Hegel: A Reinterpretation 0268010684, 9780268010683

Citation preview

HEGEL A REINTERPRETATIO N

WALTER

KAUFMANN

U N I V E R S I T Y O F NOTRE DAME P R E S S NOTRE DAME. I N D I A N A

WALTER KAUFMANN is Professor of Philosophy a t P r i n c e t o n University. Born i n G e r m a n y i n 1 9 2 1 , h e graduated from Williams College in 1 9 4 1 , a n d returned t o Europe with U . S . Military intelligence d u r i n g the war. In 1 9 4 7 h e received his P h . D . from Harvard. H e is well known for his works on existentialism a n d on religion, and for his translations of Goethe’s Faust a n d Twenty German Poets. I n h i s Nietzsche h e offered a comprehensive reinterpreta-

tion that quickly won wide acceptance. Since then he has been asked to write new articles o n Nietzsche for t h e Encyclopaea’ia Britannica, Encyc10pedia Americana, Collier’s Encyclopedia, Grolier’s Encyclopedia, a n d t h e Encyclopedia of

Philosophy, among others. His first article on Hegel attracted international attention, a n d A m e r i c a n and European scholars have long urged h i m to write a book reinterpreting H e g e l .

University o f N o t r e D a m e Press edition 1978 Copyright © 1965 b y Walter Kaufmann Published b y arrangement w i t h D o u b l e d a y 8c C o m p a n y , I n c . All translations i n this volume are t h e a u t h o r ’ s . Manufactured

in the United

States

of America

Library of Congress Cataloging i n Publication D a t a Kaufmann,

Walter Arnold.

Hegel, a r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .

“ F i r s t p u b l i s h e d b y D o u b l e d a y 8: C o m p a n y , inc., i n 1 9 6 5 , as t h e first seven c h a p t e r s o f Hegel: reinterpretation, texts, and commentary.” Reprint o f t h e 1966 e d . p u b l i s h e d b y A n c h o r B o o k s , Garden C i t y , N . Y . 1 . Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1 7 7 0 - 1 8 3 1 . I. Title. [B2948.K3 1977] 193 77-89765 ISBN 0 - 2 6 8 - 0 1 0 6 8 - 4

FOR M Y MOTHER

who read the PhenomenaIugy in 1914, in return for her copy of the book Was du Herb: van define-nVfirem hast. Erwirb

es. um

£3 a“ besitzen!

FAUST, 6 8 2 f.

Acknowledgments

For over a dozen years I have taught Hegel both in graduate seminars and t o undergraduates. I want to give thanks to my

graduate students for their interest and helpful discussions, above all to Professor Frithjof Bergmann who wrote his thesis on H e g e l . Much o f the work o n the Index was done by Michael Spence. I a m grateful t o Sanford G . Thatcher for his

cheerful and reliable help with the proofs and other lastminute chores. My deb t s to scholars are acknowledged throughout the book. B u t I should like to ‘add that one o f my teachers, Pro-

fessor John William Miller of Williams College, who never lectured on Hegel, often remarked that Hegel’s phiIOSOphy wa s much more open a n d less rigid than is usually supposed.

I am most indebted to) Georg Lasson, who pioneered the critical editions of Hegel’s

writings, t o Johannes Hofimeister,

who continued this work and edited Hegel’s letters—he also h a d my first article on Hegel translated a n d published i n Ger-

many—and to Rolf Flechsig, who edited the fourth volume of Hegel’s correspondence after Hofimeister’s death. All Hegel scholars have reason to b e grateful to Felix Meiner who, for

over half a century, has published these critical editions. For his companionship during the hours before and after midnight when much o f this book was written during the summer of 1 9 6 4 , I thank my s o n , David. My debt to my wife, Hazel, is chronic by now. And thanks t o Anne Freedgood and Robert Hewetson, the final stages, after the manuscript was

turned over to the publisher, were free from birth pangs: one could not wish for more understanding editors.

Preface

The a i m of this b o o k is a s s i m p l e as its execution is diflicult:

to establish a comprehensive reinterpretation of Hegel—not just of one facet of his thought but of the whole phenomenon of Hegel. That this is worth d o i n g , few will question. It is generally agreed that Hegel wa s o n e o f t h e greatest philosophers o f all

time, and no philosopher since 1800 has had more influence. A study of Hegel enriches our comprehension of subsequent philosophy and theology, political theory and literary criticism. Indeed, recent intellectual history cannot be understood apart from him. Since 1 9 0 5 a great deal o f new material h a s come t o light,

including many important Hegel manuscripts as well as letters a n d d o c u m e n t s . Most o f it h as never b e e n translated into English, a n d British a n d American monographs o n Hegel

have persistently ignored it. What needs to b e d o n e , however, h a s not yet been done

in German o r French either. Many German studies of Hegel a r e very erudite, a n d i n t h e two-volume works b y Franz Rosenzweig, Theodor H a e r i n g , an d Hermann Glockner the manuscript discoveries m a d e early i n this century a re taken i n t o a c c o u n t . B u t since the last o f these volumes appeared i n 1 9 4 0 , new material h a s b e e n published a n d t h e critical edition o f Hegel’s works h a s progressed. Moreover, Rosenzweig confined himself t o Hegel’s political philosophy; Haering required thirteen hundred pages t o reach Hegel’s first b o o k a n d then, after giving t h a t a few pages, stopped; a n d G l o c k n e r , after a t h o u s a n d pages, finished with Hegel’s first b o o k , and devoted o n l y a few pages t o Hegel’s later w o r k . It is a worthy a m b i t i o n to publish volumes t h a t c a n b e con-

viii

PREFACE

sulted repeatedly in libraries, b u t o n l y a b o o k that c a n b e r e a d straight t h r o u g h before being referred t o again a n d again c a n establish a really n e w interpretation. I n the b o d y of this b o o k t h e r e a d e r will fi n d H e g e l a n d not

me. But in the Preface some autobiographical remarks may b e forgiven if t h e y h e l p t o explain m y a p p r o a c h . T h e y m i g h t

even help some readers in their approach to Hegel. I n o u r living r o o m in Berlin, w h e r e I g r e w u p , a large picture of K a n t h u n g o v e r a green tile stove in o n e c o r n e r . O n the flat surface of t h e stove, w h i c h was never used, reposed a huge seventeenth-century Bible, a n d K a n t w a s flanked by smaller portraits o f F i c h t e a n d H e g e l . I n a sense, I h a v e lived with Hegel since I was four. Next to F i c h t e , t h e wall w a s covered with G e r m a n literature from Lessing to the present. A t right angles with that, on t h e wall facing Hegel, t h e c e n t e r bookcase w a s devoted t o philosophy. B u t t h o u g h w e h a d Kant’s “ w o r k s ” a n d a n incomplete set of Nietzsche, t h e r e w e r e o n l y a few volumes b y H e g e l . I t w a s n o t until I w a s a g r a d u a t e student t h a t I started seriously o n those, h a v i n g r e a d o n l y t h e Philosoflzy of Right i n college. I t w a s in t h e s u m m e r of 1 9 4 2 , a f t e r I h a d passed my “ P r e l i m s ” a t Harvard a n d got m a r r i e d , t h a t I first r e a d the Phenomenology a n d t h e Encyclopedia. O n e might s t u d y H e g e l with one’s teeth clenched, b u t I read h i m i n a h o n e y m o o n spirit. I t w a s a delight t o fi n d again a n d again t h a t a f t e r considera b l e effort o n e c o u l d m a k e sense o f passages t h a t a t first h a d s e e m e d q u i t e incomprehensible. G e o r g L a s s o n , who h a d c o n tributed prefaces i n a spirit of loving discipleship, w a s my friend; Rudolf Ha y m , w h o w a s q u o t e d a s h a v i n g disparaged t h e Phenomenology, w a s n o t . Josiah R o y c e , too, r e m a r k e d t h a t Haym h a d n o t d o n e justice to t h e b o o k , a n d it w a s n o t until m u c h later t h a t I r e a d Haym a n d found his book o n e of t h e best o n H e g e l . B u t t h a t s u m m e r t h e point w a s t o comp r e h e n d the incomprehensible, n o t t o r e a d unsympathetic criticism; a n d the p r e s u m p t i o n w a s t h a t his critics h a d n o t understood Hegel, wh i c h w a s true enough i n m o s t cases.

PREFACE

ix

I n o n e of m y weekly reports o n my reading, I criticized Royce’s i m a g e of Hegel. M y professor m a d e a n o t a t i o n o n

the paper for me to see him, and then invited me for lunch at the F a c u l t y C l u b . S i n c e I thought t h a t h e looked like Bis-

marck, and I had never set foot inside a faculty club, I was apprehensive. The menu came, and I ordered something from the middle. Then my professor s a i d : “Waiter, bring m e a n a p p l e ! ” While I h a d to e a t , I w a s told that I was confused, that all G e r m a n philosophers were c o n f u s e d , that K a n t and

Hegel had been confused, and that Royce had tried to make s o m e s e n s e of H e g e l . I n o n e way at least I was i n good

company. My honeymoon w i t h Hegel is l o n g passed. The discovery that w h a t a t first m a k e s n o sense is after all by n o m e a n s meaningless t o o often leads t o joyous assent. The Heidegger vogue is a striking e x a m p l e . B u t recognition of a n author’s m e a n i n g is o n e thing, c o m p r e h e n s i o n another. When a p h i -

losopher is exceptionally difficult, most readers leave him alone or soon give up. The few who persevere and spend years fi g u r i n g h i m o u t naturally d o n o t like t o b e experts o n

something that is not worth while. So one is tempted to susp e n d criticism a n d concentrate o n exegesis. Heidegger actually encourages a n d inculcates this a p p r o a c h : in immensely repeti-

tive essays, particularly o n Holderlin and the pre-Socratics, h e practically preaches exegetical thinking. I t is o n e o f the many important differences between Hegel and Heidegger that Hegel distinguished clearly between such t h i n k i n g a n d

comprehension. Comprehension without critical evaluation is impossible.

One of the glaring faults of most “existentialism” is this lack of seriousness. One remains at the surface and is edified. For all the usual protestations of ultimate seriousness, there is something exceedingly playful about Kierkegaard’s manipulation of language and examples, about what Heidegger does

with words, and—in their philosoPhical writings—about Sartre’s brilliance and Camus’s gambits. They ask us, i n effect, to suspend o u r critical faculties a n d n o t t o take things too exactly. I n Kierkegaard’s terms o n e might say that they ask

X

PREFACE

t o b e r e a d on the aesthetic plane. I n “existentialist” writers this s e e m s even m o r e ironical than it would b e i n Hegel’s case. Hegel o f t e n failed in the s a m e way, a n d i n his case, too, this is ironical because h e called his philosophy “science.” B u t i n principle h e w a s clear o n this point. C o m p r e h e n s i o n

requires sympathetic immersion as well as criticism: we must enter not only i n t o a t r a i n of t h o u g h t , but also i n t o its subject m a t t e r ; a n d insofar as possible w e m u s t t a k e the author’s

positions more seriously than he himself took them. Only in that w a y c a n w e h o p e t o m a k e progress beyond h i m . I n d e e d , w e are not d o i n g Hegel justice w h e n w e s a y that, in spite of his frequent lapses, h e was clear a b o u t this i n principle. T h i s suggests t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d itself is a n o l d o n e . In fact, n o b o d y h a s d o n e s o m u c h to establish it a s Hegel d i d . It is often difficult t o fuse sympathy a n d criticism. M o s t writers o n He g e l fail i n o n e respect o r t h e o t h e r , if n o t i n b o t h . O n t h e whole, t h e m o s t scholarly G e r m a n studies are too close t o their subject, while m o s t of those w h o h a v e written on h i m i n English d o not really s e e m a t h o m e with h i m . H i s world is after all n o t theirs. This is illustrated by t h e divergent attitudes toward Hegel’s early period. Recent G e r m a n scholarship h a s become s o i m mersed i n it that it often does n o t get a r o u n d t o even a n a t t e m p t a t a n y critical consideration o f his m a t u r e t h o u g h t . British a n d American scholarship, on t h e o t h e r h a n d , h a s refused altogether t o i m m e r s e itself in Hegel’s develop-

ment, and as a result usually fails to comprehend his thought from t h e inside. Perhaps m y own experience of having lived with Hegel for so m a n y years, while also living with G o e t h e a n d Nietzsche, existentialism and—in t h e flesh-American students a n d colleagues, h a s helped t o establish a proper b a l a n c e between closeness and distance. A n d it m a y be f o r t u n a t e , a s well as u n u s u a l , that t h e closeness c a m e first and t h e distance after-

wards. It would not be in Hegel’s spirit to try to go back to h i m ; b u t to take him seriously and go beyond h i m is not t o betray h i m .

PREFACE

xi

The question r e m a i n s h o w a n y o n e b o o k c a n significantly a d v a n c e the c o m p r e h e n s i o n of Hegel a s a whole. M o n o g r a p h s o n a single aspect of his t h o u g h t s e e m less problematic; b u t H e g e l himself n e v e r tired of insisting o n t h e importance o f a c o m p r e h e n s i v e a p p r o a c h , w h i l e stressing t h e shortcom-

ings of essays that renounce any whole View and confine themselves exclusively t o details. Two a p p r o a c h e s h a v e b e e n tested m o r e t h a n o n c e a n d d o

not seem to help most students of Hegel where help is needed m o s t . T h e first leads us t o H e g e l b y w a y o f his predecessors: R i c h a r d Kroner, for e x a m p l e , i n h i s two-volume Von K a n t bis H e g e l . B u t m o s t s t u d e n t s w o u l d r a t h e r n o t p l o d

through such detailed accounts of Fichte and Schelling; and H e g e l himself, in his lectures o n the history o f philosophy, gave K a n t , F i c h t e , a n d Schelling t o g e t h e r as m u c h s p a c e a s h e gave t o Aristotle alone, o r t o P l a t o . When G . R . G . M u r e devotes t h e first half of h i s slim In-

troduction to Hegel to Aristotle, this is therefore not as perverse as it appears t o b e a t first glance; but still this approach

is far-fetched. Too little space remains for Hegel himself, and moreover o n e c o u l d begin instead w i t h P l a t o o r Spinoza. This

method is needlessly indirect. The classical representative of the second approach is Kuno Fischer. I n his two-volume Hegel he gives a play-by-play account o f t h e m a j o r works, o n e by o n e , paraphrasing or, where the text becomes really obscure, q u o t i n g . In Germany h e h a s h a d few i m i t a t o r s : if that w a s w h a t was w a n t e d , h e h a d d o n e it; b u t m a n y philosophers p r o b a b l y felt that h e ha d

altogether discredited this approach by leading it to the absurd. The two m o s t widely r e a d English studies, however, represent variations of this m e t h o d . W . T . Stace’s one—volume work o n T h e Philosophy of Hegel is m i s n a m e d : it gives a play-by-play account o n l y of the third edition of Hegel’s Encyclopedia. Moreover, it is b as ed o n William Wallace’s i n a d e q u a t e translations a n d ignores all primary a n d s e c o n d a r y sources not available i n English. J . N . Findlay’s Hegel d e a l s w i t h the other m a j o r works, too, but also disregards all pri-

xii

PREFACE

mary a n d secondary sources t h a t h a v e n o t b e e n translated i n t o English a n d , like Stace, totally ignores Hegel’s development.1 G o e t h e s a i d : “Works of n a t u r e a n d art o n e d o e s n o t get t o know a s they are finished; o n e h a s t o catch t h e m in their genesis to comprehend t h e m t o s o m e extent.”2 Hegel tried to show, beginning with his first b o o k , t h a t this s a m e consideration applies to philosophy, a s well. And i t certainly should

be applied to Hegel himself. The r e a d e r o f the Phenomenology or th e Logic d o e s not so much need to b e told w h a t h a p p e n s , section by section, a s h e wants t o know h o w these books a r e t o b e t a k e n : what Hegel a t t e m p t e d t o do—and w h a t h e did i n fact. A detailed

discussion of a very few sample sections is likely to be far m o r e helpful t h a n a thumbnail digest o f almost all. The reader who is interested i n comparing Hegel with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason o r Aristotle’s Metaphysics will h a v e n o trouble in fi n d i n g good translations of b o t h , a s well a s helpful books about K a n t a n d Aristotle. T h e crucial influence o n Hegel of Kant’s phiIOSOphy of religion a n d of Lessing, Go e t h e , a n d Schiller is n o t nearly s o easy t o determ i n e for oneself; therefore, these influences h a v e been discussed i n t h e first c h a p t e r , a l o n g with Hegel’s development

to the age of thirty. People seriously interested in Hegel are more likely t o h a v e Kant’s Critique a n d s o m e Aristotle o n their shelves t h a n Schiller’s 0 n th e Aesthetic Education of Man; hence this work, which m a d e a tremendous impression

on Hegel and influenced his terminology, is liberally quoted in section 7. In s u m , t h e m e t h o d of this b o o k was dictated by its sub-

ject matter. I did not impose on Hegel a procedure that had worked o n some o t h e r subject, s a y Nietzsche. To put it i n t o Hegelian l a n g u a g e : t h e movement of this b o o k , from beginning t o e n d , c o m e s o u t of t h e subject matter itself. To b e very specific: The idea of th e first ch ap te r h a s already b e e n explained. The second deals with Hegel’s early 1 For a detailed appraisal see m y critical notice of the book in Mind, A p r i l 1 9 6 1 , 264—69. 2Letter t o Zelter, August 4 , 1 8 0 3 .

PREFACE

xfii

publications: a p a m p h l e t , a dissertation, a n d five philosophical articles. N o n e of these essays is r e p o r t e d o n , p a r a g r a p h by p a r a g r a p h . In every instance, the a c c o u n t is selective a n d

stresses what is relevant for a n understanding of Hegel’s b ooks The

third c h a p t e r deals with t h e Phenomenology but is

also meant to facilitate the comprehension of Hegel’s later writings. This c h a p t e r includes sections o n Hegel’s terminology—here k e y t e r m s are t a k e n u p , o n e b y one—and o n Hegel’s dkflecfic. The fourth c h a p t e r deals w i t h Hegel’s next b o o k , the Logic, originally published in t h r e e volumes. H e r e , naturally, more h a s t o b e said a b o u t t h e dialectic; further t e r m s h a v e t o b e discussed; a n d , a s in t h e c a s e o f t h e Phenomenology, t h e i d e a of t h e w h o l e work needs t o b e considered at some l e n g t h . There is also a n excursus, apropos o f Hegel’s t r e a t m e n t o f b e i n g a n d nothing, o n Hegel vis-a-vis H e i d e g g e r .

The fifth chapter deals with Hegel’s system and the various editions of t h e EncyclOpedia, for this is the book t h a t presents the famous system, a n d t h e r e are several markedly different editions of it. A little philological exactitude helps u s greatly

in understanding Hegel’s own conception of his system. The two l e c t u r e cycles o n aesthetics a n d philosophy of re-

ligion are available in complete English translations and should offer n o special difliculties to those w h o r e a d the pres-

ent book. But the two cycles on the philosophy of history and the history o f philosophy d o present p r o b l e m s a n d are there— fore t a k e n u p i n C h a p t e r V I . The Philos0phy of History is probably Hegel’s best k n o w n b o o k ; but i n the more demandi n g sense of that w o r d , it is scarcely “ k n o w n ” at all, a n d it is n o t really o n e of Hegel’s “ b o o k s . ” The critical edition o f 1 9 5 5 h a s n o t b e e n translated, a n d its findings h a v e never yet

been used in any major study of Hegel, in German or in English. And a great many misconceptions stand in the way of c o m p r e h e n s i o n . The s a m e applies t o the little k n o w n threev o l u m e History of Philosophy, a n d to t h e critical edition o f the i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h a t w o r k . So t h e sixth c h a p t e r is devoted to “ H e g e l o n H i s t o r y . ”

This book bears no relation to any dissertation and is plainly

xiv

PREFACE

not the place for an effort to demonstrate philosophical acuity. What is needed is n o t for somebody t o score o n Hegel by tripping h i m u p o n numerous details, which would not b e especially difficult, b u t rather a n a t t e m p t t o fashion a comprehensive new interpretation. Because so few of t h e relevant texts are accessible t o m o s t students, a n d even the majority o f scholars have ignored t h e m , a great many q u o t a t i o n s have been included. To give t h e usual footnote citations without quoting would have been strictly a c a d e m i c : it m i g h t give s o m e scholars a comfortable feeling t h a t t h e references are

given, but few indeed would be in a position to look u p the relevant passages. Since there are limits to how m u c h o n e c a n quote decently without breaking u p t h e text too m u c h , a great deal o f the documentation h a s b e e n saved for C h a p t e r V I I where it is presented i n chronological order, in s u c h a m a n n e r t h a t , I hope, m o s t readers will enjoy reading this chapter straight

through when they come to it. Indeed, this may be a pleasant and effective way o f letting Hegel’s development pass i n review once m o r e , b y way o f letters a n d contemporary reports.

Incidentally, almost none of this material has ever been translated before, nor h a s a n y biography o r s t u d y of Hegel’s intellectual development ever been published i n English. Even i n G e r m a n one still has to s u p p l e m e n t Rosenkranz’s Life of 1 8 4 4 with more recent publications, above all the four volu m e s of correspondence published after World W a r I I . The table of contents m a y suggest t h a t t h e book is composed of independent sections. I t is n o t . The book w a s written i n o n e sweep a n d is m e a n t t o b e r e a d t h a t way. The section titles follow Hegel’s e x a m p l e i n two w a y s : they appear only in the Contents a n d not i n t h e text, a n d they represent afterthoughts. They are intended t o s h o w a t a glance what t0pics are discussed a t some length later o n , t o h e l p t h o s e reading t h e book t o locate earlier passages o n c e more, and to b e useful t o readers w h o h a v e finished the book but wish t o consult it o n various points. I n t h e Chronology the left c o l u m n is devoted to Hegel’s

life and writings, the right column to contemporary events.

Preface for the Anchor Edition

This v o l u m e c o n t a i n s t h e first part of Hegel: Reinterpretatz'on, Texts, and Commentary, u n c h a n g e d , and c a n b e r e a d inde-

pendently. The second part, consisting of my new translation o f the preface t o The Phenomenology, with commentary o n facing pages, and Hegel’s essay, “Who Thinks Abstractly?”

is offered in a companion volume. There are two reasons for this split. First, it did not seem desirable to reduce the size of the print and crowd the pages to the extent that would have been required to issue the whole of the original volume in one paperback. Far better to have two volumes. Secondly, some readers may be interested in the intellect u a l biography of Hegel a n d the reinterpretation o f his thought, without feeling inclined to make a close study of his

preface to his system, with commentary. Conversely, some professors m a y wish to read the preface to The Phenomenol-

ogy with their students, but not the reinterpretation. Both volumes c a n b e r e a d by themselves. There are some cross references; but then there are also references to other

works. The Index contains references to both volumes: references to the companion volume begin with Roman numerals and are thus instantly. recognizable. They show where the reader may find further information on various points. I a m delighted b y the reception of the hardcover edition

and hope that the Anchor edition may help revive interest in Hegel.

Contents

vii

PREFACE

PREFACE

FOR THE

A N C H O R EDITION

CHRONOLOGY ABBREVIATIONS

xv xxi xxvii

H

CHAPTER 1: Early Development and Influences, 1770—1800 N a m e a n d relevance o f life Passion a n d Kant Holderlin a n d Tiibingen Education t o 1 7 9 3 Kant a n d religion Goethe’s lplzigenz'a Schiller’s Aesthetic Education of Man M S o n Folk Religion M S S o n “Jesus’ L i f e ” an d “The Positivity” Swiss diary a n d M S o n “The Spirit o f Christianity”

11. First publication 12. Change in point of view: 1800 13. Lessing’s Education of Mankind CHAPTER II: The F i r s t S e v e n Essays, 1801—1803

14. 15. 16. 17.

The Difierence . . .

D e Orbitis Planetarum “ O n t h e N a t u r e of Philosophical Criticism” Article o n common sense and Krug

37 39 40 41 46 46 52 54 57

xviii

18. 19. 20. 21.

CONTENTS

Article o n skepticism a n d Schulze Skepticism in the Encyclopedia “ F a i t h a n d Knowledge” Article on natural right

CHAPTER III: The Phenomenology

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

Jena lectures and the genesis of the book Hegel’s illegitimate s o n Hegel’s style as a lecturer and writer Aphorisms Kant—Fichte—Schelling—Hegel Kant a n d Socrates; Hegel a n d Aristotle The Phenomenology an d Faust Royce a n d others o n Faust i n The Phenomenology Antigone a n d Sittlichkeit The conception of the b o o k The contents of the b o o k The chapter on self—consciousness Hegel’s terminology

30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. The word “phenomenology” 36. I n fl u e n c e ; G o e t h e on Antigone 37. Dialectic

CHAPTER Iv: The Logic 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

The Phenomenology and Hegel’s later works Hegel a n d Schelling B a m b e r g , Nijrnberg, a n d Hegel’s development Hegel’s life i n Niirnberg The conception of the Logic

Against previous interpretations of the Logic “ M e d i a t e d ” and “ immed iate” The contents of the Logic Being, nothing, becoming Hegel versus Heidegger

Hegel as a philosopher of abundance The Subjective Logic The author of the Logic

63 68 73 78 87 87 91 95 100 102 111 115 121 125 129 133 136 143 148 151 153 163 163 164 171 175 177 187 190 192 199 203 205 211 214

CONTENTS

CHAPTER v : T h e System 51. The Encyclopedia of 1 8 1 7 ‘ 52. L a t e r editions a n d “ a d d i t i o n s ” 53. Thorwaldsen a n d Hegel’s Berlin lectures 54. The e n c o u n t e r w i t h S c h o p e n h a u e r 55. S c h l e i e r m a c h e r ; Hegel’s disciples 56. The system—with a d i a g r a m

57. Nature and subjective spirit 58. Objective and absolute spirit CHAPTER V1: Hegel o n H i s t o r y 59. The t h r e e m a i n e r a s o f history 60. R e a s o n a n d m i s e r y i n history; Sartre

61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70.

Philosophy as comfort; the actual Selection, edification, a n d c u n n i n g S t a t e a n d freedom Tradition-directedness a n d collisions Christianity, G o d , a n d Geist The History of Philosophy: contents The i n t r o d u c t o r y lectures Hegel’s i n fl u e n c e a n d t h e Hegel l e g e n d Comparison with Nietzsche S o m e views o f Hegel

xix

216 216 218 225 229 231 234 237 243 249 249 250 256 258 263 267 271 276 279 285 290 294

CHAPTER VII: D o c u m e n t a t i o n , o r Hegel’s D e v e l o p m e n t i n Letters and Contemporary Reports

298

BIBLIOGRAPHY

371

INDEX

395

Chronology *-b0rn

Georg Ludwig (father)*

1729 1732 1733

Hegel

M a r i a M a g d a l e n a Fromm (mother)*

T—dies

Lessing*; Moses M e n d e l s s o h n ” Haydn*

1741

1743 1744 1745 1749 1756 1759 1762 1764

F. H. Jacobi* Herder* K a n t , T h o u g h t s a b o u t t h e T r u e Estimat i o n of L i v i n g Forces ( l s t b o o k ) Goethe* Aug. 28

Mozart* Schiller*;

Handeli‘;

Robert

Burns*

Fichte“ Winckelmann, Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums

1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770 1772 1773

parents marry, S e p . 2 9 Hegel,* Aug. 27 Christiane

(sister) *

1774 1776 Christiana hanna

Charlotte

Fischer

1778

Jo-

(mother

Leibniz, Nouveaux essais (posthumously) Lessing, Laokoon A. W. Schlegel*

S c h l e i e r m a c h e r * ; Winckelmann‘l‘ Napoleon*

B e e t h o v e n * ; H61derlin*; Wordsworth* F . Schlegel*; N o v a l i s * ; Coleridge* Fries* Goethe, tz (lst play) G o e t h e , Werther ( l s t n o v e l ) U . S . D e c l a r a t i o n of Independence HumeT; Herbart* Voltaire’r; Rousseau’r

of

Hegel’s illegitimate s o n ) * 1779

Lessing, Gluck,

1780 1781

Nathan; Iphigenia

i n Tauris

Lessing, The Education of Mankind \ LessingT K a n t , Critique of Pure R e a s o n ; Schiller, The R o b b e r s ( l s t p l a y ) ; Voss,

Odyssey

tr.

CHRONOLOGY

xxfi

mother’r S e p . 2 0

1783 1785 1786

1787

Kant, Prolegomena; Mendelssohn, Jerusalem Kant, Grundlegung; Jacobi, 0n Spinoza’s Doctrine Frederick the GreatT M o z a r t , Figaro Jacobi, Against Mendelssohn’s Accusation K a n t , Critique of P u r e R e a s o n , 2 d rev. ed.; G o e t h e , l p h i g e n i a i n Tauris;

Schiller, D o n Carlos;

graduates Tiibingen

from G y m n a s i u m ; University

1788

1789

M . A . , philosophy, Tiibingen Marie

von Tucher

(wife)*

F r a g m e n t s o n folk religion

1790 1791 1792

1793

( p u b l i s h e d 1 9 0 7 ) ; fi n a l the010gical e x a m , T i i b i n g e n ; goes to Bern, Switzerland,

as tutor

1794

“The Life of Jesus” & “The Positivity

of

the

1795

U h l a n d * ; Glucld' Mozart, Don Giovanni & Eine kleine Nachtmusik Byron* Eichendorfi*; Schopenhauer*; K a n t , Critique of P r a c t i c a l R e a s o n ; Mozart, Jupiter Symphony

F r e n c h Revolution; Jacobi, 0n Spinoza’s Doctrine, 2d rev. ed.; S c h i l l e r , “ . . . U n i v e r s a l History” K a n t , C r i t i q u e of J u d g e m e n t ; Goethe, Faust: A Fragment

Mozart, Magic F l u t e & Requiem andT French begin repeated invasions of G e r many; F i c h t e , Critique of A l l Revelation ( l s t book); Shelley*; Rossini* L o u i s XVI g u i l l o t i n e d ; w i t h i n t h e B o u n d s of K a n t , Religion Me r e R e a s o n ; Christianity abolished in France and rep l a c e d by c u l t o f r e a s o n ; N a p o l e o n r i s e s from c a p t a i n t o g e n e r a l ; S c h e l l i n g ’ s l s t article ( 6 8 p p . o n m y t h s ) guillotined; Robespierre F i c h t e , Wissenschaftslehre (Doctrine of Science) Prussia a p p e a s e s F r a n c e t o b e a b l e t o

participate in 3 d partition of P o l a n d ;

Christian

Religion” (published in 1907)

K a n t , Eternal P e a c e ; S c h e l l i n g , Of t h e Ego; S c h i l l e r , 0 n t h e A e s t h e t i c E d u c a t i o n of Man; G o e t h e , Wilhelm Meister’s A p p r e n t i c e ship;

Keats* Hike

Bern

i n Bernese

Alps;

quits

1796

French

a g a i n i n v a d e southe r n

Germany;

Napoleon’s brilliant Italian c a m p a i g n ; Goethe, Wilhelm Meister’s s h i p , B o o k s V I I and V I I I ;

BurnsT

Apprentice-

xxiii

CHRONOLOGY Goes as

t o Frankfurt

am

Main

1797

K a n t , Metaphysics 0/ Ethics ( 2 v o l s . ) ; f o r a Philosophy

Ideas

Schelling,

tutor

of Na-

ture;

1798

I;

Part

Hyperion,

Holderlin,

Schubert* French take Rome & imprison pope i n France;

Napoleon’s Egyptian c a m p a i g n ; Napol e o n First Consul; Kant,

Anthropology;

Fichte, System of Ethics & charged with atheism;

“The Spirit of Christianity and its F a t e ” (published 1907); father,’r J a n . 14

1799

Schelling, 0 n t h e World Soul Fichte, A p p e a l t o t h e Public & leaves Jena

for Berlin;

Schelling, First Draft Nature; Schleiermacher, 0n Holderlin, Hyperion,

1800

for a Philos. of

Re ligion; Part I I ;

H e i n e * ; Balzac* F r e n c h invade B a v a r i a ; Kant,

Logic;

Fichte, Vocation of Man & Closed Trade State;

Schelling, Idealism; Moves t o J e n a , publishes

1801

System

of

Transcendental

Schiller, Wallenstein F i c h t e , Sun-clear Report; Schleiermacher, Monologues;

between “The Difference F i c h t e ’ s & Schelling’s Sys-

Schiller, Mary Stuart;

t e m ” ; Latin dissertation on planetary orbits; defense of

A . W . Schlegel, Hamlet NovaliS‘l'

tr.;

t h e s e s A u g . 27 ( o n 3 l s t

birthday): Privatdozent, beginning of university career. Co-editor (with Schelling) of Critical Journal of Philoso— p h y ; i n vol. I : “On the Nature of Phi1080phical Criticism . . . ” ; “How Common Sense Construes Philosophy . . . ” ; “Relation of Skepticism t o Philosophy

1802

Schiller, von

Maid

of

Orleans;

Ofterdingen

(2 vols.)

. . ."

1 803

El ect e d

1804

assessor

for Life;

Novalis, Writings ( 2 vols.) & Heinrich

I n vol. 11 ( l a s t v o l . ) : “Faith and Knowledge o r the Philosophy of Reflection . . . Kantian, J acobian, and Ficht e a n ” ; “0n Scientific Modes of Treatment of Natural Law . . . ”

Mineralogical

Consul

becomes

Napoleon

Schelling, Bruno;

by J e n a

Society

Schelling, Lectures o n the Method of Academic Studies & Ideas for a Philosophy

of

Nature,

rev. ed., & leaves

for Bavaria & founds New Speculative

Jena

Journal for

Physics;

Fries, Reinhold, Fichte, and Schelling & Philosophical Doctrine of Right; Herder’r N a p o l e o n crowned Emperor; K a n t T ; Krug succeeds t o Kant’s chair at Konigsberg;

CHRONOLOGY

xxiv

Promoted t o Ausserordentlicher Professor (with Fries);

1805

Fr ie s, System of P h i l o s o p h y ; S c h e l l i n g , Philosophy a nd R e l i g i o n ; S c h i l l e r , Tell; B e e t h o v e n , Fidelio Napoleon b e c o m e s King o f I t a l y a n d wins t h e B a t t l e o f t h e t h r e e E m p e r o r s a t

f a l l : b e g i n s t o l e c t u r e on h i s -

Austerlitz, defeating the Tsar a n d Aus-

tory of philosophy for the l s t t i m e ; winter: begins writing his System; Fries prof.,

trian Emperor; F r i e s , Knowledge, Faith, a n d I n t i m a t i o n ; Goethe, Rameau's Nephew, tr.; B e e t h o v e n , Eroica;

Heidelberg

S e p . : first mention o f “Phenomenology” a s title of Part 1; Oct.:

1806

Schiller’r; Rosenkranz (Hegel’s first b i o g r a p h e r ) * Napoleon’s victory i n t h e Battle of J e n a finishes Holy Roman Empire (founded 8 0 0 A . D . by C h a r l e m a g n e ) ; Napoleon enters Berlin; F i c h t e , T h e Basic Features o f t h e Prese n t A g e & T h e Way t o t h e Blessed Life;

book completed

night before battle

Schleiermacher, 0 n Religion, 2 d e d . ; Jan.

1807

member,

1: honorary

Heidelberg Physical Society; Preface

of

Fries, N e w Critique of Reason ( 3 vols.)

Phenomenology

& Fichte’s

Apr.:

Newest

Doctrine;

Schelling publishes a lecture;

sent t o publisher Jan. 1 0 ; Ludwig (illegitimate s o n ) , * Feb. 5 ; removal t o B a m b e r g t o edit newspaper;

B e e t h o v e n , Violin Conc e r to Napoleon dismembers Prussia;

Beethoven,

Fifth

Symphony

Phenome-

nology ( l s t b o o k ) ; sister bec o m e s governess 1808

Fall: leaves Bamberg; R e k t o r of Gymnasium,

Niirnberg; duties include instruction

in philosophy

1809

to the German Fichte, Addresses tion,’ F. Schlegel, 0n the Language and d o m of I n d i a ; G o e t h e , F a u s t , Part 1 ; B e e t h o v e n , Sixth S y m p h o n y ;

Na-

Wis-

D . F . Strauss* Schelling, Philosophical Writings, vol. I otherwise

(all that appeared),

no book

from 1807 t o 1812; G o e t h e , Elective Afl‘inities; Beethoven, Emperor Concerto; Haydni‘ Apr.: engaged; Sep. 16

1811

marries,

Logic, vol. I , Part I ; Susanna

(daughter)*

1812 and

Logic, vol. I , Part I I ; Schulrat

a s well

Karl ( s o n ) *

as Rektor;

’r

1813

Fries, Outline of Logic & System of Logic Georg campaign, Russian Napoleon’s Ludwig (Hegel’s only brother) falls; vol. 1; G r i m m , Mc'irchen, B e e t h o v e n , S e v e n t h & Eighth Symphonie s

Napoleon b e a t e n a t Leipzig; Schopenhauer,

0n

t h e . . . Principle

Reason ( l s t b o o k ) ;

of

CHRONOLOGY

XXV

K i e r k e g a a r d * ; W a g n e r * ; V e r d i ” ; Nietzsche’s f a t h e r * ; Biichner*; H e b b e l * ; Grimm,

I m m a n u e l (youngest s o n ) ‘ sister

retires

Ma'rchen,

vol. II

1814

N apolepn exiled t o Elba;

1815

Fichte’r Napoleon returns; Waterloo; St. Helena; S c h e l l i n g , 0 n t h e Deities of Samothrace

ill

Logic, v o l . I I ; calls t o Heidelberg, Berlin, & E r l a n g e n ; Professor, Heidelberg

1816

Encyclopedia (one-vol. syst e m ) ; L u d w i g (illegit. s o n ) joins family

1817

Wartburg festival

Berlin;

1818

Marx*

1819

Schopenhauer, World as Will and Rep-

Professor,

Schopenhauer, 0 n R o s s i n i , Barber

Vision and Colors;

of Seville;

F r i e s leaves Heidelberg for Jena

Ludwig a t t e n d s Franzosisches Gymnasium resentation,‘

G o e t h e , West-Eastern Divan; Jacobi’r Sister t e m p o r a r i l y i n asylum Philosophy of Right ( l a s t book)

1820 1821

1 822

Ludwig q u i t s bookstore job, Dutch

enters

colonial

1823 1824 1825

NapoleonT; Keats’r; Dostoevsky“; Baudelaire*; Flaubert*; G o e t h e , Wilhelm Meister’s ShelleyT Heine, Poems (lst book);

Wanderjahre

Beethoven, Piano Sonata, o p . 111 Beethoven, Ninth Symphony Byron’r Beethoven,

Quartet,

op. 132

army

L u d w i g goes t o Batavia

1826

Voss (Homer t r . ) T ; Jefl’ersoni'; H e i n e , Travel Images ( 4 vols. -1831)

rev. e d . (alEncyclopedia, most t w i c e t h e size o f the

1827

H e i n e , B u c h d e r Lieder; B e e t h o v e n T ; Blake’r

1828 1829 1830

Schubert’r; Goya’f; Tolstoy“ F . SchlegelT July Revolution in P a r i s

lst ed.)

Encyclopedia, 3 d rev. e d . ; Rektor, University of Berlin Aug.

1831

28: LudwigT

N o v . 1 4 : H e g e l d i e s of cholera F e b . 2 : Sister’s suicide; pupils begin e d . Works, 1 8 vols. ( - 1 8 4 0 ; ed. begins)

meanwhile

2d

1832

Goethe}L

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations have b e e n used for works cited often:

B

Briefe v a n a n d a n Hegel, 4 vols. (1952—60)

C

Commentary on V—PG in the companion volume

D

Chapter VII of the present book

Dok.

Dokumente z u Hegels Entwicklung, ed. Hol’fmeister (1936)

( A n c h o r Books A 5 2 8 b )

Hegel’s EncyCIOpedia, 3 r d e d . ( 1 8 3 0 )

EGP

Hegel’s Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie, critical ed. by Hofimeister (1940) Cross' references to sections of the present book

PG

Hegel’s Phc‘inomenologie (1907)

Ros.

Rosenkranz, Hegels L e b e n ( 1 8 4 4 )

VG

Hegel’s

Die Vernst

des

Geistes,

ed. Lasson

in der Gesclzichte, critical e d .

by Hofimeister (1955). All references are to Hegel’s own MS unless the page number is followed by a n “ L ” to indicate that the citation is based on the students’ lecture notes.

V—PG Hegel’s Vorrede ( P r e f a c e ) t o the Pha'nomenologie K a u f m a n n , From Shakespeare to Existentialism (Anchor e d . )

CHAPTER

I

Early Development and Influences, 1770-1800

1 Misconceptions a b o u t H e g e l begin with his very n a m e . O n the c o v e r of t h e English translation of s o m e of his e a rly writ-

ings, he is called “Friedrich Hegel.” The professor who for a generation w a s the a u t h o r i t y o n H eg el a t Harvard usually called h i m G e o r g H e g e l , a s if h e a n d Georg were o n a firstn a m e basis.1 B u t a l t h o u g h H e g e l addressed both Schelling a n d H o l d e r l i n w i t h t h e familiar D u , h e signed his letters to

them Dein Hegel. And they called him D u but also signed t h e i r last n a m e s . G e r m a n s d i d n o t u s e first n a m e s a s much a s A m e r i c a n s d o , a n d although Hegel’s full n a m e w a s Georg Wilhelm Friedrich H e g e l , o n e h a s to r e a d a lot of letters be fore o n e fi n d s a very few t h a t are signed w i t h a first n a m e . I n d e e d , w h e n his widow wrote his best friend a few days after Hegel’s d e a t h , she referred t o h i m a s “ H e g e l . ” B ut

Hegel’s letters to his sister and wife are signed—“Wilhelm.” A n o t h e r , much m o r e i m p o r t a n t , misconception is that Hegel’s life wa s utterly uneventful; nothing worth talking

about ever happened, so one might as well proceed straight to his philosophy. In fact, one cannot understand Hegel’s philosophy at all a d e q u a t e l y if o n e ignores h i s life a n d times, and there h a v e b e e n few periods i n history when s o much h a p p e n e d . H e g e l himself t a u g h t , m o s t n o t a b l y b ut by n o

means only in the preface to his PhiIOSOphy of Right, that “philosophy is its a g e c o m p r e h e n d e d in t h o u g h t ” ; a n d far 1111

t h e N e w York T i m e s B o o k Review, August 2 , 1 9 6 4 , his

picture was captioned “Georg Hegel.”

2

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCES, 1770—1800

from being a web s p u n i n a n ivory tower, his o w n thought was intimately related t o what h a p p e n e d during his life time.

This is true not only of his philosophy of history or his political philosophy but also of his whole conception of philosophy a n d his own mission. First of all, Hegel lived through the whole of t h e great a ge of German literature. Lessing was born i n 1 7 2 9 , Goethe i n 1 7 4 9 , a n d Schiller i n 1 7 5 9 ; Hegel, like Holderlin a n d Beethoven, i n 1770. Goethe’s youthful storm a n d stress masterpieces, Gb‘tz and Werther, appeared when Hegel w a s a child, a n d s o did Lessing’s Nathan, which H e g e l was to quote

more often than any other work in his early writings on religion. All the works of Goethe’s and Schiller’s maturity were published w h e n Hegel was o ld enough to t a k e i n their appeara n c e . He was seventeen w h e n Schiller’s D o n Carlos and Goethe’s Iphigem'a came o u t , and though t h e former might be expected to appeal more t o a boy of that age, we shall s e e

later how decisively Iphigenia influenced his intellectual development.

Hegel was twenty when Goethe’s Faust: A Fragment appeared, soon to be hailed: even in its incomplete form, as the greatest German

play yet written. And

h e witnessed

Goethe’s Protean development from style to style: after the consummation of storm a n d stress and German classicism, h e went o n i n t h e nineties, w h e n Hegel was i n his twenties, t o

publish Wilhelm Meister, the great Bildungsroman that established a new genre i n German letters. Soon t h e romantics,

whose movement took shape in the nineties, tried to surpass Goethe’s Meister; and Hegel experienced the high tide of romanticism not only as a contemporary b u t as the work of young men of his own age. O f the two brothers Schlegel who led the romantic revolt, o n e was three years his senior, the other, Friedrich, two years his junior; Schleiermacher, the theologian of the circle, was two years older than Hegel; Novalis, their greatest poet, two years younger. And Holderlin, the lonely outsider who i s now widely considered the greatest German poet next to Goethe, was Hegel’s closest

friend. In his thirties, H'olderlin struggled against schizophre-

1 . N a m e a n d relevance of life

3

n i a a n d finally s u c c u m b e d , t o spend t h e rest of his long life completely deprived n o t o n l y of his genius b u t of his reason, little m o r e t h a n a vegetable. M u s i c m e a n t m u c h less t o Hegel t h a n literature, a n d neit h e r his collected w o r k s n o r his published letters c o n t a i n a single r e f e r e n c e t o Beethoven, w h i c h s e e m s o d d because o n e would s u p p o s e t h a t H e g e l would h a v e greatly a d m i r e d a t least s o m e of Beethoven’s symphonies. N e i t h e r d o e s h e m e n tion H a y d n t h o u g h it s e e m s t h a t on a t least o n e occasion h e h e a r d a H a y d n symphony;2 b u t h e several times registered

his admiration for Mozart.3 And he loved Rossini’s Barber of Seville/1 H e g e l wa s nineteen a t t h e t i m e of t h e F r e n c h Revolution; a n d f o u r years later—the s a m e y e a r t h a t K a n t published his long awaited b o o k o n Religion within t h e Bounds of Mere

Reason—Christianity was abolished in France and replaced b y t h e cult of r e a s o n . T h e r e w a s a n apocalyptic n o t e in t h e a i r w h i c h soon vibrated t h r o u g h G e r m a n philosophy.

At the time of the Declaration of Independence Hegel w a s six. a n d A m e r i c a w a s very f a r a w a y , but F r a n c e w a s n o t f a r away a t all, a n d in 1 7 9 2 t h e F r e n c h b e g a n their re-

peated invasions of Germany. What happened in France duri n g t h e q u a r t e r of a c e n t u r y from t h e Revolution t o W a t e r l o o

was not just French history but also German history, and not just history b u t again a n d again a m a t t e r of life a n d l i m b . Napoleon’s m e t e o r i c rise a n d brilliant c a m p a i g n s w e r e never far from one’s mind—or body—and H e g e l finished his first b o o k , t h e Phenomenology, in J e n a , t h e night before N a p o l e o n 2 B IV, 419. 3 Aesthetik, Glockner’s ed., XII. 376; XIV, 171 f., 194, 203, 524.

The first and the last two passages praise The Magic Flute. Cf. D 1 7 9 7 a n d G u s t a v P a r t h e y , J u g e n d e r i n n e r i m g e n , I I , 4 0 6 , quoted in the Appendix to Fischer, 2d ed., 1236: “After a performance of M o z a r t ’ s D o n G i o v a n n i , ‘ H e g e l , i n h i s a w k w a r d d i c t i o n , e x pressed s u c h a w a r m l o v e for t h i s m u s i c t h a t Musika’irelctor K l e i n said to us afterwards: only now have I become really fond of this

stuttering philosopher.’ ” 4 Aesthezik, X I V , 2 0 7 , a n d B I I I , 5 9 ff., 6 4 , 6 8 . The fi r s t two pass a g e s a l s o refer t o M o z a r t ’ s Figaro.

4

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCES, 1770—1800

finished t h e H o l y Roman Empire, which h a d lasted over a t h o u s a n d years, i n t h e Battle o f J e n a .

It is well to remember that there was little peace in Europe from t h e t i m e Hegel w a s twenty until t h e t i m e h e was forty-

. five—his only brother fell in Napoleon’s Russian campaign i n 1812—and that d u r i n g his last sixteen years, of w h i c h h e s p e n t thirteen a s a professor i n Berlin, h e enjoyed p e a c e for t h e first t i m e since his childhood. Though h e h a d thrilled t o the Revolution a n d later to N a p o l e o n , even after t h e Battle o f J e n a , it is hardly surprising t h a t Hegel c a m e t o appreciate the so-called Restoration. What h a p p e n e d in far-off A m e r i c a interested h i m less. I n a sense t h a t was history rather t h a n a genuine p a r t of his life. I n another sense, it s e e m e d t o Hegel t h a t t h e U n i t e d States h a d n o t yet entered world history—and would n o t d o s o until the frontier h a d b e e n c o n q u e r e d . “ I f the forests of Germania h a d still existed, t h e r e w o u l d have b e e n n o French Revolution. . . . A m e r i c a is t h u s t h e l a n d of t h e future i n which, i n times to c o m e , possibly i n a fight between North a n d S o u t h A m e r i c a , s o m e worldhistorical significance is to b e revealed. . . . I t is n o t t h e philosopher’s business t o prophesy. A s far a s history goes, w e must rather deal with w h a t h a s been a n d with what is—in philosophy, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w i t h w h a t neither merely h a s

been nor merely will be but with what is and is eternally: with reason, a n d with t h a t we h a v e e n o u g h t o d o ” ( V G

209 f. L ) .

2 This c o n c e r n with reason is characteristic of Hegel’s philosophy, b u t it does n o t i m p l y a n y desiccation of t h e e m o -

tions or a lack of feeling for passion. Indeed, in the same cycle of lectures o n t h e philOSOphy of history from which we have just q u o t e d , Hegel also said—and these words w e h a v e i n his own m a n u s c r i p t , n o t just i n his students’ lecture notes: “Thus w e must sa y quite generally that nothing great i n the

2 . Passion a n d K a n t

5

world has been accomplished without passion” ( V G 85; emphasis h i s ) . Hegel’s reputation h a s suffered from the scorn of Kierkeg a a r d ; Kant’s h a s had n o similar f a t e . Yet i t was surely Kant m u c h more t h a n Hegel w h o resembled t h e p o p u l a r image

of the professor: Kant’s life was extremely secluded and uneventful; his phiIOSOphy issued from his mind without much o u t s i d e stimulation; a n d his m a n n e r was, more often t h a n n o t ,

almost grotesquely pedantic. Kant’s stature is secure and these observations are not offered in a vain attempt to detract from it. B u t it is extremely o d d that what is true i n his case

and admitted not to affect the greatness of his merits is so widely a s s u m e d t o diminish Hegel’s stature and even t o make

him ridiculous, although in Hegel’s case it is not true. Compare Kant on the passions with Hegel: “ P a s s i o n s are cancers for p u r e practical r e a s o n and often

incurable. . . . It is folly (making a part of one’s aim the w h o l e ) t h a t strictly c o n t r a d i c t s reason even i n its formal

principle. Therefore the passions are not only, like the affects, unfortunate moods that are pregnant with many evils, but also, without exception, wicked, and the most benign desire, even if it aims at what belongs (considering the m a t t e r ) to

virtue, e.g., to charity [Wolzltc‘itigkeit], yet is (considering the f o r m ) , as s o o n a s it d e g e n e r a t e s into a passion, not only pragmatically pernicious b u t also morally reprehensible. An

affect brings about a momentary collapse of freedom and of the dominion over oneself. Passion renounces them and finds its p l e a s u r e a n d satisfaction i n a slavish m i n d . . . . Nevertheless t h e passions h a v e also found their panegyrists ( f o r

where do these fail to appear once malignancy has invaded principles?) and it is said ‘that never h a s anything great i n the world b e e n achieved without violent passions, a nd

Providence itself has wisely planted them in human nature as springs of action.’—Of t h e various inclinations, without w h i c h , a s natural a n d a n i m a l i c n e e d s , living nature ( e v e n that of m a n ) c a n n o t get along, one may concede this. B u t o r actually t h a t they should b e allowed to b e c o m e passions, t o repreand want, t o n were m e a n t t o , t h a t Providence d i d a poet to forgiven be y a m view of t sent them from t h a t p o i n

6

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCES, 1770—1800

( n a m e l y , to say with P o p e : ‘if reason b e a m a g n e t , t h e n the passions are winds’5); but a philosopher must n o t allow this

principle to come near him, not even to praise it as a provisional institution o f Providence w h i c h intentionally placed it

in human nature until mankind would reach the proper degree of culture.”6 This l o n g passage is doubly relevant: Hegel a n d K a n t d o n ot merely offer us a neat contrast, b u t Hegel’s attitude a nd philosophy must b e appreciated a s a n i m p o r t a n t departure

from the outlook of his great predecessor. To be sure, Hegel did not go nearly s o far in t h e opposite direction a s t h e Germ an romantics d i d : h e s o u g h t t o integrate K a n t a n d romanticism in a single system. If we imagined Kant as a student at Tiibingen—or elsewhere, for t h a t matter—we could scarcely picture h i m choosi n g Holderlin for his closest friend, a s Hegel d i d . Even G o e t h e d i d not warm u p t o Ho'lderlin, a n d Schiller, who

patronized him for a while, always found him a little embarrassing, as Goethe’s and Schiller’s correspondence shows.

3 It is usually either ignored or simply taken for granted that Hegel a n d Hb'lderlin were friends; but surely it throws s o m e light o n Hegel’s character t h a t this m a n s h o u l d have

become the closest friend he ever had. They studied together a t Tiibingen, t h e n parted i n 1 7 9 3 t o become tutors in differe n t cities b u t kept corresponding; a n d in 1 7 9 7 Holderlin 5Kant

p r o b a b l y m e a n t Essay o n M a n , E p i s t l e II, 1 0 7 : O n life’s v a s t ocean d i v e r s e l y we sail,

Reason the card, but passion is the gale. 6Anthropologie

( 1 7 9 8 ) , § 7 1 ; u n c h a n g e d i n the 2 d rev. e d . ( 1 8 0 0 , W a r d a # 1 9 8 ) , § 7 8 . ( I n t h e Akademieausgabe a n d i n E r n s t

Cassirer’s edition of Kant’s Werke, both of which claim to follow the text o f the 2 d e d . , i t is § 8 1 . ) This K a n t p a s s a g e , w h i c h I h a v e

never seen paired with the well-known Hegel quotation, shows that Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations is wrong in assuming that Hegel’s d i c t u m was o r i g i n a l w i t h h i m . The “ p a n e g y r i s t s ” m a y refer to Helvetius, D e l’esprit, Essay I I I , Chapters 6—8.

3 . Holderlz’n

and Tiibingen

found his friend a post a s a tutor i n Frankfurt

7

am Main

where he himself had the same sort of job. After a while Holderlin moved t o near-by Homburg; but until Hegel gave up this k i n d o f work i n 1 7 9 9 , when h i s father’s death tem-

porarily improved his financial position, Hegel and Holderlin saw a great d e a l o f each o t h e r . A fellow student at Tiibingen, Leutwein, b e i n g two years older t h a n t h e two friends, left the university i n 1 7 9 2 t o be-

come a vicar and later a Latin teacher. In 1798 h e published a text book, and in 1839, eight years after Hegel’s death, he wrote down some reminiscences of Hegel as a student. They

were used in a newspaper story which Rosenkranz quoted in his Hegel biography (1844), with the comment: “These

port is not worthless, if one makes allowance for Leutwein’s vanity and narrow perspective” (Dok., 428—30). A certain joviality and tavern ease [Kneipen“. behaglz‘chkeit] also made him pleasant company. But one thing should n o t b e forgotten, namely that his behavior was somewhat bohemian [etwas genialisch], which was not always i n accord with the cloister statutes; altogether, his morality m a y h a v e been better than his legality, which led to h i s subs e q u e n t change. Otherwise h e w a s considered a lumen obscurum. . . . ” Leutwein c l a i m s that Hegel’s change was brought about w h e n another student w a s ranked above h i m , a n d Hegel was drOpped to fourth place i n his class instead o f being third. This was probably due i n part t o h i s behavior, a n d it sup-

posedly deeply hurt Hegel although he would not admit it. How m u c h truth this bit of amateur psychology m a y contain is at best u n c e r t a i n . “ A t least, metaphysics was not Hegel’s

special interest during the four years when I knew him. His h e r o was R o u s s e a u i n whose Emile, Social Contract, and Confessions h e w a s always r e a d i n g . He thought t h a t this r e a d -

ing liberated him from certain general prejudices and tacit

l

m y t h i c a l traditions a r e o n the whole not incorrect when we compare them with the contents of authentic sources . . . ” ( 2 8 f . ) . The first-hand m e m o i r itself was also published i n 1 8 4 4 i n Jahrbiicher der Gegenwart ( 6 7 5 ff.) a n d has since b e e n reprinted by Hoffmeister who also judges t h a t “the re-

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCES, 1770—1800

8

assumptions or, a s Hegel put it, fetters. H e found special pleasure i n the B o o k of Job o n a c c o u n t of its unruly natural language. Altogether, h e struck m e a s at times somewhat eccentric. H i s later views h e acquired only a b r o a d , for i n Tfibingen h e w a s not even really familiar with father K a n t . ” The above mentioned newspaper a d d e d a n o t h e r story, a pparently based o n the recollections of another a l u m n u s , which Rosenkranz also q u o t e d : “Hegel is said to have b e e n the most enthusiastic speaker o n freedom a n d equality, a n d , like all young m e n at the time, fervently ad mired t h e ideas of the [French] Revolution. One morning, o n a Sunday—it was a beautiful, clear s p r i n g morning—he a n d Schelling w i t h a few other friends are said to have g o n e t o a m e a d o w not far

from Tiibingen to put up a freedom tree. A freedom tree! Wasn’t that a prophetic word? I n the east, w h ere th e founde r of Critical Philosophy [ K a n t ] h a d around t h a t t i m e broken D o g m a t i s m , t h e word of freedom h a d b e e n s o u n d e d ; in t h e west it h a d emerged from the rivers of blood that h a d b e e n spilt for it. . . . ” T h a t Hegel d i d not i m mers e himself in K a n t while a t Tiibingen is surely t r u e . The y e a r after they left Tiibingen, Holderlin wrote h i m , “ K a n t a n d t h e Greeks are a l m o s t m y only reading,” a n d the evidence of Hegel’s early writings, t o o , indicates t h a t h e got u p K a n t o n his own, after h e h a d finished his formal studies. Even then it was a t first only Kant’s views of religion, published i n 1 7 9 3 , a n d his mo ral philosophy, recapitulated a n d developed in t h e s a m e b o o k , t h a t concerned h i m . The Critique of Pure Reason h e d i d not s t u d y closely until much later, a n d his i m a g e of K a n t w a s always determ i n e d decisively by Kant’s Moralitc’it and its striking contrast with t h e Sittliclzkeifl of the G r e e k s , a s interpreted in Goethe’s Iphigenia a n d i n Schiller’s “Letters” 0n the Aesthetic Education 0)‘ Man. 7Another

type o f morality, more fully e x p l a i n e d i n H 6 and 2 1 .

4 . Education

to J 793

9

4 That He g e l w a s very precocious a n d exceedingly intelli-

gent, there can be no doubt. When he was sent to Latin school a t five, his m o t h e r h a d already taught h i m t h e first declension a n d the n o u n s that go w i t h it, a n d his diary, published first by Rosenkranz a n d l a t e r r e p r i n t e d by Hoffmeister, shows t h a t a t fourteen—the age a t w h i c h it begins—he covered m a n y pages

with entries in Latin. Miiller has suggested in his big bOOk on Hegel t h a t “in the process h i s German style contracted a chronic c o l d ” ( 1 6 ) , b u t Hegel’s writings o f the nineties, which were n o t designed for publication, show u s a n extremely Vigorous a n d picturesque G e r m a n prose. The corruption o f

his style came later. What is true is that its ills are patently i n fl u e n c e d b y L a t i n : t h e excessive l e n g t h of Hegel’s sentences

points in that direction no less than his heavy reliance on b o t h personal a n d relative p r o n o u n s which m a k e s it impe ra tive for the English translator to b r e a k up t h e sentences; only the g e n d e r shows—and e v e n t h a t s o m e t i m e s d o e s not show conclusively—to w h a t these pronouns are m e a n t to refer. O n J u l y 5 , 1785—still a t th e age of fourteen—Hegel records he how u p o n t h e d e a t h of his favorite t e a c h e r , L'ofller,

bought from his library twelve books which he lists with their respective prices, all very neatly: 1 . Greek 1 . Aristoteles d e m o r i b u s 2. Demosthenes oratio de corona

3. Isocrates opera omnia 2 . Latin a . PROSE

4. Ciceronis Opera philosophica 5 . A . Gellii noctes Atticas . . b . POETRY 8. Plautus 9 . Catullus, Tibullus, Propertius, G a l l u s , Claudianus, and Ausonius . . .

10

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCES, 1 7 7 0 — 1 8 0 0

Ten days later, o n t h e fifteenth, Hegel recounts how h e t o o k a w a l k with Professor Cless: “We r e a d i n Mendelssohn’s Phaidon [ 1 7 7 6 ] , only . . . the introduction, n a m e l y the character of Socrates.8 Anytus, Melitus, a n d Crito [sic! i n stead of Lycon who is m e n t i o n e d with the other two by Mendelssohn]

were

the three

monsters

[Scheusale]

who

got

death for h i m from the timid senate and the rabid m o b . ” It seems that Hegel first l e a r n t of Socrates’ trial a n d death not from Plato’s Apology, Crito, a n d Plzaedo, b u t from Moses Mendelssohn. Rosenkranz reports how at sixteen Hegel m a d e a c o m p l e t e translation from t h e Greek, still e x t a n t i n 1 8 4 4 , of Longinus’ book O n the Sublime. “ H e w a s naturally inclined toward Greek much more t h a n toward Latin a n d for t h a t reason exerted himself more o n his L a t i n lest h e get behind. H i s w i d e reading m a d e his L a t i n style a little far-fetched; h e enjoyed rare and u n u s u a l phrases.” Also a t sixteen, he studied Tyrtaius, the Iliad, Cicero, a n d

Euripides; in the spring of 1788 Aristotle’s Ethics, and that summer Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus. “The reading of Sophocles h e continued u n a b a t e d for several years. H e also translated h i m into German a n d later, probably u n d e r the influence of his friendship with Holderlin, tried t o render not only the dialogues b u t even t h e c h o r u s e s metrically, but w a s n o t particularly successful. As t h e still extant translations show, h e occupied himself m o s t with Antigone, w h i c h to h i m represented t h e beauty and p r o f u n d i t y of t h e Greek spirit most perfectly. H i s enthusiasm for t h e sublimity and grace

of the ethical pathos in this tragedy remained constant all through his life—Beginning on April 5, 1786, he translated the Encheiridion of Epictetus. In this case he copied the G r e e k text a chapter at a time, s o the extant manuscript looks somewhat variegated in its alternation of Greek a n d G e r m a n script.” He also translated Tacitus a n d large parts

of Thucydides—the latter probably while he was a tutor in 3 Hoflmeister, D o k . , 403 f . , has c a l l e d attention to the l a s t i n g i n fluence o f Mendelssohn’s characterization o n Hegel’s conception of Socrates.

4 . Education

to 1 7 9 3

11

B e r n . Rosenkranz also lists some o f the German authors h e read (10—15). In the m i d s t of his entries for January 1 , 1 7 8 7 , after mentioning his work on Longinus, Cicero, spherical trigonometry, a n d Virgil, Hegel n o t e s : “In t h e afternoon I wanted to read

only a little in Soplziens Reise, but I could not tear myself away from it until evening w h e n I went t o the concert.”

Rosenkranz not only included this item in Hegel’s diary, in the Appendix of his Life; he also said in passing on page 9 that t h e young Hegel d i d not avoid girls “ a n y more t h a n h e excluded novels from his reading, a s indeed h e s i m p l y could

not tear himself away from Sophiens Reise.” This passing m e n t i o n , though not the diary, may hauer’s attention, for the latter, who i n g Hegel i n t h e m o s t abusive t e r m s , “ My comp a n i o n is H o m e r , Hegel’s

have c o m e t o Schopennever tired of denouncis said to have b o a s t e d : companion is SOphiens

Reise von Memel nach Sac/zsen.” Glockner comments that we cannot infer “that the boy Hegel actually finished the six-volume Schmo‘ker; on the contrary: on the following days there i s no further reference t o i t ” ( I , 4 0 9 ) . While this is as

true as can be, one might add: and if h e had?9 All this should give us a fair picture of Hegel u p to the time he left the Tiibingen Stift in 1793. The famous Stift was a kind of Protestant theological seminary and resident college which i n those years graduated m a n y m e n who later achieved renown i n German academic life, including F . I . Niethammer a n d H . E. G . Paulus w h o i n later years b e c a m e Hegel’s friends. 9The

novel was written by Johann Thimoteus Hermes (1738—

1 8 2 1 ) , p u b l i s h e d 1769—73; 2 d e d . , 1 7 7 6 . I t presents a p i c t u r e of the period a n d o f a sensitive s o u l , i n the form of l e t t e r s . Schmb’ker

is a derogatory term for a readable but worthless book. Hegel’s diary entry is discussed by Kuno Fischer, I , 9, who gives the impression that Hegel ignored books of lasting value for the sake of such trash. I t is also Fischer who introduced the SchOpenhauer quote into the literature, claiming that it came from a letter Schopenhauer wrote to his student, L . B'ahr. The published letters to Bahr, however, contain n o t h i n g l i k e i t ; nor does the whole threevolume e d i t i o n o f D e r Briefwechsel A r t h u r Schopenhauers, e d . Arthur Hiibscher, Munich, Piper, 1 9 2 9 , 1 9 3 3 , 1 9 4 2 .

12

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCES, 1770—1800

To s u m u p , Hegel w a s a n extremely bright a n d industrious boy a n d c a m e t o Tiibingen w i t h a thorough g r o u n d i n g i n classics, fluent in Latin and Greek,

and at home

in German

literature. H i s scientific training, too, was good for t h e times. At t h e University, where a t t w e n t y h e t o o k a n M . A . i n philosophy, h e enjoyed t h e freedom of being a w a y from h o m e a n d w o r k e d m u c h less h a r d t h a n before. H e w a s sociable a n d liked t o d r i n k with t h e o t h e r students, b u t his closest friend w a s Holderlin with w h o m h e w a s united b y a c o m m o n love of t h e G r e e k s , of poetry, a n d of philosophy. H e also w a s close t o Schelling w h o , five years y o u n g e r t h a n Hegel a n d Holderlin, w a s s o m e t h i n g of a b o y w o n d e r a t t h e Stift. I n 1 7 9 3 w h e n Hegel w a s writing those frag men ts o n folk religion which form t h e earliest p a r t of his so-called T lzeologz‘sche Jugendsclzriften, full of sarcastic a n d t h e n still unpublishable

contrasts of the glorious Greeks and the wretched Christians,10 Schelling published his first article, a t t h e a g e o f eighteen: sixty-eight pages “ O n M y t h , Historical Legends, a n d Philosophical D i c t a i n t h e M o s t A n c i e n t W o r l d ” ; a n d before h e

was twenty-five he had published five books and become the foremost disciple of Fichte, who was then, after Kant, Germany’s most famous philosopher. By 1815, when Schelling’s meteoric c a r e e r s e e m e d t o h a v e fizzled o u t l o n g a g o t h o u g h h e w a s o n l y forty, h e h a d returned t o t h e c o n c e r n s of his first article, a n d w h e n h e c a m e o n c e m o r e into t h e limelight a s a n old m a n , t e n Years a f t e r Hegel’s d e a t h , his lectures o n the philosophy of m y t h o l o g y a n d revelation were h e a r d by, a n d greatly influenced, K i e r k e g a a r d .

5 From Tfibingen Hegel went t o B e r n , Switzerland, as a tutor . ( H a u s l e h r e r ) . Kant a n d Fichte, t o o , h a d h e l d s u c h positions early i n their careers, a n d s o did, just a little later, Herbart 10 T h e y are omitted i n the E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n b u t discussed a t length in the chapter on “The Young Hegel and Religion” in WK 131—40, w h i c h a l s o c o n t a i n s m a n y l o n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e q u o t a t i o n s

from these fragments.

5 . Kant and religion

13

before he came to teach philosophy at Gottingen and Konigsberg. In Bern, Hegel was entirely o n h i s o w n for t h e first time, and h e tried t o clarify his thoughts about religion. He h a d

taken his final examinations in theology three years after his MA.

i n philosophy, but t h e r e is n o trace of any religious

crisis in his development. Emphatically, he was not a believer, and this d i d not bother h i m i n t h e least. Kant’s outright scorn of “religious delusion,” “fetishism,” A fterdienst, and Pfaflen-

tum in the fourth and last part of Religion within the Bounds , of Mere Reason ( 1 7 9 3 ) clearly d i d not offend Hegel i n the least, a l t h o u g h K a n t extended to institutionalized religion in

general such abusive terms as Luther had directed only against the Catholic church. Pfafi‘e is a derogatory name for a parson o r priest, Pfafientum a n even more scathing term for clericalism; A fterdz‘enst though scrupulously followed in

Kant’s semi-scholastic fashion by a parenthesis with a Latin equivalent “ ( c u l t u s s p u r i u s ) ”

brings to mind th e backside,

which Luther often used in composite words to suggest a perversion. Yet the young theology student accepted Kant’s‘ Views on these matters without the least hesitation. The second section of the last part of Kant’s book is entitled “On the Afterdienst of God in a Statutary Religion” and begins: “The true and only religion contains nothing but laws, i.e. practical principles of whose unconditional necessity w e c a n become conscious and which we recognize as

revealed by pure reason (not empirically). Only for the sake o f a church . . . c a n t h e r e b e statutes, i.e. decrees w h i c h are considered divine but which are arbitrary and accidental for

our purely moral judgment. To consider such a statutary faith . essential for the service of G o d and to make it the supreme condition of divine pleasure in man, is a RELIGIOUS DELUSION, a n d its observance is a n A F T ERDIENS T . . . . ”

The words printed in capital letters are set off by Kant in much larger type. § 2 o f t h e s a m e section b e g i n s : “First, I presuppose t h e following proposition as a prin-

ciple that requires no proof: EVERYTHING BESIDES LEADING A GOOD LIFE THAT MAN SUPPOSES HE CAN DO TO PLEASE G O D IS MERE RELIGIOUS DE-

14

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCES, 1770—1800

LUSION AND AFTERDIENST

O F GOD.” And in §3,

which links Pfafi‘entum a n d A fterdienst i n its title, Kant s a y s : “From a SHAMAN among the Tunguses- to the European PRELATE who rules church and state at once, or . . . between the wholly sensuous MOGULITZ who in th e morning

lays the paw of a bear’s hide on his head with the brief prayer ‘Do not slay me!’ to t h e sublimated PURITAN and Independent i n CONNECTICUT, there is certainly an imposing distance i n MANNER, but not in th e PRINCIPLE of faith;

for as far as that is concerned they all belong to one and the same class, namely that of those who place their divine servi c e i n that which in itself does not make a man better ( i n

the faith in certain statutary propositions or the performance of certain arbitrary Observances). Only those who find divine service solely i n the outlook o f leading a good life differ from these people by advancing to a n entirely different prin-

ciple that is far superior to the former. . . . ” And, a few pages l a t e r : “PFAFFENTUM is the constitution o f a church insofar a s FETISHISM rules i n it, a n d this is found wher-

ever it is not ethical principles but statutary commandments, rules of faith, a n d Observances that constitute what is basic

and essential.” In the final pages of the book, Kant attacks belief in miracles a n d , among other things, comments o n p r a y e r : “Prayer, considered a s a n internal, formal divine service an d thus a s a means of grace is a superstitious delusion ( m a k i n g a f e t i s h ) ;

for it is a wish declared to a being that needs no declaration o f the inner m i n d o f those who wish—and thus nothing is done a n d n o n e of t h e duties incumbent o n us a s c o m m a n d m ents of G o d are fulfilled, an d G o d is really not served. A

wish of the heart to please God in all we do and omit, i.e. the state of mind accompanying all our actions that we do them a s if they were done i n the service of God—that is the spirit

of prayer which can and should be present in us ‘unceasingly.’ But to clothe this wish (even if only internally) in words and formulas, that c a n at m o s t h a v e m e r e l y the value of a m e a n s t o animate repeatedly this state of m i n d i n ourselves,

but cannot bear any immediate relation to divine pleasure and therefore also cannot be a duty for everybody; for a

6. Goethe’s Iphigenia

15

means c a n only be prescribed t o those who need it for certain

ends, but by no means everybody needs this means (of speaking i n fact with himself while pretending, which seems more understandable, t h a t he is speaking with G o d ) . . . . ”

It was this book, published the year Hegel left Tiibingen for Bern, that prompted his initial enthusiasm for Kant— not t h e Critique of Pure Reason, which h a d appeared when Hegel w a s eleven. Liberal Protestant theology, o f course, d i d not find it necessary t o break with Kant, but Hegel, at

twenty-four, thinks it would be fun “to disturb the theologians as much as possible . . . as they amass Critical [i.e., Kantian] building materials to strengthen their Gothic temple; to make everything diflicult for t h e m , t o whip them o u t o f every nook a n d subterfuge,” and h e trusts that among the pieces

they are taking “from the Kantian stake to prevent the conflagration of dogmatics they surely also carry home live c o a l s . ” I n t h e s a m e letter t o Schelling ( s e e D 1 7 9 5 ) he expresses some concern lest Fichte’s Critique of A l l Revela-

tion (1792) may not open a 100phole for those who want to go back to old-style dogmatics. What aroused Hegel’s concern was not Kant’s radicalism b u t rather h i s division o f m a n i n t o mutually conflicting parts.

He objected-not to Kant’s impieties or blasphemies but to which consists in t h e triumph

the nature of K a n t ’ s Moralitc’it,

of reason and duty over inclination. Hegel’s departure from Kant was prompted by a higher regard not for traditional Christianity b u t for t h e Greeks, a n d his image of t h e Greeks, was profoundly influenced by G o e t h e and like H'o'lderlin’s, Schiller.

6

From the start of his philos0phica1 deve10pment, Hegel accepted Kant’s repudiation of any supra-rational statutary religion as well as G o e t h e ’ s a n d Schiller’s c o n c e p t i o n o f Sittlichkeit a s e m b o d i e d , for e x a m p l e , in G o e t h e ’ s Iphigenia

who is a completely harmonious ethical personality. The time has come to consider Goethe’s play briefly. It is the great-

16

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCES, 1770—1800

est achievement of German classicism and a s beautiful as it is noble. Like n o b o d y before h i m , Goethe succeeded at o n e blow i n bringing t h e Greeks to life i n eighteenth—and nineteenth—century Germany. Winckelmann and Lessing h a d talked a b o u t the Greeks a n d taught their countrymen, i n cluding Goethe, t o think a b o u t them i n a different way, but G o e t h e m a d e a new generation, including Hegel a n d Holderlin, see and hear t h e m . Suddenly, SOphocles’ Antigone c e a s e d t o b e m e r e l y the heroine of a tragedy written i n the fifth c e n tury B.C.; h e r spirit w a s present even now and represented a live option and an alternative t o Kant’s Moralitiit. Goethe’s play is barely longer than Antigone, h as only five

characters (Iphigenia, Orestes, Pylades, the King of Tauris, and his m e s s e n g e r ) , a n d is written for t h e m o s t part i n i a m b i c p e n t a m e t e r s ; but t h r e e times Iphigenia’s soliloquies

break this mold with all the sublimity of a Sophoclean c h o r u s : i n the last s c e n e of Act I , i n t h e first s c e n e o f Act IV, and a b o v e all i n t h e fi n a l s c e n e of t h e fourth a c t , i n the s o -

called Parzenlied whose presence one still feels in Holderlin’s poetry, especially in his Sclzicksalslied (“1hr wandelt droben im Licht . . . ” ) . It may seem far-fetched to link this play with Sophocles’ Antigone, which H e g e l loved s o much and which H'olderlin, already fighting for his sanity, translated; after all, Euripides wrote a n Iphigenia in T auris. B u t i n Euripides’ p l a y the king, Thoas, is tricked, and Iphigenia, Orestes, and Pylades carry off the divine image, a statue of Artemis, thus fulfilling the

condition for Orestes’ purification from the crime of his matricide. Goethe turned Iphigenia into an embodiment of Sittlichkeit comparable to Antigone. N o brief quotation can give any adequate idea of this, but these six lines (from Act V.3) certainly echo Sophocles’ tragedy: THOAS: IPHIGENIA:

An ancient l a w c o m m a n d s you and not I . We covetously seize u p o n a law That serves our passion a s a n e e d e d weapon. A n o t h e r l a w , more ancient, speaks t o m e And bids m e t o resist y o u , the command That makes t h e stranger sacrosanct.

6. Goethe’s Iphigenia

17

Goethe’s Iphigenia, unlike Euripides’ but like SOphocles’ Antigone, stands for love and humanity against hate a nd cruelty. I n a tremendous speech, l a t e r i n the same scene, she

decides to be honest with the king and confides in him, as in a comparable situation Sophocles’ Neoptolemus breaks his previous resolve and i s honest with Philoctetes. And even a s

her Humanitdt has restored her brother’s mind earlier in the play, it now prevails over the king’s resolve to sacrifice the strangers to the goddess, and over Orestes’ eagerness to fight;

the king allows them to leave in peace—after Orestes explains in his last speech that the plan to carry off the divine image was the result of a misunderstanding. Apollo had commanded him to bring to Greece the sister from the sanctuary in Tauris a n d promised that if h e d i d this h is curse would b e lifted:

Orestes had assumed that the image of Apollo’s sister, Artemis, was meant but now realizes that it was rather his

own sister, Iphigenia, who has already freed his mind from the Furies that haunted it ever since he slew his mother. We should recall how in the speech that culminates in the Parzenlz‘ed Iphigenia speaks first of robbing “the holy, much revered i m a g e entrusted to m e , ” and then, eight lines later,

cries out to the Olympians, “And save your image in my soul!” Goethe’s change of Euripides’ plot does not revolve around a superficial ambiguity: what is truly divine and has the power to purify a m a n is not a statue o r anything super-

natural but a harmonious ethical personality whose pride does not preclude h u m i l i t y and whose outstanding courage and honesty are employed i n the service of love.

Kant, too, felt free to speak of the divine while expressly ruling o u t all traditional Christian overtones—and Hegel fol-

lowed Kant and Goethe in this respect; but unlike them, he has often been misunderstood on this point. To understand h i m , we have to consider h i m i n the context o f h i s times. In several ways, Hegel is closer t o Goethe than to Kant.

He fully accepts and shares Goethe’s enthusiasm for the Greeks, a s well a s the association o f the Greeks with a n ethic

of harmony and humanity. Later, in the Phenomenology, Hegel celebrates the brother-sister relationship as the highest possible ethical relationship. He twice mentions and quotes

18

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCES, 1770—1800

Antigone i n this context, and n o attentive reader can fail t o notice t h a t the whole discussion revolves around SOphocles’ play. While h e does not refer to Goethe’s play at t h a t point, there can hardly b e any doubt that he thought o f it, too— and that, since h e , like G o eth e, h ad one sister, the play h a d also struck a deeply personal chord i n h i m . In any case, Goethe’s Iphigenia is cited by Hegel i n 1 7 9 5 (Nohl 9 8 ; WK 1 4 1 ) and again in “Faith a n d Knowledge” in 1 8 0 2 ( 3 0 2 ) ; and above all we have his comments o n Iphigenia i n his lectures on aesthetics:

“With Goethe, on the other hand [as opposed to Euripid e s ] , Iphigenia becomes a goddess a n d trusts the truth i n herself, i n the human h e a r t . ” “Goethe, with infinite beauty, in-

terprets the ambiguous divine pronouncement . . . in a humane and conciliatory m a n n e r : t h e p u r e and holy Iphigenia is t h e sister, t h e divine image, and the protector of the

house.” “In this as in every other respect, the profound beauty of this poem cannot be admired enough.”11

7 Besides Kant a n d G o e t h e , Schiller influenced the young

Hegel deeply—indeed, not only the young Hegel. We still have Hegel’s first reaction i n a letter t o Schelling, April 1 6 , 1 7 9 5 , to Schiller’s important essay “ O n the Aesthetic Edu-

cation of Man, in a Series of Letters,” which had just appeared that year in Schiller’s journal, Die Horen: Hegel called it “a masterpiece” ( s e e D ) . Schiller pays generous tribute t o Kant ( 1 a n d 1 5 n.)12 and

also mentions “my friend Fichte” twice ( 4 n. and 1 3 n . ) , very favorably, but i n fact h e is much too conciliatory and un11Werke, ed. Glockner, XII, 309—12. Later in these lectures, Hegel remarks that the play is “excellent but not in the strictest sense dramatically alive” and in this connection cites Schiller’s

critique o f Iphigenia. Hegel a l s o calls i t “ a truly poetic m o d e l ” o f a

conciliatory ending in the tradition of the Eumenides and Plziloctetes (ibid., XIV, 5 0 6 a n d 5 3 9 ) .

12 The numerals in parentheses refer to the twenty-seven letters, the “n’s” to Schiller’s footnotes.

7 . Sclziller’s

Aesthetic Education

of Man

19

polemical when he says, right after the second reference to Fichte: “In a transcendental philosophy . . . one easily gets

into the habit of thinking of the material merely as an obstacle and of representing the senses . . . a s necessarily op-

posed to reason. While such a way of thinking is not in any way implicit i n the spirit o f the Kantian system, i t might well

be implicit in the letter.”13 Surely, the former was Fichte’s position, and the conception of morality as the triumph of

reason over opposing inclinations was the very heart of Kant’s practical philosophy. As long as I am prompted by inclination, I am not moral, according to Kant, even if my inclinations coincide with my duties; and to like to d o what is moral is not moral. Kant insists on this point again and again; for example, in his first book on ethics, the Grundlegung ( 1 7 8 5 ) , i n Section I ,

not only for several pages immediately after the concept of duty is introduced in the eighth paragraph, but also later in the s a m e work. I n his Critique of Practical Reason ( 1 7 8 8 ) h e writes:

“The concept of duty thus demands of a n action, objectively, agreement with the law, but o f the maxim of the action, subjectively, respect for the law a s the sole way i n which

the will is determined by the law. And on this rests the difference between the consciousness o f having acted in accordance with duty and from duty, i.e., from respect for the

law; the former (legality) is also possible if only inclinations determined the will, but the latter (morality), moral worth, m u s t b e found solely i n t h i s : that the action was done from

duty, i.e., solely for the sake of the law. “It is of the utmost importance for all moral judgments to attend with the greatest possible precision to the subjective principle of all maxims in order that all morality of actions be found in their necessitation from duty and from respect for the law, not from love and sympathy for that which the actions should bring about.”14 13 On the first page of his first published essay ( T h e Difference . . . , 1801), Hegel says: “The Kantian philosophy required that its spirit be distinguished from its letter. . . . ” 14 P p . 1 4 4 f . ; Akademieausgabe, third through 1.1.3.

V, 8 1 ; i.e., a little less than one-

20

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCES, 1770—1800

is obviously quite different from the This Moralitt'it Sittlichkeit of Goethe’s Iphigenia; and Schiller, though too full of admiration for Kant to attack h i m b y name, is entirely on Goethe’s side. Without mentioning Kant, h e o n c e gave the classical formulation of the rigoristic position which h e could

not accept—in a series of distichs called “The Phi1030phers”:

CONSCIENTIOUS SCRUPLE G l a d l y I serve my friends, b u t alas out of inclination;

And though this pains me oft, virtuous I am not.

DE c I s I 0 N There is n o other counsel, but you have t o try to despise it And with abhorrence d o that which your d u t y commands.15

Schiller tried on the level of popular philos0phy what Goethe h a d d o n e poetically i n Iphz'genia: t o present a n image o f m a n a s a harmonious whole. O f course, h e , t o o , was a poet, and some of his epigrams i n the “Letters” are m e m o r a b l e : “ O n e is just as m u c h a citizen of one’s a g e a s o n e i s a citizen o f one’s s t a t e ” ( 2 ) ; “The artist is, t o b e sure, t h e son of his

age, but it is to his discredit if he is also its pupil or, worse, its favorite. May a beneficent deity tear the suckling away i n good time from his mother’s breast t o nourish him with

the milk of a better time and let him mature to his majority under distant Greek skies” ( 9 ) . The contrast between the present age and ancient Greece i s crucial for Schiller’s essay

—and for Hegel’s development. This contrast is developed particularly in the sixth letter where the totality and harmony of the classical Greek are juxtaposed with the fragmentation of modern man. Schiller comes very close t o saying that Kant’s dissection o f man reflects the modern c o n d i t i o n : “Among us, one is almost tempted to claim, the faculties of the m i n d [Gemiitskrc‘ifte] express themselves as separately i n experience as the psychologist differentiates them i n theory, a n d we see not only single subjects b u t whole classes of peeple develop only a 15 Hegel quotes the last line in his Philosophy of Right, §124. Schiller’s Letters are discussed in Hegel’s Aesthetik, Werke, Glockner’s ed., XII, 9 6 ff.

7 . Schiller’s A e s t h e t i c E d u c a t i o n o f M a n

21

part o f their dispositions while t h e rest, a s i n crippled plants, are scarcely suggested in f a i n t traces.”16 “The abstract thinker therefore often has a cold heart b e cause h e dissects the impressions which after all stir the soul only a s a w h o l e ; t h e business m a n often h a s a narrow heart because his imagination, imprisoned i n the uniform sphere of

his occupation, cannot expand to take in other ways of thinking. . . . G l a d l y I concede t o you that, however little pleasure the individuals c a n feel i n this fragmentation of t h e i r

nature, yet the species could not have made progress in any other w a y . The

appearance of Greek humanity was unques-

tionably a maximum that neither could tarry nor climb higher o n this stage. I t could not tarry there because the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n e possessed even then could not possibly

help separating itself from feeling and intuition to strive for distinctness of knowledge; a n d it could n o t c l i m b higher b e cause only a certain degree o f distinctness c a n coexist with a certain fullness a n d w a r m t h . The Greeks h ad reached this degree, a n d if they w i s h e d to progress to a higher form [Ausbildung] they, like we, had to give up t h e totality o f

their nature to pursue truth on separate ways. To develop man’s manifold dispositions, there was n o other means than to Oppose them to each other. This antagonism o f forces i s the great instrument of culture, but also no m o r e than a n

instrument; for as long as it persists one is only on the way to culture. . . .

“It is equally certain that the power of human thought would never have achieved an analysis of the infinite or a critique of pure reason if reason had not isolated itself in a few isolated individuals who were called on to d o so. . . . But will such a spirit who is, as it were, dissolved into pure understanding and pure intuition be fit to exchange the strict fetters of logic for the free deveIOpment of the poetic power and to grasp the individuality of things with a faithful and chaste m i n d ? ” This important letter ( 6 ) ends with a call for the restoration of the harmonious totality o f our nature. It is clearly 16 Cf. V—PG 11.3.2.

22

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCES, 1770—1800

implied that this does not involve a return to a past golden age but rather a harmony that is higher and more advanced than was the Greeks’, because it will retain the advances

made possible by the sacrifice of such harmony in the intervening centuries. Hegel’s agreement with Schiller—when he first read this essay at twenty-four, but also i n his later work, especially

but not only in the Phenomenology—is so far-reaching, and Schiller is so much easier to understand than Hegel, that some reflection on such passages a s these is invaluable for the student of Hegel. Hegel, too, sees through Kant’s analysis of the mind and the bifurcation of man into sense and reason

to the human reality that is mirrored in this point of view. Indeed, what Schiller does here in relation to Kant becomes

for Hegel a paradigm of phiIOSOphical comprehension. Also, Hegel accepts the idea that what is unfortunate for the individual and may look like a step down and something negative may in fact serve the progress of humanity. Specifically,

he agrees that a totality may have to fall apart before it can be reconstituted on a higher level. I n a way, the Greeks are models of humanity, and their

Sittlichkeit is superior to Kant’s Moralitc'z’t; but for the reason just given, Antigone is considered i n the Phenomenology (with the highest admiration) before Kant’s Moralitc'it, which

is considered in an extremely critical vein. When Hegel in his later

works

reversed

the sequence of Moralitc'it

and

Sittlz'chkeit, he did not change his mind but merely ceased to deal with specifically Greek Sittlichkeit and discussed instead the higher harmony that might come after Kant. There are many smaller points i n Schiller’s essay that are relevant to the Phenomenology. Hegel’s scornful remarks about “edification” (V—PG I . I I . 9 ) should be related t o the

conclusion of the twenty-second letter where Schiller derides some readers: “His interest is either moral or physical; only what it should b e , aesthetic, it is n o t . Such readers enjoy a

serious and grand poem like a sermon, and one that is naive or witty like an intoxicating drink. And if they had sufficiently bad taste to demand edification from a tragedy or epic . . . ,

7 . Schiller’s Aesthetic E d u c a t i o n o f M a n

23

they will inevitably be offended by an Anacreontic or Catullian poem.”17 B u t it is a remark a t the beginning o f the next letter ( 2 3 ) a n d , abov e all, the first paragraph of the twenty-fourth let-

ter that most obliviously influenced the Phenomenology.18 “There is no other way t o make t h e m a n of the senses rational than t o m a k e h i m aesthetic first” ( 2 3 ) . In other words, Schiller suggests t h a t there is a particular sequence through which m a n h a s to advance to rationality. This i d e a i s elabo-

rated a little later o n : “ T h u s o n e c a n distinguish three different moments or stages

of development which both the individual human being and t h e whole species m u s t traverse necessarily an d i n a determinate sequence if they are to fulfill the whole sphere o f

their destiny. Owing to accidental causes which may lie either i n external influences or i n the arbitrary freedom of m a n , the v a r i o u s periods c a n o f course b e c o m e longer or shorter,

but none can be skipped entirely, and their sequence, too, cannot be reversed either by nature or by the will. Man in his physical condition merely suffers the power of nature; he divests himself of this power in his aesthetic condition; a nd h e do m i n a t e s it i n h i s moral c o n d i t i o n . ” Hegel’s Phenomenology recognizes m a n y more t h a n three

stages; he is not quite so emphatic and clear on the point of the “determinate sequence”; and he does not echo the fi n a l s e n t e n c e just quoted. B u t h e does not only take over the c o n c e p t i o n a n d the terminology o f “ m o m e n t s or stages of development [ M o m e n t e oder Stufen der E n t w i c k l u n g ] ” ; h e

also develops the idea that “The individual must also pass through the contents o f the educational stages o f the general Spirit” (V—PG 1 1 . 3 . 3 ) : i n d e e d , this is the central i d e a of t h e whole Phenomenology. The influence of Schiller’s terminology o n Hegel’s extends

17 Cf. also Hegel’s Jena “aphorism” # 6 6 : “ O n e demands of philosophy, since religion has been lost, that it should aim at edification a n d replace the pastor”

(Ros. 552; Dok. 371).

18 This was recognized by Glockner who called attention to the i m p o r t a n c e of these letters for H e g e l ( I I , 68—78), b u t up t o this p o i n t o u r accounts are q u i t e different.

24

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCES, 1770—1800

beyond the examples given so far. In a footnote ( 1 2 ) , for example, Schiller finds very suggestive such German locutions as ausser sich sez‘n (being beside o n e s e l f ) ; “in sick gehen

[to go into oneself], i.e., returning into one’s ego. . . . Of a man who has fainted one does not say, he is beside himself but rather, er ist von sich, i.e., he has been forcibly removed

from his ego, for he is not in it. Therefore, one who comes to again is merely said to be bez’ sich, which is entirely compatible with being beside oneself.” Here was a precedent for Hegel’s later attempt to use an sz’ch, filr sic/z, etc., as sugges-

tive philosophical terms.19 Schiller distinguishes the sensuous drive and the form drive

before he introduces in the fourteenth letter what has become the best known term of the essay: the play drive [Spieltrieb]. At the beginning of the next letter h e couples the first drive with life, the second with form (Gestalt; but t h e drive he

calls Formtrieb), and then adds: “The object of the play drive, represented in a general schema, we can then call living form.” It is not irrelevant that Schiller w a s a playwright:

in German, too, a play can be called ein Schauspiel, and performing it is called es spielen, playing it. While Hegel’s Phenomenology is not a play, it brings before us—if it does not play with—living forms. A similarity that is more obvious may be found in Schiller’s triad: two opposed drives are synthesized, and their apparently mutually exclusive objects—life and form—give way to living form. If o n e did not k n o w that it w as said by Schiller near the end o f the fifteenth letter, o n e would surely assume that it w as Hegel who h ad s a i d : “ I t is neither grace nor is it

dignity that speaks to us out of the glorious face of the Juno Ludovisi; it is neither of these because it is both at once.” In fact, Hegel says much the same, only not nearly so concisely, in the penultimate paragraph of Section 111.1 of his preface to the Phenomenology: “ . . . such expressions must no longer b e u s e d where such otherhood is sublimated. . . . ” Even the characteristic Hegelian term aufheben, rendered “sublimate” throughout this book, is encountered i n Schiller. The word, of course, i s common and can mean “cancel”—

19 See C 11.1.8, 10, 30; 11.2.10.

7 . Sc/ziller’s Aesthetic E d u c a t i o n of M a n

25

a n d in Hegel’s usage it almost always m e a n s at least t h a t

—but it can also mean “preserve” and, thirdly, “lift up.”

Often Hegel uses auflzeben to suggest all three meanings at once, as in the example just given. When Schiller uses the w o r d i n t h e m i d d l e of t h e fourteenth letter, t h e m e a n i n g m i g h t m e r e l y b e “ c a n c e l ” ; b u t i n the m i d d l e of t h e eighteenth letter t h e r e is a passage t h a t h a s a definitely H e g e l i a n ring:

“beauty unites these two Opposed states and thus sublimates the Opposition. But because both states remain eternally opposed to each other, they cannot be united in any other way than by being sublimated.” A similar passage o c c u r s i n t h e twentieth l e t t e r : “ M a n c a n n o t i m m e d i a t e l y move from feeling t o t h o u g h t ; h e m u s t take a step back b e c a u s e o n l y w h e n o n e d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s subl i m a t e d again [ h e r e t h e m e a n i n g s e e m s to b e “ c a n c e l l e d ” ]

the opposite determination can appear. . . . The determinat i o n t h a t h e received through sensation therefore h a s to

be retained because he must not lose reality; but at the same time it must be sublimated insofar as it is a limitation bec a u s e a n unlimited determinability is s u p p o s e d t o t a k e place. Thus t h e task is t o annihilate a n d a t t h e s a m e t i m e t o keep

the determination of the condition, and this is possible only in one way: by opposing another determination to it. The scales b a l a n c e w h e n they a r e e m p t y ; b u t t h e y also b a l a n c e when they c o n t a i n e q u a l weights.”

Elsewhere, reason is coupled with the absolute and unconditional, while “ t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e m a i n s forever w i t h i n the sphere of the c o n d i t i o n a l ” ( 2 4 ) . ? 0 For H e g e l , t o o , the under-

standing remains satisfied with simple propositions, consisting of subjects and predicates that in the nature of the case are o n l y conditionally t r u e , while r e a s o n seeks t o t r a n s c e n d s i m ple d o g m a t i c propositions t o give an unconditionally true

20 Cf. also Goethe: “Reason depends on what becomes, the und e r s t a n d i n g o n what h a s b e c o m e . The f o r m e r d o e s n o t a s k : for what? The l a t t e r d o e s n o t a s k : from w h e r e ? R e a s o n d e l i g h t s i n d e v e l o p m e n t ; t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g w a n t s t o a r r e s t e v e r y t h i n g t o use i t ” ( W i l h e l m Meisters Wanderjalzre, 1 8 2 1 ; Maximen u n d Reflexionen # 5 5 5 ) .

26

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCES, 1770—1800

account whose form, as he argues in the preface to the Phenomenology, can only b e a whole system. In the same crucial letter, incidentally, from which we have quoted the conception o f the three stages, Schiller quotes eight lines from Goethe’s Iplzigenia. Another i d e a that i s

widely associated with Hegel also comes out of Schiller’s essay: the contrast of two types of infinity. “Some do not realize that the freedom in which they quite rightly fi nd the essence of beauty is not lawlessness b u t the harmony of laws, not arbitrariness but the highest inner necessity; others do not realize that the determinateness which they just as rightly demand of beauty consists not in the exclusion of certain realities b u t i n th e absolute inclusion of all, and that it is thus not limitation but infinity” (18).

“The condition of the human spirit before all the determination given to it through sense impressions is a determinability without bounds. The endlessness of space a nd time is given to t h e imagination for its free use, and because, ex hypothesi, nothing is posited i n this w i d e realm o f t h e possible, and hence nothing i s excluded either, one may call this condition of the lack o f all determination a n empty infinity,

which should not by any means be confused with an infinite emptiness” ( 1 9 ) . “When the latter, the lack o f all determination that issues from want, h a s been represented a s a n empty infinity, then the aesthetic freedom o f determination . . . m u s t be considered a replete infinity . . . ” ( 2 1 ) .

Schiller’s explanations of his terms are clearer, as his prose is generally, than Hegel’s. Moreover, Hegel seems t o presuppose that his readers have encountered some of h i s terms before—presumably i n Schiller—and therefore does not bother

to define them when he first introduces them. The first edition of the Phenomenology

( 1 8 0 7 ) numbered

7 5 0 c0pies;

there was no second edition until after Hegel’s death; and he probably counted

on readers who were familiar with

Schiller and Kant, even if they had not studied Fichte and Schelling. Even s o , the three Schiller quotations on the two types of

infinity may not be entirely clear. To begin with the first,

7 . Schiller’s Aesthetic Education of M a n

27

the point seems to be that a work of art is structured through and through, and precisely for that reason inexhaustible. Or, to use the crucial term in this connection: it allows for an infinity of interpretations—not because there is nothing there and hence anything goes, but because so much is there, even if not, as Schiller’s hyperbole suggests, “all”?1 The second quotation seems perfectly clear, except for the final clause. What is the difference between the empty infinity of uninhabited time and space on the one hand and an infinite emptiness on the other? Here Schiller may be speaking as a poet who is sensitive to the connotation of phrases: “infinite emptiness” is a phrase that qualifies emptiness, which is felt to be something bad, and the adjective raises the badness t o the highest possible degree; while “empty infinity” qualifies infinity, which is considered vast and sublime, and the ad-

jective, without negating this sublimity, merely tells us something more about it. Schiller’s use of Geist is similarly suggestive and brings out one more reason—though there are enough in any case— why this term, so important i n Hegel’s

lated drive their ward

work, must b e trans-

“spirit” and not “mind.” After juxtaposing the sensuous and the form drive, Schiller prepares to introduce synthesis, the play drive, in the fourteenth letter. Tothe end of the preceding letter he says that both of these

opposed drives require some limitation, but the sensuous drive

must not be weakened into “physical incapacity and a bluntness of the emotions which is always merely contemptible. . . . Character must assign to temperament its bounds, for sense may lose only to the spirit.” Geist, in other words, is the heir of the sensuous drive and of the form drive; it is not —and this is important for understanding Hegel—primarily a n epistemological faculty or organ of knowledge, like “mind,” but above all, though neither Schiller nor Hegel places this

most appropriate word in the center of the discussion where i t belongs, a creative force.

Schiller prefers to speak of a play drive without attempting any definition of play—until he finally says in the last 21 In Freud’s terminology, it is overdetermined.

28

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCES, 1 7 7 0 - 1 8 0 0

letter ( 2 7 ) : “An animal works when a lack is the driving spring of its activity, and it plays when an abundance of force is this driving spring, when the excess of life spurs itself into

activity. Even in inanimate nature one finds such a luxury of force a n d a laxity of determination which one might call . . . play.” A n excellent example of such “play” i n inanimate nature is found in Hegel’s diary of a trip through th e Bernese Alps during the summer of 1796—the year after Schiller’s essay had appeared—in Hegel’s description of the Staubbach falls ( s e e D ) . Schiller’s central contrast of abundance and l a c k prefigures Nietzsche’s contrast of r o m a n t i c and Dionysian art in

The Gay Science (1887, §370): “Regarding all aesthetic values I now avail myself of this main distinction: I ask in every single case, ‘15 it hunger or overflow which h a s here

become creative?’ ” Schiller’s wretched suffering in the military school h e attended from 1 7 7 3 till 1 7 8 0 , where play was frowned u p o n and his own first play, The Robbers, h a d t o b e

written in direct defiance of regulations—it was published at his own expense, anonymously, i n 1 7 8 1 , when he w a s still a regimental doctor under army discipline—supplies some rele-

vant overtones to his celebration of “play.” For him this word meant freedom and t h e overflow o f creative energy—not what the s a m e word might m e a n to a bored bourgeois. Incidentally, from 1 7 7 5 to 1 7 8 0 Schiller’s military a c a d e m y

was in Stuttgart (before that it had been in a small town in Wiirttemberg), a n d a s late a s 1782—the year when Hegel,

also in Stuttgart, turned twelve—Schiller was imprisoned by the D u k e of Wiirttemberg and expressly forbidden t o write any more “ c o m e d i e s ” ( l ) o r t o communicate with anybody outside Wiirttemberg. Later that year, Schiller fled from his

native state, and the following year he became theater poet i n Mannheim i n B a d e n , the s a m e state where the universities of Heidelberg and Freiburg are located. In the fall o f 1 7 8 9 h e became a professor of history a t the University of Jena, on the recommendation o f G o e t h e who was then in the state

government at Weimar. It was not until 1794 that the two poets became close friends. For Schiller, brought up in a brutally inhuman way, “play”

7 . Schiller’s Aesthetic Education of M a n

29

w a s a word t h a t carried special weight, a n d his biography helps u s t o understand o n e of t h e most famous dicta of the Letters: “ m a n plays only where h e i s ‘ h u m a n i n t h e full meani n g of that word, and h e is wholly h u m a n only where h e plays” ( 1 5 ) . Such a biographical-psychological approach, of course, leaves open the question whether Schiller is right. The glance

at his upbringing lets us see part of what he had in mind— something a t least about which h e is right. In play man

throws off constraints imposed upon him from outside and— Schiller is not speaking of “games that go o n in real life” and which have established rules—he becomes autonomous.

Indeed, when Schiller says directly before the dictum quoted that “ m a n ought only to play with beauty, and h e ought t o

play only with beauty,” h e leaves little doubt that he associates play with artistic creativity. Here—this is his central claim—man is n o t fragmented, b u t the w h o l e m a n is involved; s u c h activity i s not that of a specialist, o r rote, but wholly human. K a r l Vorl’cinder, o n e o f th e leading K a n t scholars of h i s generation, h a s called this essay “die philosophische Haupt-

schrift Schillers” and recorded how not only Goethe liked it but K a n t , t o o , found i t “ e x c e l l e n t ” and took notes on it with the intention o f writing a review to which, being seventy-one,

he unfortunately did not get around.22 But what are we to say of Schiller’s writing about beauty instead of merely writing poems or plays to create beauty? Is he defying his own counsel “only to play

with b e a u t y ” ? N o , there is something

playful about his way of writing. It is understandable that Schiller, precisely because he loved and admired Kant, felt embarrassed by “the gruesome form which o n e would like t o call a philosophical Chancery style”;23 22 D i e Philosophie

unserer Klassiker

( 1 9 2 3 ) , 1 1 1 f.

23 Letter to Goethe from Jena, September 22, 1797. Cf. also the letter t o Goethe from J e n a , December 2 2 , 1 7 9 8 : “ I a m v e r y eager

to read Kant’s Anthropology. The pathological side of m a n that he always stresses, and that may perhaps have its place in an Anthropology, pursues u s through almost everything he writes, and this is what gives his practical philosophy such a peevish appearance. It is surprising and lamentable that this cheerful and jovial spirit has not been able to clear his wings completely from the filth of life

30

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCES, 1770—1800

and we feel grateful to Schiller for writing s o much better.

But he departs deliberately not only from Kant’s scholasticbureaucratic prose but from what o n e might call entirely rational procedures. As Schiller argues i n the passages quoted above, it required some fragmentation of man a n d the exclusive cultivation o f reason i n some to create works like the Critique of Pure Reason; but now the time has c o m e for a new harmony, and we must “exchange the strict fetters of

logic for the free development of the poetic power” which alone can “grasp the individuality of things with a faithful and chaste mind” ( 6 ) . Schiller’s prose style in this essay is thus of a piece with its contents. And when h e plays with the various locutions that make u s e o f the German reflective

pronoun sich; or pairs one drive with life, the opposed drive with form, and then the play drive with living form; o r when h e plays with the meanings of the German auflzeben, o r plays

off against each other two types of infinity, he engages in the activity he commends. And here Hegel follows in Schiller’s footsteps.

Hegel’s preface to the Phenomenology has been characterized a s his break with romanticism, a n d it certainly contains

a scathing critique of many facets of that movement. But while Goethe and Schiller are sometimes considered romantics in the English-speaking world, Hegel, like Goethe, Schiller, a n d most of the leading romantics themselves, saw

Goethe and Schiller as die Klassiker

and understood ro-

manticism as in large part a revolt against them. And even if the essay here discussed should strike twentieth-century readers a s typically romantic, Hegel certainly never turned

against Schiller. The Phenomenology ends with a quotation from a Schiller p o e m (slightly adapted in keeping with Hegel’s habit in such m a t t e r s ) , and throughout the book, for all its insistence on raising phiIOSOphy to the level of a sci-

and actually has not quite overcome certain gloomy impressions of his youth, etc. There is still something in him that, a s in Luther’s case, reminds one of a monk who has opened up his monastery but been unable to destroy its traces altogether.” Both Goethe a n d Schiller objected not to Kant’s critique of Christianity b u t t o his

retention of a doctrine of radical evil in human nature.

8 . MS o n Folk Religion

31

ence, the influence of Schiller’s Letters is writ large, not least

in the matter of style. Hegel accepts Schiller’s vision of a new totality here a n d n o w , o f classical Greece reborn o n a higher level i n early nineteenth-century Germany, and of a style that projects this new fusion o f the faculties. Hegel’s Geist i s closer to Schiller’s Spieltrieb than it is to the understanding which, in Schiller’s phrase, “remains forever within the sphere

of the conditional.” And the subject of the Phenomenology is clearly a pageant of living forms. But we are twelve years ahead of ourselves: the Letters appeared i n 1 7 9 5 , the Phenomenology i n 1 8 0 7 . And to understand Hegel’s initial reaction we c a n make use o f o n e final quotation from the Letters: “Reason has achieved what it can

when it finds and proclaims the law; courageous will and living feeling have to execute it. When truth is to triumph in the struggle with forces, it must itself first become a force and

put up some drive as its advocate in the realm of phenomena; for drives are the only moving forces in the world of feeling” ( 8 ) . Kant had eXpressly denied this in his Critique of Practical Reason, s a y i n g : “How a law can a ground of determination o f the essential feature of all m o r a l i t y ) , insoluble problem and the s a m e

b e b y itself and immediately will (which is, after all, the that i s for human reason a n as how a free will c a n b e

possible”?4

8 Hegel’s early writings on religion need not be discussed here at any length because my analysis o f them, supported b y many

characteristic quotations, is easily accessible elsewhere?5 It will sufiice here to stress a few points. The earliest fragments, which contrast folk religion and Christianity, have already been mentioned ( H 5 ) : they were written before Schiller’s Letters appeared. Here t h e m a i n tendency is precisely the

24 Part I , Book I, Chapter 3, 2d paragraph; Akademieausgabe, V, 72. 25 “The Young Hegel and Religion” in WK 129-61.

32

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCES, 1770—1800

same as Schiller’s, and our last quotation from the Letters might h a v e served a s a motto for Hegel’s fragments. This is t h e point o n w h i c h h e , too, differs with K a n t . Stylistically, these f r a g men ts are q u ite different from both Kant’s b o o k o n religion a n d Hegel’s later style. There is nothi n g of “ a philosophical chancery style.” I n place of Kant’s pedantic abusiveness w h i c h operates w i t h nasty n o u n s , e mployed with scholastic precision ( H 6 ) , Hegel operates with vivid images and sarcastic contrasts of wretched Christianity with glorious Greece. A few very brief illustrations m a y show this: Christians have “piled u p such a h e a p of reasons for c o m -

fort in misfortune . . . that we might be sorry in the end that w e c a n n o t lose a f a t h e r o r a mother o n c e a w e e k ” ; while for t h e G r e e k s , who were honest and courageous, “misfortune

was misfortune, pain was pain.” T h e Greeks’ religious festivals were joyous a n d celebrated “ t h e friendly gifts of n a t u r e ” ; a t the greatest Christian festivals people a p p e a r i n c h u r c h “ i n t h e color of m o u r n i n g , with downcast eyes,” a n d , celebrating “universal brotherhood, m a n y a r e afraid t h a t t h r o u g h t h e brotherly goblet they might

be infected with a venereal disease by someone who drank from it before. And lest one’s m i n d remain . . . w r a p p e d i n a holy feeling, o n e m u s t reach into one’s pocket i n the m i d s t o f things a n d p u t one’s offering o n a plate.” I n t h e s a m e vein, H e g e l juxtaposes Jesus a n d Socrates. Here h e goes beyond t h e polemics of t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t , beyond Lessing’s courageous a t t a c k s o n the orthodoxy of his time, b e y o n d Kant’s b o o k o n religion, beyond Herder’s sharp cri-

tique of Christianity in the fourth volume of his Ideas on the Philos0phy of H u m a n History ( 1 7 9 1 ) , a n d beyond n o t only Schiller’s publications b u t even Schiller’s v e r y f r a n k letters t o G o e t h e . Contrasts o f Jesus’ faith w i t h faith in Jesus, a n d Jesus’ teaching with Christian teachings a b o u t Jesus were n o longer u n u s u a l ; b u t Jesus himself, even w h e n his divinity w a s questioned, w a s still i m m u n e from criticism. In Hegel’s contrast it becomes clear t h a t h e considers J e s u s by n o m e a n s t h e m o s t a d m i r a b l e teacher of virtue b u t inferior t o Socrates and really rather unattractive.

8 . MS o n Folk Religion

33

Socrates aimed to enlighten m e n instead of delivering sermons, and h e d i d not limit the n u m b e r of his close friends to twelve: “ t h e thirteenth, fourteenth, and th e rest were a s we]-

come as the preceding ones.” H e did not insist o n uniformity and had no wish to create “a corps that would have one spirit and bear his n a m e forever”; h e associated with m e n of higher caliber. And Socrates, unlike Jesus, “ d i d not offend anyone by swaggering self—importance o r b y u s i n g high-flown and mysterious phrases of the sort that impress only t h e ignorant

and credulous.” These passages ( No h l 3 3 f . ; WK 1 3 4 f . ) are of considerable interest to students of the history of ideas because Hegel’s

image of Jesus is so unattractive—incomparably more so than Nietzsche’s i n The Antichrist; for Nietzsche, like almost all

other critics of Christianity, finds Jesus admirable, albeit pathological. These fragments are also of crucial importance for anyone who wants to understand the puzzling phenomenon of Hegel. One ought to be perplexed at finding a philos0pher with such a firmly established reputation for conservatism and obscurity, writing i n such a radical vein, with clarity, vigor,

and stylistic brilliance. Those who ignore these fragments cannot begin to understand the m a n and his development. Hegel went on to ridicule the Sermon on the M o u n t : Chris-

tian teachers would not dream of reproaching a man whose coat was stolen for not giving u p his pants as well; the clergy plays a solemn part i n connection with oaths though Jesus expressly forbade t h e m ; a n d the fault in these matters cannot

be said to lie merely with the clergy: Jesus’ teachings make very limited sense. “When it was a matter of judging a case in accordance with the law of the courts, Christ attacked the

administrators of these laws. But even if they had been the most irreproachable of men and quite of his own mind, they still would have had to judge irrespective of that, in accordance with the laws. The

judge must often speak differently

from the human being and condemn what as a human being he might pardon.” Nor d o e s Hegel side w i t h Luther; o n the c o n t r a r y : “He took from the clergy the power t o rule b y force, over men’s purses, too, b u t h e himself still wanted to rule o v e r their opin-

34

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCES, 1770—1800

ions” and he was far “from any idea of the worship of God in spirit and truth” ( N o h l 4 1 f . ; W K 1 3 5 1 1 ) . Two points about these early fragments are of the utmost

importance. First, one should note how radical Hegel was in his early twenties. Second, his prime concern, like Schiller’s, was from the start—to quote a later passage from his early writings (Nohl 2 6 6 ; WK 1 5 4 ) — “ t o restore the human being

again in his totality.” He felt that this all-important task, left undone by Kant, could not possibly b e accomplished by Christianity; like Schiller, h e turned to the Greeks; but unlike Schiller, h e turned not t o art b u t to religion—what he then

called folk religion. In this connection, o n e m a y note that in the Phenomenology We do not yet encounter Hegel’s later triad of art, religion,

and philosophy: there, Greek art and religion are fused under the heading “Die Kunstrelz’gion” or “art religion.” In the early nineties, however, Hegel wondered whether a new folk religion

might raise a whole people to a high moral level. Such a religion, Hegel says expressly, would aim at morality a s the highest end o f m a n ; i t would not d o violence to any human conscience or coerce a n y o n e ; and it “must n o t contain anything that universal h u m a n reason does not recognize—no certain or dogmatic claims which transcend the limits of reason”-—not even doctrines that “transcend reason without contradicting reason” ( N o h l 4811; W K 1 3 8 ) . What Schiller wants from

art, Hegel wants from religion—if only such a religion were possible. B u t would it b e possible?

9

I n 1795, the year he read Schiller’s essay, Hegel wrote two essays, again not intended for publication but to clarify h i s

own thinking. The first was a life of Jesus. Pierre Van Paassen says in a postscript to his own Why Jesus Died that in 1940, when the Nazis confiscated his library, it included “ n o less than seven thousand ‘lives’ and critical studies of Jesus’ deeds and utterances, all . . . published

9 . M55 o n “Jesus’ Life” an d “ T h e Positivity”

35

within the last three quarters of a century.”26 The pioneers in this genre were David Friedrich Strauss (1808—74), a n d Ernest R e nan (1823—92). Strauss, o n e o f Hegel’s students, whose “Life” appeared i n German i n 1 8 3 5 , created a sensation,

inaugurated “ a new epoch in the treatment of the rise of Christianity,”7

a n d was translated into English by George

Eliot, with a Latin preface by Strauss, in 1846. Renan’s “Life” appeared i n French i n June 1863—and “before November sixty thousand copies of i t were i n circulation.”28 S i nc e then,

“Lives” have mushroomed, but when Hegel put his hand to his attempt, the i d e a was by n o means hackneyed.

Hegel’s “Life” has never been properly understood. It is plainly a tour de force. That there should b e no trace of any-

thing supernatural in connection with either the birth or the period after Jesus’ death a n d burial, a n d no miracles, i s not

surprising. But Hegel’s “Life” begins, “Pure reason, incapable of any limitation, is the deity i t s e l f ” : a bridge between the

abolition of Christianity in France and the institution of the cult of reason i n 1 7 9 3 , on the one hand, and Hegel’s later

philosophy on the other. And Hegel’s Jesus teaches not what the Jesus of the Gospels teaches but rather Kant’s ethic. H e demands only “ t h e service o f reason a n d virtue” and

rejects faith, and he says such things as: “What you can will to be a universal law among men, valid also against yourselves, according to that maxim act—this is the basic law of ethics . . . ” a n d , “ O h , that men h a d stopped there and never

added to the duties imposed by reason a lot of other burdens t o bedevil poor humanity.”29 This is plainly Hegel’s attempt to write a scripture for such a folk religion as he had envisaged. Kant is made to speak vivid and forceful German, worlds removed from his Chancery

style, and his ethic is made more palatable by being put into the mouth o f a thoroughly humanized Jesus. Absurd? Ob-

viously; and Hegel had no mind to publish it. On the contrary, it may have been at least partly the grotesqueness of this effort 2“

Dial Press, New York 1949, p. 269.

27 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1 1 t h e d . , article o n Strauss. 281bid., article on Renan. 29 N o h l 1 2 2 , 8 7 , 1 0 2 ; W K 1 4 0 f.

36

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCES, 1 7 7 0 ~ 1 8 0 0

that persuaded h i m o n c e an d for all that m a n could n o t b e restored i n his totality a n d harmony by religion.

Later the same year, Hegel wrote his first major essay, “The Positivity of the Christian Religion,” translated into English b y T . M . Knox ( 1 9 4 8 ) . At the outset, Hegel assumes with Kant that “ t h e e n d and essence of all true religion, and of our religion [Christianity], t o o , i s the morality of m a n ” (Nohl

153; WK 1 4 1 ) . Two pages later he defines “positive” as meaning “founded on authority and placing the worth of man not a t all, o r at least n o t only, i n morality.” Positive religion is

what Kant had called statutary religion, and the influence of Kant’s book on religion i s writ large throughout Hegel’s essay. Again, Hegel is more radical than Kant. Of course, he was i n his twenties while Kant h a d b e e n almost seventy when his book appeared, and Kant h a d to worry about the censor while

Hegel was not writing for publication. The style of the “Positivity” is very close t o t h a t of the fragments o n folk religion: vivid detail, powerful examples, trenchant s a r c a s m . Jesus is treated more respectfully, b u t the originality of the essay still lies i n Hegel’s argument that the “positivity o f the Christian religion” must b e charged i n no small measure t o Jesus himself. Hegel’s theme i s similar t o Erich Fromm’s p o p u lar juxtaposition of humanistic and authoritarian religion i n his widely read Terry Lectures o n Psychoanalysis and Religion ( 1 9 5 0 ) , but Hegel, even at twenty-five, is incomparably more pro-

found. Instead of accepting, as Fromm does, the conciliatory cliché that Jesus’ manner and teachings were humanistic, Hegel brings out, a s few free-thinkers of the Enlightenment or the nineteenth century d i d , the “positive,” authoritarian, irrational, n o t purely moral aspects o f Jesus’ m a n n e r and teaching. Hegel finds extenuating circumstances i n the alleged rawness of Jesus’ Jewish audience—extenuating circumstances, not grounds for acquittal. This is important both for an understanding of the young Hegel’s conception of Jesus, and be— cause i n the course of this essay Hegel seems to have gained t h e enduring conviction that a humanistic religion is an impossibility. Admittedly, he does not put the point this way; but

1 0 . Swiss diary and MS on “The Spirit of Christianity”

37

even as h e never expected salvation from Christianity, henceforth h e n o longer places his hopes on religion—any religion, even a new type of religion. ,

10

The following year, in 1796, Hegel took a long hike into the Bernese Alps and kept a diary.30 Those who have mentioned this diary at all—it has never before been translated—have often

given an utterly misleading impression of it, as if Hegel had been completely obtuse to nature and had written little but: as for the mountains, all one can say about them is that they are there. In fact, his diary shows a wide open mind, eager to assimi— late all kinds of observations about natural phenomena and the way of life of people living in the mountains. It is true that there is more concern with information than with aesthetic experiences, but it appears that the great peaks were in the clouds and Hegel never saw the stunning views of Jungfrau, M'dnch, and Eiger that luckier tourists find unforgettable. His whole trip was done by foot, much of it in the rain, and the poor weather did not keep him from penning some of the most sensitive impressions ever recorded of waterfalls. The difference between his response to waterfalls and walls of rock is not unconnected with his later phiIOSOphy. What attracts and entrances him

i s life and motion, while motion-

less rigidity repels him. One should hesitate to read philosophy into such matters, but anyone will find on reading Hegel’s own descriptions of the falls ( i n D ) that if his comments have any

fault it is that they are so very philosophical. And that is why the diary deserves mention at this point. It is of a piece with Hegel’s protest against the frozen dogmas and statutes of positive religion and his quest for a living harmony. The diary w a s written in July and August. Also in August,

Hegel wrote a poem, “Eleusis,” which he inscribed “For Holderlin” and mailed to his friend in Frankfurt. Part of this 30 Parts are included in D .

38

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCES, 1770—1800

l o n g p o e m a n d also parts of a n o t h e r poem—one of two that H e g e l wrote for his bride d u r i n g t h e m o n t h of their engagem e n t , in 1811—are included in D , i n English. N o n e of Hegel‘s p o e m s is i n a n y w a y outstanding, n o r did h e ever publish a n y of t h e m . “Eleusis” w a s published by his biographer, Rosenk r a n z , i n 1 8 4 4 a n d h a s been discussed n o w a n d t h e n in the literature. The style is close t o Holderlin’s, t h o u g h far less successful. I n October, Holderlin f o u n d H e g e l a job similar to his a s a tutor i n Frankfurt a n d wrote t o a s k h i m t o c o m e a n d live n e a r h i m . Hegel complied gladly. I n F r a n k f u r t Hegel w r o t e a n o t h e r l o n g essay, “The Spirit of Christianity a n d Its F a t e , ” which h a s also b e e n r e n d e r e d i n t o English, complete. Here Jesus is m a d e t o t e a c h the Sittliclzkeit of the G r e e k s , o f Goethe’s Iphigenia, a n d of Schiller’s Letters r a t h e r t h a n Kant’s Moralitc'it. “ A m a n who wished t o restore t h e h u m a n being again i n h i s totality,” after Jewish Moralirc'it a n d insistence o n l a w h a d led to “ t h e h u m a n being’s division against himself,” h a d t o offer a n ethic that d i d n o t involve “ a c t i n g f r o m respect for duty a n d i n contradiction to one’s inclinations” ( N o h l 2 6 6 ;

WK 154). Although t h e discussion of fate prefigures s o m e pages i n t h e Phenomenology, t h e essay h a s little originality o r i m p o r t a n c e . To b e sure, this reading of t h e S e r m o n o n t h e M o u n t is m o r e appealing to m a n y twentieth-century theologians a n d lay

Christians than the Kantian tour de force of the “Life of Jesus.” Many comparable attempts in this vein since Hegel’s t i m e c o m e t o m i n d . B u t this whole genre is r a t h e r insipid: it is a s pointless a s it is easy to read i n t o Jesus one’s own ethic, whatever t h a t m a y be; and Hegel w a s q u i c k e r t h a n m o s t to realize this because h e himself h a d put two very different moral outlooks i n t o Jesus’ m o u t h , o n e after t h e o t h e r . H e

could hardly persuade himself of the historical probability of his second attempt, or of the worthwhileness of a third and fourth effort. W h i l e Schelling, a s H e g e l w a s t o put it later, carried o n his education i n public, issuing book after book, sometimes several in o n e year, H e g e l filed this latest attempt in a desk drawer, where it belonged.

1 1 . First publication

39

11 The o n l y t h i n g Hegel published i n the eighteenth century

was an anonymous translation: Confidential Letters about the Former Legal [staatsrechtliche; sur le droit d e c e pays] Relationship between the L a n d of Vaua' and the City of Bern: From the French of a Deceased Swiss ( 1 7 9 8 ) . The original had appeared i n 1 7 9 3 , and the author Jean Jacques Cart, a lawyer, was n o t dead i n 1798. H e g e l added a preface, con-

densed the text considerably, and added notes. His preface ends:

“The events speak loud enough for themselves; the only point c a n be to get to know them i n their a b u n d a n c e ; they scream aloud over the earth: Discite iusticiam moniti [Learn t h e justice of the a d m o n i t i o n ! ] ; but the d e a f will b e seized cruelly by their fate.” Franz Rosenzweig, best known as a Jewish existentialist and co-translator, with Martin Buber, of the Hebrew Bible into German, established himself a s a scholar with a n i m portant two-volume work o n Hegel u n d der Staat. He discussed this translation a t length, comparing i t with t h e original,

and he juxtaposed the words quoted with Hegel’s later attitude --“the resigned self-limitation to the ‘understanding of that which is.’31 . . . Here the accent still lies entirely o n will and d e e d : to b e sure, the events are t o speak; but they are to d o more t h a n speak; they shall ‘scream,’ teach aloud, a n d adm o n i s h : discite iusticiam moniti!” ( I , 5 0 ) . In January 1 7 9 9 Hegel’s father d i e d . Hegel does not seem to have been very close to h i m , an d there is no evidence that

the event produced any trauma in the young philosopher. It d i d , however, improve his fi n a n c i a l circumstances slightly, and he gave u p tutoring forever. 31 The context of this phrase is cited at the end of H 21, text for note 19.

4O

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCES, 1770—1800 12

In 1 8 0 0 Hegel decided t o rewrite his essay o n “The Positivity” but d i d n o t get beyond th e introductory section. B y the t i m e he had finished that, it was plain t h a t a revision would not d o : a really new essay would b e called for, and this r e m a i n e d unwritten. “The following essay does not have the purpose of inquiring whether there are positive doctrines and commandments i n the Christian religion. . . . The horrible blabbering in this vein w i t h its endless extent a n d inward emptiness h a s become too boring a n d h a s altogether lost interest—so much so that i t would rather b e a need of our time t o h e a r the proof o f the opposite of this enlightening application of universal concepts. O f course, t h e proof of th e opposite must n o t b e conducted w i t h the principles and m e t h o d s with which th e education o f t h e times favored the o l d dogmatics. R a t h e r , o n e would have to d e d u c e this now repudiated dogmatics out of what we now consider the needs of h u m a n n a t u r e and t h u s show its naturalness a n d its necessity. Such a n attempt would presuppose the

faith that the convictions of many centuries—that which the millions, who during these centuries lived by them and died for t h e m , considered their d u t y and holy truth—were n o t bare nonsense o r immorality” ( N o h l 143; W K 1 5 8 ) . Hegel is n o t so much changing his mind a s h i s point o f v i e w : he fi n d s what h e had developed earlier n o t false but rather too obvious an d onesided. H i s earlier insights require, w e might say, t o be aufgehoben: they m u s t b e abandoned i n favor o f a fresh start from t h e opposite direction; a n essay ha s t o b e written t o negate them; b u t i n the e n d they would have to be preserved i n a treatment t h a t would not b e a s onesided a s

either of the two preceding efforts. The onesidedness in this case was historically conditioned: a point originally worth making h a s been picked u p b y s o many writers a n d developed a t such length that it “ h a s b e c o m e too boring an d h a s altogether lost interest”; a n d now it might b e “ a need of our t i m e ”

to restate the opposite view which it has become all too fashionable t o denounce—but to restate it, of course, not i n its

1 3 . Lessing’s

Education of Mankind

41

earlier a n d discredited form but at a higher level, making full use of contemporary insights. To b e specific: O f course, Christianity a s a positive religion embodied a great deal of nonsense a n d immorality; but that is s o obvious that the point n o longer needs laboring. Now it would b e more interesting to show to what extent it contained also some truth and contributed some good.

The question could be said to be one of emphasis. In his twenties, Hegel emphasized the dark side of Christianity. In his later work, he stressed the bright side—the contributions of Christianity. The difference in emphasis is radical, but Hegel’s conception of Christianity never d i d change radically. When

he treated Christianity sympathetically, it was only to commend i t a s a n important, if somewhat benighted, anticipation o f

modern philosophy. He no longer contrasted it unfavorably with the popular religion of Greece because, like Schiller in the Letters we have considered, h e c a m e t o believe that the

harmony of ancient Greece had to be disrupted to make way for a higher development which could now be consummated— not in religion which is incapable of restoring man in his totality, but in philosophy. At will, Hegel could now make a great point of the inadequacy of Christianity, which be considered too obvious t o stress, or o f the way i n which i t was a stage o n the road to knowledge, which h e considered more

difficult and decided to do.

13 He was not, of course, the first t o make this constructive attempt: among those who h a d traveled the same road before

him was Lessing whose essay on “The Education of Mankind” ( 1 7 8 0 ) bears a motto from Augustine: Haec omnia inde esse in quibusdam vera, unde in quibusdam falsa sunt; “all this i s

therefore in some respects true, as it is in some respects false.” Lessing’s preface,

less than

a page long, e n d s : “Why

shouldn’t we rather see in all positive religions32 nothing but 32 It m a y have been Lessing who suggested this use of “positive” to Hegel.

42

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCES, 1770—1800

the way i n which the human understanding everywhere could not but develop a n d shall continue to develop, instead o f either smiling at one of them or getting wroth? This our scorn, this our indignation nothing should deserve i n the best world, and only religions should deserve it? G o d ’s hand should b e involved everywhere, only n o t i n o u r errors?”

The essay, which consists of one hundred short paragraphs and runs only a little over twenty pages, views history a s the education of mankind and distinguishes three stages. The first

is represented by the Old Testament which allegedly taught virtue by holding out punishments and rewards in this world ( § 1 6 ) . The

New Testament occupies the second stage and

inculcates “an inner purity of the heart, with a view to another life” ( § 6 1 ) . Even if Jesus’ disciples “ h a d no other merit besides securing for a truth that Christ seemed to have intended only for the Jews a more general circulation among the nations, they would on that account alone deserve t o b e reckoned among the succorers and benefactors of mankind. But that they amalgamated this o n e great doctrine with other doctrines whose truth was less evident and whose usefulness w a s less

considerable, how could that have been any different? Let us not scold them for that but rather inquire seriously whether even these amalgamated doctrines have not given h u ma n rea-

son a push in a new direction” (§§62-63). “Indeed, it was most necessary that every pe0ple should have considered this book for a time a s the non plus ultra of

its knowledge. For the boy, too, must consider his elementary textbook that way at first, lest his impatience to finish with it tear him along to matters for which he has not yet laid the foundation” ( § 6 7 ) .

“And why should it not be possible that a religion whose historic truth is, if you will, i n such a bad way, should never-

theless lead us toward more proximate and better concepts of the divine, of our nature, of our relations to G o d which human reason o n its own should never have h i t u p o n ? ” ( § 7 7 ) .

“It is not true that speculation [this was to become one of Hegel’s

favorite words] about these matters has ever done mis-

chief and been disadvantageous for civil society.—This reproach is to be lodged not against speculation but against the

1 3 . Lessing’s

Education of Mankind

43

nonsense, t h e tyranny, of preventing such speculations, . . . ”

(§78). Finally Lessing announces “ t h e t i m e o f a n e w and eternal evangel” ( § 8 6 ) a n d relates h i s own conception of history to medieval heretics who speculated about three ages o f the world a n d the antiquation of Christianity. Three paragraphs

still deserve special notice. “Let me not despair of you [Provid e n c e ] even if your steps s h o u l d s e e m to m e to g o backwards!

—It is not true that the shortest line is always the straight one” ( § 9 1 ) . Not only is Lessing right as far as education is conc e r n e d , b u t this insight, which h e here puts s o concisely, re-

mains one of Hegel’s central convictions. The same is true of this dictum: “Precisely the way o n which the species reaches its perfection, every individual hum a n being ( o n e earlier, one later) m u s t have traversed, too” ( § 9 3 ) . B u t how, asks Lessing, is this possible i n one life? I s i t possible i n o n e and t h e s a m e life to b e first a Jew, then a Christian, a n d then t o surpass both stages? “Hardly!-——But why

couldn’t every single human being have been present in this world more than o n c e ? ” ( § 9 4 ) . I n the end Lessing suggests

the possibility of transmigration. This last suggestion Hegel did not take up. He had learned from Goethe’s great example that a man can consummate in one a n d the same life, first, storm and stress, then classicism, and then transcend both stages. And about 1 8 0 0 Hegel may

also have felt that he himself had similarly developed through a variety of points o f View regarding Christianity: he had

quite recently passed through a n anti-Christian stage and was now ready for Lessing’s mature perspective, firmly stationed o n Lessing’s third and highest level. I n h i s Phenomenology Hegel accepted, along with much else that we have cited from Lessing, the i d e a o f § 9 3 , b u t interpreted it as our task here and now (V—PG 11.3.3). It is therefore a little odd when Royce suggests i n his Lectures on

Modern Idealism ( 1 5 0 ) , and Jean Hyppolite duly echoes this suggestion in his Genése et structure de la Phe’noménologie de l’esprit de Hegel ( 1 9 4 6 , 2 3 ) , that the stages o f the Phenomenology “may b e compared t o different incarnations or transmigrations, a s it were, of the world spirit.” This idea shows

44

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCES, 1770—1800

s o m e esprit but misses the crucial demand o n the reader to “pass through the contents of the educational stages o f the general spirit, b u t a s forms that have long b e e n outgrown by t h e spirit, as stages o f a way that h a s been prepared and evened for h i m ” (V—PG 11.3.3). While Lessing’s essay e n d s : “What have I got to lose? I s not all of eternity mine?”— actually this was Lessing’s last b o o k an d he died the following year—Hegel wants u s t o traverse the whole road right n o w as we read the Phenomenology, which h e offered originally as

the introduction to his system. What is to follow after the Phenomenology will presuppose t h a t the readers have reached the level that t h e world spirit h a s reached i n o u r t i m e .

Much later, Hegel was to say: “Of all the glories [Von allem Herrlichen] o f the ancient a n d modern world—I know pretty well all of it, and one should and can know it—the

Antigone [of Sophocles] appears to me in this reSpect as the most excellent and satisfying work of art.”33 The frightening boast and demand are important for an understanding o f Hegel. I n his time i t was still possible to read, an d t o have

read, all the masterpieces of the Greeks and Romans, and of European literature and philosophy, and to try at the same time to keep up with the sciences. Hegel’s philosophy confronts u s as the work of a man who h a s n o t shunned this tremendous

eflort. Those who have done less are likely to recapitulate in their philosophies doctrines held, and criticized a n d transcended l o n g ago. B u t one who h a s done what Hegel h a s done

can say of his philosophy what Hegel says toward the end of his lectures on the history of philosophy: “To this point the world spirit has got now. The last philosophy i s the result of all earlier ones; n o t h i n g is lost, all principles are conserved. This concrete idea is the result of the exertions of the spirit through almost twenty-five hundred years (Thales was born 6 4 0 B.C.).” It is widely supposed that it is a t least arguable t h a t Hegel

may have thought that history, and particularly the history of phiIOSOphy, ended with h i m . The evidence to th e contrary is conclusive. Even this far-from-modest section begins “ T h e

33 Aesthetik, ed. Glockner, XIV, 556. Similar encomia of Antigo n e are found XIII, 5 1 , and XVIII, 1 1 4 .

1 3 . Lessing’s Education of Mankind

45

present standpoint of philos0phy is . . . ” ; and soon after the passage just quoted Hegel says (on the same page): “ N o philosophy transcends its age [Keirze Philosophie geht iiber ihre Zeit lzinaus].” Five pages later, two p a g e s before t h e e n d of the whole

three-volume lecture course, Hegel says: “Now this is the s t a n d p o i n t o f t h e present t i m e , a n d the series o f spiritual

formations is for the present concluded with this.—Herewith, this history of philosophy is concluded.” There is no ambiguity whatsoever in Hegel’s phrasing: what is here rendered as “the present time” is in the original der jetzz'gen Zeit; “for t h e p r e s e n t ” is 1‘i

jetzt; a n d “ t h i s history”

is diese Geschichte. That Hegel believed that there would b e further history after h i m w a s m a d e clear i n section 1 when we

discussed the passage in his course on the philosophy of history in which he calls America “the land of the future.” But if one drops “for the present” and changes “this history” to “ t h e history” in t h e above quotation, th en , of course, it must

seem as if he had held the fantastic View so often attributed to h i m .

CHAPTER

II

The First Seven Essays, 1801-1803

14

When Hegel arrived at the University of Jena in January 1 8 0 1 to a t t e m p t a university career, h e h a d a n excellent grounding in the Greek and Roman classics, he h a d done graduate work i n theology, a n d he had received decisive im-

pulses from the work of Kant and Schiller, Goethe and Lessing. But h e had published nothing, except an anonymous translation ( H 1 1 ) . There w a s n o question i n his m i n d about his chosen fi e l d :

phiIOSOphy. As a student he had been close to Schelling who, though five years younger, h a d m e a n w h i l e m a d e a n a m e for

himself as a philosopher. But after an extremely good and friendly letter from Schelling, dated June 2 0 , 1 7 9 6 , shortly

before Hegel left Bern, their correspondence had ceased. Hegel did not revive i t until November 2 , 1 8 0 0 , shortly before

he went to Jena where Schelling had been teaching philosophy a s an Associate Professor (ausserordentlicher Professor) since

1798. O n his arrival i n Jena, Hegel and Schelling resumed their

friendship and soon decided to edit jointly a new journal, Kritisches Journal der Philosophie. Now, if not before, Hegel worked hard to acquire a thorough knowledge o f a n c i e n t and modern philosophy. B y the t i m e the Journal was discontinued in 1 8 0 3 , when Schelling left Jena for Bavaria—Wfirzburg at

first, Munich in 1806—Hegel had assisted H . E . G . Paulus in preparing a new edition of Spinoza, and his own publications showed the range o f his scholarship.

1 4 . The Difference . . .

47

H i s first real publication w a s a p a m p h l e t o f a little over one h u n d r e d p a g e s w h o s e title page, translated, reads like t h i s :

Difi’erence ' of the F i c h t e a n a n d Schellingian

System

of Phil050phy 1n Relation to Reinhold’s Contributions toward a Readier Examination of t h e C o n d i t i o n o f Philosophy a t the Beginning o f t h e N i n e t e e n t h Century, l s t Installment by

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel D o c t o r of Worldly Wisdom Jena i n t h e a c a d e m i c bookstore a t Seidler’s 1801

O n t h e first level this w a s a n e x t e n d e d review o f a work by R e i n h o l d , wh o w a s t h e n considered much m o r e important t h a n h e is now. Born i n 1 7 5 8 , h e was a monk for s o m e t i m e before b e c o n v e r t e d t o Pr o t e st a n tis m and m a d e a n a m e for himself b y developing K a n t ’ s phi1030phy a l o n g n ew lines. Fichte suc-

ceeded to his chair at Jena when he went to Kiel in 1794. ( R e i n h o l d died i n 1 8 2 3 . ) O n t h e s e c o n d a n d m o r e i m p o r t a n t level, Hegel considered

it his first task in philosophy to absorb and fully understand Fichte a n d Schelling.

Schelling had not yet broken with Fichte whose foremost disciple he was held t o b e . Hegel articulated t h e differences between their respective phi1030phies.

On the third, and for us by far the most important level, it is symptomatic that the phrase that leaps at us from the title p a g e is “System o f P h i l o s o p h y . ” N o t only Reinhold i s mere

foreground; even Fichte and Schelling are, though to a lesser e x t e n t . The writer is m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l l y concerned with a

system of philosophy—not Fichte’s or Schelling’s, or his own

48

THE FIRST SEVEN ESSAYS, 1 8 0 1 ~ 1 8 0 3

particular system, but the system toward which r e c e n t philoso-

phy, indeed all philosophy, has been developing. After a short preface w e encounter a n introductory section of which Lasson thinks t h a t it may have been a d d e d after the essay was finished, “just a s h e later placed his famous preface before th e Phenomenology. . . . This c h a p t e r o n ‘Several forms t h a t are encountered i n contemporary philosophy’ re-

sembles that preface to an extraordinary extent in its tendency.”1 Indeed, the short preface t o the Difference e n d s with a n apology for the immediately following pages t h a t might c o m e

straight from the first pages of the Phenomenology: “Regardi n g the general reflections w i t h which this essay begins—about need, presupposition, basic propositions, etc., of philosophy —they have the s h o r t c o m i n g t h a t t h e y are general reflections,

and they are prompted by the fact that with such forms as presupposition, basic proposition, etc., the a p p r o a c h t o phiIOSOphy is still obstructed a n d covered u p , a n d it is therefore needful to a certain extent t o enter i n t o these questions until the d a y w h e n only philosophy itself is discussed.”

The first chapter has several sections with their own subtitles, the first few of which might c o m e from t h e preface t o

the Phenomenology: “Historical view of philosophical syst e m s ” ; “The need for philosophy”; “ R e fl e c t i o n a s a n instrument of philosophy”; “ R e l a t i o n of speculation t o healthy com-

mon sense”; “Principle of a philosophy in the form of an absolute basic proposition [Grundsatz]”. . . . A few quotations from t h e early sections m a y give a n i m pression of Hegel i n 1 8 0 1 a t his b e s t : “ T h e living spirit that dwells i n a phiIOSOphy d e m a n d s , i n order to reveal itself, t o b e

born [again] by a kindred spirit. Before an historical attitude that, prompted by some interest, is after information about opinions, it passes by as a strange phenomenon without revealing its inside” ( 9 ) .

“The true peculiarity of a philosophy is the interesting individuality in which reason has organized a form for itself out 1Erste

Druckschriften

( 1 9 2 8 ) , XX. All subsequent page refer-

ences to Hegel’s early writings refer to this volume, edited by Lasson.

1 4 . The

Difference

. . .

49

of t h e building materials of a particular a g e ; i n this t h e indi-

vidual, speculative reason finds spirit of its own spirit, flesh of its own flesh; it beholds itself in this as [both] one and the s a m e a n d a s a n o t h e r living being. Every philosophy is c o m plete i n itself a n d , like a g e n u i n e w o r k of a r t , c o n t a i n s the

totality. Just as the works of Apelles and Sophocles, if Raphael a n d S h a k e s p e a r e h a d k n o w n t h e m , should not have appeared

to them as mere preliminary exercises for their own work, but r a t h e r a s a k i n d r e d force o f t h e spirit, s o , t o o , reason cannot

find in its own earlier forms mere useful preliminary exercises f o r itself. A n d if Virgil d i d c o n s i d e r H o m e r s u c h a preliminary exercise [Voriibzmg] for himself a n d his r e fi n e d age, his work h a s t h e r e f o r e r e m a i n e d a post-liminary exercise [ N a c h i i b u n g ] ”

(12). T h i s is t h e e n d of t h e first section; t h e second begins: “ W h e n w e consider m o r e closely t h e particular form t h a t a philosophy

bears, we see how it springs o n the one hand from the living originality of the spirit who in it has restored through himself t h e rent h a r m o n y a n d given form t o it through h i s ow n d e e d ; o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , from t h e particular form o f t h e bifurcation

[Entzweiimg] from which the system issues. Bifurcation [or d i s c o r d ] is t h e source of t h e n e e d for philosophy . . . ” ( 1 2 ) . What He g e l o n c e sought i n a p erh ap s possible n ew religion, and w h a t Schiller s o u g h t i n play, play writing, a n d art, Hegel

now seeks in philos0phy. Nor does he consider the restoration of h a r m o n y a fringe benefit o f philosophy; t h e n e e d for philosophy is t h e n e e d for t h e restoration of h a r m o n y . I n t h e sentences t h a t follow, Hegel contrasts reason and u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( a s Schiller d i d i n h i s twenty-fourth Letter,

H 7 ) and finally says: “To sublimate such oppositions that have become fixed is the sole interest of reason. This interest d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t r e a s o n is against opposition a n d limitation i n general; for necessary bifurcation is a factor of life w h i c h forms itself through e t e r n a l Opposing, a n d totality is possible i n t h e highest liveliness o n l y through restoration out of t h e

highest separation. Reason is only against the absolute fixation of bifurcation b y t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . . . . W h e n t h e

power of unification disappears from the life of men and opposites have lost their living relation and reciprocity [Wech-

THE FIRST SEVEN ESSAYS, 1801—1803

50

selwirkzmg] and gain independence, then t h e need for philosophy originates” ( 1 3 f . ) . “The need for philosophy c a n b e called its presupposition. . . . That which people call the presupposition of philosophy is nothing else than the expressed n e e d . Because the n e e d i s thus posited for reflection [which always bifurcates], there

have to be two presuppositions. “The first is the absolute itself; this is the goal t h a t is sought.

It is already there; how else could it be sought? Reason merely produces it by liberating consciousness from limitations; this

sublimation of limitations is conditioned by the presupposed unconditionality. “The other presupposition would be the emergence of consciousness out of totality, the bifurcation into being and not-being, into concept2 a n d being, i n t o finitude and i n -

finity . . . ” ( 1 6 ) . Hegel’s approach t o philosophy, a t least a t t h e t i m e when h e himself approached philosophy, w as clearly at least i n p a r t existential. B u t h e d i d n o t look on philosophy a s a solitary individual i n isolated anguish b u t rather a s a m a n willing to

generalize as Plato and Aristotle had generalized when they suggested that philosophy begins i n w o n d e r o r perplexity. Hegel a d d s the historical observation that phiIOSOphy is born of the alienation o f man—an alienation t h a t is a s painful as i t is necessary for human excellence. B u t we have already

discussed this question in connection with Schiller’s sixth Letter ( H 7 ) . Why, it m a y b e countered, d o we need phiIOSOphy? Why won’t common sense d o ? I n his discussion of t h a t , Hegel s a y s : “As s o o n a s such truths of common sense are t a k e n b y themselves a n d isolated . . . they appear slanted a n d a s half-truths” ( 2 1 ) . A n d : “Speculation therefore understands common sense, b u t c o m m o n sense does n o t understand what speculation d o e s ” ( 2 2 ) . I n his very next essay, Hegel m a d e c o m m o n sense his central t h e m e . B u t t h e two points h e r e m e n t i o n e d state very i m 2 Not yet u s e d here i n the s a m e s e n s e a s i n Hegel’s l a t e r w r i t i n g s . When rendering Begrifi in i t s later technical sense, I capitalize

Concept.

1 4 . The Difference . . .

51

portant points forcefully and concisely. The trouble with common sense is that, like Scripture and p0pular proverbs, it c a n usually b e cited o n both sides ofi an y issue—which shows, .to

revert to Hegel’s formulation, that the so-called truths of

common sense are half-truths. And even a s o u r dreams do not furnish u s w i t h a coherent View o f the world i n which

both our dreams and our waking experiences can find their place, s o , t o o , c o m m o n s en s e is n o t o n l y self-contradictory ( a s o u r d r e a m s , too, are mutually i n c o h e r e n t ) b ut unable t o integrate the insights of philosophy, while philosophy c a n u n d e r s t a n d a n d integrate c o m m o n sense.

To that end philosophy must issue in a system. And Hegel, even in his first published essay, insists on this necessity ( 3 4 et passim) and attacks the view that philosophic truth can be comprehended in single basic propositions (2511?) Both of these points are later developed further in the preface to t h e Phenomenology.

From the long discussion of Fichte only two points require a p l a c e h e r e . Hegel c l a i m s that Fichte does n o t properly understand freedom and says o f his work o n natural law ( 1 7 9 6 ) :

“And in this ideal of a state there is no activity or movement that is not necessarily subjected to some law, taken under immediate supervision, and to be observed by the police and the other rulers, s o that p . 1 5 5 , Part II, i n a state based o n a

constitution in accordance with this principle, the police know pretty well where every citizen is at every hour of the d a y a n d w h a t he d o e s ” ( 6 7 ) . A n d a footnote ridicules Fichte’s suggestion that everybody have a passport which should b e

produced when cashing a check—a point echoed much later i n Hegel’s preface t o The PhiIOSOphy of Right. About three pages after this very l o n g footnote, Hegel says i n his critique of Fichte’s Sitterzlehre ( 1 7 9 7 ) : “ B u t when i n ethics t h e c o m m a n d i n g power is placed i n m a n himself, and s o m e t h i n g c o m m a n d i n g a n d s o m e t h i n g obeying are absolutely opposed i n h i m , then the inner harmony i s destroyed; discord a n d absolute bifurcation constitute t h e nature o f m a n ” ( 7 0 ) . For o u r purposes it does not matter how fair Hegel w a s t o Fichte o r how well h e understood his two immediate predecessors: that could n o t b e decided without a detailed

52

THE FIRST SEVEN ESSAYS, 1801—1803

examination of all of Fichte’s a n d Schelling’s works referred t o —as well as those not cited—by Hegel and would therefore lead u s much too far afield. What w e wish to understand here

is not Fichte or Schelling but Hegel, and our central consideration in the discussion of this essay has been to throw light on his development, his approach to phiIOSOphy, and his later work.

15

To obtain the right to lecture at t h e university a s a Privatdozent, Hegel had t o write a Latin dissertation and defend a few L a t i n theses. H e chose twelve theses of o n e short sentence e a c h , altogether a single page i n print, a n d defended them o n his thirty-first birthday. Hegel’s Dissertatio philosophica de Orbitis Planetarum ( O n t h e Orbits of the Planets) comprises only about twenty-five pages. The most striking fact about it is surely that Hegel had the competence to write a dissertation o n such a subject.

He had always maintained a keen interest in the sciences. After h e had become principal of t h e Gymnasium at Niirn-

berg in 1808 he often took the place of sick teachers, “and the students were especially surprised w h e n , without a d o , h e continued the instruction n o t only i n Greek a n d other such subjects b u t also i n difierential and integral calculus” ( R o s .

250). A few lines in the first paragraph of the dissertation are worth quoting i n this c o n n e c t i o n : “Thus there is n o more

sublime and purer expression of reason, none worthier of phiIOSOphical contemplation than that living being [animali illo] which we call the solar system. And when Cicero praised Socrates for bringing phiIOSOphy down from the heavens and introducing it i n t o the lives a n d homes of m e n , such praise

must either be considered low or be interpreted by saying: phiIOSOphy cannot acquire any merit concerning the lives a n d homes of men unless it comes d o w n from heaven, a n d therefore it must u s e every effort t o rise t o the heavens.”

The dissertation is now remembered mostly for its last two

15. De Orbitis Planetarum

53

pages w he r e Hegel, a s a kind of postscript, a d d s a few re-

marks on the distances between the planets. “They exhibit t h e relation of a n arithmetical series; b u t because i n t h e natural order no p l a n e t corresponds t o th e fifth m e m b e r o f the series, people believe t h a t nevertheless o n e exists as a matter o f fact between Mars and Jupiter, traversing the

heavens without our knowing it—and they search for it assiduously.” Hegel then points o u t t h a t i n Plato’s Timaeus we find another series o f n u m b e r s : “Timaeus, to b e s u r e , is not

referring to the planets but teaches that the demiurge constructed the universe according to this rule. The series of these n u m b e r s i s : 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 9 , 1 6 , 2 7 , if i t is p er mitte d to

read 1 6 instead of the 8 in the text. If this series should indicate a truer natural order t h a n t h a t arithmetical progression,

it would be clear that between the fourth and fifth member there is a large interval i n w h i c h o n e need n o t miss a p l a n e t . ”

The discovery of asteroids between Mars and Jupiter around that very time has prompted some attacks on Hegel, as if he had determined by speculative deduction that something could not b e the case even while science discovered that, o n the contrary, i t was a fact. Rosenkranz commented long ago, by way of defending H e g e l : “Hegel wrote his dissertation i n t h e spring a n d summer of 1 8 0 1 , but evidently d i d n o t yet

know of Piazzi’s discovery of Ceres on January 1, 1801. Nor could he know of the discovery of Pallas by Olbers, March 2 8 , 1 8 0 2 , a n y more than of Juno’s i n 1 8 0 4 o r Vesta’s i n 1 8 0 7 . The c l a m o r that has been raised about t h e philosopher’s

demonstrating the planet away on his podium, while the astronomers discover it t o tweak his nose, is therefore a n

entirely empty and puerile Schadenfreude”3 (154 f . ) . While Rosenkranz rightly stressed the hypothetical mode of Hegel’s remark, his defense d i d not join the issue a s ably as Glockner’s

did, almost a hundred years later: “He did not proceed speculatively but stuck to the empirical data—while, conversely, the astronomers did not want to credit these d a t a a n d , for purely theoretical reasons, searched

for a further planet whose distance from the sun would correspond to the presumed arithmetical series. The t r u e facts 3Delight

at somebody else’s

embarrassment

o r misfortune.

54

THE FIRST SEVEN ESSAYS, 1801—1803

of the c a s e are thus that the scientists ‘speculated’ while the philosopher stuck to experience a n d merely tried t o look for a law that would correspond t o the f a c t s ” ( I I , 2 3 8 ) . The last words suggest what is questionable i n Hegel’s proc e d u r e : I s it the philosopher’s task t o show how what is for a time considered right is also rational? Is it his job, t o use a modern term, to “rationalize” the Views, scientific and m o r a l , which are current in his day? Should h e n o t , o n the c o n trary, remind his contemporaries of the uncertainty of their beliefs a n d “facts”? Should h e not, i n Nietzsche’s words,

stand “in opposition to his today” and be “the bad conscience” of his age? (Beyond G o o d and Evil 2 1 2 . ) Certainly, the mature Hegel, whom we know through his books a n d lectures, represents a very different conception o f

philosophy from Nietzsche’s. And Glockner’s final words are plainly suggested in part by his knowledge of the later Hegel. In connection with the dissertation a n d Hegel’s other early writings it would b e wrong t o raise this issue. The remark

about T imaeus and the planets, which even involves an admitted emendation of the text—and at t h a t a text t h a t admittedly does not concern the planets—has a somewhat playful, if n o t ironic, t o n e . It is Hegel who is trying t o tweak the scientists’ noses. But when t h e new discoveries b e c a m e known i n J e n a , he included them i n his lectures on t h e philosophy of nature.

Later, Hegel did try more and more to show how the world is rational; but h e certainly d i d not try to justify common sense. I n d e e d , as w e shall s o o n see, o n e of his very first publications was devoted to a n attack o n common sense.

16 Hegel’s next efforts were concentrated i n the new Critical Journal of PhiZOSOphy. It lasted only through 1 8 0 2 a nd 1 8 0 3 , and each year there were three issues. As Schelling h a d another journal of his own, Hegel wrote the “Introduction” for the first issue, subtitled “ O n the nature of phiIOSOphical

1 6 . “ O n t h e Nature of Philosophical Criticism”

55

criticism i n general and its relation to the present c o n d i t i o n of philosophy i n particular.” Hegel here gives credit to K a n t and Fichte for h a v i n g “set

u p the idea of a science, and especially of philosophy as science”; but he derides the pretensions of so many philosophers who now claim that they offer a science and a system and says, “that thus such a multitude of systems and principles comes into being” that one may feel reminded of “the cond i t i o n of

philosophy i n Greece when every more e m i n e n t

philosopher elaborated the idea of philosophy in accordance with his individuality. At the same time philosophical freedom and superiority over authority and the independence of thought a m o n g u s appear to h a v e grown to s u c h a n extent

that it would be considered shameful for a phi1050pher to name

himself

after a n

already existing

philosophy; a n d

thinking for oneself supposes that it has to proclaim itself o n l y b y me a n s of t h a t originality w h i c h invents a n altogether new s y s t e m of one’s o w n . ” Hegel goes o n t o distinguish “ w h a t is original i n a genius from t h e peculiarity which con-

siders and proclaims itself as originality.” It is h i g h l y u n l i k e l y t h a t either Hegel o r Schelling con-

sidered this introduction, which was unsigned like all the contributions of t h e two friends t h a t m a d e u p t h e six issues, as a n o b l i q u e attack o n Schelling: surely, t h e introduction to such a joint venture would h a v e b e e n the last place for that.

And yet Hegel had only just published his first essay, juxtaposing Fichte’s a n d Schelling’s systems, and Schelling h i m -

self had meanwhile written, for publication i n his own journ a l , “Presentation of My S y s t e m of Philosophy.” Hegel himself h a d also b e g u n t o work out a system a n d h a d mentioned this t o Schelling i n his letter of November 1 8 0 0 , when he resumed contact with h i m before joining h i m in Jena. B u t Hegel neither n o w n o r later ever thought of h i s system as his s y s t e m , nor did h e c l a i m t h e k i n d of originality h e m o c k s i n the “ I n t r o d u c t i o n . ” O n t h e contrary, the ideas just cited r e m a i n characteristic of Hegel’s m a t u r e work. This is especially clear i n the preface t o t h e Phenomenology: Hegel insists t h a t phiIOSOphy m u s t take t h e form of a system

but does not offer us one system among others, as if his system

56

THE FIRST SEVEN ESSAYS, 1801—1803

w e r e m o r e o r i g i n a l t h a n o t h e r s ; n e i t h e r d o e s h e offer u s his

philosophy. O n t h e contrary, t h e r e is o n l y o n e philosophy; a n d this is part of what h e m e a n s w h e n h e speaks of elevating philosophy t o the level of a science. O n a n o t h e r point in t h e “ I n t r o d u c t i o n ” h e d i d c h a n g e his m i n d , o r a t least his way of putting his point. H e attacks the fashion of popularizing philosophy a n d probably m e a n s to include s o m e of Fichte’s recent books, t h e n goes o n : “Philosophy is by its n a t u r e s o m e t h i n g esoteric, neither m a d e for t h e m o b n o r c a p a b l e of being p r e p a r e d for t h e m o b . It is philosophy o n l y by being altogether Opposed t o the un— derstanding, a n d t h u s even m o r e to healthy c o m m o n sense, which m e a n s t h e geographical a n d temp o rary limitations

of a group of men. Compared with this, the world of philosophy is an inverted [verkehrt might also be translated as topsy-turvy] world. When Alexander had heard that his teacher h a d published s o m e writings a b o u t his philosophy, h e wrote h i m from t h e heart of Asia t h a t h e should n o t have m a d e c o m m o n w h a t t h e y h a d philosophized together, a n d Aristotle defended himself b y saying t h a t his philosophy h a d b e e n m a d e public a n d also n o t m a d e public. Thus philosophy m u s t indeed recognize t h e possibility t h a t t h e people rise t o it, but it m u s t not lower itself t o t h e peOple. B u t i n these times of f r e e d o m a n d equality i n which s u c h a large public h a s formed t h a t does n o t w a n t t o b e excluded from anything but considers itself good fo r everything, a n d everything good enough fo r itself, t h e m o s t beautiful a n d t h e best have n o t b e e n able t o escape t h e f a t e ” of leveling.

In the Phenomenology Hegel takes quite a different line, insisting in the preface that the time has come to make philosophy scientific a n d , like science, common property, available t o all; a n d h e alludes i n this connection t o the ideals of the French Revolution. I n 1 8 0 2 h e says that philosophy must b e esoteric; i n 1 8 0 7 h e insists t h a t it must not b e esoteric. Yet t h e contradiction is largely, if n o t entirely, verbal, a s Aristotle’s reply suggests. I n 1 8 0 7 Hegel emphasizes t h a t philosophy m u s t be available t o reason a n d not restricted to some cosy clique; i n 1 8 0 2 , that philosophy makes great d e -

1 7 . Article o n c o m m o n sense and Krug

57

m a n d s o n reason and t h a t those w h o w o u l d join i n its possession m u s t rise t o its level and not shirk t h e necessary effort.

These claims are not renounced in «1807; on the contrary, they are restated emphatically. It is even possible t h a t the

word “esoteric” was suggested b y Schelling in mutual discussions of this manifesto—Schelling used it i n his own work around t h a t time—and t h a t Hegel merely did n o t object to

the term as long as he could give it his own interpretation. N e a r the e n d of t h e introduction, Hegel alludes t o Schiller’s Letters. H e condemns t h o s e w h o pull d o w n philosophical systems t o the level of “ t h e ever changing and mere n e w s ; yet o n e should n o t c o n f u s e t h i s craving for change and nove l t y w i t h t h e indifference of play w h i c h is i n its greatest l e v i t y at t h e s a m e t i m e the most sublime a n d indeed t h e o n l y t r u e

seriousness.” While the appreciative use of “indifference” c o m e s from Schelling’s work, this e n c o m i u m of play is plainly i n fl u e n c e d b y Schiller.

17 Hegel contributed two interesting essays to t h e first t w o issues of t h e Critical Journal, b o t h i n t h e form of review

articles—one o n common sense, the other on skepticism. The first bears t h e title “ H o w c o m m o n sense takes philosophy, shown t h r o u g h a n analysis of t h e works of Herr Krug,” and t h e n , i n t h e style still current i n reviews, lists t h r e e of Krug’s b o o k s , one published i n 1 8 0 0 , two i n 1 8 0 1 . W i l h e l m Traugott Krug (1770—1842) is n o longer r e m e m bered i n t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , except for a footnote early i n

Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature ( E §250; the note was inserted i n t h e second edition of 1 8 2 7 ) : “ H e r r K r u g o n c e asked . . .

that the philosophy of nature should perform the trick of deducing merely his writing pen—One might perhaps have held out h o p e t o h i m for this a c h i e v e m e n t and t h e respective glorification of h i s writing pen w h e n science w o u l d h a v e progressed far e n o u g h one d a y a n d w o u l d b e i n t h e clear with everything more i m p o r t a n t i n h e a v e n and o n e a r t h , i n

58

THE FIRST SEVEN ESSAYS, 1801—1803

t h e present and the past, a n d n o t h i n g m o r e important would b e left t o b e comprehended.”4 I n the early years of t h e nineteenth century, Krug was far better known t h a n Hegel. B o r n the s a m e year, Krug h a d obtained a chair o f philosophy at Frankfurt o n the O d e r i n 1 8 0 1 ; a n d , notwithstanding Hegel’s attack of 1 8 0 2 , Krug succeeded t o Kant’s c h a i r in Konigsberg the year K a n t d i e d . I n 1 8 0 9 h e accepted a call t o Leipzig. We shall consider Hegel’s essay o n l y t o throw light on Hegel. I n the original edition it r u n s twenty-five pages, i n L a s son’s critical edition sixteen. The first point worth citing here concerns realism a n d idealism:

“ . . . Hr. Kr. [i.e., Herr Krug] divides dogmatism . . . into idealism, wh i c h is said t o d e n y the reality o f the outside

world, and realism when it admits and claims this reality. But i n this division, precisely transcendental idealism h a s b e e n

left out, for this does not merely admit—in a philosophical sense o n e c a n n o t s p e a k of admitting—but claims th e reality of the external world a s well as its ideality, a n d t h e theoreti-

cal part of the Wissenschaftslelzre does not aim at anything else t h a n a d e d u c t i o n of t h e reality of t h e external w o r l d ” ( 1 4 5 ) . Although the point m a y b e elementary, it is still overlooked i n s o m e discussions of Hegel. O n the next p o i n t m a n y readers, including seasoned philosophers, will surely side with K r u g ; but o n this matter, t o o , Hegel was n o t t o c h a n g e his m i n d . “ C o m m o n sense places the absolute o n exactly the s a m e level a s t h e finite, and extends t o

the absolute the demands that are made regarding the finite. Thus it is d e m a n d e d i n philosophy t h a t n o t h i n g s h o u l d b e set up unproved. Common sense immediately notes the i n c o n sistency t h a t has been c o m m i t t e d , for it notes that the absolute

has not been proved. With the idea of the absolute its being is said t o b e posited immediately; b u t , the common understanding objects, it c a n q u i t e easily think of something a n d form a n idea of something without its being necessary for 4 Professor W. E. Hocking of Harvard used to say in class that Hegel h a d ridiculed Krug’s c h a l l e n g e to h i m to d e d u c e h i s writing p e n , b u t that a really g o o d p h i l o s o p h y o f nature ought t o b e able

to accomplish such a deduction.

1 7 . Article o n c o m m o n sense and Krug

59

t h a t reason t h a t this s o m e t h i n g t h a t h a s been t h o u g h t of m u s t also h a v e existence, e t c . Thus H r . K r u g will reproach geom-

etry that it is not a science complete in itself, as it claims to b e , for it fails t o prove t h e existence of t h e infinite s p a c e in w h i c h it draws its lines.—Or d o e s H r . Krug consider G o d

or the absolute a kind of hypothesis which phiIOSOphy incurs, just as o n e physics permits itself th e hypothesis of empty space, a magnetic, electric m a t t e r , etc., i n whose place another physics m i g h t posit q u i t e different hypotheses?” ( 1 4 7 f . ) The central p o i n t a t issue h e r e is th e one K a n t raised i n

his celebrated refutation of the ontological argument for God’s existence when he tried to prove a point about the c o n c e p t of G o d by likening it t o t h e concept of a hundred dollars ( 1 7 8 1 , 5 9 9 ) . Hegel h e r e sides against not only Krug’s c o m m o n sense b u t K a n t ; a n d h e n ev er accepted Kant’s treatm e n t of t h e ontological arg u men t, b u t always insisted that G o d , o r t h e absolute, is s u i generis. The discussion of Krug’s p e n is worth q u o tin g a l m o s t in

full. It is much longer here than in the Encyclopedia footn o t e , a n d it is rarely realized t o w h a t e x t e n t t h e later Hegel drew o n his earlier, m u c h less well-known work. The passage also provides a nice s a m p l e of Hegel’s ponderous sar-

casm. “ I t is funny h o w Hr. Kr. is nevertheless s o gracious that

he does not want to take the philosopher who poses as a master i n philosophy quite literally by his w o r d ; so h e d e m a n d s only something little, o n l y t h e d e d u c t i o n of o n e definite motion, e.g., of t h e moon with all its characteristics, o r of a rose, a horse, a d o g , w o o d , iron, clay, a n o a k , o r merely of h i s

writing pen. It looks as if H r . Kr. had wished to make things e a s y for the idealists with such d e m a n d s by picking out o f t h e solar system only a s u b o r d i n a t e point, the m o o n , or, a s something still m u c h easier, his writing p e n . B u t doesn’t Hr. Kr. c o m p r e h e n d t h a t the determinatenesses which are in-

comprehensible in transcendental idealism belong to the phil o s o p h y of nature, of whose difference from transcendental idealism h e d o e s not seem t o know anything—insofar a s

they, unlike Hr. Kr.’s pen, belong in phiIOSOphy at all? In the philosophy of nature he can find a Dedukzion ( a word whose

60

THE FIRST SEVEN ESSAYS, 1801—1803

m e a n i n g is a s b a d h e r e a s its spelling) of o n e of the things

he pr0poses, of iron. Does Hr. Kr. have so little of an idea of philosophical construction that h e supposes t h a t t he m o o n could b e comprehended without t h e entire solar system, a n d d o e s h e have such a feeble notion of this solar system t h a t h e does not s e e that t h e knowledge of this system is the most sublime a n d supreme task of reason? If Hr. K r . h a d even a remote intimation of t h e m a g n i t u d e o f this definite task or of t h a t which is i n general a t the present m o m e n t t h e first concern of philosophy, n a m e l y t o place God once again absolutely right i n front at t h e h e a d of philosophy as the sole

ground of everything, as the only principium essendi and cognoscendi [principle of being and of knowledge], after he h a s been placed l o n g enough alongside other finite things or

entirely at the end, as a postulate [by Kant in his Critique of Practical Reason] that issues from a n absolute finitude—how, t h e n , could it occur t o h i m t o d e m a n d the deduction o f his

pen from philosophy? A dog, an oak, a horse, a reed are, to b e sure, like Moses, Alexander, Cyrus, Jesus, etc., something m o r e excellent, a n d both lines of organization [ n a t u r e a n d

history] are closer to phiIOSOphy than Hr. Krug’s pen and the philosophical works h e h a s a u t h o r e d . The philosophy of n a ture points out t o h i m how he Should h a v e to c o m p r e h e n d the organization of a n o a k , rose, dog, a n d c a t ; and if h e h a s the inclination a n d zeal to contract his h u m a n individuality

to the stage of life of a rose or a dog in order to comprehend and grasp their living being completely, let him make the attempt. But he cannot expect this from others. And it would be better if he tried to expand his nature to the greatest individualities, such as Cyrus, Moses, A l e x a n d e r , Jesus, etc., or even only of t h e great orator5 Cicero; then h e could hardly

fail to comprehend their necessity and to consider the construction of these individuals, a s well a s the series of the appearances of the world spirit which one calls history, more c a p a b l e of a construction. B u t from the demand for a deduc-

tion of his pen he will have to desist entirely toward this end . . . ” ( 1 4 8 f . ) .

5 Krug’s identification.

1 7 . Article o n c o m m o n sense and Krug

61

Again, Hegel states at t h e outset of his c a r e e r w h a t h e n e v e r a g a i n states s o fully, though h e never changed his m i n d a b o u t it. A n d h e m a k e s clear his distaste for t a l k of d e d u c t i o n , his preference for “ c o m p r e h e n s i o n , ” a n d his conviction t h a t it is t h e t a s k of the philosophy of n a t u r e t o c o m p r e h e n d t h e rationality of t h e solar system, a n d of t h e philos0phy of history t o comprehend t h e “necessity” of a “Cyrus, Moses, A l e x a n d e r , Jesus, e t c . ” S i n c e the times of K a n t , who developed a major hypothe-

sis in astronomy, science and philosophy have parted ways to such an extent that hardly any philosophers are left with any inclination to do philosophy of nature: one does philos0phy of science instead. Similarly, philosophy of history is t u r n i n g more and m o r e t o reflection o n historiography and historical method a n d dealing less and less w i t h the content of history—with the major events o r such individuals as Hegel e n u m e r a t e s . But t h e boundaries of philosophy are n o t perm a n e n t ; division of labor continues; a n d the fact that over a

century or two ago some philosopher still did something that is now done by members of other departments at the better universities should not preclude attempts at sympathetic comprehension of Hegel’s position. He maintained that reason must not resign itself to the View that nature and history are completely arbitrary: o n the contrary, i t must seek to determine to what extent that which it studies is rational.

The fact remains that Hegel uses “necessary” as an inclusive antonym of “arbitrary,” a s if everything for which g o o d reasons c a n b e given a n d which was not, therefore,

arbitrary could be reasonably called “necessary.” Another example

o f this unfortunate

terminology was encountered

earlier, in the penultimate sentence of the quotation at the beginning of Section 1 2 , where Hegel speaks of “naturalness

and necessity.” Indeed, for him “natural” and “necessary” and “rational” may almost be said to form a trinity. Whatever can b e shown t o have been “natural” under the circumstances

and therefore in keeping with rational expectations and not arbitrary, h e is apt t o call “ n e c e s s a r y ” ; b u t this does not m e a n

that he claims to be able to “deduce” it in any reasonable

THE FIRST SEVEN ESSAYS, 1801—1803

62

sense of t h a t word. I t does m e a n t h a t h e claims to “compre-

hend” it. The extreme sarcasm of the words that immediately follow the last brackets i n our long quotation a b o u t t h e pen d o e s n o t stand alone. Two f u r t h e r examples m a y illustrate Hegel’s biting h u m o r . Krug had mentioned that h e h o p e d to write a work covering the w h o l e of philosophy, as Hegel p u t s it, “ i n eight volumes, namely seven volumes of c o n t e n t s and o n e v o l u m e of subject index.” A p a g e later, Hegel writes: “Otherwise, e v e n t h e word ‘reason’ is not used by H r . K r. i n t h e three works before us, insofar a s they relate t o phi-

losophy. Excepting the Letters on the Wissenschaftslelzre, one encounters it a couple of times in the genitive . . . (to which we also call Hr. Kr.’s attention lest it happen to him that in the seven volumes of philosophical sciences reason should

not be mentioned at all, or only in the genitive, and this subject should then b e missing from th e subject index, volume

8 ) ” (153). O u r last example involves th e n a m e o f th e u n f o r t u n a t e Krug, w h i c h means p i t c h e r : “ I n t h e light of the above, the

synthetism of Hr. Kr. must be thought of like this: Imagine a pitcher i n which Reinholdian water, stale K a n t i a n beer, enlightening syrup called Berlinism, and other c o m p a r a b l e ingredients are contained b y s o m e accident . . . ” ( 1 5 5 ) .

Lasson may be right when he says in his introduction to Hegel’s Erste Druckschriften: “Presumably, he would not have h a d t o wait fifteen years before being offered a n aca-

demic chair, if the first impression the scientific world received from him had not been that of a polemical spirit of uninhibited sharpness who employed with mastery the whole scale of literary weapons from rough Swabian rudeness to cutting scorn and cold contempt.6 After a short time, Hegel himself sto p p e d writing t h i s sort of t h i n g . . . ” (xii f . ) . It m a y b e noted that w h e n Hegel chose t o write this way

he mastered these accents every bit as well as Kierkegaard d i d roughly fifty years later i n his uninformed attacks o n 6Cf.

Ros. 165: “Hegel had a rough wit that appeared now as naive [?] irony, now as cutting satire, now as absolute [?] humor, i n manifold ways, i n a n inexhaustibility o f new and fitting images.”

1 8 . Article o n skepticism a n d Schulze

63

H e g e l . I t is not the least value of a study of t h e young Hegel that it shows what a n u t t e r caricature Kierkegaard’s i m a g e of t h e totally unhumorous Professor Hegel was, a n d how little the D a n e understood his m a n ( C f . H 68).

18 Having attacked c o m m o n s e n s e i n the first issue of the

Journal, Hegel criticized skepticism in the second. This time h e reviewed Gottlob Ernst Schulze’s Critique of Theoretical

Philosophy, a work that had appeared in two volumes ( 1 8 0 1 / 0 2 ) , both well over seven hundred pages long. Schulze (1761—1833) was Professor of Philosophy at Helmstedt since 1788. In 1810 h e accepted a call to G'ottingen. Eight years before his new work, S c h u l z e h a d attracted a great deal of

attention with his critique of Kant. And now an extremely favorable review o f the first volume had appeared i n a pOpul a r literary supplement—and was reprinted by Hegel and Schelling i n t h e s a m e issue with Hegel’s review, i n an a p-

pendix consisting of a collection of similar material. This item they entitled: “Outbreak of popular joy over the destruction at long last of philosophy [Ausbruch der Volksfreude iiber den endlichen Untergang der Philosophie].” It b e g a n : “ I t is t i m e at l o n g last that the blanket b e taken away

from the philosophers that has covered their eyes with darkness for over two thousand years. Patience is not infinite. . . . ”

Hegel’s review article bears the title “Relation of skepticism to philosophy, account of its various modifications, and comparison of the most modern with ancient skepticism.” By now Hegel shows considerable mastery of the history o f philoso-

phy, by no means only of the deveIOpment of skepticism. I n d e e d , n o great modern philosopher before Hegel had ever shown any comparable knowledge o f his predecessors. The

article is seventy-four pages in length (fifty-one in the critical e d i t i o n ) a n d c a n n o t b e summarized here. We shall begin by considering four passages.

The first deals with the persistent disagreement among phi-

THE FIRST SEVEN ESSAYS, 1801—1803

64

IOSOphers. Does this n o t discredit philos0phy? Says H e g e l : “ B u t w h e n H r . S c h . h a s seen t h a t the striving of s o m a n y men who are venerable for their talents a n d zeal h a s b e e n unsuccessful when they tried to seek o u t the ultimate grounds of our knowledge, this c a n a t m o s t b e considered a very subjective way of seeing. Leibniz, e.g., expresses quite a different w a y of seeing in the passage w h i c h Jacobi m a d e o n e of his m o t t o e s : j’ai trouve’ q u e la plupart des sectes o n t raison dans u n e bonne partie de ce qu’elles avancent, mais n o n pas tant en ce qu’elles nient.7 The superficial View of philosophical quarrels reveals o n l y t h e difierences of the systems, but even t h e o l d rule, contra negarztes principia n o n est dis-

putana’um,8 shows us that when phiIOSOphical systems fight with each other—it is another matter, admittedly, when philosophy fights with un-philosophy—there is agreement on principles which are superior t o all success and fate a n d which do n o t Show themselves in w h a t the fight is about and therefore escape t h a t gaping w h ich always sees the opposite of what is h a p p e n i n g before its e y e s ” ( 1 6 3 ) . The problem o f philosophical disagreement thus c o n c e r n e d Hegel from the start, a n d instead o f simply ignoring it a n d giving reasons for his o w n views, h e m a d e it t h e very basis

of his own philosophy. As we have seen ( H 1 2 ) , Hegel came to believe i n 1 8 0 0 “ t h at th e convictions of m a n y centuries” were n o t “ b a r e nonsense o r immorality.” E x t e n d i n g this faith t o the great phi10S0phers, h e was confronted by t h e task of fi n d i n g what truth e a c h h a d s e e n : if o n e c o u l d o n l y recapitul a t e all the insights of all one’s predecessors o n e should b e a b l e to develop a philosophy far superior to an y t h a t h a d ever g o n e before. To be sure, Hegel has not s h o w n t h a t Leibniz a n d Jacobi were right; a n d i n fact they w e r e surely w r o n g . A c a t a l o g u e of all the affirmations of all sects through t h e ages a n d over the globe w o u l d a p p r o x i m a t e a n encyc10pedia of nonsense a n d immorality. B u t the opposite o f Leibniz’s d i c t u m c o m e s much closer to t h e truth o f t h e m a t t e r : m o s t sects are w r o n g 7I

h a v e f o u n d t h a t m o s t sects a r e r i g h t i n a g o o d p a r t o f what they a f fi r m , b u t n o t s o m u c h in w h a t t h e y deny. 8One

cannot argue against those who deny principles.

1 8 . Article o n skepticism and Schulze

65

in what they aflirm but right in a good part of their negations. Sectarians are good at seeing the errors committed by other sects, but blind t o the errors of. their own aflirmations. And i n philosophy, t o o , the great contributions of the great

philosophers may be found in their superb criticisms of errors, whether those of religions, common sense, or other philosophers; but m e n w h o h a d shown brilliance and genius i n this respect usually went o n t o offer untenable aflirmations

of their own, which had to be criticized in turn by their successors. In this way there has been cumulative insight and progress o f a s o r t : more and more illusions have been stripped away, a n d m e n gradually come to realize that more

and more of their supposed knowledge was spurious. As Socrates insisted, as long as men begin by thinking that they k n o w what i n fact they d o not know, h e m a y b e wisest who realizes how little h e knows (Apology 2 1 ) . Socrates over-

stated the point with his characteristic love of paradox and spoke of knowing “nothing,” which makes for needless confusion. B u t it makes good sense and is b y no means merely

an ironic point to say that wisdom consists in realizing how many beliefs are false, and that the history of philosophy, as the love of wisdom, has been a progressive disillusionment. This View is not nihilistic: it does not suggest that all philos0phers are equally wrong and nothing is ever gained; on the contrary, the suggestion is that there is progress and that phiIOSOphic insight is cumulative. “Instead of seeing the history of phi1050phy as an accumulation of fantastic systems, o n e m a y View i t as the gradual analysis of, and liberation from, one illusion after another, a stripping away of fan-

tasies, a slow destruction of once hallowed truths that are found to be errors. . . . PhiIOSOphers have rarely given good reasons for what was believed previously. Much more often, their denials, t h e i r heresies, their exposures of long unques-

tioned doctrines continue to be taught.”9 This View, of course, is not Hegel’s View. He came to think that positive knowledge was cumulative, and that construction could be expanded progressively. A critic may find fault 9 Kaufmann, are given.

The Faith of a Heretic, section 5 , where examples

66

THE FIRST SEVEN ESSAYS, 1801-1803

with his aflfirmation, while applauding his rejection of the View that philosophy h a s b e e n a waste of t i m e because the great philosophers did not agree with e a c h other. In any case, the View suggested here is not m e a n t t o i m -

ply that philosophers never have any positive insights that prove to b e true a n d important, or that only their criticisms o f other views are worth remembering. There are exceptions; for example, some phiIOSOphers h a v e m a d e brilliant psychological observations, and philosophers h a v e contributed m o r e

than their share of penetrating epigrams. Moreover, their way of looking at things and problems—and of seeing problems where none h a d been seen before—is often enlightening and of great educational value. B u t when it comes t o their

arguments, the best of these are generally criticisms, not ingenious defenses, of accepted views. These, to repeat once m o r e , are n o t Hegel’s ideas, a n d i t is high t i m e t o return to his essay on skepticism. H i s next p o i n t requires no critical c o m m e n t : it is important because it is s o characteristic of Hegel’s thought d o w n to his last

period. “Taking everything into account, it seems that Hr. Schulze considers only theoretical philosophy as speculative philosophy, while h e considers th e other parts o f t h e latter as o n e knows not w h a t ; o r rather, o n e nowhere sees a trace of a n idea o f a speculative phiIOSOphy w h i c h is neither par-

ticularly theoretical, nor practical, nor aesthetic phiIOSOphy” ( 1 6 5 ) . For Hegel t h e last two are not only important b r a n c h e s which must n o t b e forgotten over t h e first; there are, strictly speaking, n o b ran ch es ; philosophy is a totality

nourished as much by man’s thinking about ethics and his study of art a n d literature as it is b y reading epistemology a n d metaphysics.

In keeping with this, Hegel also attends to the human reality b e h i n d skepticism, to Pyrrho, t h e ancient founder,

and to ataraxia—the imperturbability the Greeks sought through skepticism. And of this Hegel says: “From this positive side it is also clear t h a t this skepticism is not alien t o any

phi10S0phy. The apathy of the Stoic and the indifference of t h e philosopher in general, m u s t recognize themselves i n this ataraxia.”

1 8 . Article o n skepticism and Schulze

67

The last passage from Hegel’s essay to b e considered here

deals with the problem announced in its title: “Without the determination of the true relation of skepticism t o philosophy,

and without the insight that skepticism is intimately at one with every true philosophy, and that thus there is a philosophy that is neither skepticism nor dogmatism and thus both at once, all the histories and tales and new editions of skepticism cannot lead to anything. . . . Even Diogenes Laertius mentions in his manner that some call Homer the originator o f

skepticism because he speaks differently of the same things in different situations; that m a n y o f the dicta of the seven sages, t o o , are skeptical. . . . But even more Diogenes ad-

duces as skeptics Archilochus, Euripides, Zeno, Xenophanes, D e m o c r i t u s , Plato, etc. I n brief, those whom Diogenes echoes h a d the insight that a true philosophy necessarily also has a negative side which is turned against everything that i s limited, and thus against the pile o f the facts of conscious-

ness and their undeniable certainty as well as against the bigoted concepts in those magnificent doctrines which Hr. Schulze considers inaccessible t o reasonable skepticism, against this whole soil of finitude o n which this modern

skepticism has its nature and truth—and thus true philos0phy is infinitely more skeptical than this skepticism. What more perfect and separate document and system of genuine skepticism could be found than the Parmenides in Plato’s philosophy. This embraces and destroys the whole territory of this knowledge by means of the concepts of the understanding. This Platonic skepticism does not issue in any doubting of these truths o f the u n d e r s t a n d i n g which knows things as

manifold, as wholes consisting of parts, a coming to be and passing away, a multiplicity and similarity, etc., and which

makes objective affirmations of this sort; it issues in a total negation of all truth of such a kind of knowledge. This skeptic i s m . . . is itself the negative side of the knowledge of the

absolute and immediately presupposes reason as the positive side” (173 f . ) . It might seem that the View of philosophical progress advanced a couple of pages b a c k a s n o t Hegel’s is, after all, part o f his View. Unquestionably, Hegel emphasizes the

THE FIRST SEVEN ESSAYS, 1801—1803

68

importance o f negation; his early essays and articles were essentially critiques; and his students d i d not fail t o b e struck by this aspect of his thought. Rosenkranz relates an episode that seems to have occurred almost four years after the p u b -

lication of the essay on skepticism, when Hegel first offered his course on the history of philosophy while he was working on his Phenomenology:

“The course o n history of philosophy Hegel gave at night by artificial light. . . . As o n e form of speculation emerged after the other i n the lectures, only to b e submerged again, a nd finally—the listeners h ad never expected this—the Schellingian system, t o o , took its turn, a rather old man from Mecklenburg jumped up i n horror after the conclusion of one lecture, when Hegel h a d already gone, and shouted, ‘But this is death himself, and t h u s all must perish.’ This prompted a vivacious discussion among the students i n w h ich Suthmeier

finally gained the upper hand and explained with pathos: to b e sure, this was death a n d h a d t o be death, but i n this

death was life which, purified by it, would unfold ever more gloriously” ( 2 1 7 ) .

The student who spoke last seems to have had the right i d e a about Hegel. Common sense and the inadequacies of the rigid concepts o f the understanding are criticized by Hegel along with the limitations of h i s predecessors; but the m a i n thrust o f his effort b e c a m e more and more constructive. Even in 1 8 0 2 Hegel was trying t o give final form to his

system. 19 As the essay o n skepticism proceeds, Hegel attempts a de-

tailed analysis of ancient skepticism and its various stages, and of the ten so-called tr0pes or modes of early skepticism10 he says: 10 See Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism; complete in a bilingual edition in the Loeb Classical Library; selections, includThales i n g the various modes, i n Kaufmann, Philosophical Classics: to St. Thomas (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1 9 6 1 ) ,

570-76.

1 9 . Skepticism in the Encyc10pedia

69

“The content of these modes proves even better how far removed they are from any tendency against phiIOSOphy, and

how they are directed solely against the dogmatism of common s e n s e : not one is aimed at reason and its knowledge,

but all of them are aimed quite clearly only against the finite and the knowledge of the finite—against the understanding. . . . This skepticism is thus not at all directed against philosophy but, in a not particularly philosophical but rather popular manner, against common sense or the common con-

sciousness which clings to the given, the fact, the finite (whether this be called appearance or concept [i.e., concept of the understanding; Hegel later used Concept in a different s e n s e ] ) and sticks t o this as something certain, secure,

and eternal. These skeptical modes show the common consciousness the unreliability of such certainties i n a manner

that lies close to it. For they also invoke appearances and finitudes, and from their difference and the equal rights of all of them to prevail—from the antinomy that is thus recognizable even in the finite—such skepticism recognizes the untruth of the finite. It may therefore be considered the first stage on the way to philosophy, for the beginning of philos0phy has got to be the advance above the truth which is offered by the common consciousness, and the intimation o f

a higher truth. The most modern skepticism, with its certainty about the facts of consciousness, should therefore b e

referred above everything else to this ancient skepticism . . . ” (184). This crucial contrast between ancient and modern skepti-

cism is further developed by Hegel (especially on page 192) —and taken up again twenty-five years later in the second, ( 1 8 2 7 , twice the size revised edition o f Hegel’s Encyc10pedia concludes: 9 3 § There, . ) 7 1 8 1 f o edition of the first b e well distinshould way, the by “Humean skepticism,

guished from Greek skepticism. Hume’s assumes as basic the truth that they cism

of base lack was

the empirical, o f feeling, of intuition, and from contests general determinations and laws—because justification from s e n s e perception. Ancient skeptis o far from making feeling a n d intuition the prin-

ciple of truth that, on the contrary, it turned first of all

70

THE FIRST SEVEN ESSAYS, 1801—1803

against the senses. ( O n modern skepticism i n relation to an-

cient skepticism, see Schelling’s and Hegel’s Crit. Journal of Philosophy, 1 8 0 2 , vol. I , issue 1 . ) ”

Actually, Hegel’s article had appeared in issue 2, but he d i d not catch this error when h e m a d e “ 3 6 0 0 significant changes” in the third, revised edition ( 1 8 3 0 ) , 1 1 though h e

did go over this paragraph and, after “Humean skepticism,” inserted the words “to which the above reflections refer pre-

eminently.” Schulze is no longer mentioned in the Encyclopedia although in 1 8 1 4 he h a d published an Encyclopedia

of the Philosophical Sciences—the very title Hegel used three years later, even down t o the subtitle “to b e used i n connection with his lectures.” Of course, books designed toward that end were legion, and other philosophers, t o o , h a d pub-

lished such “Encyc10pedias” for some time. In any case, the fact that Hume h a s taken Schulze’s place is hardly connected with th e matter of the book title. For the Critical Journal Hegel h a d written review articles, using books

that had just appeared as points of departure for dealing with what he considered especially important topics. He began with the dogmatism of common sense, using Krug as a foil; then took up skepticism, using Schulze. Both men h a d reputations that at that time far exceeded Hegel’s own. Next, Hegel wrote a long article for t h e Critical Journal, entitled “Faith and knowledge, o r the philos0phy of reflection of subjectivity i n the completeness of its forms, as Kant-

ian, Jacobian, and Fichtean PhilosoPhy.”12 In an important way this article belongs with t h e two preceding ones, a s be-

comes obvious as soon as we turn to the second or third edition of the Encyclopedia. In both o f these editions ( b u t not i n the fi r s t ) , Part I , which is called “The Science of Logic,” begins with what 11 This figure i s found i n the critical edition o f the Encyclopedia,

p. xxx. In this edition, Hegel’s slip is corrected without any indication that his text has been changed. Lasson, who gave the same figure e a r l i e r in his editions of 1 9 0 5 a n d 1 9 1 1 , p . 5 0 3 , d i d not correct this error. 221—346). (Erste Druckschriften, u n d Wissen 13 Glauben Mfiller’s reference ( 1 9 6 ) t o “Wissen a n d G l a u b e n ( 2 5 2 S e i t e n ) ”

is doubly in error but by n o means typical of his book.

1 9 . Skepticism in the Encyclopedia

71

Hegel calls a Vorbegrifi or preliminary analysis ( § § 1 9 - 8 3 ) ; a n d this is subdivided as follows: A . First attitude physics.

of

thought

toward

objectivity; meta-

B. Second attitude of thought toward objectivity. I . Empiricism.

II. Critical Philosophy. C . Third attitude of thought toward objectivity; immediate knowledge.

The first point that meets the eye as one considers this plan is that Hegel, confronted with four outlooks that h e considered singularly important, m a d e a triad o f them by lumpi n g together t wo o f them a s B . I . a n d B . I I . He would n o t always h a v e d o n e t h a t ; indeed, w h e n h e published his Logic13 i n three volumes i n 1 8 1 2 , 1 8 1 3 , and 1 8 1 6 , h e d i d almost the opposite. Though the tables o f contents o f all three volumes

abound in triads, the title page of the second volume actually calls i t : “Science of Logic: First V o l u m e : Objective Logic;

Second Book: The Doctrine of Essence.” The third volume contained “Subjective L o g i c . ” A s late a s 1 8 1 3 , t h e n , Hegel was capable o f presenting something that h a d three parts a s

1.1, 1.2, and II. In t h e cases at h a n d , th e three o r four “attitudes o f thought

toward objectivity” are not in any case exhaustive: all three are severely criticized, and the point of this preliminary analysis is to establish the need for Hegel’s own approach. Hegel’s criticism o f a l l four is a t bottom the s a m e : all of them

fail to subject crucial phiIOSOphical terms to analysis. Dogmatism—or, a s the t a b l e o f contents says, metaphysics—

ascribes such predicates as “has existence” to God; “finitude or infinity” to the world; and “simple, composite” to the s o u l ; b u t “ O n e h a s failed to inquire whether such predicates are i n a n d for themselves something true, a n d whether the

form of the proposition could be the form of truth” ( § 2 8 ) . 13 Logic, i n the present b o o k , refers to Hegel’s w o r k w i t h that

name; Logic, t o that branch of his system which he called “Logic”; and logic, t o what that term means ordinarily.

72

THE FIRST SEVEN ESSAYS, 1801—1803

The task remains of analyzing such concepts a s well a s the

concept of a proposition. “The basic illusion i n scientific empiricism is always t h i s : that it uses the metaphysical categories of matter, force, a n d , of course, one, many, generality, also infinite, etc., and fur-

thermore makes inferences following the thread of such categories, while presupposing the forms o f inference and using

them—and all the while it does not know that it thus contains and does metaphysics and uses these categories and their connections i n a n entirely uncritical and unconscious manner” ( § 3 8 ) . After metaphysics a n d empiricism—or dogmatism and posi-

tivism—Kant is similarly taken to task for finding only four antinomies and dealing with these as h e does, instead of realizing that a comprehensive analysis of Concepts is needed. ( S e e especially E § 4 8 a n d H 4 2 . ) “ I m m e d i a t e knowledge” ( J a c o b i ) is obviously Open t o the same charge. In Hegel’s discussion it is not as evident a s it must seem from what h a s been suggested here t h a t the central complaint

is always the same. Indeed, this has generally gone unnoticed. B u t once i t i s noticed, the inclusion of this preliminary analysis i n the so-called Lesser Logic becomes clear, and one need n o longer wonder why this introductory part was not placed before the Encyc10pedia as a whole ( i n a position comparable to the preface of t h e Phenomenology), with the Logic beginning only after this is completed. The m a i n point

of this introductory survey is to establish the need for the Logic, not for t h e whole Encyc10pedia. For the Logic

is noth-

ing else than Hegel’s comprehensive analysis of phiIOSOphical Concepts a n d their relations t o each other. We are now twenty-five years beyond 1802 when Hegel’s

articles appeared in the Critical Journal. In retrospect we can see that these articles are not mere juvenilia which the

student of Hegel’s mature work might as well ignore. It is striking how Hegel, at the beginning of his literary career, singled out i n his Journal articles, first, the dogmatism of c o m m o n sense; t h e n , the modern skepticism which h e later called empiricism and associated with H u m e , and which others (e.g., Lasson, Erste Druckschriften, xxxi) may prefer

2 0 . “Faith and Knowledge”

73

to call positivism; and then, i n “Faith and Knowledge,” Kant

and Jacobi. When we take into account that these articles were written at a time when Hegel was trying hard to finish and publish his system, it becomes clear that the “preliminary

analysis” of twenty-five years later was not added merely as a pedagogical device but reflects t o some extent Hegel’s own

approach to philosophy. Finally, the reader who finds that in the Phenomenology Hegel disposes of skepticism in a famous section of less than half a dozen pages ought to know that five years earlier Hegel had published a long article on the subject in which he had shown himself to be thoroughly familiar with its deve10pment from Pyrrho to Gottlob Ernst Schulze.

20 Of Hegel’s long article on “Faith and Knowledge” Lasson says i n his critical e d i t i o n : “It seems as if the author had

written it in a certain condition of rage, without allowing himself time enough to work over the style in any way. It was unfortunate for the manner in which his first printed essays have been judged that in the old edition of his works precisely this treatise was placed at the beginning of his collected writings; thus the readers got the impression that Hegel at this time, whether intentionally or not, expressed himself in language that is involuted and hard to understand, although

this is not at all true of his other critical essays. Moreover, in the first printing the monster of a sentence which concludes the treatise is broken in the middle, resulting in a n impossible anacoluthon”

(xxxiv).

It is symptomatic of the way Hegel was edited in the collected works that three words were changed slightly in that last sentence: The first change was unnecessary and unhelpf u l ; the second quite as ungrammatical a s t h e original reading t o which L a s s o n refers (Lasson altered the verb form in a different way, resulting i n a grammatical r e a d i n g ) ;

and the third change falsified Hegel’s meaning for n o good reason at all.

Lasson is also sharply critical of the contents of the essay,

74

THE FIRST SEVEN ESSAYS, 1801—1803

in which h e finds “the typical ingratitude of those who com-

plete a great development against their predecessors, without whom this completion would not have been possible” ( x l i ) . We shall again skip the polemic against Hegel’s im-

mediate predecessors. But the introduction reverts to the problems with which the young Hegel h a d dealt before he

came to Jena, particularly in “The Positivity” and in the attempt t o rewrite that essay i n 1800 ( H 1 2 ) , and shall there-

fore be quoted here in part. For the essay on “Faith and Knowledge” marks an important stage on Hegel’s way from a critique of the “positive” and irrational faith of Christianity to the attempt to find knowledge by means of philosophy. We begin at the beginning of the essay: “Culture has raised the most recent times s o high above the ancient oppo-

sition of reason and faith, of philosophy and positive religion, that this juxtaposition of faith and knowledge has acquired an altogether different meaning and has been removed into philosophy itself. That reason should be the handmaid of faith, a s o n e used to say i n bygone times—a

position against which philosophy relentlessly claimed its absolute autonomy—such notions or expressions have vanished; and reason, if that which gives itself this name deserves it,

has asserted itself to such an extent within positive religion that even a fight of philos0phy against what is positive, miracles, et al., is considered something dated, and obscure, and

Kant’s attempt to reanimate the positive form of religion by giving it a meaning from his own philosophy failed—not because the peculiar sense of these forms was changed, but

rather because they n o longer seemed worthy of even this honor. Yet the question remains whether triumphant reason has not suffered the very fate that the triumphant strength of barbarous nations usually suffers from the defeated weak-

ness of cultured nations: retaining the upper hand as far as external dominion is concerned, while being defeated i n spirit

by the vanquished. The

glorious triumph of enlightening

reason over what, with its small measure of religious comprehension, it took for the faith that opposed it, looks dif-

ferent when examined in this light: neither is the positive

2 0 . “Faith and Knowledge”

75

element that it fought religion, nor has that which triumphed remained reason, and t h e offspring which descends trium-

phantly upon this corpse, [posing] as‘the common child of peace that unites both, contains a s little reason a s genuine

faith. “Reason, which had in any case degraded itself by understanding religion only as something positive and not idealistically, could not d o better t h a n have a look at itself after

this fight, to gain self-knowledge, and to recognize the fact that it was nothing b y placing that which w a s better t h a n it,

as long as it is merely understanding, in a faith as something that is beyond, outside and a b o v e it—as h a s happened i n the philosophies of Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte—and t h u s reason

again makes itself the handmaid of a faith. According to Kant, t h e supra-sensible c a n n o t b e known by reason; t h e supreme idea does not also have reality. According to Jacobi, reason is ashamed of begging, and to d i g it has neither

hands nor feet; man is granted only the feeling and consciousness of his ignorance of the true, only intimations of the true i n reason, which is here merely something gen-

erally subjective and instinctive. According to Fichte, God is something incomprehensible and unthinkable; knowledge knows nothing except that it knows nothing, and has to flee to faith. According t o all three, the absolute, according to the old distinction, cannot be against any more than for reason; it is above reason. “The negative procedure of the Enlightenment, whose positive s i d e was, for all its vain pretensions, without a n y kernel,

obtained a kernel by grasping its own negativity and by liberating itself from shallowness by means of the purity and infinity of the negative. O n the other hand, the objects of its positive knowledge could therefore be merely finite and empirical things, while the eternal h a d to remain beyond. For

knowledge, the eternal thus remains empty, and this infinite empty space o f knowledge c a n be filled only w i t h t h e subjectivity o f longing a n d intimation. Formerly, it was considered t h e death o f philosophy if reason were t o renounce its being i n the absolute, simply excluding itself altogether from

76

THE FIRST SEVEN ESSAYS, 1801—1803

it and adopting a merely negative attitude toward i t ; but now

just this became the highest point of philosophy. . . .14 “The great form of the world spirit, however, which has recognized itself in these philosophies, is the principle of the North and, religiously considered, of Protestantism: it is the subjectivity for which beauty a n d truth present themselves in feelings a n d dispositions, i n love a n d understanding. Religion

builds its temples and altars in the heart of the individual, and sighs and prayers seek the God whose contemplation one

denies oneself in View of the danger for the understanding, which would look upon that which is contemplated as a mere thing, and upon the sacred woods as so much wood. To be sure, the internal, t o o , must become external, the intention

must attain actuality in the deed, the immediate religious feeling must find expression in external agitation, and the

faith which flees the objectivity of knowledge must become objective for itself in thoughts, concepts, and words. But the understanding separates quite Sharply the objective from the subjective, and the objective is considered devoid of value and altogether nothing; and subjective beauty must fight against precisely the necessity according t o which the sub-

jective becomes objective . . . and beautiful feeling giving way t o painless contemplation would b e c o m e superstition.

“. . . It is precisely its flight from the finite and the firmness of this subjectivity that reduce the beautiful to mere things for it, the sacred woods to pieces of w o o d , the images t o things that have eyes an d d o not see, ears an d d o not

hear. . . .” Hegel’s sentences are often awkwardly long, but he has by

no means lost the power of vivid imagery that distinguished his early writings o n religion, a n d what h e says is of consid-

erable interest. The “positive” religion, which the Enlightenment—and Hegel himself only seven years earlier—attacked and discredited, was religion without any religious spirit; and the enlightened reason that was so completely victorious that there w as really no point a n y more i n continuing the fight,

14 This whole paragraph forms a Single sentence in the original. The l a s t two lines and the following paragraph have been omitted here.

2 0 . “Faith an d Knowledge”

77

w a s n o t r e a s o n a t its best either, b u t , o n e might almost say, a

reason devoid of the spirit of reason. It stuck to the finite a n d w a s thus mere understanding, t o e r e t u r n t o Schiller’s dis-

tinction. Nor did reason fail to deveIOp some sense of its own i n a d e q u a c y : its nemesis w a s t h a t it excluded itself from t h e infinite, which h a d been the true goal of th e religious spirit— a n d t h u s reason ended u p , as it h a d d o n e i n the M i d d l e Ages,

as the handmaid of faith. Kant m i g h t seem to b e a rationalist o f sorts a n d some-

what scholastic in his manner, while Jacobi might strike us a s a n irrationalist a n d , quite u n l i k e Kant, a n apostle o f feel-

ing. But Kant already remarked that he had done away with k n o w l e d g e t o m a k e room for faith, a n d i n this respect h e and Jacobi are a t o n e , while Hegel, l i k e Plato and Aristotle, Spinoza a n d Leibniz, insists t h a t precisely t h e divine and eternal is the proper subject of phiIOSOphical i n q u i r y and knowledge. What K a n t a n d J a c o b i h a v e d o n e , however, s h o u l d not

be understood as the failure of a couple of individuals; rather, they represent the c o n s u m m a t i o n o f Protestantism. They have

done on the phiIOSOphical level what the iconoclasts of the R e f o r m a t i o n d i d o n t h e material level. The understanding, which is glued t o t h e finite, sees divine images o n l y a s idols t h a t h a v e eyes a n d d o n o t see, a n d t h e s a c r e d grove only a s so m u c h w o o d . But n o r e a s o n a b l e person should l o o k u p o n a G r e e k s t a t u e of A p o l l o i n t h a t spirit: reason m u s t seek to comprehend the infinite i n t h e finite, the eternal i n w h a t i s

here and now. Hegel Opposes the phi1030phers who deny themselves t h e c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f t h e infinite a n d eternal, s u p posing t h a t it dwells forever b e y o n d r e a s o n ; o n the contrary,

it is the task of reason and philosophy to contemplate the spirit in this w o r l d . The l o n g last sentence o f this essay constitutes a paragraph of o v e r t w e n t y lines. To m a k e sense of it, w e have to c h a n g e o n e verb form. B u t t h e sentence is interesting a n d points

ahead to the end of the Phenomenology of the Spirit. Early i n this s e n t e n c e we e n c o u n t e r t h e p h r a s e : “ t h e feeling on which t h e religion of m o d e r n times [Christianity] rests: G o d himself is d e a d . ” T h e w o r d s “ G o d is d e a d , ” n o w widely as-

78

THE FIRST SEVEN ESSAYS, 1801—1803

sociated with Nietzsche, occur more t h a n once in Hegel’s writings; but Hegel, unlike Nietzsche whose dictum h a d for that very reason a far greater impact, proceeds beyond the death t o t h e resurrection. Later i n the same sentence Hegel speaks of “ t h e specula-

tive Good Friday, which used to be [considered] historical,” and of restoring “this i n the whole truth a n d hardness of its godlessness, from which hardness alone—for the cheerfulness, less thorough manner, a n d greater singularity of dogmatic philosophies and natural religions m u s t disappear—the highest totality i n all its seriousness . . . can and must b e resurrected, at the same time all-embracing a n d into the most cheerful freedom o f its f o r m . ” Thus Hegel’s essay ends, i n G e r m a n , with th e w o r d s : auferstehen k a n n und muss, can and must be resurrected, or can and must rise again. As we shall see, th e Phenomenology ends with a comparable i m a g e : there t h e famous “speculative Good Friday” is replaced by a vision of Golgotha.

21

In the last two issues of the Critical Journal Hegel published a long article “ O n t h e scientific mo d es of treatment

of natural right, its place in practical philosophy, and its relation to the positive sciences o f l a w ” ( 1 8 0 2 / 3 ) . 1 5 Parts of i t are s o much worse stylistically than anything Hegel had

written before that one is led to wonder whether it marks a great turning point i n his development. S o m e of the early

pages are exceedingly obscure, and their darkness is not relieved b y the brilliant imagery that distinguished “Faith and Knowledge.” O n e feels that something has gone wrong and recalls a remark Rosenkranz makes early i n h i s biography of H e g e l :

“His handwriting became firm in 1786 [when he was sixteen] and exhibits an unfaltering flow and great distinctness of the letters. . . . Only in the Jena period he begins to 15 Lasson’s critical e d . is f o u n d i n Sclzriften z u r Politik Rechtsphilosophie, 2 d rev. e d . , 1 9 2 3 .

und

2 1 . Article o n natural right

79

rewrite a n d abbreviate frequently. Beside t h e m o r e vigorous

larger writing there appears a smaller one whose lines fluctua t e u p a n d down, press t h e letters together, a n d go over from t h e round flow t o a p o i n t e d form” ( 1 7 ) . T h e r e can b e n o doubt t h a t t h e prose b e c o m e s m o r e and more inhibited a n d less a n d less c l e a r . Glockner s a y s : “The

last chapter is the weightiest thing [das Bedeutendste] Hegel wrote before the Phenomenology”

( I I , 323). But this is

doubtful. What is certain is that in that chapter, too, one encounters a n amazing l a c k of clarity and forthrightness. O n

two facing pages in the discussion of comedy, for example— even n o w Hegel feels that tragedy a n d comedy belong to a discussion of ethics—there are two sentences t h a t extend,

respectively, over twenty-five and twenty-seven rather long lines; a n d this excessive length is i n no way functional.

In the nineties, when he wrote to clarify his own thinking without a n y intention o f publishing his essays, h e wrote with clarity a n d vigor, b u t t h e n c a m e to feel that h i s criticisms, however powerful, were facile a n d tedious; w h a t was needed

was writing in a constructive vein. He set out to develop a system of philosophy, arrived at Jena with a plan on which h e c o n t i n u e d t o work, b u t h e c o u l d not finish it to his own

satisfaction. So he began to publish review articles in a journal that he himself edited: again, his criticisms were vigorous, to s a y the least—really too vigorous, considering the victims, Krug and Schulze. While Kant, Fichte, a n d even Schelling, still in h i s mid-twenties, h a d m a d e n a m e s for t h e m -

selves with their own contributions to philosophy and were assured of enduring fame a n d inclusion i n any history of phiIOSOphy, H e g e l , now i n his thirties, was either e x p o u n d i n g the giants—one o f them his junior b y five years—or d o i n g battle against Krug and Schulze. O n e gathers t h a t h e felt deeply dissatisfied with himself, a n d this vexation a d d e d t o his aggressiveness. I t s e e m e d h i g h t i m e to write more t h a n a review

article—and the long piece o n Natural Right represents a n effort i n t h a t direction—but o n the other h a n d H e g e l felt that what w a s really needed w a s n o m e r e article b u t a system. And

the system, though in some ways clear in his mind, was nowhere n e a r completion.

80

THE FIRST SEVEN ESSAYS, 1801—1803

Rosenkranz praises this long article, but is as far as Glockner from taking i n t o account these considerations. H e is right when h e says, “It w a s here that h e first allowed his own system to emerge more definitely” ( 1 7 2 ) , but he fails

to note the strain this involved. And when he adds a page later, “This treatise i n its ethical loftiness w o u ld b e worthy of a legislator!” h e forgets t o tell his readers t h a t n o legislator could afford such obscurity. H e c o n t i n u e s : “Though Hegel later presented all these concepts more distinctly, in greater

detail, in a more artfully systematic manner, in his Philosophy of Right, o n e must yet insist that the originality of their c o n ception is more beautiful in this more youthful form, fresher, and indeed i n parts truer.” This is surely meant t o b e h i g h praise a n d will so strike adm i r e r s of the Philowphy of Right. The p o i n t is, very briefly,

that in this essay Hegel criticizes Kant’s Moralitiit—his objections to the categorical imperative include points still made i n many classrooms—and then goes o n to ex p o u n d his own conception of Sittlichkeir. I n a moment w e shall illustrate

both points. First, however, let us pursue a little further our analysis of the way i n which predicament. The crucial p o i n t c a n b e what o n his own convictions is u n a b l e to d o w h a t h e feels

Hegel’s style reflects a profound put succinctly: Hegel is d o i n g h e should not be d o i n g ; a n d h e h e ought to d o . The system t h a t

is wanted is not ready, and the form in which he does present his thoughts strikes h i m as unsuitable. We shall see in the

next chapter how this vexation persists through the Phenomenology—both the b o d y of that book a n d the l o n g preface. I n a different way it marks all of Hegel’s work. Throughout, there is a deep cleft between his peculiar gifts a n d his intentions, his genius a n d his convictions. A m o r e harmonious person would hardly have looked upon harmony a s such a high a n d significant goal. I n the nineties Hegel’s writings w e r e , for t h e most part,

far from obscure. On the rare occasions when he permitted himself t o write i n a vein t h a t h e himself considered really unworthy of a philOSOpher—for e x a m p l e , i n t h e brilliant little essay “Who Thinks Abstractly?” ( C h a p t e r IX)——his prose

2 1 . Article o n natural right

81

a n d his t h o u g h t s w e r e clear a n d forthright. B u t h e felt strongly

that he ought to be doing something that in fact he was not a b l e t o d o , a n d his curiously inhibi—ted a n d frustrated style mirrors the fatal strain between his gifts a n d his intentions.

In criticizing Kant’s moral philosophy Hegel makes much of its lack of content: “Now it is precisely one’s interest to know what is right, what duty; one asks for the content of t h e m o r a l law, a n d it is solely this c o n t e n t that matters. B u t it is of the essence of t h e p u r e will and p u r e practical reason t h a t they abstract from all c o n t e n t ; a n d therefore it i s in-

herently self-contradictory to seek any moral legislation, which would have to have content, from this practical reas o n , since its essence consists in n o t h a v i n g a n y c o n t e n t . ”

Kant’s imperative or moral law “that a maxim of your will must at the same time be valid as the principle of a universal legislation” won’t w o r k : “there is nothing t h a t couldn’t b e m a d e a m o r a l l a w in this w a y ” ( 3 5 0 f . ) . Hegel t h e n considers s o m e of Kant’s examples w h i c h , according t o Kant,

cannot be universalized because that would involve a contradiction; a n d Hegel suggests t h a t these cases are analogous

to the maxim that we should help the poor: “When one thinks that the poor would be helped universally, then there would be either no poor at all any more or only poor people; s o n o n e w o u l d r e m a i n who c o u l d h e l p , a n d i n both cases h e l p would b e c o m e impossible. The m a x i m , t h e n , universalized, does away with itself” ( 3 5 5 ) .

To find a content, Hegel proceeds beyond Kant’s Moralitc'z’t to Sittlichkez‘t; and later he says: “We remark here also a h i n t o f l a n g u a g e t h a t , otherwise rejected, i s fully justified by

the preceding: it is of the nature of absolute Siztlichkeit to be something general or Sitten [customs]; so the Greek word which designates Sittlichkeit [i.e., ethos] a n d t h e German

one both express its nature superbly well. And the recent systems o f Sittlichkeit, since t h e y m a d e being-for-oneself and the single person their principle, . . . could n o t misuse these words t o designate their subject, b u t accepted t h e word Moralitc'it w h i c h , t o b e s u r e , a c c o r d i n g t o its origin, points in the s a m e direction [ t o w a r d mores], but because it is rather

82

THE FIRST SEVEN ESSAYS, 1801—1803

more an artificially constructed word it does not so directly resist its worse [individualistic, K a n t i a n ] m e a n i n g ” ( 3 8 8 f . ) . In the original, this quotation forms a single sentence of sixteen lines; b u t unlike m a n y a n o t h e r passage it is c l e a r a n d unambiguous. Hegel’s point obviously d e p e n d s o n G e r m a n usage a n d

cannot be rendered into English. Sittlichkeit is a plain German word, not a specifically philos0phical term, and one n e e d not b e interested i n etymologies o r know foreign l a n guages t o perceive its close connection with Sitte ( c u s t o m ) . Kant, to b e sure, h a d called his first m a j o r work o n ethics Grundlegung zur Metaplzysz’k der Sitten ( 1 7 8 5 ) a n d h a d

later followed it up with a two-volume Metaphysik der Sitten ( 1 7 9 7 ) , a n d the following year Fichte h a d published his System der Sittenlehre; but Hegel felt, n o t w i t h o u t justice, t h a t all these references t o Sitten ( c u s t o m s ) were quite mis-

leading: after all, Kant’s ethic was patently not founded o n custom but rather on the solitary individual’s ratiocination about his maxims. Kant had also introduced the word w h i c h , unlike Moral, is a rather artificial t e r m ; Moralitc'it, a n d Hegel, w a n t i n g to distinguish t h e K a n t i a n e t h i c from his own, e m p l o y s this label for Kant’s while apprOpriating Sittliclzkeit for his o w n .

When he says “that the absolute ethical [sittliche] totality is n o t h i n g else t h a n a people [ein V o l k ] ” ( 3 6 8 ) , we should recall h i s early fragments a b o u t folk religion (Volksrelz'gz'on) w i t h their glorification o f the Greeks ( H 8 ) , a s well a s the fact that i n 1 8 0 2 a n d 1 8 0 3 one could scarcely s p e a k of a German people, a deutsches Volk. Hegel’s discussion of Sittliclzkeit i n his l o n g journal article is, moreover, supported by frequent citations of Plato a n d Aristotle (eight, mostly long, q u o t a t i o n s ) , a n d one passage from G i b b o n o n the de— moralization i n the R o m a n e m p i r e .

The only other quotation in the last half of this long article c o m e s from Diogenes L a e r t i u s : “ . . . a n d concerning Sittlichkeit t h e word of t h e wisest m e n of antiquity is the only t r u t h : being ethical [sittlich] m e a n s living i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the c u s t o m s [Sitten] of one’s c o u n t r y ; a n d c o n c e r n i n g e d u cation, what a Pythagorean o n c e said in answer to the ques—

2 1 . Article o n natural right

83

tion w h a t might b e the best education for one’s s o n : ‘Making him t h e citizen of a people with good institutions’ [Diogenes

Laertius VIII.16]” (392). Before h e published this article, Hegel had written a System der Sittlz’chkeit which was published in full only over a century later b y L a s s o n ; but Rudolf Haym read t h e manuscript, a n d what h e said about Hegel’s notion o f Sittlz‘chkeit applies also t o t h e journal article: “Hegel’s ethics rested on the s a m e basis, which was t h e most fundamental a n d ulti-

mate basis of his whole way of thinking. . . . It rests on the contemplation o f t h e ethical life [auf der A n s c h a u u n g des

sittlichen Lebens] of colored through and state the whole truth, and according to its

the classical peoples: its character is through by Greek antiquity. It is, to according to its contents a description, philosophical form an absolutizing of

the private and public, o f t h e social, the artistic, and the religious life of the Greeks.”16

Not only does Hegel speak of “the absolute ethical totality” in the passage just quoted; a few lines before that he introduces, italicized, “absolute Sittlichkeit.” As Haym remarks, “There is complete proof t h a t h e did n o t yet envisage art, religion, and philosophy above and after t h e ethical spirit a s a still higher manifestation a n d realization of t h e absolute spirit. . . . For the present, the real realization o f the ab-

solute spirit in ethical communal life was for him the altogether true and highest realization of this spirit; the ethical

spirit was for him the absolutely absolute. Thus it had to be in accordance with the innermost motive of Hegel’s way of thinking, and thus it had to be in accordance with the substantial idea of his philos0phy. That motive was the restoration of the content of life in classical antiquity. This idea was the realization of that which was merely thought. . . . Necessarily, the restoration of classical life was shipwrecked by the conditions of modern life. Necessarily, therefore, this restoration h a d t o flee into t h e form o f idealism, into the form of philosophy. And necessarily this form, i n turn, h a d to save its own right b y p r o c l a i m i n g itself, i.e., thinking, as 16 Hegel u n d seine Zeit ( 1 8 5 7 ) , 1 6 0 .

84

THE FIRST SEVEN ESSAYS, 1801—1803

i n t h e fi n a l instance a still truer realization of t h o u g h t than

that which thought receives in the ethical actuality of the state. . . . We shall see later that to the end Hegel decided alternately n o w i n favor o f the absoluteness of the objective and real appearance o f the absolute spirit in the state, now i n favor of the absoluteness of its ‘absolute,’ i.e., ideal, ap-

pearance in art, religion, and phi1050phy. We learn for the present that of these two decisions the latter was altogether the later one, and that in 1 8 0 2 , i n the first bloom of his philosophical conception, he wanted t o reach t h e true and actual end . . . with the ethical spirit” ( 1 6 1 f . ) .

Haym is completely right in stressing the overwhelming importance of classical Greece for Hegel’s philosophy. In a brilliant book on The Tyranny of Greece o v e r Germany,17 Professor E . M . Butler of Cambridge University dealt with Winckelmann and Lessing, Goethe and Schiller, Holderlin and H e i n e , Nietzsche and Stefan George. S h e m i g h t well

have included Hegel under that suggestive title. What Haym does not recognize clearly enough is that Hegel’s admiration for the Greeks was centered i n Athens and based i n large

measure on the fusion there accomplished of art and religion with the ethical life of the citizens. Art, religion, and public life can h a r d l y b e disentangled even i n retrospect: to which o f them would one assign the Parthenon, the great statues

of Zeus and Athena and Apollo, or the gatherings at which Aeschylus and Sophocles, and a little later Sophocles and

Euripides, vied for the first prize? When Hegel i n effect declared himself for the p r i m a c y o f the ethical r e a l m , this included art, religion, a n d philosop h y ; he never set t h e state above these. Nor is it true that “to the end Hegel d e c i d e d alternately now i n favor” of t h e one, now in favor of t h e other. I n his first b o o k , the Phenomenology, which Hegel himself compares to a ladder (11.2.5), art a nd religion, which are treated together, a n d phiIOSOphy, which is treated next and last, occupy the top rungs, above

both Sittlichkeit and Moralita't.

And in Hegel’s system—not

only i n t h e first edition of 1 8 1 7 but also in t h e thorough17 Cambridge University Press, 1935; Beacon Paperback, 1958.

2 1 . Article o n natural right

85

going revision o f 1 8 2 7 and i n the last edition, published a year before Hegel’s death—the ethical life and the state mark the p i n n a c l e o f what h e calls objective Spirit, while absolute spirit, which comprises art, religion, and philosophy, rises

above that. Hegel’s reason for assigning such a high place to the ethical life and the state is that, largely under the influence of the example o f Athens, he views them as the matrix i n which

art, religion, and philosophy develop. Hegel no more chooses between ethical life and philosophy than he chooses between phi1030phy and art; and he is aware of the fact that the

Greeks, too, did not think of making any such choice. Not all of this was as clear to him in 1802 as it was when he finally published his system. In 1802, as a matter of fact, Hegel had tried t o complete a long essay o n “The German

Constitution.”18 H e had finished over 130 pages before abandoning t h e project. The first sentence h a d b e e n : “Germany is n o longer a s t a t e . ” The question h a d been what might b e done about it. As Pelczynski says, “ O n e of Hegel’s purposes

in writing The German Constitution was to expose that hypocrisy a n d t o make his countrymen face reality” ( 1 4 ) , but beyond that his suggestions were “hopeless and impractic a l ” ( 1 6 ) ; a n d this was plainly the main reason h e gave up the project. For the very same reason, his long journal article could

not cure his profound malaise. It was all very well to contrast Athens with Kant, but as Hegel himself insisted in his critique of Kant: “It is precisely one’s interest to know what is right, what d u t y ; one asks for the content . . . a nd it i s

solely this content that matters.” In the end, Hegel had not got far beyond suggesting t h a t the ancient Athenian knew

his duties and knew what was right, which, even if entirely true, w a s n o t really m u c h help h e r e and n o w . After all, a s

Hegel put it on the last page but two of his journal article, the Germans were “ a dissolved people.” What Haym sensed, rightly enough, was that Hegel w a s a

18 Translated by T. M . Knox and discussed by Z. A . Pelczynski in Hegel’s Political Writings (1964). Original in Lasson’s ed. of Schriften z u r Politik a n d Reclttsphilosophie.

86

THE FIRST SEVEN ESSAYS, 1801—1803

man deeply at odds with himself; but in the passage we have quoted Haym d i d not analyze this tension aright. We should rather say that there was i n Hegel, especially but not only a t that time, a conflict between activism and quietism. Thus Hegel wrote in his introduction to The German Constitution: “The thoughts contained i n this essay cannot have any other

aim or effect upon publication than the understanding of that which is,19 and thus to promote calmer contemplation as well as the ability to endure it. . . . ” (5)20 Hegel was not satisfied to find harmony in art, as Schiller and some o f the romantics h a d suggested. H e lacked the artistic genius that enabled Schiller to fi n d p eace a n d happi-

ness in writing plays and poems. Like Plato and the Pythagoreans, he felt that the individual i n isolation could

not attain what he most wanted, apart from an ethical community. But that was out of reach, and meanwhile philosophical “understanding o f that which i s ” might give o n e the

strength to endure what is, without putting on blinders. The conception of phiIOSOphy as therapy has come to be widely

associated

with

Wittgenstein,

who

said

in

his

Philosophical Investigations that “The philosopher treats a question—like a disease” ( 2 5 5 ) and who compared philosophical methods t o “different therapies” ( 1 3 3 ) . For Hegel, too, philosophy was a kind of therapy—but i n the tradition of Spinoza and the Stoics. The young Hegel was not a professor who, sitting at his desk, felt confident that h e was omniscient, though this is, more o r less, the popular image of the m a n . In fact, h e w a s at odds with himself and the

world, desperately needed the therapy of philosophy, but for many years d i d not succeed in mastering it sufficiently to

cure himself. 19 These are the words quoted by Rosenzweig in the passage cited in H 11. 20 The sentence, though Short, i s extremely awkward. Knox ren-

ders it into elegant English, but his “tolerant attitude” misses the sadness and force o f Hegel’s

Ertragen

(endure).

CHAPTER

III

The Phenomenology

22 In 1803 Schelling left the University of Jena, and the Critical Journal, which Hegel and Schelling had edited together, was discontinued. Now Hegel stopped publishing—until his first book appeared i n 1807.

The articles in the Journal had been unsigned, and about one of them, not mentioned so far, there was a dispute after Hegel’s death: some of the disciples of each editor claimed authorship for h i m . It speaks greatly for Haym’s understand-

ing of Hegel—one might also say, his feeling for Hegel—that he believed “with certainty” that the error lay “on the side of the disciples of Hegel who were over-zealous for the fame of their master” (155 f . ) . A subsequently discovered list of his own publications in Hegel’s hand proved Haym right: the disputed article was by Schelling. Yet Haym was a n y t h i n g b u t a partisan of Schelling, a n d although h e is often remembered a s a severe critic o f Hegel, his critique w a s al-

ways blended with admiration. Looking back on the Journal, he wrote: “Three quarters of the whole Journal were notoriously written by the second editor. Three quarters of this Journal are truly important [bedeutend] and a treasure of the m o s t profound a n d thoughtful discussions; a fourth quar-

ter contains partly repetitions of what Schelling had said long before, partly a series of more o r less clever notions [geistreichen Einfa'llen], of polemical little skirmishes, of romantic-ingenious rudenesses and elegant frivolities: this fourth q u a r t e r is notoriously t h e p r o p e r t y of t h e first editor.

Schelling put his real literary activity around this time into

T H E PHENOMENOLOGY

88

his Neue Zeitschrift” ( 1 5 7 ) . The last point is i m p o r t a n t : it would n o t have occurred to a n y o n e t o judge Schelling m a i n l y by his contributions to the Critical Journal. B u t Haym goes m u c h further: “Hegel’s achievements surpassed those of his friend already . i n 1 8 0 2 , ” although H eg el himself never betrayed a n y sense of superiority ( 1 5 8 ) . No d o u b t , hindsight is required for this judgment. If Hegel h a d died before writing his Phenomenology, Schelling m i g h t still b e included i n histories of philosophy, b u t Hegel certainly would n o t b e m e n t i o n e d . N o r d i d h e a t the t i m e attract attention c o m p a r a b l e t o Schelling’s r e n o w n . And Hegel him-

self knew it. H i s energy now went i n t o two closely related projects: his lectures a n d t h e a t t e m p t t o prepare his system for publication. D u r i n g his first t e r m , beginning late i n 1 8 0 1 , Hegel an-

nounced “Logic and Metaphysics” and had eleven students. H e also a n n o u n c e d a c o u r s e jointly with Schelling, b u t a p parently this did n o t materialize. I n th e s u m m e r of 1 8 0 2 h e devoted himself entirely t o his literary labors—and announced a book with t h e title “ L o g i c a n d Metaphysics or Systema reflexionis e t ratiom's”; a n d w h e n h e announced a

course on the same subject that winter, he mentioned that this text would appear in the spring. In the summer of 1803 h e proposed t o cover the w h o l e of phiIOSOphy a n d referred to a text that h e w o u l d soon publish with C o t t a in Tiibingen. D u r i n g t h e next two years, until t h e s u m m e r o f 1 8 0 5 , his announcements d i d not refer t o a n y book b u t only promised lectures ex dictatis.1 H e also lectured repeatedly o n philosop h y of right.

In the winter of 1 8 0 3 / 4 he promised to read ex dictatis o n “System of Speculative PhiIOSOphy” and specified three p a r t s : first, Logic a n d Metaphysics, o r Transcendental Ideal1For

all of this, see Ros. 160 ff., and Haering, “Die Entste-

h u n g s g e s c h i c h t e der P h a n o m e n o l o g i e d e s G e i s t e s . ” C f . a l s o Haeri n g , I I , 4 7 9 if, a n d Hoffmeister’s i n t r o d u c t i o n to h i s e d i t i o n o f the Plzc'inomenologie ( 1 9 5 2 ) , xxviii ff. O t t o Poggeler, “ Z u r D e u t u n g der Ph'anomenologie des Geistes” ( H e g e l Studien, I , 1 9 6 1 ) , p . 2 7 9 , disagrees w i t h H a e r i n g but later, o n p p . 2 8 4 f . a n d 2 8 8 f . corroborates t h e essential points.

2 2 . Jena lectures and t h e genesis of t h e book

89

i s m ; t h e n t h e Philosophy of N a t u r e ; finally, t h a t of Spirit.2 T h e following s u m m e r h e did n o t lecture, while i n the win-

ter of 1 8 0 4 / 5 he repeated this course for thirty students, and after that he always had between twenty and thirty. In the s u m m e r of 1 8 0 5 h e offered t h e s a m e course again—and again promised a book that w a s e v i d e n t l y m e a n t t o cover his whole system i n o n e v o l u m e .

In the winter of 1 8 0 5 / 6 he lectured for the first time on the history of philosophy; he also repeated philosophy of n a t u r e and spirit u n d e r th e title Realphilosophie3; and for the first and o n l y t i m e h e offered a course o n m a t h e m a t i c s

in which Gabler, who after Hegel’s death succeeded t o his chair at Berlin, was one of his students. I n his course a n n o u n c e m e n t s for t h a t w i n t e r h e did not promise a book. Th e a n n o u n c e m e n t s , of c o u r s e , were c o m p o s e d a few months before, presumably late i n t h e s u m m e r ; but t h a t winter h e actually signed a contract for a book with a publisher in B a m b e r g , G o e b h a r d t . The title i n t h e n o longer extant contract s e e m s to have been “System of Sciences”—-according to Haering, “p ro b a b l y already . . . w i t h th e specification ‘First Part,’ b u t certainly still w i t h o u t any mention of a ‘Phenomenology.’ A c c o r d i n g t o the a n n o u n c e m e n t for t h e s u m m e r of 1 8 0 6 , this first part w a s still supposed t o c o n t a i n . . . t h e

Logic,” probably together with a brief introduction (122). D u r i n g t h e s u m m e r of 1 8 0 6 h e again ofiered Philosophy

of Nature and Spirit, as well as a second course o n Speculative Philosophy “in which he lectured for the first time on Phenomenology and Logic, and which he also announced again for t h e winter of 1 8 0 6 ” ( R o s . 1 6 2 ) . T h a t summer, t h e introduction kept growing, and around August—certainly not before-when Hegel wrote his a n n o u n c e m e n t for t h e winter semester 1 8 0 6 / 7 , t h e title “ P h e n o m e n o l o g y ” occurs for

the first time. Hegel announced: Logicam et Metaphysicam sive philosophiam speculativam, praemissa Phaenomenologia 2In

t h e L a t i n a n n o u n c e m e n t s the w o r d u s e d i s m e n t i s . T h i s i s a l m o s t t h e o n l y reason—and a n u t t e r l y insufficient o n e ( s e e H 3 4

and 6 5 ) for translating Hegel’s Geist as “mind” instead of “spirit.” 3For Hegel’s Jenenser Realphilosophie, the lectures of 1 8 0 3 / 4 and 1805/6, see Bibliography 11. D . 5 and 6 .

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

90

mentis ex libri sui: System der Wissenschaft proxime proditura parte prima and Philosophiam naturae e t mentis ex dictatis.4 Indeed, as late a s September 2 0 , 1 8 0 6 , Hegel’s announcement i n t h e Intelligenzblatt of th e Jenaer Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung promised, in G e r m a n , that h e would offer “Speculative Philosophy or Logic a n d Metaphysics, preceded by Phenomenology of th e Spirit . . . according t o his text-

book” and “PhiIOSOphy of Nature and Spirit . . . according to dictated sentences.” This is t h e first occurrence of t h e words “Phenomenology o f the Spirit,” a n d i n context the implication is clearly t h a t the volume about t o a p p e a r will c o n t a i n mainly Hegel’s “ L o g i c a n d Metaphysics” which h e always treats a s o n e subject. The Phenomenology will b e o n l y the introduction of volume one, not the whole of volume one, much less a sepa-

rate major work. According to the contract with the publisher, the first half o f t h e v o l u m e w as supposed t o b e printed by Easter 1 8 0 6 ; i n fact, this w a s not d o n e : Hegel h a d the greatest difficulties i n actually getting this b o o k written. He

finally mailed the first half of the manuscript to Jena o n October 8 and finished t h e remainder t h e night of O c tobe r 12—13. B u t the title “ P h e n o m e n o l o g y of th e Spirit” w a s a p -

parently chosen only in August—for the introductory part of v o l u m e one—and a s l a t e a s S e p t e m b e r Hegel still seems t o have hoped that the same v o l u m e would also accommodate, e v e n a s its m a i n part, Logic, o n which h e h a d copious notes.

In January he read proofs and mailed the preface to Bamberg—another ninety-one pages a s printed i n th e original edition. Early i n April he saw t h e first copies of t h e b o o k . I t

had not been conceived and written the way most peOple i m a g i n e Professor Hegel t o h a v e written his books. I t was

the work of a tormented spirit.5 Hegel writing the Phenomenology is worlds removed from t h e serenity o f Holbein’s E r a s m u s , standing at his desk, a timeless i m a g e of the s o b e r s c h o l a r . H e is far closer to the 4The 5Cf.

Latin is translated in the next sentence. Miiller, 1 6 3 : “Simply to c o p y t h i s b o o k w i t h o u t t h i n k i n g

probably would require not much less time than the months in w h i c h i t originated.”

2 3 . Hegel’s illegitimate son world of Dostoevsky’s novels. S o far from

91

its being true

that his life was a blank and his thoughts remote from the concerns of flesh and blood, dictated solely by cold, if perverse, logic, t h e full measure o f h i s torment has n o t yet been suggested. Goebhardt h a d not b e e n e a g e r to publish Hegel’s book, and N i e t h a m m e r , Hegel’s best a n d most loyal friend, ha d

signed a commitment that he personally would pay for the entire printed edition if Hegel did not furnish the whole manuscript by October 18. Only on that condition, the publisher had paid Hegel a badly needed advance. Hegel got off half of the manuscript ten days before the deadline, but then Napoleon moved i n , finished off the Holy R o m a n Empire, founded by Charlemagne i n 8 0 0 , i n th e Battle o f Jena,

and on October 1 3 occupied the city. The night from the twelfth to the thirteenth Hegel finished the book-appalled by the thought that the first half m i g h t well have got lost on the way, a n d w o n d e r i n g whether h e dare to m a i l t h e sec-

ond half. On the eighteenth he writes Niethammer that he h a s b e e n advised “ t h a t such circumstances s et aside all obligations,” b u t w h e n the first m a i l leaves again h e will s e n d the b a l a n c e . M e a n w h i l e th ere h a d b e e n a big fire i n J e n a as

well as some looting. That was how the book was finished— except for the preface, which was done in January.

23 By then, one might suppose, all was peace. But on February 5, Christiana Charlotte Johanna Burkhardt, neé Fischer, gave birth to a n illegitimate child, Ludwig, Hegel’s s o n . Those who have written about Hegel have hardly ever m e n t i o n e d

this fact-in almost all cases because they did not know it, in a very few because they considered it indelicate. Glockner not only fails to mention b o t h t h e mother and t h e son i n h i s

two-volume work, although he devotes a chapter of 195 pages t o “Hegel’s Personality”; h e c o n c l u d e s a footnote about w o m e n to w h o m Hegel w r o t e letters with t h e w o r d s : “Nothing suggests that any o f these relationships gave rise to a

92

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

moral problem about which Hegel ever thought seriously”

(I, 283). There are a t least two reasons for n o t omitting some discussion of Ludwig. If one ignores h i m , o n e cannot really understand t h e state of m i n d i n which Hegel wrote his first b o o k ; a n d , secondly, the boy’s birth d i d introduce a

very serious moral problem into Hegel’s life. The first of these points should be fairly clear by now. The Phenome— nology was written in a few months’ time, under a n immense

strain. It was not written with a clear outline in mind, as if Hegel h a d known exactly what he proposed to do a n d then

had done it. For years he had announced a book and not been able to write it, though he kept accumulating pages and pages o f drafts and lecture notes. Meanwhile, not only Schelling had published book upon b o o k ; J . F . Fries, three years Hegel’s junior, who together with Hegel, h a d begun his academic career at J e n a i n 1 8 0 1 , an d been m a d e Associate Professor there i n 1 8 0 5 , also together with Hegel, h a d later that year accepted a c h a i r a t Heidelberg; and Krug,

born the same year as Hegel, had published enough to obtain the chair at Konigsberg when Kant died in 1804. The point was n o t just o n e of honor, prestige, or money, though Hegel was i n desperate straits financially; the question w a s whether h e , now over thirty-five, could o r could not write a

book. And that was tied up with the problem of whether he could resolve his philosophical difliculties, clarify his thoughts, a n d resolve his intellectual torments along with his other vexations. J ena, a great intellectual center before Hegel arrived, a s sociated w i t h Goethe a n d Schiller, Fichte a n d the early ro-

mantic movement, as well as Schelling, had by then lost its lure. Everybody who was anybody w a s leaving—and after the Battle o f Jena there w a s no winter semester for Hegel;

there was the urgent necessity of finding a job somewhere else; and early in 1807 he went to Bamberg to edit a newspapen I n t h e spring o f 1 8 0 6 , when h e finally h a d begun to write,

seeking clarification in the process, without any clear idea what exactly would happen on paper, he made a woman in

2 3 . Hegel’s

illegitimate son

93

Jena pregnant, a n d knew it a s h e kept writing away a n d found

that the book was radically changing under his hands. By October, the introductory part had grown into such a fat book that there could b e n o thought o f including even the first

third of the system, the Logic. But the deadline had to be met, the French army was on the spot, and his days at the University of Jena were n u m b e r e d . So he cut the umbilical cord. Then in January, when the boy’s birth w as expected any

day, Hegel suddenly added his immensely long preface to the introduction to his system, although t h a t introduction al-

ready began with an “introduction” of nineteen pages. Some of those who know Hegel’s writings best consider this preface Hegel’s most important essay. (See the quotations that precede my complete translation of the preface.) On February 5 , Ludwig was born. Who wa s t h e mother? Rosenkranz, i n h i s biography, and Karl Hegel, i n his edition of his father’s letters, observed complete discretion, as if neither mother nor son h a d existed; meanwhile rumors grew and were not refuted. Even in 1 9 5 4 , the long note o n this m a t t e r a t the end of the third volume o f the critical edition of the letters ( 4 3 3 ff.) gave a

misleading picture of the mother. The crucial document appeared only i n the fourth v o l u m e , i n 1 9 6 0 , without any c omment o n its significance.

The document in question is a n excerpt from the Jena records o f b a p t i s m : “Christiana Charlotte B u r k h a r d t , born Fischer, the abandoned wife of a servant of a c o u n t , for the

third time an illegitimate son, Georg Ludwig Friedrich. . . . Day of b i r t h : 5 February, 1 8 0 7 , a t 1 2 n o o n . Day of b a p t i s m : 7 February, 1 8 0 7 . G o d f a t h e r s : Herr F r i e d r i c h Frommann,

book dealer here; Herr Georg Ludwig Hegel [the father’s brother], Lieutenant i n t h e Royal Wiirttemberg Regiment Crown Prince. (Former b i r t h s : 1 8 October, 1 8 0 1 : i n dishonor, a d a u g h t e r : Auguste Theresia.6 9 M a r c h , 1 8 0 4 : for the second t i m e i n dishonor, a s o n , who died 3 0 November, 6 Ludwig’s inscription in his sister’s Stammbuch, March 26, 1823, a n d a farewell l e t t e r h e wrote h e r A u g u s t 2 7 , 1 8 2 5 , show the depth of his feeling for h e r ( B IV, 1 2 6 , 1 3 0 ) .

94

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

1806.)” The entry further indicates that the mother was an only child, that her father was a court messenger—her mother

is not mentioned—and that she was born May 8, 1778. In s u m : she was almost eight years younger than Hegel, but

she was not plunged into dishonor by Hegel; and in view of her past and the prejudices of the time, it would hardly have been very surprising if Professor Hegel h ad done his best to forget the whole affair. B u t as h e wrote Frommann from Bamberg, July 9 , 1 8 0 8 : “ I always have t o regret grievously that so far I have been unable to tear her, who is the mother of my

child and who therefore may demand every kind of duty from me, entirely out of her situation. To you I a m greatly indebted

for making it easier for me to make things a little easier for her.” When the boy was four, he was given to Frau Frommann’s sister, Sophie Bohn, who had been widowed in 1803 and in 1807 had moved to Jena with her own two sons to open a home for boys. In 1811 Hegel married, while h e was principal of the Gymnasium

a t Niirnberg. I n the summer o f 1 8 1 6 h e was

finally offered a chair of philosophy, at Heidelberg. Thereupon h e wrote Frommann,

August 2 8 , 1 8 1 6 , almost two

months before he actually left Niirnberg: “ M y wife and I are resolved to have Ludwig live with u s n o w . ” In the spring

Ludwig joined the family, which by then consisted of two sons. The first child of Hegel’s marriage, a girl born in 1812, had died soon after her birth. By then, Ludwig was ten, and his little brothers were three and four. O n April 19, 1817, Hegel wrote Frommann: “Voss has meanwhile brought us Ludwig. Just now I have told him of his mother’s death, of which Voss

informed m e . It affected

him more than me. My feelings have long got over her; I could only worry about unpleasant contacts between her and Ludwig—and thus indirectly with my wife. . . . He shows a good h e a d ; h e now attends the Gymnasium here which, t o be sure, could b e better. B u t I am amazed how much Latin

he has learned this winter.” From Berlin, Hegel wrote Frommann, April 8 , 1 8 2 2 , that Ludwig had been confirmed “eight days a g o ” and that

he would like to find an apprenticeship for him in some busi-

2 4 . Hegel’s style as a lecturer and writer

95

ness. From a letter of J u n e 6 , 1 8 2 2 , to the minister of education, Altenstein, we gather that Hegel was i n financial

straits. On July 9 , h e again discusses Ludwig’s future with Frommann. Later, Ludwig entered Dutch military service and went to Batavia where he died of a fever August 28, 1831. Before h e embarked for the East Indies, the boy, then eighteen, wrote two desperate letters ( B IV, 1 2 8 i f ) . The first, dated July 1 1 , 1 8 2 5 , w a s addressed to his sister’s

foster father. He complains that his “stepmother, who had two children of her o w n , ” h a d not treated h im like he r sons;

“and so I always lived in fear, without loving my parents—a relationship that had to produce a constant tension.” He would long have liked to run away, but lacked the means. He would have liked t o study medicine, “but I was told there could b e n o thought of th a t; I should work for a businessman!

I told them before that I would hardly stay there as I did not feel born for business; the answer wa s that i n that case one

would cease to support me.—And this has really happened now.” H e has enlisted for six years and will get out again, he writes, June 2 4 , 1 8 3 1 . He has found a few congenial young

men. “If you could give me some information about the circumstances of my dear mother, about th e final circumstances of her death, and her relation to Herr Hegel, I should be

obliged t o you. I am in such uncertainty about all this; yet these are things that are very close to me.” The other letter, to h i s sister, dated August 2 7 , 1 8 2 5 ( h i s

father’s birthday), is written aboard ship. It is much shorter and e n d s : “Farewell! Your

brother, wh o loves you unto

death.”

24 Some professors find a measure of fulfillment, or at least some relief and release of tension, i n lecturing. Not Hegel. Even as a student he h a d been criticized for h i s poor oral delivery and h i s weak voice. O n November 2 7 , 1 8 0 3 , Goethe wrote Schiller: “ I n connection w i t h Hegel I have been wondering whether o n e could not secure a great advantage for

96

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

him if one could teach him something about the technique o f

speaking. He is a truly excellent human being; but his utterances are Open to too many objections.” Schiller had replied: “I am delighted that you are getting better acquainted with Hegel. What he lacks one will scarcely b e able to give h i m . ” On March 1 4 , 1 8 0 7 , just before the Phenomenology appeared, Goethe wrote his friend Knebel how glad he was that

Hegel was about to publish a book: “I am eager to see at long last a presentation o f his way of thinking. He has such an excellent head, and h e finds it s o difficult to communicate

his ideas.” Rosenkranz describes Hegel as a lecturer at Jena as follows: “Without

the least consideration for rhetorical

elegance,

devoted through and through to the subject, deeply stirred by the tendency of the present age, always striving on and yet often quite dogmatic in his expression, Hegel captivated the students with the intensity of his speculation. . . . An odd s mile revealed the purest benevolence; yet at the same

time there was something sharp, even cutting, painful, or rather ironic about it. It reflected the tragic trait o f the philosopher, the hero who wrestles with the riddle o f the world.

“On the students en masse Hegel had no influence whatever. They knew o f him only a s an obscure oddity; a nd who-

ever wanted to hear not only the older professors but also for once one of the younger lecturers preferred to hear Fries, who was trying to work his way up at the same time as Hegel. But a small circle of adherents and admirers clung to him

that much more firmly, and their enthusiasm increased immensely, especially during the last years of Hegel’s stay in Jena” ( 2 1 5 f . ) . Rosenkranz has also recorded for us how Hegel’s last lec-

ture at the University of Jena ended: “The Phenomenology was Hegel’s last lecture in Jena. He concluded his course on Speculative PhiIOSOphy September 1 8 , 1 8 0 6 , with these w o r d s :

‘This, gentlemen, is speculative phi1030phy as far as I have got in developing it. Consider it a beginning of phi1030phizing which you will carry further.

Ours is a significant epoch, a

time of ferment, when the spirit has made a jerk, transcended

24. H egel’s style as a lecturer and writer

97

its previous form, and is gaining a new o n e . The whole mass of previous notions, Concepts, t h e bonds of the world, have

dissolved and collapse like a dream image. A new emergence of the spirit is at hand. Philosophy above all must welcome its appearance and recognize it, while others, impotently re-

sisting it, stick to what is past, and the majority constitutes unconsciously the mass of its appearance. Philosophy, however, recognizing it as what is eternal, must d o it honor. Commending myself to your gracious recollection, I wish you merry holidays’ ” (214 13.). O n occasion, Hegel could b e clear enough. Nor is the

curious alternation of a powerful and straightforward style with all sorts of obscurities, including tapeworm sentences that d e m a n d to b e construed, bit by bit, unique with him. When Hegel went t o Jena to begin a university career, the greatest living philosopher-and the first world-historical philosopher to have written great works i n German-was Kant;

the most prominent German philosopher after Kant was Fichte. Both of them had set a curious precedent: they had written popular essays that proved them masters of clear and vigorous prose; but both had written their major philosophical works in highly academic language that bristled with obscurities. Kant’s relatively simple and understandable Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten ( 1 7 8 5 ) , o ne of the great classics of ethics, contained a sentence that was a page

and a half long.7 Leibniz had written phiIOSOphy i n French and Latin, not in German. Alongside Kant another tradition had begun to form, spearheaded by Lessing and Schiller. B u t they were not

professional philosophers, and philosophy was a mere sideline with both of them: they were poets, playwrights, and critics who had incidentally written essays that were of great interest philosophically. If anything, Kant’s and especially Fichte’s popular writings compromised this style i n Hegel’s eyes; for

h e did not like Fichte’s pOpular essays, and in Kant’s case there could be no question whatsoever but that his greatness and stature as a phi1030pher depended o n those of his works 7In Section II, 34 f.,: the whole paragraph following the long footnote about Sulzer.

98

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

that were written i n a thoroughly forbidding style. If one wanted t o enter t h e r a n ks a s a worthy successor of K a n t a n d Fichte, it seemed clear t o Hegel—unfortunately—how o n e h a d to write. Looking into t h e past an d reading philosophy i n other languages d i d n o t c h a n g e t h e v e r d i c t : i n t h e m o r e re-

cent past, there was no philosophical work that Hegel admired more t h a n Spinoza’s Ethics; a n d going further b a c k i n t i m e there w a s Aristotle, whom Hegel esteemed supremely. I n time, it b e c a m e Hegel’s ambition t o equal Aristotle’s achievement by fashioning a crowning synthesis of what phi1050phy h a d achieved u p t o his t i m e . N e i t h e r Aristotle nor Spinoza, n o r K a n t in his major works, had given a q u a r t e r t o t h e general reader o r shown t h e slightest concern for p0pularity. N o r h a d P l a t o in such late dialogues a s t h e Parmenides a n d t h e SOphist. To e n t e r the lists with t h e m , Hegel decided t o write like t h e m , n o t like Lessing and Schiller—and n o t t h e way h e himself h a d written before he c a m e t o Je n a . That s o m e t h i n g strange h a p p e n e d t o Hegel h a s been noted by both G l o c k n e r a n d Miiller. The former says, in spite of h i s own a d m i t t e d a d m i r a t i o n f o r F i c h t e ( I I , 2 2 7 ) : “Fichte

threw him of} course. Without Fichte’s precedent, Hegel would not have developed a n y dialectical m e t h o d . Probably, h e would h a v e b r o a d e n e d K a n t i a n i s m i n a m a n n e r c o m parable t o Schiller’s” ( I I , 2 1 5 ) . Miiller writes: “ F r i e n d Schelling i n J e n a w a s Hegel’s evil spirit a n d seducer. L i k e a spider h e spins his system webs o u t o f himself a n d catches

and wraps u p his prey. Irresistibly attracted by the Latinizing word floods, his a n i m a l p r e y plunges e x u l t a n t i n t o t h e n e t s o f

‘absolute indifference.’ Hegel succumbed to the revel and attempted w h a t he c o u l d n o t do—to ‘speculate’ a n d ‘construe’ with equal frivolity. A f t e r Schelling’s fame a s a pied piper had netted h i m a call t o Wiirzburg . . . Hegel r e t u r n e d t o his more genuine self. . . . I n t h e preface t o the Phenomenology h e offered a public confession” ( 1 7 0 f . ) . B o t h G l o c k n e r a n d Miiller point t o i m p o r t a n t facts, w h i c h , however, should b e placed i n the larger picture a l r e a d y suggested h e r e . Hegel’s d e b t t o F i c h t e a n d Schelling is great indeed~and i t is largely a negative debt, a n encumbrance,

2 4 . Hegel’s style as a lecturer and writer

99

even a curse. But G . R. G . Mure also had a point when he devoted the first half of his Introduction to Hegel t o Aristotle, and Glockner does n o t exaggerate when h e says i n a footnote: “Future monographs will show how Hegel, in the

years from 1802 t o 1815, worked innumerable passages from Plato and Aristotle, partly in literal translations, into his philosophy. A surprising number of incidents has already been adduced by Wilhelm Purpus. . . .”8 The first three sections of the Phenomenology examples.

(“Consciousness”) are full of

If I am right, Goethe and Schiller, not to speak of later Hegel scholars, did not quite understand Hegel’s case. Unlikely as it may sound, he was not unable to write clearly, but he felt that he must and should not write in the way in which he was gifted. The only one who saw this clearly and stated it beautifully was Nietzsche. He was not a Hegel scholar, and his early admiration for Schopenhauer makes it surprising that h e should have understood Hegel so well. But then it was also Nietzsche who said in Ecce Homo: “Who among philosophers before me was a psychologist?” (IV, §6.) Here is Nietzsche’s analysis of Hegel, from the Dawn (§193): “Esprit

and

Morality.—The

G e r m a n s , who have mastered

the secret of being boring with spirit, knowledge, and feeling, and who have accustomed themselves to experience boredom as something moral, are afraid of French esprit because i t might prick o u t the eyes of morality—and yet this dread i s

fused with temptation, as in the bird faced by the rattlesnake. Perhaps none of the famous G e r m a n s had more esprit than Hegel; b u t h e also felt such a great German dread of it that

this created his peculiar bad style. For the essence of this style is that a core is enveloped, and enve10ped once more and again, until it scarcely peeks out, bashful and curious—as ‘young women

peek out of their veils,’ t o speak with the old

woman-hater, Aeschylus. But this core is a witty, often saucy idea about the most intellectual matters, a subtle a n d daring 8H,

3 3 6 ; cf. 3 9 5 and P u r p u s , Die Dialektik

des Bewusstseins

nach Hegel: Ein Beitrag zur Wiirdigung der Phiz’nomenologie des Geistes, Berlin, 1908.

100

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

connection of words, such a s belongs in t h e company of

thinkers, as a side dish of science—but in these wrappings it presents itself a s abstruse science itself a n d b y all m e a n s a s supremely moral boredom. Thus the G e r m a n s h a d a form o f esprit permitted t o th em, a n d they enjoyed it with such extravagant delight that Schopenhauer’s g o o d , very g o o d intelligence c a m e t o a h a l t confronted with i t : his life long, h e

blustered against the spectacle the Germans offered him, but he never was a b l e t o explain it t o himself.” This a p h o r i s m throws more light o n “ T h e Secret of Hegel” than Sterling’s huge work with t h a t title, either in its twovolume ( 1 8 6 5 ) or its one-volume ( 1 8 9 8 ) edition. T h i s example sho ws t h a t it wa s not a n idle boast w h e n Nietzsche s a i d i n Twilight of the Idols (section 5 1 ) : “ I t is m y a m b i tion t o s a y i n ten sentences w h a t everyone else says i n a book —what everyone else does n o t s a y i n a b o o k . ”

25 The preface to the Phenomenology is full of excellent aphorisms—a few of t h e m q u i t e n a k e d a n d unconcealed, so no reader c a n miss t h e m . To b e sure, they are buried in mammoth paragraphs to forestall an y popular ap pe a l. The book is called System of Science, First Part, a n d t h e appearance of the pages is forbidding enough t o frighten away browsers. B u t t h e reader w h o perseveres is brought up short

every now and then by a striking epigram. The pity is that Hegel, t o o , is brought up short, shocked a t his own u n scientific m a n n e r , a n d intent o n m a k i n g a m e n d s immediately. B u t after a while it h a p p e n s a g a i n . I t is a s if h e wore a gar-

ment that did not fit: the buttons keep popping, revealing his chest a n d , as it were, b a r i n g his h e a r t ; but every t i m e h e stops to sew them o n again before h e feels free to m a k e another move, though it keeps happening a g a i n . It never s eems to occur t o h i m to give u p the garment a s a b a d fit that m i g h t c o n ceivably suit somebody else b u t obviously not h i m . M a n y a witty observation o r fi n e formulation is successfully concealed i n a long sentence where even the few readers

2 5 . Aphorisms

101

who find it are likely to mutter something like “couldn’t be” a n d go o n . Yet t h e preface is n o t constructed around a skele-

ton outline, as if the author’s oftenq pert observations were m e r e l y dispensable o r n a m e n t s : it would b e truer to call it a s t r e a m of thought that m o v e s from core to core—to use Nietzsche’s image. O n e m i g h t wonder briefly whether Hegel might not have

offered us aphorisms without wrappings, if he had not associated t h a t form

with the very feeble aphorisms Schelling

had published just then9 and with the effusion of other early romantics, like Friedrich Schlegel a n d Novalis, n o t to m e n -

tion lesser names. But it was not merely the insubstantiality of these aphorists and the incomparably greater weight of t h e t h o u g h t o f Aristotle, S p i n o z a , a n d Kant t h a t determined his c h o i c e of form. He w as convinced that philosophy must b e c o m e scientific rather t h a n aphoristic or essayistic, and the p o i n t o f t h e preface w a s i n large measure to give his reasons. These reasons richly deserve consideration; perhaps no bette r c a s e h a s ever b e e n m a d e out for a systematic approach to

philosophy. What is so odd is merely that the preface itself— a s Hegel a d m i t s w i t h s o m e embarrassment—is a n example o f

the kind of writing that Hegel tries in this preface to banish from philosophy; a n d the b o o k that follows, too, is at the op-

posite extreme from the scientific type of philosophy for which Hegel makes his plea. Yet many, if not most, of those familiar with the whole corpus of Hegel’s writings consider the Phenomenology

Hegel’s m o s t original, brilliant, impor-

tant, and interesting book. Before we turn t o consider the Phenomenology itself and

some of the problems it raises, something further needs to be said about the book’s immediate historical context; specifically, about t h e reaction o f Kant to Fichte, and Fichte to

Schelling. 9 “Aphorismen zur Einleitung in die Naturphilosophie” in Jahrbz'icher der Medizin als Wissenschaft

140111, 198 if.

( 1 8 0 6 ) ; Werke, VII ( 1 8 6 0 ) ,

102

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

26 Fichte was a tutor when he first read Kant. He was immensely impressed a n d , being without means, walked from

Warsaw to Konigsberg to call on the master in person. Kant was favorably impressed by Fichte a n d recommended t h e manuscript of Fichte’s first book to his own publisher, who brought o u t Fichte’s Critique of A l l Revelation i n 1 7 9 2 . In

the first copies, the author’s name and preface were missing -—not by Fichte’s design—and since Kant’s book o n religion was then expected ( i t actually appeared the following y e a r ) , the title a n d publisher gave rise to t h e rumor that this was

Kant’s work. Kant explained that it was not his but Fichte’s, and praised the book. Overnight, Fichte w a s f a m o u s .

In 1793 he received a call to the University of Jena, and in May 1 7 9 4 h e began his lectures there. H e w a s a n unusually

impressive lecturer, but his attempt to abolish the student fraternities led to his temporary exile from Jena in 1795. (See Hegel’s letter to Schelling, A u g u s t 3 0 , 1 7 9 5 , in D . )

In 1798 Fichte, who was editing a phi1050phical journal with Niethammer, who later b e c a m e Hegel’s close friend, published a n article o n religion b y F . K . Forberg (1770—

1848), with a short preface of his own in which God is equated with t h e moral w o r l d order. Accused of atheism, h e

published a couple of vigorous defenses in 1799 and threatened to resign if reprimanded, which was construed as a resignation—and h e was let g o . To understand Fichte—and Hegel a s well—one should recall the last words of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. After rejecting both dogmatism a n d skepticism, while insisting o n a

systematic approach, Kant had ended both the first and the greatly revised second edition: “The critical way alone is still o p e n . If the reader h a s h a d the kindness and patience to walk a l o n g this way i n my company, h e may now judge whether,

if he will contribute his share to make this footpath a highway, that which m a n y centuries could not achieve m i g h t not b e attained before the present century runs o u t : namely, to

2 6 . Kant—Fichte—Schelling—H egel

103

give h u m a n r e a s o n c o m p l e t e satisfaction a b o u t that which h a s always engaged its curiosity, but s o far i n v a i n . ” T h i s conclusion of a book t h a t was.plainly o n e of the great-

est works of philosophy ever written struck Fichte as a challenge. K a n t h a d b e g u n s o m e t h i n g that c o u l d and should b e

finished by 1800. Fichte tried to do just that in his books on w h a t h e called Wissenschaftslehre and System der Sittenlehre.

But now, in 1799, as Fichte lost his professorship and had to leave J e n a , K a n t dissociated himself from Fichte i n a declara-

tion published in the Allgemeine Literaturzeitung.10 H e was then seventy-five, had had enough trouble with censorship himself, h a d kept o n publishing h i s own books—a dozen of

them in the 179OS—and had not kept u p with Fichte’s publications. He had no wish to be held responsible for Fichte’s opinions, whatever they might be. Kant’s statement read: “ I n response to t h e s o l e m n challenge issued t o m e in

the name of the public by the reviewer of Buhle’s Draft of Transcendental Philosophy, i n Number 8 of the Erlangische Literaturzeitung, 1 7 9 9 , I herewith declare t h a t I c o n s i d e r Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre a wholly unt e n a b l e system. . . . F u r t h e r , I must remark t h a t the

presumption of ascribing to me the intention that I had merely wished to furnish a propaedeutic for transcend e n t a l philosophy, n o t t h e system itself o f this philosop h y , is incomprehensible t o m e . Such a n intention could

never have entered my mind since I myself have praised the completed whole of pure philosophy in the Critique of Pure Reason as the best mark of the truth of it. Since the reviewer finally claims t h a t the Critique is n o t to be

taken in accordance with its letter in regard to what it literally t e a c h e s about sensibility, a n d that everyone who would like t o understand t h e Critique m u s t first master

the proper (Beckian or Fichtean) point of view, because the K a n t i a n letter, n o less t h a n the Aristotelian, kills the s p i r i t : I herewith d e c l a r e o n c e more that t h e Critique

10 #109, reprinted in Fichte’s Leben und Iiterarischer Briefwechsel, e d . I . H . Fichte, v o l . 2 , 2 d rev. e d . ( 1 8 6 2 ) , 1 6 1 f .

104

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

is indeed t o b e u n d e r s t o o d in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e letter, a n d is t o b e understood solely from the point of view of t h e c o m m o n understanding which o n l y requires t o b e sufficiently cultivated for s u c h abstract investigations. “ A n Italian proverb says: ‘May G o d preserve u s merely from o u r friends; regarding o u r enemies we will take care ourselves!’ F o r there are benevolent so-called friends, who are well-disposed toward u s b u t who i n the choice o f m e a n s to favor o u r intentions behave the wrong way ( c l u m s y ) , b u t a t times also fraudulent, crafty o n e s wh o plot o u r destruction while yet employing t h e language o f benevolence (aliud Zingua p r o m p t u m , aliud pectore inclusum g e n e r e ) , of whom a n d whose tra ps one c a n n o t sufficiently beware. B u t heedless o f this, the critical philosophy, by virtue o f its inexorable tendency toward the satisfaction of reason, both theoretically a n d morally-practically, m u s t feel t h e calling

that no change of opinions, no improvements, nor any doctrinal edifice of a n o t h e r form are i n store for it; but t h e system o f t h e critique rests o n a complete, assured f o u n d a t i o n , fi r m forever, a n d is indispensable for t h e highest a i m s of h u m a n i t y also for all ages t o c o m e . IMMANUEL KANT.” August 7 , 1 7 9 9 .

Some of the intemperate language was probably intended for the reviewer and not for Fichte. The declaration manifests a profound irritation with all the c u r r e n t t a l k about t h e

SUpposed difference between the letter and spirit of Kant’s philosophy—Schiller’s suggestion in his thirteenth letter ( H 7 ) had fallen o n fertile ground—and with all t h e efforts t o complete what Kant h a d begun. Certainly, t h e declaration is not

an appealing document.11 Fichte owed far too m u c h t o K a n t t o feel t h a t h e himself

11 Karl Popper, The Open Society a n d Its Enemies, rev. ed., 1950, misrepresents this episode thoroughly and omits all mention o f the charge o f atheism a n d Fichte’s d i s m i s s a l . Popper s a y s , i n i t a l i c s : “I have seen s o far n o h i s t o r y o f phi1030phy w h i c h c l e a r l y

states that, in Kant’s opinion, Fichte was a dishonest impostor” ( C h a p t e r 1 2 , 2 4 9 , a n d n o t e 5 8 , 6 5 3 f . ) . T h i s is wholly representa-

tive of Chapter 12, which deals with Hegel. (See WK Chapter 7 . )

2 6 . Kant—Fichte—Schelling—Hegel

105

could publish a reply. So he wrote Schelling a letter, which Schelling was to publish in the same journal, Where it duly appeared in #122 (ibid., 163 f . ) . He was very respectful, furnished t h e context of words K a n t h a d quoted from a letter h e h a d written Fichte l o n g ago—and t h u s showed how K a n t himself h a d referred t o h i s Altersschwc'iche ( t h e weakness o f o l d a g e ) . He also mentioned t h a t K a n t h a d long

ceased to keep up with recent publications. And Fichte’s published letter ends: “ I t is only to b e expected, d e a r Schelling, that, just a s the defenders of the pre-Kantian metaphysics have not yet ceased

telling Kant that he is occupying himself with fruitless subtleties, Kant should say the same to us. It is only to be expected that, just as they assert against Kant that their metaphysics still stands undamaged, unimprovable, and unalterable in all eternity, Kant should assert the same about his against us. Who knows where even now the young fiery head may be at work who will go beyond the principles of the Wissenschaftslehre and try to prove its errors and incompleteness. May heaven then grant us the grace that we may not take our stand o n the assertion that these are fruitless subtleties and that we certainly will have nothing to do with them, but that o n e of u s, or if this should be more than could by then be asked of us, instead o f u s some m a n educated i n our school,

may stand up and either prove the nullity of these new discoveries or, if he cannot do this, accept them gratefully in our name.”

When Schelling himself turned out to be this young firebrand o n l y two years later, Fichte lacked the grace for which h e h a d wished. Until 1 8 0 1 Schelling saw himself a s

Fichte’s follower and felt that they both represented the same line. But Hegel’s pamphlet on the Difference of the Fichtean and Schellingian System of Philosophy ( 1 8 0 1 ) led Schelling

to consider his own philos0phy an advance over Fichte’s comparable t o Fichte’s advance over K a n t .

September 20, 1799, Fichte had written Schelling: “Our letters, my dear friend, have crossed each other. Meanwhile you will have received m i n e about Kant’s advertisement

[meaning the letter just quoted]. You take this matter as it well

106

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

may b e taken, b u t as I may not t a k e it. To b e sure, I am completely convinced that th e K a n t i a n phi1030phy, if it is not to b e taken as w e take it, is total nonsense.” B u t I think, excusing Kant, t h a t he is doing himself a n injustice, t h a t his own philosophy was never especially familiar t o h i m , and that b y now be neither knows nor understands it any more; and of m i n e h e certainly knows nothing except for what h e has picked u p on the wing from one-sided reviews. I now want t o do nothing further t h a n what I recently sent you. B u t if y o u wanted to d o something, if you w a n t e d t o present your view t o the public, this, I think, could b e very good. You seem less partisan; you have a public that h o n o r s y o u ; it is the external main proof o f the correctness of t h e Wissen-

schaftslehre that a head like yours has absorbed it and that it is becoming so fruitful i n your hands—a proof that people sometimes forget . . . ” (ibid., 3 0 4 f . ) . Barely more than a year later, Fichte wrote Schelling a

letter of which only a draft survives, which begins: “ I had written you, m y beloved friend, about s o m e differences i n o u r views, not as if I considered t h e m obstacles for a com-

mon undertaking, which you surely do not believe either, b ut to give you some proof of my attentive reading of your writings. O n l y I s h o u l d s ay t o a n y o n e else except you, whose truly divine power of divination I know [wahrhaft gb'ttliclze

Divinationsgabe], that he was obviously wrong” (ibid., 320). On November 1 5 , 1 8 0 0 , F i c h t e wrote Schelling about the latter’s System of Transcendental Idealism, w h i c h h a d just

appeared: “High praise is not fitting between us; in this re— gard only this much: everything is as it was to be expected from your genius [ v o n Ihrer genialischen Darstellung]. About your opposition o f transcendental philosophy and philosophy

of nature I still cannot agree with you. Everything seems to depend o n a confusion between ideal a n d real activity, of

which both of us have been guilty here and there but which I h o p e to remove completely i n m y new essay . . . ” (ibid.,

324). On May 31, 1801, Fichte still wrote in the same spirit: 12 This judgment will be illuminated later in our discussion of Hegel vis-a-vis Kant, at the end of H 42.

2 6 . Kant—Fichte—Schelling~—Hegel

107

“ M u t u a l respect a m o n g m e n who work i n th e s a m e science a n d w h o k n o w , a s I k n o w o f myself for eight years now, that t h e y h a v e seized o n w h a t is right, c a n only m e a n that

they have supreme confidence in each other, always interpret each other b y way of giving e a c h other every benefit of t h e

doubt, and where even that is no longer sufficient, hope that the erring friend, o w i n g t o his talent, will yet fi n d the right

way. That is how I have always behaved toward you, and you, when you had to consider m e in error, have shown me the same attitude. Now only about me in relation to you. . . . ” After many pages of explanations, Fichte finally added a postscript on August 7 : “So long, my dearest friend, this letter has been lying around, unsealed . . . ” (ibid., 340-48). Schelling’s reply of October 3 , 1 8 0 1 , written after t h e pub-

lication of Hegel’s essay on the Difierence, has quite a different t o n e : “ . . . The consciousness o r feeling w h i c h you

yourself had to have of this point forced you in your Vocation of Man

t o transfer the speculative dimension, because you

actually could not find it in your knowledge, into the sphere of faith, of which, in my view, one cannot speak in philosophy any more than one could in geometry. You explained in t h e s a m e essay, a l m o s t i n these w o r d s : t h e truly primordial reality, i.e., presumably t h e speculative dimension, could n o where b e s h o w n in knowledge. I s not this sufficient proof that your knowledge is n o t absolute knowledge b u t knowledge t h a t is still somehow conditional . . . ? . . . You must

forgive me when I say that your whole letter is permeated b y a c o m p l e t e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of my ideas, which is natural

enough considering that you have not exactly exerted yourself to get to really know them. On the other hand, of all the ideas that you were k i n d e n o u g h t o c o m m u n i c a t e to m e i n your letter, there w a s n o t o n e t h a t was n e w [fremd, literally: strange] t o m e . I also k n o w , a s you will perhaps concede

to me, partly from my own use, all the arts with which ideali s m is proved to b e the o n l y necessary system. These arts, which were fatal against all o f your previous opponents, are

without effect against me, since I am not your opponent, although you are, very probably, m i n e . I have already said

108

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

a b ove that I d o n o t fi n d y o u r system false, for it is a necessary a n d integrated part of m y o w n . . . . ‘that I h a v e n o t penet r a t e d the Wissenschaftslehre.’ . . . O f course, I h a v e n o t penetrated it yet i n this sense, n o r d o I intend e v e r t o p e n e t r a t e it in this sense—namely, in s u c h a w a y t h a t i n this penetration I myself a m penetrated. This opinion I h a v e n e v e r h a d of t h e Wissenschaftslehre, a n d m u c h less do I h a v e i t

now, that I should consider it a book on which everybody m u s t d e p e n d henceforth i n philosophy a n d t o which everybody h a s t o b e sent, although judgment i n philosophical matters would certainly b e m a d e a great deal easier if all o n e needed for it were a written testimonial from y o u t h a t o n e either understands or d o e s n o t u n d e r s t a n d i t ” (ibid., 348—57). Fichte’s reply of O c t o b e r 1 5 begins with a purely objective

discussion of philosophical issues. Then it proceeds: “Your letter still has a second part which it is painful for me t o touch on. Why is it that you cannot communicate yourself w i t h o u t insulting . . . ? D o b e good e n o u g h t o p u t yourself i n m y place a n d t o t h i n k h o w I should h a v e behaved regardi n g you w h e n I h a d t o declare that n o b o d y , absolutely n o b o d y h a d understood m e . ” , A n editorial footnote, written b y Fichte’s s o n , explains t h a t the final allusion is t o t h e mention of Schelling i n Fichte’s a n n o u n c e m e n t of his n e w presentation of t h e Wissenschafts-

le/zre. This is undoubtedly also the source of one of the most p o p u l a r legends a b o u t H e g e l , w h o is alleged t o h a v e died

with the words: “Only one man has understood me, and he d i d not understand m e either.”13 T h i s story is n o t o n l y untrue b u t q u i t e o u t of keeping with Hegel’s c h a r a c t e r a n d historical situation. I n his last y ears in Berlin H e g e l h a d m a n y disciples w h o w e r e applying his ideas i n a variety of fields; s o m e of t h e m were themselves respected scholars; others m a d e great reputations after h e died. H e g e l d i d not feel lonely a n d misunderstood. Fichte, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , d i d . He kept complaining i n p r i n t ; t h e most f a m o u s a n d obvious

example was the book he had published in 1801, which 13 Heinrich Heine, Zur Gesc/zichte der Religion a n d Plzilosophz'e in D e u t s c h l a n d ( 1 8 3 5 ) , Sc'imtliclze Ausgabe, V ( 1 8 6 1 ) , 2 1 1 .

Werke, Reclztmc'issige

Original—

2 6 . Kant—Fichte—Schelling—Hegel

109

Schelling m e n t i o n s a t t h e e n d of t h e letter just q u o t e d : S u n clear R e p o r t to t h e Larger P u b l i c a b o u t t h e R e a l N a t u r e o f t h e N e w e s t Philosophy: A n A t t e m p t to Compel t h e Reader

to Understand. Fichte’s position could be paraphrased with just a d a s h of malice b y saying t h a t o n l y o n e m a n h a d u n derstood h i m - n a m e l y , Schelling—and t h a t h e h a d n o t u n d e r s t o o d h i m either. B u t w h e n Fichte’s f a m e w a s eclipsed by Hegel’s, a n d a great m a n y r e a d e r s f o u n d Hegel’s b o o k s m o r e difficult t h a n a n y t h i n g t h e y h a d ever r e a d , t h e d i c t u m was ascribed t o H e g e l . There h a d b e e n n o lack of provocation w h e n F i c h t e , i n his R e p o r t o n the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre a n d Its Fate So For ( 1 8 0 6 ) , a t t a c k e d “ o n e of t h e m o s t confused h e a d s t h a t t h e confusion of o u r d a y h a s p r o d u c e d , F r i e d r i c h

Wilhelm Joseph Schelling,” and said of him: “That the man t h u s s h o w e d his absolute i g n o r a n c e o f w h a t speculation is a n d w a n t s a n d his n a t u r a l incapacity for speculation . . . is self-evident. . . 3’14 H e n e v e r w a s given t o pussy-footing; h e w a s a passionate a n d whole-hearted m a n ; a n d in his dealings with Schelling h e h a d s h o w n considerable nobility a n d h a d b e e n n o t easily a n g e r e d “ b u t , being w r o u g h t , perplex’d in t h e e x t r e m e . ” Now “ t h e w h e e l is c o m e full c i r c l e ” : F i c h t e s a w h i s work i n t h e s a m e light in which K a n t in 1 7 9 9 h a d seen his, a n d disowned his erstwhile disciple, while t h e y o u n g e r m a n s a w

the work of his predecessor as a mere stepping stone. Schelling h a d insulted F i c h t e , a s F i c h t e h a d never insulted K a n t , and Schelling was n o t i n s u c h straits a s F i c h t e h a d b e e n i n w h e n

Kant dissociated himself from him: in these two respects, F i c h t e s t a n d s blameless. B u t t h e c h a n g e i n his estimate o f the y o u n g e r man’s ability a n d work w as m o r e e x t r e m e a n d

appalling than the transformation of Kant’s judgment of F i c h t e h a d been. Still, t h e difference between Kant’s a g e a n d

Fichte’s had been thirty-eight years, and they had never been close friends, while t h e difference between F i c h t e a n d Schelling w a s o n l y thirteen years, a n d t h e y h a d b e e n very close for several years. 14 Werke, v o l . 8 ( 1 8 4 6 ) , 3 8 5 .

110

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

W h a t m a t t e r s i n t h e present context is t h e lively sense o f a progression with apocalyptic overtones. Since Hegel’s d e a t h there h a s probably never been a t i m e w h e n there w a s any widespread agreement that s o m e o n e individual w a s u n q u e s tionably the greatest living philosopher, and that t h e w h o l e history of philosophy s o m e h o w led u p t o h i m . I n t h e case of K a n t there w a s s u c h agreement, a n d not m a n y philosophers i n t h e twentieth century would d r e a m of denying that n o o t h e r philosopher i n the last quarter o f the eighteenth century was in his class. H e w a s clearly o n e of t h e greatest philosophers of all time. A n d h e himself said in t h e closing w o r d s of his greatest w o r k : “ b e f o r e t h e present c e n t u r y r u n s out . . . h u m a n reason [ m i g h t a t t a i n ] c o m p l e t e satisfaction a b o u t that which h a s always engaged its curiosity, b u t s o far i n vain.” When t h e book a p p e a r e d , nineteen years w e r e left; when t h e second, comprehensively revised edition c a m e o u t , o n l y thirteen. Two years later the F r e n c h Revolution broke out a n d convinced t h o u s a n d s of intellectuals t h a t a n e w e r a w a s indeed a t h a n d . Among those w h o t o o k u p Kant’s challenge,

Fichte was certainly the outstanding personality, and in 1798 Friedrich Schlegel, t h e leading spirit of t h e b u d d i n g G e r m a n r o m a n t i c m o v e m e n t , said in his A t h e n d u m s - F r a g m e n t e : “The French Revolution, Fichte’s Wissensclzaftslehre, a n d

Goethe’s [Wilhelm] Meister are the greatest tendencies of the age.” N o b o d y t o d a y would r a n k F i c h t e with K a n t ; a n d Schelling, too, is of interest t o few but historians. B u t in t h e years w h e n Hegel was trying t o write his first book, t h e r e w a s a widespread feeling t h a t Kant’s i m m e n s e contribution req u i r e d completion. This d i d n o t necessarily involve t h e pres u m p t i o n that t h e m a n w h o c a m e after h i m w o u l d b e greater t h a n K a n t , o r even his equal. M o s e s led his people o n l y t o t h e borders of t h e promised l a n d ; J o s h u a c o n q u e r e d it. F i c h t e h a d s o m e t h i n g of J o s h u a ab o u t h i m a n d , if n o t h i n g else, h e broke t h e ice that might h a v e frozen G e r m a n p h i los0phy after K a n t . He convinced t h e y o u n g e r generation that i m p o r t a n t work r e m a i n e d t o be d o n e . T h i s is s u p r e m e l y relevant t o a n understanding of Hegel’s philosophy.

2 7 . K a n t a n d Socrates; H e g e l a n d A ristotle

111

A g r a d u a t e student w h o writes his d o c t o r a l dissertation very q u i c k l y n e e d n o t feel that it h a s t o b e a fair s a m p l e of t h e best h e c a n d o . But t h e longer h e postpones his thesis—especially if m e a n w h i l e h e offers s h a r p a n d a t times condescending judgm e n t s a b o u t t h e w o r k others t u r n out—the m o r e t h e internal p r e s s u r e m o u n t s t h a t his dissertation h a s t o b e a m i n o r masterpiece. Schelling, w h o k e p t publishing b o o k u p o n b o o k , c o u l d afford to w r i t e o n e t h a t w a s relatively u n i m p o r t a n t . Hegel, i n

his mid-thirties, could not afford to publish a first book that might be on a par with Krug’s and Schulze’s works: if hum a n l y possible, his v o l u m e h a d t o b e better t h a n all t h e b o o k s t h a t Schelling h a d t u r n e d o u t in such r a p i d o r d e r . N o r w a s

that all—and this is the point at which the development from K a n t to F i c h t e t o Schelling b e c o m e s all-important. M u c h m o r e w a s a t s t a k e t h a n Hegel’s self-respect. H e could e i t h e r w r i t e s o m e t h i n g t h a t w o u l d be, at best, a n o t h e r good book—one m o r e respectable p e r f o r m a n c e b y a n o l o n g e r quite y o u n g philosophy professor—or h e c o u l d e n t e r t h e lists against

Fichte and Schelling and become the true Joshua. Or, if Joshua and the Judges had already done their work, he might try to c a p t u r e t h e h o l y city. The Phenomenology of t h e Spirit c h a n g e d u n d e r h a n d s a s h e w r o t e it. B u t a t n o point was it m e a n t t o another publication. At n o point w a s it i n t e n d e d a s c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t w o u l d establish its a u t h o r a s t h e equal

Hegel’s b e just a solid o f , say,

Fries. Dearly as Hegel would have liked to obtain a chair of philosophy, the stakes for which he was playing were incomp a r a b l y higher. H u m a n r e a s o n was t o o b t a i n , a t l o n g last, “ c o m p l e t e satisfaction a b o u t t h a t which h a s always e n g a g e d its curiosity, b u t s o f a r i n v a i n . ”

27 Hegel believed t h a t this satisfaction h a d t o b e f o u n d in a c o m p r e h e n s i v e system. M o s t of his reasons for believing this h e gave i n t h e preface t o t h e P h e n o m e n o l o g y . Since a comp l e t e translation o f this p r e f a c e with a c o m m e n t a r y o n f a c i n g

pages is offered later in this volume, it would be pointless to

112

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

a t t e m p t a n y s u m m a r y here. But a c o u p l e of i m p o r t a n t points m a y be a d d e d t o t h e reasons Hegel himself gives. The first w a s well stated b y Haym in 1 8 5 7 : “ . . . this is the c h a r a c t e r of t h e Hegelian system. I call it a work of art of knowledge. I t wants n o t t o dissolve t h e world of being a n d knowledge critically b u t t o achieve t h e comprehensive unity

of a beautiful whole. It wants not to uncover the perplexities of knowledge o r gain clarity a b o u t t h e limits, t h e contradictions, a n d antinomies in t h e world of the spirit, but o n t h e contrary t o b e a t d o w n these e m b a r r a s s m e n t s a n d t o reconcile these contradictions. I t is, I say, t h e presentation of the universe as a beautiful, living cosmos. A f t e r t h e m a n n e r of a n -

cient Greek philosophy it wants to show how in the world as a whole all p a r t s serve a n d unite i n t o a h a r m o n i c o r d e r ” ( 9 6 f . ) . O n l y t h e negative first half of t h e fourth sentence is misleading: Hegel assuredly m a d e it o n e o f his principal a i m s t o uncover all t h e perplexities, limits, contradictions, a n d antino— mies of t h e spirit, but—and this m u s t h a v e b e e n in Haym’s mind—not a s finalities but r a t h e r a s difficulties a n d discords t h a t were finally resolved in his system. Here a t last h u m a n reason gained “ c o m p l e t e satisfaction.” A n d instead of Haym’s r a t h e r t o o general reference t o “ancient G r e e k philosophy” we m i g h t s a y more precisely that H e g e l m e a n t t o achieve t h e sort of synthesis t h a t Aristotle h a d accomplished. Even a s Aristotle h a d resolved t he contradictions between s o m e s e e m -

ingly incompatible principles of the pre-Socratics by developi n g m o r e comprehensive doctrines, like t h a t of t h e f o u r causes, w h i c h allowed h i m t o integrate their insights a n d suggestions in his vision of t h e world, Hegel, too, h a d n o wish t o pit this principle against t h a t phi1050pher, o r this point against a n o t h e r , or doctrine against doctrine. H e s o u g h t h a r m o n y a n d integrat i o n in a system t h e like of which n o m o d e r n philosopher before h i m h a d been able t o fashion. The Sophists w e r e t h e philosophers of the G r e e k Enlightenm e n t , a n d K a n t m i g h t in s o m e ways be compared with Socrates. H e was t h e greatest thinker of t h e Enlightenment, a n d by virtue of his genius h e towered above it t o s u c h a n extent t h a t we t h i n k of h i m a s a fi g u r e a p a r t . The achievement of b o t h was largely critical: they t a u g h t t h a t m e n d o not really

2 7 . Kant a n d Socrates; Hegel a n d Aristotle

113

know what they think they know—Socrates when he said, “he k n o w s n o t h i n g , and t h i n k s that h e knows; I neither k n o w n o r t h i n k that I k n o w ” (Apology 2 1 ) , K a n t w h e n h e did away with so—called rational psychology, rational cosmology, a n d natural t h e o l o g y . A n d yet b o t h stimulated those philosophers w h o c a m e i m m e d i a t e l y after t h e m t o t h e boldest flights of specula-

tive metaphysics. T h o u g h s o m e people consider K a n t typically G e r m a n , a n d

Socrates strikes others as the most representative Greek, both were p r o f o u n d l y a n o m a l o u s a m o n g their people. The genius of t h e G r e e k s and of t h e G e r m a n s w a s exceptionally imaginat i v e and artistic, w h i l e Kant’s and Socrates’ gifts w e r e some-

what deficient in this respect. N o claim whatever about the endowments of the ordinary Greek or German is at stake here; n o r d o w e k n o w very m u c h a b o u t t h e “average” ancient

Greek. W h a t we do know is that the Greek genius achieved its greatest triumphs in art and poetry; that even Thucydides, for all his sobriety a n d respect for fact, has a n exceptionally developed aesthetic sense w h i c h w e e n c o u n t e r also i n Heracli-

tus and Parmenides, in Xenophanes and Empedocles; and that t h e b e a u t y of H o m e r ’ s and Sophocles’ artistic imagination has

never been surpassed. One might hesitate to generalize even so, because the usual clichés about national characteristics are so patently untenable; but the difference in this respect between the Greeks and, say, the Romans is surely unmistakable. Even the philosophy of the Greek Enlightenment, even t h e SOphists, did n o t altogether Oppose this aesthetic b e n t : they t a u g h t their pupils h o w t o fashion beautiful speeches. Socrates’ rationalism a n d u n c o m p r o m i s i n g critical intelligence were

immediately put to surprising uses by Plato: i n the Apology h e fashioned a s p e e c h i n fi n i t e l y m o r e beautiful t h a n any w r i t t e n by a SOphist, a n d after that h e had Socrates appear i n dialogues, and before l o n g h e put i n t o Socrates’ m o u t h speculations m o r e imaginative t h a n a n y entertained b y previous

philosophers. Kant’s fate i n G e r m a n y is s o m e w h a t similar. There w a s n o great philosophical tradition yet, as t h e r e had b e e n i n G r e e c e before Socrates. N o r were there epics a n d tragedies of the

114

THE PHENOMENOLOG Y

s a m e o r d e r . B u t t h e genius t h a t w a s unfolding even t h e n w a s musical a n d poetic. There are n o t m a n y n o n - G e r m a n c o m posers

in a class with Bach,

Handel,

Haydn,

Mozart,

and

Beethoven; a n d during their era G e r m a n poetry w a s c o m i n g into its o w n , too. T h e great achievements of t h e period were triumphs of t h e artistic imagination. K a n t , like Socrates, was a n a n o m a l y . I n b o t h cases w e c a n discern precedents a n d , if pressed, reconstruct a tradition. B u t t h e r e is n o denying t h a t in a n important sense they were outsiders—and quickly assimi-

lated to tendencies for which they had had little sympathy. I n t h e second review of t h e Phenomenology, i n 1 8 1 0 , it was suggested t h a t “if o n e m i g h t call Schelling, a s it w e re , t h e modern Plato, o n e could call h i m [ H e g e l ] with greater justice

the German Aristotle.”15 The former comparison must seem far-fetched today because of the extreme disparity in stature. What t h e reviewer m e a n t w a s that “ w i t h Schelling t h e imagination is p r e d o m i n a n t , ” a n d t h a t h e h a d t h e power t o carry

his listeners and readers along with his splendid delivery. Hegel, on the other hand, seems to lack the poetic touch, is prosy b y c o m p a r i s o n , b u t t h e more imposing in his c o m p r e hensive solidity. There is n o point now i n pressing t h e parallel between Schelling a n d P l a t o ; it is plainly n o t close a t all. W h a t m a t t e r s is r a t h e r t h a t by t h e t i m e Hegel b e g a n t o publish, K a n t h a d already been a m a l g a m a t e d i n t o a great n e w movement whose w a t c h w o r d w a s certainly n o t u n c o m p r o m i s i n g critical

intelligence. Hegel did not build directly on the foundations laid by Kant, a n y m o r e t h a n Aristotle tried above all t o s e e w h a t c o u l d b e m a d e of Socrates’ teaching. N o r w a s Hegel m a i n l y a follower a n d reviser of Fichte a n d Schelling, any m o r e t h a n Aristotle was m a i n l y a n adapter of P l a t o . B o t h looked b a c k o n the w h o l e of phi1030phy u p t o their own t i m e a n d tried t o d o justice t o all t h e insights of their predecessors. A n d t h e y were not eclectics, b u t m e n w h o succeeded i n developing a great total vision of the cosmos.

15 K . F . Bachmann (1785-1855), who had studied under Hegel in Jena, in Heidelberger Jalzrbiiclzer, 1. Abteilung, pp. 145-63 and 1 9 3 - 2 0 9 , c i t e d i n Hoffmeister’s critical e d i t i o n of the Plzc'z'nomenologie ( 1 9 5 2 ) , xxxix ff.

28. The Phenomenology and Faust

115

About this vision there is plainly something poetic in both cases. For all of Aristotle’s and Hegel’s scientific interests, their systems represent imaginative achievements of the first order. While Alexander and Napoleon went out to conquer the world with their armies, Aristotle and Hegel sought to master it with

their minds. The three main parts of Hegel’s system were fixed by the time he lectured in Jena: Logic and metaphysics, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit. They will be considered in the next chapters. When he actually started to write up his system for publication, h e began by constructing a ladder that

might lead the reader all the way from simple sense certainty to the point of View from which the system was written. At most, this introduction was meant to occupy half of the first volume, probably less. Had Hegel’s gifts and temperament been the way they are usually supposed to have been, h e

would have dispensed with this introduction, as almost all his British expositors have done, or at the very least he would have got it over as quickly as possible. But precisely this unprecedented enterprise gave him sc0pe for his genius, and he wrote a book that invites comparison with Dante’s Divine Comedy16 and Goethe’s Faust.

28 The basic i d e a of the Phenomenology of the Spirit is that a

philosopher should not confine himself to views that have been held but penetrate behind these to the human reality they reflect. It is not enough to consider propositions, or even the content of consciousness; it is worth while to ask in every instance what kind of spirit would entertain such pr0positions, hold such views, and have such a consciousness. Every outlook, in other words, is to be studied not merely as an academic possibility but as an existential reality. Even this might afford considerable scope for the imagination: one might draw one sharp vignette after another, prob16 Ros. 206 f . ; Haym, 239.

116

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

ing characteristic weaknesses. But Hegel is fascinated by the sequence. H o w would a m a n c o m e t o s e e t h e world this w a y o r t h a t ? And to what extent d o e s the r o a d o n w h i c h a point of

view is reached color the view? Moreover, it should be possible to s h o w h o w every single view in turn is one—sided a n d therefore u n t e n a b l e a s soon a s it is embraced consistently. Each m u s t therefore give way t o a n o t h e r , until finally t h e last a n d m o s t comprehensive vision is attained in which all previous

views are integrated. That way the reader would be compelled —not by rhetoric or by talk of compelling him, but by the successive examination of forms of consciousness—to rise from t h e lowest a n d least SOphisticated level t o t h e highest a n d most phiIOSOphical; a n d o n the w a y h e w o u l d recognize stoicism and skepticism, Christianity a n d Enlightenment, SOphocles and Kant. T h i s is surely one o f the most imaginative a n d poetic conceptions ever t o have occurred t o a n y philos0pher. The parallel t o Dante’s journey t h r o u g h hell a n d p u r g a t o r y t o the

blessed vision meets the eye. The comparison with Goethe’s Faust m a y b e elaborated briefly. Two quotations from “The First P a r t of th e T r a g e d y ” c ould h a v e served Hegel a s mottoes. The first o f these passages (lines 1770—75) h e knew from Faust: A Fragment ( 1 7 9 0 ) : A n d what is portioned out t o all m a n k i n d ,

I shall enjoy deep in myself, contain Within my spirit summit and abyss, Pile o n my breast their agony a n d bliss, And t h u s let m y own self grow into theirs, unfettered,

though Hegel would scarcely h a v e a d d e d , like F a u s t : Till a s they a r e , at last I , too, a m shattered. These lines eXpress m u c h of t h e spirit o f t h e b o o k : the a u t h o r is n o t treating u s t o a spectacle, letting various forms of consciousness pass i n review before o u r eyes t o entertain u s ; h e considers it necessary t o re-experience w h a t the human spirit h a s g o n e t h r o u g h in history, a n d h e challenges t h e r e a d e r to join him i n this F a u s t i a n undertaking. As l o n g a s one does

2 8 . The Phenomenology and Faust

117

less t h a n this, o n e lives w i t h blinders o n a n d is, to u s e an existentialist t e r m , u n a u t h e n t i c . M o s t m e n prefer, t o u s e a term from Jaspers’ Psychologie der Weltanschauungen ( 1 9 1 9 ) , to live i n a shell (Geha'use), h i d i n g from the m a n y o t h e r possibilities. Hegel asks them not m e r e l y t o read a b o u t such possibilities b u t t o identify with e a c h i n turn until t h e i r o w n self

has grown to the point where it is contemporary with the world spirit. Hegel’s Phenomenology

of t h e Spirit is a “psychology o f

world views” but actually more existentialist than this title of the first great classic o f twentieth-century existentialism would suggest. The title suggests w h a t Kierkegaard would have called

an “aesthetic” approach, an attitude of detachment and contemplation, perhaps of interest and occasional enjoyment or a d m i r a t i o n , rather t h a n impassioned involvement. That i s why t h e passage quoted from Faust is s o appropriate: the reader,

like the author, is meant to suffer through each position and to be changed as he proceeds from one to the other. Mea res agitur: m y o w n self i s a t s t a k e . O r , a s Rilke p u t it definitively

in the last line of his great sonnet on an “Archaic Torso of Apollo”: du musst dein Leben c'indern—“you must change your life.” Another quotation from Faust that would be an appropriate motto was not included in the Fragment of 1790 and appeared in p r i n t t h e year after the Phenomenology, when the whole

of Part One was published in 1808: What from your fathers you received as heir Acquire, if y o u would possess it!

(682 f.)

We do n o t truly possess o u r h u m a n i t y and culture a s long as

we live only in the present, in our own accidental environm e n t . We h a v e inherited priceless works o f p h i l o s o p h y and literature b u t h a v e t o exert ourselves to m a s t e r them a n d make them truly our o w n . I n t h e process, t o s a y i t o n c e more, we are b o u n d to be c h a n g e d .

The comparison with Goethe’s play can be fruitfully extended by calling attention to the function of negation. In the Prologue of Faust (1808) the Lord says to Mephistopheles:

118

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

I never hated those w h o were like y o u . O f all the spirits that negate

The knavish jester gives me least to do. For man’s activity c a n easily abate, H e soon prefers uninterrupted rest;

To give him this companion hence seems best, Who roils and must as devil help create. (337-43) Goethe’s “uninterrupted res t” invites comparison w i t h Hegel’s

“inert simplicity” or “immediacy” in the preface to the Phenomenology, a n d a s o n e reads the preface one c a n n o t fail to note how similar the role of negation is i n that book and i n

Faust. Even more obviously, men like to settle down in one position or another, a n d the negative power of criticism—and occasionally caricature worthy of a jester—keeps them moving up the ladder. Later, i n Faust’s study, Mephistopheles himself explains the function of his negativity. To Faust’s question, “Enough, who

are you then?” he replies:

Part of that force which would Do evil evermore, and yet creates the good. FAUST: MEPHISTO:

What is it t h a t this puzzle indicates? I am the spirit t h a t negates. An d rightly so, for all that c o m e s to b e

Deserves to perish wretchedly; ’Twere better nothing would begin.

Thus everything that your terms, sin, Destruction, evil represent—That is my proper element.

(1335—44)

This is both a central motif of the Phenomenology and an essential feature o f Hegel’s later philosophy, especially o f his

vision of history. Every finite position is destroyed, but tragic a s this perpetual destruction unquestionably is, in the long run it serves a positive end by leading t o a g r e a t e r good. History is the realm of sin, destruction, and evil, but o u t of these terrors and human agonies freedom emerges and grows. The sacrifices are not all i n vain; t h e process is one that leads to salvation and a great vision. Without destruction a n d suffering

2 8 . The P h e n o m e n o l o g y a n d Faust

119

the vision c o u l d n e v e r b e h a d ; w i t h o u t t h e negative, m a n w o u l d seek uninterrupted rest.

Kant already had tried to show in- his Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan I n t e n t ( 1 7 8 4 ) how what h e called antagonism led t o progress a n d w o u l d eventually compel nations t o form a League of N a t i o n s ( V o l k e r b u n d ) . H i s noble

essay, as brief as it is suggestive, partakes of the vision of Isaiah. B u t H e g e l is far closer to G o e t h e ’ s Faust i n his determ i n a t i o n to digest all of h u m a n experience—and t o t h e poet w h o fashioned “The Second Part of t h e Tragedy” (published o n l y a f t e r Goethe’s, a n d Hegel’s, d e a t h ) , i n his attempt t o find a place i n his work for a n incredible number of figures, ideas,

and details that almost any other great writer of the age would have excluded without the least hesitation. W h a t leads to this catholicity, also i n Faust II, is by no m e a n s a didactic impulse—pedagogically, the result is i n both cases impossible—but t h e artistic n e e d o f a vast spirit alienated from h i s e n v i r o n m e n t . The S e c o n d P a r t o f Faust and Hegel’s Phenomenology are the creations of m e n a s lonely as the

exiled poet of the Divine Comedy. Unable to settle down with a n y real contentment in this world a s i t is, an d despairing b o t h o f c h a n g i n g it a n d o f fi n d i n g solace i n h u m a n society, Hegel, like G o e t h e a n d D a n t e , created a world of his own,

and instead of peopling it largely with figments of his imagination as m a n y another writer h a s d o n e , found places i n it for t h e m e n a n d women a n d events h e knew from history and

literature, as well as a very few of his contemporaries—and did not really care greatly how much of all this would be recognized a n d understood. O f course, the reader is meant t o grasp the structure of the w h o l e , a n d the serious reader, who

alone is of any interest to the author, is certain to recognize familiar faces at every turn, usually in unfamiliar surroundings; but not every detail is put in mainly for the reader’s sake, for his instruction a n d the p r o m o t i o n of knowledge. A great deal i s t h e r e because i t h a p p e n e d just then to be of interest t o the writer, and h e w a s w o n d e r i n g where it belonged, how

best to place it—how to fashion a cosmos of the totality of his cultural experience without SUppressing anything t h a t seemed to matter.

120

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

I n d e e d , never before h a d a n y m a j o r philosopher so patently enjoyed allusions, a n d s o lavishly indulged in this pleasure. Let the cultured reader be rewarded for his pains; let the less

e d u c a t e d b e s h a m e d i n t o reading what they o u g h t t o h a v e r e a d l o n g a g o . Cliquishness is contemptible, but the m u t u a l affinity a n d enjoyment of those m e m b e r s o f t h e invisible c h u r c h whose highly deveIOped h u m a n i t y gives t h e m a great d e a l in c o m m o n is o n e of the legitimate consolations for t h e misery of life. This kind of writing w a s to o n ew for H eg el t o realize its peculiar dangers, a n d t h e i m m e n s e pressure u n d e r which h e wrote s u c h a big book i n s o s h o r t a t i m e d i d n o t p e r m i t h i m t o reflect very m u c h about t h e possible influence of his u n u s u a l style, m a n y decades later. I n t h e p reface h e pleaded belatedly that philosophy m u s t b e c o m e scientific—an unlikely epithet for t h e Phenomenology. The highly allusive style t u r n s t h e r e a d e r i n t o a detective r a t h e r t h a n a critical philosopher: o n e looks for clues a n d feels h a p p y every t i m e o n e h a s solved s o m e small mystery; o n e feels t h a t a l o n g w i t h w h o e v e r else h a s figured things o u t

one belongs on the author’s side as opposed to the many who have not got the point. The question w h e t h e r t h e a u t h o r is right drops from consciousness.

Thus allusions replace arguments. Instead of remaining a preliminary t h a t is almost t a k e n for granted, understanding,

because it has become so exceedingly difficult, takes the place of critical evaluation for w h i c h n o energy seems t o b e left. I t

is so hard to get the point, and so few do, that the big problem is no longer whether the point stands up but rather whether o n e h a s got it. And t h e m a i n division is n o t between t h o s e who agree a n d those who d o n o t , b u t between those who unders t a n d a n d belong a n d those who d o not. The outstanding example of such a style in t h e twentieth c e n t u r y is Heidegger. H e is anything b u t a follower of Hegel, a n d H e g e l exposed s o m e o f Heidegger’s principal confusions one h u n d r e d twenty years before Heidegger b e c a m e famous. Heidegger d o e s not invoke Hegel’s example, b u t w h e n his dis-

ciples are severely pressed in argument they not infrequently fall back o n Hegel’s precedent a s their last line of defense. We are considering the dangers of a style, not the original-

2 9 . R o y c e and o t h e r s o n F a u s t in The P h e n o m e n o l o g y

121

ity, t r u t h , o r p r o f u n d i t y of t h e c o n t e n t . Perhaps this is m a d e clearer b y t o u c h i n g o n t w o o t h e r examples.

Under the Nazi dictatorship, speakers who Opposed the g o v e r n m e n t cultivated t h e art of allusion and i n n u e n d o . As o n e listened t o , o r r e a d , say, Niem'oller, w h a t seemed to m a t t e r was t h e h i d d e n c o n t e n t a n d , of course, his courage, and

there was a feeling of fellowship among those who understood h i m a n d s h a r e d his enemies. Whether one agreed with h i m was wholly s e c o n d a r y . The s a m e is bound t o h a p p e n u n d e r any Oppressive censorship t h a t h a s n o t succeeded i n extinguishing dissent, for e x a m p l e in P o l a n d in t h e 19603. What h a s become i m p o r t a n t a n d is discussed is how m u c h somebody h a s got a w a y with, h o w bold h e h a s been, a n d whether h e might have

meant this or that; the question of truth is easily lost sight of. Obviously, nobody c o u l d i n f e r t h a t a Polish philosopher who d e p e n d s o n indirection a n d N i e m o l l e r i n the thirties should b e

classed with Hegel as regards either their eminence or their beliefs. W h a t , t h e n , a c c o u n t s for this peculiarity of style of t h e Phen o m e n o l o g y ? Certainly n o t political considerations, o r any deliberate o b s c u r a n t i s m . A t b o t t o m , it is the s a m e i m p u l s e

that lulls the critical intelligence to sleep in some of Plato’s dialogues a n d i n s o m e of Nietzsche’s writings, a l t h o u g h both m e a n t a b o v e all else t o get u s to think critically: the poetic impulse.17

29

Two examples may help to show what problems Hegel’s allusiveness poses. Here is how Josiah Royce linked the Phenomenology with Faust—and Royce has been Hegel’s foremost interpreter i n t h e U n i t e d States. I n d e e d , William J a m e s on “ H e g e l a n d his M e t h o d ” in A Pluralistic Universe is really J a m e s o n R o y c e ; and it could b e argued t h a t Royce was Hegel’s u n a u t h o r i z e d d e p u t y i n America for a generation.

In his posthumously published Lectures on Modern Idealism 17 Regarding Plato and Nietzsche, see WK Chapter 1 4 : “Philosophy Versus Poetry.”

122

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

( 1 9 1 9 , n o w also i n p a p e r b a c k ) Royce devotes f o u r chapters ( o u t of t e n ) t o Hegel, three of t h e m t o the Phenomenology. H e devotes a p a g e t o Hegel’s section o n Die Lust and die Notwendigkeit ( P l e a s u r e an d Necessity) a n d s a y s :

“He begins this sort of life by taking form as Faust. The Faust-ideal i n question is d u e to s o m u c h of t h a t poem as w a s a t that t i m e known t o Hegel, an d is n o t t h e Faust-ideal that Goethe later taught u s t o recognize a s his o w n . Hegel conceives the Faust of the p o e m , as it was then before h i m , simply a s the pleasure seeker longing for the t i m e when h e c a n say, ‘0 m o m e n t stay, t h o u art s o fair.’ The o u t c o m e of Faust’s quest, a s far as it goes, is for H eg el t h e discovery that the passing m o m e n t will neither stay n o r b e fair. . . . Pleasure seeking m e a n s , t h e n , t h e d e a t h of whatever is desirable about life; and Hegel foresees, for F a u s t himself . . . no e s c a p e from the fatal circle. At all events, t h e self is not t o b e fo u nd i n this

life of lawless pursuit of that momentary control over life which is conceived as pleasure. Such is Hegel’s reading of the first part of Faust. He entitles the sketch, ‘Pleasure and Destiny’ ” ( 1 9 0 f . ) .

Royce has no time for philological correctness. Notwendig— keit m e a n s necessity, n o t destiny. The Phenomenology ( 1 8 0 7 ) d id n o t offer a n y reading of Faust I ( 1 8 0 8 ) . “S o m u c h of that poem a s was at this t i m e known to Hegel”—i.e., Faust:

A Fragment (1790)—jumped straight from the scene between Faust and Wagner to the lines “And what is portioned out t o all mankind” (cited in the previous section), and this speech (in the Fragment these are the Opening words of the first scene between F a u s t and Mephistopheles) hardly suggests “the pleasure seeker longing for t h e time when he can say, ‘0 mom e n t stay, thou art s o fair.’ ” This apostrophe t o t h e mome nt, moreover, w a s n o t published until 1 8 0 8 a n d , in context, has

the very opposite meaning of that which Royce attributes to it. Faust says (lines 1 6 9 2 f f . ) : If ever I recline, c a l m e d , o n a b e d of sloth, You may destroy m e then a n d there. If ever flattering y o u should wile me

That in myself I find delight,

2 9 . Royce a n d others o n F a u s t in T h e P h e n o m e n o l o g y

MEPHISTO: FAUST:

123

If with e n j o y m e n t y o u beguile m e , T h e n b r e a k o n m e , eternal night! T h i s bet I offer. I a c c e p t it. Right. If t o t h e m o m e n t I s h o u l d s a y : A b i d e , you a r e s o fair— P u t m e i n fetters o n that day, I wish to perish t h e n , I swear.

A n d a s if all this w e r e n o t e m p h a t i c e n o u g h , F a u s t says later i n t h e s a m e s c e n e (lines 1 7 6 5 f f ) : D o y o u n o t h e a r , I h a v e n o t h o u g h t of joy! T h e reeling whirl I seek, t h e m o s t painful excess, E n a m o r e d h a t e a n d q u i c k e n i n g distress.

Cured from the craving to know all, my mind Shall n o t h e n c e f o r t h b e closed t o a n y p a i n , A n d w h a t is p o r t i o n e d o u t t o all m a n k i n d . . . .

A t t h a t point the s c e n e i n t h e F r a g m e n t begins. N o w t h e q u e s t i o n r e m a i n s w h e t h e r Hegel’s “ s k e t c h , ” as

Royce calls it, is intended as a portrait of Goethe’s Faust at all, and the answer is surely: No. What seems to have misled

Royce is that on the first page of this section there are three allusions to Faust; but they do not establish that the next four pages are intended as a portrait of Faust. If the point were merely that Royce had erred, it would scarcely m e r i t m e n t i o n , t h o u g h this is b y n o m e a n s a n isolated instance in his t r e a t m e n t of Hegel.18 T h e m a t t e r gains i m p o r t a n c e w h e n w e t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h a t Royce’s “ L e c t u r e s ” w e r e edited a n d very extensively revised before publication by J . Loewenberg, w h o inherited the r e p u t a t i o n of being t h e lead-

ing American Hegel scholar and who also edited what was for a l o n g t i m e t h e o n l y H e g e l a n t h o l o g y i n English. When t h e “ L e c t u r e s ” w e r e reissued i n p a p e r b a c k , “ w i t h a n e w Foreword by John E. Smith,” another authority on “Modern Idealism,” n o t h i n g w a s d o n e b y w a y of mentioning o r correcting a n y e r r o r s . A n d lest it b e t h o u g h t t h a t all this is indicative of the

18 Cf. C III.3.4.

124

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

state of A m e r i c a n Hegel scholarship only, K u n o Fischer ( p . 3 5 5 ) entitled his discussion of this section “ P l e a s u r e a n d Necessity ( F a u s t ) ” — a n d J e a n Hyppolite, i n his French c o m m e n tary o n t h e Phenomenology, which exceeds t h e P h e n o m e n o l ogy i n length, still says “ C o m m e le premier F a u s t de Goethe, le seul alors connu, elle meprz’se l’entendement e t la science . . . ” ( 2 7 1 ) . I n fact, Hegel adapts four lines from Mephisto’s soliloquy a b o u t Faust ( 1 8 5 1 f f . ) : h e uses, in considerably c h a n g e d form, t h e first two and the last two lines of a seventeen-line m o n o logue a n d t h u s characterizes a type. To begin with what M e p h i s t o actually says, b o t h in t h e Fragment a n d in t h e l a t e r version, two points a r e r e l e v a n t : first, he plainly d o e s not understand Faust and w h a t h e says is i n important respects wrong a b o u t F a u s t ; secondly, even s o , w h a t h e describes is not a “pleasure seeker” but a m a n with a n unbridled spirit whose “ h a s t y striving is s o great, it leaps over t h e earth’s d e lights.” Hegel’s a d a p t a t i o n of t h e four lines has n o longer any reference t o Faust b u t expresses a thought s o d e a r to h i m that i n q u i t e a different context, in t h e preface t o his Philosophy of Right, h e repeats this q u o t a t i o n a l m o s t literally, introducing i t : “Mephistopheles, in Goethe—a g o o d authority—says a b o u t this, roughly, what I have also quoted previously: Despise understanding a n d science,

man’s very highest gifts— then y o u h a v e yielded t o t h e devil a n d must perish.” These lines express Hegel’s View of those w h o despise t h e understanding a n d science; t h e y do n o t serve notice t h a t what

follows is “Hegel’s reading of the first part of Faust.” This is obvious i n t h e Philosophy of Right. B u t t h e whole style of t h e Phenomenology is s u c h t h a t t h e s t u d e n t a n d scholar are almost bound t o a s k themselves: W h a t is t h e m a n talking a b o u t ? Whom does h e h a v e i n m i n d ? Indeed—and this

is crucial—the obscurity and whole manner of the text are such t h a t these questions are almost b o u n d t o replace t h e question o f w h e t h e r w h a t Hegel says is right. U n t i l o n e knows about

whom he is writing, one is often at a loss to say whether he is

3 0 . A n t i g o n e and Sittlichkeit

125

right; and at other times what he says is so plainly not right a n d his generalizations a r e s o fantastic that th e only way to understand how anybody c o u l d even think o f saying such things is t o r e f e r his statements back t o t h e individual of whom he w a s thinking.

30 L a t e r i n t h e Phenomenology, almost the whole chapter o n

Sittlz‘clzkeit revolves around SOphocles’ Antigone: specifically, the first two of its three sections: “a. The ethical world, human a n d divine l a w , man and woman” a n d “ b . The ethical

deed, human and divine knowledge, guilt and fate.” The last section of this chapter is much shorter than the first two. It may sound odd to say that Antigone is “even” mentioned by name, but in the whole big book only thirteen men and w o m e n are n a m e d . Six are phiIOSOphers: Anaxagoras, Aristotle, Descartes, Diogenes, Kant, a n d Plato. Five more are historic, mostly writers or p o e t s : Homer, Lichtenberg, Origen,

Solon, and Sophocles. And two come out of tragedies: Hamlet and A n t i g o n e .

Fifteen others are plainly alluded to or quoted, ten of them historic: Aristophanes, Democritus, Diderot, Fichte, Goethe,

Lessing, Leucippus, Schiller, Shakespeare, and Socrates; also Macbeth and Orestes, and Antigone’s father and brothers— Oedipus, Eteocles, and Polyneices.

SOphocles’ Antigone is mentioned and quoted at the end of Part V ; t h e chapter o n Sittlichkeit is the first one o f Part VI.

The heroine is quoted again, and again mentioned by name, in the middle of the section on “The ethical deed. . . . ” But the interpretation of these sections does not depend on these quotations. These pages abound i n statements that are simply

outrageous in the form in which they are offered and that plainly cry out to be referred to Sophocles’ tragedy. For about three pages Hegel argues that “The feminine therefore has the highest intimation of what is ethical insofar a s s h e is a sister,” a n d t h a t “The loss of the brother is therefore

irreplaceable for the sister, and her duty to him is the highest

126

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

one.” I n the second section w e fi n d o u t how “According to its content, however, t h e ethical deed has the aspect of a

crime,” and a little later that it “is based on the certain confidence in the whole into which nothing foreign, no fear, nor enmity is m i x e d . ” Soon after this, Antigone is mentioned and

quoted the second time. After that we hear about “ t w o brothers” w h o , t o begin

with, have a n equal right to the government: “These two therefore become opposed to each other, a n d their e q u a l right to the power over the state destroys b o t h as they are equally

in the wrong. From the human point of view, the crime has been committed by the o n e who, n o t i n possession, attacked

the commonwealth at whose head the other stood. . . . But the one that was o n its side, it will honor; the other o n e , however, . . . the government . . . will punish by depriving him

of the last honors. . . . ” It would be almost perverse to argue against Hegel’s two propositions about the sister: they are plainly ad hoc. To be sure, one can ask whether h e was thinking solely of A n t i g o n e or perhaps also of Goethe’s Iphigenia a n d h e r relation to Orestes, a n d of his own sister, Christiane. There are several sentences that plainly allude to Orestes, a n d a very g o o d case

could be made that he was thinking of all three brother-sister relationships. When h e speaks of the Erinys, h e is surely thinking o f Orestes; but he m a y b e thinking of Christiane’s relation t o himself when h e says, “The brother, however, is for the

sister the calm, even being par excellence.” When he concludes that paragraph, “The loss of the brother is therefore irreplaceable for th e sister,” w e are bound t o th in k n o t o n l y of Antigone’s express words (lines 9 0 9 ff.) but also of Christiane’s suicide, a few weeks after Hegel’s death. Assuredly, the Phenomenology is not a dull book. B u t in view o f the claims with which the book is offered t o us, the excitement it begets on the aesthetic plain i s certainly not

enough. As an ultrahighbrow puzzle and a treat for intellectuals, the book is wonderful, but what are w e to make of

its scientific pretensions? Hegel claims, as we have seen, that a woman’s relationship to her brother is ethically higher than her relationship to her

3 0 . Antigone and Sittlichkeit

127

h u s b a n d , p a r e n t s , or c h i l d r e n . He argues that i n the other

relationships natural emotions are prominent, and the two persons are not so independent o f each other; “But the un—

mixed relationship takes place between brother and sister. They a r e the s a m e blood which, however, has attained in

them its rest and balance. They do not desire each other, nor have they given this being-for-itself to each other o r received it from each other; they are free individuality in relation to each other. The feminine therefore has the highest intimation of what is ethical insofar as she is a sister.”19 If we take these generalizations at face value, they are silly. One cannot rank human relationship this way, and it makes no sense to lay down once for all as a principle that a person is bound to have the

highest intimation o f what is ethical i n this relationship

rather than in that. Incidentally, the generalization that brother and sister do not desire each other is rather magisterial. But if we take the whole passage as special pleading for Antigone and a n attempt to bolster her argument (lines 909 f f ) , we find that this is not very good literary criticism either. SOphocles’ Antigone suggests powerfully that there is nobody she loved a s m u c h a s her d e a d brother; that she d o e s n o t desire m a r r i a g e with H a i m o n , h e r betrothed; that since Polyneices is d e a d s h e , t o o , wants t o d i e (e.g., lines 7 2 f t ) . Rudolf Haym said l o n g a g o : “To say e v e r y t h i n g : the Phenomenology i s psychology reduced to confusion and disorder by history, and history deranged by psychology” ( 2 4 3 ) . Even this d i c t u m , which t h e a u t h o r himself italicized, is too k i n d :

instead of mixing only history and psychology, Hegel offers us what Richard Wagner was later to call a Gesamtkunstwerk, leaving out little but music. Haym spoke of “ a romantic masquerade.” I should prefer to speak of charades: now a tableau, now a skit, now a brief oration—and what we are to guess may be the theme of a Greek tragedy or a character from Diderot’s Rameau’s Nephew, recently translated by G o e t h e ; it may b e

the French Revolution or a phiIOSOphical stance, like stoicism 19 Lasson’s ed., 296. Baillie’s tr., 475 f., renders the last sentence quite incorrectly. Ros. 208: although Hegel was undoubtedly thinki n g o f A n t i g o n e i n this section, “the characterization of the essence

of manliness and femininity in general is a glorious success.”

128

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

or skepticism; medieval Christianity o r the pseudoscience of physiognomy, or Kant’s moral philosophy—and it is hardly surprising t h a t somebody should guess Faust where Faust w a s

not meant, especially since a few charades, which are not marked to distinguish them from the rest, do n o t represent anything i n particular. In only one respect is this i m a g e u n f a i r : m o s t o f t h e tableaux are unmistakably identified, many i n the table of contents and an appropriate section heading, others i n th e text. Moreover, L a s s o n offered some helpful footnotes in his critical edition of

the text, and these were taken over by Hoffmeister and by Baillie in his translation. Still, part of the appeal of the book lies in t h e questions it poses a t every t u r n : I s Hegel thinking of Schelling? Does h e m e a n Jacobi? I s h e referring t o Iphigenia a s well a s Antigone? A n d : To whom since Hegel’s own

time is what he says applicable? With this last question we approach t h e greatness of the

book. All too often, Hegel is overly specific and has to drag i n , for example, allusions t o Antigone’s brothers w h o de-

stroyed each other in the fight for Thebes, lest we miss his string of allusions to SOphocles’ Antigone. Or he pontificates: “Actuality therefore contains, concealed, t h e other side, foreign to knowledge, a n d d o e s n o t show itself t o consciousness

-—does not show the son the father in the man who insults him and whom he slays, nor the mother in the queen whom he wifes.”20 One wishes Hegel had come out into the open, saying something l i k e : in some ways, SOphocles’ tragedy—whether Antigone or Oedipus T yrannus—gives classical formulation to

a conflict or predicament that is representative of the human condition, or of a certain stage in the deveIOpment of culture. Haym is right that Hegel’s “selection is absolutely arbitrary. As a historical figure was especially familiar to t h e author or especially present t o his mind from recent reading, it is seized and m a d e the symbol of a n allegedly necessary a n d indispensable stage o f consciousness. . . . As absolute knowledge

itself is nothing else than thoughtful contemplation of things, 20 Lasson’s ed., 305. Baillie’s tr., 490, mentions Oedipus by name, though Hegel does not.

3 1 . The conception of t h e book

129

but whitewashed and saturated with an aesthetic conception of them, a romantic-fantastic confusion of what is the poet’s business a n d what is the philosopher’s business, s o , t o o , the

phenomenological road to this knowledge consists in the per— petual poetic translation of abstract forces into concretely historic o n e s , b u t even more i n the constant interlarding a n d mixing o f both” (242—44). B u t although Haym is right, Hegel

could be defended on this score. Why should h e not seize o n Antigone b e c a u s e h e knows the play s o well, o r on R a m e a u ’ s Nephew b e c a u s e h e h a s read it

recently? Why should he not choose his examples now from history and now from literature? This is not what has gone wrong. The real fault is that the overly heavy dependence o n allusions makes Hegel’s discussions too specific. What ought t o b e merely a vivid illustration b e c o m e s the subject matter

itself. It is in this way that the poetic impulse takes over.

31

All this may seem so utterly damning that the reader may wonder how Hegelians from David Friedrich Strauss to Hermann Glockner could praise the Phenomenology as the greatest work of one of humanity’s greatest thinkers, and how Ueberweg’s superb multi-volume Geschichte der Phi1050phie could possibly say of i t : “ I t i s at the s a m e t i m e t h e most diffi-

cult and the most contentful of Hegel’s works. The difficult, dark, condensed style compresses great masses of thought to the utmost.”21 Probably the m a i n reason the book has won such ardent

admiration is that it is highly original and indeed unique, and insofar as it can be compared at all to any previous classic of philosophy one would have to adduce Plato’s Republic or, conceivably, Spinoza’s Ethics. Like Plato—and to a lesser ext e n t, Spinoza—Hegel wrote a single volume in which h e recreated t h e whole world from the p o i n t of View of a singularly 21.

. . vom Beginn des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts bis auf die Gegenwart, 11th ed., ed. K . Oesterreich (1916), 77.

130

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

cultivated and philosophically schooled sensibility. To organize s u c h a wealth of material—indeed, in a sense “everything”—in the framework of o n e story is a n astonishing feat, a n d it is exciting at every turn to s ee w h a t h e mak es o f this a n d h o w h e understands a n d fits i n t h a t . Beyond t h a t , t h e conception of the book, which should b e distinguished from its execution, deserves the greatest a d m i r a -

tion. Instead of simply sitting down to write a book containing his philosophy, Hegel considers it essential t o give a n account of w h a t m a n h a s thought s o f a r . I t is n o t e n o u g h t o write one’s own b o o k , showing in footnotes here a n d there t h a t o n e h a s read s o m e K a n t a n d Fichte, K r u g a n d Schulze, Sextus a n d Hume, P l a t o a n d Aristotle, and t o reveal something of one’s general education b y m a k i n g a n occasional b o w t o H o m e r o r

Goethe. Philosophers seem to disagree, and even if one supports one’s o w n Views with a few arguments, it is a foregone conclusion t h a t others will fi n d a few arg u men ts t o support

their different views: phiIOSOphy in that style is inconclusive and arbitrary. Instead of picking u p a proposition from one b o o k to controvert it a n d a quotation from a n o t h e r b y way o f agreement, o n e s h o u l d try, if o n e bothers a t all with t h e views of others, really to m a s t e r e a c h in turn—as a n existential whole, keeping i n m i n d t h a t e a c h belief is p a r t of a larger view, and that e a c h view requires a p o i n t of view which involves a hum an reality. When Hegel asserts the ethical p r i m a c y for w o m a n of the relationship to her brother, o r w h e n h e speaks of t h e burial of a n o t h e r a s the highest d u t y o n e c a n have toward h i m , h e is not making these claims o n his o w n behalf, a s if h e considered

them timeless truths; he is trying to perform a marvel of empathy, not just reading A n t i g o n e a n d being effusive about its beauty o r profundity b u t trying t o s e e t h e world through Antigone’s eyes. And h e supposes t h a t Antigone is not merely o n e figure in o n e old tragedy which h e himself h a p p e n s to

like especially; he takes her to represent an ancient ethic— laws of which she says, i n words t h a t Hegel quotes before he c o m m e n c e s his discussion o f Sittlichkeit,

3 1 . The conception of t h e book

131

Not now, nor yesterday’s, they always live, and no one knows t h e i r origin i n time. ( 4 5 6 f . )

Her conception of the family and of Sittlichkez't is not merely hers but—Hegel thinks—the classical conception of it, which, however, comes into conflict with another conception, repre-

sented i n SOphocles’ tragedy by Creon. One does not have to engage in any special pleading for Hegel to suggest that the moral conflict between Antigone and Creon, as pictured by S0phocles, is not about a problem contrived by the poet: the issue is bound to arise where Sittlichkeit is conceived in a certain way-and that is what interests Hegel. For all that, this particular portion of the Phenomenology is

not one of the best. The which are open to many ception of the book that Philosophers may find

point is only that even these pages, objections, fit into the over-all conhas been presented here. the discussion of Moralitc‘it, a little

later on, more to their liking; at the very least, Hegel’s critique

of Kant’s morality retains considerable interest. I have no right, Hegel says implicitly, to present my own world view without coming to terms with Kant’s. Nor is Hegel’s world view altogether separate from his view of what he calls “the moral world view [die moralische Weltanschauung],” as if Hegel kept it back until the end to present it only after everybody else is criticized. As he views Antigone and Kant and all the other points of view he considers, he presents his own view of the world, section upon section. In his critique of Kant a phrase recurs several times that is an important clue to Hegel’s total conception: aber es ist z'hm damit nicht Ernst ( b u t he i s not really serious about it).22

That is Hegel’s criticism of almost all the positions that pass in review: they are one-sided, and if they are not pushed to a tragic conclusion, like Antigone’s in its collision with another, equally one-sided position, they are maintained—and this i s the

rule—in a half-hearted way, not seriously. The views that are taken up in turn are not so much “shells,” to use Jaspers’s term o n c e more, as they are halfway 22 In the section on Die Verstellung: in Lasson’s edition, four times o n p. 401 alone, and over half a dozen times after that; in Baillie’s translation, 6 3 2 ff.

132

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

houses, a n d those who inhabit them d i m t h e lights a n d move around carefully lest they discover the limitations of their intellectual h o m e s . To r e m a i n faithful t o his conception, Hegel

must never condemn any View from his own point of View, externally: his criticism m u s t always b e internal a n d consist i n

taking each View more seriously than its professed opponents take it. The crucial question of organization r e m a i n s where s o much

material is to be considered. In the middle of the twentieth century, the most fashionable arrangement would probably b e by types, as Jaspers’s was i n his Psychologie der Weltanschauungen. A merely arbitrary assortment would h a v e the

great disadvantage that important points of view might be overlooked. B u t Hegel’s arrangement, over half a century before Darwin published his Origin of Species a n d impressed the idea of evolution on almost everybody’s m i n d , was developmental.

Probably, he was influenced by Goethe’s development from style t o style, which suggested that there w as a “logical” se-

quence—not “logical” in the ordinary sense, but rather in the way i n which, to use a Hegelian image from the beginning of t h e preface, b u d , blossom, and fruit succeed e a c h other. Hegel assumes a n organic necessity. It does not seem to h i m that s o m e of the views h e considers are true a n d others false; b u t s o m e are more m a t u r e t h a n others, a n d one m i g h t try t o arrange them i n a n ascending

series according to their relative maturity. This does not mean that what comes later is always better a n d more attractive.

Early childhood has its unsurpassable charm, youth is in some respects never eclipsed; b u t for all that there is a deve10pm e n t a l sequence that Hegel seeks t o reproduce in the Phenomenology. The idea is supremely suggestive and fascinating b u t , i n the e n d , untenable. O n e could try to offer a history of philosoPhy, or of literary styles, or even of a whole culture i n this vein, a n d i n Hegel’s three volumes of lectures of the history of philosophy something of this sort is i n fact accomplished. Even a history of Christianity o r of Hinduism could be written

3 2 . The contents of the book

133

in this spirit, and since Hegel’s time such evolutionary studies have become a commonplace. But a history of the world’s religions in which all but the writer’s own religion are treated as so many less mature stages o n the way to truth can never

be more than a piece of apologetics, though this genre flourished in the later nineteenth century and is not altogether extinct yet. The idea of arranging all significant points of View in such a single sequence, on a ladder that reaches from the crudest to the most mature, is as dazzling to contemplate as it is m ad to try seriously to implement it.

Sometimes, to be sure, one can fruitfully relate two views by showing how the first, pushed to extremes (taken seriously), leads to the second. But any attempt to relate all points of view in a single chain of this sort is bound to be at best a virtuoso performance of which one might concede that the writer “plays” brilliantly, at worst a waste of time. The transitions of the Phenomenology the other.

fluctuate from one extreme to

The idea of not sticking to the historical sequence is certainly defensible. What is earlier may at times represent a more mature stage. Hegel was also right in seeing that the way a view is reached is not necessarily external to the view

itself: on the" contrary, a knowledge of the development,including the prior positions, through which a m a n passed before ad0pting a position may make all the difference when it comes to comprehending his position. To sum u p : the greatness of the Phenomenology lies both

in its conception, which is in part brilliant and fruitful, and in a lot of its detail; but some aspects of the conception are absurd, and some of the details bizarre.

32

The very table of contents of the Phenomenology may be said to mirror confusion. After the preface and the introduction, there are eight parts, each indicated by a Roman numeral:

134

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

1. II. III. IV.

V. VI. VII. VIII.

Sense certainty, the this, and opinion. Perception, the thing, and deception. Force and understanding, appearance, and suprasensible world. The truth o f self-certainty.

Certainty and truth of reason. Spirit. Religion. Absolute knowledge.

These numbers and titles appear in the text as well as in the table of contents. Then, evidently as an afterthought, in the table of contents only and not in the text, the first three parts are lumped together under the heading—quoting from the

original edition, which also specifies the page numbers and thus shows some interesting disparities at a g l a n c e :

( A ) Consciousness, pp. 22—100. Part IV is preceded by a similar heading: ( B ) Self-Consciousness, pp. 101—161. And the last four parts o f the book are a g a i n l u m p e d together, but without a title. Above Part V we r e a d :

( C ) (AA) Reason, pp. 16223—375. Above “VI. Spirit” we read: ( B B ) Spirit, pp. 376—624. Above “ V I I . R e l i g i o n ” : ( C C ) Religion, p p . 625—741. And finally, above “VIII. Absolute k n o w l e d g e ” :

( D D ) Absolute knowledge, pp. 741—765.24 The first three parts are not further subdivided, neither is Part VIII. All the other parts, which are longer, are. P a r t I V h a s o n l y two subparts: “ A . Independence a n d de p e n d e n c e of self-consciousness; mastership and servitude,” and “ B . Freedom of self-consciousness; stoicism; skepticism;

and the unhappy consciousness.” We shall return to this part in the next section. Parts V, VI, and VII are all divided into A , B , a n d C ; and each of these, in turn, with t h e exception of VI.B a n d VII.C,

23 The original table of contents has “172,” which is a misprint. 24 The original reads: “741 to the end.”

3 2 . The contents of the book

135

is in turn divided into a , b , and c . There the breakdown ends,

except for V.A.a where the author could scarcely curb himself. Here matters become confused; and finally “Observance of the Organic” is broken down into alpha, beta, and gamma, and gamma, finally, into double alpha, double beta, and double gamma, and even under two o f these subdivisions we find

more than one descriptive title. VI.B. is handled inconsistently: its three subdivisions are assigned Roman numerals: “ I . The world of the spirit alienated from itself” (with a and b ) , “11. The Enlightenment” (with a and b ) , and “III. Absolute freedom and the Terror” (with no further subdivisions).

VII.C., “Revealed religion” has no subdivisions any more than “VIII. Absolute knowledge,” which follows it. The table of contents bears out that the work was not planned painstakingly before it was written, that Parts V and VI (Reason and Spirit) grew far beyond the bounds originally contemplated,25 and that Hegel himself was a little confused about what he had actually got when he was finished. Of course, the above account also gives some idea of the actual

contents of the book. The first three parts deal with theory of knowledge and perception and are very heavily influenced by Plato and Aristotle. The fourth part we shall consider in a moment. Part V begins with over a hundred pages on theoretical reason, as it operates i n the sciences, and this section ends, rather oddly, with a

discussion of phrenology. The second half of Part V deals with practical reason and self-realization, and begins with the aforementioned discussion of “Pleasure and Necessity.”

VI.A deals with Sittlichkeit and has been commented on above. VI.B is entitled “Spirit alienated from itself. Bildung?”3

The

further breakdown of this section has already

been given. VI.C is called “Spirit certain of itself. Moralitd’t” and contains Hegel’s critique of Kant’s ethics. Part VII begins with a few general pages in which the har-

assed author looks back on what he has done and tries rather 25 Cf. also Hegel’s letter to Schelling, May 1, 1807, in D , and Hegel’s remarks in E §25. 26 For a discussion o f this word, see C 1 . 3 . 4 .

136

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

desperately to rationalize it. He seeks to explain why it w a s all right t o take u p some forms of religion i n the earlier parts, notably in t h e discussion of the unhappy consciousness ( i n I V ) and of Antigone ( i n V I ) . But th e worst is t o c o m e ; speaking of all t h e preceding forms of the spirit, Hegel s a y s : “Religion presupposes the whole procession of them [den ganzen A b l a u f derselben] a n d is their simple totality o r absolute self.”27 Then we get about ten rather poor pages about

“A. Natural religion,” mostly on Persia and Egypt, and wonder what h e could possibly have m e a n t : d i d religion o f this sort, either a s it really was o r as Hegel here portrays it, presuppose t h e Enlightenment, the “absolute freedom” of 1 7 8 9 , and “ t h e Terror” that ensued? O r d i d it presuppose comparable events? And what could o n e say in answer t o these questions when it comes to “ B . Art-religion” ( m e a n i n g Greek religion) and “ C . Revealed religion”? Only t h a t Hegel finished the b o o k u n d e r a n i m m e n s e strain; t h a t faults are so easy to fi n d i n it that it is not worth while t o a d d u c e h e a p s of t h e m ; a n d t h a t there is a great d e a l in t h e b o o k t h a t is infinitely more

interesting.

33 B y far the best part of the Phenomenology is its preface,

included in the companion volume. Next to that, Part IV, on self-consciousness, is m o s t interesting. I t begins with a few introductory pages which c o n t a i n the d i c t u m : “Selfconsciousness attains its satisfaction only i n another self-

consciousness.”28 Then w e are offered o n e skit a n d three tableaux, all clearly labeled. I n the skit, one self—consciousness encounters an-

other. Here it is relevant that the connotations of the term are different in English and German. While being selfconscious often means being unsure of oneself and embarrassed, selbstbewusst sein means just the opposite: being self-assured and proud. O f course, the primary meaning i n 27 Lasson’s e d . , 4 3 8 ; Baillie, 6 8 9 . 28 Lasson’s e d . , 1 2 1 ; Baillie, 2 2 6 .

3 3 . The chapter o n self-consciousness

137

both languages is the s a m e : self-awareness. B u t while this sense is most important, the other connotations are relevant.

As self-consciousness encounters‘self-consciousness, pride meets pride, and each resolves to destroy the other in order to grow in self-assurance. Each aims at the other’s death and risks his life. For Sartre, i n L’étre e t le ne’ant, this account is

still paradigmatic. “The other” is the enemy. What matters to Hegel is the comprehension

o f o n e par-

ticular relationship between one self-consciousness and another, namely that between master an d servant. He construes it, in the first instance, as the result of the fight. The loser

prefers servitude to death.288 What follows made the profoundest impression on Karl Marx, who greatly admired the book and called it “the true birthplace and secret of the Hegelian philosophy.”29 The servant comes to live by his own work and thus becomes self-reliant and independent, while the master comes to rely on the servant’s labor and thus becomes dependent. In Das

Kapital, Marx writes: “As man . . . works on nature outside himself and changes it, he changes at the same time his own nature.”30 With t h i s n e a t and ironical reversal IV.A ends. IV.B is devoted to stoicism, skepticism, and the unhappy consciousness. The transition to the first of these three outlooks is easy to f o l l o w : the attitude o f the servant who, despite h i s status,

feels essentially self-reliant and independent may be characterized as stoicism. “This consciousness is thus negative against the relationship of mastership and servitude . . . to be equally 238 And the victor prefers a servant and continual recognition of his own superiority to a corpse. (This point was called to my attention by Ivan 8011 who develops it in his doctoral dissertation on Hegel.) 29 Quoted in Robert Tucker, Philosophy a n d Myth in Karl Marx, Cambridge

University

Press, 1 9 6 1 , 1 2 6 , from

Marx

and Engels,

Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe, III, 153. Tucker himself argues that “when Marx speaks of Hegelianism h e has in mind pri— marily the philosophy of history set forth by Hegel in his Phenomenology”

( 1 2 5 ) . B u t M a r x a l s o w r o t e critical essays o n T h e

Philosophy of Right (see Bibliography). 30 Vol. I , Volksausgabe, 133.

138

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

free in fetters and on the throne, in spite of all the dependence of its individual existence.” Here the historical allusion is kept properly s u b d u e d : Those who d o not know that o n e of the most famous Stoics was

Marcus Aurelius, the Roman emperor, and another Epictetus, a slave, can still accept the point Hegel is making. The same i s true o f Hegel’s sociological comment that stoicism “could

appear as a general form of the world spirit only in an age of general fear and servitude, but also of general education which had taught men to think.” The implicit distinction is a s sound as c a n be, a n d h a s often been overlooked by Marxists: the widespread acceptance of a

point of view is determined sociologically, but the original development of it by s o m e exceptional individual need not b e .

Some are, in Nietzsche’s words, “untimely” and “born posthumously.”

The transition to skepticism is plausible, too. “Skepticism is the realization of that of which stoicism is only the Concept —and the actual experience of what the freedom of thought involves; it is implicitly the negative and must present itself as such. . . . In skepticism the total insignificance and dependence of the other comes to be for consciousness. . . . The skeptical self-consciousness is this ataraxia o f thinking oneself,

the unchangeable and true certainty of oneself.” Stoicism is a halfway house: it denies the reality and significance of the external world, of such apparently real and significant matters as being a slave, being in fetters, being i n

pain, but does not seriously press the point that all this is unreal. Skepticism is serious about what stoicism merely says: the skeptic doubts that there really are fetters and thrones. In this way, perfect imperturbability and peace of mind are achieved.

Now Hegel must and does show how skepticism, too, is a halfway house; how it, too, is not truly serious about what it says. Briefly, “ i t s acts and words always contradict each other. . . . ” Though the skeptic claims to doubt the reality o f

his body and the external world, he acts in ways that show that he is not i n earnest with his doubts. Actually, this more

obvious point is made much less clearly by Hegel than another

3 3 . The chapter o n self-consciousness

139

p o i n t : the skeptical consciousness h a s two conflicting conceptions o f itself.

On the one hand, “it professes to* be an entirely accidental, individual consciousness—a consciousness that is empirical and conforms to what h a s n o reality for it, obeys what has n o significance for it, a n d d o e s a n d makes real what has no truth for it. B u t even a s it thus considers itself as individual, acci-

dental, and indeed animal life and a lost self-consciousness, it also makes itself, on the contrary, general and self-identical.

From this self-identity, or rather in it, it falls back into that accidental and confused status, for precisely this self-moving negativity deals only with what is individual and busies itself with the accidental. This consciousness is thus the unconscious drivel that moves back and forth between the two extremes of the self-identical self-consciousness and the accidental, confused, and confusing consciousness. . . .

“In skepticism consciousness experiences itself truly as a consciousness that contradicts itself. From this experience a new form emerges which brings together the two thoughts which skepticism keeps apart. The thoughtlessness of skepticism about itself must disappear because in fact it is one consciousness that has these two aspects. This new form is one which involves the double consciousness of itself as selfliberating, unchangeable, and self-identical and o f itself a s

absolutely self-confusing and perverse, as well as the consciousness o f this its contradiction. . . . Thus the doubling which was formerly distributed a m o n g two individuals, the m a s t e r a n d the servant, i s turned into o n e ; the doubling o f self-consciousness in itself, which is essential for the Concept

of the spirit, is thus present, but not yet its unity—and the unhappy consciousness is the consciousness o f itself as a dou-

ble being that only contradicts itself.” After Freud, the two poles of the skeptical self-consciousness of which Hegel speaks may perhaps be illustrated more vividly by considering the psychoanalyst’s self-consciousness: On the one hand, he views his consciousness as empirical, accidental, a n d individual; h e considers it unreliable and confused. O n the other hand, h e relies o n it, considers it trans-

empirical and objective, not merely personal but an instance

140

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

of a general scientific consciousness. This, i n any case, is the point H eg e l makes about skepticism. I t is another halfway house: now one puts o n blinders a n d looks this way, ignoring

what one sees at other times when one looks the other way. Sartre would call this mauvaise foi a n d s ay that the skeptical consciousness is in b a d faith; it deceives itself. When skepticism is deprived of this subterfuge and forced to b e i n earnest, a new form of self-consciousness e m e r g e s : the unhappy con-

sciousness that experiences itself as essentially divided against itself. Even the preceding discussion of m a s t e r a n d servant, stoicism, a n d skepticism is by n o m e a n s compressed “ t o the ut-

most,” as Ueberweg’s History suggests, and the obscurity of Hegel’s exposition is n o t d u e t o terseness a n d th e exclusion of

all but the most essential points, but to the fact that an excess of G o t h i c detail often hides the basic structure of the argu-

ment. Now, with the unhappy consciousness, the author’s poetic impulse takes over. In size, this account equals the analyses of mastership and servitude, stoicism, and skepticism taken together. And the reason for this is perfectly clear: Hegel becomes absorbed i n allusions t o the specific features of the medieval Christian mentality that, a s h e sees it, exemplified the unhappy consciousness. Hegel never n a m e s Christianity; b u t L a s s o n is surely right when i n his footnotes h e asks u s to recognize allusions t o : God a s judge, Jesus, t h e worship o f Jesus, the Crusades, the consciousness of sin, asceticism, the priest as father confessor, prayers i n L a t i n , and indulgences. Baillie i n his English translation of the Phenomenology includes these footnotes; Royce, i n his version of “The Contrite Consciousness” (included i n

Loewenberg’s Hegel Selections) uses religious terms throughout—for example, “contrite” instead of “unhappy”—to render Hegel’s m o r e neutral w o r d s . Thus “pure consciousness” becomes “Devout Consciousness”; “ b e l l ” b e c o m e s “altar bell”; and “activity a n d enjoyment” once “service and c o m m u n i o n , ” then “good works and c o m m u n i o n . ” Royce’s version is superscribed “freely translated.” The a t t e m p t to catch Hegel’s allusions and the enjoyment of his cleverness or of some of his digs is b o u n d t o distract

3 3 . T h e chapter o n self-consciousness

141

attention from the alleged “logic” of the development. The r e a d e r forgets t h e i m a g e o f the l a d d e r a n d wonders which

of the many features of this tableau are in any sense necessary a n d essential to this stage; a n d t h e author, t o o , h a s plainly

lost sight of the idea and plan of his book, and far from compressing his exposition severely, dwells at unnecessary length

on irrelevancies. Hegel evidently wanted to get some ideas about medieval Christianity off his chest, and the allusiveness of his style—no d o u b t , originally inspired by the recognition t h a t all this conc r e te detail really d i d not belong here—greatly lengthened the

discussion. His poetic impulse made the most of this opportunity to visualize and describe a state of mind and a period. We can descry yet another motive. Hegel obviously was u n able t o c o n t i n u e the development t h a t h e h a d traced s o bril-

liantly through several stages, beyond this point, to another stage.

Here w a s a divided consciousness t h a t “ p l a c e s itself o n the s i d e o f the c h a n g e a b l e consciousness a n d considers itself in-

significant; but as a consciousness of unchangeableness or simple being it must at the same time aim to liberate itself from the insignificant, i.e., from itself. . . . The conscious-

ness of life, of its existence and activity, is only the suffering over this existence and activity, for in all this it has only the consciousness of its opposite as the essential—and of its own nullity.” This is still c o n t i n u o u s with the p r e c e d i n g developm e n t from servitude t o stoicism, a n d h e n c e t o skepticism.

These transitions are among the most plausible in the whole book, and few indeed of the many other transitions can brook c o m p a r i s o n w i t h them. But what needed t o b e shown now w a s

how the unhappy consciousness, too, is a halfway house, and h o w , t a k e n i n earnest and pushed t o extremes, it gives way t o

another, more mature stage in the development of the spirit. Not only was Hegel evidently unable to d o this, he also wished to deliver himself of a lot of material about the attit u d e s r e a s o n adopts i n t h e study of nature ( a p p r o x i m a t e l y

one hundred pages of it, as it turned o u t ) . So he followed u p the discussion of the unhappy consciousness, and the seminal chapter on “Self-Consciousness” that ends with it, with an

142

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

immensely l o n g c h a p t e r o n “ R e a s o n . ” H e devoted th e first of

its three parts to “A. Observing Reason,” which in turn begins with t h e “Observation of Nature” a n d ends with “ Phys iognomy a n d Phrenology.” Hegel certainly d i d not m a n a g e t o trace a necessary development from t h e unhappy consciousness to phrenology, any more than th e development from Faust’s abandonment of Gretchen i n th e dungeon, at t h e end of “The First Part of the Tragedy” to s o m e of the more abstruse discussions i n Part Two c o u l d b e said t o be organically necessary. Rather, the framework of t h e book is loose

enough to permit the introduction of all sorts of ideas for which the writer would like to fi n d a place. The Phenomenology of th e Spirit is a profoundly incongruous book and brings to m i n d some passages i n Ecker-

mann’s Conversations with Goethe in which the poet insists that Faust “is after all wholly incommensurable, a n d all attempts to bring it closer to the understanding a r e i n vain. One

should also keep in mind that the First Part issued from a somewhat dark state of the individual. B u t precisely this darkness attracts people, and they exert themselves over it a s they d o over all insoluble p r o b l e m s ” ( J a n u a r y 3 , 1 8 3 0 ) . A g a i n : “This act, t o o , is to receive a' character of its own so t h a t , like a small world that exists for itself, it d o e s n o t touch t h e rest

and is united with the whole only through a faint relation to what precedes and succeeds i t . ” Eckermann t h e n suggested

that the poet “uses the story of a famous hero merely as a kind of c o n t i n u o u s thread on which h e c a n string w h a t pleases

him. It is no different with the Odyssey and Gil Blas.” Goethe agreed and a d d e d : “Moreover, w h a t matters i n a composition of this sort is merely that the several masses are significant and clear, while a s a whole it always r e m a i n s i n c o m m e n s u r able, but precisely for t h a t reason, like a n unsolved problem, ever a g a i n lures people to repeated c o n t e m p l a t i o n ” (February 1 3 , 1 8 3 1 ) .

3 4 . H egel’s terminology

143

34 Hegel himself, i n his later years, called t h e Phenomenology his voyage of discovery. B u t in the preface h e suggests that it

is the Odyssey of the world spirit. He himself does not refer to Odysseus or use this image, and in connection with something he does say I have suggested in the commentary (1.3.4) t h a t t h e Phenomenology is the Bildungsroman of the Weltgeist,

the story of its development and education. But a comparison with the Odyssey is n o less suggestive than this comparison with Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre. In its search for a

homeland where it can dwell in peace, the human spirit is shipwrecked again and again, has all kinds of adventures, m a n y of them fantastic, a n d d o e s not b y a n y m e a n s s e e m to b e m a k i n g progress a t every t u r n .

All of these comparisons with great works of literature are a t o d d s with the prevalent conception o f both Hegel a n d philosophy. They are bound to strike some readers as far-

fetched. But Hegel’s peculiar language bears out the present account and is not really comprehensible a t all without some such reflections. Abstruse syntax that even a native reader of G e r m a n must sometimes construe l i k e Latin appears together, in the s a m e sentence, with strikingly concrete imagery; and

metaphysical speculation is fused with considerable poetic power. Almost like Shakespeare, Hegel often thinks in pictures; a n d although this comparison must seem perverse at first glance, i t i s important t o realize that Hegel does not, like

most phiIOSOphers, search for an image to illustrate his ideas: his difficulty often lies in getting across insight and image at once—or, i n other words, i n communicating his own vision. If

the idea and its illustration were altogether separate in his own m i n d , h e could offer the thought first and then, i n the next sentence, a n example, or first the concrete picture and

then the lesson h e wishes to draw from it. But he not only denies, like Aristotle, any Platonic chorismos or cleft between separately existing forms a n d concrete instances that imitate or participate i n t h e m ; h e resembles P l a t o i n having a vision

144

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

of the forms—not i n another world, like Plato, b u t in rebus, in the images, skits, and tableaux that exemplify t h e m .

The same characteristics that make the book so difficult as a whole also make many sentences s o exasperating: concrete images turn up out o f season and resist being quickly dropped again. Hegel looks for terms that are not abstract—words that retain a sensuous core even when they are used in metaphysi-

cal prose. Consider a few examples: Anschauung, firmly established by now in phiIOSOphical English as “intuition,” in translations of Kant as well as other German philosophers, comes from anschauen which means to look at. Hence Weltanschauung is usually rendered “world View.” (Cf. C 1.2.2.) A n sich, always rendered “ i n itself,” does n o t mean in Germ a n that a feature i s h i d d e n from view and literally inside, b ut rather that the feature is “ o n ” the thing, visible “ f o r u s ” (fil'r uns) though n o t “for i t ” (fiir s i c h ) ; nor does it exist separately, “for” or “by itself” ( a n o t h e r m e a n i n g of fiir s i c h ) . A n and fiir sick ( i n a n d for itself) means that something is

both “in itself” and “for itself” in the senses just specified. (Cf. C 11.1.8, 10, 30.) Aufheben (sublimate) m e a n s literally “pick u p . ” Like every single one of the other terms explained s o far, it i s q u i t e

common in ordinary speech: it is what you do when something h a s fallen to the floor. B u t this original sensuous m e a n i n g

has given rise to two derivative meanings which are no less c o m m o n : “ c a n c e l , ” and “ p r e s e r v e ” o r “ k e e p . ” Something may b e picked u p i n order t h a t it will n o longer b e t h e r e ; o n the other h a n d , I m a y also pick it u p to k e e p it. When Hegel

uses the term in its double (or triple) meaning—and he expressly informs us that he does ( H 42)——he may be said to visualize h o w something is picked u p i n order t h a t it ma y n o longer b e there just the w a y it was, a l t h o u g h , of course, i t is not cancelled altogether b u t lifted u p t o b e k e p t o n a different level. ( C f . H 4 2 and C 11.1.16.) Begrz'fir ( C o n c e p t ) c o m e s from begreifen w h i c h m e a n s “comprehend” but also h a s a sensuous m e a n i n g . Grez‘fen means “grab” o r “ g r a s p ” ; t h e prefix intensifies th e relation t o the object. Thus tasten means to “feel (one’s w a y ) ” ; betasten

3 4 . Hegel’s

terminology

145

m e a n s t o t o u c h s o m e t h i n g all over. Similarly, dienen m e a n s t o

serve; bedienen, to wait on somebody. Denken is think; bed e n k e n , t o t h i n k s o m e t h i n g o v er. ‘Begrifl

t h u s h a s t h e basic

meaning of a thorough grasp, and this reverberates through Hegel’s usage. ( C f . C 1.1.3.) Vorstellung ( n o t i o n ) c o m e s from vorstellen ( r e p r e s e n t ) . T h e G e r m a n verb occurs i n t h e sense o f : what is this supposed to represent? ( W a s soll das vorstellen?) Eine Vorstellung c a n m e a n , a n d i n o r d i n a r y s p e e c h very often refers to , a theatrical p e r f o r m a n c e . I n t h e phiIOSOphical sense, t h e n o u n is most often c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e verb form, sic/2 etwas vorstellen, which m e a n s literally, t o represent s o m e t h i n g to oneself, b u t is much

less unusual and cumbersome. In everyday language it means as much as, to imagine something. Traditionally, translators of K a n t a n d S c h o p e n h a u e r h a v e r e n d e r e d Vorstellung a s either “ r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ” o r “ i d e a . ” The f o r m e r smacks o f philosophical jargon, w h i c h t h e G e r m a n t e r m d o e s n o t . That is w h y s o m e translators p r e f e r “ i d e a ” ; b u t since K a n t , Schop e n h a u e r , a n d Hegel also o f t e n u s e the t e r m Idee, which surely

has to be rendered “idea,” this solution is poor, too. When Hegel uses Vorstellzmg, he generally has in mind a c o n t r a s t w i t h Begrifl. H e relies o n two associations Vorstellung usually h a s i n o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e : vagueness a n d a s e n s u o u s

quality. Hegel’s Begrifi, on the other hand, is by definition precise, a n d it dispenses w i t h visual aids. There is n o English

word that could serve as a perfect equivalent of Vorstellzmg, b u t “ n o t i o n ” is p r e t t y good for a t least two reasons. First, it is a n o r d i n a r y word t h a t d o e s n o t s t o p o n e i n one’s tracks every t i m e o n e c o m e s a c r o s s it i n a sentence. Secondly, it suggests s o m e t h i n g v a g u e a n d subscientific. Unfortunately, i t h a s b e e n

widely used to render Hegel’s Begrifl, a task for which it is particularly ill fitted. A good test is the consistent use of “not i o n ” f o r Vorstellung n o t o n l y i n the m a i n part of this book

but also throughout the translation of the preface to the Phenomenology: in every case it works far better than terms previously u s e d . ( C f . C 1.2.1.) G e i s t is for Hegel “ s p i r i t ” a n d n o t “ m i n d . ” There are many

reasons of which only three need be singled out here. The first i s s w e e p i n g : i n a very large n u m b e r of passages, “ m i n d ” sim-

146

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

ply does n o t make sense, an d only “spirit” will d o ; so even Baillie, though he entitled his translation The Phenomenology

of Mind, had to use “spirit” again and again. The second reason could b e construed as merely a n instance o f the first: Der heilige Geist is the Holy Spirit, not “ t h e holy mind,” and “spirit,” unlike “ m i n d , ” has scores of biblical and religious associations. As a result, “spirit” has overtones and connotations that distinguish it from “ m i n d ” and bring it exceedingly close to the German Geist. This also explains why Hegel does n o t render the n o u s o f Anaxagoras as Geist (V G 3 7 and 3 9 ) , and why h e claims that the Concept of Geist was introduced by Christianity ( V G 4 7 L, 5 8 L ) . I n d e e d , w e shall have t o return t o Hegel’s c o n c e p t i o n of Geist when w e con-

sider his philosophy of history and its relation to Christianity ( H 65; cf. C 11.1.27 and 111.13). The third reason is in line with the central argument of this section. Who has ever seen “minds”? Minds are almost by definition invisible. They

a r e postulated b y philosophers a s

“ghosts in the machine,” to use Gilbert Ryle’s famous phrase from The Concept of Mind; their home is in epistemology and metaphysics. But many people, both in the Bible and since that time, claim to have s e e n spirits, and a Geisterreich (the “realm of spirits” Schiller envisages in the first stanza o f his

poem on Die Freundschaft) is nowhere near as abstract and metaphysical a s “ a realm of m i n d s ” would be.31 Hegel concludes h i s Phenomenology of the Spirit with his own adapta-

tion of the final two lines of Schiller’s poem, in effect referring back to the book as a “realm of spirits.” Throughout, we suddenly realize, Hegel has been conjuring spirits, letting them pass before us in a gigantic procession. To appreciate the full significance of the e n d of t h e book,

one must compare Hegel’s adaptation of Schiller’s lines with the original poem. Schiller celebrates friendship. Twice he speaks of the grosse Geistersonne ( t h e great sun of the spirits)

that the spirits seek “as streams flee to the ocean” and that he, too, wants to approach, arm in arm with a friend. Were 31 Whether some being has a mind, is a metaphysical question; whether, say, a horse has spirit o r n o t , one can s e e .

3 4 . Hegel’s

terminology

147

he all alone in the universe, he says, h e would dream up souls in the rocks and embrace t h e m ; we are dead as long a s we

hate, “gods, when we embrace each other lovingly”; “upwards, over the thousands of stages of innumerable spirits who have not created, this urge rules divinely. Arm in arm, ever higher and higher, from the Mongol up to the Greek seer,” the dancing procession ascends. “Friendless was the great world master, felt a lack and therefore created spirits, blessed

mirrors of his blessednessl Though the highest being found no equal, from the cup of the whole realm of souls foams for him—infinity.” This prose translation, of course, can give no idea of Schiller’s vigorous rhythms and rhymes. But what concerns us is how Hegel ends his Phenomenology: “The goal, absolute knowledge, or spirit knowing itself as spirit, has for its way the recollection of the spirits. . . . Their preservation, as free existence appearing in the form of the accidental, is history; but as comprehended organization it is the science of the appearance of knowledge. Both together, history comprehended, form the recollection and the Golgotha o f t h e absolute spirit, the actuality, truth, and certainty of h i s

throne, without which he would be something lifeless and lonely; only from the cup of this realm of spirits f o a m s his infinity for h i m . ”

The Phenomenology

of t h e Spirit e n d s with the death of

God, with Golgotha; and this time the “speculative Good Friday” ( t o recall the i m a g e at the end o f “Faith and Knowle d g e , ” published five years before) i s n o t followed by any

resurrection. To be sure, the tone of the ending seems affirmative; but w e should not overlook a crucial word that Hegel

has placed before the concluding quotation—a word that, being foreign to Schiller’s text, carries an immense weight: n u r (only). In Schiller’s last stanza the presumption is that the infinity of the supreme being is mirrored by the whole realm of souls: though n o single one equals the master’s infinity, all the souls together do mirror it. For Hegel, the infinite G o d is dead: “only

148

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

from the cup of this realm of spirits foams his infinity for him.”

To put it into our own words: there is no supreme being beyond; the spirit is not to b e found in another w o r l d ; the

infinite spirit has to be found in the comprehension of this world, i n the study of the spirits summoned in the P h e n o m e nology. “History comprehended” m u s t replace theology. Gestalten des Bewusstseins are also far m o r e concrete than

“forms of consciousness,” though this is probably the nearest English equivalent. The first two lines of Goethe’s Faust are relevant: 1hr naht e u c h wieder, schwankende Gestalten . . .

You come back, wavering shapes, out of the past In which you first appeared to clouded eyes. As we c l i m b the ladder of Hegel’s Phenomenology, we m u s t first visualize each Gestalt and then get a fi rm grip o n it and

grasp it thoroughly to be able to climb over and beyond it. But what i s the meaning of “phenomenology”?

35 The w o r d Phiinomenologie was not Hegel’s coinage. “The

first who used the term ‘phenomenology’ at all and at the same time also used it to designate a part of his philosophical system was J o h a n n Heinrich Lambert [1728—77]. The work i n which h e did this was called New Organon o r Thoughts a b o u t the Investigation a n d Designation of t h e True and Its Differentia-

tion from Error and Mere Appearance ( 2 vols., Leipzig 1764).”32 The fourth and last part of this Organon was “Phenomenology or the Doctrine o f Mere Appearance.”

Herder picked up the term, particularly in two pertinent passages. In 1 7 6 9 ( i n Kritische Wc‘ilder I V ) h e spoke o f “an aesthetic phenomenology, which waits for a second Lambert.” 32 Hofl’meister’s introduction t o his critical ed. of the Phc'inomenologie ( 1 9 5 2 ) , v i i . The account a n d quotations that follow are

based on pp. vii—xvii. Cf. Ros. 204.

35. The word “phenomenology”

149

And i n 1 7 7 8 : “If only w e had . . . a real phenomenology of the beautiful and the true . . . W33 Kant even thought of dedicating ‘his first Critique to Lam—

bert.34 And on September 2 , 1770—the week Hegel was born —Kant wrote Lambert: “It seems that an altogether separate, albeit merely negative, science (Phaenomenologia generalis)

must precede metaphysics to determine the validity and limits of t h e principles of t h e sensibility lest they confuse our judg-

ments about the objects of pure reason, as has almost always happened hitherto.” And o n February 2 1 , 1 7 7 2 , K a n t wrote

Markus Herz that he had thought of writing “ a work which mi g ht have a title like The Limits of Sensibility and Reason.

I thought of two parts, one theoretical and one practical. The first contained i n section 1 , phenomenology i n general, and i n section 2 , metaphysics, albeit only according to its nature and

method. The second part also in two sections: 1. General principles of feeling and sense desire, 2 . The first principles of Sittlichkeit. . . .” Hegel probably knew Kant’s letter to Lambert, as the correspondence of the two m e n was published in 1786 and a few years later reprinted in Kant’s Kleine Schriften. Novalis had also used the word a couple of times, once to say that “phenomenology is perhaps the most useful and comprehensive science,” and Fichte had Spoken of it i n Lambert’s sense, i n 1804.35 S o the term was not n e w ; but what Hegel offered

under this title was. Hoffmeister has argued that “the position of the Phenomenology of the Spirit i n the whole of Hegel’s system . . . corre-

sponds precisely to that which Kant assigned to his Critique of Pure Reason”-—on the one hand a preliminary treatise, on the other a work that contains what was to c o m e after ( x v ) . His

points are interesting and may appeal to those who feel that neither philosopher ever succeeded in equaling the stature of his first great masterpiece. One can even add to Hofimeister’s 33 From Wahrnehmungen iiber Form und Gestalt aus Pygmalions bildendem T raum. Cf. Kant’s Werke, Akademieausgabe, XV, 297. 34 W e r k e , ed. cit., X V I I I , 6 4 .

35 Werke, X, 195.

150

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

consideration that both K a n t a n d Hegel h a d taken a l o n g t i m e t o publish their magnum opus, h ad collected thoughts and notes for m a n y years, and then wrote their books i n a single spurt i n a few months. This genesis helps to explain some o f the

roughness of the prose as well as the fact that so much was stuffed i n t o a single volume. B u t after all that h a s been said about the Phenomenology in this chapter, it should b e plain that its differences from Kant’s Critique far outweigh the

similarities. One difference among many is that what has just been shown about Hegel’s terminology does not apply t o Kant’s, even though some of the very s a m e words were used by Kant, too. What is true o f the word Plzc'z'nomenologie is true of most of Hegel’s terms; they had been used before H e g e l , but h e gave them a new nuance, usually by carrying over into their

technical use something of their sensuous core. For Hegel, Schein is not “mere appearance” in the sense of error and illusion. Nor does Hegel, like Kant, begin with a fixed contrast of noumena and phenomena from which he then derives “phenomenology.” He knows t h a t the Greek, like th e G e rma n, root also m e a n s to shine, to b e c o m e visible, and for h i m “phenomenology o f the spirit” m e a n s t h e study of t h e Gestalten des Bewusstseins, t h e study of t h e spirits i n which spirit mani-

fests itself. The alleged archrationalist Hegel was much less of a rationalist t h a n Kant. The term “phenomenology” acquired new m e a n i n g s after Hegel’s death. Moritz Lazarus (1824—1903), for example, used it in his major work, Das L e b e n der Seele (1855—57, 3 d e d . , 1 8 8 3 ) , to distinguish th e description o f t h e p h e n o m e n a

of mental life from psychology which seeks causal explanations. This emphasis on description was equally marked in the usage of Edmund Husserl (1859—1938), with whom the term

has come to be associated preeminently. When Husserl employed it to designate his own philosophy, Hegel’s

Phenomenology w a s a n almost forgotten b o o k , a nd

Husserl did not choose the word to suggest a link with Hegel. H e stood in a n altogether different t r a d i t i o n : his m a s t e r was Franz B r e n t a n o (1838—1917), a declared opponent o f Kant a n d philos0phical idealism. B r e n t a n o h a d resigned his Catholic

3 6 . Influence; G o e t h e o n A n t i g o n e

151

priesthood after the p r o c l a m a t i o n of t h e d o g m a of p a p a l i n -

fallibility in 1870 and had published a Psychologie vom em— pirischen Standpunkt in 1874. i It is not feasible to attempt a brief account of the meaning of “phenomenology” in Husserl’s school. Husserl’s views changed considerably i n t h e course of his l o n g life, a n d h i s leading disciples c h a n g e d t h e i r ideas, too—indeed, t h e y revised

their own conceptions of philosOphy—and they are far from agreeing with each o t h e r . S o m e of t h e m , including Max

Scheler and Martin Heidegger, did not remain disciples. The only major figure who admittedly owes a great deal both to Husserl’s “phenomenology” and to Hegel’s Phenomenology is Sartre.

36 The features o f Hegel’s style a n d sensibility t h a t h a v e b e e n stressed h e r e have often b e e n overlooked. Unquestionably, Hegel also had rather stuffy ideas a b o u t w h a t w a s academically proper a n d “scientific,” a n d frequently his terminology, which makes g o o d sense w h e n o n e e x a m i n e s o n e o r two t e r m s at a t i m e , degenerates i n t o a jargon t h a t obscures his m e a n i n g

instead of making it more precise. This vice, of course, is not peculiar to him; if anything, it is more widespread one hundred fifty years after his time than it was in his day. Symbolism, technical terms, and footnotes can all be extremely useful, but it is common for professors to employ such devices beyond all reason, with an eye more to their preconceptions about what looks scholarly than to the clarity of their work. Just as s o m e m o d e r n philosophers a n d literary critics, a n d a g r e a t m a n y sociologists, give themselves scientific airs a n d s a y a t l e n g t h obscurely w h a t m i g h t easily h a v e b e e n said briefly a nd clearly, H e g e l , t o o , s u c c u m b e d t o this vice. In time, a fte r he

became a professor at Berlin and gained disciples, many of them c a u g h t this disease from h i m w i t h o u t c a t c h i n g his vision o r genius, a n d his i n fl u e n c e w a s certainly b a d in p a r t . O n e illustration belongs i n this c h a p t e r . O n M a r c h 2 8 , 1 8 2 7 , G o e t h e a n d Eckermann discussed The Essence of A n c i e n t

152

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

Tragedy

by H.

F.

W.

Hinrichs

(1794-1861),

and

Goethe

complained that such an originally vigorous man had been “so affected by Hegel’s phiIOSOphy that an Open-minded, natural view a n d thinking h a d b e e n driven out of h i m , and an artificial a n d p o n d e r o u s m a n n e r of b o t h t h o u g h t a n d expression h a d gradually been built i n t o h i m , s o w e encounter passages in his book where o u r understanding simply stops a n d o n e n o longer k n o w s w h a t o n e r e a d s . ” As a n example, G o e t h e r e a d E c k e r m a n n a passage a b o u t the chorus t h a t p u t him i n m i n d of t h e witch’s a r i t h m e t i c i n Faust, w h ich w a s intended a s

humorous nonsense.36 “What are the English and the French t o think of t h e language of o u r philosophers w h e n w e G e r m a n s d o not understand it ourselves?” G o e t h e goes o n t o s p e a k of Hinrichs’s “ i d e a of family a n d s t a t e ” a n d of “potential tragic conflicts” connected w i t h it. H e a d d u c e s Sophocles’ A j a x w h o “perished through t h e d e m o n of a n offended sense of h o n o r , a n d H e r a c l e s through t h e d e m o n of loving jealousy. I n b o t h cases there is n o t t h e

slightest conflict between family piety and civic virtue, which according to Hinrichs are supposed to be the elements of G r e e k tragedy.” E c k e r m a n n points o u t “ t h a t when b e developed this t h e o r y h e w a s thinking o n l y of Antigone. He also seems t o h a v e considered only t h e c h a r a c t e r a n d actions of this heroine w h e n h e asserted t h a t f a m i l y piety a p p e a r s a t its

purest in woman, and most purely of all in the sister, and that t h e sister c a n love o n l y h e r b r o t h e r i n a wholly pure a n d sexless m a n n e r . ” “ ‘I should think,’ G o e t h e replied, ‘that t h e love of a sister for h e r sister w o u l d b e still p u r e r a n d m o r e sexless!

And we should not forget that there have been innumerable cases in w h i c h , k n o w n a n d u n k n o w n , t h e m o s t sensual affection o c c u r r e d between sister a n d brother.’ ” N e i t h e r G o e t h e n o r E c k e r m a n n s e e m s t o have realized the full extent of Hegel’s influence o n H i n r i c h s : t h e y did n o t recall t h e t r e a t m e n t of A n t i g o n e in t h e Phenomenology ( H 3 0 ) . 3‘3

See W K 73.

3 7 . Dialectic

153

37

One aspect of Hegel’s thought and influence that so far has been neglected here c a n b e s u m m e d u p i n o n e w o r d : dialectic.

But while almost everybody who has heard of Hegel associates h i m with this t e r m , its m e a n i n g is far from clear. According

to an ancient tradition (Diogenes Laertius IX.5)‘, Zeno of Elea, r e n o w n e d for his paradoxes, w a s the i n v e n t o r of the dialectic; a n d Plato called t h e s u p r e m e science dialectic. Some

Neoplatonists developed the idea that the course of the world is governed by a process with t h r e e stages: u n i t y (mone’), going o u t of oneself ( p r é h o d o s ) , a n d return i n t o oneself (epistrOphe’). In t h e M i d d l e Ages, dialectic w a s o n e of the

seven liberal arts. I n Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, dialectic b e c o m e s die Logik des Scheins ( A 6 1 , B 8 6 ) : t h e logic of m e r e appeara n c e , o f error a n d illusion. Considering Plato’s usage, it is

rather odd that Kant explains his definition by saying: “Different as the meanings are which the ancients attached to a science or art, one can yet see for certain from their actual use of this t e r m that a m o n g them it w a s n o t h i n g else t h a n die

Logik des Scheins. A sophistical art of giving one’s ignorance, and even the illusions that one produced deliberately, the whitewash of truth by imitating the method of thoroughness, prescribed by logic. . . . ” B u t half of t h e Critique ( 4 1 2 o f the 8 5 6 p a g e s of the first e d i t i o n ) is t a k e n u p b y Kant’s own

“transcendental dialectic” which he defines as “a critique of this dialectical Schein.” T h i s “is called transcendental dialectic, n o t a s a n art t o stimulate s u c h illusion dialectically ( a n u n -

fortunately very viable art . . . ) but as a critique of the understanding a n d of reason in respect t o their hyper-physical

use, to uncover the false illusion of their unfounded presumptions . . . ” ( A 63, B 8 8 ) . Kant’s greatest a c h i e v e m e n t , t h e n , his critical discussion o f t h e “ p a r a l o g i s m s ” about t h e soul, t h e antinomies a b o u t the

world, and the traditional proofs of God’s existence—his attempt t o destroy d o g m a t i c psychology, cosmology, a n d theol-

ogy—went under the name of “transcendental dialectic.” His

154

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

treatment of t h e antinomies w as particularly impressive: thirtysix pages in the center of t h e b o o k presented, o n facing pages, four “theses” and four “antitheses,” e a c h followed by a “proof” a n d a “ n o t e . ” T h e first thesis w a s : “The world h a s a

beginning in time and is also enclosed in boundaries spatially.” The first antithesis: “The world h as n o beginning a nd n o boundaries i n space b u t is, i n respect t o b o t h t i m e a n d space, infinite.” The four antinomies, said K a n t , were d ue t o the illicit u s e o f reason, a n d h e considered it o n e of t h e greatest accomplishments o f his own work t h a t h e had succeeded i n resolving these antinomies. In a n interesting n o t e in t h e second edition, K a n t called attention t o the fact t h a t his twelve categories of the unders t a n d i n g are arranged i n four groups of three, a n d that the third category i n e a c h g r o u p is a synthesis of t h e t w o preceding it. ( H e d i d not u s e t h e w o r d “synthesis” at this point; the passage is translated below, C III.3.11.) Fichte introduced i n t o G e r m a n philosophy the three-step

of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, using these three terms. Schelling took u p this terminology; Hegel d i d n o t . H e never once used these three t e r m s together t o designate three stages i n a n a r g u m e n t or a c c o u n t i n a n y of his b o o k s . A n d they d o not h e l p u s u n d e r s t a n d his Phenomenology, his Logic, or his philosophy of history; t h e y i m p e d e a n y o p e n - m i n d e d compre-

hension of what he does by forcing it into a schema which was available to him and which he deliberately spurned.37 The mechanical formalism, in particular, with which critics since Kierkegaard have charged him, he derides expressly and at some length in the preface to the Phenomenology. Whoever looks for the stereotype of the allegedly Hegelian dialectic in Hegel’s Phenomenology will not find it. What one does find on looking at the table of contents is a very decided preference for triadic a r r a n g e m e n t s . As already noted ( H 3 2 ) ,

37 Cf. G . E . Mueller, “The Hegel Legend of ‘Thesis-AntithesisSynthesis,’ ” and W K 1 6 6 ff. The o n l y p l a c e where Hegel u s e s the three t e r m s together o c c u r s i n h i s l e c t u r e s o n the history o f phi-

losophy, on the last page but one of the section o n Kant—where Hegel roundly reproaches Kant for having “everywhere posited thesis, antithesis, synthesis” ( W e r k e , e d . Glockner, X I X , 6 1 0 ) .

3 7 . Dialectic

155

Parts V, VI, and VII are all divided into A , B , and C, a n d all but o n e of these nine sections a r e further subdivided i n t o three

parts. But these many triads are not‘ presented or deduced by Hegel a s s o many theses, antitheses, and syntheses. I t i s not b y m e a n s of any dialectic o f t h a t sort that his thought moves

up the ladder to absolute knowledge. Skepticism, for example, is not the antithesis o f stoicism, nor does Hegel make any effort t o present it that w a y ; rather

he introduces it as a state of mind that is reached when stoicism is taken more seriously than its pr0ponents are wont to take it and pushed to its “logical” conclusion. And the transition to the third member of t h a t particular triad, t h e unhappy consciousness, i s m a d e i n the s a m e w a y : i t is not offered t o us

as the synthesis of the two preceding stages but rather as the result of not allowing the skeptic to hide in bad faith in his halfway house ( H 3 3 ) .

When we turn to Hegel’s discussion of the ethical world ( H 3 0 ) , we also d o n o t fi n d that the triads are reducible to theses, antitheses, a n d syntheses, much less t h a t t h e y are pre-

sented to us in that fashion. The three major divisions of Part VI, “Spirit,” a r e “A. True spirit, Sittlichkeit” ( w i t h the discussion o f Antigone i n the first two of three s u b s e c t i o n s ) , “ B . Spirit, alienated from itself, Bildung,” and “ C . Spirit cer-

tain of itself, Moralitc'z’t.” This triad is certainly closer to the p0pular conception o f the dialectic. We move from a traditiondirected ethic to the alienated intellectualism o f the Enlightenm e n t and the French R e v o l u t i o n (which are discussed i n the last two subsections o f B ) , a n d hence to the inner-directed

morality of Kant. Another author might have presented the spirit o f the Enlightenment

a s t h e antithesis of Antigone’s

superstitious ethic, and then Moralitc‘z’t as the synthesis of Sittlz‘clzkez’t and Bildung. Bu t this is not w h a t Hegel d i d . Hegel’s account of Antigone’s Sittlichkeit is overwhelmingly positive and full of admiration; and far from suggesting t h a t all that

was good in this stage is preserved in the higher synthesis of Moralita't, h e neither presents Kant’s ethic a s a synthesis nor

does he extol it as the highest and most inclusive ethical point of View. One might expect him to do just that because after Moralitdt we proceed to “VII. Religion” and “VIII. Absolute

156

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

Knowledge.” B u t Hegel’s discussion o f Kant’s Moralitc‘it i s the locus classicus of h i s critique of K a n t , an d in his later books h e still refers b a c k t o it a s s u c h . I n his Encyc10pedia a n d i n t h e PhiloSOphy of Right, incidentally, Sittlz’chkez’t appears above Moralitc'it, n o t , a s h e r e , below it o n the l a d d e r . R e a d e r s with s o m e understanding of Hegel have found his dialectic not i n the triads of the table of contents but rather in the ironical reversal o f t h e roles of master a n d servant, at the p oint w h e r e the servant b eco mes self-reliant because he de-

pends on his own work, while the master comes to depend on the servant. Or they have found it in the instability of views and attitudes that, w h e n ad o p ted i n earnest an d p u s h e d , change i n t o other views and attitudes. Discerning students of Hegel, therefore, a r e likely t o fi n d t h e chapter o n “Self-Conscious— ness” the m o s t dialectical o n e i n the book ( H 3 3 ) . Whitehead wa s close i n spirit t o Hegel’s dialectic when h e said i n his Modes of Thought ( 1 9 3 8 ) : “ B o t h in science and

in logic you have only to develop your argument sufiiciently, and sooner or later you are b o u n d t o arrive at a contradiction, either internally within the argument, or externally i n its reference t o f a c t . . . . None o f these logical o r scientific myths i s wrong, i n an unqualified sense of that term. It is unguarded.

Its truth is limited by unexpressed presuppositions; and as t i m e goes o n , we discover s o m e of these limitations. The simple-minded u s e of t h e notions ‘right o r wrong’ is one o f

the chief obstacles to the progress of understanding” ( 1 4 f . ) . “Panic of error is the death of progress” ( 2 2 ) . “Philosophy is the criticism of abstractions which govern special modes of t h o u g h t ” ( 6 7 ) . A n d : “The purpose o f philosophy is t o rationalize mysticism” ( 2 3 7 ) . G o e t h e w a s not only close i n spirit t o the dialectic of the

Phenomenology but probably influenced it profoundly when he wrote in his great Bildzmgsroman, Wilhelm Meister: “Not to keep from error is the duty of the educator of men, but to g u i d e t h e erring o n e , e v e n t o let him swill h i s error out o f full cups—that is t h e w i s d o m o f teachers. Whoever merely tastes o f his e r r o r , will keep house with it for a long t i m e a n d b e glad of it a s of a rare g o o d f o r t u n e ; b u t whoever d r a i n s i t

completely will have to get to know it, unless he be insane”

3 7 . Dialectic

(VII.9). This

157

invites comparison with Hegel’s aphorism:

“What is most harmful

is trying to preserve oneself from

‘ errors.”38 Royce put the matter well—oddly, not in one of the four chapters o n Hegel, and without any particular reference to

Hegel: “Without erring, and transcending our error, we, as sometimes suggested by the Socratic irony, simply cannot become wise. . . . Error is not a mere accident of an untrained intellect, but a necessary stage or feature or moment . . . ”

( 7 9 ) . Three pages later, right after a passage in which he discusses the French Revolution and refers to Nietzsche’s will t o power—again i n a context devoid o f any reference t o Hegel

—Royce hit on a very suggestive phrase, only to drop it immediately in favor of another which is not nearly so good: “All the greater emotions are dialectical. The tragedies of the storm and stress period, and of the classical and romantic literature, are portrayals of this contradictory logic of passion [my italics]. Faust asks the highest, and therefore contracts with the devil and destroys Margaret” ( 8 2 ) . This example i s

not especially illuminating, and two sentences later Royce speaks of “similar literary expressions of the dialectics of the emotions. The fascination and the power of Byron are due to his contradictions. . . . Instances of the dialectics of the emotions abound in the European literature of the period. . . . ” Neither “logic of passion” ( a fine phrase) nor “dialectics of the emotions” is very precise or rigorous; nor do we encounter any very rigorous procedure in the Phenomenology; nor does Hegel in that book make any great point of “dialectic.” Some passages in the preface are undoubtedly relevant to his conception of dialectic, but they point more in the direction of the Logic than in that o f th e Phenomenology: preface was intended a s a preface t o the whole system.

the

In the preface Hegel pleads for rigor and announces that “the time has come for the elevation of philos0phy to a science,” but the Phenomenology,

whatever its virtues, is cer-

tainly neither rigorous nor in any reasonable sense of that word an example of “scientific” philosophy. It is well to keep in mind that even in the twentieth century Wissenschaft does

38Ros. 545; Dok. 363 (#44).

158

T H E PHENOMENOLOGY

not m e a n q u i t e the s a m e as “science.” M a x Weber, for example, in his widely discussed Wissenschaft als Beruf ( 1 9 1 9 )

presents as a test case of the meaning of Wissenschaft a philologist’s “ m a k i n g precisely this conjecture at this place i n this m a n u s c r i p t ” ( 1 0 ) . I n fact, Weber’s conception o f Wissenschaft is q u i t e close t o Hegel’s ( f o r a brief comparison, see C I I I . 3 . 2 3 ) . An d t h e Phenomenology is certainly unwissenschaftlich: undisciplined, arbitrary, full of digressions, not a m o n u m e n t to t h e austerity of t h e intellectual conscience a nd

to carefulness and precision but a wild, bold, unprecedented book that invites comparison with some great literary masterpieces. Hegel’s l a t e r works are different i n many ways from his first book, but we shall see i n t h e next c h a p t e r t h a t his

dialectic never became the ritualistic three-step it is so widely supposed t o be.

For the present we may conclude that the Hegel of the Phenomenology w a s still a m a n divided against himself a nd did not achieve the h a r m o n i o u s totality h e sought. Like Schiller, h e spurned t h e split i n Kant’s moral agent between duty and inclination; but h e himself was q u i t e similarly di-

vided between what his reason told him ought to be done and what his genius was bent on doing. The classical formulations are Paul’s: “what I w o u l d , t h a t d o I n o t ; but w h a t I h a t e , that d o I ” ( R o m a n s 7 : 1 5 ) , a n d “ y e c a n n o t d o th e things t h a t y e would” ( G a l a t i a n s 5 : 1 7 ) . This phenomenon is generally associated with religion a n d m o r a l s , but it is at least a s interesting —and deserves more study—in th e c a s e o f writers a n d artists?‘9 Hegel is a c a s e i n p o i n t . It would b e a serious mistake to a s s u m e without argument

that Hegel’s difficulty must be explained psychologically, as if —as Paul’s d i c t a suggest—the intention were above reproach

and the practice shamefully inferior. Hegel’s difliculties were due in large measure to the inadequacy of his notion of what ought t o b e d o n e . His critique o f r o m a n t i c i s m i n philosophy is brilliant a n d constitutes o n e o f the chief excellences o f h i s preface t o the 39 C f . , e.g., “ . . . Dryden seldom c o u l d m a k e h i s theory h a r monize w i t h h i s practice . . . ” ( M . T . H e r r i c k , T h e Poetics of Aristotle in England, 1 9 3 0 , 6 9 ) .

3 7 . Dialectic

159

Phenomenology. H i s call for clarity and precision, a n d for

expositions that appeal not merely to a clique of like-minded people but to all readers who are willing to take the necessary trouble to follow the argument—all this is not only plausible

but beautifully presented. Even the plea for a systematic approach makes very good sense—at least up to a point. Our quotations from Goethe a n d Whitehead show this at a g l a n c e :

not only the aphorist but also the essayist and writers of articles, monographs, and books in the area of their specialty are apt to taste now o f this error and now o f that—or always

of the same error—settling down in some untenable halfway house without ever realizing what is wrong with it; they never develop their position sufficiently to discover the contradictions that would lead them on to more inclusive insights. They are afraid of error; but “panic of error is the death of progress.” What is wrong with Hegel’s notion of what ought to be done can be stated here quite briefly. He assumes that philosophy requires a distinctive method of its own and sometimes writes a s if h e h a d such a method; but i n fact, as we follow his

procedure closely, we find that he did not. Instead of admitting this, he occasionally (though not nearly as often as is generally assumed) affected what are usually called dialectical deductions. These differ greatly from case to case and are certainly not reducible to any mechanical three-step; but what many of these cases have in common is the attempt to be rigorous in some way or other that does not really lend itself to rigor. Right a s Hegel is that i t would b e a mistake for philos0phy

to model itself o n mathematical method, he is wrong in also departing from Descartes’ quest for the greatest possible clarity and distinctness. Above all, h e fails to recognize what is really

the heart of scientific and rational procedure: confronted with pr0positions or views, w e should ask w h a t precisely they mean; what considerations, evidence, and arguments support them; w h a t speaks against them; w h a t alternatives are available; and which of these is most probable.

No quest for a system and no finished system can ever compensate u s for the neglect of t h i s canon—at least not sci-

entifically; and aesthetically only if our intellectual conscience is underdeveIOped and we are after all such romantics as

160

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

Hegel expressly scorns. With this, we are already d e e p into, and beyond, Hegel’s l a t e r thought. For this is th e reason his prefaces an d introductions are so often, a n d s o notoriously, far s u p e r i o r t o the works that follow. In this respect, the Phenomenology is no exception a t all. I n his prefaces and introductions, Hegel—usually with apolo-

gies and a bad conscience—dispenses with what he considers the proper method and talks a s , according to h i m , a philosopher ought n o t to talk. Here h e is often at his best, feeling

free, albeit regretfully, to communicate his vision and his m a n y superb insights without, i n one word, dialectic. ' There is a legend abroad that the student of H e ge l must

choose in the end between the system and the dialectic, and it is widely supposed that the right wing Hegelians chose the system while the left wing, or the “young” Hegelians, includi n g M a r x , chose the dialectic. B u t I am by no m e a n s rejecting the dialectic i n order t o elect the system; I disbelieve both. And I a m n o t s o much rejecting th e dialectic a s I s a y : there i s none. Look for it, by all m e a n s ; see what Hegel says about it a n d observe what i n fact h e does. You will find s o m e suggestive remarks, not all of t h e m i n th e s a m e vein, a s well a s

all kinds of affectations; but you will not find any plain method that you could ad0pt even if you wanted to. What, then, are we t o m a k e o f McTaggart’s e m p h a t i c dict u m , at the beginning o f his Commentary on Hegel’s Logic?

“The dialectical process of the Logic is the one absolutely essential element in Hegel’s system. If we accepted this and rejected everything else t h a t Hegel h as written, we should have a system of philos0phy. . . . O n the other h a n d , if w e reject the dialectical process which l e a d s to the absolute idea, all the rest of the system is destroyed . . . ” ( § 2 ) .

Although McTaggart was a brilliant man—for a short time both Bertrand Russell and G . E . Moore were greatly impressed and influenced by him—and much o f what h e h a d t o say is interesting, h e i s wrong o n this point, a s becomes plain when h e says i n § 4 : “The whole course of the dialectic forms one example of t h e dialectic rhythm, with B e i n g a s Thesis, Essence as Antithesis, and Notion a s Synthesis. Each of these h a s again the s a m e moments of Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis

3 7 . Dialectic

161

within it, a n d s o o n . . . . ” Like o t h e r s , McTaggart imposed

a n alien pattern on Hegel. Findlay has said what needs to be said on this score: ‘ “ I f o n e is to judge t h e v a l u e of the dialectical me thod, one m u s t judge it for what it is, an d not for what, on a one-sided

interpretation of certain of Hegel’s claims in regard to it, one thinks it ought to be. Otherwise we shall find ourselves in the position of McTaggart who, after being led t o interpret the Logic i n a manner flatly at variance with Hegel’s statements,

is then forced to jettison the whole of the remaining system as being the sort of semi-empirical venture which is not dialectically admissible” ( 7 5 ) .

Findlay’s Hegel comes close to the truth about the dialectic, but even h e d o e s n o t go far enough. The following underst a tement is r e v e l a t o r y : “The terms ‘thesis’, ‘antithesis’, and

‘synthesis’, so often used in expositions of Hegel’s doctrine, are in fact not frequently used by Hegel: they are much more characteristic o f F i c h t e ” ( 6 9 f . ) . Moreover, Findlay’s chapter

on “The Dialectical Method” is balanced by an odd “Appendix: Dialectical Structure of Hegel’s Main Works,” in which “Dialectical Structure” is repeated eight times before the various tables of contents With their triads—a blatant misuse of the word “dialectical” on Findlay’s own showing. But t o return to H e g e l h i m s e l f : What d o we fi n d if not a u s a b l e dialectical m e t h o d ? We fi n d a vision of the world, o f

man, and of history which emphasizes development through conflict, the moving power of human passions, which produce w h o l l y unintended results, a n d t h e irony o f s u d d e n reversals. If t h a t b e called a dialectical world view, then Hegel’s phi-

losophy was dialectical—and there is a great deal to be said in its favor. This is certainly an immensely fruitful and interesting perspective, a n d from t h e p o in t o f view of pedagogy, vivid

exposition, and sheer drama it may be unsurpassed. But the fateful m y t h that this perspective is reducible to a rigorous

method that even permits predictions deserves no quarter, though by n o w half t h e world believes i t .

The fact that Hegel himself never used the dialectic to predict anything, and actually spurned the very idea that it c o u l d b e used that w a y , suggests plainly t h a t Hegel’s dialectic

162 never

THE

PHENOM ENOLOGY

was conceived

as w h a t

we should

call

a

scientific

method, and that his deductions were admittedly ex post facto. In other words. Hegel's dialectic is at most a method o f ex-

position;it is not :1 [11¢d

of discovery.

CHAPTER

IV

The Logic 38 One of the better known early Hegelians, David Friedrich Strauss, best known for h i s Life of Jesus

( 1 8 3 5 ) and for

Nietzsche’s youthful attack on him, published just before he died (1874), said:

“One may fittingly call the Phenomenology the alpha and omega of Hegel’s works. Here Hegel left port in his own ships for the first time and sailed, albeit in an Odyssean voyage, around the world; while his subsequent expeditions, though better conducted, were confined, a s i t were, to inland seas. All t h e l a t e r writings and lectures o f Hegel, such a s his Logic, Philosophy of Right, Philosophy of Religion, Aesthetics, His-

tory of Philosophy, and Philosophy of History, are merely sections from the Phenomenology whose riches are preserved only incompletely even in the Encyclopedia, and in any case in a dried state. In the Phenomenology Hegel’s genius stands at its greatest height.”1 S h o u l d we, then, study the Phenomenology a little more instead o f proceeding to consider th e Logic an d Hegel’s system?

This has been done. Royce, in his Lectures on Modern Idealism, devoted over seventy-five pages to the Phenomenology and less than twenty to “Hegel’s Mature System.” Glockner reaches the en d o f the Phenomenology on page

537 of his second volume, and disposes of Hegel’s later works in a few pages—less for the lot of them than he devoted to the early essay “On the Scientific Modes of Treatment of 1 Christian Ma'rklin (1851), 53 f.; reprinted in Gesammelte Schriften, X, 224; quoted by Glockner, H , 539.

164

THE LOGIC

Natural R i g h t ” ( H 2 1 ) . Haering goes even further: h e requires

thirteen hundred pages to reach the Phenomenology, gives that only twice as much space as h e accorded the article o n “Natural Right”—and then stops altogether.

What at first glance seems madness makes at least a limited amount of sense. One does n o t read such large two-volume works o n Hegel instead o f reading Hegel himself; one reads them t o get help i n understanding Hegel. Toward that e n d , it can b e argued, nothing helps more than a n analysis o f his

early works. Even so Glockner and Haering put one in mind of

the Historisch-Kritische

Gesamtausgabe

of

Nietzsche’s

“works” (Werke), which began to appear in Germany while they were both working o n their second v o l u m e s : five fat

volumes of “works” appeared in chronological order; then the edition was discontinued d u r i n g World War II—before it

had reached Nietzsche’s first book, published in his twenties. The present volume is intended to help those who want to read Hegel. An analysis o f t h e Logic o r the Philosophy of Right does n o t enable the r e a d e r to understand the other mature works, o r the early works. B u t if we now stopped

here, the Logic and the system would still pose great puzzles.

39

Let us first consider Hegel’s further biography briefly, insofar as it is relevant. How did Schelling react to the Phenomenology? The last letters the two m e n exchanged are translated i n D , which also contains the other letters and

documents cited in this section. In January 1 8 0 7 Schelling eagerly anticipated the book. In

April Hegel wrote Niethammer about how he wanted to distribute the few first copies—and did not include Schelling. On May first, Hegel promised Schelling a copy “ s o o n ” ; h e m a d e many interesting statements about the book and apologized for its defects; h e suggested that the polemic i n the preface,

which many students still feel sure was directed against Schelling, was i n fact a i m e d a t his followers’ “ m i s c h i e f ” ; and he

not only stressed his eager anticipation of Schelling’s reaction

3 9 . Hegel and Schelling

165

to t h e work but even expressed the hope that Schelling might review it.

November 2, Schelling wrote that «he still had not got beyond t h e preface; h e accepted Hegel’s

explanation of “the

polemical part,” but, unlike Hegel, referred to the possibility that the polemic could be construed as being aimed at him, and noted expressly that in the preface itself “this distinction is not made.” The letter may be read as indicating that Schelling felt ofiended; b u t it w a s not peevish o r nasty, a n d there is

not the slightest reason for doubting that he meant it when he said in the end: “Write me soon again and remain well disposed toward Your sincere friend Sch.” I t w a s not until July 3 0 , 1 8 0 8 , that Schelling wrote Wind i s c h m a n n , registering his dislike for the book; he had evidently heard that Windischmann was reviewing i t . I n between,

both Hegel and Schelling had undoubtedly expected to get another letter: Schelling, a reassuring and cordial answer to his own letter; Hegel, a letter reporting that Schelling had now finished the whole book and expressing his reactions to it.2 Each waited, and neither w r o t e ; and that was the end of their correspondence.

It is well known that the two men met once more in Karlsbad in 1829, by chance. It is almost always overlooked that in October 1812 Schelling paid Hegel a visit in Niirnberg, and in the fall of 1815 Hegel visited Munich and saw Schelling.3 Thus the two men did not repeat the Kant-FichteSchelling pattern ( H 2 6 ) . And the situation was, of course,

different from the start inasmuch as Hegel, who came into his own later, was five years older. When writing letters to others about these late encounters, both m e n mentioned that they d i d n o t discuss philosophy, and

2 Perhaps the only one to have seen this is Horst Fuhrmans, in his long account of “Schelling und Hegel: Ihre Entfremdung,” in F. W. J . Schelling, Briefe u n d Dokumente, B o n n , 1 9 6 2 , pp. 451—553; see p p . 529-32.

vol. I :

1775—1809,

3 This is overlooked even by Otto Poggeler, one of the editors of the critical edition of Hegel, in his dissertation o n Hegels Kritik der Romantik, Bonn, 1956, p. 144; pp. 138-85 deal with “Schelling and the romantic philosophers of nature.”

166

THE LOGIC

the rapport of their early years w as obviously a matter of

the past. But they remained on civil terms. In his lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel took up

Schelling as the last phi1050pher before he came to “the present standpoint of

philOSOphy,”

his own. The discussion of “the

present standpoint”—the editor of the lectures entitled this section “B. Result”-occupies just over eight pages; the immediately preceding lectures o n “ D . Schelling,” almost forty pages. They begin:

“The most important—or, philosophically, the only important-step beyond the Fichtean philos0phy was finally taken by Schelling. The higher, genuine form that followed on Fichte is the Schellingian philosophy. “Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, born at Schorndorf in Wiirttemberg, January 27, 1775, studied in Leipzig and J e n a where he came to be close to Fichte. For several years

now he has been secretary of the Academy of Fine Arts in Munich. His life cannot be covered completely o r i n decency

since he is still living.” Kuno Fischer pointed out l o n g ago that the biographical

paragraph contains surprising mistakes.4 Of the eXposition that follows o n l y a few sentences belong i n the present cont e x t ; the over-all structure o f Hegel’s lectures a n d the relative weight given to the philosophers h e included belong i n our

discussion of his history of philosophy, later on, when we come to that part of his system ( H 6 6 ) . “Schelling got his philosophical education before the public. The series of his philosophical writings is at the same time the history of his philos0phical education and represents his gradual rise above the Fichtean principle and the Kantian content 4 “A legion of inaccuracies! Schelling was born, not in Schorndorf but in Leonberg; in Leipzig h e was not a student but a tutor; in Jena, not a student but a professor, even while Hegel was there, too; and he was a student a t Tiibingen, even for several years together with Hegel! Incomprehensible how Hegel could get into such a state of forgetfulness, and most reprehensible that the editor of his lectures has done nothing to correct such statements. Schelling was the companion of Hegel’s youth and his friend, his model and guide o n the way to philosophy” (II, 1148 n . ) . The last half sentence goes too far.

3 9 . Hegel a n d Schelling

167

w i t h w h i c h h e b e g a n ; it d o e s not c o n t a i n a s e q u e n c e of elabo-

rated parts of phiIOSOphy, one after the other, but a sequence of the stages of his education. When people ask for a final work in which his philosophy is presented most definitely, one cannot name one like that. Schelling’s first writings are entirely Fichtean, and only b y a n d by h e emancipated himself from Fichte’s form” ( 6 4 7 f . ) .

Not only is this true, nor does it merely show how Hegel related his own intentions and his own failure to publish a major work until he was thirty-six to his younger friend’s publication of over half a dozen books before he was thirty; it also shows why it wa s s o e a s y a n d almost n a t u r a l for Hegel

to see his own philosophy as the completion of Schelling’s efforts, and indeed of the whole deve10pment from Kant beyond Fichte and Schelling. M u c h later, when Schelling was called t o the University of

Berlin in 1841, ten years after Hegel’s death, he reciprocated by relegating Hegel’s phi1030phy, along with his own earlier philosophy, t o the stage of merely “ n e g a t i v e ” philosophy,

while demanding a new “positive phi1050phy,” which he described in terms exeedingly close to Kierkegaard’s later efforts. In fact, Kierkegaard was i n t h e a u d i e n c e and tremendously

impressed by Schelling’s program, though he was to be disappointed by Schelling’s later lectures.5 Not only Kierkegaard’s religious existentialism has roots in Schelling’s later thought; Paul Tillich began his scholarly career with a dissertation on Schelling. And it was Schelling who coined the term “existential philosophy [Existenzialp/ziZOSOphie]” to designate his later philosophy.6 While Schelling himself felt that his “positive phiIOSOphy” represented an altogether new stage in the deve10pment of philosophy, and a step beyond Hegel, readers of Hegel’s pref— ace t o t h e Phenomenology 5For

should ask themselves whether

relevant quotations from Schelling’s lectures and Kierke-

g a a r d ’ s r e a c t i o n s , s e e m y Nietzsche 1 0 5 f. a n d 3 7 7 . 01m

(1950),

102; Meridian ed.,

1844, Rosenkranz already criticizes Schelling’s ExistenziaIp/zilosophie (xviii). We shall return to the late Schelling in H 68.

168

THE LOGIC

Hegel’s critique of romantic philosophy is not also applicable

to the religious existentialism of the old Schelling, of Kierkeg a a r d , a n d of Tillich. The question of whether this critique w a s originally aimed at Schelling himself or o n l y a t his followers is more complex

than meets the eye. Hegel associated Schelling with a stage i n the development of m o d e r n philosophy-a stage that constituted definite progress beyond K a n t and Fichte, though it, in turn, was not fi n a l and h a d t o b e transcended. I t was certainly not his intention to vilify o r ridicule Schelling, b u t , just

as certainly, he wanted to show why one could not settle down in this halfway house. In his lectures on Schelling we find the sentences: “Schelling surely had this notion in a general way, but did not push it to a conclusion in a definite logical manner; for Schelling it is immediate truth. This is a m a i n difficulty i n

Schellingian phiIOSOphy. Then it was misunderstood, made shallow.”7 The following distinction m a y b e a little t o o fine, b u t it is unquestionably very close t o the t r u t h : Hegel was conscious

of criticizing and going beyond Schelling; but he probably thought he was ridiculing only his followers and shallow imitators. The last sentences of the lectures on Schelling point also in this direction: “The

form b e c o m e s rather an external s c h e m a ; th e m e t h o d

is the affixing of this schema to external objects. In this way formalism crept into the philosophy of nature; for example,

in Oken—it borders on madness. PhiIOSOphizing thus became m e r e analogical reflection; that is t h e worst m a n n e r . Even Schelling had already m a d e things easy for himself i n part;

the others have misused it totally” (683). Some of the passages Rosenkranz quotes from Hegel’s Jena

lectures show that during the time he was working on the Phenomenology Hegel occasionally made this contrast crystal clear. Quotation is doubly worth while because Hegel’s polemic is also interesting phiIOSOphically and supplements w h a t h e says against formalism i n t h e preface t o the Phenomenology: 7Glockner’s

e d . , XIX,

663.

3 9 . Hegel and Schelling

169

“When studying phi1050phy, you must not take such a term i n o l o g y for w h a t c o u n t s , a n d you must not respect it. Ten o r twenty years ago i t also seemed very difficult to work one’s

way into the Kantian terminology and to use the terminology o f synthetic judgments a priori, synthetic unity of apperception, transcendent a n d transcendental, etc.; but such a flood

roars by as quickly as it comes. More pe0ple master this language, a n d the secret comes t o light that very common thoughts conceal themselves behind such bugbear expres-

sions.8—I remark on this mainly because of the current appearance of philos0phy, especially t h e philosophy of nature;

what mischief is being done with the Schellingian terminolo g y ! Schelling, to be sure, expressed a good meaning and philosophical thoughts i n these forms—but this by way o f actually showing himself to b e free of this terminology, for

in almost every subsequent presentation of his philosophy he used a new one. But the way this philosophy is now discussed publicly, it is really only the superficiality of thought that hides beneath it. Into the depths of this philosophy, as we see it in so many publications, I cannot introduce you, for it has no depth; and I say this lest you allow yourself to be impressed, a s if b e h i n d these bizarre,

hundred-weight words

there must necessarily be some meaning—What alone can be of interest is the amazement all this produces in the ignorant mass. In fact, however, this present formalism can be taught i n half a n h o u r . Just say, n o t that something is long, but that it reaches i n t o length, a n d this length i s magnetism; instead

of broad, say it reaches into breadth and is electricity; instead of thick, corporeal, and it reaches into the third dimension. . . . “ I tell you i n advance that i n the philosophical system

that I present you will not find anything of this flood of form a l i s m . When I speak of this terminology and its use, as it

rages at present, as I have done, I certainly distinguish Schelling’s ideas 8The

from the u s e his students m a k e of t h e m , and

applicability of these remarks to Heidegger should be

n o t e d . B u t many a reader s a y s i n s t e a d , triumphantly and j o y o u s l y :

“See, it is not meaningless! How wonderful!” O r : “Look, he is s a y i n g what X o r Y h a s s a i d , t o o ! ”

THE LOGIC

170

I honor Schelling’s truly meritorious contribution to philosophy as much a s I despise this formalism; and because I know

Schelling’s philosophy, I know that its true idea, which it has reawakened in our time, is independent of this formalism” ( 1 8 4 f . ) . The fact remains that i n the Phenomenology

“this distinc-

tion is not made,” and quite a few phrases in the preface seem applicable to Schelling himself. For details, s e e the commentary, which also includes some pertinent quotations

from Schelling’s writings ( C 1.3.19; cf. C III.3.11). Incidentally, Rosenkranz himself tells u s elsewhere that Hegel’s students at Jena h a d their doubts about Hegel’s atti-

tude toward Schelling: “A student, about to go from Jena to Wfirzburg, took leave of him. Hegel said to him: ‘I have a friend there, too, Schelling.’ Here, t h e enthusiasts remarked, the word friend had an altogether different meaning than i n ordinary life” ( 2 1 7 ) . In any case, after the publication of the Phenomenology

Hegel could no longer be considered Schelling’s disciple. He had never seen himself that way to begin with; and when others did, it had made him angry. While the articles in the Critical Journal, which the two m e n h a d edited together, had been unsigned, there is o n e signed footnote near the end of the first issue:

“About the report . . . ‘that Schelling has brought a valiant fighter from his fatherland to Jena, and through

him proclaims to the amazed public that even Fichte stands far beneath his views,’ I could n o t , with all cir-

cumlocutions and attenuations, say anything else than that the author of this report is a liar, which I therefore declare him to b e with these clear words; and this the sooner because I believe that i n this way I shall e a r n the gratitude of a great many others to whom h e is a burden with his drolleries, half-lies, digs in passing, etc. DR. HEGEL.”

The

sort o f comment he h a d got on the Difference, which

he here protests, he was not likely to get on the Phenome-

4 0 . Bamberg, N iimberg, a n d Hegel’s

development

171

nology. It was plain henceforth that he stood alone, “for himself,” t o u s e a H e g e l i a n locution. B u t the

b o o k created no

stir whatever. The first copies had been distributed in April 1 8 0 7 ; t h e first review a p p e a r e d i n February

1 8 0 9 . A few

months before publication of his book, the Battle of Jena had put a n end to Hegel’s university career at Jena, and he was not offered a t e a c h i n g position a t another university until

1816, the year his fourth volume appeared—the third volume of the Logic. That year h e received t h r e e calls: t o Heidelberg, where h e actually w e n t ; to E r l a n g e n ; a n d to Berlin. The call t o Berlin c a m e just a little t o o late; w h e n h e got it, H e g e l already felt c o m m i t t e d t o Heidelberg. But in 1 8 1 8

Berlin asked him again, and then h e accepted.

40

For a year and a half, beginning just before the Phenomenology appeared, Hegel was the editor of a newspaper in Bamberg. Interpreters generally dismiss this intermezzo as n ot particularly i m p o r t a n t for Hegel’s deve10pment. Rosenzweig suggests t h a t Niethammer, Hegel’s best adviser and friend by this t i m e , thought it prudent for his younger compatriot to m o v e a t least i n t o t h e horizon of t h e B a v a r i a n government, which m i g h t eventually call him to a

university post. “As a rather well-paid waiting post, which would support Hegel, who was without means since he had used u p his patrimony, he took over the editorship of the Bamberger Zeitung. . . . W h i l e H e g e l w a s editor, it appeared every weekday, w a s printed i n t h e morning and distributed in t h e afternoon. It w a s n o t the truly local paper i n B a m berg; those tasks [ t o w n affairs] were taken c a r e o f by the Bamberger Korrespondent. The Bamberger Zeitung furnished B a m b e r g ” a n d a considerable area beyond it with news

about Bavaria “and above all about European events” (II, 6 f . ) . H a y m , who m a d e a p o i n t o f r e a d i n g all o f t h e issues Hegel edited, tells u s that “ t h e readers were n o t b u r d e n e d with any

philosophical discourses. I have been able to find one, and

172

THE LOGIC

o n l y one, excursus t h a t might remind a n attentive reader of the author of the Phenomenology. . . . He tried h e r e a n d there to obtain news i n s o m e special way a n d through private

communications. In the main he had to rely o n other papers, mostly French. B u t h e w as very correct and skilful in t h e composition o f his material from these sources. A sure

critical tact is notable whenever he seeks to review or reconcile contradictory reports. Everywhere h e shows care a nd thoroughness. . . . To say everything: this newspaper was a s well edited b y Hegel a s a poor newspaper could b e edited by anyone” (270 f.). I n retrospect, t h e most interesting point about this episode is that i n 1 8 0 7 a n d 1808 Hegel w a s i n such very close touc h with day-to-day events—a far cry from th e otherworldly ivory tower i n which posthumous reputation h a s placed h i m .

Moreover, and this is no less important, he was forced to publish six times a week what ordinary peeple would understand, and each issue had only four pages. So he learned t o b e brief, to cover a lot o f material very concisely, and to

finish things. In this respect, the year and a half at Bamberg were, after all, of crucial importance. I n the fall of 1808 Hegel became principal of the Gymnasium at Niirnberg; his duties specifically included instruction i n philosophy; a n d h e retained this position for eight years, until h e w e n t to Heidelberg. T h e o n l y o t h e r towns where h e lived that l o n g were Stuttgart, where h e w a s b o r n , a n d Berlin, where he died. When h e went to Niirnberg h e was not famous, although h e h a d published a n u m b e r of articles, a s well a s a book that

has since been hailed as one of the great books of all time. H e w a s thirty-eight, was immensely well r e a d , personally knew s o m e of the best known intellects of t h e time, and

struck his students as an unusually impressive headmaster. For him it was clear from the start that this occupation, too, c o u l d only be a n intermezzo. For all t h a t , it w a s t h e first real position i n w h i c h h e settled d o w n , a n d h e tried t o m e e t its peculiar challenges. Perhaps the greatest of these w a s that h e h a d to make clear philosophy for students in their teens who were n o t specializing in t h e subject. The way i n which

4 0 . Bamberg, N iirnberg, and Hegel’s

deveZOpment

173

h e tried to solve this problem b e c a m e t h e p a t t e r n for his Encyclopedia and PhiIOSOphy of R i g h t . H e a i m e d a t clear outlines t h a t " c o u l d b e readily remembered, a t great brevity, a n d at definitive formulations. The organization henceforth b eco mes neat to a fault—triads everywhere ( b u t not theses, antitheses, and s y n t h e s e s ) . Brevity

coupled with the desire to say a great deal in few words leads to reliance on jargon and a style that borders on the oracular. And the attempt to give his students definitive formulations, coupled with the fact that the boys were nowhere n e a r his own level, i n t r o d u c e d a decidedly dogmatic n o t e i n t o Hegel’s prose.

This is a prime clue to “the secret of Hegel,” which has been neglected. W h e n h e w e n t t o Niirnberg h e h a d tried for years t o complete h i s system, but h a d been a b l e to complete

for publication only an introduction which, with its 850 pages, w a s more t h a n three t i m e s a s l o n g a s the first edition o f t h e system, t h e so-called Encyclopedia, w h e n it finally appeared exactly ten years later.

Rosenkranz noted that the philosophy courses Hegel gave in Niirnberg constitute an intermediary stage between the Phenomenology

a n d t h e EncyCIOpedia when h e published

Hegel’s manuscripts covering the course, under the title PrOpEideutik, in volume XVIII of the original edition of Hegel’s Werke. But what is of the utmost significance is that the otherwise e n i g m a t i c transformation o f Hegel becomes perfectly clear a n d understandable when w e c o n s i d e r his situa t i o n , first i n Bamberg a n d t h e n , above all, i n Niirnberg. Without that, o n e ought t o b e perplexed, though scarcely

anybody seems t o have been puzzled, by the incredible contrast between the young and the mature Hegel. In his youth he was a firebrand whose vitriolic criticisms of Christianity invite comparison w i t h Nietzsche a n d d o n o t even

st0p before the person of Jesus. He wrote with passion and vigor, a n d his s a r c a s m was radical. Then h e went t o J e n a in quest o f a university career, wrote articles for a scholarly journal, affected w h a t s e e m e d t h e right t o n e for t h a t , a nd often b e c a m e r a t h e r obscure—though n o t more s o t h a n m a n y a y o u n g Assistant Professor of Sociology a century a n d a

174

THE LOGIC

half later. Still, h e could n o t c u r b his biting wit, a n d his great fl a i r for t h e picturesque constantly broke through, sometimes even i n the middle of long, hyper-academic sentences. Finally, his first big book appeared a n d turned o u t t o b e anything b u t stuffy o r conventional. O n t h e contrary, it w a s a Faust i a n book, wild, bold, and m o r e t h a n a little m a d . And after that Hegel disappeared from view for a while, first in B a m berg, then i n Nfirnberg. I n the latter city he c o m p o s e d t h e first third of his system, t h e Logik, i n three volumes ( 1 8 1 2 , 1 8 1 3 , 1 8 1 6 ) . This work still breathes a t least s o m e of t h e spirit of t h e Phenomenology: at t h e e n d of t h e preface t o t h e first edition we are told how,

when the Phenomenology appeared as the “first part” of Hegel’s System of Science, t h e s e c o n d volume w a s still t o c o n t a i n t h e Logic a s well a s t h e philosophy of. n a t u r e and t h e philosophy of spirit; b u t now t h e first t h i r d of t h a t projected v o l u m e h a s a g a i n grown beyond all b o u n d s . And i n the “introduction” that follows t h e “ p r e f a c e , ” we a r e told t h a t o n e might s a y t h a t t h e content of t h e Logic “is t h e ac-

count of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and any finite spirit.”9 Hegel himself emphasized these words in print. This work, which we shall consider shortly, is n o t a s m a d a s these words may s e e m ; i n any case, it is still the labor of a n utterly lonely genius. W h e n Hegel emerged from his obscurity t o b e c o m e a famous professor, it w a s h a r d t o recognize t h e m a n with whom we h a v e largely dealt s o f a r . Anyone w h o seriously c o m p a r e s Hegel before t h e a g e of forty w i t h t h e Professor Hegel of the last fifteen years of his life is b o u n d t o a s k : Whatever happened t o h i m ? We c a n n o w answer t h a t question in a single sentence: for eight l o n g years the p o o r m a n was headmaster of a G e r m a n secondary school. 9This

remark will be interpreted in H 42.

4 1 . Hegel’s

175

life in Niirnberg

41

Hegel’s personal develOpment during this period is adequately reflected i n the d o c u m e n t s furnished in D. I n a letter of May 2 7 , 1 8 1 0 , h e describes life i n the “dark regions” as

one who has been there, speaks of “ a few years of this hypochondria,” and suggests that only devotion to “science” can cure it. O n December

1 4 , 1 8 1 0 , h e describes human life

with a consummate bitterness that is infinitely closer to Shakespeare o r to Candide t h a n t o Leibniz or the popular image of Hegel.

Then, in April he became engaged to Marie von Tucher and wrote two poems for her. They are of no literary interest, but one of them has been translated in part, both to suggest the change in mood from the preceding year and to balance the rather odd tone of the two letters to his bride that followed. He had offended her by expressing a reservation in his postscript to his bride’s letter to his sister: “insofar as happiness is part of the destiny of my life.” Now he tried to explain and set things right. In September they married. In 1 8 1 2 , their first child, a girl, was born and soon died. His brother, Ludwig, a n oflicer who h a d been the godfather

of Hegel’s illegitimate son, Ludwig, fell in Napoleon’s Russ i a n campaign.

From letters of July and October we learn that Hegel was still on good terms with Schelling, and that he had also developed a friendly relationship to Jacobi, another butt of strong criticisms in the preface to the Phenomenology. In the

October

letter

t o h i s friend

Niethammer,

who

was

Oberschulrat in Munich, Hegel submitted his views about the teaching of philosophy at the secondary school level and related his own conception of Logic to Kant’s: after all, Kant already h a d discussed traditional metaphysics under the

heading of what he called “Transcendental Logic,” especially in the second part, which he entitled “Transcendental Dialectic.” And Hegel explained why he had no time for the fashionable talk about teaching students to philosophize in-

176

THE LOGIC

stead of teaching them philosophy. He had doubts whether philosophy should b e taught a t all in secondary schools; probably, a good grounding i n the classics would serve the students far better. B u t if philosophy were taught at all, then there should be some content, t o o , a s i n any other science. In September 1 8 1 3 , we h e a r the beginning of Hegel’s commencement address t o his students i n which h e gave expression to his conservatism. That year h e also b e c a m e Schulrat, i n addition t o being headmaster of his school, a n d his wife gave birth to her first s o n , K a r l . He was later t o edit the

second edition of Hegel’s lectures on the phiIOSOphy of history, as well a s the first collection of letters t o a n d from IIegeL

In the fall of 1814 Marie Hegel gave birth to her second s o n ; but in the spring, when she was still expecting, Hegel’s

sister sufiered her first breakdown. While Hegel certainly lacked charm and was, all in all, n o t as attractive a fi g u r e as, say, Lessing, o n e can scarcely admire his letter to his sister

(April 9, 1814) sufficiently: here his character appears at its best, and his wisdom, t o o , is impressive. Now Christiane, the sister, moved i n with t h e Hegels: their home became h e r h o m e . I n tw o letters of 1 8 1 4 w e witness

Hegel’s reactions to Napoleon’s downfall and to the triumph of Prussia and h e r allies. Late i n 1 8 1 5 , Christiane w a s well enough to leave.

On July 30, 1816, at long last, Hegel was offered a chair of phiIOSOphy. Fries had left Heidelberg for a professorship at Jena, where both h e a n d Hegel h a d b e g u n t h e i r a c a d e m i c careers at the beginning of the century, a n d now D a u b , Professor of Theology a t Heidelberg, wrote Hegel a long letter

t o invite him. On August 2, Hegel wrote Professor von Raumer a l o n g letter about t h e teaching of philosophy a t the university level; and o n August 1 0 , von R a u m e r forwarded i t to Berlin, t o t h e Minister of Education, w h o , it turned out, h a d asked h i m t o interview H e g e l . O n August 1 5 , the Minister wrote Hegel, telling h i m t h a t the c h a i r for philosophy was still vacant, b u t asking Hegel t o judge for himself whether h e had “the ability to give vivid a n d incisive lectures.” Hegel d i d not receive the letter until the twenty-

fourth, and wrote on the twenty-eighth, the day after his

42. The conception of the Logic

177

forty-sixth birthday, to answer the question put to him and i n f o r m t h e minister t h a t m e a n w h i l e h e h a d c o m m i t t e d himself to Heidelberg. ( A l l these letters have been translated i n D ;

the correspondence with Erlangen, which also issued him a call a r o u n d t h e s a m e time, h a s been o m i t t e d . ) Finally, i n Dec e m b e r 1 8 1 7 , t h e new minister, Altenstein, oflered He ge l the c h a i r i n Berlin, v a c a n t since Fichte’s death i n 1 8 1 4 , and

Hegel accepted and went to Berlin in 1818.

42 The years just considered i n such summary fashion were immensely productive ones for Hegel. I t was i n Niirnberg that h e wrote a n d published the three volumes o f his Logic,

and in Heidelberg, during his brief stay there, he completed and published his system, i n a s l i m volume. I n Berlin, h e published h i s Philosophy of Right a nd the s e c o n d a n d t h i r d editions o f his Encycl0pedia. I t was also at

Berlin that he attracted the devoted disciples who collected his writings after his death and included i n his collected

“works” four imposing cycles of lectures, mostly o n the basis of student notes. A l t h o u g h t h e Logic appeared i n three volumes, i n 1 8 1 2 , 1 8 1 3 , a n d 1 8 1 6 , Hegel conceived of it a s having two volu m e s . The whole work h e called Wissenschaft der Logik (Science of Logic; t h e word Wissenschaft appears i n t h e titles of all four of the works h e himself p u b l i s h e d ) . Volume I

contained “Objective Logic,” volume II “Subjective Logic, or The Doctrine of the Concept.” The first “volume,” as is not u n u s u a l i n Germany, appeared i n two parts, with t h e “First

Book” containing “The Doctrine of Being” and the “Second B o o k : The Doctrine of Essence.”

In 1831 Hegel prepared a second edition of the Logic and completed a n extensive revision of th e first volume shortly before h e died. T h e original edition, which is a great rarity,

has never been reprinted. Few scholars have consulted it, a n d t h e date o f the s e c o n d v o l u m e is almost invariably given as 1 8 1 2 , instead of 1 8 1 3 . T h e textual variants, c o n fi n e d t o the first volume, are not indicated i n any extant edition.

178

THE LOGIC

They are indicated in the following pages for two reasons. First, w e have been following Hegel’s development and would

falsify it at this point if we attributed to his Niirnberg period what in fact was written nineteen years later, in Berlin. Sec-

ondly, Hegel did not write a book during his last ten years, but during his last year he revised the first volume of his Logic and the beginning of the preface to the Phenomenology.10 Although many of his revisions are trivial, it is still of

some interest to observe how the author of such bold works as the Phenomenology and the Logic revised his earlier works instead of writing new ones.

Hegel still found it immensely difficult to make a beginning. There is, first, a preface. (For the second edition, Hegel even added a second preface, dated November 7 , 1 8 3 1 , ex-

actly one week before his death.) But the preface comprises only eight pages, not more than ninety, as did that t o his first book. Next comes an introduction that runs o n for twentyeight pages. Then comes a five-page section o n “General

Subdivision of the Logic”11; and then the “First Book” which begins with a section of thirteen pages, entitled “With what must the beginning of science be made?” Including the preface to the second edition, there are seventy-one pages

of introductory text. This would not be particularly odd if Hegel did not once again cast aspersions on what he is actually doing. The “introduction” begins: “There is no science where the need is felt more urgently to begin with the subject matter itself, without preliminary reflections, than in the science of Logic.” And more in the same vein. Hegel apologizes for his argumentative and historical style in these early pages, feeling that he ought to be properly “scientific” from the start; but he obviously feels at home in what he is doing and writes, on 10 For the changes Hegel made in the preface, see my commentary in Chapter VIII. In the following pages “1812” stands for the first edition o f the Logik, “ 1 8 4 1 ” for the revised edition, c i t e d acWerke, a n Auflage i n Hegel’s cording to i t s zweite unverc'z'nderte unchanged reprint o f the first posthumous edition of 1 8 3 3 . 11 This section was rewritten i n 1 8 3 1 ; the introduction was re-

vised and subtitled “General Concept of Logic.”

4 2 . The conception of the Logic

179

the whole, with surprising clarity and vigor. In this respect, his Encyclopedia a n d PhilosOphy of Right, w i t h their c r a b b e d , consecutively n u m b e r e d . paragraphs cannot compare w i t h these for the most p a r t extremely lucid pages. S i n c e Kant, w e are told i n t h e preface, the G e r m a n s have b e c o m e “a civilized people without metaphysics,” which Hegel considers a “strange spectacle.” I n the introduction H e g e l suggests that “ a n c i e n t metaphysics had in this respect

a higher concept of thinking than has become prevalent in recent times. For it assumed t h a t w h a t i n things i s recognized

by thinking is what alone in them is truly true; thus not they in their immediacy, but only they as lifted into the form of thinking, as thought. This [Platonic and Aristotelian] metaphysics thus held that thinking and the determinations of thought were not alien to objects b u t rather their essence, or that things and the thinking o f them (even a s our language

expresses some relation between them) agree in and for themselves. . . 3’12 While Hegel is right about Plato and Aristotle, the etymologies of “ t h i n g ” a n d Ding o n th e o n e h an d , and “ t h i n k ”

and Denken on the other seem to be actually different. Like Plato, Hegel takes pleasure in calling attention to linguistic points; and in the preface added to the second edition he commends t h e German l a n g u a g e for containing words that “have n o t only different m e a n i n g s b u t even Opposed mean-

ings,” which he considers evidence of “ a speculative spirit of the language; it can afford thinking a delight to hit upon such words and to find the reconciliation of opposites, which is a result of speculation but an absurdity for the understanding, present lexicographically i n this nai've manner i n a single

word of opposite meanings. Philosophy therefore requires no particular terminology at all; of course, a few words have to

be accepted from foreign languages, but words that by much use have already acquired citizenship; any affected purism would be most out of place where the subject matter is allimportant.” What matters to Hegel is not etymology as such. The point 121812,

p. v; 1841, p. 27.

180

T H E LOGIC

is t h a t h e d o e s n o t s e e himself a s o n e who comes to s a y : Ye have b e e n told—but I say unto y o u . Rather h e wants to bring into clear daylight a n d systematic order w h a t is available before h e begins. The motto is always Goethe’s:

What from your fathers you received as heir, Acquire if you would possess it.

One may also recall Mephisto’s lines, in Faust II, published only after Hegel’s ( a n d Goethe’s) d e a t h :

Depart, “original” enthusiast! How would this insight peeve you: whatsoever A human being thinks, if dumb or clever, Was thought before him in the past. Goethe also said o n occasion t h a t everything t r u e h a s already

been thought in the past; one merely needs to think it once more. A n d i n a l a t e p o e m , written in 1 8 2 9 a n d entitled “Legacy [Verma'chtnis],” he s a i d :

Das Wahre war schon la’ngst gefunden, . . . Das alte Wahre, fass es an!

These lines are wholly in Hegel’s spirit: “The true has long been found, . . . The ancient true, take hold of it!” Grasp it—or a s Hegel might say, what matters is to comprehend it, es begreifen.

The prime example of an ordinary word that shows the “speculative spirit of the l a n g u a g e ” by having seemingly opposed m e a n i n g s is, o f course, aufheben ( s u b l i m a t e ) , which was explained briefly above i n section 3 4 . The first chapter of t h e Logic e n d s with a “ N o t e ” o n this t e r m : “Aufheben a n d das Aufgehobene (das Ideelle) is one of

the most important concepts of philosophy, a basic determination which recurs practically everywhere. . . . What sublimates itself does not thereby become nothing. Nothing is immediate; w h a t is sublimated, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , is mediated; it is t h a t which is n o t , b u t as a result, having issued from what h a d being; it is therefore still characterized by the determinateness from which it comes.

4 2 . The conception of t h e Logic

181

“Aufheben has in the [German] language a double meaning i n that it signifies conserving, preserving, a n d at t h e same

time also making cease, making an‘ end. Even conserving includes the negative aspect that something is taken out of its immediacy, and thus out of an existence that is Open to external influences, to be preserved.—Thus what is aufgehoben is at the same time conserved and has merely lost its immediacy but is not for that reason annihilated.13—Lexicographically, the two definitions of aufheben can be listed a s two meanings of the word. B u t it should strike u s that a l a n g u a g e should have come to u se one and the same word for two op-

posed definitions. For speculative thinking it is a joy to find in the language words which are characterized by a speculative significance; German has several such words. The double

meaning of the Latin tollere (which has become famous through Cicero’s joke: tollendum esse Octavium) does not go so far; here the affirmative definition reaches only a s far

as raising up. Something is aufgehoben only insofar as it has entered into a union with its opposite; in this more exact definition, as something reflected, it can suitably be called a moment. . . . More often, the observation will press itself upon u s that philosophical terminology uses Latin expressions for reflected definitions, either because the mother

tongue lacks pertinent expressions or, if it has them, as here, because its expressions remind us more of the immediate, and the foreign language more of the reflected. . . . ” As this passage on Hegel’s most “dialectical” term suggests, his dialectic, even in the Logic, is not meant t o flout the law o f contradiction; i t is not even intended t o b e

counterintuitive. In fact, Hegel’s delight at finding such a word as aufheben is plainly due to the opportunity it pro13 vernichtet. 1812: verschwinden (vanished). The remainder of this paragraph is not found in the first edition, which proceeds instead: “That which is aufgehoben m a y be defined more precisely by saying that something is here aufgehoben only insofar a s i t has entered into a union with its opposite; i n this narrower definition i t is something reflected and can suitably be called a moment.— Indeed, we shall have to observe frequently that philosophical terminology

u s e s Latin eXpressions for reflected definitions.”

182

THE LOGIC

vides for h i m t o appeal to t h e intuition that is e m b e d d e d in the language. And his detailed explanation, a s q u o t e d , tries to overcome the rigid prejudices of the understanding by showing ho w both reason a n d intuition can m a k e perfectly good sense of something t h a t t h e understanding might be

inclined to rule out without a hearing because opposite meanings m u s t b e m u t u a l l y incompatible and therefore, if nevertheless combined, yield nonsense. I n his introduction to t h e Logic, Hegel is no less plain on this all-important point, o n which h e h a s so often b e e n misrepresented. Again it will b e best t o quote Hegel’s o w n w o r d s : “The [ K a n t i a n ] critique of t h e forms of t h e understanding h a s led t o t h e previously m e n t i o n e d result that these forms have n o application to t h e things-in-themselves [this is indeed Kant’s own conclusion].—But this c a n have n o other

meaning [says Hegel, but not Kant] than that these forms themselves are s o m e t h i n g u n t r u e . B u t by still being conc e d e d validity for subjective r e a s o n and for experience, the

critique has not effected any change in these forms but leaves them standing for the subject as they formerly were considered valid for t h e object. B u t if they are i n a d e q u a t e for t h e thing-in-itself, t h e n t h e understanding, whose forms t h e y are supposed to he, o u g h t t o tolerate them a n d b e satisfied with them even less. If they c a n n o t b e determinations of the thing-in-itself, they c a n e v e n less b e determinations of the understanding which ought t o b e conceded at least t h e dign i t y o f a thing-in-itself. The determinations of t h e finite and infinite a r e in the s a m e conflict whether they are applied to

time and space, to the world [where Kant elaborated their antinomies], or as determinations within the spirit; just as black a n d white yield a g r a y , whether they are united to-

gether on a wall or still on the palette: if our notion of the world dissolves a s s o o n a s t h e determinations of t h e infinite and finite are transferred t o it, t h e n the. spirit itself, which

contains both, is even more something that contradicts itself a n d dissolves itself—It is n o t t h e qualities of t h e stufir or

object to which they are applied or in which they are situated that c a n m a k e a difference; for the object is characterized by

4 2 . The conception of the Logic

183

contradictions o n l y through a n d according to these deter-

minations.”14 Kant thought that antinomies arise only when the categories of the understanding are applied to the world as a whole, to what lies beyond all possible eXperience; it did not occur to him that anything might be wrong with the categories themselves. He simply took them, as Hegel puts it in the next paragraph, “out of Subjective Logic,” or as Kant himself put it, from the traditional table of judgments. He failed to examine or analyze them as he should have done, and he never realized that there is something inherently odd or queer about the categories o f the understanding.

Hegel discusses the same point in the introductory portion of

the second and third editions of the Encyclopedia

(cf.

H 1 9 ) : “This is the place to mention that it is . . . the categories for themselves which bring about the contradiction. This

thought,

that the contradiction which arises

i n reason

through the determinations of the understanding is essential and necessary, must be considered one of the most important and profound advances of modern philosophy. But the solution is no less trivial than this point of view is profound . . . ”

(§48). What is needed is a comprehensive review and analysis of our categories, a n d this is what Hegel attempts in his Logic.

The point is to comprehend the concepts of being and nothing, of finite and infinite; then we shall see that they are all one-sided abstractions from

a concreteness o f which they

are merely partial aspects. That is the heart of Hegel’s Logic; that is the meaning of its much misunderstood dialectic. The dialectic of the Logic is thus somewhat different from

the dialectic of the Phenomenology: one could not possibly call it a logic of passion. As Hegel says in the penultimate paragraph of the introduction: “The system of Logic is the realm o f shadows, the world of the simple essences [Wesenheiten], freed from all sensuous concretion. The study of this science, the sojourn and the work i n this realm o f shadows,

is the absolute education and discipline of consciousness. Here it pursues tasks remote from sensuous intuitions and 141812,

viif.; 1841, 29 f., unchanged.

184

THE LOGIC

aims, from feelings, from t h e merely intended w o r l d of notions.15 Considered from its negative aspect, these tasks consist in t h e exclusion of t h e accidental nature of argumentative thinking and t h e arbitrary business of allowing these o r

rather the opposite reasons to occur to one and prevail.”16 H e g e l still confronts u s a s a n o t h e r Odysseus: i n t h e Phenomenology we followed his Odyssey, t h e Spirit’s great voyage i n s e a r c h of a h o m e where it m i g h t settle d o w n ; in the Logic w e are asked t o follow h i m into t h e r e a l m of shadows.

There we moved in a world where the passions had their place; here t h e passions a r e left behind. We are t o contemplate Concepts a n d categories—and see t h e m a s one-sided abstractions a n d mere shadows t h a t are n o t w h a t t h e y s e e m . We are n o w r e a d y t o u n d e r s t a n d in context a m e t a p h o r m e n t i o n e d o n c e before ( e n d of H 4 0 ) — o n t h e face of it, p e r h a p s t h e m a d d e s t i m a g e in all of Hegel’s writings: “The Logic is t h u s t o b e u n d e r s t o o d a s the system of pure reason,

as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth as it is witho u t any shroud in and for itself. O n e m i g h t therefore say that this content is t h e a c c o u n t of God, as h e is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and any finite spirit” ( I n t r o d u c t i o n ) .17 The i m a g e of t h e r e a l m of s h a d o w s s e e m s superior, but

what both metaphors have in common is the abstraction from t h e world and from concreteness. The suggestion that the Logic takes us back i n s o m e s e n s e “before t h e creation

of nature and any finite spirit” undoubtedly came from the structure of Hegel’s system: he had decided to begin with the Logic, t o follow that w i t h the phiIOSOphy of n a t u r e , and to place t h e philosophy of spirit i n t h e e n d ; a n d t h e philosophy of spirit, as w e shall s e e w h e n we take it u p i n detail, deals with t h e h u m a n ( o r “ fi n i t e ” ) spirit. 15 T h i s term has b e e n u s e d s o often t o r e n d e r Begrifl t h a t i t m a y be well t o remind t h e r e a d e r t h a t i n t h i s b o o k i t i s employed consistently t o translate Vorstellung. (Cf. H 3 4 ) . 161812,

xxvii f.; 1841, 44. The only change: Hegel added “in-

tuitions a n d . ” 171812, xiii; 1 8 4 1 , 3 3 . 1 8 1 2 : “truth itself a s it i s ” ; “ a n d ” was m i s s i n g i n the phrase “ i n a n d f o r i t s e l f ” ; and none o f the words

was emphasized.

42. The conception of the Logic

185

O n e might suppose that the Logic s h o u l d belong to the

philosophy of (finite) spirit—and one might favor the aban-

donment of any attempt to offer a‘philosophy of nature. In the twentieth century, the phiIOSOphy of (natural) science seems to have replaced the philosophy of nature, which is now apt to strike u s as a n excrescence of r o m a n t i c i s m ; and

once the philOSOphy of nature is thus transposed into the study of a h u m a n pursuit ( n a t u r a l s c i e n c e ) , o n e is b o u n d to

wonder whether Logic, too, cannot be absorbed into the philosophy of man, or philosophical anthropology. Most of this problem can be postponed until we consider the system, but something can and must be said at this point about the status and priority of the Logic. Hegel plainly does not consider it a branch of psychology, and beyond that he claims some priority for it, even over investigations of nature, a n d , for that matter, over science. O n both p o i n t s h e i s far from b e i n g o u t of d a t e . In d eed , h e co u ld b e said t o have

effected a revolution in metaphysics which is as timely one hundred fifty years later as it ever was. With Hegel, metaphysics ceases to be speculation about the nature of ultimate reality. H e is still fond of speaking of “speculation” and “speculative,” but as a matter of fact he does

not speculate

about

things of

which we could say

that the time for speculation is long past because we now look to the sciences for verifiable hypotheses. With Hegel, analysis of categories replaces Speculative metaphysics. He gives meta-

physics the new meaning and content that it still retains with some of the best phiIOSOphers in the second half of the twentieth century.

The priority of a Logic that is conceived in this manner is illuminated in two passages in the preface to the second edition: “The forms of thinking are first of all articulated and laid down i n the language of m a n . . . . In everything t h a t be-

comes for him something inward, any kind of notion, anything h e makes h i s own, l a n g u a g e h a s intruded; a n d what

man makes into language and expresses in language, contains, shrouded, m i x e d i n , or elaborated, a category. . . . ”

“ . . . I have seen opponents who did not care to make the

186

THE LOGIC

simple reflection that their ideas and objections contain categories which are presuppositions and themselves require criticism before they are u s e d . Unconsciousness of this point goes amazingly far; it makes for the basic misunderstanding,

the uncouth and uneducated behavior of thinking something else

when a category is considered, an d not this category

itself. . . . ” All discourse, whether it is about nature, science, psychology, ethics, art, o r religion, involves categories t h a t a r e not unproblematic, although those w h o e n g a g e i n such discourse very rarely realize t h a t they are begging any number of questions b y packing problematic assumptions into

their categories. Therefore Hegel considers it right to begin with an analysis of categories—or with what he calls “Logic.” His position vis-a-vis Kant may be summed up briefly. As Hegel himself points out in his “General Subdivision of the L o g i c , ” Kant extended the m e a n i n g of “logic” by introducing his “Transcendental Logic”; a n d Hegel’s “Objective Logic”—

the first two thirds of his Logic—“would partly correspond to his Transcendental Logic.” More important yet is the corollary, stated two pages later: “The Objective Logic thus replaces old-style metaphysics. . . 3’18 The difference from Kant is stated in the main part of the introduction: Kant’s “Critical philosophy already turned metaphysics into Logic, but it, like subsequent idealism, gave the logical determinations, as already m e n t i o n e d , from fear

of the object, an essentially subjective significance. . . .”19 Kant assumed that there was a thing-in-itself to which the categories did not apply; in that sense, then, the categories were merely subjective. Hegel follows Fichte in h a v i n g no

use for the thing-in-itself, which is indeed inconsistent with Kant’s m a i n ideas. Thinghood o r substance is itself a cate-

gory; unity and plurality are categories; cause is yet another. To claim that these categories have no application to the thing-in-itself, which must nevertheless b e assumed a s a

18 This “General Subdivision” was expanded in 1831, but the points here mentioned are equally emphatic in both versions: 1812, 2—4; 1841, 49—51. 191812, xv; 1841, 35.

4 3 . Against previous interpretations of t h e Logic

187

cause without which we should have n o eXperiences, is m a n i -

festly self—contradictory. If these categories have application only to the objects of experience—”and Kant produces powerful arguments i n support of this position—then we have no grounds whatsoever for assuming anything beyond experience. B u t i n that case w e also have n o grounds for con-

sidering the categories merely subjective. So far from merely telling us something about the structure of the human mind, they are part of t h e structure of all knowledge and of dis-

course o n any subject whatsoever—whether that subject be knowledge

and discourse, n a t u r e , ethics, art, religion, o r

philosophy. Therefore, the system of science—to recall the title Hegel originally gave the work t o which the Phenomenology was m e a n t as an introduction—should begin with the Logic.

43 When

it c o m e s t o t h e actual c o n t e n t s of t h e Logic, it i s

easy to look at the table of contents and to c0py it in the form of a c h a r t , as s o m e authors of studies of Hegel have d o n e . B u t i n t h e introduction Hegel says expressly:

“ . . . I point out that the subdivisions and titles of the books, sections, and chapters indicated in this work,20 as well as any explanations21 connected w i t h t h e m , h a v e been m a d e for the

sake of a preliminary survey, and that they are really solely of historical value. They do not belong to the contents and body of t h e science, b u t are arrangements of external reflec-

tion, which has already run through the whole execution and therefore knows the sequence of the moments in advance and indicates them. . . 3’22 O n c e again, as i n the Phenomenology, Hegel first wrote each v o l u m e and then asked himself w h a t precisely h e h a d got a n d how it m i g h t b e arranged neatly. H e never set as much 201812: 211812:

221812,

“in the following treatise o n Logic.” “remarks.” xxi; 1841, 39; Glockner’s ed., IV, 52; Lasson’s ed.

( 1 9 2 3 ) , 3 6 6 . I n the original o n l y historical is e m p h a s i z e d .

188

THE LOGIC

store b y his triads o r b y t h e precise s e q u e n c e a s s o m e of h i s expositors h a v e d o n e . I n fact, in t h e EnccOpedia of 1 8 1 7 , t h e order differs somewhat from t h e Logic of 1812—16. I n 1 8 3 0 Hegel published a third, revised, a n d definitive edition of the

EncycIOpedia, but when he prepared a second and definitive edition of the Logic in 1831—he completed his work on the first volume—he did not make the order conform to that of t h e Encyclopedia. The precise sequence was, after all, a s h e

had already said in 1812, not part of the “body of the scie n c e , ” a n y m o r e t h a n t h e n e a t disposition an d headings. W h a t did matter w a s n o t a n y s u c h progression from thesis t o antithesis t o synthesis, an d h e n c e t o another antithesis, a nd s o forth, a s McTaggart claimed,23 b u t a comprehensive a n a l y sis of categories a n d t h e demonstration that any two Opposite

categories are always both one-sided abstractions. H e g e l h a s been called a n archrationalist a n d a n essentialist,

but his central purpose in the Logic is to demonstrate the inadequacy, t h e one-sidedness, t h e abstractness of o u r cate-

gories. Some are more abstract than others; hence some sort of sequential a r r a n g e m e n t is possible; b u t this is not t h e m a i n thesis o r point of t h e b o o k .

Only the somewhat cut-and-dried style of the Encyclopedia, which will be considered i n d u e course, could give t h e i m pression t h a t t h e table of contents structure w a s w h a t matt e r e d . The Logic belies it a t every turn—quite especially t h e

first volume in which the reader is introduced to the whole enterprise. B u t while t h e d e h y d r a t e d s u m m a r y of t h e “Logic” i n the EncyCIOpedia wa s r e n d e r e d into English, badly, in 1 8 7 3 ( t h e revised edition of 1 8 9 2 w a s still bad),24 n o c o m p l e t e

translation of the Logic itself appeared until 1929. When Stace’s influential interpretation of Hegel appeared (1924), his teacher, H . S . M a c r a n , h a d published i n English o n l y approximately o n e ninth of t h e Logic ( t h e first third of Part

23 0p. cit., §4 (cf. H 3 7 ) . 24 M o r e o v e r , m u c h o f the t e x t W a l l a c e chose t o t r a n s l a t e c o n -

sists of “additions” of doubtful value which will be considered below ( H 5 2 ) . Wallace published an English version of the final part of the Encyclopedia in 1894; the middle part, containing the philosophy of nature, has never appeared in English.

4 3 . Against previous interpretations of t h e Logic

189

III).‘-’5 B u t w h e n a phiIOSOpher spends a large part of his life writing a t h r e e - v o l u m e work that eventually appears i n installm e n t s o v e r a period of five years, a‘ discussion of t h e ideas i n that work o n t h e basis of a translation of a syllabus of r o u g h l y a h u n d r e d pages, designed for his students’ use i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h o n e of his lecture courses, is hardly t h e best w e c a n d o . C o n c e r n i n g t h e charge of essentialism, t h e following distinct i o n from t h e introduction is relevant: “Considering education and t h e relation of the individual to Logic, I finally r e m a r k that this science, l i k e g r a m m a r , appears i n two different perspectives or values. It is o n e thing for those w h o first a p p r o a c h it a n d t h e sciences, a n d q u i t e another for those w h o return t o it from t h e m . W h o e v e r begins t o s t u d y g r a m m a r , finds i n its forms and laws d r y abstractions, accidental rules, altogether a lot of isolated determinations w h i c h m a n i f e s t m e r e l y t h e v a l u e a n d significance that lie i n their i m m e d i a t e m e a n i n g ; at first, k n o w l e d g e recognizes nothing else i n t h e m . W h o e v e r , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , masters a language, and at t h e s a m e t i m e k now s other languages w i t h w h i c h t o c o m p a r e i t , will find t h a t t h e

spirit and culture of a people reveal themselves to him in the g r a m m a r of its language; t h e s a m e rules and forms n o w have a full, living v a l u e . Through t h e g r a m m a r h e c a n recognize

the expression of the spirit, the Logic. “Thus, whoever approaches science, at first finds in the Logic a n isolated system of abstractions t h a t , limited t o itself, does n o t reach over i n t o o t h e r fields of k n o w l e d g e o r o t h e r sciences. O n t h e contrary, c o m p a r e d w i t h t h e riches of a notion of t h e w o r l d , w i t h t h e c o n t e n t of t h e other sciences, w h i c h

seems real, and compared with the promise of absolute sci— e n c e t o u n c o v e r t h e essence of these riches, t h e inner nature of t h e spirit and t h e w o r l d , t h e truth,26 this science, i n i t s abstract form a n d i n t h e colorless, cold simplicity of its pure

determinations, rather has the appearance that it could d o anything rather than keep this promise, and it seems t o confront these riches without any content. The first acquaintance 25 Hegel's Doctrine of Formal Logic, being a translation of the first section of the Subjective Logic (1912). 2‘5

“ t h e t r u t h ” w a s a d d e d i n t h e 2 d e d i t i o n . There a r e a few m o r e

very minor stylistic changes that d o not affect the sense.

190

THE LOGIC

with Logic limits its significance to Logic itself; its content is considered merely a n isolated concern with the determinations of thought, while other scientific concerns lie beside it a s separate materials with a content o f their o w n . . . . “In this way, Logic m u s t indeed b e learned t o begin with, as something one understands a n d admits but in which scope, depth, and further significance are missed to begin with. It is

only out of the deeper knowledge of the other sciences that Logic rises for the subjective spirit as something that is not merely general in a n abstract way but as the general which

includes the riches of the particular—even as the same ethical maxim in the mouth of a youth who understands it quite rightly does not have the significance and sc0pe i t h a s i n the

spirit of a man who has had much experience of life. . . 3’27

44 The first antinomy discussed i n the Logic is not that of be-

ing and nothing, which forms the subject of the first chapter, but that of the immediate and the mediated, which is introduced at t h e beginning of t h e section “With what m u s t the beginning of science b e m a d e ? ” “The beginning of philosophy must either b e something

mediated or something immediate; and it is easy to show that it could be neither the one nor the other.”8 This is not some slight bit of cleverness, offered in passing. This antinomy closely parallels Kant’s first a n t i n o m y , which assumes that the world must either h a v e a beginning i n t i m e o r not h a v e a beginning i n time, and then shows that both the “thesis” and the “antithesis” c a n b e shown to b e impossible. Kant assumed

that this must be due to the illicit application of categories to the world a s a whole and concluded that this corroborated his claim that our knowledge is perforce limited to experience.

Hegel shows that the antinomy does not depend on the application of categories t o t h e world a s a w h o l e ; h e points to a 271812,

xxv—xxvii; 1 8 4 1 , 42—44.

28 1812, 7 ; 1841, 55. The beginning of this section differs in the two editions, but this sentence does not.

4 4 . “Mediated”

and “immediate”

191

parallel antinomy when th e question i s merely o n e about the

beginning of science, or phi1030phy; and he finds that the fault lies in the nature of our categories.“ H e sums up the last point when h e says o n t h e next page “th at there is nothing, nothing

in the heavens or in nature or in the spirit or anywhere, which does not contain both immediacy and mediation; so these two determinations a r e seen to b e undivided and indivis-

ible [ungetrennt und untrennbar], and this opposition something v a i n [ein Nichtiges].”29

Nothing, in other words, is absolutely immediate (unmittelb a r ) i n the sense t h a t it is i n n o way mediated; and nothing is mediated (vermittelt) in the absolute sense that it is i n n o

sense immediate. If, for example, I know “immediately” that the answer to the question “What is 5 plus 12?” is “17,” my knowledge is, for all that, mediated by a process of learning back in my childhood. And, on the other hand, a picture that was not on the canvas “immediately” but got there through the mediation of many hours of work can still be seen all at o n c e , at a glance, immediately.

What seems trivial logic-chopping, utterly academic, and remote from the concrete content of other sciences is in fact relevant to hundreds of disputes that fill thousands of articles and books as well as many oral discussions. Again and again, people, including scholars, take such categories as those just discussed i n a n absolute sense and hack away at each other

instead of realizing the vanity, o r nullity, of the dispute. A few pages later, still in the same section, Hegel applies his point to “being” and says: “Further, what begins is already; but just as much, it is not yet. The two opposites, being and not-being, thus are found i n it in i m m e d i a t e u n i o n ; or it is their undifferentiated unity.

“The analysis of the beginning would thus furnish the Concept of the unity of being and not-being. . . . This Concept could b e considered t h e first, purest, i.e., most abstract, defini-

tion of the absolute—which it would be in fact if the form of definitions and the name of the absolute mattered at all.”30 291841,

301812,

5 6 ; not i n the fi r s t e d i t i o n .

13; 1841, 64. The

added i n 1 8 3 1 .

phrase “i.e., most abstract” was

THE LOGIC

192

45

The first book of the Logic is called “The Doctrine o f Being” and the first chapter is subdivided a s follows:

FIRST SECTION: QUALITY":1 First Chapter: Being

A. Being B . Nothing C . Becoming 1 . Unity o f being a n d nothing

Note 1 : The opposition of being a n d nothing i n our notions

Note 2 : Inadequacy of the expression: unity, identity of being a n d nothing32

Note 3 : On isolating these abstractions33 Note 4 : Incomprehensibility of beginning“

2. Moments of becoming 3 . Sublimation o f b e c o m i n g N o t e : The expression: A ufheben 311812:

DETERMINATENESS (QUALITY) Being and nothing, each taken for itself 331812: Other relations [Verlziilmisse] in the relation [Beziehung] of being and nothing 321812:

341812:

The

ordinary

dialectic a g a i n s t becoming and against

coming to be and passing away

4 5 . The c o n t e n t s of the Logic

193

When w e t u r n t o consider t h e contents of. t h e n e x t t w o chapters, w e find that t h e differences between t h e original e d i t i o n of 1812 and t h e revised version are s o great that i t will b e best t o present t h e t w o versions o n facing pages t o facilitate comparisons.

These pages, which “cover” about 130 pages of text, should b e compared w i t h t h e b r e a k d o w n of the s a m e section i n t h e so-called Lesser L o g i c , i n t h e Encyclopedia. Here i t is, i n full: A. Quality a . Being

b . Existence c . Being for itself That is i t , i n all t h r e e editions of th e Encyclopedia.

The EncycIOpedia text on this section comprises less than a dozen pages, e v e n i n t h e syllabus t h a t invites yct Hegel’s Logic is a w o r k as even t h e s e t h re e pages The Logic is indeed a of “ N o t e s ” is altogether

third edition. The Encyc10pedia is a further reduction t o a chart. B u t of a n altogether different character, of t h e table of. contents m a y suggest. m a r v e l of organization, and t h e use ingenious. This device allows Hegel

to anticipate objections, to elaborate, and to digress, while at the same time presenting an outline that is extraordinarily neat with its repeated triadic pattern. The structure is clear and pleases t h e eye i n its astounding simplicity; b u t scope,

profundity, and the riches of an unusually comprehensive m i n d are never sacrificed t o i t . Whatever seems w o r t h saying,

is said—if necessary, in a Note.

194

THE

LOGIC

FIRST E D I T I O N :

1812

Second Chapter: Existence [Das Dasez‘n] A . E x i s t e n c e a s such

1 . Existence in general

2 . Reality [Realitc'it] a . Being other b . Being for an o th er a n d being i n itself c . Reality

N o t e : O r d i n a r y m e a n i n g of reality

3. Something B. Determinateness 1. Limit 2 . Determinateness a. Determination

b . Condition [Besclzaflenheit]

c . Quality N o t e : O r d i n a r y m e a n i n g of quality 3 . C h a n g e [Verc'inderung] a . C h a n g e of condition

b. Ought and barrier N o t e : You ought t o because y o u c a n c. Negation (Qualitative) Infinity

1. Finitude and infinity

2. Reciprocal determination of the finite and the infinite 3 . Return of t h e infinite i n t o itself

N o t e : O r d i n a r y juxtaposition of the finite a n d infinite

45. The contents of the Logic

195

REVISED VERSION Second C h a p t e r : Existence [Das Dasein]

A . Existence as such a . Existence i n general

b . Quality

Note: Reality and negation c . Something B. Finitude a . Something and s o m e t h i n g other

b . Determination, condition [Beschaflenheit], and limit

c . Finitude

The immediacy of finitude The barrier and the ought

N o t e : The ought Transition of the finite i n t o the infinite

C . Infinity a . The infinite i n general b . Reciprocal determination of the finite and the

infinite c . Affirmative infinity

The transition Note 1: Infinite progress N o t e 2 : Idealism

196

THE LOGIC

FIRST EDITION: 1812 Third Chapter: Being for itself [Das Fiirsichsein] A . Being for itself as such

1 . Being for itself i n general 2 . The m o m en ts of being for itself

a . Its being i n itself b . Being for one [Fiir eines seyn] N o t e : Was fiir einer?

c. Ideality 3 . Becoming o f the one

B. The one [Das Eins] 1 . The one and the void Note: Atomisrn 2. Many ones (repulsion)

Note: Multiplicity of monads 3. Mutual repulsion C . Attraction

1 . A one [Ein Eins]

2. Balance [Gleichgewiclzt] of attraction and repulsion Note:

The

Kantian

construction

of matter

out

of the force of attraction and repulsion

3. Transition to quantity

45.

The contents of the Logic

REVISED

197

VERSION

Third Chapter: Being for itself [Das Fiirsichsein] A . Being for itself as such a . Existence and being for itself

b. Being for one [Sein-fiir—Ez’nes] N o t e : The eXpression: Was flir eines? c . On e

B. One and many

a. The one in itself

b. The one and the void Note: Atomism

c. Many ones. Repulsion N o t e : Leibnizian monad

C . Repulsion and attraction a . Exclusion of t h e o n e

Note: Principle of the unity of the one and the many

b. The one one of attraction c. The relation of repulsion and attraction N o t e : The K a n t i a n construction o f matter out

of the force of attraction and repulsion

198

THE LOGIC

Can Hegel’s many triads be construed as so many theses, antitheses, and syntheses, even if he himself did n o t choose to

do this? Let us look at them, beginning with the first three chapters: Existence (Chapter 2 ) is hardly the antithesis of Being (Chapter 1 ) , and Being for itself (Chapter 3 ) is not their synthesis. Nor will this construction work when we consider the A,

B, and C of the third chapter, or their further subdivisions. The story is the same when we turn back to the second chapter: finitude is certainly not the antithesis of existence as such, and infinity cannot well be construed as their synthesis. Again, the subdivisions, too, d o not lend themselves to that kind of

dialectic. The sole possible exception comes in the first chapter: the first triad of the book, that of being, nothing, and becoming, seems to substantiate the myth; though even here the further breakdown of the discussion of becoming will not fit, and even the mere headings of Notes 2 and 3 suggest the shallow-

ness of the traditional misrepresentation. It is tempting to suggest that those who cling to the legend o f thesis, antithesis, and synthesis have obviously never got beyond the first triad, and have n o t even read the Notes that

explain what it is all about. While this is unquestionably true in the majority of cases, the way a legend spreads is, o f course,

different. It is not true that everyone, or almost everyone, who believes i n i t has come to believe it o n his o w n , by drawing a false conclusion from, say, the first triad. PeOple are taught the legend before they have read any Hegel—or any Nietzsche,

or the four Gospels—and when they finally look at some of the books themselves, few indeed read these books straight

through, with an open mind. In fact, doing that with a really unprejudiced mind, discounting everything one has been taught for years, is so difiicult that it borders on the impossible. Typically, people read a little here and there, are delighted

when they find what fits in with their preconceptions, and actually assume that they have now found for themselves what they had merely assumed previously. What does not readily fi t is usually discounted as being d u e to one’s imperfect knowl-

4 6 . Being, nothing, b e c o m i n g

199

edge. After all, everybody knows—well, what precisely? The truth o f the legend.

46

Still, we should consider the first triad in some detail. We find that the text down to Note 1 takes u p a mere two pages, even with the three big, space-consuming h e a d i n g s : Being, N o t h i n g , a n d Becoming. B u t the four Notes take u p twenty p a g e s i n t h e first edition, a l m o s t thirty in the s e c o n d . Here is w h a t Hegel h a s to say about “ b e i n g ” : “Being, p u r e being—without all further determination. I n its u n d e t e r m i n e d i m m e d i a c y it is equal o n l y t o itself, a n d is n o t even u n e q u a l t o s o m e t h i n g else, h a s no difference within it, nor toward t h e outside. A n y d e t e r m i n a t i o n o r content t h a t

would be differentiated in it, or by which it would be posited as differentiated from something else, would mean that we no longer held fast to it in its purity. It is pure undeterminateness and emptiness—There is nothing in it to be intuited, if one can here speak of intuition; or it is only this pure, empty intuition itself. Just as little is there anything in it to be thought, or it is just as much only this empty thinking. Being, the undetermined and i m m e d i a t e , is i n d e e d nothing, a n d n o t more nor less t h a n n o t h i n g . ”

After this comes the equally brief discussion of “nothing”: “Nothing, pure nothing; it is simple equality with itself, c o m p l e t e emptiness, l a c k of all d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d c o n t e n t ; non-differentiation in itself—Insofar a s intuition o r thinking c a n b e m e n t i o n e d h e r e , it is considered a difference whether s o m e t h i n g o r nothing is intuited o r t h o u g h t . To intuit o r think n o t h i n g t h u s h a s a meaning35; b o t h are differentiated, s o

there is (exists) nothing in our intuition or thought35; o r r a t h e r it is t h e empty intuition o r thinking itself; a n d t h e s a m e e m p t y intuition o r thinking a s p u r e b e i n g — N o t h i n g is t h u s t h e s a m e d e t e r m i n a t i o n , o r r a t h e r l a c k of d e t e r m i n a t i o n , a n d t h u s altogether t h e s a m e a s p u r e being.”

35 The phrase between the two figures was slightly different in the first edition.

200

THE LOGIC

Now comes “C. Becoming. 1 . Unity of being and nothing”; and this is equally b r i e f : “Pure being and pure nothing are thus the same. What is truth is neither being nor nothing, but rather that being h a s passed over—not that i t is passing over—into nothing, and

nothing into being. But just as much is truth not their nondifferentiation but rather36 that they are not the same,36 that they are absolutely difi‘erent, but just a s much undivided and indivisible, and that each immediately disappears in its Oppo-

site. Their truth is thus this movement of the immediate disappearance of one in the other; becoming; a movement i n

which both are differentiated, but by a difference that has just as immediately dissolved.”

Even this initial brief account is very different from the usual versions of Hegel’s claim and fits our remarks about Hegel’s approach to the categories. Bu t if Hegel h a d stopped

this discussion at this point in order to hurry on to the next triad, and hence to another, and yet another, we m i g h t still

feel that he was somewhat oracular and had perhaps put something over o n his audience. B u t now come the four Notes, all designed to elucidate what Hegel meant and what h e d i d n o t mean.

It will suffice to quote some of the highlights. This discussion cannot serve as a substitute for reading Hegel’s Logic; it is meant to clear away misconceptions and impediments and to show h o w the book is to b e read. We begin with Note 1 :

“Nothing is usually opposed to something; but something is already a determinate being which is different from other somethings; thus the nothing that is opposed to something, the nothing of something, is also a determinate nothing. B u t here ‘nothing’ is to be taken in its undetermined simplicity.37—If it should be considered more correct that instead of nothing,

not-being should be opposed to being, considering the result there would be no objection to this. . . . But what matters first is not the form of Opposition . . . but rather the abstract, 36 The phrase between the two figures is not found in the first edition.

37 The remainder of this paragraph was added in 1831.

4 6 . Being, nothing, becoming

201

immediate negation, nothing purely for itself, the negation

devoid of relation—what, if you wish, could also be expressed b y the mere: not. . . . “If the result that being a n d nothing is the s a m e attracts attention, taken by itself, o r seems paradoxical, there is no

need to heed that particularly. . . . It would not be difiicult t o demonstrate this unity of being and nothing i n every ex-

ample, in every actuality or thought.38 One must say the same thing that was said above about immediacy and mediat i o n . . . about being a n d nothing: that nowhere in the heavens and o n earth is there anything that does n o t contain in itself both being and nothing. To b e sure, since here one

speaks of a something and what is actual, these determinations are no longer present in the complete untruth in which they are as being and n o t h i n g , b u t i n a further determination; and they are taken, e.g., as the positive and th e negative. . . .

“One cannot try to meet all the confusions into which the ordinary consciousness enters, confronted with such a logical

proposition, i n every possible way; for they are inexhaustible. Only a few can be mentioned. One reason for such confusions —one among others—is that consciousness carries into such an

abstract logical proposition39 notions of a concrete something, forgetting that here o n e is n o t speaking of that but only

of the pure abstractions of being and nothing, and that we must stick to these alone. “Being and nothing is the same; therefore it is the same whether I am o r a m not, whether this house is or is not,

whether these hundred dollars are part of my fortune or not.40 —This inference or application of the preposition changes the meaning of the proposition completely. The proposition contains the pure abstractions of being and nothing; but the application makes of them a determinate being and a determi— 38 The remainder of this paragraph was added in 1831. the paragraph was different up to this point, as follows: “The confusion into which the ordinary consciousness enters, confronted with such a logical proposition, is due to the fact that it 391812:

carries i n t o i t . . .”

40 Only a browser could mistake this for Hegel’s own View.

202

THE LOGIC

nate nothing. B u t of a determinate being, a s noted, one is not

speaking at this point.”1 The example of t h e hundred dollars leads Hegel t o discuss Kant’s analysis of the ontological proof of G o d ’ s existence at some length, and this i n turn leads to the remark42 “that man

should raise himself to this abstract generality in his mind, so that in fact it becomes a matter of indifference to him whether the hundred dollars . . . are or are not, just as it is indifferent to him whether he is o r i s n o t . . . si fractus illabatur orbis, impavidum ferient ruinae, a Roman said}!3 a n d a Christian

should maintain such indifference even more.” The second Note is shorter than the first; a n d w e shall excerpt it t o o :

“Another reason may be cited which is conducive to the aversion against the pr0position about being and nothing. This reason is that the expression of the result . . . in the prOposition, being and nothing is o n e and t h e same, is imperfect. The

accent is placed preferably on the one and the same, as one would generally do in a proposition in which only the predicate proclaims what the subject is. The meaning therefore seems

to be that the difference is denied, although it appears immediately in the proposition itself; for it pronounces the two determinations, being and nothing, and contains them as differentiated. . . . Insofar as the proposition, being and nothing is the same, pronounces the identity of these determinations, while also containing b o t h as differentiated, i t contradicts

itself and dissolves itself. If we stick to this, a prOposition is here posited which, on closer examination, contains the movement to disappear through itself. But in this way what happens t o it is precisely what is supposed to constitute its true content; namely, becoming. “ . . . The sentence i n the form of a pr0position is not

felicitous for the expression of speculative truths; acquaintance 411812,

23-26; 1841, 74-77. 42 Only in the revised edition. 43 Horace, Odes. I I I . 3 , 7 : “Even if the sky fell, broken, the ruins

would slay an intrepid man.” Freud also loved this quotation.

4 7 . Hegel versus Heidegger

203

with this c i r c u m s t a n c e would h e l p t o d o away with many m i s -

understandings of speculative truths.”4=4 This last point h a d b e e n m a d e b y Hegel at some length i n the preface to t h e Phenomenology, and is discussed i n the commentary, where something is also said about his reiteration of this point i n the Encyclopedia (11.1.25). It is one o f the central points of Hegel’s philos0phy and as relevant t o the comprehension of his Logic a s it is t o the Phenomenology. The poi n t of the Logic is n o t t o flout the law o f contradiction, to confound common sense, and to climb, b y means of some I n d i a n r0pe trick, o v e r theses, antitheses, and syntheses,

out of sight, to the absolute. What Hegel offers is a critique o f o u r categories, a n attempt t o show how one-sided and abstract they are, a n d a work that should destroy uncritical

reliance on unexamined concepts and dogmatic insistence on propositions t h a t invite contradiction. Far from taking a de-

light in contradictions and paradoxes, Hegel tries to show how these are inevitable unless we carefully analyze our terms and recognize w h a t a proposition c a n a n d cannot d o .

47 The prose of the Logic is worlds removed from the prose of Heidegger, both i n Being a n d Time a n d in What is Metawhich revolves around “ t h e n o t h i n g ” ; and Hegel’s physics,

thought is, too. The distinction between being [das Sein] and beings [Seiendes] is common to both but comes from Aristotle.45 What Heidegger does with being and nothing is not 44 1841, 83 f. In the first edition this Note is altogether different. 45 Cf. Ros.,287 f : Many readers resisted Hegel’s Logik “because they did not want to think the very beginning, the Concept of being as such [des Seins als solchen], but always looked behind this absolute abstraction for a particular substance, 3 being [ein Sein]. Being [ D a s Sein] was right away supposed to be something, a b e i n g [ e i n Etwas, e i n Seiendes] . . . h e h a d formed h i s G e r m a n d e s i g n a t i o n s after Greek m o d e l s in P l a t o a n d Aristotle; for beingfor-itself, b e i n g other, being-in-and-for-itself, b e i n g identical with oneself a l l a c c o r d w i t h a n c i e n t G r e e k u s a g e , e x c e p t t h a t t h i s w a s often m u c h b o l d e r still, a s Aristotle’s to t i 'e'n e i n a i [ t h e w h a t i t i s

204

THE LOGIC

merely different from what Hegel d i d with t h e m ; it is based on a total a n d unfortunate neglect of Hegel’s discussion of these terms.

Heidegger begins Being and Time ( 1 9 2 7 ) a s a great quest

for being, which allegedly has been covered up by beings. From t h e start, being is given the mystique of something l o n g lost that we m u s t seek; a n d human existence is t h e n studied a s one m o d e of being—the m o d e we a s human beings know best —in the hope that through such a study we might gain some inkling of what being is. The suggestion throughout is that

knowing something of human existence is relatively paltry; such knowledge is scarcely worth while; a philosopher should not bother with it—and Heidegger himself assuredly would

not stoop so low—if it were not for the h0pe that we might acquire a t least a little knowledge of being, which is held to b e far bigger and better. I n Heidegger’s later writings being h a s acquired such a sacred aura t h a t talk of Heidegger’s Seinsmystik (his mysticism of being) h a s long b e e n a commonplace. H e is o n the way toward being; a vision of being is n o t vouchsafed t o our generation; o u r t i m e is o n e i n which being h a s been forgotten, a n d being h a s forgotten u s ; all o n e can h o p e to d o is to start

in the direction of being and perhaps take a few steps. I n W h a t is Metaphysics? (published two years after Being and Time a n d well before the later writings just referred t o ) Heidegger discussed the revelation of th e n o t h i n g in t h e experience of anxiety. What are we afraid of when w e experi-

ence Angst—as Opposed to fear, which is fear of something particular? Nothing! In this lecture, often reprinted with a subsequently added postscript a n d a n introduction added still later, Heidegger created a great mystique around the nothing,

which was criticized by Rudolf Carnap as a semantic confusion.46 The point that must b e stressed i n our context is t h a t such writings are not excrescences of Hegel’s spirit, but, o n the to be t h a t t h i n g , o r “ e s s e n c e ” ] and entelecheia show, a s i s well known.”

46 Cf. WK 351, 432, and 438.

4 8 . Hegel as a philosopher 0/ a b u n d a n c e

205

contrary, examples of the sort of thing Hegel hoped to prevent henceforth b y m e a n s of his discussion of being and nothing.

He tried to strip them of their aur'a. He discussed them as t h e poorest a n d most abstract categories a n d found it under-

standable and fitting that Parmenides, so near the beginning of Western phi1030phy, should have extolled being.47 Any attempt to go back to Parmenides in modern times and to extol being i n any comparable manner would have struck Hegel as utterly perverse a n d as evidence that anyone proposing to do

such a thing had not profited from over two thousand years of

philosophical thought—which Heidegger, to b e sure, has

renounced as an egregious fall from grace. This historical digression is doubly pertinent because it shows how Hegel’s Logic is indeed, as he himself suggested, abstract and isolated only for those who come t o it for the first time, ignorant—to recall Hegel’s own image—of other

languages and sciences. For those who have lived with his ideas for a while, and who have studied other things, too, the relevance of his discussions b e c o m e s obvious. And the alleged essentialist w h o , a new generation supposes, ought t o hang his

head in shame when confronted with the existentialists of the twentieth century, is quite able t o hold his own. In fact, Hegel might say, quoting the title of one of his essays: Who thinks abstractly?

48 I n the Logic, as i n t h e Phenomenology, Hegel is the phi— losopher of abundance i n t h e s a m e sense that o n e might call

Shakespeare’s poetry the poetry of abundance. For the second t i m e h e tries t o write a b o o k w i t h a limited a i m , and this t i m e

he actually begins by apologizing for its unavoidable abstractness; and for the second time the work transcends his limited intentions, reaches o u t to e m b r a c e ever s o m u c h m or e , a n d

in the end anticipates his system. The idea of Hegel as a desiccated professor who e k e d out a 47 First page of N o t e I : 1 8 4 1 , 7 4 ; Glockner’s e d . , IV, 8 9 .

206

THE LOGIC

book a t a time by ceaselessly applying —a thinker who did n o t really h a v e very after all, h e h a d never had a concrete —founders on t h e Logic as it does on

a mechanical method much to say because, experience i n his life the Phenomenology.

Not counting the various prefaces, introductions, and essays in the beginning, the first volume alone contains thirty-three “Notes”48; the second h a s sixteen; and the last, which differs completely from the first two, a s we shall see in a moment,

only two. In the text, these Notes have no titles, except for the word Anmerkung; i n the t a b l e of contents, most o f them have

a title indicating their approximate content, but some of them d o not. Certainly, most of them were not written on set topics that were p l a n n e d i n advance for those particular places; a n d the great majority o f the titles in t h e table of contents represent afterthoughts. The Logic is the work of a man who h a s a vast number o f things to say, a n d who asks himself afterwards

how best to arrange what he has said in a n orderly fashion. A man once called on a professor to ask permission to audit his seminar. H e was working o n a book, h e said, a n d felt that

the seminar would be of great help to him. To substantiate the impression h e wished to m a k e , h e opened h i s brief c a s e a nd produced two enormous spring binders. Opened, they revealed perhaps a thousand pages, e a c h blank except for one or two lines. “Critique of Nicolai H a r t m a n n , ” said a typical page.

“What are you going to say by way of criticizing him?” asked the professor. “ I don’t know yet,” replied the man, who was twice the professor’s a g e ; “that’s why I want t o t a k e your

seminar.” Hegel was close to the opposite extreme, much nearer to Nietzsche than to this poor “author.” But instead of beginning i n his late twenties, o r at least a t thirty when h e first c a m e to Jena, to publish something like a book a year containing his

current thoughts, he kept accumulating material and ideas and then faced the terrible problem o f finally writing a n orderly book. If his m i n d h a d not b e e n s o crowded with ideas that urgently pressed o n h i m , h e m i g h t have written m o r e ordinary 48 1812: twenty-eight, one of them not included in the table of contents.

4 8 . Hegel as a philowpher of abundance

207

volumes. B u t a s s o o n as th e d i k e w as broken an d h e began to write t h e Phenomenology, a n d later th e Logic, everything threatened to rush i n .

What exactly does the Logic contain? We have reproduced the “contents” of the first section, Quality. The second is called Quantity, a n d o n the second p a g e of i t a “ N o t e ” (without

title) begins. Then there are the usual three chapters, with their u s u a l A , B , C , and with “ N o t e s ” o n various subjects,

including “Kantian antinomy of indivisibility and the infinite divisibility of time, space, m a t t e r ” ; “ M o d e s of calculation in

arithmetic. Kantian synthetic propositions a priori of intuition”; “Kant’s application of the determination of degree to the being o f the s o u l ” ; “The high o p i n i o n of progress ad

infinitum”; Kant’s antinomy of the finitude and infinity of the w o r l d ; t h e mathematical infinite; a n d the differential calculus. The third section is called Measure, and there is the us ua l triadic division and subdivision, a n d as u s u a l the triads c a n n o t b e construed as theses, antitheses, syntheses. A long excursus

on elective aflfinities deserves special mention, as Goethe’s novel with that title had appeared in 1809. The second volume of t h e Objective Logic, the so-called Doctrine of Essence, is organized a s follows. Some omissions are clearly indicated; b u t b y simply omitting all t h e “ N o t e s ”

one would falsify the tenor and dissemble the richness of the volume.

208

THE LOGIC

FIRST SECTION:

ESSENCE AS REFLECTION ITSELF

IN

First Chapter: Semblance [Der Schez'n] A . The essential and unessential

B . Semblance

C. Reflection [subdivided further] Second C h a p t e r : . . . the determinations of reflection N o t e : The determinations of reflections i n t h e form

of propositions [or, principles] A. Identity [followed by 2 Notes]

Note 2 : First original law of thought, the principle of identity

B . Difference [ 3 subdivisions and 2 Notes]

C . Contradiction

Note 1 : Unity of the positive and the negative Note 2 : The principle of the excluded middle

Note 3 : The principle of contradiction Third Chapter: The ground [Grund]

Note: The principle of [suflicient] reason [Grund] A . The absolute ground a . Form and essence b . Form a n d m a t t e r c . Form a n d c o n t e n t

B . The d e t e r m i n a t e ground Notes]

C . The condition [Bedingung]

[ 3 subdivisions and 2

4 8 . Hegel asap/zilosoplzer of a b u n d a n c e

SECOND SECTION:

APPEARANCE

209

[Die Erscheinung]

First Chapter: Existence [Died Existenz] A . T h e t h i n g a n d its attributes

a . Thing-in—itself and existence

b . Attribute Note:

The thing-in-itself idealism

of

transcendental

c. The reciprocity of things B . The thing’s consisting o f m a t t e r

C . The dissolution of the thing [followed by a Note]

Second Chapter: Appearance [ 3 subparts] Third Chapter: The essential relation

A . The relation of the whole and the parts

Note: Infinite divisibility B . The relation o f force a n d its expression [ 3 s u b p a r t s ] C . Relation of t h e internal a n d external

N o t e : I m m e d i a t e identity of t h e internal and external

210

THE LOGIC

THIRD SECTION: ACTUALITY [Die Wirklichkeit]

First Chapter: The absolute [ 3 subparts] N o t e : Spinozistic and Leibnizian philosophy S e c o n d C h a p t e r : Actuality

A . The accidental, o r formal actuality, possibility, and necessity B . Relative necessity o r real actuality, possibility, a n d necessity

C. Absolute necessity Third C h a p t e r : The absolute relation

A . Relation o f substantiality

B. Relation of causality [ 3 subparts] C. Reciprocity

49. The Subjective Logic

211

There is one problem of translation that ought to be mentioned, though i t fortunately does not have to b e solved here.

The second chapter of the Logic is entitled Das Dasein, rendered above as “Existence,” and the first chapter of the “Second Section: Appearance” of the Doctrine of Essence is entitled Die Existenz. I n a complete translation of the work one would obviously have to find two different English terms. The trouble is that there is no English equivalent for Dasein, which in German is a common and entirely untechnical term, by n o means as cumbersome as “being-there.” I n English, “ he

is there” is as plain as er ist da; but “being-there” as a noun has quite a difierent ring. These pages should fulfill several functions. First, they ought to give the reader some idea o f the range of topics in the Objective Logic. Second, they should show where one can find Hegel’s discussions o f any number o f crucial terms. Third, they should enable the reader to see for himself whether the procession of the categories is governed by the three-step o f thesis-antithesis-synthesis. And finally, they show how many of

the headings are plainly afterthoughts. The First Chapter is called “Semblance,” and s o is the second of its three parts.

Similarly, the Second Section is called “Appearance,” and so is the second of its three chapters. The point is not to blame Hegel on that score but rather to show that he meant what he said when he disparaged all “the subdivisions and titles of the books, sections, and chapters” (first quotation in H 4 3 ) .

49 The last part of Hegel’s Logic is i n important respects a different k i n d of work from the first two. That is why Hegel

himself did not divide the work as a whole into three parts but rather into two volumes, subdividing the first volume—the Objective Logic—into two parts. So far we have confined our attention t o t h e s e : they are the part of the Logic that was

meant to replace traditional metaphysics. The Subjective Logic, though subtitled “The Doctrine o f the

Concept,” was meant to treat the traditional subject matter of

212

THE LOGIC

logic. It contains only two Notes, and it will suffice if we give the barest outline.

FIRST

SECTION: SUBJECTIVITY

First Chapter: The Concept [ 3 subparts] Second Chapter: The proposition

A . The proposition of existence [Dasez'n; 3 subparts] B . The

proposition of reflection [ 3 subparts]

C . The prOposition of necessity [ 3 subparts]

D . The proposition of the Concept [ 3 subparts]

Third Chapter: The inference A . The inference of existence [Daseim 4 subparts;

Note] B. The inference of reflection

C. The inference of necessity SECOND

SECTION:

OBJECTIVITY

First Chapter: Mechanism [ 3 subparts, 2 subdivided further] Second Chapter: Chemism [ 3 subparts]

Third Chapter: Teleology [ 3 subparts] THIRD

SECTION:

THE IDEA

First Chapter: Life [ 3 subparts] Second C h a p t e r : The idea of knowledge A . The idea of the true a . Analytical knowledge b . Synthetic knowledge 1 . The definition

2 . The subdivision

3 . The axiom B . The

idea of the good

Third Chapter: The absolute idea [ n o further subdivision]

4 9 . The Subjective Logic

213

Very little n e e d s to b e said about this volume. I n the second chapter, which for once is divided into four parts, A , B , C, D,

Hegel covers the traditional table of judgments: positive, negative, and infinite; singular, particular, and universal; categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive; assertorial, problematic, and

apodictic. In the third chapter, under A he takes up the traditional four figures; under B the inferences of totality, induction, and analogy; under C, the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunc-

tive inference. None of this is really of a kind with the Objective Logic, and Hegel himself made plain that it was not. The point requires emphasis only because it shows how misguided all att e m p t s are t o construe the Logic a s a relentless ascent from

“being” to “the absolute.” What makes this popular legend doubly silly is the fact that “the absolute” appears not at all at the pinnacle, b u t i n the second part o f the Objective Logic (i.e., i n the second of the three v o l u m e s ) , and n o t even at the pinnacle of that but a t the beginning o f its third section, surmounted, o f all things, by “actuality” (hardly i n keeping with the t a g of “ e s s e n t i a l i s m ” ) . There is n o relentless ascent; there is rather a n attempt to organize a n excess o f m a t e r i a l . After traditional metaphysics

has been replaced by an Objective Logic, which deliberately follows the precedent set by Kant’s Transcendental Logic, the subject matter of traditional logic still requires a niche i n the

system—and is given one, rather oddly, above the analysis of the categories which has supplanted metaphysics. Hegelian metaphysics comes at the bottom, traditional logic above it. We simply have to discard the popular misrepresentations and all considerations of tops and bottoms. The analysis of the categories comes first b e c a u s e all subsequent discourse, in-

cluding logic, involves them. Traditional logic is a way of m a n i p u l a t i n g such categories. S o m e other subjects still r e m a i n e d to b e taken c a r e o f be-

fore the philosophy of nature: they are put into the second of the three sections. By calling the first, which covers traditional logic, “Subjectivity,” and this one “Objectivity,” a semblance of symmetry is created; and o n e must concede that the whole

214

THE LOGIC

arrangement looks very neat. Alas, it looks too neat. The p o o r

man who was struggling to impose some order on excess and abundance created such a n imposing appearance of neatness that readers who saw little but the table of contents a s s u m e d that the relentless progress upwards of which they had b e e n

told was plainly there, with “Objectivity” the plain antithesis of “Subjectivity,” as if these two headings were not the most palpable afterthoughts. It should at least have struck such non-readers that while the “Subjective” Logic c a m e above the “Objective” Logic, here “Objectivity” comes above “Subjectivity.” Hegel’s emphatic disclaimer about all these headings ( H 4 3 ) wants t o

be taken at face value. It would perhaps be excessively irreverent t o s a y that there still had t o b e a “ t h i r d section” which naturally became t h e place for an y leftovers—much as a speaker, groping for a conclusion after a n unusually long talk, looks for a few high-sounding an d noble words that will make a good ending. So Hegel brings in life a n d knowledge, the t r u e and the good—but suddenly, almost unaccountably, stops with

“B. The idea of the good” and does not round it off with “C. The idea of t h e beautiful.” There is n o “ C ” this time, a n d the beautiful is left out of th e Logic.

This omission is the beauty spot on the otherwise too-perfect complexion o f the work. It seems deliberate, a touch of spite, an indication that t h e author was not a slave t o triads. I n a n y case, i n the Encyclopedia “The I d e a ” is still subdivided i n t o “Life,” “Knowledge” (this heading represents a very slight change from “ T h e idea of k n o w l e d g e ” ) , and “The absolute i d e a ” ; but “Knowledge” is n o t broken d o w n into t h e true and the good, a s i n the Logic, but into “ k n o w i n g ” and “willing.”

50 The four volumes—or two books—which unquestionably constitute Hegel’s m o s t original contributions were written by h i m between the ages of thirty-five and forty-five when h e was

lonely and far from successful. Other philosophers, his own age o r even a little younger, h a d obtained chairs and fame,

5 0 . The author of the Logic

215

while he had no influence whatsoever. When the first book came out, he was editing a small neWSpaper; when the second came out i n three installments, he “was earning his living as

the headmaster of a secondary school. How obviously miscast he was in that role was summed up best b y Clemens Brentano, the famous romantic, in a letter to a friend. One may well doubt the truth o f his remark, but

there is no denying that it is at least well invented: “In N'urnberg I found the honest, wooden Hegel as the principal of the Gymnasium; he r e a d the E d d a and Nibelungen, a n d t o b e able t o enjoy them h e translated them, as h e was reading, into

Greek.”9 Hegel was indeed a s far a s ever from the romantics’ a s -

pirations to glorify the German past and the Catholic Middle Ages, aspirations with which Brentano w a s prominently associated. Hegel was n o p a t r i o t ; h e had n o real h o m e ; he d i d not

belong anywhere. He put his heart into the books he was writing—and into a sentence that he wrote into a Stammbuch where it lay buried until it was published in 1960:50 “Not curiosity, not vanity, not t h e consideration of ex-

pediency, not duty and conscientiousness, but a n unquenchable, unhappy thirst that brooks no compromise leads us t o truth. Niirnberg, S e p . 3 0 , 1 8 0 9

Written to remember HEGEL, Prof. & Principal.”

49 Joseph von Gorres, Gesammelte Briefe, II (1874), 75; quoted in Fischer, 2d ed. (1911), 1209. 50B IV, 67.

CHAPTER

V

The System

51 I n Heidelberg, where h e went a s a professor at the age o f forty-six, Hegel faced new problems. The m o s t urgent p e r h a p s was that professors were expected t o use “co mp en d ia” i n c o n nection with their courses at G e r m a n universities, and t h o u g h h e h a d by then published four remarkable volumes, t h e y cer-

tainly were not “Compendia.” A “compendium” is “an abridgement of a larger work or treatise, giving the sense and substance within smaller c o m p a s s ; a n epitome, a s u m m a r y . ” 1 Hegel’s works were at the opposite extreme. To understand his predicament, i t will b e helpful to s e e briefly what Kant had d o n e : “As a basis for his lectures he used the compendia o f Meier, B a u m g a r t e n , Achenwall, a n d Eberhard. The use of such textbooks . . . was t h e n q u i t e general at German universities, and the professors a t Konigs-

berg were even specifically admonished in this regard by an edict of the minister von Zedlitz [to whom Kant dedicated his Critique of Pure Reason i n 1 7 8 1 ] , dated October 1 6 , 1 7 7 8 :

‘The worst compendium is certainly better than none, and if t h e professors possess s o m u c h wisdom, they may criticize their author as much as they c a n ; b u t lecturing about dictata simply h a s to b e abolished.’ . . . Even i n the eighties and

nineties he [Kant] still followed his ‘author’ at least externally —to b e sure, more often t o contradict t h a n to a g r e e ” ? Immediately before his lectures, K a n t o f t e n m a d e notes i n 1 T h e Shorter Oxford English D i c t i o n a r y . 2 Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, A k a d e m i e a u s g a b e , XIV ( 1 9 1 1 ) ,

xxi.

51. The Encyclopedia of 1817

217

the compendia he used, referring to their paragraphs and problems, and then used these notes as he lectured; other notes were probably put down right after the lectures when his comments were still fresh i n his mind

(ibid.).

At Jena Hegel had kept announcing the forthcoming pub— lication of a book that he hoped to use in connection with his courses; but no such book ever appeared while he lectured at Jena, and so he had lectured about dictata. He had carried over this form of instruction into the Gymnasium at Niirnberg. On the basis of his notes, he had dictated short passages to his students and then elaborated them in his lectures; and some students had written down his elaborations and given them to him for correction. Rosenkranz discovered a bundle of these notes when he visited Hegel’s widow in Berlin. The ordering of the sheets presented a problem, and so did the many corrections and additions in the margins; but be carefully edited his material, and in 1840 it was published in volume XVIII o f the master’s collected works, under the title PhiIOSOphische

Pr0pc°ideutik: two hundred eight consecutively numbered paragraphs, not including the four-page

introduction, covering

roughly two hundred pages. One recalls Brentano’s lovely story ( H 5 0 ) and realizes that Hegel would have gone out of his mind teaching philosophy in this demented fashion, h a d h e not been able to write the

Logic on the side. O r we might say, conversely, that he worked at the Gymnasium on the side, to earn a living while he was writing his Logic. Having written four volumes that seemed t o h i m t o carry

phiIOSOphy in a really significant way beyond Kant—not to s p e a k of Meier, Achenwall, and Eberhard—Hegel, arrived at Heidelberg, d i d not feel like wasting time on the criticism o f authors of no account. U n a b l e t o put his own ideas i n t o book

form, he had begun his career at the beginning of the century by dealing polemically with Krug and Schulze; now he had n o wish t o return t o that level o r , worse yet, t o t h e compendia

that were available. So he began by once again lecturing ex dictatis; but on the side he dashed off a compendium of his o w n , w h i c h w a s published i n 1 8 1 7 . He h a d begun lecturing

late in the fall of 1816.

218

THE SYSTEM

The compendium w a s called EncykIOpiidie der phiZOSOphischen Wissenschaften im Grundrz’sse: Zum Gebrauch seiner Vorlesungen: “Encyclopedia of t h e Philosophical Sciences i n Outline Form, for Use i n Connection with his Lectures.” The

book begins: “The need to place in my students’ hands a textbook for my phiIOSOphical lectures is t h e proximate cause for

my letting this survey of the whole scope of phiIOSOphy appear sooner t h a n I should have thought of doing otherwise.”

He had been planning to write a system of philosophy even before he arrived in Jena, in January 1 8 0 1 ; the Phenomenology had been intended as the introduction, the Logic a s t h e

first part; but now nothing on that scale would do at all. What was needed in a hurry w a s a c o m p e n d i u m , a n d that is exactly what the Encyclopedia was. O n 2 8 8 uncrowded pages, it pre-

sented in 477 consecutively numbered paragraphs, first, comprising not quite half of the book, an abridgment of the Logic,

and then an abridgment of his as-yet-unwritten, or at least unpublished, philosoPhy of nature and phi1030phy of spirit. He had notes enough for those two parts, but to work them up into a book that could stand side by side with his previous volumes would have taken years. By quickly writing an immensely terse compendium, Hegel could point to a text whatever he might lecture o n , and there was never any d a n g e r that the text made the lectures dispensable. This w a s the origin o f the b o o k that contained Hegel’s famous system.

52 This b o o k exists i n four different f o r m s , i n G e r m a n . We have considered the original edition. Ten years later, in 1 8 2 7 , Hegel published a second edition. H e added a thirty-page preface, greatly expanded the introduction, let t h e Vorbegrifl grow to more than four times its original size by fi n d i n g a

place in it for his remarkable discussion of dogmatic metaphysics, empiricism a n d skepticism, Kant’s critical philosophy,

and intuitionism, rewrote and expanded the rest of the book, too, and wound u p with a work over twice the length of t h e original compendium. Still, there were more paragraphs than

5 2 . L a t e r editions a n d “additions”

219

pages, showing at a glance t h a t m o s t of the paragraphs were

less than a page in length. The compendium style was maintained, and title a n d subtitle remained u n c h a n g e d ; indeed, the purpose of the publication w a s plainly still the s a m e .

The third edition (1830) is basically very similar to the second, though there now are three prefaces, 577 paragraphs instead o f 5 7 4 , and a few m o r e pages as well. On close examination, however, o n e discovers literally thousands of changes.

Even in his approach to this most cut-and-dried of his books, Hegel until right before his death was not by any means a man who had stopped thinking and rethinking. In fact, every lecture tended to be a tortuous performance because Hegel was not content to repeat what he had written, or what he had said in previous years. The manner in which he lectured is highly relevant to the fourth and most influential I t is also relevant t o the influential edition of the Encyc10pedia. posthumous edition of the Philosophy of Right (originally

published in compendium form in 1821), and to the famous lectures on the philosophy of history, of art, of religion, and on the history of philosophy, all of which were published only after Hegel’s death.

When the Encyclopedia appeared in the collected works— a n d the same i s also true of the Philosoflzy

of Right—the

editors supplemented Hegel’s terse paragraphs with what they called, a n d clearly m a r k e d as, Zusc'z’tze ( a d d i t i o n s ) . These additions were based o n t h e i r lecture notes, or o n the notes taken by fellow students. W i t h these additions, the EncyclOpedia took up three fat volumes—over sixteen h u n d r e d pages—and what had begun a s a slim c o m p e n d i u m t o m e e t Hegel’s needs a s a lecturer h a d now grown i n t o a n imposing system.3 Even i n t h e third edition, the abridgment o f t h e Logic h a d b e e n roughly a s l o n g a s t h e original Logic down t o t h e end

of the first chapter. It was perfectly clear that anyone interested i n Hegel’s Logic h a d t o turn t o the work by that name, while t h e a b r i d g m e n t was, a s the subtitle plainly indicated,

“for use in connection with his lectures.” Now, in the posthu3 The three v o l u m e s , e a c h e d i t e d b y a different m a n , a p p e a r e d in 1 8 4 0 , 1 8 4 2 , a n d 1 8 4 5 . Bolland’s huge o n e - v o l u m e e d i t i o n ( 1 9 0 6 )

reprints this text with added footnotes of his own.

220

THE SYSTEM

mous edition, t h e a b r i d g m e n t of t h e Logic grew into a whole

big book, and it came to look as if one could take one’s pick between the earlier big Logic or the later, perhaps more definitive, “Lesser Logic.” Until 1 9 2 9 , a s mentioned above, the Logic was never rendered into English, c o m p l e t e ; b u t a v o l u m e called The Logic of Hegel (Wallace’s translation of the “Lesser L o g i c ” ) went

through two editions in the nineteenth century—and Wallace d i d not even mark t h e additions a s clearly as the G e r m a n editors h a d done. H e merely used slightly smaller p r i n t . Since Hegel himself h a d m a d e a typographical distinction between

the main portion of each section and the notes*1elaborating m a n y of these, and Wallace ignores this distinction altogether,

the additions in his text are often mistaken for part of Hegel’s text.5 Wallace further confounded confusion by not only misn a m i n g his b o o k , The Logic of Hegel, b u t b y actually m a k i n g a two-volume work of it, the first v o l u m e being taken u p b y his own Prolegomena, of w h i c h th e less said, the better.

That the additions contain some nice phrases and examples, a n d t h a t t h e y a r e often clearer t h a n t h e c r a b b e d p a r a g r a p h s they follow, t h e r e is n o denying. If t h e y h a d not b e e n published a s additions b u t rather i n a s e p a r a t e volume, u n d e r s o m e such title a s “ T h e W i t a n d W i s d o m of Hegel, in Q u o t a tions from his Lectures,” they would not be a s problematic a s t h e y a r e . W h a t is wrong w i t h a n y h e a v y reliance o n t h e m c o m e s u n d e r two headings. First, it m i g h t s e e m t h a t the students’ p r o c e d u r e w a s entirely legitimate. After all, “Hegel’s p r o c e d u r e w a s t o read the text 4T.

M . K n o x , i n h i s t r a n s l a t i o n o f Hegel’s Philosophy of R i g h t

calls them “Remarks.” He includes the additions—together, at the e n d o f the v o l u m e : a n a d m i r a b l e s o l u t i o n .

5 J. Loewenberg, in his Hegel Selections, in his own translation from w h a t h e c a l l s Hegel’s “ P h i l o s o p h y of L a w , ” r u n s Hegel’s text

and Gans’s additions into each other to form one continuous essay - a n d o c c a s i o n a l l y mistranslates. ( F o r t h e m o s t influential m i s translation, s e e W K 9 8 . ) Moreover, p a r t s o f Hegel’s s y s t e m a r e r e p r e s e n t e d b y selections from the Propr’ideutik, a n d Baillie’s vers i o n o f the preface t o the P h e n o m e n o l o g y is reprinted i n t a c t , w i t h o u t a n y attempt t o correct the m o s t o b v i o u s slips ( n e c e s s a r i l y e v e n

from Baillie’s first edition, as the revised second edition appeared only after the Hegel S e l e c t i o n s ) .

5 2 . L a t e r e d i t i o n s a n d “additions”

221

of a paragraph either entirely or one section at a time, then freely a d d i n g his c o m m e n t s . ( T h e so-called notes w h i c h form p a r t of m a n y paragraphs, usually were n o t r e a d o u t l o u d . . . ) ” 6 Yet t h e p r i n t e d additions d o n o t for t h e m o s t p a r t c o n t a i n Hegel’s c o m m e n t s o n t h e p a r a g r a p h s after which t h e y a r e printed. U n t i l 1 8 2 7 t h e lectures w e r e based o n t h e first edition of t h e Encyclopedia, a n d the editors h a d a lot of material t h a t

was based on these lectures and did not readily fit into the radically revised third edition into which they inserted the additions. From 1 8 2 7 until 1 8 3 0 t h e lectures were based o n t h e second edition. I n t h e s u m m e r of 1 8 3 0 Hegel w a s able for the first t i m e to u s e the t h i r d edition, and i n November 1831 he died. Hegel still lectured o n the first p a r t of t h e 1 8 3 0 Encyclopedia b o t h in t h e s u m m e r of 1 8 3 0 a n d again i n the s u m m e r o f

1831, and on the phil050phy of nature (the second part of the b o o k ) in t h e s u m m e r of 18307; b u t t h e mass of t h e a d d i tions, even for these t w o parts o f t h e Encyclopedia, d o e s n o t c o m e from these fi n a l lectures. I n t h e c a s e of the philosophy of n a t u r e , m o s t of the m a t e r i a l i n the additions is t a k e n from

Hegel’s Jena lectures, delivered before he had published the Phenomenology, over twenty-five years before he published the book in which these additions are embedded.8 The editors d i d n o t indicate from w h i c h year their additions c a m e , a n d i n m a n y a n addition t h e y a m a l g a m a t e d notes based o n lectures given a great m a n y years apart.9 This d o e s not r’F.

Nicolin and Otto Poggeler in their introduction to their

critical e d i t i o n o f t h e Enzyklopr’idie o f 1 8 3 0 ( 1 9 5 9 ) , xxxi. C f . t e x t

for note 4 above. 7 See Hoffmeister’s “Ubersicht iiber Hegels Berliner Vorlesungen” in his critical edition of Berliner Sclzriften: 1818-1831 (1956), 743—49. 8Ros.

193.

9 “Altogether, the editors have worked together, without making a n y distinctions, l e c t u r e s o f a l l a c a d e m i c y e a r s , a n d M i c h e l e t a c t u -

ally used for the philosophy of nature also Hegel’s Jena drafts for h i s s y s t e m — M o r e o v e r , t h e e d i t o r s p e r m i t t e d themselves the m o s t v a r i e g a t e d c h a n g e s , f o r stylistic r e a s o n s . e v e n in the printed text o f t h e Encyclopedia, e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e s e c o n d a n d t h i r d p a r t s . T h e

first section of the philosophy of spirit alone, which comprises 105

222

THE SYSTEM

merely mean that many additions do not represent any single train o f thought; it also m e a n s t h a t the editors h a d t o supply all sorts o f transitions, i n their own words, a n d that, in order to effect some unity of style, they had t o change what Hegel had said—or rather what h e h a d said according t o the lecture

notes of students.10 This brings us t o the second reason for regarding the addi-

tions with some suspicion. We have to consider Hegel’s manner of lecturing. This

is not merely of biographical interest,

or of importance only for the proper estimate of the additions; it is also crucial for any estimate of the nine volumes of his lectures on the philosophy of history, aesthetics, phi1030phy of religion, and history of philosophy.11 All of these lecture cycles have been translated into English, although many of Hegel’s own writings have not b e e n translated, and some of these lecture cycles are much better k n o w n than the Phenomenology and the Logic. The lectures o n the

philosophy of history are almost certainly Hegel’s best known “work,” i n English a s well as i n German. Before we turn t o

consider Hegel as a lecturer, it should be noted emphatically that the reservations already stated in this section apply to the lectures as well—in fact, even more s o . Here, t o o , the early editors amalgamated notes taken many years apart, a n d welded paragraphs . . . , contains over 1 5 0 such editorial changes which,

not infrequently, change the meaning of the original text.” Nicolin and Poggeler, op. cit., xlv.

10 Leopold von Henning, for example, says frankly in his editorial preface to the first volume of the Encyclopedia

known in English as The Logic of Hegel,

( t h e one

translated by Wallace):

“Whenever the . . . material was insuflicient, the editor did n o t hesitate . . . to complete from h i s own memory the explanations

that seemed necessary.” Particularly in the early parts, he admits, he did a lot of this. 11 In the original German collected works (reproduced photomechanically in Glockner’s Jubiliz'umsausgabe), these four cycles comprise, respectively, o n e , t h r e e , two, and three v o l u m e s . The English version of the Philosophy of Fine A r t s takes u p four vol—

umes; Lasson’s critical edition of the PhiIOSOphy of History, also four.

5 2 . L a t e r editions a n d “additions”

223

into a single s e q u e n c e thoughts t h a t h a d never formed any such sequence. Even more t h a n i n the c a s e of the additions, a consecutive narrative was w a n t e d , a n d therefore e v e n greater liberties

had to be taken. Lest all this sound as if the editors had been unscrupulous, it should be kept in mind that the standards of modern philology deve10ped considerably during t h e nineteenth a n d twentieth centuries. To t h e early editors it s e e m e d

important to let others share every worthy remark from the master’s lips, and if good ideas, formulations, and examples were t o be found i n every single set of lecture notes, they considered it imperative t o u s e t h e m all. They d i d n o t want a

vast historical—critical edition that might take decades to prepare and would then repose in a few large libraries to be consulted only by specialists. They wanted to m a k e everything as readable, straight through, a s possible. S o a single narrative had to be c r e a t e d i n every case, n o t volumes i n w h i c h o n e could compare h o w the lectures c h a n g e d every time Hegel

offered them. What these men fashioned was readable, and it created an image of Hegel t h a t , with slight variations, s t o o d for a century. Their editions were referred to by the readers of Kierke-

gaard’s and Marx’s polemics against Hegel; their editions were the only ones available when Hegel went into eclipse in Germany around the m i d d l e of t h e nineteenth century; a n d their

editions were used by the English translators and interpreters of Hegel, a s well a s t h e British Idealists.

In the twentieth century, Lasson began the slow work of exhuming the true Hegel by publishing critical editions; Hoffmeister took over from h i m ; and after h e , t o o , died, a number o f others continued a job t h a t , sixty years after Lasson b e g a n ,

is nowhere near completion. But unlike most other enterprises of a similar scope, this one h a s h a d the immense good fortune of having a publisher—Felix Meiner—who h a s m a d e each vol-

ume available separately, as far as possible at prices that students can afford. While some of the critical editions have by now g o n e through several revised editions, m a k i n g citations

a ticklish matter, these volumes, particularly the latest editions

224

THE SYSTEM

available, must be the basis for all responsible work on Hegel.12 The prefaces to the more recent critical editions and the

lists of variant readings at the end of some of the volumes contain many examples of the liberties the original nineteenthcentury editors took, introducing changes even into texts that

Hegel himself had published, from his early articles and the Phenomenology down to the last edition of the Encyclopedia and some of his Berliner Schriften. For intellectual history this is a point of some interest when one considers, for example,

how polemics against the editing of Nietzsche’s works have failed to distinguish between the outright forgeries his sister introduced into some of his letters (even into the manuscripts;

but generally only to publish as addressed to herself what had t o others) and the sort of thing that in fact been written Hegel’s editors did, too. While it is reasonable t o ask for philo-

logically sound editions, it is often utterly unreasonable13 to malign the motives and the good character of those who have not employed the very highest standards, which are sometimes as difficult to put into practice as they are rare. Certainly, Hegel’s lectures pose a very great problem for any editor. 12 The prices, of course, have gone up, and few students can aflord the Berliner Schriften and the invaluable four volumes of Briefe. When it comes to the books Hegel himself published, direct reference to the first editions sometimes shows things that even the critical editions d o not indicate; and the more than 3600 differences of some importance between the second edition of the Encyclopedia (1827), which has never been reprinted, and the third of 1 8 3 0 have never been listed i n print. For the figure o f 3 6 0 0 , see

Nicolin and Poggeler, op. cit., xlviii. They also point out that even Hoflmeister’s edition of 1949 was marred by approximately seventy errors that changed the meaning, including T heorie instead of Theologie a n d psychologischen instead o f physiologischen. 13 Cf. E. F. Podach, Friedrich Nietzsches Werke des Zusammenbruchs ( 1 9 6 1 ) , who i s extremely harsh on earlier editors, and my

article on “Nietzsche in the Light of His Suppressed Manuscripts” in Journal of the History of Philosophy, Oct. 1964.

5 3 . T horwaldsen and Hegel’s Berlin lectures

225

53

As a lecturer Hegel was, to begin with, wholly unprepossessing. A brief description has already been given at the beginning of section 2 4 ; but that refers t o t h e young Hegel at Jena. A long description, b y H . G . H o t h o , who also edited the three volumes of Hegel’s lectures o n aesthetics, will b e found

near the end of D : it shows how Hotho was put off at first, a n d how he then c a m e t o appreciate Hegel’s style, even t o the

point of writing about it in a rather rhapsodical vein. Hotho’s own style seems b a d l y dated, but anyone interested i n any o f Hegel’s lecture cycles ought to read his lengthy account—and then ask himself whether it is borne o u t by the n i n e volumes

that are generally accepted as the substance of Hegel’s lectures. There can be no doubt whatsoever about the answer; or about the fact that Hotho’s little-known description is essentially true t o life, while the lectures we read were never de-

livered in any such form by Hegel. Snippets of Hotho’s account have been quoted by Fischer and Glockner,14 but the

full account, to be found only in Hotho’s long-forgotten little book Vorstudien fiir L e b e n und Kunst ( 1 8 3 5 ) is practically

unknown. In h i s preface ( a l s o 1 8 3 5 ) t o Hegel’s Aesthetik, Hotho explains how he h a s tried t o turn forbidding notes i n t o a well-

written book. Lasson, in the preface to his own critical edition of the same lectures ( 1 9 3 1 ) , takes a rather different View o f

the matter. He prefers the raw materials to the “lightness, smoothness, and elegance” which Hotho missed and tried to introduce on his own. “How high-handed Hotho’s procedure was is shown by t h e mere fact that he divides the whole work

into three parts while Hegel himself in his synopsis expressly indicates a division into two parts, one general and one specific. . . . While Hegel declares in the opening words of his lectures that h e excludes the beauty of nature from h i s aesthetics, Hotho offers a n extensive c h a p t e r o n t h e b e a u t y of n a -

ture,” which he composes of relevant passages cut out of their original contexts. 14 Fischer, I , 214—16; Glockner, 1, 440—42.

226

THE SYSTEM

Of o n e of Hegel’s lecture cycles two very different editions appeared within t e n years of Hegel’s d e a t h : The Philosophy of History. I n the preface t o the second edition ( 1 8 4 0 ) , Karl H e g e l , t h e phi1050pher’s s o n , explained that Eduard G a n s , the original editor who h a d died i n 1 8 3 9 , had based his text on

the lectures given in 1830—31. This had been the last time Hegel gave the course, b u t Karl Hegel found the versions of 1822—23 and 1824—25 m u c h more to his liking because they

seemed to him to have a freshness that got lost in later years. Although his father h a d changed the course considerably every time h e gave it, Karl Hegel inserted his favorite passages from the two earlier versions in Gans’s text, here and there.

All this was in keeping with the spirit of an age in which a mediocre Danish sculptor, Bertel Thorwaldsen (1770—1844), had b e e n commissioned t o restore the magnificent archaic Greek sculptures found in A e g i n a before they w e r e placed o n exhibit i n M u n i c h : “Their restoration was somewhat drastic, the ancient parts being cu t away t o allow o f additions in

marble.”15 One did not feel that the weathered torsos were infinitely more beautiful in the state in which they were found than after their “completion.” Around 1 9 0 0 Arthur Evans still perpetrated similar horrors on the frescoes of Knossos in

Crete, commissioning a Swiss painter of less distinction than Thorwaldsen to complete t h e fragments, instead of having h i m execute Evans’ ideas on a m u s e u m wall. I n the case of Hegel,

it might be supposed that the editors, unlike Thorwaldsen and Evans, d i d n o irreparable d a m a g e ; but a great many manuscripts they used are no longer extant. Before w e take leave of K a r l Hegel, however, w e should

quote him on one point on which he clearly gives expression to his father’s spirit: “For those who identify the rigor of thought with a formal schematism and even turn this polemically against another m o d e of d o i n g philosophy, it m a y still b e remarked that Hegel c l u n g s o little t o the subdivisions h e had o n c e m a d e that h e c h a n g e d them every time h e gave a

course. . . . The sureness of thought and the certainty of truth c a n b e liberal i n such matters, a s is life itself; and the formal 15Encyclopaedia Britannica, llth ed., I, 252, under “Aegina.” The a r t i c l e o n Thorwaldsen, XXVI, 8 8 2 , i s also relevant.

5 3 . T lzorwaldsen and H egel’s Berlin lectures

227

understanding that takes offense at this only shows that it still lacks any essential grasp of the philosophic idea and of life” ( 1 9 ) . 1 These words are well taken as a prophetic warning against the charts in some books on Hegel that present his subdivisions as the core of his dialectical phiIOSOphy. And while no art historian of repute would base his discussion of archaic Greek sculpture o n Thorwaldsen’s additions, philosophers of repute d o n o t hesitate to b a s e dicta a b o u t H eg el o n his editors’ additions, o n their reconstructions of h i s lectures, and o n their tables of contents a n d arrangements. To return t o Hegel’s style a s a lecturer, this was explained by Rosenkranz ( 1 6 f . ) substantially a s Hotho h ad explained it nine years earlier, b u t Rosenkranz stated the m a i n point

briefly: “ F o r those who c a n m a s t e r the external presentation because they are finished with t h e subject, there i s n o inhibition between the inward and its expression. Their feeling, imagina-

tion, and thought are simultaneously communicated in their s p e e c h . For H e g e l , even if h e h a d p u t the speech o n paper

beforehand, there always remained a residue in this process. H e always produced the content a n e w a n d therefore could

always be only relatively finished, even for the moment. This struggle with the presentation to find the definitive, penetrati n g expression t h a t would leave n o t h i n g b e h i n d ; this incessant s e a r c h ; this w e a l t h of possibilities m a d e more difficult for him a s t h e years passed—the richer his e d u c a t i o n became, t h e more many-sided his t h o u g h t , and t h e greater his position—not only s p e a k i n g i n general b u t a l s o writing; a n d o n e c a n n o t fi n d anyt h i n g more hacked t o pieces, more crossed o u t , m o r e constantly rewritten t h a n one o f Hegel’s drafts for a letter from

the Berlin period.” L e c t u r i n g w a s n o t Hegel’s forte. H e obviously found i t a harrowing experience, a n d so d i d his listeners. A t Heidelberg h e never became a major attraction. He had arrived there a h e a d o f his family, and on O c t o b e r 2 9 , 1 8 1 6 , wrote his w i f e :

“Yesterday I began my lectures, but the number of the s t u d e n t s is n o t a s splendid a s represented a n d pretended. l was,

if not perplexed and impatient, surprised not to find things as

228

THE SYSTEM

I h a d been led t o expect. For o n e course I h a d only 4 listeners. But Paulus consoled m e that h e , too, h a d lectured for a mere 4 or 5 . . . . The first semester when o n e first comes here one has t o b e satisfied t o h a v e a c h a n c e t o get oneself across. The

students must first warm up to one. . . . ” Before h e left Heidelberg, h e had over twenty in o n e course, over thirty in a n o t h e r . But t h e audience for his eloquent first lecture a t Heidelberg, October 2 8 , 1816—introducing his

course on the history of philosophy, from which we shall quote when we reach that part of his systemlG—evidently comprised about ten listeners, if that m a n y . For t h e initial i m p a c t of his lectures at Berlin we c a n again cite Rosenkranz ( 3 2 0 ) : “ B u t a s great a s t h e expectations of Solger, t h e ministry, and m a n y people i n Berlin h a d b e e n concerning Hegel’s effectiveness, his a p p e a r a n c e h e r e , t o o , w a s soundless, without

pomp and ado, and it was only gradually that he penetrated to t h e point of irresistibility. O n November 2 2 , 1 8 1 8 , Solger wrote T i e c k : ‘I w a s curious w h a t kind of an impression the

good Hegel would make here. Nobody speaks of him, for he is quiet and industrious. If the most stupid imitator had come here—the k i n d t h e y would love t o have here—they would make a terrific noise a n d t h e students would b e sent i n t o his courses for t h e salvation of their souls.’ ” The m a i n two reasons for Hegel’s eventual success a s a lecturer, t o t h e point where h e often, though b y n o m e a n s always, h a d over a h u n d r e d students i n a course and once, just once, t w o hundred—when h e lectured “ O n the Proofs o f

God’s Existence” in the summer of 1829—are perfectly plain. First, word got around by and by that he was Germany’s greatest living phiIOSOpher. Secondly, those who stuck with h i m b e c a m e convinced t h a t h e w a s p r o f o u n d . 1“

E G P 1—17. This lecture was written out by Hegel in advance

and c o u l d be p u b l i s h e d o n the b a s i s o f his o w n manuscript. Quota-

tion in H 67.

5 4 . The e n c o u n t e r with SchOpenhauer

229

54 To begin with the first point, this was surely true. No German philosopher since Kant, with the exception of Nietzsche, who had not b e e n born at that time, is in t h e s a m e class. Schelling w a s still living, but h a d l o n g disappeared from public view and had ceased t o contribute t o t h e deve10pment of philosophy, and Schopenhauer d i d n o t become f a m o u s until

the middle of the century. Schopenhauer’s magnum Opus, the original one-volume edition o f The World as Will and Representation, h a d fallen

stillborn from the press in 1819, without attracting any atten— tion. On the last day of that year he applied to the philosophical faculty a t Berlin and asked to be included i n the next catalogue (Vorlesungsverzeichnis), with a course o f six lec-

ture hours weekly on “the whole of philosophy”—and that before he had fulfilled the usual requirements for habilitation. He left it to the faculty to fix the time, but added: “the most suitable time is presumably whenever Herr Prof. Hegel gives his biggest course [sein Hauptcollegium].” The dean, while specifically commenting on SchOpenhauer’s “no mean presumption and extraordinary vanity” favored approval of the request, provided the requirements were fulfilled before h e actually began to lecture. Hegel went along with this; other professors did not. One protested against inclusion of the announcement i n the catalogue before the requirements

were fulfilled, while another wrote: “ I confess that the exceptionally great arrogance o f Herm S . does not incline m e very much to declare myself i n favor o f any special exceptions o n

his behalf by action of the faculty”—and several others subscribed to that. Nevertheless, the government representative looked favorably on Schopenhauer’s request, the dean so informed SchOpenhauer, and the young m a n c a m e to Berlin to confer with Hegel o n the title of h is test lecture (Probevorlesung).

March 18, 1820, he wrote the dean that he had asked Hegel the day before for permission to lecture on a subject he himself had chosen, namely o n four kinds of causes. “Herr Prof.

230

THE SYSTEM

Hegel very graciously granted his approval with t h e greatest readiness. . . . ” It is indeed “unmistakable t h a t Hegel placed n o obstacles of any k i n d in Schopenhauer’s w a y , ” a s Hoffmeister p u t s it.17 H e also says: “ I n t h e w h o l e d e c a d e from 1 8 2 0 t o 1 8 3 1 we d o n o t fi n d anything m o r e miserable regarding the lecturing b y

Privatdozenten of phi1050phy than the total failure of SchOpenh a u e r . ” H e never completed a course. After his initial ap-

proach, he was absent from Berlin for many years, then in t h e spring of 1 8 2 6 asked permission t o l e c t u r e again. H e again chose t h e t i m e w h e n Hegel lectured, b u t n o t a single student showed u p t o h e a r him. T h e next semester h e d i d not lecture b e c a u s e only o n e student c a m e ; after t h a t , because only three

appeared; after that, because only two came. The next three times—the topic always being th e same “ F o u n d a t i o n s of PhiIOSOphy, comprehending Dianoology a n d Logic”—nobody c a m e ; in t h e s u m m e r of 1 8 3 0 , three students; t h e following winter again n o b o d y ; a n d t h e n SchOpenhauer left again. L a t e r

he published a famous diatribe against “University Philosop h y , ” a n d again a n d again poured o u t venom against Hegel i n bitter polemics. Ritter, o n e of Schleiermacher’s disciples, offered a course

o n ancient philosophy at the same hour at which Hegel lectured on phiIOSOphy of nature, in the summer of 1828, and Ritter h a d eighty-four students, while Hegel h a d sixty-eight.

Other Privatdozenten, whether followers or opponents of Hegel, generally were content t o start with a few students and

after a while averaged between fifteen and thirty. Hegel himself, a s w e have seen, o n c e started with four. Although Scho-

penhauer liked to denounce him as a windbag, it seems clear that Hegel’s more serious students soon gained th e impression t h a t while h e lacked verbal facility, flamboyance, a n d show-

manship—qualities that were not lacking in Schopenhauer’s m a n n e r a t t h a t time—he w a s truly profound and amp ly repaid

the effort it took to follow him. 17 Berliner Schriften, 589. The account in the text is indebted t o the section o n Schopenhauer, 5 8 7 - 9 2 , which i s based o n the d o c u ments.

5 5 . Schleiermacher; Hegel’s disciples

231

55 O f course, t h e m a j o r i t y o f those who c a m e t o listen t o H e g e l

were not really serious about philosophy. As time went on, it b e c a m e fashionable t o h e a r h i m . Writing in 1 8 4 4 , R o s e n k r a n z gave a n interesting a c c o u n t of this p h e n o m e n o n . T h i s passage

also furnishes a n example, in the last sentence, of a n objectionable use of the word “necessity.” Hegel often misused the word i n t h e s a m e w a y ; b u t this solecism, though b y n o m e a n s innocuous philosophically, is really a c o m m o n p l a c e in G e r m a n scholarly prose d o w n t o o u r t i m e . “Hegel’s m a i n effect o n Berlin, phiIOSOphically, w a s that h e really t o o k t h e pe0ple t o school an d with naive rigidity taught

them his system. The previously described character of Berlin favored this discipline [Zucht], as Hegel himself liked to call it, to an extraordinary degree, since the Berliners have an immense potential a n d h u n g e r for education b u t a r e a s yet n o t

very creative on their own. Thus they practically ask to be d o m i n a t e d a n d tolerate it gladly if only one does it w i t h esprit [geistreich] a n d knows h o w to give them n o u r i s h m e n t . Thus

it was a great good fortune for the cheerful city that the Schleiermacher element with its versatile mobility was opposed by the Hegel element with its solid, neatly inclusive systema t i c approach a n d its insistence o n method. B u t for Hegel and

his school, too, it was a great favor of fortune that Schleiermacher’s erudition, spirit, wit, renown, and p0pular strength

did not allow it to shoot up too rapidly and continually created p r o b l e m s for it. O r rather, what we call good fortune was,

viewed from a higher vantage point, the necessity [l] of the German spirit to place the classical representative of northeastern education in an immediate relationship with that of the southwest in order to introduce in this way a more profound a n d all-sided reconciliation o f the G e r m a n spirit with itself” ( 3 2 7 ) .

No love was lost between Hegel and Schleiermacher. I n his e a r l y article on “ F a i t h a n d K n o w l e d g e ” ( 1 8 0 2 ) , Hegel h a d called the author of Reden iiber die Religion ( 1 7 9 9 ) , without m e n t i o n i n g h i s n a m e , a “virtuoso o f edification and

232

T H E SYSTEM

e n t h u s i a s m . ” Now they were colleagues in Berlin. The only two letters they ever exchanged d a t e from November 1 8 1 9 a n d are translated i n D . Schleiermacher h a d a great r e p u t a t i o n a t t h a t time, but today is largely forgotten, except by theologians. Others remember h i m m a i n l y for saying t h a t “ T h e essence of religion consists i n the feeling of a n absolute d e p e n d e n c e . ” Hegel’s comment deserves to b e remembered t o o :

“Then the dog would be the best Christian.” A Privatdozent at Berlin, von Keyserlingk, “wrote a philosoPhy of religion in 1 8 2 4 a n d gave lectures o n it, expressly against this remark, w h i c h Schleiermacher’s friends a n d disciples . . . never for-

gave Hegel.”18 And what w e r e Hegel’s o w n disciples like? Rosenkranz distinguished “three g r o u p s : the level-headed, t h e effusive, a n d t h e empty. “The first comprised t h e q u i e t b u t profound m i n d s who absorbed the new phi1050phy w i t h lasting seriousness a n d t h e n proceeded from it gradually, without any noise, t o cultivate

particular fields of scholarship. “The second group, the effusive ones, were less scientific and more poetic. Hegel’s conception of world history, his phi1030phy of art, t h e peculiarly poetic expressions that frequently break through his dialectic . . . all this delighted t h e m .

Their imagination received new materials from him. . . . As t i m e went o n , such encomia b e c a m e s o h e a t e d a n d intense

that Hegel was venerated, not indistinctly, as a phiIOSOphical savior o f the w o r l d .

“The majority of the disciples, of course, was constituted by t h e group of t h e e m p t y w h o were especially fi t t o t e a c h

again quickly what they had learned fast . . . ” (382). 18 Ros. 346. The relationship of Hegel and Schleiermacher is discussed 325 f.; cf. also D 1819 and the Appendix to Fischer, 2d ed., 1216—18 (1216—23 deal with “Hegel’s position in the scholarly world in Berlin”). Hegel’s remark is found in his preface to Hinrichs’s Die Religion . . . ( 1 8 2 2 ) , Berliner Schriften ( 1 9 5 6 ) , 7 4 : “If a m a n ’ s r e l i g i o n were founded merely o n a feeling, t h i s would indeed have n o furt h e r determination beyond b e i n g the feeling of his dependence,

and then the dog would be the best Christian, for he has this feeling most intensely and lives most in it.”

5 5 . Schleiermacher; Hegel’s

disciples

233

Rosenkranz also thought that Hegel himself “gradually got used to the notion that for speculative education salvation

could indeed be found only within his phi1030phy” (381). Perhaps there was what Hegel liked to call a Wechselwirkung: their faith kindled his, and t h e n his strengthened theirs.

Hegel had arrived; he was successful at long last; he was more famous than any other philoSOpher had been in Hegel’s lifetime, save only Kant. I n the preface to the Phenomenology he had argued that the time had come for what he proposed to do; and near the end he had stated his conviction “that it is of the nature of truth to prevail when its time has come.” Now t h a t h i s own philosophy, ignored an d neglected at first,

had prevailed against all odds, and he certainly could not charge its success to his literary brilliance or his fiery lectures, he must have considered this a most significant corroboration of its truth. For all that, he retained a sense of perspective and distinguished between what was significant and presumably superior to the ideas of other contemporary philosophers, and details that were, no doubt, faulty. It was in that spirit, for e x a m p l e , that he kept revising h i s EnccOpedia

until a year

before his death. And his modesty about details is probably best illustrated by his letter to Daub, a colleague at Heidelberg who had offered his help in connection with the second edition of the EncyCZOpedia. Since the publisher w a s i n Heidelberg,

Hegel wrote Daub from Berlin, August 15, 1826: “ F i n a l l y , most revered friend, I a m able t o begin today o r tomorrow w i t h the mailing of the manuscript of the second edition of m y Encyclopedia. I inform you of this, grateful for

your gracious offer to take over in friendship the correction of the proofs. As much as I am obligated to you for this, I also have a bad conscience in view of the condition of the manuscript: I may have relied too much on you; for it is really such that it demands a n attentive printer; so you may have m o r e trouble than I c o u l d decently expect you to go t o . B u t I d i d try t o mark the changes, insertions, etc., very carefully a n d definitely. M o r e o v e r , I give you c o m p l e t e freedom

wherever you encounter obscurity, incomprehensibility, also

234

THE SYSTEM

repetitions, to correct, delete, and improve entirely as you see fit. . . . ” Some of his disciples, of course, would never have dreamed of speaking of “obscurity, incomprehensibility,” o r even o f

lesser faults. But such are disciples in all ages: “What he said and how he did it was considered definitive by many and unqualifiedly worthy of applause and imitation. Even those were

not lacking who

sought

to copy

his gestures and

speech.”19

56

Let us now consider the system. Hegel had decided long ago that it was to have three parts: Logic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit. Now it was obviously not the examination of the categories in the Logic that gradually led him to the point where it became plain that, once you entrust yourself to the inexorable dialectic, you are driven all the way from being to the absolute idea, which then irresistibly re-

leases itself into nature, so that the phiIOSOphy of nature has to come next. Nor was it through years of study of the philosophy of nature that Hegel eventually c a m e to see how the

animal organism gives birth to its antithesis, the spirit, so that philosophy of the spirit must c o m e third. Something like this fantastic construction is presupposed i n many a discussion of

Hegel. But what happened is obviously quite different. Philosophy existed a n d even flourished before Hegel took it u p. B y the time h e decided to contribute t o it, several distinct

branches of philosophy were well established. There was, for example, metaphysics, discussed by Kant in his Transcendental Logic,

in the first Critique. There was moral a nd po-

litical phi1030phy, and recently some remarkable essays had been written o n history; especially by Kant and Lessing, Herder and Schiller. Kant had also written on aesthetics; so had others. Kant and Fichte had written o n religion, and Hegel himself was particularly interested in that. And then 19 R08. 357.

5 6 . T h e system—wit h a diagram

235

there was the philos0phy of nature, cultivated especially by Schelling and, a little later, by his followers, too. There might b e yet other fields: anthropology, “on which Kant had pub-

lished a book; psychology; perhaps also the history of philosophy, which certainly merited serious study. The question confronting a man who thought that the time had come for philosophy to become systematic, and who wanted to construct a system, was how to order these various fields of inquiry. The point was plainly that as long as one pursues now one problem, and then another—as l o n g , i n short,

as one philosophizes haphazardly—one is not likely to reap one’s full benefits. By bringing to bear the results of one inquiry upon another, and b y checking each against each, one

was ever so much more likely to reach the truth. Indeed, if one were to hit the truth in any other fashion, it would be scarcely more than an accident. The only scientific procedure was to be systematic and to cover the whole field, branch by branch. (There i s no need h e r e to go into further detail about that because Hegel discusses the matter at length i n his preface t o the P h e n o m e n o l o g y . ) 2 0 The word “system” w a s , o n e might say, in the air. Fichte had called his ethic System der Sittenlehre ( 1 7 9 8 ) . Schelling

had published his System des transcendentalen Idealismus two years later. Hegel might have said of either, as he did so many times in his critique of Kant’s ethic in the Phenomenology, in another context: “but he is not really serious about it.” They had spoken of “system” without making a really rigorous and comprehensive attempt to construct a system in such a way that it would be clear where anything they had written had its place in the system. This, then, was what Hegel resolved to d o ; this was his aim

when h e came to Jena; this was the enterprise to which the 20 For a comparison of Hegel’s view with Nietzsche’s (“the will to a system is a lack of integrity” and is “in a philosopher, morally speaking, a subtle corruption, a disease of the character; amorally speaking, his will to appear more stupid than he i s ” ) see my Nietzsche ( 1 9 5 0 ) , 58—73; M e r i d i a n e d . , 65—80. There I have also

gone into the merits of both positions.

236

THE SYSTEM

Phenomenology w a s intended as a n introduction. H i s reasons

for making his Logic the first part of the system have been considered i n t h e previous c h a p t e r ( H 4 2 ) : t h e categories, which are basic t o all discourse, are t o b e e x a m i n e d first. Once o n e considers “philosophy of spirit” a s o n e m a j o r p a r t

of the whole, it is clear that most of the rest of philosophy can b e fitted i n t o t h a t : certainly, moral a n d political philosophy a s well a s philosophy of history; also aesthetics, philosophy

of religion, the history of phi1030phy, and indeed even anthrop o l o g y a n d psychology. What, t h e n , remains? The philosophy of n a t u r e . This w o u l d b e the p r o p e r p l a c e for discussing s p a c e a n d time a n d saying something ab o u t inorganic a n d o r g a n i c nature. The decision w a s never seriously i n d o u b t : this would,

of course, come before the philosophy of spirit; the philos0phy o f nature would e n d with s o m e r e m a r k s about animals, and t h e phiIOSOphy of t h e ( h u m a n ) spirit would c o m e a f t e r t h a t . The system, however, w a s n o t conceived a s a l a d d e r but a s a circle, a n d charts t h a t mechanically c o p y t h e table of contents are therefore misleading. The following figure shows what Hegel m e a n t : A

Art

Sittlic hkeit

ABSOLUTE

OBJECTIVE

Religion

Moralita'x SPIRIT

SPIRIT

PhiIOSOphy

Law OF

PHILOSOPHY

SPIRIT

Psychology L O G I C

SUBJECTIVE

Phenome nology SPIRIT

Anthropology PHILOSOPHY

OF

NATURE

5 7 . N a t u r e a n d subjective spirit

237

Although many interpreters have simply ignored this, Hegel insisted repeatedly that the spirit is “the circle that returns into itself, that presupposes its beginning/and reaches it only i n the end,” as he put it near the end of the Phenomenology?1 In t h e preliminary essay i n t h e Logic, “ W i t h w h a t must the beginning of science b e made?” Hegel said: “What is essential

for science is not so much that something purely immediate should constitute the beginning but rather that the whole of it i s a circle i n which the first also becomes th e last, and the last

also the first. . . . The line of scientific progress thus becomes a circle??? And two pages before the end of the Logic we are r e m i n d e d again that science is a circle, indeed “ a circle

of circles.”23 Our diagram is obviously greatly oversimplified. The subdivisions of the Logic and the philosophy of nature have been omitted altogether to avoid confusion. Those of the Logic have in any case been presented in the last chapter. As a result, the philosophy of spirit occupies much more than one third of the whole system—which is as it should be. Proportionately, subjective spirit looms far too large i n our diagram; absolute spirit n o t nearly large enough.

57 Discussing t h e system i n detail, we can skip the Logic,

which was considered at length in the last chapter. Hegel’s philos0phy of nature is u n q u e s t i o n a b l y much less interesting

and important than either the Logic or his philosophy of spirit, and few interpreters have had much to say in its favor. Findlay is very much an exception when he speaks of Hegel’s “brilliant a n d informed Philosophy of Nature” ( 7 5 ) . Undoubtedly, Hegel w a s very well informed for a philosopher i n the early nineteenth century, but Findlay does nothing to show 91 Lasson’s e d i t i o n , 5 1 6 ; Baillie’s, 8 0 1 : about half a dozen pages from t h e e n d . 321841, 6 1 ; Glockner, IV, 7 5 . 23 M'Liller, 2 9 6 , presents a d i a g r a m of the system a s a circle o f

circles; but this is, not surprisingly, confusing and not very helpful.

238

THE

SYSTEM

that this small section of the Encyclopedia—and this is all his philos0phy of nature comes to—repays close study today. H e r e is the basic structure:

I. M e c h a n i c s A . Space and time B . Matter a n d motion C . Absolute mechanics

II. Physics A . The physics of general individuality B . The physics of particular individuality C . The physics of total individuality

III. Organics A. Geological nature B . Vegetable nature C . The animal organism

The discussion of space and time—especially that of time— is obviously of considerable philosophic interest; much of the rest is n o t . In t h e first edition, incidentally, t h e first two pa rts of the philos0phy of nature were somewhat different, a s follows:

I. M a t h e m a t i c s ( n o t subdivided further)

II. Physics of the Inorganic A . Mechanics ( n o t subdivided)

B. Elementary physics a. Elementary bodies b. Elements c . Elementary process

C. Individual physics a . Form (Gestalt)

b. Particularization of bodies c . Process of isolation ( V e r e i n z e l u n g )

In the second edition this disposition was replaced by the arrangement that was then kept i n the third edition. Plainly, n o

5 7 . Nature a n d subjective spirit

239

“necessary” progression from stage to stage is suggested—at least not i n any ordinary sense of “necessary.” What is wanted is a sensible arrangement of the topics that Hegel, living i n a particular period of history, considered it “necessary” to

cover. Exactly the same consideration applies to the realm of subjective spirit. Hegel may well have begun with the triad of art, religion, and phiIOSOphy, which somehow belonged together and deserved, if anything did, to be called absolute spirit. The realm of morals a n d ethics seemed to h i m to form a

comparable unit with political philosophy and law; and this sphere belonged “before” absolute spirit as the social basis and context that made possible the deve10pment of absolute Spirit. A third realm w a s n e e d e d t o round out the philosophy of spirit. What might belong i n that?

Anthropology, o n which Kant had published a book i n 1798 ( s e c o n d , revised edition i n 1 8 0 0 ) , had been left out so far and

might well be placed between the philosoPhy of nature and the higher regions of the philosophy of spirit; and psychology suggested itself readily enough for a place i n this same realm, which Hegel decided to call subjective spirit, to distinguish it from spirit objectified in human institutions which he called objective spirit. ( I n the Logic, Subjective Logic had come after Objective Logic; but here subjective spirit comes before objective spirit.) One embarrassment remained: subjective spirit still had only two subdivisions, anthrOpology and psychology. Where could a third science be found? Perhaps more obviously here than anywhere else, Hegel resorted to an ad h o c solution: phenomenology. This would have been a good solution if what he himself h a d d o n e i n his Phenomenology of the Spirit could

really have found a fitting place at this point; but it certainly could not. The Phenomenology h a d b e e n conceived as an introduction to the system t h a t w a s even then t o consist of Logic, philoso-

phy of nature, and philosophy of spirit. It was meant to be a ladder from sense-certainty to the phiIOSOphical point of view of the system. This introduction could not be plausibly placed between anthrOpology and psychology, as an intermediate

240

THE SYSTEM

sphere of subjective spirit. The a d d e d fact that t h e Phenomenology h a d absorbed, i n th e process of writing, ever so m u c h

that had originally been intended for the philos0phy of objective spirit a n d the philosophy o f absolute spirit, to employ Hegel’s later terminology, need not b e considered c r u c i a l : Hegel could now say that his b o o k , The Phenomenology of the Spirit, had actually contained more t h a n phenomenology

in the stricter sense. In fact, he did say something like this in the second and third editions of the Encyc10pedia ( § 2 5 ) — b u t not i n c onne c -

tion with his inclusion of phenomenology in the realm of subjective Spirit; rather i n embarrassment over the fact t h a t in

§§26—78 he proposed once again to consider a variety of philosophical attitudes. His words deserve t o b e quoted here

because, so far from allaying the difficulty about the subsequent inclusion of phenomenology where it plainly does not belong, they really underline this difliculty: “ I n my Phenomenology of t h e Spirit, w h ich w a s therefore designated o n publication a s the first part of the System o f

Science, I took the way of beginning with the first and simplest appearance of the spirit, the immediate consciousness, developing its dialectic up to the standpoint of philosophical science, whose necessity is demonstrated by this progression. But to this end one could not stop with the formal aspect of mere consciousness; for the s t a n d p o i n t of phiIOSOphical knowle d g e is a t the s a m e time the m o s t contentful an d c onc re te .

Thus emerging as a result, it also presupposed the concrete forms of consciousness, such as, e.g., morals, Sittlichkeit, art,

religion. The development of the contents, of the objects of characteristic parts of phiIOSOphical science, therefore falls at the same time within this development of consciousness, which at first seems to be limited merely to the form. . . . The presentation thus becomes more complicated, and what belongs t o the concrete parts i s partly already included i n this

introduction.” The dozen pages that are devoted to “phenomenology” in the Encyclopedia are certainly not an acceptable compendium of The Phenomenology of t h e Spirit, w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d s rather to the Encyclopedia as a w h o l e : i t represents a first, not al-

5 7 . Nature a n d subjective spirit

241

together premeditated, a t t e m p t t o organize t h e w h o l e material i n a s o m e w h a t different w a y . A n d t h e Encyclopedia §§26—78

correspond to some extent t o the preface to the Phenomenology. This part of t h e preliminaries of t h e b o o k has already b e e n referred t o a b o v e ( H 19 a n d 4 2 ) . O n e consideration m a y s e e m to invalidate part of w h a t h a s b e e n said h e r e : t h e c o n t e n t of subjective spirit differs from

edition to edition, especially from the first to the second. This is its breakdown i n 1 8 1 7 : A . The soul a . Natural d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e soul

b . Opposition of the soul to its substantiality c . A c t u a l i t y of t h e soul B . Consciousness a . Consciousness as s u c h b . Self-consciousness c . Reason C . Spirit

a. Theoretical spirit 1. Feeling 2. Notion b . Practical spirit 1 . Practical feeling

3 . Thinking24

2 . Drive a n d inclination

3 . Happiness A t first glance it m i g h t s e e m as if i n 1 8 1 7 Hegel had n o t yet t h o u g h t i n terms of a n t h r o p o l o g y , p h e n o m e n o l o g y , and psyc h o l o g y . B u t i n fact h e said e v e n t h e n i n t h e first paragraph

of the section o n subjective spirit ( § 3 0 7 ) : “Thus subjective spirit is ( a ) i m m e d i a t e , t h e spirit of nature—the subject of w h a t is usually called anthropology,25 o r t h e soul; ( b ) spirit as t h e identical reflection i n itself a n d i n o t h e r things, relation o r particularization—consciousness, the subject of the phe24 These s u b d i v i s i o n s w i t h A r a b i c n u m b e r s d o n o t r e a p p e a r in t h e t e x t , a n d i n the t a b l e of c o n t e n t s the “ 3 ” h a s dropped o u t before Den/(en.

25 Misprinted in the lst e d . as “Athropologie.” Hegel’s very profuse italics in this paragraph have been ignored here.

242

THE SYSTEM

nomenology of the spirit; ( c ) spirit being for itself o r spirit as subject—the subject of w h a t is generally called psychology.” I n the second edition, we find this b r e a k d o w n :

A . Anthropology a . Natural soul b . D r e a m i n g soul 0 . Actual soul B . Phenomenology a . Consciousness a s such b . Self-consciousness c . Reason

C. Psychology 3 . Theoretical spirit

b. Practical spirit a . Practical feeling will a n d happiness

'8.

Drives

y. Arbitrary

The third edition is close to the s e c o n d ; yet the disposition

is not the same: A . Anthropology a . Natural s o u l

b . Feeling soul

0. A c t u a l soul

B. Phenomenology of the Spirit a . Consciousness C . Psychology

3. Theoretical spirit

b . Self-consciousness

b. Practical spirit

c. Reason

c. Free

spirit

The departures from t h e previous edition, published o n l y three years before, have b e e n e m p h a s i z e d h e r e ; of course, they were not italicized i n 1 8 3 0 . It will also b e n o ted t h a t t h e further

breakdown of “practical spirit” was omitted. Above all, psychology was saved from h a v i n g only two s u b h e a d i n g s : a third

was found, barely in time, only a year before Hegel’s death. It would b e silly t o regard all these changes as evidence o f

continuing great phi1050phical discoveries, as if new necessities had kept swimming into View. It is almost equally misleading t o present the 1830 version a s “The Philosophy of Hegel,” a s S t a c e does, and t o give the impression t h a t it i s all based o n dialectical deduction. Findlay even informs his readers that t h e Encyc10pedia was published i n 1816 (false i n any

5 8 . Objective a n d absolute spirit

243

c a s e ) and never takes any notice of t h e fact that there are

three different editions published b y Hegel himself.26 The central point of our philological excursus is, of course, to show how Hegel himself handled his system: not as so m u c h necessary truth, deduced o n c e and for all i n its inexora-

ble sequence, but rather as a very neat and sensible way of arranging the parts of philosophy—not even the neatest and most sensible possible, but only the best he could do in time t o m e e t the printer’s deadline. There w a s always every pres u m p t i o n t h a t t h e new edition would feature some improve-

ments.

58

Apart from the Logic, only the philosophy of objective spirit and the phi1030phy of absolute spirit were of surpassing interest t o Hegel. To the former he devoted a whole b o o k , The PhilOSOp/Iy of Right ( 1 8 2 1 ) ; to the latter, three cycles of lec-

tures which occupy eight volumes in the posthumous edition of the works.

Hegel’s treatment of objective spirit i n the two later editions of t h e Encyclopedia is i n fact a n abridgment of The Philosop h y of Right. The three m a i n divisions are the same i n the

first edition; only the breakdown of Sittlichkeit is different. In 1817 the triadic subdivision of that is still quite forced, though it looks neat enough i n the table of contents where we read: 1 . T h e individual nation ( V o l k ) ; 2 . international law (Aeusseres Staatsrecht); and 3 . general world history.

Once again, these headings are not found i n the text but only in the table of contents, and they palpably represent afterthoughts. They are followed by page numbers, and it turns out that the first five pages of the section on Sittlichkeit (§§430—41) precede subheading # 1 which covers a single paragraph of less than eight lines (§442). Subheading #2 covers less t h a n a page a n d a half (§§443—47), and #3 just a b o u t a page and a half (§§448—52). In other words, 2‘3

Findlay is i n error about the publication dates of three of Hegel’s four books.

244

THE

SYSTEM

the neat triadic breakdown applies to a little less than the second half of this section. In the second and the third editions something went wrong

in the numbering of the subdivisions of objective spirit, both in the table of contents and i n the text. In both 1 8 2 7 and 1 8 3 0 , “A. Das Recht” (either Right or Law in this context) is divided into ( a ) pr0perty, ( b ) contract, and ( c ) right a s such

against wrong. The subdivisions of “B. Moralitc'it” are also the same in both editions, but in 1827 they begin inconsistently with Greek alpha, beta, and gamma: ( a ) purpose, ( b ) intention and welfare, ( c ) good and evil.

In “C. Sittlichkeit” something went wrong in both editions. The initial subdivision is again the same in both, but in 1830 the headings are introduced inconsistently with AA., BB., and CC., instead of a . , b . , and c . There are no further subparts in 1 8 3 0 . In 1 8 2 7 there were, and under ( b ) they are introduced with a.a., b.b., and c.c.; but under ( c ) with Greek alpha, beta,

and gamma. It seems highly probable that even in the arrangement of objective spirit, on which Hegel had by then published an important book, he kept changing his mind about the disposition and in the process made so many alterations that he himself lost track. Anyway,

the edition of 1 8 2 7 follows The PhiIOSOphy of

Right in subdividing Sittlichkeit as follows:

a. Family b . Civic society a . a . The system of needs b . b . The administration of law

c.c. Police and corporation c . State 0:. Internal law

,8. International law y. World history In both of the last two editions of the Encyc10pedia,

the

philosophy of history is assigned a niche at the end of objective spirit. By no stretch of the imagination is it, however often this has been asserted, “the culmination of the Hegelian sys-

5 8 . Objective a n d absolute spirit

245

tem.”27 It is more nearly a stepchild, being the only major area to which Hegel devoted a cycle of lectures that was not

accorded a chapter in the system, and that did not even appear i n the table of contents of the last edition of the Encyclopedia. This does n o t mean that between 1 8 2 7 and 1830 Hegel had come t o consider the philosophy of history less important

or interesting; he merely tried to simplify the Contents by omitting almost all subheadings below a , b , and c, the sole exception being m a d e in favor of “identity,” “diflerence,” and

“ground” in the Logic. In fact, in 1827 world history rated less than eight pages; in 1830, almost twenty. The final paragraph alone (§552) grew from less than two pages to over twelve. But what we get is n o t a n abridgment of Hegel’s lec-

tures on the philosophy of history, but a lengthy excursus on “ t h e relation of state and religion.”

One reason for this curious state of affairs was probably that Hegel had already abridged his philosophy of history in the concluding paragraphs ( § § 3 4 1 - 6 0 ) of his Philosophy of Right. In any case, h e consistently included it i n the realm of objective spirit, below art, religion, and philosophy, which

comprise absolute spirit. The “history” of his philosophy of history was the history of states, what we might call political

history; therefore he always subsumed it under “The State,” at the end of objective spirit. A little philological work has shown us the pointlessness of the persistent preoccupation of some scholars with

Hegel’s

more difficult “transitions” from one “stage” to the next. But at the point we have now reached the transition is by all means significant. And it is not at all diflicult to grasp. History is not the culmination of Hegel’s system; neither is 27 For example, Robert S . Hartman, in his edition of Reason in History, (1953, p. xxiii). This is a n unreliable translation, not of Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, as edited by either Lasson or Hoffmeister, but rather of the second nineteenth—century edition, w h i c h was superseded b y Die Vernunft

in der Geschichte.

Into

this old version the editor has fitted excerpts from Lasson’s text— not in the places where Lasson who knew Hegel from beginning t o e n d , p u t them,_ b u t i n places the e d i t o r considered

suitable,

though his translation and long introduction show that for all his virtues he is certainly not a Hegel scholar.

246

THE SYSTEM

the state. Hegel’s relatively high estimate of the state depends on his belief that the development of art, religion, and philosophy, and their cultivation, depend on the state. Given the state, which provides the framework for the development of a culture, the continuity o f cultural traditions, of language, education, and techniques, as well as the necessary security,

an individual can occasionally form himself in solitude; but Hegel himself remarks that even if this should be the rule, it

would not show that the state was altogether dispensable.28 The pinnacle of Hegel’s system is absolute spirit; and within that, philosophy. This is what any reader of the Phenomenology would expect, and Hegel had made up his mind on that point long before he published his first book. But if there is any pinnacle at all, is not the system a ladder rather than a

circle? The work that represents philosophy in the system is the cycle of lectures on the history of philos0phy, which ends with the present state of philosophy—with what Hegel has done by way of still further developing the work of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. In other words, it ends with Hegel’s system, which begins with the Logic. Thus the system is indeed a “circle that returns into itself,” “ a circle in which the

first also becomes the last, and the last also the first”?9 Where one starts in this system should not matter, as long as one proceeds until one h as closed the circle. Thus one could,

for example, begin with the phi1030phy of nature, go o n from there to the philosophy of spirit, which ends with the history of phiIOSOphy, and hence to the Logic. And if, on having closed the circle, one should go all the way around a second time, one would get even more out of one’s journey. Why, then, does Hegel worry at the beginning of his Logic, “With what must the beginning of science b e made?” There, the question is where to begin the Logic. And the point is that it is better to begin with the poorest and most abstract category, being, than to begin with the most concrete and complex. 28 Hegel’s philosophy of the state will be discussed more fully in H 63. 29 See footnotes 2 1 and 2 2 above.

5 8 . Objective a n d absolute spirit

247

Moreover, i t w o u l d obviously b e foolish to begin one’s journey somewhere i n t h e m i d d l e of the Logic, closing t h e circle only after having gone through all t h e Other parts of t h e system, t h u s separating p a g e s t h a t belong closely together b y taking

up all the other parts of the system in between. Indeed, two starting points s e e m s u p e r i o r t o t h e o t h e r s : the Logic, with w h i c h Hegel begins in t h e Encyclopedia, or—better perhaps-

the history of philosophy. There is n o need h e r e t o g o through t h e system, bit b y bit. The Logic, i n its full form, is m u c h m o r e lucid t h a n is usually

supposed, and there is n o dearth of books about it. Hegel’s phiIOSOphy of nature is not that important, nor is his treatment of subjective spirit. Hegel’s book on objective spirit, The Philos0phy of Right, is available i n a g o o d English translation b y T . M . Knox, wh i c h is philologically s o u n d a n d s u p porte d b y a wealth o f informed notes. I n a c o m p a n i o n volume, K n o x h a s also made available Hegel’s m i n o r Political Writings, t o which Z . A . Pelczynski h a s c o n t r i b u t e d a l o n g a n d scholarly introductory essay. Moreover, H e r b e r t M a r c u s e h a s d e a l t w i t h this p h a s e of Hegel’s t h o u g h t i n his r e m a r k a b l e book o n Reason and Revolution: Hegel and t h e Rise of Social Theory; and

there is also Sidney Hook’s From Hegel to Marx. In addition we have s o m e excellent articles i n this area by T. M . Knox a n d S h l o m o Avineri ( s e e t h e Bibliography) a n d , i n G e r m a n , Rosenzweig’s fine two volumes o n Hegel u n d der Staat.3O

There is no need to lengthen the present book by including a s u m m a r y of their conclusions; suffice it to s a y t h a t these fi t i n very well w i t h t h e reinterpretation h e r e a t t e m p t e d . And Hegel’s conception of t h e s t a t e a n d its relation to freedom will

be considered briefly in the next chapter ( H 6 3 and 6 4 ) . O n Hegel’s lectures on aesthetics and philosophy of religion, interesting monographs might and should be written. In any case, these two cycles of lectures offer no insurmountable difficulties to the interested r e a d e r , either i n t h e original o r i n English translation. B u t t h e s a m e is n o t t r u e of t h e lectures o n the philosophy of history a n d t h e history of philosophy. 30 Cf. also WK Chapter 7 .

248

THE SYSTEM

While the present reinterpretation of Hegel n e e d not b e capped with a play-by-play summary o r interpretation of any of these works, it seems well t o conclude this account o f Hegel’s thought with some remarks about Hegel o n history;

for on this subject there is still some need of reinterpretation.

CHAPTER

VI

Hegel o n History

59

The basic structure of Hegel’s phiIOSOphy of history furnishes another striking corroboration of our reinterpretation: nobody could possibly construe i t i n terms of thesis, antithesis, a n d synthesis, although there are, a s usual, three stages. At first, in the ancient Orient, only one, the ruler, is free. The s e c o n d

stage is reached in classical antiquity where some are free, but not yet the slaves. The third stage is reached in the modern world with the recognition that all m e n are free, or—as Hegel also puts it, and w e h a v e these ideas n o t o n l y in students’ lecture n o t e s but also i n h i s own manuscript—“man a s m a n

is free.”1 In another passage, also available in Hegel’s own manuscript, he explains thjs more fully: “Of world history . . . it may be said that it is the account of the spirit, how it works t o a t t a i n t h e knowledge of what it

is in itself. The Oriental peoples do not know that the spirit, or man as such, is free in himself. Because they do not know it, they a r e not free. They only k n o w that o n e is free; but for t h a t very reason s u c h freedom is merely arbitrariness, savagery, dimness of passion, o r a t times a gentleness, a tameness of passion which is also a mere accident of nature or arbitrariness. This o n e is therefore only a despot, n o t a free m a n , a h u m a n being.

“Only in the Greeks did the consciousness of freedom arise, 1VG

156. References to Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, ed.

Hoffmeister, are followed b y an L if they do n o t refer t o Hegel’s own manuscript.

250

HEGEL 0N HISTORY

a n d therefore they were free; but they, as well a s the Romans, knew only that some are free, not man a s such. Plato and Aristotle did not know this; therefore the Greeks d i d not only have slaves, and their lives and the subsistence of their beautiful freedom were tied to this, but their own freedom, t o o , was partly only a n accidental, undeveloped, ephemeral a n d limited

flower, partly at the same time a harsh servitude of man, of what is humane. “Only the Germanic nations2 attained the consciousness, in Christianity, that m a n a s m a n is free, that the freedom of the

Spirit constitutes his most distinctive nature. This consciousness arose first in religion, in the inmost region of the spirit; but to build this principle also into the affairs of this world, this was a further task whose solution and execution demands the long and hard work of education. With the acceptance of the Christian religion, slavery, e.g., d i d n o t stop immediately; even less did freedom immediately become dominant i n states, or were governments and constitutions organized rationally and

founded on the principle of freedom. This application of the principle to worldly affairs, the penetration and permeation [Durchbildung] of the worldly condition by it, that is the long process which constitutes history itself” ( V G 6 1 f . ) . That history is the story of the deve10pment of h u m a n free-

dom, is the central idea of Hegel’s philosophy of history. This is its heart, and all the rest receives its blood from it.

60 Hegel speaks of reason i n history, and h is twentieth-century

editors—first, Lasson and, following him, Hofimeister—have taken the liberty of calling the volume containing the critical edition of the introductory lectures on the philos0phy of history Die Vernunft in der Geschichte (Reason in History). 2The term die germanischen Nationen obviously refers to the Protestant nations of northern Europe and cannot by any stretch of the imagination be taken to mean merely “the Germans”; yet

this i s a point where Hegel h a s been mistranslated

sented again and again.

and misrepre-

6 0 . R e a s o n a n d misery in history; Sartre

251

Yet Hegel never claims that history h as b e e n rational i n every detail. O n t h e c o n t r a r y , its a b u n d a n t irrationality is so plain

that it requires no special philosophical effort to see it. What d o e s call for t h e exertions of a philosopher is t o fi n d some r e a s o n in history. I t is pertinent t o recall Hegel’s early essay

on “The Positivity of the Christian Religion” and his decision, in 1 8 0 0 , t o View t h e past in a different perspective, w i t h t h e faith t h a t w h a t s o m a n y millions h a v e d i e d for w a s “ n o t b a r e nonsense o r i m m o r a l i t y ” ( H 1 2 ) . There is a m o v i n g passage, a g a i n in Hegel’s own m a n u script, t h a t suggests t h a t h e n o longer f o u n d it easy t o talk or write a b o u t t h e wretched side of history. T h e prose is c o m p l e x ,

but the thought is perfectly clear: “ W h e n w e consider this spectacle o f t h e passions; when the consequences o f their violence a n d t h e folly t h a t accom-

panies not only them but even, and indeed pre-eminently, good intentions a n d legitimate a i m s , c o m e before o u r eyes—t h e ills, th e evil, the destruction of the most flourishing realms

that the human spirit has created; when we behold individuals with the deepest sympathy for their indescribable misery— then we can only end up with sadness over this transitoriness a n d , insofar as this destruction is not o n l y a work of nature b u t o f t h e will of m e n , even more with m o r a l sadness, with

the indignation of the good spirit, if there be any in us, over such a spectacle. We c a n raise such events, w i t h o u t any rhetorical exaggeration, m e r e l y by putting together all t h e mis-

fortune that the most glorious peOples and states as well as individual Virtues o r i n n o c e n c e have suffered, i n t o t h e m o s t horrible portrait, and t h u s intensify o u r feeling i n t o t h e m o s t

profound and helpless sadness which cannot be balanced by a n y conciliatory result. . . . B u t even as w e c o n t e m p l a t e history a s this slaughter b e n ch o n which t h e happiness o f peoples, t h e w i s d o m o f states, a n d t h e Virtue o f individuals have b e e n sacrificed, o u r thoughts cannot avoid the question for w h o m , for w h a t final aim these monstrous sacrifices have been m a d e ”

(VG 79 f . ) . T h e explicit m e n t i o n o f i n n o c e n c e is noteworthy. Hegel d o e s not believe that suffering proves guilt. Recalling how a former fellow student at T'Libingen l a t e r related t h a t the young Hegel

252

HEGEL ON HISTORY

h a d “ f o u n d special pleasure in t h e Book of Job o n account of its u n r u l y natural language” ( H 3 ) , o n e wonders whether it w a s o n l y the language that attracted h i m . Hegel’s letter to Knebel, written i n December 1 8 1 0 (translated i n D ) comes to m i n d , t o o : So far from closing his eyes to the misery of hu-

manity, Hegel needed his work, his phiIOSOphy, to c0pe with it. H e tried to show himself an d others t h a t the indubitably monstrous sufferings recorded throughout history h a d not been altogether for nothing. There is s o meth in g we can show i n return for all this, though it c a n n o t balance the m i s e r y : while even Plato and Aristotle, not to speak o f the sages of India, h a d n o t known that m a n a s such w a s free, this w a s n o w widely

recognized, though it might still take considerable time before such freedom would be fully actualized. I n Hegel’s mature work the emphasis is almost th e of t h e B o o k o f Job, and also far from Nietzsche a n d the existentialists. Mostly, h e stresses the goal rather sacrifices, the growing recognition o f freedom rather

opposite some of than the than the

slowness of its implementation, and reason rather than unreason. If we ask why, two reasons offer themselves. They are sup-

plementary. First, as Goethe said: “The greatest men always are attached to their century by some weakness.”3 Or we might express the same point b y likening Hegel in o n e respect t o his “world-historical individuals,” whom we shall have to consider in a m o m e n t : h e , t o o , knew “for what the t i m e h a d

come.”4 Either way, his distribution of emphasis reveals him a s a man of the nineteenth century, n o t o f the twentieth—not

necessarily a child of the nineteenth century, but perhaps rather one of those who helped to mold its distinctive temper. As we follow Hegel’s development, we may also venture a psychological explanation, which is in no way incompatible

with the first point. Human misery was perfectly obvious to h i m . H i s closest friend, Holderlin, had become insane, a n d now this m o s t lovable h u m a n being, by far the most gifted 3Electz°ve

4VG

A flim‘ties

( 1 8 0 9 ) ; Maximen

and Reflexionen,

#49.

97 L : was a n der Zeit, was notwendig ist. Cf. Nohl 143, cited at the beginning of section 12, above: what is there said to be “a need of our time” is precisely what is at stake here.

6 0 . Reason a n d misery in history; Sartre

253

poet of his generation, vegetated m u t e l y toward his l o n g d e layed d e a t h . Hegel’s o n l y sister lived on t h e verge of m a d n e s s

and was deeply despondent. His only brother had been killed i n t h e Napoleonic wars. His m o t h e r had died w h e n h e w a s barely thirteen. It did n o t s e e m manly t o Hegel t o dwell o n t h a t aspect of l i f e . B u t it w a s never far from t h e surface and found exPression i n , for e x a m p l e , his writings and lectures o n tragedy and his i m m e n s e admiration for Sophocles and Shakespeare. O n t h e rare occasions when it finds more direct expression, as i n t h e passage we have cited that e n d s with t h e

image of the slaughter bench, one gets the feeling that he did not altogether trust himself t o speak of these matters.

The popular view of Hegel as an “optimist” is certainly misleading. He never shared the View that gained ground in the later n i n e t e e n t h century, and beyond t h a t until 1 9 1 4 , t h a t

happiness had grown throughout history, and that ultimate happiness w a s around t h e co r n er . No r did h e believe t h a t gradually so m u c h had b e e n learned from history that at l o n g

last tragedy was avoidable. O n these points he expressed himself with vigor: “What experience and history teach is this: peoples and governments have never learned anything from history and acted according t o w h a t o n e m i g h t have learned

from it”

(VG 19 L ) . “History is not the soil of happiness. The times of happiness are e m p t y leaves i n it” ( V G 9 2 L ) . It w o u l d n o t go too far t o call his vision of history tragic. The t h e m e s represented here b y a few quotations are pursued

throughout and recur again and again.5 Hegel is still far from t h e t y p e of t h e “ A l e x a n d r i a n ” scholar of t h e later nineteenth

century, whom the young'Nietzsche derides i n his first books. H e is m u c h closer t o N i e t z s c h e h i m s e l f ; say, t o Zarathustra’s “ I h a v e l o n g ceased t o b e concerned w i t h happiness; I a m

concerned with m y work.” Hegel says of the world-historical individuals: “ I t is n o t happiness t h e y c h o o s e , b u t toil, struggle,

work for their purpose.”6 That Hegel personally felt the same 5For

e x a m p l e , 3 4 f. L . 7 2 L . a n d 1 0 0 L . 1 0 0 L ; c f . 9 3 L . T h e Zarathustra q u o t a t i o n comes the first c h a p t e r of Part I V . 6VG

from

254

HEGEL ON HISTORY

way appears from his two letters to his bride in the summer of 1811 ( D ) : indeed, immediately upon becoming engaged h e hurt her feelings by questioning whether “happiness is part of the destiny o f my life.” Hegel is also close to Nietzsche w h e n h e says that “nothing great i n the world h a s b e e n accomplished without passion” (85). O r when h e attacks envy ( 1 0 0 if. L ) . Indeed, part of

this attack deserves a place here: “What schoolmaster h a s not d e m o n s t r a t e d t o his class that Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar were driven by such

passions and were therefore immoral men? From which it immediately follows that h e , the schoolmaster, is a m o r e excellent human being than they, because h e does n ot possess such passions, which he c a n prove, for h e h a s not conquered Asia, nor vanquished Darius and Porus. He lives comfortably, to b e sure, b u t he also lets live. . . . For a valet there are no

heroes, says a familiar proverb. I have added—and Goethe repeated this two years later—not because there are n o heroes but because h e is a valet.7 . . . H o m e r ’ s Thersites w h o reproaches the kings is a stock figure of all ages. Blows, i.e., a heating w i t h a solid stick, h e d o e s n o t receive i n all ages, as h e

did in Homer’s; but his envy . . . is the thorn he carries in his flesh8; and the undying worm that gnaws him9 is the torment that his excellent intentions and reproofs remain without any success in the world” ( 1 0 2 f . L ) .

What is perhaps most like Nietzsche and Sartre is Hegel’s constantly repeated insistence t h a t “ t h e organic individual p r o d u c e s himself: it makes of itself what it is implicitly; thus t h e spirit, t o o , is o n l y that w h ich i t makes of itself, a n d it

makes of itself what it is implicitly.”10 This is almost a definit i o n of spirit: “Spirit is this, t h a t it produces itself, m a k e s

itself into what it is” ( 7 4 ) . Compare this with Sartre’s: “Man is nothing else but t h a t which h e m a k e s of himself. That is 7 Phenomenology, about 5 pages before the end of “VI. Spirit”: Lasson’s e d . , 4 3 0 ; Glockner’s e d . , 5 1 0 ; Baillie’s, 6 7 3 . G o e t h e , Elect i v e Affinities. 8Alludes t o II Corinthians 1 2 : 7 . 9Alludes to Mark 9 : 4 4 , 4 6 , 4 8 .

10 VG 151; cf. 54 L, 58 L, 67 L, 72 f. L. Cf. also C 11.1.8.

6 0 . Reason a n d misery in history; Sartre

255

t h e first principle of existentialism.”11 Of course, Sartre applies emphatically t o e a c h individual what H e g e l h a d more

often said of spirit and of peoples, ‘and Sartre does not stress as Hegel does—but this is a mere truism i n any case—that potentially one was all a l o n g w h a t one makes of oneself explicitly. Where they really differ i s i n Sartre’s suggestion that we c o u l d have chosen to make something utterly different of

ourselves—a point Hegel does not discuss. O n a related point, however, Sartre’s moral i s also Hegel’s. Sartre presents this a s the distinctive doctrine of existentialism:

“Man . . . is therefore nothing else but the sum of his actions. . . . For the existentialist, there is no love apart from

the deeds of love; . . . there is no genius other than that which is expressed in works of art. The genius of Proust is the totality of the works of Proust. . . . I n life, a man commits himself, draws his own portrait, and there is nothing but that

portrait. No doubt, this thought may seem comfortless to one who has not made a success of his life.”12 Hegel says in a similar vein—and only Descartes, Husserl, a n d Heidegger are mentioned more often i n Sartre’s Being a nd Nothingness than Hegel—“What m a n is, is h i s d e e d , is the series of h i s deeds, is that i n t o which h e has m a d e himself.

Thus the spirit is essentially energy and one cannot, in regard to it, abstract from appearance” (114 L ) . Elsewhere, Hegel notes “that often a difference is m a d e between what a man is

internally and his deeds. In history this is untrue; the series of his deeds is the man himself. . . . The truth is that the external is not difierent from the internal.”13 11 “Existentialism i s a H u m a n i s m , ” in Existentialism toevsky to Sartre, e d . Kaufmann, 2 9 1 .

from Dos-

12 Ibid., 300. 13 VG 66 L ; cf. also 100 L . Hegel also anticipates Spengler both in stressing the organic unity of all the aspects of a culture (121 L, with an appropriate bow to Montesquieu), and in pushing the organic metaphor still much further: “The spirit of a people is a n a t u r a l individual; a s such, i t flourishes, i s strong, d e c l i n e s , and

dies” (67 L ) . O n the following page this point is developed further, in language at points quite close to Spengler’s.

256

HEGEL 0N HISTORY

61 From Hegel’s own point o f view, however, all this is inci-

dental to the central point that history relates the development of freedom. And when in the following passage he contrasts youth and maturity, we know by now that he is not merely comparing his own wisdom with his students’ lack o f it but

also, and perhaps mainly, his hard-won insight with the views of his own youth: “It is easier to s e e the faults of individuals, states, a n d the

governance of the world than to see what they contain of truth. For a s l o n g a s one is negative and reproaches, o n e

stands nobly, with a lofty mien, above the subject, without having penetrated into it and grasped it and what is positive

in it. Certainly, the reproach may be well founded; only what is faulty is much easier t o find than w h a t is substantial (e.g., in works o f a r t ) . . . . It is the sign of the greatest superficiality to fin d what is b a d everywhere a n d t o see nothing o f the affirmative and genuine. Age generally makes milder;

youth is always dissatisfied; that is due to the maturity of judgment in age which does not merely, from disinterestedness, put up with the bad, too, but which has also been taught more profoundly by the seriousness of life and been led t o the sub-

stantial and solid aspect of the matter . . . “Thus the insight to which philosophy should help us is that the actual world is a s it ought to be . . . G o d rules the world; the content of his government, the execution of his

plan, is world history; to grasp this is the task of the philosophy of world history, and its presupposition is that the ideal accomplishes itself, that only what accords with the idea has

actuality. Before the pure light of this divine idea, which is no mere ideal, the semblance that the world is a m a d , foolish happening disappears. . . . What is ordinarily called actuality is considered something rotten by philosophy; it may well seem, but it is not actual in and for itself. This insight contains

what one might call the comfort against the notion of absolute misfortune, of the madness of what has happened. Comfort, however, is merely a substitute for some ill that ought not to

6 1 . Philosophy as comfort; t h e actual

257

have happened, and is at home in the finite. Thus philosophy is not a c o m f o r t ; it is m o r e , it reconciles, it transfigures the a c t u a l , w h i c h seems unjust, i n t o t h e rational . . 3’14 U n t i l w e reach “ t h e insight . . . t h a t t h e a c t u a l world is as it o u g h t t o b e , ” all o n e c a n say against Hegel is that h e generalizes t o o m u c h . Whether t h e positive o r t h e negative is easier t o see, a n d which it is more important t o point o u t ,

depends greatly o n the historical context. After the polemics of t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t , and after h e himself h a d written h i s

fragments o n folk religion and “The Positivity of the Christian Religion,” Hegel m i g h t well feel, as h e put it i n 1 8 0 0 , that

“the horrible blabbering in this vein with its endless extent and inward emptiness has become too boring and has altogether lost interest—so m u c h so that it would rather b e a need

of our time to hear . . . the Opposite” ( H 12). In another time and place, the horrible blabbering in quite a different vein m i g h t m a k e it a n e e d of the t i m e t o hear s o m e pungent criticism. The second half of t h e l o n g q u o t a t i o n is open to even

graver objections. Here Hegel goes against the spirit of not o n l y his early fragments b u t also the preface t o t h e P h e n o m e nology, where h e had a n n o u n c e d that “ p h i l o s o p h y , however,

must beware of wishing t o be edifying” (1.2.9). Then he had felt that philosophers must not “aim at edification and replace the pastor”15; now he seems t o be doing just that. In these lectures “ G o d ” c o m e s t o his lips easily and frequently,

and philosophy is invoked frankly t o offer more than comfort, t o reconcile u s t o t h e horrors of life and history, and t o trans-

figure the actual—by what looks like a verbal trick. I n a n y ordinary sense of these words, Hegel himself does

not believe that “the actual world is as it ought to be.” This dictum depends on calling actual only what “accords with the idea.” What is ordinarily called actual (wirklich) is admittedly “rotten”-—but simply not called actual “ b y philosophy.” Is it really a n “insight” that reconciles Hegel t o the

terrors of history, or merely the redefinition of “actual”? 14 V G 77 f. L . Cf. 29 ff. L , 42 L , 48, 52 L . 15 Jena “aphorism” # 6 6 , D o k . 371; Ros. 552.

258

HEGEL ON HISTORY

First of all, it should b e n o t e d that Hegel’s definition is not offered ad 1106 a t this point. It goes back to the f a m o u s preface t o t h e Philosophy of Right, t o t h e discussion of this category in the Logic, a n d beyond t h a t to the Phenomenology. Beyond that, it goes back t o Aristotle a n d Plato. P l a t o h a d taught t h a t o n l y perfect justice a n d goodness, perfect circles a n d s q u a r e s —or in o t h e r words, o n l y w h a t h e called the Forms—were actual; everything i n t h e world of experience that participates imperfectly in these F o r m s is not actual but mere a p p e a r a n c e . Aristotle h a d a b a n d o n e d t h e belief in otherworldly F o r m s , h a d f o und the F o r m s in things, a s entelechies which strive t o w a r d actuality through development. Hegel does not believe t h a t a

pattern of a perfect state is laid up in the heavens, to echo Plato’s f a m o u s r e m a r k i n th e R e p u b l i c ( 5 9 2 ) ; h e does believe, however, t h a t t h e r e is a C o n c e p t of t h e state that existing states actualize more o r less—and t h e n suggests in places t h a t those states t h a t a r e not states in t h e highest n o r m a t i v e sense of t h a t word a r e n o t actual. While it m a k e s perfectly good sense t o say of a badly d r a w n circle that it is not actually a circle, seeing t h a t t h e definition of a circle is generally a n d precisely understood, it would involve stretching a point, more o f t e n t h a n n o t , t o s a y t h a t a poorly instituted state is n o t actually a state. B u t t o g o still f u r t h e r a n d say t h a t it is n o t actual is surely utterly misleading. A n d if Hegel’s c o m f o r t a n d reconciliation t o misfortune a n d m a d n e s s d e p e n d e d solely o n this redefinition of terms, his

philosophy of history would be far worse than it is.

62 T h e following quotations, all from D ie Vermmft in der Geschiclzte, explain t h e m a j o r points of Hegel’s a p p r o a c h . The first requires c o m m e n t : “ T h e philosophical a p p r o a c h t o hist o r y h a s n o o t h e r intention t h a n t o eliminate t h e incidental” ( 2 9 L ) . Das Zufiillige w o u ld usually b e translated as “ t h e accidental,” but “incidental” is equally legitimate a n d in this case m u c h clearer. All historiography involves t h e distinction between w h a t really m a t t e r s a n d w h a t is merely incidental.

6 2 . Selection, edification, an d c u n n i n g

259

(Hegel creates confusion b y n o t keeping this contrast distinct

from that between the accidental and the necessary.) N o historian c a n relate everything. Historiography always requires selection—indeed, selection o f a very few events o u t of a n in—

definite number. The historian who would relate the whole of world history in one volume, o r for that matter in three o r four volumes, m u s t b e even m o r e selective. A n d h e might as

well be clear about his principle of selection. What nations shall he include? What individuals shall h e mention by name? This is the problem Hegel faces in his lectures. The same problem confronts not only those bold enough to write a history of the world b u t also t e a c h e r s who offer s o m e s u c h survey either i n one course o r i n a sequence of several courses.

Should one discuss Bulgarian history at some length? Or A t h e n s ? A n d should B a r b a r o s s a b e mentioned? A n d Charlemagne?

The standard solution is surely this: one leads up to one’s own society. One includes what seems “necessary” for the deve10pment o f this society, a n d o n e omits w h a t is irrelevant. A G e r m a n will discuss b o t h Barbarossa a n d Charlemagne, a

British teacher, pressed for time, probably the latter but not the former. B o t h will m e n t i o n C a e s a r , Alexander, a n d A t h e n s ; neither will s p e n d any t i m e o n Bulgaria. Whether they will

say frankly what their principle of selection has been and call attention to its subjectivity, is doubtful. They are more likely to say that this is world history. And perhaps they will add, as most American secondary school teachers do, that their own society is t h e freest society t h a t has ever existed—without the

least inclination to compare it with any contemporary societies that m i g h t possibly claim t o h a v e achieved at least a s much, if not somewhat more, f r e e d o m . Comparisons w i t h earlier so-

cieties that were less free are almost inevitable; and if the teacher is British or American, Magna Charta will be presented a s a milestone. I n s u m , i n almost all A m e r i c a n secondary schools history is t a u g h t a s the gradual growth of freedom, specifically i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of the teacher’s a n d students’ own society. I t h a s often been suggested t h a t it w a s ridiculous of Hegel t o

present Prussia as the culmination of the development of free-

260

HEGEL 0 N HISTORY

d o m , b u t t o this o n e m a y offer t w o brief replies. First, t h e point depends wholly o n c o m p a r i n g different societies in t h e 18203, a s there is no suggestion whatsoever in Hegel’s lectures t h a t history will n o t go o n ; o n t h e contrary. A n d a t that t i m e it would have been less ridiculous t o single o u t Prussia t h a n , say, the United States in which there was a large slave popu-

lation. Secondly, Hegel d o e s n o t present Prussia a s th e c u l m i n a tion of the historical process, a n d his construction of world history d o e s n o t d e p e n d o n a n y s u c h implicit assumption. That G e r m a n y was, d u r i n g Hegel’s lifetime, in t h e forefront of Western civilization seems undeniable; but Hegel d o e s not say that G e r m a n y represents t h e pinnacle of t h e historical process. H e m e r e l y believes, a n d w a n t s t o s h o w , t h a t for all its many ups a n d downs t h e r e h a s been a slow a n d painful d e velopment t o t h e point w h e r e it is widely admitted, certainly i n t h e Protestant North of E u r o p e , that all m e n a s s u c h a r e free. And h e understands world history a s t h e gradual d e velopment of this recognition. Armed w i t h this insight, h e tells his students t h a t t h e r e h a s been reason in history; t h a t all h a s not b e e n in vain; t h a t o n e must a p p r o a c h t h e s t u d y of history with this faith; b u t that for

him it is no mere faith but “a result with which I am acq u a i n t e d because I a m a l r e a d y acquainted w i t h t h e w h o l e ”

(30). “ B u t we have t o t a k e history a s it is; we m u s t proceed historically, empirically” ( 3 0 ) . T h a t d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t o n e

even could approach history without any prior ideas in one’s h e a d . “Even t h e ordinary a n d mediocre historian, w h o m a y

believe and pretend that his attitude is only receptive . . . brings along his categories a n d sees t h e d a t a t h r o u g h t h e m . ” And now comes the f a m o u s e p i g r a m : “ T h e world looks rational t o those wh o look a t it rationally” ( 3 1 ) . The o t h e r way a r o u n d : “ I f one approaches t h e world o n l y with s u b jectivity, t h e n o n e will fi n d it a s o n e is constituted oneself; everywhere, o n e will k n o w everything better a n d s e e h o w it should h a v e been d o n e , how things should h a v e h a p pened” ( 3 2 L ) . People say t h a t it is p r e s u m p t i o n to try to u n d e r s t a n d

6 2 . Selection, edification, and cunning

261

Providence, but “ W h e n theology itself h a s b e e n reduced to s u c h despair, t h e n o n e h a s t o seek refuge i n philosophy if o n e w a n t s to k n o w G o d . ” It is “ a tradition that God’s wisdom is t o b e recognized i n n a t u r e ” ; h o w much more, t h e n , should

it be discoverable in human history, considering that this, much more t h a n nature, is t h e realm of the spirit ( 4 2 L ) .

“The time must finally have come to comprehend this rich product of creative reason—world history. . . . Our approach is to that extent a theodicy, a justification of God, which Leibniz still attempted metaphysically” ( 4 8 ) . Considering these “ e d i f y i n g ” remarks i n th e context both

of these lectures and of Hegel’s other writings, it seems unquestionable t h a t t h e y a r e mere frills. At the University o f Berlin, where h e gave these lectures, h e was the colleague o f

Schleiermacher, in whom he had early recognized a “virtuoso of edification” ( H 5 5 ) , a n d w h eth er h e liked it o r n o t , they

were rivals. Hegel did not disdain this contest and sprinkled these lectures on the philosophy of history with polemical rem a r k s , suggesting t h a t h e h a d t o defend G o d and divine Providence against t h e theologians.

The way had been pointed not only by Lessing’s and Kant’s essays o n history, with t h e i r explicit references to Providence, b u t also b y Schiller’s celebrated line, i n the poem “Resignat i o n ” : Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgerz'cht (world history

is the world’s last judgment). For Hegel this can only mean: This is the only Weltgericht t h e r e will b e ; there is n o judgment beyond this. S c h o p e n h a u e r , a n avowed atheist, also

adopted Schiller’s line, but in a different spirit: “ I f o n e wants to k n o w what m e n , considered morally, are worth o n the whole a n d in general, one should contemplate their fate, o n the whole a n d i n general. This is need, wretchedness, misery, t o r m e n t , a n d d e a t h . Eternal justice rules: if they were n o t , o n the whole, worth nothing, their fate, t a k e n o n t h e whole, w o u l d n o t be so s a d . In this sense

we can say: the world itself is the world’s last judgment.”16 T h i s is surely t h e wisdom o f Job’s friends, albeit without G o d . Hegel, t h o u g h h e s p e a k s of G o d , is less moralistic and

in this respect more remote from popular theism. His “the16 Welt als Wille a n d Vorstellung, I , § 6 3 .

262

HEGEL ON HISTORY

odicy” finds much less justice in the world than Schopenhauer does: in effect, it does not acquit God of the charge of cruelty a n d injustice, it merely calls o u r attention t o extenuati n g circumstances. There is s o m e r e a s o n in the madness of history, a n d t h e suffering is n o t wholly pointless. Hegel’s View is similar to Einstein’s f o r m u l a t i o n , carved

over a fireplace in Fine Hall, at Princeton University: Raffim‘ert ist der Herr G o t t , a b e r boshaft ist e r nicht, w h i c h has been translated: “ G o d ’ s sly, but h e ain’t m e a n . ” O n e might also render it, less irreverently: “ G o d is subtle but not malevolent.” A n d , of course, h e is n o t o m n i p o t e n t . That is

Hegel’s point, too—a point that is as easily demythologized in his case as in Einstein’s. The great physicist knows from his results t h a t there is s o m e reason in nature, a n d i n his further researches h e proceeds o n th e assumption that more regularities amenable t o m a t h e m a t i c a l formulation are t o b e found. They are not easy t o discover; t h e y d o n o t m e e t t h e e y e ; they a r e exceedingly subtle. B u t the world has not b e e n abandoned t o mere accident.17 Even a s the physicist m i g h t say with Hegel, “The world looks rational t o those w h o l o o k a t it rationally,” Hegel could say with Einstein, “ G o d is subtle but

not malevolent.” For the subtlety, Hegel coins a famous term: “One can call it t h e cunning of reason t h a t it lets t h e passions d o its w o r k , while t h a t t h r o u g h w h i c h it translates itself into existence loses and suffers harm.”18 The point does n o t d e p e n d o n this non-theological a n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m ; i n Hegel’s own m a n u s c r i p t it is stated a little earlier i n these lectures in a d mirably straightforward f o r m : “ i n world history t h e actions o f m e n also p r o d u c e results quite different from their purposes” ( 8 8 ) . Hegel himself goes o n t o give t h e e x a m p l e of a m a n who 17 Einstein’s f o r m u l a t i o n s h o u l d n o t b e c o n s t r u e d as s o l e m n t h e o l o g y , a n d Professor V . B a r g m a n n recalls how E i n s t e i n s a i d t o h i m : “ M a n c h m a l g l a u b e i c h , e r ist doch boshaft, weil e r 1015 a n der

Nase herumfiilzrt” (Sometimes I believe he is malevolent after all because he leads us around by the nose).

18 V G 105 L. F o r a more comprehensive quotation of this passage s e e C I I I . 3 . 2 8 .

6 3 . State and freedom

263

sets fi r e t o a n o t h e r man’s h o u s e a n d , unintentionally, causes a huge conflagration. Moreover, his a c t i o n m a y also lead t o

his punishment. “The only point to stick to in this example is that in the immediate action we may find more than lay in t h e will a n d consciousness of t h e a g e n t ” ( 8 9 ) . Similarly, t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f world-historical individuals is not reducible t o their purposes. A t times, they may well have been driven

largely by ambition and other passions; but they also produced results they did not intend and, however far this may have been from their consciousness, they contributed in the long run to the development of freedom in the modern world.

World-historical individuals are not mysterious entities either: they are simply those individuals who belong in a world history of m o d e r a t e size. S o m e very admirable kings, not to m e n t i o n non-political figures, may safely b e omitted from a n y s u c h highly c o n d e n s e d account—and really have t o b e left o u t - w h i l e s o m e others, whose m o r a l character is not necessarily a n y better, h a v e h a d world-historical consequences a n d therefore have t o b e i n c l u d e d . And the same

goes for world-historical peoples. Not being an envious Thersites, Hegel went further than necessary in the opposite direction and became rhapsodical ( 9 7 f f ) , b u t these passages w e h a v e o n l y i n his students’ notes, a n d i n t h a t lecture h e m a y have got carried away a bit.

What he says fits some of these individuals very well-for e x a m p l e , Pericles a m o n g th o s e Hegel k n e w , Lincoln a m o n g t h o s e h e d i d not—but also m a k e s sense when applied to A l e x a n d e r and Caesar.

63

Studying Hegel’s phiIOSOphy of history, one should keep i n m i n d t h a t for h i m history is n o t everything b u t m e r e l y

occupies one niche in his system. There are other points of View, and in one passage in these lectures Hegel poses the s a m e c o n t r a s t t h a t K i e r k e g a a r d l a t e r presented in a famous

passage of his Concluding Unscientific Postscript”: 19 Princeton U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s 1 9 4 4 , 1 7 9 f.

264

HEGEL ON HISTORY

“ W h e n , e.g., we s e e a m a n knee] an d pray before a n idol, and this content is reprehensible from the point of view of reason, we can nevertheless cling to his feeling that is alive in his prayer, and c a n say t h a t this feeling h a s t h e s a m e value

as that of

the Christian who worships the semblance

[ A b g l a n z ] of truth, a n d a s t h a t o f t h e philos0pher who immerses himself i n eternal truth with his thinking reason. Only

the objects are different; but the subjective feeling is one and the s a m e ” ( 5 1 L ) .

Hegel, to be sure, goes on to point out that feeling is not everything, a n d “when w e confront t h e fight o f t h e Greeks

against the Persians, . . . we are quite conscious of what interests u s ; namely, t o see t h e Greeks liberated from barbarism” ( 5 2 L ) . I n history w e are concerned with t h e objective

results of actions, not with merely subjective feelings. Indeed, the feelings of the m e n a t Marathon hardly c o n c e r n the his-

torian, and the feelings of those who fought in battles that were not destined t o b e c o m e world-historical are ignored a1together.

“When we thus put up with seeing the individualities, their purposes and the satisfaction of these, sacrificed, while their happiness i s abandoned t o t h e realm of t h e forces of nature and thus to accident, a n d w e consider the individuals altogether under the category of m e a n s , there is nevertheless o n e side to them which w e refuse to consider o n l y from this

point of View, even in relation to what is highest [presumably, freedom]; for there is something that is emphatically not subordinate, something in them that is by its own nature eternal, divine. This is Moralitéit, Sittlichkeit, religiosity”

(106). Moreover, human beings “participate in this rational purpose and are thereby ends i n themselves—ends in themselves, not only formally . . . individuals are also e n d s i n themselves

according to the contents of the purpose”20-for the freedom that is at stake in history is, after all, human freedom. 20 V G 1 0 6 . Where o u r o m i s s i o n o f three a n d a h a l f l i n e s begins,

Hegel had written in the margin of his manuscript: “see Kant.”

6 3 . State a n d freedom

265

Once more Hegel returns to the non-historical point of View: “The religiosity, the Sittlichkeit of a limited life—of a shepherd, a peasant—in its concentrated inwardness and its limitation to a few and wholly simple conditions of life has infinite value, and the same value as the religiosity and SittIichkeit of well-developed knowledge and an existence rich in the scope of relations and actions. This

internal center,

this simple region of the right of subjective freedom, the hearth of willing, deciding, and doing, the abstract content

of conscience, that i n which guilt and value of the individual, his eternal judgment, is enclosed, remains untouched and outside the loud noise of world history—outside not only external and temporal changes but even those which are involved i n the absolute necessity of the Concept of freedom” ( 1 0 9 ) .

In the margin of his manuscript, Hegel noted at this point: “Sittlichkeit in its true form—in the state.” While this idea is deve10ped more fully i n the Philosophy of Right, it i s also repeatedly discussed i n these lectures, and i n any case it de-

serves some account i n this book. The good state combines “with its general purpose the private interests of the citizens” ( 8 6 ) . “ I t is the actuality in

which the individual has and enjoys his freedom” (111 L ) . “All that man is h e owes to the state; . . . All value man

has, all spiritual actuality, he has through the state alone” (111 L ) . “It is the absolute interest of reason that this ethical whole should exist; a n d this interest of reason constitutes the right and merit of the heroes who established states” ( 1 1 2 L ) .

“Only on this soil, i.e., in the state, can art and religion exist. . . . In world history one c a n discuss only peoples w h o have formed a state. . . . Indeed, all great men have formed

themselves i n solitude, but only by working for themselves upon what the state had already created” (113 L ) . “Thus the state is the more precisely defined object of world history i n w h i c h freedom gains objective existence” ( 1 1 5 L ) . “An Athenian citizen did, as it were, from instinct w h a t was his share. . . . Sittlichkeit is duty . . . second nature, as i t

has rightly been called; for the first nature of man is his immediate animal being” ( 1 1 5 f . L ) .

At this point, we can leave behind lecture notes and revert

266

HEGEL ON HISTORY

to Hegel’s manuscript i n which he takes note of “ t h e direct opposite o f our Concept that the state is the actualization of

freedom, namely the View that man is free by nature. . . . That man is free by nature is quite right in the sense that he is free according to the Concept of m a n , but thus only according to his destiny,21 i.e., only in himsel . ” To b e sure, p60ple have assumed a state of nature, b u t hardly as a historical condition that could actually be encountered somewhere.

“Conditions of savagery one can indeed find, but they are seen to b e tied to passions of brutality and acts of violence and at the same time, however undeveloped, to social institutions, which are supposed to limit freedom” ( 1 1 6 ) .

The state is important in Hegel’s phi1030phy because it is, h e argues, the actualization of freedom, an d because it alone makes possible the further deveIOpment of spirit—the

realm of absolute spirit. Hence the hyperbolic dictum that all of man’s spiritual actuality and value depend on the state: Hegel refers specifically to the moral-ethical dimension and to art, religion, and philos0phy; but beyond that h e considers the state as the hearth of all that raises m a n above the brutality of beasts.

He opposes the view that man is free by nature, while the state curtails this freedom. Without the state, freedom re-

mains merely man’s destiny; without the state, freedom is not actual. A hundred and forty years later he might have

pointed to the collapse of the state in the Congo, not by way of suggesting, contrary to the facts, that the state that broke down had been good and had actualized the freedom of those living in it—plainly it had been bad by Hegel’s standards —but only to show that such a collapse and the sudden removal

of the restraints associated with a state does not mean freedom. To ensure freedom, maintain security, an d m a k e pos-

sible the development of art and philosophy, a good state is wanted.

“In order to . . . establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the gen-

21 Bestimmung could also be rendered a s “determination” or even as “definition.” In the title of Fichte’s famous book, it has been rendered still differently: The Vocation of Man.

6 4 . T radition-directedness and collisions

267

eral welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty,” t h o s e who

framed and ratified the Constitution of the United States of America did not find it expedient or at all possible to replace British rule with anarchy, a return to nature, and the abolition o f all states a n d all restraints; t h e y established a state. That men wh o revere their constitution and learn this preamble by heart as children should fi n d Hegel’s association

of the state with freedom perverse and talk as if it were selfevident t h a t the s t a t e merely abridges o u r n atu ral freedom is a triumph of thoughtlessness, w h i c h illustrates t h e bankruptcy of any c o m m o n sense t h a t prides itself o n spurning philosophy.

64 It is interesting t o note t h a t most o f the passages t h a t have given offense c o m e from the students’ notes, not from Hegel’s

manuscript; this also applies to the following remarks. They t a k e u p Hegel’s o l d p o l e m i c against Kant’s moral philosophy

as lacking content, and find Sittlichkeit in the concrete life of a community. “When o n e w a n t s t o a c t , o n e m u s t n o t only will t h e good, but o n e m u s t know whether this o r that is the good. But what c o n t e n t is good o r not g o o d , right or wrong, t h a t is given for t h e u s u a l cases of private life i n t h e laws a n d cus-

toms of a state. There is no great difficulty about knowing that.

“ . . . The morality of the individual then consists in fulfilling t h e duties o f his station; a n d these are easy t o k n o w : what these d u t i e s are is d e t e r m i n e d by one’s station. . . . To investigate w h a t m i g h t b e one’s d u t y [ o r : w h a t d u t y m i g h t b e ] is unnecessary r u m i n a t i o n ; i n the inclination t o look u p o n t h e m o r a l a s s o m e t h i n g diflicult, o n e m i g h t s o o n e r recognize the h a n k e r i n g t o get rid of one’s duties. Every individual h a s his station a n d k n o w s what rightful, honest activity m e a n s . . . ” ( 9 4 L ) . As examples of t h e “ u s u a l cases,” Hegel gives t h e c o n duct o f children toward t h e i r parents, o r the situation in which

268

HEGEL ON HISTORY

one m a n owes another a s u m of m o n e y . “There is n o t h i n g difficult here. The soil of d u t y is civic life”; a n d t h e individual must assimilate the customs (Sitten) a n d t h e Sittlich-

keit—or the mores and morality—of his people.” Here Hegel sketches in a few bold strokes what i n The Lonely Crowd is described at immense length a s “traditiondirectedness.” Insofar a s h e himself accepts this orientation, one is led to reflect t h a t times have c h a n g e d , a n d situations have multiplied i n which even i n ordinary life it is n o longer easy to know one’s duty. Confronted with Kierkegaard’s great c r u x , what Abraham was t o d o when God asked h i m to sacrifice his beloved s o n , many sensitive a n d t h o u g h t f u l people m a y still agree with Kant’s forceful reply, published forty-five years before Fear and Trembling ( 1 8 4 3 ) in The Quarrel a m o n g t h e Faculties:

“Abraham would have had to answer this supposedly divine v o i c e : ‘That I ought not t o kill m y good s o n , t h a t is wholly certain; b u t t h a t y o u , who a p p e a r t o m e , are G o d , of t h a t I a m n o t certain and never c a n b e c o m e certain e v e n if it should resound from t h e (visible) heavens.’ ”33 Kierkegaard’s b o o k , however, b e c a m e timely w h e n millions found themselves in situations where t h e y felt uncertain, a s a m a t t e r of fact—even if K a n t w as quite right t h a t t h e y ought not t o h a v e felt uncertain—whether t h e y should o r should not report their parents t o t h e government, a n d h o w t h e y s h o u l d c o n d u c t themselves toward their Jewish o r non-conformist

neighbors, or toward people who had been publicly branded as C o m m u n i s t s , o r w h o h a d t a k e n t h e F i f t h A m e n d m e n t , or toward N e g r o e s . When is civil disobedience permissible?

When is it a duty? Hegel did not suppose that tradition-directed Sittlichkeit was the alpha and omega of moral philosoPhy. Loving tragedy a s h e did, h e c o u l d not have th o u g h t s o ; a nd t h e 22 V G 9 5 L ; cf. 6 7 L , a s well a s the i d e a i n the p r e f a c e to the P h e n o m e n o l o g y t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l m u s t a s s i m i l a t e the w o r k o f the w o r l d spirit. 23 O r i g i n a l e d . , 1 7 9 8 , 1 0 2 f . ( t h e third f o o t n o t e in t h e s e c t i o n e n t i t l e d “Friedens-Abschluss u n d Beilegung des Streits der Fakultiiten”).

6 4 . T radition-directedness

a n d collisions

269

philosophy of history was one place to take note of the limitations of s u c h a n ethic. “ I n t h e c o u r s e of history, t h e preservation of a people, a

state, and the preservation of the ordered spheres of its life, is o n e essential m o m e n t . . . . T h e o th er m o m e n t , however, is t h a t t h e stable persistence o f t h e spirit o f a people, a s it is, is b r o k e n because it is e x h a u s t e d a n d overworked; t h a t world

history, the world spirit proceeds. . . . But this is tied to a d e m o t i o n , demolition, destruction of th e preceding m o d e o f actuality. . . . I t is precisely here t h a t t h e great collisions o c c u r between t h e prevalent, recognized duties, laws, a n d rights a n d , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , possibilities which are o p p o s e d t o this system . . . ” ( 9 6 f. L ) . I n times of transition, t h e o l d m o r e s n o longer offer certainty, a n d t h e ethical world is r e n t b y tragic collisions. I t s e e m s obvious t h a t w h a t Hegel still considered largely irrelev a n t t o t h e lives of his listeners is of i m m e d i a t e a n d vital

concern to young people who, partly for that reason, feel attracted to existentialism. While British moral philosophy, even after World W a r I I , still proceeds o n Hegel’s assumption t h a t i n t h e usual cases there is n o great difficulty a b o u t know— ing w h a t is right o r g o o d , S a r t r e h a s followed Kierkegaard i n c o n c e n t r a t i n g o n t h e exceptional cases, t h o s e t h a t are n o t ordinary, m o r e interesting, a n d b y n o m e a n s so e a s y t o resolve. And s i n c e World War I I , t h e extraordinary is n o longer exceptional.

I n his lectures Hegel m e n t i o n s two figures who are asso-

ciated with great collisions: Socrates and Antigone. “The Greeks in their period of flowering, in their cheerful Sittlichkeit, d i d n o t h a v e t h e Concept of general freedom . . . o r

Moralitc’it, or conscience. Moralitiit, what the spirit’s return into itself is, reflection, the Spirit’s search for refuge in itself, w a s lacking; t h a t b e g a n o n l y with Socrates” ( 7 1 L ) . I n a similar vein, Hegel said later in these lectures: “Socrates is celebrated a s a teacher of morality, b u t w e s h o u l d rather call h i m t h e i n v e n t o r of Moralitc'it.”’~’4 A s t h e c h a m p i o n of a new principle, h e w a s a world-historical fi g u r e w h o eventually 24 G l o c k n e r ’ s e d . , X1, 3 5 0 .

270

HEGEL ON HISTORY

t r i u m p h e d posthumously; b u t h e w a s also a tragic figure25 who w a s p u t t o d e a t h . Antigone, o n t h e other h a n d , stood for time-honored Sittlichkeit, o p p o s i n g a tyrant. “Sophocles’ Antigone s a y s : t h e divine c o m m a n d m e n t s are n o t o f yesterday, o r of today; n a y , they live without e n d , a n d n o b o d y c o u l d say w h e n c e t h e y c a m e . The laws of Sittlichkeit are n o t accidental b u t t h e r a tional itself” ( 1 1 2 L ) . H e r e there is no reference t o Antigone’s martyrdom; but elsewhere, of course, Hegel spoke of it many times, by n o m e a n s o n l y i n t h e Phenomenology (H 30). T h i s is a s good a transition as any f r o m history t o the realm of absolute spirit: Hegel’s repeated praise of Sophocles’ Antigone, t h o u g h all of these passages c o m e from his lectures o n t h e realms of absolute spirit, m a y h e l p t o r o u n d out his view of t h e state. H a d h e been the statist a n d totalitarian h e h a s been called, h o w c o u l d h e possibly h a v e s o loved this play, which is a s o n g of songs o n civil disobedience? Hegel called this tragedy “ o n e of t h e m o s t sublime a n d i n every respect m o s t excellent w o rk s of art of all t i m e ” a n d t h e “absolute e x a m p l e of t r a g e d y . ” 6 A n d h e also s p o k e of “ t h e heavenly Antigone, t h e most glorious fi g u r e ever t o have

appeared on earth.”27 To u n d e r s t a n d Hegel o n history, o n e should k e e p in m i n d the

over-all structure

of

his system;

and

as

this example

shows, s o m e awareness of w h a t h e says in his lectures on t h e three realms of absolute spirit dispels at o n e blow m a n y misconceptions about his philosophy of history a n d of t h e state. There is n o ambiguity, n o metaphysical jargon, no uncertainty about t h a t last brief q u o t a t i o n : it is a s good a c l u e a s a n y to what Hegel m e a n t an d d i d n o t m e a n w h e n h e spoke of t h e state. I n yet a n o t h e r wa y this praise of “ t h e heavenly A n t i g o n e ”

is of immense interest: the phrasing makes it almost impos25 History of P h i l o s o p h y , G l o c k n e r ’ s e d . , X V I I I , 1 1 9 . I I , G l o c k n e r ’ s e d . , X I I I , 5 1 ; a n d Philosophy of R e ligion, I I , Glockner’s e d . , X V I , 1 3 3 . Cf. a l s o the p a s s a g e c i t e d from Aesthetik, XIV, 556, in H 13. 27 History of Philosophy, I I , Glockner’s e d . , XVIII, 1 1 4 . 26Aesthetik,

6 5 . Christianity, God, a n d G e i s t

271

sible n o t t o t h i n k of Jesus, an d t o note that Antigone is here placed abo v e h i m .

65 Hegel’s treatment of Christianity in his last years has often been misunderstood. A m o n g religions, h e considers it supreme

insofar as it seems to him to come closest to the truth comprehended ultimately in his phiIOSOphy. His references t o Judaism and Islam reveal no sympathetic understanding and

are patently unjust; like almost all other writers on these religions throughout the period of the Enlightenment and the

nineteenth century, he compares Judaism and Christianity only to affirm the superiority of the latter?8 I n its relation to phi1030phy, however, religion, including

even Christianity, is as a child compared to a man: it is an anticipation in less deve10ped form of what finds mature expression in philosophy. In the very lectures on history that we have been considering, Hegel compares t h e three realms

of absolute spirit (124 f . L ) . He considers religion first, then p r o c e e d s :

“The second form of the union of the objective and subjective in the spirit is art: it steps more into actuality and sensuousness than religion; a t its most dignified it h a s to

present, not the spirit of God but the form of the god, and what is divine and spiritual in general. The divine is to be presented to intuition b y it. “ B u t the true d o e s n o t o n l y reach notions and feelings, as in religion, or intuition, a s i n art, but also the thinking spirit. Thus we c o m e to the third form of union—philosophy. This

is in the manner indicated the highest, freest, and wisest form.” I n philos0phy, mythical notions (Vorstellungen) and subjective feeling ( G e f i i h l ) , a s well as intuition ( A n s c h a u u n g ) ,

are transcended at last by genuine comprehension. When Hegel avails himself of Christian categories, he never implies 23 For example, V G 5 8 L , 1 2 6 f . L, 1 3 3 L .

272

HEGEL 0N HISTORY

acceptance of the Christian faith in the supernatural, in miracles, o r i n the incarnation and resurrection; h e merely finds the Christian myths more suggestive a n d appropriate

anticipations of his philosophy than the myths of other religions. And occasionally he enjoyed the accents of edification, b o t h as a device for showing his students that his own ideas were not a s far-fetched and counter-intuitive a s they

might seem, and as a means of polemicizing a little against the theologians.

The reference to “the form of the god,” in the passage just quoted about art, obviously refers primarily to Greek sculpture. “What is divine” emphatically includes Antigone and Goethe’s Iphigenia ( c f . H 7 ) . Hegel never scruples to call Sittlichkeit divine, and says, for example: “The ethical

[das Sittliche] is the divine of religion as action.”29 Consider the way Hegel introduces the brief section o n “Revealed Religion” i n his Eycyclopedia. At this point, not

only Logic, phiIOSOphy of nature, and philosophy of subjective spirit lie behind us, but also objective spirit with its discussion of the state and the passing remarks o n history. We are i n the r e a l m o f absolute spirit, a n d the five pages o n art now give way to five o n “Revealed Religion.” The paragraph begins in a manner that, taken out of context, would sound pious e n o u g h : once a g a i n Hegel insists o n th e importance o f knowing G o d a n d attacks the theologians who make things shamefully easy for themselves by claiming “ t h a t m a n knows nothing of G o d . ” Against th em, Hegel insists that it is the whole point of the doctrine o f revelation that G o d is n o t e n vious but makes himself known. H e s o u n d s more orthodox

than many theologians—and thus uses a device employed previously by David Hume in his Dialogues. B u t then comes

the conclusion: “To grasp in thought, correctly and definitely, what God is as spirit, that requires thorough speculation [Hegel’s odd way of saying that it requires philosophy; i.e., not theology which h e has derided i n the immediately preceding sentence].

To begin with, this contains the following propositions: God 29 Aesthetik, Glockner’s e d . , XII, 3 1 6 .

6 5 . Christianity, G o d , a n d G e i s t

273

is o n l y G o d insofar a s h e k n o w s himself; his k n o w i n g h i m self is, furthermore, a self-consciousness i n m a n a n d man’s knowledge of G o d t h a t goes o n t o man’s k n o w i n g himself

in God” (§564). W h a t d o e s this m e a n if n o t t h a t G o d does n o t k n o w h i m self until m a n k n o ws h i m ; a n d since “ G o d is o n l y G o d ins o f a r a s h e knows himself,” G o d comes i n t o being o n l y w h e n m a n “ k n o w s ” h i m . F i n d l a y has therefore called Hegel “ t h e

philosopher . . . of liberal Humanism.”30 One may cavil at “liberal”: the temperament of the mature Hegel was conservative rather than liberal. But his religious position may b e safely characterized a s a form o f h u m a n i s m . E v e n a s o n e d o e s n o t call a m a n a stage in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e e m b r y o , b u t the e m b r y o a s t a g e i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a m a n , H e g e l d o e s n o t call t h e force t h a t eventually becomes spirit a s m a n develops, say, a late stage i n t h e evolution o f

some élan vital; rather he sometimes speaks of pre-human manifestations o f this force a s manifestations of spirit. I n the n a r r o w e r sense, w e should not s p e a k of spirit until w e reach m a n ; a n d therefore o n l y the third p a r t of t h e system is called “phi1030phy of spirit.” Th e s a m e point is m a d e in t h e lectures o n h i s t o r y : “The r e a l m o f t h e spirit i s w h a t is p r o d u c e d by m a n ” ( 5 0 L ) . A n d i n a n o t h e r passage H e g e l e v e n s a y s :

“The world spirit is the spirit of the world as it explicates itself in t h e h u m a n consciousness” ( 6 0 L ) . 3 1 T h i s should h a v e caused n o misunderstanding. h a d it not b e e n for Hegel’s occasional references t o G o d . H i s choice of

the word “spirit” had been very heavily influenced by the religious c o n n o t a t i o n s of this t e r m . W h a t was h e t o call t h e force w h o s e manifestations h e wished t o t r a c e m a i n l y i n t h e ethical s p h e r e , i n history, in a r t , in religion, a n d in phi1050phy, b u t of w h i c h it w o u l d also m a k e sense t o s p e a k when dis-

cussing nature? “Spirit” served admirably and at one blow c o n n e c t e d Hegel’s t h o u g h t n o t o n l y w i t h t h e Christian t r a d i -

30 Hegel, 354; cf. the argument for this conclusion on 342. While I d o n o t a g r e e w i t h s e v e r a l o f F i n d l a y ’ s p o i n t s o n 3 4 2 , h i s n o n - s u p e r n a t u r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is c e r t a i n l y right. 31 R o s e n k r a n z a l r e a d y n o t e d t h a t H e g e l , w h e n h e s p o k e o f t h e Weltgeist, “ d i d n o t m e a n G o d b u t m a n k i n d i n its t o t a l i t y ” ( 2 0 6 ) .

274

HEGEL ON HISTORY

tion b u t also with the decidedly un-Christian, humanistic

poetry of Goethe, Schiller, and Holderlin: their verse was full of references t o Geist, n o t always, though usually, i n t h e singular. Moreover, Geist also retained the m e a n i n g of the etymologically related “gist”; for example, when Mephistopheles, instructing a young student, dr0ps the “ p e d a n t i c tone” and s a y s : “The spirit of medicine is easy t o k n o w ” (line 2011). Geist, like the Latin spiritus, G r e e k pneuma, a n d Hebrew mach ( a n d unlike mind, nous, a n d logos) also m e a n s breath a n d w i n d , is essentially a m o v i n g force and the essence o f

life. Etymologically, it is also related to “yeast” and “geyser,” a n d conceptually it is associated w i t h t h e n o t i o n o f a ferment and a n eruptive force.32 Still, one can also s p e a k , a s Goethe h a d d o n e derisively i n Faust—in t h e Fragment published i n 1790—of “ t h e spirit of the times.” Faust’s lines t o Wagner b e a r q u o t i n g because they s h o w w h a t possibilities the use of this term Opens: W h a t spirit of the times you call,

Is but the scholars’ spirit after all, In which times past are now reflected.

(577 ff.)

O n c e having chosen this eminently suggestive w o r d , Hegel sometimes c o u l d n o t resist e q u a t i n g it with G o d , instead o f saying clearly: i n G o d I d o n o t believe; spirit sufiices m e . O f course, t h e r e w a s ample precedent for his occasional u n orthodox use o f “ G o d . ” The G r e e k s h a d m a d e r a t h e r free w i t h theos a n d tlzeoi, a n d H e g e l o n t h e gods in H o m e r is very good indeed a n d still worth reading, b o t h for those i n terested i n t h e G r e e k s and for those interested i n Hegel’s

conception of God, gods, and the divinef"3 Aeschylus and Sophocles, P l a t o a n d Aristotle h a d used s u c h t e r m s freely, t o o ; a n d G i l b e r t Murray r e m a r k s i n his superb b o o k o n Five

Stages of Greek Religion: “ A metaphysician might hold that 39 C f . R . H i l d e b r a n d t ’ s article o n Geist i n G r i m m ’ s D e u t s c h e s W o r t e r b u c l l , r e p r i n t e d s e p a r a t e l y , H a l l e , 1 9 2 6 , a n d the l o n g footn o t e i n m y Nietzsche ( 1 9 5 0 ) , 2 0 7 , M e r i d i a n e d . , 3 8 5 . 33Aesthetik,

especially 6 0 ff.

Glockner’s ed., XII, especially 302 fl., and XIII,

6 5 . Christianity, God, a n d G e i s t

275

their theology is far deeper than that to which we are accustomed, since they seem not to make any particular difference between hoi theoi [the gods] and h e theos [god] or to theion [the divine, a term Hegel likes to use, t o o ] . They d o not in-

stinctively SUppose that the human distinctions between ‘he’ and ‘it,’ or between ‘one’ and ‘many,’ apply to the divine.”34 In addition to his beloved Greeks, Hegel saw before him the example o f Spinoza a n d , i n his own time, the poetry of G o e t h e , Schiller, and H o l d e r l i n , who also liked t o speak o f

gods and the divine. So he, too, sometimes spoke of God a n d , m o r e often, of t h e divine; a n d because h e occasionally took pleasure i n insisting t h a t h e w a s really closer to this or

that Christian tradition than some of the theologians of his t i m e , h e h a s sometimes b e e n understood t o have been a

Christian. That h e , i n turn, b e c a m e a precedent for theologians like Tillich a n d B u l t m a n n , is undeniable. But if o n e should con-

sider the procedure of all three reprehensible, there are still important

differences i n Hegel’s favor. What

h e d i d very

occasionally, en passant, by way of being geistreich, they have made their full-time occupation. And considering the whole weight a n d tenor of his work, he w a s ever s o much less likely to b e misunderstood i n his own time. Above all,

far from treating the latest philosophy as a remarkable anticipation o f Christianity, provided only that the latter

were radically reinterpreted on the basis of this philosophy, Hegel presented the very opposite picture: in his system Christianity wa s treated a s a n anticipation i n mythological

form—on the level of vague notions and feelings—of truths articulated in philosophy.

The culmination of Hegel’s philosophy is neither the philosophy of history nor that of religion but the history of philosophy. And to this we shall now turn. It is of very considerable interest b u t offers n o immense difficulties and may therefore be discussed briefly. 34 Anchor

Books ed., 67.

276

HEGEL ON HISTORY

66 Hegel’s History of Philosophy begins with very remarkable introductory lectures, which w e shall consider last. They are now available in German in a critical edition, in a volume of roughly three hundred pages, edited by Hoffmeister. For the rest we still have to rely on the three volumes of the

nineteenth-century edition, reprinted without change under Glockner’s editorship. The apportionment of space is surprising but revealing: Chinese and Indian philosophy are allotted a little over 30 pages; Greek philosophy about 9 3 0 pages; medieval philosophy just over 1 0 0 ; and modern philosophy, from B a c o n t o Hegel, less than 4 3 0 . Greek phiIOSOphy up to Socrates: almost 3 0 0 pages. Socrates and the Socratics (Megarians, Cyrenaics, and C y n i c s ) :

about 130 pages. Plato: about 130 pages. Aristotle: about 130 pages. “Dogmatism and Skepticism” (Stoics, Epicureans, New Academy, and S k e p t i c s ) : about 1 6 5 pages. Neoplatonism (from Philo to Proclus and his s u c c e s s o r s ) : 94 pages.

Introduction to medieval philosophy: 21 pages. Arabic and Jewish philosophy: 11 pages. Scholasticism: 80 pages, including over 7 on Anselm, barely over 1 page o n St. Thomas, and 5 on O c c a m . Renaissance philosophy, including Pomponatius, Ficinus, Bruno ( 2 0 p a g e s ) , Vanini ( 6 ) ,

and Petrus Ramus: about 40 pages. In the last part, on modern phiIOSOphy, many philosophers are little more than mentioned. Those who receive detailed attention a r e : B a c o n ( 1 8 p a g e s ) , Jacob B d h m e ( 3 2 ) , Descartes ( 3 7 ) , Spinoza ( 4 3 ) , Malebranche ( 6 ) , Locke ( 2 2 ) , Hobbes ( 5 ) , Leibniz ( 2 4 ) , Wolfi' ( 8 ) , Berkeley ( 5 ) , Hume ( 7 ) , Jacobi ( 1 6 ) , Kant ( 6 0 ) , Fichte ( 3 0 ) , Krug ( 8 l i n e s ) , Fries ( 3 l i n e s ) , Schelling ( 3 8 p a g e s ) , a n d “ R e s u l t , ” which

begins “The present standpoint of phiIOSOphy . . . ,” ( 8 pages).

In sum: Almost two thirds of the history of Western philosophy is taken u p by Greek philosophy. The pre-Socratics

get three times as much space as all of medieval and Renais-

6 6 . The History of PhilosoPhy: contents

277

sance philosophy taken together. N o single medieval philosop h e r really interested H e g e l , and nothing i n this whole period of one thousand years s e e m e d as important to h i m as

Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God. Giordano Bruno and Jacob Bohme would not receive comparable attention in modern histories of phi1080phy, nor would Neoplatonism get so much more attention than all British philosophers t a k en together. K a n t gets half as much space a s either Pl a t o o r Aristotle; the whole of “Recent

German Philosophy,” including Kant, a little more than either Plato o r Aristotle a l o n e . I t is a commonplace t h a t one’s j u d g m e n t is m o s t unreliable

when one comes to the recent past and one’s contemporaries, and it would not have b e e n surprising if Hegel h a d left out

some philosophers who now seem to be of the first rank. Thus John Passmore h a s said at th e beginning of A Hundred Years of Philosophy ( 1 9 5 7 ) : “ I t is a s a l u t a r y reflection that

had I written this book in 1800 I should probably have dismissed Berkeley a n d Hume i n a few lines, i n order to con-

centrate m y attention on Dugald Stewart—and

that in

1 8 5 0 t h e centre o f m y interest would have shifted to S i r William H a m i l t o n ” ( 7 f . ) . H e also remarks that “ M i l l knew

practically nothing of Hume” and that “interest in Hume d a t e s b a c k to t h e edition of his works b y T . H . G r e e n and T. H . Grose ( 1 8 7 4 ) ; Berkeley . . . was little regarded a s a

philosopher until the publication of A. C. Fraser’s edition (1871)” (11). I t is pleasing t o fi n d that Hegel gave Hume seven pages,

and Berkeley five, to Dugald Stewart’s page and a half. Between 1 8 2 7 a n d 1 8 2 9 , Krug, whom t h e young Hegel h a d attacked ( H 1 7 ) , published his Allgemez‘nes Handwb’rterbuch der plzilosophischen Wissenschaften, nebst z'hrer Literatur u n d Gesclziclzte,35 in fiv e volumes. He gave Stewart a b o u t a third of a page, Berkeley a little m o r e t h a n a p a g e , a n d Hume m o r e t h a n t h r e e . Locke, t o o , h e gave over t h r e e ; F i c h t e got o v e r three; a n d H e g e l t w o , very unfriendly, of course. It is n o t particularly surprising that both Krug a n d Hegel

35 “General Cyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, together with t h e i r Literature and H i s t o r y . ”

278

HEGEL ON HISTORY

did better than Passmore thinks he himself would have done. One works i n a tradition, and while British philosophy was not part of the mainstream o f the German philosophical tradition in Hegel’s day, and therefore received pr0portionately little attention, both Berkeley an d Hume had been prominently mentioned by Kant and could not be ignored. Through K a n t they h a d gained a place in the tradition. Hegel, of course, did not merely include Hume. He con-

sidered him the greatest representative of a major approach t o philosophy—one of the four he selected for discussion in

the preliminary part of the Encyc20pedia (see H 1 9 ) . Even of England it is not true that interest in Berkeley and H u m e “dates back” only to the 18703, a s Passmore suggests: I n 1 8 5 7 George Henry Lewes gave twenty pages each to Berkeley a n d to Hume, and none at all t o Stewart, in The Biographical History of Philosophy.36 Lewes, o f course, h a d

been to Germany; he had devoted one of his earliest essays to an appreciative account of Hegel’s Aesthetik; and in 1855 he had published w h a t is widely considered his major work, a Life of G o e t h e . And George Eliot ( M a r y Ann E v a n s ) , for whom he left his wife i n 1 8 5 4 , h a d translated into English the major works of two o f Hegel’s leading disciples: D . F.

Strauss’s Life of Jesus (tr., 1846) and Ludwig Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity ( t r . , 1854).37 T. H . Green, to whose edition of Hume’s works Passmore

credits the origin of interest in Hume’s philosophy, has been fittingly called “the m o s t typical English representative of the

school of thought called nee-Kantian, or neo-Hegelian.”33 It would seem that the British discovered Hume’s phiIOSOphical significance by way of Kant and Hegel. Hegel has sometimes been accused of reading his ideas into his predecessors. The essential generosity of his approach should n o t b e overlooked. Instead o f concentrating o n the follies of his predecessors and then saying, a s it were, “ B u t I

36 Second edition, “much enlarged and thoroughly revised,” 2 vols., New York, D . Appleton a n d C o . , 549—68 a n d 5 6 9 - 8 8 . 37 For Strauss’s a n d Feuerbach’s a t t i t u d e s toward Hegel, see D 1831 and 1840.

38 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edition.

6 7 . T h e introductory lectures

279

say u n t o you . . . , ” Hegel m a k e s n o point of his own originality b u t tries t o s h o w how t h e labors of t h e great p h i 1050phers of t h e past a d d u p . Hence h e gives s o much attention t o t h e Neoplatonics, t o Bruno, an d t o B o h m e . Another

man might have relied on public ignorance of works from which he had actually received much inspiration, in a n effort, not necessarily entirely deliberate, to a p p e a r m o r e original t h a n h e was i n fact. H e g e l goes t o the opposite extreme. When h e h a s found m u c h t h a t is good a n d helpful i n a m a n ,

then he discusses him at length even if others might not d e e m h i m worthy of s o m u c h attention i n a history of phiIOSOphy.

His attitude is aptly summarized in one of his Berlin aphorisms ( R o s . 5 5 6 ) : “ O n c e a m a n h a s r e a c h e d t h e p o i n t w h e r e h e n o longer knows things better t h a n others—that is,

when it is a matter of total indifference to him that others h a v e d o n e things b a d l y a n d h e is only interested i n what they

have done right—then peace and affirmation have entered his m i n d . ”

It would be pointless here to discuss in detail Hegel’s interpretation of his predecessors. To say that he was exceedingly well read and informed for his day would be a laughable und e r s t a t e m e n t . H i s lectures o n t h e subject established t h e history of philosophy a s a n a r e a o f central importance for s t u d e n t s of p h i l o s o p h y : n o g r e a t philosopher before h i m h a d

given such lectures or insisted o n his students’ study of this subject. This part of his system thus represents one of Hegel’s most noteworthy accomplishments, and as a contribution of t r u l y revolutionary i m p o r t a n c e it forms a very fitting culmination for t h e system.

67 In conclusion, let u s consider the introduction t o these lectures. ( T h e e n d h a s a l r e a d y b e e n discussed in H 1 3 ) . The first lecture He g e l gave a s a professor a t Heidelberg, O c t o b e r 2 8 , 1 8 1 6 , was t h e i n t r o d u c t o r y lecture o f his c o u r s e o n the

280

HEGEL ON HISTORY

history of philosophy a n d survives in his manuscript. We shall begin w i t h a r e m a r k a b l e passage from t h a t : “ I h o p e I shall succeed i n e a r n i n g a n d gaining y o u r c o n fidence. To begin with, however, I m a y n o t c l a i m a n y t h i n g except t h a t you s h o u l d bring along co n fi d en ce in science a n d c o n fi d e n c e i n yourselves. The c o u r a g e for t r u t h , the faith in t h e power of t h e spirit, is the first condition of philosophy. M a n , since h e is spirit, may a n d should d e e m himself worthy o f t h e highest; of t h e greatness a n d power of his spirit h e

cannot think grandly enough. And with this faith, nothing will b e s o c o y o r h a r d t h a t it will n o t o p e n u p for him. The

initially concealed and locked up essence of the universe has n o strength to resist t h e c o u r a g e t o k n o w ; it m u s t uncover

its wealth and its depths before the eyes of such courage and let it enjoy t h e m .

“The history of philosophy represents for us the gallery o f t h e noble spirits who, b y t h e boldness of their reason, penetrated i n t o t h e nature of things, of m a n , a n d i n t o the nature of G o d , unveiling its d e p t h for us a n d t h r o u g h their work presenting t o u s the treasure of t h e highest knowledge. This treasure, of which we ourselves w a n t t o partake, c o n -

stitutes phiIOSOphy in general; its genesis is what we shall learn to know and comprehend in these lectures” ( 5 f . ) . Almost all of this passage was emphasized b y H e g e l h i m -

self in his manuscript. This is the introduction to the pinnacle of Hegel’s philosophy. He did not introduce history, art, or religion i n a remotely c o m p a r a b l e t o n e . When Hegel w e n t t o Berlin h e r e w r o t e the beginning a n d fashioned a n altogether new m a n u s c r i p t for his first lectures, beginning October 2 4 , 1 8 2 0 , a n d wrote w h a t i n print comes

to over fifty pages. The following quotations come from this manuscript: “Immediately we encounter the very common view of the history of philosophy that it h a s t o n a r r a t e the store of philos0plzical opinions a s t h e y resulted a n d presented themselves

in time. When people speak pleasantly, they call this material opinions; those who consider themselves a b l e t o express t h e

matter with more thorough judgment call this history a gallery of follies, o r a t least of aberrations . . . ” ( 2 5 ) .

6 7 . The introductory lectures

281

“ O n e sees, o n g r e a t m a t t e r s . . . t h e greatest spirits erred, f o r t h e y h a v e been refuted by o t h e r s ” ( 2 6 ) . “ W h a t c o u l d b e m o r e useless than t o get t o k n o w a series of m e r e opinions? w h a t more boring? . . . A n Opinion is

merely mine [Eine Meinung ist mein: an inspired pun that crystallizes an important point]. . . . Philosophy, however, contains no opinions; there are no philosophical Opinions. . . . Phi1030phy is objective science o f th e t r u t h . . . . Truth, however, is one; t h e instinct o f reason h a s this insuperable feeling o r f a i t h . T h u s only o n e philosophy c a n b e t h e true

one. And because they are so different, the others—one infers—must o n l y b e errors” ( 2 7 ) .

“About this reflection one might say first of all that, however different phiIOSOphies a r e s u p p o s e d t o b e , a t least they

have this in common, that they are philosophy. Whoever, therefore, studied o r mastered any philosophy at all, if it really is a philosophy, would t h u s m a s t e r s o m e phiIOSOphy. T h i s e x c u s e a n d a r g u m e n t t h a t clings merely t o t h e difference I h a v e c o m p a r e d elsewhere39 w i t h a ( p e d a n t i c a l ) invalid

whom his doctor advises to eat fruit and who is offered cherries o r p l u m s o r grapes, b u t w h o will n o t take any . . . bec a u s e n o n e of these a r e fruit b u t m e r e l y cherries o r p l u m s o r grapes” ( 2 8 ) .

“But this preposition that truth is only one, is itself still abstract a n d f o r m a l . A n d w h a t is m o s t essential is t o recognize t h a t t h e o n e truth is n o t a m e r e l y simple abstract t h o u g h t o r proposition; r a t h e r it is s o m e t h i n g concrete” ( 2 9 ) .

“. . . The idea is essentially concrete, the unity of diflerentiated determinations. It is at this point that the knowledge o f reason differs from t h e k n o w led g e of the mere u n d e r s t a n d ing, a n d it is t h e business o f philosophy to s h o w t h a t t h e

true, the idea, does not consist in empty generalities but in s o m e t h i n g general t h a t is essentially p a r t i c u l a r a n d d e t e r m i -

nate. . . . Here the consciousness not yet trained in philosophy steps b a c k a n d says t h a t it d o e s n o t understand this. 39 Encyclopedia (1817), §8; (1827), §13. The point that foll o w s h a s c o m e t o b e w i d e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h G i l b e r t Ryle’s C o n c e p t of Mind ( 1 9 4 9 ) , a s if i t r e p r e s e n t e d a n e n t i r e l y new insight. Ryle never s a i d i t d i d .

282

HEGEL ON HISTORY

That it does not understand this means first of all that it does not yet fi n d this a m o n g its customary notions an d convic-

tions. . . . But to understand it and form some notion of it is easy. Red, e.g., is a n abstract sensuous notion, and when

ordinary consciousness speaks of red it is not of the Opinion that it is dealing with anything abstract. But a rose that is red is a concrete red; it is a unity o f leaves, of form, o f color,

of smell, something living and growing in which many such abstractions can b e differentiated and isolated, a n d which can also b e destroyed and torn, and which is nevertheless, in all the manifoldness it contains, o n e subject, o n e idea. Thus

the pure abstract idea is essentially not something abstract, not empty simplicity like r e d , b u t a flower, something essentially concrete. Or t o take a n example from a determination

of thought, the proposition ‘A is A,’ the principle of identity, is an entirely abstract simplicity. . . . But when I go o n to the category of ground [ G r u n d ] , this is already an essen-

tially concrete determination. Ground, the grounds, what is essential i n things is also that which i s identical with itself

and rests in itself; but ground is at the same time defined as something that goes o u t of itself to relate itself t o something

of which it is the ground. The simple Concept, therefore, contains not only what the ground is but also the other of which it is the ground; the cause contains also the effect. Something that was supposed to be a ground, taken without anything of which it is the ground, is no ground; just so, something that is supposed to be determined as a cause, but without effect. . . . This, then, is what it means t o b e con-

crete: to contain not only one immediate determination but also another. “After having thus explained the nature of the concrete, I now add about its significance that the true . . . has the drive to develop itself. Only the living, that which is spirit, moves and stirs essentially, and develops. The idea, concrete i n

itself and developing, is thus an organic system, a totality which contains a wealth of stages and moments.

“Now philosophy is for itself the recognition of this deve10pment, and as thinking that comprehends, it is itself this

6 7 . T h e introductory lectures

283

thinking development. The further this development has reached, the more perfect is the philosophy” (30 i t ) . “ T h u s philosophy is system in the process of d e v e l o p m e n t ”

(33). “ N o w I claim t h a t t h e s e q u e n c e of t h e systems of philosop h y in history is t h e same a s t h e s e q u e n c e in t h e logical derivation of t h e c o n c e p t u a l determinations o f t h e i d e a ” ( 3 4 ) .

It is time to st0p and take stock. Hegel takes more seriously than any major philosopher before him the problem posed b y t h e disagreement a m o n g t h e g r e a t philosophers. Leibniz h a d m a d e a few scattered r e m a r k s a b o u t this p r o b l e m ; Aristotle, in t h e first b o o k o f his Metaphysics, h a d related t h e views of his predecessors a n d integrated t h e m i n his ow n sys-

tem. Hegel discusses the problem at some length. If philosophy w e r e a s s i m p l e a s a single abstract proposition, t h e r e w o u l d b e n o point, Hegel a d m i t s implicitly, i n studying t h e history of philosophy. B u t philosophy is highly c o m p l e x , m u c h m o r e like a fl o w e r o r a living o r g a n i s m t h a n like a simple quality, s u c h a s r e d , o r s u c h a proposition a s t h e principle o f identity. S i n c e it is c o m p l e x a n d alive, no s i m p l e prOposition c a n e x h a u s t it, a n d even a small collection of s u c h propositions m a y d o justice to o n l y a few aspects o f

it. Indeed, the possibility arises that different collections of propositions—different philosophies, i n o t h e r words—might b e partially t r u e , might s u p p l e m e n t e a c h o t h e r , an d might therefore b e worth s t u d y i n g o n e a f t e r t h e o t h e r . N o t o n l y m i g h t this b e w o r t h while; n o b o d y w h o w a n t s t o do justice to the w h o l e c o m p l e x o r g a n i s m s h o u l d d a r e t o v e n t u r e his ow n little collection of propositions w ith o u t first s t u d y i n g t h e results o f t h e c u m u l a t i v e l a b o r o f m a n y centuries. The g r e a t philoso~ p h e r s of t h e past e r r e d i n n o t c o m p r e h e n d i n g their own re -

lation to their rivals in the most fruitful way; indeed they w e r e w r o n g insofar a s t h e y considered their fellow workers m e r e l y as rivals; b u t for all t h a t t h e y w e r e n o t a g r o u p of fools b u t “ n o b l e spirits” t o w h o s e boldness w e owe treasures t h a t n o single lifetime w o u l d e v e r b e sufficient for an y o n e m a n

to amass. T h e last q u o t a t i o n m a y still s e e m surprising—and w o u l d be if t h e Logic h a d b e e n written b y H e g e l before h e had

284

HEGEL ON HISTORY

ever studied t h e history of philos0phy. B u t though the manuscript w e a r e n o w considering w as b e g u n i n O c t o b e r 1 8 2 0 , Hegel h a d lectured o n the history of philos0phy a s e a r l y as 1 8 0 5 , a n d the published version of t h e lectures draws heavily o n the lectures given a t Jena.40 It h a s b e e n n o t e d previously that the sequence of t h e categories in the Logic

was not determined by any strict necessity, logical or dialectical; that there was no relentless deduction from Concept t o C o n c e p t ; a n d that t h e whole s t r u c t u r e of t h e w o r k is much

looser than is widely supposed. We now learn, in effect, that o n e guide for the s e q u e n c e w a s a sidelong glance a t t h e his-

tory of philosophy. But we may safely add that the statement quoted ( f r o m page 3 4 ) is something of a n exaggeration— which is fortunate b o t h f o r t h e Logic a n d for Hegel’s History of Philosophy. B o t h a r e works of abundance i n w h i c h t h e

author faced the problem of organizing an excessive wealth of materials; he did not try wretchedly to eke out a whole v o l u m e b y extrapolating from a n o t h e r work. W h e n Hegel gave the c o u r s e o n t h e history of phi1050phy i n 1829—30, h e admitted, according t o his students’ notes, that the re may

be some differences; “but in the main points the sequence in the logical realm a n d i n history m u s t b e o n e ” ( 2 7 8 ) . O n e of t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t ideas h e w a n t s t o establish i n

this way is no longer controversial: “that the study of the history of philosophy is study of plzilosOphy itsel ” ( 3 5 ) . I n getting this fi r m l y established, Hegel m a d e a m a j o r c o n t r i b u tion t o intellectual history—and actually helped t o create i n -

tellectual history as a field of scholarship. As usual in Hegel, there are many passing points that are of interest. H e r e it will sufiice t o m e n t i o n merely two or

three. There is, for example, an interesting discussion of myth a n d its relation t o t r u t h ( 5 4 f . ) . Hegel equates Dasein (existence) with In-der-Zeit-Sein (being-in-time), a point that almost everybody considers original with Heidegger ( 3 7 ) .

40 “These [Jena] lectures on the history of philosophy he did n o t c h a n g e g r e a t l y i n h i s l a t e r c o u r s e s i n t h e v e r s i o n s t h a t have also been printed; he merely elaborated them” (R05. 201).

6 8 . Hegel’s influence and t h e Hegel legend

285

There is also a passage that reads like a deliberate polemic against Heidegger’s many exegeses of the pre-Socratics‘“:

Hegel insists “that the beginning is the least formed, determ i n a t e , and developed and is the poorest and most abstract, a n d the first philosophy i s t h e wholly general, indeterminate

thought and the simplest, while the newest philosophy is the m o s t concrete and profound. One m u s t know this lest one

seek for more behind the old philosophies than they contain . . . ” ( 6 6 ) . Even those who applaud the warning and approve of the examples Hegel goes o n to give may take exception to his praise of “the newest phiIOSOphy,” which sounds like selfpraise. A few pages later Hegel repeats this praise, but immediately proceeds to explain it by saying that in this phi10$0phy “everything that at first appears as something past, must be preserved and contained; it must itself be a mirror of t h e whole history.” We shall c o n c l u d e o u r consideration of these introductory

lectures with a quotation whose tone is markedly different from the exuberance of the passage with which we began: “Every philosophy . . . belongs to its time and is biassed by its limitations. The individual is the son of his pe0ple, his world. He may put on airs as much as he pleases, he does not go beyond it . . . ” ( 7 2 ) .

68 Hegel saw what the times were ripe for, and h e developed the historical approach to art, religion, and philosophy, to

the whole realm of the spirit, to what in Germany are still 41 On 7 3 f. there is another such passage: “When the most modern age is called upon to return t o the standpoint of some ancient philosophy . . . t o g e t o u t o f all the c o m p l i c a t i o n s o f l a t e r t i m e s ,

such a return is not the spontaneous appearance of the first relearning. . . . ” A n d Hegel calls attention to the implicit authoritarianism of such an approach.

286

HEGEL 0N HISTORY

called Geisteswissenschaften.42 U n d e r his influence, scholarship i n t h e humanities flourished for over a c e n t u r y ; indeed, much of his influence h a s become permanently embedded

in Western civilization. There is no history of philosophy written since his time that does not bear the stamp of his spirit. Such German scholars a s Erdmann, Zeller, a n d K u n o Fischer, a s well a s Windelband, stood directly in the m a i n line of this influence, but others—even if t h e y despise him, like B e r t r a n d Russell in his History of Western PhiIOSOpIzy—are still following in his footsteps. Hegel’s influence h a s n o t b e e n c o n fi n e d t o the historiog-

raphy of philosophy, or to the study of Geisteswz'ssenschaften. Liberal Protestantism is unthinkable without it, a n d so are the British Idealism of F . H . Bradley, T. H . G r e e n , and Bernard Bosanquet, the philosophies of Josiah R o y c e , Benedetto Croce, a n d R . G . Collingwood, a n d large parts of Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. Much intellectual history since Hegel’s t i m e is best under-

stood as a series of revolts against Hegel’s influence. It may be stretching a point to bring this under the heading of influence; but there are few men in history of whom such a statement could b e m a d e . I n t h e e n d it matters little whether we call this s o m e sort of influence o r n o t : the significant fact

is that without understanding Hegel one can comprehend relatively little of m a n y movements since his t i m e , while a

study of his thought opens scores of doors. The most obvious example, and by far the single most important o n e , is furnished b y Marxism. Marx accepted a great d e a l from Hegel—especially what h e took to be his dia— lectic, though h e claimed t h a t Hegel’s idealism turned things upside down. As a m a t t e r of fact, Hegel’s dialectic never was t h e rigorous method t h a t Marx and his followers sought t o m a k e of it; a n d this w e h a v e tried t o show i n this book. B y depriving it of its p r i m a r y reference t o ideas a n d applying it instead t o m o d e s of production, o n e c a n n o t m a k e the

42 Much of the discussion of the differences between natural sciences a n d Geisteswz’ssenschaften, b y Dilthey, Rickert, e t a l . , is an elaboration of, e.g., V G 7 0 L .

6 8 . H egel’s influence and t h e Hegel legend

287

dialectic more precise; or materialism, “scientific.” On the contrary, beliefs are at least capable of being literally con-

tradicted and then subsumed in a higher synthesis, while any dialectic of modes of production o r material circumstances is bound to be utterly lacking in rigor. The fact that Marxism further claims that the dialectic can be used to make predictions—Hegel never did and, o n the contrary, insisted that

philosophy must confine itself to the present and past—has led Marxism much further in the direction of pseudo-scientific rigor t h a n Hegel himself ever went. B u t the fact that Marxism

is in this respect intellectually indefensible obviously does not enable us to ignore it; and those who wish to comprehend it m u s t s t u d y Hegel. “ O n e cannot completely comprehend

Marx’s Capital, and

especially the first chapter, unless one has studied and comprehended the whole of Hegel’s Logic. Consequently, after half a century not one of the Marxists has comprehended Marx.” Thus wrote Lenin.43 William James polemicized against Hegel again and again, but hardly knew Hegel and really meant Royce who, ironically, was often less close to Hegel than James was. James’s attack against the block universe, though aimed a t Hegel,

would have found a n enthusiastic ally in Hegel. So, of course, would have James’s “pragmatic” insistence that truth should make a difference in our lives, that philosophy is vision, and that the realm of faith and morals must not be severed from the realm of epistemology and metaphysics. I n James it may have been partly a n elective aflinity rather than influence that drew him to Hegel’s old p a t h s . In his fellow pragmatist, John Dewey, it was clearly a direct influence; for Dewey, as

is well known, began his philosophic career as a Hegelian. In British philosophy, R . G . Collingwood was the last major representative of Hegel’s direct influence. But the main drift of British philosophy, since G . E. Moore published his famous “Refutation o f Idealism” i n 1 9 0 3 , has been a revolt 43 A u s dem philosophischen Nachlass, 99; quoted in Wilhelm R. Beyer, Zwischen Phc'inomenologie u n d Logik: Hegel als Redakteur der Bamberger Zeitung ( 1 9 5 5 ) , 2 2 6 .

288

HEGEL 0N HISTORY

against Hegel’s influence, specifically against McTaggart and the other British Idealists. S o m e of the excesses an d t h e onesidedness of this movement—features that constitute limitations t h o u g h they certainly have not prevented a great many

fine contributions—must be explained as a n overreaction. Hegel’s own conception of th e development of phiIOSOphy helps u s t o comprehend these reactions against his i m p a c t .

A related movement requires a similar analysis: the socalled New Criticism. Here we have th e s a m e reaction against the historical school. The Hegelian a s well a s the Marxist approach is rejected i n favor of close analysis, often with a deliberate disregard for historical context. W h a t h a d been

neglected tends to be made the alpha and omega. Finally—there is no need for a more inclusive list here— there is existentialism. Even more than M a r x , Kierkegaard saw himself in revolt against H e g e l ; unlike Marx, h e w a s not clearly a w a r e of h o w m u c h h e h a d tak en from t h e m a n h e fought. Through h i m , “dialectical” theology a n d neoOrthodoxy are almost a s incomprehensible w i t h o u t Hegel as is the liberal Protestantism they rose t o attack. What m a k e s Kierkegaard’s revolt s o interesting is t h a t its i n fl u e n c e h a s b y n o m e a n s b e e n confined t o religion. After the first World War, his protest against t h e Hegelian concep-

tion of phiIOSOphy as science found a hearing both among professional philosophers a n d in Western th o u g h t generally. When h e penned his Concluding Unscientific Postscript i n 1 8 4 6 , h e w a s still “ u n t i m e l y ” : b u t , a s Nietzsche remarked

in Ecce Homo, “some are born posthumously.”44 A century later, “scientific” h a d c o m e to m e a n t o millions: shallow,

mechanical, remote from the genuine problems of life. And Hegel was stigmatized a s a n “essentialist” and academician,

a professor who constructed a system that bore no relation to his concrete existence, a philosopher who paid no heed to livi n g experience. This book h a s sought to correct this impression. Kierkegaard’s attacks w e r e n o t based o n his own reading of H e g e l a n d were usually a s wide of the mark as his remarks 44 Chapter III, fourth sentence.

6 8 . Hegel’s influence a n d t h e Hegel legend

289

a b o u t Goethe.4=5 H i s i m a g e of Hegel was derived from the

lectures of the old Schelling who had deve10ped a profound resentment when Hegel’s fame eclipsed his o w n . Any detailed analysis of this phase of th e Schelling-Hegel relationship

would lead us much too far afield: it belongs i n a study of Schelling.46 But the major documents are listed in chronological order i n the Bibliography, under Schelling. In brief, Schelling could not bear the thought that h e him-

self was, as it were, a steppingstone between Fichte and Hegel, though he did not doubt that Fichte had been a steppingstone between K a n t and h i m s e l f ; a n d he kept making two

points. The first, which earned him Heinrich Heine’s merciless mockery

( D 1 8 3 5 ) , was that Hegel had stolen his ideas.

This won Schelling no respect at all. The second point, however, deeply impressed many Christians, including Kierkegaard: Hegel’s philosophy, like Schelling’s own youthful philosophy, had remained on the level of merely “negative philosophy,” a n d t h e really significant advance remained to b e made now, after Hegel’s death; w h a t was called for was

a new “positive philosophy.” It was in this context that Schelling created the caricature of Hegel as a mere concept-monger. Indeed, Hegel h a d c o m e

after the young Schelling, but the way Christian Wolff had come after the great Leibniz: “This empirical determination was removed instinctively, as it were, by one who came later and whom nature seemed to have predestined for a new Wolfianism,

for our age: the living a n d actual, t o w h i c h a

former philosophy had attributed the quality of going over into its opposite ( t h e subject) a n d then t o return from this

into itself, he replaced with the logical Concept t o which he attributed, by means of the strangest fiction or hypostatization, a similar necessary self-movement. This last point was 45 Cf. Carl Roos’s

Danish study of Kierkegaard 0g Goethe

( 1 9 5 5 ) . R005 deals i n detail w i t h Kierkegaard a s a r e a d e r a n d

shows how completely he lacked objectivity and how heavily he was influenced by secondary sources. 46 Cf. Fischer and Fuhrmans i n the Bibliography and Schelling’s letters i n A u s Schellings Leben, I I I , p p . 6 3 , 6 7 , 9 5 , 9 8 , 1 4 2 , 1 6 5 .

290

HEGEL ON HISTORY

entirely his o w n invention a n d , a s o n e might expect, a dmire d

by paltry minds . . 3’47 Kierkegaard was soon disappointed b y Schelling’s lectures, which never lived up t o t h e bold promises m a d e i n t h e beginning. Kierkegaard did n o t side with Schelling and h a d n o interest i n Schelling’s historical position. B u t h e did find Schelling’s caricature of h i s erstwhile friend extremely useful as a t h e m e o n e c o u l d develop a n d v a r y slightly w h e n i n need of a h u m o r o u s contrast. T h r o u g h Kierkegaard, legions o f twentieth-century readers who barely know Schelling’s n a m e h a v e c o m e t o t a k e for

granted as historically accurate his spiteful caricature of Hegel. M a n y people assume t h a t Hegel is t h e antipodes o f existentialism. B u t t h e only m a j o r so-called existentialist w ho has s h o w n a s much interest in Hegel a s Kierkegaard did is Sartre. H e was actually sufficiently interested t o r e a d H e ge l and h a s never m a d e a secret of his i m m e n s e d e b t t o Hegel.48 O n Hegel’s influence o n this m a n a n d m o v e m e n t o r t h a t , m a n y a m o n o g r a p h c a n b e a n d h a s been written. T h e p o i n t here is merely t o suggest briefly h o w relevant Hegel is t o twentieth—century concerns. N o o t h e r nineteenth-century philosopher a p p r o a c h e s h i m in this respect, w i t h t h e sole e x c e p tion of Nietzsche.

69 A brief contrast with Nietzsche may p ro v e illuminating. Nietzsche c a m e from a conservative b a c k g r o u n d . B y the t i m e h e was thirty-six h e h a d published eight small books, t h e last three more radical t h a n his early essays, a n d d u r i n g the next few years, before h e collapsed a t the age of forty-four, h e published seven m a j o r works a n d completed three others

47 Vorrea’e (preface) for Cousin’s book on French and German p h i l o s o p h y ( 1 8 3 4 ) , p . xiv; s e e t h e Bibliography. Cf. a l s o t h e p a s -

sages referred to above in H 39, note

5.

43“Sartre

l e a r n e d t o s t u d y H e g e l i n the classes o f Kojéve just before W o r l d W a r I I ” ( W i l f r e d D e s a n . T h e Marxism of Jean-Paul

Sartre, 1965. 5 2 ) . See Biemel, Klaus Hartmann, and Kojéve, in the Bibliography.

6 9 . Comparison with Nietzsche

291

t h a t were published o n l y later. S h o r t l y before his collapse h e also brought o u t “ n e w editions” of several of his earlier b o o k s : h e d i d n o t rewrite t h e m b u t ‘ a d d e d brilliant prefaces a n d i n o n e c a s e a r e m a r k a b l e final chapter a n d a n a p p e n d i x of verse a s well. H i s radicalism grew with t h e s p e e d o f h i s productivity. Like Va n G o g h , h e w a s d r i v e n t o t h e breaking p o i n t i n a n incredible crescendo. H e g e l w a s most radical when h e w a s young a n d never pub-

lished his boldest essays. When he was thirty-six, he published his first major work, by far his most daring book. When he was forty-four he was in the midst of publishing his second major work. On the heels of that he published his system i n syllabus form a n d t h e n , i n 1 8 2 1 , his last book,

by all odds the least bold. During the final ten years of his life he did not attempt another book. First he wrote an unexciting preface for the book of one of his followers, then seven book reviews totaling about four hundred pages. In 1827 he published a thorough revision of his system, and thr ee years l a t e r a n o t h e r revision, containing a very large n u m b e r of very small changes. D u r i n g th e last year of his life h e revised t h e first v o l u m e of his Logic a n d also m a d e a great

many minute and for the most part utterly unhelpful changes in the early pages of the preface to his Phenomenology, b u t d i e d b e f o r e finishing w i t h t h e p r e f a c e . S a y i n g t h a t o n e prefers t h e late Nietzsche t o t h e early Nietzsche, b u t the e a r l y H e g e l t o t h e l a t e r Hegel w o u l d s o u n d highly subjective. But it is a fact t h a t Hegel d i d his m o s t original work before h e w e n t t o Berlin a n d b e c a m e a famous

professor, that his inspiration gradually dried up, and that h i s growing conservatism w e n t together with a lack of new ideas. H i s Berlin lectures c o n t a i n m a n y striking passages a nd h a v e exerted a n i m m e n s e influence, but they d r e w heavily o n

his early notes, and the power to fashion his youthful visions i n t o lasting works w a s gone. Hegel worked t o t h e e n d a n d , far from being a s self-satisfied a s h e h a s o f t e n been pictured, kept revising his lectures a s well a s h i s books. But his energies w e n t i n t o relatively insignificant changes, e v e n if h e d i d m a k e t h o u s a n d s of t h e m , a n d i n t o u n i m p o r t a n t reviews

of less important books. Once more, Rosenkranz’s testimony

292

HEGEL ON HISTORY

(16 f.) is to the point: “One cannot find anything more hacked to pieces, more crossed o u t , m o r e constantly rewritten than one o f Hegel’s drafts for a letter from the Berlin period.” His early essays are bold both stylistically and i n their radical critique of Christianity. In t h e Phenomenology and Logic the occasionally very striking prose keeps compromisi n g with the author’s notions of what is academically o r

“scientifically” respectable and solid, but the over-all conception of both projects is bold to the point of foolhardiness. In the Encyclopedia the format is c u t and dried, but the attempt to offer so much i n such a small compass is still anything but timid. Then, beginning about fourteen years before his death, Hegel dared no more. The Philosophy of Right is not, a s h a s been alleged, the work of a timeserver; neither is it a courageous book. The religious views of the later Hegel were remote from all forms of traditional Christianity, b u t h e no longer heeded his ow n

emphatic dictum that philos0phy should beware of being edifying, and tried to show that h e could b e more inspiring, and sound more Christian, than Schleiermacher and other liberal theologians. H e c a m e t o emphasize what h i s phiIOSOphy

had in common with Christianity—what is heard gladly. He had not always b e e n a tired old m a n ; h e h a d know n lit-

tle peace until he was forty—five. The great battles of the Napoleonic era had never been far away. He had not found it easy to fit into the social structure o f his t i m e : while a

great many mediocrities were appointed Professors of Philosophy, h e was thirty-eight when h e settled down to his first

decent job—as headmaster of a boys’ secondary school— and he was forty-six when he finally obtained an academic chair. (Nietzsche had been a professor for ten years when he retired in ill health at thirty-five.) When Hegel came to Berlin, he palpably enjoyed having finally found peace and security. After his death, Hegel’s works were edited by professors and other highly respectable men who had been his students. Yet his works were edited much more irresponsibly than Nietzsche’s, although the editing o f Nietzsche has long b e e n

6 9 . Comparison with Nietzsche

293

considered a scandal. That f o u r w o r d s a n d o n e e r r o n e o u s q u o t a t i o n were left o u t of T h e Antichrist w h e n it w a s p u b -

lished in 1895 has been cited as proof of the perversion of Nietzsche by his editors, while the fact that scores of changes w e r e m a d e b y Hegel’s editors, even i n t h e books h e himself h a d published, h a s excited n o interest whatever, except among a very few Hegel scholars. That a b u n d a n t “ a d d i t i o n s ” o f d u b i o u s c h a r a c t e r w e r e interlarded i n t h e posthumous editions o f two of his four b o o k s is not considered a scandal, and these “ a d d i t i o n s ” a r e q u o t e d b y t h e m o s t reputable professors a s Hegel’s own w o r d s . N o t o n e of Hegel’s books is better k n o w n t h a n “ h i s ” Philosophy of History, a n d ina d e q u a t e translations o f indefensible G e r m a n texts k e e p be-

ing reissued with learned prefaces (cf. H 5 2 and 5 3 ) . I t h a s o f t e n b e e n said t h a t Nietzsche w a s n o t really a phi1030pher b e c a u s e h e h a d n o system. S o m e G e r m a n scholars still s u p p o s e t h a t a philosopher without a system is like a s q u a r e circle. This s t r a n g e n o t i o n is largely d u e t o Hegel’s influence, a l t h o u g h Hegel himself never denied t h e n a m e o f phiIOSOpher t o a n y b o d y because h e l a c k e d a system. Nor are his own books a s “scientific” a s h e w o u ld have liked t h e m t o b e . As l o n g as h e w a s vigorous a n d original h e w a s n o t rigorous a n d systematic, b u t a writer w h o thought a n d wrote

in brief units. His span actually tended to be shorter than Nietzsche’s: he did not write essays as long as Nietzsche’s first five books o r the three inquiries that constitute the Genealogy of Morals o r T h e Antichrist. Even t h e famous

system, which is the work of a professor older than Nietzsche was w h e n h e stopped writing, consists o f h u n d r e d s of s h o r t aphorisms, averaging a b o u t half a s m a l l p a g e in length in the original edition of 1 8 1 7 a n d about o n e small p a g e e a c h in t h e final, t h i r d edition, including t h e “ r e m a r k s ” that

amplify the pithy statements in the beginning. What is systematic is merely the arrangement. What m a k e s historical w o r k s o fascinating is t h a t the realities o n e discovers a r e often, if not usually, s o different from w h a t everybody thinks h e k n o w s a b o u t t h e subject. S t u d y i n g He g e l is n o exception. A n archaeologist m a y b r i n g t o light a n unknown civilization. A philosopher w h o studies

294

HEGEL ON HISTORY

o n e of his predecessors c a n n o t a s k more than that h e might verify Hegel’s observation that w h a t is familiar is n o t neces-

sarily known: Das Bekannte iiberhaupt is: darum, weil es bekannt ist, niclzt erkannt ( C 11.3.22). Under a portrait Hegel o n c e wrote, “whoever knows m e will recognize me h e r e ” : w e r mic/1 kennt, wird mich lu‘er erkennen. I n another sense, these words m i g h t c o n c l u d e this reinterpretation: m a y those who have long known of Hegel here come t o know h i m ; w er ihn k e n n t , soll ihn hier erkennen.

70 Others h a v e seen h i m differently. To review their Hegel images would b e subject m a t t e r e n o u g h for a n interesting

book. But let us go back once more to Schelling’s triumph over Hegel i n 1 8 4 1 and s e e how Hegel’s phiIOSOphy looked t o t h e King o f Prussia a little less than t e n years after Hegel’s death.

Even while Friedrich Wilhelm III was king, the crown prince felt drawn t o Schelling: “ I n t h e forefront of his ideals stood t h e religious renewal a n d restoration of t h e c h u r c h , while Schelling proclaimed t h e speculative renewal a n d res-

toration of positive religion, and promised to effect this in his Philosophy of Revelation.”49 So t h e crown prince tried t o b r i n g Schelling t o Berlin, a s Hegel’s successor. B u t this did n o t work o u t . I n J u n e 1 8 4 0 , his father died, a n d t h e crown prince ascended t h e throne a s Friedrich Wilhelm I V . O n A u g u s t 1 , 1 8 4 0 , Bunsen, close

both to the new king and to Schelling, invited Schelling on behalf of t h e king. “Schelling’s call t o Berlin was t h e declaration of w a r from above against t h e Hegelian philosophy. I n the letter itself it w a s stated clearly against w h a t e n e m y one wished t o lead

Schelling’s intellectual power into the field. . . . It was against ‘the d r a g o n seed of t h e Hegelian pantheism’; t h u s 49 K u n o F i s c h e r , Sclzellings L e b e n s , Werke a n d Lehre, 2 d rev. e d . , Heidelberg, 1 8 9 9 , 2 3 6 .

7 0 . Some views of Hegel

295

the king himself had expressed it recently in a letter to Bunsen.”50 For the Prussian king and the ”old Schelling, Hegel was the enemy of Christianity. For Kierkegaard, too, h e was the

philosopher who had dared to place phiIOSOphy above faith. For Marx he was a great genius who, however, had turned things upside down: “He stands the world o n its head and therefore also can dissolve all barriers i n his h e a d , while of course they endure

for the bad sensibility, for the actual human being.”51 “In direct opposition t o German philosophy [i.e., Hegelia n i s m ] , which descends from heaven t o earth, w e ascend from earth to heaven. That is, w e do not start from what peo-

ple say, imagine, suppose, nor from said, imagined, supposed human beings, i n order to arrive from there among

human beings i n the flesh; we start from actually working people, and from their actual life process we also present the development of t h e ideological reflexes a n d echoes of this

life process. . . . Morality, religion, metaphysics, and other such ideology and

forms of consciousness that correspond

to them thus n o longer retain the semblance of independe n c e . They have no history, they have n o development; in-

stead, human beings who develop their material production and their material intercourse also change, along with this,

which is their actuality, their thinking and the products of their thinking. It is not consciousness that determines life, b u t life t h a t determines consciousness.”52

O n one point Marx and Kierkegaard were i n agreement with the old Schelling who called Hegel’s philosophy nega-

tive and called for a new positive philosophy. It is the point Schelling formulated in his Philosophie der Mythologie as h e

was making the transition to the Philosophie der Ofienbarung (Revelation): “Negative philosophy may tell u s i n what 501bid.,

239. 51 Marx and Engels, Die Heilige Familie i n Literarischer Nachlass, II (1902), 304. This chapter was written by Marx, and page 3 0 4 refers e x p r e s s l y t o the Phenomenology.

‘32 Marx and Engels, Deutsche Ideologie, very near the beginning; Volksausgabe (1932), 15 f.

296

HEGEL ON HISTORY

blessedness consists, but it does not help us to achieve it.”53 Kierkegaard, in the Preface to his Concluding Unscz'entific Postscript, m a d e t h e cornerstone o f his a p p r o a c h his passionate concern about his infinite happiness, i n the hereafter. Marx, i n the last of his eleven “Theses Against F e u e r b a c h , ” s a i d : “The phiIOSOphers have merely interpreted t h e world differently; but what matters is t o change it.” They all wanted

salvation. In their different ways, Schelling and Kierkegaard were mainly preoccupied with themselves; M a r x , who w a s n o t a Christian, with t h e salvation of others. The logic of Marx’s

philosophical arguments was not much better than Kierkegaard’s, and certainly not generally superior to Hegel’s: on the contrary, h e w a s more abusive a n d infinitely less patient in his philosophical writings. B u t his impassioned interest in the salvation of wretched h u m a n i t y m a d e h i m t h e second Jew i n history t o b e accepted b y almost half t h e world a s a messiah. We are not tempted t o contemplate Hegel’s books a s the

Old Testament of Marxism—at least not the way a Christian fundamentalist looks at the O l d Testament. O f course, if we prefer t h e O l d Testament to t h e New and are used t o studying the O l d Testament for its own sake, not a s the b a c k g r o u n d

of a higher dispensation, then we may compare Hegel’s writings to t h e O l d Testament. H e , too, offers u s a world of riches of which t o o many peOple know only s o m e dry gene-

alogies and a few pious psalms. The main effort of these chapters has been directed toward giving the reader some i d e a of t h e range, t h e depths, a n d the

passion of Hegel. The point has not been to show that he was some one thing i n particular, or t h a t h e should b e con-

sidered above all as the prOponent of some one great doctrine. Rather, Hegel was o n e of t h e few phiIOSOphers who in several of his books offered u s a vision of t h e world,

worked out in considerable detail. In this respect he belongs with Plato and Aristotle, Aquinas and Spinoza, Kant and Nietzsche. 53 Werke II, I , 5 6 7 .

7 0 . Some views of Hegel

297

As a h u m a n being, h e seems more interesting than Aristotle and K a n t ; as a writer, h e does n o t brook comparison

with Plato and Nietzsche. Few will find their favorite philosopher i n h i m . I , for one, d o n o t . B u t there are n o t many who offer u s s o m u c h .

CHAPTER

VII

Documentation, or Hegel’s Development in Letters and Contemporary Reports

Hegel, Holderlin, and Schelling called each other D u : they were fellow students at Tiibingen. Hegel and N i e t h a m m e r who became close friends a little later stuck always t o the less familiar Sie. Reading Hegel’s formal correspondence, especially that about his calls to Heidelberg a n d Berlin, one naturally wonders about t h e implications of his t o n e . I n this connection i t is relevant to consider Kant’s dedication o f his first b o o k : 1 “Dem Hochedelgebohrnen, Hochgelalzrten u n d Hocher— falzrnen Herrn, HERRN Johan Christoph Bohlz‘us, D e r Medizin Doctorn u n d zweyten ordentlz’chen Professorn auf der Academie z u Ko'nigsberg, wie a u c h Ko'm'glichen Leibmea’z’co, meinem insonders Hochzuehrenden Go'nner. “Hoclzedelgebohrner Herr, Hoclzgelahrter und Hocherfahrner Herr Doctor, Insonders Hoclzzuehrender Go'nner!”

(To the Highly and Nobly Born, Highly Learned and Highly Experienced . . . a n d second Full Professor . . . as well a s H i s Majesty’s Physician, my Patron, deserving o f especially high reverence. . . . ) O n the following three pages, “Ew. Hochedelgebohrnen”

(Your Highly and Nobly Born Self) is repeated once in every sentence, and i n the end all the forms o f address are 1Gedanken

von der wahren Sclzr'itzung der lebendigen Krr'ifte

. . . (Reflections on the True Estimate o f the Living Forces . . . ) , Konigsberg, 1 7 4 6 ; b u t the dedication i s dated April 2 2 , 1 7 4 7 .

Hegel’s

development in letters

299

once more piled u p on top of each other before Kant signs a s “ m o s t obligated s e r v a n t . ” In 1 7 8 1 K a n t dedicated his masterpiece, th e Critique of

Pure Reason, “To his Excellency, the Royal Minister of State, Freiherrn von Zedlitz” a n d signed the dedication as “untertlzc'iniggehorsamster Diener I m m a n u e l K a n t ” (most h u m b l y obedient s e r v a n t ) .

Naturally, the prose of the following letters sometimes strikes u s a s s o m e w h a t stilted. At other times it is rough i n a different w a y : the writers evidently d i d n o t trouble to read their letters once m o r e before mailing them; after all, they

were not writing for publication. The long selection from Hotho’s book presents different problems: Hotho was not m u c h of a writer, a n d his book created no stir and was never reprinted.

None of this material is offered for its supposed stylistic excellence. O n the contrary, i n this respect these pages are often quite rough though h e r e a n d there we do encounter passages t h a t are brilliantly formulated o r deeply moving.

The principle of selection was to give a faithful image of Hegel. Indeed, this chapter may deliver the coup de grace to the traditional misconception of Hegel and establish the reinterpretation attempted i n the preceding chapters.

When Hegel’s

sister committed suicide, she left behind a

letter addressed to Hegel’s widow and dated January 7, 18322: “ . . . What I can bring together in my present sad physical a n d psychological state out o f m y brother’s childhood, I will

tell you: As a boy of 3 he was sent to the German school, and i n his 5 t h year to t h e L a t i n school. At that age h e already

knew the first declension and the Latin words that go with it; for our blessed mother h a d taught h i m . She was, for those

days, a woman of education and thus had considerable infl u e n c e o n his first studies. I n all classes h e received a prize every y e a r because h e w a s always a m o n g the top five; a n d

from his 10th to his 18th year he was the first in his division 2Dok. 392—94. This item is placed first because it concerns Hegel’s childhood. Otherwise, the arrangement is chronological, following the dates of the letters and reports.

300

DOCUMENTATION

in the G y m n a s i u m . When h e was 8 , his teacher Lo'fiier, who showed a great preference for h i m a n d contributed m u c h t o his later education, gave h i m Shakespeare’s dramatic works,

translated by Eschenburg, with a note: ‘You do not understand them yet, but you will soon learn to understand them.’ S o this teacher a l r e a d y noticed t h e profundity t h a t w a s latent i n this b o y ; a n d I still r e m e m b e r well t h a t it w a s The Merry Wives of Windsor t o w h i c h h e responded first. . .

“In the year 1783, bilious dysentery [Gallenruhr] and bilious fever [Gallenfieber] raged in Stuttgart, and the latter attacked o u r father, o u r m o t h e r , Hegel, and m e . O f t h e first three o n e d i d n o t know who would d i e first. O u r m o t h e r hecame t h e victim. Hegel w a s so ill that h e already h a d quinsy [Brc'iune], a n d everybody d o u b t e d t h a t h e would recover. He d i d get well but t h e n g ot a big, nasty boil behind his e a r a nd h a d to und e r g o a painful operation. I forgot t o m e n t i o n t h a t

in his 6th year he had pox [Blattern] in the worst way, so even t h e d o c t o r t h o u g h t h e w a s lost, a n d h e w a s blind several

days. During his student years he had tertian fever [ Tertianfieber] for a long time and on that account spent a few months a t h o m e where o n his good d a y s h e r e a d G re e k tragedies, which w e r e his favorite reading, a n d b o t a n y ; a s far as I know, h e also visited the dissecting room i n Tiibingen. D u r i n g h i s last years a t the G y m n a s i u m , physics w a s his

favorite science. . . . ” Christiane also left a sheet of notes a b o u t h e r b r o t h e r which came into his widow’s possession: “ . . . Pleasure in physics. L a c k e d all bodily agility. Must have been easy t o get a l o n g with, for h e always h a d m a n y friends; loved t o j u m p , but w a s utterly awkward i n d a n c i n g lessons.

Fall 1788 Tiibingen: was a gay but not dissolute student, loved to dance, enjoyed the society of women, preferred one now and then but never raised hopes for the future; as a n M A . still wanted t o s t u d y law, was close t o Schelling who was a few years younger. Pulpit delivery bad, not l o u d enough, faltering.

Hegel’s development in letters

Fall 1793

301

Switzerland, more than three years, returned in-

troverted, cheerful only i n small and intimate gatherings.

Early 1797

to Frankfurt. . . .”

HOLDERLIN

‘

t0 H E G E L :

July 1 0 , 1 7 9 4

Dear brother! . . . D o write m e a lot about what you think a n d d o now, dear brother! M y w o r k now is rather concentrated. K a n t a n d the Greeks are a l m o s t my o n l y reading. . . . Your [Dein] H'o'lderlin. SCHELLING

t0 H E G E L :

T iibz'ngen, January 1 7 9 5

. . . Who w o u l d care t o bury himself i n t h e dust of antiq-

uity when the movement [Gang] of his o w n time lifts him up and carries h i m a l o n g from m o m e n t to moment. I live and

breathe phi1030phy these days. Philosophy has not reached the end yet. Kant has furnished the results; the premises are still lacking. And who could understand results without premises? —A K a n t , of course; but what c a n the masses do with that? Fichte said, w h e n h e was here the last t i m e , that one must h a v e

the genius of Socrates to penetrate Kant. I find it truer every day.—We h a v e t o g o still further with philosophy!-—Kant h a s removed everything—but how should they notice that? One h a s t o s m a s h it i n t o small pieces before their eyes, s o they can’t m i s s it! 0 these great Kantians t h a t now abound everywhere! They stick to t h e letter and bless themselves that

they still see so much. I am firmly convinced that the old superstition n o t only of positive b u t also of so-called natural

religion has already been combined in most heads with the letter of Kant’s philosophy. It is amusing to watch them pulling in the moral proof as on a string. Before one knows what has happened, the deus ex machina leaps out—the personal, individual being t h a t sits i n h e a v e n above!— Fz'chte will raise philosophy t o a height which will make

even most present-day Kantians dizzy. . . .

302

DOCUMENTATION

HEGEL t0 S C H E L L I N G :

Late January 1 7 9 5

Mein Lieber! . . . What you [ D u ] tell m e of t h e theological-Kantian (si diis placer) movement of philosophy i n Tiibingen is n o t surprising. Orthodoxy cannot b e shattered a s l o n g a s its profes-

sion is associated with worldly advantages and woven through the whole state. This [worldly] interest is too strong for it to b e given u p i n the n e a r f u t u r e , a n d it is effective even if

those concerned are not clearly conscious of it. Till then it will always have on its side t h e w h o l e h o r d e of thoughtless parrots a n d copycats—always a s n u m e r o u s a s they are d e void of all higher interests. When this h o r d e reads s o m e thing t h a t runs c o u n t e r to their convictions (if o n e w a n t s to h o n o r their verbiage with this t e r m ) a n d of w h o s e truth they h a v e s o m e inkling, they say, ‘Yes, t h a t seems t o b e

true’ and go to sleep—and in the morning one drinks one’s coffee a n d pours it for o t h e r s a s if nothing h a d h a p p e n e d . . . . . B u t I think it would be interesting t o disturb t h e theologians a s m u c h a s possible in their antlike industry a s

they amass Critical [i.e., Kantian] building materials to strengthen their Gothic temple; to m a k e everything diflicult for t h e m , t o whip them o u t of every n o o k a n d subterfuge till they found none any m o r e a n d h a d to s h o w their nakedness completely i n the daylight. B u t a m o n g t h e building materials which they abduct from t h e K a n t i a n s t a k e t o prevent the conflagration of dogmatics they surely also carry h o m e live coals; these bring a b o u t t h e general spread o f phiIOSOphical

ideas.— For t h e mischief of w h ich you write a n d w h o s e m a n n e r o f inference I c a n therefore imagine, Fichte h a s unquestionably opened th e door with his Critique of A l l Revelation. He h i m self m a d e moderate use; b u t o n c e his principles are firmly accepted, it will b e impossible t o set u p an y e n d o r d i k e for theological logic. From t h e holiness of G o d h e argues w h a t G o d m u s t d o b y virtue of his purely moral n a t u r e , etc., a n d ha s t h u s reintroduced t h e old m a n n e r of proof in dogmatics. I t might b e worth the trouble to elucidate this further.—

Hegel’s

development in letters

303

. . . O n e expression i n y o u r letter c o n c e r n i n g t h e moral

proof I do not quite understand: “which they know to handle i n s u c h a w a y t h a t the individual, personal being leaps out” [ s e e t h e preceding letter; the quotation is not e x a c t ] . D o you

believe that we really cannot go that far? Farewell! L e t reason a n d freedom r e m a i n o u r watchword, a n d the

invisible church our point of union. H.

HOLDERLIN

t0 H E G E L : Jena, January 26, I 7 9 5

. . . I h a v e s p o k e n with G o e t h e . B r o t h e r ! I t is t h e most beautiful enjoyment of o u r life t o fi n d s o much h u m a n i t y fused w i t h s o m u c h greatness. H e conversed with m e s o gently a n d kindly t h a t my heart really laughed and still l a u g h s w h e n I t h i n k o f it. Herder w a s cordial, t o o , seized m y h a n d ,

but seemed more like a man of the world, often spoke quite allegorically, a s you know h i m , t o o . I expect to s e e him many more times. . . . Fichte’s speculative pages—Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre—also h i s printed Lectures on the Vacation of

the Scholar should interest you a lot. At first I suspected him very m u c h o f d o g m a t i s m . . . . H i s absolute ego ( : S p i n o z a ’ s S u b s t a n c e ) c o n t a i n s all reality; it is everything,

and outside it there is nothing. Thus there is no object for this absolute ego, for otherwise it would not contain all of reality; b u t a consciousness w i t h o u t object is not thinkable,

and when I myself am this object, then I am necessarily limited as such, even if it should only be in time, and thus n o t absolute. Thus n o consciousness is thinkable i n the absolute e g o ; a s t h e a b s o l u t e e g o , I h a v e n o consciousness, a n d insofar a s I have n o consciousness, I am ( f o r myself) nothi n g ; t h u s the absolute ego is ( f o r m e ) n o t h i n g .

Thus I wrote down my own thoughts when I was still in Waltershausen where I read his first pages, immediately after reading Spinoza. . . .

304

DOCUMENTATION

S C H E L L I N G t0 H E G E L : Tiibingen, February 4 , I 7 9 5 . . . A n n o y e d by t h e mischief of t h e theologians, I h a v e often thought of having recourse t o satire, reducing all dogmatics, with all t h e appendages of t h e darkest centuries, t o practical g r o u n d s of f a i t h ; but I lacked t h e time, a n d G o d knows whether, if t h e satire h a d been completed, most readers wouldn’t h a v e taken it seriously, a n d I should h a v e h a d t h e joy, secretly a t least, of shining e v e n a s a y o u n g m a n a s a philosophical light of t h e c h u r c h — T h e m a t t e r needs t o b e attacked seriously, a n d I shall look forward t o seeing it beg u n by y o u r h a n d , m y f r i e n d — Y e t a n a n s w e r t o y o u r quest i o n : w h e t h e r I believe t h a t with t h e m o r a l proof w e c a n n o t reach a personal being? I confess t h a t this question surprised m e ; I shouldn’t h a v e expected it from a friend of Lessing; but presumably you o n l y asked t o fi n d o u t w h e t h e r I h a d answered it definitely for myself; for you it h a s surely been decided l o n g ago. For us, too, t h e o r t h o d o x c o n c e p t s of G o d are no more.3—My answer is: W e c a n go b e y o n d a personal

being. I have meanwhile become a Spinozistl—Don’t be a m a z e d . You’ll soon h e a r how.—For Spinoza, t h e w o r l d ( t h e

object as opposed to the subject) was—everything; for me this is t r u e of t h e ego. T h e real difference between t h e Criti-

cal [Kantian] and the dogmatic philosophy seems to me to lie in t h e fact that t h e f o r m e r starts from t h e absolute ego ( n o t yet conditioned by a n y o b j e c t ) , while t h e latter starts from t h e absolute subject o r non-ego. T h e latter, pushed t o its ultimate consequences, leads t o Spinoza’s system, the former t o Kant’s. Philosophy h a s got t o start from t h e u n conditional. The o n l y question is w h a t is unconditional, the ego o r t h e non-ego. O n c e this question is decided, everything

is decided—For me the highest principle of all philosophy is t h e p u r e , absolute e g o , i.e., t h e ego insofar a s it is mere ego, not yet conditioned by objects b u t posited through freed o m . The a l p h a a n d o m e g a of. all phiIOSOphy is f r e e d o m . . . 3An allusion t o Lessing’s w o r d s , r e p o r t e d b y J a c o b i i n h i s b o o k On Spinoza’s Doctrine.

Hegel’s development in letters

HEGEL to S C H E L L I N G :

305

Bern, A p r i l 1 6 , 1 7 9 5

. . . To exhort you to elaborate your system i n its entirety

would be insulting because an activity that has seized o n such an object requires no exhortation. From the Kantian system and its highest completion I expect a revolution in Germany

which will start from principles that are already there and merely require to be worked over and to be applied to all our knowledge. An esoteric philosophy, to be sure, will always remain—the idea of God as the absolute ego will belong

to that. . . . . I am looking forward eagerly to the products of the Easter season: I am planning to study Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre this s u m m e r when I should have more leisure to deve10p some ideas which I h a v e been hatching for a long t i m e ; b u t I lack the u s e of a library, though I need it very

much. Schiller’s [journal] Horen, two first pieces, have delighted me greatly; the essay on the aesthetic education of man is a masterpiece. Niethammer announced a phiIOSOphical journal earlier this year; did anything come of it? Holderlin writes m e often

from Jena; h e is full of enthusiasm

for

Fichte whom he credits with great intentions. How happy K a n t must feel to see the fruits of his labors already i n such worthy successors. The harvest will be magnificent one day. . . .

HEGEL to SCHELLING: Tschugg near Bern, A u g u s t 30, I 7 9 5

. . . I once w a s about to m a k e clear to myself in a n essay

what it could mean to approach God . . . What I perceived obscurely explained

and i n to me

a n undeveloped way, your essay h a s i n the m o s t glorious and satisfying

manner. . . . Comments

o n y o u r essay you cannot e x p e c t from m e . I

am merely an apprentice; I a m trying to study Fichte’s Grundlage [der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre, 1794]. Permit

306

DOCUMENTATION

m e o n e remark t h a t occurred t o me, just so you see m y good will t o c o m p l y with your request for c o m m e n t s . . . . You call t h e eg o t h e only substance. If substance a n d accidents

are corollaries, then it would seem to me that the concept of substance would not be applicable to the absolute ego— only to the empirical ego a s it is encountered i n selfconsciousness. B u t that you d o not speak of this ego ( w h i c h

unites the highest thesis and antithesis) seemed clear from the preceding paragraph. . . . Regarding your disputation . . . I have found in it con-

firmation of a suspicion I have had for a long time: it might have turned out more honorably for u s a n d for h u m a n i t y if some—really any—heresy t h a t w a s d a m n e d by church councils

and symbols had developed into the public system of faith instead of the orthodox system’s retaining t h e upper h a n d . I a m sorry for Fichte; beer glasses a n d patriotic swords

have resisted the force of his spirit; perhaps he would have accomplished more if h e h a d left them to their brutality and

had only attempted to educate a quiet, select little group. B u t it surely is shameful—his an d Schiller’s treatment b y

would-be philosophers. My God, what pedants and slaves are among t h e m ! . . .

SCHELLING

t0 H E G E L : Leipzig, J u n e 2 0 , 1 7 9 6

. . . P e r m i t m e t o tell you one more thing. You seem to b e at present in a state o f indecision and—judging from your

last letter to me [which has been lost]—even depression [Niedergesclzlagenheit], which is utterly unworthy of you. Phooey! A man of your powers must never allow such indecision to develop in him. Tear yourself away as soon as possible. If Frankfurt a n d Weimar should n o t work out, permit m e to agree with you o n a plan t o get you o u t of your present situation. For you there must b e means enough everywhere. You see, I count heavily on our friendship when I speak s o frankly. Friends m u s t have t h i s right. O n c e m o r e : your present situation is unworthy of your powers and claims.

Hegel’s d e v e l o p m e n t in letters

307

From HE GE L ’ S Diary of .His Trip through t h e Bernese Alps, July/A ugust 17964 We w e n t t h e s a m e evening t o see the S t a u b b a c h . We h a d a l r e a d y s e e n it t o s o m e extent o n t h e way, especially from the i n n where, i n spite of its proximity, it looked merely like a n inconsiderable thread of water that did not at all repay

the exertions and expenses of the day but rather seemed to confirm fully Herrn Meiner’s judgment [in Briefe it'ber a’ie Schweiz, 1785]. In spite of these prejudices against it, and although it w a s beginning to get d a r k , w e w e r e still fully satisfied o n c e we w e r e very close to it and stood u n d e r i t . Perhaps

the fact that this was the first object of its kind o n our trip contributed, w h i l e Herr M e i n e r , o n the other h a n d , arrived there sated w i t h great objects of n a t u r e . The height of t h e wall of rock from which it plunges down is great i n itself;

the Staubbach really is not. But the gracious, unconstrained, free, and playful descent of the water dust is only that much lovelier. S i n c e o n e d o e s n o t see a power, a great force, any thought of t h e constraint, of t h e must of nature r e m a i n s quite remote, a n d the life t h a t always dissolves, leaps apart, a n d is n o t united i n o n e m a s s b u t eternally moves o n actively [ewig sich Fortregende u n d T iitige] rather produces the image of free play. . . . Today we saw t h e s e glaciers o n l y at a distance of about half an hour, a n d there is n o t h i n g of interest i n this sight. O n e c a n only call it a n e w kind of seeing, b u t o n e t h a t does n o t in a n y way give t h e spirit s o m e further occupation, ex-

cept that one is struck at finding oneself in the greatest summ e r heat s o close t o m a s s e s of ice w h i c h , even at the depth

where the heat ripens cherries, nuts, and grain, are not thawed to any considerable extent. Toward the bottom the ice is very dirty and in places completely covered with filth; and whoever has seen a broad filthy road, going downhill, o n which t h e s n o w h a s b e g u n t o m e l t , c a n form a pretty fair idea of t h e sight of the lower part of th e glaciers as it looks 4Ros.

470 ff; D o k . 223 f., 227, 231 f., 234 f., 236, 241 f.

308

DOCUMENTATION

from a distance and will also a d m i t that there is nothing either great o r lovely about this sight. . . .

From here one enjoys a view of the falls as far as one can survey t h e m , a n d this majestic spectacle certainly compensated u s for t h e troubles of this uncomfortable d a y . Through a n a r r o w ravine the water presses above, quite narrow, and then falls down vertically in much wider waves—in waves that continually d r a w the spectator’s glances down with them and which one nevertheless c a n never fix, never follow, for their image, their form, dissolves every few moments a nd is replaced by another, and in these falls o n e sees eternally the same image, and sees a t t h e same time t h a t it is n e v e r the

same. . . . Meiner has quite rightly called attention to these falls, but a description c a n n o t remotely take the place of seeing them for oneself, a n y more t h a n a painting c o u l d . Confronted with a description, the imagination m i g h t more nearly paint the whole view for itself, if it already possessed similar images; but a painting, if it is not h u g e , m u s t s e e m paltry a nd give o n l y a n inadequate notion. The sensuous presence of the painting d o e s not p e r m i t t h e imagination to expand the object that is represented; it is seen t h e way it confronts

the eye. We are still further prevented from expanding it because when we hold a painting in our hands or find it hung o n a wall, the senses cannot help measuring it against o u r size and t h e size of t h e surrounding objects a n d thus fi n d i n g it

small. Such a painting would have to be brought so close to the eye that o n e would find it diflicult t o survey t h e whole, that o n e could not set it beside other objects, s o t h a t o n e lost every measure altogether. Moreover, even i n the best paint— ing the m o s t attractive and essential feature of such a spectacle would b e missing: eternal life, the tremendous motion [Regsamkeit] i n it. A painting c a n offer only a part of the whole impression, namely the sameness of the i m a g e that it h a s t o present i n determinate outlines a n d p a r t s ; the other p a r t of the impression, however, the eternal, inexorable alteration of every part, th e e t e r n a l dissolution of every wave, every f o a m , w h i c h always draws down our eyes with it, which

Hegel’s

development in letters

309

does n o t permit u s t h e s a m e direction of o u r glances for a s

long as one third: all this power, all this life is wholly lost. Completely s o a k e d , we arrived i n M e i r i n g e n a t 1 : 3 0 . The

continual rain prevented us from seeing the lower part of t h e R e i c h e n b a c h Falls. . . . . . . I doubt w h e t h e r t h e most believing theologian would dare t o ascribe t o n a t u r e itself i n these m o u n t a i n s t h e aim of expediency for m a n , w h o h a s t o steal from h e r with gre a t exertion w h a t little h e c a n use, a n d even t h a t is paltry; a n d

he can never be sure whether in the course of his wretched thieveries, while robbing a handful of grass, he will not be smashed b y rocks o r avalanches; whether t h e pitiful work o f

his hands, his poor cottage and cow stable will not be shattered o n e night. I n these bleak wildernesses, educated m e n m i g h t perhaps sooner have invented all other theories and sciences b u t h a r d l y that part of physico-theology w h i c h proves t o the p r i d e of m a n how n a t u r e has s p r e a d out everything for

his enjoyment and comfort—a pride that a t the same time characterizes o u r age i n a s m u c h a s o n e s o o n e r fi n d s satisfaction i n the n o t i o n t h a t s o m u c h h a s b e e n d o n e for u s b y a s t r a n g e being than one w o u l d fi n d i n the consciousness that it is m a n himself w h o h a s offered all these a i m s to n ature . . . . . . . N e a r d u s k , we reached a s t o n e house with a few r o o m s , i n a bleak, sa d stone wilderness that is a s s a v a g e a s t h e regions through w h i c h we h a d c o m e for several hours. N e i t h e r eye n o r i m a g i n a t i o n fi n d s i n these formless masses 3 single p o i n t on which the former might rest with pleasure o r

where the latter might find some occupation or something to play with. Only the mineralogist finds material to venture ina d e q u a t e hypotheses a b o u t the revolution [sic] of these mountain ranges. Reason fi n d s i n the thought of the d u r a t i o n o f

these mountains or in the type of sublimity that one ascribes to them nothing to impress it or demand from it amazement and admiration. The sight o f these eternally d e a d masses gave me n o t h i n g b u t the m o n o t o n o u s and at length b o r i n g n o t i o n : t h a t is h o w it is [es ist s o ] . . . . . . . Between t h e w a t e r a n d t h e village Steg, a n isolated, t r e m e n d o u s rock lies in a m e a d o w n e a r the r o a d , a n d it i s

understandable that the childish minds of these shepherd

310

DOCUMENTATION

peOples have long been struck b y its presence a n d h a v e att a c h e d a myth t o it. B u t a s always, a s also in t h e case of t h e Devil’s Bridge, t h e Christian imagination h a s p r o d u c e d nothing b u t a n insipid legend. . . .

HEGEL

to HOLDERLIN

ELEUSIS For Hélderlin, A u g u s t 1 7 9 6 Around m e a n d in m e dwells calm—the never weary care of bustling h u m a n i t y sleeps, an d they g r a n t m e freedom a n d leisure—thanks be t o you, O m y

liberator, O night!-—with a white wreath of mist t h e m o o n is s h r o u d i n g t h e uncertain border lines of distant bills; t h e glistening streak of y o n d e r l a k e is twinkling kindly— t h e day’s dull noise m a k e s m e m o r y seem distant, as if years separated it from n o w ; your image, whom I love, confronts m e , a n d t h e delight of days that fled; b u t s o o n it yields

to sweeter hopes of seeing you again—— The scene I picture of the long desired fiery e m b r a c e a n d of t h e questions after that, t h e s c e n e of t h e m o r e secret search t o fi n d each o th er o u t and see w h a t in t h e friend’s expression, bearing, outlook c h a n g e d since that time—the rapture of a s s u r a n c e : the ancient covenant’s loyalty still fi r m e r , riper, t h e covenant that n o o a t h h a d e v e r sealed, t o live for free truth only—and p e a c e with t h e l a w that regulates Opinion a n d men’s feelings, never, never!

HOLDERLIN

t0 H E G E L : Frankfurt, October 24, I 7 9 6

Dearest Hegel! . . . The d a y before yesterday Herr Gogel comes t o us

Hegel’s development in letters

311

quite unexpectedly and tells m e that h e would be pleased if you were still free and interested in-this job. You would have to educate two n i c e boys, 9 and 1 0 , would b e able to live quite

unembarrassed in his house, tant—have a room of your would be very satisfied with and his family I should not

would—and this is not unimporown, with the boys next door, the economic terms; but of him write too many good things be-

cause raised expectations are always ill satisfied; b u t if you

would come you would find his house open every day. Now the commentary. Less than 400 florins you would scarcely get. Y o u r travel expenses would b e paid, as m i n e were, and you c a n probably count o n 1 0 carlins. For every

Messe5 you would receive a very considerable present. And you will get everything free, excepting only haircuts, shaves, and o t h e r such trifles. A t table you will drink very good

Rhine wine or French wine. You will live in a house that is one of the most beautiful in Frankfurt and stands on one of the most beautiful squares i n Frankfurt, the Rossmarkt. . . .

Finally, Lieber, let me urge this on you, too: A man whose situation and character have undergone motley changes but who has remained loyal to you with his heart, memory, and spirit, and who will be your friend with greater warmth and devotion than ever and share with you every concern of life eagerly a n d frankly, and w h o lacks nothing for a beautiful

situation except you—this man does not live at all far from you if you should come h e r e .

Really, Lieber, I need you and believe that you will not find me useless either. . . .

HEGEL

t0 HOLDERLIN:

Bern, November 1 7 9 6

Dearest Holderlin! . . . So I follow your call without hesitation . . .

HEGEL to NANETTE ENDEL (ca. 1775—1841; lived i n the house of Hegel’s parents for some months in 1796/97. 5“Fair”:

i . e . , twice a year, i n the spring a n d i n t h e fall.

312

DOCUMENTATION

According to a letter b y D . F . Strauss, cited i n B I , 442, “Hegel h a d a youthful love affair with her which echoes through the letters he wrote from Frankfurt till it dies down to friendship.” Strauss does n o t seem t o have had any information outside the letters, a n d these are inconclusive re-

garding the closeness of their relationship, though Strauss may have been r i g h t ) : Frankfurt, March 2 2 , 1 7 9 7 . . . Here i n Frankfurt I come a little closer t o the world again. I go to t h e comedy at least once a week an d recently

saw the Magic Flute which was performed with nice costumes a n d set b u t b a d voices. Tomorrow they’ll have Don Giovanni t o which I am greatly looking forward o n account

of the music. . . My brother asks m e t o p a y his compliments to you . . .6

HEGEL

t0 NANETTE

E N D E L : Frankfurt, July 2 , 1 7 9 7

. . . Memories of those days spent in the country now keep driving m e out of Frankfurt; a n d as there I sought t o b e c o m e reconciled to myself a n d to m e n in th e arms of nature, I often flee from here to this faithful mother, seeking separation

from men with whom I live in peace, to preserve myself from their influence under her aegis and to prevent any covenant with them. . . .

HEGEL t0 NANETTE ENDEL: Frankfurt, May 25, I798 . . . M y sister probably attended the wedding, a n d it probably w as great fun. We, too, might have danced a lot there, as we did the night before I left: ever since, I have b e e n tuming in circles; haven’t you h a d balls in M e m m i n g e n ? I am very well disposed toward d a n c e s : there is nothing gayer in our gloomy times. . . . 3“.

in seinem Namen z u sa. . I h n e n recht viel Schc'ines gen . . .” This i s the sole reference t o Hegel’s brother i n the four volumes o f Briefe.

Hegel's d e v e l o p m e n t in letters

GOETHE

313

t0 S C H I L L E R : Wejmar, July 18, 1 7 9 8

. . . It seems to be an unfailing law of nature that every action is o p p o s e d b y a negation. . . .

C H R I S T I A N E H E G E L t0 H E G E L : Stuttgart, January 15, 1799

L a s t night, barely b e f o r e 1 2 , o u r father d i e d quietly and painlessly. I a m u n a b l e t o write y o u m o r e . G o d h e l p m e ! Your Christiane

SCHELLING

to H E G E L : Leipzig, May 2 4 , 1 8 0 2

To write you from Berlin was quite impossible. Even here a few things still delayed m e , s o I c a n return t o J e n a o n l y t o -

morrow. I shall arrive toward evening with Mme. Schlegel.7 B e s o k i n d , i n c a s e the f u r n i t u r e a n d o t h e r stuff h a v e n o t been m o v e d i n t o t h e h o u s e i n response t o y o u r first request i n M m e . Schlegel’s n a m e , t o ask M m e . N i e t h a m m e r as s o o n a s possible a f t e r you g e t this letter . . .

SCI-IELLING

to H E G E L : Cannstadt, July I I , 1 8 0 3

. . . The saddest sight I s a w d u r i n g m y stay h e r e was—

Holderlin. Since his journey to France, where he went on the recommendation of Prof. Stro'hlin with utterly false notions about what would be expected of him in his new job, a n d w h e n c e h e immediately r e t u r n e d since a p p a r e n t l y d e m a n d s were m a d e o n him that h e was partly incapable o f

fulfilling and partly could not reconcile with his sensitivity— since this fatal journey his spirit is completely shattered, a n d though h e is still c a p a b l e of s o m e w o r k , e.g., translations 7Caroline,

w i f e o f A . W . S c h l e g e l , who divorced h i m i n 1 8 0 3

to marry Schelling.

314

DOCUMENTA TION

from the G r e e k , up t o a certain point, h e is otherwise i n a state of c o m p l e t e apathy. The sight of him shook m e : h e

neglects his appearance to the point of arousing disgust and though his speech does not s o m u c h suggest d e r a n g e m e n t , h e has acquired all the outward m a n n e r s of people who are i n such a state—In these parts th ere is n o hope of recovery.

I thought of asking you whether you would want to look after him if h e should come t o J e n a ; this appealed to h i m . He needs a quiet environment. . . . I n view of o u r friendship, it will interest you t o k n o w that my friend a n d I recently got m a r r i e d . She s e n d s you warm regards. . . .

HEGEL t0 SCHELLING:

Jena, August 1 6 , 1 8 0 3

Above all, let m e congratulate you o n y o u r m a r r i a g e . In decency I o u g h t t o s e n d y o u a t least a s o n n e t o n t h e subject, but y o u are accustomed t o b e satisfied with my prose, a n d prose d o e s n o t allow one i n s u c h cases to b e more demonstrative than a handshake a n d embrace are. . . .

GOETHE

to H E G E L : Jena, N o v e m b e r 2 7 , 1 8 0 3

Would you please look over t h e a c c o m p a n y i n g essay and tell m e s o m e t i m e when w e see e a c h o th er w h a t you think o f it. Goethe

GOETHE

to H E G E L : Jena, D e c e m b e r 15, 1 8 0 3

If you, wertester8 Herr Doktor, would write a review of the accompanying essay, in t h e sense in which you talked t o m e about it the o t h e r day, this w o u ld accomplish a doubly pleas-

ing end for me, as you would thereby join our critical in3“Dearest”

o r “worthiest.”

Hegel’s development in letters

315

stitute and you would give further occasion for interesting conversations which I should l i k e to repeat with you often.

Goethe

SCHELLING

t0 H E G E L : Wiirzburg, July 1 4 , I 8 0 4

. . . About 4 weeks ago, Sinclair surprised m e . It seemed to m e that with his quickly collected, still Fichtean ideas he has moved pretty much into shallowness. He was on his way t o Swabia t o fetch Holderlin from there, and t h e n also returned with h i m . Holderlin’s c o n d i t i o n is better t h a n last year,

but h e is still visibly shattered. The decay of his mind finds complete expression in his trans]. of Sophocles.9 He told m e that h e had become librarian for the Count of Homburg and

went there with S . Best wishes and answer soon Your Schelling

HEGEL

to N I E T H A M M E R :

Jena, March

4, I805

. . . Finally, all four decrees concerning m y professorship

have arrived; Fries is getting one together with m e . . . . You will have heard that Goethe w a s very dangerously and Schiller also very ill“); I could not remain behind such great examples and w a s out for two weeks, t o o . . . .

HEGEL t0 VOSS (1751—1826, author of the classical German translation of Homer, Professor at Jena from 1 8 0 2 , 9Die

Trauerspiele

des Sophokles, Frankfurt,

1 8 0 4 . This strange

estimate was not unusual at the time; but it is arguable that Holderlin’s versions of Antigone and Oedipus Tyrannus surpass any translation available i n English 160 years later, especially i n poetic power, b u t also in the superbly felicitous rendering of m a n y lines.

Carl Orff has set both of them t o music. See also Sinclair’s letter of May 23, 1807, below.

10 Schiller died M a y 9 .

316

DOCUMENTATION

Professor a t Heidelberg from 1 8 0 5 ) : Final Draft, May 1 8 0 5 (The letter is lost, but three drafts have survived.) . . . You yourself know best t h a t J e n a h a s lost t h e interest i t used to have . . . What h a s been lost here now flourishes i n Heidelberg, even more beautifully; and I have t h e hope t h a t my science, phi-

1030phy, will enjoy a favorable reception there . . . If I am to speak of that which I might be able to achieve in this science, after my first excursions which a fair judge [should consider] n o t s o much a s they a r e , being first at-

tempts, but rather to see if they contain the germ from which something finished will develop; I h a v e remained silent be-

fore the public for 3 years and given lectures on the whole science of philosophy—speculative philosophy, philosophy o f nature, philosophy of Spirit, natural law—and moreover

[wish] that I might fill in a certain philosophical subject that a s yet h a s n o t been filled in Heidelberg a n d lecture o n aes-

thetics in the sense of a cours de lit[t]érature—an intention I have l o n g h a d a n d should like to execute even m o r e since I should h o p e to b e fortunate enough t o enjoy your support

in it. I shall present the work this fall as a system of philosop h y ; I hope t h a t at least this will emerge from it, t h a t I a m not concerned with the mischief of formalism which is practiced a t present by ignorance, especially with t h e help o f a terminology behind which it is hiding . . . Luther h a s made the Bible speak German; you, Homer— the greatest present that can b e given to a people; for a people is barbarous a n d d o e s not consider th e excellent things

it knows as its own pr0perty until it gets to know them in its own language;—if you would forget these two examples, I should like t o say of my aspirations t h a t I shall try to teach

philos0phy to speak German. Once that is accomplished, it will be infinitely more difiicult to give shallowness the appearance of profound speech. . . .

Hegel’s development in letters VOSS

to H E G E L :

317

Heidelberg, A u g u s t 2 4 , 1 8 0 5

Your trusting, c a n d i d letter, m y most esteemed Herr Professor, I should have liked to answer with m o r e t h a n mere g o o d will. G e h e i m r a t von Reizenstein t o w h o m I showed i t

said immediately that, as welcome as such an application would have been t o h i m earlier, t h e budget of t h e academy

limits h i m t o the most urgent requirements. There was some hope of new i n c o m e for w h i c h I w a n t e d to w a i t . Now it is clear t o m e that for now, until the necessary subjects are t a k e n care of, there c a n b e n o t h o u g h t of anything extraordinary.

May the genius of Germany bless your resolve to lead philOSOphy d o w n again from t h e c l o u d s t o friendly intercourse

with well-speaking humankind. . . .

H E G E L to N I E T H A M M E R :

Jena, A u g u s t 6 , I 8 0 6

. . . Meanwhile you may have an opportunity t o find out discreetly from h i s printer h o w many copies [of the Phenomenology] have been printed. Partly, h i s behavior h a s m a d e m e suspicious, partly certain because during t h e negotia-

tions he reduced the number of c0pies from 1000 t o 750, which m e a n t a r e d u c t i o n o f t h e h o n o r a r i u m , a n d this m a d e

me suspicious only after I found out that he has his own printing shop—a circumstance he had carefully kept secret although, in View of my demand that the book be printed here, it would have been the most essential objection. . . .

NIETHAMMER

to H E G E L : Bamberg, October 3 , I 8 0 6

. . . So the m a t t e r stands pretty w e l l , a n d everything depends merely o n t h i s , that you d o not fail t o send m e the

manuscript at the right time. But on this point I have to remind you again and again not t o offer Herrn G.11 the least 11 Goebhardt, the publisher o f the Phenomenology.

31 8

DOCUMENTATION

loophole, for I consider him wholly capable of insisting quite literally o n m y bond. . . . I n any case, it will be necessary that you get a very detailed receipt from the post when

you mail the last shipment, so we are covered against all querulousness and chicanery o n the part of Herrn

G . The

last possible date for dispatching the final shipment (if it is to b e here for sure October 1 8 ) , is Monday, October 13. Don’t by any means exceed this deadline. If you cannot

completely finish your corrections by then, I know of almost no course t h a n that you yourself c o m e here, too, a n d complete your corrections i n the manuscript alongside the corrections of the proofs—Coming here, t o b e sure, will b e m a d e

somewhat diflicult by the movements of the armies; but it will not b e impossible, and once you got here you might well have more quiet h e r e t h a n there . . .

Nh.

H E G E L to NIETHAMMER:

Jena, October 8, I 8 0 6

. . . Here is half of the manuscript, Friday you will receive the other h a l f ; and then I shall have done w h a t could

be done on my side. If any part of this got lost, of course, I should hardly know what to do; I should hardly be able to reconstruct it, and then the work certainly could not appear this year. . . .

HEGEL to NIETHAMMER Jena. Monday, October 1 3 , 1 8 0 6 , the day Jena w a s occupied b y the French

and the Emperor Napoleon arrived in it. What worry I m u s t feel about the former batches o f m a n u -

script, dispatched last Wednesday and Friday, you see from the dateline. . . . The Emperor—this world soull2—I saw rid12 Den Kaiser—diese WeltseeIe—sah z'ch durch die Stadt zum Rekognoszieren

hinausrez’ten; misquoted b y Royce,

p . 7 3 , and not

Hegel’s

d e v e l o p m e n t in letters

319

i n g t h r o u g h t h e city t o a review of his troops; it is indeed a w o n d e r f u l feeling t o see s u c h a n individual w h o , here c o n c e n t r a t e d in a single point, sitting o n a horse, reaches out over t h e w o r l d a n d d o m i n a t e s it. . . . F r o m t h e w h o l e appearance of things I m u s t d o u b t whether my m a n u s c r i p t , dispatched W e d n e s d a y a n d F r i d a y , arrived —my loss w o u l d really b e to o great—my o t h e r a c q u a i n t a n c e s d i d n o t suffer a n y t h i n g ; s h o u l d I b e t h e only o n e ? How m u c h I wish t h a t you h a d forgone t h e c a s h payment of part of t h e

sum and had not made the deadline so strict. But since the m a i l left from h e r e I h a d t o risk t h e dispatch. G o d k n o w s with w h a t a h e a v y heart I n o w risk this o n e , yet I d o n o t

doubt that the mails circulate freely

now behind the

armies. . . .

HEGEL

t0 N I E T H A M M E R : Jena, O c t o b e r 18, I 8 0 6

. . . Coming to my problems now, I have asked Asverus a b o u t t h e legal side. He declares m o s t emphatically t h a t s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s set aside all obligations. M o n d a y t h e first mail, either by c o a c h o r o n h o r s e b a c k , goes o u t a g a i n ; s o I

shall send the last pages then, having carried them for days i n m y p o c k e t a l o n g with a letter written d u r i n g t h e night of

terror before the fire [which raged October 13]. . . . The m o n e y n o w d u e m e s h o u l d e n a b l e m e entirely t o get t h r o u g h this w i n t e r w i t h o u t trouble. If, m o r e o v e r , o n e of t h e m a n u s c r i p t packages got lost, m y presence h e r e will b e a b solutely necessary. To b e s u r e , t h o s e fellows h a v e m i x e d u p m y p a p e r s like lottery tickets, s o it w o u l d t a k e t h e greatest exertion t o fi n d t h e necessary notes. H o w eagerly I a m awaiti n g t h e first news—But o n e request I c a n n o t a v o i d : t o s e n d m e m o n e y ; I a m i n t h e m o s t u r g e n t distress . o n l y b y h i m : “Hegel . . . s a i d t h a t h e h a d m e t the Weltgez'st z u Pferde.”

320

DOCUMENTATION

HEGEL

to SCHELLING:

J e n a , January

3, I807

. . . I h a d long hoped—even last Easter—to b e able to send you something of m y work—and this, too, w a s responsible for my silence—but n o w I finally anticipate t h e conclusion of the printing a n d shall b e able t o send it t o you—~but it is o n l y t h e beginning, though voluminous e n o u g h for a beginning— this Easter. I t will interest m e especially if you will not disapprove of m y thought and m a n n e r . . . .

SCHELLING

t0 H E G E L : Munich, January 1 1 , I 8 0 7

. . . I am full of suspense and expectation concerning your finally a p p e a r i n g work. What m u s t result w h e n y o u r maturity still takes t i m e to m a t u r e its fruits! I o n l y wish you

calm conditions and leisure for the execution of such solid and, as it were, timeless w o r k s . . . .

HEGEL to N I E T H A M M E R :

Jena, January 1 6 , 1 8 0 7

Your last letter, wertester Freund, w h i c h I received, a s a result of t h e recommendation o n t h e address, S a t u r d a y m o r n i n g instead of noon, I h a v e repaid by s e n d i n g G o b h a r d t the m a n u s c r i p t of t h e preface t h e very s a m e d a y . . . Soon, but not yet, I c a n wish the child a h a p p y trip. R e a d i n g it for t h e last t i m e o n account of misprints, I often wished, of course, t h a t I might b e able to clear t h e s h i p h e r e a n d there o f ballast to m a k e it fleeter.—In th e second edition which is to follow soon—Si diis placet?!13—everything shall become better; this comfort I shall c o m m e n d t o myself and others. . . .

13 “If it pleases the gods.” The second edition appeared only after Hegel’s death.

Hegel’s development in letters

321

H E G E L to C . G . Z E L L M A N N ( o n e , of his best students at J e n a , w h o died i n 1 8 0 8 ) : Jena, January 23, 1 8 0 7

. . . I was glad that you still think of. me now that you are away; even more, that you are devoting this winter of solitude to the study of philosophy. Both are still united in any c a s e : philosophy is s o m e t h i n g solitary . . . B u t y o u , too,

show that you pay attention to the history of the day; and i n d e e d n o t h i n g could show more convincingly how e duc a tion triumphs over brutality, a n d t h e spirit o v e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g devoid of spirit and over m e r e cleverness. Science a l o n e is

the theodicy: it keeps one both from looking at events with animal a m a z e m e n t , o r ascribing t h e m , more cleverly, t o a c cidents of t h e moment o r o f the talents of o n e individual—

as if the destinies of empires depended on an occupied or n o t o c c u p i e d hill—and from l a m e n t i n g the t r i u m p h of injustice a n d t h e d e f e a t o f right. . . . Through t h e b a t h of its Revolution, t h e French n a t i o n h a s b e e n liberated from m a n y institutions which the h u m a n

spirit had outgrown like baby shoes and which therefore weighed on it, a s they still d o o n others, as fetters devoid of spirit; a n d the individual h a s taken off the fear o f death a n d t h a t life a s usual which lacks all internal steadiness a s

soon as the scene is changed. This is what gives the French the great strength they are d e m o n s t r a t i n g against others. . . . One hardly needs to fear anything for northern Germany from Catholicism. It w o u l d b e interesting if the point o f religion were raised; a n d i n the en d it might c o m e t o that. Fatherland, princes, constitution, e t al., d o n o t s e e m to b e

the levers that could raise the German people; the question remains what might happen if religion were touched. Without a d o u b t , n o t h i n g deserves t o b e feared more t h a n this. The leaders are separated from t h e people; both sides do not understand e a c h other. What t h e former can accomplish, t h e s e days h a v e pretty well shown u s ; and how the latter

carry on when they act on their own, that you will have seen best at close quarters. . . .

322

DOCUMENTATION

HEGEL t0 N I E T H A M M E R :

Bamberg, April 7, 1 8 0 7

I write y o u , hochgeschc'itzter“ Frezmd, for two reasons. First, I d i d n o t tell you about t h e exact disposition of t h e

copies [of the Phenomenology] which you were gracious enough t o t a k e along; s o I w a n t t o d o this n o w . O f the t h r e e copies with p a p e r covers, o n e printed o n vellum is for G o e t h e , t h a t o n writing paper for G e h e i m r a t Voigt, t h e o t h e r o n e o n vellum for y o u . O f t h e three u n b o u n d c0pies, please b e gracious e n o u g h t o s e n d o n e to F r o m m a n n ; t i m e d i d n o t allow, a s you k n o w , taking c a r e of binding o r e v e n p a p e r covers. Further, I w a n t t o ask you t o b r i n g b a c k the o t h e r t w o u n b o u n d copies; but I shall s e n d a n o r d e r for two c0pies for F r o m m a n n which G o b h a r d t will send m e t o d a y . B e s o g o o d a s t o get o n e of these t o M a j o r v o n Knebel, t h e o t h e r t o Seebeck . . .

HEGEL to S C H E L L I N G :

Bamberg, May I , I 8 0 7

. . . W h a t I wrote is finally finished; b u t with t h e distribution of copies t o m y friends t h e s a m e u n fo rtu n ate confusion

is taking over that has affected the whole process of publishi n g a n d printing, a n d in part even th e composition itself. For this reason you still h a v e n o t received a c o p y from m e ; b u t I am still h o p i n g t h a t I shall get t o t h e point where you will s o o n receive o n e . I a m c u r i o u s w h a t you will say a b o u t t h e

idea of this l s t Part, which is really the introduction—for I have not yet got beyond introducing, in mediam rem.—Getting into t h e details h a s d a m a g e d , a s I feel, t h e synopsis of

the whole; but the whole is by its nature such an interlocking hither a n d thither t h a t , even if it h a d b e e n formed better, it would still t a k e m e a lot of t i m e before it would s t a n d there clearer a n d m o r e finished—That single parts, t o o , w o u l d req u i r e a lot m o r e work in m a n y ways t o b e really mastered, I need not say a s you will discover this for yourself o n l y too 14 “ M o s t highly e s t e e m e d . ”

Hegel’s development in letters

323

c1early.—Regarding the greater deformity of t h e later parts, b e considerate also because I finished the editing around

midnight before the Battle of Jena.-—‘In the preface you will not find that I have gone too far against the shallowness that does so much mischief especially with your forms, reducing your science t o a bare formalism—Moreover, I need n o t tell

you that if you approve of some pages of the whole this will mean more to me than if others should be satisfied or dissatisfied with the whole. Nor do I know anyone from whom I should rather see something to introduce this essay to the public and a judgment for my own benefit. . . .

SINCLAIR (1775—1815, phi1050pher and poet, remembered chiefly as Holderlin’s and Hegel’s friend) to H E G E L : May 23, I807

Dearest friend! . . . About Holderlin I , t o o , d o not know anything except

that Prof. Autenrieth has him under treatment in Tiibingen. With

what

success, I d o not know.

B u t in Seckendorf’s

Taschenbuch there are a few things by h i m , written in his present condition, which I nevertheless consider incomparable and which F. Schlegel and Tieck, with whom I discussed them last year, pronounced the highest achievements of their kind in the whole of modern poetry. . . .

KNEBEL

(1744—1834, major, retired

1773, introduced

Goethe t o t h e Duke of Weimar i n 1 7 7 5 ) to H E G E L : September I ] , 1 8 0 7

Jena,

. . . Now I should rather speak with you of your newest philosophy—if o n l y I had read it already. Seebeck gave me

the preface, and I admired your profound, thinking spirit. What I and, as it s e e m s , also s o m e o t h e r friends still w i s h i s that you m i g h t have put d o w n t h e subtle n e t of your thoughts, which i n places shines forth i n a very clear and lovely manner, so that it w o u l d be at times more accessible t o the senses

324

DOCUMENTATION

of o u r m o r e stupid eyes. T r u l y , w e consider y o u o n e of t h e first thinkers of o u r age; b u t w e wish t h a t y o u might have SUpported t h e spiritual force with m o r e physical form. What I a m saying here is p e r h a p s audacious, p e r h a p s n o t sufficiently supported with reasons; but you m u s t forgive a poetic wish w h e n I should like t o see w h a t is serious pulled o v e r i n t o t h e field of t h e beautiful—not necessarily exactly into a

Lucretian didactic poem.”

SCHELLING

to H E G E L : Alunich, N o v e m b e r 2 , 1 8 0 7

I a m enclosing a lecture I gave s o m e t i m e a g o . You will judge it, a s occasional lectures that a r e designed for a larger public should b e judged. I t h a s b e e n l o n g since y o u received a letter from m e . I n your last letter y o u promised m e y o u r b o o k . A fter I got it, I w a n t e d t o read it before writing y o u again. B u t t h e manifold interruptions a n d distractions of this s u m m e r left m e neither t h e t i m e n o r t h e leisure required for t h e s t u d y of s u c h a w ork. S o I h a v e s o far r e a d o n l y t h e preface. I n a s m u c h a s you yourself m e n t i o n its polemical p a r t : having a just s t a n d a r d i n m y opinion of myself, I s h o u l d have t o t h i n k t o o little of myself t o relate this polemic t o myself. S o it m a y a n d should strike, a s you s a y i n y o u r letter t o m e , the a b u s e a n d babble

of the imitators, although in this essay itself this distinction is n o t m a d e . Y o u c a n easily imagine h o w h a p p y I should b e to s h a k e t h e m off—That about w h i c h w e should really have different convictions o r views, c o u l d b e found a n d decided between u s briefly a n d clearly without reconciliation; for, of course, everything c a n b e reconciled, with o n e exception. S o I confess t h a t s o far I d o n o t c o m p r e h e n d t h e sense i n w h i c h you o p p o s e t h e Concept t o intuition. Surely, you could n o t m e a n anything else b y it t h a n w h a t you a n d I used t o call I d e a , w h o s e n a t u r e it is t o h a v e o n e side from which it is Concept

and one from which it is intuition. B e s o good t o let Liebeskinds r e a d your c 0 p y of m y lecture, 15 Knebel’s translation of Lucretius appeared in 1821 and was reviewed by Goethe. . . .

Hegel’s development in letters

325

t o o . I n V i e w of the small edition w h i c h w a s printed of i t , I have o n l y o n e c 0 p y left; if I s h o u l d locate another o n e , I s h o u l d send it t o t h e m . ‘ M y very best wishes; write m e s o o n again and r e m a i n well disposed toward

Your sincere friend Sch.16

HEGEL

t0 K N E B E L :

Bamberg, N o v e m b e r 2 1 , 180717

. You were gracious enough to say some words of praise i n your letter a b o u t t h e preface of m y b o o k ( w h i c h , as I see, you borrowed, so t h a t I a m perplexed b y w h a t m i s fortune t h e c o p y intended for yo u did n o t reach you—but I

presume that this, too, was probably incomplete and therefore perhaps n o t given to y o u ) . I w i s h I could h a v e complied with

your wish for greater clarity and comprehensibility; but this is precisely t h e aspect w h i c h is m o s t difficult to attain and constitutes t h e m a r k of perfection, assuming t h a t t h e content i s solid, too—For there are contents t h a t bring clarity with

them, like those with which I am mostly dealing at present [as editor of a newspaper]: that Prince X passes through here today, t h a t H i s M a j e s t y h a s h u n t e d wild boar, e t c . B u t t h o u g h

the communication of political news is so clear, it is nevertheless pretty m u c h t h e case these days that neither writers nor readers understand more about these m a t t e r s . I m i g h t there-

fore infer per contrarium that with m y unclear style that much more is understood—which I wish I could hope but do not believe. B u t seriously: although abstract material does n o t

permit that clarity of presentation which from the first abord18 shows t h e subject matter finished and clear, and of w h i c h more

concrete materials are capable, I find your reproach just and can counter only with the lament—if it is permitted to lament ——that I a m prevented b y so-called fate from producing some16 T h i s w a s t h e last of t h e t w e n t y - fi v e e x t a n t letters e x c h a n g e d by H e g e l a n d S c h e l l i n g . F o r d i s c u s s i o n of t h e i r so-called b r e a k , see H 39; cf. H 68 and 70.

17 See the letters of April 7 and September 11, above. 18 Attack or approach.

326

DOCUMENTATION

thing b y my work that would better satisfy m e n of insight and taste i n my science, like y o u , my friend, a n d t h a t might give m e the satisfaction t h a t I could s a y : for this I have

lived! . . .

CAROLINE PAULUS (1767—1844, novelist and wife of Professor H . E . G . P a u l u s (1761—1851), th e theologian, 1793— 1 8 0 3 at J e n a , t h e n Wiirzburg, 1 8 0 7 Schulrat i n B a m b e r g , 1 8 0 8 i n Niirnberg wh e r e Hegel succeeded him in 1 8 1 0 ; after 1 8 1 0 , Professor a t Heidelberg) to H E G E L : Bamberg, January 1808

. . . Today, he [her husband] is continually studying your System of Science”; b u t a s yet I do not know whether he will b e able t o solve the philosophical riddles a s easily a s the

theological ones. He just had his hair cut, and since he does n o t h i n g without a reason, I p r e s u m e t h a t this s u d d e n haircut

might have some relation to the study of your system [to keep him from tearing his hair?].

SCHELLING to K. J . H . WINDISCHMANN (1775—1839; a Catholic writer who h a d studied philosophy a n d medicine at Wiirzburg a n d practiced medicine before becoming Professo r of Philosophy a n d H i s t o r y a t Aschaffenburg in 1 8 0 3 . I n 1 8 1 8 h e became Professor of Philosophy a t B o n n ) : July 30,

I808 . . . I a m eager to see what you will m a k e of Hegel. I w a n t to s e e how you h a v e disentangled t h e braid. I h o p e you h a v e not approached it from t h e God-fearing side, though it would b e very wrong on t h e other h a n d to let him get away w i t h the m a n n e r in which h e w a n t s t o m a k e a general s t a n d a r d of what is i n accord with a n d granted to his individual n a t u r e . 19 The Phenomenology.

Hegel’s

development in letters

327

HEGEL to NIETHAMMER: Bamberg, October 28, I808 . . . Theoretical work, as I am becoming more convinced

every day, accomplishes more in the world than practical w o r k ; o n c e t h e realm o f n o t i o n s is revolutionized, actuality does n o t h o l d out. . . .

WINDISCHMANN: nology30

The

First Review of The Phenome-

Whether we have completely understood Herrn Hegel, we leave for h i m t o judge. We have understood ourselves, but

this is precisely the author’s most profound intention in his work. Regarding t h e author’s m a n n e r , however, we have often

missed that necessity which should strike us as we consider each m o m e n t in t u r n . H is m a n n e r is often harsh, dry, and

more difficult to cope with than the subject matter; nor is it rare for it, though this is easily comprehensible at the beginn i n g of s u c h a work, t o move a r o u n d the subject uncertainly

and hesitate anxiously before it finally hits it squarely. The fruit is delectable enough: the shell will fall off by itself as it grows ripe.

WINDISCHMANN t0 H E G E L : Aschaflenburg, April 27, I810 Verelzrter F reund! I believe I may address you this way because I really m e a n t h e former [ r e v e r e d ] , and t h e latter [ f r i e n d ] m a y well b e said

when one finds that one has long been at one in what matters most.

. . .

F o r about two weeks now I a m in o n e of the worst of mental 20 Jenaer A l l g e m e i n e Literatur

Zeitung, February

7—10, 1 8 0 9 ;

conclusion reprinted in Holfmeister’s edition of Plzc‘inomenologie ( 1 9 5 2 ) , x x x i x . The b u l k o f the r e v i e w w a s taken u p b y a lengthy

summary of the book.

328

DOCUMENTATION

conditions, brought on b y a n almost ap0p1ectic attack. N ow my situation, oppressive i n a n y case, becomes a rock o n m y c h e s t : a profound h y p o c h o n d r i a a n d almost semiparalysis h a s overcome m e ; everything I have written a n d d o n e n a u s e ates m e ; least of all d o I wish t h a t I h a d u n d e r t a k e n a work of which I shall yet s p e a k t o y o u . . . .

The study of your Syst. of Sci. has convinced me that this work will b e considered o n e d a y , w h e n th e t i m e of understanding h a s c o m e , a s t h e basic b o o k of the liberation of m a n , a s the key to t h a t new gospel of which Lessing prophesied.21 . . . I w a n t e d t o say this loud a n d publicly and c o u l d o n l y hint a t it because acceptance of m y entire review w a s de clined . . . I therefore enclose t h e remark s a b o u t t h e preface a n d the significance of t h e w h o l e work which I retained—the m o r e s o since i n t h e latest philosophical part of t h e Heidelberger Jahrbiicher, p . 1 4 9 , a D r . B a c h m a n n w h o m I d o not know refers t o m e s o unjustly, suggesting t h a t I m u s t have had m y o wn good reasons fo r n o t saying a n y t h i n g a bout t h e

preface. . . . The work a t which I hinted above a n d which I c a n n o t consider without feelings of anxiety because it transcends my

powers is . . . an investigation about magic.22

HEGEL t0 W I N D I S C H M A N N :

Niirnberg, May 2 7 , I 8 1 0

. . . I a m eager t o see y o u r work o n magic. I confess that I should not d a r e t o tackle this g l o o m y side a n d aspect of spiritual nature o r t h e n a t u r a l spirit, a n d a m d o u b l y delighted t h a t you will partly illuminate this for us, partly t a k e u p again a n d rehabilitate m u c h that h a s been neglected a n d despised.— B u t there is n o work t h a t requires health a n d a cheerful, evenly cheerful, disposition m o r e t h a n this. B e assured that y o u r mental state which you describe t o m e is partly d u e t o this w o r k : this descent i n t o dark regions where nothing shows 21§86; cf. H 13. 22 In 1813 he published Untersuclzungen fiber Astrologie, Alchemie a n d Magic, with an appendix about the relation of the

police to the occult arts.

H egel’s deveIOpment in letters

329

itself to b e fi r m , determinate, a n d secure, where splendors flash everywhere, b u t next to abysses . . . —where the be-

ginning of every path breaks off again and runs into the indefinite, loses itself, a n d tears us out o f our destiny a n d direc— tion.—From m y own experience I know this mood of t he mind, o r rather of reason, once it h as entered with interest and its intimations into a c h a o s of appearances a n d , though inwardly sure of the goal, it h a s not yet come through, not yet into the

clarity and detailed grasp of the whole. I have suffered a few years of this hypochondria, to the point of enervation. Indeed, every human being may well have such a turning point in life, the nocturnal point of the contraction of his nature through whose narrows he is pressed, fortified and assured to feel secure with himself and secure in the usual daily life; and if he has already rendered himself incapable of being satisfied with that, secure i n a n inner, nobler existence—Continue with confidence; only science, which has led you into this labyrinth

of the mind, is capable of leading you out and healing you. —If you fi n d this possible, cast out all this stuff for a while; if you stayed away from it, you would then return to i t with

renewed strength and with greater power. With m y further work things move slowly in View of my present duties; they are only partially connected with it, but I do not abandon it altogether. How fortunate you are that no such external obligations wither your activities o n behalf of your i n m o s t interests. . P.S. Forgive the lateness o f this reply. Through a n accident, the beginning which was written long ago, before I was in-

terrupted, disappeared from my sight for a while.

HEGEL

t 0 KNEBEL:

Niirnberg, December 1 4 , I810

. . . Hereabouts we have many railings and scaffolds of dry wood to which we nail and crucify our scions; and we also tabulate all this, p u t o n orderly Spanish boots,23 witness, 23 Cf. G o e t h e ’ s Faust, line 1 9 1 3 .

330

DOCUMENTATION

attest, certify, examine, a n d s t a m p . Then, w h e n w h a t is good is not achieved, regardless of the fact t h a t we always work s o hard to achieve something, w e d o n o t comprehend why, i n t h e face of so much that is better, we don’t attain what is good, and t h a t the fever of meliorism is n o t precisely supreme health. Let that b e a s it m a y ; merely give u s the h 0 p e t h a t you may perhaps visit us here before long. You will fi n d that you have

retained your old friends who often remember you with this wish—and besides, diversion i n sufficient external variety. For a few months now, w e h a v e a n actually very nice museum which h a s t a k e n the place of the o l d harmony which, how-

ever, persists, too;—recently a Herr von Haller has shot himself through the h e a d ; Frau Senatorin von Stro'mer h a s carried the child of h e r unmarried daughter into the water a n d sits i n the tower; i n a few days a m a n who h a s c o m m i t t e d incest with his daughter will b e b r o k e n o n t h e wheel, a n d t h e latter will b e beheaded together with h i m because both also killed the

child; other Fraulein are still pregnant; recently, the fourteenyear-old daughter of one of my acquaintances absconded with a c o m e d i a n , a n d a few days l a t e r another girl followed

him, too; now and then one finds dead females in the water; deaths b y natural causes n o t included;—we h a v e concerts at which w e o n l y miss a singer like your wife—comedy, as well, not t o s p e a k of organizations a n d disorganizations, which o n e often c a n n o t tell apart;—-in brief, a s you c a n see, w e , t o o , do n o t l a c k incidents and quodlibet.‘-’4

Meanwhile, until I have again the good fortune of seeing you i n person, I ask you, a l o n g with best r e g a r d s t o y o u r wife and your s o n , to remember m e i n friendship-and also be g you, when you h a v e occasion t o d o s o , t o attest my most respectful devotion t o Herrn G e h e i m e n R a t v . G o e t h e ( a n d Dr. R i e m e r ) , a n d now only have s p a c e e n o u g h to call myself Your m o s t devoted IIegeLQO C'

‘34 Literally, what pleases. 25 Muller quotes parts of this letter in his Hegel—not in the Niirnberg c h a p t e r where t h e y b e l o n g b u t in t h e s e c t i o n o n Hegel’s

newspaper editorship in Bamberg, to illustrate the nature of his

Hegel’s development in letters

331

A n MARIE den 1 3 . A p r . 1 8 1 1 Tritt m i t mir auf Bergeshbhen, Reiss D i c h von den Wolken los; Lass u n s hier i m Aether stehen, In des Lichtes farbelosem Schoss. Sieh den Altar hier auf Bergeshohen, Auf d e m Phonix in der Flamme stirbt, Um i n ew’ger Jugend aufzugehen, D i e ihm seine Asche nur erwirbt.

Auf sich war gekehrt sein Sinnen,

Hatte sich zu eigen es gespart, Nun soll seines Daseins Punkt zerrinnen,

Und der Schmerz des Opfers ward ihm hart. Aber fiihlend e i n unendlich Streben, Treibt’s i h n fiber sich hinaus; M a g d i e irdische Natur erbeben, Fiihrt e r es in Flammen aus. Fallt s o , enge B i n d e n , die u n s scheiden,

Nur ein Opfer ist des Herzens Lauf; Mich zu Dir, zu m i r Dich zu erweiten, Geh’ in Feu’r, was u n s vereinzelt, aufl Tritt der Geist auf freie Bergeshohen, Er behalt vom Eignen nichts zuriick; Leb’ ich, mich i n Dir, Du D i c h in m i r zu sehen, So geniessen wir d er Himmel Gliick.

work. Indeed, he introduces the quotation, saying: “Only the purest Empirie [empirical matter] can feed the curiosity of the public: ‘. . .’ ” ( 2 2 2 ) . In this way the whole weight of Hegel’s bitterness is dissipated, and a passage that illuminates his profound sense of the wretchedness of life is trivialized into a cliché about newspaper work.

332

DOCUMENTATION

For MARIE (Hegel’s bride) April 13, 1 8 1 1 Step with me o n mountain heights, Tear yourself away from clouds; Let u s stand here i n the ether, In light’s lap devoid of color. See the altar o n the m o u n t a i n heights On which Phoenix in the fl a m e s is dying

To be raised up in eternal youth Which his ashes only gain for him. O n himself his mind was t u r n e d , For his own possession h e h a d saved i t ; Now his own existence shall dissolve, And the sacrifice h a s brought him pain. Infinite h e feels a striving that Tears him u p beyond himself; Though the nature of this w o r l d should tremble,

He wants fiery consummation. Fall thus, narrow bonds that keep us separate, For the heart’s course i s a sacrifice; Me t o you, you i n t o m e expanding, Fire consume whatever keeps u s single!

When the spirit steps on mountain heights Nothing of its own does it hold b ack ; Living t o see me in you and you i n me,

We enjoy the happiness of heavens.

HEGEL

to His Bride: Niirnberg, Summer 1 8 1 1

Dear M a r i e : I h a v e written t o you i n my thoughts a l m o s t all night long. It was not about this o r that single matter between u s that I

Hegel’s development in letters

333

was concerned in my thoughts, but it necessarily concerned the whole thought: will we make each other unhappy?—From the depths of my soul it shouted: this can, this shall, this may not bel—It will not be!

But what I have said to you long ago now comes t o m e as a result: marriage is essentially a religious b o n d ; love needs to b e supplemented b y a higher moment than it is i n itself and

for itself alone. [The next sentence, comprising seven lines about the relation of being entirely happy to religion and the sense of duty is very difficult to construe and not unambiguous.] . . . In front of m e I have the draft for the lines which I added to your letter to my sister; but the addition to which you cer-

tainly attributed too much significance is not there. Still I remembered what occasioned the sense i n which I added i t when c0pying these lines. O n the evening before, we h a d

definitely talked about this or agreed that we wanted to call contentment what w e felt sure of attaining together; and ‘There is a blessed contentment which, considered without illusion, is more t h a n everything one calls being happy.’—

When I had written the words that I now have in front of me and whose sense is so dear t o m e, ‘You see from t h i s how happy I c a n b e with h e r for all t h e rest of m y life, and how

happy the attainment of such love, for which I scarcely had any h o p e left i n t h i s world, is m a k i n g m e even now?’—-I added,

quasi as if, in the light of our conversation, my happy emotion and its expression had been too much: ‘insofar as happiness is part of t h e d e s t i n y of my life.’ I d o n o t think that this ought to have hurt you—Further, I r e m i n d y o u , dear Marie, that

you, too, have been taught by your deeper sense and the education of what is higher i n you t h a t i n m i n d s t h a t are not

superficial all feelings of happiness are tied to a feeling of melancholy. I remind you, moreover, that you promised m e to heal a n y residue in m y m i n d of unbelief i n c o n t e n t m e n t ; i.e., you were t o reconcile m y true i n n e r nature with the way

i n which I am—too frequently—against what is actual and for what is actual. And t h a t this point of view gives your destiny 3 higher side; t h a t I credit you w i t h the strength t o d o this; t h a t this strength must lie i n o u r love;—your love for m e , m y love

334

DOCUMENTATION

for you—spoken of separately i n this way—introduce a dis-

tinction that would separate our love; and love is only ours, only this unity, only this b o n d . Turn away from the reflection into this distinction, and let u s cling firmly to this unity which alone can also b e my strength and my new pleasure i n life.

Let this confidence lie at the bottom of everything, then everything will be truly good. Ah, I could still write so much, also about my perhaps only

hypochondriac pedantry in which I so insisted on the difference between contentment and happiness—which is again so useless—that I have sworn by myself to both you and m e that your happiness shall b e for m e the dearest thing I have.—

There is also much that only passes away, forgets itself, and becomes undone 'when one does not touch o n it. Still this: I have l o n g doubted whether I ought to write you because everything one writes o r says depends again o n the explanation alone, or because I dreaded it since i t is s o d a n gerous once o n e has begun t o explain. But I have overcome

this fear, too, and hope everything from your mind as it receives this writing. All the best until w e s ee each other again today [ l ] without

a shadow, dear Marie—only this I should like to be able still to tell you, what feeling, how much—my whole existence, as much

as it is—lies for m e in these words: dear Marie. Your Wilhelm

HEGEL

to His Bride: Niirnberg, Summer 1 8 1 1

. . . I have hurt you with some of the things I said. This pains m e . I have hurt you by seeming to condemn as principles of your way of thinking and acting moral views that I must condemn—About this I now only say t o you that o n t h e one hand I condemn these views insofar a s they cancel the difference between what the heart likes and duty, or rather eliminate

the latter altogether and destroy morality. But just as much -—and this is the main point between us—I beg you t o believe m e that I do n o t ascribe these views insofar as they h a v e this consequence to y o u , not to your self, but that I look o n them

Hegel’s

development in letters

335

a s lying only in y o u r reflection w i t h o u t y o u r thinking, knowing,

and realizing them with their consequences—that they serve you to excuse others (to justify is something else—for what one can excuse in others one does not therefore consider to be permitted t o oneself; b u t what one c a n justify is right for all, including o u r s e l v e s ) .

Regarding myself and the manner of my explanation, d o not forget t h a t when I condemn maxims I lose sight too easily

of the manner in which they are actual in the determinate individual-—in this case, you—and they stand before my eyes in their generality, i n their consequences and ramifications and applications of which you are n o t thinking—much less t h a t all

these were for you contained in them. Moreover, you know yourself that even though character and the maxims of insight are different, it still is not indifferent what maxims insight and judgment employ. But I know just as well that maxims, when they contradict the character, are still more indifferent in the female than they are in men. Finally, you know that there are evil men w h o torment their

wives only to have constant visual proof of their behavior, namely their patience and love. I do not believe that I am evil in this w a y ; b u t if s u c h a dear soul a s you are ought never t o b e hurt, I might almost not regret how I hurt you,

for I feel that the deeper insight that I have thus gained into your nature has further increased the intensity and thoroughness of m y love. Therefore b e comforted also by the realiza-

tion that whatever in my replies may have been unloving and untender vanishes insofar a s I feel and recognize you ever more deeply to b e through a n d through lovable, loving, and

full of love. I m u s t go t o class. All the best—dearest, dearest, blessed

and fair Marie.

Your Wilhelm

HEGEL

t0 NIETHAMMER:

Niirnberg, July 19,

I812

. . . Jacobi will probably return o n l y t h e e n d of July; his gracious disposition toward m e and the good reception I owe

336

DOCUMENTATION

to you, and I esteem highly what I owe to you in this respect. Schelling passed through here with his wife, as I heard afterwards, but stayed here o n l y a few hours a n d , on account of some rheumatism, saw nobody. . . .

H E G E L to NIETHAMMER:

Niirnberg, October 23, 1812

You have requested m e to p u t down o n paper m y thoughts

about lecturing on philos0phy at Gymnasia, and to send them to you. . . .

O n e final n o t e is still missing, w h i c h , however, I have not

added because I am still at odds with myself about it; namely, that perhaps all philosophical instruction a t Gymnasia might

seem superfluous, and the study of the ancients is most suita b l e for Gymnasium students a n d , according t o its substance,

the true introduction to phi1030phy. . . . Please extend t o Herrn President J a c o b i m y congratulations

on his retirement. Rest is the best possession on earth. If it h a d been accorded to m e , too, I should invite h i m d o u b l y to c o m e t o o u r city o f rest. Schelling h a s visited m e here i n friendship; philosoplzica we

did not touch on. .

[FROM THE l4-PAGE ENCLOSURE] . . . A c c o r d i n g t o m y v i e w of Logic, Metaphysics is alto-

gether included in it. For this I can cite Kant as a predecessor and authority. His Critique reduces what had hitherto been metaphysical to a consideration of u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d reason. Logic c a n t h u s b e construed in Kant’s sense a s containing not only, a s usual, so-called general logic but also, c o n n e c t e d with

this and actually before it, what be designated as Transcendental Logic; namely, a s far as the c o n t e n t s go, t h e doctrine o f t h e categories, concepts of reflection, a n d t h e n t h e concepts of reason. . . . M y Objective Logic will serve, I hOpe, t o purify science again a n d to present it in its true dignity. Until

Hegel’s

development in letters

337

it is known more, these K a n t i a n distinctions already contain

the bare necessities or crude outlines. . . . As for the Kantian critique of natural theology, that c a n b e t a k e n up, a s I have done, i n the doctrine of religion

. . . It is interesting, partly to offer some knowledge of the s o famous proofs of the existence of G o d ; partly, to acquaint students w i t h the equally famous Kantian critique of these

proofs; partly, to criticize this critique in turn. . . . Method

A . Generally, one distinguishes philosophical system with its particular sciences from philosoplzizing itself. It is the modern mania, especially i n pedagogy, t h a t o n e should not s o much b e

instructed in the contents of philosophy as one should learn to philosophize without contents; that means approximately: one should travel, a n d always travel, without becoming acquainted with cities, rivers, countries, people, etc.

First,

as one becomes acquainted with a city, and then

comes t o a river, another city, etc., one learns i n any case to

travel; and one does not merely learn it, one actually travels. Thus, as one becomes acquainted with the contents of philosophy, one does not only learn to philosophize, one already phi1030phizes in fact.26 . . . Secondly, philosophy contains the highest reasonable thoughts a b o u t the essential subjects, contains what is general

and true in them. It is of great importance to become acquainted with this content, and to get these thoughts into one’s head. The s a d , merely formal attitude, the perennial search and knocking a b o u t without content, unsystematic arguing or speculating, makes for the emptiness of content, the emptiness

of thought in people’s heads—incompetence [dass sie nichts ko'nnen]. . . .

Third. The procedure in getting acquainted with a philoso26 Cf. Hegel’s Jena aphorism # 6 9 : “Kant is cited, full of adm i r a t i o n , for t e a c h i n g philosophizing, not philosophy; a s if someb o d y t a u g h t carpentry, b u t not h o w to make a table, c h a i r , door, c a b i n e t , e t c . ” ( R o s . 5 5 2 ; D o k . 3 7 1 ) . T h i s polemical remark i s still

eminently applicable to Jaspers, especially t o his Nietzsche: Einfiihrung in das Verstc'indnis seines Philosophierens (1936).

338

DOCUMENTATION

phy that has content is none other than learning. PhiIOSOphy has to be taught and learned, just like any other science. The unfortunate pruritus [itch] of educating students to think themselves and produce themselves has overshadowed this truth—as if, when I learn what substance, cause, o r whatever else is, I d i d not think myself; as if I d i d not produce these

determinations myself in my thinking; as if they were thrown into i t like stones. . . . As much a s the study of philosophy involves doing something oneself, it is just a s much a learning

process—learning an already extant, elaborate science. This is a treasure, elaborated, formed content; this extant hereditary

possession should be acquired by the individual,” i.e., learned. The teacher possesses it; he thinks it before them, the students think it after him [ e r denkt ihn vor, die Schiller denken ihn nach]. . . .

HEGEL: Commencement Speech as R e k t o r of t h e Gymnasium a t N iirnberg, September 2 , 181328

The end of a n academic year naturally prompts us, a n d higher authority requires u s , to look back at such a conclusion u p o n what has b e e n done a n d what has happened i n the course of the year, a n d to consider the results o f our annual exertions. The lapse o f t h e years is m e r e duration for the institution; for the teachers, a repeated circle of their business; for the pupils, however, above all a progressive movement that raises them to a new stage every year.—Since the annual report

that is printed contains what can be included in the history of our institution during the past year, few words are needed

now. For a n institution it is i n any case the greatest good fortune

if it has no history but merely duration. What is better kills what is good is a meaningful proverb: it expresses that the striving for what is better, if i t becomes a m a n i a , does not 27 The allusion to Faust, lines 6 8 2 f. i s unmistakable. Cf. V-PG 11.3.6. 28 Werke ( 1 8 3 4 ) , x v i ; Glockner’s e d . , III.

Hegel’s development in letters

339

permit the good to deveIOp and mature. W h e n laws and arrangements which ought t o provide a firm f o u n d a t i o n and support for w h a t is changeable are " t h e m s e l v e s m a d e changeable—where should that which is changeable i n a n d for itself look for support? G e n e r a l arrangements, t o o , are of course

involved in some progress, but such progress is slow; a single year is insignificant i n this respect; changes i n them are marked b y great and rare e p o c h s . If a government m a y c l a i m the gratitude of its subjects for improvements, t h e y m u s t be just

as appreciative of the preservation of expedient arrangements which are current. Thus o u r institution, t o o , h a s had no history in t h e past year; t h e familiar arrangements have remained the sam e, e x c e p t for m o r e detailed determinations i n a few

formal matters. . . .

H E G E L to His Sister C H R I S T I A N E : Niirnberg, A p r i l 9 , 1 8 1 4 Your c o n d i t i o n , dear sister, w h i c h you describe i n the letter

we received yesterday moves m e and my wife very profoundly. There can be no question what is to be done. If your attack of illness is such that a journey would be sufficient for your distraction a n d recovery, t h e n visit u s and return t o your job w h e n you are strong again. B u t if you are n o t capable of t a k i n g care of t h e duties of y o u r position a n y m o r e , t h e n you are invited b y u s to move i n w i t h u s forever, t o live with u s

and to receive the care you need. You are welcome from our hearts. M y wife e x p e c t s a child this fall, and if you c a n h e l p h e r s o m e , your presence t h e n will b e d o u b l y suitable. W h a t arrangements w e m a k e for you for y o u r stay, w e c a n see o n c e you are here; w e c a n let you h a v e your own little room—a little attic room ( w h i c h can b e h e a t e d , of c o u r s e ) . A b o v e all, c a l m y o u r m i n d . Your way and n a t u r e , as it s e e m s , c a n n o t acquiesce i n t h e attitude of Frau von B . W h e n you ask h e r o p e n l y w h a t you should d o o r not d o , she d o e s n o t give you a proper r e p l y , y o u w r i t e . You require friendly instruction o r e v e n orders and c o m m a n d s w h a t t o d o and n o t t o do.—I k n o w t h a t k i n d very w e l l . The chief cause is that w h e n o n e d o e s n o t k n o w h o w t o give a correct reply and order,

340

DOCUMENTATION

then o n e is really embarrassed when one is supposed t o say what is to b e d o n e . Nothing is more annoying than questions about it; a n d w h a t is m o s t agreeable a n d even c o m m e n d a b l e and a c a u s e of gratitude is when the other person does things according to her own judgment. You are even more i n the position of having to decide o n your own course of action because the children entrusted t o you are n o t those of t h e woman b u t were brought into her marriage, and s h e therefore should n o t l o o k upon you as merely her inferior. A d v i c e and

orders from others do not help much anyway since the execution of the order still d e p e n d s o n o u r own character. Your position w a s a n oflice that you yourself h a v e t o t a k e c a r e o f according to your own knowledge a n d conscience, a n d o n e acquires the contentment a n d c o n fi d e n c e of o t h e r s the m o r e o n e has c o n fi d e n c e i n oneself a n d acts independently, thus showing others h o w one is a support for t h e m . The reward for w h a t you d o you s h o u l d seek partly i n t h e

vocation which, owing to your economic circumstances, you had to fulfil so far, partly in the work itself—the physical and psychological d e v e l o p m e n t of the children entrusted t o you. -—These thoughts were occasioned b y t h e way y o u to uc he d in your letter u p o n your relation t o Frau v o n B . D o n o t m a k e

this relationship as something external a major matter in your own m i n d ; b u t r a t h e r t h e relation with the children a n d your own convenience—But otherwise t a k e your own counsel a nd the doctor’s a b o u t what you s h o u l d d o for your own good. . . . Meanwhile look u p o n m y h o u s e a s a p l a c e of refuge which is o p e n to you a n d prepared t o receive you any time. If you c a n a n d w a n t t o stay longer i n your present situation, you are

doing it of your own choice and can break off any moment and withdraw. I look forward with inner satisfaction to the m o m e n t w h e n I c a n repay you something for the m a n y things you have always d o n e for m e , a n d when you will fi n d c a l m and contentment w i t h me.—Write s o o n a g a i n about w h a t develops a n d i n any case before you c o m m e n c e the journey. Your faithful brother Wilhelm

Hegel’s d e v e l o p m e n t in letters

HEGEL

to N I E T H A M M E R :

341

Niirnberg, A p r i l 1 0 , 1 8 1 4

. . . The final main decision hasn’t come yet.—Yesterday a n o t h e r victory, dated t h e 2 5 t h , a r r i v e d ; and this is supposed t o b e t h e decision. B u t t h e y h a v e so often lied t o u s about t h i s , always t h e more gloriously t h e worse matters actually s t o o d , t h a t one still doesn’t k n o w w h e t h e r t h i s victory doesn’t m e a n that t h e Allies have m e r e l y escaped some great destruction.—Our government h a s n o w exercised t h e possession of its attained freedom and shown t h e world a n d its o w n subjects t h e sovereignty that w a s slighted b y t h e F r e n c h y o k e . The French Emperor had n o t permitted smaller powers t o have field marshals ( e v e n h i s k i n g of Holland had t o r e t r a c t ) . B u t now, after s u c h a total revolution of things, after s u c h splendid victories, such h e a v y b u r d e n s , a n d a b u n d a n t b l o o d , w e h a v e got o n e . Whether i n addition to t h i s w e are t o receive yet other consequences of o u r liberation and fruits of our burdens, w e shall q u i e t l y w a i t t o see. . . .

H E G E L t0 N I E T H A M M E R :

Niirnberg, A p r i l 2 9 , 1 8 1 4

. . . Great things have happened around us. It is a tremendous spectacle t o see a n e n o r m o u s genius destroy h i m s e l f .

—-That is the tragikétaton29 [the most tragic thing] there is. The w h o l e m a s s of m e d i o c r i t y w i t h its absolute leaden gravity keeps pressing i n its l e a d e n w a y , w i t h o u t rest a n d reconcilia-

tion, until it finally brings down what is higher—to its own level o r l o w e r . The t u r n i n g point of t h e whole, t h e reason why this m a s s has s u c h p o w e r and survives as t h e c h o r u s , o n top,

is that the great individuality itself must give them the right and t h u s d e s t r o y itself. The w h o l e r e v o l u t i o n , incidentally, I h a d predicted, as I’ll boast. I n m y book ( c o m p l e t e d the night before t h e Battle of J e n a ) I say, p. 5 4 7 : “ A b s o l u t e freedom ( t h i s is described 29 Aristotle uses this superlative, with a masculine ending, of course, when he calls Euripides “the most tragic of the poets" (Poetics l 3 ) .

342

DOCUMENTATION

before; it is t h e purely abstract, formal freedom of t h e French republic which issued, as I showed, from t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t ) m o v e s o u t of its self-destroying actuality i n t o a n o t h e r country

( I was thinking of a country) of self-conscious spirit where, i n this inactuality, it is considered the truth w h o s e thought o n e relishes, insofar a s it is a n d remains a thought. . . . ”

Of the floods of blessings which must follow these great events a s rain showers m u s t follow lightning, t h e little brown s t r e a m of coffee already flows with m o r e taste a n d spirit out of t h e p o t for our likes, since w e have b e e n delivered from guzzling surrogates . . .

C H R I S T I A N E t0 H E G E L ( D r a f t ) : N o v e m b e r 1 8 1 5 . . . For all t h e love you h a v e s h o w n m e a n d all the good-

ness I thank you from my heart. I have disturbed the order of y o u r h o u s e a n d a m sorry a b o u t t h a t ; b u t n o t t h e p e a c e of your

house, and that comforts me. My condition during the last d a y s of m y s t a y t o u c h e d especially you t o t h e h e a r t ; for t h a t I t h a n k y o u with my whole heart. .

H E G E L to F R O M M A N N (1765—1837, o w n e d a bookstore in J e n a a n d w a s Hegel’s close friend a n d t h e godfather of Hegel’s illegitimate s o n ) : Niirnberg, April 1 4 , 1 8 1 6 . . . Y o u w o u l d surely include M u n i c h i n your trip i n any case. E v e n this a l o n e w o u l d m a k e it w o r t h while. Last fall I finally visited it for t wo weeks—fourteen extremely gay a n d cosy days a m o n g m y friends t h e r e w h o for t h e m o s t part are yours too, e v e n n o w : N i e t h a m m e r , t h e o l d J a c o b i whom I

love and revere very much and who is also full of love for m y wife a n d m e , R o t h , t h e brother-in-law of t h e m a n w ho will bring y o u this letter, Schelling, etc. The a r t treasures o f M u n i c h m a k e it o n e of t h e m o s t excellent places i n Germany. . . .

Hegel’s

deveIOpment in letters

343

K A R L D A U B (1765—1836, Professor of Theology at Heidelberg since 1 7 9 5 ) to H E G E L : Heidelberg, July 30, 1 8 1 6

Wolzlgeborener Hochzuverehrender

Herr Schulratl30

In a letter received yesterday from Karlsruhe [capital of the state o f B a d e n ] I have been entrusted with the task, which gives m e a n d y o u r friends here t h e greatest pleasure, of asking

you whether you are inclined to accept the position of a Pro— fessor of PhiIOSOphy a t t h e university h e r e . The s a l a r y consists of 1 3 0 0 fl . i n money, 6 m a l t e r s of g r a i n , a n d 9 malters of spelt. That is not m u c h , of course, b u t unfortunately I k n o w t h a t a t present n o m o r e c a n b e a u t h o r i z e d . S o my hOpe for a n

affirmative reply to the above question would be quite feeble if I could not add on the basis of experiences made over a period o f years b y several of m y colleagues a s well as myself,

that when professors teach with industry and some acclaim the government by and by increases their salaries considerably a n d will c o n t i n u e t o d o so i n f u t u r e . B u t if you accepted this

call, Heidelberg would have in you a phi1030pher, for the first time since the university was founded (Spinoza once was called here, but in vain, as you presumably know). Industry the phi1050pher brings along, a n d the philosopher whose n a m e is Hegel brings a l o n g m a n y other things a s well, o f w h i c h , t o b e sure, very few pe0ple h e r e a n d everywhere have t h e slightest

intimation so far, things that cannot be gained by mere industry. Acclaim will not be lacking once they finally get to h e a r a philosopher. U p o n this, v e n e r a b l e sir, a n d upon the generosity of your concern for science a n d its reanimation

(at the moment science at the German universities is as turned to stone o r w o o d ) my h o p e s are f o u n d e d . I therefore write a s if the two o f u s were o l d a c q u a i n t a n c e s . B u t I really d o know y o u , t o o , a n d i n d e e d not just from yesterday, n o r o n l y from t h e titles a n d prefaces of y o u r works, a n d least o f all merely from the reviews with w h i c h they h a v e b e e n soiled.31 Will you hold t h e i n t i m a t e t o n e w i t h w h i c h I h a v e begun against 30“Well-born,

much-to-be-revered Mr. School Superintendent!” 31 An allusion to what Hegel himself had said in the final section of his preface to the Phenomenology.

344

DOCUMENTATION

me? I a m not worried about that and shall therefore continue

in the same vein. It is urgently desired that you should already be with us in the coming winter semester a n d that the lectures you wish to give should b e announced i n the catalogue that is to b e printed

in August. I therefore ask you to reply to the above question a s soon a s possible. For the expenses of moving here you will

be authorized, as I have been instructed in writing, a reasonable aversum or, if you prefer, you will be reimbursed for your actual expenses. Concerning the payments to widow a nd orphans there is a decree of 1 8 1 0 which affects all civil serv-

ants alike and is entirely satisfactory. I am rushing to make sure that this letter gets into the mail today, and I beg you to excuse m y extremely hurried writing. If I live to see you a s a member of the University of Heidelberg, which I love as a foster mother and shall love till the end of my life, a pure and refreshing ray of light will have fallen o n my life.

With the sincerest respect, Your most devoted Daub Provost

HEGEL to VON RAUMER (1781—1873, since 1811 Professor of History in Breslau, after 1819 Professor in Berlin): Niirnberg, August 2 , 1816 In line with our conversation, I permit myself to submit to

you my thoughts about the teaching of philosOphy at the universities. . . . . . . We therefore s e e on the one s i d e scientific attitudes

and sciences without interest, on the other side interest without scientific attitudes.

What we generally see presented at the universities and in publications are still some of the old sciences: logic, empirical psychology, natural law, perhaps also morals; for even those who are otherwise still clinging t o what is old consider metaphysics d e a d . . . . Concerning the sciences that survive, es-

pecially logic, it almost seems that it is for the most part only

Hegel’s d e v e l o p m e n t in letters

345

tradition and the regard for the formal expediency of the training of the understanding that still keeps them alive; for

the contents and the form differ too: much from the idea of philosophy t o which interest has shifted and the now accepted manner of philosophizing. . . . The demand for detailed knowledge and the otherwise ad-

mitted truth that the whole can be truly grasped only by those who have worked through the parts, have not only been cir-

cumvented but have been rejected with the claim that the definiteness and manifoldness of detailed knowledge are superfluous for t h e i d e a , indeed Opposed to i t and beneath i t . From

this point of view, philosophy is as compendious as medicine, o r at least therapy, was at t h e t i m e of t h e B r o w n i a n system, according to which i t could b e mastered i n half a n hour.

Perhaps you have met a philosopher who adheres t o this intensive manner in Munich, i n person. Franz Baader now and then publishes a few pages which are supposed to contain the whole essence of the whole of philosophy or of a special branch of it. Whoever publishes in this manner has the advantage that the public believes that he also masters the detailed execution of such general thoughts. But while still i n Jena, I witnessed Friedrich Schlegel’s appearance with his lectures on transcendental philosophy. In six weeks he had finished his course, though not exactly to the satisfaction of his listeners who had expected and paid for half a year. . . . I have just finished the publication of my works o n Logic and now must wait to see how the public will receive this approach. But t h i s m u c h I believe I c a n accept as right, that the teach-

ing of philosophy at the universities can accomplish what it should accomplish—the acquiring of detailed knowledge—only

if it follows a detailed methodical procedure that comprehends and brings order into the details. Only in this form is this science, like any other, capable of being learned. Though the teacher may avoid t h i s word, h e must b e conscious of t h e fact

that this is his first and main concern. It has become a prejudice not only of philosophical study but also of pedagogy— a n d is even more fateful there—that t h i n k i n g for oneself should b e developed a n d exercised i n the sense t h a t , first, t h e material

346

DOCUMENTATION

is irrelevant a n d a s if, secondly, learning were opposed to thinking for oneself. . . . According to a common error, a thought is supposed to b e a r the stamp of what one has thought

by oneself only if it deviates from the thoughts of other people, i n regard to which t h e familiar saying usually comes u p that what is ne w is not true, a n d what is true is not new—Further, this h a s given rise t o the craving that everyone wants to h a v e his own system, and a thought is considered the more original and excellent the more absurd a n d crazy it is because i n that

way it proves best how peculiar and different from the thoughts of others it is. Further, phiIOSOphy attains the capability of being learned by means of its definite detail insofar as it is only in this way that it beco m e s clear and capable of being communicated a nd of thus becoming common property. . . .

I have mentioned edification, which is often expected from philosophers. In my view, even when presented to youths, it should never b e edifying. Bu t it h a s to satisfy a related need on which I still want to touch briefly. Though recent times have revived the direction toward solid material, higher ideas, and religion, yet the form of feeling, fantasy, and confused Concepts is still unsatisfactory for all this, indeed m o r e so

than ever. To justify solid contents for insight, to grasp them in determinate thoughts and comprehend them, and thus t o

preserve them from murky deviations, this must be the job of phiIOSOphy. . . .

VON RAUMER to VON SCHUCKMANN

(1755—1834;

from 1 8 1 0 , Minister for T r a d e , Culture, and Education in Berlin; helped to found the university there; from 1 8 1 4 t o 1 8 3 4 Minister of the I n t e r i o r ) : August 10, 1816 During my stay in Niirnberg I visited Professor Hegel, was very kindly received b y h i m , a n d s p e n t several interesting evenings in many-sided conversations with h i m . . . we were

interrupted. But to get a detailed picture of Hegel’s views I asked h i m for a brief written synopsis. H e promised it, kept

his word, and I almost consider it a duty to send you his pres-

H egel’s development in letters

347

entation, with t h e request to return it t o m e , so Your Ex-

cellency can see what you would have or not have if you secured Hegel. . . . His conversation is fluent and sensible, s o I cannot believe t h a t his lectures w o u l d lack t h e s e qualities. To b e sure, there is a false pathos, shouting, and roaring,

little jokes, digressions, half-true comparisons, one-sided comparisons with the present, arrogant self-praise . . . and attracts masses of students. B u t t h i s direction o n e should surely

brake rather than promote. In this false sense Hegel certainly does not lecture well; whether h e lectures well i n th e genuine sense, that surely depends i n th e end o n the contents of his phiIOSOphy . . .

VON SCHUCKMANN to HEGEL: Berlin, August 15, 1816

From a letter of . . . Niebuhr the Ministry of the Interior learns that you wish to be employed at the university here. The chair for philosophy is indeed vacant, and i n view of the reputation and respect which you have acquired through your philosophical works, the Ministry will be happy to consider y o u . B u t it believes that i n th e best interests of the institution

as well as your own, one scruple should first be removed, and this should be frankly presented to you as an honest m a n for your examination and reply. In view of the fact that for quite a number of years now you have not given academic lectures, a n d before t h a t also were not a n academic teacher for long, t h e d o u b t h a s b e e n raised from several sides whether you still completely command the ability to give vivid a n d

incisive lectures on your science. As you will be convinced yourself, this is very necessary because now t h a t the sorry

commotion around the bread-and-butter studies is so notable everywhere, this science above all requires that the spirit of the young people should be stirred u p by vivid lectures and thus led toward it. With full confidence in your own insight into the duties of a teacher of phiIOSOphy and the requirements of science, the Ministry therefore leaves it to you to ex-

amine yourself whether you consider yourself fit to satisfy fully the obligations you would have to undertake here, and

DOCUMENTATION

348

will wait for

your

explanation before deciding anything

further.

HEGEL

to D A U B : Niirnberg, August 2 0 , 1 8 1 6

RS. . . . There is indeed no science in which one is as lonely as o n e is lonely i n philosophy, a n d I long from my heart for a livelier sphere of action. I can s a y this is the highest wish of my life. I also feel keenly how the lack o f a lively give a n d take [Wechselwirkung] has had an unfavorable effect on m y works s o far.

But how is it with theology? Is not the contrast between y o u r profound, philosophical view o f it a n d that which is frequently considered theology just a s glaring o r still more

hair-raising? My work will also give me the satisfaction that I

shall have t o consider it as a

propaedeutic

for

your

science. . . .

H E G E L t o VON S C H U C K M A N N : Niirnberg, A u g u s t 28, 1816 Your Excellency’s gracious letter of th e 1 5 t h , received the 24th, I believe I m u s t answer w i t h t h e information that, since

I had the honor of speaking with Herrn Staatsrat Niebuhr, I received s u c h a n agreeable offer from the Grand-Ducal Gov-

ernment of Baden, regarding the chair of philosophy at Heidelberg, that I could not fail to accept, and I dispatched my decisive letter several days before I received the gracious missive of Y o u r Excellency, a n d t h u s regret t h a t thereby I have already r e n o u n c e d the prospect of the w i d e r field o f action a t t h e University of Berlin which the grace of Your

Excellency opened before me. Although I therefore refrain from detailed c o m m e n t s about m y experience i n lecturing freely a t the G y m n a s i u m for t h e past 8 years, since m y first shy attempts, a n d I m a y consider this more advantageous for myself i n this respect t h a n even a n a c a d e m i c c h a i r , I only

wish to add respectfully what a deep impression Your Ex-

Hegel’s

development in letters

349

cellency’s gracious procedure h a s m a d e o n me, insofar a s the scruples about m y lecturing were presented t o me for m y own examination and reply, and what deeply felt a n d pure

respect I feel on this account. I may still ask Your Honor to accept most graciously the expression of th e deepest devotion and t h e most grateful reverence w i t h which I h a v e the honor

to remain

Your Excellency’s most obedient servant Hegel at present P r i n c i p a l

and Professor at the Royal Bavarian Gymnasium h ere.

ALTENSTEIN (1770—1840, helped t o found the University of Berlin i n 1 8 1 0 , and i n 1 8 1 7 became h e a d of t h e n e w M i n i s try for Culture, Education, a n d H e a l t h ) t o H E G E L : Berlin, December 2 6 , 1 8 1 7

. . . Having taken over the direction of public education, I consider it one of my most important tasks to fill the chair for phiIOSOphy, vacant since the death of Professor Fichte, in a worthy manner. I hereby invite you to accept this teaching post at the royal university here . . . I do not overlook the obligations which may keep you i n Heidelberg, yet you have

still greater obligations to science for which you will here have a more extended and important sphere of influence. . . .

SCHLEIERMACHER

to H E G E L : Berlin, November I 6, 1 8 1 9

Lest I forget o n e thing over another, wertester Herr KolIege: the deputy of t h e house o f Hesse i n Bordeaux is n a m e d Rebstock and lives at Alexanderplatz 4 . Moreover, I m u s t really b e very much obliged to you for

immediately replying to the naughty word that the other day should not have escaped from my lips; for in that way you at least attenuated the sting which the violence that overcame me has left in me. I could wish that we might soon be able t o continue the discussion at the point where i t stood before

350

DOCUMENTATION

these improper words were spoken. For I respect you far too much to b e a b l e not t o wish that we might come to an understanding about a matter which i n our present situation is of such great importance.

Schleiermacher

HEGEL to SCHLEIERMACHER (Draft) I thank you, wertester Herr Kallege, first for the address of the wine shop contained in your note, received yesterday—and then for the remarks which, b y removing a recent unpleasant occurrence between us, also takes care o f the reply that issued

from my excitement and leaves me only with a decided increase o f my respect for you. It was, as you remark, the mutual importance of the m a t t e r that misled m e into bringing about a t t h a t gathering a discussion whose continuation i n an

attempt to equalize our views could not be other than interesting.32

GOETHE

to H E G E L :

Jena, October 7, I 8 2 0

. . . With pleasure I hear from several sides that your exer-

tions to train young men are bearing the finest fruit. It is surely much needed that in these strange times a doctrine should spread somewhere from some center o n which a life can b e based theoretically and practically. Hollow h e a d s , of

course, one cannot prevent from wallowing in vague notions and resounding bombast; but good heads are in a b a d way,

too: finding that the methods in which they have been entangled from their youth are false, they withdraw into themselves, become abstruse o r transcendentalize.33 May your meritorious accomplishments, mein Teuerster,34 32 These are the only extant letters exchanged by Hegel and Schleiermacher. Cf. H 55. 33 Transzendieren really means transcend, and Goethe could mean: go beyond (this world and become otherworldly). 34 “My most esteemed friend.”

Hegel’s development in letters

351

for this world and for posterity [Welt und Nachwelt] be con-

tinually rewarded with the most beautiful effectiveness [Wirkungen]. Most faithfully,

Goethe

HEGEL

to GOETHE:

Berlin, A p r i l 24, 1 8 2 5

. . . When I survey the course of my spiritual development, I see you everywhere woven into it and would like to call myself o n e of your sons; m y inward nature received from you nourishment a n d strength t o resist abstraction and set its course

by your images as by signal fires. . . .

G . PARTHEY ( 1 7 9 8 - 1 8 7 2 ; philologist; had obtained h i s doctorate i n Berlin i n 1 8 2 0 ) : Report of a Conversation with G o e t h e : A u g u s t 2 8 , 182735

. . . He immediately began a conversation, not about my travels, but inquired about Hegel’s position i n Berlin. I . . . replied as briefly as possible that Hegel personally enjoyed the highest respect, that the awkwardness of his lectures had at first frightened away many, but that pe0ple had soon been convinced that the confusion was o n the surface only and that

under the tough shell there lay the sweet kernel of an entirely finished philosophical edifice, amazing i n its consistency. . . . 35 Goethe’s seventy-eighth birthday. Printed in Goethe’s Gespriz‘che.

352

DOCUMENTATION

EDUARD GANS (1798—1839; o n e of Hegel’s leading disciples, habilitated i n Berlin in 1 8 2 0 ; Associate Professor in 1 8 2 5 ; Professor of Law i n 1 8 2 8 ; editor of the posthumous editions of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and Philosophy of History): Report of a Conversation with Goethe: A u g u s t 28, 182736

. . . He credited Hegel with a great deal of knowledge about nature and history, b u t h e said h e could not keep from asking whether his philosophical thoughts would not always have to b e modified i n accordance with the new discoveries that would always continue t o b e m a d e ; an d wouldn’t they t h u s lose their categorical character.

I replied that a philosophy certainly made no claim to being a thought press for all t i m e ; that it merely wants t o represent

its age, and that with the new steps that history and the discoveries it brought would mak e, philosophy was gladly pre-

pared to change its types into fluid development. This modesty of the philosophical consciousness seemed to please Goethe . . .

SCHELLING

to His

Wife, August 1829

. . . Imagine, yesterday I sit i n the bath when I h e a r a somewhat unpleasant, half familiar voice ask for m e . Then the stranger mentioned his n a m e : it was Hegel, from Berlin, who h a s come here with s o m e relatives from Prag a n d is staying for a few days while passing through. In the afternoon h e came the second t i m e , very empresse’ and extremely friendly a s if there were nothing between us. B u t since so far w e have not had any scientific discussion, which I certainly shall not enter into, a n d h e is moreover a very intelligent person, I have spent a few evening hours i n very pleasant conversation with h i m . As yet I have n o t returned his visit; it is a little too far t o the Goldene Lo'we.

36 See preceding footnote.

Hegel’s development in letters

353

HEGEL to His Wife, Karlsbad, September 3 , 1 8 2 9 . . . Last evening I had a get-together with a n old acquaintance—Schelling—who also c a m e here alone, like myself, a few

days ago in order to take, not like myself, the cure. He is very healthy and strong; using the waters is only a preservative for him—We are both very pleased and are together as old cordial friends. This afternoon we took a walk together and then in

the cafe we read about the capture of Adrianople, an official bulletin in the Austrian Observer, and we also spent the evening together . . .

GOETHE

t0 ZELTER:

Weimar, A u g u s t 1 3 , 1 8 3 1

. . . Nature does nothing in vain, is a n old Philistine slogan. H e r workings are ever alive, superfluous, and squandering i n

order that the infinite may continually be present because nothing can abide. With t h i s I even believe I c o m e close to Hegel’s philosophy which, incidentally, attracts a n d repels m e ; may the genius b e

gracious unto all of us! . . .

MARIE HEGEL ( t h e w i d o w ) to CHRISTIAN s i s t e r ) , after Hegel’s death.37

E HEGEL (the

I shall get a hold o n myself and tell you briefly how everything h a p p e n e d . My blessed beloved husband b e g a n to feel unwell Sunday morning, after h e had h a d breakfast with u s ,

quite cheerfully. He complained about a stomach ache and nausea. . . . Thursday h e h a d begun his lectures with perfect

strength and cheerfulness; Saturday h e had given examinations; and for Sunday dinner had invited several good friends. I i n f o r m e d t h e m a n d devoted myself entirely to his care. Fortunately, the doctor c a m e instantly and prescribed something —but n o n e of u s found anything t o worry about in h i s condi37 R o s . 4 2 2 f.

354

DOCUMENTATION

tion. His stomach ache was tolerable. He vomited, at first without gall, then with gall. That had happened to him several times before. He was extremely restless during the night. I sat

beside his bed, covered him when he sat up in bed or threw himself around, although he repeatedly asked me in the kindest manner t o g o to bed and leave him alone with h i s unrest.

His stomach ache was not violent ‘but as wicked as a toothache; one simply can’t keep lying down quietly.’—Monday morning h e wanted to get u p . We brought him into the ad-

joining living room, but he was so weak that on the way to the sofa he almost collapsed. I had his bed moved close by. We lifted him into the warmed bed. He complained only of weakness. All pain, all nausea was gone; s o he said: ‘Wish to God I had had only one such quiet hour last night!’ He told me he needed rest and I should not admit any visitors. When I wanted to feel his pulse he took my hand, lovingly as if he wanted to s a y : St0p worrying—The doctor c a m e early i n the morning and prescribed mustard plaster for the abdomen, like the day before (leeches I h a d applied the e v e n i n g be-

fore). . . . He rested quietly, always in the same warmth and perspiration, always fully conscious and, as it seemed to me, without worry about any danger. A second physician, Dr. Horn, was called in. Mustard plaster over the whole body, flannel cloths, d i p p e d in camomile decoction, over that. All

this did not disturb or upset him. At 3 o’clock he began to have chest cramps; after that another quiet sleep. But over the left half of his face moved an icy coldness. His hands turned blue and cold. We knelt by his bed and listened to his breath. He passed away in the sleep of the blessed! Let me break off! Now you know everything. Weep with m e, but also thank G o d with m e for this painless, q u i e t , blessed end. And tell m e , would you have recognized a single symptom o f cholera i n all this? S h u d d e r i n g , I heard that t h e doctors, Medizinalrat Barez a n d Geheimrat Horn, h a d diagnosed it a s such—as the type that, w i t h o u t external s y m p t o m s , destroys the inmost life in t h e most violent way. . . .

Hegel’s development in letters DAVID

FRIEDRICH STRAUSS to CHRISTIAN L I N : Berlin, November 1 5 , 1831.33

355 MARK-

To whom, dearest friend, should I write that Hegel i s dead if not to you of whom I thought most, even when I could still

hear and see Hegel? Of course, the newspapers may tell you about it before m y letter reaches you; but you should and must

hear it from me, too. I had hoped to be able to write you more cheerful things from Berlin. Imagine how I heard i t . I

had been unable to see Schleiermacher until this morning. Then be naturally asked m e whether the cholera had not made m e afraid to come. I replied that the news had become more reassuring all the time, and now it really seemed to be over. Yes, h e said, but i t still seized o n e great victim-Profes-

sor Hegel died last night of the cholera. Imagine this impression! The

great Schleiermacher—at that moment

he seemed

insignificant to m e when I measured him against this loss. Our conversation was at an end, and I left quickly. My first thought was: now you leave; what would you do in Berlin without Hegel? But soon I reconsidered and am staying now. After all, I did travel here, and though Hegel i s dead, his spirit

is not dead here. I am glad that I still heard and saw the great master before his end. I heard both of his courses: History of

Philosophy and Philosophy of Right. If one abstracts from all externalities, his delivery gave the impression of pure being-for-itself, not conscious of its being for others; i.e., it was m u c h more a way of thinking aloud

than speech directed to listeners. Hence the only half-loud voice, the unfinished sentences—just as they may suddenly arise i n one’s thoughts. At the same time, it was a thinking

that might develop in a place where one is not altogether undisturbed; i t moved in the most comfortable, m o s t concrete

forms and illustrations that derived higher significance only from their connection and their context. . Last Thursday I visited h i m . When I mentioned my name 33 F r o m Strauss Zeller, 1 8 9 5 .

(1808—74), Ausgewc'ilzlte Briefe,

e d . Eduard

DOCUMENTATION

356

a n d place o f birth, h e immediately s a i d : A h , a W'Lirttemberger! And h e w a s cordially delighted. . . . W h e n o n e saw a n d h e a r d H e g e l lecturing, h e seemed s o infinitely old, stooped, c o u g h e d , etc.; I f o u n d h i m t e n years y o u n g e r w h e n I saw h i m i n his r o o m . Gray hair, t o b e s u r e , covered b y t h e beret o n e knows from Binder’s picture; a pale face, b u t not fallen i n ; bright blue eyes; a n d especially w h e n h e smiled o n e noticed t h e m o s t beautiful white teeth, which gave a very agreeable impression. H i s m a n n e r , w h e n I visited h i m , w a s entirely t h a t of a nice o l d gentleman, a n d in t h e e n d h e said I should visit h i m often a n d h e would t h e n i n t r o d u c e m e t o his wife, too.— Now h e is t o b e buried tomorrow a t 3 R M . T h e consternation at t h e university is e x t r a o r d i n a r y : H e n n i n g , M a r h e i n e k e , e v e n Ritter d o n o t lecture a t all; Michelet c a m e t o t h e lectern p r a c tically in tears. . . .

GOETHE

to Z E L T E R :

Weimar, January 27, 183239

. . . A f t e r this I m a y n o t s a y h o w m u c h t h e backside of Hegel’s medallion displeases m e . O n e simply d o e s n o t k n o w

what is meant. That as a human being and a poet I knew how to honor

and adorn

the cross, I have proved

in my verses;

but that a philosopher leads his students on a roundabout way through t h e primordial g r o u n d s a n d abysses of essence and

39 Cf. Karl Lowith, Von Hegel bis Nietzsche, EurOpa Verlag, Ziirich a n d N e w Y o r k , 1 9 4 1 , p . 2 8 : “ I n 1 8 3 0 H e g e l r e c e i v e d from h i s s t u d e n t s , for h i s sixtieth b i r t h d a y , a m e d a l l i o n t h a t s h o w e d o n o n e s i d e his i m a g e a n d o n t h e o t h e r a n a l l e g o r i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n :

at the left, a male figure is seated, reading in a book; behind it is a column on which an owl is perched; a t the right stands a woman

h o l d i n g a cross t h a t is t a l l e r t h a n s h e is; a n d b e t w e e n the t w o figu r e s t h e r e is, t u r n e d t o w a r d the s e a t e d y o u t h , a n a k e d g e n i u s whose r a i s e d a r m p o i n t s t o w a r d t h e cross o n the o t h e r s i d e . T h e a t t r i b u t e s , o w l a n d cross, l e a v e n o d o u b t a b o u t t h e i n t e n d e d m e a n i n g : the c e n t r a l fi g u r e o f t h e g e n i u s m e d i a t e s b e t w e e n philosophy a n d the— ology. T h i s m e d a l l i o n , still i n t h e G o e t h e C o l l e c t i o n s , w a s given to G o e t h e by Z e l t e r , a t Hegel’s r e q u e s t . Z e l t e r r e m a r k e d : ‘ T h e h e a d i s good a n d n o t u n l i k e H e g e l ; b u t t h e reverse displeases m e . W h y s h o u l d I l o v e t h e c r o s s even if I myself h a v e t o b e a r t h e cross?’ . . . ”

Hegel’s development in letters non-essence

[Ur-and

Ungriinde

des

Wesens

und

357 Nicht-

Wesens] to this dry contignation, that does not suit m e . That can be had more inexpensively and expressed better. . . .

GOETHE

t 0 ZELTER: Weimar, March 1 I , 1 8 3 2

. Fortunately, the character of your talent relies on tones, i.e., o n the m o m e n t . Now, since a sequence of succes-

sive moments is always itself a kind of eternity, it was given to you to be ever constant in that which passes and thus to satisfy m e a s well a s Hegel’s spirit, insofar as I understand it,

completely . . .40

H . G . HOTHO (1802—73): 183541 I shall never forget the first impression of his face. Livid and loose, all features drooped as dead. They reflected no destructive passion but the whole past of thinking that worked on silently, day and night. The agony of doubt, the ferment of relentless storms of thought did not seem to have tormented and tossed this forty-year long pondering, seeking, and finding. Only the restless urge t o unfold the early germ of fortunately

discovered truth ever more richly and profoundly, ever more strictly and irrefutably, had furrowed the forehead, the cheeks, and the mouth. . . . How worthy the whole head w a s , how

nobly the nose was formed, as well as the high but slightly receding forehead and the calm chin. The nobility of loyalty and thorough probity i n the greatest matters no less than the smallest, of the clear consciousness of having sought final sat-

isfaction to the best of his ability i n truth alone, was impressed eloquently on all features in the most individual manner. . . . When I saw him again after a few days, lecturing, I was unable at first to find my way into either the manner of his 40 B y finding eternity i n the m o m e n t . Zelter was a composer. Goethe died March 22. 41Hotho,

Vorstudien

fiir L e b e n a n d Kunst, Stuttgart u n d Tii-

bingen, Cotta, 1835. On Hegel: pp. 383—99.

358

DOCUMENTATION

delivery o r the train of his t h o u g h t . Exhausted, m o r o s e , h e sat there as if collapsed i n t o himself, his head bent d o w n , and

while speaking kept turning pages and searching in his long folio notebooks, forward and b a c k w a r d , h i g h a n d low. H i s constant clearing of h i s throat a n d c o u g h i n g i n t e r r u p t e d any flow of speech. Every sentence stood alone a n d c a m e o u t

with effort, cut in pieces and jumbled. Every word, every syllable detached itself only reluctantly to receive a strangely thorough emphasis from the metallic-empty voice with its broad Swabian dialect, a s if e a c h were the most i m p o r t a n t . Nevertheless, his whole appearance compelled such a profound respect, s u c h a sense of worthiness, and was s o attractive through t h e na'iveté of t h e m o s t overwhelming seriousness that, i n spite of all m y discomfort, a n d though I probably understood little of w h a t w a s said, I f o u n d myself captivated

forever. But as soon as ardor and perseverance had shortly accustomed m e to this external aspect of t h e lectures, the ir inner merits became ever more vivid i n m y sight a n d b e c a m e

interwoven with these defects into a whole that carried the standard of its perfection i n itself a l o n e .

Eloquence that flows along smoothly presupposes that the speaker is finished with the subject inside a n d o u t a n d h a s i t by heart, a n d f o r m a l skill h a s t h e ability t o glide o n garrulously

and most graciously in what is half-baked and superficial. T h i s man, however, h a d t o raise u p t h e most powerful t h o u g h t s from the deepest g r o u n d of things, a n d if t h e y w e r e to h a v e a

living effect then, although they had been pondered and worked over years before an d ever again, they h a d t o re-

generate themselves in him in an ever living present. A more vivid representation of these difficulties a n d this i m m e n s e trouble t h a n was accomplished b y t h e manner o f his delivery would be unthinkable. . . . W h o l l y i m m e r s e d in t h e subject alone, he seemed t o develop it o n l y o u t of itself a n d for its own sake, scarcely out of his own spirit for the s a k e of those listening; a n d yet it s p r a n g from h i m alone, a n d a n almost

paternal care for clarity attenuated the rigid seriousness that might have repelled the acceptance of such troublesome thoughts. H e faltered e v e n i n the beginning, tried t o go o n , s t a r t e d

Hegel’s development in letters

359

once more, stopped again, spoke and p o n d e r e d ; the right word seemed to b e missing forever,‘but then it scored m o s t

surely; it seemed common and yet inimitably fitting, unusual and yet t h e o n l y one that was right. . . . Now o n e had grasped

the clear meaning of a sentence and h0ped most ardently to progress. In vain. Instead of moving forward, t h e thought kept

revolving around the same point with similar words. But if one’s wearied attention wandered and strayed a few minutes before it s u d d e n l y returned with a start t o th e lecture, it found

itself punished by having been torn entirely out of the context. For slowly a n d deliberately, making u s e of s e e m i n g l y insignificant l i n k s , s o m e full thought h a d limited itself t o the point

of one-sidedness, had split itself into distinctions and involved itself i n contradictions whose victorious solution eventually

found the strength to compel the reunification of the most recalcitrant e l e m e n t s . T h u s always t a k i n g u p again carefully what h a d gone be-

fore in order to develop out of it more profoundly in a different form what came later, . . . th e most wonderful stream

of thought twisted and pressed and struggled, now isolating something, now very comprehensively; occasionally hesitant, then b y jerks sweeping along, i t flowed forward irresistibly.

But even those who could follow with their entire mind and understanding, without looking right or left, felt the strangest strain and anxiety. To what abysses was thought led down, torn asunder to what infinite opposites. Ever again, everything gained so far s e e m e d lost a n d all exertion i n va in , for even

the highest power of knowledge seemed constrained to stand still silently at the limits of its competence. But precisely i n these depths of the seemingly inscrutable, this tremendous Spirit wallowed and wove in magnificently self-assured calm and composure. Only then the voice rose, the eyes flashed sharply over the assembly and shone in the quietly flaring fire of their splendor, profound with conviction, while h e , never lacking a word, reached through all the heights and depths of the soul. What h e pronounced i n such moments was so clear a n d exhaustive, of s u c h simple truthfulness, that everyone able

to grasp it felt as if he had found and thought it himself; and all previous notions vanished so completely that no memory

3 60

DOCUMENTATION

whatever r e m a i n e d of t h e dreamlike d a y s in which these thoughts h a d not yet a w a k e n e d o n e for this knowledge. . . . W h e n it c a m e t o religious notions, h e fought with cutting w e a p o n s for t h e enlightened f r e e d o m of t h o u g h t f u l conviction, although h e was superior t o almost everybody in his clear c o m p r e h e n s i o n of t h e m o s t o r t h o d o x d o g m a s . I n politics, his m o d e r a t e constitutional b e n t inclined t o w a r d t h e basic principles of t h e English constitution. A corporate basis h e c o n sidered indispensable also i n m o r e general matters; t h e rights of primogeniture for peers a n d princes h e defended in every respect; indeed, h e showed a n involuntary ceremonial respect even for t h e accidental superiorities of social r a n k , class, a n d wealth. And because o n t h e w h o l e it w a s his opinion t h a t cabinet m e m b e r s a n d civil servants naturally h a d m o r e insight, h e granted t h e freedom of representatives a n d of t h e press t o criticize a n d k n o w better, without really being disposed t o claim it a s a n unalienable civil liberty. A b o v e all, however, all demagogical rabble-rousing w a s hateful t o h i m ; a n d w h e n it Opposed m o r e reasonable conditions with unclear feelings a n d irresponsible ideas—that rowdyish G e r m a n political h e a r t mongering—it f o u n d its bitterest o p p o n e n t in h i m . For it w a s his consistent d e m a n d that f r o m y o u t h o n o n e s h o u l d b r e a k t h e fortuitousness of one’s o w n feelings, of subjective Opinion, arbitrariness, a n d passion, a n d e x c h a n g e t h e m f o r a solid bent t o w a r d everything i n life that is fi r m , lawful, a n d substantial. B u t n o b o d y except G o e t h e professed s o deeply n o t t h a t morality which always o b t a i n s o n l y partial successes b u t t h a t genuine ethic which is a b l e to b r i n g feeling, senses, drives,

wishes, and will into the perfect accord of habit and custom with w h a t is necessary a n d rational. . . . B u t since this tend— e n c y developed in h i m a t a t i m e which h a d cultivated in t h e opposite w a y , also one—sidedly, o n l y t h e m o s t subjective freedom of conscience, of m a n n e r of action, a n d o f conviction, h e pushed back—to b e sure, m o r e in sentiment t h a n in t h o u g h t —the incontestable rights of m o d e r n personality. Thus h e was t h e m o s t loyal, loving h u s b a n d , t h e most tenderly c o n c e r n e d , if strict, father; yet h e d e m a n d e d t h a t m a r r i a g e s h o u l d b e entered upon f o r t h e s a k e of marriage, n o t for t h a t of t h e most intimate l o v e of souls; sympathy, respect, and loyalty

Hegel’s d e v e l o p m e n t in letters

361

w o u l d t h e n emerge by t h e m s e l v e s a n d k n i t th e m o s t indissoluble b o n d s . This righteous attitude did not preclude a n insight into t h e m o s t m a n i f o l d oscillations, contradictions, and oddities of contemporary souls; and even as h e k n e w how to describe such internal conflicts a n d abysses, h e also m e t t h e m

with enduring sympathy and consideration, if only some more substantial needs stirred t h r o u g h t h e m . For whatever might work i n the d e p t h s of t h e h u m a n soul a n d tear it never remained alien t o his rich heart. How else could his l o v e of art have continued to grow even

in his last years? Here, too, he was entirely at home, and with his universal synopsis he was able to penetrate all its fields, e p o c h s , and w o r k s . Poetry, to b e sure, was most easily accessible t o h i m , b u t architecture, t o o , revealed h e r secrets to h i m , a n d sculpture h e knew e v e n better. H e was b o r n w i t h a n e y e for painting, a n d i n m u s i c his ear and spirit c a m e t o u n -

derstand the masterpieces of every kind ever better. He was t h e first t o give Oriental art its prOper place . . . G r e e k sculpture, architecture, a n d poetry was for h i m t h e a c m e of all art w h i c h h e admired as t h e attained and m o s t beautifully actualized ideal. With the M i d d l e Ages, on the o t h e r h a n d , prior t o the time w h e n o n e felt t h e need t o m o d e l oneself o n antiquity, h e never w a s able to b e c o m e really friendly. The external confusion a n d t h e withdrawn m i n d th a t, u n c o n c e r n e d ,

hands over the external form to the barbarism of accident; the diabolic and ugly, the tribulations and tortures that antagonize the eye, the whole uncancelled contradiction between the heart inside, deeply absorbed in religion but uneducated in the world, and its visible appearance always remained for h i m a stumbling b l o c k . . . . He was a n e q u a l l y delightful c o m p a n i o n at concerts and at

the theater: cheerful, inclined t o applaud, always loud and comfortable, jocose, a n d , if t h e occasion called for i t , glad to put u p even with m e d i o c r i t y for t h e sake of good com-

pany. . . . The m o r e secluded his earlier years h a d b e e n , crowded with

work, the more h e sought out company in his later years; and as if his o w n d e p t h required as c o m p e n s a t i o n t h e shallowness and triviality of others, h e would for a time find the most

362

DOCUMENTATION

ordinary people pleasant a n d agreeable; indeed, h e even could develop a rare sort of benevolent preference for t h e m . . . .

When Plato praises Socrates in the Symposium for completely preserving sobriety and measure i n full enjoyment, while late at night all around h i m the others were sleeping,

intoxicated, if they had not stolen away; and he alone remained awake to philosophize with Aristophanes and Agathon, passing a large goblet with wine until he h a d p u t them to rest, too, a n d then, at the cock’s crow, went t o the Lyceum and only i n th e evening of this new day retired, a s usual—he, too, w a s of all m e n I have ever seen, the only o n e who placed before m y eyes, t o remain present a n d unforgettable, t h e gay image of the most cheerful capacity for life.

HEINRICH

HEINE

(1797—1856): 1 8 3 5 a n d 1 8 3 8

I believe that the attempt to achieve an intellectual intuition of the absolute concludes Herr Schelling’s philosophical career. Now a greater t h i n k e r appears w h o develops t h e philosophy of nature into a finished system . . . This is the great

Hegel, the greatest philosopher Germany has produced since Leibniz. N o question, h e towers above K a n t a n d F i c h t e . He i s a s s h a r p a s the former a n d a s vigorous a s the latter a n d i n

addition has a pervasive peace of soul, a harmony of thought that we do not find in Kant and Fichte in whom a more revo— lutionary spirit predominates. To compare this man with Herr Joseph Schelling is simply impossible; for Hegel was a man of character. An d although, like Herr Schelling, h e accorded the status quo i n state and church s o m e altogether t o o questiona b l e justifications, this was after all d o n e for a state that at least i n theory pays h o m a g e t o t h e principle of progress a nd for a c h u r c h that considers t h e principle of free inquiry a s the element i n wh i c h i t lives; a n d h e d i d not m a k e a n y secret of i t b u t w a s perfectly frank about all his intentions. Herr Schelling, o n the o t h e r h a n d , wiggles like a worm i n the antechambers

of an absolutism that is practical as well as theoretical . . . He w a s pushed ignominiously from the throne of t h o u g h t ; Hegel, his major-domo, took th e crown from h is head and

Hegel’s

development in letters

363

s h a v e d his hair, a n d t h e displaced Schelling now lives like a miserable monk i n Munich . . . There I have seen h i m stag-

gering around like a specter, with his big pale eyes and his depressed, deadened face, a wretched image of glory gone to the dogs. But Hegel had himself crowned in Berlin, unfortunately also anointed a little, and henceforth dominated Ger— man philosophy. . . in Munich. There I once saw him [Schelling] and could almost have cried over the wretched sight. And what he said was easily most wretched of all, it was envious vituperation of Hegel who had supplanted him. As a shoemaker s p e a k s o f another shoemaker whom h e accuses of having stolen h i s

leather to make boots of it, I heard Herr Schelling, when I met him accidentally, speak of Hegel who had “taken his i d e a s ” ; and f‘it is my ideas that h e h a s t a k e n ” ; an d a g a i n “ my

ideas” was the constant refrain of the poor man. Truly, if the shoemaker Jacob Bohme spoke like a philosopher, the philosopher Schelling now speaks like a shoemaker. Nothing could b e more ridiculous t h a n th e claim t h a t one

owns ideas. Hegel, to be sure, used very many Schellingian ideas in his philosophy; but Herr Schelling after all would never have been able to make anything of these ideas. He always merely philosophized but would never have been able to offer a philosophy. Moreover, it seems safe to say that Herr Schelling took more from Spinoza than Hegel ever took from him. Once Spinoza is liberated from his rigid, old-Cartesian, mathematical form a n d rendered accessible to a larger public,

it will perhaps be seen that he could complain of theft of ideas with more right than anybody else. All our present-day philosophers, perhaps often without knowing it, look through

glasses ground by Baruch Spinoza. . . . Hegel, the m a n w h o sailed around t h e world of the

spirit and intrepidly advanced to the north pole of thought where one’s brain freezes in the abstract ice“!2 4‘3

The first selection comes from Zur Geschichte

der Religion

and Philosophie in Deutschland (1835, 2d ed., 1852) and is found

364

DOCUMENTATION

LUDWIG

FEUERBACH

(1804—72) : 184043

I certainly d o n o t belong a m o n g those for whom a K a n t and Fichte, a Goethe and Lessing, a G o e t h e a n d Hegel have lived a n d worked i n vain. I n d e e d , my relation to Hegel was

more intimate and influential than that to any other spiritual ancestor; for I knew him personally, for two years I listened t o him—listened attentively, entirely, enthusiastically. I d i d not

know what I wanted o r should do; so confused and divided was m y m i n d when I c a m e t o Berlin. Bu t I h a d listened to him for barely six months w h e n my h e a d and h eart had been put right by h i m ; I knew w h a t I wanted an d should d o : not theology but phi1050phy! N o t to drivel and rave b u t t o learn. Not believe b u t think. It w a s i n h i m that I gained my consciousness of myself and the world. It was h i m that I t h e n called m y second father, even

as I called Berlin my spiritual birthplace. He was the only m a n w h o made m e feel and experience what a teacher is; t h e only one i n whom I found t h e m e a n i n g for this otherwise s o empty word; and I felt deeply indebted a n d grateful t o h i m . Strange t h a t the cold i n a n i m a t e thinker alone should have m a d e m e conscious o f the intimacy o f a student’s relation to

his teacher! My teacher was thus Hegel, and I his student; I d o n o t deny it; rather I still own it today with gratitude and joy. A n d what we once have been certainly n ev er vanishes roughly ten pages from the end. The last chapter is entitled “Von Kant bis Hegel.” The second selection comes from Die romantische Schule ( 1 8 3 5 ) , Book I I , Section 3 .

The last quotation is from D e r Schwabenspiegel (1838) and found on the fourth page, or near that. Original: der Geistesweltumsegler, der unersclzrocken vorgedrungen bis zum Nordpol des Gedankens, w o eirzem das Gelu’rn einfriert im abstrakten Eis. Cf. also D 1854. 43 F r o m K a r l Griin, Ludwig Feuerbaclz in seinem Briefwechsel u n d Nachlass . . . , v o l . I ( 1 8 7 4 ) , 3 8 7 . A n s dem Naclzlass: “ F e u e r b a c h ’ s R e l a t i o n to H e g e l ” ( 1 8 4 0 , w i t h l a t e r a d d i t i o n s ) com-

prises pp. 387—401; but 388—401 deal with Hegel’s philosophy, not with t h e m a n .

Hegel’s

development in letters

365

from o u r essence, e v e n if it s h o u l d d i s a p p e a r from o u r con. sciousness.

KARL ROSENKRANZ (1805—79): 1844 This

b u d g e t h e c o n t i n u e d i n his o w n h a n d until h e died.

From the calendar entries of the Berlin years we can see a m o n g other things h o w o ften h e returned t o t h e students the

cash they had paid to hear his lectures. (Ros. 266)

FRANZ

G R I L L P A R Z E R (1791—1872): Selbstbiographie ( 1 8 5 3 ) “ 1

H e s e e m e d t o b e o n e of Hegel’s favorite students. A f t e r t h e initial formalities h e a s k e d m e w h e t h e r I d i d not w a n t t o c a l l

on the great philos0pher. I answered him that I did not dare because I d i d n o t k n o w t h e least t h i n g about his work and system. N ow h e c o n fi d e d i n m e t h a t h e h a d c o m e with Hegel’s knowledge, a s Hegel wished to m a k e m y a c q u a i n t a n c e . So I

went and repeated to the master what I had said to the disciple: the r e a s o n I h a d n o t visited h i m earlier w a s t h a t i n our p a rts we h a d o n l y g o t t o t h e o l d K a n t , an d h e n c e his, Hegel’s, system w a s entirely u n k n o w n t o m e . So m u c h the better, re-

plied the philOSOpher, rather oddly.45 It seemed as if he had t a k e n a special interest i n m y Golden Fleece, a l t h o u g h we scarcely discussed it and altogether s p o k e a b o u t works o f art o n l y o n a very g e n e r a l level. I found Hegel a s agreeable, sensible, a n d conciliatory a s I later found his system abstruse a n d repellent. 44 Siimtliche Werke: Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. August Sauer, XVI (1925), 187 f. Grillparzer is generally con-

sidered the greatest Austrian dramatist. Cf. D 1855. 4511501131 wunderliclz: the poet was evidently very surprised; but see the next report and foomote 47.

366

DOCUMENTATION

HEINRICH

H E I N E : Confessions (Gestc'indnisse,

I854)46

. . . The m o r e or less secret leaders o f the G e r m a n communists are great logicians, and t h e strongest among them have c o m e o u t of the H e g e l i a n school and are, without a d o u b t , the most capable heads and the most energetic characters of contemporary Germany. These doctors of t h e revolu-

tion and their pitilessly resolute disciples are the only men in Germany with any life in them, and the future belongs to them. . . .

It was easy for me to prophesy which songs would be whistled a n d twittered o n e d a y i n G e r m a n y , for I s a w the birds hatched t h a t later sounded the new tunes. I s a w h o w H e g e l , with his almost comically serious face, s a t a s a brooding hen o n t h e f a t a l eggs, and I h e a r d his cackling. To b e honest, I

rarely understood him, and it was only through subsequent reflection that I attained a n understanding of his words. I believe h e really did not want t o b e u n d e r s t o o d : hence his delivery, s o full of clauses; h e n c e p erh ap s also his preference for persons wh o h e knew w o u l d not understand h i m a n d on

whom he bestowed the honor of his familiar company that much m o r e readily.47 Thus everybody i n Berlin w a s perplexed by t h e close relationship between t h e profound H e g e l a nd the late H e i n r i c h Beer, a brother of . . . G i a c o m o Meyerbeer. . . . Altogether, Hegel’s conversation w a s always a k i n d o f m o n o l o g u e , sighed forth by fits and starts i n a toneless voice. The baroqueness of his expressions often startled m e , a nd I r e m e m b e r m a n y of t h e m . O n e beautiful starry-skied evening, 46 Siimmtliclze Werke, XIV ( 1 8 6 2 ) , 2 7 5 - 8 2 . These passages are

obviously different in kind from the other testimonies in this chapt e r , b u t t h e y should not be r e a d a s m e r e l y illustrations o f Heine’s

wit: they also record the poet’s impression that Hegel was strongly opposed t o Christianity a n d t h e i s m , a n d that h e w a s , i n c o n t e m p o -

rary parlance, a humanist. After Hegel’s friendship with Holderlin and his relationship to Goethe, his encounter with the young Heine d e s e r v e s t o b e remembered, t o o . 47 Cf. t h e p e n u l t i m a t e p a r a g r a p h o f D 1 8 3 5 , D 1 8 5 3 , a n d D 1 8 8 0 .

The point Heine makes is also made, without wit, by Karl Hegel and Edgard Gans p. 1234 .

( q u o t e d i n t h e Appendix

to F i s c h e r , 2 d e d . ,

H egel’s development in letters

367

we two stood next t o each other a t a window, and I , a y o u n g man of twenty-two who h a d just eaten well a n d h a d good

coffee, enthused about the stars and called them the abode of the blessed. But the master grumbled to himself: “The stars, hum! hum! the stars are only a gleaming leprosy in the sky.” For G o d ’ s s a k e , I shouted, then there is no happy locality u p there t o reward virtue after death? But h e , staring at m e with h i s p a l e eyes, s a i d c u t t i n g l y : “ S o you want to get a t i p for h a v i n g nursed y o u r sick mother and for not having poisoned your dear brother?”—Saying t h a t , h e looked a r o u n d anxiously,

but he immediately seemed reassured when he saw that it was only Heinrich Beer, who had approached to invite him to play whist. . . . I was y o u n g a n d p r o u d , and it pleased m y vanity when I l e a r n e d from H e g e l t h a t it was n o t t h e dear G o d w h o lived in heaven that w a s G o d , a s my grandmother s u p p o se d, but I myself h e r e o n e a r t h . This foolish p r i d e d i d n o t b y a n y me a ns h a v e a c o r r u p t i n g i n fl u e n c e o n my feelings; rather it raised

them to the level of heroism. At that time I put so much effort i n t o generosity a n d self-sacrifice that I certainly o u t s h o n e the

most brilliant feats of those good Philistines of virtue who merely a c t e d from a sense of duty a n d obeyed the m o r a l

laws. After all, I myself was now the living moral law and the source of all right and sanctions. I was primordial Sittlichkeit, immune against sin, I was incarnate purity; the most notorious Magdalens were purified by the cleansing and atoning power of t h e flames o f m y love, a n d stainless a s lilies a n d blushing

like chaste roses they emerged from the God’s embraces with an altogether new virginity. These restorations of damaged maidenhoods, I strength. . . .

confess, occasionally exhausted my

368

DOCUMENTATION

FRANZ GRILLPARZER:

A u s dem Nachlass, I 8 5 5

HEGEL

Was mir a n deinem System a m besten geféillt? Es ist so unverstc’indlich wie die Welt.48 What feature m a k e s y o u r system eligible? It is like the world itself: unintelligible.

KARL GUTZKOW (1811—78): 187049 Hegel’s m a n n e r as a lecturer was quite t h e opposite of t h a t of all the famous m e n described s o far. H e w a s still i n full vigor a n d had n o idea that a disease that was then still i n Asia, the cholera, a n d a few slices o f m e l o n , eaten for dessert,

would soon put an end to his life. Schleiermacher’s unique manner was close t o Hegel’s in character, unless any such

comparison should be ruled out because the great virtuosity of Schleiermacher’s delivery w a s so unlike the l a m e , dragging

lectures of Hegel, interrupted by eternal repetitions and irrelevant filler words. What they had in common was that both improvised, spinning, as it were, their lectures out of thought processes going o n a t t h a t very m o m e n t before the eyes of the audience. The others offered finished results of prior m e d i tations. Schleiermacher a n d Hegel renewed the thought process in o r d e r t o gain this o r t h a t result. And Hegel d i d this like a spider t h a t sits concealed i n one corner of its n e t a n d tries t o draw its threads ever farther o u t o n the outside, but closer a nd closer together t o w a r d t h e inside. . . . B u t t o b e truthful, I confess t h a t i n Hegel’s lectures the

48 Literally: “What I like best about your system? It is as unintelligible as the world.” Similar but less successful epigrams a b o u t H e g e l a r e found i n Siimtlz'clze Werke in z w a n z i g Biinden, ed. August Sauer, Stuttgart, Cotta, III, 82, 123, 134, 143, 173, and 2 1 9 . T h e above c o u p l e t c o m e s f r o m p . 1 9 7 . Cf. D 1 8 5 3 .

49 Lebensbilder (1870), 11 (2d ed., 1874), 105 f., 110 f. Gutzkow wrote a p h i l o s o p h y o f history ( 1 8 3 6 ) b u t is remembered novels a n d plays.

for his

Hegel’s d e v e l o p m e n t in letters

369

D a m a s c u s miracle ( i n reverse, I m i g h t s a y : t h e conversion from a theological P a u l t o a philosoghizing S a u l ) , which I h a d experienced i n t h e p a r k in t h e w i n t e r , w a s repeated for m e h o u r l y . Every H e g e l i a n d e m o n s t r a t i o n h a d a practical perspective. A t t h e e n d of a long, certainly extremely m o n o t o n o u s a n d dull a v e n u e of c o n c e p t splitting, o n e always s a w s o m e proposition of experience t h a t was t o b e c o n fi r m e d o r s o m e proposition o f tradition t h a t w a s t o b e o v e r t h r o w n . The logical process, being a n d becoming, in-itself a n d for-itself,

were, to be sure, a kind of jugglery pursued to the point where o u r eyes get c o n f u s e d a n d o n l y t h e lifting of the c u p brings u s b a c k t o o u r senses. W h e n H e g e l lifted the c u p , s o m e t h i n g unexpected usually l a y u n d e r i t : s o m e t h i n g G o e t h e o r Spinoza h a d said, a mystical passage f r o m T a u l e r o r J a c o b Bb’hme,

an etymology from Grimm, a political dictum by Montesq u i e u , o r a n historical event. O n e c o u l d n o t h e l p being full o f a m a z e m e n t and a d m i r a t i o n . . . .

JOHANN E D U A R D ERDMANN (1805—92): 188050 . . . I n t o his o l d a g e h e k e p t t h e habit of r e a d i n g everything, p e n i n h a n d , w h e t h e r h e w as r e a d i n g a b o o k o r a newspaper. . . . L i k e K a n t , h e d i d n o t like symphilosophein; b u t , also like K a n t , h e w a s fond of confabulari with those w h o h e felt s u r e would n o t s e d u c e h i m i n t o the f o r m e r ; a n d i n Berlin whist t o o k t h e p l a c e of taroc.

50 From “Hegel” (pp. 254-74) in Allgemeine Deutsclze Biographie, Leipzig, D u n c k e r u n d H u m b l o t , X I ( 1 8 8 0 ) , 2 5 5 , 2 5 6 . E r d m a n n w a s o n e o f Hegel’s s t u d e n t s , l a t e r b e c a m e Professor o f

Philosophy at Halle, and wrote a n important history of philosophy (1866; the 3d edition was translated into English). Symplzilosolalzein, a G r e e k w o r d t h a t t h e G e r m a n r o m a n t i c s l i k e d , m e a n s to philosophize t o g e t h e r ; confabulari m e a n s to c h a t together.

370

DOCUMENTATION

WALT

WHITMAN: 188151

ROAMING

IN

THOUGHT

( A f t e r reading HEGEL) R o a m i n g i n t h o u g h t over t h e Universe, I saw the little t h a t is G o o d steadily hastening to w ard s immortality, And the vast all t h a t is call’d Evil I s a w hastening t o merge itself a n d b e c o m e lost a n d d e a d . 51 Leaves of Grass:

By the Roadside.

Bibliography

I. H E G E L BIBLIOGRAPHIES The best bibliographies a r e long d a t e d : 1 . Benedetto Croce, Lebendiges u n d Totes in Hegels Philosophie, mit e i n e r Hegel-Bibliographie: D eu ts ch e, v o m Verfasser vermehrte Ubersetzung von K . Biichler, Heidelberg, Carl Winter, 1 9 0 9 . “Abriss e i n e r Hegelschen Bibliographie,” p p . 177—228. T h e r e a r e s e p a r a t e sections listing 1 0 Italian translations of Hegel’s writings, 6 French, 1 3 English, a n d 3 S p a n i s h o n e s . The literature a b o u t H e g e l includes 8 3 G e r m a n works of a general nature, 3 0 o n t h e Logic, a n d over 8 0 o n other special topics; followed b y 7 3 Italian items, 4 6 French, 7 4 English, a n d 1 4 i n other l a n g u a g e s : 4 0 0 items a b o u t Hegel, altogether.

2 . Friedrich Ueberweg, Grundrz’ss der Geschichte der Philosoplzz'e: Vierter Tez’l: Die deutsche Philosophie des XIX. Jahrhunderts u n d der Gegenwart, e d . T . K . Oesterreich, 1 3 t h e d . ( u n c h a n g e d reprint of th e 1 2 t h e d . of 1 9 2 3 ) , Basel, B e n n o Sc hw abe & C o . , 1 9 5 1 . Bibliography of Hegel’s writings, p p . 77—80; o f writings a b o u t Hegel, p p . 678—81. 3 . Hegel u n d die Hegelz’aner: Eine Bibliothek, D r . Hellersberg A n t i q u a r i a t & Verlag, (Berlin-) Charlottenburg, Knesebeckstr. 2 0 / 2 1 , n . d . T h i s library included 2 0 items of biographical interest; 1 5 3 works “ o n Hegel’s s y s t e m ” ; 3 9 “ o n Hegel’s

Logic”; and 117 on other special areas. The most recent items in this library were published in 1927. The following bibliography, while more up-to-date, is much less comprehensive than th es e three. I t stresses ( A ) the Ger-

372

BIBLIOGRAPHY

man editions of Hegel’s collected works, ( B ) t h e editions o f his collected letters, ( C ) single works published b y Hegel

himself, and ( D ) posthumously published “works.” Under C a n d D the m a j o r editions h a v e been listed; also t h e most i m portant English translations. B u t n o t all recent reprints o r partial translations w e r e d e e m e d worthy of inclusion, a n d translations i n t o o t h e r languages are n o t listed. The m a i n point is to show the r e a d e r w h a t H eg el wrote, h o w th e m a j o r editions differ, a n d w h a t is available i n English. The list o f works a b o u t H e g e l ( P a r t I I I ) is c o n fi n e d to works cited i n this v o l u m e a n d a few o t h e r b o o k s a n d articles that, for o n e reason o r a n o t h e r , a r e likely t o be of special interest t o readers of this v o l u m e .

Current Hegel literature is listed periodically i n Hegel Studien, e d . F. Nicolin a n d O t t o Po'ggeler, B o n n , H . Bouvier & C o . , vol. I , 1 9 6 1 , vol. I I , 1 9 6 3 ; m o r e to b e published. V o l . I I , 424—41, offers a list of G e r m a n , Austrian, a n d Swiss dissertations o n Hegel, f r o m 1842—1960, in chronological o r d e r . There w e r e o n l y 1 2 dissertations before 1 9 0 0 , never m o r e t h a n one a year, except f o r two i n 1 8 9 8 ; 1900—09: 1 8 ; 1910—19: 1 7 ; 1920—32: 4 7 ; 1933—45: 3 9 ; 1946—60: 5 4 . T o t a l : 1 8 7 . S e e also Hegel-Archiv, e d . G e o r g Lasson, vols. I—II, Leipzig, 1912—14, a n d Hegelkongress, Verlzandlzmgen, e d . B . Wigersma, vols. I—III, 1 9 3 1 , 1 9 3 2 , 1 9 3 4 . Articles i n t h e Studien a n d A r c h i v are n o t listed below as there are t o o many of t h e m .

II. HEGEL’S WRITINGS A . Hegel’s Collected Works 1 . Werke: Vollstc'indige A u s g ab e durch einen Verez'n von Freunden des Verewz'gten, 1 8 vols. (actually 2 1 since t h e EncyCZOpZidie a p p e a r e d i n vols. V I , V I I . 1 , a n d V I I . 2 , a n d the Aesthetik i n vols. X . 1 , X . 2 , an d X . 3 ) , Berlin, D u n c ke r und H u m b l o t , 1832—45, 2 d ed., partly revised, 1840—47. Students’ lecture notes were used t o s u p p l e m e n t t h e texts o f the

Encyclopc‘z’die and Philosophie des Rechts, section by section,

BIBLIOGRAPHY

37 3

in t h e form of additions (Zusc'itze), an d w h o l e “works” not

written by Hegel were constructed from lecture notes: see D below. Four such cycles of lectures fill 9 vols.; the notes cove r i n g Hegel’s philOSOphy courses i n the Niirnberg G y m n a s i u m , a n o t h e r ; a n d t h e above-mentioned additions c o m p r i s e t h e equivalent o f o v e r 2 vols. I n s u m , less t h a n half of the Werke

were written by Hegel, who published only 4 books and a few essays a n d articles, a s well as s o m e long book reviews: see C below. F o r Hegel’s letters, s ee B below.

2 . Sc’imtliche Werke: Jubilc'iumsausgabe in 2 0 Bc’inden, ed. H e r m a n n G l o c k n e r ; Stuttgart, Frommann, 1927—30. A photo-

static reprint of A.1, without any corrections or critical app a r a t u s , b u t rearranged i n chronological order. SUpplemented b y a very useful 4-vol. Hegel-Lexikon, 1935—39; 2 d r e v . e d . i n 2 vols., thin p a p e r , 1 9 5 7 ( m u c h of the work on t h e HegelLexikon w a s d o n e by Frau D r. Marie G l o c k n e r ) , a nd b y D o k u m e n t e z u Hegels Ent’cklung, e d . J o h a n n e s Hoffmeister, 1 9 3 6 ; b o t h also F r o m m a n n s Verlag. This is t h e m o s t widely

accessible “complete” edition. But the letters included in A.1 (see B b e l o w ) a r e o m i t t e d .

3. Sc‘imtliche Werke: Kritische Ausgabe, begun by Georg L a s s o n , c o n t i n u e d after his d e a t h ( 1 9 3 2 ) by J o h a n n e s Hoffmeister, a n d after his d e a t h ( 1 9 5 5 ) by several other editors; published b y Felix M e i n e r , H a m b u r g . Since L a s s o n re-edited t h e Encyclopc'idie ( 1 9 0 5 ) a n d th e Phiinomenologie ( 1 9 0 7 ) , the editions h a v e gradually become more a n d m o r e exacting philologically. The e a r l y v o l u m e s were conceived a s separate single v o l u m e s within t h e framework of Meiner’s PhiIOSOphische Bibliothek; by t h e 19205 th e p ag es f a c i n g the title pages a n n o u n c e d Siz'mtlz’clze Werke a n d t h e a n n o u n c e m e n t s of other v o l u m e s i n t h e b a c k referred to a kritische Gesamtausgabe. S o m e wo r k s h a v e b y n o w b e e n published i n several different critical editions, the latest being generally the best, except t h a t i n a few instances v a l u a b l e editorial prefaces have been deleted. T h i s edition i s still incomplete. For details see C a n d D below.

4. A new critical edition in larger format is projected. The p l a n calls for 3 5 v o l u m e s , including 4 volumes of correspond-

374

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ence and o n e index volume. C f . Friedhelm Nicolin, “ D i e n e u e Hegel-Gesamtausgabe: Vorraussetzungen u n d Ziele” in Hegel-Studien, vol. I ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 295—313.

B . Letters

1. The first selection appeared in A.1, vol. XVII, 473—634. 2 . This was superseded by A 1 , vols. X I X . 1 and X I X . 2 : Briefe v a n and a n Hegel, e d . Karl Hegel; Leipzig, Duncker u n d Humblot, 1 8 8 7 .

3. This, too, was superseded by Briefe van and an Hegel, published a s vols. XXVII—XXX

of A . 3 : vol. I : 1785—1812

(1952), vol. I I : 1813—22 (1953), vol. III: 1823—31 (1954) -—all e d . by Johannes Hoffmeister. Vol. I V : Naclztrc‘ige, D o k u meme, Personenregister ( 1 9 6 0 ) , e d . Rolf Flechsig. All published by Felix Meiner, like A 3 . I , 433—515, I I , 371—508, I I I , 365—475, and IV, 139—78, comprise editorial notes, a n d IV, 179—327, a n a n n o t a t e d i n d e x o f persons. T h e s e four volumes are a n invaluable contribution to Hegel scholarship.

C. Single Works Published by Hegel Himself Asterisks mark Hegel’s four m a j o r works. The references at t h e end of many entries, which are preceded b y a n H , a r e t o t h e Sections o r , if expressly indicated, the Chapters of t h e present work i n which the i t e m is discussed; b u t i n this c o n -

nection the Contents and Index should also be consulted. 1 . Vertrauliche Briefe iiber das vormalige staatsrechtliclze Verhc’z’ltnis des Waadtlandes (Pays de Vaud) z u r Stadt B e r n : A u s dem Franzb'sischen eines verstorbenen Schweizers. Anonymously translated b y Hegel, with p reface a n d notes.

Frankfurt [Jagersche Buchhandlung], 1798. Pp. 212. ( H 11) 2 . Difierenz des F ichte’schen u n d Schelling’sclzen Systems der Philomphie in Beziehung auf Reinhold’s Beytriz'ge z u r leichte m Ubersicht des Zustands der Philosophie z u A n f a n g des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, I stes Heft. J e n a , i n d e r a k a d e m -

ischen Buchhandlung bei Seidler, 1801. Reprinted: A.1, vol.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

375

I ; A.2, vol. I ; a n d in Erste Druckschriften, e d . Georg Lasson, 1928. ( H 1 4 ) (

3 . Dissertatio philosophica de Orbitis Planetarum. J e n a , 1801. Reprinted: A . l , vol. XVI; A.2, vol. I ; Erste Druckschriften.

(H 15) 4 . Dissertationi Philosophicae de Orbitis Planetarum Praemissae Theses . . . Publice Defendet Die XXVII. A u g . a .

MDCCCI. (H 15)

Jena [1801]. Reprinted: Erste Druckschrz‘ften.

5. “Uber das Wesen der philosophischen Kritik fiberhaupt, u n d i h r Verh'altnis zum gegenw'artigen Zustand der Philosophie insbesondere,” Kritisches Journal der Philosophie, ed. Schelling and Hegel, 1.1 (1802). Reprinted: A.1, vol. XVI; A.2, vol. I ; Erste Druckschriften. ( H 1 6 ) 6 . “Wie

der

gemeine

Menschenverstand

die

Philosophie

nehme,—dargestellt an den Werken des Herrn Krug’s,” Krit. Journal, 1.1 (1802). Reprinted like C.5. ( H 1 7 )

7 . “Verh'altnis des Skeptizismus zur Philosophie, Darstellung seiner Modifikationen, und Vergleichung des neuesten mit dem alten.” Krit. Journal, 1.2(1802). Reprinted like C.5. (H 18)

7a. “Uber das Verh'altnis der Naturphilosophie zur Philosophie iiberhaUpt.” Krit. Journal, 1.3 (1802). Reprinted A.1, vol. XVI. Claimed for Hegel by his early editors, but in fact written b y Schelling.

8. “Glauben und Wissen oder die ReflexionsphiIOSOphie der Subjectivitat i n der Vollst'andigkeit ihrer Formen, als Kantische, Jacobische, u n d Fichtesche Philosophie.” Krit. Journal, 11.1(1802). Reprinted: A.1, vol. I ; A.2, vol. I ; Erste Druck-

schriften. ( H 20) 9. “Uber die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts, seine Stelle in der praktischen Philosophie und sein Verh'altnis zu den positiven Rechtswissenschaften.” Krit. Journal, II.2/3 (1802/3). Reprinted: A.1, vol. I ; A.2, vol. I ;

376

BIBLIOGRAPHY

and i n Schrz’ften z u r Politik mzd RechtSpIzilosophie, e d . Georg Lasson, 1 9 1 3 ; 2 d ( a l m o s t identical) ed., 1 9 2 3 . ( H 2 1 ) 1 0 . Four short reviews in Erlanger Literaturzeitung. a. Anfangsgrz'inde der spekulativen Philosophie: Versuch

eines Lelzrbuchs von Fried. Bouterwek (1800). Sept. 1 5 a n d 1 6 , 1 8 0 1 . Reprinted i n Lasson, Beitriz'ge z u r Hegel-Forsclzung ( 1 9 0 9 ) a n d i n Erste Druckschriften, 131—42. b . Entwurf eines n e u e n Organons der Philos0plzie, oder Versuch fiber die Prinzipien der philosoplzischen Erkenntnis von W i l h . Traug. K r u g ( 1 8 0 1 ) . June 4 , 1 8 0 2 .

Reprinted twice by Lasson, like a. Pp. 159—60. c . Kurze wissenschaftliche Darlegung der Unhaltbarkeit —sow0hl des transzend. ideal. Systems von Fichte, als auch des Systems der eiteln Grzmdlehre—und des kritischen Systems—usw. von J . F r . C . Werneburg ( 1 8 0 0 ) . Versuchte, kurze, fasslz'clze Vorschilderung der Allwissenschaftslehre, Oder alleinigen sogenannten Philosophie una’ fassliclzere Darstellzmg der Grundlosigkeit beider extrematz’scher Systeme des Idealismus und des Dogmatismus usw. von D . J . Fr. C . Werne-

burg (1800). April 9, 1802. Reprinted twice by Lasson, like a. Pp. 212—14. (1. Versuch einer gemez‘nfassliclzen D e d u k t i o n des Rechts— begrifis aus den hochsten Griinden des Wissens als Grundlage z u einem kiinftz'gen System der Plzilos0plzie des Rechts v o n K . Fr. W i l h . Gerstacker ( 1 8 0 1 ) . April 2 8 , 1 8 0 2 . Reprinted twice by Lasson, like a . Pp. 214—19. * 1 1 . System der Wissenschaft: Erster T eil, die Phiz'nomeno-

logie des Geistes. Bamberg und Wiirzburg, bei Joseph Anton Goebhardt, 1 8 0 7 . Reprinted: A . 1 , vol. I I ; A . 2 , vol. 11; ed. Lasson, Leipzig, Verlag der Dfirr’schen Buchhandlung, 1 9 0 7 ; ed. G . J . P . J . Bolland, Leiden, 1 9 0 7 ; e d . Hoffmeister, 1 9 5 2 . NOTE: Just before his death, Hegel m a d e minor revisions for a p l a n n e d s e c o n d edition b u t got only through the early

pages of the preface. A.1 and A2 embody the revisions; so

BIBLIOGRAPHY

377

does Lasson, but h e lists t h e variants in the back. Kaufmann’s c o m m e n t a r y calls attention to interesting differences.

ENGLISH: The Phenomenology of‘Mind, tr. J. B. Baillie, 2 vols., L o n d o n & N e w York, 1 9 1 0 ; 2d rev. e d . in 1 vol., Lond o n , G e o r g e Allen & U n w i n , New York, The Macmillan C o . , 1 9 3 1 . Preface, w i t h commentary, tr. Walter Kaufmann: H Chapter VIII. ( H Chapter I I I ) * 1 2 . Wissensc/zaft der Logik.

Erster

Band:

Die objective

Logik. N'Lirnberg, bey Johann Leonhard Schrag, 1812. Erster Band: Die objective Logik. Zweytes Buch: Die Lehre vom Wesen. Ibid., 1 8 1 3 ( t h i s d a t e i s generally given wrongly a s 1 8 1 2 ) . Zweiter Band: D i e subjective Logik oder Lehre vom

Begrifl. Ibid., 1816. (This is the wording of the left page, omitted in part of the edition. The facing title page readsz) Wissenschaft der subjectiven Logik oder die Lehre vom Begrifl. Ibid., 1 8 1 6 . R e p r i n t e d : A . 1 , vols. III—V; A . 2 , vols. IV—V; e d . Lasson , 2 vols., 1 9 2 3 .

NOTE: Just before his death, Hegel made very considerable changes for a planned second edition and got through the 1812 volume. The rare original edition has never been reprinted or translated, nor does any edition list the variants. I n C h a p t e r IV, above, all citations are based on comparisons w i t h t h e first edition, and interesting differences are duly n o t e d . The volumes o f 1 8 1 3 an d 1 8 1 6 are not affected. ENGLISH: Science of Logic, tr. W . H . Johnston a n d L. G. Struthers, 2 vols., London, Allen & Unwin, 1 9 2 9 . Partial tr.

(of the last third only) by H . S. Macran: Hegel’s Doctrine of Formal Logic, being a translation of the first section of the Subjective Logic, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1 9 1 2 , and Hegel’s Logic of World a n d Idea, being a translation of the second and third parts of the Subjective Logic, ibid., 1 9 2 9 .

( H Chapter I V ) * 1 3 . EncykIOpa'die der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. Zum G e b r a u c h seiner Vorlesungen. Heidelberg,

in August Osswald’s Universitatsbuchhandlung, 1817. Pp. xvi, 2 8 8 . Second completely rev. e d . , ibid., 1 8 2 7 . P p . xlii, 544. Third rev. e d . , Heidelberg, Verwaltung des Osswaldischen

Verlags (C. F. Winter), with the words “1m Vereins-Verlage”

BIBLIOGRAPHY

378

pasted over the old publisher’s n a m e , 1830. P p . lviii, 6 0 0 . R e p r i n t e d : l s t e d . i n A . 2 , vol. V I ; 2 d e d . : n e v e r ; 3 d e d . : e d . Rosenkranz, Berlin, 1 8 4 5 a n d 1 8 7 8 , e d . Lasson, 1 9 0 5 and 1 9 1 1 , superior critical e d . by Friedhelm Nicolin a n d Otto Pb'ggeler, 1 9 5 9 . Third e d . , w i t h extensive additions, based o n students’ lecture notes a n d marked a s Zusc’itze, i n 3 vols., i n A . 1 , vols. V I , V I I . 1 , V I I . 2 ; in A . 2 , vols. VIII-X; and in a single volume, e d . G . J . P . J . Bolland, with many editorial footnotes, Leiden, A . H . Adriani, 1 9 0 6 . P p . lxxvi, 1072. ENGLISH: Part I : The Logic of Hegel, t r . William Wallace, Oxford, C l a r e n d o n Press, 1 8 7 4 ; 2 d rev. ed., ibid., 1 8 9 2 . Part

II (Philosophy of Nature): never. Part III: Hegel’s Philosop hy of Mind, ibid., 1 8 9 4 . EncyCIOpedia of PhiIOSOphy, translated and annotated by Gustav E m i l Mueller, N e w York, Philosophical Library, 1 9 5 9 , contains a n informed essay o n Hegel ( 3 1 p p . ) b u t , a s the “Translator’s N o t e ” ( 7 p p . ) explains, not really a translation. Here 2 5 lines are rendered i n 3 , there 7 1 i n 1 0 ; §§230—59 of t h e Philosophy of Nature a re dismissed i n 1 1 lines; e t c . Moreover, usually the edition

of 1817 is paraphrased, often that of 1830, occasionally additions from the posthumous edition. ( H Chapter V ) 1 4 . Two

major reviews i n Heidelbergische Jahrbiicher der

Literatur. The dates indicate when the reviews appeared. a . “Ueber Friedr. H e i n r . Jacobi’s W e r k e : Erster B a n d . ” 1 8 1 3 . R e p r i n t e d : A . 1 , X V I , 203—18. This review is not by Hegel but b y E . von Meyer. b . “Ueber Friedr. H e i n r . Jacobi’s Werke: Dritter Band.” 1 8 1 7 . R e p r i n t e d : A . 1 , XVII, 3—37; A . 2 , V I . c . “Beurteilung d e r i m Druck erschienenen Verhandlungen i n d e r V e r s a m m l u n g d er L a n d s t a n d e de s Konigreichs Wfirtemberg i m J a h r e 1 8 1 5 u n d 1 8 1 6 . ” 1 8 1 7 . Reprinted i n A . 1 , X V I , 219—360; A . 2 , V I ; Schriften zur Politik and Rechtsphilosophie ( s e e 0 9

above). ENGLISH: partial translation of c. in Hegel’s Political Writings, t r . T. M . Kn o x , w i t h a n i n t r o d u c t o r y essay b y Z. A . Pelczynski, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1 9 6 4 .

BIBLIOGRAPHY

379

* 1 5 . Naturrecht a n d Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Zum Gebrauch filr seine Vorlesungen. ( F a c i n g right p a g e : ) Grund-

Iinien der Philosophie des Rechts: Berlin, 1821. In der Nicolaischen Buchhandlung. Reprinted: A . 1 , vol. VIII; A . 2 , vol. VII; b o t h with Eduard Gans’s additions (Zusc'itze) based

on Hegel’s lectures. Lasson followed their example. Hoflmeister’s e d . ( 1 9 5 5 )

o m i t s the additions but offers

(pp.

299—430) Hegel’s manuscript comments on his text in his own copy. ENGLISH: The Ethics of Hegel: Translated Selections from

his “Rechtsphilosophie,” tr. with a n introduction by J . Macbride Sterrett, Boston, Ginn

& C o . , 1 8 9 3 ; Philosophy

of

Right, tr. S. W. Dyde, London, George Bell & Sons, 1896; Philos0phy of Right, tr. with notes by T. M . Knox, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1 9 4 2 (with G a n s ’ s additions i n the back,

pp. 224—97, and translator’s notes, pp. 298—376). Knox’s translation is by far the best.

1 6 . Vorrea’e. I n H . Fr. W . Hinrichs, Die Religion im inneren Verha'ltnisse z u r Wissenschaft. Heidelberg, 1 8 2 2 , p p . i—xxviii. Reprinted: A . 1 , vol. XVII; A . 2 , vol. XX; Berliner Schriften, 1818—1831, e d . Hofimeister, 1 9 5 6 . 1 7 . Seven major book reviews i n Jahrbiicher fiir wissenschaftliche Kritik, all reprinted i n A . 1 , vols. XVI an d XVII; i n A 2 , vol. XX; a n d i n Berliner Schriften ( s e e C . 1 6 ) . Each title i s

followed by the year of publication of the review and by the page numbers i n Berliner Schriften. a . U b e r die u n t e r dem Namen Bhagavad-Gita b e k a n n t e Episode des Mahabharata von Wilhelm von Humboldt. 1 8 2 7 . 85—154. b . Solgers Nachgelassene Schriften u n d Briefwechsel. 1 8 2 8 . 155—220.

c. Hamanns Schriften. 1828. 221—94. Reprint in A l and A 2 was incomplete. d . Aphorismen iiber Nichtwissen and absolutes Wissen im Verha'ltnis z u r christlichen Glaubenserkenntnis: Ein Beitrag z u m Versta'ndnis a’er Philosophie unserer Zeit v o n C a r l Friedrich G[6sche]1. 1 8 2 9 . 295—329. . e Uber a’ie Hegelsche Lehre oder: Absolutes Wissen u n d

380

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Moderner Pantheismus. A n d : U b e r Philosophie liberh a u p t u n d Hegels EnzykIOpc'idie der philosophischen Wissenschaften insbesondere: Ein Beitrag z u r Beurteilu n g der letztern v o n D r . K . E . S c h u b a r t h u n d D r . L . C a r g a n i c o . 1829. 330—402. Several o t h e r titles are listed a t t h e h e a d of this review b u t n o t discussed i n it. D f. e r Idealrealismus. Erster T eil auch u n t e r dem besonderen Titel: D e r Idealrealismus als Metaphysik in die Stelle des Idealismus u n d Realismus gesetzt. Von D r . A l b . L e o p . J u l . O h l e r t . 1831. 403—21. U b e r Grundlage, Gliederung a n d Zeitenfolge der Weltgeschichte: D r e i Vortra'ge von J . Gorres. 1831. 422— 47.

18. “Uber die englische Reformbill.” In Allgemeine Preussische Staatszeitung, 1831. R e p r i n t e d : A . 1 , vol. X V I I ; A . 2 , vol. XX; Berliner Schriften. ENGLISH: t r . T . M . Knox in Hegel’s Political Writings ( s e e C.14.c above).

1 9 . Very short pieces: a.

“Wer denkt abstrakt?” Place of original publication u n k n o w n . R e p r i n t e d : A . 1 , vol. X V I I ; A . 2 , vol. X X . English: t r . W a l t e r K a u f m a n n : H Chapter I X : see ibid. a b o u t t h e d a t e .

“Uber Wallenstein.” Originally published in Schnellpost, e d . M o r i t z G o t t l i e b S a p h i r (1795—1858); re-

printed like 19.a. Hoffmeister, Berliner Schriften, p. xiii, claims t h a t Glockner’s inclusion of 1 9 . a a n d b i n his e d . of Berliner Schriften (i.e., A . 2 , v01. XX) was a mistake, a n d t h a t this essay was written i n Frankfurt in 1800. 2 pp.

“Uber Lessings Briefwechsel mit seiner Frau.” Place of original publication unknown. Reprinted like 19.a. 4 pp. “ U b e r die Bekehrten. ( A n t i k r i t i s c h e s . ) ” Berliner Schnellpost, 1826; # 8 , 9 ; Beiwagen z u r Berliner Schnellpost, # 4 . Dated J a n u a r y 1 1 , 1826. Reprinted like 1 9 . a , also i n Berliner Schriften, e d . Hofimeister, pp. 451—60.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

381

D . Posthumously Published “Works” 1 . Hegels theologische Jugendschriften, nach den Handschriften der Kgl. Bibliothek in Berlin, e d . Herman N o h l , Tijbingen, Mohr ( P a u l S i e b e c k ) , 1907. A careful edition of some exceptionally interesting e a r l y essays a n d drafts, not

intended for publication by Hegel: I. “Volksreligion und Christentum,” I I . “ D a s Leben J e s u , ” III. “ D i e Positivit’cit d e r christlichen Religion,” IV. “ D e r Geist des Christentums u n d sein Schicksal,” V. “Systemfragment von 1 8 0 0 . ” P p . xii,

405. ENGLISH: Early Theological Writings, tr. T. M . Knox, with a n introduction ( 6 6 p p . ) and Fragments Translated by R i c h a r d Kroner, The University o f Chicago Press, 1948. Paperback ed., unrev. b u t with t h e title: 0 n Christianity: Early Theological Writings by Friedrich Hegel, N ew York, Harper T o r c h b o o k s , 1 9 6 1 . Items I a n d I I have not been translated. ( H 8 - 1 0 , 1 2 )

2 . Kritik der Verfassung Deutschlands, aus dem handschriftlichen Nachlass, e d . G e o r g M o l l a t , Kassel, 1 8 9 3 . R e p r i n t e d :

as a companion vol. to A 2 , 1935. Critical ed.: Die Verfassung Deutsclzlands, in Schriften zur Politik und RechtSphilos0plzie, e d . L a s s o n 1 9 1 3 , 2 d ed., 1 9 2 3 . ENGLISH: “The German Constitution,” tr. T. M . Knox ( o n the basis of Lasson’s 2d e d . ) , i n Hegel’s Political Writings (see C.14.c above). (H 21) 3 . System der Sittlichkeit, aus dem handschriftlichen Nachlass, e d . Georg M o l l a t , Osterwieck, 1 8 9 3 . Critical e d . in

Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie (like D.2, above). (H 21)

4 . Jenenser Logik, Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie, aus dem Manuskript e d . L a s s o n , 1 9 2 3 . Drafts for a system, antedating the Phenomenology.

5. Jenenser Realphilosophie, I : Die Vorlesungen von I803/ 04, aus dem Manuskript,

e d . Hofimeister, 1932. C o n t a i n s :

“Hegels Naturphilosophie von 1803,” pp. 1—191; “Hegels

382

BIBLIOGRAPHY

erste Philosophie des Geistes von 1803/04,” pp. 193—241; fragments, pp. 243—70; and apparatus, p p . 271—84. 6 . Jenenser Realphilosophie, I I : Die Vorlesungen von 1805/ 06, aus dem Manuskript, e d . Hofimeister, 1931. C o n t a i n s :

“Naturphilosophie,” pp. 1—176; and “GeistesPhilosophie,” p p . 177—273. 7 . Niirnberger Schriften: T exte, Reden, Berichte und G u t achten zum Niirnberger Gymnasialunterricht: 1806—1816, ed. Hoflmeister, 1 9 3 8 . Pp . xxxvi, 4 9 9 . This volume supersedes Philosophische Propiia’eutik, e d . Rosenkranz, A . 1 , XVIII,

1840, pp. 205; also A.2, III: Philosophische Propc’ideutik, Gymnasialreden und G u t a c h t e n iiber den Philosophieunterricht, p p . 3 3 5 ; also “Fiinf Gymnasial-Reden, gehalten zu Niirnberg” i n A . 1 , XVI, 133—99.

ENGLISH: “Hegel’s Prop'aideutik, translated, with commentary,” by W. T . Harris, i n The Journal of Speculative Philomphy, vols. III—IV. 8 . Berliner Schriften ( s e e C.16—19) also contains the texts o f

4 speeches, 9 “Gutachten und Stellungnahmen,” material from the files concerning 1 5 habilitations (including Schopenhauer’s) a n d 8 doctorates, as well a s 5 t0pics for prize essays, and 6 5 pages of excerpts a n d notes. 9. Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie der Geschichte, e d . Eduard G a n s , 1 8 3 7 ; 2 d rev. e d . b y Karl Hegel, 1 8 4 0 ; 3 d ed. by Karl Hegel, 1843—all i n A . 1 , IX; Karl Hegel’s e d . re-

printed: A.2, XI. ENGLISH: Lectures on t h e Philosophy of History, t r . from the 3 d German e d . b y J . Sibree, 1 8 5 8 ; often reprinted both

in hard covers and in paperback. Entirely new ed. in 4 vols., ed. Lasson, 1917—20. Vol. I : Die Vernunft in der Geschichte: Einleitung in die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, 2 d enlarged ed., 1 9 2 0 ; 3 d rev. ed., 1 9 3 0 ; 4th ed., not rev., 1 9 4 4 ; 5 t h rev. e d . by Hoffmeister, 1 9 5 5 , re-

printed 1963. Vol. 11: Die orientalische Welt; 111: Die griechische und romische Welt; I V : Die germanische Welt. My discussion of vol. I is based o n Hofimeister’s ed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

383

ENGLISH: Untranslated. Reason in History, tr. Robert S. Hartman, N e w York, Liberal Arts Press, 1 9 5 3 , is n o t a translation of Die Vernunft in der Gesc‘hichte but follows Karl

Hegel’s 2d ed. “with a few exceptions,” interpolating in places of the editor’s choosing some passages from Lasson’s 1917 ed. It is thus not a translation of any one German book. The translations of “Selections from the Philosophy of History” i n The Philosophy

of

Hegel,

e d . Carl J . Friedrich,

New York, Modern Library, are based partly on Lasson’s 1920 ed., partly “upon Sibree’s old translation which followed the German of Karl H e g e l . ” ( H 59—65)

1 0 . Vorlesungen iiber die Aesthetik, e d . H . G . Hotho, A . 1 , X . 1 , X . 2 , X . 3 , 1 8 3 5 , 1 8 3 7 , 1 8 3 8 ; 2d slightly rev. ed., 1 8 4 2 .

Reprinted: A.2, XII-XIV. ENGLISH: The Philos0phy of Fine Art, tr. F . P . B . Osmaston, 4 vols., London, G . Bell & S o n s , 1 9 2 0 .

Critical ed. (incomplete): Erster Halbband: Einleitung and Erster T eil, I . Abteilung: Die Idee and Das son,1931. 1 1 . Vorlesungen einer Schrift

Ideal,

ed. Las-

iiber die Philosophie der Religion, nebst iiber die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes, ed.

Philipp Marheineke, A.1, XI-XII. Reprinted: ed. G . J. P . J. Bolland, Leiden, 1901; A.2, XV—XVI. ENGLISH: Lectures on the Philos0phy of Religion, Together with a Work on the Proofs of the Existence of God, tr. from the 2d German ed. by the Rev. E. B. Speirs, B.D., and J . B u r d o n Sanderson, 3 vols., London, Trench, Triibner, & C o . , 1 8 9 5 .

Kegan

Paul,

Critical ed., nach den vorhandenen Manuskripten vollstiindig n e u herausgegeben von Lasson: Begrifi‘ der Religion, 1 9 2 5 ; Die Naturreligion, 1 9 2 7 ; Die Religion der geistigen Individualitc'it, 1927. 1 2 . Vorlesungen iiber die Geschichte der Philos0phie, ed. Karl Ludwig Michelet, A . 1 , XIII-XV. Reprinted: ed. G . J . P. J . Bolland, Leiden, 1 9 0 8 ; A . 2 , XVII-XIX. ENGLISH: Lectures on t h e History of Philosophy, tr.

384

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Elizabeth S. Haldane a n d Frances Simson, L o n d o n , Kegan Paul, Trench, Triibner, & C o . 1892—96.

Critical ed. of the introductory lectures onlymEinIeitung: n e u nach System und Geschichte der Philosophie, vollsta'ndig den Quellen herausgegeben v o n Hoffmeister, 1 9 4 0 , reprinted 1 9 4 4 and 1 9 5 9 . I n 1 9 5 9 the title was changed to Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philos0phie, and F . Nicolin substituted a few short Vorbemerkungen (ix—xvii) for Hoflmeister’s interesting preface ( i - x l i v ) . ( H 66—67)

III. WRITINGS ABOUT HEGEL Avineri, Shlomo, “The Problem of War in Hegel’s Thought” i n Journal of the History of Ideas, 1 9 6 1 ( X X I I . 4 ) , pp. 463—74. ._..__._, “Hegel a n d Nationalism” in The Review of Politics, October 1 9 6 2 ( X X I V . 4 ) , p p . 461—84.

, “Hegel’s Views on Jewish Emancipation” in Jewish Social Studies, April 1963 (XXV.2), pp. 145—51. Baillie, J . B., The Origin and Significance of Hegel’s Logic: System, London & A General Introduction to Hegel’s New York, 1 9 0 1 . Barion, Jakob, Hegel und die marxistische Staatslehre, B o n n , 1963. Bauer, Bruno ( a n o n y m o u s ) , Die Posaune des jiingsten gerichts wider Hegel, den Atheisten und Antichristen, Leipzig, 1 8 4 1 . , Hegels Lehre von Religion and Kunst, Leipzig, 1842. Bergmann, Frithjof, “Harmony and R e a s o n : An Introduction

to the Philosophy of Hegel,” unpublished dissertation, Princeton, 1 9 6 0 .

, “The Purpose of Hegel’s System” in Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1964 (11.2), pp. 189—204. Beyer, Wilhelm R . , Zwischen Phc'inomenologie u n d Logik: Hegel als Redakteur der Bamberger Zeitung, Frankfurt, 1955.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Biemel, Walter, “ D a s Wesen der Dialektik Sartre” i n Tijdschrift voor PlzilosOphie, 269—300. Bloch, Ernst, Subjekt-Objekt: Erliiuterungen lin, 1 9 5 1 . Bosanquet, B e r n a r d , A History of Aesthetic,

385

bei Hegel und 1 9 5 8 ( 2 ) , pp. z u Hegel, Ber-

London, 1 8 9 2 ;

2d ed., 1904; paperback ed. Meridian Books, 1957, pp. 334—62, 471—87.

Bradley, A . C.,

“Hegel’s Theory of Tragedy” in Oxford

Lectures on Poetry, London, 1 9 0 9 , p p . 69—95.

Carrit, E. F., “Discussion: Hegel and Prussianism” in Philosophy, April 1940, pp. 190—96; July 1940, pp. 315—17. See Knox, below. Collingwood, R . G . , The Idea of History, Oxford, 1 9 4 6 , pp. 113—26. , The Idea of Nature, Oxford, 1 9 4 4 , p p . 121—32. Croce, Benedetto, Cio‘ ch e é vivo e cio che é morto della filosofia di Hegel; Bari, 1 9 0 7 . German t r . : see above, 1.1. E n g l i s h : What is Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel, tr. from the 3 d Italian e d . , 1 9 1 2 , by Douglas Ainslie, London, 1 9 1 5 . Derbolav, Josef, “Die kritische Hegelrezeption des jungen

Marx und das Problem der Emanzipation des Menschen” in Studium Generale, 1 9 6 2 ( X V . 4 ) , p p . 271—88. , “Hegel u n d die Sprache” i n Sprache—Schliissel zur Welt: F estschrift fiir Leo Weisgerber, Dfisseldorf, 1 9 5 9 , pp. 56—86. Dilthey, Wilhelm, Di e Jugendgeschichte Hegels, Berlin, 1 9 0 6 ;

reprinted in Dilthey’s Gesammelte Schriften, IV, Leipzig & Berlin, 1 9 2 1 . Easton, Lloyd D . , “Alienation and History in the Early Marx” i n Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1 9 6 1 ( X X I I . 2 ) , p p . 193—205.

_,

“Hegelianism in Nineteenth-Century Ohio” in

1 9 6 2 ( X X I I I . 3 ) , pp. Journal of the History of Ideas, 355—78. F e u e r b a c h , Ludwig, Philosophie und Christenheit in Beziehung auf die der hegelschen Philosophie gemachten Vorwiirfe der Unchristlichkeit, Mannheim, 1 8 3 9 .

386

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Findlay, J . N . , Hegel: A

Reexamination“

London & New

York, 1958; paperback reprint, Collier Books, 1962. Fischer, Kuno, Hegels Leben, Werke und Lehre, 2 vols., Heidelberg, 1 9 0 1 ; 2 d ed., Heidelberg, 1 9 1 1 , with new appendix by Hugo Falkenheim and Georg Lasson. , Schellings L e b e n , Werke und Lehre, 2 d rev. ed.,

especially pp. 145 f., 208 fi., 21511,

829 f., Heidelberg,

1899. Fleischmann, Eugene, La philosophie politique de Hegel, sous forme d’un commentaire des Fondements de la philos0phie du droit, Paris, 1 9 6 4 . Foster, Michael B., The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel, Oxford, 1 9 3 5 . Franklin, Mitchell, “ O n Hegel’s Theory of Alienation and Its Historic Force” i n Studies in Hegel (Tulane Studies i n Philosophy, vol. I X ) , New Orleans, 1 9 6 0 , pp. 50—400. The same volume contains shorter contributions by A . B . Brinkley, J . K. Feibleman, P . G . Morrison, A. J . Reck, R . C . Whittemore, and E . G . Ballard. Friedrich, Carl J . , “Introduction” i n The Philosophy of Hegel, e d . Carl J . Friedrich, p p . xiii-lxiv, New York, Modern Library. See also under Travis, below.

Fuhrmans, Horst, “Schelling und Hegel: Ihre Entfremdung” i n F. W. J . Schelling, Briefe und Dokumente, vol. I : 1775— 1 8 0 9 , ed. Horst Fuhrmans, p p . 451—553, Bonn, 1 9 6 2 . Garaudy, Roger, Dieu est mort: Etude sur Hegel, Paris, 1 9 6 2 . Glockner, Hermann, Hegel, 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1 9 2 9 , 1 9 4 0 ; I : Die Vorraussetzungen der Hegelschen Philosophie; I I : Entwicklung und Schicksal der Hegelschen Philosophie. 3 d ed.

with new preface, 1954. Goschel, Karl Friedrich, Hegel und seine Zeit. Mit Riicksicht auf Gb’the, Berlin, 1 8 3 2 . Cf. above, I I . C . 1 7 . d . Gray, J . Glenn, Hegel’s Hellenic Ideal, New York, 1 9 4 1 .

Haering, Theodor, Hegel: Sein Wollen und sein Werk: Eine chronologische Entwicklungsgeschichte der Gedanken und der Sprache Hegels, 2 vols., Leipzig & Berlin, 1 9 2 9 , 1 9 3 8 . , “Die Entstehungsgeschichte der Phanomenologie des G e i s t e s ” i n Verhandlungen ales dritten Hegelkongresses vom 1 9 . bis 23. April 1933 in R o m : Im Auftrag des Inter-

BIBLIOGRAPHY

nationalen H e g e l b u n d e s , e d . B . Wigersma; Haarlern, 1 9 3 4 , p p . 1 1 8 - 3 8 .

387

Tiibingen

&

Harris, William T . , Hegel’s Logic, 24 Book on the Genesis of the Categories of t h e Mind: A Critical Exposition, Chicago, 1 8 9 0 , 2d e d . , 1 8 9 5 . “A Selection of Books o n Hegel’s Philosophy for the English Reader” ( p p . xxix—xxx) in-

cludes an itemized list of the many “Translations from Hegel’s works” i n The Journal of Speculative Philosophy. , Hegel’s First Principle: A n Exposition of Comprehension and Idea (Begrifl u n d I d e e ) , tr. from the Ger-

man (from the Philosophische Propiideutik) and accompanied with an Introduction and Explanatory Notes, St. Louis, 1869. Hartmann, Klaus, Grundziige der Ontologie Sartres in ihrem Verha'ltnis z u Hegels Logik, Berlin, 1 9 6 3 . H a r t m a n n , Nicolai, Hegel ( D i e Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, [1. T e i l ) , Berlin & Leipzig, 1 9 2 9 . Haym, R u d o l f , Hegel u n d seine Zeit: Vorlesungen iiber Entstehung und Entwickelung, Wesen und Wert der Hegel’-

schen

Philos0phie,

Berlin,

1857;

unchanged,

photo-

mechanical reprint, H i l d e s h e i m , 1 9 6 2 ; 2 d e d . , i n c l . a letter from Haym to Rosenkranz ( p p . 471—75) a n d Haym’s essay “ An Hegels 1 0 0 . Geburtstag” ( p p . 4 7 6 - 8 5 ) , as well as

Hans Rosenberg’s “Zur Geschichte der Hegelaul’fassung” ( p p . 510—50), L e i p z i g , 1 9 2 7 . Heidegger, Martin, “Hegels Begril’f d er Erfahrung” i n Holzwege, Frankfurt, 1 9 5 2 . , “Hegel u n d d i e G r i e c h e n ” i n Die Gegenwart der Griechen im n e u e r e n D e n k e n : Festschrift fiir H. G . Gadam e r , p p . 43—57, T fi b i n g e n , 1 9 6 0 . Herbart, J o h a n n Friedrich, reviews of Hegel’s PhilosOphie des Rechts i n Leipziger Literaturzeitung, 1 8 2 2 , and of Hegel’s Enzyklopiidie of 1 8 2 7 i n Hallesche Literaturzeitung, 1 8 3 1 , both reprinted i n Herbart’s Werke, vol. XII ( 1 8 5 2 ) , pp. 419—35 and 664—86. H i b b e n , John G r i e r , Hegel’s Logic: A n Essay in Interpretation, New York, 1 9 0 2 . Johannes, G o e t h e u n d der deutsche Idealismus: Holeister, Eine Einfiihrung z u Hegel’s RealphilosOphie, Leipzig, 1 9 3 2 .

388

BIBLIOGRAPHY

( H i s introductions t o his editions of Hegel’s writings are also noteworthy; see Part I I of this Bibliography, a b o v e . ) Hook, Sidney, From Hegel to Marx: Studies in t h e Intellectual Development of Karl Marx, New York, 1 9 3 6 ; reprinted, New York, 1950. See also u n d e r Travis, below. Hotho, H . G . , Vorstudien fiir L eb en u n d Kunst, Stuttgart & Tfibingen, 1 8 3 5 .

Hyppolite, Jean, Genése et structure de la Phe’nome’nologie de l’esprit de Hegel, Paris, 1 9 4 6 . , Introduction (3 la philosOphie de l’histoire de Hegel, Paris, 1 9 4 8 . , Logique e t existence: Essai sur la Logique de Hegel, Paris, 1 9 5 3 . , Etudes sur Marx e t Hegel, Paris, 1 9 5 5 . Iljin, Iwan, Die Philosophie Hegels als kontemplative Gottes— lehre, Bern, 1 9 4 6 . Jakowenko, Boris, “ H e g e l i n R u s s l a n d ” in Der Russische Gedanke: Internationale Zeitschrift, 1 9 3 1 (11.3), p p . 1—8, incl. “Kurze russische Hegel-Bibliographic,” p p . 5—8. James, William, “ H e g e l a n d H i s M e t h o d ” in A Pluralistic Universe, Lecture I I I , New York, L o n d o n , Toronto, 1 9 0 9 ; reprinted, 1 9 4 3 .

Kaufmann, Walter, Nietzsche (comparison of Hegel’s and Nietzsche’s m e t h o d s and views of systems i n C h . I I , a n d of

Hegel’s concept of Geist with Nietzsche’s will to power in Ch. V I I I ) , Princeton, 1 9 5 0 ; rev. paperback ed., M e r i d i a n Books, 1 9 5 6 . , “The Hegel Myth a n d I t s M e t h o d ” a n d “Hegel’s Early Antitheological P h a s e ” in The Philos0phical Review, Oct. 1 9 5 1 ( L X . 4 ) a n d J a n . 1 9 5 4 ( L X I I I . 1 ) . G e r m a n tr. of t h e former, with a n e w section, in Zeitschrift fiir philosophische Forschung, 1 9 5 6 ( X . 2 ) . B o t h articles rev. a n d greatly enlarged i n From Shakespeare to Existentialism ( C h s . VII-VIII; C h . I X : “ H e g e l : C o n t r i b u t i o n a n d Cal a m i t y ” ) , Boston, 1 9 5 9 ; British ed., entitled T h e O w l a n d t h e Nightingale, L o n d o n , 1 9 6 0 ; rev. p ap erb ack ed., Anchor Books, 1 9 6 0 . , “ H e g e l ” in The Concise Encyclopedia of Western

BIBLIOGRAPHY

389

Philos0phy and Philosophers, e d . J. O . Urmson, L o n d o n & N e w York, 1 9 6 0 , pp. 157—61. ‘ , Critical N o t i c e of J. N . Findlay’s Hegel i n Mind, April 1 9 6 1 ( L X X . 2 7 8 ) , pp. 264—69. Kedney, J o h n Steinfort, Hegel’s Aesthetics: A Critical Exposition, C h i c a g o , 1 8 8 5 ; 3d e d . , 1 8 9 7 . Knox, Israel, The Aesthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, New York, 1 9 3 6 .

Knox, T . M., “Hegel and Prussianism” in Philosophy, January 1940, pp. 51—63, July 1940, pp. 313—14. See Carrit, above. Kojéve, A l e x a n d r e , Introduction (3 la lecture de Hegel: Lecons s u r la Phénome’nologie de l’esprit, professées de 1 9 3 3 (i 1 9 3 9 . . . , re’unies e t publie’es par Raymond Q u e n e a u , Paris, 1 9 4 7 . Partial G e r m a n tr.: Hegel: Eine Vergegenwc’irtigung seines D e n k e n s : Kommentar z u r Phc'inomenologie des Geistes, e d . Iring Fetscher, Stuttgart, 1 9 5 8 . Kroner, Richard, Von K a n t bis Hegel, 2 vols., Tiibingen, 1921, 1924; 2d ed., 1961.

, “Introduction: Hegel’s PhiIOSOphical Development” i n Hegel’s Early Theological Writings ( s e e I I . D . 1 , a b o v e ) . A l s o articles i n Hegel Studien and Hegel-Kongress, Verhandlungen; see e n d of I above. Krug, W . T . , Schelling a n d Hegel oder die Neueste Philosophie im Vernichtungskriege mit sich selbst begrifien, Leipzig, 1835. Kupfer, Johannes, Die Aufiassung des Sokrates in Hegels Geschichtsphilosophie, dissertation; Borna-Leipzig, 1 9 2 7 . Lasson, G e o r g , Hegel als Geschichtsphilosoph, L e i p z i g , 1 9 2 0 . ( H i s l o n g introductions to his editions of Hegel’s writings are also noteworthy: see Part II of this Bibliography.)

Levy, Heinrich, Die Hegel—Renaissance in der deutschen Philosophie, ( B e r l i n - ) Charlottenburg, 1 9 2 7 . L i t t , Theodor, Hegel: Versuch einer kritischen Erneuerung, Heidelberg, 1 9 5 3 . Loewenberg, J., “The Exoteric Approach to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind” and “The Comedy of I m m e d i a c y i n Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind” in Mind, 1 9 3 4 and 1 9 3 5 (XLIII, XLIV).

390

BIBLIOGRAPHY

, “ I n t r o d u c t i o n ” in Hegel Selections, e d . J . Loewenberg, p p . ix—xliii, N e w York, Chicago, Boston, 1 9 2 9 ; reprinted i n Scribner p a p e r b a c k . Lowith, K a r l , Von Hegel bis Nietzsche, Ziirich & New York, 1 9 4 1 ; English t r . : From Hegel to Nietzsche, tr. David E . G r e e n , N e w York, 1 9 6 4 . Lukacs Georg, D e r junge Hegel Uber die Beziehungen von Dialektik und Oekonomie, Z'Lirich & Wien, 1 9 4 8 ; 2d e d .

with new 4-page preface and title, Der junge Hegel and die Probleme der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft, difierent pagination, Berlin, 1 9 5 4 . Mackintosh, R . , Hegel a n d Hegelianism, Edinburgh, 1 9 1 3 . McTaggart, J . M . E . M . , A Commentary o n Hegel’s Logic, Cambridge, 1910. , Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, C a m b r i d g e , 1 9 1 8 . , Studies in t h e Hegelian Dialectic, C a m b r i d g e , 1 8 9 6 . M a r c u s e , Herbert, Reason a n d R e v o l u t i o n : Hegel a n d t h e Rise of Social Theory, Oxford University Press, 1 9 4 1 ; 2 d ed., N e w York, 1 9 5 5 ; Beacon p a p e r b a c k , 1 9 6 0 . Marx, K a r l , “Zur Kritik der Hegelschen RechtSphiIOSOphie” i n Deutsch-Franzb'sische Jahrbiiclzer, Paris, 1 8 4 4 , p p . 71—85;

“Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts (§§261—313)” and “ K r i t i k d e r Hegelschen Dialektik u n d PhiIOSOphie iiberh a u p t , ” published posthumously in Marx-Engels, HistorischKritische Gesamtausgabe, Abteilung 1, vol. I I I ( 1 9 3 2 ) . All three essays have been reprinted; e.g., i n M a r x , Friihe Schriften, vol. I , Stuttgart, C o t t a , 1 9 6 2 , p p . 488—505, 258— 4 2 6 , a n d 637—65. M o s t of this material is also included i n Marx, Die Friihschriften, Stuttgart, K rd n ers Taschenaus— gabe, 1 9 5 3 . Different translations of the third essay b y Martin Milligan i n M a r x , Economic a n d Philosophic Manuscripts of 1 8 4 4 , Mo s co w , F o reig n L a n g u a g e s Publishing H o u s e , 1 9 6 1 , a n d b y T . B . Bottomore i n Erich F r o m m , Marx’s Concept of M a n , N e w York, Ungar, 1 9 6 1 , a n d in K a r l M a r x , Early Writings, New York, MCGraw-Hill, 1 9 6 4 , w h i c h also contains the first essay. The second essay, which is m u c h longer, is n o t available i n English. M e u l e n , J a n v a n d e r , Heidegger u n d Hegel oder Widerstreit und Widerspruch, Meisenheim, 1 9 5 3 .

BIBLIOGRAPHY

391

M o o g , Willy, Hegel u n d die Hegelsche Schule, Mfinchen, 1930. M'Liller, G u s t a v E m i l , Hegel: Denhgeschichte eines Lebendig e n , B e r n & Miinchen, 1959. , . “ T h e Hegel Legend of ‘Thesis—Antithesis-Synthesis’ ” in Journal of t h e History of Ideas, J u n e 1 9 5 8 ( X I X . 3 ) . S e e also under Travis, b e l o w . Mure, G . R . G . , A n Introduction to Hegel, Oxford, 1 9 4 0 . , A Study of Hegel’s Logic, Oxford, 1 9 5 0 . Pelczynski, Z . A . , “An Introductory Essay” i n Hegel’s Political Writings, p p . 5—137. See II.C.14.c., above. Peperzak, Adrien, L e jeune Hegel e t la vision morale du monde, L a Haye, 1 9 6 0 . Poggeler, O t t o , Hegels Kritik der Romantik, dissertation, B o n n , 1 9 5 6 . S e e also H 2 2 , n o t e 1 . Popper, Karl, The Open Society and Its Enemies, v o l . 11, London, 1 9 4 5 , Chapter 12; rev. e d . , Princeton, 1 9 5 0 , p p . 223—73, 642—60. For a detailed critique, see Kaufmann, “The Hegel Myth and Its M e t h o d , ” above. I n th e 4th rev. e d . , London, 1962, v o l . I I , pp. 393—95 explain that errors

in the Hegel chapter have not been corrected. Purpus, Wilhelm, Zur Dialektik des Bewusstseins nach Hegel: des Geistes, Ein Beitrag z u r Wiirdigung der Phc’inomenologie Berlin, 1 9 0 8 . , Eduard von Hartmanns Kritik der dialektischen Methode Hegels, antikritisch gewiirdigt, Ansbach, 1 9 1 1 . Radermacher, Hans, Kierkegaards Hegelverstc'indnis, dissertat i o n , Koln, 1 9 5 8 . Rosenkranz, Karl, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s L e b e n , Berlin, 1 8 4 4 . , Kritische Erliiuterungen des Hegel’schen Systems, K'onigsberg, 1 8 4 0 ; Reprografischer Nachdruck, Hildesheim, 1963. , Hegel als deutscher Nationalphilosoph, Leipzig, 1 8 7 0 . English: Hegel as t h e National Philosopher of Germ a n y , tr. G e o . S . H a l l , reprinted from The Journal of Speculative PhiIOSOphy, S t . L o u i s , 1 8 7 4 . Rosenzweig, Franz, Hegel u n d der Staat, 2 vols., I : Lebens-

392

BIBLIOGRAPHY

stationen (1770—1806); 11: Weltepochen (1806—1831), Mijnchen & Berlin, 1 9 2 0 ; reprinted A a l e n , 1962. Rotenstreich, N a t h a n , “Hegel’s Image of J u d a i s m ” i n Jewish Social Studies, 1953 ( X V . 1 ) , p p . 33—52. , “ M a n a n d t h e Estranged G o d ( H e g e l ) ” i n The Recurring Pattern: Studies in Anti-Judaism in Modern Thought, L o n d o n , 1 9 6 3 . Royce, Josiah, “ H e g e l ” i n The Spirit of Modern Philosoflzy:

An Essay in the Form of Lectures, pp. 190—227, Boston & New York, 1892. , “Hegel’s Terminology” i n Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, e d . James M a r k Baldwin, vol. I , p p . 454—65, New York & L o n d o n , 1901. , Lectures o n Modern Idealism ( t h r e e of t h e t e n lectures deal w i t h Hegel’s Phenomenology, a n d o n e with “Hegel’s Mature S y s t e m ” ) ; Y a l e University Press, 1919; Yale pap e r b a c k reprint with Foreword b y J o h n E . Smith, 1964. Sartre, J e a n - P a u l , L’Etre et le Néant, Paris, 1943. English tr. by Hazel Barnes, Being and Nothingness, New Y o r k , 1956. See especially Part 111, C h a p t e r 1, section I I I : “Husserl, Hegel, Heidegger.” Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph v o n , “ H e g e l ” ( p p . 126—64) i n Zur Geschichte d er neueren Philos0phie ( a u s dem handschriftlichen Nachlass, 1827—lectures delivered i n M u n i c h ) , in Siimtliche Werke, Erste Abtheilung, X ( 1 8 6 1 ) . , Vorrede in Victor Cousin, U b e r franzo'sische und

deutsche Philosophie. Aus dem Franzo'sischen [tr.] von Dr. Hubert Beckers, Nebst einer beurtheilena’en Vorrede des Herrn Geheimenraths v o n Schelling, p p . v-xxviii, especially xiii ff., Stuttgart & Tiibingen, 1834. Reprinted in Siimtliche Werke, I , X ( 1 8 6 1 ) , 201——24. , Erste Vorlesung in Berlin: 1 5 . November 1841 ( 2 2 p p . ) , Stuttgart & Tiibingen, 1841. , Die endlich ofi‘enbar gewordene positive Philosophie der Ofl‘enbarung oder Entstehungsgeschichte, wo'rtIicher Text, Beurtheilung und Berichtigung der v. Schellingischen Enta’eckungen iiber Philosophie iiberhaupt, Mythologie und Oflenbarung a'es dogmatischen Christen-

BIBLIOGRAPHY

393

tums im Berliner Wintercursus von 1841—42. D e r allgemeinen Priifung vorgelegt v o n Dr. H . E . G . Paulus ( p p . lxvi, 7 3 6 ) , Darmstadt, 1 8 4 3 . (Sch'elling sued—for plagarism,

not for misrepresentation.) , Philosophie der Oflenbarung (posthumous authorized edition of Berlin lectures) i n Siimtliche Werke, I I , III

(1858), especially pp. 86 ff. and 122. Schilling-Wollny, K u r t , Hegels Wissenschaft von der Wirklichkeit u n d ihre Quellen; I : Begrifi‘liche Vorgeschichte der Hegelschen Methode, M'Linchen, 1 9 2 9 .

Schlunk, Wolfgang, Hegels T heorie ales Dramas, dissertation, Tfibingen, 1 9 3 6 . Schoeps, Hans Joachim, “ D i e ausserchristlichen Religionen bei Hegel” i n Zeitsclzrift fiir Religions- u n d Geistesgeschichte, 1 9 5 5 ( V I I . 1 ) , p p . 1—34. S c h u b a r t h , K . E . , U b e r a’ie Unvereinbarkeit der hegelschen Staatslelzre m i t dem obersten Lebens- u n d Entwicklungsprinzip des preussischen Staates, Breslau, 1 8 3 9 . See also above II.C.17.e. Seeberger, W i l h e l m , Hegel oder die Entwicklung des Geistes z u r Freiheit, Stuttgart, 1 9 6 1 . Stace, W . T . , The Philosophy of Hegel; A Systematic Exposition, L on d o n , 1 9 2 4 ; paperback reprint, D o v e r Publications, 1955. Sterrett, J. M a c b r i d e , Studies in Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion, With a Chapter o n Christian Unity in A m e r i c a , New York, 1 8 9 0 . Stiehler, Gottfried, Di e Dialektik in Hegels “Pha'nomenologie des Geistes,” Berlin, 1 9 6 4 . Stirling, James H u t c h i s o n , The Secret of Hegel, Being the Hegelian System in Origin, Principle, Form, a n d Matter, 2 vols., Lo n d o n , 1 8 6 5 ; 2d r e v . e d . i n 1 v o l . , Edinburgh & New Y o r k , 1 8 9 8 . T a k e u c h i , Y o s h i n o r i ; “ H e g e l and B u d d h i s m ” i n II Pensiero, 1 9 6 2 ( V I I . 1 — 2 ) , p p . 5—46. T r a v i s , D . C . , A Hegel S y m p o s i u m , A u s t i n , T e x a s , 1 9 6 2 . ( C o n t a i n s : “ A Philosopher Reconsidered” b y D . C . Travis, “ T h e P o w e r of N e g a t i o n : Hegel’s Dialectic and Totalitarian Ideology” b y Carl J. Friedrich, “ H e g e l and t h e Perspective

394

BIBLIOGRAPHY

of Liberalism” b y Sidney Hook, “Hegel and Heine” by Helmut Motekat, “Hegel’s Absolute and th e Crisis of Christianity” by Gustav E. Mueller, and “Of Structure and Symb o l : The Significance of Hegel’s Phenomenology for Liter-

ary Criticism” by Helmut Rehder. Pp. 139.) Trendelenburg, Adolf, Logische Untersuchungen, Berlin, 1 8 4 0 ; 2 d ed., 1 8 6 2 ; 3 d ed., 1 8 7 0 ; Reprografischer Nachdruck, Hildesheim, 1 9 6 4 . , Die logische Frage in Hegels System, Leipzig, 1843.

Tschiiewskij (CyievskYi), Dmitrij, Hegel bei den Slaven, Reichenberg, 1 9 3 4 ; rev. ed., B a d Homburg vor der Hohe, 1961. Wallace, William, Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel’s Philos0phy and especially of his Logic, Oxford, 1 8 7 4 ; 2 d rev. ed., 1 8 9 4 . Walsh, W. H . , “A Survey of Work o n Hegel, 1945—1952” in Philosophical Quarterly, O cto b er 1 9 5 3 .

Index This Index covers both Hegel: A Reinterpretation and Hegel: Texts and Commentary.

Arabic numerals refer to sections of the former, not pages. D indicates references to Chapter VII (Documentation, arranged chronologically) and is followed by the year. An as-

terisk indicates a letter written by, or addressed to, the person listed. References beginning with a Roman numeral will b e found i n the latter volume, which is divided into 1 2 sections, 1.1 through I V . 3 .

By including first names, the Index should help to identify some persons mentioned in passing in the text. P m e a n s Preface. “Who Thinks Abstractly” ( i n Texts and

Commentary) has not been indexed because it is so short; neither has the Bibliography. Abraham, 64 absolute, 49, 1.3, II.1; absolute ego, D1795; absolute idea, I.3 accidental and incidental, 62 Achenwall, Gottfried, 51 Acts, Book of, IV.3 actual, 49, 61, 11.1, IV.1 actual, the spirit alone is the, 11.1 Aegina,

sculptures, 5 3

Aeschylus, 6 , 21, 65 Afterdz'enst ( K a n t ) , 5 afterlife, D1854 Agathon, D 1 8 3 5 Ahndung, A h n u n g ,

III.3

Alexander the Great, 16, 27, 60, 62 alienation, 7 , l 4 allusiveness, 28, 29 Altenstein, Karl Sigmund Franz, Freiherr vom Stein zum 41, D1817*

America 1, l 3 Anaxagoras, 30, 34, III.3 Anschauung, 34, 65, D1807, I.2, III.3 Anselm, St., 66 an sick, 7 , 34, II.1 Anstrengung des Begrifls, IV.1 Antigone, see Sophocles antinomies, 19, 42, 44 antithesis, thesis & synthesis, 36, III.3. See also dialectic an und fz't'r sich, II.1 Anytus, 4

Apelles, 14 Apollo, 6, 20 Appian, III.2 applause, III.3 Aquinas, St. Thomas, 66, 7 0 Arabic PhiIOSOphy, 66 Archilochus, 18

396

INDEX

argue, not deign to, 111.2 Aristophanes, D1835 Aristotle, P, 4, 16, 20, 21, 24, 25, 27, 30, 32, 34, 37, 42, 47, 59-61, 65-67, 70, D1814, 1.3, 111.3, 1V.1, 1V.3 Asverus, Ludwig Christoph Ferdinand, D1806 ataraxia,

Brownian

aufgehoben,

7, 12, 34,

42, 11.1, 11.3, 111.1, IV.1 Augustine, S t . , 1 3 Aurelius, M a r c u s , 3 3

Ausbildung, 7 auswendig, 111.2 Autenrieth, Johann Hermann Ferdinand von, D1807 Avineri, Shlomo, 58

B u l t m a n n , Rudolf,

65

Bunsen, Christian Karl Josias F rhr. Burkhardt, Christiana Charlotte Johanna, 2 3 Burkhardt, Ludwig, 23 Butler, E . M., The Tyranny of Greece over Germany, 2 1 C a e s a r , J u l i u s , 6 0 , 6 2 , 111.1; year

of birth, 111.2, 111.3 Camus, Albert, P Capaneus, 1V.2 Carnap,

Baader, Franz, D1816 bacchanalian

System, D 1 8 1 6

Buber, Martin, 1 1 bud, blossom & fruit, 31, 1.1 von, 70

18, 35

atheism, 2 6 aufheben,

Brentano, Clemens, 50 Brentano, Franz, 35 British Idealism, 52, 68

whirl, 111.3

Bach, Johann Sebastian, 2 7 Bachmann, K a r l Friedrich, 27, D1810 Bacon, Francis, 6 6 B'ahr, L., 4 Baillie, J. B., 30, 31, 33, 34, 1.1, 1.2, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 111.1, 1V.1 Barnberger Zeitung, 40 Barbarossa, 62 B a r t l e t t ’ s Familiar Quotations, 2 B a u m g a r t e n , Alexander Gottlieb,

51 beauty & understanding, 1.3

Rudolf,

47

Cart, J e a n Jacques, 1 1 Cassirer, Ernst, 2

catechism, 1V.2 c a t e g o r i e s , 42—44, 4 6 catholicism, D1807 Ceres, 15 Charlemagne, 62

Chinese a n d Indian philosophy, 6 6 Christian, dog the best, 55

Christianity, 28, 33, 34, 59, 65, D1796 Cicero, 4, 15, 42

circle, 11.3 circle, the true a s a , 56, 11.1 Cless, Heinrich David von, 4

becoming, 46, 1.1, 11.1

coffee, D 1 8 1 4 , 1 V . 2

b e c o m e s itself,

Beer, Heinrich, D1854

coin, truth is n o t a minted, 111.1 Collingwood, R . G., 68, 11.2

Beethoven, Ludwig van, 1, 27 Begrifi, s e e also C o n c e p t , 1 4 , 3 4 ,

Collins, J a m e s , T h e Mind of Kierkegaard, 111.1

1.1, 1.3, IV.1 Begrifis, der Ernst des, 1.1 being, 46, 47, 11.1, 111.1 bekannt, 11.3

collisions, 64 common sense, 14, 16, 17, 11.3, 1V.2 Communists, 64 Concept, 19, 34, 67, 68, D1807, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 11.3, 111.2, 111.3, 1V.1; Concept versus concept, 14, 19

11.1

Berkeley, G e o r g e , 6 6 , 1.1, 11.3 better versus good, D1810, D1813 Beyer, W. R., 68

bifurcation, l 4 Bildung, 36, 1.3, 11.3, 111.3 Bildungsroman, 1, 1.3; Bildungsro-

concrete, 67 counterthrust,

m a n of t h e Weltgeist, 3 4 Béhme, Jacob, 66, D1870

c r i t i c i s m , i n t e r n a l , 11.1 c r i t i c i s m , p h i l o s o p h i c a l , 1.1

Bosanquet, Bernard, 68

Criticism, New, 68 Crito, 4

B r a d l e y , F.

H., 68

IV.1

Cousin, Victor, 68

INDEX Croce, Benedetto, 68 crucifixion, II.3 cultus spurius ( K a n t ) , 5 cunning o f r e a s o n , 6 2 , 111.3

D a n t e , 27, 28 Darius, 60 Darwin, Charles, 31 Dasein, 45, III.2; equated with Inder-Zeit-Sein, 6 7 D a u b , Karl, 4, D1816* death himself, Hegel as, 1 8 Declaration of Independence, 1 deduction versus comprehension, 17 Democritus, 18 Demosthenes, 4 Denken,

das andenkende,

IV.1

Denken, das begreifende, IV.1 depth, empty, 1.2 Desan, Wilfred, 6 8 Descartes, René, 30, 37, 60, 66, 1.1 develop, 6 7 Dewey, John, 6 8 dialectic: espec., 37, 42—46, 49, 68, IV.1 dialectic, ancient, IV.3 Diderot, Denis, Rameau’s Nephew, 30 differentiation, III.3 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 6 8 Diogenes, 3O Diogenes Laertius, 18, 21, 37 Dionysian whirl, 111.3 Dionysus Zagreus, 11.3 disagreement, philosophical, 18, 67, 1.1 dismemberment, absolute, 11.3 divination, III.3

dog the best Christian, 5 5 dogmatism, 19, 11.1, 111.1, 111.3. See also propositions a n d G o d Dostoevsky, F . M . , 2 2 dragon seed of Hegelian pantheism, 69 dreams, 14, 1.2 Dryden, John, 3 7

Eberhard, Johann August, 51 Eckermann, Johann Peter, 33, 36 ecstasy, 1.2

edification, 7, 62, D1816, 1.2 education, ancient & modern, 11.3 ego, absolute, D 1 7 9 5

397

ego, non-ego, D1795 e g o , p u r e , 1.3

Einstein o n G o d , 6 2 Eliot, George, 6 6 embryo, 11.1 empiricism,

scientific, 19

Endel, Nanette, D1797*, D1798* e n 501', 11.1

entzweit, Entzweiwzg, 14, III.2 Epictetus, 4 Epicureans, 6 6

Erasmus, Desiderius, 22 Erdmann, Johann Eduard, D1880

68,

erkannt, 11.3 esoteric, 1 6 , D 1 7 9 5 , 1.3

essence and form, 11.1 eternal life, D1796 Euclid, III.2, 1V.2 Euripides, 4, 6, 18, 2 1 Evans, Arthur, 53 Evans, Mary A n n , 6 6 excellent will get itself used, III.3 excuse versus justify, D 1 8 1 1 exegetical thinking, P existentialism, P , 60, 64, 1V.2; term coined by S c h e l l i n g , 3 9 . S e e a l s o Heidegger, J aspers, Kierkegaard,

Sartre exoteric, 16, 1.3 false, III.1 familiar, 11.3 feeling, 1.2, 1V.2 Feuerbach, Ludwig, 66, D1840* Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 4, 5, 7, 14, 16, 20, 21, 23—27, 35—37, 39, 41, 42, 56, 58, 66, D1795, D1804, D1817, 11.1, 111.1, III.3, 1V.1; Critique of All Revelation, 5, 26, D1795; Sun-clear Report to the Larger Public about the R e a l Nature of the Newest Philosophy: A n Attempt to Compel the Reader to Understand, 26, 1.1, 111.3; System der Sittenlehre, 1 4 , 2 1 , 2 6 , 5 6 ; Vocation of Man,

26; Vocation of the Scholar, D1795; Wissenscha/tslehre, 17, 26, D1795; Report on the Conc e p t of t h e Wissenschaftslehre a n d Its Fate so far, 2 6

Findlay, John N., Hegel, P , 37, 57, 65, Chapter V I I I motto

398

INDEX

fi n i t e , 111.1

D 1 8 1 2 ; p r o p o s i t i o n s about, 11.1,

Fischer, K u n o , P , 29, 39, 53, 68, 7 0 F. K . , 2 6

Forberg,

for itself, 7, 11.1, 11.3 formalism, 39, D1805, D1807, 1.3, 111.3 form a n d essence, 11.1 o f consciousness, forms

34, 35,

11.3, 111.1 7

Formtrieb,

for us, 11.1 France,

IV.1 Anton, 22, Josef D1806, D1807 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, P, 1-3, 5—7, 14, 23, 24, 31, 33, 36, 42, 60, 65, 68, D1795, D1798*, D1799, D1803*, D1805, D1807, D1810, D1820, D1825*, D1827, D1831*, D1832*, D1835, D1870; Faust, 1, 27-29, 33, 34, 36, 65, D1812, 1.1, 11.3, 111.3; Goebhardt,

1

freedom, 3, 59, 62, 63, D1795

Gespra'che

freedom tree, 3 French, D 1 8 0 7

genia, 1, 3, 6, 7, 10, 30, 65; Wil-

French Revolution, 1, 3, 16, 26, 37, D1807, 1.3 Freud, Sigmund,

Gans,

Georg

D1827;

[phi-

helm Meister, 1 , 2 6 , 3 4 , 3 7 , 1 . 3 G o g e l , Johann N o e , D 1 7 9 6 Golgotha, 20, 34

G o o d Friday, speculative, 20, 3 4

7, 33, 46

Friedrich Wilhelm I I I and IV, 7 0 Fries, J . F., 23, 24, 41, 66, D1805 Fromm, Erich, 9 Frommann, Karl Friedrich Ernst, 23, D1807, D1816* fiir sick, 7, 11.1, 11.3 Fuhrmans, Horst, 39, 6 8 Gabler,

cited,

G o r r e s , J o h a n n J o s e p h v o n , IV.2 Gothic temple, D1795 g r a v i t a t i o n , 111.2

Greeks, 3, 7, 8, 21, 65, D1794. See also individual names Greek sculpture, 53, D1835 G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y in H e g e l ’ s History of Philosophy, 6 6

Green, T. H., 66, 6 8 D1853*, Grillparzer, Franz, D1855* Grzmdsatz, 14, 11.1 Gutzkow, Karl, D1870*

A n d r e a s , 22

Eduard, 53, D1827*

IV.2 Gedankenblitz, 1V.1 Gegenstoss, 28 Gehd’use,

Geist, 7, 22, 34, 65, 11.1. See also spirit

Haering,

Geist, der heilz‘ge, 34, 111.1 general, 1.1, 1.3 genius, I V . 2 geometry, 111.2 teach German, speak, D 1 8 0 5

philosophy

to

Germany, 1 Gestalt, 7 , 34 Gestalten

des Bewusstseins,

34, 35,

11.3, 111.1 Gibbon, Edward, 2 Glockner, Hermann, Hegel, P, 4, 15, 21, 23, 24, 31, 38, 53, 66, Chapter VIII motto, 111.2, 111.3, IV.1 G o d , 5, 17, 61, 62, 65, D1795, D1799, 1.2, 11.3; a s substance, 11.1; a v o i d i n g t h e n a m e of, I V . 1 ;

before the Creation, 42; death of, 20, 34; moral proof of, D1795; proofs of his existence,

Theodor,

Hegel,

P,

38,

111.1 half-truths, 1 4 Haller von Hallerstein, Johann, Sigmund Freiherr von, D1810 Hamilton, William, 66 Handel, G . F . , 2 7 contentment, happiness versus D1811 harmony,

6, 7, 14, 27

Hartmann, Nicolai, 4 8 Hauslehrer,

5

Haydn, Franz Josef, 1 , 27 Haym,

Rudolf,

Hegel,

P , 2 1 , 22,

27, 30, 40, Chapter V I I I motto head, walk on, 11.2 Hegel as a lecturer, 22, 24, 52-55, D1816 ( 3 letters), D1827, D1835, D1840, D1870; father’s death, D1799; Hegel’s philosophy represents its age and re-

INDEX (cont’d)

Hegel as a lecturer

quires modification as new discoveries are made, D1827 Hegel, a r t i c l e s in Critical Journal

of Philosophy, 14, 16-22, 39; Difference of the Fichtean and Schellingian

System

of

Philoso—

phy, 14, 26; “Eleusis” ( p o e m ) , 10, D1796; Encyclopedia, P , 19, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43, 45, 46, 49, 51—58, 65, 66, 11.1; “Faith and Knowledge”, 6 , 20, 21, 34, 55;

Hermes,

Johann

phiens Reise, Herrick,

399

Thimoteus,

So-

4

M. T., 37

Hesse, Hermann, 1.3 Herz, Markus,

35

Hinrichs, H . F. W., The Essence of A n c i e n t Tragedy, 3 6 ; Hegel’s Vorrede, 5 5 ; Hegel l e t t e r t o , p r e f a c e to Chapter V I I I

history, 28, Chapter V I ; and the accidental, 111.2, 111.3; versus duration,

D1813

tory of Philosophy, P , 66—67, 1 . ] ; Logic, P, 19, 22, 37, 38, 40, 4252, 56, 58, 61, 67, D1812, D1816, 11.3, 111.1, 111.3, IV.1; “Natural Right”, 21, 38; Phenomenology of the Spirit, P, 1, 6 , 7, 8 , 10, 13, 14, 16, 18—43, 46, 48, 51, 52, 55, 56—58, 61, 64, D1806, D1807, D1809, D1814,

Hobbes, Thomas, 66, 1.1 Hofimeister, Johannes, 3, 4, 30, 35, 52, 54, 60, 66, 11.1, 111.3, IV.2 Holbein, Hans, 22 Holderlin, Friedrich, P , 1, 2 , 4—6, 10, 60, 65, D1794*, D1795*, D1796*, D1803, D1804, D1807 Homburg, Count of, D1804 H o m e r , 4, 14, 30, 60, D1805 Hook, Sidney, From Hegel to

a n d C h a p t e r V I I I entire; Philos0phy of History, P , 5 3 , 59—65,

Horace cited, 46

“German

Constitution”,

2 1 ; His-

D1827; Philos0phy of Right, P, l , 14, 21, 29, 37, 38, 40, 42, 52, 58, 61, 63, D1827, 11.1; “Positivity of the Christian Religion”, 9 , 12, 20, 60, 61; Propc'ideutik, 40, 51; Realphilosophie, 22; System der Sittlichkeit, ~21; Theologische

Jugendschriften, 4, 8—10, 12—13, 20, 60, 61; translation of Cart’s Confidential Letters, 11; Vernun/t in der Geschichte, 59—65; “Who Thinks Abstractly”, 21, Chapter IX Hegel, Christiane, 41, D1799*, D1814*, D1815*, D1831*, D1832* ( l s t item in D ) Hegel, Karl, 2 3 , 5 3

Hegel, Marie, 41, D1811*, D1829*, D1831* Heidegger, Martin, P , 28, 35, 47, 60, 67, IV.1, IV.2 Heine, Heinrich, 26, D1835*, D1838*, D1854* Helvetius, C. A., 2 Henning,

Leopold

von, 52

Heraclitus, 27, 11.3 Herbart, Johann Friedrich, 5 Herder, Johann Gottfried, 35, 56, D1795 heresy, D1795

Marx, horas,

58 1.2

Hotho, Heinrich Gustav, D1835* Hiibscher, Arthur, 4

53,

Hurnanitc’it, 6

humanity, IV.2 Hume, David, 19, 65, 66, 1.1 Husserl, Edmund, 35, 6 0 Hyppolite, Jean, 13, 2 9 idea, D1807 idea as species, 111.3 idealism, 11.1, 111.3 immediacy, 42, 44, 11.1, 11.3 in a n d for itself, 11.1 inclinations, 2 Indian and Chinese philosophy, 6 6 infinite, 111.1;

infinity, two types, 7

in itself, 11.1 insight, 111.2 intelligibility, 1 . 3

intensity void of content, 1.2 i n t i m a t i o n , 111.3

intuition, 34, 1.2, 111.3, D1807 inwendig, 111.2 Iphigenia, s e e G o e t h e Isaiah, 28 Islam, 65 Isocrates, 4

400

INDEX

J a c o b ’ s d r e a m , 11.2

K unstreligion, 8

Jacobi, F. H., 18—20, 41, 66, D1795, D1812, D1816, 1.2, 1 V . l James, William, 29, 68

ladder,

J a s p e r s , D 1 8 1 2 ; Psychologie Weltanschauungen, 2 8 , 3 1

der

Critique of Practical R e a s o n , 7 , 1 7 , 3 5 , 3 6 ; C r i t i q u e of P u r e R e a -

son, 3, 5, 7 , 26, 51, 56, D1812, 111.3; Grundlegung, 7, 21; Idea for a Universal History with I n t e n t , 2 8 ; Kleine

Schriften, 35; Quarrel A m o n g the Faculties, 64; Religion within t h e Bounds of Mere Rea— son, 1 , 5 , 9 ; t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l o g i c ,

42, D1812 Kaufmann, Walter, The Faith of a Heretic, 18; From Shakespeare Nietz-

Leibniz, G . W., 18, 20, 24, 41, 62, 66, 67 Lenin, V. 1. U., 6 8 Lessing, G . E., P , 1, 6, 13, 14, 24, 41, 56, 62, D1795, D1810, 111.1 Leutwein, Christian Philipp, 3 Lewes, George

Henry,

66

Lichtenberg, G e o r g Christoph, 30 Lincoln, Abraham, 62 List d e r Vernunft, 6 2 , 111.3 L o c k e , J o h n , 6 6 , 1.1

Loewenberg, 1., 29, 33, 52, 1.1, 111.3 Lofiier, J o h a n n J a c o b , 4 Logic v e r s u s l o g i c , 1 9

loneliness of philosopher, D1807, D1816 Longinus, 4 L o w i t h , K a r l , V o n Hegel bis Nietzsche, D 1 8 3 2

Luke 15:16, 1.2 Luther, Martin, 5, 7, 8, D1805 Lycon, 4

Keyserlingk, H e r m a n n von, 5 5 Kierkegaard, S¢ren, P, 2 , 4, 17, 28, 37, 39, 52, 63, 64, 68, 70, 1.2, 1.3, 11.1, 111.1, 111.3, IV.2; attitude toward truth a n d Hegel, 111.1;

P , 1 4 , 1 7 , 19—21,

l e a p , q u a l i t a t i v e , 1.3

Kant, Immanuel, 1—3, 5—10, 14, 16—21, 23—28, 30—32, 34, 35, 37, 39, 41, 42, 44, 46, 48, 51, 52, 54— 58, 62, 64, 66, 70, D1794, D1795, D1812, 1.1, 11.1, 11.3, 111.3, IV.1; Anthropology, 2, 7;

passim;

as,

30, 33, 52, 53, 60, 1.1, 1.2, 11.1, 111.3, 1V.1 Lazarus, Moritz, 35

Judaism, 65

to Existentialism, sche, 3 9 , 5 6

Phenomenology

Lasson, Georg,

Jesus, 8—10, 13, 33, 40, 64 J o b , Book of, 3, 6 0 Johnson, Dr., 11.3 Joshua, 26

Cosmopolitan

The

11.2 Lambert, J o h a n n Heinrich, 35

Concluding

Unscientific

Postscript, 63, 68, 70, 1.2, 1.3; Edifying Discourses, 1 . 2 ; Fear and Trembling, 6 4 ; Sickness

Macran,

H. S., 43

Magna Charta, 62 Malebranche, Nicolas, 66 M a n n , Thomas, 1 . 3 Marathon, 63

Marcuse, Herbert, Reason and Revolution, 58, Chapter V I I I motto

unto Death, 11.] Knebel, Karl Ludwig von, 60, D1807*, D1807, D1810*

Marx, Karl, 33, 37, 52, 68, 70, 1.3, 11.2 master and servant, 33

knowledge

m a t h e m a t i c s , 111.2 Matthew, cited, IV.3

v s . l o v e o f knowledge,

1.1 Knox, T. M . , 9, 21, 52, 58 Kojéve, Alexandre, 6 8 K r o n e r , R i c h a r d , V o n K a n t bis Hegel, P Krug, W i l h e l m T r a u g o t t , 1 7 , 1 9 ,

maturity, stages of, 31, 1.1 mauvaise foi, 11.1 McTaggart, J. M. E. M., 37, 43, 68

mediaeval philosophy, 6 6 mediation, 44, 11.1, 11.3

21, 23, 26, 51, 66; AIlgemeines

Meier, Georg Friedrich,

Handwb’rterbuch,

Meiner, Felix, 5 2

66

51

INDEX Meiners, Christoph, Brie/e

iiber

die S c h w e i z , D 1 7 9 6 M e i m m g is! m e i n , 6 7 Melitus, 4 Mendelssohn, Moses, 4

401

D1805*, D1806*, D1807*, D1808*, D1812*, D1814*, D1816 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 7, 8, 15, 20, 24, 33, 37, 38, 40, 45, 48, 52, 54, 60, 68—70, 11.1, 111.3

metaphysics, Hegel’s revolution in, 42

n i g h t i n w h i c h a l l c o w s a r e black,

Meyerbeer, G., D1854 S e e a l s o Geist m i n d , 111.2. spirit Mitwelt, IV.3

nobody understood non-ego, D1795 nothing, 46, 47

1.3 and

me, 26

moment o r stage, 7, 42, 67, 1.1, 1.3, 11.3 Mommsen, Theodor, 111.2

notion, II.3, I V . ] . See also Begri/j

Montesquieu, Baron de, 60, D1870 Moore, G. E., 37, 68

Novalis (pseudonym of Friedrich

a n d Vorstellung Nous. III.3. See also Geist

von Hardenberg),

l, 25, 35

moralische Weltanschammg, 31 Moralitc‘it, 3, 5, 6, 7 , 10, 21, 37, 63, 64, 11.3 moral world order, 11.1

object, 11.3, 111.1 Occam, William of, 6 6

Moses, 26

Odysseus, 33, 34, 42

Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus, 1, 27, D1797 Muller, o r Mueller, Gustav E.,

Olbers, H . W. M., 1 5 ontogenetic principle, 11.3 ontological argument, 17, 4 6 opinion, 6 7

(different spelling in German and American publications), 4,

19, 24, D1810, C h a p t e r

VIII

m o t t o , 111.3

painting, D1796 palette with two colors, 111.3

IV.3

N e l s o n , L e o n a r d , 111.3 N e o p l a t o n i s m , 6 6 , 111.3 Neoptolemus, 6 York Times B o o k Review, 1

Nicolin, F . , 5 2 Niebuhr, B. G . , D1816 Niemo'ller, Martin, 28 Friedrich

Panlogismus,

111.3

pantheism, 70 Parmenides, 27, 47

Parthey, G., Report of a Conversation with Goethe, D1827* passion, 2, 1.2 Passmore, J o h n , A Hundred Years of Philosophy, 6 6 Paul, St., 37

Paulus, Caroline, D1808* Paulus, H . E . G., 4, 14, 53, D1808 Pelczynski, Z . A., 21, 5 8 Pericles, 62 Pfa/je, Pfaflentum, 5 p h i l o s o p h i c d i s a g r e e m e n t , 1.1

New Academy, 6 6

Niethammer,

Oriental art, D1835 originality, 16, D1816 Otto, Rudolf, Das Heilige, 111.3

Napoleon, l , 22, 27, 41, D1806, D1814, D1816 nature, D1796, 11.3; beauty of, 53; philosophy of, 56, 57 necessary & necessity, 12, 17, 1.1, 111.3 negative, negativity, 28, 11.1, 111.1—3 negative a n d positive philosophy, 68, 70 negative, the power of the, 11.3

New

Orff, C a r l , D 1 8 0 4 Origen, 30

M u r e , G . R . G., P M u r r a y , Gilbert, 6 5 myth, 65, 67 Nachwelt,

oak and acorn, 1.3

Imman-

uel, 4, 22, 26, 39—41, D1795,

philosophical instruction a t Gymdiscussion), (detailed nasia D1812 phi1050phica1 instruction a t universities (detailed discussion), D1816

402

INDEX

philosophical method, 111.3 philosophy, vs. philosophizing D1812 philosophizing, natural, IV.2 philosophy, need for, 14 Piazzi, Giuseppe, Pindar, 11.1

15

sium, D 1 8 3 5 ; Timaeus,

1 5 , 111.2

Plautus, 4 play theory, Schiller’s, 7 Plutarch, 111.2 pneuma, 65; see Geist, spirit

8,

Open 26

9,

21;

to

be

Rembrandt,

11.3

Renaissance philosophy, 66 Renan, Ernest, 9 Restoration, 1 11.1

retreat into essence, 111.2 Rickert, Heinrich, 6 8 Riemer, Friedrich Wilhelm, D1810 Riesman,

D a v i d , 64

Rilke, R . M., 2 8 Ritter, Heinrich Julius, 54 R005, Carl, 68 Rosenkranz, Karl, 3, 4, 10, 15, 18, 21, 23, 24, 30, 39, 40, 51, 53, 55, 66, D1844* Rosenzweig, Franz, Hegel und der Staat, P, 1 1 , 40, 5 8 R o s s , W . D . , 111.3

Otto, 22, 39, 52

Pope, Alexander, 2 Popper, Karl, T h e and Its Enemies,

folk,

feared, D1807

result, n a k e d , 1.1,

Plato, 4, 15, 18, 20, 21, 24, 27, 3032, 34, 37, 42, 47, 59-61, 65, 66, 70, D1835, 1.2—3, 11.3, 111.2, 1V.3; Apology, 4, 18, 27; Laws, 1 V . l ; Republic, 31, 61; Parmenides, 18, 24, 11.3, IV.3; Sympo-

Poggeler,

religion,

Society

positivism, 19 p o u r soi, 11.1 predicate, 11.1, IV.1

Rossini, G . A., 1 Roth, Karl Johann D1816

Friedrich,

Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 3 royal r o a d , I V . 2

Royce, Josiah, P , 13, 29, 33, 37, 38, 68, D1806, 1.3, 111.3

pre-Socratics, 66

Proclus, 111.3, IV.2, IV.3 p r o d i g a l s o n , 1.2 progress, D 1 8 1 3

Russell,

Bertrand,

3 7 ; History

propositions, 7, 19, 111.1, IV.1;

Ryle, Gilbert, The Mind, 3 4 , 6 7

of

Western Philosophy, 67

about G o d , 11.1, 1 V . 1 ; b a s i c , 1 4 ,

Concept

of

19, 11.1 Sache, 1.1, 111.3 Sartre, Jean-Paul, P, 33, 35, 60, 64, 68, 1.2, 11.1 Schadenfreude, 15

Proust, M a r c e l , 6 0 , 1 . 2 proverbs, I V . 2

Prussia, 62, 11.1 Psalms, 1.2

Scheler, Max, 35

psychoanalysis, 111.3 Ptolemy 1, I V . 2

Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, P , 1, 3 , 4, 5, 7, 10, 14, 16, 18, 21—27, 30, 37, 39, 41, 54, 56, 58, 66, 68, 70, D1795*, D1796*, D1802*, D1803*, D1804*, D1807*, D1808*, D1812, D1816, D1829*, 1.2, 1.3,

Pyrrho, 18, 19 Pythagoreans, 2 1 Pythagorean

t h e o r e m , 111.2

Raphael, 14 n'z'sonnieren,

IV.1

rational procedure, 37 R a u m e r , Friedrich Ludwig von, D1816* reason, see u n d e r s t a n d i n g

Georg

reflection, 1.2, 11.1 Reformation, 2 0 refutation,

11.1

Reinhold, K a r l Leonhard, 1 4 Reizenstein, Sigmund Karl Johann von, D1805

11.1, 111.3; Schelling,

quotations, 1.3 Caroline, D1802,

D1829* Schema, S c h e m e n , 111.3 schematism, 53 Schiller, Friedrich v o n , P , 1 , 2 , 3 ,

5, 10, 12, 14, 16, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26, 34, 51, 62, 65, 1.2, 11.3, D1795, D1798*, D1799, D1805; Letters o n t h e Aesthetic

Educa-

403

INDEX

Schiller, Friedrich von, (cont’d) t i o n of M a n , P , 3 , 7 , 8 , 1 0 , 1 2 ,

16, 1.2

Schlegel, Friedrich von, 1, 25, 26, D1807, D1816, 1.2, 1.3 Schleiermacher, Friedrich Ernst Daniel, 1, 54, 55, 62, D1819*, 1.2 scholasticism, 66, 11.3 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 4 , 24, 34, 5 4 , 6 2 ; on m a t h e m a t i c s , 111.2

Schuckmann, K a s p a r Friedrich Freiherr von, D I 8 1 6 * Schulze, Gottlob Ernst, 18, 19, 21, 26, 51 1.2

science, elevation of philosophy t o a, 16, 37, 1.1 Seckendorf, T aschenbuch, D1807 Seebeck, T h o m a s Johann, D1807 selbstbewusst, 3 3 selbstisch, 111.1

sensibility, 11.3 Sermon

on the Mount,

8, 10

Sextus Empiricus, 19, 11.2 Shakespeare, William, 14, 34, 41, 4 8 , 6 0 ; Merry

Wives, D 1 8 3 2 ( l s t

item in D ) von, D1804, Isaak Sinclair, D1807* Sittlichkeit, 3, 6, 7, 10, 21 ( d e tailed explanation),

30, 35, 37,

57, 58, 63-65, 11.3 skepticism, 18—19, 28, 33, 6 6 sleep, wisdom in, 1.2

Smith, J o h n E., 29 Socrates, 4, 8, 15, 18, 64, 66, D1795, D1835, 11.3 Solger,

Karl

Wilhelm

Ferdinand,

53 5011, I v a n , 3 3 Solon, 30

70,

D1795,

D1816, determi-

s p i r i t , a b s o l u t e a s , 5 7 , 11.1 S p i r i t , H o l y , 3 4 , 111.1 s p i r i t , objective, 5 7 ; s t r e n g t h only

as great a s expression, 1.2; subjective, 57

spirit versus letter, 7, 26, D1795 spirit, world, 65, 11.2, 11.3 Stace, W . T . , The Philosophy of Hegel, P, 43, 57 stages, educational, 11.3. See also moment

state, 21, 58, 6 3 S t e w a r t , Dugald,

66

Stirling, J. Hutchison, The Secret of Hegel, 24 Stoicism, 28, 33, 6 6 Strauss, David Friedrich, 9 , 31, 38, 66, D1797, D1831* Strohlin, Friedrich Jakob, D1803 Stromer von Reichenbach auf Holenstein, Helena Maria Katharina Karoline ( d a u g h t e r ) a n d M a r i a Sabina Hedwig Freifrau von (mother),

D1810

style, speculative versus argumentative, 1V.1 subject, 11.3, 111.1, 111.3; vs. subs t a n c e , 11.1

subject matter, 1.1 sublimate, 7, 12, 34, 42, 11.1, 11.3, 111.1, 1V.1 substance, D1795, 11.1, 111.3 Suetonius, 111.2 supposed t o suppose, 1V.1 Suthmeier, H e r m a n n , 18 synthesis, see antithesis

system, 14, 16, Chapter V, D1816, 1.1, 11.1

Tacitus, 4

Sophists, 27, 6 6 Sophocles, 4, 6, 7, 13, 14, 21, 28, 30—32, 36, 60, 64, 65, D1804; Antigone, 4, 6, 7, 13, 30—32, 36, 6 4 , 6 5 ; Oedipus a t Colonus, 3 0 ; Philoctetes, 6 s p a c e , 111.2 Spengler, Oswald, 60 Spieltrieb, 7

66,

D 1 8 7 0 , 1.1, 11.1, 111.3; natio negatio est, 11.1

spirit, 7, 22, 24, 34, 65, 1.2, 1.3, 11.1

Schlegel, A. W., D1802 Schlegel, Caroline, D1802

Schwiirmerei,

65,

4,

Spinoza, B . de, 14, 20, 21, 24, 25,

t e l e o l o g y , 11.1

theodicy, 62, D1807 theology, 62, D1795, D1840 theoretical

work

more than D1808

accomplishes

practical

Thersites, 60

thesis, see antithesis t h i n g i n itself, 4 2 , 1 V . 1

thinking for oneself, D1816

work,

404

INDEX

thinking, a r g u m e n t a t i v e , I V . 1 ; r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l , 1 V . 1 ; thinking that comprehends, 1V.l Thorwaldsen, B e r t e l , 5 3 Thucydides, 4 , 2 7

Tieck, Ludwig, D1807 Tillich, Paul, 39, 65, 1.2, IV.1 time, 111.2 time of birth and transition, 1.3 tollere, 42 tradition-directedness, 64 tragedy, D 1 8 1 4 . S e e a l s o Sophocles, etc.

triads, 40, 53, 111.3. See also dia-

Voltaire, Arouet Francois Marie, Candide,

41

Vorbegrifl, 1 9 Vorl'ander,

Karl, 7

Vorstellung, 34, 65, 1.2 Voss, Johann Heinrich, D1805* Wagner, Richard, 30, 65, IV.2 Wallace, William, P, 5 2 Waterloo, 1 Weber, M a x , Wissenscha/t als Beruf, 37, 111.3 Wechselwirkung, 1 4

lectic triangle, 111.2

Weltgeist, 6 5 , 11.2, 11.3 Whitehead, Modes of quoted, 3 7

triplicity, 40, 53, 111.3. See also dialectic

Whitman, Walt, D1881* whole, t h e true is the, 11.1

true & false, 111.1

Winckelmann, J . J . , 6 Windelband, Wilhelm, 6 8

truth prevails when its time has come, 1 V . 3

truths, mathematical vs. historical, a c c i d e n t a l , arbitrary,

111.2

Tucker, Robert, 33 Tyrtaeus, iibersieht,

111.3

power, 11.3; t a b u l a r , 111.3; versus reason, 7 , 1 4 , 1 6 , 18—20, 4 2

unfamiliar, 111.3 consciousness, 3 2 , 3 3 , 1.2

United States, 1 U. S. Constitution, amendment,

D1809*

Wirklickkeit, 1.3 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophi-

Ueberweg, Geschichte der PhilosOphie, 31, 33 understanding a s the absolute

unhappy

Windischmann, Karl Josef Hieronymus, 39, D1808*, D1809*, D1810*; review of Phenomenology i n Jenaer Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung,

4

Thought,

63;

fifth

cal Investigations, 2 1 ; Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 11.2

Wolf, Christian, 66 world-historical individuals

and

peoples, 6 2 , 64

world soul, D1806 world spirit, 65, 11.2, 11.3 Xenophanes, 1 8

64

Unmittelbarkeit, 44, 1.3

Zeller, Eduard, 6 8

unmoved

Christian Gotthold, D1807* Zelter, Karl Friedrich, Goethe’s correspondence with, P, D1831*, D1832* Zeno of Elea, 18, 3 7

mover,

11.1

Zellmann,

Van Gogh, Vincent, 6 9 Van P a a s s e n , Died, 9

Pierre,

Why

verkehrt, 16, 11.2, 111.2 Virgil, 4, 1 4 void, the, 111.1 Voigt, Christian Gottlob D1807

Jesus

Zerrissenheit, Zeus, IV.2

von,

11.3