Henry Ireton and the English Revolution 1843832356, 9781843832355

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HENRY IRETON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

A devout puritan Henry Ireton was an immediate Parliamentarian activist in his native Nottinghamshire before his meeting with Oliver Cromwell in 1643 changed both men’s lives. Rising to the rank of Commissary-General of the New Model and playing a prominent role in their English campaigns of 1645–48 Ireton shared Cromwell’s religious enthusiasm and acted as one of his political mentors. Henry Ireton, more than any other individual, even Oliver Cromwell, brought about the execution of Charles I in 1649. Indeed it was Ireton’s influence, symbolised by his marriage to Bridget Cromwell in 1646, that did much to persuade Cromwell to become a regicide and in doing so to put his political weight behind that very singular act of English history. Ireton’s importance was through the theoretical and practical framework he provided for the New Model Army officer corps that made possible their revolution in the period 1647–1649. As the ‘penman’ of the revolutionary army Ireton was an author of its significant political statements. Ireton was at the heart of the army’s Heads of the Proposals, their attempt at settlement with the King in 1647, he was its chief negotiator with the Levellers at the Putney and Whitehall debates and Ireton was chiefly responsible for the 1648 Remonstrance that justified the army’s purge of Parliament and called for execution of justice on Charles I. Ireton drove the New Model Army’s revolution in his direction through his strength of will, fortified by his faith and grasp of political reality, to enable a republic to be constructed after the regicide. In 1649 both Ireton and Cromwell embarked on the conquest of Ireland, Ireton remaining there as Lord Deputy. Here he was forced to modify his stance to the Irish, if not Catholicism. It was in Ireland, while on campaign in 1651, that Ireton, having worked selflessly to establish a godly republic, died. DAVID FARR is Head of History and Director of Studies at Norwich School.

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Henry Ireton, c. 1650. Copy attributed to Robert Walker (1599–1658), after Samuel Cooper and Sir Anthony Van Dyck. By courtesy of the National Portrait Gallery, London.

HENRY IRETON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

David Farr

THE BOYDELL PRESS

© David Farr 2006 All Rights Reserved. Except as permitted under current legislation no part of this work may be photocopied, stored in a retrieval system, published, performed in public, adapted, broadcast, transmitted, recorded or reproduced in any form or by any means, without the prior permission of the copyright owner The right of David Farr to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 First published 2006 The Boydell Press, Woodbridge ISBN 1 84383 235 6 The Boydell Press is an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF, UK and of Boydell & Brewer Inc. 668 Mt Hope Avenue, Rochester, NY 14620, USA website: www.boydellandbrewer.com

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Contents Acknowledgements Abbreviations

vi viii

Introduction: the two ‘deaths’ of Henry Ireton, 1651 and 1661

1

1 The making of Henry Ireton, 1611–1642

15

2 Reshaping, 1642–1647

44

3 ‘Penman’ of the army, 1647

76

4 Putney, 1647

99

5 Radicalisation, 1648

118

6 The Remonstrance, 1648

138

7 Purge, 1648

159

8 Regicide, 1648–1649

178

9 Ireland, 1649–1651

204

10 Lord Deputy, 1650–1651

221

Conclusion: Henry Ireton and the English Revolution

244

Bibliography Index

248 271

v

Acknowledgements As a member of the ‘New Morrill Army’ I have no qualms in admitting the great debt that I, as do many others, owe to John Morrill. Much of this will be clear from the numerous references to his work in the footnotes. The time and care that he has always given in support, both academically and otherwise, has always been significant. Others who read drafts of this work, at various stages and in diverse forms, have done much to point me in the right direction. I have been very fortunate in being able to benefit from the advice of Ian Gentles over the past twelve years. His expertise with regard to the New Model Army has always proved invaluable and his recent authorship of the Ireton NewDNB entry made his comments on various parts of this work even more directed. Norah Carlin generously allowed me to read her draft article on army petitions and her useful advice, particularly on early drafts of chapters covering the period 1647 through to the regicide, has been much appreciated. Norah’s comments with regard to historical practice, the nature of ‘authorship’ and especially with regard to the Remonstrance of November 1648 saved me from numerous errors. Markku Peltonen and Kate Siddiqui worked through early manuscripts covering the period up to the regicide. Their comments encouraged me to continue and reshape the book. The final person who worked through a draft of the completed text, in typically record time at the end of the summer of 2005, was Eamonn O’Ciardha. His comments with regard to the Irish period of 1650–1652 and advice with regard to ‘republican style’ saved me much time and invariably improved the final draft. There are many others to whom I also owe a debt of gratitude. Colin Davis was prepared to let me inflict some of my early ideas with regard to Ireton on his Cromwell Special Subject students at UEA. It says much of him that their questioning challenged some of what I said, and Colin himself made me think much more carefully about key aspects of Ireton’s life and writing. Jason Peacey sent me copies of his excellent articles, ‘Marchamont Nedham’ and ‘Royalist Newspapers’, as well as offering much useful advice with regard to Nedham generally. Martin Dzelzainis shared information in relation to the attribution by Austin Woolrych of the pamphlet, An Abridgment of the Late Remonstrance of the Army (1648). Paul Sutton saved much of my time during the later stages of this work. Tom Siddiqui was an excellent Bodleian ‘research assistant’. This book would not, however, have been completed without the friendship and hospitality of Richard Woolvin. vi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As with any book of this type the time and expertise of a variety of archivists and librarians across the country has been essential. The nonconformity of Ireton’s parents could not have been constructed as fully or as efficiently without the database of Nottinghamshire Archdeaconry records held at Nottingham University. I was fortunate to benefit from the expertise of Kathryn Summerwill while researching. Her advice made sure that these records were fully appreciated and set in context by her own work on ‘The Bawdy Court’. I would like to thank Aude Fitzsimons and Dr Neil Jones of Magdalene College and Dr Frances Willmoth of Jesus College for providing information with regard to their college and the Foljambe bequest. The staff of the Cambridge University Library, the British Library, the Bodleian Library, and Nottingham and Derbyshire Record Offices have all been especially helpful. I am also grateful to Peter Sowden, Sarah Pearsall and Ann King at Boydell and Brewer for their support, skills and efficiency. Finally, I would like to thank those who made sure that Ireton always remained in context, namely Fern, Arthur and Henry.

vii

Abbreviations Abbott AN/PB Berkeley Memoirs BL Carlin, ‘Petitons’ CJ Clarke Papers CSPD Declaration of the Engagements DRO Gardiner, Civil War Gentles, NMA Hammond Letters

Hutchinson, Memoirs KWI Lilburne, LFL LJ

Abbott, W.C., The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell 4 vols (Cambridge, MA, 1934–44, reprinted Oxford, 1988). Archdeaconry of Nottingham, Presentment Bills. Berkeley Memoirs, in F. Maseres (ed.), Select Tracts Relating to the Civil Wars in England, 2 vols (1815–26). British Library. Carlin, N., ‘Petitions and Revolution in England, September 1648-January 1649’, unpublished. Journals of the House of Commons. Firth, C.H. (ed.), The Clarke Papers (vols 1 and 2, 1992). Calendar Of State Papers – Domestic Series. Declaration of the Engagements, Remonstrances, Representations, Proposals, Desires and Resolutions from His Excellency Sir Tho: Fairfax (27 Sept 1647), BL, E409(25). Derbyshire Record Office. Gardiner, S.R., History of the Great Civil War 1642–9, 4 vols (Adlestrop, 1987). Gentles, I., The New Model Army in England, Ireland and Scotland 1645–1653 (Oxford, 1992). Letters between Col Robert Hammond, Governor of the Isle of Wight, and the Committee of Lords and Commons at Derby House, General Fairfax, Lieut. General Cromwell, Commissary General Ireton, &c Relating to King Charles I (1764). Hutchinson, T. (ed.), Memoirs of the Life of Colonel Hutchinson (London, 1968). Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer. Lilburne, J., Legal and Fundamentall Liberties of the People of England (18 June 1649). Journals of the House of Lords. viii

ABBREVIATIONS

Ludlow’s Memoirs

Firth, C.H. (ed.), Ludlow’s Memoirs, 2 vols (1894). Mendle (ed.), Mendle, M. (ed.), The Putney Debates of 1647. Putney Debates The Army, the Levellers and the English State (Cambridge, 2001). MP Mercurius Politicus. Morrill (ed.), Cromwell Morrill, J. (ed.), Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution (London, 1990). Morrill, Morrill, J., ‘Rewriting Cromwell: A Case of ‘Rewriting Cromwell’ Deafening Silences’, Canadian Journal of History, 38 (2003). Morrill and Baker, Morrill, J. and Baker, P., ‘Oliver Cromwell, the ‘Zeruiah’ Regicide and the Sons of Zeruiah’, in J.Peacey (ed.), The Regicides and the Execution of Charles I (Basingstoke, 2001). NewDNB Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. NRO Nottinghamshire Record Office. NU Nottingham University. PRO Public Record Office. Ramsey, Ireton Ramsey, R.W., Henry Ireton (London, 1949). Remonstrance A Remonstrance of his Excelleny Thomas Lord Fairfax, Lord Generall of the Parliaments Forces. And of the Generall Councell of Officers held at St.Albans the 16. of November, 1648. Presented to the Commons assembled in Parliament, the 20. instant, and tendred to the Consideration of the whole Kingdome (1648), BL. E473(11). Taft, ‘Ireton’ Taft, B., ‘From Reading to Whitehall: Henry Ireton’s journey’, in M.Mendle (ed.), The Putney Debates. Underdown, Pride’s Purge Underdown, D., Pride’s Purge (Oxford, 1971). Woolrych, Soldiers Woolrych, A., Soldiers and Statesmen, The and Statesman General Council of the Army and Its Debates, 1647–8 (Oxford, 1987). YAS Yorkshire Archaeological Society.

ix

Introduction The two ‘deaths’ of Henry Ireton, 1651 and 1661

On 15 May 1660 the Convention Parliament ordered that justice be meted out on the regicides Oliver Cromwell, Henry Ireton, John Bradshaw and Thomas Pride. For a Parliament that had welcomed monarchy back to England there was nothing surprising about initiating revenge against those who had committed the act that had led to eleven years of republican rule. What was different of course was that all four men were already dead. For the justice required by this Parliament to be enacted their bodies would have to be dug up, taken to Tyburn, the traditional place for the execution of traitors, hung, decapitated and disembowelled before being publicly displayed.1 The horror of such a process is only heightened by the length of time these men had been dead. Cromwell died on 3 September 1658; Pride on 23 October 1658; Bradshaw on 31 October 1659. Of the four Ireton, despite being the youngest, had been the first to die, in Ireland aged 40 on 26 November 1651. A royalist satire played upon the fact that Ireton had been dead for a considerable length of time.2 Of the fifty-nine regicides twenty-four died before the Restoration but of that number only these four were singled out for such treatment,3 a mark of how they were regarded ‘as most guilty of the King’s

1

CSPD (1660–61), p. 408; CJ (8, 15 May, 27 June, 4 and 8 Dec. 1660. That their bodies were dug up at the Restoration was not novel. Other figures from the Interregnum who had also been placed in Westminster Abbey were disinterred. While Edward Popham and Richard Deane were transferred to nearby churchyards the body of Robert Blake was slung into a pit. Cromwell’s mother, Elizabeth, had been buried in Henry VII’s chapel in Westminster but this body was left in place; see NewDNB Elizabeth Cromwell entry by Peter Gaunt. 2 BL, E1081(5), The Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, Henry Ireton, John Bradshaw (1661), p. 7. 3 There is some debate about the exact number of men who should be termed ‘regicide’; see A.W. McIntosh, ‘The Numbers of the English Regicides’, History, 67: 220 (1982). The general accepted number is the fifty-nine whose names are actually on the death warrant. McIntosh has argued that sixty-nine should actually be classed as regicides based on evidence of attendance at Charles’ trial and the trial of regicides between 1660 and 1662. He includes ten men who were present at the last sitting of the trial on Saturday, 27 January where the commissioners stood up and publicly declared agreement with Bradshaw’s verdict 1

HENRY IRETON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

death’.4 In a declaration of 26 August 1651 Charles Stuart had offered indemnity to all but the regicides, specifically naming Cromwell, Ireton and Bradshaw.5 In 1660 Cromwell naturally topped any royalist hit list. Bradshaw owed his selection to the fact that he had served as President of the Court that had tried Charles I. Colonel Thomas Pride had given his name to the purge of Parliament on 6 December 1648 that had made the trial of Charles I possible before then attending almost every session of its proceedings. 6 In the end Pride was not exhumed, and Cromwell’s and Bradshaw’s bodies were only accompanied by a third body, that of Henry Ireton.7 Royalist hatred of Ireton centred not just on the fact that he was Cromwell’s son-in-law but also that he was regarded by many of them as the individual who had done most to bring about the execution of Charles I. Ireton, for Warwick, was ‘a man of blood’.8 For some Ireton directed Cromwell politically.9 While not as simplistic as this it is a view that has some validity.10 but then did not sign the warrant. Partridge has written that only fifteen regicides died before Charles Stuart’s return whereas twenty-four actually appear to have died before the Restoration. R.B. Partridge, ‘O Horrable Murder’. The Trial, Execution and Burial of Charles I (1998), p. 113. 4 Calendar State Papers Venetian (1659–61), p. 148. 5 ‘Charles R’, English Historical Review, 17 (1890), p. 118. The only other regicide named was John Cook, prosecutor at Charles I’s trial. 6 Bradshaw’s name was first on the document authorising the regicide, Cromwell’s third, Ireton’s ninth and Pride’s fifteenth. 7 It is possible that Pride was not dug up because they were unable to find his body; see R.Hutton, The Restoration. A Political and Religious History of England and Wales 1658–1667 (Oxford, 1985), p. 328 n.49. Pride had actually been buried in Nonsuch, Surrey, land he had bought from the Crown; see NewDNB entry by Ian Gentles. 8 Sir Philip Warwick, Memoires of the Reigne of King Charles I (1701), p. 354. This phrase derived from the army’s denunciation of Charles I as the ‘man of blood’ in 1648. 9 See e.g. E.Hyde, The History of the Rebellion, 6 vols (Oxford, 1888), XIII, pp. 175–6, V, pp. 264–5. He wrote that Ireton ‘was thought often by his obstinacy to prevail over Cromwell, and to exhort his concurrence contrary to his own inclinations’; BL, 669 fol. 13 (76), The last damnable designe of Cromwell and Ireton, and their junto, or caball (29 Jan. 1649); BL, E427(15), A new Magna Charta: enacted and confirmed by the high and mighty states, the remainder of the Lords and Commons, now sitting at Westminster, in empty Parliament, under the command and wardship of Sir Thomas Fairfax, Lievtenant Generall Cromwell, (our present soveraigne lord the King, now residing at his royall pallace at White-Hall) and Prince Ireton his sonne, and the Army under their command (17 Feb. 1649); BL, E1035(3), The English Devil: or, Cromwel and his Monstrous Witch Discover’d at White-Hall (27 July 1660), pp. 6–7. 10 The fact that Ireton was Cromwell’s son-in-law was significant. That Ireton became Cromwell’s son-in-law reflected the strength of their relationship and formed a direct link through which Ireton could exert influence over Cromwell. Cromwell’s relationship with Ireton had more depth, politically and emotionally, than those Cromwell had with other figures in his army such as Charles Fleetwood, who was to marry Ireton’s widow, or John Desborough, who was Cromwell’s brother-in-law. For details of Cromwell’s kin see S.J. Weyman, ‘Oliver Cromwell’s Kinsfolk’, English Historical Review, 6: 21 (1891). 2

INTRODUCTION

The hatred vented against the bodies of Ireton, Cromwell and Bradshaw was part of the revenge of returning royalism but also part of a necessary reinforcement of the authority of monarchy, or rather the Stuarts, that had been undermined by the events of the previous eighteen years.11 Zaller has argued that ‘Charles’ reinvestment of the sacred body of monarchy was paralleled by the desecration of the regicides’.12 For Knoppers it was a ‘spectacular and grisly display of monarchical power’.13 The violation of Ireton’s corpse in 1661 tells us much about royalist perceptions of him and the atmosphere of the early Restoration. In contrast, what happened to Ireton’s body almost ten years earlier illustrates the needs of another state, also unsure of itself and seeking to make a political statement through public spectacle.

I On Saturday, 26 January 1661, the tombs of Ireton, Cromwell and Bradshaw, which lay in the chapel of Henry VII in Westminster Abbey, were broken open in time for the anniversary of the regicide. Two contemporaries, Lucy Hutchinson and Edmund Ludlow, expressed some doubt as to whether Ireton’s body was actually removed from his tomb. They felt that his body had not been transported from Ireland in early 1652. Hutchinson argued that ‘whether his body or an empty hearse was brought into England, something in his name came to London’. Ludlow appeared more certain, stating that ‘the wise providence of God so ordered it that his body being interred in Ireland, that of Mrs. Claypoole’s, a great friend of Charles Steward, was treated as his should have bin’. Such stories are most likely fanciful. The argument of McMains, which had been propounded in 1939 by Varley, that Ireton was buried in Ireland and that his funeral in 1652 was a façade, with another body substituted for his, does not rest on any credible source material. In his survey of the evidence Gaunt concluded that, in 1661, the bodies of Cromwell and Ireton were removed from the abbey.14

11 K. Sharpe and S.N. Zwicker (eds), Refiguring Revolutions (1998), p. 56; C. Hill, The Experience of Defeat. Milton and some contemporaries (1984), p. 333. 12 R. Zaller, ‘Breaking the Vessels: the Desacralization of Monarchy in Early Modern England’, Sixteenth Century Journal, 29: 3 (1998), p. 775. 13 L.L. Knoppers, ‘“This so horrid spectacle”: Samson Agonistes and the execution of the regicides’, English Literary Renaissance, 20 (1990), p. 487. 14 For a consideration of whether the bodies dug up in 1661 were Cromwell’s or Ireton’s see P. Gaunt, ‘To Tyburn and Beyond: The Mortal Remains of Oliver Cromwell’, Cromwelliana (1986). Gaunt concludes that it was the remains of Cromwell and Ireton that were dug up in 1661. The following article in the same edition of Cromwelliana, Ivan Roots’ ‘Cromwell’s Head’, deals with the probable resting place of Cromwell’s head. Ireton’s kinswoman, Lucy Hutchinson, expressed her doubts, believing that Ireton was on the point of returning from Ireland just before his death to thwart Cromwell’s growing ambitions.

3

HENRY IRETON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

On Monday night, 28 January, the bodies of Cromwell and Ireton were drawn in two carts from Westminster to Holborn to be followed by Bradshaw’s body the following day. Then on Wednesday, 30 January 1661, after a ‘solemne fast and humiliation for the horrid murder of his late Majesty’, observed in every parish church, the bodies of Ireton, Cromwell and Bradshaw were drawn on a hurdle to Tyburn. Ludlow states that before they had been dragged to Tyburn the bodies were ‘first carryed to the Sessions Howse in the Old Baily, and there condemned’.15 The bodies of Cromwell and Ireton had been ‘wrapped in searcloth’ but Bradshaw had been put in a ‘winding sheete’. As a result the ‘body turned to putrification, cast a most odious sent all the way it went’. At Tyburn their bodies were ‘hung on the gibbet, in the view of thousands’ by the common executioner for Middlesex, with their toes apparently cut off by some apprentices. Ireton ‘having been buried long hung like a dried rat’. Ireton, Cromwell and Bradshaw hung there ‘from 9 in the morning’ until ‘sunset at which time they were cut down and their heads ordered to be set at Wesminster Hall, directly over their High Court of Justice’ with Bradshaw in the centre flanked by Ireton and Cromwell. It took four cuts to remove Ireton’s head. Meanwhile ‘their bodies [were] thrown into a hole under the gallows’ and ‘then buried under that fatal and ignominious Monument, in a deepe pitt’.16 Heath wrote sarcastically that the ‘qualities and conditions of Ireton were so congenial with others’ that ‘the evil spirit after his decease being doubled upon him by a mischevious Metemsychosis, a She wrote, ‘Ireton, Deputy of Ireland, would not be wrought to serve him, but hearing of his machinations, determined to come over into England to endeavour to divert him from such destructive courses. But God cut him short by death, and whether his body or an empty hearse was brought into England, something in his name came to London’. N.H. Keble (ed.), The Memoirs of Colonel John Hutchinson (1995), p. 250. Lucy’s account is, however, wherever it touches upon Cromwell particularly shaped by her antipathy towards him. For Ludlow’s doubts about Ireton’s resting place see A.B. Worden (ed.), ‘Edmund Ludlow. A Voyce From the Watch Tower. Part Five: 1660–1662’, Camden Society, Fourth Series, 21 (1998), p. 272. Elsewhere comments attributed to Ludlow would tend to suggest that he believed Ireton’s body was interred in Westminster Abbey. Ireton ‘would certainly have made it his desire that his body might have found a grave where his soul left it, so much did he despise these pompous and expensive vanities’, C.H. Firth (ed.), Ludlow’s Memoirs, 2 vols (1894), I, p. 295; H.F. McMains, The Death of Oliver Cromwell (Lexington, 2000); F.J. Varley, Oliver Cromwell’s Latter End (1939), p. 63. 15 Worden (ed.), ‘Ludlow’, p. 283. 16 CSPVen. (1659–61), pp. 226, 246; CSPD (1660–61), pp. 500–1; HMC Finch, I, pp. 101–2; Calendar State Papers Ireland (1660–62), pp. 195, 205; J.Bowle (ed.), The Diary of John Evelyn (Oxford, 1983), p. 187; BL, E192(16), Mercurius Publicus, no. 4 (24–31 Jan. 1661), p. 64; BL, E192(17), Mercurius Publicus, no.5 (31 Jan.–7 Feb. 1661), p. 80; BL, E192(18), The kingdomes Intelligencer, no.5 (28 Jan.–4 Feb. 1661), p. 72; BL, E192(20), The kingdomes Intelligencer, no.6 (4–11 Feb. 1661), p. 86; Hutton, Restoration, p. 134; R.C. Temple and L.M. Anstey, ‘The Travels of Peter Mundy in Europe and Asia, 1608–1667’, V, Hakluyt Society (1936), p. 130; Varley, Cromwell’s Latter End, pp. 55–6; LJ, 11, 10 Dec. 1660. 4

INTRODUCTION

transmigration of soul, which assimilated their [Cromwell and Ireton] Ashes in the same grave at Tyburn’.17 The mood of revengeful royalism is clear in the enthusiasm with which some viewed the dismemberment of the corpses of Ireton, Cromwell and Bradshaw. John Evelyn believed the exhibition witnessed ‘the stupendious, and inscrutable Judgements of God’.18 Edward Nicholas, Charles II’s Secretary of State, reported on the day. He wrote at least five letters to acquaintances that commented on how the ‘arch-traitor Cromwell, and two of his choicest instruments, Bradshaw and Ireton, finished the tragedy of their lives in a comic scene at Tyburn; a wonderful example of justice’.19 Ludlow commented with regard to such men as Nicholas that, ‘Yea so barbarous were these men growne that they tryumph over the bones of those whom they durst not looke in the face whilest living’.20 It is likely however that most of the reputed thousands who watched the event did so because it was precisely that, an event.21 Samuel Pepys’ wife witnessed the spectacle, but not with her husband. Pepys did however see the heads of Cromwell, Ireton and Bradshaw when he was at Westminster on 5 February 1661.22 Restoration revenge appears to have been particularly called for by Henrietta-Maria. Yet Charles I’s widow was not in the country to see the spectacle. The actual order for the disinterment of Ireton had been passed by the Convention Parliament on 10 December 1660. Charles II has generally been seen as quite forgiving after 1660, but he certainly did not apply this to the majority of the regicides. In June 1661, during an attempt to bring to trial nineteen regicides who had surrendered, Charles reputedly told Clarendon, ‘I am weary of hanging except on new offences; let it sleep. You know that I cannot pardon them.’23 As Nenner has pointed out, Charles ‘needed to react to the “murder” of a parent while at the same time fashioning his response to the dictates of political necessity’.24 The continuing number of executions after 17

J. Heath, Flagellum, or, the life and death, birth and burial of O.Cromwell, the late usurper faithfully described, with an exact account of his policies and successes, not heretofore published or discovered (1665), p. 124. 18 Bowle (ed.), The Diary of John Evelyn, p. 187. 19 CSPD. (1660–61), pp. 500–1; HMC Finch, I, pp. 101–2; CSPIreland (1660–62), pp. 195, 205. 20 Worden (ed.), ‘Ludlow’, p. 272. 21 For the wider context of receptions of the Restoration and revenge on the regicide see T. Harris, London Crowds in the Reign of Charles II. Propaganda and Politics from the Restoration to the Exclusion Crisis (Cambridge, 1987); N.K. Maguire, Regicide and Restoration. English Tragicomedy, 1660–1671 (Cambridge, 1992). 22 R.C. Latham and W. Matthews (eds), The Diary of Samuel Pepys, II (1970), pp. 26–7, 31. In June 1662 Pepys did attend the execution of Sir Henry Vane: III, pp. 108–9. 23 R.L. Greaves, Deliver Us from Evil. The Radical Underground in Britain, 1660–1663 (Oxford, 1986), p. 33. 24 H. Nenner (ed.), Politics and the Political Imagination in Later Stuart Britain (Woodbridge, 1997), p. 21. 5

HENRY IRETON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

Charles’ restoration indicates that he, like others, wanted a bloody revenge upon the regicides.25 Indeed the ‘merry monarch’ even had one Tench, the carpenter of the gallows for Charles I, executed.26 In 1648–49 Ireton had been motivated, in part, by the notion of ‘blood-guilt’. The retribution exacted on the surviving regicides who had not fled the country at the Restoration was in the same context.27 Even those who had fled the country were hunted down. John Okey who had left a pregnant wife behind him was arrested at Delft and brought back to England for his execution.28 Rather than any scruples on Charles II’s part the executions ended because the most prominent regicides had been killed and the process was having damaging political consequences. By October 1660 a Paris-based correspondent of Henry Oldenburg could comment, ‘Every body here admireth ye constancy and resolution of those men, yt were lately executed in England for having Judged ye late King’.29 A Dutch traveller recorded the courage with which John Okey met his death.30 The state retreated on a promise to Okey’s widow that they would return his body for a funeral due to reports of the numbers likely to attend.31 By June 1662, following the trials of John Lambert and Henry Vane, Hutton had written that ‘whereas Londoners had exulted over the deaths of the regicides in 1660, now they spoke only in praise of Vane and in criticism of the manner of his destruction. By overplaying his hand, Charles had turned a symbol of treason and schism into one of dignity and law.’32 In particular the response to their fate of three of the regicides who had been particularly close to Ireton illustrated the danger that continued retribution would merely serve to stir further sympathy for their cause or reignite the resolve of the defeated. Their sympathisers interpretated ‘the execution of the regicides as a spectacle of martyrdom’.33 Three of Ireton’s closest comrades, the regicides Thomas Harrison, John Cook and Hugh Peter, were all executed in June 1662 proclaiming their continuing belief that what they had done in 1649 had been right. Cook, who had probably worked with Ireton in 1647 and was certainly with him later in

25

CSPD (1660–61), p. 500; J.Miller, Charles II (1991), pp. 46–7. McMains, Death of Cromwell, p. 139. 27 Nenner, Politics and the Political Imagination, p. 25. I would like to thank Kate Siddiqui for reference to this notion of blood-guilt from her reading of an early draft of this chapter. 28 NewDNB Okey entry by Christopher Durston. For his wife’s account of this period see PRO, C7/585/3; C7/84/60, and for a detailed consideration of this D. Farr, ‘Marriage Settlement and Litigation in Early Modern England. The Experience of Mary Rose’, forthcoming. 29 A.R. Hall and M.B. Hall (eds), The Correspondence of Henry Oldenburg, I, p. 402 (University of Wisconsin, 1965); C.Hill, The Experience of Defeat. p. 71. 30 ‘The Journal of William Schellinks’ Travels in England 1661–3’, Camden Society, Fifth Series, I (1993), p. 82. 31 NewDNB Okey entry by Christopher Durston. 32 R. Hutton, Charles II (Oxford, 1989), p. 171. 33 Knoppers, ‘Execution of the Regicides’, p. 491. 26

6

INTRODUCTION

Ireland, had been the prosecuting solicitor for the Commonwealth at Charles I’s trial in 1649. Cook wrote to a friend before his execution proclaiming, ‘We are not traitors, nor murderers, nor fanatics, but true Christians and good Commonwealth men, fixed and constant to principles of sanctity, truth, justice and mercy’.34 As Peter approached execution he proclaimed ‘this is a good day, he is come that I have long looked for, and I shall be with him in glory’.35 When Harrison was derided on his way to his death ‘where is your good old cause?’ he ‘with a cheerful smile clapt his hand on his breast, and said, Here it is, and I am going to seal it with my blood’.36 Such were the men with whom Ireton had decided to publicly commit regicide. With the defeat of the cause for which they had fought, the reputations of the regicides, like Ireton’s, were to be subjected to a written degradation as brutal as that which had been meted out physically on their bodies.37 Knoppers has written of how ‘official accounts appeared to insure that the spectators would properly interpret the drama they watched’.38 While the treatment of the bodies of Cromwell and Ireton was certainly macabre, the fate of Cook, Harrison and Peters was, if anything, more bloody. It also had its grisly features. In the sledge on 16 October 1660 that transported Cook to his death had been placed ‘the face bare towards him, the head of Major General Harrison’ who had been executed three days earlier. Cook’s own head, with Harrison’s, was displayed on Westminster Hall.39 Peter was made to watch the execution of his friend Cook.40 The execution of regicides like Peter, Harrison and Cook was part of the same process of reimposing monarchy that saw such brutal treatment meted out to the bodies of Ireton, Cromwell and Bradshaw. It may have enabled a returning monarchy to illustrate its power, but its authority, after what Ireton, Cromwell and Bradshaw had done in 1649, could never be the same as it was before the regicide.41 34

T.B. Howell (ed.), State Trials (1809), V, p. 1265. Worden (ed.), Ludlow, p. 240. 36 C.H. Simpkinson, Thomas Harrison. Regicide and Major-General (1905), p. 264. 37 See e.g. in relation to Ireton, Justa sive inferiae regicidarum: or, Tyburns revels. Presented before Protector Cromwel, Lord President Bradshaw, Lord Deputy Ireton (1661), J1247/BL, 669 fol. 26[58]; The last damnable desinge of Cromwell and Ireton, and their junto, or caball; intended to be carried on in their Generall Councell of the army, and by their journey men in the House of Commons, when they have engaged them desperately in sinne, past all hope of retreat by murdering the King (29 Jan. 1649), L480/BL, 669 fol. 13[76]; A new meeting of ghosts at Tyburn. Being a discourse of Oliver Cromwell, John Bradshaw. Henry Ioeton. [sic] Thomas Pride. Thomas Scot, Secretary to the Rump. Major Gen. Harrison. & Hugh Peters the divells chaplain (1661), N669/BL, E1085(7); G416, E. Gayton, The religion of a physician, or, Divine meditations upon the grand and lesser festivals, commended to be observed in the Church of England by act of Parliament (1669), p. 94. 38 Knoppers, ‘Execution of the Regicides’, p. 489. 39 Worden (ed.), Ludlow, p. 266. 40 NewDNB entry for Peter by Carla Pestana. 41 Sharpe and Zwicker (eds), Refiguring Revolutions, p. 56; Hill, The Experience of Defeat. p. 333. 35

7

HENRY IRETON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

II Almost a decade earlier what had happened to Ireton’s body had been very different. As in 1661 John Evelyn witnessed the event. On 6 February 1652 he recorded: This day I saw the Magnificent Funeral of that arch-Rebell Ireton, carried in pomp from Somerset house to Westminster, accompanied with divers regiments of Souldiers horse and foote; then marched the Mourners, Generall Cromewell (his father in Law) his Mock-Parliament men: Officers, and 40 poore-men in gownes, 3 led horses in housses of black-Cloth: 2 horses led in black-Velvet, and his Charging horse all coverd over with embrodery and gold on crimson Velvet: Then the Guidons, Ensignes, 4 Heraulds, carrying the armes of the State (as they cald it) namely the red Crosse, and Ireland, with the Casque, Wreath, Sword, Spurrs etc: next a [Charriot] Canopied, all of black Velvet, and 6 horses, in this the Corps, the Pall held up by the Mourners on foote: The Mace and Sword with other marks of his Charge in Ireland (where he died of the Plague) carried before in black Scarfs; Thus in a grave pace, drums covered with cloth, souldiers reversing their armes, they proceeded thro the streetes in a very solemn manner.42

Ireton had died on campaign in Ireland on 26 November 1651.43 Whereas in 1661 Ireton was to be part of the spectacle of the reimposition of monarchy, the preparations for his funeral in late 1651 indicate that the Republic wanted to illustrate its authority through his death. A newspaper reported that the ‘preparations which are made for the Internment of the late Lord Deputy of Ireland, which will now be speedie, and be very solemn and magnificent’.44 In the State Papers for Ireland the care taken over the planning of Ireton’s funeral is clear from the details that were being considered.45 The scale of the funeral is apparent from the fact that £60 was to be spent just on coats for six officers-at-arms to attend and £400 was set aside for some of the costs.46 The new tabards embroidered with the arms of the Commonwealth, worn for the first time at Ireton’s funeral, cost 42

Bowle (ed.), Diary of John Evelyn, p. 145. BL, E791(25), The Faithful Scout, no.47 (5–12 Dec. 1651), p. 368, ‘Thursday Decem. 11. This day came a conformation of the death of Gen. Ireton: He fell sick on the 16 of Nov. On the 17 took a purge; On the 18 he was let bloud; On the 19 lay dangerous ill of a Fever; and on the 26 he died. On his Death-bed he had very heavenly expressions, and desired that the interest of the precious sons of Zion might be preserved’; BL, E791(27), Perfect Diurnall, no.105 (8–15 Dec. 1651), p. 1502; BL, E791(24), Perfect Passages, no.46 (5–12 Dec. 1651); BL, E791(23), Severall Proceedings, no.115 (4–11 Dec. 1651), p. 1777; Whitelocke Memorials (1762), p. 491; CSPVen. (1647–52), p. 209; HMC Ormond, II, p. 247; HMC De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, VI (1626–1698), p. 610. 44 BL, E652(15), The Weekly Intelligencer, no.58 (27 Jan.–3 Feb. 1652), p. 341. 45 CSPIreland, 1625–1660 ADDENDA, p. 385. 46 CSPD (1651–52), pp. 586–7, 595. 43

8

INTRODUCTION

£220.47 Ireton’s brother John, Sheriff of London, was selected as chief mourner. He was accompanied by six assistants, one of whom was Ireton’s father-in-law, Cromwell.48 The State Papers Ireland also indicate that in planning for Ireton’s funeral, reference was made to previous formats, especially the funeral of the Earl of Essex, itself modelled on that for Prince Henry in 1612.49 As with Robert Walker’s portrait of Ireton, his funeral appeared to be another example of the regime not clearly developing its own distinctive artistic forms for political ends.50 Whereas what was done to Ireton’s body in 1661 was all about the act of regicide, no reference was made to it in any aspect of Ireton’s funeral. Yet descriptions of Ireton’s funeral as ‘little more’ than a ‘military parade’ should not lead us to dismiss it as a political statement, if in some ways a conservative one, by the new regime. Indeed its overt military nature is in itself very telling.51 For the funeral Ireton’s body was shipped from Ireland to Bristol.52 A longboat covered in black cloth collected Ireton’s body from the ship anchored in Kingrode.

47

C. Gittings, Death, Burial and the Individual in Early Modern England (1984), p. 231. Evelyn’s Diary, p. 145. Another of Ireton’s brothers, Clement, was probably one of the other mourners. It is possible that another of Ireton’s brothers, Thomas, who had served as a Major alongside Henry in the New Model Army, was too ill to attend. In his will of 20 May 1652 Thomas described himself as ‘weake & sicke in body’. PRO, Prob.11/224 fol. 569. It is not clear what happened to the last of Henry’s brothers, Matthew, after his time at Oxford in the late 1630s. Heath (Flagellum, p. 124) wrote of Cromwell as chief mourner but the records indicate that this position was reserved for Ireton’s brother. Heath naturally wanted to portray Cromwell in the position to add to the drama of his account. 49 J.S.A. Adamson, ‘Chivalry and Political Culture in Caroline England’, in K. Sharpe and P. Lake (eds), Culture and Politics in Early Stuart England (1994), pp. 191, 193. Essex’s funeral is described in BL, E360(1), The true mannor and forme of the proceeding to the funerall of the right honourable Robert Earle of Essex (1646). Essex’s funeral was also a political statement. That Ireton and Cromwell did not attend it further marked them as opponents of the ‘political presbyterians’ in Parliament. See, I.Gentles, The New Model Army in England, Ireland and Scotland 1645–1653 (Oxford, 1992), pp. 143–4. 50 National Portrait Gallery, no.3301. Only an approximate date can be given for the commissioning of this work, c.1650. Another portrait, NPG 33, is also tentatively said to be that of Ireton. Sharpe has argued that the ‘failure of republican politics was a failure to forge a republican culture that erased or suppressed the images of kingship’, Sharpe and Zwicker (eds), Refiguring Revolutions, p. 26. Worden has also argued that ‘supporters of the new regime, both inside and outside Parliament, recognised that it could hope to survive only if it developed an identity opposite to, and ready to confront, that of the royalists’, A.B. Worden, ‘Republicanism, Regicide and Republic: The English Experience’, in Republicanism, vol.I (Cambridge, 2002), p. 325. However, it is debatable how far it was a failure, since previous formats, whether portraiture or even funerals, cannot be seen as exclusively royalist. See S. Kelsey, Inventing a Republic. The Political Culture of the English Commonwealth, 1649–1653 (Manchester, 1997), p. 55. 51 Sharpe and Zwicker (eds), Refiguring Revolutions, p. 44. 52 CSPD (1651–52), pp. 52, 56. Also on the ship was Hugh Dubh O’Neill who had defeated 48

9

HENRY IRETON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

There were great ceremonies over the body of Lord Deputy Ireton at Bristol. Placed on a car of black velvet it was followed by the governor and his officers, the mayor, council and other deputies to the castle, the guns firing the while. The same functionaries, dressed in mourning, followed it out of the city. The governor, with a part of his suite and some of the inhabitants of the deceased’s friends, followed as far as the first stage.53

As the procession left Bristol through Lamsford Gate there ‘was at parting three Vollies of shot, after two Murderers placed for that purpose, and then all great Guns in Castle and Fort’. On the following day Ireton’s body was taken to London, transported in a ‘chariot’ pulled by six horses accompanied and met by two regiments, one of infantry and one of cavalry, received in state and laid in Somerset House where rooms had been cleared for its reception.54 Ireton’s funeral took place on 26 February 1652. At the funeral John Owen preached on the ‘Labouring Saint’s Dismission to Rest’ from Daniel 12: 13 (‘But go thou thy way till the end be: for thou shalt rest, and stand in thy lot at the end of the days’) outlining how he regarded Ireton as committed in his religious beliefs and actions.55 After the funeral Ireton’s body was laid in a specially constructed tomb in Henry VII’s chapel in Westminster Abbey. It seems to

Cromwell and Ireton at Clonmel but had to later surrender Limerick to Ireton. In a Council of War Ireton had argued that O’Neill should be put to death but accepted its decision to spare him. Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 288; J.G. Simm, War and Politics in Ireland 1649–1730 (1986), p. 29. This is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 9, this volume. 53 CSPVen., ‘Advices from London, 11 January 1652’, p. 212. 54 CSPD (1651–52), pp. 66, 546; BL, E791(33), The Faithful Scout, no.49 (19–26 Dec. 1651), p. 382; BL, E791(34), Perfect Diurnal, no.107 (22–29 Dec. 1651), pp. 1539–40; BL, E793(1), Severall Proceedings, no.118 (24 Dec.–1 Jan. 1651), pp. 1831–2. 55 BL, E654(3), John Owen, The Labouring Saints Dismission to Rest. A Sermon Preached at the Funeral of the Right Honourable Henry Ireton Lord Deputy of Ireland: In the Abbey Church at Westminster, the 6th day of February 1651(2); P.Toon, God’s Statesman. The Life and Work of John Owen (Exeter, 1971), p. 83, states that it ‘was essentially a funeral sermon and has no religio-political ideas in it’. J. Peacey, Politicians and Pamphleteers. Propaganda during the English Civil Wars and Interregnum (2004), p. 73, outlines how Owen’s sermon was an example of how ‘published sermons tended to be dedicated to friends of both the author and the deceased’. Owen outlined how he was going to dedicate the printed version to Ireton’s widow, Cromwell’s daughter Bridget. He did not do so however because she was still so stricken with grief. Instead he dedicated it to Cromwell’s second son Henry, who had been in Ireland with Ireton. Bridget’s second husband was to be another of Cromwell’s soldiers, Charles Fleetwood. His wife had died at the same time as Ireton, November 1651. He married Bridget in June 1652, four months after Ireton’s funeral and a month after she was left a ring in the will of Henry’s brother Thomas. Fleetwood was appointed to command the army in Ireland on 10 July 1652 after Lambert had refused the post as a lesser honour than the authority Ireton had weilded as Lord Deputy. Some contemporaries believed that Cromwell engineered the whole episode for the benefit of his daughter and new son-inlaw. Indeed Fleetwood was appointed Lord Deputy on 27 August 1654, the title which had been denied Lambert. For this see D. Farr, John Lambert. (Woodbridge, 2003). 10

INTRODUCTION

have been as elaborately prepared as the funeral, costing £120 and with Hugh Peter apparently writing and paying for its epigraph.56 The republican Algernon Sidney was told that Ireton’s burial inscription was based on Pompey’s and apparently believed, or wished to believe, ‘that if Ireton . . . had not died the Republic would have been Established, and that he would have prevented Cromwell from aspiring to domination’.57 The funeral and monument disgusted some Fifth Monarchists. Jan Poortmans, serving aboard the Resolution, could still denounce the spectacle over a year later: I am glad to hear there is such a spirit in our rulers as to [discountenance] the very appearance of Antichrist in their practices, as the vain pomp at the funeral of Lord Ireton was very offensive to many. It will be disowned in the burial of Gen. Deane.58

One wonders how Ireton’s own Fifth Monarchist brother Clement viewed the spectacle that had been made of his brother’s death and the effusive praise of the press. Given his refusal to accept many of the monetary awards offered to him during his life or to purchase crown lands it seems unlikely that Ireton received the funeral that he would have wanted.59 Indeed John Owen, in the

56

CSPD (1654), pp. 5, 27, 35, 445. While Peter’s epigraph was overblown it was nothing compared to some that appeared in the press. For example see BL, E793(27), Faithful Scout, no.55 (6–13 Feb. 1651[2]): H ere lies Valour it self, in whom alone, E ach Limb enjoy’d its full perfection: N ow thou mayst see (though valiantly he stood) R eader, that Time Consumptions breed ith bloud; Y oung, old, and all must go, both great and good. I reland laments the loss, and England may, R epent that ere she knew that dismal day; E ach man may here see, t’what our glories come, T here being no difference betwixt the House and Tombe O nely Death’s Conquest now’s compleat I see, N ature having suffer’d him to vanquish thee. In another epigraph Ireton was compared militarily to Caesar and politically to Augustus but as someone who would never succumb to the temptations that they eventually did; see BL, E652(15), The Weekly Intelligencer, no.58 (27 Jan.–3 Feb. 1652), pp. 341–3; D. Norbrook, Writing the English Republic. Poetry, Rhetoric and Politics 1627–1660 (Cambridge, 1999), p. 236. 57 J. Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623–1677 (Cambridge, 1988), p. 105. 58 CSPD (1652–53), p. 425. It was not. Deane’s funeral was also a staged affair. 59 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 286; I. Gentles, ‘The Sales of Crown Lands during the English Revolution’, Economic History Review, 26: 4 (1973), p. 629. Ireton did accept land in Ireland and there was only a limited royalist attack on him for profiteering, see, for an early example 11

HENRY IRETON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

sermon he preached at Ireton’s funeral, portrayed Ireton as an example of the idea of service not for its own reward but for God.60 This was also the refrain of another description of Ireton from John Cook who worked with him in Ireland: there was never a more able painefull, provident and industrious servant; that with more wisdom, prudence, faithfulnes, fortitude, and selfe-denial, discharged his duty to all people . . . if he erred in any thing (as error and humanity are inseperable) it was in too much neglecting himselfe.61

Hewson, who also served in Ireland and was governor of Dublin, praised Ireton. He stated, ‘Wee that knew him, can and must say truly, wee know no man like minded; most seeking their own things, few so singly minde the things of Jesus Christ, of publique concernment, of the interest of the precious sons of Zion’.62 Ludlow, another who worked closely with Ireton in Ireland, held a similar opinion. He wrote that Ireton ‘was so diligent in the publick service, and so careless of every thing that belonged to himself, that he never regarded what clothes or food he used, what hour he went to rest, or what horse he mounted’.63 In a letter of January 1650 Rushworth commented that, ‘MajorGeneral Ireton cannot well endure the yoke of his new honours, such is his modesty; indeed he is a good soul’.64 Ludlow believed that Ireton ‘would certainly have made it his desire that his body might have found a grave where his soul left it, so much did he despise these pompous and expensive vanities’.65

* As in 1661, what happened to Ireton’s body in 1652 was more for public consumption as the image that each respective state wanted projected. The funerals of Isaac Dorislaus, Edward Popham and, despite what Poortmans believed, Richard Deane, were all designed to serve the same purpose.66 As Seymour argued:

of this, E3600B, An Exact and necessary catalogue of pentioners in the Long Parliament together, with their several gratuities, rewards, and sallaries, bestowed upon themselves, out of the ruins of the King, and Kingdom (1648). 60 BL, E654(3), John Owen, The Labouring Saints Dismission to Rest, pp. 17–18. 61 BL, 1238(1), John Cook, Monarchy No Creature of Gods making (26 Feb. 1652). 62 BL, 791(23), Severall Proceedings, no.115 (4–11 Dec. 1651), p. 1780. 63 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, pp. 278–9. 64 BL, E533(37), Perfect Diurnal (7–14 Jan. 1650). 65 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 295. With regard to such comments the nature of the construction of Ludlow’s Memoirs needs to be borne in mind as well as Ludlow’s own republicanism; see B. Worden, Roundhead Reputations. The English Civil Wars and the Passions of Posterity (2002). 66 Isaac Dorislaus, civil lawyer, counsel to High Court of Justice, assassinated in 1649 at the Hague when serving as special envoy to the States General (funeral 14 June 1649); Richard Deane, civil war officer, regicide and general-at-sea who died in a sea battle against 12

INTRODUCTION

These were occasions upon which the state and its adherents spectacularly confronted the London population, and through printed accounts thereof, the political nation as a whole. These were occasions when the state chose publicly to demonstrate its power, if not its authority, and the solidarity of its adherents, if not their unity of purpose.67

The contrasting nature of what happened to Ireton’s remains in 1652 and in 1661 is a simple reflection of how perceptions of the man were distorted by the perspective and purpose of each respective state. Yet as with any caricature, these created images of Ireton were based on already received contemporary perceptions of the man which had grounding in the reality of his actions. They have historical validity as they resulted from how his actions were and could be seen and how each respective state wanted to be viewed. The real Ireton was, however, obviously a much more complex individual. One of the most important influences on making Ireton who he was rather than as he was portrayed in the created images of two different states was his relationship with Oliver Cromwell. The royalist and Leveller image of a Machiavellian leading his father-in-law to kill Charles I is overplayed, but one of the most important influences on Cromwell during 1647–49, after God, was Ireton. The two men had worked very closely together since first meeting in 1643. There can be little doubt that they were close and that Cromwell respected Ireton’s intellect and faith.68 Cromwell and Ireton became an effective political partnership, both guided by providence but with Cromwell’s pragmatism also acting as a taming influence on Ireton’s fanaticism.69 Heath referred to Ireton as Cromwell’s ‘second self’.70 Yet their relationship must also be grasped at its more emotional level. Whitelocke wrote that Ireton’s ‘death struck a great sadness into Cromwell’.71 A letter written by Cromwell in September 1652 illustrates his emotional need for political and religious guidance but may also indicate the loss he still felt from Ireton’s death. Cromwell wrote to an unknown correspondent: Have I one friend in our society to whom I can unbowell myself? You absent; Fleetwood is gone; I am left alone – almost so – but not forsaken. Lend me one shoulder. Pray for me. The Lord restore you. My hearty love to you and your dear Lady. If I had more you should have it. I rest Yours to love and serve you.72

the Dutch in 1653 (24 Sept. 1651); Edward Popham, civil war officer and general-at-sea (24 June 1653). 67 M. Seymour, ‘Pro-government Propaganda in Interregnum England 1649–1660’, Cambridge University Ph.D. (1986), pp. 195–6, 226–7. 68 Abbott, I, p. 327. 69 NewDNB Ireton entry by Ian Gentles. 70 Heath, Flagellum, p. 122. 71 Whitelocke, Memorials (1853), III, p. 371. 72 Abbott, II, pp. 575–6. The most likely recipient of this letter was Lord Wharton. For 13

HENRY IRETON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

It was apt that Ireton should hang next to Cromwell in 1661, for it was the depth of the relationship between the two men that did so much to shape the English Revolution of 1647–49 into the form that it took. By their treatment of the bodies of Ireton and Cromwell in 1661 the royalists had tried to portray the recent past as transitory. Cromwell’s faith led him to regard all the past as such. In the only recorded direct comment from Cromwell on Ireton’s death he informed his sister Elizabeth that, ‘What is of this world will be found transitory, a clear evidence whereof is my son Ireton’s death’.73 Yet, no matter what Cromwell thought, or what the Republic of 1652 or the royalists of 1661 did to Ireton’s remains, what Ireton had achieved alongside Cromwell could not be erased. Ireton: erected for himself a more glorious monument in the hearts of good men, by his affection to his country, his abilities of mind, his impartial justice, his diligence in the publick service, and his other vertues, which were a far greater honour to his memory, than a dormitory amongst the ashes of kings.74

the importance of networks in Cromwell’s life see J.C. Davis, Oliver Cromwell (2001), pp. 84–5, 157, 167–8. 73 Abbott, II, pp. 507–8. 74 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 295. 14

1

The making of Henry Ireton, 1611–1642

Henry Ireton was baptised on 3 November 1611 in Attenborough, Nottinghamshire.1 The Iretons had moved from the area of Kirk Ireton, Little Ireton or Ireton wood in Derbyshire into Nottinghamshire at some point after 1600. In 1544 a German Ireton of Little Ireton made his will after being appointed to go in the retinue of the Earl of Shrewsbury against the Scots. 2 Ireton’s grandfather, William, was still described as ‘of Ireton’.3 In his will of January 1604 he was referred to as of ‘Little Ireton’.4 Henry Ireton’s father, another German Ireton, was also described as ‘of Ireton’ in 1591.5 The fact that land in Ireton Wood remained in the hands of Ireton’s father German would also suggest that this is from where the family originated. 6 In 1591 German purchased a lease of Hurst Grange, Norton Cuckney, Nottinghamshire.7 His move to Attenborough seems to have taken place sometime between 1602 1

NRO, Attenborough Parish Register, 8191(3 Nov. 1611). The page with the entry for Ireton is reproduced in Transactions of the Thoroton Society, 9 (1905), p. 28. The original parish register has had all but one of the Ireton entries highlighted, those apart from Henry, in pencil at a much later period. Henry’s baptism looks as if it was actually highlighted in the seventeenth century. In ink, someone has drawn a hand with the index finger pointing at the entry for his baptism. 2 HMC, The Shrewsbury Papers in Lambeth Palace Library, p. 43, Ms 697 fol. 94; HMC, The Talbot Papers in The College of Arms, Vol. G fol. 247. In an entry for a German Ireton who attended St John’s Cambridge in the 1560s reference is made to his father, a John Ireton, ‘Lord Ireton, the first Protestant of the family’, J. Venn and J. Venn, Alumni Cantabrigiensis (Cambridge, 1924), Part I, II, p. 450; DRO, GB 026 D156 M/G8. His son, another German Ireton, also appears to have been linked with the Earls of Shrewsbury; see NRO, 157 DD/P/51/9, 12, 14. 3 NU, AN/PB 293/1/31. 4 PRO, Prob.11/103 fol. 6. 5 NRO, DD2P/28/344. 6 R.W. Ramsey, Henry Ireton (London, 1949); Index of Wills in the York Registry AD 1620 to 1627, Yorkshire Archaeological Society Record Series, 32 (1902), p. 143 of appendix, lists probate of admonition for German Ireton on 12 Oct. 1626. Borthwick Institute, AB fol. 28. 7 NRO, DD2P/28/344. This was purchased from John Zouch, a relation of the family through his father. William Zouch of Attenborough was William Ireton’s brother-in-law who in his will left William Ireton ‘two leases one of the personage’ of Attenborough. 15

HENRY IRETON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

and 1608 but the poor condition of the Kirk Ireton Register does not give us any indication and may also mask his marriage to his wife Jane, whose family no one has yet been able to clarify.8 German Ireton dismantled the estate at Little Ireton, Caldwell and Coton-in-the-Elms in 1611 thus marking the transfer of the family to Attenborough.9 Born in 1611, Henry Ireton was his parents’ eldest son. The Ireton family was to become relatively extensive, Henry ultimately having four brothers and three sisters.10 Naturally his relationship with his parents and siblings would be a strong, formative influence and in Ireton’s case helps explain his activism in 1642 and the later direction of his life. What stands out most visibly is how his early family experiences helped shape him into the ‘Puritan’ that the historical record allows us to see more clearly after 1642. Ireton’s religion was to be the driving force behind his allegiance in 1642 and at the heart of his revolutionary actions after 1647.

I Later evidence from Independent ministers such as Hugh Peter and John Owen indicates contemporary perceptions of Ireton’s godliness.11 Ireton’s close relationship with Cromwell also stands as testimony of his devout Independent

8 DRO, D2069A/PI 1/1. The entries in the register are very faded with not much clear until folio 12, 1622. There are no entries of any kind between 1600 and 1603. A printed version of marriages from the Derbyshire Parish Registers, 3, leaves many gaps and makes many mistakes. For the relevant period parish registers do not survive for the other places that German Ireton may have lived in. 9 S. Barber, Regicide and Republicanism. Politics and Ethics in the English Revolution, 1645–1659 (1998), p. 69; J.L. Hobbs, ‘The Sanders Family and the Descent of the Manors of Caldwell, Coton-in-the-Elms and Little Ireton’, Derbyshire Archaeological Journal, 21 (1948), p. 8. Hobbs stated that ‘the Iretons were originally the senior branch of the Shirley family, both claiming descent from Saswalo, Lord of Ettington in 1079. They descend from Henry, eldest son of Fulcher, son of Saswalo, which Henry sold his birthright to his younger brother Sewallis, from whom come the Shirleys. Fulcher settled at Ireton, the family became lords of that place and adopted the place-name as a personal name’. William Wooley in his History of Derbyshire gives an account of the descent of the land of Ireton to the Ireton family. See C. Glover and P. Riden (eds), ‘William Wooley’s History of Derbyshire’, Derbyshire Record Society, 6 (1981), p. 59. There is also an inaccurate pedigree in Reliquary, 10 (1870), pp. 169–70. For the Ireton/Sacheverell link see PRO, C3/174/56; STAC, 5/568/30. 10 Three of Henry’s sisters died before him. Ramsey, Ireton, p. 1; NRO, Attenborough Parish Register (baptism and burial dates), Mary (April 1607); Elinor (August 1608, buried March 1633); Elizabeth (December 1609, buried March 1613); Henry (3 November 1611); Katherine (July 1613, buried 6 January 1621); Grace (buried 25 June 1614); Clement (31 August 1614); John (17 October 1615); Matthew (June–August 1617); Thomas (4 May 1619). 11 J.L. Dean, ‘Henry Ireton, the Mosaic Law, and Morality in English Civil Politics from April 1646 to May 1649’, Cambridge M.Litt. (1990), pp. 45–6.

16

THE MAKING OF HENRY IRETON, 1611–1642

Puritanism.12 Lucy Hutchinson referred to Ireton as ‘having had an education in the strictest way of Godliness, and being a very grave and solid person, a man of good learning, great understanding, and other abilities’.13 There are, however, problems with the account Lucy Hutchinson has left, it being shaped by hindsight and political loyalty to her husband, the regicide and anti-Cromwellian Colonel John Hutchinson. Her comments on most of the people who appear in the memoirs are quite acerbic, with negative portrayals of even those who worked closely with her husband if she was in any doubt about their godliness or if they were perceived to have crossed him. Yet the work of Norbrook and Hirst has shown how Hutchinson needs to be treated more positively. Indeed she should be regarded as an ‘acute observer’, ‘sophisticated and hard-headed’.14 All of her references to Ireton are positive. Lucy Hutchinson knew Ireton reasonably well. From her own religious perspective it is clear that she viewed those of similar radical beliefs in a much more positive light. This religious dimension is her perspective when writing of Ireton. Her more positive view of Ireton in political terms may have been helped by his early death in that he was never really in a position to clash with her husband who opposed Cromwell’s elevation. Hutchinson’s comments with regard to Ireton’s ‘Godliness’ may be regarded as reliable, in the light of other evidence, as to the importance of religion for Ireton. Ireton’s ‘education in the strictest way of Godliness’ appears then to have taken place in the pre-1642 period. Whereas Cromwell had a ‘conversion experience’ in 1638 Ireton’s approach to religion derived more directly from his parents. Given the fact that Henry’s father died when he was only 13 his mother probably played the more crucial role in shaping his nonconformity.15 German Ireton was the impropriator of the rectory of Attenborough. This position gave him the right to collect some of the tithes. 16 His role as impropriator may account for the fact that the two houses Henry Ireton is known to have occupied in his earlier years were so close to the parish church. As impropriator German also possibly had the right to sell the living or even present it himself. This is suggested in a review of how the rectory came into the Ireton family produced in 1613 and a later chancery proceeding.17 12 The marriage of Ireton to Bridget Cromwell and the obvious closeness of the two men which is apparent in all contemporary comment indicates their shared religious values. 13 Hutchinson, Memoirs, p. 94. 14 D. Hirst, ‘Remembering a Hero: Lucy’s Hutchinson’s Memoirs of her Husband’, English Historical Review, 119: 482 (2004); D. Norbrook (ed.), Lucy Hutchinson. Order and Disorder (Oxford, 2001). 15 For Cromwell’s experience see Morrill (ed.), Oliver Cromwell, pp. 34–6; Morrill, ‘Rewriting Cromwell’, p. 559. 16 AN/PB 293/4/29 stated that ‘Mr Ireton of Ireton is the farmer and receives our tithe corn, hay, wool and lamb’; AN/PB 292/6/9 stated that ‘Mr Wm Ireton who receives our tithe corn and hay’. 17 DRO, D37M/H23/4 fol. 1. This document suggests that the conveyance of the rectory on 27 August 1595 Elizabeth from Isabel Folijambe to William Ireton of Ireton included

17

HENRY IRETON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

The acquisition of the right to collect the tithes of the rectory of Attenborough was accompanied by incumbent financial responsibilities. In 1595 German’s father William became impropriator as a result of a conveyance he signed with Isabel Foljambe, widow of Godfrey Foljambe. In his will Foljambe had specified certain charitable uses to which any profits from the tithes associated with the rectory should be used. Out of the profits of the tithes the Iretons were expected to meet the cost of £40 for a George Tuke while he was preacher in the town of Chesterfield, as long as he conformed to ‘the Rytes and ceremonyes used and allowed within the Church of England’. After Tuke this £40 would then pass to another licensed preacher who should also be orthodox. The sum of £13 6s 8d was to provide for a schoolmaster ‘being sufficiently learned for the teachine of Children within the Towne of Chesterfeald’. The sum of £20 was to be paid to Robert Lansdale fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge during his life and after his decease to the Master and Fellows of Jesus, and £13 5s 8d was for the Master and Fellows of Magdalene College, Cambridge. Finally a lesser sum was reserved to help the poor.18 The failure of the Iretons to meet these stipulations and the nature of the parties designed to benefit from the will, the borough of Chesterfield and two Cambridge colleges resulted in extensive litigation over the tithes from the rectory. Clement Ireton, as trustee of the will of his brother Thomas, was still dealing with this issue in the 1650s.19

the ‘advowson’ but also the requirement to maintain a preacher within Attenborough; PRO, C10/21/116; Ramsey, Ireton, pp. 1–2; C. Brown, A History of the Nottinghamshire (1891), p. 40; NRO, DDHA 1/4/8/157 is a sale catalogue from 29 September 1966 of ‘Ireton House’, Church Lane, Attenborough. If the Iretons did have the right to present the living they did not have the chance to exercise it, since the main incumbent John Mather was there for a forty-year span. In 1635 Richard Brownlowe, a 58-year-old roper, who had lived in Attenborough all his life, apart from the five years of his apprenticeship, reviewed the six vicars he had seen during his life; see PRO, E134/10 Chas1/mich17 fol. 3v. 18 DRO, D37M/H23/4 fol. 1; PRO, Prob.11/86 fol. 54; PRO, Prob.11/88 fol. 58; Foljambe’s will is also printed in D.G. Edwards (ed.), ‘Derbyshire Wills Proved in the Prerogative Court of Canterbury 1575–1601’, Derbyshire Record Society, 31 (2003); PRO, C10/21/116; C93/3/21. A possible link between the Foljambes and Ireton was a Margaret Ireton mentioned in the will as Godfrey Foljambe’s goddaughter. The reason for this bequest is clear from the records of Magdalene College, Cambridge. Foljambe was a fellow-commoner of Jesus College but he was grandson of Sir James Foljambe, a benefactor of Magdalene who married Isabel, daughter of Sir Christopher Wray, a major benefactor of Magdalene College. See Magdalene College Archives, Old Book, fol. 39, B/411. While at Jesus Godfrey Folijambe had been a pupil of Robert Lansdale who originated from Derbyshire. I would like to thank Aude Fitzsimons and Dr Neil Jones of Magdalene College and Dr Frances Willmoth of Jesus College for providing information with regard to their college and the Foljambe bequest. 19 PRO, C10/21/116; E134/9 Chas1/Mich13; E134/10 Chas1/Mich17; C22/773/8; IndI/16825 fol. 25v; E112/168 fol. 41; E126/5 fol. 53; C93/3/21. William Ireton of Ireton had also been involved in his own tithe disputes, NU, AN/LB 219/2/15; 219/2/20; 219/2/21. For Thomas Ireton’s will see PRO, Prob.11/224 fol. 569. 18

THE MAKING OF HENRY IRETON, 1611–1642

In 1607 Chancery mediation under Sir John Manners was tried.20 In June 1609 the aldermen of Chesterfield and the Cambridge colleges secured a decree from the Lord Chancellor, Thomas Ellesmere, against German Ireton.21 This stated that German, his wife Jane and his mother Mary needed to transfer their rights and obligations to other feeoffees to manage the Foljambe bequest.22 It appears that even this did not make German act as the alderman of Chesterfield and the Cambridge colleges wanted. The colleges took further action against German. They argued that he had ‘employed various incumbrances to avoid payments’. As a result of his control of the rectory tithes Ireton was expected to pay £18 p.a. to the King as fee farm rent. His apparent failure to do so brought the intervention of James I’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Julius Caesar, who ‘committed the said German to Prison’. German was forced to give security to make the payment to the King. As a result the Cambridge colleges ‘greatly feare[d] that the said charitable paymts by reason of the weake & declininge estate of the said German are like to be frustrated or defeated’. 23 Eventually it appears as if the tithes for the charity bequests were transferred to a group of Chesterfield aldermen, since a presentment of 2 May 1625 stated that ‘the feoffees in trust of Chesterfield, who have the tithes of the parsonage, and Mr Percivall Hind, parson of Wollaton who has some part of the profit, for the chancel being out of repair’.24 Problems remained however. Magdalene College archives hold a Chancery decree dated 1648 in the case of the Foljambe bequest.25 Records over the issues of tithes and Foljambe bequest continue into the early 1800s.26 Despite the fact that German was the impropriator of the rectory of Attenborough, he and his wife Jane were clearly far from being quiet members of the Attenborough religious community.27 As a result of his right to collect the tithes German Ireton was also liable for maintaining the chancels of Attenborough church and the associated Bramcote chapelry. He was to be consistently cited in the church courts for failing to repair both chancels.28 The chancels had been an issue for German’s father, William, since his purchase of the rectory of Attenborough with its rights and obligations in

20

DRO, D267/162. DRO, D37M/H23/4. 22 DRO, D37M/H23/5. 23 DRO, D267/162. 24 NU, AN/PB 302/198. 25 Magdalene College Archives, A/29.1 (MB 198); A/29.2–3. 26 DRO, D37M/H23/1–5; D267/64/1–19. 27 Hobbs, ‘Sanders Family’, p. 8, argued that Ireton’s father German ‘left the Catholic faith’. That he was ever a Catholic seems to me highly unlikely given the examples of his nonconformity. 28 Presentment Bills were reports made by churchwardens but sometimes by clergy, at regular visitations of the Archdeacon, detailing failings in church buildings, conduct of clergy, and conduct of parishoners. Holland (ed.), Mender of Disorders. 21

19

HENRY IRETON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

1595.29 A 1598 presentment indicates that the Bramcote chancel had long been out of repair and it was unclear whose responsibility it was, although it was suggested by ‘old men’ that as William collected the tithes he was responsible like ‘his predecessors’.30 This remained the situation when William was presented again in 1601.31 German Ireton was first presented for failing to repair the chancel, presumably following the death of his father.32 The records show that in total Ireton was presented for the chancel nine times over the period 1608 to 1624.33 Although the detail of these presentments varied they increasingly placed a clearer onus on German being responsible for the chancel than had been levelled at his father. In 1602 the churchwardens had stated, ‘we are not able to say whether he should repair the chancel’.34 When German was presented in 1608, specifically for one of the windows in the Attenborough chancel, it was clearly seen as his responsibility.35 Attenborough acted as the parish church, for the chapelry of Bramcote and Ireton was also presented for Bramcote in 1608.36 When he was again presented for the chancel in 1609 and 1612, alongside Ireton was named ‘Mr Alldridge of Nottingham’.37 This appears to have been Robert Aldridge, the minister of St Mary’s, the centre of Elizabethan puritanism in Nottingham itself, where he was vicar from 1578 until his death in 1616.38 Why Aldridge was presented alongside Ireton for the disrepair of the chancel is unclear. Ireton was to be presented a further six times for the chancel.39 Yet Ireton’s refusal to address the disrepair of the chancels may also have simply been due to the fact that his responsibility for it was not clear.40 Another reason for Ireton’s failure to repair the chancel may have been economic. The Bramcote chancel was in disrepair in 1587.41 Some chancels were neglected 29

DRO, D37M/H23/4 fol. 1. The chancel was where the priest officiated. NU, AN/PB 292/6/9. A presentment of 1587 indicates that this was nothing new. This reported that the chancel was not in good repair; see NU, AN/PB 292/1/4r/4. At this point the parsonage/rectory was in the hands of John Zouch. See also NU, AN/PB 292/1/1v/4. Zouch was probably the link through which it passed to William Ireton. See DRO, D37M/H23/1–5; PRO, C10/21/116; Edwards (ed.), ‘Derbyshire Wills’, No.155. The Iretons controlled the ‘great tithes’ which traditionally went to the rector whereas the ‘small tithes’ generally went to the vicar of the parish. 31 NU, AN/PB 293/1/31. 32 PRO, Prob.11/103 fol. 6. 33 NU, AN/PB 293/4/29; AN/PB 294/2/107; AN/PB 294/2/89; AN/PB 293/8/106; AN/PB 295/3/106; AN/PB 295/6/78; AN/PB 302/17; AN/PB 302/88; AN/PB 302/149; AN/PB 302/379; AN/PB 302/435. 34 NU, AN/PB 293/4/29. 35 NU, AN/PB 294/2/107. 36 NU, AN/PB 294/2/89. 37 NU, AN/PB 293/8/106; AN/PB 295/3/106. 38 Marchant, Church Courts. 39 NU, AN/PB 295/6/78; AN/PB 302/17; AN/PB 302/88; AN/PB 302/149; AN/BB 302/379. 40 NU, AN/PB 293/4/29. 41 NU, AN/PB 292/1/4r/4. 30

20

THE MAKING OF HENRY IRETON, 1611–1642

because those responsible simply did not want to pay for their upkeep.42 In this economic vein in a record of 1622 German Ireton is the first entry in a list of rectors and vicars who were cited ‘to shoe cause why they ought not to be compelled to pay the procurations and synodals due to the Archdeacon’.43 Although the issue of the chancels brought German to the attention of the ecclesiastical authorities, the nature of the issue and the records are not clear enough to draw any conclusions as to his religious views. Elsewhere in the church records however are clear signs that German Ireton was a Puritan. In July 1616 German Ireton was presented for keeping ‘his hat on his head in the most part of divine service’. In the same presentment it was also recorded that Ireton had, with others, received holy communion without kneeling the previous Easter at the home of one Mr Orme, vicar of Lockington, Leicestershire. Furthermore, Ireton had his child baptised without the sign of the cross by a preacher other than the Attenborough parish priest John Mather.44 This 1616 presentment suggests that German Ireton should be regarded as a Puritan. The godly regarded kneeling as idolatrous and their view of the holy communion as first and foremost commemorative made them wary of anything which evoked an older ‘altar-worship’. Although the laity were expected to take communion three times a year for Puritans ‘the overwhelming majority made a single annual contribution at Easter’.45 Puritans also objected to the sign of the cross. Puritans ‘illegally went to a minister who would baptize without making the sign of the cross’.46 The Attenborough minister John Mather clearly did not live a blameless life but Ireton obviously regarded him as too conformist.47 German Ireton’s act of keeping his hat on during the service might also be regarded as an indication of puritanism.48 Those presented with German Ireton had also given other indications of nonconformity.49 Another incident from April 1620 indicates that there may have been something of a nonconformist core in a relatively small parish of 42

K. Summerwill, ‘The Bawdy Court’, in K. Holland (ed.), Menders of Disorders. Court and community in the Archdeaconry of Nottingham, 1560–1756 (Nottingham, 2004), p. 10. 43 NRO, Hodgkinson’s Transcriptions of the Proceedings of the Court of the Archdeaconry of Nottingham: 1565–1675, 3 vols, III, p. 408. 44 NU, AN/PB 295/6/93; AN/A/36, 28 June 1616. Unfortunately in this presentment the words are missing for the place of the preacher where Ireton had his child baptised. Rather than an unknown child, this is most likely to have been either Clement or John. Although both appear in the Attenborough parish register for baptism their father may simply have wished for another rite to his own satisfaction. 45 Spurr, English Puritanism, pp. 31, 34. 46 Spurr, English Puritanism, pp. 32, 34; Durston and Eales, Culture of English Puritanism, p. 18. 47 Mather was presented as ‘not an allowed preacher’ and as an usurer, see NU, AN/PB 292/10/25; AN/PB 293/2/18. His son was presented for fornication; see NU, AN/PB 302/256. 48 ‘Hat-honour’ was later a marked element of Quakerism. 49 NU, AN/PB 294/2/119; AN/PB 303/123; AN/PB 303/260; AN/PB 303/724/1. 21

HENRY IRETON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

at most 350 communicants.50 It was alleged that with the ministers and churchwardens absent, a ‘strange minister’ ministered the communion on ‘Care Sunday last’, to diverse communicants, some of them standing and some sitting. The church door had been locked by the clerk so that none ‘should come to them’.51 German died when Henry Ireton was 13 years old, and was buried on 18 May 1624 in Attenborough parish church.52 Whereas Dean took this to indicate that German must have died in good standing with the Anglican church it was more likely simply due to the fact that it was normal practice to allow Puritans a church burial.53 The Ireton family’s problems with the church did not, however, stop with the death of German Ireton. As with her husband, Jane Ireton, Henry Ireton’s mother, found herself in trouble with the church. The court records which suggest that Ireton’s mother was a Puritan reinforce the likelihood that his father was. Much of the evidence of Jane Ireton in the church records also derives from the family’s control of the rectory of Attenborough and its tithes. In 1624, soon after her husband’s death, Jane Ireton was presented, alongside Percival Hind, parson of Wollaton, for Bramcote chancel’s disrepair.54 Control of the tithes also meant that like her husband Jane Ireton became dragged into dispute with the aldermen of Chesterfield.55 Yet the issue of these tithes also became part of an increasingly acrimonious dispute between Jane Ireton and the new vicar of Attenborough, Gervase Dodson, who took up residence there in July 1625.56 There appeared to be no obvious early signs of problems between Jane Ireton and Gervase Dodson. On 14 June 1628 as a result of being presented for the chancel of Bramcote and not appearing in her defence, Jane Ireton was excommunicated.57 On 28 June, ‘Mr Gervase Dodson, clerk, appeared and said that she was not liable for these repairs’. It was recorded that Jane Ireton was ‘Absolved and dismissed until the churchwardens justified their presentment’.58 By 1634 however there were Exchequer court proceedings between Gervase Dodson and Jane Ireton that focused on the issue of tithes.59 Through impropriated tithes the laity could exercise control over appointments and

50 NU, AN/PB 292/10/25. The numbers given in 1603 were 335 for Attenborough and 83 for Bramcote. 51 NU, AN/PB 295/8/87. 52 NRO, Attenborough Parish Register, 8191; YAS, ‘Index of Wills’, p. 143. 53 Dean, ‘Ireton’, pp. 43–4; D. Cressy, Birth, Marriage and Death (Oxford, 1997), p. 465. 54 NU, AN/PB 302/184. 55 DRO, D1622/6/1. 56 PRO, E112/168 fol. 41. 57 NRO, Hodgkinson, III, p. 444. 58 NRO, Hodgkinson, III, p. 444. 59 PRO, E134/9 Chas I/Mich 13; E134/10 Chas I/Mich 17. Not all those we can class as Puritans were automatically opposed to tithes; see Morrill (ed.), Cromwell, pp. 22–3.

22

THE MAKING OF HENRY IRETON, 1611–1642

this dispute, given other evidence of serious clashes between Dodson and Jane Ireton, may have been directed at removing Dodson.60 Tithes could also be a substantial form of income.61 Between her husband’s death and 1633 Jane Ireton was presented on no less than eleven occasions for the disrepair of the chancels.62 This suggests that the issue of responsibility and the tithes derived from control of the rectory had not been cleared up by the legal action taken by the aldermen of Chesterfield and the Cambridge colleges. That the rectory of Attenborough appears to have been leased back to Jane Ireton probably accounts for her continuing appearance in presentment bills.63 Jane Ireton certainly seems to have done as much as she could to avoid dealing with the issue of the chancels. The presentments of 1630 and 1632 record her procurment from the Archbishop of York, Samuel Harsnett, of an inhibition to prevent the vicar or churchwardens from presenting her.64 Further presentments seem to indicate that this inhibition made little difference. Henry Ireton’s mother certainly set an example of nonconformity for her family. She refused to be churched and as a result was prosecuted on 16 July 1608.65 ‘Churching’ was a ritual that was designed to mark the end of childbirth. Also known as ‘Purification’ or ‘Thanksgiving’ it had become a church ceremony, and reactions to it were shaped by an individual’s perception of the church and religion. Cressy contends that churching was for most merely an opportunity for a social gathering. Those who were already of a more committed protestant faith would, however, view it in a different context. Many of those who may be referred to as Puritans had a tendency to regard it as another example of popish superstition. Keith Thomas argued that ‘resistance to churching or to wearing the veil became one of the surest signs of Puritan feeling among clergy or laity in the century before the Civil War’.66 There are many reasons why Jane Ireton may have refused the ceremony: that it was a Jewish or popish superstition, the magical sounding call for protection from the sun and moon in Psalm 121, or the offering. There may have been one aspect of the ceremony that made her refuse to be churched. The minister may have insisted on the contentious use of the veil during the ceremony. Yet Jane’s refusals to be churched derive from 1608, and again in 1616, whereas imposition of the veil became more prominent through Laudian

60

J. Spurr, English Puritanism 1603–1689 (1998), p. 70. Morrill, ‘Making of Oliver Cromwell’, in Morrill (ed.), Cromwell, p. 23. 62 NU, AN/PB 302/249; AN/PB 302/256; AN/PB 302/300; AN/PB 302/309; AN/PB 302/567; AN/PB 303/80; AN/PB 303/119; AN/PB 303/164; AN/PB 303/755; AN/PB 303/760; AN/PB 303/805. 63 DRO, D16221. 64 NU, AN/PB 303/80; AN/PB 303/805. 65 NRO, Hodgkinson, I, p. 296. 66 K. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic (1971), p. 69. The information on churching, unless specified, comes from Cressy, Birth, Marriage and Death, esp. pp. 198, 208, 214, 296. 61

23

HENRY IRETON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

influence in the 1620s and 1630s. The records do not allow us to get to the heart of her objection. Yet what does need to be stressed is that Jane Ireton made an active refusal, for whatever reasons, of churching, as she was cited ‘for refusing’.67 Clearly it would be wise to set Jane Ireton’s refusal in the context of the other examples of her religious nonconformity. In 1616 her husband, with others, was cited for refusing to kneel to take holy communion.68 This may have been part of the basis of Jane’s objection to the churching ceremony, that she did not want to kneel at the altar. Indeed Jane Ireton was again presented in 1636 for refusing to kneel at the altar to receive communion.69 Whatever the reason for Jane’s refusal to be churched, both this fact combined with her husband’s own 1616 prosecution tend to suggest Puritanism. Further records of the church courts illustrate Jane Ireton’s nonconformity and influence over her children as well as evidence of Henry Ireton’s own failure to conform. Marchant had shown how in 1631 the vicar of Attenborough Gervase Dodson presented Jane Ireton ‘her children and servants . . . for not coming to evening service and sermon and catechizing, and for owing him three years’ dues’.70 The actual presentment bill also shows that the Attenborough chancel is once more referred to and Dodson also reported that there was ‘noe chancel dore key’.71 Dodson seems to have been at odds with others in the small Attenborough community. Given the animosity between the Iretons and the local minister it is naturally of interest to wonder what they made of Gervase Dodson being indicted for riotous affray in Attenborough in 1631 and subsequently facing a jury trial.72 In May 1632 Dodson himself recorded in the parish register his dispute with his parishioners over how much money had been spent on buying bread and wine for communion.73 Dodson was clearly not an easy man to deal with but the records indicate more of a fundamental clash between him and Jane Ireton. Other evidence not only illustrates the collapse of the relationship between Dodson and Jane Ireton but how far she was prepared to antagonise the vicar. 67

NU, AN/PB 295/6/93. NU, AN/PB 295/6/93. 69 Marchant, Church Courts, p. 178. 70 Marchant, Church Courts, p. 178. Marchant’s work is based on consultation of the church records, specifically the Visitations and Act Books of the Archdeaconary of Nottingham. He also derived some information from the Presentment Books of the Archdeaconary of Nottingham but given the nature of these records and his own research he clearly was not going to come across the full extent of references to the Iretons that are in them. 71 NU, AN/PB 303/123. 72 NRO, C/QSM 1/74/2 fols 148, 182, 208; H. Hampton Copnall (ed.), Nottinghamshire County Records (Nottingham, 1915), p. 162. 73 NRO, 8191, Attenborough Parish Register, 1560–1643; NU, AN/PB 298/183; 303/123; 303/586; Dodson did sign the 1641 Protestation; see W.F. Webster (ed.), Protestation Returns 1641/2, Nottinghamshire/Derbyshire (Nottingham, 1980), pp. 48, 50. 68

24

THE MAKING OF HENRY IRETON, 1611–1642

Presented again in 1632 for allowing the chancel to decay, it was also reported that Jane Ireton had not received the holy communion at Easter.74 In this presentment Dodson also personally recorded how Jane defied him: I doe prsent Mrs Jane Ireton wydow; for deteyninge the chancell dore key unto her owne privat use, and permittinge her Children and servants & others to enter the church whenthey please, and there comitt disorder in breakinge the windows, and [crossed out – in ringing the bells, and] throwinge the Cassocks upp and downe; And for denyinge the minister to have the keepinge of that key, as antiently hath ever accustomed, whereby he is disgracefully lockt out of the churche, and hindered of the benefitt and use [damage], for his privatt studye.75

The breaking of windows may be a reference to iconoclastic attack on stained glass; the abuse of the cassocks may have been because they were considered popish, as Puritan ministers wore academic gowns.76 It may be that in 1631 the 20-year-old Henry Ireton was one of his mother’s ‘children’ presented alongside her, though, as Marchant implies, it is unlikely.77 It is probable that he was in London, having entered the Middle Temple in 1629. He would however have been fully aware of his mother’s activities and the tension between her and Dodson; indeed, he was to have his own problems with Dodson and with the legal and ecclesiastical authorities. From these the reference to Henry Ireton’s nonconformity in 1636 is very clear. Henry Ireton’s legal training at the Middle Temple prepared him for the kind of land disputes in which the Ireton family had become embroiled. It is probable that when Ireton returned from London in the early 1630s he practised law in some form. As the eldest son, he would have been conversant with the continuing issues from the tithes of the rectory of Attenborough and the Foljambe charitable bequests. He acted as the family lawyer in Chancery proceedings in the 1630s, involving the aldermen of Chesterfield, the Cambridge colleges and Gervase Dodson, vicar of Attenborough. Indeed, Dodson had commenced several suits in several courts in relation to the ‘profits’ of the rectory. Jane Ireton herself claimed that Dodson had sued in the ecclesiastical court of the Archbishop of York and of the Archdeacon of Nottingham.78 These ‘suits were managed sevall yeares by the said Jane Ireton and Henry Ireton esq her sonne now deceased at their owne charge amountinge in all to a great sume of money’.79 As a result of some of the legal proceedings that this issue produced, ‘Henrie Ireton of Middle Temple gentl, aged Twentie Two yeares or thereaboutes’, was ‘sworne and examined’, on the 74 75 76 77 78 79

NU, AN/PB 303/760. NU, AN/PB 303/760. I would like to thank John Morrill for his advice with regard to this. Marchant, Church Courts, p. 198. PRO, E112/168 fol. 41. PRO, C10/21/116. 25

HENRY IRETON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

third and fourth days of September 1635.80 In his deposition Henry Ireton reviewed the history of the Foljambe charitable bequest and its relation to the Attenborough rectory tithes. In so doing Henry Ireton referred to other legal documents and other proceedings with which he was clearly familiar.81 With regard to the Foljambe bequest the archives of Magdalene College show that ‘Mris Ireton’ paid in 1635 but not in 1636 or 1637.82 Jane Ireton had by an Exchequer court injunction stayed Dodson’s proceedings against her in the ecclesiastical courts. In October 1640 however the Exchequer court dismissed Jane Ireton’s complaint against Dodson.83 Alongside their appearance in the courts Henry Ireton and his mother were presented by Dodson during the Visitation of 1636 and would thus face other action in the ecclesiastical courts. They had repeatedly refused to obey Dodson’s summons to leave their pew to receive the sacrament at the ‘rails of the Alter’. The altar policy demanded that the communion table be placed against the east wall of the church ‘altarwise’ and railed off. At communion the minister stood on one side while the communicants were supposed to kneel at the rails. It was this policy, probably more than any other, that Puritans regarded as popish.84 The Iretons felt the force of the altar policy and Laudianism from 1635 with the appointment of Edward Mottershed, one of Archbishop Neile’s ‘keenest executives’.85 They would have witnessed the expenditure and physical change in the parish church of Attenborough and the connected chapelry of Bramcote and probably have been aware of the ‘handsome rayle made’ for nearby Thrumpton.86 Chancellor Easdell’s courts for the 1636 Visitation were held on 12 September 1637.87 Ireton did not appear in general court, and as a result was marked as an excommunicate. This was deleted however, for he seems to have represented himself and his mother directly to Easdell in private and submitted. Although ordered to receive at the rails and certify, there ‘is no note that he certified but no further action was taken’.88 80

PRO, E134/10 ChasI/Mich17. PRO, E134/10 ChasI/Mich17. 82 Magdalene College Archives, Old Book, fol. 39, B/411. 83 PRO, E126 fol. 53. 84 J. Davies, The Caroline Captivity of the Church. Charles I and the Remoulding of Anglicanism 1625–1641 (Oxford, 1992). 85 R.A. Marchant, ‘The Restoration of Nottinghamshire Churches, 1635–40’, Transactions of the Thoroton Society, 65 (1961), p. 61. 86 Marchant, ‘Restoration’, pp. 64, 67, 87. 87 Marchant, Church under Law, pp. 232–33. 88 Marchant, Church Courts, p. 198. This information comes from Visitation record R.VI.A. 24 fol. 505v. This may be a reflection of the fact that while still referred to as ‘the ultimate sanction’ in practice, it has been argued, excommunication was sometimes not as threatening as it sounds. C. Durston and J. Eales (eds), The Culture of English Puritanism, 1560–1700 (1996), pp. 61, 64–5. 81

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THE MAKING OF HENRY IRETON, 1611–1642

Clearly Jane Ireton was a persistent offender and the church court records also indicate Henry Ireton’s own noncomformity had already formed by 1636 and would therefore be a key factor in shaping his response to the crisis that Charles unleashed upon himself with the imposition of a new Prayer Book on Scotland in 1637. Ireton’s willingness to present himself in person to Chancellor Easdell no doubt derived from his legal training but is also suggestive of a stubborn nature that many later noted. In November 1639 Henry Ireton was presented for ‘not paying five levies’.89 What reinforces the importance of religion in shaping Ireton and his response in 1642 is the experience of three of Ireton’s four brothers. John Ireton (1615–90) has been described as an Independent. He was later clearly identified as one of London’s Puritan civil leaders. Woolrych commented that he ‘demonstrated his religious radicalism in the Nominated Parliament of 1653 by appearing as a teller for bringing in a bill to abolish lay patronage’. A prominent member of the influential Bread Street ward, John Ireton was also part of the St Pancras Soper Lane congregation of the Independent/Fifth Monarchist George Cockayne.90 The evidence for Thomas Ireton, Ireton’s youngest brother, is more limited. His independency might be indicated by the Lord’s veto of his New Model commission. His later role as an officer adjutator may also reflect his relative political radicalism.91 The preamble in his will where he bequeathed his soul as well as making a bequest to the poor of the neighbourhood of his birth may also indicate Puritanism.92 There is even less information for Henry’s other brother, Matthew. He attended Magdalen, Oxford between 1635 and 1639.93 Clement Ireton (1614–70) has been labelled by Capp as a prominent Fifth Monarchist. He was very active during the 1650s in opposing Cromwell’s Protectorate, the New Model Army and then the Restoration.94 In 1666 Clement Ireton’s nonconformity landed him in prison.95 The views of three of Ireton’s four brothers may be indicative of a shared experience that shaped their nonconformity. The evidence considered to date 89

NU, AN/PB 303/679. T. Liu, Puritan London. A Study of Religion and Society in the City Parishes (1986), pp. 49n. 98, 203, 226. R.L. Greaves and R. Zaller (eds), Biographical Dictionary of British Radicals in the Seventeenth Century, 3 vols (Brighton, 1982–84), p. 155. 91 I. Gentles, ‘The Choosing of Officers for the New Model Army’, Historical Research, 67: 164 (1994). We should however bear in mind Massarella’s point with regard to the adjutators that the ‘fact that the non-engaging officers authorised some of their own number to represent their views serves to remind us that the roles of representation did not emerge solely from the ranks with the agitators, it was common both to officers and soldier’, and obviously not just the preserve of those of a more ‘political independent’ persuasion. See D.P. Massarella, ‘The Politics of the Army 1647–1660’, York University Ph.D. (1977), p. 24. For full consideration of the role of adjutators see Chapter 3. 92 PRO, Prob.11/224 fol. 569. 93 A. Wood, Alumni Oxonienses (1817), III, p. 789. 94 B.S. Capp, The Fifth Monarchy Men (1972), pp. 107, 114, 124, 126, 211, 252. 95 East Sussex Record Office, FRE/5504. 90

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for these brothers however derives from after 1642. Other evidence from the 1630s also shows that, like Henry Ireton, some of his brothers and sisters were also regarded as nonconformists by the ecclesiastical authorities. In 1631 Dodson presented Elinor, Henry’s 23-year-old sister, with others, for ‘going from their parish church at evening catechism service and sermon every Sabbath day and most particularly for their absence on 10 July and 11, 18 and 25 September, although they were publicly admonished to have come to catechism’.96 On 14 May 1632 the presentment was repeated. This time however one of Ireton’s brothers, John, was also presented alongside his sister for ‘going from the parish church at evening catechism, exposition, sermon both in time of Lent and at other times, and for not applying themselves in divine service according to the 18th Canon’.97 Religion was a real force in Henry Ireton’s life and one, given his apparent Puritanism, that would have made him more inclined to be an active Parliamentarian. Writing to Ireton in 1650, Cromwell remarked that ‘I often remember you at the Throne of Grace’.98 In 1646 he had told his daughter Bridget of ‘the image of Christ’ he saw in her new husband, Ireton, that in effect he saw him as one of the saints.99 Ireton’s own words from 1642 indicate how he saw the conflict in religious terms, with the implication that he believed his cause was God’s: I stick to my former proposition till Mr. Hastings mend his answer and find some reason (at least) to wave his presumed principle (that he’s I’ the right and we in the wrong) until God or the sword or some other more competent judge than himself have decided it.100

Such ideas were also expressed on the cornet borne during Ireton’s early captaincy in the war: ‘In matters divine, he who lets in (surrenders) preserves: in matters human, meet force with force.’101 Gentles has concluded that the 96

NU, AN/PB 303/123. AN/PB 303/759. 98 Abbott, I, p. 327. 99 Abbott, I, p. 416. I would like to thank John Morrill for his comments with regard to this letter. 100 HMC Hastings, II, pp. 83–4. Although only this letter survives it was clearly not the first communication. The Mr Hastings referred to was Henry Hastings, second son of Henry, 5th Earl of Huntingdon. He was appointed to the commissions of array for Derbyshire and Leicestershire and became Colonel General of Leicestershire, Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire and Rutland. He was in the garrison of Colchester in 1648 that was besieged by Ireton but escaped and went into hiding. See P.R. Newman, Royalist Officers in England and Wales, 1642–1660: A Biographical Dictionary (New York), pp. 179–80. In the summer of 1642 Hutton has noted that Hastings was ‘one of Charles’s most fervent, and notorious, followers’, R. Hutton, The Royalist War Effort 1642–1646 (1999), p. 41. 101 A.R. Young, The English Emblem Tradition, III, Emblematic Flag Devices of the English Civil War (Toronto, 1995), p. 178. A colour reproduction of Ireton’s cornet and a range of 97

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THE MAKING OF HENRY IRETON, 1611–1642

‘key factor in pre-combat motivation can be summed up in a word: it was religion.’102 There is evidence however of another influence to which Ireton was subjected in his early years which may also help explain his immediate activism in 1642.

II Ireton’s religious leanings make him an obvious stereotypical model for the Puritan motivated into taking active opposition to the Crown in 1642. More significantly Ireton was part of an ‘interest’. Lucy Hutchinson referred to ‘Mr Ireton being very active in promoting the Parliament, and the Godly interest in the country’.103 In this context ‘country’ refers to the county of Nottinghamshire. Ireton’s kindred links had formed a bond which, combined with shared religious beliefs, made them, despite, or because of, their relatively low social standing, a potent Parliamentary grouping in the county by 1642. Lucy Hutchinson referred to the various connections her husband had in the pre-civil war period and Henry Ireton appears to have been a prominent member of the overlapping network circles of Nottinghamshire Puritan gentry. Again, awareness of the problematic nature of Hutchinson’s memoirs as a source is needed. She overstated the influence of her husband and viewed the pre-1642 connections from the perspective of the centre of his network. Hutchinson’s and Ireton’s network circles overlapped significantly, but Ireton’s obviously had as its centre himself and would therefore intersect with other networks from a different perspective than that of Hutchinson. Lucy Hutchinson’s view is also shaped by hindsight in that she may have had a tendency to focus more on those who continued to work together after 1642 for Parliament and marginalise others to whom Ireton was also connected prior to 1642 and who were not Parliamentarians. Yet, despite all of this, treated with care, Lucy Hutchinson’s memoirs do at least present a picture of some of the people Ireton was close to before the outbreak of the war. Lucy Hutchinson’s husband John Hutchinson (1615–64) was Henry Ireton’s cousin.104 John Hutchinson was four years younger than Ireton. Lucy commented directly on their cooperation in 1641 but she indicated that their

other civil war banners may be seen in C. Kightly, ‘Standards of the English Civil War’, Military Modelling, 7: 12 (1977), p. 853. 102 I. Gentles, ‘Why Men Fought in the British Civil Wars, 1639–1652’, The History Teacher, 26: 4 (1993), p. 409. 103 Hutchinson, Memoirs, p. 79. 104 Robert Thoroton, The Antiquities of Nottinghamshire (1670), Wing T1063, Reel 299.1, pp. 12, 79; Transactions of the Thoroton Society, 9 (1905), p. 29; 13 (1909), pp. 19–20; Thoroton Record Series, 13 (1950), Nottinghamshire Visitation 1662–1664, pp. 11, 23. However, for an example of the legal difficulties from kin for the Ireton family see the record in relation to one of Ireton’s daughters, ‘Katherine Lloyd, wife or reputed wife of Richard 29

HENRY IRETON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

relationship had already been influenced by John’s father, Sir Thomas Hutchinson (1589–1643). She stated that Ireton: being a kinsman of Mr. Hutchinson’s and one that had received so much advantage to himself and his family in the country by Sir Thomas Hutchinson’s countenance and protection, that he seemed a kind of dependent upon him, and being besides a very grave, serious, religious person, there was a great kindness and good-will between them.105

Lucy’s comments, written in the knowledge of Ireton’s later significance, possibly exaggerated the ‘advantage’ Ireton received at the hands of her fatherin-law. However, given the relative economic and social standing of the two families, coupled with Ireton’s father’s early death, Sir Thomas Hutchinson did probably extend at least some aid to the young Ireton as befitted the normal interaction of kin relations, and more specifically where there were strong social and religious ties. Lucy’s comments on Ireton’s obligation to Sir Thomas only points to her willingness to admit that it was Ireton and not her fatherin-law or husband who was the leading figure in the resistance to the Crown in 1642. Her need to qualify her own husband’s reticence is, in part, right. Ireton, a minor gentry figure with no wife and family, was in a better position to take open action than were Lucy’s husband or his father. It is probable that they were very influential behind Ireton’s more visible opposition. As well as extending some aid to Ireton following the death of his father, Sir Thomas Hutchinson was part of Ireton’s political education. Indeed this may have taken quite a direct form. Given the rather studious image of Ireton it is also not hard to imagine him, reinforced by his admission to Trinity, Oxford in 1626, making use of Hutchinson’s noted library. His hospitality would have included discussion of current affairs.106 Sir Thomas Hutchinson’s actions would also have had some impact in shaping Ireton’s political thinking. Sir Thomas Hutchinson’s position in 1642 came after previous opposition to the Crown having been imprisoned for refusing to contribute to the 1626 Forced Loan. Whereas Hutchinson was one of the eleven of the forty-five liable in Nottinghamshire for the Forced Loan who refused to pay, he, along with everyone else, ‘willingly condescended’ to a new loan of 1627–28.107

Lloyd’. Surrey History Centre: Mortlake Parish Records II: 2414/6/20, 14 February 1688. Richard Lloyd was a London-based lawyer but had links with Derbyshire through John Gell in the late 1640s; see DRO, D258/9/11/4, 15–17; D258/10/65; D258/17/31/50–53. There may also have been a link through one of John Ireton’s associates, Griffith Lloyd; see PRO, C6/185/86. 105 Hutchinson, Memoirs, p. 78. 106 M. Keeler, The Long Parliament (Philadelphia, 1954), p. 227. 107 A.C. Wood, Nottinghamshire in the Civil War (Wakefield, 1971), p. 10; Keeler, Long Parliament, p. 227. 30

THE MAKING OF HENRY IRETON, 1611–1642

It is obviously problematic to infer allegiance in 1642 from resistance to the Crown in 1626. However, Cust, in his study of the Forced Loan, felt able to draw some general conclusions. He argued that contemporaries did regard the Forced Loan as ‘a test of fundamental loyalties’ and that the ‘memories of opposing and defying the Crown’s servants in 1626 and 1627 carried into the later period’. Furthermore, he asserted that ‘many of those who came to the fore as loan resisters also took a leading part in opposing Crown levies of the 1630s, and actively supported Parliament during the Civil War’. Cust furthermore stated that ‘the response to the loan often provided the best indication of ultimate political allegiance prior to the Civil War’.108 Hutchinson appears to have paid the Ship Money assessment. For those who were not fully commited in their opposition to the Crown the legal basis of Ship Money was stronger than that of the Forced Loan, and as such they would be more inclined to accept this later tax. 109 Hutchinson’s payment should also be set in the wider context of the general acceptance of this tax, on a nomimal level at least, until the Scottish revolution gave confidence to those who wanted to more openly resist Ship Money. Hutchinson’s appearance as one of the MPs named on the Ship Money committee in the 1640 Parliament may be an indication of his concerns over the issue.110 As a JP for Nottinghamshire Hutchinson also delivered a receipt of March 1633 for money collected from the county for repair to St Paul’s.111 Ireton’s relationship with Hutchinson and his network would have involved him in the political debate that the Forced Loan and Charles’ policies during the Personal Rule, clearly stimulated in county communities, as well as in the London Inns of Court which Ireton entered in 1629.112 Ireton’s relationship with the Hutchinsons allows us to see the other figures that Ireton stood alongside in opposition to the Crown in 1641–42. Although most of our evidence of their cooperation comes from this crisis period it was clearly based on previous links. Francis Thornhagh (1616–48), eldest son of Sir Francis Thornhagh of Fenton, being five or six years younger than Ireton, had been at Lincoln School with John Hutchinson before attending Magdalen with Ireton’s brother Matthew.113 Unlike Henry Ireton and John Hutchinson, who both moved from university to the Middle Temple and Lincoln’s Inn respectively, Thornhagh had served with Essex in the Netherlands. Thornhagh might have given the

108

R. Cust, The Forced Loan and English Politics 1626–1628 (1987), pp. 329, 331, 333–5. W. Prest, ‘Ship money and Mr Justice Hutton’, History Today, 41 (1991), p. 45. 110 Keeler, Long Parliament, p. 227. 111 NRO, C/QSM 1/74/3 fol. 405. 112 K. Fincham, ‘The Judges’ Decision on Ship Money in February 1637: The Reaction of Kent’, Historical Research, 57 (1984). 113 J. Foster, Alumni Oxonienses (Oxford, 1892), p. 789. One of Matthew Ireton’s sons, Charles, attended Westminster School before Trinity, Cambridge; see J. Venn and J. Venn, Alumni Cantabrigiensis (Cambridge, 1924), Part I, II, p. 450; G.F. Russell Barker and A.H. Stenning, The Records of Old Westminsters (1928), I, p. 505. 109

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group that Ireton cooperated with in 1642 the European context for their actions.114 There was a perception that England had betrayed fellow Protestants, evident in the later years of James’ reign and reinforced by Charles’ Laudianism. Lucy Hutchinson believed that Charles was ‘stirred up by Satan’ and had a court ‘replenished with papists’.115 It is very unlikely that contemporaries chose to oppose Charles simply as the result of one policy and most probably had a broad view of the danger he presented to the ‘ancient constitution’ and Protestantism. Thornhagh was back in the country by at least 1640 to marry Elizabeth St Andrew of Gotham. It is possible that his return was due to this marriage or, like others, he returned to England as a result of the developing political crisis that emerged with the outbreak of the Scottish rebellion in 1637.116 Another individual with whom Ireton worked in the early days of war in Nottinghamshire and with whom there was probably some previous connection was Gervase Pigott (b. 1617). Pigott was a year older than Thornhagh, born in Thrumpton close to Attenborough. He had also been to Lincoln School. Hutchinson’s favourable view of Pigott points to shared religious values.117 Pigott’s noncomformity appears to have evolved into presbyterianism as he, with his wife, privately maintained the presbyterian preacher Ferdinand Poole.118 This may explain his being a victim of Pride’s purge in 1648, whereas his readmittance to the Commons may also have been as a result of Ireton’s influence.119 In addition to religious and political ties, Thornhagh and Pigott shared kinship links. It is difficult to order the process, as it is likely that their intermarriage was partly based on their shared values. It was the St Andrew family in particular that bound many of them together through marriage but

114

Close to Ireton’s Attenborough in Thrumpton in 1635 lived one Zouch Holden, an example of the effect of the European war. In Holden’s petition of that year he outlined how he was pressed as a soldier in the war of the King of Denmark. NRO, C/QSM 1/75 fol. 25. 115 Spurr, Puritanism, p. 95; W. Hunt, The Puritan Moment: The Coming of a Revolution in an English County (Harvard, 1983), pp. 187–8. There were, naturally, a range of reasons for entering war, from the mundane to the romantic; see G. Parker, The Thirty Years’ War (London, 1984), pp. 194–5. In 1627 Hugh Peter was busy raising money for the refugee ministers of the Palatinate; see J.T. Peacey, ‘Seasonable Treatises: A Godly Project of the 1630s’, English Historical Review, 113: 452 (1998); Hutchinson, Memoirs, pp. 67–8. 116 General biographical information for Thornhagh comes from Zaller and Greaves (ed.), Biographical Dictionary. 117 Hutchinson, Memoirs, pp. 108–9. The extent of preaching at Owthorpe appears to have been quite marked in 1596, NU, AN/PB 292/5/77. 118 Marchant, Church Courts, p. 198. In 1608 Poole was presented for his part in the local churchyard being in decay, NU, AN/PB/294/2/136. 119 D. Underdown, Pride’s Purge (Oxford, 1971). In 1653 Pigott and John Hutchinson took the deposition of Clement Ireton at Chesterfield as part of the long-running tithe dispute the family had, at this stage, with the vicar Gervase Dodson; see PRO, C22/773/8. 32

THE MAKING OF HENRY IRETON, 1611–1642

also provided a direct kinship link for Ireton with Thornhagh and Pigott.120 John St Andrew of the puritan parish of Gotham had with his wife Elizabeth, daughter of John Bainbrigge, three daughters. Two of these daughters, Mary and Elizabeth, had married respectively Gervase Pigott and Francis Thornhagh. William Bainbrigge had married Elizabeth Pigott, the sister of Gervase Pigott. When she died Bainbrigge married Henry Ireton’s sister Mary.121 Another personality in Hutchinson’s Memoirs and a member of this ‘interest’ in the early years of the war was Gervase Lomax, son of Henry Lomax of Thrumpton, close to Attenborough. Lomax married Elizabeth Bainbrigge, a close confidant of Lucy as well as being Henry Ireton’s ‘very loving niece’. Pigott was Lomax’s ‘good cousen’; Mrs Francis Pigott was his ‘good sister-inlaw’. Lucy Hutchinson refers to Lomax as being from lower reaches of the gentry. He earned her respect and no doubt his position within the ‘interest’ from his godliness.122 Nicholas Charlton (1592–1650) of Chilwell, again close to Attenborough, was one of the most regular and active members of the Nottinghamshire Parliamentary committee. His son Thomas, who was 17 years old in 1636, was Henry Ireton’s ‘honoured friend’.123 Thomas married Tabitha, daughter of William Nixe, another prominent member of the Nottinghamshire Parliamentary committee and clearly linked to the Charltons for some time.124 That Attenborough church served as the parish church for Chilwell and Thrumpton would have reinforced the links between the Iretons, Charltons, Pigotts and Lomax.125 The strength of this group appears to have been their kinship links reinforced by their broad shared religious values. The Hutchinsons and Thornhagh, the

120

NRO, 157 DD/FJ/1/162/1–2; Thoroton Society Record Series, 13 (1950), Nottinghamshire Visitation 1662–1664, pp. 52, 69. 121 Ramsey, Ireton, p. 6; Marchant, Church Courts, p. 325. Bainbrigge was from Lockington, Leicestershire but on the very border of Derbyshire. A possible link to this family came through German Ireton using a Mr Orme, vicar of Lockington; see NU, AN/PB/295/6/93. 122 Hutchinson, Memoirs, p. 109. See also Lomax to Thomas Fairfax, 6 June 1645, R. Bell (ed.), Memorials Of The Civil War: Comprising The Correspondence Of The Fairfax Family With The Most Distinguished Personages Engaged In That Memorable Contest, 2 vols (1849), I, p. 229. 123 Both Nicholas and Thomas signed the Nottinghamshire Protestation return; see Webster (ed.), Protestation Returns, p. 50. 124 Wood, Notts., p. 131; Nicholas Charlton’s will was proved 10 March 1650/1, PRO, Prob.11/215 fol. 542; NRO, C/QSM 1/74/2 fol. 204; C/QSM 1/76 fol. 29. William Nixe’s father, Edward Nixe, of the puritan parish of St Mary’s Nottingham, was denounced as a ‘brownist’; see NU, AN/PB 294/2/119. 125 Thoroton, Antiquities, p. 205; PRO, E134/10 Chas I/Mich 17. Mrs Pigott had been noted in a Visitation of 1619 for receiving the communion standing; Marchant, Church Courts, p. 198. The south aisle wall of Attenborough St Mary church displays the arms of the Charlton family. In the south aisle there are also various floor slabs for members of the Charlton family dating back to this period. 33

HENRY IRETON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

most substantial members of the gentry in the group, linked this circle with men of more influence such as William and Francis Pierrepont, the second and third sons of the Earl of Kingston. There was no economic pattern to the relationship of this group. On 1641 Subsidy return, Sir Thomas Hutchinson was assessed at £20, his family having been particularly hard hit by wardships.126 Sir Francis Thornhagh was assessed at £10 and his son Francis at £5, whereas Pigott and Charlton were assessed at £4 and £3 respectively. However, as Cliffe’s study of the subsidy returns of the Yorkshire gentry has indicated, the relationship between levels of assessment and yearly income was less than exact. An assessment figure of £20 probably meant that Hutchinson owned land worth about £1,000 p.a. Ireton and Lomax appear to have been of much lower social standing, with estates probably under £100 p.a.127 Zagorin referred to Ireton as the ‘ideologist of the “mere” gentry’.128 Ireton may have been from the gentry class but his own economic position before the civil war was not secure. The composition of the Nottinghamshire committee once war had begun indicates the preponderance of the group of which Ireton was a part. Of the twenty-three other men named to the committee, Ireton can be linked to half of them. Of these twenty-three, Wood argues that only some sustained the cause or formed a core of ‘resolute supporters’. What stands out about those with whom Ireton was connected was that, like him, they were a key part of the active core. Wood pointed out the importance of the family ties that bound this active core together.129 The question of allegiance is complicated however, and examples of open opposition to the Crown prior to 1642 are rare, even for those who later emerged as opponents in 1642. This is more so in the case of men such as Ireton, on the reaches of the gentry, who have left fewer traces on the historical record until their emergence as a consequence of the war. In terms of the group of which Ireton was part there is little evidence of their activities in the 1630s. Even for those who have left some material from the 1630s the development of their position to the point where in 1642 they were prepared to oppose the Crown is naturally not signposted. Their position in the 1630s does, however, provide further context for Ireton’s position. Through his interaction with them, Ireton would have been linked to the central political and religious issues of the day.

126

Hyde, The History of the Rebellion, 6 vols (Oxford, 1888), I, pp. 198–9, II, pp. 102–3. Wood, Notts., p. 130; J.T. Cliffe, The Yorkshire Gentry. From the Reformation to the Civil War (1969), p. 139. 128 P. Zagorin, ‘The Social Interpretation of the English Revolution’ Journal of Economic History, 19: 3 (1959), p. 385. 129 Wood, Notts., pp. 124, 128–9. 127

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III Francis Thornhagh’s father, Sir Francis Thornhagh, Sheriff of the county of Nottingham, had responsibility for Ship Money returns. On 13 January 1638 Thornhagh wrote to the Council in response to complaints made by the county’s southern division about his Ship Money assessments. He refuted charges that he had assessed to the advantage of the northern division in which he resided.130 It is nevertheless significant that geographically the southern area provided most resistance to the Crown in 1642.131 On 24 March 1638 Thornhagh informed Secretary Nicholas that ‘money is scarce in the country, and you know how I have [been] troubled about the assessment. I have neither spared care nor pains since I came down into the country.’132 By 18 May 1638 Thornhagh informed Nicholas that his ‘forbearance’ had: produced no other effects but refractoriness, but now I intend to proceed to distraining, which I hope will bring in the money more speedily, though not willingly. The arguments of Judge Croke and Hutton against the King for this shipmoney have made men more backward than they would have been. It is reported that the King has expressed himself that he would have nobody distrained or imprisoned. I pray write me what the Council would have done with those who refuse, that I may, as near as I can, satisfy the King’s expectation, wrong nobody and keep myself out of danger.133

In response the Council sent Thornhagh a stinging rebuke.134 Thornhagh’s letter of 18 May 1638, which provoked such a bitter reaction from the Council, concerned the legality of Ship Money and the trial of John Hampden for disputing the right of the Crown to levy it.135 Thornhagh’s position is not clear,

130

CSPD (1637–38), p. 159. Wood, Notts., p. 129. 132 CSPD (1638), p. 327. 133 CSPD (1638), p. 443. 134 CSPD (1638), p. 462. 135 Charles I initiated the process of receiving judicial judgement on the legality of his actions for clarification of his right to collect Ship Money in two areas: first, that he could levy it on the whole country, and second, that he judged what was an emergency. Of the twelve Common Law judges Croke and Hutton had already made public their opposition. Although the appearance of unanimity was given by the convention that the dissenters should follow the majority line, Charles’ judges were closely divided on the subject and it is therefore no surprise that this reflected divisions in the country, as indicated by Fincham’s study of the reaction of the Kent gentry; see Fincham, ‘the reaction of Kent’. Charles, who initiated proceedings against John Hampden as a test case to reinforce the judgement of the common lawyers, only added to the concerns of the political elite about the legality of his actions. Croke and Hutton again made clear their objections to the actions of the Crown. For this see Prest, ‘Hutton’. 131

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but what is, from his letter of 18 May 1638, is that the ‘arguments of Judge Croke and Hutton against the King for this ship-money’ appear to have had an impact.136 Even if he agreed with the policy of Ship Money, Thornhagh knew of the division it was causing among his gentry neighbours. Thornhagh came under greater pressure as the opposition to the 1638–40 levies increased, as it did elsewhere, in the light of Hampden’s case and the Scottish rebellion.137 Thornhagh did not openly oppose Ship Money and appears to have worked for the Crown to ensure its collection. He encountered many problems in its collection at the time of the wider concerns across the country sparked by the Scottish crisis and Hampden’s case. His comments may imply that he shared concerns about its legality and what it was doing to destablise consensus. Writing to Nicholas in March 1638 Thornhagh referred to himself as being ‘troubled’. This could refer to practical or more fundamental concerns.138 It is also possible that he tried to steer a middle course between a policy he deemed misguided and the need to be loyal and play the role demanded of him given his place within the heirarchy of the county. His ‘forbearance’ and desire for ‘consensus’ appeared evident in his letter of May 1638.139 This does not present his position clearly, because he was probably unsure which line to take. For the majority one should not expect clear opposition to Ship Money, for as Prest commented in relation to Judge Hutton, ‘the topic of Ship Money was far too politically sensitive for any prudent man, even a judge, to commit his opinions about it to paper, except in the most guarded terms’.140 The harsh line taken by central government may have alienated Thornhagh; there is no doubt that in 1642 he may be regarded as an opponent of the Crown. If his experience of Ship Money did not make him a Crown opponent it surely contributed to his eventual defiance of the Crown. No contemporary evidence exists of Ireton’s attitude to Ship Money. Through his relations with the Thornhagh and Hutchinson families he would have been engaged in the debate of the issue that took place across the English political nation and which Thornhagh makes clear was heated in Nottingham-

136 CSPD (1638), p. 443; Prest (‘Hutton’, p. 43) writes that Hutton’s judgement ‘attracted considerable national attention, circulating widely in manuscript’. 137 P. Lake, ‘The Collection of Ship Money in Cheshire During the Sixteen-thirties: A Case Study of Relations between Central and Local Government’, Northern History, 17 (1981), pp. 44–5. This was one of the most successful areas for the collection of money; CSPD (1638–39), pp. 29, 110. 138 CSPD (1638), p. 327. 139 CSPD (1638), p. 443. 140 Prest, ‘Hutton’; Fincham (‘The Reaction of Kent’, p. 231) argued that ‘anxiety over the constitutional implications of ship money remained largely tacit until the general collapse of the King’s personal rule following the Scottish wars of 1639 and 1640’. He also stated that, ‘the gentry’s tacit acquiescence in the policies of prerogative rule did not imply an uncritical endorsement of them (p. 232)’.

36

THE MAKING OF HENRY IRETON, 1611–1642

shire. Information spread rapidly across the gentry.141 In 1648 Ireton cited Ship Money as an example of the King’s abuse of the ‘supreame trust’ he was given.142 Ireton’s allegiance in 1642 came from a position of relative religious radicalism but also from a political awareness of the impact of Charles’ policies in the country.

IV Apart from religion and the influence of his kin, the other experience which may have had some impact on Ireton was the nature of his education. Given the family’s standing and his father’s premature death it is very possible, as in other cases, that Ireton only received an education through the aid of his kin.143 This may in part account for Lucy Hutchinson’s comments about the aid Ireton received from her father-in-law, Sir Thomas Hutchinson. Despite being the eldest son, Henry Ireton did not inherit his father’s estate, since Attenborough, as it lay within Nottinghamshire, ‘Borough English’ or ultimogeniture applied to inheritance rather than primogeniture. As a result on the death of Henry’s father the estate passed to the youngest of the Ireton brothers, Thomas. This is confirmed by Thomas’ will of 1652. He actually passed it on to his nephew, Henry Ireton’s son, also called Henry, Clement Ireton acting as an executor of the will.144 Under ultimogeniture Henry would have inherited nothing. At the Putney Debates of October 1647 he was asked ‘whether the younger sonne have nott as much right to the Inheritance as the eldest?’ Ireton regarded property as a necessity for the vote.145 Ireton would not have been in a strong position to fund his education; Tuck’s definition of Ireton’s economic status as ‘wealthy’ is too general.146 Another commentator has more correctly defined him as ‘mere’ gentry.147 Given his father’s premature death and his younger brother’s inheritance of the estate it is possible that the said Thomas played some role in funding Henry’s education. Dean stated that ‘There is no evidence of Thomas having supported his brother General Ireton by means of that estate’; it could also be

141

F.J. Levy, ‘How information Spread Among the Gentry, 1550–1640’, Journal of British Studies, 21: 2 (1982). 142 Clarke Papers, II, p. 80. 143 Farr, ‘Lambert’s Education’, Cromwelliana (2000). 144 PRO, Prob.11/224 fol. 2; E320/E9; C10/21/116. For the scope of Ireton Wood see E317/Derb./25. 145 CP, I, p. 316; M.Sampson, ‘A story ‘too tedious to relate at large’? Response to the Levellers, 1647–53’, Parergon, ns, 5 (1987), p. 148. 146 R. Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572–1651 (Cambridge, 1993), p. 246. 147 Zagorin, ‘The Social Interpretation of the English Revolution’, Journal of Economic History, 19: 3 (1959), p. 385. 37

HENRY IRETON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

stated that there is no evidence that he did not.148 Ireton clearly received some financial support to pursue his education. The Middle Temple records for his admission of 24 November 1629 recorded that ‘Mr Henry Ireton son and heir of German Ireton of Attenborough Notts Esq decd. Specially bound with Gilbert Warde and Brian Carr. Gent – fine £4.10.’149 This reference to ‘heir’ may suggest that Ireton did benefit financially from his father’s death. Alternatively it could just be a reference to his being the eldest son. The Gilbert Warde in question was Ireton’s uncle by marriage. It is also possible, citing Lucy Hutchinson’s comments, that Sir Thomas Hutchinson provided another source of funds. The nature of his education as well as his religious views and his link with his gentry neighbours indicate that in 1642 Ireton was already a well-informed man of religious conviction. Ireton entered Trinity Oxford as a ‘gentleman commoner’ in 1626, matriculating in 1628, aged 18. The following year, 1629, he graduated with a BA. Whereas many gentry formally entered university the record of Ireton’s attendance appears to represent more than the mere formality of entrance, although, according to Wood, Ireton took one degree in the Arts in 1629, but left without completing that degree by determination.150 The impact on Ireton of his experience at Oxford is hard to quantify. Ireton had just left when Laudianism began to exert itself.151 Given his later role as ‘penman’ of the New Model Army it would appear that Ireton seems to have made good use of his time at university. Indeed, he may have taken the advice that Bevill Grenville offered his son to ‘fixe upon Logick and Philosophy till you have attayned some perfection therein’.152 From Ireton’s writings of the late 1640s Tuck has argued that he must have been familiar with the work of Selden and Grotius.153 He may have read the latter during his time at Oxford or later; the army documents with which he is associated do indicate some engagement with such philosophy. John Lambert, Ireton’s co-author of the army’s Heads of the Proposals (1647), clearly read Grotius at some point.154 148

Dean, Ireton, p. 62. H.A.C. Sturgess, Register of Admissions to the Honourable Society of the Middle Temple (1949), I, p. 123; Ramsey, Ireton, p. 4. In 1650 Ireton’s uncle, Gilbert Warde, was still acting on Ireton’s behalf in financial matters; see BL, Add 12098 fol. 7. In 1652 Henry’s brother Thomas appointed Warde as overseer of his will; see PRO, Prob.11/224 fol. 569. 150 A. Wood, Alumni Oxon, III, pp. 298–302. See also M.H. Curtis, Oxford and Cambridge in Transition 1558–1642 (Oxford, 1959), p. 127. Curtis has stated that ‘Many of the young gentlemen who came to the universities had no intention of taking a degree. Frequently they came only for one or two years before they went down to read at the Inns of Court, to travel abroad, or to return to their homes and estates.’ 151 N. Tyacke (ed.), The History of the University of Oxford, 4: Seventeenth Century Oxford (Oxford, 1997), p. 199. 152 A. Duffin, Faction and Faith. Politics and Religion of the Cornish Gentry Before the Civil War (Exeter, 1996), pp. 28–9. 153 Tuck, Philosophy and Government, p. 246. 154 D. Farr, The Reading of a Revolutionary? The Reading and Prison Book List of Major 149

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THE MAKING OF HENRY IRETON, 1611–1642

Anthony Wood’s bitter comment that Ireton ‘had the character in that house of a stubborn and sawcy fellow towards the seniors, and therefore his company was not at all wanting’ may suggest that Ireton approached university life not just for its social connections, and the traits of his character prominent in his statements on the Army Councils during 1647 to 1649 were already apparent.155 Indeed, something of an emerging self-righteousness is evident from one of Ireton’s letters from 1642.156 After graduation Ireton moved to London and entered the Middle Temple on 24 November 1629. It is not clear how long he spent there but he did receive at least basic legal training. Whitelocke’s comment, although warped by the arrogance and self-interest of a seventeenth-century lawyer, would indicate that Ireton did not receive full training at the Middle Temple.157 Even if he did not fully qualify or spend the consequent time in London it is likely that his experience of the Middle Temple and London did broaden his horizons. Prest regards this as the most important function of the Inns for many gentry. Clarendon pointed to a direct link between membership of an inn and political awareness. Given Ireton’s immediate activism in Nottinghamshire in 1641–42, his education and religious views, he was probably engaged in political discussion during his time in London.158 Dean suggested that it is likely, given the limited nature of the Iretons’ estate, that he returned home to practise law. Evidence confirms this projection. If Ireton had returned from London to pursue a legal career there was nothing out of the norm about a member of the gentry taking this path. They could make a living without being called to the bar of an Inn of Court.159 Excommunication proceedings against himself and his mother suggest that he was in Attenborough in 1637, since Henry Ireton represented himself to Chancellor Easdell as a result of being excommunicated after the 1636 Visitation.160 He certainly appears to have been in Attenborough in the latter end of the 1630s, as he signed a bond for the marriage of his sister Mary to William Bainbrigge.161 He had already also involved himself in the long-running dispute of which the family was at the centre concerning the tithes of the rectory of Attenborough and the Foljambe charity bequest. The various ‘suits’, in different courts, arising from this Henry Ireton ‘managed sevall yeares’.162

General John Lambert, Cromwelliana (2004); W.H. Dawson, Major-General John Lambert (1938), p. 427. 155 Wood, Alumni Oxon, pp. 298–302. 156 HMC Hastings, II, pp. 83–4. 157 Hutchinson, Memoirs, p. 79. 158 Duffin, Faction and Faith, p. 29. 159 Dean, ‘Ireton’, pp. 55, 62–3, 66. 160 Marchant, Church Courts, p. 198. 161 Ramsey, Ireton, p. 4. 162 PRO, C10/21/116; E112/168 fol. 41; E134/10 ChasI/Mich17. 39

HENRY IRETON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

Religion, kin and the law shaped Ireton. Documents from 1647 and after suggest that he felt that the causes of the war had some constitutional dimension. He argued that ‘the ground of the warre was nott the difference in what the supreame Magistracie [was, but] whether [it was] in the Kinge alone’.163 For Ireton, ‘the beginninges of unsettlement are the controversies about power, where the power was’.164 The law probably had some impact on his constitutional thinking in 1642.

V The image of Ireton as the educated Puritan who, along with his kin, naturally opposed his King in 1642 should, nevertheless, be qualified. There are obvious dangers in approaching Ireton’s allegiance by considering him simply in the context of those with whom he was working in the early part of the civil war. Hunt argued that a ‘man of irreproachable personal piety who nevertheless has no objection to his neighbours’ boozing on the Sabbath or fornicating in haylofts is not a Puritan. A man who minds his own business is a contradiction in terms.’165 This is an overly simplistic view. It does not account for the fact that Puritanism was a ‘Protean beast’ and included a wide circle of individuals.166 There is more to Ireton than the serious puritan image of him. Cromwell and Barrington, despite their respective schoolboy humour and love of the theatre, were Puritans none the less.167 The strength of Ireton’s commitment to the Parliamentary cause in 1642 is clear but it did not impede civilised interaction with those of opposing views. Writing to the royalist Lady Hastings in 1642 he expressed the hope that ‘I might be master of the opportunity wherein (without neglect or prejudice to the cause I serve in or the friends of it) to evidence how much I am your Ladyships most humble servant’. Although such comments may be part of seventeenth-century social niceties Ireton was not obligated to make them. 168 George Jaques, yeoman of Toton, close to Attenborough, by his will desired: my loving and ever honoured freinds Mr Thurleby Parson of Clifton And my good and loving gossip Mr Henry Ireton to bee overseers of this my last Will and Testament, and to bee Assistant with their advice and Councell to my poor wife and children giving unto either of them tenne shillings apiece in token of my love desiring them to accept of it from their dead friend. 163

Clarke Papers, II, p. 80. Clarke Papers, II, p. 179. 165 Hunt, Puritan Moment, p. 146. 166 Durston and Eales (eds), Culture of Puritanism, p. 6. The term was used by W.J. Sheils in ‘Puritans in the Diocese of Peterborough 1558–1610’, Northants Record Society, 30 (1979), p. 2. 167 Hunt, Puritan Moment, p. 225. 168 HMC Hastings, II, p. 84. 164

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THE MAKING OF HENRY IRETON, 1611–1642

Jaques also desired to be buried in Attenborough parish church ‘neare to my Deceased father Francis Jaques’ and ordered his executor to buy ‘two Faire Pewter Flagons for the use of the Alter or Holie Communion Table for the Wine, when the Priest or Mynister shall administer the holie and blessed Sacrament of the Bodie and blood of our Blessed Saviour Jesus Christ’. 169 The tone of his will and reference to the ‘Alter’ make it unlikely that George Jaques was a Puritan.170 This may also be suggested by his commissioning a wall memorial for his father that may still be seen in Attenborough church. George Jaques’ ‘incontinent life’ does not fit with any stereotypical Puritan image.171 The reference to ‘my loving and ever honoured friend Mr Thurleby, parson of Clifton’ also indicates this. This is possibly the same Robert Thirleby listed as ejected from his parish during the period 1642–62.172 Jaques’ refusal to pay the loans demanded by the Crown in 1626 might suggest that he had some form of discontent with the Crown, yet such evidence needs to be treated with care.173 Reference to Ireton as his ‘loving gossip’ could be as a godparent, and links with the desire for Ireton to give advice to Jaques’ widow and children that is also expressed in the will.174 Another looser interpretation of the phrase would indicate that the two men were on friendly terms, which may also have been strengthened by the antipathy their vicar Dodson clearly felt for them.175 Either interpretation of the phrase suggests that Ireton was linked with people not merely of a godly nature.176 Ireton’s relationship with such a man despite his own beliefs does indicate, as recent research would suggest, that many Puritans lived amicably with their neighbours.177 It should also make us more wary of the dominant image of Ireton as ‘a very grave, serious, religious person’ that the records of Hutchinson and Putney have created for us.178 Whereas Mary Ireton married William Bainbrigge, an immediately active Parliamentarian, the marriage of another of Ireton’s sisters, Sarah, to the future royalist colonel Edward Ford indicates the care needed when considering how far his kin may have shaped Henry Ireton’s allegiance. In a wider sense it also

169

PRO, Prob.11/204 fol. 96; Ramsey, Ireton, p. 7. Durston and Eales, Culture of Puritanism, p. 19. 171 NU, AN/PB 295/6/93; 302/215; 292/3/33. 172 A.G. Matthews (ed.), Walker Revised: being a revision of John Walker’s Sufferings of the clergy during the Grand Rebellion, 1642–60 (Oxford, 1988), p. 294; Thirlby was to be minister to Sir Gervase Clifton, a nominal Parliamentarian; Thoroton, Antiquities, p. 57. 173 Victoria County History, I, p. 340. 174 B. Capp, When gossips meet: women, family, and neighbourhood in Early Modern England (Oxford, 2003), p. 7. 175 PRO, E112/168 fol. 41. In 1669 the tithes belonging to the ‘impropriate rectory of Attenborough’ were conveyed to a certain Edward Jaques, see NU, Po/179. 176 Cressy, Birth, Marriage and Death, p. 202. 177 Spurr, Puritanism, p. 200. 178 Hutchinson, Memoirs, p. 78. 170

41

HENRY IRETON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

indicates how the question of allegiance divided kinship circles, as well as suggesting how and why they survived despite the war. Ford had, like Henry Ireton, been at Trinity and his brother William also attended Trinity from 1624. It is possible that the link which led to the marriage between Ford, whose family came from Sussex, and Ireton may have developed in London. Edward Ford, according to Newman, entered the Middle Temple in the same year as Henry Ireton: 1629.179 This also illustrates the dangers of reading backwards from civil war allegiance. Marriages cemented before the conflict cut across many established kin networks. It is possible that the Edward Ford link was used to try to help bring the King and the army to agreement in 1647 on the basis of Heads of the Proposals. This claim must, however, be treated with caution as it emanated from the Leveller John Wildman.180 The royalist Ashburnham however also claimed that while Ireton was stationed at Oxford in 1646 Charles had tried to use Ford to persuade Ireton to allow him to go to the Scots.181 Evidence from 1667 would suggest that the Iretons managed to maintain at least a working relationship with Edward Ford; other sources indicate a conflict of interest in this later period.182 The example of Ford is indicative of the complexity of kin interaction in the early modern period. It could be the bind in relations but it could also make any disputes more bitter.

* Without his own testimony and more direct comment from others, the moment Ireton became an opponent of the Crown cannot be isolated. Ireton can be clearly tied with a group who were to work together in the early months of the war which was linked through kinship. It should also be stressed, however, that all of their responses to the events of these years would have been contextualised on an individual basis. Some of them had a shared Puritanism but that was a broad outlook. Within this general framework that shaped his allegiance, focus must be on Ireton as an individual. 179 P.R. Newman, Royalist officers in England and Wales, 1642–1660: a biographical dictionary (New York), p. 140. However it should be noted that Foster states Ford attended the Inner Temple, although Ford does not appear in the printed registers of either Inn; Foster, Alumni Oxonienses (Oxford, 1892), p. 574. 180 J. Wildman, Putney Projects (1647), p. 12. 181 A. Fea, Memoirs of the Martyr King (London, 1905), p. 204. 182 London Metropolitan Archives, ACC 2558/NR13 233, 237–8; PRO, C6/183/38; C6/185/42; C6/185/43; C6/185/44; C6/185/86; C6/186/41. These proceedings also indicate the working relationship of the Interregnum’s political class for they involved John Desborough, Charles Fleetwood, Henry Vane, John Bradshaw and Gilbert Pickering. The extent of the litigation between Ford and the Iretons may also be a reflection of John Ireton’s propensity to court proceedings; see PRO, C3/449/11; C5/94/96; C5/504/38; C5/380/72; C5/17/83; C5/20/69; C6/200/43; C6/204/31–34; C6/138/99; C7/401/8; C8/221/63; C8/221/82; C8/329/57; C9/12/11; E133/57/56. Ireton’s youngest daughter, Bridget (born c.1650), married a Thomas Bendish, probably a relation of the royalist delinquent of the same name; see House of Lords Record Office, HL/PO/JO/10/1/174, 208, 212, 223.

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THE MAKING OF HENRY IRETON, 1611–1642

Ireton’s activism in 1641 and 1642 may be attributed to three main influences: 1 2 3

His religion – apparently shaped by his parents, especially his mother. Ireton can be labelled under the broad term Puritan. His kinship circle – Ireton may have been aided to receive an education. He was connected with those of similar religious values, and as part of a group he would have felt more confident in taking action in 1642. His educational experience – Oxford and Middle Temple – gave Ireton a wider political context than the county level and formed the basis of his role as the leading theoretican within the New Model Army after 1646.

It may be argued that of the three factors, religion, kinship and education, which naturally interlinked, it was the religious influences to which Ireton had been subjected through his parents that shaped his position most in 1642. As with others, religion was the force that made men such as Ireton act and, in the words of John Morrill, ‘prepared them to fight’.183

183

J. Morrill, The Nature of the English Revolution (Harlow, 1993), p. 39; D.L. Smith, A History of the Modern British Isles, 1603–1707: The Double Crown (Oxford, 1998), p. 128. 43

2

Reshaping, 1642–1647

Despite the limits of the evidence of what shaped Ireton to take the stand he did in 1641–42 there is no doubt about his active Parliamentarianism during these years. By October 1641 contemporaries regarded him as a Parliament man.1 The experience of war, however, fighting and living alongside other godly men as a member of the Eastern Association and New Model Army, reshaped Ireton.

I There is evidence of Ireton’s activism before the official start of the civil war in August 1642. Ireton and Thornhagh took a protest to Parliament because of the obstruction of a petition, to which they had subscribed, that had requested Charles’ return from York to Westminster. In consequence they received the thanks of the House in February 1642. On 30 June 1642 Ireton was nominated Captain of a horse troop in the Nottingham forces. 2 On 11 July 1642 the Commons ordered Ireton to carry arms to Nottingham. The same day his brother-in-law William Bainbrigge received a similar order.3 Ireton recorded that ‘(in the beginning of the warre in Jul: & Aug: 1642) I Received some horses, Arms &c (besides many that I advanced my selfe) for the rayesing of my troop’.4 Ireton was at the rendezvous at Northampton of Essex’s army. By January 1643 however he was back in Nottinghamshire with his troop. Nominated to the Nottinghamshire committee he became major in

1

Hutchinson, Memoirs, p. 78. CJ, II, 30 June 1642, p. 648. 3 CJ, II, pp. 458, 668. 4 PRO, SP28/255 unfoliated, 17 August 1644. In this document Ireton outlined his service, ‘first in the Ld: Generalls Army (where I served till Jan 1642[3] & was then sent away to the garrison of Nottingham . . . (where I served from thence till about the end of July 1643) . . . went out thence with Col: Cromwell to field service agayne, until in Septemb: 1643 I was placed by him in the Isle of Elye’. 2

44

RESHAPING, 1642–1647

the horse regiment raised by Sir Francis Thornhagh whose son Francis was its lieutenant-colonel.5 It was as part of this regiment that Ireton, under Sir John Meldrum, met Oliver Cromwell’s forces to attack Gainsborough on 28 July 1643. Cromwell had stated at the start of August 1643, ‘raise honest, godly men, and I will have them of my regiment’.6 Ireton was such a ‘godly’ man. It is little wonder that from their first meeting Hutchinson could comment that Ireton ‘began an inseparable league with Colonel Cromwell’.7 Upon leaving Thornhagh’s regiment Ireton became deputy governor of Ely in September 1643, under the direct command of its governor Oliver Cromwell.8 Records show Ireton fulfilling necessary military duties in his position as Cromwell’s deputy and as a commander of a substantial body of men, as well as a role on the Nottinghamshire committee.9 Both Ireton and Cromwell came into dispute with the committee of the Isle of Ely. In one of his letters to the committee Cromwell’s dissatisfaction with the organisation of the Isle is clear. Cromwell stressed his own authority and that of his deputy Ireton.10 In part such disputes were a reflection of the tension between the army and the civilian administrators with regard to the confused status of their relevant responsibilities and jurisdiction. The other dimension implied in another letter written by Cromwell in August 1643 was that the experience of battle had separated the military mentally from their civilian allies.11 A further source of tension was what Ireton, and presumably Cromwell, chose to do in Ely with the authority they had: Cromwell made Major Ireton deputy-governour of the Ile of Ely, who did report well of him, but he noe sonner came amounge us ther but he begins to levy great sums of money, some by ordinance of Parliament, some other wayes, pretending he would fortifie the Ile, and it is reported to me and others by the treasurer that he in aleuen mounths did receive at the least £15,000; yett at this day the Ile is in noe posture then it was in at the time when he came into it, onely it is become a meere Amsterdam, for in the chefest churches on the Sabbath day the souldiers have gonn up into the pulpitts both in the forenoone and the afternone and preached to the whole parish, and our ministers have satt in ther seatt in the church, and durst no attempt to preach, it being a common thinge to preach in private houses night and day, they having gott whole famalyes as Independents into that Ile from London and other places under ther command, lykwise hav(e)ing mayd poore men of that

5

CJ, II, 24 January 1643 p. 944. Bell (ed.), Fairfax Correspondence, I, pp. 56–7. 7 Hutchinson, Memoirs, p. 128. 8 PRO, SP28/255. 9 CSPD (1644–45), pp. 19, 21, 49; House of Lords Record Office, HL/PO/JO/10/1/195. 10 Abbott, I, p. 291; C. Holmes, The Eastern Association in the English Civil War (Cambridge, 1974), p. 188. 11 Bell (ed.), Fairfax Correspondence, I, pp. 58–9. 6

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HENRY IRETON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

Ile captaines onely as I conceive because they profess themselves Independents, and as such have filld dung carts both before they were captaines and sinc; they frequently rebaptise the peopell of that Ile, and thos captaines have power to commit to prison, and by a letter from Coll. Cromwell to the Committee, the coppy whereof I have, he doth command that Committey that they should not release any prisoner committed by his offecers, soe that the hole Ile is soe awde that they dare not seeke for ther libertyes. . . . Major Ireton is still making a show of raysin of fortifications, but it is verely bel(ei)ved it is but a pretence to gett moneys; covetuo[sness] doth best agree with a coward.12

Although prejudiced and probably overstated, there was likely some basis to the image projected of Cromwell and Ireton’s support for Independents from outside of the gentry and their willingness to ‘rebaptise the peopell’. Richard Baxter’s account would indicate so: When he [Cromwell] lay at Cambridge long before . . . his Officers purposed to make their Troop a gathered Church. . . . These very men that then invited me to be their Pastor, were the men that afterwards headed much of the Army, and some of them were the forwardest in all our Changes.13

Holmes has argued that Cromwell’s regiment contained a strong London contingent, men from lesser backgrounds and Independents. Ireton’s brother was in the Earl of Manchester’s own regiment, presumably joining the Eastern Association with his brother. Other radicals like Charles Fleetwood and Thomas Harrison also joined the Association in 1643.14 Lay preaching has been well noted within the New Model;15 Cromwell himself may have preached in the 1630s and there is little doubt that he would have seized the opportunities to do so as a member of the Eastern Association army.16 Ireton was subjected to attack for his financial activities while deputygovernor of Ely. Called to account in August 1644 for all moneys he had used, the implication was that he had been corrupt. Ireton regarded this ‘base scandalous suggestion’ as an attempt by his accusers to distract attention from their own financial irregularities: I find the malice & devilish practises of those Inflamers of our distractions restlesse & endlesse, who being by mee discountenanced onely in theyr Injurious, Insolent & ffactious Cariages, whereby I found they did distract & disaffect the Countrye while I governd them & being more lately by mee & that Committee calld to

12 D. Masson (ed.), ‘The Quarrell between the Earl of Manchester and Oliver Cromwell’, Camden Society, new series, XII (1875), pp. 73–4. 13 Richard Baxter, Reliquiae Baxterianae (1696), Part I, p. 51. 14 Holmes, The Eastern Association, pp. 176–7. 15 Gentles, NMA, pp. 99–102. 16 Morrill, ‘Rewriting Cromwell’, p. 565.

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RESHAPING, 1642–1647

Accompt wth others theyr ptners, for sequestracon monyes Rec by them (wherein they were, upon good grounds, suspected & some of them, I believe, since found to have abused & defrauded the state) have already (to avoid or Revenge that Scrutinye) tried theyr utmost Interest wth the pliamt, the Cittye & all most all the Committee there, upon false suggestions, to pcure many & various Orders, to trouble distract & diverte us & by Inhumane practices of Scandall & Calumnye, to render us suspected & Odious.17

Ireton responded with robustness typical of the man: ‘I dare challenge all men to except to the truth’ (i.e. his truth).18 The reports of the activities of Cromwell and Ireton in Ely comprised only part of the more serious dispute that had developed in the Eastern Association, which in itself was an aspect of the tension that was coming to a head between the ‘war group’ and its adversaries at Westminster. This quarrell emerged as the result of the failure to follow up victory in the field. Appointed Quartermaster-General of the Eastern Association on 25 June 1644, it is not clear whether Ireton was part of Cromwell’s regiment at Marston Moor a week later.19 However, the failure to build on this victory, indeed the apparent collapse of much of Parliament’s position through failure at Cropedy Bridge and Lostwithiel, triggered the political crisis at Westminster. In it Ireton played his role.

II A crucial part of the Westminster struggle focused on the clash between the Earl of Manchester, Commander of the Eastern Association, and his subordinate Cromwell. In this clash Ireton was prominent. Ireton and Cromwell were concerned that Manchester’s military strategy was too negative. It is clear that they seized the initiative on some military decisions. John Lilburne, a lieutenant-colonel in the Eastern Association, later a leading figure in the Leveller movement, had approached Manchester because he believed that Tickhill could be taken from the royalists. Lilburne argued that to: his request to be allowed to summon it, the Earl answered that he was a mad fellow. Upon receiving this answer he consulted with Quartermaster-General Ireton, who said to him that all circumstances considered he conceived that he might summon it, which he did.20

17

PRO, SP28/255 unfoliated. PRO, SP28/255 unfoliated. 19 In August 1644 Ireton made an agreement with regard to the future exchange of prisoners with Byron’s royalist representatives; see DRO, GB 026 D803 M/Z9 fol. 119–20. 20 CSPD (1644–45), p. 149. 18

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As the dispute escalated at Westminster Ireton was examined on the issue of Manchester’s military command. Ireton’s evidence portrays his legalistic mind and matter-of-fact manner that becomes more obvious with the broadening of his historical record in the later period. Ireton focused on Manchester’s military failure. In a debate about Donnington Castle, whose relief by a force much smaller than his own Manchester had failed to prevent, Ireton ‘clearly pointed out to the Earl’ his mistake. One can almost picture the scene of Manchester being berated by his forceful junior officer from the contextualisation of Ireton from the later Putney Debates. Ireton stated that ‘he has heard the Earl of Manchester declare himself, that he would not have the present war ended by the sword but by accommodation’.21 It is in Ireton’s evidence that Manchester’s most memorable exposition of his attitude to the conflict is found. Ireton stated that at a: Council of War the Earl urged with much earnestness and seeming solicitude this principle for not fighting, saying, ‘Gentlemen, I beseech you let’s consider what we do; the King need not care how oft he fights, but it concerns us to be wary, for in fighting we venture all to nothing. If we fight 100 times and beat him 99 he will be King still, but if he beats us but once, or the last time, we shall be hanged, we shall lose our estates, and our posterities be undone’.22

This had been much to the frustration of Cromwell who reputedly responded, ‘if this be so, why did we ever take up arms at first?’23 The struggle at Westminster indicates the political grouping Ireton had moved into as a result of his relationship with Cromwell. The charges against Manchester were also supported by Cromwell’s kin, Nathaniel Rich, Valentine Walton, Thomas Hammond, John Pickering, Edward Whalley and John

21

CSPD (1644–45), p. 158. CSPD (1644–45), p. 159. A more positive assessment of this comment and Manchester has recently been propounded by Wanklyn and Jones who focus on what they regard as the determining sentence, ‘Gentlemen, I beseech you let’s consider what to do . . . it concerns us to be wary for in fighting we venture all to nothing’: M. Wanklyn and F. Jones, A Military History of the English Civil War (2005), pp. 200–1. Although placed in quotation marks these words were from Ireton’s evidence rather than actually directly from Manchester, or, as stated in the record, Ireton’s remembrance of Manchester’s argument. The context of all of Ireton’s evidence from which this passage derives indicates the negative light in which Ireton viewed Manchester. For this work generally see review in Journal of Military History, 69: 4 (2005). 23 D.L. Smith, A History of the Modern British Isles 1603–1707. The Double Crown (1998), p. 143. Given such statements it is little wonder that Cromwell was sympathetic to the demands of the troops during the revolt of 1647. In BL, E385(18), A Second Apologie of All the Private Soldiers (3 May 1647), the soldiers asked, ‘Is it not better to dye like men, then to be enslaved, and hanged like Dogs?’ Also printed in BL, E409(25), A Declaration of the Engagements, Remonstrances, Representations, Proposals, Desires and Resolutions from His Excellency Sir Tho: Fairfax (1647), p. 10. 22

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Desborough.24 Yet behind these men was the more significant Parliamentary political network of which Cromwell was now becoming a leading player. In the Lords his allies were Saye and Sele and Wharton, whereas in the Commons he was aligned with men such as Oliver St. John.25 Underlying the political struggle at Westminster was the religious tension between the essentially Independent network that Cromwell was part of and their ‘Political Presbyterian’ opponents.26 The Manchester–Cromwell quarrel resulted in the introduction of the Selfdenying Ordinance. Perceptions, then and now, of why it was introduced are very much shaped by the interpretation of Cromwell.27 Although connected to the group Cromwell was working with at Westminster, it is not clear whether at this time Ireton was privy to their political machinations. His apparent absence in Ely would argue against it, as would the probability that the Ordinance resulted from immediate Parliamentary politics rather than a prearranged strategy. Colonel John Lambert’s letter to Thomas Fairfax of 10 December illustrates the unexpected nature of the Self-denying Ordinance to these northern commanders,28 further confirmed by the correspondence of Lord Ferdinando Fairfax, head of a significant network within Parliament.29 Writing again to Thomas Fairfax a week later Lambert commented on the difficulties in the Lords with the Ordinance.30 Davis’ belief that Cromwell genuinely sought a compromise, but with his political skill also set in train the reorganisation of Parliament’s army with no premeditation about his own position, carries weight. This is especially so when it is set in the wider context of his career and of Lambert’s letters.31

24 Ramsey, Ireton, p. 27. While they were not to be married until 1646 it is probable that Ireton was already in some form of relationship with Cromwell’s daughter Bridget by this stage. 25 Davis, Cromwell, pp. 152–4; G.F.T. Jones, Saw-pit Wharton. The Political Career from 1640 to 1691 of Philip, Fourth Lord Wharton (Sydney, 1967). 26 In using the terms Presbyterian and Independent to denote the factions in Parliament in these years I have followed the definitions outlined by Gentles and Woolrych; see I. Gentles, ‘The Impact of the New Model Army’, in J. Morrill (ed.), The Impact of the English Civil War (1991), p. 91; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesman, pp. 5–8. 27 Gentles, NMA, pp. 6–10; Davis, Cromwell, p. 93. 28 BL, Sloan Mss 1519 fols 37–8. Lambert was one of Fairfax’s political informants at this stage because he was recovering from battle injuries at his father-in-law’s house in Kensington. However Fairfax had other significant connections at Westminster who Lambert was doubtless in contact with at the time. That they all appeared unaware of the Ordinance does suggest that it was not a pre-planned strategy. 29 Bell (ed.), Fairfax Correspondence, I, pp. 142, 157–8. On 5 February 1645 Lord Wharton informed Ferdinando Fairfax of the appointment of his son, Sir Thomas Fairfax, as Commander of the New Model, ‘both Houses have resolved to rob the North of a good friend of its and yours’. 30 BL, Sloan Mss 1519 fols 39–40. 31 Davis, Cromwell, pp. 93–5.

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The Self-denying Ordinance led to the formation of the New Model Army. The Lords had wanted Ireton’s brother, Captain Thomas Ireton, removed in favour of a conservative. Henry Ireton was not even on the original list of officers to be commissioned, probably due to his religious radicalism.32 His failure to be nominated in effect meant that Ireton would be eliminated from Essex’s second horse regiment and from the army in favour of the ‘obscure’ Captain Sawkine.33 Yet once fighting had started Ireton returned as colonel of a horse regiment. In this Cromwell probably had some role.34 Gentles has argued that Fairfax ‘flaunted his radical colours later that spring when he gave colonelcies to . . . Henry Ireton without consulting Parliament’. By this point, Fairfax would, however, have had little experience of Ireton, and there is the later example of Fairfax acceding to Cromwell’s request to appoint Ireton Commissary-General at Naseby. 35

III At Naseby Ireton commanded the left wing with five and a half regiments of horse. Ireton charged Prince Rupert with his right-hand division. Initially successful, Ireton’s force drove so deep into the enemy that they were routed by Rupert’s reserve. Rupert then broke through Ireton’s left-hand division, continuing on to the village of Naseby. This was probably the turning point of the battle; Rupert’s absence allowed Cromwell to make use of the advantage he had gained on the other wing. Ireton, responding to the pressure of the royalist foot on their Parliamentary counterparts on the right, led a charge into them. Gentles attributes this to Ireton’s ‘inexperience’ which allowed him to be ‘distracted’. His horse was shot from under him and he received wounds to the face and thigh before being captured. However, amid the general confusion and with Cromwell’s success elsewhere on the battlefield, Ireton managed to effect his escape.36 Despite his indifferent performance at Naseby there can be little doubt that Ireton was a valued officer in the New Model Army.37 Ireton had been made 32

Gentles, ‘Choosing of Officers’, p. 274. Gentles, ‘Choosing of Officers’, p. 277; ‘Quarrell between Manchester and Cromwell’, Camden Society, p. 73. Ferdinando Fairfax was informed that the ‘list of officers presented by Sir Thomas Fairfax to the House of Commons is approved there with some alterations’, see Bell (ed.), Fairfax Correspondence, I, p. 166. 34 Although it is too much to state that Cromwell chose him. G. Foard, Naseby. The Decisive Campaign (Whitstable, 1995), pp. 71–2, 341. 35 Gentles, ‘Choosing Officers’, p. 266fn. 9. 36 Gentles, NMA, p. 58; Whitelocke, Memorials (1762), p. 145; DRO, DD1101 M/F2, Henry Bourne, an acquaintance of Ireton, outlined to his son the significance of Naseby. 37 In contrast to his portraits of Cromwell and Lambert, Robert Walker’s depiction of Ireton contains much more direct military imagery; National Portrait Gallery, NPG3301(Ireton), NPG536(Cromwell) and NPG252(Lambert). 33

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colonel of a horse regiment in the spring of 1645 and the day before Naseby had been notably successful in attacking the royalist quarters in the village. This move had done much to persuade the King to engage the New Model the following day.38 Having recovered from his injuries sustained at Naseby Ireton helped to convey money from Portsmouth in July.39 He then participated in the storming of Bristol in September 1645.40 This significant victory further reinforced the army’s confidence and unity.41 Fairfax informed his father that ‘the good providence of God’ had secured Bristol.42 Ireton moved with the New Model into the west of England and by March had reached Cornwall.43 In April he acted as one of the main negotiators of the Truro and Exeter treaties.44 In a dubious later report from 1652, Ireton’s kin, Edward Wogan, who had left Parliament’s forces to become a royalist, accused Robert Long, by then secretary to Charles II, of aiding the New Model’s campaign in the west.45 Ireton’s link with Cromwell appears to have advanced him further than his military talents would have allowed, but he proved an effective commander. That Sir Thomas Fairfax, the New Model’s commander-in-chief, was prepared to entrust Ireton with the advance party moving on Oxford in the next phase of the campaign indicates as much.46 Ireton’s promotion should not be viewed from the perspective of meritocracy. Ireton gained promotion due to his ability, but also because he fulfilled the criteria that Cromwell specifically required for a godly warrior. Ireton’s ‘mere’ gentry origins and religious radicalism fitted within Cromwell’s ‘faction’.47

IV On 30 October 1645 a new, more overt political role opened up for Ireton: he was ‘recruited’ as an MP for Appleby.48 The process of ‘recruiting’ had started

38

NewDNB Ireton entry by Ian Gentles. CSPD (1645–47), p. 30. 40 Abbott, I, pp. 374–8. In the battle for Bristol, Ireton’s brother Thomas had his arm broken by some bullets from a pistol. See BL, E307(5), A true relation of the storming of Bristol (1645). 41 Gentles, NMA, p. 75. 42 Bell (ed.), Fairfax Correspondence, I, p. 249. 43 DRO, D1232/065. 44 BL, E333(13), Barnstaple Agreed to be surrendred to Sr Thomas Fairfax: With all the Ordnance, Armes, and Ammunition, and upon what tearmes: With a copy of seven Articles (of the Chiefe of those) for surrendring of Exeter (11 April 1646); E334(4), A true Copy of the Articles Agreed on at the Surrender of Exeter (9 April 1646); DRO, D1232/067. 45 Cal.Clar.SP, II, p. 116. 46 Bell (ed.), Fairfax Correspondence, I, p. 289. 47 R. Hutton, Studies in Stuart History (2004), pp. 102–3, 109; P. Zagorin, ‘The Social Interpretation of the English Revolution’, Journal of Economic History, 19: 3 (1959), p. 385. 48 This is no doubt the reason for his nomination to the Westmorland committee, although 39

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in September 1645 and, as Underdown has shown, manipulated as part of party management.49 Cromwell had connections to many of the leading political players at Westminster and it is probable that Lord Wharton aided Ireton’s recruitment as MP for Appleby.50 It is also possible that the significant Fairfax political network at Westminster also eased his appointment. Despite his recruitment as an MP Ireton remained with the army. In April 1646 Ireton was ordered to Oxford from where he communicated with his political superiors at Westminster.51 Ireton had to deal with a French royalist who appeared to have switched sides.52 At Oxford Ireton received a message from the King, through some royalist officers, signalling his readiness to give himself up to Fairfax and Parliament if he could ‘continue King still’. That Charles addressed his message to Ireton may be some indication that he had already been marked out as one of the army’s chief negotiators; reinforced no doubt by the fact that Ireton, with Colonel John Lambert, had been the New Model Army’s main negotiator at Truro, Exeter and Oxford.53 Alongside Ireton and Lambert in negotiating the surrender of Oxford were Colonels Harrison and Rich who he worked closely with in shaping army policy in late 1648.54 The approach to Ireton also suggests that Charles had realised that the army had a political role to play. Ireton refused to respond to Charles and sent the letter to Cromwell on 23 April 1646. In his accompanying letter to Cromwell Ireton formally laid out a report of what had occurred. Furthermore, he sent an express of the information to Fairfax but sent nothing to Parliament, presumably expecting Cromwell to communicate his relation.55 Cromwell’s response, criticising Ireton for being in direct contact with royalists on political matters, could simply be seen as him fulfilling his role as an officer and MP under the authority of Parliament. Ireton had justified his response by indicating that it was the responsibility of Fairfax and Cromwell to communicate the information to Parliament. However, as Ramsey argued,

he remained on the Nottingham committee. LJ, 8 (27 Nov. 1645), p. 13; (10, 17 Feb. 1648), p. 55; CJ (4, 17 Nov. 1645), p. 346. 49 D. Underdown, ‘Party Management in the Recruiter Elections, 1645–1648’, English Historical Review, 83 (1968). 50 J.S.A. Adamson, ‘The Peerage in Politics 1645–1649’, Cambridge University Ph.D. (1986), p. 175. The reference for this is BL, E391(9), John Musgrave, A Fourth Word to the Wise (5 May 1647), p. 2. Musgrave wrote, ‘I know many here have a good opinion of the Lord Wharton, and the rather for that he hath brought you, Mr. Lawrence, and Mr. Salaway into the house’ (p. 8). This letter was addressed to Ireton by Musgrave as his MP after repeated attempts to elicit a response from Cromwell (p. 4). See also Underdown, ‘Party Management in the Recruiter Elections’, p. 243. 51 CSPD (1645–47), pp. 404–7, 419. 52 CSPD (1645–47), p. 421. See also CSPD (1645–47), pp. 151–2, 309–11. 53 Farr, Lambert, p. 60. 54 HMC, 13th Report, I, p. 399. 55 H. Cary (ed.), Memorials of the Great Civil War in England from 1646 to 1652, 2 vols (1842), I, pp. 1–3. 52

RESHAPING, 1642–1647

‘Cromwell’s criticism of Ireton was probably formal and politically advisable’.56 The nature of this reproof of Ireton and subsequent instigation of an order to Fairfax that all overtures might be sent to Parliament may have had a deliberate subtext in highlighting the fact that the army comprised an important part of the political process of settlement.57 It should also be noted that Ireton had already made an overt public political statement of which Fairfax was fully aware. Gentles has argued that a letter, nominally from Fairfax, of 4 September 1645, summoning Rupert to surrender Bristol, had actually been written by Ireton: SIR, The Crown of England is and will be where it ought to be, we fight to maintain it there, but the King misled by Evil Councellors, or through a seduced heart hath left His Parliament, and His People; (under God the best assurance of his Crown and Family), the maintenance of this Schism is the Ground of this unhappy War on your part, and what sad effects it hath produced in the three Kingdoms, is visible to all Men. To maintain the Rights of the Crown of England jointly (a principal part whereof is that the King in Supreme Acts concerning the whole State is not to be advised by Men, of whom the Law takes no notice, but by His Parliament the Great Council of the Kingdom; in whom (as much as Man is capable of) he hears all his People as it were at once, advising Him, and in which multitude of Councellors lies His Safety, and His Peoples Interest; and to set Him right in this, has been the constant and faithful endeavour of the Parliament, and to bring those wicked Instruments to Justice (that have misled Him) is a principal Ground of our Fighting. SIR, If God makes this clear to you as he has to us, I doubt not but he will give you a heart to deliver this Place.58

Although supportive of a ‘misled’ monarch in 1645 Ireton’s stress on ‘rights’ and the ‘Peoples Interest’ became more pronounced in the years to follow. Ireton harboured no illusion that God had judged the righteousness of the cause for which he had fought.

V The bond between Ireton and Cromwell remained strong and became formalised, on 15 June 1646, through Henry’s marriage to Cromwell’s daughter

56

Ramsey, Ireton, p. 43. CJ, IV, pp. 523–4; Gardiner, Civil War 1642–9, III, p. 96. 58 NewDNB entry by Ian Gentles. This was not stated in Gentles’ book on the New Model Army where he states that ‘Fairfax had written a long letter inviting Rupert to surrender’, Gentles, NMA, pp. 73–4; J. Rushworth, Historical Collections, Part IV, I, pp. 73–4. Gentles quotes from the version in Joshua Sprigge, Anglia Rediviva, England’s Recovery (1647), p. 98. 57

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Bridget.59 The two had probably met and begun a relationship sometime in 1643, when Ireton was 32 and Bridget 18, but decided to wait until the end of the civil war before marrying. In the war Cromwell himself had lost a son, Oliver, and had also witnessed the loss of many close to him such as his nephew Valentine Walton.60 Having waited to marry, Ireton’s reaction to the start of the second civil war in 1648 and the need to go back into battle must have been even more bitter. Cromwell leased Ireton a farm in Ely on 26 April 1646 as part of the marriage agreement.61 By this stage Cromwell’s fortunes appeared more secure than earlier in his life. Nevertheless, his care over the details of his eldest son Richard’s marriage in 1647 shows Cromwell’s continuing material concerns,62 no doubt due to the fact that he had been the ‘poorest man in the Commons’.63 Hutchinson believed that Cromwell later ‘insinuating himself with Colonel [Robert] Saunders, to flatter him into the sale of a town of his called Ireton, which Cromwell earnestly desired to buy for Major-general Ireton, who had married his daughter’.64 The timing of Ireton’s marriage appears to have been shaped by the imminent conclusion of the surrender of Oxford, finalised by treaty on 20 June 1646. This marked another step in the New Model defeat of the King, apparently bringing the war closer to a finish. The marriage ceremony took place at Holton, a fortified house five miles east of Oxford, which was being used by Fairfax as his headquarters.65 The parish register records: June 15, 1646, Hen. Ireton, Commissary-General to Sir Thomas Fairfax, and Bridget, daughter of Oliver Cromwell, Lieutenant-General of the horse to the said sir Thomas Fairfax, was married by mr. Dell in lady Whorwood her house in Holton.66

59 In a satire of 1649 Cromwell was attributed with the comment with regard to Ireton that ‘my Sonne wants no Spirit (if hee did, hee should never have married my Daughter’; see BL, E561(10), Aaron Guerdon, A Most Learned, Conscientious, and Devout-Exercise; held forth the last Lords-day, at Sir Peter Temples, in Lincolnes Inne-Fields; By Lieut-Generall Crumwell. As it was faithfully taken in Characters (25 June 1649), p. 13. 60 Abbott, I, pp. 279–80, 287–8. 61 Abbott, I, p. 402. Abbott footnotes Historical Research, 10 (Nov. 1932), Accessions, p. 73, ‘where the original with seals and signatures missing is said to be in the Museum, Art Gallery and Public Library at Leicester’. 62 D. Farr, ‘Oliver Cromwell and a 1647 Case in Chancery’, Historical Research, 71: 176 (1998). 63 Morrill, ‘Rewriting Cromwell’, pp. 59–60. 64 Hutchinson, Memoirs, p. 258. 65 C. Markham, A Life of the Great Lord Fairfax (1870), p. 270. 66 Abbott, I, p. 404. The Ireton–Cromwell link did continue; see Northamptonshire Record Office, Fitzwilliam (Milton) Charters 2343.

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‘[M]r. Dell’, the ‘anti-formalist’ army chaplain William Dell, had in June 1646 strongly argued that the army’s spiritual direction from God was the key to its success.67 He saw the army as ‘instruments in the hand of God’ and stated that he had ‘seen more of the presence of God in that Army, then amongst any people that ever I conversed with’.68 Ireton and Cromwell shared this view. Before joining the New Model, Dell had been in the Eastern Association with Cromwell and Ireton.69 The marriage represents the religious and political link that had bound Ireton to Cromwell since their meeting in 1643. It appears that Bridget shared some of the religious feeling of her new husband and father. The Baptist Thomas Patient, chaplain of Ireton’s foot regiment in Ireland, wrote to Cromwell of Bridget who, ‘I doe by good experience find, as far as I can discern, the power of God’s grace in her soul, a women acquainted with temptations and breathing after Christ’.70 A letter from Cromwell to his daughter Bridget dated 25 October 1646 gives us some insight into the relationship between him, his son-in-law and of the marriage itself. I write not to thy husband; partly to avoid trouble, for one line of mine begets many of his, which I doubt makes him sit up too late; . . . let not husband, let not anything cool thy affections after Christ. I hope he will be an occasion to inflame them. That which is best worthy of love in thy husband is that of the image of Christ he bears. Look on that, and love it best, and all the rest for that. I pray for thee and him; do so for me.71

Ireton’s tendency to overwork, noted in the memorials to him at his death, had already become apparent.72 Cromwell’s reference to Ireton’s ‘many’ lines also indicates the wealth of material that remains lost to us from this period. Although Cromwell and Ireton spent much time together after they had first met in 1643 they communicated regularly when apart. It would appear that Ireton’s letters to Cromwell were long. Only one letter, however, from Ireton

67

J. Coffey, ‘Puritanism and Liberty Revisited: The Case for Toleration in the English Revolution’, Historical Journal, 41: 4 (1998), p. 968. 68 BL, E343(5), W. Dell, The Building and Glory of the Truly Christian and Spiritual Church (7 June 1646); Gentles, NMA, p. 95. The chaplain of Ireton’s regiment at the time was one James Nicholl; see A. Laurence, Parliamentary Army Chaplains 1642–51 (1990), pp. 156, 194. 69 NewDNB Dell entry by Roger Pooley. 70 E.B. Underhill (ed.), Confessions of Faith, and other Public Documents, illustrative of the History of the Baptist Churches of England in the 17th Century (1854), p. 313; B.R. White, ‘Thomas Patient in England and Ireland’, Irish Baptist Historical Society Journal, 2 (1969–70), pp. 36–48. 71 Abbott, I, p. 416. 72 J. Cook, Monarchy No Creature of God’s Making (1652); BL, E654(3), John Owen, The labouring saints dismission to rest. A sermon preached at the funeral of the Right Honourable Henry Ireton Lord Deputy of Ireland (6 Feb. 1652). 55

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to Cromwell and one letter from Cromwell to Ireton are known to have survived.73 The depth and nature of Ireton’s faith made his bond with Cromwell possible. Cook believed that for Ireton: his estimat or character of a godly man, was not principally that he was of such a forme, opinion, judgement, or attainement; but where he found the maine bent and resolution of his soule to be to know God in the face of Jesus Christ, and to promote his glory, to serve the Saints, to begin or second a good motion, with all his might; to doe good to every visible object, to love the first appearances and cherish the least sparks of grace, and Image of Christ in whomsoever existing and to renounce the horrors, profits and pleasures of this life for Christs sake who became of no reputation for us; he greatly delighted in the Communion of Saints, and made union with Christ (and not any other opinion) the ground of it, which is the onely foundation of that Church, against which the gates of hell shall never prevaile . . . he would often say to this effect, that there was no honor like to the service of Jesus Christ, and let our ambition be who shall be most instrumentall for God in his generation, and having done our worke with all diligence, let us trust God for our wages, but halfe worke is not pleasing to God.74

Bound through kinship, their religion and army experience made Ireton and Cromwell politically compatible.75 This was to become clear during the politicisation of the New Model Army in 1647.76

VI The attempt by the ‘presbyterian’ faction at Westminster to disband the New Model triggered Ireton’s first recorded activity in the Commons. His response was no doubt heightened by the fact that the strategy of Holles, leader of the ‘presbyterian’ faction, involved forcing out those opposing MPs who were also officers, namely Ireton himself, Fairfax, Cromwell and Fleetwood.77 The cold reception given by Holles’ faction to the moderate material grievance based Humble Petition of 29 March 1647 alienated Ireton who had drafted it, alongside the Hammonds, Robert Lilburne, Mark Grime and Thomas

73 Ireton to Cromwell, Cary, Memorials, I, pp. 1–3 (23 April 1646); Cromwell to Ireton, Abbott, II, p. 327 (1650). 74 John Cook, Monarchy no Creature, epistle, n. p. 75 NewDNB Ireton entry by Ian Gentles. 76 Much of what follows in terms of the politics of the army is based on the two standard works on this: Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, and Gentles, NMA. Reference can also be made to G. Catermario, ‘The Political Making of the New Model Army’, Queen Mary and Westfield, University of London Ph.D. (2002) which focuses on the origins of the religious and political development of the army. 77 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, pp. 29–30.

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Pride.78 However, they had not done so openly. The agents of the army would later argue that: Though your Officers, yea the greatest Officers, should apostatise from you; Its well known that the great Officers which now oppose, did as much oppose secretly when wee refused to disband according to Parliament’s Order; and at last they confessed the Providence of God was the more wonderfull, because those resolutions to stand for Fredom and justice began among the Souldiers only.79

Waller presented to the Commons a view of the officers as behind the petition. Ireton was not in the Commons when Waller first accused the officers. When Ireton did come in to the Commons Waller was asked to repeat his report. Waller wrote that the: Commissary Generall, in answer to this, told the Speaker, that he presumed, and took it for granted, that what I had delivered was by way of an information given me, and not as upon my own knowledge, and therefore he would have nothing to say to me. But for the matter suggested, he was there to avow, that it was a pure fiction, and there was no such petition at all, nor any such thing in agitation. This being so confidently spoken, and by a person of that quality and trust in the army, the House continued in a great suspense, untill it pleased the providence of GOD to order it so, that in the midst of the debate (unbeknown to me, and, I think I may speak it confidently, unknown to any body else within those walls) there came a letter to Col. Rossiter from his major out of Lincolonshire, signifying, that a petition had been sent to him from head-quarters, to be subscribed by the regiment, with directions, that he should return their subscriptions to Commissary general Ireton, and the rest of the officers formerly named by me. . . . Upon this, when som moved, that there might be a vigorous course taken to surpress the petition, the Commissary Generall stood up, and humbly besought the Speaker, that he would not go that way to work, for some reasons, which, if the House commanded him, he should express. The House thereupon required him to speak. He said, Why then, Mr Speaker, I must confess there is such a petition, and agreeing with that coppy, which hath been presented to you; but both myself and the other officers were necessitated to yield to it, to prevent a worse. Therewithal he told them of a great inflammation in the army, and that there was no course to be held for the allaying of it, but by a gentle and tender proceeding. This blowing hot and cold, with the same breath, and in the face of such an Assembly, was entertained with wonder enough.80

78 BL, E409(25), Declaration of the Engagements, pp. 1–2; CJ, V, pp. 129, 132–3; LJ, IX, p. 115; B.Taft, ‘From Reading to Whitehall: Henry Ireton’s journey’, in M. Mendle (ed.), The Putney Debates of 1647. The Army, the Levellers and the English State (Cambridge, 2001), p. 177. 79 Clarke Papers, I, p.xix, from A copy of a Letter sent by the Agents of Several Regiments (1647). 80 Waller, Vindication, pp. 58–9.

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Waller, a leading political presbyterian or ‘Presbyterian-royalist’, is hardly an impartial observer of this episode.81 His bitterness stemmed from a firm belief that Parliament should not make any concessions to the army.82 He acted as a teller for the presbyterians with Massey. Indeed, his political stock rose by virtue of the fact that he had been proposed in March as a potential commander for Ireland. Recognising the problems of such a post Waller refused it and actually received an appointment as a Parliamentary Commissioner to the army in April 1647.83 Nevertheless, Ireton was involved in the disturbances in the army, its own factionalisation and opposition to the presbyterians in Parliament. Wogan wrote of Ireton drawing up a ‘black lyst’ of ‘names of all those officers in the army that were Presbiterians’.84 Wogan’s account, like Waller’s, is too shaped by antagonism to the army leadership to be totally credible but there is enough in Ireton’s own words to implicate him in resistance to Parliament. Waller’s account of Ireton’s performance in the Commons reads very much as if Waller and the presbyterians had managed to lead him into self-incrimination. The bitterness of the army was expressed in print. The soldiers argued that: When their Officers, Lieutenant generall Hamond, Commissary Ireton, and others appeared to the House; and desired that these malicious suggestions might be proved, or the Authors punished, and the Army vindicated; they could not obtain so much as civil right, as the authors of these false aspersions (which were Rossiter and Harley) to be called forth.85

Ireton’s bitterness at how he had been exposed in the Commons probably explains why he responded so violently to Holles’ next manoeuvre. Holles’ ‘Declaration of Dislike’, which declared the soldiers ‘enemies of the state’, led to a more direct confrontation with Ireton, to the point where both men appeared to be contemplating a duel. A Commons’ injunction sought to prevent this, but the dispute between the political forces that both Holles and Ireton represented escalated.86

81 I. Gentles, ‘The Struggle for London in the Second Civil War’, Historical Journal, 26: 2 (1983), p. 293. 82 M. Kishlansky, ‘The Emergence of Adversary Politics in the Long Parliament’, Journal of Modern History, 49: 4 (1977), p. 637. 83 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, pp. 37, 39–40, 44. 84 Clarke Papers, I, p. 424. 85 BL, E384(11), New Found Stratagem, p. 11. 86 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, pp. 189–90; P. Crawford, Denzil Holles 1598–1680. A study of his political career (1979), p. 143; Clarendon Mss 2478; Cal. Clar.S.P., I, p. 373; Clarendon Mss 2495; CJ, V, p. 133; Clarendon, Rebellion, X, p. 104; IV, p. 238. Holles was obviously one of the Eleven Members that the army drew up charges against. The army committee appointed on 5 July 1647 to do this did not include Ireton. This may have been due to this very public clash between Ireton and Holles. For the committee see Clarke Papers, I, p. 151.

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Another army petition on the Irish service, composed in March by a committee which included Ireton, was finally presented to Parliament in midApril.87 It appears that the petitioners may have acted without Fairfax’s sanction, a forerunner to the blurred picture of Fairfax’s political role in the following years and other examples where his subordinates acted on their own authority in political matters. There is also the possibility, however, that they sought to give the appearance of subverting Fairfax who politically needed to appear above such machinations. Despite the fraught relationship between Parliament and army the majority in both institutions sought agreement. Although attacked for not wanting the army disbanded, thus jeopardising his place as a recruiter army MP, Ireton believed that some form of agreement could be reached. 88 On 30 April Cromwell, Ireton, Fleetwood and Skippon, the officer MPs, were sent to calm the army, as Commissioners of Parliament to the army, and undoubtedly wished to do so. The political make-up of both institutions meant that a simple Parliament–army division is not applicable. There can be little doubt that men such as Cromwell and Ireton did not wish to become revolutionaries and sought agreement between both of the institutions they represented. Woolrych may be right in arguing that Cromwell and Ireton’s collection of their arrears in reaction to the disbandment vote anticipated the army obeying Parliament’s authority. Their securing of their arrears may also however have been a more cynical action. As with the Self-denying Ordinance, interpretation of Cromwell’s motives depends on his overall make-up. Nedham’s Mercurius Pragmaticus commented ‘pointedly on the personal profiteering made by the Cromwell family, especially Ireton’ in 1649.89 At the same time Lilburne believed, or chose to portray, or someone portrayed him as arguing that Cromwell and Ireton benefited financially from their positions: [T]he substance of my discourse with Mr. Peter, saving I pinched him a little particularly upon his great Masters large fingering of the Common wealths money, which was no better then Theft in them, and State-Robbery in the highest (as I told him.) I but, saith he, Ireton hath got none: Then, said I, former Reports are false; and besides, if he have not, what need he, when his Father-in-law gets so much for them both, as 3 or 4000 l.per annum at one clap; with well-nigh twenty thousand pounds worth of wood upon it, if Parliament mens relations may be beleeved: besides, the People that know them, know the Father and Son piss both in one gullie; though they seem sometime to go one against another, yet it is but

87

Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, pp. 32–3fn.18. Works of Darkness Brought to LIGHT. OR A true Representation to the whole Kingdome of the Dangerous Designes driven on by Sectaries in the ARMY (1647), p. 12. 89 N. Smith, Literature and Revolution in England 1640–1660 (New Haven, CT, 1994), pp. 68–9. 88

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that they may the more easily and thoroughly drive on the main design of them both: viz. To make the People slaves. And so farewell Mr Peter.90

A rebuttal to these charges, specifically with regard to Ireton rather than Cromwell, appeared in print: Indeed replyed Mr Peters, they have given money among them heretofore; but I pray you, what hath been given of late? and because you speak of Ireton, what hath he got, that you mention him? I am sure I heard a neer friend of his averre, that to his knowledge, that service for the State had impaired and hindred him in his own estate at least 3000l. No replyed L.Coll.Lilborne, what need hath he, his father hath enough given for himself and Ireton too; and they pisse both in one Glasse, and know well enough how to share it i’le warrant you.91

Cromwell secured all of his arrears of £1,976, while Ireton only received £300. Hoover has indicated that Cromwell’s ‘collection of full arrears was highly unusual . . . no other officer appears to have made a similar collection’. 92 Woolrych again may be right in postulating that for Ireton this may have ‘been all he could get in cash at such short notice’; Ireton’s later financial self-sacrifice may indicate other motives.93 Ireton, in refusing £2,000-worth of land assigned him by the Rump Parliament, commented that: they had many just debts, which he desired they would pay before they made any such presents; that he had no need of their land, and therefore would not have it; and that he should be more contented to see them doing the service of the nation, than so liberal in disposing of the publick treasure.94 90 John Lilburne, A Discourse Betwixt Lieutenant Colonel John Lilburn Close Prisoner in the Tower of London, and Mr Hugh Peter Upon 25 May 1649 (1649), p. 8. Jason Peacey has argued that Lilburne’s pamphlet ‘was probably a fake’. J. Peacey, ‘The Hunting of the Leveller: The Sophistication of Parliamentarian Propaganda, 1647–53’, Historical Research, 78: 199 (2005), p. 26n.73. As Peacey has also shown Marchamont Nedham ‘offered readers an extended report on Hugh Peters’ visit to John Lilburne in the Tower’. J. Peacey, ‘“The counterfeit silly curr”: Money, Politics, and the Forging of Royalist Newspapers during the English Civil War’, Huntingdon Library Quarterly, 67: 1 (2004), p. 38 n.81. 91 The Examination and Correction of a Paper Lately Printed Intituled A Relation of the Discourse between Mr. Hugh Peters and Lieut. Collonel John Lilborn in the Tower of London, May 25. (1649) by Robert Massey, Doctor in Physick, who was present thereat. 92 C. Hoover, ‘Cromwell’s Status and Pay in 1646–47’, Historical Journal, 23: 3 (1980), p. 712. As Hoover also points out (p. 711 n.36), Cromwell’s ‘account’ was signed by the Deputy Treasurer at War John Blackwell, who was also a captain in Cromwell’s own regiment of horse. However it could also be added that Blackwell was part of Cromwell’s kinship network. See W.L.F. Nuttall, ‘Governor John Blackwell: His Life in England and Ireland’, Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 88 (1964). 93 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 100; Hoover, ‘Cromwell’s Status’, p. 709; PRO, SP28/49 fol. 501; SP28/303 fol. 769. 94 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 286.

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The continuing inability of the Presbyterian faction in Parliament to come to terms with the changed political situation and what Ireton and Cromwell saw and heard when they rejoined the army at Saffron Walden made them side with the men with whom they had shared so much during the last four years of conflict. They did not want to be revolutionaries. Cromwell and Ireton both keenly felt the grievances of the army and were probably not averse to working with others, of all ranks, to put pressure on Parliament. Rushworth stated, ‘lett the Parliament see it is possible they may erre as well as the Army or any other State’.95

VII At Saffron Walden on 15 April a meeting of over a hundred officers chose a committee to represent their views. Those selected were Lambert, the two Hammonds, Lilburne, Rich and Hewson.96 Lambert spoke for all. He asked the Commissioners of Parliament which regiments were to be maintained in England, who would command in Ireland, whether there would be sufficient pay and resources for that campaign, and what was to be done with regard to their arrears and indemnity for service to date.97 Meanwhile A New Found Stratagem Framed in the Old Forge of Machivilisme . . . to Destroy the Army had been circulated throughout the army. It argued that only the army stood in the way of those in Parliament it believed had a ‘designe’ to ‘inslave’ the nation.98 Lt-Col. Mark Grime, Captain William Style and Sergeants Roger Crofts and John Eve, officers of Lambert’s regiment, played a leading role in distributing this pamphlet.99 The other officer involved was Major Robert Saunders of Robert Lilburne’s regiment, Lilburne himself being close to Lambert. This again may be an indication of co-operation through the ranks in putting pressure on Parliament. According to Wogan, shortly after 15 April Ireton presented to the council of officers a plan to resist their enemies in Parliament: Ireton all this while was not ignorant what the Parliamt was resolved to doe, and at councell of warr tooke occasion to speake to this; how the Parliamt had noe good

95

Clarke Papers, I, p. 102. BL, E384(16), The Weekly Account, no.16 (14–21 April 1647), n.p.; BL, 515(8), Perfect Diurnall, no.194 (12–19 April 1647), pp. 1557–8. 97 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, pp. 44–5; Clarke Papers, I, pp. 6–7; W. Waller, Vindication of the Character and Conduct of Sir William Waller (London, 1793), pp. 116–25; Farr, Lambert, p. 48. 98 BL, E384(11), A New Found Stratagem Framed in the Old Forge of Machivilisme (18 April 1647), p. 9. 99 Gentles, NMA, p. 159; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, pp. 47, 56, 72; BL, Loan 29/122 Misc.8. 96

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intentions towards the army, and that it was a sad reward for we many years service to be cast of wthout any reward for their service or security for their persons after they were disbanded: likewise that the Parliamt was resolved to set upp the King agayne, that there would be noe living for any in that kingedome that had served in our army. All the officers that were present were much moved at this and besought the Commissary to advise what they were to doe. He answered there was noe way but one to prevent this, wch was that every officer should repayre to his respective command, and to send a trooper of each troope wth the grievances of the severall troopes to Saffron Walden, where the Generall was then goeing to receive the Commissionrs of both Houses that were coming downe to disband the Army.100

The reliability of Wogan’s narrative may be questioned in the light of his later royalism. Nevertheless, his apparent closeness to Ireton at the time of which he is later writing and the substance of his charges caution against dismissing his account.101 As an MP Ireton would have been fully aware of what some in Parliament were intending to do. His presentation to fellow officers is easily imagined. His role as a political leader within the army is confirmed by a variety of other sources and his own words. While Wogan’s charges against Ireton and Cromwell are grave they could be seen as a fairly accurate presentation of necessary co-operation for the officers with their men over shared grievances, but also with the aim of trying to ensure that the revolt against Parliament did not get out of hand. The best way to cope with their difficult position was to co-operate with the newly emerged adjutators.102 It is possible that Ireton was more positive about this process than Cromwell given the latter’s failure to institutionalise a General Council when with the Northern Association Army in 1648.103 The genesis of the adjutator movement is unclear. In the army’s politicalisation there is a lack of clarity over the interaction between the officers and men. A consideration of the terminology employed does indicate, as Woolrych argued, that the terms agitator, adjutator and agent were generally interchangeable.104 However, some distinction exists in the use of the term agent 100

Clarke Papers, I, p. 425. Ramsey, Ireton, p. 18. For a consideration of the reliability of Wogan’s narrative see Norris, ‘Sectarian Grandees’, p. 42fn.57. 102 In the seventeenth century ‘agitator’ did not have the same connotations as today and was used interchangeably with ‘adjutator’, someone who worked for/with a senior. See John Morrill’s review of Woolrych’s Soldiers and Statesmen in Times Literary Supplement (8–14 Jan. 1988); S.D. Glover, ‘The Classical Plebians: Radical Republicans and the Origins of Leveller Thought’, Cambridge University Ph.D. (1994), p. 168; Gentles (NMA, p. 159), has written that the term adjutator ‘meant simply one who had been empowered to act on behalf of others’. 103 Massarella,’Politics of the Army’, p. 149. It should be noted that the context of 1648 was different. 104 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 65. 101

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for those men who later claimed to be representatives of their regiments and the earlier adjutators. Although the words agitator and adjutator are used interchangeably the context and the actual activities of these men tells us more about their function. The term adjutator has been employed here for those first representatives in line with the seventeenth-century usage as someone who worked with a senior. Its use does not denote that these men were controlled by their officers. Their initial actions and those of the officers reinforce the co-operation and unity that the majority of the army desired. The source material does not allow an examination of the exact mechanics of the emergence of the adjutators. Woolrych stated that it ‘is utterly unlikely that the initiative for electing agitators came from Ireton, but it is possible that he was aware of an embryonic organization of troop-representatives and suggested making use of it’.105 Given the limits to the evidence it may also be unwise to employ the term election. Gentles has stated that the adjutators had ‘evidently been chosen by their regiments when their officers had summoned them to a rendezvous to hear the terms for the Irish service. The presence of the officers hints at their approval, if not their supervision.’106 Chosen could be very different from election. Ireton, in the Solemn Engagement, used the term ‘chuse’.107 Wogan, whatever his closeness to Ireton, would not be in a position to make such a distinction even if one could be made about the officers’ relation to the emergence of the adjutators. Even if Ireton had no involvement in the process of their emergence he would not have wanted to do so openly. Woolrych argued that Ireton probably responded to a development that had already taken place in his regiment and formalised it rather than the initial concept being his own. At the time he had no reason for not working with the adjutators. The adjutators had not opposed the officers and their thinking at this point was, as Gentles states, ‘congruent’.108 Kishlansky argues that initially ‘the agitators acted only as conduits’ and that it ‘was not until mid-May . . . that the role of the agitators expanded’.109 Writing on 19 May 1647, the adjutators themselves stated: Before you were the Marke shott at without your Officers, and they loath to see you in such a condition designed to ruine they appeare now to speake and act for you; but noe sooner came they to speake on your behalfes, but they become the Marke instead of you.110

105 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 62; Woolrych, ‘The debates’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 58. 106 Gentles, NMA, p. 159. 107 BL, E409(25), Declarations of the Engagements, p. 23. 108 Gentles, NMA, p,159. 109 M.A. Kishlansky, ‘The Army and the Levellers: The Roads to Putney’, Historical Journal, 22: 4 (1979), p. 800. 110 Clarke Papers, I, p. 87.

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That the adjutators first emerged in Ireton’s own regiment as early as 15 April may be another of the reasons why he so readily sought to work with and make use of them. Thomas Sheppard of Ireton’s regiment presented, with two other troopers, an appeal by the soldiers to their commanders to add to the pressure on Parliament.111 Ireton’s co-operation with the adjutators may have been aided by the fact that the officer-adjutator of Rich’s regiment was his brother, Captain Thomas Ireton. Once the adjutators had emerged, Cromwell and Ireton, according to Wogan, sought to direct them. He stated that the troopers representing each regiment were ‘called privately together by Capt John Reynolds of Cromwell’s Regiment and one his greatest favorete’. The presentation of a ‘remonstrance’ from the adjutators, according to Wogan, met with feigned anger from Cromwell, whereas Ireton ‘seemed to be a neuter and would not openly owne the remonstrance, nor seeme to contest wth Parliamt’. Wogan argued that Ireton provided the brain behind the political machinations of the adjutators and officer corps during this period, directing strategy with Cromwell through their links in the army with the radicals. Fairfax: was ignorant of these contrivances and certaynely persuaded by Ireton that these that were called Agitators intended nothing to his prejudice nor to the dishonr of the army, yet the General, the Comissary Generall, and all the Officrs of the Army disavowed the proceedings of the Agitators. Ireton designed the matter, what he would have the army to doe, and privately would send it to London to Crumwell. Crumwell would with as much privacie send it back agayne to his Capt. Reynolds, the Chayreman Raynolds would present it to the Agitatrs as the greevance of the Army, they would declare it to the Parliament as the desire of the Army.112

The letter to Fairfax accompanying the petition of Rich’s regiment of May 1648 stated that ‘although your Excellency did not first concur with us, but gave forth orders to suppress our agents, and prevent their meetings, yet you were pleased afterwards to associate and engage with us in the common cause’.113 Wogan’s comments about the role of Reynolds are significant. However, his claims should not be too surprising given the co-operation within the army and the nature of the original adjutator movement. This may be a distorted image but it would have been natural for Ireton and Cromwell to have communicated with regard to proceedings in the army and to organise how they might deal with internal army problems and with Parliament. Indeed, given their likely content, it is little wonder that only two letters which passed between Ireton and Cromwell have survived. 111

BL, E385(18), The Apologie of the Common Souldiers of Sir Thomas Fairfaxes Army (28 April 1647); BL, E409(25), Declaration of Engagements; Norris, ‘Sectarian Grandees’, p. 32; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 44. 112 Clarke Papers, I, p. 427 113 Bell (ed.), Fairfax Correspondence, II, pp. 25–7. 64

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Another significant contemporary comment has survived on the role Ireton and Cromwell played in the disturbances in the army. Huntingdon later argued that Cromwell and Ireton, despite their orders to help disbandment and service for Ireland, had hindered that process. He stated that Ireton said ‘to the Agitators, “That it was then lawful and fit for us to deny disbanding, until we received equal and full satisfaction for our past service”’.114 Waller’s account of Ireton’s actions was similar to Huntingdon’s but, given the political leanings of both men, their claims need to be treated with caution. Huntingdon resented the fact that he did not get Cromwell’s place as colonel of the regiment in 1647 when MPs were debarred from commissions as a result of the army revolt. His account in 1648 may be seen as a ‘set of vituperative and distorted charges’.115 Yet while Huntingdon was writing from the different context of 1648 similar claims, with some justification, were made in 1647 about Lambert, Ireton’s close political collaborator, undermining the call for service in Ireland.116 The continued co-operation across the ranks is also suggested by events in the Northern Association Army. The mutiny against Poynts, the political presbyterian Commander of the Northern Association Army, seems to have had the direct support of Colonel John Lambert whose origins in that army gave him direct links with the troops, being particularly closely tied to those who led the rebellion.117 On Poynts’ removal Lambert left the New Model and took command of the Northern Association Army. He maintained it in line with Ireton’s stance in the New Model. According to Whitelocke, Lambert, was, at this time, Ireton’s chief collaborator in vocalising the army’s demands through the various documents emanating from its councils. 118 Poynts indicated that Ireton too played his part in undermining his command of the Northern Army. Addressing his soldiers in June 1647, Poynts claimed that Major Henry Lilburne and Lambert’s associate John Hodgson had stirred up the Northern Army, by claiming to be acting on Fairfax’s authority. He stated that he was ‘credibly informed by my owne Quarter Master who was with Commissary Ireton and Collonell Whalley within thes foure or five dayes, that some of them framed a letter as if it came from the Souldiers of these parts, that they would march to him [Fairfax] if hee pleased’.119 The immediate root of the emergence of the adjutators is likely to remain unclear. None the less, Norris has reinforced the evidence of their close

114

Sundry Reasons inducing Major Robert Huntingdon to lay down his Commission (1648), in F. Maseres (ed.), Select Tracts relating to the Civil Wars in England, 2 vols (1815–26), II, pp. 397–8. 115 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 41. 116 BL, E394(3), A Vindication of 167 Officers (26 June 1647); Farr, Lambert, pp. 50–4. 117 D. Farr, ‘John Hodgson. Soldier, Surgeon, Agitator and Quaker?’, Journal of the Friends Historical Society, 58: 3 (1999). 118 Whitelocke, Memorials (1853), I, p. 254. 119 Clarke Papers, I, p. 143; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 148. 65

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co-operation with the officers. Indeed he has gone further to emphasise the direction of the movement by a group of officers.120 The command structure of the army did not, whatever Wogan’s comments, directly ‘disavowe’ the proceedings of the adjutators and actually formalised them with the establishment of the General Council in July 1647.121 Furthermore it is clear that many of the adjutators received payments from army funds for their actions. 122 Wogan and Huntingdon’s descriptions illustrate the general unity and desire for unity between the officers and adjutators. If viewed as adjutators in the seventeenth-century meaning of the term, such co-operation partly explains their emergence. The interaction of Cromwell and Ireton with the adjutators and London radicals was suspect to men like Wogan because they were in the difficult position of having a command in the army while being MPs and Parliamentary commissioners to the army. Cromwell and Ireton had been selected as commissioners because of their profile within the army but struggled to deal with the contradictions inherent in their position which had been exposed by the army’s revolt against its governing authority.123 They made use of the adjutators to aid agreement with Parliament and to prevent the revolt in the army from escalating. Berkeley’s close contact with the army leadership and Ireton in particular gave him an appreciation of the influence of Cromwell and Ireton. His account indicates the more subtle political interaction within the army through its differing consultative mechanisms. Berkeley believed that: Out of my discourses and inquiries, I collected these observations: First, that the Army was governed partly by a Council of War, and partly by a Council of the Army, or Agitators, wherein the General had but a single voice; that Fairfax, the General, had little power in either; that Cromwell and his son Ireton, with their Friends and Partisans, governed the Council of War absolutely, but not that of the Army, which was the most powerful, although they had a strong party there also.124 120

M.A. Norris, ‘Edward Sexby, John Reynolds and Edmund Chillenden: Agitators, “Sectarian Grandees” and the Relations of the New Model Army with London in the Spring of 1647’, Historical Research, 76: 191 (2003). 121 Gentles, NMA, p. 160. 122 E. Kitson and E. Kitson Clark (ed.), ‘Some Civil War Accounts 1647–50’, Thoresby Society, 11 (1902), p. 157. Mendle has raised the question of the ‘extent to which army funds were used to purchase the acquiescence of the agitators. . . . Certainly payments recorded in army accounts are suggestive’, Mendle, ‘Putney Pronouns’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 128fn.21. It may be less a case of purchasing ‘acquiescence’ if they are regarded as adjutators. 123 This tension was in part shown by the directions to one army committee where the last five men named to it (Hardress Waller, Rich, Lambert, Robert Hammond and Desborough) were specified as its key constituents as they did not also hold a position within Parliament; see LJ, IX, p. 312. In practice however, the records of negotiation show that despite these instructions Ireton led the committee see Clarke Papers, I, p. 148, where listed as negotiating for the army were Ireton, Waller, Rich, Lambert and Desborough. 124 Berkeley Memoirs, II, pp. 363–4. 66

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Given their contact since at least 1645 negotiating peace treaties in the west and during the period he was writing about, it is likely that some of Berkeley’s ‘discourses and inquiries’ had been directly with Ireton. The split which increasingly developed between the army and Parliament in the period 1646–47 saw Fairfax formally in line with men such as Ireton and Cromwell. Politics appears to have been more problematic to Fairfax than the battlefield. Rushworth wrote at the time that Fairfax wished he could resign his command.125 As commander he would necessarily need to stand above a direct politcal role as far as possible. On 29 August 1647 he appointed a committee to ‘receive and take into consideration all Businesses’ and would have held discussions with such committees.126 Army documents continued to be issued in his name. Fairfax’s conservatism should not be pre-dated. He may have colluded in the removal of Poynts.127 Like Cromwell and Ireton, he absented himself from Essex’s funeral and disbanded Massey’s Western Brigade with Ireton, both overt ‘anti-presbyterian’ political statements.128 The fact that Parliament sent Skippon to quell the Petition of the Officers and Souldiers rather than rely on Fairfax says something of their perception of his stance.129 Fairfax’s apparent aloofness cannot be construed as simply the result of political naivety but was a necessary part of his function as commander-in-chief. The difficulty of his position and the care he needed to take with public statements and actions is clear in a letter to him of 28 May 1647. Colonel William White, an MP and part of Lord Fairfax’s political network, commented that the New Model Commander had ‘a most difficult game to play, your relations to Parliament and Army considered especially if there shall be opposition to the Parliament’s command’s’.130 Fairfax had no illusions about the politics within the army but in likelihood agreed, if with some reticence, with the stance being taken. Wogan’s reference to Fairfax having ‘advised wth Ireton’ should be interpreted as an exchange of ideas and a discussion of policy.131 Ireton may have provided the direction and details but the very nature of Fairfax’s military career and other aspects of his private life suggest a courageous and intelligent man who would not have been easily sidelined by his subordinates. Yet such was the difficulty of his position that Rushworth wrote to Fairfax’s father that the Commander-in-chief of the New Model Army wished he could resign his post.132 125

Bell (ed.), Fairfax Correspondence, I, pp. 343–4. Clarke Papers, I, pp. 223–5. This committee was composed of Cromwell, Thomas Hammond, Ireton, Thomas Rainsborough, Fleetwood, Robert Hammond, Hardress Waller, Rich, Stane, Watson, Thomas Ireton and Deane. This committee had to include one of Cromwell, Thomas Hammond, Ireton or Rainsborough. 127 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 146–7. 128 Gentles, NMA, pp. 143–4. 129 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 37. As Gentles has shown, Parliament was mistaken in its conception of Skippon’s politics; see NewDNB Skippon entry by Ian Gentles. 130 Clarke Papers, I., pp. 103–4. 131 Clarke Papers, I, p. 427. 132 Bell (ed.), Fairfax Correspondence, I, pp. 343–4. 126

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VIII Lambert and the committee of officers, the two Hammonds, Lilburne, Rich and Hewson, represented the sense of the army in A Vindication of Officers. This stated that ‘the Petition tooke its first Rise from amongst the souldiers, and that wee ingaged but in the second place to regulate the souldiers proceedings & remove as neer as we could all occasion of dislike’.133 Norris suggests this was ‘an admission that they had actively participated in the genesis of the Agitator movement’.134 He believes that these officers were ‘ultimately responsible’ for the Advertisements and a letter of 5 May which formed ‘an ambitious plan to unite the officer corps and soldiers in a common stand against Parliament’.135 The Advertisements comprised an eleven-point list designed to structure the adjutator movement. According to Norris the ‘text revealed that Agitators viewed the maintenance of Army unity as the chief means by which they could promote what they wanted’. 136 The events at Saffron Walden do suggest co-operation throughout the ranks. The officers’ admission in the Vindication provides another direct statement of their direct involvement in shaping the grievances of their men for their presentation to Parliament. Ireton with Cromwell and Skippon sent a letter on 3 May to the colonels of the regiments to report on the ‘present temper and disposition of the regiment’. On the same day they informed Lenthall, Speaker of the Commons, of their actions.137 Following a meeting at Saffron Walden Ireton and the other commissioners sent a report, on 8 May, to the Commons that more time was needed for the officers to achieve a full report, to be brought together by Lambert.138 On 25 April ‘Captaine Rolphe with some others of Colonel Hammond’s Regiment came this morning to Colonel Lambert and the rest of them which are appointed by the Generall for the affairs of the Army’. They complained to Lambert that soldiers had been tricked or forced into enlisting for the Irish service.139 Each regiment made its grievances known through regimental returns. Lambert organised and directed this campaign. Lt.-Col. Thomas Reade hinted at the co-operation between the officers and their men in this process.140 A letter from London of 5 May to Cromwell, drafted, according to Norris, by Rushworth on behalf of the ‘Vindicators’, ‘designed to shape the soldiery’s 133

BL, E385(19), The Petition and Vindication of the Officers of the Armie (7 April 1647), p. 3; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 55. 134 Norris, ‘Sectarian Grandees’, p. 38. 135 Norris, ‘Sectarian Grandees’, pp. 37–8. 136 Norris, ‘Sectarian Grandees’, p. 33. 137 Abbott, I, p. 441. 138 Abbott, I, p. 443. 139 Clarke Papers, I, p. 16. 140 Worcester College, Clarke Mss 41, fol. 31. 68

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perception of Parliament’.141 The desire for united action from the officers and the men stands out: all our friends doe hope the Army will be well united by this meeting (horse and ffoote) and for this time lett them demand nothing but what is relating to them as Souldiers. . . . Be carefull to whome you speake but doe what you can to unite the Officers to the Army in demanding things Just and honourable relateing to them as Souldiers if wee fall softly I perceive wee shall loose by it.142

Those officers who stayed in London, having presented the Vindication, continued to act as a link with the radicals in the capital.143 Lambert informed Fairfax of his proceedings and hinted at the pressures in the army: we used as much moderation as possibly wee could with satisfaction to the Souldiers, who, though they remaine very high in their demaunds and expressions, yet I am confident I have declined much which was in their hearts to have strongly insisted upon.

It might be wise to take his words at face value. The officers, in general agreement and co-operation with their men, tried to shape the response to Parliament. Furthermore it mirrored Waller’s report which came from a rather different perspective.144 Lambert made clear to Fairfax that, ‘if the Parliament thinke to have helpe out of this Army for Ireland, they must goe another way then what they are in for the present’.145 On 15 May the officers held another meeting in Saffron Walden church to listen to regimental grievances. Lambert’s leading part in organising the army’s opposition to Parliament’s scheme for Ireland and Holles’ general anti-army strategy is evident during the progress of this meeting, as is his probable participation in organising a preliminary meeting, without Fairfax’s public sanction, between the officers and adjutators.146 Ireton does not appear to have had any direct involvement in this process. As one of Parliament’s commissioners he could not be seen to take an open role. Yet given their working relationship, from the time of the New Model’s campaign in the west, Ireton and Lambert must have discussed proceedings at Saffron Walden.

141 Norris, ‘Sectarian Grandees’, pp. 34–5, 44fn.67; See Clarke Papers, I pp. 24–5; Clarke Mss 41 fol. 22r; Clarke Mss 110 unfoliated. 142 Clarke Mss 41 fol. 22r; Clarke Mss 110 unfoliated is a rough draft of 41 fol. 22r. This letter is also printed in Clarke Papers, I, pp. 24–5. 143 Norris, ‘Sectarian Grandees’, p. 38. 144 Waller, Vindication, pp. 58–9. 145 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 81–2. 146 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 87.

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Lambert’s stance at Saffron Walden would have, at the very least, been strengthened by the calls from the ranks. At the end of April Edward Sexby and William Allen with Thomas Sheppard of Ireton’s regiment had presented The Apologie of the Common Soldiers to Fairfax. They argued that they were ‘sensible of another more dangerous storm hanging over our Heads’ and asked whether ‘we can be proclaimed enemies, and your Excellency remain secure?’ Their bitterness towards Parliament resonated through the Apologie: ‘a farre worse enemy we have to deale with, who like Foxes lurke in their Dennes, and cannot be dealt withall, though discovered, being protected by those who are intrusted with the Government of the Kingdome.’ They viewed the Irish expedition as a ‘Designe’ or a ‘meer cloake for some who have lately tasted of Sovereignty’.147 Attached to the Apologie was A Second Apologie of All the Private Soldiers. In this the authors called for their ‘brave commanders . . . to stand fast in your integritie that you have manifested to us your Souldiers’. If any did not however, ‘he shall be marked with a brand of infamie for ever, as a Traytor to his Countrey and an Enemie to his Armie’.148 This document indicates the co-ordinated nature of the opposition to Parliament and also shows the pressure under which the officers operated. The assertion that ‘the meanest subject should fully enjoy his right, liberty and properties’ posed as great a potential threat to men such as Ireton as it did to Parliament. Note should be made, however, of the fact that both the Apologie and Second Apologie were actually printed in the army’s Book of Declarations.149 At the 15 May meeting in Saffron Walden church Colonel Sheffield vigorously opposed the scheme to collect regimental grievances. From his statements it is clear that he believed, justifiably, that the move constituted a deliberately organised political strategy by officers like Lambert who opposed Holles’ aims. In justifying his actions Lambert stated: wee have done and presented what are the comon grievances of the army to you, I make noe question but you will finde what wee say doth not proceede singly from us, but from the body of the army, and will appeare themselves what they are to yourselves and the world.150

That 167 officers left the army indicates that Lambert could not justifably argue that their proceedings derived totally ‘from the body of the army’. One of Lambert’s officers, Grime, exaggerated when he argued that ‘there is not so

147

An Apollogie in BL, E409(25), Declaration of the Engagements, pp. 5, 8. A Second Apology in BL, E409(25), Declaration of the Engagements, pp. 9–11. See also Norris, ‘Sectarian Grandees’, p. 41. 149 BL, E409(25), Declaration of the Engagements, pp. 5–11. I would like to thank John Morrill for his comments with regard to this. 150 Clarke Papers, I, p. 38. 148

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much as they speake of, for 7 or 8 men doe not make a dissent in the army’.151 It would seem that, politically, factionalism existed among the officer corps.152 Prynne certainly regarded Cromwell and Ireton as part of a ‘faction’ in the army.153 The withdrawal of men like Sheffield provided a notable victory for men of Ireton’s view and may in part help explain the army’s subsequent political success. A letter of 18 May to the adjutators, possibly from Sexby, again stressed the need for unity between the soldiers and their officers.154 Cromwell allegedly reported to the Commons in May that the officers no longer had control over their men. His words may have been deliberately designed to add to the pressure on moderates in Parliament in seeking a compromise with the army’s demands.155 By 17 May commissioners Ireton, Cromwell, Fleetwood and Skippon had sent a preliminary report to the Commons. Cromwell and Fleetwood returned to the House to give a full report signed by all four commissioners. They justified how the officers had summarised the regimental returns as the originals had been ‘confused and full of tautologies, impertinences, or weaknesses answerable to Soldiers dialect they drew the matter of them into some form more fit for view’. According to this report the officers ‘did, by their persuasions with the inferior Officers and soldiers that came with them (intrusted for the rest), bring them to lay avoide many more offensive things’.156 On 27 May someone within the army command, possibly Rushworth, wrote: I doubt the disobleiging of soe faithfull an Army will be repented of; provocation and exasperation makes men thinke of that they never intended. . . . I assure you that passionate and violent councell which is given thus to provoke the Army will in time be apprehended to be destructive, or my observation failes mee. It shall be my endeavour to keepe things as right as I can; but how long I shall be able I knowe not. Unlesse you proceede upon better Principles, and more moderate termes then what I observed when I was in London in the bitternesse of spirit in some Parliament men, Cittizens, and Clergie, and by what I perceive in the Resolution of the Souldiers to defend themselves in just things as they pretend – and truly many honest consciencious men much disobleiged by the Declaration – I cannot but imagine a storm.157

151

Clarke Papers, I, p. 70. Hutton, Studies in Stuart History, pp. 100–1. 153 BL, E422(12), W. Prynne, The Machavilian Cromwellist and hypocritical perfidious new statist (1648), p. 3. 154 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 84–5. 155 Gentles, NMA, p. 165; Clarke Mss 41 fol. 131v. 156 Abbott, I, pp. 446–7. For the report see pp. 447–50. 157 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 101–2; Clarke Mss 41 fol. 134. Firth argued that Ireton wrote this letter. Hoover has put forward Rushworth showing that on the date this letter was composed Ireton was in London. The other possibilty suggested has been Skippon. 152

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The predicted ‘storm’ soon unfolded. Ireton headed the committee appointed, on 29 May 1647, to put the officers’ advice to Fairfax in reponse to the Commons vote on disbanding of 25 May and the ‘humble petition of the souldiers of the army’.158 The resulting Opinion and Humble Advise was, according to Woolrych, ‘an audacious document’. He argued that it ‘did not condone the recent disturbances in the army, but it noted that they had occurred ‘especially among those regiments, whose principal officers, by neglecting and deserting their soldiers in their necessary concernments, or just grievances, have disobliged their soldiers, and lost interest with them’.159 This is exactly the argument Lambert used at Saffron Walden when attacking Colonel Sheffield and his fellow ‘presbyterian’ officers who had engaged for Ireland.160 The document did not criticise the intention of the men to bring about a general rendezvous, even if they received no order to do this. Ireton’s committee recorded that they were ‘unsatisfied in one and something amazed and startled at the other’ with regard to Parliament’s votes on the army’s grievances (21 May) and disbandment (25 May). The document concluded that if Parliament had responded to the soldiers positively at Saffron Walden they would have engaged for Ireland under their old officers, the implication being that it was now too late.161 A letter from within the army of 21 May 1647 argued that: Our Adversaries doe fall very flatt and whereas before they voted Us 6 weekes and after that 8 weekes pay now they are glad to Vote Us our full Arreares part in hand and the rest upon very good securitie hopeing hereby to divide the Comon Souldiers from the Officers, They will not doe Us any Right concerning the Declaration, nor my Lord Pembrocks false charge, nor the sending for our Officers.162

Even the small concessions made by Parliament were now regarded with suspicion; the offer of pay before disbandment no longer sufficed to pacify the army. Writing to the regiments on 19 May the adjutators made clear that they believed Holles’ faction had a deliberate design, through organisation of the Irish campaign, to undermine the army. They advised the soldiers: 158

Clarke Papers, I, p. 109; BL, E409(25), Declaration of the Engagements, p. 16. On the committee, Ireton as the most senior officer was joined by Colonels Whalley, Rich, Lilburne, Okey, Hewson, Lt. Col. Jackson and Major Desborough. 159 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, pp. 102–3; BL, E409(25), Declaration of the Engagements, pp. 12–15. 160 Clarke Papers, I, p. 41; Farr, Lambert, p. 51. 161 BL, E409(25), Declaration of the Engagements, pp. 12–15. 162 Clarke Mss 41 fol. 133. The reference to Lord Pembroke refers to his attack on the army to Common Council of the City of London, 3 May 1647, see Clarke Mss 41 fol. 22r: ‘It is much wondered that my Lord Pembrock should soe rayle agt the Army at a Comon Councell the other day that 4000 cavalier’s were in it.’ As Smith argues, by ‘May 1647 Pembroke had emerged as one of the army’s most outspoken critics and a vigorous advocate of its speedy disbandment’. See NewDNB, Pembroke entry by David L. Smith. 72

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if you doe but stand, and not accept of any thing nor doe any thing without the concent of the whole Army, you will doe good to your selves, your Officers and the whole kingdome. Stand with your Officers, and own with another you need not feare. If you divide you destroy all. . . . Doe nothing for your owne securitie, but what may secure your reall and faithfull Officers as well as your selves. Be assured they are yours, while you are theirs.163

IX The seizure of the King by Cornet Joyce and his troopers at the start of June 1647 brought the army physically into the political arena. It openly marked them out as a political force that any settlement would have to reconcile. Huntingdon later wrote that Ireton and Cromwell designed, after their actions at Saffron Walden, to prevent Parliament from disbanding the New Model. Huntingdon stated that ‘for the effecting of their further purposes, advice was given by [Cromwell and Ireton] to remove the King’s person from Holdenby, or to secure him there by other guards than those appointed by the Commissioners of Parliament’. He further claimed that when Joyce informed Fairfax of the King’s arrival at Newmarket a concerned Fairfax asked Ireton for clarification. Fairfax ‘told Commissary-general Ireton, that he did not like it; demanding withal “who gave those orders.” Ireton replied, “That he gave orders only for securing the King there, and not for taking him away from thence”.’164 Huntingdon’s interpretation needs to be treated with care. The same applies to Fairfax’s own later account of this episode. Fairfax argued that he: called for a Council of War to proceed against Joyce for this high offence, and breach of the Articles of War; but the officers, whether for fear of the distempered soldiers, or rather ( as I suspected) a secret allowance of what was done, made all my endeavours in this ineffectual.165

A partial Waller argued that ‘This egg was laid, in Lieutenant Generall Cromwell’s own chamber, and brooded between him, and CG Ireton; but they were too wise to cackle’.166 Gentles believes that on the night of 31 May Cromwell met Joyce in his garden in Drury Lane and approved a plan to replace Charles’ guard with a more politically loyal force. Joyce then, on his

163

Clarke Papers, I, pp. 87–8. Huntingdon Sundry Reasons, II, p. 398. 165 Short Memorials of Thomas Lord Fairfax (1699), printed in Maseres Tracts, p. 448. Fairfax’s Memorials were a self-serving apology but his main fault lay in his being too easily led or ignored by subordinates. His ignorance on such issues as the seizure of the King does have a ring of truth about it, especially when set against the studied ambiguity of the statements by Joyce, Cromwell and Ireton. 166 Waller, Vindication, p. 136. 164

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own initiative, brought the King to the army at Newmarket and, as a result, the army to the centre of the politics of settlement.167 Gentles also refers to Rushworth’s letter to Ferdinando Fairfax which implied ‘that the seizure of the King was carried out with the full support of the army high command’.168 The idea that they sanctioned the securing of the King, but not his removal, is also implicit in the officers’ own comments to Charles.169 Others suggested that in other circumstances the adjutators had taken action upon their own initiative.170 Huntingdon’s account may be regarded as fairly accurate, as Cromwell and Ireton probably had prior knowledge of the action to be taken against the King and, in all likelihood, ordered that he be secured. Wogan wrote that Cromwell owned the ‘takeing away of the King to be his design’. This amazed Fairfax, ‘but Crumwell and Ireton perswaded him that there was a necessity for it, and that it was for theire owne safety’. This may relate to Joyce’s necessity in having to remove Charles from Holmby when the original intention had just been to change his guard. However, it is unlikely that Fairfax, with his political connections in Parliament, needed to be persuaded by Cromwell and Ireton that there was a design within the Houses to come to terms with Charles which would be to the detriment of the army.171 The placement of Lt. Edmund Chillenden as a link between London radicals and the army leadership further points to the involvement of the officers in Joyce’s actions. Norris stressed the apparent prior knowledge of Joyce’s actions by Wroth Rogers, one of the ‘Vindicators’.172 Furthermore, in a letter of 25 May Chillenden claimed to have received instructions from ‘59’ and ‘89’ who, according to Norris, were likely to have been ‘sectarian grandees and possibly even Cromwell and Ireton’.173 Joyce’s letter of 4 June 1647, probably to Cromwell, stated that: we have secured the King. . . . You must hasten an answer to us, and let us know what we shall do. . . . I humbly entreat you to consider what is done and act accordingly with all haste you can. We shall not rest night nor day till we hear from you.174

167

Huntingdon Sundry Reasons, II, p. 398; Gentles, NMA, p. 169; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, pp. 107–9; Davis, Cromwell, pp. 13, 23, 147. 168 Gentles, NMA, p. 488n.243. 169 Clarke Mss 41 fol. 66. 170 Cary (ed.), Memorials, I, p. 220. 171 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 427–8; Short Memorials of Thomas Lord Fairfax, p. 448. 172 Norris, ‘Sectarian Grandees’, p. 49; Bodl., Tanner Mss 68 fol. 123 [Clarke Papers, I, pp.xxv–xxvi, gives reference to this as 58 fol. 123]. 173 Norris, ‘Sectarian Grandees’, p. 51. 174 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 118–19. For one consideration of the evidence regarding Joyce’s removal of the King, see Clarke Papers, I, pp. xxv–xxxi. 74

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The implication of Joyce’s words, ‘what is done’, is that Charles I’s removal had not been planned but had been deemed necessary. Joyce brought the King to army headquarters at Newmarket and handed him over to Fairfax. Over the next two months Ireton moved to achieve settlement through direct negotiation with the King.

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‘Penman’ of the army, 1647

Gentles has argued that ‘the agitators may have forced the pace of events until 4 June, but on the 5th the grandees, perhaps led by Ireton, moved for the creation of a council of the army’.1 Many might have had sympathy with the adjutators’ agenda but wanted leadership from the officers. Later, in May 1649, a keen observer of army politics commented: though God made them [the adjutators] Instruments of much good, yet I would rather wish those that sitt at the helme would so act and steere theire shippe as that there may be no need of them to appeare to help the same from sinking.2

As the politicalisation of the army, in reaction to Holles’ Parliamentary faction, became more pronounced, the rendezvous at Newmarket on 4–5 June 1647 saw the organisation of a more formal political structure, the General Council of the Army. Through this body the officers, in particular Ireton, sought to lead the army, officers, adjutators and men, to settlement. The army’s position, written by Ireton, emerged as the Solemn Engagement of 5 June 1647.

I Like most of the significant documents which emerged from the army in the period before Charles’ execution, the Solemn Engagement was principally the work of Ireton, in consultation with others.3 The imagery employed by

1

Gentles, NMA, pp. 171–2. BL, Add Mss 21417 fol. 134, Thomas Margetts from Bedford, 6 May 1649; Massarella, ‘Politics of the Army’, p. 221. 3 BL, E409(25), Declaration of the Engagements, pp. 23–7; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, pp. 117–18; Gentles, NMA, p. 174. Vallance has argued that it ‘seems plausible that Saltmarsh’s call for a covenant for liberty of conscience, along with other tolerationist works on the Solemn League and Covenant, influenced the army in framing its “Solemn Engagement” ’, E. Vallance, Revolutionary England and the National Covenant. State Oaths, Protestantism and the Political Nation, 1553–1682 (Woodbridge, 2005), p. 146. 2

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Walker in his portrait hints at Ireton’s role as ‘penman general’ of the army.4 Whitelocke, present with the army at Oxford, wrote about a ‘select council’ of army – Fairfax, Ireton, Cromwell, Lambert and Fleetwood.5 He later wrote that: in these declarations and transactions of the Army, Col Ireton was chiefly Employed, or took upon him the business of the pen and having been bred in the Middle Temple, and learned some grounds of the law of England, and being a working and labourious brain and fancy, he set himself much upon these businesses, and was therein employed and assisted by Lt General Cromwell, his father in Law, and by Col Lambert, who had likewise studied at the Inns of court, and was of a subtle and working brain.6

In May 1649 the newspaper editor Marchamont Nedham described Ireton as the ‘penman general of the army’.7 The Solemn Engagement has been described as ‘essentially a compromise’ and a ‘statement . . . to distance the army from a factional political standpoint’. It should not be seen as a conservative document.8 It stated that the army would disband but only if their grievances were met: indemnity and the removal of Holles’ presbyterian faction. Described by Woodhouse, Woolrych and Gentles as a ‘military covenant’,9 Barber has argued, ‘it assumed a position which potentially set it apart from common citizens’ and the army claimed ‘for themselves an additional and special reason to be the recipients of rights’.10 Hugh Peter, army chaplain and close associate of Ireton, supported the Solemn Engagement and the stance of the army in print.11 This religious justification for the document should also be seen in relation to the prayer meetings held by the army that would have provided a context for all of its political statements.12

4 National Portrait Gallery, NPG3301; BL, E556(3), Mercurius Pragmaticus, no.45 (15–22 May 1649). 5 Whitelocke, Memorials (1853), II, pp. 204, 244. Gentles (NMA, p. 197) has argued that the composition of the Committee of the General Officers ‘tells us whom Fairfax regarded as his most important officers’. While the quorum only required there to be three on the committee there were Oliver Cromwell, Thomas Hammond, Henry Ireton, Thomas Rainsborough, Charles Fleetwood, Robert Hammond, Hardress Waller, Nathaniel Rich, William Stane, Leonard Watson, Thomas Ireton and Richard Deane. 6 Whitelocke, Memorials (1853), I, p. 254. 7 BL, E556(3), Mercurius Pragmaticus, no.45 (15–22 May 1649). 8 Barber, Regicide and Republicanism, p. 49. 9 Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty. p. 23; Woolrych, Statesmen and Soldiers, p. 117. 10 Barber, Regicide and Republicanism, p. 49. 11 BL, E410(16), A Word for the Armie (1647). 12 J. Cook, Redintegratio amoris, or A Union of hearts, between the Kings most excellent Majesty, the Right Honourable the Lords and Commons in Parliament, His Excellency Sir Thomas Fairfax, and the Army under his command (1647), pp. 68–9; Robertson, Cooke, p. 96.

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The content of the Solemn Engagement suggests co-operation between the officers and the adjutators.13 Gentles believes that it ‘must also have been cleared by the agitators before being presented to the army as a whole’.14 An army council of general officers and four representatives of each regiment, two officers and two soldiers, would decide whether their terms had been met. At this point there was little reason for division between the adjutators and the officers. All ranks wanted to work together and these ‘elected’ men may more properly be described as adjutators than agitators.15 On 7 June from army headquarters at Cambridge, Ireton, with Fairfax and Cromwell, proceeded to Childerley where Charles I was held. Herbert wrote of how Cromwell and Ireton ‘behaved themselves civilly and with respect’ on their visit.16 Clarendon made a greater distinction about the behaviour of the two men towards the King: Fayrefax had been with him, and kissed his hand, and made such professions as he could well utter; which was with no advantage in the delivery; and his authority was therefore of no use, because he resigned himself entirely to Cromwell; who had been, and Ireton likewise, with the King, without either of them offering to kiss his hand; otherwise [they] behaved themselves with good manners towards him.17

Although Ireton probably encountered the King after Joyce had brought Charles to Newmarket, this Childerley meeting was the first of what became formal negotiations between the army leadership and Charles I. In these Ireton assumed the role of the army’s chief spokesman.18 A newsletter of 7 June recorded that when the officers went to the King: they were according to the usuall manner received by the King with civilitie; after some generall discourse of things, the King went into the garden, and the Generall, his Officers, and the Commissioners went together and conferred upon the whole carriage of the businesse.19

On 15 June, in an effort to reinforce the Solemn Engagement, impeachment charges were drawn up against the eleven members, headed by Holles and Stapleton, whom the army saw as leading Parliament against them. Waller claimed that:

13 BL, E409(25), Declaration of the Engagements, pp. 23–7; Woolrych, Statesmen and Soldiers, p. 117. 14 Gentles, NMA, p. 174. 15 Gentles, NMA, p. 175. 16 Fea (ed.), Memoirs of the the Martyr King, p. 88. 17 Clarendon, Rebellion, X, p. 96, IV, p. 231. 18 Fea (ed.), Memoirs of the Martyr King, p. 87; Abbott, I, pp. 456–7. 19 Clarke Papers, I, p. 124.

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Ireton, and his fellow accusers of their brethren, were sadly put to their invention what to charge upon them. . . . Herein the dexterity of the CG [CommissaryGeneral Ireton] was very remarkable, who was most active in framing the charge, and gave particular directions to the Secretary, what he should write down against such and such persons.20

Woolrych believes that selection of those to be impeached ‘must have lain very much with Cromwell, advised no doubt by Ireton and possibly by Fleetwood and Harrison, for only those who had sat in the House could identify who the army’s most active and effective enemies were’.21 It would appear that Lambert and others, rather than Ireton, principally drafted the charges. Essentially a composite document, the charges reflected wider army opinion, including the adjutators.22 While Ireton may not have been on the committee Woolrych suggests rightly that he had some input. His absence from the committee may be attributed to his position as an MP and his very public clash with Holles. A further committee, responsible for drafting the charge, met John Cook and a Mr Norbury, two lawyers who had been hired to add legal gloss to the document.23 The five charges stated that the eleven members had ‘infringed or indeavoured to overthrow the Rights and Liberties of the Subjects of this Nation, in Arbitrary, violent or oppressive wayes’.24 In response the Commons essentially shelved the document, for on 12 July the named MPs were allowed a week to respond.25 This forced the army to apply more direct pressure by moving closer to London. On 10 June Ireton had been one of the officers who signed a letter from the army at Royston to the City of London. The other signatures included all those officers who would become the most prominent players, with a range of opinions, in the politics of the army over the coming months: Fairfax, Cromwell, both Hammonds, Waller, Rich, Pride, Robert Lilburne, Desborough, Thomas Rainsborough, Lambert and Harrison. On receipt of this piece of selfjustification the City elders would have harboured no illusions that the army had become a political force and wanted its enemies in Parliament dealt with. The officers stated that, whereas ‘the sum of all our desires as soldiers is no other than a desire of satisfaction to our demands as soldiers’. They also wanted ‘reparation upon those who have, to the uttermost, improved all opportunities

20

Waller, Vindication, pp. 174–6. Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 138. 22 Clarke Papers, I, p. 151; BL, E409(25), Declaration of the Engagements, pp. 47–9. 23 BL, E393(5), A Charge Delivered in the Name of the Army (14 June 1647); Clarke Papers, I, p. 151; Gentles, NMA, p. 490n.277 and n.279. This was the John Cook who in January 1649 was the Solicitor-General of Charles I, Robertson; Cooke, p. 144. 24 BL, E409(25), Declaration of the Engagements, p. 47. The Humble Remonstrance which was produced about a week later was more forceful in its attack on the eleven members and this may have been a reflection of Ireton’s more direct role in it. 25 CJ, 5 (12 July 1647), pp. 240–1. 21

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and advantages, by false suggestions, misrepresentations and otherwise, for the destruction of this army with a perpetual blot of ignominy upon it’. They recognised that the experience of the army and battle had shaped their political and religious will and distinguished them from Holles’ faction. The letter also threatened the City. Announcing that they were moving closer to London the letter concluded that, if: after all this, you, or a considerable part of you, be seduced to take up arms in opposition to, or hinderance of, these our just undertakings, we hope by this brotherly premonition, to the sincerity whereof we call God to witness, we have freed ourselves from all that ruin which may befall that great and populous City; having hereby washed our hands thereof.26

The Earl of Nottingham, one of Parliament’s commissioners with the army, did not doubt the threat it posed. Obviously not privy to the proceedings of the Army Council, Nottingham informed Manchester of the vote to move the army to St Albans.27 That Parliament waited upon developments in the army is further evidenced by Nottingham’s letter from St Albans of 15 June which informed Manchester that he had to wait for the army’s Representation. Originally told he would receive it at midnight, it was not in Nottingham’s hands until late the next morning.28

II The Declaration or Representation of 14 June 1647 appears to have derived from Fairfax’s Council of War rather than any wider body, although principally written by Ireton, aided by Lambert and Cromwell. It marked a significant statement by the army that their charges against the eleven members should have been taken seriously.29 Although their material grievances had been met, the army leadership remained unsatisfied with the continuing prominence at Westminster of Holles’ faction. Ireton’s overtly political Declaration had moved the army in a more radical direction. Calling for a purge of Parliament the

26 Abbott, I, pp. 469–71; BL, E392(16), A letter sent to the Right Honourable, the Lord Mayor, aldermen, and the Common Councel of the City of London, June 10. [1647] By His Excellencie T.Fairfax. O. Cromwell, Thomas Hammond, Henry Ireton, Thomas Rainsborough, Hardress Waller, Nathaniel Rich, Robert Hammond, Robert Lilburne, Thomas Pride, John Hewson and John Desborough. 27 BL, Add Mss 34253 fol. 54. 28 BL, Add Mss 34523 fol. 61. 29 Taft, ‘Ireton’, p. 177; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 128; Gentles, NMA, p. 179, refers to Ireton as the ‘most likely author’. Lilburne regarded Ireton as the author of this document; see L2084, John Lilburne, As you were or The Lord General Cromwel and the Grand Officers of the Armie their Remembrancer (April 1652), p. 18.

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army stated they ‘were not a mere mercenary army’ and that they were called in ‘defence of our own and the people’s just rights and liberties’. The army’s growing distrust of Parliament saw it now argue that future Parliaments should be of a limited duration.30 The fear of Parliamentary authoritarianism present in the Heads of the Proposals and the Instrument of Government remained a central factor in undermining agreement between the army and Parliament until the Restoration. The Declaration also addressed the issue of religion and its toleration in relation to the powers of the state: whereas it hath been suggested or suspected, that in our late, or present proceedings, our design is to overthrow Presbytery, or hinder the settlement thereof, and to have the Independent governement set up, we do clearly disclaime, and disavow any such design; We onely desire that according to the Declarations (promising a provision for tender consciences) there may be some effectuall course be taken according to the intent thereof, and that such, who, upon conscientious grounds may differ from the established formes, may not (for that) be debarred from the common Rights, Liberties, or Benefits belonging equally to all, as men and Members of the Commonwealth, while they live soberly, honestly, inoffensively towards others, and peacefully and faithfully towards the State.31

The Remonstrance of the Representations of the Army of 21 June hoped that the ‘glory of God may be exalted’.32 Yet despite such sentiments it is clear that the army still wanted a settlement ratified by both Parliament and the King. In its Humble Remonstrance of 23 June the army expressed a desire for the King’s ‘concurrence’ to ‘settle the Rights, Liberties and peace of the Kingdome’.33 The army also still had some influential remaining friends in Parliament. A vote of a month’s pay helped keep the rank and file in check. This showed the benefits of remaining a unified force. Having moved to Uxbridge, within fifteen miles of London, the army, responding to these Parliamentary concessions, moved back to Reading. Nottingham and Wharton received this information after the decision was made on 27 June, directly from Ireton.34 The army’s General Council met at Reading on 16 July.35 There appeared to be signs of a breakdown of the general unity of the army that had held to date. The adjutators had become impatient with the slow progress in achieving their demands following the relatively moderate path outlined by Ireton and

30

BL, E409(25), Declaration of the Engagements, pp. 36–46; Taft, ‘Ireton’, p. 178; Gentles, NMA, p. 179. 31 A Declaration, printed in BL, E409(25), Declaration of the Engagements, p. 46. 32 BL, E393(17), Remonstrance of the Representations of the Army (21 June 1647). 33 BL, E393(36), An Humble Remonstrance (23 June 1647) but also printed in BL, E409(25), Declaration of the Engagements, pp. 57–67. 34 BL, Add Mss 34523 fol. 65. 35 Gentles, NMA, p. 180. 81

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Cromwell. The adjutators pushed for a more immediate march on London to secure their demands.36 Their alienation was heightened by the fact that at Reading it became clear that the senior officers now had a more fundamental design for settlement and on that basis were negotiating directly with the King. These negotiations opened Ireton and Cromwell up to charges of hypocrisy. On the first day of the Reading debates the adjutators’ petition calling for a speedy march on London had to be dealt with. Ireton responded: Wee act as if wee did [would?] gett the power into our owne hands. To give the Kingdome satisfaction in the thinges wee desire, itt is not the getting power into one man’s hands more then another, butt it is the setling and securing liberties in order to a peace. . . . There are some thinges prepared for that purpose if any know any particulars to bee added. Before we doe bring ourselves into scandall and dishonour by putting it upon new Puntillios and quarrelling more, one is what itt is that wee intend to doe with that power when we have it.37

Ireton argued that the army needed to make a clear statement of its plans for settlement before taking action, stressing that they acted in the interest of the ‘Kingdome’ rather than self-interest. He made clear that he had some basis of this already prepared (i.e. the Heads of the Proposals). Cromwell, who is recorded as having spoken directly after Ireton, also implied this. He stated that whereas Ireton: does offer that these thinges were desired before satisfaction bee given to the publique settlement, there may bee a convenience of bringing in that to the Council of Warre next sitting, if itt bee ready, and thought fitt to be brought in.38

Ireton’s next statement clarified the first: [We should give the kingdom first] some reall tast of that which wee intend for the satisfaccion of the Kingdome, and what wee would doe with that power if we had itt in our hands [after] the putting of itt out of soe many hands.

This implied some form of action against Parliament to secure the passage of the army’s proposals. The proposals would in some manner be shaped around the ‘liberties’ that Ireton and others regarded as a predeterminant of future settlement.39

36

Clarke Papers, I, pp. 214–16. Clarke Papers, I, p. 179. At the Whitehall Debates in late 1648 Thomas Harrison was to make a similar refrain with regard to the Agreement, that the army had to indicate what they would do with their power, see Clarke Papers, II, p. 186. 38 Clarke Papers, I, p. 180. 39 Clarke Papers, I, p. 182. 37

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A committee of eighteen, including Ireton, then sat to consider the army’s engagements.40 That afternoon when the wider body had been reconvened, Ireton informed them that the Heads of the Proposals were being produced and suggested that it would be more effectual than the present ‘Treatie’ as ‘another way to drawe out all thinges out of our own proposalls’.41 He further stated: This preparation of an entire proposall of particulars they have bin desir’d, and I shall appeale to as many as have spoken to mee if I have nott made it knowne that wee were uppon this worke of drawing all thinges for a proposall to the setling of the Kingdome. Therefore [it was desired that] any man that had leasure and freedome and a minde to further the worke would thinke of any particulars to give in to my self and another [Lambert] that was sequestred or sett apart for that worke; and truly Sir, I thinke if noe man else hath prepared any other particulars, I thinke those that have prepared some particulars [deserve thanks]. Wee propose thus. Wee doe thinke that the settlement of peace is by having a settlement of itt in our hands; if ever itt doe come to settle, itt must bee by setting downe some thinge that may bee a rule to lay a foundation for the common rights and liberties of the people, and for an established peace in the Nation.42

Ireton regarded the Heads as containing what he saw as fundamentals to the cause and necessary for future settlement with a monarch who had shown he could not be trusted to rule by the ambiguity of the ancient constitution. Ireton, in what appears to be the longest discourse of the day, continued to argue that because the army had received some satisfaction from Parliament the circumstances had changed and therefore they should not immediately march on London.43 In a later intervention Ireton stated that if ‘wee have friends in the Parliament or Citty that wish well to the Army or Kingdome, I could nott butt expect to loose them by’ marching on London.44 They finally agreed that a representation should be sent to Parliament without the threat of a march on London.

III On 17 July, the second day at Reading, Ireton introduced the Heads of the Proposals to the General Council:

40 Clarke Papers, I, p. 183. Lt. Gen. Cromwell, Commissary General Ireton, Colonel Rainsborough, Sir Hardress Waller, Colonel Rich, Adjutant General Deane, Colonels Scrope, Thomlinson, Overton, Okey, Titchborne, Lt. Gen. Hammond, Mr Sexby, Mr Allen, Mr Lockyer, Mr Clarke, Mr Stenson and Mr Underwood. 41 Clarke Papers, I, p. 196. 42 Clarke Papers, I, p. 197. 43 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 194–9. 44 Clarke Papers, I, p. 211.

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There could bee butt 2 wayes: either by Treatie, or else to have such an intire proposall of particulars prepared, as might neede the lesse delay in way of Treatie. The Commissioners are those that your Excellency was pleased to appoint. Itt was offer’d to us by the Commissioners of the Parliament parte, whether wee would draw out particulars, or [make] an intire proposall of all together? Though there was noe publique proposall [ready], yett wee did satisfie our selves how longe and teadious itt would have bin to draw our particulars by way of debate by the Commissioners there; and therefore truly I was, with the consent of your Excellency and the rest of the Commissioners, sequestred from that imployment of the Treatie to make some preparation of particulars fitt to tender to your Excellency and the Army as were declared in itt. That if any body could thinke of any other particulars that concern’d the Kingdome every man was as free to doe as my selfe or any other, and would have bin as well accepted; and for my owne parte I should have bin glad that any other would have sett himselfe on worke as I did.45

The Heads of the Proposals were then read for the first time.46 After this, Cromwell queried the process for dissolving Parliament which Lambert, Ireton’s co-author, dealt with. Ireton then requested that a committee consider the Heads as they were, ‘nott for a present conclusion butt consideration; for I cannott say the thinges have bin soe consider’d as to satisfie my self in them’.47 The following day Fairfax appointed a committee of twelve officers to meet with twelve agitators for ‘perfecting of the proposals’.48 Although the adjutators were not named, later evidence from Ireton himself indicated that they included John Wildman and Maximilian Petty. The committee also contained the radical officers Thomas Harrison and Thomas Rainsborough. The extent of Ireton’s role as author of the Heads of Proposals has been questioned and transformed into that of a ‘broker’ for ‘proposals which originated outside the army’, namely as part of ‘Saye’s programme’. This argument, that the Heads were essentially authored and directed by Lord Saye and Sele and Lord Wharton with the army as their junior partners, has not been established and indeed has been seriously questioned.49 However, the general point that there was co-operation between Ireton and Cromwell and their allies in Parliament is valid; this is certainly the impression given by the two 45

Clarke Papers, I, pp. 211–12. Clarke Papers, I, p. 213. There is no indication who actually read the Heads. 47 Clarke Papers, I, p. 213. 48 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 216–17. The committee was composed of Ireton, Colonels Fleetwood, Rich, Harrison, Horton, Major-General Desborough, Colonels Rainsborough, Hammond, Lambert, Lt. Col. Cowell and Adjutant General Deane, as well as twelve adjutators. Taft, ‘Ireton’, p. 180. Wildman does not appear to have gone into the army until 1647; see Zaller and Greaves (eds), Radicals, p. 323; Ashley (1947), p. 9. 49 J.S.A. Adamson, ‘The English Nobility and the Projected Settlement of 1647’, Historical Journal, 30: 3 (1987), pp. 568, 579, 586–7. For some of the problems with this interpretation; see M. Kishlansky, ‘Saye What?’, HJ, 33: 4 (1990), pp. 917–37; M. Kishlansky, ‘Saye No More’, Journal of British Studies, 30 (1991), pp. 399–448. 46

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officers. Yet the preparation of the Heads and the direct negotiation between the army and the King indicates that the balance of power had decisively shifted to the army. The army believed, as their statements since the Solemn Engagement indicated, that they had earned and would have a role in settlement. Rather than ‘ “The Lord Say, Saint Jon and Vaine the younger” were the “Cabbinet Counsell”, Sir Lewis Dyve informed the King in September, “who now steer the affaires of the wholl kingdome” ’, the actual wording of Dyve’s letter indicates a different balance to the army–Parliamentary alliance. Dyve actually wrote: ‘it was thought fitt by Cromwell and his Cabbinet Counsell, which are the Lord Say, Saint Jon and Vaine the younger, who now steer the affaires of the wholl kingdome.’50 Smith has reaffirmed the terminology employed by the King and those around him as ‘likely to have known where real responsibility for the proposals lay’, indicating that the Heads had its origin as an army document. He cites Berkeley, Ashburnham, Hyde and Charles himself all referring to the Heads as army proposals.51 Nedham later wrote of Ireton ‘drawing up Proposalls’ and Prynne of ‘your Proposals’ when attacking the army.52 In negotiating with the King and Parliament on the basis of the Heads Ireton and Cromwell illustrated their desire for an essentially moderate settlement. Their willingness to compromise with Charles brought division in the army to a head and would also be the basis of their own more hardline attitude towards Charles following the second civil war. It is widely accepted that the Heads provided the best settlement on paper that Charles had been offered. One feature of the Heads was the limits on Parliament, through biennial elections and redistribution of seats, reflecting the experience of the army over the past two years, as did the issue of indemnity.53 Other crucial features of the Heads would see the King limited by Parliament and a selected council of state. Yet the Heads proposed no check on his negative voice, allowing episcopacy without disciplinary powers with an assurance of Charles’ ‘personal rights’. As Appelbaum has argued, the Heads

50 Adamson, ‘Projected Settlement’, p. 594, citing H.G. Tibbutt (ed.), ‘The Tower of London Letterbook of Sir Lewis Dyve, 1646–7’, Bedfordshire Historical Record Society, 38 (1958), p. 84. 51 D.L. Smith, Constitutional Royalism and the Search for Settlement, c.1640–1649 (Cambridge, 1994), p. 133. See also Woolrych, ‘The Debates’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 61fn.9. 52 BL, E474(2), A plea for the King, and Kingdome; By way of Answer to the late Remonstrance of the Army (30 Nov. 1648), pp. 14–15; BL, E421(20), W.Prynne, A Word to Lieutenant General Cromwell and two words for the settling of the King Parliament and Kingdom (December 1647), p. 12. 53 J.A. Shedd, ‘Thwarted Victors: Civil and Criminal Prosecution against Parliament’s Officials during the English Civil War and Commonwealth’, Journal of British Studies, 41: 2 (2002), p. 143.

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‘contain his [Ireton’s] radicalism within a context of traditionalism’.54 Tuck suggests that the Heads would have left Charles very similar to a Dutch Statholder.55 It is very possible that the real concessions to Charles came about as a result of direct negotiation with Ireton.56 Berkeley believed ‘that if Cromwell was not real in it, he was a great Dissembler, and so was Ireton’.57 Their later defence of their negotiations and bitterness towards Charles would support Berkeley’s assessment that their desire to secure Charles’ compliance was real. On 3 July Ireton stayed in conversation with the King from dinner until midnight.58 Huntingdon wrote: at Caversham, the King was continually sollicited by messengers from [Cromwell and Ireton], proferring any thing his Majesty should desire. . . . and (by Commissarygeneral Ireton) that his negative voice should not be meddled-withal. . . . Ireton went further saying, That what was offered in these Proposals should be so just and reasonable, that, if there were but six men in the Kingdom that would fight to make them good, he would make the seventh, against any power that should oppose them.59

There is little doubt that Ireton and Cromwell went as far as they felt they could in trying to get Charles to accept the Heads. The issue of Charles’ negative voice in particular was used to attack Ireton at Putney. Ireton regarded it as a vital bulwark to the potential anarchy of a universal franchise.60 Berkeley also recorded Ireton modifying the Heads after negotiation with Charles: I went with them to Ireton for that purpose, and remained with him almost till morning. He permitted me to alter two of the articles, and that in most material points; and I would have done a third, which was, the excluding seven persons (that were not named) from pardon, and the admitting of our party, to sit in the next Parliament. To the first he answered, That being they had prevailed in the War, if they should not in the sight of the World make some distinction between themselves and those that were worsted (who always bear the blame of publick quarrels) they had so many malicious enemies, both in the Parliament and Army,

54

R. Appelbaum, Literature and Utopian Politics in Seventeenth Century England (2002), p. 133. 55 Tuck, Philosophy and Government, p. 243. 56 Berkeley Memoirs, II, p. 363; Huntingdon Sundry Reasons, II, pp. 400–2; J. Ashburnham, A Narrative of his attendance on King Charles the First (1830), II, pp. 90–2; Wildman, Putney Projects, pp. 13–15, 31, 39–41. 57 Berkeley Memoirs, II, p. 362. 58 Bodleian Library, Clarendon Mss 2544. 59 Huntingdon Sundry Reasons, II, pp. 400–2. This also appears in BL, E474(2), A plea for the King, and Kingdome; By way of Answer to the late Remonstrance of the Army (30 Nov. 1648), pp. 14–15. 60 M. Mendle, ‘Putney’s Pronouns’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, pp. 138–9. 86

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that they should be censured of betraying their party, and to have sought their own ends by private and indirect means. To the second, He confessed that he should himself be afraid of a Parliament wherein the King’s party should have the major vote.61

Taft claims ‘the changes are evidence of Ireton’s belief that not only was Charles’ support essential to a settlement: the monarchy was a vital component of a reformed constitution’.62 Yet it is also clear that Ireton was well aware of the dangers to his cause inherent in any traditionally representative Parliament. It is likely, given their respective characters and political views, that Cromwell rather than Ireton drove the case for compromise. Of Cromwell, Berkeley commented: I found no man, in appearance, so zealous for a speedy blow as he; sometimes wishing that the King was more frank, and would not tie himself so strictly to narrow maxims; sometimes complaining of his son Ireton’s slowness in perfecting the proposals, and his not accommodating more to his Majesty’s sense.63

Clearly Berkeley, Charles’ emissary with the army, had at the time of the Heads established a good working relationship with Ireton. Berkeley believed that Ireton had ‘drawn’ the Heads. He felt that Ireton would be able to get the Heads through the Army Council. Berkeley however also commented on the political divisions that had opened up in the army as a result of the negotiations with the King over the Heads. If Charles did not accept the Heads, ‘ye temper of the Army’ would turn against him. Ireton and Cromwell’s later coldness to Berkeley and bitterness towards his master derived to a large extent from the ‘temper of the Army’ to which their direct negotiations with the King had exposed them.64 Berkeley felt that Charles should have accepted the Heads: there was a draught of Proposals, wch Ireton had drawn, wch would certainly be voted by ye whole Army . . . if this Maty would consent to them there would be an end of all difficulties, and they thought the sooner His Maty did it would be ye better, because there was no certainty in ye temper of the Army.65

As late as 22 September, Cromwell and Ireton opposed a motion in Parliament to make no further addresses to Charles.66 On 23 September Ludlow stated that ‘Cromwell, Ireton, and many of their party in the House pressing

61

Berkeley Memoirs, II, p. 363–4. Taft, ‘Ireton’, p. 181. 63 Berkeley Memoirs, II, p. 365. 64 Berkeley Memoirs, II, pp. 363–4. 65 Berkeley Memoirs, II, p. 363, quoted from original BL, Add Mss 29869 fol. 5. 66 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 198; Gentles, NMA, p. 498n.83; Bodleian Library, Clarendon Mss 30 fol. 73. 62

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the King’s desires with great earnestness’.67 His account may be both distorted by his republicanism and the later reconstruction of his memoirs. 68 Rainsborough stated publicly that he was with Cromwell in the General Council and not in the Commons on 23 September.69 Others believed, as late as 28 September, that Cromwell and Ireton spoke ‘much in ye kings behalfe’ in the Commons.70 At the start of November Bridget Ireton and her mother, Elizabeth Cromwell, met Charles’ adviser Ashburnham at Court.71 Some have seen the lawyer John Cook as a mouthpiece for those Independents in the Lords who still wished to see the Heads as a form of settlement.72 In seeking compromise Ireton and Cromwell were left open to attack. Even at the start of the process Fairfax wrote to his father on 18 July that while he hoped for a ‘happy conclusion to our proposals of peace’ there were ‘many turbulent sperits . . . yitt in the citty & army but I hope there fury shal not prevaile’.73 John Wildman, one of those turbulent spirits, wrote later that year of his concerns about the actions of Ireton and Cromwell. Wildman had no illusion that the Heads were ‘the first borne of Iretons braine’74 and felt that Ireton had manipulated Cromwell.75 He further stated that when: these Proposalls were roughly drawn, IRETON IN A PRIVATE CONFERENCE WITH THE KING, INGAGED HIMSELF TO SEND HIM A COPY, and though at the first some of the other Generall Officers opposed it, yet Ireton professed he was fixed in his resolution to fulfill his INGAGEMENT, though the General should hang him, accordingly a Copy of them was sent by Huntington, Cromwell’s own Major.76

Another Leveller source repeats the charge that Ireton allowed Charles to see a draft copy of the Heads and to modify them: Ireton declared to diverse of the chief Officers, he would send a copy of them to the King, which was opposed by them, he replied, that he was engaged by promise to send a copy to the King . . . was delivered to the Kings owne hands, who read it over, and WITH HIS OWNE HANDS BLOTTED AND RASED OUT WHAT

67

Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, pp. 165–6. Worden, ‘Ludlow’; B. Worden, Roundhead Reputations. The English Civil Wars and the Passions of Posterity (2001). 69 Clarke Papers, I, p. 233; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 219. 70 Bodleian Library, Clarendon Mss 30 fol. 76v. 71 Cal.Clar.SP, I, p. 397. 72 Adamson, ‘Peerage in Politics’, pp. 199–201; Peacey, Politicians and Pamphleteers, pp. 116–17. 73 BL, Add Mss 18979 fol. 247. 74 Wildman, Putney Projects, p. 13. 75 Wildman, Putney Projects, p. 37. 76 Wildman, Putney Projects, p. 12. 68

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HE MOST DISLIKED, and enterlined it with his own hand in some places, which very Copy thus curtail’d and guelded, the King sent back to Ireton, and IRETON CAUSD THIS GEULED COPY OF THE KINGS, TO BE PRINTED TO THE VIEW OF THE KINGDOME AS THE ARMIES PROPOSALS.77

Berkeley’s own record of his altering Ireton’s draft of the Heads coincides with these hostile Leveller views of Ireton. They suggest that Ireton did enter into direct negotiations with the King.78 In his willingness to negotiate directly with Charles, and by the very moderate nature of the Heads themselves, Ireton’s desire for settlement based on monarchy and as rooted in the constitution as possible is evident but it exposed him politically within the army. Another aspect of Wildman’s concern derived from the role of one of Ireton’s royalist kin: they would never have entertained Sir Edward Ford, Iretons brother in law (a known Papist, who brok prison, and by right is a prisoner in the Tower) they would never have provided him and his family Quarters at the Head Quarters, that he might be the Kings Resident Solcitor, that he might lye in Iretons bed and bosome.79

Lilburne, no doubt, using the same material, produced a very similar account.80 Ludlow also argued that Ford had been sent into England ‘to sound the designs of the army, and to promote an agreement between the King and them’.81 Prynne was also to criticise the army leadership for its hypocrisy in its negotiations with the King. He denounced them for: holding private intelligence with the King and his Party; admitting them into the Armies quarters, and there keeping Cabinet Counsels with the chiefest of them, drawing up, and sending Propositions privatly to the King without the Houses privity, holding correspondency with Sir Edw. Ford.82

In a similar vein Clarendon wrote of Ford, who was unable to ‘fathom the reserved and dark designs of his brother-in-law’, being used by Ireton and Cromwell to manipulate Ashburnham.83 It does appear that Ford secured knowledge of developments in the army.84 Wildman concluded that ‘let every impartiall Iudgement, passe his sentence upon the question, whether IRETONS 77 AN IMPEACHMENT OF HIGH TREASON AGAINST Oliver Cromwell, and his Son in Law Henry Ireton (1649), p. 31. 78 Berkeley Memoirs, II, p. 363–4. 79 Wildman, Putney Projects, p. 12. I can find no clear evidence of Catholicism on Ford’s part. Wildman’s aim was to undermine Ireton. 80 Lilburne, Impeachment, p. 56. 81 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 153. 82 BL, E422(12), William Prynne, The Machivilian Cromwellist and hypocritical perfidious new statist (1648), p. 10. 83 Clarendon, Rebellion, X, p. 134, IV, p. 270. 84 Bodleian Library, Clarendon Mss 30 fol. 67; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 203n.48.

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and CROMWELLS (or as they are called the Armies) PROPOSALLS, doe not confirme that foundation of tyranny, . . .’, and that ‘how clearly visible, are the intentions of Cromwell and Ireton, &c, in the Proposall, to conforme themselves to the Kings humor’.85 Huntingdon believed that Ireton and Cromwell deliberately manipulated the Heads for their own ends. Later developments shaped these comments. Lilburne, in his Impeachment of High Treason against Oliver Cromwell, and his Son in Law Henry Ireton, printed Huntingdon’s account with his own commentary. One source for Lilburne with regard to the Heads was Rainsborough who visited him in the Tower. Rainsborough informed Lilburne of ‘Iretons, &c Base jugling and underhand dealing, daubing, and dissembling with the King’.86 Rainsborough also provides the source for Charles’ supposed comment to Ireton when negotiating the Heads that ‘you cannot do without me’.87 One direct attack on the grandees decried ‘this striving contending, and sending again and againe to our conquered enemy. Wee did not expect that wee should have beene beholding to him, when once wee had brought him on his knees’.88 The Leveller, John Harris, condemned Cromwell and Ireton as the ‘royalized faction’.89 Huntingdon’s pamphlet brought a defence of Cromwell and Ireton into print. Cromwell and Ireton’s necessary flirtation with Charles over the Heads had left them politically exposed.90

IV It was thought that at this point Wildman, in The Case of the Armie Truly Stated, denounced the whole command structure of the army. Morrill and Baker have, however, recently questioned Wildman’s authorship, seeing The Case as the work of the adjutator turned agent Edward Sexby and therefore more from within the army.91 They also argued that there was ‘much more in

85

Wildman, Putney Projects, pp. 32, 38. Lilburne, Impeachment, p. 57. 87 Gentles, NMA, p. 184. 88 BL, E413(10), A ALARUM TO THE HEADQUARTERS (9 Nov. 1647), p. 2. 89 BL, E419(15), THE GRAND DESIGNE: OR A Discovery of that forme of Slavery, entended, and in part brought upon the free People of England; by a powerfull Party in the Parliament: And L.G. Crumwell, Commissary Gen. Ireton, and others of that faction in the Army; tending to the utter ruine, and enslaving of the whole Nation (8 Dec. 1647). 90 BL, E461(34), A BACK-BLOW TO Major Huntingdon, FOR His Treacherous accusation OF Lieutenant Generall Cromwell, and Commissary Gen. IRETON. Published for generall satisfaction of all, who have unadvisedly received the malicious accusation against those active gentlemen (1 Sept. 1648). 91 Gentles (NMA, pp. 200, 214) sees The Case as the work of ‘new agents and their Leveller mentors, with the agents being based within the army’. Woolrych saw no direct link between agents and Levellers: Soldiers and Statesmen, pp. 203–9. See also Morrill and Baker, ‘The case of the Armie truly re-stated’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 105. 86

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The case of the armie that was acceptable to the grandees’ and that it did pick up ‘themes from the Heads’. This may be valid but does not necessarily mean that ‘the extent of the criticism of the generals should not be exaggerated’. Morrill and Baker may not see The Case as ‘a massive indictment of the senior officers’, but it was critical of the grandees and their reaction seems to indicate this.92 The Preface stated that ’”the present manner of actings of many at the Head Quarters” meant that “nothing” had “been done effectually”’. The Case also argued that the treaty with the King should end.93 This had been the central platform of all that Ireton and Cromwell had been trying to achieve since July. Gentles has noted Ireton’s violent opposition to The Case.94 Ireton certainly believed that ‘the Case of the Armie doth soe abuse the Generall and Generall Council’.95 Indeed, Woolrych has noted that both he and Cromwell ‘roundly condemned both the tract and its authors’.96 Furthermore, the opening comment at Putney on 28 October by the man who may have authored the document, Edward Sexby, bitterly attacked Cromwell and Ireton for their negotiations with Charles over the Heads: Wee have labour’d to please a Kinge, and I thinke, except wee goe about to cutt all our throates, wee shall nott please him. . . . I shall speake to the Lieut. Generall and Commissary Generall concerning one thinge. Your creditts and reputation hath bin much blasted . . . for seeking to settle this Kingdome in such a way wherein wee thought to have satisfied all men, and wee have dissatisfied them – I meane in relation to the Kinge.97

Cromwell’s rejoinder makes plain the difficult position in which the army leadership found itself, specifically MPs such as Fairfax, Cromwell and Ireton, in trying to negotiate between the army, King and Parliament. This had been explicit in the instructions given regarding the negotiations between army and Parliament at Wickham in July 1647.98 It was specified that Ireton, Cromwell, Fairfax, Rainsborough and Harrison should not be the key negotiators but Hardress Waller, Rich, Lambert, Robert Hammond and Desborough should. Despite these instructions Ireton, with this second group, led the negotiations.99 92

Morrill and Baker, ‘case’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 113. Morrill and Baker, ‘case’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, pp. 106, 112–14. 94 Gentles, NMA, p. 214. 95 Clarke Papers, I, p. 356. 96 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, pp. 209, 242. See also his statement in Woolrych, ‘The Debates’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 67 that it ‘criticised the military grandees severely, and tendentiously, for failing to carry out the promises that the army had made’. Taft, ‘Ireton’ (p. 184) has argued that however ‘much all particpants professed their commitment to army unity, the gulf between grandee officers and proponents of the The case of the armie and An agreement proved wide and deep’. 97 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 227–8. 98 Lords Journal, IX, p. 312. 99 Clarke Papers, I, p. 148. 93

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The Levellers focused on the contradictions in the positions of officer-MPs like Ireton. John Harris wrote: And if you shall ask, wherein Crumwell, Ireton, and the rest of that Faction, are concerned in the Parliaments actions; I Answer. They are Parliament men, and so bound up in the Parliaments actings; and indeed so involved in the Parliaments interest (joyned to their own ends).100

Cromwell distinguished between his comments as an MP and soldier. Thomas Rainsborough supported Cromwell’s narrative of his distinction. He recalled that they were in the General Council and not in the Commons for the 23 September vote to send terms once more to the King. Rainsborough also reminded Cromwell that ‘it was urged in the House that it was the sense of the Army’. To this Ireton responded, the implication being, reinforced by his actual words, that Rainsborough’s imputation was that it had been Ireton who had ‘urged’ it ‘in the House’: If I had told any man soe (which I know I did nott) if I did, I did tell him what I thought; and if I thought otherwise of the Army, I protest I should have bin ashamed of the Armie and detested itt . . . for that which Mr. Sexby tells us hath bin one of the great businesses [cast] uppon the Lieutenant Generall and my self, I doe detest and defie the thought of that thinge, of any indeavour, or designe, or purpose, or desire to sett uppe the Kinge; and I thinke I have demonstrated, and I hope I shall doe still, [that] itt is the interest of the Kingdome that I have suffer’d for . . . though I am cleare . . . from the setting uppe the person of one or other, yett I shall declare itt againe; I doe nott seeke, or would nott seeke, nor will joyne with them that doe seeke the destruction either of Parliament or Kinge. Neither will I consent with those or concurre with them who will not attempt all the wayes that are possible to preserve both, and to make good use, and the best use that can bee of both for the Kingdome; and I did nott heare anythinge from that Gentleman (Sexby) that could induce or incline mee to that resolution.101

In clearing the imputation that his direct negotiations with Charles had been improper, Ireton’s concept of making ‘good use’ of both monarchy and Parliament implied that once more he regarded certain fundamentals as at the heart of his design for settlement and these still included monarchy. Ireton stridently defended the part he had played in army politics and negotiations with the King. A close reading of his defence illustrates Wildman’s links with the agents and does not focus on Wildman’s authorship of The Case. Indeed, if Ireton believed this to be the case he would have reaped much

100

Harris, THE GRAND DESIGNE. Clarke Papers, I, p. 233; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 219. There were clearly times when Ireton was absent from the Commons on army business; see DRO, D1232/073, (28 Sept. 1647); CJ, 5 (9 Oct. 1647), p. 330.

101

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more political capital out of a direct attack on Wildman. Ireton, responding to Wildman, stated: I thinke there is noe man is able to give a better account of the sence of the Agents; he hath spoke soe much as they have in their Booke and soe readily and therefore I see hee is very able to give their sence.102

This is not Ireton stating that Wildman was the author of The Case.103 Whether Sexby co-wrote The Case of the Armie he certainly appears to have played a subtle game at the ensuing Putney debates. Ireton headed a committee, which included Sexby, appointed to consider the document and prepare a response.104 It could be that Sexby’s membership of the committee was a recognition of his authorship. Meeting at Ireton’s lodging, Woolrych argues that ‘it must have transpired that some of its members, particularly Sexby and his friends, were in disconcertingly close rapport with the new agents’ organization’. Despite his role on this committee it is very possible, as Morrill and Baker have argued, that Sexby was one of the main authors of The Case of the Armie. Indeed, precisely because of his role within the General Council Sexby may have been at pains not to overtly advertise his authorship. For Woolrych, ‘Sexby’s readiness’ to speak for the new agents, along with the actions of Allen and Lockyer, ‘confirms the impression that’ they ‘had withheld their names from the new agents’ pamphlets in order to safeguard their membership of the General Council’.105 On 28 October when Cromwell asked for a report on the new agents it was Sexby who responded, attacking Cromwell and Ireton directly. Although worried by The Case of the Armie this did not mean that the grandees felt they could not deal with it and achieve compromise, as indicated by the committee headed by Ireton. There was indeed much in the Case with which the officers could sympathise as they moved, partly under pressure, to similar conclusions. Morrill and Baker have seen the Case as ‘only going beyond the demands in previous army documents in respect to the arrangements for

102

Clarke Papers, I, p. 356. Clarke Papers, I, p. 354n. Firth argued that ‘As Ireton points out, Wildman was probably the author of the Case’. 104 Rushworth, Historical Collections, VII, p. 849. Ireton and seven officers, six officeradjutators and six soldier-adjutators. Committee to consider the Case in Ireton’s quarters was composed of Ireton, Waller, Deane, Overton, Rich, Hewson, Thomas Ireton, Captains Rolphe, Leigh, Carter, Lt. Col. Cowell, Masters Allen, Lockyer, Willoby, Vaughan, Sexby and Whighting, Captains Deane and Clarke, and Lt. Scotten. They were ordered ‘to send for such Persons as they shall think fit, and to prepare something to offer to the next General Council, which is to be upon Thursday next the 28th of October Instant; and to add the Vindication of the Army from the Aspersions cast upon them by the said Paper’. 105 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, pp. 211, 214, 218; Morrill and Baker, ‘case’, in Mendle, Putney Debates, p. 110. 103

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elections, and there they were in many respects picking up on these from The heads’.106 The Case stressed that a ‘settlement should precede any take-itor-leave-it offer to the Crown’;107 a position to which Ireton had moved, evidenced by his call in the Commons in January 1648 for a settlement ‘without him’.108 The Case did not become more of an issue because the Agreement appeared. The Putney debates showed this to be a very different kind of document.

V Ireton and Cromwell would have been aware of the dangerous political webs that linked the army with the Levellers. The emergence of the agents, at some point in late September 1647 just before The Case, provides the most visible evidence of the attempt by the Levellers to use the army for their own agenda.109 Cromwell would comment in Parliament that ‘those not of the Army who drive at levelling and parity’ lay behind the unrest. He also referred to ‘London Agents’.110 Sharp considered the agents to be ‘rather more leveller and rather less simply disaffected soldiers than the more established “agitators”’; but there was no obvious distinction between the agents and the adjutators.111 Gentles believes that the agents had a mandate from the rank and file in some regiments.112 Morrill and Baker stated that the ‘new agents represent a new dimension, but not a clean, straight forward break’.113 Evidence from Ireton’s regiment indicates that the adjutators and agents had coalesced politically.114 The use of the terms adjutator and agitator were generally ‘interchangeable’ for contemporaries. However, ‘Agents, agitators, and adjutators’ cannot be deemed ‘words of identical meaning in the context of Fairfax’s army’.115 When Lilburne called for the soldiers to have new representatives he warned them:

106

Morrill and Baker, ‘case’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 114. Morrill and Baker, ‘case’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 113n.46. 108 Clement Walker, Anarchia Anlicana: OR, THE HISTORY OF INDEPENDENCY, 2 vols (1648–49), I, pp. 71–2; Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p. 88; Gentles, NMA, p. 237; CJ, 5, pp. 415–16; D.E. Underdown, ‘The Parliamentary Diary of John Boys, 1647–8’, Historical Reasearch, 39 (1966), p. 155–7. 109 Gentles, NMA, pp. 198–9. 110 Gentles, ‘Agreement’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 156. 111 Sharpe, The Levellers, p.x. 112 Gentles, NMA, p. 199. 113 Morrill and Baker, ‘case’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 108. 114 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesman, p. 264n.54; this ‘new dimension’ was illustrated in A Copy of a Letter from the Com. Gen. Regiment, to the Convention of Agents residing at London (11 Nov. 1647), where Woolrych indicates that the new agents and adjutators were ‘coalescing’. 115 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 203; emphasis added. 107

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Be sure not to trust your great officers . . . by their plausible but yet cunning and subtile policies, most unjustly stolne the power both from your honest Generall, and your too flexible Adjutators.116

Cromwell commented later on the role of the Levellers during internal army debate on the franchise, alluding to ‘the unreasonableness of that representation these London Agents would have’.117 Agents were seen as something different even if there was some continuity in terms of the personnel. The emergence of the agents tells us much about the adjutators. The very fact that the agents appeared as primarily Leveller spokesman indicates that the adjutators were firmly rooted within the institution of the army; they had tried to co-operate with the officers. The denunciations of the adjutators by the Levellers also indicates something of the nature of those men and their work with the officers. Wildman attacked Cromwell and Ireton for making the actions of the ‘ADJUTATORS . . . fruitless’.118 The idea that Cromwell and Ireton had used the adjutators resonated in The Hunting of the Foxes: When Cromwell and Ireton, and their faction of self interessed Officers thought they had got the souldiery fast by the brain, as to dote sufficiently upon their transaction and conduct of busines, they then decline the Agitators, decline the Engagement, sleight their Declarations and Promises to the People and the Army, rendring the Agitatours but as ciphers amongst them, corrupting some with places, overuling and overawing others.

The impotence of the adjutators, from the polemical perspective of the Levellers, explains the emergence of the agents. The author of The Hunting of the Foxes argued that: These things the souldiery beholding and observing, endeavored to restore their Agents to a competent power and ability, to make good the faith of the Army to the people, but then found the hottest opposition from Cromwell and Ireton with his faction of Officers.119

Much bitterness existed between Ireton, Cromwell and the commited Levellers. Harris argued that they had used the army and the Levellers:

116 Lilburne, Advice to the private soldiers (8 Sept. 1647), printed in The juglers deceived (1647), pp. 10–12; Woolrych, ‘The Debates’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 65. This argument needs development from a fuller consideration of the terminology employed by the Levellers with regard to the ‘agitators’. 117 Gentles, ‘Agreement’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 156. 118 A Cal to the Souldiers, pp. 4–5. 119 The Hunting of the Foxes FROM NEW-MARKET and TRIPLOE-Heaths TO WHITEHALL (1649), p. 6.

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Crumwell and Ireton, finding themselves completely seated in the affections of the soldiery, having caught them by their plausible pretences of Liberty, Freedome, Indemnity, security, and the like, and being sure likewise (by reason of their many Creatures in the Army, which they had advanced to places of promotion, and brought into the Councell) being sure I say, to carry any thing that they should propound, though they might meet with some opposers; they cast about first how to un-horse that Faction that opposed them.120

Lilburne saw Ireton as the Machiavellian figure who pulled the strings of the army;121 Nedham referred to Cromwell ‘and his Son Ireton being both Scholars of Machiavell’.122 The author of The Hunting of the Foxes for his part stated: This makes us call to mind the saying of Ireton to honest Major Cobbet of Snowhill, who for joyning with the Agents of the Army, asked him if he were not deluded in his understanding, in joyning with the giddy headed Souldiers; and advised him not to run against the Interest of himself and the Officers.123

The reference to Major John Cobbett also suggests the nature of the adjutators and the agents. The agents were no mere tools of the Levellers, and their basis within the army structure and continued link with the officers is suggested by the subsequent careers of men such as Sexby, Joyce, White or Cobbett.124 Cobbett’s position as one of the adjutators and then as an agent would tend to suggest that the adjutators were not merely ‘ciphers’ of the officers. It suited the Levellers to denounce them as such to excuse their own failure to win over the rank and file. The position of such men also partly explains the genuine desire for co-operation that existed, and would continue to exist at Putney, between the officers and the men of the New Model Army. Rushworth’s letter to Ferdinando Fairfax of 20 July indicates his belief that this co-operation was still extant and that the officers’ ‘reason’ was still ‘superior’ to the ‘will’ of the ‘agitators’ in the General Council.125

120

Harris, The Grand Design. BL, E409(22), John Lilburne, The juglers discovered, in two letters writ by Lieut. Col. John Lilburne, prerogative prisoner . . . discovering the turn-coat, Machiavell practises, and underhand dealings of Lieut. Gen. Cromwell, and his soone in law, Commissary Generall Ireton (28 Sept. 1647). 122 BL, E474(2), A plea for the King, and Kingdome; By way of Answer to the late Remonstrance of the Army, p. 16. 123 The Hunting of the Foxes, p. 13. 124 H. Reece, ‘The Military Presence in England 1649–1660’, Oxford University Ph.D. (1981), pp. 81–3. 125 Bell (ed.), Fairfax Correspondence, I, pp. 369–71. 121

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VI The day after the unveiling of the Agreement of the People a much more strident document than The Case of the Armie apppeared. A Cal to all the Souldiers of the Armie of 29 October wanted the soldiers to demand what had been stated in The Case of the Armie.126 This much more obviously Leveller-inspired document, probably written by John Wildman, reinforces the argument that The Case of the Armie was more of an internal army document, chiefly authored by Sexby. Would Wildman have been able to produce both The Case of the Armie and A Cal to the Souldiers in such a short space of time? Why produce two documents similar in their demands, their main difference being the pressure brought to bear on the officers to comply? A Cal to the Souldiers showed itself to be more open in its condemnation of Ireton and Cromwell. Its greater emphasis on Ireton as the political manipulator behind Cromwell became a recurring theme in attacks on him from this point.127 Wildman deemed Ireton and Cromwell to be ‘the chiefe Authors, contrivers and increasers of all our miseries, especially the new raised hypocrites, by whose treacherous practices, all the just intentions and actions of the ADJUTATORS and other well minded Souldiers have been fruitless’. He warned the soldiers to ‘Take heed of crafty politicians and subtill Machivelians, & be sure to trust no mans painted words, it being high time to see actions’. In a clear reference to Ireton, he stated that ‘One of the surest markes of deceivers, is to make faire, long and eloquent speeches’. Given the date of its publication the views expressed probably derived from Wildman’s experience of Cromwell and Ireton in army councils. He argued that: one of the surest tokens of confederates in evill, is not only when one of the fellows is vehement, firy or hot in any of their pursuits, to be patient, cold or moderate to pacify his partner, and like deceitfull Lawyers before their Chants to qualify matters; but sometimes seeme to discord or fallout, and quarrel in Councels, reasonings and debates, and yet neverthelesse in the end to agree in evill; which they doe purposely, to hold upright men in a charitable (though doubtfull) opinion . . . under the vizards of great professions, gilded with some religious actions, they both deceive the world, and bring their wicked designs and selfe-interests to passe. Those of you, that use of thursday general-Councels of late, might have observed so much of this kind of jugling, false-blood and double dealing . . . especially in their debates about the aforesaid Case of the ARMY. . . . Wherein though the Generall was so ingenuous, as to move for the publicke reading thereof, yet the Commissary General Ireton, and Lievtenant Generall Cromwell, yea, and most of the Court, would and did proceed to censure & judge both it and the Authors and promoters thereof, without reading it, and ever since doe impudently boast and glory in that

126

BL, E412(10), A Cal to All The Souldiers Of The Armie, By The Free People Of England (29 Oct. 1647). 127 Woolrych, ‘The debates’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 65. 97

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their victory. It is very wonderfull, that such understanding men, should so soone fall into the same pernitious courses of those late impeached fugitives, their predecessors, Hollis and Stapleton.128

Despite the author’s exaggeration, it is probable that some form of co-ordinated strategy existed between Ireton and Cromwell. Rather than artifice, it is likely that real disagreements existed between Ireton and Cromwell. The debate on The Case of the Armie suggests that both men used the threat of possible division and anarchy; this had been a continuing theme since Saffron Walden. William Allen produced the response of the agents to the listed objections to the The Case of the Armie drawn up by Ireton’s committee. Ireton attacked those who had produced it for being ‘of a fix’t resolution, setting themselves to bee a divided partie or distinct Council from the General Councill of the Army’.129 This statement implies that its authors were within the army, otherwise Ireton could have attacked them directly for being outside the army. Ireton and Cromwell were more in tune with the wider feeling of the army, especially the officers, than Wildman, Sexby or Rainsborough. Although expressed in derogatory terms Ireton’s opponents harboured no illusions as to the danger he posed: Yee had need to bee well armed and fortified against the devices that will bee put upon you, Ireton (yee know) hath already scandalized the Case of the Army in the generall counsel where, by his owne, and his confederats craft and policy, he raigneth as sole master . . . hee sheweth himselfe soe full of arte & cunning smooth delusion.130

The implication in The Case, the Agreement and more clearly stated in A Cal to the Souldiers, that Ireton and ‘his Father Cromwell, doe so earnestly and palpably carry on the Kings designe’, represented the greatest threat to their position at the Putney debates.

128

A Cal to the Souldiers, pp. 4–5. A Cal to the Souldiers, p. 5; Clarke Papers, I, p. 235; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 220. 130 A Cal to the Souldiers, p. 7. 129

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4

Putney, 1647

Putney needs to be set in the context of previous army proceedings and the continuing desire of the soldiers to maintain unity. Woolrych warned us to ‘be very cautious about treating the Putney debates, wonderful as they are, as the typical voice of the army’.1 Evans argues that ‘the Debates were essentially concerned with the search for, and definition of, practical answers to the pressing “strategic” problems’.2 Reece cautions that the ‘rhetoric of Putney should not blind us to the fact that the vast majority of the rank and file and junior officers united behind their leaders in pursuance of settlement of the army’s non-political grievances’.3 Indeed Tuck made the point that Clarke’s ‘record may have been designed as a safeguard against the Levellers’ in providing an account of policy that should be kept to.4 Ireton’s comments also need to be treated with care when considering the atmosphere at Putney. Too often his stubborn and legalistic mind led him off into areas where only a few others, like Wildman and Rainsborough, were prepared to follow. The comments of Wildman and Rainsborough differed in perspective from those of the army officers present. Wildman, a Leveller outsider, and Rainsborough, a bitter and frustrated man, did not even have the right to attend the debates.5 Reading of the Putney debates has too often been shaped by an understandable,

1

Woolrych, ‘The Debates’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 73. M. Evans, ‘The Revolt of the Army and the Putney Debates’, Exeter University MA (1979). 3 Reece, ‘Military Presence’, p. 74. 4 Tuck, Philosophy and Government, p. 245. Furthermore a ‘record’ of debate needs to be treated differently from a written source. 5 Although there is a reference in Thomas Ireton’s will to court dispute which led to ‘moneyes due unto me by Maior Raynisborow upon a Judgment by him heretofore acknowledged in the upper Bench’ (see PRO, Prob.11/224 fol. 569), this would have been the brother of Colonel Thomas Rainsborough, Major William Rainsborough. There is no evidence of any issue between Thomas Rainsborough and Henry Ireton, and the two men must have worked closely together prior to Putney and indeed after, at Colchester. As Rainsborough had been transferred to the Navy he should not, technically, have attended the debates. Jones, Rainborowe, p. 68. 2

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if exaggerated, focus on political theory to the detriment of how the participants’ religious thinking and army mentality structured their statements at Putney. The attitude of men like Cromwell and Ireton towards religion made them respect, if not always agree with, the political views of their men. 6 Isolated by some of the points they made there was still much that bound Cromwell and Ireton with the army, if not with individuals such as Wildman and Rainsborough. In the end the wider perspective of the army which was not so clearly vocalised at Putney, or rather has been of less interest for some observers, enabled the army leadership to reassert their authority.

I At the start of the first day of debate, 28 October, Ireton stressed the need to go over the army’s previous engagements. This became a constant refrain for Ireton, in part no doubt due to his drafting of most of the army’s engagements. Implied criticism of the army leadership in a letter of 27 October from the influential army chaplain John Saltmarsh may have also focused Ireton’s mind on engagements.7 Furthermore The Case, as a means of highlighting the divergence of the grandees from their men, used numerous references to the army’s engagements.8 Ireton’s sterilising focus on previous engagements set a context highlighting where the radicals and Levellers threatened army unity. Woolrych has commented that Ireton and Cromwell focused on engagements as the weakness in the ‘new agents’ case’ as ‘their appeal to the army’s former declarations and engagements was highly selective’. 9 The strength of Ireton’s commitment to the statements the army had made must also not be overlooked as a context for his position at Putney. The Solemn Engagement as a ‘military covenant’ did bind them before God and suggests why Ireton could state during the debates: ‘I heare men speake of laying aside all Engagements to [consider only] that wild or vast motion of what in every man’s conception is just or unjust, I am afraid and doe tremble att the boundlesse and endlesse consequences of itt.’10 The implied threat of anarchy was prominent throughout many of Ireton’s other statements on the negative voice, the franchise or property, at Putney. In doing so Ireton sought to expose Wildman as an outsider and isolate others like Rainsborough. Lilburne claimed

6

Gentles, NMA, p. 103. G.E. Aylmer (ed.), The Levellers in the English Revolution (1975), p. 120; D.E. Kennedy, The English Revolution 1642–1649 (2000), p. 65. 8 Sharp, Levellers, p.x. 9 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 217; E. Vallance, Revolutionary England and the National Covenant. State Oaths, Protestantism and the Political Nation, 1553–1682 (Woodbridge, 2005), p. 147. 10 Clarke Papers, I, p. 264; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 223; V. Kahn, Wayward Contracts. The Crisis of Political Obligation, 1640–1674 (Oxford, 2004), p. 12. 7

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Ireton first used the perjorative term ‘levellers’.11 ‘Levellers’ did not exist until Ireton named them, or rather the concept, at Putney.12 Worden argued that the ‘army grandees had put the word into circulation, perhaps with the general purpose of discrediting those to whom it applied’.13 Woolrych disagreed with Kishlansky’s argument that the focus on engagements was used as a way to preserve consensus. He saw it more as a means to prevent the increasing attacks on the King which the grandees hoped to show could not come from the army’s previous statements. Ireton and Cromwell aimed to achieve both ends.14 Consensus on their previous statements would highlight the flaws in the Agreement’s attack on monarchy. The problem they encountered was that most of those who challenged them at Putney believed that the circumstances had changed. In consequence the army’s position needed revising. It took a second civil war to force Cromwell and Ireton to accept this conclusion. Ireton found he had to defend himself for his negotiations with the King over the Heads. Wildman, who appeared to be acting as an agent for the agents, attacked Ireton, who responded: I thinke there is noe man is able to give a better account of the sence of the Agents; he hath spoke soe much as they have in their Booke and soe readily and therefore I see hee is very able to give their sence.15

Wildman made plain that he had been ‘desired by the Agents yesterday to appeare at Council’. They would have held discussions with regard to their shared aims and strategy.16 Ireton continued to defend his position under attack from Wildman. He argued that the maintenance of the Lords in the Heads had been discussed and agreed and that those proposals did not ‘give the King any negative voice’.

11 Sharp, Levellers, pp.xxi–xxii; Sampson, ‘A story “too tedious to relate at large” ’, p. 142; BL, E659(30), John Lilburne, His Apolgetic Narration (1652), p. 70. 12 Morrill and Baker, ‘Case’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 119. For Ireton’s use of the concept see Clarke Papers, I, p. 405; Clarke Mss 65 fol. 83v. 13 B. Worden, ‘The Levellers in History and Memory, c.1660–1960’, p. 280 in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates. 14 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 223; M. Kishlansky, ‘Consensus politics and the structure of debate at Putney’, Journal of British Studies, 20 (1981). It does appear however as if Woolrych modified his view of Kishlansky’s argument. In Woolrych, ‘The Debates’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, he stated that ‘Kishlansky sees them, far more plausibly, as seeking a procedure that would help them to preserve consensus, but their purpose went further than that’. In a review of his writings at a meeting of the Early Modern Cambridge Graduate Student Seminar on 17 November 2004, Kishlansky stated that the concept of consensus still needed development. For a different perspective and one that directly challenges Kishlansky’s interpretation, see J. Holstun, Ehud’s Dagger: Class Struggle in the English Revolution (2000), pp. 218–31. 15 Clarke Papers, I, p. 356. 16 Clarke Papers, I, p. 352.

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That Ireton could then very quickly comment that ‘Wee doe nott demand that hee shall have noe Negative, butt wee doe nott say that hee shall have any’ indicates why some could see him as a Machiavellian. Ireton made plain that settlement needed to be imposed upon Charles as ‘wee doe butt take the Kinge as a man with whome wee have bin att a difference, wee propound termes of peace’. The rights of the people would come before the King. He clearly expressed bitterness over the attacks to which he had been subjected; the argument that ‘we should preferre the Kinge’s Rights before a generall good, was an unworthy and as unchristian as injury as ever was done’.17 With no discernible progress in the debate Lieutenant-Colonel William Goffe wanted to search for God’s guidance. Ireton strongly supported this and his statement should remind us of the faith that drove him, sometimes overlooked amid the dry and legalistic nature of his numerous contributions at Putney: That which Lieut. Col. Goffe offer’d hath [made] a very great impression uppon mee; and indeed I must acknowledge to God through him, that, as hee hath severall times spoke in this place, and elsewhere to this purpose, hee hath never spoke butt hee hath touched my heart; and that especially in the point that hee hintes. That one thinge is, that in the time of our straights and difficulties, I thinke wee none of us – I feare wee none of us – I am sure I have nott – walked soe closely with God, and kept soe close with him, [as] to trust wholly uppon him, as nott to bee led too much with considerations of danger and difficulty, and from that consideration to waive some thinges, and perhaps to doe some thinges, that otherwise I should nott have thought fitt to have done. Every one hath a spiritt within him – especially [he] who has that communion indeed with that spirit that is the only searcher of hearts – that can best search out and discover to him the errours of his owne wayes, and of the workinges of his owne heart. And though I thinke that publique actinges, publique departings from God are the fruites of unbeleif and distrust, and nott honouring God by sanctifying him in our wayes; they doe more publiquely engage God to vindicate his honour by a departing from them that doe soe, and if there bee any such thinge in the Army that is to bee look’t uppon with a publique eye in relation to the Army. I thinke the maine thinge is for every one to waite uppon God, for the errours, deceits, and weaknesses of his owne heart, and I pray God to bee present with us in that.18

Ireton believed that God could speak through men like Goffe. He later stated that ‘Whether God will bringe itt to passe that or the other way is a secrett in his will, and is further then what is revealed to him, lett him [to whom it has been revealed] speake itt’.19 Wildman did not want any delay that a prayer meeting would bring. Ireton rounded on him regarding the importance of

17 18 19

Clarke Papers, I, pp. 356–9. Clarke Papers, I, pp. 256–7; Gentles, NMA, p. 206. Clarke Papers, II, p. 180. 102

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engagements. This may have been a tactical mistake but Ireton had little choice; he had to respond to Wildman’s comments. Ireton stated that: Covenants freely made, freely entred into, must bee kept one with another. Take away that I doe nott know what ground there is of any thinge you can call any man’s right. . . . If you will resort onely to the law of Nature, by the law of Nature you have noe more right to this land or any thinge else then I have.20

Gleissner has stressed that for Ireton the Leveller emphasis on the law of nature represented a threat to stability.21 At times the debates became a sterile clash between Ireton and his opponents, principally Wildman and Rainsborough. They developed entrenched positions in reaction to each other with the result that the wider perspective of the other participants who were not so vocal is sometimes forgotten. Most there, and certainly most of those in the army not there, fundamentally wanted agreement. Ireton’s comments at Whitehall make it clear that he saw discussion as leading to dissension as wrong. 22 Debate within the army was designed to lead to an agreed way forward. Cromwell famously stated that he, and indeed Ireton, were not ‘wedded and glewed to formes of Government’.23 The record of the debates, considered in their context, were not a clash, but for the majority present as a way to compromise. Within army politics prayer meetings were designed to facilitate this process. Cook regarded Ireton as ‘a most exemplary Christian in duties of piety and Religion, alwayes beginning and ending Conferences & Councells with prayer, seeking wisedome, advise and strength from God upon all occasions’.24 Towards the end of the first day at Putney a committee of twelve officers and six adjutators was appointed, as Ireton wanted, to review the Agreement of the People in the light of the army’s engagements. Of those appointed Ireton could have relied on the support of Cromwell, Waller, Rich, Deane and Thomas Hammond.25 20

Clarke Papers, I, pp. 259–64; Gentles, NMA, p. 207. R.A. Gleissner, The Levellers and Natural Law: The Putney Debates of 1647’, Journal of British Studies, 20 (1980), p. 81. For ‘theologically understood natural law’ and the Levellers see, F.W. Bridger, ‘Theology and Politics in the English Revolution 1640–1660’, Bristol University Ph.D. (1980). 22 Clarke Papers, II, pp. 78–9, 95. 23 Clarke Papers, I, p. 277; Gentles, NMA, p. 207; Woolrych, ‘The Debates’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 60, has argued that ‘the army commanders’ desire to consult and involve all ranks was genuine’. It was argued that Ireton ‘was willing to heare truth from the Souldier’; see John Cook, Monarchy no Creature, epistle, n. p. 24 John Cook, Monarchy no Creature, epistle, n. p. 25 Clarke Papers, I, p. 279: the committee was composed of Lt. Gen. Cromwell, Com. Gen. Ireton, Colonel Rainsborough, Sir Hardress Waller, Colonel Rich, Adjutant General Deane, Colonels Scrope, Thomlinson, Overton, Okey, Tichborne, Mr Sexby, Mr Allen, Mr Lockyer, Mr Clarke, Lt. Gen. Hammond, Mr Stenson and Mr Underwood; Gentles, NMA, p. 207. 21

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The prayer meeting was held at the start of the second day. It illustrated an increasing danger that emerged at Putney for Ireton and Cromwell. Goffe’s reflection on Revelation 17–20 and Numbers 14 convinced him that there should be no further attempt at negotiation with Charles. Goffe wanted unity and stressed that the time to judge the King was when God’s will was clearer to all. In many ways he was simply a step ahead of Cromwell. Woolrych, commenting on Cromwell’s reply to Goffe’s reflections, suggested that his ‘attitude had plainly changed since The heads of the proposals were first framed, and Charles’ temporising response to them probably explains why. The second civil war would clinch his conviction that the King had earned God’s wrath.’26 Direct negotiations with Charles over the Heads forced Ireton to confront the reality of the King’s duplicity. According to Hutchinson the: King uttering these words to him, ‘I shall play my game as well as I can’, Ireton replied, ‘If your Majesty have a game to play, you must give us also liberty to play our’. Colonel Hutchinson privately discoursing with his cousin about the communications he had had with the King, Ireton’s expressions were these: ‘He gave us’, said he, ‘words, and we paid him in his own coin when we found he had no real intention to the people’s good but to prevail upon our factions, to regain by art what he had lost in fight’.27

The ongoing debates precipated more forceful attacks on Charles I.28 The prayer meeting, while highlighting potential dangers for the leadership, served to draw the officers together. The shared experience of the prayer meeting isolated Wildman and Rainsborough, who did not attend.29 Wildman attacked Ireton for using religion as a means of deception when the debate began again.30 Although many of the soldiers at Putney had some sympathy with the pronouncements of Wildman and Rainsborough these were increasingly focused on what many saw as details on which agreement was unlikely. The majority, like Ireton, still wanted consensus. Woolrych has commented that ‘before the end of the day’s debate such officer-agitators as Captain Merriman and Lieutenant Chillenden were looking forward to a genuine reconciliation between the positions of the army commanders and of the agents of the five regiments’.31 This may now been seen in the light of Norris’ 26

Woolrych, ‘The Debates’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 75. N.H. Keeble (ed.), Hutchinson Memoirs (1995), p. 214. 28 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 281–5; Gentles, NMA, p. 208; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 231. 29 BL, E412(10), A Cal to all the Souldiers (29 Oct. 1647), p. 4. 30 Holstun, Ehud’s Dagger, p. 228. Holstun does not regard the prayer meeting as genuine or part of the debates. It was both. 31 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 225. See also p. 226 where it is stated that ‘Only three officer-agitators, Audley, Merriman, and Chillenden, had spoken so far, all briefly, and whatever sympathy they had with the new agents’ cause was qualified by an evident desire to preserve the army’s unity’. 27

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placing of Chillenden as a link between the original adjutators and the officers.32 The impact of the prayer meeting continued to manifest itself in Ireton’s comments on providence during the debate and should be borne in mind when the development of his political stance over the following two years is considered: Wee have professed to indeavour to follow the councells of God, and to have him President in our Councills; and I hope itt hath bin soe in our hearts. That wee have bin ready to follow his guidance; and I know itt hath bin soe in many thinges against our owne reasons, where wee have seene evidently God calling us. That wee have bin carried on with a confidence in him, wee have made our trust, and wee have held forth his name, and wee have owned his hand towards us. These are the thinges I say which God hath in some degree and measure wrought his people in this Army uppe to, in some degree of sincerity; and this itt is, as I said before, that I account hath bin [the cause] that God hath taken delight in, amongst us, to dwell with us, to bee with us, and to appeare with us, and will manifest his presence to us. And therefore by this meanes, and by that appearance of God amongst us, the name and honour of God, the name and reputation of the people of God, and of that Gospell that they professe, is deeply, and dearly, and nearly concern’d in the good or ill manage of this Army, in their good or ill carriage; and therefore for my parte I professe itt, that’s the onely thinge to mee. [It is] nott to mee soe much as the vainest, or lightest thinge you can imagine, whether there bee a kinge in England, or noe, whether there bee Lords in England or noe. For whatever I finde the worke of God tending to I should desire quietly submitt to. If god saw itt good to destroy, nott only Kinge and Lords, butt all distinctions of degrees – nay if itt goe further, to destroy all property, that there’s noe such thinge left, that there bee nothing att all of Civill Constitution left in the Kingedome – if I see the hand of God in itt I hope I shall with quietnesse acquiesce, and to submitt to itt, and nott resist itt. Butt still I thinke that God certainly will soe leade those that are his, and I hope too hee will soe lead this Army that they may nott incurre sin, or bring scandall uppon the name of God, and the name of the people of God that are both soe neerly concern’d in what this Army does.33

Lamont has stressed that such comments ‘should not be written off as rhetoric’.34 The sincerity of Ireton’s faith should not be questioned; he believed that if he saw ‘the hand of God’ he would ‘submitt’.35 However, the last part of this statement would indicate that, like Cromwell, Ireton’s faith in providence could be self-deluding. He did not want ‘levelling’ and is unlikely to have seen it as providence. 32

Norris, ‘Sectarian Grandees’, p. 52. Clarke Papers, I, pp. 296–7. Ireton was to repeat this idea twice, see pp. 306, 322. 34 W. Lamont, ‘Puritanism, Liberty and the Putney Debates’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 243. 35 A. Walsham, Providence in Early Modern England (Oxford, 1999). 33

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After the Agreement had been read out Ireton immediately set himself on the defensive by focusing on the franchise and property rights. Ireton stated that: I thinke itt is noe person hath a right to an interest or share in the disposing or determining of the affaires of the Kingdome, and in chusing those that shall determine what lawes are shall bee rul’d by heere, noe person hath a right to this, that hath nott a permanent fixed interest in this Kingedome.36

This has been seen as a ‘tactical blunder’.37 It allowed the Levellers to focus on the franchise and highlighted their differences with Ireton who, through his statements, appeared to be defending his privileged position as a man of property against his less well-off colleagues. This more conservative position may also be a reflection of the age of those arguing and their more established position in society. At Putney a 48-year-old Cromwell and a 36-year-old Ireton were confronted by a 24-year-old Wildman, although Rainsborough was the same age as Ireton and from a more financially secure background.38 Winfrey argues that ‘Ireton concluded that property rights were to be the product of government’.39 For Ireton, rights did not come from the law of nature. The emphasis on freehold property gave structure to society and law, as Pocock stated, of ‘anchoring the individual’.40 Ireton argued that ‘the will of one man should nott bee a law, butt that the law of this Kingedome should bee by a choice of persons to represent, and that choice to bee made by the generality of the Kingedome’.41 Tuck believes, however, that Ireton’s arguments at Putney have been ‘misunderstood’ and ‘treated merely as a case of atavistic conservatism’. For Tuck, what Ireton said with regard to the ‘denial of any natural right of property’ and civil rights being derived from a civil constitution was an ‘espousal of a new kind of theory’.42 Ireton went on:

36

Clarke Papers, I, pp. 301–2. I would like to thank Colin Davis for his comments with regard to Ireton’s use of the phrase ‘permanent fixed interest’. 37 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 299–300; Gentles, NMA, pp. 209–11; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 235, citing J. Morrill, ‘The Army Revolt of 1647’, pp. 72–3, reprinted in J. Morrill, The Nature of the English Revolution (1993), p. 326. Morrill actually uses the phrase a ‘great error of judgement’, but sets this in the context of the eventual outcome as the ‘debates fizzled out’. 38 Jones, Rainborowe. 39 J.C. Winfrey, ‘Charity versus Justice in Locke’s Theory of Property’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 42: 3 (1981), p. 429; I. Hampsher-Monk, ‘Civic Humanism and Parliamentary Reform: The Case of the Society of the Friends of the People’, Journal of British Studies, 18: 2 (1979), p. 86. 40 J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (1975), pp. 375–7. 41 Clarke Papers, I, p. 327. 42 R. Tuck, ‘ “The Ancient Law of Freedom”: John Selden and the Civil War’, in J. Morrill (ed.), Reactions to the English Civil War, pp. 156–7. 106

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I will aske that Gentleman [Rainsborough] that spoke, whom I love in my heart, whether when they drew out to serve the Parliament in the beginning, when they engag’d with the Army att New Markett, whether then they thought of any more interest or right in the Kingdome then this? Whether they did thinke, that they should have as great interest in Parliament men as freeholders had? Or whether from the beginning wee did nott engage for the liberty of Parliaments, and that wee should bee concluded by the lawes that such did make. Unlesse somebody did make you believe before now that you should have an equall interest in the Kingedome, unlesse somebody doe make that to bee believed, there is noe reason to blame men for leading [you] soe farre as they have done; and if any man was farre enough from such an apprehension that man hath nott bin deceiv’d.

Ireton continued and in doing so specifically defended his own actions: And truly, I shall say butt this worde more for my self in this businesse, because the whole objection seemes to bee prest to mee, and maintain’d by mee. I will not arrogate that I was the first man that putt the Army uppon the thought either of successive Parliaments or more equall Parliaments; yett there are some heere that know who they were putt us uppon that foundation of libertie of putting a period to this Parliament, that wee might have successive Parliaments, and that there might bee a more equall distribution of Elections. There are many heere that know who were the first movers of that businesse in the Army. I shall nott arrogate that, butt I can argue this with a cleare conscience: that noe man hath prosecuted that with more earnestnesse, and will stand to that interest more than I doe, of having Parliaments successive and nott perpetuall, and the distributions of itt [more equal].

Ireton then made it clear he believed that a reformed franchise should still be limited: Butt notwithstanding my opinion stands good, that itt ought to bee a distribution amongst the fix’t and setled people of this Nation. Itt’s more prudent and safe, and more uppon this ground of right for itt: itt is the fundamentall Constitution of this Kingedome now, and that which you take away for matter of wilfulnesse. Notwithstanding [as for] this universall conclusion, that all inhabitants [shall have voices], as it stands [in the Agreement]. I must declare that though I cannott yett bee satisfied, yett for my parte I shall acquiesce. I will nott make a distraction in this Army. Though I have a property in being, one of those that should bee an Elector, though I have an interest in the birthright, yet I will rather loose that birthright, and that interest then I will make itt my businesse [to oppose], if I see butt the generality of those whome I have reason to thinke honest men, and conscientious men, and godly men to carry them another way. I will nott oppose though I bee nott satisfied to joyne with them. And I desire [to say this], I am agreed with you if you insist uppon a more equall distribution of Elections; I will agree with you, nott onely to dispute for itt, butt to fight for itt and contend for itt. Thus farre I shall agree with you. On the other hand those who differ their termes, I will not agree with you except you goe farther. Thus farre I can goe with you, I will goe with you as farre as I can.43 43

Clarke Papers, I, pp. 333–4. 107

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Ireton took issue with Leveller ideas about why men took up arms in 1642 and stated that he had done so with the idea of a traditional Parliament. It is also evident from Ireton’s later words that he had taken up arms in 1642 ‘to give freedom and enlargement to the Gospel for the increasing and spreading of light amongst men’.44 As Davis has commented, the demands for liberty of conscience had little to do with individual rights. The freedom secured would allow them to submit to an arbitrary God.45 Ireton also argued that in 1642 no one had verbalised the ideas now being stated by the Levellers and he should not therefore be attacked for betraying the men who had fought under him. However, his own words indicated his awareness of how the war itself and the political sturggle that had ensued between Parliament and army had changed men’s ideas about why they were fighting. A figure in the army command commented in May 1647 that men had been made to ‘thinke of that they never intended’.46 Ireton forcefully expressed his own work in seeking, once the war had concluded, a reform of Parliament, notably in his Heads. Nevertheless at the end of a speech effectively justifying his position, Ireton left room for compromise with those less politically driven than his Leveller opponents.47 Sexby challenged Ireton. Directly turning the words of Ireton’s own Solemn Engagement against him, Sexby stated that: There are many thousands of us souldiers that have ventur’d our lives; wee have had little propriety in the Kingedome as to our estates, yett wee have had a birthright. Butt itt seemes now except a man hath a fix’t estate in this Kingedome, hee hath noe right in this Kingedome. I wonder wee were soe much deceived. If wee had nott a right to the Kingedome, wee were meere mercinarie souldiers.48

Ireton argued that Sexby had not been deceived but he had no room in his arguments to take account of the development of the position that Sexby now occupied. This focus led to Ireton entering upon two very detailed expositions on the history of the 1640s franchise and the rights of foreigners. Ireton used the example of the foreigner as another means to argue that the propertyless did not warrant a political role.49 Wildman queried whether a person, without

44 Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, pp. 458–9. Cromwell also saw the war in such religious terms, later commenting with regard to his Eastern Association regiments that ‘I raised such men as had the fear of God before them, and made some conscience of what they did’. See Abbott, IV, p. 471. 45 Davis, ‘Religion and the Struggle for Freedom in the English Revolution’, Historical Journal, 35 (1992). 46 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 101–2. 47 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 333–4. 48 Clarke Papers, I, p. 323; Gentles, NMA, p. 210; Kennedy, English Revolution, p. 77. 49 Mendle, ‘Putney Pronouns’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, pp. 138–9; R. Foxley, ‘Citizenship and the English Nation in Leveller thought, 1642–53’, Cambridge University

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their own consent, could be bound by law. Ireton in turn responded by stressing that the political nation should be based on property and control: Lett the Question bee soe; whether a man can bee bound to any law that hee doth nott consent to? And I shall tell you, that hee may and ought to bee that hee doth nott give a consent to, nor doth nott chuse any, and I will make itt cleare. If a foreigner come within this Kingedome, if that stranger will have libertie who hath noe local interest heere – hee is a man itt’s true. . . . Butt if that man bee received to a being amongst us I thinke that man may very well be content to submitt himself to the law of the land: that is the law that is made by those people that have a property, a fixt property, in the land. . . . A man ought to bee subject to a law that did nott give his consent, butt with this reservation, that if this man doe thinke himself unsatisfied to bee subject to this law hee may goe into another Kingedome . . . in every Kingedome, within every land, the originall of power, of making lawes, of determining what shall bee law in the land, does lie in the people that are possess’t of the permanent interest in the land.50

Ireton believed that positive law rather than natural law should be at the heart of government, since the original covenant establishing government had to be binding if peace was to be maintained.51 For Tuck such ideas expressed by Ireton indicated that he had read Grotius and Selden, perhaps even talked to Selden.52 For her part Kahn regards Ireton’s arguments as rooted in practicality. She has argued that by: distinguishing between justice before man and before God, Ireton suggested that the keeping of covenants was not so much a divine law as a moral principle or human institution deriving entirely from human interaction. In striking contrast to classical notions of man as a political animal, Ireton presented the artificiality of government as a guarantee of its effectiveness and legitimacy.53

A benefit for Ireton from these long exchanges with Wildman seems to have been in wearying his audience.54 In recent exchanges a fundamental difference between Ireton and Levellers over the nature of the constitution had emerged. The Levellers essentially argued that the Norman Yoke had been overthrown, thus facilitating the introduction of new constitutional forms.55 Hence Sexby’s

Ph.D. (2001), pp. 13–14; R. Foxley, ‘John Lilburne and the Citizenship of ‘Free-born Englishmen’, Historical Journal, 47: 4 (2004), pp. 871, 874. 50 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 318–19. 51 Gleissner, ‘Levellers and Natural Law’, p. 83. 52 Tuck, Philosophy and Government, p. 246. 53 Kahn, Wayward Contracts, p. 12. 54 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 301–3, 313–14; Gentles, NMA, p. 210; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 238. 55 J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law (1957). 109

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comment that they had fought to ‘recover’ their ‘birthrights and privileges as Englishmen’. He wondered whether they had ‘fought all this time for nothing’.56 Ireton maintained a ‘typical’ view of the unwritten constitution and sought only moderate reformation.57 Despite, or because of, these long exchanges between Ireton and Rainsborough others moved for compromise at Putney. Ireton’s ill-executed focus on the franchise may not have been such a great tactical blunder as it seemed initially. Gentles pointed out that while it had put Ireton on the defensive he ‘had succeeded in turning it into the issue on which the radicals would not compromise’. Their isolation made a compromise position much more tenable and attractive to the majority present.58 Wildman claimed that Ireton deliberately played up the idea of division as a debating strategy.59 Rainsborough also believed that Ireton’s comments at Putney were designed to isolate the radicals in relation to the rest of the army, that Ireton had a deliberate strategy to do this. He replied to one of Ireton’s speeches with obvious bitterness: I wish wee were all true hearted and that wee did all carry our selves with integretie. If I did mistrust you I would use such asseverations. I thinke itt doth goe on mistrust, and thinges are thought to be matters of reflection that were never intended. For my parte, as I thinke, you forgott somethinge that was in my speech, and you doe nott only your selves believe that [we] are inclining to anarchy, butt you would make all men believe that.60

Rainsborough’s opinion was justified as Ireton’s words gave this impression. Yet Ireton’s stance cannot simply be viewed as part of a deliberate strategy; he genuinely believed this. That is why there had been so much stress on previous engagements. Ireton reiterated his concern for civil peace at the Whitehall debates. He believed that man, as naturally destructive, needed to be restrained. Ireton argued that: the necessary thinge, that which necessarily leads all men into civill agreements or contracts, or to make Commonwealthes, is the necessity of itt for preserving peace. 56

Clarke Papers, I, pp. 322–3, 329; Taft, ‘Ireton’, p. 185. Clarke Papers, I, pp. 301–14, 316–20, 324–7; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statemen, p. 221; Kennedy, English Revolution, p. 75. However, see R. Tuck, ‘“The Ancient Law of Freedom”: John Selden and the Civil War’, in J. Morrill (ed.), Reactions to the English Civil War, pp. 156–7 who has argued that Ireton’s arguments at Putney have been ‘misunderstood’ and ‘treated merely as a case of atavistic conservatism’. He states that what Ireton said with regard to the ‘denial of any natural right of property’ and civil rights being derived from a civil constitution was an ‘espousal of a new kind of theory’. While this may be so it made little practical difference in terms of the resolution of the debate. 58 Gentles, NMA, p. 211. 59 BL, E412(10), A Cal to all the Souldiers, p. 5. 60 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 308–9. 57

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Because otherwise, if there were noe such thinge, butt every man [were] left to his ownewill, mens contrary wills, lusts, and passions would lead every one to the destruction of another, and [everyone] to seeke all the wayes of fencing himself against the jealousies of another.61

This belief may have led Ireton to emphasise the threat to society as a debating strategy to isolate the radicals. Hardress Waller, probably more representative of general feeling in the army than individuals like Rainsborough or Ireton, highlighted the futility of debating the franchise. Waller foresaw that agreement was unlikely and argued that the practical issue of the army’s burden on the people should take precedent.62 At this point, by reiterating the earlier statements of Colonel Rich, Ireton appears to have made the Levellers move with the developing consensus that there should be some limit to the franchise.63 Tuck has also pointed to the role of Peter in seeking compromise on the franchise.64 For Woolrych the ‘ease with which discussion passed to common ground suggests how differently the debate might have gone if it had been steered that way from the start, instead of falling into those clashes of principle that Ireton and Rainsborough too much enjoyed’.65 Nevertheless it may also be argued that the clashes of Ireton and Rainsborough did much to ensure compromise. The meeting moved in Ireton’s favour as a desire for unity among the majority persisted. Rainsborough’s call for a rendezvouz in part appeared to invite division and allowed Ireton to respond that ‘If the army was divided now, it was because certain elements had cut themselves off from the General Council and set up a rival caucus’.66 Ireton and Lambert had earlier, and successfully, used this argument at Saffron Walden when isolating Colonel Sheffield and his fellow ‘presbyterian’ officers. It worked again.67 Ireton, in defending the Heads of the Proposals, stressed the similarities between the Heads and Agreement as a means of highlighting the room for compromise.68 Ireton now came to a crucial argument on the nature of settlement. He stated that there was no security for the army in the Agreement. Even if all the soldiers subscribed it would not be enough without more general acceptance. This would later lead him to argue that the Agreement needed to be as broad as possible to ensure a wide subscription. If the army sought to impose the Agreement, further conflict would ensue: 61

Clarke Papers, II, pp. 79–80. Clarke Papers, I, p. 339; Gentles, NMA, p. 212; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 241. 63 Gentles, NMA, p. 212. 64 Tuck, Philosophy and Government, p. 247. 65 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 241. 66 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 346–8; Gentles, NMA, p. 212. 67 Farr, Lambert, p. 51. 68 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 349–51, 356–61; Gentles, NMA, p. 213; Kishlansky, ‘Consensus Politics’, p. 52; ‘there was much in the Agreement that was uncontroversial’ is in essence the stance that Ireton took at the time. 62

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If all people to a man had subscribed to this [Agreement] then there would bee some security to itt, because noe man would oppose; butt otherwise our concurrence amongst ourselves is noe more then our saying our selves wee will bee indemnified. Our Indemnity must bee to somethinge that att least wee will uppehold, and wee see wee cannott hold to bee a conclusive authority of the Kingedome.69

Later at the Whitehall debates Ireton responded to William Erbery’s concern with regard to imposition of the Agreement with the argument that it should be a testimony of the Army’s intentions rather than enforced. The Officers’ Agreement would not disenfranchise those who refused to sign.70 In essence Ireton’s comments at Putney with regard to subscription touched upon the heart of the failure of ‘settlement’ during the Interregnum. All regimes were ultimately dependent on the authority of an army that had very limited support among the political nation. On 30 October 1647 a new committee of eighteen, headed by Cromwell and Ireton, was appointed to consider army engagements.71 Gentles states that its ‘recommendations illustrated the substantial common ground that existed between the respective authors of the Heads of the Proposals and the Agreement of the People’. These recommendations included: that Parliament be dissolved by 1 September 1648; biennial elections; Parliament to sit for at least six months; a council of state to govern between Parliaments; the monarchy and lords to remain but with reduced powers, especially in relation to the Commons; redistribution of seats but with Parliament to decide how and who should vote; there was to be no signed constitution as envisaged by the Levellers. For Gentles these recommendations included the ‘revolutionary concept of powers reserved from Parliament – religion, conscription, and indemnity’. The recommendations may be regarded as a success for the army leadership.72 The recommendations were in line with what Ireton had been arguing for.73 The obvious progress made in committee was not immediately reflected in the wider debates. Clear statements against the King gave Ireton and Cromwell most cause for concern. Captain George Bishop declared Charles ‘that man of blood’. Sexby was most violent in his statements against the King. His theme

69 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 361; Gentles, NMA, pp. 213–14; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, pp. 221–2, 243; Taft, ‘Ireton’, p. 186. 70 E. Vallance, Revolutionary England and the National Covenant, p. 148. 71 Clarke Papers, I, p. 363. On the committee with Cromwell and Ireton were Thomas Rainsborough, Hardress Waller, Robert Lilburne, Nathaniel Rich, William Goffe, William Rainsborough, John Cobbett, Edmund Chillenden and William Allen. Woolrych (Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 224) argued that this meeting was held at Thomas Ireton’s quarters but Gentles has shown that it was held at the quarters of the other Quarter-Master General of the army, Grosvenor; Gentles, NMA, pp. 499–500n.110. 72 Gentles, NMA, p. 214; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 245–7; Taft, ‘Ireton’, p. 186. 73 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 327, 333–4.

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that God had judged Charles was also verbalised by Lieutenant-Colonels Goffe and Jubbe. Goffe believed that the army needed to reflect on whether God was still with them. He argued: God does seeme evidently to bee throwing downe the glory of all flesh; the greatest powers in the Kingedome have bin shaken. God hath throwne downe a partie in the Citty; I doe nott say, that God will throw us downe – I hope better thinges – butt hee will have the glory; lett us not stand uppon our glory and reputation in the world.74

Cromwell could not as yet discern God’s will. Indeed he would wait for most of the next year for enlightenment. Nevertheless, such comments did have an impact on his thinking.75 Morrill has argued that Goffe’s comments lit a ‘slow fuse’ for ‘Cromwell had an epiphany, the beginnings of his conversion to the view that God had withdrawn his support for the annointed Charles, and might well be inviting the army to be the instrument of his destruction’.76 Hutton has, however, commented more critically in relation to Cromwell’s immediate reaction to Goffe. Hutton believes that Goffe was: forced to apologise by Cromwell, who insisted that nobody at these gatherings could actually claim to speak on behalf of the deity. This was certainly in accordance with Oliver’s sense of religious propriety, but it also eliminated the risk that one of his subordinates could assume the status of a prophet.77

Ireton replied more directly to what Goffe had offered, believing that God spoke ‘through him’ but stressing that ‘the maine thinge is for every one to waite uppon God, for the errours, deceits, and weaknesses of his owne heart, and I pray God to bee present with us in that’.78 Ireton responded to a longwinded attempt by Wildman to turn the debate back to his concerns: ‘Truly Sir, by what Lieut. Col. Goffe moved I confesse I was soe taken off from all [other] thoughts in this businesse that I did nott thinke of speakinge any thing more.’79 Typically however, Ireton could not contain himself from responding to Wildman’s comments. There followed a detailed exchange between Wildman and Ireton on the monarch’s negative voice. Ireton read the proposals of the committee showing that there had been substantial compromise. Their numbing discourse again may in part have worked to Ireton’s advantage. According to Gentles the

74 75 76 77 78 79

Clarke Papers, I, p. 254; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, pp. 231–2, 232n.63. Gentles, NMA, pp. 215–16; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 250. Morrill, ‘Rewriting Cromwell’, p. 569. Hutton, Studies in Stuart History, p. 104. Clarke Papers, I, pp. 256–67. Clarke Papers, I, p. 262. 113

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‘fragmentary record of this protracted debate one can sense the General Council’s diminishing interest in the recondite historical and theoretical arguments of Ireton, Wildman . . .’.80 The committee appointed on 30 October headed by Ireton and Cromwell proceeded with its work. At the end of 2 November they agreed various points to be finalised on 5 November. With Cromwell at Parliament on 5 November the committee, following Rainsborough’s lead, agreed to send a letter to Parliament stating their opposition to any more approaches to the King. Ireton ‘stormed out of the meeting’ and ‘protested he would act no more with them, unlesse they recalled the Letter’.81 Rainsborough had firsthand experience of negotiating with the King, being alongside Ireton in the delegation that went to Charles at Woburn in 1647.82 Gardiner has written that this letter commented on statements supposedly made by Ireton in the Commons to the effect that the army agreed with his current proceedings with the King. This was the cause of Ireton’s anger.83 This had been the substance of an earlier exchange between Rainsborough and Ireton in September. Rainsborough indicated that he believed that Ireton had stated in the Commons that the army favoured negotiation with the King.84 As an MP Rainsborough would certainly be in a position to know what Ireton said during a Commons speech. He had been able to clarify that Cromwell had not made such statements when under no obligation to do so. Ireton argued that Rainsborough may have misconstrued what he had said in the Commons. None the less it is possible that Rainsborough told the truth as Ireton can easily be imagined allowing different inferences of his words in the differing audiences of the Commons and Army Council. Yet Rainsborough could also have been manipulating Ireton’s words against him as part of his general stance at Putney alongside the Levellers. It was noted that with regard to the sending of the letter: Ireton opposed the same all he could, and in testimony of his dissent left the council, protesting he could come no more there to be partaker of the high neglect and violation of reason and justice which he observed to reign amongst them. He hath been moved since to return, but continues resolute.85

80

Gentles, NMA, pp. 216–17; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, pp. 252, 254. Gentles, NMA, p. 217; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, pp. 259–60; For the letter itself see BL, E413(3), A Message to Both Houses of Parliament (1647), pp. 1–2; BL, E413(18), A Copy of a LETTER Sent by the Agents of severall Regiments (11 Nov. 1647), p. 2; Kennedy, English Revolution, p. 85; Morrill, ‘Zeruiah’, pp. 22–3. 82 W.R.D. Jones, Thomas Rainborowe (c.1610–1648). Civil War Seaman, Siegemaster and Radical (Woodbridge, 2005), p. 48. 83 Gardiner, Civil War, IV, p. 8; The letter is in BL, E413(3), A Message to Both Houses of Parliament (6 Nov. 1647); BL, E413(18), A Copy of a Letter (11 Nov. 1647). 84 Clarke Papers, I, p. 233. 85 Clarke Papers, I, p. 441. 81

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Ireton’s anger was justified, given that the letter Rainsborough induced the Council to send on 5 November essentially stated that Ireton had no place within army politics: Whereas it is generally reported that the House was enduced to make another addresse to the King, by Propositions, by reason it was represented to the House as the desire of the Army, From a tendernesse to the priviledges of Parliamentary actings, this night the Generall Councell of the Army declared, that any such representation of their desires was [al]together groundlesse; and that they earnestly desire no such consideration may be admitted into the House’s resolutions in that particular.86

The breakdown of trust between 5 and 11 November centred on the position of Charles I within any settlement. Ireton still sought to make use of him whereas others had been ‘attracted to the language of blood guilt’.87 * Despite what had happened at Putney, the army leadership remained in control of the army. They decided to end the debates for three reasons: the failure to get agreement to the committee’s recommendations; that the Levellers had subverted the army; and rumours that Charles sought to escape.88 They succeeded because most soldiers feared disunity. As Morrill has stressed, Cromwell himself had stated, ‘we all speake to the same end, and the mistakes are only in the way’.89 Fairfax, having been absent from most of the Putney debates, now made a telling political intervention which, as Gentles reminds us, carried the significant political weight of a genuinely respected commander. A Remonstrance, drafted by an essentially moderate eighteen-man committee including Ireton, attacked the agents for trying to divide the army.90 Lilburne commented on his own clash with Ireton at the ‘Commons doore’ in which Ireton denounced ‘the Plea for the Agents was full of falsehoods and mistakes’.91 Fairfax stated he would resign if problems continued, but pledged that the leadership would ensure that the soldiers’ demands were met. Perhaps more fundamentally money was now available for the soldiers, and with a promise of a rendezvous

86

Clarke Papers, I, pp. 440–1; Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 260. Morrill and Baker, ‘Case’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 123. 88 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 262. 89 Morrill, ‘Rewriting Cromwell’, p. 570. 90 Clarke Papers, I., p. 413. This was composed of Lt. Gen. Cromwell, Com. Gen. Ireton, Sir Hardress Waller, Colonels Okey, Titchborne, Hewson, Commissary Stane, Scoutmaster General Watson, Colonel Rich, Mr Allen, Capt. Clarke, Mr Lockyer, Capt. Deane, Colonel Thomlinson, Lt. Col. Goffe, Major Rainsborough, Lt. Col. Cowell and Commissary Cowling. 91 BL, E427(4), John Lilburne, The peoples prerogative and priviledges, asserted and vindicated (1648), p. 55–6. Ireton was also part of a pamphlet dispute centred around the agent 87

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their commanders appeared to be addressing their immediate concerns.92 The General Council also produced a disclaimer on 9 November to the letter that Rainsborough had managed to get sent to Parliament on 5 November.93 Taft sees the: ready concurrence of the soldiery indicates that Leveller ideology had not penetrated the ranks to a meaningful extent. Leveller concepts were too abstruse for soldiers primarily concerned with material grievances that could most effectively be alleviated by Parliament responding to pressure from generals.94

A Leveller bitterly commented that after the failed Ware mutiny: ‘it being then made death to observe the Engagement, or but speak for the Agitators . . . for here the Engagement was utterly cast aside, and the Adjutators laid by, and after that no more Agitators would be permitted.’95 The genuine popularity of the officers among their men should also not be discounted. One Leveller had to admit that Cromwell and Ireton were ‘completely seated in the affections of the soldiery’.96 Furthermore, as Reece has noted, ‘historians have come to expect too much from the junior ranks. . . . The exceptional circumstances of April to August 1647 have become the norm by which the army’s subsequent political behaviour is measured.’97 The Levellers sought to use the rendezvous to their own disruptive ends. Yet only four regiments posed a real threat, one of them being Ireton’s own. At the first stage of the rendezvous at Ware the generals tried to impose order by dealing with some of the ringleaders. The actions of Cromwell and Fairfax in imposing their will on the regiments of Harrison and Lilburne, that had arrived unauthorised, quelled any further disturbances. The Remonstrance focused on material grievances but also outlined that the present Parliament should end and subsequent Parliaments be of a fixed period with a changed franchise. The Levellers demanded that the soldiers ‘Enquire whether the Engagement at Ware was not made by Cromwell and Ireton on purpose to tye William Thompson; see A.C., A vindication of Lieut. Gen. Cromwell, and Com. Gen. Ireton, against the scandalous aspersions cast upon them in a posted libell signed by one Tompson. And likewise a true state of the case concerning the said Tompson (1648), C11/BL, E431(7); Anon., A true and impartial relation of the whole matters concerning the proceedings of several coucnels of war, against W.Tompson, a free commoner of England, which may serve for a refutation to a scandalous paper, entituled, The vindication of Lieutenant General Cromwel, and Commissary General Ireton (1648), T2503/BL, E432(23). 92 Gentles, NMA, pp. 218–19. Sexby and Thomas Rainsborough were not on this committee. Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, pp. 263–6; Taft, ‘Ireton’, p. 188; A remonstrance from his excellency Sir Thomas Fairfax and his council of war (14 Nov. 1647). 93 Kennedy, English Revolution, p. 86; Clarke Papers, I, pp. 416, 440–2. 94 Taft, ‘Ireton’, p. 188; Woolrych, ‘The Debates’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 57. 95 The Hunting of the Foxes, p. 6r. 96 Harris, The Grand Design. 97 Reece, ‘Military Presence’, p. 75. 116

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you up from performing your former Engagements?’98 Nevertheless, the troops accepted the Remonstrance and the two other separate stages of the rendezvous were marked by their discipline. For Putney focus should not be solely on the franchise but more on the army’s attempt to come to terms with what immediate political action it needed to take. Lamont ‘sees “property” not as the central issue for Ireton but rather as the telling illustration of what is for him the important issue . . . core question . . . should promises be kept?’99 Morrill has stressed that focus should be on the questions that were relevant to the participants of the debates.100 He has pointed out that the lack of record between 2 and 11 November derived from the focus being on the issue of the King. As the most important issue it required as united an approach as possible, which the Levellers appeared to threaten.101 The army remained under the control of the generals, which they reinforced by pressure on Parliament to address the army’s material grievances and their own restructuring of the New Model.102 Yet, just at this point, all that Ireton and Cromwell had argued for at Putney was undermined by the escape on 11 November of Charles I from Hampton Court.

98

BL, E433(15), Westminster Projects (23 March 1648), p. 10. Lamont, ‘Puritanism, Liberty and the Putney Debates’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 243. 100 Morrill, ‘Rewriting Cromwell’, p. 569. 101 Morrill, ‘Rewriting Cromwell’, pp. 568–9. 102 Gentles, NMA, pp. 221–6, 233–4. 99

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5

Radicalisation, 1648

The escape of Charles I from Hampton Court in the short term may have reinforced the need for unity in the army, but it radicalised Ireton’s thinking with regard to the King. At Putney Ireton and Cromwell had come under increasing pressure from fellow officers and agents who did not believe that settlement with Charles could be achieved. Charles’ reaction to the Heads and the debates at Putney reinforced for Ireton the need for Charles’ actual role to be even more circumscribed than he had proposed in 1647. For Ireton the King still had to be used as a means of making any settlement more secure. It had become increasingly clear, however, that Charles could not be trusted. At Holdenby reports circulated that he expected troops from Europe.1 The King’s subsequent escape from Hampton Court and the impression of his compliance in the events of 26 July 1647, when a mob had invaded the Commons in support of the Presbyterian leaders, made Cromwell and Ireton’s position untenable. The nature of the King’s agreement with the Scots must have hardened Ireton’s sense of betrayal for, as Kennedy argues, ‘the Engagement manifests a strong animus against the Army as the King’s real adversary’.2 More stringent measures clearly had to be taken against the monarch. Ireton and Cromwell supported the Four Bills but Charles’ flight meant that there had to be a more wholesale change in their approach to the King.3 The reality of another conflict that Charles’ escape precipated made Ireton and Cromwell even more receptive to the argument that they had first been confronted with at Putney, that Charles was that ‘man of blood’. Yet their political interpretation of this passage from the book of Numbers differed from men such as their close colleague the millenarian Major General Thomas Harrison.4 Their

1

BL, E515(14), Perfect Diurnall (17–24 May 1647), p. 1598. Kennedy, English Revolution, p. 94. 3 Gentles, NMA, pp. 267, 305–7; Ashton, Counter-revolution, pp. 32–3, 350; Kennedy, English Revolution, p. 91. The Four Bills was presented to Charles on 24 December but were rejected by him on 28 December. Their main points were Parliamentary control of the army for twenty years and for Parliament to have the power to adjourn itself. 4 Ireton, Cromwell and indeed even Fairfax can rightly be described as millenarian. What 2

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political links with their allies in Parliament and wider conception of how settlement could be achieved meant that Ireton and especially Cromwell remained a step behind men such as Harrison, not in envisaging recigide or accepting that Charles deserved to die, but in openly articulating what might have to be be done with the King. By 1648 both Ireton and Cromwell had reached the conclusion that Charles had to be removed, if the manner of his removal remained subject to debate. At Putney with regard to the fate of the King Cromwell had stated, ‘we all speake to the same end, and the mistakes are only in the way’.5 During this period Ireton and Cromwell’s thinking regarding Charles developed at different speeds. Ireton, like Cromwell, became a ‘bitter opponent of Charles’ but Ireton was not ‘a reluctant regicide’, nor did he remain a ‘firm monarchist’.6 Furthermore, Cromwell’s eventual decision to embrace regicide had much to do with the prompting he received from his more strident and politically radical son-in-law, Henry Ireton.

I An immediate concern for Ireton was keeping Charles physically under the control of the army. Following his escape from Hampton Court in November 1647, Charles, amid division in his council, ended up on the Isle of Wight and in the custody of Robert Hammond, Cromwell’s cousin.7 This was not through the manipulation of Cromwell. Hammond did not at this time share the political views of his kinsmen and wanted negotiations to continue with Charles. The King continued to use Berkeley as an intermediary to try to persuade Cromwell and Ireton to accept his terms.8 Ireton and Cromwell’s concern over the custody of Charles is clear in their letters to Hammond.9 From Windsor on 21 November 1647 Ireton had informed Hammond of: the pretence of the King’s keeping himself within the protection of the army by coming into your hands; both reason, and all the circumstances I have heard, make me believe, and the King’s own declaration, left behind upon his table, doth plainly discover, that he in his going away had other intentions. . . . I must tell thee, God hath wonderfully appeared to justify and bear witness to that little measures of integrity and truth, which he have given to his servants. And I am confident, he

marked them out as different from men such as Thomas Harrison was not the depth of their faith but its interaction with their political thinking. 5 Morrill, ‘Rewriting Cromwell’, p. 570 6 J. Morrill and P. Baker, ‘Oliver Cromwell, the Regicide and the Sons of Zeruiah’, in J. Peacey (ed.), The Regicides and the Execution of Charles I (Basingstoke, 2001), p. 14. 7 P. Gregg, King Charles I (1981), pp. 419–20; Gardiner, Civil War, IV, pp. 13–14. 8 Gentles, NMA, p. 307; BL, E418(8), Propositions from the King’s Majesty (26 Nov. 1647). 9 Hammond Letters, pp. 87–8. 119

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will appear with us still; withall he bringe us off the stage without reproach or scandal to his name.10

It is no wonder that Ireton gave Berkeley a frosty reception in late November 1647, as Ireton believed that he had ‘abundantly demonstrated the Reality and Innocency of their Intentions towards’ Charles and felt that they ‘could not go lower’.11 An unnamed officer informed Berkeley that he faced arrest and that 800 of the ‘most dissaffected of the Army’ would be dispatched to ‘secure’ the King.12 On 31 December Ireton and Cromwell dined with Parliament’s commissioners before they left the army.13 On 3 January 1648 they appeared in the Commons to support a Parliamentary motion by Sir Thomas Wroth that Charles should be impeached and settlement take place without him.14 The Vote of No Addresses indicates that the shift in their position reflected a wider anger in Parliament at the King’s actions. Fairfax wrote to Robert Hammond at the start of February 1648 with instructions from Parliament to ensure that the King had no more than thirty ‘of all sorts, gentlemen, their servants, cooks, butlers, &c’ about him, but also that he took care who was in that thirty.15 In turn, on 11 February, Colonel Robert Overton wrote to Fairfax: I, for my part, am well pleased with the Parliament’s impartial proceedings touching the removal of our sovereign’s servants; the declension of his state will in time pull down his spirit, which, perhaps, is too much exalted on earth to ascend to heaven; it would prove a happy privation if the Father would please to dispossess him of three transitory kingdoms to infeoff him in an eternal one.16

The reported detail of Ireton’s and Cromwell’s comments in the Commons highlights the difficulty of their position under pressure from fellow soldiers and Levellers. It also indicates that they wanted, at this juncture, to impose a settlement through Parliament which included monarchy. This could now be with Charles, or even ‘without Him’. According to Walker, Cromwell stated that Charles was ‘an obstinate man, whose heart God had hardned’. As a result ‘Parliament should governe and defend the Kingdome by their owne power’, indicating that he clearly intended a much more limited role for the monarchy than previously. After Wroth had spoken, Walker claimed that: 10

Hammond Letters, pp. 20, 22. Rushworth, Historical Collections, part IV, II, p. 962. 12 Berkeley Memoirs, p. 384. 13 BL, E520(21), Perfect Diurnal, no.231 (27 Dec. 1647–3 Jan. 1648), p. 1864. 14 Clement Walker, Anarchia Anlicana: OR, THE HISTORY OF INDEPENDENCY, 2 vols (1648–49), I, pp. 71–2. Given Walker’s political leanings care is needed with the actual words attributed to Cromwell; see Gaunt, Cromwell, p. 90. 15 Bell (ed.), Fairfax Correspondence, II, pp. 7–8; CJ, V, p. 452 (2 Feb. 1648). 16 Bell (ed.), Fairfax Correspondence, II, pp. 10–12. 11

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Then Commissary Ireton (seeming to speake the sense of the Army, under the notion of many thousand Godly men who had ventured their lives to subdue their enemies) said after this manner, The King had denied safety and protection to His people by denying the foure Bills: That subjection to Him was but in lieu of His protection to His people; this being denied, they might well deny any more subjection to Him, and settle the Kingdome without Him: That it was now expected, after so long patience, they should shew their Resolution, and not desert those Valiant men who had engaged for them beyond all possibility of retreat, and would never forsake the Parliament, unlesse the Parliament forsook them first.17

This account of Ireton’s comments hints at his constitutional thinking. Ireton supposedly remarked that Charles had broken his ‘covenant’ with the people and this meant that they could proceed ‘to settlement without him’. It is very possible, given Walker’s animosity to both Cromwell and Ireton, that he may have overstated their public antagonism to Charles. Walker, however, may even have based his account on the words, probably drafted by Ireton, in the Declaration of 9 January 1648, specifically the phrase ‘settle the Kingdome without Him’. The fact that Ireton could produce and publicly support such an army document tends to suggest that he would not have had any trouble articulating in the Commons such an idea as attributed to him by Walker. Furthermore, Ireton’s supposed comments do mirror some of his statements made at Putney where he argued that there was a covenant between kings and their people.18 It is also to be expected that he would hold such a position by January 1648 due to Charles’ engagement with the Scots. Ireton’s concept of the ‘trust’ reposed in Charles was to be more fully developed later in the year in the Remonstrance. That Ireton had become more openly antagonistic to Charles is, however, more reliably shown in a document that emerged from the army on 9 January 1648, A DECLARATION from Sir Thomas Fairfax and the General Council of the Army, of their Resolutions to adhere to the Parliament in their Proceedings concerning the King.19 Woolrych attributes the authorship of this to Ireton which, given Ireton’s input in previous army declarations, is probable. Its tone reinforces Woolrych’s claim. He argues that ‘the style reads like Ireton’s: the long-breathed periods, the powerful chain of argument, the well-placed emphases, and the pervading whiff of self-righteousness all recall his known compositions’.20 Self-righteousness was certainly part of Ireton’s character but it was also a necessary collorary of justification by providence.

17

Clement Walker, Anarchia Anlicana: OR, THE HISTORY OF INDEPENDENCY, 2 vols (1648–49), I, pp. 71–2; Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p. 88; Gentles, NMA, p. 237; CJ, V, pp. 415–16; D.E. Underdown, ‘The Parliamentary Diary of John Boys, 1647–8’, Historical Research, 39 (1966), pp. 155–7. 18 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 259–64. 19 Rushworth, Historical Collections, Part IV, II, p. 962. 20 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, pp. 320–1. 121

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A Declaration warned those in Parliament who still considered negotiating with Charles, reiterating some of Cromwell’s supposed comments in the Commons six days earlier. Indeed, it reflected Ireton’s own supposed comments in Parliament that the army ‘would never forsake the Parliament, unlesse the Parliament forsook them first’.21 In A Declaration Ireton argued that settlement with the King could not be at the expense of ‘those great and more obliging publick interests of religion, and the rights, liberties and safety of the Kingdom, and not otherwise’.22 This is mirrored later in the Remonstrance of November 1648, that religion and rights overrode obedience to a King. In considering the Remonstrance’s key passages Ireton’s focus on ‘Salus populi, solus Rex’ and his brutal attack on the King is also implied in the January Declaration: Notwithstanding the high Violation of the Kingdom’s Rights and Liberties, and the Endeavours to swallow up the whole Interest of the Kingdom’s, into the Power and the Will of the King . . . [we] hath yet Enacted with that Tenderness towards the King . . . [we] abundantly demonstrated the Reality and Innocency of their Intentions towards him: In all which we have still understood the Sence and Intention to be no other, than the Preservation of the King’s Person and particular Rights should be so endeavoured as it might be consistent with, and not destructive to those great and more obliging Publick Interests of Religion, and the Rights, Liberties and Safety of the Kingdom, and not otherwise. . . . Now in the Parliament’s Last Address to the King, we find they have insisted only upon some few things, so essential to that Interest of the Kingdom, which they have hitherto engaged for; as that without betraying the Safety of the Kingdom and themselves, and all that engaged with them in that Cause; without denying that which God in the Issue of this War hath been such a Testimony unto, they could not go lower, and (those things granted) they have offered to treat for all the rest. Thus we account that great Business of a Settlement to the Kingdom . . . (upon the King’s Denial of those things) we can see no further Hopes of Settlement or Security that way. . . . We do freely and unaniomously declare for our selves and the Army, that we are resolved, through the Grace of God, firmly to adhere with and stand by the Parliament in the things voted on Monday last concerning the King, [vote of no addresses] and in what shall be further necessary for Prosecution thereof, and for the setling and securing of the Parliament and Kingdom without the King and against him, or any other that shall hereafter pertake with him.23

21

Clement Walker, Anarchia Anlicana: OR, THE HISTORY OF INDEPENDENCY, 2 vols (1648–49), I, pp. 71–2. 22 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, pp. 320–1. 23 Rushworth, Historical Collections, VII, p. 962. Similar sentiments focused on the phrase, ‘settlement of the nation without and against the King’ appeared in the petition presented to the Army Council on 11 November 1648 by three or four regiments (Fleetwood’s, Whalley’s, Barkstead’s and Rich’s), see BL, E470(32), A Petition from Severall Regiments of the Army; E472(3), THE REPRESENTATIONS AND Consultations of the Generall Councell of the ARMIE at St Albans (7 Nov. 1648). I would like to thank Norah Carlin for her advice 122

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The prospect of renewed bloodshed, made imminent following Charles’ escape and engagement with the Scots in December 1647, and the political pressure in the army, had been central in moving Cromwell and Ireton from the position they held at Putney to that articulated in January 1648 in the Declaration, and possibly in the Commons. This came after Ireton had exposed himself to recrimination within the army through his direct negotiations with Charles over the Heads. In the Declaration there appeared to be a recognition of the fact that the army’s attempts to preserve a form of mixed monarchy had foundered on Charles’ intransigence. Ireton felt that he had attempted ‘all the wayes that are possible to preserve’ monarchy.24 He believed that he had ‘abundantly demonstrated the Reality and Innocency of their Intentions towards’ Charles.25 This personal bitterness reinforced the impression that Goffe’s words at Putney had made on Ireton.26 This religious pressure to which they had been subjected to at Putney, but no doubt throughout the period, must have been very telling, coming as it did from close comrades. Settlement of the ‘Kingdom without the King and against him’ meant that Ireton would seek to construct a settlement to be imposed on the King without negotiation and one in which there would be clear limits on Charles’ powers.

II In April 1648 with the immediate renewed threat of war the army sought to invigorate itself again through prayer and in so doing made it clear that the King would be judged. Ireton was one of the officers who led the army in prayer at their Windsor meeting in late April 1648.27 Heath deemed him to be ‘absolutely the best Prayer-maker and Preacher in the Army’.28 In November 1648 Colonel Edward Whalley wanted Ireton to ‘pray with him’.29 A royalist interpretation of the Windsor prayer meeting argued that Ireton and Cromwell made ‘such sweet music as the heavens never before knew’ to bend the army

with regard to Ireton and this petitioning campaign and for allowing me to read a draft of her article, ‘Petitions and Revolution in England, September 1648 – January 1649’, p. 22. 24 Clarke Papers, I, p. 233. 25 Rushworth, Historical Collections, VII, p. 962. 26 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 374–5. 27 Morrill has indicated how Cromwell may have been an underground preacher in the 1630s and it is likely that both Cromwell and Ireton preached during their time controlling Ely and that this continued through their time in the army. See Morrill, ‘Rewriting Cromwell’, p. 565. For a satire of Cromwell preaching see Aaron Guerdon, A Most Learned, Conscientious and Devout Exercise (June 1649). For comment on this see Morrill (ed.), Cromwell, pp. 265–7; L. Lunger Knoppers, ‘The Politics of Portraiture: Oliver Cromwell and the Plain Style’, Renaissance Quarterly, 51: 4 (1998). 28 Heath, Flagellum, p. 124. 29 Bodleian Library, Mss Eng.d.2406 fols 13–14. 123

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to their will. Rushworth naturally recorded the episode somewhat differently, writing that among the officers, as a result of the prayer meeting, there was ‘a sweet harmony’.30 There can be no doubt that the prayer meetings did serve a political end in bringing the army together. This was the aim of such meetings and had always been part of the character of the New Model. Cook indicated the binding nature of army prayer meetings, writing of ‘a Noble Generall and valiant Commanders that had encountred with Lyons and walls of brasse, toyle groveling upon their knees, and pouring forth fervent prayers (the breath and voice of God in them) asking counsell from heaven’.31 Prayer meetings were a normal preparation for political meetings and battles.32 Rather than deliberate manipulation by Cromwell and Ireton it is not inconceivable that the search for God’s purpose did foster unity. Given the characters of Cromwell and Ireton and the real religious drive within a core of the New Model Army, it must be stressed that the Windsor prayer meeting, as with such previous collective introspections, was once more vital in confirming to the army its favour from God.33 The meeting reflected adversely on the person of the King, a debate which, as Barber states, gave ‘an apocalyptic expression of biblical exegesis’.34 Prayer gave the army the will to come to the decision that if they were victorious against their enemies they would call Charles Stuart ‘that man of blood, to an account for that blood he had shed, and mischief he had done to his utmost, against the Lord’s Cause and People in these poor Nations’.35 It should be remembered that William Allen, the source of this statement, was writing in 1659 to rally unity to the ‘Good Old Cause’ by recalling the heady days of 1648. With regard to Cromwell’s thinking it has been stressed how cautiously Allen should be used.36 Nevertheless, the impression Allen gives of a general unity among the men at Windsor at this juncture can be

30

Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 316; Gentles, NMA, p. 230; Rushworth, Historical Collections, Part IV, II, p. 943; Clarendon State Papers, II, appendix, p.xliv. Morrill has shown how Cromwell himself might have acted as an underground preacher in the 1630s; see Morrill, ‘Rewriting Cromwell’, p. 565; Gaunt, Cromwell, p. 92. The actual presence of Cromwell and Ireton is not clearly documented. Cromwell was certainly there on the 29th but it is not clear exactly where he was on the 28th and 30th. Nevertheless, given the nature of army prayer meetings, and certainly in the context of 1648, it is most likely that both men were there for the duration of the prayer meeting. 31 Cook, Union of Hearts, p. 68. 32 Bodleian Library, Mss Eng.d.2406 fols 13–14. 33 For the importance of religion for the New Model see Gentles, NMA, ch. 4. 34 Barber, Regicide and Republicanism, p. 96. 35 Kennedy, English Revolution, p. 99 from William Allen, A Faithful Memorial of that Remarkable Meeting of Many Officers of the Army in England at Windsor Castle, in the Year 1648 (27 April 1659) from Somers Tracts, VI, pp. 500–1. Allen’s account is also at BL, E979(3). 36 Morrill and Baker, ‘Zeruiah’, p. 25. I would like to thank Norah Carlin for her comments on how Allen has been used. 124

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accepted. Gentles views Allen’s account as ‘basically trustworthy’, as this ‘was plainly one of the most vivid and meaningful experiences of his life, and he may well have jotted down some notes on it shortly after it occurred’.37 For Worden, ‘Allen’s document, despite its late appearance, is likely to be broadly reliable’.38 Woolrych also believes that ‘Allen’s account can be taken as probably a fair representation, blurred by a fallible memory, of the impressions of those meetings carried by a political and religious enthusiast’. It may also be generally accepted, for it ‘is easy to believe that feeling in the army was running very strongly against the King by the end of April’.39 Ireton, Cromwell and Harrison, who had lived, fought and prayed together for a period of five years, joined in prayer at Windsor in April 1648. They did so in the knowledge that they had to go into battle against a foreign Scottish invading army, Englishmen who they had previously fought alongside within the context of a population generally hostile to them. In November 1648 Cromwell wrote of Charles’ attempt to ‘vassalize us to a foreign Nation’ and of ‘their fault who have appeared in this Summer’s business is certainly double theirs who were in the first, because it is the repetition of the same offence against all the witnesses that God has borne’.40 It may not have been openly stated but all knew that the responsibility lay with one man, the ‘chief author’ Charles Stuart. Allen’s account of that moment in April 1648, when Ireton and Cromwell were at one with a cry to call ‘to an account’ Charles Stuart as a ‘man of blood’, should not be too readily dismissed. Woolrych saw a: Strong consensus, with no explicit dissent, but not necessarily that the officers entered formally and unanimously into a binding pledge to bring the King to trial. To assume the latter makes it needlessly difficult to explain why Ireton had so much difficulty in getting the officers to support a demand for capital proceedings in November, even after all the bloodshed of the second Civil War.41

The projection of Charles Stuart as ‘that man of blood’ had first arisen from the comments made by Captain George Bishop at Putney. Men such as Thomas Harrison appeared to have had a literal interpretation of Numbers 35: 33: ‘for blood it defileth the land: and the land cannot be cleansed of the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it.’ Gentles has referred

37

Gentles, NMA, p. 510n.33. Worden, ‘Achan’, p. 44 n.16. 39 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, pp. 333–5. 40 Abbott, I, pp. 691–2; Ashton, Counter-revolution, p. 423; Smith, History of the British Isles, p. 159. 41 Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, p. 335; Gardiner, Civil War, IV, p. 120. Gardiner argued that Cromwell agreed with calling Charles to account ‘in momentary exaltation of spirit . . . many months had still to pass before he could throw himself heart and soul into the course to which the resolution of his fellow soldiers deliberately pointed’. 38

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to Harrison as ‘intent on destroying the King’.42 Ireton and Cromwell still saw a calling ‘to an account’ as more focused on imposing on Charles a settlement with the broadest support possible, as declared in the January 1648 Declaration, ‘without the King and against him’.43 They were still unsure of the most politic means by which Charles could be dealt with. Underdown’s argument, that the outcome of the Windsor prayer meeting meant that the army ‘was out of hand; Cromwell and Ireton could no longer control it even if they wished’, is overstated.44 The Windsor prayer meeting had brought the army together in deciding that Charles was a ‘man of blood’. For Worden the army ‘recovered its unity and fire’.45 Nevertheless, Ireton, Cromwell and the officers were subjected to others who believed, and wanted them to believe, that God had different intentions from the path they appeared to have embarked upon. Their political pragmatism also opened them up to doubt and even ‘self-deception’ in their search for providence as to the King’s ultimate fate.46 Settlement would be ‘without him’ but something had to be done with Charles. Walker even argued that Ireton and Cromwell in April 1648 supported a call for the deposing of Charles, disinheriting of his eldest son and the crowning of the Duke of York.47 William Sedgwick reminded them of how in December 1647 John Saltmarsh, Fairfax’s former army chaplain, had approached the army at Windsor to communicate a vision. He urged one of the ‘Adjutators’ to ‘depart from these Tents, lest you perish with them, for the Lord hath revealed to me, that he is very angry with this Army, because they have forsaken Him’.48 Saltmarsh delivered his vision directly to Fairfax, Cromwell and Ireton. It had a real ‘impact’ on them.49 Their doubts revolved around the process needed to bring about settlement. The crucial question remained whether the army constituted God’s agency for his purpose. Victory in battle placed the army in a position to act against Parliament and to judge Charles with the confidence that such action was divinely sanctioned. Victory in the second civil war confirmed for Ireton that Charles should die.

42

NewDNB Harrison entry by Ian Gentles. Rushworth, Historical Collections, Part IV, II, p. 962. 44 Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p. 96. Gentles has commented that ‘the army was as united in the summer of 1648 as it had been in 1645’, NMA, p. 511n.53. 45 Worden, ‘Achan’, p. 45. I would like to thank Alasdair Dick for this reference. 46 Morrill and Baker, ‘Zeruiah’, p. 14. 47 Gardiner, Civil War, IV, p. 99n.4. 48 BL, E536(16), William Sedgwick, Mr William Sedgwick’s Letter to his Excellency Thomas Lord Fairfax, Generall of the Parliaments Forces, in prosecution of his Answer to the Remonstrance of the Army (1648); BL, E421(16), John Saltmarsh, Wonderfull PREDICTIONS DECLARED In a MESSAGE, as from the LORD, To his Excellency SR THOMAS FAIRFAX and the Councell of His Army (29 Dec. 1647), p. 3; Morrill (ed.), Cromwell, p. 269n.34, ‘Sedgewick had been town preacher at Ely since 1644 and therefore may have been well known to Cromwell’, and thus to Ireton. 49 Gentles, NMA, p. 229. 43

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III After some initial engagements in Kent Ireton assumed a central role during the second civil war alongside Fairfax, conducting the siege of Colchester.50 For Clarendon, Ireton ‘was left by Cromwell to watch the general as well as the army’.51 Ireton ‘compared the town and those therein to a great beehive, and our army to a small swarm of bees sticking on one side of it’.52 As with the fighting elsewhere in 1648 the siege was marked by its brutality, including reports that the besieged had used poisoned bullets.53 Fairfax also denied the town water and announced that ‘justice must be done on such exemplary offenders who have embroiled the kingdom in a second bloody war’.54 Colchester surrendered on 27 August 1648 as a result of Cromwell and Lambert’s crushing defeat of Hamilton’s invading Scottish force at Preston.55 In the wake of such a bitter siege the New Model meted out punitive justice against leading royalists remaining in Colchester. Those who sought to construct Ireton’s Machiavellian image have attributed the execution of Lucas and Lisle, the leaders of royalist resistance at Colchester, to the CommissaryGeneral. Clarendon in particular commented that ‘Ireton’s hatred was immortal’.56 At the time a certain Matthew Carter emphasised Ireton’s role.57 Taft has also stated that the executions were ‘supervised by an implacable Ireton’.58 Fairfax, however, fully endorsed the executions because, as Ashton has observed, they were ‘perfectly in line with existing military codes of conduct’.59 Indeed, one pamphlet of the time was strident in placing its blame

50

BL, E522(38), A petition presented to the Lords and Commons, by the royall party in the county of Sussex . . . A totall defeate given to those forces in Kent, under Sir Richard Hardress at Feversham . . . by Ireton (1648). 51 Clarendon, Rebellion, XI, p. 62, IV, p. 359. 52 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 197. 53 BL, E458(4), The Colchester spie. Truly informing the kingdome of the estate of that gallant town, and the attempts of Fairfax against it (1648); BL, E455(16), Colchesters teares; affecting and afflicting city and country; dropping from the sad face of a new earr, threatning to bury in her own ashes that wofull town (1648); Z. Grey, An Impartial Examination of Mr. Daniel Neal’s History of the Puritans, 4 vols (1734–39), 3, pp. 131–2. 54 Gentles, NMA, p. 256. 55 Ireton acted as a negotiator of the surrender terms, BL, Perfect Diurnall, no.266 (28 Aug.–4 Sept. 1648), p. 2142; BL, E461(15), Colchester surrendred to the Lord Generall with the manner of the agreement (1648). 56 Clarendon, Rebellion, XI, p. 262, IV, p. 507. 57 Matthew Carter, A most true and exact relation of that as honourable as unfortunate expedition of Kent, Essex, and Colchester by M.C., a loyal actor in that engagement, Anno Dom. 1648, [1650], C662, p. 195. Another contemporary placed the blame for the deaths of Lucas and Lisle on Thomas Rainsborough; see S. Sheppard, The Famous Tragedie of King Charles I. Basely Butchered (1649). 58 Taft, ‘Ireton’, p. 189; Clarke Papers, II, pp. 31–9. 59 Gentles, NMA, p. 256; Ashton, Counter-revolution, p. 438; Markham, Fairfax, pp. 328–33. 127

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equally on Fairfax and Ireton as ‘the joynt contrivers, and designers of the late cruel execution of his Majesties and Kingdomes two loyall Subjects at Colchester’.60 Another royalist pamphlet, which sought to place Lucas in the most positive light, portrayed Ireton as deferring repeatedly to Fairfax’s authority.61 One pamphlet clearly blamed Fairfax.62 In his own self-serving memoirs he in turn sought to excuse himself.63 Cromwell had the leaders of the revolt in South Wales tried and convicted, with one being executed in London.64 Gardiner has argued that Cromwell left Poyer to the justice of Parliament whereas Ireton used military justice at Colchester.65 Ireton gave evidence at the trial of Capel who had surrendered at Colchester.66 He too was executed. Ireton may indeed have been ‘implacable’ but, in response to the renewed bloodshed, so was the whole army leadership. Donagan has written that what ‘happened after Colchester and Pontefract . . . signalled a harsher response and a novel and dangerous erosion of soldiers’ protection’.67 The treatment the army felt justified in enacting against its defeated enemies from this second civil war was reflected in its hardened attitude to the monarch who had brought about the renewed bloodshed and should have warned Charles of the harder line that would be taken with him. 68 Ireton supposedly commented to Lucas, one of the leaders of the second civil war, ‘Know, your self as all others that engage a second time against the Parliament are traitors and rebells, and they doe employ us as soldiers by authority from them to suppresse and destroy’.69 Ireton’s supposed comments would imply justice against the King. It was claimed that ‘with their late successes in the

60

BL, E462(30), The Cruell Tragedy Or Inhumane Butchery, of Hamor and Shechem, with other their Adherents. Acted by Simeon and Levi, in Shechem, a City in Succoth a County or Lordship in Canaan. Lately revived and reacted heere in England, by Fairfax and Ireton, upon the persons of Sir Charles Lucas and Sir George Lisle, in Colchester (28 Aug. 1648), p. 5. For another example of how the whole army leadership were blamed see BL, 669 fol. 13(20), An elegie on the death of Sir Charls Lucas and Sir George Lisle (1648). 61 An account of the death of Sir Charles Lucas &c, in Clarke Papers, II, pp. 35–7. 62 BL, 669 fol. 13(15), An elegie on the death of that most noble and herocik knight, Sir charles Lucas governour of Colchester, and generall of the Essexian forces, who was murthered by the excellent rebell Fairfax, the day on which colchester was surrendered, August 27. 1648 (1648). 63 Short Memorial of Thomas Lord Fairfax (1699), pp. 449–50. For Fairfax’s manipulation of his memoirs see B. Donagan, ‘Atrocity, War Crime, and Treason in the English Civil War’, American Historical Review, 99: 4 (1994), p. 1158n.69. 64 Morrill and Baker, ‘Zeruiah’, p. 34 fn.53. 65 Gardiner, Civil War, IV, pp. 205–6. 66 BL, E527(21), Perfect Occurences, no.111 (9–16 Feb. 1649), pp. 842–3; BL, E527(23), Perfect Summary, no.4 (12–19 Feb. 1649), p. 27. 67 Donagan, ‘Atrocity, War Crime, and Treason’, p. 1155–6. 68 Kennedy, English Revolution, p. 110. 69 Clarke Papers, I, p. 35. This comes from An account of the death of Sir Charles Lucas &c., the original of which, writt with my owne Fathers’ hand, I gave Sir Thomas Clarges; P. Jones, The Siege of Colchester 1648 (Stroud, 2003), pp. 135–6. 128

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North, they begin to fly high, both against his Majesty and the Houses, and all that wish well to the [Newport] Treaty’.70 The Army Council voted to ‘acquiesce to the result of the Treaty’ but, according to Gardiner, had their own ‘indispensable conditions’.71 This reads more like a reference to the current discussions of the Remonstrance between the officers at St Albans rather than a separate settlement as implied by Gardiner. At a meeting at the Bull’s Head tavern officers ‘debated many excellent things tending to peace’. 72 The determination of the army to ensure that settlement addressed their concerns is implied in Ireton’s words to Robert Hammond, the King’s gaoler: it hath pleased God (and we are persuaded in much mercy) even miraculously to dispose the hearts of your friends in the Army, as one man (together with the concurrence of the godly from all parts) to interpose in this treaty, yet is such wise, both for matter and manner, as we believe, will not only refresh the bowels of the Saints, and all other faithful people of his kingdom; but be of satisfaction to every honest member of Parliament, when tendered to them, and made public; which will be within a few days.73

Charles’ continued duplicity needs to be set in the context of how far Ireton had exposed himself through his negotiations with the King on the basis of the Heads. Ireton’s anger derived from a genuine sense of betrayal. The actual fighting of the second civil war also confirmed for Ireton the divine justification of his animus against Charles. God had again blessed the New Model, and in doing so confirmed Charles’ guilt through ‘the Issue of War’.74 Ireton had long held that God would indicate through victory in war the justness of the cause. In 1642 he had stated that the struggle would be decided by ‘God or the sword’.75 Cromwell saw the victory at Preston as: 70

BL, E466(11), Mercurius Pragmaticus, no.28 (3–10 Oct. 1648), n. p., quote from Saturday, 7 October. 71 BL, E472(9), Packets of Letters, no.35 (14 Nov. 1648), p. 6; Gardiner, Civil War, IV, pp. 237–8, 241–2; BL, Add Mss 17677 fol. 283. The 16 November conditions the Council of Officers were, supposedly, to put to Charles included an end to the present Parliament, biennial Parliaments, improved distribution of seats, Council of State militia, great officers of the Crown appointed by Parliament for ten years by Charles from three names supplied by Parliament. Gardiner argued that ‘Although Ireton had consented to the transmission of these proposals to Newport it is most unlikely that he anticipated anything else than their summary rejection’. 72 BL, E472(9), Packets of Letters, no.35 (14 Nov. 1648), p. 3. 73 Hammond Letters, pp. 87–8. 74 Rushworth, Historical Collections, Part IV:II, p. 962. 75 HMC Hastings, II, pp. 83–4. The Mr Hastings referred to was Henry Hastings, second son of Henry, 5th Earl of Huntingdon. He was appointed to the commissions of array for Derbyshire and Leicestershire and became Colonel General of Leicestershire, Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire and Rutland. He was in the garrison of Colchester in 1648 which was besieged by Ireton but escaped and went into hiding. See Newman, Royalist Officers, pp. 179–80. 129

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nothing but the hand of God, and wherever anything in this world is exalted, or exalts itself, God will pull it down, for this is the day wherein He alone will be exalted . . . exalt Him, and not hate His people, who are as the apple of His eye, and for whom even Kings shall be reproved; they that are implacable and will not leave troubling the Land may be speedily destroyed out of the land.76

This could not be anything but a reference to Charles. The King had to be ‘reproved’, for he had shown himself to be ‘implacable’ in ‘troubling the Land’. Cromwell wanted him ‘destroyed’. ‘Ireton was no temporizer’; Ireton sought to do it.77

IV The experience of the second civil war further radicalised Ireton. He wrote from Windsor on 27 September 1648 a ‘longe’ letter resigning from the army.78 Its length may be attributed to Ireton’s natural tendency to verbosity but also to the ‘reasons’ he gave. The author of Mercurius Pragmaticus argued that the negotiations between Charles and Parliament explained ‘the true cause, why Ireton left the Head-Quarters, and retired to Windsor’.79 Ireton’s ‘reasons’ would most likely have included reference to the need to purge Parliament, rebuild links with the Levellers, strip the monarchy of any significant power and for justice to be enacted on Charles. Ireton believed that Charles should die and that a trial would secure this. The ‘reasons’ may account for the fact that the letter has not survived. His letter was a political statement of intent. Lilburne argued that Ireton ‘pretended to lay down his commission’.80 It is possible that Ireton’s ‘resignation’ may have been a way to put pressure on Fairfax by showing how strongly he held his views. To do this he would have had to have felt confident that his Commander was unlikely to accept his resignation. Ireton’s resignation was ‘not agreed unto’ by Fairfax.81 This of course raises the question that if Fairfax felt so out of line with Ireton and Cromwell why did he not take advantage of this situation? He may have felt that he could not do without his Commissary-General. Putney indicated quite clearly that the army contained more dangerous men than Ireton. Indeed Ireton had kept these men in check. Care is also needed with a picture of

76

Abbott, I, p. 638. Gentles, NMA, p. 266. 78 Clarke Mss 114 fol. 80. This has the only detail we have. The full content is ‘Comissary Genall Ireton wrote a longe Lre to ye Lord Fairfax with reasons for his laying downe his Comission & desiring a Discharge from the Army, wch was nott agreed unto. v[id]e Lres/Dated 27. Septr.’. 79 BL, E466(11), Mercurius Pragmaticus, no.28 (3–10 Oct. 1648). 80 Clarke Papers, II, p. 258, Lilburne, Legal and Fundamental Liberties. 81 Clarke Mss 114 fol. 80. 77

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Fairfax seriously at odds with Cromwell and Ireton. They had different political and religious perspectives but they appeared to be willing to work together to establish a framework for settlement. Part of this may also have come from Fairfax being unsure of the policy of his subordinates towards the King, for when ‘it came to political scheming he was like a lamb among wolves’.82 Both Cromwell and Ireton recognised that they needed to proceed with as broad support as possible and may have privately appeased Fairfax. By this stage Ireton believed that Charles could not be forced to come to terms but there could be no policy in stating that the King would, rather than should, die. As Gentles has argued: By the end of November 1648 the key senior officers had decided that the King . . . must die. I interpret their apparent efforts to negotiate with the King as an elaborate ruse to divert and neutralize moderates such as Warwick, Whitelocke, and Fairfax.83

Some of these ‘apparent efforts’ may also have been for Cromwell’s benefit who, befitting other episodes in his career, found himself torn between political conservatism and religious radicalism. As well as a statement of intent, Ireton’s resignation may also have been indicative of a need, as much as Cromwell, for God’s direction in the face of Parliament’s continuing determination to treat with the King. Kishlansky has argued that Ireton and Cromwell’s offer to withdraw at Putney had been sincere and sets their actions in the context of the ‘process of humbling individual will and identifying God’s will’. He refers appropriately to Ireton’s comment at Putney that ‘whatever I find the work of God tending to, I should desire quietly to submit to’.84 Ireton’s September resignation may also have been a genuine desire to remove himself from the army and thus the politics of settlement out of frustration with others’ denial of God’s will. Providential thinking, as Walsham shows, could produce ‘debilitating despair’.85 Ireton, and 82 NewDNB Fairfax entry by Ian Gentles. See also the comment in Gardiner, Civil War, IV, p. 216n.1, from a communication by Firth: ‘Can it be that Fairfax proposed standing by the treaty, that Ireton then proposed to resign – that Fairfax then promised, in order to induce Ireton to withdraw his resignation, to demand certain specified securities from the King – that Ireton accordingly withdrew it, and retired to Windsor to watch the progress of negotiation, returning to headquarters after it failed?’ ‘Mr Firth also suggests that Ireton may have obtained the consent of the extreme party to delay by representing to them that Fairfax would ultimately join them, and that his resignation was caused by the discovery that Fairfax insisted on defending the treaty made by the Houses with the King whatever it might be’. 83 Ian Gentles’ review of D. Scott, Politics and War in the Three Stuart Kingdoms, 1637–1649 (2004), at www.h-net.org/reviews. 84 M. Kishlansky, ‘Consensus Politics and the Structure of Debate at Putney’, Journal of British Studies, 20 (1981), pp. 58–9. 85 A. Walsham, Providence in Early Modern England (Oxford, 1999), p. 17.

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those close to him, would have reflected on God’s design for them and the kingdom at this time. Ireton would have conducted this period of religious self-examination with Cromwell, Peter, Rich and ‘a Fifth Person’, as well as his wife Bridget, who stayed with her husband in his lodgings at a Mr Starkey’s house in Windsor. It appears to have reinvigorated Ireton. His attitude shifted ‘from near despair to resolution’.86 He now pushed ahead with dragging others to his process for settlement.87 In this period he began, in conjunction with Cromwell, Peter, Rich and the ‘Fifth Person’, to formulate the Remonstrance. They met together as a political and religious support group. Ireton now sought to enact the settlement ‘without’ reference to Charles that he had called for in general terms in the January 1648 Declaration. In order to do so, however, Ireton, ever the political realist, needed to rebuild the links with the Levellers that had been fractured at Putney. Moreover, he needed to maintain those links with the army’s allies in Parliament, while at the same time seeking to maintain control over the army. This is the practical political context in which he constructed the Remonstrance.

V Ireton reputedly stated that it was ‘high time’ to ‘clear the House again . . . with a new purge of impeachment’.88 The army, particularly Fairfax, needed to be persuaded of this, or acquiesce in Ireton’s plans. The subsequent petitioning campaign which applied such pressure appeared to some contemporaries to have had Ireton as its director.89 Carlin however has argued that though ‘there can be little doubt that some commanders encouraged and perhaps even initiated the petitioning campaign, the texts produced seem to represent the opinions and activities of literally subaltern strata of the army, rather than the machinations of a leadership faction’.90 The petitions represent a range of opinion in the army. They indicate that Ireton had moved more in line with

86

Gentles, NMA, p. 267. State Trials, II, p. 359. At this point Cromwell stressed in a letter to Oliver St John that he should turn to Isaiah 8, and he no doubt had similar scriptual advice for Ireton to turn to. See Abbott, I, pp. 644–5. For comment on Cromwell’s use of Isaiah see Morrill and Baker, ‘Zeruiah’, pp. 27–8. For the frequent use of Isaiah at a wider level at this time see Barber, Regicide and Republicanism, pp. 107–9. 88 BL, E465(19), Mercurius Pragmaticus (26 Sept.–3 Oct. 1648). 89 BL, E466(11), Mercurius Pragmaticus (3–10 Oct. 1648), sig pp. 6; BL, 669 fol. 13, A Copie of Two Letters Sent from Divers Officers of the Army in the North to his Excellency Thomas Lord Fairfax (October 1648); BL, E473(23), Two Petitions Presented to His Excellency the Lord Fairfax (24 Nov. 1648); Peacey, Pamphlets and Propaganda, p. 253. 90 Carlin, ‘Petitions’, p. 21. 87

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the radicals in the army. Carlin’s view of a more representative petitioning campaign indicates the dangerous pressure to which Fairfax and Parliament had been subjected. Orders to disperse Ireton’s regiments across Surrey, Sussex and Hampshire were rejected and the regiment petitioned Fairfax on 16 October 1648. 91 Underdown has argued that it ‘is inconceivable that this petition can have been presented without Ireton’s encouragement, likely indeed that he was himself its author; it therefore marks the beginning of his campaign to make Fairfax and his fellow officers accept the risks of purposeful action’. 92 The interaction between Ireton and his officers and men in the constructing of this petition is clouded, as with all of the politics of the army since 1647.93 Carlin believes it is unlikely that Ireton was strictly the petition’s ‘author’. Yet it is surely likely that he was, as Underdown believed, involved in its appearance in some form. Royalists believed that Ireton was behind the petition and referred to him as a ‘devil’.94 If, as seems possible, he did play some role in its appearance, duplicity would enable him to use his regiment to put more direct pressure on Fairfax than he could officially countenance. A newspaper report believed that the views of Ireton’s regiment should be seen as reflective of the whole army.95 Carlin’s study indicates that this was not strictly the case. The first point of the petition of Ireton’s regiment called for justice on the rebels in Kent and Wales. Carlin’s study of sixty-seven petitions indicates that Ireton’s regiment was one of the few that accused Charles of blood-guilt.96 Point 2 stated that: the King hath betrayed the trust reposed in him, and raised War against the Nation to enslave it, violating his Oaths and trampling under foot our Laws . . . he is guilty of all the blood-shed in these intestine Wars. . . . There is yet a prevalent party of his Creatures, who in Parliament, and elsewhere, act his Designe, and endeavor to re-inthrone him.

In detailing this idea the petition stated that: impartial and speedy Justice may be done upon all criminal persons, and especially upon such as have or shall endeavor to obstruct the course thereof, or have betrayed

91

BL, E468(35), Mercurius Militaris, no.2 (10–17 Oct. 1648), pp. 11–12. Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p. 117. 93 Carlin, ‘Petitions’, pp. 7, 15. 94 BL, E476(11), Independency Stript & Whipt. Or, Iretons Petition, And the Royal Proiect, Examined and Confuted (1648). For comment on this see N. Smith, Literature and Revolution, p. 110. 95 BL, E468(24), The Moderate Intelligencer, no.15 (17–24 Oct. 1648), p. 126. 96 Carlin, ‘Petitions’, pp. 15–16. 92

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their Trust, or bin Authors of shedding that innocent blood, which calls to Heaven for Vengeance, that so we may be at peace with God.97

Whitelocke deemed this to be ‘a subtle petition, and the beginning of the design against the King’s person, but not discerned till afterwards’.98 The petition’s direct and radical message cannot really be described as ‘subtle’. The execution of Lucas and Lisle set a precedent for Charles, clearly stated in the third point of the petition that ‘the same fault may have the same punishment, in the person of King or Lord, as in the person of the poorest Commoner’.99 The petition also said that all royalists should be regarded as traitors until the King was acquitted of the guilt of shedding innocent blood. The context of such a phrase must be considered. The authors of the petition believed that Charles was guilty and thus he would not be acquitted. Royalists believed that Ireton called for Charles to be killed: ‘they desire speedy Justice may be done upon the King Himself . . . whereby ’tis clear they intend to take away His Majesties life, though under the pretence of justice.’100 Marchamont Nedham believed that Ireton prompted letters and petitions from the Northumberland garrisons to Fairfax:101 It being resolved by them (all as one man) to come and petition their friends in the House, in persuance of the Levellers large Petition; as appears by severall Petitionary Letters (preparatory to their designe) which they have sent up out of the North to the Generall, to invite him to joyne with them, and another gratulatory Letter to the presenters of the late large Petition. It’s said both these divellish Letters had their frame from Ireton, and countenance from his Father Cromwell.102

According to Nedham Ireton directed the petitioning campaign.103 As with the adjutators in 1647, Ireton may not have been directing affairs but it is likely that he had some involvement. Colonel Edward Whalley wrote to Ireton from

97 BL, E468(18), THE TRUE COPY OF A PETITION Promoted in the ARMY, And already presented to His Excellency The Lord General, BY The Officers and Soldiers of the Regiment under the Command of Commissary General Ireton (1648); Another copy in BL, E468(24), The Moderate Intelligencer, no.15 (17–24 Oct. 1648). 98 Whitelocke, Memorials, I (1853), p. 424. 99 BL, E468(18), THE TRUE COPY OF A PETITION Promoted in the ARMY. 100 BL, E476(11), Independency Stript & Whipt. Or, Iretons Petition, And the Royal Proiect, Examined and Confuted (1648), p. 11. 101 BL, E466(11), Mercurius Pragmaticus (3–10 Oct. 1648), sig Pp6; BL, 669 fol. 13, A Copie of Two Letters Sent from Divers Officers of the Army in the North to his Excellency Thomas Lord Fairfax (October 1648); BL, E473(23), Two Petitions Presented to His Excellency the Lord Fairfax (24 Nov. 1648). 102 BL, E466(11), Mercurius Pragmaticus, no.28 (3–10 Oct. 1648), n. p., quote from Saturday, 7 October. 103 BL, E466(11), Mercurius Pragmaticus, no.28 (3–10 Oct. 1648); E467(22), Mercurio Volpone, no.22 (5–12 Oct. 1648), p. 12.

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St Albans on 5 November 1648, ‘Having this Morning with Some other Officers of the Army sought the Lord in Order to the general meeting to morrow, It came cleare upon our spirrits (which we conceive A call from God) to desire your presence without fail’.104 It would seem that Ireton heeded Whalley’s call, since both attended a General Council of the Army on 7 November 1648.105 A petition presented to the Army Council on 11 November at St Albans from the regiments of Whalley, Fleetwood and Barkstead contained the phrase ‘without, and against the King’ which had been used in the 9 January Declaration which was most likely drafted by Ireton.106 It is thus very possible that his arrival in St Albans may have allowed him some form of input into the petition presented on 11 November, and may have been the reason for Whalley’s ‘desire’ for his ‘presence without fail’.107 The letters and petitions outlined opposition to the Newport Treaty and equated Charles with the biblical King Agag.108 Prompted by Balaam’s use of the name in Numbers 24: 7 Agag was King of the Amalekites taken by Saul and, contrary to God’s command, spared. Saul’s disobedience occasioned his rejection by God. In 1 Samuel 15: 24 Saul declares unto Samuel, ‘I have sinned: for I have transgressed the commandment of the LORD, and thy words: because I feared the people, and obeyed their voice’. Samuel wrought justice on Agag: ‘Agag came unto him delicately. And Agag said, Surely the bitterness of death is past. And Samuel said, As thy sword hath made women childless, so shall thy mother be childless among women. And Samuel hewed Agag in pieces before the LORD’ (1 Samuel 15: 32, 33). George Cockayne, preaching in Soper Lane before Ireton’s brother John, also commented on Ahaziah, son of Agag.109 Thought should also be given to how the word justice was employed at the time. Its use seems to have been more in the context of enactment than consideration. The Peoples Eccho called for the malignants (Agags) to be ‘hewn in pieces by the sword of Justice’. The pamphlet referred to malignants in general but implied in the phraseology was an image of Charles as Agag. Agag

104

Bodleian Library, Mss Eng.d.2406 fols 13–14. Clarke Papers, II, pp. 54n, 274, 280. 106 Rushworth, Historical Collections, Part IV:II, p. 962. 107 Bodleian Library, Mss Eng.d.2406 fols 13–14. 108 BL, E473(23), Two Petitions Presented to His Excellency the Lord Fairfax (25 Nov. 1648). A reference to Agag had been used by Thomas Scot in an untitled work from 1627. He wrote that subjects ‘may disobey and refuse an unworthy King’s command and request if it be more than of duty we owe unto him. Yea, gracious subjects ought of duty in their places to discountenance and dishearten graceless tyrants that will not [punish] Agag but in his defence fall out with Parliament and with loans and impositions and exalted services continue to deny right and liberty and to oppress and exhaust the people.’ J. Morrill and C.W. Daniels (eds), Charles I (Cambridge, 1998), p. 23. Scot used it as a reference to Buckingham. 109 Barber, Regicide and Republicanism, p. 106. 105

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after all was the King: ‘Shall not Agag, and the fattest Malignants be only spared against all lawes of justice.’110 A clear message resonated from a variety of documents and had also been stated in the petition of Ireton’s regiment: justice on Charles should be executed or they risked God’s displeasure.111 The political pressure on Fairfax and Parliament from the Northern Association Army and Lambert’s role therein may be indicative of the nature of Ireton’s communication with his own regiment.112 Lambert did not direct his officers. The Declaration of the Officers in Lambert’s Brigade appears to have come out of discussion and voting in the Council of Officers forum in which he directly stated his own position. One of his agents Thomas Margetts informed William Clarke that Lambert: did expresse himself very sweetly and fully, opposing with aboundance of convincing reason all that gainsaid, so that he gave great incouragement and full satisfication to all the well affected, and putt much life and strength to the busines. . . . I believe no man acts in it with more clearnes and satisfaction in point of conscience, nor can give greater life to the thing.113

Margetts voiced concern about the form the Declaration of the northern officers might take when published: It is the greate feare of the well affected, that the Army through some temptation or other may fall off, and not act vigorously, (the former defection breeds iealousy) and so they may be brought in to further mischeif by being engaged with them. And this is also the enemies hope. If in case this declaration be appointed to be printed I beseech you let it be carefully done, and the presse carefully examined and corrected before it be published; and I beseech you also, when they are done, lett a reasonable proportion of them be sent to mee.114

Similar discussions no doubt took place within the structure of Ireton’s and other regiments. Ireton’s inability to be with his troops at all times reinforces Carlin’s argument that, despite the claims of Ireton’s detractors, the regiment’s petition derived from his men. Nevertheless, he probably knew of and approved its contents. Whatever communication he maintained with his regiment may have also seen him play some part in the petition’s wording. It cannot, however, strictly be seen as his petition.

110

BL, E459(25), The Peoples Eccho, p. 12. For comment on the use of Agag see Barber, Regicide and Republicanism, pp. 105–6. 112 BL, E477(10), Declaration of the Officers in Lambert’s Brigade (20 Dec. 1648). This argued that providence justified the army ‘to work in an extraordinary way’; BL, Add Mss, 21417 fol. 40. 113 Clarke Papers, II, p. 70. 114 Clarke Papers, II, p. 70. 111

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One contemporary report claimed that the petition of Ireton’s regiment had been laid aside by Fairfax.115 Another report of proceedings in the army at St Albans on 9 November 1648 stated that a petition from Ireton’s regiment was considered alongside some other army papers.116 Whatever Ireton’s role in his regiment’s petition, what he was composing at the time, the Remonstrance, shows that he was very publicly in almost direct step with his regiment’s pronouncements in relation to Charles. Ireton would have taken note of the feeling of men with whom he had twice defeated the King. The petitioning campaign and the Remonstrance may be seen as one. The Remonstrance was the public political platform of the army but both, resulting from the second civil war, led to a context where Charles could be executed. As Barber has argued: Charles Stuart was the chief delinquent, responsible for the bloodshed, and the general criticism of kingliness and kings turned into a vicious, regicidal attack, homing in on Charles as an individual. It eventually arrived at the most personalised attack possible. Charles was unlike other men, all of whom possessed the sins of the flesh. He was Ahab. He was Nebuchadnezzer. . . . For Charles the writing was on the wall.117

115

BL, E468(33), KWI, no.282 (17–24 Oct. 1648), p. 1128. BL, E472(3), THE REPRESENTATIONS AND Consultations of the Generall Councell of the ARMIE at St Albans (7 Nov. 1648), p. 2. 117 Barber, Regicide and Republicanism, p. 112. 116

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The Remonstrance, 1648

The Remonstrance, drafted principally by Ireton in November 1648, marked the political conclusion of articulating Charles’ guilt and equating him with those royalists who had already been executed. It is likely that Ireton believed Charles should die. Enacting this was, however, rather different. Ireton believed that justification for the regicide existed but he had concerns about the consequences and needed to prepare the framework for its justification, but also a means of proceeding that could take other, less determined men along with him. Deliberately choosing his words with care, rather than the Remonstrance being ‘a mist of circumlocutions’ and ‘dark and vain tautologies’, Ireton facilitated interpretations of justice by others which may have seen the removal of Charles by imprisonment, deposition or exile to maintain the political alliance necessary to bring Charles to trial.1 It is possible that for men like Fairfax, and even Cromwell, the implication of regicide in the Remonstrance may have been regarded as a device to bring Charles to his senses, reinforced by a trial.2 For Ireton the Remonstrance was a justification of regicide.

1 William Sedgwick, Justice Upon the Armie REMONSTRANCE. OR A Rebuke of that evill spirit that leads them in their Counsels and Actions. With a Discovery of the contrariety and enmity in their waies, to the good spirit and minde of God. Dedicated To the Generall, and the Councel of War (1649), pp. 2, 5. This comment applies more directly to Ireton’s dense written style. At this point Sedgwick saw the Remonstrance very negatively. He denounced the army for driving ‘furiously over the necks of the King and Parliament, Lawes, Civenants, Loyalty, Priviledge, and no humane thing can stand before you’. Mr William Sedgwick’s Letter (1648). 2 Burgess is inclined ‘to explain many of these ambiguities [in the Remonstrance] in the same way one might explain the complexities of Cromwell’s position, namely that they resulted from a certainty that the King ought to be brought to capital justice in principle, with an uncertainty about just how far the circumstances of late 1648 and early 1649 would allow things safely to be taken’. G.Burgess ‘Regicide: The Execution of Charles I and English Political Thought’, in R. von Friedeburg (ed.), Murder and Monarchy: Regicide in European History, 1300–1800 (Basingstoke, 2004), p. 219.

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I The nature of the Remonstrance reflected the manner of its composition based on discussions by a core group around Ireton including Cromwell, Rich, possibly Harrison and most notably Peter. A contemporary referring to Peter stated: I look upon you as one of the principall Guides of the Army, and a man that doth from time to time speak very much the sence of the Leaders of the Army because you ly in their Bosoms know their secrets and are much imployed by them to Trumpet abroad their Tenets and Principles.3

Sterns, in his biography of Peter, implied the role he may have had and referred to a report in Mercurius Pragmaticus which stated that the Remonstrance was read: to the amazement of the Members, when they heard the Particulars; which were so spun out with Impertinences, and tedious Repetitions, that instead of a Remonstrance, they had a volume of Nonsence, which took no lesse then 4 houres in reading, in so much that H.Elsyng was glad when he came home to consult with an Apothecary for the mending of his Lung-pipes: yet I’ll undertake, had any but Ireton (one that was bred up to long Indentures) and Hugh Peter (that Pulpit Pantaloon) had the penning of it, it might easily have been comprised in three Sheets.4

In evidence given against Peter at his trial in 1662 a Mr Starkey stated that Ireton’s quarters had been used for the Council of War but also for more informal meetings: I did observe that Cromwell, Ireton, and this Gentleman, Mr. Peter, and one Colonel Rich, and a Fifth Person, whose Name I have forgot, did usually meet and consult together, and would sit up till Two or Three a-Clock in the Morning very privately together; this was the usual Course when their Council of War sat. . . . I was often in Mr. Ireton’s Company, where Mr. Peter coming to him, was very often at Meals there, but especially at Nights. . . . Mr. Peter was the constant Man.5

The late-night meetings between Ireton and Peter continued through to the act of regicide on 30 January 1649. It was from these meetings that the

3

BL, E558(20), Mercurius Pragmaticus, no.7 (29 May – 5 June 1649), p.G2. R.P. Stearns, The Strenuous Puritan, Hugh Peter, 1598–1660 (Urbana, 1954), pp. 322–5; BL, E473(35), Mercurius Pragmaticus, no.35 (21–28 Nov. 1648). 5 State Trials, II, p. 359. This was probably George Starkey of New Windsor, admitted to Grays Inn in 1633 and called to the bar in 1641. Robertson, Cooke, p. 408 n.2. 4

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Remonstrance would have derived in its essentials before some limited reshaping by the army committee established to consider it.6 Was Major-General Thomas Harrison the ‘Fifth Person’ at Windsor? Given that Harrison was also on trial as a regicide the witness, Ireton’s Windsor landlord Mr Starkey should really have remembered if Harrison was the ‘Fifth Person’.7 Care is obviously needed with Starkey’s ‘evidence’ at what in effect were show trials. He appears to have also acted as a witness against John Cook. Yet there is little doubt that a strong bond existed between Ireton, Peter and Harrison. At the time all were regarded as chief proponents of regicide.8 Ireton was close to Harrison at this point. They had known each other since 1643 and spent a lot of time together in late 1648 until the regicide. During this time Harrison would have had some impact upon Ireton’s thinking with regard to the King even if he was not the ‘Fifth Person’. Ireton drafted the Remonstrance in the context of the reality of the problems the army faced and was set upon solving rather than in the luxury of an intellectual and political vacuum. The Remonstrance was part personal manifesto but also part political programme. The separation of the two is complicated by the limited sources in relation to the construction of the document. Although critics attacked the document for being ‘a mist of circumlocutions’ and ‘dark and vain tautologies’, there is within the Remonstrance a core condemnation of Charles. Mazarin wrote that ‘it is inconceivable that subjects should imagine such extraordinary ideas against the King’.9 Ireton called for regicide.10

II Ireton’s Remonstrance11 was drawn up in the period between the offer of his resignation in late September and its submission to the Army Council on 16 6 Clarke Papers, II, p. 54. The membership of the committee persuades me that Ireton’s voice was still dominant, not only due to his overbearing demeanour but as the most senior officer on it. Alongside Ireton on this committee were Colonels Whalley, Constable, Scrope and Ewer, Lt. Col. Kelsey, Adjutant General Evelyn and Captains Cannon and Messervey. What reinforces this is the fact that the committee was only appointed on 16 November, four days before the presentation of the Remonstrance. 7 The Tryall and Condemnation of Mr John Cooke, Sollicitor to the late High-court of Injustice. And Mr Hugh Peter, that carnall Prophet (1660), pp. 11, 13. 8 Robertson, Cooke, p. 176. 9 C.V. Wedgwood, ‘European Reaction to the Death of Charles I’, American Scholar, 34 (1965), p. 436. 10 Gardiner, Civil War, IV, p. 234. Gardiner has argued that ‘such was the language of a man, who having, like Ireton, watched Charles’s acts and words had the penetration to deduce from them correctly the secret workings of his mind’. 11 In what follows Ireton is repeatedly denoted as the author. The Remonstrance came from discussion but it is still valid to see Ireton’s as the dominant hand in the document. This

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November.12 Ireton needed it to be accepted by the Army Council with the formal endorsement of Fairfax.13 He entered negotiations with the Levellers over it. The reference to the Agreement of the People and to the 11 September Large Petition in conjunction with the reforming agenda of the second half of the Remonstrance indicate that he sought to build some bridges with the Levellers.14 Taft has argued that it ‘is probable that Ireton also encouraged Oliver Cromwell, who remained in the north, to instigate the London meetings of Levellers and City Independents in mid-November’.15 Scott has pointed to the incorporation into the Remonstrance of ‘key Leveller positions’ of ‘popular self-government through representatives’ and ‘freedom’ from the negative voice.16 The Remonstrance may have included some Leveller-inspired ideas, yet Ireton had his own about what he deemed important in the document. It is little wonder that men like Lilburne and Wildman regarded him as a hypocrite who had used them for his own ends. At Whitehall, Ireton’s words left him room for manoeuvre with the Levellers and the 11 September

is the consistent view of contemporaries, and Ireton’s subsequent words and actions clearly show his support for it. The full title of the document was A Remonstrance of his Excelleny Thomas Lord Fairfax, Lord Generall of the Parliaments Forces. And of the Generall Councell of Officers held at St.Albans the 16. of November, 1648. Presented to the Commons assembled in Parliament, the 20. instant, and tendred to the Consideration of the whole Kingdome (1648). 12 At the start of November 1648 one of Ireton’s royalist kin complained that he could not furnish the proofs of his surrender at his composition ‘because he gave them to his kinsmen, Commissary General Ireton, who, in regard of weighty engagements in the army, has been unable to present them’. See Calendar of Compounding, p. 1095. 13 D. Scott, Politics and War in the Three Kingdoms, 1637–49 (2004), p. 186. 14 E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 69; Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, p. 464. Gentles has argued that Ireton was the ‘most likely’ author if the claim that a pamphlet from a ‘great commander in the army’, The demands, resolutions and intentions of the army, was true. This could partly have been produced as an approach to the Levellers; see BL, E464(41), Demands, Resolutions and Intentions of the Army (26 Sept. 1648); Gentles, NMA, p. 267; Gentles, ‘Agreement’ in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 157–8. There are some issues with the reading of The demands as an Ireton document. Point 4 of the demands on page 6 argued ‘that matters of Religion bee exempted from all compulsive or restrive power of any authority whatsoever’. If Ireton was the author of this why did his contrary stand to this point at the later Whitehall Debates not provoke comment? The tone of the document and its content also read more as if it was produced by Levellers who wanted it to have the appearance of coming from within the army, ‘Wee the Commanders and Officers of the Army’. Yet it was ‘communicated to all the Free-borne people’ which seems an unlikely phrase for Ireton. The reference to this document coming from a ‘great commander in the army’ derives from the document itself and may just be a political device on the part of the Levellers. If Ireton was the author of this document there are real questions about his employment of such political devices and his relationship with the Levellers. 15 Taft, ‘The Council of Officers’ Agreement of the People, 1648/9’, Historical Journal, 28: 1 (1985), p. 171. 16 J. Scott, Commonwealth Principles. Republican Writing of the English Revolution (Cambridge, 2004). 141

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petition. Ireton argued with regard to the Remonstrance, ‘When wee had desired the whole we did nott insist uppon every particular of itt’. 17 He continued to qualify his support for the Leveller petition in characteristic stubborn fashion: I must clearly minde that Gentleman, that all that is said in the Remonstrance concerning the 11th of September is butt this: when wee have prosecuted our desire concerning justice, and our devices to a generall settlement, and amongst the rest a dissolving of this Parliament, [we then desire] that this Parliament would apply themselves for the remainder of the time to such thinges as are of publique consideration, and lay aside particular matters that have interrupted them hitherto, and for the further time they shall sitt nott medling with private matters, butt consider those thinges that are proper [work] for Parliaments, as reformation of laws, and providing better for the well government of the nation, and hearken to what hath bin offer’d them by persons well-affected for the publique good; and amongst the rest [we mention] that petition of the 11th of September [and we move this as to matters to be taken into consideration, in due time and place, after public justice and the general settlement of the kingdom].18

Ireton hoped that the failure of Parliament’s current negotiations over the Newport Treaty with the King, likely given Charles’ past record, would secure the passage of the Remonstrance through the Army Council.19 In the end Ireton actually achieved apparent unanimous acceptance of it before the collapse of the Newport Treaty on 18 November.20 Some political lobbying had gone on within the Council of Officers at St Albans.21 Fairfax had outwardly agreed to Ireton’s Remonstrance. He may not have been as passive as sometimes portrayed. He did sign the army’s political statements and did not resign until June 1650. Some argued at the time that the Remonstrance was ‘both hatched and penned by his [Cromwell’s] son Ireton against the consent of the General’, but such comments are most likely a reflection of royalist wishes for division among the army.22 Fairfax, and possibly Rich, criticised the Remonstrance, but conceded its unanimous acceptance. Fairfax’s endorsement, despite his concerns, may be seen as another reflection of the army’s consensual approach

17

Clarke Papers, II, pp. 95–6. Clarke Papers, II, p. 96. The ‘Gentleman’ Ireton was responding to was ‘Captain Clarke’, most likely the officer-adjutator John Clarke. 19 Gardiner, Civil War, IV, p. 238. 20 Underdown, Pride’s Purge, pp. 118–20, 123, using some contemporary newsbooks, believed that there were two dissents to the Remonstrance. However, in a letter Fairfax referred to it being agreed ‘unanimously’; see BL, E473(1), The Moderate, no.19 (14–21 Nov. 1648), p. 163; BL, E473(13), Perfect Weekly Account (15–22 Nov. 1648), p. 287; Gentles, NMA, p. 274. 21 Gentles, NMA, p. 272. 22 Gardiner, Civil War, IV, p. 236n.1; Clarendon Mss 2920. 18

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to politics.23 All in the leadership could agree on condemnation of Charles. The document’s scope with regard to the interpretation of justice facilitated different readings and would have provided another reason for its acceptance. The language of the Remonstrance centres on the sovereignty of the people. Ireton justified the army’s political intervention on the basis of Salus populi suprema Lex. Public safety, legal rights and religious freedom overrode obligation to a King, particularly one such as Charles.24 This had also been stressed by Ireton in the January 1648 Declaration, and possibly by Peter in a pamphlet of October 1648. This pamphlet argued that: Laws are lawless that are only calculated for the Kings personal benefit, and not peoples safety, and the truth is, such pleas as those becomes rather the policy of the Prince of this world, that great Abaddon, and destroyer of mankinde, then the just sovereignty of lawfull authority; whose rules are (like its originall author, the great preserver of man and beast) all conducing to the preservation of all, not particular exaltation of any one.25

Ireton used this idea at Whitehall. Putney and the Remonstrance had indicated that there was to be representative government of property, through a ‘supreme council’, with either an elective monarchy, a republic, or both.26 The Remonstrance proposed that: no King be hereafter admitted, but upon the election of, and as upon trust from the People by such their Representatives, nor without first disclaiming and disavowing all pretence to a negative voyce against the determinations of the said Representatives, or Commons in Parliament; and that to be done in some certain form, more clear then heretofore in the Coronation Oath.27

The implication of some form of written constitution in these words became much clearer in the next paragraph of the Remonstrance. Once the settlement had been drawn up it was to be ‘further established by a general Contract or 23 NewDNB. Fairfax entry by Ian Gentles. Rich did act as President of a meeting of the Council of Officers that warmly received written support of the Remonstrance from Glamorgan, see BL, 536(18), Moderate Intelligencer, no.197 (21–28 Dec. 1648). 24 BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 4. 25 BL, E467(9), Salus populi, solus Rex. The Public Safety is the sole Sovereignty; or, the Royalist out-reasoned (a reply to David Jenkins). Brailsford attributed this to Peter (The Levellers, p. 345 n.8), but for doubts see S. Barber, Regicide and Republicanism. Politics and Ethics in the English Revolution, 1645–1659 (1998), p. 95n.119. Abaddon was the satanic angel of the bottomless pit in Revelation 9:11 whose Greek name is given as Apolyon, ‘destroyer’. In Hebrew it means ‘place of destruction’. In the Old Testament it is used as a synonym of death (Hell) and Sheol. 26 B. Worden, ‘Republicanism, Regicide and Republic: The English Experience’, in Q. Skinner and M. van Gelderen (eds), Republicanism, I (Cambridge, 2002). 27 BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 67.

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Agreement of the People, with their subscriptions thereunto’.28 No one would ‘benefit by the Agreement, who shall not consent and subscribe thereunto; nor any King be admitted to the Crown, or other person to any Office, or place of publike trust, without expresse accord, and subscription to the same’. 29 Ireton wanted Parliament to adopt the new constitution through subscription to the Agreement before dissolution, to ensure that people ‘did not looke for a succession of new Parliaments in the old way and old forme of a Kinge again’.30 This was restated in the Remonstrance: after the end of this Parliament there needed to be a ‘certain succession of Parliaments’, sitting without ‘dependence on the Kings will’.31 The Remonstrance argued that there was a ‘covenant’ between the ruler and the people. Ireton used the rhetoric of power being in the hands of the people.32 It is significant that Ireton employed the term ‘covenant’ rather than ‘contract’. A ‘covenant’ would be more binding than a ‘contract’ for one of his religious conviction. The view of Ireton from Putney and the perception of him as legalistic should not cloud the religious conviction which was his main driving force. Ireton stated emphatically in the Remonstrance that they had fought: to give freedome and inlargement to the Gospell (for the encreasing and spreading of light amongst men) to take away those corrupted formes of an out-side religion and Church-government, (whether imposed without Law, or rooted in the Law in times of popish ignorance or idolatry, or of the Gospels dimmer light) by meanes whereof, snares and chaines were layd upon conscientious and zealous men, and the generallity of people held in darknesse, superstition, and a blind reverence of persons and outward things fit for popery and slavery; and also to take away or loosen that dependence of the Clergy, and Ecclesiasticall affaires upon the King, and that interest of the Clergy in the Lawes and civill affaires, which the craft of both in length of time had wrought for each other.33

Given Ireton’s own experience of excommunication and the general nonconformity of his family these words may have been shaped by his perception and personal experience of Laudianism. Ireton argued with regard to the Solemn League and Covenant that ‘as it is drawn (though it have something of that ensaring nature, yet as to this point) has not left the takers without an honest way out; or if it had, yet

28

BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 67. BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 67. 30 Clarke Papers, II, pp. 170–1; Gentles, ‘Agreement’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 158. 31 BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 45. 32 Clarke Papers, II, p. 176. At Putney Cromwell had stated that the ‘Kinge is Kinge by contract’, Clarke Papers, I, p. 368. 33 BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 20. 29

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through the providence of God the snare is broken, and they may escape’.34 If they found that the Covenant bound them more to the King than to the ‘preservation of the true Religion and Liberties of the Kingdomes’ they should and could remove themselves:35 rather then unnecessarily to continue your selves, and hold others under, but a colour of Obligation, to a thing so evill, so full of prejudice and danger unto, and so inconsistent with the security of so many other unquestionably good things (to which in the same Covenant, as well as by immutable duty you stand obliged,) would it not call for your utmost consideration and endeavour (so farre as providence has left you any occasion, without sin or wrong) to extricate and cleare your selves and others from such a snare?36

Ireton believed experience had shown that princes never observe agreements limiting their powers. Charles proved himself no different, since ‘hath your and our experience of this King with whom we have to do, given cause to hope better things from him’.37 The King had no remorse for his actions and had proved that he could not be trusted. Ireton referred to the contrast ‘of light with darkness, of good with evill’ when writing of Charles and the hope of settlement.38 Kelsey has written that ‘if Henry Ireton believed in November 1648 that Charles I must die he had a hard time saying as much’.39 It made little sense politically for Ireton to state that the King must die; the Remonstrance showed that Ireton believed he should. Kelsey has stated that the Remonstrance argued that Charles could be acquitted at any trial if he could show his innocence. Naturally, the Remonstrance stated this rather than the opinion that a trial would lead to his execution. Note should also be taken of the tone and context of this statement within the Remonstrance. It is clear that Ireton believed in Charles’ guilt and that a trial should lead to execution. However, it made little political sense to brutally state this more than was already implied in the Remonstrance. It is clear from the language and tone of the Remonstrance that its authors were convinced of the King’s guilt and were thus men who believed that Charles I deserved to be executed. Nenner has stressed that the Remonstrance made a ‘specific indictment of Charles’.40 The Remonstrance was not couched in the language of men looking

34

BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 54. BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 55. 36 BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 57. 37 BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, pp. 29–30. 38 BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 26. 39 S. Kelsey, ‘The Death of Charles I’, Historical Journal, 45: 4 (2002), p. 731. See also S. Kelsey, ‘Politics and Procedure in the Trial of Charles I’, Law and History Review, 22: 1 (2004). 40 H. Nenner, ‘The Trial of Charles I and the Failed Search for a Bounded Monarchy’, in G.J. Schochet (ed.), Restoration, Ideology, and Revolution (Washington, 1990), p. 5. 35

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to compromise with Charles. Ireton argued in the Remonstrance that the ‘Parliamentary and publique interest that it hath been made one (very much) with the interest of the godly’.41 Ireton, as part of this interest, regarded himself as one of the ‘Saints’.42 The King’s ‘interest’ was ‘their greatest Opposites’.43 Ireton believed that the King was ‘trusted with a limited power to rule according to Lawes’.44 Yet if a King ‘pervert that trust, and abuse that power to the hurt and prejudice of the generality’ and used the powers entrusted to him to become a tyrant, then this result absolved ‘the people from the Bonds of covenant and peace betwixt him and them’.45 In so doing a King ‘doth set them free to take their best advantage, and (if he fall within their power) to proceed in judgement against him’.46 The Remonstrance made clear reference to Charles’ guilt in bringing about the second civil war. The bitterness felt by many in the army, including Ireton, had found expression at their Windsor prayer meeting in April and resonated in the words of the Remonstrance: He had maintayn[ed] a warre many yeares against them (to the spilling of much blood and desolation or spoyl of a great part of the Kingdom) try all meanes and interests by divisions and parties stirred up within, and invasions from abroad to lengthen it out longer, and (after he was subdued, wholly in their power, and at their mercy) to revive and renew it, multiplying disturbances, and never ceasing till he had wearied all friends in his owne and neighbour nations, or so long as any hopes were left wherby possibly to prolong it; and all this meerly to uphold the interest of his will and power against the common interest of his people.47

The Remonstrance outlined the consequences for a monarch who, once defeated, sought to overthrow this judgement, in effect the position of Charles in late November 1648: [S]uch a person in so doing (wee may justly say is guilty of the highest Treason against the highest Law among men, but however) must needs be the authour of that unjust warre, and therein guilty of all the innocent blood spilt thereby, and of all the evills consequent or concomitant thereunto.48

The next section of the Remonstrance outlined how on these terms Charles was guilty. Kelsey has argued that the Remonstrance left open the possibility that Charles could be found innocent. The actual text at the start of this

41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 21. BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 21. BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 21. BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 21. BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 22. BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 22. BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 23. BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 23. 146

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section employs a rhetorical device of asking whether he can ‘make it appeare’ as if he is not guilty. In the context of the whole section of this part of the Remonstrance it is clearly arguing Charles’ guilt: Now (to assume hereupon) whether the King have not, in the same case, acted all these things and more, wee dare appeal to the story and evidence: If he have not, or can justly alleadge and make it appeare, that what he has acted therof has not bin for the interest of his will of power, or not against the publique interest of his people; or that the Parliament or any particular party in the Kingdome have raysed or continued the warre for private interests of their owne, and not for that publique interest of the Kingdome (which wee have before stated) but that they might have had all that cleared and assured to the Kingdome with quietnesse, and would not accept it, let him then be acquitted in judgement, and the guilt and blame be laid where else it is due.49

The tone and context of this passage as a transition from outlining Charles’ fault in bringing further war on his people to how such kings should be punished suggests that the authors of the Remonstrance did not believe Charles could be shown to be innocent of the charge laid against him. Directly following this rhetoric the Remonstrance stated that: [I]f indeed he hath acted such things and in such case (as before exprest) and all for the particular interest of his will and power against the Publick Interest of the Kingdome, then (without mention or consideration of ought he has done against God and godlinesse, or godly men, and though we have toucht but a few of those many morall or civill Evils acted by him, (which have bin judged capitall in severall of his predecessors from whom he claymes, yet) from that alone which is before spoken of we may (without need of his late implicitie Concession) conclude that he has bin the Authour and Continuer of a most unjust warre, and is consequently guilty of all the Treason it contaynes and of all the innocent blood, rapine, spolie, and mischeif to the Kingdome acted or occasioned thereby;50

This guilt needed to be accounted for. The Remonstrance could countenance some accommodation with a King who had ‘a new or changed heart’; Charles, however, could not be seen in such a light.51 He had shown ‘such Hypocrrisie as (we think) was never yet so proclaimed before God and the world’.52 The Remonstrance asked its readers whether ‘your and our experience of this King with whom we have to do, given cause to hope better things from him’. Charles had shown ‘many particulars of hypocrisie, dissumulation and treachery’.53 The

49 50 51 52 53

BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 23. BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, pp. 23–4. BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 24. BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 25. BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 30. 147

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Remonstrance also asked ‘how farre the Publike justice of the Kingdom can bee satisfied, the blood, rapine &c, avenged or expiated, and the wrath of God for the same appeased without judgment executed against him’.54 Furthermore, it argued that there could be no accommodation with Charles due to ‘his continuing, and not recalling his Commissions to the Prince, and other English Rebells and Revolters, yea to Ormond and his associated Irish Rebells’:55 [W]hat fruits can be hoped from such a Re-union or renewed communion betwixt those contraries, God hath once so separated, viz. of principles or affections of liberty, with Principles of Tyranny, Principles of publique Interest, with Principles of Prerogative and particular interest; principles of zeale, and the power of godlinesse, with principles of formality and superstition in Religion (we might say indeed, of light and darknesse, of good with evill).56

The Remonstrance reiterated that Charles had clearly indicated he would not compromise.57 Hence Ireton’s argument for a written constitution that would offer more protection than the ‘coronation oath’. Even with a written constitution the power of justice needed to be treated with care, since: it is obvious to each considering man (that power of punishment, and the having of it in the most trusty hands, and no particular persons to be exempt from their Justice, being that essential part of publike Interest, which is the sence and guard of all the rest in the depraved state of mankinde).58

Commenting on the 1628 Petition of Right the MP Robert Mason had addressed the idea of the monarch being ‘trusted’ to rule. The idea of the trust through which a monarch ruled was unclear in the early modern period. Hirst has stated it was ‘very ambiguous whether it mean [a King] trusted by God only as a conqueror, or by the people also, as kings which are to govern by laws ex pacto [made by agreement]’.59 Ireton’s conception of trust by this stage saw the King entrusted with power by the people. That Charles had shown that he would not compromise meant that Ireton felt justified in the Remonstrance to call for ‘exemplary Justice being done in Capitall punishment upon the principall Author and some prime instruments of our late warres, and thereby the blood thereof expiated’.60 The Remonstrance did state that Charles may be acquitted; a mere rhetorical technical legal nicety

54 55 56 57 58 59 60

BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 24. BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, pp. 25–6. BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 26. BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, pp. 29–30. BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 47. Hirst, Authority and Conflict, pp. 21–2. BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 64. 148

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as it clearly reiterated in the later stages of the document, ‘the Capitall and grand Authour of our troubles, the person of the King, by whose procurement, and for whose interest onely of will and power, all our wars have been, may be brought to Justice for Treason, Bloud, and mischiefe he is therein guilty of’.61 The Remonstrance stated that any in the victorious and righteous position that the army held would proceed to the ‘utter rejection, expulsion, and deposure, either of his whole race, and all that claimed upon the same account of right, or at least, of his particular person, and execution of justice upon him’.62 The view of Charles propounded in the Remonstrance was one of a monarch guilty of betraying the trust invested in him and as such deserving of punishment. Providence dictated that the King, subject to the law, be brought to justice, for: if any person whatsoever (if the offence extend to the prejudice of the publike) may call such offendors to account and distribute punishments to them, either according to the Law, (where it has provided) or their own Judgement (where it has not, and they finde the offence, though not particularly provided against by particular Lawes, yet, against the generall law of reason or Nations, and the vindication of publike interest to require justice) and that in such case, no person whatsoever may be exempt from such account or punishment.63

Gentles deemed this concept of retrospective legislation vital – ‘to Ireton regicide was impossible without it’. Ireton’s focus on this issue at the later Whitehall debates indicates his determination to try the King. 64 On 25 November 1648 the army leadership called for support for the Remonstrance. The tone in which they did so indicates once more the interrelation of religion and politics in the army.65 As a result, a range of regiments offered support in print for the Remonstrance.66 Others argued that Charles should be judged.67 Ireton’s brother John was a member of George Cockayne’s Soper Lane London congregation. Cockayne preached a sermon to Parliament at the end of November 1648 on the story of Ahab: ‘if God do not lead you to do Justice upon those that have been the

61

BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 62. BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 28. 63 BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 16. 64 Gentles, NMA, p. 275. 65 Clarke Mss 114 fol. 104. In calling for support the army argued that ‘The providence of God together with the sence hee hath beene pleased to sett upon our hartes’. 66 Carlin, ‘Petitions’; Peacey, Pamphlets, p. 253. 67 BL, E539(9), Heads of a Diarie, no.4 (20–27 Dec. 1648), pp. 27–8; E536(17), The people Informed of their Oppressors and Oppressions. With a Remedy against both. Unto which is added the sentence of Deposition against King Richard the second, and Edward the second; with the hapiness that ensued to this Nation thereupon (28 Dec. 1648), p. 5; E536(21), Articles Exhibited against the King, And the Charge of the Army against his Majesty. 62

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great Actors in shedding innocent Blood, never think to gain their love by sparing of them.’68 Ireton’s close associate Hugh Peter justified regicide on religious grounds. In supporting Ireton’s Remonstrance Peter called upon diverse biblical quotations as justification for regicide: Deuteronomy 19:13 (‘thou shalt put away the guilt of innocent blood from Israel, that it may go well with thee’); Numbers 25:4 (‘hang them up before the Lord against the sun, that the fierce anger of the Lord may be turned away from Israel’); 2 Samuel 21:3, 5, 6, 14 and 2 Samuel 23:3 (‘he that ruleth among men, must be just ruling in the fear of God’) were all used by Peter to support Ireton’s comments that the ‘wrath of God’ needed to be appeased for the ‘blood’ shed.69 Peter also gave detailed biblical support to the Remonstrance for kings being judged. Ireton himself stressed that justice on Charles would set a crucial example to his followers, since ‘one example in this kind made, would be of more terror and availe then the execution of his whole party, yea then all satisfaction you can imagine’.70 The Remonstrance stated that it was right to: Fix the exemplary punishment, first upon the capitall Leader, and upon others, as nearest to him, and not to punish the inferiours, and exempt the chiefe, so in this your case, ’tis most cleare, that to fix your Justice first upon the head, and thereby let his successors see, what themselves may expect (if they attempt the like,) may hopefully discourage them, from heading any more what Instruments they might finde in the like quarrell, and so is like to be a reall securitie (when such Instruments cannot finde an head.) But to punish onely Instruments, and let the head (by whose power, and in whose interest all has been done,) not onely goe free, but stand in perpetuall priviledge and impunitie to head such Instruments againe, as oft as he can finde opportunitie, and get any to serve him, is a way so farre from securitie, as it leads indeed to endlesse trouble and hazzard, or the perfect losse of all. And besides, in poynt of Justice, with what Conscience inferiour Ministers can be punish’d, and the principall set free, yea, restored to dignitie and honour, for whose

68

Barber, Regicide and Republicanism, p. 104; BL, E473(37), G.C., Flesh expiring and the spirit inspiring in the new earth (29 Nov. 1648), in R. Jeffs, Fast Sermons, p. 42, quote coming from p. 21 of the pamphlet; Mayfield, Puritans and Revolution, pp. 258–62. 69 A107, An Abridgment of the Late Remonstrance of the Army (1648), pp. 6–7. For Peter as author of this, see M. Dzelzainis, ‘Anti-monarchism in English Republicanism’, p. 34n.9 in Q. Skinner (ed.), Republicanism, I (Cambridge, 2002). I would like to thank Professor Martin Dzelzainis for his comments with regard to Woolrych’s attribution of this pamphlet to Hugh Peter. Whether this was a deliberate changing of the wording by Peter is unclear. In the Geneva Bible and the King James version the verse runs: ‘He ruleth over men must be just, ruling in the fear of God.’ Peter’s choice of words therefore seems to be a comment on the monarchy. However, Peter’s reference may even have been based on his use of the StatesGeneral Bible which had replaced the Geneva Bible in the Dutch Reformed Church. See R.A. Beddard, ‘A Traitor’s Gift: Hugh Peter’s Donation to the Bodleian Library’, Bodleian Library Record, 16: 5 (1999), p. 378. 70 Abridgment, second p. 8. 150

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onely interest, in whose onely quarrell, and by whose Commissions and Commands they have acted.71

This is clear. Charles would be judged and punished at the head of his party. Again Peter provided biblical support from 1 Cor 10:8 and Numbers 25:4,5,9 for Ireton’s words: ‘The chiefe men guilty were first hang’d, being 1000; and then inferiour men slaine.’72 The Remonstrance clearly stated that justice would be executed on the royalist party as a whole, after ‘justice first upon the head’.73 It argued that any in the position of the authors of the Remonstrance would proceed to the ‘utter rejection, expulsion, and deposure, either of his whole race, and all that claimed upon the same account of right, or at least, of his particular person, and execution of justice upon him’.74 The Remonstrance also specified that this extensive justice would include Charles’ two eldest sons: That a timely and peremptory day may be set for the Prince of Wales and the Duke of Yorke to come in and render themselves, by which time (if they do not) that then they may be immediately declared incapable of any Government, or trust in this kingdome, or the Dominions thereunto belonging, or of any kind of Right within the same, and thence to stand exiled for ever, as enemies and Traytors to dye without mercy, if ever after found and taken therein.75

Peter believed that good men (i.e. right in religion) were more important than the laws, as they would prevent tyranny. The implication in the Remonstrance that the army represented the people derived from it being representative of the good people.76 As Mayfield has argued: Spiritual-millennial independency could boldly assert the right, indeed the duty, to bring a King to justice even if it were done outside the sanction of the Parliamentary-Presbyterian understanding of and interpretation of the law. Clearly the view of law expressed by Peter and other Independents that we have considered was informed by their religious Independency.77

Ireton’s Remonstrance called for ‘exemplary justice’ on Charles, ‘the principal author’ in the biblical language of blood-guilt. The enactment of such ‘capital

71

BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 50. Abridgment, p. 9. 73 BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 48. 74 BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 28. 75 BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 62. 76 Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, p. 465. For references to the ‘godly, ‘honest’ or ‘good men’ in the Remonstrance see, BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, pp. 4, 10, 12, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26. 77 N.H. Mayfield, Puritans and Regicide. Presbyterian–Independent differences over the Trial and Execution of Charles (I) Stuart (New York, 1988), p. 176. 72

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punishment’ would expiate ‘the bloud’ of the ‘late wars’.78 The Remonstrance was a politically calculated call for regicide.

III Analysis of Ireton’s political statements indicates the development of his thinking and the evolution to the more radical stance in relation to Crown and Parliament, stated in the Remonstrance. This reactive evolution stemmed from the failure to achieve a settlement with Charles and the antagonism of those in Parliament who regarded the army as a threat. In his statements Ireton had a clear conception of constructing a settlement that took into account what he regarded as the ‘rights’ or ‘liberties of the people’. His rhetoric in 1645 saw Parliament as representative of ‘all . . . People’. His comments at Putney indicated however that the ‘people’ would be represented by those of property.79 Ireton appears to have moved on from his comments at Putney with regard to the nature of the constitution and its relation to the Conquest by partly taking on some of the Leveller rhetoric with regard to the impact of the Conquest on the constitution.80 The Remonstrance attacked: Court Maxims concerning the absolute impugnity of Kings, their accountableness to none on earth, and that they cannot erre, do wrong, &c. which principles as they begot by the blasphemous arrogancy of Tyrants upon servile Parasites, and foster’d onely by slavish or ignorant people, and remain in our Law-Books, as HeirLooms onely of the Conquest; so they serve for nothing but to establish that which begot them (Tyranny).81

Nenner has argued: if the Constitution had been corrupted by the Conquest, it would now be relatively simple to set matters right. By virtue of their victories in two civil wars, the Remonstrance argued, God had given his people the same right of conquest over their kings, who need no longer be beyond the reach of the law.82

78

BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 64. Clarke Papers, I, pp. 179, 197, 256–7, 333–4; Rushworth, Historical Collections, VII, p. 962; Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, p. 458; BL, E458(18), A Meanes to reconcile the present distempers of these Times, as things now are (14 Aug. 1648); BL, E477(25), Heads of the CHARGE AGAINST THE KING. 80 Clarke Papers, I, p. 300. 81 BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 48. 82 Nenner, ‘Trial of Charles I’, p. 6. 79

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Ireton actually went further than this. The Remonstrance stated: If therefore our Kings claim by right of Conquest, God hath given you the same against him, and more righteous, by how much that on their parts was extended to a forcible Dominion over the people (which originally or naturally they had not) and our’s but to a deliverance from that Bondage.83

Again, Ireton stressed that his cause was God’s. The Remonstrance’s rhetoric, like reference to the Large Petition, was designed to build bridges with the Levellers, or perhaps rather with those in the army drawn to their radicalism. In considering the army documents their political purpose should always be remembered. The Heads were designed to secure the ‘liberties’ of the nation ‘by setting downe some thinge that may bee a rule to lay a foundation for the common rights and liberties of the people’. This concept of ‘fundamentals’ ran through all attempts by the army at settlement from the Heads of 1647 to the Instrument of Government, the latter drafted in 1653 by Lambert, co-author with Ireton of the Heads. Ireton clearly regarded elements of the Heads as fundamentals to establish and protect these rights but had also recognised that Parliament had to be subjected to more control than previously. Despite Ireton’s rhetoric to the contrary, Parliament would not be more substantially representative than it had been heretofore. Indeed, Ireton harboured no illusion as to the dangers of a free Parliament. He ‘confessed’ to Berkeley that ‘he should himself be afraid of a Parliament wherein the King’s party should have the major vote’.84 Greater religious freedom was part of the fundamentals to be established. Ireton saw this not as a collorary of political settlement but as its vital underpinning. He stated, ‘whatever I finde the worke of God tending to I should desire quietly submitt to. . . . If I see the hand of God in itt I hope I shall with quietnesse acquiesce.’ 85 However, the Whitehall debates showed Ireton that there needed to be some limits to religious freedom, especially where it might clash with civil peace.86 Some control of Parliament would be required to establish greater religious freedom.

83

BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 48. Abbott, I, pp. 279–80, 287–8; Berkeley Memoirs, II, pp. 363–4; Clarke Papers, I, pp. 233, 333–4; Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, p. 463. An obvious change to Parliament was implied in the fact that the Remonstrance was addressed to the Commons only; BL, E473(11), Remonstrance. As Carlin points out, all the petitions of late 1648 from the army were addressed to the Commons only, the assertion that the Commons was the supreme power. Clarendon believed that Ireton’s animus against the Lords was also illustrated by the contrast of his calls for the execution of Lord Capel after Colchester compared to his call for leniency for the commoner John Owen. Clarendon, Rebellion, XI, p. 262, IV, p. 507. 85 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 296–7. 86 Clarke Papers, II, p. 81. 84

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As Ireton’s thinking had developed in relation to Parliament, so had his thinking on Charles and monarchy undergone change. He moved from expressing clear support for monarchy and Charles in the Heads to engaging with republican forms. Appelbaum has argued that Ireton used the ‘language of rectification’. The Heads were ‘a correction rather than a reinvention of the traditional constitution’.87 Ireton wanted settlement not revolution. Charles’ unwillingness to agree to the Heads and his subsequent duplicity forced a reassessment of the man but also his office. Ireton rightly stated that he had acted with ‘Tenderness towards the King . . . abundantly demonstrated the Reality and Innocency of their Intentions towards him’.88 Ireton felt personally betrayed by the King. It had taken a lot to push him to the stance outlined in the Remonstrance. In September 1648 Ireton still felt that they should ‘make good use’ of the monarchy in settlement, if its form was, as yet, unclear. The person of Charles remained the crux of the problem. For Weston, ‘Ireton referred to England as a “mixed state”, and it is possible that he was saying that Charles I had sought to destroy the mixed monarchy’.89 The Remonstrance justified the removal of Charles. By the Remonstrance the office of monarch, as distinct from the person of Charles, would definitely take some limited form, as ‘no King be hereafter admitted but upon the election of, and as upon trust from, the people by such their Representatives’. The limits on monarchy would ‘be done in some certain form, more clear than heretofore in the coronation oath’.90 Such comments might, once again, indicate Ireton’s engagement with the work of Grotius and knowledge of Dutch oligarchy. English republicanism contained elements of elective monarchy; indeed, John Cook’s Elective Aristocracie indicated the discussion of ideas of a prince within a republic.91 In this context Ireton’s Remonstrance indicates not only that he favoured regicide but that he had become a republican. In doing so the chief textual influence on Ireton had been the Bible. Ireton was no classical republican but a Bible republican.92

87

R. Appelbaum, Literature and Utopian Politics in Seventeenth Century (2004), p. 136. Rushworth, Historical Collections, IV:II, p. 962. 89 C. Comstock Weston, ‘English Constitutional Doctrines from the Fifteenth Century to the Seventeenth Century: II. The Theory of Mixed Monarchy under Charles I and after’, English Historical Review, 75: 296 (1960), p. 438n.3. BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 16, which outlines the idea of checks and judgment on those in power. 90 Abbott, I, pp. 279–80, 287–8; Clarke Papers, I, pp. 233, 425; BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 67. 91 Worden, ‘Republicanism, Regicide and Republic: The English Experience’; J. Cook, Elective Aristocracie (1651). 92 Robertson, Cooke, p. 125. For a discussion of republicanism and treatments of it see Worden, ‘Republicanism’ in Skinner (ed.), Republicanism. For an examination of pre-civil war proto-republicanism see M. Peltonen, Classical Humanism and Republicanism in English Political Thought, 1570–1640 (Cambridge, 1995). I would like to thank Markku Peltonen for reading an early draft of this book. 88

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IV Cromwell fully supported the Remonstrance. He wrote to Fairfax of how the officers of the Northern Army wanted ‘impartial justice done upon all offenders’ and how ‘from my heart concur with them’.93 Cromwell sought to persuade his cousin Colonel Robert Hammond, the King’s gaoler, of the necessity of the army’s current actions.94 Cromwell, as well as writing to Hammond, went to Farnham to see his cousin.95 Cromwell also sent Goffe to Hammond, doubtless mindful of how much he himself had been struck by Goffe’s reflection at Putney.96 Ireton also felt it necessary to try to secure Hammond’s support for the Remonstrance. In one of his letters to Hammond of 22 November 1648 Ireton laid out his case: I shall not at this distance undertake a dispute concerning our ground or proceedings; but leave thee; for the one to our Remonstrance; for the other to farther tryal of us. I shall only in the love of a friend and brother, speak a word or two to that, which I find the ground of thy scruples against what hath been from hence desired (?), or rather of thy declared resolution to the contrary.97

Ireton clearly felt it necessary to address Hammond’s concerns, given his control over Charles I. Unfortunately, while Ireton clearly referred to ‘our Remonstrance’, he did not provide commentary on it in his letters to Hammond: Thou lookest on thyself as a servant under trust; and so both in honour and conscience obliged to discharge that faithfully. And thus for thou art in the right. But the only measure of that discharge thou takest to be the mere formal observance of commands; and those carrying but that name of power, from which thou apprehendest it was committed to thee. As to the first part, the faithful discharge of the trust, the Lord forbid, that I should tempt thee from it. Nay, I will charge and challenge it at thy hands, that, with all faithfulness and singleness of heart, as before the Lord, thou perform thy trust to those persons, by whom, and to those public ends and interests, for which, it was committed to thee.98

Ireton appeared to have already resolved the question of loyalty to the institution of Parliament for himself:

93

Morrill, ‘Zeruiah’, p. 26. For support of the Remonstrance by the Northern Association Army see Farr, Lambert, pp. 68–71. 94 Morrill and Baker, ‘Zeruiah’, p. 29. 95 Walker, Independency (1648), I, p. 80. 96 Gentles, NMA, p. 237. 97 Hammond Letters, pp. 95–100. 98 Hammond Letters, pp. 95–100. 155

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But for these things, I shall appeal to the witness of God in thy conscience, as follows: I. For the persons trusting, whether thou didst receive the present place from the affections or trust of the formal Parliament only, even as then it stood; or whether of the General or Army? And whether, so far as thou seemest to have the formality by way of confirmation from the Parliament, it were from any affection or trust of that sort or generation of men, which now, through accident, bear the sway and name? Or whether from them, whose judgement and affections are most opposite to the present proceedings there?

Ireton believed the army to be more representative of the public interest than Parliament; ‘honest men’ were those who truly represented the cause: II. For the ends, whether thou receivedst thy trust in order to the ends now carried on by the prevailing party there? Or whether, in confidence of thy faithfulness, to some other higher and more public ends? Whether for the King’s, and the present prevailing faction’s; or for the public interest, and the generality of honest men, that have engaged for the same.99

He continued to reinforce his point that Hammond owed loyalty to God and that the army were the people of God. Upon the answer of thy conscience in these, I propound farther; In case said persons, as neither did, nor would have committed any such trust unto thee, but only gaining since the name of that power, from which thou hadst the formal compliment of the trust, and yet but partly that, shall require things destructive to, or not for the best advantage of, those public ends, for which ready thou receivedst thy trust; and at the same time those, from whose affection and confidence in thee thou hadst the matter of the power and trust, shall desire and expect from thee other things necessary for the security, or but really for better advantage, of those public ends, for which thou were trusted, and for the common benefit and interest of that people, for which all pretend their employments and interest; in this case I say, I shall appeal farther to thy conscience, or but ingenuity, to determine, to which of these several persons, and according to which commands and expectations, thou art to exhibit and approve thy faithfulness in the trust: And whether part to observe and follow is the more real and substantial performance before God, and reasonable men. I shall not press upon thee, but thus plainly lay the case before thee; only desiring thee not to slight it, but seriously weigh it, as thou tenderest the approving thyself to God and his people.100

Ireton believed that Parliament had come under the sway of a faction and, consequently, did not act for the ‘public interest’ or ‘honest men’, both of

99 100

Hammond Letters, pp. 95–100. Hammond Letters, pp. 95–100. 156

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which the army could argue it represented more. The New Model Army were God’s ‘people’, the ‘honest men’ who stood ‘for the public interest’. This had been shown through continuous victory on the battlefield over the course of two bloody civil wars. The army carried this belief into battle emblazoned on their cornets and in their hearts, a theme continually reiterated by the preaching of its chaplains, men like Erbery, Dell and Peter.101 By this stage Peter and his ilk argued for a ‘theocratic totalitarian system based on a military dictatorship’.102 The death-warrant of Charles I required ‘all officers, soldiers, and others, the good people of this nation of England’ to assist in the execution of the monarch.103 Ireton saw himself as one of ‘the good people of this nation’. It is debatable how far Ireton had ‘plainly’ laid ‘the case’ before Hammond. Cromwell’s own letter of three days later, 25 November, has been described as ‘a plea to Hammond to see how a critical mass of evidence points to God’s manifest will being encapsulated in what the army proposes in the Remonstrance’. The plea to Hammond ‘to go along with the Remonstrance’ probably formed part of a co-ordinated strategy between Cromwell and Ireton.104 In a letter of 1646 to his daughter Bridget, Cromwell had stated that ‘I write not to thy Husband; partly to avoid trouble, for one line of mine begets many of his, which I doubt make him sit up too late’. However, writing to his son-inlaw the day after Dunbar Cromwell commented that ‘though I hear not often from you, yet I know you forget me not. Think so of me “too”; for I often remember you at the Throne of Grace.’105 The weight of business was no doubt just as telling on their correspondence in late 1648 as it was in 1650. No letters survive to indicate that the two men corresponded while they were apart during the crucial period from the end of April to 6 December 1648. It is, however, inconceivable that these two men, who were so close, did not communicate and the problems with which they were grappling would surely have dominated their letters. The very fact that they were considering what should be done with Charles probably explains why their correspondence from this period does not survive.106 Upon his return to London on the evening of

101

Ireton’s regimental chaplains in this period were James Nichol (1646) and Joseph Salmon (1647–49); see Laurence, Army Chaplains, pp. 156, 170. Salmon, while critical of the army, argued with regard to the army, ‘you are the Rod of God, yea, the Rod of the Lords anger in his own Hand, the Almighty Arm acts you; and so it appears, for no manly glory can encounter with you’. Joseph Salmon, A Rout, A Rout, in Smith (ed.), A Collection of Ranter Writings From the Seventeenth Century (1983). 102 Brailsford, The Levellers, p. 346n.8. 103 S.R. Gardiner (ed.), Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625–1660 (1906), p. 380. 104 Morrill and Baker, ‘Zeruiah’, p. 28. 105 Abbott, I, p. 327. This comment in Cromwell’s letter may have been a reference from Hebrews 4: 16 (‘Let us therefore come boldly unto the throne of grace, that we may obtain mercy, and find grace to help in time of need’). 106 From the publication of the Remonstrance on 16 November to the pair of letters Ireton 157

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6 December Cromwell and Ireton would have been in daily contact, thus removing the need for correspondence. Both Ireton and Cromwell agreed that Charles should be brought to trial. Neverthless, their letters of this period would no doubt show some divergence over the manner and speed in which this would be brought about, as well as the end result. Ireton wished to proceed to justice and had engaged with republican forms. Cromwell appears to have been more hesitant and unsure. Cromwell’s political pragmatism is evident in his comment during the first day of debate at Putney: ‘itt is our duty as Christians and men to consider consequences, and to consider the way.’107 For both, however, the method and timing was ultimately to be forced upon them by the actions of others, Parliament, and Charles himself.

and Cromwell produced together on 22 December 1648 for Harrison and Whitchcott, only six of Cromwell’s letters are known to have survived. See Abbott, I, pp. 690–715. 107 Clarke Papers, I, p. 238. 158

7

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The army’s allies in Parliament had first approached the generals to stop any negotiations by their fellow MPs at the end of the second civil war, and about one month before the beginning of the Newport Treaty negotiations. It appears that Ireton hoped that the inevitable failure of the treaty negotiation would turn more MPs against the King. He felt some direct action by the army against Parliament would, at some point, also be necessary.1 The Remonstrance informed the Commons that the army wanted them to ‘forbear any further proceeding in this evil and most dangerous treaty, and to return to your former grounds in the vote of non-addresses, and thereupon to proceed to the settling and securing of the kingdom without, and against, the King’.2 Almost identical terminology had been used in other documents linked to Ireton: a petition presented to the Army Council at St Albans on 11 November 1648 and much earlier in Ireton’s Declaration of January 1648.3 The army’s Heads of the Charge of December 1648 repeated calls for ‘a speedy settlement of the Kingdome either against the King, or without him’.4 At the beginning of November 1648 Ireton was prepared to wait, encouraged, no doubt, by Cromwell, to allow the current negotiations between the King and Parliament to strengthen any subsequent action by the army. Some probably believed that these negotiations were progressing.5 Ireton had decided, from past experience, that settlement

1

Kennedy, English Revolution, p. 111. BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 8. 3 BL, E470(32), A Petition from Severall Regiments of the Army, p. 3, ‘the settlement of the Nation without, and against the King’. As Carlin, ‘Petitions’, has stressed, it is impossible to prove whose actual phraseology this was, although ‘this one is more likely to have been written by Ireton’ than the petition from his regiment. I would like to thank Norah Carlin for allowing me to read her draft of an article on the Petitions of this period but also for offering further valuable comment in private correspondence. In the January 1648 Declaration was the statement, ‘for the setling and securing of the Parliament and Kingdom without the King and against him’. Rushworth, Historical Collections, Part IV:II, p. 962. 4 BL, E477(25), Heads of the Charge against the King, Drawn up by the Generall Councell of the Armie (24 Dec. 1648), p. 7. 5 BL, E472(9), Packets of Letters, no.35 (14 Nov. 1648), p. 6. This idea was put across clearly 2

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with Charles was not possible. The second civil war confirmed for Ireton that the King should die. That he eventually succeeded in pushing through regicide resulted from continuing frustration with Charles and Parliament in the period from late August 1648; frustrations at Parliament’s repeal of the Vote of No Addresses, its ignoring of the Remonstrance and the vote of 5 December to continue the Newport Treaty. The possibility of settlement, no matter how remote, between Parliament and Charles forced Ireton to take action.

I At Windsor an army committee including Ireton, Constable, Harrison and Whalley considered ‘such things as may be of concernment for the present affaires’.6 Another committee of 16 November considered the Remonstrance.7 Ireton had moved into a chamber within the castle where he had been joined by his wife. Many of the crucial meetings that shaped army policy were held here.8 More publicly, the army held a prayer meeting on 26 November, designed, like all others, to search for God’s direction as a guide for any subsequent political action. A newsletter from Windsor stated that the day from nine in the morning until five in the afternoon was spent: seeking God by prayer to direct them in the great businesse now in hand, that they may bee instruments that justice may bee done uppon those who have caused soe much bloud to bee shed, and that righteousnesse and iudgement may flowe in the land. Itt is incredible how wonderfully God appears in stirring uppe and uniting every man’s heart as one man in the prosecution of this businesse, and that there might bee a suddaine settlement made in this Kingdome, and wholesome lawes and modell of Governement may bee speedily agreed uppon, which will bee vigorously prosecuted by the army.9

The author of this account suggested that the army steeled itself to be the ‘instruments’ that could bring ‘justice’ ‘uppon those who have caused so much bloud to bee shed’. Such action would facilitate ‘a suddaine settlement’ which would be ‘vigorously prosecuted by the army’. Hugh Peter, prominent among the preachers that day, worked closely with Ireton in this period. Another account of the meeting recorded that in a pamphlet at the end of November; see BL, E526(34), A New Marriage, Between Mr King, and Mrs Parliament. The Banes forbidden by Captaine Army (30 Nov. 1648). 6 Clarke Papers, II, p. 55–6. This committee was composed of Ireton, Thomas Hammond, William Constable, Colonels Harrison, Whalley, Thomlinson and Whitchcott. 7 Clarke Papers, II, p. 54. This was composed of Ireton, Whalley, Sir William Constable, Colonels Scrope and Ewer, Lt. Col.Kelsey, Adjutant General Evelyn, Captains Cannon and Messervey. 8 Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, p. 420. 9 Clarke Papers, II, pp. 58–9; Clarke Mss 114 fol. 112. 160

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This day the Generall & officers mett in the Castle att Windsor. They sought God earnestly for a Blessing uppon their Councills, & to direct them in the way they should walke Mr Peter Mr Symonds, & others spake, Mr Knight, Lt. Col: Kelsay, & others prayed earnestly. The great dispute was concerning the opposing of a visible authority wch some shew’d Reasons for, yett that nott being the businesse of the day butt onely to waite uppon God for his Direction nothing of that nature was debated butt they came away sweetly refreshed with divine influences & Discoveries.10

About two hours after the end of the prayer meeting: Severall petitions are come from the forces in South Wales, and the regiments of horse in the North, earnestly importuning the Generall to make way for justice against those who have shed soe much innocent blood in this first and 2nd warre, desiring the Kinge may bee speedily brought to justice.11

There is little doubt that at this point Ireton controlled the army’s political strategy. He had been prominent in a range of army committees and his hand was on most of its public pronouncements.12 Underdown has argued that in Cromwell’s absence: the direction of Army policy devolved inevitably on the willing shoulders of Henry Ireton, the one man with the determination, the intellectual honesty, the dialectical skill, and the unshakable conviction of the God-given rightness of his conduct to drive through the hesitations of his more politic colleagues. Ireton, far more than Cromwell, could accept the appalling risks that the use of the Army against Parliament entailed; the risks of Leveller revolution, of uniting the rest of the nation in armed resistance to a militant minority, of being left with a government with no more legitimacy than the sword.13

Gentles similarly sees Ireton, in the period from the end of the second civil war to May 1649, as the driving force behind the political positioning of the army. Cromwell, Peter and Harrison supported him.14 Many contemporary commentators appreciated the extent of Ireton’s influence. In his attack on the army’s purge of Parliament John Lilburne deemed Ireton to be a key power

10

Clarke Mss 114 fol. 111. Clarke Papers, II, pp. 58–9. These petitions were BL, E473(23), The Petition of your Officers and Soldiers of Col. Horton’s Regiment, and of the severall garrisons in South Wales (25 Nov. 1648); BL, E473(31), Two Petitions Presented to His Excellency the Lord Fairfax (25 Nov. 1648). 12 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 183, 279, 363, 413; II, pp. 54, 61, 156, for committees from July 1647 to 29 December 1648. 13 Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p. 116. 14 Gentles, NMA, p. 266. 11

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broker.15 He believed, as did others, that Ireton’s ‘concurrence’ was ‘taken for the concurrence of the whole Army’.16 Lilburne’s opinion is reinforced by further direct appeals from the Levellers and others to Ireton.17 In December Ireton replied to a petition directed to Fairfax and the army.18 Cromwell did not return to London from the Pontefract siege until the evening of 6 December 1648.19 In this crucial moment of the English Revolution Ireton, not Cromwell, or Fairfax, directed the army’s political strategy. Ireton focused his attention towards Parliament and on Charles, still captive on the Isle of Wight. Despite his literary efforts Ireton remained concerned as to the allegiance of the King’s gaoler Robert Hammond. Ireton sent one of his trusted ‘henchmen’, Colonel Issac Ewer, to secure either Hammond’s allegiance or his person. Ewer was an army political hardliner. Ewer had taken control of Robert Hammond’s regiment in October 1647, and served with Cromwell in South Wales before joining Ireton at Colchester. There he had signed the articles of surrender. Appointed on 16 November to the army committee that scrutinised the Remonstrance, Ewer was selected to present it to the Commons.20 In late November 1648 Ewer was instructed to take three letters to Hammond. He was to deliver ‘two of the letters, viz., that sealed from the Generall, that unsealed from the Commissary Generall, but not that from the Council’. The latter would only be delivered if Hammond showed himself favourable to the Remonstrance, since the purpose of Ewer’s mission was to

15

BL, E550(14), THE PICTURE OF THE Councel of State, pp. 16–17. Lilburne, LFL, p. 33; Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, p. 420. 17 BL, E477(18), SEVERAL PROPOSALS FOR Peace & Freedom, BY AN AGREEMENT OF THE PEOPLE, Offered unto Commissary General IRETON for the Concurrence of the Army (22 Dec. 1648); BL, E536(12), A Plea For Moderation In the Transactions of the Army: Or, Weighty Observations upon the late Proposalls for Peace, presented by the Honourable City of London, To Commissary-General Ireton, for concurrence of the Generall Councell (Dec. 1648); John Clayton, State Colors and Complections in which are Reasons against the proceeding to try the King, in Cal.Clar.SP, I, p. 504. See also BL, E477(18), An apology unto the honorable and other the honoured and worthy officers of his Excellencies the Lord Generals Army, by Lieut. Col. John Jubbes. Touching his proceeding in a paper (called, Proposals for peace and freedom, offered from many worthy citizens unto Commissary General Ireton, for the concurrence of the Army) after the prohibition of things of that nature (1649). 18 Clarke Papers, II, pp. 149–50. The petition was from the ‘well affected in Newport Pagnell’. 19 While in Scotland Stevenson has argued that Cromwell might have secured Argyll’s consent to the idea that kings could be put on trial. D. Stevenson, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Scotland 1644–51 (1977), p. 124. 20 BL, E445(6), A full and particular relation of the manner of the late besieging and taking of Chepstow Castle in Wales. By the forces of his Excellency the Lord Fairfax, under the command of Colonel Ewer; expressed in a letter from Colonel Ewer to the Honourable William Lenthall (1648); Clarke Papers, I, p. 54; NewDNB Ewer entry by A.J. Hopper; Jones, Colchester, p. 129. 16

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‘taste whether upon our Remonstrance, the letters, or otherwise, it please God to satisfye his minde better towards the doeing of the thinges himselfe’. If: notwithstanding all this, hee will neather undertake it himselfe nor leave it to you, then keep the letter [from the Council] & proceed as God shall direct & give opportunitye, according to the close of the letter from the Councell to yourselfe, adviseinge therein with Major Rolphe & such honest officers thereabouts as you finde will be faithfull & secret.21

Hammond’s continued doubts about the army’s proceedings were clear from the fact that Ewer arrested him. Ewer worked with other political hardliners such as Edmond Rolphe and Ralph Cobbett. Rolphe had been on the committee to draw up charges against the eleven members, pushed for a march on London and was officer-adjutator of Robert Hammond’s regiment.22 He acted as paymaster to the adjutators and signed an army petition demanding justice on grand delinquents.23 Robert Hammond had secured Rolphe’s promotion to help guard the King. However, Parliament imprisoned Rolphe between July and September 1648 for his supposed involvement in a plot to kill Charles I. After his release he returned to Carisbrooke Castle to guard the King, remaining in charge after Hammond was arrested by Ewer.24 Ewer, after arresting Hammond, proceeded to send Captain Ralph Cobbett, another political hardliner, to move Charles from Carisbrooke to the much more forbidding Hurst Castle.25 A contemporary report stated: ‘the Kinge is secured by Col. Ewers (who deliver’d the Remonstrance & could receive noe Answer) hath the charge of him, Col: Hammond is coming uppe to attend the Genall.’26 When Cobbett arrived to take Charles and was asked by him whether his orders had been issued from Parliament or Fairfax, Cobbett replied that they were from neither.27 Morrill has commented that in 1648 ‘Fairfax ran the army as a military force, and Cromwell led it as a political force’.28 There is much merit in this opinion but from late September to 6 December 1648 Ireton played a more

21

Clarke Papers, II, p. 55. Gentles, NMA, p. 181; Massarella, ‘Politics of the Army’, p. 46; NewDNB Rolphe entry by Keith Thomas. 23 Gentles, NMA, p. 176; BL, 669 fol. 13/71, The humble Petition and Representation of the Officers and Souldiers of the Garrisons of Portsmouth (1649). 24 NewDNB Rolphe entry by Keith Roberts. 25 Hurst Castle was ‘a dismal place . . . its thick damp walls had all the charm of a modern pillbox . . . Charles’ room was small and poky. It was so dark that he needed candles to read at noon’, C. Carlton, Charles I. The Personal Monarch (1983), p. 341. 26 Clarke Mss 114 fol. 112. 27 Gentles, NMA, pp. 274–8; Herbert Memoirs (1819), p. 117. 28 Morrill (ed.), Cromwell, p. 7. 22

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direct political role than either man. Cobbett’s comments can only lead us to speculate on the nature of the orders Ewer carried from Ireton. The letter ‘from the Commissary General’ could very well have been either that of 21 or 22 November addressed to Hammond.29 It seems likely however that Ewer received other instructions from Ireton that really mattered and on which Ewer and Cobbett as his ‘henchmen’ acted. These men would have been deliberately selected as Ireton could count on their political loyalty, but their appearance would also make a political point to Charles. Hammond’s own words indicate the blurring of authority in the army between the General Council and Fairfax. In response to Ewer’s arrival, Hammond wrote to the Speaker: I demanded of him to know what instructions he had, and from whom; because, though I held myself obliged to obey the General’s commands in going to him, yet I had a trust upon me from the Parliament, no way, as I conceived, relating to the General or army, which I must be faithful unto, to the utmost of my power, and careful (as much as in me lay) that the Parliament’s and kingdom’s services might not be prejudiced in my absence. Upon which, he produced a letter, signed John Rushworth, and in the name and behalf of the general council of the army, ordering him to come hither; and if in case I should, according to the commands of the General’s letter, repair to the head quarters, then he to secure the person of the King in Carisbrooke castle, or otherwise, as he should think fit; and in case I should refuse, then to do as God should direct him; giving him power to call over other forces: and if he should so secure him, then if he found any hazard in being here, to give them notice, and to bring the King over the water. This was the substance, to my best remembrance, of his said instructions.30

Gentles believes ‘it was clearly Ireton and his henchmen – not Fairfax – who were in control of the army’s political strategy’.31 It is unclear how much Cromwell and Fairfax were apprised of Ireton’s actions. Nevertheless, Fairfax’s own words from the time indicate that he was not opposed to the proceedings of the army at this stage. Fairfax ordered Hammond ‘with all possible speed to repair to me’, and informed him that ‘I have herewith sent colonel Ewer, (the fittest person I could think of, ) to take care of the island till you return’.32 In response Hammond appealed to Parliament and consequently they informed Fairfax ‘not to expect his [Hammond’s] sudden repair to you, nor to appoint colonel Ewer, or any other, to take charge of the island’.33 Ewer did arrest Hammond and did bring him to headquarters.34

29 30 31 32 33 34

Clarke Papers, II, p. 55; Hammond Letters, pp. 95–100. Cary, Memorials, II, pp. 66–7. Gentles, NMA, p. 278; NewDNB. Fairfax entry by Ian Gentles. Cary, Memorials, II, pp. 59–60. Fairfax to Hammond (21 Nov. 1648). Cary, Memorials, II, pp. 61–63. Cary, Memorials, II, pp. 66–70. 164

PURGE, 1648

Despite his crucial role in army politics, Ireton did not have total control of events. He knew that he needed the formal support of the army to bring the King to justice. On 15 November the Council of Officers had held a three-day session at the Bull-head tavern in St Albans that culminated in the adoption of the Ireton-inspired Remonstrance.35 None the less, Ireton still had much negotiating to conclude within the army and with the Levellers. He saw that with broad army support, allies in Parliament and even agreement with the Levellers any action against Parliament would have more chance of political success. Justice against Charles would also need to be accompanied by some form of settlement. John Lilburne went ‘to Windsor, to speak with Mr Ireton the Stear-man himself’.36 Unable to speak to Ireton himself, Lilburne approached Peter, whom he regarded as Ireton’s close associate, or, as he described him, ‘the grand Journey-or Hackney-man of the Army’.37 He delivered a paper through Peter to Ireton: with whom we desired to discourse about them; who sent us word, at such an hour he would come to our Inn at the Garter, to speak with us about them; and accordingly he did, accompanied with a whole Train of Officers; and a large and sharpe discourse we had; our principall difference lying at his desire in the too strict restraining Liberty of Conscience, and in keeping a power in the Parliament to punish where no visible Law is transgressed; the unreasonableness of which was much spoken against by divers of the principall Officers with him, but especially by Col. Harrison, who was then extreme fair and gilded: And so little satisfaction had we at that meeting, from Ireton (the Armie’s Alpha and Omega) that we despaired of any good from them, and were in a manner resolved to come away in haste to London.38

Once more Lilburne viewed Ireton as the army’s ‘beginning and end’ in control of its policy. The need for a settlement alongside justice on Charles brought about the Whitehall debates of December 1648 to January 1649. Lilburne described the process of the formulation of the idea for these debates. Those drawn into the scheme however approached Ireton for legitimisation of the process, once more confirming his influence. As Lilburne wrote: so we went all together to Commissary General Iretons chamber to have his concurrence, which of all sides was taken for the concurrence of the whole Army,

35

Gentles, NMA, p. 272. As Gentles has shown it was on this day that the Commons voted ‘that the King shall be settled in a condition of honour, freedom and safety agreeable to the laws of the land’, what those who had risen in the Second Civil War had declared for. Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, p. 423. 36 Lilburne, LFL, p. 31. 37 Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, p. 417. 38 Lilburne, LFL, p. 31; Clarke Papers, II, pp. 258–9. 165

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or at least for the powerfull and governing part of it; he being in a manner both their eyes and ears.39

Ireton’s role at Whitehall confirms Lilburne’s image of him as a dominant figure. Taft sees Ireton as a ‘forceful, frequently dogmatic debater whose determination to carry his points irritated as often as it convinced’.40 John Evelyn, who witnessed one day of the Whitehall debates (18 December), expressed horror at the ‘disorder and irreverence, and palpable cozenage’ he saw. The soldiers used ‘uncivil terms’ and were ‘ill-spoken men’, and ‘Ireton himself, in whom the world is so much mistaken, not excepted’.41 To Evelyn’s genteel sensibilities Ireton, a man from the lesser gentry, but more importantly a statesmen formed by war and a revolutionary army, would have sounded direct and rough. Such open debates were how army politics were conducted in the search for an agreed way forward. The time and energy Ireton spent on the Whitehall debates indicates the seriousness with which he approached them. During the debate on 14 December Ireton made twenty-three mainly extensive contributions. Naturally verbose, repetitive and pedantic in debate, the weight of his contributions, the first comprising about 1,900 words, are real testimony to the seriousness with which he approached the debates.42 Lilburne recorded a ‘tedious tug we had with Commissary Generall Ireton only, yea sometimes whole nights together’. In their discussions, according to Lilburne, ‘Ireton himself shewed himself an absolute King, if not an Emperor, against no man must dispute’.43 Naturally bitter, and writing after the regicide, Lilburne’s view of ‘an absolute’ Ireton reinforces the impression of him gained from the record of Putney and implied in how Walker has Ireton confronting the viewer in his later portrait of the man.44 At the start of his first two contributions to the debate of 14 December Ireton’s tone reads as if he is chiding the previous speakers for their ‘many mistakes’.45 Other Levellers attacked Ireton in debate as one of the ‘crafty politicians and subtill Machivelians’. They believed rightly that at Putney he and Cromwell followed a co-ordinated strategy in debate. The ‘record’ left by William Clarke of the Putney and

39

Lilburne, LFL, pp. 33; Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, p. 420. Taft, ‘Voting Lists’, p. 141. 41 Taft, ‘Voting Lists’, p. 141; W. Bray (ed.), Diary and Correspondence of John Evelyn (1906), p. 166. 42 Clarke Papers, II, pp. 71–132. From this record of the debates we have about 6,000 of Ireton’s words just from 14 December. However, his contribution would have been much more extensive across all the days of the debates but 14 December is the only day for which a detailed record survives. 43 Lilburne, LFL, pp. 32–42; Clarke Papers, II, p. 262. 44 National Portrait Gallery, NPG3301. 45 Clarke Papers, II, p. 78. 40

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Whitehall debates also illustrates Ireton’s tenacity.46 Lilburne’s comments are those of a political enemy yet they show Ireton’s willingness to engage with the Levellers, as he had done through the Remonstrance. They also indicate that there were differences in the army’s command structure, notably between Harrison and Ireton over the extent of religious freedom. As Taft has shown, the political circumstances Ireton faced meant that at Whitehall he was willing to go a long way in appeasing those who were more radical than him.47

II Differences existed over how the army would deal with Parliament in the light of its refusal to consider the Remonstrance and the continuing treaty with Charles. Underdown suggested that at the end of November 1648 it ‘is at this point that Ireton’s intentions emerge. His plan was for the Army to dissolve rather than merely purge Parliament’.48 A new representative would then be formed. Before its calling there would in effect be rule by a revolutionary council until the calling of a ‘more full and formal power’. This somewhat optimistic plan may reflect Ireton’s belief in providence but also his radicalism in seeing a core within the army and Parliament as marked out as ‘honest’ rulers. A word of caution is needed with regard to what Ireton’s actual intentions were towards Parliament. He may well have originally considered dissolution. He would, however, have harboured concerns about the authority and legitimacy of Parliament, not only in its present state given the willingness of some MPs to continue negotiations with Charles, but more importantly in the light of any action by the army against Parliament. How far would a forced dissolution remove all legitimacy? Given Ireton’s character there can also be little doubt that he would have expressed his concerns about Parliament’s authority. That he resolved on dissolution by force instead of a purge derives from a statement by Lilburne.49 Lilburne wrote of the army: their haste to London, to force and break up the Parliament . . . the absolute dissolution of which, their friends in the House would no wayes admit of, although Ireton and Harrison, etc commonly stiled it then a Parliament that had forfeited

46

A Cal, pp. 4–5; Clarke Papers, I, pp. 308–9, 323; II, p. 170. B. Taft, ‘Voting Lists of the Council of Officers, December 1648’, Historical Research, 52 (1979). 48 Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p. 129; BL, E550(14), Lilburne et al The Picture of the Council of State (4 April 1649), p. 16. 49 BL, E550(14), Lilburne et al The Picture of the Council of State (4 April 1649), p. 16. Underdown states (p. 128): ‘The best evidence for Ireton’s intentions at this time comes from Lilburne.’ 47

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its trust, a mock-Parliament, and that if they did not totally dissolve it, but purge it, it would be but a mock-Parliament, and a mock-power.50

It served Lilburne’s rhetorical interest to argue that the army leadership planned to forcibly dissolve Parliament; he determined to portray them as destroyers of the liberties of England. Writing after the regicide and in the context of the failure of his designs for the Agreement, Lilburne argued that there would have been a dissolution ‘if we, or some in the House of your then friends, had not been the principall instruments to hinder them’.51 In part the reference to the supposed opposition of ‘we’ is another clue to the purposes of Lilburne’s argument. Nevertheless it does appear, as Lilburne and Ludlow argued, that the opposition of their allies in Parliament did lead to an adjustment to the plans of the army.52 Ireton’s action subsequent to 6 December may indicate that while he would naturally have considered a forced dissolution he was actually more inclined to accept a purge than has been previously argued. Army demands of this period and after 6 December make it very clear that Ireton wanted a new representative. Ireton was concerned to have some legitimacy for the revolution. A purged Parliament provided this more than if the army had removed Parliament completely in December 1648. The army’s Declaration has also been used to argue that Ireton originally planned a dissolution.53 Underdown has written that when ‘the Declaration went to press, then, Ireton’s plan was unchanged: withdrawal of the “upright” members and dissolution, not a purge’.54 Another reading of the Declaration of his Excellency The Lord General Fairfax and his General Councel of Officers may be proposed. The Declaration could also indicate that the army did not resolve to dissolve Parliament but wanted Parliament to undertake action itself, as this was more constitutionally appropriate. MPs allied to the army were invited to withdraw themselves from their colleagues but to continue as a form of authority until the new representative had been constructed. The Declaration stated that the army desired that the MPs: so many of them as God hath kept upright, and shall touch with a just sence of those things, would by Protestation, or otherwise, acquit themselves from such breach of Trust, and approve their faithfulness, by withdrawing from those that persist in the guilt thereof.55

50

Lilburne, LFL, p. 38. Lilburne, LFL, p. 43. 52 Lilburne, LFL, p. 43; Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 206. 53 BL, E474(13), The Declaration of his Excellency The Lord General Fairfax and his General Councel of Officers (30 Nov. 1648). 54 Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p. 129. 55 BL, E474(13), Declaration, p. 6. 51

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The army would: look upon them as persons having materially the chief Trust of the kingdom remaining in them, and though not a formal standing power to be continued in them, or drawn into ordinary Presidents; yet the best and most rightful that can be had, as the present state and exigence of Affairs now stand; And we shall accordingly own them, adhere to them, and be guided by them in their faithful prosecution of that Trust, in order unto, and until the introducing of a more full and formal power in a just Representative to be speedy endeavored.56

The draft timetable to which Ireton worked may not have comprised a formal dissolution of Parliament but rather a short period of authority divested in reliable MPs, leading to the construction of a new authority and the enactment of justice upon Charles. This did not happen. Underdown, relying on Lilburne and Ludlow, argued that it became clear that the majority in Parliament would never comply; the army faction had concerns about the implications for Parliamentary legitimacy and were not inclined to ‘withdraw’. This came to Ireton’s attention when MPs discussed their concerns with the army.57 A meeting between three MPs and three members of the army, including Ireton, agreed on a purge.58 This may not have been to the Commissary-General’s taste. Lilburne claimed that, after the purge, the army: when they were come to London, Ireton, &c and some members of the House (in a Chamber near the long Gallery in White-hall) had a large conference, where, and to whom he stifly maintained the same to their faces, calling this purged Parliament, a mock-power, and a mock-Parliament.59

Ireton, probably uncomfortable with what was already the pragmatic solution he had been working to, was also uncomfortable with the purge. Legitimacy and political allies were, however, essential to help enforce justice, and thus, in the short term, Ireton had to accept a purge. The perceived dangers to their position from Parliament’s continuing discussions in relation to the Newport Treaty and the fact that they could not rely on their allies in Parliament probably forced the hand of Ireton and the army. The purge provided a practical solution. Ludlow wrote that as a result of the MPs expressing their concerns about removing themselves from their colleagues ‘Ireton sent me word, that now he hoped they should please me’ (i.e. the army would purge Parliament).60 In the long term however the politics 56 57 58 59 60

BL, E474(13), Declaration, p. 6. Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 206. Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 209–10; Worden, Rump Parliament, p. 23. Lilburne, LFL, p. 38. Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 206. 169

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of the purge would have been another reason as to why in 1649 Ireton was probably prepared to abandon the Agreement and contemplate settling in Ireland. Increased pressure from the army on Parliament was clear to all. The army took note of the poor reception of its Remonstrance, stating that they were ‘drawing up’ to London and that there should be justice.61 Others also stressed that Parliament could be judged.62 Prynne and others in the Commons responded to the pressure from the army by moving that ‘the city might be ordered to stand upon their guard and the army to be declared rebels and traitors’.63 The army’s march towards London applied further pressure on Parliament. Peter preached to the army before it marched on London.64 Ireton, Constable, Harrison, Whalley and Hewson drafted a Declaration, appearing on 30 November, which justified their march and denounced the poor reception given their Remonstrance.65 On the same day a Remonstrance to the City of London was reissued. A subcommittee of six, including Ireton and Harrison, organised the details for the army’s action against Parliament. Gentles has argued that the ‘militant character of this committee points to Ireton’s control of the army’s political strategy’.66 Ireton had gone back into Parliament on 30 November. His observations and subsequent conversations with Ludlow appear to have made up his mind that action by the army needed to be fairly imminent, ‘considering how the Members of Belial flock’t this day about the righteous’.67 The army subsequently 61

BL, E474(13), THE DECLARATION Of His Excellency The Lord General FAIRFAX, AND HIS General Councel OF OFFICERS (30 Nov. 1648), pp. 4, 7; BL, E475(10), The Demands of his Excellency Tho. Lord Farifax. And the Generall Councell of the Army, In prosecution of the late Remonstrance (30 Nov. 1648), BL, E475(25), The Humble Proposals and desires of His Excellency the Lord Fairfax, And of the General Councel of Officers, In order to a speedy prosecution of JUSTICE, and the Settlement formerly propounded by them (6 Dec. 1648), pp. 6–7; BL, E475(30), The Articles and Charge of the Armie Against Fourscore and odd of the Parliament men, who have acted contrary to the trust reposed in them by the People, and would have his Majesties late concessions to be a Ground of Peace (8 Dec. 1648). 62 BL, E467(9), Salus Populi, p. 17. 63 Morrill and Baker, ‘Zeruiah’, p. 26. 64 NewDNB entry for Hugh Peter by Carla Pestana. 65 Clarke Papers, II, p. 61; BL, E474(13), THE DECLARATION Of His Excellency The Lord General FAIRFAX, AND HIS General Councel OF OFFICERS (30 Nov. 1648), pp. 4, 7. 66 Gentles, NMA, p. 278, 518–19n.71; Clarke Papers, II, p. 56. The committee was composed of Ireton, Thomas Hammond, Constable, Harrison, Whalley, Thomlinson and Whichcote. 67 BL, E465(19), Mercurius Pragmaticus, no.27 (26 Sept.–3 Oct. 1648); Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p. 115. ‘Belial’ was a reference to worthlessness or a very wicked person in Psalm 18:4. Given Ireton’s comments on Parliament in his letter of 22 November to Hammond it is probable that Ireton would also have seen them in the light of 1 Samuel 12, ‘Now the sons of Eli were sons of Belial; they knew not the Lord’. It was thus no doubt a deliberate act to take the expelled members to the ‘Hell’ public house. 170

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justified their actions by citing Parliament’s negotiation with Charles over the Newport Treaty: ‘the consideration of our Remonstrance, on the day appointed, was waived and laid aside; the Treaty, the mean while, going on in the former way and terms, like to be concluded the very next day.’68 A letter from the headquarters of the army using Remonstrance terminology stated that ‘the disease being desperate there could be nothing thought upon but a desperate cure’.69 Ireton proceeded to organise a military coup. The impression that Fairfax no longer controlled the army cannot be avoided. He still hoped the continuing approaches to Charles, without appearing to help foster them, would be successful.70 Fairfax’s latest biographer argued that since the approval of the ‘Remonstrance and the launching of the Army on an illegal course, Ireton, not Fairfax, had been taking the major decisions’.71 Gentles has written that between 1647 and 1649 Fairfax ‘was manipulated by men much shrewder than himself’ and that in ‘the world of subtle intrigue and political manoeuvre he was out of his depth and helpless to thwart the efforts of men far more adept than himself’.72 A contemporary wrote of Fairfax being ‘easily seduced’. 73 Another saw him as a ‘Cifer’.74 This may have been why Fairfax was so keen for Cromwell to leave Pontefract to discuss the Remonstrance with him directly.75 He may have believed that Cromwell could restrain Ireton. Others felt that Cromwell also manipulated Thomas Fairfax. In writing about Cromwell, a pamphleteer stated, ‘though Sir Thomas Fairfax bear the name, yet its-wel known you are the man, you are the primum mobile, that moves all in the Army’.76 Fairfax was prepared for a letter in his name from

68 BL, E474(13), THE DECLARATION Of His Excellency The Lord General FAIRFAX, AND HIS General Councel of OFFICERS, Shewing the Grounds of the Armies Advance towards the City of LONDON (30 Nov. 1648), p. 4. 69 Clarke Papers, II, pp. 67–9; BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 8. 70 Underdown, Pride’s Purge, pp. 140–1, 148, 191; Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, pp. 209–10; BL, E475(29); Letter of intelligence (20 Nov. 1648); Bodleian Library, Clarendon Ms 31 fol. 312. When Lambert presented the issue of the Remonstrance to the Northern Association Army he acquainted them with letters from the General Council of the New Model, Cromwell and Fairfax. Lambert’s own letter to Fairfax about the acceptance of the Remonstrance was markedly restrained in comparison to how he was perceived to have supported the Remonstrance when discussing it with his troops. Part of the reason for Lambert’s reticence may well have been due to knowledge of Fairfax’s likely reservations with regard to the Remonstrance. 71 Wilson, Fairfax, p. 148. A new biography of Fairfax is currently being prepared by Dr. A.J. Hopper (Manchester University Press). 72 NewDNB Fairfax entry by Ian Gentles. 73 Guerdon, A Most Learned, Conscientious and Devout Exercise, p. 8. 74 BL, E550(14), John Lilburne, The Picture of the Council of State (4 April 1649), p. 17. 75 Clarke Papers, II, pp. 62–3. 76 BL, E421(20), A Word to Lieutenant General Cromwell and two Words for the settling of the King, Parliament and Kingdom (Dec. 1647), p. 6.

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his army to be sent to the speaker of the Commons, asking for an answer to the Remonstrance.77 Although Fairfax signed the letter, Wedgwood believed that ‘the guiding mind and the strong hand were Ireton’s’:78 It is not unknown to you, how and how long we have waited for some things from you, respecting our Remonstrance, and the present condition of the kingdom: but receiving nothing in answer to the one, nor remedy to the other, we do hereby again let you know, that we are so apprehensive of the present juncture of affairs, that, through fault of such helps as we might have had from you, we are attending and improving the providence of God, for the gaining of such ends as we have proposed in our aforesaid Remonstrance.79

Fairfax repudiated any involvement in Pride’s purge. He later claimed that others: carried it on with such secrecy as I had not the least intimation of it till it was done, as some of the members of the House can witness, with whom I was at that very time upon special business when that attempt was made by Colonel Pride upon the Parliament, which I protest I never had any knowledge of till it was done. The reason why it was so secretly carried that I should have no notice of it was, because I always prevented those designs when I saw them.80

Fairfax protested his innocence too much, but the planning of a military coup on 5 December does appear to have been made elsewhere. According to the testimony of Ludlow, on 5 December, ‘Ireton went to Sir Thomas and acquainted him with the necessity of this extraordinary way of proceeding, having taken care to have the army drawn up the next morning by seven of the clock’.81 The regiments of Ireton’s close political associates, Colonels Rich, Hardress Waller, Hewson and Pride were selected for the task. Pocock saw Pride’s purge as symptomatic of Ireton’s position at Putney. Ireton’s arguments there: suggest the ideological explanation of why, a year and a half later, he rejected one of the few opportunities for revolutionary action ever afforded an English statesman . . . such an attitude issued logically enough from Ireton’s mode of arguing that social structures, laws, and institutions were prerequisite to the political wills of men.82

77

Cary, Memorials, II, pp. 70–1; Gentles, NMA, p. 279. Wedgwood, Trial, p. 37; Clarke Papers, II, p. 61; Rushworth, Historical Collections, VII, p. 1341; BL, E474(13), Declaration of the Lord General. 79 Cary, Memorials, II, pp. 70–1. 80 Markham, Fairfax, pp. 343–4n.4. 81 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 210. 82 Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, pp. 376–7. 78

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This interpretation derives too much from the perspective of political theory and focus on the Leveller position being divorced from the practical context of the politics of the army. A letter from army headquarters of 12 December argued that ‘to dissolve the Parliament would have bin counted a rash act; to purge it by a force would be thought a bold and unwarrantable attempt’. 83 Ireton did not want a purge. He did not get what he wanted. Underdown has argued that: The ‘honest members’ did not issue their expected declaration of secession, and it must have been Ireton’s knowledge of their obstinacy which forced the reversal. On Ludlow’s evidence it was only during the march that Ireton gave way to the civilians and accepted the alternative of a purge.84

Ireton might have accepted it because his inclination for ‘social structures, laws, and institutions’ would act as a control on the wills of men but he was clearly not happy with the compromise he had made. After the King’s execution, according to Lenthall, he showed his desire to make a clean break with the past by proposing that the very name of Parliament should be changed to ‘the representative of the people’.85 That the arrested MPs were taken to the Hell public house was probably a deliberate political comment by the army leadership.86 The desire of the pragmatic Ireton for civil peace may have drawn him back from the brink of dissolution but the purge, as contemporaries recognised, was a revolutionary act. The army’s subsequent justification for the purge indicated this. They had been ‘necessitated unto some extraordinary vigorous and speedy way, whereby those roots of Faction, Division, and private Interests may be weeded out’.87 The purge of Parliament was accompanied by a purge of the ‘government of London’ with money extracted from the city treasuries for the troops.88 Ireton had planned and led a military coup.89

III Cromwell no doubt welcomed the compromise when he arrived on the evening of 6 December 1648, after the purge had been completed, naturally much to 83

Clarke Papers, II, p. 67. Underdown, Pride’s Purge, pp. 132–3; Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 206. 85 W1988, Monarchy Asserted, To be the best, most Ancient and legall form of Government, in a conference had at Whitehall, with Oliver late Lord Protector & a Committee of Parliament (1660), p. 13; Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p. 285. 86 Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p. 148n.13; Pepys’ diary indicates two other public houses adjoining Westminster Hall: Heaven and Purgatory. 87 BL, E475(25), The Humble Proposals, p. 3. 88 Gentles, ‘London in the Second Civil War’, pp. 301, 303–4. 89 B. Manning, 1649. The Crisis of the English Revolution (1992), pp. 13–24. 84

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the suspicion of some contemporaries and historians.90 Gentles however has dismissed suggestions that Cromwell used the Pontefract siege as a delaying tactic. It was an important assignment. Cromwell also had to await the return of Lambert from Edinburgh.91 Gardiner also saw no design on Cromwell’s part in his timely arrival in London.92 Other historians have been more inclined to believe that Cromwell was delaying at Pontefract and to link this to other occasions in his career where he temporised. Gaunt writes of Cromwell as ‘a man still undecided, an accomplice after the fact’, which Woolrych regards as ‘typical of him’.93 Woolrych believes that Cromwell ‘could not yet go all the way with Ireton’.94 Cromwell may have delayed due to reluctance ‘to be associated with an unconstitutional use of force against Parliament. Alternatively, it may be that he supported the army’s actions, but preferred to wait on political events without taking the lead in so bold a move.’95 It is likely that Cromwell had concerns about the momentum being built up in the army by Ireton for a dissolution, not a purge, of Parliament. Although Pontefract was an important assignment a commander as experienced as Lambert could have managed it. Cromwell could have handed over command and embarked on his journey to London by the middle of November.96 However, although action against Parliament had been under discussion for some time the exact timing of Pride’s purge was only forced by the vote in the Commons on 5 December by 129 to 83 that there was ‘a ground for the course to proceed upon for the settlement of the peace of the kingdom’.97 Cromwell was on his way south before this vote. A letter from army headquarters of 12 December stated that finding ‘the disease being desperate there could be nothing thought upon but a desperate cure’.98 This phraseology mirrored that in the Remonstrance from November, ‘desperate cure in a desperate case’, in justifying its arguments.99 The timing of the purge had been dictated not

90 BL, E476(2), Mercurius Pragmaticus, nos. 36,37 (5–12 Dec. 1648), ‘Hugh Peter (that knowes all) came to the rest, and avowed this to be the Act of the Generall, and Lieut.Gen . . . and when all was done, in came Nol.Cromwell to Towne at night, as if he (poore man) had no hand in the Busines’. For a more detailed consideration of Cromwell’s position in relation to the purge and subsequent regicide see, E.A.V. Beesley, ‘Aspects of the English Revolution December 1648–May 1649’, Bristol University Ph.D. (2001). 91 Gentles, NMA, pp. 284–5. 92 Gardiner, Civil War, IV, p. 272. 93 P. Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell (1996), p. 102; Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, pp. 424–5. 94 Woolrych, ‘Cromwell as a Soldier’, in Morrill (ed.), Cromwell, p. 110. 95 Smith, British Isles, p. 160. I would like to thank Beth Jones for reference to Smith’s argument. 96 It was reported at Pontefract on 10 November that Lambert, on his return from supporting the Argyll’s political coup in Edinburgh, was ‘20 miles on this side of Barwick’, BL, E472(9), Packets of Letters, no.35 (14 Nov. 1648), p. 4. 97 Gardiner, Civil War, IV, p. 266. 98 Clarke Papers, II, pp. 67–9. 99 BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 6.

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by Ireton but by the MPs, and thus the timing of Cromwell’s arrival was a coincidence. Underdown has stated that Cromwell’s ‘late arrival, indeed his behaviour during the entire month before the Purge, suggests that he was a reluctant accomplice of the revolution, however fully he had been kept informed of Ireton’s intentions’.100 Lamont believes that Ireton saw the hand of God in Pride’s purge, although this is debatable given his original intentions, whereas Cromwell was slower in coming to this conclusion. 101 For Underdown, Cromwell’s arrival at the centre of the revolution had a fundamental impact upon its direction: Before the Purge Ireton had made the running, in alliance (though sometimes in conflict over details) with Ludlow and the radical MPs, but always providing firm and decisive leadership for the more militant colonels and junior officers. Once Cromwell was in London, however, the clarity and directness of Army policy disappeared; there were hesitations, changes of line.102

Adamson also argued that once ‘the army leadership found itself masters of the Parliament, the clarity of purpose that had shone through its public manifestos in November was clouded by indecision’.103 Such interpretations do fit with the picture of periods of hesitancy before decisive action throughout Cromwell’s career. Yet the negative connotations of these interpretations should not blind us to the fact that compromise was politically exactly what was needed given the circumstances the army leadership faced after the purge. Such an approach would necessarily need to be, and would appear to be, less decisive. Ireton and the army wanted and needed to work with other groups, from MPs to Levellers. This explains why Parliament was purged rather than dissolved. Cromwell provided a much firmer link to more MPs than Ireton’s connections allowed him. Furthermore there were differences within that leadership over how fast and far they should proceed with justice. As Gentles has argued, the ‘urgent need to widen the army’s political base, combined with insistent pressure from below, explains why Ireton and the other grandees leaned so far in the direction of an Agreement of the people’.104 It is also clear in how Ireton wanted the Agreement to be as inclusive as possible.105 Cromwell and Ireton were not,

100

Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p. 148. W. Lamont, ‘Puritanism, Liberty and the Putney Debates’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 243. 102 Underdown, Pride’s Purge, pp. 166–7. 103 Adamson, ‘Junto’, p. 36. 104 Gentles, ‘Agreement’, in Mendle (ed.), Putney Debates, p. 158. 105 Clarke Papers, II, p. 82. 101

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after 6 December 1648, ‘the new Turkish Tyrants’ and sought to work with others.106 Cromwell may have been more forthright in his willingness to gain as broad a support as possible but Ireton could also recognise the political viability of such an approach. Any interpretation of the relationship between Ireton and Cromwell which saw the latter being manipulated by the ‘cunningest of Machiavillians’, his son-in-law, should not be too readily accepted.107 Cromwell was a shrewd political operator. They remained a close political partnership. After the purge and despite Cromwell’s arrival, Ireton retained a prominent role in directing army strategy. Ireton, Whalley and Rich freed sixteen of the imprisoned members, but did not give them permission to return to Parliament.108 Prynne, who managed to get into this meeting with the MPs, denounced Ireton directly in print for his role in Pride’s purge.109 A report of the meeting of the sixteen MPs with the army officers, mirrored closely in Nedham’s Mercurius Pragmaticus, revealed that the MPs: At their first coming, Ireton saluted them, and spying Prynne there, was much enraged at the marshall for bringing him without order, and required Prynne to be gone, which he refusing, Ireton threatened to throw him out by force, which he [Prynne] perceiving delivered a protestation openly, in the name of himself and the rest, against the army’s proceedings.110

As with many other incidents during this period Fairfax had no direct involvement as he was, again, laid low by illness: [On] 20. of December the Generall sent for 16. of the imprisoned Members to his lodging: where coming, Commissary Ireton, Col.Whaley, and Col.Rich acquainted them that the Generall was fallen sodainly ill, and kept his Chamber, and therefore left them to acquaint them with his minde. That they were all absolutely discharged: and had free liberty to go to their lodgings and houses; but did expect they should act nothing contrary to the present actings.111

106

BL, E476(34), The Tyranny of Tyrannies (19 Dec. 1648). Lilburne, LFL, p. 35; Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, p. 423. 108 BL, E477(19), THE SECOND PART OF THE NARRATIVE Concerning the Armies Force and Violence upon the COMMONS HOUSE, AND MEMBERS (23 Dec. 1648), p. 8. 109 BL, E476(37), William Prynne, Articles of impeachment of high-treason, exhibited by the Commons of England, in a free Parliament, against Lieutenant-General Oliver Crumwel Esquire, Commissary-General Henry Ireton Esquire, Sir Hardress Waller (19 Dec. 1648). 110 Morrill and Baker, ‘Zeruiah’, p. 32. 111 BL, E477(19), THE SECOND PART OF THE NARRATIVE Concerning the Armies Force and Violence upon the COMMONS HOUSE, AND MEMBERS (1648), p. 8. 107

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It is very possible that what was in Fairfax’s ‘minde’ and transmitted to the sixteen MPs was Ireton’s reading of it. Fairfax’s illness may have been brought on because, as Gentles believes, he was ‘greatly embarrassed by events over which by now he had no control’.112

112

Gentles, NMA, p. 297.The idea of Fairfax’s lack of control is clear in some contemporary literature. See e.g. A New Magna Carta, 1648 Enacted and confirmed by the High and Mighty States, the Remainder of the Lords and Commons now sitting at Westminster in empty Parliament under the command and wardship of Sir Thomas Fairfax, Lieut Gen Cromwell (our present Soveraigne Lord the King, now residing at his Royall palace in Whitehall), and Prince Ireton his sonn and the Army under theire command. 177

8

Regicide, 1648–1649

The army leadership’s hesitation following the purge grew out of the need for genuine reflection with regard to the nature of any future political settlement. The Whitehall debates were designed to facilitate this process and, for Ireton, to forge as broad an Agreement as possible to give legitimacy to any new regime in the hope of establishing and maintaining civil peace. Lilburne, for his part, argued that the Whitehall debates were engineered by the army leadership to keep the Levellers and army radicals occupied.1 This has been accepted by Underdown.2 Ireton’s approach to the Whitehall debates would suggest otherwise. Ireton’s tone grated upon those with whom he debated, yet his words implied a genuine desire for a broad settlement. This may have had a political element to it by isolating the radicals, but such an approach also derived from the essentially consensual nature of army politics. Massarella, drawing upon letters now in the National Library of Scotland, detects real enthusiasm for the Agreement.3 Gentles in turn has argued that all ‘the participants, among whom Ireton was preeminent, appeared to share the conviction that they were taking part in deliberations of the greatest political and historical importance’.4 Taft has shown how the Whitehall debates provide another example of how the army entered into genuine debate across its own membership, with its political allies as well as the Levellers, who it sought to incorporate into any new polity.5

1

Lilburne, LFL, in Clarke Papers, II, p. 264. Underdown, Pride’s Purge, pp. 198–9. Underdown argued that ‘there is no need to revise the traditional conclusion that Ireton and his officers kept the Army Levellers talking while they went ahead with their own more limited revolutions’. 3 Massarella, ‘Politics of the Army’, p. 187. 4 Gentles, NMA, p. 286. 5 Barber (Regicide and Republicanism, p. 4), reminds us of the factions within the Levellers; it was not a party or a unified grouping. 2

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At Whitehall, Sir Hardress Waller stated that ‘if there bee nott neede of an Agreement now, there never was since the sons of men were uppon earth’.6 He stressed: I am sure there needes somethinge to goe out from you. You promised itt in your Remonstrance. Wee are now gott into the midst of January. Whether every man does nott see that thousands and tenn thousands of men are sencelesse? You have lost two monthes.7

Harrison emphasised the importance of the Agreement: Our Agreement shall bee from God, and nott from men; and yet I thinke the hand of God doth call for us to hold forth [something] to this Nation, and to all the world to vindicate that profession wee have all alonge made to God, [and] that wee should lett them know that wee seeke nott for ourselves butt for men.8

The Whitehall debates may have been more of a ‘moment’ than Putney. The royalist Evelyn, who gained access to the Whitehall debates on 18 December, ‘heard horrid villanies’.9 If not ‘villanies’ it is clear that radical choices were debated at Whitehall. Both Ireton and Cromwell argued for an end to the present Parliament. Ireton sought an Agreement as broad as possible ‘for our civill rights uppon those thinges wherein wee are agreed, and lett us [not] make such a thinge necessary to the agreement as will inevitably exclude one of us from the agreement’.10 Ireton stressed the need to maintain civil peace. He stated: ‘men as men are corrupt and will bee soe.’11 This reflected a view expounded in the Remonstrance of the ‘depraved state of mankinde’.12 Central to Ireton’s argument on 14 December for the magistrate to be given powers with regard to religion was the context of maintaining civil peace, but his words make clear that this was central to all of his political thinking: the foundation of the necessity – the ground of the necessity – [of] the determination of this point now, is fix’t uppon this: that wee have had warres and troubles in the Nation, and that hath bin for want of ascertayning the power in which men should have acquies’d in the Nation, and for that men have nott knowne where to acquiesce. If the meaning of this bee, that itt hath bin for want of knowing what power Magistracie hath had, I must needes say that utt hath bin a cleare mistake [to say] that this was the ground of the warres. The grounds have bin these: That wheras itt is well and generally knowne what is the matter of the

6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Clarke Papers, II, pp. 180–1. Clarke Papers, II, pp. 180–1. Clarke Papers, II, p. 186. Beer (ed.), Evelyn Diary, II, p. 546. Clarke Papers, II, p. 82. Clarke Papers, II, p. 179. BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 47. 179

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supreame trust (that is all thinges necessary for the preserving of peace) [it is not so well known] what is the end of civill societie and Commonwealthes. If I did looke att libertie [alone] I would minde noe such thinge [as a Commonwealth]; for then I am most free when I have noebody to minde mee. Nor doe I finde anythinge else that’s imediately necessary, nott [as the cause] of making any power amongst men, but the preserving of humane society in peace. Butt withall to looke att such a trust. That you comitt the trust to persons for the preserving of peace that they may use it in such a way as may bee most suitable in civill societie, that are most probable and hopefull for [preserving] libertie, and nott [like] to make us slaves, as itt may bee most hopefull for the common and equall right amonge us, as may be most hopefull to provide for the prosperitie and flourishing state of the nation. That the necessary thinge, that which necessarily leads all men into civill agreements or contracts, or to make Commonwealthes, is the necessity of itt for preserving peace.13

The desire for civil peace permeated Ireton’s stance at Whitehall as a ‘conservative tolerationist’, one who felt that there needed to be limited religious toleration.14 In so doing Ireton not only disagreed with many of the junior officers there but also with his close colleague Colonel Rich, who was politically moderate, but in religion a ‘radical libertarian’. Rich ‘spoke against allowing the magistrate any power over men’s consciences’.15 Ireton argued that all, including the first four of the ten commandments, ‘were known to be true from natural reason and from divine revelation, that they had not been abrogated by the gospel, and should therefore be enforced by the magistrate’.16 Davis shows that Ireton’s conception of man as ‘corrupt’ clashed with his argument that there needed to be a restriction on religious freedom, for if men were ‘corrupt’ who would impose control?17 In a similar vein the political question was, ‘what kinde of power wee should committ with those that have the supreame trust’?18 This complex interaction between Ireton’s political and religious ideas had been reflected much earlier in Ireton’s military banner: ‘In human affairs oppose force with force; in divine affairs, he serves God chooses

13

Clarke Papers, II, p. 79. J. Coffey, ‘Puritanism and Liberty Revisited: The Case for Toleration in the English Revolution’, Historical Journal, 41: 4 (1998), p. 970. 15 NewDNB Rich entry by Ian Gentles. 16 Clarke Papers, II, p. 112; D. Wooton, ‘Leveller democracy and the Puritan Revolution’, in J. Burns (ed.), The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450–1700 (1991), pp. 439–40. In debating the question Ireton stated: ‘whether the Magistrate have or ought to have any power of retrayning men, by penalties or otherwise, from the profession or practice of any thinge the evill or good whereof relates to God only?’ He continued, ‘I take it for granted that [the things commanded in] those words which wee call the fower first Commandements they are matters of religion, the fault of non-performance whereof relates to God only.’ 17 J.C. Davis, ‘Religion and the Struggle for Freedom in the English Revolution’, Historical Journal, 35: 3 (1992), pp. 515–16n.40; J.F. Maclear, ‘Isaac Watts and the Idea of Public Religion’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 53: 1 (1992), pp. 27–8. 18 Clarke Papers, II, p. 80. 14

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or enrolls.’19 Nevertheless, in the different context of July 1649 Ireton acted as teller with Cromwell in the Commons against a motion which sought the authority to silence ministers preaching against the government.20 Contradictions abounded in Ireton’s stance at Whitehall. He acknowledged the necessity for government as all men were ‘corrupt’, but that government needed to be constructed out of the propertied class. Law and government was to be wielded by the ‘honest’ men of ‘property’. The Agreement would protect fundamentals ‘above the flawed individuals who carried the burden of administering it’.21 Ireton was caught between ‘honest’ men making good government and good government making honest men. His thinking would lead to honest dictatorship, as initial compulsion would secure good government and bring more men to become ‘honest’. Whitehall, where he was outvoted by the junior officers, may have reinforced to him the need for rule by oligarchy. Ireton’s lead in trying to shape the questions and debate at Whitehall is clear.22 There were set orders for discussing questions which Ireton reiterated, arguing that ‘Otherwise wee shall, as farre as my reason goes, perplex ourselves and all that heare us’.23 His stubborness, as at Putney, overcame many of the objections of Overton and Lilburne.24 Defeated on the crucial issues of religious restrictions and punishment where ‘no law hath been provided’, Taft has shown that he accepted this.25 Yet Ireton’s success may also be seen as a reason for the failure of the Agreement. For Taft, Ireton drove ‘the authors of the second Agreement . . . to face up to political realities’.26 This meant that the ‘compromise Agreement was a viable constitution’. The problem was that as a compromise it ‘was never strongly supported by those who assembled it or those to whom it was addressed’. Yet Ireton also made it clear that he regarded it as merely a temporary necessary constitutional form. For ‘the nature of this [Agreement] is, that uppon that ground [that] till God doe soe breake itt there will be some power exercised’.27 He did not pursue the Agreement because at the time he would naturally be more focused on the trial of the King. Taft has also argued that Ireton’s ‘resolve was shaken’ by doubt as to whether what they were doing, especially in relation to the King, was God’s work.28 19

I. Gentles, ‘Why Men Fought in the British Civil Wars, 1639–1652’, History Teacher, 26: 4 (1993). Another translation of this has been suggested: ‘In matters divine, he who lets in (surrenders) preserves: in matters human, meet force with force.’ The Latin was PRO DIVINIS QUI ADMITTIT SERVAT (PRO) HUMANIS VIM VI. 20 Davis, Cromwell, p. 134. 21 Barber, Regicide and Republicanism, p. 7. 22 Clarke Papers, II, p. 78–83, 104–5. 23 Clarke Papers, II, p. 79. 24 C. Polizzotto, ‘Liberty of Conscience and the Whitehall Debates of 1648–9’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 25: 1 (1975), p. 77. 25 Taft, ‘Voting Lists’; Taft, ‘Ireton’, p. 192. 26 Taft, ‘The Council of Officers’ Agreement’, Historical Journal, 28 (1985), pp. 162–3. 27 Clarke Papers, II, p. 176. 28 Taft, in Mendle, pp. 192–3. 181

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V Notwithstanding their agreement on the Remonstrance, Underdown claimed: Cromwell and his son-in-law were seriously at odds. Ireton wanted to have him [the King] tried first, before the others, such as Hamilton, against whom proceedings were intended: Cromwell wanted to take Hamilton first, presumably to allow more time to bring the King to reason.29

Another reason for Cromwell’s focus on Hamilton has been given by Gentles. He argued that it ‘would have furnished watertight evidence’ against Charles.30 Gardiner wrote of Cromwell’s opposition to Ireton over the proceedings against Norwich and Capel.31 According to Clarendon, Ireton and Fairfax differed over how to proceed against Hamilton.32 Marchamont Nedham deemed Ireton and Hugh Peter to be most forward in their antipathy to the King; Cromwell seemed much more willing to reach a settlement:33 Ireton declared, they had conquered the Kingdom twice; and therefore it was fit they should bring the King, the capitall enemy thereof, to speedy justice: there were six in the council that were very hot for justice; and Hugh Peter did very gravely shew the necessity of it; but Cromwell had more wit in his anger, and told them there was no policy in taking away his life.34

It is likely that Ireton would have been one of the six who ‘were very hot for justice’. Although a detailed analysis of the positions of the officers within the Army Council is not possible, enough evidence exists to illustrate Ireton’s primacy within the Army Council. He missed only one meeting, that of 23 December, of the twelve councils between 7 November and 29 December.35 The Whitehall debates also indicate that Ireton pushed more forcefully for the end of the present Parliament and was prepared for what amounted to a dictatorship of ‘honest’ men.36 Cromwell himself, and others in the army, countenanced such an approach, in part due to their sense of alienation from 29

Underdown, Pride’s Purge, pp. 168–9, quoting from Grignon to Brienne (21 Dec. 1648), which is reproduced in Gardiner, Civil War, III, p. 551n. 30 Gentles, NMA, p. 285. 31 Gardiner, Civil War, IV, p. 192. 32 B. Donagan, ‘Atrocity, War Crime, and Treason in the English Civil War’, American Historical Review, 99: 4 (1999), p. 1163n.87. 33 Morrill and Baker, ‘Zeruiah’, p. 30. 34 BL, E536(27), Mercurius Melancholius (25 Dec. 1648–1 Jan. 1649), p. 7. While care is needed with this newspaper report Cromwell commented that ‘itt is our duty as Christians and men to consider the consequences, and to consider the way’, Clarke Papers, I, p. 238; Morrill and Baker, ‘Zeruiah’. 35 Clarke Papers, Appendix D. 36 Taft, ‘Council’, pp. 161–2. 182

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an ungodly population.37 Cromwell drew heavily on the prophet Isaiah. Morrill argues that Cromwell ‘was working out his own destiny in relation to God’s plan, and God was no democrat. He had worked through a godly remnant in the days of Isaiah and he could and would do so again’. 38 At Reading, Cromwell had declared that the consideration should be ‘what’s for their good, nott what pleases them’.39 Ireton’s stance since Pride’s purge and indeed before indicated that he appreciated the political need to have the broadest support for any army action. Ireton viewed a core within the army as ‘honest’ and its cause legitimised by God but he would have been very aware, as Cromwell was, of the political dangers regicide would create. Cromwell may have been looking at more negotiated solutions but Ireton proceeded with the more practical matters. Committed to a trial and regicide, he would have been prepared to allow others to pursue other approaches to settlement, in the knowledge that Charles I would never come to an agreement. Charles’ intransigence would force the more hesitant Cromwell closer to his approach. Cromwell’s hesitancy has been noted. Coward has argued that after ‘Cromwell reached London he rarely attended meetings of the Army Council, where Ireton pushed ahead with arrangements for the King’s trial’. Instead, although Cromwell lived in Whitehall, it was only after the failure of the Denbigh Mission that Cromwell ‘at last joined Ireton’s revolution’.40 Woolrych has stated that it is ‘hard to escape the conclusion that he [Cromwell] had still doubts about Ireton’s efforts’.41 It is also possible, adding to the confusion, that Cromwell and Ireton co-ordinated strategy privately. Their approaches may have differed, they both may have agreed to test the waters in different ways as they sought a way out of an impasse of Charles’ own making. Cromwell does appear to have sought a non-regicidal solution through the Denbigh Mission.42 On 15 December Cromwell and Ireton visited Warwick ‘perhaps to discuss Denbigh’s compromise scheme’.43 On 18 December Denbigh, Pembroke, Salisbury and Northumberland met with the Council of Officers.44 Warwick had publicly declared his support for the army’s actions on 13 December resolving to ‘joyn with his Excellency and the Army for the impartiall executing of Justice’, further indicating to Charles his limited options.45 The Lords’ acceptance of the practical political primacy of the army

37

Gentles, NMA, p. 105. J. Morrill, ‘King-killing No Murder: Cromwell in 1648’, Cromwelliana (1998), p. 20. 39 Clarke Papers, I, p. 209. 40 B. Coward, Oliver Cromwell (1991), pp. 63–4. 41 Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, pp. 424–5. 42 For Cromwell and the Denbigh Mission see Morrill, ‘Zeruiah’, pp. 24. 30–1. 43 Adamson, ‘Peerage in Politics’, Ph.D., p. 263. 44 BL, E477(30), Mercurius Pragmaticus, no.39 (19–26 Dec. 1648); Gardiner, Civil War, IV, p. 285 only has a 19 December meeting. 45 BL, E536(5), KWI (19–26 Dec. 1648), p. 1196. 38

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in any projected settlement is partly implied in Denbigh’s willingness to act in a subservient position in his interaction with Fairfax. 46 The army’s confidence in its own position in relation to the Lords is indicated by the fact that the Remonstrance was addressed solely to the Commons. Indeed in January 1649 Ireton proposed ‘taking away power from men to oppresse the people, and nott leaving power hereditarie in men is some meanes of settlement’.47 Yet the Lords could still provide powerful political support in any approach to Charles. The removal of the ‘negative voice’ appeared central to the Denbigh scheme. Furthermore, Adamson claims that the Denbigh Mission was also designed to remove Ormond’s Irish threat which the King could still hold over his enemies.48 Some doubt exists as to how seriously the Denbigh Mission was regarded by the army leadership. Adamson has plausibly suggested that Ireton accompanied Cromwell to the Earl of Warwick because his father-in-law was ‘still trying to persuade his colleague to stop short of regicide after the trial of the King’.49 Yet Ireton could show Cromwell and others through the failure of the Denbigh Mission that he understood Charles better than they. It is even possible that Cromwell expected the Denbigh Mission to fail and it provided him with a means to appease his Parliamentary allies. Ireton would not have believed that Charles would agree to, let alone abide by, any suitable settlement by this stage. The Army Council voted on 25 December six to one to spare Charles if the King accepted Denbigh’s Mission. They could hardly not do so. That Charles refused to even receive Denbigh rendered their vote meaningless.50

46

Gardiner, Civil War, IV, p. 285. Clarke Papers, II, p. 179. 48 Adamson, ‘Junto’. 49 Adamson, ‘Peerage in Politics’, Ph.D., p. 263. 50 Morrill and Baker, ‘Zeruiah’, p. 30; Adamson, ‘Junto’, p. 56. The main contemporary source for the Denbigh Mission is Nedham. While Nedham is used to full advantage to play up the episode of the Denbigh Mission and the power of the Lords, elsewhere in the same article the author is dismissive of him as a source where he actually passes judgement on the Denbigh Mission as ‘a cynical attempt by a group [of] self-interested lords to bargain away the privileges of the peerage so long as they could hang on to their ill-gotten gains’; see Adamson, ‘Junto’, p. 63n.7. Nedham certainly tried to keep himself informed but his writing was always shaped by his agenda. As Peacey has shown, Nedham ‘expressed the views of those who distrusted the Scots and opposed a Presbyterian church settlement, and who favoured an alliance with the Westminster Independents’. With regard to the fate of Charles I ‘Nedham and the pro-Independent strand of royalist commentators [were] more inclined than their rivals to expect the King to survive, even if his power was removed, and to regard the legal proceedings against him as a form of negotiation with menaces, rather than as reflecting a bloodthirty desire for his death’ (Peacey, Pamphlets, p. 258). Nedham has also been seen by Peacey as having a ‘profound understanding of machinations at Westminster’ (‘Counterfeit’, p. 34). Nedham is a useful source for Westminster politics if his political leanings are taken into account but as the politics of this period were also 47

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VI At the time of the Denbigh Mission in late December 1648 and early 1649 Ireton’s actions leave little doubt of his total committement to the trial of Charles I. His experience of Charles, the Remonstrance, his role in the Whitehall debates and the framework he put in place to facilitate the trial, all suggest that Ireton wanted and expected the King to be executed. Scott has chosen to downplay Ireton’s achievements and position within the army between Pride’s purge and the start of the trial. Nevertheless, Ireton’s activity after 6 December suggests that he remained the central player in the English Revolution.51 On 22 December Cromwell and Ireton issued instructions as to the confinement of Charles at Windsor.52 The instructions outlined that when dealing with the King ‘nothing be done upon the knee’.53 It was reported that ‘the King is lodged in a very secure place, In time of night his doore is secured with strong Bolts, and his person with strong Guards that do attend him’. These were significant in how Charles was now regarded, not Pembroke’s appointment as Constable of Windsor. Pembroke had little credit with the army.54 He did not even take up the post, nominating Whitelocke in his place.55 On 24 December the Heads of the CHARGE AGAINST THE KING, Drawn up by The Generall Councell of the ARMIE was published. Gentles, with good reason, sees this as an Ireton document.56 This document again included the phrase that the kingdom was to be settled ‘either against the King, or without him’.57 It contained themes already aired in the Remonstrance but focused in particular more on Charles’ guilt than anything Ireton had been involved in to date. It listed the ‘Matters charged against the King’ as: 1. That his Majesty being trusted with a limited power to rule according to Law, and by expresse Covenant and Oath obliged to preserve and protect

centred in the army, Nedham has a limited context; he is, as Gentles has argued, ‘not the most trustworthy source for army politics’ (NMA, p. 515n.10). 51 D. Scott, Politics and War in the Three Kingdoms, 1637–49 (2004), pp. 190–1. 52 These instructions were the significant ones with regard to Charles’ treatment at Windsor rather than the 19 December decision by the Commons ‘at Fairfax’s behest’ to appoint Pembroke Constable of Windsor (Adamson, ‘Junto’, p. 40). Pembroke was a figure of derision within the army. He also did not take up his post at Windsor, appointing Whitelocke in his stead, which Adamson indicates, in ‘Junto’, p. 63n.15. 53 BL, E536(18), Moderate Intelligencer, no.197 (21–28 Dec. 1648), p. 1812; BL, E536(33), KWI, no.292 (26 Dec–2 Jan. 1649), p. 1205. 54 Clarke Mss 41 fols 22r, 133. 55 Adamson, ‘Junto’, p. 40 and p. 63n.15. 56 NewDNB Ireton entry by Ian Gentles. 57 BL, E477(25), Heads of the CHARGE AGAINST THE KING, Drawn up by The Generall Councell of the ARMIE (24 Dec. 1648), p. 1. 185

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the Rights and Liberties of the People, for and by whom he was intrusted, hath perverted that trust and abused that power, to the hurt and prejudice of the generality. . . . 2. the King hath granted Commissions to the Prince, as also to ORMOND and his associate Irish Rebells. . . . 3. That this capitall and grand offender and author of our troubles the person of the King . . . is guilty of all the trouble . . . expence of blood.58 A letter of late 1648 which originated within the army command illustrates a belief that the King could no longer be trusted and that he still schemed to reverse his military defeat: Who in his condition might have had any thing to feast him butt innocent blood. And this is what which both free and restrained hee always is contriving: would God it were otherwise, and that hee knew what a streame the blood of 300000 innocents would make. . . . In fine, converse with him in private, and you see him still the same and as the compus, whilst it hath one foote which stands fixt in the center, att the same tyme hath the other which perambulats in a circumference. Even so the King whilst his body is restrained with us, hath his minde and contrivances forming in most remote parts for desolating the remainder of that little which was saved from the fury of his last warres.59

It should also be remembered that at this time Ireton played a leading role in the Whitehall debates. The Agreement at the heart of these debates ‘took for granted the abolition of monarchy and the house of Lords’. At these debates Ireton argued for the deletion of the sixth reserve. This blocked punishment for acts not explicitly prohibited by law. Gentles argued that his focus on this was due to a fear that it might be used to prevent the trial of the King.60 Barber has written of how on 22 February 1649 ‘radicals’ in the Commons attempted to insert into the Engagement an oath for the Council of State to approve the regicide. The additional clause would have read, ‘I doe approve of the late acts of the Commons of England assembled in Parliament, erecting an high court of justice for the trying and adjudging of Charles Stuart’. It is quite likely that Ireton played some role in drafting this proposed addition to the Engagement; he certainly would have agreed with it. The tellers for this motion were Henry Marten and Ireton.61 Yet much more convincing than

58

BL, E477(25), Heads of the CHARGE AGAINST THE KING, Drawn up by The Generall Councell of the ARMIE (24 Dec. 1648), pp. 4–6. For the importance of Ormond in this period see J.S.A. Adamson, ‘The Frightened Junto: Perceptions of Ireland, and the last Attempts at Settlement with Charles I’, in Peacey (ed.), Regicides. 59 Bodleian Library, MS.Eng.c.6075; Bodleian Library Record, 16: 4 (1998), pp. 351–2. 60 NewDNB Ireton entry by Gentles. 61 S. Barber, ‘The Engagement’, p. 56. Barber argued that ‘Since Ireton’s membership of the council had been voted down, it is difficult to see how he could have had a significant 186

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this post-regicide information is how far Ireton was involved in the practical process leading to the regicide. Ireton took a very active and public role in the preparations for the King’s trial, then at the trial itself and in the preparations for the actual execution and its aftermath. He attended twelve of the nineteen sessions of the King’s trial that took place over a space of sixteen days, while also being engaged at the Whitehall debates.62 Ireton, with Cromwell and the republicans Henry Marten and Thomas Scot, were regarded as the men who steered the committee that drafted the list of Charles’ judges.63 Ireton, Scot, Marten and Cromwell were appointed to assist in drawing up a new charge against the King when the original, by Isaac Dorislaus and John Cook, was deemed inappropriate.64 Gentles points out that the charge against the King, read out in the Commons on 28 December, was ‘broadly similar’ to the army’s political indictment of a few days earlier in the Heads of the Charge. The end of this document stated that ‘these being the grand matters in charge against the King, (amongst others) they are to be put into forme, and then if they proceed to triall, it will be in a Parliamentary way, and the Army are to manage the proofs’.65 Charles was charged with a: Wicked design to erect and uphold in himself an unlimited and tyrannical power to rule according to his will, and to overthrow the rights and liberties of the people . . . take away and make void the foundations thereof . . . hath traiterously and maliciously levied war against the present Parliament, and the people therein represented.66

Morrill argued that the charge dwelt ‘on the events of 1648 . . . the case for executing Charles arose from what his opponents in the army came to see as his sacrilege in seeking – in the second civil war – to overturn the judgement

say in the wording of the oath, other than this attempt on the floor of the House’ (i.e. as a teller, p. 47). While he may not even have been put forward for the Council this should not have hindered him from having some say in the construction of the oath or its additional clauses given his position in the Commons and more importantly his predominant influence at the time through his role in the army and link with Cromwell. See also S. Kelsey, ‘Constructing the Council of State’, Parliamentary History, 22: 3 (2003). 62 State Trials, II. Listed at the start of each day’s proceedings are those in attendance, for both morning and afternoon sessions. 63 C.V. Wedgwood, The Trial of Charles I (1983), p. 101. 64 Wedgwood, Trial, p. 114. John Cook, according to Kelsey, was a ‘committed congregationalist solicitor’, ‘Staging of the Trial’, in Peacey (ed.), Regicides, p. 78. For Woolrych, Cook was a ‘thorough paced republican and a puritan fanatic’, Britain in Revolution, p. 431. 65 Gentles, NMA, pp. 300, 302; BL, E477(25), Heads of the CHARGE AGAINST THE KING, Drawn up by The Generall Councell of the ARMIE (24 Dec. 1648), p. 6. 66 S.R. Gardiner (ed.), Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625–1660 (1906), pp. 371–4. 187

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of God in giving the Parliament victory in the first civil war’.67 Ireton wanted the focus to be on 1648 to avoid comment on the negotiations he and the army leadership had conducted with the King in 1647. Ireton, Cromwell, Scot and others persuaded those remaining in the Lords to ‘implicitly’ accept the ‘legitimacy of the trial’. 68 Ireton, in a small subcommittee with Harrison, Marten, William Say, John Lisle and Nicholas Love, drew up the sentence against the King during the night of 25 January.69 This, echoing the Remonstrance, stated that ‘Charles Stuart, being admitted King . . . trusted with a limited power’.70 The death warrant required ‘all officers, soldiers, and others, the good people of this nation of England, to be assisting unto you’.71 Ireton was also appointed with Harrison, Deane, Okey and Waller to consider the time and place for the King’s execution.72 On the morning of the King’s execution a meeting took place in Ireton’s quarters, although he and Harrison, while in the room, seem to have stayed in bed.73 In ‘evidence’ at his trial Colonel Axtell implied that orders during the trial, although issued in the name of Fairfax, came directly from Ireton and Cromwell.74 Although post-regicide, Axtell’s information was probably an approximation of how publicly committed to the trial Ireton and Cromwell were in January 1649. Axtell’s post-Restoration information also fits with previous incidents, such as Pride’s purge, where Ireton, not Fairfax, appeared to be issuing orders to the army. Rumours abounded that a faction led by Fairfax tried to limit the charge against the King.75 A pamphlet of June 1649 gives an account of Ireton and Cromwell visiting Fairfax on Sunday, 28 January 1649. They did so in order to exert political pressure on their commander in response to attempts to get Fairfax to intervene to prevent regicide. Cromwell supposedly remarked that Fairfax was ‘easily seduced’ and asserted that ‘I thinke my selfe and sonne Ireton may prove of greater use to the Republique than any other’.76 It seems rather fanciful in the final days of the King’s life that Fairfax tried to save him. 67

J. Morrill, ‘Charles I, Tyranny and the English Civil War’, in J. Morrill, The Nature of the English Revolution (1993), p. 287; Gardiner (ed.), Constitutional Documents, p. 378. 68 S. Kelsey, ‘The Death of Charles I’, Historical Journal, 45: 4 (2002), p. 735. 69 Wedgwood, Trial, p. 152; A. Orr, Treason and the State: Law, Politics, and Ideology in the English Civil War (Cambridge, 2002), p. 198; Robertson, Cooke, p. 178. 70 Gardiner (ed.), Constitutional Documents, pp. 377–80; BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 21. 71 Gardiner (ed.), Constitutional Documents, p. 380. 72 Wedgwood, Trial, p. 165. 73 This is from evidence at the trial of the regicide Daniel Axtell; see T.B. Howell (ed.), Cobbett’s complete collection of state trials, 33 vols (1809), V, p. 1148; M. Brod, Politics and Prophecy in Seventeenth Century England: The Case of Elizabeth Poole’, Albion, 31: 3 (1999), p. 398n.12. 74 State Trials, II, p. 378. 75 Kelsey, ‘Politics and Procedure’, p. 12; BL, E536(24), A New Years Gift. 76 BL, E561(10), A. Guerdon, A Most Learned, Conscientious and Devout Exercise (1649), pp. 7–8; J. Morrill, ‘Cromwell and his Contemporaries’, in J. Morrill (ed.), Oliver Cromwell, 188

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The image of a cowering Fairfax is overstated. Fairfax’s comments to Juxon and Herbert after the King’s execution should not be attributed to ignorance of the deed but an enquiry as to Charles’ demeanour on the scaffold.77 Ireton and Cromwell certainly drove the trial on. Underdown argued that Fairfax like ‘everyone else’ was blind to Ireton and Cromwell’s real intentions. He may have rightly believed, down to the opening session of the court which he attended, that they did not earnestly seek the King’s execution.78 Their commander-in-chief was more than a ‘meer stalking-horse to their Designes’, but he was undermined by Ireton and Cromwell.79 The Dutch ambassador recorded that Cromwell and other officers interrupted his meeting with Fairfax ‘without asking permission or performing any act of civility’, which exemplifies Fairfax’s ‘political irrelevance’ by this stage.80 Kelsey has argued that the ‘King’s trial was contrived as a final bid for peaceful settlement, not a prelude to King-killing’.81 This view of the trial held by Nedham, a ‘royalist author’, may well have been the self-delusion of someone who did not want the King killed.82 Even in late December the author of a direct plea to Ireton could accept that the King should die but hoped that this would not happen.83 For some the trial may have been regarded as a final form of enforcement. Ireton would not have shared this view. As Burgess has pointed out, ‘given the range of views and attitudes amongst those who wished to bring the King to some sort of justice, it is quite possible for the trial to have been both an effort by some to save the King, and an act of Old Testament justice with only one outcome for others’.84 Ireton would probably have accepted some last-minute monarchical settlement if it proved a viable political solution to the problems faced. Ireton most likely believed, however, that Charles would not have accepted any attempt at settlement and thus the trial would lead to regicide. Nedham’s rather unrealistic appreciation of the situation is clear from his belief that Charles would not be killed if he: yield up his crown and dignity, send the church a begging, part with his negative voice, root up the fundamentals of Parliament, establish a perpetual state junto, or

pp. 265–7. See also a consideration of this pamphlet by Professor Morrill in his NewDNB entry for Cromwell in which he commented that this ‘pamphlet may be a distorted and hostile rendering of a very important actual event, and is worthy of serious study’. 77 Markham, Fairfax, p. 351; Fea, Memoirs, p. 147. 78 Underdown, Pride’s Purge, pp. 192–3. 79 BL, E537(20), Mercurius Pragmaticus, no.40 (26 Dec.–9 Jan. 1648–49), last page. 80 Gibb, Fairfax (1938), p. 212; NewDNB Fairfax entry by Ian Gentles. 81 Kelsey, ‘Death of Charles I’, abstract. 82 J. McElligott, ‘Propaganda and Censorship: the underground royalist newsbooks, 1647–1650’, Cambridge University Ph.D. (2001), p. 126. 83 BL, E536(12), A Plea for Moderation in the Transactions of the Army, p. A2. 84 Burgess, ‘Regicide’, p. 218. 189

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senate after the Venetian model, wherein none but the grandee brethren shall be admitted, and content himself with a share among them, as a duke, or Lord President.85

Nedham misread both Ireton and the King. He saw the trial as a form of terror used to gain concessions. However, Charles was not the kind to concede and Ireton, in any case, did not seek concessions. He did not believe that Charles would abide by any settlement.86 It is also very possible that the care taken over the trial was not to allow the King to avoid death but to ‘make the trial as convincingly legal as possible’.87 Royalist newsbooks ‘never addressed the question of what would happen if the King did not keep his word’, one reason being the widespread belief that Charles could not be trusted.88 There had been newspaper reports, before the trial had started, that Charles discussed the Remonstrance with those officers who guarded him at Windsor and had opted for martyrdom: His Majesty hath had some Discourse about the Remonstrance of the Army in relation to the bringing him to triall, and having received some notion of it, he hath demanded which way it could be done, whereupon a Socrattick Question was put unto him, that what if a charge should be brought against him for his life, according to the manner of triall of Subjects by the Lawes of the Kingdome, what would he then doe: The King made answer, that he would then returne no answer, And if they would proceede to put him to Death, that he would then dye patiently like a Martyr. 89

Cust, in the most recent study of Charles I, concluded that Charles ‘began seriously to face up to the possibility of his trial and martyrdom’. 90 Some royalists believed that the trial would lead to the execution of the King.91 After the event other royalists saw regicide as a device for the ambitions of Cromwell and Ireton.92 Nedham rightly deemed Ireton and Peter as most hostile to the 85 ‘ “ The counterfeit silly curr”: Money, Politics, and the Forging of Royalist Newspapers during the English Civil War’, Huntingdon Library Quarterly, 67: 1, p. 43. 86 J.T. Peacey, ‘Marchamont Nedham and the Lawrans Letters’, Bodleian Library Record (2000), pp. 26–7, 30. 87 Burgess, ‘Regicide’, p. 218. 88 McElligott, ‘underground royalist newsbooks’, p. 125. 89 BL, E536(33), KWI, no.292 (26 Dec.–2 Jan. 1649), pp. 1205–6; BL, E526(45), Perfect Occurences, no.104 (22–29 Dec. 1648), p. 779. 90 R. Cust, Charles I. A Political Life (2005), p. 445. 91 BL, E476(11), Independency Stript & Whipt, p. 8. 92 For example, BL, 669 fol. 13(76), The last damnable designe of Cromwell and Ireton, and their junto, or caball: (29 Jan. 1649); BL, E427(15), A new Magna Charta: enacted and confirmed by the high and mighty states, the remainder of the Lords and Commons, now sitting at Westminster, in empty Parliament, under the command and wardship of Sir Thomas Fairfax, Lievtenant Generall Cromwell (our present soveraigne lord the King, now residing at his royall pallace at White-Hall) and Prince Ireton his sonne, and the Army under their command (17 Feb. 1649).

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King but some of his context is distorted by an overemphasis on Westminster rather than army politics. By 8 January Nedham may have been forced to be more realistic and regard Charles’ execution as a possibility: ‘I fear this popular hurry may extend to the ruin of his majesty’s person immediately, because the grandees seem to give way, having found him obstinate against their unreasonable demands.’ His reasoning does not, however, completely square with his own recognition that Ireton was one of the most hostile to the King and had moved, rather than given way, as a result of Charles’ intransigence.93 Ireton’s apparent greater and earlier willingness to embrace regicide than others was predicated on his personal negotiations with the King in 1647 and having to address more directly the political framework for such action from the drafting of the Remonstrance in September 1648. Ireton’s more practical and political thinking made him a more ready regicide than the ‘reluctant’ Cromwell in December 1648. Like Cromwell, his religion allowed Ireton to act on the framework he had put in place by allowing him to feel secure in the knowledge that this was what God wanted. The search for this guidance was, however, an ongoing process that continued into January 1649.

VII Much speculation has concerned determining when the regicides, and Cromwell in particular, decided that Charles should be executed. Cromwell and Ireton had already made the decision that Charles deserved to die by the time of the Remonstrance. There is unlikely to be a source that indicates clearly when the actual decision that regicide needed to be enacted was made, although for Ireton it may be argued that he had come to that conclusion as he drafted the Remonstrance. There was no such moment; the determination to act developed and was confirmed by victory in the second civil war, the lack of other suitable alternatives and providence. Cromwell’s faith in providence is well known. Worden and Morrill, in particular, have highlighted the importance of providence throughout his life. Worden has written that Cromwell through ‘the fear of God he conquered the fear of men. When providence led him into unknown political territory he followed unflinchingly, and took his weaker brethren with him.’ However, he noted that Cromwell ‘always [had] room for anxiety, perhaps even for doubt’.94 Late 1648 and early 1649 was no exception. Once Cromwell reconciled himself to the necessity of regicide he was forceful in ensuring its enactment. However, in coming to that point Cromwell had, if anything, been looking to counter his belief that God had judged the King. His attempts at

93

Peacey, ‘Lawrans Letters’, p. 30. B. Worden, ‘Oliver Cromwell and the Sin of Achan’, in D.L. Smith (ed.), Cromwell and the Interregnum (2003), p. 41. 94

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settlement derived more from his political concerns about the consequences of regicide than whether providence had made clear that killing Charles was just. Cromwell was searching for another form of justice. Cromwell’s words after Preston indicate his confidence that God had owned the army as his instrument. His letter to Wharton, having recognised his membership of a despised minority, displays the confidence of one who believed that God would sustain them ‘despite of all enemies’.95 Morrill believes Cromwell’s use of ‘destroyed’ in this context did not necessarily mean regicide. 96 Cromwell certainly wanted action against Parliament and justice on Charles but, as Gaunt has commented, ‘Neither in his letters nor in the army declarations do we find an unambiguous commitment to regicide’.97 If such a statement ever existed it is unlikely that it did so for long. God’s providence, supported by his experience as a member of the army, also provided a vital prop to Ireton’s political conviction that Charles needed to be removed. A pamphlet, possibly by Peter, of October 1648, Salus populi, argued that: When the Glorious Majesty, Power, and presence of God do most visibly appear in successes; when he maketh one to chase ten, and two to put a hundred to flight; when he breaks the heavens and comes down, making the mountains to flow down before him, when he shall with a small, contemptible, despised and disperst Army, break in pieces above fourscore thousand forces in actual Arms against them.98

By late September 1648 Ireton appears to have felt that providence dictated regicide; although he may have wavered in late 1648 when faced by the imminent prospect of having to enact regicide. It cannot be recovered but the dialogue between close comrades such as Ireton, Cromwell, Peter and Harrison would have been crucial in forming their resolution to act. Ireton had stated at Putney that ‘the maine thinge is for every one to waite uppon God, for the errours, deceits, and weaknesses of his owne heart, and I pray God to bee present with us in that’.99 In relation to forms of government, Ireton at Putney commented:

95

Abbott, I, pp. 638, 646. Morrill and Baker, ‘Zeruiah’, p. 26. Morrill argues that ‘the phrase “destroyed out of the land”, for all its rhetorical strength, leaves open the possibility of exile rather than execution’. 97 Gaunt, Cromwell, p. 102. 98 BL, E467(9), Salus populi, solus Rex. The Public Safety is the sole Sovereignty; or, the Royalist out-reasoned (a reply to David Jenkins), p. 21; Brailsford, The Levellers (pp. 345–6n.8) stated that the author of this pamphlet was ‘conceivably Hugh Peter’. For doubts see Barber, Regicide and Republicanism, p. 95n.119. While both the pamphlet and the sermon have similar general arguments pointing to a dictatorship of the honest, the parallel of Christ and Barabbas is made by Peter elsewhere; see D.P. Klein, ‘The Trial of Charles I’, Journal of Legal History, 18 (1997), p. 16. 99 Clarke Papers, I, pp. 256–7. 96

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Wee have professed to indeavour to follow the councells of God, . . . wee have bin ready to follow his guidance; and I know itt hath bin soe in many thinges against our owne reasons. . . . For whatever I finde the worke of God tending to I should desire quietly submitt to. If god saw itt good to destroy, nott only Kinge and Lords, butt all distinctions of degrees – nay if itt goe further, to destroy all property, that there’s noe such thinge left, that there bee nothing att all of Civill Constitution left in the Kingedome – if I see the hand of God in itt I hope I shall with quietnesse acquiesce, and to submitt to itt, and nott resist itt.100

Once more when debating the Agreement Ireton anticipated the breaking forth of God into the world.101 Writing to Cromwell after the regicide, Ireton again clearly stated his belief in the importance of providence: all these sad strokes from heaven were raised out of that sleepy secure condition to call upon His name, seek His face, and beg to know His mind in these His judgements, which while we doing He both discovered the sin, which was our departure and backsliding from Him . . . and on a sudden, whilst He was discovering His mind to us, in answer to our desires.102

Indeed, from many of Ireton’s statements that have survived his providential thinking is clear.103 He argued that ‘if wee take the most probable way according to the light wee have, God gives these thinges [their success]’.104 His words in 1650 indicate the dangers of backsliding; it could lead to ‘sad strokes from heaven’. In 1648, as in 1650, Ireton needed ‘to call upon His name, seek his face, and beg to know His mind’. After the regicide he accompanied Cromwell to ‘supper’ with Bulstrode Whitelocke. Their host later wrote that they were very cheerful, and seemed extreamely well pleased; they discoursed together till twelve a Clock at night, and told many wonderful observations of Gods providence, in the affairs of the War, and in the business of the Army’s coming to London, and seizing the Members of the House, in all which were miraculous passages.105

John Cook, who later worked with Ireton in Ireland but who had probably first encountered him in 1646–47 through his employment by the army, wrote of his, ‘seeking wisdome, advise and strength from God on all occasions’.106 It

100

Clarke Papers, I, pp. 296–7. Clarke Papers, II, p. 176. 102 Worden, ‘Sin of Achan’, pp. 45–6. 103 Cary (ed.), Memorials, I, pp. 1–3; Abbott, I, pp. 279–80, 287–8; Rushworth, VII, p. 962; Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, pp. 87–8. 104 Clarke Papers, II, p. 179. 105 Whitelocke Memorials (1762), p. 377; R. Spalding, Diary of Bulstrode Whitelocke, p. 233. 106 John Cook, Monarchy No Creature of God’s Making (1652). 101

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was not that in December 1648 Ireton doubted that God had judged against Charles and that the King deserved to die. The seeking of providence was a constant feature of life for someone of Ireton’s faith. It led to a willingness to reflect. God’s will had to be constantly considered. Providence could lead to despair as much as to determination. Ireton’s reflection made him determined.

VIII The visit of prophetess Elizabeth Poole to the army and her debate with Ireton should be seen as part of his, and the army’s, search for providence. On 23–25 December 1648 the Council of Officers considered whether Charles, as a result of his trial, should be executed, deposed, replaced with another monarch or a republic, or be a monarch within a republican structure.107 Poole stated that God did not want Charles executed.108 Gentles has named Colonel Nathaniel Rich as Poole’s ‘most logical’ patron because her expressed views corresponded with his own.109 Furthermore Brod linked Poole with William Kiffin, one of whose military patrons was Rich. However, it should also be noted that Thomas Harrison, another of Kiffin’s military patrons, vocally supported the regicide.110 A royalist in 1660 tried to portray Cromwell and Ireton as having used Poole to convince the Army Council to act against the King.111 This was part of the royalist vein of portraying Ireton as the Machiavellian who planned regicide.112 Poole did not, however, speak in favour of regicide. Brod has shown how others regarded Poole as a tool of Ireton due to her anti-Leveller statements and ‘her repeated insistence that the power the Army at that time wielded was providential; they were to use it in God’s cause, not give it away’. He correctly dismisses this and Firth’s idea that this part of Poole’s ‘mission’ was ‘approved’ because her ‘earlier message did not actually suit Ireton’s purpose at all’.113 Whoever brought Poole to the officers, she was received with respect.114 Her stated view that even if the army tried or deposed the King they should not execute him, alongside the very fact that they had met to debate Charles’

107

Worden, ‘Republicanism’. BL, E537(24), E. Poole, A VISION: Wherein is manifested the disease and cure OF THE KINGDOME. BEING The summe of what was delivered to the Generall Councel of the Army (29 Dec. 1648). 109 Gentles, NMA, p. 301. 110 Brod, ‘Politics and Prophecy’, p. 399. NewDNB Harrison entry by Ian Gentles. 111 BL, E1035(3), The English Devil: or, Cromwel and his Monstrous Witch Discover’d at WhiteHall (27 July 1660), pp. 6–7. 112 Clarke Papers, II, p. 165. 113 Brod, ‘Politics and Prophecy’, pp. 402–3. 114 Brod, ‘Politics and Prophecy’, p. 403. 108

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ultimate fate, should be taken as an indication that the nature of the King’s future remained open for some in the Council of Officers.115 This is reinforced by the votes in the Army Council of 21 and 25 December.116 The political concerns of an anonymous member of the army leadership may be seen in A deliberation about the execution of justice uppon HR. The writer saw himself as ‘butt part of a party’ and worried that: To have no Kingly governmt att all, and then, what everlasting inlets will there bee left, for torrents of mischiefs and machinations, against those, who by misgovernment have already lost above halfe their owne party, and will never bee able to gaine the Kings wch is three parts of the kingdome.117

Taft has suggested that Ireton’s ‘resolve was shaken by Elizabeth Poole’.118 Ireton’s words elsewhere would indicate that he had to take Poole seriously and would have reflected on her message and whether it was God’s. He had stated: ‘Whether God will bringe itt to passe that or the other way is a secrett in his will, and is further then what is revealed to him, lett him [to whom it has been revealed] speake itt.’119 Addressing the officers with regard to Poole, Ireton argued forcefully that they should be guided by providence: I thinke the summe of that which shee offers, that wee ought to doe for God, and you must goe on in the way, and I thinke the exhortation is very seasonable; and therefore I would have you come to the businesse that is before you, and I hope that God will lett that [counsel] goe alonge with you, that wee doe itt nott as men pleasers and men observers, butt as unto the Lord.120

The Poole episode may be construed as another attempt by Ireton and other officers to confirm what God intended rather than him overtly trying to manipulate his comrades. Care is needed however not to overemphasise the meeting with Poole, especially with no source from the perspective of any of the officers. It is likely, as at Windsor in April 1648, that the Poole episode was merely one part of the search for providence, and that determining his 115 A royalist pamphlet of 1651 claimed that Poole was introduced deliberately to the Council by Cromwell and Ireton as part of their strategy against the King; see A Brief Narrative of the Mysteries of State carried on by the Spanish Faction in England (1651), extract printed in Clarke Papers, II, pp.xx–xxi. 116 Morrill and Baker, ‘Zeruiah’, p. 30. 117 Bodleian Library, MS.Eng.c.6075; Bodleian Library Record, 16: 4 (1998), pp. 351–2. 118 Taft, ‘Ireton’, p. 193. Gardiner (Civil War, IV, pp. 281–2) commented on a report that ‘Ireton’s proposals that the King remain a prisoner might be revived’. A close reading of the letter in Carte I (pp. 201–3) does not actually indicate that this suggestion came from Ireton at the time and may have been an attempt to revive discussion by others. Other references in the letter also may suggest a different dating. 119 Clarke Papers, II, p. 180. 120 Clarke Papers, II, p. 154.

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will would not have been limited to one event. In Ireton’s words God would have been constantly ‘President in our Councills’.121 Ireton appealed to God for direction on many occasions. On 13 January 1649, when asking the Council of State to approve the Agreement of People, Ireton stated that it would serve until ‘the breaking forth of the power of God amongst men to make such formes needlesse’.122 It is fair to accept the validity of Cromwell and Ireton’s searching for direction and confirmation of God’s favour during this period. In late 1648, in Cromwell’s absence Ireton appears to have spent much time with Hugh Peter and the Fifth Monarchist Thomas Harrison. These two men would have further impressed upon him that they believed God wanted Charles to die.

IX Ireton appears to have spent a considerable deal of time with Harrison in the pre-regicide period. Their relationship serves as a reminder that despite their political and religious differences many in the army had been bound together through shared experience. The two had known each other since 1643 when they had both joined the Eastern Association. In November 1648 Ireton and Harrison had stressed to Robert Hammond that the army was God’s instrument and that its proceedings against the King were not only justified but necessary. 123 In a letter to Harrison of 22 December 1648 Cromwell and Ireton stated that ‘your presence heere is both desired and needed’.124 Wedgwood notes that Ireton and Harrison at army headquarters in Windsor ‘shared one of the smaller rooms where, after late and weary sessions, they sometimes slept in the same bed’.125 Although they had differences over the nature of settlement, it is likely that Harrison further drew Ireton to search for God’s direction. Given their close proximity, Harrison and Ireton would have discussed this at length.126

121

Clarke Papers, I, pp. 296–7. Clarke Papers, II, pp. 176–7. 123 Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, pp. 87–8. 124 Clarke Papers, II, pp. 140–4. 125 Wedgwood, Trial, p. 71. 126 Gardiner, Civil War, IV, p. 261. Clement Ireton, now a Fifth-Monarchist based in London, may also have had some impact upon his brother’s thinking. Harrison and Clement Ireton were clearly in touch in 1657; see An INVITATION to a Solemn Day of HUMILATION (viz. the third day of the seventh Moneth, 57.) to the Lords People in the three Nations who are sensible of the great dishonour of God; and desire to approve themselves Faithfull to God and his Work in this day of Division and Apostacy. Signed by Clement Ireton – with Thomas Harrison, John Rogers, Vavasour Powell . . . Subscribed seventh of the sixth moneth August 1657. 1298A. 122

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Hugh Peter’s relationship with Cromwell was well recognised at the time and there can be little doubt that he was also close to Ireton.127 Peter had a long-standing acquaintance with Ireton, probably dating from 1643. From the drafting of the Remonstrance Peter remained in the close counsel of Ireton, often holding discussions with him long into the night. He would have acted as another spiritual support for the Commissary-General. Peter, according to Kelsey, approached the King on 15 and 18 January in order to try and secure some settlement.128 Kelsey sees Peter as a ‘messenger from the King’ on 23 January as part of an attempt to avoid regicide.129 This is based however on evidence from Peter’s own trial, where in all probability he put a positive spin on his communications with the King.130 The lawyer Robertson, in his study of Cook, reads the proceedings of Charles’ trial differently from Kelsey and has concluded that there was a determination to illustrate Charles’ guilt.131 Nevertheless even this could be seen as merely forcing Charles to terms. It is, of course, possible that Peter did sound out Charles. Lilburne denounced Peter as: One of the setting Doggs, or stalking-Horses of the great men of the Army, with faire and plasible pretences to insinuate into men when they have done them wrong, and to work out their designes when they are in a streight, and to cover their Plots.132

Peter was regarded by Warwick as ‘truly and really his[Charles’] Gaoler, for at St. James’s no body went him, but by Peters’s leave’.133 If indeed he tried to communicate with the King to effect a compromise, he signally failed to do so. The contact appears to have been part of the spiritual assault on Charles conducted by Peter, Dell and Goodwin, a continuation of the policy established when the army had first negotiated directly with Charles in 1647.134 On that occasion, the officers had been accompanied by Peter, Dell and Sedgwick.

127 BL, E1035(3), English Devil, or Cromwell and His Monstrous Witch Discover’d at Whitehall (1660), p. 3; W. Prynne, A Word to Lieutenant General Cromwell and two words for the settling of the King Parliament and Kingdom (December 1647), p. 18. 128 Kelsey, ‘Death of Charles I’, p. 742. 129 Kelsey, ‘Trial’, p. 605. 130 BL, E1047(3), An Exact and most Impartiall Accompt of the Indictment, Arraignment, Trial, and Judgment (according to Law) of nine and twenty Regicides (1660), p. 173. 131 Robertson, Cooke, pp. 173, 394n.32. 132 BL, E558(20), Mercurius Pragmaticus, no.7 (29 May–5 June 1649). 133 Warwick Memoirs (1701), p. 340. 134 BL, E527(8), Perfect Occurences, no.107 (12–19 Jan. 1648), p. 802; E527(9), Perfect Diurnall, no.288 (15–22 Jan. 1649), p. 2304; E527(11), Perfect Occurences, no.108 (18–25 Jan. 1648), p. 863; E527(13), Perfect Summary, no.1 (22–29 Jan. 1649), p. 2; E538(15), The Moderate, no.27 (9–16 Jan. 1648), p. 259; E538(21), The Moderate Intelligencer, no.200

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Prynne deemed Cromwell, Ireton, Pride and Peter, ‘that fast and loose carnall prophet and Arch Iesuited Incendiary in these present tumults’, to be the ringleaders of the revolution.135 Others held Peter as one of those primarily responsible for the King’s death.136 Ireton, Cromwell and Peter were noted as having visited Presbyterian ministers throughout the City of London in early January to stifle opposition to the army’s proceedings.137 Peter not only probably had a role in the drafting of the Remonstrance, but he appears to have solidified Cromwell and Ireton’s conviction that judgement on Charles was God’s will.138 Lilburne wrote of Peter as ‘one of the Guides of the Army’.139 John Cook noted that in contemplating action Ireton was always prone to ask ‘what Scripture have you to warrant it?’140 Peter would have provided further scriptural support to Ireton. During this period Peter was not trying to save Charles but to send him to his deserved death. Nedham’s Mercurius Pragmaticus noted the anti-monarchical tone of Peter’s fast day address on 22 December at St Margaret’s Westminster.141 Peter ‘called for the rooting-out of monarchy both in England and throughout Christendom. He likened the army leaders to Moses leading the Israelites out of Egypt.’142 On 27 December 1648 An Abridgment of the Late Remonstrance

(11–18 Jan. 1648), p. 1848; Rushworth, Historical Collections, VII, Part IV:II, p. 1398. Sanderson has argued that in his The Obstructors of Justice: A Defence of the Sentence, Goodwin produced the ‘most substantial justification of the proceedings against Charles’; see J.Sanderson, ‘But the People’s Creatures’. The Philosophical Basis of the English Civil War (Manchester, 1989), p. 145. 135 BL, 537(7), W. Prynne, A Breife Memento To the Present UnParliamentary Iunto (4 Jan. 1649), p. 13. 136 BL, E558(20), Mercurius Pragmaticus, no.7 (29 May–5 June 1649). 137 BL, E537(20), Mercurius Pragmaticus, no.40 (26 Dec.–9 Jan. 1648–49). Adamson (‘Junto’), has them visiting Independents and footnotes Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p. 183. This episode may have been more of an open experience than the slant of the newspaper report allows which has all three pressurising Presbyterian ministers; see BL, E537(20), Mercurius Pragmaticus, nos 40–1 (26 Dec. 1648–9 Jan. 1649), Ff fol. 3. As Davis has pointed out, there are examples of Cromwell’s positive communication with those of differing religious views from his own, including presbyterians; see J.C. Davis, ‘Religion and the struggle for freedom’, Historical Journal, 35 (1992), pp. 148, 156. 138 Given his public statements it is also likely that he discussed the drafts of the Heads of the Proposals with Ireton in 1647; see BL, E410(16), Hugh Peter, A Word for the Army (1647). 139 Walker, History of Independency, II, p. 180. 140 John Cook, Monarchy no Creature, epistle, n. p. 141 E477(30), Mercurius Pragmaticus, No.39 (19–26 Dec. 1648); State Trials, II (p. 362) indicates that evidence was produced at Peter’s trial from the records of Parliament showing an order on 20 December for him to preach the following day; 536(5), KWI (19–26 Dec. 1648), p. 1199; Rushworth, Historical Collections, VII, part IV:II, p. 1370. 142 Gentles, NMA, p. 525n.177. 198

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appeared.143 Woolrych believed that this was penned by Peter.144 Peter’s address of 22 December and the Abridgment focused on the latter end of Psalm 149 – ‘To binde their Kings in chains, and their Nobles in fetters of iron’.145 Kelsey regards Peter’s use of Psalm 149 as ‘a text far better suited to plans for a limited restoration rather than a regicide’.146 It had also been used by a royalist in an appeal to Ireton for moderation.147 Kelsey has seen it as ‘the perfect encapsulation of the objectives of a limited, oligarchic revolution very much in keeping with the maxim, attributed to him [Peter] back in October 1648, that “it is not vox, but salus populi that is the supreme law”’. Yet this pamphlet of October 1648 was very antagonistic towards Charles and argued that if Parliament did not judge Charles then they should be judged. 148 Contemporaries also had a different interpretation of Peter’s sermon on Psalm 149.149 A consideration of Psalm 149 verses 7 through to 9 would support these contemporary interpretations that see it as a call to regicide: To execute vengeance upon the heathen, and punishments upon the people; To bind their kings with chains, and their nobles with fetters of iron; To execute upon them the judgement written: this honour have all his saints.

Peter’s use of Psalm 149 should also be seen in the context of his other statements. Peter had long seen the army as the saints and the King as not one of them, not their King. The Remonstrance is supported throughout the Abridgment by numerous examples of the just punishment of biblical kings. The princes Oreb and Zeeb of the Midianites were killed (Judges 7:25); God delivered ‘a very great host’ into the hands of a small company of Syrians because King Joash had forsaken the Lord. As a result King Joash was executed (2 Chronicles 24:24); Ehud killed Eglon, the King of Moab (Judges 3:15, 3: 20–1). Peter cited twenty-five books of the Bible in the Abridgment. These included Numbers 35: 33 which had been cited at Windsor when Charles Stuart had 143 A107, An Abridgment of the Late Remonstrance of the Army (1648); the army also followed up its Remonstrance; see BL, 536(24), A New-years Gift: Presented by Tho Lord Fairfax, And the General-councel of Officers, In severall Propositions for the generall satisifaction, and setling the Peace of the Kingdom (1 Jan. 1649). 144 M. Dzelzainis, ‘Anti-monarchism in English Republicanism’, p. 34n.9, in Q. Skinner (ed.), Republicanism, I (Cambridge, 2002). I would like to thank Professor Martin Dzelzainis for his comments with regard to Woolrych’s attribution of this pamphlet to Hugh Peter. 145 The Tryall and Condemnation of Mr John Cooke, p. 12. 146 Kelsey, ‘Death’, p. 747. 147 BL, E536(12), A Plea For Moderation In the Transactions of the Army: Or, Weighty Observations upon the late Proposalls for Peace, presented by the Honourable City of London, To Commissary-General Ireton, for concurrrence of the Generall Councell (Dec. 1648), n. p. 148 BL, E467(9), Salus populi, p. 19. 149 BL, E539(7), The Moderate, no.28 (16–23 Jan. 1649), p. 271; BL, E540(13), Certain weighty Considerations (28 Jan. 1649); Carte I, p. 212.

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been declared ‘that man of blood’. Other citations such as from Numbers 25: 4 were just as clear in their message that Charles should be punished: ‘hang them up that the fierce anger of the Lord may be turned away from Israel.’ Peter’s citation of Deuteronomy 19: 13 was in the same light: ‘thine eyes shall not pitty him, but thou shalt put away the guilt of innocent blood from Israel, that it may go well with thee.’ Yule and Crawford have both argued how men like Ireton and Peter believed that blood-guilt should be exorcised by the death of the guilty.150 During the week of Charles’ trial Peter used Genesis 9:6: ‘Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed.’151 No Parliamentary fasts took place during the month of Charles’ trial but, Wilson claims, ‘preachers like Peter were exceedingly active’.152 Peter apparently told soldiers who wanted the King to be ‘dispatched’ that ‘ye shall see the work done for which ye were brought hither’.153 He preached on Luke 23:18–19 seeing the army as Christ and Charles as Barabbas.154 This parallel had also been used in another pamphlet attributed by some to Peter. In this the argument was clear that God could work through a righteous minority, that it ‘is not vox, but Salus populi that is the supream Law’.155 In a sermon of 22 December Peter stated that the army would lead the nation out of bondage. At Peter’s trial a witness gave his interpretation of a solemn fast for officers in the Painted Chamber: Mr Peters desired to call for a Blessing upon their Business, in his Prayer he uttered these Words, ‘O Lord (said he) what a Mercy is it to see this great City fall down before us! And what a Stir is there to bring this Great man to Trial, without whose Blood he will turn us all into Blood if he Reign again!’156

150 G. Yule, ‘Independents and Revolutionaries’, Journal of British Studies, 7: 2 (1968), pp. 16–17; P. Crawford, ‘Charles Stuart, That Man of Blood’, Journal of British Studies, 16 (1977). 151 N.H. Mayfield, Puritans and Regicide. Presbyterian–Independent differences over the Trial and Execution of Charles (I) Stuart (New York, 1988), pp. 31, 97–8, 174. 152 Wilson, Pulpit in Parliament, p. 95. For examples of other sermons calling for justice see BL, E536(6), Gods Delight in the Progressse of the Upright. Especially, In Magistrates Uprightnesse and constancy in wayes of justice and righteousnesse, in these Apostatizing Times, notwithstanding all discouragements, oppositions, &c. This sermon by Thomas Brooks quoted Numbers 35: 33 on its cover. BL, E536(7), Gods Anatomy Upon Mans Heart (27 Dec. 1648); BL, E536(28), John Goodwin Right and Might Well Met. Or A briefe and unpartiall enquiry into the late and present proceedings of the Army under the command of His Excellency the Lord Fairfax (2 Jan. 1649). 153 Carte, I, pp. 201–3. 154 D.P. Klein, ‘The Trial of Charles I’, Journal of Legal History, 18 (1997), p. 16; At Peter’s own trial a Mr Beaver gave evidence that Peter preached on this theme: State Trials, II, p. 362. 155 Salus populi solus rex (17 Oct. 1648), p. 19; Brailsford, Levellers, p. 345n.8. 156 State Trials, II, p. 362.

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On 17 January 1648 another hostile witness, Evelyn, recorded probably the same event. He ‘heard the rebell Peter incite the Rebell powers met in the Painted Chamber, to destroy his Majestie’.157 Peter, in what appears to be numerous sermons throughout December and January, reiterated essentially the same argument: Charles deserved to be punished, his crimes justified regicide and the army would be the instrument to implement it. On Sunday, 28 January as a final reinforcement Peter preached to the troops that Charles had ‘destroyed thy land and slain thy people’. His text was Isaiah 14. Gentles has rightly regarded this ‘a homilectic extravaganza’.158 Verses 18–22 not only imply that the King should be executed but reinforced Charles’ separation from monarchy. Others also used Genesis 9: 6 and Isaiah 14:20 to justify regicide.159 There may also be an implication that Peter, using Isaiah 14:20, was arguing that the Stuart line should not be restored after judgement was executed upon Charles: All the kings of the nations, even all of them, lie in glory, every one in his own house. But thou art cast out of thy grave like an abominable branch, and as the rainment of those that are slain, thrust through with a sword, that go down to the stones of the pit; as a carcase trodden under feet. Thou shalt not be joined with them in burial, because thou hast destroyed thy land, and slain thy people: the seed of evildoers shall never be renowned. Prepare slaughter for his children for the iniquity of their fathers; that they do not rise, nor possess the land, nor fill the face of the world with cities. For I will rise up against them, saith the LORD of hosts, and cut off from Babylon the name, and remnant, and son, and nephew, saith the LORD.

The Remonstrance had also directly attacked the Prince of Wales and the Duke of York.160 Peter’s use of Isaiah 14 mirrored the example of King Joash in the Abridgment to the Remonstrance. They ‘executed judgement against Joash’ but ‘they buried him not in the sepulchres of the kings’ (2 Chronicles 24: 24–5). The day after Charles’ execution Ireton reported in the Commons ‘a paper of divers particulars concerning the late King’s body’.161 Charles I was not buried in Henry VII’s chapel at Westminster, the sepulchre of kings.162

* 157

Evelyn Diary, II, pp. 546–7. Gentles, NMA, p. 309. 159 BL, E527(10), The Resolver, or A Short Word, to the Large Question of the Times, Concerning the Parliament: And confirming the Proceedings about the King. Being, A Letter written to a deare Friend, tending to satisfie him. At least, to shew the Authour rationall, in approving the proceedings of the Army (23 Jan. 1649). 160 BL, E473(11), Remonstrance, p. 62. 161 J.G. Muddiman (ed.), Trial of King Charles the First (1928), p. 156. 162 P. Gregg, King Charles I (London, 1981), p. 445. 158

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Ireton, Cromwell, Harrison and Peter reinforced each others’ opinion that they acted out of God’s will.163 As Worden has argued, men of ‘diverse beliefs . . . could be united in a sense of common spiritual purpose’. 164 Indeed, it appears that John Cook, the King’s chief prosecutor, drew from Peter’s sermons of December and January as they have ‘often approaching the exact wording which Cook used in King Charles’ Case’. It is likely that Peter, in turn, drew from Cook.165 The two had first met in 1646 when Cook had heard Peter preach at St Bride’s London.166 Both, as others, used Genesis 9:6 and Deuteronomy 19:13 to justify regicide. Davis has indicated that there was a general theme that ‘monarchical government had been against the mind of God’.167 The precise nature of the interaction between Ireton and Cromwell can, of course, never be recovered, but there can be little doubt that they sought each other out in this moment of political but, more importantly, spiritual crisis. Walsham has argued that providence: not only helped to destabilize a situation which was swiftly unravelling and to propel the nation into a military conflict which culminated in the execution of that ‘man of blood’ Charles I and the proclamation of a godly republic; it also supplied a conceptual framework within which these cataclysmic events were inexplicable and, moreover, predictable.168

It is right to refer to men like Ireton as a ‘Bible republican’. Morrill has commented on Cromwell’s ‘unsophisticated political thought, which owed nothing to Aristotle and everything to the Old Testament’.169 Ireton may have been more theoretically sophisticated but their chief text was the same. Given how much they had shared since 1643, the bond of kinship that had cemented their relationship and the strength of a working partnership aided by their differing perspectives, Ireton more than anyone would have played a dominant role in helping a reluctant Cromwell to confront the necessity of the political action that faced him at the start of 1649. In September 1652 Cromwell wrote to an unknown correspondent, ‘Have I one friend in our society to whom I can unbowel myself? You absent; Fleetwood is gone; I am left alone. . . . Lend

163

For other aspects of religion and the regicide see M.R. Bell, ‘The theology of violence: just war, regicide and the end of time in the English Revolution’, Oxford University Ph.D. (2002). Chapter 6 in particular is ‘a discussion of regicide [that] not only draws on the preceding discussion of the theology of violence but also examines the “scapegoating” dimension of the execution of the King’. 164 B. Worden, The Rump Parliament (1974), p. 135. 165 For comment on Cook’s King Charles’ Case, see A. Tubb, ‘Printing the Regicide of Charles I’, History, 89: 296 (2004). 166 Robertson, Cooke, p. 75. 167 Davis, ‘Religious freedom’, Historical Journal, 35: 3, p. 520. 168 Walsham, Providence, p. 6. 169 Robertson, Cooke, pp. 122, 125; Morrill, ‘Rewriting Cromwell’, p. 570. 202

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me one shoulder. Pray for me.’170 Upon his return to London on 6 December through to the act of regicide on 30 January 1649 it had been Ireton in particular at Cromwell’s shoulder helping to lead him to see necessity but, more crucially, providence. On 13 January 1649 Ireton declared publicly that: I am confident that itt is nott the hand of men that will take away the power of Monarchy in the earth, butt if ever itt bee destroyed, itt will bee by the breaking forth of the power of God amongst men to make such formes needlesse.171

170 171

Abbott, II, pp. 575–6. Clarke Papers, II, p. 176. 203

9

Ireland, 1649–1651

John Cook, Ireton’s associate, regarded Ireland as ‘a white paper’. There is little reason to doubt that Ireton shared this view. He stated that he went to Ireland due to ‘the great encouragment that I had from Cromwell and Ireton and many honourable persons in the army, who were pleased to say that Ireland was like a White Paper’.1 The leaders of the New Model Army, motivated by their religion, believed that a war of re-conquest allowed them to start afresh and reform Ireland. For some it would also provide a model for England. Cook stated that ‘though Ireland be but the younger sister, yet England might have been the learner and gainer by her’. Cromwell believed that Ireland could ‘be a precedent to England it self ’.2 Refashioning of Ireland would be brutal. Colonel John Jones ‘believed that the Irish were a “cursed people” Christ had had to fetch instruments farther off to save the country. As one of these instruments he was engaged in nothing less than a holy mission.’3 The words and actions of men such as Jones and Ireton himself show at times their utter contempt for their Catholic enemy. Yet within this the practicalities of warfare in Ireland saw Ireton necessarily draw distinctions between the Irish he faced. His words indicate that he did not see the landless Irish people as intrinsically evil, but as deluded by the propagators of a false religion whom he denounced as ‘these incendiaries of blood and mischief’.’4 The brutality of the conquest and reshaping of Ireland cannot be denied but the distinctions which men like Ireton made with regard to the Irish must also be considered. The reality of any Irish settlement would be formed from these practicalities rather than Cook’s theoretical musings.

1

Robertson, Cooke, p. 225. T. Barnard, Cromwellian Ireland. English Government and Reform in Ireland 1649–1660 (Oxford, 2000), pp. 14, 268–9. 3 Gentles, NMA, p. 382. 4 HMC 36 Ormond, I, p. 226; Gentles, NMA, p. 381. 2

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I Ireton’s horse regiment was one of those selected by lots for the conquest of Ireland.5 He had been recommended as Cromwell’s second-in-command by the Council of State, confirmed by Parliament on 15 June 1649.6 Cromwell could be sure that his subordinate would fulfil the military duties subscribed to him but the choice derived more from his political, religious and emotional need for support in such a dangerous task. Cromwell sailed for Dublin on 13 August with between 3,000 and 4,000 men in thirty-five vessels. Ireton left Milford Haven two days after him for Kinsale, Munster. Accompanying Ireton, another force of 4,000 men was transported in seventy-seven vessels. The wind however meant that both fleets ended up in the bay of Dublin.7 From his arrival in Ireland in August 1649 to June 1650 Ireton accompanied Cromwell. He therefore takes his share of responsibility for the bloodshed at Drogheda and Wexford. The nature of this bloodshed has been clarified. Hutton, who of all recent historians has been the most critical of Cromwell, argued that his actions need to be set in context.8 In a similar vein Stevenson has written that ‘in a wider context of European warfare they are not outstanding’.9 The recent work of Morrill has shown that the majority of the actual victims of Drogheda and Wexford were English royalists.10 Hutton has argued that after ‘his two brutal episodes at Drogheda and Wexford, Cromwell himself treated four more towns with notable clemency, and after he returned to England his successor in the Irish command, Henry Ireton, became praised by the Catholic population as the most gentle and just general they had known. All this, however, is expunged from the nationalist myth.’11 This is not to deny the brutality of what took place in Ireland. Ireton, like Cromwell was anti-Catholic. This manifested itself however in denunciations of the

5 Gentles, NMA, pp. 332, 352–3. Soldiers from Captain George Hutchinson’s troop from Ireton’s regiment joined the Leveller-inspired rebellion of William Thompson. In the Clarke manuscripts there exists a record compiled by Captain Hutchinson in May 1649 of who participated in the mutiny; see Clarke Mss 16 fols 103–7. 6 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 232.; CJ, 6, p. 234; Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, I, p. 86. 7 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 232; HMC Leyborne-Popham, p. 35; Gentles, NMA, p. 356. Colonel Richard Deane who sailed with Ireton wrote on arrival that ‘first we endeavoured with the greatest part of the army to have landed there [kinsale] when Ireton and I were as high and Youghall, but the wind took us short and we forced for Dublin’, HMC Leyborne–Popham, pp. 40–1. Deane to Colonel Ed Popham, 22 Sept. 1649. 8 Hutton, British Republic, pp. 47–8. 9 D. Stevenson, ‘Cromwell, Scotland and Ireland’, in Smith (ed.), Cromwell and the Interregnum, p. 192. 10 NewDNB Cromwell entry by John Morrill; UEA visiting lecture 2003 John Morrill. 11 R. Hutton, Witches, Druids and King Arthur (2003), p. 10.

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priests, soldiers and elite rather than the majority of the population, who were landless and politically powerless. Although the treatment of all the Irish was brutal the distinction reflected Ireton’s perception of Catholicism and the practicalities of any long-term settlement of Ireland. The distinction derived from Ireton’s experience of Irish warfare in the first year of the Irish campaign under Cromwell. This influenced how he conducted affairs when in command for the second year of the conquest. Laborious, siege-based and subject to guerrilla attack, the English campaign used up resources of both men and supplies. Despite what happened at Drogheda and Wexford and the remarkable headway Cromwell had made, the English still faced a series of drawn-out sieges before even contemplating controlling the countryside. The major reverses suffered by the New Model Army under Cromwell at Waterford in December 1649 and at Clonmel in May 1650 can only have confirmed the need to be realistic about use of limited resources in what would be a permanent occupation of a hostile country. Simply in terms of manpower the English forces were much reduced.12 Ireton had clearly discussed the problems with his officers.13 The reverses Cromwell suffered before his departure must have done much to shape the approach a naturally cautious soldier such as Ireton felt he could adopt.

II The Commons agreed to Ireton as Cromwell’s successor, the next Commanderin-Chief of Ireland, on 15 June 1649.14 Wheeler argued that the ‘other logical choices for command in Ireland, Lord Broghill and Sir Charles Coote, lacked Ireton’s family and political connections and his indentification with the regicides’.15 Coote’s betrayal of comrades at the Restoration indicates his self-interest.16 Yet Broghill and Coote were not ‘logical choices’ precisely due to their lack of English political connections, especially to Cromwell. Ireton’s suitability for command was never going to be judged solely by military criteria. The most important aspect of Ireton’s role would be political. The long-term problem of settlement would be more of a political than a military issue. Sankey, a commander in Ireland, believed that ‘never any age did produce in Ireland so dexterous and fit a workman for so intricate and knotty a peace as the work of this nation was’.17As a competent commander, with experienced men around him, Ireton could be expected to deal with the immediate military

12 13 14 15 16 17

Gentles, NMA, p. 371. HMC Various, 6, p. 435. CSPD (1649–50), p. 184; (1650), p. 219. Wheeler, Cromwell in Ireland, p. 182. Robertson, Cooke, p. 275. Ramsey, Ireton, p. 202. 206

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threat the English faced. The reverses suffered at Waterford and Clonmel may have reinforced the decision to appoint Ireton as Commander-in-Chief, for while lacking in flair his resilence suited the need to capture the remaining major points of Irish resistance. Ireton had the necessary drive and vision to impose his will upon Ireland. It is likely that Cromwell and Ireton had already considered the long-term strategy for Ireland before their arrival in 1649 and that Ireton had been designated as its post-conquest governor. This would be in line with the importance attached to Ireland by Cromwell, exemplified by the subsequent appointments of men as talented and important as John Lambert, Charles Fleetwood and Henry Cromwell. That Cromwell, upon his recall from Ireland for the Scottish campaign, gave Ireton command in Ireland says much for the importance he attached to the task. That Ireton did not leave Ireland may indicate that he and Cromwell still believed the Rump Parliament would dissolve itself. If they regarded any clash with Parliament to be imminent it is likely Ireton would have returned to England to take charge of army strategy. Ireton’s return may have been planned after major Irish resistance was crushed. There are no signs however that Ireton was preparing to leave Ireland in late 1651. His purchase of land in Kilkenny along with the arrival of his wife Bridget may suggest that Ireton intended to be in Ireland for some time.18 The question remains however why Ireton would want to stay in Ireland. His faith may have meant that Ireton regarded subjugation of Ireland as part of his duty. On one level men like Cromwell and Ireton did not see themselves as politicians. There remained an element in both men’s psyche of wishing to return to normal life. Ireton had also shown evident frustration with politics before, at Putney and in September 1648. Ireland may have represented a welcome retreat from the machinations within Parliament which someone of Ireton’s temperament must have found frustrating. The period of December 1648 through to the formation of the new Council of State at the start of 1649 can only have grated with Ireton’s authoritarian streak and distaste for elements within Parliament.

III Henry Ireton and his comrade Thomas Harrison were not elected to the new Council of State on 14 February 1649. This has traditionally been viewed as a reaction against their position as army revolutionaries chiefly responsible for

18 Ireton had made no purchases of Crown or Church lands in England. An enquiry into his lands in Nottinghamshire carried out at the Restoration indicates the limits of his property (NRO DD4P 22/317–18). Ireton did however have land at Swarston, Leicestershire and Mynshall Vernam, Cheshire. The Rump voted lands of inheritance in England to the value of £2,000 p.a. for Ireton which he refused (Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 286).

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the purge of Parliament of December 1648 and the regicide.19 In response to this rebuff Ireton supposedly took a leading role in the introduction of an Engagement oath for the Council that required a statement of support for the revolution.20 Barber believed that as Ireton was not voted on to the Council of State: it is difficult to see how he could have had a significant say in the wording of the oath, other than acting as a teller with Henry Marten supporting the insertion into the oath of the phrase ‘I doe approve of the late acts of the Commons of England assembled in Parliament, erecting an high court of justice for the trying and adjuding of Charles Stuart, late King of England’.21

This view has been recently questioned by Kelsey. He has argued that Ireton and Harrison were never on the original list of nominations for the Council of State and Ireton never introduced the conciliar oath.22 Although Ireton, as Kelsey posits, may not have even been nominated for the Council this would not necessarily have hindered him from having some input in the construction of the oath or its additional clauses given his political prominence by this stage. That Ireton and Harrison ‘were rebuffed without a division’ from being put forward for the Council may have confirmed for Ireton that Parliament was not the place for him.23 His attempts to promote reform during this period may also have added to his frustration with parliamentary politics. It must have been from this period that Ireton supposedly suggested a renaming of Parliament: In the Parliament there was a question, whether we should not alter the name of Parliament, and call it the Representative of the people, but the whole House went upon this ground, that by changing the name of Parliament, to a Representative, we did not know how it might change the very course, ground and reason of Parliament: there is a great deale of thing in the very name: I remember, a very Honourable person now with God, was then very earnest for it, for having this name changed, and he did shew many reasons for it, but hearing the debates and reasons against it, he sat down and was satisfied, I think I may name him, it was my Lord Ireton who did say he was satisfied, it was not fit to be done at that time.24

19

CJ, VI, p. 140; Worden, Rump Parliament, pp. 180–1. Worden refers to ‘Ireton’s oath’. S. Barber, ‘The Engagement for the Council of State and the Establishment of the Commonwealth Government’, Historical Research, 63 (1990), p. 47. 21 Barber, ‘Engagement’, p. 47. 22 S.Kelsey,’Constructing the Council of State’, Parliamentary History, 22: 3 (2003), pp. 224–5. 23 Kelsey, ‘Constructing the Council of State’, p. 224. 24 W1988, Monarchy Asserted, To be the best, most Ancient and legall form of Government, in a conference had at Whitehall, with Oliver late Lord Protector & a Committee of Parliament (1660), p. 13. 20

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Worden saw Ireton’s acceptance of a purge on 6 December 1648 as ‘probably the most critical decision of his career. His revolutionary zeal steadily declined thereafter, until by the spring of 1649 he was evidently reconciled to the entrenchment of the Rump’s authority.’25 On 24 February 1649 Whitelocke appears to have found both Cromwell and Ireton apparently content. He recorded in his diary: The LG Cromwell & Ireton supped att W[hitelocke’s] house, & were very cheerfull & well pleased, they discoursed togither till 12. a clocke att night & then parted. They told many wonderfull passages of the War, & of the Army.26

Whatever Ireton’s role in the debate on the conciliar oath and renaming Parliament, London politics of early 1649 cannot have been conducive to a man who was not really a Parliamentarian and who saw himself foremost as a godly soldier.

IV Despite what had been achieved before Cromwell left Ireland there was much that Ireton faced that would have concerned him.27 Waterford and Clonmel had indicated that Irish resistance could be fierce and successful. Attritional rates among Ireton’s forces, from campaign and disease, were high. Limerick and Galway still held out. Even when these were taken the problem remained of how to control and exploit Ireland. On 2 July 1650 Ireton wrote to the Governor of Carlow-Castle, a garrison about thirty miles from Dublin on the river Barrow, summoning him to surrender.28 According to Ludlow, Carlow was ‘esteemed by the enemy to be

25

Worden, Rump Parliament, pp. 58, 74–5, 116, 156–7. R. Spalding, The Diary of Bulstrode Whitelocke, p. 233; Worden, Rump Parliament, p. 186. 27 An officer in Ireton’s army kept a diary of their proceedings in Ireland from July to November 1650. This, with a journal from another member of Ireton’s army and other sources, principally newsbooks as well as Irish and royalist accounts, means that we have a reasonably full, if always partial, account of the nature of the campaign and conditions which Ireton faced. On top of this there are more letters from Ireton himself that survive from his time in Ireland. Rather than a detailed consideration of Ireton’s military proceedings in Ireland the focus on the major siege of Limerick is used to come to an overall assessment of Ireton’s approach to the campaign and his success. W.D. Macray (ed.), Calendar of Clarendon State Papers in the Bodleian Library, 5 vols (Oxford, 1869–1932), II, p. 87, no.442, 11 November 1650 Diary kept by an officer in the parliamentary army in Ireland of the proceedings of the forces under Sir Hardress Waller and the Lord Deputy Ireton from 20 July to 11 November; Clarendon State Papers, II, p. 111, no.587, 1 May to 5 November. Part of a very full journal of the operations of the parliamentary forces in Ireland, kept by someone in Ireton’s army. 28 THE HISTORY OF THE Irish Rebellion, Traced from many of the Preceding ACTS, TO 26

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of great importance, and therefore fortified by them with divers works’.29 Faced with such problems Ireton showed his siege warfare skills. Dividing his army on either side of the Barrow, Ireton improvised a bridge for communication.30 The defeat inflicted on the Irish in Ulster by Coote brought the surrender of Carlow in July 1650 to ‘Ireton upon articles; which he caused punctually to be executed, as his constant manner was’.31 On 1 July 1650 Ireton had written to General Thomas Preston, Governor of Waterford, summoning him to surrender.32 One of numerous exchanges between the two men over the following months, Ireton’s words indicate his continuing belief that the forces he led were doing God’s work. 33 As in England he argued that although a despised minority, this merely confirmed the army’s godliness which victory would further reinforce. He informed Preston that ‘being assured the more you do, from such a Principle, despise us, and the more we were despicable, as to Man, the more will God appear to pull down the Proud, and honour himself in doing it, by the Despised’.34 Ireton believed that Preston’s pride reflected his ungodliness: Your Defintion of Honour hath handsome Words in it, but I am to seek for their Depth of Sense; with us the Truth and Substance of Honour is Honesty, of which there is no Danger that it should be valued or priz’d too much, if we exalt not Man’s Righteousness above the Grace of God, and yet the Shadows and Plumes of Honour, which your Letters seem to point at, will never pass for Weight with God as a Price for Blood. I have found that those who have prized themselves most affectedly, and used the most hectoring Language, even in the same Case as yours is, in which I have had to do with many, have through the Power of God, and his just Hand, been brought to stoop and fall as low as Dirt, even by such despicable Instruments as we are here, and take Terms agreeable only to the most abject Souls, and therefore I am not moved, nor weigh any men the more for such Ostentation.35

THE GRAND ERUPTION The 23d of October, 1641; And thence pursued to the Act of Settlement, MDCLXII. To which are added LETTERS to and from OLIVER CROMWELL, IRETON . . . taken from Original MSS of Mr. Cliffe, an Intimate of Cromwell’s, and Secretary to General Ireton (Dublin, 1743), Appendix, p. 26. 29 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 251. 30 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 251. 31 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 255. 32 HISTORY OF THE Irish Rebellion, Appendix, p. 32. 33 HISTORY OF THE Irish Rebellion, Letters to and from Preston about Waterford pp. 34–46, July 1650; 34–6, 23 July 1650 Ireton to Preston; pp. 36–8, 25 July 1650 Ireton to Preston; p. 39, 27 July 1650 Ireton to Governor of Waterford; pp. 40–1, 28 July 1650 Ireton to Preston; p. 42, 30 July 1650 Ireton to Preston; p. 43, 30 July 1650 Ireton to Preston; pp. 43–4, 30 July 1650 Ireton to Preston; p. 45, 31 July 1650 Ireton to Preston; pp. 45–6 appointment of commissioners. 34 HISTORY OF THE Irish Rebellion, Appendix, p. 39. 35 HISTORY OF THE Irish Rebellion, Appendix, p. 42. 210

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There is an implied link in Ireton’s words between Preston’s ostentation, his ungodliness and his disregard for his men. Ireton moved through Carlow and Wicklow to Athlone intending to counter Tories raiding up to Dublin. It has also been argued that Ireton was tricked by Lord Dillon into thinking that he was on the point of surrendering Athlone. If Athlone could be taken, an army could cross the river and move down the west side of Shannon to Limerick, cutting it off from Connaught.36 On 16 August 1650 Ireton left Waterford for Wicklow. On the border of Wicklow with 600 foot and 200 horse he went into the mountains as his troops sought out Tories. At Naas fresh supplies were taken on and the troops rested. In mid-September Ireton arrived at Athlone, being met by Charles Coote’s regiments. Writing on 13 September 1650 to William Lenthall, William Basil outlined how Ireton divided his army so that Waller could besiege Limerick while he proceeded to Athlone.37 Dillon had retreated to the western side of Athlone after having set fire to the eastern part of the town. Unable to cross the Shannon after two weeks Ireton rejoined Hardress Waller at Limerick, which he reached on 6 October. With the refusal of Ireton’s summons to surrender, the council of officers decided to abandon the siege of Limerick and move into winter quarters.38 Bridget, Ireton’s wife, sailed to join him.39

V A newspaper report of early February 1651 illustrates the frustrating nature of the early stages of Ireton’s campaign, as does Ireton’s own letter to Bradshaw of the same period.40 Other reports indicate that no matter the victories Ireton had been able to secure, the Irish continued to reorganise.41 Colonel John Hewson went to Carlow to receive orders from Ireton.42 Ireton had to send troops from his main force to seek engagements or force the retreat of pockets of Irish.43 By April Ireton’s situation had not improved.44

36 BL, E615(6), MP, no.20 (17–24 Oct. 1650), p. 329. Appearing every Thursday and edited by Nedham, Mercurius Politicus was the official newsbook of the state; Wheeler, Cromwell in Ireland, pp. 182–3. 37 HMC 13th Report, pp. 534–5. 38 BL, E615(6), MP, no.20 (17–24 Oct. 1650), p. 333; Wheeler, Cromwell in Ireland, pp. 183–6. 39 CSPD (1650), p. 417. 40 BL, E623(14), MP, no.36 (6–13 Feb. 1651), p. 580; BL, E784(12), Faithful Scout, no.9 (14–26 Feb. 1651), pp. 66–8. 41 BL, E620(4), MP, no.30 (26 Dec.–2 Jan. 51), p. 409. 42 BL, E622(5), MP, no.35 (30 Jan.–6 Feb. 1651), p. 569. 43 BL, E621(8), MP, no.33 (16–23 Jan. 1651), p. 544. 44 BL, E628(6), MP, no.46 (17–24 April 1651), p. 742.

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Ireton held a council of principal officers to discuss the assault on Connaught.45 There were clearly problems in trying to control a hostile country with limited forces and also with the need to conduct a major siege at Limerick. In April it was reported that ‘Ireton is not able to hold those places of strength which he hath gotten; the Catholicks being stronger than he, and that supplies can hardly be got out of England. This is false.’46 Despite the positive spin, the official English state newspaper reports indicate serious problems with Ireton’s campaign. In his letter to the Speaker in January 1650 Ludlow expressed his concerns as ‘wee found the army in worse condition, and the enemie uppon more daringe termes then wee expected’. As a result Ludlow requested that ‘as seasonably as possible to speed away the designed recruits and supplies’.47 Despite having secured Dublin the logisitics of campaigning in Ireland were problematic. Through sheer attrition there needed to be a fairly constant flow of resources to maintain Ireton’s army. Supplies, such as boots, surgeon’s chests, carbines and men, all needed to be shipped from England.48 Ireton himself prepared the army for the siege of Limerick.49

VI In the spring of 1651 Ireton’s forces moved into Kilkenny.50 It was reported that ‘My Lord Deputy marched yesterday to Clonmel about 20 miles hence Thence on Munday he intends to proceed to his businesse’.51 He intended to ‘make entrance over the Shannon some other way’.52 With the securing of a passage over the Shannon a siege of Limerick became practical. Ireton must have felt some annoyance however at Parliament’s attitude to his proceedings. Their letter to Ireton of July 1651 sought to pressurise him into achieving a speedy end to the war or a solution that could support a reduction in his forces.53 At this point Ludlow came to give Ireton an account of his military proceedings which, in turn, Ireton related to Parliament.54 Marching to the Shannon, Ireton’s army, when opposite Killaloe, faced the forces of the Earl of Castlehaven. Ireton’s move meant that Clanricarde could

45

Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 488. BL, E628(9), MP, no.47 (24 April–1 May 1651), p. 763. 47 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 486. 48 CSPD (1650), pp. 87, 260, 265, 277, 402, 427, 433, 471, 573, 576, 579, 607; HMC 13th Report, p. 560; Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 488. 49 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 260. 50 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 262. 51 BL, E630(2), MP, no.51 (22–29 May 1651), p. 817. 52 BL, E628(17), MP, no.48 (1–7 May 1651), p. 780. 53 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, pp. 267–69; CSPIreland (1625–60), Addenda, p. 793, Council of State to Ireton, 11 July 1651. 54 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 274; BL, E637(11), MP, no.58 (10–17 July 1651), p. 931. 46

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not concentrate his forces against the other threats the Irish faced in the north and at Athlone.55 On 21 May 1651 Ireton reached Killaloe, where Ireton typically decided to hold a day of prayer. The decision was taken to attempt a crossing of the Shannon at O’Brien’s Bridge.56 Colonel Reeves’ regiment built a road across the bogs on his side of the river and then boats transported troops under the cover of artillery fire to the western side. A shuttle of boats pulled by cables allowed 500 men an hour to cross. A crossing established on 2 June was used to build a bridge. Ireton’s success, coupled with Coote’s activities in the north, saw the Irish abandon their positions guarding the crossings over the Shannon. The surrender of Athlone opened Connaught up to the English. Ireton attacked Clanricarde with two columns, forcing his retreat and leaving the English controlling Athlone to Limerick.57 Ireton marched his force to Limerick where an English fleet furnished him with heavy guns and supplies.58 After securing a passage over the Shannon, ‘the Deputy, with most part of the army, marched over to the other side of the river, where he marked out ground for three bodies of men’.59 Twenty-eight siege guns were established at Thomond Bridge and on 14 June Ireton summoned Hugh O’Neill, governor of Limerick, to surrender.60 A contemporary map of Ireton’s siege of Limerick shows the geographical hazards facing the New Model.61 Limerick had naturally developed around the flow of the River Shannon and its fortifications were thus quite widespread. Split in two, the main town, known as Irishtown, was located on the mainland on the southern side of the River Abbey on the Limerick–Munster coast. On an island created by the flow of the river was Englishtown. Baal’s bridge connected the two towns. Thomond bridge linked the island of Englishtown to the Clare bank of the River Shannon. The difficulties of launching an attack on both towns are clear. One as an island posed numerous difficulties while even Irishtown had the river protecting one of its sides, and the besieged also had the option of retreating into Englishtown. Furthermore, much of the land surrounding Limerick, as a result of its proximity to the sea inlet and the River Shannon, was unsuitable for the heavy artillery that, given the scale of the town’s fortifications, would be necessary for a siege. On 19 June 1650 Ireton launched an ambitious amphibious assault on King’s Island to establish a bridgehead on the northern bank to assault Englishtown which lay in the southwest corner of the island. An uncoordinated landing 55

Wheeler, Cromwell in Ireland, p. 200. J.G. Simms, War and Politics in Ireland, 1649–1730 (1986), pp. 23–4. 57 Simms, War and Politics, p. 24; Wheeler, Cromwell in Ireland, p. 200. 58 Bodleian Library, Tanner Mss 54 fol. 96. 59 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 276. 60 Wheeler, Cromwell in Ireland, p. 200. 61 This map is printed in J. Burke, ‘Siege Warfare in Seventeenth Century Ireland’, in Lenihan (ed.), Conquest and Resistance, fig. 27, p. 269. For an account of the siege see pp. 267–75. 56

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of boats led to a rout of the soldiers from the first four. Only one of the English soldiers was given quarter, the rest being killed apart from eight, who managed to swim back to safety. On seeing this the other boats fell back. Ireton described this as ‘a greater check and rebuke upon us, then I can remember or have heard to have fallen upon any party of ours in this War’. He stated that they had lost eighty-seven men and four officers. Irish estimates differed, Muskerry claiming that, ‘In one attempt that the enemy made with boats upon King’s Island they lost 700 men at least, some say 1,000’. 62 Embedding for a long siege, Ireton ordered the construction of a large fort at the Clare end of Thomond bridge, capable of holding 1,000 foot and troop of horse, followed by construction of two forts, called Cromwell’s fort and Ireton’s fort, to south and southwest, with an entrenchment linking them.63 When the negotiations for surrender failed, the attempt to reduce the castle continued. Ludlow wrote that ‘a battery was erected, and a breach being made, the Deputy remembering the vigour of the troopers in the action at Gourtenshegore, desired that one might be drawn out of each troop to be an example to the foot that were to storm’.64 Ludlow’s account gives an impression of Ireton’s energetic command of his forces in which he personally led the men and took the decisions: The Deputy feared that the plague, which raged fiercely in Limerick, might reach our army, and to the end that care might be taken of our sick and wounded men, caused an hospital to be prepared, and furnished with all things necessary; and whilst the works were finishing against the town, he went to visit the garison of Killalo, and to order a bridg to be made over the river at that place, for the better communication of the counties of Tipperary and Clare. I accompanied him in this journey, and having passed all places of danger, he left his guard to refresh themselves, and rode so hard that he spoiled many horses, and hazarded some of the men; but he was so diligent in the publick service, and so careless of every thing that belonged to himself, that he never regarded what clothes or food he used, what hour he went to rest, or what horse he mounted.65

VII The bitterness of the Limerick siege combined with the frustration of his attempts to bring other enemy parties to battle must have confirmed to Ireton the problems for any long-term settlement of Ireland. One particular episode of the Limerick siege illustrates its brutality and the measures Ireton took to terrorise the inhabitants: 62

BL, 638(13), Sad Newes from Ireland (1651); HMC 36 Ormond, II, p. 187, Lord Muskery to Ormond, 25 Aug. 1651; Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 306. 63 Simms, War and Politics, p. 24. 64 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 275. 65 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, pp. 278–9. 214

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Great numbers of people endeavoured to get out of the town, sent out by the garrsion either as useless persons, or to spread the contagion amongst us. The Deputy commanded them to return, and threatned to shoot any that should attempt to come out for the future: this not being sufficient to make them desist, he caused two or three to be taken out in order to be executed, and the rest to be whipped back into the town. One of those that were to be hanged was the daughter of an old man, who was in that number which was to be sent back: he desired that he might be hanged in the room of his daughter, but that was refused, and he with the rest driven back into the town. After which a gibbet was erected in the sight of the town walls, and one or two persons hanged up, who had been condemned for other crimes, that those within might suppose that execution to be for coming out; and by this means they were so terrified, that we were no farther disturbed on that account.66

It would also appear that in the circumstances of the siege Ireton could not always have total control of his men. When O’Neill sent out starving civilians Ireton sent them back with a letter stating that any others would be dealt with harshly. O’Neill did not let them in and sent out more. Ireton ordered four to be ‘knocked on the head’. Forty were by mistake.67

VIII The refusal of his summons to surrender saw Ireton start a bombardment of the weaker sections of the walls. Ireton had received information from defectors that parts of the walls were not reinforced and this is where he focused his barrage.68 By the third day the besieged began to bargain. Ireton sought to enflame divisions within the garrison about whether to surrender through ‘letters and messages’. Ireton refused to call a cease-fire but offered terms. Unwilling to offer security for the Catholic religion, the negotiations broke down.69 One of Ormond’s correspondents wrote that the beseiged ‘have renounced all kind of condition and quarter and are resolved to die upon the place rather than expose themselves to the mercy of a cruel and perfidious enemy’. 70 Those actually inside Limerick were finally worn down by the conditions, having been subjected to attempts to starve them out for four months. Only the

66

Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 284. Simms, War and Politics, p. 25. 68 R. Hutton and W. Reeves, ‘Sieges and Fortifications’, in J. Kenyon and J. Ohlmeyer (eds), The Civil Wars. A Military History of England, Scotland, and Ireland 1638–1660 (Oxford, 1998), p. 221; Abbott, III, pp. 125–251; Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, pp. 268–89. 69 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, pp. 284–5; Simms, War and Politics, pp. 24–5; Bodleian Library, Tanner Mss 54 fol. 50. 70 HMC 36 Ormond, II, p. 187, Lord Muskery to Ormond, 25 Aug. 1651. 67

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impact of Ireton’s additional artillery prompted their surrender however. This of course raises the question as to why Ireton did not deploy it earlier.71 Ireton himself addressed this, pointing out that the earlier loss of artillery at Clare had necessitated the delay in its deployment at Limerick.72 From an Irish perspective a letter from Muskerry to Ormond stressed how the siege had drained English resources.73 Although the cost of securing Limerick may not have been as pronounced as Muskerry presented, the Parliamentary Commissioners admitted to ‘a great wasting’ of their resources.74 Ireton exhorted his readers to: adde it to the account of those other great Blessings and Deliverances, and more glorious Workings of Gods good hand towards you in this year in England and Scotland, which you have to acknowledge to the Praise of his Great Name, and improve to his further Honor and Service in the Advancement of Righteousness and Truth in the Three Nations, and furthering the Exaltation of all that is indeed the Interest of the Lord Jesus Christ, who hath so graciously owned, and thus far Upheld and Established yours. Now that you, and those that serve and partake with you in these things, may be both intent to consider and seek, and taught of him more and more what maner of persons we ought to be, and what to do for his Name, and made (through his greater Grace) both really to be, and faithfully to do in some sort more answerable to such peculiar Favors of his, and Experiences or Testimonies thereof towards us, and preserved by him from the many Snares and Temptations, attending such Advantages to such corrupt Natures, is still the hearts desire and prayer of him, who hath been very little, and grows less able otherwise to serve you.75

Colonel Hugh O’Neill, Governor of Limerick, already condemned to die, met Ireton at the gate to surrender. In all, twenty-two were excepted from the articles. Alongside O’Neill were two bishops, a priest and Major-General Purcell.76 Such terms reflect the wider approach of Ireton to settlement in Ireland. The leaders of resistance and Catholic priests were regarded as the implacable enemies while for the deluded people who had been seduced by them there remained a chance of mercy. O’Neill pleaded for his life to a Council of War and in a letter to Ireton: The relation I have of your noble and generous disposition induceth me to presume pleading your favour in my present condition (which I presume to be innocent) being guilty of no base or dishonourable act, having only discharged the duty of a

71

Bodleian Library, Tanner Mss 55 fol. 67. BL, E647(9), A Letter from the Lord Deputy-General of Ireland (1651), p. 6. 73 HMC 36 Ormond, II, p. 187, Lord Muskery to Ormond, 25 Aug. 1651. 74 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 492. 75 BL, E647(9), A Letter from the Lord Deputy-General, pp. 9–10; CJ, 7 (28 Nov. 1651), p. 45. 76 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 287; Gentles, NMA, p. 379. 72

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soldier as became a man subject to the superior power to which I must have been accountable. Neither in reflection of this was I transported either with passion of my own or the violent strain of others, who would not be directed into reason and in the whole course of my proceedings since I came into this garrison, I appeal to the judgment and censure of the most – and men of best understanding within the City what my behaviour hath been and with what difficulty and patience I endeavoured the surrender of this place, being satisfied in all human reason and policy (even from the beginning) that it could not withstand your power. I shall therefore humbly entreat your Honour to take my condition into your serious consideration that I be not otherwise dealt with than the justice or injustice of my case requires, which I shall undoubtedly expect from a person of my Lord Deputies honor and through the intercession of your Lordship which shall remain an undoubted obligation never to be unacknowledged by your Lordship’s most humble servant.77

Ireton wanted O’Neill to die for the: blood formerly shed at Clonmel, where this Col. O’Neal was governour, had made such an impression on the Deputy, that his judgment, which was of great weight with the court, moved them a second time to vote him to die, tho some of us earnestly opposed it, for the reasons before mentioned by himself; and because whatsoever he had been guilty of before, had no relation to these articles, which did not at all exempt him from being called to an account by the civil magistrate for the same. The court having passed sentence of death a second time against him, the Deputy, who was now entirely freed from his former manner of adhering to his own opinion, which had been observed to be his greatest infirmity, observing some of the officers to be unsatisfied with this judgement, referred it again to the consideration of the court, who by their third vote consented to save his life.78

Ireton had certainly shown himself to be secure in his own rectitude in England. The practical problems he encountered in Ireland may have tempered this but it seems unlikely that there was a real marked change in Ireton’s character or approach. The nature of Ludlow’s account, the fact that Ireton now commanded and the nature of the record of him from Army Councils in England must be considered. As a commander, Ireton may have been more prone to regard the advice of those around him. Ludlow’s account probably overemphasises his own role in affairs and that civil justice should override military rule. The descriptions of Ireton’s role in Army Councils in England come from sources where he was leading an argument in a political context rather than from the hundreds of Army Councils that he must have participated in which dealt with military issues. Ireton may have believed that O’Neill deserved to die but took note of the legal argument against this.

77 78

Ramsey, Ireton, pp. 192–3. Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 288. 217

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IX After the fall of Limerick Ireton wanted to proceed to Galway, but other opinion regarded November as too late for another campaign and the army moved into winter quarters.79 On 7 November 1651 Ireton sent a summons for Clare Castle to General Preston, Governor of Galway, and a letter to the Mayor and Aldermen of the City.80 In both of these missives Ireton reinforced similar ideas he had expressed earlier to Preston, in particular the righteousness of the English cause.81 If Preston surrendered Galway on the terms offered, Ireton would extend mercy as befitted the rules of war. Ireton’s words indicate, however, his belief that his offer would be refused and again betray his contempt for his adversary. He also threatened Preston not to deny the terms to those who served under him: If you smother or suppress it, you may guess whose head shall pay for the trouble or mischief that shall follow, if God enable us to reach it, as I doubt not but he will because he is, and we have eminently found him still to be, a righteous Judge, pleading the quarrel of the innocent, and a severe avenger of their blood against those that spill it or lightly regard it, as well as a merciful father and a faithful master to those that seek and serve him.82

In Ireton’s letter to the Mayor and Council of Galway, note should be taken of the qualification in his offer of terms. He stated that if they surrendered they would receive the same terms as he first offered at Limerick. They would find ‘more mercy and favour to all save the original authors of the rebellion’.83 In a characteristically long letter Ireton made it clear to them that if the town continued to offer succour to those whom he regarded as the true enemies of God all would be deemed guilty. In trying to provoke division among those besieged Ireton again made a clear distinction with regard to those whom he faced, the guilty (the minority, leaders and priests) and the deluded (the people). He argued that though: you should not be overmastered by an hungry, starving soldiery, yet the multitude of priests, these incendiaries of blood and mischief among them, and other desperate persons (engaged upon their principles in the beginning of this rebellion and in the murders and outrages therein committed) which I understand you have amongst you, makes me apt to doubt that by your reception and protection of them adhering thus far unto them (if not by any bloody and treacherous acting of your own) you

79

Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 289. HMC 36 Ormond, I, p. 225–7; BL, E652(14), Parker, chief affairs of Ireland truly communicated (1652). 81 HMC 36 Ormond, I, p. 225. 82 HMC 36 Ormond, I, p. 226. 83 HMC 36 Ormond, I, p. 226. 80

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may in the same guilt as to be doomed to partake with them in the same plagues and given up to be either overawed or deluded thereunto by the same persons with whom and for whose sakes you have made yourselves partakes of the guilt, or at least I am sure such as those amongst you so far as they can prevail to overpower and deceive you will endeavour to engage you as deep and render you as desperate as themselves, and make your wealth and strength serve to maintain and protect them and their broken and wicked interests as long as ever they can.84

Ireton’s notion of blood-guilt was the same as he had applied in 1649 to Charles I. Mercy would be shown to those who deserved it, but for those who did not God demanded ‘severity’.85

X Wheeler argued that Ireton ‘underestimated the logistical and tactical problems’.86 He believed that a ‘campaign to seize the gateways into the province at Limerick and Athlone was entirely feasible . . . Cromwell or Michael Jones would have pursued aggressively such an opportunity’.87 Burke states that ‘Ireton’s background was legal rather than military and he approached the problems of siege warfare with a lawyer’s caution’.88 In arguing that Ireton should have attacked Limerick, Wheeler has claimed that ‘Ireton decided, however, not to pursue the capture of Limerick as his immediate objective. Refusing to discuss campaign plans with his key subordinates, he kept his own council and decided to divide his army’.89 Although Gentles may be right in contending that ‘It is difficult to avoid the impression that had Cromwell been in charge of the siege it would have been over much sooner’, even Cromwell may have been more hesitant after his experience at Clonmel.90 Account should be taken of the problems Ireton faced. Cromwell sought to break major Irish resistance before returning to face the problems that were developing from Scotland. Ireton had to secure the position for long-term settlement. Quick victories were not needed after what Cromwell had achieved. Clonmel had also indicated the need for caution. Even in 1649 Commissary-General Reynolds could inform Ireton that ‘our Irish manner of warfare is different from other plans which are now practised’.91

84

HMC 36 Ormond, I, p. 227. HMC 36 Ormond, I, p. 227. 86 Wheeler, Cromwell in Ireland, p. 180. 87 Wheeler, Cromwell in Ireland, p. 181. 88 J. Burke, ‘Siege Warfare in Seventeenth Century Ireland’, in Lenihan (ed.), Conquest and Resistance, p. 267. 89 Wheeler, Cromwell in Ireland, p. 182. 90 Gentles, NMA, p. 379. 91 HMC Various, 6, pp. 435–6. 85

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No matter how unrealistic, Ireton would also have had to consider the persistent rumours of foreign aid. On 24 March 1651 William King wrote to Ireton concerning the supposed terms agreed between Clanricard and the Duke of Lorraine’s agent.92 In May 1651 the Council of State wrote of information they had received about the ‘designs the Duke of Lorraine has had upon Ireland, and have had confirmation of the same from you’.93 Ireton did need to be more circumspect than Cromwell. Capturing Limerick, the main objective after Cromwell’s departure, would be difficult. Ireton simply could not afford any reverse after the defeats suffered by Cromwell at Duncannon, Waterford and most notably at Clonmel, where it has been estimated he lost between 1,000 and 2,500 men. 94 It is likely therefore that Ireton’s ponderous approach to campaigning was not only symptomatic of his military stance but also a reflection of the impact Clonmel and Irish conditions had upon his generalship. Furthermore, any reverse would be seen as a sign of God’s disfavour. Limerick’s fortifications were modern, dating only from the 1590s. Furthermore they had been reinforced in the 1640s. From his previous campaign experience Ireton appreciated the problems such strong defence would cause. An Italian observer described Limerick as ‘almost impregnable’.95 Surroundered by counterscarp the town walls had been reinforced by earthworks. As Lenihan has stressed, Limerick ‘could be fully invested only by the deployment of large logistic and engineering resources and by a division of the attacking army’.96 That Limerick’s fortifications were in the command of the resourceful Hugh O’Neill, who had inflicted such a heavy defeat on Cromwell at Clonmel, also provided a further obstacle to a quick assault. At Clonmel, Cromwell’s mistake had been to believe that a quick assault would be successful. Ireton could not but have taken note. After Ireton’s death Galway, the last Irish stronghold, resisted Coote for nine months until April 1652. Any assessment of Ireton’s campaign should be placed in the context of the major problems he faced. Ireton was in fact ‘a general who seemed to comprehend the problems of siege warfare better than any other and who had successfully concluded the most technically difficult siege yet undertaken by the army’.97

92

Z. Grey, An Impartial Examination of the Fourth Volume of Mr. Daniel Neal’s History of the Puritans, 4 vols (1734–1739), 4, appendix, letter 7, p. 15. HMC 13th Report, p. 563; CJ, 6, p. 564. 93 CSPD (1651), p. 186. 94 Gaunt, Cromwell, p. 121. 95 Hutton and Reeves, p. 225; Burke, ‘Siege Warfare’, in Lenihan (ed.), Conquest and Resistance, pp. 268–70. 96 Burke, ‘Siege Warfare’, in Lenihan (ed.), Conquest and Resistance, p. 268. 97 Burke, ‘Siege Warfare’, in Lenihan (ed.), Conquest and Resistance, p. 268. 220

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After Cromwell’s departure Ireton assumed control of English military and administration within Ireland. The limited time that Ireton spent in Ireland makes assessment of his rule problematic. This period witnessed only the beginning of English attempts to remodel Ireland. Yet Ireton’s actions and statements still indicate his own ideas with regard to how the New Model’s limited control of Ireland should be translated into settlement. As Lord Deputy, Ireton was, in practice, President of the Parliamentary Commissioners, but was also appointed as Lord President of Munster.1 In these capacities Ireton’s statements and actions show how he shared Cromwell’s views with regard to the Irish and Catholicism. They indicate how, as elsewhere in his career, his religious conviction most underpinned his actions. Wheeler stated that had: the English offered the Catholics some way to surrender honourably, without loss of religion or life, the war might have ended at this point. But the English Puritans refused to do so, leaving the Catholics no choice but to fight on until total exhaustion.2

This is to misread the approach of the English. The terms Ireton offered at Limerick and Cromwell’s Declaration with regard to the Irish people show there was not a simple approach to the question of Catholicism. The distinction made by Cromwell and Ireton between priests, leadership and people indicates that while toleration would not be offered there was still a real element of pragmatism in how Catholicism was dealt with in response to the problems of long-term settlement in Ireland.

1

Barnard, Cromwellian Ireland, p. 17; CJ, 6, p. 435; CSPD (1649–50), pp. 476, 502; CJ, 6, p. 343. 2 Wheeler, Cromwell in Ireland, p. 200. 221

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I While Ireton would have been chosen through Cromwell’s influence, his command needed to be formally conferred on him by the Rump Parliament. The actual authority given to Ireton proved far less extensive than the extraordinary political and military powers Cromwell had secured for himself. Ireton evinced no such respect from the Rump politicians, keen to flex their muscles against the political power of the army. On 10 January 1650 an order in Parliament made clear that he should submit to their authority.3 Ireton’s instructions as President of Munster reflected the reality of dual power between the New Model and the Rump Parliament. The political control that MPs sought was to be through the appointment in October 1650 of Commissioners to rule with Ireton. Their instructions indicated that with Ireton they would be responsible for military and administrative affairs in Ireland.4 Ludlow maintained that as Ireton carried the whole weight of Irish government Cromwell wanted others to work with him. Ireton undoubtedly had a large administrative burden alongside his military duties, which Cromwell appreciated and, no doubt, sought to alleviate, but the context for Ludlow’s comments must be appreciated. To have Commissioners alongside Ireton suited the agenda of republicans like Ludlow who had concerns about the political power of the New Model Army.5 Appointed with Ludlow as Commissioners for Ireland were Colonel John Jones, Miles Corbet and John Weaver.6 Their political and religious outlook appeared to be conducive to Ireton. Miles Corbet was a religious radical regicide, John Weaver, a noted Independent, had been a treasurer in the Eastern Association army, while John Jones was also a religious radical.7 As well as being one of the Commissioners, Ludlow was also appointed Lieutenant-General of Horse, in effect Ireton’s military deputy.8 The new Lieutenant-General wrote that it was ‘About the beginning of January [1651] the Commissioners of Parliament, the Lady Ireton, and my self, met at Milford, in order to embark for Ireland’.9 It is difficult to discern any obvious hostility between Ireton and the Commissioners. This may be partly as a result of the fact that one of the main sources for this period is written by a Commissioner, Ludlow. It may simply reflect that, given the scale of the problems faced, Ireton genuinely welcomed the appointment of Commissioners 3

CSPD (1649–50), p. 476; CJ, 6 (4 Jan. 1650), p. 343. CJ, 6 (4 Oct. 1650), pp. 479–80. 5 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 247. 6 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 249. 7 NewDNB Miles Corbet entry by Sarah Barber; John Weaver entry by Toby Barnard; John Jones entry by Stephen Roberts. 8 Gentles, NMA, p. 377. 9 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, pp. 259–60, 486. 4

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to share the burden. Ireton clearly expressed support for the Commissioners to Lenthall: [T]he comeing over of your Commissioners (whome God hath favoured with soe quick an Opporunity of Passage) and that soe safe, quiet and comfortable, as exceeds ordinary Experience or Expectation, especially at that Season of the Yeare, which may bee some Testimony that hee is well pleased with their Employment; I finde an Occasion obligeing mee (as I blesse God for the seasonable Helpe and Comforte hee hath sente us in theyr cominge soe) to acknowledge with all Thankfullness your Favor and Care in sending Commissioners soe impowered and instructed, wherein I am apte to hope you did not onely intende and take care for the better manageing of your Affayres here, but considered and minded withall the Assistance, Ease, and Refreshment of your poore weake Servant, under those Burdens of every Kinde, which hitherto have pressed too heavyly uppon a single Shoulder, and God knowes I speake not faynedly herein, as allso in the Choyce you made of the Persons to sende for those Ends, whiche (soe farre as more Knowledge or Understandinge of one then an other may make a Difference to mee amongst your Members, I crave Leave to assure you) doe redound very muche to my Contentment, as I hope it will to the publique Advantage.10

Other evidence may also suggest that he co-operated with the Commissioners. After Ireton’s death three of the Parliamentary Commissioners, Corbet, Jones and Weaver, informed Cromwell that, upon ‘discourse with the Lord-Deputy in his life-time, we found his opinion was that Presidents of Provinces were an unnecessary burthen to the state and country’.11 The Munster court came to an end and Ireton was not replaced as President.12 This unreliable report from after his death by men who would not want provincial presidents should be set in the context of Ireton’s self-denial and care with the assets of the state. For Ludlow he ‘was always careful to husband those things that belonged to the State to the best advantage, so was he the most liberal in employing his own purse and person in the publick service’.13

II As President of Munster Ireton’s reforming influence has been most noted. Barnard commented that most: of the important reforms and innovations – the substitution of government salaries for tithes, state payment for schoolmasters, the revival of the Munster presidency

10 11 12 13

Grey, 4, applendix letter no.48, pp. 80–2. Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 497. Barnard, Cromwellian Ireland, pp. 271–2. Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 286. 223

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court, the act for the propagation of the Gospel – occurred between 1649 and 1652, and were the result of the Rump’s or (more often) Oliver Cromwell’s and Ireton’s activity.14

Ireton, naturally concerned with military affairs, allowed John Cook a lot of scope with regard to legal reforms. Cook’s work may generally be seen as representative of the measures that Ireton sought, and which some regard as a model to be later applied elsewhere.15 Cook did not do much that may be regarded as new; his work in Munster was modelled on Thomas Wentworth, Charles I’s Lord Deputy. For Barnard the only ‘important innovation was to set up azzise courts in each county’, which Ireton authorised.16 Cook wrote that: My Lord Deputie (who is a blessed Instrument and indefatigable in the works of holines and righteousnes) for the great ease and safety of the people, hath altered the Provinciall Court into County Courts, that whereas before the people travailed fourty or fifty miles, now their differences are ended at home in the nature of Assizes or sittings.17

The Irish landed elite regarded Cook as ill-disposed towards them.18 Ireton may have shared a similar prejudice against the landed Irish.19 Cook’s apparently arbitrary way of proceeding in Munster is no great surprise, being made possible by the state of war and the self-justification of the English Independents for the imposition of order upon a ‘barbaric’ country.20 Ireton’s role in administering Ireland, shown in particular by his enforcement of military discipline, tends to confirm the harsh but fair picture of him from his record in England. Ireton, according to Ludlow: was so great a friend to justice, even where an enemy was concerned, that tho Col. Axtell was a person extraordinarily qualified for the service of that conjecture, he, together with the Council of War, at which the Commissioners of the Parliament were also present, suspended him from his employment.21

Despite the bitterness of the siege-based Irish campaign Ireton sought to maintain the conduct of his men. He court-martialled a Colonel Tothill for 14

Barnard, Cromwellian Ireland, p. 299. Barnard, Cromwellian Ireland, p. 256. 16 Barnard, Cromwellian Ireland, p. 271. 17 John Cook, Monarchy no Creature, epistle, n. p. 18 Barnard, Cromwellian Ireland, p. 274. 19 Barnard, Cromwellian Ireland, p. 272. 20 N. Carlin, ‘Extreme or mainstream?: the English Independents and the Cromwellian reconquest of Ireland, 1649–1651’, in B. Bradshaw, A. Hadfield and W. Morley (eds), Representing Ireland: Literature and the Origins of Conflict, 1534–1660 (Cambridge, 1993). 21 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, pp. 263. 15

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ordering his men to kill fourteen soldiers who had surrendered after one of the initial exchanges at Limerick.22 That Ireton conducted a court-martial into what had happened suggests that he did not hold the enemy in complete contempt and sought to abide by the rules of war. Ireton wrote of the incident and the court-martial. His own words show that while he had taken action against Tothill he still keenly felt the damage of the incident due to the depth of his faith: ‘I fear it fell short of the Justice of God required therein to the acquitting of the Army from the guilt of so foul a sin.’23

III Ireton, like Cromwell, showed a willingness to work with those in Ireland whom he felt some advantage could be gained from, irrespective of their previous political loyalty, their Catholicism or other continuing doubts about their current allegiance. Such measures were obviously a pragmatic response to the military and political complexities of the problems faced in Ireland. In the long term, indicated by the land settlement, ‘an entire society was to be destroyed to build a new one’. This did not happen only because it proved impracticable.24 The Earl of Antrim, Randal MacDonnell (1609–83), had been one of those from whom Cromwell accepted aid and which Ireton continued. Ohlmeyer has shown how Antrim ‘appears to have been in fairly close contact with the invaders – especially with Henry Ireton’.25 In December 1650 the Council of State felt it necessary to write to Ireton giving him reasons as to their unwillingess to come to an agreement with Antrim.26 Denied composition and the chance to put his case personally before the Council, Antrim was ordered back to Ireland, where he arrived in January 1651. 27 The Council order indicated that Ireton had wanted some form of compromise with Antrim, in return for the ‘singular service’ he had performed by helping them secure the surrender of New Ross in October 1649.28 Although distrustful of Antrim Ireton did give him material aid. In December 1651 ‘Antrim received, out of Customs and Excise duties, £500

22

Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 274; BL, E786(29), Severall Proceedings (31 July–7 Aug. 1651), p. 1486; Gentles, NMA, p. 378. 23 BL, 638(13), Sad News from Ireland (1651), p. 2. 24 Stevenson, ‘Cromwell, Scotland and Ireland’, in D.L. Smith (ed.), Cromwell and the Interregnum: The Essential Readings (Oxford, 2003), p. 200. 25 Ohlmeyer, Antrim, p. 232. 26 CSPD (1650), p. 465. 27 J. Ohlmeyer, Civil War and Restoration in the Three Stuart Kingdoms: The Career of Randal MacDonnell, Marquis of Antrim, 1609–1683 (Cambridge, 1993), p. 238. 28 Ohlmeyer, Antrim, pp. 232–3. 225

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which Ireton had promised him’.29 Some of this was due to Antrim’s employment by ‘Ireton in preparing forces and boats to be transported into Scotland against his majesty’s interest there’.30 After the Restoration, a selfinterested Antrim falsely denied the scale of his involvement with Ireton.31 The Bishop of Cork, who admittedly had his own agenda, claimed that Ireton’s tent ‘was his [Antrim’s] sanctuary’.32 This appears to be closer to the truth than Antrim’s post-Restoration denial. Ireton did not trust Antrim and had doubts about other leading Irish figures, Broghill and Coote, who had acted much more positively for the Commonwealth.33 Broghill’s loyalty was bought by political and military office. Ireton himself responded to a complaint by Broghill, indicating his need to be pragmatic no matter his personal feelings.34 Without the aid of men such as Broghill control of Ireland would be even more problematic. In February 1651 Ireton and the Commissioners wrote to Lenthall in support of Broghill’s petition, in relation to an act for an estate of £1,000 p.a. that needed amendment.35 Ireton had also proposed helping the Earl of Castlehaven with his estates. 36 The nature of Ireton’s proposal might indicate, however, longer term ideas about settlement in Ireland, as Castlehaven would have to remove himself to England. Agreement with the Irish elite was only temporary and did not preclude a shift in real power when circumstances permitted. Late in November 1651 the way Ireton reportedly dealt with Lady Honoria O’Bryan, daughter of the late Earl of Thomond, suggests that other factors could shape his response. She was: accused of protecting the goods and cattle of the enemy, under pretence that they belonged to her, and thereby abusing the favour of the Deputy’s safeguard, which he had granted her, came to him; and being charged by him with it, and told, that he expected a more ingenuous carriage from her; she burst out into tears, and assured him, if he would forgive her, that she would never do the like again, desiring me, after the deputy was withdrawn, to intercede with him for the continuance of his favour to her: which when I acquainted him with, he said, ‘As much a cynick as I am, the tears of this woman moved me;’ and thereupon gave order that his protection should be continued to her.37

29

Ohlmeyer, Antrim, p. 249; CSPIreland, pp. 63–5, 215. Ohlmeyer, Antrim, p. 258. 31 CSPIreland (1660–62), p. 542, 8 May 1662, Examination of Antrim. 32 Ohlmeyer, Antrim, pp. 236–8. 33 Barnard, Cromwellian Ireland, p. 272. 34 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, pp. 264–5. 35 HMC 13th Report, p. 557. 36 Ohlmeyer, Antrim, p. 238; The Earl of Castlehaven’s Review: Or his Memoirs of his Engagement and Carriage in the Irish Wars (London, 1684), p. 172. 37 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 293. 30

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IV Antrim’s Catholicism prevented him from securing his estates. Ireton’s attempt to help Antrim is indicative of a pragmatic response to Catholicism. Fleetwood, quite rightly given Antrim’s record, did not trust the Earl. Much harsher in his assessment than Ireton, Fleetwood argued with regard to Catholics that ‘the truth is, these people are an abominable false, cunning and perfidious people; and the best of them to be pitied, but not to be trusted’.38 Ireton, like Cromwell, propounded a view that those who professed Catholicism were not genuine in their faith and the majority of the population were simply deluded. This view was naive, distorted and partly propaganda, but one that both men believed. Gentles has argued that ‘By 1652 every vestige of the earlier enlightened attitudes espoused by Whalley, Ireton and Ludlowe had vanished. Just before his death Ireton had denounced the Irish clergy as “these incendiaries of blood and mischief.” ’39 Yet this would be to take Ireton’s comments out of context. Ireton, writing to the Mayor and Council of Galway, commented that ‘the multitude of priests, these incendiaries of blood and mischief . . . you may in the righteous judgment of God be so far involved with them in the same guilt as to be doomed to partake with them in the same plagues’.40 Ireton’s policy did not shift from ‘enlightened’. English policy in Ireland remained brutal in its implementation. Ireton and Cromwell were, however, willing to make a distinction between priests, those in arms and the people to indicate that they did not arrive with an intention of massacring the whole Catholic population. Nevertheless, the language they employed still indicated that the people would be expected to observe the rule and religion imposed upon them as God’s work. Ireton’s letter to Preston, Governor of Galway, makes clear his belief that severity against those who opposed God’s will was justified: if God inable us to reach it, as I doubt not but he will, because he is, and we have eminently found him still to be a righteous Judge, pleading the quarrell of the innocent, and a severe revenger of their blood against those that spill it, or lightly regard it, as well as a mercifull Father, and faithfull Master to those that serve and fear him.41

Official policy which Ireton supported, formulated and implemented was anti-Catholic. A newspaper report of January 1651 stated that:

38

Ohlmeyer, Antrim, p. 248. Gentles, NMA, p. 381. 40 HMC, Ormond, I, pp. 226–7; BL, E652(14), Parker, Chief Affairs of Ireland. 41 BL., E654(9), MP, no.88 (5–12 Feb. 1652), p. 1401; HMC Ormond, I, pp. 225–6 (7 Nov. 1651); BL, E652(14), Parker, Chief Affairs of Ireland. 39

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From Dublin we are certified, by Letter, That all Papists there are commanded to deepart thence within 15 dayes or else to be taken as Enemies. It were well if all of that Sect there, were shipt away for some other Climat, they being disposed by their principles of their Religion, and a kinde of natural Antipathie, not to keep any Faith or Peace, with the English Nation.42

Ireton’s concerns with regard to relationships between his soldiers and Irish women indicated that there could not even be outward conformity; more was demanded by the conquerors. Ireton did not really believe that many of the women who had married his soldiers were sincere in their conversion to Protestantism, a necessary prerequisite for the marriage. Ireton produced an order whereby unless suitable ministers could confirm the reality of their wife’s conversion, officers would be reduced to the ranks. Similar demotions would apply to all other troops.43 There would be no toleration of Catholicism; it remained illegal. At New Ross Cromwell had declared, ‘if by liberty of conscience you mean a liberty to exercise the mass, I judge it best to use plain dealing, and to let you know, where the Parliament of England have power, that will not be allowed of’.44 Ireton did not offer toleration in the Limerick surrender terms. Ireton, in drawing up plans for future plantation of Ireland, made no distinction between the Old English and the Irish due to their Catholicism. He argued that the Old English were ‘made as much our Enemies by their Religion, and as ill to bee trusted as the other’.45 Yet what Ireton and others like him meant when they referred to Catholicism, how this related to their actions, their view of the institution of the Catholic Church and the Catholic population must be considered. The fullest statement of this came in Cromwell’s Declaration.

V Cromwell’s Declaration of 1650 demands consideration as a statement of intent with regard to Catholicism and the Irish people.46 Barnard argued that this Declaration ‘betrays Ireton’s influence’.47 It is very likely that Cromwell

42

BL, E621(8), MP, no.33 (16–23 Jan. 1651), p. 550. Gentles, NMA, p. 382; B. Whelan, ‘Women and Warfare, 1641–1691’, in Lenihan (ed.), Conquest and Resistance, p. 330. 44 Abbott, II, p. 146. 45 Grey, 4, appendix no.47, pp. 78–80. 46 A Declaration of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland For the undeceiving of deluded and seduced People, which may be satisfactory to all that doe not wilfully shut their eyes against the light (21 March 1650). 47 Barnard, Cromwellian Ireland, p. 172; T. Barnard, ‘Planters and Policies in Cromwellian Ireland’, Past and Present, 61 (1973), p. 44. The Early English Books Online database lists Ireton as a contributing author. In the Declaration there is a quotation [page before B2] from 43

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discussed this Declaration with his son-in-law, especially given the latter’s input into the statements of the New Model Army and the depth of the relationship between the two men. Ireton’s actual input, however, cannot be determined. Woolrych has perceived the influence of John Owen in parts of the document, notably the ‘pulpit-rhetoric’, alongside ‘Cromwell’s own tone and thought’.48 The document is essentially Cromwell’s but the argument is one that, given Ireton’s own statements and actions in relation to Catholicism, priests, leaders and people, he clearly shared at the time of its publication. The Declaration warrants attention as context for Ireton’s actions and his own later statements. These indicate that he, not suprisingly, shared Cromwell’s perceptions of Catholicism and the Irish. In the Declaration for ‘the undeceiving of deluded and seduced People’ the distinction Cromwell made with regard to Catholicism and treatment of the Irish people can be appreciated. The Declaration portrayed Catholicism as a means to control and ‘seduce’ a ‘deluded’ people. Catholicism had been corrupted by its priests, who ‘by making the people beleeve that they are not so holy as your selves, they might for their penny purchase some Sanctity from you’.49 It referred to the ‘poore Layety’ that ‘you and your King might ride them and jade them as your Church hath done’ and ‘ignorant’ priests ‘mumbling over mattens’. These priests had deluded the people, led them ‘into so horrid a Rebellion’ and made the ‘Country almost a ruinous heap’.50 The Declaration directly criticised the religious impact of their priesthood. The people had been denied the true word of God and there was no depth to Catholicism among the population: You cannot feed them, you poyson them with your false abhominable & Antichristian doctrin and practices; You keep the Word of God from them, and instead thereof give them your senceless Orders and Traditions, you teach them implicite belief; he goes amongst them may find many that doe not understand any thing in the matters of your Religion.51

The reference to ‘your Religion’ is possibly a reflection of the argument that Catholicism was not rooted in the population at large, since Cromwell had produced the Declaration as a response to the Catholic clergy’s statement from Clonmacnoise. Although Gillespie may conclude that the Irish ‘were indeed

Cromwell’s letter at New Ross, ‘And you instance in Cromwells Letter of the 19. of October 1649’. While it may be asked why this is not ‘my letter’ or ‘our letter’ there are references to ‘I’ (i.e. Cromwell) throughout other parts of the letter. I would like to thank John Morrill for discussing his ideas with regard to the authorship of this Declaration. For him it reads like a Cromwell document. 48 A. Woolrych, Britain in Revolution 1625–1660 (Oxford, 2002), p. 473. 49 A Declaration, A2. 50 A Declaration, n. p. 51 A Declaration, n. p. 229

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a people of God’, the nature of Ireton’s and Cromwell’s beliefs would not have enabled them to recognise this.52 Cromwell and Ireton saw it as part of their work in Ireland to expose the Catholic Church and consequently allow the people to truly come to God through their religion; that the ‘principle, that People are for Kings and Churches, and Saints for the Pope or Churchmen (as you call them) begins to be exploded; and therefore I wonder not to see the Fraternity to be so much enraged’.53 Cromwell stated that to facilitate this process or ‘to discover and unvaile those falsities, and to let them know what they are to trust to from me, is the principall end of this my Declaration’.54 The language of the Declaration is very much that of conquest and, no matter the distinction it makes between priests, those in arms and the people, it is still clear that English rule would be brutally imposed. The conquerors declared that ‘we are come to aske an accompt of the innocent blood that hath been shed. . . . We come (by the assistance of God) to hold forth and maintaine the lustre and glory of English liberty in a Nation we have an undoubted right to doe it’.55 In so doing Cromwell was merely voicing typical English attitudes towards Ireland.56 The Declaration stated a belief in not ‘destroying men because they will not be of our faith’ making a distinction between the priest and the people who they had deluded. Ireton later argued in a similar vein.57 Cromwell declared, ‘I shall not where I have Power, and the Lord is pleased to blesse me, suffer the exercise of the Masse where I can take notice of it; nor suffer you that are Papists: where I can find you seducing the People, or by any overt act violating the Lawes established’.58 With regard to the people however, ‘what thoughts they have in matters of Religion in their owne breasts I cannot reach; but thinke it my duty, if they walke honestly and peaceably, not to cause them in the least to suffer for the same’. Cromwell stated he would ‘endeavour to walke patiently and in love towards them to see if at any time it shall please God to give them another or a better minde’. Although they were not to be ‘extirpated’ the people were still expected to see God through Cromwell’s eyes. Thus while there may have been some distinction with regard to the way priests, those in arms and the people should be treated it cannot be denied that in their statements Ireton and Cromwell were violently anti-Catholic and anti-Irish. Both saw Catholicism as a false doctrine and the Irish people as conquered. In the words of both men the language of rights may have implied that the Irish people were to be better52

R. Gillespie, Devoted People: Belief and religion in early modern Ireland (Manchester, 1997), p. 34. 53 A Declaration, n. p. 54 A Declaration, B. 55 A Declaration. 56 N. Carlin, ‘Extreme or mainstream?’ 57 BL, E612(3), A Declaration of the The Deputy-General of Ireland, p. 9. 58 A Declaration, B2. 230

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off. Nothing could be gained from outlining a directly anti-Catholic stance in printed justifications of conquest, partly designed as appeals to some of the Irish population. English Protestant rule in practice would have brought little change to most Irish people’s lives. As in England, to ‘equally participate in all benefits to use liberty and fortune’ were mere words for most in society. Carlin has written of the contradictions within the ideas of Independents with regard to Ireland and the ‘difficulty of reconciling an ideology of individual rights and liberty with the degradation and exploitation of a particular section of humanity’. This she believes led them away from religious to political justifications for their actions in Ireland. The political writer Henry Parker, Ireton’s close associate, used this justification.59 Religion formed part of the self-justification of what they intended to establish in Ireland. That it had to be imposed would have been for Ireton simply an extension of how force had been necessary in England. Although in his Declaration Cromwell made a distinction between the clergy and the laity, the possible consequences for the deluded people remained brutal: That if I be not able to doe good upon them which I most desire (and yet in that I shall not seek to gain them by flattery, but tell them the worst in plainenesse, and that which I am sure will not be acceptable to you. And if I cannot gaine them) I shall have comfort in this that I have freed my owne soule from the guilt of the evill that shall ensue.60

The Declaration stated a belief in not ‘destroying men because they will not be of our faith’, but for those priests and those that used Catholicism it had a stark message: You are a part of Antichrist, whose Kingdome the Scripture so expresly speakes should be layed in blood, yea in the blood of the Saints; you have shed great store of it already; And ere it be long you must all of you have blood to drinke; even the dreggs of the cup of the fury and wrath of God, which wil be powred out unto you.61

There is nothing in what Ireton did or wrote as Lord Deputy of Ireland that indicates he deviated from the views expressed by Cromwell in his Declaration. Both men were articulating views from ‘part of the mainstream of English colonising thought’.62 Some of Ireton’s attitude, and therefore Cromwell’s, may have derived from his relationship with Henry Parker. According to Aylmer it was probably Ireton who selected Parker as Secretary to the General Officers 59 Carlin, ‘English Independents and the Cromwellian Reconquest of Ireland’, pp. 213–14, 216–17. 60 A Declaration, p.B. 61 A Declaration, n. p. 62 Carlin, ‘English Independents and the Cromwellian reconquest of Ireland’, pp. 222–3.

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in Ireland during the planning of the campaign.63 Mendle claims that Parker, upon his return from Hamburg, ‘grew particularly close to Ireton’ who became his ‘patron’.64 In 1646 Parker started an account of the 1641 Irish rebellion. In this, Parker stated that ‘Religion, is not the supreame motive’.65 Parker, as Ireton and Cromwell, saw Catholicism as a means to delude and control the people. He argued that ‘Popery hath now long since beene discovered to be an imposture or nothing else but a slie sophisme, to establish Empire in the long Robe, and wrest it from such as they account secular men’.66 In February 1652, in response to Ireton’s death, Parker tried to justify Ireton’s proceedings in Ireland.67 Ireton’s own statements with regard to Catholicism and the Irish people are part of the Independent rhetoric but also indicate the potential and actual brutality of godly rule. A religious selfjustification may be seen in Ireton’s own rhetoric.

VI On 6 August 1650 Ireton held the first of eight fast days.68 As in England the New Model sought God, before and during campaigning. The letter Ireton received from ‘his loving father and true friend’ Cromwell after Dunbar illustrates their continued belief that God would direct them. Cromwell informed Ireton that: I knowing the acquainting you with this great handiwork of the Lord would stir up your minds to praise and rejoicing, and not knowing but your condition may require mutual experiences for refreshment, and knowing also that the news we had of your successes was matter of help to our faith in our distress, and matter of praise also, I thought fit (though in the midst of much business) to give you this account of the unspeakable goodness of the Lord, who hath thus appeared, to the glory of His great Name, and the refreshment of His Saints.69

Ireton clearly regarded the enforcement of godliness within his own troops and the raising of morale through a reinforcement of the message that the New Model was God’s army as an important part of his role as commander. The rigour of the Irish campaign further necessitated the maintenance of morale.

63

G.E. Aylmer, The State’s Servants. The Civil Service of the English Republic 1649–1660 (1973), p. 261. 64 M. Mendle, Henry Parker and the English Civil War: The Political Thought of the Public’s Privado (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 28, 160. 65 Carlin, ‘English Independents and the Cromwellian Reconquest of Ireland’, p. 212. 66 Carlin, ‘English Independents and the Cromwellian Reconquest of Ireland’, p. 213. 67 Mendle, Henry Parker, p. 160; BL, E652(14), Henry Parker, Chief Affairs of Ireland. 68 Gentles, NMA, p. 377. 69 Abbott, II, pp. 327–8. 232

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Cook wrote that Ireton ‘upon the least losse we received by the Irish, or any disappointment; Oh, sayes he, is not our God angry with us? let us be servent in prayer to know his minde in every checke or chastisement.’70 In July 1651 Ireton himself wrote at length with regard to God’s favour in the light of heavy losses before Limerick: God hath taught us also (in dreadful language) who it was that gave us passage over this River, by his out-stretched arme, and taught us how to value such a mercy and reproved our under-valuings and unmindfulne of it. Divers other things he hath hereby given us hints of his mind in (more then I can well make out) the wound was deep, and the rebuke and losse most sad upon us all; yet thus far already appears to be from the good will of a Father, That through his grace it hath had (so far as we can judge of our selves or of others in the Army) a more deep through impression, and tender kindly sence of his hand then any such dispensation I have known: But alas, we are apt (without daily new awakenings one way or other) to forget, grow cold, secure, and sleepy againe, and soone loose (even though in part we have found somewhat of) the fruit intended; and though this hath had some effects of humbling melting and teaching upon many hearts amongst us; yet for the fore-going reason, and because such a signall and eminent testimony of his displeasure towards us, in so-used a kind of both blasting our enterprise, and giving us up that party so clearly, and in view of all the rest of us into the hands of our enemy is surely not without some extraordinary ground and ends; and when this insolent enemy took occasion of reproach, blaspheming against our God with sacrifycing to their owne, and the hearts of his poore Servants that much sought to him in that businesse have temptation to discouragement, and to be ashamed of their hope & confidence, (as I desire and beg that my self & others here may not lightly or soon passe it over, or take it up with slight humiliation, or with short and easie inquiries into our own hearts & ways & the mind of God in such a thing, so) it calls for humilation and earnest supplication to all Gods people concerned with us (that shall have notice of it) that the full meaning and effects intended of such a thing both to themselves and us, may bee made out, and not fallen short thereof.71

In a letter to the President of the Council of State Ireton requested the Councillors to: earnestly praye that the Lorde (the onely Giver of every good Gifte) will give us your Servants here, (in the manageing of our Affayres under you) and you in the Affayres of the whole Commonwealth under your Charge, Hearts truly and singly bent to seeke and honor him in all, and doe good to his People, and not to bee lifted up in our Mindes, or corrupted to worldely or selfe Ends, in the Reception or Use of those Blessings or Powers and Advantages hee is pleased to vouchsafe us, but humbly to acknowledge and minde him in all, and improve all to suche Ends as are

70 71

John Cook, Monarchy no Creature, epistle, n. p. BL, E638(13), Sad News from Ireland (1651), pp. 5–6. 233

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most honourable and well pleaseing to him: Now to his abundant Grace I commende you.72

The radical Baptist Thomas Patient, chaplain of Ireton’s foot regiment in Ireland, regarded Ireton as godly.73 John Cook recounted that when ‘Patient (a man of great experience in heavenly things) or any other seemed to be strained in time’ Ireton would always give them the time required, for ‘he would say, let us not think that time too long in God’s immediate service’.74 The Lord Deputy was noted to have been: A most exemplary Christian in duties of piety and Religion, always beginning and ending conferences and counsells with prayer, seeking wisdome, advice and strength from God upon all occasions. He had constantly (when in garrison) an exercise before supper and though he satt in Councell till eight or nine at night, yet by his good will the discourse should not be the shorter.75

First and foremost a godly man, Ireton is still predominantly written about in the context of his comments on the franchise at Putney. Even at Putney however, his comments derived from a relgious basis. The faith which pervaded all that he did is more directly apparent in his statements in Ireland. On 30 July 1650 Ireton issued A Declaration of The Deputy-General of Ireland, Concerning The present hand of God in the Visitation of the Plague; And for the Exercise of Fasting and Prayer in relation thereunto.76 For Ireton it was ‘the Lord our God’ who had stretched ‘his heavy hand over this Nation’ in those ‘capital Judgements of the Sword and Pestilence’.77 This judgement: which of late was so heavy onely, or chiefly, upon the Enemies of his and his Peoples Cause, and upon other the Natives of the Land, with distinguishing Mercy, and forebearance towards those his poor creatures that serve him in that Cause hath of late been extended to the taking away of many of them also.78

Plague had a huge impact upon the English forces and Ireton wrote of God’s ‘destroying Angel . . . seems to come near to us, to the Doors, and even into the Houses or Tents of us that yet survive, even of those that are esteemed best amongst us’.79 As ever, Ireton counselled a greater reliance on God, who had intervened to: 72

Grey, 4, appendix letter no.48, pp. 80–2. Underhill, Confessions of Faith, p. 313. 74 John Cook, Monarchy No Creature, epistle, n. p. 75 John Cook, Monarchy No Creature, epistle, n. p. 76 BL, E612(3), A Declaration of The Deputy-General of Ireland, Concerning The present hand of God in the Visitation of the Plague; And for the Exercise of Fasting and Prayer in relation thereunto (Cork, 1650). 77 BL, E612(3), A Declaration of The Deputy-General of Ireland, p. 3. 78 BL, E612(3), A Declaration of The Deputy-General of Ireland, p. 3. 79 BL, E612(3), A Declaration of The Deputy-General of Ireland, p. 4. 73

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warn those of us that remain, and calls upon all men every where to repent, and not to think that those he hath thought fittest to take away, were greater sinners then our selves, but all of us to search our hearts, and try our ways, and turn unto himself, that he may heal us, and have mercy upon us.80

For Ireton, ‘none of the works of God are without their grounds or ends, or without their speakings and teachings intended to the Sons of men, and especially to those whom he hath given eyes to see’.81 In this vein in 1651 the Lord Deputy and some of his fellow officers urged Cromwell to ‘remember Hezekiah’s fate and judgement’ and ‘take heed of making it your own’.82 In thus recognising Cromwell as their leader he was warned that any backsliding on his part would bring God’s judgement on all of them. In his Declaration Ireton declared that God always acted for ‘reproving, or restraining, for awakening, or quickning, for humbling, teaching or instructing, for purging or purifying, for trying or perfecting of them’.83 He made it clear that he had expressed such thoughts openly among his men as occasion arose during his time in Ireland and his Declaration had been designed to bring the message to a wider audience. He recommended the ‘frequent exercise of Prayer with Fasting (such as is without Superstition) and (suitable to the Faith, Simplicity, Truth and Purity of the Gospel) during the time of this our Calamity’.84 Ireton suggested that how they now responded to the Irish should be shaped by waiting upon God and in particular a following of his will ‘towards the generality of the people, and our Enemies here, whether in respect of Justice (for innocent Blood) or of more moderation and mercy towards any’.85 Ireton denounced ‘Cruelty’86 towards people in protection. In a statement, mirroring Cromwell’s Declaration, Ireton reiterated the view of the ordinary people of Ireland being deluded by Catholicism. For Ireton, the Irish were a ‘poor deluded Popish people of this Nation (captivated and kept in miserable darkness and bondage by their seducing Priests and Leaders)’.87 Yet they were still denounced for ‘their continued abominable Treachery towards all that concur not with them in their own Superstitions, Idolatry and affected Ignorance, or indeed that worship not the Beast as they do’.88 Ireton and his men should help them ‘give glory to the living God’.89 Ireton hoped that:

80

BL, E612(3), A Declaration of The Deputy-General of Ireland, p. 4. BL, E612(3), A Declaration of The Deputy-General of Ireland, pp. 4–5. 82 Worden, ‘Sin of Achan’, p. 47; 2 Chronicles 32:26: ‘But Hezekiah humbled himself for the pride of his heart, both he and the inhabitants of Jerusalem, so that the Wrath of the LORD came not upon them in the days of Hezekiah.’ 83 BL, E612(3), A Declaration of The Deputy-General of Ireland, p. 6. 84 BL, E612(3), A Declaration of The Deputy-General of Ireland, pp. 7–8. 85 BL, E612(3), A Declaration of The Deputy-General of Ireland, p. 8. 86 BL, E612(3), A Declaration of The Deputy-General of Ireland, p. 9. 87 BL, E612(3), A Declaration of The Deputy-General of Ireland, p. 9. 88 BL, E612(3), A Declaration of The Deputy-General of Ireland, p. 9. 89 BL, E612(3), A Declaration of The Deputy-General of Ireland, p. 9. 81

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the wrath of God may be appeased towards them, and not utterly destroy them and their Nation; and that those of them who are capable of his eternal Mercies, may be truly and spiritually humbled under his mighty hand, taken off from the foundations of any Self-or-Creature-confidence, and brought to see, and finde the pure and free mercies of God in Jesus Christ; and, for that purpose, may have their eyes opened, and hearts enlarged to discern and embrace the true light and freedom of the Gospel, and be converted from their carnal conceptions to a spiritual reception thereof, and from their vain Idols to the living God; and in order thereunto (if the Lord have any purpose of a Church or People to himself to be called out amongst them) we may, through his Grace, be made instruments thereof, as well as of subduing their outward man; and (however) may so walk towards them and amongst them, both in word and life, as not to give them occasion of further offence, or stumbling at the Gospel we profess, or cause it to be the worse thought or spoken of amongst them.90

The message of Ireton’s Declaration is essentially the same as Cromwell’s Declaration. Ireton as one of the godly had to bring the deluded Irish to the ‘true light’. He set aside the first three Tuesdays in August for public humilation, detailing what he expected and particularly exhorting ‘all true Professors of the Reformed Religion . . . to be seriously affectionate in this Exercise’.91 This would revitalise the army for ‘Blood and further war’.92 Ireton’s Declaration reinforces the depth and public nature of his profession of what he regarded as a godly cause. Alongside other statements, writings and contemporary accounts of him it reinforces the impression that Ireton was primarily a godly warrior engaged in Ireland in a struggle with the forces of the ‘Beast’.93

VII For the vast majority of Irish, because of their already powerless position, English rule may not have impacted upon them too much if they forsook a religion which Ireton believed they were not attached to. As with Cromwell’s Declaration Ireton offered little hope of compromise to others if they maintained their Catholicism. When considering the extent of mercy after the taking of Limerick: Jeffrey Barrow having the same question put to him with the rest, answered, that it was not just to exclude him from the mercy, because he had been engaged in the same cause as we pretended to fight for, which was for the liberty and religion of

90 91 92 93

BL, E612(3), A Declaration of The Deputy-General of Ireland, p. 10. BL, E612(3), A Declaration of The Deputy-General of Ireland, p. 12. BL, E612(3), A Declaration of The Deputy-General of Ireland, pp. 11–13. BL, E612(3), A Declaration of The Deputy-General of Ireland, p. 9. 236

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his country. The Deputy replied, that Ireland being a conquered country, the English nation might with justice assert their right of conquest: that they had been treated by the late government far beyond their merits, or the rules of reason; notwithstanding which they had barbarously murdered all the English that fell into their hands, robbed them of their goods which they had gained by their industry, and taken away the lands which they had purchased with their money: that touching the point of religion, there was a wide difference also between us, we only contending to preseve our natural right therein, without imposing our opinions upon other men; whereas they would not be contented unless they might have power to compel all others to submit to their impositions upon pain of death. The Council of War looking upon what he said for himself to be hereby fully refuted, adjudged him to die.94

In March 1651 the Commissioners, backed by Ireton, wrote to the Council of State for a more pragmatic approach to settlement.95 This may be an indication that Ireton’s time in Ireland had made him very aware of the practical problems of ruling Ireland. Yet the implicit concept of greater toleration within this statement needs to be treated with care. The letter, dated 24 March 1651, outlined that since their arrival in Kilkenny they had received several petitions from diverse counties: now under your protection, wherein (manifesting their affection to live under the protection and government of the Parliament) they desire to knowe what assurance they shall have for the enjoyment of their religion, lives, libertyes and estates.96

The petitioners had argued that their enquiry was due to their wish to ‘contribute to the maintenance of the army, and improve their lands, which wilbe a meanes to settle the distracted condition of the country, and reduce those in hostility against the State’. The Commissioners argued that they shared the petitioners’ concerns that ‘the enemy have it in designe to stirre the natives to a general insurrection this next summer, by possessing them with an opinion of an utter extirpation of them’. The Commissioners clearly wished to avoid this and offered a compromise: We doe humbly conceive that (as the State and condition of affaires at present stand here), if the inhabitants now under protection, should (upon an apprehension that the Parliament will extend noe favour or mercy towards them) give over tillage and husbandry and join with those forces which keepe in the bogs and woods almost in every county, the war will be much lengthened and made very burthensome to England, be necessitating constant and considerable supplyes of corne and other victuals for all the forces, until the land can be competently planted with English

94 95 96

Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, pp. 288–9. Gentles, NMA, p. 376; Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, pp. 486–8. Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, pp. 486–8. 237

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to till the ground. And the hopes and designes of forraigne enemyes to work disturbance, as well in England as here, wilbe strengthened. And therefore (upon serious consideration of the present state of affaires here, and that the justice and mercy of the Parliament might be extended to all the people here, in some measure proportionable to theire respective demerits) we have framed the inclosed qualifications to be tendered (if thought fit) to the consideration of the Parliament wherein nothing is inserted which relates to their religion (humbly conceiving it more seasonable for the Parliament to declare their pleasure in that particular, when the country is more thoroughly settled). But we humbly conceive that if the Parliament shall please to hold forth some termes of favour and mercy to them in these other things it will probably quiett the mindes of many, and justify the severity and justice of the Parliament against such as embrace not their clemency.97

Here was a call for a more measured treatment of the Irish population, but only in order that English control and exploitation of Ireland could be effective. Ireton may have regarded the Irish people as merely deluded and exploited by their priests and leaders, but in real terms English control meant continued exploitation of the ordinary Irish. On 14 April 1651 the Council of State had the letter from Ireton and the Commissioners reported to Parliament.98 On 2 May Parliament referred the letter back to the Council of State.99 Nothing was done. At other times Ireton painted a much darker future for the Irish people. In December 1650 Ireton wrote to the President of the Council of State, enclosing a paper of proposals for expelling the inhabitants from Waterford, Wexford, Kilkenny and other towns, and planting them with English which derived from proposals by Colonel Richard Lawrence.100 As a detailed consideration of what Ireton regarded as tendering to settlement in Ireland, both documents warrant attention. In his letter Ireton outlined his concern that English forces were stretched too thinly across a ‘Multitude of Guarrisons’ even ‘though wee manne them very weakly’. This was especially so in ‘the Townes we have gained from the Irish’ as ‘the Inhabitants being all Irish, or else Old English, (made as much our Enemies by their Religion, and as ill to bee trusted as the other)’. For Ireton, the practical issue of exploiting Ireland also needed consideration: if wee should doe it before the English be gott to inhabit the houses, wee should not only loose the Contribution of Rent of the Houses, and the Excise and Customes, 97 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, pp. 486–8. The original is in Bodleian Library, Tanner 56 fol. 253. On this it is noted that it was reported and read on 22 April 1651. 98 CSPD (1651), p. 147. 99 CSPD (1651), p. 175. 100 For Ireton’s letter see Grey, 4, appendix no.47, pp. 78–80; HMC 13th Report, p. 550. For Ireton’s proposals see CJ, 6, p. 546; BL, E1061(39), Propositions approved of and granted by the Deputy-General of Ireland to Colonel Richard Lawrence (1650); Barnard, Cromwellian Ireland, pp. 53–4.

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(which though small, yet in some Places are worth preserving, but also the Howses, if the Irish should be put out of them before the English be in to looke to them) would be purposely spoyled by the Irish before or at their going out at least, (in a few Months standing empty) would either be ruined or so spoiled and rendred untenantable, as would at least require the Allowance of a good Time Rent-free for any Men to undertake the Repaire.

The Irish would, however, be removed. They would be replaced with the godly: Now therefore being desirous as speedily as may be to cleare their Townes of Irish and Papists, and have them planted with English, if it be possible, against next Springe, and especially to have those Townes upon the Barrowe and the Setter, that are most fit for trading, to be planted (if God see it good) with a Generation of his People, and suche as upon the best Principles may be faithful to the Interest of the Commonwealth.

Ireton had obviously given some thought to the mechanics of plantation: And knowing no better nor other Way to effect that, I have fallen upon the Proposal of the Way, and the Termes your Lordship will find expressed in the inclosed Paper: wherein, for the speedy gaining of this planting Regiment, and to have it made upp of such Men and Families as are most to be desired in the Respects aforenamed, having made as good as Choyce of a Collonel as possibly as I could, and indeed I think as fitt as any could be found in England or in Ireland for such a Purpose; and being assured of most of the Captaines already, that they are Men answerably fitt for their Partes, and put all the rest of the Officers in suche a way of Choice, as I am confident they will be all sober and good Christians; and being selected out of severall Partes with respect to their Acquaintance and Interest with good People in all Partes, I am very hopefull they will soone bringe over a Regiment of such Families as by possessing for you the Townes of theise Rivers, and by the Blessing of God, which I hope will accompany suche, may probably be a great Stay and Security to the Interest of the Commonwealth in this Nation; and by keeping those Townes with little or no Charge (except suche small Benefitts about the Townes, as in their Absence either the Irish would goe away with, or else noe body) will sett you many Men free for other Service abroad.

Not only had Ireton thought through the practicalities of plantation but the process had begun: Your Lordship will see in the Close of the Paper how farr I have gone in the Way of Agreement for this Business; and soe farr I thought it needfull and sitting my selfe to set it forward. That those that are employed may have something at present to show, wherewith to possesse and prepare their Acquaintance, that incline to such a Thinge, soe as if it be approved by the State, Time might not be lost for their getting over with their Familys against Springe. Thus I humbly tender and submit the Whole to your Lordship’s Consideration, desiring (if it be approved of by your 239

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Lordship) that you will be pleased to represent it to the Parliament, that, if approved there, it may have a full Confirmation, unless your Lordship find it a Thing that may be done by the Commissioners of Parliament, when they come over, without troubling the Parliament particularly about it.101

Ireton wanted to push ahead as soon as possible. Thus Ireton recognised the importance of a longer term solution to the problem of controlling and exploiting Ireland but also the speed with which ‘planting’ needed to be undertaken. Ireton did not want any delay between the removal of the Irish and the occupation of their land and houses by settlers, as this would lead to the loss of rent. He felt they were ‘absolutely free to cast out upon reasonable Warneing’ the Irish from the land apart from where they were bound by terms at such places as Clonmel, Ross and Kilkenny. Those towns most conducive to trade should be planted as quickly as possible and ‘with a Generation of his People’.102 After the surrender of Limerick Ireton again expressed his thoughts with regard to settlement. He intended: speedily to clear the place of a multitude of People that are most dangerous (either in Quality or Infection) and by degrees it may be rendred more English, as you or your Ministers shall finde opportunity of Planters, though there are now divers of the now Inhabitants (and some persons of Quality amongst them) whose carriage all along towards the English People and Interest, and particularly in this surrender, may deserve your admittance to continue here, and favourable dealing in point of their Estates.103

Confirmed by Parliament, Ireton’s Propositions suggested the use of troops raised in England as planters but also as a guard for the city of Waterford and towns of Ross and Carwick. They were confirmed by Parliament.104 Whatever the compromise implied in the suggestions of Ireton and the Commissioners in their letter of March 1651, his Propositions again indicate that life would still be brutal for the bulk of the population. The vast majority of the Irish did not own land and would be even more marginalised by any influx of planters. Such statements may also indicate that while Ireton wished for the Irish to ‘embrace the true light and freedom of the Gospel’ this would not necessarily be imposed upon them. By forcing the bulk of them to Connaught the focus would then be on ‘planting’ godly people to control Ireland and not conversion of the native population. After Ireton’s death the Irish Commissioners, who presumably supported the stance he had taken, not only requested ‘a Commandr in cheife in this 101

Grey, 4, appendix no.47, pp. 78–80. Grey, 4, appendix no.47, pp. 78–80. 103 BL, E647(9), A Letter from the Lord Deputy-General, pp. 7–8. 104 BL, E1061(39), Propositions approved of and granted by the Deputy-General of Ireland (1650). 102

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Nation’ but ‘what Qualifications the Parliamt shall please to hold forth to the Irish, hath bene long expected and much desired’.105 Yet the continued resistance of many Irish prompted men like Ludlow and Jones, who had supported Ireton’s proposals, make bitter statements about the Irish as a ‘cursed people’.106 The subsequent Parliamentary Land Settlement of August 1652 had its roots in what had happened since the arrival of the New Model, antiCatholicism and a desire to remodel Ireland. As Stevenson has indicated, the 1642 Adventurers’ Act and further legislation in 1643 and 1649 providing land for soldiers’ arrears had already shaped Irish policy.107 Whatever distinctions Ireton made between the Irish leadership and people he remained anti-Catholic and determined to construct an Ireland on his terms. Even in September 1650 Ireton’s letter from Kilkenny indicates that his rule of Ireland would have been as brutal as any other army general. According to Ireton, the Irish: seeme to be a people mark’d out to destruction (by the Lord) for their cruelty and bloudinesse, there being no way left for them to escape ruine and destruction, if they should design it; for while they stand out in Rebellion against us, we are spoiling & destroying of them upon all occasions; and as soon as they come into Contribution and Protection with us, then their own party, even their very sonnes, brothers, and kinsmen, they spoile and ruine them: so that, that woe in Isa.33.1. is perfectly befallen them.108

* A correspondent of Ormond stated that ‘I am of opinion that Limerick and Galway will go near to break their army if they stick by them, as I suppose they will, being so deeply engaged and incensed’. 109 This, with regard to Ireton, was one of the few predictions which Muskerry got right. In Ireland Ireton had to face the problems of the attritional nature of warfare and disease. It was to be the latter that actually killed him. After the end of the siege of Limerick the New Model moved into winter quarters. Ireton viewed the country to equalise quarters ‘as to let us see that he would not command any service, but such as he was willing to take a share of himself’.110 He proceeded on a two-day march with Ludlow ‘into the Barony

105

Bodleian Library, Tanner Mss 55 fol. 112. Gentles, NMA, pp. 381–2. 107 Stevenson, ‘Cromwell, Scotland and Ireland’, in Smith (ed.), Cromwell and the Interregnum, p. 200. 108 BL, E614(12), MP, no.19 (10–17 Oct. 1650), p. 313. Woe to thee that spoilest, and thou wast not spoiled; and dealest treacherously, and they dealt not treacherously with thee! When thou shalt cease to spoil, thou shalt be spoiled; and when thou shalt make an end to deal treacherously, they shall deal treacherously with thee. 109 HMC 36 Ormond, II, p. 187, Lord Muskery to Ormond, 25 Aug. 1651. 110 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, pp. 291–2. 106

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of Burren’, then went to ‘Lemene’ which he garrisoned.111 According to his own account Ludlow was suffering from a ‘distemper’. Consequently Ireton did not permit Ludlow to join him the following day as he went with a party of horse to view other places for potential garrisons in preparation for the next campaign in Galway. On this day: there fell an abundance of rain and snow, which was accompanied with a very high wind, whereby the Deputy took a very great cold that discovered itself immediately upon his return; but we could not perswade him to go to bed, till he had determined a cause that was before him and the court martial, touching an officer of the army, who was accused of some violence done to the Irish; and as in all cases he carried himself with the utmost impartiality, so he did in this, dismissing the officer, tho otherwise an useful man, from his command for the same.112

This, coming on top of the rigours of the Limerick siege, almost a decade of being a soldier who clearly worked himself to his physical limits, as well as playing the leading role in the army’s political revolution, led to Ireton’s death. Seriously ill for over a week Ireton had a fever and, despite being given ‘physick’ and being ‘bled’, deteriorated from 17 November.113 When Ludow next met Ireton again, on the Monday morning at Limerick, he: found the Deputy grown worse, having been let blood, and sweating exceedingly, with a burning fever at the same time. Yet for all this he ceased not to apply himself to the publick business, settling garisons and distributing winter-quarters, which was all that remained to be done of the military service for that year. I endeavoured to perswade him, as I had often done before, that his immoderate labours for his country would much impair, if not utterly destroy him; but he had so totally neglected himself during the siege of Limerick, not putting off his clothes all that time, except to change his linen, that the malignant humours which he had contracted, wanting room to perspire, became confined to his body, and rendred him more liable to be infected by the contagion.114

Ludlow’s family had just arrived in Dublin and Ireton sent him there. From Dublin Ludlow’s fellow Commissioners Weaver, Corbet and Jones wrote to Lenthall on 1 December that they had been informed ‘that the Lord Deputy was then very ill of a ffeaver, and that the Disease was not then come to the height: Wee hope the Lord will spare his life.’115 By the time they wrote their letter and by the time Lenthall had read it, 9 December, Ireton was already

111 112 113 114 115

Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 292. Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 292. Whitelocke, Memorials (1762), p. 491. Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, pp. 293–4. Bodleian Library, Tanner Mss 55 fol. 97. 242

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dead. Ludlow arrived in Dublin in late November 1651 and there, ‘soon after my arrival, the sad news of his death was brought to us, which was universally lamented by all good men, more especially because the publick was thereby deprived of a most faithful, able and useful servant’.116 Cook argued that ‘his Death is such an Ecclipse to poore Ireland; that may be best felt & understood many yeers hence; indeed England and Scotland’.117 Ludlow’s fellow Commissioners wrote to the Speaker: This morning came unto us the sad newes of the death of the Lord-Deputy, his gain (we are assured) is very great, he doth now rest from his sore great labours, and is with the Lord. But our losse and (we may well say) your losse also of such a servant is very great.118

To Cromwell they wrote of the: sad news of the death of that incomparable man the late Lord Deputy who expired of a fever at Limerick the 26th of the last month. . . . We desire not to add to your Lordship’s just cause of sorrow by any repetition of the loss the Commonwealth hath by the death of the Lord-Deputy, or how much we are like to suffer by it in our own particular, but rather to beseech the Lord to support you under it for the public good of the nation, and the private comfort of my Lord.119

116

Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 294; CSPVen. (1647–52), p. 209. Cook, Monarchy no Creature, epistle, n. p. For the historian Worden the ‘decisive event was the death of Ireton . . . conflict developed in Ireland between supporters of the “royal, or lordly interest” and the Anabaptists’, Worden, Rump Parliament, p. 292. 118 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 496; Bodleian Library, Tanner Mss 55 fol. 99. 119 Ludlow’s Memoirs, I, p. 496–7. It is also likely that Cromwell received an account of Ireton’s death from one of his sons Henry Cromwell, who was with the Lord Deputy at his death. 117

243

Conclusion Henry Ireton and the English Revolution

Ireton’s contemporaries had no doubt of his central role in the English Revolution. His political enemies and army allies all regarded Ireton as the arbiter of army political strategy, its ‘alpha and omega’.1 From September to December 1648 Ireton drove the New Model to purge Parliament, the institution that was its political master. In the subsequent six weeks his relentless energy would have been crucial in maintaining the nerve of those who recognised that the monarch had to die. In this, Ireton’s influence would have especially told on Cromwell. As with others Ireton has remained in Cromwell’s shadow. This is a product of his early death in Ireland, Cromwell’s own importance before 1649 and his pre-eminence after 1651. Although the role of the individual has become unfashionable in academic history the figure of Cromwell necessarily continues to loom large over the historiography of the years 1645–60.2 A man typically beset by doubt throughout his life, one of those closest to Cromwell, especially in 1648, was Ireton.3 Ireton’s influence on Cromwell would have been a key factor in shaping his response to the failure of Charles I to come to terms. Clarendon wrote that Ireton ‘was thought often by his obstinacy to prevail over Cromwell, and to exort his concurrence contrary to his own inclinations’. Furthermore, it: was generally conceived by those who had the opportunity to know them both very well, that Ireton was a man so radically averse from monarchy, and so fixed to a republican government, that if he had lived he would either by his counsel and credit have prevented those tyrannical excesses in Cromwell, or publicly opposed and declared against them, and carried the greatest part of the army against him.4

1

Lilburne, Legall Fundamental Liberties, p. 31; Clarke Papers, II, pp. 258–9. Morrill (ed.), Cromwell, p. 1. 3 Gaunt, Cromwell, pp. 234–5. For the individual and history see G. Cubitt and A. Warren (eds), Heroic Reputation and Exemplary Lives (Manchester, 2000), pp. 10–21. 4 E. Hyde, The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars, 6 vols (Oxford, 1888, reprint 1969), XIII, pp. 175–6, IV, pp. 264–5. 2

244

CONCLUSION

Clarendon was no admirer of Ireton and his History generally is ‘royalist’. The latter view he espoused was shared by the republican Algernon Sidney, but does not really stand up to scrutiny. Ireton easily had it within him to support an authoritarian style of rule as long as it was godly, and there was no man he trusted more than Cromwell. Furthermore, such speculation would be to ignore the influence that Ireton would have exerted over Cromwell and the politics of 1652–53. Sidney’s apparent belief that Ireton would have prevented Cromwell from assuming the Protectorship may be unreliable but such was the influence of Ireton that the ‘settlement’ of 1653–58 would have been different if he had lived. Ireton may well have agreed with much that was in the Instrument of Government, drafted by his co-author of the Heads, John Lambert, but had he been alive he would have been a key influence in shaping any post-Rump regime.5 Cromwell’s faith in Ireton is evinced by the marriage of his eldest daughter, Bridget, to him in 1646. Ireton, a godly young man, earned Cromwell’s respect on the battlefield, through organisation, intellect and in prayer. Whitelocke, who knew both men well, wrote that Cromwell ‘had a great opinion’ of Ireton and ‘no man could prevail so much nor order him so far as Ireton could. His death struck a great sadness into Cromwell and indeed it was a great loss to him of so able and active, so faithful and so near a relation and officer under him.’6 Although Cromwell was absent in the buildup to Pride’s purge there can be little doubt that the two men were in contact. Ireton drove Cromwell, as much as the army, to complete a revolution and enact regicide. Ireton, as Cromwell, illustrates the importance of the individual in history. His determination and energy derived from a faith inculcated in his early years and seen clearly at Putney, Whitehall and in Ireland, but Ireton would have also steeled his associates in the private moments that elude us. The sources do reveal the amount of time that those who were the key players in army politics in 1648 – Ireton, Cromwell, Peter and Harrison – spent together. This time together was more important than all the pamphlets Ireton authored in bringing about regicide. Individuals are the products of particular societies, subjected to a range of influences. There may be no general pattern for the rise of the gentry or of Puritanism and revolution, but Ireton was certainly a Puritan member of the gentry who became a revolutionary.7 The crucial shared experience of the men he stood with as the leading regicides – Cromwell, Peter and Harrison – was, however, in the societies of the Eastern Association and New Model Army. Ireton, a man from the lesser gentry, educated at Oxford, trained for the law at the Middle Temple, was first and foremost a Puritan who became a revolutionary through the experience of battle and comradeship in Parliament’s armies. 5

For the nature of Clarendon’s History see M.W. Brownley, Clarendon and the Rhetoric of Historical Form (Philadelphia, PA, 1985). 6 Whitelocke, Memorials (1853), III, p. 371. 7 W. Lamont, Puritanism and historical controversy (1996). 245

HENRY IRETON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

A man formed by different experiences, lawyer, soldier, statesman and adminstrator, what also marked Ireton out was the energetic determination to all that he did. For Whitelocke he was ‘industrious’.8 John Cook wrote that: Happily some may excel in one thing and some in another, but for so great a stock of knowledge, such extraordinary abilities in matters and learning, military, judiciall, republicall, mathematicall, morall, rationall and Divine, I say, for everything requisite and desirable both as a man and as a Christian, I thinke it will be hard with many candles to find his equall.

Although Cook’s assessment is overdone, Ireton’s death undoubtedly did prove a great loss to the Republic and to Cromwell. Worden believes it marked a turning point in the political and religious affairs of Ireland.9 Ireton’s drive is another reason for his importance because of the scale of the work which he undertook. Cook wrote upon hearing of Ireton’s death: if he erred in any thing (as error and humanity are inseperable) it was in too much neglecting himself, for like a candle hee wasted his vitalls, to give light to others, seldome thinking it time to eat till he had done the worke of the day at nine or ten at night, and then will sit up as long as any man had busines with him; indeed he was every thing from a foot Souldier to a Generall; and thought nothing done whilst any thing was undone.10

According to another man who worked alongside Ireton in Ireland, Colonel Hierome Sankey, ‘the presence of the Lord did manifest himself abundantly in everything whereto that good man put his hand’. 11 One commentator ‘wonders that the Lord Deputie is not madd as a march hare with the endless inculcation of business which from morning agaybe, he labours under. The pen, tongue, head, or both or all being incessantly at worke.’12 From a completely different perspective Ireton’s drive can still be appreciated. Clarendon saw him as ‘of a melancholic, reserved, dark nature, who communicated his thoughts to very few, so that for the most part he resolve alone, but was never diverted from any resolution he had taken’.13 Dogmatic and direct, Ireton’s bluntness, combined with his religious sincerity, clearly appealed to Cromwell and were the attributes he employed to great effect during this period. Henry Parker wrote, in the context of Ireland, that the ‘English were never guilty of circumventing Enemies by subtilties, and of all English men there was never any one more averse from deluding snares than the Lord Dep: Ireton’.14 A 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Whitelocke, Memorials (1853), III, p. 371. Worden, Rump Parliament, p. 292. Cook, Monarchy no Creature, epistle, n. p. Ramsey, Henry Ireton, p. 202. Ramsey, Henry Ireton, p. 179. Clarendon, Rebellion, XIII, p. 175, IV, p. 264. BL, E652(14), Parker, The Chief Affairs of Ireland Truly Communicated (1652). 246

CONCLUSION

pragmatic politician with a real sense of God’s cause, Ireton was a driven individual whose brutal commitment to dealing with the political problems he encountered, no matter the cost, meant that he may be regarded as an individual who significantly shaped the narrative of the period 1647–49. Without Ireton the how and when of regicide would have been different. Ireton, foremost a driven, godly man, stands as one of the chief architects of the English Revolution.

247

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270

Index Abridgment of the Late Remonstrance (Dec 1648) 198–201 Adamson, John 175, 184 adjutators 62–75, 76, 78, 79, 81, 82, 94–8, 103, 105, 116, 126 Agag 135–6, 135n.108 agents 94–8, 100, 101, 115 Agreement of the People (1647–9) 94, 97, 98, 101, 103, 106, 111, 112, 141, 144, 168, 170, 175, 178–81, 186, 193, 196 Aldridge, Robert 20 Allen, William, adjutant-gen. 70, 83n.40, 93, 93n.104, 98, 103n.25, 112n.71, 124–5 Apologie of the Common Soldiers (28 April 1647) 70 Appelbaum, R. 85, 154 Ashburnham, John 42, 85, 88, 89 Ashton, Robert 127 Athlone 211, 213, 219 Attenborough chapter 1 passim Axtell, Daniel, maj., lt.-col. 188 Bainbrigge, William 33, 39, 41, 44 Baker, Philip 90–1, 93, 94 Barber, Sarah 77, 124, 137, 186, 208 Barkstead, John, col. 134 Barnard, Toby 224 Basil, William 211 Baxter, Richard 46 Berkeley, Sir John 66–7, 85–7, 89, 119, 120, 153 Bible republicanism 154, 202 Bishop, George, capt. 112, 125 Blackwell, John, capt. 60n.92 Blake, Robert 1n.1 blood-guilt 6, 133, 200, 219 Boyle, Roger, Lord Broghill 206, 226 Bradshaw, John, President, High Court of Justice 1, 1n.3, 2–5, 7, 42n.182, 211 Bramcote 19, 20, 22, 26 Brod, M. 194

Brownlowe, Richard 18n.17 Burgess, Glenn 189 Burke, J. 219 Caesar, Sir Julius 19 Cal to all the Souldiers (29 Oct 1647) 97, 98 Capel, Arthur Lord 128, 182 Capp, Bernard 27 Carlin, Norah 132–7, 231 Carlow Castle 209–10, 211 Carr, Brian 38 Carter, Matthew 127 Case of the Army Truly Stated, The (1647) 90–4, 97, 98, 100 Charles I 73 duplicity 115, 116–17, 129, 145, 147, 190 Heads of Proposals 78, 85–90, 129 intransigence 90, 123, 148, 190, 191 Laudianism and 27, 31, 38, 144 regicide chapter 8 passim seizure by army 73–5 Charles II 2, 3, 5, 6, 51 Charlton, Nicholas 33, 34 Chesterfield 18, 19, 22, 23, 25 Chillenden, Edmund, lt. 74, 104, 105, 112n.71 Clarke, William 136, 166 Clonmel 206, 207, 209, 219, 220 Cobbett, John, maj. 96, 112n.71 Cobbett, Ralph, lt.-col. 163, 164 Cockayne, George 135, 149 Colchester 127–8, 162 Constable, Sir William, col. 140, 160, 160n.7, 170 Cook, John 2n.5, 6, 7, 12, 56, 79, 88, 103, 124, 154, 187, 193, 197, 198, 202, 204, 224, 233, 234, 243, 246 Coote, Sir Charles 206, 210, 211, 213, 220, 226 Corbet, Miles 222, 223, 242 Council of State 186–7, 196, 205, 207–9, 220, 225, 233–4, 237, 238 Coward, Barry 183 271

INDEX Cowell, William, lt.-col. 84n.48, 93n.104, 115n.90 Cowling, Nicholas, lt.-col. 115n.90 Crawford, P. 200 Cressy, David 23 Crofts, Roger 61 Cromwell, Bridget 17n.12, 28, 49n.24, 53–5 Cromwell, Elizabeth 1n.1 Cromwell, Henry 207 Cromwell, Oliver army committees 67n.126, 77, 77n.5, 83n.40, 91, 103, 112, 114, 115 army revolt 61, 64–7 attacks on 92, 97 Charles I and 104, 112, 113, 125, 126, 138, 155, 185 Commissioner of Parliament 71 Declaration of the Lord Lieutenant (1650) 228–32, 236 Fairfax and 138, 171, 188 finances 54, 59–60 Heads of Proposals 78, 81–90, 92, 104 influence 66, 71, 80–1, 85, 91, 95, 112, 126, 161–2, 163–4, 198, 244 Ireland chapter 9 passim Ireton and 17n.12, 45, 51, 53–6, 64, 88, 98, 119, 138, 139, 141, 157, 159, 166, 171, 176, 181, 182, 183, 185, 193, 196, 202–3, 222, 232, 235, 244–5 letters of 13, 14, 45, 55, 68, 79, 80n.26, 119, 129–30, 155, 157, 192, 232 letters to 68, 193 letters to Ireton 28, 55–6, 64, 157–8, 232 Machiavellism 90, 95, 116, 123–4, 171, 174, 176, 190 MP 56, 59, 91, 92, 114, 119, 181 network 49, 51, 52, 119 political compromise 87, 119, 131, 138, 159, 173, 174–5, 182, 183–4, 191 preaching 46, 123 Putney 86, chapter 4 passim, 118, 119, 123, 131, 158 regicide 119, 162n.119, chapter 8 passim religion 40, 46, 105, 183, 191–6, 205–6, 221 Remonstrance (Nov 1648) 155 Restoration revenge 1–5, 7 second civil war 104, 126–30 seizure of king 73–5 Self-denying Ordinance 49

speeches to Commons 71, 88, 94, 120, 122, 123, 126 trial of Charles I 183, 185–203 Ware mutiny 116 Cromwell, Richard 54 Cust, Richard 31, 190 Davis, Colin 49, 108, 202 Deane, Richard, capt., col., adjutant-gen., maj.-gen. 1n.1, 11n.58, 12, 12n.66, 67n.126, 77n.5, 83n.40, 84n.48, 93n.104, 103, 188 Declaration (9 Jan 1648) 121–3, 126, 135, 143 Declaration of the Deputy-General (July 1650) 234–6 Declaration of his Excellency (30 Nov 1648) 168–9 Declaration of the Lord Lieutenant (1650) 228–32, 236 Dell, William 54, 55, 157, 197 Denbigh Mission 183–5 Desborough, John 2n.10, 42n.182, 49, 66n.123, 72n.158, 79, 80n.26, 84n.48, 91 Dillon, Lord 211 Dodson, Gervase 22–4, 32n.119, 41 Donagan, Barbara 128 Dorislaus, Isaac 12, 12n.66, 187 Drogheda 205, 206 Dublin 205, 209, 211, 212, 242, 243 Duncannon 220 Dyve, Sir Lewis 85 Ellesmere, Thomas 19 Erbery, William 112, 157 Evans, M. 99 Eve, John 61 Evelyn, John 5, 8, 166, 179, 201 Ewer, Isaac, col. 140, 160n.7, 162–3, 164 Fairfax, Ferdinando, Lord 49, 49n.29, 50n.33, 52, 56, 67, 74, 96 Fairfax, Sir Thomas 49, 49n.28, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 59, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 72, 73–5, 77, 77n.5, 79, 80n.26, 88, 91, 115, 116, 120, 126, 127, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137, 138, 141, 142–3, 155, 162, 163, 164, 171, 172, 176–7, 182, 188–9 Fiennes, William, Lord Saye and Sele 49, 84, 85 Firth, C.H. 71n.157, 131n.82, 194

272

INDEX Fleetwood, Charles, col. 2n.10, 10n.55, 42n.182, 46, 56, 59, 67n.126, 71, 77, 77n.5, 78, 84n.48, 135, 202, 207, 227 Foljambe, Godfrey 18, 26 Ford, Edward 41–2, 42n.179, 89 Galway 209, 218, 220, 227, 241, 242 Gardiner, S.R. 114, 125n.41, 129, 140n.10, 182 Gaunt, Peter 3n.14, 174, 192 Gentles, Ian 28, 50, 53, 63, 74, 76, 77, 78, 94, 110, 112, 113, 115, 125, 131, 149, 161, 164, 170, 171, 174, 175, 177, 178, 182, 185, 186, 187, 194, 201, 219, 227 Goffe, William, capt., lt.-col. 102, 104, 112n.71, 113, 115n.90, 123, 155 Goodwin, John 197 Grime, Mark, lt.-col. 56, 61, 70 Grotius, Hugo 38, 109, 154 Hammond, Robert, col. 56, 61, 66n.123, 67n.126, 68, 77n.5, 79, 80n.26, 84n.48, 91, 119, 120, 129, 155–7, 162–3, 164, 196 Hammond, Thomas, lt.-gen. 48, 56, 61, 67n.126, 68, 77n.5, 79, 80n.26, 83n.40, 103 Hampden, John 35 Harnsett, Samuel 23 Harris, John 90, 92, 95 Harrison, Thomas, maj., col., maj.-gen. 6, 7, 46, 52, 78, 79, 82n.37, 84, 84n.48, 118, 125, 126, 139, 140, 160, 161, 167, 170, 188, 194, 196, 202, 207, 208, 245 Hastings, Henry 28, 28n.100, 129n.75 Heads of the Charge (Dec 1648) 159, 185, 187, 188 Heads of the Proposals (1647) 38, 42, 78, 81–90, 91, 92, 104, 108, 111, 112, 118, 123, 153–4, 191, 197 Heath, James 4–5, 9n.48, 13, 123 Henrietta-Maria 5 Hewson, John, lt.-col., col. 12, 61, 68, 72n.158, 80n.26, 93n.104, 115n.90, 170, 172, 211 Hind, Percival 19, 22 Hirst, Derek 17, 148 Hodgson, John, capt. 65 Holles, Denzil 56, 58, 69, 70, 72, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80 Holmes, Clive 46

Hoover, Charles 60, 71n.157 Horton, Thomas, col. 84n.48 Humble Remonstrance (23 June 1647) 81 Hunting of the Foxes (1649) 95, 96 Huntingdon, Robert, maj. 65–6, 73, 74, 90 Hutchinson, John, col. 17, 29, 31 Hutchinson, Lucy 3, 3–4n.14, 17, 29, 30, 32, 33, 37, 41, 54, 104 Hutchinson, Sir Thomas 30, 31, 34, 37 Hutton, Ronald 6, 113, 205 Hyde, Edward, Earl of Clarendon 5, 39, 78, 85, 89, 127, 182, 244–6 Instrument of Government (1653) 81, 245 Ireland 170, chapter 9 passim, chapter 10 passim Ireton, Bridget 17n.12, 28, 49n.24, 53–5, 88, 132, 157, 160, 207, 211, 222, 245 Ireton, Clement 9n.48, 11, 16n.10, 18, 21n.44, 27, 32n.119, 37, 196n.126 Ireton, Elinor 16n.10, 28 Ireton, Elizabeth 16n.10 Ireton, German 15, 16n.8, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 33n.121 Ireton, Grace 16n.10 Ireton, Henry, commissary-general of horse Bristol 51, 53 Commissioner of Parliament 59, 66, 69, 71 Council of State 207–9 Cromwell, relationship with 2n.10, 13–14, 17n.12, 45, 51, 52, 53–6, 71, 88, 98, 119, 131, 157, 159, 166, 176, 181, 182, 183, 185, 196, 202–3, 222, 232, 235, 244–5 death 1, 242–3 education 25, 30, 31, 37–40 financial irregularities 46–7, 59–60 funeral introduction passim Ely, deputy-governor of 45–7, 49 Heads of the Proposals 38, 42, 78, 81–90, 92, 104, 108, 111, 129, 153–4, 188, 191 income, wealth and land 34, 37, 51, 54, 207n.18, 223, 245 Ireland chapter 9 passim, chapter 10 passim, 245 Lambert, relationship with 69 legal training 25, 31, 38, 39, 42, 43, 48, 219, 245 letters 39, 40, 52, 68, 71n.157, 79, 80n.26, 119, 129, 130, 132n.87, 273

INDEX 155–6, 162, 164, 193, 196, 209, 210n.33, 210–11, 212, 214, 218, 226, 227, 233–4, 237, 238, 241 letters to Cromwell 52, 55–6, 64, 157–8, 193, 235 Lord Deputy of Ireland chapter 10 passim marriage 53–6 military career chapter 2 passim, chapter 9 passim, chapter 10 passim Munster, President of 221, 222, 223–4 Naseby 50 politics army committees 59, 67, 72, 76, 77n.5, 79, 83, 84, 84n.48, 93n.104, 103, 112, 113, 114, 140, 160, 170 attacks on 2–3, 4–7, 13, 39, 45–7, 52–3, 57–8, 59–60, 61–2, 64, 73–4, 79, 88–90, 90, 91, 92, 97, 98, 101 author of army pamphlets 38, 40, 53, 56, 59, 63, 72, 76, 77, 79, 79n.24, 80–1, 80n.26, 81–90, 108, 115, 121, 132, 137, chapter 6 passim, 140n.11, 141n.14, 159, 170, 172, 185, 187, 229 Case of the Army Truly Stated (1647) 91 Charles I, attitude to 78, 86, 92, 98, 101, 102, 112, 114, 115, 118, 119, 120–3, 125, 126, 128, 129–31, 132–7, chapter 6 passim, 159–60, 185 constitutional ideas 40, 53, chapter 4 passim, 118, 122, chapter 6 passim, 178–81, 190–1 Declaration (9 Jan 1648) 121–3, 126, 132, 135, 159 Declaration (30 Nov 1648) 170 disbanding regiments 56, 72 Levellers and 92, 94, chapter 4 passim, 130, 132, 141, 142, 162, 165, 167, 175, 178 Lucas and Lisle 127–8, 134 Machiavellism 90, 95, 96, 97, 102, 116, 123–4, 127, 166, 171, 176, 178, 190, 194 MP 51, 56, 59, 62, 91, 114, 119, 120, 181 militancy 108, 118, 125, 128, 182 moderation 108, 110, 119, 183, 209 New Model Army, influence on 50, 66, 71, 76, 77, 78, 93n.104, 95, 112, 126, 132, 140, 161–2, 164,

165, 170, 171, 172, 176, 178, 181, 182, 183, 185, 198, 244–7 Parliament, attitudes to 52, 56, 59, 66, 72, 80, 82, 84, 87, 108, 119, 120, 126, 132, 144, 146, 153, 156, chapter 7 passim, 179, 207, 208 petitions of New Model 132–7 Pride’s Purge chapter 7 passim, 188, 244 Putney 86, chapter 4 passim, 118, 121, 123, 131, 132, 143, 166, 172, 181, 192, 207, 234, 245 regicide 119, 130, chapter 6 passim, 160, 173, chapter 8 passim, 247 Remonstrance (Nov 1648) 121–2, 129, 132, 137, chapter 6 passim, 165, 167, 179, 182, 184, 185, 188, 190, 191, 197, 198, 201 report 68 resignation 130–1, 207 seizure of king 73–5 Solemn Engagement (June 1647) 76–8 treaty negotiator 51, 52 trial of Charles I chapter 6 passim, 185–203 Whitehall Debates 103, 110, 112, 143, 153, 165–7, 178–81, 182, 186, 187 portrait of 9, 50n.37 Portsmouth 51 preaching 123 regiment of 172, 205 religious beliefs and attitudes 24–5, 27–9, 39, 40–3, 46, 50, 51, 53, 55–6, 102, 105, 108, 113, 121, 131, 144, 157, 178–81, 191–6, 205–6, 209, 210–11, 215, 218, 221, 225, 227–40, 245 republicanism 119, chapter 6 passim, 186–7, 202 second civil war 126–30, 160 Ship Money 36–7 speeches in Parliament 56, 57, 88, 120–1, 122, 126, 201 Trinity College, Oxford 38–9 Ireton, Jane 16, 19, 22–7 Ireton, John 9, 16n.10, 21n.44, 27, 28, 30n.104, 135, 149 Ireton, Katherine 16n.10 Ireton, Mary 39, 41 Ireton, Matthew 16n.10, 27, 31n.113 Ireton, Sarah 41 Ireton, Thomas, capt., quartermaster-gen. of horse 9n.48, 10n.55, 16n.10, 18,

274

INDEX 18n.19, 21n.44, 27, 37, 38n.149, 50, 51n.40, 64, 67n.126, 77n.5, 93n.104 Ireton, William 15, 15n.7, 17n.16, 17n.17, 18, 19, 20, 20n.30

Love, Nicholas 188 Lucas, Sir Charles 127–8, 134 Ludlow, Edmund, col., lt.-gen. 3, 4n.14, 5, 12, 87, 168, 169, 170, 172, 209, 212, 214, 217, 222, 223, 227, 241, 242, 243

Jackson, John, lt.-col. 72n.158 Jaques, George 40–1 Jesus College, Cambridge 18 Jones, John, col. 204, 222, 223 Jones, Michael, col. 219, 241, 242 Joyce, George, cornet 73–5, 96 Jubbe, John, lt.-col. 113 Kahn, V. 109 Kelsey, Sean 145, 146, 160n.7, 189, 197, 199, 208 Kelsey, Thomas, lt.-col. 140, 161 Kiffin, William 194 Kilkenny 207, 237, 238, 241 King, William 220 King Charles’ Case 202 Kinsale 205 Kishlansky, Mark 63, 101, 131 Knoppers, L.L. 3, 7 Lambert, John, col., maj.-gen. 6, 10n.55, 38, 49, 49n.28, 52, 61, 65, 66n.123, 68, 69, 72, 77, 79, 80, 84, 84n.48, 91, 111, 127, 136, 171n.70, 174, 207, 245 Lamont, William 105, 116, 175 Lansdale, Robert 18 Large Petition (11 Sept 1648) 141, 153 Lawrence, Richard, col., marshal-gen. 238 Lenihan, P. 220 Lenthall, William 68, 164, 173, 211, 212, 223, 226, 242 Levellers 90, 94, 95, 97, chapter 4 passim, 120, 141, 142, 173, 175, 178 Lilburne, Henry, maj. 65 Lilburne, John 47, 60, 60n.90, 80n.29, 89, 90, 94, 96, 130, 141, 161, 162, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 178, 181, 197, 198 Lilburne, Robert, col. 56, 61, 68, 72n.158, 79, 80n.26, 112n.71 Limerick 209, 211, 212–18, 219, 220, 221, 233, 236, 241, 242 Lisle, Sir George 127–8, 134 Lisle, John 188 Lockyer, Nicholas 93, 93n.104, 103n.25 Lomax, Gervase 33, 34 Long, Robert 51

MacDonnell, Randal, Earl of Antrim 225–7 Magdalene College, Cambridge 18, 19 Manchester, Edward Montagu, Earl of 46, 47, 48, 48n.22, 80 Manners, Sir John 19 Margetts, Thomas 136 Marten, Henry 186–7, 188 Mason, Robert 148 Massarella, Derek 27n.91, 178 Massey, Edward, col. 58, 67 Mather, John 18n.17, 21 Mayfield, N.H. 151 Meldrum, Sir John 45 Mendle, Michael 66n.122, 232 Merriman, John, capt. 104 Morrill, John 43, 90–1, 93, 94, 113, 115, 116, 163, 183, 187, 192, 202, 205 Mottershed, Edward 26 Munster 221, 222, 223–4 Muskerry 214, 216, 241 Nedham, Marchamont 59, 60n.90, 77, 85, 96, 134, 176, 182, 184n.50, 189–91, 198 Nenner, Howard 5, 145, 152 New Model Army army committees 39, 59, 67, 72, 77n.5, 78, 93, 97, 103, 112, 140, 160, 170 General Council 76, 81, 88, 92, 96, 98, 101, 114, 115, 116, 129, 134, 140, 141, 142, 161, 162, 164, 182, 183, 185, 194, 195, 217 petitioning campaign 132–7, 161 prayer meetings 77, 103, 104, 105, 123–6, 146, 160, 161, 195, 232 Newport Treaty 129, 135, 142, 159, 160, 167, 169, 171, 174 Nichol, James 157n.101 Nicholas, Edward 5 Nixe, William 33 Norbrook, David 17 Norris, M.A. 65, 68, 74, 104 Northern Association Army 62, 65, 136, 155

275

INDEX Norwich, Goring, Lord George, Earl of 182 Nottingham, Earl of 80, 81 O’Bryan, Honoria 225 Officers’ Agreement (20 Jan 1649) 112 Ohlmeyer, Jane 225 Okey, John, col. 6, 72n.158, 83n.40, 103n.25, 188 Okey, Mary 6, 115n.90 Oldenburg, Henry 6 O’Neill, Hugh Dubh 9n.52, 213, 215, 216–17, 220 Opinion and Humble Advise (1647) 72 Orme, Mr 21, 33n.121 Overton, Robert, col. 83n.40, 93n.104, 103n.25, 120, 181 Owen, John 10, 11, 16, 229 Parker, Henry 231–2, 246 Patient, Thomas 55, 234 Pembroke, Philip Herbert, Earl of 72n.162, 185, 185n.52 Pepys, Samuel 5 Peter, Hugh 6, 7, 11, 16, 59–60, 77, 132, 139, 140, 143, 150–1, 157, 160, 161, 182, 190, 192, 196–202, 245 Petition of the Officers and Souldiers (1647) 67 Petition of Right (1628) 148 Petty, Maximilian 84 Pickering, Gilbert 42n.182 Pickering, John, col. 48 Pierrepont, Francis 34 Pierrepont, George 34 Pigott, Gervase 32–3, 34 Pocock, J.G.A. 106, 172 Poole, Elizabeth 194–6 Poole, Ferdinand 32 Poortmans, Jans 11, 12 Popham, Edward 1n.1, 12 Poynts, Sydenham, col., maj.-gen. 65, 67 Prest, Wilfred 39 Preston, Thomas, gen. 210, 218, 227 Pride, Thomas, col. 1–2, 56–7, 79, 172, 198 Pride’s Purge 2, 2n.7, 32, chapter 7 passim, 185, 188, 244 Putney Debates 37, 41, 48, 86, 91, 94, 98, chapter 4 passim, 119, 125, 130, 131, 143, 155, 158, 166, 172, 181, 192, 234, 245 Prynne, William 71, 89, 170, 176, 198

Rainsborough, Thomas, col. 67n.126, 77n.5, 79, 80n.26, 83n.40, 84, 84n.48, 88, 90, 92, 98, chapter 4 passim, 103n.25, 112n.71 Rainsborough, William, maj. 112n.71, 115n.90 Reade, Thomas, lt.-col. 68 Reading Debates 81–4, 183 Reece, Henry 99, 116 regicide 1, 1n.3, 173, chapter 8 passim Remonstrance (Nov 1648) 121–2, 129, 132, 137, chapter 6 passim, 160, 162, 165, 167, 170, 171, 172, 174, 179, 182, 184, 185, 188, 190, 191, 197, 198, 199, 201 Remonstrance of the Representations (21 June 1647) 81 Representation/Declaration (1647) 80–1 Reynolds, John, capt., col., commissarygeneral 64, 219 Rich, Nathaniel, col. 48, 52, 61, 66n.123, 67n.126, 68, 72n.158, 77n.5, 79, 80n.26, 83n.40, 84n.48, 91, 93n.104, 103, 111, 112n.71, 132, 139, 142, 143n.23, 172, 176, 180, 194 Robertson, Geoffrey 197 Rogers, Wroth, maj. 74 Rolphe, Edmond, capt. 68, 93n.104, 163 Rushworth, John 12, 61, 67, 68, 71, 71n.157, 74, 96, 124 St John, Oliver 49, 85 Salmon, Joseph 157n.101 Saltmarsh, John 100, 126 Sankey, Hierome 206, 246 Saunders, Robert, maj. 54, 61 Say, William 188 Saye and Sele, Lord see Fiennes, William Scot, Thomas 187, 188 Scott, David 141, 185 Scrope, Adrian, col. 83n.40, 103n.25, 140, 160n.7 Second Apologie of All the Private Soldiers (1647) 70 Sedgwick, William 126, 197 Selden, John 38, 109 Self-denying Ordinance 49–50, 59 Sexby, Edward 70, 71, 83n.40, 90, 91, 93, 96, 97, 98, 103n.25, 108, 109, 112 Seymour, M. 12–13 Sharp, A. 94 Sharpe, Kevin 9n.48 Sheffield, Thomas, col. 70, 71, 72, 111 276

INDEX Sheppard, Thomas, cornet 64, 70 Sidney, Algernon 11, 245 Skippon, Philip, maj.-gen. 59, 67, 68, 71, 71n.157 Smith, David 85 Solemn Engagement (June 1647) 63, 76–8, 85, 100, 108 Solemn League and Covenant 144 Stane, Dr William, comm.-gen. of musters 67n.126, 77n.5, 115n.90 Starkey, George 132, 139n.5, 139–40 Sterns, R.P. 139 Stevenson, D. 205, 241 Style, William, capt. 61 Taft, Barbara 87, 116, 127, 141, 166, 167, 178, 181, 195 Thirleby, Robert 41 Thomas, Keith 23 Thomlinson, Matthew, col. 83n.40, 103n.25, 115n.90, 160n.6 Thornagh, Francis lt.-col. 31–3, 34, 42, 45 Thornhagh, Sir Francis 34, 35–6, 45 Titchborne, Robert, col. 83n.40, 103n.25, 115n.90 Tuck, Richard 37, 38, 86, 99, 106, 109, 111 Tuke, George 18 Underdown, David 52, 126, 133, 161, 167, 168, 169, 173, 175, 178, 189 Vane, Henry 6, 42n.182, 85 Vindication of Officers (1647) 68–9 Vote of No Addresses 160 Walker, Clement 120–1, 126 Walker, Robert 9, 77, 166 Waller, Sir Hardress, col. 66n.123, 67n.126, 77n.5, 79, 80n.26, 83n.40, 91, 93n.104, 103, 111, 112n.71, 115n.90, 172, 179, 188, 211

Waller, William 57–8, 65, 69, 73, 78 Walsham, Alexandra 131, 202 Walton, Valentine 48, 54 Warde, Gilbert 38, 38n.149 Ware Mutiny 116 Warwick, Robert Rich, Earl of 184 Waterford 206, 207, 209, 210, 211, 220, 238 Watson, Leonard, maj., scoutmaster-gen. 67n.126, 77n.5, 115n.90 Weaver, John 222, 223, 242 Wedgwood, C.V. 172, 196 Wentworth, Thomas, Earl of Strafford 224 Wexford 205, 206, 238 Whalley, Edward, col. 48, 65, 72n.158, 123, 134–5, 140, 160, 160n.7, 170, 176, 227 Wharton, Lord Philip 13n.72, 49, 49n.29, 52, 81, 84 Wheeler, J.S. 206, 219, 221 White, Francis, capt. 96 White, William, col. 67 Whitehall Debates 103, 110, 112, 143, 153, 165–7, 178–81, 182, 186, 245 Whitelocke, Bulstrode 13, 39, 65, 77, 134, 185, 193, 209, 245, 246 Wicklow 211 Wildman, John 42, 84, 88, 89, 90, 92–3, 95, 97, 98, chapter 4 passim, 141 Wilson, John 200 Winfrey, J.C. 106 Wogan, Edward 51, 58, 61–4, 66–7, 74 Woolrych, Austin 59, 60, 62, 63, 72, 77, 78, 91, 99, 100, 101, 104, 111, 121, 125, 174, 183, 199 Worden, Blair 9n.48, 101, 125, 202, 209, 246 Wroth, Sir Thomas 120 Yule, George 200 Zaller, P. 3

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