] is called [Hestia only] through participation and as her [sc. Hestia’s] final image (agalma),172 since the earth in fact moves.173 But each thing is named according to what is predominate [in it]; since even if we call the very centre of the earth ‘Hestia’, or the poles, or being (142) in the intermediate genera, or existence and being in the first genera,174 one must be aware that all of these are called ‘Hestia’ by participation. Since even if we say that the centre of the earth or the poles stay still, even if they are locally motionless they nevertheless move in the manner of living things. And again, even if the rest of the body of the heaven is always moving, it has its being everlasting and its always being the same and unchanging175 from Hestia. So all things partake of stationariness as well [as other qualities], but are referred to (legein) according to what is predominate [in each] and is more conformable [to their nature] (oikeioteros). Hence someone praying to Hestia must face towards the poles as towards a region that is more her own (oikeioteros) and and her everlasting image; and [others, praying] to other [gods, face] elsewhere, according to the associations (oikeiotês) of each [god]. One should be aware that theology furnishes not only the Zeus that leads the eleven with horses but also the threefold Zeus, [i.e.] Zeus, Poseidon, [and] Pluto, and, moreover, the single transcendent Zeus himself. And what is surprising [about this] seeing that [they do the same] for his father Cronus and his forefather Uranus,176 and, even further back, Phanes himself? For theology furnishes this last with horses first [of all] as being the first to travel away from his own origins, since it is also through this that marriage first takes place; and, in short, anyone it assigns activity to it also furnishes with horses. And to this very same first ruler (despotês) Phanes they also give wings: ‘borne to and fro on golden wings’177 [they say of him]. In the dwelling-place of the gods is equivalent to ‘in herself ’, for the particular nature of each god is said to be its dwelling-place; for they are not each in a

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different place in the way that we are [each] said to be in [a separate] dwellingplace, but the associations and the particular nature of each god, through which it has its existence (histasthai)178 and is characterised, and through which it also exercises providential care over the cosmos, is called its dwellingplace.

25. Many and blessed [are the sights and the pathways (diexodos) within the heaven on which the race of happy gods moves to and fro, each performing his own [task], and whoever is at any time (aiei) willing and able follows [them], for jealousy is located outside of the divine choir] (247A4-7) Having said of the Zeus who leads all things and of the other leaders that they take with them to the intelligible, in their longing for it, gods and daemons and all things able to follow them, he wants next to tell of the sights that those who are led upwards see. He divides these into three, into those within the heaven, those under the vault beneath the heaven,179 and those outside the heaven. And by ‘heaven’ here one (143) is not to understand this perceptible heaven.180 For how could the gods be described as happy and as having the bliss of viewing (thea) [wonderful sights] on account of the sights (thea) within this [perceptible] heaven when not even for the good man ?181 For us indeed who live by our senses, gazing at it is better than [looking] at anything else, but it certainly isn’t the case that this constitutes the happiness of either the gods that lead or of the gods that follow [them]. Some have laughably said: ‘in fact they take pleasure in observing human societies (politeia), as Zeus in Homer delighted “in looking down upon the city of the Trojans and the army of the Achaeans”182 and “in looking away, to the land of the horse-herding Thracians” ’.183 But it is clear that it is not by turning [their attention] to us that they exercise providential care over us; rather, absorbed in their own blessed state, they arrange our affairs well by their very existence.184 One must abandon these beliefs and this perceptible heaven and understand that Uranus is meant, the highest of the intellective gods, whom the theologians call the father of Cronus and the forefather of Zeus. There are in fact many orders of intellective gods185 [ranging] from Uranus to Zeus and many forms – primary, intermediate, and last; more universal and more particular;186 more massed together and all-embracing, more spread out

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(koilos); both sources and principles – to all of which Zeus raises up the things that follow after him. Sights is more appropriate to intellect and discursions (diexodos)187 to soul and both fit both but in a manner appropriate to each; for in the case of soul sight too is discursive and in that of intellect too discursion 188 in respect of (kata) having gone through (diexodeuein). By the race of happy gods he means the powers of the first and encosmic gods. And happy also, as the divine Iamblichus says, ‘as [used] of those who provide happiness’. And it is [also] possible to take happiness [as asserted] of the gods themselves owing to their following their leaders and always staying close to them.189 Each performing his own [task]:190 that is to say, one [working] in a solar manner, another a lunar, another in the manner of Ares, and, in a word, each according to his own particular nature – something he also said earlier [in the words] each in the position he has been assigned (247A3-4). Plato extends happiness even to the (144) gods and, as he said in the Laws,191 to non-rational creatures. And whoever is at any time (aiei) willing and able follows [them] is said of our souls; for what was said earlier was said of classes [of beings] superior to us. For envy is located outside of the divine choir: not because the gods don’t envy us, for this isn’t even such a big thing to say of a good man here [on earth].192 Rather freedom from envy indicates the plenitude of their goodness and providential care and of [their] ceaseless bestowal of good things and conferring of bounties (kala). Is located is well [chosen], for it [sc. jealousy] is not at one time nearer to them, at another further away but always uniformly gives them a wide berth and shuns them.

26. But when [they go] to a feast and to a banquet, [they proceed uphill to beneath (hupo)193 the surface (akros) of the vault beneath the heaven, to which the vehicles of the gods, with even balance, . . . travel easily, but the rest with difficulty; for the horse that has a share of wickedness is heavy, sinking towards the earth and weighing down a charioteer by whom it has not been well schooled] (247A8-B5)

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‘Feast’ (dais) is the perfection that has come to them from above and the fulfilment falling to each in accordance with its particular limits. Hence a portion (meris) is a feast and to distribute (merizein) is to share out (dateisthai).194 ‘Banquet’ is their common and collective enjoyment of and being filled to repletion (plêrôsis) with the good things [they receive]; for both common and individual good comes to them from the higher [regions].195 Their taking their fill, then, and the overflowing perfection of the goods [they receive] has been called a banquet. To beneath (hupo) the surface (akros) of the vault beneath the heaven means [to] the orders of gods directly attached to Uranus, or to some others [sc. orders of gods] between Uranus and Cronus. Accordingly he says that the vehicles of the gods are always suited to travelling uphill. And by vehicles he means their secondary powers, or their attached bodies themselves.196 With even balance because they [sc. the vehicles] are careful (pronoein)197 and are being led up to their own origins; and they do both these [things] at once equally and in the same way. Or else with even balance is equivalent to ‘justly’. But the [vehicles] of the rest, he says, [climb] with difficulty, meaning our [vehicles], which are of a nature to be damaged and which dip towards [the realm of] generation. For, he says, the horse of wickedness – that is, the generative power in us – is heavy; and this does not allow [us] to interpret the vehicle and horses as the luminous body.198 He says both sinking and weighing down: on the one hand sinking [downwards] itself as being heavy with the generative power, on the other weighing down, that is to say, dragging down all the rest of the soul as well.

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(145) 27. Here its ultimate distress and struggle awaits the soul (247B5-6) Soul: he means our [soul], the particular [soul], for it is often his way to call the particular [soul simply] ‘soul’. [He says] that it experiences ‘distress’ on account of the coruscation and brilliance199 [which dazzle it] until it becomes accustomed to the divine light. And ‘struggle’ (agôn) we shall understand consistently with what is said by him elsewhere200 about the three wrestling falls.

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Ultimate as being the last and without another [struggle] after it for those who are ascending, or the first for those who are descending; for there awaits a struggle (athlon)201 to either come to be among the gods or fall to the earth, [and] hence [it is] ultimate.

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28. For the [souls] that are called immortal (247B6) He first talks about the divine souls (as far as [the words] and this is the life of the gods (248A1)), and then in what follows [after that] about ours. He said called [immortal] not because they are [really] mortal (for all souls, both divine ones and ours, are immortal), but [it is] because their being immortal goes without saying and is perfectly obvious in the case of divine [souls], so that anyone at all knows that divine souls are immortal, [that] he has used called;202 [and] in fact our individual soul, as being corrupted, admits dispute as to whether it is immortal.

29. [For the souls that are called immortal], when [they come] to the top (akron), [proceeding outside, stand on the surface of the heaven, and as they stand the rotation carries them around and they contemplate the things outside the heaven. But of the place beyond the heaven no poet from among those here [on earth] has as yet sung or ever will sing worthily] (247B6-C4) 30 152,1

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There being two ‘tops’, the one at the concave periphery, the other at the convex, when he said the vault beneath the heaven, he was referring to the concave one, that is, to the gods directly attached to Uranus, but now outside and the ‘surface’ (nôton) [of the heaven] mean the convex [periphery, that is,] the entire realm of Uranus itself;203 for ‘surface’ also shows the unified and all-embracing [nature] of the realm of Uranus, just as with us the surface is around the whole of the rest of the body on the outside, even and smooth204 and one and simple; through all of which he indicates the single embrace and unified divinity of the realm of Uranus. What about when? For the divine souls don’t come to the intelligible at one time, at another not. This is characteristic of our [souls]. [The answer is that] when does not mean the chronological ‘when’ but [refers to] the characteristic property of the soul’s thinking (noêsis), [namely,] it’s always grasping forms

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step by step and discursively (diexodikôs); for their [sc. the gods’] intellects are always present to the things (onta) themselves, grasping the whole of the intelligible all at once, but their souls [grasp them] step by step (146) or this one after that. Since, then, the intellects always see the same thing all at once but we [only] at a particular time, there had also to be a mean, [namely,] the divine souls, which are always there, but view the forms discursively and step by step and not all at once.205 Or else [it is] like this. Since the divine souls too are multi-powered, they have some powers that are linked to the intelligibles and the surface of the heaven, others that are in the midst of the heaven itself, and, last, those that see the things within the heaven. Since, then, the divine souls are active with all their powers, when they come to the top stands for ‘when they are seen acting with their primary powers’. They contemplate the things outside the heaven: he has divided the ascents themselves and the happy and blessed sights into three, describing some of them as within the heaven – those which are in the realm of Cronus and the midmost manifestation (ekphaneia) of the intellective gods,206 and which he has also called ‘discursions’ (diexodos) as being more complex than those that precede them207 – some as within the vault itself of the heaven, and some as sights outside above the heaven, just as we say that those possessed by a god are out of their wits. But why [does he say] they stand (histanai) on the surface of the heaven? They certainly didn’t become idle once they got up there; the further they ascend the stronger and more active they become. Well, he is showing that they are no longer positioned (histanai) qua individual [souls] nor at all according to their own activities, but, having closed down, as it were, their own activities, engage in the activity of the whole heaven, living in the heavenly manner, in just the same way that a possessed person here [on earth] is not positioned according to his own activity but according to that of the god.208 As they stand, then, and are inactive as far as their own activities go, the heaven and the [process of] heavenly intellection (noêsis)209 carries them round, for it causes them to intuit the intelligibles above it and to intelligise210 after the manner of heavenly intellection. The things outside the heaven are the Nights, which he also calls the place beyond the heaven.211 But why does he say that neither has any of the poets that have gone before sung worthily of the place beyond the heaven and nor [will] any of those to

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come? He certainly isn’t so full of himself [as to believe] that he alone sings of [it] worthily. Rather, what is meant is something like this. If we understand by poets those at a third remove from the truth (Republic 597E), that is, the multitude of human poets here [on earth], and so exclude from reckoning Homer and Orpheus (for this place has been spoken of by them, and by Hesiod and Musaeus),212 the truth of the statement is quite evident, [namely,] that of such poets, the run of the mill and [merely] technically skilled ones, (147) none has touched upon these things worthily, but [only some] of the inspired poets, such as Homer and Orpheus.213 But if we understand absolutely all poets, so that Homer and Orpheus are included, it is clear that he is also including himself, so that he won’t be able to speak of [it] worthily either – just as though he had said ‘none of the human beings [involved] in poetry will sing worthily of the place beyond the heaven but only Apollo and the choir of the Muses’.

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Why, after saying that no one will sing worthily of the place beyond the heaven (247C2-3), does he now say for surely one must be bold enough to speak the truth? Well, the truth as in human notions (ennoia) [of it] is meant; and, moreover, it is possible to speak the truth but not worthily [of the subject], as someone who says that Socrates is not evil, or not irreverent, speaks the truth but not worthily of him in the way that someone who says that he is good and wise and right-thinking in religious matters and dear to the gods does, for someone who says these things [of him] is praising him in a worthy manner. So he is saying something similar about the place beyond the heaven. Especially when one is talking about the truth: [when one is talking] entirely esoterically (aporrêtôs) and in a theological vein (theologikôs) is meant, for by ‘truth’ they mean the whole order of the Nights, and if he speaks of the plain of truth (248B6) later, he is hinting at them, and the theologians locate truth there in particular. Indeed, talking about Night, Orpheus says: ‘for she has of the gods’,214 and ‘he gave her an absolutely undeceiving skill in divination’.215 And this [goddess] is said to make prophecies for the gods. And Homer too has referred to (endeiknunai) her; for in one place only has he mentioned the

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name of Night: talking about Zeus, he says: ‘if Night, tamer of gods and men, had not saved [me], / to whom, in flight, I came as a suppliant, and he, though angry, halted, / for he feared to do anything that was displeasing to swift Night’.216 He [sc. Plato] says that he will be speaking of her daringly (tolmêrôs)217 because he is going to talk about (148) her in negative terms and there is a fear that we may be borne down into the formless and indefinite owing to the lack (khêron) of form in teachings of that kind. He talks about this [goddess] in a manner that is concordant with what is said about the first principle in the Parmenides, for he elucidated that too by means of negative statements. But of (epi) the first principle he denied absolutely everything218 while of the place beyond the heaven he denies some things and asserts others, since the goddess is higher than some orders [of gods] but lower than others, and just as the first is beyond being (huperousios) this is beyond the heaven. I asked why the souls are not [only] said to see the heaven but to be in it and to be joined with it whereas they are not said to be joined with the things above the heaven but only to see them. [In reply] to this it was stated that union (sunaphê) must only exist up to a certain point. But why [only] up to this point? Because not even the gods below Zeus are said to be united with Phanes but only Zeus, and [even] he through the mediation of Night.219

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31. Colourless and shapeless [and intangible] being, [[being] which truly is, which is visible to, mind, the steersman of the soul alone [and] with which the class of true knowledge is concerned, occupies this place] (247C6-D1) In what sense is he using colourless? Is it in the sense that we call both nature220 and the soul colourless? And what is surprising or out of the ordinary about this in the case of the place beyond the heaven given that both nature and the soul have it? Well, Plato has attended very closely to the words of the theologians and composes his own account following them. For after the order of the Nights there are three orders of gods, [those] of Uranus, of the Cyclopes, and of the Hundred-handers, of which [sc. the Nights] he221 denies the terms (onoma) proper to (oikeios) these [latter three orders of gods]. For since, of those that remained in Phanes himself, Uranus first visibly emerged from him (for Uranus and Ge first came forth from him, ‘and he displayed them visibly

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after they had been invisible, they who exist by birth’),222 and [since] Uranus is the first to be illuminated by the divine light of Phanes (for he says that Night is united with him: (149) ‘as first-born nobody set eyes on him, / save holy Night alone; all the others / looked in amazement at an unexpected light in the ether; / so brightly gleamed the colour (khroos) of immortal Phanes’),223 and [since] the visible and the illuminated have colour, for colours are lights of a kind, Night and the entire place beyond the heaven, being above the first visible [being], Uranus, are with reason said to be colourless. And if because night is also opposed to day as regards being illuminated and coloured it is on that account called colourless, that would be reasonable too. By colourless he has indicated that the place of the Nights is above the realm of Uranus and by shapeless that it is also above the order of the Cyclopes. For theology states that shape appears among these [sc. the Cyclopes] first and that these gods are the first beginnings (arkhê) and causes of shapes everywhere. Hence theology calls them ‘Handworkers’. For this triad is what perfects shapes; ‘a round eye was set in their brows’, [says224 Hesiod]; and if Plato speaks of ‘straight’ and ‘round’ in the Parmenides,225 he is hinting at this order of [gods]. And these [gods] teach Athena and Hephaestus the varied forms of shapes as being originally responsible for shapes: ‘the first handworkers, who to Hephaestus and Athena / taught all things (panta)’.226 So if we hear that both Hephaestus and Athena are responsible for shapes, we shall not be surprised: for Hephaestus is the cause of all shape in bodies and of all encosmic shape227 and Athena of psychic and (150) intellective [shape],228 while the Cyclopes, it is clear, [are responsible] for divine shape and for shape overall; and the place beyond the heaven is above the order of the Cyclopes.229 By intangible he indicates that [the place beyond the heaven] is also above the Hundred-handers. For these latter are ‘first’ in that they touch the whole creation. [IT is] for this reason [that] theology calls them Hundred-handers, for we touch and make and distinguish everything with our hands. And, moreover, the sense of touch pervades the whole body. Theology, then, has symbolically named these [gods] Hundred-handers because they touch the entire creation and are responsible for it. The triad of the Hundred-handers is protective.230 And [as for] Plato, what he has found positively (kataphatikôs) stated by the theologian he has conveyed negatively (apophatikôs), for what the latter has called Night he has [described as] colourless, and what the latter expressed in

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negative terms231 [in the words] ‘he gave her undeceiving skill in [the] divination of all things’232 he has stated positively [in the words] with which the class of true knowledge is concerned, being which truly is;233 [for] having cited three negative [terms], he in turn (palin) adds three positive ones, advancing three [that are] drawn from being (on).234 For, since this order is a single triad, he has with reason preserved the triadic both in the negative [statements] and in the positive ones. Or else, since it is both a one and a being (for this noetic complex is called ‘one being’) and is also triadic as regards both, [that is,] both as regards the one and as regards the being, he shows [us] the negative [propositions] in relation to the One beyond being and the positive ones in relation to being. And here the first number also makes its appearance.235

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32. [Visible to mind,] the steersman of the soul [alone] (247C7-8) The divine Iamblichus takes the steersman to be the one of the soul and the charioteer to be its intellect. Visible (theatos) not because he [sc. the steersman] grasps this intelligible [sc. the place beyond the heaven] in otherness, but because he is in union with it and enjoys it in that manner. This shows that the steersman is something more perfect than the charioteer and the horses; for the one of the soul is of its nature in union with the gods.236 The objection does not at all tell against him if someone should observe that Plato goes on to say: So, inasmuch as the thought237 (dianoia) (151) of a god is nourished by reason (nous) and uncontaminated knowledge (247D1-2); for to this it will be said that each thing is nourished in its own fashion, thought through knowing and discursive thinking, the intellect intellectively, its [sc. the soul’s] one in a divine fashion.

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33. [Being] . . . with which the [class] of true [knowledge] is concerned,238 [occupies this place] (247C8-D1) He does not mean the truth by consensus (sumphônia) but [the truth] whose being and essence lies in its agreement (sundromê) with the true [state of affairs] and this is [what it is] for it to be the truth; or, as the theologian has put it, ‘he gave her undeceiving skill in [the] divination of all things’. You see that mantic grasps all of time at once and sees future things and past things as

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present: ‘who knew what was, and what would be, and what had been before’,239 [says Homer]. That, then, which embraces all truth in a unified form the theologian has called ‘divination’ and Plato the genus of knowledge, which has brought together in itself in a unified form all instances of knowledge. So what the former called ‘undeceiving’ the latter called ‘true’. Occupies this place we shall understand appropriately [to real being]. For matter is the place of enmattered forms; and [that of] bodies is the empty expanse (diastêma) of the cosmos; and the place of images is the imagination; and that of thoughts the mind (dianoia); and intellect is the place of forms240 with [true] being241 and of [the place] beyond the heaven, which place we shall appropriately understand as being the compass of the divine forms. It is possible to talk about anything in two ways, either about its essence and its, as it were, underlying nature (hupokeimenon) or about its criterion,242 [and] Plato uses both. Exactly as in the Timaeus 243[the question] ‘what is it that always is and has no becoming, and what is it that is coming to be but never is?’ is formulated (hermêneuein) from the essence of the things and [the answer] ‘the former [is] grasped by thought employing (meta) reason, the latter, in contrast, [is] conjectured (doxastos) by opinion employing (meta) non-rational sense perception’ [formulated] from the criteria and the states of knowledge and comprehension associated with them, just so does he proceed here. For [the words] colourless and (152) shapeless and intangible being that really is (247C6-7) are expressive of (hermêneutikos) the underlying nature of the thing, some of its one, others of its being, as we have said244 (for it is ‘one being’), and visible to the steersman of the soul alone (247C7) [expressive] of the criterion, while class of true knowledge embraces the complex [of one and being]. He did well to add alone to the steersman. In the Timaeus, because absolutely all of the intelligible was under discussion, he said ‘grasped by thought employing (meta) reason’, but here, since the topic is the truly highest intelligibles, he has said visible to the steersman of the soul alone; for the one of the soul is able to be in union with the highest intelligibles. For even if the active intellect that is ensconced above it is always contemplating the things with [real] being, this has nothing to do with our soul, for it is ours [only] when we turn towards it [sc. the active intellect].245 The substance (huparxis) of the soul, which is its one, is truly inspired when it looks upon the plain of truth

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(248B6). (And it is no bad thing to also set out in outline a certain number of truths; for the higher things kindle a light of truth for the inferior.) Let us, then, be aware of these four things: [1] The One, the first principle; [2] Phanes, that is, the limit of the intelligible gods and the transcendent principle of the intellective gods (for the Nights are principles whose [own] principle is on the same level246 (suntattein) [as they are]); [3] Zeus, who is king of the hypercosmic gods and the limit of the specifically intellective gods; [4] the Sun, who is king of the sensible sphere. Each one of these kindles a light, that is, the truth that it gets from the order [immediately] above it, for those beneath him. For instance, the Sun sends hypercosmic light [down] to sensible things (hence his being is said to derive from the hypercosmic [deities]). Again, Zeus kindles an intellective light for the hypercosmic [deities]. [And], again, Phanes beams an intelligible light upon the intellective gods. And the principle of all things fills the intelligible gods and all [else] that comes from it with a divine light.

34. So inasmuch as the thought (dianoia)247 of a god [is nourished by reason (nous) and uncontaminated knowledge, and [likewise] the thought of every soul which is destined to receive what is appropriate to it, having seen being in time (dia khronou), it is well pleased, and, contemplating true things, is nourished and enjoys itself, until such time as the revolution brings it back in a circle to the same place. And during the circuit it sees justice itself, sees moderation, sees knowledge – not that knowledge with which coming into being is associated, and certainly not that which is different in [the case of] different things . . . And having viewed and feasted in the same way upon the other things that truly are, entering once more into the interior of the heaven, it comes248 home] (247D1-E4) [All] this, as far as this is the life of the gods (248A1), is still being said of the divine souls. By ‘the thought of a god’ he will mean, if we understand ‘thought’249 in its strict sense, the thought that is dependent on (exartan) the god, just as we are frequently also wont to address the (153) body that is attached to (exartan) the god as [the] god. But if we take ‘of a god’ in the strict sense, we shall clearly be understanding ‘thought’ improperly, in just the way that he [himself] has [improperly] spoken of [the] reasoning (logismos) of god elsewhere.250

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Uncontaminated (akêratos)251 as presiding, without harm to itself, over the things within the cosmos and remaining unmoved by (pros) the things below it; for the Timaeus252 created the divine souls from pure (akêratos) sorts [of ingredients] but our [souls] from no longer entirely pure sorts. One must also understand thought with every soul. Which is destined,253 he says, to receive what is appropriate (that is, which receives the fitting measure) will refer to gods, angels, daemons, and heroes; for to each of these kinds is assigned the fitting and proper measure, a different one to each, by the primary and superior (epanabebêkôs) gods. dia khronou254 will not mean that the intellection of the gods is interrupted in mid-course, as is ours, so that they255 see at one time and not at another; for [in that case] we will not be preserving the even tenor (ison) of the happiness of the divine souls; for they must not be more happy at one time, less at another. Rather, dia khronou means ‘in time’, which is characteristic of the nature (ousia) of souls – carrying out their activities in time [I mean]; just as we, even if we always keep our eyes open for a particular star, nevertheless do so in motion and in time. Also, in conformity here too256 with what is [said] in the Philebus, he has taken the goal [of life] as involving (ek) both contemplation and joy. It is well pleased and is nourished and enjoys itself: he means that it is nourished from the perfection lent to (ekdidonai) it from above; it is well pleased is equivalent to ‘it is content and reaches up to its own origins’; and it enjoys itself is the result of (ek) both of these. Until the revolution brings it back in a circle to the same place means (anti) until they [sc. the souls] are carried around along with the intellection of the heaven, not in that it too [sc. the heaven] is discursively active but in that the soul receives its [sc. the heaven’s] intellection and activity in time, just as the possessed person here [on earth] gives utterance in time whereas the god is acting outside of time. So on the one hand in a circle applies to (idios) the circular movement (periodos) of soul, on the other to the revolution (periphora) of the heaven’s intellection. It sees justice itself, sees moderation itself, sees knowledge itself:257 the use of the expression (prosrêma) ‘it sees . . . itself’ in each case indicates the independent (monos) intellection [of each of] the divine souls, and by saying the same thing a number of times he also indicates the discursiveness and the divided nature of psychic intellection.

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When talking of the Forms, it is usual to speak of justice-itself [or] moderation-itself. He doesn’t (154) refer to them in that way here but as justice itself [and] moderation itself,258 [thereby] indicating the all-perfect god,259 [or] justice qua god and moderation qua god, as far as it was possible for someone using [the methods of] prose (logôi) to give an account of the primary divinities. For the poets for their part, having obtained greater licence, have set them before us yet more vividly, showing (paradidonai) justice being born and moving out (kineisthai) among all things, whereas the philosopher has given an account, as best a philosopher can, of the all-perfect god Justice in prose. Among the Forms (idea) justice and moderation and knowledge are individual Forms (eidos) embraced by a single Form, intellect itself, being, as it were, parts or components of intellect, but justice itself, that [included] among the gods, is all-perfect, it too embracing all things within itself in its own manner. For the justice [that is] among the Forms embraces all things in an intellective fashion, that among the gods [embraces them] in a divine fashion. Justice determines what falls to each, moderation causes the things posterior to the primary things or causes to exist, knowledge (epistêmê) produces understanding (gnôsis) and truth in everyone. And justice, according to the theologian,260 is produced by law and piety. And it is not without reason that he has employed the three terms justice itself, moderation itself, and knowledge itself. For three Nights having been passed down [to us] from Orpheus, one [of them], the first, staying in one place, [another], the third, having gone forth, [the remaining] one being between these [two], he says that the first prophesies, which is [the role] of knowledge, calls the middle one ‘reverent’ (aidoios),261 which is [characteristic] of moderation, and says that the third brings justice to birth.262 I raised the difficulty as to how, while looking at the place beyond the heaven, they [sc. the souls] see these [three Nights]; for they are not even immediately next to Night but three and more removes from it. To this he replied that they are offspring of Night that remain in her. And there is also a heaven beyond the heaven, and all these remain in Night: ‘And she gave birth in turn to earth and broad heaven, / and she displayed them visibly after they had been invisible, they who exist by birth’.263 ‘For what reason’, says my fellow student (hetairos) [Proclus], ‘do the theologians also list these things that remain in themselves? For it is clear that

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each god produces itself, so what need was there of a coming forth (proodos)?’. To this the reply was that wholeness is twofold, one kind (155) as composed from wholes,264 the other as from more partial [components], the more partial [components] being produced from the more whole (holikos)265 [ones] among them, as is the case with the cosmos; for the cosmos is whole as being composed from the whole of [each of] the elements, from the whole of earth, from the whole of fire, from the whole of water, from the whole of air, the which wholeness the transcendent Demiurge, Zeus, creates.266 And again, from a different perspective, the cosmos is said to be a whole as having in it all the intelligible living beings, which it also subsequently (loipon) brings into existence itself within itself; over which creative activity Dionysus presides.267 The first wholeness, then, is analogous to the gods that remain within the producing [gods], the second to those that emerge from out of the whole (holikos) [gods]. What was said of knowledge, [namely, that it is] not that with which coming into being is associated, and certainly not that which is different in [the case of] different things, he is saying not only of the [knowledge] that is composed out of the sights (theôrêma) [the soul has viewed] and that is in the soul but also of that in intellect and in Form (idea). For in the intellect, as we have said,268 it is embraced as by another; for [discursive] thought (logos) separates [them], even though they are united. He was satisfied (arkeisthai) with these three names269 – [those] of justice, moderation, and knowledge – because even by themselves they suffice (arkein) for happiness. He did well to add having feasted to having viewed,270 for it is not merely an indistinct viewing but being filled with good things and the fulfilment of its own particular perfection [that is in question]. Entering once more into the interior of the heaven it comes home is equivalent to ‘from the sight of the place beyond the heaven it goes to the sights that are within the heaven, then, after them, also contemplates itself qua soul’, for this last is ‘to come home’. It is not, then, that, leaving the place beyond the heaven, it comes to be in the lowest regions. This is not what is laid down (themis) in the case of divine soul; for the divine souls are not [sometimes] more, [sometimes] less, happy. What is said of them, [namely,] that ‘what is at times the case among us is always so among them’ and, again, that ‘they are always in full realisation (en telei)’,271 is well said. Rather, the meaning is as follows. The divine souls have

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a number of powers, some higher, some intermediate, some inferior. With the very first of these powers they always devote their attention to the very first of the intelligibles and to the place beyond the heaven, with the intermediate ones to the things within the heaven, with the lowest [they function] mainly in the psychic mode.272 Thus, they finally end up contemplating themselves qua souls. Hence [the statement] entering once more into the interior of the heaven it comes home (oikade); for its inferior activities are said to be inside the heaven and at home (oikade) as being its own (oikeios)273 because they are especially viewed as being the soul’s own, when they [sc. the activities] end up in the psychic mode and contemplate themselves qua souls.274 Or it is also said to travel into the interior because a kind of illumination is being channelled from the primary powers to the secondary.

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(156) 35. And when it has come [home], [having stationed the horses at the manger, the charioteer throws them ambrosia and gives them nectar to drink in addition] (247E4-6) He wants next to talk about their [sc. the souls’] providential care for the cosmos, because, having talked about their viewing [of the place beyond the heaven], he wants next to talk about their providential care for the cosmos. [The] horses, as was already stated,275 we shall take to be the lowest powers of their thought, [that is,] the power of the Same and the Other, and [the] charioteer to be the power of [their] essence, that is, its love. Having stationed [the horses at the manger, the charioteer throws them ambrosia and gives them nectar to drink in addition]: one should understand the memory he [sc. the charioteer] had from the viewing of those intelligibles;276 for he instills this in the horses so that they will steer the universe in accordance with it. And [one should understand the] manger as the receptacle of that memory and of the spectacle (thea). Just, then, as among us the judging faculty (to doxastikon) gets its parameters (metron) from reason (logos) and thought and then passes them on to the appetitive faculty, to both the spirited part and to desire, so that, these parameters thus set, it may exercise providential oversight over the living being and all aspects of life, and you might call the judging faculty a manger, so too in the case of the divine souls that which receives those divine and blessed sights and remembers them and passes them

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on to the horses would be a manger of the soul; for here [on earth] too to receive and to be filled is characteristic of the manger. So [the fact that] the horses are filled with ambrosia and nectar stands for ‘the powers of divine souls that elevate them and exercise providential care are ensconced among the gods and exercise providential oversight over the cosmos’. Ambrosia is what ensconces the soul among the gods, [the word] being formed (legein) by the privation of ‘mortal’ (brotos), or ‘perishable’ (phthartos).277 Hence whenever tradition (historia) tells us that someone has attained immortality, they say that he has partaken of ambrosia, [which is] equivalent to ‘he has been ensconced among the gods’. Ambrosia is analogous to dry food among us, on account of which it indicates ensconcement among the causes.278 Nectar, on the other hand, is analogous to liquid food. It indicates the divine providence of the gods in relation to secondary things, [the word] being formed by the privation279 of ‘[funeral] gifts’ (kteras), or ‘funeral rites’ (taphos), for [the verb] kterizein [means] ‘to bury’.280 Hence the gods, refusing to allow the contents of the cosmos and soul itself to be buried, are said to toast it [sc. the soul] with nectar. And when he [sc. Homer] shows the gods exercising providential care he depicts them using nectar: ‘going among them august Hebe / was pouring nectar; and they, in golden goblets, / toasted one another, as they looked down on the city of the Trojans’;281 (157) for at that time they were exercising providential care over the Trojans. The present horses too, then, are said to drink nectar as being set over and exercising providential care over secondary things and to eat ambrosia as being ensconced among the gods.282

36. Of the other souls, the one [that best follows and comes to resemble a god raises the charioteer’s head into the place outside and is carried around with the revolution, [though] thrown into confusion by the horses and only with difficulty seeing the things that are. Another at one time rises up, at another sinks down and, its horses overpowering it, sees some things, others not. The rest, all longing for the things above, follow, but lacking strength are carried around with [the rotation]283 beneath the surface [of the heaven], trampling and jostling one another, each striving to get ahead of the other] (248A1-B1) Having talked about the souls that are divine and always the same and unchanging284 he now turns to our partial and human souls, the [souls] that

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can at times even fall away from the divine, because of which he has referred to them by the indefinite term other as displaying much indefiniteness and irregularity (peplanêmenon). He divides these too three ways, into first, middle, and last; for he also divided everything [mentioned] earlier triadically. Thus, of the spectacles (theôria), he says285 that some are within the heaven, others under the vault beneath the heaven, others outside the heaven.286 And, again, of the things outside the heaven he said colourless, shapeless, intangible being that really is.287 And still earlier [he made a division] into288 Zeus and Hestia and the ten leaders,289 and, again, into Zeus and gods and daemons,290 or, again, into Zeus and those who always follow [him] when they are willing and able.291 For absolutely everything that has once proceeded from the First must be triadic; for being perfect, it will have first [parts], middle [parts], and ends, as the oracle puts it, ‘a triad traversing all things’.292 In this way,293 then, he also says of our souls that one raises the charioteer’s head (that is, the highest [part] of our intellective [aspect]) into the place outside [the heaven], that another sometimes raises [it], sometimes doesn’t, and that [yet] another cannot raise [it] any longer but is finally borne down into generation. One should carefully note how great is the difference he reveals between our souls and the divine ones. For after describing our highest happiness294 and having turned to [the case of] the soul that has best come to resemble a god, he says that only with difficulty, being thrown into confusion by the horses, could it raise just its head into the [place] outside the heaven and see something of the things that [truly] are, and [that] standing then upon the back of the heaven they contemplate (247B7-C1), as though at leisure, now this, now that.295 And the divine (158) souls were said to be ‘carried around’ (periagein) by the revolution of the heaven, ours ‘to be carried around with’ (sumperiagein) [them].296 By the charioteer’s head one should understand its [sc. the soul’s] highest and most intellective part, possessing in a unified form its entire intellective power. Since, then, the soul is multi-powered and the other powers are also naturally disposed to be active, the first [group of] souls are with reason said to be ‘thrown into confusion’ by the horses, the middle ones, which have not entirely disciplined the other powers, are not just said to be ‘thrown into confusion’ but even to be ‘overpowered’ by their horses (hence at one time they operate at the highest level, but at another at a more superficial one), and the

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third [group are said] to be completely dominated [by them], and hence, lacking the strength to raise [the charioteer’s] head, they are [left] beneath the [heaven’s] surface. Consider examples of these [groups of souls drawn] from people here [on earth]. Let the philosopher here [on earth], who is self-focused and devotes himself to contemplation while bringing only good to his other roles in life (zôê) and to all his neighbours, be an example of the first [soul]; let the politician, who at times rises to contemplation, but at others turns back to lower things and organises them, be the representative of the middle souls; and let the third [group of] souls be analogous to the average, sensual (empathês) person. However there is a great range among the middle [souls], who have seen some things but not others; for some have seen most things but not seen a few, others have conversely seen a few but not seen most, while [yet] others have in equal measure seen some things and not seen others. One should pay attention to the following, for it will help us in our future lives. The last of those that follow, being by nature desirous of the [regions] above, are carried around, but due to their power flagging are borne downwards; and finally both the will and the desire desert them; for the will is both the first to begin and the last to cease [functioning]. So just as the sensual, or average, person here [on earth] by nature desires the good but is unable to sort out and discover what is really good, even so do the souls fare up there (ekei). You might also consider yet other examples of the three grades of souls, [namely,] of the first, the temperate person, of the second, the self-controlled person297 (in whose case (hopou) inferior [objectives] are in conflict with better ones, but reason nevertheless is eager to preserve its rule), and of the last, the intemperate or licentious person. And, again, [as an example] of the first [grade], the good man, who blames neither himself nor anyone else [for his circumstances] – for the very first of the souls are not thrown into confusion through their own fault but because of the nature of the underlying situation298 being such [as to cause this]; on the basis of which (hothen) we shall also solve the puzzle that asks: ‘What does when it [sc. the soul] is perfect and [still] winged it travels on high and governs the whole cosmos (246B7C2) mean?’. For [it is] insofar as it follows the gods and has devoted itself to them [that] it is (159) happy (eudaimôn)299 – the middle souls, for their part, would be ranked like a person who is making progress300 and blames only

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himself [for his failings]; the last ones like the ignorant person who [only] blames others.

37. [The rest . . . ] are carried around with [the rotation] beneath the surface [of the heaven], [trampling and jostling one another, each striving to get ahead of the other] (248A7-8) He has not said ‘having plunged down’ in the case of these [souls] but that they are beneath the surface [of the heaven] because they have been enslaved by the force and discord of the other powers, but are nevertheless being carried around along with the followers of the gods on account of their desiring the [region] above. Of the divine souls, then, it was said that the revolution of the heaven carries them around (247C1) as though they are of themselves ready for this and have surrendered themselves to the revolution. Of these [souls], on the other hand, it is said [that] they are carried around with [the rotation] as being ultimately (loipon) carried along by force and, although they are being borne down the direct route to [the sphere of] generation, are despite this being carried around in a circle on account of their also being carried along (empherein) by the heaven and the followers of the gods, in the way the fuelzone of the air is said to be carried [around] in a circle.301 They come to be beneath the surface, then, because their generative [aspect] eventually preponderates and wants to be active, or because [their] vehicle has eventually become moist; for eventually the non-rational form of life also attaches itself to them.302 Trampling one another obviously not in that they use feet [up] there but because each is eager to get ahead of the other. The higher one, then, will be said to ‘trample’ the one below, the lower to ‘jostle’ the higher. Such souls are certainly no longer reaching up towards the intelligible but watching each other and trying to appear superior to one another in competition with one another.

38. So confusion [and conflict and extreme sweating occur, during which, through the poorness of the charioteers, many are lamed and many have many wings broken. And, undergoing much toil, they all depart without achieving a sighting of being, and after departing feed on the food of opinion] (248B1-5)

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Confusion of the mind ensues for them, and conflict on the part of the spirited part (for the spirited part is what strives for honour and primacy (philoprôtia)),303 and extreme sweating on the part of the desiring or generative part, as they304 finally sink into [the sphere] of generation. Extreme305 as distinct from divine sweating, which those that are being raised up experience, as he will say306 later. Only here, in [describing the behaviour of] the third [category of souls], has he criticised the charioteer as well [as the horses] as being responsible for such disorder on their part – just as he said in the Republic307 that it was impossible for the good order of the city to be (160) disrupted without incompetence (kakia) on the part of the rulers. And you may take it from this that according to Plato the entire soul descends – if indeed he says that its highest part, which is its charioteer, is corrupted – and it is not the case, as Plotinus says, that a part of it descends and a part remains above.308 [Many] are lamed becomes intelligible from the movement of those who are lamed, for these move slowly and awkwardly and are at risk of being bowled over. In just the same way, then, these souls are rather dull and disorganised (askhêmôn) in their intellections and always at risk of being borne down into [the realm of] generation. Accordingly he has likened their intellections to the gait (badisis) of the lame, since [their] gait is something that is akin to their pedestrian (metabatikos) perception. He also did well to say ‘broken’ (katathrauein); he didn’t say ‘destroyed’ because it [sc. the soul] never loses its power to ascend; its activities are in abeyance and thus are lost, but its power remains [though] enfeebled (thrauein). Again, let’s draw [the same conclusion] from [what is the case with] birds. For if something damages their wings, they are raised up for a little while on account of their winged nature, but [then] sink back down. They depart, he therefore says: that is to say, they flee to godlessness and darkness, a fugitive from the gods and a wanderer.309 Without achieving (atelês) is equivalent to ‘without being initiated’ (atelestos); for the viewing of the intelligibles truly is a rite (teletê). They feed on (khrêsthai) the food of opinion: that is, they produce concepts that are based on sensible things and live in accordance with these, no longer contemplating the intelligibles but [only seeing] sensible things.

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39. Now (dê) the reason for the great eagerness to see where the plain of truth is [is that the pasturage clearly (dê) proper to the best part of the soul is from the meadow there and the nature of the wing by which a soul is lifted up is nourished by this] (248B5-C2) Here he teaches [us] what is common to the three grades [of souls], the divine ones, those that are successful, and those that are not,310 as though someone were asking ‘Why are they so avid and struggling so hard?’ and they answered311 ‘Because they are all longing to see the things that [truly] are’. The pasturage proper to the best part of the soul means to the intellective part of the soul, for this is fittingly nourished by the intelligible alone. (161) (Understand ‘for’ (gar) rather than ‘now’ (dê) and the [sense] of the text becomes clear.)312 [He says] ‘the wing, which is its elevating power’313 not [just] because it is fittingly nourished by the intelligible but also because it is nourished by it alone and by nothing else. The ‘meadow’ is the productive power of the forms. And by ‘meadow’ he will mean the Nights, for the sources of life are there. The one in the Republic,314 in which [souls] about to travel to [the realm] of generation, that is [to say], sublunar appearance (phasma),315 camp is a different meadow. However, this meadow in the Republic has a resemblance to the one mentioned here, for there too [sc. in the Republic] the principles of nature and of life in [the realm of] generation are contained in it.316

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40. The ordinance of Adrastia is this (248C2) He wants next to talk of the descent of souls and their first entering [the realm of] generation from the intelligible. Because they have left off viewing the intelligibles, they soon after, being borne down, fall into [the realm of] generation. The souls that are descending from the intelligible into [the realm of] generation for the first time have the boon (geras) of entering the body of a man and not into something else, as he will tell [us] next (248C8 ff.). This Adrastia too is one of the gods that remain in Night, being the offspring of Melissus and Amalthea.317 Melissus is named from [his] concern (epimeleia)

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and providential care for secondary things, Amalthea from [her] steadfastness and [her] not bending (malthassein). Thus Adrastia, who is the sister of Ida, is born from steadfast providential care -’beautiful Ida and [her] sister Adrastia’318 – [Adrastia] who of all laws at once, both the encosmic and the hypercosmic, both those of fate and those of Zeus (for there are laws of Zeus and laws of Cronus, divine laws, and hypercosmic and encosmic laws) – who of all these, as I was saying (oun), gathers and embraces the [entire] extent (metron) in a unified form in herself.319 This goddess is called Adrastia (162) on account of things that are laid down and ordained by her being ineluctable (anapodrastos). Hence she is said to sound [instruments] in front of the cave of Night – ‘she placed bronze cymbals (rhoptron) / in the hands of Adrastia’320 – for she is said to sound cymbals (kumbalon) at the entrance of the cave of Night so that all things will be aware of her ordinances. For within, in the [inner] sanctuary of Night, sits Phanes, in the middle [of the cave] Night, giving oracles to the gods, and at the entrance Adrastia, proclaiming the divine decrees to all things. She [sc. Adrastia] is different from the Dike there [sc. in the intelligible sphere] as promulgating laws rather than giving judgements. And the Dike there is said to be the daughter of the Nomos there and Eusebeia, and this Adrastia, being sprung from Melissus and Amathea, also embraces Nomos. These last321 are also said322 to rear Zeus in the cave of Night, the theologian saying exactly (antikrus) what Plato says about him [sc. Zeus]; for he depicts him both creating and issuing ordinances.323 An ordinance is issued by Adrastia to the gods too (for the ranking (taxis) among them stems from this goddess), and it is also issued to the followers of the gods, both to all in common and to each individually.324 However, Plato does not propose to speak about all of [her] ordinances and laws here but [only] about the dispositions (taxis), ordinances, and laws pertinent to our souls. He wants to talk about the rewards the soul gains from contemplating the intelligibles, and he mentions three falls, the one before generation, the one during the descent and entry,325 the one into generation. [This is] because one [soul], if at the beginning of the circuit it once more sees something of the intelligibles, doesn’t as yet fall into generation but traverses the whole circuit again under the [leadership of] the gods, while another, not having seen [the intelligibles a second time], enters into the body of a man, [though] not into a wild animal or something else (these two [outcomes] are the result of viewing

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the intelligibles), and, finally, third is the one that comes to be present on the route [to] generation itself by the soul’s own choice, because [a soul] that lives its life in a better manner is allotted a better portion, one that lives it in a worse manner a worse one.326

41. Any soul [that, having become a follower of a god, sees something of the true things, is to be unharmed until the next circuit, and if it can do this each time, is to always remain unhurt] (248C3-5) Any soul, he says, that having followed its own god,327 (163) has been able to see something of the intelligibles, remains unharmed throughout the whole of that circuit, that is, it does not fall into generation, for this, [viz.] falling into generation, is what being harmed is. Observe how precisely, here as earlier, he sets before us the difference between the divine and the human souls, for he doesn’t simply say ‘if it sees something’ – that is, something particular and individual. If, then, [he says] it sees something at the beginning of the circuit, it remains unharmed until the next circuit, for the ordinance of Adrastia determines in advance the processions of all, both gods and souls, and assigns what is appropriate to each. So if it sees anything at all, the very great reward of remaining on high for a whole circuit and travelling around along with the gods is assigned to it; for its kinship with the circuit (periodos) holds it [there], just as here [on earth] some things live for a single solar cycle (periodos) [sc. a year], some for two, and others for a day or so, on account of being akin to such a disposition of the stars. And certain daemons, by [applying] restraints (anokhê),328 keep it [sc. the soul] from falling into generation. Just as here [on earth] we see congenitally sound bodies remaining healthy even when badly treated329 thanks to their original constitution, and [just as] some people setting out to perform impure acts have been prevented from accomplishing them by certain good daemons, in just the same way the soul that has once viewed any of the intelligibles is aided and kept from falling into generation during that circuit by good daemons and heroes.

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and falls to earth, then it is the law not to implant this [soul] in any kind of beast at its first birth . . . ] (248C5-D2) 25

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He recounts many reasons for its being borne [down] to generation: its powerlessness, its having been unable to view any of the intelligibles at the beginning of the circuit. First, then, its powerlessness to follow along with the followers of the gods; second, its having been unable to view any of the intelligibles; third, an [unfortunate] chance encounter (suntukhia).330 The last is, in all likelihood, a meeting with certain maleficent daemons; for, after parting from the followers of the gods, it falls in with daemons who inflame its desires regarding [the realm of] generation, just as here [on earth] too we see that as long as someone follows his teacher (Socrates, say, or some other worthy teacher), he turns out to be well-behaved and decent and gets some benefit in return, but if he is away from his teacher, he falls in with licentious and shameless people who awaken him to contrary desires. A fourth reason is [its] total331 forgetfulness of the intelligibles and its difference-creating and generative power being eventually weighed down and being full of the draught of forgetfulness, and everything associated with the chains of generation, and the complete forgetfulness of the intelligibles on the part of the departed [soul].332 For this is its evil and what causes it (164) to shed its wings and be borne down to earth. Falls to the earth will mean [to] earth and the whole of generation; and it will also mean this Earth here in particular; and it will also mean this human body [of ours], into which it [sc. the soul] has entered, on account of its chiefly consisting of earth. The law of Adrastia, then, grants to the soul that has fallen from the intelligible into generation for the first time [not only] that it will not enter into the body of a wild animal but also [that it will enter] into that of a man. He calls333 ‘a first birth’ the soul that descends into generation after a viewing of the intelligibles and joins in completing this [earthly] living being.

43. . . . but [to implant] the one [that has seen] most [in the seed of a man who is going to become a philosopher or lover of beauty or devotee of the Muses of some kind and dedicated to love; the second in that of a law-abiding king or a warlike and regal person; the third in that of a statesman or a manager or business man of some kind; the fourth in that of a hard-working gymnast or of

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someone who will be concerned with the healing of the body; the fifth will have a mantic life or a telestic one of some kind; a poetic life or some other among those concerned with imitation will be fitting for the sixth; that of a craftsman or that of a farmer for the seventh; that of a sophist or a demagogue for the eighth; of a tyrant for the ninth] (248D2-E2) First it needs to be said that the nine lives (bios) given here differ from those that are given in the Republic. While these are nine, those are innumerable; and while those were allotted according to the choices of the soul, these are assigned as a reward and mark of honour proportionate to (axiôs) its viewing of the intelligibles;334 and while there the soul’s transmigration (metabasis) was [on occasion] from a human into a wild animal or from an animal into a human, here [it was] only into a human, and that a man, for it was not [ever] into a woman.335 And the most important thing of all is that here the soul is entering into generation for the first time from the intelligible but there [it may] also [be moving] from one life into another life. And in short, going into detail, you would find many differences between things here and things there. Further, let’s also mention the essential point that here he lists [just] the types of life (zôê) themselves, certainly not their fortunes (tukhê) and external circumstances as well; for instance, [he includes] a military or kingly [life,336 but] certainly not one that is called to arms and meets with a particular fortune, but one that expresses (proballein) such a style (eidos) of life, so that the style of the military life is manifested even in, say, a philosopher. In the Republic, on the other hand, he says that the fortunes themselves are also selected and assigned to them [sc. to souls].337 Finally, one must ask whether the whole spectrum (platos) of life (zôê) has been divided into these nine lives (bios) or whether some other division has been left out which will make the lives ten or more for us; for it is possible, taking different viewpoints, to divide the same thing into more or fewer [divisions], in the way that that there are three lives in the Philebus and five in the Republic.338 It is our task to show that here (nun) [in the Phaedrus] the entire spectrum of life has been apportioned among these nine lives. Now, these four things being seen in people – reason, spirit, desire, [and] nature – the soul that has descended into (165) generation either lives in accordance with reason alone, taking no account of the passions and not being

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at all affected by them, and creates the first life, the philosophical; or it lives in accordance with spirit, [but] with reason in control, and creates the second life, the kingly and military; or it lives in accordance with desire, [but] with reason again in control, and creates the third life, the political and commercial (for this [life] procures the necessary resources (trophê) for the living being and for the city); or, again, it concerns itself (epistrephesthai) with nature, [but] with reason in charge, and creates the gymnastic and medical [life] (for this [life] is concerned with nature and with bodies, caring for them and healing them). Because we have now reached the limit of the natural procession of life, there remains (loipon) [only] the fifth life, the telestic, which, having no power of its own, turns to the gods and provides the lives before it with a kind of assistance from that source – by the mantic and telestic [life] he does not intend the inspired kind (for this is in the highest degree philosophical and sapient and wholly god-inspired), but this [everyday] technical and priestly kind, which by means of sacrifices and prayers provides people with aid of a kind.339 And these are the five lives that are led in accordance with right reason and modelled on things in the divine sphere; for each of the gods remains and proceeds and reverts; and so here too [a life]340 either remains in reason, and constitutes (poiein) the philosophical [life], or proceeds as far as nature and constitutes the next (allos) three, or reverts back to the gods and constitutes the fifth. Of the remaining four lives, those that are imitative and reflective of those before them, two, the sixth and the seventh, truly imitate those before them, the one by means of words, the other by means of actions, while the eighth and the ninth, imitate [them but] with dissimilarities (anomoiôs) and for the worse, [again] the one by means of words, the other by means of actions. And so the remaining four lives are imitative of those before them, but two imitate truly, two with dissimilarities. The sixth and the seventh, [while both] being genuine imitators, differ in this, that the former imitates the philosopher and the king and the rest by means of words and in this way educates men, while the seventh [imitates them] by means of actions (for such is the [life] of the craftsman). The eighth and ninth, on the other hand, imitate with dissimilarities, the former again by means of words, the latter by means of actions. Take ‘poetic’ (poiêtikos)341 as [embracing] every mimetic [life], including [that of] the painter, [all of] whom, he says in the Republic, are three removes

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‘from the truth’ (597E7). And [understand] the [life] of the craftsman as the one that brings something into being from non-being, as [do] woodworkers, (166) sculptors, leather workers – and the farmer too342 in that he manages nature so that it will bring forth [produce] that is healthy and of the highest possible quality.343 The [lives] of the sophist and of the demagogue differ in this, in that the sophist wants to be a teacher of laws344 and of virtue, the demagogue to orate to the mob (plêthos). Let’s understand [here] not [only] sophistical and tyrannical lives that are already perverted but also those that, albeit with the good in mind, employ in the one case deceit, in the other force; for it is possible to conduct them well or badly, as [Plato] himself observes (248E3-5).

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44. Now in all of these [lives] . . . (248E3-4)345 So many and of such a nature, then, are the nine lives. But one must understand ‘having seen most’ (248D2) with each, giving: the [soul] that ranks first in ‘having seen most’ enters into this or that, the one that ranks second in ‘having seen most’ into this [or that], the one that ranks third in ‘having seen most’ into this [or that], and so on. Hence the first four lives involve (ekhein) wider choices, for each [choice] is out of three, the next four narrower choices, for [each is] out of two, while only the ninth [soul enters upon a life that is] constrained, single, and tyrannical.346 Perhaps he has [only] gone up to nine [in listing types of life] because increase in number also proceeds [only] as far as nine. Next, let us infer, employing [our merely] human understanding (dianoia), after viewing which types of intelligibles [it is that a soul] will descend into [either] the first life, or the second, or [one of] the subsequent ones. Well, one that has viewed the beautiful, the wise, and the good (247D6), because, due to these, having started out from the very first principles, it will traverse [everything] all the way down to the lowest things, will descend into the first life. Hence it is reasonable that one that has viewed the wise should choose the philosophical life, and one that has viewed the beautiful the beautyloving one, which he divides in two, into the cultured (mousikos) and the erotic lives; for it is by taking in beauty either through our eyes or our hearing that we recollect the intelligible beauty. And for all [things] ascent is to the good.

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The [soul] that has viewed the kinds (genos) of being347 chooses the second life. For the king settles everything, which relates to (analogein) ‘rest’ – for which reason he is called ‘king’ (basileus), from ‘base’ (basis), and ‘stability’ (to hedraion), and from affairs being based (bainein) on him.348 And he initiates (kinein) all things, arranging and regulating everything, which is analogous to ‘motion’ (kinêsis). And he gives to everyone a share in amity and unity through shared laws, which is an aspect of ‘sameness’. And he separates all things and repels hostile and injurious [agencies], which is the task of ‘difference’. And he prevails over all comers, because of which he is said to be skilled in warfare and royal by nature (arkhikos). Given that he makes all things exist, would he not be said to bring each and every thing out of non-being into being by [his very] being (ousia)? The [soul] that has viewed the kinds of being in a more partial manner and not (167) completely or [has viewed] justice-itself makes (poiein)349 the third life; for those who have been received into the third life are more engaged in the area of justice. And the [soul] that has viewed health-itself and body-itself makes the fourth, and the one that has viewed the elevating gods [makes] the mantic or telestic life. The remaining four view sameness-itself and dissimilarity – but the first [pair] more sameness, the latter [more] dissimilarity. Plato has used virtually all of the [possible] divisions (tomê).350 He has divided into three and four and one in that he has presented the first four [lives] triadically and has divided the remaining four dyadically and the last one singly.351 And [he has divided them] into five and four in that he has presented the first five in the same case, giving (eipein) the first, the second, the third, the fourth, the fifth [in the accusative case], and has changed the case in those that follow, mentioning the sixth, the seventh, and those that follow in the dative case. And [he has divided them] into eight and one in that he lists all the rest by [giving] a number [of possibilities] but the final one by [giving just] one. And should we also make three triads, we shall find that the first is Zeusian, for Zeus is a philosopher and a king and moreover the best statesman of the cosmos. And other gods would also be found to belong under this triad, for example Athena because of the philosophical [aspect], Ares because of the warlike, and Hera because of the royal. And the second triad we would say is Apollonian and [connected with] mantic and the poetic – at any rate he is called Leader of the Muses – and, again, Hermes could be brought in here

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because of [his being] connected with games (agônistikos).352 And the third triad we would call Hephaestian; for he who concerns himself with the phenomenal and [its] creation, making ready the encosmic abodes of the gods, is Lord Hephaestus. That is how we for our part have arranged these things. And should some people either multiply the charioteer and the two horses (which [together] make three) by three, or multiply the three types of whole353 (holotês) (the one before the parts, the one in the part, and the one out of the parts) by three, and think to make the lives come to nine in that way, I don’t see how they could be consistent with themselves or with Plato.

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45. [Now in all of these [lives], whoever lives justly is allotted354 a better portion], whoever unjustly a worse. [For each soul does not return to the place it came from for ten thousand years (it doesn’t grow wings before that much time [has passed]), except for the [soul] of someone that has genuinely practised philosophy or loved a boy in a philosophical manner; these, with the third thousand year circuit, if they have chosen this life three times in a row, having thus become winged, depart on the three-thousandth year] (248E3-249A5) Having spoken355 of the lives and of the rewards distributed prior to generation to the souls descending from the intelligible into generation he wants next to talk (168) briefly about the actual mode of life of the soul in [the realm of] generation as well, [stating], in line with what is said in the Republic (614E ff.), that the soul that has passed its life here [on earth] justly and piously is allotted a better portion, whoever unjustly a worse. And, having brought the soul down, he wants to send it back up to the intelligible [realm], and says that every soul is restored to the intelligible [realm] after ten thousand years – thus [is it with] the souls of the many – but the [soul] of the philosopher after three thousand. But since he has mentioned the ten-thousand and three-thousand year cycles, and also the thousand-year one from generation to generation, let’s first set out the mathematical [aspect] on its own and after that ask what he wants to convey. In the Republic (615A-B) he defined the limit of human life as a hundred years, a square number, the product of ten, which embraces all the kinds (eidos) of numbers within itself. Then, multiplying a hundred by ten and

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producing the cube number one thousand, he made it chthonic and specific to the earth356 and stated that the soul’s journey beneath the earth, that is, the [journey] from generation to generation, is a thousand years [long], in order that the payment for its misdeeds or its virtuous actions might also be tenfold. And this must also be prefaced. The soul that is to be reinstated must choose the philosophical life in order to be be thus elevated. And this is the restorative life, after living which in a philosophical manner and having departed [this] life, it [sc. the soul] is then elevated. Now assume a soul to have lived these nine lives, and assume that it has finally lived one more after these, the restorative one, as is stated. That makes ten lives. Then, since the journey beneath the earth for each [life] is a thousand years long, ten times a thousand makes ten thousand years. And since, as he says, a reinstated person must have led the philosophical life three times, three times a thousand in turn make three thousand. [And] perhaps he has taken this too from report (historia);357 for Hermes the Thrice-great was so called as /15 / having led the philosophical life three times here [on earth] and come to know himself the third time. And Pindar [says]:358 ‘those that have managed three times, / on either side, to totally keep their soul from evil deeds / set forth on the road of Zeus to the tower of Cronus’. The mathematics, then, is as stated. To summarise, he multiplies a thousand, [the length of] the journey under the earth, that is, (169) [the journey] from birth to birth, by three and by ten, and gets three thousand and ten thousand. So what then does Plato want to intimate by this? One must say, he states,359 that three thousand and ten thousand are a symbol for some perfection;360 for he is not saying what the mathematics appear to indicate. Otherwise every soul being reinstated after ten thousand years would have rendered this cosmos [down] here void of souls.361 But this is impossible. It must be that [a soul] that has led a single truly philosophical life is restored and one that has led [even] a philosophical life in an emotional and deceitful manner for thirty thousand years is not restored.362 And indeed Ardiaeus in the Republic (615C5-616A4) shows [this], who spent many thousands of years beneath the earth and was unable to climb out through the mouth [of the underworld] even though the other souls were ascending. Or [it is] like this. Plato does not want to impart the mathematical and arithmetical number of the years but wants to indicate to us the due measures

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and degrees of perfections of [the] foremost, intermediate, and last [souls]. For since some of the souls are restored more quickly and some more slowly, and since some have need of little cleansing and others of more, and [since] the [number] three is perfect after the manner of a smaller number, possessing a beginning, a middle, and an end, and [since] the [number] ten in its turn also becomes perfect in another sense (eidos), embracing all the numbers within itself, and [since] three is proportionate to three thousand and ten to ten thousand (for each of them is a kind of monad and inclusive of all numbers), on this account he has used three thousand and ten thousand, [thereby] showing that the [souls] that have lived completely philosophical lives are restored to the intelligible after a shorter time, as needing no, or little, cleansing, while the majority are restored after a longer time, as needing much correction and cleansing. Moreover ‘thousand’ reveals a kind of measure of the perfection of the soul that is cleansed beneath the earth, upon attaining which it travels back to [the sphere of] generation and, after having once more lived either well or badly there, attains the required perfection beneath the earth. And so these periods do not necessarily indicate a certain number of years such that souls are necessarily restored after a certain time but symbolically indicate a certain measure of perfection [that is] proper [to them], by regaining which proper [measure] and [thus] coming into possession of its perfection, the soul is restored.363

46. But the other [souls], when [they have completed] their first life [undergo separation, and after being separated, some, going to the subterranean places of punishment, pay a penalty, others going to a certain region of the heaven] . . . (249A5-8) By the first life he means the one the soul lives here [on earth] after newly descending from the intelligible. And since separation (krisis)364 taken as a whole (hôs en platei) is threefold he is talking here about the middle one. The first separation is the one by Zeus himself along with Aeacus.365 (170) [It is one] that is essence-creating, separating the souls from one another and making some heavenly, some daemonic, some human, [and is] one that coincides with the essential difference of the souls. The second separation, which is with Minos and Rhadamanthys and the judges in that place, the ones

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at the meeting of three roads, that is, the openings,366 is the one that separates the pure souls from the impure and sends the one lot to heaven, the other to the subterranean places of punishment (249A6) to be cleansed, [and] this is the one he is currently talking about. The third separation is the one with Pluto himself and the purifying gods in Hades, [the one] that cleans away the blemishes of souls [resulting] from generation, and that, by separating what is foreign to souls from what belongs to them, renders their essence pure. Here, then, he is talking about the middle separation, which sends some [souls] to the heaven and others to the subterranean places of punishment. After the separation Dike (Dikê) assigns its just deserts to each and every [soul], justice (dikê) being pronounced as often as (isakhôs) [there is a] separation.367

47. [In the thousandth [year], both [lots of souls], arriving at the allotment and choice of a second life, choose whichever one each [soul] wishes.] Then [a human soul enters] upon the life of an animal [and, in the case of someone who was once a human being, from an animal into a human being again] (249B1-5) It has often been stated368 by us that the soul of a human being does not enter an animal, but that the rational soul of the human is intertwined with the irrational soul of the animal and thus, along with the animal itself, appears to make up a single living being.369 But we must enquire how it is that he says that in the second choice of a life from an animal it enters into a human again; for it did not first become an animal. For if, after descending from the intelligible [sphere], it makes [its] first life [that of] a human being, and after dying and coming to the allotment of a second life, chooses whichever [life] it wishes, how does it enter a human being from an animal? It did not become an animal in its first life but a human. We shall resolve this difficulty as follows. We shall understand ‘second life’ as absolutely all those ensuing after the first, so that the second, the third, the fourth, and all the ensuing [lives] are called ‘second’. In this way in the [course of] their ensuing – and numerous – lives [souls] can also enter a human being from an animal. Moreover we shall also resolve the difficulty by reading [the passage] in the following manner. He says [that] in the second allotment of a life ‘then a human soul enters upon the life of an animal’. Well, punctuating with a full stop at this point and pausing (171) vocally,370 we shall read, as though

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making a fresh beginning: and from an animal one who was once a human being [etc.] – obviously, again, [only] in subsequent lives.

48. For the [soul] that has never seen [the truth will not enter into this [human] form. For a human being must understand a statement involving a form, [one] arising from many perceptions [and] brought together into one by reasoning.371 This is recollection of those things that our soul once saw [when] it travelled around with a god and scorned the things we now describe as existing and raised its head into what truly is. Hence, justly, only the philosopher’s thought is winged.] (249B5-C5) He shows by this that the irrational soul, the one that is properly that of an animal (for this is the [soul] that has never seen the truth and the intelligible place) never enters into a human being and helps complete this upright, flatnailed, human form,372 setting out what is specific to a human being and what task is a human being’s alone to perform. For the human being must be able (for this is what to understand means) to assemble mentally from the common features distributed (katatattein) among particulars ([i.e.] from what is common in Socrates and Plato and the like) the later-generated (husterogenês) universal, and from these project the universals present in the soul by virtue of its essence, from which, as [being their] likenesses, it will recollect the forms in the intelligible [realm]. But the soul of an animal cannot do this. It is not able, upon seeing this, that, and yet another horse, to mentally assemble the later-generated universal horse. This is because it does not even possess by virtue of its essence and innate [to it] the concepts and the essential universals373 of these things.374 So only a human being and the rational soul of a human being can do this, viz. from this and that equal thing (not things that are exactly equal, for what enmattered thing is exact?)375 collect the universal and exact later-generated concept of the equal, from which it mobilises and projects the universal concepts [that are] in itself by virtue of its essence, then from all these likenesses recollects the forms in demiurgic intellect. For neither the soul itself nor things in the [sphere] of generation would possess these forms if demiurgic intellect had not possessed them much earlier, always with the same stability and with real being.376 Since then the soul of the philosopher is sent up through forms, and through more immaterial forms at that, to [the transcendent] forms and in that way is

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reminded of the intelligibles, he has said that, with justice, only the thought of the philosopher is winged. For the lover (erôtikos) and the votary of the Muses (mousikos) are not initially reminded by forms but, until such time as they encounter the philosopher, by sensible and enmattered things.

49. [For he is always as close as possible through memory to those things] by being close to which a god is divine. [And the man who correctly uses such reminders, always fulfilling perfect rites, alone becomes truly perfect. Standing apart from human concerns and becoming close to the divine, he is criticised by the many as being out of his mind, and his being divinely inspired has escaped the many] (249C5-D3) 25

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Four readings are current: either ‘by being close to which a god is a god’; or [the same] again [but with] ‘is divine’; or, with the article, ‘by being close to which the god377 is a god’; or [the same] again [but with] ‘is divine’. He will mean by ‘a god’ either the (172) person who is a philosopher by virtue of [this] relationship (kata skhesin)378 or else an encosmic [god], as for example the souls of stars,379 so that the sense is this: ‘by being as close as possible through memory to which intelligibles, the philosopher, being by virtue of [this] relationship a god, becomes divine thanks to illumination from the intelligibles’. Or, again, as follows: ‘being close to which intelligibles, the encosmic gods are divine as being exposed to them’. Perfect rites [is what] he has called the viewings of the intelligibles. For just as here [on earth] not all have become full initiates (epoptês) but [only] some (for many have stopped at the first or second levels and [only] some few have participated in the seventh rite380 when they became full initiates (epopteuein) and truly received perfection381 (to teleion): [for] ‘there are many narthexbearers but few Bacchanals’),382 in the same way Plato too says here that those who have viewed the intelligible place and the intelligible and supracelestial383 forms are initiated into perfect rites in that [only] then does the soul truly receive its perfect and complete being. By ‘reminders’ he meant the forms distributed among particulars and the undistributed (akatataktos) ones, both the later-generated ones and the essential universal [ones], through all of which the soul is reminded of the intelligibles.384

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Next he goes on to state the goal of this whole verbal excursion, of the earlier circuit with [the gods], of the descent to the [realm of] generation and the ascent back to the intelligible [realm, saying] that it is inspiration. For, reminded through things here and having viewed those divine and immutable visions (250C3) [up there] and the forms that have true being, [a person] is truly inspired through his comprehension (noêsis) of this spectacle (theôria), but is thought to be unbalanced and out of his mind by the many. This then is the goal of that [heavenly] spectacle and rite: inspiration and divine possession.

The third of the three [books] of the scholia of the philosopher Hermias on the Phaedrus 1. Our whole discourse [on the fourth type of madness then] has come to this . . . [that this [is] the best of all the forms of divine inspiration] (249D4-E1) The connection (akolouthia) of what is said [here] is with the division of madness.385 After initially speaking (173) against love because of Lysias’ speech, he said purificatory rites are needed because he has in a sense spoken against the divine name [Love]. What is the expiation? Clearly the palinode. And since, throughout their speech[es], both Lysias and Socrates, when talking of how one should not gratify a lover, made much of (epideiknunai) madness, for this reason he has shown in the palinode that the term ‘madness’ is not univocal (haplous) (244A6) but has many meanings and that there is a madness that is superior to sanity. And he has divided this ‘madness’ into four [types], into mantic, Muse-engendered, telestic, and erotic [madnesses], and assigned four gods, Apollo, the Muses, Dionysus, [and] Love, to them. And after telling how many good things each of the [first] three madnesses provide for humans – how mantic [madness] provides prediction of the future [and] how we can fare well in life; [how] poetic madness sings the ‘deeds of men’386 and by this educates the human race; how telestic [madness] cleanses ancient blood-guilt (244D6.) – [and] being about to talk about the fourth [type of] madness, which is what his whole discourse is about, and having, before talking about that, talked about the immortality of the soul, about its form, about its lives, about its descent and ascent and all the [other] things [more] briefly touched on above, he then talks about how many good things erotic madness provides [us with]. (174)

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He has employed, one could say, analytic argument.387 [The argument goes] as follows: The end for human beings is nothing other than happiness, that is, union with the gods (for Plato doesn’t locate happiness in external [goods]). But the soul is joined to gods when, while being here [on earth] and contemplating the sensible universe and the beauty of the heaven, it is reminded of intelligible beauty. But [a soul] that is reminded [of something] is one that once saw [it], for recollection occurs in the case of things that one has known or seen or heard. But [the soul] that once saw [intelligible beauty] is one that travelled around [the heaven] along with its own gods. And it has travelled with388 [the gods only] if it is immortal. For if it is not immortal, it clearly has neither travelled around [the heaven] nor recollected [doing so]. Because of this389 he spoke first of the soul’s immortality and of its form, etc. and after that of the things that love is going to lead us to, I mean to intelligible being and divine, unalloyed, and immutable beauty. For, he says, just like those [other] madnesses,390 this one too procures intelligible beauty for the soul and ensconces it among the gods, and hence he calls (249E1) it the best of the madnesses.391 He sums up everything said earlier in these words.392 One must also be aware that one should not separate the madnesses. They are interwoven with one another. Neither telestic [madness] nor poetic nor mantic can exist without erotic.393 So perhaps this is another reason why erotic is more divine [than the others]. The following is a case of hyperbaton: Our whole discourse on the fourth type of madness then has come to this . . . that this is the best of all the forms of divine inspiration, etc.394 So what is meant is something like this: ‘Since we have told in the case of those [other] madnesses how many good things they provide [us with] but have said nothing about this one, you should be aware that we set forth all that was said above on account of it’. And he [then] tells how many good things the erotic [madness] provides [us with] and how [it does this] and that our whole discourse and all our focus (spoudê) are on this erotic madness, because it is superior to all [others].

2. [Madness] which, when a person, seeing the [beauty] here [[and] being reminded of the true [beauty]] . . . (249D5-6)

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For [such a person] experiences (ekhein) the beginning of recollection through the senses. For instance, the philosopher wonders at a particular instance of beauty and through this at all corporeal beauty, then at the [beauty] in the sciences, and finally, through this, experiences recollection and makes the ascent to intelligible beauty.395

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3. . . . has grown wings and, winged again, [eager to fly up, but not able to, gazing up in the manner of a bird, unmindful of things below, is accused of being in a deranged state] (249D6-E1) He wants to say that at the beginning, so to put it, of their ascent, just as (175) young birds are eager to fly on account of their natural equipment but are unable to and fall back down, in the same way souls that are being newly elevated are alike [in undergoing] this experience. Eager for those things [up there] but not having as yet prevailed,396 because they have not yet been ensconced among them, they cannot fly up and, [departing] from the things perceived by the senses, reach the things apprehended by the mind397 (for the soul’s perceptions (noêma) are called ‘things apprehended by the mind’) and then be led up from things that are apprehended by the mind to the intelligibles. Gazing up, unmindful of things below: that is, eager to be elevated and distaining human pursuits (spoudasma) – which he said earlier (249D1) – but not able to grasp that very thing that is earnestly pursued (spoudazein) [by him] because he has not become habituated to it.

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4. . . . that this [type of madness] then turns out to be the best of all the forms of divine inspiration and from the best [stock], both for him who has it and for him who shares in it, and that by partaking of this madness a person who loves beautiful things398 is called a lover] (249E1-4) Here he has given [us] the whole argument (logos), [viz.] that he who is properly called a lover is he who loves this madness,399 being led up to intelligible beauty and beauty itself and taking his boyfriend (paidika)400 along with him.

5. For, as was said, [every human soul has by virtue of its nature gazed upon the things with [true] being] (249E4-5)

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What he has said earlier is all brought together [here] in summary form. For [the soul] sees the things with [true] being (ta onta), and for that reason desires them; for it would not desire things it had never seen. So it is for this reason that he has said all [he said] earlier about the soul, showing of how many good things love becomes the cause for us by leading us up to the beautiful-itself. He says by virtue of its nature since every soul has by virtue of its nature gazed upon the things with [true] being but not every [soul] possesses them consciously and active[ly],401 and hence does not easily recollect the things with [true] being even though it possesses them by virtue of its nature.

6. [But it is not easy for every [soul] to recollect those things through things here], neither [for] those who [at that time] saw [the things there] briefly [nor [for] those that, falling down here, suffered misfortune and so . . . forgot the holy things they saw at that time] (250A1-4)

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To put it briefly, he here says that the causes he earlier gave for the descent [of the soul] are also the causes of its not easily recollecting. He says holy because he is likening those sights to sacred precincts and shrines and holy sanctuaries.

(176) 7. Few indeed are left [for whom memory is adequately present] (250A5) [This means] those that recollect, that is, the souls that pursue philosophy, those who have not yet been dipped in the water of Lethe.402

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8. And these, when [they see] some [likeness of things [up] there, are astounded and no longer [masters] of themselves and do not understand what has happened because they do not grasp [it] adequately] (250A6-B1) But those who have [that] memory, when they see some image and likeness of things [up] there, such as the beauty that is in bodies, are then no longer [masters] of themselves, that is, they are beside themselves and out of their minds, and withdraw from things [here] below and are astounded as they recollect that beauty.

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And do not understand what has happened [to them]: that is, the souls that are perceiving this beauty (he means those that are [just] beginning to be elevated) do not understand what [it is] they are experiencing.

9. Now in the likenesses here [on earth] of justice [and self-control and such other things as are of worth to souls, there is no brightness, but just a few, upon approaching their images by means of weak tools, [only] with difficulty see the nature (genos) of what is imaged] (250B1-5) What he means is that some of the Forms extend to all things, others [only] as far as some. For example, the Form of beauty (kallos): because it stems from the first principle and from [primal] beauty (kallonê), beauty (kalon) will extend to the whole cosmos. Hence it causes everything to turn [to the first principle]. So what he means is that there is no brightness in the likenesses of justice and the like here [on earth] as there is in the case of beauty, for it would certainly have produced powerful passions in us if there were any such image of it (250D4-5) [here on earth]. [It is] by means of tools, both arguments and propositions,403 [that] we learn that justice and moderation are to be chosen, since we do not grasp them [directly] or arrive at recollection of them through sense perception as [we do] in the case of beauty – unless one would call ‘justice of the body’ the [right] balance (summetria) between the dry [elements] and the wet and the cold and the hot.404 But ‘justice of the soul’ [at any rate] is not to be grasped by the senses. The whole of the Republic is organised [as it is] by Plato because he finds the justice of the soul in the tripartition of the soul. And there [sc. in the Republic] he [also] divided the city into the guardian [class], the warrior [class], and the menial [class]; for the [justice] of the soul is analogous to external justice. For instance, the city is at peace when the menial [class] is subjected to the warrior [class] and the warrior [class] to the rulers, but when this is not the case but they are at odds, the whole city is turned upside down and does not enjoy justice. And one should understand [things] in the (177) same way in the case of the soul: when the desiring part is subservient to the spirited part and the spirited part to reason, the soul then enjoys justice.405 See then by tools of what magnitude and with how much difficulty it is that one can acquire an image of justice and the like;406 beauty itself, on the other hand, comes our way of itself.

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The nature of what is imaged means justice-itself; and justice consists in the parts of the soul [each] keeping to its own business (idiopragia).407

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9.408 But then it was possible to see beauty [shining] bright (250B5-6) Plato everywhere says that Lord Helios [sc. the sun] is analogous to the first principle [sc. the One]. For just as here [in our sphere] the sun is lord of the entire sensible cosmos, even so is that409 [first principle lord] of the intelligible [realm]. And just as light that yokes and binds together and unites the organ of sight to the visible object is brought down from Lord Helios, in the same way the light that proceeds from the First God (he calls it ‘truth’) yokes the intellect to the intelligible.410 You [can] see, then, that beauty imitates this. It is a sort of light transmitted from the source of the intelligible to this cosmos here that calls [us] to itself and acts to unite lovers with the beloved, because of which ascent takes place through it. So he encompasses (sunopsizein) here the whole sphere of the intelligibles, stating that this is what love leads us up to; for the beauty [down] here is [itself] dim and [merely] sensible, just as the light here is mingled with air, and it prompts us to recollection of beauty-itself. Then it was possible to see beauty [shining] bright is equivalent to ‘beautyitself flashing [like lightning], without admixture of an opposite, but [as] the beautiful-itself ’.

10. When with a happy [chorus] (250B6)

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That is, when we were circling around together with our own gods. [The] ‘happy chorus’ is the circlings around together of the divine souls,411 and hence he has called it a ‘chorus’ on account of its [moving] in unison. That of which he earlier said and the host of gods follows him, etc. (246E6 ff.) he has now called a ‘chorus’.412 And he has done well to call it ‘happy’, for one who has gazed upon those forms truly is happy and blessed.

11. We [following] with Zeus (250B7) 30 186,1

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[of them]; that’s obvious, but we shall nevertheless (homôs)414 understand it in the sense of kinds [of soul]. Having, then, created solar, lunar, Zeusian, [etc., souls], ‘he sowed some into [the] earth’,415 others elsewhere. So Plato says we following with Zeus416 here as being cognisant of his own god. For true happiness for the human soul is this, to travel around [the heaven] with their own gods; for it is not possible to outstrip gods.

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12. And were initiated (telein) [into that of the rites which it is right to call most blessed, [a rite] which we celebrate417] . . . (250B8-C1) As we have already stated,418 it has been called a ‘rite’ (teletê) from its rendering (apotelein) the soul perfect (teleos).419 So you can see that the soul was [once] perfect. But here [on earth] it is divided and cannot of itself act as a [united] whole.420 He says which it is right to call [most blessed], for the vision is not absolutely the most blessed. For one who sees sees something that is other than himself, but union must also occur, so ensconcement [among the things that are viewed]421 would be the ‘most blessed’ [thing]. One should be aware that a rite (teletê) is one thing, [preliminary] initiation (muêsis) another, [full] initiation (epopteia), [yet] another. The rite corresponds to (analogein) the preparation, or the purifications and the like. The [preliminary] initiation, [a term] that is derived from [the phrase] ‘to shut (muein) the eyes’, is more sacred, for to shut the eyes is this: to no longer take in those sacred mysteries [up there] through the senses but with the purified soul itself. And the [goal of] full initiation is to be ensconced among them [sc. the sacred mysteries] and become an observer (epoptês)422 of them. We celebrate (orgiazein) because to participate in the rites (orgia) or the mysteries is called celebrating [them].

13. . . . being unimpaired ourselves [and untouched by the evils that awaited us in later time, initiated into and observing perfect, simple, unchanging, and blessed spectacles in pure light, being pure [ourselves] and unmarked by this thing we now carry round [and] call a body, bound [into it] like an oyster](250C1-6) Plato really does speak of those divine mysteries as an initiate. Unimpaired (holoklêros) is equivalent to perfect (teleios).

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He says that [awaited us] in later time because association with the body becomes the cause of the downfall of the soul. By unchanging he indicates the stability and immutability of the intelligibles. He uses initiated into (muein) and observing (epopteuein) as in the rites at Eleusis. In pure light, being pure [ourselves]: because the light here isn’t pure since it is mixed with air. And he says being pure because it is ‘not right for the impure to touch the pure’.423 Unmarked (asêmantos) [means] not carrying around this mark (sêmeion).424 Like an oyster because just as oysters are bound into [their shells] so too are we [into our bodies while] here [on earth]. (179) 14. Let this, then, have been [our] tribute425 (kharizein) to memory, [due to which [sc. to memory], out of yearning for things at that time, we have talked at some length] (250C7-8)

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He is providing a summary (sunopsis)426 and reminder of what has been said earlier, saying ‘let this be recalled (parapempein)427 to memory’. And for this reason he also dwelt on them, habituating us to spending time on such things. For frequent mention (mnêmê) of the intelligibles instils in us the habit of spending time with them; just as he has – as you’d expect seeing that he was obviously inspired with regard to them (i.e. the intelligibles) – spent time on those things, making clear what recollection in action is. Accordingly, having been reminded [in this way], we have said these things on the subject of the intelligible realities (pragma). He said have been [our] tribute (kharizein) because it is the Graces (Kharites) who produce all lovely things.428 One can interpret at some length (makrotera) [as meaning] that [although] what has been said is little (oligos) in terms of words or syllables, it is very farreaching (makrotatos) in terms of its impact (dunamei). He did the same in the Symposium:429 although he told Diotima’s tale about Love in few words, he called it a very great tale in terms of its impact. 15. As for beauty, as we said [it shone forth among those [other] things [sc. the other forms], and we, having come here, grasp it, gleaming most clearly, with the

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clearest of our senses (aisthêsis). For sight comes to us as the keenest of the bodily senses] . . . (250C8-D4) He wants to talk about the erotic person, [about] how he is led up from the beauty here to intelligible beauty. So what he says is that the intelligible beauty in intelligible being shone forth among those sights [and] from it this [earthly] perceptible beauty shone forth. For just as the light originating from the sun shines upon the entire perceptible cosmos so too does the beauty that originated from the intelligibles cross to the perceptible cosmos. He calls sight the ‘clearest’ of the senses as compared to the other senses, for of all the senses this is the keenest. Because of this those who correlate the senses with the elements correlate it with fire. This will be clear to you from the following. When something visible coincides with a sound, i.e. lightning with thunder, we see the lightning first, then the sound reaches our hearing some time later. Why is this? Clearly because sight sees things instantaneously while the other senses need time. [In this] sight is analogous to intellect. For just as the intellect sees everything in an instant (en amerei),430 so too does vision; for it sees the [entire] expanse from here to the heaven all at once.

16. And we, having come here, grasp it [with the clearest of our senses . . . by which [however] wisdom is not seen] (250D1-4) It here means a reminder of that beauty [there]; and by by which wisdom is not seen [he means] by which sense, or by sight, wisdom is not seen, (180) since wisdom is one of the incorporeals and is seen in the incorporeal being of the soul. What? Aren’t philosophers [even] more passionate about those things, I mean about wisdom and justice and the like [than about beauty]? Well, to this we say that he isn’t currently talking about philosophers who have already been led up from the forms431 to the intelligibles but about the erotic person who 432 to them by means of beauty: and the range of the erotic is wide.433

17. As it is, beauty alone [received this role, and so is most manifest and most lovely] (250D6-E1)

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Because it is analogous to light – for the light from the sun serves to connect (sundetikos) the organ of sight and the visible object, since vision and the visible object are yoked together and light is their bond – in the same fashion beauty too serves to bind together (sundetikos) and unify the soul for ascent to the intelligibles.434 So beauty received that kind of role, [the role of] arousing us and moving the soul towards the intelligibles.

18. He who is not recently initiated [or has been corrupted is not swiftly conveyed hence to that place, to beauty itself, upon seeing its namesake here, and so does not feel awe when looking at it, but surrendering to pleasure, attempts to mount [it] in the manner of a four-footed beast and to inseminate boys and, consorting with wantonness, has no fear and feels no shame in pursuing pleasure contrary to nature] (250E1-251A1)

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It is characteristic of the person with knowledge [in a field] that he studies (theôrein) both the failings (ptôsis) and the contraries of things, of the doctor, for example, that he studies both healthy and diseased states. Accordingly through what he says here he wants to study the perversions of love and tell how it declines into licentiousness (he also describes its positive side (katorthômata) later on). [This is evident] because he says: the soul that is not recently initiated, the one that has not seen much (251A2), the one that has experienced a chance encounter [with an evil daemon] and forgetfulness,435 when seeing beauty does not feel awe but attempts to mount (bainein)436 it in the manner of a four-footed animal. He has used ‘to mount’ in that in suits irrational animals better. The corrupted437 person is one who does not retain the memory. Not swiftly hence, that is, is [not quickly] sent up from sensible beauties to intelligible beauty. He did well to say namesake (epônumia)438 since he wants names to have first been established for the intelligibles and for wise men, having learned from the forms, to have then given names derived from those [transcendent entities] to things [down] here. The philosopher Aristotle, on the other hand, wants names to first be established for sensible things.439 So, upon seeing sensible beauty, he says, he is not reminded through it of that [transcendent] beauty and so does not feel awe when looking at it. For, just as the

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pious and prudent man makes obeisance to images of the gods because they bear a certain likeness to the divine (ta theia), so too does the erotic person, upon seeing the beauty here [on earth], because it bears a likeness to divine beauty, revere it as [its] image. Surrendering to pleasure, after the fashion of a four-footed beast: as would someone smitten by (181) pleasure and dragged away by it as a captive, he does not attempt to have intercourse in the human fashion, but attempts to mount (bainein) in the manner of a four-footed beast and to inseminate boys (paidosporein),440 that is, to plant his seed in boys, and [thus] perform fruitless acts like someone sowing seed (speirein) on rocks, and, consorting with wantonness, he has no fear of the ordinance of Adrastia and feels no shame.

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19. One who is newly initiated, one of those who saw much at that time, when he sees a godlike face or some bodily form that has imitated beauty well . . . (251A13) Having said these things about the perversion [of love], he next wants to talk about the person who is being elevated, [that is,] the person who is being elevated from sensible beauty to that [intelligible] beauty. And he has not merely said ‘beauty’ but has also added godlike (theioeidês), showing by ‘godlike’ the likeness of things here below to those up there. For this sensible beauty [here on earth] appears godlike to someone who sees it and through it comes to a recollection of the intelligible [kind] and is elevated through it.441 Has imitated well: because when the physical forming principle (logos)442 prevails, then the living being has what is best (arista) [for it].443

20. . . . first shudders [and something of the fears of that [earlier] time comes upon him, then, gazing at him, reveres him as a god, and if he were not afraid of seeming totally insane, would sacrifice to his boyfriend as to a [sacred] image or a god] (251A3–7) The things that happen to us in the course of (peri) human activity he talks of in connection with (peri) that [heavenly] vision. One must understand these [things] both in relation to life (zôtikôs) and on the intellective level (noerôs). For just as amazement and fright grip us here below, so too do they in the case

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of visions of the gods – but not the sort [we experience] at the sight of approaching enemies, but of a kind superior to this fear, thanks to the overflowing plenitude of the gods. The human soul, then, must prostrate itself before the gods, who transcend our power, and shudder at them, [though] not as being terrifying and fearsome and intractable (antitupos), for these are the fears of [the sphere] of matter and of the earthborn. The awakening, then, to those [transcendent] things, [that is], the [awakening] to the intelligibles via sensible things, he has called ‘shuddering’. The fears of that time of those [heavenly] sights [are] holy fears, not fears like those [one experiences] in the face of the enemy; for what sweat is [down] here holy fear is [up] there. [He reveres him] as a god [means he reveres] him as [one would] the image of a god. And he would have sacrificed, had he not feared to, to his boyfriend as to a [sacred] image: it is clear that he doesn’t mean to [the boy] himself but to beauty, of which he is the reflection and likeness and image, that is, to intelligible [beauty]. After all, even down here people who sacrifice to statues are not sacrificing to the actual matter or to the images but to the gods.

(182) 21. When he has seen him, [as [though] from (ek) the shuddering, a change – sweating and a strange warmth – comes over him]444 (251A7-B1) He wants to tell of the things that ensue in association with the viewing and the recollection of intelligible beauty for someone who has looked upon beauty and through this been sent up445 to intelligible beauty; for after (ek)446 the shuddering a change comes over him. The change is twofold, that from the intelligible to the [sphere of] generation, which he has described as a falling away (apoptôsis)447 of the soul, and that from the [sphere of] generation to the intelligible, which he calls ‘a viewing’. So now, on the subject of the sprouting of wings, he wants to tell how the moistening of the plumage begins. But he means all these things figuratively (metaphorikôs). Sweating: that is, divine sweating. For while the soul is here [on earth] it really does sweat until such time as it grasps the intelligible, so sweating is a mark of the [sphere of] generation.448 Sweating, then, of a kind that casts off generative activity grips him.

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[As for] warmth, you know that it is life-giving (zôtikos). For down here too all things are preserved through warmth. Therefore the warmth will be the elevating power of the soul that lives through the fire of the intelligibles.449 He says unaccustomed since prior to this, while dwelling in the sphere of generation, it did not have such warmth; for, not as yet having recollected the intelligibles, it did not yet possess such energising warmth. But when it has begun to recollect, it is warmed and elevated, for even [down] here warmth conveys moisture upwards.

22. Having received [through his eyes the stream] of beauty [by which the wing’s nature is irrigated, he is warmed, and when he is warmed, the [areas] around the [points of] growth, which, being previously closed off through hardening, had prevented sprouting [from taking place], are melted] (251B1–5) For recollection comes about through the eyes. Stream [of beauty] stands for images of beauty. Having received: because one grasps the things down here in a divided manner. Is warmed stands for is awakened, in that its [sc. the soul’s] elevating power begins to be moistened and, as it were, bloom. In the same way one might say of rose buds that they are closed but that after being warmed they unfold. But [here] he is talking about the unfolding and ascent of the soul. As they are warmed,450 they are melted: for previously they were closed off through hardening, but now they are melted and dissolved and all that has to do with generation [in those areas] has grown supple (eulutos) [in preparation] for ascent. It is possible to understand are melted as [it is used] in the case of wax, [sc.] as equivalent to ‘are dissolved’ or ‘are spread out’ (haploun);451 for wax too when melted flows and is dissolved. And here we also gain for ourselves the sign of a worthy soul, [namely,] being able to give birth to many things from a few starting points, or teachings. And so he is saying here that, as a result of the viewing and impact of beauty, the [areas] around the [points of] growth, which were previously closed off through (183) hardening, are warmed and expanded and able to ascend to the universals; that is, the powers of the soul that had been closed off as a result of generation begin to expand due to warmth and the elevating power.

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23. And when the nourishment flows in [the shaft of the wing swells and begins to grow from its root under the whole form of the soul; for it was formerly feathered all over. So during this the whole [soul] seethes and boils] . . . (251B5-C1)

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Every human soul has by nature [the potential] to be elevated. So this means its power and activity, [which were] at that time hidden deep down (en bathei). The root swells and grows and makes visible the shaft of the wing452 as well and the power to elevate is awakened. Under the whole [form] of the soul is equivalent to [under the] whole [soul], for it is not the case that one [part] of it is elevated, another not, but that the whole [of it is]. For it was [formerly feathered] all over stands for ‘it had the powers of ascent’. So [the whole [soul]] seethes: just as down here we understand ‘seething’ as ‘extremely hot’, so too in the case of soul we mean by [its] ‘seething’ the extreme nature of its desire to ascend. What [the soul] seethes means then is this, that it has an extremely vehement desire and eagerness for the things above. Boils: that is, it leaps upwards, is divinely inspired, is filled with Bacchic frenzy. The poet [puts it]: ‘much sweat burst forth’.453

24. [. . . and the soul of someone who is beginning to grow wings experiences just the same pain] as those cutting teeth [get around the teeth when they are just coming through, [namely,] irritation and pain around the gums] (251C1-4)

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He says that just as with the emergence of teeth there is irritation, in the same way, when the soul has recollected, it longs for the things above and cannot bear to remain inactive and is pained at still being kept down here when it desires the things up there. Observe how many metaphors Plato has used: here one from cutting teeth, earlier (251C1) one from kettles (when he said [the soul] seethes), one from four-footed creatures (250E4), and those from other things he mentions.

25. Now, when, [gazing at the boy’s beauty [and] receiving particles (meros) coming [to it] and flowing from that source (which in fact are called ‘desire’ (himeros) on account of this), [the soul] is irrigated and warmed and experiences relief from its pain and rejoices] (251C5–D1)

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The subject is the ascent of the soul. And since, while being elevated, it is held back here until it is fully (teleon) elevated, he wants to describe a mingling,454 as it were, of pleasure and pain and says that when it looks at the boy’s beauty, it is nourished and watered and delights in the memory of the things [up] there; for the recollection of the forms and of the intelligibles stems from things here, [and] hence when [the soul] sees beauty and the particles (merê) coming to [it] from the beautiful boy (ho kalos) like images as it were, it is nourished and rejoices and is led up to the intelligible, but when the beautiful boy is absent, [the outlet of] the wing is closed up and is no (184) longer watered but dries up. (He has used this [term] ‘dries up’ metaphorically, [taking it] from trees.)455 What is said [here] is consistent with what was said in the Symposium (203B–D) about the birth of Love, where he said that Love was born from Poverty and Resource. For since he is not one of those well-resourced gods who are always united with the first causes yet doesn’t belong with matter and deficiency but is one of those who are in between, wanting to make his intermediate status obvious, he [sc. Plato] says that he is born from Poverty and Resource. Accordingly, here too, he portrays his activity as a kind of mixture, one of pleasure and pain. He says particles coming to [it] instead of images because of the enmattered and fragmented nature of the things down here. Down here beauty is fragmented and we do not apprehend the entire form but [only] the [aspects] that nature can partake of, but up there beauty is unified and incorruptible. Are called desire: because in the Cratylus456 he says ‘desire’ (himeros) is derived from ‘to flow desirously’457 (hiemenos rhein), for there he says that the correctness of names exists when they are in harmony with the thing [they refer to]. Here, on the other hand, ‘desire’ (himeros) is derived from the stream (251B2) that flows from beauty, from its flowing in when someone takes in the incoming458 particles of beauty though his eyes (251B2) [and] the soul459 is irrigated and warmed and grows and is nourished. Observe too how many metaphors he has employed, for here too he has employed the one from the watering of plants. He means the life-engendering kind of heat; as the Oracles also say: ‘Animating all things with heat’.460 It experiences relief [from its pain] and rejoices at seeing beauty close at hand – unless one were to interpret it as referring to phenomenal beauty – will

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mean that when that which comes from the intelligible beauty slips into the soul, it may be called desire from [its] ‘flowing in’, and as long as we are in the presence of the intelligible and of that spectacle (theôria) we are glad and the soul rejoices.

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26. But when it becomes separated [and is parched] . . . (251D1) He is saying all of this metaphorically and he gets the parching from the watering, because when a plant isn’t watered it withers.461 When, then, the soul is no longer watered by this beauty, but has come to be in the [realm of] generation and has withdrawn from the intelligibles, [its growth] is checked.

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(185) 27. . . . [the mouths of the outlets] where the wing sprouts (horman), [are dried up as well, [and], having closed up, shut off the bud of the wing] . . . (251D13) Where (katho) the wing starts to grow.462 ‘It dries up’: that is, its elevating power is checked and it is held back by [the realm] of generation. The mouths of the outlets. He really has used a lot of metaphors, for in using this phrase he is virtually (hôsper) likening [it] to a spring (pêgê).

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28. . . . and [each] [sc. bud], [shut up] inside together with the desire, [throbbing like pulsating [blood vessels], pricks at its own outlet] . . . (251D3–5) Here again he is using pulsating metaphorically, from things that are inflamed;463 for just as in the case of things that are inflamed the moisture presses to come out but is held back by the density of the surrounding body, in the same manner the soul [while] here below desires the things up there and feels love [for them] but, being still held back by [the realm] of generation, is with reason agonised (251D6); whence some464 have said that love is ‘bittersweet’, basing this belief on what happens to us here. Pricks is the same as stings or attacks; he has used pricks as [it is used] in the case of spiders, flies, and bees, for he is expressing everything metaphorically.

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29. . . . [pricks] at its own outlet, and so, stung all over, [the soul is frenzied and agonised – but when it once more experiences recollection of the beautiful, it rejoices] (251D4–7) He wants to reveal the whole of its motion. For since it was feathered all over (251B7), it is therefore stung all over and, not wanting even a part of it[self] to be here below, it is with reason frenzied – [which] stands for: is in turmoil (251D7) as it longs for and remembers those things [up there]. Is frenzied: what he earlier called seething (251C1) and being divinely inspired (249D2), he now calls being frenzied. Is agonised: these are signs of pain (lupê), for I have already said (192,5 ff.) that he wants to describe a mixture [of pleasure and pain], because of which, when reminded by beauty of the intelligibles, [the soul] rejoices, but when it becomes separated (251D1) from it [sc. from beauty], is agonised and in turmoil (251D7).

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30. And through [the mingling] of both [it is in turmoil (adêmonein) at the strangeness of the experience and, being at a loss, is frantic] (251D7-8) Through its memory of the beautiful and through its failure to gain it, since it has not yet taken possession of it and that object of desire is not present to it, [the soul] is in turmoil and distress. This is what happens in any situation. For example, if someone loves a teacher of philosophy, then so long as he has him close to him and satisfying his (186) desire, he is happy, but when he be absent, he is distressed. [Its] being in turmoil, then, is midway between pain and pleasure, which is to say, it rejoices at the memory, but is distressed that what is remembered is not present. Is frantic: he is again employing metaphorical language and hyperbole, saying [that the soul] is frantic, is frenzied (251D6), is maddened (mainesthai),465 and the like.

31. [And, being maddened,] it can neither [sleep] at night [nor stay where it is during the day] . . . (251D8-E2) You can take this as applying to lovers, as it is said to in the Symposium.466 But it is better to understand it as follows. The person who has been enthralled by

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that vision of the beautiful and yearns for those [sights], thinking little of children and possessions and all human concerns, holds fast to that beauty, sleepless and unresting;467 for the gods do not supply us with good things while we sleep; we need to be awake.

32. . . . but runs in its yearning [to wherever it thinks to see the possessor of beauty; and seeing [him] and irrigating itself with desire] . . . (251E2-3)

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‘It runs to wherever it thinks the beloved is’ according to the surface [meaning] (kata to phainomenon)468 but [actually] ‘it hastens to be elevated’. Seeing [him] and irrigating itself [with desire] is equivalent to ‘when the irrigating agency approaches, it is watered (as happens with plants), when it sees the object of desire’. For as long as the beautiful is absent, we seek it, yearning for it and running around [after it], but when it is present, we embrace it and hold on to it.

33. . . . frees the [outlets]469 that were previously blocked [and, regaining its breath, is done with stings and travails, and again for the moment enjoys this sweetest pleasure] (251E3–252A1) 5

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Observe how many metaphors he has used. He has said frees as though from bonds – that is, [the soul] has become free from the [realm of] generation and unencumbered, which is to say, it is done with distress as regards the phenomenal [world]. He has said regaining its breath470 as though after choking fits or being short [of breath].471 So, drawing breath again, or discovering the object of its desire, it is done with stings and travails. Sweetest pleasure means good cheer (euphrosunê), or the viewing of the intelligible, as relating to what is apprehended by the intellect (to nooumenon) but on the surface (to phainomenon),472 [the sight] of the boy.

(187) 34. Wherefore it is not willingly apart from . . . (252A1)

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That is, when it is not held back by the [realm of] generation, it is wholly there [above]; since, having a body coupled with it [while] here [on earth], it is compelled to give its attention to it and foster it and consider it deserving of

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care; at any rate, when supplying it with food and drink, it is of necessity and unwillingly absent from that [heavenly realm].473 And you can also take this as referring to the philosopher-statesman [and meaning] that, on the one hand, he clings to the vision of those intelligibles, but, on the other, because of the needs of the city, turns to the things here [on earth] and to the ordering of human affairs.474 35. . . . and does not [value] anyone [more] than the fair one, [but neglects mothers and brothers and all its companions, and when its possessions are lost through neglect, thinks nothing of it] . . . (252A2-4)

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He does not esteem any person more highly than that beauty (kalon)475 of which he speaks and the viewing [of it] but becomes free from, or easily released from, every tie and is no longer restrained by individual bonds or any tie but has no interest in possessions (ousia) and external things, and nothing appears more valuable to him than the beautiful (kalon).

36. . . . [and, disdaining all] the norms and proprieties [on which it had previously prided itself, is ready to serve as a slave and to sleep anywhere any one lets [him provided it is] very close to [the object of] his desire; for, as well as revering the possessor of beauty, it has discovered [in him] the only physician for the greatest of sufferings] (252A4–B1) That is, he despises the norms of the city here below, or [things] such as wearing one’s cloak a certain way and everything of that sort, and all [other] outwardly conspicuous elegance. Anywhere anyone lets [him] because he pursues beauty (kalon) alone, regarding all else as of no consequence. He says he has discovered a physician for such great pain because it is through him [sc. the beloved] that he achieves a viewing of the intelligible.

37. This passion (pathos), beautiful boy, [to whom indeed my speech is addressed, men call love, but when you hear what the gods call it you may quite reasonably laugh476 because of its strangeness. Certain of the Homerists, I believe, recite from the unpublished verses two verses about Love, of which the second is entirely

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outrageous and not altogether metrical. They sing as follows: ‘mortals call him winged Eros, / immortals Pteros on account of the need to grow wings’]477 (252B19) 5

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He wants to give the origin of the word love, that is, [that] this passion that is born in us from the beautiful – he means the desire of the beautiful – humans for their part call Eros, from ‘flowing in’ (eisô rhein),478 but the gods Pteros, because it excites (pteroun)479 the soul. The names of [sc. used by] the gods are different because their natures (ousia) are also different as compared to humans. Homer did this480 too when he said: ‘the gods call [it] Chalcis, and men Cymindis’,481and again: ‘whom the gods call Briareus’.482 (188) They also paint Eros as a winged (pteroun) boy – a boy because he is in full bloom, not yet a man and not wilted, and winged because he elevates the soul to the intelligible. You may laugh because of its strangeness (neotês): because it seems to be unmetrical (ametros). [Certain] of the Homerists [recite] from the unpublished [verses]: by Homerists he means those who sing the poems of Homer. He says unpublished either because they are not disseminated along with his [other] poems or, more likely, because he wishes to indicate the hidden, divine, and secret character of the work (logos). He has explained entirely outrageous (hubristikos) by saying that it is not altogether metrical; for the verse is unmetrical (ametros). So what [does that signify]? We say that by this he is showing that the gods surpass all measure (metron). He says not altogether because while it perhaps seems unmetrical to us, it is [actually] metrical; for divine metre is other [than ours] and the gods use a different metre just as they use different names.

38. Of course [one may believe] these [verses] [or one may not] (252C1)

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That is to say, one may believe the unpublished verses of Homer if one wishes. He said this because it seems that he fabricated them himself. Or, rather, he said it because of what he said earlier (247A6-7), [namely,] that whoever is at any time (aei) willing and able follows [them], for envy is located outside of the

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divine choir. It is possible, then, for those who are willing to believe what has been said. He says on account of the need to grow wings (252B9) because what has proceeded must return (hupostrephein) to its own beginnings, for this is the salvation of what has proceeded.

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With these [words] he introduces (paradidonai) the goal (telos) of the erotic enterprise (pragmateia).483 He said in the Timaeus that the Demiurge assigned the souls to gods on the basis of kinship (okeiotês), saying that ‘he sowed some in the earth, some in the sun’.484 Here he has also talked about the nine types of life (bios) (248C8 ff.) and also talked about the twelve gods (246E4 ff.), symbolically including the whole multitude [of them].485 Now, in what follows (252C3-253C2), he wants to state the goal of the erotic [enterprise], [which is] that souls are possessed by Love in different ways and that they seek a beloved in line with the particular character of their own god. For instance, one who has been possessed by Apollo [looks for] his beloved to be of a prophetic disposition, while one possessed by Zeus [looks for him] to be leaderly, and in the case of the rest too [a beloved is chosen] on the basis of his similarity to the [lover’s] god. What he is saying, then, is this: that [the lovers] choose [their] beloved and [his] (189) pursuits and [his] character (êthê) and everything else on the basis of the particular character of [their] own god and that it is their goal to recognise their own god and to make their choices on the basis of affinity with him. So what he is saying is this: the Zeusian soul looks for his beloved to be Zeusian, and he bears [the burden of] love with some decorum, with restraint, and without being too readily provoked. After all, everything that is Zeusian is steadfast, stable, and remains always the same; and because of this he wants the character and pursuits of the beloved to be of the same kind, for he wants to make the beloved like himself. The burden [that the lover bears] means possession [by love] and the devouring nature (emphorêsis) of love. 40. But those who are attendants of Ares [and travelled around with him, when they have been captured by Love and believe they have been wronged in some

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way by their beloved, are murderous and ready to sacrifice both themselves and their boyfriend] (252C4-7)

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Having assumed486 two first principles, as he did earlier, and now likening that of Zeus to that of Hestia, who establishes all things [in their places], he opposes that of Ares to it, referring him back to the monad of division; for Lord Ares is the friend of division, since everything connected with Ares is arousable, [readily] provoked, and unstable, on which account he refers mobile substance back to him.487 One needs to be aware that it is a universal [truth] that each person shares in the gifts bestowed by the gods according to his particular connection. For instance, Lady Aphrodite graciously bestows affection (philia) and union, but since this illumination that is given by the goddess is mixed in together with matter, often the recipient alters such a gift and affection becomes debauchery (moikheia) on the part of someone who shares in [this gift] in a wicked manner. For [such gifts] are shared out in one manner by the gods, but participated in in another by the participants. In the same way, although the warmth of the sun is a single thing, when different materials are present, one (wax, for example) melts, another (mud, for example) dries out; for each thing shares in what is given in accordance with its own essence, even though the light of the sun is of a single kind. And for this reason Idomeneus partook of affection, that is to say, Aphrodite, in one way, Paris in another, and Socrates loved Phaedrus488 in one way, and Lysias [loved him] in another – whence, he says, those inspired by Zeus are steadfast and those inspired by Ares murderous and jealous. And this – the perversion (apoptôsis) of the erotic – is the surface (phainomenos), as it were, interpretation. More allegorically (theôrêtikôteron),489 one might say that this ‘murderous person’ means the philosopher because of his breaking away from matter through his vehemence,490 and his divesting himself of matter, and his being no longer active on the physical plane but on the intellectual one, and his achieving ascent for them [sc. for himself and his beloved], even before it is time, if possible.491 After all, in the case of the gods, their turning away from (apostasis) secondary things could be called ‘murder’, in the way that here below ‘murder’ means deprivation of this [earthly] life. And believe they have been wronged in some way: the surface [aspect] (to phainomenon) of the exegesis, or the (190) perversion of love, is obviously that

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they are ready to cut both their own throats (aposphattein)492 and those of their boyfriends should they be wronged by [those] boyfriends.493 The allegorical exegesis (theôria),494 on the other hand, has it that believe they have been wronged means that the soul is still held fast in matter. And it is clear from ‘to sacrifice’ that one ought to interpret these [statements] in a more allegorical fashion (theôrêtikôteron), for ‘to sacrifice’ is used in the context of a divine rite.

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41. And thus [it is] for each god: each person lives his life honouring and imitating as best he can that [god] of whom he was a follower (khoreutês) as long as he is uncorrupted and is living out his first birth (genesis) here [on earth] (252D1-3) Having referred, as earlier,495 to two first principles – that of Zeus and that of Ares – the former standing firm, the latter giving rise to motion, he makes a like assumption in the case of the other gods. For this is the soul’s happiness: to be able to imitate its own god, to the extent of each person’s power, so long as [that person] lives life here [on earth] in an uncorrupted manner. He says uncorrupted so that he won’t undergo a falling away from this sort of love. The first birth [sc. incarnation], as he has already said496 in relation to the nine lives, is the one out of the intelligible.

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42. So [each chooses] his love [from among the beautiful [boys] according to character, and as though that [boy] were himself a god, shapes and adorns [him as] a divine image, as it were, for himself, (heautôi)497 that he will honour and celebrate] (252D5-E1) Since just as [down] here we honour the image [of a god] not because of the material [of which it is made], but because of the god [it represents], in the same way [down] here too [the lover] turns the beloved into a divine image, as it were, for himself; for looking at him and recollecting beauty (that is, looking with the mind (dianoia)), and tracing this beauty back to the intelligible forms, and engendering divine offspring, and educating his boyfriend, he becomes fruitful (gonimos) and begets virtues and all the things he [sc. Plato] talks of in what follows, wishing to lead his boyfriend up to his own god.498

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43. Thus the [followers] of Zeus [look for the one loved by them to be godlike in soul. [And] therefore they look at whether he is philosophical and leaderly by nature] . . . (252E1-3)

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He means that someone who is ‘philosophical’ and ‘leaderly’ (hêgemonikos) by nature is from [the contingent of] Zeus, by ‘leaderly’ indicating the preeminence of Lord Zeus. Thus‘leaderly’ seems to mean fit to rule transcendentally, and kingly (253B2) [fit to rule] on one’s own level, for a kingly person accepts guidelines (metron) from the philosopher. Godlike (dios); that is to say, Zeusian (diios).499

44. . . . [and when they have found him and are in love, they do everything [they can] so he’ll be like that.] So if [they have] not previously [embarked upon the enterprise (epitêdeuma), then, turning their hand to [it], they both learn from wherever they can [learn] anything and pursue [the matter] themselves, and seeking to discover on their own the nature of their god, they have success (euporein) through having been compelled to gaze intently at the god, and laying hold of him in memory] . . . (252E3-253A3)

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That is, if they turn their hand to such a great enterprise – he means the erotic [enterprise] – not as yet having any memory of the things up there and not knowing whence they will (191) imprint (kharaktêrizein) the [characteristics] of their own [god on their beloved].500 Then, turning their hand to [it]: that is, beginning to sprout wings. Seeking [to discover] on their own: that is, reverting upon themselves so as to see those [intelligible] forms within themselves. He says seeking in order to convey that they are getting [this] knowledge (gnôsis) as though from images.501 Thus what he is saying is this: when they revert upon themselves and hunt out through themselves the [character] of their own god, they then become successful (euporos). They both learn [from wherever they can [learn] anything] and pursue [the matter] themselves as not having knowledge but [nevertheless] having some idea (emphasis) of such an ascent; and they pursue the sorts of studies (epitêdeuma) that appertain to their own god – a musical person, for instance, sounds and rhythms and the like, a philosophical one geometry, astronomy,

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and the like – until such time as, by seeking, they discover the very nature of their own god. And laying hold (ephaptein) of him [in memory]: he says laying hold because they have not yet been united but their reversion upon themselves arises first from indistinct traces,502 then through contact (epaphê), then through unification. So when, having reverted, they lay hold of him, then they are united through memory to their own god himself.

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45. And, regarding the beloved as responsible for these things, [they feel even more affection for him, and pouring, like Bacchantes, what503 they draw from Zeus onto the soul of their beloved, they make him as much like their own god as possible] (253A5-B1) Because he was the starting point of recollection for them, they honour (periepein) him as [one would] an image [of a god]. And what they draw from Zeus: that is, whatever [concepts] they draw from their reversion upon their own god, they channel those concepts (noêma) to the beloved in educating him.504 Like Bacchantes: since these, inspired by Lord Dionysus, the overseer of the ritual (telestikê), come to be possessed by him and well-equipped [with knowledge] and channel what they discover to others.

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46. Those, on the other hand, who [followed] after Hera [seek a regal [beloved]] (253B1-2) That is, those who are possessed by love of Queen Hera and are her followers seek a beloved who is regal (basilikos), since [this] goddess is an overseer of royal office (basileia) and partner (sunthakos)505 to Zeus. (He means regal at one’s own level.)506

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47. And the [followers] of Apollo and of each [of the [other] gods, following after their god, look for their boy to be thus by nature; and when they take possession [of him], imitating [their god] themselves and persuading and shaping their boyfriend, lead him into the behaviour and semblance (idea) of that [god] to the extent that this is possible for each; harbouring no envy towards their boyfriend

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nor [any] illiberal ill will, but trying in every way as much as possible to lead [him] to total likeness to themselves and to whichever god they honour, they act in this way] (253B3-C2)

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Of the [gods that follow] after Zeus, the leader, he has mentioned two others, Hera and (192) Apollo, the former causing all things to revert by means of her royal sway (basileia), the latter elevating all things to concord and union. And persuading their boyfriend: for the goal (telos) of the erotic [enterprise] is to engender reciprocated love (anterôs)507 [and] accordingly the two are elevated together at the same time. [Showing] no envy: in a way he says this in contradiction of Lysias’ speech, since Lysias said that [lovers] envy their boyfriends. Therefore lovers like these, he says, do not feel envy, but instead imitate the divine,508 which is wise, beautiful, and good (246D8-E1), not bearing ill will, like false lovers, but bringing [their beloved] to likeness to themselves, because what they want for themselves they also want for their beloved, since their life is one. The Pythagoreans were the same, whence the following saying of one of the Pythagorean is passed down: ‘What is a friend? Another self (egô)’.509

48. [The] eagerness, then, [of those who truly love and [its] issue (teleutê)510 – if indeed they accomplish what they are eager for in the manner I describe – thus become beautiful and blessed, through the agency of a friend (philos) maddened by love (erôs), for the one who is befriended (philein), if he is captured] (253C2-6) The eagerness, then, of those who love is such as we have recounted,511 and the objective (skopos) and goal (telos) of the lovers is this: to make a choice on the basis of affinity with their god and take their boyfriend with them along this path. One must attempt to say how it [can be] that the lover is captured and wounded at all by the beloved.512 And he starts to describe the view of things up there from things down here, for at one point he has utilised a starting point (arkhê) relative to us, at another the natural one – that is, from top to bottom. If they accomplish what they are eager for: that is, the happy outcome (telos), which is to be assimilated to (oikeioun) their own god513 and to know their own origin (arkhê).

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49. [The captured one] is captured [in the following manner. Just as at the beginning of this myth we divided each soul in three, into two horse-shaped forms and a third, charioteer-like (hêniokhikos) form, let that still remain [the case] for us here too. Now, of the horses, one, we say, is good, the other not] (253C6-D2) The goal of the erotic art is what is best for the captured one (ho hairetheis),514 since not everyone is inspired (kinein) to connection with their own god, and he wants to describe by what kind of path a person is led up to himself and just what the nature of the erotic path is. So, having discussed both correctly conducted love and perversely conducted love, describing the extremes, as it were, he now wants to talk about the intermediate kinds as well – I mean, of course, about the continent and the incontinent kinds. So, since he is talking about a soul that has associated itself with (prosomilein)515 body, he fittingly provides it with different (alloi) horses, for the further the soul descends into generation and the closer it comes to the turmoil (kludôn)516 here [below], the more ‘garments’ it puts on.517 Hence he talks about other (193) horses that have assumed a relationship to body, providing these with shapes and characteristics (tupos) and roles (merismos) and bodily aspirations, since the soul, having already assumed a relationship to this [earthly] body, also shares the experiences (pathêma) associated with the life of the body. For a soul in the intelligible [realm] and resident (diazên) [there] has different horses, [namely,] that of the Same and that of the Other; this is clear, since theology gives horses even to the gods themselves.518 So now it receives other horses; viz. that of spirit and that of desire. [This] myth: and yet prior to this he has not called this myth, but now he does. Why has he done this? Because from now on (loipon) the soul is in this body as though in [some] fictional account (plasma); for all the body visible about us and surrounding519 us, or (kai) the entire phenomenal cosmic order,520 is like a myth. So, wanting to talk about the soul’s relation to the body, he has fittingly called it a myth. In what came before this he did not say [this], since the soul was still above with the gods in possession of different horses. Hence he said there that the soul is like the combined (sumphutos) power [of a team of horses and a charioteer] (246A5–6), but here says we divided [each soul] into three,521 by these words making the greater fragmentation of the soul apparent.

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Also, saying each soul [is indicative] of soul that has been sliced up (apotemakhizein)522 and is no longer complete but has been divided up. Two horse-shaped [forms]: he says horse-shaped because he assigns shape to them; for the soul does indeed acquire shape and undergo embodiment [down] here. So he makes spirit and desire horses and the rational element of the soul the charioteer-like [part]. He says charioteer-like (that is to say, mimicking a charioteer) and not ‘charioteer’ (hêniokhos), as he did earlier,523 and, moreover, says horse-shaped and not ‘horses’, and the reason is clear: because the activities of the soul [when it is paired] with a body are not like those when it is among the intelligibles. Let that still remain [the case] for us here too: [i.e. the soul’s] having two horses and a charioteer. Now, of the horses, one, we say, is good: this too he said earlier, [namely,] that the one is good, the other inferior, indicating by means of [this] dyad the dual nature (duoeidês) of the soul; for once it has withdrawn from union with the gods, the soul is of necessity borne into generation and otherness.524

(194) 50. [But we have not told fully] what the virtue of the good [horse] is or the vice of the bad one] (253D2-3) Why does he not say, as he said earlier (246A8-B1), that the [horses and charioteers] of the gods were wholly good and of good stock, but in the case of the rest mixed?525

51. Well then, the one of the pair [in the more honourable position is of upright appearance (eidos), well put together, high-necked, somewhat hook-nosed, white in appearance, dark-eyed,] . . . (253D3-6)

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The divine Plato assigns the parts of the soul to [different parts of] the body. He seats the intellect and the reasoning part, which are analogous to the authoritative or ruling part of the city, in the brain; [for] since the brain is spherical and man is a miniature cosmos, he has therefore made the brain an analogue of the heaven.526 Next, since the spirit is more nobly born than desire and is analogous to the defenders [of the city] and those who restrain all that is ‘moving in a discordant and disorderly fashion’527 in the city – which [group]

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he [sc. Plato] calls the guardian or military [class] – and desires honour and rebukes what is irrational, on that account, after putting the neck in between as a barrier, he established it in the heart so that it would be in the vestibule of reason. The desiring part, as being irrational and like the menial element, or the masses, in the city, he housed in the liver, so that it can be fed there like a donkey at a manger, having [first] placed a barrier in between yet further down than the spirit. So spirit is more nobly born as being close to reason, and hence it has the better position, for it has been located in a better place. Accordingly he speaks about spirit first because it is nobler (kalos) and derives its features (morphôma) in some cases (pote) from body, but in others from moral character (êthê), or soul. The more honourable position: he has assigned it the better position and characterised it for the time being in line with [that] position. He says that it is ‘upright’ due to the fact that it accepts reason’s rules (metron). Well put together: that is, well-defined and not all jumbled.528 High-necked: that is, always reaching upwards and excelling and despising inferior things. Somewhat hook-nosed stands for regal, for he always ascribes529 a hooked nose (to grupon) to royalty and nobility and hooked is a better shape than snub. White in appearance stands for superlatively bright and radiant with beauty. Dark-eyed: that is, exploring the depths and wanting to scrutinise things that are invisible and intelligible; for ‘dark’ means that which is invisible.530

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52. . . . a lover of honour [[but] with prudence and modesty, a friend of true reputation, is, without being beaten, controlled by command and reason alone] (253D6-E1) Having listed the advantages [the good horse enjoys] through the body, he next lists those [it enjoys] through the soul. Honour is the greatest of goods, (195) as he himself says531 in the Laws. And nothing evil is honourable. Hence we honour the gods. Therefore honour is a good. Hence the soul wants to be honoured. At any rate (goun)532 [it is] a lover of honour – that is, [it is] striving after good things and the forms.

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[But] with prudence: that is, it has these advantages of the soul and [so] attends to its own affairs, not wanting to be sullied by the opposite [of those advantages]. Without being beaten: that is, not needing goads, as though understanding what is required. Nor does it roam the [sphere of] enmattered things, but is controlled by command and reason alone. Because it is close to reason, it immediately agrees of its own accord to do everything [reason suggests] and regulates533 the parameters (metron) of [its] life in accordance with the parameters of reason.

53. The other [horse], for its part, is crooked, [multiplicitous, thrown together at random, strong-necked, short-necked, snub-nosed, black-coated, grey-eyed, hotblooded, a companion to wantonness and wild boasting, shaggy about the ears, deaf, barely submitting to lash and goads] (253E1-5) 5

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Having spoken about the more nobly born of the horses, he now says the opposite of what he said [about it] of the other [horse], and he imitates its muddled and mixed up character [in his description]. For [here] he doesn’t describe bodily characteristics first and then those that relate to the soul, but mixes up their order. Consider [the two descriptions], then, using antithetical correspondence[s].534 The other [horse] was upright, this one is crooked as being [the horse] of desire; for desire is like a savage beast.535 Multiplicitous (polus):536 multiplicity (to polu) belongs to [the sphere] of generation and the things down [here]. Therefore it is not governed by a single form but is multiple in form and a friend to plurality. Thrown together (sumpephorêmenos) at random: [that is,] unlimited (apeiros) and unbounded (aoristos)537 and heading off in just any direction. Strong-necked: the other [horse] had an upwards-reaching [posture], this one the opposite, the one associated with [the realm of] generation. Short-necked: stands for ‘degraded’ and ‘living in accordance with desire’ and ‘not desiring honour’. Snub-nosed: worthless, low, and not regal. Black-coated: dark; not translucent and shining like the other [horse].538 Grey-eyed:539 that is to say, the superficial [kind] of illumination occurs,540 or (kai)541 ‘having mental processes that only extend as far as imagination’.542

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Hot-blooded:543 that is, very suited to [the realm of] generation. A companion to wantonness and wild boasting, which is the opposite of what the other [horse] had [as company], for it had prudence and modesty. Shaggy about the ears, deaf: with ears that are hairy and blocked up. Hence it is without hearing, or deaf. And often, hearing something and not taking any notice but yielding to desire, it needs much lashing (196), showing544 that exhortations have no power at all to get anywhere with people who are like this – [and] by this indicating that the soul must take great care to accustom itself to the better horse, since this horse is controlled by words of command and reason, but that of desire barely with lash and goads. Hence nor do those who have been taken over by this horse bear with exhortations.

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54. Now when the charioteer, [having seen the erotic eye [and] having spread warmth through the entire soul by virtue of the perception]545 . . . (253E5-6)

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When he wanted to tell how the captured one is captured (253C6), he first talked about the horses of the soul that has already associated itself with body, that is, about spirit and desire.546 Wanting moreover to talk about continent and incontinent [love], he talks about genuine love, that is, about elevating [love],547 as seen both in declension (apoptôsis) and in mixture (summixis).548 For, there being two parts of the soul, reason and the irrational part (alogia), some four [dispositions] are apparent between them,549 of which some are virtues, some vices. For when reasoning (logismos) has subdued irrationality (to alogon), so that irrationality does not resist but is enslaved, then this whole550 becomes temperance. But when it is the other way around and reason is subject to the irrational part, having been enslaved by it, [it becomes] licentiousness (akolasia). And when there is conflict between these two, if reason has the upper hand, there is continence, if the irrational part (to alogon) has, incontinence. Here (entautha),551then, he wants to talk about (dialambanein)552 the various mixes (summixis) of love and about the better, or continent love and the horse that elevates [and to explain] that the soul, because it is associated with body, is dragged [down] by the licentious horse, but itself, along with the better [horse], drags the worse horse in the opposite direction, [up] to the intelligible forms.

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The erotic eye (omma);553 that is, the soul of the beloved. Someone becomes truly erotic when they revert upon themselves. This will come about through the eyes, when, as he says in the Alcibiades (133B),554 wishing to see oneself, one gazes into another soul. After all, in the sensible sphere (ta aisthêta) too, when we wish to see ourselves, we find no other example of this [happening] than the eye, since [in its case] what sees and what is visible come together – in [the case of] mirrors, what sees is different from what is visible.555 Entire: that is, through the whole soul. He does well to say this, for the love that is a passion is not to be observed throughout the entire soul but only a part of it when [that part] is active in a depraved manner. Having spread warmth throughout [the entire soul by virtue of the perception (aisthêsei)]:556 (197) that is, having elevated the entire soul by means of memory, for he is calling the elevating power ‘heat’. And he has called recollection perception because perception too has a cognitive aspect (to gnôstikon) and perception is a cognitive capacity.

55. . . . [is suffused with] tickling [and pricks of desire, the horse that is obedient to the charioteer . . . holds itself back from leaping upon the beloved . . .] (253E6254A3) That is, when he begins to be moved and to love the beautiful-itself and the intelligible forms, for the charioteer must not lead [them] down into passion. The [horse] that is obedient: we have already557 said that he wants to talk about a better state [of the soul] and a better love. It is the spirit he is calling ‘obedient’, for this eagerly follows to the vision up above, whereas the other [horse] wants instead to pull downwards and participate in generation. [Holds itself back from] leaping upon the beloved: that is, from associating with generation, or, on the surface (to phainomenon), from entering into conversations with the beloved.

56. . . . but the other one [no longer responds to the charioteer’s] goads [or whip . . . [but] compels [them] to approach the boyfriend and recall the joy of sex]558 (254A3-7)

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The other [horse], the one that inclines towards generation, as being heedless of reason, compels association and contact with the boyfriend. To recall the joy of sex: that is, he brings [them] to a recollection of the desire for generation.

57. At first, the two [resist . . . but finally, when there is no end to the evil . . . they yield and agree to do what he what he demands] (254A7-B3) That is, the charioteer and the horse that occupies the better position.559 When there is no end to the evil: that is, when they are no longer able to argue but the horse of desire uses force, as it were, they approach nearer to the beloved and as a result of this recollection of the intelligible beauty comes to them and they once more retreat from contact with the beloved.

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58. [And they get close to him and see the boyfriend’s face flashing like lightning. And as the charioteer sees it] his memory [is carried back to the [true] nature] of beauty [and again sees it seated along with temperance on its holy seat] . . . (254B3–7) For since he still retains the memory of the things up there, he is aloof from the entire [realm of] generation. Flashing like lightning stands for ‘bearing a trace (indalma) of intelligible beauty’. (198) And [again] sees it along with temperance: from this too it is clear that he is talking about the better kind of love, [about] how it arises and how it declines and has its ups and downs, and [how it] masters desire – and later he also tells how it is [on other occasions] mastered [by it]. He is teaching, then, that those of us who exercise self-control here [below] and exercise it over a long period prevail and come to the vision of the beautiful-itself. On its holy seat: he means the intelligible because the intelligible place is pure, unadulterated and holy: beautiful things down here are not of an unmixed beauty.

59. . . . [and seeing,] is afraid, [and, awed, falls back, and at the same time is forced to pull (helkein) the reins back so forcibly that both horses sit back on their haunches, the one willingly, because it does not resist, the wanton one most unwillingly] (254B7-C3)

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One must, as we said earlier,560 understand the fear as the sort of fear that makes us shrink before the gods, not the kind [we experience] in the face of the enemy. Falls back: that is,561 drags (helkein) itself back from all that is perceptible. By to drag562 [oneself back] he means to return from matter and sensible things to the intelligible forms. The wanton one: he means the [horse] of desire. 60. When they have moved some distance away, [the one drenches the whole soul with sweat out of shame and astonishment, the other . . . having barely recovered its breath, rebukes them in anger, reproaching the charioteer and his yokemate at length for breaking ranks and their agreement out of cowardice and unmanliness] (254C3–D1) [Means] when they were no longer drawing closer to association (koinônia) with the beloved but to the intelligible [instead]. The one [sc. the good horse] drenches the whole soul with sweat: for this is the profuse sweat, or struggle,563 on the part of the soul which it engages in as it is elevated to the intelligible. Having barely recovered its breath: the horse of the desiring part has evidently begun to level at the charioteer the charge that he should have made for the sensible world (ta aisthêta) and not have fled from it. For breaking ranks and their agreement out of cowardice and unmanliness: through not associating with sensible things. 61. And [when it tries] once more [to compel] them [to advance], unwilling [as they are], [when they beg it to postpone it until later, it reluctantly consents] (254D1-2)

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In reality with these words he is displaying the soul’s struggle and its swinging (rhopê) in either direction (because at one time it is elevated, at another drawn downwards) and with how much trouble it overcomes its association with sensible things. He says reproaching [him] at length (254C7) because, it says, he has abandoned [any] association with the beloved.564 62. When the agreed time arrives . . . [reminding [them] . . . , it forces [them] to approach the boy (paidika) again] (254D2–5)

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Since they had put associating [with the beloved] off until later (254D2), [the bad horse], he says, reminds them of what was agreed upon. Everything that is said here565 shows the movements of the (199) desiring part [of the soul] coming [to work] against us – that is to say, the forces that drag [us] down.

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63. But the charioteer, [experiencing the same reaction566 even more forcibly [and] falling back as though from a prod . . . bloodies the evil-speaking tongue and jaws and, forcing [its] legs and haunches to the ground, delivers it over to pain] (254D7-E5) He is not as yet telling how the soul has been led down and borne into generation but by all of this is explaining [the nature of] the right kind (katorthôtikos) of love. The same reaction means drawing back.567 From a prod (husplêx): [i.e.] prodded by a goad (muôps). (But some call a whip a husplêx.)568 Falling back: that is, falling backwards and pulling back. Delivers it over to pain: that is, he does not allow [it] to advance towards generation and the sensible. All these things – [I mean] drawing back all one’s powers into oneself and standing aloof from sensible things – are characteristic of the person who is continent and desires the intelligible.

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64. When, [after suffering] the same thing many times, [the base [horse] puts aside its wantonness, humbled, it now finally follows the charioteer’s guidance, and when it sees the fair one, is overwhelmed by fear] (254E5–8) Thus, when it has suffered such treatment (pathos) many times and has been brought to heel, from that point on the irrational life in its entirety follows and does not resist the charioteer, and in this way ascent takes place. Is overwhelmed by fear: [that is,] the inferior horse [is]; for since the soul is multi-powered and has multiple parts, it also wants to activate its other parts. Therefore it resists lower activities and changes course towards better ones and towards the higher [realm], whereas the inferior horse is turned towards generation.

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65. Well then, seeing that [the beloved] [is accorded] all manner of service (therapeia)569 [as if the equal of the gods] . . . (255A1-2) The task before him is to tell how the person elevated is elevated from sensible things and generative nature and absents himself from generation and comes to a vision of the intelligible. So, having described how the lover is captured (253C6), he now also wants to describe how the beloved is captured and how reciprocal love (anterôs) is engendered [in him].570 Therefore from here on he discusses reciprocated love. Is accorded [all manner of] service: that is, the beloved is. By service he does not mean this [earthly kind] that has to do with generation (genesiourgos) or the debasing (katagôgos) and bodily kind but being accorded service like an image of the gods, and as Alcibiades was by Socrates. In any event, [only] when the beloved is accorded service in this manner by the lover, and the lover has given proof [of his character], does the beloved then surrender himself [to him] as being a true lover. The whole thrust of what is said next is as follows. Since the divine (ta theia) overflows with good things and is full of them,571 it is necessarily the case that love, which the gods have sown in human beings, should also overflow with goodness. And therefore the person who is gripped by this love is full of good things. [And] hence he says that the lover, who has been reminded of the intelligibles by his (200) beloved’s eye and has come to himself and contemplated true beauty, pours something of the good things he has acquired into his beloved. [And] the beloved, receiving this from the lover like sound that rebounds or re-echoes from smooth (255C4) and shiny [surfaces], or like the eye of another person that is sympathetically572 infected by [other] eyes,573 reaches out to himself and the beloved becomes a lover.

66. . . . [by the lover], who is not pretending [but truly feels this, and that he himself is naturally friendly to the one who serves [him]] . . . (255A2-4) This is what spurious lovers do, dissimulating and pretending to love. And that he is naturally friendly [to the one who serves [him]]: he [sc. Plato] equates friendship and love because ascent to the gods comes about through friendship, like-mindedness (homonoia), and being in accord (sumpnoia).574

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67. . . . even if earlier [he was misled by schoolmates, or other people, saying that it is a shameful thing to associate with a lover and because of that had rejected the lover] . . . (255A4-6)

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That is, even if he was misled (diaballein) about associating with the lover, because he [sc. the lover] has not consorted with him for the sake of carnal pleasure but for the benefit of his [sc. the beloved’s] soul, he subsequently (tote) surrenders himself [to him], scorning those who are levelling these false accusations.575

68. . . . with the passage of time [age and fate lead him to admit him to his company] (255A6-B1) This is just what he says in the Alcibiades.576 When with the passage of time those who are lovers of the body leave while he himself remains, it becomes clear to the lover that he is not staying for the sake of [his own] bodily pleasure but for the benefit of the young man.577 Hence the young man, having thereafter an opportunity to become acquainted with reports (logoi) [about the lover] and to [thereby] distinguish the genuine lover [from the rest], enters into association with the lover and surrenders himself to the lover.

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69. For it is never fated that the bad [be dear to the bad or that the good not be dear to the good. And having [thus] admitted him and accepted conversation and association at close quarters] . . . (255B1-3) For it is not natural for unlike things to mix, neither a base lover with a good beloved, nor a base beloved with a good lover, but ‘like is friend to like’.578 Hence a base person is not dear to a noble, nor a cowardly one to a rash – nor indeed to a brave one since vice is unbounded and unlimited, while fine things (kala) lie in measure and in limit. He calls life and position in the corporeal sphere ‘fate’. Iamblichus, on the other hand, calls the nature of the universe ‘fate’.579 (201) But the fate that results from the law of Adrastia never couples bad with good. After he has accepted the lover and they have entered into conversation (logoi) .580

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At close quarters (enguthen):581 no longer from afar as formerly, but being close to the lover so as to be able to hear his words (logoi). Or ‘close’ signifies that good things are available from close by (enguthen) to those who wish to partake of [them]. 70. . . . [the manifested (gignesthai)582 goodwill of the lover] astonishes the beloved, [who perceives that not even all of his other friends and relatives together provide any measure of friendship when compared with his divinely inspired friend] (255B4-7)

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Because he remained with the beloved not for the sake of bodily pleasure, but out of friendship and for his benefit. He describes a divinely inspired friend as [a friend] compared with whom neither fathers nor relatives are anything at all. 71. And when he continues doing this and keeps close [to him], including touching [him], in gymnasiums and during other encounters, then at last the fount of that stream, which Zeus, in love with Ganymede, called longing, travelling copiously towards the lover, in part enters him, in part, when he is filled, flows away outside [of him] (255B7-C4)

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He [now] gives the rest [of the account] of reciprocated love.583 When, he says, the beloved continues doing this – that is, being with the lover and benefitting from him – he engenders reciprocal love. Touching: even when touching [his beloved] the genuine lover touches [him] chastely, just as we have Socrates [doing] when exercising in the gymnasium or sleeping with Alcibiades.584 Then at last the fount of that stream: that is, [the stream] of love, which he called longing (himeros) from Zeus’ having loved Ganymede.585 So then the longing born in him from the boy, welling up586 and travelling to the beloved, rebounds as from smooth (255C4) and shiny [surfaces] and is reflected as is the case with rays of light and gives birth to reciprocal love. The fount, then, is the beauty (kallonê) travelling copiously from the beloved. 72. And as a gust of wind [or an echo, reflecting from smooth and hard [surfaces], is carried back to where it came from, so too the stream of love, travelling back to

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the fair one by way of [his] eyes . . . waters the exits of the wings and stimulates them to sprout the wings and fills the soul of the beloved in its turn with love. So he loves, but is at a loss as to what [he loves]] (255C4-D3) In what remains he uses analogies. Just as, he says, a gust of wind turns back from smooth [surfaces] to587 , sent [back] by the echo, or just as another person is infected with ophthalmia from [an existing case of] ophthalmia (255D4-5) and does not understand where the infection (pathos) comes from – this infection [actually] comes about through sympathy and union – in the same way, the beloved who feels reciprocal love for the lover feels love (philein) but does not recognise what he is feeling. Waters: something that is watered speedily gains height, so this means to be led upwards away from earthborn things. But is at a loss as to what [he loves]: by ‘being at a loss’ he has indicated the unified and extraordinary nature of love, [showing] that on the one hand we love that [heavenly] vision and seek our own wholeness, in that we are hewn asunder, but on the other hand are unaware that we love and [so] sink down into matter and [the realm of] sensible things.

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(202) 73. But, as though [he has caught] ophthalmia from someone else, [he is not able to state the cause, but without realising it is seeing himself in the lover as though in a mirror] (255D4-6) For neither is a person who suffers from ophthalmia in this way able to state the cause, or reason.588 He doesn’t even know why the infection occurs. [In fact] it comes about through sympathy (sumpatheia). Or else ophthalmia is somehow contracted through the air. But as though in a mirror: the appropriate exemplar (paradeigma) of erotic knowledge is an eye, since loving (to eran) comes from seeing (to horan)589 and the soul’s illuminations are manifested through the eyes. Therefore, just as the lover is elevated through the eye of the beloved as he is mirrored there, so too is the beloved [elevated] through the eye of the lover. Thus one would do better to say mirror of the eye [than simply ‘mirror’] – and [this] interpretation of the word can fit in the case of other mirrors too.

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74. And when he [sc. the lover] is present, [he [sc. the beloved] stops hurting just as he does, and when he is absent, again like him, he desires and is desired, experiencing reciprocal love, love’s reflection . . . And he longs to see, to touch, to kiss, to lie down with [him] in much the same way as he does, but less strongly] (255D6-E3) That is, he experiences the same things as the lover, and they have the same activities, the same ascent and the same goal. He calls reciprocated love ‘love’s reflection’; and he connects secondary (deuteros) [characteristics]590 with reciprocal love because love is the initiating (prôtourgos) cause of reciprocated love. In much the same way but less strongly: here too he is connecting all that is secondary with reciprocated love.

75. And of course, as you’d expect, soon after he does these very things (255E4)

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As you might put it, he wants to perform the act in question by becoming united with him and gives himself to the lover. On the surface (kata to phainomenon) he’s talking about lying with the lover.

76. So, during their lying together, [the lover’s licentious horse knows what to say to the charioteer and claims a little enjoyment in repayment for its many tribulations] (255E4–256A1)

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On the face of it these words seem to be referring to the continent person and the incontinent one. But one must understand them more allegorically (theôrêtikôteron) and not in the sense the text seems to have, for what is said is not without a shameful sense. For what does during their lying together mean? The licentious [horse] tries to compel [them] to approach the boyfriend, but the better horse resists. And when they have been instructed in the philosophical way of life, the irrational part [of the soul] follows and is guided by reason. But when they have pursued an unphilosophical way of life, they fall into this sort of shameful conduct. But one must understand [Plato’s] words differently, so that [those] words will be far removed from [any] unsavoury sense – so that he is saying that [someone] who has had philosophical instruction makes contact

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with beautiful things by way of the forms, despising sensible beauty because it is enmattered, whereas the (203) non-philosopher expects to possess591 the intelligible by way of sensible things, by [physical] contact and intercourse, which must be understood without [any] shameful imputation (huponoia), in the way that with fathers and their children and with siblings one can observe embraces and [close] associations without [there being any] shameful implication (huponoia). So something of this nature must also be understood in the case of the [horse] here described as ‘licentious’. It is clear from what he says about it later (256B4) that these [horses] too come to be winged (hupopteros),592 and he would not have said that they come to be winged if he was saying anything shameful about them [here].

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77. That of the boyfriend, on the other hand, [has nothing to say, but full of longing and feeling confused, embraces and kisses the lover] (256A1-2) That is, the beloved’s horse. Has nothing to say: for he has not even seen that the lover is attached to him through some shameful ulterior motive (huponoia) and because of [his] bodily beauty. Nevertheless, full of longing and desire, he acquiesces out of friendship and embraces the lover.

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78. When they lie down together [it is of a mind not to refuse its own part in gratifying the lover, should he beg to have his way] (256A3-5) The passage in the Symposium (218C) where Alcibiades says ‘Socrates, are you asleep?’ will serve to explain to you that this is how things are. The boy, then, is willing to gratify the lover if he should wish it. But this interpretation is [merely] of the apparent [meaning].

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79. But his yokemate, [on the other hand, along with the charioteer, resists this] (256A5-6) That is, the spirited faculty resists such gratification, not descending to [such] a shameful notion (huponoia).

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80. So, then, if [the better aspects of the mind, which lead] to an orderly way of life [and to philosophy, prevail, they lead a blessed and harmonious life here [below], being self-controlled and orderly] . . . (256A7-B2)

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When they are well schooled, having dealt with (tunkhanein) studies, teachers, habits and good pursuits in a philosophical manner, then they drag even the licentious horse up above, teaching it that the vision of the intelligible will not come to pass for it by way of perceptible beauties. Self-controlled: that is, mastering [their] generative nature and not being elevated by means of sensible things.

81. . . . [having enslaved] that by which vice of the soul was being engendered in [them] [and having liberated that by which virtue [is] (256B2–3) He means the desiring part [of the soul]; for by what else but the desiring (204) part is vice engendered [in the soul]? Having liberated: that is, [having liberated] the charioteer, in whom virtue is engendered.

82. And when they have died [and become winged and light, they have been victorious in one of the three wrestling falls that are truly Olympian, than which neither human prudence nor divine madness can provide a greater good for a human being] (256B3-7) 10

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That is, after the end of this life and way of life, since their end and object and succesful outcome (katorthôma) is becoming winged. Light stands for ‘not burdened by generative nature’. One can take the three wrestling falls in the same way as the struggles (agôn),593 but it is better to take what is said more allegorically (theôrêtikôteron) in line with what was said earlier (249A1 ff.), so that he will be saying that someone who has come to [the realm of] generation for a third time and has been a philosopher is elevated. Than which [neither human prudence nor divine madness can provide] a greater good: that is, than the happiness which love procures, which neither prudence nor any other virtue procures. He says this of set purpose as being

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directed at Lysias’ speech, since that man said that lovers are jealous of their boyfriends and want them always to be in need.594 He says these things, then, tacitly directing them at the speech of Lysias and [also] because the virtues connected with the mortal life do not procure the sort of good for the soul that the intellectual and divine virtues do. He means divine madness as opposed to the other kinds of madness, [namely,] mantic, telestic, poetic.

83. But should [they pursue] a way of life [that is coarser and lacking in philosophy, but are devoted to honour] . . . (256B7-C1)

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As one might put it: ‘That, then, is the philosophical way of life. The unphilosophical one, for its part, produces an incontinent person’. But one must not understand what is said this way, but [as saying] that they look to be elevated through bodies and sensible things.

84. . . . perhaps in their cups [or at some other careless moment] . . . (256C1-2) In the same way that the charioteer elevated the desiring part [up] there (ekei), here [below] (entautha)595 the desiring part drags the soul down. On the face of it, then, [this] statement is about the incontinent person. But for those who take the statement to be remote from shameful desire, it will be about those who look to be elevated through sensible things.

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85. . . . [their licentious yoke-beasts, catching] the souls off guard, [may, bringing them together, choose and follow the course [deemed] most blessed by the many] (256C2-5) He means spirit and desire, or, better, the desire of the lover and [that] of the beloved.596 The course [deemed] most blessed by the many on the surface (to phainomenon)597 means shameful pleasure, but more allegorically it is the ascent from sensible things. He says by the many because such love (philia) is not [that] of philosophers, for genuine love is the meeting of mind[s].

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(205) 86. [And having followed it,] they engage in it [thereafter, though infrequently, since they are doing something not whole-heartedly approved of [by either of them]] (256C5-7)

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[They engage in it]: since as they go on they no longer pursue philosophy as keenly. [Not] whole-heartedly means [not] by the intellectual part of the soul.

87. This pair too [remain] dear [to one another, though less so than the former [pair], both during their love affair (erôs) and when they have fallen out [of love]] (256C7-D1)

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He positions (aponemein) [them] relative to the extremes, as though one were to say ‘the lowest kind of erotic friendship is this physical kind’.598 And when they have fallen out [of love]: that is, they are friends even when they are no longer lovers, for ‘when they have fallen out [of love]’ means when they are no longer physically lovers.

88. At the end, [wingless, but beginning to grow wings, they leave the body, and so secure the not insubstantial prize for erotic madness; for it is not the law that those who have once started on the journey beneath the heaven should go thereafter into darkness and to the journey beneath the earth, but that, living in the light, they should be happy, journeying together with one another, and, on account of their love, become like-winged, when they become [winged]] (256D3-E2)

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[By the end] he means either that of death or that of love. Wingless: because they have not employed the soul’s intellectual [aspect]. Those who obtain [even] the least trace of love carry away a not insubstantial prize.599 Into darkness: that is, those who have procured friendship through sensible things also become winged and do not depart again for the subterranean places of punishment (249A6-7), as do those whose love is licentious, since they have made a start of a sort on erotic madness and ascent. He says like-winged600 due to the fact that [both] the beloved and the lover are elevated.

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89. These very great [and divine [rewards] the friendship of a lover will in this way give you, my boy; association with a non-lover, on the other hand, married with [merely] mortal prudence, doling out mortal and miserly [gifts], engendering in the soul of his friend an illiberality which is extolled by the multitude as a virtue, will leave it wallowing mindlessly around the earth and beneath the earth for nine thousand years] (256E3-257A2) Here he compares and contrasts the lover and the non-lover, saying that the lover leads them up to the heavenly pathway and truly to being itself, while the non-lover has nothing like this [to offer] but [only] all that is human and mortal and corporeal and [mere] images of what is real. He says by the multitude because most people praise the kind of people who are prudent by their standards, even if there is nothing intellectual or uplifting about them. He says for nine thousand [years] because in the first birth, the circulation from the intelligibles to things down here involves no suffering.

90. This [palinode, the finest and best within our means, is dedicated . . . ] to you, dear Eros (257A3-4) He also started601 from the gods when he began his speech, and now, when he is finishing his speech, he prays to Love. Why does he do this? It is because the gods embrace beginning, middle, and end and everything [there is] and one must invoke a god as partner in every undertaking, great or small, [as] he himself says.602 And again, in the (206) Laws [he says] ‘god embraces beginning, middle, and end’.603 Thus the philosopher, who takes the same position as he [sc. Plato] does, quite appropriately both begins with a prayer and ends with a prayer. Accordingly, he begins by praying to the gods that he may succeed in the venture he has undertaken and that he may, through the gods, achieve his goal. Again, one must give thanks to the gods after the event both for having achieved one’s objective and for what has been said or done or whatever else is [in question] itself having a solid foundation. He says dear [Eros] because it is Lord Eros604 who grants friendship and unity to all. Thus he is bringing the erotic and friendship together,605 since ascent comes about through friendship and like-mindedness.

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Within our means: because the superior orders – gods, daemons, and heroes – celebrate Love in one fashion and those who become possessed by him and the philosophers in another; for each celebrates the god according to his ability.

91. The finest (kallistos) and best (aristos) (257A3-4) For what is finest and best is fitting for the gods and especially so for Love, the one in question here. After all, the ascent to the intelligible is by way of beauty (kallos) and virtue (aretê).

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92. [Given that, apart from anything else,] it [sc. the palinode] has had to be [delivered in rather poetic] language [because of Phaedrus] (257A4-6) Here, defending himself, [he explains] why he has used poetic language (onomata) – for he has used ‘winged’, ‘watered’, ‘feast’, ‘banquet’, and many other similar [words]. Why did he use such language? He himself says because of Phaedrus. The philosopher did this when he saw that Phaedrus was amazed at the beauty, spareness and perfection of the composition of Lysias’ speech [and], wanting to astonish him with the opposite, employed a more weighty, forceful, and high-flown style. But it should be said that the truer explanation is that the high style is fitting and suited to important matters and to speeches about such momentous issues.

93. But [granting me] pardon for my previous [words] . . . (257A6) Socrates explains his attitude to the names of the gods in the Philebus. For when he [sc. Philebus] says Aphrodite is Pleasure, the philosopher, maintaining that she is not, says: ‘My fear, Protarchus, when it comes to the (207) names of the gods is beyond the greatest fear known to man’;606 for one must not besmirch the names of the gods. Since, then, he has seemed in some sense to speak against Love, he has on that account delivered the palinode by way of apology and is [now] begging for pardon for the things he has seemed to say against the name of Love.

Translation

147

94. . . . and favour for the present ones, [may you, benevolent and gracious, neither take away nor incapacitate in anger the erotic art you bestowed upon me] . . . (257A6-8) For it is the gods who radiate favour (kharis) to the entire cosmos and through favour and concord we are joined with the gods. He does not say favour [here] because the gods receive favour from us but because by worshipping the gods [and thereby] gratifying (kharizesthai) them, we are joined with the gods and made akin to them. In any event, [and your] favour for the present ones will stand for ‘receiving the speech favourably’. He says benevolent and gracious with reference to his connection to him [sc. Love] and to the goodness of the gods. How is it that he now calls the erotic, which he earlier said is divinely inspired, an art (tekhnê)? Well, it is clear that he says this because we must [first] activate the technical principles (theôrêma) that originate with us and only after that receive the illumination [that comes] from the gods – just as, [when practising] the poetic art, we must [first] activate our [own] inventiveness and creativity (poiêtikon) and only then expect the illumination [that comes] from the gods – for it is the person who comes to be possessed by the Muses who becomes a divine poet. But what is the character of the erotic art? It is as he revealed and taught in the Alcibiades, [namely,] that one must first seek out someone deserving of love and decide who one should love, for it must not be just anyone but someone high-minded, someone who is scornful of secondary things; then, after one has fallen in love, one must not say anything to [him] until he is of an age to understand philosophical discourse (logoi); then, when he is able to understand [it], [one must] take control of him and teach him the [elements] of the erotic [art] and so engender reciprocal love in him. Neither take away nor incapacitate through anger: the anger of the gods consists in separation from them; for the gods do not even become angry. Thus what he says is this: ‘Do not cause me to be separated from the inspiration (epipnoia) that stems from you or make me inefficacious but make me hold fast to the gift and the goodness that stem from you’.

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95. . . . and grant [that I be honoured] even more [than now by the fair ones] (257A9)

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He says ‘be honoured’ for the sake of the young, for he wishes to be honoured by the young not for his own sake but for theirs. For one must honour even the gods not for their sake, but for our own, for honouring what is superior profits the one who does the honouring. (208) It is for this reason that Socrates prays that he be honoured by the young, because this is also a goal of the erotic art; for what he is saying is nothing other than: may the young have reciprocal love for me. For because the young men honour him this results in their also loving him. And honour is a divine and good thing, as he himself says elsewhere.607

96. And if in the previous speech [Phaedrus and I said] something [that grates]608 with you, [holding Lysias, the father of the speech, responsible, make him desist from such speeches and turn him to philosophy, just as his brother Polemarchus has been turned [to it], so that this lover of his will no longer be in two minds as he presently is] . . . (257B1-5)

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That is, if anything discordant (apêkhês) was said against your name609 Love, Lysias was responsible, because he compelled Phaedrus to use such language (logoi). [Turn him] to philosophy, just as, etc.: The true philosopher comports himself in the likeness of divinity. For just as divinity proffers good things to all without envy – for envy [is located] outside the divine choir (247A7) – but [only] the person who is of a nature to and ready partakes of [them], in the same manner Socrates, who wishes good things for everyone, prays on behalf of Lysias that he may no longer write such things [as he has] but things that can benefit the young. Polemarchus is the brother of Lysias who was mentioned in the Republic (327B ff.) as chasing after Socrates and desiring to hear him. No longer be in two minds: ‘that he [sc. Phaedrus] may no longer go after Lysias and follow after us too, but be of one mind (gnômê)’. He says this because Lord Eros provides us with unity and a single harmony, dispelling all that is twofold or alien and every activity of that sort [and thereby] guiding everything to unity. He says this, then, in order that Phaedrus too might act in a unified manner.

Translation

149

97. . . . but [make for himself a life] oriented entirely towards Love (257B5-6) For Love is our guide in the whole of life and its disposition. Therefore he makes this prayer that Love guide the whole of Lysias’ life610 as well towards simplicity and truth.

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98. I join you, Socrates, in praying [that these things come to pass, if it is indeed better for us that they should] (257B7-C1) He says I join [you] in praying because the prayer of many achieves rather more than that of a single man. [The words] if it is indeed better must, by divining the communion of souls, make the prayer general; for they [sc. souls] were formerly together before they came into [the realm of] generation. He says [if it is indeed better] for us that they should because it is not always the case that what is fitting for one person is fitting for another. Nor indeed do we know what applies to (209) ourselves or the outcome of future events. But the gods do know what is fitting for each person.

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Notes 1 Hermias takes the argument of 245C5–246A2 to be analysable into two syllogisms, A and B, (109,22–9 in vol. 1) with a common premiss, C. The first syllogism runs as follows: C1 the soul is self-moved; A1 all that is self-moved is in perpetual motion; A2 that which is in perpetual motion is immortal, so the soul is immortal. Then the second syllogism proceeds: C1 the soul is self-moved; B1 that which is self-moved is a source of motion; B2 that which is a source of motion is ungenerated; B3 that which is ungenerated is imperishable; B4 that which is imperishable is immortal. The A syllogism rules out the possibility that soul might be destroyed by its own agency, while the B syllogism rules out the possibility that the soul might be destroyed by the agency of anything else. These alternatives for soul’s destruction seem alien to the text of the Phaedrus and represent an aligning of this argument for the soul’s immortality with that of Republic 608D–611A. 2 We are conscious of not having found a convincing rendering of hupomimnêiskein here and in the similar passage at 126,4 (where Bernard translates ‘argumentiert’). 3 Strictly ‘he said’, or ‘has said’, but Hermias seems to use eipen interchangeably with legei and we sometimes translate it ‘he says’. 4 Couvreur assumed a lacuna after horismon (‘definition’) in line 20 and considered emending autês (‘of its’) to auton after Plato. We have translated Lucarini and Moreschini’s text but punctuated with a full stop after horismon rather than with a semicolon before it as they do. (horismon will be in the accusative rather than the genitive as being the actual word that ousian kai logon supposedly stands for and touton will begin a new comment.) 5 This first part of the sentence is a paraphrase of touton auton legôn ouk aiskhuneitai at 245E4 on which the rest of the paragraph comments, the most significant difference being the substitution of autês for auton, which facilitates Hermias’ interpretation of the phrase. In Plato touton auton looks back to tou huph’ eautou kinoumenou (‘that which is moved by itself ’) in the previous line (as commentators point out, it is presumably masculine by attraction to logon in the same line), but Hermias seems to assume that it refers to ousian te kai logon (‘essence and account’). This has the effect of making the use of ousian te kai logon in lieu of horismon rather than the actual definition of soul (as it is in Plato and seems to be in the next paragraph) a source of possible embarrassment.

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Notes to pp. 39–40

6 sc. both ‘essence’ and ‘account’, which represent the two views of definition. 7 Taking the kai after malista men as the kai of balanced contrast, on which see Smyth 2885–6. 8 Here, in contrast to in the previous paragraph, it seems natural to assume that Hermias means defining it as the self-moving. 9 123,25-9 contain a number of problems. (1) Both Couvreur and Lucarini and Moreschini punctuate with a semicolon after eipe in line 25. This seems to imply that amphotera looks forward to the two alternatives in what follows, but dia touto must look back to what precedes and it is difficult to see how what follows is to be explained by that. Better, we believe, to follow Bernard and punctuate with a full stop, making amphotera refer back to ousian kai logon. This has the further advantage of making to de legôn ouk aiskhuneitai (line 26) parallel to to men oun pephasmenou (line 17) and to de ousian kai logon (line 19). (2) Reading legei for legôn at 123,27. Whether one punctuates as Couvreur and Lucarini and Moreschini do or as Bernard and we do at the end of line 25, the participle in line 27 is awkward. One would expect a finite verb as in lines 17 and 20 and the obvious emendation would be legei, which we have translated. (3) Lucarini and Moreschini follow Couvreur in printing aiskhunas heauton in line 27. In fact, the manuscripts disagree as to the inflection of the verb aiskhunein and all have seauton or sauton rather than heauton. We retain seauton, translate aiskhuneis (although this is not the reading of any of the manuscripts), and close the parentheses after heauton (or seauton as we read it) in line 27 rather than after psukhês in line 28. ‘And you do above all shame yourself ’ will then explain malista, etc. (line 26) and ‘for such a definition of soul will not give him cause for regret’ will explain why there will be no need for shame. (Bernard’s suggested emendation makes good sense but departs too far from the manuscripts.) (4) Lucarini and Moreschini follow Couvreur in deleting de in line 27. Emending and punctuating as we suggest, we think it can stand, although gar, or perhaps dê, would certainly be better. 10 At 245E2-6. 11 cf. 108,6 ff., 113,5 ff., and 128,11 ff., and for empsukhia in Hermias, see Finamore 2020. 12 We find in Proclus the notion that the irrational ‘soul’ is not, properly speaking, a soul at all but rather an image of soul; cf. PT 3,23,21–3. See Opsomer 2006. 13 Though Hermias does not say so, his examples make clear that the question at issue here is the relation between Aristotelian natures understood as internal sources of motion and souls as sources of motion. 14 Neither Couvreur nor Lucarini and Moreschini nor Bernard have any suggestion as to where this might be but it seems probable that it was in the lacuna at 113,12 ff.

Notes to pp. 40–2

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Immediately prior to it Hermias tells us that he is about to show that the motions of soul are final causes of the motions of body and continues ‘since even the serious and sensible man here below, for his own advantage (khrêsimon)’, at which point the lacuna begins. It seems likely that Hermias was about to draw a parallel between the behaviour of a sensible person and that of soul. The manuscripts have autês which is difficult and which Couvreur and Lucarini and Moreschini, emend to hautês. The parallel provided by to heautou khrêsimon at 113,12 (on which see the previous note) strongly supports the emendation. The phrase kai tauton on (125,9) is syntactically difficult and we have smoothed the sentence out a bit. Given the proximity of ‘demonstrative’ it seems likely that this reflects Aristotelian constraints on the demonstrative syllogism. In a much-discussed passage at An. Post. 1.4, Aristotle notes that demonstration depends upon what holds in every case (kata pantos), what is in itself or per se (kath’ hauto) and the universal (to katholou). In the course of explaining the various senses of kath’ hauto, Aristotle claims that, in one sense, what holds ‘through itself ’ (di’ hauto) is in itself (kath’ hauto). Hermias’ observation that Plato’s demonstrations involve terms that are ‘per se’ (kath’ hauto) and ‘qua the thing itself ’ (hêi auto) is perhaps not meant to convey criteria that are particularly distinct. Philoponus similarly draws together the Phaedrus and the Timaeus, observing that while Plato sometimes regards the soul’s essence as its motive power, at other times he stresses its gnostic power in relation to being (in DA 81,18–25). Hermias’ precise wording in this expanded definition is otherwise unattested. The pseudoPlatonic Definitions makes its essence self-motive and vital. ‘It resembles’ translates eoike, which is the original reading of all manuscripts of the Phaedrus. The OCT edition of the Phaedrus prints eoiketô (‘let it be likened’), which, although poorly attested, may well be correct. As Hermias observes at 132,19, a zeugos is not necessarily a pair of animals. hupopteros is normally to be translated ‘winged’. See the note at 131,10 for the reason for rendering it ‘with lowered wings’ here and in Hermias’ subsequent comments on this passage. (As modern commentators point out, hupopteros applies to both the horses and the charioteer.) Perhaps Hermias’ example of one one-way immortality presupposes a rhetorical context, as in an encomium to the immortal memory of a person or his excellence. cf. Isocrates, Orat. 4 (Panegyricus), 84: ‘while the gods surrendered the bodies even of their own sons to the doom of nature, yet they have made immortal the memory of their valour’. It is doubtful that Plato’s use of ‘idea’ here carries any serious metaphysical sense. Accordingly, Nehamas and Woodruff ’s 1997 translation renders it ‘structure’: ‘That,

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then, is enough about the soul’s immortality. Now here is what we must say about its structure’. But because Hermias sees it as a bit of technical terminology, he is left with a puzzle. Socrates has just told us that the soul’s essence (ousian te kai logon, 245E3) is self-motion. What then can it mean to now turn to the question of its form (idea)? Hermias’ resolution of this problem (which is, of course, of his own making) is that self-motion is the soul’s ‘substantial one’, while what follows now in terms of the description of chariot and horses is the pluralisation of that substantial one. It is located in Intellect and thus quite separate from Soul. sc. its essence. This ‘one of the soul’ was taken by Iamblichus to be identical with the ‘steersman’ of Phaedrus 247C8, distinguishing it from the charioteer who is interpreted as the soul’s intellect. See sections 32-3 below. In general, the one of the soul is a divine trace or source of the soul. cf. Addey 2012, Dillon 2008. Bernard changes to hekastou to hekastou to at 126,12 and translates differently. We translate Lucarini and Moreschini’s text, which is that of the manuscripts. Only the One itself can be absolutely devoid of plurality. The editors begin a new sentence with this kai. Like Bernard, retaining the manuscript reading hen polla at 126,14, which Couvreur, followed by Lucarini and Moreschini, emends to hen kai polla. As Bernard points out, the two phrases look to the Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato’s Parmenides, according to which hen polla describes nous (and therefore form) and hen kai polla soul. Translating akinêton, which seems to be the reading of all but one manuscript, rather than akinêton with Couvreur and Lucarini and Moreschini, at 126,29. (Couvreur prints autokinêton without angle brackets and lists akinêton as the reading of the manuscript A in his apparatus, which presumably means that it is the reading of the tradition at large, which depends on A, but leaves the source of autokinêton unclear. Lucarini and Moreschini print akinêton, citing v (v doesn’t appear in their Conspectus Siglorum but, on the analogy of a, it presumably represents a correction in the manuscript V) as its source in their apparatus. They don’t mention the reading akinêton in their apparatus, but we are to assume that the letters uto are peculiar to v and that akinêton is the reading of the rest of the manuscript tradition). The parenthetic addition (aei . . . arkhê) at 126,28-9 should offer an explanation of the relative closeness of the self-moved to the unmoved (as the one at 126,30-1 does of that of the immortal to the othermoved). It does so, we believe, by establishing an, admittedly far-fetched, parallel between them: just as the self-moved preserves itself by perpetually moving (see, for example, 117,13 for this), so too is the unmoved perpetually the first principle,

Notes to pp. 43–4

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or the cause of everything else. (For prôtê arkhê (‘first principle’) used of the One in Hermias, see 121,24, 154,13 ff., 159,4, etc.; when he calls the self-moved an arkhê he calls it the arkhê kinêseôs (120,19) or arkhê kinêseôn (112,2), not the prôtê arkhê without qualification.) athanatos (here translated ‘immortal’) is formed from thanatos (here translated ‘death’) and the privative prefix ‘a’. The argument seems to be that being expressed as the privation of death makes the immortal close to death and therefore, because only the other-moved dies (see, for example, 113,31 ff.), close to the other-moved. cf. Proclus, in Tim. 2,25,7 and 2,74,24 where the powers or shapes of things are similarly likened to exhalations of the thing’s essence. A square number is one made up of two equal factors, a cubic number one made up of three. The procession envisioned, then, is from 3 to 9 to 27. Three becomes ‘inferior to itself ’ in this procession by virtue of its increasing complexity and greater distance from the One. heterôtheisa should be from heteroun, which isn’t listed in the lexica, so either we have a hapax or we should correct to heteroiôtheisa. cf. Proclus, in Remp. 2,47,5–49,10 where the three sides and three angles of the triangle are presented as an image of the soul’s triadic nature. At issue is whether the soul’s essence is changed in its descent so that it becomes other than it was on high, or whether its psychic activities or powers undergo a change. Compare the view of Hermias’ classmate Proclus, in Tim. 3,335,23–336,2 who similarly holds that the essence remains the same but the activities and powers of the soul are changed in its embodiment. For the rejection of this Iamblichean view, see Steel 1978. cf. Timaeus 43D where the influx of sensations distorts the revolutions of the soul’s circles ‘entirely arresting the circle of the Same by flowing opposite to it’. Or perhaps ‘innate’, as Scully translates. ‘Of good stock’ in fact translates ex agathôn, which is literally just ‘from good’ (presumably with ellipsis of ‘horses and charioteers’), which leaves it open to Hermias’ hypothetical interlocutor to argue that the ellipsis is of ‘causes’ (aitiôn) We have an example from Homer below. Certainly Parmenides’ poem opens with the image of the narrator carried along in a chariot drawn by horses to the gates of the roads of night and day (DK A1). It is hard to imagine that Parmenides’ proem was not allegorised by the Neoplatonists, but we find no trace of such treatment in our remaining texts. Manolea 2004 refers us to Kern fr. 49,69–71. On the ‘dignity’ and ‘lofty’ nature of Plato’s style in this part of the dialogue, see 11,15 ff. Iliad 9.438 ff. Iliad 1.536; Odyssey 5.195.

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45 Timaeus 35A: ‘intermediate being . . . bodies’ (128,14-15) is a mixture of paraphrase and quotation of 35A1-3. 46 Proclus, in Tim. 3,125,10–126,8 sets out the steps in the psychogony. This includes its substance (woven together from the kinds of Being, Sameness, and Difference found in intelligibles and divisible being associated with bodies, as well as its powers (the circles of the soul) and its activities (their rotations). While the Demiurge creates every aspect of the soul, the creation simpliciter is the creation of its essence. The structuring of this discourse in terms of substance, power, and activity is possibly a legacy from Iamblichus (cf. Baltzly 2009, 21). It is common to Hermias as well. See below 128,31–4. 47 It is frequently difficult to choose between ‘being’, ‘substance’, and ‘essence’ when rendering ousia. We’ve tried to move between them in a way that makes reasonable overall sense in what follows, but in many instances a case could be made for a different rendering. 48 cf. 124,8 ff. 49 Timaeus 41D4-6. 50 cf. in Tim. 2,133,26–8: ‘Therefore it is necessary that each of the genera be in all things, and that Being is the most primary one to be established in them since it is like the very hearth of these things, a monad and analogous in rank to the One’ (trans. Baltzly 2007). 51 135,14 ff. 52 Perkams (2006, 171) sees 129,3-6 together with Hermias’ description of the soul as multi-powered in several passages as proof that Syrianus, like other Neoplationists before Proclus, but in his view unlike Proclus himself, held that soul is a single substance with multiple powers. 53 Both the horses and the wheels can stand for the ‘motions’ characteristic of soul. The horses symbolise the manner in which the soul circumscribes the intelligible (cf. Proclus, in Tim. 2,290,12) or ‘dances around it’. The wheels convey the idea that this psychic motion is ‘apocatastatic’, sc. that it returns to the same place. 54 Timaeus 37C2. 55 Timaeus 37B7. 56 Hermias has little difficulty reading the circle of the Same in the description of the soul from Timaeus in terms of the wheel. The use of ‘smooth-running’ at 37C2 makes that easy enough. The other wheel is more difficult, since it is ‘going straight’. But he uses the fact that the circle of the Other is set over sensibles and invokes Plato’s extramission theory of vision. In this theory, seeing is like touching: the eye’s ray comes out and gets strengthened by the daylight. Now rigidified, it touches the objects seen and transmits the shape back to the visual faculty as a blind person might touch the shape of a face. This ‘out and back’ journey is a true (orthos) circle and both the Same and the Other can now be seen as wheels.

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57 Timaeus 43E1. 58 Since Ast editors have assumed a lacuna at this point and there does seem to be something wrong with the text. However, rather than posit a lacuna, we have emended tôn pronoêtikôn at 130,2 to tên pronoêtikên. For the pronoêtikê dunamis of divine souls cf. 163,16 (where the plural is used), for the downward orientation of divine souls, especially those of goddesses, in the exercise of providence cf. Proclus, in Remp. 1,246,10–22, in Tim. 1,46,24–47,1 and 2,241,27–9, in the last of which the feminine divine soul is also aligned with the circle of the Other. 59 Earlier at 125,19 Hermias observed that Socrates’ description of the soul’s form is encapsulated in its definition: ‘an incorporeal, self-moved substance capable of knowing things’. The previous exegesis was broadly in terms of the soul’s motive aspects. We now begin an exegesis broadly focused on its cognitive aspects. 60 Lucarini and Moreschini include this last clause in the previous paragraph. 61 In other words, this part of the soul also apprehends the intelligibles but by discursive means rather than more directly like the other two. 62 For these young gods, see Timaeus 42D-E. 63 Until now none of Hermias’ different (and doubtless, as often in the Neoplatonists, equally valid) interpretations of the charioteer and horses have assumed any change in them, but the interpretation in this paragraph assumes a different set of horses and in the next we are told that both the horses and the charioteer change with their environment. 64 Hermias adverts here to the idea of gradations or levels of virtue. The civic virtues exist in a soul when the rational soul and the parts of the irrational soul (spirit and appetite) are properly ordered. This level of virtue was allegedly the subject of the Gorgias and the Republic. The contemplative virtues were subsequent to both the civic virtues and the cathartic or purificatory virtues that separate the soul from any concern for the body. The purificatory stage thus corresponds to the soul’s reversion upon itself, while the contemplative stage involves reversion upon the soul’s causes. The Phaedrus and the Symposium are the Platonic dialogues studied at the apex of the acquisition of theoretic virtues, since both are supposed to involve contemplation of the gods. 65 As before at 130,2, Hermias seems to want to show that the correlations established through the reading of the image in terms of the soul’s cognitive, rather than motive, aspects includes both divine and human souls. After all, the ‘summits’ of even the irrational parts of the soul are present in encosmic divine souls too. The most obvious encosmic gods are, of course, the planets. Hence the vague references to spheres and elements (cf. Epinomis 984D ff.). 66 These are the ‘superior orders’ of soul we find in Porphyry and Iamblichus. See Porphyry ap. Augustine, Civ. 10.9,20–35 (= 290F Smith) and Iamblichus, De Myst. 2.1, ff.

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Notes to pp. 48–51

67 In Plato, and in general usage, hupopteros simply means ‘winged’, but Hermias wants to give some force to the prefix hupo. In his first explanation of the word he takes it to mean that the wings are down or folded (if only part of the time), in the second that, in the case of the divine souls, it serves to indicate that their wings represent ‘their more superficial and lowly powers’. We have opted for the rather clumsy rendering ‘with lowered wings’ in an attempt to cater for both explanations. 68 cf. 246E5, where Zeus drives a ptênon harma, and Hermias’ comment ad loc. at 146,10–11. 69 The words translated ‘at times in use’ (pote de energounta) do not occur in the manuscripts but are supplied by Lucarini to fill a lacuna posited by Couvreur. Bernard, perhaps correctly, argues that there is in fact no lacuna. 70 Close paraphrase of 251B7. 71 In what follows Hermias argues that there are two ways of reading the Greek of this first clause. In the lemma we have used the second of them, which is the way modern translators normally read the Greek. 72 Proclus’ treatment of the psychogony in the Timaeus, with its complex structure of harmonies, is indeed the densest part of his treatment of that text. He expends 216 pages of text on the 86 OCT lines from Timaeus 34B2–37C5. Marinus tells us that Proclus wrote this when he was only twenty-eight years of age. Thus it is certainly possible that his classmate Hermias had first-hand experience of the composition of this massive work. 73 According to LSJ the word translated ‘team’ (zeugos) properly refers to a conjoined pair, but see Hackforth 69, n. 3. 74 sc. from the gods themselves (cf. Proclus, in Parm. 717,21-2). 75 The issue in the background is how to explain the decline or huphesis that accompanies procession into greater plurality and lower ranks of being without invoking a factor opposed to the Good, such as matter considered as an arkhê or principle of evil. See below 134,8–13 on the Pythagorean columns of opposites where Hermias is similarly reluctant to admit any principle opposed to the Good. 76 Plato actually has ‘our ruler’ (hêmôn ho arkhôn), as does Hermias in line 32 below. 77 For Hermias Orpheus is the theologian par excellence, but mythology is a kind of theology (78,16) and Homer and other poets can be described as theologians and he probably has them in mind here. 78 Presumably at 132,20-1. 79 cf. Orphei Hymni 9,1–2 (Quandt) and Proclus, in Remp. 2,181,2. 80 On the history of the use of tolma (‘daring’) in this and similar contexts see O’Neill 1971, 87, n. 272 and Griffin 2015, 201, n. 324. 81 cf. 133,4-5.

Notes to pp. 51–3

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82 Square and oblong are the tenth pair of contraries in the Pythagorean sustoikhiai, or columns, as recorded by Aristotle at Metaphysics 986a22 ff. 83 theteon is difficult and Lucarini and Moreschini describe it as ‘mirum’ in their apparatus. Although nothing under theteos in LSJ encourages the present rendering, some of the passages at tithêmi (the related verb) IA5 perhaps suggest that it is possible. 84 enantiopoios (‘opposite-making’), which has not been picked up by the lexica, seems to be a hapax. This last clause seems to be an explanation of the ‘generative’ nature of the second horse: being ‘opposite’ it automatically produces opposites and, since opposites are principles of the sensible world, it can therefore be said to be ‘generative’. 85 Couvreur assumes a lacuna after dunamis (‘power’) in line 19 and, like Bernard, we translate accordingly. Lucarini and Moreschini don’t indicate a lacuna in their text but remark in their apparatus that Couvreur may be right to assume one. 86 More literally something like ‘opposite and from opposites’. (And Plato actually has ‘from opposites and opposite’.) 87 It is the powers that are being described as good, not the horse. 88 For this see 134,15. 89 Punctuating with a comma after ekei rather than one before it as Couvreur and Lucarini and Moreschini do. ekei will, as often, mean among the gods or in the intelligible world. 90 For a similar analysis of the way in which Plato’s subtle stylistic choices convey deep meaning, see Hermias’ remarks on word order in Socrates’ opening question (‘where to and where from?’ 227A1) and Phaedrus’ chiastic response at 16,17–17,30. 91 Hermias’ commentary on this lemma is the subject of Wear 2020. 92 ‘This living being’ in effect means ‘this earthly living being’ (cf. LSJ houtos C.1) or perhaps just ‘us’ (for this compare touto to ostreiôdes sôma – ‘this oyster-like body [of ours]’ – at 137,3). A soul joins with a body to ‘complete’ the living being. ‘Phenomenal’ because the composite of soul and body is visible and tangible. 93 ‘To where’ translates heôs hou. Plato has just heôs, and one would translate ‘until it takes hold. . .’, as we do in the lemma. 94 As Bernard points out, ‘with knowledge’ (eidotes) here suggests that Hermias, like Proclus and the manuscripts B and D of the Phaedrus, probably read out’ eidotes rather than oute idontes at Phaedrus 246C7. 95 There’s a playful element here that defies translation. The interpretive point concerns the scope of two universal quantifiers conveyed by pas in 246B6 (psukhê pasa pantos epimeleitai tou apsukhou). Hermias employs the adverbial form of pas in beginning his exegesis (ou legei pantôs, etc.). We’ve translated by ‘certainly’, which gets the sense right, but at the expense of the word play.

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Notes to pp. 53–4

96 sc. the god in whose company the soul makes the circuit of the heaven. For the idea that a soul takes on the character of this god, see Phaedrus 252C. 97 Hermias justifies a division of labour among the divine and human souls that administer cosmic providence by analogy with the human division of labour in the city. Proclus’ reading of the Republic uses the same analogical relationship in the other direction. For instance, one of the things that justifies the existence of female Guardians is the role of goddesses in the administration of divine providence. cf. in Remp. 1,247,16–26. 98 It’s hard to know how to render logos here, but it glosses Plato’s ‘forms’ and we have settled for ‘guises’. 99 cf. 129,18. 100 LSJ gives ‘relax in tension’ for this occurrence of the verb. It has ‘grow slack or weak’ for the almost synonymous verb khalaô (see s.v. II.3), which seems to work here. 101 Presumably the suggestion is that pterorruêsasa (‘having shed [its] wings’) at 246C2 was suggested to Plato by epterômenê (‘winged’) at 246C1. Hermias here takes pterorruêsasa as equivalent to ‘wingless’, which indeed replaces it in the next sentence. 102 This is the third and final body in the theory of psychic vehicles common to Syrianus, Proclus, and Hermias. Divine souls possess only the first of these psychic vehicles – the ethereal or luminous body – and it never constitutes an impediment to their ascent to the intelligibles (151,30–151,1). The souls superior to those of humans (i.e. those of daemons, angels, and heroes) have in addition a pneumatic body. Human souls do too and acquire a third, solid ‘oyster-like’ body (cf. Phaedrus 250C6) when incarnated. For a summary of this doctrine, as well as an argument that Hermias is in fact in agreement with the views of Syrianus and Proclus on these three bodies, though he does not use the specific term ‘pneumatic body’, see Finamore 2019. On these soul vehicles in general see Proclus, ET 205, 207-210 with Dodds’ notes and his Appendix II (Dodds 1963). Plato, of course, is actually talking about the embodiment of souls. 103 In Plato ‘something solid’ evidently means something corporeal and ‘earthy’. Dampness of the psychic vehicle is mentioned below at 166,15–18 as accompanying the soul’s desire for the realm of generation and responsible for its subsequent descent. However, in lines 28-9 Hermias uses the language of geometry, equating the solid with the three dimensional, referring to the natural state of the vehicle as planar, or two dimensional, and using the verb bathunein (here translated ‘add depth’) which can be used of adding a third dimension, to describe the movement from the latter to the former. One finds a somewhat similar (and equally baffling) description of the human soul’s descent into a three-dimensional solid in Proclus’ exegesis of the marriage number in the

Notes to pp. 54–5

104

105

106

107

108

109

110 111

112

113

161

Republic (cf. in Remp. 2,51,20–52,7). Proclus’ discussion does not specifically mention psychic vehicles, but rather deals with increasingly ‘solid’ forms of life. But forms of life correspond to vehicles, as in the case of the wet psychic vehicle for the soul that desires generation. So we might speculate that Hermias equates the ethereal body with the plane, the pneumatic body with pure extension in three dimensions, but the oyster-body with ‘earthy’ three-dimensional existence. This alternative explanation of stereos (‘firm’, ‘solid’) depends on a misguidedly assumed etymological connection with stereisthai (‘to be deprived’) and involves stereos here meaning something like ‘deprived’. And therefore mobile. As 138,2 ff. shows, he is referring to the heavenly bodies. (At 129,21, where, following Timaeus 37C2, eutrokhos was used of the circle of the Same, we translated it ‘smooth-running’.) Or perhaps something like ‘vividly’, ‘colourfully’, but it isn’t clear why Hermias has singled out katoikizein as especially strong or vivid – or, indeed, what the force of palin (‘again’) is here. The soul is, of course, impassive in relation to the body. So the exchange between them – which, like Glaucus’ with Diomedes, works to the soul’s disadvantage – cannot be understood as involving the soul being caused to be ignorant by the body. Rather, by taking itself to be something other than what it is, the soul renders itself less able to know and less able to live the life that belongs to it. Of course ‘animal’ would work better for zôion here, but because it is a wider term than ‘animal’, we normally use ‘living thing’ and, on balance, it seems better to be consistent. It seems likely that Hermias has in mind the condition of the incarnated soul at birth. cf. Timaeus 43D2 where the same verb is used to describe the manner in which the newborn’s sensations shackle the rotation of the soul’s circle of the Same. Like Bernard, translating apo, the manuscript reading, rather than Couvreur’s emendation epi. cf. Timaeus 90B–C: ‘So if a man has become absorbed in his appetites or his ambitions and takes great pains to further them, all his thoughts are bound to become merely mortal’ (trans. Zeyl 1997). Proclus’ Timaeus Commentary informs us about competing philosophical views about the nature of the ‘gods of generation’ – this is, the generations of gods recorded at Timaeus 40E–41A– but none of the readings of the ‘birth’ of Phorcys, Cronus, etc from Ge and Uranus matches the literal character of the ‘warped’ view that Hermias discusses here. cf. in Tim. 3.168,1 ff. This paragraph is peppered with allusions to Plato’s Timaeus. At Timaeus 39E7 ff. the Demiurge further assimilates the visible universe to its invisible paradigm – the

162

114 115

116 117

118 119 120 121

Notes to pp. 55–8 intelligible living being. He does this by creating four kinds of living beings within it, the first of which is the celestial genus in which we find the stars and planets. The celestial genus is divine and eternal (Timaeus 40B5), with bodies composed principally of fire. They imitate the universe (which is itself a blessed god, Timaeus 34B8) in their shape and their motions. These gods are ‘created’. That is to say, in the Neoplatonists’ understanding, they are everlastingly dependent upon the will of the Demiurge. But they are put together with bonds that are indissoluble save by the will of the Demiurge (Timaeus 41A8). See the note at 136,35 for this translation of eutrokhos. We’d like to translate ‘abode’, but monê is one phase of the important Neoplatonic triad monê – proodos – epistrophê (on which see Chlup 2012, 64 ff.), when it is normally rendered ‘remaining’, and the continuation suggests that Hermias has that in mind here. With this paragraph cf. 148,26-30. One of the most pervasive principles of Neoplatonism is that ‘all things are in all, but in each in an appropriate manner’ (Proclus, ET 103; cf. Syrianus, in Metaph. 82,1). The manner is often specified adverbially, as it is here when Hermias tells us that the beautiful, the wise, and the good are in the intelligible gods in an intelligible manner; in the intellectual gods in an intellectual manner; and so on. In what follows, he concentrates on their presence in the intelligible gods and, in so doing, identifies three moments or aspects of these intelligible gods: nous, noêsis, and noêton (or the intellect, its activity of intellection, and the object intelligised) and these are correlated with the beautiful, the wise, and the good respectively. For a Platonist, there is an obvious question of how this triad in the Phaedrus relates to the triad in Philebus 65C that is said to be located in the ‘vestibule (prothyron) of the Good’. After all, goodness figures as one of the members in the Phaedrus’ triad and beauty appears as the first of the three monads (as they came to be called) that figure in the Philebus. Hermias answers this question by locating the latter’s key triad as an attempt to say how things are at the level above the intellects of the intellective gods. Of the passages cited by Lucarini and Moreschini, 20D, where the good is agreed to be perfect, adequate, and desired by all, is the best fit. When he describes the good as ‘sufficient’ in the Philebus, Plato means that it must embrace all that is required for the best life. Republic 508D ff. For the role of the ‘light of truth’ in rendering intellects and intelligibles divine, see Proclus, PT 2,33,15–21. 65A1-5. ‘Well, then, if we cannot capture the good in one form, we will have to take hold of it in a conjunction of three: beauty, proportion, and truth’ (trans. Frede 1997).

Notes to pp. 58–61

163

122 Here Hermias substitutes simplicity (to haploun) for the Philebus’ ‘proportion’, or ‘symmetry’, on the basis of the fact that in the Laws god is both simple and the measure of all things. While the ‘three monads’ of the Philebus (beauty, truth, and proportion) were widely invoked by the Athenian school of Syrianus, they seem to have been treated with a certain creative licence. cf. Combès 1987. 123 Laws 716C4. 124 See above, 133,10–14. 125 Saffrey and Westerink, Proclus, PT 6, xxi, identify Calcidius (in Tim. 206,14– 207,9 (Waszink)) as an example of such an interpretation. 126 ‘The seven wandering [spheres]’ would probably be more literal. 127 Saffrey and Westerink, op cit., xxi, tentatively identify the ‘Zeus as intellect’ reading with Plotinus; cf. Enn. 4.4.9.1. 128 Hermias seems to imply that there was a distinctly astrological reading of this portion of the myth in the Phaedrus, but it is certainly not represented in our surviving astrological works, such as Ptolemy or Vettius Valens. Perhaps unsurprisingly, since these works are more practically oriented and do not spend too much time engaging in interpretation of texts – even those as authoritative as Plato’s. Proclus’ essay on the nuptial number in the Republic attributes a rather naive astrological understanding of the optimal time for the Guardians to hold their marriage festivals to Amelius (in Remp. 2,32,10–25) so he is perhaps one possible suspect for the ‘some’ in this passage. But the incorporation of astrological elements into the understanding of Plato’s philosophy is hardly unique to him. 129 Literally ‘twelfth part’, but used to refer to the signs of the zodiac. 130 This last clause is an interpretation of Phaedrus 247A1 where Plato says ‘For Hestia alone remains in the dwelling-place of the gods’. The idea seems to be that Hestia is to be equated with the zodiacal sign in which the sun is located at any particular time. 131 Or ‘decan-ruling’. On them, see Tarrant 2017, 76, n. 143 and Plaisance 2013, 81. 132 Iamblichus, in Phaedr. fr. 3a (Dillon 2009). Dillon’s fragment 3b is Proclus, PT 4,21,14 ff., where Proclus reports that Plotinus and Iamblichus held that the heaven Plato talks of at Phaedrus 246E, etc. is an intelligible one, and in his commentary Dillon states that Hermias makes no such claim. However Hermias does in fact make a similar claim at 149,7 ff. and 20 ff. (although he has ‘intellective’ rather than ‘intelligible’) and, in view of the Proclus passage, its ultimate source may well be Iamblichus. 133 The line of argument rehearsed here for not identifying this Zeus with the Demiurge is similar to that which we find in Proclus, PT 6,87,24–89,8 for not treating this Zeus as the god who lies at the limit of the intellectual level.

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Notes to p. 61

134 This sentence is part paraphrase, part direct quotation of Phaedrus 250B7-8, the present sentence reading peri de tou entautha Dios hêmeis, alloi de met’ allou theôn, the Phaedrus passage . . . hepomenoi meta men Dios hêmeis, alloi de met’ allou theôn. In the Phaedrus Socrates, or perhaps Plato himself (as Hermias believes), says that he, or perhaps philosophers in general, before incarnation, contemplated beauty in the train of Zeus, others in that of some other god. Hermias now appears to be making the same claim for himself, or for himself and his fellow philosophers. At first sight, it seems odd that Hermias should make such a claim here rather than when commenting on 250B, but he is reinforcing the point that the Zeus in question here is, unlike the transcendant Zeus, ‘more akin’ to some people (chiefly philosophers) than to others. (From this it follows that a new paragraph should begin after the sentence rather than with it, as Lucarini and Moreschini punctuate.) There is another possibility. According to Couvreur the words alloi de met’ allou theôn (‘others with another of the gods’) don’t appear in one manuscript. If that reflects what Hermias actually wrote, we could translate ‘We [then hold that he is talking] about the Zeus here [sc. as opposed to the transcendant one]’ and argue that the words alloi de met’ allou theôn were added from 250B by someone who misunderstood what Hermias was saying. This would make good sense in the context, and better sense of peri, but we prefer the solution we have adopted. 135 The theologians in question seem to be Orpheus and Homer. On the intertwining of Orphic and Homeric materials in this section of Hermias’ commentary, see Manolea 2020, 143–6. (Manolea also discusses Orphic elements elsewhere in Hermias.) 136 cf. Proclus, PT 6, ch. 8 where we similarly find a transcendent Zeus, followed by a triad of three leaders, or lower manifestations of the transcendent Zeus, identified as Zeus, Poseidon, and Hades. 137 cf. Proclus, PT 6,86,23–5 where the triad is the symbol of the first perfection, but the square root of four, the dyad, is assigned the role of the generative. 138 cf. Proclus, PT 6,35,23–4: ‘the first is Zeus simpliciter, the second oceanic Zeus, the third subterranean Zeus’ along with Proclus, in Crat. 148,18–23. 139 This seems to differ just slightly from Proclus’ treatment in PT 6,97,11–98,24. Like Hermias, Proclus assigns the twelve gods to four groups of three. The groups are the same and reflect the character of the ‘assimilative gods’ from which the ‘liberated gods’, who are both hypercosmic and encosmic, are derived. The groups are A paternal, B protective, C life-producing, and D elevating (i.e. responsible for reversion). Proclus assigns (in order) Zeus, Poseidon, and Hephaestus to A; Hestia, Athena, and Ares to B; Demeter, Hera, and Artemis to C; while Hermes, Aphrodite, and Apollo make up D.

Notes to p. 62

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140 Unlike Bernard, we take it that ‘the following verses’ means all of the quotations that follow. The relationships between the different quotations and Hermias’ comments on them is at times difficult to sort out and we have at some points taken a rather different view from those of the editors and Bernard and punctuated accordingly. (Presumably we are to see the aorist infinitive meinai in the first quotation and the third person singular imperative menetô in the second, both from the verb menein (‘to remain’), as references to Hestia.) 141 Iliad 1.534-5. The specific passage in which the gods all rise before Zeus follows shortly upon a line that would mark this episode in the Iliad as obviously connected to the Phaedrus (at least for a Neoplatonic reader): ‘Now when the twelfth dawn after this had come, then to Olympus came the gods who are forever, all in one company, and Zeus led the way’ (493–5, our emphasis). 142 Punctuating with a full stop after entha in 143,29. (Bernard punctuates after Dios and Couvreur and Lucarini and Moreschini only at the end of the following line.) 143 From Iliad 15, lines 187, 192, 195. This is likely to be the Homeric passage alluded to at Gorgias 526A when Socrates says, ‘As Homer says . . .’. 144 Punctuating with a full stop after entha rather than with a semicolon after to at 144,4. 145 Iliad 1.425. 146 Iliad 1.423. Proclus employs the same line in his argument that Plato’s description of the army of the gods accords with and partakes of the same divine inspiration of Homer; cf. in Remp. 1,166,12–167,9. 147 cf. 133,30 above, where apostasis is paired with proodos (‘procession’). There we translated it ‘departure’ and the second verse might suggest the same translation here, but the two verses taken together suggest that we are to think of procession and reversion. 148 Bernabé fr. 132; Kern fr. 76. The same theme of an Orphic god with four eyes is invoked by Proclus at in Remp. 2,169,28, ff. also in a context related to the Phaedrus. There the four-eyed (and four-horned) god is Dionysus, not Phanes. But the quotation occurs in a context where Proclus is attempting to reconcile the 10,000 year cycle of incarnations from Phaedrus 249A with the 1,000 year journey of souls in the myth of Er (Republic 615A). Proclus, however, allegorises the various numbers in terms of the soul’s descent into generation. The tetradic Dionysus seems to represent a stage in this descent in which the soul ‘no longer lives simply in accordance with the charioteer’ (in Remp. 2,170,17–18) but instead is divided dyadically into noetic and providential activities. Here, as with Hermias, the unified or monadic activity of the charioteer on his own is identified with the monad.

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Notes to pp. 62–3

149 ‘Bring . . . together’ translates the verb sunelissein which is more literally ‘roll up together’. The meaning is obscure, but we can compare Kern fr. 315, which is included in Proclus, in Remp. 2,121,4: ‘The number twelve seems to be a perfective limit that is fitting for the causes that bring together (sunelissein) the bounds of the cosmos and (why not say it?) for the order of celestial [gods]. And it is for this reason that Plato allotted the twelfth month to the worship of the Chthonic gods and it is why the theologian says that the great god Hecate who shuts in the boundaries of encosmic things and is for this reason called “the one who holds the key” was allotted the twelfth portion of the cosmos’. 150 Perhaps because in some versions of his birth, including the commonest, his mother is a mortal. 151 Lucarini and Moreschini start a new paragraph with ‘The order is not like other kind[s]’, Bernard with ‘And the order is threefold’. 152 Emending dekatôi at 145,5, which is clearly wrong, to dekadi: when Hermias recurs to the division of the twelve gods into two monads and a group of ten at 147,12, he refers to the group of ten as a dekas (at 147,14 and 28), so it seems probable that that is what he wrote here. (Couvreur suggests two possible emendations, either of which would make good sense but neither of which is as close to the manuscript reading, Bernard translates ‘unter den Zehnen’ without a note, and Lucarini and Moreschini obelise the whole phrase en tôi dekatôi.) 153 The manuscripts have ‘the fourth (tetartên) Zeusian’, but it is hard to see how the Zeus of the Twelve could be the fourth Zeus however one counts the Zeuses mentioned by Hermias. Couvreur says that ‘the fourth’ appears to be corrupt and suggests two possible emendations, Lucarini and Moreschini obelise it and list a suggestion by Lucarini in the apparatus. We have followed Bernard in simply omitting it from the translation. 154 Proclus considers a similar division of the number twelve at PT 6,85,19–28. Zeus and Hestia are set to one side as constituting two monads. The remaining gods then form a decad. These gods are not assigned specific numbers, as in the example that Hermias considers and rejects. Rather, they collectively exercise providence with specific gods responsible for specific aspects of that administration, e.g. with Apollo looking after the mantic way of life. The ‘arithmetic’ way of looking at these matters, which assigns specific numbers to specific gods in the decad, resembles in some ways the assignment of individual numbers in the soul to specific aspects of the universe that Proclus attributes to Amelius (cf. in Tim. 2,213,20–214,2. 155 Homer, Iliad 5.428-9. 156 The number seven is not the product of any of the other numbers in the decad, nor is it a factor in any of them. Hence it is equated with Athena (as at 145,9

Notes to pp. 63–5

157

158 159 160 161 162 163

164

165 166

167

above) who has neither mother nor offspring. cf. Iamblichus (?), Theology of Arithmetic 71,3–10 (Falco). Bernard (ad loc.) notes the fluidity of Hermias’ use of the idea of a perfect number. Earlier at 83,6–7, in the midst of Hermias’ summary of the symbolism of the Iliad, ten or the decad was a symbol of perfection as illustrated in Chalcis’ prediction of ten years for the return from Troy (Iliad 3.219–29). Subsequently, Hermias will return again to the idea that multiples of ten connote perfection in his discussion of the lengths of periods of embodiment at Phaedrus 248E3– 249A5. Here ten’s symbolic perfection is a reflection of the fact that it embraces all the kinds of numbers within itself (175,28–9; cf. Iamblichus (?), Theol. Arith. 79,16–17). Bernard supposes that twelve was taken by Hermias to be a symbol of perfection or completeness on similar grounds: that it is the product of the first odd and first even number. If one assumes that one is not a number but a principle of number, and similarly that two is not a number but a principle of plurality, then three and four are the first odd and even numbers respectively. Homer, Iliad 24.90. More literally ‘place a vehicle under him’. For this equation of Olympus and the ‘firmaments’, which appears to be Chaldaen, see Proclus, in Tim. 2,57,13-14 with Baltzly 2007, n. 201. Presumably the idea is that it is faster moving. hestia can by extension be a home or an altar and all three senses seem relevant here. See above 143,21. Proclus’ reading of the role of Zeus and Hestia seems to be slightly different (PT 6,95,1–11). Here, and below at 147,29–33, Hermias aligns Zeus to ‘things being led upwards’ (i.e. reverting upon their causes) but Hestia to ‘remaining in their own order’. Thus each god is linked to a different idea in the triad remaining–procession–reversion. Proclus, however, treats both in terms of reversion, but gives them different objects. Zeus is credited with providing for reversion upon a thing’s causes, but Hestia for each soul’s reversion upon itself. It may be that these come to the same thing: it is in virtue of reverting upon itself that each remains in its own order. Socrates does subsequently call the souls who follow Zeus a blessed chorus or troupe (sun eudaimoni chorôi) at 250B5 and Hermias’ commentary there similarly claims that this indicates that the group is unified (below 185,24), but the salient difference seems to be the martial discipline and purpose of the collection of souls in this context versus their blessedness in the latter context. cf. 43,3, where the cosmos is said to be the plaything of the gods. We have been translating stratia ‘host’, but the alternative rendering ‘expedition’ seems more appropriate here.

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Notes to pp. 65–6

167 See above 145,5–7 and note ad loc. The two monads plus a decad pattern is common to Proclus’ reading as well; cf. PT 6,85,19–28. 168 ‘Change’ would work better for kineisthai here, but ‘move’ catches the contrast with menein better. The derivation of monad from menein is common NeoPythagorean etymology; cf. Theon of Smyrna, Util. Math. 19.7 (Hiller) and Iamblichus (?), Theol. Arith. 1.4–5 (Falco). 169 On the perfection or completeness of the decad, see, e.g. Iamblichus (?) Theol. Arith. 79,16–81,1. 170 This switch to the plural is surprising. 171 Recall that above Hermias reconciles Zeus’ single leadership at Phaedrus 246E4 in relation to the divided kingdoms of Gorgias 523A by regarding Poseidon and Hades as other Zeuses. 172 ‘Image’ certainly works well for agalma in some contexts (cf. 74,21 above), but the more specific sense of ‘statue’ perhaps also wafts around this passage. Recall that Hermias has already displayed an interest in the theurgic practice of animating statues (91,3–18; 97,21–8). Indeed, his discussion of the sense in which a statue can be ‘inspired’ is plausibly a digression and attests to a particular interest in this matter. And, of course, the earth is a three-dimensional thing, like a statue. Indeed, Timaeus 37C speaks of the entire universe as an agalma or ‘shrine’ for the everlasting gods (trans. Zeyl 1997). But this statue of the goddess Hestia cannot share all features with its paradigm: while she presides over what is stationary, Hermias tells us that the earth moves – much as statues of gods animated by telestic rites moved or gave responses to questions. 173 If we assume that hê gê refers to the planet Earth, then here we seem to find Hermias in disagreement with his classmate Proclus. The issue of the earth’s movement in the centre of the universe (at least for Platonists) is intertwined with the correct reading of Timaeus 40B8–C3 where some manuscripts have eillomenên (‘packed around’) while others have illomenên, which one would normally understand as ‘winds around’. Proclus seems to have read illomenên, but defended a meaning for this term that is more in keeping with the reading eillomenên. In effect, Earth is ‘concentrated’ around its axis in the sense of being ‘confined’ (sunechomenên) and ‘held fast’ (sphiggomenên); in Tim. 3,137,7–8. Proclus supposes the universe to revolve around the Earth’s pole or axis. The earth itself does not move. 174 By the ‘ousia of the intermediate or first genera’, we suppose Hermias to refer to divisible and indivisible kinds of Being, Sameness, and Difference that the Demiurge combines in order to create the intermediate substance or ousia of the soul in the Timaeus’ psychogony. The primary and intermediate kinds of ousia must be at issue, since one could easily suppose that the ‘kind of being that is

Notes to pp. 66–7

175

176 177 178 179

180

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divisible in relation to bodies’ is subject to motion. But the soul’s intermediate substance might be supposed to be above that. But the intermediate and first grades of substance also share in Hestia rather than being Hestia, for the soul lives psychically and temporally, while even the indivisible being of the intelligible realm has an intelligible life to it. The phrase we translate ‘always being the same and unchanging’ (in Greek, aei kata ta auta kai hôsautôs ekhein), which goes back to Plato’s Philebus (59C4), was popular with philosophical and religious authors (in fact Syrianus uses it, or close variants, eight times in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics) as a description of unchanging entities. The god Uranus (Ouranos) is a personification of the heaven (ouranos). Bernabé fr. 136; Kern fr. 78. cf. LSJ histêmi, B.1. Translating Lucarini’s plausible suggestion of tas hupo tên to fill the lacuna at 149,6. (First made in Lucarini 2012, 247 and repeated in the apparatus.) These three crucial locations in the myth are similarly identified by Proclus for careful investigation; cf. PT 4,18,25–19,5. This interpretive error is similarly criticised by Proclus but without reference to any specific philosopher at PT 4,19,6–21,9. He offers a number of arguments against this view, but none of them exactly matches the a fortiori argument given here, viz. that if the contemplation of the sensible heaven is not sufficient for securing the blessed life for human souls, then neither can it be a suitable object of contemplation for divine souls. The sentence ends awkwardly and Lucarini and Moreschini assume a lacuna after ‘for the good man’ (tôi spoudaiôi). We suggest that something like ‘is this the case’ has dropped out. The next sentence is in apparent tension with this, but we believe the tension can be resolved by distinguishing means from ends. We take the thought briefly expressed here in the context of Timaeus 90A–D. Viewing the things within the heaven, and specifically the heavenly bodies is not, in itself, sufficient for understanding their harmonies and revolutions (90D3–4). Furthermore, the point of knowing the harmonies and revolutions of the heavenly bodies seems to be the restoration of our own psychic harmonies and revolutions that are distorted by sense perception (Timaeus 43C5–E8). So it is indeed true that looking at the heaven is better for those of us whose psychic circles have been distorted by the influx from the senses rather than looking at anything else. But merely being a spectator is not sufficient for the happy life that is achieved through assimilation to the divine paradigm. Much less could this vision of things within the universe be sufficient for the blessedness of gods who do not live the life of sensation in the same manner in which we do.

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182 Homer, Iliad 8.52. 183 Homer, Iliad 13.4. 184 The argument in Hermias that the gods do not need to revert upon human affairs in order to exercise providence over them is paralleled in Proclus by an argument that the gods know human affairs by virtue of reverting upon themselves and the causes within themselves rather than by attending to the things beneath them in the order of being. cf. PT 4,19,26–20,8. 185 O’Brien 2020, 186 provides a useful guide to the orders of divinities in Hermias. What is significant in this context is that these noeric gods are superior to both the transcendent Zeus and the coordinate Zeus described below in Hermias’ discussion of the twelve Olympians at 142,27 ff. 186 ‘A god is more universal as he is nearer to the One, more specific in proportion to his remoteness from it’ (Proclus, ET prop. 126; trans. Dodds 1963). (Although Dodds translates merikôteros ‘more specific’ here, he renders it ‘more particular’ in a similar context in prop. 136.) 187 In the Phaedrus, theai are spectacles and diexodoi routes followed by the gods (and we have translated the latter ‘pathways’ in the lemma), but Hermias is here clearly interpreting the former as acts of direct apprehension (something like ‘seeings’ perhaps) and the latter as instances of discursive thought (the adjective diexodikos is often to be translated ‘discursive’). 188 The editors indicate a lacuna here. Couvreur suggests that at a minimum an adjective such as theatikê has dropped out, to which Lucarini and Moreschini have nothing to add. Thanks to the lacuna, it isn’t clear to us how kata to diexodeukenai (‘in respect of having gone through’) fits into the sentence – or how best to translate it. 189 ‘And happy . . . close to them’ = Iamblichus, in Phaedr. fr. 4 (Dillon 2009). 190 As Waterfield 2002 points out ad loc., this is reminiscent of the Republic, where performing its own function is characteristic of the classes in the just city and of the parts of the just soul. (For the phrase, cf. Republic 441D9.) 191 Laws 636D4-E3. 192 Compare Proclus’ treatment of the claim from Timaeus 29E1 that the Demiurge is free from jealousy at in Tim. 1,362,17–65,3. He too begins by making the point that even good human beings are free from phthonos. This justifies giving a deeper meaning to the sense in which a divine being is free from jealousy. 193 The OCT text of the Phaedrus, with some Plato manuscripts, has epi (‘to’), but Hermias has hupo below at 150,26. 194 This last sentence is intended to justify the explanation of dais, and in particular the words ‘the fulfilment falling to each in accordance with its particular limits’ in the previous sentence, on etymological grounds. The ‘fulfilment’ envisioned there

Notes to p. 69

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is a kind of distribution and the noun dais (a meal or banquet; we have preferred ‘meal’ because it better suits Hermias’ gloss ‘portion’) is probably etymologically related to the verb dateisthai (divide, share, etc.). The meal is the individual good, the banquet the common. The term plêrôsis likely has a double sense here. On the one hand, it describes the repletion experienced by the participants in the banquet, on the other, it has a technical sense in Neoplatonism, describing the fulfilment or completion that lower orders derive from higher ones; cf. Proclus, ET 134,4; in Tim. 1,133,5–7. We seem to be presented with two alternatives for understanding Plato’s text: either ‘vehicles’ means just that – the psychic vehicles – or it is a symbol of the soul’s powers. We noted in vol. 1, n. 537 that it is not absolutely clear that Hermias’ text refers to both the luminous or ethereal immortal vehicle attached to all souls, as well as the pneumatic and mortal vehicle that comes to be attached to human souls in their descent into the sublunary. There are simply too few mentions of psychic vehicles in Hermias to be terribly confident one way or the other. The view which we find in Proclus and which Proclus attributes to Syrianus gives divine souls an ethereal vehicle that contains the highest forms of the irrational kind of life, but not the same kind of irrational life attached to the pneumatic vehicle which houses the irrational soul. If we were to suppose that, in fact, Hermias did share the view we find in Proclus and Syrianus, then the fact that the souls of the gods and superior orders are ‘always suitable for travelling uphill’ could allude to the fact that their souls lack the lower, pneumatic body that human souls have. In any event, Hermias’ view on psychic vehicles is idiosyncratic in at least one way: he refers to the ensoulment of the pneuma as a synonym for the irrational soul (108,6–12). See Finamore 2019. Note that Finamore does attribute to Hermias the two-vehicle theory of Syrianus and Proclus. As above at 146,16–17, Hermias seems to be playing with different senses of the verb (in this case, ‘to exercise forethought’ and ‘to be provident’). Socrates imitates such divine souls in his philanthropic care for Phaedrus. He can attempt to elevate the young man, but without ever descending to his level. Presumably this is because the divine souls also possess a luminous body, but lack a bad horse. The conjunction of marmarugê and lamprotês in this context is similar to Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras 32,228,13, where the soul must show courage in not turning its eyes away from the coruscation and brilliance of the intelligible when it is led upwards. Phaedrus 256A-B, which should be read in conjunction with 248E-249A. The ‘wrestling falls’ are the fight to shun the carnal life in favour of the philosophical

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Notes to pp. 69–71 one that the philosopher’s soul must win three times at thousand year intervals if it is to regain its wings. The three falls are a reference to the three falls of an Olympic wrestling contest. For the singular in this sense see Lampe s.v. 2. The reasoning here is somewhat convoluted. Hermias wants to deny that Socrates in any way implies that these souls are merely called immortal, though they are – in truth – mortal. Yet there must be an explanation for the use of the word ‘called’ (since, for Hermias, there must be an explanation for everything in Plato’s text!). Hermias’ alternative is that Socrates says that they are called immortal because – at least in the case of the divine souls – any random person would call them that. It’s common sense, even if there might be some doubt about human souls. Though it is somewhat inelegantly expressed by Hermias, his analysis of the text is more or less that of both Yunis and Ryan: ‘called immortal’ serves to restrict the discussion to divine souls. Moreover, something needs to restrict the scope to the divine case, since psukhê in the previous line refers to the struggles of human souls. The phrase hai men gar athanatoi kaloumenai at 247B5 does that and is finally answered by the hai de allai psukhai of 248A1. Could hai men gar theai psukhai have served that purpose just as well? Of course it could. Hermias’ imputation of significance to every word choice in Plato creates problems for him that are, in all likelihood, those of his own making. cf. Proclus, PT 4,63,10–12 for a similar reading of the outer surface as the realm of Uranus. cf. Timaeus 34B1 where Timaeus describes the Demiurge’s creation of the body of the heaven with the same words. Proclus takes ‘even and smooth’ to indicate ‘the single comprehension of all things within the cosmos and its highest receptivity for participation in divine soul’ (in Tim. 2,101,16–17). Proclus similarly entertains the notion of an intermediary between the ‘all at once’ cognition of intellection and the ‘one thing at a time’ discursive thought that encosmic souls engage in. cf. in Tim. 3,251,32–252,9 and Baltzly 2009, 37–41. For the centrality of Cronus (between Uranus and Zeus) among the intellective gods, see 149,20-3. For the threefold division, see 149,5-6, for the difference between theai and diexodoi, 149,26 ff. (Presumably the point here is that discursive thought is more complex than intuition.) It seems that here Hermias touches on a standing issue for Platonists: the individuality of selves or souls. Just as he seems to adopt a view, common to Proclus, that souls are not changed in their essence or ousia in their descent, but only in their activities, so too he here supposes that amidst the intelligibles souls remain individual, though they engage only in a shared activity – not their

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characteristic individual energeiai. On the individuation of the intellectual selves in the Platonic tradition, see Sorabji 2006, 115–33. cf. Laws 897C and 898A for circular motion as the visible image of the ‘revolution of intellect’. Proclus draws the same connection between the text of Phaedrus 247C1 (periagei hê periphora) and the Laws passage at PT 4,20,18 ff. Or perhaps ‘intelligise [them]’. See Introduction, pp. 24–5. For the distinction between inspired poets and the rest in the thought of the Athenian school, see Sheppard 2017. At in Remp. 1,166,12–167,9 Proclus connects Zeus leading the procession of souls in the Phaedrus to Iliad 1.423–4, but we possess no exegesis of Homer or Hesiod by Proclus that connects either poet specifically to the ‘place above the heaven’ in the Phaedrus. This distinction between the inspired poet and the mere technician was also made at 104,20-1. Bernabé fr. 113,1; Kern fr. 103. Couvreur and Lucarini and Moreschini both assume a lacuna, though not quite at the same point. Bernabé fr. 113,2; Kern fr. 103. Homer, Iliad 14.259-61. The pursuer is Zeus, the pursued Sleep. ‘Her’ means Night, who has been equated with truth, and tolmêrôs looks back to the cognate word tolmêteon in the lemma, which we rendered ‘one must be bold enough’. All of the conclusions drawn about the One in the first hypothesis of the Parmenides are, of course, negative: it is neither a whole nor a part, neither straight nor round, etc. Proclus differentiates the denial of colour and shape to the place above the heaven here in the Phaedrus from the denial of all things to the One in the Parmenides in almost exactly similar terms. cf. in Parm. 1127,35– 1128,5: ‘For of the former class [sc. statements in the Phaedrus] he has denied some attributes, but has asserted others. . . . But of the One he denies all characteristics, and asserts none’ (trans. Morrow and Dillon 1987). Presumably a case of Hermias posing a question and Syrianus providing an answer. cf. Lucarini 2012, 249, who compares 161,13 ff. For the sense in which nature is colourless see Proclus, in Parm. 1076,19-21. Bernard’s emendation of hôn to kai ep’ at 155,3 is attractive, giving as it does neater Greek and more immediately obvious sense than Ast’s emendation of autês to autos (155,4), which both Couvreur and Lucarini and Moreschini adopt, but it is rather more difficult palaeographically and we have stayed with Lucarini and Moreschini’s text. We take it that hôn . . . onomata is a delayed relative clause, the antecedent of hôn being tôn Nuktôn, and that toutôn refers to Ouranou, Kuklôpôn, Hekatonkheirôn, Hermias’ claim being that Plato is denying a

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Notes to pp. 73–5 characteristic of each of the three latter of the Nights (he argues this in detail at 155,4-156,20). Bernabé fr. 149,2; Kern fr. 209,2. cf. 161,19, where Night rather than Phanes is the subject of ‘displayed’. Lines 8-13 = Bernabé fr. 123; Kern fr. 86. Theog. 145. In fact Cyclops means ‘round-eyed’. Parmenides 137E. Bernabé fr. 269, 3-4; Kern fr. 179. In Proclus (in Tim. 1,137, 24-6) we have: ‘To Zeus they furnished thunder as a resource and lightning, / the first handworkers, and to Hephaestus and Athena / they taught all the items of craftsmanship which heaven encloses within’ (trans. Runia and Share 2008, but changing their ‘manual builders’ to ‘handworkers’). As well as having an additional line at the beginning and an additional half line at the end, Proclus has ‘and’ rather than ‘who’ and has panta agreeing with daidala (‘items of craftsmanship’) rather than functioning as a quasi-noun. It looks as though Hermias has shaped the quotation to serve his purposes. cf. Proclus, in Tim. 2,70,21 which, citing Iliad 18.401, makes Hephaestus the one who ‘shapes all the figures within the cosmos – both the whole heaven and the realm of generation-making’. cf. in Tim. 2,284,5 where Proclus invokes Iliad 2.448 and the aegis of Athena in explaining how the World Soul covers the body of the universe. Lines 155,19-156,12 = Kern fr. 179. cf. Proclus, in Remp. 2,252,25–7: ‘Thus the hands are symbols of the most divine powers, so that among the gods above the Demiurge the Hundred-handers are celebrated as being guardians of the intellectual realm’. In negative terms in that he says ‘undeceiving’ rather than, say, ‘reliable’. Also cited at 154,3 and 157,21 – in the former case with pantêi (‘absolutely’) rather than pantôn (‘of all things’). Hermias has rearranged Plato’s words. In the Phaedrus ‘being which truly is’ comes first (at 247C7) and ‘with which the class of true knowledge is concerned’ comes later (at 247C8) after another phrase that Hermias doesn’t quote. The rearrangement doesn’t seriously misrepresent Plato. The three are the words constituting the phrase ousia ontôs ousa (translated ‘really existing being’ in line 26), all of which, like on, are in one way or other related to the verb ‘to be’ (einai). Bernard compares Proclus, in Tim. 2,91,1-3. 157,7-11 = Iamblichus, in Phaedr. fr. 6 (Dillon 2009). See above 126,11 ff. where Hermias takes the idea of the soul mentioned at Phaedrus 247A3 to be ‘the one in it’.

Notes to pp. 75–7 237 238 239 240 241 242

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See the note at 159,15 for this rendering of dianoia. This amounts to ‘the true kind of knowledge’. Homer, Iliad 1.20. cf. Aristotle, DA 429a27: ‘It was a good idea to call the soul “the place of forms” ’. As opposed to the enmattered forms mentioned earlier in the sentence. (The phrase is tôn ontôn eidôn.) The means of identifying it and distinguishing it from other things. The kritêrion becomes a term of art in Hellenistic epistemology to refer to the correct standard of judgement for ascertaining the truth. Thus for the Stoics, the cognitive impression is the criterion, while for the Epicureans it was sense perception. Proclus’ commentary on the Timaeus sheds some light on this compressed remark. Proclus responds to the way in which Plato seems to mix epistemological and metaphysical elements in the characterisation of the distinction between Being and Becoming. The former is that which ‘always is’ (metaphysical) and is ‘grasped by thought’ (epistemological). The latter is ‘what is always coming to be’ (metaphysical) and ‘grasped by opinion’ (epistemological). So the Timaeus’ accounts of Being and Becoming are taken as a template for the account of the place beyond the heaven that Hermias here attributes to Socrates. On the one hand, it is colourless, shapeless, and intangible (metaphysical). On the other hand, it is observable only by the steersman of the soul and is the object of true knowledge (epistemological). As Proclus sees, this entails the rejection of the idea that there is such a thing as the criterion in the sense of a single correct standard of judgement. So empiricists such as Protagoras (or the Epicureans) are wrong to say simply that ‘sense perception is the criterion’. Rather, for each kind of reality, there is a unique criterion. cf. Proclus, in Tim. 1,254,19–255,26 where he concludes by referring the reader to his work on the Theaetetus. Lucarini and Moreschini cite 154,25 ff. but 157,2-5 seems most relevant. This is very obscure, but it seems likely that Iamblichus’ identification (157,7–9 above) of the steersman with ‘the one of the soul’ guides Hermias’ remarks here. Human intellect is merely an intellectual disposition of the soul – not an active intellect or intellect in actuality. The steersman is that which enables us to be oriented towards and united with this intellect in actuality, i.e. the gods; cf. Finamore 1997. sc. unlike Phanes, not transcendent. ‘Mind’ is probably the best rendering of dianoia at 247D1, but Hermias’ comparison of Plato’s use of it here with his use of logismos in the Timaeus suggests that he is taking it in the alternative sense of ‘thought’. In any case, Hermias’ objection to attributing either dianoia or a dianoia to a god will be that either implies discursive thought, which is not the route by which the gods come

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Notes to pp. 77–9 to know things. (As Hackforth and Ryan point out, dianoia, rather than the expected psukhê, remains the grammatical subject down to 247E6.) We have treated this, and a number of other aorists later in the myth, as ‘gnomic’. ‘Thought’ translates the phrase to tês dianoias and there are two similar elliptic phrases in line 20. In none of these cases is it clear what the ellipsis is and we have translated according to what we take to be the general sense of the passage. Timaeus 30B4. Proclus’ commentary makes much of the fact that the Demiurge makes bodies for the celestial gods (i.e. the planets) at 38C5, but does not make them bodies; cf. in Tim. 3,59,18–22. It seems that the visible bodies in the night sky depend upon, but are not identical to, these celestial gods. Some manuscripts of Plato have akêratos, which would have to agree with theou dianoia, rather than akêratôi and the occurrence of akêratos here and Hermias’ comment on it both suggest that that is what he read. (The surviving manuscripts with akêratos also have strephomenê rather than trephomenê and Hermeias may well have read that too. If so, we don’t know what he made of the sentence as a whole and we have translated the OCT text in the lemma.) Timaeus 41D6-7. The same passage is cited at greater length at 128,11-22 above. Hermias reads mellêi, as do the Plato manuscripts B and T. The OCT edition of the Phaedrus, on the other hand, prints melêi (‘is concerned’, or similar), the reading of the Plato manuscript G. Because the issue is the choice between rival interpretations of dia khronou we have left it untranslated. Hermias wants it to mean ‘in time’ or ‘during time’ (and we translate accordingly in the lemma), but in Plato the appropriate rendering is something like ‘after a time’, ‘at last’ (for which see LSJ s.v. A.II.2 and cf. Hackforth’s translation and Ryan ad loc.), the sense Hermias rejects. ‘They’ is feminine, looking back to ‘divine souls’ earlier in the section rather than, as it might seem, to ‘gods’ in the previous line. Hermias similarly invokes the Philebus at 60,9 ff. and 140,8 ff. The reference here is presumably, as Lucarini and Moreschini suggest, to Philebus 60-1. The second and third instances of ‘itself ’ are not actually present in the Greek but are, as Hermias sees, implied. Justice-itself and moderation-itself translate autodikaiosunê and autosôphrosunê and justice itself and moderation itself autê dikaiosunê and autê sôphrosunê; the terms would normally be entirely synonymous. (Lines 22-5 (oukh hôsper . . . sôphrosunên) are difficult to render closely in English and we have fallen back on paraphrase.) Or perhaps something like ‘the justice that is wholly a god’, as opposed to a Platonic form.

Notes to pp. 79–81 260 261 262 263 264

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Lines 6-8 = Bernabé fr. 248 (II); line 6 = Kern fr. 159; lines 7-13 = Kern fr. 99. Or ‘revered’ (see LSJ s.v.), but ‘reverent’ seems to suit moderation better. Lines 7-13 = Kern fr. 99. Lines 19-20 = Bernabé fr. 149 and Kern fr. 109; the second line was cited earlier at 155,7 where Phanes was the subject of the verb ‘displayed’. Bernard translates ‘universals’ and ‘particular’ rather than ‘wholes’ and ‘partial’ here (and ‘universal’ rather than ‘whole’ in the case of holikos at 161,25 and 162,2). We have preferred the language of whole and part to preserve the analogy between the cosmos and its components and the containing and contained gods. For holikos in this sense see Lampe s.v. 1. It seems likely that the relevant Platonic background for Syrianus’ reply is Timaeus 33A7 where the world’s body is compounded as ‘a one complete whole composed out of wholes’ and 34B2–3 where the Demiurge is said to make the body of the world ‘a whole and complete body out of complete bodies [sc. the four elements]’. cf. in Tim. 2,2,9–15 for the way in which this theme of primary and secondary wholeness is taken to structure Plato’s presentation of creation in the dialogue. Proclus notes that Orpheus identifies Dionysus with the monad of the ‘younger gods’ of Timaeus 42D5–6. These younger gods, of course, complete the task of filling up the cosmos with the remaining mortal kinds of living things that the Demiurge himself did not create directly (41B7–8). Bernabé fr. 299, Kern fr. 205 = in Tim. 3,241,14–18 and 310,28-311,6. The reference is to 160,31 ff., where justice, moderation, and knowledge are said to be forms embraced by a single form, intellect, and justice to embrace everything, which suggests that here it is intellect that embraces justice and that it is the three forms (notice the switch from the singular ‘is embraced’ to the plural ‘are united’) that are united but separated by discursive thought (or perhaps just ‘discourse’). Equivalent to ‘naming these three’. Consultation of Couvreur’s text and apparatus confirms that theasamenê rather than theasamenêi is the correct reading at 162,9. (Correction doesn’t affect the translation.) In other words, perfect and unchanging. The phrase aei en telei in more or less this sense seems to go back to Aristotle, Meteor. 339a26, a passage much cited by Proclus. (The source of the quotations, if that is really what they are, is not known.) With this compare 93,19 ff., and for the ‘psychic mode’ also 51,12 and 66,25. Both the adverb oikade and the adjective oikeios are related to the noun oikos (‘house’).

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274 Line 28 echoes 23-4 but rather strangely soul’s activities rather than the souls themselves are now the subject. We were tempted to emend to histamenês kai heautên hôs psukhên theôrêsai in line 28 and translate ‘because they are especially viewed as being the soul’s own when it ends up in the psychic mode and contemplates itself qua soul’ in lines 27-8, but that seemed rather radical and we have translated the text as it stands. 275 129,10 ff. 276 Although Hermias doesn’t mention the ambrosia and nectar, they are clearly what is meant to symbolise the memory of the intelligibles. 277 Hermias’ derivation is essentially correct (although he omits the intermediate forms ambrotos and ambrosios; see Chantraine 1968, s.v. brotos). kai phthartos (or ‘perishable’) is Hermias’ gloss on brotos. 278 cf. 29,21 ff., where wetness is associated with generation and dryness with elevation to a higher plane. 279 Presumably Hermias is taking the syllable ne as equivalent to the privative prefix nê. 280 According to Chantraine 1968, s.v., the derivation of nektar is actually unclear. Moreover, kteras is simply a gift and not specifically a funeral offering; Hermias would have done better to adduce the cognate neuter plural noun kterea which does mean funeral offerings. taphos (or ‘funeral rites’) is again a gloss. 281 Homer, Iliad 4.2–4. It is perhaps significant for Hermias that this episode occurs just before Zeus chides Hera for her undying antipathy to the Trojans. This hatred has just been made more acute by Paris’ escape from Menelaus in the duel at the end of Book III thanks to Aphrodite’s providential care for the Trojan. Hera responds (lines 25–8): ‘Most dread son of Cronos, what a word you have said! How can you be minded to make my labor vain and of no effect, and the sweat that I sweated in my toil – and my two horses grew weary with my summoning the army as an evil for Priam and his sons?’ (trans. Murray and Wyatt, LCL vol. 170). Though the passage is not exactly a perfect fit for Hermias’ purposes, it does associate the horses of the gods with both nectar and their ‘care’ (of a rather biased sort!) for lower things. 282 The symbolic interpretations of nectar and ambrosia here seem to differ from Syrianus’ discussion in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. (cf. in Metaph. 41,30–42,9 where Syrianus responds to Aristotle’s criticisms of the theologians at 1000a9–14.) But it seems to accord pretty closely to Proclus’ interpretation of these elements of the Phaedrus in PT 4,46,20-47,1. See also in Parm. 1038,1–2 where Hebe as the bearer of nectar is similarly invoked. 283 For this translation, see Hermias comment at 166,10-14. 284 For ‘always the same and unchanging’ see the note at 148,11.

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285 With Lucarini and Moreschini’s text and punctuation, one would expect the finite verb legei rather than the participle legôn in line 8. It was presumably seeing this that Couvreur bracketed oun in line 8 and punctuated with a comma rather than a full stop after eteme in line 7 and with a full stop rather than a comma after ouranou in line 9. This has its virtues, but we have settled for emending legôn to legei. 286 247A5, 247A8-B1, and 247C2 respectively. 287 247C6-7. 288 Presumably this eis (‘into’), and those in lines 12 and 13, looks all the way back to diairei in line 6 – which, incidentally, supports the addition of eis there. 289 246E4 ff. 290 246E6. 291 247A6-7. It is hard to see a triad in this last example and the editors posit a lacuna. Couvreur suggested that Hestia may have appeared again and another possibility might be ‘the race of happy gods’ (theôn genos eudaimonôn; 247A5). Also, although the phrasing is against it, it’s not impossible that Hermias is taking the willing and the able as notionally separate groups, in which case there would be no lacuna. 292 Kern fr. 310, and cf. Laws 715E7-716A1. 293 sc. in the manner of the triadic divisions described in lines 7 ff. The division itself further describes the one referred to in lines 6-7. 294 This suggests that Hermias takes it that 247D1 ff. applies to human as well as to divine souls, which it certainly does, at least initially, grammatically (cf. Hackforth’s note ad loc.). 295 The last part of this sentence (from ‘and standing’ on) is appropriate to the divine souls rather than to even the most successful of the human souls and Lucarini and Moreschini suggest that something may have been lost after tôn ontôn (‘the things that are’) in line 26. 296 The references are to 247C1 and 248A3 (where Plato has sumperiagein rather than sumperipherein). Presumably Hermias (like Hackforth) understands Plato to mean ‘carried around along with the gods’ (and hence perhaps not completely in their own right), although that implication isn’t necessarily present in Plato. 297 For Hermias’ explanation of the Aristotelian distinction between temperance and self-control or strength of will (enkrateia), see 56,9–14. 298 ‘Underlying situation’ translates hupokeimenou pragmatos. The same phrase occurs at 276,18 where it seems to mean something like ‘the matter in hand’. 299 The literal meaning – something like ‘blessed with a good daemon’ – seems particularly relevant here. 300 The ‘progressor’ is a key term in Stoic moral philosophy since they suppose that the difference between the virtuous and the vicious is, strictly speaking, absolute.

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Notes to pp. 84–7 Yet among those who are miserable (i.e. not virtuous), some are at least making progress. ‘Fuel-zone’ translates hupekkauma, which is more literally just ‘fuel’ and which is sometimes translated ‘fire-sphere’. For Aristotle (Meteor. 341b5 ff.) the hupekkauma consists of dry exhalations that rise from the earth and collect immediately beneath the heaven at the extremity of the air-sphere. These exhalations are highly combustible (in fact, Aristotle says that we call them ‘fire’) and are often ignited by friction caused by the rotation of the heaven, which is the origin of comets and the like. The natural motion of both the exhalations forming the hupekkauma and of air is upwards, but both zones are carried round by the circular motion of the heaven. For soul vehicles, including the idea that they can become earthy and moist through a base way of life, see 136,26-30 and the notes there. philoprôtia is more literally ‘love of first place’. One would expect brithousais rather than brithousai here. In Plato eskhatos (‘extreme’) presumably means ‘copious’ but Hermias takes it to mean ‘of the basest quality’. 251B1. 546A ff. where Socrates invokes the Muses to explain how the ideal city could degenerate into timocracy. This passage – along with the nuptial number whose miscalculation is the ultimate cause of the factionalism among the ideal city’s rulers – is the subject of an extensive essay by Proclus in his Republic commentary. For the controversy among the Platonists on the undescended soul, see Sorabji 2012, 93–9. Empedocles fr. 115.13 DK. The line is quoted in a similar context in Plotinus’ very personal first chapter of Ennead 4,8, while Proclus invokes it in his exegesis of Timaeus 32C2–4 at in Tim. 2,116,24. See also Hierocles’ Commentary on the Golden Verses of Pythagoras 24,2,3. Both Plotinus and Hierocles connect Empedocles with the Pythagorean tradition. This is unexpected. At 164,2 ff. he distinguished the divine souls and three groups of human souls. Perhaps he is lumping together the first two groups of human souls as both having had at least some success. Or ‘they received the answer’. In either case the (masculine) plural is unexpected. The position of the comment suggests that the dê referred to is the one at 248B7 rather than, as Bernard (292, n. 289) believes, the one in the lemma, which is drawn from the previous line. Clearly Hermias feels that the sentence is hard to construe as it stands. He isn’t alone in this; de Vries (1969, ad loc.), for instance, suggests that we understand touto estin, hoti after hou estin at 248B5, giving: ‘The reason for their

Notes to pp. 87–8

313 314

315

316 317 318 319

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great eagerness to see where the plain of truth is [is this, that] the pasturage clearly proper . . .’. (It isn’t immediately clear how substituting gar for dê – which most translators anyway ignore – would help things, but there are textual problems at the beginning of the sentence in both Plato and Hermias and things might be clearer if we could be sure what the former wrote or the latter read.) ‘The wing, which is its elevating power’ paraphrases hê te tou pterou phusis, hôi psukhê kouphizetai at 248C1-2. In the Phaedrus, there appears to be no sharp distinction between the plain (pedion) of truth and the meadow (leimôn) from which the ‘pasturage proper to the soul’ derives. These seem to be synonymous, or perhaps the leimôn is a specific region upon the pedion. However, there are, in fact, two flat open areas in the Republic’s myth of Er that seem to be functionally and thus ‘geographically’ distinguished. One, described as a meadow (leimôn), occurs at the beginning of Er’s narrative, when souls descending from heaven and coming up from Hades meet, camp, and converse (614E). Then there is the ‘plain of oblivion’ (Lêthês pedion) where souls who have chosen their lives journey and camp beside the river of forgetfulness (621A). In his discussion of the first of these, Proclus identifies it with the meadow (leimôn) of Gorgias 524A where the roads to the Isles of the Blest and Tartarus diverge and souls are judged by Rhadamanthys, Aeacus, and Minos (cf. in Remp. 2,132,20–134,23). With respect to the plain of Oblivion at 621A, Proclus claims that this plain is the exact antithesis of the plain of truth mentioned in the Phaedrus (cf. in Remp. 2,346,19–21). Which plain in the Republic does Hermias have in mind? It seems perhaps slightly more likely that Hermias has in mind the latter: the plain of Oblivion. It, after all, might plausibly be thought to contain the principles of life and nature in the realm of generation by virtue of involving forgetfulness of the full details of life prior to embodiment. It is difficult to see how the leimôn of 614E could be described in this way: it seems only to provide a setting for souls to be judged and to relate their experience in heaven or below the earth to Er. When phasma appears again at 177,28, Bernard comments that its meaning there is unclear. Here it perhaps means something like ‘the realm of appearance’, although we may be missing something. For this, cf. Proclus, in Remp. 2,133,11 ff. Adrastia, Melissus (or Melisseus), Amalthea, and Ida all featured in the myths, Orphic and other, surrounding the birth and childhood of Zeus. Bernabé fr. 208. cf. Proclus, PT 4,51,1-53,20. Proclus treats the ‘kingdom’ of Adrastia at greater length, but makes some of the same points as Hermias. The laws that are unified in Adrastia relate to the Gorgias (Cronus) and the Sophist (Zeus), as well as the

182

320

321 322 323

324 325

326 327 328 329 330

Notes to pp. 88–90 laws of fate proclaimed to souls by the Demiurge in the Timaeus. We also find the same etymology of Adrastia from anapodrastos. (Saffrey and Westerink’s note ad loc. shows that it was a locus communis). In addition, while Proclus also relates Adrastia to Orphic teaching, he situates her in relation to the Chaldean Oracles’ theotaxonomy as well. Bernabé fr. 211. (1) LSJ gives ‘tambourine or kettle-drum’ for rhoptron, while Saffrey and Westerink (PT 4,52,19) translate ‘cymbales’. The plural, the fact that they are made of bronze, and ‘cymbals’ in line 6, all favour ‘cymbals’ here. (2) It isn’t actually clear who gives the cymbals. Our ‘she’ assumes that it is Night, but it could be Phanes, or some other god, male or female. ‘These’ is feminine and the reference is probably to Adrastia and Amathea, both of whom are associated with the rearing of Zeus in Orphic myth. Lucarini and Moreschini compare Proclus, PT 4,51-3 and Proclus, in Tim. 3,274,17-20. Lucarini and Moreschini compare lines 15-16 with Timaeus 42D2 ff. We find a similar all-embracing view of the ordinance of Adrastia in Proclus, in Tim. 3,274,15–20, where he comments on Timaeus 41E2–3: ‘And if I must state my own position, Plato is establishing these three causes of order next to one another [as a sequence]: Adrastia, Necessity, Fate: the intellective cause, the hypercosmic cause, and the encosmic cause. For the Demiurge too, as Orpheus says, receives nourishment from Adrastia, consorts with Necessity, and generates Fate’ (trans. Tarrant 217). 168,19-169,19 = Kern fr. 105. In Christian authors eiskrisis (‘entry’) is used of the soul entering the body (see Lampe s.v.) and eis andros sôma eiseisin (‘enters into the body of a man’) in line 27 suggests that this is probably the case here. 169,30-1 (‘because . . . a worse one’) is a paraphrase of Phaedrus 248E4-5, which is cited again at 175,18-19. Plato has ‘having become the follower of a god’, or even just ‘of god’ (i.e. of Zeus), with Rowe. The noun anokhê is cognate with the verb sunekhein used at 170,13 and 21. diaitethêi at 170,18 is a misprint for diaitêthêi (from diaitan), as read by Couvreur. For suntukhia in this sense (which doesn’t seem to be the sense in which Plato uses it) see Lampe s.v. 1. It is implausible that Plato’s text presents us with three distinct causes or sufficient conditions for the soul’s descent. What Hermias regards as distinct causes are more plausibly construed as describing various aspects of the state of affairs in which the soul descends. This perhaps explains why the explanation of the first two of the causes consists in nothing more than a second

Notes to pp. 90–1

331

332

333 334

335

336

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enumeration of them. Only in explaining the third – ‘the chance encounter’ – does Hermias actually add any information. In spite of Hermias’ words ‘in all likelihood’ there is no particular reason to treat any encounter as involving maleficent daemons. Nonetheless, this idea provides us with an unfortunate encounter in the pathway of descent to match Phaedrus’ own fortunate encounter with Socrates and his subsequent elevation through this meeting. Translating pantêi, the reading of the manuscripts, rather than pantôn with the editors at 171,3. (If emendation were necessary, we would prefer pantelês, as in line 6.) Clearly something has gone wrong with this sentence. Couvreur thought the problem lay in the words plêthousa . . . noêtôn in lines 5-6, Lucarini and Moreschini obelise apostasês . . . noêtôn in line 6, and we are inclined to think that the difficulties begin as early as barunomenê in line 4, since, as things stand, it is the generative power in line 4 that becomes weighed down and full of the waters of Lethe whereas it should be the soul (cf. 151,8-10, where it is the soul that is weighed down and the generative power that is – ultimately – the weight). However, it isn’t easy to see what Hermias might have written and we have decided, like Bernard, to do our best with the transmitted text. (According to Couvreur the manuscript M has apostasis for apostasês and, although we haven’t translated it, we are, like him, inclined to think this is the correct reading. If one did adopt it, it could begin a new sentence reading: ‘And departure [from the divine troupe; cf. 170,30] is complete forgetfulness of the intelligibles’.) Something like ‘he uses “first birth” in connection with’ would be more accurate on Hermias’ part and Bernard translates accordingly. Proclus similarly distinguishes the principles guiding the incarnations in the Republic’s myth of Er from those here in the Phaedrus; cf. in Remp. 2,185,23– 186,1. When Socrates describes the initial incarnation, he says that the one who has seen the most enters ‘the birth of a man (anêr) born to become a philosopher’ (248D2–3). Given the homoerotic context of the whole discussion, this is perhaps unsurprising. Socrates certainly does not say that no soul’s first birth is ever into a female, but Hermias nonetheless aligns the Phaedrus with the account of initial masculine incarnation given at Timaeus 42B5. This passage – where failed souls are reincarnated as women prior to a further potential demotion to animal bodies – was a significant concern for Proclus. cf. in Remp. 1,247,27– 249,21 and in Tim. 3,292,10–294,17. The masculine article ton in lines 29 and 30 suggests that a masculine noun is to be supplied and, like Bernard, we have assumed that it is bion, although that is rather awkward after zôôn in line 27.

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337 Hermias seems to have in mind the fact that when the souls in the myth of Er select a life of a certain general description, closer examination may reveal that this life includes being fated to eat one’s own children; cf. Republic 619B6–C6. This fortune – the fine print on the life the soul chooses, as it were – is then confirmed when the soul passes before Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos. See Adamson 2014, 444–50 for an overview of the Neoplatonists’ reading of fate in the myth of Er. 338 In relation to the Philebus, Hermias has in mind the life of intellect, the life of pleasure, and the mixed life. With respect to the Republic, the aristocratic, timocratic, oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical kinds of soul. 339 For the distinction between inspired telestic and skill-based telestic, see 104,19– 29 translated in vol. 1. 340 Or perhaps [a soul], as Bernard has it. But neither is entirely satisfactory. 341 Although poiêtikos is best translated ‘poetic’ in the Phaedrus passage and we have gone with that here, it is in its more basic meaning ‘creative’ or ‘productive’ that it can be said to embrace all the ‘imitative’ arts. 342 Hermias is explaining why the life of the farmer is linked with that of the craftsman. The phrase could be taken as a condensed version of: ‘The life of the farmer is mentioned along with that of the craftsman in that the farmer . . .’. 343 More literally something like ‘so that it will produce healthily and in the best possible way’. 344 nomoi covers customs and conventions as well as laws. 345 In what follows Hermias actually continues his discussion of the previous lemma. 248E3-4 ff. are only discussed under the next lemma. 346 This last clause is difficult and Couvreur, rightly we think, deems it corrupt. However, we are not convinced by his suggested emendation and, having nothing very convincing of our own to offer, have decided to do the best we can with the text of the manuscripts, which is what Lucarini and Moreschini print. (Our translation assumes (1) that ‘soul’ is to be understood with ‘the ninth’ and that this, looking back to line 24 ff., further stands for ‘the soul that ranks ninth in having seen the most’, (2) that eiseisin eis (‘enters upon’) is to be supplied from line 25 (where we translate ‘enters into’), (3) that bion is to be supplied with apestenômenon kai hena kai turannikon, (4) that apestenômenon in effect means ‘enforced’ rather than just ‘restricted’ as one would expect, since in reality no choice remains.) In spite of any lack of clarity in expression, Hermias’ point is obvious enough if we attend carefully to Plato’s text. The first ranked life is for one who is born to be philosophou ê philokalou ê mousikou tinos kai erôtikou. While this looks like four options, Hermias will subsequently treat the latter two as sub-species of the philokalou so that there are three. The second to fourth

Notes to pp. 93–6

347 348

349 350

351 352

353 354 355 356

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ranked lives can similarly be construed as involving three options: tên de deuteran eis basileôs ennomou ê polemikou kai arkhikou, tritên eis politikou ê tinos oikonomikou ê khrêmatistikou. Beginning with the fifth life (mantic or telestic) we narrow to two options and this pattern then continues through eighth place, and when we get to the ninth no choice remains. The five ‘kinds of being’ of Sophist 254D4 ff., being, rest, motion, sameness, difference, and in what follows each in turn is linked to an aspect of kingly behaviour. Hermias is incorrectly relating basis and bainein, which have the same root, to basileus. hedrazein and hedraios, which also share a root, are meant to explain the relationship between stasis (‘rest’) and a basileus. Or perhaps something like ‘plays out’, or just ‘lives’. The divisions that follow should be of groups of souls, but Hermias often writes as though they are divisions of types of life. In lines 25-6, for example, the division into three, four, and one must be of groupings of souls but ‘the first four’ is masculine, implying ‘lives’, and in lines 29-31 the numerals are feminine, implying ‘soul’ while ‘the first five’ in line 28 and ‘all the rest’ and ‘the final one’ in lines 32-3 are masculine, implying ‘lives’. sc. three different lives are available to each of the first four groups of souls, two different lives to the next four groups, only a single life to the ninth group. One of the occupations falling under the fourth type of life is that of the gumnastês, the trainer of professional athletes and Hermes had the epithet agônios or enagônios as presiding over contests, or agônes, which often included athletic contests. (‘Connected with games’ is a bit of a stretch for agônistikos, but agônistikos and agôn are cognates and the first sense of agônistikos in LSJ is ‘fit for contest, esp. in the games’.) Mentioned earlier at 94,21, where we refer to Proclus, ET 67 and Baltzly 2008. 175,19 shows that Hermias reads metalankhanei rather than metalambanei here. 168,17 ff.; 169,22 ff. Presumably a reference to the cubic shape assigned to particles of earth at Timaeus 55D8. The idea that 1,000 is a chthonic number dedicated to Pluto is likewise mentioned in Proclus’ commentary on the myth of Er at in Remp. 2,169,8–9, but the somewhat fuller explanation of the sense in which 1,000 is Plutonian at 173,3–8 is marred by two gaps in the text. The anecdote about Hermes Trismegistus and the quotation from Pindar are representative of the historia it is claimed Plato may have drawn on and we have shaped the translation to bring this out. It is often difficult to know how to translate historia, as witness the variety of possible renderings given in LSJ. In this case we would probably think ‘myth’ appropriate enough, but Hermias might argue that ‘the historical record’ would be closer to the mark.

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Notes to pp. 96–7

358 Pindar, Ol. 2, 68-70. 359 It isn’t immediately clear who it is who ‘says’ (phêsin) and Couvreur raises the possibility of deleting phêsin or emending it to phasin (‘they say’). Although we have translated the passage as Lucarini and Moreschini print it (but without the quotation marks) we are more inclined to think that the words ‘one must say, he states, that three thousand and ten thousand are a symbol for some perfection’ were a marginal comment looking forward to 176,31 ff. that has found its way into the text and that Hermias is the unstated subject of phêsin. Another possibility, attractive but less likely, is that Syrianus is the subject of the verb and that Hermias is referring back to 83,7-8, where (after references to the thousand and ten-thousand year periods in the Republic and to Chalcas’ prophecy that the Greeks would take Troy after ten years) the number ten is described as ‘bearing the mark (sumbolon) of a perfect period’. 360 One must say, he states, that three thousand and ten thousand are a symbol for some perfection. 361 Taking pasa psukhê . . . apokathistamenê as the subject of epoiêse. However, this is awkward and Bernard may be right to emend. (For the repeated an see Smyth 1764. The kai is presumably the kai of balanced contrast (Smyth 2885).) 362 There is clearly something wrong with the Greek. We have following Bernard in punctuating with a full stop after adunaton and emending aei to dei at 176,26. However, one would expect a gar after dei and another possibility would be to emend adunaton to dunaton, retain aei, and translate: ‘But it is possible that [a soul] that has led a single truly philosophical life should always be restored . . . ’. 363 Proclus shows a similar enthusiasm for deeper, more symbolic readings of the durations of psychic periods. In general he supposed that one should not handle these numeric parts of Plato’s dialogues entirely by counting up by fingers. cf. in Remp. 2,169,2 for periods between incarnations, 2,16,3 for the Nuptial Number and in Tim. 3,41,5 for the understanding of the Great Year. As with Hermias, there is generally some mathematical interpretation, but the deeper significance is by no means exhausted by this initial reading. 364 Although ‘judgement’ works well for krisis in the Phaedrus, we have opted (both here and in the lemma) for ‘separation’, which is closer to the core meaning of the word, is a better fit for the other two kriseis described, and is clearly the sense uppermost in Hermias’ mind throughout. 365 The mention of Aeacus places what follows in the context of the myth of judgement related at Gorgias 523A ff. There Socrates divides judging responsibilities between Rhadamanthys and Aeacus based on where the souls come to the place of judgement from. Those from Asia are judged by Rhadamanthys, while those from Europe by Aeacus, with Minos rendering a final

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decision if either of these judges has any doubt (524A). On this basis alone, it is unclear why Aeacus should be allotted a superior role at the first separation alongside Zeus. As the one authorised by Zeus to make the final judgement, we might expect to see Hermias recruit Minos to work alongside Zeus in the initial ‘essence-creating’ separation. But perhaps Olympiodorus’ later commentary on the Gorgias provides a clue. Olympiodorus reads the distinction between Europe and Asia symbolically rather than literally (in Gorg. 49,2). Since Asia is in the east, it is bright while Europe is in darkness. So the division signifies a difference, not between regions on earth, but between the celestial and the earthly. So perhaps Aeacus works with Zeus to distinguish souls that belong in these two regions, while the other sons of Zeus separate those that belong to the earthly realm on the basis of their deeds in a previous life. 366 At 177,27-8 the manuscripts have hêtis tôi Minôi kai Rhadamanthui kai tois en ekeinôi tôi topôi dikastais tois en tôi triodôi, toutesti tôi phasmati, sunestin. As Bernard saw, tôi phasmati makes little sense here and we have, with considerable misgiving, emended it to tois khasmasi. In the Gorgias (524A2) judgement of the souls is said to take place en tôi leimoni, en tôi triodôi, in the Republic (614C1-4) between openings (khasmata) by which the souls come and go between the place of judgement and either the heaven or the area beneath the earth. We suggest that Hermias, wanting, like Proclus (e.g. in Remp. 2,132,20 ff.), to harmonise the two myths, not unreasonably equates the triodos and the khasmata. If correct, the emendation would solve another mystery. With the text of the manuscripts it isn’t clear who tois en ekeinôi tôi topôi dikastais are, but if Hermias is combining data from the two myths, we can assume that he has in mind the unnamed judges of the Republic myth. (Proclus, with similar objectives, makes these judges gods, daemons, and heroes, the last of these including Minos, Rhadamanthys, and Aeacus.) An objection to our emendation is that it is hard to see how tois khasmasi could become tôi phasmati. We would suggest that tois khasmasi was misread as tois phasmasi and that this was then ‘corrected’ to tôi phasmati. 367 Bernard, like both Couvreur and Lucarini and Moreschini, assumes that dikê is the goddess (as it probably is at Phaedrus 249A8), and takes it that we are being told that there is a separate Dike for each of the three kriseis (or ‘judgements’ as she translates). Our translation assumes that ‘justice being pronounced as often as (isakhôs) [there is a] separation’ is epexegetic of hekastais (‘each and every [soul]’). This of course makes the translation of Dikê problematical. We are inclined to think that Hermias is having it both ways, the first occurrence referring to the goddess, the second to the abstract noun, and have translated accordingly. Since the Greeks didn’t capitalise proper names, Hermias may not even have perceived the shift in meaning.

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Notes to pp. 98–100

368 169,27-8 and 171,11-13 seem closest, but they actually only say that the first incarnation will be as a human being. Perhaps this is the voice of Syrianus referring to other works of his. 369 Proclus discusses this issue at in Tim. 3,294,22-295,32, where he offers a similar explanation of Plato’s position at 294,29-295,6, telling us that he has discussed it at greater length in his lectures on the Phaedrus. On the range of Neoplatonic interpretations of reincarnation ‘into’ animal bodies, see Sorabji 2012, 213–16. 370 This is described as a vocal exercise because in Hermias’ day punctuation was still sporadic or non-existent in written texts. 371 There is no consensus as to how this last sentence should be translated and it is frequently emended. For discussion, see Helmig 2004. 372 Definitions of a human being that include being flat-nailed and walking upright go back at least to the pseudo-Platonic Definitions (Def. 415A) and are common in the commentators and some Christian authors. 373 ta ousiôdê ta katholou (179,8-9): as the text stands, ta ousiôdê should be nominal and katholou an attributive adjective. One would expect either ta katholou ta ousiôdê or ta ousiôdê katholou, as at 180,11, and we have translated accordingly. 374 For detailed discussion of this passage and the secondary literature around it, see Helmig 2013, 67–70. Against interpreters who characterise this passage in terms of a harmonised Platonic and Aristotelian theory of concept formation, Helmig notes that ‘the later-generated universal’ can mean two different things in the late antique Platonists’ writings: either an empirically attained Aristotelian concept or a concept that originates in the soul because of the soul’s innate knowledge or essential universals. The sense in this Hermias passage is clearly the latter. 375 Placing the opening bracket at 179,10 before mê ontôn rather than before ti gar as Lucarini and Moreschini do. 376 178,30-179,17 are translated in Sorabji 2012, 5(c)(10) and there is relevant commentary at ibid. 133-5 and 138-9. 377 The four readings then are (1) pros hoisper theos ôn theos estin (by being close to which a god is a god) (2) pros hoisper theos ôn theios estin (by being close to which a god is divine) (3) pros hoisper ho theos ôn theos estin (by being close to which god (or the god) is a god) (4) pros hoisper ho theos ôn theios estin (by being close to which god (or the god) is divine). Lucarini and Moreschini’s text and apparatus shows that (1) isn’t found elsewhere, but something similar is found at Plutarch, Quest. Conv. 718F, (2) is the reading of Plato manuscript B – which the OCT text follows – and Hermias’ lemma, (3) isn’t found anywhere else, (4) is the reading of Plato manuscripts T, W, and P (26 theios estin in Lucarini and Moreschini’s apparatus should presumably read 27 theios estin).

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378 sc. his relationship ‘to those things by being close to which a god is divine’. A skhesis can also be a non-permanent state or condition, one that can be acquired or lost, and this is conceivably the sense in which it is used here. One might then translate (or paraphrase) kata skhesin ‘in a philosophical condition’ in line 28 and ‘by virtue of his then condition’ in line 30. However ‘by virtue of [this] relationship’ seems to make better sense of Hermias’ comments on the Platonic text. 379 For these cf. 91,14. 380 Analogies between philosophy and initiation into mystery rites are a staple of Neoplatonic writers. See, for instance, Damascius’ commentary on the Phaedo (§§168-9), where correlations are drawn between the grades of the virtues and the steps in initiation. But these don’t add up neatly to seven, nor can we find other references to seven steps of initiation in other Platonic authors. Nor does it seem likely that the Eleusinian mysteries – whose tradition for a late antique Platonist must be important given the frequency with which Plato alludes to them – involved seven stages. cf. Clinton 2003. Perhaps the most well-known correlation between seven steps or grades and a mystery cult is in relation to Mithraism; cf. Jerome, Letters 107, §2: ‘. . . did not your own kinsman Gracchus whose name betokens his patrician origin, when a few years back he held the prefecture of the City, overthrow, break in pieces, and shake to pieces the grotto of Mithras and all the dreadful images therein? Those I mean by which the worshippers were initiated as Raven, Bridegroom, Soldier, Lion, Perseus, Sun, Crab, and Father?’ Manfred Clauss, however, argues that these were priestly grades rather than stages in the initiation. Importantly for our purposes, however, he also thinks it likely that these grades correlate with the planets (which must surely be encosmic gods in the mind of someone like Hermias). (cf. Clauss 2001, 131, ff.) Now, if Jerome conveys an ambiguous characterisation of cult as involving seven ranks or stages of initiation, is it possible that Hermias and the learned public might have shared this vague understanding? We are otherwise hard-pressed to explain why Hermias supposes that the number seven is a suitable example for levels of initiation. 381 ‘The final rite’ would be tempting for to teleion, but cf. lines 8-9. 382 Bernabé fr.576; Kern fr. 5; 235; quoted by Plato at Phaedo 69C8-9 and by many later writers. 383 ‘Beyond the heaven’, our usual rendering, doesn’t work here. 384 cf. 178,30 ff. The three kinds of form are essentially those that Ammonius, and later commentators, refer to as ‘in-the-many’, ‘after-the many’, and ‘before-the many’. 385 More literally, ‘The succession of what is said [here] is from the division of madness’.

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386 Homer, Iliad 9.189 and 524; Odyssey 8.73. 387 What follows is a rather briefer and somewhat modified recapitulation of the argument at 106,30 ff. 388 The verb ‘travel with’ (sumpolein) isn’t listed in either LSJ or Lampe, but a TLG search shows that it does also occur once in the scholia to Aristophanes’ Plutus. 389 The claim seems to be that because of the shape of his argument (as Hermias reads it), Plato begins with his proof of the immortality of soul. 390 Plato doesn’t make any such claim, although Hermias himself does at 91,26-94,19. 391 Although Lucarini and Moreschini print the text as we have translated, the apparatus tells us that Lucarini would indicate a lacuna after maniai (‘madnesses’) at 182,8 on the ground that it wouldn’t make sense for Hermias to claim that Plato says that all four types of madness give us access to intelligible beauty and that therefore love is the best of them. Although we have translated Lucarini and Moreschini’s text, we are inclined to agree with Lucarini’s diagnosis. 392 sc. in the statement that love is the best kind of madness. 393 cf. 92,27–8 in vol. 1 where Hermias likewise insists on the primacy of erotic madness among the four forms of beneficial madness. 394 249D4-E1 (with four lines omitted in the middle). 395 Lucarini and Moreschini plausibly note the parallel with the rungs in the ladder of love at Symposium 210A–E. 396 At 183,1 the manuscript A has katô (which Lucarini and Moreschini print), but only added in a late hand, L has oupô, and c outô (assuming that the smooth breathing is correct), and all manuscripts have katakratêsasai, which Lucarini and Moreschini obelise. Ast suggested emending to akratêsasai and Lucarini (apparatus and in Lucarini 2012, 215) to katarruêsasai. We have, rather dubiously, translated oupô katakratêsasai, for which compare 83,2-3. 397 ‘Things perceived by the senses’ translates ta aisthêta and ‘things apprehended by the mind’, ta dianoêta. 398 kalôn could be either masculine or neuter and so either beautiful boys or beautiful things or both could be intended. 399 ‘He who loves this madness’ (ho tautês tês manias erôn) seems rather improbable, and certainly not close to what Plato says, and emendation is tempting. Lucarini (in the apparatus) suggests adding ek before tautês, which would give something like ‘he who loves out of this kind of madness’ and another possibility would be to emend erôn to metekhôn (for which cf. 249E3), giving ‘he who partakes of this madness’. 400 For to paidikon or ta paidika (the form preferred by both Plato and Hermias) LSJ gives ‘darling, favourite, minion’, none of which quite works, and we have settled for ‘boyfriend’.

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401 More literally: ‘but not every [soul] possesses them projected (proballein) [into consciousness] and active’. 402 cf. Republic 621A–C. 403 In the Phaedrus the phrase di’ amudrôn organôn refers to the organs of perception, but ‘arguments and propositions’ here (which we take to be epexegetic) and 184,32-185,2 below suggest that Hermias takes it as referring to the tools, or instruments, of dialectic. (For the concept ‘tools of dialectic’, cf. Philoponus, in An. Pr. 307,7-8.) 404 Presumably the contention is that the presence or absence of such balance is detected by the senses. 405 For the analogy between justice in the city and justice in the soul, see Republic 427D-444E and MacIsaac 2009. 406 ‘By tools of what magnitude’ translates dia posôn organôn. The first rendering of the phrase to come to mind would be ‘by means of how many tools’, but the reading of the Republic seems to be the only ‘tool’ that Hermias could be referring to, which would certainly be an undertaking of some magnitude. 407 In translating this last clause we’ve had to resort to paraphrase. LSJ gives ‘pursuit of private interests’ for idiopragia and it can be used pejoratively, as it is at Laws 875B7, the only passage where Plato himself uses it. Interestingly about half of the passages a TLG search for the word turns up relate to the definition of justice and, many of them clearly, and perhaps all of them ultimately, are inspired by Plato’s definition in the Republic. (The relevant passages go back to the second century and occur in the pagan authors Galen, the author of anonymous scholia on Book 5 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Porphyry, Proclus, Damascius, and Olympiodorus and in the Christians Athenagoras, Origen, Gregory Thaumaturgus, and Michael of Ephesus – who is drawing on the abovementioned anonymous scholia.) 408 This section number repeats the previous one in the Greek text. 409 Following Lucarini and Moreschini in accepting Couvreur’s conjecture ekeinê. Bernard defends the manuscript reading ekeinos, but the context and the passage from the Republic that is clearly behind it is against it. 410 cf. Republic 507D-508D. 411 This suggests the rendering ‘dance’ for khoros, but sun (‘with’) in the lemma tells against it. 412 sc. ‘host’ (stratia) is a military term while khoros (‘chorus’ or ‘dance’) suggests a musical or dramatic performance. 413 Timaeus 41D8. 414 homôs is rather awkward and Couvreur considered emending it to monôs. 415 Timaeus 42D4.

192

Notes to pp. 107–8

416 Actually behind Zeus, or, as Hackforth puts it, in the train of Zeus. 417 As 186,19 shows, Hermias read the present tense orgiazomen with Plato’s manuscripts B and T, rather than the imperfect ôrgiazomen with W and the OCT text. 418 180,8-9. 419 Unfortunately we have been unable to find English words sharing the same root that would satisfactorily render the four Greek words built on the root tel. 420 teleos, like ‘perfect’, implies ‘whole’, ‘complete’. 421 At 102,31; 163,15 ff.; and 182,9 the goal of the soul should be to be ‘ensconced’ among the gods, but in view of line 18 below ‘among the things that are viewed’ (which almost amounts to the same thing) is a better supplement here. 422 The same threefold distinction between rite, initiation, and full vision is explained in Proclus’ interpretation of Phaedrus 250B in PT 4,77,9–15. The basic meaning of epoptês, which was the technical term for someone admitted to the highest grade of the mysteries, is ‘watcher’, ‘spectator’. For the stages of initiation into the Eleusinian mysteries (which are of course those that seem most salient for Platonists in light of the hints dropped in the dialogues) and their associated terminology, see Clinton 2003. 423 Phaedo 67B2. 424 In Plato asêmantos involves a play on words. A sêma can be (1) a sign or mark, (2) a grave-marker, (3) a grave, and here asêmantos can be interpreted both as unmarked, or untainted, through contact with the body and (with a reference to the saying that the body (sôma) is a tomb (sêma), for which see Gorgias 493A3 and Cratylus 400C1 ff.), as not entombed in the body. There is no sign that Hermias is aware of this double entendre and his use of sêmeion (which LSJ has only found with the meaning ‘tomb’ in a pair of Doric inscriptions) rather than sêma suggests that he hasn’t picked it up. 425 Or perhaps ‘concession’. But we haven’t managed to find a reasonable rendering of kekharisthô that squares with either of Hermias’ interpretations of the word in what follows. 426 As a reader has pointed out, a TLG search turns up 8 occurrences of sunopsis or of the cognate verb sunopsizein in Hermias but none in Syrianus and only 1 in Proclus, so this looks like distinctively Hermian diction. 427 See Lampe s.v. 4 for this rendering of parapempein. It is however hard to see how this gloss on kharizein squares with the explanation of kharizein in lines 10-11 below. 428 There is clearly a play on kekharisthô and Kharites, the precise nature of which eludes us (perhaps we are to understand some such meaning as ‘let these then have been our indulgences (or gifts) to memory’).

Notes to pp. 108–11 429 430 431 432

433 434

435 436 437 438

439

440

441

442

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Symposium 203B2, where Diotima says that her tale will be makroteros. sc. in an indivisible moment of time. Presumably enmattered forms; cf. 179,18 ff. Couvreur suggests understanding anakhthentos after ekeina in line 8, but we have preferred adopting Lucarini’s suggested supplement anagomenou (apparatus and Lucarini 2012, 250), which lends point to êdê. Presumably this means that there are many erotic people who are not philosophers. There are difficulties here. (1) The analogy with light would lead us to expect beauty to connect two things, soul and the intelligibles, for instance, and we considered translating ‘serves to connect and unite the soul to [the] ascent to the intelligibles’. But, apart from that conjunction being a little odd in itself, the gloss of ‘connect’ by ‘unite’, the lack of an article with ‘ascent’, and the next sentence all seem to be against it, and we have opted for the rendering adopted, which is similar to Bernard’s. (2) The genitive tôn noêtôn in line 14 is unexpected; one would expect epi ta noêta, as in line 16, or eis ta noêta, as at 224,11. Our translation ‘to the intelligibles’ is a bit of a cheat. Lastly, perhaps 185,12-15 above tells slightly in favour of the soundness of the transmitted text. See 170,28 for these encounters and 171,3 for forgetfulness. Hackforth translates ‘to go after the fashion of a four-footed beast’, but see 187,7 ff. below and the notes ad loc. of Rowe, Yunis, and Ryan. cf. 250A3-4, where those who fall into bad company are said to forget the vision of beauty. An epônumia is actually a derived name, a nickname, or simply a name and Plato says ‘the name derived from it here on earth’ when ‘the thing named from it (autou to epônumon) here on earth’ would have been more expected. (For the translation ‘namesake’, see LSJ, Yunis, and Rowe ad loc.) Hermias’ evidence for Plato’s position is probably, primarily at least, the sentence he is commenting on here. That for Aristotle’s might be, as Lucarini and Moreschini suggest, Categories 2a11 ff., where Aristotle calls individual substances primary and their genera and species secondary. In Plato paidosporein is often taken to mean to engender children (LSJ, for example, gives ‘to beget children’), but the exegetic phrase that follows it in Hermias suggests that he at least, as Bernard sees (see her note ad loc.), takes it to mean to plant his seed in boys. When Hermias says ‘is elevated through it’, there’s an ambiguity about whether the person who sees the sensible beauty and recollects the intelligible beauty is elevated through the former or the latter. For this principle, see Proclus, in Tim. 2,15,20 ff.

194

Notes to pp. 111–13

443 Compare Plotinus, 1.6.2.14–18: ‘How, then, are things here and there both beautiful? We say that these are beautiful by participation in Form. For everything that is shapeless but is by nature capable of receiving shape or form, having no share in an expressed principle (logos) or form (eidos), is ugly, and stands outside divine reason’. (Gerson, et al. 2018). 444 Plato’s description of the lover’s symptoms is highly reminiscent of those of Sappho in fr. 31 (Voigt). For details see, for example, Yunis ad loc. 445 Emending idonta to idonti and anapempazomenon to anapempomenôi at 190,7. The change of the accusatives to datives was mooted by Couvreur in his apparatus. One would certainly expect datives after sumbainonta and we hypothesise that Hermias’ idonti was ‘corrected’ to idonta under the influence of idonta in the lemma and that the other dative was also changed to conform with it. The alteration of anapempazomenon to anapempomenôi is our own idea. LSJ gives ‘count again, count over’ and ‘think over, ponder over’ as possible renderings of anapempazesthai. The latter alternative might be just possible here but seems unlikely followed by epi to noêton kallos. On the other hand, Hermias uses anapempein quite often in similar contexts, the closest to the present one being 27,12; 81,6; 107,10; 175,20; and 188,27. It could of course be argued that Hermias believed that the not altogether common verb anapempazesthai is a synonym for anapempein, but even so it would be hard to see why he chose to abandon anapempein just here. (Bernard translates ‘nach oben geschickt wird’ without any note.). 446 It isn’t clear how best to translate this ek (or for that matter the whole clause in which it occurs) in Plato and we have treated it differently in the lemma and here. 447 As Bernard points out, this is presumably a general reference to what Plato says about the fall of the soul at 248C5 ff. rather than a claim that he uses the term – which Hermias himself uses 13 times. 448 cf. 29,30; 34,24; 59,10; 69,10; 84,11 for the association of fluidity with the realm of generation. Even among the kinds of physical sweating, there is the healthy, dry sweat of the gymnasium and the unhealthy, wet sweat of the dissipated drinker or visitor to the baths; cf. 61,28–31. 449 cf. Iamblichus, De Myst. 3,31,68 on the fire of the intelligibles and their role in divination and theurgic ascent. See also Proclus, in Tim. 3,114,11 ff. on the fire of the intelligibles and its relation to the Empyrean region of the Chaldean Oracles. 450 In Hermias ‘warmed’ is accusative plural, making it agree with ta peri tên ekphusin (‘the areas around the growth’), whereas in Plato it is a genitive singular referring back to the lover. 451 Presumably the idea is that the melted wax spreads out to form a pool.

Notes to pp. 114–17

195

452 The manuscripts read to tou pterou kallos at 191,16-17 which editors since Ast emend to ho tou pterou kaulos. It does seem clear that Hermias should be talking about the wing’s kaulos rather than its kallos, but the text as emended by Ast remains difficult and in the apparatus to Lucarini and Moreschini Lucarini suggests further emendation. We think that better sense can be achieved by replacing to tou pterou kallos with ton tou pterou kaulon and that is what we have translated. 453 Iliad 23.507, describing the sweat streaming from the horses during a race. 454 Inspired by ek de amphoterôn memeigmenôn (‘through the mingling of both’) at 251D7. 455 More literally something like ‘through transference of trees’. 456 Cratylus 419E3–420A4. 457 Or perhaps ‘eagerly’ or ‘gushingly’, depending on how one takes hiemenos. Here in the Phaedrus Plato opts, as Hermias at least in part sees, for the derivation hienai + merê + rhoê. 458 ‘Incoming’ translates epionta, which was translated ‘coming to’ in the lemma. 459 The switch from the masculine participle eisdexamenos (Plato has dekhomenê) to the feminine nominative hê psukhê is ungrammatical but the sense seems clear enough. 460 Majercik fr. 53,2; cf. Proclus, in Tim. 2,61,22–5. This is the second of the two quotations of the Oracles in Hermias. The Oracles play a much more prominent role in Proclus’ reading of the palinode in Platonic Theology 4. 461 In other words, the talk of drying out is a kind of prolongation of the metaphor of watering. In Plato’s metaphor, the watering of the soul is a benefit to it, since it encourages the growth of its wings. But this runs somewhat counter to Hermias’ pervasive identification of liquidity or wetness with matter and the realm of generation (see the note at 190,15 above). 462 A gloss on hêi to pteron hormâi, which we have translated ‘where the wing sprouts’ in the lemma. katho is normally to be translated ‘insofar as’, ‘according as’, which would be difficult here, but the supplement to LSJ shows that it can occasionally mean ‘where’. 463 ‘In Plato’s day, before arteries and veins were distinguished and the normal pulsating properties of arteries were recognised, sphuzô, “pulsate” was used of blood vessels whose pulsations were thought to be the result of inflammation (Hippoc. Epid. 2.5.16; von Staden 1989: 268)’ (Yunis ad loc.). However, although Plato seems to have pulsating blood vessels, or pulses, in mind, it’s possible that Hermias is thinking of the throbbing of festering sores or wounds. 464 Notably Sappho, fr. 130,2 (Voigt). 465 Actually, mainesthai is only used in the first two speeches and discussion of them, although the cognate adjective emmanês (maddened, frantic) is used here at 251D8.

196

Notes to pp. 117–20

466 It isn’t clear what passage Hermias has in mind. Bernard suggests 217D and Lucarini and Moreschini 183A. Another possibility is 219B, if we are to suppose that both Socrates and Alcibiades passed a sleepless night there. 467 cf. Republic 476D, 533C–534C where the person who knows the forms is awake, while others are asleep. 468 Hermias uses phrases such as kata to phainomenon, to phainomenon, and hê phainomenê exêgêsis when referring to the literal or surface sense of a passage as opposed to its deeper or symbolic meaning. See 69,1 and 198,13 above and 206,8 below for further examples. 469 Or perhaps, with Hackforth and Ryan, the buds of the wings and the desire locked inside. 470 ‘Drawing breath’ would better represent the Greek, but the continuation suggests something like the rendering we have adopted. 471 deomenôn (195,8) is difficult and one manuscript omits it and Ast and Couvreur, probably correctly, felt that emendation is needed. Our rendering assumes that anapnoês is to be understood from anapnoên in the previous line. (Admittedly this a bit of a stretch, and even if it is correct, one would expect the article tôn before deomenôn.) 472 The nooumenon/phainomenon contrast here suggests a distinction between what is evident to the intellect, or at the intelligible level, and what is evident to the senses, or at the bodily level – which for Hermias would probably be much the same thing as the surface meaning and the deeper meanings. (A TLG search shows that elsewhere the nooumenon/phainomenon contrast only appears in Christian authors. Were they perhaps behind Kant’s noumenon/phainomenon distinction?) 473 Like Couvreur, punctuating with a semicolon rather than a comma in 195,15. 474 The soul’s care for and governance of the body is thus a microcosm of the philosopher-statesman’s rule over the ideal polis. This is a function of the civic virtues. See Essay 7 in Proclus’ Republic commentary. 475 Plato is referring to the young man and the rendering ‘the fair one’ is initially attractive here, but the continuation, and 196,1 in particular, shows that ‘beauty’ is the appropriate rendering in Hermias. 476 Plato has gelasêi (‘you will laugh’), but 196,16 shows that Hermias read gelaseias. 477 197,2 shows that Hermias read pterophuton with a number of Plato’s manuscripts rather than pterophutor’ (which would give ‘the need to engender wings’) with one Plato manuscript and Stobaeus, and as printed in the OCT edition of the Phaedrus. 478 cf. Plato, Cratylus 420A9 ff. 479 To preserve the play on words we have rendered Erôs ‘Eros’ rather than ‘Love’ (our usual translation) and Plato’s coinage Pterôs ‘Pteros’ rather than, say, ‘the

Notes to pp. 120–3

480 481 482 483

484 485 486 487 488 489

490 491

492 493

494 495 496

197

winged one’. There is also a play on two possible meanings of the verb pteroun, the literal one ‘furnish with feathers or wings’ and the metaphorical one ‘excite’. i.e. claims that gods and men have different names for things. Iliad 14.291. (The names are those of a bird of disputed identity.) Iliad 1.403 (The passage continues: ‘but all men Aegaeon’.) Bernard’s rendering ‘Damit leitet er den letzten Teil zum Thema “Eros” ein’ has its attractions, but what Hermias goes on to say about the telos both under this lemma (197,10 ff.; 17 ff.) and later at 200,24 and 201,7 (where telos glosses skopos) is against it. Timaeus 42D4. As Bernard notes, Plato has the moon rather than the sun. (Same misquotation at 90,25.) That is to say, there are more than twelve gods, but the twelve Olympians in Plato’s text symbolically represent all of them. cf. Phaedrus 246E4-247A4, with Hermias 147,12-13. For Ares as a lover of division, cf. Proclus, in Tim. 1,167,30-2; in Remp. 2,221,4; for a monad of division, Proclus, PT 5,12,10 and 21; 5,148,12. Emending Phaidros at 198,11 to Phaidrou. For theôrêtikôteron in this sense see Lampe theôrêtikos 4 in conjunction with theôria D.2.b and theôreô 2. In similar passages (28,18; 42,24) in vol. 1 we, faute de mieux (see notes 10 and 253 there), translated theôrêtikos ‘theoretical’ and theôrêtikôteron ‘from a more theoretical perspective’, but ‘allegorically’ and the like seems to fit such contexts well. (Notice that at theôria D.2.b we are told that Christian writers at Alexandria, where Hermias taught, were among those who described allegorical interpretation as theôria.) Or ‘because of its [sc. matter’s] instability’. The allegorical reading of this lover’s murderous nature depends on the idea of philosophy as a practice for death – in the sense of separation of the soul from bodily concerns. The successfully murderous lover secures ascent for both himself and his beloved ‘before it is time’. Presumably this means before the time at which the soul is actually separated from the body at death. This is the way in which sacrificial victims were dispatched. The Greek of the first part of the sentence is awkward and, although they print the text of the manuscripts, both Couvreur and Lucarini and Moreschini suggest possible emendations. We have done our best with the text as printed – as has Bernard, who translates rather differently. For this translation of theôria, see Lampe theôria D.2.b and the note at line 14 above. (In retrospect, we would translate theôrian at 31,20 ‘a piece of allegory’.) cf. 197,26 and the note there. At 248D1.

198

Notes to pp. 123–6

497 Yunis may well be right to take heautôi with hôs theon (‘like a god’) (which would have a considerable effect on the translation), but, as 199,5 f. shows, Hermias, like some modern translators, takes it with agalma (‘divine image’). 498 It isn’t entirely clear whether this means the lover’s god or the boyfriend’s god, but 197,10-23 and Phaedrus 252E3-5 and 253A6-B1 suggest that it amounts to the same thing. 499 Plato juxtaposes Dios, the genitive case of ‘Zeus’, and dion, the accusative case of the adjective dios, which is normally to be translated ‘noble’ when used of people. Clearly there is some sort of play on words, but its nature is unclear: some have thought there is a reference to Plato’s Sicilian friend Dion (on this see the notes of Hackforth and Yunis ad loc.), but, as LSJ shows, dios was already used as an adjective of Zeus in tragedy, and that may have been uppermost in Plato’s mind, which would validate Hermias’ note. 500 pothen (‘whence’), etc. because they don’t initially recollect the character of their own god (for this cf. lines 19 and 26-7). We are assuming the ellipsis of theou (‘god’) after oikeiou (‘their own’); for the phrase oikeios theos cf. for example 27 and 30. (The ellipsis is rather harsh and perhaps theou has dropped out and should be restored.) 501 The verb translated ‘seeking’ is used of tracking by scent or other traces and the lover learns the nature of his god by finding evidence (or images) of it within himself rather than by direct observation. 502 ikhnôn (here translated ‘traces’ but most literally ‘track’, ‘footstep’) is motivated by Plato’s ikhneuontes at 252E7, on which see the previous note. 503 Translating khan, which Lucarini and Moreschini print in line 9 below. 504 The verb ‘to draw’ in Plato (arutein) typically conveys drawing water from a water source, such as a well. Hermias’ use of ‘to channel’ (metokheteuein) (Plato has epantlein, ‘to pour over’) continues the hydrological theme since it typically refers to the channelling of water for irrigation. Both fit nicely with the watering of the wing sprouts by the beauty flowing into the lover from the beloved. 505 As an adjective, sunthakos means ‘sitting with’ and the message is that Hera shares Zeus’ throne. 506 See above 199,15–17 on the relation between leadership and kingship in the case of Zeus and Hera. 507 For the production of anterôs, see 255B3 ff., for the term itself, 255E1. 508 As well as the Phaedrus passage, Hermias may have Timaeus 29E2 in mind where the Demiurge creates the sensible world because he is good and goodness has no place for envy. 509 cf. Aristotle, EN 1166a31-2; Diogenes Laertius 7.23,3 (where it is attributed to Zeno).

Notes to pp. 126–8

199

510 skopos and telos at 201,7 show that Hermias read teleutê rather than teletê here, as do most manuscripts of the Phaedrus. 511 Presumably the reference is to 197,6 ff., and especially to 197,15-18, where the language is very similar. 512 This suggests that Hermias, unlike modern scholars, takes it that ean hairethêi (‘if he is captured’) at 253C6 refers to the lover rather than the beloved. It isn’t clear where Hermias offers the explanation of this that he says needs to be attempted. 513 Hermias often expresses the relation of the leading god to the souls that follow that god by use of oikeios – a use that we have frequently expressed by ‘his own god’. The duplication involved in the words here – to oikeiôthênai tôi oikeiôi theôi – resists any convenient English translation. 514 Or possibly, with Bernard, ‘the chosen one’, although most translators and commentators agree on ‘the captured one’ or the like. 515 For the verb in this sense, see Lampe, s.v. 4, and cf. LSJ s.v. II and homilein I.1. 516 Literally ‘billow’; cf. the similar use of the word at Proclus, in Crat. 178,46. 517 The vocabulary of ‘garments’ is an alternative way of describing the soul’s vehicles; cf. Proclus, ET prop. 209 with Dodd’s 1963 commentary. For an outline of this theory as it is found in Porphyry, see Gersh 1986, 593-5 and, more generally, Finamore 1985. 518 cf. 132,20-1, and 133,18-20. 519 Or perhaps ‘revolving around us’. 520 Taking this clause as epexegetic. 521 The threefold division also refers back to 246A. Hermias’ point is that to liken the soul to ‘a united power’ emphasises its unity whereas the present reference to the earlier passage emphasises its fragmentation. 522 apotemakhizein is perhaps a coinage of the Athenian school. Although temakhizein, katatemakhizein, and suntemakhizein are found elsewhere, apotemakhizein itself occurs almost exclusively in Syrianus, Hermias, and Proclus. 523 A nice illustration of what we have called the presupposition of the ‘maximal semantic density’ of Plato’s text. Hermias assumes that nearly every word choice on Plato’s part conveys some meaning to the discerning reader. 524 The double-formed or duoeidês nature of the soul is familiar from Proclus’ Timaeus commentary and relates to the soul’s being shaped by the Demiurge into the circle of the Same and the circle of the Other. Here, however, we are no longer considering the soul in itself, but rather in its relation to the body. So while Hermias earlier interpreted the soul’s two horses in terms of the circles of the Same and the Other (130,5–6), its double-formed nature now manifests as the duality of spirit and desire.

200

Notes to pp. 128–30

525 As Bernard notes, this looks both odd and possibly out of place. Nowhere else does Hermias provide a question about the text that receives no answer. Moreover, by Hermias’ own lights, we are now discussing different horses than the ones that human and divine souls have in the intelligible – the subject of discussion in 246A–B. 526 cf. Timaeus 44D3-5 (where Plato talks of the head rather than the brain) and Timaeus 69C ff. where the younger gods imitate the Demiurge, who frames the body of the cosmos, in their framing of the human body. 527 Timaeus 30A4-5 (with slightly different word-order). In the Timaeus the phrase is used to describe the pre-cosmic condition to which the Demiurge brings order. 528 The passive participle of krinein – a verb normally used in relation to judgement – perhaps suggests that the good horse inherits the clear and authoritative determinations of Reason. Hermias’ use of ou sumphurein here is probably influenced by the fact that Plato describes the bad horse with the verb sumphorein below. 529 cf. Republic 474D9. 530 cf. the remarks at 15,10 ff. 531 cf. Laws 726A–727A. It does not seem that the Athenian’s point there is that honour is a great good, but rather that when we honour something correctly we confer great goods on it. We should thus honour our own souls, secondarily after the gods and their attendants, but the correct way of honouring is known to few and most suppose that they honour their soul by flattering it with gifts rather than making it better. Hermias, however, needs the notion that the good horse, in being a lover of honour (Phaedrus 256D3), is a lover of the good. So the import of the Laws passage is somewhat simplified and honour is conceived of as a thing that is itself a benefit rather than an activity through which what is correctly honoured is benefitted. 532 goun is surprising here and Couveur suggests in his apparatus that it should perhaps be emended to oun, giving ‘It is, then, a lover of honour’. 533 The active hêniokhei (‘regulates’) corresponds to the passive hêniokhetai (‘is steered’) of Plato’s text: the good horse, due to the moderation and sense of shame that belongs to it, is not merely driven by reason but goes willingly where reason bids of its own accord. 534 Actually, Plato’s description of the bad horse is structured along much the same lines as his description of the good one and contrasts its physical and moral characteristics with those of the good one more systematically than Hermias does in what follows. Presumably Hermias has in mind the fact that after Socrates has enumerated the inferior horse’s bodily characteristics and commenced on its psychic characteristics, he seemingly goes back to the bodily

Notes to pp. 130–1

535 536

537 538 539

540

541

542 543 544

545

201

when he attributes shaggy ears and deafness to it. But of course these bodily feature explain why it lacks temperance: being deaf, it fails to heed reason. But Hermias is everywhere keen to exhibit Plato as a masterful writer whose skill far outruns that of Lysias. Hence he attributes to him a parallel between style and content in the description of the inferior horse on the basis of rather thin evidence. Recall that at Republic 589B Socrates describes the desiring part of the soul as a many-headed beast. In Plato polus probably means something like ‘massive’ (Hackforth) or ‘ponderous’ (Yunis), but Hermias’ comment suggests that he takes it to mean ‘many’. This would be a rather odd description of a horse, but Hermias identifies the bad horse with desire and it would be a reasonable enough description of desire. At 209,25 vice is said to be aoristos and apeiros. The adjectives are meant to describe the character of the horse even more than its coat. Or ‘with light blue eyes’. LSJ (glaukos II.2) cites passages that show that the colour was ‘not admired’ in eyes and Yunis cites pseudo-Aristotle, Physiognomica, 812b3, which claims that eyes of this colour are a mark of cowardice. Couvreur, Bernard, and Lucarini and Moreschini all, perhaps rightly, believe that the text of this first clause is corrupt and suggest various remedies, none of which seems very convincing. We have, not very optimistically, attempted to make sense of the text of the manuscripts (Lucarini and Moreschini bracket ginetai (‘occurs’)). The general point seems clear enough. The dark eyes of the good horse indicate penetration of the intelligible world, the lighter eyes of the bad horse restriction to knowledge of the sensible world (for similar symbolism, cf. 15,10 ff.). Taking ‘having mental processes that only extend as far as imagination’ as epexegetic of what precedes. (The unexpressed subject of ekhôn (‘having’) is presumably the bad horse.) That is, they don’t extend to reasoning. Some translators of Plato prefer ‘bloodshot’, but ‘hot-blooded’ seems to suit Hermias’ comment better. As things stand, it is the horse that does the showing (and the indicating a little further on), whereas it surely should be Plato. Lucarini suggests (in the apparatus) emending deiknus (‘showing’) to deiknusi (‘he shows’), but if surgery is required, it probably needs to be a bit more radical and we have left the showing to the horse. There are several difficulties here, for which see Hackforth ad loc. Our translation is governed by what seems to be Hermias’ understanding of the passage.

202

Notes to pp. 131–2

546 cf. 201,23 ff. 547 Reinstating kai akratous, which Lucarini and Moreschini, following Couvreur, bracket, and repositioning toutesti peri anagôgou to follow tou alêthinou erôtos at 205,4-5. (1) 204,2-17 echoes 201,17-202,1 where Hermias (correctly) says that Plato will discuss both continent and incontinent love, there too describing them as falling between genuine love and perverse love. (2) The argument for deleting kai akratous (‘and incontinent’) is that, as the text stands in the manuscripts, Hermias will be describing incontinent love as genuine love. The suggested transposition does away with that difficulty and gives good sense. (A case could be made for the transposition even with the deletion of kai akratous, since ‘uplifting [love]’ isn’t a very likely gloss for continent love either.) 548 cf. line 13 below. 549 It becomes apparent that ‘between [them]’ amounts to ‘as a result of the interaction between them’. 550 sc. reason and the enslaved irrational part of the soul together. 551 This would seem to apply to the whole of 253E5-256B7. 552 For the verb in this sense cf. Lampe, s.v. C.4. 553 The basic meaning of omma is ‘eye’, but it can extend to the face or the whole person or be used metaphorically of the source of light or light itself or of anything dear or precious. Modern editors or translators usually assume that it is used in one or other of its extended senses in Plato, but the continuation shows that Hermias reads it as ‘eye’. 554 Olympiodorus’ Alcibiades commentary, which, unlike that of Proclus, extends as far as 133B, does not draw any connection with the ‘erotic eye’ in the Phaedrus. 555 The manuscripts, and Lucarini and Moreschini’s text, have ‘. . . since [in that case] that which sees (to horôn) and that which is capable of sight (to horatikon) come together – in [the case of] mirrors, that which sees (to horôn) is different from that which is capable of sight’. As Bernard says, this doesn’t make any sense. Bernard’s solution is to emend both instances of horôn to horômenon. This gives tolerable sense but we are inclined to think that the problem lies with to horatikon. Our guess is that Hermias actually wrote either to horômenon or to horaton. The former would be easier but the latter makes better sense palaeographically and is what we have translated. Even after emendation, Hermias’ observation is a puzzling one. Presumably what he has in mind is that when a person sees the image of his own eye reflected in the eye of another, the medium through which the seeing eye sees itself is at least the same in kind – viz. another eye. But this is presumably not the case when the person sees his own eye in a mirror. So the situation imagined in the Alcibiades is a kind of intermediate case between the numerical identity of the subject and object of

Notes to pp. 132–5

556 557 558

559 560 561

562

563 564

565 566

567 568

203

thought in self-thinking and the duality of kinds involved in seeing oneself in the mirror. aisthêsei is difficult in Plato (see Hackforth’s note ad loc.), but Hermias seems to take it in some such sense as this. 205,4-6. Yunis convincingly argues that mneian poieisthai is best rendered ‘recall’ here rather than ‘remind’ or the like as most translators assume and Hermias seems to be in agreement. For this cf. 203,10-11. 189,23-6. In Plato the grammatical subject is the charioteer’s memory, although, as Yunis remarks, this fills in for the charioteer himself, but in Hermias’ interpretation of the passage the feminine pronoun heautên (‘itself ’) suggests that it is the soul. We have not italicised drag because it looks back to heilkusen (‘drags’) in the previous line which glosses anepesen (‘falls back’) rather than quoting helkusai at 254C1. It seems that Hermias is understanding hidrôs as ‘the sign of toil’ (for which see LSJ s.v. I.1), or even simply as ‘toil’, and that agôn (‘struggle’) is epexegetic of it. (1) This last comment would seem to belong under the previous lemma. (2) In Plato the bad horse abuses both the charioteer and the good horse, but here we have the singular verb apelipe (translated ‘he has abandoned’). Our translation assumes that the charioteer is the subject, but Bernard may be right to assume that it is the soul. Not just under this lemma but throughout the account of the struggle between the bad horse and the other two. In Plato tauton pathos probably means either the same emotion as the charioteer felt at the recollection of the form of beauty, as Ryan suggests, or, perhaps more appropriately, the same feeling of indignation at the bad horse’s conduct, as Hackforth’s translation implies. Hermias, on the other hand, seems to take it to mean the same physical reaction. cf. 207,6 above. The word husplêx has a number of different meanings and there is no agreement as to which of them Plato had in mind. For what it’s worth, we are inclined to agree with those who believe that the reference is to a kind of starting machine that was used in chariot races, the idea being that the rider, or charioteer, will jerk back as a result of the sudden acceleration when the barrier is withdrawn and the horse(s) surge forward. Hermias seems to think that a husplêx is something that acts like a goad. But this doesn’t really work. The part of the psychic triad that falls back – thus pulling the bit in the mouth of the bad horse – is the charioteer. It’s a very incompetent horseman who uses the goad on himself and, moreover, it

204

569 570

571 572

573 574 575

576 577

Notes to pp. 135–7 is hard to see why this self-goading would cause his horse(s) to experience what Plato describes. This can range from paying court to the worship afforded a god. Hermias treats the text from 253C6 to 255A1 as describing how the lover comes to possess the real object of his desire, viz. ascent from sensible to intelligible beauty. This actually fits nicely with Plato’s text, since while 253C6’s ho hairetheis might superficially seem to refer to the boy who is the object of the lover’s interest, in fact the text in between says very little about the boy, but a great deal about the psychic changes within the lover. The sense in which the lover ‘is won over’ in the present passage needs to be seen in light of Hermias’ distinction between the real and apparent ‘object of desire’. In English, we would normally say something like ‘abounds in good things and is overflowing with them’. The idea that the infection is ‘sympathetic’ seems to be Hermias’ own and he repeats it at 210,27 and 211,6-7. Galen for one has plenty to say about sympathetic infection (for the standard account, see Siegel 1968, 360-70) but for him it is always between organs in the same body, including between the eyes in ophthalmia, and we haven’t been able to find evidence for a belief in inter-person sympathetic infection in other ancient medical writers. (The term sympathetic ophthalmia is still used in modern medicine to describe cases where inflammation in an eye occurs after injury to the other eye.) For this cf. Phaedrus 255D4-5. ‘He equates . . . being in accord’ (209,7-9): almost the same words are used to explain a phrase used of Eros at 215,23-4. (1) Translating toutesti ean kai diabeblêmenos tês sunousias tou erastou hoti ou sômatikês kharitos heneka eplêsiasen autôi alla ôpheleias psukhês tote paradidôsin heauton kataphronêsas tôn tas diabolas legontôn, the text of the manuscripts, at 209,11-12. Couvreur and Bernard both emend kai, the former to êi, the latter to gnôi. Lucarini and Moreschini, as well as emending kai to êi, make a major transposition in the middle of the sentence. (Lucarini and Moreschini refer the reader to one of Lucarini’s articles in their apparatus but the passage isn’t discussed there.) (2) Perhaps a case could be made for relocating tote paradidôsin eauton kataphronêsas tôn tas diabolas legontôn from 209,13, where it seems premature and rather awkward, to fill the lacuna at 210,3 – although there too it would be somewhat premature. Alcibiades 1 131C5-D5. More literally ‘for the young man to benefit (apolauein)’. apolauein is Lucarini’s emendation (Lucarini 2012, 252) of apoluein for which he compares 210,13. apoluein is indeed unexpected but, although we translate it, apolauein with ton neon as subject (Lucarini loc. cit.) is awkward too.

Notes to pp. 137–41

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578 Plato invokes Odyssey 17.218 in support of this principle at Lysis 214A ff. The idea that friendship – or at least friendship of the best kind – is confined to those who are alike in being virtuous is pervasive in ancient Greco-Roman philosophy. cf. Baltzly and Eliopoulos 2009. 579 Iamblichus, in Phaedr. fr. 6 (Dillon 2009). cf. Iamblichus, Letter to Macedonius on Fate, fr. 2 (Dillon and Polleichner 2009): while the soul is free in its essence, ‘in so far as it gives itself to the realm of generation and subjects itself to the flow of the universe, thus far also it is drawn beneath the sway of Fate and is enslaved to the necessities of nature’. 580 There is a gap in the text here of uncertain extent. (See the note at 209,13 for a possible way of filling it.) 581 In Plato enguthen probably goes with what follows, but Hermias takes it with what precedes. 582 It’s difficult to know how best to translate gignomenê when enguthen is separated from it. 583 An account that began at 208,20. 584 For attending the gymnasium with Alcibiades, see Symposium 217B7 ff., for sharing a bed with him, Symposium 217D3 ff. 585 Plato has ‘which Zeus, loving Ganymede, named longing’. 586 In Plato this participle is in the genitive case and its implied subject is the boy, giving something like ‘when he is filled [with it]’. 587 As the text stands, it’s hard to make sense of epi to pemphthen (Bernard’s ‘von wo er ausgesendet wurde’ doesn’t really do justice to the Greek). We suggest that something has dropped out after epi to in line 25 and, for purposes of translation, have assumed that it is hothen hôrmêthê, as at Phaedrus 255C5 (for the resulting construction, cf. Simplicius, in Phys. 1351,24). 588 Assuming that aitian (‘reason’) glosses prophasin (‘cause’), which, as a technical term in medicine, means ‘external exciting cause’. 589 This is both a statement about the origin of love and a fanciful etymology of eran (to love). 590 ‘Secondary’ covers both being later and being inferior. Here it is applied to being a reflection rather than an original, in the next comment to being similar to another thing and to being weaker than another thing. 591 Couvreur deletes legein at 212,6, Lucarini and Moreschini obelise it, and Bernard emends it to ekhein. Clearly the text isn’t viable with or without legein and for purposes of translation we have accepted Bernard’s emendation. 592 Hermias earlier seemed to distinguish between pterôtos and hupopteros (for this see the note at 131,10) and we have until now translated the latter ‘with lowered wings’ but he obviously doesn’t make that distinction here and in subsequent passages.

206

Notes to pp. 142–8

593 For this see 247B5. In his comment ad loc. (at 151,13 ff.) Hermias suggests that the agôn (singular there) should be interpreted consistently with the wrestling falls here. 594 Perhaps he has in mind 232C4 ff., but the criticism could better be levelled at Socrates’ speech (jealousy, 239A7 ff.; keeping the beloved in need, 239D8 ff.). 595 As Bernard says, it isn’t clear that these are the correct renderings of ekei and entautha. They may amount to ‘earlier’ and ‘in this passage’, although that would involve an odd use of ekei. 596 Following Bernard in emending psukhên to epithumian at 214,8. Plato is clearly referring to the wanton horses of the lover’s and the beloved’s souls, not to their respective souls or to the two horses of the lover’s soul. The surprising thing is that Hermias should even consider the last possibility. 597 For this cf. the note at 195,11. 598 ‘Physical kind’ and ‘physically’ in lines 19-20 both translate dia tôn sômatôn. 599 Hermias appears to think that erotic madness is itself the prize. Plato’s Greek could be construed that way, but he seems to mean that avoiding a trip to the underworld is the reward of those who have experienced erotic madness. 600 Either they will both grow wings at the same time (Yunis), or they will have matching plumage (Rowe and Hackforth), or their wings will be like those of the philosophical lovers (Ryan). Hermias seems to have in mind one of the first two interpretations. 601 As Bernard notes, Hermias harks back to the start of Socrates’ first speech (237A–B) in praise of the non-lover, not of the palinode that forms his second speech. 602 cf. Timaeus 27C1–3. 603 A somewhat loose quotation of Laws 715E7–8. 604 We normally translate Erôs ‘Love’ but ‘Lord Love’ somehow doesn’t work. 605 The erotic is hê erôtikê and friendship, hê philia and they are brought together in the phrase ô phile Erôs, which occurs in the lemma. However (1) agei eis tauton (‘he is bringing together’) could also be translated ‘is identifying’, ‘is equating’ (as we translated it at 209,7-8, where the same phrase is used in a different context), and (2) ‘like-mindedness’ (homonoia) in the next clause seems to look back to ‘unity’ (henôsin) rather than to erôtikên. 606 Philebus 12C1-3. Also quoted, and more accurately, in a similar context at 74,22-5. 607 Laws 727A3-4, and cf. 203,28. 608 ‘Grates’ renders apênes (literally ‘rough’, ‘hard’), the reading of the manuscripts of Plato. The OCT edition emends this to apêkhes on the strength of Hermias’ gloss

Notes to pp. 148–9

207

in the next line, but, as de Vries 1969 points out, there is no reason to think that Hermias read apêkhes in Plato, rather the contrary in fact, and we have assumed that he read apênes. 609 Or perhaps ‘out of tune with your name’. 610 In the Phaedrus it’s Phaedrus’ life.

208

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Westerink, L. G. (1962), Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, Amsterdam: North-Holland. Yunis, Harvey (2011), Plato: Phaedrus, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (cited as Yunis) Zeller, Eduard (1863), Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung: Die Nachsaristotelische Philosophie, 3 vols in 5 (vol. 3.2), Leipzig: Fues. Zeyl, Donald (1997) (tr.), ‘Timaeus’, in John Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works, Indianapolis: Hacket, 1224–91.

English–Greek Glossary accord service: therapeuein account: logos acquired: epiktêtos act: energein active: energos active, be: energein activity: energeia actualisation: energeia affection: philia air: aêr allegorical exegesis: theôria animal: zôion animate: psukhoun animation: empsukhia apparent: phainomenos appear: phainesthai argument: logos, sullogismos art: tekhnê ascent: anagôgê, anodos association: koinônia attached, be: exaptesthai banquet: thoinê base: kakos bear down: hupopherein beautiful: kalos beautiful-itself, the: to autokalon beauty: kallonê, kallos, to kalon beauty-itself: autokallos beginning: arkhê being: to on, ousia beloved, the: ho erômenos beneath the heaven: hupouranios best: aristos beyond the heaven: huperouranios bird: to ptênon birth: genesis blessed: eudaimôn, makarios bodily: sômatikos, sômatoeidês body: sôma body-itself: autosôma bond: desmos boyfriend: paidika bring down: katagein bring into existence: paragein

call: prosagoreuein captured, be: haliskesthai care (n.): epimeleia care for: epimeleisthai carry around: periagein case: ptôsis cause: aitia, aition, aitios characterise: kharaktêrizein charioteer: hêniokhos choice: hairesis choir: khoros choose: hairein chorus: khoros circle: kuklos circuit: periodos citizen: ho politikos city: polis class: genos cleanse: kathairein cleansing (n.): katharsis colourless: akhrômatos column: sustoikhia common: koinos complete (v.): plêroun, sumplêroun completion: sumplêrôsis component: plêrôma compose: sumplêroun concept: logos concern (n.): epimeleia consider: theôrein construction: sustasis contemplate: theasthai, theôrein contemplation: theôria conventional: orthodoxastikos corporeal: sômatikos, sômatoeidês cosmic: kosmikos cosmic order: diakosmos cosmos: kosmos create: dêmiourgein creative act: poiêsis cube number: kubos cycle: periodos daemon: daimôn daemonic: daimonios

215

216

English–Greek Glossary

death: thanatos decree: thesmos definition: horismos Demiurge: dêmiourgos demiurgic: dêmiourgikos dependent, be: exaptesthai descend: katienai descent: kathodos desire (n.): epithumia, ephesis, himeros desire (v.): ephiesthai desiring part: to epithumêtikon destroy: phtheirein destruction: phthora difference: diaphora different: diaphoros differentia: diaphora direct apprehension: epibolê discourse: logos discursive: dianoêtikos discursive thought: dianoia divide: diairein divination: mantosunê divine: theios divine inspiration: enthousiasis divinity: theotês division: diairesis downfall: ptôsis downwards-leading: katagôgos dyad: duas eager, be: ephiesthai earth: gê earthborn: gêgenês educate: paideuein element: stoikheion elevate: anagein elevating: anagôgos emanate: proïenai embrace: periballein, periekhein encosmic: enkosmios end (n.): peras end (n.): telos engender: gennan enmattered: enulos ensconce: enidruein ensconcement: enidrusis ensoul: psukhoun ensouled: empsukhos envy: phthonos erotic: erôtikos erotic person: ho erôtikos essence: ousia essence-creating: ousiopoios essential: ousiôdês

establish: hedrazein eternal: aiônios ether: aithêr everlasting: aïdios evil (adj.): kakos evil (n.): to kakon exercise providential care: pronoein exercising providential care: pronoêtikos existence: to on expanse: diastêma expiation: katharmos extension: diastasis eye: opsis fall: ptôsis falling away: apoptôsis fate: heimarmenê feathered: pterôtos fill: plêroun fine: kalos fire: pur firmament: stereôma follow: hepesthai form: eidos form, Form: idea form part of: sumplêroun fortune: tukhê fount: pêgê framing: sustasis friendship: philia from eternity: ex aïdiou full stop: hê teleia furnish with wings: pteroun generation: genesis generative: genesiourgos genus: genos goal: telos god: theos godlike: theoeidês good: agathos good man: ho spoudaios goodness: agathotês govern: epitropeuein gratify: kharizesthai guardian: phrourêtikos happiness: eudaimonia, to eudaimon happy: eudaimôn having the role of preserving: sôstikos health-itself: autoügieia heaven: ouranos heavenly: ouranios hero: hêrôs

English–Greek Glossary heroic: hêrôikos holy: hieros honour (n.): timê honour (v.): timan host: stratia human (adj.): anthrôpeios, anthrôpikos, anthrôpinos human (being): anthrôpos hypercosmic: huperkosmios illumination: ellampsis image: agalma, eidôlon, eikôn, indalma imitate: mimeisthai immaterial: aülos immobile: akinêtos immobility: akinêsia immortality: athanasia, to athanaton imperishable: aphthartos in a unified manner: heniaiôs inborn: sumphutos incorporeal: asômatos incorruptible: adiaphthoros individual: merikos infect: anapimplanai infer: sullogizesthai inferior: katadeesteros initiation: muêsis innate: sumphuês inspiration: enthousiasmos inspired: entheos, enthousiastikos, katokhos inspired, be: enthousian intangible: anaphês intellect: nous intellection: noêsis intellective: noeros intellectual: noeros interpret: exêgeisthai interpretation: exêgêsis invisible: aphanês irradiate: ellampein irrational: alogos irrational part: alogia, to alogon judge (n.): dikastês justice: dikaiosunê, to dikaion, dikê justice-itself: autodikaiosunê keep safe: sôzein kind: eidos, genos kindle: ellampein, epilampein king: basileus knowledge: epistêmê

language: lexis later-generated: husterogenês law: nomos lead (v.): hêgeisthai lead down: katagein lead up: anagein leader: hêgemôn liberated: apolutos licentious: akolastos licentiousness: akolasia life: bios, zôê life-producing: zôogonos light: phôs light-itself: autophôs liken: apeikazein likeness: eidôlon, eikôn, homoiotês limit: metron, peras live (v.): zên living being: zôion long for: ephiesthai longing: himeros lord, Lord: despotês love (n.): philia, erôs love (v.): eran loveliness: kallonê lover: ho erôn, erastês lower: katadeesteros lunar: selêniakos madness: mania maleficent: kakopoios man: anêr mantic: mantikos mark: sêmeion marshal (v.): kosmein material: hulê matter: hulê meadow: leimôn measure (n.): metron memory: mnêmê metaphor: metaphora metrical: emmetros military: stratiôtikos mimic: mimeisthai mind: dianoia mode: idiôma moderation: sôphrosunê moderation-itself: autosôphrosunê moisten: ardein monad: monas moon: selênê more allegorically: theôrêtikôteron mortal: thnêtos motion: kinêsis

217

218 move: kinein movement: kinêsis multi-powered: poludunamos multitude: plêthos mysteries: ta mustêria myth: muthos name: onoma narthex-bearer: narthêkophoros natural: phusikos nature: phusis nectar: nektar noble: kalos noetic: noêtikos non-rational: alogos nourish: trephein number: arithmos, plêthos objective: skopos one, One: to hen oneness: to heniaion operate: energein ophthalmia: ophthalmia opinion: doxa oracle: logion order (n.): diakosmos, taxis order (v.): diakosmein ordinance: nomos, thesmos organ of sight: to horatikon origin: arkhê other-moved: heterokinêtos overflowing: huperplêrês own manner: idiôma oyster-like: ostreôdês pain: lupê part: meros, morion partake of: metekhein participate in: metekhein participation: methexis particular: merikos particular character, nature: idiotês perceptible: aisthêtos perfect (n.): teleios perfect (v.): teleioun perfection: teleiotês, to teleion perish: phtheiresthai perpetually moved: aeikinêtos perversion: apoptôsis phenomenal: phainomenos philosopher: philosophos philosophical: philosophos philosophy: philosophia

English–Greek Glossary physical: phusikos place: topos place of punishment: dikaiôtêrion pleasure: hêdonê plenitude: to huperplêres plurality: plêthos pneuma: pneuma poet: poiêtês poetic: poiêtikos poetic art: hê poiêtikê poetry: poiêsis political: politikos politician: ho politikos portion: moira possessed: katokhos possession: katokôkhê power: dunamis powerlessness: adunamia pray: eukhesthai prayer: eukhê premiss: protasis preserve: sôzein principle: arkhê privation: sterêsis proceed: proïenai procession: proödos produce: paragein, proballein project: proballein prophetic: mantikos proposition: protasis protective: phrourêtikos providence: pronoia providential care: pronoia prudence: sôphrosunê prudent: sôphrôn psychic: psukhikos pure: akêratos, katharos purificatory rite: katharsion purifying (adj.): kathartikos purity: to akhranton qualitative change: alloiôsis race: genos radiate: epilampein range: platos rank: taxis rational: logikos reason: aitia, aition, logos recently initiated: neotelês reciprocal love: anterôs reciprocated love: anterôs recollect: anamimnêiskesthai recollection: anamnêsis

English–Greek Glossary reflection: eidôlon, indalma reflective: eidôlikos regulate: diakosmein relation: skhesis relationship: skhesis reminded, be: anamimnêiskesthai repletion: plêrôsis responsible: aitios restorative: apokatastatikos restore: apokathistanai return: hupostrephein reversion: epistrophê revert: epistrephein, hupostrephein revolution: periphora, periodos right: orthos rite: teletê ruler: arkhôn sacred precinct: hieron salvation: sôtêria sameness: tautotês sameness-itself: autoomoiotês secret: aporrêtos see: theasthai, theôrein self-moved: autokinêtos self-movement: autokinêsia send up: anapempein sense: aisthêsis sense perception: aisthêsis sensible: aisthêtos sensible sphere, world: to aisthêton sensible thing: to aisthêton sensual: empathês separation: krisis service: therapeia settle: hedrazein shape: morphê, skhêma shapeless: askhêmatistos shed wings: pterorruein shedding of wings: pterorruêsis sight: opsis, thea, theama sign: sêmeion similarity: homoiotês simple: haplous simplicity: haplotês society: politeia solar: hêliakos solid: stereos soul: psukhê soul, of: psukhikos soulless: apsukhos source: pêgê species: eidos spectacle: theôria

speech: logos sphere: sphaira spirit: thumos spirited: thumikos spirited part: thumos spring: pêgê sprout wings: pterophuein sprouting of wings: pterophuêsis statesman: ho politikos steer: kubernan steersman: kubernêtês struggle: agôn style: kharaktêr sublunar: huposelênos substance: huparxis, ousia suitability: epitêdeiotês sun: hêlios sun, of the: hêliakos surface: to phainomenon surround: periekhein syllogise: sullogizesthai syllogism: sullogismos symbol: sumbolon symbolically: sumbolikôs sympathy: sumpatheia teach: didaskein teacher: didaskalos telestic: telestikos temperance: sôphrosunê temperate: sôphrôn term: onoma tetrad: tetras text: lexis theologian: theologos theology: theologia theory: theôria thought: dianoêma, dianoia time: khronos trace: indalma train: paideuein transcendent: exêirêmenos triad: trias troupe: khoros true: alêthês, orthos truth: alêtheia, to alêthes turn to: epistrephein ungenerated: agenêtos unharmed: ablabês unified: heniaios union: henôsis, sunaphê united, be: henousthai unity: henôsis, to hênômenon

219

220 universal (adj.): holikos universal (n.): to holon universe: ta hola, to pan unmoved: akinêtos upright: orthos vehicle: okhêma verbal: prophorikos view (v.): theasthai, theôrein viewing: thea virtue: aretê visible: theatos visible object: to horaton vision: thea warm (v.): thermainein warmth: thermotês

English–Greek Glossary water (v.): ardein way of life: zôê whole (adj.): holos, holikos whole (n.): holotês, to holon wholeness: holotês wind: pneuma wing (n.): pteron, pterux wing (v.): pteroun winged: hupopteros, ptênos, pterôtos wings, with lowered: hupopteros wise: sophos without being initiated: atelestos word: lexis, logos, onoma worship: therapeuein zodiacal sign: zôidion

Greek–English Index References are to the page and line numbers of the Greek text (indicated in the margins of the translation). ablabês, unharmed, 170,3.8 adêmonein, be in turmoil, 194,5.10.14.17 adiaphthoros, incorruptible, 192,24; 198,32 adiastrophôs, without distortion, 129,24 adikein, wrong, 198,20.22.23 adoios, reverent, 161,12 adunamia, powerlessness, 170,25.27 aduton, sanctuary, 169,7; 183,24 aeikinêtos, perpetually moved, 126,21.24 aêr, air, 133,11; 161,27; 166,14; 185,17; 186,28; 211,7 agalma, image, 148,3.15; 189,2.5.34; 190,1.3; 199,4.5; 200,8; 208,23 agathos, good, 124,31; 127,21.22.27–9, etc. agathotês, goodness, 140,10; 150,15; 208,29; 217,17 agein, guide, 141,28; 218,12; bring, 173,14; 174,17; 206,14; 215,23; lead, 182,6; make, 191,16; reduce, 209,8 agenêtos, ungenerated, 125,32 agisteia, rite, 198,26 agnôsia, ignorance, 137,10 agôn, struggle, 151,11.15; 207,13.19; 213,13 agônistikos, connected with games, 175,5 aïdios, everlasting, 125,28.29.32; 136,27.34; 148,11.14; ex aïdiou, from eternity, 137,33; 138,4.8.26.28 ainittesthai, hint at, 153,29; 156,3; intimate, 176,22; tacitly direct, 213,21 aiônios, eternal, 130,28 airein, raise, 164,20.21; 165,9; 167,17 aiskhros, base, 134,23; ugly, 141,2.8; shameful, 211,30; 212,4.7.9.12.16.26; 214,4.9 aiskhrotês, shameful conduct, 222,3 aiskhunein, embarrass, 123,27; aiskhunesthai, experience, feel, shame, 123,21.26; 189,11 aisthêsis, (sense-) perception, 125,22; 158,16; 167,12; 184,19; 205,29.30; sense-impression, 129,28; sense,

137,10; 149,10; 182,24; 184,23; 186,16; 187,23–5.30; 188,3; 205,29 aisthêtos, perceptible, 149,7.20; 187,20–2; 207,6; 213,2; sensible, 181,29; 185,7.17; 188,27.31.32; 189,14.17; 208,4; 212,5; to aisthêton, object of sense, 129,22.25; sense-object, 129,28; sensible thing, 159,10; 167,24.25; 179,22; 189,31; 207,8.17.21; 208,6.16; 211,3; 212,6; 213,4.28; 214,5.10.25; things perceived by the senses, 183,2; sensible sphere, world, 134,17; 159,8; 205,21; 207,15 aithêr, ether, 144,15; 155,12 aitia, cause, 124,16.17.29; 125,9; 133,30; 138,16.17; 142,7; 147,32.33; 155,22; 183,22.23; 186,24; reason, 127,33.35; 128,2; 137,30; 161,21; 211,6; explanation, 216,13 aitiasthai, blame, 165,32; 166,2.3 aitiologia, assigning causes, 140,13 aition, cause, 126,2.24; 127,27.28; 135,3; 136,15; 140,20.21; 142,30.32; 145,14.15; 147,29–31; 161,5; 163,22; 192,17; 211,19; reason, 170,25; 171,3 aitios, a, the, cause, 126,22; 138,15.24; 142,32; 146,32; 156,10; 183,16; responsible, 136,4; 141,21; 156,4.8.19; 167,1; 217,29 akêratos, pure, 128,20.21; 157,13; 159,23.24; uncontaminated, 159,22 akhranton, to, purity, 145,23 akhrômatos, colourless, 154,24.25; 155,16.18.19; 156,22; 158,18; 164,10 akhronôs, outside of time, 160,16; instantaneously, 187,29 akinêsia, immobility, 146,26 akinêtos, unmoved, 126,25.28.31; immobile, 142,3–5; motionless, 148,9; to akinêton, immobility, 141,29 akolasia, licentiousness, 188,21; 205,11

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akolastos, licentious, 165,31; 171,2; 205,16; 211,31; 212,10; 213,1 alêtheia, truth, 140,13.19; 153,6.18.27–9; 157,18.20; 158,1; 159,1–3.9; 161,5; 167,26; 173,13; 178,27; 185,11 alêthês, true, 132,3; 156,25; 157,19; 158,4.22; 180,17; 208,32; 216,13; real, 215,5; to alêthes, truth, 132,12; 142,15; 153,9.17.20–3; 218,17 alêthinos, genuine, 173,7; 205,5 alêthôs, truly, 173,2.6; 176,26; 215,4 alloiôsis, qualitative change, 140,29 alogia, irrational part, 205,7.11 alogos, irrational, 128,16; 130,26.27; 178,7.26; 188,25; 203,5.7; 208,9; non-rational, 150,9; 158,16; 166,17; to alogon, irrationality, 205,9; irrational part, 205,13; 212,1 alutos, indissoluble, 137,31 ambrosia, ambrosia, 163,15.18.20.21.34 ameristos, indivisible, 128,14.17 amudros, indistinct, 162,10; 185,17; 200,3 anagein, elevate, 139,4; 146,11.12; 176,6, etc.; lead up(wards), 141,23; 144,10; 146,6.28.31.2, etc.; raise up, 139,28; 166,29; refer back, 197,28.30 anagôgê, ascent, 141,21; 146,23; 174,7; 185,15; 188,14; 191,3; 192,4; 198,17; 199,29; 208,10; 209,9; 211,17; 214,10.28; 215,24 anagôgos, elevating, 129,20; 131,11.30; 133,26; 134,7.29; 138,31; 139,3; 168,4; 174,21; 190,18.29; 191,12; 193,16; 205,5.28; to elevate, 138,27; 191,17; that elevate, 163,16; 205,15; to ascend, 167,14; 191,22; of ascent, 191,19; uplifting, 215,7 analogein, be analogous to, 162,1; 163,23; 174,12; 185,6; 187,30; 188,11; 202,30; 203,3; correspond to, 186,14; be equivalent to, 163,21; relate to, 174,9 analogia, resemblance, 168,10; kat’ analogian, in a manner that resembles, 142,15; analogous, 184,27 analogos, analogous, 127,1; 129,1.4.6; that resembles, 142,14; proportionate to, 177,6; an analogue of, 203,1 anamimnêiskein, remind, 207,24; prompt [to recollection], 185,18; anamimnêiskesthai, recollect, 174,7; 179,4.14; 182,4; 183,20.23.27; 184,6; 190,21.22; 191,28; 199,7; experience recollection, 182,27; be reminded, 179,19.22; 180,12.15; 181,29; 182,1; 187,10; 189,1; 208,31

anamnêsis, recollection, 182,1.24; 184,20; 185,18; 187,9; 189,18; 190,6.26; 192,8; 200,8; 205,29; 206,14.19; reminder, 188,2 anapempein, send up, 138,21; 175,20; 179,19; 188,27; trace back, 199,8 anaphês, intangible, 156,13; 158,19; 164,11 anapimplanai, infect, 137,9; 209,4; 210,26; sully, 203,31 anapodrastos, ineluctable, 169,2 andreios, brave, 209,25 anêr, man, 142,18; 154,7; 168,18, etc. angelikos, angelic, 131,7 angelos, angel, 143,16; 159,28 anienai, ascend, 135,5; 151,17; 152,28; 176,30 anisotês, inequality, 134,12 anodos, ascent, 129,8; 147,8.25.33; 152,21; 180,14; 181,23; 182,27.29; 191,1; 216,4 anoêtos, foolish, 141,4 anomoios, unlike, 209,22 anomoiôs, with dissimilarities, 173,4.6.10 anomoiotês, dissimilarity, 174,22.24 anosios, irreverent, 153,23 anteran, feel reciprocal love, 210,28 anterôs, reciprocated, reciprocal, love, 200,24; 208,19.20; 210,12.14.21; 211,18.19.21; 217,12.24 anthrôpeios, human, 131,21 anthrôpikos, human, 153,6; 177,25 anthrôpinos, human, 128,10; 132,22; 133,2; 140,14; 153,21; 164,3; 170,6; 173,32; 178,21; 183,6; 186,5; 189,7.22.27; 191,14; 194,25; 195,19; 215,5 anthrôpos, human, human being, man, 123,23.24; 130,33; 134,2, etc. antidiairein, distinguish, 142,21 antitupos, intractable, 189,29; opposite, 204,14 antron, cave, 169,2.5.13 aoristos, indefinite, 133,7; 154,11; 164,5; undefined, 133,27; unbounded, 204,12; 209,25; to aoriston, indefiniteness, 133,17; 164,5 aoristôs, without specification, 132,23 apatê, deceit, 173,20 apeikazein, represent, 129,17; liken, 147,8; 167,11; 183,24; 193,19; 197,26; model on, 172,29; be alike, 182,32 apeiros, limitless, 126,3; innumerable, 171,19; unlimited, 204,12; 209,25 aphanês, unseen, 144,9; invisible, 155,7; 161,20; 203,22.23

Greek–English Index aphilosophos, unphilosophical, 212,2; 213,26 aphistanai, (transitive forms), distance, 140,31; (intransitive forms), depart, 133,32; 171,6; keep, be, away, 140,33; 171,1; part from, 170,30; leave off, 168,15; be separated, 217,15; stand, be, aloof, 141,24; 206,23; 208,6; withdraw, 184,5; 193,14; 202,23; (be) absent, 195,16; 208,17; retreat, 206,20 aphorizein, define, 144,24 aphthartos, imperishable, 125,32 aphthonon, to, freedom from envy, 150,17 aphthonôs, without envy, 218,2 aplanês, fixed, 141,27.28; 146,9.10 apodeiknuein, demonstrate, 123,14 apodeiktikos, demonstrative, 125,11 apogennan, produce, 144,20 apokatastatikos, restorative, 176,7.9 apokathistanai, return, 129,19; restore, 175,21; 176,27.28; 177,2.10.11.17.19; reinstate, 176,5.12.25 apokruptein, hide, 196,20 apokuiskesthai, be born, 143,6 apolauein, benefit, 146,3; 157,9; 209,18; 210,13 apolausis, enjoyment, 150,23 Apollôniakos, Apollonian, 175,3 apollunai, lose, 131,23; 167,14.15; destroy, 142,6; 167,13 apolutos, liberated, 145,24.25; 195,22 apomerismos, fragmentation, 202,10 apomerizein, separate, 182,11 apoplêrôsis, fulfilment, 150,22 apoplêroun, satisfy, 194,16 apoptôsis, falling away, 136,2; 190,10; 199,1; perversion, 188,20; 189,13; 198,14.21; declension, 205,6; kata apoptôsin, perversely, 201,21 aporein, be at a loss, 210,31; 211,1 aporia, puzzle, 165,34 aporon, to, difficulty, 178,15.20 aporrêtos, secret, 196,20 aporrêtôs, esoterically, 153,27 apostasis, departure, 133,30; emanation, 144,8; turning away, 198,18; separation, 217,14 apsukhos, soulless, 124,2.5.13.15.18.26.28; 135,26 ardein, moisten, 190,12.29; water, 192,7.11; 193,12.13; 195,1; 210,29; 216,7; irrigate, 192,30 aretê, virtue, 129,23; 173,18; 199,9; 202,25; 205,8; 213,8.18.21.22; 216,3

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aristos, best, 164,24; 168,1; 174,35; 182,9.17; 189,20; 201,17; 216,1.2; of the highest quality, 173,16 arithmêtikos, arithmetical, 176,31 arithmêtikôs, arithmetically, 145,5.10 arithmos, number, 127,2; 132,20; 133,20.21.28, etc. arkhê, outset, 123,13; source, 124,3.11; principle, 125,33; 126,29; 136,25, 154,13.15, etc.; origin, 133,31; 137,25; 142,32, etc.; beginning, 146,31; 147,2.30; 155,22, etc.; starting point, start, 200,8; 201,11; 214,28; rule, 165,30 arkhein, preside, 161,30; arkhon, ruling element, 134,3; arkhesthai, begin, 136,23.24; 165,23; 184,8; 190,12.22.29; 191,11; 199,22; 206,2; 207,15; 215,11.17; start, start out, 174,2; 193,16; 201,10; 215,11; originate, 187,21.22 arkhikos, royal by nature, 174,15; fit to rule, 199,15; ruling, 202,30; to arkhikon, sovereignty, 145,31 arkhôn, ruler, 133,15.32; 134,1–3; 135,12; 167,3; 184,28 arrên, male, 143,18.20.23 askhêmatistos, shapeless, 154,24; 155,20; 158,19; 164,10 asômatos, incorporeal, 125,18; 139,6; 188,4 astêr, star, 160,6 astrôios, of stars, 136,16; 138,4; 179,29 astron, star, 137,30; 170,16; 185,30 astronomia, astronomy, 199,31 ataktôs, in a disorderly fashion, 203,4 atelestos, without being initiated, 167,22 athanasia, immortality, 125,24.26.27; 126,17.32; 128,32; 129,1.4.7; 135,15; 163,20; 181,23; 182,5 athanatos, immortal, 123,11.13.15; 124,9, etc.; to athanaton, immortality, 125,27.34 atheon, to, godlessness, 167,19 athlon, struggle, 151,18; prize, 214,23 athroos, concentrated, 126,20; 127,6; massed together, 149,25; collective, 150,23 athroôs, all at once, 152,10.12.14 atomos, individual, 160,32; 170,8 auainein, dry up, dry out, 192,12; 193,16; wither, 193,12 augê, light, 186,27.28 augoeidês, luminous, 151,7 aukhmos, parching, 193,11 aülos, immaterial, 126,8; 136,28; 179,18

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autodikaiosunê, justice-itself, 160,23; 174,18; 185,3 autokallos, beauty-itself, 185,18.19 autokalon, to, the beautiful-itself, 183,17; 185,20; 206,2.30 autokinêsia, self-movement, 125,8.33; 128,32; 129,1.4.6; 137,5.6 autokinêtos, self-moved, 124,1.4; 125,7.15.19; 126,21; to autokinêton, the self-moved, 123,13.14.16; 126,23.28.29; self-movement, 123,20; 125,20; 129,7 autoomoiotês, sameness-itself, 174,22 autophôs, light-itself, 133,10 autosôma, body-itself, 174,20 autosôphrosunê, moderation-itself, 160,23 autoügieia, health-itself, 174,20 auxanein, strengthen, 140,32; grow, 142,6; 191,16; 192,30 auxêsis, increase, 173,30 axierastos, worthy of love, 217,8 azôia, absence of life, 137,8 basileia, realm, 152,2.3.5.23; 155,20; royal office, 200,18; royal sway, 200,22 basileus,king, 159,7.8; 173,8; 174,9.10.34 basilikos, kingly, 171,29; 172,15; 199,16; royal, 175,2; regal, 200,17.18; 203,19; 204,17; to basilikon, royalty, 203,19 bathmos, degree, 176,32; level, 180,3 bia, force, 166,6.11; 173,20 bios, life, 151,22; 159,17; 163,10; 165,20, etc. blabê, harm, 159,22 boulêsis, will, 165,22.24 daimôn, daemon, 142,13; 144,11; 146,7, etc. daimonios, daemonic, 131,8; 143,17; 177,25 dais, feast, 150,20–2; 216,7 deiknuein, show, 124,1; 138,23; 178,29, etc.; prove, 125,4; display, 155,7; 161,20 dêmiourgein, create, 145,11; 146,15.16; 169,15 dêmiourgia, creation, 156,14.18; 175,6; creating, 146,17; creative activity, 161,30 dêmiourgikos, demiurgic, 142,26; 143,21; 147,34; 179,14.16; of the craftsman, 173,10.14 dêmiourgos, Demiurge, 128,11; 130,29; 138,26; 142,17.20.21; 161,28; 185,29; 197,8 dêmokopikos, of the demagogue, 173,17 dêmokopos, demagogue, 173,18

desmos, bond, 137,30; 188,13; 195.23; chain, 171,6 despotês, ruler, 148,23; Lord, lord, 175,6; 185,6.8.9; 197,28; 199,14; 200,12; 215,22; 218,10 diairein, divide, 130,4; 143,17; 146,21, etc.; separate, 162,7; 174,13; distribute, 142,15 diairesis, division, 130,12; 135,10; 147,16.28; 172,6; 181,7; 197,29 diairetikos, of division, 197,28 diakosmein, order, 146,15; regulate, 174,11 diakosmos, order, 144,14.18; cosmic order, 202,5 diakrinein, distinguish, 156,16; 209,19; sort out, 165,25; separate, 177,24.29.34; decide, 217,8 diakrisis, separation, 135,1 dialektikos, dialectical, 125,8 dianoêma, thought, 158,7 dianoêtikos, discursive, 130,6.13.20; of discursive thought, 131,2 dianoêtikôs, through discursive thinking, 157,15 dianoêtos, apprehended by the mind, 183,3.4 dianoia, discursive thought, 130,7.15.16.19.22; thought, 140,14; 157,13.15; 159,15.17.18.20.26; 163,2.8; 179,21; mind, 158,7; 166,25; 199,7; understanding, 173,32; têi dianoiâi, mentally, 179,1.7 diaphora, differentia, 125,14; difference, 164,22; 170,6; 171,26 diaphoros, different, 128,8; 196,8.9; 198,7; varying, 132,20 diaphtheirein, corrupt, 188,26; 198,32 diastasis, extension, 127,2.7 diastêma, expanse, 158,6; 187,31 diastrephein, warp, 130,34 diastrophos, warped, 130,34; 138,1; perverted, 173,19 diastrophôs, in a distorted manner, 129,31; warped, 137,26 didaskalos, teacher, 170,32.33; 171,1; 173,17; 194,15; 212,29 didaskein, teach, 156,4.7; 206,28; 213,1; 217,7.12 diexodikôs, discursively, 152,9.13 diexodos, discursion, 149,27.29; 152,24; route, 169,29; excursion, 180,13; outlet, 193,17; 194,1 diios, of Zeus, 131,5; 142,27; 147,13; 168,26; Zeusian, 131,5; 142,27;

Greek–English Index 143,8.11; 145,7; 174,34; 186,2; 197,19.21; 199,17 dikaion, to, justice, 174,19 dikaiôs, justly, 151,3; 175,18; with justice, 179,20 dikaiosunê, justice, 160,18–161,13; 162,8; 184,10–185,3; 188,6 dikaiôtêrion, place of punishment, 177,30; 178,2; 214,27 dikastês, judge, 136,9; 177,28 dikê, justice, 178,3 doxa, opinion, 129,25.29; 130,7.19.22.31.33; 158,16; belief, 149,20 doxastikos, opinionative, 130,6.14.16.21; of opinion, 130,35; to doxastikon, judging faculty, 163,7.11 doxastos, conjectured, 158,16; of opinion, 167,23; to doxaston, object of opinion, 129,22 duadikôs, dyadically, 174,27 duas, dyad, 133,30; 144,15; 145,8; 202,22; kata duada, in pairs, 143,19 dunamis, power, 127,11–135,16; 138,27– 139,27, etc.; means, 215,24; ability, 215,27; capacity, 205,30; force, 207,27; kata dunamin, as possible, 179,30; dunamei, in terms of its impact, 187,13.15 dunamoun, empower, 147,27 eidôlikos, reflective, 173,1 eidôlon, likeness, 184,2; image, 190,27; 192,10.21; 199,25; 215,5; reflection, 211,17 eidos, form, 123,24; 126,8.9.13; 132,13, etc.; kind, 130,27; 131,4; 175,28; 186,1; type, 130,30; 171,27; species, 131,7.8; 134,13; style, 171,30; 172,1; sense, 177,5 eikôn, representative, 165,13; likeness, 179,4.13; image, 185,1; 190,2 eklegesthai, choose, 197,17; make a choice, 201,8 eklogê, choice, 197,18 ekplêttein, astound, 184,5; astonish, 210,7 ellampein, irradiate, 136,32; kindle, 159,3.9.12 ellampsis, illumination, 162,29; 179,31; 198,2; 211,10; 217,3.5 emmetros, metrical, 196,22.24 empathês, sensual, 165,16.24 empathôs, in an emotional manner, 176,28 empsukhia, animation, 124,10; 128,16 empsukhos, ensouled, 124,5.7.16.21 energeia, activity, 127,11–19; 128,34;

225

132,1, etc.; actualisation, 131,24–6; energeiâi, active, 158,29 energein, be active, 127,13; 132,26; 134,21; 135,2; 140,32; 152,18; 160,14; 165,3; 166,16; 198,17; 205,27; operate, 130,23; 132,13; 165,7; be in use, 131,22; act, 132,28; 152,20; 160,16; 186,10; 218,13; engage in activity, 152,31; activate, 208,12 energos, active, 131,26.30; 183,19; energising, 190,22 enidruein, locate, 132,1; ensconce, 136,15; 147,26; 163,15.18.21.34; 182,9; 183,1; 186,18; establish, 146,14 enidrusis, ensconcement, 147,32; 163,22; 186,12; foundation, 215,20 enkosmios, encosmic, 138,22; 139,31; 143,16; 150,2; 156,10; 168,25.27; 175,7; 179,28.32; within the cosmos, 159,23 entheos, inspired, 127,32.33; 153,10; 210,9 enthousian, be (divinely) inspired, 132,11; 159,1; 180,17; 187,8; 191,24; 194,7; 200,12; 217,1; be under divine inspiration, 127,33 enthousiasis, divine inspiration, 182,16 enthousiasmos, inspiration, 180,15.19 enthousiastikos, inspired, 172,25 enulos, enmattered, 136,27; 158,5; 179,11.22; 192,22; 203,33; 212,6 epainein, praise, 153,25; 215,7 ephesis, desire, 165,23; 191,21.23; 196,6 ephiesthai, long (for), 130,11.16.17; 149,3; 167,30; 191,28; 194,6; desire, 131,14.6.29; 165,25; 166,7.26; 183,15; 191,30; 208,5; be desirous, 165,21; be eager, 182,30.32 epibolê, point of view, 131,13; viewpoint, 172,7; direct apprehension, 140,15.16; insight, 142,18; notion, 146,17 epikourikos, guardian, 203,4 epiktêtos, acquired, 138,7 epilampein, kindle, 159,12; radiate, 216,25 epimeleia, concern, 168,21; care, 195,15; poeisthai epimeleian, care for, 136,5 epimeleisthai, have, take, care of, care for, 135,26.28; 139,26; 142,1; 146,15; 172,21; manage, 173,15 epipedos, planar, 136,28.29 epipnoia, inspiration, 217,16 epistêmê, knowledge, 140,6.30; 156,26, etc. epistêmôn, wise, 153,24; sapient, 172,26; ho epistêmôn, person with knowledge, 188,18 epistrephein, turn (to), 141,22; 149,18; 165,14; 172,23; 184,14; revert, 143,2;

226

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146,30; 199,24.26; 200,5.22; 205,19; give attention to, 195,14 epistreptikos, responsible for reversion, 143,22; to epistreptikon, possibility of reversion, 140,5 epistrophê, reversion, 142,31; 200,4.10 epitêdeios, adapted, 146,4; suited, 150,29; ready, 166,9; 218,3 epitêdeiotês, suitability, 138,3 epitêdeuma, pursuit, 197,16.22; 212,29; enterprise, 199,21; study, 199,30 epithumein, desire, 193,24; 218,7; full of desire, 212,17 epithumêtikon, to, desiring part, 166,27; 184,31; 203,7; 207.26; 213,6.7; 214,2.3 epithumia, desire, 130,32; 163,9; 170,31, etc. epitropeuein, govern, 135,29; 141,23.32 eran, love, 194,14; 201,6; 206,2, etc.; ho erôn, the lover, 181,11; 183,11; 185,14, etc.; ho erômenos, the beloved, 208,19; 210,20; 211,11, etc. erastês, lover, 131,14; 183,10; 194,22, etc. erôs, love, 138,14.22.24; 163,3; 181,7, etc. erôtikos, erotic, 174,5; 181,15.24; 182,13.14.20.21, etc.; ho erôtikos, erotic person, 187,17; 188,8; 189,4, etc.; lover, 179,21 ethizein, habituate, 187,6 ethos, habit, 187,7; 212,29 êthos, êthê, (moral) character, 197,16.22; 203,13 etumologein, give the origin, 196,5 eudaimôn, blessed, 137,32; happy, 149,8; 150,1.2; 152,22; 166,1; 185,21.22.26; 201,14; to eudaimon, happiness, 149,11 eudaimonein, be happy, 160,3; 162,17; 185,27 eudaimonia, happiness, 150,3.4.9; 160,1; 162,9; 164,23; 181,26.28; 186,5; 198,30; 213,17 eukhê, prayer, 172,27; 215,17; 218,19.20 eukhesthai, pray, 148,13; 215,12.17; 217,22; 218,4; make a prayer, 218,16 euphrosunê, joy, 160,8; good cheer, 195,10 eusebeia, piety, 161,6 exairein, exclude, 145,6; 153,7; exêirêmenos, transcendent, 142,20.26.28; 143,8.24.29; 144,28; 145,1.32; 148,18; 159,6; 161,28; to exêirêmenon, transcendence, 145,31; kata to exêirêmenon, transcendentally, 199,15 exaptein, inflame, 218,9; exaptesthai, be dependent, 133,24; 142,2; 146,8; be

fastened to, 136,36; be attached, 142,4; 150,27; 151,1.31; 170,31 exêgeisthai, comment on, 132,24; interpret, 142,9; 187,12; 193,6; 198,25; explain, 207,30; be a leader, 141,21 exêgêsis, interpretation, 134,14; 198,14; 211,14; 212,23; exegesis, 198,21 gamos, marriage, 145,20; 148,22 gê, ground, 131,17; earth, 137,3.4; 141,12.29; 148,3–5.8, etc.; hupo gên, subterranean, 177,30; 178,2; 214,26 gêgenês, earthborn, 189,29; 210,30 gêinos, earthy, 137,1–3 genesiourgein, participate in generation, 206,7 genesiourgos, generative, 129,22; 130,1; 131,16, etc.; that has to do with generation, 191,3; 208,22; for generation, 206,14 genesis, generation, 130,17; 133,24.25; 135,18; 137,15, etc.; genesis, 135,22; birth, 171,13; 176,21; 192,15; 199,1; 215,8 genêtos, generated, 137,1 gennan, create, 137,33; generate, 145,23; bear, 192,16; engender, 199,8; 200,24; 210,14; 217,13; beget, 199,9 gennêma, offspring, 161,16; 199,8 gennêtikos, generative, 128,28 genos, genus, 125,14; 128,25; 129,11, etc.; kind, 128,13.20; 143,16, etc.; race, 134,2; 139,13; 150,1; 181,19; class, 150,12; 156,26; 158,23; sort, 159,24; nature, 185,3; order, 215,25 geôdês, earthy, 136,29 geômetrês, geometer, 128,30 geômetria, geometry, 199,31 gnôsis, knowledge, 137,9; 199,26; understanding, 140,5; 161,5 gnôstikos, capable of knowing, 125,19.21; able to know, 125,22; of knowledge, 158,17; cognitive, 205,30; to gnôstikon, cognitive aspect, 205,30 gonimos, generative, 143,5; productive, 168,7; fruitful, 199,9 gumnastikos, gymnastic, 172,19 gumnazein, exercise, 210,16 gunê, woman, 171,23 hagnos, holy, 206,30; 207,1 hairein, grasp, 152,9.11; select, 172,2; choose, 174,4.8; 176,6; 178,13; capture, 201,17; 205,2

Greek–English Index hairesis, choice, 169,29; 171,19; 173,28; 178,9; course, 214,9 hairetos, to be chosen, 184,19 haliskesthai, be captured, 201,9.16; 205,2; 208,18.19 haplotês, simplicity, 140,16 haplous, simple, 126,8; 140,14.21.22.25; 152,4; uncompounded, 147,19; univocal, 181,12; unalloyed, 182,7; to haploun, simplicity, 140,20; 218,17 harmonia, harmony, 218,10 harmonikos, harmonic, 132,15 harmozein, be appropriate, 132,3; fit, 136,13; 149,28; 211,14; suit, 188,25; join, 216,28 Hêbê, Hebe, 163,29 hêdonê, pleasure, 189,5.6; 192,6.20; 194,17; 195,9; 214,9; 216,17 hedrazein, establish, 146,32; 147,2; 197,27; settle, 147,14; 174,9 hêgeisthai, lead, 134,7; 147,27; 148,16; 149,2.11 hêgemôn, leader, 141,14; 143,14.15, etc. hêgemonikos, leaderly, 197,14; 199,13–15; leadership, 143,13; authoritative, 202,30 hêliakos, of the sun, 131,4; 198,6.9; solar, 131,5; 170,15; 186,2 hêliakôs, in a solar manner, 136,6.13; 150,6 hêlios, sun, 133,10.11.13.21.22; 136,6, etc.; Helios, 185,6.9 hen, to, one, One, 126,11–127,7; 128,32; 145,27; 156,28–157,16; 158,21–159,4 heniaios, unified, 152,2.5; to heniaion, oneness, 147,4 heniaiôs, in a unified form, manner, 126,20; 127,6; 129,3; 147,21; 158,1.3; 165,2; 168,27 hêniokhos, charioteer, 126,20–135,9; 139,8; 157,7.10; 163,3; 164,19; 165,1; 167,1.4; 175,8; 202,16.17.20; 205,1; 206,3.16; 207,15.28; 208,9; 213,7; 214,2 henôsis, union, 130,10; 186,12; 198,2; 200,23; 202,23; 210,28; 218,10.12; unity, 134,30; 174,12; 215,22; unification, 200,4; kata henôsin, in a unified manner, 218,13 henousthai, be united, 154,22; 200,5; 211,24; 192,17; be in union, unison, 157,9.11; 158,28; 185,24; be unified, 192,24; 210,31; to hênômenon, unity, 147,4 hepesthai, follow, 134,7; 144,11; 146,19, etc. hêrôikos, heroic, 131,9 hêrôs, hero, 159,28; 170,22; 215,25

227

hetairos, fellow student, 161,21; companion, 204,20 heterokinêtos, other-moved, 124,1; 126,26.30.31 heterotês, variance, 127,1.3; difference, 134,28; 174,14; 177,26; otherness, 135,10; 157,8; 202,24 hexis, state, 158,17 hieratikos, priestly, 172,27 hieros, holy, 155,11; 183,23; hieron, sacred precinct, 183,24 himeros, desire, 192,24.25.27; 193,8.20; longing, 210,18 historia, tradition, 163,19; report, 176,13 holikos, universal, 149,24; whole, 161,25; 162,2 holos, whole, 129,31; 130,22; 132,2; 137,1, etc.; entire, 145,4; 192,23; all, 202,3; to holon, universal, 191,9; whole, 205,10; wholly, 172,26; ta hola, the universe, 136,2; 142,2 holotês, wholeness, 161,23.28; 162,1; 211,2; whole, 175,9 homoiôma, likeness, 184,15; 190,2 homoiotês, similarity, 174,23; 197,15; likeness, 189,3.4.16; 200,29; 217,30; kath’ homoiotêta, like, 198,29 homonoia, like-mindedness, 209,8; 215,24; concord, 216,26 horatikon, to, organ of sight, 185,10; 188,12; (emended to horaton, 205,23.24) horaton, to, visible object, 185,10; 188,12; something visible, 187,27 horikos, definitional, 125,14 horismos, definition, 123,20.21.28; 125,11.13.18 horizein, define, 147,23; 175,27; determine, 161,4 horos, term, 125,12; limit, 126,3.4 hosiôs, piously, 175,18 hubris, wantonness, 189,10; 204,20 hubristês, wanton one, 207,8 hugros, liquid, 163,23; wet, 184,22; to hugron, moisture, 139,4; 190,24; 193,23 hulê, matter, 141,3; 158,5; 189,29; 190,3; 192,17; 198,3.15.16.24; 207,8; 211,3; material, 198,7 humnein, celebrate, 138,14; sing of, 153,3.4.15.20 huparkhein, belong, 125,21.22; 126,13; be, 126,22; 158,9; hold for, 134,16; be the case, 135,3; other translation: 179,17 huparxis, substance, 158,31

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huperbolê, extreme nature, 191,21; hyperbole, 194,19; huperbolêi, extremely, 191,20 huperkosmios, hypercosmic, 139,31; 144,22; 145,26; 159,7.10.11.12; 168,25.27 huperouranios, beyond the heaven, 138,22; 153,1.3.14.19.26; 154,16.18.27; 155,16; 156,12; 158,8; 161,14.17; 162,13.15.22; supracelestial, 180,8 huperousios, beyond being, 126,26; 154,18; 157,4 huperplêrês, overflowing, 140,25; 189,26; to huperplêres, plenitude, 150,15 huphistanai, exist, 142,33 hupodeigma, example, 165,10.11.27 hupodekhestha, get, 163,7; receive, 163,12.14 hupodokhê, receptacle, 163,6 hupokeisthai, underlie, 165,33; to hupokeimenon, substrate, 126,9; underlying nature, 158,11.20; material, 199,4 hupomimnêskein, indicate, 123,16; 124,4 hupomnêma, reminder, 180,10 hupomnêsis, reminder, 187,4 huponoia, sense, 211,30; 212,3; imputation, 212,8; implication, 212,9; notion, 212,26; ulterior motive, 212,16 hupopherein, bear down, 136,33; 154,12; 164,21; 167,11; 168,16; decline, 188,21; fall, 212,2 hupopteros, with lowered wings, 131,10– 132,29; 146,11; winged, 212,11.12; 213,11; 214,26; 216,7 huposelênos, sublunar, 137,2 hupostatikos, having the role of giving existence, 146,18 hupostrephein, return, 147,30; 197,3; revert, 172,30.32 hupouranios, beneath the heaven, 149,6; 150,27; 151,30; 164,9 husterogenês, later-generated, 179,3.7.12; 180,11 iatros, doctor, 188,19; physician, 196,2 idea, form, 126,1.7.19.35; 128,24.29; 129,2.4; 132,9; 135,16; 140,14.16; 181,22; 182,5; Form, 126,5; 160,22.32; 161,2; 162,6; 184,11.12 idiôma, own manner, 161,2; mode, 162,24.28 idiôs, in its own manner, 139,31; properly, 143,23; 159,7; 178,26; individually, 145,25; in particular, 153,29; 171,9

idiotês, particular character, nature, 127,5; 131,6; 132,20; 136,3.5; 139,14.17; 145,12.13; 148,2.26.28; 150,7; 197,12.15; peculiarity, 133,19; manner, 136,9; characteristic, 145,21 Idomeneus, Idomeneus, 198,10 indalma, image, 124,12.26; 184,2.17; reflection, 137,5; 190,2; trace, 206,24; 214,24 kairos, time, 198,17; opportunity, 209,18; age, 217,10 kakê, wickedness, 151,6 kakia, fault, 165,33; incompetence, 167,3; evil, 171,7; vice, 205,8; 209,25; 213,5.6; kata kakian, in a depraved manner, 205,27 kakizein, reproach, 135,24; 207,22 kakopoios, maleficent, 170,29 kakos, bad, 134,11; evil, 134,23; 153,23; 203,27; base, 209,22–24; to kakon, evil, 133,8; 134,11; 138,19; 141,3.8; 206,17; bad, 209,21; 210,2 kakôsis, suffering, 215,9 kakunein, harm, 127,18; damage, 151,5; corrupt, 151,27; 167,5; kakunesthai, suffer damage, 127,17.22.30; become bad, 134,23 kallonê, loveliness, 140,4.18; beauty, 184,13; 210,22 kallos, beauty, 140,4; 174,6; 181,29, etc. kalos, beautiful, 139,29; 200,28; noble, 134,4–6.22; 209,24; fine, 216,1.2; to kalon, the beautiful, 131,14; 140,3.11; 141,9, etc.; beauty, 174,6; 183,12; 184,13, etc.; beautiful thing, 134,6; 140,30; 141,10; 207,2; fine thing, 209,25; bounty, 150,16; ho kalos, beautiful boy, 192,10.11; 196,4; fair one, 195,20 katadeesteros, lower, 126,27; 165,15; inferior, 128,26; 130,12.20; 145,4; 162,21.26; worse, 130,17.32 katagein, bring, lead, down, 138,19; 175,20; 185,9; 206,3; 207,29; draw downwards, 207,20 katagôgos, downwards-leading, 130,1; 131,16; 134,19.30; to lower, 138,27; which leads the way down, 139,1; that drag downs, 207,27; debasing, 208,22 kataphronein, disdain, 183,6; think little of, 194,25; despise, 195,28; 212,5; scorn, 209,13 kathairein, cleanse, 177,13.31; 181,20 katharmos, expiation, 181,9; 186,14

Greek–English Index katharos, pure, 133,10; 177,29.34; 186,27–9; 207,1; purified, 186,17; pared back, 141,30 katharôs, purely, 126,16 katharsion, purificatory rite, 181,7 katharsis, cleansing, 137,12; 177,3.10.12; 181,7 kathartikos, purifying, 177,32 kathêgemôn, guide, 218,15 kathodos, descent, 129,8; 168,14; 169,24; 180,14; 181,23; 183,22 katienai, descend, 151,18; 168,17; 171,14; 175,15 katokhos, possessed, 152,26.32; 160,15; 200,13; 215,26; 217,5; inspired, 172,26; 198,12 katokôkhê, possession, 180,19; 197,23 kharaktêr, style, 216,12.14 kharaktêrizein, characterise, 125,21; 146,31; 148,29; stamp, 199,20 Kharis, Grace, 187,11 kharis, joy, 206,13; pleasure, 209,12.17; 210,8; gratification, 212,25; favour, 216,24–9 kharizesthai, grant, 171,11; 215,22; gratify, 181,10; 212,22; 216,28; be a tribute, 187,3.10; graciously bestow, 198,2 khoros, troupe, 147,4; choir, 150,13; 153,16; 196,31; 218,2; chorus, 185,23.25 khrêma, possession, 194,25 khrêmatistikos, commercial, 172,17 khronos, time, 125,28; 157,22; 160,3.4.6.15; 177,9.11.16; 187,28.30; 209,14.16; kata khronon, chronological, 152,8; other translations: 125,30; 159,30; 181,18 khthonios, chthonic, 176,1 kinein, move, 124,6–26; 129,15; 137,5; 147,19; 148,4.10; 160,29; 188,15; 203,4; 206,2; initiate, 174,11; provoke, 197,20.30; inspire, 201,18; activate, 217,2.4 kinêsis, motion, movement, 124,3.12.16.31; 125,33; 126,25.27; 129,16; 146,22.23; 160,6; 167,7; 174,12; 194,3; 207,25 kinêtikos, motive, 197,30; giving rise to motion, 198,29; to kinêtikon, motive power, 133,22 koinônein, display commonality, 125,20; have intercourse, 189,7 koinônia, association, 186,24; 207,11.21.22; meeting, 214,12; communion, 218,21 koinos, common, in common, 125,6.17; 126,6; 131,28; 132,22; 133,3; 150,23.25;

229

167,28; 169,19; 179,2; one and the same, 128,9; as well, 135,25; shared, 174,13; general, 218,20 kosmein, marshal, 146,24; 147,11 kosmikos, cosmic, 136,16 kosmos, cosmos, 124,20.23; 135,3.18.28; 136,1.4, etc. kratein, dominate, 165,8; control, be in control, 172,14.16; prevail over, 174,15; have the upper hand, 205,12; master, 213,3 krisis, separation, 177,22.23.27.31; 178,1.3.4 kritêrion, criterion, 158,11.17.22 kubernan, steer, 163,6 kubernêtês, steersman, 157,6.7.10; 158,21.24.27 kubos, cube number, 127,5; 176,1 kuklos, circle, 129,20.30.31; 130,5, etc. lampros, bright, 185,5; shining, 204,17; shiny, 209,2; 210,20 lamprotês, brilliance, 151,15 leimôn, meadow, 168,7.8.10 lêthê, forgetfulness, 171,3.5.6; 188,23 lexis, word, 123,19; 187,12.15; 202,10; text, 168,4; 211,29; language, 194,19 logikos, rational, 123,22; 130,24; 134,3; 137,16.17; 178,8; 179,9; 202,15 logion, oracle, 164,16; 193,3 logismos, reasoning power, 137,17; argument, 137,24; reasoning, 159,21; 202,30; 205,8 logos, reason, 158,15.26; 163,8; 165,30; 172,11–31; 184,31; 203,7.10.16; 204,1.2.28; 205,7.10.12; 206,12; 212,1; thought, 140,17; 162,7; concept, 167,24; 179,8.12.13; forming principle, 189,19; argument, 125,11.33; 126,17; 128,1; 137,22; 181,25; 183,10; reckoning, 153,7; ratio, 132,15; guise, 136,12; ground, 142,4; sense, 179,29; language, 131,28; 217,29; prose, 160,26.31; word, 145,17; 173,3.4.7.11; 210,5; speech, 171,7.9; 200,26; 213,19.20; 215,11.12; 216,10.14.30; 217,27; discourse, 135,15; 181,5.21; 182,15.21; 217,11; tale, 187,15; work, 196,20; locution, 132,29; account, 123,19.22.25; 125,25; 128,9; 142,18; 155,2; report, 209,19; statement, 153,9; topic, 158,27; subject, 192,4; conversation, 206,9; 210,3; section, 128,31; ekhein logon, be reasonable, 135,30; 155,18

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lupê, pain, 192,6.20; 194,8.17; distress, 195,7 Lusias, Lysias, 181,7.10; 198,12; 200,26; 213,18.20; 216,10; 217,29; 218,4.6.8.16 makarios, blessed, 149,1.19; 152,22; 163,12; 185,27; 186,11.12; 214,8; to makarion, bliss, 149,8 mania, madness, 181,6.11–14.16.21.24; 182,8.10.12.16.18.21; 183,11; 213,23; 214,28 manteuein, make prophecies, 154,4; prophesy, 161,11; give oracles, 169,8 manthanein, learn, 184,18; 199,28 mantikos, mantic, 172,24; 174,21; 181,14.17; 182,13; prophetic, 197,13; 213,23; mantikê, mantic, 157,22; 175,3 mantosunê, divination, 154,3; 156,24; 157,21; 158,2 mathêma, science, 182,26; teaching, 191,7; study, 212,28 meiresthai, heimarmenê, fate, 209,26.27; 210,1; heimarmenos, of fate, 168,26 merikos, individual, 124,19.27.33; 136,13; 151,26; 152,29; 195,23; particular, 129,2.8; 149,24; 151,13.14; 170,7; partial, 161,24.25; 164,3; merikôs, in a partial, divided, manner, 174,17; 190,28 merismos, division, 141,3; 147,34; role, 201,27 meristos, divisible, 128,15.18; fragmented, 192,21.22 merizein, distribute, 150,23; divide, 160,22; 186,9 meros, part, 142,5; 160,33; 175,10.11; 194,4; 205,6.26; division, 142,21; section, 146,24; 147,9.11; particle, 192,9.21.28; para meros, by turns, 135,5 meris, portion, 150,22 metabasis, inference, 130,12; transition, 134,15; transmigration, 171,22 metabatikos, of transition, 135,1; pedestrian, 167,12; to metabatikon, discursiveness, 160,21 metabatikôs, discursively, 136,18; 160,13; step by step, 152,9.11.14 metabolê, change, 190,8.9 metapherein, transfer, 142,17; draw, 206,27 metaphora, metaphor, 191,30; 193,1.18; 195,5; apo metaphoras, metaphorically, 192,12; 193,21 metekhein, partake of, 124,22; 129,12; 142,7; 148,12; 192,24; 210,6; participate

in, 130,7.8; 146,4; 198,6; consist of, 171,11 methexis, participation, 148,3 metrein, delimit, 133,29; measure, 140,23; set parameters, 163,9; traverse, 164,17 metron, measure, 140,21–3; 143,3; 159,27.29; 176,32; 177,12.18; 196,23; limit, 136,17; 150,22; 175,27; 209,26; extent, 168,27; parameter, 163,8; extreme, 214,17; 204,2.3; guideline, 199,16; rule, 203,15; metre, 196,25 miktos, a mixture, 192,19 mimeisthai, mimic, 129,30; 202,17; imitate, 173,2.4.6.7.10; 185,12; 198,31; 200,28; 204,6 mimêtês, imitator, 173,7 mimêtikos, imitative, 173,1.5; mimetic, 173,12 mixis, admixture, 185,20; mixture, 194,8 mnêmê, memory, 163,4.6; 179,30; 184,2; 187,3.5; 188,26; 192,7; 194,12.17; 199,19; 200,5; 205,28; 206,22.23; mention, 187,6 moira, share, 144,3; portion, 169,30; 175,19; role, 188,15 monas, monad, 142,26.28; 143,8; 144,15; 145,6.7; 147,10–33; 177,7; 197,28 monimos, stable, 197,21; to monimon, stability, 147,31 monoeidês, of a single kind, 198,9 morion, part, 135,28; 185,4; 202,29; 208,12; division, 142,22 morphê, shape, 201,27; 202,13 morphôma, feature, 203,12 mousêgetês, Leader of the Muses, 175,3 mousikos, cultured, 174,5; votary of the Muses, 179,21; Muse-engendered, 181,14; musical, 199,30 muêsis, initiation, 186,13.15 mustêria, mysteries, 186,17.19.22 muthos, myth, 202,1.2.5.6 narthêkophoros, narthex-bearer, 180,5 nektar, nectar, 163,15–33 neotelês, recently initiated, 188,17.22 noein, think of, 128,27; intelligise, 152,35; be aware of, 159,4; apprehend by the intellect, 195,10 noêma, perception, 183,3; concept, 200,10 noeros, intellective, 130,4; 139,31; 140,31; 149,21.23; 152,23; 156,11; 159,5.7.12.13; 164,20; 165,2; 168,2; intellectual, 213,22; 214,15.23; 215,7

Greek–English Index noerôs, intellectively, 157,15; in an intellective fashion, 161,3; on the intellective level, 189,23; on the intellectual plane, 198,17 noêsis, intellection, 130,13; 140,2.5.6; 152,34.35; 159,31; 160,13.14.17.20.22; 167,10.12; intellectual, mental, process, 137,18; 204,19; thinking, 152,9; thought, 158,15.26; comprehension, 180,17; mind, 132,14 noêtikos, noetic, 157,3 noêtos, intelligible, 138,21; 139,31; 140,1, etc.; to noêton, the intelligible, 129,18.20; 130,10.11, etc. nomos, law, 161,6; 168,25.26; 169,20.22; 171,11; 173,18; 174,13; ordinance, 169,6; 189,11; nomôi, in the fashion of, 189,6.7 nous, intellect, 126,4; 130,5; 132,13, etc.; mind, 214,12; thrust, 208,26 odunasthai, be pained, 191,29; be agonised, 193,25; 194,7.10 odunê, pain, 196,2; 208,3 oistikos, productive, 128,23.28; 129,5 okhêma, vehicle, 136,27; 138,2; 146,8; 150,29.30; 151,8; 166,16 on, to, being, 126,21; 148,6; 156,27, etc.; existence, 128,13.24; thing, thing with being, thing that is, 125,19.22; 147,29; 158,29; 164,26; 168,1; 183,15.18.20; to mê on, non-being, 173,14; 174,16 onoma, name, 142,16; 143,9.10.12, etc.; word, 125,14; 196,5; term, 155,4; 161,7; 164,5; 181,12; ta onomata, language, 216,5.6.8 onomazein, name, 156,18 ophthalmia, ophthalmia, 210,26; 211,4.5.7 opsis, eye, 129,27; 160,5; sight, 187,23.29– 31; 188,3; eis opsin, visible, 191,16 oregesthai, yearn, 194,24; desire, 203,5; 204,16; strive after, 203,29 orektikos, appetitive, 163,9 organon, tool, 184,17.32 orthodoxastikos, conventional, 130,33 orthos, right, 129,23.24; 130,32; 172,29; true, 129,31; good, 137,24; upright, 203,15; 204,9 ostreôdês, oyster-like, 136,26; 137,3 ouranios, heavenly, 135,23; 152,34.35; 177,25; 215,3; the heaven’s, 160,17; of the heaven, 181,29 ouraniôs, in the heavenly manner, 152,31 ouranos, heaven, 133,12; 138,22; 141,24, etc.

231

ousia, essence, 123,19; 125,8; 126,7.10.11.21.33, etc.; substance, 125,18; 133,8; 134,5; 197,30; being, 128,13–16.24; 129,11.13, etc.; nature, 160,4; 196,9; possessions, 195,23; kat’ ousian, essential, 177,26 ousiôdês, essential, 126,18; 179,8; 180,11 ousiopoios, essence-creating, 177,24 paideuein, train, 130,35; educate, 173,9; 181,19; 199,9; 200,11 paidia, amusement, 147,7 paidika, boyfriend, 183,12; 190,1; 198,22.23; 199,9.11; 200,23.27; 201,9; 206,12; 211,32; 212,14; 213,19 palaios, ancient, 181,20 pan, to,universe, 124,20.33.35; 141,23; 163,6; 181,29; 209,27 paraballein, expose, 180,1; correlate, 187,25.26; compare, 215,2 parabolê, analogy, 210,24 paradeigma, paradigm, 126,5; example, 205,22; exemplar, 211,8 paragein, produce, 145,16; 161,6.23.25; 162,1; bring into existence, 161,30 paskhein, fare, 165,26; be affected, 172,13; experience, 184,9; 211,16; suffer, 208,8; feel, 210,29 pathêma, experience, 201,29 pathos, passion, 172,13; 196,4.5; 205,26; 206,3; experience, 182,32; reaction, 208,1; infection, 210,27; 211,6; other translations: 184,6; 208,8 pêgê, source, 149,25; 168,8; 185,13; spring, 193,19; fount, 210,17.21 peithein, persuade, 200,24; peithesthai, believe, 196,28; 197,1 peras, limit, 144,23; 159,5.7; 172,21; 209,26; end, 181,26; 206,17; object, 213,11 periagein, carry around, 152,34; 164,29; 166,8; periagesthai, surround, 202,4 periballein, embrace, 212,18 periekhein, surround, 139,22; 193,23; embrace, 144,14; 158,1; 160,33; 161,1.3; 162,6; 175,29; 177,6; 215,13.16; (be) around, 152,4; contain, 168,12 perilambanein, grasp, 132,14; encompass, 140,16; include, 153,12; 197,10; embrace, 158,23 perilêptikos, all-embracing, 149,25; 152,2 periodos, revolution, 129,17; circular movement, 160,17; circuit, 169,25.26; 170,3.8.9.13.14.23.26; cycle, 170,15;

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175,23; period, 177,16; circulation, 215,8 periphereia, periphery, 151,29 periphora, revolution, 160,12.17; 164,29; 166,9.10 peripolein, travel around, 141,2; 182,4; circle around, 185,22 phainesthai, appear, 126,3; 166,23; 189,17; 195,24 phainomenos, obvious, 124,5; phenomenal, 135,19; 175,6; 193,6; 195,7; 202,5; apparent, 137,5.11; 195,28; 212,23; conspicuous, 198,13; visible, 202,4; to phainomenon, surface, 194,29; 195,11; 198,21; 206,8; 211,25; 214,9 phanos, bright, 203,21; to phanon, illumination, 204,19 phantasia, appearance, 137,12; imagination, 158,7; 204,19 phantasma, image, 158,6; phasma, appearance, 168,10; vision, 177,28 philia, amity, 174,12; affection, 198,2.4.10; friendship, 209,8; 214,17.25; 215,22.23; love, 214,11.12 philokalos, beauty-loving, 174,5 philosophein, lead a philosophical life, 176,12.15.27; 177,9; pursue philosophy, 183,27; be a philosopher, 213,16 philosophia, philosophy, 127,34; 214,14; 217,30 philosophos, philosopher, 125,16; 137,26; 143,17, etc.; philosophical, 172,14.26.31; 174,4, etc. philotimia, aspiration, 201,28 phônê, têi phônêi, vocally, 178,23 phonos, murder, 198,18.19 phôs, light, 133,9–13; 140,12.15, etc. phôtizein, illuminate, 155,14.17 phronein, think, 137,22; be right-thinking, 153,24 phronêsis, wisdom, 188,3.4.6 phroura, guardianship, 142,30 phrourêtikos, guardian, 142,31; protective, 143,21; 156,20 phthartos, perishable, 163,19 phtheirein, cause death, 124,33; destroy, 125,4.9; 127,18; 142,6; phtheiresthai, perish, 125,29.30 phthinein, wither, 141,6 phthonos, envy, 150,12; 196,31; 200,25; 218,2 phthora, destruction, 124,14.15.17.29

phulakikos, guardian, 184,25 phusikos, natural, 182,30; 201,12; physical, 189,20 phusikôs, by nature, 191,14; on the physical plane, 198,16 phusis, nature, 124,26.35; 128,16; 133,23, etc.; constitution, 170,19 planan, planômenos, planetary, 141,27; to peplanêmenon, irregularity, 164,6 plasma, fictional account, 202,3 Platôn, Plato, 125,25; 127,20.25.31.34; 128,11; 132,17; 142,25; 144,10; 146,1; 150,9; 155,1; 156,2.20; 157,12; 158,2.12; 167,4; 169,14.20; 174,25; 175,12; 176,22.32; 179,2; 180,6; 181,27; 184,23; 185,6.29; 186,4.22; 192,1; 202,29 platos, range, 165,17; 188,9; spectrum, 172,4.9; en platei, in outline, 159,2; overall, 177,22 plattein, fabricate, 196,29 plêrôma, component, 160,33 plêrôsis, repletion, 150,24; being filled, 162,11 plêroun, complete, 125,18; 140,7; fill, 159,14; 163,14 plêthos, plurality, 126,12.13.16.19; 204,12; multiplicity, 141,3; number, 143,3; 176,31; 177,15; multitude, 153,6; 197,10; 215,6; mob, 173,18; masses, 203,8 plêthuein, be full, 171,5; 208,27; to peplêthusmenon, plurified nature, 147,35 Ploutôn, Pluto, 142,27; 143,11; 148,17; 177,32 pneuma, pneuma, 129,26.29; wind, 210,23.24 poiêma, poem, 196,19 poiêsis, creative act, 147,7; poetry, 153,15 poiêtês, poet, 127,32; 153,2–11; 160,28; 191,24; 217,6 poiêtikos, poetic, 173,12; 175,3; 181,18; 182,13; 213,24; 216,6; hê poiêtikê, poetic art, 217,4; to poiêtikon, creativity, 217,4 poikilia, variety, 134,13 poikilos, variegated, 140,4; complex, 152,24; varied, 156,4 polemikos, military, 172,15; skilled in warfare, 174,15; warlike, 175,2 polemios, warlike, 145,19; hostile, 174,14; ho polemios, enemy, 189,25.33; 207,5 polis, city, 136,7.8.10; 149,15; 163,31; 167,3; 172,18; 184,25.27.29; 195,18.26; 202,31; 203,4.8

Greek–English Index politeia, society, 149,13 politikos, political, 172,17; ho politikos, citizen, 131,1; politician, 165,13; statesman, 174,35; 195,17 polos, pole, 148,6.8.14 poludunamos, multi-powered, 152,15; 165,3; 208,11 polueidês, multiple in form, 204,11 polumerês, having multiple parts, 208,11 Poseidôn, Poseidon, 128,4; 142,27; 143,10.29; 145,8; 148,17 pragma, thing, 123,22.23; 126,11,14; 134,13, etc.; matter, 132,11; 216,13; situation, 165,33; affair, 174,11; undertaking, 215,13; venture, 215,18; event, 215,19 pragmateia, enterprise, 197,6 praxis, act, 170,19 proballein, open, 131,21; produce, 167,24; express, 171,30; project, 133,5; 179,3.13; other translation: 183,19 proerkhesthai, emerge, 124,22; progress, 127,3; process, 127,7; come forth, 155,6; go forth, 161,10; proceed, 164,14; 197,2.3 prohairesis, deliberation, 129,26 proïenai, process, 126,3; 127,2; proceed, 134,5; 142,31; 146,30; 147,2.29; 172,30.31; 173,31; 185,11; spring, 134,27; emanate, 140,12.15; emerge, 162,2; other translation: 209,14.15 proïstanai, preside, 159,22; be set over, 163,33 pronoein, exercise providential care (over), 135,3.6; 145,11; 146,17; 148,29; 149,18; 163,27.33; exercise providential oversight over, 163,10.17; take care of, 147,27; be careful, 151,2 pronoêtikos, exercising providential care, 130,2; 139,25; 163,16 pronoia, providential care, 141,2; 146,16; 150,15; 162,32; 163,1; 168,21.22; providence, 163,24 proödos, procession, 125,34; 127,4; 130,29; 133,30; 147,34; 170,10; 172,22; coming forth, 161,23 prophorikos, verbal, 123,25 prosagoreuein, call, 129,21; 131,13; 134,11; 143,9.12.14; 156,15; address, 159,20 protasis, premiss, 123,15; 125,7; proposition, 184,18 prôtourgos, initiating, 211,19 psukhê, soul, 123,13.16.19.28; 124,1–34, etc.

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psukhikos, soul’s, 152,8; psychic, 156,10; 160,22; 162,23.28; of soul(s), 160,4.16 psukhoun, ensoul, 124,20; 136,31; animate, 193,4 ptênos, winged, 146,10; 167,17; to ptênon, bird, 167,16 pteron, wing, 131,11.18.19.21.32; 132,25.29, etc. pterophuein, sprout wings, 136,22 pterophuêsis, sprouting of wings, 129,9; 190,12 pterophutos, of growing wings, 197,2 pterorruein, shed wings, 127,22; 135,18; 136,19.21–3.25; 141,19; 171,7 pterorruêsis, shedding of wings, 129,9; 134,24; 138,17.18 pterôtos, winged, 131,20.26.28; 132,3.26; 196,15; with wings, 133,25; feathered, 194,4 pteroun, furnish with wings, 139,1; wing, 179,20; excite, 196,8 pterux, wing, 148,23.25 ptôsis, fall, 141,7; 169,23; downfall, 186,24; failing, 188,18; case, 174,29.31 pur, fire, 124,14.24; 161,27; 187,25; 190,19 Rhadamanthus, Rhadamanthys, 177,27 rhêma, saying, 201,3 rhêtoreuein, orate, 173,18 rhuthmos, rhythm, 199,31 selênê, moon, 133,23; 168,10 selêniakos, lunar, 186,2 selêniakôs, in a lunar manner, 136,13; 150,6 sêmainein, indicate, 126,15; 133,23.26; 144,9, etc.; mean, 126,7; 152,1.8; 160,3; 198,20; convey, 131,10; signify, 210,6; other translation: 181,13 sêmeion, mark, 186,30; 190,15; sign, 191,6; 194,8 skhêma, shape, 155,21–156,10; form, 178,28 skhesis, relationship, 126,1; 179,28.30; 201,26.28; relation, 202,5; tie, 195,22.23 skholê, leisure, 164,28 skopos, objective, 201,7; 215,20 sôma, body, 124,3–125,2, etc. sômatikos, corporeal, 182,25; 215,5; bodily, 208,22; 209,17; 210,8; 212,17; carnal, 209,12 sômatoeidês, corporeal, 142,8; 209,26; bodily, 201,27 sophia, wisdom, 140,6

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sophistês, sophist, 173,17 sophistikos, of the sophist, 173,16; sophistical, 173,19 sophos, wise, 140,5.11; 141,9.10; 174,1.3; 188,29; 200,28 sôphrôn, temperate, 165,28; prudent, 189,3; 215,6 sôphrosunê, moderation, 160,18.25.26.31; 161,4.8.12; 162,8; 184,19; prudence, 203,30; 213,17; temperance, 204,21; 205,10; 206,25; sanity, 181,13 sôstikos, having the role of preserving, 146,18 sôtêria, salvation, 197,3 sôzein, preserve, 126,28; 190,18; retain, 127,5; keep safe, 139,22 sphaira, sphere, 131,3; 136,5; 141,26.29.32 spoudaios, worthy, 191,6; ho spoudaios, good man, 124,32; 149,9; 150,14; 165,31 stasiazein, be in conflict, 165,29; be at odds, 184,29 stasis, stationariness, 148,12; discord, 166,6; rest, 174,9; position, 203,10.13.14; 206,16 stereôma, firmament, 146,10 stereos, solid, 135,21; 136,20.26.27.30; 138,18; 141,20 sterêsis, privation, 126,30; 163,18.24; 198,19 stoikheion, element, 126,14.19; 131,4; 140,8; 141,27; 161,27; 187,25 stratêgikôs, in the manner of a general, 136,9 stratêgos, general, 136,7 stratia, host, 142,12.21.22; 144,11; 146,7.20.21.25; 147,3.5; 185,25; expedition, 147,8 stratiôtikos, military, 171,28; 172,1; 203,5 stratos, army, 136,7 strephesthai, return, 126,4; circle, 129,20.23; turn, 158,31; 195,18; concern self, 172,19; roam, 203,33 sullabê, syllable, 187,13 sullogismos, syllogism, 123,12; 125,3.6; argument, 184,18 sullogizesthai, syllogise, 124,2; infer, 173,32 sumbolikôs, symbolically, 156,17; 177,17; 197,10 sumbolon, symbol, 133,25; 145,28; 176,23 summetria, balance, 184,21 summigês, mingled with, 133,8; 185,17; mixed with, 133,12.13

summixis, mingling, 192,5; mixture, 205,6; mix, 205,13 sumpatheia, sympathy, 210,27; 211,7; dia tên sumpatheian, sympathetically, 209,3 sumperasma, conclusion, 123,14 sumphônein, be consistent with, 175,12; be in harmony with, 192,27 sumphônia, consensus, 157,18; concord, 200,23 sumphônos, consistent, 192,14 sumphônôs, consistently, 151,15; in a manner that is concordant with, 154,13; in conformity with, 160,6 sumphuês, innate, 179,8 sumphutos, inborn, 138,9 sumplêrôsis, completion, 138,6 sumplêroun, form part of, 135,19; compose, 161,24; complete, 171,14; 178,28; make up, 178,9 sunaphê, union, 154,21; 181,26 sunaptein, join with, to, 154,19.20; 181,28; 216,26; bind together, 185,9; contract, 211,7; to sunaphthênai, connection, 201,18 sunekheia, continuity, 141,15 sunekhein, preserve, 125,10; embrace, 168,28; keep, 170,16 sunekhês, continuous, 187,6 sungenês, akin, 140,25; 142,22; 146,3; ho sungenês, relative, 210,10 sungraphein, write, 218,5 sunopsis, summary, 187,4 sunousia, contact, 206,21; association, 209,11 suntattein, rank with, 130,16; construe with, 132,6; subordinate to, 142,10; organise, 184,24; suntattesthai, be of the same rank, 143,12.13; suntetagmenos, on the same level, 159,6; at one’s own level, 200,19; to suntetagmenon, shared organisation, 147,3; one’s own level, 199,16 sustasis, construction, 129,13; framing, 137,15 sustoikhia, column, 134,10 tattein, class, 127,10.25; assign, 130,20; 147,1; 150,8; appoint, 136,7; place, 141,28; order, 145,2; 146,12; 212,27; organise, 165,15; rank, 166,2; locate, 203,11 tautotês, sameness, 174,13 taxis, position, 134,3; 150,8; 209,27; station, 139,14; rank, 143,13; 144,21; 145,14;

Greek–English Index 207,17; order, 144,26–28; 145,1; 147,1; 149,23; 150,28; 153,28; 154,17; 155,3.21; 156,3.12.28; 159,10; 204,8; company, 146,22.24.27; grade, 165,27; 167,28; ranking, 169,18; disposition, 169,22 tekhnê, art, 201,17; 216,31; 217,6 tekhnikos, technically skilled, 153,9; technical, 172,27; 217,2 telein, belong, 175,1; initiate, 180,8 teleios / teleos, perfect, 129,14; 135,4.30; 140,7.8.25, etc.; full, 142,13; to teleion, perfection, 145,24; 180,5; 216,11; hê teleia, full stop, 178,22 teleiotês, perfection, 136,1; 140,29; 145,28; 150,21.25; 160,9; 162,11; 176,23.32; 177,13.15.17.19 teleioun, perfect, 145,26; finish, 215,11 telestikos, telestic, 172,23.25; 174,22; 181,14.20; 182,12; 213,24; hê telestikê, ritual, 200,13 teletê, rite, 167,22; 180,1.4.8.19; 186,8.13.14.26 telos, goal, 160,7; 180,12.18; 197,6.11.17; 200,24; 201,7.17; 211,17; 215,19; 217,23; end, 164,15; 177,4; 213,10; 215,13; full realisation, 162,19; outcome, 201,13 tetras, tetrad, 144,16.17 thanatos, death, 126,30; 141,6; 214,22 thea, sight, 149,5.8.28; 152,22.26; 162,13, etc.; viewing, 149,8; 162,10; 163,4, etc.; spectacle, 163,7; vision, 186,11; 189,23.25, etc.; view, 201,11 theama, sight, 138,23; 183,25; 187,19; 189,32 theasthai, gaze upon, 138,21; 185,26; contemplate, 158,29; 167,25; view, 162,9; 168,16; 170,21, etc.; see, 152,17; 182,1.2; 183,14.15.18; 188,32; 189,17 theatos, visible, 157,8; 158,22.28 theios, divine, 128,9; 130,2; 131,7.19.29.31.32, etc.; to theion, divinity, 217,30 theiôs, in a divine fashion, 157,16; 161,3 thêlus, male, 143,18.21.23 themis, what is laid down, 162,16; right, 186,10 theoeidês, godlike, 189,15–17 theologia, theology, 143,10; 145,13; 148,16.20; 155,22.24; 156,15.18; 201,32 theologikôs, in theological vein, 153,27 theologos, theologian, 133,18; 142,25; 149,22; 153,30; 155,1; 156,21; 157,20; 158,1; 161,6.22; 169,14

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theôrein, view, 123,22.24; 140,18; 152,14; 162,27; deal with, 126,1; observe, 126,34; 144,22; see, 127,2.8; 139,30; 146,22, etc.; consider, 130,9.24; 138,18; 140,2.11; contemplate, 136,18; 139,25; 141,24, etc.; study, 188,19.20 theôrêma, sight, 162,5; principle, 217,2 theôrêtikos, devoting self to contemplation, 131,2; theôrêtikôteron, more allegorically, in a more allegorical fashion, 198,14.25; 211,29; 213,14; 214,10 theôria, theory, 142,13; contemplation, 160,7; 165,11.14; viewing, 162,33; spectacle, 164,8; 180,17.19; 193,8; allegorical exegesis, 198,23 theos, god, goddess, 127,20; 130,11.30; 131,6, etc. theotês, divinity, 152,5; 160,27 therapeia, service, 208,15.21 therapeuein, accord service, 208,20.23.24; worship, 216,27 thermainein, warm, 190,23.31; 191,1; 192,30 thermos, hot, 184,22 thermotês, warmth, 190,17.18.20.22.23; 191,12 thesmos, ordinance, 168,13.17; 170,9; decree, 169,9 thêtikos, menial, 184,26.28; 203,8 thnêtos, mortal, 123,23; 130,30; 135,14.20; 137,20.21; 151,23; 213,21; 215,5 thoinê, banquet, 150,20.23.26; 216,7 thronos, throne, 128,5 thumikos, spirited, 184,31; 212,25 thumos, spirited part, spirit, 130,32; 163,9; 166,25.26; 172,11.14; 202,1.15; 203,2.9.10.12; 205,4; 206,5; 214,7 Timaios, Timaeus, 128,11; 132,15; 137,29; 142,17; 158,12.25; 185,29; 197,7; Timaeus, 159,24 timan, honour, 143,18.19; 199,4; 203,28; 217,19.21.24 timê, honour, 166,26; 171,20; 203,5.24.26.28; 204,16; 217,25 timios, valuable, 195,24; honourable, 203,27; honoured, 217,22; to timion, worthiness, 139,11 tomê, division, 174,25 topos, place, 138,23; 153,1.3.8.14.19.26, etc.; region, 148,14; kata topon, local, 139,10; locally, 148,9 trephein, nourish, 140,27; 157,14; 160,8.9; 168,3.6; 192,7.10.30; feed, 203,8; foster, 195,15; rear, 169,13

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trias, triad, 126,34.35; 127,1; 142,27; 143,8; 144,15; 145,8; 155,24; 156,19; 164,17; 174,33; 175,1.2.5 triodos, meeting of three roads, 177,28 tukhê, fortune, 171,28.29; 172,2 tupos, characteristic, 201,27 turannikos, tyrannical, 173,19.29 xumphutos, combined, 127,26; 132,18; 202,8 zên, live, 125,10; 137,16; 149,10, etc.; to zên, life, 124,17; 142,30; 143,1

zôê, life, 126,3.25.27.32; 128,16; 129,3, etc.; way of life, 136,30; 213,10 zôidion, zodiacal sign, 142,11 zôion, living being, 123,22; 124,9; 135,19.20.22–4, 137,13–138,11, etc.; animal, 188,24.25 zôogonos, life-producing, 143,22; 147,2 zôtikos, vital, 124,22; life-giving, 190,17; life-engendering, 193,2; associated with life, 201,29 zôtikôs, in the manner of living things, 148,9; in relation to life, 189,23

Subject Index References in the form of 123,5 are to the page and line numbers of the Greek text in the margins of the translation; those listed after ‘n.’ to the notes. Adrasteia 168,13–28; 169,4–17; 170,10; 171,11; 189,11; 210,1 angels 131,7; 143,16; 159,28, n. 102 Alcibiades 208,23; 210,16; 212,20; n. 466, 584 Aphrodite, 145,9.18; 198,1.10; 216,17; n. 139, 281 Apollo 145,7; 153,15; 175,3; 181,15; 197,13; 200,20.22; n. 139, 154 Ares 131,5; 136,6; 145,9; 175,1; 197,25.27– 9; 198,12.28; n. 139, 487 Aristotle 188,31; n. 17, 82, 175, 240, 271, 281, 301, 439, 509, 539 Artemis 145,10; n. 139 Athena 145,9.23; 156,3.8.10; 175,1; n. 139, 156, 226, 228 Athenians 123,18; 144,20

177,25; 188,23; 215,24; n. 102, 299, 330, 366 fate-guiding 142,13 Demiurge 128,11; 130,29; 138,26; 142,17.20.21; 161,28; 185,29; 197,8; n. 46, 113, 174, 192, 204, 250, 266, 267, 319, 323, 508, 524, 526, 527 pertaining to the Demiurge 142,26; 143,21; 147,34; 179,14.16 desire 170,30; 192,25; 193,20–4; 192,24.25.27; 193,8.20; 218,7; 196,6; 210,18 object of 194,13; 195,2.9 Dikê (goddess) 169,10.11; 178,3 Dionysus 144,24; 161,30; 181,16; 200,12; n. 148, 267 Diotima 187,14

beauty or the beautiful passim; n. 117, 121–2 beautiful (or beauty)-itself / form of beauty 183,11.17; 184,12; 185,2.17.20; 206,2.30; n. 556 beauty of forms 140,4 corporeal or bodily beauty 182,25; 184,3; 212,17 intelligible beauty 174,6; 182,3.9.27; 183,11; 187,18; 188,28; 190,7.8; 193,7; 199,7; 206,20.24; 208,32; n. 391, 441, 570 sensible beauty or beauty down here 174,6; 182,29; 185,16; 187,17.20; 188,32; 189,4.14.17; 192,9.22; 193,6; 207,2; 212,5; n. 570

Empedocles 167,20; n. 309 Eros (as god) (see also Love) 196,7.14; 215,10.22.24; 218,10.15; n. 479, 604 Ether 144,15; 155,12 etymological explanations 136,30; 146,18; 150,21; 168,20; 169,2; 174,10; 176,15; 180,8; 186,8.19; 192,25; 193,8; 211,9; n. 104, 168, 194, 319, 589 eudaimonia see happiness

Chaldean Oracles 193,4; n. 319, 449, 460 Cronus, 144,1; 148,19; 149,22; 150,28; 152,23; 168,26; 176,18; n. 112, 206, 319 Cyclopes 155,3.21.23; 156,11.12; n. 224 daemons 131,8; 143,17; 144,11; 146,7; 159,28; 164,13; 170,16.20.22.29;

fate 168,26; 209,26.27; 210,1; n. 319, 337, 579 forms 123,24; 126,5–9.13; 132,13; 160,22.32; 161,2; 162,6; 184,11.12 beauty (or the beautiful)-itself 183,17; 185,17–20; 206,2.30 enmattered forms 158,5; n. 431 health-itself 174,20 intelligible forms 138,22; 199,8; 205,17; 206,2; 207,8 justice-itself 160,23; 174,18; 185,3 light-itself, 133,10 moderation-itself, 160,23 sameness-itself, 174,22

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Galen n. 407, 572 gods see also individual gods assimilative n. 139 decadarchic (sc. celestial gods of the zodiac) 142,12; n. 149, 250 demiurgic (or paternal) 143,20; n. 139 elevating 141,20; 143,21; 174,21 encosmic 138,22; 139,31; 143,16; 150,1; 159,7; 175,7; 179,28.32; n. 65, 380 hypercosmic 139,31; 145,26; 159,7 hypercosmic-and-encosmic n. 139 intelligible 139,31; 159,5.13; n. 117 intellective 139,31; 149,21.23; 152,23; 159,5.13; n. 117, 185, 206 liberated 145,25; n. 139 life-producing 143,20; 147,2; n. 139 protective or guardian 142,31;143,21; 156,20; n. 139, 230 purifying 177,32, n. 149 providence of 145,11; 148,29; 149,18; 150,16; 162,9; 163,23; 164,23; 168,21.24 young gods (cf. Tim. 42D-E) 130,29; n. 267, 526 good, the 140,6–23; 141,9; 165,25; 173,20; 174,1.7; n. 75, 117, 119 Graces, the (Kharites) 187,11 Hades 177,32; n. 136, 171, 314 happiness 149,11; 150,3.4.9; 160,1; 162,9; 164,23; 181,26.28; 213,17 as union with, or imitation of, the divine 181,26; 186,4; 198,30 Hebe 163,29 Hecate 144,22; n. 282 Henads 126,26 Hera, 145,8; 147,2; 175,2; 200,15–21; n. 139, 281, 505, 506 Hermes 133,26; 145,8; 175,4; 176,14; n. 139, 532 Hermes Trismegistus 176,14 heroes 159,28; 170,22; 215,25; n. 102, 366 Hestia 141,28; 142,7.10; 143,23.26; 145,7; 146,21.25.28; 147,2.12.13.31; 148,3.5.8.12.13; 164,12; 197,27; n. 130, 139, 154, 162, 163 Homer 127,32; 128,4; 143,24; 149,13; 153,7.10.12; 154,5; 196,10.18.28; n. 41, 77, 135, 143, 146, 155, 158 Homerist, 196,17.18 Iamblichus, 142,16; 150,2; 157,7; 209,27; n. 26, 46, 66, 132, 156, 157, 168, 169, 189, 199, 236, 245, 449, 579

inspiration or divine possession 127,31–3; 152,31–2; 160,15–16; 180,12–19; 200,11–14; 216,31–217,6; n. 146 intellect 126,4; 130,5; 132,13; 149,27; 157,16; 158,8; 160,33; 162,6; 185,11; 187,31; 195,10; 202,30; n. 268 active intellect 158,29; n. 245 demiurgic intellect 179,16 motion of 152,34; n. 209 powers of 139,3 Love (as god) (see also Eros) 133,26; 181,7.16; 187,15; 192,15; 197,12; 215,12; 216,2.23; 217,28; 218,16 n. 479, 604 madness 181,6.11–14.16.21.24; 182,8.10.12.16.18.21; 183,11; 213,23; 214,28; n. 391, 393, 599 matter 141,3; 158,5; 189,29; 190,3; 192,17; 198,3.15.16.24; 207,8; 211,3; n. 75, 461 motion 146,22.23; 160,6; 167,7; 174,12; 194,3; 207,25 motion of intellect 152,34; n. 209 self-movement or self-motive 123,13–20; 125,7–33; 126,21–9; 128,32; 129,1.4.6; 137,5.6; n. 1, 13, 23, 53 muses 153,16; 181,15; 217,6; n. 307 mysteries 180,1–9; 186,8–20.22.25–7; n. 380, 422 Night (Orphic) 153,1.28.30; 154,5.7.9.23; 155,2.9.11.16.20; 156,22; 159,6; 161,9.15.16.18; 168,8.20; 169,2.5.7.14 Oceanus 144,7 Olympiodorus n. 365, 554 Olympus 146,9 one, the 126,26; 154,13–16; 157,4; 159,3; 164,14; 184,12; 185,6; n. 31, 34, 50, 186, 218 one of the genera 128,25; 129,11; n. 50 one of the soul 126,11–33; 156,28; 157,7–16; 158,18–159,3; n. 26, 236, 245 Orpheus 127,32; 144,16; 153,7.11.12.30; 161,9 Parmenides 127,32; n. 41 Phanes 144,16; 148,20.23; 154,22; 155,5.8.13; 159,5.12; 169,7; n. 148, 246 philosophy 127,34; 214,14; 217,30

Subject Index Pindar 176,16 platonic dialogues Alcibiades I 205,20; 209,15; 217,7; n. 555, 576 Cratylus 192,25; n. 424, 456, 478 Laws 140,22; 150,10; 203,27; 215,15; n. 122, 123, 191, 209, 292, 407, 531, 603, 607 Parmenides 154,13; 156,2; n. 30, 218, 225 Republic 167,2; 168,9.11; 171,18; 172,2.8; 173,13; 175,17.27; 176,29; 184,23; 218,6; n. 1, 64, 97, 120, 148, 190, 307, 314, 334, 337, 338, 359, 366, 402, 405, 406, 407, 409, 410, 467, 529, 535 Sophist n. 319, 347 Symposium 187,14; 192,14; 194,23; 212,20; n. 64, 429, 584 Timaeus 128,11; 132,15; 137,29; 142,17; 158,12.25; 159,24; 185,29; 197,7; n. 18, 38, 45, 49, 54, 55, 56, 57, 62, 105, 109, 111, 113, 172, 173, 174, 181, 204, 243, 247, 250, 252, 266, 267, 309, 319, 323, 335, 356, 413, 415, 484, 508, 524, 526, 527, 602 Plotinus 167,6; n. 127, 309, 443 Pluto 142,27; 143,11; 148,17; 177,32; n. 356 pneuma 129,27.29; n. 102, 103, 196 poets and poetry 127,31–3; 153,2–16; 160,27–31; 181,18–19; 217,3–6; n. 77, 212 Poseidon 128,4; 142,27; 143,10.29; 145,8; 148,17; n. 136, 139, 171 Proclus 161,21; n. passim Pythagoreans 133,31; 134,10; 201,2.3; n. 75, 82, 168 realm of sensibles 134,17; 159,8; 205,21; 207,15; n. 56, 84 recollection 182,1.24; 184,20; 185,18; 187,9; 189,18; 190,6.26; 192,8; 200,8; 205,29; 206,14.19 Sophists 173,16.17.19 soul (see also one of the soul under one, the) ascent of 129,8; 181,23; 182,27.29; 185,15; 188,14; 191,1.4.19; 192,4; 198,17; 199,29; 208,10; 209,9; 211,17; 214,10.28; 215,24; 216,4; n. 449, 491, 570

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descent of 129,8; 168,14; 169,24; 180,14; 181,23; 183,23; n. 37, 103, 148, 196, 208, 330 desiring or appetitive part 163,9; 166,27; 172,11; 184,31; 202,1; 203,7; 207,26; 213,6.7; 214,2.3; n. 535 intellective part 130,4; 202,30 spirited part 130,32; 163,9; 166,25.26; 172,11.14; 202,1.15; 203,2.9.10.12; 205,4; 206,5; 214,7 reasoning part 158,26; 163,8; 165,30; 172,11–19.29–31; 184.31; 202,30; 203,7–15; 204,1–3 sense perception 125,22; 158,16; 167,12; 184,19; 205,29.30 vehicles of 136,27; 138,2; 146,8; 150,29.30; 151,8; 166,16; n. 102, 103, 159, 196, 302, 517 steersman of 157,6.7.10; 158,21.24.27; n. 26, 243, 245 symbolism 133,25; 145,28; 156,17; 176,23; 177,17; 197,10; n. 53, 137, 157, 196, 230, 276, 282, 359, 360, 363, 365, 468, 485, 540 Syrianus 154,20; 161,23; 176,23; 178,7; n. 52, 102, 117, 122, 175, 196, 219, 266, 282, 359, 368, 426, 522 theologians 133,18; 142,25; 149,22; 153,30; 155,1; 156,21; 157,20; 158,1; 161,6.22; 169,14; n. 77, 135, 382 theology 143,10; 145,13; 148,16.20; 155,22.24; 156,15.18; 201,32 theurgy n. 172, 449 Trojans 149,15; 163,31.32; n. 157, 281, 359 vice 151,6; 205,8; 209,25; 213,5.6; n. 537 virtue 129,23; 173,18; 199,9; 202,25; 205,8; 213,8.18.21.22; 216,3; n. 64, 380, 474 Zeus 128,3.6; 131,5; 141,25.28; 142,9–28; 143,7–149,26; 154,6.22.23; 159,6.11; 161,28; 164,11–13; 174,34; 176,18; 177,23; 185,28; 186,4; 197,5.14.26; 198,12.28; 199,12–17; 200,9.18.21; 210,18; n. 68, 127, 133, 134, 136, 138, 139, 141, 153, 154, 163, 164, 171, 185, 206, 212, 216, 226, 281, 317, 319, 321, 327, 365, 416, 499, 505, 506, 585

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