Hedwig Conrad-Martius: The Phenomenological Gateway to Reality (Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences, 8) [1st ed. 2021] 3030687821, 9783030687823

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Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 8

Ronny Miron

Hedwig Conrad-Martius The Phenomenological Gateway to Reality

Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences Volume 8

Series Editors Ruth Edith Hagengruber, Department of Humanities, Center for the History of Women Philosophers, Paderborn University, Paderborn, Germany Mary Ellen Waithe, Professor Emerita, Department of Philosophy and Comparative Religion, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, OH, USA Gianni Paganini, Department of Humanities, University of Piedmont, Vercelli, Italy

As the historical records prove, women have long been creating original contributions to philosophy. We have valuable writings from female philosophers from Antiquity and the Middle Ages, and a continuous tradition from the Renaissance to today. The history of women philosophers thus stretches back as far as the history of philosophy itself. The presence as well as the absence of women philosophers throughout the course of history parallels the history of philosophy as a whole. Edith Stein, Hannah Arendt and Simone de Beauvoir, the most famous representatives of this tradition in the twentieth century, did not appear form nowhere. They stand, so to speak, on the shoulders of the female titans who came before them. The series Women Philosophers and Scientists published by Springer will be of interest not only to the international philosophy community, but also for scholars in history of science and mathematics, the history of ideas, and in women’s studies.

More information about this series at https://www.springer.com/series/15896

Ronny Miron

Hedwig Conrad-Martius The Phenomenological Gateway to Reality

Ronny Miron Interdisciplinary Studies Bar-Ilan University Ramat Gan, Israel

ISSN 2523-8760 ISSN 2523-8779 (electronic) Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences ISBN 978-3-030-68782-3 ISBN 978-3-030-68783-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68783-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

Introduction: “Die Frau in der Philosophie voran-!” A. The Prize Essay (Die Preisschrift) Hedwig Margarete Elisabeth Martius (27 February 1888–15 February 1966)1 (HCM)2 first appeared in the phenomenological discourse when, in 1912, she won the essay competition of the Philosophy Department of the University of Göttingen. A while before, in 1910 she had started attending the lectures of Edmund Husserl, who was a professor there. The founding father of phenomenology, who rose to prominence with the publication of Logical Investigations (1900–1901), established a prize competition about “The epistemological principles of positivism” in honor of the University’s festival. The prize was promised to the best original philosophical essay (HCM, 2015b, 62).3 About two hundred essays were submitted to the strict, anonymous judgment of philosophy professors of repute and status. Only one essay, entitled “The epistemological foundations of positivism” (Die erkenntnisstheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus) was found worthy of the prize. This essay, later called the “Prize Essay” (Avé-Lallemant, 1971, 52, 213, 1975b, 197), was written 1 The

literature suggests two options regarding the places of HCM’s birth and death. Except for Hart, who reports that she was born in Königsberg (Hart, 1973, 14), all other sources indicate Berlin. There also appears to be disagreement regarding the place of her death. The majority (and most probable) position indicates Munich, while a few sources (Wikipedia.de included) note it as Starnberg. Martha Martius, HCM’s mother, composed a family chronicle in four volumes in which she described both the positive and negative sides of her six children (HCM was the third), who were rather different from each other. Martha Martius’ grandchild, Goetz-Alexander, published some sections from this chronicle (Martius, 2002, 2003a), which has also been published as a book (Martius, 2003b). 2 In his speech from 27 February 1958 for HCM’s 70th birthday, Avé-Lallemant indicted that “HCM” was Conrad-Martius’ nickname among her pupils at the University of Munich. 3 This source is a first publication of the text of HCM’s acceptance speech (to be referred to later in the body text) (HCM, 1958bN). It contains the original German text (HCM, 2015a, 56–59) and its translation to English by Ferrarello (HCM, 2015b, 60–63), which also added an introduction (Ferrarello, 2015, 51–55). See references to the speech in: Ursula Avé-Lallemant (1965/1966, 207), Pfeiffer (2005, 49). v

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by a 21-year-old student named Hedwig Martius. The surprising win was covered by the local press. On 6 June 1912, the Berliner Tageblatt wrote: A woman at the forefront of philosophy! Or better, a young miss (Fräulein), since this is not Madame Curie or a famous lady scholar, but a young student who, by submitting an essay to a prize competition (Preisbewerbung) defeated all the other applicants […] The essay was crowned with the prize in full. The author’s name was revealed when the envelopes were opened, Miss Hedwig Martius from Rostock. (HCM, 1912N)4

The San Francisco Examiner, an English language newspaper published in Berlin, wrote on 22 September 1912, under the headline “German Fraulein is a Clever Thinker”: People who dislike clever woman [sic] are in a tragic mood. The Cleverest philosopher in Germany is a woman, and a brand-new woman, too. Hedwig Martius has had her book on philosophy crowned and prized by Goettingen University [sic]. A 21-year-old girl, with the round, pleasant features of an everyday German hausfrau, has beaten the cleverest brains of Germany. (HCM, 1912N)

The reporter added that the essay was found worthy of the prize due to its being “profound, original, and striking”. They guessed that the essay had been written by a brilliant young professor from Leipsig [sic]. But when they opened the envelope, they saw to their amazement that the essay had been composed by a young woman. It was reported that a professor from Göttingen University exclaimed: “if women begin with philosophy they will go further. They will degenerate to the condition of their English suffragist sisters, and take to breaking windows” (HCM, 1912N).5 On the face of it, this win could have seemed as a natural, perhaps even expected, progression for someone who was known as one of the first women to have studied at a grammar school (Gymnasium)6 and then at university in Germany (Sander, 1997, 155). HCM described her feelings upon graduation from the secondary school for girls (Höhere Töchterschhule) as a “sudden… passionate desire to study” (HCM, 2015b, 60). After completing her grammar school studies, she attended courses in

4 All

translations from the German original into English are mine. Emphases follow the original unless stated otherwise. In cases of unique terms or phrases, the original German is included in parentheses. I have attempted to maintain consistency in the translations I offer. However, at times, certain contexts have obliged me to choose a different English phrase for the same word in German. There is no doubt that HCM’s unique vocabulary and her solecisms have frequently necessitated the inclusion of the German term in parentheses. Regarding other German sources, in particular the writings of Edmund Husserl and Adolf Reinach, the text refers to English translations of the German sources, where available. In light of the many sources mentioned, and in order to assist the readers, a system of abbreviations is employed. This system is listed alongside each item in the References section at the end of each article and at the end of the book. For convenience, I have avoided using the abbreviation ibid, and I have repeated the abbreviation with each reference. 5 This citation is taken from a photograph of the newspaper cutting that is stored in Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich and cataloged under the title Zeitungsveröffentlischungen zur Preisschrift 1912. 6 In 1903, HCM enrolled in the Gymnasialkurse für Frauen at the Helene Lange School in Berlin, and in fall 1907/1908 she received her Abitur at the Sophien-Realgymnasium in Berlin.

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History and Literature at the universities of Rostock and Freiburg.7 Thus, she became the first woman (Stein, 2013, 7 n. 10),8 or at least one of the first women (Sander, 1997, 155), to study in a German university. Without any doubt, moving to Munich in 1909 and choosing to study at the Ludwig Maximilian University there were a formative step in HCM’s life.9 Although her first encounter with academic studies in philosophy was already in Rostock,10 it seems that in Munich it has dawned on her that philosophy was her calling.11 She describes this period as follows: It was a seminar on Hume.12 At the end of that semester he [Moritz Geiger - RM] gave me a note for Adolf Reinach, a lecturer in Göttingen who was like him a pupil of Husserl, and said “You have to go to Göttingen to go to Husserl.” I knew virtually nothing about Husserl, but I went and dropped right into the center of the original circle of phenomenologists. Lightning (Blitz) struck for a second time. (HCM, 2015b, 61)13

7 In

WS 1907/8, HCM enrolled in the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Rostock and spent three semesters attending courses in philosophy and German Studies. In SS 1908 (one semester), she studied philology at the University of Freiburg. In 1908–1909, she returned to Rostock for two more semesters (WS = winter semester; SS = summer semester). Avé-Lallemant refers to HCM’s writing of fine literature, yet he adds that “later she burned her own poetic and dramatic attempts” (Avé-Lallemant, 1984, 212). Avé-Lallemant also testified that after her religious experiences at the beginning of the 1920s (concomitant with Stein, to be discussed below), HCM had a big auto-da-fé and in 1929 she burned also her poetic writings from her time at Bergzabern. Nonetheless, a copy of two valuable manuscripts survived. For this study of particular importance is: HCM 1916aN (cited from: Avé-Lallemant, 2015, 79 n. 45). 8 This note was composed by the editor of Stein’s mentioned work, Andreas Uwe Müller. 9 In October of 1909, HCM transferred to the University of Munich, where she studied philosophy with Max Scheler and Moritz Geiger. She remained there for two semesters (WS 1909/10 and SS 1910). During her first semester in Munich, HCM enrolled in courses with Max Scheler and with professors who were the students of Theodor Lipps, in particular Ernst von Aster (1880–1948) and Aloys Fischer (1880–1937). 10 In Rostock, she participated in an advanced seminar on Spinoza’s Ethics with her Professor, Franz Bruno Erhardt. Later she would describe her encounter with Spinoza as her first experience of being “hit by lightning” See: HCM (2015b, 61). 11 Fréchette suggests that in 1905, two groups of philosophers in Munich can be largely distinguished (Fréchette, 2012, 156–157). One, whose members remained largely faithful to Theodore Lipps and included August Gallinger, Aloys Fischer, Fritz Weinmann, and Max Ettlinger. See here also: Smid (1982, 114–115), Schuhmann (1973, 128–132). The second group included Theodor Conrad, Johannes Daubert, Adolf Reinach, and Moritz Geiger. Fréchette characterized them as “already showing more than a mere interest in phenomenology and it progressively abandoned most of the Lippsean conceptions” (Fréchette, 2012, 156). 12 Hart indicates that according to Ludwig Maximillian, in Munich the seminar was on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, see: Hart (2020, 2 n. 3). 13 A similar testimony of this striking experience that took place as HCM first encountered Husserl’s phenomenology appears in Avé-Lallemant’s Habilitation. It documents a conversation Avé-Lallemant conducted with her on the occasion of her 70th birthday at Munich University. The conversation (in manuscript) was stored in the Munich Archive. See Avé-Lallemant (1971, 212 n. 1).

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HCM took Moritz Geiger’s advice, having attended his courses on Psychology and Art History at Munich University in 1909–1910, and went to Göttingen.14 On his part, Geiger prepared HCM’s arrival to Göttingen well. In a letter to Husserl from 28 September 1910, he informed him about HCM’s plan to study phenomenology and probably write her dissertation at the University of Göttingen on phenomenology. He also mentioned in this regard her preparing studies in phenomenology already in Munich. Geiger asked Husserl to pay attention to HCM despite her timidity “since she is philosophically the sharpest woman I have encountered so far” (Geiger, 1910b, 103). On the same day, Geiger delivered a special postcard to Reinach informing him about HCM’s arrival at Göttingen and expresses his special recommendation about “our most talented Munich philosopher”. Geiger promised Reinach: “you will already notice what makes her into what she is” (Geiger, 1910aN).15 B. “The Munich Invasion of Göttingen” HCM moved from Munich to Göttingen together with a group of young philosophers previously related to the “Academic Society for Psychology” (Akademische Verein für Psychologie).16 Their plan was to attend the courses of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) and of Adolf Reinach (1883–1917). The subsequent designation of the event by the local phenomenologists as “The Munich Invasion of Göttingen”

14 Ferrarello details the courses delivered by Husserl and Reinach between WS 1910/11 and SS 1912 that HCM attended in Göttingen. In the WS 1910/11, she attended Husserl’s following courses: “logic as a theory of cognition” (Logik als Theorie der cognition), “Basic Problems of Phenomenology”, and “Philosophical Exercises in connection of David Hume’s Tractatus ‘On the Human Spirit’” and Adolf Reinach’s “Kant’s Critique of Reason”. In SS 1911, she attended Husserl’s “Basic Problems of Ethics and Theory of Values” and “Philosophical Exercises with connections with Ernst Mach” along with Reinach’s “Philosophical Exercises: Selected Problems of Present Philosophy”. In the WS 1911/12, she attended Husserl’s “Kant and the Post-Kantian Philosophy”, and “Philosophical Exercises in Connection with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason” and Reinach’s “Freedom of the Will, Attributions and Responsibility” (Ferrarello, 2015, 52 n. 1). See here also Schuhmann’s report of the courses Husserl delivered in Göttingen. See: Schuhmann (1977, 67–198). 15 HCM’s exceptional talent was well-known among her family members, even many years after her death. See, for example, the report of Hueglin, the grandson of HCM’s younger sister, Helene: “Her [Helene’s] sister Hedwig Conrad-Martius had gone through life as an independent philosopher and university teacher, and her brother was a famous gynecologist and author of numerous scientific treatises and textbooks. Many around my grandmother were certain that she could have been the brightest star of them all” (Hueglin, 2010, 108). 16 During her first period in Munich, HCM was involved in the related society, see: Feldes (2015, 2022), Fréchette (2012). Apart from HCM, four more women were involved in the society: Margarete Calinich, Frau Dieltrich, Frau Dr. Ortner, and Katharine Tischendorf (indicated in the list of members from Maximilian Beck’s estate in the Bavarian State Archive (BSM)) (signature: Ana 354 D. II. 1), cited from: Hart (2020, 2 n. 4). The society was established in 1895 by Theodor Lipps and later operated by his students and assistants. Walther’s addendum of “philosophy” to the name of the society (Akademische Verein für Psychologie und Philosophie) (see: Walther, 1960, 379) mirrors its origin in “the Munich psychological school” (Die Münchener psychologische Schule) and its declared objective of “scientific engagement with psychological questions and the philosophical [questions] included in it” (cited from: Smid, 1982, 114).

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seems to reveal a sense of a threat.17 However, alongside the apparent negative aspect, a positive one transpires from Schapp’s description of the time, in which he testifies “we used every opportunity, day and night, to engage in philosophical discussions with the Munichers. In our opinion, they were much ahead of us in every aspect” (Schapp, 1959, 20). The admired figure of Reinach served as “connector” (Klammer) between the phenomenologists from Munich and the local ones (Avé-Lallemant & Schuhmann, 1992, 85 n. 8).18 Husserl, who felt rare admiration toward Reinach, stated: “The phenomenological mode of thinking and investigation soon became second nature to him” (Husserl, 1983, xii, 1987b, 301).19 Likewise, HCM called him “the phenomenologist among phenomenologists, the phenomenologist par excellence” (HCM, 1951b, 7).20 The group received various names, whose use was not consistent even by those who coined then, yet they all referred to the same cultural occurrence: The Göttingen Circle (Rosenwald, 1989, 16, 21–22); The Göttingen Movement; The Göttingen School (Conrad, 1953/1954N; Schmücker, 1956, 7).21 ; The Munich-Göttingen Phenomenologists; The Munich Circle; The Munich-Göttingen Phenomenology (Conrad, 1954N)22 ; The Munich Phenomenology23 ; The Munich-Göttingen School (Rosenwald, 1989, 19)24 ; The Munich-Göttingen Circle (Hart, 1973, 14); The Munich-Göttingen Group (AvéLallemant, 1975a, 23); The Munichers (Die Münchener) (HCM, 2015b, 62 n. 1)25 ; The First Phenomenological School (Landgrebe, 1963, 22); The Old Phenomenology 17 In Göttingen, the group met Husserl’s and Reinach’s students, among which were Wilhelm Schapp, Karl Neuhaus, Alfred von Sybel, Alexander Rosenblum, Dietrich Mahnke, Heinrich Hofmann, David Katz, and Erich Heinrich. 18 Johanes Daubert (1887–1947) is also mentioned as “an important mediator between the Munich phenomenological circle and Husserl” (Stein, 2005b, 204 n. 5) (notes by Maria Amata Neyer and E. Avé-Lallemant). The students’ admiration for Reinach is also indicated in the obituary Husserl composed about him after he fell during the First World War (16 Nov. 1917). The obituary first appeared in the daily newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung (6 December 1917) (see: Husserl, 1917/1987a). Subsequently to Husserl’s transcendental turn (to be discussed below), it was Reinach’s philosophy on which the Munich phenomenologists relied. Spiegelberg argues that “independently of each other, the Göttingen students of phenomenology […] in their accounts of this period refer to Reinach, not to Husserl as their teacher in Phenomenology. […]”. It was his [Reinach’s] “death in action in 1917 rather than Husserl’s going to Freiburg which cut short not only his own promise but that of the Göttingen phenomenological Circle” (Spiegelberg, 1984a, 191–192). After Reinach’s death, his students published his writings, and HCM wrote two introductions to his essays. See: HCM (1921b, 1951b). 19 See here also: Husserl (1919/1987b/1983) (English translation). 20 This statement by HCM echoed in the research literature. See: Spiegelberg (1960, 195/1984a, 192), Schuhmann and Smith (1987, 16/1989, 618), Feldes (2015, 55). 21 See here also: Avé-Lallemant and Schuhmann (1992, 85 n. 8). 22 Cited from: Smid (1982, 112). 23 Like Smid, I favor the term “Munich Phenomenology” since several important phenomenologists belonged to the group who had no connection to Husserl or to Göttingen. For the history and various appearances of the term, see a review in: Smid (1982). 24 This phrase was coined by Theodor Conrad and describes the philosophical realism that united the phenomenologists of Munich and Göttingen. See also: Rosenwald (1989, 14). 25 See here also: Spiegelberg (1959, 60).

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(Rosenwald, 1989, 13); The Older Phenomenological Movement (Spiegelberg, 1960, 168f.)26 ; “The oldest generation” (Spiegelberg, 1985); The Early Phenomenology (Rosenwald 1989, 13); the Original Phenomenological Movement (Spiegelberg, 1984a, 166f.), and The Beginning Phenomenology (anfangenden Phänomenologie) (Husserl, 1999, §59 138/1991, §59 165). Finally, due to their special affinity to Reinach, the group was called “‘Reinach Phenomenologists’” (Stein, 2005b, 203). Whatever the terminology, it denoted the first generation of phenomenologists active during and immediately after Husserl’s time.27 Among their leading members: Alexander Pfänder, Johannes Daubert, Moritz Geiger, Theodor Conrad, Adolf Reinach, Maximilian Beck, Max Scheler, and Jean Hering. The younger members of the group were: Hans Lipps, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Alexandre Koyré, Roman Ingarden, Edith Stein, and Hedwig Conrad-Martius.28 HCM’s star seemed to be on the rise in Göttingen, where she moved in the fall of 1910/1911. Rapidly, she became the living spirit and the driving force of the young group. During this period, she participated in the seminar of the Göttingen Young Phenomenologists, which she chaired in 1911, and was appointed Chair of The Philosophical Society in Göttingen (Die philosophische Gesellschaft Göttingen).29 In all these early settings, where the participation of a woman was unusual, HCM stood out as an original and daring intellectual, leading to her being known as the “first lady” of German philosophy (Hart, 1972, 1, 1973, 14). HCM described the atmosphere at that time with the following words: We were not doing anything other than carefully scrutinizing virtually everything with regards to its real essence. We disputed about the essence of nature, amongst all the genres of nature plant, animal, human—kinds of nature, about the sociological and historical and its nature, about art, about the psychological, ethical and transcendental. We talked about nature spirits, demons and angels as if we had, de facto, met them. We didn’t meet them de

26 Likewise, Theodor Conrad described them as “the oldest group” (cited from: Feldes, 2013, 206) and Alexander Koyré referred to them as “the ‘old people’” (Stein, 2005b, 193). 27 In this context, see Spiegelberg’s discussion of the three generations of phenomenology, including his characteristics of the members of the first generation, which included the members of the Munich and Göttingen circle (Spiegelberg, 1985). Spiegelberg posits that regarding the significance of a generation in philosophy, “Here the decisive criterion would be the relation not between child, parent and grandparent etc., but the analogous one between a student—his teacher and his teacher’s teacher etc.” (Spiegelberg, 1985, 252). 28 Avé-Lallemant suggests dividing the phenomenologists in this period into three groups, which maintained mutual relations and were connected to Husserl before the first world war: (1) The real Munich group, including: Pfänder, Daubert, and Geiger; (2) The Munich-Göttingen group, including Reinach and Theodor Conrad, and later also Wilhelm Schapp, Jean Héring, Alexander Koyré, Hans Lipps, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Roman Ingarden, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Edith Stein, Fritz Kaufmann, and Adolf Grimme; (3) Max Scheler’s group, which had a counter-influence of the two previous groups (Avé-Lallemant, 1975a, 23). See here also: Schmücker (1956). 29 The related Society was chaired by Theodor Conrad up to the summer semester of 1912, with breaks, during which his place was filled by HCM (SS 1911, WS 1911–1912) and Hildebrand. Feldes describes this group as constantly admitting new members, who later composed the group that became known as the Munich-Göttingen Group. In this context, see also: Avé-Lallemant and Schuhmann (1992), Feldes (2015, 30–32).

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facto—at least not the angels, but we met their essence and got a grasp of it. We didn’t ask at all whether they actually really existed. (HCM, 2015b, 61)30

The plural used by HCM is not just an expression of a style typical in this period, but also denotes the fundamental understanding of the Munich phenomenologists that they were part of a “phenomenological movement” (Phänomenologische Bewegung) (Avé-Lallemant, 1988, 62). This formulation became popular with the publication of the first treatise presenting the history of phenomenology to the English-speaking world, with the title: The Phenomenological Movement (Spiegelberg, 1960). Furthermore, Reinach’s description of this period shows that not only were the early phenomenologists conscious of the group ethos, it also possessed a visionary component: “At the moment when, in place of momentary brainstorms, there sets in the laborious effort at illumination, there philosophical work is taken out of the hands of individuals and laid in the hands of ongoing generations” (Reinach, 1969, 221, my emphasis).31 Indeed, this period would later be characterized by Spiegelberg as “a time of group philosophizing and of a vigorous mutual criticism” (Spiegelberg, 1960, 169) or “period […] of joint philosophizing and live mutual criticism”. In connection with Reinach, Spiegelberg adds: “Like all the other early phenomenologists he firmly believed in philosophy as a cooperative scientific enterprise to which each researcher would have to contribute patiently and unhurriedly, much in the same way as was the case in the sciences. There could be no such thing as a one-man system” (Spiegelberg, 1984a, 166/1960, 196).32 From the methodical aspect, the circles of Munich and Göttingen followed Husserl’s doctrine of regional ontology that is designated to serve as a framework for the study of essences. In this regard, the region (Region) is marked as the highest material genus of the essences that belong together (Husserl, 1952a, §9/2012a, §9) and consolidate “the highest and most inclusive generic unity belonging to a concretum” (Husserl, 1952a, §16 36/2012a, §16 31). From a wider historical perspective, the related ethos of philosophical group communicated the Hegelian ideal of philosophy as an organic unity whose moments “not only do not conflict, but […] each is necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole” (Hegel, 1977, 2). 30 In this context, see a similar testimony given to Edith Stein. Dr. Georg Moskiewicz (1883–1955), who studied with Husserl in Göttingen and was very close to him, said: “In Göttingen, they only philosophized—day and night, about the essence, in the street and everywhere. They spoke only about ‘phenomena’”. This testimony is cited in: Avé-Lallemant (1988, 70). 31 These words are taken from Reinach’s best-known text, based on a lecture he gave at Marburg in January 1914. The German original of the lecture was published twice (Reinach, 921b/Reinach, 1951) and received two English translations (Reinach, 1968, 1969). 32 However, regarding the similarity of phenomenology to the sciences, Spiegelberg wonders “what was to be the place of phenomenology, then, in such a framework?” (Spiegelberg, 1960, 196/1984a, 193). In any event, he establishes that “compared with the intensity and vitality of the philosophizing that went on in these two circles during the ten years of the ‘phenomenological spring’ (as Jean Hering has called it), the later Phenomenological Movement, though richer in literary output, seems to be almost shapeless and anemic” (Spiegelberg 1960, 168–169/1984a, 166). Likewise, Seifert emphasizes the uniqueness of the Munich phenomenology as a philosophical occurrence that has no equivalent in the history of modern philosophy. See: Seifert (1971, 97).

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However, the early phenomenologists rapidly discovered that the very thing for which they had gathered around the founder of phenomenology in Göttingen was largely no longer in existence. In a letter from Reinach to Conrad dated 1907, he reported about a conversation with Daubert who maintained that “one might really question whether proper phenomenology, as it is pursued in Munich, has its roots in Husserl” (Reinach, 1907N).33 Likewise, shortly before the start of the semester, the Ideas appeared in Husserl’s yearbook.34 Stein writes: […] the Ideas included some expressions which sounded very much as though their master wished to return to idealism. His oral interpretation could not appease our concerns. It was the beginning of that development which led Husserl to see, more and more, in what he called ‘transcendental Idealism’ […] the genuine nucleus of his philosophy […]. This was a path on which, to his sorrow as well as their own, his earlier Göttingen students could not follow him. (Stein, 2002a, 201)35

Finally, in retrospect HCM recalls her personal disappointment already during her time in Göttingen. Back then, it would soon transpire that winning the prestigious prize from Göttingen University was merely a fleeting moment, after which signals of trouble and difficulty started to appear one after the other. Among these, it is barely even possible to include declining an offer of marriage from a wealthy man from Marburg who wanted a wife who would bake him cakes rather than a brilliant philosopher (HCM, 1912N). HCM clearly felt in real time the arrows of criticism and mistrust directed at her following her win. Later in life, she described the responses to the fact that none other than “a little female student from Rostock had won the first and only prize—very much to the delight of Husserl but not to the delight of those opposed to the academic education of women” (HCM, 2015b, 62). Unfortunately, HCM’s case transpires as one in which determination, exceptional talent, and unending dedication to the human spirit were not enough. C. PhilosophicalPeripeteia The “prize essay” should have framed as a nice early episode that would be expected to be forgotten in light of HCM’s subsequent massive crop of writings and unique 33 Reinach’s

letter is mentioned also in: Smid (1982, 116), Fréchette (2012, 150). Ideas first appeared in the first volume of Husserl’s Yearbook (Husserl, 1913). 35 The research literature generally identifies the ontological-formal starting point with Logical Investigations, while the shift to an idealistic-transcendental position is identified with the publication of the first volume of his Ideas in 1913, where this position appeared in writing (see: Husserl, 1952a/2012a). However, later in life, HCM reached an understanding that what she called “Husserl’s incomprehensible retreat to transcendentalism, to subjectivism, if not to psychologism” occurred “already in volume 2 of ‘Logical Investigations’” (HCM, 1965c, 395). Avé-Lallemant also indicated the gap between the two volumes of Logical Investigation. See Avé-Lallemant (1971, 14ff.). AvéLallemant shares this view about the Logical Investigation with Spiegelberg, who observed that the two volumes designated two periods in Husserl’s Phenomenology (the pre-phenomenological and the period of phenomenology), see: Spiegelberg (1960, 74/1984a, 70). In any case, Husserl himself testified that in 1905, already at his time in Göttingen he “first executed the phenomenological reduction” (Husserl, 2002b, 315). See also Husserl (1966 [Seefelder Manuskripte über Individualtion (1905–1907)], 237-268), Heffernan (2018/2016), Nakhnikian (1964), Seifert (2004–2005, 146f.). 34 Husserl’s

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phenomenological approach. However, in the spirit of Aristotle, the winding path awaiting HCM after winning the prize could be characterized as a sort of peripeteia in both her philosophical and her personal life, namely: the turning point in a tragedy where the transition from happiness to misery occurs.36 Thus, instead of this milestone, where her philosophical and critical talent was shining brightly, paving her way as one of the most original and daring phenomenologists of her time, HCM’s work was pushed into the distant margins of contemporary philosophy. As a result, her philosophical ideas were largely formulated through internal dialogue and in the absence of a real possibility of sharing them and growing from the echoes they would have created among colleagues and students.37 To an extent, this evaluation of the event of winning of that philosophical prize as a sort of peripatetic moment complies with HCM’s retrospective observation of her life. Thus, on the occasion of the recognition and celebration of her reception of the award of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany (Groβes Verdienstkreuz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland) on 1 March 1958, she speaks out: Even when I explore the most remote corner of my heart, I find no inkling of any possibility that I could ever be worthy of a celebration like this or be honored with such an award. This is not modesty. I wasn’t pampered by life and there have been more crosses in a negative sense than crosses in a positive sense of exaltation. (HCM, 2015b, 60)

Against the background of this description, HCM added that precisely those people who objected to women receiving an academic education were responsible for her not being able to write her dissertation at Göttingen University, basing it on the prize essay.38 The official reason was that her matriculation was of the Realgymnasium Abitur type, which did not include learning Greek, without which, they argued, it would be impossible to write a doctoral dissertation.39 HCM explains that not only would male students have been granted an exemption in such circumstances, but that the school curriculum did not include such studies, so that she had not been given the chance to meet this condition.40 36 The proposed simile of peripeteia follows Aristotle’s Poetics. While the peripeteiac moment is described as sudden, its roots are planted in the circumstances of preceding events. HCM herself used this simile in connection to Being and Time. See: HCM (1965g, 371). HCM employs this simile also in her theological discussions. See: HCM (1965e, 189, 1965m, 222, 1965n, 196). 37 Kuhn testified to the “long painful lack of teaching activity” (Kuhn, 1966). 38 This directly disproves Spiegleberg’s statement that HCM submitted her doctoral dissertation in Munich with Pfänder and not in Göttingen with Husserl “for technical reasons” (Spiegelberg, 1985, 252). In fact, both statements, regarding the affiliation and regarding the identity of the supervisor, are incorrect. Husserl did not directly supervise HCM in writing her dissertation, and this was not “for technical reasons”, as it transpires HCM was well-aware. Spiegelberg’s statement, written in the USA, where he had emigrated, is tainted with blindness toward the difficulties HCM faced in the period where very few women even tried to write dissertations, let alone be considered for tenured academic positions. 39 See Karl Schuhmann’s editorial comment on Husserl’s letter to Theodor Conrad on 21 July 1912, where he wrote that “for technical reasons she [HCM] was promoted with this essay but not by Husserl rather by Pfänder in Munich” (Husserl, 1994a, 16). 40 One wonders how Husserl, who, according to HCM was “delighted” by her winning the prize (HCM, 2015b, 62), was unable to influence her admission to the Philosophy Department at Göttingen

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In any case, in 1912, HCM left Göttingen and returned to Munich. Under the supervision of Alexander Pfänder, who led the Munich phenomenologists group, she developed into an extensive treatise the first chapter of the prize essay entitled “The perception of ‘the Natural world view’ that is immanent in the ‘consciousnessindependent external world’” (HCM, 1920a, 10–24).41 In this opening chapter to her essay, HCM addresses positivism as “a content-designated doctrine that historically attached itself to the name positivism” (HCM, 1920a, 2). However, despite praising positivism for its awe toward “real experience (wirklicher Erfahrung)” and more generally accepting the “lawful positivistic basic tendency towards the datum (das Gegebene)” (HCM, 1920a, 4), she accuses positivism for “utter Blindness towards the living-being (Lebewesen)” (HCM, 1920a, 1).42 HCM described the process of writing the new elaborated and enlarged essay, which took only four weeks,43 as follows: “My doctorate came to me a priori. It was obviously bestowed on me in the cradle since I was already reading Critique of Pure Reason at the age of fifteen” (HCM, 2015b, 63).44 Pfänder immediately recognized the related essay as a dissertation entitled The Epistemological foundation of Positivism. On the Ontology and the Doctrine of the Appearances of the Real External World (Die erkenntnisstheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus. Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Auβenwelt) (HCM, 1913N).45 It was submitted on 3 July 1912 to the Ludwig Maximillian University of Munich and was given the grade “summa cum laude”. A pretty close version to the dissertation was later published in the Husserl’s Yearbook 46 in 1916 under the title “On the Ontology and Doctrine of the Appearances of the Real External World, in Connection with Critiques of Positivistic Theories” University, where he was a senior professor. Also, Hart supports HCM’s impression and indicates that: “Husserl was willing to accept the work for a doctorate at Goettingen”, Hart (1972, 12 n. 1). However, it is still difficult to accept this state of affairs at face value. 41 The first part of the dissertation, “The Entire Phenomenon of the Real External World” (HCM, 1916b, 345–397), is based on the first chapter of the “prize essay”. The second part of the dissertation “Sensory Givenness: Feeling and Appearing” (HCM, 1916b, 397–542) is entirely new and anticipates the subsequent book, Realontologie (HCM, 1923b). 42 Avé-Lallemant testified that the plan to adapt the remaining chapters of the Prize Essay was never realized. See Avé-Lallemant (1971, 213). 43 During these weeks, HCM was in Munich, and not as Spiegelberg wrote: “her main work having been done at Gottingen” (Spiegelberg, 1985, 253). 44 The understanding of becoming a phenomenologist almost as an innate givenness is repeated by several phenomenologists. In this spirit, as we have seen, Husserl characterized Reinach: “The phenomenological mode of thinking and investigation soon became second nature to him” (Husserl, 1983, xii, 1987b, 301). Stein referred to those who “were born phenomenologists” (Stein, 2013, 6) and HCM maintained that the phenomenologists “as [naturally] born out of a common spirit” (HCM, 1960b, 62). 45 HCM was the first woman to be promoted in a German university. This was in 1912, by Alexander Pfänder, on the basis of her prize essay. See Stein (2013, 7 n. 10) (by the editor, Andreas Uwe Müller). 46 Husserl’s Yearbook (Jahrbuch für Phänomenology and philosophische Forschung) that was published between 1913 and 1930 and contained eleven issues in which the most foundational works ever in phenomenology were published, such as Husserl’s first volume of Ideen (Husserl, 1913) and Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (Heidegger, 1927). Schuhmann wrote the only article to date that is wholly dedicated to Husserl’s Yearbook (Schuhmann, 1990).

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(Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Auβenwelt. Verbunden mit einer Kritik positivistischer Theorien) (HCM, 1916b).47 The apparent change in the dissertation’s title, emphasizing the ontological aspect while relocating the criticism of positivism into the subtitle, is a clear hint of the direction HCM started to take immediately afterward. Its peak was the first treatise she wrote after her dissertation, Realontologie (HCM, 1923b). In any case, even prior to composing this work, it seems that she herself sensed that her philosophical oeuvre would not be restricted to ontological inquiries, but would enter the realm of metaphysics. In this spirit, she explained that eventually epistemological questions can be grasped only from the objective stance of the real to which the metaphysical dimension relates (HCM, 1920b, 130). In any event, subsequently to obtaining her dissertation, her achievements seem to have faded as though they had never happened. HCM described her life in the following years: “During the following years my husband and I had to make a great effort to make a living and continue to substantiate it in a practical manner. […] there was no way of making preparations or plans for the habilitation” (HCM, 2015b, 63). Thus, at the critical stage, after her doctoral dissertation had been approved in 1912, HCM encountered the fundamental barrier of inability to find a university where she could write a Habilitation, which was an indispensable condition for applying for academic positions.48 D. Bergzabern—The Domestication of Phenomenology 1. The Conrads’ Place and the Bergzabern Circle In 1912, HCM married the philosopher Hans Theodor Conrad (1881–1969) and left Munich for his hometown Bad-Bergzabern.49 Theodor Conrad’s plan was “securing the economic foundation and free time for her further philosophical work through the establishment of an orchard farm” (Avé-Lallemant, 1984, 213) that he had purchased before the First World War (Avé-Lallemant, 2015, 69). However, behind this choice to leave Munich, both the city and its university, stood Conrad’s disillusioned awareness of “the difficulty of finding a place for a woman in university”. Therefore he “encouraged her to devote herself to another passion, caring for plants” (Ales Bello, 2002, 210). In the following years, besides her arduous work in the orchard farm50 HCM 47 Only in 1920 was the prize essay published by a private press. It is possible that the delay in publishing this treatise, and also perhaps its publication by a marginal press, contributed to the connection between it and HCM’s doctoral dissertation not being known. Many of the articles in this volume are devoted to the interpretation of this complex essay, which is packed with the important elements of HCM’s entire philosophy, including her later thought. 48 Gerda Walther also described the difficulties women encountered when seeking to enter the university’s lecture halls. See: Walther (1960, 17). 49 The couple moved first to Theodor’s mother in the Southern Palatinate, close to the French border. Theodor Conrad was a professor of Philosophy in Munich and belonged to the older Göttingen students of Husserl. Among the members of the Munich Circle, Theodor Conrad’s nickname was Autós (“self” in Greek), inspired by his self-assurance. See: (Stein, 1960, 1993, 149 n. 2) (letter no. 146 to Theodor Conrad). In the circle of her friends, HCM’s nickname was Hatti. Stein uses Hatti for HCM quite systematically, in particular in: See: Stein (2005b, 1960). 50 Stein testified that HCM “has worked well beyond her strength in the farm” and therefore she planned to go and help her there (Stein, 2005b, 187). Walther, who was invited to the orchard farm in

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explored the foundation of an ontology of reality and studied intensively German philosophy (especially idealism) and natural sciences (Avé-Lallemant, 1984, 213). The fruits of her study at that time were the Metaphysische Gespräche (HCM, 1921a), Realontologie (HCM, 1923b) 51 and several essays on plants.52 In 1920, the couple built their own house in Bergzabern.53 A year later, and throughout the 1920s, the Göttingen phenomenologists gathered there, usually in the autumn and discussed the development of phenomenology, philosophical, religious, and political issues.54 These meetings at the Conrads’ home, in between which few hundreds of letters were exchanged among the members (Feldes, 2013, 16),55 would later be called the “Bergzabern Circle” (Spiegelberg, 1960, 220).56 Except for the Conrads, the members of Circle—“the children of the house” as Stein put it (Stein, 2005, 203)—included: Jean Hering, Alexander Koyré, Hans Lipps, Edith Stein, and Alfred von Sybel57 (Avé-Lallemant, 2015, 69). All these were Reinach’s

1923, found as an “accurate description” the impression HCM gave Walther’s relative: “completely not an abstract thinker” but by means of “nice little apples […] a seminal philosopher” (Walther, 1960, 331–332). 51 An essay on the soul that preceded Metaphysische Gespräche was later included in it (HCM, 1917, 26–86). Stein was utterly impressed by Realontologie (Stein, 2005b, 188) and by Metaphysische Gespräche as well (Stein, 2005b, 196–197). However, Stein reports that Ingarden expressed a “vehement reaction to the book” and “fear for phenomenology” due to the metaphysical and religious tone that he found in it, see: Stein (2005b, 196). 52 See: HCM (1933, 1934, 1938, 1963g). The common discourse of HCM’s time often suggested a philosophy of natural sciences from the standpoint of human studies and in this regard communicated the philosophical project of Wilhelm Dilthey (see in particular: Stein, 2010a; Husserl, 1976/1970c). However, beside her realistic phenomenology, HCM consolidated a philosophy of nature in the most strict and classical sense that also manifested the spirit of German romanticism. Hart suggests that her “early and deep interest in nature owed much to her father who was a famous botanist” (Hart, 1973, 14). Also, Ales Bello argued that HCM’s “interest in nature is also bound with her personal experience” (Ales Bello, 2002, 210). 53 The Conrads continued to own their apartment in Munich, where they visited frequently even after their move to Bergzabern. However, following financial difficulties, the apartment was sold in 1919 (Feldes, 2013, 210). The mutual assistance among the circle’s members was reflected by one of the members, Alfred von Sybel, handling the sale. The words of encouragement he sent the couple in this context show that the Conrads’ home in Munich was a significant place for the circle’s members. In a letter dated 12 September 1919, he wrote: “It is very sad that the Munich apartment now is not anymore. But meanwhile the orchard house grows, and this is actually much more beautiful” (cited from: Feldes, 2013, 210). 54 Feldes (2013, 205); Hart (2020, 4). 55 Only Stein’s letters were published. See: Stein (1993), Stein (2005). From the correspondence of the Bergzabern circle in HCM’s estate, her letter to Hering (HCM, 1955aN), as well as letters she received from him (Hering, 1914–1965N) and from Alexandre Koyré (Koyré, 1911–1964N), are preserved. The importance granted to letters at the time is articulated in Stein’s following words: “man’s life lies in his letters […] not only for the interest of biography, but for arriving at the inside of things” (Stein, 1993, ix). 56 Feldes discussed the origin of the name “Bergzabern Circle”: Feldes (2015, 9–10). 57 Feldes published the only study, so far, on von Sybel (see: Feldes, 2013).

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students and before the First World War, all were members of the “Philosophical Society in Göttingen”.58 The plan was to establish an institute with a library and an archive for phenomenology.59 This idea seems to follow the early plan of Hering and Reinach before the First World War to erect what Hering referred to as a “Foundation for Phenomenological Purposes” (Stiftung für phänomenologische Zwecke) (Feldes, 2013, 63).60 The group, whose members called themselves “the ‘old people’”, intended to initiate a “‘new direction’” that would provide a “counter” response to the “the unedifying relationships that have developed around him [Husserl]” in Freiburg under the influence of Heidegger (Stein, 2005b, 193). In their view, the latter turned Husserl’s surrounding into “a dark spot” (Stein, 2005b, 191). They even invited Husserl to Bergzabern for the purpose of, as Stein put it, “[having] him here with us without the whole Freiburg atmosphere” (Stein, 2005b, 195).61 Stein was also involved in gathering books for erecting a library at the Conrads’ place62 and observed that “indeed it has become the general home for phenomenologists (allgemeine Phänomenologenheim)” (Stein, 2005b, 187) and referred to it as “the phenomenology house (Phänomenologenhaus) in Bergzabern” (Stein, 2005b, 191). These designations, to the point of urging Ingarden to come for a visit, arguing that this “certainly belongs to the category of ‘demands of phenomenology (Förderung der Phänomenologie)’” (Stein, 2005b, 190), not only express the emotional attachment to the Conrads’ place but also manifest the spiritual depth that tied the members of the group to each other.63 HCM shed light on the uniqueness of the connection between the phenomenologist that gathered in Bergzabern, with the following words:

58 For

an account of the society, see: Feldes (2015, 29–41). Husserl moved to Freiburg, and following the dismantling of the philosophical society of Göttingen, the Conrads’ place became the constant address for their communication (Feldes, 210). Thus, for example, Hering asked about von Sybel, who had been sent to the front. The letters he sent to HCM are cited by Feldes (Feldes, 2013, 209). 60 See here a letter of Hering from 23 April 1915 (found by Avé-Lallemant in HCM’s estate, cited in: Feldes, 2015, 64). However, Feldes leaves open the question whether the Bergzabern Circle was the realization of this early vision of Hering’s (Feldes, 2015, 64). 61 It is hard to miss the deep, almost maternal concern that the circle’s members felt for Husserl, in particular Stein who expressed her sense of personal responsibility for working with Husserl as his assistant (Stein, 2005b, 39) and her fear that: “alone the master would not publish anything else” (Stein, 2005b, 65). 62 The small library was sponsored by Winthrop Pickard Bell (1885–1956), Husserl’s student from Göttingen, who belonged to the circle there. Bell regularly read the writings of his phenomenologist colleagues (see Stein, 2005b, 65, 79, 89, 90 n. 4, 170), provided Stein with funding for her research activities (Stein, 2005b, 187), which probably financed the activity of the Bergzabern Circle (see: Stein, 2005b, 190; Feldes, 2013, 205), and probably had political influence, which he employed for Germany after the First World War. Later, Bell held a professorship in Canada (See Stein’s references to this in: Stein, 2005b, 162, 173, 190). Husserl’s letters to Bell were published in: Husserl (1994b, 3–58). 63 For Stein, the Conrads’ house also possessed a spiritual value. In 1921, during a visit there, Stein reached the decision to convert to Christianity and was baptized, with HCM serving as her Godmother. Herbstrith describes Stein’s stay with Conrad-Martius before her baptism. See: Herbstrith (1972, 24–25). 59 After

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The way in which we felt about each other was something totally different from usual friendship. There was first the communality of the philosophical atmosphere, from which we together with many others were born out (herausgeboren). We, that have been the personal pupils of our highly respected teacher and master, Edmund Husserl.64 “spiritually born out”! I wish to emphasis here, that it was not about mere common type of methodical thinking and study, especially not common world view or the like. The certainly deep common type of methodical thinking and study produced – and posed – a connection between Husserl’s pupils, that I cannot designate other than a [natural] birth from a common spirit, that nevertheless is exactly not a common world view from the aspect of content. Nothing better than some words by Peter Wust could describe the essence of the communality of all genuine phenomenologists. He said that “from the outset in the intention of every new philosophical direction must well be concealed something entirely mysterious, a yearning back to the objective, to the sanctity of Being, the purity and virtue (Keuschheit) of the things, the ‘things themselves’. (HCM 1960b, 62–63)65

Against this background, Avé-Lallemant maintained that Bergzabern Circle “should not be understood as the Göttingen [circle] and the Munich [circle] in connection to their respective universities but as friendly-familial, philosophically fruitful relationship (Beziehung) of the always again meeting phenomenologists” (AvéLallemant, 2015, 69). Another evaluation of the Bergzabern Circle referred to is as “a kind of institutional response to Freiburg, whose goal was to sustain the genuine phenomenology” (cited from: Feldes, 2015, 14–15) that distinguished itself from the Heideggerian that has been established in Freiburg. During the period of National Socialism, the paths of the seven phenomenologists of the Berzgabern Circle parted. Stein was murdered at Auschwitz in 1942. Hans Lipps and Alfred von Sybel died. Avé-Lallemant’s attempt to study the history of the Bergzabern Circle after the war were unsuccessful, and he was unable to obtain access to their writings, which were kept by their families and not published. 66 Apart from Feldes’ studies (Feldes, 2013; Feldes, 2015), there are still no comprehensive studies about the group, even though it is mentioned in various contexts in studies of early phenomenology. These studies, and the few sources that exist, open a window upon the human experience, and thus enable a glimpse of the personal and even theological dimension behind their philosophical investigations. 2. The Friendship with Edith Stein and the Choice of Faith Stein and HCM knew each other already from the Göttingen period from the circle of phenomenologists that formed around Husserl. HCM had already been mentioned in the newspapers following her winning of the prize (HCM, 1920a). However, the personal meeting took place in 1920, when Stein visited Bergzabern for a few months and even considered moving there (Stein, 2005b, 188). Between 1921 and 1922, the 64 Spiegelberg indicates that “[Der] Meister”, namely the master, was “the inner circle’s affectionate

nickname for Husserl, or his associates” (Spiegelberg, 1985, 253). 65 See here HCM’s reference to the similarity between her ontological understanding of the dialectic

between Being and nothingness and the idea of spirit (Geist) in the thinking of Peter Wust (1884– 1940) in: HCM 1963f, 261 n. 6. Wust was influenced by Max Scheler and was very involved in the Munich-based Catholic monthly Hochland (1903–1941) in which many of HCM’s articles appeared. 66 See: Feldes (2015, 14 n. 25).

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two experienced an “identity crisis” (Sinnkrise) (Stein, 2005b, 60 n. 4),67 which was accompanied by a crisis in philosophical creation.68 HCM considered taking a radical step following her religious experiences, as she described in a letter a few years later: “In me grows incessantly the demand (Verlangen) to lose everything for the sake of Jesus Christ. I know and feel that my philosophical desire stops me from being entirely poor and void before the Lord of all Lords” (HCM, 1924N). Eventually, the two chose different paths. As HCM put it: “we walked along a narrow ridge, close to each other, each present in every moment of divine call. It happened but is has led us to confessional different directions” (HCM, 1960b, 73). According to AvéLallemant, in the end, HCM “found her spiritual homeland in a community within the evangelic church” (Avé-Lallemant, 2015, 71)69 joined the Protestant Free Church (protestantische Freikirche) (Stein, 2013, 7 n. 10).70 For her, the choice of “liberal Protestantism” was after her parents’ home, which was in connection with the vivid evangelical community (Avé-Lallemant, 2015, 70). In contrast, in 1922 Stein joined the Catholic Church and entered a Carmelite monastery. Interestingly, even in retrospect, the two did not view the choice of faith as conflicting with their philosophical work. For HCM, the choice of faith is based on essence intuition (Wesensfassung) that unveils its “existence possibility (Daseinsmöglichkeit)” that leads to a “tremor about heresy” (HCM, 1951b, 16). Likewise, in 1928 also Stein wrote (to Sister Callista): “it is possible to worship God by doing scholarly research […] and even in the contemplative life, one may not sever the connection with the world” (Stein, 1993, 54). It appears that this fundamental approach shared by the two philosophers is based upon their realistic philosophical position, which helped them detect the basic connection between phenomenology and Catholicism. For Stein, the path from phenomenology is inherent in the close connection she discerned between Husserl’s phenomenology and medieval scholasticism. Her first and foundational scholarly elaboration of the connection between phenomenology and Catholicism takes place in her essay on Husserl’s Phenomenology and the philosophy of Aquinas from 1929 (Stein, 2014, 119–142). However, in Finite and Eternal Being,71 which was written after her conversion to Catholicism, Stein reveals herself as the one of the modern thinkers who approached the question of Being “out of inner necessity” and “unmediated proximity”, yet independently of the traditional ties. Stein wrote: this is especially the imperative way of the author for whom the school of Edmund Husserl is a homeland and her philosophical mother tongue is the language of phenomenologists. She must attempt to find in this starting point her way in the great cathedral of scholasticism. 67 The

note added by the editor, Andreas Uwe Müller

68 According to Avé-Lallemant, their stay at Bergzabern in this period entailed a break in publication

and a turning to Christianity on the existential level, which was doubted in the scientific research the two had engaged in up to that point. See: Avé-Lallemant (2015, 78). 69 The community was established in Schobdach Franconia and HCM always spent the Christian holidays there (Avé-Lallemant, 2015, 48 n. 15). 70 The note added by the editor, Andreas Uwe Müller. 71 According to Uwe Müller, it is almost certain that the treatise Finite and Eternal Being was composed between July 1935 and January 1937. See: Stein (2013, xiv).

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Preface She believed that as much as she is aware of this goal, as is necessary, it will guide her on the way. (Stein, 2013, 19–20)

It seems that the inner dialogue Stein shares here with her readers contributed to the interpretation that her “intellectual conversion led to a personal one” (Baring, 2019, 75). Later, in a treatise she wrote about Stein, in relation to the religious aspect of her figure, HCM quotes the following words from Peter Wust: “even if the curse of subjectivism could not entirely be overcome by the father of this new direction of thought (Husserl), still many of his pupils endeavored in the direction of the original intention of the openness to the object (Objektgeöffnetheit) belonging to this school further on the path to the things, to the facts, to Being itself, and even to the habit of the catholic man, for whom nothing is more appropriate than the eternal measures of the knowing spirit to the decisive things”.

Subsequently, she establishes the unequivocal determination: “if one marks the catholic in this way, then certainly all phenomenologists could be called ‘catholic’ also when they in no way confess to it” (HCM, 1960b, 63). In any event, the friendship between the two philosophers had a mutual, formative influence, mentioned in Stein’s letters and in research about Stein in the context of her decision to convert to Catholicism. Perhaps Stein’s tragic fate, which became well-known after her canonization in 1998, and particularly following the awakening of intensive study of her writings from 2000 onward, contributed to HCM not being completely forgotten in phenomenological research. Incidentally, during that period, the Catholic church in Germany was losing parishioners. Therefore, the choice of some of the early phenomenologists to convert to Christianity has attracted scholarly attention. In addition to Max Scheler, von Hildebrand, the most famous case was of Edith Stein, who converted from Judaism to Catholicism.72 Husserl himself converted from Judaism to Protestantism at the age of 28 in 1886 (Schuhmann, 1977, 15–17). However, he distanced himself from the theistic position, which he interpreted as “a sign of inner wretchedness (Elends) in the soul”, explaining that “a true philosopher cannot be other than free: the essential nature of philosophy is the most radical autonomy” (Husserl, 1968, 22).73 Nonetheless, the connection between his 72 For

further reading on the conversion of Husserl’s early followers, see here: Schaber 2003.

73 Husserl and Ingarden rejected this link between faith and philosophy on the basis of identifying the

religious dimension with Christian dogmatism (see: Feldes, 2015, 143). This position of theirs was expressed explicitly in reference to HCM’s work Metaphysische Gespräche (HCM, 1921a) (Stein sent Husserl and Ingarden copies, see: Stein, 2005b, 198 n. 1). Stein naively commented that “Husserl sent a card expressing his delight”, though she certainly mentioned Husserl’s stinging remark when he received the book and wrote to her: “I will first have to see how much of it considers philosophy as a rigorous science” (Stein, 2005b, 197). In his letters to Ingarden (Husserl, 1968, 23) and to Bell, Husserl expressed himself more decisively against HCM’s approach, which he considered to lack scientific rigor and to be instead “romantic ingenious soulful” (Sinnig-seelenvolle Romantik) (Husserl, 1994b, 34). In this spirit, he correctly identified the influence of the Catholic philosopher of romance, Franz von Baader (1765–1841). See Husserl (1994b, 34 n. 104). For examples of HCM referring to Franz von Baader, see HCM (1921a, 62, 66, 127, 140). Feldes also notes Von Sybel’s reference to Franz von Baader (Feldes, 2015, 153).

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phenomenology and his students’ search for the self in relation to Christianity did not escape Husserl’s attention, and it seems to have bothered him. Thus, for example, in a letter to Rudolf Otto dated 5 Match 1919, he wrote: “my philosophical influence has something remarkably revolutionary: evangelic become Catholic, Catholics become evangelic” (Husserl, 1994c, 206). This background seems to explain Oesterreicher’s indication that Christianity was a loaded and tense issue for Husserl. He quotes from a private conversation he had with HCM and Sister Adelgundis Jaegerschmidt (O.S.B., St. Lioba-Kloster, Freiburg im Breisgau), in which Husserl said about his New Testament: “It is always on my desk, but I never open it. I know that once I open it and read it, I shall have to give up philosophy” (Oesterreicher, 1952, 43).74 Other accounts of the matter suggested that the conversions of a few phenomenologists of the first generation concern phenomenology’s appeal to intuition and its reservation regarding empiricism that made it open to religious belief.75 To this extent, Baring characterized this phenomenon as “philosophical conversions” (Baring, 2018, 115). Spiegelberg presents a balanced position on this issue. Similarly, also Spiegelberg believed that this phenomenon should be linked to the nature of phenomenology. In his words: “The Truth of the matter would seem to be that the phenomenological approach in its openness to all kinds of experiences and phenomena is ready to reconsider even the traditional beliefs in the religious field in a fresh and unprejudiced manner”. Nonetheless, Spiegelberg established that in spite of the many famous cases of conversion, still some of the members of the Munich circle chose to maintain their religious affiliation (Spiegelberg, 1960, 172–173).76 Husserl, for his part, expressed indifference to the related phenomenon and in this regard wrote to Rudolf Otto: “I would be delighted to influence all true men, be it catholic, evangelic or Jewish” (Husserl, 1994c, 207). In any case, it would be difficult to disregard the conspicuous phenomenon of conversion among the early phenomenologists or ignore the influence of Christian thought on the phenomenologists who in the end did not convert or turn religious faith into the focus of their intellectual endeavor, such as HCM.

The Realistic Orientation in Phenomenology A. The Call for “Go Back to the ‘Things Themselves’” Husserl’s resounding call in his Logical Investigation from 1900 of “go back to the ‘things themselves’” (auf die ‘Sachen selbst’ zurückgehen) (Husserl, 1970a,

74 See

here also: Oesterreicher (1952, 334 n.1). here: Vidal 1972 (cited from: Baring, 2018, 115 n. 5). 76 Spiegelberg’s words appear as an excursus entitled “Note: Phenomenology and Conversion”. This section was omitted from the third expanded edition of his book (Spiegelberg, 1984a), despite the fact that in contrast to its predecessors, this expanded edition devoted space to discussing the realistic phenomenologists. The issue of conversion is addressed in “Faith, Individuality, and Radicalism”, appearing as an appendix to this volume. 75 See

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168/1984a, 10),77 already at the time of Logical Investigations was referred to as the slogan of phenomenology, implied an unmistakably revolt against another current call of ‘back to Kant’.78 This last call, by the neo-Kantian movement, was addressed to the then-dominant idealistic and materialistic theories of knowledge in the name of the possibility of a universal scientific truth, whose supreme ideal was the Kantian “thingin-itself”. However, Husserl’s endeavors were harnessed to turning one’s gaze to what is already known or clearly seen. To this end, whatever presents itself to consciousness must be approached and understood on its own terms while avoiding addressing any category external to it. The subsequent elaboration of Husserl’s early call in Ideas from 1913 was consolidated as “The principle of all principles” that marks “an absolute beginning” for phenomenological study. In this regard, knowledge as such is regarded as based on an awareness of phenomena that can be presented to us “as it were in its bodily reality” (Husserl, 1952a, §24 51/2012a, §24 43). The early phenomenologists, who perceived themselves as “confirmed realists” (entschiedende Realisten) (Stein, 2002a, 200), were attracted to Husserl’s call to “go back to the ‘things themselves’”. But beyond the inspiration they drew from Husserl’s reverberating call, when they came to realize the vision it embodied, they were not guided by a model. Rather, their encounter with Husserl’s ideas brought about, as Spiegelberg put it: “interpretive studies of the first-hand work of other well-known phenomenologists” (Spiegelberg, 1985, 251). Spiegelberg added in this regard that they “could enjoy again some of the freedom of the first generation in approaching the Sachen themselves without intermediaries. You no longer need to study the phenomena under the shadow of the historical authorities, not even the authorities of the founders of phenomenology” (Spiegelberg, 1985, 254). Likewise, Kuhn portrays vividly the atmosphere of the time as follows: “The slogan ‘back to the things’ (zurück zu den Sachen)” was: “a signal of inner relief (Befreiung). The chains (Fesseln) of the idealistic construction that held captive the spirit in its own made abstractions have fallen. The world in the multiplicity of phenomena opened itself up like an eye waking up from a slumber” (Kuhn, 1966). These observations by Spiegelberg and Kuhn were retrospectively confirmed in HCM’s description of her time in Göttingen: “Wir wollten nur an die Sachen selbst heran” (we only wanted to come close to the things themselves) (HCM, 2015b, 62). Moreover, the primary, foundation nature embodied in Husserl’s reverberating call was directly expressed in the first attempts to formulate a “metaphenomenology”, meaning reflective writing about phenomenology itself.79 The independent inquiry into the essence of phenomenology is apparent in the essays written by the first generation of phenomenology with the titles: “What 77 The phrase “to return to the things themselves” appeared in Husserl’s writings in several contexts.

See also: Husserl (1970a, §4 172, §6 174–175/1984a, §4 17–18, §6 22-23). This saying has also been discussed extensively in connection to the realistic orientation in phenomenology, see: Seifert (1971, 1995); Kuhn (1969); Schmücker (1956). 78 For further reading, see: Willey (1978). 79 This writing about phenomenology contradicts Spiegelberg’s statement regarding the first generation of phenomenology: “They could not but be ‘original’ in the sense of doing phenomenology without the threat of metaphenomenology” (Spiegelberg, 1985, 253).

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is phenomenology?” (Stein, 2014, 85–90) and “About phenomenology” (Reinach, 1969). 80 In this regard, HCM described the phenomenological turning to the things as a “veil” falling “away from the eyes” (HCM, 2015b, 61),81 similar to Reinach’s description that: “things will present themselves to us quite differently than is today believed” (Reinach, 1969, 204). Also, the first generation of phenomenologists understood the call to “go back to the ‘things themselves’” as an appeal to return to the “origin phenomena” (Urphänomen / arch-phenimenon) in the spirit of Goethe. In this approach, phenomena are regarded as delineating the entire field of observation, to the extent that there is nothing meaningful behind or beyond it (Goethe, 1840, 67– 68; Deibel, 1921).82 The approach has been depicted by Reinach with these words: Phenomenological analysis means that we are not permitted to inject the customary concepts of representation, thinking, feeling, and will in order to “build up” premeditation out of them, a process which inevitably would involve the loss of what is most essential to it. Rather do we have to make an effort to transport ourselves into the phenomenon in order to be able to render faithfully what we can vividly intuit there. (Reinach, 1921a, 122)83

Moreover, based on the fundamental principles of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, the Munich-Göttingen phenomenologists sought to establish knowledge and truth on evidence as immediate recognition of things, in contrast to the skeptical position whereby “there is no truth, no knowledge, no justification of knowledge” (Husserl, 1970a, §32 76/1975, §32 120). In contrast to the skeptical position, Husserl stated: “The most perfect ‘mark’ of correctness is inward evidence, it counts as an immediate intimation of truth itself. […] Ultimately therefore, all genuine, and, in particular, all scientific knowledge, rests on inner evidence: as fare as such evidence extends, the concept of knowledge extends also” (Husserl, 1970a, §6 17–18/1975, §6 28–30). Finally, the phrase “go back to the ‘things themselves’” indicates the assumption that the ultimate independence and non-reductiveness of real things and of knowledge about them are a condition for achieving the objectivity of things. HCM described this principle as being “at the foundation of the sort of phenomenology… that I am targeting” to which she cannot “grant a particular name” to her own approach that she 80 HCM’s reflections about the issue appear particularly in two main treatises written in relation to the question: what is phenomenology? See: HCM (1951b, 2015b). 81 The German original says: “Um Phänomenologen zu sein oder zu werden, muβ einem ja irgenwie der Star gestochen sein” (in order to become a phenomenologist, one must somehow be a stabbed star) (HCM, 2015a, 57). These lines were omitted from the English translation of the speech (HCM, 2015b, 61). This passage is also cited in: U. Avé-Lallemant 1965/66, 208. However, the image of a “veil” falling appears in HCM’s critique of Idealism (see: HCM, 1963l, 44; HCM, 1963c, 195) and Positivism (see: HCM, 1920a, 1), within which they were accused of philosophical “blindness”. 82 HCM declared the connection to Goethe explicitly as driving to return “the eye and the gazing power”. As she put it: “We see that alongside the wisdom that analyzes conceptually, the eye and the observing power return again to the order (Rechte), as was requested by Goethe” (HCM, 1963g, 347–348). An affinity between Goethe’s theory of colors and HCM’s view of the issue is noticeable in: HCM, 1929a). The association of Husserl’s phenomenology to Goethe has been indicated in the literature, see: Heinemann (1934), Seifert (2004–2005, 133–137), Spiegelberg (1984a, 23 n. 9). 83 English translation cited from: Spiegelberg (1960, 197/1984a, 193).

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terms as “phenomenology in the comprehensive and radical sense. Phenomenology equals essence-research! Phenomenology without any thematical restriction” (HCM, 1965g, 377). However, the most fundamental principle behind her phenomenology is portrayed as follows: There is not only the pure consciousness, there is not only the existing human person. There are not only what is relative to pure consciousness directed intentionally, not only everything that is relative to the existential (existenziell) that is caring for the world, that is projected, and experiencing existence personally. There is also the world itself in its very own independency-of-Being (Seinsunabhängigkeit) in regard to consciousness and also from the existing I (Ich). […] such independence of Being belongs to the essence of the real world! If the world in which we live possessed no independence of Being… then there would be no real world, only a fake real (vorgetäuscht Wirklische). (HCM, 1965g, 374–375)84

Dietrich von Hildebrand, a member of the Munich-Göttingen Circle, clarified this connection between the world’s independent existence and the possibility of obtaining knowledge about it: “The act of knowledge is an ultimate datum which cannot be reduced to anything else. Therefore, we cannot ‘define’ it; we can only point to it indirectly. The true nature of knowledge can be grasped only in-itself and not through anything else” (Hildebrand, 1973, 13).85 Furthermore, independence on consciousness transpires for von Hildebrand as a unifying foundation of the objects of knowledge themselves, and at the same time as a justification of knowledge itself. The unities in which […] necessary states of facts are grounded stand entirely on their own feet. […] If they are unequivocally and clearly given, they do not need any criterion for the integrity of the act that grasps them, but, on the contrary, they themselves justify the grasping act as not contaminated by error. (Hildebrand, 1973, 13)

Notwithstanding, for the first generation of phenomenology, Husserl’s related appeal of going “back to the ‘things themselves’” in no way denoted a call for addressing

84 See here HCM’s distinction between three types of phenomenology: the idealistic-transcendental of Husserl; the existentialism of Heidegger; and the ontologism of the Munich-Göttingen phenomenologists. See: HCM (1965c/1959a). The division into three types of phenomenology appears already in an unpublished manuscript from 1916 (HCM, 1916aN, 7–8). Avé-Lallemant testified that the manuscript was lost until 1960 (Avé-Lallemant, 1975a, 34). Also, in a handwritten note, Avé-Lallemant adds that probably Jean Hering produced the manuscript in a typewriter font during the First World War (Avé-Lallemant, 1975b, 197; see here also: Parker, 2019, 170). Avé-Lallemant emphasizes that already from the beginning, a difference was apparent between the phenomenology of the Munich Circle and that of Husserl, which he characterized thus: “For Husserl, the method of phenomenology was essentially an intentional analysis (Intentionalanalyse). For the Munichers [it was] essence analysis (Wesensanalyse)” (Avé-Lallemant, 1975a, 24). See here also: Avé-Lallemant (1971, 218). 85 Von Hildebrand, a student of Reinach, taught in Munich after the Second World War (AvéLallemant, 1975a, 23). He was recognized by Husserl as continuing to develop Reinach’s theory (Schuhmann, 1987, 243) and as developing on the basis of his teacher a theory of phenomenological realism (Dubois, 1995, 97 n. 83).

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real objects in the external world. In this regard, Arnold Metzger proposed an unambiguous phrasing when he said about “the motif of ‘addressing the things’ (Wendung zu den Sachen)” the following: “the ‘things’ are the ideal objects. The turning to the ‘things’ is the turning to the a priori as an object” (Metzger, 1966, 28).86 HCM continues the same line as she addressed her ontological studies to “essence-holdings (Wesensbeständen) existing de facto” (HCM, 1916b, 354) and establishes the importance of the “‘science of essences of the real world (Wesenswissenschaft vom realen Sein)’” provided by ontology as the “unabbreviated complete concept of finite reality” (unverkürzter Vollbegriff endlicher Realität) (HCM, 1963b, 82). However, as will be discussed later, the ontological orientation of phenomenology did not satisfy HCM either, and she sought to open paths from it to metaphysics. B. Essence-Observation, Regularity, Necessity, and Unity Husserl’s early struggle in Logical Investigation against psychologism, relativism, and various forms of reductionism (Husserl, 1970a, §23, §31/1975, §23, §31), and particularly his demand that the conditions of consciousness be examined independently of the thinking subject (Husserl, 1970a, §66/1975, §66), served as primary principles for the phenomenologists of the Munich Circle. To this extent, Spiegelberg established that for the early phenomenologists, “Husserl’s Logical Investigations was the bible” (Spiegelberg, 1959, 60). In this spirit, Reinach wrote to his friend Theodor Conrad in a letter dated 22 January 1904 that he was studying Husserl’s Logical Investigations and “you certainly have to believe (glauben) them too” (AvéLallemant and Schuhmann, 1992, 77, my emphasis). Theodor Conrad’s familiarity with Husserl’s phenomenological method from Logical Investigations was presented as evidence of his being a “full-blooded phenomenologist (Vollblutphänomenologist)” (Avé-Lallemant and Schuhmann, 1992, 78).87 Finally, the importance of the Logical Investigations within the evolution of the Munich Circle transpires also from the significance attributed to a meeting between Husserl and Johannes Daubert (1887–1947) in summer 1902. Just like the other members of the circle Daubert, then a student of Theodor Lipps in Munich, read Husserl’s book and was thoroughly impressed by it. In this regard, Schmücker reported that after this meeting, Husserl told his wife: “here is someone who read my Logical Investigations and understood!”. Schmücker further maintained that “in a sense, with this conversation commenced the ‘School’ that will be known as phenomenology” (Schmücker, 1956, 1). Theodor Conrad referred to this meeting several times (Conrad, 1954N, 86 Arnold Metzger (1892–1974) returned to Germany having left to the USA during the Nazi period. He held a teaching position at Munich University, alongside HCM. The work cited is his main treatise, in which he dealt with the problem of relativism, which he believed phenomenology was unable to solve. For further reading on phenomenology and relativism, see: Carr (1985). 87 Notwithstanding, Avé-Lallemant and Schuhmann rightly noted here, the esteem in which the members of the Munich Circle held Husserl’s Logical Investigations should not be seen as mere acceptance. A more critical approach on this point was voiced by Rosenwald, who followed Landgrebe’s critique (Landgrebe, 1963, 21–22), arguing that their static understanding of the correlation between an object and intending it “turns out into faith, a faith which for many adherents of the Munich-Göttingen school was easily transformed into religious faith. This opened to phenomenology a path towards irrationalism” (Rosenwald, 1989, 19).

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2, Conrad, 1965–1969aN, 1; Conrad 1965–1969bN, 1)88 and Spiegelberg maintained that “this conversation was easily the most important single event in the History of the Munich phenomenological Circle” (Spiegelberg, 1960, 171/1984a, 169). Avé-Lallemant, who was personally exposed to these figures who were the first to provide a historical account of that time, unreservedly justified this determination by Spiegelberg (Avé-Lallemant, 1971, 31). In any event, among the various issues Husserl addressed in Logical Investigations, essence intuition had a particularly formative influence on the members of the Munich-Göttingen phenomenologists. They saw it not just as Husserl’s most essential achievement, but also as the genuine core of phenomenology.89 Following him, they were convinced that the objects perceived and the ways in which they are known are founded upon lawfulness of essence (Wesensgesetze) (Husserl, 1970a, 168/1984a, 10) stemming from the things themselves and capable of being directly grasped by the art of phenomenological intuition.90 The “essence observation” (Wesensfassung) method shaped in Husserl’s Logical Investigations, which HCM called a “the genuine philosophical assignment (Aufgabe)” (HCM, 1916b, 348),91 was aimed to reveal the essential “what” (was/Washeit) that makes something into this specific object, “while break[ing] through with theories and constructions” (Reinach, 1969, 220). Reinach explains: “There is no accidentally-being-so in essences, but rather a necessarily-having-tobe-so, and an essentially-cannot-be-otherwise” (Reinach, 1969, 210). Moreover, according to Reinach, the direct access to things is aimed at leading us not only to the essences we have “already” intended (intendiert), but also to new essences that must be discovered and brought into the gaze (Reinach, 1969, 210).92 At the same time, he believes that “new light is thrown upon the old problems supplied by the history of philosophy” (Reinach, 1969, 219). In his opinion, “the first effort of phenomenology has been to trace out the most diverse of the domains of essence relations-psychology and aesthetics, ethics and law, etc. Everywhere new domains of such relations open up to us” (Reinach, 1969, 219, my emphasis). In the same spirit, 88 The

reference to Theodor Conrad’s estate is cited from: Smid (1982, 130, 150 n. 139). Landgrebe, Husserl’s close student in Freiburg, was one of the most severe critics of the Munich-Göttingen Circle’s. He argued that his colleagues’ use of the observation method was not only more intensive than that characteristic of Husserl, but also irresponsible. In his opinion, this gave phenomenology a bad name, and as a result, it was perceived as “method-less intuition”. See: Landgrebe (1963, 21). 90 Regarding the formative influence of “essence intuition” on the Munich Circle, see: Schmücker (1956, 1–33), Ebel (1965), Pfänder (1913), Hering (1921, 39–40), Pfeiffer (2005, 1–13), Reinach (1951). 91 See also: HCM (1923b, 159, 1965g, 377, 1965k, 347). 92 In this context, Reinach likens direct observation as a movement from Socrates to Plato: “Socrates did signification analysis […] Here it is a question of clearing up the obscurities and contradictions of significations a procedure which, moreover, really has nothing to do with definition, and certainly not with induction. By contrast, Plato does not start with words and significations. He aims at the direct view of the ideas (Ideen), the unmediated grasp of essences as such” (Reinach, 1969, 210, my emphasis). 89 Ludwig

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HCM adds that in fact, there is not one essence that the whole of phenomenological thinking is harnessed to the philosophical understanding, but an “inexhaustible kingdom (Reiche) of entities (Wesenheiten) and of rules of essence that flow from it. This in-itself lies beyond the entire historical-philosophical difference of mere appearing and metaphysical in-itself” (HCM, 1951b, 6). Along with the Husserlian essence intuition, and as part of it, the realistic phenomenologists also adopted the Husserlian thesis regarding the rationality of the world (Husserl, 1952a, §136–§137, §139, §142/2012a, §136–§137, §139, §142). This statement was particularly true for HCM. Assuming the fundamental intelligibility of Being in general (HCM, 1963h, 230),93 she argued that the presence of essences in real things is original and perceptible (HCM, 1931aN, 2–3).94 HCM explains that the “forms of essence” (Wesensformen) originating from the hidden depth of the human spirit are shaped by the objective logos of the real world (HCM, 1965l, 311–312). HCM apparently wonders: “don’t the two radically contradict each other?”. However, she immediately answers: “I don’t believe it. The same logos, which is intended in the conceivable most universal sense, accords with the essence and the Being of the world, lies concealed with the same universality also in human intelligence” (HCM, 1965c, 400–401).95 Thus, the harmony existing between the logos of the self and the logos of the world is enabled. Despite its being peculiar and incomparable to any other mode of being (HCM, 1963h, 240), the ontological exclusivity of the I might be illuminated also “on the ground of Being itself” (HCM, 1963h, 243). Alternatively, “only out of this ontological foundation” of the real being in general is “a true ‘comprehension’ (Begreifung)” of the I possible (HCM, 1931aN, 6). Thus, inspired by Reinach’s statement according to which “that does not mean that intuition is thought of as a sudden inspiration and illumination” but rather with

93 Here,

“Being” indicates the all-encompassing phenomenon of primordial Being (Das Sein) or “the Being or beings”, while “being” stands for particular existing things (die Seiende). This choice follows the classic translation of Heidegger’s Being and Time. See translator’s note in: Heidegger (1962, 19 n. 1). While for Heidegger it seems that almost anything one can think or talk about might count as a “being” or entity (books, animals, numbers etc.), regarding “Being” he clarifies: “In the question which we are to work out, what is asked about is Being—that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood, however we may discuss them”, Heidegger (1962, 25–26). 94 In this context, see Rosenwald’s assertion that on this point HCM opposed her realistic phenomenologist colleagues, who adopted the quantifying approach typical of the modern scientific method, which relied on what was then called the “‘subjectless’ aspect of reality” (Rosenwald 1989, 22–23). However, as I have demonstrated above, HCM’s argument that harmony between the personal logos and the world’s logos represents a more complex position of HCM, who assimilated her philosophy of the I into the philosophy of Being. 95 This insight enabled HCM to view Heidegger’s perception, in Being and Time, of human understanding as the key to the philosophy of being and the interpretation of reality as an expression of “performing a radical existential turn”. Although alongside this, we should also mention her criticism of his chain of thought, which she described as “an absolutization of the mode of existence of the I-being by means of which once again brought about relativization of any other being”. See HCM (1963i, 186).

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“a gradual approximation to the object” (Reinach, 1969, 220),96 HCM added that “‘essence’ is not mystical nor is it a speculative construct or something thought out (Erdachtes). It presents itself from the exact […] respective givenness itself. This possibility is proven through actual essence study” (HCM, 1965g, 377–378). She explains that studying the essence: Mostly it requires a long and very precise philosophical work, in which the spiritual eye must be incessantly directed at the presently only darkly anticipated “sense-position” (Sinnstelle) of the essential (wesenmäßig) of the discussed issue. This is phenomenology in the inclusive and radical sense. Phenomenology or the study of essence! (HCM 1965g, 377)

From HCM’s point of view, revealing the essence at the basis of things requires mining into the depths for which surface-appearance (Erscheinungsoberfläch) functions as a sort of cover (HCM, 1916b, 353–354). In any case, the philosophical toil demanded of the phenomenologist by essence intuition should not remove from it the immediate quality that constitutes its hallmark. On the contrary, the presentation of essences to intuition appears as a brilliant light, to the extent that, as HCM puts it, “all of a sudden you see a thousand things you didn’t see before” (HCM, 2015b, 61).97 Two far-reaching insights regarding essences underly the above assertion. The first concerns the aspect of lawfulness in the essence, whose seeds first transpired in Husserl’s study of the laws of logic. In Logical Investigations, Husserl argued that mental activities only have mental significance when they have the form of logical law (Husserl, 1970a, §8 22/1975, §8 19–20). In addition, “what they say has entire validity: they themselves in their absolute exactness are evident and proven”. Instead of being “one of countless theoretical possibilities”, logical law as such is “the single, sole truth which excludes all possibilities” (Husserl, 1970a, §23 53/1975, §23 84). The second insight in this regard relates to the component of necessity entailed in this law. As Husserl phrased it: “To see a state of affairs as a matter of law is to see its truth as necessarily obtaining… [we] call every general truth that itself utters a law, a necessary truth” (Husserl, 1970a, §63 146/1975, §63 233). These two elements—law and necessity—are explicitly tied to the element of essence in Reinach’s following words:

96 One of the strictest critics of the early phenomenologists’ perception of essence was Ludwig Landgrebe, who characterized their use of Husserl’s phenomenology as “‘method-less intuitionism’ (methodenlosen Intuitionismus) that gives phenomenology a bad name” (Landgrebe, 1963, 21). No less severe was Rosenwald’s critique, claiming that: “Göttingen circle shows the results of advancing the ‘seeing of essences’ in isolation from the other procedures of the phenomenological method, and demonstrates the contradictoriness and lack of clarity that characterize phenomenology as a whole” (Rosenwald, 1989, 32). 97 The image of a “veil” falling fits well into the severe criticism HCM directed at Idealism (HCM, 1963l, 44, 1963c, 195) and Positivism (HCM, 1920a, 1), which accused them of philosophical “blindness”.

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Of essences laws hold true, and these laws are incomparable with any fact or factual connection of which sense perception informs us. These laws in question hold of the essences as such, in virtue of their nature (Wesen). There is no accidentally-being-so in essences, but rather a necessarily having-to-be-so, and an essentially-cannot-be-otherwise. That there are these laws is one of the most important things for philosophy and-if one thinks it out completely-for-the-world at large. (Reinach, 1969, 210)

The language of plurality employed by Reinach regarding essences and their laws, as a result which he observes that “the realm of the a priori is incalculably large” (Reinach, 1969, 215), echoes also in the HCM’s related idea of “kingdom of entities (Wesenheiten) and of rules of essence” flowing from it (HCM, 1951b, 6). The plurality of essences inserts to them an aspect of diversity. To this extent might be challenged the ideal of absolute exactness that accompanies Husserl’s discussions of the logical lawfulness upon which essences are established. Even more so, the question regarding the force that can bring together several essences in one and the same reality is of special importance for a realist phenomenology. At this point, the realist phenomenologists seem to speak with almost one voice when emphasizing the unity that characterizes the givenness of essences. This is apparent in Reinach’s criticism of the rejection of the a priori by empirical psychology. In this regard, he equates the significance theory of essences for empirical psychology to geometry for natural science and clarifies the following: It is not correct to say that, when I have at the same time perceived A and B, and now represent A, a tendency exists also to represent B. I must have perceived A and B together in a phenomenal unity […] in order to that distinct tendency to arise. Where two objects appear to us as related, an association sets in. Further, if the relation is one which is grounded in ideas (Ideen) themselves, e.g., similarity or contrast, then not even such a previous appearence [sic] is necessary. […] Any relation at all is capable of setting up associations. But above all it must be said that in association we have to do, not with empirically collocated facts, but rather with rational (verstehbare) connections, grounded in the nature of things. (Reinach, 1969, 218, my emphasis)

This observation by Reinach of a unify that pervades essences, recurs also in HCM’s observations with the ontological accentuation typical of her thinking, in her words: “[if] we remain on the strict ontological ground, thus can be only the substantial unity, the existing (Daseinede) itself , that by virtue of the existential own potency (Eigenpotenz) ‘forms’ itself into the concerned essence” (HCM, 1963c, 220). Likewise, von Hildebrand devoted a special discussion to the aspect of unity existing in essences as such. In this regard, he postulated categorically: “Every existing thing is a unity and its such-being must in some way be characterized as a unity” (Hildebrand, 1973, 100). That is to say that not only are essences necessary, but the unity of the essence is also indispensable. Moreover, according to von Hildebrand, “necessary unities are the only genuine ‘essences’” (Hildebrand, 1973, 116). Moreover, in the view of the realist phenomenologist, the force of the related unity operating in givenness is experienced as an evident aspect in essences themselves. In this regard, Reinach determines that one must be directed by “distinctions of essence which are ultimately given and found before us” (Reinach, 1969, 197–198), to the

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extent that “Wherever in the world we find ourselves, the doorway to the world of essences and their laws always stands open to us” (Reinach, 1969, 211). Elsewhere, he writes: [to] try to explain it would be just like trying to explain the proposition, 1 x 1 = 1. It is a fear of what is directly given (Angst vor der Gegebenheit), a strange reluctance or incapacity to look the ultimate data in the face and to recognize them as such which has driven unphenomenological philosophies […] to untenable and ultimately to extravagant constructions. (Reinach, 1983, 46)

In an unmistakable resemblance, also for HCM the givenness of essences is evident to the extent that she argues “Either one sees the essence, or he does not see it. It’s impossible to prove (beweisen) it but only to lead to it. Where the spiritual organ for this is lacking, where it is still buried, or where it’s completely rotten, the real philosophical organ is also lacking there. Entities (Wesenheiten) are givennesses” (HCM, 1951b, 10–11).98 Likewise, she explains that “one cannot prove the empirical-sensory fact of the presence (Vorhandensein) of trees. They are there, and whoever is not blind sees them. One cannot prove the spiritual-empirical (rather than psychological) fact of entities prove. They are there, and whoever is not blind for essence (wesensblind) sees them. There is the cosmos of essences (Wesenskosmos), just as there exists a cosmos of Being (Seinskosmos)” (HCM, 1951b, 15). However, while for Reinach and HCM the matter of the unified givenness of essences in reality is so evident that not further explanation if required, von Hildebrand construes the following: […] necessary essence is given in its generic character when we perceive a concrete individual being possessing that essence. When we see a triangle for the first time, we grasp not only this concrete triangle, but also the genus “triangle.” The necessary such-being in its generic character discloses itself intuitively in the concrete individual triangle which we perceive. […] thanks to the very nature of the necessary essence, the generic imposes itself on our mind when we perceive the concrete individual. (Hildebrand, 1973, 112)

This “generic character” that is imposed on every individual being, introduced by von Hildebrand, is but the force that brings about the unity that brings together various individual essences that possess one and the same essence. Obviously, this possession exceeds the “concrete individual” as it is inherent in any other or even possible beings that bear the same essence. Finally, Scheler seems to continue the same line while arguing that “what constitutes the unity of phenomenology is not a particular region of facts, such as mental or ideal objects, nature, etc., but only self-givenness in all possible regions” (Scheler, 1973, 145). Alongside the path of establishing the presence of essences within realty and arguing for their unified givenness, common to the main figures of the Munich Circle. HCM discusses also the aspect of the very meaning of essence intuition for realist phenomenology. In this regard, she clarifies that “phenomenology does not deal with a description of so-called mere phenomena in some possible contrast to some transcendent in-itself but especially both with an ‘in-itself’ and its ongoing exposure 98 See also another reference by HCM to the need for a “spiritual eye” (HCM, 1965g, 377) and a “philosophical organ” (HCM, 1965j, 404). Rosenwald characterizes HCM’s approach to nature following this insight as “ontologized sensuality”, see: Rosenwald (1989, 28).

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(fortschreitende Bloβlegung)” (HCM, 1951b, 5). She observes that description alone is insufficient because “the world is full of a priori meaningfulness” (apriorischer Sinnhaftigkeit) (HCM, 1951b, 10). These meanings, which von Hildebrand saw as the ultimate object of philosophy (Hildebrand, 1973, 63),99 do not denote primarily contents perceived mentally, but as HCM clarifies: “‘sense’ (Sinn), is here equal to ‘essence’; and essence is precisely this last, qualitative, type of its own that grants each smallest or biggest being-existence (Seinsbestand) its sense-position (Sinnstelle) that is that cannot be replaced or be withdrawn” (HCM, 1951b, 10). This primordial affinity taking place between “sense-position” (Sinnstelle) and “being-existence” (Seinsbestand), that has been revealed and explored by the phenomenology, enables then its essences to serve as a very basic infrastructure for obtaining understanding of reality. True, essence (Essenz) and existence (Existenz) are not identical.100 HCM asserts categorically: “Reality is something that from the aspect of its entity (seinsmäβig) stands on its own ground” (HCM,1963e, 36). Moreover, existence is characterized by “selfness” (Selberkeit), which constitutes “the ontological root of any real being”. Such a being is characterized by “that which is in-itself and stands underneath Being and suchness” (das Sich-selber-im-Sein-und-Sosein-Unterstehen) (HCM, 1957, 84). In contrast, “essence lacks precisely this selfness” (HCM, 1957, 85) that brings about what HCM calls “the radical independency-of-Being (Seinsunabhängigkeit) of essences” (HCM, 1957, 84, 1965g, 374). Exactly the absence of a specific belonging to Being that might enable then positioning themselves in existence deprives essences of the capability stand on their own feet. This also implies what HCM refers to as a lack of “objectivizing grasp” (vergegenständlichenden Zugriff ), which makes essences “alien to the object” (gegenstandfremd) as such. To this extent, so argues HCM, essences “‘have no objective Beingness’ (keine gegenstänsliche Seinshaftigkeit)!” (HCM, 1957, 84). She explains that this means not only that essences cannot be objectivized, but rather that “they themselves are not selffully placed under themselves. They possess no self (Selberkeit), within which its own Being or its suchness (Sosein) could have been grounded” (HCM, 1957, 84). Consequently, unlike the existences of the real world that can be encountered (begegnen), “access to the essences can be achieved only indirectly, in the concrete realization where they constitute the essence of objects, or as an idea through a transcendental action” (HCM, 1957, 85). The realist phenomenologists are well aware of the apparent vagueness and the sense of evasiveness that accompany the above-discussed descriptions of essences. Reinach establishes that the infinite distance from the things persists even when we address an intentional attitude toward the things. He says that it is a mistake to assume that this distance is reduced by science (Reinach, 1969, 196). In contrast, 99 See

here also: Reinach (1921c) or Reinach (1976). this point, HCM accepts Hering’s fundamental distinction. See: Hering (1921). HCM stated her agreement with Hering’s approach in this regard, see: HCM (1923b, 162). For further reading, see: De Santis (2015). The influence of Hering on HCM and Stein is discussed in: Ales Bello (1993), Surzyn (2002).

100 On

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he believes that it is precisely philosophy that can penetrate “through all signs, definitions, and rules to the facts themselves” (zu de Sachen selbst)” (Reinach, 1969, 204). Likewise, HCM maintains that “constructive solidity (Festgelegtsein) does not and never did belong to real phenomenologists” (HCM, 1951b, 10). She explains that it is precisely the inability to achieve an accurate definition that expresses the spirit of phenomenology that establishes what she portrays as “a distance towards things, light hand, all-around open gaze” (HCM, 1951b, 9). Von Hildebrand takes a further step in this regard and refers to the inadequacy and incorrectness of a priori knowledge as such that result from the nature of its object. He explains while Husserl’s method addressed objects “which intuitively reveal to us an essential unity that is necessary and possesses high intelligibility”, the such-being (Sosein) of real objects cannot be approached by “bracketing its real existence” (Hildebrand, 1991, 128). However, the related vagueness is by no means an ideal for its own sake. Rather, HCM clarifies that “the ambiguous and chaotic that I reckoned for a tainted spiritual stomach, destroys directly the real philosophical distinction (Unterscheidungssinn), darkens the pure vision of the very own (ureigen), the fullness and depth of things and of essence, destroys the enchantment from the beauty of the spiritual cosmos” (HCM, 1951b, 14). Thus, in the absence of any point or ability to classify essence at all, HCM presented the related vagueness and sense of evasiveness that concern a factual necessity hidden in the things themselves. Against this background, it transpires that the meaning of the essences of real entities (Seinssinn) does not denote a cognitive dimension and cannot be concretely pinpointed, but concerns the very “thing-in-itself” of beings. HCM asserts explicitly that phenomenology deals precisely with exposing this “in-itself” that denotes “an entity (Wesenheit) or an essence that with the same characteristic essence of a being-existence (Seinsbestand) is something final, deep-rooted, singular, independent”. Therefore, “wanting to go beneath it would make no sense” (HCM, 1951b, 6). Nonetheless, “essences themselves are capable of being studied” and they also grant all existents their meaning and logos (HCM, 1957, 85). This is precisely the reason that recognizing the essence of a thing does not require an investigation of its appearance within the multiplicity of empirical cases, but it is sufficient to investigate a single case in order to analyze its essence. Furthermore, this singular case does not have to be perceptually given but can be given to pure observation (HCM, 1965g, 375). The fact that the essence is shared by different entities—abstract or concrete— makes phenomenological essence study into the key to the formal discourse about reality and Being in general. Indeed, only “existence” can achieve concrete or material realization. However, since essences also exist (HCM, 1923b, 162), its exposure to a certain thing is simultaneously the understanding of its reality. At this point, Reinach’s words are enlightening: “The essential laws which we have brought out in this work can be considered purely in themselves and apart from their realization. One could conceive of a world in which these laws would not at all be realized […]. But when all of this exists, it is intimately interwoven with the rest of the natural world” (Reinach, 1983, 130, my emphasis). This expressed intimacy that exists between the world of essences and the natural world epitomizes an essential aspect of the stance of the realist phenomenology, HCM’s included.

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However, it is exactly in this view of essential connectedness between the ideal and the real inhere the seeds of the above-discussed broke up between the Munich and Göttingen phenomenologists and Husserl. Well before the appearance of Ideen in 1913, already in the Prolegomena to Logical Investigations, namely in 1900 and as a radical means against psychologism Husserl inaugurated “the fundamental sense of ideality, which puts an unbridgeable gulf (unüberbrückbare Kluft) between and real” (Husserl, 1975, § 59 220/1970a, §59 138), and accordingly established that “no conceivable gradation could mediate between the ideal and the real” (Husserl, 1975, § 22 80/1970a, §22 50).101 Nonetheless, HCM’s phenomenological studies that are discussed in this volume serve as a mouthpiece for Husserl’s doctrine of essence intuition, which was first founded and considerably explored in Logical Investigations. Despite the apparent disagreements with Husserl’s accentuation of the ideal already at that time, she relied on his observations as point of departure in her most foundational contention that it is possible and necessary to obtain the meaning of the presence of beings in the world. This should be achieved not only or primarily through clarifying the conscious and idea-based relations toward them but first and foremost by gazing into their essence. This essence is perceived as an ontological element with a distinct structure whose exposure grants a key to understanding the world and reality in general. C. From Epistemology to Ontology: “The Turn to the Object” The marginalization of ontology and metaphysics in nineteenth-century philosophy, especially in neo-Kantian thought, played a central role in the consolidation of the thinking of the early phenomenologists. Their striving to obtain a grasp of real things while being free of dealing with the conscious dimensions involved in the human relation toward them, took shape in their choice to shift from epistemology to ontology. In particular, the shift to ontology, which became a lever for the revival of metaphysics in the first decades of the twentieth century, is well reflected in the works of the members of the Munich-Göttingen Circle.102 In this regard, HCM writes: “we got completely out of the habit of making any kind of epistemological, scientific, arbitrary speculative assumptions or drawing respective conclusions” (HCM, 2015b, 62).103 In fact, shifting the emphasis of the philosophical discussion from epistemology to ontology was already inherent in the interpretation the Munich phenomenologists gave to the Husserlian phrase “go back to the ‘things themselves’”. Stein explicitly noted this: “The Logische Untersuchungen had in particular made an impression as a 101 See

here Seifert’s argument that Husserl’s separation between the ideal and the real in Logical Investigation led him to Idealism (Siefert, 1987, 142). 102 Rosenwald argues that phenomenology played a specific role in what he calls “the process of ‘ontologization’ in the twentieth century western philosophy” (Rosenwald, 1989, 11). A systematic expression of this trend is apparent in Reinach’s phenomenological a priori doctrine, which captures the range of his phenomenological realistic insights. It is also found in the background of his discussion of Kant. See in particular: Reinach (1951, 1921b/1968, 1969, 1921c/1976, 1921d/1983). 103 The precedence given to ontology over epistemology is at the center of HCM’s continuing dialogue with the leaders of this trend. See in particular her extensive discussions with: Heidegger: HCM (1963i, 1963k, 1963c, 1963h, 1930N, 1963b, 1965g, 1965j, 1965c, 1965d); on Nicolai Hartmann, see: HCM (1963b).

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radical departure from critical Idealism which has a Kantian and Neo-Kantian stamp. It was considered a ‘new scholasticism’ because it turned attention away from the ‘subject’ and towards things themselves” (Stein, 2002a, 200). HCM even adds that fundamentally, Husserl “was indifferent toward epistemology just as we ontological phenomenologists were always indifferent. This too we learned from our great teacher (Meister)” (HCM, 1965c, 402).104 The relevance of essence intuition to the study of the phenomenon of reality that grants it precedence and value above any epistemology was explained by HCM as follows: “the epistemological sphere in no way relates to the question of being able to prove these ‘essences’ as concrete elements of the real world. We believe that philosophy, in genuine and rigorous sense, stands outside any (epistemological) question of reality” (HCM, 1916b, 355). Later, and as her critique of idealism became more explicit and detailed, HCM presented epistemology as a burden whose removal would enable entry into the realm of metaphysics, the final destination of phenomenology (HCM, 1963l, 48).105 One of the dominant aspects behind the overall shift from epistemology to ontology typical of the Munich Circle’s phenomenological study of essence relates to the focus of attention on objects as such. This trend was characterized as “the turn to the object” (Die Wende zum Objekt). Moritz Geiger asserts that this approach enables a glimpse of the “tension between the I and the object” at the basis of any reference to the world. Geiger explains: […] while in the past people almost always saw the objects as images of the I, now the tension between the I and the object in accordance with its law returns. [We seek] what is in front of the I, the object. Overcoming the tension between them cannot be achieved through absorbing the object into the subject but through turning to the object itself, as a result of which the construction of the world that is given in an unmediated manner receives a different gaze. (Geiger 1933, 13)

Like Geiger, Edith Stein describes the new approach as follows: “the cognition (Erkenntniss) again appeared as reception (Empfangen), deriving its laws from the things not—as in criticism—from determination (Bestimmen) which imposes its laws on the thing” (Stein, 2002a, 200). HCM joins this approach and lists the essential prerequisites for this philosophical achievement, especially distance and separation from the perceiving subject, persistence of the object in-itself, and openness to the perceiving gaze. In her words: An object (Gegenstand) is the objective (Objektive) par excellence (kat’ exochen). In order to possess something as an object in the pure sense, it must be conceived and construed in distance, in total separateness from the perceiving subject. It must be conceived and construed at the position of its true standing (Stehen) and existence (Bestehen): this is the standingopposite (Gegen-stand) in the accurate sense of the word. This is the first [meaning]. And the other [meaning] is that something can first become an absolute object when it enters the perceiving gaze sharply and without residue; when it already contains any change in itself or enables such without reservation, by giving itself to the conceiving gaze and as such opens up as such, without losing the separated position of distance of the opposite (der Gegenüber). 104 As

will transpire later, according to HCM, after the transcendental turn, Husserl’s indifference toward epistemology turned to formulating “real epistemological philosophy” (HCM, 1965c, 395). 105 In this context, see also: HCM (1963e, 1931dN).

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Here, the precise ideal relationship between the knower and the known is plainly realized. (HCM 1921b, viii)

These words of HCM’s add an important clarification regarding the principle of “turning to the object” that the early phenomenologists adopted, some more and others less.106 Her fundamental argument here is that the object’s various dimensions do not undermine the epistemic relation toward it on the part of the perceiving subject. Instead, the sharpness characterizing the basic qualities identified in the object enables its very recognition. Hence, the realistic orientation toward the world of objects is not in conflict with the possibility of establishing mental relations toward it. Indeed, the relation between ontology and the realistic position was not explicit early in the journey of the early phenomenologists. Nor was it typical of their understanding of Logical Investigations. HCM explains that their philosophizing took place without “ask[ing] at all whether they actually really existed. […] we were still entirely indifferent to the existential question” (HCM, 2015b, 61). This approach can be explained, in retrospect, through HCM’s perception that such metaphysics do not aim to prove the reality of the external world. She clarifies that the reason for this is that “such proof cannot succeed and never will succeed. This stems from the factuality of the things that cannot be reached. Because the factuality is here and now—and essentially!—such of unmediated phenomenality facing a transcendent factor” (HCM, 1963l, 45). In other words: In light of the factuality of the real Being itself, there are no more empirical or essential rational questions. There is no unmediated why, no infinite regression from condition to condition, from reason to reason, in which empirical research can once more always find its satisfaction. However, nor is there any essence understanding (Wesenseinsicht) that can solve the question of factuality at all. (HCM, 1963b, 85)

This understanding of factuality as such that cannot be proven from within itself, places, then, an unpassable boundary for both science and philosophy. This is also the deep reason for HCM and most of her Munich phenomenologist colleagues not rejecting the epoché.107 In this regard, HCM employs the expression “real reality” (wirkliche Wirklichkeit), to appear later in many references to her idea of reality, in her words: Both the transcendental and ontological phenomenology stand in an attitude facing the epoché. The two have nothing to do with an assertion (Behauptung) of or doubting the Being of this world. This is because real reality (wirkliche Wirklichkeit) can never be known evidentially. (HCM, 1965c, 401)108

106 Following his criticism of the early phenomenologists (particularly Reinach, Geiger, and HCM)

on the issue of their understanding of Husserl’s essence intuition method, Landgrebe asserts that the “turning to the object” they employed expressed “more or less a ‘static’ correlativism between the intention and the object”, and that “essence intuition liberated from theories regarding the real in all areas”. In his opinion, they surrendered the essential that was Husserl’s ontological starting point. Yet, Landgrebe argues that for Husserl this point did not serve a naïve realism that lead to the escape of subjectivity but to deepening its problematic. See: Landgrebe (1963, 21–22). 107 This stance has exceptions, for example Reinach and Pfänder. For Reinach see: Dubois (1995, 148–149); for Pfänder see: Spiegelberg (1982, 26–34). 108 HCM discusses the term “real reality” also in: HCM (1965c, 397).

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A few occurrences of the expression “real reality” (wirkliche Wirklichkeit) preceded its use by HCM. Apparently, the first was in a lecture by Theodor Lipps from 1899 (Schuhmann & Smith, 1985, 792) and the subsequent is in a manuscript of Johannes Daubert from 1904.109 Also Husserl used the related phrase for indicating “the full givenness of a thing, a givenness in which the thing exhibits its actual reality (wirkliche Wirklichkeit)”. For Husserl, the self-exhibition of the thing “must contain, at the very outset, components that refer back to the subject, specifically the human […] subject in fix sense” (Husserl, 1952b, §18 55/2002a, §18 60–61). However, the mentions of the related phrase in HCM’s discussions encapsulate her straight response to the Husserlian view, according to which the ego is an inherent aspect within the account of reality. In this regard, Kuhn explains that by this seemingly tautological expression HCM meant the real being as standing on its own and deliberately not as reduced to a phenomenon or any representation by the I (Kuhn, 1971, 2).110 Ferrarello added that “‘real reality’ served to distance the GöttingenMünchner’s […] understanding of reality, in which she [HCM] had a leading role, […] from the other conceptions of reality, which with and according to Husserl and his other pupils made its way via Freiburg” (HCM, 2015b, 62 n. 1.) Finally, AvéLallemant clarified that while for Husserl the reality of the objective material thing can exist solely as an intentional unity of sensory appearances, for HCM, “real reality” relates to the independent and in-itself existence of real being that preconditions any possible fulfillment of spatial-temporal existence (Avé-Lallemant, 1975a, 33 n. 41). In any event, besides the obvious emphasis on the element of reality, HCM’s discussion of the phrase “real reality” indicates an unequivocal and explicit rejection of Husserl’s transcendental reduction due to the repercussion of the decisive status granted to the ego within his philosophical account of reality. In retrospect, HCM recalls: “there came a moment where each one of us had to start self-questioning by asking: ‘Well, do these things really exist?’ After we fathomed the essence of reality, we started asking whether the world, the worlds below and beyond as well as everything that belongs to them was really real or is now real” (HCM, 2015b, 62, my emphasis). This “moment” was preceded by confusion that was a shared experience among the Munich Circle phenomenologists, as HCM described: I… and certainly the others too… became baffled (ratlos) in the face of Husserl’s transcendentalism. It seemed to me… that he lost what was for us veteran phenomenologists the priciest philosophical thing: radical practicality (Sachlichkeit)… that cannot be mistaken, always restarting anew in the face of any perceived problematic. (HCM, 1965c, 396)

Moreover, the insight that the relation between essence and being is inevitable generated an explicit deviation also from the narrow boundaries of the Husserlian epoché. This means that the realistic criticism of Husserl’s transcendentalism was not confined to its, so to speak, operative methodical stage, i.e., the phenomenological 109 See:

Daubertiana A I 5, Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich, cited from: Schuhmann and Smith (1985, 792 n. 39). Schuhmann and Smith indicate that Daubert’s manuscript was “written in preparation for his discussion with Husserl on Jan. 18 1904” (Schuhmann and Smith, 1985, 792). 110 However, Kuhn was suspicious about the capability of what he designates as “duplication of the embarrassment” to solve the philosophical problem of reality (Kuhn, 1971, 5).

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reduction, but pervaded also to the preliminary stage of the epoché that concerns the philosophical stance toward reality. In this regard, HCM explains that the element of epoché contained two undistinguished meanings of reality: the noematic one revealed through the conscious process, and the one that exists independently of any mental process. HCM’s criticism in this context is not only that this duality “oddly never reached clarification in Husserl” (HCM, 1965c, 397) but also that for him, “the epistemological question whether the noematic being responds to a factual being was shifted aside completely” (HCM, 1965c, 398).111 However, the Munich phenomenologists, among them HCM, believed that rationality, apparent in reality, as formulated in idealistic thinking, including its transcendental incarnation in Husserl’s thought, does not enable access to aspects that are not concrete or consciousness-related. Whether these aspects exist in the so-called real reality or whether they are present in the subjective being of individuals, rational thought cannot penetrate them. In any event, regarding both the phenomenological reduction and the epoché problem of the Munich realistic phenomenologists concerns the excessive status of abstract consciousness in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and in idealistic thought as a whole.112 As is well known, the publication of the first volume of his Ideas in 1913 (Husserl, 1952a/2012a) signaled Husserl’s turn to the idealistic-transcendental direction, which placed the study of consciousness and subjectivity in general in the center. Paul Ricoeur clearly phrased the position that viewed the publication of Ideas I as an expression of a turning point in Husserl’s though, as a result of which the world of objects was sucked into the realm of consciousness: In transcendental phenomenology, the objects are not only “for me” (für mich), but are also “drawn from me” (aus mir). Consequently, reality is interpreted only within the boundaries of consciousness (Ricoeur, 1967, 89). Likewise, HCM asked “How should the noema of the existing-being (Seiend-sein) not belong to the overall meaning (Gesamtsinn) of absolute consciousness?” (HCM, 1965c, 397). For her, “considering something real, seeing it, estimating it, believing in reality— be it conscious or unconscious, 111 In this context, see the criticism of Theodor Celms, Husserl’s student from Freiburg, who charac-

terized the epoché as a phenomenological reflection that leaves open the question of idealism-realism and the phenomenological reduction that is a methodological tool. In his opinion, due to the lack of distinction between epoché and reduction, Husserl reaches metaphysical spiritualism. See: Celms (1928, 309). In this context, see the discussion of Avé-Lallemant on this issue: Avé-Lallemant (1971, 230–231). On one point, Avé-Lallemant goes further, stating that HCM’s approach whereby “in the clarification of the essences not only should ‘the handed-down preconceptions’ of ‘all philosophical and scientific fields’ be disregarded, but also the factual reality of the objects under investigation and of the subject performing them” must be dismissed. He clarifies that HCM “carried out a ‘phenomenological reduction’ without using that label” (Avé-Lallemant, 1984, 214). Russell maintains that concerning the epoché, “Husserl and his critics […] failed to understand each other on this point”. Moreover, the “self-limitation [that has been imposed by the epoché…] even prevents Husserl from taking a side on the question of realism/idealism” (Russell, 2007, 89). 112 See here Schuhmann’s reference to Reinach’s description of pure consciousness as Husserl’s “favourite concept” (Lieblingsbegriff ). Schuhmann establishes that this choice of Husserl’s played a decisive role in the segregation of the Munich-Göttingen phenomenologists from Husserl’s Ideas (Husserl, 1952a/2012a), see: Schuhmann (1987, 253).

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be it with a simple way of life (Lebenshaltung) or through scientific abstraction— are themselves thinking (Vermeintheiten), noemata in the very own sense” (HCM, 1965c, 397). Moreover, HCM’s idea of “real reality”, which highlights the general orientation of the members of the Munich-Göttingen Circle to place reality at the focus of their philosophical study, amounted to an inclusive counter-response to the transcendental turn in Husserl’s phenomenology. HCM’s unmistakable judgmental response to Husserl’s transcendental turn is apparent in her determination that with him, the world of objects was sucked into the realm of consciousness until “eventually it seemed that Husserl found the entrance into real epistemological philosophy” (HCM, 1965c, 395, my emphasis). Eventually, this response took shape as a “path from phenomenology to metaphysics”—a path regarded by her as obvious to the extent that she found it as “not so difficult to understand” (HCM, 2015b, 61).113 However, the removal of the element of reality from Husserlian phenomenology that emerged in Ideas I, as expressed by some members of the Munich-Göttingen Circle, is far from a simple hermeneutic move.114 Husserl himself, in various places, as Moran presents it, “reinforces the claim made in Cartesian Meditations that phenomenology is eo ipso transcendental idealism” (Moran, 2012, xxix).115 However, Husserl also explicitly recoiled from German idealism and even admitted this in 1915, that is after the publication of Ideas I: “throughout my life I have searched for reality”.116 Later, Husserl clarified that this was constituted reality, and accordingly he asserted that “the real task of phenomenology is to clarify the constitution of any reality”.117 Obviously, for Husserl the pathways to any reality are deliberately paved from consciousness and positioned with a fundamental relation to it. However, the special status granted to consciousness therein is insufficient to remove the issue of reality from Husserlian phenomenology. This acknowledgment is apparent in Eugen Fink’s rejection of the argument “[…] that Husserl’s phenomenology is uninterested in the ‘question of reality’, in the ‘problem of being’, or that phenomenology 113 Stein

emphatically phrases a similar position and even views the metaphysical stance as the ultimate expression of a true philosopher. As she says: “… certainly each philosopher is in his heart, fundamentally, a metaphysician, either explicitly or implicitly. […] Each great philosopher has his own…” (Stein, 2005b, 197, letter no. 80 to Ingarden). However, the shift from phenomenology to metaphysics is far from being obvious and can even conflict with some prevailing opinion about phenomenological philosophy. See here Dubois’ note: “Phenomenology is stereotyped as being independent of metaphysics, so much so that we find a philosopher like Karol Wojtyla (now Pope John Paul II), i.e., a metaphysical realist engaged in phenomenological analysis, in the Acting Person and elsewhere, despairing of arriving at metaphysical knowledge on the basis of phenomenology” (Dubois, 1995, 148). 114 The discussion of the issue of Husserl’s idealism-realism exceeds the scope of this Preface. For the view of Husserl as a realist, see Ameriks (1977), Smith and McIntyre (1971). For the view of Husserl as an idealist, see: Ingarden (1975), Küng (1972a), Küng (1972b), Morriston (1976). The third interpretation of Husserl’s stance toward the related debate as “neutrality” is presented in: Holmes 1975. 115 See here also: Husserl (2012b, xil). 116 These words were said by Husserl in conversation with his student Helmuth Plessner. See Plessner (1959, 35). 117 These words by Husserl are cited in: (1952, xv).

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thematized the existent merely as a Subjective formation of meaning, as a moment of sense in the intentional life of consciousness” (Fink, 1981b, 44).118 Nonetheless, even Fink believed that Husserl was not presenting what he called the “thematic concept” of reality, namely a positive perception of reality (Fink, 1981a, 58–61), and obviously could not meet the one that the Munich phenomenologists were seeking (Fink, 1981a, 58–61). This complexity of the indeterminacy of Husserl’s concept of reality is well articulated in the concluding words of Avé-Lallemant’s Habilitation. Thus, observing Husserl’s concept of reality from the Munich Circle’s perspective, Avé-Lallemant maintains: In studying his [Husserl’s] concept of reality, we touch a boundary. […] Husserl assumed in advance a meaning of reality and determined it only in a formal definition way […]. Here we lack the clarification of the meaning that was assumed in advance […] of what reality is from itself. […] The essence analyses of the real being required here can be found […] in Hedwig Conrad-Martius. (Avé-Lallemant, 1971, 327–328)

Without doubt, these words of Avé-Lallemant echo his profound identification with HCM and his deep appreciation of her unique and exceptional contribution to the phenomenological movement. D. Husserl and the Munichers After the meaningful experience in Bad Bergzabern, the Conrads returned to Munich in 1930. Now, HCM was able to resume her philosophical work and focus on developing a universal ontology on phenomenological foundations. The cold response of the founding father of phenomenology was not late to arrive.119 In a letter dated 28 March 1932, Husserl wrote to HCM: I cannot join your metaphysical ways. Your philosophizing is fundamentally different from what I call phenomenology. I no longer expect you will have the time and inner freedom to enter my large, arduous works that are based on extensive research, in which you will understand what I call phenomenology—this is, of course, the assumption of any acceptance or rejection. In any case, I am interested in your progress and your tranquility, since you are consolidating a philosophy. I am afraid you will not be able to take the Yearbook into account for your planned work. The next one is not possible. It will be in the winter of 1933, and the following one is entirely unclear. (Husserl, 1994a, 19–20)120 118 See here Husserl’s approval of Fink’s interpretation of phenomenology in a preface he composed

to Fink’s article dealing with criticism of his transcendental phenomenology. Husserl wrote: “I am happy to be able to state that it contains no sentence which I could not completely accept as my own or openly acknowledge as my own conviction” (Husserl, 2000, 71). 119 Husserl’s reservations about the Conrads were well-known and discussed among the members of the Munich Circle. See here Stein’s comment in a letter to Ingarden dated 19 February 1918: “I do not know what I would do if Husserl takes offense at my letter and, like Conrad, I fall out of his favor” (Stein, 2005b, 89). Husserl’s reservations about HCM’s philosophy are more than implied in his letter to Fritz Kaufmann dated 4 January 1937, where Husserl asks him not to mention this issue to her, because: “she is having a hard enough time as it is” (Husserl, 1994b, 350). 120 Ingarden, too, recoiled from the metaphysical accentuation of HCM’s phenomenology. Stein came to defense her friend with the following words: “I do not know whether your fear for phenomenology is justified. Of course, that is not phenomenology without exception. […] It is not just ‘poetic fabrication’. You noted that yourself […] You feel that a claim for truth is hidden here […] You will not deny that, in part, it concerns itself with reasonable connections in a strictly

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These unpalatable words resonate with Husserl’s fundamental attitude to the phenomenologists of the Munich Circle as a whole. He protested their rejection of the developments that had occurred in his writings after the publication of Logical Investigations (1900–1901), in particular Ideas I, first published in 1913. This work was centered on explicit consolidation of the transcendental reduction that removed the element of existence from the realm of phenomenological study. In light of the critical response of the Munich phenomenologists to the developments and changed in his phenomenological philosophy, Husserl dismissively described them as “remaining stuck in ontologism and realism”121 and characterized them as “the philosophical island in Bergzabern” (Husserl, 1994b, 34).122 In this spirit, he added: “almost half of my mature students have remained stuck in half-measures (Halbheiten) and are afraid of the radicalism of the necessary essence of phenomenology, precisely what established my life component and to which I owe all my insights” (Husserl, 1959, 285).123 In fact, already on 24 December 1921, before the publication of the first part (Buch I) of Realontologie in the Yearbook (HCM, 1923b), Husserl wrote to Ingarden that he felt “alien” (befremdet) to HCM’s latest work (Husserl, 1968, 23).124 While HCM called Husserl on almost every occasion “our good, esteemed teacher and master” (HCM, 2015b, 61) or her “honored teacher and master”,125 he wrote to phenomenological sense” (Stein, 2005b, 196). See in this context HCM’s discussion on the relation between phenomenology and speculation, in: HCM (1965g/1959b). 121 Husserl’s words are cited from: Spiegelberg (1959, 60). See also in this context: Schuhmann (1973, 1–16). Similar sentiments appeared in Husserl’s letter to Spiegelberg from 12 August 1930, in which he said: “it would be a pity if you, like some of the phenomenologists of the early period, remained stuck in ontologism and realism” (cited from: Schuhmann, 1973, 4). Spiegelberg regarded himself as “one of the few survivors of an older generation” (Spiegelberg 1985, 251), but also as “a second-generation student of Husserl and Becker, but mostly of Pfänder, who supervised my Ph.D. thesis” (Spiegelberg, 1985, 253). 122 The citation is taken from Husserl letter to Bell from 28 January 1922. 123 Husserl’s words were addressed to Dorion Cairns in a later from 21 March 1930. Avé-Lallemant adds in this regard that for this reason, “he [Husserl] could not consider them as genuine phenomenologists and nor even as philosophers” (Avé-Lallemant, 1975a, 28). These words received additional confirmation from Spiegelberg’s report that was based on his personal conversations with Husserl. Spiegelberg maintained that for Husserl, the writings of the Munich phenomenologists did not constitute real phenomenology or even philosophy but could only be valid as individual scientific achievements. Furthermore, from his final meeting with Husserl on 8 October 1926, he understood that for Husserl the break with the Munich phenomenologists was irreparable. See: Spiegelberg (1959, 60–61). However, in Cartesian Meditations, Husserl saw fit to praise the early phenomenologists for developing a different ontology to that prevalent in the 18th century and for using terms that were far from the sensory-visual view or alternatively for leaving the concrete gaze to build a priori sciences. See: Husserl (1999, §59 138/1991, §59 165). In this context, see: Rosenwald (1989, 13). Obviously, Husserl did not mean by these words retreating from his transcendental orientation, rather they indicated his growing awareness of the involvement of concrete dimensions in the transcendental subjective experience. 124 Husserl refers here to the work: HCM (1916b). On the obstacles accompanying the publication of this essay, which was intended to appear in the second volume of the Yearbook in 1916, but which eventually appeared in the third volume the same year, see: Schuhmann (1990, 10). 125 See here also: HCM (1965c, 402, 1920b, 130 n. 1). Stein also testified that “both Conrads also always speak of Husserl with great admiration” (Stein, 2005b, 193). However, Stein was less naïve

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Ingarden that like Stein, HCM “was never really my student and she consciously rejected the ethos of philosophy ‘as a rigorous science’” (Husserl, 1968, 23).126 It seems that accepting this ethos functioned almost as an audition for Husserl when he evaluated the phenomenologists of his period (Husserl, 1987a, 296).127 Also, in practice for Husserl a person’s attitude to his transcendental accentuation became a test of the authenticity of the phenomenological position. In this spirit, Stein wrote in a letter to Ingarden dated 30 September 1922: […] all the orthodox “transcendental phenomenologists”, those who do not stand with idealism are considered “Reinach phenomenologists [sic]” […] and are really no longer affiliated with the group. Husserl explained that before Freiburg he never really had any students. (Stein, 2005b, 203–204)128

Husserl’s difficulty in accepting other perceptions of phenomenology was already apparent in his dissatisfaction with his contemporary phenomenologists’ understanding of phenomenology. In general, Husserl was far from being satisfied with the great diversity of the materials that appeared in the Yearbook. He even had reservations about the work of the Yearbook’s sub-editors. He wrote about Pfänder that his phenomenology was “essentially different to his”, called Geiger “only ¼ of a phenomenologist” (Husserl, 1968, 23), while he termed Scheler a “fake phenomenologist” (Talmiphenomenologen) (Spiegelberg, 1959, 59). Later on, Husserl wrote: “Given the way in which the contributions, though by my earlier ‘disciples’, have taken shape, leading to a cumulated effect, the Yearbook has become an undertaking to annihilate the fundamental meaning of my life’s work”.129 In this respect, than HCM in this regard. Thus, in a letter to Ingarden from 15 October 1921 she wrote that despite “look[ing] up to him with unbounded admiration and thankfulness”, this takes place “in spite of everything” (Stein, 2005b, 193). Elsewhere, in a letter to Fritz Kaufmann from 22 November 1919, Stein clarifies: “[…] the Master […] it is not easy to maintain the right attitude […] for me he will always remain the Master, whose image cannot be blurred by any human weakness” (Stein, 1993, 37–38). Again, in a letter to Kaufmann from 25 January 1920: “I will never stop having a boundless veneration for the philosopher Husserl and will always concede any human weakness as his fate” (Stein, 1993, 39). 126 Notwithstanding, in the literature HCM frequently mentions as Husserl’s student. See: Walther (1960, 331), Avé-Lallemant & Schuhmann (1992, 79). 127 See here also Husserl’s letters to Roman Ingarden: Husserl 1968, 61 [21 Dec. 1930], Husserl 1968, 73 [13 Nov. 1931], Husserl 1968, 77 [11 June 1932]. 128 In another letter to Ingarden dated 9 October 1926, Stein describes as a “real tragedy” the fact that: “none of his students are in complete agreement with him… he obviously feels that, without really wanting to acknowledge it” (Stein, 2005b, 235). For further reading about Stein’s view of Husserl’s Phenomenology, see: Stein (2014, 147-150). 129 Husserl’s words are cited from a letter he wrote to H. Stolenberg in 1934 (see: Thyssen, 1959, 179) after Stolenberg sent him a manuscript for submission to the Yearbook. Probably, Stolenberg did not know that the Yearbook ceased being published at the end of 1933, though this was never officially declared. Schuhmann emphasizes that it was not the external political circumstances of National Socialism that led to this, but Husserl’s conviction “that he should not go on undermining the future chances of his own phenomenology by publishing under his own name and editorship all these pseudo-phenomenologies which were a lethal threat to it” (Schuhmann, 1990, 23). Schuhmann refers to the great importance that Husserl ascribed to his stance as the editor and his overall identification with the Yearbook. See: Schuhmann (1990, 10).

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Husserl’s lack of sympathy for the original phenomenological approach that HCM was shaping was no exception compared to his attitude to other phenomenologists of the time. In any case, the lack of spaces for publishing her writings and the lack of sympathy from the undisputed authority in phenomenology did not deter her. She wrote continuously throughout the 1920s and 1930s, and described it as follows: “I have always been writing something” (HCM, 2015b, 63).130 HCM continued writing even when the Reichsschrifttumskammer banned the publication of her writings in 1935 due to her Jewish ancestry (Avé-Lallemant, 1971, 258),131 despite her Protestant religious lifestyle. She also never gave up attempting to find a university in which she could write her Habilitation. The first attempt took place immediately after in 1930 the possibility to do this was opened in principle to women. This transpires from a draft dated to 1931 that was intended for Tübingen University in Germany (HCM, 1931cN). The second attempt occurred in 1937, when she applied to Vienna University in Austria (HCM, 1937bN). The plan was to write about the fundamental structures of the cosmos of nature under the supervision of Alios Dempf.132 Neither plan was realized due to the economic crisis in Germany after the First World War. The issue of the Habilitation continued to occupy HCM, as is apparent from her extensive correspondence with researchers and colleagues, in which she refers to her failure to find a university in which she could write her Habilitation, and asks them to help her obtain funding to continue her activity. HCM’s insistence on clearing paths to continue her studies is apparent in the many letters she wrote to her colleagues and acquaintances, telling them about her requests for support for her research and her tense expectation of answers from the various institutions.133 For example, in 1930 she applied for grants in Berlin and the Academic Assistance Council and the Sarah Smith Research Fellowship in England.134 None of these and other attempts succeeded.

130 In

this context, see Stein’s description of HCM as “someone, who at no time writes from other than an irresistible inner force…” (Stein, 2005b, 196). 131 See here also: Avé-Lallemant (1977, 301–302), Avé-Lallemant (2015, 70); for the Jewish background of HCM’s family, see: Hueglin (2011, 110–117). 132 Alios Dempf (1891–1982) was a Catholic philosopher. Due to his resistance to National Socialism, he was banned from teaching in 1938. In 1958, he honored HCM with a preface to the Festschrift that was dedicated to her 70th birthday. See: Dempf (1958). 133 See here HCM’s letter to Stein from 13November 1932 (Stein, 1993, 125) and to Marvin Farber (HCM, 1952N). 134 In a letter from 9 January 1923, Husserl wrote to HCM about a possible grant in Berlin, suggesting that she compose an application from the materials she was dealing with (philosophy of nature). On 1 October 1930, HCM submitted a grant application to the Sarah Smith Research Fellowship of Newnham College on behalf of which Husserl wrote a recommendation letter. Yet, in a letter from 28 November 1932, Husserl wrote to HCM that he was sorry she had not received the grant (Husserl, 1994a, 19–20). The archive contains several applications HCM submitted to various institutions, both at early and rather late stage of her career, the late 1940s and early 1950s. See: HCM (1931bN, 1932N, 1937aN, 1949cN). The letters Marvin Farber wrote her (25 January 1952; 7 February 1952) indicate that HCM also applied to the Rockefeller Foundation and the topic of her proposal was: The Ideological Roots of National Socialism. See: Farber (1952N).

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In fact, HCM was not alone in encountering such barriers on the way to realizing her philosophical vision. One could say that the circumstances of time and place were not welcoming to her phenomenologist colleagues from Munich or to phenomenology in general. HCM states that already when Husserl was summoned to Freiburg in 1916, where, in her view “a school was not really established”, and more so during the First World War, the work-school (Lehrtätigkeit) Husserl set up in Göttingen completely dissolved (HCM, 1965c, 393–394). Similarly, Spiegelberg wrote: “The Munich Circle lost most of its coherence after the First World War” (Spiegelberg, 1960, 168/1984a, 166). Eventually, after Husserl’s death in 1938, and certainly after the Second World War, phenomenology disappeared from the scene in Germany. Against this background, it is not surprising that even from the time when she already received significant, though belated, recognition, when she looked back upon this period and the phenomenological movement to which she tied her fate, she saw missed opportunities, loss, and death all around: The First World War started and brought a lot of hardship, misery and sickness. Also, an inner crisis that I don’t want to talk about here. Husserl died. Even before that, Scheler died and also Geiger, who had already emigrated to America long before the Third Reich. Then Pfänder died as well, and Adolf Reinach had been killed during the First World War. Phenomenology disappeared from the scene in the scientific community. When I could finally start to think about my habilitation the foreshadowings of the Nazi era darkened all life. Women were no longer wanted in such professions. (HCM 2015b, 63)135

Against this background, James Hart explains that “although the actual life-time of the circle as an existing community was only a few years, the attitudes and convictions formed then never seemed to leave the various members. This was certainly true for Conrad-Martius” (Hart, 1972, 4–5). In any event, for her philosophical work to progress, the world wars had to come to an end.136 The wars indeed came to an end. As will transpire later, developments awaited HCM on the other side of the war. They might have arrived a few decades too late and found her quite old when the signs of time already started to make themselves known in her health, which started to decline. But still, her return to Munich University, this time as a philosopher who had already established her own philosophical system, and no less than this, the experience of teaching and nurturing students who came to learn her philosophy, enabled her to taste the good flavor of leaving her mark, and in particular, laying the groundwork for revealing her philosophical heritage to future generation.

135 Two

of HCM’s brothers (Leonhard Martius and Friedrich Franz) also fell in the Second World War, see: Martius (2002, 14), Hueglin (2011, 115). 136 Like HCM, also Stein referred in her letters to damage of war to phenomenology. For example, a letter to Ingarden from 27 April 1917 Stein wrote: “Nothing is going on with phenomenology during the war. […] Summer has to come sometimes since surely the laws of nature have not changed and it seems to want to come. I wonder whether peace will come then, too?” (Stein, 2005b, 65–66).

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Return to the University of Munich: Profn. Drn. Hedwig Conrad-Martius A. The Lecturer on Philosophy of Nature After the Second World War, a new period in HCM’s life commenced. As part of the attempt to rehabilitate Germany’s universities, HCM was invited in 1949 to the Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich and appointed Lecturer on Philosophy of Nature.137 There, as Spiegelberg describes, she “revived the interest in ontological phenomenology among an enlarged group of colleagues and students” (Spiegelberg, 1960, 220). Furthermore, the ethos of group philosophizing that originated in the communal circle of phenomenologists in Munich and Göttingen was also resurrected with HCM’s arrival in the university Munich in 1949. Theodor Conrad reported that under the influence of the Göttingen discussions, the “Phäno-Club” was established. This was a setting where the participants of HCM’s philosophy of nature seminars met for philosophical evenings between 1953 and 1954.138 There is no doubt that this development was enabled first and foremost thanks to the fact that HCM was not defeated by the difficulties her fate presented her during the historical era and cultural circumstances in which she was active. As Kuhn testifies: “Her laboriousness did not darken the exhilaration of her essence” (Kuhn, 1966). Thus, subsequently to the Second World War, HCM entered to a very fertile creative period, at the center of which she explored her philosophical stance toward various aspects of nature—the time, the space, the constitution of nature, evolution, the phenomenon of life, the earthly (Der Irdisch), etc.139 In fact, HCM’s interest in the issue of nature started at a very early stage and is documented in the first version (erste Fassung) of Realontologie (HCM, 1915– 1919N).140 The draft plans for the two Habilitations confirm that HCM did not 137 For

further reading, see: Plümacher (1996, 15-95). meetings were organized by Franz Georg Schmücker who wrote his dissertation on their basis (Schmücker, 1956). See: Avé-Lallemant and Schuhmann (1992, 79). Interestingly, late in his life, Husserl also began to view the idea of group philosophizing as more dominant in the perception of philosophy and the sciences. In Crisis, his fundamental argument is that the continuity of philosophical problems and the discourse of philosophers with the history of philosophy enables a “community of philosophers” (Philosophengemeinschaft) and a “common unit of thinkers” (Denkergemeinschaft) that establish what he calls the “generativity” (Generativität) of philosophy (Husserl, 1976, 443-444) and the “communalization” (Vergemeinschaftung) that occur in philosophy, the sciences, and in general experience. Husserl explains: “[…] in living with one another each one can take part in the life of the others. Thus, in general the world exists not only for isolated men but for the community of men; and this is due to the fact that even what is straightforwardly perceptual is communalized” (Husserl, 1970c, §47 163/1976, §47 166). See also: Husserl (1970c, §34, §52/1976, §34; §52). 139 See here: HCM (1940N, 1948, 1949a, 1949b, 1965h, 1949b, 1951a, 1954, 1955b, 1957, 1958a, 1960a, 1960b, 1960c). 140 See her two manuscripts with an identical title: 2 Abschnitt: Natur (§32–§48); 2 Abschnitt: Natur (in: HCM, 1915–1919N). In this context, see an enthusiastic recommendation letter from Husserl, dated 10 January 1915, to the editor of the journal Logos, Paul Siebeck, to consider publishing a planned work of hers about philosophy of nature, in which he expressed his appreciation of her 138 These

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abandon her early plan to engage seriously with the issue of nature. However, just like so many plans and beginnings throughout her life, only at a later phase, from the 1940s, did the stage of realization come to fruition. Thus, HCM’s philosophical interest in nature would arrive at mature formulation in a book that she would write in 1944, The Self-Assembly of Nature (Der Selbstaufbau der Natur) (HCM, 1961); a book that Dempf described as the final achievement of HCM’s “indispensable step from phenomenology to ontology that has been taken above and beyond the honored master and thereby entered to the big movement of the new philosophy of nature and indicative metaphysics”. In his view, thus “the metaphysics has been raised to a speculation and nevertheless remained a scientific philosophy” (Dempf 1958, 1). However, despite the fact that only in her later works did the issue of nature become central, some have identified her contribution to phenomenology precisely with her philosophy of nature, ignoring her original early phenomenological philosophy of being, which constitutes an essential basis for interpreting her later works, too. Thus, for instance, while no reference to HCM’s realistic phenomenology appears in Spiegelberg’s main treatise on realty,141 HCM is mentioned once in the context of the issue of nature (Spiegelberg, 1975, 7). Even Kuhn that had a considerable acquaintance with HCM’s work establishes that “one is only little exaggerating if saying that Hedwig Conrad-Martius was the philosopher of nature of her epoch” (Kuhn, 1966). Ales Bello regards HCM’s idea of nature as “the most original aspect” of her work and adds that “it is not by chance that the few studies of her thought all tend to concentrate on this particular area of inquiry” (Ales Bello, 2002, 210). Finally, Hart established that “the phenomenologists of this generation saw themselves as regional co-workers. Conrad-Martius, as we have seen, felt called to the region of “nature’” (Hart, 2020, 223 n. 19/1972, 596 n. 2). Another important development that occurred upon HCM’s return to the University of Munich and appointment as a member of staff relates to the publication of her writings, almost all by Kösel publishing house, which became the publisher of the vast majority of her published works. Thus, in the middle of the 1940s and throughout the 1950s and to the early 1960s, many of HCM’s works were published and awakened great interest (HCM, 1949a, 1965h, 1949b, 1951a, 1954, 1955b, 1957, 1958a, 1960a). Also, in 1955, she was awarded the title of Honorary Professor, an honor HCM knew well she deserved. As she said: “I was very happy, because as Morgenstern said: ‘one understands that a prophet is only recognized on becoming a professor’. […] My honorary professorship was a posteriori: that is to say, it was a result of many studies, plans, deliberations etc.” (HCM, 2015b, 63).142 One year talents (Husserl, 1994d, 269). The early date of this letter indicates that HCM’s interest in the issue of nature was already familiar to her colleagues early in her career, many years before any of her publications on this issue appeared. Also, in a letter dated 16 March 1921, Husserl writes to HCM that he is sorry that her manuscript on the philosophy of nature is not ready, and that he would be happy to print it as the first or second chapter of his Yearbook. See Husserl (1994a, 18). 141 See here: “The phenomenon of reality and Reality”, in: Spiegelberg (1975, 130–172). 142 A letter from HCM to Martin Heidegger dated 27 October 1947 indicates that there was a possibility that she would receive a “teaching position” (Lehrauftrag), which was in fact an honorary professorship, not only in Munich but also in Erlangen. She wrote that Munich had a “momentary

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earlier, in 1954, she had received a scholarship of The German Research Association (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) (DFG) that granted her financing for the rest of her life. This relieved her of concern for her survival needs and allowed her to develop her phenomenology and philosophy of nature. B. Eberhard Avé-Lallemant In 1955, HCM met Eberhard Avé-Lallemant (1926–2015), who came to Munich University to study philosophy, physics, and mathematics. This was a fateful meeting for both of them. Avé-Lallemant returned to West Germany having served in the Germany navy and having been imprisoned in England for three years. He described to me his meeting with Prof. Conrad-Martius, the charismatic lecturer in seminars on the philosophy of nature, as “a revelation”.143 She rapidly became a spiritual lighthouse for him, way beyond an admired philosophy lecturer and the supervisor of his studies.144 From this point onward, he devoted the rest of his life to HCM and her work, despite knowing that her honorary professorship at Munich University would not be able to open the possibility of a tenured academic position for him. AvéLallemant became her research assistant and the deciding factor in the publication of HCM’s writings, on whose editing and bringing to press they worked together, intensively and pedantically.145 Avé-Lallemant’s crowning achievement is the trilogy of Writings in Philosophy (Schriften zur Philosophie) in which he gathered and edited HCM’s important articles, what can be called her small essays (kleine Schriften), of which only some had previously been published (HCM, 1963a, 1964a, 1965a).146 No less important was his curating of HCM’s literary estate in the Bavaria State Archive (BSM) in Munich (Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek), where he was given a tenured position and put in charge of the literary estates of the philosophers of the Munich Circle.147 Despite inflation of philosophers” and asked about the situation at the time in Freiburg, where he was then serving as a professor. See: HCM (1947N). 143 During the years 2003–2004, I spent time alternately at the universities of Munich and Frankfurt for my post-doctoral research for the Minerva Fund. During this period, lasting a few weeks each time, I worked with Avé-Lallemant for many long hours every day. He shared with me much of his knowledge about HCM and her life story and gave me access to many original materials. I am greatly in his debt for much of my knowledge about her character and thought. 144 Avé-Lallemant’s dissertation was devoted to HCM’s work and was written under her supervision. See Avé-Lallemant (1959). 145 In 1958, HCM received financing for an assistant from The German Research Association (DFG) and appointed Avé-Lallemant to this position. See: Pfeiffer (2005, 26). 146 The publication ban imposed upon HCM left HCM no choice but to publish her ideas in articles and lectures. Many of these were gathered in this trilogy. In this context, see: Avé-Lallemant (1984, 261 n. 5). 147 Avé-Lallemant’s curating work on the literary estates of the prominent members of the Munich-Göttingen Circle was collected in: Avé-Lallemant (1975b). The volume is divided into the following chapters: Alexander Pfänder (Avé-Lallemant, 1975b, 1–40), Max Scheler (AvéLallemant, 1975b, 41–124), Johannes Daubert (Avé-Lallemant, 1975b, 125-138), Moritz Geiger (Avé-Lallemant, 1975b, 139–159), Theodor Conrad (Avé-Lallemant, 1975b, 159–170), Adolf Reinach (Avé-Lallemant, 1975b, 171–180), Maximilian Beck (Avé-Lallemant, 1975b, 181–190), Hedwig Conrad-Martius (Avé-Lallemant, 1975b, 191–256).

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the extensive work he had already invested in its editing, Avé-Lallemant was himself unable to bring to publication the manuscript of the unpublished chapters of HCM’s foundational treatise, Realontologie,148 nor the manuscript “The metaphysical problematic of the earthly world” (Die metaphysische Problematik der Irdischen Welt), which she regarded as her opus magnum, whose first draft is dated to 1940.149 The importance of the meeting with the educated and extremely devoted student to HCM cannot be overestimated. She wisely recognized that in light of her advanced age and ill health (HCM, 2015b, 63) she would be unable to publish her writings by herself, and therefore entrusted them to the loyal hands of her student. Even though the publication of most of her writings has yet to be completed, and even though most of her work remains largely unknown even among phenomenologists, one can state without hesitation that for HCM’s oeuvre, her encounter with Avé-Lallemant was a unique historic opportunity that was not missed.150 C. Research into Conrad-Martius’s Thinking The first studies dealing with HCM’s work appeared around the time of her return to Munich University with a teaching position, and later her appointment to honorary professor at this university. The first monographic studies on HCM’s thought were written by Avé-Lallemant (Avé-Lallemant, 1958, 1959), who also reconstructed the 148 The treatise Realontologie has two versions (see: HCM, 1915–1919N; HCM, 1919–1922N). The

published version is taken from the second, mature version (HCM, 1923b) that did not appear in its entirety. The treatise that appeared in Husserl’s Jahrbuch is composed of three parts: 1. Realität (HCM, 1923b, 159–190), 2. Materialität (HCM, 1923b, 191–245), 3. Konkrete Stoffgestaltung (HCM, 1923b, 246–333). The third part is composed of five paragraphs: a. Materialer Konstitution (HCM, 1923b, 246–282), b. Ton und Geräusch (HCM, 1923b, 282–295), c. Temperature (HCM, 1923b, 295–303), d. Licht (HCM, 1923b, 303–333). Paragraph d. has a second section called “Farben—Ein Kapitel aus Realontologie” (HCM, 1929a). This section appeared as a contribution to special issue of Husserl’s Yearbook that was devoted to Husserl’s 70th birthday (HCM, 1929a). This chapter is divided into sections. Sections §251–§289 are a direct continuation of the published book that ends at §250. Paragraph d. has another section, “Geruch und Geschmack” (HCM, 1929bN) sections §289–§309 (supposed to be §290–§309, probably a mistake by HCM). Yet, the last section was not completely elaborated in the second version (zweite Fassung) (HCM, 1919–1922N) and in the archive there is a manuscript that in the first version (Erste Fassung) (HCM, 1915–1919N) was part of the section “Geruch und Geschmack” and has the same title (HCM, 1929bN, §185–§206, §299–§257). Part of this section overlaps parts in “Farben—Ein Kapitel aus Realontologie” (HCM, 1929a). Finally, in the file of Realontologie in the archive there exists another manuscript whose title is “Historisch-metaphysische Anmerkung” (3 pages, no archive registration) that was supposed to close part one (Realität), but due to some unclear reason was not printed together with it. As stated before, in the first version (erste Fassung) of Realontologie (1915–1919) HCM intended to publish the sections that dealt with the issue of nature (two manuscripts with an identical title: 2 Abschnitt: Natur (§32–§48); 2 Abschnitt: Natur, see: HCM, 1915–1919N). However, the discussion of nature was left outside the published version of Realontologie that is based on the second version of the treatise (zweite Fassung) (HCM, 1919–1922N), probably due to the plan that it would serve as a basis for a second book of Realontologie. Again, this plan, just like so many others of her plans, never took place. 149 This work has two drafts: HCM (1940aN, 1940bN). 150 The relationship between Avé-Lallemant and HCM has been discussed in different contexts in Feldes’ book. See: Feldes (2015). See also Herald Seubert’s words following Avé-Lallemant’s death in 2015: https://iap.li/downloads/Nachruf-EAL.pdf.

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historical context of her period and in phenomenological thinking in general (AvéLallemant, 1971, 1975a, 1980, 1984, 1988; Avé-Lallemant and Schuhmann, 1992; Avé-Lallemant, 1994, 2015). No less than his studies that addressed HCM’s work directly, Avé-Lallemant merits priceless recognition for publishing HCM’s writings and the cataloging and curating work with the manuscripts that remained in her literary estate. Indeed, Avé-Lallemant’s scholarship about HCM’s thinking is inseprable part of his work in bringing her writings to publication and currating the manuscripts of here estate (Nachläss). It seems inevitable that in the third, expanded edition of his historical book, The Phenomenological Movement (Spiegelberg, 1984a), Spiegelberg chose Avé-Lallemant to write the chapter devoted to HCM (Avé-Lallemant, 1984), as the loyal student, editor, curator, and publisher of HCM’s writings, who was so absolutely identified with her philosophical oeuvre. To this very day, Avé-Lallemant’s writing provides the most extensive documentation and historical background to the work of the Munich-Göttingen Circle, and particularly to the work of HCM. There is no doubt that Avé-Lallemant’s studies will remain an indispensable resource for any future studies on her thinking. Alongside the studies by Avé-Lallemant during the 1950s, which placed HCM’s thinking and that of the Circle members in the center, several other studies were published around that time that addressed the wider historical context. Among these we should mention the contribution of Herbert Spiegelberg who laid the first historical foundations of the realistic approach in phenomenology in the Anglo-American world.151 Presumably, the Order of Merit of the German Federal Republic, which she received in 1958, also increased her visibility. In that year, a Festschrift of her work was published (Wenzel et al., 1958), along with additional studies dealing with her thinking (Avé-Lallemant, 1958; Hering, 1959). Research studies with a philosophical orientation were written between the 1950s and the 1970s. Some of these studies, written at the University of Munich itself, addressed specific aspects related to realistic phenomenology, and HCM was mentioned in them rather sporadically (Landgrebe, 1949; Schmücker, 1956; HerzogDürck, 1956; Habbel, 1959; Wiser, 1960; Diemer, 1965; Kuhn, 1969). A few studies also appeared that referred to HCM comparatively (Schmücker, 1956; Behler, 1956). However, since her death in 1966, none of her additional works has been published, 151 Spiegelberg

was himself one of the thinkers who developed the realistic approach in phenomenology (see: Avé-Lallemant, 1971, 2), and even Husserl treated him as such, see: Spiegelberg (1959, 61). In the first two editions of his historical book, a tiny amount of space was devoted to the phenomenologists of the Munich and Göttingen Circles. In this context, HCM was mentioned alongside eight other phenomenologists, under the category “Other Members of the Göttingen and Munich Circles”, who were mentioned with a few biographical details and their main themes and select bibliographies. See: Spiegelberg (1960, 220–221, 1965, 218–227). But in the third, expanded edition of The Phenomenological Movement (Spiegelberg, 1984a), the phenomenologists of the Munich and Göttingen Circles were reclassified from “the older phenomenological movement” (Spiegelberg, 1960, 168) to “the original phenomenological movement” (Spiegelberg, 1984a, 166). Also, separate chapters were devoted to the work of Hedwig Conrad-Martius (Avé-Lallemant, 1984) and Roman Ingarden (Küng, 1984). Spiegelberg explained the changes he introduced in the third edition while focusing on the figures of HCM and Ingarden saying that “[the] two have risen later to independent importance” (Spiegelberg, 1984a, 170).

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and her writings have not been translated into English or any other language.152 Furthermore, apart from the only dissertation written about her work in English (Hart, 1972) that has just been published (Hart, 2020), and studies in Polish (Machnacz, 1985; Machnacz, 1992) and Italian (Vrana, 1963), it seemed as if the two decades of awakened interest in her philosophy had reached their end, and her work became almost entirely absent from academic and intellectual discourse. Thus, those writings that had already been published were marginalized, while the manuscripts remained stored in the Bavaria State Archive in Munich in the form of their creation: typed on a home typewriter or handwritten on yellowing, strongly scented stencil sheets. It appears that with the end of the world wars and the rise of the so-called Cultural Turn, phenomenology fell into “forgetfulness” and “darkness” (HCM, 1951b, 6–7), and HCM’s work also sunk into the depths of oblivion.153 However, in the early 2000s, interest was reignited in the early phenomenology of the work of the Munich-Göttingen Circle members. Perhaps the declaration of Edith Stein as a saint by the Vatican in 1998, followed by international interest in her work, contributed to this.154 Whether or not this theory is true, the issues of early phenomenological thought started to be discussed seriously in the research literature. This indicated the beginning of historical justice for the work of the group of young intellectuals who sought to handle the crisis of the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth centuries through phenomenological philosophy.155

152 An

exception to this rule is a single article translated into English: HCM (1959b). The German source is: HCM (1965g). 153 Smid suggested two explanations to the question of how come the huge scope of the writings of the outstanding thinkers of the Munich circle did not attract the attentions of scholars. The first, voiced by Paul Stern, Lipps’ student, maintains that one cannot undertake the phenomenological method of “pure description” since all concepts are already shaped beforehand by ones use of the language. The second concerns the neglection, already at the early stage, of the universal foundations of phenomenology (Smid, 1982, 140–142). 154 Some grounds for this theory can be found in the fact that in the third and enlarged edition of Spiegelberg’s book (Spiegelberg, 1984a), where he expanded the discussion of the works of HCM and Ingarden, his reference to Stein, who had yet to be declared a saint, remained minor (Spiegelberg, 1960, 223–224/1984a, 238–239). Thus, in a new paragraph he includes Stein among “other members… [who] can be introduced only as background in a condensed section” (Spiegelberg, 1984a, 170). Since 1998, there have been regular academic conferences about Edith Stein. The growing interest in Stein’s thinking is apparent in the many studies that were written since her canonization, see: Calcagno (2007, 2016, 2018), Sawicki (1997), Borden Sharkey (2008), Borden Sharkey (2010), Feist and Sweet (2003), Schulz (2008), Vendrell-Ferran (2008), Lebech (2010), Ales Bello, Alfieri, and Shahid (2010a), Ales Bello, Alfieri, and Shahid (2010b). 155 Fritz Heinemann, a phenomenologist contemporary with HCM, properly classified this crisis as “a quiet process of disrupting the entering into the appearances (In-Erscheinung-Tretens)” (Heinemann, 1960, 184). Consequently, instead of what appears to testify to its reality and to the unity that connects the thing and its appearance to each other, destruction occurs in the world of phenomena. Eventually, appearance does not indicate reality, while reality cannot reveal its face through its appearances (Heinemann, 1960, 183–185). In this context, see further: Alles Bello (2004, 2008a, 2008d), Pfeiffer (2005), Moran and Szanto (2016).

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The Phenomenological Gateway to Reality Edmund Husserl’s question what would be the “entrance-gate of phenomenology” (Husserl, 1952a, §30 60/2012a, §30 55) has been pivotal to the phenomenological discussions ever since.156 This question is often interpreted as concerning the proper methodology for phenomenological study that typically involves epistemological matters. Sometimes, such methodological discussions also involve metaphysical aspects concerning the assumed idea of reality within phenomenological inquiries. However, in HCM’s phenomenological path, the metaphysical dimensions are brought to the fore of her philosophizing that addresses reality both as an idea and as an existence. Moreover, she seems to transform the transcendental ponderings into a firm determination, according to which reality does not concern “more or less objectivity”, rather it is “something totally different” (HCM, 1923b, 180) that stands with “an unbridgeable and absolute opposition” (HCM, 1923b, 162) to “the nonexistent or nothingness” (HCM, 1923b, 160). Moreover, “the real existence is not one ‘form of existence (Daseinsform)’ among others but something plainly and absolute new” (HCM, 1923b, 163). Accordingly, she describes the real thing as such that is “at first positively elevated by itself from nothingness” and thus “becomes entirely its own” (HCM, 1923b, 181). In this regard, she calls “gateway to reality” (Tor der Realität) the datum-point where “a radical overcoming” of the “mere formal positioning” of reality takes place and things “elevate” themselves from nonexistence or mere ideal and formal existence, but do not yet arrive at factual existence (HCM, 1923b, 173). The expression “The Gateway to Reality” in the volume’s subtitle indicates the anchor of the discussion in the chapters of the work Realontologie from 1923. To this extent, the articles composing this volume reveals them as various attempts to address, each via its own specific topic, the meaning of that “Gateway to Reality”.157 Moreover, the ontological foundation identified in HCM’s early work, which would reach full maturation in her writings from the late 1930s, constitutes the core of her phenomenological thought. Although after the Second World War, as stated above, she turned in other directions, she never abandoned her early anchor point.158 Thus, the philosophical issues discussed in the articles in this volume, I argue, sketch the indispensable infrastructure of HCM’s thought and they should be considered in any discussion of her work. Indeed, it is not difficult to show that her renewed and vigorous activity after the war realized philosophical potential whose foundations were established mainly in relation to her phenomenological thinking in her writings 156 See

here also Husserl’s question what would be helpful in “preparing the way for phenomenology” (Husserl, 1952a, §65 139/2012a, §65 129) in order to position us “on the threshold of phenomenology” or a the “beginning of phenomenology” (Husserl, 2012a, §84 174)/1952a, §84 191). 157 The expression “Gateway to reality” is discussed in the article from 2014 (Chapter 4). At this point “Gateway to” seems to me as a better option than “Gate of”, as it preserves the metaphorical sense of the word “gate” yet remains faithful to the original. 158 See also: Avé-Lallemant (1971, 319–320).

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up to the end of the 1930s. The discussion about them exceeds the scope of the studies collected in this volume, centered around HCM’s metaphysical phenomenology. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that in the preliminary remark (Vobenerkung) to her book Das Sein, published in 1957 but explicitly based on her early thought from the 1930s, she writes: No special justification is needed today to present fundamental philosophical studies on Being, essence, and reality. Regarding existential philosophy with its highly significant, yet confined to the human person, concept of Being, for which it is “existence” (Existenz), [these studies] are relevant than ever. (HCM, 1957, 11)

That is to say, shifting the focus of her philosophical engagement to issues related to nature did not involve withdrawing from the phenomenological metaphysics she had developed earlier. Moreover, her early inquiries, which are grounded in Husserlian essence intuition are self-standing. In contrast, her later inquiries, which are usually beyond the scope of the articles included in this volume, rely on the earlier ones to the extent that understanding them requires an investigation of the roots of her early phenomenological thought.159 In some respects, already the early study based on her doctoral dissertation (HCM, 1916b), belonging to her early phenomenological oeuvre, can be considered as the first chapter of her philosophy of nature. Although the word “nature” is absent from the title of this work, it appears that she herself viewed this horizon projected from it when she stated: “one should fix a special scientific field (Wissenschaftsgebiet) that could carry the title of “‘Doctrine of Appearance’” (Erscheinungslehre) whose sphere would lie between “‘nature’” and “life-essence” that refers from natural approach to this nature” (HCM, 1916b, 353 n. 1). In any event, it would take her a while until she would address these phenomena of nature in a direct manner. The articles included in this volume present a hermeneutic discourse with HCM’s writings composed during the formative stage of her work, dedicated to revealing the metaphysical dimensions involved in the phenomenological observation of reality. This results in a consequential diversion from the epistemological, considered as the core of transcendental phenomenology, to the ontological. In my view, this is the most fundamental ground, whose explication and exploration pave a reliable path to HCM’s phenomenological metaphysics as a whole. The interpretation of HCM’s writings discussed in this volume reveals the classical speculative dimensions, originating in the Aristotelean ontology typical of HCM’s philosophizing style. At the same time, these writings are brimming with fresh, original thinking that reveals a complex, layered view of reality that contains varied modes of givenness: empirical, transcendental, eidetic, and speculative. The uncovering of the rich perception of givenness woven into HCM’s discussions is essential for elucidating her choice to radically reject the phenomenological reduction at the heart of Husserl’s transcendental philosophy, where epistemological or other considerations turned the world into an intrinsic correlate of absolute consciousness that is referred to as “world phenomenon” (Weltphänomen) (Husserl, 1952a, §47; §51; §76/2012a, 159 Avé-Lallemant

too stresses the particular important of her early work “for understanding the overall oeuvre of Hedwig Conrad-Martius”. See: Avé-Lallemant (1977, 301).

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§47; §51, §76). In this context, she asks, rhetorically, whether “this noematic world that is also really real (wirklich wirklich), entirely remains undecided” (HCM, 1965c, 396) or alternatively: “but where does the world remain?” (HCM, 1965g, 371). This somehow naïvely worded question encapsulates the core of HCM’s criticism of Husserl’s transcendental reduction. Specifically, it doubts precisely his confidence that bracketing the reality for the sake of establishing and studying pure consciousness would not destroy the thesis of the “world” that underlies the “natural attitude”. In Husserl’s words: “The” world is as fact-world always there […] “it” remains ever, in the sense of the general thesis, a world that has its being out there. To know it more comprehensively, more trustworthily, more perfectly than the naive lore of experience is able to do, and to solve all the problems of scientific knowledge which offer themselves upon its ground, that is the goal of the sciences of the natural standpoint. (Husserl, 1952a, §30 61/2012a, §30 65)

However, for HCM, the transcendental reduction damages to the point of eradication the most important promise of phenomenology, to enable grasping the fundamental structures of reality as such. In this regard, she establishes: “instead of hypothetically bracketing the real Being and thereby seeing the world (in the reduction) stripped of the real reality, it is suggested now to hypothetically posit the real Being of the world and thereby present it with its own rootedness into Being” (HCM, 1965c, 398). These unmistakable words can summarize the position of the person who became the leading force in the phenomenological circle that gathered around Husserl in Göttingen. HCM eloquently opposed Husserl’s transcendental turn to the extent that she was defined as a figure who “by means of the cohesive force (Wucht) of her literary work became the appointed speaker (berufenen Sprecher) of this opposition (Widerstrebenden)” (Kuhn, 1966). Her fundamental argument was that the essences, which were the original object of phenomenology, cannot be approached except through observation whose horizons are anchored in reality itself (Kuhn, 1966). Thus, unlike Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, which, by means of a glorious transcendental step, withdraws from the temporal and the experienced in a person’s world, HCM’s phenomenological inquiry seeks exactly what she refers to as “transcendent objectivation” (transzendenten Objecktivation) (HCM, 1965c, 401), namely the objective region of the world whose very reality, as opposed to non-existence (HCM, 1963j, 93–94), is considered as “the grounding of its own Being in its self (die Gegründetheit des eigenen Seins in Selbst)” (HCM, 1963c, 207). Against this background, she classifies her phenomenological approach as deliberately exceeding the boundary of the noematic reality that exists within the boundaries of pure consciousness. Pure consciousness deals with “the world itself in its peculiar independency-of-Being (Seinsunabhängigkeit) in regard to consciousness and also from the existing I (Ich)” (HCM, 1965g, 374). This is precisely the “real reality (wirkliche Wirklichkeit)” (HCM, 1965c, 397, 401) toward which HCM’s phenomenological interest was directed. Unfortunately, HCM’s phenomenological metaphysics did not escape the fate of metaphysics, which had already well before been dethroned from its status as the “queen of all the sciences”. Like many other members of the Munich Circle,

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HCM was also destined to “write for the drawer” during the most formative period of her creativity. Furthermore, even today, more than fifty years after her death on 15 February 1966, she remains largely “the unknown known” (Die bekannte Unbekannte), just as she was termed in Kuhn’s eulogy immediately after her death (Kuhn, 1966). My hope is that this volume will bring some historical justice to this unique philosopher.

The Collection of Articles The articles collected in this volume offer a presentation and interpretation of HCM’s writings and share with the reader my experience of interpreting her ideas. The first articles deal with her first major publication from 1916 “On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World” (HCM, 1916b). This is a particularly challenging treatise due to the idiosyncratic nature of the ideas it expresses, its singular conceptual language, and no less than this, its characteristic stylistic density. These features necessitated repeated attempts to clear pathways into this essay, and this led to the multiplicity of articles on this work included in this volume. Alongside Doctrine of Appearance, that is based on HCM’s dissertation, her subsequent treatise Realontologie (HCM, 1923b) from 1923 is also an indispensable component in any interpretation of HCM. These two works, which were published in Husserl’s Yearbook (Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung), were in fact the only writings published soon after their composition. Also, they were largely aimed at the community of contemporary phenomenologists, to whom her ideas were familiar, and whose support she enjoyed.160 The fruits of engaging with Doctrine of Appearance and Realontologie are the articles included in the first part of this volume. Next, I turned to her foundational essays, most of which were collected in three volumes edited by Avé-Lallemant (HCM, 1963a, 1964a, 1965a). The importance of the essays collected in this trilogy is that alongside continuing the development of her philosophy of Being, they open an essential window to understanding the issue of the I in HCM’s writings. HCM’s conspicuous achievement in this regard concerns her explicit and consistent endeavors to suggest a comprehensive alternative to Husserl’s transcendental philosophy. This is apparent in her choice, quite typical of the realistic phenomenologists, to employ the term “i” (Ich) and avoid the term “ego” at the center of Husserl’s construct of “Pure consciousness”. In hindsight, the essays collected in the trilogy are helpful in identifying HCM’s first tentative approach to the I nascent in Doctrine of Appearance. The development of a realistic phenomenological philosophy of the I is one of the greatest and most ground-breaking

160 Schuhmann

refers to Reinach’s assistance in publishing HCM’s work in the third volume of the Yearbook (HCM, 1916b). See Schuhmann (1990, 10).

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achievements of her work, in which the prejudice about the Munichers’ abandonment of the issue of transcendentalism is also dismissed.161 Each of the articles included in this volume sketches a unique path cleared from the enormous totality of HCM’s writings, and in this respect each one is selfstanding. At first, the paths seemed to run parallel to each other, but upon analysis, points of tangency emerged between the various articles indicating that certain ideas had a formative influence on how she addresses various issues. From the interpretative perspective, these occurrences not only reveal the cohesion of HCM’s thinking that alludes to the entirety of her work. Moreover, just as these tangential points multiplied, they accumulated into a more encompassing picture of HCM’s philosophy. A. The Hermeneutics of the Incommensurable Philosophical Voice “A truthful philosophical work, and as such Being and Time must assuredly be addressed, eludes external criticism. It is an organism that arises from the center of life (Lebensmittelpunkt) and remains incommensurable with respect to every measurement (Messen) using an alien scale” (HCM, 1930N, 1). These words of HCM’s about the opus magnum of her contemporary phenomenologist, Martin Heidegger, lay the foundation for what I call the hermeneutics of the incommensurability. This unique philosophical position, which is marked out in a momentary flash in a document from HCM’s estate, took shape over the years during which the articles in this volume were published, as the hermeneutical space most appropriate for studying her work. As this hermeneutical position became established through continued discourse with HCM’s own work, it also came to contain general insights related to philosophical interpretation as such. In this regard, two aspects are involved in the act of interpretation. The first takes place in the part of the interpreter and concerns the consolidation of an unmediated interpretive stance toward the philosophical text. This aspect responds to Husserl’s direction, according to which phenomenological meditation “can best carry on in the first person” (Husserl, 1952a, §27 56/2012a, §27 51). The second aspect pertains to text under discussion, which, in this regard, is conceived as an individual to the point of incommensurable expression of its author. The two aspects are correlated with each other in the sense that the individuality of the interpreter matches itself to the incommensurability of the text. Moreover, in connection with the study of phenomenological texts the awareness to this twofold individuality could be particularly valuable given their being, as Simon Glendinning aptly maintained, “works of words whose capacity to work as philosophy is inseparable from their capacity to involve their reader’s capacity to acknowledge the matter for thinking itself for themselves” (Glendinning, 2007, 27). The following section will present and analyze four main steps in the constitution of the realm of the hermeneutics of the incommensurability. The first two are preliminary stages that consolidate the proper stance of the interpreter of a given incommensurable text while the subsequent two concern the practical matter of 161 In

this context, the criticism of Brecht, who accused the Munich philosophers of “philosophical wretchedness” due to their lack of handling the issue of transcendentalism, is typical. See: Brecht (1948, 42 n. 2). See here also: Schmücker (1956, 39).

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coping with the incommensurability of the contents themselves. Each of the four steps employs aspects of analysis and synthesis. It is instructive that also Helmut Kuhn too made a similar observation regarding the idea of the person that underlies HCM’s philosophy of nature, in his words: Man himself is drawn to the attention of the thinker about nature not so much by its insideview (Innensicht) or the role he played as a subject of knowledge, but rather through his division (Aufgliederung) and integration (Eingliederung) into the total of wholeness of the order (Ordnungsganzheit) of the world. (Kuhn, 1966)

The first step in constituting the hermeneutics of the incommensurable relates to marking the presence of the incommensurable in the text. Thus, the incommensurable is affirmed as the hallmark of real philosophical work and not as a problem seeking solution or an obstacle that needs to be overcome. In other words, the incommensurable in philosophical work is here to stay. Moreover, we can draw from HCM’s words about Heidegger’s Being and Time fundamental guidance that marks the incommensurable as a cornerstone in philosophical interpretation. Consequently, the latter turns out to be deprived of a general criterion for true philosophical argument. This sort of “guidance” can appear in the text explicitly or as a mere indirect hint, as part of the development of the philosophical moves, or off-the-cuff, in his statements about other philosophers. Either way, these are rare moments of grace that the author grants the readers. Readers, in turn, gradually learn to seek them out during their reading of the philosophical text and to locate their complex presence within it, aiming to wrench from them insights about the work under discussion. Furthermore, I believe that as the consciousness accompanying the experience of these moments grows, the presence of the incommensurable transpires as an inevitable element of the metaphysical search itself, a search intimately involving what Karl Jaspers called the “impermanence (Unbeständigkeit) of metaphysical objects”, which circumscribed them with “a circle, a tautology or as an internal contradiction” (Jaspers, 1956, 15).162 Reflection about the above-mentioned “moments of grace” is a cornerstone in the formation of the hermeneutics of the incommensurable, which thematizes them and thus helps turn them into an effective tool of philosophical interpretation. The second step in the hermeneutics of the incommensurable involves the identification of the connection between the personal or individual dimension of the text and the philosophical argument conveyed in it. Thereby, the perspective viewing the two as mutually exclusive is rejected. Regarding this nexus, we can find support in HCM’s own words. Thus, in her preface to a volume that collected Reinach’s writings, she asserts: “a philosopher creates exclusively out of the position (Rang) he saw from his essential personal individual-spirit (Individualgeist). Only through him outwards or inwards to the observable world—whether he is explicitly aware of it or not” (HCM, 1921b, vii). At the same time, she clarifies that no “false relativization and subjectivization of philosophical cognition” underlies her principal stance in this regard. Rather, she maintains that “philosophical matter is precisely not unambiguously perceivable and definable through an unequivocal analysis par excellence of 162 See

here my reference to this view by Jaspers in: Miron (2012, 273).

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understanding like scientific matter is” (HCM, 1921b, vii). The individual spirit of the philosopher functions then not only as the treasured source of philosophizing but also as inhering in an essential accessibility to the world itself. Moreover, loyal to the principle of “turn to the object” discussed above, HCM explains the complexity that binds the personal and the individual together through the fundamental nature of metaphysical objects, which is infinite and inexhaustible. In fact, the complexity embodied in the philosophical interpretation of the incommensurable necessitates responding precisely to the state of affairs in which the individual spirit seeks to perceive a philosophical object objectively. The meeting between the two can be enabled thanks to the dimensions of multiplicity and infinity that they share. As HCM puts it: The fullness of the aspects, into which the philosophical object can enter, is infinite. The fullness of intuitions, which should be perceived from it objectively, cannot be exhausted [just like] the infinite number of possible individual spirits—spirits whose specific configuration is capable of intuitively seizing Being in this and no other way. (HCM, 1921b, vii)

Subsequent to the two preliminary steps discussed above, which are addressed to the interpreting reader, the next two steps address the incommensurable contents themselves. Thus, the third step deals with the proper attitude toward the truth claims of the text. Again, HCM’s guidance in this regard is unequivocal: As philosophers, we can grasp the structure of his [Reinach’s] philosophical world only if we accept as our point of departure exactly what he regarded as the same level of the most rigorous objectivity and practicality (Sachlichkeit) at which philosophy has arrived and [are also] capable of realizing just as natural sciences do in their field. An objectivity that immediately manifests its results in the exact categorical conceivability. (HCM, 1921b, vii)

With these words, HCM presents a double requirement—not only accepting the truth claim that is expressed in a philosophical text as the starting point of an inquiry, but also referring to it as the “most rigorous objectivity”. This means that for the far-reaching incommensurable contents, they attain to the unconditional status of objectivity already at the start of the inquiry. HCM further clarifies that only the one exactly for whom “every peculiar, the pure givennesses of an intuitively perceiving and encompassing gaze is the presumption of any philosophical study” can have “an enlightened relation to the philosophical matters, which are more like the attitude of the artist than of that of natural scientist” (HCM, 1921b, vii). Again, this means that rigorous objectivity and the peculiarity attained by intuitive perception do not exclude each other. Even more so, the two join together within that philosophical study that is dedicated precisely to the illumination of their co-existence in the studied thinking of the philosopher. This is also apparent in HCM’s determination that “the requirement for absolute objectification and thereby the fixation of essential cognition is unaccomplishable” (HCM, 1921b, vii). In other words, HCM detects no contradiction between a self-constituted philosophical stance and the related “most rigorous objectivity and practicality” desired by both philosophy and sciences.

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This choice to adopt the text’s truth claims as a means of understanding and interpreting is manifested also the decision to employ in each of the collected articles a method of putting of the philosophical influences on HCM into parentheses. Instead, by mimicking HCM’s approach through a piecing together and explication of her own arguments and ideas, I sought to formulate the core of her foundational phenomenological thinking. Moreover, this method was also favored due to the fact that unlike other philosophers, such as Heidegger, who developed their ideas through dialogue with Kant, Parmenides, Aristotle, Descartes, and others, many of HCM’s writings fall into the essay genre, in which her ideas are formulated directly, without mediation or clear reference to other philosophers. Even when her words echo Aristotelian concepts, or the flavor of scholastic thought, or the phenomenological attention of Husserl’s school, her unique and singular voice immediately bursts out of each line of her writings. This results in the unparalleled nature of HCM’s philosophy, which developed in independent directions different even from those of members of the Munich-Göttingen Circle. Furthermore, this state of affair has been considerably influenced by the fact that most of HCM’s writings were published many years after their composition. Thus, once they appeared, they often encountered a new philosophical and cultural context. In any event, this does not imply that HCM’s writings lack echoes and influences of contemporary phenomenologists. Indeed, the introduction composed especially for this volume seeks to convey above all the lively discourse the Munichers held on shared philosophical questions. Finally, the most inclusive expression of the related choice to adopt HCM’s truth claims concerns the overall interpretative tone employed in the collected articles in this volume. As opposed to a discursive approach to the text, focusing on the logical and systematic dimensions of the arguments it expresses in order to extricate from it a decisive conclusion on the given issue, the hermeneutical approach withdraws from the text in order to enable the truth it embodies to emerge from its multiple dimensions, with the tensions that exist among them. In a profound sense, the hermeneutical position harnesses itself to the text’s interest, whether by searching for the strengths it contains or by locating aspects that could complement it from other philosophical texts, located on the horizon of this text. This approach finds expression in the Introduction in turning to the work of other phenomenologists in the Munich-Göttingen Circle, in order to emphasize HCM’s unique contribution to the realistic orientation in phenomenology, to elucidate vague aspects of her work, and to explain ideas and arguments that are not fully developed in her writings. Like the third step, the fourth step also addresses the incommensurable contents themselves, but it does so by way of the philosopher’s peculiar vocabulary. With regard to HCM, this emerges as one of the greatest challenges raised by her idiosyncratic terminology, with its plethora of neologisms. HCM’s unique and challenging writing style was well-known and apparently also discussed among contemporary phenomenologists. Thus, in a letter to Roman Ingarden from 22 September 1921, Edith Stein referred to Ingarden’s critical attitude to HCM’s style and maintains: “I see it differently. The language is very much her own and, therefore, probably, not easily accessible to you; throughout, however, it is quite suitable” (Stein, 2005b,

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190). Indeed, Stein’s approach confirms that HCM’s individual presence in her writings and thinking is, as we have seen, a foundation in the discussed hermeneutics of the incommensurable. In general, scholarly attitudes to a peculiar vocabulary of the sources can range between two essentially different choices. The first suggests a translation of the thinker’s unique vocabulary into philosophical terms that are familiar in the history of philosophy. Thus, it helps connect the particular philosophy with which it is dealing to the history of ideas. This undoubtedly makes it more accessible to new readers. This approach is reflected in Edith Stein’s description of thinkers who find access to “things” (Sachen) through conceptual perception that has been established by their predecessors, which helps them reach “understanding” (Verstehen) and exposure of the historical contexts (Stein, 2013, 6). However, in the articles gathered in this volume, I have adopted a different hermeneutical position. Instead of proposing a conceptual construction of HCM’s terms through comparison to phenomenological thought or the history of philosophy in general, I have chosen to name her ideas using her own language. This means that instead of moving away from HCM’s unique, even idiosyncratic, vocabulary, I have chosen to adopt it and even turn it into part of the language of the research itself. In any case, it is important to clarify that the choice to adopt HCM’s unique language does not grant the unconventional terms and concepts that oppose the meaning of a metaphor. For example, HCM’s view of the real being as a “wedding (Vermählung) of substantial fullness with the abyss (μη` Ôν / meonic)” (HCM, 1923b, 225)163 employs a word that seems to refer to an entirely different context. One might think that here “wedding” is merely a casual metaphor. However, I argue that in this regard, “wedding” incarnates HCM’s most profound idea of reality, namely: reality as preceded by nothingness (“abyss”) and observation of real beings as permeated by an ideal aspect that is not manifested in their phenomenal appearance yet concerns their entirety. Again, the reader of this study might be guided by HCM’s own clarification that one should not understand the terms she uses in their naturalistic sense, but “only in their pure formal ontological sense” (HCM, 1923b, 190), i.e., regardless of their possible ontic actualization. She explains that “reality is thereby constituted, [its] selfbearingness (Selbstträgerschaft) in this pure formal formative sense is given, it need not be added to materially useful or to immanent creative potencies” (HCM, 1923b, 190). In short: “in their purified (formal) meaning […] all these images (Bilder) are also indispensable to an accurate visualization of the thing (Sache). There remains in them a final and plain sense” (HCM, 1923b, 176). Elsewhere, while discussing “spatial operative immaterial entities”, she establishes that these being “occupy the space […] in an entirely ‘elevated’ mode”, i.e., they cannot penetrate it but at the same time they are not “swallowed” in it. Then comes her amazing request that “this last expression should be understood entirely literally” (HCM, 1923b, 232). As noted above, the hermeneutics of the incommensurable responds precisely to “guidance” such as that HCM sometimes gives her readers. At first, this response is intended to 163 The

word in ancient Greek means relating to, or consisting of void or nothingness, yet it potentially can be transformed into a material thing (unlike absolute blank nothingness).

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help in coping with the hurdles encountered concerning the specific philosophical ideas at stake. However, subsequently a transcending takes place from the specific confines of the discussed matter in favor of more general insights that seem to concern other aspects as well and even philosophical thinking as a whole. Moreover, I argue that the commitment to this type of hermeneutics inevitably involves not only adopting unique terminology as a legitimate philosophical language, but also necessitates its explicit thematization. The article “The Vocabulary of Reality,” included in this volume, not only most explicitly and directly addresses this issue, but also suggests that HCM’s unique vocabulary constitutes one of her most important contributions to the phenomenological movement and the realistic philosophical movement in general. I find an echo of this approach in Stein’s characterization of those she called “born phenomenologists”, whom she depicted as “devoted to a direct study of the things (unmittlebar Sachforschung) and arriving at an understanding of the other’s spiritual work only with the help of their own intellectual capability” (Stein, 2013, 6).164 This standing against the philosophical knowledge that accrued as critical for interpreting the idiosyncratic is obviously in contrast to comparative and conceptual approaches that strive for generalizations such as those usually employed in the sciences, described by Husserl as follows: All sciences proceed methodically in the pursuit of truth, employ […] artificial aids in order to bring to knowledge truth or possibilities that would otherwise remain hidden, and in order to use the obvious or the already established as a level for achieving what is remote and only mediately attainable. The comparative treatment of these methodical aids […] should provide the means for setting up general norms for such procedures and likewise rules for their inventive construction in various classes for cases. (Husserl, 1970a, §6 19/1975, §6 32)

Needless to say, this comparative approach, with its striving to achieve general norms and phraseology, has no place in the philosophical inquiry into the incommensurable that constitutes HCM’s thinking. In Hegel’s spirit, we can characterize the comparative approach in the philosophical context as leading to identifying the different as contradictory, and thus it not only misses the value that could be embodied in the unique, but also does a disservice to the philosophical search for truth. As he puts it: […] the very attempt to define how a philosophical work is supposed to be connected with other efforts to deal with the same subject-matter drags in an extraneous concern, and what is really important for the cognition of the truth is obscured. The more conventional opinion gets fixated on the antithesis of truth and falsity, the more it tends to except a given philosophical system to be either accepted or contradicted; and hence it finds only acceptance or rejection. It does not comprehend the diversity of philosophical system as the progressive unfolding of truth, but rather sees in it simple disagreements. (Hegel, 1977, 1–2)

The difficulty involved in coping with HCM’s idiosyncratic vocabulary is exacerbated by the fact that many of her writings relevant to the studied period are archive materials that were never published, some of which are still in handwriting. These include sketches (Skizze) (HCM, 1931dN); work plans (Entwurf ) (HCM, 1931aN, 164 Likewise, HCM related to “birth from common spirit” that binds the phenomenologists together

(HCM, 1960b, 62).

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1937bN); schemes (Schematik) (HCM, 1931aN, 1930, 1930–1931N); fragments (HCM, 1931cN); synopses (Übersicht); writing down (Niederschrift) (HCM, 1930– 1932aN, 1930–1932bN, 1930–1932cN); and even notes (Notizzettel) (HCM, 1912– 1938N). All these required not only interpreting and transcribing from handwriting but also adding complements and syntheses from the research itself, and as part of it. Coping with the challenge of the accessibility of her ideas, which is not usually the lot of scholars of modern philosophy, made particularly tangible the modern hermeneutical insight, classic since Friedrich Schleiermacher, that the basis of any interpretation is in reconstructing the content with which the reconstruction deals. The reader may easily notice the reconstructive work in the background of the interpretation of HCM’s philosophy offered in light of the special attention devoted to the exposition of her ideas. This accentuation of the interpretation of HCM’s texts is also necessitated by the relative unfamiliarity of her ideas and the paucity of research into her oeuvre. In fact, the reconstruction is necessary not only for writings in HCM’s estate, but also for those that have been published. Despite the intensive editing performed by Avé-Lallemant on HCM’s writings prior to their publication, many of them still require significant hermeneutical efforts from the reader due to the fact that they still contain unfinalized discussions or, alternatively, were phrased as a sort of continuation of a discussion that does not appear in them. It is typical of HCM’s style to open her articles and treatises with a series of rhetorically-phrased questions and immediately afterward to dive into the discussion without clearly indicating what for her is taken for granted. Thus, even her published works necessitate reconstruction and comparison among different treatises, including the manuscripts and documents that remain in her estate that deal with the same issue. In any event, any exposition of thinking involves decisions and syntheses on the part of the reader that exceed the boundaries of a given text. In this regard, a critical assessment unavoidably underlies the exposition of HCM’s ideas in these collected articles. Eventually and inevitably, facing the incommensurable encounters a fundamental hermeneutical isolation in which the interpreter stands alone facing the boundary of the text, or the text as boundary, lacking all the general means that could help understanding the text apart from joining it—a joining that amounts to a single encounter between the monadic individual and the incommensurable text. Indeed, a reflection of this state of affairs can also be found in HCM’s own words: Here we reach the absolute boundary of the replaceability of one scholar by another. While a researcher in the natural sciences completely enters the objective scientific community, a philosopher enters the monadic solo appearance (Einzelerscheinung), and eventual solitude becomes his lived experience (Erlebniss). (HCM, 1921b, vii)

B. The Structure of the Collection This volume is composed of a Preface and three parts. 1. Preface The Preface presents what has been largely absent from the discussions in the various articles: HCM’s personal background and the social and philosophical contexts of her thought. In addition, the Preface addresses aspects I found to be crucial for

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understanding the hermeneutic philosophical aspects the articles apply in relation to specific issues. In this context, special emphasis has been given to the mutual influences of the early phenomenologists. HCM’s ideas are discussed in the Preface along with those of Husserl, Reinach, Geiger, Pfänder, Stein, von Hildebrand, and Spiegelberg. At the same time, the fascinating phenomenon whereby often the ideas of one member of the Circle were explained and further developed by other members reveals the group nature as a philosophical characteristic, which thus transpires as a key for the interpretation of early phenomenology in general. Naturally, over the years, as my research into HCM’s work expanded and developed, changes have sometimes occurred in my interpretation of some of her ideas. Despite this, the articles appear in the original form in which they were published. 2. Part One: The Philosophy of Being This part is composed of five articles based on an analysis of one of two early works, Doctrine of Appearance or Realontologie. 1. From the “Still Covered” to the “Pure Primordial” Phenomena and Back: The External World in the Phenomenology of Conrad-Martius A previous version of this article appeared in Hebrew. The current revised and elaborated English version was composed especially for this volume. The article addresses the two questions HCM poses at the opening of her first great treatise, “On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World” (HCM, 1916b): “In which real mode are perceived ‘essences (Washeiten)’ given to us, in more or less big definiteness (Bestimmtheit)? And where do we encounter them in their concrete realization?” (HCM, 1916b, 356). These questions initiate the problematization of the given and thus pose a clear limit between the immediate appearance of the external world and its real being, which in HCM’s opinion are not identical (HCM, 1916b, 427). The philosopher deals with the first through a careful investigation of what she refers to as “feeling givenness (Empfindungsgegebenheit)”, and the second through a keen observation of the givenness of “manifest-appearance”. These two tracks are woven together, and thus the phenomenology of the external world moves simultaneously in two opposing directions: by following the line from the “still covered” to the “pure primordial” phenomena we are looking for the ideal reality that brings about the reality of things. This reality does not manifest itself on the phenomenal level but transpires as covering or hiding reality as such. However, since the phenomenon of the external world is not an idea, while moving from the “primordial” to the “covered”, we search for the reality that transcends its ideal boundaries—a transcending that is embodied in the fundamental essence of reality achieving external dimensions. The real transcendence of the external world to human consciousness is revealed in these opposing directions, and thus the reality of the phenomenon of the external world is confirmed. 2. The Realism of the Transcendence: A Critical Analysis of Hedwig ConradMartius’ Early Ontology Like the previous paper, this article also focuses on the treatise On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World (HCM, 1916b), this time

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addressing the issue of transcendence that is essential to the ontology of the external world. HCM’s establishing argument associates transcendence with mundane reality while eliminating any mystical meaning from it. Although the ontological aspect of the problem of transcendence is more dominant in her approach, its epistemological dimensions are not denied but illuminated through her discussion of the nature of human spirit in the face of which the world appears as external. My main argument in this article is that HCM’s phenomenology of externality lays the foundations for the phenomenology of transcendence. Consequently, transcendence transpires as the depth and the most ultimate meaning not only of external phenomena but also of reality as such. 3. The External World—“Whole” and “Parts”: A Husserlian Hermeneutics of the Early Ontology of Hedwig Conrad-Martius This article proposes an analysis of HCM’s On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World (HCM, 1916b) from the perspective of Husserl’s theory of whole and parts presented in his Logical Investigations. Here the “whole” (Ganz) is identified with “sensory givenness” and “parts” (Teile) with “feeling givenness (Empfindungsgegebenheit)” and “appearance givenness (Erscheinungsgegebenheit)”. The main argument thus established is that dependent-independent relations and the necessary laws that prescribe the unity of objects, at the center of Husserl’s theory of whole and parts, are also foundational in HCM’s early ontology. This ontology is torn between two forces that comprise an unsolvable tension. On the one hand, she searches for an essential and unified whole, viewed as independent of the senses, of consciousness, and of the human subject in general. This search is expected to provide a grip on the problem of “reality as such”. On the other hand, while searching for access to this whole, HCM encounters the involvement of the senses and consciousness in its appearances, that is, in the appearing of the external world. 4. The “Gate of Reality”: Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Idea of Reality in Realontologie The next two articles included in part one of this volume focus on the treatise Realontologie (Real Ontology) from 1923. This treatise should be considered as the crowning achievement of her metaphysics, although to this very day it has yet to be published in whole. The question “what is reality?” that opens this treatise, just as her contemporary phenomenologist, Martin Heidegger, asked in Being and Time indicates the attempt to reexamine the foundations of metaphysics (HCM, 1923b, 159; Heidegger, 1962, §3 31.). HCM asserts that a “blinding insight” exists in modern philosophy regarding the unfathomable contrast between the ideal and the real and argues that this insight blocks access to the question of reality. To counter this, HCM’s ontology seeks what she calls the “gateway to reality”, meaning the datumpoint where things “elevate” themselves from non-existence or mere ideal existence but do not yet arrive at “operative Being” or realistic fulfillment. The discussion in the article distills from HCM’s thinking three characteristics of the real that should be capable of addressing what she what she refers to as “the task of Being”. Each is personally imposed on the real and brings about the fulfillment of the essence

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inherent in it: corporeality (Leibhaftigkeit), selfness (Selbsthaftigkeit), and primordiality (Primordialität). The suggested interpretation of each of these three seeks to unravel the only apparent contrast between the real and the ideal in favor of what HCM regards as the only genuine and primordial opposition that separates the real from nonexistence. 5. The Vocabulary of Reality Like the previous article, this article also concentrates on Realontologie (HCM 1923b). It addresses HCM’s unique contribution to the philosophical realistic discourse by extricating and explicating the unique vocabulary that HCM consolidates within her phenomenological analysis of reality. The article analyzes the following concepts: “Essence” (Wesen), “Bearer” (Träger), “Selfness” (Selbsthaftigkeit), Capability (Konnen), ¨ Tangentiality (Tangirbarkeit), Corporeality (Leibhaftigkeit), Internality, “Quiet”, Fullness (Fülle), Depth, divisibility (Teilbarkeit), Abyss (Abgrund), and others. HCM does not always coin them as distinct concepts, but they function philosophically due to the meaning she pours into them and the way she uses them. These terms initiate an essential vocabulary for establishing a new philosophical discourse about reality, which is nearly absent in twentieth-century philosophy that has been overshadowed by literal and advanced idealistic discourse. 3. Part Two: The Philosophy of the “I-Being” This part contains four articles dealing with the perception of the I in HCM’s philosophy, referred to as “I-being” (Ichhaftes Sein). The sequence of the articles addresses her early corpus but provides the key to understanding the later writings dealing with her idea of the I, offer a method for approaching her philosophy of the I in its entirety. HCM’s fundamental argument in this context is that the I should be understood as part of Being in general, even if it possesses unique characteristics. Thus, the analysis of HCM’s idea of the I that is presented in Part Two of this volume integrates the insights obtained from her perception of Being that were discussed in the articles that are included in Part One. 6. The Phenomenal Experience of the I: The Idea of the I in Hedwig ConradMartius’ Early Phenomenology This article addresses the phenomenal experience of the I that is at the foundation of HCM’s realistic phenomenology. Focusing on her early book Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World from 1916, the discussion strives to interpret the modes of the involvement of the I in the appearances of the real external world. It also extricates from HCM’s analysis of the external world two primordial dispositions of the I: “passive and resting self-inclusiveness” (passive und ruhender Ichhaltung) and “active consciousness”. These two real dispositions correspond to two kinds of consciousnesses: as “saturated” (inprägniertheit) in itself, the I illuminates itself by itself and as such that “objectively absorbs” (gegenständlich aufnehmende) the reality external to it. Moreover, the two dispositions correspond to the two spheres of objects in the external world discerned by HCM: that of sensory manifest (sinnfällige) objects and that of covered objects. Thus, in relation to the sensorially manifest (sinnfällige)

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objects, regarding which the I conducts itself as passive and self-including being visà-vis the phenomenality of objects. However, regarding the sphere of covert objects, the I is active and directed beyond itself, to the concealed essence that is covered over by the phenomenal layer of things. 7. The Ontological Exclusivity of the I. The pivotal insight that paved HCM’s way in elucidating the ontological exclusivity of the I, often referred to as “I-being” (Ichhaftes Sein), is that despite its peculiarity and incomparability to any other mode of being, only by coming to terms with the “ontological foundations” of the real being in general can “a true ‘comprehension’ (Begreifung)” of the I be enabled. The phenomenological interpretation suggested in this article presents HCM’s ontological understanding of the I vis-a-vis her philosophy of Being, in particular in regard to three of its general characteristics—existence, intelligibility, and “selfness” (Selbsthaftigkeit / Sichheit / Selberkeit)—which provide the critical approach to the ontological study of the I. Finally, the ontological exclusivity of the “I-being” is illuminated by means of explication of the joining together of its typical affinities and discrepancies in regard to Being in general. 8. The Duality of the I: A Commentary on Hedwig Conrad-Martius’s Realistic Phenomenology This article deals with the duality that characterizes the idea of the I in the realist ontology of the phenomenologist Hedwig Conrad-Martius (HCM) (1880–1966). The basis of the discussion reveals two dimensions of duality in HCM’s perception of the I: one, which appeared in her early work On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World (HCM, 1916b), focuses on the phenomenological dimensions of the I and lays the critical foundations for the more developed ontological duality in HCM’s later writings that address the ontological aspects of the I. The later phase in HCM’s thinking regarding the I focused on the spiritual I and established the simultaneous operation of two elements in it: its “origin-like” nature (Ursprungshaftigkeit) and its spritualness (geistlichthafte), which is referred to also as “infrastasis” (Infrastase). The phenomenological interpretation of the idea of the I in HCM’s thinking commences with unveiling these two phases in her writing, proceeds to the explication of the meaning of the I explored in them, and culminates in the illumination of the relations between them. Meanwhile, HCM’s radical response to Husserl’s turn toward transcendentalism and the well-established criticisms of realistic phenomenology contemporary with Husserl regarding the lack of discussion of the issue of the ego or the I is refuted. 9. A Philosophical Resonance: Hedwig Conrad-Martius versus Edith Stein This article seeks to unearth the philosophical resonance of HCM’s ideas with Edith Stein’s thinking. Thus, it adds an element of content to the better-known personal relations between the two phenomenologists. Here, resonance has two meanings. The first is phenomenological and apparent in the manifestation of a spiritual communality between the two philosophers. The second relates to the constitutive establishing of a new hermeneutical framework from which new possibilities of understanding might

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emerge from analyzing the ideas under discussion. The article starts with presenting HCM’s and Stein’s basic stance regarding core metaphysical aspects that serve as an introduction to their idea of the I. The discussion presents the dual structure of the I in the thinking of HCM and Stein and analyzes their different stances toward it. The former regards it as an utmost indication of the realism of the I; the latter illuminates its compatibility with the Christian religious faith. 3. Part Three: The Convergence of Being and the I-Being This part is composed of three articles in which the insights from HCM’s philosophy of Being converge with aspects related to her perception of the I. The most extensive article in this context is the first one, while the two articles that follow present the integration between the philosopher’s perceptions of Being and of the I from a defined perspective. 10. In the Midst of Being: A Journey into the Internality of Being in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Metaphysics This article delineates the main milestones in the trajectory to the internality of Being in HCM’s thinking against Husserl’s transcendentalism. It starts by uncovering the multi-aspect duality that characterizes the real being, continues in encountering the limitations and constraints that are imposed by a study anchored in the appearances of the real external world, and culminates in the articulation of the internality of Being as “selfness” (Selbsthaftigkeit or Selberkeit) that typifies real beings and the spiritual-I. This trajectory is not marked by HCM herself, but like any phenomenological journey it is personal and can be best carried out in the first person. The discussion in the article delineates the path to the internality of Being in Husserl’s phenomenology, in which the gap between the internal and the external is intensified to the point of the reduction of the external world. As a result, the world is eliminated and sometimes even seems entirely forgotten. In contrast, for HCM, there is no such opposition. On the contrary, in her thinking the simultaneous gaze to the internal and the external aspects of reality is preserved and the thematization of the gap between the two transpires as a useful hermeneutical tool achieving an abundant and complex perception of the internality of Being that in no way leaves behind its external dimensions and the world in general. 11. Essence, Abyss, and Self: Hedwig Conrad-Martius on the Non-Spatial Dimensions of Being The point of departure of the discussion in this article is HCM’s description of the reality to which her philosophizing is addressed as “totally non-material corporeality”. With this contradictory expression, she seeks to affirm two foundational aspects regarding reality. The first is the spatial that achieved material realization in real existents. The second refers to the concealed non-spatial that is at the cradle of reality and remains present behind its phenomenal and material appearances. In this regard, three ontological elements in HCM’s idea of reality—“essence”, “abyss”, and “selfness”—are distinguished as both implying and raising the issue of the non-spatiality of Being in her thinking. Moreover, the force in real beings that can never shine in its entirety evolves from the illumination of each of the related elements. By means

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of philosophical explication of the ideas of “essence”, “abyss”, and “selfness” and of their dialectic relations with the corresponding spatial aspects, this article demonstrates the evolution of HCM’s understanding of the issue of spatiality that mirrors her metaphysics as a whole. 12. The Metaphysical Absolutizing of the Ideal: Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Criticism of Husserl’s Idealism This article discusses the main arguments of Hedwig Conrad-Martius against the world view (Weltanschauung) of idealism in connection to her phenomenological idea of reality. The discussion focuses on her most far-reaching critical argument concerning the damage caused by idealism to the possibility for metaphysics due to its turning of the real (das wirkliche) to the ideal (Ideelles) or the concept. Consequently, so she argues, reality is consolidated in idealism as an idea. The article suggests an analysis of Conrad-Martius’ understanding of the evolution of the world view of idealism and of her criticism regarding what she refers to as metaphysical absolutizing of the ideal in idealism. Against this background, HCM’s counter-response to idealism is articulated, suggesting rehabilitating facticity (Faktizität) of real reality (wirkliche Wirklichkeit) within metaphysics. 4. Appendix 13. Faith, Individuality, and Radicalism: A Jewish Perspective on Edith Stein The basis of this article was originally published in Hebrew, and the English version as it appears here was prepared specially for this volume. The relevance of this article to this volume stems not only from Edith Stein, like HCM, belonging to the MunichGöttingen Circle, but particularly from the many references to parallels between Stein and HCM, as expressed in the notes to this paper. The relations between the two thinkers, made explicit in this article, partially underly the discussion in article nine. In this regard, the term “resonance” is preferred over “influence” because HCM’s ideas appeared in writings composed and published after Stein’s death. In any case, it is unclear how accessible HCM’s writings were to Stein during the years when HCM composed her main works, or how much the two discussed these ideas before their ways parted during the war and up to Stein’s murder in Auschwitz in 1942. However, the main discussion in this paper confronts Stein’s Christian idea of faith with the Jewish one of Yeshayahu Leibowitz (1903–1994) on the basis of the radicality that is common to their view of religious faith as such. The discussion commences with uncovering the common starting point of the two thinkers, which anchors the religious faith in one’s volitional decision. Yet, this commonality appears to be undermined by essential differences between their understandings of the religious experience. Delving into the differences between Stein’s and Leibowitz’s idea of faith demonstrates two faces of radicalism in the human religious experience. Ramat Gan, Israel

Ronny Miron

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References165 Ales Bello, A. (1993). Edith Stein und Hedwig Conrad-Martius: eine menschliche und intellektuelle Begegnung, Phänomenologische Forschungen, 27(27), 256–284. Ales Bello, A. (2002). Hedwig Conrad-Martius and the phenomenology of nature. Analecta Husserliana (ANHU) (Vol. LXXX, pp. 210–232). Ales Bello, A. (2004). The controversy about the existence of the world in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological school. In A. Reinach, R. Ingarden, H. Conrad-Martius, & E. Stein. Analecta Husserliana (ANHU) (Vol. LXXIX, pp. 97–115). Ales Bello, A. (Ed.). (2008a). Axiomathes, 18(4), 395–542 (special issue on Conrad-Martius). Ales Bello, A., Alfieri, F., & Shahid, M. (Eds.). (2010a). Edith Stein. Hedwig Conrad-Martius Fenomenologia Metafisica Scienze (Phenomenology, Metaphysics, Science). Bari: Giuseppe Laterza di Giuseppe Laterza. Ales Bello, A., Alfieri, F., & Shahid, M. (Eds.). (2010b). Edith Stein, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Gerda Walther, Fenomenologia della Persona, della vita e della Comunitá (Phenomenology of Person, of Life and of Community). Bari: Giuseppe Laterza di Giuseppe Laterza. Ameriks, K. (1977). Husserl’s Realism. The Philosophical Review, 86(4), 498–519. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1958). Psychologisch-ontologische Perspektiven. Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görres-Gesellschaft, Festschrift für Hedwig Conrad-Martius 66, 166–176. Freiburg-München: Karl Alber. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1959). Der kategoriale Ort des Seelischen in der Naturwirklichkeit. Eine Untersuchung auf der Grundlage der realontologischen Arbeiten von Hedwig Conrad-Martius (Dissertation). München. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1971). Phänomenology und Realität, Vergleichende Untersuchungen zur ‘München-Göttinger’ und ‘Freiburger’ Phänomenology (Habilitationsschrift). München. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1975a). Die Antithese Freiburg- München in der Geschichte der Phänomenologie. In H. Kuhn, E. Avé-Lallemant, & R. Gladiator (Phaenomenologica 65) (Eds.), Die Münchener Phänomenologie, Vorträge des Internationalen Kongresses in München 13.–18. April 1971 (pp. 19–38). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1975b). Die Nachlässe der Münchener Phänomenologen in der Bayrischen Staatsbibliothek, Catalogus Codicum manu scriptorium Bibliothecae Monacensis, Tomus (vol) X, part (pars) I. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1977). Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888–1966): Bibliographie. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 31(2), 301–315. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1980). Religion und Metaphysik im Weltalter des Ausgleich. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 42(2), 266–293. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1984). Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888–1966), Phenomenology and Reality. In H. Spiegelberg (Ed.), 1984a. The phenomenological movement: A historical introduction, third revised and enlarged edition with the collaboration of Karl Schuhmann trans. Herbert Spiegelberg (Phaenomenologica 5/6). The Hague, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, Kluwer Academic Publishing, 212–222. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1988). Die Phänomenologische Bewegung. Ursprung, Anfänge und Ausblick. In H. Reiner Sepp (Ed.), Edmund Husserl und die phänomenologische Bewegung, Zeugnisse in Text und Bild (pp. 61–75). Freiburg/München. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1994). Die Neubegründung einer Philosophischen Kosmologie im Werk von Hedwig Conrad-Martius. In F. Bernhard (Ed.), Cosmologica et Geographica. Festschrift für Heribert M. Nobis (Algorismus 13) (pp. 37–60). München.

165 HCM’s writings are listed according to the publication year, with the date of composition added

in brackets. Works by the same author are listed in order of publication, from earliest to latest and alphabetically. Archive materials that have yet to be published are noted with the letter N (Nachlass) after the year of their composition.

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Avé-Lallemant, E. (2015). Edith Stein und Hedwig Conrad-Martius—Begegnung in Leben und Werk. In B. Beckmann & H. Barbara Gerl-Falkovitz (Eds.), Edith Stein, Themen-BezügeDokumente (2nd ed.) (pp. 66–88). Dresden: Verlag Text and Dialog. Avé-Lallemant, E., & Schuhmann, K. (1992). Ein Zeitzeuge über die Anfänge der phänomenologische Bewegung: Theodor Conrad Bericht aus dem Jahre 1954. Husserl Studies, 9, 77– 90. Avé-Lallemant, U. (1965/1966). Hedwig Conrad Martius. Jahrbuch der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing, XV, 203–212. Baring, E. (2018). Neo-Scholasticism, Phenomenology, and the Problem of Conversion. In R. Heynickx & S. Symons (Eds.), So What’s New about Scholasticism? How Neo-Thomism Helped Shape the Twentieth Century. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter. Baring, E. (2019). Converts to the Real: Catholicism and the Making of Continental Philosophy. Cambridge, MA, London, England: Harvard University Press. Behler, W. (1956). Realität und Ek-Sistenz, Auseinandersetzung mit der Konzeption Martin Heidegger in Konfrontation mit der ontologischen Schriften von Hedwig Conrad-Martius (Diss.). München. Borden Sharkey, S. (2008). Edith Stein and Thomas Aquinas on Being and Essence. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 82(1), 87–113. Borden Sharkey, S. (2010). Thine own self: Individuality in Edith Stein’s later writings. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press. Brecht, F. J. (1948). Bewusstsein und Existenz, Wesen und Weg der Phänomenologie. Bremen: J. Storm. Biemel, M. (1952). Einleitung des Heraugegebers. Ideen zu einer Reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologische Philosophie, Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution, Husserliana (Vol. IV, pp. xiii–xx). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Calcagno, A. (2007). The Philosophy of Edith Stein. Pittsburg: Duquesne. Calcagno, A. (Ed.). (2016). Edith Stein: Women, social-political philosophy, theology, metaphysics and public history, new approaches and applications. Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, and London: Springer. Calcagno, A. (2018). On the vulnerability of a community: Edith Stein and Gerda Walther. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 49(3), 255–266. Celms, T. (1928). Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls. Latvijas Universitatis Raksti, XIX, 251–436. Conrad, T. (1953–1954N). Überblick über die Untersuchungen zur phänomenologischen Methode im WS [Winter Semester] 1953/54 und SS 1954. In Conradiana A.V.2, 13 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad, T. (1954N). Bericht über die Anfänge der phänomenologischen Bewegung. In Conradiana A.V.1, 6 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad, T. (1965–1969aN) [Späte Manuskripte]. Was ist und was will die Phänomenologie heute? In Conradiana A.VI.5, 16 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad, T. (1965–1969bN) [Späte Manuskripte]. Zum Gedanken an Husserl und seine phänomenologische Methode. In Conradiana A.VI.6, 5 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1912N). [Aus der Studienzeit, Zeitungsbericht], Conrad-Martiusiana, D.I 2 [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1912–1938N). [Aus der München-Bergzabener Zeit], Conrad-Martiusiana, D.I 3 [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1915–1919N). Realontologie I, Buch. (erste Fassung). Conrad-Martiusiana, A.I 4, 294 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1916). Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Auβenwelt: Verbunden mit einer Kritik positivistischer Theorien. Jahrbuch für Phänomenology and philosophische Forschung III. Halle: Max Niemeyer, 345–542.

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Ingarden, R. (1975). On the Motives which Led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism. Trans. Arnór Hannibalsson (Phenomenologica 64). Trans. Arnór Hannibalsson. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Jaspers, K. (1956). Philosophie, vol III: Metaphysik. Berlin, Göttingen, Heidelberg: Springer. Koyré, A. (1911–1964N). [correspondence: Letters to HCM], Conrad-Martiusiana, C.II 37 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Kuhn, H. (1966). Die bekannte Unbekannte, Zur Erinnerung an Hedwig Conrad-Martius (obituary), Süddeutsche Zeitung 5/6 March 1966. Kuhn, H. (1969). Phänomenologie und Realität. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 23(3), 397–399. Kuhn, H. (1971). Phänomenologie und “wirklich Wirklichkeit”. In H. Kuhn, E. Avé-Lallemant, & R. Gladiator (Eds.), Die Münchener Phänomenologie, Vorträge des Internationalen Kongresses in München, 13–18 April 1971 (pp. 1–7). The Hague. Küng, G. (1972a). Husserl on pictures and intentional objects. The Review of Metaphysics: A Philosophical Quarterly, 26, 670–680. Küng, G. (1972b). The world as noema and as referent. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 3 (1), 15–26. Küng, G. (1984). Roman Ingarden (1893–1970): Ontological phenomenology. In Herbert Spiegelberg. 1984a. The Phenomenological Movement, A Historical Introduction (pp. 223–233), third revised and enlarged edition with the collaboration of Karl Schuhmann (Phaenomenologica 5/6). The Hague, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, Kluwer Academic publishing. Landgrebe, L. (1949). Phänomenology und Metaphysik, (Aufsatzsammlung). Hamburg: M. Von Schroder. Landgrebe, L. (1963). Der Weg der Phänomenologie, Das Problem Einer Ursprünglichen Erfahrung. Güterslohe: Gred Mohn. Lebech, M. (2011). Beginning to read Stein’s finite and eternal being. In L. Embree, I. Copoeru, D. Moran, & H. Reiner Sepp (Eds.), Phenomenology 2010 4, Selected essays from Northern Europe traditions, transitions and challenges (pp. 138–154). Bucharest: Zeta Books/Paris: ArghosDiffusion. Machnacz, J. (1985). Problematyka ontycznei budowy czlowieka w pimach Hedwig Conrad-Martius (The problem of ontological constitution of man in Hedwig Conrad Martius’ works) (Diss.). Lublin. Machnacz, J. (1992). Hedwig Conrad-Martius i Edith Stein, uczennice E. Husserla a filozofia arystotelesowsko-tomistyczna (Hedwig Conrad-Martius and Edith Stein, Husserl’s pupils and Aristotelian-Thomistic Philosophy). Studia Philosophiae Christiana 28, 87–103. Martius, G.-A. (2002). 1933–1945, Auch das geschah in Deutschland: Martius zum Beispiel, Genealogie. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Familienkunde, 26(51). Martius, G. -A. (2003a). 1933–1945, Auch das geschah in Deutschland: Martius zum Beispiel, Genealogie. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Familienkunde, 26(52). Martius, G. -A. (2003b). 1933–1945, Auch das geschah in Deutschland: Martius zum Beispiel. Blätter zur Geschichte der Familie Martius: Heft 17, Neustadt: Degener. Metzger, A. (1966). Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, Das Problem der Realtivität und seiner Überwindung (2nd ed.). Stuttgart: Neske Pfulling. Miron, R. (2012). Karl jaspers: From selfhood to being, Value Inquiry Book Series. Amsterdam, New York, NY: Rodopi. Miron, R. (Ed.). (2018b). Husserl and other phenomenologists. London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis. Moran, D. (2012). Forward. In E. Husserl, Ideas, central introduction to pure phenomenology (W. R. Boyce Gibson, Trans.) (pp. xiii–xxxiii). London: Routledge. Moran, D., & Szanto, T. (Eds.). (2016). Phenomenology of sociality discovering the “We”. New York: Routledge. Morriston, W. (1976). Intentionality and the phenomenological method: A critique of Husserl’s transcendental idealism. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 7(1), 33–43.

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The Articles in this Book were Previously Published in the Following Places166

The Preface was written for this volume and has not been previously published. 1.

2.

3.

4.

5. 6.

7. 8.

From the “Still Covered” to the “Pure Primordial”: The External World in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Phenomenology. Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 63, 2014, 407–429. Translated from Hebrew for this volume and reprinted with permission. The Realism of the Transcendence: A Critical Analysis of Hedwig ConradMartius’ Early Ontology. The International Journal of Literary Humanities 11 (3), 2014, 37–48. Reprinted with permission. The External World—“Whole” and “Parts”: A Husserlian Hermeneutics of the Early Ontology of Hedwig Conrad-Martius The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy XVI, 2018, 299–316. Reprinted with permission. The “Gate of Reality”: Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Idea of Reality in Realontologie. Phänomenologische Forschungen, 2014, 59–82. Reprinted with permission. The Vocabulary of Reality. Human Studies 38 (3), 2015, 331–347. https://doi. org/10.1007/s10746-015-9345-5 (printed by Springer). The Phenomenal Experience of the “I”: The Idea of the “I” in Hedwig ConradMartius’ Early Phenomenology. The Irish Philosophical Society Yearbook, 2014/15, 99–123. Reprinted with permission. The Ontological Exclusivity of the “I”. Phänomenologische Forschungen, 2017, 97–116. Reprinted with permission. The Duality of the “I”. Phänomenologische Forschungen, 2019, 71–98. Reprinted with permission.

166 An

early version of the articles appeared in the places listed. Before their reprinting as chapters in this volume, all the translations from German to English have been checked and edited, some previous phrasings have been improved, and slight updates have been introduced in the notes.

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10.

11.

12.

13.

The Articles in this Book were Previously Published in the Following Places

A Philosophical Resonance: Hedwig Conrad-Marius versus Edith Stein. Empathy, Sociality, and Personhood. Essays on Edith Stein’s Phenomenological Investigations, Elisa Magrì and Dermot Moran (eds.), 2017, 193–216. (printed by Springer). In the Midst of Being: A Journey into the Internality of Being in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Metaphysics. Phenomenological Ontologies: Individuality, Essence, Idea. A special issue of the Italian philosophical journal: Discipline Filosofiche 26 (1), 2016, 217–244. Reprinted with permission. Essence, Abyss and Self: Hedwig Conrad-Martius on the Non-Spatial Dimensions of Being. Woman Phenomenologists on Social Ontology, Sebastian Luft and Ruth Hagengruber (eds.), Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences Series, Chan Switzerland: Springer, 2018, 147–167. (printed by Springer). The Metaphysical Absolutizing of the Ideal: Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Criticism of Husserl’s Idealism The Idealism-Realism Debate in the Early Phenomenological Movement, Rodney K. B. Parker (ed.), Springer, 2020. (to be printed by Springer). Faith, Individuality, and Radicalism: A Jewish Perspective on Edith Stein. Revised version of: Faith and Individualism—Edith Stein and Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Daat: A Journal of Jewish Philosophy & Kabblah 82, 2016, 33–57 (Hebrew). Revised and translated from Hebrew for this volume and reprinted with permission.

Acknowledgments

This book has been published with the support and encouragement of many dear people and institutions. It originated in a post-doctoral study supported by the Minerva Fund, which I conducted at the universities of Munich, Frankfurt, and Cologne in 2002–2003. After about a decade, during which I focused on other topics of research, I returned to study Hedwig Conrad-Martius. These two periods are connected by an almost random meeting with Prof. Ruth Hagengruber at Cologne University in 2002. This encounter was preserved in our shared memory, and it received new life in 2015 at Paderborn University, Germany, at a conference held at the Center for the History of Women Philosophers and Scientists, which Ruth established and manages. Ruth was among the very few who were familiar with Hedwig Conrad-Martius, and was immediately excited by the study I wanted to carry out. She gave me invaluable impetus and encouragement at the first stage of my study into an almost anonymous philosopher, whose value and importance to the history of philosophy was hardly known to anyone. I give her my deep gratitude for her true friendship, her unending enthusiasm, and her exemplary commitment to revealing the legacy of women philosophers and scientists. All this was accompanied by many invitations to her Center, enabling me to use its archive and to share the fruits of my research with colleagues and students from Paderborn University in concentrated courses as part of the Erasmus Program, and in international summer schools held between 2017 and 2019. I also wish to thank the Center’s always helpful team, particularly Christian Meineke and Julia Mühl. Following Ruth’s recommendation, I contacted Eberhard Avé-Lallemant, who generously shared with me his knowledge and rare texts of Conrad-Martius’s writings. I deeply regret that he did not live to see the fruits of this research. My warm thanks to Prof. Mary Ellen Waithe for the shared work on the manuscript of this volume. The deep reading of the text by a scholar of her stature gave me an unforgettable lesson in proper philosophical work. My sincere gratitude also goes to Prof. Antonio Calcagno for true friendship, limitless giving, a thorough reading of drafts, wise comments, helpful advice for translating German terms into English, and much more. I would also like to thank Rodney Parker, who generously shared with me many materials of phenomenological thinking. Special thanks to Burt Hopkins lxxxiii

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for the metaphysical brotherhood and to George Heffernan for the knowledge he shared with me and for his friendship. Many thanks to my colleagues at Bar-Ilan University for the support and trust they gave a study about an anonymous philosopher whose name they had never heard. The Rector of Bar-Ilan University, Prof. Miriam Faust, is a paragon of a leader guided by the unconditional value of academic research that is an inseparable part of the life of the spirit. Prof. Elda Weizman, the Chair of the Interdisciplinary Studies Unit at Bar-Ilan University, and Prof. Edward Greenstein, the Head of the Program for Hermeneutics and Cultural Studies at Bar-Ilan University, gave valuable support and appreciation for the study during their years in office. My thanks and affection also to my students in the phenomenological seminars, and especially to my Ph.D. students who took up my enthusiasm for the unfamiliar philosopher, took it upon themselves to study the early phenomenological thinking, and joined my travels overseas and wherever they could hear about the thinking of Conrad-Martius and other female phenomenologists. Through them, I was able to relive the spirit of group philosophizing established by the members of the Munich Circle, of which Conrad-Martius was the living spirit. My thanks to Ruth Ludlam, who devotedly and professionally undertook the editing and preparation for print of the book’s chapters. Finally, my gratitude goes to my family members, my children Shira, Noa, Itamar, and Neta, and my partner Ben Hecht, who supported my many overseas travels, and who was the first to listen to my lectures about Conrad-Martius, to comment, to encourage, and to rejoice in every advance in my study of her thinking.

Neither the “covered” (verhüllten) primordial phenomena (Urphänomene) nor especially the perceived ideas lie themselves on the concealed in the “bare surface of the mere appearances” (baren Erscheinungsoberfläche). Accordingly, the work required here can thereby nevermore be achieved, so that through passive observation that is devoted to the plane of appearing, one perceives descriptively the directly obvious phenomenal differences, and be it also down to the finest nuances. On the other hand, from this “‘surface-appearance’ […] only the present essence-holdings (Wesensbestände) that are present de facto, to which the surface-appearances lead through a respective precise analysis as to its own foundation must also emerge.” (HCM, 1916, 353–354).

Contents

Part I 1

2

3

The Philosophy of Being

From the “Still Covered” to the “Pure Primordial” Phenomena and Back: The External World in the Phenomenology of Conrad-Martius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 The “Still Covered” and the “Pure Primordial” Phenomena . . . . . 1.3 “Sensory Givenness” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.1 “Feeling Givenness” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.2 The Sensorially Manifest “Appearance Givenness” . . . . . 1.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3 4 7 10 12 18 26 26

The Realism of Transcendence: A Critical Analysis of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Early Ontology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 The Problem of Transcendence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Essence and Transcendence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Gap and Transcendence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 The Human Spirit and Transcendence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31 31 34 38 41 44 45

The External World—“Whole” and “Parts”: A Husserlian Hermeneutics of the Early Ontology of Hedwig Conrad-Martius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The “Whole”: “Sensory Givenness” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 The “Parts”: “Feeling Givenness” and “Appearance Givenness” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 “Feeling Givenness” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 “Appearance Givenness” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

47 47 50 53 54 57

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3.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61 66 67

“The Gate of Reality”: Hedwig Conrad-Martius’s Idea of Reality in Realontologie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 “Selfness” (Selbsthaftigkeit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Corporeality (Leibhaftigkeit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Primordiality (Primär) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71 71 77 81 83 90 93

The Vocabulary of Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 “Essence” (Wesen, Washeit) and “Bearer” (Träger) . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Materiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 “Selfness” (Selbsthaftigkeit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 “Homeland” (Heimat) and “Dwelling” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 Fulfillment and Capability (Konnen) ¨ ........................ 5.7 Tangentiality (Tangierbarkeit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8 Corporeality (Leibhaftigkeit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.9 Internality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.10 “Soundness” (Solidität) and “Rest” (Ruhe) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.11 Fullness (Fülle), Depth, and Darkness’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.12 Divisibility (Teilbarkeit) and Abyss (Abgrund) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.13 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.14 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

95 95 97 98 99 99 100 101 103 104 105 107 108 110 111 112

Part II 6

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Contents

The Philosophy of the “I-Being”

The Phenomenal Experience of the I: The Idea of the I in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Early Phenomenology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Essence and Phenomenal Givenness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Two Fundamental Dispositions of the I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.1 The Disposition of Passive Self-Inclusiveness . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.2 The Disposition of Active Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

117 117 119 122 122 127 133 134

The Ontological Exclusivity of the I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 7.2 Existence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

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7.3 Intelligibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 7.4 Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 8

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The Duality of the I: A Commentary on Hedwig Conrad-Martius’s Realist Phenomenology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 The Dual Ontological Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 The Phenomenal Duality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 The Ontological Duality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

157 157 159 161 167 170 175 178

A Philosophical Resonance: Hedwig Conrad-Martius Versus Edith Stein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 Conrad-Martius Versus Stein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.1 Reality as a Common Point of Departure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.2 Philosophy and Theology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.3 The Beginning in Nothingness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.4 The Idea of the I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.5 The Dual Structure of the I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 The Destiny of Duality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

183 183 185 185 189 191 194 195 201 204 205

Part III The Convergence of Being and the “I-Being” 10 In the Midst of Being: The Journey into the Internality of Reality in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1 Introduction: Idea, Essence, and Appearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2 The Fundamental Duality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.3 Toward the Internality of Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4 The Real Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.5 Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

211 212 214 219 225 231 233

11 Essence, Abyss, and Self: Hedwig Conrad-Martius on the Non-spatial Dimensions of Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 Essence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3 Abyss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.4 Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.5 Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

237 237 243 247 252 256 257

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12 The Metaphysical Absolutizing of the Ideal: Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Criticism of Husserl’s Idealism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.2 Idealism’s Architectonic and Its Damage to the Metaphysical Absolutizing of the Ideal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3 Conrad-Martius’ Alternative to Idealism: Securing the Possibility for Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4 Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

261 261 265 271 279 280

Appendix: Faith, Radicalism, and Individuality—A Jewish Perspective on Edith Stein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285 Works Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315

Part I

The Philosophy of Being

Chapter 1

From the “Still Covered” to the “Pure Primordial” Phenomena and Back: The External World in the Phenomenology of Conrad-Martius Ronny Miron Abstract This article addresses the two questions HCM poses at the opening of her first great treatise, “On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World” (HCM, 1916): “In which real mode are perceived “essences (Washeiten)” given to us, in more or less big definiteness (Bestimmtheit)? And where do we encounter them in their concrete realization?” (HCM, 1916, 356). These questions initiate the problematization of the given and thus pose a clear limit between the immediate appearance of the external world and its real being, which in HCM’s opinion are not identical (HCM, 1916, 427). The philosopher deals with the first through a careful investigation of what she calls “feeling givenness” (Empfindungsgegebenheit) and the second through a keen observation of the givenness of “manifest-appearance”. These two tracks are woven together, and thus, the phenomenology of the external world moves simultaneously in two opposing directions: by following the line from the “still covered” to the “pure primordial” phenomena we are looking for the ideal reality that brings about the reality of things. This reality does not manifest itself on the phenomenal level but transpires as covering or hiding reality as such. However, since the phenomenon of the external world is not an idea, while moving from the “primordial” to the “covered”, we search for the reality that transcends its ideal boundaries—a transcending that is embodied in the fundamental essence of reality achieving external dimensions. The real transcendence of the external world to human consciousness is revealed in these opposing directions, and thus, the reality of the phenomenon of the external world is confirmed.

R. Miron (B) Interdisciplinary Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Miron (ed.), Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68783-0_1

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1.1 Preface Neither the “covered” (verhüllten) primordial phenomena (Urphänomene) nor especially the perceived ideas lies themselves on the concealed in the “bare surface of the mere appearances” (baren Erscheinungsoberfläche). Accordingly, the work required here can thereby nevermore be achieved, so that through passive observation that is devoted to the plane of appearing, one perceives descriptively the directly obvious phenomenal differences, and be it also down to the finest nuances. On the other hand, from this “‘surface-appearance’ […] only the present essence-holdings (Wesensbestände) that are present de facto, to which the surfaceappearances lead through a respective precise analysis as to its own foundation must also emerge.” (HCM, 1916, 353–354)1

These words by Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888–1866) (hereafter: HCM) describe the path that she created in phenomenological-ontological research, examining the complex and dynamic relations pertaining between the “overt” and the “covered”, between inside and outside, between proximity and distance, and between the appearance and the reality in the real external world. HCM was a member of the early phenomenological Munich Circle that developed around Edmund Husserl in the 1920s in Göttingen, seeking to respond to his famous call to “go back to the “things themselves”.2 Following him, they were convinced that the perceived objects and the ways in which they were known were founded on lawfulness of essence, which is independent of consciousness and the subject in general.3 HCM was a prominent figure in this group of phenomenologists, not only due to being female, but because of her philosophical oeuvre, which was exceptional in its innovation, daring, and monumental scope. Her approach sought to cope with the metaphysical crisis characterizing the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth centuries, later termed by Fritz Heinemann “a quiet process of disrupting the entering into the appearances (In-Erscheinung-Tretens)”—a process he considered to have produced also a disturbance in the “thing” or the reality that changes within 1 All

translations from the German original into English are mine. Emphases follow the original. for example: Husserl (1970a/1900, 168; 1984a/1901, 10). Much has been written about this statement, which became phenomenology’s slogan. See, for instance: (Seifert, 1995, 92–98; Kuhn, 1969, 397–399). The Circle was composed of a group of philosophers the first generation of phenomenologists, whose prominent members were: Alexander Pfänder, Johannes Daubert, Moritz Geiger, Theodor Conrad, Adolf Reinach, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Maximilian Beck, Max Scheler, Jean Hering, Alexander Koyré, Roman Ingarden, Edith Stein, and Hedwig Conrad-Martius. For further reading about the circle, see: Avé-Lallemant (1975). 3 The Munich Circle philosophers drew their inspiration from Husserl’s struggle, in Logical Investigation, against psychologism, relativism, and various forms of reductionism Husserl (1970a/1900, §23 51, §31 74; 1975, §23 82, §31 117), and especially from his fundamental argument that it is possible to observe the conditions of consciousness and to study them in isolation from the thinking subject Husserl (1970b/1901, 10–13, 1984a/1901, 240–245). See also (Walther, 1955, 190; Schmücker, 1956, 31). HCM declares the influence of Logical Investigation on her current study, see: HCM (1916, 355 n. 1). The principles of observation directed at the object were formulated by Hering. See: Hering (1921, 496). HCM stated her agreement with Hering’s approach, see HCM (1923, 162). For a detailed discussion of the object-directed approach in the Munich Circle, see (Avé-Lallemant, 1959, 89–105; Schmücker, 1956, 3–8). 2 See,

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the appearances themselves. This refers to the destruction of the phenomenon as a unity of the appearance and of what appears within it (Heinemann, 1960, 184).4 However, these early phenomenologists did not simply follow Husserl, whose transcendental-idealistic direction became clearly apparent with the publication of ideas in 1913 (Husserl, 1952a/1913; 2012a/1913). In contrast, their explicit realistic orientation was addressed to specific analyses of particular fields of investigation which, so hoped the Circle’s members, would enable understanding of the “things” (Sachen) available for observation, whether of a physical or an ideal order (Ales Bello, 2008, 396). Their guiding method of essence observation (Wesensfassung) focused on locating and identifying the primordial features of the phenomena and was designated to identify the necessary “what”, which makes these into this specific object while removing any theory or presumption regarding them. HCM believed that this approach could serve as a methodical tool that could be applied in the entire object sphere (HCM, 1916, 355 n. 1) and open up entire possibilities of consciousness and object realms that were inaccessible by any other means, particularly by the psychology of consciousness or the biology of consciousness (HCM, 1916, 346).5 Furthermore, the emphasis, so typical of analytic discourse on the formal and logical aspects of the matter under discussion, is rejected in the essence intuition in favor of describing the data as it appears before its beholder, namely free of particular and cognitive features (Avé-Lallemant, 1971, 69; Pfeiffer, 2005, 1–15).6 HCM explained the phenomenological method’s typical abstention from defining determinations regarding the object of observation as follows: Definitions always give only any—usually the external one—minimum of what must exist, thereby the thing (Sache) exists. However, with real essence analysis the issue becomes perceived in its very-own middle (Mittelpunkt) and source-point (quellpunkt). One must certainly have them as such in the gaze. (HCM, 1964, 42)7

4 Heinemann

argues that the disturbance in the process of the appearance also involved the disintegration of the foundation layer of the spirit, which as such “rises from the phenomenon and returns and sinks into it in order to embody itself there”. Thus, restoring the phenomena naturally involves an appropriate understanding of the spirit (Heinemann, 1960, 184). Indeed, one of the most important achievements of HCM’s realistic phenomenology deals with the formation of a realistic perception of transcendentalism. This perception requires a separate discussion that exceeds the scope of this article. 5 See also HCM (1965c, 377; 1965d, 347). For further discussion regarding the issue of the phenomenological method of essence intuition, with particular emphasis on the role of the realistic school within it, see (Reinach, 1913, 1921b; Pfänder, 1913; 2005, 1–13; Schmücker, 1956, 1–33; Ebel, 1965, 1–25). 6 The Circle’s members often wrote about the unique essence intuition that guided them. See AvéLallemant (1988, 69; Walther, 1955, 21; Reinach, 1951, 21–73; Schapp, 1910, 12; Pfänder, 1913; Ebel, 1965, 1–25; Schmücker, 1956, 1–33). 7 See here also Husserl (2002, 63–65; 1952b, 58–59). For the realistic phenomenologists, the main difficulty in a defining approach concerns the lack of certainty regarding the actual meeting with the object. On the differences between essence intuition and a defining approach, see: Ebel (1965, 15–19).

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HCM explains that no matter how we characterize the phenomenological investigation, it does not define its assignment and the essence that belongs to the thing in advance (HCM, 1916, 354 n. 1). She understood Husserl’s emphasis in Logical Investigation on the study of objects as an attempt to trace the way the object itself is revealed, rather than as a description of the constitutional relations existing between the subject and the objects, of the lawfulness of thought or of the mode in which the objects appear before consciousness. In her opinion, the objects’ availability to consciousness stems from an objective logo embodied in the things that can declare itself (HCM, 1965d/1956, 347), which HCM was later to term kosmos no¯etos (HCM, 1965c/1956, 377). The discussion in this article will center around the essay “On Ontology and the Doctrine of the Appearance of the Real External World”, published in 1916 (hereafter: Doctrine of Appearance). In this work, the first published out of the extensive corpus of her writings, HCM proposes a phenomenological-realistic perception of the phenomena of the external world anchored in essence intuition, which in this context was characterized as a “the genuine philosophical assignment (Aufgabe)” (HCM, 1916, 348). HCM seeks to establish in this essay the perception of the external world as a genuine reality (HCM, 1916, 386), to be later referred to as “real reality (wirkliche Wirklichkeit) (HCM, 1965a/1958, 397, 401). She typifies this reality with the qualities of self-standing of Being (Seinselbstständigkeit) (HCM, 1916, 391), autonomous and absolute in its existence (HCM, 1916, 392), and closed in-itself and transcendent in relation to spirit and consciousness (HCM, 1916, 424).8 She defines as a “certainly from the outset self-evident” matter that “every real entity has a being “for itself” (für sich)” (HCM, 1916, 472), “as if the related objectivity is detach (losgelöst) from it [spirit], [as if] it have independent and self-reliant existence and suchness (Sosein) and it in the face of existence and activity of spirit it is entirely autonomous” (HCM, 1916, 386). Nonetheless, HCM determines that this objectivity can be achieved only through studying the modes of givenness of the real external and physical world (HCM, 1916, 346).9 Against this background, HCM devoted her 8 HCM

explains that it is a mistake (common in positivistic literature) to identify between an “existence independent of consciousness” and the real external world, see: HCM (1916, 391). 9 HCM clarifies the title “Doctrine of Appearance” as referring to the realm of the object between “nature” and “the essence of life” that stands in relation to the perceiving subject that has existence within it HCM (1916, 352–354 n. 1). However, nature as such is not discussed in Doctrine of Appearance and remains, to a great extent, a hidden layer that would only be developed in her later writings see in particular HCM (1965b/1961). Doctrine of Appearance is a development of the first chapter in an early essay from 1912, “The Epistemological Elements of Positivism” HCM (1920a/1912, 10–24). This essay was awarded a prize by the Philosophy Faculty of Gottingen University and was later termed the “prize essay” (Preisschrift). The subtitle of Doctrine of Appearance—“Regarding the Criticism of Positivistic Theories” and the polemic with positivism that appears throughout the discussion HCM (1916, 345–347, 352, 357–358, 361–365, 378, 382–386, 390–391, 398–400, 423, 425)—clearly indicate its roots in the essay that preceded it. On 3 July 1912, an expanded version of the first chapter of the prize essay was printed and submitted as a dissertation in a form almost identical to Doctrine of Appearance and recognized as a doctorate by Pfänder at Munich see Avé-Lallemant (1965/1966, 212). In the Postscript added to a special printing of the essay in

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study in Doctrine of Appearance to “a totally peculiar idea of a ‘real Being’” that is meant to clarify the entire phenomenon of “real external world” (HCM, 1916, 365), or alternatively, “proving concrete, tangible perceivable phenomena” (HCM, 1916, 391).10 The expressions “idea” and “phenomenon” receive a very specific meaning in this context: “idea” denotes all the essence-unity in which self-standing essentiality is separated from any correlation with consciousness and bears its own absoluteness. “Phenomenon” denotes the achievement of the independent self-revealing of specific essentiality involving a relation to an act of conscious observation. HCM clarifies that the weight of these two expressions in the analysis of the phenomenon of the real external world is equivalent, since anything constituted in the idea is subject to essential observation, and any real primordial-phenomenon responds essentially to the idea separated from it (HCM, 1916, 353). Devoting a significant part of the discussion below is intended to present and elucidate the perceptions appearing in Doctrine of Appearance, in order to reveal HCM’s ideas, known to so few, and to fill in the gap in the little research literature regarding her work, which often disregards this essay despite its decisive importance in understanding her oeuvre as a whole.11

1.2 The “Still Covered” and the “Pure Primordial” Phenomena Two fundamental questions raised at the opening of Doctrine of Appearance guide HCM in investigating the phenomenon of the external world: First, in what real way are “essences (Washeiten)” given to us? Second, where do we encounter essences in concrete realization, and can we indeed not doubt their concrete reality in general and their presence as individual cases? (HCM, 1916, 356). These questions problematize the given, and as a result of this, a clear boundary is positioned between the immediate appearance of the external world and its real being, which HCM considers not to be identical (HCM, 1916, 427). Her fundamental argument is that sometimes there exists “a semblance (Anschein) of real presence-being (Gegenwärtigsein) that does not correspond to a factual presence-being (tatsächliches Gegenwärtigsein)” (HCM, 1920, HCM established her shift to ontology-oriented studies and seems to know that her original plan to develop the rest of the chapters in her essay on positivism will not be realized HCM (1920b, 130). See here also: Avé-Lallemant (1971, 213). Avé-Lallemant, her assistant, the curator of her estate, and the editor of her writings, told me in conversation with him (4 July 2003, Munich) that Doctrine of Appearance received positive responses upon its publication. 10 Heinemann expressed very similar ideas to HCM’s in his article on concrete phenomenology. He mentions her article “Phänomenologie und Spekulation” HCM (1965c/1956), see Heinemann (1960, 185 n. 2). However, he does not refer to her most relevant treatise to his discussion, Doctrine of Appearance, with which he was undoubtedly familiar. 11 This argument also applies to studies dealing with HCM’s perception of the world, such as Ales Bello (2004). Exceptions to this statement include Schmücker, who mentioned Doctrine of Appearance once in his dissertation, defining the essay as a “decisive breakthrough” Schmücker (1956, 39 n. 1), and Ebel (1965, 16 n. 42, 17; 22 n. 48, 42). However, both these researchers lack a systematic and comprehensive discussion on the range of issues handled in the essay.

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1916, 356). More specifically, she construes that “concerning its ‘position-of-Being’ (Seinsstelle) (either real or not), the intuitively given (anschaulich Gegebene) does not always hold what it seems to promise as so and so appearing (Erscheinende)” (HCM, 1916, 358).12 Accordingly, she distinguishes between “phenomenal starting material (phänomenales Anfangsmaterial)” and a “genuine phenomenon (echte Phänomene)” or “primordial phenomena” (Urphänomene). The phenomenal given serves as a starting point in the philosophical investigation of the objective forms of possible consciousness (HCM, 1916, 351) and of the essence they contain in a condition of “concealment (Verhültheit) and distance” (HCM, 1916, 352). But the thing is connected to the object itself, whose essence is not totally revealed, rather than in the aspects connected to the conscious relation toward it. She maintains that “the specific phenomenological-philosophical work” starts for us in the progress from the yet covered, although as such it is already visible primordial-phenomenon, to the “pure primordial phenomenon”; this progress first requires the specific phenomenological stance (Haltung) in which the entirely direct and undeterred gaze is aimed at the phenomenon in its “pure ‘what (Was)’” (HCM, 1916, 352).13 HCM determines that in a work of “unveiling” (Enthüllung) it is necessary to deduct everything that is coincidental and that appears only to me and is only “from a certain side” of the phenomenon, “whereas the remaining essential bounded totality lies in darkness”. However, only then, when the phenomenon “steps out in full objectivity and absoluteness”, does the philosophical work reach its completion (HCM, 1916, 353) and the “genuine phenomenon” or “primordial phenomenon” is revealed. HCM considers the view within which the concealed is counted as leading to skepticism or to dogmatism as “leading to a statement (Stellungnahme) against the given” (HCM, 1916, 358), since they do not enable the careful and patient observation of the phenomenal givenness and of the world of phenomena in general.14 We can learn about the distance between these positions and HCM’s approach first and foremost from studying the slow and continuing observation characterizing her discussion in Doctrine of Appearance. Moreover, her words contain implicitly, more or less, a response to them. The direct contrast to the skeptical approach is apparent in her argument that the determinations she reaches through essence intuition are not relative or dependent upon particular circumstances (HCM, 1916, 349), while every real primordial-phenomenon responds essentially to the idea that essence intuition

12 Regarding the “semblance of reality (Aussehen einer Realität)” typical of objects of representation, see HCM (1916, 356, 441 n. 1). 13 Helmut Kuhn (1969, 399) well described it as follows: The things to which the gaze is directed are always known in advance. We do not start from the zero point. They show themselves to us, but they are covered. They are placed before us as known but also as riddles, and force upon us a distinction between what the things are in their origin and the essence that reveals the observation that penetrates them. In this context, see also Husserl’s “The principle of all principles” Husserl (1952a/1913, §24; 2012/1913, §24), in which alongside establishing the value of the primordial givenness there is also recognition of the fact that things are given to use under certain restrictions. 14 For more on the phenomenological given, see Spiegelberg (1984).

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can discern (HCM, 1916, 353).15 The use of the term “believe” (glauben), common in Doctrine of Appearance, also indicates the adoption of the certainty that existed in the inception of the constitution of the Husserlian phenomenology.16 At the same time, HCM opposes dogmatism when she assumes the original belonging to this essentiality to a particular phenomenal state of affairs (HCM, 1916, 347, 349). This means that even if dealing with essences is indeed itself free of dependence upon factual existence within the real world, the essence is revealed and clarified through study of the appearance itself and can never obtain independence from the phenomenal appearance itself. Thus, it transpires that not everything belongs to the phenomenal primordial material, or alternatively that not everything that is given is rooted in a primordial-phenomenon (HCM, 1916, 351). Therefore, the phenomenology of the external world is not exhausted in the study of phenomenal appearances but is anchored in a very fundamental certainty regarding the so-called real reality (wirkliche Wirklichkeit) (HCM, 1965a, 397, 401) they contain. Also, a “‘factual’ (sachliche)” that is often referred to as “objective” rootedness cannot be considered as “real rootedness” in the sense that “real moment in concrete reality corresponds with it” (HCM, 1916, 351). Thus, the careful observation of the phenomenal appearance must serve as a starting point for the phenomenological investigation of the external world. However, also the phenomenal investigation of the external world cannot exhaust the reality of the given. HCM distinguishes in this context between two types of objects: overt, characterized as “unveiled-self-emerging (unverhüllte Selbsthervortreten)”, and covert, described as “covered presentiveness (verdeckter Anschaulichkeit)” (HCM, 1916, 371, 380–381).17 The status of the two types of objects is not equivalent in the study of the external world. HCM states that only “uncovered-self-emerging” (unverhülte Selbsthervortreten), which she later terms “self-announcing”, grants an unmediated guarantee through the object’s factual thusness and self-existence (HCM, 1916, 371).18 Thus, the study of the external world must rely on the study of the “uncovered-self-emerging” of the sensory given, 15 In

Doctrine of Appearance, HCM refers critically to skepticism in various contexts in which she discusses positivism. See, for example: HCM (1916, 358, 398). 16 See especially: HCM (1916, 355, 370, 398, 407, 413, 418, 423, 446, 496, 500, 513). Husserl understood skepticism as a denial of the apodictism, meaning the necessary and universal truths essential for a theory to have meaning. He distinguished between three forms of skepticism: logical, “noetic”, and metaphysical; see: Husserl 1970a/1900, 134–143, Husserl (1975/1900, 214–226; 1970a/1900, 134–141). Husserl, and like him, HCM in Doctrine of Appearance considered metaphysical skepticism to be the most problematic. For further discussion of the issue of skepticism in phenomenology, see Wachterhauser (1996). On certainty in Husserlian phenomenology, see Kołakowski (1975). 17 The distinction between these two types of objects has important implications for the issue of the I: the overt objects require the restricting and restraining of the I, while the covert objects necessitate its active involvement. As mentioned, the issue of the I exceeds the scope of this paper. 18 HCM continued to deal with the relation between the object’s thusness and its selfness in her other writings. See, for example, HCM (1957, 57). In this context, see the critique of Ebel (1965, 42) regarding the realistic direction in phenomenology, including that of HCM, which he did not believe could posit true realism: reality becomes a mere “phenomenon” of reality for them, and therefore, it is precisely not real Ebel (1965, 2). More favorable approaches to this school appear in Seifert

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meaning on overt objects. However, as a metaphysical disposition, the realistic position cannot be exhausted on the level of externality, and thus, the realism of the “covered” objects should also be affirmed. The distinction between the overt and covert objects and the focus of the study of the external world on the appearances enable an awareness of the complexity and depth of the constituting movement of Doctrine of Appearance, from the “covered” to the “primordial”. The appearing object is not simply identical to the “covert”, nor the hidden to the “primordial”. Also, Doctrine of Appearance is not a move that leaves the overt and accessible behind in favor of the hidden in the appearance. Precisely because the “primordial” is already present in the overt objects, the study of the external world can and should be focused on them. However, since the duality between the overt and the covert is fundamental, it is present both in the overt objects and in the covert ones.

1.3 “Sensory Givenness” The phenomenological investigation of the external world in Doctrine of Appearance focuses on the study of the “sensorially given” (sinnlicher Gegeben) and of “sensory givenness” (sinnlicher Gegebenheit). HCM seeks to show that this given is “a sort of ‘sensory appearance givenness’ (sinnlicher Erscheinungsgegebenheit)” rather than the opposite (HCM, 1916, 399). This means that the discussion of the phenomenon of the external world is focused on the object of “sensory givenness”, as opposed to focusing on the senses as an expression of a subjective experience involving objects.19 The choice of “sensory givenness” as the starting point in the investigation of the external world is justified by what HCM terms as “the totally peculiar and very own (ureigene) nature of the sensory given” (HCM, 1916, 398), and more generally the sensory givenness as such, that enables it to establish “‘real contact’ (Realkontakt)” with the external world (HCM, 1916, 423, 425).20 First, among all the existences of the external world, the “sensory given” has the ability to approach me as the contents of givenness, since it can make its real existence, in-itself and from itself, in its “here and now”, clear and comprehensible from itself outward. This is also in the face of an I that persists in its circle of being, and as such lacks the essential distance to affirm the (1995, 97–98), who focused their contribution on the thusness-experience (Soseinserfahrung), and Heinemann (1960), who noted the importance of focusing on the appearance. 19 Hermann Krings, who was professedly influenced by HCM, explains that focusing on the object as existing real reality is not simply equivalent to reversing the Kantian beginning in which the existing is directed in its self to consciousness. The premise here is that there exists a real relation between the existing and the essence referring to it; however, this assumption does not include an argument regarding the possibility of consciousness. See Krings (1960, 193–195). 20 Like HCM, Spiegelberg too addressed the justification of relying on sensory data within a realistic perception. In his opinion, a critical phenomenological examination of the immediate phenomena of reality themselves could remove the most common objections regarding the reliability of perception mediated by the senses. See Spiegelberg (1975, 153).

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reality of the world external to it (HCM, 1916, 412–413). Second, the sensory given as such “raises from itself” the claim of its real and factual existence here and now. She maintains that it belongs to the “‘façade’ (Gesicht) of the sensory appearance” in a way that cannot be factually separated from worldly-external existence of real existence (Dasein) to inform me about itself and thus “personally brings its existence into presentation” (HCM, 1916, 422).21 These qualities enable the “sensory given” to mediate between me and the factual being and organization of the real external world. In fact, the sensory given is the only means that guarantees for me the external world in its spatial and temporal factuality, since its essence is manifested in what HCM refers to as “the character of self-performance” (Selbstdarbietungseigenschaft), that enables the self-presentation of the external world (HCM, 1916, 411, 494). Assuming that essentiality (Washeit) belongs to a particular phenomenal state of affairs (HCM, 1916, 349), she determines that in order for something to argue that it is a given, we must believe that it possesses an “existence”. Accordingly, what enables sensorygivenness to fulfill its role as mediating the external world is its fundamental “real contact” with the real world (HCM, 1916, 423, 425).22 HCM clarifies that the sensory appearances lack the aim of “discovering” the “thing in-itself” that exists there beneath, but instead they aim to bring the “world itself to an exposure (Aufdeckung)”. The choice to focus on the external discovery of the world enables her to “be satisfied here with taking the sensorially manifest surface (sinnfällige Oberfläche) pure for itself—regardless of what it eventually might be capable of bringing to presentation above and outside itself” (HCM, 1916, 463), namely as “a self-standing entity (selbstständige Entität)” (HCM, 1916, 466). The expression “surface” (Oberfläch) here does not denote only a section or “random cut of a complete thing”, but “the visible external side of matter in general, which encounters the in principle invisible ‘interior’ (Innere) of the matter”. Since we are always, so to speak, walking upon the “surface”, we can never reach this internal side through any real possible cutting from the given thing (HCM, 1916, 21 Spiegelberg explains that the phenomenon and reality do not exclude each other, meaning that what is real exists within itself and from itself, and it can be presented to us in its very reality. This means that actual things in the world can remain exactly as they are even when they enter into relations with us and are presented to us. Spiegelberg calls the phenomena in which we are involved “subjectival”, not in the sense that they do not have real existence or that they are deceptive, but that they are objective parts of the subject and of his world, see: Spiegelberg (1975, 134–135). Moreover, in his opinion, the reality of the subjectival phenomena is completely certain Spiegelberg (1975, 149). In any case, the subjectival reality constitutes only a very small part of our total reality and of reality as a whole Spiegelberg (1975, 135). 22 Like HCM, Spiegelberg also emphasizes that what can be referred to as the “claim” for reality entailed in real existence. In this context, he defines a “phenomenon of reality” as one where the phenomenal object presents itself along with the argument about its being real. Therefore, a realityphenomenon is one that is both positioned as real and distinguished from “mere phenomena” that do not claim reality. See Spiegelberg (1975, 133).

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465 n. 1).23 The function of the appearance presents the material internality of the bodily thing (Körperding) outwardly and thus indicates the movement occurring within the material-being toward external appearance (HCM, 1916, 463). The unmediated self-performance of the sensorially manifest surface is enabled only because in the sensory appearance, what presents itself outwardly simultaneously describes the material internality of the thing that constitutes its appearance. This means that the sensory “surface” does not denote only the presented aspect of the thing, but, as she says, it “exists in-itself” (HCM, 1916, 464), meaning it embodies its reality. She explains that the “self-presentation” is very closely related to the phenomenon of reality, and she discerns the sensory-givenness from everything that “has no being for itself”, first and foremost from what relies on perception anchored in objective consciousness, and thus lacking existence from itself that it could have presented outwardly (HCM, 1916, 413). HCM establishes the rule that what appears as dependent on its existence, including dependence on the objectivization of consciousness, cannot appear as self-presenting (HCM, 1916, 413 n. 2).24 Thus, despite the sensory appearance not being the entire totality of the external world, pure observation of what these appearances present by themselves and from themselves, and not of what is above and beyond them, serves for HCM as “a frame for the whole of the study” and “guidance to the order of this embroiled and complicated state of affairs” of sensory givenness (HCM, 1916, 399). Sensory givenness is composed of two fundamental phenomena, which the following discussion is intended to elucidate: “feeling givenness” (Empfindungsgegebenheit), and “appearance givenness” (Erscheinungsgegebenheit) or the “sensorially manifest appearance” (sinnfällige Erscheinung) (hereafter: the givenness of sensorially manifest appearance).

1.3.1 “Feeling Givenness” The expression “feeling givenness” describes the occurrence of a direct touch of “something” on me (HCM, 1916, 406), or a personal touch of the I (HCM, 1916, 425). Thus, the “feeling” (Empfindung) is distinguished from whatever has an objective orientation, such as “hearing” or “seeing” (HCM, 1916, 460), indicating an occurrence outside of the I. HCM states that “there exists no direct sensory contact 23 In “Real Ontology” (Realontologie), in her discussion of materiality, HCM returns to the concept

of the “surface”. Her argument in principle is that the material entity has depth and internality, but only its surface reaches sensory appearance. What is outside is the lighted part, and what is inside, in the depths, is the dark and closed part. She states that there is a causal relation between these two components of the material entity, so that just because there is depth there is also a surface. See HCM (1923, §55–§56 205–206). In this essay, she refers to the concept of the surface also in other places, see: HCM (1923, §37 194; §57–§61 206–209; §72 214; §107 235–236). 24 Spiegelberg explains that the very lack of dependence on the subject is “a very fundamental and essential consequence of reality” (except for cases of real actions of the subject, which of course depend upon him); see: Spiegelberg (1975, 132 n. 2).

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between the feeling-existence (Empfindungbestand) and consciousness in general” (HCM, 1916, 523). This means that the absence of an external index for the feeling is an expression of the limited involvement of the spirit. Moreover, she establishes that “despite its position as a sensory given, the feeling-existence itself does not possess something that could lead it directly and personally to the spirit”, like the colorful and vocal appearances that present themselves to the spirit directly and personally. In fact, the spirit does not serve as a “bearer (Träger) of the experience of sensory-givenness”. Also, spirit “does not pick up (auflesen) the feeling-existence and it cannot fill itself with its sensory Being” (HCM, 1916, 523). HCM considers as “factual absurd” the possibility of the involvement of spirit in feeling itself. Such involvement would have indicated the origin of the material sensed in consciousness (HCM, 1916, 535) and not in the external world itself. Instead, she maintains that this world delivers itself in principle as separate from the sphere of consciousness (HCM, 1916, 441). Moreover, consciousness “cannot be the personal recipient (Empfänger)” of this “peculiar art and mode of “announcement” (Kundgabe)” (HCM, 1916, 520) of the world. Beyond the general observation that openness of beings is inherent in the very givenness of their essences,25 she provides here a more specific explanation of the related remoteness of spirit from the so-called sensory given. Maintaining the guidance of her analysis of the phenomenal plane, she establishes that unlike the sensorially manifest given, “spirit as such […] lacks the appropriate filling material” and therefore “here only the width filling (breite Füllung) with the sensory given is not possible” (HCM, 1916, 520). To this extent, the related feeling-existence is and remains transcendent to the human spirit. Against this background, HCM establishes the essential closedness of the real that enables it to resist or place an obstacle to the pure spiritual action. She further deduces from this characteristic of the real also the “principle impossibility of understanding” the sensorially manifest thing as if “its personal Being gets in the way (in die Quere kommen) of the pure spiritual action” (HCM, 1916, 441–442).26 HCM explains that the separation from spirit and thereby also from consciousness of the feeling-existence is so fundamental that spirit can address no relation to it. In this regard, she characterizes the feeling-existence, that is experienced by senses such as seeing, as “absolutely ‘unspiritual’” (HCM, 1916, 526). The radical meaning of her main argument that sensory givenness does not depend on its sensory appearance (HCM, 1916, 456) is now clarified: The feeling-existence in-itself and for itself might appear as sensorially given, and as such apparently related to the seeing that observes it. However, HCM establishes that “seeing itself is not sensory” in the sense that the consciousness could have personally encompassed what appears to it through the senses (HCM, 1916, 535). Since consciousness does not cause the feeling-existence and cannot influence it, its manifestation cannot be exhausted in the sensory plane (HCM, 1916, 525). Furthermore, HCM assumes that within the experience of appearance (Erscheinungserlebnis), one stands in “direct relation with the material qualification of things 25 See

here the discussion of the matter in the introductory section and in: HCM (1951, 10–11). (1975, 148) presents objects’ lack of probe-resistance to our will as a hallmark, sometimes significant, of their reality. 26 Spiegelberg

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in the external world. Therefore, this qualification serves as a basis for “judging the material qualifications of the real thing” (HCM, 1916, 432).27 This means that the phenomenal state of affairs itself, rather than consciousness, indicates the reality of the “felt-thing” (Empfundene) that appears in the external world.28 Otherwise, namely: if whole takes place “only ‘in my consciousness’, there could be no meaning to denoting the ‘felt-things’ with the term of ‘appearances’” (HCM, 1916, 433). Thus, also the thing’s hardness (Härte), felt by the sense, is interpreted as a hallmark of the reality of the material felt-thing, and so it should be understood as something that belongs to the object rather than to the subject that feels it. In this context, the involvement of consciousness in the sensory experience is interpreted as misleading, since it attributes what the felt-thing denotes in its self-presentation to itself rather than to the thing. In any case, HCM states that consciousness cannot disturb the very appearance of the feeling-existences (HCM, 1916, 514), which grant itself to the spirit that observes it as autonomous in its existence, as a real reality directed outwardly. Moreover, in her opinion, there is nothing in the feeling-existence that somehow “presses” directly into the “realm of consciousness”, as, for example, the noise presses in my hearing or the blueness of the sky on my external gaze (HCM, 1916, 516). Against this background, we can understand HCM’s characterization of the feltthing as “floating” and existing “in the periphery” of the being of the I (HCM, 1916, 441–442)—terms that emphasize the strength of the threshold that prevents the entry of the felt-thing into the realm of consciousness.29 She clarifies that these are not spatial or anatomical relations between what causes the feeling givenness and the I, but a description of the way in which the subject experiences the touch of what is presented in it (HCM, 1916, 443). In her words: “Consciousness opens itself from its real-position (Realstelle) in here, facing any feeling-existence or towards it inwards, and thus brings it into its forum” (HCM, 1916, 444). The subjective experience of the felt-thing, appearing on the living body of the I, is caused “from the outside 27 HCM clarifies that the innovation is not in such a perception being capable of misleading, but in the foundation of this experience not “really” being in faith, that the material feltness has direct relations with the external world HCM (1916, 433), but that these relations actually exist. 28 At this point too, Heinemann’s position is very similar to that of HCM. In his opinion, the primordial phenomenon of the human being is not consciousness but appearance, meaning the entry of appearance and change within appearance (humans live within pictures before they know it). In contrast, consciousness is an epiphenomenon or a phenomenon in retrospect, which, as such, denotes a reflective action that takes place only after the appearances collapse. Thus, he determines that the meaning of phenomenology is “the doctrine of appearance”. See Heinemann (1960, 186–187). 29 Spiegelberg characterizes the peripheral field of our perception as “marginal openness” (Spiegelberg 1975, 147), meaning that this field is never sharply cut like its boundaries. However, he stresses that peripherality does not denote unreality. What we perceive at the periphery of the perceptual filed is not just vague configurations but usually well-defined structures subject to reduced clarity. We can still see the phenomenon itself, through these modifications, and understand its structure prior to it being subjected to influences. More importantly, the structural openness of what exists in the periphery of our perceptual field indicates that reality does not reach its end in accordance with the end of our field, meaning that it does not cease at its periphery but continues beyond it. Thus, openness shows, in his opinion, that the phenomena of reality are self-standing.

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inwards”, meaning from the felt-thing to the feeling I. We should not conclude from this that the objective and factual experience of givenness is “correlative in its existence (Dasein)” with consciousness, and that such existence, accessible in this experience of givenness, must also be “‘correlative in its existence’ (daseinskorrelativ) to consciousness” (HCM, 1916, 458 n. 1). Consciousness clearly does not serve here as a “window” through which something can really appear inward as if “half is outside and half inside”, or alternatively, half on the living body while the other half is in consciousness. Not only does consciousness not have what she terms “real boundaries” (Realbegrenzung), but there are no boundaries common to the sphere of consciousness and the real world, “and what lacks common boundaries also has no common object” (HCM, 1916, 450). HCM argues that it should be possible to claim without contradiction that something can somehow be “given” for me even if I was not “aware” of it. In such a case, consciousness is characterized as “still completely dull and dark” (HCM, 1916, 459). In her opinion, the attempt to pull in the feeling-existence from its peripheral position in the I into the center of consciousness constitutes an essential contradiction, since in terms of the feeling itself, the feeling-existence does not actually float “within” or “on” the sphere of consciousness but is clearly strongly connected back to the “world” beyond consciousness, or it has a position that is anchored within it, even if this position is placed in the realm of the I (HCM, 1916, 443). The separation of the felt-thing from consciousness leaves the field of occurrence of feeling within the living body. HCM explains that the experience of feeling can be determined only in a position of a living body (Leib) that experiences a pushing “from the outside inward” (HCM, 1916, 532), referred to as “the periphery of the living body” (HCM, 1916, 526). The living body here becomes the bearer of the sensory givenness, since it is pushed in an unmediated way by the material content of the felt-thing (HCM, 1916, 525–529). This means that while the personal nature of touch is what turns the phenomenon of the feeling givenness into what it is (HCM, 1916, 450), for HCM the most dominant factor in the constituting of this phenomenon is the felt-thing or the material givenness of the bodily thing (HCM, 1916, 513). The felt-thing indeed belongs “to the thing experienced sensorially” (HCM, 1916, 530), such as firmness and roughness (HCM, 1916, 406). However, she argues that from the outset, the givenness that brings about the experience of feeling, by its essence “factually was not yet present there ‘for me’” (HCM, 1916, 456). In this respect, givenness of the felt-thing does not concern here mainly the sensory appearance but the existence that reveals itself and thus acquires presence in the external world. However, as the living body fulfills a role in sensory givenness, the pure factual relation of sensory givenness toward the living body does not define the realm of sensory givenness in practice and unanimously (HCM, 1916, 401). In order to prevent such a distorted subjectivist perception of the phenomenon (HCM, 1916, 430), HCM clarifies that there is no contrast between the dependence of touch and the reality of the touched. Rather, it is the very real existence of the external world that brings about what is referred to as the “presentation of feeling (Empfindungspräsentation)”. Thus, “a real touch-relation (Berührungsbeziehung) cannot denote a real presumption” but “presentation of real existence (realer Bestand)” (HCM, 1916, 430 n. 2).

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More importantly, the living bodily experience as such is not equivalent to a spiritual experience, which obviously includes the “objective receptive senses” (HCM, 1916, 536), seeing and hearing. Thus, the I “bears” the experience of feeling precisely as a living body and in no way thanks to its senses or its ability to receive objects objectively through consciousness or a spiritual sense (HCM, 1916, 533). The possibility of the experience of feeling to become actual, that is to press the living body, is not dependent on the formation of an objective link with consciousness. The existence that appears as felt would not have reached a connection of sensory givenness vis-àvis consciousness were it not really given. Moreover, in her opinion, it is not feeling givenness of existence presented as protruding on the living body, but precisely its reality that makes “transparent” the impossibility of living-spiritual connection of feeling-existences with consciousness (HCM, 1916, 537). Thus, the appearance of the felt-thing is achieved on the one hand through detaching or splitting the senses from the overall consciousness, so that there is no possibility of processing what the senses announce from “inside”. On the other hand, thanks to the openness of the living body to the material felt-things (HCM, 1916, 529). The experience of feeling is thus established between two levels: the receiving position of the I and the appearing existence of the felt-thing. This experience appears on the line between the rigid thing, enfolding the phenomenal content of the experience, and the real living body. This location does not split the experience of feeling, since a real relation prevails between the two layers that constitute it (HCM, 1916, 530). HCM characterizes as “fact” the “real transcendence of the appearing from the aspect of feeling (empfindungsmäβig)” vis-à-vis consciousness. This means that when the living body itself appears already as transcendent in principle in relation to consciousness, and thus as irreducible to it, then everything that is on the living body—internally or externally—“arriving at appearance” from the aspect of feeling. Therefore, “when the living body ‘appears’ as an entity rooted within itself from the aspect of being (that is, as a real entity in the strictest sense) then what appears on it shows itself as feeling-full and as rearward connected inward into this real entity” (HCM, 1916, 447). This special accentuation on the word “rearward” does not indicate primarily the moment of awareness but especially the primordial reality generated the experience of feeling in itself. However, the transcendence and autonomy of the living body in relation to the spirit embodied in it do not denote a restriction of the spirit but actually the essence of the spirit, which is “homeless” or its being one “whose home has been denied it in principle” (HCM, 1916, 446). The living body as a real element, it transpires, realizes the transcendent separation between feeling and consciousness. The personal distress that constitutes the content of the feeling announces the involvement of the living body in the feeling givenness. Unlike the senses characterized as open, consciousness is described as closed (HCM, 1916, 532). However, to the extent that the feeling givenness is separated from consciousness, it has contact with the I through the living body, what HCM terms in this context “the periphery of the I”, “from outside

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and here” (HCM, 1916, 449), or the restriction of my living bodily being (HCM, 1916, 530). The characterization of the phenomena of the spirit and of my living body as “real transcendents” now receives its precise meaning. The living body and the spirit cannot reach each other because they are spatially incommensurable, meaning that in terms of their extent they belong to two different spheres of existence (HCM, 1916, 437). Factually, my living body and the phenomenon of the spirit indeed appear together. Moreover, it cannot be said about my living body, which I feel from the inside, that it presses me from a sphere existing beyond my own I. When my living body is experienced as belonging to me, it is experienced from the inside as my living body, meaning that it belongs to me with its entire totality. However, we should distinguish the real transcendence against consciousness, which is also connected to my living body’s givenness, from everything “beyond the I” that does not belong to me, even if this is sometimes existence that presses me from the outside inwards in a personal manner (HCM, 1916, 447). In any case, there is no possibility of the related “real contact” (HCM, 1916, 423, 425) between the spirit and my living body. This means that as spirit or as consciousness I am prevented from reaching the real in the genuine sense, and in any case, I could not have influence over it or the ability to rearrange it. This transcendence is clearly also the reason for no comprehensive and full objective relation to the real world being possible. According to HCM, already the “objective comprising (Umfassen) itself excludes a genuine arriving” (HCM, 1916, 437) at the real thing.30 In other words, consciousness cannot defeat the essential transcendence of the real thing. The traditional question, how the given changes from the outside when it enters into “the content of consciousness”—a question usually directed at “the boundaries of the possibilities of cognition and of understanding”—receives a clear answer: “the felt-thing in its position as felt-thing is not at all a ‘content of consciousness’”, even if this concept is perceived in the widest way possible (HCM, 1916, 542 n. 1). In contrast, the real experience of feeling, in-itself, exists beyond the overall dimension of possible experience of consciousness. In HCM’s opinion, the felt-thing, to the extent that it is felt, does not give itself as conscious and thus as clarified, but precisely as felt.31 Finally, it is impossible, in HCM’s opinion, to reach a higher level of accuracy in presenting the felt-thing because feeling-full givenness is an

30 One of the typical arguments of the realistic phenomenological approach deals with the temporal gap between the real way in which the thing exists and the way in which it is perceived (see: Geiger, 1930, 170). Spiegelberg claims that the situation is identical for any sensory perception, which, in his opinion, “can never give what is present, but only what has just passed. And since the past no longer exists, we can never see the original object itself but only its “trace”, which means its cast or likeness” (Spiegelberg, 1975, 157). 31 In order to reach greater accuracy in presenting the felt, one should tackle questions that exceed her main discussion in Doctrine of Appearance, such as what is the nature of the I that allows itself to be framed (einrahmt) through the body-entity (körperlich Entität), so that it is really restricted by it? And how do the relations between the I and the living body describe themselves phenomenally? (HCM, 1916, 541–542).

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“exceptional mode of givenness” (HCM, 1916, 541), whose field of interpretation is not in consciousness or spirit but in the realm of the real.

1.3.2 The Sensorially Manifest “Appearance Givenness” HCM characterizes the sensorially manifest appearance as real existence that arrives “from far to here” thanks to the specific self-presentation ability of the existences appearing in it (HCM, 1916, 430).32 Although like the givenness of feeling, the givenness of sensorially manifest appearance is also included in the phenomenon of sensory givenness, there are some fundamental differences between them: first, in the appearance, something is determined for me “through the senses” (HCM, 1916, 406) to which the appearing thing becomes sensorially manifest. HCM describes the senses in this context as forming that “real contact” that grants the appearing thing the quality of self-presentation (HCM, 1916, 423, 425), or, alternatively, the selfpresentation of the existing things is realized in the sensorially manifest appearance (HCM, 1916, 462). Second, the realization of the sensorially manifest appearance requires distance from the I and the living body—a distance that the senses involved in this phenomenon bridge (HCM, 1916, 406). While distance would have thwarted the very existence of feeling givenness, which is apparent through contact and personal pressing on the living body, the sensorially manifest appearance is described as existence that reaches the I while maintaining its fixed distance that is essentially embedded in it (HCM, 1916, 472). Furthermore, it would never be possible to reach the sensory world without the senses involved in the givenness of the sensorially manifest appearance, which is capable of “making itself noticeable from itself” while maintaining the distance from the I. HCM clarifies that the “objective qualification” of the felt-thing imposes on it an “absolute ‘restraint’ (Zurückhaltung) in all performance possibility (Darbietungsmöglichkeit)” (HCM, 1916, 473). She states that the fact that hearing and seeing are “distant-senses” (Fernsinne) is essential, and she necessitates receiving the visible and the audible as existences that are closed within themselves within any sensory manifestation and as “separated” from what is sensed in them. In her opinion, even when these existences have a real appearance-position that is close to me (such as when something rings close to my ear), it is always experienced as content that is held at a distant position, or “as closed for itself” (HCM, 1916, 473).33 Third, while the experience of feeling is not subject to the rigidity and roughness of the bodies that cause it being understood by the I (HCM, 1916, 406), the requirement for distance from the appearing existence also enfolds the possibility of perceiving or paralleling it through consciousness. As she puts it: “existence is given objectively 32 The discussion will revolve only around existences that appear in a strict objective manner and not around what HCM calls “the loose givenness of a sensorially manifest material”, which she grants marginal space in Doctrine of Appearance (HCM, 1916, 504–505). 33 In this context, see also: Husserl (1970b, 17–18; 1984a, 253–255).

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only when it is possessed in a “distant position”, when it is perceived or accepted by the I, yet it still remains separated from it and closed to itself” (HCM, 1916, 470). When representing an object or making it visible, the consciousness must divert it from itself and position it in a counter-position to itself. Unlike feeling givenness, understanding the essence of the physical being of the living I is completely irrelevant to the elucidation of the givenness of the sensorially manifest appearance, which only encounters the spiritual being of the I (HCM, 1916, 541). The givenness of sensorially manifest appearance has three fundamental characteristics—relation to the senses, distance from the I, and structural openness to consciousness—which distinguish it from the phenomenon of feeling givenness. This distinction fills with content the argument that the two sensory components are not located on the same level (HCM, 1916, 425). The following discussion will focus on the real aspects of the sensorially manifest appearance, and in particular the relation to the senses and the distance from the I. The concept of “quale”, which recurs throughout Doctrine of Appearance, plays an important role in understanding the sensorially manifest appearance.34 In principle, this term denotes for HCM a sensory quality within which the real thing is imbued (HCM, 1916, 464). She stresses the unity between a thing’s form and its quale, so that the substance constructed upon its sensory appearance exists from a suitable quale. In this regard, HCM established that the sensory quale not only determines the “material” of the sensorially manifest appearance. Moreover, this quale is also the basis for the possibility of self-presentation as a ready-made whole (fertige Ganz) (HCM, 1916, 465), and thereby the presentation of the real thing that appears within the sensorially manifest appearance itself. In this regard, she distinguishes between two essential aspects of the sensory quale. The first concerns its being “distinguished by the very fact that by means of its own Being it can ‘respond’ (ansprechen)” (HCM, 1916, 456). To this extent, the quale is secondary to the being that “carries” it or to the being that is manifested through it. However, its other side consists of the fact that by the sensory quale are established the type and mode of “speaking” (Sprechen), the “externalization” (Äußerung) or the “announcing” (Kundgabe) itself and the possibility of an entity that is purely constructed from such material: exactly the sensorially manifest as taken for itself. (HCM, 1916, 466)

Thus, the felt-thing denotes the substantization that constructs the sensorially manifest appearance rather than a quality or characteristic that adheres to it from outside (HCM, 1916, 465). 34 In

the literature, the “quale” denotes the contents of the subjective experience of mental states, usually excluding any intersubjective aspect. Thomas Nagel characterized the quale as “feeling itself in a certain way” Nagel (1974). Unlike HCM, some philosophers deprived the qualia of existence Dennett (1993), but most philosophers and natural scientists believe that the existence of the contents of the subjective experience is undoubted (see: Beckermann, 2001, 358). This puzzling term has appeared in the philosophical discourse already since Descartes, has been repeated by Locke and Hume, and has frequently been mentioned in the twentieth century. See in particular: Lewis (1991, 89 ff.).

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From the outset, for HCM, it is “self-evident that the being of an existent (Bestand) that in-itself and purely from and out of itself and thereby completely independent of the being or the doing of my spirit, announces and offers (darbringt), exactly as appearing stands before me” (HCM, 1916, 411–412). However, she still sees fit to explain that the very titling of the sensorially manifest appearance does not concern the recipient of the related manifestation, but rather the manifested being itself that “in its real ‘being for itself’ and ‘standing for itself’ arrives at an unmediated announcement givenness (Kundgegebenheit) for itself”. Alternatively: “despite this sensory quale possesses by its very being the specific function of so to speak carrying itself to me, it nevertheless remains this function of being (Seinsfunktion) concurrently for itself” (HCM, 1916, 471). The conspicuous emphasis on the aspect of the being that is manifested falls in line with regarding the related announcement as “self-announcement” (Selbstkundgabe) that also consolidates the objectivity of the sensorially manifest existence. This objectivity concerns primarily the “material” of which it is “made in itself” (HCM, 1916, 471), namely the specific being that is being manifested therein. Accordingly, the sensorially manifest quale itself is observed as such that “in itself is described as holding-inside an externalization material (innegehaltenes Äußerungsmaterial)” (HCM, 1916, 470). This means that the “material” that is manifested outwardly is exactly the same that fills it from inside and lends the sensory quale, with the depiction of “possessing a being that itself is encompassed (abrundet) by itself and provides it with a closed form of givenness (abgeschlossene Gegebenheitsgestalt)” (HCM, 1916, 471). Of course, an objective closedness and formedness can also describe a real moment that is not self-standing, meaning that it needs to be filled into another entity in order to achieve concrete appearance. This would be a wider concept of objectivity than the one assumed in HCM’s discussion of the sensorially manifest phenomena. However, she favors the narrower sense of objectivity, claiming that this is the true meaning of objectivity, which refers to an object that stands in-itself and foritself. She explains that the very fact that an existence has a being that is so-called closed in itself does not necessarily mean that by this very fact it also has an objective being that “stands for itself”, since “its objective closedness and shape can well describe a real nonindependent moment that requires an insertion (Einfügung) into another entity in order to be capable of appearing concretely” (HCM, 1916, 476). To be sure, by that statement, concrete fulfillment does not at all turn out to be a criterion for objectivity; rather, the “need” for further insertion mirrors an insufficiency or alternatively does not meet the indispensable condition for real being, i.e., self-standing. In short: while every object has, so to speak, an object-full being, not every adherence to an object testifies to the object to which it adheres. In fact, HCM’s peculiar idea of objectivity is not only derived from her primordial conception of the real but also closely connected with her idea of givenness. In this regard, it is argued that presentation, by its very essence, denotes a sensoryobjective mode of givenness (HCM, 1916, 506). Furthermore, the sensory felt-thing is simultaneously the mediator and the material that constructs the mediated, meaning the factor that serves for mediation: what takes the felt outside, and at the same time

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is held within the thing itself. This dual nature of the sensorially manifest appearance is anchored, in HCM’s opinion, in the duality typical of the sensory quale as such, in which it manifests itself and at the same time “in its very own being becomes ‘restrained back’ (zurückgehalten)—a peculiar capability that makes it possible that where appropriate it can enter with its mediating nature into the strictest objective frame of the unity of the thing (Dingeinheit)” (HCM, 1916, 468). However, the entity that appears in the sensorially manifest appearance indeed does not require the means of presentation in order to be presented. Rather, concerning the related appearance, HCM maintains that “on the very entity that belongs to the sensorially manifest appearance as a shape (Gebilde), built out of speaking or announcing material, rests its own mediation”, or alternatively, “in that it exists completely and only out of externalization material, it is itself entirely and solely brought from here outward. And thereby it is—as a self-standing entity—through and through surface” (HCM, 1916, 466). Thus, the quality of performance (Darbietungseigenschaft) can determine, for example, the color or vocal nature as sensorially manifest appearing that is inseparable from them. This means that the presentation of the color or the vocal is realized in the very existence of the appearing; it brought to an externalization or to an expression outward, regardless of the presence or absence of an experiencing subject (HCM, 1916, 412). Also, when this appearance “reaches outward”, therefore referred to as “reaching outward (Hinausgelangen)” as such, obviously through itself in accordance with the materials that constitute it, it also “fixes again its own threshold”. Thus, the sensorially manifest appearance exists out of performance of its own self, in which it is concurrently completely verified (HCM, 1916, 467). It transpires that “manifestation” in this regard is far beyond a depiction of a mode of appearance but primarily concerns the innermost internality of the being of the existence that appears as sensorially manifest. Eventually, exactly this ontological primordiality underlies HCM’s statement that the sensorially manifest presentation opens, rather than closes, “the book of the real world” (HCM, 1916, 463). It is important to further clarify that the function of the felt-thing to carry itself toward me does not threaten to disrupt or to abandon the given or mediated objective framework. HCM established that not only does no change occur on the “surface of the bodily thing” (HCM, 1916, 468), but due to its being a real entity, it also maintains its being “for itself” (HCM, 1916, 471). Moreover, among all real existences, only the “sensorially manifest appearing can itself be possessed by an in-itself ‘pulled back’ spirit-holding (zurückgebundener Geisterhaltung)” (HCM, 1916, 474). In this regard, HCM characterizes the sensorially manifest appearance as “something that by its essence functions as ‘mediator’ (Vermitteler) between the consciousness and this real world that is rooted in-itself and that stands for itself” (HCM, 1916, 472).35 In any case, she now emphasizes what she considers not taken-for-granted, that this solely mediated real-existence can respond only in its closedness and that its 35 We should distinguish between the term “play” here, which does not express detracting from the reality of the appearance, and “playing with the reality of objects”, which is typical of the perceptual state and expresses the weakness of the dimension of reality within it (see: HCM, 1916, 379).

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ability to be experienced is enabled only in its connectedness to its “closedness” and “objectively bounded pattern” (HCM, 1916, 472). Further, even the reception of the felt-thing is realized in accordance with its nature and based on its “appearance-full” (Erscheinungshafte) mode of givenness, i.e., the final objective formation in which it is experienced as standing for itself. She concludes, then, that sensorially manifest existents can be received adequately when they are experienced in their own concrete appearance-like mode of givenness (HCM, 1916, 478). No contradiction exists between the consistent elimination of the aspects that concern the receiving I vis-à-vis the sensorially manifest being and the very fact that its appearance is formed for the I through the senses. In this regard, HCM pays special attention to seeing and hearing, which have different modes of givenness and announcing that bring to sensorially manifest presentation a different side of the material-being (HCM, 1916, 483). The argument is not that the sensorially manifest appearance is dependent on “bodily” organs. While bodily eyes and ears must exist in practice for a real bodily individual to be able to see and hear (HCM, 1916, 484), as bodily organs in particular, they are unable to serve as receptacles for objective experiences that maintain a transcendent-real relation to the I (HCM, 1916, 480).36 HCM’s interest in these senses stems from their being “essentially required ‘opponents’ (Widerparte) for any reception of sensorially manifest materials in general” (HCM, 1916, 484).37 In this regard, seeing and hearing are likened to doors or windows through which the sensory given reaches “into” the I (HCM, 1916, 536). Also, they are characterized as “spiritual senses (geistigen Sinne)” (HCM, 1916, 511, 531, 535–536) or “‘spiritual organs’ (geistigen Organe)” (HCM, 1916, 484, 489) with specific openness to the particular objective form of externalization responsible for presenting the sensorially manifest appearance. By means of these, “we experience from the inside the eyes and ears again as ‘body-gateways’ (Leibestore) or ‘bodily openings’ (leibliche Öffnungen), through which the unmediated contact between the living-spiritual I and the sensorially manifest external world is established”. HCM notes that were we to dismantle these bodily positions toward the external world, the living body as such would become closed to us (HCM, 1916, 492). Seeing and hearing are thus described as “filling (Fühlung)” (HCM, 1916, 510, 511) and as “encroaching (übergreiffen)” (HCM, 1916, 495) or “widening inside (hineinweiten)” (HCM, 1916, 522) in an appropriate sense. The precedence and essentiality of feeling-existences over the senses in determining the very nature of the sensorially manifest quale are unmistakable given HCM’s depiction of the senses as possessing “saved emptiness” (HCM, 1916, 511) and such that “only as in itself empty can be filled” (HCM, 1916, 36 See here also HCM’s references to “an appropriate ‘receptacle’ (Gefäβ)” of the real thing HCM (1923, 215, 217, 219). 37 Spiegelberg, who characterized the sensory organs as “phenomena of reality in themselves”, is helpful in illuminating the problematic HCM handles here as follows: “Is there a way back, as it were, from the retina via the cortex and mental processes to the original object outside which supposedly started the whole chain of physical and physiological processes?” Spiegelberg (1975, 150). He adds that this problem is meaningful only if you assume that the physical objects, as conditioned by our sense perception, our sensory organs, and the physiological processes involved in them, are proven realities, and that one can know real objects Spiegelberg (1975, 151).

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510). Accordingly, also the involved “spiritual gaze” is regarded as “empty, free, and accidental” (HCM, 1916, 522). Against this background, HCM’s articulation of the genuine meaning of the expression “sensory manifestation” (Sinnfälligkeit) becomes understandable: “the sensorially manifest is such that invades into these senses, meaning what can ‘give’ itself to them” (HCM, 1916, 486). The fundamental argument is that the specific mode of expression should “encounter” the possibility of appropriate “reception” that is ontically rooted in the spiritual-I, meaning that it is not a product of a momentary influence originated in the living spirit (HCM, 1916, 484). Moreover, the appearance of the sensorially manifest as such and as a whole, though not its very existence, is enabled through thwarting the living spiritual contact with the external world, and thereby, a representative conscious relation is avoided. This means that the sensorially manifest is received adequately through hearing and seeing without significant involvement on the part of the spirit of the I (HCM, 1916, 479). The same process also occurs in the opposite direction: “when we break (abbrechen) the spiritual-living contact with the external world, the sensorially manifest (Sinnfällige) remains standing in its defined position of appearance-like expansion and deployment” (HCM, 1916, 478–479). Therefore, in the absence of the involvement of the spiritual-I, the sensorially manifest appears as lacking “depth”, “rootedness (Gegründetheit)”, and “grounding (Abrundung)”, which only a spiritual-living perception could have granted it (HCM 1916, 479).38 However, if consciousness must remain open to the existence of the extra-worldly, how can this take place without the involvement of living spirit of the I? (HCM, 1916, 479). Furthermore, what can the sensorially manifest appearance mean on the recipient’s side when this meaning is regarded as unshaped by the “organ” that receives it? Despite their apparent focus on the involvement of I in sensory appearances, HCM defines these questions as concerning the reality of the sensorially manifest appearance (HCM, 1916, 480). Here again, just as in here discussion of the feeling givenness, and in the same careful, limited, and accurate manner, HCM seeks to harness consciousness for establishing the faithfulness of the senses in the indication of reality. In this regard, she postulates that while the felt-thing is located in the “periphery of the I”, namely on the living body that is personally pressed, the sensorially manifest existence “makes itself discernable simultaneously from itself and outward through personal pressing of the periphery of consciousness”. She explains that precisely because the spirit is beyond the sensorially manifest existence, namely is no longer directed through the senses toward the external world, we receive the heard or the seen and not a conscious interpretation of them (HCM, 1916, 498–499). The related location of consciousness in the periphery is characterized as spiritual “dead acceptance” (eine “geistige tote Entgegennahme”) of sensorially manifest existences (HCM, 1916, 490). This peculiar sort of mental stance denotes a fixed reception of a sensorially felt-thing in its objective self-presentation. Alternatively: 38 HCM argues that these aspects of the sensorially manifest appearing are similar to those reflected

in primitive observation. Yet, apparently due to their assumed diminished sophistication or even manipulation by consciousness, she finds them as revealing a correct façade of the sensorially manifest appearance (see: HCM, 1916, 478–479).

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the felt existence is experienced by the I as deprived of context as “a fact in-itself and for itself” (HCM, 1916, 481). However, this context-free acceptance is not in conflict with the fact that it is the same I that experiences a current givenness and is the recipient of what it contains. However, since in both positions the I experiences itself from “separated I-positions (Ichstellen)”, they are held with it as “context-free” (HCM, 1916, 482 n. 1). HCM clarifies that actually it is not spirit itself that dies in the related acceptance. Quite the opposite, the spirit is alive and awake, it does receive inwards another world that is not the sensorially manifest one. Yet it is exactly the sensorially manifest appearance that dies in the spirit itself. In any case, even when the living spirit is placed in the periphery, this is sufficient for the full realization of the sensorially manifest appearance (HCM, 1916, 490). This emphasis on the absence of context within the acceptance of the sensorially manifest appearing is fundamental to HCM’s view of the grounding of the reality of the external world as independent of the living spirit. She explains that when one’s spirit is directed at the sensorially manifest appearing, it does not only acquire what is received from seeing and hearing, but completes and even improves what sensorially presents itself by providing it with “depth (Tiefe)”, “grounding (Gegründetheit)”, and “rounding (Abrundung)” (HCM, 1916, 479). This is why living spirit should detach itself from the “self-presentation” that is peculiar to the sensorially manifest appearance and particularly “performed (darbieten)” upon its “surface”. Finally, this “envelopment (Umfassung)” of the sensorially appearing with the qualities of living spirit itself brings to the fore its “latent content” and therein enables the sensorially felt-thing to “appear as internally filled”. However, she clarifies that “this is of course those factors that as such do not belong to the sensory material itself and therefore cannot be considered as given” (HCM, 1916, 494). In short, the internal is not sensorially manifest and thus cannot appear. She further explains that not only “primary observation entails in itself certain achievement of positioning (Setzung)” (HCM, 1916, 487 n. 1), but also the living spirit changes the primordial given when it introduces it into a uniform, content-filled, and contextual world. However, theimportance of “this epistemological value”, so she puts ironically, cannot be taken into account, since as a spiritual creature, “I can grasp and place but cannot sensorially receive. Furthermore, the sensory given itself lacks the spiritual-living testing”. Consequently, “the eternal discrepancy that gapes between my spiritual achievement and the sensory basis” cannot be overcome, but can only be preserved in a “dead relation to givenness” (HCM, 1916, 488). Against this background, the question arises: What should be the appropriate description of the spirit that in HCM’s view has been moved aside into the periphery of consciousness in favor of receiving through the senses? (HCM, 1916, 494). After introducing her vivid account of spirits’ imprint on the sensorially manifest appearance, she unmistakably clarifies that “this is not the case of visual elusiveness of sensorially manifest materials through spirit” (HCM, 1916, 488). Instead, she suggests that a certain consonance exists between the state of the sensorially manifest appearance and that of the I revealing sensory openness toward it. Their mutual “encroaching”, as opposed to elimination of the one or the other, is regarded as essential for the realization of appearance as such. Thus, the sensorially manifest appearance “delivers itself from its closed-objective

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position”—a position enabled when it is not perceived and not expanding in a momentary spiritual-living act of spirit, namely “when it has been factually achieved within ‘dead’ acceptance […] that contains holding (Fassen)” the received data without acting upon them. In parallel, the I is described as possessing a “natural grasp range (Natürliche Greifweite) of spirit” that facilitates spirit “holding (Fassen) of sensorially manifest existences as a dead situational achievement (Zustandsleistung) of the senses”—a position that “interrupts the living-spiritual contact with the sensorially manifest external world” (HCM, 1916, 495). In this way, a (peripheral) conscious relation might be enabled toward the appearing existences while maintaining separation from them. HCM calls this peculiar position of the I as an “accomplishment of transcendence” (Transzendenzleistung), in which it constitutes a relation toward existences while being closed within itself and maintaining distance from them. Indeed, it is precisely the “openness”, essential for constituting this relation on the part of the living spirit (HCM, 1916, 474) that enables the I facing closed and sealed being while refraining from violating the distance gaping between humans and sensorially manifest appearances. To this extent, the transcendence here is mutual—the spirit does not invade the sensorially manifest appearance, which in turn remains located beyond it. At this point, the role spirit plays in the so-called dead acceptance of sensorially manifest appearances might become understandable. In the first place, HCM characterized the range within which spirit exerts as “natural”, in the sense that no special momentary action is required from the spirit but the involvement of the senses is sufficient (HCM, 1916, 495). In any event, the spiritual sphere itself cannot exceed what is enabled within the limits of the occurrences realized in it, as these place a boundary that spirit cannot cross. To this extent, the living spirit can never control the observation that constitutes itself as “dead acceptance”. In contrast, the sensory felt-thing can only be reached when it encompasses itself in a sort of blindness to the forms of perception, and when the “sense’s expressions (Sinneseindrücken)” contain nothing of the perception of “a uniform world” (HCM, 1916, 488). Thus, so to speak, “a peripheral ‘capturing’ (einfangen)” of the sensorially manifest appearance takes place as if “from itself”. Again, this manifestation is not generated through the living spirit but as its “dead achievement” (HCM, 1916, 496), or through spirit “in which senses are embedded (eingelassen)”. In this regard, the related “natural grab range of spirit” is observed as “dead residue of achievement (tote Restleistung)” of living spirit that “as such is left over in the peripheral position”. The “impression (Eindruck)”, as she puts it, is that the spirit equips the spiritual senses with the perception ability through its “natural grab range” and then “again only through the actionable (aktionsfähigen) spirit they are positioned from it” (HCM, 1916, 497) and thereby receive the sensorially manifest appearances. HCM summarizes the “only important condition for the adequate acceptance of the sensorially manifest appearances”, namely: “the senses must […] always be set into the realm of spirit […namely] as personally positioned gateways carried vividly and actually” (HCM, 1916, 498) within the boundaries of the so-called dead acceptance. Thus, it transpires that already the related requirement of “transcendence achievement” addressed to the I presumes the

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existence of the natural grab range and at the same time a degree of involvement of the subject’s spirit. As HCM phrased it: We believe that in fact it should be fixated that the spiritual being as such helps its bearer (Träger) to a certain natural situation of transcendence – in a sense that a specific act of some sort or executing “salto mortale” is not at all needed. Hence, this spiritual I does not live only by itself but also in a world strange to the I (ichfremde Welt). It belongs to the nature of the spiritual being that an entire world can be contained within it. Without it sometimes being asked to guarantee an additional undisturbed further, but its very own “range” (Weite). […spirit] can rest there without superficially and arduously surpassing or overstretching its own being. (HCM, 1916, 407–408)

1.4 Conclusion The two discussed fundamental phenomena of the external world—feeling givenness and sensorially manifest appearance—are directly related to the two fundamental questions that interested HCM’s ontological study of the external world. First, “in which real mode are perceived ‘essences (Washeiten)’ given to us, in more or less large definiteness (Bestimmtheit)? And where do we encounter them in their concrete realization?” (HCM, 1916, 356). HCM addresses the first question through patient following of the ontological nature of the external world’s reality and the second through careful investigation of the external world’s phenomenal dimensions. Phenomenologically, these two inquiries are intertwined, and thus, the track of the realistic phenomenology of the external world moves simultaneously in two opposite directions: moving from the “still covered” to the “pure primordial”, we seek the ideal realization that brings about the reality of things. However, since reality as such, addressed in this track, is not revealed on the phenomenal plane, this plane that in turn transpires context as covering and concealing. At the outset of the second track is presumed that the phenomenon of the external world is not an idea. Therefore, within the moving from the “pure primordial” to the “still covered”, we aim at the reality that exceeded its ideal boundaries—an exceeding that is embodied in the fundamental essence of reality to achieve external dimensions. In any event, both movements reveal the real transcendence of the external world toward consciousness (HCM, 1916, 355) and naturally affirm the reality that is manifested within the phenomenon of the external world.

References Ales Bello, A. (2004). The controversy about the existence of the world in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological school: A. Reinach, R. Ingarden, H. Conrad-Martius, E. Stein. In Analecta Husserliana (ANHU) (Vol. 79,pp. 97–115). Ales Bello, A. (2008). Forward. Axiomathes, 18, 395–398.

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Avé-Lallemant, E. (1959). Der kategoriale Ort des Seelischen in der Naturwirklichkeit: Eine Untersuchung auf der Grundlage der realontologischen Arbeiten von Hedwig Conrad-Martius. Dissertation, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, München. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1971). Phänomenologie und Realität, Vergleichende Untersuchungen zur ‘München-Göttinger’ und ‘Freiburger’ Phänomenology. München: Habilitationsschrift. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1975). Die Antithese Freiburg-München in der Geschichte der Phänomenologie. In H. Kuhn, E. Avé-Lallemant, & R. Gladiator (Eds.), Die Münchener Phänomenologie, Vorträge des Internationalen Kongresses in München 13–18 April 1971 (Phaenomenologica 65) (pp. 19– 38) (H. Kuhn, E. Avé-Lallemant, and R. Gladiator, Eds.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1988). Die phänomenologische Bewegung: Ursprung, Anfänge und Ausblick. In H. R. Sepp (Ed.), Edmund Husserl und die phänomenologische Bewegung, Zeugnisse in Text und Bild (pp. 61–75). Freiburg and München: Alber. Avé-Lallemant, U. (1965 [1966]). Hedwig Conrad Martius. Jahrbuch der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing, XV, 203–212. Beckermann, A. (2001). Analytische Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes (2nd ed.). Berlin: De Gruyter. Conrad-Martius, H. (1916). Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt. In Jahrbuch—für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung III (pp. 345–542). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Conrad-Martius, H. (1920a [1912]). Die erkenntnisstheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus. Bergzabern: Heinrich Müller. (Private print). Conrad-Martius, H. (1920b). Nachwort. In Die erkenntnisstheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus (pp. 130–131). Bergzabern: Heinrich Müller. (Private print). Conrad-Martius, H. (1923). Realontologie, Buch I: Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung (Vol. VI, pp. 159–333). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Conrad-Martius, H. (1951). Vorwort. In A. Reinach (Ed.), Was ist Phänomenologie? Mit einem Vorwort von Hedwig Conrad-Martius (pp. 5–17). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1957). Das Sein. München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1959a [1958]). Die transzendentale und die ontologische Phänomenologie. In H. L. van Vreda & Jacques Taminiaux (Eds.), Edmund Husserl 1859–1959—Recueil Commémoratif Publié A L’occasion De Centenaire De La Naissance Du Philosophe (Phaenomenologica 4) (pp. 175–184). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. (Reprinted in: HCM 1965a). Conrad-Martius, H. (1959b). Phenomenology and speculation. Philosophy Today, III(1–4), 43–51. (Translation of: HCM 1965c). Conrad-Martius, H. (1964 [1950]). Naturwissenschaft und Naturphilosophie. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. II, pp. 23–46). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1965a [1958]). Die transzendentale und die ontologische Phänomenologie. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 393–402). München: Kösel. (Printed also in: HCM 1959a). Conrad-Martius, H. (1965b [1961]). Die Wahrheit der Dinge. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 421–444). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1965c [1956]). Phänomenologie und Spekulation. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 370–384). München: Kösel. (English translation: HCM 1959b). Conrad-Martius, H. (1965d [1956]). Über das Wesen des Wesens. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 335–356). München: Kösel. Dennett, D. (1993). Quining Qualia. In A. Marcel & E. Bisiach (Eds.), Consciousness in contemporary science (pp. 42–77). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ebel, G. (1965). Untersuchungen zu einer Realistischen Grundlegung der phänomenologischen Wesensschau. Dissertation, München. Geiger, M. (1930). Die Wirklichkeit der Wissenschaften und die Metaphysik. Bonn: F. Cohen. Heinemann, F. (1960). Erscheinen und Sein—Prolegomena zu einer konkreten Phänomenologie. In R. Wisser (Ed.), Sinn und Sein, Ein philosophisches Symposion (pp. 183–219). Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.

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Hering, J. (1921). Bemerkung über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee. In Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung VI (pp. 495–543). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Husserl, E. (1952a [1913]). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie. In E. Buch (Ed.), Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie. Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. (English translation: Husserl 2012). Husserl, E. (1952b). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. In Z. Buch (Ed.), phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution. Marly Biemel, Husserliana IV. Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. (English translation: Husserl 2002). Husserl, E. (1970a [1900]). Logical investigations (Vol. I, J. Findlay, Trans.). London and New York, NY: Routledge. (Translation of: Husserl 1975). Husserl, E. (1970b [1901]). Logical investigations (Vol. II, J. Findlay, Trans.). London and New York, NY: Routledge. (Translation of: Husserl 1984a and Husserl 1984b). Husserl, E. (1975 [1900]). Logische Untersuchungen, Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, Husserliana XVIII. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. (English translation: Husserl 1970a). Husserl, E. (1984a [1901]). Logische Untersuchungen, Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Husserliana XIX (1). The Hague, Boston, MA and Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. (English translation: Husserl 1970b). Husserl, E. (1984b [1901]). Logische Untersuchungen, Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Husserliana XIX (2). The Hague, Boston, MA and Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. (English translation: Husserl 1970b). Husserl, E. (2002). Logische Untersuchungen. Ergänzungsband Erster Teil: Entwürfe zur Umarbeitung der VI. In U. Melle (Ed.), Untersuchung und zur Vorrede für die Neuafulage der Logischen Untersuchungen (Sommer 1913) Husserliana XX (1). Dordrecht, Boston, MA and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Husserl, E. (2012 [1913]). Ideas, general introduction to pure phenomenology (W. R. Boyce Gibson, Trans.). London: Routledge. (Translation of: Husserl 1952a). Kołakowski, L. (1975). Husserl and the search for certitude. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press. Krings, H. (1960). Studie über Vorstellung und Sein. In R. Wisser (Ed.), Sinn und Sein, Ein philosophisches Symposion (pp. 193–208). Tübingen: Max Niemeyer. Kuhn, H. (1969). Phänomenologie und Realität. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 23(3), 397–402. Lewis, C. I. (1991). Mind and world order: Outline of a theory of knowledge (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Dover. Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450. Pfänder, A. (1913). Zur Psychologie der Gesinnung. In Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung I (Vol. 1, pp. 325–404). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Pfeiffer, A. (2005). Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Eine phänomenologische Sicht auf Natur und Welt. Würzburg: Orbis Phenomenologicus, Königshausen and Neumann. Reinach, A. (1913). Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes. In Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung I (Vol. 2, pp. 685–847). Halle: Max Niemeyer. (Reprint of: Reinach 1921; English translation: Reinach 1983). Reinach, A. (1921a [1914]). Vortrag über Phänomenologie. In A. Reinach (Ed.), Gesammelte Schriften (pp. 379–405). Halle: Max Niemeyer (Reprint of: Reinach 1951; English trans.: Reinach 1968; Reinach 1969). Reinach, A. (1921b). Die Apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes. In A. Reinach, Gesammelte Schriften (pp. 166–350). Halle: Max Niemeyer. (Reprint of: Reinach 1913; English translation: Reinach 1983). Reinach, A. (1951 [1914]). Was ist Phänomenologie? Mit einem Vorwort von Hedwig ConradMartius. München: Kösel. (Published also in: Reinach 1921a. English trans: Reinach 1968; Reinach 1969). Reinach, A. (1968 [1914]). What is phenomenology? (D. Kelly, Trans.). Philosophical Forum, 1(2) (New Series), 231–256. (Translation of: Reinach, 1921, Reinach, 1951).

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Reinach, A. (1969 [1914]). Concerning phenomenology (W. Dallas, Trans.). The Personalist, 50(2), 194–221. (Translation of: Reinach, 1921, Reinach, 1951). Reinach, A. (1983 [1913]). The Apriori foundations of civil law (J. Crosby, Trans.). Aletheia, 3, 1–142. (English trans. of: Reinach 1913, Reinach 1921b). Schapp, W. (1910). Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung. Göttingen: Kaestner. Schmücker, F. G. (1956). Die Phänomenologie als Methode der Wesenerkenntnis, unter besondere Berücksichtigung der Auffassung der München-Göttinger Phänomenologenschule. Dissertation, München. Seifert, J. (1995). Was ist Philosophie? Die Antwort der realistische Phänomenologie. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 49(3), 92–103. Spiegelberg, H. (1975). Doing phenomenology: Essays on and in phenomenology (Phaenomenologica 63). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Spiegelberg, H. (1984). Three types of the given: The encountered, the search-found, and the striking. Husserl Studies, 1, 69–78. Wachterhauser, B. R. (1996). Introduction: The shipwreck of apodicticity? In James M. Edie & Brice R. Wachterhauser (Eds.), Phenomenology and skepticism: Essays in honor of James M. Edie (pp. 1–62, 227–238). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. (Notes). Walther, G. (1955). Phänomenologie der Mystik. Olten und Freiburg im Breisgau: Walter-Verlag.

Chapter 2

The Realism of Transcendence: A Critical Analysis of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Early Ontology Ronny Miron

Abstract This chapter focuses on the problem of transcendence in “On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World” (HCM, 1916) (Doctrine of Appearance)—the first publication from a vast corpus of writings by Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888–1966) (HCM). The principles of the realistic phenomenology that HCM explores in this treatise by studying the phenomenon of the real external world designate her early ontology upon which her later metaphysical worldview would be based. Her establishing argument associates transcendence with mundane reality while eliminating any mystical aspect from it. Although the ontological aspect of the problem of transcendence is more dominant in HCM’s approach, its epistemological dimensions are not denied but illuminated through her discussion of the nature of the human spirit in the face of which the world appears as external. My main argument is that HCM’s phenomenology of externality lays the foundations for the phenomenology of transcendence. Consequently, transcendence transpires as the depth and the most ultimate meaning not only of external phenomena but also of reality as such.

2.1 The Problem of Transcendence The philosophical problem of transcendence is first raised by the awareness of the fundamental difference between two kinds of cognition: genuine and presumed. While the first has an objective correlate in reality, the second does not. However, one’s reflection on an object—either genuine or not—is a real and indisputable experience. Therefore, the study of human experience, in which objects and one’s relation to them are inseparable, will never be sufficient for the explication of transcendent objects. The externality of these objects will forever prevent them from achieving complete lucidity. From epistemological point of view, one can put the problem of transcendence as follows: How can an experience that is immanent to the subject be R. Miron (B) Interdisciplinary Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Miron (ed.), Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68783-0_2

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correlate to the object that is not included in it? (Claesges, 1972, 283). From ontological point of view, the problem stems from the unceasing escape of transcendence from consciousness. Since the appearing of the transcendent before one’s thinking enfolds inseparably presence and absence, void and fullness—the transcendent will never be able to be exhausted or realized by consciousness (Caputo, 1979, 205– 206). The impossibility of avoiding referring to the aspect of consciousness also in the ontological characterization of the problem indicates that in the problem of transcendence, both the epistemological and the ontological aspects reach a boiling point that might thwart any possible solution.1 The present article focuses on the problem of transcendence in “On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World” (HCM, 1916)2 (Doctrine of Appearance)—the first publication from a vast corpus of writings by Hedwig ConradMartius (1888–1966) (HCM). HCM lays the first essential layer of her realistic phenomenology within her ontological study of the phenomenon of the real external world.3 The problem of transcendence is structured in Doctrine of Appearance, and its ontological exploration is based on two fundamental principles. The first addresses the nature of the reality of transcendence. In this regard, HCM strives to associate transcendence with mundane reality while avoiding any mystical aspect in it. Her argument here is postulated as follows: “real transcendence does not mean, then, factual separateness (Auseinander) (like separateness between two material things […]), but essential rootedness in a different sphere to the extent that it is impossible to release the one from the other”. She explains that real transcendence is an objectivity that possesses its very own “internal content (innere Gehalt)” in compliance with its “being stance (Daseinsstelle)” that cannot be reached by another real transcendent with its respective characteristics (HCM, 1916, 437). These two fundamental aspects regarding transcendence, namely its separateness from other beings and its factual rootedness within the world, establishes the first principle in HCM’s understanding of transcendence as the core of the ontological study of the external world.4 1 For

the resistance of philosophical problems from solution, see: Dillon (1998, 75). translations from the German original into English are mine. Emphases follow the original. Doctrine of Appearance is used to denote the book as a whole. Doctrine of Appearance is an exploration of the first chapter in her essay on positivism (HCM, 1920a, 10–24) that received an award from the department of philosophy at the University of Göttingen. In 1912, Alexander Pfänder recognized Doctrine of Appearance as a Ph.D. thesis in the University of Munich (Avé-Lallemant, 1965/1966, 212; Pfeiffer, 2005, 25). In 1913, the expanded chapter of the award-winning essay was printed and submitted as a dissertation, in a version similar to Doctrine of Appearance. In the epilogue added to the special print in 1920, HCM established her shift to ontology-oriented studies and seems to know that her original plan to develop the rest of the chapters in her essay on positivism will not be realized (HCM, 1920b, 130. See here also: Avé-Lallemant, 1971, 213). 3 HCM was one of the early phenomenologists of Munich Circle which, apart from her, included a group of intellectuals and philosophers from Munich, the first generation of the phenomenologists, whose prominent members included: Alexander Pfänder, Johannes Daubert, Moritz Geiger, Theodor Conrad, Adolf Reinach, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Maximilian Beck, Max Scheler, Jean Hering, Alexander Koyré, Roman Ingarden, and Edith Stein. For further reading about this circle see: Avé-Lallemant (1975). 4 In Realontologie, HCM will distinguish between the idea of transcendence upon which her realistic approach is based and the mistaken one. The first means a “continuing maintaining” (fortdaurende 2 All

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The second principle in HCM’s ontological investigation of the reality external world concerns the issue of the relation between transcendence and the human spirit. In this regard, she asserts: the principle transcendence of the external world against spirit that in fact should thereby be pronounced and stressed by us. [This] might be in a transcendence interpreted, after which the real external world is such that will be in general and plainly closed for spirit. […]; however, exactly therefore the still asserted transcendence and its special meaning remains incomprehensible. We would like to indicate that this concerns the possibility of objective comprehending but not the real [understanding]. (HCM, 1916, 434)

This ontological accentuation within the study of the external world means primarily not focusing on the unique capability of the human spirit to achieve objectivity regarding the transcendence of the external world. Instead, the focus on the aspect of transcendence enables HCM driving the most significant characteristics of the reality of the external world, i.e., its being a real substance (HCM, 1916, 386), a self-standing being (Seinselbstständigkeit) (HCM, 1916, 391), autonomous and absolute in its existence (HCM, 1916, 392), closed in-itself, and transcendent to spirit and consciousness (HCM, 1916, 424).5 Obviously, the immediate epistemological consequence of this characterization of the real external world is the inclusive incomprehensibility of transcendence and its specific meaning (HCM, 1916, 434). However, despite being declared marginal, the involved epistemological aspects that concern the transcendence of the external world are not entirely denied with HCM’s ontological study. Indeed, not only does HCM discuss the nature of the human spirit in the face of which the world appears as external, but the explication of the relations between the spiritual being and the world is also harnessed to the establishing of the ontological independence of the external world.6 This does not mean that the external is identical to the transcendent. On the contrary, externality denoted a mode of appearing, while the transcendent is what simply does not appear, at least on the face of the subject. However, I argue that HCM’s phenomenology of externality begins to show signs—as its far marginal edges—of the principles of Erhaltung) of the real thing in its real being that is established by-itself and in-itself. The second is characterized as fragile and suffering from possible dependence on immanence because of its rootedness in the human spirit, see: HCM (1923, 185–186). 5 HCM explains that is a mistake (quite common in positivistic approaches) to identify “existences independence of consciousness” with the “real external world” (HCM, 1916, 391). In her opinion, what appears as dependent in its being cannot appear as what presents itself (HCM, 1916, 413 n. 2). Spiegelberg explains that the very independence of the subject should not be considered as the essence of reality but as a “fundamental and essential result of reality” (excluding real acts of the subject that of course depend on him or her). See: Spiegelberg (1975, 132 n. 2). 6 The early phenomenologists understood Husserl’s appeal “go back to the ‘things themselves’” (Husserl, 1970, 168/1984, 10) as indifference toward epistemological questions. See: U. AvéLallemant (1965/1966, 207). For the relations between phenomenology and epistemology and phenomenology, see: Spiegelberg (1975, 130–131). Like HCM, who characterized the epistemological approach as dogmatic (HCM, 1916, 347) and incapable of coping with its questions (Spiegelberg, 1975, 131), Spiegelberg too criticized epistemology, which in its highly speculative accounts of how knowledge works omits its first and paramount obligation to be critical itself (Spiegelberg, 1975, 152).

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the phenomenology of transcendence. Consequently, transcendence transpires as the deepest and the most ultimate meaning not only of externality but also of reality as such. The following discussion will extricate the main implicit insights regarding transcendence from HCM’s idea of the real external, out of which one can elicit guidelines for the explication of the transcendent dimension of the object and of transcendence in general.7

2.2 Essence and Transcendence The awareness of the transcendent presence in reality is implicit already in essence intuition (Wesensfassung), to which HCM is committed in Doctrine of Appearance and in the rest of her oeuvre.8 The supreme principle of this method is eliminating the possibility of equating reality with the immediate, concrete, and material dimensions in which reality might be fulfilled under certain conditions. This method originated in the Husserlian phenomenology that localizes and analyzes the “what” that establishes the real being by searching for the indispensable a priori and primordial foundations, thanks to which the real being can become a specific object.9 HCM devotes Doctrine of Appearance to “a totally peculiar idea of ‘real being’” that is meant to clarify of the entire phenomenon of “real external world” (HCM, 1916, 365). She clarifies that the focus of her interest is not “physical-optic regularities” or in what might be “seen” or perceived by a narrow natural-scientific approach (HCM, 1916, 394), but the “idea of reality” (HCM, 1916, 396) that is ruled by a priori principles which might become transparent by the very act of observation (HCM, 1916, 395). Here “idea” indicates the separateness from consciousness, the bearing of absoluteness of its own, essentiality, and substantial unity per se, while “phenomenon” denotes the achievement of independent appearing of specific essence that involves within itself also aspects of consciousness. HCM explains that these two are equally important for the analysis of the real external world, since everything that is constituted in an idea is accessible to essence intuition, and every genuine 7 HCM’s

approach was directed toward the object, and later on she will explicitly reject the phenomenological reduction. See: HCM (1963, 17). 8 HCM declares her reliance on essence intuition in: HCM (1916, 355, no. 1; 1923, 159). Elsewhere she refers to this method in greater detail, see: HCM (1965b, 377; 1965c, 347). 9 HCM was committed to “essence intuition” (Wesensfassung), which she shared with the early phenomenologists of Munich Circle. They were inspired by Husserl’s struggle in Logical Investigations against psychologism, relativism, and various reductionisms (Husserl, 1970, §23 51, §31 74/1975, §23 82, §31 117), in particular by his principle that it is possible to observe consciousness’ condition apart from the thinking subject (Husserl, 1970b, III, §5 10/1984, III, §5 240). For further reading about this circle see: Avé-Lallemant (1975, 19–38). HCM admits the influence of Logical Investigations on her, see: HCM (1916, 355). About the method of “essence intuition”, especially in the realistic school of phenomenology, see: Reinach (1913), Pfänder (1913, 325–404), Pfeiffer (2005, 1–13), Schmücker (1956, 1–33), Ebel (1965, 1–25); Avé-Lallemant (1959, 89–105) Walther (1955, 190).

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primordial phenomenon essentially corresponds to an idea that has been separated out of it (HCM, 1916, 353). HCM asks “In which real mode are perceived ‘essences (Washeiten)’ given to us, in more or less big definiteness (Bestimmtheit)? And where do we encounter them in their concrete realization?” to the extent that it is indeed impossible to doubt their real concreteness in general as well as in a special case? (HCM, 1916, 356). These questions initiate the problematization of the given, and thus pose a clear limit between the immediate appearance of the external world and its real being, which in her opinion are not identical (HCM, 1916, 427). HCM contends that sometimes there exists only a “semblance (Anschein) of real presence-being (Gegenwärtigsein) that does not correspond to the factually presence-being (tatsächliches Gegenwärtigsein)” (HCM, 1916, 356). More specifically, she explains that “concerning its ‘position-of-Being’ (Seinsstelle) (either real or not), the intuitively given (anschaulich Gegebene) does not always hold what it seems to promise as so and so appearing (Erscheinende)” (HCM, 1916, 358). In the background of these words is HCM’s early criticism of positivism10 that explicitly served for her as a starting point for the discussion of the real external world (HCM, 1916, 345). She characterizes positivism as a skeptical approach according to which “there exist certain cognition possibilities and their corresponding entire realms of objects of a specific kind that is not given at all” (HCM, 1916, 346). She holds that positivism’s basic argument is that it can achieve an accurate analysis of immanent natural consciousness, in which it is impossible to separate between the reality of this analysis and the perceiving I. Thus, for the positivist, “reality in original sense” is “something that will become presently perceived (Vorgestellte wahrgenommen)” (HCM, 1916, 363–364). Consequently, a cognition out of “pure reason” or based on “pure observation” (HCM, 1916, 346) is rejected in favor of “‘sensory perception’ (sinnliche Wahrnehmung) (outer or inner) as the only mode of perceiving of Being (Seinserfassungsweise)”. Accordingly, the capability for “sensorially-perceptible” (sinnliche Wahrnehmbare) or also “feeling (Empfindung)” is regarded by positivism as the only material that can be considered as given to consciousness (HCM, 1916, 347). In this regard, HCM accuses positivism of naivety, which she associates with its battle against idealism (HCM, 1916, 362). She rejects as an “untenable […] limitation” (HCM, 1916, 347) positivism’s related fundamental principle that sensory perception is the only mode of cognition and localizes her approach as “proceeding necessarily in a dimension that so to speak lies where positivism secludes itself” (HCM, 1916, 400), meaning: in the real substance as transcendent and independent of consciousness and spirit in general. At the same time, HCM distances her view from dogmatism, and thereby established her approach as phenomenological, by 10 The subtitle of Doctrine of Appearance, “Associated with a critique of positivistic theories”, as well as the debate with positivism throughout the text (HCM, 1916, 345–347, 352, 357–358, 361– 365, 378, 382–386, 390–391, 398–400, 423, 425) clearly indicates its roots in the first essay (HCM, 1920a).

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assuming the original belonging of the discussed essentiality to a certain phenomenal state of affair (HCM, 1916, 347, 349). This means that even if dealing with essences is in-itself free of any dependency on factual existence inside the real world, the essence will never be able to achieve independency from the phenomenal appearing itself. So, she establishes that the mission of explication of the external world “can only then truly succeed if that whose sensory givenness would be epistemologically questioned, at first purely conceived in its peculiar essence” (HCM, 1916, 348). Thus, perceiving an essence is the only legitimate departure point in ascertaining the phenomenal givenness or the possible factuality of the external world. Against the skepticism at the basis of positivism and dogmatism that makes redundant the observing of the phenomenon itself, HCM establishes that for the philosophical mission of explication, the real external world can be possess “little meaning” if one dismisses the real or factual givenness of the phenomenal givenness and the “ideality” of these “unities of essence (Wesenseinheitedn) and thereby the possibility of such studies” that address them. Subsequently, she asks rhetorically: if these “ideas” (Ideen) could not have existed in human consciousness, “then how should these have entered inside?” (HCM, 1916, 348).11 That is to say, both ideality and reality, and thereby the ideal aspect of the real and the real aspect of the ideal, must be confirmed at the very outset of the study of external reality. Similarly, she holds later that “if in all components-of-existence (Bestandteile), for their possible real givenness-being (Gegebensein) no assumable hypotheses are presented, for the time-being to bring to deletion […] [then] all Being and occurrence would be emptied and impoverished” (HCM, 1916, 359). The subsidiarity of the epistemological illumination and essence intuition in which HCM’s phenomenology of the external world is anchored is derived directly from the certainty regarding its reality, in her words: “the question of how a real man can reach these ideas in a certain case, where the genetic-psychological fundamental situation of real givenness-being actually could not be found, must meaningfully remain secondary” (HCM, 1916, 348), or in a more radical wording: “the epistemological sphere in no way relates to the question of the provability of these ‘essences’ as concrete elements of the real world. We believe that philosophy, in a genuine and rigorous sense, is outside of any (epistemological) question of reality” (HCM, 1916, 355).

11 See

HCM’s criticism of skepticism: HCM (1916, 358, 398). HCM’s widespread use of the word “believe” (glauben) clearly indicates the adoption of the typical certainty that stood at the foundation of the Husserlian phenomenology. See in particular: HCM (1916, 355, 370, 398, 407, 413, 418, 423, 446, 496, 500, 513). Husserl regarded skepticism as a denial of apodicticity, i.e., necessary and universal truths that are essential for any theory to make sense. He distinguished between three forms of skepticism: “logical”, “noetic”, and “metaphysical”. See: Husserl (1970, §57–§61 134–141/1975, §57–§61 214–226). As for Husserl, so also for HCM in Doctrine of Appearance the metaphysical skepticism that denies the objective knowledge of the real world is the most problematic. For further discussion, see: Wachterhauser (1996, 1–62, 227–238). Regarding Husserl’s certitude, see: Kołakowski (1975).

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The rejection of the positivistic world view in favor of essence intuition is indispensable for establishing access to the external and the transcendent that as such are not given directly to the I that is distinguished from them. In this respect, HCM’s criticism of positivism signifies the rejection of directedness as such, even if some amount of directedness is nevertheless preserved also in essence intuition.12 The affinity between the essence of the real being and its transcendent dimension is rather wide. Firstly, both are established upon an evident ground and accordingly the essence and the transcendent dimension are not addressed to explication but signify truth that does not need any proof. Second, in both the discussed elements transpire as the restrictedness and insufficiency of the phenomenal appearing for the embodying of the real being. Finally, regarding the two elements, the distinction between the internal and the external is blurred, since the essence is the depth of the real appearing and simultaneously transcendent to it. Alternatively, the transcendent is not external to the real appearing but dwells insides it and is inherent in its essence, which can never be exhausted by its external manifestations. In any event, there is no contradiction between the realistic disposition and the methodological choice of essence intuition. HCM’s idea of realism assumes the primacy of the essential over the empirical and knowable. Transcendence might be considered as a comprehensive expression of this primacy—it has presence yet is independent of its appearing and does not necessarily shine in it. Moreover, HCM’s reliance on essence intuition, which in her later writings will deepen and become more explicit, is capable of responding to the two faces of transcendence—noematic and noetic. The noematic one refers to the objective dimensions of the real being that is characterized also as “essential closedness (wesensmäβige Abgesschlossenheit)” (HCM, 1916, 349). The noetic aspect deals with the subjective experience of objective and independent presence beyond oneself, as well as with the negativity and restrictions to which the elucidation of the transcendent is subordinated, as a result of which one will never achieve a complete lucidity regarding it. These two faces, the noematic and the noetic, are discussed in the following two sections.

12 For

further reading regarding intuitive cognition, see: Cobb-Stevens (1990), Hintikka (2003). HCM’s choice to anchor her study of the external world in “sensory- givenness” that deals with the characters of the sensory given, which she regarded as enabling “real touch” with the external world (HCM, 1916, 423), made it possible for her to keep the duality that is composed of the objective content of givenness external in its origin and the direct experience of the subject that feels it. Elsewhere, I have discussed in length the realism of sensory givenness, see Chapter 1 in this volume and: Miron (2014).

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2.3 Gap and Transcendence The elucidation of the aspect of transcendence within the real external world is carried out within a movement between two fundamental insights. The first insight concerns the explication of reality within the boundaries of the phenomenon of the real external world about which HCM determines the following: “In our observations, we have not yet achieved a grip in the problem of ‘reality’ as such, but only in this partial problem of how the real existence of the external world insides the real sphere in general raises itself from a ‘mere appearing existence’ (bloßen Erscheinungsbestand)” (HCM, 1916). She explains that the “mere appearing existence” as such, that is at the center of Doctrine of Appearance, takes part to a certain extent in the real world; “it ‘appears’ in it; it ‘emerges’ (taucht auf ) in it” (HCM, 1916, 389 n. 1). Indeed, this is the justification for the very establishing of realism on the external appearing of the world. Truly, the choice to focus on the external revealing of the world enables her to “‘be satisfied here’ with taking the sensorially manifest surface (sinnfällige Oberfläche) pure for itself – regardless of what it eventually might be capable of bringing to presentation above and outside itself” (HCM, 1916, 463), namely, as “a self-standing entity (selbstständige Entität)” (HCM, 1916, 466). Here, the “surface” does not mean only “a contingent surface cutting (Schnittoberfläche) of a ready-made thing, but the […] visible exterior side of the matter in general that stands against the ‘in principle invisible’ ‘interior’ (Innere) of the matter”. This is unreachable by any possibly real cutting from the given, for we are always walking upon the manifest surface (HCM, 1916, 465 n. 1).13 However, exactly the involvement of the related “in principle invisible ‘interior’ of the matter” in the appearance of real existences is particularly important for the explication of the transcendent aspect of the phenomenon of the real external world, because it undermines the equation between appearance or visibility and reality (HCM, 1916). Moreover, HCM holds that the sensorially appearing does not have the “vocation” (Beruf ) of unearthing the “thing-in-itself’” that is beneath, but “to bring ‘the world in-itself’ to exposure (Aufdeckung)” (HCM, 1916, 463). The second fundamental insight employed within HCM’s explication of the aspect of transcendence has to do with the desire to overcome the partial manifestation of the real world in order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of reality and “proving

13 In Realontologie, while discussing the issue of materiality, she refers again to the concept of “the

manifest surface”. Her principal argument there is that the material being has depth and internality, but only its external can reach sensory appearing. While the illuminated part is outside, the dark and closed faces are inside or in depth. She establishes that there is a causal bond between these two elements of the material being. Therefore, especially because there is depth, there is also manifest surface, see: HCM (1923, 205–206). For additional references to the idea of manifest surface, see: HCM (1923, 206–209, 214, 235–236).

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concrete, tangible perceivable phenomena” (HCM, 1916, 391).14 To this end, there emerges a clear awareness regarding the insufficiency of the study that is restricted to the “merely apparent (scheinbar) real nature” (HCM, 1916, 389). Despite the fact that the external appearing of the real world is not itself the entirety of the real world or of reality, the pure observing of what is delivered by this appearing by itself and in-itself serves for HCM as “a frame for the whole of the study” and “guidance for the order of this embroiled and complex state of affairs” (HCM, 1916, 399). HCM was convinced that this choice might lead to the “entire sphere of reality” in which “we will be able to make perceivable the very own essence of ‘reality’ as such” (HCM, 1916, 389 n. 1). Against the background of this complexity, the explication of transcendence transpires as anchored in the acknowledging of the gap that is stretched between the appearing or the sensorially manifest and the concealed internality within real things that appears to be incapable of revealing itself. HCM distinguishes between “phenomenal beginning-material” (phänomenales Anfangsmaterial) and “genuine phenomenon” or “primordial phenomenon” (Urphänomen). The first is but the phenomenal given that serves as a starting point in the philosophical study of the entirety of objectivities of possible consciousness (HCM, 1916, 351). HCM establishes that essence is present in these objectivities, is not accidental, and does not signify “‘accidental’ psychological unities” as positivist and reductionist approaches argue (HCM, 1916). However, the essence is present in the phenomenal givenness layer in a “concealment (Verhültheit) and remoteness (Ferne)” manner (HCM, 1916, 352).15 Similarly, she refers to the ‘merely apparent (anscheinend) reality’ of the sensory given (HCM, 1916, 358) and to the state of affairs in which “the given in its ‘self-giving’ cannot anymore offer a reliable holding” (HCM, 1916, 357). The reference to what appears as covert or “merely apparent” reality is liable to lead to skepticism or dogmatism. Yet, these philosophical stances should be counted with what HCM refers to as “leading to a statement (Stellungnahme) against the given” (HCM, 1916, 358), because they do not enable the careful and restrained observation of phenomenal givenness and of the world’s phenomena in general. First and foremost, one faces the gap between skepticism and dogmatism. HCM’s approach is apparent from watching the slow and prolonged observation typical of her discussion in Doctrine of Appearance and from her argument that the determinations that were reached by the method of essence intuition are not relative or conditioned by specific circumstances (HCM, 1916, 349). In any event, given the described state 14 Heinemann expressed very similar ideas to HCM’s in his article on concrete phenomenology. He mentions her article “Phänomenologie und Spekulation” (HCM, 1965b), see Heinemann (1960, 185 n. 2), but does not refer to her most relevant treatise to his discussion, Doctrine of Appearance, with which he was undoubtedly familiar. 15 Helmut Kuhn is a contemporary of HCM’s who was part of the German phenomenological movement in the 1920s. He well described this as follows: “The things towards which the gaze is directed are always known in advance, we do not start at a null point. They show themselves to us, but they are concealed. They are standing up against us as known but also as mysterious, and impose on us the distinction between what things are in their beginning and the essence that is uncovered by penetrating observation” (Kuhn, 1969, 399). See in this context Husserl’s “The principle of all principles” that requires accepting “whatever presents itself in “intuition” in primordial form […] only withing the limits in which it presents itself ” (Husserl, 1952, §24 51/2012, §24 43).

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of affair, HCM holds that in the work of “‘unveiling’ (Enthüllung) of primordial phenomenon” there is a need for “dismissing (abtun)” what appears before us as contingent that “adheres only the appearing to me”, which is “from a certain side” of the phenomenon, “while all remaining [sides] of its essential delimited totality lies in darkness” (HCM, 1916, 353).16 She describes the “specific phenomenological stance in which the entirely direct and undeterred in its direction gaze is aimed at the phenomenon in its pure ‘what’ (Was)” and “progresses from the yet covered, yet as such already visible ‘primordial phenomenon’, to the ‘pure primordial phenomenon’” (HCM, 1916, 352). Only when the phenomenon “steps out in a complete absolute objectivity” is the philosophical work ended (HCM, 1916, 353) and the “primordial phenomenon” comes to light. Of particular importance for the explication of transcendence is the acknowledgment of the boundaries of philosophical explication of real phenomena. In this regard, HCM clarifies that as much as the philosophical analysis arrives with the greatest possible proximity to the “‘genuine primordial phenomenon’ or the essence”, nevertheless as a result of that, the phenomenon under discussion does not reach specification and greater lucidity but, as she put it, rather “it still has the character of concealment (Verhültheit) and remoteness (Ferne)” (HCM, 1916, 352). Exactly the darkness that covers those sides that do not shine in the phenomenally appearing indicates the transcendent quality of the object that cannot enable the complete uncovering of its essence. That is to say that not everything belongs to the “phenomenal beginning-material” or alternatively not all that is given is rooted in in the primordial phenomenon (HCM, 1916, 351). Rather, there always remains a residue that concerns its transcendent aspects. Thus, the power of essence intuition is clearly not in its capability of bringing the transcendent—be it an aspect of the phenomenal appearing or a transcendent being—into lucidity. On the contrary, the strength of this method is exactly in confronting one with this entity-like element that is concealed yet present amidst of the phenomenal appearing itself. In one of the most beautiful paragraphs of Doctrine of Appearance, she presents her approach as follows: An accurate study of considered facts demonstrates that regarding the sensory given of the real world in no way is the case of immobile (unbeweglich) and unilayer (einschichtig) relation that was continually presumed; not unilayer, since both the sensory given itself as well as the prevailing approach and position of consciousness towards it indicate all-various formation of totally uneven epistemological value. Therefore, addressing them to an epistemological question can have a decisive meaning and in fact this is the case; not unilayer, since the genuine meaning of Being (Seinsbedeutung) of a momentary state of affairs, that does not give itself from its own sensory content, but rather by means of a sequence (Ablauf ) of perceptions experiences is capable of arriving at complete evidence. (HCM, 1916, 359–360)

Obviously, the acute awareness of the difficulty in achieving the transcendent by human cognition does not make redundant the endeavor to seek the transcendent and uncover its dark traces in the real appearances of reality. In any event, confronting these boundaries again and again is an indispensable tool for any metaphysical search, especially the one that wishes to trace the mysterious presence of transcendence. 16 The aspect of darkness will appear in Realontologie as one of the expressions of reality, see: HCM

(1923, 206).

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2.4 The Human Spirit and Transcendence In the simple sense, the idea of subjective experience of transcendence, by means of spirit or consciousness, disproves itself. The fundamental fact regarding the transcendent as such concerns its being outside of the realm of human experience and the boundaries of human understanding. Therefore, except for acknowledging this very fact, it seems impossible to make any progress in the elucidation of the noetic pole of the experience of the transcendent. HCM describes the fundamental difficulty that spirit or consciousness in general raise regarding the experience of transcendent, and anyway concerning its very real existence, as follows: “due to its peculiar nature [the merely appearing existence] possesses vis-à-vis genuine and true real existents a reality ‘from second hand’ or from ‘second nature’” only (HCM, 1916, 389 n. 1). Meaning, as long as spirit or consciousness accompanies the appearing of the real being, it shows itself before it as attaining “a position is the real world”.17 Yet, once it is deprived of it, “it must disappear again from it, it must - as reality - become destroyed”. Thus, the fundamental rule that establishes the real as such as “resting autocratic (selbstherrlich) and autonomous on its real position” (HCM, 1916, 389 n. 1) and as a thing “closed in itself (in sich selbst Geschlossene)” (HCM, 1916, 439 n. 1) is violated. Consequently, the appearing does not belong anymore to “real existences (Realbeständen) in the genuine and true sense” (HCM, 1916, 389 n. 1). Thus, the transcendence of reality transpires as stemming from “the entirely peculiar nature of every other the real existence that is totally incomparable to the nature of the specific spiritual being”, namely while real being are closed in themselves, the human spirit is essentially open (HCM, 1916, 439, 439 n. 1). However, the described problematic is not the end. HCM bestows a double ontological guarantee to the real nature of the human experience of objects and thereby to the reality of transcendence in general. At the outset she establishes the unambiguous reality of the objects themselves, in her wording: “the objects that step forth for me in an ‘unveiled’ appearance are not there for me simply ‘so suddenly’ or like ‘from nowhere’. Rather, they accidently come forward to me out of a space-sphere that is always somehow there, and I am close enough to it” (HCM, 1916, 395). True, spirit has the capability of representation outwards. Yet, in regard to real objects, the meeting with the spirit is accidental and it is not the case that thanks to spirit they achieve their external existence (HCM, 1916, 372). It means that especially as objects that appear in the face of spirit are not its personal expression but rather “step forth out of already possessed space-reality (Raumwirklichkeit) (though not always intuitively)”, their appearing should not be credited to spirit’s account. Moreover, the contingency of the perception of specific parts of the external world allows disregarding it within the evaluation of the reality (HCM, 1916, 395). In addition, HCM fortifies the ontological guarantee of the human experience of objects also from the noematic side, meaning by referring to the nature of the human 17 In

Realontologie, HCM explores this aspect and determines that the real being must achieve a “‘position of your own’ (Eigenposition)” (HCM, 1923, 177–179).

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spirit as capable of what she calls “accomplishment of transcendence” (Transzendenzleistung), thanks to which the I might be able to establish a relation to the real being and simultaneously remain separate from it (HCM, 1916, 474), or alternatively: We believe that in fact it should be determined that the spiritual being as such helps its bearer (Träger) to a certain natural situation of transcendence – in a sense that a specific act of some sort or executing ‘salto mortale’ is not needed. Hence, this spiritual-I does not live only by itself but also in a world strange to the I (ichfremde Welt). The nature of the spiritual being is such that that an entire world can be contained within it. Without it sometimes being asked to guarantee an additional undisturbed spreading and development beyond the belonging “range” (Weite) of the spiritual being. […spirit] can rest there in quiet without surpassing or overstretching […] its own being superficially and arduously. (HCM, 1916, 407–408)

The argument that the human spirit is “open” toward the world of objects (HCM, 1916, 475), and in particular the insight that the I can exist also in an “Istrange” sphere, is essential for responding to HCM’s demand to separate between representation, meaning of the sphere where objects can appear, and perception that is conducted inside the immanent boundaries of consciousness (HCM, 1916, 371). HCM characterizes the realm of representation as “covered presentiveness” (verdeckte Anschaulichkeit) (HCM, 1916, 371, 375) and that of perception as “unveiled presentiveness” (unverhüllte Anschaulichkeit) (HCM, 1916, 381), “unveiled appearance” (unverhüllter Erscheinung) (HCM, 1916, 395), “unveiled self-emerging” (unverhüllte Selbsthervortreten) (HCM, 1916, 371, 377), and “selfannouncement” (Selbstkundgabe) (HCM, 1916, 371). Her leading principle is that where something is given in a “covered presentiveness” any “unveiled self-emerging” is closed (HCM, 1916, 371). Or alternatively: It is impossible to create from the spirit objects of perception and put them in the real world (HCM, 1916, 375). The difference between the two spheres is the following: in representation, it is impossible to disconnect the object from the realm to which it belongs, meaning: from the reality external to the subject, or to posit it in the wrong place (HCM, 1916, 367), meaning in the immanent realm of consciousness. Accordingly, the external world is regarded as “‘hosting site’ (Aufnahmestätte) of the objects of representation (Vorstellungsgegenstände)” (HCM, 1916, 373). Although the capability of spirit occasionally to conduct “genuine ‘turns’” (HCM, 1916, 373 n. 1) by which, as we have seen, it is capable of being also outside itself, it can reach the object in reality. Yet, this object appears before it in a “covered presentiveness” that as such maintains the gap and the vagueness that are indicative of the presence of the transcendent as such. HCM explains that indeed the spiritualpresentive reaching, typical of the situation of perception, is unnecessary in the disposition of representation, since “objects are already situated there for themselves in an ‘seeable proximity’: my spiritual gaze can immediately and directly penetrate until their own reality position (Wirklichkeitstelle) itself” (HCM, 1916, 376). Despite that, in perception spirit is “imposed to fixate and retain as sustained (ununterbrochen) the ‘reality of the external world’”. To the extent that spirit loosens, even slightly, its effort in this regard, in her wording “ceases to play to (vorspielen) the thing itself”, disappears also the objectivity that is represented within spirit. This subsequent “nonreality (Unwirklichkeit)” of the represented objects is then consolidated by spirit

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as a specific mode of appearance that leads spirit to regard the appearing object as “something that is ‘thought’ (vorschwebend) and ‘carried’ (getragen) by spirit” (HCM, 1916, 387). More importantly, HCM defined the position of perception as “totally contingent to the existence and the sort of this world and its objectivities” (HCM, 1916, 392). The real world is not defined by or bound to the accidental constraints of my perception field due to the partial stance I acquire in it. Rather, HCM postulates that “the possibility to ‘look into’ the space-reality (Raumwirklichkeit) as such from this stance is not confined to these contingent boundaries: it exists also in any directions and in any dimensions as well as above and beyond any ‘obstacles’” (HCM, 1916, 393).18 Obviously, the identification of the real appearing with the field of perception, typical of the positivist approach, also eradicates the gap and the distance, without which the experience of the transcendent cannot be enabled. True, also representation is a product of one’s consciousness, as she put it “the child of my spirit” (HCM, 1916, 375), and it is obvious that no “magic” takes place here that turns representation into what she calls “a child of the real world”. HCM explains that the point is that “only objectivity that is created in a representing manner (due to its nature it can sometimes belong to the real world) can be projected by a spiritual act into space-reality”. Also, due to its unmediated representative-appearance (Vorstellungserscheinung), this objectivity, “exactly ‘by its look’”, seems as actually belonging exactly to “actual” objects. However, since perception is rooted in spirit and not in the real world, “a certain act of positioning outside (Hinaussetzung)” merely “lends” what HCM calls “‘habit’ (Habitus) of factual existence that belongs to real reality (reale Wirklichkeit)” (HCM, 1916, 375). However, to the extent that reality is a result or product of positioning, which as such is through and through dependent on the human spirit, for HCM, it cannot be counted as real reality—both of the external world and in general. The fundamental differences between the spheres of presentation and perception, to which the discussion only alluded, demonstrate the two as different metaphysical realms that to a large extent determine the possible appropriate appearance for the real thing and for the transcendent element in it. It is not surprising, then, that HCM establishes that what is required for the representation of the real object as such is an “exchange of the line of gaze… from an approach of perception (Wahrnehmungseinstellung) to an approach of representation (Vorstellungseinstellung)” (HCM, 1916, 366). HCM explains that although in representation, “the represented content remains […] always ‘kept’ by my ‘spirit’, it is not in this way entirely ‘separated’ or ‘discharged’ like the objects of perception are”. Nevertheless, the represented content can also clearly “there, outside, somehow” appear; except 18 Like HCM, Spiegelberg also argues that genuine phenomena are not influenced by theoretical or other interpretations, while untrue ones collapse as soon as their falsification is uncovered. See: Spiegelberg (1975, 164). Spiegelberg’s ideas in this essay closely resemble those of HCM in Doctrine of Appearance. Obviously, he was familiar with this work, but surprisingly none of HCM’s writings are even mentioned in his essay. However, Spiegelberg provides the lacking but important background and explanation of HCM’s principles of realism.

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that unlike the objects of perception, “[…] it is not genuinely rooted there” (HCM, 1916, 367). It seems that what is implied in the related genuine rootedness is exactly the power of spirit over the objects of perception to the extent that they are, as it were, impoverished of the utter mark of real being, i.e., independence of consciousness. As opposed to these, the objects of representation cannot be entirely captured by spirit. Rather they “hover there somehow”—a hovering whose “position” is “neither exactly definable nor possesses any relevant function for its existence or its suchness” (HCM, 1916, 367). Again, exactly these seeming “downsides” of the objects of representation compared to those of perception, such as uprootedness, indefinability serve for HCM as evidence of real existence. Therefore, her unequivocal postulation is that genuine “awareness of reality is in some way linked or can be linked with the experience of representation (Vorstellungserlebniss)” while perception “possesses no relevant function in it” (HCM, 1916, 364).

2.5 Epilogue The immediate meaning of dealing with the transcendent in Doctrine of Appearing, even on the implicit level, is that the transcendence is a real and mundane phenomenon. However, HCM’s approach regarding the issue is not exhausted by that. Her choice to interconnect transcendence, worldliness, and externality eliminates from her ontology the separation between immanence and transcendence. Simply, if the transcendent is part of the world, thus the transcendent is at the same time an immanent phenomenon. On the other hand, if worldliness encompasses also a transcendent element, then the external phenomenal alignment of things is not everything. On the contrary, the transcendent is tied to the internality of the world that does not and cannot appear, in HCM’s wording: “studies of essence in the sphere of actuality lead entirely to the transcendent region” (HCM, 1916, 355 n. 1). Indeed, also immanence is not exhausted by its external appearing, but is what HCM will later refer to as a reality that is “structured inwardly into to the outside” (HCM, 1923, 191). However, what must burst forth from the study of “surface-appearance” (Erscheinungsoberfläche) (HCM, 1916, 354) is the inseparable uniting of the immanent core and the transcendent element amidst the essence that constitutes the real thing and reality as such.

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References Note Regarding HCM’s writings, the year mentioned first is the year of publication, while the second year in brackets denotes the year of the work’s writing. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1959). Der kategoriale Ort des Seelischen in der Naturwirklichkeit. Eine Untersuchung auf der Grundlage der realontologischen Arbeiten von Hedwig Conrad-Martius. Diss., München. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1971). Phänomenologie und Realität: Vergleichende Untersuchungen zur ‘München-Göttinger’ und ‘Freiburger’ Phänomenologie (Habilitationsschrift). München. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1975). Die Antithese Freiburg- München in der Geschichte der Phänomenologie. In H. Kuhn, E. Avé-Lallemant, & R. Gladiator (Eds.), Die Münchener Phänomenologie, Vorträge des Internationalen Kongresses in München 13.–18. April 1971 (Phaenomenologica 65) (pp. 19– 38). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Avé-Lallemant, U. (1965/1966). Hedwig Conrad Martius: Eine Groβe Philosophin unserer Zeit 1988-1966. Jahrbuch der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing, XV, 203–212. Caputo, J. D. (1979). Transcendence and transcendental in Husserl’s Phenomenology. Philosophy Today, 23(3), 205–216. Claesges, U. (1972). Intentionality and transcendence: On the constitution of the material nature. Analecta Husserliana (ANHU), II, 283–291. Cobb-Stevens, R. (1990). Being and categorial intuition. Review of Metaphysics, 44, 43–66. Conrad-Martius, H. (1916). Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Auβenwelt: Verbunden mit einer Kritik positivistischer Theorien. In Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und philosophische Forschung III (pp. 345–542). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Conrad-Martius, H. (1920a [1912]). Die erkenntnisstheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus. Bergzabern: Heinrich Müller (private print). Conrad-Martius, H. (1920b). Nachwort. In H. Conrad-Martius. 1920a [1912]. Die erkenntnisstheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus (pp. 130–131). Bergzabern: Heinrich Müller (private print). Conrad-Martius, H. (1923). Realontologie, Buch I. In Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung VI (pp. 159–333). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Conrad-Martius, H. (1959 [1958]). Die transzendentale und die ontologische Phänomenologie. In H. L. van Vreda & J. Taminiaux (Eds.), Edmund Husserl 1859-1959 - Recueil Commémoratif Publié A L’occasion De Centenaire De La Naissance Du Philosophe (Phaenomenologica 4) (pp. 175–184). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (Reprinted in: HCM 1965a). Conrad-Martius, H. (1963 [1931]). Seinsphilosophie. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 15– 31). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1965a [1958]). Die transzendentale und die ontologische Phänomenologie. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 393–402). München: Kösel (Printed also in: HCM 1959). Conrad-Martius, H. (1965b [1956]). Phänomenologie und Spekulation. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 370–384). München: Kösel (English translation: HCM 1959b). Conrad-Martius, H. (1965c [1956]). Über das Wesen des Wesens. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 335–356). München: Kösel. Dillon, M. C. (1998). Beyond semiological reductionism: Transcendental philosophy and transcendence. Analecta Husserliana (ANHU), LIII, 75–88. Ebel, G. (1965). Untersuchungen zu einer Realistischen Grundlegung der Phänomenologischen Wesensschau. Diss., München. Heinemann, F. (1960). Erscheinen und Sein: Prolegomena zu einer Konkreten Phänomenologie. In R. Wisser (Ed.), Sinn und Sein, Ein philosophisches Symposion (pp. 183–192). Max Niemeyer: Tübingen.

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Hintikka, J. (2003). The notion of intuition in Husserl. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 2(224), 57–79. Husserl, E. (1913). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie. In Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, I (1). Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1–323 (Reprinted in: Husserl 1952; English translation: Husserl 2012). Husserl, E. (1952 [1913]). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, Erstes Buch, ed. Karl Schuhmann, Husserliana III (1). Haag: Martinus Nijhoff (English translation: Husserl 2012). Husserl, E. (1970 [1900]). Logical investigations (Vol. I, J. Findlay, Trans.). London and New York: Routledge (Translation of: Husserl 1975). Husserl, E. 1970b [1901]. Logical Investigations (Vol. II, J. Findlay, Trans.). London and New York: Routledge. (Translation of: Husserl 1984a and Husserl 1984b). Husserl, E. (1975 [1900]). Logische Untersuchungen, Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, Husserliana XVIII. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (English translation: Husserl 1970). Husserl, E. (1984 [1901]). Logische Untersuchungen, Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Husserliana XIX (1). The Hague, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (English translation: Husserl 1970b). Husserl, E. (2012 [1913]). Ideas, general introduction to pure phenomenology (W. R. Boyce Gibson, Trans.). London: Routledge (Translation of: Husserl 1952). Kołakowski, L. (1975). Husserl and the search for certitude. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Kuhn, H. (1969). Phänomenologie und Realität. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, 23(3), 397–402. Miron, R. (2014). The outside’s inside: The phenomenology of the external world in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ thought. Analecta Husserliana (ANHU), CXVI, 327–358. Pfänder, A. (1913). Zur Psychologie der Gesinnungen. In Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung I (1) (pp. 325–404). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Pfeiffer, A. E. (2005). Hedwig Conrad-Martius: Eine Phänomenologische Sicht auf Natur und Welt. Würzburg: Orbis Phenomenologicus, Königshausen and Neumann. Reinach, A. (1913). Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes. In Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung I (2) (pp. 685–847). Halle: Max Niemeyer (Reprint of: Reinach 1921; English translation: Reinach 1983). Reinach, A. (1921). Die Apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes. In A. Reinach (Ed.), Gesammelte Schriften (pp. 166–350). Halle: Max Niemeyer (Reprint of: Reinach 1913; English translation: Reinach 1983). Reinach, A. (1983 [1913]). The apriori foundations of civil law (J. Crosby, Trans.). Aletheia, 3, 1–142 (Translation of: Reinach 1913/Reinach 1921). Schmücker, F. G. (1956). Die Phänomenologie als Methode der Wesenerkenntnis, unter besondere Berücksichtigung der Auffassung der München-Göttinger Phänomenologenschule. Diss., München. Spiegelberg, H. (1975). Doing phenomenology: Essays on and in phenomenology (Phaenomenologica 63). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Wachterhauser, B. R. (1996). Introduction: The shipwreck of apodicticity? In J. M. Edie & B. R. Wachterhauser (Eds.), Phenomenology and skepticism: Essays in honor of James M. Edie. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Walther, G. (1955). Phänomenologie der Mystik. Olten und Freiburg im Breisgau: Walter-Verlag.

Chapter 3

The External World—“Whole” and “Parts”: A Husserlian Hermeneutics of the Early Ontology of Hedwig Conrad-Martius Ronny Miron Abstract This paper proposes an analysis of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’s (1888– 1966) On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World (HCM, 1916b) from the perspective of Husserl’s theory, of whole and parts in Logical Investigations. The author identifies the “whole (Ganz)” with “sensory givenness” and “parts (Teile)” with “feeling givenness (Empfindungsgegebenheit)” and “appearance givenness (Erscheinungsgegebenheit)”. The dependent-independent relations and laws that prescribe unity of objects at the center of Husserl’s theory of whole and parts are also foundational in HCM’s early ontology. This is torn between two forces. On the one hand, she searches for an essential and unified whole, viewed as independent of the senses, of consciousness, and of the human subject in general. This search is expected to provide a grip on the problem of “reality as such”. On the other hand, while searching for access to this whole, HCM encounters the involvement of the senses and consciousness in its appearances, that is, in the appearing of the external world.

3.1 Preface “The factual presence (tatsächliche Vorhandensein) of an entirely peculiar and initself factually harmonious (einstimmigen) phenomenon of ‘real external reality’ became undeniable” (HCM, 1916b, 396).1 This programmatic determination is the basis of her treatise from 1916, On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World (Doctrine of Appearance) by Hedwig Conrad-Martius (HCM) (1888–1966), in which she traces the foundational patterns of the appearing of the external world. In an unpublished document from the same period, she describes the appropriate starting point for the study of the given real external world: “we will never be able to penetrate really and ultimately the essence of any real entity (Realentität) 1 All

translations from the German original into English are mine. Emphases follow the original.

R. Miron (B) Interdisciplinary Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Miron (ed.), Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68783-0_3

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[…] if we will not let it stand exactly on the thesis of existence (Daseinsthesis) that was bracketed in Husserl’s approach” (HCM, 1916aN, 6). Elsewhere, HCM clarifies the related thesis as follows: Instead of hypothetically bracketing the real Being and thereby seeing the world (in the reduction) stripped (enthoben) of the real reality (wirklich Wirklichkeit), it is suggested now to hypothetically posit the real Being of the world and thereby present it with its own rootedness into Being (HCM, 1965a, 397).

Marvin Farber aptly characterized the approach that regards the reality of the external world as a basic fact: “The so-called ‘external world’ is a field of existence independent of all human beings, but it is the same kind of existence as the field of existence that is known in experience. This thesis is not altered when one recognizes the complications introduced by the individual’s participation in experience” (Farber, 1943, 65).2 Doctrine of Appearance is a fundamental criticism of two aspects of Husserl’s thinking, both of which are important for the present discussion. First, HCM reinstates facts and their precedence into phenomenological discourse after Husserl excluded them, together with the entire empirical field, from such discourse in favor of the seeing of essences (Husserl, 1952, §3 13–16/2012, §3 11–14).3 Second, she pushes aside Husserl’s transcendental argument while leaning on his shoulders, as it were. That is, she accepts his claim that “nulla ‘re’ indigent ad existendum” (Husserl, 1952, §49 116/2012, §49 95) in the sense that immanent being is absolute, as it never brings any “thing” to being.4 Yet HCM derives from Husserl’s statement a conclusion fundamentally opposed to his, namely, since what is established as an absolute being is fundamentally opposite to any other reality, within the framework of absolute consciousness “the real should collapse” (HCM, 1916aN, 2). Behind HCM’s uncompromising criticism of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction stands her “thesis of existence (Daseinsthesis)” that is presented and discussed throughout the entire early manuscript (HCM, 1916aN, 5–8, 11–12). HCM will further elaborate this thesis in her subsequent writings and postulate the existence of an “unbridgeable and absolute opposition between real being and nothing” (HCM, 2 Like

the early phenomenologists, Farber regarded Logical Investigations as the most important part of Husserl’s oeuvre and criticized his idealistic turn. See: Farber (1943). 3 See also: Mohanty (1977, 3–9). HCM later established that Husserl never rejected or doubted the reality of the world but regarded it as a hypothetical being, see: HCM (1965c, 398). However, unlike him she does not see any problem with the empirical experience (HCM, 1965c, 351) and even regards the then new natural sciences as elucidating the real foundations of such experience (HCM, 1965a, 401). 4 HCM refers to Husserl’s phrase “nulla ‘re’ indigent ad existendum” on several occasions, see: HCM (1916b, 1, 3; 1963a, 195; 1963b, 229; 21; 1965b, 370; 1965c, 353). In connection to the first mention in 1916, that is considered as HCM’s response to Husserl’s Ideas I (Husserl, 1952/2012), Stein indicates (in a letter to Ingarden from 9 April 1917) that HCM’s “notes on the question of Idealism […] are however, not a refutation of Husserl’s position. In fact, the main argument seems to me to be based on a misunderstanding of his exposition” (Stein, 2005, 58). However, this evaluation of Stein seems to communicate more her general attitude to Husserl’s phenomenology than illuminate HCM’s view of the matter.

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1923, 162).5 Accordingly, she maintains that “real existence is not one ‘form of existence’ (Daseinsform) among others, but something plainly and absolutely new thing (Neues)” (HCM, 1923, 163). Against this background HCM will ask whether from Husserl’s detailed analysis of consciousness this real noematic world remains internal to consciousness entirely or is rather thrown outside (HCM, 1965a, 396), and elsewhere hints at the negative by rhetorically asking “but where does the world remain?” (HCM, 1965b, 371).6 Later on, HCM will wonder about Husserl’s sacrifice of “world belief” in favor of the pure study of the world, arguing that “what’s odd is then that here absolute indubitable judgments on the essence about factual being, about factual being, about the present at-hand (Vorhandenheiten), can be made pleasing” (HCM, 1963d, 20). Indeed, in Doctrine of Appearance, HCM takes worldbelief a step further and turns the acknowledgment of the facticity of the external world into the firm ground upon which her metaphysical thinking stands.7 Nevertheless, in Doctrine of Appearance one can also recognize traces of Husserl’s thinking from Logical Investigations, to which HCM declares her general commitment (HCM, 1916b, 355 n. 1). The interpretation suggested here will seek to demonstrate that dependent-independent relations and the necessary laws that enable the unity of objects, at the center of Husserl’s third investigation,8 are foundational in HCM’s early ontology. Moreover, it will seek to show that her early ontology is characterized by an irresolvable tension between two opposing forces. On the one hand, HCM searches for an essential and unified whole or grip on the problem of “reality as such” as it manifests itself in the real sphere of the external world, which is elevated beyond “mere appearing existence (bloßen Erscheinungsbestand)” (HCM, 1916b, 389 n. 1). On the other hand, her gaze seeks to penetrate the parts that compose the whole and provide it with the status of the related “mere appearing existence” that “takes part in the real world in a certain way” only. HCM typifies this participation of the related appearing as occurring “from second hand” or from “second nature” only. Although it can still possess a position in the real world, once such holding is avoided “it must disappear again from it, it must - as reality - become destroyed”. Eventually, lacking autonomy the “mere appearing existence” can only “momentarily ‘appear’” (HCM, 1916b, 389 n. 1). The explication of these two opposing dimensions of HCM’s approach to the phenomenon of the external world provides support for the general assertion that the Husserlian whole-parts theory is “the single most important contribution to realist […] ontology in the modern period”, whose

5 See

here also: HCM (1963c, 93–94). along with the realist phenomenologists rejected Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, see: Pfeiffer (2005, 31–32). HCM explicitly rejects the phenomenological reduction. See: HCM (1965a, 394–402). 7 This is unlike Farber’s determination: “The philosophical problem of the existence of the external world resulted from an unsettling of a natural world belief, and has been complicated by underlying premises and theories” (Farber, 1967, 63). 8 Already in Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891), Husserl discussed diverse kinds of relations among parts, and after Logical Investigations the issue continued to occupy his thinking, see: Husserl (1939; 1952, §12–§15, §51/2012, §12–§15, §51). 6 HCM

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significance was acknowledged particularly by the members of Munich-Göttingen circle of Phenomenology (Smith & Mulligan, 1982, 37) to which HCM belonged.9

3.2 The “Whole”: “Sensory Givenness” From a methodological point of view, anchoring the beginning of a phenomenological study in a whole is indispensable for the initial decision about what should be considered in it and what is irrelevant to it.10 For Husserl, the whole signified: “a range of contents which are all covered by a single foundation without the help of further contents” (Husserl, 1970b, III, §21 34/1984a, III, §21 282). He maintains, “a mere aggregate or mere coexistence of any contents is not to be called a whole, as little as a likeness […] or a difference […] are wholes”, but it is constituted on a priori laws that determine the relations between its parts (Husserl, 1970b, III, §23 38/1984a, III, §23 288–289). Here, the a priori has an ontological meaning that concerns the valid grounding of objective elements of reality.11 Finally, Husserl’s argument that “these sorts of relations [between whole and parts] have an a priori foundation in the idea of an object” (Husserl, 1970b, III, §1 4/1984a, III, §1 229) enables the whole to be considered as an idea.12 In sum: the “whole” is an independent content, its parts are gathered according to a priori law, and it is an idea. The Husserlian theory of whole and parts does not identify the “whole” with a specific object, especially not with the “world” or “external world” that is central to HCM’s early ontology.13 However, both philosophers share fundamental principles that are critical to the present discussion. First and foremost, HCM’s characterization of the world resembles Husserl’s idea of the “whole” as an independent category, i.e., as a self-standing being (Seinselbstständigkeit) (HCM, 1916b, 391), autonomous and

9 In the literature, there is usually an emphasis upon the influence of Husserl’s criticism of psychol-

ogism on the Munich circle, apparent in their adoption of his method of “essence intuition” and orientation toward the object independently of the thinking subject (Hart, 1972, 39–40; Schmücker, 1956, 3–8, 31; Reinach, 1951, 21–73; Hering, 1921, 495–543; HCM, 1923, 162). Regarding the circle, see: Avé-Lallemant (1975a, 19–38). 10 This methodological awareness is implicit in Husserl’s discussion of the peculiar difficulties of pure phenomenological analysis (Husserl, 1970a, 179–172, 175/1984a, 13–17, 22). Later on, this issue will be consolidated as “the problem of beginning” (Husserl, 1952, §63/2012, §63). 11 The German term Sachverhalt (state of affairs) is central in the theoretical studies of the object in early phenomenology, signifying the specific correlate of judgments that is independent of acts of consciousness and any psychological aspect (yet not always identical with the object), see: (Husserl, 1970a, §28–§29 64–69, §44 108/1975, §28–§29 101–109, §44 170–171; 1952, §148 342–343/2012, §148 309–311; HCM, 1957, 19–36). See also: Habbel (1959, 55–87). 12 Husserl argued that distinctions that relate to the being of particular individuals are applicable also to the ideas themselves (Husserl, 1970b, III, §7a 13/1984a, III, § 7a 245). 13 The notion of “world” (die Welt) appears in the Prolegomena and lies outside the realm of Husserl’s investigations (Husserl, 1970a, 81/1975, 128). Only later will the “world” become central to Husserl’s thinking.

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absolute in its being (HCM, 1916b, 392).14 The awareness of the independent existence of the whole also underlies HCM’s discussions of its parts.15 In this regard, she explains that her discussion starts with the “sensory givenness” (sinnliche Gegebenheit) in order to achieve “a frame for the whole” and a “guidance for the order of this embroiled and complex state of affairs”, since this specific sphere might then be subject to differentiation in diverse directions (HCM, 1916b, 399). Moreover, the common moment that despite the diversity within sensory givenness exists within the sensory givenness is yielded by the order of the whole (HCM, 1916b, 401). Finally, the guiding whole of HCM’s study is also an idea, and not necessarily the concrete reality that embodies it, an idea that nevertheless can and indeed does reveal itself in factual reality. Thus, she devotes Doctrine of Appearance to “a totally peculiar idea of ‘real being’ that is meant to clarify the entire phenomenon of “real external world” (HCM, 1916b, 365). She explains that “idea” means here the separateness from consciousness, the bearing of absoluteness on its own, essentiality, and substantial unity per se (HCM, 1916b, 353). The approach to the phenomenon of the external world as a “whole”, as an independent idea capable of being investigated with respect to both its wholeness and the appearance of its parts, allows HCM’s ontology of the external world to be understood in terms of Husserl’s doctrine of whole and parts. However, the following questions emerge. What is the nature of this “whole” called “external world”? The sum of the objects in the world? The reality in their background yet not identical with them? The space of the cosmos? It is clear that as firm as the evidence is regarding the existence of the external world, as apparent as this evidence is in Husserl’s notion of “world-belief”, the world as such cannot be an object for philosophical or phenomenological study.16 As an “object”, the world is too “big”, so to speak, to be addressed to a philosophical study, especially as it possesses an abundance of meanings, not all of which have an objective embodiment. HCM narrows the scope of her study and focuses on the object of sensory givenness as distinct from the sensory itself as an experience in which subjects are involved (HCM, 1916b, 399).17 At the essential level, the justification for this choice stems from what HCM refers to as “the totally peculiar and very own (ureigene) nature of the 14 See also: HCM (1916aN, 11). The term “transcendence” that HCM uses in her characterization of the external world is not equivalent to lack of relation to human consciousness that is inherent in Doctrine of Appearance, see: Miron (2014a, 341–344; 2014b) (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 2). The understanding of the “whole” as independent is implicit also in HCM’s idea of the spiritual being, see: HCM (1916b, 407). 15 See also: “the I as a whole” (HCM, 1916b, 533), “the spiritual realm as a whole” (HCM, 1916b, 491), “consciousness as a whole” (HCM, 1916b, 480, 500, 506, 510, 521), “the realm of observation as a whole” (HCM, 1916b, 394). 16 See here: Husserl (1964, §77 368–371/1973, §77 305–307; 1952, §30/2012, §30; 1991, §44/99, §44). HCM often uses the word “belief” (Glauben), see: HCM (1916b, 355, 370, 398, 407, 413, 418, 423, 446, 496, 500, 513). 17 Krings, who is admittedly influenced by HCM, explains that the focus on the object as a real existing being is not simply equivalent to the inversion of the Kantian beginning in which the I directs itself to consciousness. Here, we assume that there is a real relation between the existent and the essence referring to it, yet without arguing for the possibility of knowing this existent. See: Krings (1960, 193–195).

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sensorially given” (HCM, 1916b, 398), which enables “real contact” (Realkontakt) to be given with the external world (HCM, 1916b, 423).18 This peculiar nature concerns the exclusive capability (Können) of the real being that Husserl characterized as “the objective ideal of an inability-to-be-otherwise” (Husserl, 1970b, III, §7 12/1984a, III, §7 242–243). On the phenomenal level, in which the externalization or the realization of the essence takes place, the independence of the “sensorially given” becomes apparent, since among all the existents in the external world, it is possible for the “sensorially given” to approach me as a content of givenness, due to its capability to make obvious its real being in its “here and now”, and to make itself felt from itself and outwardly (HCM, 1916b, 412–413). The ontological nature of such independence is recognizable also in Husserl’s wording: “it is possible to present the object as something existing by itself, as independently there in the face of all other objects. A thing or piece of a thing can be presented by itself – this means it would be what it is even if everything outside it were annihilated” (Husserl, 1970b, III, §6 11/1984a, III, §6 241). It is instructive that later HCM would mark the aspect of capability as foundational for real being as such. As she puts it: “the real only is such that by itself ‘can’ (Könnende)” (HCM, 1923, 177). Finally, both philosophers emphasize the persistence of the independence of the real being vis-à-vis the knowing subject. Husserl established, “A thing or piece of a thing can be presented by itself - this means it would be what it is even if everything outside it were annihilated” or “no mere contingencies of our subjective thinking” (Husserl, 1970b, III, §6 11/1984a, III, §6 241). Likewise, HCM explains that only the sensorially given “can make obvious its real being in its ‘here and now’ in-itself and from-itself”—whether it oppresses me personally as a felt given or presents its being before me (HCM, 1916b, 412). The independence that characterizes the sensory givenness on both the essential and phenomenal levels enables it to serve as an indication of the external world, despite the awareness that it does not cover the entire external world as “thing-in-itself” but only brings “‘the world in-itself’ into exposure (Aufdeckung)” (HCM, 1916b, 463). In Husserl’s terms, one can regard the sensory givenness as relatively independent, as its relation to the whole provides it with an aspect of dependency even if in other contexts it is dependent (Husserl, 1970b, III, §13 22/1984a, III, §13 263). This legitimizes the consideration of sensory givenness as a “whole” in HCM’s ontology of the external world. Indeed, the fragmentation of sensory givenness, discussed below, can also testify to its being a whole. Like the term “world”, the term “external” also raises questions related to the involvement of consciousness in the ontology of the external world. Yet HCM rejects this possibility and establishes explicitly that by means of consciousness we “leave behind (zurücklassen) the real entities of the external world” (HCM, 1916b, 389). Although HCM admits the possible effectiveness of the transcendental study of epistemological questions, it is evident to her that within what she refers to as the 18 Like

HCM, Herbert Spiegelberg also provides a justification for relying on sensory givenness within a realistic approach. He argues that a critical, phenomenological inspection of the immediate phenomena of reality will remove the most frequent objections about the reliability of perceiving that is mediated by the senses. See: Spiegelberg (1975, 153).

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realm of “hovering” absolute consciousness, no real worldly positing can take place. Moreover, HCM goes so far and postulates that “the metaphysically genuine and the true […] nature of consciousness can be eventually penetrated, when one guaranties this consciousness ontically full and thereby first true real entity that is ‘positable’ (setzbare)” (HCM, 1916aN, 6).19 More important, “something else must enter” into every “external positing” that refers to the appearance-stance (Erscheinungstelle) of the given, to distinguish between the “real (Real)” that “exists out there” (Daraußenseiende) or the “external worldly (Auβenweltsliche)” and the other “out there appearing ‘not real’ (Nichtreale)” (HCM, 1916b, 385–386). Unlike the former, the latter only yields the “look of reality” (Aussehen einer Realität) (HCM, 1916b, 441 n. 1) or even of “external ‘habits’ (Habitus)” of real objects while actually carrying within itself “non-reality” (Unwirklichkeit) (HCM, 1916b, 379). Thus, she distinguishes between two kinds of “being outside”—one results from world positing, i.e., an achievement of a mental act that refers equally to the real and the non-real, while the other is an existent that is there or better is really there. Finally, both elements of the notion “external world” legitimize studying it as a “whole” in the Husserlian sense. Following Husserl’s distinction between complex (zusammengesetzte) and simple (einfach) objects—the former have parts (geglierderte), while the latter do not (ungeglierderte)—(Husserl, 1970b, III, §1 4–5/1984a, III, §1 229–230) one can regard the external world as a “complex object” and, as will be discussed below, also as a relational substance that is not only structured internally due to its inherent essence but also is such whose capability for self-manifestation bounds it to a network of affinities to the knowing subject.

3.3 The “Parts”: “Feeling Givenness” and “Appearance Givenness” The understanding of the whole as composed of parts brings with it the possibility of transcending its essence that is regarded as fragmentable. Husserl established that in its widest meaning the word “part” (Teil) is “an object’s real possession… that truly helps to make it up: an object in-itself, considered in abstraction from all contexts to which it is tied” (Husserl, 1970b, III, §2 5/1984a, III, §2 231). Also relevant in this context is the term “concrete” (concretum), which first appeared in Husserl’s third investigation as signifying an independent content (Husserl, 1970b, III, 3/1984a, III, 227) or object that can be treated as a “whole”.20 Inherent in the understanding of 19 The early phenomenologists understood Husserl’s appeal “go back to the ‘things themselves’” (Husserl, 1970a, 168/1984a, 10) as indifference toward epistemological questions. See: U. AvéLallemant (1965 [1966], 207). HCM characterized the epistemological approach as dogmatic (HCM, 1916b, 351) and Spiegelberg criticized it for omitting the obligation to be critical (Spiegelberg, 1960, 130–131, 152/1984, 115–116, 134–135). 20 Husserl (1970b, III, §17 28–29/1984a, III, §17 272–274). In the third investigation, Husserl is ambivalent regarding the notion of “content”. Sometimes it signifies an abstract and less limited

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the concrete is that it has parts and that the transcendence of the ideal limits of the essence has already occurred. HCM understands phenomenological investigation as “a genuine ontological approach” that “deliberately demands the execution” (HCM, 1916aN, 8), namely, the performance of the related “thesis of existence” (HCM, 1916aN, 12). In this way, so she assumes, phenomenology might be able to meet “the genuine ontological object” (HCM, 1916b, 10), as it explicitly brings about the transcendence of the external world from the “whole” to its “parts”. From HCM’s point of view, this move does not appear to be very dramatic, since this transcendence is already inherent in her assumption that essence (Washeit) belongs to a specific phenomenal situation (HCM, 1916b, 349). As a result of this, the main concern of Doctrine of Appearance is of “proving concrete, tangible perceivable phenomena” (HCM, 1916b, 391).21 It transpires, then, that while the Husserlian theory of whole and parts suggests a theorization of this transcendence and its logical repercussions, HCM’s Doctrine of Appearance pursues it regarding the sensory givenness that is the concrete embodiment of the “external world” as a whole. Sensory givenness is composed of two fundamental phenomena that will be explicated below: “feeling givenness” (Emfindungsgegebenheit) and “appearance givenness” (Erscheinungsgegebenheit) or, equivalently, “sensorially manifest appearance” (sinnfällige Erscheinung).

3.3.1 “Feeling Givenness” “Feeling’s givenness” is referred to as the “direct touch of ‘something’” on me (HCM, 1916b, 406) or a living personal (lebendig-persönliche) touch on the I (HCM, 1916b, 425). Here, “feeling” (Empfindung) is distinguished from whatever has objective orientation, such as ‘seeing” or “hearing” (HCM, 1916b, 460). Therefore, HCM determines that “there exist no direct sensory contact between the feeling-existence (Empfindungabestand) and consciousness in general” (HCM, 1916b, 523). In her view, there is nothing in the sensory quality that adheres to the real thing (qual) itself from outside that can lead it directly and personally toward spirit, as in the case of colored or vocal appearance (HCM, 1916b, 523).22 Thus, she contends that spirit does not serve as a “carrier (Träger) of sensory givenness” and “does not aspect of the object. Therefore, the object of presentation can be called an object or “content”. Yet, Husserl was also cautious about the psychological connotations of this notion as denoting the experience of the subject: “But talk of ‘contents’ tends to move in a purely psychological sphere, a limitation with which we may start investigating our distinction, but which must be dropped as we proceed” (Husserl, 1970b, III, §2 5/1984a, III, §2 232). 21 Fritz Heinemann wrote about the affinity of phenomenology to the concrete being. See: Heinemann (1960, 185). He mentioned another essay by her (HCM, 1965b), but surprisingly not Doctrine of Appearance, which is the fundamental work regarding the issue and which was undoubtedly known to him. 22 In the literature, the “quale” denotes the contents of the subjective experience of mental states, usually excludes any intersubjective aspect. Thomas Nagel characterized the quale as “feeling itself in a certain way” (see: Nagel, 1974). Unlike HCM, many philosophers deprive “qualia” of reality

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pick up (auflesen) the feeling-existence, likewise cannot fill itself with its sensory being” (HCM, 1916b, 523). This means that as much as the touch is related to the “felt-thing” (Empfundene) in a “living and personal” manner, especially the material givenness of the thing that is experienced bodily (HCM, 1916b, 513) is decisive for the constitution of the phenomenon of feeling givenness (HCM, 1916b, 450). In HCM’s view, “a genuine feeling-experience (Empfindungserlebnis) constitutes at itself equally […] inside a single plane – namely exactly where the phenomenal content of the experiences after the tough thing and the real body factually border on each other” (HCM, 1916b, 530). Therefore, despite being experienced by the subject, for example as rigidity or roughness (HCM, 1916b, 406), the felt-thing is regarded as indicating to the reality of the material qualia, i.e., as something that belongs to the object and not to the feeling subject. She emphasizes that, from the outset, the givenness that brings about the feeling, by its very essence, does not exist there “for me” (HCM, 1916b, 456), to the extent that HCM regards the possible involvement of senses and thereby of consciousness in the feeling as “factual absurd” (HCM, 1916b, 535). She argues that the felt-thing grants itself as separated in principle from consciousness’ sphere (HCM, 1916b, 441), and that it cannot in a living and personal manner encompass this kind of self-announcing being at all (HCM, 1916b, 520). In this respect, the main part of this givenness is not anchored in its sensory appearance (HCM, 1916b, 455–456), but in the being that uncovers itself and thus acquires presence in the external world. HCM explains that the transcendence of the felt-thing is reflected in the closedness characteristic of real beings and in its capability to resist that places a barrier before the pure spiritual act. She maintains that there exists both “principle” and “phenomenal” impossibility of encompassing (Unangreifbarkeit) the qualia “inside” consciousness” (HCM, 1916b, 441 n. 1),23 and, thereby also an impossibility of qualia relating to spirit. Simply, since consciousness does not bring about the qualia, it cannot be subject to its influence and obviously cannot become sensorially recognized (HCM, 1916b, 525). Thus, she characterizes the felt-thing as “absolutely unspiritual” (HCM, 1916b, 526). Moreover, due to its direct relation to the things in the external world, feeling provides the actual foundation for the judging of real things (HCM, 1916b, 432). HCM insists that the phenomenal state of affairs itself, and not consciousness, indicates the existence of the felt-being in the external world24 ; otherwise, it would have made no sense to refer to the materially felt-thing by the term “appearance” (HCM, 1916b, 433). To do so is to succumb to the trickery inherent in consciousness” involvement in the phenomenological investigation of phenomenal states of (see: Dennett, 1993). Yet other philosophers as well as scientists regard the content of the subjective experience as certain (see: Beckermann, 2001). 23 Spiegelberg presents the probe-resistance of objects to our will as an indication, sometimes even a strong one, of their reality. See: Spiegelberg (1960, 148/1984, 131). 24 Heinemann’s words remind us of HCM’s. In his opinion, the primordial phenomenon of man is not consciousness but appearance, namely, entering into the appearance and changing within it. In contrast, consciousness is an epiphenomenon or ex-post-facto phenomenon, a reflective act that exists only after appearances collapse. Therefore, exactly like HCM, he referred to phenomenology as a “doctrine of appearance”. See: Heinemann (1960, 186–187).

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affairs, which she attributes to its capability to blur the fact of the self-presentation of the felt-thing, so that mistakenly this presentation is assigned to consciousness and not to the felt-thing itself. Yet consciousness cannot disturb the very appearance of the felt-thing (HCM, 1916b, 514), rather it grants itself to it and as such it makes itself known from its real position, outwardly. Moreover, in the felt-being “there is nothing” that somehow “presses” directly into “consciousness” “domain”, as, for example, the noise presses upon my hearing, or the blue sky my gaze (HCM, 1916b, 516). Finally, she maintains that no contradiction is implied in the “phenomenal” dependence on “real” touching-contact (“realen” Berührungsbeziehung) and the reality of the “felt-thing” itself (HCM, 1916b, 430 n. 2). The characterization of the felt-thing as “appearing” on the periphery” of the I (HCM, 1916b, 440) or “on the periphery of consciousness” (HCM, 1916b, 431)25 especially emphasizes the steadfastness of the threshold that prevents the entrance of the felt-thing into the domain of consciousness.26 However from the viewpoint of feeling itself, feeling-being does not at all float “inside” or “above” consciousness” sphere, but is clearly strongly linked back into the “world” that is beyond consciousness or has a rooted stance inside it, even if this stance lies in the realm of the I (HCM, 1916b, 443). This means that the subjective experience of the qualia, which appears before the living body of the I, is generated “from the outside inwards”, meaning from the thing toward the feeling I (HCM, 1916b, 443–444). Yet the sphere of consciousness and the real world share no common borders and thus “also cannot possess the same object” (HCM, 1916b, 450). HCM determines that it should be possible to argue without incongruity that something can somehow be “given” to me without my being “aware” of it. In such a case, consciousness is characterized as “entirely dull and dark” (HCM, 1916b, 459). The attempt to pull the feeling-being inside the I from its peripheral stance, such that it would be in the center of consciousness, is an essential contradiction. The separateness of qualia from consciousness leaves the arena of bodily occurrence that serves as the carrier of sensory-givenness (HCM, 1916b, 526). HCM explains that the experience of appearance (Erscheinungserlebnis) can be determined only in terms of the living-body (Leib) that is pushed immediately by the real material content of the felt-thing (HCM, 1916b, 525–529) “from outside inwards” (HCM, 1916b, 532), or “from the outside to here” (HCM, 1916b, 449). It is not the feeling givenness of the presented being to the living-body but its real being that illuminates the impossibility of sensory-objective contact with consciousness (HCM, 1916b, 537): that is, the real being of the appearing of the felt-thing on the “periphery of the body” (HCM, 1916b, 534). The appearance of the felt-thing is achieved, on the one hand, by means of the 25 Regarding the appearance on the “periphery of consciousness” see also: HCM (1916b, 429, 446, 451, 498–499, 510). 26 Spiegelberg characterized the peripheral field of our perception as “marginal openness”, meaning that this field is never cut as sharply as its borders. However, he emphasized that peripherality does not mean non-reality, but mostly well-defined structures that are presented in decreased clarity. More important, we can still see via these modifications the phenomenon itself in its uninfluenced structure, rather than the structural openness of what is given in our perception field. This implies that reality does not culminate at the borders of our perception, but continues beyond that. Openness teaches that the phenomena of reality stand on their own feet (Spiegelberg, 1960, 147/1984, 130).

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splitting of the senses from the inclusion in consciousness so that it is impossible to elaborate what is announced from inside by the senses. On the other hand, this appearance is acquired by the openness of the living-body to the material qualia (HCM, 1916b, 529) that exposes it to affinities beyond it. The experience of feeling is constituted then between two planes, the perceptive stance and appearance being; it appears where the rigid-thing, which enfolds within itself the phenomenal content of the experience, borders on the real lived-body. However, this location does not split the feeling-experience, because the relation between its two constituting planes is real (HCM, 1916b, 530) and thus a separation from consciousness takes place in each of them. HCM characterizes the phenomena of the relation of the spirit and my body as “real transcendence” (Reale Transzendenz) and explains that the two cannot reach each other because they are spatially incommensurable. In terms of their expansion, they belong to two different spheres (HCM, 1916b, 437). Surely, my body and my spirit actually appear together. Moreover, it is impossible to say about my body, to the extent that I feel it from the inside, that it presses me from a sphere that exists beyond my I; but inasmuch as it is experienced from the inside, it is also experienced as belonging to me in its entirety. Yet one should distinguish the real transcendent vis-à-vis consciousness, that is part of the givenness of my body, from everything that is beyond the I (Ichjensseitigkeit) that does not belong to it, including beings that sometimes press me in a living and personal manner from the outside inward (HCM, 1916b, 447). In any event, there is no possibility of a genuine contact between my spirit and my body. As spirit and as consciousness, I am prevented from arriving at the real in the genuine sense, and in any case, I cannot have any influence upon or capability to reshape it. Obviously, this transcendence is the reason for the impossibility of achieving a full and comprehensive concept about the real world. Indeed, the objective perception itself already removes any moment that could become real (HCM, 1916b, 437).27

3.3.2 “Appearance Givenness” Appearance givenness concerns real being that arrives “here from a distance”, which is rooted in the peculiar capability for self-presentation of the being that appears in it (HCM, 1916b, 430). Self-presentation signifies the “stepping forth” (Hervortreten) connected with the sensory qualia that are embodied in the appearing and determine its essence. Such qualia do not denote a quality of appearance givenness, but rather the substance that establishes it from inside (HCM, 1916b, 465). The qualia have a being that is surrounded by itself and grants it with a givenness-structure that is closed for 27 One of the arguments typical of the realistic approach in phenomenology deals with the difference in time between Being and being perceived. See: Geiger (1930, 170). Spiegelberg contended that “sense-perception […] can never give what is present, but only what has just passed. And since the past no longer exists, we can never see the original object itself but only its ‘trace’ which means its cast or likeness” (Spiegelberg, 1960, 156–157).

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itself (HCM, 1916b, 471), which has a specific appearance-place and appearanceshape (HCM, 1916b, 475). HCM depicts the qualia as composed of an objective material (HCM, 1916b, 471) whose presentation denotes a sensory-objective mode of givenness (HCM, 1916b, 506). Objectivity signifies mediation or externalization of the qualia that is simultaneously being kept inside itself (HCM, 1916b, 468).28 Alternatively, the qualia that are simultaneously mediating outwardly and the material that builds the mediated inwardly, thanks to which the self-containment is enabled. HCM maintains that this duality is typical of the sensory qualia as such (HCM, 1916b, 468). However, the being that shows or emerges itself in the appearance givenness does not require external mediation in order to be presented. Rather, “in the very own being of the sensory appearance it rests as a shape (Gebilde) from an announcing or appropriate material, the mediation of itself”. Alternatively, “by means of existing totally and only from an externalizing-material (Auβerungsmaterial)”, it is itself exclusively and entirely “outwardly offered” (HCM, 1916b, 466). The quality of performance (Darbietungseigenschaft) determines, for example, the nature of the color and the tone as manifest and is inseparable from them. The presentation of the colored or vocal appearing is realized within their very being that expresses itself independently of the presence or absence of an experiencing subject (HCM, 1916b, 412) and without including from the outset the “being-in-itself” of the observing subject (HCM, 1916b, 378). This means that the character of the “appearance” is to relate to its appearing and not the experience of the I. Thus, when “appearing” “arrives outside” by itself and according to its constituting materials, it simultaneously reestablishes the threshold of itself. Thus, the appearance givenness exists from out of its self-presentation and at the same time it verifies itself by means of this selfpresentation (HCM, 1916b, 467). Therefore, “the book of the real world” is opened by its appearance givenness in presentation (HCM, 1916b, 463). Appearance givenness differs from feeling givenness in the involvement of the senses of seeing and hearing that in this context are described as establishing “real contact” that grants the appearance the character of the self-presentation (HCM, 1916b, 425), and whose different modes of givenness and announcement present diverse sides of the material being (HCM, 1916b, 483). The sensorially manifest appearance invades these senses, meaning it “can specifically give itself to them” (HCM, 1916b, 486). Also, HCM characterizes hearing and seeing as “remote-senses” (Fernsinne) and the seeable and hearable as beings as “existences that are locked within themselves” and “separated” from what has been sensed through them. Even when their real appearance-position is nearby (something is ringing near my ears), phenomena are always experienced as a content that is kept at a distant position or as “closed for themselves” (HCM, 1916b, 473). Although bodily ears and eyes must be there in order for an embodied individual to be able to hear and see, this is not to 28 The objective closedness can also describe a real moment that is not self-standing but needs to be filled inside another being in order to be able to appear concretely. This is the wide idea of objectivity. However, the narrower one, which according to HCM is genuine, refers to a self-standing object. In other words, every object has an objectness, but not everything that has such a being is purely for this reason an object in the narrow sense (HCM, 1916b, 475–476).

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say that the appearance givenness is dependent on “bodily” organs (HCM, 1916b, 484), especially as such they cannot serve as receptacles for objective experiences that stand in a real transcendent relation to the I (HCM, 1916b, 480).29 Seeing and hearing are as doors and windows through which the sensory given arrives “inside” the I (HCM, 1916b, 536), and are characterized as “spiritual senses” or “spiritual organs” that have a specific openness to a certain objective mode of manifestation that is responsible for the presentation of appearance givenness (HCM, 1916b, 484). So, we experience from the inside eyes and ears as the “body’s gateways” or as the “body’s openness”, through which the immediate contact between the spiritual-living I and the external and apparent world is brought about in terms of bodily positions. Therefore, if we destroyed these bodily positions toward the external world, the body as such would become closed for us (HCM, 1916b, 492). Secondly, whereas distance would have hindered the very existence of the feeling givenness that demands touch and the living personal pressing of the lived-body, the realization of the appearance givenness necessitates a distance from the I and the body. This distance is bridged by the senses involved in appearance givenness (HCM, 1916b, 406), yet a measure of it must be preserved in order for the very givenness to endure (HCM, 1916b, 472). Moreover, the objective quality of the felt-thing imposes upon the I “an absolute ‘restraint’ (Zurückhaltung)” from acting directly (HCM, 1916b, 473). This means that the appearing of the sensorially manifest appearance, though not its very being, becomes possible through the inhibition of a spiritually living contact with the external world, namely by avoiding a representative relation through consciousness. The sensorially manifest appearance is adequately absorbed by means of hearing and seeing without any considerable involvement of the spirit of the I (HCM, 1916b, 479). Although without the involvement of the spiritual I, the sensorially manifest appearance appears as lacking the “depth”, “‘rootedness’ (Gegründetheit),” and “‘rounding’ (Abrundung)” that could have been granted to it only by means of spiritually living perception. HCM observes that these faces of the sensorially manifest appearance resemble those that are mirrored by primitive observation. Nevertheless, she maintains that they uncover the right perspective on the appearance givenness and are therefore justified (HCM, 1916b, 478–479). Third, while the experience of feeling is not dependent on the solidity and roughness of the bodies that bring it about having meaning for the I, the demand for distance regarding appearance givenness includes at the same time the possibility of grasping or receiving them by means of consciousness (HCM, 1916b, 406). Thus, 29 The illumination of HCM’s thinking here might be aided by Spiegelberg’s position, according to which “ultimately, all these organs are themselves phenomena of reality and so are the causal links between them”. He then asks: “is there a way back […] from the retina via the cortex and the mental processes to the original object outside which supposedly started the whole chain of physical and physiological processes?”. However, he maintains that this problem “makes sense only on the assumption that the physical objects, as the “stimuli” for our sense perception, our sense organs, and the physiological process within, are ascertained realities (… and) as long as it is possible to know some real objects themselves” (Spiegelberg, 1960, 150–151/1984, 132–134). See here also: HCM’s references to “an appropriate ‘receptacle’ (Gefäβ)” of the real thing (HCM, 1923, 215, 217, 219).

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when approaching an object in order to represent it, consciousness must detach it from itself and position it against itself (HCM, 1916b, 470). Appearance givenness meets only the spiritual being of the I (HCM, 1916b, 541) and HCM assumes that there is something in this being that imposes itself upon the I and always captures one’s eye without any possibility of escape from it (HCM, 1916b, 411). Yet the function of the qualia to carry itself toward me does not threaten to disrupt or abandon the objective framework that has been mediated. Moreover, no change takes place in the sensorially manifest appearance of the “surface of the body-thing (Körperding)” (HCM, 1916b, 467), but the perception of the felt-thing follows its own nature and is required by its mode of givenness, referred to as “appearance-like (erscheinungshafte)” (HCM, 1916b, 478). She explains that the quale keeps its being “for itself” (HCM, 1916b, 471), inasmuch as obviously every real-being has being “for-itself” (HCM, 1916b, 472). Moreover, among all real beings the uniqueness of the sensory-given results from its purely out-of-itself capability to be experienced, noticeable, and contained by spirit (HCM, 1916b, 473), and only by means of its connection to this objective form can it be experienced at all (HCM, 1916b, 472). The involvement of spirit is depicted here as “noticeable through personal pressing against consciousness’ periphery” (HCM, 1916b, 498) and as a “spiritually ‘dead’ acceptance” (geistige tote Entgegennahme) of sensorially appearing beings (HCM, 1916b, 490). HCM explains that precisely because the spirit is ahead of the sensibly appearing-being, what remains to be received is what is being heard and seen (HCM, 1916b, 499), which is accepted in their objective self-presenting. This appearance is experienced by the I as having no context, partly thanks to the given appearance being as an in-itself and for-itself fact (HCM, 1916b, 481). However, it is not the spirit itself that dies in the acceptance. Quite the opposite, the spirit is living and awake and conceives a world different from the externally apparent one, but it is the appearance givenness that dies in it. The argument that the recognition of the external world cannot be based on the living spirit is explained in that when it is directed to the appearing given it does not only achieve what is being perceived through seeing and hearing, but in a manner that, as indicated before,30 provides it with completion and aspects that are fare beyond what its appearance manifests. Indeed, as a result of spirit’s involvement, the sensory material appears as “disintegrated (gelöst)” while its latent content comes to the fore. Obviously, the content that fills the given appearance does not belong anymore to the sensory material itself, and therefore, it cannot be regarded as given and even less counted with its appearance (HCM, 1916b, 494). Simply, the internal is not sensibly manifest and thus is incapable of appearance. Elsewhere, HCM adds that the living spirit changes the initial given as it inserts it into a unified, meaningful, and contextual world. Indeed, there is an eternal gap, thus unbridgeable, between the spiritual achievement and the sensory given, i.e., as a living spirit one can only grasp and posit but not sensorially observe—which necessitates a “dead relation to givenness”. Therefore, she concludes, the consequences of the spiritual positioning cannot really be considered (HCM, 1916b, 488).

30 See

here: HCM (1916b, 479).

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It transpires, then, that the realization of appearance givenness is bound with mutual restrictions or preventions of expansion that are essential for the very coming into being, or even performance, of its appearance. The given appearance delivers itself from its closed-objective stance and from itself, while the I is subjected to a condition of “enclosing grasp” (Fassen entahalten) (HCM, 1916b, 495) that might enable (peripheral) conscious affinity toward the given appearance and at the same time remain separated from it. This duality is well reflected in the requirement that the I carry out “accomplishment of transcendence” (Transzendenzleistung), meaning that it constitutes a relation toward an in-itself closed being while keeping a distance from it (HCM, 1916b, 474). Indeed, the transcendence here is mutual—the spirit does not invade the appearance givenness, which itself remains located beyond it. Simultaneously, the felt-thing encompasses itself with a kind of blindness to forms of perception, and the senses address no perception of a unified world (HCM, 1916b, 477–478). Finally, the manifestation of the appearing occurs “from itself”, or alternatively “from the natural range that replaces exactly the momentary achievement of the living spirit” (HCM, 1916b, 496).

3.4 Discussion Husserl’s fundamental determination that “a part as such cannot exist at all without a whole whose part it is” (Husserl, 1970b, III, §11 20/1984a, III, §11 257) serves as the starting point for the discussion of the two parts of sensory givenness explicated above. Husserl explains that the appearing content cannot be separated from its bonds to other nearby contents, and that “isolability means only that we can keep some content constant in idea despite boundless variations – variation that is free, though not excluded by a law rooted in the content’s essence – of the contents associated with it, and in general given with it” (Husserl, 1970b, III, §5 9/1984a, III, §5 238). The immediate meaning is that as much as feeling givenness and the appearance givenness are different parts of the external world, despite the diversities, they both appear in it and therefore should be regarded as realizing through their very appearing a necessary a priori law of the external world. Also, Husserl’s distinction between “near” and “remote” parts helps to expose the specific mode of presence of the two modes of appearing according to which, for HCM, the external world reveals itself. The former have an immediate relation to the whole (Husserl, 1970b, III, §20 32/1984a, III, §20 279) and accord with feeling givenness that represents a living and personal direct touching “of something” on the I (HCM, 1916b, 406, 425). The latter, which mediate the whole (Husserl, 1970b, §19, §20/1984a, §19, § 20), might describe the appearance givenness that is constituted by the distance separating it and the body bridged by the senses (HCM, 1916b, 470– 472).31 Husserl’s clarification that “in themselves the remotest of these parts are no 31 The overlap between the two philosophers’ ideas of distance and proximity is not complete. Husserl regarded them as initial and alluded to their metaphysical horizon: “Our analyses show,

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further from the whole than the nearest” (Husserl, 1970b, III, §19 31/1984a, III, §19 276) suggests that feeling givenness is not nearer to the sensory givenness than the appearance givenness. In any event, what differentiates the two is not the physical distance from the experiencing subject. Moreover, Husserl’s clarification that his theory is designated to elucidate the relation between objects and their parts rather than that of contents and their parts, thus can “achieve an objective distinction freed from all relations to interpretive acts and to any phenomenological content that might be interpreted” (Husserl, 1970b, III, §5 10/1984a, III, §5 240). The importance of this clarification by Husserl for the present discussion concerns its support of the objectivity of the two discussed givennesses, namely: the diversity between feeling givenness and the appearance givenness does not mirror the variety of subjective experiences in the world but first and foremost the modes of appearing of the felt-thing itself. Moreover, HCM goes so far as to harness the diverse subjective experiences for the illumination of the distinguished feeling existences (Empfindungsbestende) that first generated the respective experiences themselves. An important support for HCM’s ontological view of the external world is also inherent in Husserl’s attitude to the subjective aspect in his theory of whole and parts. Husserl maintains that his distinctions “are no mere contingencies of our subjective thinking” (Husserl, 1970b, III, §6 11/1984a, III, §6 245) and that he prefers characterizing his theory as the elucidation of the relations between objects and their parts rather than that of contents and their parts, in order “to achieve an objective distinction freed from all relations to interpretive acts” (Husserl, 1970b, III, §5 10/1984a, III, §5 240). Likewise, in her discussion of the sensory givenness, also HCM emphasizes the primacy of the aspect of the object over the involvement of the subject. In this regard, she clarifies that the diversity between feeling givenness and appearance givenness does not mirror the diversity of subjective experience in the world.32 In her discussion of appearance givenness, HCM takes a step forward as she argues that the objective quality of the felt-thing imposes on the I “an absolute ‘restraint’” from a direct act of representation that eradicates the essential distance from the I (HCM, 1916b, 473). Also, the expressions of “proximity (Nähe)” and “remoteness (Ferne)” that course throughout HCM’s discussion are ontological predicates that concern the aspect of the object in both the “feeling givenness” and “appearance givenness”. Proximity and remoteness mean here the different nature of the parts that compose the discussed whole, i.e., givenness. This insight resonates Husserl’s view of the part as “an object’s real possession, not only in the sense of being a real thing, but also in the sense of being something really in something, that truly helps

however, that anything that holds water in this descriptive situation is mixed up with other quite alien matters, and in any case unfitted to illuminate our ontological distinction” (Husserl, 1970b, III §9 17/1984a, III 252). For HCM, these are descriptive notions and none can have precedence over the other. HCM overcomes the descriptive view of ontology in her next book and grasps Being in terms of divisibility (Teilbarkeit) (HCM, 1923, 207). See also: Smith and Mulligan (1982, 39). 32 Husserl’s departure from Stump’s psychological stance is indeed also the fulcrum for the realist phenomenologists, see: Ingarden (1925, 125–304).

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to make it up: an object in itself” (Husserl, 1970b, III, §2 5/1984a, III, §2 231).33 Moreover, the different “location” of the parts in the whole cannot split or dismantle it as Husserl explicitly established: “Not every part is included in its whole in the same fashion, and not every part is woven together with every other, in the unity of a whole, in the same way” (Husserl, 1970b, III, §15 27/1984a, III, §15 270). Moreover, he stated that “the descending order of divisions here correspond to no fixed, factually determined gradation in the relation of parts to whole” (Husserl, 1970b, III, §19 31/1984a, III, §19 276). Thus, the phenomena that are involved in the whole do not create mathematical “continuity” or “discontinuity”, and also, “The essences which direct ideation elicits from intuitive data are ‘inexact essences’, they may not be confused with the ‘exact’ essences, which are ideas in the Kantian sense, and which […] arise through a peculiar ‘idealization’” (Husserl, 1970b, III, §9 15/1984a, III, §9 249). Likewise, HCM stresses the “cut” (Schnitt) between feeling givenness and appearance givenness and the impossibility of their equality (Gleichsetzung) (HCM, 1916b, 400), as these two are not located on the same plane (HCM, 1916b, 425). Against this background, I argue that feeling givenness and appearance givenness signify two paradigmatic modes of the external world. The first arrives “from the outside to here” and approaches the I up to living personal touch on its body (HCM, 1916b, 449); it is independent of consciousness and the senses and provides the context for all the finite beings in the external world.34 The second presents itself “outwardly” (HCM, 1916b, 467) and reflects the need for mediation and bridging in order to be able to be experienced by the I. This means that both tangible proximity and the bridged gap are necessary for the appearing of the external world. Yet one should not expect that the presence of these two phenomena that compose the sensory givenness is equal and systematic. Moreover, in certain contexts one can oppose the other. Yet, both feeling givenness and appearance givenness can rightly serve as reliable indicators of the independent reality of the external world. An additional advance in the explication HCM’s ontology of the external world is achieved by coming to terms with the two composing elements of sensory givenness in light of Husserl’s distinction between two kinds of parts (Teil): pieces (Stücke) and moments. The first signify “a thing or a piece of a thing that can be presented by itself […] even if everything outside it were annihilated” (Husserl, 1970b, §6 11/1984a, §6 241). Also, “In the case of independent objects […] they may, but need not, enter into more comprehensive wholes” (Husserl, 1970b, §7 12/1984a, §7 244). However, the moments or “non-independent objects are objects [… that] are governed by a law of essence to the effect that they only exist (if at all) as parts of more inclusive wholes [… and] cannot be thought of as existing by themselves” (Husserl, 1970b, III, §7 12/1984a, III, §7 244). I argue that the pivotal distinction between dependentindependent in the Husserlian whole-part theory is foundational in HCM’s analysis 33 See here: Findlay’s note regarding the occurrence in one sentence by Husserl of “real” (what is actually there in the time-space world) and “reell” (what is actually immanent in the experience and not merely “meant” by it), see: Husserl (1970b, 349 n. 1). 34 Later in HCM’s writings, the accessibility to nothingness will become an indispensable element in her understanding of real being as “at first positively elevated by itself from nothingness” and thus “becomes entirely its own” (HCM, 1923, 181). See here also: HCM (1963c).

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of the two elements of sensory givenness, to the extent that the independence of consciousness functions for her as the ultimate expression of independence in general. Thus, she presents feeling givenness as a real appearing of closeness, rejection, and transcendence toward other beings in the external world. Even if the content of this givenness is sensory, the relation that is woven between it and the senses and consciousness in general is one of independence. Obviously, the endeavor to ground the independence of appearance givenness is more demanding, especially because of the involvement of consciousness in it. As discussed above, HCM’s analysis also characterizes such givenness in terms of closedness, self-standing, and maintains that a part of its appearing spirit is to be, so to speak, “put to death”. Exactly as the felt-thing, also appearance givenness does not describe the experience of the I, but the nature of the being that appears in it. Thus, from the aspect of content, the two elements of sensory givenness present themselves in the ontological mode of “piece”. Yet for Husserl, independence is not only a predicate of the content of the parts but also of the relation between them: if the part is treated in respect to its internal content, its own essence, then a thing having this same content can exist without a whole in which it exists; it can exist by itself, not associated with anything else, and will not then be a part [….] The complete elimination of associations […] does not eliminate its existence: only its relation falls away, the fact that it is a part. (Husserl, 1970b, III, §11 20/1984a, III, §11 257)

Undoubtedly, even if feeling givenness and appearance givenness “behave”, so to speak, like “pieces” due to their independence from consciousness, the relation between them is not one of independence. Moreover, the same being that at a certain moment is “felt” and touched by the body of the I can later distance itself from it and appear as a sensorially manifest appearance. In this respect, the movement of the felt-thing and the given appearance inside the “whole” is dynamic. Husserl almost seems to play into the hands of HCM regarding appearance givenness when he discussed “the neighbouring [sic] qualities” and describes a situation in which “one visual quality […] leaps over into another” (Husserl, 1970b, III, §9 16/1984a, III, §9 250). Husserl refers to this state of affair as “phenomenally empathic” within which the setting “of one content is at times the basis for noticing another that intimately belongs to it” (Husserl, 1970b, III, §8 14/1984a, III, §8 247) or for having “common boundaries” (Husserl, 1970b, III, §9 16/1984a, III, §9 250). Clearly, such commonality cannot exist without dependent bordering pieces. Concerning HCM’s discussion, this means that both elements of sensory givenness—feeling givenness and appearing givenness—are precisely moments and not pieces. This insight applies to the understanding of Doctrine of Appearance in its entirety and also the phenomenological investigation in general. Indeed, after suggesting an abundance of distinctions regarding parts and their partitioning (Husserl, 1970b, III, §17 28–29/1984a, III, §17 272–274), toward the end of the third investigation Husserl remarks, “talk of separation implies the thought of relative independence of the separated, which is just what we have excluded. […] but the contents of which we speak have plenty to do with each other, they are in fact ‘founded’ on one another” (Husserl, 1970b, III, §22 36/1984a, III, §22 285).

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Against this background, I argue that if the proper whole of the phenomenological investigation is properly identified, in the end its parts should present themselves in the mode of moments. Illuminating the independence of “pieces” is an important stage of the phenomenological analysis. Yet the phenomenologist’s observation should undergo a transformation so that the pieces will be dissolved into moments, otherwise the work of illuminating the presence of the beings under discussion is not yet exhausted.35 An overview of the development of HCM’s oeuvre clearly shows such a process. The consistent effort to ground the independence of feeling givenness and appearance givenness from the senses and the consciousness in general are what form the diversity of the two phenomena in Doctrine of Appearance. In my opinion, this has to do with HCM’s complex stance toward positivism in that work and her view that her study “proceeds necessarily in a dimension that so to speak lies where positivism secludes itself” (HCM, 1916b, 400).36 On the one hand, HCM’s choice of the external world as the first object of her phenomenological study enables her to lean on her previous criticism of positivism (HCM, 1920). She argues that the sensory aspect of the phenomenon referred to as “the sensory manifest surface” (sinnfällige Oberfläche) that presents itself purely and as [existing] for-itself in the sensoryappearance” (HCM, 1916b, 463) is an important element in its appearing. Moreover, this aspect carries within itself the complete ontological meaning of phenomena as such. On the other hand, she rejects the fundamental principle of positivism according to which sensory perception is the only mode of knowing (HCM, 1916b, 352), arguing that this is “an untenable […] limitation” and wondering whether what the positivist considers as “the only given material of cognition” indeed has such precedence (HCM, 1916b, 347). However, particularly her rigid attitude to consciousness as thwarting the appearing of the real was about to become much more moderate in the writings that followed Doctrine of Appearance, arguing that the study of consciousness might return to reality the external world (HCM, 1963d, 23). In retrospect, the late development in her thinking brings about a transformation in her early view, which regarded as independent the phenomena that compose the external world, and thus retroactively confirms their correct understanding of the two as parts of one whole.

35 Sokolowski establishes that “a phenomenological analysis is concerned with eidetic necessities, and so deals in the currency of moments, not pieces”. See: Sokolowski (1974, 16). 36 The subtitle of Doctrine of Appearance—“associated with a critique of positivistic theories”, as well as the debate with positivism throughout the text (HCM, 1916b, 345–347, 352, 357–358, 361–365, 378, 382–386, 390–391, 398–400, 423, 425), clearly indicates its roots in her first essay (HCM, 1920).

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3.5 Summary The interpretation presented here uncovered a fundamental affinity between Doctrine of Appearance and Husserl’s theory of whole and parts, and thus supported his argument that this theory “extends beyond the sphere of conscious content and plays an extremely important role in the field of objects as such” (Husserl, 1970b, III, 3/1984a, 227).37 This means that a priori laws are constitutive not only for mental contents but also for processes in the material world and objects in general. Thus, the theory of whole and parts is pertinent for the entire realm of phenomena. Also, the Husserlian theory functioned as an effective hermeneutical tool, providing the outline for describing the external world’s appearing and the analysis of its components.38 Considering that Doctrine of Appearance is an extremely loaded, compressed, and complicated essay, and thus one that creates considerable difficulties for the reader, this is not an insignificant achievement.39 Moreover, according to Husserl, in phenomenology our concern is “with insight into the essence of the concepts involved […] and of their forms and combination”. These are not “trivial, preparatory tasks” but belong to “the true aims” of the study to the extent that without it all further efforts become “hopeless” (Husserl, 1970a, §67 154/1975, §67 246). Therefore, beyond the methodological benefits gained by reading Doctrine of Appearance via the perspective of the theory of whole and parts, Husserl’s argument here allows us to regard HCM’s ontology of the external world as faithful to the fundamental phenomenological commitment to reveal the essence of things.40 Finally, the affinity between HCM and the Husserlian theory that is discovered here can also guide the reading of HCM’s later work, despite the explicit rejection of Husserl’s transcendentalism recurring in it. Insofar as Husserl could refer to his theory as “an epistemological clarification” before completing the systematic study of its concepts (Husserl, 1970b, III, 3/1984a, III, 228), even more so can it serve as a guide to the understanding of HCM’s thinking, a thinking that never arrived at its full maturity and has yet to appear in its entirety.41

37 Indeed, Husserl’s insight that Logical Investigations leads outsides the realm of logic is not confined to his theory of whole and parts (Husserl, 1970b, Introduction, §2 166–167/1984a; Einleitung, §2 13). The members of the Munich-Göttingen circle believed in applied phenomenology and applied Husserl’s principles to different areas such as science, law, and literature. See: Seifert (1971, 98). 38 Yet, HCM identifies Husserl’s descriptive theory with his interest in immanent consciousness and thus confesses that it is “abstruse (fernliegend)” for her (HCM, 1916b, 355 n. 1). 39 See: Miron (2014a, 2014b) (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 2). 40 Sokolowski argues that “the doctrine of parts and wholes at least partially justifies Husserl’s philosophical language”, See: Sokolowski (1977, 95). 41 Despite the tremendous work of Eberhard Avé-Lallemant, HCM’s assistant, estate curator, collector, and editor of her published writings, many of her manuscripts are still in the archive of Munich (BSM), See: Avé-Lallemant (1975b, ix–xvii, 191–256).

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References Avé-Lallemant, E. (1975a). Die Antithese Freiburg-München in der Geschichte der Phänomenologie. In H. Kuhn, E. Avé-Lallemant, & R. Gladiator (Eds.), Die Münchener Phänomenologie, Vorträge des Internationalen Kongresses in München 13.–18. April 1971. Phaenomenologica 65. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 19–38. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1975b). Die Nachlässe der Münchener Phänomenologen in der Bayerischen Staadsbibliothek. Catalogus Codicum manu scriptorium Bibliothecae Monacensis, Tomus (Vol. X), part (pars) I. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz. Avé-Lallemant, U. (1965 [1966]). Hedwig Conrad Martius: Eine Groβe Philosophin unserer Zeit 1988–1966. Jahrbuch der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing, XV, 203–212. Beckermann, A. (2001). Analytische Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes (2nd ed.). Berlin: De Gruyter. Conrad-Martius, H. (1916aN). Über Ontologie, Conrad-Martiusiana, A.I 3, 14 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1916b). Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Auβenwelt: Verbunden mit einer Kritik positivistischer Theorien. In Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und philosophische Forschung III (pp. 345–542). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Conrad-Martius, H. (1920 [1912]). Die erkenntnisstheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus. Bergzabern: Heinrich Müller (Private print). Conrad-Martius, H. (1923). Realontologie, Buch I. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung VI (pp. 159–333). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Conrad-Martius, H. (1957). Das Sein. München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1959 [1958]). Die transzendentale und die ontologische Phänomenologie. In H. L. van Vreda & J. Taminiaux (Eds.), Edmund Husserl 1859–1959 - Recueil Commémoratif Publié A L’occasion De Centenaire De La Naissance Du Philosophe (pp. 175–184). Phaenomenologica 4. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (Printed also in: HCM 1965a). Conrad-Martius, Hedwig. 1963 [1932]. Dasein, Substantialität, Seele. In Schriften zur Philosophie, (Vol. I, pp. 194–227). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963a [1934]). Dasein, Substantialität, Seele. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 194–227). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963b [1931]). Sein und Nichts. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 89– 100). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963c [1931]). Seinsphilosophie. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 15– 31). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963d [1930]). Was ist Metaphysik? In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 38–48). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1965a [1958]). Die transzendentale und die ontologische Phänomenologie. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 393–402). München: Kösel (Printed also in: HCM 1959). Conrad-Martius, H. (1965b [1956]). Phänomenologie und Spekulation. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 370–384). München: Kösel (English translation: HCM 1959b). Conrad-Martius, H. (1965c [1956]). Über das Wesen des Wesens. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 335–356). München: Kösel. Dennett, D. (1993). Quining Qualia. In A. Marcel & E. Bisiach (Eds.), Consciousness in contemporary science (pp. 42–77). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Farber, M. (1943). The foundation of phenomenology: Edmund Husserl and the quest for a rigorous science of philosophy. New York: State University of New York Press. Farber, M. (1967). Phenomenology and existence: Toward a philosophy within nature. New York, Evanston, and London: Harper & Row. Geiger, M. (1930). Die Wirklichkeit der Wissenschaften und die Mataphysik. Bonn: F. Cohen. Habbel, I. (1959). Die Sachverhaltsproblematik in der Phänomenologie und bei Thomas von Aquin. Dissertation. Regensburg: Josef Habbel.

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Hart, J. G. (1972). Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ ontological phenomenology. Dissertation. Chicago, IL. Heinemann, F. (1960). Erscheinen und Sein – Prologmena zu einer Konkreten Phänomenologie. In R. Wisser (Ed.), Sinn und Sein, Ein philosophisches Symposion (pp. 183–192). Max Niemeyer: Tübingen. Hering, J. (1921). Bemerkung über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung VI (pp. 495–543). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Husserl, E. (1913). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, I (1) (pp. 1–323). Halle: Max Niemeyer (Reprinted in: Husserl 1952; English translation: Husserl 2012). Husserl, E. (1939 [1913]). Entwurf einer “Vorrede” zu der Logische Untersuchungen. Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, 1, 106–133, 319–339. Husserl, E. (1952 [1913]). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, Erstes Buch, ed. Karl Schuhmann, Husserliana III (1). Haag: Martinus Nijhoff (English translation: Husserl 2012). Husserl, E. (1964 [1938]). Erfahrung und Urteil, Untersuchungen zur Geneologie der Logik. Hamburg: Classen (English trans: Husserl 1973). Husserl, E. (1970a [1900]). Logical investigations (Vol. I, J. Findlay, Trans.). London and New York: Routledge (Translation of: Husserl 1975). Husserl, E. (1970b [1901]). Logical investigations (Vol. II, J. Findlay, Trans.). London and New York: Routledge (Translation of: Husserl 1984a and Husserl 1984b). Husserl, E. (1973 [1938]). Experience and judgment, investigation of genealogy of logic (J. S. Churchill, Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press (Translation of: Husserl 1964). Husserl, E. (1975 [1900]). Logische Untersuchungen, Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, Husserliana XVIII. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (English translation: Husserl 1970a). Husserl, E. (1999). Cartesian meditations: An introduction to phenomenology (D. Cairns, Trans.). The Hague, Boston, and London: Martinus Nijhoff (Translation of: Husserl 1991). Husserl, E. (1984a [1901]). Logische Untersuchungen, Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Husserliana XIX (1). The Hague, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (English translation: Husserl 1970b). Husserl, E. (1984b [1901]). Logische Untersuchungen, Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Husserliana XIX (2). The Hague, Boston, and Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (English translation: Husserl 1970b). Husserl, E. (1991). Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge. Husserliana I (S. Strasser, Ed.). Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers (English translation: Husserl 1999). Husserl, E. (2012 [1913]). Ideas, general introduction to pure phenomenology (W. R. Boyce Gibson, Trans.). London: Routledge (Translation of: Husserl 1952). Ingarden, R. (1925). Essential Fragen. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologiesche Forschung, VII, 125–304. Krings, H. (1960). Studie über Vorstellung und Sein. In R. Wisser (Ed.), Sinn und Sein, Ein philosophisches Symposion (pp. 193–208). Max Niemeyer: Tübingen. Miron, R. (2014a). The outside’s inside: The phenomenology of the external world in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ thought. Analecta Husserliana (ANHU), CXVI, 327–358. Miron, R. (2014b). The realism of the transcendence: A critical analysis of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ early ontology. The International Journal of Literary Humanities, 11(3), 37–48 (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 2). Mohanty, J. (1977). Phenomenology: Between essentialism and transcendental philosophy. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450. Pfeiffer, A. E. (2005). Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Eine Phänomenologische sicht auf Nature und Welt. Würzburg: Orbis Phenomenologicus, Königshausen & Neumann.

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Reinach, A. (1921 [1914]). Vortrag über Phänomenologie. In A. Reinach, Gesammelte Schriften (pp. 379–405). Halle: Max Niemeyer (Reprint of: Reinach 1951; English translation: Reinach 1968/Reinach 1969). Reinach, A. (1951 [1914]). Was ist Phänomenologie? Mit einem Vorwort von Hedwig ConradMartius (pp. 21–72). München: Kösel (Reprint of: Reinach 1921; English translation: Reinach 1968/Reinach 1969). Reinach, A. (1968). What is phenomenology? (D. Kelly, Trans.). Philosophical Forum, 1(2) (New Series), 231–256 (Translation of: Reinach 1921/Reinach 1951). Reinach, A. (1969 [1914]). Concerning phenomenology (W. Dallas, Trans.). The Personalist, 50(2), 194–221 (Translation of: Reinach 1921/Reinach 1951). Schmücker, F. G. (1956). Die Phänomenologie als Methode der Wesenerkenntnis, unter besondere Berücksichtigung der Auffassung der München-Göttinger Phänomenologenchule. Dissertation. München. Seifert, Josef. (1971 April 13–18). Über die Möglichkeit einer Metaphysik, Die Antwort der ‘Münchener Phänomenologen’ auf E. Husserl’s Transzendentalphilosophie. In Helmut Kuhn, Eberhard Avé-Lallemant, and Reinhold Gladiator (Eds.), Die Münchener Phänomenologie, Vorträge des Internationalen Kongresses in München 81–104. The Hague. Smith, B., & Mulligan, K. (1982). Pieces of a theory. In B. Smith (Ed.), Parts and moments: Studies in logic and formal ontology (pp. 15–109). München, Wien: Philosophia. Sokolowski, R. (1974). Husserlian meditations. Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Sokolowski, R. (1977). The logic of parts and wholes in Husserl’s Investigations. In J. N. Mohanty (Ed.), Reading on Edmund Husserl’s logical investigations. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Spiegelberg, H. (1960). The phenomenological movement (1st ed., Vol. 1). Phaenomenologica 5. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Spiegelberg, H. (1975). Doing phenomenology: Essays on and in phenomenology. Phaenomenologica 63. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Spiegelberg, H. (1984). The phenomenological movement: A historical introduction (3rd revised and enlarged edition with the collaboration of Karl Schuhmann). Phaenomenologica 5/6. The Hague, Boston, and Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Kluwer Academic Publishing. Stein, E. (2005). Self portrait in letters: Letters to Roman Ingarden. The Collected Works of Edith Stein (Vol. XII, H. C. Hunt, Trans.). Washington, DC: ICS Publications, Institute for Carmelite Studies.

Chapter 4

“The Gate of Reality”: Hedwig Conrad-Martius’s Idea of Reality in Realontologie Ronny Miron

Abstract The question “what is reality?” that opens Realontologie (HCM, 1923), the establishing book in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’s (HCM) oeuvre, establishes her realistic metaphysics. In her opinion, the firmly established “blinding insight” in modern philosophy regarding the unfathomable contrast between the ideal and the real blocks any access to the question of reality. To counter this, HCM’s ontology seeks the “gateway of reality”, meaning the datum-point where things “elevate” themselves from nonexistence or mere ideal existence but do not yet arrive at “operative Being” or realistic fulfillment. The discussion in the article distills three characteristics of the real that should be capable of addressing what she refers to as the “task of Being”. Each is personally imposed upon the real and brings about the fulfillment of the essence inherent in it: corporeality (Leibhaftigkeit), selfness (Selbsthaftigkeit), and primordiality (Primordialität). The suggested interpretation of each of these three seeks to unravel the contrast between the real and the ideal in favor of what she regards as the only genuine and primordial opposition that separates the real from nonexistence.

4.1 Preface The question “what is reality?” that opens Realontologie (“Real Ontology”) (HCM, 1923, 159),1 the establishing book of the phenomenologist Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888–1966) (hereafter: HCM), enfolds the fundamental metaphysical drive that courses throughout her entire oeuvre. In this piece, she seeks to establish the foundations that enable the real world in the pure objective sense and not only the Kantian and subjective one (HCM, 1923, 172). Accordingly, she addresses her study to reality as a non-material substance or an extra-physical reality (HCM, 1923, 221–222) and as a “primordial phenomenon” (Urphänomen) (HCM, 1923, 174), which either exists 1 All

translations from the German original into English are mine. Emphases follow the original.

R. Miron (B) Interdisciplinary Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Miron (ed.), Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68783-0_4

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factually or one needs to search for it (HCM, 1923, 159). She writes: “we are dealing here with ‘contents’ or ‘essences’ (Washeiten) that possibly are not only ideal or exist in a poetic shape or mathematical entity but also are real or are presented by us as existing” (HCM, 1923, 161–162).2 Later on, we will clarify that her investigation of reality does not invade the realm of the physicist or proclaim ancient and medieval speculation, but focuses on the question “wherein exists the essence [of reality]—not the (something like physical) power (Kraft) but—out of “power” as such!”. This little twist of the question says already very much (HCM, 1965b, 340).3 HCM does not equate reality with the immediate, concrete, and material dimensions in which reality might be fulfilled under certain conditions. Rather, her approach is anchored in essence intuition (Wesensfassung) originating from the Husserlian phenomenology (HCM, 1923, 159) that localizes and analyzes the “what (Was)” that establishes the real being by searching for the indispensable a priori and primordial foundations, thanks to which the real being can become a specific object.4 HCM’s idea of reality assumes a fundamental structure of the real being that is composed of two inseparable constituents: the essence (Washeit) or the “whatness” of the thing, and the “bearer” (Träger)5 upon which the essence is “loaded” and which signifies the content of the real being. She establishes that when the essence 2 HCM

clarifies the essential difference between her study and the scholastic approach as follows: while “within the entire scholastic system essence implies this and non-other than the concept of reality […], we believe that it would have been ontologically especially important to signalize a moment by which natural real-entity (naturhafte Realentität) as such distinguishes itself from plainly real-entity (schlecthin Realentität)” (HCM, 1923, 174 n. 1). For more on the scholastic aspect in HCM’s thinking, see: Habbel (1959). 3 This essay is based on seminar that HCM delivered during the winter semester in 1955/1956 that dealt with phenomenology. 4 HCM was committed to “essence intuition” (Wesensfassung), which she shared with the early phenomenologists of Munich Circle which, apart from her, included a group of intellectuals and philosophers from Munich, the first generation of the phenomenologists, whose prominent members included: Alexander Pfänder, Johannes Daubert, Moritz Geiger, Theodor Conrad, Adolf Reinach, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Maximilian Beck, Max Scheler, Jean Hering, Alexander Koyré, Roman Ingarden, and Edith Stein. In Realontologie, HCM declares her principle reliance on the “pure essence intuition in the Husserlians’ ideatic sense” (HCM, 1923, 159), which in her opinion is applicable in any thinkable object sphere, see HCM (1916b, 355 n. 1). Elsewhere she refers to it in greater detail, see HCM (1965a, 377; 1965b, 347). The early phenomenologists were inspired by Husserl’s struggle in Logical Investigations against psychologism, relativism, and varying reductionisms (Husserl, 1970a, §23 51, §31 74/1975, §23 82, §31 117), in particular by his principle that it is possible to observe consciousness” condition apart from the thinking subject (Husserl, 1970b, III, §5 10/1984a, III, §5 240). For further reading about this circle, see Avé-Lallemant (1975). HCM admits the influence of “Logical Investigations” on her, see: HCM (1923, 355). For further reading about the method of “essence intuition”, especially in the realistic school of phenomenology, see Reinach (1921), Pfänder (1913), Pfeiffer (2005, 1–13), Schmücker (1956, 1–33), Ebel (1965, 1–25), Avé-Lallemant (1959, 89–105), Walther (1955, 190). 5 The term “bearer” has several appearances already in Doctrine of Appearance, usually as a character of the I (HCM, 1916b, 482), of the spirit (HCM, 1916b, 407, 514), of the senses (HCM, 1916b, 497– 498) or of the body (HCM, 1916b, 525–526), and not as an ontological creature that accompanies the essence.

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constitutes itself, it personally carries a bearer which is the filling with content of the real being (HCM, 1923, 167), or alternatively the real is that which carries the essence that belongs to it and specifies it fundamentally (HCM, 1923, 176). The function of carrying that takes place in the real being, in its pure and formal sense, is based on “unbreakable (unzerreißbar) formal cohesion (Zusammenhang)” (HCM, 1923, 179). Moreover, these are reciprocal relations: the bearer is specified by the essence that is uploaded onto it and by which it exists. At the same time, the essence is carried to the extent that it specifies its bearer. The two consolidate an absolute body or shape (Gebilde) in-itself (HCM, 1923, 167–168) or unity in which the specifier and the specified are at the same time the borne and the loaded (HCM, 1923, 171). They should be regarded as “formally completely chained together and instructing one another” and “emerging [into existence] (entstehen)” at the same time” (HCM, 1923, 172).6 This means that the essence that specified the bearer is but the bearer itself, meaning: What turns the bearer into what it is, in her words: “a real entity became a carrier (Hypokeimenon) of its own self like Atlas that takes earth upon its ‘back’” (HCM, 1923, 176).7 HCM introduces her approach as a counter reply to the “blinding insight” in modern philosophy regarding the unfathomable contrast between the ideal and the real. In her opinion, this inappropriate contrast blocks any access to the question of reality. Yet, for her the only philosophically meaningful difference concerns the contrast between the real and the non-existing or the nothing. In this regard, she distinguishes between a mode of being that can be either ideal or real and reality that does not concern “more or less objectivity”, rather it is “something totally different” (HCM, 1923, 180) that stands with “an unbridgeable and absolute opposition” (HCM, 1923, 162) to the non-existing or nothingness (HCM, 1923, 160). She characterizes her approach as a “descriptive guidance to the real Being” (HCM, 1923, 160) by which “the empty concept of reality is provided with the descriptive fullness (Fülle)” (HCM, 1923, 174) and as “an attempt to fix the specific characteristic of the real world as real in its spatial-temporal determination” (HCM, 1923, 164). This characterization might be misleading, as if we are dealing here with the concrete dimensions of reality. However, HCM explains that the study of “the descriptive and full essence of real existence” seeks the way to demonstrate and explain the way in 6 HCM clarifies that this observation should be understood as a “methodological illustration” rather

than as an indication of a genetic and simultaneous becoming of the essence and the bearer (HCM, 1923, 172 n. 1). Moreover, admitting the existence of God requires regarding reality as constituted (by Him). However, her argument in Realontologie keeps the independency of the philosophical path, unlike later writings, in which the theological aspect becomes important and apparent. For further reading, see: Hart (1972, 545–638), Pfeiffer (2005, 87–107). 7 HCM differentiated here between two fundamentals that are usually identified with each other: “self” and “autonomy”. She clarifies that the standing of a phenomenon on its essence is not equivalent to its objectivity, to its autonomy in its existence, or to its independency (HCM, 1923, 180). This clarification is important considering her discussion in Doctrine of Appearance in which she posed the aspect of autonomy in existence as fundamental in the idea of reality (HCM, 1916b, 392). However, in Realontologie this aspect is regarded as insufficient (HCM, 1923, 162) due to the insufficiency of objectivity and absoluteness that in her view lack the aspect of “corporeality” (Leibhaftigkeit) to be discussed later.

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which the real thing actually and positively elevates (erhebt) itself from nothingness and bails itself out (heraushauen) of it and thereby becomes totally charged with its own content (HCM, 1923, 181). Thus, essence intuition faces the loss of fullness, depth, and content of the real thing (HCM, 1923, 192) taking place in the formal approach to reality. In her opinion, the images used in phenomenological discourse have “a final and simple meaning that indeed seems emptied as regard to their material usefulness for relationships with nature […] yet still contains typical fullness and stiffness that are sufficient for the characterization of the ontic relations and for specific illustration” (HCM, 1923, 176).8 The justification for addressing essence intuition to the study of reality might be found in what Jean Hering defined as a “fundamental fact” that was acknowledged by phenomenologists, according to which “the existence (existenz) of the nonempirical givennesses is what facilitates the a priori study” (Hering, 1921, 495).9 The “nonempirical givenness” is not necessarily such, for under certain conditions it might achieve material fulfillment. However, the empirical actuality is not a condition for the reality of such givenness, and thus is not a component in the essence that generates it as well. The “gateway of reality” signifies the datum-point where “a radical overcoming” of the “mere formal positioning” of reality takes place. At that point, “these things do not yet factually ‘exist’ but are ‘lifted’ (anhebt)” from nonexistence or mere ideal and formal existence (HCM, 1923, 173). In principle, this reality can be tangential to the physical and material one under the appropriate conditions (HCM, 1923, 221), yet not necessarily. Indeed, the essence intuition that directs HCM’s approach on the issue of reality is responsible for the emphasis on the non-material and non-physical aspects of reality. Therefore, HCM signifies reality as “through and through immaterial materiality (immarteriell Stofflichkeit)” and points to its two fundamentals: firstly, this is a “true material entity” originating from real fullness, that in certain conditions might expand spatially. Second, the corporeality of this reality is immaterial and thus is characterized as “subject to non-depth (Untiefe) of space” (HCM, 1923, 211) and as a being that “never turns back upon itself” (HCM, 1923, 221). The immediate 8 In

Doctrine of Appearance, the expression stiffness is used comprehensively (although there it is denoted by Härte while in Realontologie she uses Schwere) for signifying the material givennessmode of the object (HCM, 1916b, 426). She argues there that despite the fact that this characteristic brings about the feeling of the I, stiffness itself is not based on its influence on the I, but in its being an “experiential confirmation” of the reality of the material felt-thing (HCM, 1916b, 514). Hence, stiffness belongs to the object and not to the subject (see: Miron, 2014). It appears that also in Realontologie the expression of stiffness characterizes the real being, but while HCM’s early efforts were addressed to purifying reality of “feeling givenness (Empfindungsgegebenheit)” from the experience of the I, here she concentrates in distinguishing reality from its concrete appearances. 9 Following Husserl, the early phenomenologists were convinced that perceived objects and the modes in which they become known were established upon lawfulness of essence, which is independent of consciousness and of the subject in general. The principles of object-oriented observation were phrased by Hering. See Hering (1921, 496). See here also Geiger’s characterization of “the turn to the object” (Die Wende zum Objekt) (Geiger, 1933, 13). For a detailed discussion of this observation in regard to the Munich Circle, see Avé-Lallemant (1971, 89–105), Schmücker (1956, 3–8).

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contradiction that emerges out of these two fundamentals enfolds the complexity of HCM’s relation to the issue of materiality in Realontologie10 : on the one hand, she holds that addressing essence intuition upon the issue of reality requires studying it independently of its possible material fulfillment (HCM, 1923, 159). Thus, she describes her approach as an “observation experiment” that poses before one’s eye the essence without “its being material in the narrow and strict sense (this sense we wish to remove), but could have a corporeal and substantial existence (Bestehen) in this being (Dasein)” (HCM, 1923, 219) or alternatively: “one should not perceive it (the matter) already from the outset in the sense of matter of shaped fullness” (HCM, 1923, 217). HCM describes the material being as sinking into a static body and of narrowness rigidity. In her opinion, it is possible that material beings will not appear anymore as primordial expressions of self-substantializing force, for they are subject to external influences that fixate them (HCM, 1923, 201) and thus blur its essence. Moreover, with material being the direction of being goes from outsides inward, and it is constituted statically, hence typified as a “brutal order of being” (HCM, 1923, 223). Thus, HCM wishes to remove from her discussion materiality in the narrow and strict sense. On the other hand, she accepts Jean Hering’s description of essence as the “material mother” of all objects and of their very possibility (HCM, 1923, 162 n. 1). Therefore, HCM establishes that the aspect of materiality is inseparable from what we perceive as “the real givenness of things” (HCM, 1923, 192). Moreover, the material fulfillment personifies the answering of the conditions that are acknowledged as necessary for the real being. Thus, materiality is typified as “exactly the factor […] for which we are looking” (HCM, 1923, 192). Accordingly, she declares that her genuine assignment is to explicate the specific being-mode of materiality (HCM, 1923, 204). While the positivistic approach regarded materiality as “a constituted concept which is not founded in the things themselves” and dealt with the question whether it exists or not, HCM determines that this approach cannot “really meet the genuine moment of materiality” (HCM, 1923, 192).11 Essence intuition detaches one’s gaze from any possible measurement and fixation which are given factually 10 This complexity emerges from the comparisons that appear throughout Realontologie, of the real

being with the material one, which are not exhausted in their methodical plane. This insight is also the ground for not including materiality with the necessary requirements for being a reality, as Nicoletta Ghigi did. See: Ghigi (2008). 11 This argument continuing the debate with positivism marks the beginning of HCM’s oeuvre. Her first essay (HCM, 1920a) was devoted to the issue. Doctrine of Appearance is an exploration of the first chapter in her first essay (HCM, 1920a, 10–24) that received an award from the department of philosophy at the University of Göttingen. The subtitle “associated with a critique of positivistic theories”, as well as the debate with positivism throughout the text (HCM, 1916b, 345–347, 352, 357–358, 361–365, 378, 382–386, 390–391, 398–400, 423, 425), clearly indicates its roots in the first essay. In 1912, Alexander Pfänder recognized Doctrine of Appearance as a Ph.D. thesis in the University of Munich (see U. Avé-Lallemant, 1965 [1966], 212). In 1913, the expanded chapter of the award-winning essay was submitted as a dissertation, in a version rather similar to Doctrine of Appearance. In the epilogue to the special print in 1920 (HCM, 1920a, 130–131), HCM referred to this fact and explained that she left behind the direction of criticism of positivism in favor of an ontological direction. Indeed, the plan to elaborate the rest of the chapters was never carried out (Avé-Lallemant, 1971, 213).

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together with its object. These, not only empty the thing from its other dimensions, but also present it as an “absolute void” and thus its perception by the mentioned means necessarily distorts it (HCM, 1923, 215). However, as essence intuition is addressed to the issue of materiality, it seeks to explicate “like what materiality delivers itself […], how is it contained in the plain perception of the thing?” (HCM, 1923, 192). HCM explains that since what is “inside itself” stands before us totally differently from the way it appears in the immediate experience; thus its possible perception is thwarted; or alternatively, “what turns is perceivable ‘falls outside’, loses its fullness, its depth, its base and its very own content” (HCM, 1923, 193). All this has led to the wrong identification of materiality with factuality. Against this background, HCM postulates the “Assignment of Being” (Seinsaufgabe) of the real being: to describe personally and precisely the essence that generates it; to be outside the absolute and “boundless void” (HCM, 1923, 225 n. 2); to be carried within substantial fullness; to be unified with itself and to be contained in-itself. HCM refers to the fulfillment of this assignment, as a result of which a simple material positioning in space might be enabled, “an unmediated and immediate wedding (Vermählung) of substantial fullness with abyss (μη` Ôν /meonic)” (HCM, 1923, 225).12 The suggested interpretation of Realontologie, regarded as HCM’s first systematic and most profound attempt to apply essence intuition to the phenomenon of reality, will uncover three fundamental characteristics of the real being: selfness, corporeality (Leibhaftigkeit), and primordiality.13 Each of these three underlies the aforementioned double fundamental structure composed of bearer and essence. Also, these three respond to the so-called Assignment of Being and in this respect should be regarded as capable of constituting a real being. In case the other conditions are met, this real being might be fulfilled as a material being and thus cross the “gateway of reality”. Yet, HCM’s discussion in Realontologie is located on the threshold of reality and thus deals with what essentially establishes reality and is not necessarily materially fulfilled. The unique vocabulary which HCM consolidates in Realontologie expresses her attempt to dub the real with what she called “extraspatial definitions” or to understand it in a “pure space-like sense” (HCM, 1923, 205). She clarifies that one should not understand the terms she uses in their naturalistic sense, but “only in their formal ontological” (HCM, 1923, 190), that is, regardless of their possible ontic actualization. She explains by employing her definitions “reality is thereby constituted, [its] 12 The word in ancient Greek means relating to, or consisting of, void or nothingness yet potentially can be transformed into a material thing (unlike the absolute blank nothingness). 13 HCM details four elements of the real being: “selfbearingness” (Selbstträgerschaft); possessing a position of its own (Eigenposition); “tangentiality” (Tangirbarkeit); and corporeality (Leibhaftigkeit). She depicts the last one as existing in a different plane than the others, constituting itself “by and through them” as their inclusive ontic result (HCM, 1923, 187–188). Yet, in my interpretation, except for “corporeality”, the other three transpire as not having their independent status but as part of another element. In this respect signifying “selfness”, “corporeality”, and “primordiality” as the constituting elements of the real being in Realontologie expresses an interpretative stance.

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self-bearingness (Selbstträgerschaft) in this pure formal formation sense is given, it needs not to be added to materially useful or to immanent creative potencies” (HCM, 1923, 190). Exactly as the idea of essence is regarded by HCM as an evident reality, so also in the other terms she finds “a last and plain meaning” (HCM, 1923, 176). Therefore, it is possible to determine that the figurative idioms that HCM harnesses for the characterization of the real being—i.e., “body”, “house”, and “clothing”—were meant to moderate the recognized abstractedness that wraps her perception without arriving at material fulfillment in the narrow and strict sense. In any event, HCM’s idea of reality, and not reality itself, is the object of the suggested interpretation of Realontologie.

4.2 “Selfness” (Selbsthaftigkeit) The element of selfness in reality, due to which the real being is referred to as “self-full” (selbsthäftig) or subordinated to itself, concerns an internal aspect of the real being. To a considerable extent, this peculiar expression encapsulates the fundamental shift from her previous focus on the phenomenal manifestation of the external world in Doctrine of Appearance (HCM, 1916b).14 She explains that by the very fact of loading an essence on its bearer, the bearer establishes itself and becomes “standing” (stehend). The expressions “standing” and “subordination” (Unterstehen) are inseparable: the bearer carries the essence by the fact of being subordinated to it, while the essence finds in the bearer its “seat” (Sitz) or “a position of your own” (Eigenposition) (HCM, 1923, 179). Also¸ only reality has a stance of its own, and vice versa: everything that has a stance of its own is real by that fact alone (HCM, 1923, 177). Meaning, the essence cannot be carried without achieving a “stance” (Stellung) in the real being and being defined by its belonging to its bearer. Moreover, the real being has an aspect of selfness, since an essence is being carried in it and by this fact achieves a stance in it. Thus, the selfness of the real being is composed of its indispensable constituents. HCM characterizes the “standpoint” (Standort) achieved by the essence as a “homeland” (Heimat) of the essence inside the real being (HCM, 1923, 179). While “fatherland” (Vaterland) denotes some objective occurrence that took place, “homeland” has an abstract touch that is related to meaning, exactly as the essence relates to the real being. Indeed, also the expression “stance” does not necessarily denote a concrete place but an essential rootedness in the thing. All this is unlike the “pure unity of appearance” (rein Erscheinungseinheit) that is restricted to a theoretical knowledge about reality (HCM, 1923, 192) and can exist only “outwards”, 14 The

aspect of the self appears already in Doctrine of Appearance, where HCM’s discussion is aiming at establishing the autonomy of the external world vis-à-vis the consciousness and the I in general. Thus, she regards the external world as a real being (HCM, 1916b, 396) with a selfstanding in being (Seinselbstständigkeit) (HCM, 1916b, 391) closed in-itself and transcendent to consciousness and spirit (HCM, 1916b, 424). In contrast, in Realontologie, the issue of the I is pushed aside in favor of the discussion of the explication of the inherent elements of the real being itself.

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meaning vis-à-vis its perceiving consciousness without having something “inside” itself (HCM, 1923, 195, 199). HCM characterizes the pure appearing as an “artificial foundation” (HCM, 1923, 197) because in any “stance” it does not possess (i.e., have inside itself) selfness (HCM, 1923, 218), does not “fill” a space inwardly (HCM, 1923, 204) but exists “without a place of its own”, “hanging in a “void” and “its mode of existence is of pure hovering” (HCM, 1923, 197–198). Consequently, no positioning of real being can ever take place in pure appearance (HCM, 1916aN, 6). The original connection between the essence and its bearer signifies a “real entity that is ‘placed in-itself’” (HCM, 1923, 179) while being a “‘position of your own’ (Eigenposition)” denotes “‘self-bearingness’ (Selbst-Trägerschaft)” (HCM, 1923, 177), in HCM’s words: “reality is immanence in person. Such that by means of possession of itself the turning back (Zugekehrte) or the in itself turning inwardly (Hineingerkehrte) and thereby everything else is positioned against [it]” (HCM, 1923, 217). While the essence achieves “personal dwelling” (Wohnstätte) in the real being (HCM, 1923, 178), the formal and ideal representations are exhausted in mere shape (Eingeformtsein), lack a real bearer, and their existence is only functional or formal (HCM, 1923, 178). HCM distinguishes between the “ideal bearer” and the “real bearer”. The former manifests itself by means of content and its bearer does not have the meaning of “the bearer as ‘Hypokeimenon’” (HCM, 1923, 168) upon which the essence is loaded. Rather, to a certain extent the essence remains detached from the beings in which it appears. Thus, for example, the triangle is the bearer of the essence of triangularity. Yet the attachment of triangularity to the thing in which it appears—for example, this table before me—is to a large extent loose, and therefore cannot signify its selfness (HCM, 1923, 167). In contrast, “the real [bearer] ‘takes over’ (übernimmt), also factually, what defines it essentially – it allows itself to be carried upon what manifests and describes its very own” (HCM, 1923, 168). The ideal beings, like the real ones, to a certain extent have also absolute independence. Yet, HCM establishes that by the very becoming of the ideal beings they sink into “self-less” and “mere formal mode of existence” as distinguished from “positively constituted existence in the full and peculiar sense of the real” (HCM, 1923, 180). Thus, she determines that regarding the issue of bearing an “unbridgeable abyss” separates the ideal being from the real one (HCM, 1923, 223).15 The difference between the real being and the ideal one becomes sharper also through two additional terms that contribute to the exploration of the element of the self: fulfillment (Erfüllung) and tangentiality (Tangirbarkeit). HCM establishes that the selfness of reality embodies the aspect of fulfillment that is inherent in the real being as such: “the real—by means of its pure being and existence—is the positive and personal realizer (Realisator) of its own essentiality or its own self” (HCM, 1923, 173). Indeed, already the “elevation” (Erhebung) of the real from the formal abstraction toward real existence, in which an essence is being positively “operated” 15 However, the anchor of HCM’s discussion of reality in Realontologie is essence intuition regard-

less of the aspect of its actual fulfillment enables the applicability of many of her arguments to both real and ideal beings. Thus, she holds that regarding the inseparability of the essence and the bearer (HCM, 1923, 170) there exists “accordance in the sense (Gleichsinnigkeit) of the situation on the real side and the ideal side” (HCM, 1923, 162).

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(ausgewirkt), might be regarded as fulfillment of the belonging essence (HCM, 1923, 173, 176). At once: “where reality is, [there takes place] a positive operation” (HCM, 1923, 223). The aspect of fulfillment illuminates the capability for “‘movement’ (Bewegung)” (HCM, 1923, 175) and “activity” (Gewirktsein) of the real being, thanks to which “the empty concept of reality is granted with the descriptive fullness (Fülle)” (HCM, 1923, 174). HCM establishes that whatever “by itself ‘cannot’” is also incapable of anything else, whereas “the real only is such that by itself ‘can’ (Könnende)” (HCM, 1923, 177). Thus, reality is first fulfilled where the operation of being proclaims the power-stream of the being in concern (HCM, 1923, 223). Indeed, feature of capability to operate that is inherent in the real being is based already in its being “a factual bearer” of an essence operating in it (HCM, 1923, 177). Yet this feature does not signify “any acts but pure relation of Being (Seinsverhältniss)” (HCM, 1923, 223), meaning: this relation exists as much as that Being exists. The dimensions of power, movement, and activity that are bounded in the real being fill with content HCM’s argument that reality is anchored in dynamic relations (HCM, 1923, 221). This means that the formation of the real being does not express a constituted reality but a self-constituting occurrence that bails itself out of nothingness. She clarifies that in this context the expressions of “power (Kraft)” and “dynamic relations” are not physical definitions that as such must “assume in advance a readymade constituted nature” (HCM, 1923, 221), namely a positive material substrate to which the dynamic power-relation is addressed. Rather, we are dealing here with “constituting of an entity that would fall outside the physical dimension”, yet in principle “is tangent to the physical-mechanical – the matter”. Alternatively, the matter in concern is “exactly the constitution of the counterpart of the matter, the constitution of entirely immaterial materiality” (HCM, 1923, 221). Later on, we shall see that especially as the dimensions of power and dynamics have no physical meaning, at the same time also the presence of “quiet (Ruhe)”, rest, and immobility can be enabled in the real being. HCM exemplifies: the mountain is loaded upon itself and carries itself by means of a “physically dormant (ruhend) static relation” that is different from what appears at the “ontic layer” of that mountain. In HCM’s view, this is a pure being-like relation expressing absolute quiet in-itself that enables the mountain, so to speak, to “rest inside itself”. At the same time, one can perceive the “self-loading” (Selbstbelastung) of the mountain as addressing stiffness and firmness toward the tree that is planted on it. As a result, the mountain, from the aspect of its being, “is transferred to restlessness, stress, and movement” (HCM, 1923, 175). So, she summarizes: “the real is the constitutively operated in-itself. Because and to the extent that it is operated in its own being and in its self, it must carry itself and be loaded on itself” (HCM, 1923, 174). An additional aspect that further sharpens the disparity of the real being from ideal being is that of tangentiality (Tangirbarkeit). This unique term signifies the principle capability of meeting of the real being: “the real as such must be capable of being encountered (antreffbar) and thus also (due to a principle possibility) be tangential in its being, [meaning] where it possesses its primary seat: namely by itself” (HCM, 1923, 181). This aspect of tangentiality testifies to genuine states within the real

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being that might be encountered by an observer—an encounter not in the sense of a concrete touch of two beings in space and time (HCM, 1923, 230–231). Rather, this is, so to speak, a tangent between the essences of the two beings that share some real aspect. However, this principle of tangentiality does not refer to an independent characteristic of the real being, but is part of an inherent part of the alignment that constitutes the self of the real being that is composed also of other characteristics, at the center of which lie: unmediatedness, selfness (Selbsthaftigkeit) (HCM, 1923, 187), and being a “‘position of your own’ (Eigenposition)” (HCM, 1923, 177, 186). As against the tangentiality of the real being, HCM points to the loss of tangentiality or the principle and original deprivation (Entzogenheit) of the ideal being. In her opinion, this aspect of the ideal being was misunderstood as an identifying mark of its objectivity. Yet, in her opinion the objective existence is not an expression of the ideal existence as such; otherwise, this would have thwarted any possible perception of it. Rather, she holds that the deprivation of the ideal being expresses its self-loss formality that cannot enable it to be capable of being encountered and tangent. Moreover, the character of deprivation in principle that HCM discovers in the ideal being is not a result of its atemporality and aspatiality. Quite the opposite. The ideal does not exist in space and time because its being is not reachable, and not because it is in principle untangential. Alternatively: the formal relation to space and time, deprivation in principle, and loss of tangentiality signify the selfless existence of the ideal being as such (HCM, 1923, 180–181). Unlike what might be denoted as mere objectivity of the ideal being, the real being has “material objectivity” that is achieved by “its positive stepping out” by means of the selfness of its being. This material objectivity stands against the pure nothingness (HCM, 1923, 182), and it meets the “space as an absolute shape (Gebilde) […] that can be ‘posited’ ‘for-itself’” (HCM, 1923, 214). The aspects of fulfillment and tangentiality are responsible, among others, for the capability of the real being to achieve an external appearance. This means that the extrication of the real from nothingness denotes an internal occurrence as well as external one. In HCM’s words: “a ‘bearer’ is of your own self […] means that your being operates from yourself outwardly [and arrives at] description and appearance” (HCM, 1923, 223). There is no contradiction between the two, rather “the real entity as such carries itself […] since its pure elevating into existence already bears by itself this carrying as pure formation moment” (HCM, 1923, 175). Inasmuch as by this elevating the real being breaks through the wall of nothingness, it testifies to “an internal mode of structuring” of the real being itself (HCM, 1923, 176). This is, then, the uniqueness of the real being compared to the formal one and the material one: the formal being cannot achieve any aspect of internality, and its externality is exhausted by its intelligibility by human consciousness. Whereas with material being, “from the aspect of power the entire body is kept outside itself” only (HCM, 1923, 220), namely: the power of the material being is addressed wholly outwards. Only with the real being does the external manifestation that bails it out of nothingness at the same time denote its self-operating inwardly. In HCM’s words:

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One should not signify a specific aspect of being as external just because it exists external to me or to any other perceiving spirit, but because in-itself and for itself as such it possesses an essential characteristic of “externality”. This is true even if there is anyone outside who will perceive it. It will nevertheless always remain in itself outwardly constituted. To a certain extent it is “structured inwardly into to the outside”, and only this peculiar moment interests us. (HCM, 1923, 191)

4.3 Corporeality (Leibhaftigkeit) The aspect of corporeality denotes the mode of being of the real thing (HCM, 1923, 165) that deals with the capability of essence to “achieve a pattern”—whereas in the real being this might be a material pattern, while in the ideal being it should be a formal pattern (HCM, 1923, 162 n. 1). The element of corporeality does not depict the real as given in “an appropriate ‘receptacle’ (Gefäβ)” (HCM, 1923, 215, 219), and does not add to it any new moment (HCM, 1923, 165). Also, the corporeal shape does not serve as a “mere mirror image” or a “virtual image” of another being but “‘a real’ picture” that is really projected into the space and carried inside itself (HCM, 1923, 193 n. 1) and thus becomes “this” corporeal being. The “appearance material” (Erscheinungsmatrial) signifies a pure element that is responsible for the “visual givenness” as such in which also the related assignment of Being of the thing is being realized (HCM, 1923, 194), meaning “within its achieved contents some sort of substantiality and corporeality—fullness” (HCM, 1923, 218). Thus, “when an essence reaches realization or becomes corporeal, by that fact itself a ‘bearer’ is established, upon which it - as the content of its real existence – is ‘loaded’” (HCM, 1923, 167). This means that the element of corporeality of the real being is inherent already in the double structure that is composed of essence and bearer, or alternatively: especially as an essence is being “carried”, it must achieve shape or be corporeal. HCM’s choice of this unique idiom of corporeality seems to intensify the aspect of body (Leib) involved therein and thus established an understanding of the real being as “a possessor of a body” (Leib habende) (HCM, 1923, 188). This very “possession” of a body, so to speak, stands out in a “specific form” (HCM, 1923, 220). As discussed above, an aspect of “power” is already operative within the element of selfness of real beings. However, here HCM adds that the body as such must be totally “founded on power” (Kraftfundierter) (HCM, 1923, 220), meaning: it bears its own activity. This power enables a “stepping out” in which the real being is also inwardly “widened”. Thus, the real being is provided with the character of “absolute immanent transcendence”, namely “a transcendence that by itself is given with the substentialization [… and] yet by no means the absolute closedness of the substantialized collapses or is cancelled by itself” (HCM, 1923, 225–226). Rather, this “positive stepping out” (HCM, 1923, 182) of the real being expresses the original dynamic relations (HCM, 1923, 221) between the essence and the bearer that exist at the cradle of its establishment as a being that has a self of its own. The related internal power transpires, then, as not imprisoning the real being inside its boundaries,

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but addresses it outwardly. To this extent, both immanence and transcendence are involved inseparably in the real being. However, while with the real being that has not yet crossed the “gateway of reality” internality has precedence, externality is decisive in regard to the material that has, so to speak, “crossed the gate”, and is located on its other side. Moreover, corporeality not only signifies the related “stepping out” of the real being. Rather, but it is “at the same time its personal dwelling (persönliche Wohnstätte)” (HCM, 1923, 178). Thus, the real being exists “as in its very own self” and “because this self factually and genuinely is operated in it […] – the body possessor – the corporeal!” (HCM, 1923, 188–189). Accordingly, HCM typifies corporeality as “what stamps itself [… as] the almost personal character of reality” (HCM, 1923, 187). The affinity of corporeality to the element of selfness is explicitly in HCM’s maintaining that “one can first speak about a selfness in the genuine sense generally, where that is in concern is corporeal or respective bearer of an unfolded essence”. The opposite it true as well: only what by its essence became corporeal and brought this essence “personally and factually” into expression has selfness that might operate as a constitutive selfness (HCM, 1923, 176). The primary distinction between inside and outside, upon which HCM’s previous book, Doctrine of Appearance (HCM, 1916b) was established, is undermined when she describes the body as “entirely carried from inside” and “kept outside itself” (HCM, 1923, 224), or alternatively when she depicts the manifestation of the real being as directed inwardly: “the positioning of the body is by this very fact an operation (Auswirkung), exploration, and description of your own being means ‘stepping out’”. The existent that in its own essence is elevated inside (Hineingehobene) and in is genuinely by itself is together with it thereby widened the actual opened (Aufgeschlossene) and “expressed” (Geäußerte)” (HCM, 1923, 225–226). Indeed, the dichotomous view that puts inside and outside as opposed to each other must be removed already by the understanding in principle according to which the essence of the real cannot sink inside itself but must be carried. This general principle is crystalized in the characterization of corporeal being as “genuinely carried outside itself” (HCM, 1923, 224) and in the description of the “corporeality” as the core of the real being or of its selfness, and at the same time the ground of its appearance: Forasmuch as the real entity is a factual carrier (Hypokeimenon) of its own essence, it enters inside it like into its personal “gown” (Kleid). Namely: clothing of Being (Seinskleid). The reason is that this certain real being is nothing but (but no more) than the personal that is dressed so. The essence [of the real being] became a clothing that has grown on it or onto the - “body”. (HCM, 1923, 188)

Against this background, we might characterize the real as a being that is clothed with an essence that belongs to it and refer to corporeality as a bodily and personal fulfillment of that essence. However, the real being as a corporeal “possessor of a body” must be distinguished from its material body, which is only a partial dimension of it (HCM, 1923, 189), and which might be fulfilled either as factuality of not. Indeed, the “stepping out” and the self-widening of the real being do not constitute spatial relations as in the material

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being. While the real being as non-material substantiality is being carried and elevated by its immanent force, and thus its transcendence is deliberately “immanent”, the material being is depicted in this context as “unlifted” (Ungehoben) and “collapsing into itself” (HCM, 1923, 225–226). Here, one should recall the distinction between “corporeality” that signifies a mode of being of the real and “corporeal givenness” (leibhafter Gegebenheit) that refers to the actual appearing of concrete real being (HCM, 1923, 165). While corporeality denotes the stage of being at the threshold of the “gateway of reality” (although this is principally possible for it), “corporeal givenness” refers to the being that has crossed the “gate” and achieved material fulfillment. However, HCM clarifies that there exists an affinity between corporeality and “corporeal givenness”, which might be described as follows: since the real is corporeal, in certain conditions it can achieve corporeal givenness. Something is not real because it is corporeally given. Quite the opposite: since something is real is carries inside itself the element of corporeality that can either be actually realized or not (HCM, 1923, 166). In any event, while corporeal givenness takes place, not only the appearing of the being that appears is realized as an appearing entity (Erscheinende) but also the thing (Ding) itself becomes real (Seiende) (HCM, 1923, 194). Indeed, there exist two layers that are laid one upon the other—the layer of the appearance possessing a mere “layer of appearance” (Erscheinungsschicht) and the genuine material layer that is a layer of a thing (Dingschicht) (HCM, 1923, 194). Both layers join together in the unity of the thing (Dingeinheit) that enfolds inside itself the mere phenomenal and factual appearing. In any event, this unity as “a closed being initself” that “encompasses itself” means then that not only does the real being achieve “shape” (Gebilde) (HCM, 1923, 171) that is capable of shining outward, yet also “possesses itself in itself” (HCM, 1923, 217), meaning: it is shaped from inside.

4.4 Primordiality (Primär) Unlike the former elements, in particular the corporeality that appeared as a distinguishing theme in Realontologie, the element of primordiality expresses an interpretive stance that synthesizes a few elements of reality.16 First and foremost, primordiality signifies “an internal mode of structuring” (HCM, 1923, 176) of the real being, or, as previously indicated, its being “structured inwardly into to the outside” (HCM, 1923, 191). HCM describes the real being as “substantialized inwards” (hineinsubstanzialisiert), as passing through “internalizing” (Innerung), and eventually becoming a “unity that is centered in-itself” (HCM, 1923, 226–227). The continuity between the dimension of internality and the element of selfness is apparent. Simply, the element of selfness is an internal element. Moreover, the internality of the real being is portrayed as an internal occurrence in which are echoed the dimensions 16 However,

the term “primordial” (Primär) is mentioned throughout Realontologie, see HCM (1923, 174–175, 181, 235).

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of power, movement, and operation that were discussed in the context of the explication of the element of selfness. Yet the construct of primordiality provides them with an essential setting and anchor. Surely, already the element of selfness signifies an abstract context of the real being, by which one can distinguish between what belongs to it and what does not. However, the element of internality expresses a radical observation on the context as such, as a result of which the reality of beings transpires as independent of their external realization. This observation teaches that the power, the movement, and the activeness of the real being are expressions of its internality. Hence, exactly because the real being is primordial, it is also a “self-full being”. However, there is no contradiction between the internality and its capability to achieve an external appearing and even be fulfilled corporeally. As we recall, even regarding the aspect of “stepping out” of the real being (HCM, 1923, 225), HCM emphasized that it should not be understood in material terms (HCM, 1923, 175), or alternatively, “one should not perceive it already from the outset in the sense of matter of shaped fullness” (HCM, 1923, 217).17 Yet, the element of internality denotes a more primary aspect of the real being that deals with its reality at the stage the preceded the achieving of an external fulfillment: Entities as such are substantialized inward (hineinsubstanzialisiert) into the space […] yet, the Being’s body (Seinsleib) does not fall prey to the abyss and its formal measurelessness; The unity that is centered in itself and vividly carried and held […]remains totally related back to the unity that substantialized itself in it […] without delivering its formal governance and thereby becoming outwardly established. […] Such an entity is well inwardly substantialized in the external existence in the accurate sense, yet without that its formal control will be transferred and thereby be outwardly established. We signify this sort of immanent substantialization simple transcendent immanence, or one can equally call it simple immanent transcendence. (HCM, 1923, 226–227)

Against this background, one might understand the characterization of the real being as “non-material substantiality” (HCM, 1923, 222, 224). As with the discussion of the elements of selfness and corporeality, so also in the context of primordiality the real being and the material one are placed at opposing sides of the “gateway of reality”, to the extent that in the related internalization of the real being one encounters an aspect that seems to thwart the absolute transcendent immanence (HCM, 1923, 226), namely threatens to undermine its transcendence aspect. As opposed to that, the directedness of the material being toward the outside indeed falls in line with its transcendent fulfillment, or alternatively the material being is shaped beforehand as transcendent. Moreover, to the extent that the real being is materially fulfilled, this will be enabled from the outset thanks to its being “genuinely carried outside itself”. In this way, the material being can “hold and maintain itself outside” and possess and own its “affected fullness” (HCM, 1923, 224). However, prior to its material fulfillment or embodiment, the aspects of internality and primordiality of the real material were already established. 17 See in this context the distinction between the “primary qualities” of the real being that enable its material constitution and the “secondary qualities” that are noticeable in its external appearing, see HCM (1923, 235).

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Another step in the explication of the element of the real being deals with the aspect of “soundness” (Solidität). HCM establishes that a primarily constituted Being (primär konstituierenden Seins) has a static character by which it achieves “quiet” or “rest” (Ruhe) in its existence. The content of the soundness is quiet and rest. The quiet signifies the “undisturbed” state of the real being in which it “remains held and retained inside itself” (HCM, 1923, 222), meaning before a real fulfillment is achieved and the “gateway of reality” has been crossed. The characterization of the real being as “resting on the grounds of the abyss” (HCM, 1923, 222) indicates the internal force that is inherent in its rest. It seems that the internal power of the real being enables it to keep itself from falling into the abyss of nothingness or being exhausted in “pure appearance”, which is typified by HCM as “hovering”, restless, unfounded (HCM, 1923, 197), “fixated”, motionless, and stiff (HCM, 1923, 201). The meaning of the determination that the real being does “not fall prey” to its external fulfillment stems exactly from this understanding that this being achieves a powerful fulfillment already within its internal and quiet domain. An affinity between the related dimensions of quiet and its illumination in terms of primordiality is apparent in the designation of the aspect of “loading” (Lasten) within the material being as “not loading in the positive sense!” (HCM, 1923, 222). HCM holds: “what should operate in the sense of nature must at first ‘rest’ in its own being—this means nothing but that it must in the first time ‘exist’” (HCM, 1923, 175). This “factual ‘quiet’ is ‘founded’ in the real being and thus embodies its internality”. Alternatively, the location of the real being’s quiet is “inside itself” and through it turns the quiet itself into a real fact (HCM, 1923, 196). There is no contradiction between the discussed aspect of rest or quiet and the argument that power, movement, and activity operate in the selfness of the real being. Indeed, the firsts are relative to the subsequent. In other words, especially as the real being can be quiet and restful, its capability to move and operate is significant, or the mobility and activeness of the real being signify the transcending from the quiet and restful in which it is founded. Yet the transcending toward movement does not leave its quiet behind, since the quiet does not denote a relative state of affairs or a mere aspect of the appearing of the thing (HCM, 1923, 196), but “pure being-like relation” (HCM, 1923, 223). Exactly like the aspect of soundness, so also that of the quiet is characterized as “plainly absolute” (HCM, 1923, 175). Thus, the quiet cannot be violated by the entering into the noise of material and objective fulfillment that is bound with “load (Last) and burden (Bürde)”. Rather, these should not be understood in the material sense but as a formal “internal modes of formation […] they are simply there […] in it the existent elevates itself to existence” (HCM, 1923, 174–175). This means that as much as the real being will be mobile and powerful, it will always keep inside its quiet, rest, and soundness. However, the aspect of fulfillment of the real being deliberately removes the possibility of regarding its relation to the material being as simple opposition. Moreover, HCM postulates that only in a “naïve representation” space appears as “receptacle” (Gefäβ)” and the matter is regarded as “beforehand ready” (HCM, 1923, 217). Obviously, “material positioning as such is a form of real positioning. In it, contents achieve some sort of substantiality and corporeality - fullness” (HCM, 1923, 218). As

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indicated before, the external dimension of the real being indicates its preservation, and therefore, it is also regarded as “the form of substantializing in […] sensory-tied existence” (HCM, 1923, 200). To the extent that internality is an absolute foundation, it might, under the appropriate conditions, become what is upon the “surface” (Oberfläche) and thus achieve actual sensory appearing (HCM, 1923, 205). Moreover, exactly the material embodiment of the real being might serve as a convenient context for its explication. HCM admits that the choice to focus her discussion on the external appearing of the real that has achieved “surface-clothing” (oberflächliche Umkleidend) rather than on “the formal differentiation of the real material itself” means that the difficulties that accompanied the elucidation of the real being “do not exist” (HCM, 1923, 235). Thus, she declares: “the decisive thing for us at first lies in the transition from the formal background to the material fulfillment” (HCM, 1923, 208). Against these insights, in which HCM’s complex attitude to the issue of materiality clearly echoes, one can scrutinize the main repercussions of the location of the real being and the material one on the two sides of the gateway of reality. Firstly, HCM clarifies that the empirical qualification is not an end in-itself, and the essence of the thing is not a result of putting together empirical qualities, which are “mere “symptomatic” of the thing” (HCM, 1923, 231) or what might be regarded in HCM’s terms as expressing their distinguished “being assignment”. Thus, while real being should personally and accurately describe the essence that operates it (HCM, 1923, 168), its aspect of internality must persist in it and maintain its initial relativity to the aspect of selfness upon which it relies. Despite that, the material being has an “ontic assignment” whose movement spans “from the ground up” and whose target is to achieve a unity in which its content appears as “body” and material fullness, as she put it: to reach the stage “in which the corporeal operation became the content of the substantial fullness” (HCM, 1923, 217). To put it differently, establishing the substantial fullness in an absolute transcendence (HCM, 1923, 227, 234). This is a fullness that is characterized as “absolute transcendent collection (Sammlung)” (HCM, 1923, 228), meaning that the material being denotes a gathering or joining of a mass, but lacks the active dimension of abyss that characterizes the real being as such, thanks to which it can preserve its meaningful link to its origin in nothingness. Secondly, the space as a dimension of the material being becomes a different “thing” from what it is in-itself and how it should be perceived (HCM, 1923, 214). Here, HCM distinguishes between two modes of being. The first is fulfilled in material being and actually “becomes the appropriate ‘receptacle’” for it, a fulfillment that is characterized as a “naïve cut” that is “immediately fitted in the matter (hineinpaβt) ([…] ‘without paradox’)” (HCM, 1923, 215). Yet, since material positioning is immediately seen (HCM, 1923, 214), as it “rises and falls by the factual fulfillment”, HCM establishes that “one cannot wish to position it for itself” (HCM, 1923, 215). Thus, she focuses on the second mode, which deals with “space as an absolute shape (Gebilde) […] that can be ‘posited’ ‘for itself’” (HCM, 1923, 214). Not only is it hard to think of this space as “filled” on the ontic plane, but this space is no longer a dimension that can be measured, and it has no other dimensions but “it is absolutely void of itself. Hence, any attempt to perceive it in some sense […] fundamentally

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distorts it”. Against this background she distinguishes the discussed “naïve cut” that “exists only in and by the material positioning itself” from a “radical ontic cut” within which matter and space possess “entirely different meaning” (HCM, 1923, 215). She explains that matter does not need the special givenness in order to appear. Quite the opposite, matter positions by itself the space “as its constitutive internal and by that also its external dimension. […] it unfolds itself from the outset as ‘spaceful’ (raumhafte)” (HCM, 1923, 214), meaning: it appears and describes itself in the spatial spreading. In HCM’s view, this matter should be regarded as a body that is substantially operated in the genuine sense, i.e., is carried by the fullness that appears in it, which is itself the foundation of its own being. In short, the material being appears by being carried by its bearer (HCM, 1923, 220). Therefore, when there is a material thing, there already exists a space, it does not need at first the space in order to be matter that spreads. Rather, the material being is a fullness that is spatially established (HCM, 1923, 214), which means that the fullness is initially relative to its spatial expression, although the spatial expression is but the material being itself. HCM dismisses the epistemic consideration that is her view requires the “radical opposition” (HCM, 1923, 218) between the material being that is constituted as fullness and the transcendent void that as such is measureless. She determines that the transcendent abyss enters, not only formally but also factually, inside the infinite and thus the material fulfillment is enabled (HCM, 1923, 214). Despite the fact that the material being is an expression of filling and fulfillment, the abyss not only is not canceled in it (HCM, 1923, 217). Rather the real being itself is no less than regarded as “carried out in the abyss” (HCM, 1923, 227). Yet in the material being the abyss “is transformed into a matter […] and by entering into it and filling it, it enters to it” (HCM, 1923, 217). Thus, the material being is characterized as “completely filling that ‘abyss’” (HCM, 1923, 216) to the extent that there remains “no more ‘space’ beneath and inside it” (HCM, 1923, 225), but appears as a manifested fullness. The third facet in the positioning of the real and material being as opposing each other concerns the aspect of fullness (Fülle). Thus, HCM describes the content of the material being as “in-itself formally wholly transcendent and totally void of itself”, and “not existing there from the outset”. Not only does here “the fullness first pop up in it outwardly (HCM, 1923, 218), but also “in its corporeal operation (Ausgewirktheit), the material becomes a substantial fullness” (HCM, 1923, 217). However, despite its “radical capability of being cut (durchschneidbar)”, the material being “cannot emerge to the surface, due its essential incapability to exit the depth” (HCM, 1923, 209), this alleged fullness is merely an “external surface”—a relative concept that denotes the boundary plane of a spatially spreading entity (HCM, 1923, 207). Indeed, the space is the only hold by which the material being might be described due to its essence (HCM, 1923, 208). This is the background for assigning a “negative meaning” to the aspect of “rest” in the material being, meaning regarding it as a “rest of helplessness” or a “rest of mere being […] where is nothing there as plain filling” (HCM, 1923, 222). It transpires that surrounding the filling, the loading, and the heaviness in which it is operated, seems to push, so to speak, the material being outside and beyond the original hidden internality that characterizes its foundation

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as a real being that is referred to as powerfully and quietly resting on the brink of the abyss. Consequently, the material being cannot press itself outside into the space that it fills, hence the characterization of the transcendence that is operated in the material being as “‘self-escape’ of the abyss” and “immanence of the absolute transcendence” (HCM, 1923, 227). In what HCM denotes as the “wedding” of the material being with the abyss, any aspect of internality is eradicated, or alternatively, the original abyss which is based in its reality is wholly filled: “abyss plus the substantial content that is operating in it gives space plus matter!” (HCM, 1923, 219). In this spirit, she writes: In the pure material being […], the body-being (Seinsleib) is plainly loaded and it itself possesses […] no more “space” beneath or inside it. It does not elevate itself to itself […] but it is “buried” under the fullness of its being […] and it - qua bearer - does not exist anymore. One can say this: there is nothing there but “to be measured” (hingemessene) fullness. (HCM, 1923, 224–225)

HCM characterizes as an “ontical curiosity” (HCM, 1923, 238) the state of affairs in which while “material positioning of pure mass [… nonetheless] is essentially incapable of being qualified (Unqualifiziertbar)” (HCM, 1923, 238). Therefore, she concludes that the related “wedding” of the material being with the abyss (HCM, 1923, 218) is actually “impossible” (HCM, 1923, 238). She explains that while in the so-called spatial wedding (Raumvermählung), the space, in which the material fulfillment takes place, is actually evaluated (HCM, 1923, 232), the abyss is and remains “measureless as such” (HCM, 1923, 234). Thus, fulfillment and measurelessness join together in the material being—the first necessitates the possibility of measurement, while the second eliminates the possibility of fulfillment. Nonetheless, the material being is merely a “collection of absolute escape, [… an] internal limitation of absolute measurelessness” (HCM, 1923, 216). This incommensurability of the material being is but a result of its measureless foundation, that is its “collection” into the abyss that as such is measureless (HCM, 1923, 228). In this spirit, HCM points to the real “paradox”, not only the formal one, that operates in the material being that “fixates the unfixable” without canceling it but enables at the same time “essential depth and non-depth (Untiefe) exist in space” (HCM, 1923, 211) that only seemingly fulfills the space. HCM explains that “the entire problem” (HCM, 1923, 207) does not stem from the fact that something has been decided in the material being. Instead, the very fulfillment of this being has eroded the different aspects that comprise the element of primordiality that now transpires as host for many characters crowding in it before achieving material fulfillment. Moreover, since the overcoming of nothingness, that for HCM is the establishing moment of the real being, does not take place in the material being as entity-like operation, its reality is characterized as “body-less content” and “ground-level” (Ungrund) (HCM, 1923, 218). In other words, the crossing of the “gateway of reality” by the material being has left behind or detached itself from some of the original aspects the real being. As opposed to the discussed material being, real being as such is “substantialized inward” (hineinsubstanzialisiert) and thereby establishes its primordiality (HCM, 1923, 226), which first enables the “radical overcoming” of nothingness. Also, the

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overcoming nothingness is referred to by the very existence of the real being, and that is bound with a possession of “its own fullness” (HCM, 1923, 201) that positively “meets” that radical depth which the material being lacks (HCM, 1923, 208). This depth is but “the darkness of the primordial nothingness” (HCM, 1923, 206) that preceded the real being and out of which it “elevated itself” (HCM, 1923, 204). Yet, especially as internality denotes the primordiality of the real being, a complete externalizing can never operate in it, or alternatively, an aspect of an “abyss” is constantly kept in it as, so to speak, the “inexhaustible ‘to be filled’” or as “the ‘infinity’ and ‘inexhaustibility’” of Being as a whole (HCM, 1923, 216). The characterization of the real being using the terms “filling”, “depth”, and “surface” joins the understanding of the real being as layered or as carrying inside itself “infinite divisibility (Teilbarkeit) of space” (HCM, 1923, 207).18 This aspect of the real being might be illustrated regarding the material being, and indeed, it appears mainly in the context of its discussion. HCM describes the material being as “‘filled’ into the space that is infinitely divisible”. Since every division lives behind “a ‘residual’” (Rest), it can be again a candidate for division. HCM explains that infinity does not signify here the impossibility to terminate the division because of infinite number of parts but that “none of these possible cuts (Schnitte) can reach into the depth in which there still exists something to reach down” (HCM, 1923, 207) that can necessarily be elevated. Thus, HCM deduces from the related capability of being cut that the material being “cannot emerge itself to the surface, for essentially it cannot come out of depth” (HCM, 1923, 209). The aspects of depth, divisibility, and all that fills the internality of the real being mirror its intricacy that is also responsible for the fact that it can never be wholly understood. Against this background, the absolute difference between the real being and the pure appearance being transpires. The pure appearance being is characterized as “superficial constitution” (HCM, 1923, 197), relative (HCM, 1923, 207), and mere appearing (HCM, 1923, 208) on the space that expressly does not enable “any division” regarding it. Simply, what does not actually and radically fill the space but only “superficially and appearing-like” or as “hovering”, cannot “genuinely meet the real and […] radical depth of the space of an aimed cut; but must evade it and remain outside it” (HCM, 1923, 208).19 Thus, HCM establishes: “a pure appearance entity is principally “all in light”. There is nothing that can be brought from the concealed depth on surface” (HCM, 1923, 206); it is not founded in-itself, and “is not ceded (überlassen) to itself, namely “decreased down” (hinabsinkend) into the depth of the depth” but “‘hovers’ in the abyss, filling it but not yet resting on its own ground” (HCM, 1923, 219)—an abyss that is depicted as “stretching between two points 18 Ghigi

(2008) counts five characteristics of the real: autonomy vis-à-vis relativity of the real; whatness; materiality; personal essence; and essential stratification. Yet, in the suggested interpretation, stratification (here “divisibility” suggested as a translation of “Teilbarkeit”) is not regarded as distinctive aspect of being but as an inclusive insight that highlights in particular the aspects of fullness or depth in HCM’s idea of reality. 19 HCM’s discussion here falls in line with the idea of “surface” in Doctrine of Appearance that assumes this depth without referring to is as an explicit element, see HCM (1916b, 408, 425–447, 462–467, 476, 494, 526).

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that cannot be measured, that is the absolutely formal non-recoverable non-depth” (HCM, 1923, 210). The attempt to dive into the depth of this being encounters a substantial lack of grip, a lack of mass, and an “emptiness of the transcendent” that it experiences as an escape to the infinite. These characteristics make the pure appearance being indivisible and unlayered. HCM explains that the shallowness that makes this being indivisible as resulting from the fact that nothing is concealed in this being, and even more so since it lacks “what at all could has been covered” (HCM, 1923, 206). Also, the fullness of the pure appearance being is one of “immovability (Unbeweglichkeit) and the rest (Ruhe) into an entity-like rigidity (Starre)”. Moreover, exactly thanks to these characteristics, the related being can be perceived in the first place (HCM, 1923, 201). Thus, unlike the real material being, the purely appearing one is commensurable and exhaustible. However, after the material being is actually fulfilled, a perception of shallowness as a constant fundamental of being is achieved. HCM describes this experience as “paradox” (HCM, 1923, 211) and “insanity” (Wahnsinn). She explains that the “absolute ‘non-depth’” is fundamental to the pure appearing being to the extent that the material that fills it encounters an immeasurable emptiness and the “void transcendent”. This entity-like void is equated with “formal abyss” (HCM, 1923, 210) and immeasurable abyss (HCM, 1923, 224)—unlike the abyss that underlies real beings that is exactly commensurable to their very being and therefore an indispensable element in their illumination. Finally, since the pure appearing being lacks the aspects of “in-itself and for itself” (HCM, 1923, 198), it is declared as “a being outside itself” (Auβersichsein) whose unity is merely formal (HCM, 1923, 217–218).

4.5 Epilogue At the immediate level, one can summarize that in Realontologie three elements that constitute real beings as follows: The selfness of the real being means that an essence is being carried and fulfilled in it, that dynamic forces operate it, and in principle it is capable of being encountered. The corporeality signifies the competence of the essence that is realized in the real being to achieve shape or be corporeal. Finally, the element of primordiality denotes the internality, the quiet, and rest that fills the real being. The essentiality of these three means not only that they must all take part in the real being, but also that it is impossible for one of them to exist while the others do not. Thus, for instance, the fulfillment of an essence that embodies the selfness of the real being is bound with its capability to achieve corporeal expression, an expression that is enabled thanks to the power to act and move that characterized it as a self-full being. So that internality signifies the primordiality of the real being, which is inseparable from its selfness. In any event, the method of essence intuition enabled HCM to locate Realontologie at the threshold of the gateway of reality and not on its other side obliged her discussion to remain in of “the plane external to space” (HCM, 1923, 205), meaning on the general and abstract level. Therefore, the study of a specific being from the perspective of the three above-discussed elements

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will need to decide ad hoc about the specific essence that is realized in it and thus establishes the self of this being, to scrutinize the nature of the corporeal shape that it achieved, and to find the aspects that consolidate its primordiality. Needless to say, this assignment is extremely demanding in the case of real beings that are neither material nor formal. Yet, a rereading of this complicated treatise in light of the three elements that transpired as indispensable in the real being teaches that these are much more than the conditions or criteria according to which it will be decided if a certain being is real or not. Indeed, we are dealing here with three centers that create the magnetic field in which HCM’s metaphysical reflections regarding the eternal philosophical question regarding reality is located. At the beginning of the essay, HCM declares that her guiding line is to demonstrate that the contrast between the real and the nothing is, as she put it, “the root of everything” (HCM, 1923, 160) and that “the real existence is not one “form of existence” among others, but something plainly and absolutely new in-itself” (HCM, 1923, 163). Also, in her opinion, since a “true essential difference” divides the real being from nothingness, it must be brought to an explicit observation that can be characterized (HCM, 1923, 160). However, it is not at all clear whether the idea of reality that is presented in Realontologie indeed fits this bill and demonstrates that the three discussed elements actually distinguish the real being from nothingness. As a matter of fact, the issue of nothingness, and anyway the abyss between it and nothingness, remains to a large extent outside the discussion. On the other hand, the discussion positions the real being against the material being on the one hand, and against the formal being on the other hand, and thus locates the real being exactly in a net of relations to other beings. In my opinion, HCM does not abandon unanswered the aim that she put at the basis of Realontologie, but moves alternately between two constituting philosophical experiences: one stands before the wonder of the real being that achieved material fulfillment that takes part mainly in the external world (HCM, 1923, 205). This is a dramatic and powerful aspect of the real being that breaks through nothingness and crosses the gateway of reality. The second experience notices that the real being is “again erasable” (fortstreitbar) (HCM, 1923, 182), that it is transcendently fragile and dependent, meaning that at any time it can vanish. Thus, despite its “continued conservation” (fortdaurende Erhaltung) in the immanent sphere (HCM, 1923, 185) that real transpires as unceasingly accessible to nothingness. In both experiences, HCM’s philosophical observation is addressed to the operating forces of reality, and releases one’s gaze from the need for existential confirmation taken from the phenomenal appearance of things. This is exactly the reason for locating her idea of ontology on, so to speak, the threshold of reality without the need to cross its so-called “gate”. This was HCM’s way of standing before the two paths of escape from questions of reality typical of modern philosophy: the abstraction of reality and establishing it as an ideal, or the concretization of reality into material fulfillment and accordingly approaching it with empiricist tools taken from the positivist school. Undoubtedly, the juggling between the two mentioned experiences adds difficulty and complexity to the enigmatic and loaded style of the treatise that often boils over

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to a poetic style that only partially achieves lucidity. The interpretative journey to which the reader is invited posits in full swing the frequent challenge of containing the ambiguity that is typical of phenomenological writings. The need to cope with what Husserl termed “lack that has no compensation” (nicht auszugleichender Mangel) (Husserl, 1970a, 175/1984a, 22), meaning employing concepts before they have achieved an adequate explication, is extremely demanding in Realontologie. Part of its terminology is not customary in the phenomenological discourse, and assimilating these terms” meaning is, as transpires frequently only toward its end, a task imposed upon the readers. They will need to consolidate by themselves the arguments of HCM and to put them into an order and structure that they lack. It is possible that the most genuine challenge of the interpretation stems more from the explication of the wealth of the ambiguity that wraps Realontologie than from removing it. In any event, I think that the importance and the complexity of this treatise justify a separate discussion of it that will fill the vacuum in the very little literature that was written on this important phenomenologist. The difficulties and the truncation between the different parts of Realontologie, not all of which were printed, are a reliable mirror for HCM’s complex and unique oeuvre that has not yet appeared in its entirety.20

20 The treatise Realontologie has two versions: Erste Fassung (HCM, 1915–1919N) and “zweite Fassung” (HCM, 1919–1922N, 1929bN). Both exist in the Munich Estate Archive (BSM, Nachlass). The published version is taken from the second and riper version that was published under the title “first book”. The treatise is composed of three parts: (1) Realität (HCM, 1923, §1–§31 159–190), (2) Materialität (HCM, 1923, §32–§121 191–246), (3) Konkrete Stoffgestaltung (HCM, 1923, §122–§250 246–333). The third part is composed of five paragraphs: (a) Materialer Konstitution (HCM, 1923, §122–§181 246–282), (b) Ton und Geräusch (HCM, 1923, §182–§199 282–295), (c) Temperature (HCM, 1923, §200–§211 295–303), (d) Licht (HCM, 1923, §212–§250 303– 333). Paragraph (d) has a second section called “Farben—Ein Kapitel aus Realontologie” that appeared in the version that first appeared in Husserl’s yearbook (HCM, 1923), but in a special print (Sonderdruck) of the yearbook that was devoted to Husserl’s 70th birthday (HCM, 1929a). This chapter has a section (§251–§289) that is a continuation of the published version of the book that ends at §250) (HCM, 1923). Paragraph “d” has another section, “Geruch und Geschmack; chemische Constitution [sic]” (HCM, 1929bN) sections §289–§309 (supposed to be §290–§309, probably a mistake by HCM) that ends paragraph “d”. The last section of the first version (HCM, 1915– 1919N, §185–§206 257–299) was not elaborated in the second version (HCM, 1919–1922N). Also, there is a manuscript that in the first version (Erste Fassung) was part of the section “Geruch und Geschmack” (HCM, 1915–1919N, §185–§206 257–299). Part of this section overlaps the chapter “Farben—Ein Kapitel aus Realontologie” (HCM, 1929a). Also, there is another manuscript whose title is “Historisch-metaphysische Anmerkung” (3 pages, no archive registration) that was supposed to close part one (Realität), but from some unclear reason was not printed together with it. In the first version, HCM intended to publish a chapter titled “Natur” (probably supposed to be based on two manuscripts entitled “Natur” with sections numbered as follows: §32–§48, §32–§35, in: HCM, 1915–1919N), but it was erased from it, probably due to the plan that it would serve as a basis for a second book, but this never happened. However, in Realontologie important foundations were laid for HCM’s philosophy of nature, which she was intending to explore later on. In any event, in Realontologie she justifies this choice as follows: “our phenomenological goal is to let reality and thereby also later on nature in and with the genuine relations between carrier (Hypokeimenon) and the loaded (Aufgeladenen) to arise” (HCM, 1923, 171–172).

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References Avé-Lallemant, E. (1959). Der kategoriale Ort des Seelischen in der Naturwirklichkeit. Eine Untersuchung auf der Grundlage der realontologischen Arbeiten von Hedwig Conrad-Martius. Dissertation. München. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1971). Phänomenologie und Realität: Vergleichende Untersuchungen zur ‘München-Göttinger’ und ‘Freiburger’ Phänomenologie. Habilitationsschrift. München. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1975). Die Antithese Freiburg- München in der Geschichte der Phänomenologie. In H. Kuhn, E. Avé-Lallemant, & Reinhold Gladiator (Eds.), Die Münchener Phänomenologie, Vorträge des Internationalen Kongresses in München 13.–18. April 1971 (pp. 19–38). Phaenomenologica 65. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Avé-Lallemant, U. (1965 [1966]). Hedwig Conrad Martius. Jahrbuch der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing, XV, 203–212. Conrad-Martius, H. (1915–1919N). Realontologie I, Buch (erste Fassung). Conrad-Martiusiana, A.I 4, 294 p. [contains also: two unidentical manuscript with identical title: 2. Abschnitt: Natur §32–§48, 21 p.; 2. Abschnitt: Natur §32–§35, 3 p.; a closing part (§185–§206 257–299) that does not appear at all in the second version] [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1916aN). Über Ontologie, Conrad-Martiusiana, A.I 3, 14 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1916b). Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Auβenwelt: Verbunden mit einer Kritik positivistischer Theorien. In Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und philosophische Forschung III (pp. 345–542). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Conrad-Martius, H. (1919–1922N). Realontologie II, Buch. (zweite Fassung), Conrad-Martiusiana, A.I 5, 165 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1920 [1912]). Die erkenntnisstheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus. Bergzabern: Heinrich Müller (Private print). Conrad-Martius, H. (1923). Realontologie, Buch I. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, VI (pp. 159–333). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Conrad-Martius, H. (1929a). Farben. Ein Kapitel aus der Realontologie. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, Festschrift für Edmund Husserl zum 70 (pp. 339–370). Geburtstag gewidmet, X (Ergänzungsband). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Conrad-Martius, H. (1929bN). Geruch und Geschmack [§185–§206 299–257]. ConradMartiusiana, A.I 6, 25 p. + 3 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1965a [1956]). Phänomenologie und Spekulation. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 370–384). München: Kösel (English translation: HCM 1959b). Conrad-Martius, H. (1965b [1956]). Über das Wesen des Wesens. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 335–356). München: Kösel. Ebel, G. (1965). Untersuchungen zu einer Realistischen Grundlegung der Phänomenologischen Wesensschau. Dissertation. München. Geiger, M. (1933). Alexander Pfänder Metodishe Stellung. In E. Heller & F. Löw (Eds.), Neue Münchener Philosophiche Abhandelungen (pp. 1–16). Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth. Ghigi, N. (2008). The real-constitution in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ realontologie. Axiomathes, 18, 466–469. Habbel, I. (1959). Die Sachverhaltsproblematik in der Phänomenologie und bei Thomas von Aquin (Diss.). Regensburg: Josef Habbel. Hart, J. G. (1972). Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ ontological phenomenology. Dissertation. Chicago, IL. Hering, J. (1921). Bemerkung über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee. In Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung VI (pp. 495–543). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Husserl, E. (1970a [1900]). Logical investigations (Vol. I, J. Findlay, Trans.). London and New York: Routledge (Translation of: Husserl 1975). Husserl, E. (1970b [1901]). Logical investigations (Vol. II, J. Findlay, Trans.). London and New York: Routledge (Translation of: Husserl 1984a and Husserl 1984b).

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Husserl, E. (1975 [1900]). Logische Untersuchungen, Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, Husserliana XVIII. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (English translation: Husserl 1970a). Husserl, E. (1984a [1901]). Logische Untersuchungen, Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Husserliana XIX (1). The Hague, Boston, and Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (English translation: Husserl 1970b). Husserl, E. (1984b [1901]). Logische Untersuchungen, Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Husserliana XIX (2). The Hague, Boston, and Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (English translation: Husserl 1970b). Miron, R. (2014). The outside’s inside: The phenomenology of the external world in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ thought. Analecta Husserliana (ANHU), CXVI, 327–358. Pfänder, A. (1913). Zur Psychologie der Gesinnung. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung I (1) (pp. 325–404). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Pfeiffer, A. E. (2005). Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Eine Phänomenologische sicht auf Nature und Welt, Orbis Phenomenologicus. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann. Reinach, A. (1913). Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes. In Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung I (2) (pp. 685–847). Halle: Max Niemeyer (Reprint of: Reinach 1921; English translation: Reinach 1983). Reinach, A. (1921). Die Apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes. In A. Reinach, Gesammelte Schriften (pp. 166–350). Halle: Max Niemeyer (Reprint of: Reinach 1913; English translation: Reinach 1983). Reinach, A. (1983 [1913]). The Apriori Foundations of civil law, trans. John Crosby. Aletheia, 3, 1–142 (Translation of: Reinach 1913/Reinach 1921). Schmücker, F. G. (1956). Die Phänomenologie als Methode der Wesenerkenntnis, unter besondere Berücksichtigung der Auffassung der München-Göttinger Phänomenologenchule. Dissertation. Walther, G. (1955). Phänomenologie der Mystik. Olten und Freiburg im Breisgau: Walter-Verlag.

Chapter 5

The Vocabulary of Reality Ronny Miron

Abstract This article seeks to extricate and explicate the unique vocabulary that was consolidated by the realistic phenomenologist Hedwig Conrad-Martius (HCM) in her establishing book Realontologie (HCM, 1923). Among the concepts are: “Essence” (Wesenheit), “Bearer” (Träger), Selfness (Selbsthaftigkeit), Capability (Können), Tangentiality (Tangierbarkeit), Corporeality (Leibhaftigkeit), Internality, “Quiet”, Fullness (Fülle), Depth (Tiefe), divisibility (Teilbarkeit), Abyss (Abgrund; Ungrund), and others. HCM does not always coin them as distinguished concepts, but they function as philosophical concepts due to the meaning she pours into them and the way she uses them. The author suggests that these terms can inaugurate the realistic discourse on reality, which is noticeably almost absent in the modern philosophy that has been almost sweepingly conquered by the literal and advanced idealistic discourse. Moreover, this realistic vocabulary is one of the greatest contributions of HCM to modern philosophy.

5.1 Preface One of the most important tasks of a philosopher is to coin concepts that will serve as tools or anchor points not only for his or her philosophy but also for those of others. One can determine almost sweepingly that philosophers made their names thanks to creating such concepts. To mention the boldest examples in modern philosophy: Hegel’s ideas of “lordship” and “bondage”, Heidegger’s “Dasein”, etc. These unique concepts turned out to be the foundation stones of philosophy. The opposite argument is also true: one of the main things that make it difficult for philosophers to achieve their status in the philosophical discourse is their failure to coin concepts that guarantee their place in that discourse. Simultaneously with the coining and routinizing of new concepts into the philosophical discourse, a process of new contents being cast into the existing concepts also takes place. However, despite the modifications R. Miron (B) Interdisciplinary Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Miron (ed.), Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68783-0_5

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that take place over the years, something of the original meaning is nevertheless preserved. Unfortunately, sometimes one’s possibility to acquire his or her appropriate place in the philosophical discourse is blocked by circumstances independent of the quality of the work itself. The realistic phenomenologist Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888– 1966) (hereafter: HCM) is a special example of such an unjust fate. While already at the start of her professional life HCM was considered the “first lady” of German philosophy (Hart, 1972, 1; 1973, 14),1 her achievements are rarely mentioned in the philosophical discourse, and only lately has a real interest in her work arisen. In her approach to reality and indeed in her entire oeuvre, HCM employs the method of essence intuition (Wesensfassung), originating from the Husserlian phenomenology that studied reality as a “primordial phenomenon” (Urphänomen) (HCM, 1923, 174).2 The analysis of the “what” that establishes the real being necessitates searching for the indispensable a priori and primordial foundations, thanks to which the real being can become a specific object. The justification for addressing essence intuition to the study of reality might be found in what acknowledged by phenomenologists as a “fundamental fact” according to which “the existence (existenz) of the nonempirical givenness is what facilitates a priori study”. The “nonempirical givenness” is not necessarily such, for under certain conditions it might achieve material fulfillment. However, the empirical actuality is not a condition for the reality of such givenness and thus is not a component in the essence that generates it as well. HCM distinguishes between “a mode of being” (Dasein)—that can be either ideal or real—and reality that does not concern “more or less objectivity”, rather it is “something totally different” (HCM, 1923, 180) that stands with “an unbridgeable and absolute opposition” (HCM, 1923, 162) to the non-existing or nothingness (HCM, 1923, 160). She explains that the study of “the descriptive and full essence of real existence” seeks the way to demonstrate and explain the way in which the real thing actually and positively elevates (erhebt) itself from nothingness and bails itself out (heraushauen) of it and thereby becomes totally charged with its own content (HCM, 1923, 181). Thus, essence intuition faces the loss of fullness, depth, and content of the real thing (HCM, 1923, 192) taking place in the formal approach to reality. The enthused and reflective disposition toward reality is a common aspect of any religious experience. One can say that exactly as this method releases one’s gaze from the need for existential confirmation to the phenomenal appearance of things, so also the theological thinking as such is expected in this context not to be limited to 1 All

translations from the German original into English are mine. Emphases follow the original. The wording of the idea of primordial phenomenon that can only be intuited but not explained appears already in Goethe, see: Goethe (1921, 639; 1970). An affinity between Goethe’s theory of colors and HCM’s view of colors is noticeable in: HCM (1929). For further reading, see: Seifert (2004–2005, 133–137). 2 HCM shared the reliance on the Husserlian “essence intuition” (Wesensfassung) with the Munich Circle, see: HCM (1916, 355 n. 1; 1965a, 377; 1965b, 347). For further reading about this circle, see: Avé-Lallemant (1975), Reinach (1921), Pfänder (1913, 325–404), Pfeiffer (2005, 1–13), Schmücker (1956, 1–33), Ebel (1965, 1–25), Avé-Lallemant (1959, 89–105), Walther (1955, 190).

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the boundaries of the proofs of the reality of God. However, HCM argues explicitly that only under the theological presumption of the existence of God can one refer to reality, since God is the most real essence of all essences (HCM, 1923, 164, 167). Later on, she explains that the creation ex nihilio established every “thing” with its specific “what” due to God’s arch-idea that copies the divine essence. Also, the capability to know things is due to one’s “operative mind, his spirit-light, is a personal-creatural afterimage of God’s logos” (HCM, 1965c, 270). Thus, HCM adopts the principle of the Cartesian move from the I to God and identifies it as the correct ontological understanding that paves the way to genuine metaphysics (HCM, 1963b, 48). This article seeks to extricate the unique vocabulary that was consolidated mainly in Realontologie, which enfolds the fundamental metaphysical drive that courses throughout HCM’s entire oeuvre. In this treatise, she seeks to ponder the things that are embodied in the world of phenomena, yet does not equate these things with their empirical aspects but with abstract and metaphysical ones. The fulfillment of these aspects might allow things to reach the radical point of overcoming their primordial non-existence or nothingness yet not necessarily to achieve material fulfillment (HCM, 1923, 173). However, the self-evident affinity of the theological approach to reality remains in the background of the philosophical approach at the center of Realontologie.

5.2 “Essence” (Wesen, Washeit) and “Bearer” (Träger) HCM’s idea of reality assumes a fundamental structure of the real being that is composed of two inseparable constituents: the essence (Wesen) that is also the “whatness” (Washeit) of the thing, and the “bearer” (Träger)3 upon which the essence is “loaded”, and which signifies the content of the real being. She establishes that “when an essence reaches realization or becomes corporeal, by that fact itself ‘a bearer’ is established, upon which it - as the content of its real existence – is loaded” (HCM, 1923, 167), or alternatively the real is that which carries the essence that belongs to it and specifies it fundamentally (HCM, 1923, 176). The function of carrying is based on pure and “unbreakable (unzerreißbar) formal cohesion” (HCM, 1923, 179). Moreover, these are reciprocal relations: the bearer is specified by the essence that is uploaded onto it and by which it exists. At the same time, the essence is carried to the extent that it specifies its bearer. The two consolidate an absolute body or shape (Gebilde) in-itself (HCM, 1923, 167–168), or unity in which the specifier and the 3 The term “bearer” has several appearances already in Doctrine of Appearance, usually as a character

of the I (HCM, 1916, 482), of the spirit (HCM, 1916, 407, 514), of the senses (HCM, 1916, 497– 498), or of the body (HCM, 1916, 525–526), and not as an ontological creature that accompanies the essence.

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specified are at the same time the borne and the loaded (HCM, 1923, 171). They should be regarded as “formally completely chained together and instructing one another” and as “‘emerging’ [into existence] (entstehen) at the same time” (HCM, 1923, 172).4 HCM concludes then: “a real entity became a carrier (Hypokeimenon) of its own self like Atlas that takes earth upon its back”.5

5.3 Materiality At the outset, HCM addresses her study to reality as a non-material substance or an extra-physical reality (HCM, 1923, 221–222). She describes her approach as an “observation experiment” (HCM, 1923, 165) that poses before one’s eye the essence without “its being material in the narrow and strict sense (this sense we wish to remove), but could have a corporeal and substantial existence (Bestehen) in this being (Dasein)” (HCM, 1923, 219). She argues that it is possible that material beings will not appear anymore as primordial expressions of self-substantializing force, for they are subject to external influences that fixate them (HCM, 1923, 201) and thus blur its essence. Moreover, with material being the direction of being goes from outsides inwards and it is constituted statically hence, typified as a “brutal order of being” (HCM, 1923, 223). Therefore, HCM establishes that the aspect of materiality is inseparable from what we perceive as “the real givenness of things” (HCM, 1923, 192). Moreover, the material fulfillment answers the conditions that are acknowledged as necessary for the real being. Thus, materiality is typified as “exactly the factor […] for which we are looking” (HCM, 1923, 192). Accordingly, she declares that her genuine assignment is to explicate the specific being-mode of materiality (HCM, 1923, 204). While the positivistic approach regarded the concept of materiality as “a mere constituted that in no way can be founded in the things themselves” and dealt with the question of whether it exists or not, HCM determines that this approach cannot “really meet the genuine moment of materiality” (HCM, 1923, 192).6 Despite that, addressing the issue of materiality with the method of essence intuition can explicate “like what materiality delivers itself […] how is it contained in the plain perception of the thing?”. HCM explains that since what 4 HCM clarifies that this observation should be understood as a “methodological illustration” rather

than as an indication of a genetic and simultaneous becoming of the essence and the bearer (HCM, 1923, 172 n. 1). 5 HCM differentiated here between two fundamentals that are usually identified with each other: “self” and “autonomy”. She clarifies that the standing of a phenomenon on its essence is not equivalent to its objectivity, to its autonomy in its existence, or to its independency (HCM, 1923, 180). This clarification is important considering her discussion in Doctrine of Appearance, in which she posed the aspect of autonomy in existence as fundamental in the idea of reality (HCM, 1916, 392). However, in Realontologie this aspect is regarded as insufficient (HCM, 1923, 162) due to the insufficiency of objectivity and absoluteness that in her view lack the aspect of “corporeality” (Leibhaftigkeit), to be discussed later. 6 This argument continues HCM’s debate with positivism that marks the beginning her oeuvre, see: HCM (1916, 345–347, 352, 357–358, 361–365, 378, 382–386, 390–391, 398–400, 423, 425; 1920).

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is “inside itself” stands before us totally differently from the way it appears in the immediate experience, its possible perception is thwarted and “what turns it touchable (anfaβbar) is ‘falling outside’”, loses “its fullness, its depth, its base (Basis) and its very own content” (HCM, 1923, 193). All this has led to the wrong identification of materiality with factuality.

5.4 “Selfness” (Selbsthaftigkeit) The idea of the self in this context concerns the internality of the real being or the relations between its indispensable constituents. HCM argues that the real being is “self-full” (selbsthaftig) or subordinated to itself.7 She explains that by the very fact of loading an essence on its bearer, the bearer establishes itself and becomes “standing” (stehend). The expressions “standing” and “subordination” (Unterstehen) are inseparable: the bearer carries the essence by the fact of being subordinated to it, while the essence finds in the bearer its “seat” (Sitz) or “a position of your own (Eigenposition)” (HCM, 1923, 179). Also¸ only reality has a “stance” (Stellung) of its own and vice versa: everything that has a stance of its own is real by that fact alone (HCM, 1923, 177). Moreover, the real being possesses selfness or is self-full, since an essence is being carried in it and by this fact it achieves a stance in it.

5.5 “Homeland” (Heimat) and “Dwelling” HCM characterizes the “standpoint” (Standort) achieved by the essence as a “homeland” (Heimat) of the essence inside the real being (HCM, 1923, 179). While “fatherland” (Vaterland) denotes some objective occurrence that took place, “homeland” has an abstract touch that is related to meaning, exactly as the essence relates to the real being. Indeed, the expression “stance” does not necessarily denote a concrete place, but an essential rootedness in the thing. All this is unlike the “pure appearing’s unity” (reine Erscheinungseinheit) that is restricted to a theoretical knowledge about reality (HCM, 1923, 192) and can exist only “outwardly”, meaning vis-à-vis its perceiving consciousness, without possessing an aspect of “inside” in itself (HCM, 1923, 195, 199). HCM characterizes the pure appearing as “artificial foundation” because in any “stance” it does not possess selfness (HCM, 1923, 218), does not “fill” a space inwardly (HCM, 1923, 204), but exists “without a place of its own”, “hanging in a ‘void’”, and “its mode of existence is of pure hovering” (HCM, 1923, 197–198).8

7 The

aspect of the self appears already in Doctrine of Appearance, where HCM’s discussion aims at establishing the autonomy of the external world vis-à-vis the consciousness and the I in general, see: HCM (1916, 391–396). 8 See here also: HCM (1916aN, 6).

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The original bond between the essence and its bearer signifies “real entity that is ‘placed in-itself’” (HCM, 1923, 179), thus, being a “‘position of your own’ (Eigenposition)” denotes “self-bearingness” (Selbst-Trägerschaft) (HCM, 1923, 177). While the essence achieves a sort of domestication, referred to by HCM as “personal dwelling” (Wohnstätte), in the real being (HCM, 1923, 177), the formal and ideal representations are exhausted in mere shape (Eingeformtsein), lack a real bearer, and their existence is only functional or formal (HCM, 1923, 178). HCM distinguishes between “ideal bearer” and “real bearer”—the ideal one shows itself by means of content and its bearer does not have the meaning of an aspect that, so to speak, “underlies” (Hypokeimenon) (HCM, 1923, 167) upon which the essence is loaded; rather to a certain extent the essence remains detached from the beings in which it appears and therefore cannot signify its belonging self. In contrast, the real “takes over” (übernimmt) itself the essence that specifies it as its real bearer is factual (Hypokeimenon) (HCM, 1923, 168). HCM establishes that by the very becoming of the ideal beings they sink into “‘self-less’ and only formal” existence, while the real ones constitute themselves already as a full and positive existence (HCM, 1923, 180). Thus, she determines that regarding the issue of bearing, an “unbridgeable abyss” separates the ideal being from the real one (HCM, 1923, 223).

5.6 Fulfillment and Capability (Konnen) ¨ HCM establishes that the aspect of selfness of reality embodies the aspect of fulfillment that is inherent in the real being as such: “the real—by means of its pure being and existence—is the positive and personal realizer (Realisator) of its own essentiality or of its own self” (HCM, 1923, 173). Indeed, already the “elevation” (Erhebung) of the real from the formal abstraction toward real existence, in which an essence is being positively “operated” (ausgewirkt), might be regarded as fulfillment of the belonging essence (HCM, 1923, 173, 176). The aspect of fulfillment illuminates the capability for “movement” (HCM, 1923, 175) and “activity” (Gewirktsein) of the real being, thanks to which “the empty concept of reality is provided with the descriptive fullness (Fülle)” (HCM, 1923, 174). HCM establishes that whatever “by itself ‘cannot’” is also incapable of anything else, as against “the real only is such that by itself ‘can’ (K¨onnende)” (HCM, 1923, 177). Thus, reality is first fulfilled where the operation of being proclaims the powerstream of the being discussed (HCM, 1923, 223). Indeed, the feature of capability to operate that is inherent in the real being is based already in its being “a factual bearer” of the essence that is operated in it (HCM, 1923, 177). Yet this feature does not signify “an act […] but pure relation of Being (Seinsverhältniss)” (HCM, 1923, 223), meaning: this relation exists as much as that being exists. HCM was aware of the scholastic spirit that encompasses her thinking and clarified that the difference between her thinking and the scholastic approach concerns the aspect of actual fulfillment, i.e., while reality or existence is central to the scholastic approach, for her decisive is the following: “we believe that it would have been

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ontologically especially important to signalize a moment by which natural realentity (naturhafte Realentität) as such distinguishes itself from plainly real-entity (schlecthin Realentität)” (HCM, 1923, 174 n. 1). Accordingly, she clarifies: “we are dealing here with ‘contents’ or ‘essences (Washeiten)’ that possibly are not only ideal or exist in a poetic shape or mathematical entity but also are real or presented by us as existing” (HCM, 1923, 161–162).9 Later on she clarifies that her investigation of reality does not invade the realm of the physicist or proclaim ancient and medieval speculation, but focuses on the question “wherein exists the essence [of reality]—not the (something like physical) power (Kraft) but—out of ‘power’ as such! This little twist of the question already says very much” (HCM, 1965b, 340). The dimensions of power, movement, and activity that are bounded in the real being fill with content HCM’s argument that reality is anchored in dynamic relations (HCM, 1923, 221). This means that the formation of the real being does not express a constituted reality but a self-constituting occurrence that extricates itself from nothingness. She clarifies that in this context the expressions of “‘power (Kraft)’” and “‘dynamic relations’” are not physical definitions that as such must “assume in advance a ready-made constituted nature” (HCM, 1923, 221), namely a positive material substrate to which the dynamic power-relation is addressed. Rather, we are dealing here with “the constituting of an entity that should be able to exist outside the ready-made physical dimension”, yet in principle can be tangent to the physical and the material (HCM, 1923, 221). Later on, we shall see that especially as the dimensions of power and dynamics have no physical meaning, at the same time also the presence of “immovability” (Unbeweglichkeit) and the “rest” (Ruhe) can be enabled in the real being. Thus, she summarizes: “the real is the constitutively operated in-itself. Because and to the extent that it is operated in its own being and in its self, it must carry itself and be loaded on itself” (HCM, 1923, 174).

5.7 Tangentiality (Tangierbarkeit) One of HCM’s establishing and critical arguments in Realontologie deals with what she called a “blinding insight” in modern philosophy regarding the unfathomable contrast between the ideal and the real. She dismisses this inappropriate contrast that blocks any access to the question of reality in favor of the genuine one between the nothing and the real. The idea of tangentiality (Tangierbarkeit) is central in clarifying this point. This unique term signifies the capability in principle of meeting of the real being: “the real as such must be capable of being encountered (antreffbar) and thus also (due to a possibility in principle) be tangential in its being, [meaning] where it possesses its primary sit: namely by itself” (HCM, 1923, 181). Here, tangentiality testifies to a tangent taking place between the essences of the two beings that share some real aspect and not necessarily a concrete touch of two beings that share some 9 For

further reading regarding about the affinities existing between HCM’s idea of reality and the scholastic thinking, see: Habbel (1959).

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external aspect (space, time, etc.) (HCM, 1923, 230–231). Indeed, the idea of tangent concerns an abstract communication between the essences of the two beings that share some real aspect. However, tangentiality does not mean an independent characteristic of the real being, but is an inherent part of the alignment that constitutes the selfness of the real being that entails also aspects of unmediatedness (HCM, 1923, 187), and possession of a “‘position of your own’ (Eigenposition)” (HCM, 1923, 177–186). Unlike the real being, the ideal is characterized as “in principle non-tangential” (Untangierbarkeit) or deprivation (Entzogenheit). In HCM’s opinion, this aspect of the ideal being was misunderstood as an identifying mark of its objectivity. Yet, for her the objective existence is not an expression of the ideal existence as such, otherwise this would have thwarted any possible perception of it. Therefore, she establishes that the deprivation of the ideal being expresses its self-loss formality that cannot enable it be capable of being encountered and tangent. Moreover, the deprivation of the ideal being does not result from its atemporality and aspatiality. On the contrary, not existing in space and time results from not possessing a reachable being or being non-tangential. Finally, formal relation to space and time, deprivation, and loss of tangentiality signify the selfless existence of the ideal being as such (HCM, 1923, 180–181). Unlike what might be denoted as mere objectivity of the ideal being, the real being has “material objectivity” that is achieved by “its positive stepping out” that is equivalent to itself. This material objectivity stands against the pure nothingness (HCM, 1923, 182) and it meets the “space as an absolute shape (Gebilde) […] that can be ‘posited’ ‘for-itself’” (HCM, 1923, 214). The aspects of fulfillment and tangentiality are partially responsible for the capability of the real being to achieve an external appearance. This means that the extrication of the real from nothingness denotes an internal occurrence as well as external one. In HCM’s words: “a ‘bearer’ is of your own self […] this means that your being operates from yourself outwardly [and arrives at] description and appearance” (HCM, 1923, 223). There is no contradiction between the two, since already in the function of bearing of the essence, “a structural element (Gestaltungsmoment) of pure elevating into existence” takes place. Inasmuch as through this elevating the real being breaks through the wall of nothingness, it testifies to “an internal mode of structuring” of the real being itself (HCM, 1923, 176). This is then the uniqueness of the real being compared to the formal one and the material one: the formal being cannot achieve any aspect of internality, and its externality is exhausted by its intelligibility by human consciousness, whereas with material being “from the aspect of power the entire body is kept outside itself” only (HCM, 1923, 220). Only with the real being does the external manifestation that extricates it from nothingness at the same time denote its self-operating inwardly.

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5.8 Corporeality (Leibhaftigkeit) Corporeality (Leibhaftigkeit) denotes the mode of being of the real thing (HCM, 1923, 165) that concerns the capability of essence to achieve a pattern or “be shaped”—in the real being as a material pattern and in the ideal being as a formal pattern (HCM, 1923, 162 n. 1). The element of corporeality does not depict the real as given in “an appropriate ‘receptacle’ (Gefäβ)” (HCM, 1923, 215, 219), and does not add to it any new moment (HCM, 1923, 165). Also, the corporeal shape is not a “mirror” or a “virtual image” of another being but “‘a real’ picture” that is really projected into the space and carried inside itself (HCM, 1923, 193 n. 1) and thus becomes “this” corporeal being. The “appearing material” (Erscheinungsmaterial) signifies a pure element that is responsible for the “visual givenness” as such, meaning “contents achieve some sort of substantiality and corporeality —fullness” (HCM, 1923, 218). Thus, “when an essence reaches realization or becomes corporeal, by that fact itself ‘a bearer’ is established, upon which it - as the content of its real existence – is ‘loaded’” (HCM, 1923, 167). This means that the element of corporeality of the real being is inherent already in the double structure that is composed of essence and bearer, or alternatively: especially as an essence is being “carried” it must achieve shape or be corporeal. The idiom of corporeality seems to intensify the aspect of body (Leib) involved therein. Consequently, the real being appears as “a possessor of a body” (Leib habende) (HCM, 1923, 188). Moreover, within this very “possession” of a body, the aspect of “power” that played a role within the illumination of the selfness of the real being recurves, acquires in this regard a more “specific form” (HCM, 1923, 220). HCM contends that the body as such must be totally “founded on power (kraftfundierter)” (HCM, 1923, 220), meaning: its activity is immanent within the being the real thing itself. Moreover, due to this power, a “stepping out” in which the real being is also inwardly “widened” takes place. Thereby, the characteristic of “absolute immanent transcendence” is bestowed to real being (HCM, 1923, 225–226). The “positive stepping out” (HCM, 1923, 182) of the real being expresses original dynamic relations (HCM, 1923, 221) between the essence and the bearer. This means that the internal power of the real being does not confine it to its formal boundaries but addresses it outwardly. The character of transcendence of the real being is inherent in its immanent power; thus, it is characterized as “simple transcendent immanence” or “simple immanent transcendence” (HCM, 1923, 226). Either way, immanence and transcendence are involved inseparably in the real being. Moreover, corporeality not only signifies the “stepping out” of the real being, but is at the same time its “personal dwelling (persönliche Wohnstätte)” (HCM, 1923, 178), where it exists due to its characteristics and where “this self factually and genuinely is operated in it” (HCM, 1923, 188–189). Accordingly, HCM typifies corporeality as “what stamps itself […as] the almost personal character of reality” (HCM, 1923, 187). The affinity to the element of selfness is explicitly worded: “one can first talk plainly about the self in the genuine sense only where we are speaking about a corporeal or corresponding […] bearer of an unfolded essence, where we

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are dealing with real entity”. The opposite is true as well: only what by its essence became corporeal and brought this essence “personally” into expression has selfness (Selbstheit) and reaches a positive description that expresses the activity of this constitutive selfness (HCM, 1923, 176). One should distinguish the real being as corporeal that “possesses body” from its material body, which is only a partial dimension of it (HCM, 1923, 189) and which might be fulfilled either as factuality or not. The “‘stepping out’” of the real being does not constitute spatial relations as in the material being. While the real being as non-material substantiality is being carried and elevated by its immanent force, and thus its transcendence is deliberately “immanent”, the material being is depicted in this context as such that “does not lift itself to itself […] but is ‘buried’ under the […] fullness of its being” (HCM, 1923, 225). Here, one should recall the distinction between “corporeality” that signifies a mode of being of the real and “corporeal givenness” (leibhafte Gegebenheit) that refers to the actual appearing of the real that is concrete (HCM, 1923, 165). There exists an affinity between corporeality and “corporeal givenness”, which might be described as follows: since the real is corporal, in certain conditions it can achieve corporeal givenness. Something is not real because it is corporeally given. Quite the opposite: since something is real, it carries inside itself the element of corporeality that can either be realized or not (HCM, 1923, 166). In any event, while corporeal givenness takes place, not only the appearing of the being that appears (Erscheinendes), but also the thing (Ding) itself exists (seiend) (HCM, 1923, 194). Indeed, there exist two layers that are laid one upon the other—the “appearance-layer” (Erscheinungsschicht) and a “genuinething-layer” material layer (Dingschicht). While the former possesses one layer that is apparent (Schein), the latter has two layers, namely an essence is loaded upon a material thing and can rightly be considered as reality or being (HCM, 1923, 194). The two are distinguished from each other also from the aspects of unity, namely: the first has mere appearance-unity (Erscheinungseinheit) whose reality is “‘reduced’”. HCM explains that despite realizing the idea of reality by the appearance being is mere schematic, namely confined to its appearing or “qua mere appearance it is without foundation and is essentially reliant on other reality source” (HCM, 1923, 194–195). On the other hand, both related layers join together in the thing-unity (Dingeinheit) that enfolds inside itself the mere phenomenal and factual appearing and the “what exists inside itself” and thus “elevates itself” from nothingness (HCM, 1923, 195). The unity of the real being as “a closed being in-itself” that “encompasses itself” means then that not only does it achieve “shape” (Gebilde) that is capable of shining outwards but it also “possesses itself in itself” (HCM, 1923, 217).

5.9 Internality One of HCM’s intriguing ideas is that the real being has “an internal mode of structuring” (HCM, 1923, 176) or is “structured inwardly into to the outside” (HCM,

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1923, 191). HCM describes the real being as resulting from a process of “substantialization inwards”, “internalizing” (Innerung), and “unity that is centered in itself” (HCM, 1923, 226–227). The affinity of the aspect of internality to that of selfness is apparent, i.e., exactly because the real being has internality it is also self-full. Simply, selfness or self-fullness, so to speak, signifies an internal element of the real being, while internality is portrayed as an internal occurrence. Moreover, the aspect of internality echoes the dimensions of power, movement, and operation that were discussed within the context of the element of the selfness of the real being. Indeed, the power, the movement, and the activeness of the real being transpire as expressions of its internality. Thus, the element of internality deepens the insight that the reality of beings is independent of their external realization. However, the idea of internality does not exclude the capability to achieve an external appearing and even be fulfilled corporeally. Even regarding the aspect of “‘stepping out’” of the real being (HCM, 1923, 225), HCM emphasized that it should not be understood in material terms (HCM, 1923, 175). Yet it seems that the element of internality denotes a more primary aspect of the real being that deals with its reality at the stage the preceded the achieving of an external fulfillment. Against this background, HCM’s characterization of the real being as “immaterialmaterial substantiality” (HCM, 1923, 222) might become understandable. She explains that in the “internalizing” that signifies the real being we face a cause that thwarts the ‘simple transcendent immanence’” (HCM, 1923, 227). This means that addressing the power of the real being inwardly threatens to undermine its transcendence aspect. This is unlike the material being, whose directedness toward the outside falls in line with its transcendent fulfillment, or alternatively the material being is shaped beforehand as transcendent. Moreover, to the extent that the real being is materially fulfilled, this will be enabled from the outset thanks to being “totally and from itself genuinely carried outside itself” as fullness “that is given inside itself as a vivid property that is interwoven from itself” and as such has its own self as a property (HCM, 1923, 224). Thus, the internality of the real being stems exactly from the fact that its internal fullness precedes its material embodiment.

5.10 “Soundness” (Solidität) and “Rest” (Ruhe) HCM postulates that “the real is the constitutively operated in its own self […]; an operation (Ausgewirktsein) that is not presupposed and included in the natural occurrence (Naturwirkung)” (HCM, 1916, 174).10 She observes that in this “primary being formation” (Seinsgestaltung) the real being possesses a static character by which it achieves “quiet” or “rest” (Ruhe) in its existence (HCM, 1916, 175). To put it differently, the content of the soundness (Solidität) is quiet and rest. The quiet signifies the “undecided” state of the real being in which it “remains held and retained 10 The

term “primordial” (primär) is mentioned throughout Realontologie, see: HCM (1923, 174– 175, 181, 235).

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inside itself only” (HCM, 1923, 222), meaning before real fulfillment is achieved. The characterization of the real being as “resting on the grounds of the abyss” (HCM, 1923, 222) demonstrates the internal force that is inherent in its rest. It seems that the internal power of the real being enables it to keep itself from falling into the abyss of nothingness or being exhausted in “pure appearance”, which is typified by HCM as “hovering”, restless, unfounded (HCM, 1923, 197), “fixated”, motionless, and stiff (HCM, 1923, 201). The meaning of the determination that the real being “is not falling prey” to its external fulfillment stems exactly from this understanding that this being achieves a powerful fulfillment already in its internal and quiet reality. The affinity of the dimension of quiet and rest to the element of internality is evident, HCM holds: “what should operate in the sense of nature must at first ‘rest’ in its own being —this means nothing but that it must in the first time ‘exist’” (HCM, 1923, 175). This “factual ‘quiet’” is “founded” in the real being and thus embodies its internality, or the quiet itself turns into a real fact (HCM, 1923, 196). There is no contradiction between this determination and the argument that power, movement, and activity operate the selfness of the real being. The quiet and the rest that characterize the real being are initial relative to the aspects of power, movement, and activity. Moreover, especially as the real being can be quiet and restful, its capability to move and operate is significant, or alternatively, the mobility and activeness of the real being signify the transcending from the quiet and restful in which it is founded. Yet transcending toward movement does not leave its quiet behind since the quiet does not denote a relative state of affairs or a mere aspect of the appearing of the thing (HCM, 1923, 196), but a “pure being-like relation (Seinsverhältniss)”. Exactly like the aspect of soundness, also quiet is characterized as “plainly absolute” (HCM, 1923, 175). Thus, here quiet cannot be violated by entering into the noise of material and objective fulfillment, meaning with the shift into movement and restlessness that characterizes the ontic fulfillment of the real being as it “elevates into being” (HCM, 1923, 174–175). This means that as much as the real being will be mobile and powerful, it will always keep inside its quiet, rest, and soundness. Only at the present point, after the uncovering of the main ideas that create the HCM’s vocabulary of reality, can one get to the bottom of her understanding of materiality within the context of reality. It appears that the aspect of fulfillment of the real being deliberately removes the possibility of regarding its relation to the material being as simple opposition. In HCM’s view, only a “naïve representation” can be regarded as characterizing them as such (HCM, 1923, 217). Instead, “material positioning as such is a form of real positioning. Its contents achieve some sort of substantiality, corporeality - fullness” (HCM, 1923, 218). To a certain extent, the material positioning is the accurate fulfillment of substance or becoming corporal in existence that is connected to the senses (HCM, 1923, 200). Also, to the extent that internality is an absolute foundation it might, under the appropriate conditions, become what is “upon surface” (Oberfläche) and thus achieve actual sensory appearing (HCM, 1923, 205). Moreover, exactly the material embodiment of the real being might serve as a convenient context for its explication. Therefore, she declares: “the decisive thing for us at first lies in the transition from the formal background to the material fulfillment” (HCM, 1923, 208).

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Finally, the “radical contrast” (HCM, 1923, 218) between the material being that is constituted as fullness and the transcendent void that as such is measureless is thus dismissed. HCM determines that the transcendent abyss factually enters inside the infinite and thus material fulfillment is enabled (HCM, 1923, 214). Despite the fact that the material being is an expression of filling and fulfillment, the abyss not only is not canceled in it (HCM, 1923, 217), but this being “is carried out in the abyss” (HCM, 1923, 227). Yet in the material being the abyss “is transformed into a matter […] and by entering into it and filling it, it enters to it” (HCM, 1923, 217). Thus, the material being is characterized as “completely filling that ‘abyss’” (HCM, 1923, 216) to the extent that there remains “no more ‘space’ [remains] beneath and inside it” (HCM, 1923, 225), rather it is wholly manifested.

5.11 Fullness (Fülle), Depth, and Darkness’ The terms “fullness” and “depth” are important elements in the explication of the complex relations between real being and the material one. In the first place, the aspect of fullness that denotes the content of the material being. Yet, this content is “in-itself formally wholly transcendent and totally void of itself”, “it does not exist there from the outset”, rather its fullness “first pops up in it” outwardly (HCM, 1923, 218). Also, the substantial operation that takes place in the material being deprives it of any aspect of internality. Yet since the material being “is essentially incapable of exiting the depth” (HCM, 1923, 209), the alleged fullness it possesses as an entity spreading in space is merely “external” (HCM, 1923, 207) and so to speak, conceptual or abstract. Therefore, HCM characterizes the aspect of “rest” in the material being as “negative”, which means that its actualization expresses its “helplessness” as a result of it surrounding the filling, the loading, and the heaviness in which it is operated (HCM, 1923, 222). These, so it transpires, seem to push it outside, beyond the original hidden internality that characterizes its foundation as a real being that is depicted as powerfully and quietly on the brink of the abyss. Consequently, the material being cannot press itself outside into the space that it fills, hence the characterization of the transcendence that is operated in the material being as “‘self-escape’ of the abyss” and “immanence of the absolute transcendence” (HCM, 1923, 227). Thus, the profound affinity of the material being with the abyss eradicates any aspect of internality from the material being. It transpires then that in the material being fulfillment and measurelessness join together—the first necessitates the possibility of measurement, while the second eliminates the possibility of fulfillment. The material being is merely the infinite “escape from nothingness” and “absolute measurelessness (Maßlossigkeit)” into an “internal limitation” that typifies the material being (HCM, 1923, 216). The incommensurability of the material being signifies its situation as being founded in a measureless mode, and it “collects” the abyss that as such is measureless (HCM, 1923, 228). Likewise, HCM points to the real “paradox”, not only the formal one, which operates in the material being that “fixates the unfixable” without canceling it.

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Rather, there exist fixations that at the same time “lets essential depth and non-depth (Untiefe) exist in space” (HCM, 1923, 211). The argument that the material being only seemingly fulfills the space (HCM, 1923, 207) might be illuminated by the above mentioned “paradox”. HCM establishes that “the entire problem” (HCM, 1923, 207) does not stem from the fact that something has been decided in the material being. Instead, the very fulfillment of this being seems to erode the infrastructural internality upon which the real being is founded. Moreover, exactly because regarding the material being as the overcoming of nothingness does not seem as an entity-like operation, its reality is characterized by the terms abyss, “body-less content”, and “ground-level” (Ungrund) (HCM, 1923, 218). However, in the real being a “substantialized inward” (hineinsubstanzialisiert) (HCM, 1923, 226) operates, which first enables the related radical overcoming of the nothingness. Unlike nothingness, whose overcoming is denoted by very existence of the real being, the fullness that is achieved in the real being is characterized as positively encountering a “radical depth” (HCM, 1923, 208), and as possessing “pure surface”, namely a corporeal presence capable of spreading outward into the space and at the same time continuing to carry inside itself depth (HCM, 1923, 207). This depth is but “the darkness of the primordial nothingness” (HCM, 1923, 206) i.e., that was there from the outset the real being and out of which it “elevated itself” (HCM, 1923, 204). Yet, especially as internality denotes the primordiality of the real being, a complete externalizing can never operate in it, or alternatively an aspect of an “abyss” is constantly kept in it as the “inexhaustible ‘to be filled’” and more generally as “the ‘infinity’ and ‘inexhaustibility’” (HCM, 1923, 216) of Being.

5.12 Divisibility (Teilbarkeit) and Abyss (Abgrund) The characterization of the real being using the terms “filling”, “depth”, and “surface” joins its understanding as layered or carrying inside itself “infinite divisibility (Teilbarkeit) of space” (HCM, 1923, 207).11 This aspect of the real being might be illustrated regarding the material being, and indeed, it appears mainly in the context of its discussion. HCM describes the material being as “radically divisible” (HCM, 1923, 208) or as “‘filled’ into the space that is infinitely divisible”. Since every division lives behind “a ‘residual’” (Rest), it can be again a candidate for division. HCM explains that infinity does not signify here the impossibility to terminate the division because of infinite number of parts but that “none of these possible cuts (Schnitte) can reach into the depth in which there still exists something to reach down” (HCM, 1923, 207) that can necessarily be elevated. Thus, HCM characterizes the material being as a “radical capability of being cut (durchschneidbar) and thus it cannot emerge 11 Ghigi (2008) counts five characteristics of the real: autonomy vis-à-vis relativity of the real, what-

ness, materiality, personal essence, and essential stratification. Yet, in the suggested interpretation, the aspect of layeredness (here “divisibility”, suggested as a translation of “Teilbarkeit”) is regarded as a dimension driven from that of fullness or depth that is more fundamental compared to it.

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itself to the surface, for essentially it cannot come out of depth” (HCM, 1923, 209). Undoubtedly, the depth, divisibility, and all that fill the internality of the real being are responsible for the fact that the real being can never be wholly understood. Against this background, the absolute difference between the real being and the pure appearance being transpires. The pure appearance being is characterized as “‘superficial constitution’” (HCM, 1923, 197), relative (HCM, 1923, 207), and mere appearing (HCM, 1923, 208) of the space that expressly does not enable “any division” regarding it. Simply, what does not actually and radically fill the space but only “superficially and appearing-like” or as “‘hovering’”, cannot “genuinely meet the real and […] radical depth of the space of an aimed cut; but must evade it and remain outside it” (HCM, 1923, 208).12 HCM describes then the pure appearance as an entity in which “all is in light”. There is nothing that can be brought from the concealed depth on surface (HCM, 1923, 206); it is not founded in-itself, and “is not ceded (überlassen) to itself, namely ‘decreased down’ (hinabsinkend) into the depth of the depth” but “‘hovers’ in the abyss, filling it but not yet resting on its own ground” (HCM, 1923, 219); its mode of being is that of “shallow” and “the absolutely formal non-recoverable non-depth” (HCM, 1923, 210). The attempt to dive into the depth of this being encounters a lack of grip (substantial and not psychological), a lack of mass, and an “emptiness of the transcendent” that it experiences as an escape to the infinite. These characteristics make the pure appearing-being indivisible and unlayered. HCM explains that this is not only a result of the fact that nothing is concealed in this being, but also because it lacks “what at all could have been covered” (HCM, 1923, 206). Additionally, the fullness of the related being is of “immovability (Unbeweglichkeit) and the rest (Ruhe) into an entity-like rigidity (Starre)”. Indeed, these features of the pure appearance being enable its perceiving from the very outset (HCM, 1923, 201). Thus, unlike the real material being, the purely appearing one is commensurable and exhaustible. However, after the material being is actually fulfilled, a perception of shallowness as a constant fundamental of being is achieved. From HCM’s realistic perspective, this experience is described as “paradox” (HCM, 1923, 211) and as “‘insanity’” (Wahnsinn). HCM explains the “shallowness of the pure appearing being”, “absolute ‘non-depth’” in her words, as an expression of “emptiness” or “void transcendent” (HCM, 1923, 210). Also, unlike the abyss that underlies real beings that is exactly commensurable to their very being, the abyss of the discussed being is an immeasurable abyss (HCM, 1923, 224), namely such that cannot be an aspect of its being. Rather, bare of any aspect of depth, abyss included, the pure appearing being is but “a being outside itself” (Auβersichsein) whose unity is merely formal (HCM, 1923, 217–218).

12 HCM’s

discussion here falls in line with the idea of “surface” in Doctrine of Appearance that assumes this depth without referring to it as an explicit element, see: HCM (1923, 408, 425–247, 462–467, 476, 494, 526).

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5.13 Discussion How should the unique terms that HCM coins in Realontologie while attempting to describe the real being be understood? The answer to this question one might find in HCM’s words casts one into further complexity, in addition to the complexity that whoever reads this extremely loaded and even enigmatic treatise finds anyway. On the one hand, she characterizes her approach as a “descriptive guidance to the real being” (HCM, 1923, 160) by which “the empty concept of reality is provided with the descriptive fullness (Fülle)” (HCM 1923, 174) and as “an attempt to fix the specific characteristic of the real world as real in its spatial-temporal determination” (HCM, 1923, 164). This characterization might be misleading, as if we are dealing here with the concrete dimensions of reality. Yet, it is evident that the study of a specific being from the perspective of the aspects that were noted in the discussed vocabulary will need to decide ad hoc about the specific essence that is realized in it and thus establishes, for example, selfness, or scrutinizes the nature of the corporeal shape, etc. On the other hand, HCM also considers her terms as taken from “outside of space (auβerräumliche) definitions” that should not be understood in their naturalistic sense, but only in a “pure space-like sense” (HCM, 1923, 205), or in their “formal ontological” sense. Thus, these should be taken as constituting elements of the real being independently of the appearing as actually ontically fulfilled, or as she puts it, “material useful” potencies (HCM, 1923, 190). Moreover, in her opinion the images used in phenomenological discourse have “a final and simple meaning that indeed seems emptied as regard to their material usefulness for relationships with nature […] yet still contains typical fullness and stiffness that are sufficient for the characterization of the ontic relations and for specific illustration” (HCM, 1923, 176).13 Exactly as the idea of essence is regarded by HCM as an evident reality, so also the other terms that compose her vocabulary of being she finds “a last and simple meaning” (HCM, 1923, 176). It is possible that the figurative idioms that HCM harnesses for the characterization of the real being—i.e., “body”, “house”, and “clothing”—were meant to moderate the recognized abstractedness that wraps her perception without arriving at material fulfillment in the narrow and strict sense. Undoubtedly, this duality mirrors HCM’s complex attitude to the issue of material fulfillment, which could not enable her to establish her idea of reality on it, nor escape it. What has been said about Husserl’s attitude to psychologism holds true also for HCM vis-à-vis positivism, to use Stroker’s ¨ words: “one of the special strengths of 13 In Doctrine of Appearance, the expression stiffness is used comprehensively (although there it is denoted by “Härte” while in Realontologie she uses “Schwere”) to signify the material givennessmode of the object (HCM, 1916, 426). She argues there that despite the fact that this characteristic brings about the feeling of the I, stiffness itself is not based on its influence on the I, but in its being an “experiential confirmation” of the reality of the material felt-thing (HCM, 1916, 514). Hence, stiffness belongs to the object and not to the subject (see: Miron, 2014). It appears that also in Realontologie the expression of stiffness characterizes the real being, but while HCM’s early efforts were addressed to purifying reality of “feeling givenness” (Empfindungsgegebenheit) from the experience of the I, here she concentrates on distinguishing reality from its concrete appearances.

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Husserl’s critique of psychologism was not only that buried psychologism […] under a mass of conclusive counterarrangement […] but also the absurdities he uncovered in the process became occasions for new kind of questioning of his own” (Ströker, 1993, 4). I argue, then, that HCM’s early critique of positivism remained a constant element in her thinking, and this is apparent in her attitude to the issue of materiality.14 However, besides the general issue regarding the nature of the concepts that comprise Realontologie, there is the complexity of their content. First and foremost, HCM does not always coin them as distinguished concepts, and sometimes these are words in the natural language, but they function as philosophical concepts due to the meaning she pours into them and the way she uses them. Besides, not all the concepts stand for themselves; some are integrated into another concept or serve as aspects of another concept which is relatively more comprehensive without being directly explicated. Anyway, the need to cope with what Husserl termed the “lack that has no compensation (nicht auszugleichender Mangel)” (Husserl, 1984a, 22/1970a, 175), meaning employing concepts before they have achieved an adequate explication, is extremely demanding in Realontologie. Part of its terminology is not customary in the phenomenological discourse, and assimilating their meaning, as transpires frequently only toward its end, is a task imposed upon the readers. Also, there are concepts that are integrated almost in all the concepts, for example: “abyss” and “materiality”. The vocabulary of reality suggested by HCM is composed of main concepts and supporting ones, or those that detail the main ones. Indeed, this vocabulary is consolidated in a cumulative way. Thus, as the discussion progresses and new concepts are inserted into the discussion, simultaneously others are being clarified and developed.15 This process increasingly exposes what one might call the “syntax” that is woven into a net of meaning or “language” by which it becomes possible to inaugurate the modern realistic discourse on reality. In my opinion, the huge philosophical achievements of HCM in Realontologie guarantee her status as the first lady of the modern philosophical realistic discourse.

5.14 Summary The absence of a vocabulary that can be used in realistic discourse is well recognized in modern philosophy, which is, to a large extent, controlled by a much more detailed and developed idealistic discourse. One of HCM’s most important contributions is the consolidation of a unique vocabulary that aims to approach reality via its most 14 HCM’s

first essay explored a profound critique of positivism (HCM, 1920). The treatise won a prize of the faculty of philosophy at the University of Gottingen, ¨ and therefor is called “Preisschrift”. Although in the appendix to this essay that was written in 1920 she wrote that to a large extent she had left the issue of positivism behind her, the subtitle of her following book, Doctrine of Appearance—“associated with a critique of positivistic theories”—continues this path, and the later writings do as well. 15 This situation is crystalized by Husserl regarding the use of the phenomenological method, see: Husserl (1952a, §63/2012, §63).

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abstract and even obscure dimensions. These concepts delineate the philosophical way to reality. As much as HCM assumes as an undoubtable axiom the reality of God, it is not her starting point in the study of reality. The metaphysical viewpoint in which Realontologie is anchored obliges us to regard the real being as having “positively elevated itself from nothingness” (HCM, 1923, 181) and as facticity that lacks reasoning (HCM, 1963a, 264). It appears that exactly this incapability of reasoning might awaken the theological way to reality, in which God is regarded as the starting point of finite reality and thus its supreme reason. The theological way to reality that was in the background of HCM’s the early writings was to become more manifest in those from the 1940s onward (Pfeiffer, 2005, 87; Hart, 1972, 10, 545–638). However, already in Realontologie, the book that signifies the choice of her philosophical way to reality, it transpires that the initial contradiction between the two ways cannot last, and the possibility of a metaphysical thinking that can be wholly independent from religion is questioned. HCM establishes unequivocally that both philosophical and theological thinking can address the problem of reality and they should be regarded and evaluated as penetrating the same matter from different sides (HCM, 1963a, 258).

References Avé-Lallemant, E. (1959). Der kategoriale Ort des Seelischen in der Naturwirklichkeit. Eine Untersuchung auf der Grundlage der realontologischen Arbeiten von Hedwig Conrad-Martius. Diss., München. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1975). Die Antithese Freiburg- München in der Geschichte der Phänomenologie. In H. Kuhn, E. Avé-Lallemant, & R. Gladiator (Eds.), Die Münchener Phänomenologie, Vorträge des Internationalen Kongresses in München 13.–18. April 1971 (Phaenomenologica 65) (pp. 19– 38). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Conrad-Martius, H. (1916). Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Auβenwelt: Verbunden mit einer Kritik positivistischer Theorien. In Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und philosophische Forschung III (pp. 345–542). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Conrad-Martius, H. (1916aN). Über Ontologie, Conrad-Martiusiana, A.I 3, 14 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1920 [1912]). Die erkenntnisstheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus. Bergzabern: Heinrich Müller (private print). Conrad-Martius, H. (1923). Realontologie. Buch I. In Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung VI (pp. 159–333). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Conrad-Martius, H. (1929). Farben. Ein Kapitel aus der Realontologie. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, Festschrift für Edmund Husserl zum 70. Geburtstag gewidmet X (Ergänzungsband) (pp. 339–370). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963a [1932]). Die fundamental Bedeutung eines substentiallen Seinsbegriffs für eine theistische Metaphysik. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 257–267). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963b [1930]). Was ist Metaphysik? In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 38–48). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1965a [1956]). Phänomenologie und Spekulation. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 370–384). München: Kösel (English translation: HCM 1959b).

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Conrad-Martius, H. (1965b [1956]). Über das Wesen des Wesens. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 335–356). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1965c [1938]). Licht und Geist. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, 261– 274). München: Kösel. Ebel, G. (1965). Untersuchungen zu einer Realistischen Grundlegung der Phänomenologischen Wesensschau. Diss., München. Ghigi, Nicoletta. (2008). The real-constitution in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ “Realontologie”. Aximathes, 18, 461–473. Goethe, J. W. (1921). Gespräche mit Eckermann. Leipzig: Insel. Goethe, J. W. (1970 [1840]). Theory of colours (C. L. Eastlake, Trans.; D. B. Judd, Introd.). Cambridge, MA: M.I.T Press. Habbel, I. (1959). Die Sachverhaltsproblematik in der Phänomenologie und bei Thomas von Aquin. Diss., Regensburg: Josef Habbel. Hart, J. G. (1972). Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ ontological phenomenology. Diss., Chicago, Illinois. Hart, J. G. (1973). Hedwig Conrad-Martius. Minerva’s Owl, D-I, (15 February. 1973), 14–19. Husserl, E. (1913). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung I (1). Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1–323 (Reprinted in: Husserl 1952; English translation: Husserl 2012). Husserl, E. (1952 [1913]). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, Erstes Buch, ed. Karl Schuhmann, Husserliana III (1). Haag: Martinus Nijhoff (English translation: Husserl 2012a). Husserl, E. (1970a [1900]). Logical investigations (Vol. I, J. Findlay, Trans.). London and New York: Routledge (Translation of: Husserl 1975). Husserl, E. (1970b [1901]). Logical investigations (Vol. II, J. Findlay, Trans.). London and New York: Routledge (Translation of: Husserl 1984a & Husserl 1984b). Husserl, E. (1975 [1900]). Logische Untersuchungen, Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, Husserliana XVIII. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (English translation: Husserl 1970a). Husserl, E. (1984a [1901]). Logische Untersuchungen, Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Husserliana XIX (1). The Hague, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (English translation: Husserl 1970b). Husserl, E. (1984b [1901]). Logische Untersuchungen, Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Husserliana XIX (2). The Hague, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (English translation: Husserl 1970b). Husserl, E. (2012 [1913]). Ideas, general introduction to pure phenomenology (W. R. Boyce Gibson, Trans.). London: Routledge (Translation of: Husserl 1952a). Miron, R. (2014). The outside’s inside: The phenomenology of the external world in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ thought. Analecta Husserliana (ANHU) CXVI, 327–358. Pfänder, A. (1913). Zur Psychologie der Gesinnung. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung I(1), 325–404. Halle: Max Niemeyer. Pfeiffer, A. E. (2005). Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Eine Phänomenologische Sicht auf Nature und Welt. Orbis Phenomenologicus, Würzburg: Konigshausen ¨ and Neumann. Reinach, A. (1921 [1914]). Vortrag über Phänomenologie. In A. Reinach (Ed.), Gesammelte Schriften (pp. 379–405). Halle: Max Niemeyer (Reprint of: Reinach 1951; English translation: Reinach 1968; Reinach 1969). Reinach, A. (1951 [1914]). Was ist Phänomenologie? Mit einem Vorwort von Hedwig ConradMartius (pp. 21–72). München: Kösel (Reprint of: Reinach 1921b; English translation: Reinach 1968/Reinach 1969). Reinach, A. (1968 [1914]). What is phenomenology? (D. Kelly, Trans.). Philosophical Forum, 1(2) (New Series), 231–256 (Translation of: Reinach, 1921b/Reinach, 1951). Reinach, A. (1969 [1914]). Concerning phenomenology (W. Dallas, Trans.). The Personalist, 50(2), 194–221 (Translation of: Reinach, 1921b/Reinach, 1951).

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Schmücker, F. G. (1956). Die Phänomenologie als Methode der Wesenerkenntnis, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Auffassung der München-Göttinger Phänomenologenschule. Diss., München. Seifert, J. (2004–2005). The significance of Husserl’s logical investigation for phenomenological realism. Seminarios de filosofía [artículo de revista], 17–18, 133–190. Ströker, E. (1993). Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology (L. Hardy, Trans.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Walther, G. (1955). Phänomenologie der Mystik. Freiburg im Breisgau und Olten: Walter-Verlag.

Part II

The Philosophy of the “I-Being”

Chapter 6

The Phenomenal Experience of the I: The Idea of the I in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Early Phenomenology Ronny Miron

Abstract This paper addresses the phenomenal experience of the I that is at the foundation of the realistic phenomenology of Hedwig Conrad-Martius (hereafter: HCM) (1966–1888). Focusing on HCM’s early book On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External from 1916, the discussion strives to interpret the modes of the involvement of the I in the appearances of the real external world. It also extricates from HCM’s analysis of the external world two dispositions of the I: “passive and resting self-inclusiveness” (passive und ruhender Ichhaltung) and “active consciousness”. These two real dispositions correspond to two kinds of consciousness: as “saturated” (inprägniertheit), in itself the I illuminates itself by itself and as such that “objectively absorbs” (gegenständlich aufnehmende) the reality external to it. Moreover, these two dispositions correspond to two spheres of objects in the external world discerned by HCM: that of sensory manifest (sinnfällige) objects, regarding which the I conducts itself as a passive and self-including being vis-à-vis the phenomenality of objects. However, regarding the sphere of covert objects, the I is active and directed beyond itself, to the concealed essence that is covered over by the phenomenal layer of things.

6.1 Preface The phenomenological study the I is necessitated by the fact of human involvement in phenomena as such. Thus, rather than inquiring whether there exists a subject, an object, or even a world, phenomenology studies the subject’s encounter with the world. Therefore, phenomenology is expected to report about both the object and the subject or the I, i.e., the one who conducts the phenomenological observation and serves as its object as well. However, while the transcendental approach suggests advanced tools for accessing the I that are based on its extensive study of consciousness, the realistic approach in phenomenology rejects this possibility. Moreover, in realism, the matter is further challenged by its foundational requirement to anchor R. Miron (B) Interdisciplinary Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Miron (ed.), Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68783-0_6

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the understanding of the I in the inclusive apprehension of Being that exceeds the boundaries of the human subject and obviously cannot be exhausted in the analysis of its consciousness.1 This realistic emphasis in the study of the I is apptly articulated by Franz Georg Schmücker regarding the realistic phenomenology of Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1966–1888) (HCM). In this regard, he establishes that in HCM’s work, “for the first time the subject is released from Kant’s prison” (Schmücker, 1956, 39).2 Two aspects are implied in this general assessment. First, the I is not restricted to the boundaries of consciousness and thereby its understanding is not based on an epistemological study.3 Second, HCM’s idea of the I is an inherent part of her philosophy of Being. The following discussion will focus on the idea of the I in HCM’s early book from 1916, On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External (Doctrine of Appearance),4 within which the understanding determinative of the real existence of the external world (HCM, 1916, 386) is established as an autonomous, absolute, and independent being (Seinselbstständigkeit) (HCM, 1916, 391–392). Allegedly, this understanding of the world, as closed in-itself and transcendent to human consciousness and spirit (HCM, 1916, 424), deliberately excludes the issue of the I from its discussion. Moreover, this seems to be confirmed by HCM’s own admission that her discussion of the issue of the I in Doctrine of Appearance is incomplete and that she postpones to future investigations questions about it, such as: What is the nature of the I that allows it to be framed by the bodily-entity and thus be restricted by it? How do the relations between the I and the body-entity depict themselves phenomenally? (HCM, 1916, 541–542). In fact, her references to the I in the related book do not 1 It used to be a prevalent criticism of the realistic orientation regarding the phenomenological school

that it lacks an explicit discussion about the I and the issue of transcendentalism. For example, see Brecht’s criticism of the Munich Circle: Brecht (1948, 42 n. 2). 2 Schmücker (1956, 39). All translations from the German original into English are mine. Emphases follow the original, unless stated otherwise. 3 The early phenomenologists understood Husserl’s appeal “go back to the ‘things themselves’” (Husserl, 1970a, 168/1984a, 10) as indifference toward epistemological questions. See: U. AvéLallemant (1965/1966, 207). For the relations between phenomenology and epistemology, see: Spiegelberg (1975, 130–131). Like HCM, who characterized the epistemological approach as dogmatic (HCM, 1916, 347) and incapable of coping with phenomenological questions (HCM, 1916, 351), Spiegelberg too criticized epistemology, which in its highly speculative accounts of how knowledge works omits its first and paramount obligation to be itself critical (Spiegelberg, 1975, 152). 4 Doctrine of Appearance’s first chapter is an exploration of her first essay (HCM, 1920a, 10–24), which received an award from the department of philosophy at the University of Gottingen. ¨ Its subtitle “associated with a critique of positivistic theories”, as well as the debate with positivism throughout the text (HCM, 1916, 345–347, 352, 357–358, 361–365, 378, 382–386, 390–391, 398– 400, 423, 425), clearly indicates its roots in the first essay. In 1912, Alexander Pfänder accepted Doctrine of Appearance as a Ph.D. thesis at the University of Munich (U. Avé-Lallemant, 1965/1966, 212). In 1913, the expanded chapter of the award-winning essay was printed and submitted as a dissertation, in a version almost identical to Doctrine of Appearance. In the epilogue that she added to the special print edition in 1920, HCM established her shift to ontology-oriented studies and seems to know that her original plan to develop the rest of the chapters in her essay on positivism will not be realized (HCM, 1920b, 130. See here also: Avé-Lallemant, 1971, 213).

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fuse together into a coherent philosophy of Being, which will be explored in her later writings and will include a comprehensive criticism of idealism and transcendental philosophy in general.5 Nonetheless, the focus of Doctrine of Appearance on the phenomenal level of the real external world does disclose the phenomenal dimensions of the I and thus initiates a new path to its study by means other than its cogitations.6 Also, the foundations are thereby laid addressing HCM’s fundamental requirement to plant the understanding of the I within a comprehensive view of Being.

6.2 Essence and Phenomenal Givenness The question “in which real mode are ‘essences’ (Washeiten) given to us?” (HCM, 1916, 356)7 that guides HCM’s study of the external world in Doctrine of Appearance captures the fundamental phenomenological problematic of reality.8 On the one hand, the essence signifies an internal and “primordial” element that is determined by an a priori necessity thanks to which the object is what it is. One should not identify the essence with the concrete, material, and immediate dimensions that in certain conditions might achieve empirical realization. HCM’s dedication to givenness leads her to devote Doctrine of Appearance to the study of “a totally peculiar idea of ‘real being’” (HCM, 1916, 365) and “for proving concrete, intuitively perceivable phenomena” (HCM, 1916, 391).9 The assumption of the original belonging of this whatness (Washeit) to a certain phenomenal state of affairs (HCM, 1916, 349) is 5 HCM

deals with the problem of the subject in several contexts, see: HCM (1932bN, 1–35; 1954, 11–13; 1957, 118–141; 1963a, b, c). 6 Bringing a phenomenal-realist orientation to the I is a genuine achievement of HCM, which took place already in 1916 (!) long before Heidegger’s fundamental ontological investigation of the I in Being and Time (1927). A comparison between HCM and the early Heideggerian thinking is essential for coming to terms with the novelty of HCM’s approach to transcendentalism in Doctrine of Appearance and her later writings. Yet this exceeds the scope of this article. HCM criticized Heidegger in several contexts. See: HCM (1930 N, 1–42; 1954, 13–11; 1963c). For further reading, see: Behler (1956). 7 All translations from the German original into English are mine. Emphases follow the original, unless stated otherwise. 8 In her entire oeuvre, HCM was committed to “essence intuition” (Wesensfassung), which she shared with the early phenomenologists of the Munich Circle who, apart from her, included a group of intellectuals and philosophers from Munich, the first generation of the phenomenologists, whose prominent members included: Alexander Pfänder, Johannes Daubert, Moritz Geiger, Theodor Conrad, Adolf Reinach, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Maximilian Beck, Max Scheler, Jean Hering, Alexander Koyré, Roman Ingarden, and Edith Stein. HCM referred to this method in many contexts, see: HCM (1916, 346–348; 1965a, 377; 1965b, 347). For further reading about the method of “essence intuition”, especially in the realistic school of phenomenology, see: Reinach (1921), Pfänder (1913, 325–404), Pfeiffer (2005, 1–13), Schmücker (1956, 1–33), Ebel (1965, 1–25). 9 Similarly to HCM, Fritz Heinemann also wrote about the affinity of phenomenology to concrete being. He mentioned another essay by HCM (1965a), but not Doctrine of Appearance, in which she establishes this theme.

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intended exactly to justify attention to the level of concrete facticity. This means that even if essences are dealt with independently of factual existence in the real world, the essence is revealed and illuminated by means of studying the appearing itself and will never achieve independence from this appearing. The strong evidence for HCM of the affinity between essence and its phenomenal appearing does not, however, transform the level of facticity into the ultimate context in which reality might be explicated.10 HCM adopts in this context the insight acknowledged by the realist phenomenologists that there is a “fundamental fact” according to which “the existence of non-empirical givenness actually facilitated a priori study” (Hering, 1921, 495). Following Husserl, the early phenomenologists were convinced that the perceived objects and the modes of their perception follow essential principles that are independent of consciousness and the subject.11 HCM’s approach has added complexity by maintaining that sometimes there exists only a “semblance (Anschein) of real presence-being (Gegenwärtigsein) that does not correspond to a factually presence-being (tatsächliches Gegenwärtigsein)” (HCM, 1916, 356), or more specifically, that “concerning its ‘position-of-Being’ (Seinsstelle) (either real or not) the intuitively Given (anschauliche Gegebene) does not always hold what it seems to promise as so and so appearing (Erscheinende)” (HCM, 1916, 358).12 Accordingly, HCM distinguishes between the “phenomenal beginningmaterial” (phänomenales Anfangsmaterial) and the “genuine phenomenon” or “primordial phenomenon” (Urphänomen). The phenomenally given serves as a starting point in the philosophical study of the entirety of objectivities of possible consciousness (HCM, 1916, 351), while the essence is inherent there in a “concealment (Verhültheit) and remoteness (Ferne)” manner. Yet, this condition is due to the nature of the object itself, which does not completely expose its essence, and not because of aspects referring to one’s consciousness’s capabilities. In her opinion, the genuine and specific phenomenological-philosophical work starts for us in the progress from the yet covered, though as such it is already a visible primordial phenomenon, to the “pure primordial phenomenon”; progress first demands the specific phenomenological stance (Haltung) it the totally direct and undeterred gaze towards the phenomenon in its “pure what” (Was). (HCM, 1916, 352) 10 The

widespread use of the word “believe” (glauben) in Doctrine of Appearance (HCM, 1916) clearly indicates the adoption of the typical certainty that stands at the foundation of the Husserlian phenomenology, see in particular, HCM (1916, 355, 370, 398, 407, 413, 418, 423, 446, 496, 500, 513). Husserl regarded skepticism as a denial of apodicticity, i.e., necessary and universal truths that are essential for any theory to make sense. He distinguished between three forms of skepticism: “logical”, “noetic”, and “metaphysical”. See: Husserl (1975, §57–§61 214–226/1970a, §57–§61 134–141). As for Husserl, so also for HCM in Doctrine of Appearance, the metaphysical skepticism that denies objective knowledge of the real world is the most problematic. For further discussion, see: Wachterhauser (1996, 1–62, 227–238). Regarding Husserl’s certitude, see: Kołakowski (1975). 11 The principles of the oriented observation of an object were presented by Hering (1921, 495– 543). HCM declares her affinity with Hering in: HCM (1923, 162). For a detailed discussion of this observation in regard to the Munich Circle, see: Avé-Lallemant (1971, 89–105), Schmücker (1956, 3–8). 12 For the “semblance of reality (Aussehen einer Realität)” typical of perceptual objects, see also: HCM (1916, 356, 441 n. 1).

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Helmut Kuhn well described this as follows: The things toward which the gaze is directed are always known in advance, we do not start at a null point. They show themselves to us, but they are concealed. They are standing up against us as known but also as mysterious, and impose on us the distinction between what things are in their beginning and the essence that is uncovered by penetrating observation (Kuhn, 1969, 399).13 The related “uncovering” demands disregarding all contingent aspects of the phenomenon that appear only up against me, and are only “a certain side” of the phenomenon, “whereas the remaining essential bounded totality lies in darkness”. Only then, when the phenomenon “steps out in complete objectivity and absoluteness” does the philosophical work culminate (HCM, 1916, 353) and the genuine phenomenon and primordial phenomenon come to light. Against the background of understanding reality as enfolding a fundamental duality between essence and phenomenal givenness, or alternatively, duality between covert and sensory manifest (sinnfällige) dimensions, HCM distinguishes between two intentional spheres. The first is of presentation (Vorstellung) and is referred to as “covered presentiveness” (verdeckte Anschaulichkeit) (HCM, 1916, 371, 375). The second is of perception (Wahrnehmung) and is related to in several ways: as “unveiled presentiveness” (unverhüllte Anschaulichkeit) (HCM, 1916, 381), as “unveiled appearance” (unverhüllter Erscheinung) (HCM, 1916, 395), as “unveiled self-emerging” (unverhüllte Selbsthervortreten) (HCM, 1916, 371, 377), and as “self-announcement” (Selbstkundgabe) (HCM, 1916, 371).14 Also, the sphere of presentation is composed mainly of sensible objects are capable of revealing themselves from their factual existence or suchness in a concrete and unmediated manner.15 The openness before observation characterizing these objects is considerable yet not complete, since reality contains within itself covert dimensions and obviously the essence that dwells in them is not simply sensible. This means that the sphere of presentation has contact, yet not identity or complete overlapping, with the realm of reality that in-itself imposes limits on observation (HCM, 1916, 383). Thus, one’s experience of presenting objects cannot become a decisive criterion for the explication of reality. At the same time, perception takes place in the 13 See in this context Husserl’s “The principle of all principles” that requires accepting “whatever presents itself in ‘intuition’ in primordial form […] only within the limits in which it presents itself ” (Husserl, 1952, §24 51/2012, §24 43). 14 Herman Krings, who is admittedly influenced by HCM, explains that the focus on the object as a real existing being is not simply equivalent to the inversion of the Kantian beginning in which the I directs itself to consciousness. Here we assume that there is a real relation between the existent and the essence referring to it. Yet the possibility of knowing this existent is not implied therein, see: Krings (1960, 193–195). 15 In her later writings, HCM continued to deal with affinity between the suchness of the object and its substantial being, see: HCM (1957, 57). See Gerhard Ebel’s criticism of the realistic direction in phenomenology, including HCM’s, for not being able to produce a genuine realism, which instead turns reality into a sheer “phenomenon” of reality that is therefore especially not real (Ebel, 1965, 2). Ebel admits that HCM brought to the fore aspects unnoticed by the realistic school. Yet in his opinion these are insufficient (Ebel, 1965, 42). For a supportive evaluation of this school for suggesting the suchness-experience alternative, see: Seifert (1995, 97–98). Like Seifert, Heinemann also speaks for the value of phenomenology’s focus on appearance; see: Heinemann (1960).

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sphere of consciousness whose objects are concealed despite their essential so-called presentiveness (HCM, 1916, 371). It is evident that the accessibility of the objects in this sphere is even more restricted compared to those of presentation. Moreover, in the absence of concreteness, consciousness becomes dominant in regard to the objects of presentation. Thus, these objects are further covered over and the distance between them and the observing subject is even more thickened. HCM argues then that “the consciousness of reality (Realitätsbewuβtsein) in the genuine and original sense plainly does not fall in line with the experience of grasping of something” (HCM, 1916, 382). Therefore, the analysis of the external world must bypass the perceptual attitude, which in her opinion has no function for our consciousness of reality (HCM, 1916, 364). Thus, while Husserl analyzed “real objectivity” or “thinghood” (Dinglichkeit) in connection with the act of perception, arguing that the real existing thing is an object that can be perceived (Husserl, 2012, §42/1952, §42) or alternatively defined “a real object as the possible object of a straightforward percept” (Husserl, 1970b, VI, § 47 285/1984b, VI, § 47 679), in HCM’s idea of reality perception appears as almost an obstacle to the genuine encounter with reality.16

6.3 Two Fundamental Dispositions of the I The treatment of the issue of the I in Doctrine of Appearance is not systematic and indeed rather marginal. Most of the references to the I are connected with the realistic grounding of the external world that is at the center of this book. Yet, one can extricate two fundamental dispositions of the I that are involved in the experience of the external world. One is addressed to objects that are close to the I, which I will signify as “passive self-inclusiveness”. The second is consolidated with regard to objects that are distinguished and removed from the I, which I will indicate as “active consciousness”. These characterizations generalize and crystallize various determinations made by HCM that are not explicitly referred to as such by her.

6.3.1 The Disposition of Passive Self-Inclusiveness The disposition of the passive self-inclusiveness of the I is consolidated against the close presence of objects experienced by immediate touch, termed by HCM “feeling givenness” (Emfindungsgegebenheit) (HCM, 1916, 400). One’s experience of these objects is as if they are welling up from the external world with an “unveiled presentiveness (verdeckter Anschaulichkeit)” (HCM, 1916, 380–381). Here the I has 16 Husserl

explored his view of perception throughout his entire work. The often-discussed milestones are the following: the Dingvorlesung (Lecture on the Thing) from 1907 (Husserl, 1973, 105–139/1997, 89–115; 2002, 171–230) (“The Texts of July and August 1913”). See here: (Bernet, 2004; Melle, 1983, 101f; Russell, 2007, 92–97).

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tangible possession of the space in which it finds itself. This sphere is not constituted by the observation of the I of objects that concretely appear before it. Therefore, the I cannot collapse suddenly as it looks away from these objects (HCM, 1916, 380). This means that the sensible objects that appear to the I in this sphere are independent of it, i.e., these objects are not constituted by the gaze directed toward them. However, two elements enable the I to experience the sensible objects that fill the external world: the personal aspect of the experience of reality and the restriction and restraint of the involvement of consciousness. Feeling (Empfindung) denotes a focus on the experience of the I by “touching contact” (HCM, 1916, 412) that is characterized also as personal affection (HCM, 1916, 474), “pressure (Druck)” (HCM, 1916, 518), and “obtrusive givenness (distanzlosen Gegebenheit)” (HCM, 1916, 404) of objects that are given “in a unique mode of space-reality (Raumwirklichkeit) that is void of content yet fills itself with them” (HCM, 1916, 381). HCM maintains that the way the external world reaches me personally (HCM, 1916, 378) leaves behind the sensory quality that adheres real thing (qual)17 that is “sensorially experienced” (HCM, 1916, 530) as hardness (Härte) and roughness (Rauheit) (HCM, 1916, 406) from the domain of the I (HCM, 1916, 518). HCM maintains that the sensuously given delivers itself as real content to the I, while the I lacks the necessary distance that is crucial for confirming the reality of the world external to it (HCM, 1916, 412–413). One can conclude from this that the only sensory involvement that takes part here is that of the sense of touch that is activated by the encounter of the I with an external object. The posture of the I that experiences such touching with external reality is described as quiet, passive, and without tension in its internal being. Thus, individuals are enabled to experience what naturally comes near as unmediated by their surrounding domain. For example, the wind that shakes me, the heat that encompasses me, the scent that envelops me, and everything that is simply there without one’s needing to “get out of oneself” (HCM, 1916, 404). What is the status of consciousness while the I experiences personal touch with the sensible objects of the external world? HCM discerns an amount of conscious involvement in the sensory experience, in particular in seeing and hearing. Yet, in this context she establishes that despite its origins in a sensory given, “there exists no direct sensory contact between the feeling-existence (Empfindungabestand) and consciousness in general” and also that “nothing in the sensory quality that adheres the real thing (qual) itself that can lead it [the real thing (qual)] directly and personally towards spirit” (HCM, 1916, 523). Indeed, spirit does not serve as a “carrier of the experience of ‘sensory givenness’”, “it does not pick up the feeling’s being and cannot fill itself with the sensory being of itself”. HCM considers the possibility of the involvement of senses in this context absurd, since such an involvement would 17 In the literature, the “quale” denotes the contents of the subjective experience of mental states, usually excludes any intersubjective aspect. Thomas Nagel characterized the quale as “feeling itself in a certain way” (Nagel, 1974). Unlike HCM, some philosophers deprived the qualia of existence (Dennett, 1993), but most philosophers and natural scientists believe that the existence of the contents of the subjective experience is undoubted (see: Beckermann, 2001, 358). For further reading see: Lewis (1991).

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mean that the materially felt-thing originated in consciousness (HCM, 1916, 535). In fact, it is separated in principle from consciousness’s sphere (HCM, 1916, 441), which cannot personally encompass this kind of self-announcing being (HCM, 1916, 520), and is transcendent to spirit. The transcendency of the felt-thing is reflected in the closed characteristic of the real beings, and in its capability to resist, which places a barrier before the pure spiritual act. Hence she establishes regarding the sensory “the impossibility in principle of somehow crossing by means of pure spiritual action” and the “phenomenal impossibility of genuine emerging of its self ‘in’ the sphere of consciousness” (HCM, 1916, 442).18 HCM explains that the separateness of quale from consciousness is so fundamental that no reference to spirit is enabled by the quale, therefore the primordial characterization of the absorption of the quale into the I as “absolutely unspiritual” (HCM, 1916, 526). Now the accurate meaning of the argument that the main part of sensory givenness does not depend on its sensory appearance transpires as follows (HCM, 1916, 456): the feeling’s being in-itself and for-itself appears as sensuously given, but “sighting itself is not sensory”—as it would be if consciousness personally encompassed these experiences of sensory givenness (HCM, 1916, 523). In other words, since consciousness does not bring about the quale, it cannot be subject to its influence, i.e., become sensuously recognized (HCM, 1916, 525). Nonetheless, it is doubtful whether it is at all possible to eliminate consciousness from the personal experience of feeling (Erscheinungserlebnis), as an amount of conscious involvement is inherent in the quale as such. Moreover, the I incessantly interprets its feelings to itself, and thus awareness is involved. HCM seems to be aware of this when she establishes that the I’s touching of material beings, which generated the experience of hardness, can evoke the consciousness of the I (HCM, 1916, 427). She even characterizes consciousness as a conscious residue of an essential moment of feeling (HCM, 1916, 461). HCM describes a “beam of consciousness” (Bewußtseinstrahl) that is directed to the feeling from outside as different from consciousness itself, and that is capable of “evoke or elicit” its own objects inside itself (HCM, 1916, 456). At the same time, the felt-thing is depicted as “floating” and as existing “at the periphery” of the being of the I (HCM, 1916, 441–442).19 HCM clarifies that it is not a spatial or anatomic relation between what brings about the feeling’s givenness and the I, but rather a description of the way the subject experiences the touch of the felt-thing on the I (HCM, 1916, 443). The fact that the experience of objective givenness is “existentially correlative” (daseinskorrelativ) to consciousness does 18 Spiegelberg presents the probe-resistance of objects to our will as an indication, sometimes even a strong one, of their reality; see: Spiegelberg (1975, 148). 19 Spiegelberg characterized the peripheral field of our perception as “marginal openness”, meaning that this field is never cut as sharply as its borders. However, he emphasized that peripherality does not designate non-reality. What we perceive at the periphery of the field of perception are not only vague configurations, but mostly well-defined structures that are presented in decreased clarity. More importantly, we can still see via these modifications the phenomenon itself in its unaffected structure, rather than the structural openness of what is given in our perception’s field. This implies that reality does not culminate at the borders of our perception, but continues beyond that. Openness teaches that the phenomena of reality stand on their own feet. See: Spiegelberg (1975, 147).

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not mean, of course, that beings as such that are accessible through this experience must also be “existentially correlative” to consciousness (HCM, 1916, 458 n. 1). Obviously, consciousness does not serve here as a “hatch” (Gucklöchern) through which something might really be seen as if “half inside and half outside”, or alternatively half in the body while the other half is inside consciousness (HCM, 1916, 450). HCM considers it possible to argue without incongruity that something can somehow be “given” to me—even in a primitive sense—without my being “aware” of it. In such a case, consciousness is characterized as totally shadowy (HCM, 1916, 459). In her opinion, the attempt to relocate the feeling-being from its peripheral stance in the I into the center of consciousness is an essential contradiction. This is because from the viewpoint of feeling itself, feeling-being does not float “inside” or “above” consciousness’s sphere, but is clearly linked back into the “world” that is beyond consciousness and that has a rooted stance inside it, even if this stance lies within the realm of the I (HCM, 1916, 443). The discussion of the body continues the radical withdrawal of consciousness from the realistic disposition of the feeling-I. HCM’s fundamental argument is that the unmediated pressing of the living body (Leib) by the material content of the quale makes the body become the barrier of the sensory givenness and its real element (HCM, 1916, 525). This experience is characterized as a factual oppression of the body (HCM, 1916, 537), which she also refers to as the “body periphery” or “from the outside inwards” (HCM, 1916, 534). This takes place when the I, as a living integrated entirety, is “present” for itself with its own living body (HCM, 1916, 532). HCM argues that the lived-bodily experience as such is not equivalent to the spiritual experience which contains the objectively receptive senses (HCM, 1916, 536). In particular, she emphasizes the lack of involvement of seeing and hearing, which are addressed to the objective reality that is external to the body by the activity of consciousness (HCM, 1916, 460). Hence the capability of the body to “carry” the experience of the I depends upon the very fact of being a lived-body and not upon the senses or the capability to perceive objects objectively by means of consciousness or a spiritual sense (HCM, 1916, 533). The possibility of the feeling-experience becoming actual, having contact with the lived-body, is independent of the creation of objective contact with consciousness, but related to the real givenness of the felt-thing. Moreover, it is not the feeling givenness of the presented being of the living-body but its real being that shows it is impossible to have sensory-objective contact with consciousness (HCM, 1916, 537). The appearing of the felt-thing is achieved by separating the senses from the inclusive consciousness, so that it is impossible to elaborate what is announced from inside by the senses. HCM characterizes the relation between phenomena of the spirit, including consciousness, and my living-body as “real transcendent” (HCM, 1916, 437), meaning as belonging to two different spheres of being that are incapable of reaching each other, in her words: “spatially incommensurable” (HCM, 1916, 437). True, my body and the phenomenon of spirit appear together. Moreover, one cannot say about my body, as long as I feel it from inside, that it presses me from a sphere that is beyond me, for I experience my body “from the inside” as belonging to me in its

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entirety. However, one should distinguish the real transcendent of consciousness, that is part of the givenness of my body, from “everything that is beyond the I” that does not belong to it, including beings that sometimes personally press me from the outside inwards (HCM, 1916, 447). In any event, there is no possibility of a genuine contact between my spirit and my body. As spirit and as consciousness, I am prevented from arriving at the real in the genuine sense, and in any case, I cannot have any influence upon it or capability to reshape it. Obviously, this transcendence is the reason for the impossibility of achieving a full and comprehensive conception of the real world. Indeed, HCM argues that the objective perception itself already removes any moment that could become real (HCM, 1916, 437).20 To the extent that this givenness is dissociated from consciousness, it touches the I, which HCM terms the “I periphery” or alternatively “from the outside to here” (HCM, 1916, 449). This means that feeling’s content presents itself to consciousness from the outside (HCM, 1916, 452) and as autonomous to the observing spirit (HCM, 1916, 516). HCM clarifies that transcendency of the body and its inherent autonomy vis-à-vis consciousness does not denote a restriction but the essence of spirit that is “homeless” or “deprived (entzogen) of its own place” (HCM, 1916, 446). The dominance granted to the body compared to the restraint and the limitation that are imposed on consciousness, demonstrate the basic principles of the realistic understanding of the I that becomes apparent in the passive self-inclusiveness disposition. First and foremost, the body is a solid and compressed reality that turns it into “a thing” or substance, while consciousness is an ideal construct that hovers above things themselves. Moreover, the body belongs to the I, or alternatively the I “possesses” a body. To the extent that the human body possesses some typical characteristics, a specific body belongs to a specific I. This is a deliberate particular possession, and obviously the characteristics that bodies share together cannot diminish the belonging of the body to the I.21 The particular nature of the related possession of the living body to the I is actually what makes the body a solid resource for a realistic explication of the I. In contrast, one’s consciousness possesses universal functions and dimensions that go beyond the real boundaries of the specific I. Thus, while consciousness refers to the I, it is at the same time “nobody’s” consciousness.22 The living body, that is illuminated here by means of studying the experience of personal touch on the feeling body, signifies the sphere in which one’s I is included within itself as the 20 It is typical of the realistic approach in phenomenology to emphasize the difference between Being and being perceived. See: Geiger (1930, 170). Spiegelberg contended that “in principle, the situation is the same in all cases of sense-perception […which] can never give what is present, but only what has just passed. And since the past no longer exists, we can never see the original object itself but only its ‘trace’ which means its cast or likeness” (Spiegelberg, 1975, 156–157). 21 Allegedly, the achievement of organ transplants contradicts HCM’s argument. Yet, it seems that the difficulties in implementing them, and the development of personal medicine, testify to the unsurpassable particular possession of the living body to the I. In this spirit, Pfeiffer noted that although HCM was not familiar with recent developments in medicine, one might draw lines between her basic intuitions and our time. See Pfeiffer (2005, 15). 22 Husserl’s texts until 1907 refer to “anonymous” consciousness and regard it as a condition of its absoluteness. These texts strongly evoke the problem of the solipsism of the ego in Husserl’s early phenomenology. For further reading, see: Marbach (1974).

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most primordial givenness. This inclusiveness denotes the exclusive belonging of the body to the I, as opposed to the consciousness that violates the real boundaries of the I. Here, the meaning of this passivity is merely the original givenness of the I as a being that owns a living body. Thus, the I and the body are equally primordial. However, although consciousness violates the boundaries of the I—from inside toward outside and vice versa—the passive self-inclusiveness of the I is not undermined by the involvement of consciousness. On the contrary, the understanding of consciousness as a mechanism that is addressed to the I from outside and that marks the body as a periphery of the I even fortifies the solid being of the I as the being that shows firmness against external forces by means of its crystallized internality. Moreover, I argue that the firmness of the feeling-I enables it to control and restrain its consciousness. This interpretation empowers HCM’s positive demand that the I “prevents the spiritual gaze” (HCM, 1916, 409), or alternatively, her request for the spirit “to keep constant in eliminating its continuous effort for representation (Vorstellungsbemühung)” in order to be able to maintain the self-imposed objectivity “as external world reality” on itself (HCM, 1916, 386–387). HCM clarifies that the objective quality of the felt-thing imposes on the I “absolute ‘restraint’” from direct acting (HCM, 1916, 473). It seems that especially the passive self-inclusiveness of the I, which becomes apparent by means of its bodily experience with feeling, is capable of helping the I to achieve such oppositional disposition against its own consciousness.

6.3.2 The Disposition of Active Consciousness The active consciousness disposition of the I is consolidated against the close presence of objects that approach the experience of the I “from a distance to here” (HCM, 1916, 430). HCM characterizes these objects in terms of their “appearance givenness” (Erscheinungsgegebenheit) or “sensible-manifest appearance” (sinnfällige Erscheinung) (HCM, 1916, 409). Whereas distance would have hindered the very existence of feeling’s givenness, which is apparent by touch and personal pressing of the livingbody, the sensible-manifest appearance is depicted as a being that does not reach the I personally, but only as long as the distance in which it is essentially rooted and fixed is preserved (HCM, 1916, 472). HCM characterizes these objects as “covert”, due to their reduced concreteness (HCM, 1916, 416) or because of having a mere “look of reality” (Aussehen einer Realität) (HCM, 1916, 441 n. 1) or even of and “external ‘habits’ (Habitus)” of real objects, whereby they “hover” in the face of the spiritual gaze, but actually carry within themselves “non-reality” (Unwirklichkeit) (HCM, 1916, 379). The structured distance of the objects of sensible manifest appearance from the I is bridged by the senses that are involved in the phenomenon. HCM establishes explicitly regarding these objects that “something drops in the senses, that is different from what ‘penetrates’ (hineindrängen) the realm of my personal I”, yet it enables their realization for the I (HCM, 1916, 406). She refers here in particular to the

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senses of seeing and hearing, depicted as “remote senses” (Fernsinne), due to their distance and separation from what is sensed through them, i.e., “the seeable and hearable”. She contends that even when their real appearance-position is nearby me (e.g., something is ringing near my ears), sensible phenomena are always experienced as a content that is kept at a distance or as “closed for themselves” (HCM, 1916, 473).23 She argues that it would never have been possible to reach the external world without the involvement of the senses, thanks to which it is noticeable without abolishing the distance from the I. Although bodily ears and eyes must be there in order for a bodily individual to be able to hear and see (484), the sensorially manifest appearance is not dependent on “bodily” organs; especially as they cannot serve as receptacles for objective experiences that stand in a real-transcendent relation to the I (HCM, 1916, 480). HCM’s interest in these senses is due to there being essential and substantive “opponents” (Widerparte) for the absorption of sensible materials in general (484).24 Seeing and hearing are visualized as doors and windows through which the sensorially given arrives “inside” the I (HCM, 1916, 536) and re characterized as “spiritual senses” or “spiritual organs” that possess a specific openness to a certain objective mode of manifestation that is responsible for the presentation of the sensible manifest appearance (HCM, 1916, 484). So, we experience from inside the eyes and ears, as the “body’s gateways” or as the “body’s openness”, the enabling of immediate contact between the spiritual-living I and the external and sensible world. Therefore, had we destroyed these bodily positions toward the external world, the body as such would have become closed for us (HCM, 1916, 492). Seeing and hearing are described as “filled” and “fitted” in the sense appropriate to them, unlike the “void, free, and accidental” stance of the felt-thing or that of the living spirit when it turns to another subject. This is why there is no place for an analogy between them and the sensiblemanifest appearance (HCM, 1916, 522). HCM summarizes the genuine meaning of her idea of sensorial manifestation (Sinnfälligkeit) as follows: The sensible is exactly what breaks into the senses, meaning that it is capable of specifically “gives itself” to them (HCM, 1916, 486). The sensory involvement entailed in one’s experience of objects remote from the I is indeed part of consciousness’s participation that might compensate for the lack of unmediated access to them. The depiction of the disposition of the I in regard to the object’s sensible manifest appearance as “filled” (HCM, 1916, 510) means, then, that consciousness grants them content and meaning. Thus, for example, the perceiving-I has considerable involvement in the real validation of covert objects. In fact, the I grants the objects of perception their concreteness, though their very reality is indubitable and independent of such validation. HCM 23 See

in the context: Husserl (1970b, III, §10 18/1984a, III, §10 254). noted, “Ultimately, all these organs are themselves phenomena of reality and so are the causal links between them”. This statement illuminates the problem with which HCM deals here as follows: “Is there a way back […] from the retina via the cortex and the mental processes to the original object outside which supposedly started the whole chain of physical and physiological processes?” This problem “makes sense only on the assumption that the physical objects, as the “stimuli” for our sense perception, our sense organs, and the physiological process within, are ascertained realities (…and) as long as it is possible to know some real objects themselves” (Spiegelberg, 1975, 150–151). 24 Spiegelberg

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considers the possibility of dependency on the act of perception as a “pathological chaining of spirit”. She argues in this regard that the I is the one who is forced by the appearance of the sensible being that surrounds it to the extent that “one cannot defend oneself from the appearing existence of the sensorially manifest given” by closing one’s eyes. Moreover, she maintains that “no sickness” lies therein (HCM, 1916, 411). In her words: “it is totally obvious that an existence (Bestand) that itself and purely out of itself and thereby totally independent of the Being or doing of my spirit is announced or offered, exactly as appearing stands before me” (HCM, 1916, 411–412).25 While the experience of feeling (Erscheinungserlebnis) is not dependent on the solidity and roughness of the constituent bodies having meaning for the I (HCM, 1916, 406), the demand for distance regarding the sensible-manifest appearance harbors at the same time the possibility of grasping or receiving them by means of consciousness. In her words: “a being is objectively given only when it is at a ‘distant position’ possessed, in which it is perceived or absorbed by the I, yet remains separated from it and closed for itself” (HCM, 1916, 470). As we have seen, when approaching an object in order to represent it, consciousness must detach it from itself and position it against itself. Yet, unlike in the case of feeling givenness, the understanding of the essence of the living-body-being of the I is totally irrelevant for the explication of the sensible-manifest appearance’s givenness that meets only the being of the spiritual-I (HCM, 1916, 541). The emphasis on the autonomy of the sensorially manifest appearing raises the following questions: What is the meaning of the argument that in order to apprehend wholly phenomena, the entire consciousness of such phenomena must remain open in the face of the appearance-being of the external world?; Where can such openness exist when the I does not actually participate in the spiritually living receiving of these beings? (HCM, 1916, 479); What should be the meaning of the sensible-manifest appearance on the part of the receiving-I, when this meaning is understood in advance as not shaped by the “organ” that perceives it? (HCM, 1916, 480). At this point, we have uncovered the fundamental tension that marks Doctrine of Appearance and that will characterize HCM’s subsequent thought. On the one hand, the realistic commitment of HCM’s phenomenology leads her to emphasize that the quale’s function to carry itself toward me does not threaten to disrupt or abandon that work’s objective framework. She explains that no change takes place in the realm of the sensible surface of the body-thing (HCM, 1916, 467– 468) and that the quale keeps its being “for itself” (HCM, 1916, 471), inasmuch as obviously every real being has being “for-itself” (HCM, 1916, 472). Indeed, thanks 25 HCM determines that our accidental perception of the external world cannot define it, and the possibility of looking into the reality of space as such “exists also in any directions and in any dimensions as well as above and beyond any ‘obstacles’” (HCM, 1916, 393). Like HCM, Spiegelberg also argues that genuine phenomena are not influenced by theoretical or other interpretations, while untrue phenomena collapse as soon as their falsification is uncovered. See: Spiegelberg (1975, 164). Spiegelberg’s ideas in this essay closely resemble those of HCM in Doctrine of Appearance. Obviously, he was familiar with her work, but surprisingly neither Doctrine of Appearance nor any of HCM’s later writings are not even mentioned in his essay. However, Spiegelberg provides the lacking but important background and explanation of HCM’s principles of realism.

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to this objective form, it can be accessible to experience at all. HCM establishes that even the experience of perception, in which the I is active, is not accidental but follows the nature and the mode of appearance of the felt-thing, in which it is sensible as “appearance-like” (erscheinungshafte) and is experienced as self-standing. HCM explains that the recognition of the external world cannot be based on the living spirit because it inserts into the sensible manifest appearing “improvements” that extend what reveals itself through seeing and hearing. Consequently, the presented surface of the quale “becomes looser” and the latent content that underlies it comes to the fore. Now the sensible-manifest appearance is granted with “depth” that enables it to appear before the pure observation as filled from the inside. However, the content that fills the sensible-manifest appearance does not belong to the sensory material itself anymore, and therefore it cannot be regarded as given (HCM, 1916, 494). Simply, the internal is not sensible and thus is incapable of appearance, since the living spirit changes the initial given as it inserts it into a unified, meaningful, and contextual world. It appears that the epistemological value that might be derived from the involvement of living spirit deposits upon the felt-thing internal elements of spirit itself. While these elements are external to real being as such, they assimilate it into the living spirit and thus eradicate the transcendent externality that primarily signifies its reality. HCM is insistent that as a living spirit one can pose or grasp things, but not sensuously observe them, since the observational basis of the sensory given lacks any spiritually living aspect, or alternatively, an unbridgeable gap separates the spiritual achievement and the sensory given. Moreover, the appearance of the sensible as a whole and as such, though not its very being, becomes possible through the inhibition of spiritually living contact with the external world, namely the avoidance of a representative relation through consciousness. That is to say, that the manifest sensible is adequately absorbed by means of hearing and seeing without any considerable involvement of the spirit of the I (HCM, 1916, 479), which she refers to as “dead relations to givenness” (HCM, 1916, 488). On the other hand, it is exactly this emphasis on the autonomy of the sensible manifest appearing that raises the question regarding the meaning of consciousness’s openness toward the appearance-beings of the external world. Where can such openness exist when the I does not actually participate in the spiritually living receiving of these beings? (HCM, 1916, 479). Moreover, what should be the meaning of the sensible manifest appearance on the part of the receiving-I, when this meaning is understood in advance as not shaped by the “organ” that perceives it? (HCM, 1916, 480). HCM seems to harness consciousness in a careful, restricted, and accurate manner to the realistic grounding of the sensible manifest appearing. She establishes that the specific mode of announcing must “meet” the appropriate possibility of “perception” that is ontically rooted in the spiritual-I, meaning that is not a result of a momentary influence of the living spirit (HCM, 1916, 484). Yet while the felt-thing is located at the “periphery of the I”, meaning on its personally pressed body, the sensible manifest appearance “makes itself discernible simultaneously from itself and outwardly by means of personal pressing against consciousness’s periphery”, where spirit is no longer directed by the senses to the external world (HCM, 1916, 498). HCM explains that precisely because the spirit

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is ahead of the sensible being, what remains to be received is what is being heard and seen (HCM, 1916, 499). The peculiarity of the “sensory-given” vis-à-vis its purely out-of -itself capability to be experienced, noticeable, and contained by spirit is what results from this (HCM, 1916, 473). In this context, HCM characterizes the sensible-manifest appearance as “something that by its essence plays the ‘mediator’ (Vermittler) between the accepting consciousness and this real world that is rooted in-itself and stands for itself” (HCM, 1916, 472).26 This means that sensible beings can be received adequately only when they are experienced in an appearance-like concreteness of- and for-themselves (HCM, 1916, 478). Hence, the sensorial manifestation of the sensible being does not describe an experience of the I, but a feature of the appearing-being (HCM, 1916, 378). Yet, in the absence of the involvement of the spiritual-I, the sensible being appears as lacking the “depth”, “rootedness”, and “surroundedness” that could have been granted to it only by means of spiritually living perception (HCM, 1916, 478). The autonomy of sensible-manifest appearing and the acknowledgment that the involvement of consciousness is essential for its reception are combined in the characterization of consciousness in the disposition of “active consciousness” as a “spiritually dead acceptance” (eine geistige tote Entgegennahme) of sensible beings (HCM, 1916, 490). HCM describes “a natural grab width of spirit” (Natürlice Greifweite) that enables spirit “holding (Fassen) of sensorially manifest existences as a dead situational achievement (Zustandsleistung) of the senses”—a position that “interrupts the living-spiritual contact with the sensorially manifest external world” (HCM, 1916, 495). The capability of the senses to be equipped with a natural grasping-range, which facilities the “dead acceptance”, enables the senses to be regarded as the genuine and personal bearers of sensible beings (HCM, 1916, 497). “Natural” means here that there is no need for a special momentary act by spirit, but the involvement of the senses can suffice (HCM 1916, 495). Moreover, the living spirit can never rule an observation that has established itself as “dead acceptance”. In spite of that, the sensory quale might be reached only if it encompasses itself with a kind of blindness to forms of perception, and when the senses “express” nothing from the perception of a unified world (HCM, 1916, 477–478). The “capturing” of the sensible-manifest appearance itself and for-itself occurs “from itself”, or alternatively from the natural grasping-range that replaces the momentary achievement of the living spirit (HCM, 1916, 496). The location of consciousness at the periphery is typified as a “spiritually dead acceptance” (eine geistige tote Entgegennahme) of sensible beings (HCM, 1916, 490). This acceptance is merely the fixed reception of the thing that presents itself in its objective self-presentation. This appearance is experienced by the I as having no context, partly thanks to the appearance of the sensible being as an in-itself and for-itself fact (HCM, 1916, 481). This context-less acceptance does not contradict the fact that the same I stands in the two experiences as bearer of givenness’ experiences 26 One should distinguish between the term “play” here, which does not express a diminishing in the reality of the appearance and the “play on the reality of objects”, which is typical of the perceptive attitude that indicates the weakness of its dimension of reality. See: HCM (1916, 379).

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and as recipient of what appears in them. Yet since in each of them the I experiences itself from different places, they are considered as lacking context (HCM, 1916, 482 n. 1). HCM clarifies that indeed it is not the spirit itself that dies in the acceptance. Quite the opposite, the spirit is living and awake and conceives a world different from the externally sensible one, but the sensible-manifest appearance is what dies in it. In any event, even when the living spirit is at the periphery it is sufficient for the realization of the sensorially manifest appearance (HCM, 1916, 490). Against this background, I argue that there exists a certain accordance between the condition in which the sensorially manifest appearance is given and the condition of the I that is sensorially opened toward it. Both are depicted in terms of restriction or prevention of expansion that is essential for the very coming into being of the appearance. The sensorially manifest appearance delivers itself from its closedobjective stance and from itself—a stance that is enabled when it is not conceived and grasped in a spiritually living moment of the spirit of the I. At the same time, the I is described here as being subject to a condition of the related “holding” (HCM, 1916, 495) that might enable (peripheral) conscious affinity toward the sensiblemanifest appearance and at the same time remain separated from it. This duality is well reflected in the “accomplishment of transcendence” (Transzendenzleistung), the constitution of a relation toward an in-itself closed being while keeping a distance from it. The “openness” in particular is essential for the constitution of this relation by the living spirit (HCM, 1916, 474), which enables it to stand up against what is closed and sealed in-itself without violating the distance that lies between the I and the sensorially manifest appearance. Indeed, the transcendence here is mutual—the spirit does not invade the sensible-manifest appearance, which itself remains located beyond it. However, this does not mean that the living spirit is completely removed from the scene. First and foremost, seeing and hearing are completely unthinkable without their actual insertion into the realm of consciousness, meaning: The very existence of the senses ensured that there is a spiritual sphere, even if it is primitive in constitution. Hence one should position the sensory sphere as a unique type of occurrences that are realized there, so that the spiritual sphere reaches as far as the possibility of these occurrences do. Indeed, the definition of the senses involved in the reception of the sensorially manifest appearance as “spiritual” already hints at a certain affinity in the vitality of spirit. Additionally, one should remember that not only are seeing and hearing considered “open I-stances”, but this openness is embodied in the possibility of objective experience—one that is actually realized in the self-presentation of the sensible-manifest appearance (HCM, 1916, 506). Finally, just as the living spirit can withdraw from the senses and be located at consciousness’s periphery, so too can this spirit return and be presented again inside seeing and hearing. Actually, when the living spirit is withdrawn from the sensible external world, it simultaneously withdraws also from the senses. Alternatively, it is presented again inside when it is directed to the external world. It transpires, then, that the spirit can have two modes of relations with the senses: It can let them remain peripheral as a gateway to itself, and that enables what HCM calls “dead acceptance” of sensible beings regarding which the senses serve as places

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of a sort of specifically accommodated reception. Likewise, the spirit can itself enter inside the senses and thus be changed from “dead acceptance” to living spirit. Elsewhere, HCM characterizes the human spirit as given in two fundamental situations: It is simultaneously “underhand” and “covered” (HCM, 1916, 386), or alternatively “nearby itself and out of itself”. Obviously, the senses continue be able to serve as sensitive places for defined modes of presentation, but spirit “enters” them and “occupies” them from the inside, and thus becomes itself sensitive to certain modes of presentation (HCM, 1916, 491), yet it generates a transformation in the sensible given (HCM, 1916, 488), i.e., transforms it from a formed condition into an unformed one. Therefore, a different perception should be attributed to “a change in the givenness” (Gegebenheitsveränderung) (HCM, 1916, 499) that already appears before the I. HCM assumes that spirit equips the senses with the capability for receiving through its own natural grasping-range. This means that the spiritual senses can be situated in terms of place only by means of the spirit that is capable of acting from within them and with their assistance (HCM, 1916, 497). This placement enables the senses to receive sensible beings. Thus, she establishes: “the only important condition for the adequate counter-acceptance of the sensible-manifest appearance” is that “the senses must […] be truly appointed from themselves in the realm of spirit”. HCM further explains that the senses function here “like personally positioned gateways” of this spirit, namely as borders of the so-called dead acceptance. As such, “they must always be carried vividly and actually by their self” (HCM, 1916, 498). It transpires, then, that the very appearance of the sensible being involves “dead acceptance” from a specific position of the I. This means that careful nurturing of consciousness and the I are crucial for one’s experience of the sensorially manifest appearance—a nurturing that involves the withdrawal of consciousness to the periphery, the opening to the appearance through the senses, and the achieving of transcendence. Finally, the activity that characterizes the disposition of the I facing the sensible beings is apparent not only in addressing the “living” spirit toward them, but also in the “death” that is imposed on spirit in order for it not to disrupt their appearing for the I that encounters them.

6.4 Epilogue The duality composed of essence and phenomenal givenness that served as a starting point for the explication of the phenomenon of the external world in Doctrine of Appearance emerged in the suggested interpretation as being in correlation to two fundamental stances of the I before the external world. The disposition of passive selfinclusiveness follows the aspect of essence as a compressed fullness that is addressed inside itself, while the disposition of active consciousness is applied outwards, thus more available to the phenomenal dimensions of the external world. This does not mean that the I becomes a mirror or serves as a space for the appearing of the I, which would have brought HCM’s thinking close to idealism. Quite the opposite, especially as a real being, the I is subjected to the fundamental duality typical of the real as such.

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The mark of this duality is apparent also in the two spheres of objects that compose the external world: overt and covert. Accordingly, she consolidates the two dispositions of the I as a counter-response to them: against the sensible object, the I is passive and self-including, thus responding to the objects’ aspect of phenomenality. However, regarding the covert objects, the I is active and directed beyond itself, in order to meet the concealed essence that is hidden from the phenomenal layer of the things. In any event, since both overt and covert objects are present simultaneously in the external world, the I also realizes these two dispositions at once. Moreover, exactly as the fact of being composed of two different types of objects does not damage the unity of the world, so also the two dispositions do not bring about a split within the being of the I. On the contrary, the I is not torn in the face of the external world’s duality because it carries in-itself the two fundamental dispositions that enable it to respond to the internal essence and the phenomenality that shines outwards as well. The double dispositions of the I that are extricated in the suggested interpretation might explain HCM’s statement that the “the spiritual I does not live only by itself but also in a world strange to the I (ichfremden Welt) [… and] rests there without superficially and arduously surpassing or overstretching its own being” (HCM, 1916, 408). Thus, as the I is by itself, embodied in its feeling of the body, which experiences a personal proximity to the external world. However, a distance is stretched between the I as consciousness and the world of objects. The great challenge that HCM’s philosophy of Being will later face is to maintain the meaning of the I as a self-inclusive being before the transcendent strangeness of the real being that will become a pivotal issue subsequently to Doctrine of Appearance.

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Husserl, E. (2002). Logische Untersuchungen. Ergänzungsband. Erster Teil. Entwürfe zur Umarbeitung der VI. Untersuchung und zur Vorrede für die Neuafulage der Logischen Untersuchungen (Sommer 1913) Husserliana XX (1) (U. Melle, Ed.). Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Husserl, E. (2012 [1913]). Ideas, general introduction to pure phenomenology (W. R. Boyce Gibson, Trans.). London: Routledge (Translation of: Husserl 1952). Kołakowski, L. (1975). Husserl and the search for certitude. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Krings, H. (1958). Das Experiment der Vernunft. In Philosophisches Jahrebuch der GörrresGesellschaft, Festschrift für Hedwig Conrad-Martius, 66 (pp. 48–62). Freiburg-München: Karl Alber. Krings, H. (1960). Studie über Vorstellung und Sein. In Sinn und Sein, Ein philosophisches Symposion (R. Wisser, Ed.) (pp. 193–208). Tübingen: Max Niemeyer. Kuhn, H. (1969). Phänomenologie und Realität. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, 23(3), 397–402. Lewis, C. I. (1991 [1929]). Mind and the world order: Outline of a theory of knowledge (3rd ed.). New York: Dover. Marbach, E. (1974). Das Problem des Ich in der Phänomenologie Husserls. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Melle, U. (1983). Das Wahrnehmungsproblem und seine Verwandlung in phänomenologischer Einstellung. Untersuchungen zu den phänomenologischen Wahrnehmungstheorien von Husserl, Gurwitsch und Merleau-Ponty. Den Haag/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff. Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450. Pfänder, A. (1913). Zur Psychologie der Gesinnung. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung, I (1) (pp. 325–404). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Pfeiffer, A. E. (2005). Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Eine Phänomenologische Sicht auf Natur und Welt. Würzburg: Orbis Phenomenologicus, Königshausen and Neumann. Reinach, A. (1921 [1914]). Vortrag über Phänomenologie. In A. Reinach, Gesammelte Schriften. Halle: Max Niemeyer, 379–405 (reprint of: Reinach 1951; English trans.: Reinach 1968; Reinach 1969). Reinach, A. (1951 [1914]). Was ist Phänomenologie? Mit einem Vorwort von Hedwig ConradMartius (pp. 21–72). München: Kösel (Reprint of: Reinach 1921b; English trans.: Reinach 1968/Reinach 1969). Reinach, A. (1968). What is Phenomenology? (D. Kelly, Trans.). Philosophical Forum 1 (2) (New Series), 231–256 (Translation of: Reinach, 1921b/Reinach, 1951). Reinach, A. (1969 [1914]). Concerning phenomenology (W. Dallas, Trans.). The Personalist, 50(2), 194–221 (Translation of: Reinach, 1921b/ Reinach 1951). Russell, M. (2007). Husserl, a guide for the perplexed. London: Continuum. Schmücker, F. G. (1956). Die Phänomenologie als Methode der Wesenerkenntnis, unter besondere Berücksichtigung der Auffassung der München-Göttinger Phänomenologenschule (Dissertation). München. Seifert, J. (1995). Was ist Philosophie? Die Antwort der realistische Phänomenologie. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, 49(3), 92–103. Spiegelberg, H. (1975). Doing phenomenology, essays on and in phenomenology (Phaenomenologica 63). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Wachterhauser, B. R. (1996). Introduction: The shipwreck of apodicticity? In J. M. Edie & B. R. Wachterhauser (Eds.), Phenomenology and skepticism: Essays in honor of James M. Edie. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Chapter 7

The Ontological Exclusivity of the I Ronny Miron

Abstract The pivotal insight that paved Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ (1880–1966) (HCM) way in elucidating the ontological exclusivity of the I, often referred to as “I-being” (Ichhaftes Sein), is that despite its peculiarity and incomparability to any other mode of being, only by coming to terms with “ontological foundations” can “a true ‘comprehension’ (Begreifung) of the of the I be enabled” (HCM, 1931, 6). The phenomenological interpretation suggested in this article presents HCM’s ontological understanding of the I vis-a-vis her philosophy of Being, in particular in regard to three of its general characteristics—existence, intelligibility, and “selfness” (Selbsthaftigkeit/Sichheit/Selberkeit)—which provide the critical approach to the ontological study of the I. Finally, the ontological exclusivity of the “I-being” is illuminated by means of explication of the joining together of its typical affinities and discrepancies in regard to Being in general.

7.1 Introduction Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1880–1966) (HCM), the realist phenomenologist, denotes the individual, specific, personal, and active nature of the I as “self-full existential ‘selfness’ (selbsthaft existentielle Selbsthaftigkeit)” (HCM, 1963a, 240),1 in short: “Ibeing” (Ichhaftes Sein). The peculiarity of the being of the I amounts to a fundamental contradiction between it and “the simply existing there of plainly placed being” (HCM, 1931, 5). The fundamental formation (Gestaltung) of the real Being thus transpires as occurring in “two opposing ontic dimensions of existentiality” (HCM, 1957, 127) or “two substantial spheres ontologically contradicting each other totally: ‘nature’ and ‘spirit’” (HCM, 1957, 98) that enjoy “ontically radical self-standing” that can be wholly verified (HCM, 1957, 99). 1 All translations from the German original into English are mine. Emphases follow the original, unless stated otherwise.

R. Miron (B) Interdisciplinary Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Miron (ed.), Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68783-0_7

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However, the pivotal insight that paved HCM’s way in elucidating the ontological exclusivity of the I is that despite its being peculiar and incomparable to any other mode of being (HCM, 1963a, 240) only “on the ground of Being itself” (HCM, 1963a, 243) or “only out of this ontological foundations” of the real being in general “a true ‘comprehension’ of the I might be enabled” (HCM, 1931, 6). Generally, based on the promise of the Husserlian phenomenology regarding the principle intelligibility of Being, HCM’s ontological study is imbued with the “belief” that “the question” about the essence “that repeats itself in any I” (HCM, 1963a, 235) “is not unanswerable” (HCM, 1963a, 231). Against this background, she establishes: “in no way does the I-being drop out of genuine real-positioning (eigentlicher Realitätssetzung herausfällt)” (HCM, 1931, 5). Also, the ancient and “radical enough” duality of the material being and the I-being “nevertheless ontologically […] is not unbridgeable” (HCM, 1963a, 240). Finally, HCM realizes that there is no gap between the emphasized peculiarity of the I (HCM, 1957, 128) and its understanding as the “genuinely last substantial form of Being (Seinsform)” (HCM, 1957, 126). My basic argument is that HCM’s philosophy of the I is indeed an inherent chapter in her philosophy of Being. Yet, this manifests itself in a rather complex manner.2 An initial access to the complexity that lies behind this determination might be provided by the Husserlian idea of “nucleus” (Kernbestand) according to which “Meaning (Sinn) […] is not a concrete essence in the constitution of the noema as a whole, but a kind of abstract form that dwells in it” (Husserl, 1952, §132 304/2012, §132 275). One can determine that an essential self-sameness and unity of experience (Husserl, 1952, §91/2012, §91) enables the “nucleus” in beings, despite the joining together of different dimensions originating in objectivity and subjectivity.3 This idea is radicalized in HCM’s idea of the I to the extent that it enables her understanding of the I-being as capable of containing unfathomable discrepancies which together with the affinities to the other beings consolidate the human ontological exclusivity. The phenomenological interpretation suggested below, will focus on three general characteristics of Being in HCM’s thinking—existence (Existenz), intelligibility, and selfness (Sichheit/Selberkeit).4 The elucidation of these three fundamental elements provides an essential approach to the ontological understanding of the I-being and might uncover its exclusivity within the entirety of her metaphysics.

2 Despite HCM’s explicit distinguishing herself from existentialism (see: HCM, 1930, 1954, 11–13;

1963a) due to what she regarded as existentialism’s continuing focus on the idealist emphasis on the conscious experience, here and in other places in the discussion the affinities to existential thinking are rather apparent (mainly to early Heidegger and Sartre in regard to the issue of nothingness). This is no wonder given their realistic phenomenological orientation. This issue demands a separate discussion that exceeds the scope of the present article. For further reading, see: Behler (1956). 3 Husserl’s search in Logical Investigation for the pure principle that regulates both the objective and subjective conditions for knowledge (Husserl, 1970, §65 147–150/1975, §65 238–241) continues in his later discussion of the “nucleus” as relating to the “noema” (Husserl, 1952, §129 297–299/2012, §129 269–271) and “Noesis” (Husserl, 1952, §131 301–304/2012, §131 272–275) as well. 4 For further reading about HCM’s characteristics of Being, see: Miron (2015, Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 5).

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7.2 Existence HCM lays the firm foundations for her ontological investigation in Realontologie, in which she sought “The Gateway to Reality”, i.e. the turning point where a “radical overcoming” of the “mere formal positioning” of reality occurs and things “elevate” themselves from the condition of non-existence or mere ideal existence, but do not yet arrive at factual existence (HCM, 1923, 173). Her critical assumption is that reality does not concern “more or less objectivity”, rather it is “something totally different” (HCM, 1923, 180) that stands in an absolute and unbridgeable primordial-opposition (Urgegensatz) to nothingness (HCM, 1923, 160). In this spirit she describes the appropriate starting point for ontological investigation as follows: “we will never be able to penetrate really and ultimately the essence of any real entity (Realentität) […] if we do not let it stand exactly on the thesis of existence (Daseinsthesis) that in Husserl’s approach was bracketed” (HCM, 1916a, 6).5 This thesis of existence, that was foundational to HCM’s entire metaphysical thinking, was later presented as follows: “instead of hypothetically bracketing the real Being and thereby seeing the world (in the reduction) stripped (enthoben) of the real reality (wirkich Wirklichkeit), it is suggested now to hypothetically posit the real Being of the world and thereby the present it with its own rootedness into Being” (HCM, 1965d, 397). In this regard, the importance of the related thesis concerns the support provided by it for reinstating facts and their precedence into the phenomenological discourse after Husserl had excluded them and the entire empirical field from it in favor of seeing, intuition, and observation of essences.6 Secondly, this thesis permitted her to reject Husserl’s transcendental argument while leaning on his shoulders, as it were,7 i.e.: she accepts his claim that “nulla ‘re’ indigent ad existendum” (Husserl, 1952, §49 104/2012, §49 94), in the sense that immanent being is absolute, as it never brings any “thing” to being, yet derives from it a fundamentally opposed conclusion. Namely, since what is established as an absolute being is fundamentally opposite to any other reality, within the framework of absolute consciousness “the real should collapse” (HCM, 1916a, 2).8 HCM then asks whether from Husserl’s detailed analysis of consciousness this real noematic world really remains entirely internal to 5 HCM expresses her commitment to the “Existence thesis” also in: HCM (1916b, 396; 1963a, 233). 6 Husserl

(1952, §3 13–16/2012, §3 11–14), Mohanty (1977, 3–9). HCM later established that Husserl never rejected or doubted the reality of the world but regarded it as a hypothetical being (HCM, 1965d, 398). However, unlike Husserl, HCM does not see any problem with the empirical experience (HCM, 1965b, 351) and even regards the then new natural sciences as elucidating the real foundations of such experience (HCM, 1965d, 401). 7 Schmücker establishes that in HCM’s philosophy “for the first time the subject is released from Kant’s prison” (Schmücker, 1956, 39). This position points to a fundamental aspect of her approach to the I, i.e., it is not restricted to the boundaries of consciousness and was not based on an epistemological study. Indeed, this is true also of HCM’s philosophy of Being. 8 HCM refers to Husserl’s phrase “nulla ‘re’ indigent ad existendum” on several occasions, see: HCM (1916a, 1, 3; 1963a, 229; 1963c, 21; 1963e, 195; 1965a, 370; 1965b, 353). In connection to the first mention in 1916, that is considered as an indication of HCM’s response to Husserl’s Ideas I (Husserl, 1952/2012), Stein indicates (in a letter to Ingarden from 9 April 1917) that HCM’s “notes on the question of Idealism […] are however, not a refutation of Husserl’s position. In fact,

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consciousness or is rather thrown outside (HCM, 1965d, 396), and elsewhere hints at the negative reply: “but where does the world remain?” (HCM, 1965a, 371).9 Later on, HCM will wonder about Husserl’s sacrifice of “world belief” in favor of the pure study of the world, arguing that “what’s odd is, then, that here absolute and indubitable judgments about factual being, about the present at-hand (Vorhandenheiten), based on empirical existences, can be made pleasing” (HCM, 1963c, 20).10 The above-indicated element of existence is very dominant regarding the I. HCM contends that the concept I (Ich) has no further content or meaning than exactly to point to its existence (HCM, 1963a, 234). In other words: the I is itself already so much “I am” that otherwise it would be nothing, thus the expression “I am” does not add anything to the single word I. She explains that as I-beings, we need to do nothing in order to exist, but we simply exist (HCM, 1963a, 235). The incapability of the I to be otherwise but to exist and always to exist again is intensified to the extent of “necessity-of-being” (Sein-Müssen), or “inescapability of being for the I” who “cannot flee from Being” but is “abandoned and delivered” to Being (HCM, 1963a, 236). The immediate meaning of the argument of the “necessity-of-being” regarding the I is that the elements that refer to consciousness have no precedence in the study that aims at elucidating the I-being. This interpretation is also supported by the criticism of the idealistic tradition HCM expresses within her discussion of the I. While idealism, in particular the Husserlian kind, leads to a withdrawal from the concrete dimensions of the I and to narrowing its understanding to the realm of pure consciousness, and thus to “one-sided absolutization” of the being of the I, HCM establishes: In strict opposition to the idealistic philosophy, and herein explicitly above and outside it, we may not take the I in the immanent boundaries of the mere transcendental “cogito”. This entirely epistemologically meaningful but ontologically infertile standpoint must be the main argument seems to me to be based on a misunderstanding of his exposition” (Stein, 2005, 58). However, this evaluation of Stein seems to communicate her general attitude to Husserl’s phenomenology than illuminating HCM’s view of the matter that in this regard can be encapsulated in her fundamental “thesis of existence (Daseinsthesis)” that she discussed throughout the entire early manuscript (HCM, 1916a, 5–8, 11–12). Moreover, HCM further elaborates this thesis in her subsequent writings, that were established on the “unbridgeable and absolute opposition between real being and nothing” (HCM, 1923, 162. see here also: HCM, 1963f, 93–94) and on the postulate that “real existence is not one ‘form of existence’ (Daseinsform) among others but something plainly and absolutely new thing (Neues)” (HCM, 1923, 163). Finally, HCM’s explicit rejection of Husserl transcendental reduction in favor her idea of “real reality” (wirkich Wirklichkeit) clarifies her dismissal of the most essential foundation of his Idealism that she depict as “hypothetically bracketing the real Being and thereby seeing the world (in the reduction) stripped (enthoben) of the real reality” (HCM, 1965d, 397). 9 HCM, along with the realist phenomenologists, rejected Husserl’s phenomenological reduction (HCM, 1963a, 228–230; 1963b, 43; 1963c, 19–24). See also: Pfeiffer (2005, 31–32). 10 Marvin Farber, too, regarded the reality of the external world as a basic fact. See Farber (1967, 65). Yet, while HCM turns the acknowledgment of the facticity of the external world into the firm ground upon which her metaphysical thinking stands, for Farber, “The philosophical problem of the existence of the external world resulted from an unsettling of a natural world belief, and has been complicated by underlying premises and theories” (Farber, 1967, 63).

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abandoned. We must place ourselves outside the “cogito” and in the “sum” as the explicit “I am”. The moment of Being (Seinsmoment) that lies in the “sum” grasps and conceives the I in its ontic-substantial foundness (Fundiertheit), in which it is not only a thinking thing (res cogitans) but a thinking thing. The Augustinian-Cartesian cogito-sum turns into sum-cogito. (HCM, 1957, 125)

Thus, the demand to reverse the Cartesian cogito repeats the argument regarding the necessity of the thesis of existence (Daseinsthesis) that seems to make redundant the element of consciousness in the study of the I-being. Also, HCM adds that the ontological discussion of the I is dependent on the reality of the world: “the genuine ontological sense of our I-full essence must have remained unfulfilled, if this world was factually not real […], as had there been given no real world, [it] should have been created” (HCM, 1957, 141). This uncompromising demand to presuppose the reality of the world in any understanding of the I implies her criticism of the overrated transcendental approach. In her view, the centrality granted to the aspect of the cogito not only damages the possibility of discerning the ontic-ontological essence of transcendentality itself but also ignores the genuine substantiality and the original power of the self-justification of the I-being (HCM, 1957, 135). HCM acknowledged the importance of the study typical of the idealistic approach to the I that is directed to “‘the I in its pure entity-like generality’”, i.e.: as existent as such and not specifically one’s I in its body-soul facticity and even as detached from all conjunctions with possible others (HCM, 1957, 125). HCM seems to connect between the idealistic supreme emphasis on what she calls “pure generality” that powerful epistemological tools and the dismissal or at least pushing aside of the dimension of existence.11 She then presents her ontological study as the appropriate alternative to the “blindness to Being” of idealism, which brings about “deracination of Being” (Seinsentwurzelung) (HCM, 1963e, 195–196), not only of the I-being but also to Being itself. A decisive step in coming to terms with what HCM denotes as “the ontological condition” of the I (HCM, 1957, 131) confronts her with a fundamental difference between it and the real material being. HCM explains that when we refer to something, we always look for the being that is submerged in it and implicitly we try to extricate it from aspects that do not touch its being (HCM, 1963a, 235). HCM states that while with the material being its substance is at the same time the foundation and the ground that lies on itself (HCM, 1957, 127) regarding the I, “there is nothing submerged there or that could have been submerged” (HCM, 1963a, 235) or could have been “‘carried’” ontically (HCM, 1957, 127). This argument falls in line with the absence of the expression “fullness” (Fülle) within the discussion of the I, unlike its prevalence in the discussion of the real being. In particular, the being that might achieve material fulfillment is depicted as “achieving fullness”, as “real fullness” (HCM, 1923, 218), as “substantial fullness” (HCM, 1923, 217, 224, 227, 234), and as “founded on itself as an internal fullness” (HCM, 1923, 215). Consequently, for the “I-being” the “radical depth” of the material real being is substituted with “shallowness” (Untiefe) or “lack of surface” (HCM, 1965c, 295). 11 The

argument that the epistemological emphasis is bound with pushing the ontological is typical of the Munich-Gottingen ¨ School. See, for example, Hildebrand (1976, 141).

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HCM does not explain directly why the I-being cannot contain depth within itself and how come the I lacks one of the fundamental characteristics of the real being. However, the complex relation that can be delineated between the expressions “elevation” (Erhebung), beginning (archonal), and “ground-level” (Ungrund) might be helpful for the elucidation of what she posits as “the ontological situation” of the I (HCM, 1957, 131). As we recall, the opposition between Being and nothingness or between existence and non-existence lies at the foundation of HCM’s ontological approach (HCM, 1923, 162). The real being not only “elevates (erhebt) itself from nothingness” but also “bails itself out (heraushauen) of it” (HCM, 1923, 181). Thus, the relation between the real being and the nothingness that preceded it is characterized in terms of “overcomingness” (Überwindbarkeit) (HCM, 1923, 234), “overcoming” (Überwindung) (HCM, 1923, 243 n. 1), and even radical overcoming (HCM, 1923, 173), while the transition from one state to the other is depicted as “elevation” (Erhebung) from itself toward Being (HCM, 1957, 127; 1963f, 90, 96). The moderation of the expression “elevation”, compared to “overcoming” is made manifest in HCM’s characterization of the “situation” (Sachlage) of the I toward nothingness as “limited self-elevation (begrenzten Sich-Erhebens)!” (HCM, 1963f, 93). However, while the expression “overcoming” is dominant in her understanding of the real being, in the context of the I-being she seems to struggle with it: At any “point” […] your self is repealed (aufgehoben) within this existent of nothingness. Not only relatively, as mere facticity, but absolutely as factual overcoming of nothingness! No, even this determination is insufficient! Also, in such “overcoming” would lie again a boundary against nothingness, even if such that was overcome. No, as much as we descend deeply into this existent, we cannot find anything from this possible nothingness. Possible nothingness, even if such that was overcome, could have posed a boundary against nothingness. (HCM, 1963f, 92)

This complex stance or even weakness of the I-being toward nothingness becomes, then, a beginning in nothingness. Moreover, especially the profound affinity to nothingness, as much as this expression can make sense, transpires as a decisive element that establishes the metaphysical nature of the I-being as the paradigm of beginning. This development in the explication of the I-being leads HCM to characterize it as an “archonic (archonalen)” being, a word she claims to have created from the Greek verb archéo (¢ρχšω), which means “to begin”12 : […] we are speaking here about the archonic form of Being (Seinsform) or archonic substantiality, since this existent elevates itself from ontically nullified ground-level (nichtiger Ungrund) up to existential self-justification. No other existence exists here at all but the one of self-full self-justification that constitutes itself: ¢ρχšω: I begin. (HCM, 1957, 134)

HCM establishes that eventually, i.e., after the I-being has “elevated itself” from nothingness, there is nothing there, since “it is essentially impossible to go back underneath to a deeper ‘position-of-Being’ (Seinsstelle), since such does not exist anymore” (HCM, 1957, 123). Moreover, even in its “transcendental climbing-over 12 In

fact, the Greek verb for “to begin” is in the transitive archo (¥ρχω), and in the intransitive archomai (¥ρχoμαι).

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(Übersteigenheit)” itself, the I “must ‘fasten’ (festmachen) itself in its own being” (HCM, 1957, 132), namely, attach itself to the point of “beginning”. Thus, the I is deprived of any depth and its existence is exhausted is but in its exclusive ontological disposition. There, at the “origin-position” (Ursprungsstelle), the I is posed “infinitely outwardly”, yet at the same time “it also infinitely left-behind under itself” (HCM, 1957, 124). Finally, by means of transferring from its own ground-of-being (Seinsgrunde) outside and beyond itself, the I “resides in ‘transcendence’ and hence is by no means alien or remote from it” (HCM, 1963a, 230–231). At this point, the ontological difference between the material and the pneumatic being typical of the I becomes sharper: In the former, a self-transcending takes place by the very real fulfillment, which is its self-externalization that closes it inside its own boundaries (HCM, 1957, 124). The transcendence of this being is characterized as a being whose fullness is addressed outward (HCM, 1923, 199) to the extent that it is accumulated, so to speak, as “a full absolute transcendent gathering (Sammlung)” (HCM, 1923, 228). Whatever the meaning of this idiosyncratic phrasing, it maintains the essential establishment of the I in the world transcendent to it. Nonetheless, the I-being experiences also as “left endlessly behind itself” (HCM, 1957, 124). Hence, the characterization of the transcendence the I as a returning back to itself (Retroszendenz) (HCM, 1957, 123), namely such that nevertheless does not transcend its own internal boundaries. To this extent, also the internality the I transpires as absolute. HCM explains that the case here is not of infinite regression of the I but of a process she typifies as “the absolute immanent returning (Retroszendenz)”, in which the I must relate to itself and thereby “it is transferred back behind itself”, where it “cannot find itself anymore as an entity” but “includes an essential infinite ‘shallowness’ (Untiefe)” (HCM, 1957, 124). The lack of depth is merely the internality that has nothing behind itself, or transcendence that is incessantly returned to itself and thus cannot be embodied except as entirely internal.13 Finally, the close relation between the I-being and nothingness becomes apparent also in the characterization of “ground-level” (Ungrund) that is attributed to it. HCM establishes that while all beings have their ground already in existence or outside itself, “whilst existing, the I-full existent elevates itself from its existential ‘groundlevel’ (Ungrund) to itself. In its self-full origin, it has no ground and soil on which it stands while existing and in which it could have had a substantial standpoint initself” (HCM, 1957, 131), “it stands only vis-à-vis nothingness” (HCM, 1963f, 93) without any protection from it (HCM, 1963f, 91). The proximity of the I-being to nothingness reaches almost intimacy, in which there is no contradiction between the beginning of the I and its equality (Gleichmächtigkeit) in nothingness where it finds a “ground and end” (HCM, 1963f, 92). This means that the ground of the I-being is at the same time the “ground-level of Being” (Seinsungrund) (HCM, 1963a, 231), meaning the I carries within itself an element of opposition or negation toward itself, which is merely the ground of its own existence. Undoubtedly, the foundational relationship of the I-being to nothingness, which cannot enable it to entirely “overcome nothingness”, as apparent in the deprivation 13 For

further reading, see: Miron (2014b, Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 2).

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of the I of foundation and depth, makes it difficult to characterize the I as substance. HCM hints at that when she contends that it is hard to demonstrate the pneumatic substance, since in the reality of an immediate experience there are no pure spiritual natures. She clarifies that this difficulty does not stem from the nature of the complex substance of the human being. Rather it is the ontological disintegration of the factual and empirical situations of the I (HCM, 1957, 118), which clashes with the suborder of the material substance. Consequently, the I-being appears as a “powerless shadow-image (Schattenbild) of itself” (HCM, 1957, 119). Against this background, I argue that the anchor of the I-being in nothingness indicates a fundamental contradiction within HCM’s understanding of the element of “existence” in regard to the I. Also, it is not at all clear what she means by claiming that being that has no ground can find its ground especially in nothingness. Moreover, it is hard to come to terms with the kind of intelligibility, if any, that could be bestowed upon the I-being by its anchor in nothingness. In any event, HCM does not suggest any “solution”, so to speak, to the fundamental contradiction delineated above and even seems to worsen it when she establishes as follows: the I-being “either must have its ground and soil in nothingness… Or it will have no ground and soil outside itself and thus not in-itself since it always stands again on itself!” (HCM, 1963f, 93); “the I possesses a meaningful ‘place’ (Ort) in the middle of nothingness – especially there, where it breaks through, especially there, where it elevates itself to Being!” (HCM, 1963f, 91), and “where no passage can be given, passage exists!” (HCM, 1963f, 95), but the “groundlessness” (Grundlosigkeit) becomes an absolute “groundpossessing (Grundhaben) everywhere” (HCM, 1963f, 94). The “brutal facticity” of the I-being concerns its being “in itself metaphysical incomprehensibility as well as impossibility” (HCM, 1963f, 91). This is, then, the power of facts that overcome any intelligible complexity and resolve it on a completely different plane. Indeed, HCM characterizes the “groundless” beginning of the I-being as a “wonderful place” since in it the “barren” becomes “an origin”, the “blind” converts into “an eye”, “the nowhere to a place” (HCM, 1963f, 91), “a beginning in the beginning-less”, the “selfgrounding in the groundless” (HCM, 1963f, 94), and the “ground-level of Being” or “the groundlessness” transpires as “ground-necessity” (Gründenmüssen) (HCM, 1963f, 92). Consequently, “we are not anymore in the brutality of the beginning-less and reference-less (Übergangsloser Unbezüglichkeit)! The I possess a beginning in nothingness! It is in-itself the passage from nothingness into Being” (HCM, 1963f, 90). Moreover, nothingness itself is described in this context as deepening into that place in which the I-being starts (HCM, 1957, 91). This means that if the I-being has any amount of depth at all, this depth is related to its special relation to the abyss that lacks any dimension of commensurability, due to its bounds with nothingness. At least to some extent, one might now come to terms with HCM’s inscrutable claim that the I-being carries within itself anxiety-evoking (angsterregende) “depth and shallowness (Untiefe)” (HCM, 1963a, 234).

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7.3 Intelligibility The positivity of the element of “existence” is not bound with renouncing “essence”, which is the source of the intelligibility of beings and of Being itself. The necessity of the joining together of existence and intelligibility means then that existence might be comprehended. Accordingly, HCM characterizes ontology as the science of beings due to their being-sense (Seinssinn) essence (HCM, 1965b, 339), which is the general meaning of what “‘is there’” and in relation to which “stands the real existing (wirklich Seiende) on one level together with any thinkable ‘existent’ (Vorhandenes)” (HCM, 1963e, 200). She establishes that “ontological (Seinsmäßig) sense is what underlies” everything and thanks to it “the referred to thing (res) possesses meaning within the context of the total ‘existing’” (HCM, 1965b, 347). Therefore, the ontological study of the “pure immanent” sense of beings is “gaining a true insight into the essence of reality” (HCM, 1963e, 202). HCM determines that in principle the intelligibility of beings is original and perceivable (HCM, 1931, 2–3) and confidence about its existence is already presumed in the efforts to achieve it (HCM, 1963a, 230). In her opinion, since “the objectiveintelligible logos is a primordial idea (Uridee)”, that endless diversity inherent in it is capable of bestowing meaning upon “every single thing and limb (Glied) in the world” (HCM, 1965c, 307). Consequently, the entirety of existents (Vorhandenes) in the world has an objective sense that provides them with their intelligibility (HCM, 1965b, 336). Had they not had such a sense, there would also have been no knowable essence and thus also no essence-intuition (HCM, 1965b, 348). Yet, the intelligibility of the existing thing does not express the involvement of the human subject and is independent of it: “The objective realism […] is not taken from subjective mindtreasure (Verstandsschutz)” (HCM, 1965c, 310); “we hear nobody speaking”, rather things “‘talk’ from themselves. They themselves say wherein they belong and what constitutes their essence” (HCM, 1965b, 347). Thus, HCM concludes that not only is the world “intelligible from itself” (HCM, 1965c, 307), but also “in this comprehensibility of the world by itself, in this objective intelligibility is inherent the deepest ontological secrets” (HCM, 1965c, 305). HCM’s focus on “the objective as it is” is even intensified by her explicit arguing in the name of “objective realism” (HCM, 1965c, 310). She establishes that objectivity is enabled due to the essence of the unambiguous and unmistakable “what” (Wesensquod) (HCM, 1965b, 343) or the definite and unchangeable “what”, which is the essence (HCM, 1965b, 336–337) that signifies real beings as such. Thanks to this “what”, being acquires the necessary “sense-position” (Sinnstelle), i.e., a “place” or “topos” (HCM, 1965b, 336–337) within what HCM refers to as “sense cosmos” (kÒsmos noetÒs) (HCM, 1965a, 377; 1965b, 347–348). The relevance of ontological study is clear, then: the “on” denotes the general sense of what exists (HCM, 1965b, 338), while “logy” signifies the logos of beings due to their entity-like sense (HCM, 1965b, 339). That is to say that the intelligibility of things is not exhausted within the realm of consciousness but expresses itself in reality. Therefore, within the argument that things have an objective sense, the fact of their possible existence is also

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inherent. However, possible existence is capable of being intelligible only before it crosses “the gateway to reality”. In contrast, “The incomprehensibility of the mere facticity of being is objective! Objectively, the so existing does not allow itself to be perceived into Being! and yet, it exists; and yet it is perceived into Being!” (HCM, 1963f, 90). Basically, HCM’s including of the I-being within the potential or pre-reality (Vorwirklichkeit) beings (HCM, 1931, 1), as distinct from the objectively incomprehensible actual or completely realized (Volwirklichkeit) ones (HCM, 1957, 100), enables expecting it to be intelligible. However, she seems quite ambivalent at this point: on the one hand, she determines that “the I-full existent comprises a more metaphysical understanding of Being than the mere thing-of-nature (Naturding)” (HCM, 1963f, 94). She explains that the I has a structural self-understanding of Being because of the stance-of-Being (Seinsstand) that it carried inside itself compared to thing-of-nature that is “given over” (überantwortet) to Being in a mode that is depicted as “blind to Being” (seinsblind) and “impotent to Being” (seinsohnmächtig) (HCM, 1963f, 95). This means that intelligibility results from the activity that the I manifests in life, which HCM refers to as achieving “position-of-Being”. On the other hand, HCM observes that “the finite being, be it the nature-ness or the I-ness, taken only for itself, remains metaphysically incomprehensible” (HCM, 1963f, 98). This means that the incomprehensibility of the I-being is absolute, exactly like its facticity, and it relies on “what it is for itself”, namely on the elements that are peculiar to it as opposed to other beings. The presence of these two sides in HCM’s ontology of the I shows that in addition to the split between the element of existence and intelligibility that is typical of beings as such, the I-being is subject to a second split from the aspect of intelligibility. In my opinion, the intelligibility and non-intelligibility of the I-being signify two levels of its ontological exclusivity. The first is relative to other existents and anchors the I-being in the wide context of reality. Here, exclusivity means that the I-being is more intelligible than non-human beings. The second is more radical and focuses on the characterization of the I-being within its own boundaries. Thus, its ontological exclusivity is but one’s radical particularity that deprives it of intelligibility in the sense of universal communality of elements. In the first place, the duality in respect to the element of intelligibility stems from the special relation of the I-being to nothingness that transpired as inherent in its very necessary existence. In HCM’s words: “And nevertheless! in all this fundamental comprehensibility the incomprehensible remains, like something that still springs up from nothingness to Being and thereby can conceive itself!” (HCM, 1963f, 90). However, as much as the beginning in nothingness plants non-intelligibility in the Ibeing, I argue that HCM’s point here is not the restrictedness of human consciousness but the coexistence of two contradicting elements in its being. In any event, since the existence of the I is mirrored in its intelligibility (and not the other way around!), only the I-being can undertake the task of achieving self-understanding. Finally, if the existence of the I is “necessary”, intelligibility must also be achieved despite the incomprehensibility to which it is doomed by its anchor in nothingness. The element of “selfness” refers to the internality that fills the real existent or its fullness (Fülle). In HCM’s words: “In every true existent lies an internal possibility

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for being of its own” (HCM, 1963a, 232). This unique expression does not signify one’s mental capability of self-reference, in which it sometimes become possible to cross the borders of oneself, but an ontological and constitutive core that fills finite existents from inside or “uploaded” on it, to the extent that it cannot “renounce” it (HCM, 1963a, 234). In this spirit, selfness is characterized as “‘ground and soil’ of its own creation” (HCM, 1957, 131) or the belonging of being to itself (Sëität) (HCM, 1957, 95), upon which the constitutive selfness (Sichheit) of real substance is built.14 HCM explains that this “belonging being-rootedness” (selbsteigenen Seinsgegründetheit) of the real thing to itself (HCM, 1963a, 232) also justifies it (HCM, 1963e, 206). Also, this justification that is an “essential necessity” for the real being as such (HCM, 1957, 132) to the extent that without this “self-full groundness of Being (selbsthaft Seinsgegrüdenheit), there could be no existents, yes, no world” (HCM, 1963e, 205). Thus, HCM establishes regarding any existent that it “not only must be, but it must be itself ” (HCM, 1963a, 233). This core that fills real existents from inside is closely linked to the essence in which real things are structured. HCM used various metaphors in order to depict the position of the essence in the real thing, i.e., as achieving “seat” and “a position of its own”, as “dwelling” and finding “homeland” or personal “domestication” in the real thing (HCM, 1923, 179–180). These descriptions are but modes of selfness typical of the essence as the indispensable constitutive element of the real thing.15 Thus, HCM establishes: “The most internal essence of real Being […] lies in the selfness (Selberkeit) of Being, […] in the ontic self (Sëität) per se”. Namely, all real existents that are characterized “‘by themselves’, ‘in themselves’ or ‘from themselves’ have their formal constitutive ground in the ‘selfness of Being’ (Selberkeit des Seins)” (HCM, 1963e, 203), or “the real (Wirkliche) is that which is standing in the selfness of Being” (HCM, 1965c, 295). Also, the element of selfness transpires as embodying in-itself the power of realization of the real thing as such. In HCM’s words: “the real—by means of its pure being and its existence—is the positive and personal realizer (Realisator) of its own essentiality (Washeit) or its own self” (HCM, 1923, 173). This realization, which is enabled thanks to the fact that existence possesses “‘potentiality’ (Potenz) or ‘mightiness’ (Mächtigkeit) to its own Being” (HCM, 1963e, 204), is characterized also as “substantialization inward” (HCM, 1923, 226) and achieving fullness (HCM, 1923, 201) and “radical depth” (HCM, 1923, 208), and such that at least potentially acquire an external appearance. This means that the extrication of the real from nothingness denotes an internal occurrence as well as an external one. In HCM’s words: “where the ‘bearer’ is of your own self […] means that your being operates from yourself outwardly [and arrives at] description and appearing” (HCM, 1923, 223). There is no contradiction between the two, rather “the real entity as such carries itself […] since its pure elevating into existence already bears by itself this carrying as pure formation moment” (HCM, 1923, 175). Moreover, inasmuch as by this elevating the real being breaks through the wall of nothingness, it testifies to “an internal structuring” 14 See:

HCM (1957, 120 n. 1; 91–97). (2014a, 66–72).

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of the real being itself (HCM, 1923, 176). The uniqueness of the real being compared to the formal one and the material one is then the following: while the formal being cannot achieve any aspect of internality, and its externality is exhausted by its intelligibility to human consciousness, with material being, “from the aspect of power, the entire body is kept outside itself” only (HCM, 1923, 220), or addressed wholly outward. Only with the real being does the external manifestation that extricates it from nothingness at the same time denote its self-operating inwardly. The element of occurrence uncovers, then, the capability for “movement” (HCM, 1923, 175) and “activity” (Gewirktsein) of the real being, thanks to which “the empty concept of reality is granted with descriptive fullness (Fülle)” (HCM, 1923, 174). HCM establishes that whatever “by itself cannot” is incapable of anything else, as opposed to the real, which is the only thing that “essentially can” (Die einzig K¨onnende) (HCM, 1923, 177). That is to say that real being is not constituted but a self-constitutive occurrence, which is indicated in terms whose prefix is “self” (i.e., selfness, selfrootedness, self-justification, self-realization, etc.). However, as much as these terms suggest the vocabulary and the foundation for a realistic approach to the I-being, their reference to it moves between a direct resonance, transforming it to the point of true opposition. The element of “selfness” in regard to the I is discussed in the context of within the spiritual essence of man typifies as a matter of “a radical genuine form of Being (Seinsform)” (HCM, 1957, 119), thus relate directly to the ontological exclusivity of human beings. HCM describes spirit as given to “a primordial movement (Urbewegung)” (HCM, 1965c, 295) between two elements that comprise its substantive and ontological essence (HCM, 1957, 98) and project it into a “dualistic existential primordial dynamic (Urdynamik)” (HCM, 1957, 129) that consolidates the spiritual-I. The first element characterizes the I as follows: “It is very much so and a mere self, to the extent that it cannot get out of itself or out of its own origin (Ursprung): it is entirely origin, depth, ground level, abyss” (HCM, 1965c, 295). As pure origin, the spiritual-I cannot have any “outside itself” and its own “originlike” nature (Ursprungshaftigkeit) is fundamentally inside-itself and by-itself (HCM, 1965c, 296) or in its selfness. Yet, this is a different selfness from the one that typifies material beings or any other form of animality. While the material being is “carried as substrate-full (substrathaft)” (HCM, 1957, 131), or alternatively it is “substrate-full” substantiality that is eventually realized outwardly, the selfness characteristic of the I is person-full (personhafte) being (HCM, 1963a, 242) or possesses a “personal accent” (pers¨onlicher Akzent) (HCM, 1957, 127). This personal nature is but its directedness to itself or its being wholly itself. Moreover, it determines the ontological condition of the I as ultimately “towards Being” (hin zum Sein) (HCM, 1963a, 235, 237), to the point of “being incapable to escape from Being, inescapably renouncing and surrendering (ausgeliefert)” to it (HCM, 1963a, 236). Therefore, as long as the I delves into the entanglements of its own being, nothing but itself will be found there. HCM depicts as “something strange (Merkwürdig)” the fact that one’s “self-full relation to Being” (selbsthaftes Verhältnis zum Sein) or “self-capability of being its own being” (Selber-Können-des-eigenen-Seins) is “developed positively inside oneself”. In HCM’s view, this manifest itself in the state of affair in which

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we “find no other realized Being (Sein) or suchness (Sosein)” within the I which we regard “as the genuine embodiment (Ausgestaltung) of this ontic fundamental capability itself ” (HCM, 1957, 128). By means of what is referred to as the “personal capability-for-Being (persönlische Seinsvermögen)” of the I, it constitutes the real existentiality as belonging to it. Consequently, the I is established as “beingfull selfness (seinshafte Selberkeit) that is characterized as personal power-of-Being (persönliche Seinsmacht) from the bottom up” (HCM, 1957, 128). Thus, the socalled archonic being elevates itself to its own being, becomes the existent that it is, and poses itself in Being. This element of origin-like of spirit that consolidates the firmest foundation of the I-being appears to fall in line with the characterization of the I as “static”, “spiritualmaterial (geiststofflich)” (HCM, 1965c, 302) and as a “receiving-spirit (empfangender Geist)” upon which concepts, words, and phenomena are transferred. These are “forms of essence” (Wesensformen) originating from the hidden depth of the human spirit, yet HCM argues they are shaped by the objective logos of the real world (HCM, 1965c, 311–312). As much as these forms describe the intelligible experience of spirit in its selfness, from HCM’s point of view they signify the “pure spiritual-objective self-encounter before the inner eye” (HCM, 1965c, 312). She explains that despite being static, resting in-itself, and directed toward itself, the receiving-spirit is always shaped anew by the intelligible reality and becomes this reality itself. This could not have happened if the spiritual-material did not have the capability for becoming manifest by the light of spirit (Geistlicht) (HCM, 1965c, 312). In any event, HCM considers the receiving-spirit as a tabula rasa that it is capable of being filled, among others, by the eternal ideas of reality (HCM, 1965c, 313) or by an appropriate observer of pure essences. The second element of spirit is described as “spiritualness” (geistlichthafte) (HCM, 1965c, 302) and as “infrastasis (Infrastase)”, which indicates the capability of the spiritual-I to be directed to something which is not itself, in HCM’s words: “it belongs to the most genuine constitutive-existential essence of the I-being and thus to the spiritual being, to elevate itself above and outside itself (über sich selbst hinauszusteigen), or rather to be always already what elevates itself (Gesteigener) above itself outwardly. Indeed, the I-being cannot exist (sein) at all but in this elevation-above (Übersteigenheit), or via being beyond itself (Jenseitigkeit)” (HCM, 1963a, 230–231). This elevation is “a real factual power of Being (Seinskraft) of the I-being” (HCM, 1965c, 296) that thereby transpires as in need of developing itself toward the spiritual for its own substantial constitution (HCM, 1957, 140). Alongside the I-being, spirit as such “stands there without itself or [as such that] itself it truly elevated” (HCM, 1965c, 298). Thus, the spiritual transpires as “totally empty of itself down to its most internal ground, which is precisely therefore an abyss” (HCM, 1965c, 296), in short: “free of its own self, self-less (selbstlos)” (HCM, 1965c, 298). HCM establishes that “the pure infrastatic perceiving permits no retained ‘opposite’ (Gegenüber), by which it could become illuminated for itself” (HCM, 1965c, 310). In her early work, HCM depicts the I as such that already “dwells in the ‘transcendence’” that is in no way “alienated or remote” from it (HCM, 1963a, 231). In this view, she then characterizes the spiritual being as such that “in a way helps

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the natural situation of transcendence” to the extent that “an executive act or ‘salto mortale’ is not needed” (HCM, 1916b, 408). Later, this insight is crystalized as the perception that the infrastatic nature of the I-being is imprinted in its very existence, and that a projecting-against (Gegen-wurf ) (HCM, 1957, 129) and “existential objectification” (existenziellen Objizierung) (HCM, 1957, 130) take place in it due to the “absolute self-transcendence” that is established in the I. Consequently, the I-being “stands against itself” (HCM, 1957, 126) and thus manifests an “original existential capability to create by itself” what stands against itself (HCM, 1957, 129). Obviously, the self-transcending of the I-being involves transcendental activity, and as such, it enables it to achieve a grip on objectivity (HCM, 1957, 140). However, HCM clarifies that this objectifying activity “is not cognition (Erkenntniss)” (HCM, 1965c, 299). Rather, that “as existing, the I-ness existent elevates itself from an existential ground-level (Ungrund) of itself to its own self”—a movement that “belongs to the essence of this projecting (Objizierung) that as such fills the archonic existence” (HCM, 1957, 131). This means that we are dealing here with an ontological structure of the I-being and not with its peculiar and even exclusive mental capabilities as such. The characteristics of transcending and openness toward what exists beyond the I-being fall in line with regarding the infrastatic element of the spiritual-I as an “influencing-spirit” (wirkender Geist), since within it spirit exists due to its capability to exercise an influence without having inside itself something to be posed against what it receives. In her opinion, the big secret of the deep penetration of intelligibility lies in the fact that the influencing-spirit is filled with the logos (HCM, 1965c, 308) of the real world (HCM, 1965c, 311). Yet, since the world’s colorful fullness is removed from the influencing-spirit, the spiritual itself is depicted as “‘suspended’” (in der Schwebe gehaltene) materiality of spirit (Geiststofflichkeit) (HCM, 1965c, 312). Alternatively, the spiritual is described as “‘floating’ richness” (‘schwebende’ Erfühltheit) with the logos (HCM, 1965c, 312). HCM visualizes that the fullness of logos can be there only as “enrolled” (eingeschrieben), in which all forms of essence are just modes in which the light of spirit is totally elevated by itself and returns to itself within pure objectivity and intelligibility (HCM, 1965c, 311–312). Thanks to the forms of essence that are inherent in the influencing-spirit, it matches exactly the reality that is comprehensible and conceivable to the I. In this wonderful internal mechanism, or rather the intra-spiritual analogous process, the pure objectivity of empirical reality is verified; and this is especially through the other side of spirit, which is anchored in the most profound subjectivity! At the same time, the subjective root of consciousness also provides the possibility of objective and a priori knowing of essence (HCM, 1965c, 313). Although the personal-spiritual nature of the I-being is independent of one’s search for an objective foundation in existence, we are dealing here with a “stage” (Stufe) that existed beforehand in human beings and is principally deeper than anything spiritual and psychological, either one is aware of it or not (HCM, 1957, 136). As much as consciousness is involved in the directedness of the I-being to the beyond, the spirituality that facilitates the infrastasis is enabled “only because the human I with the primordial constitution (Urkonstitution) of its

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existence is grounded in its ground-level origin (ungründigen Ursprung)” (HCM, 1957, 137–138). I argue that the movement in which “the I elevates itself from itself, towards itself outwardly, and into itself inwardly” (HCM, 1965c, 297) is one single movement. As much as one “projecting-against” oneself toward Being “gains a foothold” and “posits itself” in it and thus (HCM, 1957, 129) manifests an active disposition as an initiative agent and thereby becomes an existent (HCM, 1957, 129), the I-being possesses also a passive disposition in which it seems to be encompassed by a more comprehensive being. One way or another, the I-being becomes what it is through the very attempt of self-elevation from itself, which is at the same time toward itself. Especially as the infrastasis is anchored in the I and takes place inside it, it is capable of widening the I without tearing it from itself. That is to say that also in the infrastatic experience of spirit one not only continues to be unceasingly oneself but also through that one becomes the individual one is. In HCM’s view, this is no less than a “miracle of Being (Seinswunder)” (HCM, 1965c, 296). The primordial duality that characterizes the spiritual-I requires that the two discussed constitutive elements will not exclude each other. HCM establishes explicitly that the character of the infrastasis in no way signifies self-negation or internal contradiction within spirit. That is to say that even within its elevating from itself, and despite sometimes being depicted even by HCM herself as self-abandoning (HCM, 1965c, 296), spirit continues to be a self-full being and to be verified as the origin of itself (HCM, 1965c, 298). HCM asks: How can real essence transcend toward itself and through this very act be transferred beneath itself? She answers that here a doubling of the I occurs, and consequently, there is the transcending I (transzendiertes) and the I that is in the transcending itself (transzendierdes). Nevertheless, the I is not a double being, in her words: We should not at first set down as ready this I and then put it again outside itself. This would have canceled the entire ontological meaning of the matter. No, this I, as one and whole, constitutes itself in general only in this self-owned (selbsteigenen) ontic transpositionoutwards (Hinausversetztheit) above itself, that is simultaneously an absolute transposition back beneath (Zurückversetztsein) itself. (HCM, 1957, 126)

In this spirit, she establishes: “the archonic being as an existent elevates itself to its own being and precisely thus also becomes itself an existent. As existing, it poses itself into Being. In the personal capability-for-being (Seinsvermögen) it constitutes its own real-being, its own existentiality” (HCM, 1957, 129). Hence, the two constituting elements of the I-being present two levels of realization of its internality—as an origin and as openness. HCM explains as follows: If it were no spirit-material (Geiststoff ), no “standing” power for self-devotion (Selbstzuwendungskraft), then reality in its intelligibility could not objectively have imprinted spirit: the mere self-devotion infrastasis could have, as it were, dragged into the “shallowness” (Untiefe) of the I-self (Ichselbst). On the other hand, were it not for the infrastatic effective power of self-devotion (Selbstzuwendungswirkkraft) (no infrastasis), then the spiritually silent I-self would have remained in its sensory phenomenality imprinted reality, not actualized in terms of its comprehensibility: its various essence-forms would have been embedded and engulfed in the material-sensory material. (HCM, 1965c, 308)

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Now the meaning of the originality of the I achieves a new sense: it is not an achievement of one’s spirit, as HCM puts it: “The personal cannot […] be mere selfempowered origin of its being (bloβer selbstmächtiger Seinsursprung), if it does not at the same time revert to itself from itself out of complete free self-elevation (Selbsterhebung)” (HCM, 1965c, 296). Indeed, the “personal” character of being oneself is enabled beforehand, thanks to the fact that as existing the I-being is constituted “beyond itself”, and thus “stands thereby against itself in radical freedom” (HCM, 1957, 121). Consequently, the pneumatic substance “is entirely void and free of any operative essence” (HCM, 1957, 127–128). Against this background, HCM crystalizes the difference between the “thingof-nature” (Naturding) and the I-being as follows: the first is a being of hypokymenal nature (hypokeimenalen Seinsartung), its anchor lies “backwards” (HCM, 1957, 126), or “its being is submerged beneath itself”, since the embodiment of the material substance is within the body-becoming (Leibwerdung), in which it is wholly and factually posed as “being-by-itself” (Bei-sich-Sein) that departs from itself and is posed outside. The belonging of the material being to itself is entirely “engulfed” (verschlungen), externalized as substrate, and realized as non-personal being (HCM, 1957, 127). Indeed, the material being’s characteristic of ecstasy already deprives it of any possibility of personality, so it is “with itself ‘full to the brim’” (HCM, 1965c, 296) and entirely outside and on the surface (HCM, 1965c, 295). Thus, HCM describes that material self as “trembling power”, as “selfless (and therefore helpless) selfness” (HCM, 1965c, 297), and as “selfless ecstasy” (HCM, 1965c, 298), since in the total self-externalization the material being is no more than the carried that presents itself (HCM, 1965c, 298) or “its pure infrastatic comprehension does not leave any retained ‘opposite’ (Gegenüber) by which it can be illuminated for itself” (HCM, 1965c, 310). Its objectivity lies exactly in the fact that being entirely itself, it stands against everything else and thus presents itself (HCM, 1965c, 298)—presenting in which it is deprived of any personality. As opposed to the material being, the I-being is endowed with an original openness toward Being (Seinsoffenheit) (HCM, 1963f, 95) and is anchored “forwards” (HCM, 1957, 126), or alternatively, “in regard to the specific I-being existent, this self-manifestation remains open, as much as here the existential self-determination (Selbstbeschliβung) takes place in the comprehension of the beyond objects” (HCM, 1963a, 241). HCM clarifies that the case is not of first the positing of the I-being and then achieving the openness toward Being, but openness (Geöffnetsein) toward Being is radical and determines the essence of the I as a real thing (HCM, 1963a, 235). The uniqueness of the spiritual being lies in the very fact that due to being its own origin it has an ontological capability to be totally free of itself (HCM, 1965c, 296). Exactly because its directedness beyond itself is a positive characteristic of the spiritual-I, it cannot rob it of its own personality, and what is more, from each point beyond itself it can return back to itself (HCM, 1965c, 296). Hence, the infrastatic character of the spiritual-I does not take away its self-control and it remains incessantly a selffull being. To be precise, HCM establishes that the spiritual is that which “always already elevates (Gestiegener) above itself and outside itself”, thus the I-being is in everything but in this elevating up (Übersteigenheit) (HCM, 1965c, 230) or being

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beyond itself (Jenseitigkeit) (HCM, 1963a, 231; 1965c, 297). HCM explains that from a purely ontological point of view, the “existential position” of the I contains: “an unlimited freedom and power. Whilst in its self it is nothing, it is capable of being everything. Whilst nothing relapses, it is capable of comprehending all and always new things. Since it is never fully loaded by comprehending, can [never] be concluded and withdrawn, it stands in the possibility of choice and freedom towards everything” (HCM, 1963a, 239). Thus, the infrastatic condition of spirit is located exactly at the “middle point” in which the I is moving between self-abandoning and being self-devoted backwards. HCM depicts as “wonder” the state of affairs in which the spiritual as infrastatic self-full being, i.e., especially as being beyond itself, can arrive at itself without ceasing being itself even for a single moment (HCM, 1965c, 296). That is to say that the externalization of the substance of the I to the point of the self-loss that occurs in the infrastatic state happens out of freedom of spirit, yet from the aspect of its content it signifies self-loss.

7.4 Epilogue How come the issue of the I, which is so central to HCM’s thinking, is absent from Realontologie, an oeuvre regarded by many as her magnum opus? Dealing with this question is critical given my thesis that HCM’s philosophy of the I is an inherent chapter in her philosophy of Being, whose ontological foundations she lays in Realontologie. However, in light of the journey in the writings HCM wrote afterward, it appears to me that the key to this question might be found in the fact that the severe discrepancies HCM finds in her study of I-being in these later writings do not exclude each other as does the establishing primordial-opposition between Being and nothingness in Realontologie. Thus, the I-being appeared as directed inward but at the same time open toward Being; in its openness toward Being the it wishes to chase Being, but is chased by it; it belongs to itself but also surrenders to Being; owns his or her being, nevertheless this possession does not grant it the sovereignty to be something else. The I-being cannot be understood in a context which is subordinated to an uncompromising contradiction, but needs a more containing realm which will not block its wealth from shining forth. This is exactly why the ontological exclusivity of the I-being is but the gathering and inclusive thematization of its typical affinities and discrepancies in regard to Being in general. This insight is clearly supported in the face of the being of the spiritual-I, characterized by HCM as a “kind of boundary break within transcendence” (HCM, 1963a, 243). She clarifies that this is no pantheistic position (HCM, 1963f, 100) but the creation of a new space which, despite the origin-like nature of the I, nevertheless enables an openness of the spiritual-I to transcendence. As she put it: “what the I does not find in-itself and constitutively cannot find, it finds in transcendence” (HCM, 1963a, 238). HCM explains that since the I is not unified with itself and cannot find within itself a “foothold”, as ontologically it is never thrown back to itself, it must become established outside itself and acquire a “position” (Stellung) in Being in the very comprehension of what stands

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against it (HCM, 1963a, 238). Hence, the entire existence of the spiritual substance is unceasingly bound with the experience of transcendental self-justification. Moreover, the fundamental affinity between the I-being and transcendence is responsible for the fact that “the archonic being can never be the perfect groundness being, and therefore it will never possess a collected affected suchness (gesmmelt ausgewirktes Sosein)” (HCM, 1957, 134); that the existential being of the I will always be presentist (präsentisches) and current (gegenwärtiges) and never fully developed into a complete reality. Also, it is inherent that “in its perceived-being it can never come to itself and fall on itself”; it can never be “merged” (zusammenzuschließen) in-itself into a concrete and real form and thus arrive at the place of the ground and the soil of its own being (HCM, 1963a, 238). HCM establishes: “the finite being that itself is incomprehensible […] needs a sustainable return to the original and obvious Being […], a repatriation (Rückführung) to its own power of being (Seinsmacht) and not resolution in its being!” (HCM, 1963f, 100). There is no other alternative, then, for a finite being that is deprived of any ground but whose beginning and end are in nothingness except to be answered exactly by transcendence. The affinity to the transcendent, which is enabled due to the spiritual nature of the I-being, actually brings about a transformation from the negation of ground-level to the positive confirmation of the anchor in oneself and thus the co-presence of discrepancies within the I-being is enabled. In the end, the relation to transcendence transpires as not only the ultimate source for achieving entity-like unity, despite the many discrepancies within human beings, but also for the realization of the ontological exclusivity of the I-being that is signified by the word I (Ich) by which human beings are distinguished from any other mode of being (HCM, 1957, 120–121). Just like transcendence, also the I-being has characteristics that HCM attributes to what she regards as the “highest category of Being (die höchste Seinsgattung)” (HCM, 1957, 35).

References Behler, W. (1956). Realität und Ek-Sistenz, Auseinandersetzung mit der Konzeption Martin Heidegger in Konfrontation mit der ontologisvhen Schriften von Hedwig Conrad-Martius. Diss., München. Conrad-Martius, H. (1916a). Über Ontologie, Conrad-Martiusiana, A.I 3, 14 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1916b). Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Auβenwelt: Verbunden mit einer Kritik positivistischer Theorien. In Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und philosophische Forschung III (pp. 345–542). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Conrad-Martius, H. (1923). Realontologie, Buch I. In Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, VI (pp. 159–333). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Conrad-Martius, H. (1930). Heidegger ‘Sein und Zeit’, Metaphysische Quellpunkte, ConradMartiusiana, A.III 6, 42 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1931). Entwurf zu einer universalen Schematik realen Seins, ConradMartiusiana, A.II 2, 10 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1954). Die Zeit. München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1957). Das Sein. München: Kösel.

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Conrad-Martius, H. (1963a [1934]). Existentialle Tiefe und Untiefe von Dasein und Ich. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 228–244). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963b [1931]). Was ist Metaphysik? In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 38–48). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963c [1931]). Seinsphilosophie. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 15– 31). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963e [1932]). Dasein, Substentialität, Seele. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 194–227). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963f [1931]). Sein und Nichts. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 89– 100). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1965a [1956]). Phänomenologie und Spekulation. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 370–384). München: Kösel (English translation: HCM 1959b). Conrad-Martius, H. (1965b [1956]). Über das Wesen des Wesens. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 335–356). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1965c [1956]). Wirkender und Empfangender Geist. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 295–314). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1965d [1958]). Die transzendentale und die ontologische Phänomenologie. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 393–402). München: Kösel (Printed also in: HCM 1959a). Farber, M. (1967). Phenomenology and existence: Toward a philosophy within nature. New York, Evanston and London: Harper & Row. von Hildebrand, D. (1976). Was ist Philosophie?. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer. Husserl, E. (1913). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, I (1). Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1–323 (Reprinted in: Husserl 1952; English translation: Husserl 2012). Husserl, E. (1952 [1913]). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, Erstes Buch, ed. Karl Schuhmann, Husserliana III (1). Haag: Martinus Nijhoff (English translation: Husserl 2012). Husserl, E. (1970 [1900]). Logical investigations (Vol. I; J. Findlay, Trans.). London and New York: Routledge (Translation of: Husserl 1975). Husserl, E. (1975 [1900]). Logische Untersuchungen, Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, Husserliana XVIII. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (English translation: Husserl 1970). Husserl, E. (2012 [1913]). Ideas, general introduction to pure phenomenology (W. R. Boyce Gibson, Trans.). London: Routledge (Translation of: Husserl 1952). Miron, R. (2014a). The “gate of reality”: Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ idea of reality in Realontologie. Phänomenologische Forschungen, 59–82 (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 4). Miron, R. (2014b). The realism of the transcendence: A critical analysis of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Early Ontology. The International Journal of Literary Humanities, 11(3), 37–48 (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 2). Miron, R. (2015). The vocabulary of reality. Human Studies, 38(3), 331–347 (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 5). Mohanty, J. (1977). Phenomenology: Between essentialism and transcendental philosophy. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Pfeiffer, A. E. (2005). Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Eine Phänomenologische Sicht auf Natur und Welt. Würzburg: Orbis Phenomenologicus, Königshausen and Neumann. Schmücker, F. G. (1956). Die Phänomenologie als Methode der Wesenerkenntnis, unter besondere Berücksichtigung der Auffassung der München-Göttinger Phänomenologenchule. Diss., München. Stein, E. 2005. Self portrait in letters: Letters to Roman ingarden.The Collected works of Edith Stein (Vol. XII: Hugh Candler Hunt, Trans.). Washington, D.C.: ICS publications, Institute for Carmelite Studies.

Chapter 8

The Duality of the I: A Commentary on Hedwig Conrad-Martius’s Realist Phenomenology Ronny Miron

Abstract This article deals with the duality that characterizes the idea of the I in the realist ontology of the phenomenologist Hedwig Conrad-Martius (HCM) (1880– 1966). At the basis of the discussion is the uncovering of two dimensions of duality in HCM’s perception of the I: one, appearing in her early treatise On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World (HCM, 1916b), focuses on the phenomenological dimensions of the I, and in it, she lays the critical foundations for the more developed ontological duality in HCM’s later writings that addresses the ontological aspects of the I. The later phase in HCM’s thinking of the I focuses on the spiritual I and established the simultaneous operation of two elements in it: its “originlike” nature (Ursprungshaftigkeit) and its spritualness (geistlichthafte), which is also referred to as “infrastasis” (Infrastase). The phenomenological interpretation of the idea of the I in HCM’s thinking commences with unveiling these two phases in her writing, proceeds to explicate the meaning of the I, explores them, and culminates in the illumination of the relations between them. Meanwhile, HCM’s radical response to Husserl’s turn towards transcendentalism transpires and the well-established criticisms of realistic phenomenology contemporary with Husserl regarding the lack of discussion of the issue of the ego or the I are refuted.

8.1 Introduction One of the widespread criticisms of the phenomenological realism contemporary with Edmund Husserl relates to the lack of discussion of the issue of the ego or the I. In this respect, the criticism of Brecht, which complained about the “philosophical wretchedness” of “the Munich or the realistic direction of phenomenology that did not work out the transcendental problem” is typical (Brecht, 1948, 42 n. 2). This sweeping criticism seems to be based on the presumption that the precedence granted to considerations relating to reality, as opposed, for example, to those that concern epistemological matters, leaves no room for the discussion of the I, in particular R. Miron (B) Interdisciplinary Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Miron (ed.), Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68783-0_8

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aspects relating to consciousness. A more radical idealistic stance might even argue that the I could be elucidated only within a philosophical thinking that provides it in advance with primacy over any other aspect and first and foremost over the real external reality. The discussion of the idea of the I in the realist phenomenology of Hedwig ConradMartius (HCM) (1888–1966) radically refutes the above-described criticism. HCM was the driving force within what was then called “the Munich Circle”,1 i.e., a group of young disciples from the University of Munich who gathered around Edmund Husserl in Göttingen in the 1920s and were motivated by the wish to respond to his appeal “go back to the ‘things themselves’” (Husserl, 1970a, 168/1984b, 10)— an appeal that they grasped first and foremost as indifference towards epistemological inquiries.2 Inspired by Husserl’s struggle against psychologism, relativism, and varying reductionisms (Husserl, 1970a, §23, §31/1975, §23, §31), they were convinced that objects and their modes of knowing are established upon lawfulness of essence, which is independent of the thinking subject and of consciousness in general.3 However, a major disappointment to the point of a break of the group with Husserl took place when his turn towards transcendental idealism was manifested.4 Among the members of the Munich Circle, the work of HCM presents one of the most comprehensive and radical attempts to critically respond to Husserl’s turn towards transcendentalism by means of establishing an explicit realist, phenomenology.5 The present article addresses HCM’s idea of the I, which is an inherent chapter in her philosophy of Being whose foundations she lays in “Real Ontology” (Realontoligie) (HCM, 1923). More precisely, her phenomenology of the I is established 1 The

Munich Circle included a group of intellectuals and philosophers from Munich, the first generation of phenomenologists, whose prominent members were: Alexander Pfänder, Johannes Daubert, Moritz Geiger, Theodor Conrad, Adolf Reinach, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Maximilian Beck, Max Scheler, Jean Hering, Alexander Koyré, Roman Ingarden, Edith Stein, and Hedwig Conrad-Martius. For further reading about the circle, see: Avé-Lallemant (1975). 2 This appeal is first mentioned by Husserl in Logical Investigations (Husserl, 1970b, §4, 172, §6, 174–175) and on many other occasions. HCM admits the influence of Logical Investigations on her, see: HCM (1916b, 355). This appeal is widely discussed in the literature, see: Seifert (1995), Kuhn (1969), Walther (1955), Schmücker (1956, 31). 3 See: U. Avé-Lallemant (1965/1966, 207). Husserl’s method of essence intuition (Wesenserfassung) focused on searching for the most primordial characteristics of things, or alternatively the essential “what” thanks to which they became these specific objects, while putting aside any previous theories or assumptions regarding them. For further reading on this method in relation to the realistic school of phenomenology, see: Hart (1972, 39–40), Reinach (1951, 21–73), Pfänder (1913), Pfeiffer (2005, 1–13), Schmücker (1956, 1–33), Ebel (1965, 1–25). HCM mentioned this method in many contexts, see: HCM (1916b, 346–348, 355 n. 1; 1923, 159; 1965e, 377; 1965g, 347). 4 Husserl’s transcendental turn was revealed publicly in the lectures given at Göttingen University in 1906–1907 (posthumously published as Die Idee der Phänomenologie, see: Husserl, 1950/1964) and announced in print with the publication of his Ideas in 1913 (Husserl, 1952/2012). However, the change in his thinking had occurred already in 1905. Biemel testifies that Husserl experienced a crisis in 1906 regarding the importance of his work, see: (Biemel, 1950, vii). 5 The discussion of the complex relation between HCM’s idea of the I and Husserl’s view of the ego exceeds the scope of the present article. I have referred to this issue in: Miron (2017) (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 7).

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upon her phenomenology of Being. However, this connection is mostly implicit. Furthermore, even more than her phenomenological understanding of Being, which is expressed in books that present it in rather systematic way, first and foremost Realontologie (HCM, 1923) and Das Sein (HCM, 1957), the arguments that relate to the I are scattered throughout all her writings. The first exegetical step is, then, to extricate her arguments regarding the I, including those that are implicit within her discussions of other issues, in particular of Being. Only then can one pursue the synthetic stage of piecing together all HCM’s references to the I and consolidating out of them a consistent understanding of her phenomenology of the I.6

8.2 The Dual Ontological Foundation The establishing insight in HCM’s realist ontology is that the real being is “at first positively elevated by itself from nothingness” (HCM, 1923, 181).7 Subsequent to this “elevation” from the depth of nothingness that brings about the real being, it is established on a dual structure whose elements are inseparable: the essence (die Washeit) or the “whatness” of the thing, and the “bearer” (Träger). HCM establishes that when the essence constitutes itself, it personally carries a bearer which is the filling with content of the real being (HCM, 1923, 167). The function of carrying that takes place in the real being, in its pure and formal sense, is based on “unbreakable (unzerreißbar) formal cohesion” (HCM, 1923, 179) and reciprocal relations; that is, the bearer is specified by the essence that is loaded onto it and by which it exists. At the same time, the essence is carried to the extent that it specifies its bearer. The two consolidate an absolute body or shape (Gebilde) in-itself (HCM, 1923, 167–168). In this regard, HCM portrays two simultaneous occurrences taking place within the real being. One is addressed outwards, in HCM’s words: “where the ‘bearer’ is of your own self, this means that your being operates from yourself outwardly [and arrives at] description and appearance” (HCM, 1923, 223). The second is referred to as a “substantialization inward” and consolidates the primordiality of the real being (HCM, 1923, 226) by means of which the related radical overcoming of nothingness is enabled. However, since this primordiality is essentially internal, a complete externalization will never occur in it (HCM, 1923, 216). To this extent, both internalization and externalization can never be exhausted within the real being as such. However, no contradiction exists between the two involved processes of internalization and externalization subsequently to the extrication of the real being from nothingness. HCM explains that already in the function of bearing the essence, “a 6 HCM’s

characteristic extremely loaded, vague, unsystematic, and unique style of thinking and writing, as well as her relative anonymity even to the phenomenological discourse, necessitates a detailed presentation. However, my consistent attempt to use HCM’s words throughout the exposition and discussion should not mislead readers about the exegetical work that underlies it. 7 All translations from the German original into English are mine. Emphases follow the original.

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structural element of pure elevating into being” takes place. At the same time, inasmuch as by this elevating the real being breaks through the wall of nothingness, it testifies to “an internal mode of structuring” of the real being itself (HCM, 1923, 175). This is, then, the uniqueness of the real being compared to the formal one and the material one: the formal being cannot achieve any aspect of internality, and its externality is exhausted by its intelligibility by human consciousness, whereas with material being, the power of the material being is addressed wholly outwards and, in this respect, its “body is kept outside itself” (HCM, 1923, 220). Only with the real being does the external manifestation that extricates it from nothingness at the same time denote its self-operating inwardly. In HCM’s words: One should not signify a specific aspect as external just because it exists external to me or to any other perceiving spirit, but because in-itself and for itself as such it has an essential characteristic of “externality”. This is true even if there is anyone outside who will perceive it. It will nevertheless always remain in itself outwardly constituted. To a certain extent it is “structured inwardly into to the outside”, and only this peculiar moment interests us. (HCM, 1923, 191)

Against these metaphysical insights regarding Being in general, later to be articulated as the “fundamental duality in the possible configuration of the real being” (HCM, 1957, 98), HCM consolidates her idea of the I, to which she frequently refers as “Ibeing” (ichhaftes Sein). She explains that despite its being peculiar and incomparable to any other mode of being (HCM, 1963c, 240), only “on the ground of Being itself” (HCM, 1963c, 243) or “only out of this ontological foundation” of the real being in general can “true ‘comprehension’ (Begreifung)” of the I be enabled (HCM, 1931aN, 5–6).8 However, while duality is the mechanism by which real beings come into being, i.e., the two described processes finally join together into a unity which is indeed the real being, regarding the I the same procedure results in “two substantial spheres ontologically contradicting each other totally: ‘nature’ and ‘spirit’” (HCM, 1957, 98). HCM’s dramatic contention is that these two spheres can be wholly verified as “ontically radically self-standing” despite their unification in the human concrete reality, which is not only spiritual but also material (HCM, 1957, 99). This duality echoes in two contexts of HCM’s writing to be discussed below: her early phenomenal study of the external world and her mature ontological doctrine.9 Moreover, far beyond being a mere structure, this duality also provides the framework for the phenomenological deciphering of the I in HCM’s thinking.

8 For a comprehensive account of HCM’s philosophy of Being, see: Miron (2015) (Reprinted in this

volume as Chapter 5); Miron (2014) (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 4). duality of the I is explored also in the writings in which HCM deals with the mindbody dichotomy, in which she establishes that also “the soul has two dimensions of expansion (Ausweitung): outwards and inwards”, see: HCM (1949, 1960, 1965a, 1965f). However, despite some considerable affinities with aspects that are discussed in this article, the issue of mind-body dichotomy in HCM’s thinking deserves a separate study and exceeds the scope of the present article.

9 The

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8.3 The Phenomenal Duality The question “in which real mode are ‘essences’ (Washeiten) given to us?” (HCM, 1916b, 356) at the beginning of HCM’s early book, Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt (Doctrine of Appearance) (HCM, 1916b)10 marks the first fundamental duality of her idea of reality, composed of essences and appearance or phenomenal givenness. The essence signifies an internal and “primordial” element that is determined by an a priori necessity thanks to which the object is what it is. Despite its distinction from the concrete and material reality, the essence originally belongs to a certain phenomenal state of affairs (HCM, 1916b, 349); thus, it should be revealed and illuminated by means of studying the appearance itself and will never achieve independence from this appearance.11 HCM derives from this insight the correlative distinction between the “phenomenal beginning-material” (phänomenales Anfangsmaterial), in which the essence is inherent in a “covered and distanced” manner, and the “genuine phenomenon” or “primordial phenomenon” (Urphänomen), in which the essence appears as responsible for establishing the “what” of the object or the phenomenon “steps out in complete objectivity and totality” (HCM, 1916b, 353). Against this duality typical of the phenomenal sphere, two faces of the I transpire: The “feeling-I”, as part of “feeling givenness” (Emfindungsgegebenheit) (HCM, 1916b, 400) signifies one’s experience of immediate “touching contact” (HCM, 1916b, 412) characterized also as personal affection (HCM, 1916b, 474), “pressure” (HCM, 1916b, 518), and “obtrusive givenness (distanzlosen Gegebenheit)” (HCM, 1916b, 404) of objects. HCM maintains that the sensorially given or the felt-thing12 10 This book is an exploration of the first chapter of her first essay from 1912 Die erkenntnisstheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus (HCM, 1920a), which received an award from the department of philosophy at the University of Göttingen. In 1912, Alexander Pfänder accepted Doctrine of Appearance as a Ph.D. thesis at the University of Munich (U. Avé-Lallemant, 1965/1966, 212). In 1913, the expanded chapter was printed and submitted as a dissertation, in a version almost identical to Doctrine of Appearance. 11 However, this does not make the level of facticity the ultimate context in which reality might be explicated. HCM, like other realist phenomenologists, argues that there is a “fundamental fact” according to which “the existence of non-empirical givenness actually facilitated a priori study”; see: Hering (1921). Following Husserl, these early phenomenologists were convinced that the perceived objects and the modes of their perception follow essential principles that are independent of consciousness and the subject. The principles of the oriented observation of an object were presented by Hering (1921, 495–543). HCM declares her affinity with Hering in: HCM (1923, 162). For a detailed discussion of this observation in regard to the Munich Circle, see: Avé-Lallemant (1971, 89–105), Schmücker (1956, 3–8). For further reading, see: Ales Bello (2002, 2004, 2008a, b). 12 Throughout the discussion, “felt-thing” is used to indicate what appears in the original as “quale” (mostly translated as “raw feel”) and signifies the subjective content’s experience of mental situations. This subjective aspect seems to resist any intra-subjective definition. Thomas Nagel characterizes “quale” as what “feeling itself in a certain way” (Nagel, 1974). This characterization cannot be considered as ultimately valid, because it assumes that the content of the subjective experience has already been understood. Unlike HCM, many philosophers deprived “quale” of reality. For example, see: Dennett (1993). Yet other philosophers as well as scientists regard the content of

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delivers itself as real content to the I, while the I lacks the distance that is vital for confirming its reality as part of the external world (HCM, 1916b, 412–413). Therefore, the only sensory involvement that occurs here is that of the sense of touch that is activated by the encounter of the I with an external object. In any event, the “unique mode of space-reality (Raumwirklichkeit) that is void of content yet fills itself with them” (HCM, 1916b, 381) enables the touching objects to reveal themselves to the feeling-I out of their factual existence or suchness in a concrete and unmediated manner, which is depicted also as “uncovered self-emerging” and capable of “selfannouncement” (Selbstkundgabe) (HCM, 1916b, 371).13 Despite the I possessing the space in which it experiences touching, these objects are independent of one’s experience of touch. Concomitantly, the external world appears as welling up from itself as an “uncovered lucidity” or “uncovered concreteness” (HCM, 1916b, 380). For HCM, one’s touching of material beings, which generates the experience of hardness, does not necessarily evoke one’s consciousness (HCM, 1916b, 427). Yet, she regards the felt-thing as linked back into the “world” beyond consciousness and as rooted inside it, even if this stance can be touched by or be tangent to the realm of the I (HCM, 1916b, 443).14 Therefore, she argues that despite the origins of the felt-thing in a sensory given, there is “nothing in the sensory quality that adheres real thing (qual) itself that can lead it directly and personally towards spirit, as in the case of colored or vocal appearance”. Indeed, spirit does not serve here as a “carrier (Träger) of sensory givenness” and “it does not pick up (auflesen) the feelingexistence and likewise cannot fill itself with the sensory being” (HCM, 1916b, 523). HCM explains that the separateness of consciousness’s sphere from the experience of touch (HCM, 1916b, 441) and feeling in general is due to the incapability of consciousness to encompass personally this kind of self-announcing being (HCM, 1916b, 520), which is transcendent to spirit. Simply, since consciousness does not bring about the felt-thing, it cannot be subject to its influence, i.e., become sensorially recognized (HCM, 1916b, 525). Thus, she establishes both the “principle” and “phenomenal” impossibility of “encompassing (Unangreifbarkeit) of the felt-thing ‘inside’ consciousness” (HCM, 1916b, 441–442) and depicts the absorption of the felt-thing into the I as “absolutely unspiritual” (HCM, 1916b, 526).15 the subjective experience as undoubted. See: Beckermann (2001). For further reading, see: Lewis (1991). 13 In her later writings, HCM continued to deal with the affinity between the object’s suchness and its substantial being (HCM, 1957, 57). See Gerhard Ebel’s criticism of the realistic direction in phenomenology, including HCM’s, for not being able to produce a genuine realism, which instead turns reality into a sheer “phenomenon” of reality that is therefore not real (Ebel, 1965, 2). Ebel admits that HCM brought to the fore aspects unnoticed by the realistic school. Yet, in his opinion, these are insufficient (Ebel, 1965, 42). For a supportive evaluation of this school for suggesting the suchness-experience alternative, see: Seifert (1995). Like Seifert, Heinemann also values phenomenology’s focus on appearance, see: Heineman (1960, 183–192). 14 Regarding the idea of tangentiality (Tangierbarkeit), see: Miron (2015, 337–338). 15 Spiegelberg presents the probe-resistance of objects to our will as an indication, sometimes even a strong one, of their reality, see: Spiegelberg (1975, 148). Spiegelberg’s ideas in this essay closely resemble those of HCM in Doctrine of Appearance. Obviously, he was familiar with her work, but surprisingly none of HCM’s later writings are even mentioned in his essay. However, Spiegelberg’s

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The discussion of the body in Doctrine of Appearance continues the radical withdrawal of consciousness from the realistic disposition of the feeling-I. HCM’s fundamental argument is that the unmediated pressing of the living-body (Leib) by the material content of the felt-thing makes the body become the barrier of the sensory givenness and its real element (HCM, 1916b, 525). This experience is characterized as a factual oppression of the body (HCM, 1916b, 537), to which she also refers as the “body periphery” or “from the outside inwards” (HCM, 1916b, 534). The capability of the body to “carry” the experience of the I depends upon the very fact of being a lived-body and not upon the senses or the capability to perceive objects objectively by means of consciousness or a spiritual sense (HCM, 1916b, 533). In her opinion, there is no possibility of a genuine contact between my spirit and my body. She explains that on the one hand these two are transcendent and autonomous to each other (HCM, 1916b, 437), and on the other hand spirit is “homeless” (HCM, 1916b, 446). Thus, the body appears in this context as a solid and compressed reality that turns it into “a thing” or substance, while consciousness is an ideal construct that hovers above things themselves. Moreover, the body belongs to the I, or alternatively the I “possesses” a body. To the extent that the human body possesses some typical characteristics, a specific body belongs to a specific I. Unlike consciousness, whose relatedness to the I is mediated by universal characteristics, one’s living-body belongs to that individual exclusively.16 Finally, the posture of the feeling-I that experiences touching with external reality is described as quiet, passive, and without tension in its internal being. Thus, individuals are enabled to experience what naturally comes near as unmediated by their surrounding domain. For example: “the wind that shakes me, the heat that enshrouds me, the scent that envelops me”, i.e., everything that is presupposed “to be present for me” (HCM, 1916b, 404). Accordingly, HCM demands that “I am really withdrawn into myself and as spiritual essence […] prevent the spiritual gaze” (HCM, 1916b, 409), or alternatively she requests the spirit “to disable (ausschalten) its continual effort for representation (Vorstellungsbmühung)” in order to be able to “maintain sustained and fixed the role of ‘external world reality’” (HCM, 1916b, 386–387). She clarifies that the objective quality of the felt-thing imposes on the I “absolute ‘restraint’” from direct acting (HCM, 1916b, 473). The appearance of the sensorially manifest as a whole and as such, though not its very being, becomes possible through the inhibition of spiritually living contact with the external world, namely the avoidance of a representative relation through consciousness. However, HCM’s understanding of consciousness as a mechanism that is addressed to the I from outside seems to fortify its view as a solid being possessing crystallized internality that cannot be undermined by external forces. However, exactly this solid

discussion does refer to some aspects of phenomenological realism that might be explanatory also for HCM’s position. 16 HCM’s idea of the living body belonging to the I seems to communicate the current development of personal medicine. Pfeiffer noted that one might draw lines between her basic intuitions and our time, see: Pfeiffer (2005, 15).

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internality of the I can explain the capability of the feeling-I to control and restrain its consciousness. The “perceiving-I” is consolidated in the face of the close presence of objects that are characterized as “appearance givenness” (Erscheinungsgegebenheit) (HCM, 1916b, 409) and approach the I “from a distance to here” (HCM, 1916b, 430). Whereas distance would have hindered the very existence of the experience of touch, appearances do not reach the I personally but only as long as the distance in which it is essentially rooted and fixed is preserved (HCM, 1916b, 472). HCM characterizes the objects of appearance givenness as “covert”, due to their reduced concreteness (HCM, 1916b, 416) or because of having a mere “semblance of reality” (Aussehen einer Realität) (HCM, 1916b, 441 n. 1) and “external ‘habits’ (Habitus)” of real objects, whereby they “hover” in the face of the spiritual gaze, but might carry within themselves “non-reality” (Unwirklichkeit) (HCM, 1916b, 379). The structured distance of the objects of appearance from the I is bridged by the senses that are involved in the phenomenon; hence, HCM typifies “appearance givenness” also as “sensorially manifest appearance” (sinnfällige Erscheinung) (HCM, 1916b, 409). She establishes that in the objects of appearance something is determined “through the senses” that enables their realization for the I (HCM, 1916b, 406). HCM refers here in particular to the senses of seeing and hearing, depicted as “remote senses” (Fernsinne), due to their distance and separation from what is sensed through them, i.e., “the seeable and hearable”. She contends that even when their real appearance-position is nearby me (e.g., something is ringing near my ears), sensible phenomena are always experienced as content that is kept at a distance or as “closed for themselves” (HCM, 1916b, 473). Moreover, she argues that it would never have been possible to reach the external world without the involvement of the senses, thanks to which it is noticeable without abolishing the distance from the I. Although bodily ears and eyes must be there in order for a bodily individual to be able to hear and see (HCM, 1916b, 484), the sensorially manifest appearance is not dependent on “bodily” organs—especially as they cannot serve as receptacles for objective experiences that stand in a real-transcendent relation to the I (HCM, 1916b, 480). HCM’s interest in these senses is due to there being essential and substantive “opponents” (Widerparte) for the absorption of sensible materials in general (HCM, 1916b, 484).17 Seeing and hearing are visualized as doors and windows through which the sensory given arrives “inside” the I (HCM, 1916b, 536) and characterized as “spiritual senses” or “spiritual organs” that possess a specific openness to a certain objective mode of manifestation that is responsible for the presentation of the sensorially manifest appearance (HCM, 1916b, 484). So, we experience from inside the 17 Spiegelberg contends: “Ultimately, all these organs are themselves phenomena of reality and so are the causal links between them”. This statement illuminates the problem with which HCM deals here as follows: “Is there a way back […] from the retina via the cortex and the mental processes to the original object outside which supposedly started the whole chain of physical and physiological processes?” This problem “makes sense only on the assumption that the physical objects, as the ‘stimuli’ for our sense perception, our sense organs, and the physiological process within, are ascertained realities [… and] as long as it is possible to know some real objects themselves” (Spiegelberg, 1975, 150–151).

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eyes and ears, as the “body’s gateways” or as the “body’s openness”, the enabling of immediate contact between the spiritual-living I and the external and sensible world. Therefore, had we destroyed these bodily positions towards the external world, the body as such would have become closed for us (HCM, 1916b, 492). Seeing and hearing are described as “filling” and “spreading” in the sense appropriate to them, unlike the “empty, free, and accidental” stance of the felt-thing or that of the livingspirit when it turns to another subject. This is why there is no place for an analogy between them and the sensorially manifest appearance (HCM, 1916b, 521–522). HCM summarizes the genuine meaning of the term “sensory manifestation” (Sinnfälligkeit) as follows: the sensible is exactly what breaks into the senses, meaning that it “can specifically give itself to them” (HCM, 1916b, 486). The sensory involvement entailed in one’s experience of objects that are remote from the I is indeed part of consciousness’s participation that might compensate for the lack of unmediated access to them. The depiction of the disposition of the I in regard to the object’s sensorially manifest appearance as “filling” (HCM, 1916b, 510) means, then, that consciousness grants them content and meaning. Thus, for example, the perceiving-I has considerable involvement in the real validation of covert objects. In fact, the I grants the objects of perception their concreteness, though their very reality is indubitable and independent of such validation (HCM, 1916b, 411–412).18 Indeed, the I is the one who is forced by the appearance of the sensible being to see what surrounds it to the extent that one cannot “resist” oneself by closing one’s eyes (HCM, 1916b, 411). While the experience of appearing (Erscheinungserlebnis) is not dependent on the solidity of the constituent bodies having meaning for the I (HCM, 1916b, 406), the demand for distance regarding the sensorially manifest appearance harbors at the same time the possibility of grasping or receiving them by means of consciousness. In HCM’s words: “Existence is given objectively only when it is possessed at a ‘distant position’, when it is perceived or accepted by the I, yet it still remains separated from it and closed for itself”. In other words, when approaching an object in order to represent it, consciousness must detach it from itself and position it against itself (HCM, 1916b, 470). The autonomy of the sensible over against the perceiving-I is considered by HCM as a necessary precondition to ensure the possibility of achieving objectivity in regard to the real external world. She explains that the felt-thing keeps its being “for itself” inasmuch as obviously every real-being has being “for-itself” (HCM, 1916b, 471– 472). Indeed, thanks to this objective form, it can be accessible to experience at all. HCM establishes that even the experience of perception, in which the I is active, is not accidental but follows the nature and the mode of appearance of the feltthing, in which it is sensorially manifest as “appearance-like” (erscheinungshaft) and is experienced as self-standing. She insists that as a living-spirit one can pose or grasp things, but not sensorially observe them, since the observational basis of the 18 HCM determines that our accidental perception of the external world cannot define it, and the possibility of looking into the reality of space as such “exists above and beyond all obstacles” (HCM, 1916b, 393). Like HCM, Spiegelberg also argues that genuine phenomena are not influenced by theoretical or other interpretations, while untrue phenomena collapse as soon as their falsification is uncovered. See: Spiegelberg (1975, 164).

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sensory given lacks any spiritually living aspect, or alternatively, an unbridgeable gap separates the spiritual achievement and the sensory given. Moreover, the appearance of the sensorially manifest as a whole and as such, though not its very being, becomes possible through the inhibition of spiritually living contact with the external world. That is to say, the manifest sensible is adequately absorbed by means of hearing and seeing without any considerable involvement of the spirit of the I (HCM, 1916b, 479), which HCM calls “dead relations to givenness (ein tot Verhältniss zur Gegebenheit)” (HCM, 1916b, 488). At the same time, HCM establishes that the specific mode of announcing must meet, so to speak, the appropriate possibility of perception that is ontically rooted in the spiritual-I, meaning that is not a result of a momentary influence of the livingspirit. In this regard, she refers to the senses as “essentially required ‘opponents’ (Widerparte) for any reception of sensorially manifest materials in general” (HCM, 1916b, 484). She maintains that the sensorially manifest appearance is “noticeable through personal pressing against consciousness’s periphery”, where the spirit is no longer directed by the senses to the external world (HCM, 1916b, 498). The difficulty in achieving a grip on the appearing thing concerns this gap between the sensory given and the being the I. While the first “raises from itself” the claim of its real and factual existence (HCM, 1916b, 422), the second is that which “among all real existences is the only that can be possessed by means of an in-itself ‘pulled back’ spirit-holding (zurückgebundener Geisterhaltung)” (HCM, 1916b, 473). A spiritual being is required to act against spirit itself that is “focused away from itself (fortkonzentriert)” (HCM, 1916b, 499). Therefore, only when sensible beings are experienced in an appearance-like concreteness of-themselves and for-themselves might they be received adequately (HCM, 1916b, 478). Yet, in the absence of the involvement of the spiritual-I, the sensible being appears as lacking the “depth” (Tiefe), “rootedness” (Gegründetheit), and “rounding” (Abrundung) that could have been granted to it only by means of spiritually living perception (HCM, 1916b, 479). Finally, the autonomy of sensorially manifest appearing over spirit and the acknowledgment of the essentiality of active involvement of consciousness in regard to the appearances’ givenness are combined in the characterization of consciousness as a “spiritually dead acceptance” (eine geistige tote Entgegennahme) of sensible beings (HCM, 1916b, 490). HCM describes “a natural grasping-range” (Natürliche Greifweite) that enables spirit to conceive sensible beings through the senses as “dead” “situational-achieving” (Zustandsleistung) when the spiritually living contact with the sensory manifestation of the external world collapses (HCM, 1916b, 495). The capability of the senses to be equipped with a natural grasping-range, which facilitates the related “dead acceptance”, enables regarding the senses as the genuine and personal bearers of sensible beings (HCM, 1916b, 497). “Natural” means here that there is no need for a special momentary act by spirit, but the involvement of the senses can suffice (HCM, 1916b, 495). Moreover, the living-spirit can never rule an observation that has established itself as “dead acceptance”. In spite of that, the felt-thing might be reached only if it encompasses itself with a kind of blindness to forms of perception, and when the senses “express” nothing from the perception of a unified world (HCM, 1916b, 477–478). The “capturing” of the sensorially manifest

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appearance itself and for-itself occurs “from itself”, or alternatively from the natural grasping-range that replaces the momentary achievement of the living-spirit (HCM, 1916b, 496). The “spiritually dead acceptance” by consciousness is merely the fixed reception of the thing that presents itself in its objective self-presentation. This appearance is experienced by the I as having no context, partly thanks to the appearance of the sensible being as an in-itself and for-itself fact (HCM, 1916b, 481). This context-less acceptance does not contradict the fact that the same I stands in the two experiences as the bearer of givenness’ experiences and as the recipient of what appears in them. Yet, since in each of them the I experiences itself from different places, they are considered as lacking context (HCM, 1916b, 482 n. 1). HCM clarifies that indeed it is not the spirit itself that dies in the acceptance. Quite the opposite, the spirit is living and awake and conceives a world different from the externally sensible one, but the sensorially manifest appearance is what dies in it. However, also in this shape of spirit, it is sufficient for the realization of the sensorially manifest appearance (HCM, 1916b, 490).

8.4 The Ontological Duality The ontological duality of the I is mostly apparent in HCM’s discussion of the spiritual essence of man. HCM describes spirit as subject to “a primordial movement (Urbewegung)” (HCM, 1965h, 295) between two elements that comprise its substantive and ontological essence (HCM, 1957, 98) and project it into a “dualistic existential primordial dynamic (Urdynamik)” (HCM, 1957, 129) that consolidates the spiritualI. The first element characterizes the I as follows: “It is very much so and a mere self, to the extent that it cannot get out of itself or out of its own origin (Ursprung): it is entirely origin, depth, ground level, abyss” (HCM, 1965h, 295). As pure origin, the spiritual-I cannot have any “outside itself”. Rather, its own “origin-adhering” (Ursprungshaftigkeit) signifies its being fundamentally inside-itself (HCM, 1965h, 296) or its selfness (Selbsthaftigkeit). Yet, this selfness differs from the one that typifies material beings or any other form of animality. While the material being is “carried as substrate-full (substrathaft)” (HCM, 1957, 131), or alternatively it is “substrate-full” substantiality that is eventually realized outwardly, the selfness of the I is person-full (personhafte) being (HCM, 1963c, 242). This personal nature is its directedness to itself and it determines the ontological condition of the I ultimately “towards Being” (hin zum Sein) (HCM, 1963c, 235, 237) to the point of “being incapable to escape from Being, inescapably renouncing and surrendering (ausgeliefert)” to it (HCM, 1963c, 236). Therefore, as long as the I delves into the entanglements of its own being, nothing but itself will be found there. HCM depicts as something strange (Merkwürdig) the fact that one’s “self-adhering relation to Being” (selbsthaftes Verhältnis zum Sein) or “self-capability of being its own being” (Selber-Können-des-eigenen-Seins) is “developed positively inside oneself”. In Conrad-Martius’ view, this manifests itself in the state of affairs in which we

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“find no other realized Being (Sein) or suchness (Sosein)” within the I, which we regard “as the genuine embodiment (Ausgestaltung) of this ontic fundamental capability itself ” (HCM, 1957, 128). By means of what is referred to as the personal capability-for-Being (persönlische Seinsvermögen) of the I, it constitutes the real existentiality as belonging to it. The personal capability-for-Being (persönlische Seinsvermögen) peculiar to the I takes part in its constitution as possessing real existentiality whose “being-full selfness (seinshafte Selberkeit) that is characterized as personal power-of-Being (persönliche Seinsmacht) from the bottom” (HCM, 1957, 128). This element of origin-like nature of spirit consolidates the firmest foundation of the I-being and falls in line with its characterization as “static”, “spiritual-material (geiststofflich)” (HCM, 1965h, 302) and as a “receiving-spirit (empfangender Geist)” upon which concepts, words, and phenomena are transferred. HCM explains that despite being static, resting in-itself, and directed towards itself, the receiving-spirit is always shaped anew by the intelligible reality and becomes this reality itself. This could not have happened if the spiritual-material did not have the capability for becoming manifest by the light of spirit (Geistlicht) (HCM, 1965h, 312).19 In any event, HCM considers the receiving-spirit as a tabula rasa that it is capable of being filled, among others, by the eternal ideas of reality (HCM, 1965h, 313) or an appropriate observer of pure essences. The second element of spirit is described as spritualness (geistlichthafte) (HCM, 1965h, 302) and as “infrastasis (Infrastase)”, which indicates the capability of the spiritual-I to be directed to something which is not itself. In HCM’s words: “it belongs to the most genuine constitutive-existential essence of the I-being and thus to the spiritual being, to elevate itself above and outside itself (über sich selbst hinauszusteigen), or rather to be always already what elevates itself (Gesteigener) above itself outwardly. Indeed, the I-being cannot exist (sein) at all but in this elevation-above (Übersteigenheit), or being beyond itself (Jenseitigkeit)” (HCM, 1963c, 230–231). This elevation of the I-being concerns exactly “the factual power of Being (Seinsmacht) for infrastasis possesses by the spiritual” (HCM, 1965h, 296) that is essential for its own substantial constitution (HCM, 1957, 140). In this regard, spirit is portrayed as “such that itself it truly elevated”, in short: as “free of its own self, self-less (selbstlos)” (HCM, 1965h, 298) and as “totally empty of itself down to its most internal ground” (HCM, 1965h, 296). HCM establishes that “the pure infrastatic condition (Verfassung) allows no preserved ‘opposite’ (Gegenüber), by which it could become illuminated for itself” (HCM, 1965h, 310). In her early work, she characterizes the spiritual-being as such that it “helps its bearer (Träger) to a certain natural situation of transcendence” to the extent that “an executive act or ‘salto mortale’ is not needed” (HCM, 1916b, 408). Later on, she will depict the I as already “dwelling in the ‘transcendence’” that is in no way “alienated or remote” from it (HCM, 1963c, 231). This insight is then crystallized as the perception that the infrastatic nature of the I-being is imprinted 19 For further reading regarding the idea of “light” (Licht) in HCM’s thinking, see: (1965c), Pfeiffer (2005, 61–66).

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in its very existence, and that a projecting-against (Gegen-wurf ) (HCM, 1957, 129) and “existential objectification” (existenziellen Objizierung) (HCM, 1957, 130) take place in it due to the “absolute self-transcendence” that is established in the I. Consequently, the I-being “stands against itself” (HCM, 1957, 126) and thus manifests its “original existential capability to create by itself” what stands against it (HCM, 1957, 129). Obviously, the self-transcending of the I-being involves transcendental activity, and as such, it enables it to achieve a grip on objectivity (HCM, 1957, 140). HCM clarifies that this objectifying activity “is not cognition” (Erkenntniss) (HCM, 1965h, 299), but lies in “an existential ground-level (Ungrund) of its own self” that essentially belongs to the spiritual-I (HCM, 1957, 131). That is to say that the various expressions HCM employs, such as “infrastatic”, “self-transcending”, and “objectification”, concern the ontological structure of the I-being and not with its peculiar and even exclusive mental capabilities as such. The characteristics of transcending and openness towards what exists beyond the I-being fall in line with regarding the infrastatic element of the spiritual-I as an “influencing-spirit” (wirkender Geist), since within it spirit exists due to its capability to exercise an influence without having inside itself something to be posed against what it receives. In her opinion, the big secret of the deep penetration of intelligibility lies in the fact that the influencing-spirit is filled with the logos (HCM, 1965h, 308) of the real world (HCM, 1965h, 311). Yet, since the world’s colorful fullness is removed from the influencing-spirit, it is described as “‘floating’ richness” (‘schwebende’ Erfühltheit) with the logos (HCM, 1965h, 309) or as “suspended” (in der Schwebe gehaltene) materiality of spirit (Geiststofflichkeit) in itself (HCM, 1965h, 312). HCM visualizes that the fullness of logos can be there only as “enrolled”, in which all forms of essence (Wesensformen) are just modes in which the light of spirit is totally elevated by itself and returns to itself within pure objectivity and intelligibility (HCM, 1965h, 311–312). Thanks to these forms of essence that are inherent in the influencing-spirit, it matches exactly the reality that is comprehensible and conceivable to the I. In this wonderful internal mechanism, or rather the intra-spiritual analogous process, the pure objectivity of empirical reality is verified, and this is especially through the other side of spirit, which is anchored in the most profound subjectivity! At the same time, the subjective root of consciousness also provides the possibility of objective and a priori knowing of essence (HCM, 1965h, 313). Although the personal-spiritual nature of the I-being is independent of one’s search for objective foundation in existence, we are dealing here with a “stage” (Stufe) that existed beforehand in human beings and is principally deeper than anything spiritual and psychological; either one is aware of it or not (HCM, 1957, 136). As much as consciousness is involved in the directedness of the I-being to the beyond, the spirituality that facilitates the infrastasis is enabled “only because the human I with the primordial constitution (Urkonstitution) of its existence [that] is grounded in its ground level origin (ungründigen Ursprung)” (HCM, 1957, 137–138). Therefore, the I-being becomes what it is through this very experience, elsewhere referred to as “complete free self-elevation (Selbsterhebung)” (HCM, 1965h, 296)—a movement that might be considered also as towards itself. HCM designates as “miracle of Being (Seinswunder)” (HCM, 1965h, 296) the state of affairs in which the infrastasis is anchored in the I and takes place inside it is

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capable of widening the I yet without tearing it from itself. That is to say that also in the infrastatic experience of spirit, one not only continues to be unceasingly oneself, but also especially through it one becomes an individual person.

8.5 Discussion The recurrence of the phenomenon of the duality of the I in two different studies raises the fundamental hermeneutical question regarding the influence of the context of the study on the shape of its object. It makes sense that if the different studies are addressed to a real phenomenon, an essential common ground should be revealed in the different studies of the same objective. Indeed, this assumption is confirmed in the phenomenal and ontological studies in HCM’s writings and thus might indicate the reality of the I under discussion. Already at first glance one realizes the essential common ground of both descriptions of the I: the phenomenal and the ontological. Firstly, both studies presuppose the existence of personal and internal space within the being of the I that shows a considerable sustainability over the external reality. Thus, in her depiction of the feeling-I, she emphasizes the personal manner in which the external world reaches me (HCM, 1916b, 378, 447), the accompanying “restraint” (Zurückhaltung) (HCM, 1916b, 473), and the belonging of the body to the experience of the I “in its entire totality” (HCM, 1916b, 447). In general, HCM clarifies, in order to “experience” the external world or for this world to “be there for me”, one does not need to “get out of oneself” or renounce the aforementioned restraint (HCM, 1916b, 404). Moreover, in her opinion, the I enjoys “concrete possession (Haben)” of the space in which he or she exists for itself (HCM, 1916b, 380). In the same way, the spiritual-I is depicted as “origin-like” nature that as such one is fundamentally by-itself and “personal accent” (persönlicher Akzent) (HCM, 1957, 127). Here, personality means one’s being wholly itself. Just as the passivity of the I on the phenomenal plane has meaning and value thanks to one’s possession of internal space, so also the spiritual-I is a receiving-spirit due to its characteristic origin-like nature. This passivity of the feeling-I is an aspect of the nature typical of the spiritual-I. In this regard, passivity contains then also the characteristic of “receiving” or “acceptance” typical of it. At the same time, a resemblance is recognizable between the perceiving-I and the spiritual I, or, alternatively, between the activity of the perceiving-I and the influencing-spirit of the I. As demonstrated above, in both the phenomenal and the ontological contexts, activity expressed the fundamental openness towards the surrounding objects that is common to the feeling-I and the spiritual I and enables the bridging between the I and the external world and reality in general. In the phenomenal context, HCM characterizes the senses of seeing and hearing as “open I-position” (offene Ichstellen) (HCM, 1916b, 506) and the body as open towards the material felt-things (HCM, 1916b, 529). Likewise, the spiritual I is characterized as endowed with radical (HCM, 1963c, 235) original openness-towards-Being

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(Seinsoffenheit) (HCM, 1963e, 95). Just as the spirit that is involved in the experience of perceiving is characterized as such that has “been deprived (entzogen) of its own place” (HCM, 1916b, 446), so the spiritual I is characterized as infrastatic, i.e., possessing the above-discussed capability of elevating itself and addressing what is not itself (HCM, 1965h, 296). Also, HCM’s requirement that the perceiving consciousness is able to remove the object from itself and posit it over itself (HCM, 1916b, 470) resonates in her determination that the uniqueness of spiritual-being lies in the very fact that due to its being an origin of its own it has an ontological capability to be totally free of itself or “in no way is burdened down by itself (sich belastet)” (HCM, 1965h, 296). Finally, the perceiving-I and spiritual I share the directedness to the transcendent. Thus, in the phenomenal study, HCM establishes that “the spiritual-I does not live only by itself but also in a world strange to the I (ichfremde Welt)” (HCM, 1916b, 408). Accordingly, she demands that the I carry out “accomplishment of transcendence” (Transzendenzleistung), namely: to constitute a relation towards an in-itself closed being while keeping a distance from it. This demand is accepted later in her writings, where, as demonstrated above, the I as such is depicted as one who already “dwells in the ‘transcendence’” (HCM, 1963c, 231). Especially, the “openness” that is crucial for establishing a relation towards the transcendent from the side of livingspirit enables it to stand before what is sealed in-itself without violating the distance that lies between the I and world of the appearing objects. This last element, which is common to HCM’s understanding of the I in both contexts in her writings, joins those discussed above. Especially the recurrence of the same structure in two separate studies from different time periods is supportive of the possibility that the duality relates to the essence of the I and is not derivative of a specific perspective that HCM addressed to the matter, but is foundational to her view in general. Nevertheless, it is also apparent that both studies of the I in HCM’s writings do not overlap each other; otherwise, one of them would have been redundant. Instead, a development from the phenomenal study of the I to the ontological one takes place. In this respect, a few aspects should be briefly indicated. First and foremost, there is a development regarding the importance that is bestowed upon the issue of the I in both studies. It is clear that the discussion of the issue of the I within the study of the external world’s appearing modes is rather marginal, as indicated by HCM herself (HCM, 1916b, 541–542). It appears that this marginality is prescribed already by the understanding of the external world as real existence (HCM, 1916b, 386), an absolute and independent being (HCM, 1916b, 391–392), autonomous and absolute (HCM, 1916b, 392), closed in-itself and transcendent to human consciousness and spirit (HCM, 1916b, 424), and as such in-itself imposes limits on observation (HCM, 1916b, 383).20 However, in HCM’s later writings, the issue of the I is inherent 20 HCM clarifies here the difference between her view of reality and the one prevalent in positivism, in which “‘reality’ can be reached only through acts of consciousness that somehow relate […] to objects” HCM (1916b, 390 n.1). The subtitle “associated with a critique of positivistic theories”, as well as the debate with positivism throughout the text (HCM, 1916b, 345–347, 352, 357–358, 361–365, 378, 382–386, 390–391, 398–400, 423, 425), clearly indicates the roots of Doctrine of Appearance in the work that preceded it.

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and sometimes even central to the discussion.21 So, the elucidation of the feelingI and the perceiving-I is derived from the analysis of the two intentional spheres: “representation” (Vorstellung), whose objects are close and tangible and “perception” (Wahrnehmung), composed of remoted objects whose tangibility is reduced. These objects that are addressed to the I from outside shape one’s modes of response to them.22 In contrast, the ontological characteristics of “origin-like” nature and “spirit-ness” are anchored from the outset in the I as self-standing real fullness that is independent of the objects towards which these objects are directed. Thus, the feeling-I is “oppressed” and “pressed” (HCM, 1916b, 518) by an external object that has “touching contact” (HCM, 1916b, 412) with it, and thus eradicates the distance that separates the I from the world of objects. This aspect is apparent also within the discussion of the body that is presented as a solid and compressed reality that turns it into “a thing” or substance, while consciousness is regarded as an ideal construct that hovers above things themselves. To this extent, the human body inheres the “capability” (Können) that characterizes beings as such.23 In any event, HCM’s discussion of the body well demonstrates the shift from oppression, whose origin is external (the felt-thing), into the understanding of origin-like nature of the I as its primordial ontological feature. An additional development is apparent in regard to the discussion of consciousness within the illumination of the being of the I. One cannot miss the remarkable cautiousness in HCM’s discussion of the I within the phenomenal study of the external world. So, unlike the general characterization of consciousness as capable of obtaining its objects within itself by means of what is referred to as “illuminating ray of consciousness” (Bewußtseinsstrahl), “something is made noticeable as independent from its real position” (HCM, 1916b, 456), namely as something that is directed to the feeling from outside. This experience is enabled thanks to “the always indispensable existing residue (Rest) of contact taking place between the sphere of consciousness” and that of feeling givenness (HCM, 1916b, 461). Even in regard to the perceiving-I, in which the involvement of consciousness is structured, HCM seems to harness consciousness in a restricted and accurate manner to the realistic grounding of the sensorially manifest appearing. She establishes that the specific mode of announcing must meet or encounter, so to speak, the appropriate possibility of “perception” that is ontically

21 HCM (1930 N; 1930–1932aN; 1930–1932bN; 1932bN; 1954, 11–13; 1957, 118–141; 1963a, c, d). 22 HCM was one of the phenomenologists who proclaimed “the turn to the object” (Die Wende nach Objekt), which implied the reconsideration of the idea of “intention” as it appeared in Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen. Moritz Geiger well characterized this orientation as seeking “what is in front of the I, the object” that underlies “the tension between the I and the object” (Geiger, 1933, 13). For further reading, see here also: Becker (1930), Vendrell Ferran (2008, 71–78). 23 HCM establishes that whatever “by itself cannot” is incapable of anything else, unlike the real, which is the only thing that “essentially can” (das einzig Könnende) (HCM, 1923, 177). Thus, reality is first fulfilled where the operation of being proclaims the power-stream of the being in concern (HCM, 1923, 223). See the discussion in: Miron (2015, 336–337) (The entire article is reprinted in this volume as Chapter 5).

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rooted in the spiritual-I, meaning that is not a result of a momentary influence exerted by the living-spirit (HCM, 1916b, 484). The motive behind this entangled approach to consciousness within the phenomenal study might be found in HCM’s argument that the knowledge of the external world cannot rest on the living-spirit because it inserts into the sensorially manifest appearing “improvements” that extend what reveals itself through seeing and hearing. Consequently, the presented surface of the felt-thing “becomes looser” and the latent content that underlies it comes to the fore. Now the sensorially manifest appearance is granted “depth” that enables it to appear before the pure observation as filled from the inside. However, the content that fills the sensorially manifest appearance does not belong to the sensory material itself anymore, and therefore, it cannot be regarded as given (HCM, 1916b, 494). Simply, the internal is not apparent and thus is incapable of appearance, since the living-spirit changes the initial given as it inserts it into a unified, meaningful, and contextual world. It appears that the epistemological value that might be derived from the involvement of living-spirit deposits upon the felt-thing internal elements of spirit itself. While these elements are external to real being as such, they assimilate it into the living-spirit and thus disrupt the transcendent externality that is decisive in the grounding of the external world as real. Nevertheless, within HCM’s ontological study, consciousness cannot appear as a threat. The importance of the involvement of the aspect of consciousness in the ontological study is necessitated for the view of the entirety of existents (Vorhandenes) in the world as possessing an objective sence, hence the essential bond of ontology with intelligibility (HCM, 1965g, 336). Accordingly, HCM asserts that the achievements of spirit are but the related “forms of essence”. Hence, as much as they originate from the hidden depth of the human spirit and describe the intelligible experience of spirit in its selfness, HCM argues they are shaped by the objective logos of the real world (HCM, 1965h, 311–312). Whereas within the phenomenal study consciousness seems as “invading” the realm of appearing of the feeling-I and the perceiving-I, within the ontological study of the spirit-ness of the I, an understandable and central part is allocated to consciousness. To some extent, HCM’s discussion of consciousness in Doctrine of Appearance is required by her early polemic with the positivism. At that stage her view of consciousness moves between two forms of relation to senses—“dead” within which consciousness can enable sensed things to remain peripheral and accept appearings that are addressed to it from outside, and “living” as consciousness manifests her peculiar capability for consolidating the sense of appearings. However, in her later writing, she explores, in connection with her discussion of the spiritual-I, a more mature view of consciousness that establishes its secure status within her phenomenological realism. Thus, whereas at first the activity manifested by the perceiving-I is operated by objects that approach it “from a distance to here” (HCM, 1916b, 430), the spiritual-I possesses an inherent openness, implied also in its capability for infrastasis, that typifies it as anchored “forwards” (HCM, 1957, 126). HCM clarifies that the case is not of first the positing of

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the I-being and then achieving the openness towards Being, but openness (Geöffnetsein) towards Being is radical and determines the essence of the I as a real thing (HCM, 1963c, 235). The enhancement of the understanding of the I reaches its peak in HCM’s discussion of the relation between the two composing elements of the spiritual-I. While the phenomenal study in Doctrine of Appearance lacks any discussion of the relation between the feeling-I and the perceiving-I, within her later discussion of the spiritual-I, HCM depicts as “wonder” the state of affairs in which the spiritual as infrastatic self-full being, i.e., especially as being beyond itself, arrives at itself without ceasing being itself even for a single moment (HCM, 1965h, 296). Undoubtedly, the infrastatic character of the spiritual-I evokes a special difficulty for the thesis of the duality of the I, since by indicating the human capability to posit oneself outwards, the possibility of detaching itself, i.e., the nullification of the origin-like nature of the I, is questioned. A possible response to this possibility might be found in HCM’s determination that the infrastatic character of spirit in no way signifies selfnegation or internal contradiction within the being of spirit (HCM, 1965h, 298). This means that also in elevating itself above, sometimes even depicted by HCM herself as one who “has lost its own pure and free self” (HCM, 1965h, 296), spirit continues to be a self-full being that is verified as an origin of its own (HCM, 1965h, 298). Hence, so it appears, the spiritual-I in the infrastatic condition is located exactly at the “middle” (Mittelpunkt) of itself, in which the I is moving between self-abandoning and being self-devoted backwards. This enables it to return to itself from any point in which it elevates itself towards a transcendent reality (HCM, 1965h, 296; see also: HCM, 1965f, 111). In this spirit, HCM establishes that the I “as existent elevates itself towards its own being and therein exactly becomes itself an existent. By means of its personal capability-for-Being (persönlisches Seinsvermögen) it constitutes its own real-being, its own existentiality” (HCM, 1957, 129). It appears, then, that the infrastatic character is the ultimate expression of the personality of the spiritual-I and in no way can be considered an undermining force upon it. Moreover, the infrastatic character of the spiritual-I transpires as the operating and preserving mechanism for duality as a fundamental structure of the I. In this respect, the understanding of the I that is consolidated in the ontological study of the I is more mature compared to that implicit within the phenomenal study that precedes it. As much as the above-depicted developments delineate the genealogy of HCM’s thinking, which after Doctrine of Appearance turned declaredly (HCM, 1963c, 230– 231)24 to ontological studies in which HCM achieved the critical insights for her metaphysics, they reflect what she considered as the principle track of genuine phenomenological study, in her words: Neither the “covered” (verhüllten) primordial phenomena (Urphänomene) nor especially the perceived ideas lie themselves on the concealed in the “bare surface of the mere appearances” (baren Erscheinungsoberfläch). Accordingly, the work required here can thereby nevermore 24 In the epilogue added to the special print in 1920, HCM established her shift to ontology-oriented studies and seems to know that her original plan to develop the rest of the chapters in her essay on positivism will not be realized (HCM, 1920b, 130. See here also: Avé-Lallemant, 1971, 213).

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be achieved, so that through passive observation that is devoted to the plane of appearing, one perceives descriptively the directly obvious phenomenal differences, and be it also down to the finest nuances. On the other hand, from this “surface-appearance” […] only the present essence-holdings (Wesensbestände) that are present de facto, to which the surfaceappearances lead through a respective precise analysis as to its own foundation must also emerge. (HCM, 1916b, 353–354)

From HCM’s point of view, the phenomenal plane is the critical starting point for phenomenological study in general, due to the original belonging of this whatness (Washeit) to a certain phenomenal state of affairs (HCM, 1916b, 349). However, the study cannot be exhausted at this level since the essences are given on the phenomenal plane in a “concealment (Verhültheit) and remoteness (Ferne)” manner. Instead, the need for “one’s addressing of a direct and undeterred gaze at phenomena in their “pure ‘what (Was)’” (HCM, 1916b, 352) can be answered by the ontological study, which focuses exactly on the “pure and general essence of existence” (HCM, 1963c, 231) and not on a specific mode of being. In any event, the insights that were achieved in the riper study do not obviate those that were uncovered within the phenomenal one. On the contrary, the two studies join together in the fortifying of the dual conception in HCM’s philosophy of the I.

8.6 Epilogue The phenomenological nature of the suggested interpretation of HCM’s philosophy of the I obliges us to avoid finding satisfaction in overt constructions from philosophical thinking, even if these are the indispensable part in any philosophizing. Yet, after this stage or even simultaneously with it, one should seek contact with the less manifest layers of the phenomenon under discussion and search for their resonance in other areas of philosophical thinking. In this context, this means that the ultimate grounding of the issue of duality of the I should find a support in the wider infrastructure of HCM’s phenomenological thinking. I argue that the deep source of the development of HCM’s dual understanding of the I is inherent in her criticism of contemporary idealistic thinking, which she regarded as aggrandizing the human subject by means of anchoring it in a “close subjective ring of generated and recognized phenomenality” (HCM, 1965d, 261). HCM explains that the identifying mark of the idealist worldview (HCM, 1963b, 35) is the split between Being and seeing, and the filling of “abyss (Abgrund)” between the “mere appearing” and with the knowing reason (HCM, 1963f, 18). Consequently, so she contends, a “de-substantialization” of existence occurred, in which the real became ideal (HCM, 1963b, 36), was subordinated to epistemological demands and lost its independency. HCM admits that this idealistic approach, originating from the hubris of human spirit, which put the knowing subject at the center is “aggressive” and “tiring” and that she wishes “to return back again to the objective fundaments of true experience and knowledge” (HCM, 1965d, 261–262). Elsewhere, she responds to Karl Jaspers’

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thinking that all separations are lost in the “encompassing” (Das Umgreifende) of life, as follows: In truth, it is so that the “splittings” (Spaltungen) are lost in it [Jaspers’ “the encompassing”]. On the contrary: they are it, in them the encompassing psychic self operates, expressed; whether it is deepening inside itself as in the realm of the affective soul, or it externalizes itself out of itself outwards in the genuine sense, as in the case of the body-mind realm; or also it is above and upwards itself – and elevated outwards – like in the just discussed case if the spiritual. […] all is so clearly arranged. (HCM, 1965a, 137)25

The above-expressed unequivocal negative stance towards any attempt to dissolve the duality, not only of the I but also of any sort of existence in general, appears to be HCM’s concise response to the various Husserlian attempts to maintain the centrality of the transcendental ego as the decisive element in any philosophical understanding. As opposed to his insistence on absoluteness that might be fulfilled only within the realm dominated by a single element, in this case by consciousness, HCM identifies a primordial duality. In fact, she rejects Husserl’s transcendental argument while leaning on his shoulders. At first, she accepts his claim that “nulla ‘re’ indigent ad existendum” (Husserl, 1952, §49 104/2012, §49 94), in the sense that immanent being is absolute, as it never brings any “thing” to being. Yet, she derives from this principle a fundamentally opposed conclusion. Namely, since what is established as an absolute being is fundamentally opposite to any other reality, within the framework of absolute consciousness “the real should collapse” (HCM, 1916aN, 2).26 Then, she asks rhetorically “but where does the world remain?” (HCM, 1965e, 371)27 and wonders about Husserl’s sacrifice of “world belief” in favor of the pure study of the world, arguing that “what’s odd is, then, that here absolute and indubitable judgments about factual being, about the present at-hand (Vorhandenheiten), 25 For

Karl Jaspers’ idea of “the encompassing”, see: Miron (2006; 2012, 185–225). refers to Husserl’s phrase “nulla ‘re’ indigent ad existendum” on several occasions, see: HCM (1916b, 1, 3; 1963a, 195; 1963c, 229). In connection to the first mention in 1916, which is considered as an indication of HCM’s response to Husserl’s Ideas I (Husserl 1952/2012), Stein indicates (in a letter to Ingarden from 9 April 1917) that HCM’s “notes on the question of Idealism […] are however, not a refutation of Husserl’s position. In fact, the main argument seems to me to be based on a misunderstanding of his exposition” (Stein, 2005, 58). However, this evaluation of Stein’s seems to communicate her general attitude to Husserl’s phenomenology than illuminated HCM’s view of the matter, which in this regard can be encapsulated in her fundamental “thesis of existence (Daseinsthesis)” that she discussed throughout the entire early manuscript (HCM, 1916aN, 5–8, 11–12). Moreover, HCM further elaborates this thesis in her subsequent writings that were established on the “unbridgeable and absolute opposition between real being and nothing” (HCM, 1923, 162; see here also: HCM, 1963e, 93–94) and on the postulate that “real existence is not one ‘form of existence’ (Daseinsform) among others but something plainly and absolutely new thing (Neues)” (HCM, 1923, 163). Finally, HCM’s explicit rejection of Husserl’s transcendental reduction in favor of her above-discussed idea of real reality (wirkich Wirklichkeit) clarifies her dismissal of the most essential foundation of his Idealism, which she depicts as “hypothetically bracketing the real Being and thereby seeing the world (in the reduction) stripped (enthoben) of the real reality (wirkich Wirklichkeit)” (HCM, 1965b, 397). 27 HCM, along with the realist phenomenologists, rejected Husserl’s phenomenological reduction. See: HCM (1963f, 19–24; 1963c, 228–230; 1963g, 43). See also: Pfeiffer (2005, 31–32). 26 HCM

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can be made pleasing” (HCM, 1963f, 20).28 In the same spirit, she postulates that establishing reality as a single absolute element clashes with “the entire ontic situation […] of the finite existence”. In this regard, she discerns “two opposing extremes that seem as immediately touching each other”: autonomic and “causa sui” being on the one hand, and “complete powerlessness” (vollkommene Seinsohnmacht) that is surrounded with the threat of nothingness on the other hand. She determines that “it is strange (wunderlich) to wish imposition of a unification of the two in one and the same existent” (HCM, 1963a, 215–216), and adds: It is clear that this is practically our determinate opinion: that the state of affairs includes within itself the two; that the two together first determine the concrete ontic unity that depicts the finite existence (Dasein). We are not dealing here with contradiction that can be roughly dialectically unified. No, every autonomy of Being and this decrepitude-of-Being (Seinshinfälligkeit) have their ontic stance on totally different points or totally different planes of the totality of existence (Daseinstotalität). (HCM, 1963a, 216)

These decisive words leave no room for a mutual exclusion or convergence into unity of the two composing elements of the I in HCM’s thinking. The necessity of the persistence not only of difference but also of divergence of these two elements is indicated also by HCM’s description of the self-positioning of the I outside itself as “existential dualistic primordial dynamic (Urdynamik)” (HCM, 1957, 129). The special problematic the infrastatic character of the spiritual-I for the thesis of duality seems to be implicit in HCM’s question: How can real essence transcend towards itself and thus be transferred back beneath itself? She answers that here a doubling of the I takes place, as a result of which there exist both the I that transcends and the I that is within transcending itself. Nevertheless, and this is of utmost importance, the I is not a double being. In her words: We should not first set down as ready this I and then put it again outside itself. This means again cancelling the entire ontological meaning of the matter. No, this I as one and whole constitutes itself in general only in this self-owned (selbsteigenen) ontic transposition-outwards (Hinausversetztheit) above itself, that is simultaneously an absolute transposition-back (Zurückversetztsein) beneath itself. (HCM, 1957, 126)

However, since there is not and cannot be a meeting-point between the part that operates inwards and the part that operates outwards, the doubling of the I is necessarily not its duplication. In other words, since behind the duality of the I, there exists a real phenomenon; then, this phenomenon must be one and the same I that keeps within itself two parts whose difference and separateness are persistent.

28 Marvin

Farber, too, regarded the reality of the external world as a basic fact, see: Farber (1967, 65). Yet, while HCM turns the acknowledgment of the facticity of the external world into the firm ground upon which her metaphysical thinking stands, for Farber “The philosophical problem of the existence of the external world resulted from an unsettling of a natural world belief, and has been complicated by underlying premises and theories” (Farber, 1967, 63).

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References Ales Bello, A. (2002). Hedwig Conrad-Martius and the phenomenology of nature. Analecta Husserliana (ANHU) (Vol. LXXX, pp. 210–232). Ales Bello, A. (2004). The controversy about the existence of the world in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological school. In A. Reinch, R. Ingarden, H. Conrad-Martius, & E. Stein, Analecta Husserliana (ANHU) (Vol. LXXIX, pp. 97–115). Ales Bello, A. (2008a). Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein: The question of the human subject (A. Calcagno, Trans.). American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 82(1), 143–159. Ales Bello, A. (2008b). The human being in the context of nature: Philosophical anthropology and natural sciences in Hedwig Conrad-Martius. Axiomathes, 18, 425–443. Avé-Lallemant, U. (1965/1966). Hedwig Conrad Martius: Eine Groβe Philosophin unserer Zeit 1988–1966. Jahrbuch der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing, XV, 203–212. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1971). Phänomenologie und Realität: Vergleichende Untersuchungen zur ‘München-Göttinger’ und ‘Freiburger’ Phänomenologie (Habilitationsschrift). München. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1975). Die Antithese Freiburg- München in der Geschichte der Phänomenologie. In H. Kuhn, E. Avé-Lallemant, & R. Gladiator (Eds.), Die Münchener Phänomenologie, Vorträge des Internationalen Kongresses in München, 13–18 April 1971 (Phaenomenologica 65) (pp. 19– 38). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Becker, O. (1930). Die Philosphie Edmund Husserls. Kantstudien, 35, 119–150. Beckermann, A. (2001). Analytische Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes (2nd ed.). Berlin: De Gruyter. Biemel, W. (1950). Einleitung des Herausgegebers. In Edmund Husserl, Die Idee der Phänomenologie, Fünf Vorlesungen, W. Biemel (Ed.), Husserliana II (pp. vii–xi). Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Brecht, F. J. (1948). Bewußtsein und Existenz: Wesen und Weg der Phänomenologie. Bremen: J. Storm. Conrad-Martius, H. (1916aN). Über Ontologie, Conrad-Martiusiana, A.I 3, 14 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1916b). Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Auβenwelt: Verbunden mit einer Kritik positivistischer Theorien. Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und philosophische Forschung III (pp. 345–542). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Conrad-Martius, H. (1920a [1912]). Die erkenntnisstheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus. Bergzabern: Heinrich Müller (private print). Conrad-Martius, H. (1920b). Nachwort. In H. Conrad-Martius. 1920a [1912]. Die erkenntnisstheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus (pp. 130–131). Bergzabern: Heinrich Müller (private print). Conrad-Martius, H. (1923). Realontologie Buch I. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung (Vol. VI, pp. 159–333). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Conrad-Martius, H. (1930 N). Heidegger ‘Sein und Zeit’, Metaphysische Quellpunkte, ConradMartiusiana, A.III 6, 42 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1930–1932aN). Das “Ich”, Conrad-Martiusiana, A.II 1, 4 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1930–1932bN). Geisige Substanzen, Conrad-Martiusiana, A.II 1, 3 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1931aN). Entwurf zu einer universalen Schematik realen Seins, ConradMartiusiana, A.II 2, 10 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1932bN). Die Problematik des Subjekts, Auseinandersetzung mit Eugen Herrigel ‘Urstoff und Urform’. Conrad-Martiusiana, A.III 8, 35 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1949). Bios und Psyche. Hamburg: Classen & Goverts. Conrad-Martius, H. (1954). Die Zeit. München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1957). Das Sein. München: Kösel.

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Conrad-Martius, H. (1959 [1958]). Die transzendentale und die ontologische Phänomenologie. In V. Herman Leo van & T. Jacques Edmund Husserl 1859-1959 - Recueil Commémoratif Publié A L’occasion De Centenaire De La Naissance Du Philosophe (Phaenomenologica 4). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 175-184. (reprinted in: HCM 1965c). Conrad-Martius, H. (1960). Die Geistseele des Menschen. München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963a [1932]). Dasein, Substantialität, Seele. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 194–227). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963b [1932]). Die aktuelle Krisis des idealistischen Denkens, Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 32–37). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963c [1934]). Existentialle Tiefe und Untiefe von Dasein und Ich. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 228–244). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963d [1932]). Heideggers ‘Sein und Zeit’. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 185–193). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963e [1931]). Sein und Nichts. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 89– 100). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963f [1931]). Seinsphilosophie. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 15– 31). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963g [1931]). Was ist Metaphysik? In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 38–48). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1965a [1957]). Die menschliche Seele. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, 125–143). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1965b [1958]). Die transzendentale und die ontologische Phänomenologie. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 293–402). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1965c [1961]). Die Wahrheit der Dinge. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 421–442). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1965d [1938]). Licht und Geist. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 261– 274). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1965e [1956]). Phänomenologie und Spekulation. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 370–384). München: Kösel (English translation: HCM b). Conrad-Martius, H. (1965f [1948]). Seele und Leib. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 107– 124). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1965g [1956]). Über das Wesen des Wesens. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 335–356). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1965h [1956]). Wirkender und Empfangender Geist. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 295–314). München: Kösel. Dennett, D. (1993). Quining Qualia. In A. Marcel & E. Bisiach (Eds.), Consciousness in contemporary science (pp. 42–77). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ebel, G. (1965). Untersuchungen zu einer Realistischen Grundlegung der Phänomenologischen Wesensschau (Dissertation). München. Farber, M. (1967). Phenomenology and existence: Toward a philosophy within nature. New York, Evanston, London: Harper and Row. Geiger, M. (1933). Alexander Pfänder methodishe Stellung. In E. Heller & F. Löw (Eds.), Neue Münchener Philosophiche Abhandelungen (pp. 1–16). Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth. Hart, J. G. (1972). Hedwig Conrad Martius’ ontological phenomenology (Dissertation). Chicago, IL. Heinemann, F. (1960). Erscheinen und Sein – Prologmena zu einer Konkreten Phänomenologie. In R. Wisser (Ed.), Sinn und Sein, Ein philosophisches Symposion (pp. 183–192). Tübingen: Max Niemeyer. Hering, J. (1921). Bemerkung über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee. In Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung (Vol. VI, pp. 495–543). Halle: Max Niemeyer.

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Husserl, E. (1913). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung I (1). Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1–323 (Reprinted in: Husserl 1952a; English translation: Husserl 2012). Husserl, E. (1950). Die Idee der Phänomenologie, Fünf Vorlesungen (W. Biemel, Ed.). Husserliana II. Haag: Martinus Nijhoff (English translation: Husserl 1964b). Husserl, E. (1952 [1913]). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, Erstes Buch, ed. Karl Schuhmann, Husserliana III (1). Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1964). The idea of phenomenology (W. P. Alston & G. Nakhnikian, Trans.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (Translation of: Husserl 1950). Husserl, E. (1970a [1900]). Logical investigations (Vol. I, J. Findlay, Trans.). London and New York: Routledge (Translation of: Husserl 1975). Husserl, E. (1970b [1901]). Logical investigations (Vol. 2, J. Findlay, Trans.). London and New York: Routledge (Translation of: Husserl 1984a and Husserl 1984b). Husserl, E. (1975 [1900]). Logische Untersuchungen, Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, Husserliana XVIII. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. (English translation: Husserl 1970a). Husserl, E. (1984a [1901]). Logische Untersuchungen, Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Husserliana XIX (1). The Hague, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (English translation: Husserl 1970b). Husserl, E. (1984b [1901]). Logische Untersuchungen, Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Husserliana XIX (2). The Hague, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (English translation: Husserl 1970b). Husserl, E. (2012 [1913]). Ideas, general introduction to pure phenomenology (W. R. Boyce Gibson, Trans.). London: Routledge (Translation of: Husserl 1952a). Kuhn, H. (1969). Phänomenologie und Realität. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, 23(3), 397–399. Lewis, C. I. (1991). Mind and the world order: Outline of a theory of knowledge (3rd ed.). New York: Dover. Miron, R. (2006). Towards reality: The development of the philosophical attitude to reality in Karl Jaspers’ thought. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 37(2), 152–172. Miron, R. (2012). Karl Jaspers: From selfhood to being, value inquiry book series. Amsterdam, New York, NY: Rodopi. Miron, R. (2014). “The gate of reality”: Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ idea of reality in realontologie. Phänomenologische Forschungen, 59–82 (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 4). Miron, R. (2015). The vocabulary of reality. Human Studies, 38(3), 335–336 (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 5). Miron, R. (2017). The ontological exclusivity of the “I”. Phänomenologische Forschungen 97–116 (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 7). Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450. Pfänder, A. (1913). Zur Psychologie der Gesinnung. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung I (1) (pp. 325–404). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Pfeiffer, A. E. (2005). Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Eine Phänomenologische sicht auf Nature und Welt. Würzburg: Orbis Phenomenologicus, Königshausen and Neumann. Reinach, A. (1921 [1914]). Vortrag über Phänomenologie. In A. Reinach, Gesammelte Schriften (pp. 379–405). Halle: Max Niemeyer (reprint of: Reinach 1951; English trans.: Reinach 1968; Reinach 1969). Reinach, A. (1951 [1914]). Was ist Phänomenologie? Mit einem Vorwort von Hedwig ConradMartius (pp. 21–72). München: Kösel (Reprint of: Reinach 1921b; English translation: Reinach 1968/Reinach 1969). Reinach, A. (1968). What is Phenomenology? (D. Kelly, Trans.). Philosophical Forum, 1(2, New Series), 231–256 (Translation of: Reinach, 1921b/Reinach, 1951).

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Reinach, A. (1969 [1914]). Concerning phenomenology (W. Dallas, Trans.). The Personalist, 50(2), 194–221 (Translation of: Reinach, 1921b/ Reinach, 1951). Schmücker, F. G. (1956). Die Phänomenologie als Methode der Wesenerkenntnis, unter besondere Berücksichtigung der Auffassung der München-Göttinger Phänomenologenschule (Dissertation). München. Seifert, J. (1995). Was ist Philosophie? Die Antwort der Realistische Phänomenologie. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Frorschung, 49(3), 97–98. Spiegelberg, H. (1975). Doing phenomenology: Essays on and in phenomenology (Phaenomenologica 63). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Stein, E. (2005). Self portrait in letters: Letters to Roman ingarden. The Collected works of Edith Stein (Vol. XII: Hugh Candler Hunt, Trans.). Washington, D.C.: ICS publications, Institute for Carmelite Studies. Vendrell Ferran, Í. (2008). Die Emotionen, Gefühle in der realistischen Phänomenologie. Berlin: Akademie. Walther, G. (1955). Phänomenologie der Mystik. Olten und Freiburg im Breisgau: Walter-Verlag.

Chapter 9

A Philosophical Resonance: Hedwig Conrad-Martius Versus Edith Stein Ronny Miron

Abstract This article seeks to unearth the philosophical resonance of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ ideas with Edith Stein’s thinking and thus to add an element of content to the better-known personal relations between the two phenomenologists. Here, resonance has two meanings. The first is phenomenological and apparent in manifestation of a spiritual communality between the two philosophers. The second relates to the constitutive establishing of a new hermeneutical framework from which new possibilities might emerge for understanding the ideas under discussion. The discussion starts with presenting Conrad-Martius’s and Stein’s basic stance regarding core metaphysical aspects that serve as an introduction to the idea of the I, the explication of which within the writing of both philosophers occupies the bulk of the article. The discussion presents the dual structure of the I in the thinking of both Conrad-Martius and Stein and analyzes their different stances toward it: While the former regards it as an utmost indication of the realism of the I, the latter illuminates its reconciliation within the Christian religious faith.

9.1 Introduction It is not an easy task to speak about Edith Stein. Primarily since ultimately it is impossible to make an adequate expression about a specific religious person. The internal life of such a person lies in the mysteries of God. Thereafter Edith Stein, later St. Teresia Benedicta of the Cross, was of a type extraordinarily sealed in-itself.

1 All translations from the German original into English are mine. Emphases follow the original, unless stated otherwise. The above quotation is taken from the ending essay (without title) by HCM that was added to the volume of the collected letters of Stein to HCM. The essay is based on a lecture that HCM delivered to the Society for Christian-Jewish Collaboration. See especially: HCM (1960, 74).

R. Miron (B) Interdisciplinary Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Miron (ed.), Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68783-0_9

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The expression Secretum meum mihi, my secret is mine, that she once told me, in truth exists in all her biography (HCM, 1960, 61).1 So stated the realist phenomenologist Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888–1966) (HCM), the close friend of Edith Stein (1891–1942) and her god-mother when she converted from Judaism to Catholicism.2 However, the division that this implies regarding Stein, into an overt presence of humans and the concealed depths of a specific person’s religious experience goes further than the personal encounter between the two women.3 More importantly, Stein’s mentioned division mirrors the fundamental duality that forms HCM’s own idea of the I.4 Thus, she establishes that the “I am” (Ich bin) indicates a fully secret and at the same time conscious wonder (HCM, 1963c, 234). Elsewhere, she adds that digging into the I is a new search for a novel and genuine being and life, yet this I was never and can never be found within the region of transcendental intuition or the or phenomenal plane (HCM, 1963c, 229). This observation by HCM about Stein also applied to herself very well, as she remained silent about her own religious experiences.5 Moreover, in her doctrine of the I, she thematized this aspect and referred to that cannot have any “outside itself” and due to its own “origin-like” nature (Ursprungshaftigkeit) signifies its being fundamentally inside-itself as pure origin (HCM, 1965f, 296).6 In what follows, I wish to unearth the philosophical resonance of HCM’s ideas with Stein’s thinking and thus to add an element of content to the better-known personal relations between the two philosophers.7 Here, resonance has double meaning. In the first and immediate sense, it indicates a spiritual communality between two thinkers, which does not necessarily result from a systematic or conscious influence, yet is firm enough to carry the diversities involved in their thinking. As in any hermeneutical discussion, which requires both familiarity and strangeness regarding the issue at stake, here too affinity and difference inseparably occur among resonating perceptions. Secondly, the philosophical resonance expresses an interpretive argument regarding the hermeneutical efficiency of uncovering both the affinities and diversities that exist between the involved perceptions.8 To this extent, an observation of a philosophical resonance between two perceptions might serve as a first 2 Herbstrith

describes Stein’s stay with Conrad-Martius before her baptism, see: Herbstrith (1972, 24–25). 3 This recalls Levinas’ statement: “To meet a man is to be kept awake by an enigma”, however, “Upon meeting Husserl, the enigma was always that of his work” (Levinas 1998, 111. Cited from: Kenaan, 2016, 481, 2018, 17). 4 I have addressed the issue of philosophical resonance regarding Husserl and other figures within the phenomenological discourse. See: Miron (2016b, c). 5 Avé-Lallemant testified that after her religious experiences at the beginning of 1920s (in concomitant with Stein’s), HCM had a big auto-da-fé and in 1929 she burned her poetic writings from that period, see: Avé-Lallemant (2015, 79 n. 45). 6 This aspect of the I is widely discussed in the previous chapter that is dedicated to the duality of the I in HCM’s thinking. 7 For further reading about the relations between HCM and Stein, see: Avé-Lallemant (2015). 8 The above-used expression, hermeneutical efficiency, is inspired by, yet not equivalent to, the Gadamerian “Principle of History of Effect” (Wirkungsgeschichte) that requires “an inquiry into history of effect every time a work of art or an aspect of the traditions is led out of the twilight

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step in establishing a new hermeneutical framework from which new possibilities for understanding of the ideas under discussion might emerge. In any event, at least some of these possibilities were not realized within the original boundaries of each thinking, or alternatively they flourished better, despite considerable transformations, within a different thinking in which they resonate. In this article, HCM’s thinking serves as a point of departure for the study of philosophical resonance, as apparent in the more detailed account of her ideas. However, this setting can change occasionally during the discussion. Consequently, an idea which sprouts within the context of HCM’s thinking can be considerably specified and achieve further explorations and transformations within Stein’s thinking. Practically, I begin with presenting HCM’s and Stein’s basic stance regarding three core metaphysical issues: reality as point of departure, the relation between philosophy and theology, and the beginning in nothingness. These three aspects, which are sketched rather generally while stressing mainly their similarities, serve as an introduction to the central topic of the idea of the I of both philosophers. Indeed, already within the mentioned introductory aspects one might observe a growing variance and detailing. However, only within the analysis of the I, which occupies the bulk of the article, does the discussed philosophical resonance switch from the latent to the manifest mode. Moreover, both the proximities and differences between HCM and Stein are most conspicuous in regard to their ideas of the I.

9.2 Conrad-Martius Versus Stein 9.2.1 Reality as a Common Point of Departure Unlike the founding father of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, who suspended the existential element from the philosophical investigation of the I and the world, both the HCM and Stein require it by posing the philosophical question of all times at the beginning of their magnum opus. HCM opens Real ontology (Realontologie) with “what is reality?” (HCM, 1923, 159), while Stein initiates her discussion in Finite and Eternal Being by asking “what is that which is [seined]?” (Stein, 2013, 11).9 HCM’s fundamental argument is the following: “we will never really be able to penetrate really and ultimately the essence of any real entity (Realentität) […] if we do not let it stand exactly on the thesis of existence (Daseinsthesis) that in

region between tradition and history so that it can be seen clearly and openly in terms of its own meaning” (Gadamer, 2004, 299). 9 Baseheart emphasizes Stein’s “divergence from Husserl who insisted on philosophy being radically new, a ‘science of beginning’” (Baseheart, 1997, 23–24) and “rare respect for other thinkers – even for those with whom she differed greatly. Yet, Stein remained faithful to Husserl’s idea of presuppositionlessness, excluding preconceived theories and ‘naive’ premises” (Baseheart, 1997, 123ff.).

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Husserl’s approach was bracketed” (HCM, 1916N, 6).10 Elsewhere, HCM clarifies the related thesis as follows: “instead of hypothetically bracketing the real Being and thereby seeing the world (in the reduction) stripped (enthoben) of the real reality (wirkich Wirklichkeit), it is suggested now to hypothetically posit the real Being of the world and thereby the present it with its own rootedness into Being” (HCM, 1965a, 397). However, beyond its being foundational to HCM’s entire metaphysical thinking, the related thesis was crucial first and foremost for reinstating facts and their precedence into the phenomenological discourse after Husserl had excluded them and the entire empirical field from it in favor of seeing, intuition, and observation of essences (Husserl 1952a, §3/2012a, §3).11 Secondly, this thesis permitted her to reject Husserl’s transcendentalism that was based on acceptance of the principle “nulla ‘re’ indigent ad existendum” (Husserl 1952a, §49 104/2012a, §49 94), as a result of which consciousness was bestowed with an absolute status. Indeed, HCM confirms that immanent being is absolute since it never brings any “thing” into being. Yet she derives from it a fundamentally opposed conclusion. Namely, since what is established as an absolute being is fundamentally opposite to any other reality, within the framework of absolute consciousness “the real should collapse” (HCM 1916N, 2).12 From HCM’s point of view, the most problematic element in Husserl’s transcendental approach lies in its becoming a guiding principle in the study of real Being. She explains that for Husserl the ego was a “secret” that fascinated his philosophical thinking, within which knowledge about the world and the meaning of Being is established on the study of the ego. Also, the expression “transcendental”, as a 10 HCM expresses her commitment to the “Existence thesis” also in: HCM (1916, 396, 1963c, 233). 11 For further reading on HCM’s ontology, see: Miron (2017, 99–101), Mohanty (1977, 3–9). HCM

later admitted that Husserl never rejected or doubted the reality of the world but regarded it as a hypothetical being (HCM, 1965a, 398). However, unlike Husserl, HCM does not see any problem with the empirical experience (HCM, 1965e, 351) and even regards the then new natural sciences as elucidating the real foundations of such experience (HCM, 1965a, 401). 12 HCM refers to Husserl’s phrase “nulla ‘re’ indigent ad existendum” on several occasions, see: HCM (1916, 1, 3), (1963e, 21), (1963a, 195), (1963c, 229), (1965c, 370), (1965e, 353). In connection to the first mention from 1916, which is considered as an indication of HCM’s response to Husserl’s Ideas I (Husserl, 1952a, 2012a) Stein indicates (in a letter to Ingarden from 9 April 1917) that HCM’s “notes on the question of Idealism […] are however, not a refutation of Husserl’s position. In fact, the main argument seems to me to be based on a misunderstanding of his exposition” (Stein, 2005, 58). However, this evaluation of Stein seems to communicate her general attitude to Husserl’s phenomenology than illuminate HCM’s view of the matter that in this regard can be encapsulated in her fundamental “thesis of existence (Daseinsthesis)” that she discussed throughout the entire early manuscript (HCM, 1916N, 5–8, 11–12). Moreover, HCM further elaborates this thesis in her subsequent writings, that were established on the “unbridgeable and absolute opposition between real being and nothing” (HCM, 1923, 162; see here also: HCM, 1963d, 93–94) and on the postulate that “real existence is not one ‘form of existence’ (Daseinsform) among others but something plainly and absolutely new thing (Neues)” (HCM, 1923, 163). Finally, HCM’s explicit rejection of Husserl transcendental reduction in favor her above-discussed idea of real reality (wirkich Wirklichkeit) clarifies her dismissal of the most essential foundation of his Idealism that she depicts as “hypothetically bracketing the real Being and thereby seeing the world (in the reduction) stripped (enthoben) of the real reality (wirkich Wirklichkeit)” (HCM, 1965a, 397).

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description of Husserl’s phenomenology, designates the return of the physical and psychical world as well as of the empirical and the ideal to the realm of subjectivity (HCM, 1965a, 400). Consequently, the real world became for Husserl a noematic phenomenon whose being is dependent on consciousness and the phenomenological investigation is confined to the intentional framework.13 The convergence of phenomenology into the realm of consciousness results from the fact that Husserl did not practice only the epoché, which is regarded by HCM as a legitimate and methodological stage. Moreover, HCM herself practices it and justifies it with the assertion that despite being beyond all doubt, the reality of the world cannot be known evidently (HCM, 1965a, 400–401). Yet the difficulty lies in the phenomenological reduction that follows the Husserlian epoché, in which although “the world with all its parts included is hypothetically posed as existing”, eventually “(in the reduction) it is stripped (enthoben) of the real reality (wirkich Wirklichkeit)” (HCM, 1965a, 398). HCM rhetorically asks whether after the unveiling and exploring of the various sides of consciousness and of meaning “this noematic world that is also really real (wirklich wirklich), entirely remains undecided?” (HCM, 1965a, 396) or simply: “but where does the world remain?” (HCM, 1965c, 371). In HCM’s opinion, given Husserl’s accepted presuppositions, the loss of the world that takes place in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is unavoidable (HCM, 1916N, 2). This means that for HCM, Husserl’s phenomenological reduction makes a metaphysical decision as a result of which the external reality of the world is dropped from his phenomenology. To a certain extent, Stein’s choice of wording regarding Husserl’s reduction of the reality of the world seems less decisive than HCM’s, or at least shows a gradual process. At first, she asks “what can be left if all is cancelled, the whole world and the subject experiencing it?”, then replies that “in truth, there remains an infinite field of pure investigation” (Stein, 2016, 11). Indeed, Stein does observe the advantages in Husserl’s methodological move that she does not at all dismiss. Nevertheless, she observes “difficulties in seeing how it is possible to suspend the positing of existence and still retain the full character of perception” (Stein, 2016, 12). This means that also for Husserl’s most frequent case-study of perception, the reduction of the world transpires as problematic. However, this reserved stance toward Husserl’s transcendental reduction is further diminished concerning ones empirical-I, which for Stein is indispensable in any philosophical argumentation: It is still to be shown what it means to say: my experience is not to be excluded. Is not indubitable that I exist, this empirical I of this name and stand, given such and such attributes. My whole past could be dreamed or be a deceptive recollection. Therefore, it is subjected to the exclusion, only remaining an object of consideration as a phenomenon. But I the experiencing subject who considers the world and my own person as phenomenon, I am in experience and only in it, am just as indubitable and impossible to cancel as experience itself. (Stein, 2016, 12)

Regarding Stein’s attitude to Husserl’s method of transcendental reduction at the early stage of her work On Empathy from 1916 (Stein, 2016), Baseheart attempts 13 See in particular: Husserl (1952a, §35–§47/2012a, §35–§47). Becker regards Husserl’s transcendental turn as a result of his reassessment of the issue of intentionality: Becker (1930). In this context, see also: Vendrell Ferran (2008, 71–78).

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to provide a balanced explanation that confirms both Stein’s continuing attachment to her admired teacher and her inconvenient disagreement with his transcendental reduction. In this regard, Baseheart maintained: [Stein] is simply making an honest effort to implement the methodology that Husserl had impressed on his pupils and that she could use it in a way that did not involve agreement with an idealist position. She appears to use the method not as an ultimate suspension of the natural belief, but as a legitimate method of rescinding from existence in the consideration of empathy. (Baseheart, 1997, 32)

However, in a personal letter to Roman Ingarden from 3 February 1917, her reservation from the matter seems to be manifested more clearly, as she reestablishes the indispensability of both the reality of the world and the I in the philosophical discourse. Yet, also Stein’s reverence for Husserl cannot be disregarded. In her words: I think I now have a reasonable clear understanding of “constitution”14 —but outside the context of idealism. Prerequisites for an intuitive nature to constitute itself are: an absolutely existing physical nature and a subjectivity of a precise structure. So far, I have not gotten around to confessing this heresy to the Master (Stein, 2005, 39–40). Finally, like almost all the members of the Munich-Göttingen circle including HCM, also Stein could not accept Husserl’s transcendental reduction. In this regard, Stein explains: The abundance of essence and of existence collapse in upon the subject and as regards consciousness, it surpasses all variations forms. It seems to me that the trusty analysis of the givenness of reality leads to a suspension (Aufhebung) of the transcendental reduction and leads to a return to the holding of the faithful acceptance of the world. (Stein, 2014, 166–167)

HCM undoubtedly did not face the inhibitions Stein experienced in her rejection of such a fundamental Husserlian stance as the transcendental reduction. After all, HCM never worked so closely with Husserl as Stein did and never developed such close proximity to his figure and perceptions, with which, presumably, she was less fluent compared with Stein.15 Also, Stein’s explicit phenomenological orientation enabled her to include more aspects of Husserl’s transcendental approach compared with the metaphysical ontology that characterized HCM’s early thinking. In any case, in the end both of them were unable to accept Husserl’s transcendental reduction first and foremost because of its idealistic implications, which they viewed as its explicit outcome. 14 Stein

refers here to the theme of “constitution” (Konstitution) that Husserl explored in Ideas-II (Husserl, 1952b, 2002a). In this regard, Ricci writes: “In her duties as an assistant to Husserl, she had been given the responsibility of organizing Husserl’s random papers into a coherent form for publication. […] not only did Husserl expressly define her task of making sense of his writings, but that she also had difficulties getting Husserl to review her work” (Ricci, 2010, 422–423). In this connection, Moran states the following: “During 1912, Husserl had written extensive drafts for the planned two subsequent volumes of Ideas, now known as Ideas II and Ideas III. Subsequently, Edith Stein prepared drafts of Ideas II from 1916 to 1918 and, in 1924–1925, Ludwig Landgrebe took over the job of preparing Ideas II for publication” (Moran, 2012, xx). 15 For further reading, see here: Ingarden (1962), Ricci (2010).

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9.2.2 Philosophy and Theology Both HCM and Stein found the relation of philosophy to theology relevant to their existentially oriented approach to reality. Even more so, beyond the known diversity of personal choice, theology plays an important role in the maturation of the two thinkers’ thinking. HCM indicates the communality between phenomenology and the Catholic religion while establishing that though “the modern escape of subjectivism cannot be entirely overcome”, if one identifies Catholicism with “the yearning backwards to the objective (Objektiven), to the sanctity of Being, the purity and chastity of things, the ‘thing itself’”, then “certainly all the phenomenologists might be considered Catholic”.16 Alternatively, she links Catholicism with “the openness towards the object (Objektge¨offenheit) further on the way towards the things, to the states of affairs (Sachverhalt), to Being itself, and indeed to the habitus of the catholic man” (HCM, 1960, 63).17 In another context, HCM speaks generally about the relation of philosophy to theology, opining that “basically the two ways [philosophical and theological] run together and frequently cross each other, because in no event are we dealing here with logical deduction but with a factual overall intuition into which we can penetrate from different sides” (HCM, 1963b, 258). However, while attempting to specify the relation between philosophy and theology, a more hierarchical order between the two transpires. Thus, HCM clarifies that only under the theological presumption of the existence of God can one refer to reality, since God is the most real essence of all essences (HCM, 1923, 164).18 More specifically, she holds that the creation ex nihilio established every “thing” with its specific “what” due to God’s arch-idea that copies the divine essence. Also, the capability to know things is due to one’s possession of “the copious light of the logos of God” (HCM, 1965b, 267–269). Elsewhere HCM explains that “everything depends on the moment of substantiality of the world”, i.e., its existentiality. However, she clarifies the following: This substantiality of the world primarily makes it impossible to understand ontologically the factual existence of the world, on the other hand and exactly for this reason, it comprises the one and the only possible true theological solution. Since without the substantiality of the real being it lacks the necessary tension in its relation to God, the only capable of providing the ground for a metaphysical question and thus also for possible metaphysical grounding. (HCM, 1963b, 260–261). 16 HCM

cites these words from the theologian Peter Wust, to whose Book Dialektik des Geistes from 1928 she mentions as sharing the spirit of her discussion. See HCM (1963b, 261 n. 6). 17 Both HCM and Stein relate to the orientation then called “the turn to the object” (“Die Wende nach Objekt”), which implied the reconsideration of the idea of “intention” as it appeared in Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen. Moritz Geiger well characterized this orientation as follows: “[…] while in the past people almost always saw the objects as images of the I, now the tension between the I and the object in accordance with its law returns. [We seek] what is in front of the I, the object. Overcoming the tension between them cannot be achieved through absorbing the object into the subject but through turning to the object itself, as a result of which the construction of the world that is given in an unmediated manner receives a different gaze” (Geiger, 1933, 13). 18 See also: HCM (1963b, 257–258).

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Simply, “since due to its essence metaphysics requires penetrating to the last foundations of every being and knowing, it must so envisage the world as it factually gives itself to the sober experience and in the science, that is built upon this experience” (HCM, 1963f, 38). Consequently, HCM adopts the principle of the Cartesian move from the I to God and identifies it as the correct ontological understanding that paves the way to genuine metaphysics (HCM, 1963f, 48). It appears that exactly this incapability of reasoning might awaken the theological way to reality, in which God is regarded as the starting point of finite reality and thus its supreme reason. Given Stein’s personal choice to convert and become a nun, it is interesting that her early reference to the relation between philosophy and theology stresses a gap between reason and faith. Thus, in her phenomenological analysis of the relation between the individual and community she writes what often is regarded as testifying to her own stance: “I can crave for religious faith, strive for it with all the forces, yet it does not need to be bestowed on me. I can deepen into the greatness of a character without being able to master the admiration that belongs to it”. Moreover: A convinced atheist becomes within a religious experience aware of the existence of God. He cannot withdraw himself from belief. However, he does not stand on its ground, he does not let it become effective on him, he remains undeterred in his “scientific world view” […]. Finally, an affection enters into me and I cannot avoid it. However, I do not want to admit that, I elude myself. (Stein, 2010a, 42)

Beyond the known nuances and variations that distinguish the two thinkers from each other, for both of them the theological way to reality that at early stage of their work was in the background later became more manifest. However, while in HCM’s case, philosophy persists in the forefront of her thinking, Stein proceeded gradually and consistently to establish the primacy of theology over philosophy. In the first place, she illuminates her view of what philosophy is all about: “precisely because philosophy (not theology) requires content completion, it is assigned to the task of establishing a unified and comprehensive doctrine” (Stein, 2013, 33). Stein explains that what enables philosophy to be aided by theology relates to the fact that “the revelation speaks in a language accessible to natural human reason and offer subject matter for the formation of purely philosophic concepts” (Stein, 2013, 31). Moreover, even in the crowning achievement of this process in Finite and Eternal Being that was completed in 1937, Stein explicitly necessitates both theology and philosophy, in her words: Certainly, philosophy cannot claim for the achievements gained with the aid of doctrine of faith as hallmark of its own independent results. […] Whatever drives from the synthesis (Zusammenschau) of truth of faith and philosophical cognition bears the imprint of this dual source of knowledge. (Stein, 2013, 32).

However, philosophy employs its concepts while “completely ignoring the facts of revelation as such whose result became common good (Gemeingut) of every later philosophy” (Stein, 2013, 31). Alternatively, “when the philosopher borrows from theology it concerns the revealed truth qua truth” (Stein, 2013, 32). On the other hand, Stein observes that faith in-itself and for-itself is independent of such revelations. Nevertheless, she characterized the Holy Scriptures as the “believing”

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speech of God’s apostles and the prophets, as an expression of faith as a vocation in their ordinary human routine (Stein, 2007, 42–43). Finally, she established the hierarchical order of philosophy and maintains: “Certainly, the ‘formal primacy’ (Form-Primat) of theology must be acknowledged in the sense that the final judgment (Richterspruch) on the truth of both theological and philosophic propositions belongs to theology” (Stein, 2013, 33). This proper order can be fully realized in Stein’s vision of Christian philosophy, which is for her: not only the name for attitude (Geisteshaltung) of a Christian philosopher, nor merely the designation of the actual doctrinal system of Christian thinker but, above and beyond these, the idea of perfectum opus rationis.19 A Christian philosophy should be able to unite and synthesize the entirety of all knowledge which we have gained by exercise of our natural reason and by revelation. (Stein, 2013, 33)20

9.2.3 The Beginning in Nothingness One of the constitutive insights of HCM’s ontology relates to the fundamental difference between being and nothingness. Thus, she establishes that reality does not concern “more or less objectivity”, rather it is “something totally different” (HCM, 1923, 180) that stands with “an unbridgeable and absolute opposition” (HCM, 1923, 162) to the nonexistent or nothingness (HCM, 1923, 160). Accordingly, she describes the real thing as such that is “at first positively elevated by itself from nothingness” and thus “becomes entirely its own” (HCM, 1923, 181). HCM denotes as “gateway of reality” the datum-point where “a radical overcoming” of the “mere formal positioning” of reality takes place and things “elevate” themselves from nonexistence or mere ideal and formal existence, but do not yet arrive at factual existence (HCM, 1923, 173).21 However, after crossing, so to speak, that “gateway”, two processes come to pass within the real being and indicate an overcoming of the nothingness, this means operation from itself outwardly that eventually arrives at “description and appearing” (HCM, 1923, 223) and a “substantialization inward” that establishes its primordiality (HCM, 1923, 226).22 Hence, in HCM’s view, a complete externalization can never take place within the real being (HCM, 1923, 216). This means that the extrication of 19 The expression perfectum opus rationis indicates a science of ultimate realities. This science is essentially incomplete not only because of the being of ultimate realities but also due to the restrictedness of the human mind. See in this regard, Lebech (2011, 146f.). 20 Concerning the relation of philosophy and theology, see also: Stein (2014, 119–142) (First appeared in: Stein, 1929; English translation: Stein, 1997). 21 See my discussion of “the gateway of reality” in: Miron (2014, reprinted in this volume as Chapter 4). 22 HCM’s idea of reality assumes a fundamental structure of the real being that is composed of two inseparable constituents: the essence (die Washeit) or the “whatness” of the thing, and the “bearer” (Träger) (this term is discussed extensively in: HCM, 1916, 407, 482, 497–498, 514, 525– 526). The relation of the essence to its bearer is of “unbreakable (unzerreißbar) formal cohesion (Zusammenhang)”, and is reciprocal, i.e., the bearer is specified by the essence that in turn is carried to the extent that it specifies its bearer (HCM, 1923, 167–168).

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the real being from nothingness signifies both an internal and an external occurrence. Moreover, this is also the meaning of HCM’s determination regarding the “fundamental duality in the possible embodiment (Ausgestaltung) of the real being” (HCM, 1957, 98). There is no contradiction between the two, since already in the function of bearing of the essence, “a structural element of pure elevating into being” takes place. Inasmuch as by this elevating the real being breaks through the wall of nothingness, it testifies to “an internal mode of structuring” of the real being itself (HCM, 1923, 176). This is then the uniqueness of the real being compared to the formal one and the material one: the formal being cannot achieve any aspect of internality, and its externality is exhausted by its intelligibility by human consciousness. Whereas with material being, “from the aspect of power the body is kept entirely outside itself” only (HCM, 1923, 220). However, with the real being the external manifestation that extricates it from nothingness at the same time denotes its self-operating inwardly. Thus, HCM establishes that any aspect of the real being “will nevertheless always remain in itself outwardly constituted” and to a certain extent, at the same time it can be regarded as “structured inwardly into to the outside” (HCM, 1923, 191).23 The fact that there is something as opposed to nothing speaks greatly not only to HCM but to Stein as well. However, for Stein the ontological processes of elevating from nothingness, and then occurring inwardly and outwardly are conspicuous within the choice of faith. In this regard, she describes faith as emanating from self-search for an internal-origin out of which individuals might consolidate their worldview. She emphasizes that even regarding Catholicism, which by its “genotype” grants its believers with a “close worldview”, one must personally acquire it in order to possess it (Stein, 2014, 143).24 However despite its being originated in people’s volitional decision, they cannot foresee its consequences and influences upon their life. Stein explains: The innermost and very own [nature of human beings] remains mostly hidden. It is veiled by that stamp of character (Gepräge) which individual human nature has accepted in the course of life under the influence of environment and especially via the intercommunication of within the “community”. Whatever we therefore sense, remains dark, mysterious and “ineffable” (Unaussprechlich). (Stein, 2013, 423)

Indeed, the difference between being and nothingness is given further emphasis within Stein’s thinking. Human beings are “created spirits” before whose beginning there was nothing. Moreover, their certitude of their existence cannot be regarded as a beginning in the sense of knowledge from which “all other truth may be logically deduced” or serve as a measure for other truth, especially as the “‘natural attitude’ of man tends above all else to the external world” (Stein, 2013, 41). In this regard, one’s self is even less than a beginning. Indeed, the darkness that preceded one’s being 23 Elsewhere, I have discussed at length the internal elements of being in HCM’s thinking. See: Miron (2016c, reprinted in this volume as Chapter 10). 24 To this extent, no difference separates between the one who was raised as a Catholic and a person who like Stein has taken the decision to convert to Catholicism. I have discussed the affinity regarding the volitional choice between Stein and the Jewish thinker Yeshayahu Leibowitz. See: Miron (2016a, 119–124, a revised and expanded version is printed in this volume as Chapter 13).

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and choice of faith is somehow represented in religious life since, “faith is a ‘dark light’” (dunkeles Licht). In Stein’s view, this not only influences the entire human life. Moreover, “since the ultimate ground of all existence is unfathomable, therefore everything which is seen in this ultimate perspective moves back into that “dark light” of faith and of secret, and everything conceptual receives an incomprehensible background” (Stein, 2013, 32). This dark element that pervades human life cannot be entirely removed, even and especially within a religious life. Indeed, already “for the I there exists the possibility to step into existence out of nothingness” (Stein, 2013, 52). Thus, she depicts the I as such “whose life comes out of one darkness and move into another darkness” (Stein, 2013, 295). However, faith “bestows upon us an understanding of something just in order to draw our attention to something that remains for us incomprehensible” (Stein, 2013, 32). The different contexts in which the relation between being and nothingness are discussed within the thinking of the two philosophers—the ontological for HCM and that of faith for Stein—is well mirrored in their different idea of “rest” (Ruhe), which is closely related to the idea of nothingness and thus might indicate to the final weight of nothingness within reality. As a positive element in HCM’s ontology, nothingness acquires no illumination that might be able to lessen the anxiety that is caused by considering the underlying nothingness. Rather, the real being is characterized as “resting on the grounds of the abyss” (HCM, 1923, 222) and even as “carried out in the abyss” (HCM, 1923, 227). HCM explains that since internality denotes the primordiality of the real being, a complete externalizing can never operate in it, or alternatively, an aspect of an “abyss” is constantly kept in it as the “inexhaustible ‘to be filled’” and more generally as “the ‘infinity’ and ‘inexhaustibility’” (HCM, 1923, 216) of Being. At this point, Stein could not better distinguish herself from HCM’s stance toward the abyss within being more clearly than by establishing: “every ‘possible abyss of nothingness’ is ‘eo ipso… filled’ by eternal being” (Stein, 2013, 100).25 In fact, Stein fully realizes the insight regarding the relief from nothingness with God in her personal life, as aptly she describes in first person: There is a state of resting [Ruhens] in God, of utter relaxation of all spiritual activity, in which man makes no plans, takes no decisions, and at first rightly does not act, but everything prospective is left to the divine will. You totally “deliver yourself to fate”. This state somehow has been extended to me, after an experience in which my forces were exceeded, my spiritual life-forces were totally used up, and all activity was robbed from me. In contrast, the resting in God as the failure of activity out of lack of life-forces is totally new and peculiar. That was a dead stillness. In the place of this, commenced the feeling of security (Geborgensein), of being exempted from all anxiety and responsibility and action. In which this feeling indulged me, began bit by bit to feel new life imbuing me - without any voluntary exertion towards new activity. This invigorating influx seemed as an outflow of activity that is not mine. (Stein, 2010a, 73)

25 Calcagno well described the discussed aspect as follows: “What Stein experiences is not merely the gegebebheiten (givens) of the phenomenologist, but the plenitude omnitudinis (Fülle, or fullness) of creation” (Calcagno, 2007, 127).

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9.2.4 The Idea of the I HCM’s approach to the human subject declares its ontological exclusivity thanks to which human beings are distinguished from any other mode of being.26 HCM explains that while in regard to animals one might relate to their “selfness” (Sichheit), which signifies their internal formation that endows them with an essence, they can never have an I (Ich), which is possessed solely by human beings and indicates the human capability for self-reference or returning to oneself (HCM, 1957, 120–121). HCM’s designation of the peculiar term of “I-being” (ichhaftes Sein) grants it the “highest category of Being” (die höchste Seinsgattung) (HCM, 1957, 35). However, and with no contradiction to its being incomparable to any other mode of being (HCM, 1963c, 240), HCM argues that it should be illuminated “on the grounds of Being itself” (HCM, 1963c, 243). Alternatively, despite its transcendental character, “in no way does the I-being drop out of genuine real-positing (eigentlicher Realitätssetzung herausfällt)”. Hence, “only out of this ontological foundation” of the real being in general can “true ‘comprehension’ (Begreifung)” of the I” be enabled (HCM, 1931N, 5–6).27 It is instructive that exactly like HCM, Stein too emphasizes the uniqueness of the word I as signifying the ontological exclusivity of human being. Stein establishes: The name by which every person designates himself or herself qua person in the name I [Ich]. Only an existent who in its being is conscious of its own being and simultaneously conscious of its differentiation from every other existent can call itself an I. And of every I there is unparallel (Einmallige). It possesses something which it shares with no other existent, i.e. something which is “incommunicable” (Unmitteilbare). (Stein, 2013, 294)

Stein adds that “every human being sooner or later refers to itself as ‘an I’” and in this respect the word I marks a beginning. Also, “a human being pronounces the word I before it is able to accomplish its meaning” or “understands the meaning of the word” before beginning to use it. However, Stein clarifies that we are not dealing here with a merely linguistic matter. Rather, the word I is “a sign of awakened life of the I” or “the being of the I” (Stein, 2013, 294), and elsewhere refers to the I as “distinguished existent” (Stein, 2013, 56). Yet “this being does not coincide with the being of man, and the beginning of the awakened life of the I is not equivalent to the beginning of human existence” (Stein, 2013, 294). Like HCM, Stein too anchors her discussion of the person in the more general understanding of being. Her fundamental argument is that no temporal thing can exist without a formal and eternal structure that regulates the particular flux of occurrences, and thus goes through an actualization in time. This apparent concomitance of the person to being in general seems to result from Stein’s view, according to which “the ‘real world’ with its manifold becoming and passing structure being […] is grounded in the ‘realm of meaning’” (Stein, 2013, 99). Obviously, this, as she unequivocally 26 For

further reading, see: Miron 2017, reprinted in this volume as Chapter 9, Miron 2021. a comprehensive account of HCM’s philosophy of Being, see: Miron (2015, reprinted in this volume as Chapter 13), Miron (2014, reprinted in this volume as Chapter 4).

27 For

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clarifies, does not at all imply that “the ‘fleeting’ being is not in possession of the existent that is momentary: it must be bestowed to it always anew”. Moreover, this very bestowal is conditioned by the very fact that meaning is not abandoned to arbitrary passing of finitude. Instead, it is enabled by the identification of “the lord of being” (“Herr des Seins”) with “the lord of meaning” (“Herr des Sinns”) (Stein, 2013, 100). The I ultimately testifies to the essential actualization of being within by means of meaning within its life in the world. Stein writes: If some experiential unit (Erlebniseinheit) is actualized within me, then it is I who is bestowed with being, and by this bestowal the gift of being is realized. However, the formative meaning of being that bestows me the gift of being but by means of being this meaning is given to me and by I myself is formed by it (Stein, 2013, 100).

9.2.5 The Dual Structure of the I HCM describes spirit as subject to “a primordial movement (Urbewegung)” (HCM, 1965f, 295) between two elements that comprise its substantive and ontological essence (HCM, 1957, 98) and project it into a “dualistic existential primordial dynamic (Urdynamik)” (HCM, 1957, 129) that consolidates the spiritual-I. The first element characterizes the I as follows: “It is very much so and a mere self, to the extent that it cannot get out of itself or out of its own origin (Ursprung): it is entirely origin, depth, ground level, abyss” (HCM, 1965f, 295). As pure origin, the spiritual-I cannot have any “outside itself” and its own “origin-like” nature (Ursprungshaftigkeit) signifies its being fundamentally inside-itself (HCM, 1965f, 296) or its selfness (Selbsthaftigkeit). Yet, this selfness differs from the one that typifies material beings or any other form of animality. The material being is “carried as substrate-full (substrathaft)” (HCM, 1957, 131), or alternatively it is “substrate-full” substantiality that is eventually realized outwardly, the selfness characteristic of the I is a person-full (personhafte) being (HCM, 1963c, 242). This personal nature is its directedness to itself and it determines the ontological condition of the I as ultimately “towards Being” (hin zum Sein) (HCM, 1963c, 235, 237) to the point of “being incapable to escape from Being, inescapably renouncing and surrendering (ausgeliefert)” to it (HCM, 1963c, 236). Therefore, as long as the I delves into the entanglements of its own being, nothing but itself will be found there. HCM depicts as “something strange (Merkwürdig)” the fact that one’s “‘self-full relation to Being’” (selbsthaftes Verhältnis zum Sein) or “‘self-capability of being its own being’” (Selber-Könnendes-eigenen-Seins) is “developed positively inside oneself”. In HCM’s view, this manifest itself in the state of affairs in which we “find no other realized Being (Sein) or suchness (Sosein)” within the I that we regard “as the genuine embodiment (Ausgestaltung) of this ontic fundamental capability itself ” (HCM, 1957, 128). In its personal capability-for-Being (persönlische Seinsvermögen), the I constitutes real existentiality as belonging to it and thus as “being-full selfness (seinshafte Selberkeit) that is characterized as personal power-of-Being (persönliche Seinsmacht) from the bottom up” (HCM, 1957, 128).

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The origin-like nature of spirit consolidates the firmest foundation of the I-being and falls in line with its characterization as “static”, “spiritual-material (geiststofflich)” (HCM, 1965f, 302), and as a “receiving-spirit (empfangender Geist)” upon which concepts, words, and phenomena are transferred. HCM explains that despite being static, resting in-itself, and directed toward itself, the receiving-spirit is always shaped anew by the intelligible reality and becomes this reality itself. This could not have happened if the spiritual-material did not have the capability for becoming manifest by the light of spirit (Geistlicht) (HCM, 1965f, 312).28 In any event, HCM considers the receiving-spirit as a tabula rasa that it is capable of being filled, among others, by the eternal ideas of reality (HCM, 1965f, 313) or an appropriate observer of pure essences. The second element of spirit is described as spiritualness (geistlichthafte) (HCM, 1965f, 302) and as “infrastasis (Infrastase)”, which indicates the capability of the spiritual-I to be directed to something which is not itself. In HCM’s words: It belongs to the most genuine constitutive-existential essence of the I-being and thus to the spiritual being, to elevate itself above and outside itself (über sich selbst hinauszusteigen), or rather to be always already what elevates itself (Gesteigener) above itself outwardly. Indeed, the I-being cannot exist (sein) at all but in this elevation-above (Übersteigenheit), or being beyond itself (Jenseitigkeit). (HCM, 1963c, 230–231)

This elevation is “a real factual power of Being (Seinskraft) of the I-being” (HCM, 1965f, 296) that transpires as needing to develop itself toward the spiritual for its own substantial constitution (HCM, 1957, 140). Concomitantly to the appearing of I-being spirit as “standing there without itself or [as such that] itself it truly elevated” (HCM, 1965f, 298) and the spiritual as “totally empty of itself down to its most internal ground, which is precisely therefore an abyss” (HCM, 1965f, 296), in short: “free of its own self, self-less (selbstlos)” (HCM, 1965f, 298). HCM establishes that “the pure infrastatic condition (Verfassung) allows no preserved ‘opposite’ (Gegenüber), by which it could become illuminated for itself” (HCM, 1965f, 310). In her early work, she characterizes “the spiritual-being as such” as such “in a way helps the natural situation of transcendence” to the extent that “an executive act or ‘salto mortale’ is not needed” (HCM, 1916, 408). Later on, she depicts the I as such that already “dwells in the ‘transcendence’” that is in no way alienated or remote from it (HCM, 1963c, 231). This insight is then crystalized as the perception that the infrastatic nature of the I-being is imprinted in its very existence, and that a projecting-against (Gegen-wurf ) (HCM, 1957, 129) and “existential objectification” (existenziellen Objizierung) (HCM, 1957, 130) take place in it due to the “absolute self-transcendence” that is established in the I. Consequently, the I-being “stands against itself” (HCM, 1957, 126) and thus manifests its “original existential capability to create by itself” what stands against it (HCM, 1957, 129). Obviously, the self-transcending of the I-being involves transcendental activity, and as such it enables it to achieve a grip on objectivity (HCM, 1957, 140). However, HCM clarifies that this objectifying activity “is not cognition (Erkenntniss)” (HCM, 28 For further reading regarding the idea of “light” (Licht) in HCM’s thinking, see: HCM (1965b), Pfeiffer (2005, 61–66).

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1965f, 299) but concerns “the existential ground-level (Ungrund)” that fills the being of the I (HCM, 1957, 131). This means that we are dealing here with an ontological structure of the I-being and not with its peculiar and exclusive mental capabilities as such. The characteristics of transcending and openness toward what exists beyond the I-being fall in line with regarding the infrastatic element of the spiritual-I as an “influencing-spirit” (wirkender Geist), since within it spirit exists due to its capability to exercise an influence without having inside itself something to be posed against what it receives. In her opinion, the big secret of the deep penetration of intelligibility lies in the fact that the influencing-spirit is filled with the logos (HCM, 1965f, 308) of the real world (HCM, 1965f, 311). Yet, since the world’s colorful fullness is removed from the influencing-spirit, the spiritual is described as “‘floating’ richness” (‘schwebende’ Erfühltheit) with the logos (HCM, 1965f, 309) or as “‘suspended’” (in der Schwebe gehaltene) materiality of spirit (Geiststofflichkeit) in itself (HCM, 1965f, 312). HCM visualizes that the fullness of logos can be there only as “enrolled”, in which all forms of essence (Wesensformen) are just modes in which the light of spirit is totally elevated by itself and returns to itself within pure objectivity and intelligibility (HCM, 1965f, 311–312). Thanks to these forms of essence that are inherent in the influencing-spirit, it matches exactly the reality that is comprehensible and conceivable to the I. In this wonderful internal mechanism, or rather the intraspiritual analogous process, the pure objectivity of empirical reality is verified; and this is especially through the other side of spirit, which is anchored in the most profound subjectivity! At the same time, the subjective root of consciousness also provides the possibility of objective and a priori knowing of essence (HCM, 1965f, 313). Although the personal-spiritual nature of the I-being is independent of one’s search for an objective foundation in existence, we are dealing here with a “stage” (Stufe) that existed beforehand in human beings and is in principle deeper than anything spiritual and psychological; either one is aware of it or not (HCM, 1957, 136). As much as consciousness is involved in the directedness of the I-being to the beyond, the spirituality that facilitates the infrastasis is enabled “only because the human I with the primordial constitution (Urkonstitution) of its existence [that] is grounded in its ground-level origin (ungründigen Ursprung)” (HCM, 1957, 137– 138). Therefore, the I-being becomes what it is but through this peculiar experience of infrastasis, that practically means “self-elevation” (Selbsterhebung) (HCM, 1965f, 296) that it at the same time none other than a movement toward itself. It is apparent that especially as the infrastasis is anchored in the I and takes place inside it, it is capable of widening the I without tearing it from itself. In the infrastatic experience of spirit, one not only continues unceasingly to be oneself, but also through it one becomes an individual person. In HCM’s eyes, this is no less than a “miracle of Being” (Seinswunder) (HCM, 1965f, 296). Like HCM, Stein also observes that the peculiar being of the I “possesses a dual ontological advantage (Seinsvorzug)” with respect to the contents that fill its life.29 29 Despite devoting a special attention to the word I, unlike HCM, Stein does employ the word “ego” from time to time. This might be, at least partly, explained by Stein’s greater ambivalence about

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The first element relates to the actual life that is “present at every moment, whereas the contents have only one moment with height of actuality (Gegenwartshöhe)”. The second element refers to the being of the I as such whose life is “the ‘carrier’ (Träger) of experiential contents” that in turn “receive their lively being from it [the life of the I] and is unified by it and in it” (Stein, 2013, 295). Moreover, also with Stein these two elements are deciphered with the aid of the images of “internality” and “externality”. Almost with the same wording as HCM, Stein depicts the internal as an “interior world (Innewelt)” (Stein, 2010a, 67). However, while with HCM the internal aspect of the I is epitomized in the expression of origin-like nature, which to a large extent remains rather enigmatic, Stein suggests a vocabulary that addresses the internal terrain of the I at the center of which are: soul (Seele),30 person, personal property, and core of a person. Stein clarifies that “all these are evidently interrelated, and yet each of these words carries a special meaning which does not completely covered with the meaning of the others” (Stein, 2013, 318).31 In any event, each of these different terms seeks to address the question that Schulz aptly articulated: “how the modern concept of the person, which is to a great extent tied to the human selfconsciousness, can be connected to the (individual) ‘core’ (that is, substrate) without which the person would only be a sort of reflective concept” (Schulz, 2008, 170). Obviously, just like any philosophical concept, these too cannot be exhausted in mere definitions or determinations relating to them. However, HCM’s idea of internality might be helpful is deciphering Stein’s following determinations as addressing the internal aspect of the human person. In the first place, HCM’s idea of origin-like being resonates in Stein’s reference to the self-emanation of the I: “we call an existent an I whose being is life” in the sense of “a being which wells up (hervorquillt) from the I itself” (Stein, 2013, 318). This I, “from which all ego-life wells up and which in the life of the I becomes conscious of its own self, is therefore the same I to which pertain body and soul” (Stein, 2013, 320). Second, the entity-like qualification of the “origin” of the I for HCM might be recalled when reading Stein’s discussion of the concepts of “core of the person” or “personal property” that explicitly indicate the inner distinctiveness of the person, which is something originally given that and cannot be reduced to one’s conscious life (Stein, 2010c, 176–177). These two concepts indicate the peculiar unity and internal distinctiveness that relate to the human person, since they persist Husserl’s transcendentalism than that of HCM, who explicitly and remarkably distances herself. In her words: “The entire physical, mental (psychische), empirical, and ideal or backwards into the categorical world in Husserlian phenomenology – be it individual or collective – must descend backwards into the subjective in order to arrive at the mysterious ‘Ego’, out of whose living ‘activity’ the entire validity of Being and meaning is plainly deducible. […however] We cannot go behind this ego […] that is such that constitutes anything and everything” (HCM, 1965a, 400). See Ales Bello’s interpretation of Stein’s idea of the I as closely related to Husserl’s view of the I: Ales Bello (2008). 30 Stein discusses in length the various aspects of the internal element of the human subject, see: Stein (2010a, 189–199). Ales Bello suggested a detailed discussion of Stein’s concept of the soul that is composed of several meanings: psyche, unity of spirit and psyche, an entire autonomous aspect of the human subject. See: Ales Bello (2008, 152). 31 See here the entire section “I, Soul, Person”, in: Stein (2013, 318–323).

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in any human evolution and thus consolidate the essence and necessary conditions for its very possibility. Stein explains: The essence of the person, which does not develop but only unfolds in the course of the character development, in which single qualities manifest themselves according to both favorable and unfavorable circumstances. The core remains the same and is found in all possible processes of development and in the result of developmental processes that are determined by their relations to the external world that also confines the domain of possibilities. (Stein, 2010c, 134–135)

Notwithstanding, despite the undeniable elements of “swelling and ripening of the soul”, Stein deliberately deprives any possible development regarding this entityaspect of the I (Stein, 2010a, 215–216). Later on, she will clarify that “the life of the soul is in no way throughout pure life of the I. The unfolding and formulation of the soul takes place to a large extent without our being consciously aware of them” (Stein, 2013, 319), rather for the I, “the soul is as a ‘thing-like’ (Dingartige) ‘substantive’ (Substantiell) with enduring properties, with faculties and powers that are capable of formation and operations” (Stein, 2013, 320). To be sure, the human soul “is not space filling and sensorial as all spatial-material (beings) are”, rather it is “naturally bound to matter (stoffgebunden)” and evidently “is the form of the body” (Stein, 2013, 321). In the same way, the sense of profundity evoked by HCM’s view of the origin-like nature of the I is apparent also in Stein’s references to depth of the person, such as: “Whatever the person does freely and consciously is the life of the I (Ichleben), but it brings it up out of greater or lesser depth” (Stein, 2013, 320)—“a depth which is hidden most of the time and only occasionally opens itself” (Stein, 2013, 319). Elsewhere, she explains that “the depth from which lived experience arises and unfolds for consciousness, so to speak, is only in a flash illuminated. Despite becoming conscious and notwithstanding the knowledge grounded on such consciousness, it remains beyond consciousness, dark and inexhaustible” (Stein, 2010b, 177). Finally, exactly as with HCM’s view the I as an origin-like nature, in the abovediscussed references, also Stein portrays the human subject as a substantial being that is inwardly compressed. In this spirit, Stein establishes the following: “The person cannot live as ‘pure I’. It lives out of fullness of essence (Wesensfülle), the lights up in waking life, without ever completely being able to be fully illuminated or mastered. The person carries this fullness and is simultaneously carried by this dark ground” (Stein, 2013, 321). At once: The human person “is determined through and through by the core” (Stein, 2010a, 199). As with the internal element of the I, a similar journey could be taken regarding its external aspect in Stein’s thinking. Stein establishes that despite its ontological advantage, prerogatives that concern the above-discussed internal aspects of the soul, “its being is needy and by itself is nothing (nichtige): it is empty unless it is filled with the contents and it receives these contents from the worlds that lie ‘beyond’ its own realm – the ‘external’ and the ‘internal’” (Stein, 2013, 295). In the first place, both thinkers link the discussed externality with the element of spirit. Stein argues that “in its free and conscious mode of life, a life which encompasses and carries its own fullness, [the human person] is equal to pure spirits” (Stein, 2013, 321). The

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association of the human spirit to the external element of the I is meant to meet both senses of the external world that Stein specifies. The first relates to “everything that does not pertain to ‘me’, to the ‘monadic’ unity of my being”, including the inner world of other spirits. The second signifies “that which is accessible only to external perception, the corporal world (Körperwelt) with everything that pertains to it” (Stein, 2013, 311). Of special importance for the present context is Stein’s emphasis on the ontological meaning of spirit, which cannot be exhausted by its mental capabilities but relates first and foremost to its structural aspect, namely: the capabilities for knowing and freedom from oneself which testifies to the human capability for self-transcending.32 Stein writes: For the I that has once grasped the idea of the pure act or of eternal being, that is once apprehended, becomes the measure of its own being. But how does the I learn to see in eternal being also the source (Quelle) or the creator (Urheber) of its own being? The nullity (Nichtigkeit) and fugacity (Flüchtigkeit) of its own being becomes clear to the I once thinkingly it seizes upon its own being and seeks to get to its source. (Stein, 2013, 59)

Finally, both philosophers portray this transcending as indicating the human capability to empty out oneself or alternatively as maintaining the primordial affinity of finite beings to nothingness: My own being, as is presented to me and find myself a null being (nichtiges Sein); I am not out of myself (aus mir) and by myself I am nothing […]. And yet this null being [is] being and I thereby rest in every moment on the fullness of being. (Stein, 2013, 57)

At this point, the divergence of HCM and Stein seems sharper and clearer than it does regarding many other aspects. For HCM, the contradiction between being and nothingness remains unchanged. To use her words “nowhere does the contradiction enable itself to be grasped more radically than here” (HCM, 1963d, 92). The existing thing (Seiende) sustains its groundlessness within its very being, as an abyss upon which it stands. In this regard, the existing being is in a complex way commensurable with nothingness. Consequently, within the very being of the existing thing “everything is overly near and quick” (HCM, 1963d, 92), which seems to be closely related to its groundless grounding in nothingness. On the other hand, for Stein “the undeniable fact” that my being is “exposed to the possibility of nothingness” is not the end; it is counterbalanced by “the equally undeniable fact” that “I am, that from moment to moment I become obtained (erhalten) in being, and that in my fleeting (flüchtig) being, I am enduringly contained” (Stein, 2013, 59). Even more so, the related constant need to be filled with contents, from both realms internal and external to the I (Stein, 2013, 295) might enable closing the gap between being and nothingness within the being of the person by means of meaning. Thus, being and meaning join together, in a manner “by which all knowledge about God becomes precisely knowledge of God: the personal encounter with God” (Stein, 2007, 57, my emphases). Whereas “knowledge about” sustains the distance and gap between the knower and the object, with “knowledge of” a degree of intimacy is achieved between the two, or else a personal relation is established. 32 Schulz argued that in Finite and Eternal Being Stein uses the concept of the “person” to indicate the ontology of spirit. See: Schulz (2008, 170). See also: Schulz (2008, 173–173).

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9.3 The Destiny of Duality If at the end of a long path of walking together such a clear-cut divergence appears, one wonders what the observed communality means in the first place. It seems that the discussion arrives at a milestone that requires reflecting upon both the dual structure that carried the observed affinities and the thematization of its different destiny in each of the thinkers. This is exactly the moment in which the philosophical resonance is enacted, and the entire hermeneutical effort, including the concomitant reconstruction of the ideas of HCM and Stein, might find its justification. Just as the physical phenomenon of resonance is manifested as movement, so too is its philosophical mirroring apparent as a deviance from the track of the discussion hitherto. Assuming the above-discussed relation between being and nothingness, one could not be too much mistaken about the general stance of both HCM and Stein toward duality. HCM expresses an explicit unequivocal negative stance toward any attempt to dissolve the duality, not only of the I but also of any sort of existence in general. In her opinion, such a choice clashes with “something extraordinarily prominent, that must stand out, since it is founded in the entire ontic situation […] namely that of finite existence”. She explains that “in the given identifying mark of the finite there are two opposing extremes that seem as immediately touching each other”: autonomic and “causa sui” being on the one hand, and “complete powerlessness” (vollkommene Seinsohnmacht) that is surrounded with the threat of nothingness on the other hand. She determines that “it is strange (wunderlich) to wish imposition of a unification of the two in one and the same existent” (HCM, 1963a, 215–216) and adds: It is clear that this is practically our determinate opinion: that the state of affairs includes within itself the two; that the two together first determine the concrete ontic unity that depicts the finite existence (Dasein). We are not dealing here with a contradiction that can be roughly dialectically unified. No, every autonomy of Being and this decrepitude-of-Being (Seinshinfälligkeit) have their ontic stance on totally different points or totally different planes of the totality of existence (Daseinstotalität). (HCM, 1963a, 216)

These decisive words leave no room for mutual exclusion or convergence into unity of the two composing elements of the I in HCM’s thinking. The necessity of the persistence not only of difference but also of divergence of these two elements is indicated also by HCM’s description of the self-positioning of the I outside itself as an “existential dualistic primordial dynamic (Urdynamik)” (HCM, 1957, 129). The special problematic infrastatic character of the spiritual-I for the thesis of duality seems to be implicit in HCM’s question: How can real essence of transcend toward itself and thus be transferred back beneath itself? She answers that here a doubling of the I takes place, as a result of which there is the I that transcends and the I that is in transcending itself. Nevertheless, and this is of utmost importance, the I is not a double being. In her words: We should not first set down as ready this I and then put it again outside itself. This means again cancelling the entire ontological meaning of the matter. No, this I as one

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and whole constitutes itself in general only in this self-owned (selbsteigenen) ontic transposition-outwards (Hinausversetztheit) above itself, that is simultaneously an absolute transposition-back (Zurückversetztsein) beneath itself. (HCM, 1957, 126)

However, since there is not and cannot be a meeting-point between the part that operates inward and the part that operates outward, the doubling of the I is necessarily not its duplication. Against this background, it is clear why HCM had to reject Husserl’s idealistic category of the “pure I”. She warns against “any analogy between the being of consciousness or that of the ‘pure I’ with any conceived substance-full thought thinghood (Dinglichkeit)” in which “lie entirely different, precisely act-full (akthaft) conceived modes of existence”. She establishes that “the being of the factually existents can never be conceived in its complete peculiarity when it is measured according to the standard of consciousness” (HCM, 1963e, 25), namely transcendentally evaluated. Moreover, HCM focuses the problem on the detachment of consciousness from existence and on the deficient being of consciousness itself. This deficiency is visualized as “free hovering” and uprooted, which enables the peculiar enactment (Vollzüge) of consciousness. HCM establishes the following: “Certainly, this selfenactment (Selbstvollzug) is possible in virtue of this free-floating mode of existence; or also the opposite: mode of existence if pure consciousness is freely floating, since consciousness never ‘is’, but is always only enacted” (HCM, 1963e, 24–25). HCM responds, then, to what she regards as a deficiency of consciousness with insistence on a sharp distinction between being or reality and consciousness. Precisely this established divergence restricts and restrains consciousness from swallowing reality into itself. Consequently, the contradiction between consciousness and reality is avoided in advance. More important for the present discussion is the insight that a restrained consciousness keeps the I within its own boundaries and surely does not conflict with its origin-like nature. In the last resort, this firm separation also secures the reality of the I itself, who is not transformed into a mental content. While being beyond itself through the very experience of self-elevation, the I arrives at itself without ceasing being itself even for a single moment (HCM, 1965f, 296). Indeed, the directedness of the spiritual-I toward itself does not deprive it of self-control, as it can always return to itself from any point in which it elevates itself toward a transcendent reality (HCM, 1965f, 296).33 Since the capability of self-transcending is anchored within the I, it enables the widening of the scope of its being without tearing it from itself and robbing it of its personality. In this regard, if the I in HCM’s thinking has any aspect of unity, it necessarily relates to its peculiar capability of being directed both outward and inward (HCM, 1965f, 297). So different is Stein’s view that observes no contradiction between reality and consciousness. She regards the I as that whose “being is at every moment real-present (gegenwärtig-wirklich), actual”. Moreover, one’s “experiential contents (Erlebnisgehalte) that arrive at real being […are] indeed not its being, merely by themselves they are incapable of real being, but are obtained only by virtue of the I into whose life they enter” (Stein, 2013, 52). However, “every experience belongs to it [the pure I] and the 33 See

also: HCM (1965d, 111).

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I is such that lives in each of them” (Stein, 2013, 51–52). It transpires that for Stein, consciousness implies no threat to the being of the I.34 Moreover, the involvement of the “pure I” in the person’s life is crucial for the mediation between the different modes of existence that are discovered by consciousness since the I relates to both the “height of being (Seinshöhe) and its rudimentary stages (Vorstufen) of being to act and potency” (Stein, 2013, 52). In this respect, the enactment of consciousness does not damage the contact with reality. However, despite the understanding that “the I, always alive, proceeds from one content to the next, from one experience to another, and so its life is a flowing life” (Stein, 2013, 53), “its freedom is not unlimited. It faces lacunae which it cannot fill” (Stein, 2013, 55). Hence, the referred incapability of the person to live as a “pure I” (Stein, 2013, 321) means primarily its being in constant need for meditation. Stein drives from this insight the concomitance of finitude and eternity within human life that the very need for mediation testifies to lack of acceptance of the primordial duality within the I is further supported for example by Stein’s following words: “A reception of being that is independent of eternal being is inconceivable because, aside from eternal being, nothing exists that could be truly in full possession of being” (Stein, 2013, 57). Stein concludes, then, that “the being of the I is the “extreme opposite of an autonomous (Selfbstherrlichkeit) and self-evidence (Selbstverständlichkeit) of being by it-self . […] Thus, it never truly arrives at its own possession. Therefore, we are forced to designate the being of the I, this constantly varying living present, as a receiving [being]” (Stein, 2013, 56–57). At this point, it becomes apparent that the “receiving” element, which HCM located in the internal section of the I, is transferred by Stein to the external one. This is not a mere technical change but rather a move that will finally loosen what Stein regards as the “peculiar ambivalence of the being” of the human person (Stein, 2013, 321), namely the relation between the soul that indicates its internality and the spirit that relates to its externality. Exactly at this point, the possibility of reconciliation between the two comprising elements of the I is consolidated, so that the “‘internal and innermost,’ is but the ‘most spiritual’, that which is farthest removed from matter, that which moves the soul in its depth” (Stein, 2013, 321).35 This means also that the spirit, which HCM attributes to the external aspect of the I, is consolidated by Stein as an internal element. Moreover, despite the fact that for Stein, “All that I experience issues from my soul”, namely arises out of the soul’s depths that “opens itself by the experience and rises up from it and in it, since it opens itself in I and thereby arrives at its ‘actual’ present-living being”, there occurs a bidirectional movement from the internal to the external and back (Stein, 2013, 319). As opposed to that, HCM locates the I in two separate worlds. In her words: “the spiritual-I does not live only by itself but also in a world strange to the I (ichfremde Welt)” (HCM, 1916, 408). This dual 34 This

insight surely enables Stein to maintain a close and complex dialogue with Husserl. Ales Bello and Baseheart stress the continuity, while Schulz emphasizes the divergence. 35 See in this context Ales Bello’s interpretation according to which Stein is not interested in describing the tension between the internal or “center” and the external or “periphery” but in a “balanced vision of human being” (Ales Bello, 2008, 156).

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location in fact establishes the duality of the I as an essential ontological framework for its deciphering. Even though the theological horizon is not completely removed from HCM’s discussion, in her thinking theology is not called upon to solve the duality within its being that has been uncovered by philosophy. In a sharp contrast to such commitment to the results of the philosophical analysis, Stein’s restless efforts addressed to filling the mentioned “lacuna” by means of faith finally seem to close the gap between the two constituent elements of the I—exactly as has been indicated earlier in regard to being and nothingness. Also, the affinity between the filling of the gap typical of the human experience and the divine granting is entirely clear. The human being, who did not create himself, is incapable of filling the abyss within himself. He or she needs God. On the other hand, God provides himself to man “in a wholly personal way”. Consequently, the innermost of one’s soul turns out to be “the apartment” (Wohnung) of God (Stein, 2013, 423), meaning: the space in which one dwells and observes the world and establishes his or her identity.36 Finally, at this point where theology is merged into philosophy and an immanent unity is achieved through and through the duality of the I in Stein’s thinking evaporates.37

9.4 Conclusion The unearthing of the philosophical resonance that takes place between the ideas of HCM and Stein stretched their thinking toward each other up to the edge from which emerged the incommensurable path that is peculiar to each of them. The indication of the radical differences between the two philosophers, which was fully realized in regard to their idea of the I, does not cancel the fundamental affinity that transpired regarding their metaphysical assumptions. Moreover, it transpired that assumptions are not the prison of a philosophical thinking. Rather, a genuine philosophy enables freedom of thought that sometimes is realized beyond its primordial boundaries. This means that in order to resonate in a thinking of another philosopher, a philosophical thinking cannot be individualistic to the point of firm solipsism. Notwithstanding, the final turning of HCM and Stein in different directions evokes a reflection upon the meaning of the common point of departure. Obviously, a philosophical reflection requires readiness to question its own truths. Of particular interest in this context is the question whether it is possible to pinpoint as compelling any feature of the mentioned assumptions. Alternatively, whether the discrepancies existed already at the stage of the common point of departure, but advanced analysis was required in order to reveal them. In retrospect, these assumptions expressed 36 For

Stein’s use of the image of “apartment”, see: Alfieri (2012, 37), Miron (2013, 102). The consolidation of the most private and personal together with the most spiritual and lofty in Alfieri’s idea of apartment throws much light on Edith Stein’s analogy between the individual personality and the community. See: Stein (2007, 134–158). For further reading, see: Calcagno (2007, 25–44), Baseheart (1997, 30–75). 37 Elsewhere I referred to Stein’s thinking of as “radicalism of immanence”. See: Miron (2016a, 140).

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HCM’s ontological interest about which she explicitly noted: “we deliberately and forcefully seize on the position of the ontologists” (HCM, 1963c, 231). In the depth of the issue, HCM’s ontological focus, and particularly its highlighted focus on the element of structure, could not enable addressing the philosophical deciphering to the mental aspects of the human subject. However, the structured self-transcending that HCM specifies regarding the spiritual-I, which enables it to be directed to both reality and its own occurrence within it, prevented in advance the contradiction between the I and reality that she observed in the idealistic thinking (HCM, 1963e, 25). As opposed to that, Stein’s thinking, as observed by many of its commentators, was crystalized around the issue of the human person.38 Certainly, the philosophical resonance, like any reflective thinking, can never be unearthed within the first reading but requires re-readings that reveal the horizons for developing and transformation that relate to a certain idea. However, the novelty of the philosophical resonance as a new constituted hermeneutical framework lies exactly in the following aspect: the return to assumptions does not take place only within the thinking that served as a point of departure for the current discussion but also within another thinking, which shares a common ground with it. In any event, it is no coincidence that the philosophical resonance burst forth within the discussion of the I. The I, especially in phenomenological thinking, is ultimately a subject of reflection that as such modifies both the subject and the object. Moreover, during the reflective journey of the I along his or her philosophical life, returning to the point of departure never means returning to the same place.

References Ales Bello, A. (2008). Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein: The question of the human subject (A. Calcagno, Trans), American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 82 (1), 143–159. Alfieri, F. OFM. (2012). Die Rezeption Edith Steins. Internationale Edith-Stein-Bibliographie 1942– 2012. Festgabe für M. Amata Neyer OCD [Ordo Carmelitarum Discalceatarum]. Würzburg, Echter. Avé-Lallemant, E. (2015). Edith Stein und Hedwig Conrad-Martius – Begegnung in Leben und Werk. In B. Beckmann & H. B. Gerl-Falkovitz (Eds.), Edith Stein, Themen-Bezüge-Dokumente (2nd ed., pp. 66–88). Dresden: Verlag Text and Dialog. Baseheart, M. C. (1997). Person in the world: Introduction to the philosophy of Edith Stein. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Becker, O. (1930). Die Philosphie Edmund Husserls. Kantstudien, 35, 119–150. Calcagno. A. (2007). The philosophy of Edith Stein. Pittsburg: Duquesne. Conrad-Martius, H. (1916). Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Auβenwelt: Verbunden mit einer Kritik positivistischer Theorien. Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und philosophische Forschung, III (pp. 345–542). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Conrad-Martius, H. (1916N). Über Ontologie, Conrad-Martiusiana, A.I 3, 14 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich.

38 The secondary literature that is mentioned in the footnotes can be considered as representative of

this view of Stein’s thinking.

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Conrad-Martius, H. (1923). Realontologie, Buch I. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, VI (pp. 159–333). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Conrad-Martius, H. (1931N). Entwurf zu einer universalen Schematik realen Seins, ConradMartiusiana, A.II 2, 10 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1957). Das Sein. München: Kosel. ¨ Conrad-Martius, H. (1960). Edith Stein. In Edith Stein. 1960. Briefe an Hedwig Conrad-Martius (pp. 59–83). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963a [1932]). Dasein, Substantialität, Seele. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 194–227). München: Kosel. ¨ Conrad-Martius, H. (1963b [1932]). Die Fundamentale Bedeutung eines substanziellen Seinsbegriffs für eine theistische Metaphysik. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 257–267). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963c [1934]). Existentialle Tiefe und Untiefe von Dasein und Ich. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, 229–256). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963d [1931]). Sein und Nichts. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I., pp. 89– 100). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963e [1931]). Seinsphilosophie. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 15– 31). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963f [1930]). Was ist Metaphysik? In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 38–48). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1965a [1958]). Die transzendentale und die ontologische Phänomenologie. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 393–402). München: Kösel (printed also in: HCM 1959a). Conrad-Martius, H. (1965b [1938]). Licht und Geist. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 261– 274). München: Kosel. ¨ Conrad-Martius, H. (1965c [1956]). Phänomenologie und Spekulation. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 370–384). München: Kösel (English translation: HCM 1959b). Conrad-Martius, H. (1965d [1948]). Seele und Leib. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 107– 124). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1965e [1956]). Über das Wesen des Wesens. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 335–356). München: Kosel. ¨ Conrad-Martius, H. (1965f [1956]). Wirkender und Empfangender Geist. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III., pp. 295–314). München: Kösel. Gadamer, H.-G. (2004 [1960]). Truth and method. Second revised edition (J. Weinsheimer & D.G. Marshall, Trans). London and New York: Continuum. Geiger, M. (1933). Alexander Pfänder methodishe Stellung. In E. Heller & F. Löw (Eds.), Neue Münchener Philosophiche Abhandelungen (pp. 1–16). Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth. Herbstrith, Waltraud (Teresia a Matre Dei, OCD [Ordo Carmelitarum Discalceatarum]. 1972. Edith Stein. Freising: Kyrios. Husserl, E. (1913). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, I (1) (pp. 1–323). Halle: Max Niemeyer (Reprinted in: Husserl 1952a; English translation: Husserl 2012a). Husserl, E. (1952a [1913]). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, Erstes Buch, ed. Karl Schuhmann, Husserliana III (1). Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1952b). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie: phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution. Zweites Buch ed. Marly Biemel, Husserliana IV. Haag: Martinus Nijhoff (English translation: Husserl 2002). Husserl, E. (2002 [1989]). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy, second book (R. Rojcewicz & A. Schuwer, Trans.). Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers (Translation of: Husserl 1952b). Husserl, E. (2012 [1913]). Ideas, general introduction to pure phenomenology (W. R. Boyce Gibson, Trans.). London: Routledge (Translation of: Husserl 1952a).

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Ingarden, Roman. (1962). Edith Stein on her activity as an assistant of Edmund Husserl. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: A Quarterly Journal XXIII, 2, 155–161. Kenaan, H. (2016). Husserl and Levinas: The ethical structure of a philosophical debt. In R. Miron (Ed.), Husserl and other phenomenologists. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis, 17–28 (previously published in: The European Legacy, Toward New Paradigms, 21 (5–6), Husserl and other phenomenologists, a special issue edited by Ronny Miron, 481–492). Lebech, M. (2011). Beginning to read Stein’s finite and eternal being. In L. Embree, I. Copoeru, D. Moran, & H. R. Sepp (Eds.), Phenomenology 2010 4, selected essays from Northern Europe traditions, transitions and challenges (pp. 138–154). Bucharest: Zeta Books / Paris: Arghos=Diffusion. Levinas, E. (1998). The ruin of representation. In: Discovering existence with Husserl (R. A. Cohen & M. B. Smith, Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Miron, R. (2013, January). Untitled book review of Alfieri (Alfieri 2012). Iyyun, The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly, 62, 98–104. Miron, R. (2014). “The gate of reality”: Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ idea of reality. In Realontologie. Phänomenologische Forschungen (pp. 59–82) (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 4). Miron, R. (2015). The vocabulary of reality. Human Studies, 38(3), 335–336 (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 5). Miron, R. (2016a). Faith and radicalism: Edith Stein vis-à-vis Yeshayahu Leibowitz. The Review of Rabbinic Judaism, 19, 118–146 (A revised and expanded version is printed in this volume as Chapter 13). Miron, R. (2016b). Husserl and other phenomenologists, The European Legacy, Toward New Paradigms, 21(5–6) (Husserl and Other Phenomenologists, a special issue edited by Ronny Miron), 467–480 (Reprinted in: Miron 2018c). Miron, R. (2016c). In the midst of being: The journey into the internality of reality in Hedwig ConradMartius’ metaphysics. Discipline Filosofiche, 26(1) (Phenomenological Ontologies: Individuality, Essence and Idea, a special issue edited by Simona Bertolini and Faustino Fabbianelli), 217–244 (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 10). Miron, R. (2016d). Introduction. The European Legacy, Toward New Paradigms, 21(5–6) (Husserl and other phenomenologists, a special issue edited by Ronny Miron), 465–466 (Reprinted in: Miron 2018d). Miron, R. (2017). The ontological exclusivity of the “I”. Phänomenologische Forschungen (pp. 97– 116) (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 7). Miron, R. (Ed.). (2018a). Husserl and other phenomenologists. London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis. Miron, R. (2018b). Husserl and other phenomenologists. In Husserl and other phenomenologists, ed. Ronny Miron. London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis, 3–16 (previously published in: Miron 2016b). Miron, R. (2018c). Introduction. In R. Miron (Ed.), Husserl and other phenomenologists (pp. 1–2). London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis (previously published in: Miron 2016d). Miron, R. (2021). Between ontological duality and unified individuality: Hedwig conrad-martius versus edith stein. In K. Harm & K. Edeltraud (Eds.), Edith stein’s ltinerary: Phenomenology, christian philosophy, and carmelite spirituality (pp. 195–204). Münster: Aschendorff. Mohanty, J. (1977). Phenomenology: Between essentialism and transcendental philosophy. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Moran, D. (2012). Forward. In E. Husserl (Ed.). Ideas, central introduction to pure phenomenology (pp. xiii–xxxiii) (W. R. Boyce Gibson, trans.). London: Routledge. Pfeiffer, A. E. (2005). Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Eine Phänomenologische sicht auf Nature und Welt. Würzburg: Orbis Phenomenologicus, Konigshausen ¨ and Neumann. Ricci, G. R. (2010). Husserl’s assistants: Phenomenology reconstituted. History of European Ideas, 36(4), 419–426. Schulz, P. J. (2008). Toward the subjectivity of the human person: Edith Stein’s contribution to the theory of identity. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 82(1), 161–176.

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Stein, E. (1922). Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geistwissenschaften, I, Psychische Kausalitat, Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, V (pp. 1–115). Halle: Max Niemeyer (Reprinted in: Stein 2010a; English translation: Stein 2000c). Stein, E. (1929). Husserls Phänomenologie und die Philosophie des hl. Thomas V. Aquino. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phaenomenologische Forschung, Festschrift Edmund Husserl (zum 70, Geburtstag gewidmet) (pp. 315–338). Halle: Max Niemeyer (Reprinted in: Stein 2014, 119–142; English translation: Stein 1997). Stein, E. (1960). Briefe an Hedwig Conrad-Martius. München: Kösel. Stein, E. (1989 [1970]). On the problem of empathy. Translation of Zum Problem der Einfiihlung by Waltraut Stein (2nd edn.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Revised ed.: Collected Works of Edith Stein, Vol. III. Washington, DC: ICS Publications, Institute of Carmelite Studies (Translation of: Stein 2016). Stein, E. (1997). Husserl’s phenomenology and the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas: Attempt at a comparison. In Person in the world: Introduction to the philosophy of Edith Stein (M. C. Baseheart, Ed. and Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer (Contributions to phenomenology 27), 129–144 (Translation of: Stein 1929 / Stein 2014, 119–142). Stein, E. (2000a). Knowledge and faith. In The collected works of Edith Stein (Vol. VII, Trans. W. Redmond). Washington, DC: ICS Publications, Institute of Carmelite Studies (Translation of: Stein 2007). Stein, E. (2000b). Philosophy of psychology and the humanity. In The collected works of Edith Stein (Vol. VII, ed. M. Sawicki, trans. M. C. Baseheart & M. Sawicki). Washington, DC: ICS Publications, Institute of Carmelite Studies (Translation of: Stein 2010a / Stein 1922). Stein, E. (2002). Finite and eternal being, An attempt at an ascent to the meaning of being, The Collected Works of Edith Stein, volume IX, trans. Kurt F. Reinhardt. Washington, DC: ICS Publications, Institute of Carmelite Studies (Translation of: Stein 2013). Stein, E. (2005). Self portrait in letters: Letters to Roman Ingarden. The collected works of Edith Stein (Vol. XII, trans. Hugh Candler Hunt). Washington, DC: ICS publications, Institute for Carmelite Studies. Stein, E. (2007). Wege der Gotterkenntniss, Studie zu Dionysus Areopagita und Übersetzung seiner Werke, ESGA, Vol. XVII, 2nd Auf., bearbeitet und eingeleiter von Beate Beckmann und Viki Ranff. Freiburg, Basel and Wien (English translation: Stein, Edith. 2000b). Stein, E. (2010a). Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geistwissenschaften, ESGA VI, Bearbeitet und eingeleitet von Beate Beckmann-Zöller. Freiburg, Basel, Wien: Herder (First appeared in: Stein 1922; English translation: Stein 2000c). Stein, E. (2010b). Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person. Vorlesung zur philosophischen Antropologie, ESGA XIV, 2nd Auf., Neu bearbeitet und eingeleitet von B. Beckmann-Zoller. ¨ Freiburg-Basel-Wien: Herder. Stein, E. (2010c). Einführung in die Philosophie, ESGA VIII, 2nd Auf., Hinführung, Bearbeitung und Anmerkungen von Claudia Mariéle Wulf. Freiburg, Basel, Wien: Herder. Stein, E. (2013). Endliches und ewiges Sein, Versuch eines Aufstiegs zum Sinn des Seins, ESGA XI/XII, 2nd Auf., Eingeführt und bearbeitet von Andreas Uwe Müller. Freiburg, Basel, Wien: Herder (English translation: Stein 2002b). Stein, E. (2014). “Freiheit und Gnade” und weitere Beiträge zu Phänomenologie und Ontologie (1917 bis 1937), ESGA, Vol. IX Beate Beckmann und Hans Rainer Sepp (Hrg.). Freiburg, Basel, Wien: Herder (Edith Stein Gesamtausgabe IX). Stein, E. (2016). Zum Problem der Einfühlung, ESGA, Vol. V, 3nd Auf., Eingeführt und bearbeitet von Maria Antonia Sondermann OCD [Ordo Carmelitarum Discalceatarum]. Freiburg, Basel, Wien: Herder (English translation: Stein 1989). Vendrell-Ferran, Í. (2008). Die Emotionen, Gefühle in der realistischen Phänomenologie. Berlin: Akademie.

Part III

The Convergence of Being and the “I-Being”

Chapter 10

In the Midst of Being: The Journey into the Internality of Reality in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Metaphysics Ronny Miron

Abstract This article delineates the main milestones in the trajectory to the internality of Being in HCM’s thinking against Husserl’s transcendentalism. It starts by uncovering the multi-aspect duality that characterizes the real being, continues in encountering the limitations and constraints that are imposed by a study anchored in the appearances of the real external world, and culminates in the articulation of the internality of Being as “selfness” (Selbsthaftigkeit or Selberkeit) that typifies real beings and the spiritual-I. This trajectory is not marked by HCM herself, but like any phenomenological journey it is personal and can be best carried out in the first person. The following discussion delineates the path to the internality of Being in Husserl’s phenomenology, in which the gap between the internal and the external is intensified to the point of the reduction of the external world. As a result, the world is eliminated and sometimes even seems entirely forgotten. In contrast, for HCM, there is no such opposition. On the contrary, in her thinking the simultaneous gaze to the internal and the external aspects of reality is preserved and the thematization of the gap between the two transpires as a useful hermeneutical tool for achieving an abundant and complex perception of the internality of Being that in no way leaves behind its external dimensions and the world in general.

R. Miron (B) Interdisciplinary Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Miron (ed.), Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68783-0_10

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10.1 Introduction: Idea, Essence, and Appearing The question “in which real mode are ‘essences’ (Washeiten) given to us?” (HCM, 1916b, 356) raised at the very outset of Doctrine of Appearance, the first published work of the realist phenomenologist Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888–1966) (HCM)1 lays out the fundamental duality that pervades her entire metaphysics: it assumes as evident the presence of essences in reality and at the same time alludes to the plurality and complexity of their mode of givenness in it. In this regard, she argues that every absolute essence-unity describes an idea that is distinguished from any correlation to consciousness. The employed method of “essence intuition” (Wesensfassung), is designed to scrutinize things in their entirety and thereby discern the related idea (HCM, 1916b, 353), which is responsible for establishing a thing as a specific object that has its proper and unchangeable place in reality.2 The categories of the idea, essence, and objectivity are then inseparably related to each other in HCM’s ontology, to the extent that the argument regarding the existence of essences also entails their real existence and can be referred to as possessing an objective sense. Hence, unveiling essences and explicating their modes of appearing can be considered as a means of understanding reality. HCM was a prominent figure in “The Munich Circle” that gathered around 3 By means of the so-called turn to Edmund Husserl in the 1920s in Gottingen. ¨ 4 the object (Die Wende zum Objekt) they responded to Husserl’s appeal “go back 1 Doctrine

of Appearance is an expanded version of the first chapter of an essay, which received an award from the department of philosophy at the University of Göttingen (HCM, 1920a, 10–24). In 1912, Alexander Pfänder accepted Doctrine as a Ph.D. thesis at the University of Munich (U. Avé-Lallemant, 1965/1966, 212). In 1913, the expanded chapter was printed and submitted as a dissertation, in a version almost identical to Doctrine of Appearance. In a postscript added to the special print in 1920, HCM established her shift to ontology-oriented studies and seems to know that her original plan to develop the rest of the chapters in her essay on positivism will not be realized (HCM, 1920b, 130. See here also: Avé-Lallemant, 1971, 213). All translations from the German original into English are mine. Emphases follow the original. 2 Throughout all of her work, HCM was committed to the method of the “essence intuition” (Wesenserfassung), which she regarded as her “the genuine philosophical assignment (Aufgabe)” (HCM, 1916b, 348), mentioning it on many occasions in her work, see: HCM (1916b, 346–348, 355 n. 1; 1923, 159; 1965b, 377; 1965c, 347). The influence of Husserl’s criticism of psychologism on the early realist phenomenologists is apparent in their adoption of his method of the essence intuition (Husserl, 1952, §1–§17 3–39/1970a, introduction, §§1–7 165–179/1984a, §§1–7 5–29; 2012, §§1–17 9–32). For further reading on the related method, especially in the realist school of phenomenology, see: Hart (1972, 39–40), Reinach (1951/1968/1969; 1921b/1983), Pfänder (1913), Pfeiffer (2005, 1–13), Schmücker (1956, 1–33), Ebel (1965, 1–25). 3 The Munich Circle included a group of intellectuals and philosophers from Munich, the first generation of phenomenologists, whose prominent members included: Alexander Pfänder, Johannes Daubert, Moritz Geiger, Theodor Conrad, Adolf Reinach, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Maximilian Beck, Max Scheler, Jean Hering, Alexander Koyré, Roman Ingarden, Edith Stein, and Hedwig Conrad-Martius. For further reading about this circle, see: Avé-Lallemant (1975). 4 Indeed, the trend of “turn to the object” was part of their commitment to “essence intuition” and implied the reconsideration of the idea of “intention” as it appeared in Husserl’s Logical Investigations. Moritz Geiger aptly characterized this trend as follows: “[…] while in the past

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to the ‘things themselves’” (Husserl, 1970a, 168/1984a, 10), which implied that objects and their modes of knowing are established upon the lawfulness of essence, which is independent of the knowing subject and consciousness in general (Husserl, 1970b, Introduction, §4 172, §6 174–175/1984a, §4 17–18, §6 22–24).5 However, these phenomenologists did not simply follow Husserl, whose transcendental turn was already evident then.6 Instead, the patent realist orientation that they applied to the specific analysis of fields of research was meant to understand “the things” (die Sachen) as they give themselves to intuition—be they physical or ideal. Phenomenology in this approach, depicted also as “clinging to” givenness (Walther, 1955, 21–23), means describing appearances free of any presumption or theory regarding reality. However, description is not a goal in-itself but is meant to extricate the “primordial characteristics” of phenomena that determine the reality of the objects that are included in it, by means of which an access to new areas of knowledge and experience might be enabled (Avé-Lallemant, 1988, 69). In particular, HCM assumes the applicability of “essence intuition” in any sphere of thinkable objects (HCM, 1916b, 355 n. 1) and maintains that this method might open possibilities of knowledge and a whole domain of objects that cannot be accessed by the psychology and biology of consciousness (HCM, 1916b, 346).7 This article delineates the main milestones in the path to the internality of Being in HCM’s metaphysical thinking that has been consolidated in confrontation with and criticism of Husserl’s transcendental thinking. Her point of departure might be pinpointed in her uncovering of the multiple aspects of the duality that characterizes real being. Subsequently, she unveils the limitations and constraints that are imposed by a study that is anchored in the appearances of the real external world. The culminating stage is marked by the insight concerning the internality of Being, referred to as the “selfness” (Selbsthaftigkeit or Selberkeit) that is manifested by the spiritual-I. The sketch is not pointed out by HCM herself but is achieved via the arduous work

people almost always saw the objects as images of the I, now the tension between the I and the object in accordance with its law returns. [We seek] what is in front of the I, the object. Overcoming the tension between them cannot be achieved through absorbing the object into the subject but through turning to the object itself, as a result of which the construction of the world that is given in an unmediated manner receives a different gaze” (Geiger, 1933, 13). See also: Becker (1930), Vendrell Ferran (2008, 71–78). 5 This saying is widely discussed: Seifert (1995, 92–98), Kuhn (1969, 397–399). The early phenomenologists understood Husserl’s appeal as an indifference to epistemological questions. See: U. Avé-Lallemant (1965/1966, 207). For the relations between phenomenology and epistemology, see: Spiegelberg (1975, 130–131). Like HCM, who characterized the epistemological approach as dogmatic (HCM, 1916b, 347) and incapable of coping with its questions (HCM, 1916b, 351), Spiegelberg too criticized epistemology, which in its highly speculative accounts of how knowledge works omits its first and paramount obligation to be critical of itself (Spiegelberg, 1975, 152). 6 While Husserl’s transcendental turn first appeared in writing with the publication of the first volume of his Ideas in 1913 (Husserl, 1952/2012), it was expressed earlier, starting in 1905, in his lectures. On this issue, see: Nakhnikian (1964), Biemel (1950). 7 See also: Ales Bello (2008, 397).

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of elucidating her complex ideas and enigmatic style of writing.8 To this extent, the suggested view regarding HCM’s idea of the internality of being should be regarded as my “depiction […] in the first person” (Husserl, 1952, §27 56/2012, §27 51) of the subject.9

10.2 The Fundamental Duality The Husserlian postulate that an essence dwells in beings is also fundamental to HCM’s metaphysics.10 However, while in Husserl’s phenomenology this insight enables the convergence of the variety that characterizes the world of phenomena into the transcendental subject that bestows meaning upon reality, for HCM it is the object itself that organizes this variety. Consequently, in HCM’s thinking, reality is understood within a dual structure that governs the real being that is composed of essence or the “what” of the thing (Washeit) and the “bearer” (Träger) onto which the essence is loaded.11 The essence of the real being or its “what” (Wesensquod) is “unambiguous and unmistakable” (HCM, 1965c, 343) and is “definite and unchangeable”, thanks to which the real being acquires a “sense-position” (Sinnstelle), i.e., a “place” (topos) (HCM, 1965c, 336–337) within the “sense cosmos” (kÒsmos noetÒs) (HCM, 1965b, 377).12 At the same time, the carrying of essence is such that it implies “a structural element (Gestaltungsmoment) of pure elevation into existence” (HCM, 1923, 175), and in this respect it is tantamount to an actual realization or extrication from nothingness.13 This process is more perceptible with regard to the material

8 HCM’s

unique style as well as her relative anonymity even to the world of phenomenology, necessitate a detailed presentation. However, my consistent attempt to use HCM’s words throughout the exposition and discussion should not mislead us into thinking that there is no exegetical work involved here. 9 Carr establishes that Husserl introduces phenomenology in the first-person voice in his mature “middle” period, namely during the time of Ideas I (Husserl, 1952/2012). In his opinion, this was Husserl’s historical overture to Descartes, see: Carr (1999, 75–76). For discussions of the subject as the anchor of phenomenology, see: Spiegelberg (1969, 137–143). 10 Husserl establishes that unlike individual beings, which might be accidental, essence is the necessary and universal element of the being under discussion. See: Husserl (1952, §2 5–6/2012, §2 9–10). For further reading, see: Mohanty (1977, 1–7). 11 The discussion of the dual structure of Being pervades HCM’s most essential writings. See in particular: HCM (1923, 167–172; 1957, 36–42). However, in Doctrine of Appearances the term “bearer” does not signify an ontological element accompanying the essence but a characteristic of the I (HCM, 1916b, 482), of spirit (HCM, 1916b, 407, 514), of the senses (HCM, 1916b, 497–498), or of the body (HCM, 1916b, 525–526). 12 See also: HCM (1965c, 347–348). The influence of Hering at this point is apparent, see: Hering (1921). HCM expresses her debt to Hering, see: HCM (1923, 162). 13 At the foundation of HCM’s ontology, there exists the contradiction between being and nothingness, see: HCM (1923, 162). This issue is discussed also in: Miron (2014b) (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 4).

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being (HCM, 1923, 195) that is characterized as “an absolute escape from nothingness” that is also “absolute measurelessness (Maßlossigkeit)” (HCM, 1923, 216). Yet, the very embodiment in the concrete or external appearing of a thing in reality does not condition the reality of a thing, as HCM explicitly establishes: “We ask what may become reality, if it is to be found factually or also only as encountered in thought” (HCM, 1923, 159).14 Moreover, even material being is regarded as a “specific internal limitation” of material being (HCM, 1923, 222). That is to say that inasmuch as by elevating real being it breaks through the barrier of nothingness, it also testifies to “an internal mode of structuring” (HCM, 1923, 175) and “personal” carrying (HCM, 1923, 167) of real being itself. In addition to the structural aspect, the discussed duality has an aspect of content, in which the existence of the real being and its intelligibility are juxtaposed one against the other. Regarding the element of existence, HCM establishes that “we will never be able to penetrate really and ultimately the essence of any real entity (Realentität) […] if we do not let it stand exactly on the thesis of existence (Daseinsthesis) that was bracketed in Husserl’s approach” (HCM, 1916aN, 6). Elsewhere, HCM clarifies the related thesis as follows: “instead of hypothetically bracketing the real Being and thereby seeing the world (in the reduction) stripped of the real reality (wirkich Wirklichkeit), it is suggested now to hypothetically posit the real Being of the world and thereby the present it with its own rootedness into Being” (HCM, 1965a, 397). The importance of this thesis in this regard concerns the support provided by if for reinstating facts and their precedence into the phenomenological discourse after Husserl had excluded them together with the entire empirical field in favor of observation of essences.15 Instead, HCM establishes explicitly: “the factual presence (tatsächliche Vorhandensein) of entirely peculiar and in-itself factually coherent phenomenon of the ‘real external-worldliness’ became undeniable” (HCM, 1916b, 396). More specifically, HCM rejects Husserl’s transcendental argument while leaning on his shoulders, as it were, i.e., she accepts his claim that “nulla ‘re’ indigent ad existendum”, namely: immanent being is absolute, as it never brings any

14 While in Doctrine of Appearance, HCM presumes the factual realization of the real external world, in Realontologie her study of essence is located at the “gateway to reality” (Tor der Realität) (HCM, 1923, 173), which signifies the datum-point where “a radical overcoming” of the “mere formal positioning” of reality takes place and things “elevate” themselves from nonexistence or mere ideal and formal existence, but do not yet arrive at factual existence (HCM, 1923, 173). 15 For Husserl’s negative attitude toward facts, see: Husserl (1952, §3 13–16/2012, §3 11–13), Mohanty (1977, 3–9). HCM later established that Husserl never rejected or doubted the reality of the world but regarded it as a hypothetical being (HCM, 1965c, 398). However, unlike Husserl, HCM does not see any problem with empirical experience (HCM, 1965c, 351) and even regards the then new natural sciences as elucidating the real foundations of such experience (HCM, 1965c, 401).

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“thing” to being.16 However, she derives from the same insight an opposite conclusion, according to which a thing that, like consciousness, is established as an absolute being is fundamentally opposed to any reality. Hence, she establishes that within the framework of absolute consciousness, “the real should collapse” (HCM, 1916aN, 2). Against the idealistic stance, depicted as “hypothetically bracketing the real Being and thereby seeing the world (in the reduction) stripped (enthoben) of the real reality (wirkich Wirklichkeit)” (HCM, 1965a, 397), HCM established her early “thesis of existence (Daseinsthesis)” (HCM, 1916aN, 5–8, 11–12), which was to become foundational to her entire metaphysics. According to this thesis, there exists an “unbridgeable and absolute opposition between real being and nothing” (HCM, 1923, 162),17 hence “real existence is not one ‘form of existence’ (Daseinsform) among others but something plainly and absolutely new thing (Neues)” (HCM, 1923, 163). Nonetheless, HCM insists18 that existence is also intelligible due to the essence inherent in it (HCM, 1965c, 336). In this regard, she argues that the presence of essence in real beings is original and perceivable (HCM, 1931N, 2–3), as well as the foundation of the intelligibility of Being in general (HCM, 1963a, 230). At this point, she follows Husserl’s general thesis of the rationality of the world,19 arguing that “the objective-intelligible logos is a primordial idea (Uridee)” according to which the world was created, that “endless diversity is inherent in it”, and thus it is capable of bestowing meaning upon “every single thing and limb (Glied) in the world” (HCM, 1965d, 307) and it “is not taken from subjective treasure of the mind (Verstandsschutz)” (HCM, 1965d, 310). Moreover, the existence of essences in real things enables, at least in principle, their givenness to the observing subject and from itself also the study of their essences. This necessary joining together of existence and intelligibility in real being means, then, that existence might be comprehended. In any event, as much as HCM does not renounce the most important asset of idealistic thinking, i.e., the intelligibility of being, she clarifies that once real being is realized as an existing-thing (Dasein) and achieves suchness, it is wrapped with misunderstanding. In her opinion, “the incomprehensibility (Unfaßlichkeit) of the mere facticity of being is objective! What exists in a certain way, does not allow itself to be reached in its Being! Nevertheless, it exists; and nevertheless, it is comprehended within it being!” (HCM, 1963d, 90). That is to say that whereas in the ontological 16 HCM cites Husserl here (Husserl, 1952, §49 104/2012, §49 94). This determination of Husserl was

regarded by a few members of the Munich Circle, HCM included, as incapsulating his overall turn toward transcendental idealism in Ideas I from his philosophical stance in Logical Investigations. HCM refers to Husserl’s phrase “nulla ‘re’ indigent ad existendum” on several occasions, see: HCM (1916aN, 1, 3; 1963a, 229; 1963c, 195; 1963e, 21; 1965b, 370; 1965c, 353). However, in connection with the first mention, Stein indicates (in a letter to Ingarden from 9 April 1917) that HCM’s “notes on the question of Idealism […] are however, not a refutation of Husserl’s position. In fact, the main argument seems to me to be based on a misunderstanding of his exposition” (Stein, 2005, 58). 17 See here also: HCM (1963d, 93–94). 18 HCM argues that Husserl’s detailed analysis of consciousness and meaning raises the question of whether the noematic world is “really real” or remains entirely internal to consciousness and therefore is eventually thrown outside (HCM, 1965c, 396). Marvin Farber, too, regarded the reality of the external world as a basic fact, see: Farber (1967, 65). 19 See, for example, Husserl (1952, §136–§137; §139; §142/2012, §136–§137; §139; §142).

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realm existence and intelligibility overlap each other, in the realm of facticity this duality is radicalized into a split that is recognized in the apparent incomprehensibility of the phenomenal and the factual. Obviously, this impedes one’s access to the objectivity of the phenomenal and the factual though not to their objectivity itself, which according to HCM has an entity-like sense. The third duality, which is already implied in the two dualities at the level of structure and content, is the hermeneutical one. Simply put, the existence of the two parts unavoidably raises the question of their relation to each other and their affinity to the whole whose parts they are. For the present context, of particular importance are Husserl’s observations regarding the a priori element in his “Theory of whole and part”, i.e., first that the relation between whole and part can “have an a priori foundation in the idea of an object” in general (Husserl, 1970b, III §1 4/1984a, III §1 229)20 ; second, that the whole is not “a mere aggregate or mere coexistence of any contents” or similarity of beings of the same kind but it is constituted by a priori laws that determine the relations between its parts (Husserl, 1970b, III §23 39/1984a, III §23 288–289). This idea of the a priori is also crucial for HCM’s objective grounding of states of affairs (Sachverhalt) and reality as a whole because it combines both intelligible and ontological aspects and thus responds to the discussed structure of duality.21 There is no contradiction between HCM’s dealing with the meaning of the two elements that comprise real being and their relation to each other, on the one hand, and her principle commitment to Husserl’s descriptive method (HCM, 1916b, 355 n. 1), on the other hand. Indeed, the issue of the relation between the elements of reality was already raised at the stage of description.22 In this respect, the hermeneutics of the relation between whole and part should be considered in any phenomenological study. Yet, despite being helpful to illuminate many elements of reality, in no way is the hermeneutic aspect of duality confined to the epistemological plane. How do these three aspects of duality in the world of beings relate to each other in HCM’s thinking? One can say that the most moderate is the structural duality 20 Husserl also argued that distinctions relating to the being of particular individuals are applicable also to the ideas themselves (Husserl, 1970b, III, §7a 13/1984a, III, §7a 245). 21 The term “state of affairs” (Sachverhalt) is central in the theoretical studies of the object in early phenomenology, signifying the specific correlate of judgments that is independent of acts of consciousness and any psychological aspect (yet not always identical with the object), see: Husserl (1970b, V, §28–§29 139–143, V §44 171–174/1984a, V §28–§29 461–468, V § 44 520–527), Husserl (1952, §148 342–343/2012, §148 309–311), HCM (1957, 19–36). For further reading, see: Habbel (1959, 55–87). 22 The hermeneutical duality seems to give content to the general argument that the Husserlian whole-parts theory is “the single most important contribution to realist […] ontology in the modern period”, Smith and Mulligan (1982, 37). For further reading, see: Miron (2018b) (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 3). HCM’s relation to the descriptive method is complicated. On the one hand, she equates Husserl’s descriptive theory with his interest in immanent consciousness, which is “abstruse” for her (HCM, 1916b, 355 n. 1). On the other hand, she depicts her own philosophical moves as “descriptive”, see: HCM (1916b, 415, 541). The descriptive method is legitimate only as an initial stage of the investigation but insufficient for approaching the internal dimensions of Beings.

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as is apparent in the characterization of the essence and the bearer as reciprocal: the bearer is specified by the essence that is loaded onto it and by which it exists. At the same time, the essence is carried to the extent that it specifies its bearer. The two consolidate an absolute body or shape (Gebilde) in-itself (HCM, 1923, 167–168) or unity in which the specifier and the specified are at the same time the borne and the loaded. They should be regarded as “only formally merely reciprocally determined” (HCM, 1923, 171) and as “‘emerging’ (entstehen) at the same time” (HCM, 1923, 172).23 The duality of essence and its bearer resonates also in the duality that is composed of existence and intelligibility, since the very existence of essence enables us in principle to comprehend real being, while being carried is itself embodied in what is established as real. Thus, both dualities refer to each other like the formal to the realized—the first element in them is not perceptible, yet it might achieve an external realization as actually taking place in the elements of the bearer and existence. However, compared to the first duality, the second one seems to have a considerable gap between its comprising elements, i.e., existence and intelligibility. This gap indicates something more than the mere difference which surely also exists between the essence and its bearer. The ontological framework is brought into play exactly to regulate this gap between existence and intelligibility. HCM characterizes ontology as the science of “beings” due to their sense-of-Being (Seinssinn) and essence (HCM, 1965c, 339), which establish the general meaning of what “is there” and in relation to which “stands the really existing (wirklich Seiendes) on one level together with any thinkable ‘existent’ (denkbaren Vorhandenen)” (HCM, 1963c, 200). She adds that “the ontological (Seinsmäßig) sense is what underlies” everything and thanks to it, “the encountered thing (res) possesses meaning in the context of the entire ‘existing thing’ (Seiende)” (HCM, 1965c, 347). Therefore, the ontological study of the purely immanent sense of beings is capable of “acquiring a true insight into the essence of reality” (HCM, 1963c, 202) and in this context it is the ground upon which the duality of existence and intelligibility rests. However, despite the bridge of the logos between all that exists and human consciousness, the two elements in the second duality do not achieve the intimacy that is evident from the reciprocity of the essence and its bearer. The insight that a remnant of the mentioned gap is still there anyway raises the need for the thematization of the first two dualities and of the structure of duality as such. It is thus that the third duality comes into play. The hermeneutical duality is not created by a difference or even a gap between two elements but transpires as an achievement of reflection. To this extent, the hermeneutical one is the most implicit of the three dualities. More importantly, the third duality has repercussions for the entirety of HCM’s thinking. In this respect, reconciling the hermeneutical duality at the same time resolves the structural and contents dualities as well. 23 HCM

clarifies that she does not mean here a genetic and simultaneous becoming (HCM, 1923, 172). Moreover, admitting the existence of God requires regarding reality as constituted (by Him). However, her argument in Realontologie keeps the independency of the philosophical path, unlike later writings, in which the theological aspect becomes important and apparent. For further reading, see: Hart (1972, 545–638), Pfeiffer (2005, 87–107).

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Against the background of what has been suggested, I argue that the phenomenon of duality as governing the world of real beings in HCM’s thinking—whether one is fully aware of it or not—is her comprehensive response to the one-sided view of the external world and of human experience in general.24 For her not only is it impossible to detach the layer of the appearance of things from their essence, but also essences originally belong to a certain phenomenal states of affairs (HCM, 1916b, 349). HCM rejects, then, the simplistic view that divides reality into internal and external elements as two contradicting elements in favor of multi-aspect duality. Moreover, the three discussed dualities fill with content the general ideas of externality and internality of reality, so that externality is first understood in terms of carrying, existence, and part, while internality is interpreted as essence, intelligibility, and wholeness. Indeed, the elimination of the contradiction between externality and internality is merely the negative side of the affirmation of duality as a constant element of reality. Finally, this complex view of the ideas of externality and internality will transpire below as a paving the way to the internality of Being in HCM’s thinking.

10.3 Toward the Internality of Being Doctrine of Appearance marks HCM’s entry into the discourse of phenomenology, in which she attempts to recover the view of the world as a reality that has an external presence. In this context, Being is conceived as real existence (HCM, 1916b, 386), a self-standing being (Seinselbstständigkeit) (HCM, 1916b, 391) that is autonomous and absolute in its existence (HCM, 1916b, 392), closed in-itself, and transcendent to human consciousness and spirit (HCM, 1916b, 424). However, in no way is the achieving of an ontology of the external world bound with the elimination of the one’s gaze from the internality of Being that is necessitated by the very presumption of the existence of essence in real beings. At this point, there is an explicit unanimity between HCM and Husserl regarding the idea of phenomenology (HCM, 1916b, 350), namely that basically the approach to the world should not be primarily epistemological, in the sense of focusing on the relation to consciousness, but essence intuition. Moreover, HCM even admits that within the study of the essence of consciousness it is completely legitimate to omit the real or any other meaning of the existing world (HCM, 1965a, 401–402), exactly as Husserl did. HCM explains: “The same logos, which is intended in the conceivable most universal sense, accords with the essence and the Being of the world, lies concealed with the same universality also in human intelligence” (HCM, 1965a, 400–401). In this respect, the fundamental 24 HCM clarifies here the difference between her view of reality and the one prevalent in positivism in which “‘reality’ can be reached only through acts of consciousness that somehow relate […] to objects”, see: HCM (1916b, 390 n.1). The subtitle of Doctrine of Appearance “associated with a critique of positivistic theories”, as well as the debate with positivism throughout the text (HCM, 1916b, 345–347, 352, 357–358, 361–365, 378, 382–386, 390–391, 398–400, 423, 425) clearly indicates its roots in her first essay (HCM, 1920a). However, this debate seems to continue to be significant even in her later writings.

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dimensions of internality, i.e., essence and intelligibility, are most relevant for the understanding of the external reality. This means that no contradiction exists between the two realities, but, so argues HCM, a wonderful harmony (HCM, 1965a, 401).25 However, despite the conceptuality common to Husserl and HCM, mainly regarding essences and objective logos in reality, the differences between the two philosophers amount to a radical divergence. HCM argues that the two phenomenologies should be seen as distinct from each other (HCM, 1965a, 399), signifying Husserlian phenomenology as “transcendental” and her own as “ontological”. Thus, she unequivocally establishes: “We deliberately and firmly accept the position of the ontologist” (HCM, 1963a, 231). From HCM’s point of view, the most problematic element in Husserl’s transcendental approach lies in its becoming a guiding principle for the study of real Being. She explains that what for Husserl is “secret” and thus fascinates the philosophical thinking is the ego from whose study he acquires knowledge regarding not only its living but also the validity of Being and the meaning of the world in-itself. That is to say that as a description of Husserl’s phenomenology, the expression “transcendental” means the return of the physical and psychical world as well as the empirical and ideal to the subjective (HCM, 1965a, 400). Consequently, as is well known, the real world became for Husserl a noematic phenomenon whose being is dependent on consciousness and the phenomenological investigation is confined to the intentional framework.26 The reduction of phenomenology to the realm of consciousness results from the fact that Husserl did not practice only the epoché, which is regarded by HCM as a legitimate and methodological step. HCM herself practices it and justifies it with the assertion that despite being beyond all doubt, the reality of the world cannot be known evidently (HCM, 1965a, 400–401). Yet the difficulty lies in the phenomenological reduction that follows the Husserlian epoché (HCM, 1965a, 398). However, HCM rhetorically asks whether “this noematic world that is also really real (wirklich wirklich) remains entirely undecided?” after the unveiling and exploring of the various sides of consciousness and meaning (HCM, 1965a, 396) or more directly: “but where does the world remain?” (HCM, 1965b, 371).27 In HCM’s view, the loss of the world that takes place in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is unavoidable (HCM, 1916aN, 2). This means that for HCM, Husserl’s phenomenological reduction actually makes a metaphysical decision as a 25 The understanding that the same logos that pervades the world also characterizes the human spirit is central to HCM’s philosophy of the I. See in HCM’s following writings: HCM (1965c, 335–350; 1965d). For further reading, see also: Miron (2017) (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 7). 26 See in particular: Husserl (1952, §35–§47 71–102/2012, §35–§47 65–92). For further reading, see the interpretation that regards Husserl’s transcendental turn as a consequence of his reassessment of the issue of intentionality: Becker (1930, 119–150). 27 Celms, Husserl’s student from Freiburg, discussed in length the distinction between the phenomenological epoché and the phenomenological reduction (Celms, 1928, 347–397). In his opinion, Husserl arrived at “metaphysical spiritualism” without a clear distinction between the two. Celms contends that from a phenomenological point of view only the epoché is justifiable as a procedure of suspension of judgment that implies no decision regarding the reality of the world (Celms, 1928, 427–435). Avé-Lallemant testifies that HCM was acquainted with Celms’ writings (Avé-Lallemant, 1971, 229).

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result of which the external reality of the world is dropped from his phenomenology. It is for this reason that HCM finds that “we cannot go behind this Ego […] that is such that constitutes anything and everything” (HCM, 1965a, 400). The ontological phenomenology to which she aspires recognizes the existence of not only pure consciousness or the human person, or that which intentionally relates to this consciousness, but also the world itself in its independency-of-Being (Seinsunabhängigkeit) of consciousness and of the existing I (HCM, 1965b, 374). Moreover, for HCM the deepest ontological secret lies exactly in the comprehensibility of the world by itself and in the objective intelligibility that is intrinsic to it (HCM, 1965d, 305). Against this background, she distinguishes between two concepts of reality: “reality” (Wirklichkeit) as a noematic existence “(Bestand)” and “the reality transcendent to consciousness (bewuβtseinstranszendente Wirklichkeit) of the noematic moments of reality (noematischen Wirklichkeitsmomnente)”, which is “exactly the real reality (wirkliche Wirklichkeit)”. In her opinion, “it is impossible to name the genuine problematic different from the terminological doubling of the expression to be referred to as: real reality!” (HCM, 1965a, 397). Nevertheless, the status of these two realities in not equal in HCM’s metaphysics, but the reality which is transcendent to consciousness, i.e., “real reality”, is unequivocally prior to empirical reality and conditions any possible mode of its appearing; in HCM’s words: “an empirical nature in real reality cannot exist without ontic self-rootedness (Selbstverwurzelung) in an super-physical and sub-physical sphere of potentiality in which the actual world is predetermined (vorgegeben)” (HCM, 1965a, 398).28 This means that the doubling does not “duplicates” reality but arrange it in hierarchical order.29 Also, HCM puts a special emphasis on the independence and separateness of the “real reality” from the noematic one: It [real reality] can never belong to the entire noematic-phenomenal stock (Gesamtbestand) of the world, because it concerns the factual “on-itself-standing” (Auf -sich-selber-Stehen) or an entity-like “being-grounded-in-itself” (seinsmäβige ‘In-sich-selber-Gegründetsein’) 28 HCM’s ontology also includes concepts that deal with aspects or characters of the real being that bestow upon it a perceptible and immediate guarantee that is taken from the self-existence and the factual suchness of the object. In regard to the external world, these bring about its very externality and are practically responsible for its appearing, for example: “self-announcement” (Selbstkundgabe) (HCM, 1916b, 371, 471), “the property of self-performance” (Selbstdarbietungseigenschaft) (HCM, 1916b, 411, 494), “disclosure” (Aufdeckung) and “performance” (Darbietung) (HCM, 1916b, 463–464), arriving outside by itself (durch sich selbst… ‘nach auβen gelangen’) (HCM, 1916b, 467). For the discussion of these concepts, see: Miron (2014a). Different concepts are integrated in HCM’s analysis of real being in Realontologie, for example: “tangentiality” (Tangierbarkeit) and “Corporeality” (Leibhaftigkeit). For a systematic discussion of these last two, see: Miron (2015, 337–339). In general, the understanding of the appearing and externality of real being is illuminated in other contexts of discussion in HCM’s writings, like those on morphological perception (morphologisch), and the philosophy of nature in general. 29 The principle of doubling also appears in HCM’s philosophy of the I, which is composed of a “transcending I” that constitutes itself by means of an ontic relocating-out (Hinausversetztheit) above itself, and the I that is within the act of transcending itself, depicted as such that “is an absolute being of relocating-back (Zurückversetztsein) beneath itself” (HCM, 1957, 126). Also, in this context, the doubling does not duplicate the I. For further reading see: Miron (2019).

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of the world and all its relating holdings (Bestände). Herein lies the real reality of the world, may it be factually given or not. (HCM, 1965a, 397)

HCM’s suggestion to characterize the opposition between the two realities as that of empiricism and transcendentalism or objectivity and subjectivity (HCM, 1965a, 399)30 is of great importance for the present discussion. It explicitly distinguishes between the outward orientation that is typical of the study of the so-called real reality and the inward orientation, namely, toward the observing subject, within whose boundaries the noematic reality might be clarified. Unavoidably, HCM’s radical criticism of Husserl’s understanding of the externality of Being also permeated her response to his idea of intentionality. HCM distinguishes between two constitutive moments of intentionality: the first refers to the transcending of the subject from itself toward what “in principle remains ‘revoked’”; the second deals with the conceiving of the inconceivable that is remote from the knowing subject (HCM, 1963b, 54). At the same time, she describes two radically different states of affairs: “unreached reachability” (unerreichte Erreichbarkeit) and “unreachable reachability” (unerreichbare Erreichbarkeit) (HCM, 1963b, 56). The first relates to empirical reality. Yet since empirical thinking can never reach its object, it be never be able to find any rest in finitude (HCM, 1963b, 60). However, despite the fact that distance and separateness from the subject are preserved in this element of intentionality, it implies no contradiction, and therefore the possibility of achieving objectivity is not damaged. On the contrary, HCM establishes that exactly in these elements there exists the sole ontological possibility of achieving a genuine knowledge.31 The second state of affairs is also characterized as an “intentional mode of thinking”, but it relates to the metaphysical absolute and can never be found within empirical thinking. HCM characterizes the metaphysical knowledge achieved by means of an “intentional or subject-object relation” (HCM, 1963b, 57) as an “impossibility” and “contradiction”, since it crosses exactly the gap that is supposed to impede it (HCM, 1963b, 56–58). Nevertheless, HCM explains the fact of metaphysical knowledge, within which related gap is indeed being crossed (HCM, 1963b, 54) as follows: in itself there is no unreachability of the metaphysical object. The metaphysical knowledge […] bursts forth at the boundary that must be arrived at factually as a boundary of knowledge in order to experience the impossibility of the “above and beyond” and thus at the same time the “requirement” of “nevertheless the above and beyond”. (HCM, 1963b, 58)

Not only does metaphysical knowledge, as HCM understood it, not have a constitutive power, but by the very denial of this status that is granted to it in the intentional mode, metaphysical knowledge is itself enabled. In this respect, the marginality 30 In

this context, HCM draws attention to Fink’s article that presented Husserl’s phenomenology as based on the opposition between the “worldly” and the “transcendental” and not between the objective and the subjective, see: Fink (1938). 31 There are some similarities between HCM’s argument regarding the necessity of separateness for achieving objectivity and Byers’s commentary on the problem of knowing in Husserl’s thinking, see: Byers (2002, 3–6).

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of the subject in metaphysical knowledge is reflected already in the location of metaphysical knowledge itself at the “boundary” of the possibility of cognition. Finally, metaphysical thinking reaches the object and finds in it its “rest” (Ruhe) (HCM, 1963b, 60).32 This analysis of intentionality marks a step beyond HCM’s criticism of the loss of the external world in Husserl’s phenomenology, since it embodies the expectation that some aspect of awareness of the independence and externality to consciousness will be part of the intentional experience itself. Only thus, one might assume, can “real reality” be the achievement of the related “unreachable reachability”. This means that the erosion of the externality of the world that according to HCM takes place in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is also reflected in HCM’s understanding of his idea of intentional experience itself. More importantly, in both these issues HCM finds marks of Husserl’s inappropriate understanding of the internality of Being. Therefore, the shift from the unveiling of the external dimensions of Being to illuminating its internal aspects cannot be achieved only within philosophizing about the world but also in the context of the explication of knowledge. Indeed, this shift inheres not only the genealogy of the development of HCM’s thinking but its logic as well. The next step after achieving the appropriate idea of the externality of Being is turning toward the illumination of its internal aspects. Indeed, this step is necessitated already by the primary thesis of the fundamental duality, according to which reality has both external and internal aspects that are connected to each other. Moreover, the illumination of the internal aspects of Being is the second and complementary side of HCM’s criticism of the loss of the world in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. HCM establishes that Husserl’s phenomenological reduction that bestowed upon us “an entirely new ‘metaphysics’ of subjectivity” lacks “the crucial reference to the ‘inner worldly’ (innerweltliche), even if it is not the a priori subjective immanence in general” (HCM, 1965a, 399). Truly, for Husserl internality first and foremost signified the primordial experience that we have of ourselves and of our states of consciousness that he characterized as “inner self-perception” (Husserl, 1952, §1 11/2012, §1 10). Husserl argued that even before we conduct the unique phenomenological reduction, we have the analysis of essence that grants us a general understanding from “experience” or pure internal “observation” of consciousness (Husserl, 1952, §33/2012, §33). Husserl adds that even when we talk about the relation or “intention” of consciousness to its objective thing, we do not point to the “objective” nucleus (Kernbestand) itself but to the most internal element of the noema. The importance of this element lies especially in its capability to uncover the noematic modifiable characteristics of the thing that is being thought as such (Husserl, 1952, §129/2012, §129). In no way could HCM have accepted this idea of internality. As we have seen, in her opinion not only can the noema not be identified with the external reality, already within the intentional experience one should achieve some idea of what she refers to as “real reality”. Moreover, for her, not only the externality of Being but 32 Within the distinction between the two above-discussed states of affairs resonates the Kantian distinction between “boundary” (Grenze) and “limit” (Schranke), see: Kant (2002, 142). For further reading about the philosophical experience of boundaries, see: Miron (2012, 11–13).

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also its internality is not confined to the boundaries of the intentional framework. Thus, the primary assignment of her ontological phenomenology is to release the study of reality from being bound to the boundaries of consciousness. However, the shift from the study of the modes of appearance to the elucidation of the internal dimensions of Being is rather complex and encounters essential difficulties. Firstly, there is a boundary between the immediate appearance of the external world and its real being, which includes many dimensions that do not manifest themselves in the external appearing (HCM, 1916b, 427); what is more, the study of essences as such is independent of the actual existence in the world. Secondly, HCM contends that the position in Being (Seinsstelle) of the concretely given that has been uncovered “does not always hold what it is as so and so appearing entity (Erscheinende) seems to promise” (HCM, 1916b, 358) and sometimes there exists “only a semblance (Anschein) of a real presence-being that does not correspond to the actually present” (HCM, 1916b, 356).33 Based on a reflection on these obstacles, HCM achieves the critical insight that paves her philosophical way to the internality of Being. She distinguishes between the “phenomenal beginningmaterial” (phänomenales Anfangsmaterial), which signifies the point of departure of the phenomenological study, and the “genuine phenomenon” or the “primordial phenomenon” (Urphänomen), which is referred to as its culminating stage. HCM explains that at the point of departure of the philosophical study, essence is given in a mode of “concealment (Verhültheit) and remoteness (Ferne)”. Yet, this condition is due to the nature of the object itself, which does not completely reveal its essence, but not because of aspects that refer to one’s consciousness’ capabilities (HCM, 1916b, 351–352). Since not everything belongs to the “phenomenal beginning-material”, or alternatively not everything is rooted in the “primordial phenomenon”, the study of Being cannot be exhausted on the phenomenal plane of appearing. However, “what must burst forth from this surface-appearance (Erscheinungsoberfläche) […] are only the de facto matters concerning essence-holdings (Wesensbeständen) to which an accurate and current analysis of the surface of appearance leads as its own foundation” (HCM, 1916b, 354). Thus, HCM characterizes the phenomenological investigation as a “progression from the yet covered, despite as such already visible primordial phenomenon, to the ‘pure primordial phenomenon’”. This progress requires first the specific phenomenological stance (Haltung), in which is inherent “the entirely direct and undeterred in its direction gaze that is aimed at the phenomenon in its pure ‘what’ (Was)” (HCM, 1916b, 352). Then all that is contingent and that appears only up against me, and are only a “certain side” of the phenomenon should be reduced, while “the substantial totality that circumscribes it is under darkness”. Only then does the phenomenon “step out in complete absolute objectivity” and come to light (HCM, 1916b, 353).34 The state of affairs that underlies HCM’s words in this regard is aptly pictured by 33 For the “semblance of reality (Aussehen einer Realität)” typical of the objects of perception, see also: HCM (1916b, 356, 441 n. 1). 34 In his “principle of all principles”, Husserl established that within the original givenness, things are given to us under restriction (Husserl, 1952, §24/2012, §24). Indeed, inadequacy characterizes not only the object of experience (Husserl, 1952, §3, §44, §138/2012, §3, §44, §138) but also the

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Kuhn as follows: “the things towards which the gaze is directed are always known in advance, we do not start at a null point. They show themselves to us, but they are concealed. They are standing up against us as known but also as mysterious, and impose on us the distinction between what things are in their beginning and the essence that is uncovered by penetrating observation” (Kuhn, 1969, 399). Undoubtedly, the focus of HCM’s ontological phenomenology on the “general essence of existence” (HCM, 1963a, 231) that lies behind the surface of the appearance of things and that achieved a specific mode of existence turns her ontology into an ultimate tool for approaching the concealed internality of real beings and interpreting the fullness of Being. In this context, internality signifies not only a formal or “topographical” aspect of real being but a substantial state of affairs with two faces. While the first refers to what she calls the “in principle invisible” nature of material being (HCM, 1916b, 465 n. 1) and the fully realized being (Vollwirklichkeit) in general, the second concerns the intelligible aspect of real being in the sense of the potential reality (Vorwirklichkeit) (HCM, 1957, 100). The ontological study of the purely immanent element of beings is the illumination of the role of the aspect of sense in their constitution as real things (HCM, 1963c, 202). Both these faces of internality necessarily characterize every real being, yet their distinctiveness in it is maintained. Consequently, the realized aspects of reality remain, at least partly, unintelligible, while those that are understandable will never be able to be fully realized.

10.4 The Real Self The most important inference from the understanding of Being as carrying within itself an essence is that inside real being there is an internal realm that as such does not come forth in appearance. HCM signifies this realm as “selfness” (Selbsthaftigkeit or Selberkeit): “In every existent (Daseiendes) is inherent an internal potentiality for being its own”, or “self-centered unity” (HCM, 1923, 227). The clarification that the term “self” does not signify in this context a mode of self-reference of being fromitself eliminates the possibility of understanding in mental terms the idea that Being has a “self”. While the act of self-reference signifies the human mental capability to cross the borders of oneself, the “self”, sometimes referred to as the “selfness” of Being means its constitutive core that fills finite existents from inside. In other words, the “self” is a pure ontological moment that belongs to the real being as such; therefore, it relates to the element of essence in it. As HCM puts it: “The most internal essence of real Being… is inherent in selfness (Selberkeit) of Being, or in the ontic self (Sëität) in-itself. Namely, all real existents that are characterized

experience of the subject (Husserl, 1952, §15/2012, §15). For further discussion, see: Miron (2016a, 470–472/, 2018a, 6–8).

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‘by themselves’, ‘in themselves’, or ‘from themselves’ have the formal constitutive ground in the ‘self of Being’ (Selberkeit des Seins)” (HCM, 1963c, 203).35 HCM proceeds further, claiming that in this regard internality means the “beingrootedness that belongs” to itself, which is at the same time its “essential necessity” (HCM, 1957, 132) and the “self-full groundness of Being” (selbsthaft Seinsgegründetheit) of the real being as such. She explains that the self-belonging of Being is an ontic and functional limb (Glied) by means of which the abstract being of mere existing can sink into the concrete reality (HCM, 1957, 96). Just as the connection of the essence and the bearer are “unbreakable (unzerreißbar) formal cohesion (Zusammenhang)” (HCM, 1923, 179), so also the ontological selfness of the finite being cannot be damaged without being eradicated or relinquished (HCM, 1963a, 234). In the same spirit, the aspect of the self is characterized as “‘ground and soil’ of its own creation” (HCM, 1957, 131) or the belonging of Being to itself (Sëität) (HCM, 1957, 95), upon which the constitutive selfness (Sichheit) of real substance is built (HCM, 1957, 120 n. 1, 91–97). Therefore, without the element of “selfness” “there could be no existents, no world” (HCM, 1963c, 205). Thus, HCM establishes: “an existing thing (ein Seiendes) […] not only must be, but it must be itself ” (HCM, 1963a, 233). First and foremost, the argument that real beings have a “self” points to the independence of their Being. This is apparent in the study of the external world whose real existence is depicted as a self-standing being (Seinselbstständigkeit) (HCM, 1916b, 391), autonomous and absolute in its existence (HCM, 1916b, 392), closed in-itself and transcendent to human consciousness and spirit (HCM, 1916b, 424). The dominance of the element of independence in the understanding of real being is clearly manifested in the centrality of the concept of the “self” within the predication of real being. Accordingly, the objects of which the external is comprised are characterized as exhibiting “unveiled self-emerging” (unverhülltes Selbsthervortreten), “self-announcement” (Selbstkundgabe), “self-existence” (Selbstdasein) (HCM, 1916b, 371), “corporal-self” (leibhaftes Selbst), “real self-presence” (reale Selbstgegenwart) (HCM, 1916b, 376), “the property of self-performance” (Selbstdarbietungseigenschaft) (HCM, 1916b, 411, 494), and “self-presentation” (Selbstpräsentation) (HCM, 1916b, 413).36 In the same spirit, HCM later describes real being as “subordinated to itself” and “self-standing”. She explains that by the very fact of loading an essence onto its bearer, the bearer establishes itself and becomes something “standing” (stehend) and the essence finds it its “seat” (Sitz) or “a position of its own” (Eigenposition) (HCM, 1923, 179). The term “position” here does not necessarily mean a concrete place but the essential rootedness in the thing. As opposed to that, the “pure unity of appearing” (reine Erscheinungseinheit) is restricted to a theoretical knowledge about reality (HCM, 1923, 192) and can exist only “outwards”, meaning vis-à-vis its perceiving consciousness without itself having something “inside” (HCM, 1923, 195, 199). HCM characterizes the pure appearing as 35 See

also: “the real is that which is standing in the selfness (Selbsthaftigkeit) to Being” (HCM, 1965d, 295). 36 See also: HCM (1916b, 430, 450, 452–455, 464–465, 471, 474, 514).

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“artificial foundation” because in any “stance” it does not possess (i.e., have inside itself) selfness (HCM, 1923, 218), does not “fill” a “space” inwardly (HCM, 1923, 204) but exists “without a place of its own”, “hanging in a ‘void’”, and “its mode of existence is of pure hovering” (HCM, 1923, 197–198). To this extent, pure appearance lacks the most essential and necessary characteristics that establish real being as such.37 Secondly, the element of the “self” relates also to internal processes that take place in real being and bring about its realization. Thus, besides the extrication from nothingness (HCM, 1923, 181) that addresses the outwardness of real being, there are also processes of “substantialization inward”, “internalization” (Innerung) (HCM, 1923, 226), “internal mode of structuring” (HCM, 1923, 176) that operate within it and establish its primordiality. Therefore, a complete externalization will never occur in real being as such (HCM, 1923, 216). Moreover, the extrication from nothingness is at the same time itself an inwardly operation. HCM puts it as follows: One should not signify a specific aspect of being as external just because it is external to me or to any other perceiving spirit, but because in-itself and for itself as such it possesses an essential characteristic of “externality”. This is true even if there is anyone outside who will perceive it. It will nevertheless always remain in itself outwardly constituted. To a certain extent it is “structured inwardly to the outside”, and only this peculiar moment interests us. (HCM, 1923, 191)

It transpires, then, that it is specifically the inwardly operation rather than the accomplishment of a concrete being in the external world that is the indispensable expression of real being as such. HCM explains that existence “possesses through its own being ‘potentiality’ (Potenz) or ‘mightiness’ (Mächtigkeit) for its own being” (HCM, 1963c, 204). Hence, whatever “by itself cannot” is incapable of anything else, as against the real, which is “the only thing that essentially can” (Die einzig K¨onnende) (HCM, 1923, 177). In this respect, the occurrence of real being is not a constituted reality but a self-constituting operation. The element of the “self” in reality expresses exactly the force of realization of real being as such. In HCM’s words: “the real—by means of its pure being and existence—is the positive and personal realizer (Realisator) of its own essentiality (Washeit) or of its self” (HCM, 1923, 173). This element of realization uncovers, then, the capability for “movement” (HCM, 1923, 175) and “activity” (Gewirktsein) of real being, thanks to which “the empty concept of reality is granted with descriptive fullness (Fülle)” (HCM, 1923, 174), “radical depth” (HCM, 1923, 208), and sometimes also an external appearance. The extension and exploration of the idea that the real thing has a “self” take place in HCM’s philosophy of the I, specifically in her explication of the spiritual-I. Although the general insights regarding the “self” of real being are relevant also to the human self, referred to as the “I-being” (Ichhaftes Sein), yet its mode of realization in it is unique. HCM describes the spiritual-I as composed of two elements: The first deals with the character of the I as an “origin-like” nature (Ursprungshaftigkeit), as a result of which it “cannot get out of itself or out of its own origin (Ursprung)” (HCM, 1965d, 295) or alternatively it is fundamentally “inside-itself” and “by-itself” 37 See

here also: HCM (1916aN, 6).

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(HCM, 1965d, 296). While the material being is a “substrate-full” (substrathaft) substantiality that is eventually realized outwardly, the selfness characteristic of the I is a person-full (personhaft) being (HCM, 1963a, 242) or possesses a “personal accent” (persönlicher Akzent) (HCM, 1957, 127). This personal nature is but its directedness to itself or its being wholly itself. HCM explains that in its personal capability-for-Being (persönlische Seinsvermögen), the spiritual-I constitutes the real existentiality as belonging to it and thus as “being-full selfness that is characterized as personal power-of-Being (persönliche Seinsmacht) from the bottom up” (HCM, 1957, 128). Here, personality signifies merely the directedness toward oneself or the being of the I wholly oneself. This feature establishes the ontological condition of the I as ultimately “towards Being” (hin zum Sein) (HCM, 1963a, 235, 237) to the point of “being incapable to escape from Being, inescapably renouncing and surrendering (ausgeliefert)” to it (HCM, 1963a, 236). Therefore, as long as the I delves into the entanglements of its own being, nothing but itself will be found there (HCM, 1963a, 236). HCM depicts as “something strange (Merkwürdig)” the fact that characters of “self-full relation to Being” (selbsthaftes Verhältnis zum Sein) or “self-capability of being its own being” (Selber-Können-des-eigenen-Seins) that are peculiar to the “I-being” develop inside itself and not in any “other realized Being (Sein) or suchness (Sosein)” (HCM, 1957, 128). Finally, the origin-like nature of spirit consolidates the firmest foundation of the I-being and falls in line with its characterization as “static”, “spiritual-material (geiststofflich)” (HCM, 1965d, 302), and as a “receiving-spirit (empfangender Geist)” upon which concepts, words, and phenomena are transferred. These are “forms of essence” (Wesensformen) originating from the hidden depth of the human spirit, yet HCM argues they are shaped by the objective logos of the real world (HCM, 1965d, 311–312). As much as these forms describe the intelligible experience of spirit in its selfness, from HCM’s point of view they signify the “pure spiritual-objective self-encountering” (rein geistiggegenständliche Selbstbegegnung) (HCM, 1965d, 312). The second element of spirit is described as spiritual (geistlichhaft) (HCM, 1965d, 302) and as “infrastasis (Infrastase)”, which indicates the capability of the spiritualI to be directed to something that is not itself. This is a “factual power of Being (Seinsmacht)” that is granted to the I-being by its capability for infrastasis (HCM, 1965d, 296), that in turn is foundational for its own substantial constitution (HCM, 1957, 140). Moreover, in being turned toward what is outside and beyond itself, the spiritual I-being is revealed as “self-less (selbstlos)” (HCM, 1965d, 298) while spirit as “standing there without itself or [as such that] itself it truly elevated” (HCM, 1965d, 298) and as “totally empty of itself down to its most internal ground, which is precisely therefore an abyss” (HCM, 1965d, 296). In this way, HCM establishes that “the pure infrastatic condition (Verfassung) allows no preserved ‘opposite’ (Gegenüber), by which it could have become illuminated for itself” (HCM, 1965d, 310). Already in her early work, HCM depicts the I as such that “in a way helps the natural situation of transcendence” to the extent that “an executive act or ‘salto mortale’ is not needed” (HCM, 1916b, 408). Later, this insight is crystalized as the perception that the infrastatic nature of the I-being is imprinted in its very existence, and a projecting-against (Gegen-wurf )

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(HCM, 1957, 129) and an “existential objectification” (existenzielle Objizierung) (HCM, 1957, 130) in which the “original capacity to create by itself what stands against it” (HCM, 1957, 129) is manifested. Obviously, the self-transcending of the I-being involves transcendental activity, and as such it enables it to acquire a grip on objectivity (HCM, 1957, 140). However, HCM clarifies that this objectifying activity “is not cognition (Erkenntniss)” (HCM, 1965d, 299) but lies in the existential depth of the I (HCM, 1957, 131). In other words, the related self-transcending concerns the ontological structure of the I-being and not exclusive mental capacities as such. The characteristics of transcending and openness toward what exists beyond the I-being express the infrastatic nature of the spiritual-I. Moreover, the characteristic of infrastasis is related to the being of the spiritual-I as an influencing-spirit. Accordingly, we can understand the spiritual-I as existing due to its influence on what exists beyond it without containing something to be posed against what spirit receives. However, since the influencing-spirit is filled with the logos (HCM, 1965d, 308) of the real world (HCM, 1965d, 311), it truthfully fits the reality that is comprehended and perceived by the I-being. In this wonderful internal mechanism that takes place inside the spirit itself, the purest objectivity of empirical reality is verified; and even more so, this happens due to the fact that the other side of spirit is anchored in the deepest internality. Moreover, by “projecting-against” oneself toward Being, the Ibeing “gains a foothold” or “posits itself” in Being and thus becomes “an existent” (Seiendes) (HCM, 1957, 129). This means that the I-being becomes what it is through the very attempt at self-elevation (Selbsterhebung) peculiar to it (HCM, 1965d, 296), which is simultaneously from itself and toward itself. Moreover, especially as the infrastasis is anchored in the I and takes place inside it, it is capable of widening the I without tearing it from itself. Hence, also in the infrastatic experience that sometimes is depicted by HCM herself as one who “has lost its own pure and free self” (HCM, 1965d, 296), not only does spirit continue unceasingly to be a self-full being that dwells in its midst, but also it becomes what it is and is even verified as the origin of itself (HCM, 1965d, 298). HCM refers to this ontological condition of the I-being as “miracle of Being (Seinswunder)” (HCM, 1965d, 296). Against this background, HCM crystalizes the difference between the “thing-ofnature” (Naturding) and the I-being as follows: the first is a being has the nature of a hypokeimenon (hypokeimenal), its anchor lies backward or “its being is submerged (eingesenkt) ‘beneath’ itself” (HCM, 1957, 126), since the embodiment of the material substance is within the becoming of the body (Leibwerdung), in which it wholly and factually exists as “being-by-itself” (Bei-sich-Sein) that is addressed outwards. The belonging of the material being to itself is entirely “engulfed”, externalized as substrate, and realized as non-personal being (HCM, 1957, 127). Indeed, the material being’s characteristic of ecstasy already deprives it of any possibility of personality, so it is “with itself ‘to the brim’” (HCM, 1965d, 296) and entirely outside and on the surface (HCM, 1965d, 295). Thus, HCM describes that material self as “shaky”, “selfless”, and “helpless” power (HCM, 1965d, 297) or “selfless ecstasy”, since in the total self-externalization the material being is no more than the carried that presents itself (HCM, 1965d, 298). Its objectivity lies precisely in the fact that being

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entirely itself, it stands against everything else and thus presents itself (HCM, 1965d, 298)—presenting in which it is deprived of any personality. As opposed to material being, the I-being is endowed with an original openness toward Being (Seinsoffenheit) (HCM, 1963d, 95) and is anchored “forward” (HCM, 1957, 126). The uniqueness of spiritual being lies in the very fact that due to being its own origin it has an ontological capability to be totally free of itself (HCM, 1965d, 296). HCM explains that from a purely ontological point of view, the “existential position” of the I contains: …an unlimited freedom and power. Whilst in its self it is nothing, it is capable of being everything. Whilst nothing falls back to it, it is capable of comprehending all and always new things. Since it is never fully loaded (beladen) by comprehending, it can [never] be resolved and withdrawn, it stands in the possibility of choice and freedom towards everything. (HCM, 1963a, 239)

Precisely because its directedness beyond itself is a positive characteristic of the spiritual-I, it cannot be robbed of its own personality, and what is more, from each point beyond itself it can return back to itself (HCM, 1965d, 296). Hence, the infrastatic character of the spiritual-I does not deprive it of its self-control and it remains incessantly a self-full being. More to the point, HCM establishes that the spiritual is that which is “always already elevated (Gestiegener) above itself and outside itself”, thus the I-being is in everything but in this ascending (Überstiegenheit) (HCM, 1963a, 230) or being beyond itself (Jenseitigkeit) (HCM, 1965d, 297). The infrastatic condition of spirit is located exactly at the “middle point” in which the I is moving between self-abandoning and being self-devoted backward. HCM depicts as “wonder” the state of affairs in which the spiritual as infrastatic selfness, i.e., especially as being beyond itself, arrives at itself without ceasing being itself even for a single moment (HCM, 1965d, 296). That is to say that the fact that within the spiritual-I there exists a force that addresses it toward what is beyond itself, i.e., to the real world and to Being in general, in no way diminishes the internality that fills the human self from inside. On the contrary, thanks to the ontological character of the infrastasis characterizing the spiritual-I, human beings will never be imprisoned in their internality but will be unceasingly filled with an inexhaustible abundance coming from the world beyond and external to them.38

38 See

Schmücker’s general establishment that in HCM’s philosophy “for the first time the subject is released from Kant’s prison” (Schmücker, 1956, 39).

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10.5 Epilogue The classical phenomenological path was established by the founding father of phenomenology in such a way that its telos is not beyond itself but in its beginning or one might say in the “nucleus”, which described as “meaning (Sinn) is not a concrete essence in the constitution of the noema as a whole, but a kind of abstract form that dwells in it” (Husserl, 1952, §132 304/2012, §132 275).39 Husserl explains that the complete objective meaning around which the various intentional experiences “group themselves is essentially the selfsame and persists in the various experiences that are directed to the same object” (Husserl, 1952, §91 210–211/2012, §91 191–192). The Husserlian journey comes of age when one’s consciousness stands before the “nucleus” that was disentangled from its vague hideaway and envisaged as “one central concept” (Husserl, 1952, §91 211/2012, §91 192). This is at the same time the moment in which the “given” with which the phenomenological investigation started, arrives at “self-givenness”, on the basis of which Husserl established “our phenomenological sphere, the sphere of absolute clarity, of immanence in the true sense, which reaches no farther than self givenness reaches” (Husserl, 1950, 10/1964, 8).40 The explicit affinity between self-givenness and the absolute lucidity of consciousness confines, then, Husserl’s entire phenomenological journey to the sphere of conscious experience, which is deliberately internal.41 However, since with Husserl we proceed to the journey’s destination in a regressive manner, his transcendental phenomenology is meant to be a philosophical science of beginnings, whose greatness lies in the fact that it promises to be the ground beneath which it is impossible to dig further, since it is “an absolute beginning” (Husserl, 1952, §24 51/2012, §24 43).42 Likewise, HCM’s phenomenological journey also aims at internality. However, her different understanding of the relation between the internal and the external is different and leads to a consequence that is almost opposite to that of the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. In the latter, the gap between the internal and the external is intensified to the point of a reduction of the external world, as a result of 39 See

also: Husserl (1952, §63 135–137/2012, §63 125–127). Husserl, self-givenness is not a requirement of phenomenological investigation only but of science in general, in his words: “Every science has its own object-domain as field of research, and… to all its correct assertions, there correspond as original sources of the reasoned justification that support them certain intuitions in which objects of the region appear as self-given and in part at least as given in a primordial (originär) sense” (Husserl, 1952, §1 5–6/2012, §1 9). In the background of this insight stand the principles of “descriptivity” and “presuppositionlessness”, which were foundational for Husserlian thinking from its very beginning and were designed to save knowledge from various speculative and scientific theories and to consolidate phenomenology as a non-constructivistic theory. For further reading regarding the philosophical development from mere givenness to self-givenness in Husserl’s phenomenology, see: Miron (2016a, 470–472/2018a, 6–8). 41 For further reading, see: Boehm (2000). 42 The issue of the beginning of the phenomenological investigation is central in the transcendental period of Husserl’s writings, see also Husserl (1952, §19, §63, §84/2012, §19, §63, §84). For further reading see: Ströker (1993, 45–52). 40 For

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which the world is eliminated and maybe even be entirely forgotten. As opposed to that, in HCM’s phenomenology the distance between the phenomenal appearing that shines outwards and the essence that constitutes the “primordial beginning” of the phenomenon signifies only the provisional point of departure of its journey, which is thus destined to move further on. The establishing of a divided gaze that is directed simultaneously at the internal and the external in fact attests to the observation of the fundamental duality in reality. Moreover, this gaze achieves a thematization of the gap. In so doing, the gaze becomes a hermeneutical tool that is capable of achieving a view of reality in which the external and the internal do not exclude each other. Indeed, HCM attains this view in her explication of the spiritual-I, which is such that it “elevates itself from itself, towards itself outwardly, and into itself inwardly” (HCM, 1965d, 297) in one single movement. That is to say that the self-addressing of the I into the midst of its being and its positioning before the transcendent world that is external to it is but the same movement. HCM’s determinations according to which “in regard to the specific I-ness existent, this self-manifestation [of the spiritual-I] remains open” (HCM, 1963a, 241) and that the I-being already “dwells in the ‘transcendence’” that is in no way “alienated or remote” from it (HCM, 1963a, 231), not only link the ultimate appearing of internality, i.e., the human self, to the externality that is patently undecided. More importantly, these determinations untie the far from necessary bond between internality and closedness that occurs in Husserl’s phenomenology as HCM understood it. Consequently, the internality of Being as unveiled in HCM’s thinking is not entrenched in hidden depths. On the contrary, the addressing of oneself outwards, referred to by HCM as the infrastasis of the I, transpires as a mechanism of its internality itself as well. In addition, the dissolving of the opposition between the internal and external at the peak of the journey to the internality of Being within the explication of the spiritual-I retroactively also influences the understanding of its beginning. HCM characterizes the I-being as “archonic (archonal)”, a word she claims to have created from the Greek verb archéo (¢ρχšω), which means “to begin” (HCM, 1957, 134).43 However, she explains, that eventually, i.e., after the I-being has “elevated itself” from nothingness, there is nothing there, since “it is essentially impossible to go back underneath to a deeper ‘position of Being’ (Seinsstelle), since such does not exist anymore” (HCM, 1957, 123) but “whilst existing, the I-being elevates itself from its existential ‘ground-level’ (Ungrund) to itself” (HCM, 1957, 131). So, the I-being is disclosed as “a beginning in the beginning-less, self-grounding in the groundless!” (HCM, 1963d, 94) and existing within the “ground-level of Being” (Seinsungrund) (HCM, 1963a, 231). I argue that the uncovering of the spiritual-I as “beginning-less” and the dissolving of the opposition between internality and externality that occurs within its explication are connected together. The beginning is a state of affairs that is in opposition to what preceded it, and in HCM’s Realontology, this opposition is constitutive of reality as standing in an absolute and unbridgeable primordialopposition (Urgegensatz) to nothingness (HCM, 1923, 160). The ultimate realization 43 In fact, the Greek verb for “to begin” is archo (¥ρχω) in the transitive, and archomai (¥ρχoμαι) in the intransitive.

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of this opposition takes place in regard to material beings whose self-transcending is an externalization that closes them inside their own boundaries (HCM, 1957, 124) and constitutes them as a “fullness is addressed outwards” (HCM, 1923, 199) or a fullness that is “a full absolute transcendent gathering (Sammlung)” (HCM, 1923, 228). The beginning is but the moment in which nothingness is “overcome” by the real, and as such the beginning “presents itself as a boundary against nothingness” (HCM, 1963d, 92) and so leaves it behind itself. The spiritual-I whose explication marks the maturation of the journey to the internality of Being in HCM’s thinking, is radically different from a material being. This I does not really present itself as a boundary against nothingness, but remains unceasingly standing “only vis-àvis nothingness” (HCM, 1963d, 93) without any protection from it (HCM, 1963d, 91). The proximity of the I-being to nothingness almost reaches intimacy, in which there is no contradiction between the beginning of the I and its being leveled-off (Gleichmächtigkeit) in nothingness where it finds a “ground and end” (HCM, 1963d, 92). However, since nothingness cannot truly start anything, the spiritual-I that is rooted in it is the ultimate non-beginning. Obviously, what cannot begin will never be able to reach an end. Therefore, also the journey into the midst of Being, whose traces are scattered in HCM’s writings is constantly available for new beginnings.

References Note Regarding HCM’s works, the date in brackets signifies the year of creation, while the later date is the year of publication. Ales Bello, A. (2008). Forward. Axiomathes, 18, 395–398. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1971). Phänomenologie und Realität: Vergleichende Untersuchungen zur ‘München-Göttinger’ und ‘Freiburger’ Phänomenologie (Habilitationsschrift). München. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1975). Die Antithese Freiburg- München in der Geschichte der Phänomenologie. In H. Kuhn, E, Avé-Lallemant, & R. Gladiator (Eds.), Die Münchener Phänomenologie, Vorträge des Internationalen Kongresses in München (pp. 19–38), 13–18, April 1971 (Phaenomenologica 65). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Avé-Lallemant, E. (1988). Die phänomenologische Bewegung: Ursprung, Anfänge und Ausblick. In H. R. Sepp (Eds.), Edmund Husserl und die phänomenologische Bewegung, Zeugnisse in Text und Bild (pp. 61–75). Freiburg/München: Alber. Avé-Lallemant, U. (1965/1966). Hedwig Conrad Martius: Eine Groβe Philosophin unserer Zeit 1988–1966. Jahrbuch der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing, XV, 203–212. Becker, O. (1950). Die philosophie Edmund Husserls. Kantstudien, 35, 119–150. Biemel, W. (1950). Einleitung des Herausgebers. In E. Husserl & W. Biemel (Eds.), Die Idee der Phänomenologie, Fünf Vorlesungen (pp. vii–xi), Husserliana II. Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Boehm, R. (2002). Husserl’s concept of the ‘absolute’. In R. O. Elveton (Ed.), The phenomenology of Husserl (pp. 164–191). Seattle: Noesis Press. Byers, D. (2002). Intentionality and transcendence: Closure and openness in Husserl’s phenomenology. Seattle and Wisconsin. Carr, D. (1928). The paradox of subjectivity. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Celms, T. (1928). Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls. Latvijas Universitatis Raksti, XIX, 251–436. Conrad-Martius, H. (1916aN). Über Ontologie. Conrad-Martiusiana A.I 3, 14 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1916b). Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Auβenwelt: Verbunden mit einer Kritik positivistischer Theorien. Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und philosophische Forschung, III, 345–542. Conrad-Martius, H. (1920a [1912]). Die erkenntnisstheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus. Bergzabern: Heinrich Müller (private print). Conrad-Martius, H. 1920b. Nachwort. In Die erkenntnisstheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus (pp. 130–131). Bergzabern: Heinrich Müller. (private print). Conrad-Martius, H. (1923). Realontologie, Buch I. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung VI (pp. 159–333). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Conrad-Martius, H. (1931N). Entwurf zu einer universalen Schematik realen Seins, ConradMartiusiana, A.II 2, 10 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1957). Das Sein. München: Kosel. ¨ Conrad-Martius, H. (1963a [1934]). Existentielle Tiefe und Untiefe von Dasein und Ich. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 228–244). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963b [1932]). Bemerkungen über Metaphysik und ihre methodische Stelle. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 49–88). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963c [1932]). Dasein, Substantialität, Seele. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 194–227). München: Kosel. ¨ Conrad-Martius, H. (1963d [1931]). Sein und Nichts. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 89– 100). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1963e [1931]). Seinsphilosophie. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 15– 31). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1965a [1958]). Die transzendentale und die Ontologische Phänomenologie. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 393–402). München: Kösel (printed also in: HCM 1959a). Conrad-Martius, H. (1965b [1956]). Phänomenologie und Spekulation. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 370–384). München: Kösel (English translation: HCM 1959b). Conrad-Martius, H. (1965c [1956]). Über das Wesen des Wesens. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 335–356). München: Kösel. Conrad-Martius, H. (1965d [1956]). Wirkender und Empfangender Geist. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III, pp. 295–314). München: Kösel. Ebel, G. (1965). Untersuchungen zu einer realistischen Grundlegung der phänomenologischen Wesensschau (Diss.). München. Farber, M. (1938). Phenomenology and existence: Toward a philosophy within nature. New York, Evanston, London: Harper and Row. Fink, E. (1938). Die phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik, Kantstudien 33, 321–383. (Reprinted in: Fink 1966; English translation: Fink 2000). Fink, E. (1966). Die phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik (1933). In E. Fink (Eds.), Studien zur Phänomenologie 1930–1939 (pp. 79–156) (Phaenomenologica 21). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. (English translation: Fink 2000). Fink, E. (2000). The phenomenological philosophy of Husserl Edmund and contemporary criticism. In R. O. Elveton (Eds.), The phenomenology of Husserl, selected critical readings, 2nd edition (pp. 71–139), Seattle. (Translation of: Fink 1938/Fink 1966). Geiger, M. (1959). Alexander Pfänders methodische Stellung. In E. Heller & F. Low (Eds.), Neue Münchener Philosophische Abhandlungen (pp. 1–16). Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth. Habbel, I. (1959). Die Sachverhaltsproblematik in der Phänomenologie und bei Thomas von Aquin (Diss.). Regensburg: Josef Habbel. Hart, J. G. (1972). Hedwig Conrad Martius’ ontological phenomenology (Diss.). Chicago, IL. Hering, J. (1921). Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung VI (pp. 495–543). Halle: Max Niemeyer.

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Husserl, E. (1950). Die Idee der Phänomenologie, Fünf Vorlesungen (Eds. W. Biemel), Husserliana II. Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. (English translation: Husserl 1964b). Husserl, E. (1952 [1913]). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, Erstes Buch (Eds. K. Schuhmann), Husserliana III (1). Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. (English translation: Husserl 2012a). Husserl, E. (1964). The idea of phenomenology (W. P. Alston & G. Nakhnikian, Trans.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. (Translation of: Husserl 1950). Husserl, E. (1970a [1900]). Logical investigations, vol. I (J. Findlay, Trans.). London/New York: Routledge. (Translation of: Husserl 1975). Husserl, E. (1970b [1901]). Logical investigations, vol. II (J. Findlay, Trans.). London/New York: Routledge. (Translation of: Husserl 1984a and Husserl 1984b). Husserl, E. (1984a [1901]). Logische Untersuchungen, Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Husserliana XIX (1). The Hague, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. (English translation: Husserl 1970b). Husserl, E. (1984b [1901]). Logische Untersuchungen, Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Husserliana XIX (2). The Hague, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. (English translation: Husserl 1970b). Husserl, E. (2012 [1913]). Ideas, general introduction to pure phenomenology (W. R. Boyce Gibson, Trans.). London: Routledge. (Translation of: Husserl 1952). Kant, I. (2002). Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come forward as a science (G. Hatfield, Trans.). In I. Kant, H. Allison, & P. Heath (Eds.), Theoretical philosophy after 1781. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kuhn, H. (2012). Phänomenologie und Realität. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 23(3), 397–402. Miron, R. (2014a). Karl Jaspers: From selfhood to being, value inquiry book series. Amsterdam, New York, NY: Rodopi. Miron, R. (2014a). The outside’s inside: The phenomenology of the external world in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ thought. Analecta Husserliana (ANHU) CXVI, 327–358. Miron, R. (2014b). The “gate of reality”: Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ idea of reality in realontologie. Phänomenologische Forschungen, 59–82. (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 4). Miron, R. (2015). The vocabulary of reality. Human Studies, 38(3), 331–347. (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 5). Miron, R. (2016a). Husserl and other phenomenologists, the European legacy, toward new paradigms 21 (5–6) (Husserl and other phenomenologists, a special issue edited by Ronny Miron, pp. 467– 480). (Reprinted in: Miron 2018b). Miron, R. (2016b). Introduction, the European legacy, toward new paradigms 21/5–6 (Husserl and other phenomenologists, a special issue edited by Ronny Miron, pp. 465–466). (Reprinted in: Miron 2018d). Miron, R. (2017). The ontological exclusivity of the “I”. Phänomenologische Forschungen 97–116. (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 7). Miron, R. (2018a). Husserl and other phenomenologists. In R. Miron (Eds.), Husserl and other phenomenologists (pp. 3–16). London/New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis. (previously published in: Miron 2016b). Miron, R. (2018b). The external world—‘whole’ and ‘parts’—A Husserlian hermeneutics of the early ontology of Hedwig Conrad-Martius. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (NYPP) XVI (pp. 299–316). (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 3). Miron, R. (2019). The duality of the “I”. Phänomenologische Forschungen, 71–98. (Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 8). Mohanty, J. N. (1964). Phenomenology: Between essentialism and transcendental philosophy. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

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Nakhnikian, G. (1964). Introduction. In E. Husserl & G. Nakhnikian (Eds.), The idea of phenomenology (W. P. Alston & G. Nakhnikian, Trans.) (pp. ix–xxii). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Pfänder, A. (1913). Zur Psychologie der Gesinnung. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung I (1), 325–404. Halle: Max Niemeyer. Pfeiffer, A. E. (2005). Hedwig Conrad-Martuis, Eine phänomenologische Sicht auf Nature und Welt, Orbis Phenomenologicus, Würzburg: Konigshausen ¨ and Neumann. Reinach, A. (1921a [1914]). Vortrag über Phänomenologie. In A. Reinach (Eds.), Gesammelte Schriften (pp. 379–405). Halle: Max Niemeyer. (Reprint of: Reinach 1951; English translation: Reinach 1968; Reinach 1969). Reinach, A. (1921b). Die Apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes. In A. Reinach (Eds.), Gesammelte Schriften (pp. 166–350). Halle: Max Niemeyer. (Reprint of: Reinach 1913; English trans.: Reinach 1983). Reinach, A. (1951 [1914]). Was ist Phänomenologie? Mit einem Vorwort von Hedwig ConradMartius (pp. 21–72). München: Kösel. (Reprint of: Reinach 1921b; English trans.: Reinach 1968; Reinach 1969). Reinach, A. (1968 [1914]). What is phenomenology? (D. Kelly, Trans.). Philosophical Forum, 1(2), 231–256 (New Series). (Translation of: Reinach, 1921b/Reinach, 1951). Reinach, A. (1969 [1914]). Concerning phenomenology (D. Willard, Trans.). The Personalist, 50(2), 194–221. (Translation of: Reinach, 1921b/Reinach, 1951). Reinach, A. (1983 [1913]). The Apriori foundations of civil law (J. Crosby, Trans.). Aletheia, 3, 1–142. (Translation of: Reinach 1913/Reinach 1921d). Schmücker, F. G. (1956). Die Phänomenologie als Methode der Wesenserkenntnis, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Auffassung der München-Göttinger Phänomenologenschule (Diss.). München. Seifert, J. (1982). Was ist Philosophie? Die Antwort der realistischen Phänomenologie. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 49(3), 92–103. Smith, B., & Mulligan, K. (1982). Pieces of a theory. In B. Smith (Eds.), Parts and moments: Studies in logic and formal ontology (pp. 15–109). München, Wien: Philosophia. Spiegelberg, H. (1975). How subjective is phenomenology? In M. Natanson (Ed.), Essays in phenomenology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Spiegelberg, H. (1975). Doing phenomenology: Essays on and in phenomenology. (Phaemenologica 63). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Stein, E. (2005). Self portrait in letters: Letters to Roman Ingarden, the collected works of Edith Stein, vol. XII, trans. Hugh Candler Hunt. Washington, DC: ICS Publications, Institute for Carmelite Studies. Ströker, E. (1993). Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology (L. Hardy, Trans.). California: Stanford University Press. Vendrell Ferran, Í. (2008). Die Emotionen: Gefühle in der realistischen Phänomenologie. Berlin: Akademie. Walther, G. (1955). Phänomenologie der Mystik. Olten und Freiburg im Breisgau: Walter-Verlag.

Chapter 11

Essence, Abyss, and Self: Hedwig Conrad-Martius on the Non-spatial Dimensions of Being Ronny Miron

Abstract Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888–1966) (HCM), one of the outstanding pioneers of the realistic phenomenological school, describes the reality (Realität) to which her philosophizing is addressed as “totally non-material corporeality”. With this contradictory expression, she seeks to affirm two foundational aspects regarding reality: the spatial that achieved material realization in real existents and the concealed non-spatial that is at the cradle of the establishing of reality and remains present behind its phenomenal and material appearing. This article focuses on three ontological elements in HCM’s idea of reality—“essence”, “abyss”, and “self”—whose meaning both implies and raises the issue of the non-spatiality of Being in a complex manner. Moreover, the three seek the same objective of accounting for the force in real beings that will never ever be able to shine in its entirety. By means of philosophical explication of the mentioned elements and the illumination of the dialectic of each of them with the corresponding spatial aspects, this article demonstrates the evolution of HCM’s understanding of the issue of spatiality that mirrors her metaphysics as a whole.

11.1 Introduction Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888–1966) (HCM) describes the reality (Realität) to which her philosophizing is addressed as “entirely immaterial materiality (immateriallen Stofflichkeit)” (HCM, 1923, 221).1 With this contradictory expression, the pioneer of the realistic phenomenological school seeks to affirm two foundational aspects regarding reality. The first deals with the spatial characteristics of Being

1 All

translations from the German original into English are mine. Emphases follow the original.

R. Miron (B) Interdisciplinary Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Miron (ed.), Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68783-0_11

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(das Sein)2 that achieved material realization in real existents and thus enables the “self-performance” (Selbstdarbietungseigenschaft) (HCM, 1916b, 411, 494), and “self-presentation” (Selbstpräsentation) (HCM, 1916b, 413) of reality.3 The second refers to the concealed non-spatial elements in Being that are present at the cradle of the establishing of reality and continue to exist behind its phenomenal and material appearing. These two aspects are placed on opposite sides of what HCM describes as “the gateway to reality”, namely: the datum-point that brings about Being.4 On the one side, “a radical overcoming” of the “mere formal positioning” of reality takes place and things “elevate” themselves from nonexistence or mere ideal and formal existence, but do not yet arrive at factual existence (HCM, 1923, 173). On the other side, the real thing is “at first positively elevated by itself from nothingness” and thus “becomes entirely its own” (HCM, 1923, 181). This is the ground for establishing two paths in HCM’s study of reality, which implicitly intertwine throughout her oeuvre: the spatial and the non-spatial. On the spatial path, HCM characterizes her approach as a “descriptive guidance to the real being” (HCM, 1923, 160), by which “the empty concept of reality is granted with the descriptive fullness (Fülle)” (HCM, 1923, 174), and as “an attempt to affix the specific characteristic of the real world as real in its spatial-temporal determination” (HCM, 1923, 164). Her fundamental argument is that reality does not concern “more or less objectivity”, rather it is “something totally different” (HCM, 1923, 180) that stands with “an unbridgeable and absolute opposition” (HCM, 1923, 162) to the nonexisting or nothingness (HCM, 1923, 160). In this context, HCM accepts Hering’s description of essence as the “material mother” of all objects and of their very possibility (HCM, 1923, 162 n. 1) and explains that the aspect of materiality is inseparable from what we perceive as “the real givenness of things” (HCM, 1923, 192).5 HCM visualizes the spatial realization of real beings, in which they actually acquire a specific place within which they can be evaluated, as “a spatial wedding (Raumvermählung)” (HCM, 1923, 232). Against this background, HCM’s proclamation that materiality is “exactly the factor […] for which we are looking” (HCM, 1923, 192) sticks out and she even defines the explication of the specific being-mode of materiality as “our genuine assignment” (HCM, 1923, 204). At the same time, one observes in HCM another path of inquiry that is addressed to what she typifies as based on definitions taken from “outside of space (auβerräumliche)” of reality (HCM, 1923, 205). She explains that the corporeality

2 HCM

is an outstanding figure in the early phenomenological school, later called The Munich Circle, which consolidated around Edmund Husserl in the 1920s in Gottingen. ¨ The circle included a group of intellectuals and philosophers from Munich, the first generation of phenomenologists, whose prominent members were: Alexander Pfänder, Johannes Daubert, Moritz Geiger, Theodor Conrad, Adolf Reinach, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Maximilian Beck, Max Scheler, Jean Hering, Alexander Koyré, Roman Ingarden, Edith Stein, and Hedwig Conrad-Martius. For further reading about the circle, see: Avé-Lallemant (1975). 3 See also: HCM (1916b, 430, 450, 452–455, 464–465, 471, 474, 514). 4 For further reading, see: Miron (2014, Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 4). 5 See: Hering (1921).

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of reality is not tantamount to materiality, thus corporeality is characterized as “subjected to non-depth (Untiefe) of space” and as a being that “never turns back upon itself” (HCM, 1923, 221). In this spirit, she says explicitly that her study of reality is addressed to the non-material substance or to the extraphysical reality (HCM, 1923, 222). Thus, she characterizes her approach as an “observation experiment” that poses before one’s eye the essence without “its being material in the narrow and strict sense (this sense we wish to remove), but could have a corporeal and substantial existence (Bestehen) in this being (Dasein)” (HCM, 1923, 219). One can mark the path of philosophizing that proceeds from the spatial elements of reality to its non-spatial using HCM’s following words: Neither the “covered” (verhüllten) primordial phenomena (Urphänomene) nor especially the perceived ideas lie themselves on the concealed in the “bare surface of the mere appearances” (baren Erscheinungsoberfläche). Accordingly, the work required here can thereby nevermore be achieved, so that through passive observation that is devoted to the plane of appearing, one perceives descriptively the directly obvious phenomenal differences, and be it also down to the finest nuances. On the other hand, from this “surface-appearance” […] only the present essence-holdings (Wesensbestände) that are present de facto, to which the surfaceappearances lead through a respective precise analysis as to its own foundation must also emerge. (HCM, 1916b, 353–354)

The phenomenological-realistic study of reality commences, then, with the systematic observation of the phenomenal appearing itself—typified by HCM also as “phenomenal beginning-material” (phänomenales Anfangsmaterial) or “bare surface of the mere appearances” (HCM, 1916b, 353)—that can be accessed via an immediate sensory observation that establishes the spatial path in the study of reality. However, the essence and indeed all the non-spatial dimensions6 that determine the “primordial characteristics” of phenomena prior to their achieving spatial realization is given in a mode of “concealment (Verhültheit) and remoteness (Ferne)” (HCM, 1916b, 352– 353). This state of affairs does not result from restrictions of human consciousness but is due to the nature of the real being that does not reveal itself in its entirety. The method of “essence intuition” (Wesenserfassung), to which HCM was committed in her entire oeuvre and regarded as “the genuine philosophical assignment (Aufgabe)” (HCM, 1916b, 348), is designed to come to terms with the active existence of nontangible elements in reality.7 However, HCM clarifies that the study of reality that is 6 HCM

realizes this path in Doctrine of Appearance, which is focused on the study of the modes of appearing of the external world before the senses. In this treatise, reality is regarded as realized in the external space (HCM, 1916b, 423) which is at the same time the realm for objectivity (HCM, 1916b, 373), for objects of perception (HCM, 1916b, 372) depicted as “transcendent to perception space’s parts” (wahrnehmungstranszendenten Raumstücke) (HCM, 1916b, 381). HCM uses various expressions for this understanding of spatiality: “space reality (Raumwirklichkeit) of objectivity”, see: HCM (1916b, 373, 375, 377, 379, 381, 392–395); space world or real space world (realen Raumwelt), see: HCM (1916b, 373, 381, 392, 394, 436–437); space sphere, see: HCM (1916b, 383, 395); “position of the space of reality (Raumwirklichkeitstelle)”, see: HCM (1916b, 367, 374, 393); and spatial place (Rämlich Platz), see: HCM (1916b, 433). 7 Husserl’s method of essence intuition was common to the early phenomenologists of the Gottingen ¨ and the Munich Circle. HCM mentioned this method in many contexts, see: HCM (1916b, 346–348, 355 n. 1; 1923, 159; 1965a, 377; 1965b, 347). In the literature, there is usually an emphasis on the

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based on this method does not invade the realm of the physicist or proclaim ancient and medieval speculation, but focuses on the question “wherein exists the essence [of reality] — not the (something like physical) power (Kraft) but—out of ‘power’ as such!” (HCM, 1965b, 340). That is to say that already within the idea of reality that underlies HCM’s method of inquiry reality is not equated with the immediate, concrete, and material dimensions of the spatial realization of real beings. Indeed, not only within the method of essence intuition but the grounding for the study of the non-spatial elements of Being also underlies the outcomes of the study of spatiality. This is apparent already in the initiative understanding that material or concrete realization of reality takes place under certain conditions, which as such are not necessarily accessible to sensory seeing. Also, an awareness of the nonspatiality of real beings is implied in HCM’s foundational determination that there exists a boundary between the immediate appearing of the external world and its real being (HCM, 1916b, 427). She explains that sometimes there exists “a semblance (Anschein) of real presence-being (Gegenwärtigsein) that does not correspond to a factually presence-being (tatsächliches Gegenwärtigsein)” (HCM, 1916b, 356), or alternatively that “concerning its uncovered ‘position-of-Being’ (Seinsstelle) (either real or not) the intuitively given (anschaulich Gegebene) does not always hold what it seems to promise as so and so appearing entity (Erscheinende)” (HCM, 1916b, 358). Husserl’s similar insight in regard to the inadequacy of appearance clearly resonates in HCM’s words here. As he puts it: “In principle a thing in the real world, a Being in its sense, can within the finite limits of appearance appear only ‘inadequately’” (Husserl, 1952, §138 319/2012, §138 289). Of particular, importance for the present context is the explanation he provided, according to which the mentioned inadequacy belongs not only to: “the spatial shape of a physical thing [that] can be given only in some single perspective aspect” but also “to the type of development peculiar to certain categories of essential being that essences belonging to them can be given only ‘one-sidedly’, whilst in succession more ‘sides’, though never ‘all sides’, can be given” (Husserl, 1952, §3 13/2012, §3 12).8 The relation of the element of essence to non-spatiality will be discussed below. However, the understanding that already the spatial plane suffers from a fundamental inadequacy, i.e., that spatiality is not the whole picture regarding reality, has a positive aspect as well. As ever, here too inadequacy motivates philosophizing and guides HCM’s study of reality beyond the boundaries of spatiality toward the limitless realm of non-spatiality. Perhaps this very guidance could also have been projected from Husserl’s determination that “every physical property draws us on into infinities of experience” (Husserl, 1952, §3 13/2012, §3 12). In these respects, addressing the non-spatial elements of Being can thus be considered as resulting from the spatial path of the investigation. influence of Husserl’s criticism of psychologism upon the early realist phenomenologists, which is apparent in their adoption of this method, see: Husserl (1984a, §1–§7 5–29/1970a, §1–§7 165–179; 1952, §1–§17 10–38/2012, §1–§17 9–33). For further reading on the method of essence intuition in relation to the realistic school of phenomenology, see: Hart (1972, 39–40), Reinach (1951, 21–73), Pfänder (1913), Pfeiffer (2005, 1–13), Schmücker (1956, 1–33), Ebel (1965, 1–25). 8 For further reading, see: Miron (2016).

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However, HCM is well cognizant of the challenge of achieving an approach to the elements in things that do not reveal themselves to one’s ordinary gaze. For her, this concerns the very question of what phenomenology is all about, and no less than that the question of who is the phenomenologist: “In order to be or to become a phenomenologist a veil has to fall away from one’s eyes. How does this happen? I am not able to say. But all of the sudden you see a thousand things that you didn’t see before” (HCM, 2015b, 61).9 Again, already Husserl faced the challenge of explaining “seeing” of essence that as such does not reveal itself. In his opinion, this is a primordial experience of reflective consciousness (Husserl, 1952, §19 42/2012, §19 36) and he even typified it as “a primordial dator act that, and as such analogous to sensory perception, and not to imagination” (Husserl, 1952, §23 50/2012, §23 43). HCM even takes the discussion a step further as she establishes that indeed one cannot prove even the empirical fact itself, yet the one who has eyes can see it. In her opinion, this is also the case with seeing essences, which she regards as “the ultimate factual question”. She argues then that “one cannot prove the empirical-sensory fact of the presence (Vorhandensein) of trees. They are there, and whoever is not blind sees them. One cannot prove the spiritual-empirical (rather than psychological) fact of entities prove. Again, they are there, and whoever is not blind for essence (wesensblind) sees them. There is the cosmos of essences (Wesenskosmos), just as there exists a cosmos of Being (Seinskosmos)” (HCM, 1951, 15). The indication in regard to the existence of an approach to essences, as part of the non-spatial elements of Being in general, lies first and foremost on the undisputed evidence regarding their very existence that reveals itself to an appropriate observation. However, both the spatial and the non-spatial paths of the study of reality that are implicit in HCM’s writings are patently different from Husserl’s view of the matter, whose focus was given ultimately to the representation of space (Raumvorstellung) within which the transcendental subject is involved. As is typical, also here he distinguishes between two planes of experience. The first concerns the subjective experience of space within the so-called natural attitude and is visualized by Husserl as follows: “I am aware of a world, spread out in space endlessly, and in time becoming and become, without end. I am aware of it, that means, first of all, I discover it immediately, intuitively. I experience it. Through sight, touch, hearing, etc., in the different ways of sensory perception, corporeal things somehow spatially disturbed are for me simply there […] whether or not I pay them special attention” (Husserl, 1952, §27 56/2012, §27 51). The second plane scrutinized the space from transcendental point of view. In this regard, spatiality is approached by means of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities of bodily things. Thus, the mere spatial appearance of things refers to “something that transcend the whole content of the thing as present to us in bodily form. It cannot therefore mean even the thing as lying in natural sensible space. In other words, its physical space cannot be the space of the world of bodily perception” or “what Is given in perception as corporeal reality, which is given exclusively through its sensory determinations” (Husserl, 1952, §40 9 Pfeiffer referred to this quote in: Pfeiffer (2008, 448). The issue of achieving the phenomenological

approach also occupied other members of the Munich Circle, see: Avé-Lallemant (1971, 62–73).

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82–83/2012, §40 75). Husserl further clarified the transcendental observation of space by pointing to its affinity with the a priori typical of geometry and physics. In his words: “To ideal space belongs, for us, a universal, systematically coherent a priori, an infinite, and yet—in spite of its infinity—self-enclosed, coherent systematic theory which, proceeding from axiomatic concepts and propositions, permits the deductively univocal construction of any conceivable shape which can be drawn in space. […] Our apodictic thinking, proceeding stepwise to infinity through concepts, propositions, inferences, proofs, only ‘discovers’ what is already there, what in-itself already exists in truth” (Husserl, 1970c, §8, 22/1976, §8 19–20).10 It is obvious that there is no way to reconcile between the experience of space in the natural attitude and within the transcendental one. Husserl’s choice of the latter unavoidably to a large extent deprives his idea of space of aspect of perceptibility. Differently from Husserl, for HCM, the perceptibility of space is maintained in the first place by her principle commitment to the realistic orientation of “the turn to the object” (Die Wende zum Objekt) that seeks “what is in front of the I, the object” itself, which as such “is not absorbed into the subject” (Geiger, 1933, 13).11 However, since objects and their modes of knowing are established upon lawfulness of essence objects cannot arrive at full manifestation. The duality composed of the orientation toward the object and at the same time acknowledging their complex mode of appearance consolidates HCM’s departure point to the issue of spatiality. Against this background, she addresses the limitations of the explication of spatiality that are involved in the appearing of the external world. In this regard, she established that the perceiving spirit can come near the objects of the external world, internally encompass them, yet the sphere of spirit and that of “the realities of the external world” are not united by any “homogeneous” bond (HCM, 1916b, 373). Likewise, she characterizes the objects of perception as “covered” due to their reduced concreteness (HCM, 1916b, 416) or because of having a mere “‘habit’” (Habitus) of real objects, whereby they “hover” in the face of the spiritual gaze, but actually carry within themselves “non-reality” (Unwirklichkeit) (HCM, 1916b, 379).12 At the same time, HCM explicitly typifies her own phenomenology as a “methodic turn” and “opposite sense” compared to the idealistic philosophy (HCM, 1963d, 22) of which she considers Husserl’s phenomenology to be one of its peaks (HCM, 1963c, 229). In regard to the issue of spatiality, HCM’s criticism of the idealistic choice of bestowing reason with the status of criterion for all consciousness’s acts (HCM, 1963d, 19) and more generally for regarding thinking as the only “determinateness of Being (Seinsbestimmtheit)” (HCM, 1963b, 36) is particularly important. In the same spirit, she argues that the status provided to pure consciousness in idealism, according to which everything, i.e., “the physical and the psychic, the 10 See

here also: Husserl (1952, §149–§150/2012, §149–§150 311–318). here also: Becker (1930), Vendrell-Ferran (2008, 71–78). This orientation toward the object was inspired by Husserl’s famous appeal “go back to the ‘things themselves’” (Husserl, 1970a, 168/1984a, 10) that is widely discussed in the literature (see: Seifert, 1995; Kuhn, 1969). 12 For the “semblance of reality (Aussehen einer Realität)” typical of perception’s objects, see also: HCM (1916b, 356). 11 See

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interior and the external – are immediately given and attainable, as it is in-itself, just as it is given in-itself” (HCM, 1963d, 20). She adds that with the loss of selfcriticism caused by reason becoming absolute (HCM, 1963d, 18), the very access of idealism to the issue of spatiality has been damaged. On the one hand, she regards idealism as incapable of facing the spatial dimension of reality, explaining that with idealism reality is converted into terms of thought, detached from basic factuality and concreteness (HCM, 1963b, 36) and deprived of what she refers to as “that typical factor of reality (Wirklichkeitsfactor)” (HCM, 1963d, 24). Consequently, idealism became ontically “hovering (schewebt)” (HCM, 1916aN, 7–8) and confined to mere theoretical knowledge about reality (HCM, 1923, 192). At the same time, HCM argues that the loss of substantial ground of pure consciousness, the supporting pillar of idealism, does not enable us to find reality in its systems anymore. Rather, the “internal de-substentialization” of real being in the idealistic worldview dissolves into “pure space-scheme (Raumschemata)” (HCM, 1963b, 36). Certainly, if the openness to spatial dimensions is damaged in idealism, one’s access to the non-spatial is impeded in it even more so. This article focuses on three ontological elements in HCM’s idea of reality: “essence”, “abyss”, and “self”. My principal argument is that her discussion of these both implies and raises the issue of the non-spatiality of Being in a complex manner. Moreover, the three seek the same objective of coming to terms with the force in real beings that will never ever be able to shine in its entirety. In this regard, the insights that relate to each element must be implied also within the other two. However, an improved openness to the study of non-spatiality of real beings is discernible while proceeding from the discussion of the essence, continuing with the abyss, and culminating with the element of the self. Hence, by means of philosophical explication of the mentioned elements and the illumination of the dialectic of each of them with the corresponding spatial aspects, this article will demonstrate the evolution of HCM’s understanding of the issue of spatiality that mirrors her metaphysics as a whole.

11.2 Essence The Husserlian postulate that an essence dwells in beings and determines their necessary dimensions is also foundational to HCM’s realistic phenomenology.13 This essence does not communicate what is actually present and can be detected by an empirical observation. Rather, essence is an abstract source that relates to the entire range of possibilities included in the thing and determines its identity and self-sameness, even if some of the possibilities will never be realized. This proximity of essence to the abstract and unseen aspects in things is apparent also in Husserl’s method of free variation that was meant to discern the unchanging essence 13 Husserl establishes that unlike individual beings, which might be accidental, essence is the necessary and universal element of the issue under discussion. See: Husserl (1952, §2 12–13/2012, §2 10–11). For further reading, see: Mohanty (1977, 1–7).

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that courses throughout any possible variation of appearance.14 The illumination of the essence as a non-spatial element in HCM’s idea of Being might be assisted by Husserl’s idea of “nucleus” (Kernbestand), which does not indicate a concrete aspect in the constitution of the noema but “a kind of abstract form that dwells in it” (Husserl, 1952, §132 304/2012, §132 275). Husserl’s association of the nucleus with both the noema and noesis,15 i.e., objectivity and subjectivity, respectively, enables determining in this context that the assumed dwelling of an abstract element within reality is not confined to transcendental phenomenological framework but might be applicable also to a realistic one such as HCM’s. Indeed, this dwelling is assumed already in her study of the appearance of the external world which is anchored in the distinction between “the sensorially manifest surface” (sinnfällige Oberfläche) that presents itself in sensory appearance” (HCM, 1916b, 463) as the exterior side of the matter and the “in principle invisible” interior (HCM, 1916b, 465 n. 1). Later on, this observation becomes more explicit and generalized to the nature of the real thing as such that cannot appear in its entirety. In this regard, HCM contends that material beings have depth and internality yet only their external manifest surface achieves actual sensory appearing (HCM, 1923, 205).16 Against this background, I argue that the proximity of essence to the characteristics of abstractedness and internality, which is common to both Husserl and HCM, provides the most fundamental openness to the understanding of non-spatiality of Being in HCM’s thinking. However, as is typical in other contexts of discussion in her work, here too the ground of communality of a very fundamental aspect between the two phenomenologists leads to the vacillating of HCM’s thinking— beyond the boundaries that Husserl marked and backward to his most primordial foundation. Thus, despite the adherence to Husserl’s view of essence that locates it in the midst of things, HCM undermines the general identification of the internal realm where essences dwell with transcendental consciousness. Thus, she establishes that although “every essence-unity, in which its belonging absoluteness exists, describes an idea”, this idea is distinguished from any correlation to consciousness (HCM, 1916b, 353). HCM explains that consciousness does not serve as a “hatch” (Gucklöchern) to the real being since “consciousness does possess any real 14 See:

Husserl (1991, §34 103–106, §60 166–168/1999, §34 69–72, §60 139–140). described “a certain noematic ‘nucleus’ from the changing ‘characters’ that belongs to it, whereby the noema in its fullest specification appears drawn into the stream of modifications of various kinds. This nucleus […] stood out [abheben] intuitively as a unity, and sufficiently clearly to enable us to concern ourselves with it in a general way” (Husserl, 1952, §129 297/2012, §129 269). At the same time, the idea of nucleus is mentioned in Husserl’s discussions of subjectivity, in his words: “To the one object we attach a variety of modes of consciousness, acts or act-noemata. […] sundry act-noemata have everywhere here a variety of nuclei, yet so that, despite this fact, they close up together in an identical unity, a unity in which the ‘something’, the determinable which lies concealed in every nucleus, is consciously grasped as self-identical” (Husserl, 1952, §131 302/2012, §131 273). 16 See also HCM (1923, 205–206). For further references to the idea of manifest surface, see: HCM (1923, 194, 206–209, 214, 235–236). 15 Husserl

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margins (Realbegrenzung)” and also “there exist no common borders” that consciousness and the real world share together, hence they cannot possess the same object (HCM, 1916b, 450). Nevertheless, thanks to its “definite and unchangeable” “place” (topos) within the “sense cosmos” (kÒsmos noetÒs) (HCM, 1965a, 377),17 essence has also an unequivocally objective (HCM, 1965b, 336) and an “unambiguous and unmistakable” (HCM, 1965b, 343) sense. This means that essence’s independency of consciousness and of experience in general does not deprive it of intelligibility. On the contrary, HCM argues that the presence of essence in reality is primordial, perceivable (HCM, 1931N, 2–3), and foundational for any real being (HCM, 1963c, 230). She puts it as follows: “The objective-intelligible logos is a primordial idea (Uridee)” and the endless diversity inherent in it is capable of bestowing meaning upon “every single thing and limb (Glied) in the world” (HCM, 1965c, 307). Yet, the intelligibility of the existing thing does not express the involvement of the human subject for “the objective realism […] is not taken from subjective mindtreasure (Verstandsschutz)” (HCM, 1965c, 310). Alternatively, “we hear nobody speaking”, rather things “‘talk’ from themselves. They themselves say wherein they belong and what constitutes their essence” (HCM, 1965b, 347).18 However, since essence first and principally enables the objectivity of real beings and provides them with their intelligibility (HCM, 1965b, 336), it also facilitates their givenness before the observing subject and thus also the study of essences (HCM, 1965b, 348). In any event, as much as essence intuition enables the general approach to the non-spatial elements of reality, practically it addresses itself to identify the necessary “what” (Washeit) of real things, without which real beings could never acquire their specific objective shape (HCM, 1916b, 353). That is to say that the method of essence intuition is integral also in the study of their spatial aspects. HCM determines that the essence is “loaded” upon the “bearer” (Träger) without which no reality can exist or be specified (HCM, 1923, 176).19 She explains that “when an essence reaches realization or becomes corporeal, by that fact itself ‘a bearer’ is established, upon which it – as the content of its real existence – is ‘loaded’” (HCM, 1923, 167). This function of carrying is based on pure and “unbreakable (unzerreißbar) formal cohesion (Zusammenhang)” (HCM, 1923, 179). Moreover, these are reciprocal relations: the bearer is specified by the essence that is uploaded onto it and by which it exists. At the same time, the essence is carried to the extent that it specifies its bearer. The two consolidate an absolute body or shape (Gebilde) in-itself (HCM, 1923, 167–168), or unity in which the specifier and the specified are at the same time the borne and the loaded (HCM, 1923, 171). Hence, the essence and the bearer 17 See

also: HCM (1965b, 347–348).

18 At this point, HCM’s reliance on Husserl’s thesis of the rationality is apparent, see: Husserl (1952,

§136–§137, §139, §142/2012, §136–137, §139, §142). term “bearer” has several occurrences already in Doctrine of Appearance, usually as a character of the I (HCM, 1916b, 482), of the spirit (HCM, 1916b, 407, 514), of the senses (HCM, 1916b, 497–498), or of the body (HCM, 1916b, 525–526), and not as an ontological creature that accompanies the essence. 19 The

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should be regarded as “formally completely chained together and instructing one another” and as “‘emerging [into existence] (entstehen)’ at the same time” (HCM, 1923, 172).20 HCM concludes then: “a real entity became a carrier (Hypokeimenon) of its own self like Atlas who takes earth upon its back” (HCM, 1923, 176)”.21 At this point, the difference between HCM’s realistic phenomenology and the idealistic approach comes into focus. She argues that while the essence achieves “personal dwelling” (Wohnatätte), namely a kind of domestication, in the real being (HCM, 1923, 177), the formal and ideal representations are exhausted in mere shape (Eingeformtsein), lack a real bearer, and their existence is only functional or formal (HCM, 1923, 178). Thus, she distinguishes between two bearers: The “ideal bearer” shows itself by means of content and does not have the meaning of “what underlies” (Hypokeimenon) (HCM, 1923, 167) and such upon which the essence is loaded; rather to a certain extent the essence remains detached from the beings in which it appears. Thus, for example, the triangle is the bearer of the essence of triangularity. Yet the attachment of triangularity to the thing in which it appears—for example, this table before me—is to a large extent loose, and therefore cannot signify its belonging “self” (to be discussed below). In contrast, the “real bearer” is factual (Hypokeimenon), namely it “takes upon itself” the essence that specifies it (HCM, 1923, 167–168). To a certain extent, both ideal beings and real ones have absolute independence. Yet, HCM establishes that by their very becoming ideal beings they sink into “selfless and mere formal” existence, while real ones constitute themselves already as a full and positive existence (HCM, 1923, 179). Thus, she determines that regarding the issue of bearing an “unbridgeable abyss” separates ideal beings from real ones (HCM, 1923, 223).22

20 HCM clarifies that this observation should be understood as a “methodological illustration” rather than as an indication of a genetic and simultaneous becoming of the essence and the bearer (HCM, 1923, 172 n. 1). 21 HCM clarifies in this context that the phenomenon’s standing on its essence is not equivalent to its objectivity, to its autonomy in its existence, or to its independency (HCM, 1923, 180). This clarification is important given her earlier discussion in Doctrine of Appearance, in which she positions the aspect of autonomy in existence as fundamental in the idea of reality (HCM, 1916b, 392). However, in Realontologie this aspect is regarded as insufficient (HCM, 1923, 162). It seems that objectivity and absoluteness are considered as insufficient since they can relate solely to formal and ideal existence and lack the capability for spatial realization and more generally for “corporeality” (Leibhaftigkeit), which is inherent in HCM’s discussion of non-spatiality. 22 However, it should be noted that in Realontologie, HCM’s dealing with the issue of reality is free from affinity to actual fulfillment. This enables many of her arguments regarding the real being to be applicable also to the ideal one. Thus, she holds that regarding the inseparability of the essence and the bearer (HCM, 1923, 170) there exists “accordance in the sense (Gleichsinnigkeit) of the situation on the real side and the ideal side” (HCM, 1923, 162).

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11.3 Abyss The element of essence is a critical beginning in HCM’s phenomenological study of the non-spatial elements of Being as it directs attention to the non-tangible and nonconcrete elements in reality. However, the understanding of essence as the origin of the intelligibility of real existents and of Being itself and the reciprocity to the extent of intimacy that takes place within essence between spatial and non-spatial elements of Being, might obscure the problematic peculiar to non-spatiality. Non-spatiality is opaque to the direct glance and everyday understanding of reality, and hence requires interpretation. Indeed, these aspects of the abyss are already indicated in the everyday meaning of the word. In any event, we are not dealing here with a metaphor but rather with a genuine ontological element, as HCM puts it: “While vividly carried and kept out of self-centered unity, [Being] becomes expanded in the abyss with which it is filled” (HCM, 1923, 226). The insight that abyss does not signify an absolute void but a real and positive element in reality is apparent also in HCM’s characterization of the real being as “resting on the grounds of the abyss” (HCM, 1923, 222). Obviously, precisely because the abyss is a real ground, it is possible to “rest” (Ruhe) on it at all. A real internal and silent force is embodied in this resting upon abyss, such that enables the real being to keep itself from falling into nothingness but exists independently of achieving any material or external realization. In any event, being a reality that is not and patently cannot be realized spatiality is exactly what makes the element of the abyss the ultimate non-spatiality. By understanding the real being as including within itself a positive element of abyss, HCM’s typical realistic disposition becomes apparent. This disposition does not surrender to the epistemic demands of the philosophical discourse that she regards as demanding the “radical opposition” (HCM, 1923, 218) between the material being that is constituted as fullness and the transcendent void that as such is measureless. Therefore, only a study of reality that is exhausted with the illumination of its spatial elements can respond to this opposition between the material, which is accessible to a spatial qualification, and the transcendent, whose immediate characterization is non-spatiality. In other words, the epistemological study can only take place within the boundaries of spatiality.23 Therefore, the elimination of the general contradiction between the transcendent and the material or any filled thing is a precondition for achieving access to non-spatial aspects of reality. Obviously, this insight challenges HCM’s foundational determination in Realontologie that reality stands with “an unbridgeable and absolute opposition” (HCM, 1923, 162) to the nonexisting or nothingness (HCM, 1923, 160). One wonders how 23 The early phenomenologists understood Husserl’s related appeal to “go back to the ‘things themselves’” as indifference toward epistemological questions (see: U. Avé-Lallemant, 1965 [1966], 207). HCM characterized the epistemological approach as dogmatic (HCM, 1916b, 347). The argument that the epistemological emphasis is bound with pushing the ontological is typical of the Munich-Gottingen ¨ School, see, for example: Hildebrand (1976, 141). Likewise, HCM seems to connect between the idealistic supreme emphasis on “pure generality” that proved itself as a powerful tool in achieving epistemological meanings and its typical pushing aside of ontological elements, see: HCM (1963a).

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a perception that in-itself is based on such a primordial opposition can claim the need of eliminating another particular opposition? In my opinion, there is no contradiction here but rather a maturation of HCM’s study of reality that enables her thinking to include various elements—such as abyss and materiality and more generally spatiality and non-spatiality—that do not exclude each other. This evolution can be demonstrated by the extrication of two descriptions of the material being that are mixed up in HCM’s discussion: while the element of the abyss lacks in the first, its gradual integration into the second enables a riper and more complex understanding of materiality, which transpires as including within itself non-spatial elements. The first depiction of the material being as mere external fullness (HCM, 1923, 225) whose direction in Being is addressed outward (HCM, 1923, 223) already includes the aforementioned underlying primordial opposition between the real and the nonexistent. Therefore, within this initial description of the material being, the external borders of its extent in space provide the only hold for coming to terms with its essence (HCM, 1923, 207–208). Furthermore, the content that fills the material being “in itself is formally and wholly transcendent and totally void of itself”, “it does not exist there from the outset”, but its “fullness first pops up in it” outwardly (HCM, 1923, 218). The understanding of the material being as entirely controlled by its externality is apparent also in its characterization as a sinking “body” of narrowness and stiffness that as such is not anymore in-itself a primordial expression of a free self-substantializing force but is subjected to external influences (HCM, 1923, 201). In this way, the material being loses its dynamic forces and becomes static (HCM, 1923, 201) and passive. This change involves the processes of filling, loading, and heaviness in which it is operated (HCM, 1923, 222). In what HCM typifies as a “brutal order of being” of the material being (HCM, 1923, 223), the “body of being (Seinsleib) is plainly loaded and it itself […] possesses no more ‘space’ beneath or inside it. It does not elevate itself to itself […] but is ‘buried’ under the fullness of its being […] and it - qua bearer - does not exist anymore” (HCM, 1923, 224–225). Finally, the material being is characterized as such that is incapable of “exiting the depth” (HCM, 1923, 209), as an infinite escape from nothingness and the absolute measurelessness into the “internal limitation” of the material being (HCM, 1923, 222), and as “body-less content” and “ground-level” (Ungrund) (HCM, 1923, 218). Thus transpires a considerable erosion of some of the ontological features of the real being that is bound with the process of material realization. For example: freedom, mobility and the non-spatial internal space, in short: “only the real is such that by itself ‘can’ (K¨onnende)” (HCM, 1923, 177). Moreover, as the element of the abyss is blurred in this description of the real being, it can no longer express the peculiar depth and capability for self-pushing into the space and filling it that typifies things that have not yet crossed “the gateway to reality”. This erosion, which constricted the material being to the mere spatiality, results from the convergence of the real being into one mere totalized possibility, in whose boundaries the opposition between existence and nonexistence is the most radical and all-inclusive. An important step toward achieving a riper understanding of materiality that can contain oppositions takes place after HCM integrates the element of abyss into her ontology. This is apparent within the discussion of the aspect of fullness (Fülle) that

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denotes the content of the material being. Here, the material being is described as a substantial occurring that is achieved by a “wedding” (Vermählung) of the material being with the boundless abyss (HCM, 1923, 218). HCM explains that within the material being, abyss “converted into matter […] and by entering into it and filling it, it enters to it” (HCM, 1923, 217). Thus, the material being is characterized as “completely filling that ‘abyss’” (HCM, 1923, 216) to the extent that there remains “no more ‘space’ beneath and inside it” (HCM, 1923, 225) but is totally manifested. Moreover, the fulfillment of the material being by means of filling the abyss is described as resulting from the entrance of the transcendent into the infinite within the real being (HCM, 1923, 214). In fact, this infinite aspect of the real being is merely its enfolding within itself a plurality of modes of being which enables it to be realized also in a material manner, yet without being conditioned on this (HCM, 1923, 159) or any other possibility. The aforementioned need of removal of materiality “in the narrow and strict sense” (HCM, 1923, 219) takes place exactly at this point within an observation that does not exhaust the material being with its external realization. In this regard, the element of the abyss provides reasoning or even a metaphysical guarantee of the establishing of independency as a fundamental and general character of the real being.24 In fact, within the riper observation of the material being, the element of the abyss not only serves as a mental context that contains oppositions that do not exclude each other, but is also a paradigm of the non-spatial aspect of Being in general. Surely, the method of essence intuition that underlies HCM’s studies of reality was already designed to free one’s gaze from any measure and possible fixation that could impose unification on the comprising elements of reality. However, at this point the fruits of this method are discernible in the understanding of Being as capable of including ontological heterogeneity in which abyss and materiality coexist, as crystalized in the understanding of the real being as no less than “carried out in the abyss” (HCM, 1923, 227). At this stage, the transformation brought about by the observation that confirms the existence of abyss within reality stands out. The denoted “spatial wedding” (Raumvermählung) (HCM, 1923, 232) that was meant to visualize, so to speak, the material realization of the real being is now viewed as mere seeming (HCM, 1923, 207) and even as impossible (HCM, 1923, 238). In other words, when the existence of the abyss in real beings is considered, the very attempt to confine them within their spatial materiality transpires as “a fixation of the non-fixable” (HCM, 1923, 211, 213) and as a filling of the “measureless as such” (HCM, 1923, 234), or the incommensurability of Being (HCM, 1923, 228) that cannot work out well. Finally, HCM describes the observation that tries to gather spatial measure and estimation on the one hand and incommensurability or “measurelessness” on the other hand as real rather than a mere formal “paradox”, “the entire problem” (HCM, 1923, 207), 24 This is apparent in the study of the external world whose real existence is depicted as an absolute and independent being (Seinselbstständigkeit), autonomous and absolute (HCM, 1916b, 391–392), closed in-itself and transcendent to human consciousness and spirit (HCM, 1916b, 424). The aspect of the autonomy of Being will achieve its full maturation in the idea of the “self”, to be discussed below.

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“unbelievable” (HCM, 1923, 210), “a mysterious element” (HCM, 1923, 209), and even as “insanity” (HCM, 1923, 210). It is typical of HCM’s approach to suggest no solution to the contradictory state of affairs that she herself unveils but instead to intensify it. In this regard, she relates to “a fixation of measureless void in-itself, which thus ‘fixes’ the unfixable as this unfixable and therefore does not abrogate (aufhebt) but exactly retains” (HCM, 1923, 211). This is, then, HCM’s direct response to the processes of “filling” that she observes as resulting from the idealistic elevation of everything to the plane of the absolute consciousness. Like Husserl, HCM understands the sensory as “participating” in “eternal forms, values, and norms” (HCM, 1963b, 35) and in a priori essential relations (HCM, 1963b, 33).25 However, she explains that in the processes of unification and absolutization of Being and appearance that takes place in idealism within which “the real [das wirkliche] now thoroughly becomes an ideal [Ideelles] (concept!)” (HCM, 1963b, 36)—existence always becomes doubtful in its factuality. In her opinion, this is why within idealism’s endeavor to elevate to the plane of pure and doubtless consciousness; the element of factuality must be bracketed (HCM, 1963d, 24). No less important is the fact that in idealism there is no room for abyss in HCM’s sense. This insight is directly supported by Husserl’s contention according to which “whatever in purely immanent and reduced form is peculiar to the experience, and cannot be thought away from it, as it in-itself, and in its eidetic setting passes eo ipso into the Eidos, is separated from all nature and physics, and not less from all psychology by veritable abyss” (Husserl, 1952, §89 205/2012, §89 187), or in short: “Between the meanings of consciousness and reality yawns a veritable abyss” (Husserl, 1952, §49 116/2012, §49 95). In fact, for Husserl consciousness both discerns the abyss and eradicates it by bracketing factuality by means of phenomenological reduction. Indeed, it is evident also to HCM that abyss and absolute consciousness exclude each other. Exactly for this reason she denounces idealism for “filling” the “break” between the thing-in-itself and consciousness or mere appearing with cognizing reason (HCM, 1963d, 18), arguing that this is a “superficial and appearing-like” or as “‘hovering’”, cannot “genuinely meet the real and […] radical depth of the space of an aimed cut; but must evade it and remain outside it” (HCM, 1923, 208). 25 HCM’s criticism of idealism also implicitly contains a rejection of the positivistic worldview, according to which sensory perception is the only mode of knowing (HCM, 1916b, 352), arguing that this is “untenable” limitation and wondering whether what the positivist considers as “the only cognition material” indeed has such precedence (HCM, 1916b, 347). Doctrine of Appearance is an exploration of the first chapter essay, which received an award from the department of philosophy at the University of Göttingen, see: HCM (1920a, 10–24). In 1912, Alexander Pfänder accepted Doctrine of Appearance as a Ph.D. thesis at the University of Munich (see: U. Avé-Lallemant 1965 [1966]). In 1913, the expanded chapter was printed and submitted as a dissertation, in a version almost identical to Doctrine of Appearance. In the epilogue added to the special print in 1920, HCM established her shift to ontology-oriented studies and seems to know that her original plan to develop the rest of the chapters in her essay on positivism would not be realized (HCM, 1920b, 130. See here also: Avé-Lallemant, 1971, 213).

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From this analysis, it is apparent, then, that idealism or any approach that ignores the inherent and indispensable existence of an abyss within real beings can never be capable of coming to terms with the non-spatial aspects of reality. As opposed to that, the firmness of HCM’s acknowledgment of the unbeatable non-spatial dimensions of reality thwarts in advance any possibility to fill any genuine gap in it, to the extent that when losing sight of such one unavoidably escapes reality itself. Moreover, I argue that her acknowledgment of the existence of the element of abyss in reality also contains the ground for the rehabilitation of the ambivalence (Zweispältigkeit) (HCM, 1963b, 35) that is lost in idealism, which can be valid only within the unified sphere of pure consciousness. Instead, she established the following: “that which is not root-fully (wurzelhaft) grounded in its Being and therein in its internal efficacy out of itself corporally effects the world, also by means of participating in a priori forms, will not encounter anymore fixable ambivalence regarding what should be the genuine essential in it” (HCM, 1963b, 35). Or in a positive phrasing: “the normalness, the lender of form (Formverleihend), the standardizing, the unconditioned, and the ‘truthful’ because it essentially exists, this cannot be detected in the sensory phenomena givenness, ‘somehow’ must have its proper place” (HCM, 1963b, 34– 35). Undoubtedly, HCM’s idea of abyss indicates such a non-sensory and non-spatial “place”, yet no less genuine and real. However, since the rehabilitation of duality is at the same time the reaffirmation of abyss, i.e., an inherent splitting element within reality, a complete externalizing can never operate in real beings, as she puts it: “abyss” as “inexhaustible ‘to be filled’” or as “the ‘infinity’ and ‘inexhaustibility’” (HCM, 1923, 216) of Being as such. The evolution of HCM’s understanding of the issue of the non-spatiality of Being can now be established accurately. As stated, the element of essence is the critical establishment of the very existence of the non-spatial aspect within reality. Yet HCM’s coping with non-spatiality within her discussion of essence is rather restricted, due to reasons that relate to her understanding of essence itself, i.e., its inclusive implications on many other issues in her metaphysics, its affinity to the point of identification with the abstractedness of the Being as such, and finally its philosophical and existential dependency on the spatial aspect of the bearer which is an inseparable part of it. Largely, the element of the abyss responds to the deficiencies that are inherent in the element of essence in respect to the issue of non-spatiality of Being. Paradoxically, even though limitlessness is the most prominent character of abyss as such, a considerable focus on the issue of non-spatiality is achieved within the context of its discussion. Moreover, despite the fact that the discussion of the material being is integrated within the explication of the abyss, no dependency between the two is noted. On the contrary, not only is non-spatiality clearly the dominant aspect of the abyss, the abyss is the context of the potentiality of Being, meaning what patently does not indulge spatial realization. In other words, concerning the element of the abyss, the issue of non-spatiality also achieves independency of the spatial elements that might be attached to it. In this regard, one can pose essence and abyss on two sides of the divide—on the one is located the inherent intelligibility of the real being, thanks to which objectivity is possible, while on the other stands the ultimate incomprehensibility of Being. However, despite the impossibility of solving the tensions

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inherent in this very positioning, the very understanding of the non-spatiality of Being as an assignment of interpretation should be regarded as an accomplishment of the elucidation of the element of the abyss.

11.4 Self The most unique non-spatial expression in HCM’s ontology is that of “self” (Sëität) or “selfness” (Selbsthaftigkeit or Selberkeit). In this regard, she establishes that all real existents that are characterized “‘by-themselves’, ‘in-themselves’, and ‘from-themselves’ have their formal constitutive ground in the ‘selfness of Being’ (Selberkeit des Seins)” (HCM, 1963a, 203), or alternatively they are the “‘ground and soil’ of its own creation” (HCM, 1957, 131). Whereas the non-spatial element in essences is first apparent as abstractedness, and that of the abyss appears in the absence of clear boundaries, the non-spatiality of the element of self is prominent in its association with the internality of real beings. As she puts it: “In every true existent (Daseiendes) lies an internal potentiality for being of its own” (HCM, 1963c, 232) which is “self-centered unity” (HCM, 1923, 227), or elsewhere “the most internal essence of real Being […] is inherent in selfness (Selberkeit) of Being […], or in the ontic self (Sëität) per se” (HCM, 1963a, 203).26 HCM’s reference to a distinction between a “conscious” determination that signifies self-reference to Being and “ontological” assertion that relates to the real being itself eliminates the possibility of understanding in mental terms the idea that Being possesses a self. Otherwise, so she argues, we would have remained within the idealistic boundaries of thinking, and thus “the access to philosophy of Being in general will remain closed” (HCM, 1963d, 26). That is to say that while the act of self-reference signifies the peculiar capability of human consciousness that might enable one to cross the boundaries of concrete reality, the “self” of Being is referred to as pure ontological moment that belongs to real beings as such. Moreover, exactly as the connection of the essence and the bearer is “unbreakable (unzerreißbar) formal cohesion (Zusammenhang)” (HCM, 1923, 179), so also the ontological selfness of the finite being is loaded with itself and cannot be damaged without being eradicated (HCM, 1963c, 234). Therefore, without the element of the self “there could be no existents, yes no world” (HCM, 1963a, 205). Finally, as part of the establishing of the self as an ontological 26 The term “self” occurs in Doctrine of Appearance in the sense of grounding the autonomy of the real against the I and the consciousness in general. Accordingly, the external world is depicted as an absolute and independent being (Seinselbstständigkeit), autonomous and absolute in its existence (HCM, 1916b, 391–392), closed in-itself and transcendent to human consciousness and spirit (HCM, 1916b, 424). Also, the objects of which the external is comprised are characterized as having “unveiled self-emerging” (unverhülltes Selbsthervortreten), “self-announcement” (Selbstkundgabe), “self-existence” (Selbstdasein) (HCM, 1916b, 371), “corporal-self” (leibhaftes Selbst), “real self-presence” (reale Selbstgegenwart) (HCM, 1916b, 376), “self-performance” (Selbstdarbietungseigenschaft) (HCM, 1916b, 411, 494), and “self-presentation” (Selbstpräsentation) (HCM, 1916b, 413) (see also: HCM, 1916b, 430, 450, 452–455, 464–465, 471, 474, 514).

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element of the real being as such, HCM asserts its connectedness to Being itself. In this context, she argues that the self is “self-full groundness of Being” (selbsthaft Seinsgegründetheit) of the real being as such (HCM, 1963c, 232) and that “standing in the selfness to Being” (HCM, 1965c, 295) grants real beings with an “essential necessity” (HCM, 1957, 132). Finally, this constitutive selfness (Sichheit) of the real being is based on the belonging of Being to itself (HCM, 1957, 95) that builds up the substance of real beings (HCM, 1957, 120 n. 1, 91–97). The dialectic between the spatial and non-spatial aspects of Being that was unveiled within the discussion of the elements of abyss and essence, is implied also in HCM’s exposition of the element of the self. On the one hand, the self relates to the processes of extrication from nothingness and realization (HCM, 1923, 181, 195) that enable real beings be part of the world. HCM explains that the internal essence of real beings is in-itself inherent in the ontic self (Sëität) (HCM, 1963a, 203) that belongs to them, or alternatively, the self-belonging of Being is an ontic and functional limb (Glied) by means of which the abstract being of mere existing can sink into the concrete reality (HCM, 1957, 96). The spatial aspect of the element of the self is implicit in the description that by the very fact of loading an essence on its bearer, the bearer establishes itself and becomes “standing” (stehend), while the essence finds in it a “seat” (Sitz) or “‘a position of its own’ (Eigenposition)” (HCM, 1923, 179). At this point, the opposition of the real being and the “pure unity of appearing” (reine Erscheinungseinheit) that is restricted to a theoretical knowledge about reality (HCM, 1923, 192) is most conspicuous and can exist only vis-à-vis its perceiving consciousness without having something “inside” itself (HCM, 1923, 195, 199). HCM characterizes the pure appearing as “artificial foundation” because in any “stance” it does not possess (i.e., have inside itself) selfness (HCM, 1923, 218), does not “fill a space” inwardly (HCM, 1923, 204) but exists “without a place of its own”, “hanging in a ‘void’”, and “its mode of existence is of pure hovering” (HCM, 1923, 197–198). Consequently, no positioning of real being can ever take place in pure appearance (HCM, 1916aN, 6). However, the real being has a self since an essence is carried in it and thus occupies a stance in it, which under certain conditions can also be realized spatially. On the other hand, the term “position” here does not necessarily mean a concrete place but rather the essential rootedness in the real thing. So, alongside the ontic occurrence of the real being that addresses it outward, processes of “substantialization inward”, “internalization” (Innerung) (HCM, 1923, 226), and “an internal mode of structuring” (HCM, 1923, 176) also operate in it. More importantly, the realization itself refers to the elements of the self and essence, namely to the non-spatial aspect of Being. As she puts it: “the real—by means of its pure being and existence—is the positive and personal realizer (Realisator) of its own essentiality (Washeit) or its own self” (HCM, 1923, 173). That is to say that the self as part of the internal realm of the real thing does not arrive at spatial appearing, thus like the abyss it should be regarded as responsible for the fact that reality will never achieve complete externalization. Both sides of the real self—the first that can achieve spatial realization and the second that is entrenched into the midst of the real Being which patently does not occupy concrete place—arrive at their full maturity within HCM’s philosophy of the

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I,27 more specifically within the explication of the spiritual-I, which is depicted as composed of two elements: one is described as spiritualness (geistlichthaft) (HCM, 1965c, 302) and as “infrastasis (Infrastase)”, which indicates the capability of the spiritual-I to be directed to something that is not itself. This is a real “factual power of Being (Seinsmacht)” of the I-being (HCM, 1965c, 296), whose directedness toward the spiritual is decisive for substantial constitution (HCM, 1957, 140). To the extent that the achieving of substantiality by means of relation to spirit describes the internality of the real I-being, it also expresses its transcendent aspect that enables one’s being addressed beyond itself and attaining spatial expression. Indeed, early in her work, HCM depicts the spiritual-I as such that “helps its bearer (Träger) to a certain natural situation of transcendence” to the extent that “an executive act or ‘salto mortale’ is not needed” (HCM, 1916b, 408). Later, this insight is crystalized as the perception that the infrastatic nature of the I-being is imprinted in the very existence of spirit. This is manifested in the human capability of projecting-against (Gegenwurf ) or “existential objectification” (existenzielle Objizierung) and creating “by oneself what stands against you” by means of which one “gains a foothold” in Being or “posits itself” in it and thus becomes “an existent” (Seiendes) (HCM, 1957, 129– 130). However, HCM clarifies that these peculiar activities are not conscious but lie within “the existential depth” of the spiritual-I (HCM, 1957, 131). In other words, the attempt of self-elevating from itself, which is at the same time toward itself, does not signify one’s exclusive mental capabilities as such but the ontological structure of the I-being. The implicit proximity of this aspect of the spiritual-I to the issue of spatiality might be discernible regarding the characterization of the infrastatic element of the spiritual-I as an “influencing-spirit” (wirkender Geist) by which it transcends its own boundaries without having inside itself something to be posed against what it receives (HCM, 1965c, 308). Hence, spatiality is here noticeable in transcending from the internal nucleus to the external world. The second side of the spiritual-I deals with the character of the I as an origin-like (Ursprungshaftigkeit), as a result of which it “cannot get out of itself or out of its own origin (Ursprung)” (HCM, 1965c, 295) or alternatively it is fundamentally “insideitself” and “by-itself” (HCM, 1965c, 296). While the material being is “carried as substrate-full (substrathaft)” (HCM, 1957, 131), or alternatively it is a “substratefull” substantiality that is eventually realized outwardly, the selfness characteristic of the I is person-full (personhaft) (HCM, 1963c, 242). HCM explains that in its personal capability-for-Being (persönlische Seinsvermögen), the spiritual-I constitutes the real existentiality as belonging to it and thus as “being-full selfness that is characterized as personal power-of-Being (persönliche Seinsmacht) from the bottom” (HCM, 1957, 128). Here, personality signifies merely the directedness toward oneself or the being of the I wholly itself. This feature establishes the ontological condition of the I as ultimately “towards Being” (hin zum Sein) (HCM, 1963c, 235, 237) to the point of “being incapable to escape from Being, inescapably renouncing and surrendering (ausgeliefert)” to it (HCM, 1963c, 236). Therefore, as long as the I delves into the 27 For further discussion of HCM’s philosophy of the I, see: Miron (2017a, Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 7; 2017b, Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 6).

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entanglements of its own being, nothing but itself might be found there (HCM, 1931). HCM depicts as “something strange (Merkwürdig)” the fact that the characters of “‘self-full relation to Being’” (selbsthaftes Verhältnis zum Sein) or “‘self-capability of being its own being’” (Selber-Können-des-eigenen-Seins) are developed inside the I-being and not in any other being. To this extent, the origin-like nature of spirit built the firmest foundation of the I-being. However, at the same time the aspect of originlike nature is depicted as “spiritual-material (geiststofflich)” (HCM, 1965c, 302), and as a “receiving-spirit” (empfangender Geist) (HCM, 1965c, 311). Here, the I-being serves as a substrate upon which concepts, words, and phenomena are transferred. These are “forms of essence” (Wesensformen) (HCM, 1965c, 311–312) originating from the hidden and non-spatial depth of the human spirit, thus responsible for its never ever arriving at complete revelation. The aforementioned dialectic between the spatial and non-spatial elements reaches its peak within the explication of the element of the self, in which the two sides transpire as identical. In this context, HCM depicts the human spirit as such that within its elevation toward what is outside and beyond itself it is revealed as “self-less (selbstlos)” (HCM, 1965c, 298). Consequently, the I-being also appears as such that “its self was elevated from it” (HCM, 1965c, 298) and as “totally empty of itself down to its most internal ground, which is precisely therefore an abyss” (HCM, 1965c, 296). Even more so, within the explication of the element of self, the mechanism that brings about the very split between spatiality and non-spatiality within Being is unveiled. Specifically, the spiritual-I itself appears as divided, thus heading in two opposing directions, i.e.: the infrastasis might enable achieving a spatial realization outward by means of knowledge and creation, while origin-like nature serves as an internal context for all the non-spatial occurrences of the real self. In this respect, the element of the self absorbs what in regard to essence and abyss was merely external, and thus the self transpires as the most encompassing framework for the non-spatiality of Being. This means that within the element of the self, both spatial and non-spatial forces are intensively active, hence the self should be regarded as simultaneously spatial and non-spatial. The ultimate expression for the crowding of the spatial and non-spatial elements of Being in the spiritual-I is apparent in the location of the infrastatic state of the human spirit exactly at the “middle point”, in which the I moves between self-abandoning and being self-directed backward to its origin. HCM depicts as a “wonder” the state of affairs in which the spiritual as “an infrastatic selffull being”, i.e., especially as being beyond itself, arrives at itself without ceasing being itself for even a single moment (HCM, 1965c, 296). That is to say that the fact that within the spiritual-I there exists a spatial force that addresses it beyond itself, to the real world and to Being in general, in no way diminishes the internality that fills the human self from inside or reduces its constitutive non-spatial dimensions. On the contrary, the capability of the spiritual-I to achieve a spatial realization, which ensures that human beings will never be imprisoned in their internality, at the same time testifies to the non-spatial infinity that explains one’s inherent helplessness in regard to achieving complete expression and realization. Nevertheless, the aboveexplicated mechanism does not entirely eradicate the structured incomprehensibility of non-spatiality in real beings. Simply, in the end non-spatiality as such is also the principle boundary of openness to intelligibility itself.

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11.5 Epilogue HCM’s facing of the concealed dimensions of Being as such places her on the same plane as the poet and the artist who enjoy a unique openness to reality.28 However, HCM takes this challenge a step forward. Her phenomenological reflections endeavor to interpret these dimensions themselves in terms of reality. To use HCM’s unique or even idiosyncratic vocabulary, not only does reality have an abyss, but the abyss is reality itself. Undoubtedly, the co-presence of spatial dimensions within the discussion of non-spatiality is helpful in preventing the reality that is illuminated by the study of its non-spatial elements from being consolidated as a detached and elusive concept. However, besides being crucial for the philosophical explication, the proximity of the spatial and non-spatial elements describes a real state of affairs, or as she puts it: essences originally belong to a certain phenomenal state of affairs (HCM, 1916b, 349). Hence, despite being independent of its spatial realizations that testify to the patent potential nature of Being in general, reality will never attain a complete dependence of them. At the same time, a complete independence and freedom from realization is impossible as well. Hence, the ontological study of the external world should start with observing its phenomenal appearances (HCM, 1916b, 351–353), namely with the spatial realizations. This is exactly what she means by establishing that not everything is rooted in the “primordial phenomenon” (Urphänomen), hence objectivity that can be rightly considered as real must be expressed in concrete reality (HCM, 1916b, 351). The delicate balance that exists between the spatial and nonspatial elements in HCM’s idea of reality enables what she describes as the “wonderful” yet not mystical position in Being of real existents (HCM, 1960, 15–17). On the one hand the “substantialization into the space” that is typical of real beings as such and enables their “unity that is centered in itself” prevents them from becoming merely constituted outwardly. At the same time, despite an inward substantialization taking place in the real being, it does not “fall prey to the abyss and measurelessness” or “deliver its formal governance and thereby become outwardly established” (HCM, 1923, 226–227). Finally, the phenomenological realism that is unveiled by means of the explication of the three non-spatial elements of Being discussed above arises as complex and full of secrets. This situation requires self-harnessing of the philosopher who does not recoil the frustrations that result from the fact that reality does not simply submit itself to its observers.

28 This

understanding of art is currently discussed in relation to Heidegger (see: Heidegger, 1977, 1–74). Heidegger elaborates his observations in this regard by means of discussion of the Hegelian idea of great art (see: Hegel, 1988). For further reading, see: Harries (2009, 1–17).

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Pfänder, A. (1913). Zur Psychologie der Gesinnung. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung I(1) (pp. 325–404). Halle: Max Niemeyer. Pfeiffer, A. E. (2005). Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Eine Phänomenologische sicht auf Nature und Welt, Orbis Phenomenologicus. Würzburg: Konigshausen ¨ and Neumann. Pfeiffer, A. E. (2008). Ontological phenomenology: The philosophical project of Hedwig ConradMartius. Axiomathes, 18, 445–460. Reinach, A. (1921 [1914]). Vortrag über Phänomenologie. In A. Reinach, Gesammelte Schriften (pp. 379–405). Halle: Max Niemeyer (reprint of: Reinach 1951; English trans.: Reinach 1968; Reinach 1969). Reinach, A. (1951 [1914]). Was ist Phänomenologie? Mit einem Vorwort von Hedwig ConradMartius (pp. 21–72). München: Kösel. Reinach, A. (1968 [1914]). What is phenomenology? (D. Kelly, Trans.). Philosophical Forum, 1(2) (New Series), 231–256 (Translation of: Reinach, 1921/Reinach, 1951). Reinach, A. (1969 [1914]). Concerning phenomenology (W. Dallas, Trans.). The Personalist, 50(2), 194–221 (Translation of: Reinach 1921/Reinach 1951). Schmücker, F. G. (1956). Die Phänomenologie als Methode der Wesenerkenntnis, unter besondere Berücksichtigung der Auffassung der München-Göttinger Phänomenologenchule (Dissertation). München. Seifert, J. (1995). Was ist Philosophie? Die Antwort der realistische Phänomenologie. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, 49(3), 92–98. Vendrell-Ferran, Í. (2008). Die Emotionen, Gefühle in der realistischen Phänomenologie. Berlin: Akademie. von Hildebrand, D. (1976). Was ist Philosophie? Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer.

Chapter 12

The Metaphysical Absolutizing of the Ideal: Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Criticism of Husserl’s Idealism Ronny Miron

Abstract This article discusses the main arguments of Hedwig Conrad-Martius (HCM) against the worldview (Weltanschauung) of idealism in connection to her phenomenological idea of reality. The discussion focuses on her most far-reaching critical argument concerning the damage caused by idealism to the possibility for metaphysics by turning to the real (das wirkliche) into the ideal (Ideelles) and thereby reducing reality to an idea. This article analyzes HCM’s understanding of the evolution of idealism and of her criticism regarding the metaphysical absolutizing of the ideal in idealism. Subsequently, her response to idealism will be illuminated. HCM attempts to rehabilitate the facticity (Faktizität) of real reality (wirkliche Wirklichkeit) within metaphysics.

12.1 Introduction In her radio lectures on “Seinsphilosophie,” Hedwig Conrad-Martius (HCM)1 states that “we can no longer leave this land (Boden) that has been won by means of wholly idealist and epistemological (erkenntniskritische) research. In terms of methodology, we cannot simply go back to the land of medieval ontologies” (HCM, 1963g, 21– 22).2 This sober insight regarding the irreversibility of philosophical progress results from HCM’s acknowledgment that phenomenology is “still carrying the eggshells of its idealist origins (Geburtsursprungs)” (HCM, 1951, 5) and that the contemporary 1 From WS 1909/10 until SS 1910, HCM studied at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. During this time, she participated in the Munich Circle of phenomenologists. She then transferred to the University of Göttingen, where she studied with Edmund Husserl and Adolf Reinach from WS 1910/11 until SS 1912 before submitting her dissertation under Alexander Pfänder back in Munich. During her time in Göttingen, HCM was a central figure in the Göttingen Circle of phenomenologists, becoming the leader (Leiterin) of the group in WS 1911/12. Cf. Avé-Lallemant (1975b, 193), Hart (2020, 1–4). 2 All translations from the German original into English are mine. Emphases follow the original.

R. Miron (B) Interdisciplinary Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Miron (ed.), Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68783-0_12

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philosophical trends of her time, namely existentialism and phenomenology, emanate from idealism and are even its zenith (HCM, 1963e, 229). Moreover, she determines that like any genuine philosophy, idealism deals with Being in its absoluteness (HCM, 1963i, 15–16) and has the “cognitional commitment (erkenntnismäβige Hingabe)” to establish an approach that seeks an essential a priori grounding (HCM, 1963d, 33). She adds that “it is in fact indisputable that subjective idealism again and again in all its forms since Plato (albeit the mostly false subjectivist interpretation of his epistemology) upholds that the human spirit (Geist) in its own depth meets with the most mysterious fullness of all intelligibility” (HCM, 1965b, 271). In her opinion, the Platonic-idealist way of thinking “surely leads to a great abundance of objectively valuable insights” (HCM, 1963g, 22). Hence, she argues that “Platonism and idealism have time and again trusted the most profound and essential arteries of the process of coming to know (Erkenntnisvorgangs)” (HCM, 1965e, 310). Also, she agrees with idealism that “the spiritual being genuinely depicts an ‘elevated’ form of substantiality” and regards the idealist position as preferable to material realism, which in her opinion “darkens the view” (HCM, 1957, 135) and disregards the spiritual element. Finally, she establishes the importance of completing and supporting objective realist epistemology with an idealist subjective epistemology that “emanates from the last essential truth” (HCM, 1965b, 271). Nonetheless, Conrad-Martius is unwilling to consider as genuine philosophy of Being (Seinsphilosophie) the post-Kantian approaches within which reason “remains the measure” of Being (HCM, 1963g, 19). In this regard, she argues that “modern philosophy totally divests itself of the inconvenient ‘in-itself’. Instead, this aspect has been ‘transcendentally idealized’ in idealism concomitantly with turning it to an ‘eternally escaping target’” (HCM, 1963a, 61), until finally the metaphysical thesis regarding the existence of world has been rejected “in favor of a converted transcendental antithesis” (HCM, 1963a, 78). She explains that the confinement of the study of Being to the boundaries of pure consciousness underlying the transcendental stance, which in many respects reinforces the philosophical vision of idealism, suggests a solution to the philosophical problem of Being “that in truth does not exist” (HCM, 1963a, 75). Against this background, HCM presents her own approach as executing a “necessary methodical turn” that stands in opposition to “idealist philosophy” (HCM, 1963g, 23); as overcoming the “idealist world-aspect (Weltaspekt) in general that became blind to the true (substantial) Being” (HCM, 1965b, 195) that brings about desubstantialization of the I and of Being in general (HCM, 1965b, 195–196) and finally as responding to the what she critically refers to as the “blinding darkness” generated by idealism’s distinction between the ideal and the real that blocked any access to the question of reality (HCM, 1923, 160). However, while HCM’s discussion of idealism addresses it as a “way of thinking (Geisteshaltung)” often without engaging in a detailed account of the specific ideas that took shape within idealism (HCM, 1963d, 32), her references to Husserl seem to bear some ambivalence and reservations that are often accompanied by a positive evaluation. Thus, on the one hand she counts Husserl within the idealist tradition and regards his work as describing not only “its last and utmost blossom, but also the fulfillment of its most

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genuine and deep essential content.”3 Subsequently, she adds: “Here truly, in the most purest, most factual (sachlichste), and most accurate sense, to the extent that these are generally only possible, consciousness became the measure (Maß) of all Being” (HCM, 1963g, 21).4 On the other hand, unlike the sweeping determinations about idealism as a whole or representative figures such as Kant and Hegel, regarding Husserl, HCM emphasizes not just the disagreements between her philosophy and his, but also their shared aspects. For example, she declares her affinity to Husserl’s early idea of phenomenology that was anchored in the method of “essence intuition (Wesenserfassung)” and not in epistemology (HCM, 1916b, 355 n. 1).5 Following Husserl’s general thesis of the rationality of the world,6 HCM argues that the presence of essences in real beings is primary and perceivable HCM, 1931aN, 2–3) as well as foundational to the intelligibility of Being in general (HCM, 1963e, 230). Also, she explains that “The same logos, in the thinkable and most universal sense, with which the world due to essence and Being is pervaded, lies concealed with the same universality also in human reason” (HCM, 1965a, 400–401).7 In this regard, she establishes that “the objective-intelligible logos is a primordial idea (Uridee) according to which the world was created,” and that “endless diversity is inherent in it” to the extent that “every single thing and part of the world in accordance with its specific nature reflects this essence” (HCM, 1965e, 307). Moreover, she explicitly admits that within the study of the essence of consciousness it is completely legitimate to leave outside the real or any other meaning of the existing world (HCM, 3 The

question of whether Husserl was an idealist or realist is widely and continuously being discussed in the scholarly literature. See, for example, Ingarden (1975), Drummond (1988), Moran (2005), Hopkins (2010), Zahavi (2017). However, for the present article on HCM’s stance towards idealism, it is unnecessary to take a position on this matter. Rather, it accepts methodically HCM’s view of Husserl as an idealist. 4 See also HCM’s reference to Husserl in: HCM (1916aN, 2). HCM’s criticism of Husserl’s idealism refers to his transcendental phenomenology as presented in Ideas I. In the view of the members of the Munich Circle as a whole, Ideas I essentially withdraws the establishing principles of the Logical Investigations, to the point of a “turn” that brings about an insurmountable abyss within Husserl’s phenomenology. HCM suggests Husserl’s shift to idealism is already present in the second volume of the first edition of the Logical Investigations (HCM, 1965a, 395). Avé-Lallemant also discusses the difference between the two volumes of Logical Investigations (Avé-Lallemant, 1971, 14ff.). See also Herbert Spiegelberg, who observed that the two volumes constitute two periods in Husserl’s phenomenology—the pre-phenomenological and the phenomenological (Spiegelberg, 1960, 74). 5 HCM was committed to the method of essence intuition that localizes and analyzes the “what” that establishes the real being by searching for the indispensable a priori and primordial foundations, thanks to which the real being can become a specific object. (For Husserl’s relation to this method, see: Husserl (1970, 165–179/1984, 5–29; 1952a, §§ 1–17/2012, §§ 1–17). HCM regards this method as a “genuine philosophical mission” (HCM, 1916b, 348). See also: HCM (1916b, 346–348; 1923, 159; 1965c, 377; 1965d, 347). For further reading on the issue, especially in reference to the realist school of phenomenology, see Hart (2020, 18–19), Reinach (1951, 71–73; 1913, 1–163), Pfänder (1913, 325–404), Pfeiffer (2005, 1–13), Schmücker (1956, 1–33), Ebel (1965, 1–25). 6 See, for example, Husserl (2012, §§ 136–137; §139; §142/1952a, §§ 136–137; §139; §142). 7 The understanding that the same logos that pervades the world also characterizes the human spirit is also central to HCM’s philosophy of the I. See HCM (1965d, 335–350; 1965e). For further reading, see also Miron (2017, Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 7; 2019, Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 8).

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1965a, 401–402), namely: just as Husserl did. Therefore, she justifies and even practices herself the epoché, while explaining that despite being beyond all doubt, the reality of the world cannot be known evidently (HCM, 1965a, 400–401).8 Nonetheless, the position that is granted to consciousness in Husserl’s thinking over the world violates HCM’s most primordial insight regarding the essential precedence of reality over any other aspect that might concern philosophy. Also, for her, the phenomenological commitment to the given should be directed to reality as an absolute, autonomous, and independent being (HCM, 1916b, 391–392), while Husserl’s “principle of all principles” clearly adheres to the appearance before one’s consciousness.9 Consequently, she distinguishes between two types of phenomenologies: the “transcendental phenomenology” that she attributes to Husserl and idealism in general and the “ontological phenomenology” with which she herself identifies, declaring: “We deliberately and firmly accept the position of the ontologist” (HCM, 1963e, 231). In any event, her unequivocal assertion that the two phenomenologies should separate themselves from each other (HCM, 1965a, 399) does not indicate the removal of her primordial ambivalence toward Husserl and even toward transcendentalism as a whole. Rather, she devotes her thinking to the rehabilitation of philosophical issues that in her view were misconceived in idealism, Husserl’s phenomenology included. In what follows, we will unveil what might be called, following Kant, HCM’s view of the architectonic of idealism, that is, the unifying goal that consolidates idealism into a philosophical system.10 In particular, her view of idealism as evolving from an initial empirical starting point will be scrutinized. This view distinguishes between appearances and true Being, and finally evolves into a position where pure consciousness is provided with a be-all and end-all status. Subsequently, the main consequence of idealism, as conceived by HCM, namely, the damage it does to the possibility of metaphysics, will be discussed. Finally, I will discuss the alternative to idealism outlined in her thinking, which seeks to overcome the deficiencies resulting from the centrality of pure consciousness. Specifically, she rejects the metaphysical 8 HCM

distinguished between the époche and the phenomenological reduction. While the former indicates the justified suspension of any existential judgment, the latter includes judgment regarding real beings (HCM, 1965a, 397f). Similar to HCM and independently of her, Theodor Celms distinguished between the two concepts (Celms, 1928, 347–379). In his view, Husserl’s ambiguity regarding the époche and the phenomenological reduction led him to “metaphysical spiritualism” (Celms, 1928, 427–435). Helmut Kuhn presents a more radical stance that demands “giving away” not only the reduction but also the thinking of the époche, which he regards as “an artificial methodical concept” that is incapable of moving beyond the phenomena into the essential forms that appear in them. See Kuhn (1971, 6). 9 Husserl (2012, §24/1952a, §24). 10 Kant described the architectonic of reason as follows: “By an architectonic I understand the art of systems. Since systematic unity is that which first makes ordinary cognition into science, i.e., makes a system out of a mere aggregate of it, architectonic is the doctrine of that which is scientific in our cognition in general […]. I understand by a system, however, the unity of the manifold cognitions under one idea. This is the rational concept of the form of a whole, insofar as through this the domain of the manifold as well as the position of the parts with respect to each other is determined a priori” (Kant 1998, 619 [A832/B860]).

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absolutizing of the ideal in favor of rehabilitating the facticity (Faktizität) of real reality (wirkliche Wirklichkeit) within metaphysics. Instead of metaphysical idealism, HCM argues for a phenomenological realism.

12.2 Idealism’s Architectonic and Its Damage to the Metaphysical Absolutizing of the Ideal In her essay “Die aktuelle Krisis des idealistischen Denkens,” HCM asks: “How can we characterize the innermost ingredient of idealism?”, “where is the basis (Ausgangsebene) from which idealism has always, in all its forms, been generated?”, what is the thing that brings about from itself “the internal dialectic of idealism in an unstoppable way?” (HCM, 1963d, 34). Rather than a historical account of the establishing roots of idealism or suggesting an analysis of its foundational arguments, HCM addresses idealism primarily as a worldview (Weltanschauung) that has exerted a foundational influence over modern thinking as a whole. The starting point of her critique of idealism concerns its evolution from an empirical stance in which only sense-data are acknowledged as the immediately given and true Being, as “an acosmic, ateleological, and aformal fundamental view” (HCM, 1931bN, 1), and as “mere sensory phenomenality, mere appearance (Scheinhaftigkeit) of the world of experience” (HCM, 1963d, 34). HCM argues that this stance “necessarily ‘misplaces’ (verlegt) all the ‘rest’ (forms [Formen], purposes, values) in the perceiving subject and thus subjectivism emerges out of itself” from which any sensory moment seems to be eliminated in favor of an “indissoluble totality” (HCM, 1931bN, 1). This “totality” concerns exactly the essential necessity of judgments that can no longer be anchored in reality itself. Rather, these judgments are established as “necessary thinking contents” that thereby ground “a new realm of the ideal” that becomes “the realm of ideality” (HCM, 1931bN, 2). In other words, aspects and contents of thinking are associated with the human subject, while their connection to the world external to the subject is disregarded. In fact, from the standpoint of idealism even the human being is reduced to nothing more than an idea, thereby removing it from the world and robbing it of its factual reality. Consequently, a comprehensive split between perceptibility and conceivability seems to take place to the point of bifurcation and hence a “dualism of the given world, a split into ‘Being’ (Sein) and ‘appearance’ (Schein) […] in the sense that the sensory given (sinnlich Gegebene) is the genuine ‘Being’; everything else (forms, purposes, values) are mere subjective appearance” (HCM, 1931bN, 1). Up to this point, HCM’s characterization of the evolution of idealism seems to imply that initially her criticism is not addressed to an extreme version of idealism in which the concrete world can and should be deduced from thinking only.11 However, it soon transpires that the initial duality does not persist. In this regard, she describes a subsequent “insight into the indissoluble totality of the eliminated sensory moment” 11 For

a general survey of the different sorts of idealism, see: Kupperman (1957), Brown (1973).

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that brings about the shift from subjectivism to idealism, which she calls “a modified […] aprioristic form of subjectivism” (HCM, 1931bN, 1–2). This idiosyncratic phrasing concerns the decisive stage that establishes the worldview of idealism as a purified philosophical stance. More specifically, HCM points here to the main consequence of the removal of any aspect of sense perception and thereby of worldliness and externality whatsoever, from the realm of the human subject, namely: the transposition to the realm of a priori thinking. At this point, idealism is declared to be a “new form of phenomenalism” in which the “the empirical sphere is regarded as an accidental facticity (Faktizität) of mere ‘appearance’” (HCM, 1931bN, 2) to the extent that “the real (das wirkliche) now thoroughly becomes an ideal (Ideelles) (concept!)” (HCM, 1963h, 36). Subsequent to this conceptualization of the real, the ideal itself goes through a process of “metaphysical absolutization.” Consequently, the ideal emerges as the only necessary absolute based on the a priori necessity of thinking contents that, in HCM’s judgment, “can be termed a loss of the world (Entwirklichung der Welt)” (HCM, 1931bN, 1–2). Eventually, also the elimination of the “sensory moment” from pure consciousness—that detaches it not only from any aspect of sense experience but also from the real world itself, the human subject is included—clarifies that its “purity” is but its being wiped of any aspect of reality. The philosophical dynamic sketched above, as a result of which idealism is depicted by HCM as trapped in subjectivism to the point of “losing the world,” seems to deprive real or worldly things of their essential intelligibility. This is apparent from her indication of a “necessity of another reasoning (extra-cosmic, extra-subjective, extra-empirical) and securing thereof” (HCM, 1931bN, 1) that is raised by idealism. The accentuation of the “extra” seems to be responding exactly to the “indissoluble totality” (HCM, 1931bN, 1) that concerns the problematic of a lack of worldliness that typifies idealism as a closed worldview. Consequently, a new element comes into play and unavoidably dissipates the described initial duality, i.e., pure consciousness. This mental construct, which appears purports to extricate idealism from the selfimposed boundaries resulting from its binary starting point, is depicted by HCM as “a new (over-empirical, over-real, over-sensory) realm, the realm of the Ideal, or the realm of Ideality” (HCM, 1931bN, 2). Also, “for pure consciousness all – the physical and the psychic, the interior and the external – are immediately given and attainable, as it is in-itself, just as it is given in-itself” (HCM, 1963g, 20), hence “here precisely consciousness is taken for Being!” (HCM, 1963g, 21). She explains that, under the influence of Descartes, the indubitable pure consciousness serves as the secure foundation not only for all claims of what we can know, but for all claims about what is. HCM agrees that an absolute grounding in an indubitable epistemological realm is attainable within the realm of pure consciousness, regarding which she determines: “here and only here exists an absolute Being” (HCM, 1963g, 21). She also admits that this move “certainly leads to a great abundance of factual valuable insights,” hence the “Platonic-idealist way of thinking (Geisteshaltung)” is not entirely unjustified. Nevertheless, HCM is confident that “it does not lead and cannot lead to the fundamental problem of Being and facticity” (HCM, 1963g, 22) that in her view is indispensable in any metaphysical account. Thus, these unequivocally

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articulated arguments mark an unmistakable boundary between her view of idealism and her understanding of what metaphysics is all about. The suggested interpretation of HCM’s view of the evolution of idealism from a empiricism, is further supported in her indication of the vanishing of the idealist dualism (HCM, 1963d, 36) by filling the “abyss (Abgrund)” between the “mere appearing” and the “in-itself” with knowing reason (HCM, 1963g, 18). I argue that both the insertion of pure consciousness into idealist thinking and the difficulty in maintaining the bifurcated point of departure are connected in HCM’s view of idealism. That is to say that pure consciousness is posited to overcome this duality. Moreover, the objective of this positing is uncovered also in her characterization of the aim of idealism as viewing the realm of pure consciousness for epistemologically oriented studies (HCM, 1963g, 19). Obviously, this epistemological task cannot be fulfilled in a torn domain. Rather, precisely a vision of cognition that is purified from any doubt can be realized under the jurisdiction of a purified consciousness. Ultimately, the sphere of thinking that is governed by the absolutized single element of pure consciousness, within which no room exists anymore for the factual world that is imbued with diversity and plurality, is all that remains. HCM then refers to the subsequent expulsion of the world in-itself from idealist thinking as “absolutizing the ‘meta’” (i.e., the “meta” in metaphysics), whereby everything that is beyond experience is marked as an ideal possibility inaccessible to consciousness (HCM, 1963a, 53). Alternatively, since absoluteness cannot be achieved out of what is beyond experience—namely: from the “thing-in-itself”—it has been altogether expelled from the homogeneous and indubitable sphere of pure consciousness. Concomitantly with the establishment of pure consciousness in idealism, its idea of world, which has been consolidated as “pure facticity” and “pure being-here (Da-sein),” soon becomes “a philosophical stumbling block” that rational, idealist, autonomic, and pure thinking has always tried to dissolve into the plane of reason (HCM, 1963h, 39). Alternatively, such a world boosts the attempts “to interpret-away (fortzuinterpretieren) reality idealistically” (HCM, 1963h, 41). In her view, once the sensory qualities fall completely on the subjective side, it follows that “the empirical qualification is no longer substantially genuinely rooted in the thing” itself and we arrive at “the complete desubstantializing (Entsubstanzialisierung) of Being” (HCM, 1963g, 35). The above discussed “loss of the world” transpires, then, as but the final result of eradicating facticity as such from the domain of the worldview of idealism. Moreover, this eradication is tantamount to what HCM denotes as “the metaphysical absolutizing of the ideal” (HCM, 1931bN, 2), which can also be considered as the ultimate expression of freedom from any doubt. This seems to be enabled precisely due to the reconfiguration of reality as ideal, referred to as “true reality (wahre Wirklichkeit),” which “is at the same time a rational reality, since precisely in its thinkable necessity it is understandable (einsehbare) and deducible (ableitbare) […] from the highest principles, that are through and through reasonable (vernunftgemässe)” (HCM, 1931bN, 3). For HCM, it is obvious that reality, which “from the start and on its own grounds has been shaped in a non-substantial and non-real

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way […] can never be recovered from the ideal […] since ideality can never release reality from itself,” rather it only “remains (a basically illusory) pseudo-shape (pseudogestalt)” (HCM, 1963d, 36). Finally, her analysis of the evolution of idealism arrives at the unavoidable ruling out of idealism as metaphysics. Against this background, I argue that within the discussed process of elimination of “sensory moments” that eventually dissipated the related duality that HCM observes in idealism, another process emerges that is even more radical and far-reaching in its overall consequences, namely, a transposition from the epistemological plane to the ontological one. To a certain extent, what is implied here is that even what is presented in idealism as a methodical stance, which as such has particularly epistemological bearings, is eventually consolidated as an ontological or metaphysical positioning in the sense that it determines the only beings whose existence reason is permitted to confirm. In this spirit, HCM accepts the interpretation according to which “Kant did not present epistemology but a theory of Being” that blocks the “departure (Aufbruch) and breakthrough (Durchbruch) to a true comprehensive doctrine of Being” (HCM, 1963c, 366). In this way, also pure consciousness appears to be transformed from a mental construct to a legitimizing force that decides what is reality itself. Obviously, this is already implied in her statements regarding the loss of the world in idealism. However, at this point, this insight is lifted to an explicit ontological argument and thus the initial moderated version of idealism, which can also be regarded as epistemological, gives way to metaphysical idealism in which idea and Being are equated to the extent that reality is constituted as an idea. In HCM’s words, in idealism thinking becomes the only “determination of Being (Seinsbestimmtheit)” (HCM, 1963d, 36), or alternatively: “within the endeavor for a universal being-directed stance of cognition, idealism attempts to reclaim (Zurückerobern) the cosmic and metaphysical reality” (HCM, 1963d, 34). Eventually, the idealist world of things lacks what HCM calls “that typical factor of reality (Wirklichkeitsfactor)” (HCM, 1963g, 24). HCM’s analysis of the above discussed complex processes in idealism, in particular her focus on the transformation of the epistemological into the ontological or metaphysical, resonates also in her discussion of the foundation of Husserl’s notions of the phenomenological reduction and the transcendental ego. In the first place, she establishes that Husserl’s choice of “bracketing” reality was conducted to provide a firm and absolute ground for his philosophy, by locating reality outside and beyond consciousness and regarding it as that which essentially cannot be indubitably reached (HCM, 1963g, 20–21). However, she is suspicious about Husserl’s sacrifice of the so-called naive “belief in the world” in favor of a pure study of the world, arguing that “what’s odd is, then, that here absolute and indubitable judgments about factual being, about the present at-hand (Vorhandenheiten), can be made pleasing” (HCM, 1963g, 20).12 Moreover, the idealist leap from the epistemological to 12 Marvin

Farber, too, regarded the reality of the external world as a basic fact (Farber, 1967, 65). Yet, while HCM turns the acknowledgment of the facticity of the external world into the firm ground upon which her metaphysical thinking stands, for Farber, “The philosophical problem of

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the ontological plane is apparent also from HCM’s observation that Husserl did not only practice the legitimate methodological stage of the epoché, but rather made, conspicuously in the phenomenological reduction, a metaphysical decision whereby “the world with all its parts included is hypothetically posed as existing” but eventually “suspended (enthoben)” (HCM, 1965a, 398). In her view, the result of Husserl’s choice to supplement the epoché with phenomenological reduction is apparent in his employment of pure consciousness. As she puts it: “What is fundamental for the analytical study of pure consciousness, becomes an inducement (Anlaß) to radical factual reversal (Verkehrung) when this reduced field turns out to be an ontological and metaphysical absolute! This is indeed the overall intention of Edmund Husserl” (HCM, 1963h, 43–44 n. 3).13 The transposition into the ontological in Husserl’s phenomenology is further reinforced in connection to his concept of the transcendental ego, whose cognitive limits determine the boundaries of reality. Accordingly, the real world is transformed into a noematic phenomenon whose being is dependent on consciousness and the phenomenological investigation as a whole is restricted to the intentional framework.14 In this regard, HCM establishes that the expression “transcendental” denotes the “descending (untersteigen)” of the physical and psychical world as well as the empirical and ideal into the subjective (HCM, 1965a, 400). This determination concerns the loss of the world taking place in Husserl’s phenomenology after conducting the phenomenological reduction, regarding which HCM (rhetorically) asks if the “noematic world that is also really real (wirklich wirklich), remains entirely undecided?” (HCM, 1965a, 396), or alternatively “where does the world remain?” (HCM, 1965c, 371).15 The fundamental similarity between HCM’s view of the idealist notion of pure consciousness and her understanding of Husserl’s conception of transcendentalism is thus apparent, i.e., both are cleared of any aspect of real reality. Consequently, Husserl’s phenomenology, regarded by her

the existence of the external world resulted from an unsettling of a natural world belief, and has been complicated by underlying premises and theories” (Farber, 1967, 63). 13 Kuhn disagrees with HCM on this point. He argues that Husserl does not present an idealist position but a methodical requirement that paved the way to transcendental phenomenology. Yet he argues that there is no justification for encapsulating all of reality within the realm of phenomena (Kuhn, 1971, 4–5). 14 See in particular: Husserl (1952a, §§35–47/2012, §§35–47). For further reading, see the interpretation that regarded Husserl’s transcendental turn as a result of his reassessment of the issue of intentionality: Becker, 1930, 119–150. 15 Husserl, for his part, was very critical of HCM’s metaphysical approach, see: Husserl (1994, 20). In his view, the phenomenologists from Munich “remain stuck in half-measures (Halbheiten),” namely, they were dogmatic for refusing to accept the phenomenological reduction (Husserl, 1959, 285). Therefore, he could not consider them as genuine phenomenologists nor even as philosophers. See Avé-Lallemant (1975a, 28). Other phenomenological works were also evaluated by him as “pseudophenomenologies” and “essentially different” from his own, including those of his chosen coeditors of the Jahrbuch für Philosophie and Phenomenologische Forschung. Concerning Geiger and Pfänder, see: Schuhmann (1990, 23–24); as for Scheler being considered a “fake phenomenologist” (Talmiphenomenologen), see: Spiegelberg (1959, 59).

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as merely the offspring of previous forms of idealism, is helplessly trapped within the realm of consciousness. To be sure, of the various deficiencies that HCM detects in idealism, the most bothersome is the destruction of the possibility of metaphysics. She argues that metaphysics includes the absolute in-itself, which we are somehow able to cognize, not as a regulative idea, but as an “inherent, freestanding, quantity (seinshaften – stehenden – Größe)” (HCM, 1963a, 52). Idealism, whose ultimate product is an absolutized pure consciousness, eliminates any existing-in-itself dimension of reality and thereby thwarts the possibility of achieving metaphysics. In opposition to this, metaphysics can be established only within a realm that assumes the existence of Being, where Being has the “typical factor of reality (Wirklichkeitsfactor)” (HCM, 1963g, 24) as an inherent part, namely, an aspect of substantiality. HCM explains that idealism unavoidably and insolvably arrives at proton pseudos.16 As a result, concrete reality is pushed outside, thereby the idealist realm of reality loses its substantial ground to the extent that reality cannot be found in it anymore (HCM, 1963d, 36). That is to say, the intelligible unity that is achieved by idealism, which is but a rationalization of reality (HCM, 1963d, 36–37), lacks any real foundation. In other words, the positioning of reality that takes place in idealism is subordinated to epistemological requirements and therefore cannot meet the ultimate requirement for something to be real, i.e., standing on its own foundations and not on anything else, rational or other. Finally, HCM accuses idealism of ignoring in its account of reality the aspect of irrationality into which facticity is absorbed and therefore referred to as the brutum. Moreover, this aspect exists within itself and out of itself in an incommensurable individuality that is but a manifestation of the most essential characteristics of reality as independent, autonomous, absolute (HCM, 1916b, 392), closed in-itself, and transcendent to human consciousness and spirit (HCM, 1916b, 424). As opposed to that, the ideal and purely defining force of idealism is completely helpless and innocent about the related incommensurable aspect of reality (HCM, 1963d, 37). In this regard, she asks “how should a bridge be found between an internal de-substantialized and de-organized (in an exhausted pure space-scheme) matter and pure thinking, which for its part can be extracted from any substantial context of reality (Wirklichketszusammenhang)!?” (HCM, 1963d, 36). Evidently, such a “bridge” cannot be erected by idealist thinking that is portrayed by HCM as assuming exactly the opposite, namely that “only higher reality,” i.e., such that is consolidated by means of pure consciousness, is “capable of being substantiated and established commensurably” only (HCM, 1963d, 37). HCM concludes, then, that as far as reality is concerned, the “Idealist worldview […] in its consequences is practically only so ‘ominous’ (unheilvoller), since here again what is at stake is the whole (das Ganze)” (HCM, 1963d, 36), in which both the rational and the incommensurable irrational should be included. 16 The

term proton pseudos is what Aristotle uses to refer to a set of false starting premises or an original error that necessarily leads to false conclusions despite the formal soundness of the intermediary steps in reasoning.

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12.3 Conrad-Martius’ Alternative to Idealism: Securing the Possibility for Metaphysics The most decisive point of departure of HCM’s philosophical project concerns what she calls the “thesis of existence (Daseinthesis),” according to which reality does not concern degrees of objectivity, but rather “something totally different” (HCM, 1923, 180) that stands in an absolute and unbridgeable primordial-opposition (Urgegensatz) to Nothingness (Nichtsein) or non-existence (Nichtexistenz) (HCM, 1923, 160).17 This thesis is her response to what she identifies as the “Platonic-idealist metaphysics” (HCM, 1963g, 22) that took root in modern philosophy concerning the opposition between the ideal and the real, which in her view blocked any access to the philosophical understanding of reality. The immediate consequence of the “thesis of existence” concerns the requirement to reintegrate the world of facts into the philosophical discourse about reality after its removal by idealism. HCM derives from Husserl’s constitutive determination that “nulla ‘re’ indigent ad existendum,” that immanent being is absolute, since it never brings any “thing” into being, that he left out facts, and that the entire empirical field is left out.18 Therefore, HCM extracts from the same insight an inverse argument that emphasizes the impossibility of establishing any real aspect of consciousness, or alternatively, determining the inevitability of the “collapse” of the real within a discourse that is based on an absolute consciousness (HCM, 1916aN, 2). Moreover, bringing facts back to the fore of the philosophical study of reality seems as an immediate response to what she observes as the loss of fullness, depth, and content taking place within the approach of the formalistic idealist thinking about reality (HCM, 1923, 192). Thus, while idealism appears in HCM’s discussion as immersed in mere abstract and ideal objectivity regarding objects and reality, her realist stance emphasizes the “material objectivity” that might be reached by what she describes as

17 For a detailed discussion of HCM’s view of reality as “elevating” from nonexistence or merely ideal and formal existence (HCM, 1923, 173), see Miron (2014). 18 HCM here cites Husserl (1952a, §49 104/2012, §49 94). Husserl expressed his negative attitude toward facts in Husserl (1952a, §3/2012, §3). See also Mohanty, 3–9. HCM later clarified that Husserl never rejected or doubted the reality of the world but regarded it as a hypothetical being (HCM, 1965a, 398). She clarifies in this regard that unlike Husserl, she does not see any problem with empirical experience (HCM, 1965d, 351) and even regards the then-new natural sciences as elucidating the real foundations of such experience (HCM, 1965a, 401). However, it is far from being unequivocal that Husserl sweepingly dismissed empirical sciences or observed a contradiction between phenomenology and the concrete scientific practice. Rather, merely the reductionism and objectivism that characterize certain scientific worldviews were dismissed. Husserl writes: “When it is really natural science that speaks, we listen willingly and as disciples. But, the language of the natural scientists is not always that of natural science itself and is assuredly not so when they speak of ‘natural philosophy’ and the ‘theory of knowledge of natural science’” (Husserl, 1952a, §20 44–45/2012, §20 38–39). For further reading on the issue, see: Harvey (1989), Rinofner-Kreidl (2014), Choi (2007), Feist (2004) (mentioned in Urban, 2016, 468).

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“the positive outward departure” from pure nothingness of the real thing that posits itself in reality (HCM, 1923, 182). Indeed, HCM hesitates from the outset about the choice to eliminate from the philosophical discourse the world of facts, which she calls the “immovable rock (unentwurzelbar erhebende Fels) of factual existence in the face of which we find ourselves” (HCM, 1963h, 39). She chooses to state what is for her the obvious, by means of phrasing a series of rhetorical questions while omitting the question marks, such as “how is this strange separation […] upon which the phenomenological reduction relies at all possible! How is it possible that I can bracket and set aside the positioning of facticity of the entire world and nevertheless have the entire world left over; the very same world, only that it is on the uplifted plane of pure consciousness!” (HCM, 1963g, 24). As opposed to this, she determines: “it is no longer acceptable that we, in ascending to the essence and confining ourselves to the descriptive analysis of pure essential relationships, set aside the question of facticity or the question of Being (Seinsfrage) or leave it behind us” (HCM, 1963g, 22). Moreover, for her facticity is a philosophical “primordial situation” that stimulates two effects. On the one hand, it confronts the observer with “the primordial doubtfulness” or the “non-justifiability” of the immediate thing. On the other hand, precisely this state of affairs propels us toward continuous metaphysical questioning (HCM, 1963h, 39). HCM was convinced that the being of factual existents can never be grasped in its full peculiarity if it is transcendentally evaluated by means of pure consciousness. She argues that pure consciousness is “always only carried out (vollzogen)” as an “intentional (akthaft) mode of existence” but never truly “is.” Therefore, reality must be anchored in facts, thinghood (Dinglichkeit) or substance (HCM, 1963g, 25); in forces that are independent of consciousness and its merely intentional mode of being. This means that her philosophical journey begins precisely at the point from which idealism recoils. She criticizes what might be called Heidegger’s “draining away of life (Ent-lebung),” which seems to her as the cessation of the required philosophical efforts for illuminating the Being that is inherent in finitude and facticity. In this regard, she asks why not “dig deeper” into the innermost finiteness of Being? How can one position oneself out of full awareness and resoluteness into the nothingness of Being? She wonders whether here there is not a spoiling of the metaphysical and divine procedures. Finally, unlike Heidegger’s “deepening absolutizing of finitude, temporality, and historicity of the I,” she argues that only with genuine penetration into the essence of facticity that is “not I-adhering (nichtichhafter)” can the desired “true entry” to Being be inaugurated (HCM, 1963g, 30–31). Against the background of above explanation of HCM’s philosophical stance toward facticity, which was consolidated vis-à-vis her criticism of idealism mainly in her writings from the 1930s, stands her earlier observation that “the factual presence (tatsächliche Vorhandensein) of entirely peculiar and in-itself factually unanimous phenomenon of the ‘real external-worldliness’ became undeniable” (HCM, 1916b,

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396).19 The importance of the early reference to the issue of facticity concerns its anchoring in a detailed discussion of “the sensory given,” which is grasped as a kind of “sense givenness” (HCM, 1916b, 399). In other words, the focus is given to the thing sensed as an object and not to the subjective experience of it.20 HCM attaches the ability to achieve “real contact” with the external world (HCM, 1916b, 423) to what she calls “the unique and original (ureigenen) nature of the sensory given” (HCM, 1916b, 398).21 She explains that the capability of the “sensory given” to make obvious its real being in its “here and now” and be outwardly felt from itself enables it to approach the I as a content of givenness (HCM, 1916b, 412– 413). Moreover, the sensory given declares itself by itself as factually existing and appears in person before the I as self-presenting (HCM, 1916b, 422).22 Even more so, HCM establishes that the sensory given is the only means that ensures for me the external world in its time-space facticity, since its essence is to “present” the external-world’s Being. Thus, assuming the essential belonging of an essence to some specific phenomenal situations (HCM, 1916b, 349), she argues that we must have confidence in the “existence” of something in order to argue for its givenness. She trusts that this requirement is not in vain, since the sensory given is already structured as a content of givenness or alternatively has a real connection to the real world (HCM, 1916b, 423).23 Finally, HCM’s understanding that the sensory given is the ultimate mediating link to external reality and Being itself will become crucial to mature thinking, which unlike idealism, regards the sensory given as an inseparable part of Being (HCM, 1963d, 35). The return of facticity and sensation—clearly conducted vis-à-vis idealism—is finally complemented and generalized as the philosophical homecoming of the idea of the world. HCM established unequivocally: “we cannot go behind this Ego […] that is such that constitutes anything and everything” (HCM, 1965a, 400). Also, she 19 “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt” is an exploration of the first chapter of her earlier prize essay “Die erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus” (HCM, 1920, 10–14), which served as her doctoral dissertation in 1913. 20 Krings illuminated that the focus on the real existing object is not tantamount to the inversion of the Kant’s idea of the I as directed to its objects. Rather, the presumption here is that there is a real relation between the existent and the essence referring to it. Yet this assumption does not contain an argument about the possibility of knowing this existent, see: Krings (1960, 193ff.). 21 Based on a similar realist point of departure, Spiegelberg justifies relying on the sensory for achieving contact with the immediate phenomena of reality. See: Spiegelberg (1975, 153). 22 Spiegelberg explains that phenomenon and reality do not exclude each other. What is real exists within itself and can be presented to us in its very existence out of itself. This means that real things in the world can remain exactly as they are, including in case of being presented and having relation to us. He terms the phenomena in which subjects are involved “subjectival” in the sense that they are objective parts of subjects and of their world (Spiegelberg, 1975, 134–135). However, despite being evident (Spiegelberg, 1975, 149), the subjectival phenomena encompass only small part of one’s total reality and of Being in general (Spiegelberg, 1975, 135). 23 Like HCM, Spiegelberg also emphasizes the “argument of reality” that is inherent in real being. A “phenomenon of reality” refers to the convergence of the capacity for the phenomenal object to present itself and its claim on being real. Hence, real phenomena are distinguished from “bare phenomena” that have no such claim to reality (Spiegelberg, 1975, 133).

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affirms that within the framework of ontological phenomenology the world itself exists primarily and by its very being is independent of consciousness and of the I (HCM, 1965c, 374).24 In this regard, she distinguishes between two concepts of reality: “reality (Wirklichkeit) as a noematic existence” and “the noematic moments of reality that are transcendent to consciousness” that she call “the real reality (wirkliche Wirklichkeit)” (HCM, 1965a, 397). This terminological duplication refers exclusively to the non-mental reality whose appearance and concretization outwards is possible.25 HCM emphasizes the independence and separateness of the two “realities” from each other. In her words: the real reality […] can never belong to the noematic-phenomenal totality (Gesamtbestand) of the world, because it concerns the factual “standing-on-its-own” (“Auf -sich-selberStehen”) or ontological “being grounded in-itself” (seinsmäßige “in-sich-selber Gegründetsein”) of the world and all its parts (Bestände). Herein lies the real reality of the world, whether it is factually given or not. (HCM, 1965a, 397)

Both ideas of reality are remote from the extreme version of idealism. However, while the former might be exhausted in the epistemological framework and thus at least partly have some affinities with the moderate shape of idealism, the latter inheres some stamp of HCM’s ontological-metaphysical stance, and hence can serve as a starting point in a realist philosophy of Being. In any event, the common title of “reality” might suggest that their separation from each other is not obvious. However, unlike the real world that exists in-itself and for-itself, to which HCM refers as the “‘habit’ of being independent (‘Habitus’ der Seinsselbstständigkeit)”26 that refers to reality as such (HCM, 1916b, 356), facticity is not there by-itself. At the very outset, she establishes that “‘factual’ (Sachliche) or as we also often say, ‘objective’ groundedness (Habitus) in genuine phenomenon does not mean […] real groundedness” (HCM, 1916b, 351). More specifically, factual existence indicates what she calls “sensory self-presenting (ein sich selbst Präsentierendes).” It is impossible for such existence to be confined to sense perception, which does not 24 Spiegelberg regards the related independence as a “fundamental and essential result of reality” (excluding real acts of the subject that depend on the subject itself) (Spiegelberg, 1975, 132 n. 2). 25 Kuhn explains that this expression of HCM, which seems like a tautology, indicates the real that was not reduced to a phenomenon in which the I represents, but rather the real as standing on its own reality (Kuhn, 1971, 2). However, he is suspicious of a potential “duplication of the embarrassment” in attempting to solve the philosophical problem of reality (Kuhn, 1971, 5). The expression “wirkliche Wirklichkeit” occurred previously in a lecture by Theodor Lipps from 1899 (Schuhmann & Smith, 1985, 792) and the subsequent is in a manuscript of Johannes Daubert from 1904 (Schuhmann & Smith, 1985, 792 n. 39). It is mentioned also by Husserl (1952b, §18 55/2002, §18 16) in the sense of the objective material thing that transcends the initial subjectivity and indicates the intersubjective sphere (thus its translation as “actual reality”). Avé-Lallemant clarified that while for Husserl this reality can exist solely as an intentional unity of sensory appearances, for HCM, “real reality” refers to the independent and in-itself existence of real being that preconditions any possible fulfillment of spatial-temporal existence (Avé-Lallemant, 1975a, 33 n. 41). 26 Spiegelberg regards the related independence as a “fundamental and essential result of reality” (excluding real acts of the subject that depend on the subject itself), see: Spiegelberg (1975, 132, n. 2).

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have the “job (Beruf )” of unearthing the “thing-in-itself” that underlie the perceptions, but rather of bringing “the ‘world in-itself’ into exposure” (HCM, 1916b, 463). Moreover, she explains that the concretely given “does not always hold what it, as appearing (Erscheinende) thus and so, seems to promise” (HCM, 1916b, 358). Sometimes the sensory given exposes merely what she calls the “semblance of reality (Aussehen einer Realität)” (HCM, 1916b, 441 n. 1) that does not entirely match “the actually present” (HCM, 1916b, 356, 380). Indeed, the sensed is supposed to exist “only through ‘participation’ in these eternal forms, values, and norms” (HCM, 1963d, 35) and in a priori essential relations (HCM, 1963d, 33) that as such are imperceptible. Similar to Husserl’s “principle of all principles,” according to which “every primordial dator intuition is a source of authority (Rechtsquelle) for knowledge, that whatever presents itself in ‘intuition’ in primordial form (as it were in its bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself ” (Husserl, 1952a, §24 51/Husserl, 2012, §24 43), HCM argues that the essence is initially given in the phenomenal appearance in a “covered and distant” manner. Husserl explains this inadequacy of appearance in terms of both the inadequacy of the object of experience (Husserl, 1952a, §3 13–15, §44 91–94, §138 319/Husserl 2012, §3 12, §44 82–84, § 138 289) and subject of experience (Husserl, 1952a, §15/Husserl 2012 §15).27 For HCM, the same inadequacy results exclusively from the nature of the object itself, whose essence cannot be entirely unearthed at once, rather than from the limited capacities of the observing subject (HCM, 1916b, 351–352).28 However, despite the incompleteness of the appearance of the essence at the phenomenal layer, HCM insists on the indispensability of the study of the phenomenal layer of appearance. She argues that the essence (Wesensbeständen) that underlie the appearances (HCM, 1916b, 354) “bursts forth” already at the manifest “surface-appearance (Erscheinungsoberfläche).”29 Moreover, any claim for matter-of-factness and objectivity must find some expression in the concrete reality (HCM, 1916b, 351) in which finally the phenomenon “steps out in complete objectivity and totality” (HCM, 1916b, 353).30 Obviously, in the absence of a full revealing of reality by means of its phenomenal appearances, the factual existence can be called into question. Hence, it is evident 27 See

here also: Miron (2016a, 470–472; 2018c, 6–8).

28 At this point, HCM is clearly influenced by Reinach’s view concerning the “gradual approximation

to the object” (Reinach, 1969, 220). 29 In general, the manifest “surface-appearance” denotes the external side of the thing, behind which lies the interior realm that is imperceptible (HCM, 1916b, 353–354). HCM refers to this idea also within her discussion of materiality, where she establishes that the material being has internality and depth that lies in the dark, while its external surface is lightened and achieves appearance. However, she clarifies that there is a casual connection between the concealment in darkness and shining in the light to the extent that only because there is a depth there is also surface. See: HCM (1923, 205–209, 214, 235–136). 30 Kuhn described the same state of affairs in the following words: “the things towards which the gaze is directed are always known in advance, we do not start at a null point. They show themselves to us, but they are concealed. They are standing up against us as known but also as mysterious and impose on us the distinction between what things are in their beginning and the essence that is uncovered by penetrating observation” (Kuhn, 1969, 399).

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that the idealist stamp on Husserl’s thinking, which prescribed the suspension and anything that admits of doubt, could not help but “bracket” any factual element of reality as an essential precondition for the constitution of pure consciousness (HCM, 1963g, 24). In opposition to this, HCM not only does not flee from the doubtfulness of facticity but seems to further emphasize and reinforce it. In addition to her employment of “incommensurability” that is rather familiar in philosophical discourses, she searches for proper words that might properly label the mysterious element that she observes in factual reality. In this connection, she refers to “something (Etwas)” that is there in facticity that turns it into “the questionable in the strict sense (katexochen)!” and raises questions such as: How does it arrive at Being? Why does it have Being? What does it substantiate in Being? What does it obtain in Being? Why is it the way it is, as it exists? She establishes that this problematic, referred to also as a primordial questioning (Urfraglichkeit), lies in the unjustifiability (Unbegründbarkeit) of the primordial situation (Ursituation) (HCM, 1963h, 39–40).31 Likewise, she describes her philosophy as follows: “here we come across a pure, stubborn, unresolvable (unaufschließbares), readily acceptable ‘that (Daβ)’! And it is precisely in this pure, insoluble stubbornness of the ‘that’ that the ‘offensiveness’ (Anstößigkeit) of facticity lies” (HCM, 1963h, 42).32 In any event, in her view, the related incommensurability, ‘something’, and ‘such’ that are inherent in facticity rob facticity of the possibility of achieving an internal uniformity and overall rationalization. Obviously, this offensiveness of reality cannot be detected from an idealist perspective, let alone interpreted by it. However, rather than suggesting an illumination of it, HCM establishes the importance of acknowledging its presence in reality and consolidating this acknowledgment as a first datum in any philosophical approach to reality, that is to metaphysics. Consequently, she establishes that if the moment of rupture (Bruch) and ontological incommensurability is not inherent in the questioning and reasoning, then no metaphysics is possible at all (HCM, 1963h, 43). As a genuine phenomenologist, HCM gives herself over to what appears before her eyes rather than providing “solutions,” and thus she harnesses philosophical argumentation for reinforcing the complexity that has been revealed to her. In this spirit, she declares “we must remain with Kant primarily vis-à-vis the hard fact of antinomy itself, that verifies both the thesis just like the anti-thesis to be proved” (HCM, 1963a, 79). Also, she agrees with Kant that “the infinite dimension of the empirical has no direct metaphysical connection to the metaphysical absolutes” (HCM, 1963a, 78), and that indeed there is no transfer from the real world and its patterns to the absolute and that it is impossible to extricate out of an anti-thesis a thesis of existence. However, while in her view these insights into the Kantian and idealist thinking carry out a “shifting back to reason (in die ratio zurückverschob)” (HCM, 1963a, 79), she herself favors enduring in the dual realm, within which both appearance and Being are maintained. Therefore, the starting point of her metaphysics adheres to this 31 For

additional references to the ‘something’, see: HCM (1963f, 89; 1963i, 158). further reading about HCM’s search for a vocabulary that can appropriate her realist phenomenology, see: Miron (2015, Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 5). 32 For

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original duality and aims at rehabilitating it in the form that she regards as an overrationalizing influence that has been exerted by idealism. In this regard, she wonders what might be the genuine essence of a world that can no longer be accounted for by a priori forms of experience (HCM, 1963d, 35). She responds as follows: An irresolvable dualism of Being and appearing is constituted, whereby, depending on how much weight is given to the empirical (sensualistischem) or the ideal in the formation of the system, the character of mere appearance lies more on the side of the empirical (Sensuellen) or more on the side of the ideal. Therefore, conversely, “true Being” (wahre Sein) lies now on the side of immediate sense perception, now on the side of eternal ideas. (HCM, 1963d, 35)

The duality is, then, the tangible expression of her understanding of the real as essentially not revealing itself entirely in its sensory appearance, yet it still, as she puts it, “must possess ‘somehow’ its own position” (HCM, 1963d, 35). Indeed, the crucial infrastructure for the rehabilitation of the desired duality is implied already in the aforementioned contention that the sensory exists through its “‘participation’” in eternal forms, values, and norms (HCM, 1963d, 35) and in a priori essential relations (HCM, 1963d, 33). However, while idealist thinking chooses to fill the abyss that separates the two constituents of the duality with cognizing reason, HCM favors preserving and even reinforcing this abyss by maintaining the thesis and the antithesis “in their antonymic equilibrium,” in which they were supposed to be from the outset as “proving and negating in the same sense” (HCM, 1963a, 50). To be sure, what is at stake is not an epistemological balance, which can be altered to the point of the constitution of metaphysical idealism. On the contrary, especially as the elements involved here are existing in-themselves by their very nature, the essential abyss between them cannot be overcome. Consequently, the unearthing of the “fundamental duality in the possible configuration of real being” (HCM, 1957, 98), addresses the philosophical observation both outwards to the phenomenal shape of reality and inwards to its foundational essence. Finally, the ultimate reinforcing of the duality between appearance and Being that HCM argues for in response to the unifying force of pure consciousness in idealism is suggested when she writes: Any ‘groundlessness’ (Grundlosigkeit) of Being, which is bounded by the Nothing (das Nichts), must be located in the abyss or the non-ground (Ungrund) of the Nothing, the groundlessness of Being that is incommensurable with the Nothing, however, is a foundation in the abyss of its own Being! (HCM, 1963f, 92)33

Being itself is portrayed as “resting on the grounds of the abyss” (HCM, 1923, 222). Thus, the ontological nature of the abyss, which enables it to serve as ground for real beings, is confirmed (HCM, 1923, 175, 222). Therefore, the rehabilitation of the duality is also the confirmation of the existence of an ontological abyss, the result of which being that neither a complete externalization nor an ideal unification of reality can take place. 33 I

have discussed the term “abyss” in HCM’s thinking in two papers: Miron (2015, 342–343; 2018a, Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 11).

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One might wonder how facticity, which one tends to associate with ephemerality, became so important for a philosophy of Being that seeks to understand reality in its absoluteness. HCM’s reply is straight to the point: Facticity is related to the very possibility of metaphysics. In her words: “We find the genuine field of metaphysics only under the assumption of the factual reality of the world in which we are and to which we ourselves belong” (HCM, 1963h, 38). Facticity motivates the metaphysical question to the extent that “it makes our not-questioning (nichtfragen) almost impossible” (HCM, 1963h, 42). HCM explains that by its very nature, metaphysics refers to the real world within factual existence itself and for-itself. Once one deprives the world of this element, it becomes dependent being (seinunselbständigen) in an idealist sense, relative in its being (daseinsrelativen) to cognition, and thus we destroy the foundation for metaphysics. In contrast, in her view, what makes metaphysics possible is precisely the fact that the existence of the given world is problematic (HCM, 1963h, 40). Therefore, “the entire metaphysical problematic applies only in a world that exists in-itself and for-itself. Moreover, only in the view of that factual Being in its facticity can genuine metaphysical wonderment emanate” (HCM, 1963h, 39). This means that not only can no metaphysics be established without considering facticity, but also in the face of facticity we cannot help but establish metaphysics. As opposed to idealism, HCM establishes, then, the importance of a conscious avoidance of the elimination of facticity as the first datum of metaphysics. In this regard, she argues that “facticity is an extensive partaking (mitbestimmender) factor in the qualitative basic set-up (Grundaufbau) of the existing types of Being! Hence any new type of real Being precisely conditions a new kind of metaphysical reasoning” (HCM, 1963h, 44). Moreover, only coming to terms with the essential ontological constitution of the various types of facticity and confirming their factual existence might consolidate what HCM calls the “entry point (Eingangsstellen) and breakthrough point (Durchbruchsstellen) into the realm of metaphysics” (HCM, 1963h, 44). Nonetheless, metaphysics cannot find its safe-haven in facticity or in any empirical fulfillments of Being that unavoidably remain conditioned by contingent circumstances. HCM clarifies that here the anchoring in facticity is dissimilar to any questioning in positive science, which is also based on facts (HCM, 1963h, 43) and in any event, we must take into account that fundamental datum that Being “could have not existed!” (HCM, 1963h, 41). Moreover, she explains that in metaphysics we do not deal with the question of the very existence of the external world or with providing evidence of its reality. Such evidence has never been achieved and in fact is impossible, since as much as facticity is here and now and acquires an essential immediate and phenomenal expression, it exists vis-à-vis an essential transcendent element. Therefore, HCM demands confronting facticity itself with elements that are external to it, or aspects that have no factual expression. Thus, she contends that “the metaphysical problem […] includes in itself the permanent positioning of transcendence (beleibende Transzendenzstellung) of the absolute” (HCM, 1963a, 53). However, the above-construed duality, whose polarity is reinforced by the abyss that underlies it, leaves no possibility for a direct relation to the absolute but “a leap (Absprung)” that can be accomplished only by an “epistemological encroachment (Übergriff )” into

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another realm (HCM, 1963a, 53).34 As much as this transcendent element remains unspecified and rather obscure within HCM’s writings, it provides at least an initial protection from the related perils of the “proton pseudos” of idealism.

12.4 Epilogue HCM’s striving to unveil the “offence (Anstoß)” of thinking (HCM, 1963g, 17) or even its “primordial offence (Uranstoß)” (HCM, 1963j, 428), to pinpoint “where the philosophical stumbling block (Stein des Anstoßes) is located” (HCM, 1963h, 39) and illuminate it (HCM, 1963i, 41), or alternatively to come to terms with “the inner driving motive (das treibende innere Motiv)” (HCM, 1963h, 39) of philosophy, is typical of her writings. This attitude resonates in her overwhelming critique of idealism within which she attempts to demonstrate that idealism’s sense of metaphysics, which dismisses any real aspect altogether, is “contradictory” (HCM, 1963a, 51–52). Thus, subsequent to her critical description of the deficiencies of idealism she asks, “whether signs are increasing that our thinking about the world is becoming again truly substantial, cosmic, in short anti-idealist” (HCM, 1963d, 37). Yet, HCM’s argument that “the peril of the slipping of phenomenology into idealism […] is overwhelming” (HCM, 1963a, 75 n. 20) seems to threaten her own endeavors to achieve an “anti-idealist” philosophy insofar as she is a phenomenologist herself. Moreover, the friction indicated between phenomenology and idealism, which underlies the possibility for “slipping” from the one to the other, seems to imply that from a phenomenological point of view the conscious effort to establish an antiidealist philosophy might also be unjustified. Indeed, also her own observation of phenomenology as “still carrying the eggshells of its idealist origins” (HCM, 1951, 5) clearly conflicts with this choice. To a considerable extent, it is unclear on what exactly HCM based her contention that only by regaining philosophical access to the empirical, the factual, and the genuinely transcendent, which in her view were eventually eroded in idealism, can we protect against “slipping” into idealism. What is it about facticity that can protect us from the “perils” of idealism? HCM’s response could have concerned their resistance to and escape from complete rationalization. However, the possible surprising or even mysterious aspects that are implicit in her view of facticity can deprive it of offering protection, unless it is acceptable that the desired metaphysics is deliberately fluid and bears no coherence whatsoever. Obviously, this is not the case as far as HCM’s idea of metaphysics is concerned. Despite characterizing the idealist striving for “absolute and indubitable judgments about factual being” (HCM, 1963g, 20) as odd, her essence-based metaphysics and the assumed fluidity cannot go together. Therefore, it seems that HCM’s rehabilitation of the possibility of metaphysics out of the idealist worldview cannot rely solely on bringing facticity back to the fore of philosophizing. 34 HCM

uses the Greek expression μεταβασις ´ ε„ς ¥λλo γšνoς.

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In addition to the aspects that concern HCM’s declared philosophical predisposition, her view of the evolution of idealism, particularly the “elevation” of the empirical to the ideal, is also questionable. The main reservation in this regard is to what extent this “elevation” results from an informed decision, or from the human drive to understand reality, which involves to one degree or another an abstraction articulated in ideal terms. Hence, the discussed turning of the real into an ideal, as a result of which reality turns out to be a mere concept for the idealist (HCM, 1963d, 36), not only applies to idealism but to the human experience, whose search for meaning is often not confined to facticity. Moreover, despite the apparent narrowing of the realm of reality by its rationalization and conceptualization in idealism, a restricted idea of reality does not necessarily deprive thinking from consolidating a metaphysical stance. The final reservation concerns HCM’s accusation of idealism for “filling” again with reason (Vernunft) the “abyss” between the “mere appearing” and the “in-itself” (HCM, 1963g, 18). Instead, as discussed above, her view of reality preserves and reinforces the ontological “abyss” and stresses the “incommensurability,” the “something,” and the “that” regarding reality. However, given that she herself assumes the possibility of the intelligibility of reality, due to the presence of essences in real beings (HCM, 1963e, 230) that are considered as original and perceivable (HCM, 1931aN, 2–3), it seems that not much follows from this aspect of her criticism. In other words, acknowledging an aspect of incomprehensibility regarding facticity that prevails alongside the principle intelligibility of real beings seems more like a nuance that cannot support the sharp distinction between idealism and the anti-idealist thinking she strives to uphold. Nonetheless, despite the indicated insufficiencies in HCM’s criticism of idealism, I argue that it should not be dismissed altogether. Rather, the issue requires a complementary study of other aspects in her thinking that might suggest broader grounds for understanding her view in connection to idealism. That is to say that HCM’s critique of idealism does not stand on its own but should be further explored and evaluated within the context of her work in its entirety. Also, it is worth mentioning the essential fact that important sections of her criticism of idealism still appear in unpublished documents (HCM, 1931aN, 1931bN), meaning that her critical view was never finalized. Nevertheless, both her published essays that deal with idealism and the archival and unfinalized documents open an important window to her realist phenomenology.

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Appendix

Faith, Radicalism, and Individuality—A Jewish Perspective on Edith Stein

Preface “It is not an easy task to speak about Edith Stein. Primarily since ultimately it is impossible to make an adequate expression about a specific religious person” (HCM, 1960b, 61).1 So stated Hedwig Conrad-Martius (HCM), who was the godmother of Edith Stein (1892–1942) when she converted from Judaism to Catholicism (HCM, 1960b, 74).2 This determination, which assumes the depths embodied in the individual religious experience, is true especially about a person like Stein who has taken the radical choice of conversion, with far-reaching implications for all aspects of life.3 1 Conrad-Martius’ essay on Edith Stein (HCM, 1960b, 59–83) is based on a lecture that she delivered

before the Society for Christian-Jewish Collaboration (undated). For further reading about the friendship between Stein and Conrad-Martius, see: Avé-Lallemant 2015. All translations from the German original into English are mine. Emphases follow the original, unless stated otherwise. 2 Herbstrith describes Stein’s stay with Conrad-Martius before her baptism, see: (Herbstrith, 1972, 24–25). 3 There are many considerations for not regarding Stein’s conversion to Catholicism as a positive rejection of Judaism. Elsewhere I dealt with this issue. See: Miron (2014a). Stein herself admitted that she did not know much about Judaism, see: Stein (2002a, 82f). See also: Herbstrith (1972, 13); Ehrlich (1986, 3). Krochmalnik holds that there is no need to track so far back Stein’s conversion that she carried out with full awareness, see: Krochmalnik (1988). Except for her book My life in a Jewish Family (Stein, 2002a), Stein’s references to the Jewish elements are mostly fragmentary and testify to the loss of religious foundation from the Jewish identity that was common to most members of the family. Schandl details the places in Stein’s writings from which one might learn about her attitude toward Judaism, see also: Schandl (1990, 90ff). In the first edition of his book, The Phenomenological Movement, in an excursus entitled “Note: Phenomenology and Conversion”, Spiegelberg writes about what he terms “The seeming frequency of conversions to Catholicism” among the members of the Munich-Göttingen circle the following: “It is a development that stands in marked contrast to the trend away from the Catholic Church in the preparatory phase of the Movement. […] Catholicism became almost fashionable among the religiously indifferent as well as among Protestant and Jewish members. […]. The truth of the matter would seem to be that the phenomenological approach in its openness to all kinds of experiences and phenomena is ready to reconsider even the traditional beliefs in the religious field in a fresh and unprejudiced manner. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Miron (ed.), Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68783-0

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Yet, also for Yeshayahu Leibowitz (1903–1994), one of the most original and challenging Jewish thinkers of the twentieth century, this is an ultimate truth about the believer whose personality was regarded by him as remaining on the dark side of religious praxis. This quality, as will transpire later, becomes a central element in his perception of faith. This article examines Edith Stein and Yeshayahu Leibowitz’s perceptions of religious faith, which branch out from the common departure point formed against the background of the modern reality of individualism and secularization. These two approaches have become central in theological discourse and academic research, and their influence has exceeded the particular theological context identified with them. The phenomenological gaze I shall direct at the opinions of these two thinkers regarding the issue of faith and religious experience seeks to expose and elucidate the hermeneutic strategies and the analytical considerations behind their positive arguments. First, I shall investigate the common departure point shared by both, then follow the paths that split away from it, developing into two different radical approaches, and finally, I shall sketch a possible meeting point. Each of these stages of the discussion raises the hermeneutic challenge of simultaneously facing the similarities and differences through which the approaches are intertwined, whose strength fluctuates frequently. Both the connections and the differences between them reveal a basic datum regarding the nature of radical religious faith, whereby the more it is filled by its unique contents, the more it shares common features with other radical faiths. In principle, the possibility of dialogue between two radical believers—whatever their religion—is structured by the very nature of their faith. Thus, although comparisons between the thought of Stein and Leibowitz occupy the heart of the paper, they should still be viewed as a means of interpreting radical religious experience.

The Common Point of Departure At the basis of Stein’s and Leibowitz’s idea of religious faith stands the volitional decision in favor of faith that is undertaken by individuals.4 Stein, who regards free and conscious choice as the most fundamental infrastructure of one’s being as a person (Stein, 2013, 288–302, 295), depicts her own choice as “the great decision of That Catholicism, and particularly Augustinianism with its emphasis on intuitive insight, had a marked advantage over Protestantism at the time may have been due partly to the neo-orthodox tendencies in Protestantism with their exclusive emphasis on supernatural revelation and Biblical faith” (Spiegelberg, 1960, 172–173). In the third, expanded edition of his book (Spiegelberg, 1984a), this excurse has been omitted. Even though Husserl himself converted from Judaism to Protestantism at the age of 28, in a letter to Ingarden dated November 25, 1921, he wrote: “Unfortunately there is a great movement (Übertritt) toward conversion – a sign of inner wretchedness (Elends] in the soul. A true philosopher cannot be other than free: the essential nature of philosophy is the most radical autonomy” (Husserl, 1968, 22). For further reading about the conversions of Jews to Christianity, see: Oesterreicher (1953). The author devotes a chapter to Husserl’s conversion (Oesterreicher, 1953, 43–86) and another to Edith Stein (Oesterreicher, 1953, 288–329). 4 For classical analytic perspective on volitional choice, see: Frankfurt (1971).

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my life” (Stein, 2002a, 209). Elsewhere, she highlights that even though Catholicism has a complete world view, one must acquire it personally in order to claim to have it—whether he or she was raised into it, outside it, or left it behind. In her opinion, such a choice is undertaken without knowing at the outset what exists within “faithgood” (Glaubensgut), but as part of one’s search for sources out of which his or her worldview will be consolidated (Stein, 2014, 143–144). This original source, out of which the volitional decision is undertaken, functions as an identifier of human beings’ “innermost and most peculiar thing [that] mostly remains concealed.” Stein suggests that one’s volitional choices “is covered by the imprint which human nature has assumed its path in life and under the influence of the environment.” Thus, what is being felt inside oneself and toward others “remains dark and secret” and “ineffable” for him or for her. Finally, she establishes: “a person becomes him or her self by virtue of his or her free decisions” (Stein, 2013, 423). Similar to Stein, Leibowitz depicts the believer as a person who out of free will has decided to accept the whole framework of God’s commandments.5 Sometimes the decision to believe replaces a secular lifestyle with a religious one, and sometimes it stands between the childhood of a person raised religious and the beginning of his or her adulthood, when he or she seeks to choose his or her way in the world. Whether they choose to continue in the way they were raised or to abandon it, the decision to believe is, in Leibowitz’s opinion, a condition without which religious life cannot occur. Against this background, he establishes that religious faith is “A value determination he makes, and like any value content in the human consciousness, it does not stem from information provided to him or given to him, but is an obligation with which the person obligates himself ” (Leibowitz, 1982, 11). According to Leibowitz, the source of religious belief is the person’s volitional choice to obligate himself or herself. However, while the volitional choice essentially denotes spiritual content, for Leibowitz, the decision of the will to believe does not denote mental persuasion, nor can it be exhausted by persuasion regarding abstract contents. Instead, for Leibowitz, the Jewish faith is completely identical to the practical performance of the commandments. As he puts it: “belief is but the religion of divine commandments, outside of which the religious belief does not exist at all” (Leibowitz, 1979, 37–38). That is to say, despite the “commitment to which one binds himself ” is the indispensable source for religious faith, faith itself is entirely identified with the practical performance of God’s commandments. Alongside the shared recognition of the intentional decision of the individual to believe as an essential foundation for the constitution of religious belief, Stein and Leibowitz share additional aspects of the understanding of religious experience. These aspects widen and establish the shared starting point despite their different implications on their philosophy as a whole. The element of “intention” that is integrated to both systems of the related thinkers well exemplifies a communality that persists despite considerable differences therein. 5 The Hebrew term Mitzvoth is translated here as God’s commandments and refers to the divine imperative. In the Jewish tradition, there is a distinction between written commandments and oral ones—the former are taken from the Pentateuch (Torah) and the latter were produced by a continuous historical process of interpretation of the former, which was oriented toward the deduction of detailed practical norms. However, both kinds bind the believers equally.

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The dimension of “intention” appears within Stein’s discussion of the relationship between philosophy and theology. In the first place, Stein regards revelation as accessible to human understanding, since she mediates the divine through the words of God declared in the holy scriptures (Stein, 2007, 42–43).6 Also, she argues that revelation might provide materials for establishing a conceptual infrastructure for pure philosophy, even in cases in which such philosophy might even overlook the facts that are inherent in revelation. However, in her opinion what is decisive and thus distinguishes philosophical from theological discourse is “the leading intention” (leitende Absicht) (Stein, 2013, 32). It seems that with philosophy the point is to achieve a discursive understanding regarding its objects, whereas faith is always stamped with something that will never become totally understandable, and therefore, its leading intention cannot be exhausted solely by understanding. While the element of “intention” remains somehow blurry or at least indirect in Stein’s idea of faith, in Leibowitz’s it is an explicit and central basis that is regarded as indispensable in the religious experience, no less than its establishing volitional choice. He employs a distinction taken from the Jewish classics in order to support his concept of Judaism: “belief for its own sake” and “belief not for its own sake.”7 What differentiates between these two is the underlying intention and not the praxis of religious commandments, which in any case is carried out according to the fixed traditional criteria. “Belief not for its own sake” is actually an instrument for fulfilling one’s needs or it appears as a conclusion that one reaches out of his worldly experience. It is clear that this kind of belief is dependent on the believer achieving his conscious goals, without which it would fail. “Belief for its own sake” that lacks any external purpose and does not actually give the believer any kind of benefit, satisfaction, or even understanding of the world and of himself is different. According to Leibowitz, only this kind of belief is genuine, precisely because a believer is not expected to feel “happiness,” “perfection,” or “morality” (Leibowitz, 1979, 63). For all these, Leibowitz determines, one does not need religious belief but can get them from even better agents. The only satisfaction that “belief for its own sake” can wish to have is the contentment from fulfilling the divine obligation (Leibowitz, 1979, 37–42). However, a genuine belief must be independent even of this satisfaction, to the extent that as long as one’s belief bears witness to his needs or motivation, this can be considered as evidence of its falseness. Although Stein and Leibowitz bestow rather different meanings upon the element of intention, its inclusion within their discussion supports the status of the deciding believer as the establisher of his or her faith. Whatever it means to be led by an intention, it is simply that the believer as a person must be present there in order to intend. Although neither Stein nor Leibowitz indicates much about the positive 6 At the same time, Stein clarifies that faith in-itself and for itself is not dependent on this revelation. 7 This

classical distinction has appeared in many contexts. For instance, see: B. T. Ta’anith 7a. Leibowitz wrote a series of articles on the topic of “Lishmah and Not-Lishmah” (“for its own sake and not for its own sake”). The one that was translated into English appeared in: Leibowitz (1979, 61–78).

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content of that intention, it makes sense that such an intention plays a role in one’s decision, and in any case, consciousness and intention work together to fortify the believer’s status in religious experience. Another aspect that accompanies the common point of departure of both thinkers refers to their basic understanding of the disposition of the believer as a self being in the face of the religious experience. This aspect might be illuminated by Husserl’s idea of the “Pure I that is consolidated as a mediating category between consciousness and its objects.”8 The affinity to this Husserlian idea is apparent in Leibowitz’s understanding of the believer as a transcendent and non-constitutive participant in the religious experience, namely: external to the system of God’s commandments which he adopted as one inseparable unit, which he was completely unable to influence.9 This transcendence is deepened in light of Leibowitz’s radical demand for the total absence of any connection between faith or religious practice and the real occurrence of the world, including the believer’s life circumstances. On the deep level, the shaping of the believer as a being transcendent to religious experience instantly deprives him or her of his or her status as an empirical being characterized by the other contexts of his or her life. As a result, believers, according to Leibowitz, appear and function as ideal beings raised above concrete reality and free of any individual expression. At the same time, believers are also distinguished from the idealistic framework of consciousness, since their faith does not require them to understand it or themselves, but only to perform the actions resulting from the decision they undertook to believe. Alternatively, in this view, believers can be portrayed as located at a middle point, since on the one hand they function as ideal beings elevated from their concrete reality, but at the same time they are separated from the idealistic frame of consciousness, as they are not required or expected to achieve understanding concerning religious faith but to practice the religious imperatives.10 However, these believers do not cease to be individual beings thanks to their decision to believe, and, of course, in all aspects of their life outside of religious practice, they are free to act as any human being would. 8 The

idea of the “pure I” appeared for the first time in “Ideas”, see: Husserl (1952a, §80 178– 180/2012a, §80 162–164), Husserl (1952b, §22–§29 97–120/2002a, §22–§29 103–127). This term arrived at its full explication in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations within the theory of constitution that also included an empirical layer. For further reading, see: Ströker (1993, 124f). Indeed, already in Logical Investigations, Husserl admitted that his idea of the I is not entirely empirical, see: Husserl (1970b, IV, §12 67/1984a, IV, §12 334). Marbach has rightly understood this insight as a preparation stage for the achieving of the idea of the “pure I”, see: Marbach (1974, 17). For his interpretation of Husserl’s idea of the “pure I”, see: Marbach (1974, 74–120). 9 For further reading about the status of the ego in the sphere of transcendental phenomenology, see: Ströker (1993, 42f). 10 This location of believer might only regulate the gap between the empirical stage of the initial decision to believe and the abstract one of religious praxis—but cannot solve the fundamental paradox of subjectivity in Leibowitz’s thinking; i.e., it is involved in the world yet capable of acting as detached from it. For further reading in this regard, see: Miron (2013b, 545–583), Miron (2007). Indeed, this is the paradox of the transcendental ego in Husserl’s thinking. For further reading, see: Sokolowski (2000, 112–129), Carr (1999, 67–97).

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While the points of connection between Husserl’s idea of “pure I” and Leibowitz are implied and result from hermeneutical analysis of his thinking, for Stein this is a direct and explicit influence.11 She depicts human consciousness as a continuous flow of becoming, an actual stream whose unity is constituted by the “pure I”— the sole constant element in one’s intentional experience that is stretched from the past, into the present, and toward the future (Stein 2013, 47–48). Like Husserl, Stein infers the independence and constant presence of all acts of the self (feeling, thinking, perceiving, etc.), yet without having a content of its own. This in-between disposition of the I is apparent in Stein’s discussion of the experience of joy as coming “from inside” yet it responds “to something coming from outside.” Thus, Stein concludes: “the conscious life of the I [Ichleben] is dependent for its content on a double ‘beyond’ (Jenseits), from ‘outer’ world and on an ‘inner world’” (Stein 2013, 56).12 Like Leibowitz, so also for Stein, the duplication characterizing the being of the I is essentially ontological, and as such, it is harnessed to the elucidation of the experience of religious faith. Leibowitz uses the space between the two faces of the I—the empirical and the non-empiric transcendental—to explain the peculiar experience of faith whose criteria are not concrete but ideal, although it is conducted in the real world. Stein, on the other hand, attaches the emptiness typical to the disposition of the pure I to her fundamental argument, according to which the religious experience is an essential filling for finitude that brings it close to the eternal Being: [The] genuine being of the I […], that has a double ontological feature (Doppelten Seinvorzug) before the contents that fill its life: in every minute his life is actual (aktuell) while the content has a single moment of high presence (Gegenwartshöhe); it is a “carrier” (Träger) of experiential contents (Erlebnisgehalte) that encompasses the lively being of the I that lives through it and is crystalized in it as unity. Yet, despite these virtues its being is needy (bedürftige) and in-itself it is nothing: it is empty if it is not filled with contents and it receives its content from “beyond” its own realms of horizontal worlds, the “outside” and the “inside”. (Stein, 2013, 294–295)13 11 Stein refers in length to the Husserlian idea of the “pure I” in the paragraph entitled “the ‘pure I’ and its modes of being”, see: Stein (2013, 51–61). Stein encountered this idea at the beginning of her academic path, when she arrived in Gottingen in 1913 to study with Husserl. Later, she wrote her doctoral dissertation under his supervision and followed him to Freiburg in 1916, where she served as his assistant (see: Ricci 2010). Roman Ingarden, who was in Freiburg with her, wrote about this period and its influences on Stein, see Stein (2002a, 189–261), Ingarden (1962). For Husserl’s idea of the “pure I”, see: Husserl (1952a, §37, §84, §46, §57, §80/2012a, §37, §84, §46, §57, §80). See also: Ströker (1993, 124ff; Marbach 1974, 74–120). 12 Hart argued that Stein borrowed here the Heideggerian idea of “Daseins geworfenes” (Hart, 2015, 106), but was also critical about it (Hart, 2015, 109). Calcagno observed that for Stein “it is not a matter of finding ourselves in the world, but a matter of creating and reinterpreting the world” (Calcagno, 2007, 127). See also: Stein 2014, 156. Regarding the double faces of the life of the I, see: Stein 2013, 294–295. Baseheart refers to the experience of joy, see: Baseheart (1997, 88–90, 115). In establishing the living of the I within its experiences, Stein relies on HCM, see: Stein (2013, 42, n. 10). 13 Later in her writings, after Stein’s death, HCM developed this thesis and described the I as subject to a “dualistic existential primordial dynamic (Urdynamik)” split between “origin-like” nature (Ursprungshaftigkeit), expressed as a personal force directed inward into its Being, and what she calls “spiritness”, directing it to the world and what is external to it (selbsthaft infrastatische

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The starting point shared by Leibowitz and Stein, anchored in the aspect of the self, transpires as granting a foundational status to the volitional decision to believe. Consequently, religious faith itself is perceived as an expression of the believer’s individual selfhood. However, beyond the different meaning the two granted the shared elements, significant differences also develop between the perceptions of the two thinkers, which evolve into two different types of religious faith experience. Consequently, as will be clarified later, it is not only the overall meaning of the shared starting point that will be questioned. The capability of the similar start to serve, despite the differences, as a basis for possible dialogue between different believers, is also put to the test.

The Branching Out Stein Stein’s anchoring of religious faith on the I expresses her search for an undoubted starting point. As a phenomenologist, she finds such in one’s certainty of one’s own being as “the most primary knowledge” or “the point of departure behind which I cannot go back.” She argues that exactly for being “the nearest to me, [it is] indistinguishable from me.” Also, “one’s ‘natural attitude’ is turned first of all to the external world and a long time is needed until one finds himself” (Stein, 2013, 41). Moreover, for Stein, the self is more than the I, as one pole of the intentional act which is settled in the basic phenomenological framework. She holds that the self is “the most original form of ‘consciousness’ that accompanies the life of the I, without separating itself from it as a specific ‘perception’ (Wahrnehmung) and turning back to it” (Stein, 2013, 319). The I is not only aware of itself but also has “a personal-spiritual life of soul” (Stein, 2013, 370).14 This inner aspect of the I is characterized as the “dark” side of the self, first and foremost because as an inner element it simply does not appear (erscheinen) before us. However, Stein assumes that the I also contains a communicative dimension and that this facet is what makes the I accessible to phenomenological study.15 Stein shared with the early phenomenologists of her generation the Husserlian method of “essence observation” (Wesensfassung), which focused on locating and analyzing the primary features that constitute phenomena and are responsible for

Selbstenthobenheit). See: HCM (1957, 129; 1965l). I have discussed HCM’s duality of Being, of which the duality of the I is a part, in the following articles included in this volume: Miron (2017b) (reprinted in this volume as Chapter 6); Miron (2019) (reprinted in this volume as Chapter 8). See also: Miron (2016c) (reprinted in this volume as Chapter 10). 14 See also Stein (2013, 75 n. 33). 15 For the publicness of the mind in phenomenology, see: Sokolowski (2000, 11–16).

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shaping them for consciousness, whether they are physical or ideal.16 Helmut Kuhn, Stein’s contemporary phenomenologist, well described this observation: The things to which the gaze is directed are always known in advance. We do not start from the zero point. They show themselves to us, but they are covered. They are placed before us as known but also as riddles, and force upon us a distinction between what the things are in their origin and the essence that reveals the observation that penetrates them. (Kuhn, 1969, 399)17

Understanding this covered nature of essence in reality, Stein asks: “How is the world constructed for a consciousness which I can explore in immanence?” (Stein, 1997, 136; 2014, 130).18 Yet, while Husserl chose to suspend the existential aspect both of the world and of the I from the phenomenological investigation, Stein regards this aspect as necessary for coming to terms with “the inner and the outer world, the natural and the spiritual, the value-free and the good world, eventually and finally the world ruled by religious meaning, the God-world (Gotteswelt)” (Stein, 1997, 136; 2014, 130).19 Thus, Stein rejected the Husserlian transcendental idealism in favor of “a return to the holding of the faithful acceptance of the world” (Stein, 2014, 167).20 This existential orientation is encapsulated at the beginning of Finite and Eternal Being, as the guiding yet unsolved primordial philosophical question of “what is the beingness (Was ist die oυσ ι´α?)?” (Stein, 2013, 11).21 16 Among others in the early realistic circle in Göttingen, Stein was influenced by the early Husserlian method of “essence intuition” (Wesensschau). To clarify this method, I referred to the various articles dealing with the thinking of HCM, included in this volume. For further reading, see: Reinach (1969), Hildebrand (1973, 152–171), Schmücker (1956, 1–33), Ebel (1965, 1–25). 17 See also here Husserl’s observations regarding one-sided and incomplete givenness of things (Husserl 1952a, §138 319/2012a, §138 289) and their inadequate experience by the living subject (Husserl, 1952a, §44 93/2012a, §44 84). For further reading, see: Miron (2016b/2018c). 18 The investigation into the essence of the person is apparent already in Stein’s dissertation from 1917 on the problem of empathy (Stein, 2016), but also in later works: the essay “Individual and Community” (Stein, 2010a, 110–262), the essay “Freedom and Grace” (Freiheit und Gnade) (Stein, 2014, 10–72), and obviously Finite and Eternal Being (Stein, 2013) are the most rich sources for the issue. Baseheart argues that Stein establishes “an original blend of phenomenological and perennial ways of probing the question of what it means to be human” (Baseheart, 1997, 30). Baseheart holds that “The thread that runs through all her work from her first study of empathy to the Finite and Eternal Being is that of the ontic structure of the person” (Baseheart, 1997, 29). This argument pervades Baseheart’s study, see in particular chapter III: “The Human Person”, Baseheart (1997, 30–57). 19 For further reading, see: Ales Bello (2008b). 20 See here also: Stein (2013, 41). Stein’s approach at this point bears a resemblance to that of HCM, see: HCM (1963k, 1965c). For further reading, see: Plessner (1959, 38; 1996, 15–17). 21 ‘oυσ´ια’ or Ousia combines abstract noun built on the participle on, ontos (being) plus a suffix of abstract form (see: Preus, 2007, 190). Baseheart discusses “The existential character of Stein’s metaphysics” (Baseheart, 1997, 32) and in this regard emphasizes Stein’s “divergence from Husserl who insisted on philosophy being radically new, a ‘science of beginning’” (Baseheart, 1997, 23– 24) and “rare respect for other thinkers—even for those with whom she differed greatly. Yet, Stein remained “faithful to Husserl’s idea of presuppositionlessness, excluding preconceived theories and ‘naive’ premises” (Baseheart, 1997, 123).

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Baseheart depicts the joining together of Stein’s search for essence and her existential orientation as an attempt: “to show that essences are and what they are, and to attack the problem of their status in being” (Baseheart, 1997, 89). Indeed, the essence that beings carry within themselves enfolds both individual and universal elements that are inseparable from each other. On the one hand, the individual element is responsible for the differing fulfillment of a general human feature in every single case.22 On the other hand, the essence serves as a context for the study of the structure that unites together the human traits of individuals according to a determinate law (Stein, 2013, 136–137). Therefore, the knowledge of objects in the world and the entirety of the phenomena might be achieved by unveiling the essence that is inherent in them. This essence serves as a general facet of the individual being as well as the peculiar fulfilling of that essence in it. In other words, the investigations of the essence of the person, of the phenomena, are the fundamentals of Stein’s study of Being. Against this background, Stein’s dramatic decision in favor of a religious faith appears as expressing her self-knowledge—the “self” represents the individual aspect, while “knowledge” represents the universal one. Here, the hyphen indicates the individuality that has universal dimension and vice versa. Therefore, for Stein, faith is not simply a cognitive understanding that might be achieved out of the illumination of the contents attached to it, but also contains elements that are beyond individuals’ grip which she typifies as “‘dark knowledge’ (dunkle Erkenntniss) insofar as the conviction included in it is not founded upon insight regarded the truth that underlies faith” (Stein, 2007, 43). Elsewhere, she characterizes faith as “dark light” (dunkeles Licht). Moreover, since “the ultimate ground of all existents is unfathomable (unergründlicher), everything that is seen from this perspective returns back into the ‘dark light’ of faith and secret, and all comprehensible knowledge (Begreifliche) receives an incomprehensible background.” Stein explains that faith “enables us understanding something, only in order to point to something that remains for us incomprehensible (unfaβlich)” (Stein, 2013, 32). It transpires, then, that just as for Leibowitz, so also for Stein incomprehensibility is structured into the experience of faith. In any case, the aspect of “darkness” in the self exists alongside communicative and rational features that are positive and stable.23 Thus, according to Stein, there is no absolute barrier between the believer and his or her faith, and believers can even achieve a degree of transparency regarding their decision to believe. Moreover, the fundamental phenomenological understanding of consciousness as accompanying the acts of one’s experience might indicate the continuity and even intimacy that might be achieved between the person and the decision to believe. Thus, 22 In this context, Stein sought to assimilate the Aristotelian idea of “form”, see: Stein (2013, 139– 194). The influence of Jean Hering’s programmatic essay is easy to discern, see: Hering (1921). For the influence of Hering and Husserl on Stein in this context, see: Baseheart (1997, 90–91). 23 Stein, like many of her contemporary early phenomenologists, including HCM, shared with Husserl the thesis about the rationality of the world. See: Husserl (1952a, §136, §137, §139, §142/2012a, §136, §137, §139, §142), see also: HCM (1916b, 396; 1931aN, 2–3; 1965l, 307; 1963h, 233).

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in the spirit of Husserlian phenomenological thought, whereby “we can best carry on in the first person” (Husserl, 1952a, §27 56/2012a, §27 51),24 alongside her complex discussions of the issue of faith, Stein describes with inexhaustible sensitivity and self-listening her experiences during the stage of deciding to believe: There is a state of resting [Ruhens] in God, of utter relaxation of all spiritual activity, in which man makes no plans, takes no decisions, and at first rightly does not act, but everything prospective is left to the divine will. You totally “deliver yourself to fate”. This state somehow has been extended to me, after an experience in which my forces were exceeded, my spiritual life-forces were totally used up, and all activity was robbed from me. In contrast, the resting in God as the failure of activity out of lack of life-forces is totally new and peculiar. That was a dead stillness. In the place of this, commenced the feeling of security (Geborgensein), of being exempted from all anxiety and responsibility and action. In which this feeling indulged me, began bit by bit to feel new life imbuing me - without any voluntary exertion towards new activity. This invigorating influx seemed as an outflow of activity that is not mine. (Stein, 2010a, 73)

It transpires, then, that for Stein, faith is anchored in the individual as its solid ground that enables rational discourse on the religious experience and even on the individual decision to believe. This contains a key for understanding the profound affinity between religious faith and the two chief elements of immanence: the world in which the believer lives, and the consciousness that accompanies his or her life. Thus, securing the first link of religious experience lays the foundation for understanding the reality that follows the decision to believe. Unlike the things that exist in reality, which come close to the pure form that is realized in them, human beings preserve the distance between essence and existence. This means that, due to human nature, the human person can never become what he or she could be. Thus, assuming that the source of the essences is in God, Stein determines that “they [things] are always mirrors of divine perfection, yet broken mirrors” (Stein, 2013, 211). This aspect reveals the mystery within the individual person in which also underpinned the secret of the affinity between man and God (Stein, 2013, 427–441). However, Stein clarifies that the human person will never be able to achieve complete intelligibility, since the openness to eternity is established in his or her very being, so it is unceasingly being posed beyond the actual plane of space and time. It seems that the fundamental gap as a result of which the human persona can never become what it could be is merely a reflective expression of this “darkness” that can never completely dissipate. At the same time, it appears that the same openness to eternity, which she considers characteristic of the human persona as such, may also contain the guarantee for it never becoming completely swallowed by darkness. In the terms “act” (Akt) and “potentiality” (Potenz) that mark Stein’s first steps as a philosopher, it is possible to characterize the human person as always carrying an excess of potentiality against his or her fulfilled acts in reality; thus, he or she can never become identical to their own actual existence.25 Nevertheless, the act of choice in favor of religious faith is inherent in the potential formation of the human 24 See

here also: Miron (2016b, 474/2018c, 10).

25 On the background of the treatise “Akt und Potenz, Studien zu einer Philosophie des Seins” (Stein

2005a), see: Alfieri (2012, 61). Stein devoted a chapter to this theme also in: Stein (2013, 37–61).

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person that constantly transcends from the now to the past and from the past to the self-transcending in which the potential turns actual and the actual sinks again into potentiality (Stein, 2013, 47–50).26 I believe that the main importance of the issue of act and potentiality for the discussion of Stein’s perception of faith stems from the fundamental gap that this duality indicates regarding human experience in the world, which also echoes that of religious faith. This perspective enables viewing religious faith as expressing a need that realizes a fundamental human potentiality. Thus, like any human experience, faith can also be clarified through the relations between the act and its potentiality. From a phenomenological point of view, it appears that the covertness structured into a potential state of affairs, that is prior to its appearance, necessitates mediation that would connect it to the act that realizes it. This is not necessarily a concrete step directly involved in realizing the appearance of things in the world. The mediation between potentiality and act can be achieved through the constituting of a system of mental relations, justifying the covert reality itself and thus affirming the reality of the potential—an affirmation that actually is the mediation itself. Against the background of this explanation, we can easily understand Stein’s need to rely on the self as an essential rational beginning for the mediation between the two fundamental experiences of the I—reality and presence on the one hand and negation and vagueness on the other hand. With words clearly inspired by Augustine, Stein states that: The undeniable fact that my being is fleeting sets a deadline from moment to moment, exposed to the possibility of unexistence that corresponds to the other just as undeniable fact, according to which in spite of this fleetingness I am and from moment to moment I am sustained in Being, and in my fleeting being I encompass an enduring being. […] Here in my being I encounter another being, not mine, which is the support and the ground of my being, which in-itself is supportless and groundless. (Stein, 2013, 59–60)27

Understanding the human persona as lacking Being from itself does not deprive it of its freedom, which is granted to it by force of its rational element. Quite the opposite, Stein holds that it is especially due to this fact that the I can rightly be considered as “‘limited in its freedom,’ since this enables it to exist ‘as an everrenewed gift’ (Gabe) received during the entire duration of it being” (Stein, 2013, 316). The assignment of filling the uncovered gap within the human experience occupies the core of Finite and Eternal Being. The two aspects of beings of the main title of this work and, no less than that, the subtitle—“An attempt to ascend to the meaning of Being”—speak for themselves.28 Thus, there exist two beings, finite and eternal. There is a process of ascent from the one to the other through which the two are bound to each other. In fact, this is a double process—of ascending from the human to the eternal and the divine on the one hand, and the embodiment of the divine in the human and the personal on the other hand. This duality echoes also in 26 On

Stein’s relation to the issue of act and potentiality, see: Stein (2005a). also Calcagno’s reference to this quotation, Calcagno (2007, 145–146 n. 10). 28 See in this context also Baseheart’s analysis of the title Finite and Eternal Being, Baseheart (1997, 118–119). 27 See

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the essential tension embodied in God’s speaking to his emissaries (Sendboten) in human language and yet conveying a sacred message. In Stein’s words: When speaking God’s “Word” and “addressing” (Ansprache), this is not tantamount to saying that supernatural revelation consists always in a positive and immediate speaking of God in a human way (Menschenweise). God’s word and “speech” is also the word of his emissaries, of his Prophets and Apostles directed in His name at those who are called to faith, and thus primarily means Holy Scriptures. (Stein, 2007, 43)

Eventually, the clear line that appears throughout Stein’s entire body of writings starting from the human person up to the possibility of theology that is opened to revelation allows her to determine that natural reason and therein philosophy need faith and theology for their completion. (Stein, 2013, 22–36).29 At this point, the double importance of the idea of pure I as a mediating category for coming to terms with Stein’s idea of faith stands out: firstly, it might create continuity within the empirical person of the individual believer, meaning between faith and finitude. Secondly, the very continuity achieved by this category clarifies the indispensability of eternity, to the extent that “a receiving of being which is independent of eternal Being is unconceivable” (Stein, 2013, 57). Indeed, there is one single sequence, whose beginning is in the finite being of the believer, continuing throughout the pure I as the conscious element that accompanies its experiences, and finally ascending to the eternal Being. This track contains considerable potholes and gaps that are already apparent in the being of the “I.” It appears that from Stein’s point of view, there is no other possibility given the perception of faith itself as a human potentiality. Yet, Stein is convinced that the believer cannot fall into the abyss sprawling between the finite and the eternal Being but “jumps” above it, unlike the unbeliever cannot bridge the gap and thus falls into the abyss (Stein, 2013, 104).30 The ultimate evidence for the bridging of that gap that is uncovered in the human experience in the world is the experience of fullness that the believer encounters by recognizing oneself as originating in an eternal being: My being, as I find it and discover myself in it, is a void Being (ein nichtiges Sein); I do not exist by myself, and by myself I am nothing. At each instant, I stand before nothing and from instant to instant Being must be endowed and re-endowed with Being. And however this nothinged Being is Being, and with it I touch at each instant the fullness (Fülle) of Being. (Stein, 2013, 57)31 29 See here also: Stein (2013, 99–101, 286–288; 2014, 10–72). Baseheart holds that “it seems likely when she [Stein] conceived the idea of Finite and Eternal Being, she may have had in mind the words of René Kremer which she had heard at the Journée of the Sociéte Thomiste at Juvisy: ‘The question of being can be resolved only by a complete system embracing finite being and infinite being’” (Baseheart, 1997, 110). 30 See here also: Stein (2013, 48f, 104, 106–110). A fundamental comparison may be drawn between Stein’s concepts of abyss (Abgrund) and fullness (Fülle), which have a clear theological orientation, and those of HCM, which denote pure and stable ontological elements of being. I have discussed these concepts of HCM’s in several places. See, for example: Miron 2015 (reprinted in this volume as Chapter 5); Miron (2018a) (reprinted in this volume as Chapter 11). 31 HCM’s ideas resonate in these words of Stein’s, especially the concept of the “spirit-full I” (geistlichthaft Ich). I prefer the term “resonate” over “influence”, since these ideas of HCM appeared

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It appears, then, that the ontological structure of the self constantly demands overcoming the ever lying-in-wait nothingness.32 Stein clarifies that while our vague and “dark feeling grants us the unconceivable as inescapably proximity (Nahen) […] yet as the unconceivable,” faith gives us more, i.e.: “God of personal proximity (Nähe), the loving, compassionate, and a certitude that no natural knowledge possesses” (Stein, 2013, 61). The affinity between the filling of the gap typical of the human experience and the divine granting is thus entirely clear. The one, who did not create himself, is incapable of filling the abyss within himself. He or she needs God. On the other hand, God provides himself to man “in a wholly personal way.” Consequently, the innermost of one’s soul turns out to be “the apartment of God” (Wohnung Gottes) (Stein, 2013, 422), meaning: the space in which one dwells and observes the world and establishes his or her identity.33 However, in order that God will dwell inside the internal rooms of one’s soul, it is necessary the “the Master of Being” (Der Herr des Seins) will be at the same time also “the Master of meaning” (Der Herr des Sinns). Stein explains: “That which gives me being and thereby fills this being with meaning, must not only be the Lord of Being but also the Lord of meaning: all abundance of meaning (Sinnfülle) is contained within the eternal Being, nowhere else than from itself can it [the eternal Being] ‘draw’ (schöpfen) the meaning with which every creature is filled” (Stein, 2013, 100).34 Elsewhere, Stein sheds light on this joining together of Being with meaning, as she refers to “that by which all knowledge about God becomes precisely knowledge of God: the personal encounter with God” (Stein,

in writings composed and published after Stein’s death, and in any case, it is unclear how accessible Stein’s writings were to HCM’s during the years when she composed her main works, or how much the two of them discussed these ideas before their separation during the war and up to Stein’s murder at Auschwitz in 1942. In this context, see: HCM (1960b, 67–76; 1965l; 1965b) . The issue of the spiritual-I is discussed extensively in two articles in this volume: Miron (2017a) (reprinted in this volume as Chapter 7); Miron (2019) (reprinted in this volume as Chapter 8). 32 Many of Stein’s commentators seek to illuminate this ontological structure of the self (see: Calcagno, 2007, 126–127; Hart 2015, 106). Calcagno claims more generally that each of the 24 volumes of Stein’s Gesamtausgabe addresses the question of human experience (Calcagno, 2007, 125). When Calcagno wrote these words, the standard 27-volume edition of Stein’s works (Gesamtausgabe: ESGA) had yet to be completed, and what was available was the first edition of her works, including 18 volumes (Edith Stein Werke: ESW). In this context, see: Gerl-Falkovitz (2010). Stein’s approach that identifies proximity or even intimacy of Being with nothingness indicates a clear stamp of HCM’s thought. I have discussed this issue in various articles dealing with HCM’s perception of Being (Das Sein). See: Miron (2017a) (reprinted in this volume as Chapter 7); Miron (2017b) (reprinted in this volume as Chapter 6); Miron (2017c) (reprinted in this volume as Chapter 9); Miron (2019) (reprinted in this volume as Chapter 8). 33 For Stein’s use of the image of “apartment”, see: Alfieri (2012, 37; Miron 2013a, 102). The consolidation of the most private and personal together with the greatest spiritual and lofty in Alfieri’s idea of apartment throws much light on Edith Stein’s analogy between the individual personality and the community see: Stein (2004). For further reading, see: Calcagno (2007, 25–44), Baseheart (1997, 33–75). 34 For the image of God as “living” in the rooms of one’s heart in the Jewish context, see: Hartman (2002).

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2007, 57, my emphasis),35 i.e., whereas “knowledge about” sustains the distance and gap between the knower and the object, with “knowledge of” a degree of intimacy is achieved between the two, or else a personal relation is established. In any event, in my view, the movement from one state to the other is rather slight and should not be regarded as a transformation. Rather, it is exactly the fact that some distance is nevertheless preserved that grants this development the stamp of “mysterious revelation” (geheimnisvolle Offenbarung), explained by Stein as “the selfrevelation of God in silence” (die Selbstoffenbarung Gottes im Schweigen) (Stein, 2007, 57). Moreover, when God is associated with meaning then, unavoidably, “God Himself is the First Theologian” (Gott ist der Ur-Theologe) (Stein, 2007, 58). It seems that when God becomes a theologian, human words must be found so that the “conversation” among persons will be enabled. However, neither mystery nor silence are thus eradicated. Rather: “God as the first Theologian […] would have to commence from the truest instance of God’s speaking, the speaking of the Divine World” (Stein, 2007, 58), meaning God’s speaking appears to be his presence in the human world. Against this background, the meeting to the point of loving unification that takes place between God as the grantor of meaning and a human being as a receiving-being becomes clear. Stein explains that “with the eternal Being all the fullness of meaning (Sinnesfülle) is obtained” for “It is the eternal Being itself that by itself patterns— not in temporal occurrence—the eternal forms after which the world is created in time and by means of the time” (Stein, 2013, 100). Needless to say, the human who receives must continue unceasingly in order to avoid the believer’s falling back to the ground of his or her void Being. Finally, the personal joining together of granting and receiving to the point of loving fullness finds its comprehensive expression in the following words: We must also consider what the reception of God in the innermost of the soul means. True, the omnipresence of God is present everywhere and always. […]. Thus, there cannot be speech as if God could have come to a place where he had not been before. That the soul receives God means that it freely opens itself toward him as is possible only between two spiritual persons. This is the loving unification: God is the love and taking part in the divine being that granted the unification, must be loving-with (Mitlieben). God is the fullness of love. Yet spiritual creatures are incapable of absorbing in themselves the complete fullness of the divine love and concurring with it. Its part rates according to the measure of its being. [i.e…] the love carries the stamp of personal peculiarity. And this in turn makes understandable that God can create inside every human soul an apartment “of its own.” Therewith, the divine fullness of love finds through the manifold various souls further leeway (Spielraum) for its communication. (Stein, 2013, 423)

It transpires, then, that only omnipresence is capable of filling the counter experience of anxiety in the face of nothingness which is the fate of human beings in the world.36 Thus, I argue that Stein’s idea of faith is merely this filling, in which one experiences his or her being as sustained in existence. The achieved sequence is thus 35 Stein

refers to the search for God also in: Stein (2013, 3, 9, 20). argued that at this point “Stein takes Heidegger to task both for what she regards as his atheism as well as for his misunderstanding of the Christian tradition” (Hart, 2015, 109, n. 5). 36 Hart

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fullness of being no less than it is fullness of meaning. Finally, faith covers the entity of immanence that in-itself is imbued with the personal presence of God.

Leibowitz For Leibowitz, anchoring faith in the volitional decision to believe does not in any way imply that the I is a certain element in the religious experience; unlike Stein, this definitely cannot serve as “a point of departure behind which I cannot go back” (Stein, 2013, 41). For Stein, the choice for faith is anchored in the “I,” understood as a constituting being to the extent that the I is regarded as identified with its faith that is granted the status of an absolute beginning. However, for Leibowitz, faith is but the constituted beginning of the religious experience that deliberately establishes itself as a beginning. In any event, an individual being who in Leibowitz’s view is ultimately inaccessible to any inquiry whatsoever preceded this datum-point and is maintained subsequently to it. It is apparent that what prevents Leibowitz from regarding the I in this way is his extreme dualistic worldview that distinguishes between one’s psychic reality and the physical reality and presents them as two realms of being in which human beings participate: […] there is no logical correlation between our concepts which refer to things or events of the psychic reality and those which relate to the same in the physical reality…nothing can be changed in the physical world because of the psychic reality. On the other hand, my psychic reality, which I know by a direct acquaintance, is totally independent of any physical reality, in any event of logical necessity; …we do not discover any functional association between these two worlds. (Leibowitz, 2002, 211)

Moreover, according to Leibowitz, “there is no correlation between what occurs in nature or in history…and man’s faith in God and his willingness to serve him” (Leibowitz, 1979, 75). Otherwise, from his point of view, faith would lack value meaning, since it would be enforced upon people, like scientific consciousness that rational people have no choice but to accept (Leibowitz, 1979, 37). From Leibowitz’s perspective, faith, like any volitional choice, was free even from logic itself. As he put it: “I do not regard religious faith as a conclusion… like all evaluations, it does not result from any information one has acquired” (Leibowitz, 1979, 37). Leibowitz insists that “one may still refuse to serve God” even if he or she “could be absolutely certain that the world was created by the will of God, and that He liberated our forefathers from Egypt” (Leibowitz, 1979, 75). Leibowitz supports this argument with Biblical history, claiming that even though the Bible is full of miraculous proofs of the existence of God, as well as attempts to persuade people to believe, those attempts failed totally (Leibowitz, 1979, 75). The foundational nature of the decision to believe is merely its double detachment from the individual’s inner mental reality on the one hand and from the real events of the world on the other hand. Without this detachment, faith would become an outcome of the mental reality or of the worldly reality, and this would deprive it of its value-based nature.

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Blocking the will to believe to any rational or external observation is thus supported by an ontological theory that distinguishes between two fundamental realms of Being in which people participate: internal and external. The decision to believe belongs to the former world and is blocked to the latter world. Thus, we can conclude that even if believers themselves report retrospectively the considerations that led them to take the decision to believe, this is insufficient to explain religious faith, since these considerations have no general validity but at most have particular meaning for these individuals. In contrast, the Halakhic praxis that is the content of faith and identical with it is uniform and grants validity and religious value to the commandments. The Halakhic norms that apply to everyone to the same degree, and only thanks to them, rather than any particular experience or considerations, give religious validity and value to the commandments. Another aspect of the dualistic worldview, which does not enable regarding the I and the volitional decision in favor of faith as a firm ground of faith, deals with Leibowitz’s peculiar understanding of consciousness. In his opinion, one’s wills are composed of “the intimate realm of one’s consciousness.” In contrast to what can be observed and recognized by everyone, one’s wills and the like (wishes, thinking, feelings, etc.) cannot be estimated or evaluated and no method whatsoever is capable of paving the way to them. These might be known only to their owner (Leibowitz, 2002, 210–212), yet cannot be communicated with other individuals, or related to occurrences in the world, either. In Leibowitz’s view, religious belief clearly belongs to the psychic world and is blocked from the physical one; the will to believe cannot be subjected to any objectification or reasoning (Leibowitz, 1982, 62–63). The believer appears as one who has his own idiosyncratic mode of being, so one can never really know what happens in his heart. It is impossible to understand him, and, thus, it is impossible to come to terms with one’s specific will to accept God’s commandments and hence to become a believer. Accordingly, Leibowitz holds: I know no ways to faith other than faith itself […] No method can guide him to this [decision]. Nothing he could experience would lead him to faith if faith did not spring from his own decision and resolve… It is not nature or history that gives origin to religious faith. In that case, faith could have no meaningful value. It would impose itself on man even as the findings of science impose themselves on any mind that understands them, leaving no room for choice, deliberation, and decision. (Leibowitz, 1979, 37–38)

It appears, then, that regarding Leibowitz, there is almost a heavy darkness that shrouds the individual world of the believer—both the precedent one that might have led to the decision to believe and the one that underlies the factual religious experience. Obviously, the centrality of the aspect of heavy darkness in Leibowitz’s idea of believer, which is not balanced by any counter aspect, fortifies its inaccessibility before observation. The situation is so different for Stein, who regarded the “dark” aspect of the person is concomitant with the communicative and rational one; together these appear as positive characteristics of the self and as such are harnessed to the illumination of the experience of faith. While Stein was able to describe much of the world that preceded her choice of faith (Herbstrith, 1983, 47–48), for Leibowitz the very possibility of such a report is dismissed out of hand. Moreover, for Stein, faith, like any human experience, might

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be elucidated through the relationship between the act and its potentiality, whereas for Leibowitz behind the act of the decision to believe there is no potentiality at all. This is also the explanation for his acknowledgment of the principal possibility of human life that does not necessitate religious faith. In any event, anything that has led to faith—either acknowledged as such or not—has no religious value except for the practical experience of following God’s commandments. In fact, Leibowitz does not only recognize the principle possibility of human life that does not lead to the decision to believe, he also characterizes religious faith as “a contrast to human harmony” and the religious experience as “the human being’s crisis” (Leibowitz, 1982, 57). An additional point that radicalizes the darkness that wraps the believer in Leibowitz’s thinking is the extreme heteronomic understanding of God’s commandments, namely as imperatives that are directed to God as another being beyond one’s self. Consequently, after the decision to believe has been taken, i.e., within the praxis itself, the believer is asked to put aside his free will and actually the entire realm of his individuality from which that will be stemmed, and to commit himself totally to those commandments. Thus, Leibowitz’s relentless voluntarism is dismissed in the religious praxis and ends in formalism and deductivism, to the extent that the praxis is finally identified with the religious faith itself. In his words: “We define Judaism as an institutional religion—not only in the sense that it has institutions, as any religion has these institutions, but in the sense that these institutions—the practical commandments—are for Judaism the religion itself, and Judaism doesn’t exist at all outside of these institutions” (Leibowitz, 1976, 14). The aspect of the relations between religious experience and real experience also contains fundamental differences between the two thinkers. Against the background presented in the part devoted to Stein, we can establish that for her it is assumed, almost as a promise, the possible continuity and intimacy between the I and his world thanks to the mediating capability of one’s reflective consciousness. With Leibowitz, one encounters a rift between the act of decision to believe and the wholly practical religious experience itself. This rift is but a mirror to the understanding of one’s consciousness as an intimate realm that has no windows to the happening in the world or to the intentional relation addressed to them. Stein, as we have seen, included in one’s intimacy with oneself openness toward the world and its happenings; in her opinion, the believer might experience reflective insight regarding his or her decision for faith and its background. When this actually happened in her personal life, Stein the phenomenologist had the appropriate tools to come to terms with it. None of all this can happen to Leibowitz, whose understanding of the decision to believe as closed before the world robbed it of the very possibility of reflective experience. It should be noted that since Leibowitz acknowledged no religious value to the consciousness that accompanies faith, i.e., the awareness that is associated with the religious praxis, he also did not regard this fact as a religious deficiency. Finally, Leibowitz’s understanding of the believer as living and acting in an empirical world, yet at the same time as capable of being distinguished from it, led him to conduct a split strategy in his thinking about the Jewish religious faith in which he differentiates between three spheres in which the believer moves. Firstly, there

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is the individual world of the believer which is blocked off from any kind of reflection or rationality. Indeed, the split takes place within the very being of the believer who functions in two different unbridgeable contexts.37 The radicalism that characterizes Leibowitz’s thinking is that even the believer, who is the establisher of the religious experience, cannot bridge the gap between the natural experience and the religious one, for the believer himself is eliminated from it together with every natural component of the human life, to the extent that Leibowitz saw the commandments as conflicting with human nature. Second, there is the world of religious belief, which is ruled by divine commandments that cover all the religious praxis as well as the instructions for its fulfillment. Leibowitz’s thinking is directed exclusively to the sphere of religious belief. He used to say they that he never discussed “religion” or “religiosity” only Judaism that appears as a particular way of obedience to the divine commandments (Leibowitz, 1979, 64). Leibowitz characterized the space in which God’s commandments are actualized as “a sector of things and acts in life that have the meaning of sanctity” (Leibowitz, 1976, 31). Since the “sector of sanctity” takes place in the same realm in which the profane life is conducted, the believer is requested to constantly separate between what is ruled by God’s commandments and thus is sacred and what is free from the divine norms. Leibowitz consciously undermines the widespread traditional approaches that usually regard metaphysics as a theoretical justification or as a mental infrastructure for the religious praxis. For him, at most there is a negative theology, but even such theology is superfluous exactly like its prevalent dealing with the idea of revelation. Indeed, Leibowitz’s equation of faith with the praxis of commandments also eradicated the possibility of achieving theology and philosophy of Judaism. For him, there is no such difference between belief and religion, for “belief is but the religion of divine commandments, outside of which the religious belief does not exist at all” (Leibowitz, 1979, 38). Finally, there is the natural world that can be accessed by every means developed by human civilization. Religious life takes place in the natural world, i.e., in the world as it is. Yet, faith is indifferent toward all the worldly aspects regarding which no commandments are established, for instance: Artistic taste, cosmological scientific issues, and so on. This means that there is no overlap between faith itself and the space in which it exists, but it is a “sector” within it. As is well known, the acknowledgment of the opposition between the religious sphere and the natural one is not an innovation in the religious language.38 What is unique about Leibowitz in this context is that despite facing the challenges that Judaism encountered in the era of modernity and secularization, he did not look for bridges or connecting points between the two spheres, but made great efforts to strengthen the split between them in order to defend religious belief from the invasion of any natural or human elements. So much so that the split becomes a mechanism and even the content of religious life.

37 For

further reading on the split within modern religion, see: Berger (1979, 36f). a sketch of typical Jewish responses to modernity, see: Goldman (1956), Liebman (1988, 43–59). 38 For

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The study of the split strategy that is implemented in Leibowitz’s thinking culminates and crystalizes the entirety of differences that distinguish between the two thinkers’ ideas of religious faith. In the first place, Leibowitz removes from faith’s experience and from religion any personal and human dimension. The understanding of religious faith as identical with the praxis of God’s commandments was designated by Leibowitz both to promote a specific idea of the Jewish religion, which is free of subjectivization and naturalization that would turn it into a human and personal matter, and to defend the believer’s right to remain an individual despite his total commitment to an authority external to himself. The logic behind this move is rather simple; i.e., if one does not want religion to be subjective and subjectivity to be religious, one must separate religious faith from the individuality of the believer. As a result, the believer as an individual being is removed from religious life in two fundamental senses: the believer does not serve as a source for religious life becoming understandable, nor does he or she become clearer in light of his or her decision to commit to religious life. At most, the believer’s personality can be discussed in the negative; i.e., it is not accessible to observation, it is not communicative, and so on. The atomism characterizing the believer is reflected in his or her detachment from any realistic context and closeness before himself or herself and the external world. Thus, the believer in no way constitutes evidence for religious experience, and vice versa, the believer’s choice to commit to all the rules of this experience says nothing about him or her. This means that the believer does what he or she must as a result of his or her decision, but performing the commandments does not and cannot have any personal expression. The removal of the personal and human from the religious experience is associated with the elimination of the aspect of consciousness from the religious experience. Leibowitz explicitly contends that the essence of religious belief is not cognition but the endeavor to maintain the dichotomy between the human and the divine (Leibowitz, 1982, 24) or the gap between immanence and transcendence. Thus, the demand to overcome one’s own human nature becomes the core of religious praxis, and no self-knowledge can be thus achieved. In other words, religious belief is not linked with the attempt to achieve certain knowledge about religion, faith, or the believer, but rather the effort to execute the practical implementations of it (Leibowitz, 1979, 15). This does not necessarily mean that the believer does not understand what he practices, but only that his or her faith is independent of such understanding. Hence, not only can the decision to believe not bear witness to the believer’s personality, but also the individuality that is responsible for choosing a life ruled by religious commandments does not become transparent because of that choice. At most, one can speak of it in a negative way, i.e., not observable, not communicative, etc. Thus, in Leibowitz’s mind, even a religion like Judaism, whose commandments demand so much involvement and cooperation with other practitioners, cannot get in touch with the believer’s personality, which finally remains unaffected and independent of the religious experience. Consequently, the believer does not appear in religious experience as a complete being but solely as a non-personal performer of the commandments of God. As a result of this, the believer’s presence, free of any particularity and individuality in

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the religious experience, does not enable the believer to become the object of study or prediction. This means that despite being a critical component in the very constituting of the religious experience, originating in the volitional decision to believe, in Leibowitz’s approach the believer remains external and even transcendent to his or her own religious experience. The decision is the only moment in which the believer appears in his or her full subjectivity. But immediately after this, the believer functions in the religious experience as a cohesive uniformity that cannot be reduced to anything else. Being ideal, this uniformity does not involve any individual or concrete aspect, and thus, the believer is able to treat all the commandments equally. In fact, there is no reason for a varying attitude toward them, since from Leibowitz’s point of view, they are all contrary to the believer’s individual and natural being, since they are God’s commandments. Thus, after the stage of the decision to believe, in which the believer appeared as an empiric being who is identified with his or her decision, the believer and all the personal elements were removed from the religious experience. The identity between the believer and his or her acts vanished so that the believer remains in the religious experience as an empiric being, whereas the acts signify a nonexperiential and transcendent presence upon which he or she has no influence. As a result, the believer appears in religious experience as an empirical entity, but his or her actions are directed to God’s non-experiential and transcendent presence, which he or she cannot influence. Finally, in contrast to the bridging that occurs between finality and infinity in Stein’s perception of faith, the strategy of splitting applied in Leibowitz’s approach deliberately removes any possibility of mediation from the arena of religious experience. The second aspect that is uncovered by the split strategy deals with the existential dimension regarding faith. As we have seen, Stein and Leibowitz’s approaches clearly show the joining together of the philosophy of the I and the ontological position. However, the expression of the related joining together is opposite in their approaches; i.e., for Stein, the personalization of religious faith accords with the personal ontology of God in Christianity. As opposed to that, with Leibowitz, the elimination of the believer and all personal dimensions from the religious experience are bound with a clear idealistic and anti-existential positioning. Obviously, the unavoidable existence of God underlies Leibowitz’s idea of faith as well. Yet, this point is deliberately silenced, in his words: “In thinking and speaking, in man’s status before God […] the believer (a person of faith for its own sake) tries to refer as little as possible to God—and this is the way of Halakhic people” (Leibowitz, 1982, 84). Also, the ideal of total transcendence unavoidably excludes God from the religious experience as a whole. As against Stein’s experience of fullness, Leibowitz empties the human experience from divine presence and the religious experience from both God’s presence and the personal presence. As a result of the crystallization of the religious experience around the principle of the heteronomy of God’s commandments and the idea of absolute transcendence, God “appears” in religious praxis in an analogical mode, namely by following his commandments. But His very being, i.e., exactly the core of his meaning according to Leibowitz, is absent there. Leibowitz

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himself admitted that, saying that “in reflecting and speaking about man’s standing before God, the believer tries to refer minimally to God” (Leibowitz, 1979, 76). In any event, since faith is but practical obedience to God’s law, the existential aspect can make no difference, since the very decision to believe is not an outcome of external circumstances. Thus, we arrive at the third and the last difference between Stein and Leibowitz that is uncovered by the study of the split strategy. The split narrows and limits the scope of religious life solely to what is defined by the religious commandments. Although the Jewish law covers a vast amount of details, Leibowitz stressed that outside these borders, believers are free to conduct themselves as everybody else, namely as non-believers. In this regard, the figure of the believer is uncovered as resembling that of the non-believer. The sole difference between believers and nonbelievers is exhausted by their attitude to themselves as natural beings; that is, while the non-believer seems to accept it, the believer has not “reconciled himself with the fact that he is part of the natural reality which he cannot transcend.” Thus, one’s religious faith “is not in accord with the objective reality in which he already finds himself and with which he will never be in accord” (Leibowitz, 1982, 53).39 Narrowing and limiting the scope of religion in one’s life takes into account the fact that believers unavoidably remain natural beings. Additionally, especially an approach that strives to separate between one’s individuality and his or her faith may decrease the conflict between the two by making room also for non-religious aspects and activities that concern the natural existence.40 Consequently, a religion that covers a delimited sphere appears as single dimension among others, none of which claim superiority, let alone exclusivity. The limited concept of religion appears as respecting the individuality of the believer and defending it from possible invasion of elements that belong to the religious sphere. At this point, the disparity with Stein becomes clear and transparent: whereas her philosophy of the person is combined with her idea of faith until she finally identifies the person with his or her decisions (Stein, 2013, 423–424), within Leibowitz’s delineating of faith in a distinguished “sector,” such identification is unthinkable. Indeed, Leibowitz’s idea of the Jewish faith compartmentalizes the sphere of faith from that of the profane and thus establishes an unbridgeable gap between worldly immanence and divine transcendence—unbridgeable because the believer will always remain a natural being, whereas religious imperatives are divine.41 According to Leibowitz, only complete detachment of the divine from the human can secure the total devotion of the believer to the work of God. In order to illustrate his 39 For

further discussion of the differences between the two, see: Leibowitz (1979, 142).

40 The understanding of Judaism as a religion that does not close its believers from the non-religious

aspects of life appears is emphasized in Hartman’s studies of Maimonides and in Soloveitchik. See: Hartman (2000, x–xii; 2001). 41 The theory of compartmentalization has become common in current interpretations of the phenomenon of Jewish Orthodoxy. See: Liebman (1988, 54–59). It should be noted that Leibowitz’s original position did not adopt a narrowed version of Judaism but spoke for a model that was more akin to Catholicism. See: “Jewish education in a modern society” (an article from 1954), in: Leibowitz (1976, 37–45). Leibowitz himself did not fully admit a change in his thinking, but

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approach, he suggested distinguishing between two types of religions: granting and demanding. The “granting religion” appears to be a means of fulfilling the believer’s needs, whereas the “demanding religion” imposes upon him obligations without promising him anything in return (Leibowitz, 1979, 13–14). For Leibowitz, as long as one’s faith is based on what religion grants to human beings, it should be seen as idolatry (Leibowitz, 1979, 64). Therefore, only the “demanding religion” is a genuine religion, and vice versa: only when belief is detached from worldly experience and reality and has no function in one’s life is worth its name. Although the decision to believe originated in one’s individuality, the commandments themselves were not designed to fulfill any individual need. This is exactly the meaning of religious belief as a transcendental act—it directs the believer to what lies beyond himself or herself and not toward his internal personality or concrete needs.42 Even more so, by defining the spheres of human experience, narrowing the scope of religious life, and the compartmentalization of the splitting strategy, the believer’s individuality was pushed outside the religious experience. At this point, the gap between the religion of commandments and the religion of love that conquered Stein’s world becomes fully apparent.

Epilogue: The Renewed Meeting in Radicalism The presentation and analysis of Stein and Leibowitz’s perceptions of faith in this article showed that despite the starting point common to both thinkers, the essential differences between them—which were implied already within their understanding of the stage of the decision to believe, and further clarified in the discussion of its implications—form an abyss separating the two types of religious experience. The exposition of Stein’s and Leibowitz’s ideas of faith uncovered essential differences that point to an abyss between the two thinkers. Stein exposed an approach in which faith, personality, and the meaning that human beings grant to their existence in the world join together into a coherent system. Her idea of the immanent sphere contains all components of faith until finally faith becomes in-itself the all-inclusive and comprehensive meaning of the immanent being. Consequently, for Stein, immanence embraces, besides the divine, the human, and even the personal as well. Also, despite her deep affinities with Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, Stein was bound to reject his phenomenological reduction, which indicated the idealistic turn in his phenomenology, which demanded that the reality of the world and the I should be presented it more as shift of emphasis (he referred to it in a note. see: Leibowitz, 1976, 45). Nevertheless, the understanding that a real change occurred in Leibowitz’s thinking is common among his commentators. 42 The distinction between the religions complements the above-mentioned regarding the two beliefs, i.e. “belief for its own sake” and “belief not for its own sake.” This classical distinction has appeared in many contexts. For instance, see: B. T. Ta’anith 7a. Leibowitz wrote a series of articles on the topic of “Lishmah and Not-Lishmah” (“for its own sake and not for its own sake”). The one which was translated into English appeared in: Leibowitz (1979, 61–78).

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bracketed in favor of focusing on the contents of consciousness. It seems that from her realistic phenomenological point of view, the reduction was perceived as a metaphysical move and the homogeneity of immanent being that created a false lacuna in reality, which operates according to its own rules and breaks the sequence and the homogeneity of immanent Being.43 As against the rupture within immanence that is caused by Husserl’s methodical act, Stein achieved a notion of faith in which everything might find its proper place: the individual’s person, empathic relations with others, gender identity, the intellectual search that associates philosophy and metaphysics, the rational meaning granted to oneself in the world, and of course the ineffable religious passion. To a certain extent, Stein’s notion of faith realizes her early vision regarding the “trustworthy translation” (sachgetreuen Übersetzung), whereby “The translator must be like a windowpane (Fensterscheibe) that transfers all the light, but itself does not become visible” (HCM, 1960c, 7).44 Like the figure of the translator she imagines, Stein’s faith did not place any barrier before the entire range of references that accompanied her life and work. Stein’s religious faith created a space that enabled all of these to coexist without conflict of a breach in her being. Moreover, against the background of faith, the range of Stein’s spiritual accomplishments shone brighter, so that she required nothing additional beyond the Catholic faith she had adopted. Thus, if one is able to put aside for a single moment Stein’s tragic destiny at Auschwitz, it might be possible to state that the Catholic faith granted her everything, i.e., Being (‘Herr des Seins’), meaning (‘Herr des Sinns’) (Stein, 2013, 99–100), and a comprehensive, total, and closed world view (Stein, 2014, 143). This all-inclusive system deserves the title radicalism of immanence. Leibowitz’s narrowed and limited view of Judaism, which banishes the classic demand for the totalization of religious life, is entirely different. The split to the point of compartmentalization that rules his idea of faith expropriated from it any authority for teaching something regarding the human experience in the world—be it scientific, aesthetic, ethical, or psychological. Rather, in Leibowitz’s view of Judaism, outside the practical realm of the commandments, all the aspects of human existence in the world are free from any religious meaning. Therefore, the Jewish faith as conceived by Leibowitz does not supply its believes any information about the world. Of particular importance is the fact that the phenomenology of the believer in Leibowitz’s thinking is not identical with his general conception of anthropology. Thus, aspects in the individual’s personality that appear in the phenomenon of religious belief do not come into view in other realms in which human beings take part. Within this exclusion of the believer as an individual outside of faith is mirrored the ideal of total transcendence 43 Like

the other early realistic phenomenologists of the Munich Circle, Stein too understood phenomenology first and foremost as a method, and realism as an attitude toward things rather than as a conceptual framework (as it is usually understood implicitly in Husserl’s transcendent reduction). See: Avé-Lallemant (2015, 66–67; Spiegelberg, 1959; Funke, 1987). 44 Stein’s statement from the Gymnasium period is documented in the Preface that HCM composed as an introduction to the collection of her letters. HCM established that “one can say that Edith Stein barely comprehended anything that is indifferent to this beauty through her coined sense of ‘translation’” (HCM, 1960c, 7).

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that excludes God from the religious experience as well. Thus, Leibowitz’s idea of faith might be defined as radicalism of transcendence.45 Against these fundamental disparities between Stein and Leibowitz arises the question regarding the significance of their common point of departure. The basic phenomenological observation that underlies the discussion throughout this essay implies that this communality cannot be accidental, since the first given must somehow be present also in the last one at which the investigation has arrived.46 The question is then: what is the thing that Leibowitz’s Jewishness and Stein’s Catholicism share? HCM’s association between Catholicism, the Jewish spirit, and phenomenology might provide the fulcrum for dealing with this question. On the one hand, she holds that if one identifies “the longing towards the objective” and the “sanctity of Being” with Catholicism, then “certainly all the phenomenologists might be called ‘Catholic’” (HCM, 1960b, 63)47 On the other hand, as she tried to explain the Jewish background of many phenomenologists in the realistic circle,48 she observed that unconditioned radicalism was typical of the Jewish spirit (HCM, 1960b, 68). These firm determinations should not be considered as historical arguments, regardless of HCM herself having a Jewish background and a religious Protestant lifestyle. Yet it appears that through them, HCM succeeds in identifying a deep element motivating the passion Stein and Leibowitz shared, despite the differences in their perceptions of faith: a radicalism explicitly constructed in an effort to overcome the modern flight to subjectivity by means of openness to the object (Objektgeöffenheit), to the fact, and to Being itself (HCM, 1960b, 63).49 Moreover, I argue that the radical 45 In another context, I coined the phrases “radicalism of immanence” and “radicalism of transcendence”, and I discussed extensively the paradigmatic metaphysical positions entailed in them and their hermeneutic efficiency. See: Miron (2014b, 395–397). 46 This inspiring phenomenological principle is interestingly discussed by the contemporary French phenomenologist Jean-Luc Marion, see: Marion (2002, 9–11). 47 The understanding of Judaism as Catholic in its spirit exists also in modern Jewish thinking, in particular Ernst Simon. See: Simon 1969. In this context, see also Schandl’s discussion Stein’s thinking vis-à-vis Simon, Schandl (1990, 176–185). 48 Among this group, the Munich Circle, were several prominent people who were Jewish, some of whom converted to Christianity. To Edith Stein, who was the most famous in her act of conversion, even more than Husserl, we can add the following names: Adolf Reinach; Max Scheler; Dietrich von Hildebrand. There were also Jews who did not convert, including: Fritz Kaufmann and Moritz Geiger. For further reading about this group, see: Avé-Lallemant (1971, 1975a), Schmücker (1956, 1–33). 49 The method that united the realistic phenomenological circle was characterized by “the turn to the object” (Die Wende zum Objekt). This orientation, which developed around Husserl during the 1920s in Gottingen, sought to respond to his famous appeal “go back to the ‘things themselves’” (Husserl, 1970a, 168/1984a, 10), which considered the perceived objects and the ways in which they are known to be founded upon a regularity independent of consciousness or the subject. Moritz Geiger, Stein’s contemporary realistic phenomenologist, well characterized this orientation as follows: “[…] while in the past people almost always saw the objects as images of the I, now the tension between the I and the object in accordance with its law returns. [We seek] what is in front of the I, the object. Overcoming the tension between them cannot be achieved through absorbing the

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nature of the thought that as such is directed at the most primordial elements of the issue under discussion might allow Leibowitz’s Judaism and Stein’s Catholicism to stand side by side after each of them recognizes that what it lacks is realized in the other. Thus, while Stein’s disposition of radicalism of immanence might achieve the insight regarding its need for containing an aspect of firm transcendence, Leibowitz’s radicalism of transcendence might acknowledge its urgent need for the participation of immanent consciousness. Consequently, would elucidate not only the power of faith in shaping one’s personality but also the unique metaphysical experience whose object is God. This vision of a spiritual meeting between the two archetypes of radicalism by no means relinquished the element of tension that is inescapable in any very attempt of human beings to rise above their natural existence. Still, the two ideas of religious faith can meet in Stein’s depiction of her experience at the Carmelite monastery: “the complete self-creation […] for a specific matter” (Stein’s words cited from: HCM, 1960b, 76). Moreover, somehow both acknowledged the need for a kind of worldwithdrawal in order to realize their idea of faith in a sort of homogeneous realm: Stein entered the Carmelite monastery, and Leibowitz localized faith in “a sector of sanctity” (Leibowitz, 1976, 31). The homogeneity characterizing these constituted spaces, even though the contents that fill them are fundamentally different, is the immediate and direct stamp of meeting the general requirement for radicalism. In this respect, at least, we can observe these two perceptions of faith discussed in this article in the spirit of what Stein termed the “wonder of the world” (Weltwunder) of “simultaneous-Church” that she encountered in her visit to Heidelberg which was “divided in its middle by a wall, and this side is used for protestant service while the other for catholic one” (Stein, 2002a, 333).50

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