Hard, Soft, and Smart Power – Education as a Power Resource (DIA-LOGOS) [New ed.] 9783631732212, 9783631732229, 9783631732236, 9783631732243, 363173221X

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Dia-Logos

Schriften zu Philosophie und Sozialwissenschaften Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences

In the current global context, there is a shift in power paradigm from the rigid realpolitik perspective towards the inclusion of multiple faces of power. This publication focuses on the power forms identified by Joseph Nye: hard, soft, and smart, and evaluates education as a resource of power. Resource ambiguity is one of the key shortcomings of soft power theory. Education is a smart power resource since it has both hard and soft power characteristics. The case study of Kazakhstan reveals that international educational programs allow education to become a power resource.

Aigerim Raimzhanova studied International Relations at the University of Rochester (NY, USA) and Management at the Regents University (London, UK). She has obtained a Ph.D degree from the University of Bucharest and the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy in Berlin, Germany. www.peterlang.com

DIA 22_273221_Raimzhanova_GR_HCA5151x214 PLE.indd 1

Aigerim Raimzhanova · Hard, Soft, and Smart Power – Education as a Power Resource

22

Bd./vol. 22

Dia-Logos Herausgegeben von/Edited by Tadeusz Buksiński und Piotr W. Juchacz

H S E P

Hard, Soft, and Smart Power – Education as a Power Resource Aigerim Raimzhanova

ISBN 978-3-631-73221-2

06.03.18 11:39

Dia-Logos

Schriften zu Philosophie und Sozialwissenschaften Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences

In the current global context, there is a shift in power paradigm from the rigid realpolitik perspective towards the inclusion of multiple faces of power. This publication focuses on the power forms identified by Joseph Nye: hard, soft, and smart, and evaluates education as a resource of power. Resource ambiguity is one of the key shortcomings of soft power theory. Education is a smart power resource since it has both hard and soft power characteristics. The case study of Kazakhstan reveals that international educational programs allow education to become a power resource.

Aigerim Raimzhanova studied International Relations at the University of Rochester (NY, USA) and Management at the Regents University (London, UK). She has obtained a Ph.D degree from the University of Bucharest and the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy in Berlin, Germany.

Aigerim Raimzhanova · Hard, Soft, and Smart Power – Education as a Power Resource

22

Bd./vol. 22

Dia-Logos Herausgegeben von/Edited by Tadeusz Buksiński und Piotr W. Juchacz

H S E P

Hard, Soft, and Smart Power – Education as a Power Resource Aigerim Raimzhanova

www.peterlang.com

DIA 22_273221_Raimzhanova_GR_HCA5151x214 PLE.indd 1

06.03.18 11:39

Hard, Soft, and Smart Power – Education as a Power Resource

Dia-Logos Schriften zu Philosophie und Sozialwissenschaften Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences Herausgegeben von / Edited by Tadeusz Buksiński / Piotr W. Juchacz Advisory Board Karl-Otto Apel (Frankfurt am Main) Manuel Jiménez-Redondo (Valencia) Peter Kampits (Wien) Theodore Kisiel (Illinois) Hennadii Korzhov (Donetsk) Marek Kwiek (Poznań) George McLean (Washington) Evangelos Moutsopoulos (Athènes) Sergey Nizhnikov (Moscow) Ewa Nowak (Poznań)

Bd. /vol. 22

Aigerim Raimzhanova

Hard, Soft, and Smart Power – Education as a Power Resource

Bibliographic Information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress

Printed by CPI books GmbH, Leck

ISSN 1619-005X ISBN 978-3-631-73221-2 (Print) ISBN 978-3-631-73222-9 (E-PDF) E-ISBN 978-3-631-73223-6 (EPUB) E-ISBN 978-3-631-73224-3 (MOBI) DOI 10.3726/b11642 © Peter Lang GmbH Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften Frankfurt am Main 2017 All rights reserved. Peter Lang Edition is an Imprint of Peter Lang GmbH. Peter Lang – Frankfurt am Main · Berlin · Bruxelles · New York · Oxford · Warszawa · Wien All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any utilisation outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without the permission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in electronic retrieval systems. This publication has been peer reviewed. www.peterlang.com

Contents List of Figures����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7 Chapter 1 Introduction�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������11 Chapter 2 Power�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21 Chapter 3 Issues of Soft Power���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������39 Chapter 4 Education as a Resource of Smart Power��������������������������������������������������63 Chapter 5 Empirical Case Study�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������91 Chapter 6 Education as a Power Resource in Kazakhstan��������������������������������������117 Chapter 7 Conclusion�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������139 Bibliography��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������163

List of figures Figure 1. Figure 2. Figure 3. Figure 4. Figure 5. Figure 6. Figure 7. Figure 8. Figure 9. Figure 10. Figure 11. Figure 12. Figure 13. Figure 14. Figure 15. Figure 16. Figure 17. Figure 18.

Power (Nye, J. 2008)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 33 Hard power resources������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 44 Soft power resources (Nye, J. 2008)�������������������������������������������������������� 45 Soft power resources (McClory, J. 2011)����������������������������������������������� 47 Soft power resources (McClory, J. 2015)����������������������������������������������� 48 Soft power resources (Raimzhanova, A. 2015)������������������������������������� 54 Soft power resources expanded (Raimzhanova, A. 2015)������������������� 55 Education in soft power theory�������������������������������������������������������������� 64 Education in hard power resource framework������������������������������������� 69 Relationship between Education, Human Capital, and Economic Growth������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 83 Resource of Education����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 85 Smart power���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 86 Smart power resources����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 87 Smart power resources Alternative�������������������������������������������������������� 87 Education in the hard-soft-smart power framework��������������������������� 88 Map of Kazakhstan��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 102 Kazakhstan’s power resources��������������������������������������������������������������� 115 Education as a power resource in Kazakhstan������������������������������������ 137

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Education is the most powerful weapon, which you can use to change the world. - Nelson Mandela

Chapter 1. Introduction Power has represented a key topic of interest to academics throughout the ages and remains a central subject in various disciplines today. Despite a great deal of attention, however, there are notable debates over power’s definition and features that lead to the topic’s ambiguity and complexity. Power derives from the Latin potere, which means, “to be able.” It is generally used to describe a property, ability, or capacity to affect things.1 The word lies at the center of a semantic field that includes authority, influence, coercion, force, violence, manipulation, strength, and so forth.2 At its most general, power means the capacity to bring about outcomes3 or the ability to affect others to achieve the outcomes one wants.4 Alternatively, power can be defined as “the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances.”5 Furthermore, power could be viewed not as the property of an individual, but instead, as a property of a group and exist only as long as the group is together.6 In an attempt to study power, scholars have responded to the breadth of the topic by narrowing their views on power and its methodological and normative schemas. However, Power is far too complex in its sources, effects, and production to be reduced to one dimension.7 According to Petersen, progress in the understanding of power depends on changing the focus of theory development from quests for consensus on the definitions to research agendas that are aimed at progressive refinements of distinctions between different types of power.8 Moreover, Baldwin argues that although power is an ancient research focus, there are many opportunities for further 1 Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), 1213. 2 Steven Lukes, “Power,” Contexts 6, no. 3 (2007): 59. 3 Ibid. 4 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 154. 5 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59, no. 01 (2005): 42. 6 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1970), 44. 7 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59, no. 01 (2005): 67. 8 Kira Petersen, “Four Types of Power in International Relations: Coercive Power, Bargaining Power, Concerted Power, and Institutionalized Power” (working paper, presented at the IPSA, XXII World Congress of Political Science, Madrid, 2012), 2.

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studies, including in the field of different forms of power.9 Many aspects of Power are still not well understood; for instance, the notion of power as hard and soft. Joseph Nye, a prominent political scientist, split power into two forms: hard and soft. Hard or command power is linked to the oldest understanding of power, in which nation-states exist in a system of anarchy and, as a result of not having a higher authority, have to rely on power politics. Hard power could be defined as an ability to reach one’s goals through coercive actions or threats, the so-called ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ of international politics. Traditionally, “power in international relations has been defined and assessed in easily quantifiable ‘hard’ terms, often understood in the context of military and economic might.”10 Hard power is “the exercise of influence through coercion and relies on tactics like military intervention, coercive diplomacy, inducements of payment, and economic sanctions.”11 Meanwhile, soft power, according to Nye, “rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others” and is “associated with intangible assets such as attractive personality, culture, political values, institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority.”12 Soft power strategies avoid the use of coercive instruments. Instead, they persuade “by using networks, developing and communicating compelling narratives, establishing international norms, building coalitions, and drawing on the key resources that endear one country to another.”13 In other words, “hard power is push; soft power is pull.”14 The relevance of soft power is increasing as the global geopolitics is currently in the process of a fundamental transformation. The dynamics of global power is rapidly changing, which causes “extensive economic and political changes affecting

9 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, in Handbook of International Relations 2nd ed., ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 291. 10 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 153–171. 11 Ernest J. III Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power, ” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 114. 12 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 95. 13 Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 8. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portland-communications.com/ publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/. 14 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Power and foreign policy,” Journal of Political Power 4, no. 1 (2011): 19.

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all nations.”15 For instance, economic and political power is slowly distributing from West to East. Rapid industrialization, demographic changes, modernization and the spread of modern technology have enhanced the capabilities of emerging states. As a group, the developing states are becoming active participants in global policy-making, symbolizing a shift in the global center of power from the developed West toward the emerging East or, alternatively, from North to South.16 Furthermore, the nation-states are no longer the only key global players today. As non-state actors start to play an influential role in world affairs, global power seems to shift away from states altogether toward multinational corporations.17 Nye attributes the diffusion of power from state to private actors to the factors of modernization, urbanization, and increased communication in developing countries.18 The era of broadening and deepening global flows will continue to create new opportunities for emerging governments and a wider range of companies to achieve growth and participate in the global policymaking.19 The shifting landscape of power is the result of two global trends: “the rise of networks as the driving force in global affairs and the digital revolution, meaning that world events increasingly play out online.”20 The challenges and opportunities will rarely be contained within national borders. To achieve preferred policy outcomes and multiply their power, states would now have to cooperate with other players.21 In sum, as a result of power diffusion among actors, technological advances, and empowered global public and networks, international politics are undergoing a fundamental shift.22 Nye argues: “In this more complex and 15 Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 8. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portland-communications.com/ publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/. 16 Deepak Nayyar, The South in the World Economy: Past, Present, and Future (New York: Human Development Report Office, 2013). 17 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011). 18 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 162. 19 James Manyika, Jacques Bughin, Susan Lund, Olivia Nottebohm, David Poulter, Sebastian Jauch, and Sree Ramaswamy, Global flows in a digital age: How trade, finance, people, and data connect the world economy (McKinsey Global Institute, 2014), 119. 20 Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 11. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portland-communications.com/ publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/. 21 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011). 22 Jonathan McClory, The New Persuaders II. A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power (Institute for Government, 2011), 24. Accessed June 1, 2015. http://www.instituteforgovernment. org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/The%20New%20PersuadersII_0.pdf.

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multi-polar world, the limits of hard power–the use of force, threats, sanctions or payments–are more evident.”23 According to the author, the growing social mobilization re-emphasizes the use of intangible forms of power and makes the factors of technology, education, and economic growth as significant as geography, population, and resources.24 The new global paradigm makes the renegotiation of international relations and the reshaping of policies critical. Meanwhile, the imperative to study soft power stems not only from the growing relevance of soft power but also from the need to critically assess its conceptual foundation. In International Relations (IR) theory, Power has been historically viewed in the realm of the realist school. Realism has been the dominant theory of world politics since the beginning of the Academy of International Relations.25 The belongingness of power to the realist tradition, however, has generated a limit for the concept of power.26 Baldwin argues that the importance of military force–a key focus of the realist school–has been previously exaggerated, while “the role of nonmilitary forms of power has been underestimated.”27 As Bilgin and Elis state: The centrality of power—in its various guises—to the theory and practice of world politics is impossible to overlook. What is often overlooked, however, are the less visible expressions of power that are difficult to examine in the ways in which one can observe and document the projection of military power. Merely focusing on the projection of military power, while useful on its own terms, has nevertheless impoverished our understanding of the productive role [of] other forms of power.28

23 Joseph Nye’s Foreword, in Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 6. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portlandcommunications.com/publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/. 24 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 154. 25 Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmit, “Realism,” in The Globalization of World Politics: an Introduction to International Relations, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 161. 26 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59, no. 01 (2005): 39–75. 27 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, in Handbook of International Relations 2nd ed., ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 285. 28 Pinar Bilgin and Berivan Elis, “Hard Power, Soft Power: Toward a more realistic analysis,” Insight Turkey 10, no. 2 (2008): 5.

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Hence, Stefano Guzzini, among others, has strongly argued for the expansion of the dimensions of power.29 Although the idea of soft power and its resources is not new,30 it is only now that soft power is developing conceptually. Scholars and practitioners start to increasingly recognize that the world is in need of a shift from old assumptions and rigid distinctions about ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power.31 As Mattern argues: Military prowess and economic accumulation–both commonly recognized as hard power–are the uncontested baseline for thinking about power among IR scholars, but dissatisfaction with this simplistic conceptualisation has spurred myriad inquiries into other facets and forms of power.32

However, a wider usage of the soft power concept does not symbolize wider understanding.33 There are many paths one can pursue in soft power research: Which forms of power are more relevant in today’s global framework and why? Is soft power more effective than hard power? What are the moral implications of soft power use? These issues have been probed at and discussed in a number of publications. To conduct innovative and topical scholarly research, the author of this monograph has decided to focus on one of the most urgent issues in soft power: the topic of resources. As stated by Nye:

29 Stefano Guzzini, “The Concept of Power: A Constructivist Analysis,” in Power in World Politics, ed. Felix Berenskoetter and M.J. Williams (New York: Routledge, 2007). Stefano Guzzini, “Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis”, International Organization 47, no. 3 (1993): 443–478. Stefano Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1998). 30 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 167. 31 Kirsten Bound, Rachel Briggs, John Holden, and Samuel Jones, Cultural Diplomacy (London: Demos, 2007), 13. Accessed May 1, 2015. http://www.demos.co.uk/files/ Cultural diplomacy - web.pdf. 32 Janice B. Mattern, “Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics,” Journal of International Studies 33, no. 3 (2005): 587. 33 Joseph Nye’s Foreword, in Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 6. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portlandcommunications.com/publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/.

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In order to deploy soft power to achieve the wider foreign policy goals, governments must first understand the resources they can deploy and understand where they might be effective; as up to now, they often relied on guesswork and intuition.34

According to Nye, the three resources that soft power of a nation-state is based on are its culture, political values, and foreign policies.35 Nye’s categorization of soft power resources has stimulated the appearance of other influential works, in particular, the research of Jonathan McClory. In evaluating soft power components, McClory expanded on Nye’s pillars and assessed the soft power of countries according to the following five categories: Government (political values of the country), Culture (a set of practices that created meaning for the society), Diplomacy (foreign policy), Education, and Business/Innovation.36 In 2015, McClory presented a new report on soft power, which included an updated categorization of soft power resources and now included a ‘Digital’ component as well.37 While McClory’s project effectively builds on the work of developing the concept of soft power,38 one could disagree with McClory’s conceptualization as his pillars might be regarded as not equivalent in the analytical sense. For instance, calling the initial sub-indexes Government and Business is a potential source of confusion; it is unclear whether they represent the specific instruments in the respective spheres or the agents of soft power. The Business sub-index could refer to business as the agent of soft power or the specific business policies, implemented by the state or other actors. In the later conceptualization, McClory puts the Government sub-index on the same line as Education, assuming that the key creator of soft power is the state. Meanwhile, many non-traditional actors such as NGOs, multinational corporations, and civil society groups are becoming significant

34 Joseph Nye’s Foreword, in Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 7. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portlandcommunications.com/publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/. 35 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 96. 36 Jonathan McClory, The New Persuaders II. A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power (Institute for Government, 2011), 10. Accessed June 1, 2015. http://www.instituteforgovernment. org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/The%20New%20PersuadersII_0.pdf. 37 Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 21. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portland-communications.com/ publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/. 38 Joseph Nye’s Foreword, in Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 7. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portlandcommunications.com/publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/.

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power players. This points to the need of revisiting the conceptualization of soft power resources. Power resources are numerous; yet, their nature and categorization are not always straightforward. As resources “are not an essential defining characteristic of soft [or hard] power,” but more of an empirical association, some power resources are not easily identifiable.39 Outlining the characteristics that define soft power can be challenging.40 In this respect, Education represents an ambiguous resource. On the one hand, education seems to be a classic soft power resource as propagated by Nye. Following Nye’s definition, Education sub-index could refer to the factors of foreign exchange effectiveness and “include measures on the number of foreign students in a country, the relative quality of its universities and the output of academic publishing.”41 The capability of a state to attract international students and support educational exchanges is a significant instrument of public diplomacy.42 Previous research on educational exchanges shows empirical evidence of the benefits to a host country, including in reputation, after international students go back to their home countries.43 In contrast–while acknowledging education as an effective source of soft power–one could also suggest that education has hard power characteristics through its connection with human capital and economic strength, a traditional hard power resource. In case of a positive answer, could this mean that the position of Education resource solely in soft power theory is erroneous and it should be conceptualized differently? This book suggests that a better understanding of soft power mechanisms, particularly of education, is imperative. Apart from soft power, Nye introduced another concept into the realm of power theory: smart power. According to Nye, the classic distinction between realpolitik and liberalism becomes blurred since hard and soft power often interact

39 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, in Handbook of International Relations 2nd ed., ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 289. 40 Ibid. 41 Jonathan McClory, The New Persuaders II. A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power (Institute for Government, 2011), 11. Accessed June 1, 2015. http://www.instituteforgovernment. org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/The%20New%20PersuadersII_0.pdf. 42 Arthur H. Miller, “Promoting Democratic Values in Transitional Societies through Foreign Aid” (paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL, 2006). 43 Carol Atkinson, “Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs 1980–2006,” Foreign Policy Analysis 6, no. 1 (2010): 1–22.

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and complement each other.44 Smart power is defined “as the ability to skilfully combine hard and soft power for the development of integrated strategies.”45 As an approach that goes further than hard and soft, it fits well into the current realities of international relations. However, as another infant theoretical concept, it requires extensive studies as well. In particular, Wilson argues that the critique of soft and smart power is justified as their arguments “suffer from methodological flaws, pointing for a need for better definitions and conceptualization of soft power, greater attention to the institutional realities, and a more systematic effort to incorporate real-world dynamics.”46 Hence, the aim of this publication is to contribute to the development of sub-categories of power and fill the gap in studying Nye’s frames: hard, soft and smart. Importantly, Power is an inter-disciplinary subject, requiring a similarly diverse analysis. To enable a fruitful and well-rounded assessment of the subject of power, this monograph will consider the theories in the fields of International Relations and Economics. Incorporating theories from more than one field should contribute to a better understanding of the theoretical foundation and empirical realities of Nye’s forms of power. To reiterate, the aim of this monograph is to assess Nye’s forms of power and, specifically, evaluate education as a resource of power. The research questions which this publication explores are three-fold: First, what are the key shortcomings of the soft power theory and practice? Second, does education represent a hard power resource, in addition to being a soft one? If yes, what are the underlying reasons for this? And third, how can education become a more effective power resource, based on the results of the empirical study? In order to get answers to the questions, the following research objectives are set: a) Carry out an extensive literature survey to evaluate the concept of power, with specific reference to soft, hard, and smart power frames; b) Analyze the problematic aspects of soft power, specifically regarding its resources; c) Evaluate education as an instrument of soft and hard power and assess this theoretically and empirically. 

44 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 170. Joseph S. Jr. Nye, Soft Power: the means to success in world politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 45 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Jr. Nye, CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A smarter, more secure America (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2007), 7. 46 Ernest J. III Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 114.

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This publication will make use of both theoretical and practical research, making the methodology an integrated one. The first part will be theoretical, relying on the existing scholarly literature on the topic. It is essential that scholar’s arguments be tested against the existing theories. This can be achieved through building on the ideas already in the public domain, synthesizing them, and detecting any contradictions.47 In the second part of the publication–in line with the third research objective– the author is going to evaluate the findings of the empirical study. It is important to apply practically the concepts of soft and smart power to try to see their relevance for political reality and policies that can be adopted by states. Empirical research will make use of a case study research method. The case study approach is often highlighted as a valuable research method for addressing a descriptive or explanatory question, studying a phenomenon within the real-world context, and conducting evaluations.48 Since education as a power resource is a relatively unknown phenomenon, qualitative research approach is chosen. Qualitative data allows getting “deep insights into the phenomenon under study by considering context-specific factors, complex patterns and causal relationships.”49 Moreover, this perspective aims to understand people and seek insight, rather than statistically interpret them.50 The detailed empirical research methodology is presented in chapter 5. This book consists of 7 chapters, including the introductory and concluding chapters. Chapter 2 will highlight the complexity of the subject of power, setting the context for the discussion of power forms introduced by Joseph Nye. Chapter 3 will argue that the weakness of the soft power theory stems, among other issues, from the ambiguity with regard to its resources and address this by proposing an updated categorization of soft power resources. The chapter will also highlight practical issues that prevent soft power’s effective recognition and deployment, thus, analyzing power both as a conceptual idea and a practical

47 Steven Harrison, How to Write a PhD in Less than 3 years: A Practical Guide (Bloomington: AuthorHouse, 2010), 37. 48 Robert K. Yin, Applications of case study research 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Sage Publications, 2012), 5. 49 Anne-Katrin Neyer and Anne-Wil Harzing, “The impact of culture on interactions: Five Lessons learned from the European Commission,” European Management Journal 26, no 5 (2008): 6. 50 Judith Bell, Doing Your Research Project: A Guide For First-Time Researchers in Education, Health and Social Science (Maidenhead, England: Open University Press, 2005).

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category. To further address the issue of resource ambiguity, the author will take on the resource of education for a closer analysis in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 will assess the ambiguous nature of Education as a power resource. Educational programs and exchanges traditionally shape opinion, create goodwill and attract temporary migrants, making it an effective soft power resource. It will be argued, however, that educational investments also contribute to economic competitiveness–which is an attribute of hard power–following the review of the relevant literature. Furthermore, the chapter will look back at a smart power theory and propose a new theorization of smart power resources. The author will frame Education in a smart power resource category by illustrating that it has both hard and soft power characteristics. In order to expand this discussion, the author will conduct an empirical study, presented in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 will overview the empirical research methodology and set the framework for the discussion of the case study. The assessment of the Kazakhstani case will reveal the state’s high dependency on hard power resources and, at the same time, highlight the willingness to invest into soft power resources. In particular, the empirical respondents will outline education as a sustainable source of development in light of Kazakhstan’s complex geopolitical context. Chapter 6 will evaluate education as a power resource in Kazakhstan. In answering the question of whether education is a power resource, the empirical research will reveal that the competitive international educational programs on the secondary level are important factors in affecting change and development in the Kazakhstani educational sector. In other words, there is evidence that international education could be a driver of human capital formation and economic growth, making it a potential power resource. Overall, the findings of the empirical study will support the argument that education can be viewed as a power resource. In terms of insights for the theory of education as a determinant of growth, the case of Kazakhstan will provide evidence that a secondary international educational sector, spurred by private sector efforts, could be regarded as a parameter of estimating human capital and economic strength of the country. Finally, Chapter 7 will highlight the key insights and contributions of the monograph, as well as outlining directions for further research.

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Chapter 2. Power Introduction The introductory chapter has presented the book rationale and outlined the research aim and objectives. This chapter aims to partially satisfy the first objective – carry out a literature survey on the concept of power with specific attention to Joseph Nye’s power frames. The evaluation of the concept of power is not the overall goal of this publication; rather, it is an important pathway toward setting the context for the analysis of soft and smart power. Hence, I am going to overview the concept of power, keeping in mind the scope and goals of the book. The discussion in this chapter will refer, among others, to the writings of the following scholars: Robert Dahl, Max Weber, Roderick Martin, Talcott Parsons, Jeffrey Isaac, Steven Lukes, Stephen Walt, David Baldwin, Hans Morgenthau, John Mearsheimer, Jeffrey Hart, Barnett and Duvall, Bachrach and Baratz, and Joseph Nye.

Conceptualizing Power The topic of power can be approached from a multitude of disciplines and methodological approaches; importantly, no treatment of the subject is exhaustive. Power has been present in scholarly discussions since the time of Thucydides.51 Despite such great deal of attention, however, there are notable debates over power’s specific definition and its features, which lead to the topic’s ambiguity and complexity. Power derives from the Latin potere, which means, “to be able.” It is generally used to describe a property, ability, or capacity to affect things.52 The word lies at the center of a semantic field that includes authority, influence, coercion, force, violence, manipulation, strength, and so forth.53 For instance, among pluralists, power, influence, and other similar terms are used interchangeably, on the

51 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, in Handbook of International Relations 2nd ed., ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 273. 52 Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), 1213. 53 Steven Lukes, “Power,” Contexts 6, no. 3 (2007): 59.

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assumption that a similar notion lies behind all these concepts.54 Furthermore, Nelson Polsby states that power, influence, and control are synonyms since they refer to the capacity of one actor to do something to influence another actor and change the probable pattern of future events.55 Robert Dahl calls the objects in the relationship of power as actors. The term is inclusive and refers to individuals, groups, roles, governments, nation-states, or other human aggregates.56 This monograph adopts this definition of an actor as well. Furthermore, the focus of this research is power in the framework of international relations, not domestic political power. The main reason for this is that soft power–the focus of the monograph–is primarily created and implemented for the influence on the international arena, although in most cases, its effects are visible within the country as well. Before moving on to soft power, however, it is essential to overview the concept of power in general terms. Most definitions of power are abstract. For instance, Dahl argued that “power terms in modern social science refer to sub-sets of relations among social units in such a way that the behaviours of one or more units depend in some circumstances on the behaviour of other units.”57 In an attempt to study power, scholars have responded to the breadth of the topic by narrowing their views on power and its methodological and normative schemas. For instance, power can be defined as “the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate.”58 Alternatively, power could be defined not as the property of an individual, but as a property of a group and remain in existence only as long as the group is together.59 One of the most influential definitions of power, as exercised in the framework of a state, belongs to Max Weber, who views it as the “probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will

54 Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” in Political Power: A Reader in Theory and Research, ed. Roderick Bell, David V. Edwards, and R. Harrison Wagner (New York: Free Press, 1969), 80. 55 Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), 3–4. 56 Robert A. Dahl, “The concept of power,” Behavioral Science 2, no. 3 (1957): 203. 57 Robert A. Dahl, “Power”, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences vol. 12 (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1968). 58 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59, no. 01 (2005): 42. 59 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1970), 44.

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despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.”60 In Weber’s theorization, power is an “attribute that derives from the qualities, resources and capabilities of one subject.”61 However, the Weberian definition attracted a number of criticisms as well. For instance, Roderick Martin pointed out that Weber did not define power, but rather provided the foundation for comparing the characteristics of the actors. Moreover, the author argues, by incorporating the element of conflict, Weber disregards the occurrence of mutually beneficial relations by power holders.62 In contrast, Talcott Parsons offered a conceptualization of power, which did not define it in terms of conflict, but viewed it as a system resource. Parsons argues: Power is a generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective organization when obligations are legitimized with reference to their bearing on collective goals and where in case of recalcitrance there is a presumption of enforcement by negative situational sanctions.63

While Parsons’s definition links power with authority, consensus and the pursuit of collective goals, it does not consider conflicts of interest and the possibility of coercion and force.64 Moreover, Anthony Giddens stated that, among other things, the Parsonian definition does not consider that power is exercised over someone and as a result of viewing power as legitimate and consensual between players, Parsons ignores the hierarchical characteristic of power.65 Overall, “the two major threads in [the] discussion about power, the Weberian and the Parsonian, both suffer from major problems of definition.”66

60 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1947), 152. 61 Matteo Pallaver, “Power and Its Forms: Hard, Soft, Smart” (master’s thesis, London School of Economics, 2011), 32. Accessed 1 May 2015. etheses.lse.ac.uk/220/1/ Pallaver_Power_and_Its_Forms.pdf. 62 Roderick Martin, “The Concept of Power: A Critical Defence,” The British Journal of Sociology 22, no. 3 (1971): 243. 63 Talcott Parsons, “On the Concept of Political Power”, in Sociological Theory and Modern Society, ed. Talcott Parsons (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 361. 64 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View 2nd ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1974), 31. 65 Anthony Giddens, “Power in the Recent Writings of Talcott Parsons,” Sociology 2, no. 3 (1968): 264. 66 Roderick Martin, “The Concept of Power: A Critical Defence,” The British Journal of Sociology 22, no. 3 (1971): 244.

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Power is conceptualized using different methodologies. One of the key debates concerns the issue of how power should be measured.67 There are two prominent methods in power evaluation: the “elements of the national power approach” or “power as resources,” which depicts power as a property of nation-states, and the “relational power” approach, which perceives power as a relationship.68 In other words, some scholars define power in terms of resources, while others perceive it as the ability to have influence over other actors. Both approaches are evident in ‘power’ scholarship. Proponents of power as a property approach associate power with the possession of identifiable resources. All the resources that a nation-state owns make up its overall aggregate power. The resources that are “indicators of national power include the level of military expenditure, size of armed forces, gross national product, size of the territory, and population.”69 In line with this tradition, Morgenthau referred to power as the possession of resources such as natural resources, geography, industrial development, military, and population and defined them as nations’ stable power elements.70 A critique of this methodological approach, however, is the difficulty of power conversion: “the capacity to convert potential power, as measured by resources, to realized power, as measured by the changed behaviour of others.”71 Meanwhile, it is not the possession of resources that is important, but the capacity to turn them into influence. Jeffrey Hart argued that, with the resources approach, “it is not always certain that actors will be able to use the resources under their control; some types of resources are difficult to measure; and, finally, the focus

67 Stephen M. Walt, “The Enduring Relevance of the Realist tradition,” in Political Science: The State of the Discipline, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002). 68 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, in Handbook of International Relations 2nd ed., ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 274. 69 Matteo Pallaver, “Power and Its Forms: Hard, Soft, Smart” (master’s thesis, London School of Economics, 2011), 64. Accessed 1 May 2015. etheses.lse.ac.uk/220/1/Pallaver_Power_ and_Its_Forms.pdf. 70 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954). 71 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “The changing nature of world power,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 2 (1990): 178.

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on national power precludes the consideration of the role of non-state actors and […] collective action.”72 Behavioral oriented political scientists, such as Lasswell and Kaplan, promoted the relational power approach as an alternative to the national power approach.73 Morgenthau defined power as “a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised… It gives the former control over certain actions of the latter through the influence which the former exert over the latter’s minds.”74 This statement puts Morgenthau in the relational camp as well. Fundamental to the relational view of power is the ability to demonstrate a change in outcomes. James Coleman was the first to develop control over events and outcomes approach.75 It is based “on a rational choice theory of power, in which the reasons for controlling resources or other actors arise out of the desire to achieve certain outcomes.”76 Hart states, “instead of making a direct connection between actions and outcomes, Coleman gives intermediate links between actions and events and between events and outcomes.”77 Hart outlined the approaches for power analysis as control over resources, control over actors and control over events and outcomes, which he defined as “the only approach which takes into account the possibility of interdependence among actors and of collective action; is more general than the other approaches; produces a type of analysis which has both descriptive and normative advantages over other approaches.”78 On the other hand, Jeffrey Isaac warned against thinking of power as a behavioral concept: This misconception has led many to think of power as a behavioral concept, referring to the conjunction of the behaviors of two parties, such that “A has power over B” means

72 Jeffrey A. Hart, “Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations,” International Organization 30, no. 2 (1976): 290. 73 Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950). 74 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954): 27. 75 James S. Coleman, The Mathematics of Collective Action (Chicago: Aldine, 1973). 76 Matteo Pallaver, “Power and Its Forms: Hard, Soft, Smart” (master’s thesis, London School of Economics, 2011), 67. Accessed 1 May 2015. etheses.lse.ac.uk/220/1/Pallaver_Power_and_Its_Forms.pdf. 77 Jeffrey A. Hart, “Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations,” International Organization 30, no. 2 (1976): 296. 78 Ibid., 289.

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that in some sense A does something to get B to do something. I argue that this view is doubly confused. First, it is limited to situations of “power over” and fails to see that “power over,” or what I call domination, is parasitic upon a “power to.” Second it fails to distinguish between the possession and exercise of power.79

In other words, the behavioralist foundation of the debate prevents its participants from looking at power as something more than a behavioral regularity and from seeing it as an enduring capacity.80 Thereby, despite the rise of the relational methodological approach, “the elements-of-national-power approach is still deeply embedded in the International Relations literature.”81 Moreover, Nye argues that the relational power approach might be “too ephemeral” and ambiguous to practitioners. The idea of power as having resources, meanwhile, is more appealing to politicians because it “makes power appear more concrete, measurable, and predictable.”82 Importantly, in discussing power, one needs to be careful to avoid possible semantic fallacies. According to Steven Lukes, one should not equate power directly with its exercise i.e. make the concept of power “operational” as power is a dispositional concept: it names a potentiality that may never be actualized. Similarly, one should be wary of the “vehicle fallacy,” which occurs when one equates power directly with the resources of power: “having the means of power is not the same as being powerful.”83 In the framework of the current discussion, the goal is not to argue which approach of conceptualizing power is better. This debate is brought up to highlight the contested nature of power and warn against generalizations. At its most general, power means the capacity to bring about outcomes84 or the ability to affect others to achieve the outcomes one wants.85 In the last couple of decades alone, however, scholars have developed many distinctions of power,

79 Jeffrey C. Isaac, “Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist Critique,” Polity 20, no. 1 (1987): 4–5. 80 Ibid., 19. 81 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, in Handbook of International Relations 2nd ed., ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 277. 82 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 26. Joseph S. Jr. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 240. 83 Steven Lukes, “Power,” Contexts 6, no. 3 (2007): 59. 84 Ibid. 85 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Soft Power.” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 154.

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going as far as introducing the Fourth Face of power based on the writings of Michel Foucault.86 To exemplify the breadth of the subject, one could list the following terms: hard, soft, and smart power,87 compulsory power, institutional power, structural power, and productive power,88 normative power,89 and network power.90 Additionally, there are general terms developed in political and social thought like power over vs. power to,91 power with,92 conflictual vs. consensual power,93 dispositional vs. episodic power,94 symbolic power95 and communicative power.96 Importantly, these concepts are not mutually exclusive; they simply evaluate power from different angles. Nevertheless, their presence in the literature raises a difficulty in selecting consistent tools for conceptualization and categorization of power and its forms. Evidently, Power is far too complex in its sources, effects and production to be reduced to one dimension.97 Despite widespread use, there is a lack of agreement on foundational definitions, with scholars creating their individual terminologies and methodologies.98 Gallie confirms that due to the existence of competing 86 Peter Digeser, “The Fourth Face of Power,” The Journal of Politics 54, no. 4 (1992): 977–1007. 87 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011). 88 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59, no. 01 (2005): 39–75. 89 Thomas Diez and Ian Manners, “Reflecting on Normative Power Europe,” in Power in World Politics, ed. Felix Berenskoetter and M.J. Williams (New York: Routledge, 2007). 90 David Grewal, Network Power: The Social Dynamics of Globalization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). 91 Peter Morriss, Power: A Philosophical Analysis (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987, 2002). 92 Amy Allen, The Power of Feminist Theory: Dominance, Resistance, Solidarity (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999). 93 Mark Haugaard, ed., Power: A Reader (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002). 94 Peter Morriss, Power: A Philosophical Analysis (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987, 2002). 95 Pierre Bourdieu, “Social Space and Symbolic Power,” Sociological Theory 7, no. 1 (1989): 14–25. 96 Thomas Risse, “Let’s Argue: Communicative Action in International Relations,” International Organization 54, no. 1 (2001): 1–39. 97 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59, no. 01 (2005): 67. 98 Robert Bierstedt, “An Analysis of Social Power,” American Sociological Review 15, no. 6 (1950): 730–38.

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theories and meanings, power is essentially a contested subject.99 This is also the case for the conceptualization of power in the discipline of International Relations, which is the focus of this chapter.

Realism and Key Debates Power is one of the critical subjects in the field of International Relations. The discipline of IR incorporates a number of competing theoretical schools, but, for the longest time, it has treated power as the exclusive prerogative of realism. Realism has been the dominant theory of world politics since the beginning of the Academy of International Relations.100 The unifying theme of the realist thinking is that nations exist in a state of anarchy with no guarantees for their security. In such circumstances, it is rational for states to compete for power and security.101 Realism argues that survival is the key aim of nation-states and views economy and military as the key instruments of power.102 Hans Morgenthau famously proclaimed that, fundamentally, politics is a fight for power and “whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.”103 Furthermore, the “ubiquity of the struggle for power in all social relations on all levels of social organization” made the arena of international politics a necessity of power politics.104 Realists have focused on the geopolitical struggles for power and argued that the pursuit of national interest in the context of a balance of power strategy is the most efficient to international security.105

99 100 101 102 103 104 105

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Walter B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1956): 167–98. Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmit, “Realism,” in The Globalization of World Politics: an Introduction to International Relations, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 161. Ibid., 165. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001): 30–31. Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (1998): 38. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 25. Ibid., 31. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred K. Knopf, 1985). Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).

Violence is acknowledged as a regular fact in the realist school. Carr asserted that politics, at its heart, is power politics.106 The author also argued that military power was the most significant type of power in IR, as it symbolizes “both a means and an end in itself.”107 Weber confirmed that the decisive means for politics is violence.108 Furthermore, Weber categorized the state as a legitimate user of violence: A state is a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory… The right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it… The state is considered the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence. Hence, ‘politics’ for us means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state.109

While realists are in agreement that power is a key determinant in political relations, there are differences in how various realists conceptualize power.110 One of the differences lies in what the scholars believe motivates the nation-states–the key actors in the realist school–to strive for power. Classical realists posit that fighting for power begins with the innate human drive for power.111 In contrast, for structural or neo-realists, it is the architecture of the international system that forces states to pursue power and maximize their power position.112 Despite the differences in the explanation of motivation for wanting power, however, for all realists the pursuit of power is at the core of the states’ perception of the world.113 A product of realism is the theory of balance of power. The underlying assumption of balance of power theories is that military force is a key measure of

106 Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An introduction to the Study of International Relations (New York: Harper and Row, 1946), 102. 107 Ibid., 109. 108 Max Weber, “Politics As Vocation,” Essays in Sociology, ed. and trans. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1921, 1946): 77–128. 109 Ibid. 110 Brian C. Schmit, “Competing Realist Conceptions of Power,” Millennium – Journal of International Studies 33, no. 3 (2005): 523–49. 111 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954). 112 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 113 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 12.

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power.114 The states with more military power in the realist school were named “Great Powers,” which participated in the so-called “game” of international politics.115 Arguably, the realism’s domination long before and during the Cold War could be justified, given its explanations for wars, alliances, imperialism, obstacles to cooperation, and other international phenomena. Specifically, its emphasis on competition was consistent with the features of the American-Soviet Cold War.116 Another theory linked to the realist understanding of power is the power cycle framework. Power cycle theory asserts that the ability of a state to influence international politics and play a principal role is determined in large part by its stage of evolution, which involves a generalized, cyclical pattern of ascent, maturation and descent.117 The power cycle theorists claim that the conception of power, as expressed in the power cycle theory, can account for and explain conflict in the international system. According to Doran, the power cycle framework allows understanding the changes in the structure of the international system and the states’ rise and decline as great powers. Using unweighted measures of national material capabilities, the power cycle method allows to estimate the relative hierarchical position of each state in a defined system or set of states, the rapidity of each state’s rise and decline in relative power and to propose the likely future for each state.118 Although useful and influential, the balance of power and power cycle theories were, in large part, the products of their time and may have methodological 114 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, in Handbook of International Relations 2nd ed, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 281. 115 Nicholas Spykman, American Strategy and World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt, 1942). Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, ed. Foundations of National Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945). Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics (New York: Van Nostrand, 1962). Martin Wight, Power Politics (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946). 116 Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy no. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (1998): 31. 117 Lui Hebron, Patrick James, and Michael Rudy, “Testing Dynamic Theories of Conflict: Power Cycles, Power Transitions, Foreign Policy Crises and Militarized Interstate Disputes,” International Interactions 33, no. 1 (2007): 3. 118 Charles F. Doran, “Confronting the Principles of the Power Cycle: Changing Systems Structure, Expectations, and War,” in Handbook of War Studies Volume II, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2000).

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weaknesses in evaluating the states post-Cold War and post-20th century. As theories born out of the Cold War, they were heavily linked to the assumptions of realism: that military power is supreme; economics is secondary; and states are the only actors worth investigating in evaluation of the international relations. For instance, Doran’s power cycle theory does not account for innovation in technology, nor does it include significant non-state actors, such as international institutions, alliances and supranational bodies, in its calculations of relative power. The theory relies on the quantitative analysis of national material capabilities, and, thus, other aspects of power remain excluded.119 The fact that the concept of power has been treated as a prerogative of realism has partially occurred because other International Relations schools of thought did not fundamentally attend to the issue of power and did not include it in their theories. Neoliberals have argued that nation-states with similar interests help setting up international institutions and rules that are more effective than individual state power, highlighting the processes of social choice.120 Theorists of the liberal international relations school highlight the concepts of democracy, liberal values, economic interdependence and international institutions to explain political outcomes rather than referring to power variables.121 Meanwhile, mainstream constructivists–who argue that state behavior is shaped by elite beliefs, collective norms, and social identities–focus on the importance of persuasion and state that the key instruments are influential ideas and discourse.122 Wendt, a famous constructivist, has stressed the link between power and knowledge and emphasized the significance of social relationships and social structures (knowledge, material resources, and practice) in the international system.123 119 Dylan Kissane, “Curves, Conflict and Critical Points: Rethinking Power Cycle Theory for the Twenty-First Century” (bachelor’s thesis, University of South Australia, 2005), 12. 120 Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 39–51. 121 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 513–53. 122 Thomas Risse, “Let’s Argue: Communicative Action in International Relations,” International Organization 54, no. 1 (2001): 1–39. Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change,” International Organization 55, no. 3 (2001): 553–88. Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy no. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (1998): 38. 123 Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 73.

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Although Realism continues to attract academicians and policymakers, since the end of the Cold War there has been criticism of realist assumptions of a globalized world.124 As Bilgin and Elis state: Merely focusing on the projection of military power, while useful on its own terms, has nevertheless impoverished our understanding of the productive role other forms of power play in world politics.125

Realism’s key weakness is in emphasizing that the dimension of power that can be seemingly operationalized is military.126 The attention to military power has resulted in IR students disregarding other dimensions of power.127 Barnett and Duvall argue that the belongingness of power to the realist tradition has created a limit for the concept of power.128 The authors pointedly state that it is difficult to rely on one dimension of power since no single conceptualization can reflect all of the power’s forms. Therefore, the authors have offered the “taxonomy of four types of power,” which incorporates Compulsory, Institutional, Structural, and Productive forms of power, thus, encouraging scholars to see its multiple forms.129 The key idea here is to stress that while the realist framework may still be relevant in the current global era, it is imperative to evaluate other growing forms of power as well.

Change in Paradigm: Soft Power As the discipline of IR was evolving, the rigid interpretation of power started to change as well. In particular, Joseph Nye argued that the changing nature of international framework has re-emphasized the use of intangible forms of power, such as culture, ideology, and institutions, and the growing social mobilization makes the factors of technology, education, and economic growth as significant

124 Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmit, “Realism,” in The Globalization of World Politics: an Introduction to International Relations, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 165. 125 Pinar Bilgin and Berivan Elis, “Hard Power, Soft Power: Toward a more realistic analysis,” Insight Turkey 10, no. 2 (2008): 5. 126 Ibid., 11. 127 Kira Petersen, “Four Types of Power in International Relations: Coercive Power, Bargaining Power, Concerted Power, and Institutionalized Power” (working paper, IPSA, XXII World Congress of Political Science, Madrid, 2012), 3. 128 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59, no. 01 (2005): 42. 129 Ibid., 39-75.

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as geography, population, and resources.130 Baldwin states that the significance of the military form of power “has been exaggerated” while “the nonmilitary forms of power have been underestimated.”131 A state could reach its preferable outcomes, for instance, “because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, or aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness.”132 As the instruments of power change, so do strategies. Traditionalists consider the goal of security and the instrument of military force to be linked by a strategy of balancing power. States wishing to preserve their independence from military intimidation follow a balancing strategy to limit the relative power of other states. Today, however, economic and ecological issues involve large elements of mutual advantage that can be achieved only through cooperation. These issues are often critical to the reelection of political leaders.133

To reiterate, Nye split power resources into two forms: hard and soft. Thereby, hard and soft power can be considered two “ideal-type or pure forms of power.”134 Figure 1.  Power (Nye, J. 2008)

130 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 167, 154. 131 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, in Handbook of International Relations 2nd ed., ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 285. 132 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 94. 133 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 158. 134 Matteo Pallaver, “Power and Its Forms: Hard, Soft, Smart” (master’s thesis, London School of Economics, 2011), 99. Accessed 1 May 2015. etheses.lse.ac.uk/220/1/ Pallaver_Power_and_Its_Forms.pdf.

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Hard power is linked to the oldest understanding of power, in which nationstates exist in a system of anarchy and, as a result of not recognizing a superior authority, have to rely on power politics. Hard power could be defined as an ability to reach one’s goals through coercive actions or threats. This is in line with the realist framework, where “power in international relations has been defined and assessed in easily quantifiable ‘hard’ terms, in the context of military and economic might.”135 Hard power is “the exercise of influence through coercion and relies on tactics like military intervention, coercive diplomacy, inducements of payment, and economic sanctions.”136 Importantly, Nye underlines that “today the direct use of force for economic gain is generally too costly and dangerous for modern great powers… the translation of economic into military power resources may be very costly.”137 Meanwhile, soft power, according to Nye, “rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others” and is “associated with intangible assets such as attractive personality, culture, political values, institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority.”138 Nye argues that soft power is an important reality stemming from the changes in the global framework. In The Future of Power Nye defined soft power more fully: “as the ability to affect others through the co‐optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.”139 The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)”.140 Evidently, Nye acknowledges both the relational and resourcebased view of power. The roots of the soft power concept could be traced to Steven Lukes’s argument on the third face of power.141 This is connected to the famous theoretical

135 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 153–171. 136 Ernest J. III Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power, ” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 114. 137 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 159. 138 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 95. 139 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 20–21. 140 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 96. 141 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View 2nd ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1974).

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discussion on the ‘Faces of Power.’142 The debate was initiated by theoretical reactions to Dahl’s study of governance in New Haven, Connecticut.143 The first face of power was associated with Dahl, who stated that an actor who wins the argument or an issue has the power.144 Bachrach and Baratz, however, argued that Dahl’s approach disregarded the ‘second face of power,’ symbolized by the undermining of certain issues by removing them from consideration.145 In short, the second face of power refers to the ability to set the agenda.146 Finally, Lukes argued that the scope of power was even wider than the one outlined by Bachrach and Baratz and introduced the third face of power. He argued that “one way for the actor A to get the actor B to do something B would not otherwise do is to affect B’s preferences, desires or thoughts.”147 In other words, the first two faces of power refer to how power can be used to force someone to do what you want them to, even against the will; meanwhile, the third face of power explains how power could affect an actor by changing his initial preferences. According to Lukes’s ‘three-dimensional account,’ power does not only influence whether actors behave as they want and determines whether they express their preferences, but also shapes the ways they perceive their wants, desires, and interests.148 It gives a misleading picture of the ways in which individuals and, above all, groups and institutions, succeed in excluding potential issues from the political process. Decisions are choices consciously and intentially made by individuals between alternatives, whereas the bias of the system can be mobilized, recreated, and reinforced in ways that are neither consciously chosen nor the intended result of particular individuals’ choices… Moreover, the bias of the system is not simply sustained by a series of individually chosen acts, but also, more importantly, by the socially structured and culturally patterned

142 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” American Political Science Review 56, no. 4 (1962): 947‐52. Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View 2nd ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1974). Jeffrey C. Isaac, “Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist Critique,” Polity 20, no. 1 (1987): 4–31. 143 Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). 144 Ibid. 145 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” American Political Science Review 56, no. 4 (1962): 947‐52. 146 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, in Handbook of International Relations 2nd ed., ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 276. 147 Ibid. 148 Clarissa R. Hayward, “De-Facing Power,” Polity 31, no. 1 (1998): 11.

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behavior of groups, and practices of institutions which may indeed be manifested by individuals’ inaction.149

At the same time, Lukes admits that “the significance of the three-faces debate may be exaggerated.”150 The author has stated that “the three views can be seen as alternative interpretations and adaptations of one and the same underlying concept of power, in which B is affected by A.”151 Nevertheless, Lukes’s third face represents a significant route of developing the notion of power and acknowledging its various forms. Alternatively, one could trace the roots of Nye’s soft power to Carr’s earlier writings when the latter divided power into three types: military power, economic power, and power over opinion.152 Military and economic powers are obviously the attributes of hard power, while the power over opinion could be viewed as the variant of Nye’s soft power. As stated by McClory, there is no better example of an International Relations concept making the successful leap from the academic journals into the wider political discourse than Nye’s soft power.153 As a viable approach to foreign policy, soft power has enjoyed a rapid growth in popularity over the last two decades for three main reasons. First, soft power strategies are an appropriate response to the changing nature of foreign policy, which is driven by power diffusion and the digital revolution. Second, using soft power resources can be much more cost-effective than hard power tactics. Third, collaboration has become the most effective approach to shaping major global outcomes. In contrast, unilateral action has become increasingly difficult, costly, and open to challenge…154

149 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View 2nd ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1974), 22–23. 150 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, in Handbook of International Relations 2nd ed., ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 276. 151 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View 2nd ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1974), 27. 152 Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An introduction to the Study of International Relations (New York: Harper and Row, 1946), 108. 153 Jonathan McClory, The New Persuaders II. A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power (Institute for Government, 2011), 5. Accessed June 1, 2015. http://www. instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/The%20New%20 PersuadersII_0.pdf. 154 Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2016), 16.

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With regard to soft power’s conceptual development, Bilgin and Elis sum up Nye’s contribution in the following way: Nye’s (soft) power analysis complements that of realist IR in two ways. First, it highlights non-material forms of power that are overlooked in realist power analysis. Second, in the attempt to capture the ways in which non-material power is expressed, it looks at nonvisible forms of power relations – what Lukes refers to as the ‘second face of power’.155

To summarize, although soft power and its resources–cultural attraction, ideology, and international institutions–are not new,156 it is only now that soft power is growing as a conceptual idea and, therefore, is in need of research. Despite the growing recognition of soft power, there are several issues that require further study.

Chapter Summary This chapter has highlighted the complexity of the subject of Power in International Relations. The aim of the current theoretical engagement is not to defend a particular conceptualization of power against all others, but to contribute to the development of sub-categories of power with regard to Joseph Nye’s frames. This book accepts Nye’s general definition of power and Dahl’s notion of power actors. To reiterate from the introductory chapter, although power is an ancient research focus, there are many opportunities for further studies, including in the field of different forms of power.157 Moreover, the progress in the understanding of power will derive from developing distinctions among different types of power.158 The preoccupation with military power in IR has limited the understanding of other forms of power. While soft power’s popularity is rising in academic and policy circles, a stronger theoretical foundation is imperative for the further development of the concept. The next chapter will proceed to the evaluation of soft power theory and the proposition of new frameworks.

155 Pinar Bilgin and Berivan Elis, “Hard Power, Soft Power: Toward a more realistic analysis,” Insight Turkey 10, no. 2 (2008): 6. 156 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “The changing nature of world power,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 2 (1990): 167. 157 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, in Handbook of International Relations 2nd ed., ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 291. 158 Kira Petersen, “Four Types of Power in International Relations: Coercive Power, Bargaining Power, Concerted Power, and Institutionalized Power” (working paper, IPSA, XXII World Congress of Political Science, Madrid, 2012), 2.

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Chapter 3. Issues of Soft Power Introduction Chapter 2 has highlighted the complexity of Power as an academic subject and set the context for the discussion of power forms introduced by Joseph Nye. In studying soft power, there are many research paths one can take, including the topicality of soft power, its uses, the advantages over hard power, and so forth. This chapter is going to overview some of the problematic issues of soft power theory and focus specifically on the resource framework. The chapter will base the analysis on Nye’s theory as he is the direct developer of the soft power concept. At the same time, the chapter will incorporate the works of other researchers who devoted their critical attention to soft power, among them Ernest Wilson, Todd Hall, Janice Mattern and Jonathan McClory.

Conceptual Difficulties Nye states that soft power is “the ability to affect others to obtain preferred outcomes by the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuasion and positive attraction.”159 A state may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics because other states want to follow it or have agreed to a situation that produces such effects. In this sense, it is just as important to set the agenda, the structure, the situation in world politics as to get others to change in particular cases. This second aspect of power–which occurs when one country gets other countries to want what it wants–might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast to hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants.160

Soft power strategies avoid the traditional instruments of coercion. Instead, they persuade “by using networks, developing and communicating compelling narratives, establishing international norms, building coalitions, and drawing on the key resources that endear one country to another.”161 Soft power is defined as an 159 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Power and foreign policy,” Journal of Political Power 4, no. 1 (2011): 19. 160 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 166. 161 Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 8. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portland-communications. com/publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/

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attractive power and thereby “soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction.”162 When a state is able to attract and convince others with the use of its values and set of practices, the state is considered to have an effective soft power. In this light, the Fulbright program could be considered an important aspect of American educational soft power. In another example, Hollywood and Broadway may be regarded as significant aspects of American cultural soft power. In outlining Nye’s definitions, we encounter several problems. For instance, one of the issues with the author’s theory is the ambiguity of the ‘attractiveness’ term that constitutes an integral part of the soft power definition. The notion of attraction has been under-studied in International Relations,163 and, hence, represents a certain difficulty. On the one hand, Nye states: Soft co-optive power is just as important as hard command power. If a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow. If it can establish international norms consistent with its society, it is less likely to have to change.164

On the other hand, Mattern appropriately argues that attraction is a subjective experience and the process of attraction is vague both for the academic impulse for theoretic clarity, but also in relation to the practical uses of soft power.165 A nation’s ‘attractiveness’ to others is not a factor that can be easily exploited in a straightforward way.166 Hall effectively continues: It is amazing how thoroughly the concept of soft power has gained traction despite the lack of any clear evidence as to what the actual returns of being perceived as “attractive” are. Certainly, we can mark the attractiveness of various states and their cultural products in international polls, flows of tourists, and exchange students… But to what

162 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 95. 163 Janice B. Mattern, “Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics,” Journal of International Studies 33, no. 3 (2005): 591. 164 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 167. 165 Janice B. Mattern, “Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics,” Journal of International Studies 33, no. 3 (2005): 584. 166 Barry M. Blechman, “Review of Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 4 (2004/2005): 680.

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extent is such popularity a political resource from which states can actually reap tangible benefits, let alone one states can wield to specific ends?167

Furthermore, what may be attractive to one person/nation might not be so for another. Hall argues that it is not exactly clear what generates attraction, whether or not attraction takes various forms, whether it is transferable, how attraction can be translated into support, and how valid an asset’s attraction actually is.168 As it stands, the concept of attraction as articulated by Nye appears an imprecise foundation for a category of analysis. Hall continues: Some might argue for a more intensive theorization of the concept of attraction. Such a theory entails a more thorough explication of the psychological underpinnings of attraction; an outline of its different forms; specification of its eliciting conditions, durability, and tangible effects; and ways to empirically disentangle attraction from processes that have similar consequences. This accomplished, there is still no guarantee that this mechanism is actually capable of generating important empirical effects.169

Hall proposes an alternative to the notion of attractiveness. While preserving the basics of soft power theory–that there are forms of influence other than military and economic power–Hall discards the concept of attraction altogether: Nye identifies in his writings various possible sources of influence, such as institutions, reputations, and dissemination of information. It is possible to extract and develop theories based on these sources, without the need to assume the mechanism of attraction is at work. This, however, requires disaggregating the notion of soft power into separate analytical categories and abandoning the assumption that these mechanisms are unified by anything other than the fact that none is a type of hard power. In other words, [there is not one] soft power, but ‘soft powers’, each with distinct causal pathways and mechanisms. Specifically, […]the categories of institutional power, reputational power, and representational power.170

To reiterate, Hall proposes to look at soft power through institutional, reputational, and representational dimensions. Institutional power is defined “as the options available to state actors according to their membership and relative position within specific international organizations, which enable those states to exercise

167 Todd H. Hall, “China, Soft Power, and the Politics of Attraction,” China Policy Institute Analysis, March 3, 2016, Accessed 1 August 2016. https://cpianalysis. org/2016/03/03/88482/. 168 Todd H. Hall, “An Unclear Attraction: A Critical Examination of Soft Power as an Analytical Category,” Chinese Journal of International Politics (2010): 19. 169 Ibid. 170 Ibid., 19–20.

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influence within them.”171 Meanwhile, reputational power “highlights the manner in which particular reputations provide states with issue-specific forms of influence… Reputations as independent variables can be measured through polling, focus groups or surveys.”172 Finally, representational power in Hall’s conceptualization is defined “as the ability of states to frame issues, advance their own interpretations, and consciously seek to shape the beliefs of others… Sources and tools of representational power include public diplomacy, propaganda and information control…”173 Generally, Hall’s research offers useful thoughts on the soft power theory and the ways to improve its weaker dimensions. His insights are significant in pointing out the weaknesses of the soft power concept. While studying soft power, it is imperative to outline the inherent limitations of the theory. The aspect of attractiveness represents one of such limitations. Another important issue to highlight before moving on to resources is the distinction between soft power as a practical notion and a conceptual category. The concept of soft power, given its adaptations by both practitioners and scholars, has had a dual existence as a category of practice and a category of analysis.174 The fact that many policymakers have adopted the concept of soft power qualifies it as a category of practice, but the qualities of the concept of soft power that are responsible for this are not necessarily those that recommend it as a category of analysis. A category of analysis is based on attributes or mechanisms common to the objects or phenomena it designates, but at the same time discrete from the observed outcomes they are purported to explain. Widespread usage is not sufficient for designating a term a category of analysis. That said, status as a category of practice does not necessarily disqualify a term as a category of analysis. The criteria necessary for a category of analysis are, after all, shared attributes or mechanisms… Nye proposes a mechanism—attraction—which analytically unites soft power resources.175

This monograph considers it important to differentiate between soft power as a category of analysis and a category of practice. The primary focus of this research is the former; however, evaluating the conceptual foundations will require outlining few practical issues as well. Theory and practice in the case of soft power inevitably go hand-in-hand, but it is important to differentiate between them. Wilson argues that the flaws that soft power suffers from illustrate a need for: 171 Todd H. Hall, “An Unclear Attraction: A Critical Examination of Soft Power as an Analytical Category,” Chinese Journal of International Politics (2010): 20–21. 172 Ibid., 22. 173 Ibid., 22–23. 174 Ibid., 7. 175 Ibid., 9.

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1. Better definitions and conceptualizations of the meaning of hard and soft power; 2. Greater attention to the institutional realities that underlie the ways these meanings are articulated; and 3. A more systematic effort to incorporate real-world political dynamics involved in shifts toward smart power doctrines, as well as a more fundamental attempt to engage politically with the issues in consistent ways.176 The current research is paying attention to all of the aforementioned points, among others. It was necessary to acknowledge the inherent limitations of soft power theory before moving on to the specific analysis of resources.

Nye’s Resource Framework Before proceeding to the evaluation of the resources of soft power, a note is in order, already mentioned in Chapter 2. As argued by Lukes, one should be careful in not equating power directly with either its exercise or resources. One should avoid the “vehicle fallacy,” since “having the means of power is not the same as being powerful.”177 To reiterate, in the framework of this book, the goal is not to argue which approach of conceptualizing power is better: the relational or power as resources view. Nevertheless, as this publication deals with evaluating resources based on Nye’s framework, one could argue that it will, therefore, build on the resources approach. However, focusing on the analysis of power resources does not mean equating them directly to power. To begin the evaluation of soft power resources, we start with hard power resources. Nye associates hard power with traditional politics that emphasizes military and economic power.178 In other words, hard power is an ability to exercise influence “through coercion, relying on tactics like military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions.”179 Historically, hard power has been associated with the population size, territory, natural resources, military,

176 Ernest J. III Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power, ” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 114. 177 Steven Lukes, “Power,” Contexts 6, no. 3 (2007): 59. 178 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 100. 179 Ernest J. III Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power, ” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 114.

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and social stability.180 The unifying aspect of these resources is that they are ‘material’ and visible in nature. If one were to illustrate hard power resources, it could be presented in the following way: Figure 2.  Hard power resources

Meanwhile, soft power resources are more complex. Nye argues that the soft power of a country depends on the following resources: “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).”181 Culture is the set of practices that create meaning for a society, and it has many manifestations. It is common to distinguish between high culture such as literature, art, and education, which appeals to elites; and popular culture, which focuses on mass entertainment.182

According to Nye, a country’s overall culture can make a state more attractive to others.183 Similarly, political values and institutions can affect the soft power of a country. Government policies can either support or undermine the soft power of a state. The state model can constitute a significant part of nation’s attractiveness: “When government institutions effectively uphold values like transparency, justice, and equality at home, they are more attractive and legitimate abroad.”184

180 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A smarter, more secure America (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2007), 6. 181 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 96. 182 Ibid. 183 Joseph S. Jr Nye, Soft Power: the means to success in world politics (Public Affairs: New York, 2004). 184 Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 20. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portland-communications. com/publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/

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Finally, according to Nye, foreign policy refers to the extent to which a nationstate seems to operate with moral authority abroad, in effect, “whether the state is seen as a force for good or ill?”185 Generally, the policies that appear to be “hypocritical, arrogant, and indifferent to the opinion of others or based on a narrow approach to national interests can undermine soft power.”186 Apart from attractiveness, morality is another complex issue that deserves critical attention in future studies. In outlining soft power resources, it is important to keep in mind the theory’s inherent limitations, such as the ambiguity of the terms ‘culture’, ‘attractiveness,’ and so forth. Nevertheless, since we are primarily interested in the categorization of soft power resources–not on the validity of each individual pillar or the mechanism of its influence–we will overview the pillars as put forth originally by Nye. Moving forward, one could illustrate Nye’s categorization in the following way: Figure 3.  Soft power resources (Nye, J. 2008)

McClory’s Resource Framework Nye’s categorization represents the original categorization of soft power resources. The author’s conceptualization has been innovative and, in fact, stimulated the appearance of other influential works, in particular, the research of Jonathan McClory. In evaluating soft power components, McClory has expanded on Nye’s pillars and assessed the soft power of countries according to the following five categories: Government (political values of the country), Culture (a set of practices

185 Joseph S. Jr Nye, Soft Power: the means to success in world politics (Public Affairs: New York, 2004). Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 20. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portlandcommunications.com/publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/. 186 Matteo Pallaver, “Power and Its Forms: Hard, Soft, Smart” (master’s thesis, London School of Economics, 2011), 95. Accessed 1 May 2015. etheses.lse.ac.uk/220/1/ Pallaver_Power_and_Its_Forms.pdf.

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that created meaning for the society), Diplomacy (foreign policy), Education, and Business/Innovation.187 McClory has based his categorization of soft power components on the framework of Joseph Nye. Thereby, ‘Government’ and ‘Culture’ resemble Nye’s components. Meanwhile, ‘Diplomacy’ sub-index is similar to Nye’s foreign policy pillar: “it aims to account not only for the global perception of a given country, but its policies and diplomatic resources that allow a state to reach international audiences.”188 Importantly, McClory took Education outside of the cultural resource category because he felt that a number of references to higher education’s impact on soft power warranted it a separate sub-index. The Education sub-index refers to the “factors of foreign exchange effectiveness and includes measures on the number of foreign students in a country, the relative quality of its universities and the output of academic publishing.”189 The capability of a state to attract international students and support educational exchanges is a significant instrument of public diplomacy.190 The research on educational exchanges reveals that there is empirical evidence of the reputational benefits to a host country as a result of international student movement.191 Furthermore, McClory has added the Business/Innovation sub-index to “capture the relative attractiveness of a country’s economic model in terms of its openness and capacity for innovation.”192 Economic factors may contribute to soft power as well, although, practically, it could be difficult to differentiate between the hard and soft aspects of economic power.193 187 Jonathan McClory, The New Persuaders II. A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power (Institute for Government, 2011), 10. Accessed June 1, 2015. http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/The%20New%20PersuadersII_0. pdf. 188 Ibid., 11. 189 Ibid. 190 Arthur H. Miller, “Promoting Democratic Values in Transitional Societies through Foreign Aid” (paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL, 2006). 191 Carol Atkinson, “Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs 1980–2006,” Foreign Policy Analysis 6, no. 1 (2010): 1–22. 192 Jonathan McClory, The New Persuaders II. A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power (Institute for Government, 2011), 12. Accessed June 1, 2015. http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/The%20New%20PersuadersII_0. pdf. 193 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).

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Figure 4.  Soft power resources (McClory, J. 2011)

In 2015, McClory presented a new report on soft power, which included an updated categorization of soft power resources. The sub-indices now incorporated the following categories: Government, Culture, Engagement, Education, Digital, and Enterprise.194 Enterprise is the renamed Business/Innovation Index. This sub-index refers to “the relative attractiveness of a state’s economic model in terms of its competitiveness, capacity for innovation, and ability to foster enterprise and commerce.”195 Meanwhile, the Engagement sub-index resembles the former Diplomacy component. It aims to “measure a state’s diplomatic resources, global footprint, and contribution to the international community and capture the ability of states to engage with international audiences, drive collaboration, and shape global outcomes.”196 This sub-index incorporates metrics such as the number of embassies, high commissions, and memberships in international organizations. The key difference with the previous framework is the ‘Digital’ component. This is extremely relevant in the global era, as power is passing from the ‘capitalrich’ to ‘information-rich’ states.197 Hence, an appropriate conceptualization of soft power has to consider a digital dimension as well. McClory argues: The ways that technology has transformed everyday life over the last two decades is hard to over-exaggerate. Media, commerce, government, and our daily social interaction have all changed with technology.
The inclusion
of a Digital sub-index aims to capture the extent to which countries have embraced technology, how well they are connected to the digital world, and their use of digital diplomacy through social media platforms.198

194 Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 21–22. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portland-communications.com/ publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/. 195 Ibid. 196 Ibid., 21. 197 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 164. 198 Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 22. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portland-communications.

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Figure 5.  Soft power resources (McClory, J. 2015)

Overall, McClory’s research proposes an updated categorization of soft power resources. McClory bases his theory on Nye’s model and approaches the measurement of soft power from a practical point of view when he applies his methodology to top-30 developed nations. Simultaneously, he progresses the theory further. Nye himself admits that McClory’s project does a fine job in building upon the work of developing the concept of soft power.199 In particular, McClory is able to unite, albeit superficially, the categories of soft power as a conceptual and practical notion. Moreover, McClory’s study reveals the multifaceted nature of soft power and also illustrates the difficulty of applying it to the real-world context. On the other hand, McClory’s work omits certain points. For instance–staying on point with the issue of resources–one could disagree with McClory’s conceptualization as his pillars might be regarded as not equivalent in the analytical sense. Calling the initial sub-indices ‘Government’ and ‘Business’ is a potential source of confusion; it is unclear whether they represent the vehicles or the agents of soft power. The ‘Business/Innovation’ sub-index could refer to business as the agent of soft power or the specific business policies, implemented by the state or other actors. In the later conceptualization, McClory puts the ‘Government’ sub-index on the same line as Education, assuming that the key creator of soft power is the state. Meanwhile, many non-traditional actors such as NGOs, multinational corporations, civil society groups, and individuals are becoming significant power players. Hence, this chapter proposes to update the categorization of soft power resources.

Alternative Conceptualization This chapter stresses the importance of incorporating all actors of soft power in the theoretical framework. Moreover, there is a need to distinguish between the com/publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/. 199 Joseph Nye’s Foreword, in Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 7. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www. portland-communications.com/publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/.

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particular spheres where soft power is created and the specific instruments that are used to mobilize it. One could also argue that today’s sources are wider than ever, including history, culture, arts, education, technology, business environment, achievements in sport, tourism industry, ecology projects and much more, even though it may be hard to estimate their effects specifically. The key goal of this chapter is to propose an updated categorization of soft power resources, which would incorporate all the possible Actors, Pillars/Spheres, and Instruments of soft power. Before proceeding to the proposed categorization, however, it is necessary to overview the variety of soft power agents. Dahl calls the objects in the relationship of power as actors; his term is inclusive and refers to individuals, groups, roles, governments, nation-states, or other human aggregates.200 I apply this definition to soft power actor as well. While this may be evident, the variation of power actors has not been widely acknowledged in the conceptualization of soft power theory. Nation-states are the traditional power actors. However, the concept of a nation-state today is expansive; it includes supranational bodies, such as the European Union, for instance. The current era is characterized by a larger transparency of governments and an inclusion of more nation-states in the power contest than ever before. The new global context requires governments to integrate other agents in the decision-making process.201 With the proliferation of media technologies, the credibility of national government today is often suspect; hence, some even argue that the political control should be removed from soft power initiatives.202 In particular, NGOs–“the professionalized independent societal organizations whose primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or the international level”–are becoming powerful actors.203 The 2014 Edelman Trust Barometer ranked the NGOs as the world’s most trusted institutions, above

200 Robert A. Dahl, “The concept of power,” Behavioral Science 2, no. 3 (1957): 203. 201 Nicholas Bayne and Stephen Woolcock, ed., The New Economic Diplomacy (Hampshire: Ashgate 2003), 6. 202 Simon Mark, “A Greater Role for Cultural Diplomacy,” Clingendael Discussion Paper in Diplomacy, No. 114 (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, 2009), 33. 203 Kerstin Martens, “Mission Impossible? Defining Nongovernmental Organizations,” Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organisations 13, no. 3 (2002): 280.

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business, media, and governments.204 NGOs are generally smaller in size than states, not as bureaucratic in their management style, and have gained legitimacy as a result of their effectiveness and accountability. NGOs take various forms, from large ones such as the UN and UNESCO to organizations smaller in size and scope. NGOs are often viewed as the legitimate players because of their organizational priorities and grassroots foundation.205 At the same time, some of today’s multinational NGOs own investments, stocks and real estate worth millions of dollars.206 According to Ferguson, it is somewhat a cliche to state that NGOs are now “powerful international actors in their own right and represent the pillars of a global civil society.”207 At the same time, however, the bottom-up initiatives are often indirectly dependent on top-down institutions and, hence, some level of connection with traditional political actors is inevitable.208 Certain elements of public diplomacy will always remain in a government’s purview since it is linked to national interests and policy objectives.209 Indeed, the government alone “can create the policy environment necessary for maximizing NGO’s effectiveness and only government has the administrative machinery for large-scale implementation of certain projects and policies.”210 204 Peter Dauvergne and Genevieve LeBaron, “Corporatizing activism,” Open Democracy, March 24, 2014. Accessed 1 December 2015. http://www.eurozine.com/ articles/2014-03-24-lebaron-en.html. 205 Bish Sanyal, “The myth of development from below” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning, Pasadena, California, 1998), 7–8. Accessed 1 May 2014. http://web.mit.edu/sanyal/www/articles/Myth%20 of%20Dev.pdf. 206 Peter Dauvergne and Genevieve LeBaron, “Corporatizing activism,” Open Democracy, March 24, 2014. Accessed 1 December 2015. http://www.eurozine.com/ articles/2014-03-24-lebaron-en.html. 207 Niall Ferguson, “Think Again: Power,” Foreign Policy, November 3, 2009. Accessed 1 August 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/03/think-again-power/. 208 Bish Sanyal, “The myth of development from below” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning, Pasadena, California, 1998). Accessed 1 May 2014. http://web.mit.edu/sanyal/www/articles/Myth%20 of%20Dev.pdf. 209 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A smarter, more secure America (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2007), 49. 210 Bish Sanyal, “The myth of development from below” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning, Pasadena, California, 1998), 14. Accessed 1 May 2014. http://web.mit.edu/sanyal/www/articles/Myth%20 of%20Dev.pdf.

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In view of such issues, the responsibility for soft power programs could be transferred to hybrid independent entities such as the UK’s British Council,211 whose arm’s length connection with the government is highly acclaimed for its success.212 When soft power is delivered through an independent entity rather than the government, it is likely to be perceived as more legitimate. The British Council is a well-known example of this type of delivery; it places more value on its independence and less on its contribution to the UK government’s foreign policy goals. An alternative model to the British Council is to establish an independent entity within a foreign service, accountable to an independent board.213 Civil society actors–as intermediaries between state and society–are attributed a special ability and role in mobilizing the problem-solving abilities of a society. They are seen as a significant aspect of global governance and characterized by the capacity to connect local knowledge with global decision-making.214 Sufficiently competent and professional civil society actors can be included in problemsolving governance processes at different levels: as a source of legitimation for national and international policy decisions, within public-private partnerships at the national level, and at the local level in terms of community-building and empowerment.215

The United Kingdom’s soft power, for instance, is heavily supported by a strong civil society. Like the UK private sector, “British civil society is extremely diverse,

211 Simon Mark, “A Greater Role for Cultural Diplomacy,” Clingendael Discussion Paper in Diplomacy, No. 114 (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, 2009), 34. 212 Kirsten Bound, Rachel Briggs, John Holden and Samuel Jones, Cultural Diplomacy (London: Demos, 2007). Accessed May 1, 2015. http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Cultural diplomacy-web.pdf. 213 Simon Mark, “A Greater Role for Cultural Diplomacy,” Clingendael Discussion Paper in Diplomacy, No. 114 (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, 2009), 34. 214 Achim Brunnengräber, “‘Global Governance’ oder die Notwendigkeit eines neuen Globalkonzeptes - diskutiert am Beispiel der internationalen Klimapolitik,” in Vernetzt und Verstrickt, ed. Elmar Altvater, Achim Brunnengräber and Markus Haake (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1997). 
 215 Bernhard Lorentz, “New Governance, New Diplomacy, and the Role of Foundations,” in Bridging the Trust Divide: Cultural Diplomacy and Fostering Understanding between China and the West, ed. Helmut K. Anheier and Bernhard Lorentz (Berlin: Stiftung Mercator, 2012), 25.

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including a range of organisations from charities, NGOs and the religious community, to cultural institutions and even trade unions.”216 Multinational corporations (MNEs) are another source of soft power.217 Economic interdependence of transnational actors, the spread of technology, modernization, urbanization, and increased communication are some of the factors that diffused power from state to private actors.218 Businesses hold financial power and, due to their brands and resources, can also attribute to soft power. Companies are currently actively embedding corporate social responsibility into their policies and processes “based on the belief that the environmental, economic and social sustainability of communities are part of ensuring long-term business sustainability.”219 Although they lack military power, transnational corporations have enormous economic resources. Thirty corporations today each have annual sales greater than the gross national products (GNPs) of 90 countries. While military force remains the ultimate form of power in a self-help system, the use of force has become more costly for modern great powers than it was in earlier centuries. Other instruments such as communications, organizational and institutional skills, and manipulation of interdependence have become important.220

Furthermore: Today’s multinationals exercise power indirectly. Other than in regions of the world where state power has crumbled away or become hopelessly contested, they prefer to coexist with governments rather than replace them. Moreover, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman has argued that real power in the age of globalization is vested in the “electronic herd” of international investors.221

In times where state resources are not enough to handle global social issues, “impact investing offers a new alternative for channeling large-scale private capital for social benefit.”222 However, it is difficult to predict where and why the MNEs 216 Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 26. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portland-communications. com/publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/. 217 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 168. 218 Ibid., 160–162. 219 The United Nations Alliance of Civilizations and the United Nations Global Compact, Doing Business in a Multicultural World: Challenges and Opportunities (New York: United Nations, 2010), 21. 220 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 157–158. 221 Niall Ferguson, “Think Again: Power,” Foreign Policy, November 3, 2009, Accessed 1 August 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/03/think-again-power/. 222 Nick O’Donohoe, Christina Leijonhufvud, Yasemin Saltuk, Antony Bugg-Levine and Margot Brandenburg, “Impact Investments: an emerging asset class,” J.P. Morgan Global

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will invest and put their efforts. There are associated issues such as the lack of control over transmitted message and the difficulty of taking relationships outside the private sector.223 There is also the question of for-profit versus non-profit imperative and other hidden agendas. Nevertheless, it is evident that the private sector is a powerful player that could aid in building and sustaining the soft power of a country and in developing soft power initiatives. In view of the various shortcomings of different actors, one could argue for a constructive cooperation between them. In line with this, Gienow-Hecht and Donfried argue that the goals of cultural diplomacy–an instrument of soft power– can be most effectively reached if the state will work in tandem with civil society and private organizations.224 Although the triple alliance between the state, market, and civil society is rare,225 the collective action problem makes it more likely to occur. The solutions to many issues of transnational interdependence will require collective action. The ability to reach tandem will depend, however, on “whether actors’ social identities will generate self-interests or collective interests.”226 Networks are essential for establishing and sustaining power and influence. In a multipolar world power is likely to shift toward multifaceted networks and coalitions.227 Global politics has become a contest of competitive credibility and network positioning in international networks is an important aspect of power.228 Network governance is identified as “an important mechanism for bringing soft

223 224

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Research, November 29, 2010, 5. Accessed 1 November 2014. https://thegiin.org/assets/ documents/Impact%20Investments%20an%20Emerging%20Asset%20Class2.pdf. Anne Buckle, “The New Diplomacy: Devising a Relational Model of Public Diplomacy,” Pursuit: The Journal of Undergraduate Research at the University of Tennessee 3, no. 2 (2012): 16. Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried, “The Model of Cultural Diplomacy: Power, Distance, and the Promise of Civil Society,” in Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy, ed. Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010). Bish Sanyal, “The myth of development from below” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning, Pasadena, California, 1998), 11. Accessed 1 May 2014. http://web.mit.edu/sanyal/www/articles/Myth%20 of%20Dev.pdf Alexander Wendt, “Collective identity formation and the international state,” The American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (1994): 386. Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (National Intelligence Council, 2012), 4. Accessed May 1, 2015. https://publicintelligence.net/global-trends-2030/. Ernest J. III Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008). Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Power and foreign policy,” Journal of Political Power 4, no. 1 (2011): 17.

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power into play and, if successful, network entrepreneurs can use their soft power to build transcultural coalitions for change.”229 The aim of this section is not to overview all the actors of soft power in their depth or to argue which one is most effective. The key idea is to outline the variety of soft power agents and to emphasize the need to incorporate all of them in soft power’s resource framework as “foreign policy in an increasingly multipolar world includes more actors, more platforms, and more interests than ever before.”230 Now that the importance of revising actors and resources of soft power has been pointed out, the author is going to proceed to presenting a categorization of soft power resources. It is important to clearly and coherently view the resources of soft power and distinguish between the vehicles and the agents (implementers) of soft power. In an attempt to address these and other issues, the author is proposing the following framework: Figure 6.  Soft power resources (Raimzhanova, A. 2015)

229 Bernhard Lorentz, “New Governance, New Diplomacy, and the Role of Foundations,” in Bridging the Trust Divide: Cultural Diplomacy and Fostering Understanding between China and the West, ed. Helmut K. Anheier and Bernhard Lorentz (Berlin: Stiftung Mercator, 2012), 26. 230 Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 15. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portland-communications. com/publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/.

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In the proposed diagram, one can visualize the following categorization of resources: Agents, Pillars/Spheres, and Instruments. The AGENTS index addresses the numerous power actors that are able to create and mobilize soft power initiatives: state, supranational bodies, NGOs, Private sector, Individuals, Networks, Civil society, Hybrids, and so forth. The PILLARS/SPHERES index refers to the multiple spheres where soft power could be created or activated: Foreign politics; Domestic politics; Culture and History; Education and Science; Business; Creative industries; Technologies; Tourism; Sport; Environment, and so forth. Finally, the INSTRUMENTS index addresses the specific instruments/vehicles through which the soft power is mobilized/instrumentalized: Laws and policies; Agreements (domestic, regional, international); Programs (e.g. in foreign exchanges, cultural diplomacy, nation-branding, so forth); Media outlets; Events (conferences, symposia, exhibitions, competitions, concerts, publications); and so forth. An expanded version of this diagram could be presented in the following way: Figure 7.  Soft power resources expanded (Raimzhanova, A. 2015)

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The diagram could be used to illustrate various soft power resources. For instance, if one looks at the American Fulbright program, it is a state initiative in the sphere of education, which is realized through the instrument of exchange programs. Alternatively, one can look at the activity of the British Council worldwide. This organization represents a hybrid of a state and non-state organization, which is active in the spheres of culture, creative industries and education, and completes its initiatives through various programs, publications and organization of events. The diagram presented in this chapter can be visualized in a number of ways, as a hierarchical graph, relational model, and so forth. Moreover, in future studies, it could be transferred from a static to a dynamic model and be presented as a 3D graph or through Venn diagrams to illustrate the potential overlaps between the various sub-indices. In sum, while the variety of soft power actors and the multiple spheres of soft power may be evident, to progress the theory of soft power, this chapter has incorporated all of them in the theoretical framework. Nye’s and McClory’s frameworks outline key pillars of soft power, however, they do not get into highlighting all the possible agents of soft power or the various instruments they can employ. Meanwhile, Agents, Pillars/Spheres, and Instruments are all part of the soft power resource arsenal. The aim of the proposed categorization is to progress the understanding of soft power resources. As argued by Nye, “in order to deploy soft power to achieve their wider foreign policy goals, governments must first understand the resources they can deploy and understand where they might be effective; as up to now, they often relied on guesswork and intuition.”231 To reiterate, this diagram is only one variant of categorizing soft power resources; further developments are both possible and necessary.

Practical Issues The key objective of this chapter was to evaluate the conceptualization of soft power resources. If we were to shift from soft power as a theoretical idea to soft power as an empirical notion, one could also outline few practical aspects, which prevent the recognition of soft power and its resources. One of the key reasons why soft power is not widely acknowledged is because it is difficult for practitioners to see the immediate results of investing into it. Due to the fact that “hard power manifests in a very practical and concrete way, 231 Joseph Nye’s Foreword, in Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 7. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www. portland-communications.com/publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/.

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its effects are easier to see and measure.”232 In contrast, the results of soft power initiatives are often intangible, with benefits not being visible until many years after the implementation of programs. Building soft power often requires an effort of many years, if not decades.233 For instance, effective cultural diplomacy requires a long-term commitment–5, 10, 20 years–“and a degree of faith.”234 This, however, does not mean that it is not worth the investments; on the contrary, the effects of soft power may take months or years to see, but it may be more rewarding and efficient than hard power. Since no metric exists, qualitative measurements such as interviews and polls will most likely serve as best feedback for soft power initiatives. Whether a particular asset is an attractive soft power resource can be measured through polls or focus groups. It is important to note that the difficulties of measuring the inputs versus the outcomes of initiatives are not unique to soft power, but occur with all forms of power.235 The estimation difficulties primarily arise from the fact that there is no such thing as power per capita.236 However, since soft power is more complex than hard power, it requires a more sophisticated set of expertise and skills. Estimating the soft power of a country is a challenging issue “with few methodological precedents on which to build.”237 McClory’s index represents one of the first attempts of estimating soft power of developed countries. The practice of soft power is further complicated by an inadequate institutional support. Bureaucratic structures are often a barrier toward an efficient production of soft power. A significant challenge of soft power programs is that they 232 Matteo Pallaver, “Power and Its Forms: Hard, Soft, Smart” (master’s thesis, London School of Economics, 2011), 81. Accessed 1 May 2015. etheses.lse.ac.uk/220/1/ Pallaver_Power_and_Its_Forms.pdf. 233 Jonathan McClory, The New Persuaders II. A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power (Institute for Government, 2011), 23. Accessed June 1, 2015. http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/The%20New%20PersuadersII_0. pdf. 234 U.S. Department of State, Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, Cultural Diplomacy The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy (September 2005), 15. Accessed 1 May 2014 http://iwp.uiowa.edu/about/CulturalDiplomacyReport.pdf. 235 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 95. 236 Jonathan McClory, The New Persuaders II. A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power (Institute for Government, 2011), 13. Accessed June 1, 2015. http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/The%20New%20PersuadersII_0. pdf. 237 Ibid., 9.

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lack integration and coordination. In the U.S., for instance, the programs that promote American soft power are fractured and spread across many agencies and departments.238 The differences between the institutional foundation of hard and soft power point to the necessity of revising the existing institutional support for different forms of power. The institutions of hard power are disproportionately larger, better funded, and, thereby, more influential and powerful than the institutions of soft power. The institutional reality is that soft power institutions are in a subordinate position, lacking the resources and clout of their hard power counterparts. The proponents of soft power mostly exist “as public intellectuals in various think tanks and universities, or the occasional consulting group.”239 Hence, soft power requires more advocates and better financial and institutional support for its theoretical and practical development. The institutions are vital for soft power, both in terms of their domestic quality, as well as the representation on the international level. It is not coincidental that Hall even created a separate dimension for institutional soft power that is defined “as the options available to state actors according to their membership and relative position within specific international organizations, which enable those states to exercise influence within them.”240 It is possible to add to this definition that the quality and exposure of institutional soft power also include the quality of the domestic government system and domestic institutions. A significant barrier is the rigid mentality of the policy-makers and practitioners. Many support soft power initiatives in principle, but tend to give it a low priority in practice, since practitioners “have to deal with a wider range of issues within a shorter timeframe and on tighter budgets.”241 Having few proponents of soft power, however, is not enough; the ideas need to be accepted and followed on the institutional and policy levels. Inadequate institutional framework for soft power ultimately leads to sustainability issues. For instance, there is a strong need to create a coherent structure for coordinating the activities

238 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A smarter, more secure America. (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2007), 7. 239 Ernest J. III Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 119. 240 Todd H. Hall, “An Unclear Attraction: A Critical Examination of Soft Power as an Analytical Category,” Chinese Journal of International Politics (2010): 20–21. 241 Simon Mark, “A Greater Role for Cultural Diplomacy,” Clingendael Discussion Paper in Diplomacy, No. 114 (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, 2009), 3.

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that contribute to cultural diplomacy, as part of soft power initiatives.242 Schneider appropriately argues that a coherent strategy, public-private coordination, and increased public and private funding are all a key to realizing the potential of soft power.243 Given the advantages [of soft power], some governments have latched on to the concept of soft power, looking for ways to generate and leverage it. Yet, there are plenty of states whose response to soft power’s growing appeal has simply been to pepper speeches and whitepapers with the term in the hopes it will lead to better foreign policy strategy. In reality, soft power is notoriously difficult to deploy effectively…244

To conclude, the challenges of soft power agencies in budget, clout, and organizational effectiveness must be addressed seriously.245 Evidently, soft power can be derived from a broad range of sources, but successfully leveraging it can only be achieved through a careful and balanced approach. The governments need to understand their soft power assets, see whether they can be mobilized by the state, and, if so, where and how they might be deployed.246 The road to achieving desired outcomes in the case of soft power is harder to estimate and, thus, hard power options often prevail. Importantly, overviewing the practical issues of soft power has exemplified that soft power can be evaluated through a conceptual, as well as a practical lens.

Hard Or Soft? This chapter has overviewed some of the issues that prevent soft power’s appropriate recognition and deployment. In view of soft power issues, it is evident that the relevance of hard power will stay intact. Moreover, one should not be hasty 242 Kirsten Bound, Rachel Briggs, John Holden and Samuel Jones, Cultural Diplomacy (London: Demos, 2007), 52. Accessed May 1, 2015. http://www.demos.co.uk/files/ Cultural diplomacy - web.pdf. 243 Cynthia P. Schneider, “The Unrealized Potential of Cultural Diplomacy: “Best Practices” and What Could Be, If Only,” The Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society 39, no. 4 (2009): 276. 244 Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2016), 16. 245 Ernest J. III Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 121. 246 Jonathan McClory, The New Persuaders II. A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power (Institute for Government, 2011), 5. Accessed June 1, 2015. http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/The%20New%20PersuadersII_0. pdf.

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in abandoning other types of power, as they could all be useful in the current global framework. Pallaver rationalizes the decision-making process and the choice of power frames in four steps: “understanding the context, appropriate power choice, the effectiveness of power solution for the outcomes, and the successful implementation of agenda.”247 An important consideration is to ask what the power initiatives are used for.248 Ultimately, soft power cannot be a remedy recipe for all cases. Some foreign policy objectives are better suited to soft power strategies, while others are not and, therefore, the specialists must establish clear objectives. Soft power contributes importantly to the nation’s ability to achieve its goals in the world. But I don’t think Professor Nye would disagree that soft power also has its limitations. For instance, U.S. attractiveness to others will never be shaped fundamentally by the government, nor can it be tapped for use in particular situations. Nor will soft power be a dominant consideration in situations in which there are real differences of interest and perspective. In these cases, harder forms of national strength will continue to dominate policy choices.249

Clemens Wergin of the New York Times has argued that, in case of the U.S., soft power cannot replace hard power. According to him, soft power is merely a complementary foreign policy tool that can yield results only when it is backed up by real might.250 This brings up a question of whether you need soft power at all if you have a strong hard power. The intuition–considering the current global climate–would be yes, since becoming influential in the international relations of the 21st century will require shaping narratives, setting international norms and mobilizing transnational networks. The credibility and maintenance of international support are essential for soft power.251

247 Matteo Pallaver, “Power and Its Forms: Hard, Soft, Smart” (master’s thesis, London School of Economics, 2011), 97–99. Accessed 1 May 2015. etheses.lse.ac.uk/220/1/ Pallaver_Power_and_Its_Forms.pdf. 248 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Soft Power.” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 160. 249 Barry M. Blechman, “Review of Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 4 (2004/2005): 681. 250 Clemens Wergin, “Is Obama’s Foreign Policy too European?” The New York Times, July 8, 2014, Accessed 28 January 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/opinion/ clemens-wergin-is-obamas-foreign-policy-too-european.html. 251 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, Soft Power: the means to success in world politics (Public Affairs: New York, 2004), 8–9. Dylan Kissane, “Curves, Conflict and Critical Points: Rethinking Power Cycle Theory for the Twenty-First Century” (bachelor’s thesis, University of South Australia, 2005).

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The current reality of international relations demonstrates that it is necessary to approach soft and hard power together, rather than separately. In fact, the classic distinction between realpolitik and liberalism is in transition; hard power and soft power often interact and reinforce each other.252 Both are ultimately related because they both represent the ability to “achieve a desired goal by affecting the behavior of others and, thus, are inextricably intertwined.”253 Hence, enters Nye’s smart power frame. Smart power is defined as an “ability to skilfully combine hard and soft power for the development of integrated strategies.”254 In other words, smart power is “the capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that the actor’s goals are advanced effectively and efficiently.”255 As an approach that goes further than hard and soft, it fits well into the realm of international relations. However, as another infant academic concept, it requires further theorizations and practical applications. Smart power will continue to be highlighted in chapter 4 within the framework of Education as a power resource discussion.

Chapter Summary This chapter has focused on the first and second objectives of the monograph. The chapter specifically dealt with highlighting the weaknesses of the soft power theory, including its resource framework. Adding a new framework makes sense only to the extent that it sheds light on distinctions relevant to research and practice that are not yet sufficiently understood. The proposed framework of resources is ultimately motivated by a desire to offer an alternative to current soft power resource categorizations and develop a clearer understanding of the distinction between the various resources of soft power i.e. its instruments, pillars/ spheres of activity, and the agents. These are, of course, not the last word on the subject; the main goal is to illustrate the possibility of alternatives to soft power resource categorization. With soft power’s theoretical and practical issues in mind,

252 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990). Joseph S. Jr Nye, Soft Power: the means to success in world politics (Public Affairs: New York, 2004). 253 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, Soft Power: the means to success in world politics (Public Affairs: New York, 2004). 254 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Jr. Nye, CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A smarter, more secure America (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2007), 7. 255 Ernest J. III Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 115.

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it is also evident that hard power and, furthermore, smart power–as a combination of hard and soft power options–continue to be topical in world politics. The next chapter will continue assessing the ambiguity of soft power resources, specifically, the resource of education, and then return to smart power theory to offer new theoretical suggestions.

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Chapter 4. Education as a Resource of Smart Power Introduction The previous chapter has looked at some of the issues, which prevent soft power’s effective recognition. Specifically, resource ambiguity has been highlighted as one of the problematic issues in soft power theory. The categorization of power resources is not always straightforward. As resources “are not an essential defining characteristic of soft [or hard] power,” but more of an empirical association, some power resources are not easily identifiable.256 For instance, military force, which is perceived as a primary source of hard power, only “appears to be a defining characteristic of hard power,” but can also be used to produce soft power.257 Discussing which characteristics define soft power can also be challenging.258 Hence, a clarification of soft power resources is imperative. In line with the third research objective, this chapter is going to focus on the resource of education. It will evaluate Education–a traditional soft power resource–and see if it can also be defined as a hard power resource. Education is one of those eternal topics, which is always of high relevance. As the world is currently shifting toward knowledge economies in the information era, education remains a central subject. The chapter will start by highlighting education as a soft power resource, then evaluate education as a hard power resource. The last section will outline the smart power frame and discuss the possibility of putting Education in the ‘smart’ power resource category.

Education as a Soft Power Resource Education constitutes an integral part of the soft power theory. Joseph Nye, the creator of the concept, has outlined education as a prominent source of soft power. 256 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, in Handbook of International Relations 2nd ed., ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 289. 257 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Notes for a Soft Power Research Agenda,” in Power in World Politics, ed. Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams (London: Routledge, 2007), 167. 258 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, in Handbook of International Relations 2nd ed., ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 289.

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In referring to the example of the U.S.A, Nye argues: “America’s education system is one of its greatest soft power assets.”259 Indeed, the author emphasizes the opportunities offered by the U.S. educational exchanges in comparison to hard power options.260 Conceptually, Nye considers education as part of his ‘culture’ resource - one of the pillars of soft power: Culture is the set of practices that create meaning for a society, and it has many manifestations. It is common to distinguish between high culture such as literature, art, and education, which appeals to elites; and popular culture, which focuses on mass entertainment.261

From this and other statements, it is clear that Nye views education as part of the ‘culture’ resource i.e. a clear soft power resource. Nye’s soft power resource framework was presented in the previous chapter. I will duplicate it here, adding the resource of Education to the diagram, following Nye’s definition. Figure 8.  Education in soft power theory

While presenting the resource of Education in Nye’s theory is straightforward, it is difficult to identify what the term entails. Education is an expansive term that could refer to anything from educational reforms and policies to specific 259 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Jr. Nye, CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A smarter, more secure America (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2007), 14. 260 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Soft Power and Higher Education, Forum for the Future of Higher Education, Educause” (2005), available at: http://www.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/ FFP0502S.pdf.
 261 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 96.

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institutions and programs. The review of Nye’s literature illustrates that his Education resource, among other factors, refers to the benefits of an effective educational system in attracting foreign students, conducting public diplomacy, and promoting ideas abroad: An effective public diplomacy approach must include exchanges of ideas, peoples, and information through person-to-person educational and cultural exchanges.262 (Soft power) sources
include the political values and ideas enshrined in the […] educational systems, personal contacts and exchanges…263 Education is the best hope of turning young people away from violence and extremism. But hundreds of millions of children in the developing world are not in school or else attend schools with inadequate teachers or facilities.264

Looking at the quotes above, one observes several issues. First, it is unclear what makes one’s educational system the ‘best,’ as nations and people have different quality standards. Nevertheless, it is possible to assume that the world’s top educational institutions–supported by authoritative ratings–are most competent. The second issue with education as a soft power resource in Nye’s conceptualization is the fact that, generally, it is assumed to aim at attracting foreign people. In other words, Education as a soft power resource is attributed to work primarily through the mechanism of exchange. However, Education’s role in promoting image abroad seems narrow and limiting. One could suggest that a high-quality educational system could affect domestic reforms and local opinion as well. It is somewhat a misconception that soft power should be aimed at foreign public only; it could equally affect the local population. Finally, one could find problematic the assumption that giving people education will “turn them away” from extremism. There are plenty of examples when well-educated people have conducted atrocious acts. Therefore, one cannot simply assume that a better degree leads to a better character. These are obviously themes for future research, but it is important to highlight the limitations in the definition of Education resource. One of the inherent difficulties in evaluating Education is that, generally, the term itself is ambiguous and lacks clear markers of analysis. Estimating Education’s effect on foreign policy, for instance, is extremely difficult, not least due to soft power’s estimation difficulties highlighted in Chapter 3. 262 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Jr. Nye, CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A smarter, more secure America (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2007), 49. 263 Ibid., 7. 264 Ibid., 36.

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While discussing Education as a soft power resource, scholars have primarily focused their attention on exchange programs. The capability of states to attract international students and support educational exchanges is a significant instrument of public diplomacy, even in opposing countries.265 Previous research on educational exchanges shows empirical evidence of the benefits to a host country, including in reputation, after international students go back to their home countries.266 The programs such as Fulbright and Humphrey allow the potential enrichment of both host and home countries in areas of cultural understanding. The JET Program, which fosters educational exchanges between the USA and Japan, is another example of a program with spillover effects including the shaping of positive opinion.267 The exchanges are generally assumed to be beneficial and, furthermore, leading to ‘ripple effects’ on indirect participants, meaning that the influence is wider than anticipated.268 For instance, a thesis by Medalis reveals that Fulbright program has largely contributed to the qualitative development of the Hungarian higher education system through its graduates.269 Education is arguably one of the most effective forms of soft power. According to Banks, not all soft power investments create equal outcomes, and there is a hierarchy of outcomes depending on the issues of time (sustainability) and scale (of change).270 Through investments in educational and exchange programs, countries are presumably able to create goodwill, build partnerships and attract high-skill temporary migrants. Of course, one should not exclude the possibility of negative effects of studying in one’s country. Importantly, since students usually go in the impressionable age period, they are not bound by previous prejudices

265 Arthur H. Miller, “Promoting Democratic Values in Transitional Societies through Foreign Aid” (paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL, 2006): 1–43. 266 Carol Atkinson, “Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs 1980–2006,” Foreign Policy Analysis 6, no. 1 (2010): 1–22. 267 Emily T. Metzgar, Promoting Japan: One Jet at a Time (Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, March 2012), 36. 268 Julie C. Olberding and Douglas J. Olberding, “‘‘Ripple Effects’’ in Youth Peacebuilding and Exchange Programs: Measuring Impacts Beyond Direct Participants,” International Studies Perspectives 11, no. 1 (2010): 75–91. 269 Christopher Medalis, “American Cultural Diplomacy, the Fulbright Program, and U.S.-Hungarian higher education relations in the twentieth century” (Ph. D thesis, Columbia University, 2011). 270 Robert Banks, A resource guide to Public Diplomacy Evaluation (Los Angeles: Figueora Press, 2011), 30.

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or the state agenda and end up having an authentic experience of a new place – whether positive or negative. If one looks at McClory’s soft power resource framework that was presented earlier, the researcher–following Nye–also outlines Education as a soft power resource. Moreover, to highlight its significance, McClory took Education outside of the cultural resource category; he felt that a large number of references to higher education’s effect on soft power warranted it a separate sub-index. The Education sub-index in his conceptualization refers to “the factors of foreign exchange effectiveness and includes measures on the number of foreign students in a country, the relative quality of its universities and the output of academic publishing.”271 As stated by Chakraborty, however, only countries with well-developed and internationally reputable educational systems can offer such education; “this restricts education’s potential to attribute to soft power to the more advanced countries.”272 Thereby, states attempting to use education as a power resource must aim at increasing the quality and reputability of their educational systems. Scholars increasingly admit that “a high quality education sector is one of the important factors that contributes to a country’s soft power.”273 However, it is also evident that “education has not been adequately covered in the existing IR literature.”274 Despite the weaknesses associated with the resource of Education in the framework of soft power, it is necessary to accept a version of its categorization at this point to progress the argument. This chapter accepts Nye’s position of Education (in the general sense of the educational system of a country and associated programs and outlets) as part of his “Culture” i.e. “Soft Power” category, as presented in Figure 8. Now follows the next step. While acknowledging education as a soft power resource, this research will now assess whether education could represent a hard power resource as well.

271 Jonathan McClory, The New Persuaders II. A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power (Institute for Government, 2011), 11. Accessed June 1, 2015. http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/The%20New%20PersuadersII_0. pdf. 272 Kishore Chakraborty, “Cultural Diplomacy: A Review, a Stocktaking and an Outline of Directions for Further Research” (working paper, Berlin, 2014), 9. 273 Anna Wojciuk, Maciej Michałek and Marta Stormowska, “Education as a source and tool of soft power in international relations,” European Political Science
(2015): 1. 274 Ibid.

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Education as a Hard Power Resource Analytical Framework The section above has presented education as a resource of soft power, following the conceptualization of Joseph Nye. To assess the possibility of education having a connection to hard power resources, it is necessary to review the resources of hard power, presented in the previous chapter. Figure 2.  Hard power resources

To argue that education has hard power traits would mean that it is connected to one of the hard power resources presented above. The Economy is a possible candidate since economic strength is spurred by economic growth. Although in practice it could be challenging to differentiate between hard and soft aspects of economic power, and economic elements can impact soft power as well, economic strength is primarily associated with hard power.275 This monograph views economic strength as a hard power resource. Hence, one could hypothesize that education has hard power characteristics through its connection to economic growth. Another possible connection between education and economic growth could be through the proliferation of human capital, which also includes the source of education. In other words, one could suggest that the place of education in hard power theory is the following:

275 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011). Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 22. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portland-communications.com/ publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/.

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Figure 9.  Education in hard power resource framework

To examine education as a hard power resource, the chapter is going to incorporate economic literature on growth theories. The research methodology stays the same; the author is going to make use of an extensive secondary research, thus conducting a literature review on the subject. The covered literature relies heavily on Econometrics; for the purposes of this book, I will not go deep in presenting the econometric and regression calculations, but rather, compare and contrast the empirical study results. The analytical framework in looking at whether education represents a hard power resource is the following: If based on the existing literature one were to find a plausible connection between education–either separately or through the human capital element–and economic growth, then that would signify that education is one of the resources of hard power. Two important notes are in order here. First, the terms of economic growth and economic development will, to an extent, be used interchangeably – based on the covered scholars’ choice of terminology. However, development in the context of this research will refer primarily to the economic development in the ‘hard’ sense, i.e. something that could be empirically measured, such as the GDP. I focus specifically on economic development since that is directly connected to economic growth. The second point concerns the terms of ‘education’ and ‘human capital.’ Both of these terms are ambiguous; however, in the framework of this research, the goal is not to analyze the traits of the individual terms but, ultimately, to assess their empirical connection to economic growth (which, to reiterate, would enable us to consider education as a hard power resource in conceptual terms). Some authors study either education’s relationship to economic growth or focus specifically on the human capital element. Others include both terms in their 69

discussions. It is important to note that there is a vague but clear connection between the two terms. The link between the terms of education and human capital is revealed in a number of definitions of human capital. According to the United Nations, human capital is a productive wealth embodied in labor, skills and knowledge.276 Meanwhile, the OECD defines human capital as “the knowledge, skills, competencies and attributes embodied in individuals that are relevant to economic activity.”277 It usually relates to the competence of employees, which includes the knowledge, skills, experiences, and abilities of people.278 Human capital is often defined as part of intellectual capital or intangible resources of firms and countries.279 The process of affecting real income through the embedding of resources in people is called investing in human capital.280 Further examples of human capital include innovation capacity, creativity, experience, and learning capacity; however, all of the above assume educational proficiency. Moreover, as human capital generally refers to the acquisition of skills through education, the majority of studies use education-related proxies such as enrollment rates or tests to determine the level of human capital.281 The duration of schooling and levels of qualification are other standard measures of human capital,282 thus also revealing the connection between education and human capital. Ultimately, both terms include the element of education.

276 United Nations, Glossary of Environment Statistics, Studies in Methods, Series F, No. 67. (New York: UN, 1997). 277 OECD, Human Capital Investment: An International Comparison (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Centre for Educational Research and Innovation, 1998), 9. 278 Meritum. Guidelines for Managing and Reporting on Intangibles, ed. Leandro Cañibano, M. Paloma Sanchez, Manuel García-Ayuso, and Christina Chaminade (Madrid: Vodafone Foundation, 2002), 63. 279 Ulf Johanson, “A human resource perspective on intellectual capital,” in Perspectives on Intellectual Capital: Multidisciplinary insights into Management, Measuring, and Reporting, ed. Bernard Marr (Boston: Butterworth Heinemann, 2004), 96. 280 Gary S. Becker, “Investment in Human Capital: a theoretical analysis,” The Journal of Political Economy 70, no. 5 (1962): 9. 281 Paschalis Arvantidis, George Petrakos, and Sotiris Pavleas, “Determinants of Economic Growth: The Experts View,” Discussion Paper Series 13, no. 10 (2007): 250. 282 Tom Schuller, “The Complementary Roles of Human and Social Capital” (OECD, 2001), 3. Accessed 1 September 2015. http://www.oecd.org/innovation/research/1825424.pdf.

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Education and Economic Growth The research on the determinants of economic growth is extensive. The factors of economic growth have been analyzed in both theoretical and applied research. The literature on economic growth has a rich tradition and includes various schools of thought.283 Among different models, the endogenous growth theory constitutes a significant paradigm. At its core, the model emphasizes the role of education, human capital and innovation for growth and development.284 Many scholars have found a positive correlation between education and economic growth, among them Barro (1991), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), Barro and Lee (1993), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Krueger and Lindahl (2001), and others.285 Sabadie and Johansen argue that: Education and training remain implicit cornerstones of national economic competitiveness, despite being explicitly marginalised as independent variables in the dominant models of competitiveness.286

Keller summarizes that numerous studies empirically confirm education’s importance to economic growth; education is viewed as positively affecting growth rates through various mechanisms, including increased productivity, spillover effects from level of education in the community, new knowledge, and other.287

283 Valerien O. Pede, Raymond J. G. M. Florax and Henri L. F. de Groot, “Technological Leadership, Human Capital and Economic Growth: A Spatial Econometric Analysis for U.S. Counties, 1969–2003,” Annales d’Économie et de Statistique 87/88 (2007): 104. 284 Paschalis Arvantidis, George Petrakos, and Sotiris Pavleas, “Determinants of Economic Growth: The Experts View,” Discussion Paper Series 13, no. 10 (2007): 250. 285 Robert J. Barro, “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, no. 2 (1991): 407–33. N. Gregory Mankiw, David Romer, and David N. Weil, “A contribution to the empirics of economic growth,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, no. 2 (1992): 407–37. Robert J. Barro and Jong-Wha Lee, “International Comparisons of Educational Attainment,” Journal of Monetary Economics 32, no. 3 (1993): 363–94. Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Economic Growth (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995). Alan B. Krueger and Mikael Lindahl, “Education for growth: why and for whom?” Journal of Economic Literature 39, no. 4 (2001): 1101–36. 286 Jesús Alquézar Sabadie and Jens Johansen, “How Do National Economic Competitiveness Indices View Human Capital?” European Journal of Education 45, no. 2 (2010): 236–58. 287 Katarina R. I. Keller, “Investment in Primary, Secondary, and Higher Education and the Effects on Economic Growth,” Contemporary Economic Policy 24, no. 1 (2006): 18.

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The theoretical foundation for a positive link between education and economic growth is human capital theory and growth theory. Originating in the writings of Becker (1964), human capital theory predicts that formal education raises the productivity level of workers. Growth theory predicts that greater educational attainment will increase real income per person.288

This would illustrate that, while human capital theories can be differentiated from pure education-economic growth studies, they are ultimately related in revealing the correlation between economic development and education. The significance of human capital as a source of progress and economic growth has long been recognized in the economic literature. Adam Smith was the first classical economist to include human capital in the definition of capital.289 From studies on income growth, it became evident that less tangible resources, such as knowledge, play a larger role than formerly believed.290 Four decades later, the debate continues much at the same level. Schuller summarizes: Human capital focuses on the economic behaviour of individuals, especially on the way their accumulation of knowledge and skills enables them to increase their productivity and their earnings – and in so doing, to increase the productivity and wealth of the societies they live in. The underlying implication of a human capital perspective is that investment in knowledge and skills brings economic returns, individually and therefore collectively.291

In looking at the research related to education/human capital and economic growth, it is important to note that the authors use various methodologies in evaluating this relationship. While conclusions may seem attractive, one should be careful not to generalize the results of studies since they use different estimation parameters. Barro, for instance, reported that a country’s growth rate and per capita GDP was closely related to school enrollment rates.292 Later, Barro

288 Steven Yamarik, “Human Capital and State-level economic growth: what is the contribution of schooling?” The Annals of Regional Science 47, no. 1 (2011): 195. 289 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book 2 (London: G. Routledge, 1776). Mireille Laroche, Marcel Mérette, and G. C. Ruggeri, “On the Concept and Dimensions of Human Capital in a Knowledge-Based Economy Context,” Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques 25, no. 1 (1999): 87. 290 Gary S. Becker, “Investment in Human Capital: a theoretical analysis,” The Journal of Political Economy 70, no. 5 (1962): 9. 291 Tom Schuller, “The Complementary Roles of Human and Social Capital” (OECD, 2001), 5. Accessed 1 September 2015. http://www.oecd.org/innovation/research/1825424.pdf. 292 Robert J. Barro, “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, no. 2 (1991): 407–33.

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and Sala-i-Martin found that the average years of both male and female secondary and higher education schooling, observed at the start of each decade, also significantly correlate with the average growth rates of per capita GDP.293 Some studies suggest that the inequalities in educational attainment levels and income have more significance for economic performance than average educational attainment.294 Another study finds that per capita GDP growth is dependent on the growth of per capita public spending on education, among other factors.295 Similarly, Alam, Sultana, and Butt conducted a study on developing Asian countries and found a dynamic relationship between the expenditure on education and economic growth.296 Meanwhile, Romer connected human capital with technologies, stating that quality human capital is necessary for research and consequent technological progress and economic growth.297 Moreover, Nelson and Phelps argued that the inclusion of human capital as a factor of production in growth equation is, in fact, a misspecification, as education increases the speed of technological diffusion in an economy and then the technological diffusion affects economic growth.298 Meanwhile, in advancing human capital as the main source of country differences in per capita incomes, Mankiw attributes a substantial role to externalities.299 Human capital externalities serve as the linchpin of theories of

293 Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Economic Growth (New York: McGrawHill, 1995). 294 Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and Vassilis Tselios, “Inequalities in income and education and regional economic growth in Western Europe,” The Annals of Regional Science 44, no. 2 (2010): 349. 295 Minh Q. Dao, “Government expenditure and growth in developing countries,” Progress in Development Studies 12, no. 1 (2012): 77. 296 Shaista Alam, Abida Sultana and Mohammad S. Butt, “Does Social Expenditures Promote Economic Growth? A Multivariate Panel Cointegration Analysis for Asian Countries,” European Journal of Social Sciences 14, no. 1 (2010): 52. 297 Paul M. Romer, “Endogenous Technological Change,” Journal of Political Economy 98, no. 5 Part 2: The Problem of Development: A Conference of the Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise Systems (1990): S71. 298 Richard R. Nelson and Edmund S. Phelps, “Investment in humans, technological diffusion, and economic growth,” The American Economic Review 56, no. 1/2 (1966): 75. 299 N. Gregory Mankiw, “Comment on ‘The Neoclassical Revival in growth Economics: Has it gone too far?” NBER Macroeconomics Annual (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).

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economic growth.300 If innovations produce externalities, because they show the way to imitators, then education–by its stimulation of innovation–also yields externalities. Hence, the way of viewing the role of education in economic growth seems to signify a “possible source of a divergence between the private and social rate of return to education.”301 Acemoglu and Angrist state that “the returns to education are important for both economic policy and economic theory […] A large literature in labor economics reports estimates of private returns to education on the order of 6–10%.”302 Moreover, stemming from empirical studies, human capital externalities are important for education policy as well as for cross-country income differences, however, “there is little empirical work estimating human-capital externalities.”303 Importantly, the economic benefits of better education are located not only in higher productivity and earnings, but also in a wide variety of other benefits including health, mobility, improved child-rearing, family planning, and consumption decisions.304 Keller’s study finds that investments in education indirectly affect other development goals, such as openness, decrease of inflation, and political rights.305 Investments in human capital are also associated with another type of capital – social. According to Coleman, social capital is closely linked to human capital and is created through changes in the relations among persons that facilitate action.306 The author discusses the concept of social capital, paralleling other

300 Robert E. Lucas, Jr. “On the Mechanics of Economic Development,” Journal of Monetary Economics 22, no. 2 (1988): 3–42. Paul M. Romer, “Endogenous Technological Change,” Journal of Political Economy 98, no. 5 Part 2: The Problem of Development: A Conference of the Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise Systems (1990): S71–102. 301 Richard R. Nelson and Edmund S. Phelps, “Investment in humans, technological diffusion, and economic growth,” The American Economic Review 56, no. 1/2 (1966): 75. 302 Daron Acemoglu and Joshua Angrist, “How Large Are Human-Capital Externalities? Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Laws,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual
15 (2000): 48. 303 Ibid., 11. 304 Barbara Wolfe and Robert Haveman, “Schooling and Economic Well-Being: The Role of Non-Market Effects,” Journal of Human Resources 19, no. 3 (1984): 377–407. Deepak Nayyar, The South in the World Economy: Past, Present, and Future (Human Development Report Office, 2013). 305 Katarina R. I. Keller, “Investment in Primary, Secondary, and Higher Education and the Effects on Economic Growth,” Contemporary Economic Policy 24, no. 1 (2006): 32. 306 James S. Coleman, “Social Capital in creation of human capital,” The American Journal of Sociology 94 (1998): S100.

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concepts in social theory–of financial capital, physical capital, and human capital–but embodied in relations among persons.307 The concept of social capital has received considerable attention among scholars. There seems to be a widespread consensus on the hypothesis that social networks can also affect economic performance.308 Education also provides benefits to the larger society, the so-called external benefits, “because they extend beyond the direct recipients of education in the form of more effective economic, political, and social interactions that benefit the entire population.”309 Naturally, however, the relationship between education and growth is not simple or linear. For instance, Agenor’s model defined productive public spending as simultaneous investments in education, infrastructure and health.310 In an empirical study of Nigeria, Ogundipe and Aworinde show that an increase in government’s spending on education, along with agriculture and transport, positively affects economic growth.311 These arguments illustrate the complex nature of productive spending that affects growth and the importance of evaluating cases individually. Finally, investments in education do not always correlate with economic growth and development.

Criticism Despite the evidence provided with respect to education and economic development, some studies find the relationship between changes in education and growth rates to be surprisingly weak. For example, Benhabib and Spiegel and Pritchett come to this conclusion for a large sample of countries.312 The study by

307 James S. Coleman, “Social Capital in creation of human capital,” The American Journal of Sociology 94 (1998): S118. 308 Kenneth J. Arrow, “Observations on Social Capital,” in Social Capital: A multifaceted perspective, ed. Parthe Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999), 3. 309 Clive R. Belfield and Henry M. Levin, The price we pay (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press: 2007). 310 Pierre-Richard Agénor, “Schooling and Public Capital in a Model of Endogenous Growth,” Economica 78, no. 309 (2009): 108. 311 Mushay A. Ogundipe and Olalekan B. Aworinde, “Sectoral Analysis of the Impact of Public Investment on Economic Growth in Nigeria (1970–2008),” European Journal of Social Sciences 20, no. 2 (2011): 259. 312 Jess Benhabib and Mark M. Spiegel, “The role of human capital in economic development. Evidence from aggregate cross-countries data,” Journal of Monetary Economics 34 (1994): 143–73.

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Monteils also did not verify the correlation between education and economic growth; the study shows that human capital returns are decreasing, in contradiction to growth models.313 Simply increasing the human capital stock in a country will not result in a direct social or economic progress. In fact, it may even slow it down by isolating some groups and whose position is undermined by the fact that others are gaining skills and qualifications.314 Based on the U.S. and international data, Hanushek states that a resourcebased policy of a state has a minor impact on the educational attainment of students.315 Moreover, Blankenau and Camera reveal that when a state spends more on the educational sector, it could have an opposite effect.316 Similarly, Basu and Bhattarai report that increasing public spending on education decreases per capita growth rate in the long run: Growth and schooling returns are in fact lower in countries with a higher ratio of public spending to GDP, except for in the case of very high education spenders… An increase in public spending on education without adequate infrastructural support may not necessarily be beneficial for the society. More spending on education through taxes in countries without sufficient infrastructure creates larger distortions and lowers growth. Thus, a blanket increase in government spending on education may not necessarily promote growth and welfare in all countries.317

It is important to note that the studies in question mainly speak about government spending on educational sector, but not a private one. This stresses the need to evaluate the involvement of private sector in developing education, along with a state one. Curs, Bhandari and Steiger conducted a study using the data from years 1970 to 2005 and found that the omission of the U.S. private higher education system negatively biases the estimated relationship between

313 Marielle Monteils, “The Analysis of the Relation Between Education and Economic Growth,” Compare: A Journal of Comparative Education 34, no. 1 (2004): 103, 113. 314 Tom Schuller, “The Complementary Roles of Human and Social Capital” (OECD, 2001), 10. Accessed 1 September 2015. http://www.oecd.org/innovation/research/1825424. pdf. 315 Eric A. Hanushek, “The failure of input-based schooling policies,” Economic Journal 113, no. 485 (2003): F64–98. 316 William Blankenau and Gabriele Camera, “Public spending on education and the incentives for student achievement,” Economica 76, no. 303 (2009): 505–27. 317 Parantap Basu and Keshab Bhattarai, “Government Bias in Education, Schooling Attainment, and Long-Run Growth,” Southern Economic Journal 79, no. 1 (2012): 129–30, 140.

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higher education spending and economic growth in the States.318 According to the authors, specifically, “the states with a large market share of students in private higher education institutions have a negative relationship between higher education spending and economic growth, while states with large public shares are found to have a positive relationship.”319 In this respect, a study by Yamarik finds a quantifiable positive relationship between education and U.S. state-level growth.320 Evidently, different research parameters can lead to a variation in the empirical findings. Following an extensive literature review, it became evident that, among other aspects, one can attribute the discrepancies in study results to: 1) the employed measurement methods, and 2) the chosen variables.

Estimation Issues: explanation for ambiguity Importantly, certain studies321 reveal that the results estimating the relationship between human capital and growth may be biased due to the measurement error in the study and that education positively correlates with economic growth when the measurement error in considered for: Indeed, after adjusting for measurement error, the change in average years of schooling often has a greater effect in the cross-country regressions than in the within-country micro regressions. The larger return to schooling found in the cross-country models suggests that reverse causality or omitted variables create problems at the country level of analysis, or that increases in average educational attainment generate nationwide externalities.322

Furthermore, Portela, Alessie, and Teulings extensively evaluate the estimation errors in measuring the relationship between education and country’s GDP and, using technical evidence, conclude that “the measurement error in education is

318 Bradley R. Curs, Bornali Bhandari, and Christina Steiger, “The Roles of Public Higher Education Expenditure and the Privatization of the Higher Education on U.S. States Economic Growth,” Journal of Education Finance 36, no. 4 (2011): 424–41. 319 Ibid., 424. 320 Steven Yamarik, “Human Capital and State-level economic growth: what is the contribution of schooling?” The Annals of Regional Science 47, no. 1 (2011): 195–211. 321 Alan B. Krueger and Mikael Lindahl, “Education for growth: why and for whom?” Journal of Economic Literature 39, no. 4 (2001): 1101–36. 322 Ibid., 1130–31.

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widely recognized as an important source of bias in growth regressions.”323 While Barro and Lee’s data “underestimate the growth of education by about one-fifth of a year per five-year period,” the authors’ results indicate that “an additional year of education only has a moderate effect on GDP of about 4%–7% in the short run, but a huge effect of about 50%–60% in the long run.”324 Permani also argues that the empirical evidence of the relationship between education and economics is ambiguous due to econometric and model specification problems.325 To summarize, where human capital is found to correlate negatively with growth,326 the results are generally attributed to be an outcome of the quality of data, measurement issues or the proxy adopted to capture the effect of human capital.327 The different measurement parameters lead to a variation in conclusions. The discrepancies in study results also arise from different employed variables. For instance, Becker’s study found that the most significant determinant is the profitability or rate of return, but little attention is paid to the factors determining amount invested in human capital.328 Primarily, human capital is measured by levels of the achieved qualification, but this is often considered inadequate.329 Benhabib and Spiegel analyzed the role of human capital by using a data set from Summers and Heston and, by including the specification that the total factor productivity growth depends on the level of human capital, found that human capital plays a significant role in economic growth.330 Similarly, De

323 Miguel Portela, Rob Alessie and Coen Teulings, “Measurement Error in Education and Growth Regressions,” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 112, no. 3 (2010): 618. 324 Ibid., 618–19. 325 Risti Permani, “Role of Education in Economic Growth in East Asia: a survey.” AsianPacific Economic Literature 23, no. 1 (2009): 1. 326 Jess Benhabib and Mark M. Spiegel, “The role of human capital in economic development. Evidence from aggregate cross-countries data,” Journal of Monetary Economics 34 (1994): 143–73. Lant Pritchett, “Where has all the education gone?” World Bank Economic Review 15, no. 3 (2001): 367–91. 327 Faisal S. Qadri and Abdul Waheed, “Human Capital and Economic Growth: Crosscountry evidence from low-, middle- and high-income countries,” Progress in Development Studies 13, no. 2 (2013): 90. 328 Gary S. Becker, “Investment in Human Capital: A theoretical analysis,” The Journal of Political Economy 70, no. 5 (1962): 9–49. 329 Jere R. Behrman, “Conceptual and Measurement Issues,” in The Social Benefits of Education, ed. Jere R Behrman and Nevzer G. Stacey (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997). 330 Jess Benhabib and Mark M. Spiegel, “The role of human capital in economic development. Evidence from aggregate cross-countries data,” Journal of Monetary Economics

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la Fuente and Domenech revise Barro and Lee’s study with a set of twenty-one OECD countries and, as a result of considering previously unexploited elements, remove sharp differences in the data.331 An important point of differentiation between studies is the considered level of education. Mankiw, for instance, found that the differences in secondary and higher education are more important than differences in primary education.332 Gemmell and Webber evaluated the role of human capital in the economic growth and found a positive correlation after estimating the impact of different levels of education: primary, secondary, and tertiary.333 Sequeira and Martins argue that there is a positive effect of education for the broad sample of countries when the population on secondary level of education is a parameter of measurement.334 Meanwhile, Gyimah-Brempong argues that different levels of education affect the development outcomes differently, stating that primary and secondary levels are often more significant.335 However, the author also points out that certain factors such as income growth are more influenced by the developments in tertiary education. Similarly, it is essential to differentiate between the private and public sectors of education. Public expenditure is presented as a key investment. The study by Blankenau, Simpson, and Tomljanovich demonstrates a positive relationship

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332 333

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34 (1994): 143–73. Robert Summers and Alan Heston, “The Penn world table (Mark 5): An expanded set of international comparisons, 1950–1988,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, no. 2 (1991): 327– 68. Robert J. Barro and Jong-Wha Lee, “International Measures of Schooling Years and Schooling Quality,” American Economic Review 86, no. 2 (1996): 218–23. Angel De la Fuente and Rafael Doménech, “Human Capital in Growth Regressions: How Much Difference Does Data Quality Make?” Journal of the European Economic Association 4, no. 1 (2006): 1. N. Gregory Mankiw, “Comment on ‘The Neoclassical Revival in growth Economics: Has it gone too far?” NBER Macroeconomics Annual (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). Norman Gemmell, “Evaluating the impacts of human capital stocks and accumulation on economic growth: Some new evidence,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 58, no. 1 (1996): 9–28. Don J. Webber, “Policies to Stimulate Growth: Should we Invest in Health or Education?” Applied Economics 34, no. 13 (2002): 1633–43. Tiago N. Sequeira and Elsa V. Martins, “Education public financing and economic growth: an endogenous growth model versus evidence,” Empirical Economics 35, no. 2 (2008): 361–77. Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong, “Education and Economic Development in Africa,” African Development Review 23, no. 2 (2011): 219–36.

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between public education expenditure and growth.336 Similarly, Greiner argues that since government finances the school sector, it, therefore, plays a key role with regard to economic growth.337 The state, however, is not the only provider of educational services. There is an increasing competition between public and private educational institutions.338 According to Bjarnason et. al., 30% of world higher education enrollment is now private, while earlier few existed outside the United States, Japan and Korea.339 Sanyal and Johnstone outline that: The private higher education has been the result not only of increased demand, but also of differentiated demand in many countries, where government provision of higher education may not be meeting the demand, for example, for religious education or shortterm training in the areas of greatest employment growth such as business or computer science, or English language instruction.340

Generally, private educational establishments have intensified the educational markets worldwide and, thereby, need to be considered in studies related to education and human capital. In discussing human capital as a determinant of growth, it is also imperative to distinguish between the countries in question. Most studies that evaluate the correlation between human capital, education and economic growth focus on the developed country cases.341 For instance, Middendorf empirically investigated the effect of human capital on economic growth by applying the panel data approach to twenty-nine OECD countries during the period of 1965–2000 336 William F. Blankenau, Nicole B. Simpson and Marc Tomljanovich, “Public Education Expenditures, Taxation and Growth: Linking Data to Theory,” AEA Papers and Proceedings 97, no. 2 (2007): 393–97. 337 Alfred Greiner, “Human Capital Formation, Learning by Doing and the Government in the Process of Economic Growth,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy 59, no. 1 (2012): 84. 338 Pedro Teixeira, Vera Rocha, Ricardo Biscaia and Margarida Fonseca Cardoso, “Myths, Beliefs and Realities: Public-Private Competition and Program Diversification in Higher Education,” Journal of Economic Issues 46, no. 3 (2012): 683. 339 Svava Bjarnason, Kai-Ming Cheng, John Fielden, Maria-Jose Lemaitre, Daniel Levy, and N. V. Varghese, ed., “A new dynamic: Private higher education” (background document prepared for the World Conference on Higher Education, Paris: UNESCO, 2009), 8. 340 Bikas C. Sanyal and D. Bruce Johnstone, “International Trends in the Public and Private Financing of Higher Education,” Prospects 41, no. 1 (2011): 163–64. 341 Boopen Seetanah, “The Economic Importance of Education: Evidence from Africa using Dynamic Panel Data Analysis,” Journal of Applied Economics 12, no. 1 (2009): 137.

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and found a significant positive effect of human capital on economic growth.342 Meanwhile, there are different factors affecting economic dynamism between the developed and developing countries.343 In particular, with regard to the emerging states, one may highlight brain drain as a negative externality of investing in human capital. Indeed, as the competition today is less for markets and more for capital, talent, and ideas,344 brain drain and brain gain are important implications of investing in education and human capital in the current age of globalization. The direct impact of losing high-skilled human capital and its potentially negative externalities may harm domestic production and adversely affect those left behind in the developing economies. However, there is empirical evidence of positive feedback effects, suggesting that high-skilled emigration may inspire more human capital formation and, on top of remittances, emigrants may contribute to the home economy through diaspora externalities.345 The recent literature demonstrates that high-skill emigration, both permanent and temporary, need not deplete a country’s human capital stock. It can generate positive network externalities and provide multiplier effects, such as an effect on institutional quality.346 In fact, empirical studies on developing states confirm the positive effect of investments into human capital. Seetanah investigated the empirical link between education and economic performance in 40 African states and found that “education stimulates economic growth through strengthening the efficiency of labor force and earning potential.”347 According to Perlo-Freeman and Webber, poorer countries cannot 342 Torge Middendorf, “Human capital and economic growth in OECD countries,” Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Discussion Papers 30 (2005): 1–20. 343 Paschalis Arvantidis, George Petrakos, and Sotiris Pavleas, “Determinants of Economic Growth: The Experts View,” Discussion Paper Series 13, no. 10 (2007): 267. 344 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Jr. Nye, CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A smarter, more secure America (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2007), 54. 345 Luca Marchiori, I-Ling Shen and Frédéric Docquier, “Brain Drain in Globalisation: A general equilibrium analysis from the sending countries’ perspective,” Economic Inquiry 51, no. 2 (2013): 1596–97. 346 Frédéric Docquier and Hillel Rapoport, “Globalization, Brain Drain and Development,” IZA Discussion Paper 5590 (2011): 1–62. Frédéric Docquier, Elisabetta Lodigiani, Hillel Rapoport, and Maurice Schiff, “Emigration and democracy,” World Bank Policy Research Paper 5557 (2011): 1–49. 347 Boopen Seetanah, “The Economic Importance of Education: Evidence from Africa using Dynamic Panel Data Analysis,” Journal of Applied Economics 12, no. 1 (2009): 137–57.

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opt for growth and life-changing improvements without the particular attention to education.348 The authors build up on Barro’s finding that human capital is a key element that enables a poor country to catch up with established markets. In fact, Nomura argues that the contribution of education to economic growth is statistically more significant in countries with relatively low level of initial education and countries with relatively high improvement of educational equality.349 The study by Qadri and Waheed–which finds positive correlation between human capital and economic growth for the sample of 106 countries over the period of 2002–2008–illustrates that investments are more necessary for the middle- and low-income countries.350 A higher stock of human capital can allow a less developed country to reach the income levels of a developed country quicker through increased absorption of international technologies or capacity for imitation.351 In fact, according to the Human Development Report, the rise of the global South has largely resulted from applying pragmatic policies, including the improvement of human development through education.352 To reiterate, the critique of studies on human capital can be partially justified after considering the employed methodologies and measurement parameters. Moreover, it is essential to consider the variables in different studies. An important difficulty in measuring human capital and education comes from the fact that it involves measuring human behavior, which, to a great extent, is tacit and not measurable.353 Despite these challenges, academics and policymakers increasingly recognize the vital role of human capital in the process of economic growth, even though the importance of human capital externalities does not have

348 Samuel Perlo-Freeman and Don J. Webber, “Basic Needs, Government Debt and Economic Growth,” The World Economy 32, no. 6 (2009): 991. 349 Tomokazu Nomura, “Contribution of education and educational equality to economic growth,” Applied Economics Letters 14, no. 9 (2007): 627. 350 Faisal S. Qadri and Abdul Waheed, “Human Capital and Economic Growth: Crosscountry evidence from low-, middle- and high-income countries,” Progress in Development Studies 13, no. 2 (2013): 89. 351 Mireille Laroche, Marcel Mérette, and G. C. Ruggeri, “On the Concept and Dimensions of Human Capital in a Knowledge-Based Economy Context,” Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques 25, no. 1 (1999): 88. 352 Deepak Nayyar, The South in the World Economy: Past, Present, and Future (Human Development Report Office, 2013), 1. 353 Ulf Johanson, “A human resource perspective on intellectual capital,” in Perspectives on Intellectual Capital: Multidisciplinary insights into Management, Measuring, and Reporting, ed. Bernard Marr (Boston: Butterworth Heinemann, 2004), 103.

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a solid empirical basis.354 One must be cautious about reaching a final conclusion in science because the evidence is limited.355 Educational investments may not bring quick and easily measurable results, but their results are gradual and deep. To tie the discussion of this section with the larger argument of this chapter, we need to go back to the analytical framework, presented at the beginning of the chapter. It was argued that if one were to find a plausible connection between education–either separately or through the human capital element–and economic growth, then that would signify that education belongs to hard power resources as well. Following the critical review of the literature, partially presented in the chapter, one may suggest that there is, indeed, a positive correlation between educational investments and economic growth: Figure 10.  Relationship between Education, Human Capital, and Economic Growth

This suggests that the hypothesized place of education in the hard power resource framework is confirmed:

354 Mireille Laroche, Marcel Mérette, and G. C. Ruggeri
, “On the Concept and Dimensions of Human Capital in a Knowledge-Based Economy Context,” Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques 25, no. 1 (1999): 98. 355 James J. Heckman and Peter J. Klenow, Human capital policy (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1997), 3.

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Figure 9.  Education in hard power resource framework

Education: a Smart Power Resource? The discussion above illustrates that education represents not only a soft power resource, but also a hard power resource, as educational investments are able to impact economic growth. The latter is an important finding, widening the scope of education in the International Relations theory. This chapter has illustrated that hard power resources are expansive and include education as well. This has not been previously outlined in research related to education and power. However, to take one step further, one could think about what this could mean for education in terms of its categorization in soft and hard power theories. First, it seems that Education belongs to both hard and soft power resource frameworks. Education could be referred to as a ‘gray’ resource area, as it has both soft and hard dimensions to it. The soft dimension is represented in the connection to soft power’s ‘culture’ category. The hard dimension is revealed in the connection to economic growth, i.e. economic strength. If one were to look at hard and soft power through its resources and employ Venn diagrams, circle A would then represent hard power resources and circle B would symbolize soft power resources. Meanwhile, the Middle darker oval C would represent their overlapping resources. Education in both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ sense refers to the quality of the educational system, its programs and graduates i.e. they are somewhat equivalent and one could, therefore, equalize the two resources. Hard and soft power resources do not overlap–as far as we have seen at this point–except when it comes to the Resource of Education. To reiterate, following the argument of this chapter, the resource of Education has both hard and soft power characteristics; therefore, it is located in the middle darker oval:

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Figure 11.  Resource of Education

However, going back to the previous chapter’s discussion, there already exists a power form that unites both soft and hard power, namely, smart power. Smart power is “the ability to skilfully combine hard and soft power for the development of integrated strategies.”356 Alternatively, it could be defined as “the capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that the actor’s goals are advanced effectively and efficiently.”357 Smart power must begin with the assumption that hard power is essential, and the national interest is best advanced by effectively combining hard power and soft. Smart power advocates must learn to articulate the advantages of soft power combined with hard power in a language that is politically compelling.358

Wilson continues: Smart power means knowing the strengths and limitations of each instrument. One needs the capacity to recognize when to use one kind of power rather than another to achieve national purposes, depending on the context. This is related to the wisdom to know how to combine the elements of coercive power with the power to persuade and to inspire emulation (i.e., to combine soft and hard power).359

Graphically, smart power could be represented in the following way:

356 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Jr. Nye, CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A smarter, more secure America (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2007), 7. 357 Ernest J. III Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power, ” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 115. 358 Ibid., 120. 359 Ibid., 116.

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Figure 12.  Smart power

The existing definitions posit smart power as an ability to utilize hard power and soft power. As an infant academic concept, however, it requires further theorizations and practical applications. As argued by Pallaver, first and foremost, “smart power is the recognition of the different forms of power and the instruments it can employ.”360 While there has not been an explicit discussion of smart power’s resources, following Nye and Wilson’s definitions, smart power (i.e. ability to combine soft and hard resources) then must include both soft power resources and hard power resources, i.e. all the resources listed in the Figures 2 and 3. Of course, smart power is not simply ‘having’ both soft and hard power resources, but combining them to achieve the desired results. However, if one were not to go into the discussion of turning resources into outcomes, but focus specifically on the resources–as we have throughout this monograph–then it would be possible to visualize the smart power arsenal. Obviously, theorizations such as this are risky. First of all, there are inherent limitations in hard and soft power theories, part of which were covered in previous chapters. Moreover, lists of any kind are a simplification of the theory. Nevertheless, if one accepts that any form of power could be visualized through the system of resources, then smart power resources could be illustrated as the following:

360 Matteo Pallaver, “Power and Its Forms: Hard, Soft, Smart” (master’s thesis, London School of Economics, 2011), 105. Accessed 1 May 2015. etheses.lse.ac.uk/220/1/ Pallaver_Power_and_Its_Forms.pdf.

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Figure 13.  Smart power resources

One can see how education is duplicated twice – in hard power and then soft power resource arsenal. Alternatively, smart power resources could be illustrated in a different manner, employing the Venn diagrams from Figure 11: Figure 14.  Smart power resources Alternative

This diagram is similar to the previous list-version. The key difference is that it shows a smart power resource arsenal using Venn diagrams and illustrates the overlapping resource of Education in a clearer manner. The key point again is that it illustrates the resource of Education in the overlapping area C as belonging not only to hard and soft, but also to the smart power arsenal. Now comes the most important yet somewhat ambiguous point. Illustrating an arsenal of smart power resources means that smart power resources exist (as a 87

combination of hard and soft power resources). Importantly, Figure 14 allows seeing that Education resource does not belong to hard and soft power separately, but is inside the circle that belongs to both. Following the unique position of Education resource, I propose to consider it a pure smart power resource. Pure in this sense means that it does not represent a mix of different resources, but in itself, it already possesses both hard and soft attributes. In sum, this research suggests that smart power resources exist and defines a pure smart power resource as a resource that can contribute to both hard and soft power, in other words, exist in both hard and soft power arsenal. Figure 15.  Education in the soft-hard-smart power framework

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Chapter Summary The goal of this chapter was to assess the ambiguous nature of Education resource in the framework of hard and soft power. Educational programs and exchanges shape opinion, create goodwill and attract temporary migrants, making it an effective soft power resource. It was argued, however, that investments in education also contribute to the economic competitiveness of a nation–an attribute of hard power–making it a hard power resource as well. Despite the discrepancies in the human capital theory–which could be partially attributed to estimation issues and choice of variables–there is secondary empirical evidence of a positive relationship between investments in education and economic growth, either directly or through human capital proliferation. Following this argument, in a sequence of theoretical steps, the chapter framed Education resource in a pure smart power resource category and defined a pure smart power resource as a resource that can contribute to both hard and soft power. While the argument of education belonging to hard power may be evident, there is no publicly available research to help illustrate that point. This research seeks to begin filling that gap. The suggestions here are heuristic rather than definitive; in other words, it encourages questions and reflection rather than providing final answers. So far, this monograph has used theoretical research to progress the argument. However, a practical outlook is a useful step in strengthening a theoretical discussion. Therefore, the next step is to conduct an empirical study to test first-hand where and how education can become a stronger power resource. The next part of the publication is dedicated to the presentation and analysis of the empirical case study.

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Chapter 5. Empirical Case Study Introduction The previous chapters have evaluated the concept of power with specific reference to the forms identified by Joseph Nye. Chapter 3 has dealt with highlighting the weaknesses of the soft power theory, specifically regarding its resources. To further address this issue, the author assessed the ambiguous nature of Education resource in Chapter 4. It was revealed that education represents, in fact, not only a soft power resource but also a hard power resource. Following a critical literature review, it was outlined that educational investments contribute to economic competitiveness–an attribute of hard power–making it a hard resource as well. Following this argument, the chapter put Education resource in a smart power resource category and defined a Smart power resource as a resource that can contribute to both hard and soft power. The next step in this research is assessing the phenomenon of education as a power resource empirically. This would be one of the first attempts to apply the concept of education as a soft and hard power (or smart, if you will) practically. As outlined in the introductory chapter, this monograph relies on various research methods. In particular, Chapters 5 and 6 will incorporate primary data, stemming from the results of the empirical study, conducted specifically for this book.

Research Strategy While the previous chapters have been primarily theoretical, it is important to apply practically the concepts of hard, soft, and smart power to try to see their relevance for political realities and policies that can be adopted by states. As Wilson argues, the critique of soft and smart power is justified as their arguments suffer from methodological flaws, pointing to a need for better definitions and conceptualization of soft power, greater attention to the institutional realities, and a more systematic effort to incorporate real-world dynamics.361 My previous answer regarding the relationship between education and power, based on the theoretical research, is positive. In Chapters 5 and 6, I will make

361 Ernest J. III Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 114.

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a brief but fundamental inquiry into the general empirical realities that can prove or disprove that education as part of power can work. The discussion in the previous chapter has illustrated that education represents not only a soft power resource but also a hard power resource, as educational investments are able to impact economic growth. Education in both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ sense refers to the quality of the educational system, its programs and graduates, among other parameters. For example, the Education sub-index in McClory’s conceptualization “includes measures on the number of foreign students in a country, the relative quality of its universities and the output of academic publishing.”362 Thereby, states attempting to develop and use education as a ‘power’ resource–whether soft or hard–must aim at increasing the quality and reputability of their educational systems. As the research focus of this research is education as a power resource, the template research questions for the empirical study are straightforward: Is education an effective hard/soft power resource? Which forms of education are most effective in contributing to hard/soft/smart power? How can education become a more effective power resource? In an attempt to answer these questions, an appropriate method should be chosen. The choice of a particular research strategy generally depends on its appropriateness for the topic area, the subject of study and the specific objectives of the research in question. Among other methods, the case study research approach is often highlighted as a valuable research method for addressing a descriptive or explanatory question, studying a phenomenon within the real-world context, and conducting evaluations.363 In the case study method, the purpose is to gain insight rather than measure effects or make generalizations to a larger population.364 According to Cohen and Manion, case studies allow observing the characteristics of the particular unit and analyzing the phenomena surrounding 362 Jonathan McClory, The New Persuaders II. A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power (Institute for Government, 2011), 11. Accessed June 1, 2015. http://www. instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/The%20New%20 PersuadersII_0.pdf. 363 Robert K. Yin, Applications of case study research 3rd ed. Vol 5 (Washington, D.C.: Sage Publications, 2012), 5. 364 IAR, Instructional Assessment Resources (The University of Texas at Austin, 2011). Accessed 10 September, 2014. http://www.utexas.edu/academic/ctl/assessment/iar/ teaching/gather/method/survey-Response.php.

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it.365 Importantly, a case study strategy is not without its critics and there are limitations in adopting this approach. For instance, the researchers need to be aware of the difficulty of making generalizations as a result of one case study.366 Critics of the case study approach draw attention to a number of problems and/or disadvantages. For example, some question the value of the study of single events and point out that it is difficult for researchers to cross-check information. Others express concern about the possibility of selective reporting and the resulting dangers of distortion. A major concern is that generalization is not always possible…367

Yet, the author adds that “the case study approach can be particularly appropriate for individual researchers because it provides an opportunity for one aspect of a problem to be studied in some depth.”368 The case study approach provides the focus that is required for this particular study and it assumes that reality could be understood through social constructions, especially when the context of the phenomenon under study is complex. Taking into account the scope and overall research objectives, I will focus on a single case study. The next step is to choose an appropriate case study for analysis. The traditional agent of power is a nation-state; so a logical choice would be to study a specific country case and evaluate the educational system of that country. As the topic of education in the framework of power is new, a study of almost any country would be relevant. To narrow down the options, the author has taken into consideration the fact that the previous chapters have revealed gaps in knowledge with regard to emerging countries in both the areas of soft power and education as a determinant of growth. Meanwhile, the imperative to study the developing nations is growing, not least because of their rise as power sources. Due to these considerations, as well as the availability of resources, the choice fell on the emerging state of Kazakhstan. After reworking the research focus on Kazakhstan, the research questions are thus:

365 Louis Cohen and Lawrence Manion, Research Methods in Education (London: Routledge, 1995), 106. 366 Clem Adelman, David Jenkins, and Stephen Kemmis, “Re-thinking case study: notes from the second Cambridge conference,” Cambridge Journal of Education 6, no. 3 (1977): 139–150. Walter R. Borg, Applying Educational Research: A Practical Guide for Teachers (New York: Longman, 1981). 367 Judith Bell, Doing Your Research Project: A Guide For First-Time Researchers in Education, Health and Social Science (Maidenhead, England: Open University Press, 2005): 11. 368 Ibid., 10.

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Is education an effective hard/soft power resource in Kazakhstan? Which forms of education are effective in contributing to soft/hard/smart power in Kazakhstan? How can education become a more effective power resource in Kazakhstan? It is not principally important here to state whether education is a hard+soft or smart power. Either way, hard and soft power characteristics remain within the resource of Education, whether one puts a ‘smart’ label on it or not. In essence, this research is qualitative in nature, not quantitative, where the former relates to studying “things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them,”369 and the latter tends to be used in the natural sciences to study natural phenomena, using methods such as laboratory experiments and mathematical modeling. As highlighted in previous chapters, estimating the effects of soft– and hard power is difficult.370 The metrics usually include some version of polls and opinions. Moreover, the quantitative literature on education as a source of economic growth has empirical weaknesses. As highlighted, “a simple increase in government spending on education may not necessarily promote growth in all countries.”371 The existing measures of investment do not allow policymakers to comprehend the full implications of human capital on economic performance and technological advancement.372 Therefore, to enable a well-rounded and novel analysis of the topic of education as a soft and hard power resource, qualitative data collection method is chosen.

369 Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, ed., Handbook of Qualitative Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994), 2. 370 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990). Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008). Joseph S. Jr. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011). Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015). Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portlandcommunications.com/publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/. 371 Parantap Basu and Keshab Bhattarai, “Government Bias in Education, Schooling Attainment, and Long-Run Growth,” Southern Economic Journal 79, no. 1 (2012): 130. 372 Mireille Laroche, Marcel Mérette, and G. C. Ruggeri, “On the Concept and Dimensions of Human Capital in a Knowledge-Based Economy Context,” Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques 25, no. 1 (1999): 88.

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The qualitative research approach allows discovering knowledge in a context where not much is known about the issue in question.373 Compared to a quantitative approach, qualitative data allows getting “deep insights into the phenomenon under study by considering context-specific factors, complex patterns and causal relationships.”374 The qualitative perspective aims to understand people and seek insight, rather than statistically interpret them,375 which is important for the study of somewhat abstract topics such as education and power. The choice of data collection method is also important in research strategy. To study the topic of education as a power resource, personal interviews were chosen as a qualitative data collection method. This type of data collection is resource intensive, but more expansive than those gathered by other means.376 Yin asserts that the “interviews are essential sources of case study information,” principally because most case studies are human affairs and those interviews can provide insights into complex situations.377 The technique provides the opportunity to obtain qualitative data by providing the opportunity for the interviewees to express their views. Additionally, the interview is not restricted to questions that the interviewer initially intends to ask; if issues arise during the interview process, then these issues can also be pursued. In this study, the narratives are aimed at collecting deep evidence. The questions during interviews were open-ended and semi-structured to encourage meaningful responses not available through other means.378 Such approach lets the interviewees “respond openly to question, without restricting data collection through an 373 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, “Building Theories from Case Study Research,” Academy of Management Review 14, no. 4 (1989): 532–550. Matthew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis: An expanded sourcebook 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994). 374 Anne-Katrin Neyer and Anne-Wil Harzing, “The impact of culture on interactions: Five Lessons learned from the European Commission,” European Management Journal 26, no 5 (2008): 6. 375 Judith Bell, Doing Your Research Project: A Guide For First-Time Researchers in Education, Health and Social Science (Maidenhead, England: Open University Press, 2005). 376 John Biggam, Succeeding with your Master’s Dissertation: A step-by-step handbook (Maidenhead, England: Open University Press, 2011), 121. 377 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods 3rd ed. Vol 5 (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003), 89. 378 Michael Q. Patton, Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods 2nd ed. (Newburry Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1990).

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a priori classification.”379 At the same time, the interviews needed to have some general structure to ensure that the interview has a clear direction and theme, not taking away from the opportunities for respondents to express their views, explain individual perspectives and expand on answers. The structured interview meets the researcher’s aim of respecting “how the participant frames and structures the responses… the participant’s perspective on the social phenomena of interest should unfold as the participant views it, not as the researcher views it.”380 To help focus the interviews to reflect the main objectives of the research and optimise the analysis of the qualitative data, the interviews were structured according to the following themes: Kazakhstan’s Power Paradigm and Education as a Power Resource in Kazakhstan. The author aimed at a 60–80 minute personal interview with each respondent. The interviews were carried out in the native language of the respondents: Russian or English. This was done to control for “any culturally determined construct bias,” as conducting interviews in a foreign language creates a risk of misinterpretation.381 All interviews were recorded and later transcribed. The use of interviews was deemed appropriate for this research because they give the opportunity for an in–depth discussion with a variety of pertinent stakeholders within a focused framework (this research is interested in stakeholder perspectives on the aspects of education as a power resource). The qualitative research, especially in the form of interviews, allows observing and analyzing people’s values, perceptions and opinions. The methodological approach in this study is normative/interpretative. Interpretative researchers believe that there are many, equally valid, interpretations of reality, and that these interpretations are dependent on when they are made and the context in which they are made, i.e. that they are time and context dependent.382 I will try to compensate the deficiency of data with some conceptual perspectives as well.

379 Anne-Katrin Neyer and Anne-Wil Harzing, “The impact of culture on interactions: Five Lessons learned from the European Commission,” European Management Journal 26, no 5 (2008): 7. 380 Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research (London: Sage Publications, 1989). 381 Anne-Katrin Neyer and Anne-Wil Harzing, “The impact of culture on interactions: Five Lessons learned from the European Commission,” European Management Journal 26, no 5 (2008): 7. 382 John Biggam, Succeeding with your Master’s Dissertation: A step-by-step handbook (Maidenhead, England: Open University Press, 2011), 137.

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The rationale for answering the research questions is the following: if one were to find competent forms of educational systems and programs, then that would signify that those have a potential to contribute to hard and soft power (or, if you accept the theorization of Chapter 4, smart power). If we already accept the ‘truth’ that education has hard and soft power characteristics, the main question is now to find the most efficient i.e. ‘power’ worthy forms of education. As the research questions specifically sought to study education as a power resource in Kazakhstan, it was necessary to interview the persons that are able to contribute to the discussion in a significant way due to their expertise or experience i.e. elite position holders. Moreover, to acquire valid and authentic data, it was imperative to interview a wide variety of respondents, so not only the heads of government agencies, but also the leaders of the educational institutions, private sector representatives, and political scientists. Due to research constraints, the study targeted a limited number of participants and educational institutions. To satisfy the objectives of this research, the following individuals were selected for interviews: № 1

Surname, Name Aitimova, Byrganym

Official Position Government representatives Special Envoy of the President of Kazakhstan. Chair of the Senate Committee responsible for “International Relations, National Security and Defense.” Former duties include, but are not limited to:

2

Idrissov, Erlan

Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations in New York (2007–2013); Minister of Education (2004–2007); Ambassador to Italy, Israel (prior to 2004); Deputy to the Prime Minister of Kazakhstan. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan. Former duties include: Ambassador of Kazakhstan to the Unites States; Ambassador of Kazakhstan to the United Kingdom; Ambassador of Kazakhstan to Ireland; Ambassador of Kazakhstan to Sweden; Ambassador of Kazakhstan to Norway; Ambassador of Kazakhstan to Brazil.

3

Raimzhanova, Ulzhan

Active promoter of collaborations with international educational institutions in Kazakhstan. Researcher at the Institute of Economic Research under auspices of the Ministry of Economy of Kazakhstan. The graduate of the Miras International School in Almaty. The graduate of the University College London, UK.

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Educational sector – Headmasters, Rectors and Students 4

Mutanov Galimkair, Professor, Doctor of Technical Sciences, the member of the World Academy of Art and Science

Rector of the Al-farabi Kazakh National University.

5

Auster, Andrew

First Headmaster of the Haileybury British school in Almaty, later Headmaster of the Haileybury in Astana.

6

Bartholomew, Alister

Project Director of the Haileybury British Schools in Kazakhstan.

7

Bullock, Howard

Third Headmaster of the Haileybury British School in Almaty.

8

Educational Foundation (cumulative interview)

Nazarbayev Educational Foundation, Patron of the Miras International School and other leading international educational institutions in Kazakhstan.

9

Park, Suna

One of Miras International School’s Top Graduates.

Chairman of the Board of Governors for both schools.

Founder and Director of the “K’orobe” packaging company in London, United Kingdom. Kazakhstani citizen. Private sector 10

Baitassov, Armanzhan

Prominent Kazakh Forbes-listed businessman. Owner of Forbes Kazakhstan. Endowment fund member for Kazakhstani universities. Parent at the Haileybury British school in Almaty.

11

Ertaeva, Nurgul

Member of the Board of Directors and Independent Director of the RBK Bank in Kazakhstan. Prominent philanthropist. Parent at the American International School in Almaty. Academic Expertise

12

Sarym, Aidos

Prominent Kazakh political scientist.

To enable a productive data collection, the following questions served as a starting point in the interviews.

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PART I: Kazakhstan’s Power Paradigm 1.

Joseph Nye has introduced the concept of soft power to identify the nation-state’s ability to reach goals through the attraction of behavior and resources. What steps is Kazakhstan pursuing in implementing soft power in state policy? How can the state develop effective power resources? What are the associated difficulties?

2.

Why do you think realpolitik methods still prevail in politics and in Kazakhstan, specifically?

3.

In the current global era, there is a shift in paradigm of the global power distribution. One could observe two trends: 1) As a group, the developing states are becoming active participants in global policy-making, symbolizing a gradual shift in the global center of power from the developed West towards the emerging East. 2) Furthermore, as the non-state actors start to play an influential role in world affairs, the global power seems to be shifting away from states altogether towards multinational corporations. How do you view this in the context of Kazakhstan?

4.

Kazakhstan participates in the so-called Great Game, where larger power players compete over the influence on the territory. What is the optimal strategy for the country in this context? PART II: Education as power resource in Kazakhstan

5.

As stated by Gary Becker, globalization puts a greater emphasis on people, investments in people, which is becoming the foundation for success in the 21st century as knowledge economies are more prevalent. How do you view this in the context of Kazakhstan? Which institutions do you identify as leaders in forming competitive human capital?

6.

How do you view the growing international education sector in Kazakhstan? (Trends? Competition? Demand? Customers? Fees? Relations with the state?) Which social, economic and political factors are in favor of international schools’ successful integration into the Kazakhstani market and which factors slow down the integration?

7.

Which aspects of the Soviet education need to be retained in Kazakhstan, in your opinion? Alternatively, which standards of international education need to be implemented, both on the secondary and tertiary level of education?

8.

With reference to international schools in Kazakhstan–similar to other developing markets–there is criticism that only a certain layer of the population can gain access to such education. How would you comment on this issue?

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9.

There is a growing trend of educational exchanges and getting a higher education abroad, which is associated with brain-drain. Do you perceive this as a serious issue in Kazakhstan?

10.

Private philanthropy is growing in the West. For instance, the Gates Foundation has a large endowment. How can the millionaires in the developing countries be stimulated to fund various programs of development?

11.

Henry Etzkowitz has created a ‘Triple Helix’ principle, which propagates an active collaboration between the universities, state and business sector for the effective development of industries. A key role within this framework is attributed to the universities, which do not only educate students but also capitalize human capital. Do you see the possibilities of the implementation of this theory in Kazakhstan?

As with any empirical research, one has to be aware of the inherent limitations. For instance, the inability to change independent variables, the risk of improper interpretation and lack of random sampling are identified as key weaknesses of the case study method.383 Moreover, this study incorporated the analysis of one country, a single country’s educational sector, and within that, an evaluation of only a certain number of institutions. Thus, while it is possible to draw conclusions about this particular study, it could be difficult to generalize data. In addition, the interview method has the issue of subjectivity. The study addresses this weakness by selecting a wide variety of respondents. Nevertheless, for future studies on the topic of education as a power resource, a larger number of respondents and a mixed data collection method are recommended. Given the nature of this research–an in-depth study of a novel phenomenon (education as a power resource), in a complex environment (government bodies, schools, universities), where a variety of stakeholder perspectives are sought (educators, students, management team, private sector, government officials), and where the underlying research philosophy is based on an interpretative understanding of the world–a strategy that meets the needs of this research is a case study with interviews as a data collection method. This sub-chapter has provided an overview of the research strategy of the empirical study. To determine whether education is an effective resource of the power, the analysis will proceed in two parts: first, the author is going to set the context in terms of the power resources of Kazakhstan, indicating a place of education in it (Chapter 5). The second part of the analysis will focus specifically on the instrument of education as a power resource in Kazakhstan (Chapter 6). 383 Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research 3rd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1986).

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Case Study: Kazakhstan The focus of the empirical study is education as a power resource in Kazakhstan. However, before proceeding to the resource of education, it is important to set the context in terms of the power resources of Kazakhstan and the topicality of soft power forms, if existent. This will require outlining geopolitical dynamics of Kazakhstan and the state’s power framework. In outlining hard and soft power resources, the chapter will refer to the categorizations presented in Chapter 3.

Hard power potential The Republic of Kazakhstan is a country that gained independence and sovereignty in 1991 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The country is located in Central Asia, with a minor part west of the Ural River in Europe. Kazakhstan is the largest landlocked country and the ninth’s largest country in the world, with the territory of 2,724,900 square kilometers.384 While Kazakhstan is the largest country in Central Asia, it is one of the world’s most sparsely populated with only 18 million people; hence, while geography could be perceived as a hard power resource, the population - not that much. In another aspect, the nation is endowed with considerable mineral resources, including significant oil and natural gas reserves, as well as vast areas of arable land.385 Within the Central Asia, Kazakhstan is the most noteworthy Turkic state with regard to its hydrocarbon resources as well as territorial size.386 Overall, geographical location and natural resources represent the sources of hard power in Kazakhstan. With regard to economic strength–another hard power resource–the road has been complex. When the Soviet Union dissolved, the centrally planned economic system collapsed and the sharp decline in demand for Kazakhstan’s traditional heavy industry products caused a significant drop in output. Nevertheless, with the implementation of economic reforms, the country’s economic performance has been rising since the late 1990s.387 The state’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita grew from $700 to $2,700 during the last decade, a rate of growth second only to China’s. Since achieving its independence, Kazakhstan has become the leading state in the former Soviet Central Asia in terms of such 384 CIA World Factbook, 15 August 2016, Accessed 20 August 2016. https://www.cia. gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kz.html. 385 Denise Y. Coleman, ed. “Kazakhstan Review 2015,” Country Watch (2015): 1. 386 Kaan Diyarbakırlıoğlu and Süreyya Yiğit, “Kazakh Multi Vector Foreign Policy in Action,” Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations 13, no. 4 (2014): 71. 387 Denise Y. Coleman, ed. “Kazakhstan Review 2015,” Country Watch (2015): 1.

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criteria as GDP, GDP per capita, privatization of the economy, volume of exports, rate of economic development, volume of energy production, effectiveness and transparency of the banking system, development of transportation, growth of technical education, and so forth.388 Figure 16. Map of Kazakhstan. Accessed 1 May 2016. http://www.infoplease.com/atlas/ country/kazakhstan.html

388 Michael Rywkin, “Stability in Central Asia: Engaging Kazakhstan A report on (with policy recommendations) U.S. Interests in Central Asia and U.S.- Kazakhstan Relations. Central Asia Project,” National Committee on American Foreign Policy (May 2005): 4–10.

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New Great Game In order to better understand Kazakhstan’s power sources, it is important to overview the state’s larger political framework and geopolitical dynamics. In Kazakhstan’s case, the larger political context is associated with the New Great Game framework. Central Asia had traditionally been the geopolitical center stage of the 19th-century Great Game i.e. the imperial rivalry between Britain and Russia for the influence on the territory. The disintegration of the Soviet Union changed the geopolitical realities, but “the centrality of Central Asia did not diminish in the New Great Game, though it changed its dimension.”389 Qamar and Sumera studied the phenomenon of the New Great Game and identified the following factors that initiated its new phase: 1) First, is the landlocked geographical location of the states, which means they need well-developed land routes to access other countries and major trade routes, requiring long-term strategic partners; 2) Second, is the closeness of the region to the important world powers such as Russia and China, which makes them strategically placed geopolitically; 3) Finally, the states are rich in energy resources such as natural gas and oil.390 Landlocked countries can have as much as 60 percent less trade than coastal states and twice their transport costs.391 In fact, transport costs in Central Asian countries represent 50 percent of the value of imported goods.392 Thereby, one of the most critical issues for Kazakhstan is breaking out of its landlocked, isolated geographic position by opening exit routes (rail, roads, and pipelines) in all possible directions.393 At the same time, although landlocked, Kazakhstan’s vast area

389 Fatima Qamar and Zafar Sumera, “New Great Game: Players, Interests, Strategies and Central Asia,” South Asian Studies - A Research Journal of South Asian Studies 29, no. 2 (2014): 627. 390 Ibid. 391 Elena Kulipanova, “International Transport in Central Asia: Understanding the Patterns of (Non-) Cooperation” (working Paper no. 2, August 2012). Accessed 1 August 2016. http://www.ucentralasia.org/Resources/Item/379. 392 Gael Raballand, “Determinants of the Negative Impact of Being Landlocked on Trade: An Empirical Investigation Through the Central Asian Case,” Comparative Economic Studies 45, no. 4 (2003): 520–36. 393 Michael Rywkin, “Stability in Central Asia: Engaging Kazakhstan A report on (with policy recommendations) U.S. Interests in Central Asia and U.S.- Kazakhstan Relations. Central Asia Project,” National Committee on American Foreign Policy (May 2005): 5.

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in the center of Eurasia means that virtually any communications and transit corridors linking Russia or Eastern Europe with South or East Asia must cross the country’s territory.394 As a result, the country is a strategic area of interest for many major Powers for economic, political, and security purposes. The geopolitical realities greatly affect and perhaps even dictate foreign and domestic policies of the state. As a matter of fact, Kazakhstan had largely built its foreign policy strategy around the New Great Game framework.

Multi-vectorism In light of its geopolitical context, Kazakhstan officially posits its foreign policy as multi-vector, which implies simultaneous co-alignment with different Great Powers, without particularly choosing any of them.395 The term was introduced by the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev when he outlined the foreign policy strategy for the independent country.396 In IR theory, the multi-vector policy has been viewed through the lenses of traditional theories, from balancing397 to bandwagoning.398 At its theoretical core, the multi-vector strategy appears to conform to the realist rational model of state behavior, at least in the sense that self-interest and self-preservation are the primary motivators of interaction.399 394 Reuel R. Hanks, “Multi-vector politics’ and Kazakhstan’s emerging role as a geostrategic player in Central Asia,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 11, no. 3 (2009): 258. 395 Kaan Diyarbakırlıoğlu and Süreyya Yiğit, “Kazakh Multi Vector Foreign Policy in Action,” Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations 13, no. 4 (2014): 73. 396 Reuel R. Hanks, “Multi-vector politics’ and Kazakhstan’s emerging role as a geostrategic player in Central Asia,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 11, no. 3 (2009): 257. 397 Roy Allison, “Regionalism, Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia,” International Affairs 80, no. 3 (2004): 463–83. William Wohlforth, “Revisiting Balance of Power Theory in Central Eurasia,” in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, ed. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004). 398 Roy Allison, “Regionalism, Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia,” International Affairs 80, no. 3 (2004): 463–83. Joshua P. Spero, “Paths to Peace for NATO’s partnership in Eurasia,” in Limiting Institutions? The Challenge of Eurasian Security Governance, ed. James Sperling, Sean Kay, and S. Victor Papacosma (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003). 399 Reuel R. Hanks, “Multi-vector politics’ and Kazakhstan’s emerging role as a geostrategic player in Central Asia,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 11, no. 3 (2009): 259.

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This policy explains the adaptive strategies and policies of states versus the geopolitical pluralism introduced by the “intersecting” economic, political, and cultural interests of the great powers.400 The first goal of multi-vectorism is the preservation of the country’s sovereignty, independence of values, and territorial integrity through the prevention of the leadership of one power on the territory. National security and the preservation of sovereignty and independence in the face of a greater power are the main objectives.401 The adoption of a multi-vector policy allows states to decrease the potential costs of dependence. As Efegil argues, “autonomy is an underlying concern for Central Asian states while engaging external great powers.”402 Thereby, the adoption of the multi-vector policy not only ensures the territorial integrity of Kazakhstan but also provides with space for maneuverability in the international community.403 The second important goal is the seeking of financial aid and assistance from major powers. As Schweller observes, while the aim of balancing is selfpreservation and the protection of values, the goal of bandwagoning is usually self-extension: “to obtain values coveted.”404 In other words, balancing is driven by the desire to avoid losses, while bandwagoning by the opportunity for gain. Blank notes that the multi-vector strategy allows governments to mitigate their potential external security dilemmas “by exploiting great and major power rivalries to secure tangible assistance that they could otherwise not produce on their own.”405 From the first days of its independence, Kazakhstan followed a pragmatic foreign policy, the main goal of which is to create a favorable interna400 Maria R. Freire, “Eurasia at the Heart of Russian Politics: Dynamics of (In) Dependence in a Complex Setting,” in Key Players and Regional Dynamics in Eurasia, ed. Maria R. Freire and Roger Kanet (London: Palgrave, 2010), 50. Moihaddin Mesbahi, “Eurasia Between Russia, Turkey and Iran,” in Key Players and Regional Dynamics in Eurasia, ed. Maria F. Freire and Roger Kanet (London: Palgrave, 2010), 165. 401 Nicola P. Contessi, “Foreign and Security Policy Diversification in Eurasia Issue Splitting, Co-alignment, and Relational Power,” Problems of Post-Communism 62 (2015): 301. 402 Ertan Efegil, “Regime Security vs. Imperialist Geopolitics: Which Factors Dominate the Decision Making of the Central Asian States?” Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies 4, no. 8 (2009): 56. 403 Diyarbakırlıoğlu and Süreyya Yiğit, “Kazakh Multi Vector Foreign Policy in Action,” Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations 13, no. 4 (2014): 80. 404 Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.” International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 74. 405 Stephen Blank, “The Influence of External Actors in Central Asia,” in The New Central Asia, ed. Emilian Kavalski (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010), 296.

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tional environment for the implementation of priority goals in the economic and political modernization of Kazakhstan.406 Multi-vectorism for Kazakhstan translates into multiple partnerships, agreements, and relationships – primarily for security and economic reasons. Strategic areas include the regions of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Asia, Europe, North America, and the Pacific Basin.407 As a practical illustration of this, one could look at the state’s membership in various organizations. Kazakhstan is a member of numerous international organizations, including the United Nations and many of its specialized and regional agencies, such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund. Kazakhstan is also confirmed for candidacy for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for 2017–18. In addition, Kazakhstan is a member of the following organizations: World Trade Organization, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Eurasian Economic Community, North Atlantic Cooperation Council (now the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Asian Development Bank, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The state is a founding member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Conference for Interaction and Confidence in Asia. It is also an active participant in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Partnership for Peace program and engages in regional security dialogue with the Association of South East Asian Nations.408 At the start of 2010, Kazakhstan gained the distinction of being the first Central Asian state to function as the chair of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The election of Kazakhstan to head the OSCE is considered as one of the latest achievements via multi-vectorism that increased the country’s status on the international stage.409 According to

406 Shaikhutdinov in Kaan Diyarbakırlıoğlu and Süreyya Yiğit, “Kazakh Multi Vector Foreign Policy in Action,” Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations 13, no. 4 (2014): 72. 407 Nursultan Nazarbaev, “Strategiia stanovleniia I razvitiia Kazakhstana kak suverennogo gosudarstva,” Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 16 May 1992. 408 Denise Y. Coleman, ed. “Kazakhstan Review 2015,” Country Watch (2015): 69. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations With Kazakhstan Fact Sheet Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. February 8, 2016. Accessed on 1 May 2016. http://www.state. gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5487.htm. 409 Denise Y. Coleman, ed. “Kazakhstan Review 2015,” Country Watch (2015): 73. Reuters, 2007. 30 November 2007. Accessed 1 May 2016. reuters.com/article/pressrelease/ idUS91821þ 30-NOV-2007.

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Baizakova, Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of the OSCE is an important factor “in building a safe, stable, and predictable Central Asia as well as in increasing the economic attractiveness of the region to partners in the organization.”410 Although Kazakhstan engages in these and other organizations, the country from the start faced a triangular foreign policy and had built its foreign policy strategies primarily around three nation-states. One could clearly observe the following three key actors for Kazakhstan: Russia, China, and the United States.411 Moscow proclaims it an area of vital significance, both economically and politically. Russia is Kazakhstan’s key partner for a variety of reasons that include economic, political, ethnic, linguistic, demographic, religious and geographical factors. The two countries are closely linked through a common border - the world’s longest land border.412 Russia has been pushing for the closer integration with Kazakhstan through the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union. In 2000, the countries of Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, and Tajikistan established the Eurasian Economic Community in efforts to balance trade tariffs and create a free-trade zone as part of a single customs union.413 In 2015, the Community agreement was terminated in light of the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union. Despite this, some scholars argue that Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russia and surrounding countries is often exaggerated.414 Meanwhile, China is an equally important partner. The Kazakhs are close geographically, share ancient historical ties with the Chinese, and possess common interests in the spheres of security, as well as political and economic cooperation. In particular, China attracts Kazakhstan with economic prospects and offers grand infrastructural projects. Overall trade with China rose to $24 billion in 2012, with the volume projected to reach $40 billion by 2015.415 As of now, China had outstripped Russian investment in the country. Ultimately,

410 Kuralai I. Baizakova, “Energy security issues in Kazakhstan,” American Foreign Policy Interests 32 (2010): 107. 411 Nursultan Nazarbaev, “Strategiia stanovleniia I razvitiia Kazakhstana kak suverennogo gosudarstva,” Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 16 May 1992. 412 Kaan Diyarbakırlıoğlu and Süreyya Yiğit, “Kazakh Multi Vector Foreign Policy in Action,” Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations 13, no. 4 (2014): 73. 413 Denise Y. Coleman, ed. “Kazakhstan Review 2015,” Country Watch (2015): 69. 414 Vladislav L. Inozemstev. “Why Kazakhstan Holds the Keys to the Global Economy?” 9 November 2015. http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/why-kazakhstan-holdsthe-keys-to-the-global-economy-a6727391.html. 415 Kaan Diyarbakırlıoğlu and Süreyya Yiğit, “Kazakh Multi Vector Foreign Policy in Action,” Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations 13, no. 4 (2014): 76–78.

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Kazakhstan’s relations with China could not be at the expense of its relations with Russia and vice versa. Stuck between these two powers, the Kazakhstani government looked for a third way in the face of collaborations with Europe and the United States. The USA is heavily interested in Kazakhstan as it wants to contain Russian and Chinese influence in the region, while Russia and China are doing the opposite to the States.416 Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States was the first country to recognize Kazakhstan’s independence. The cornerstone of the U.S.-Kazakhstani relationship is in the areas of security and nuclear nonproliferation as evidenced by Kazakhstan’s active participation in the Nuclear Security Summits in Washington, D.C. (2010), Seoul (2012), The Hague (2014), and the latest one in D.C. (2016).417 Kazakhstan renounced its nuclear weapons in 1993 and closed the Semipalatinsk Test Site; the U.S. assisted Kazakhstan in the removal of nuclear warheads, weapons-grade materials, and their supporting infrastructure.418 Kazakhstan emerged as a fourth nuclear power in the world following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Nuclear power is a clear, albeit controversial, hard power resource. Yet, the state voluntarily gave up its nuclear weapons in order to open the doors to the West. In fact, the close cooperation with the USA in the relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal is considered as “one of the key factors in paving the way for Kazakhstan to acquire the status of a regional leader in Central Asia.”419 To this day, the United States remains a vital partner of Kazakhstan. As argued by Hanks, it is surely the most important extra-regional power that captures much of the time and effort of Kazakh diplomats and decisionmakers.420

416 Fatima Qamar and Zafar Sumera, “New Great Game: Players, Interests, Strategies and Central Asia,” South Asian Studies - A Research Journal of South Asian Studies 29, no. 2 (2014): 627. 417 Nuclear Security Summit (Washington, D.C., 2016). Accessed on 15 May 2016. www. nss2016.org. 418 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations With Kazakhstan Fact Sheet Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, February 8, 2016. Accessed on 1 May 2016. http://www. state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5487.htm. 419 Reuel R. Hanks, “Multi-vector politics’ and Kazakhstan’s emerging role as a geostrategic player in Central Asia,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 11, no. 3 (2009): 257. 420 Kaan Diyarbakırlıoğlu and Süreyya Yiğit, “Kazakh Multi Vector Foreign Policy in Action,” Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations 13, no. 4 (2014): 72.

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To sum up, the multi-vector policy allows Kazakhstan to keep its historic relations with the Russians, attract Europe and the United States in terms of investing in its economy, primarily the energy sector, “as well as taking up the opportunity to feed the increasing thirst for energy that stems from China’s impressive economic growth.”421 While Kazakhstan is not unique among the post-Soviet states in structuring a foreign policy that may be labeled as ‘multi-vector’, it may be argued that Astana has shown the greatest sensitivity, skill, and persistence in formulating and implementing multi-vectorism.422 One may argue that it is partly because Kazakhstan is attractive in terms of its vast natural resources and geographical position.

Resource dependency The overview of Kazakhstan’s power strategies reveals the state’s high dependency on natural resources in devising political strategies. The Great Powers’ interest in partnering with Kazakhstan, as well as the subsequent multi-vector policy, could be attributed to the state’s strategic location and possession of resources. From the moment of its independence, the Kazakhstani officials have made a national priority to integrate their country into global markets.423 The country holds the world’s ninth-largest petroleum reserves, and the government has stated that petroleum production, most of which will be exported to global markets, will expand threefold over the next decade.424 Kazakhstan is fast becoming a key energy producer - behind the Gulf States and Russia but on par with North Sea producers. Its production and known reserves are growing, and its role is steadily increasing. To reiterate, Kazakhstan has been primarily following a multi-vector foreign policy in relation to its oil-led development and the geopolitics of exporting

421 Kaan Diyarbakırlıoğlu and Süreyya Yiğit, “Kazakh Multi Vector Foreign Policy in Action,” Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations 13, no. 4 (2014): 80. 422 Reuel R. Hanks, “Multi-vector politics’ and Kazakhstan’s emerging role as a geostrategic player in Central Asia,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 11, no. 3 (2009): 259. 423 Nicola P. Contessi, “Foreign and Security Policy Diversification in Eurasia Issue Splitting, Co-alignment, and Relational Power,” Problems of Post-Communism 62 (2015): 306. 424 Richard Weitz, “Kazakhstan multi-vector energy policy leaves much unresolved,” World Politics Review, 14 November 2007. Accessed 15 May 2016 www.worldpoliticsreview. com.

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oil.425 The stakeholders in the New Great game are trying to build the pipelines to fulfill their aims to dominate the energy reserves of this region.426 Meanwhile, Kazakhstan’s multi-vector policy has been used as leverage in negotiating favorable terms with Western oil companies and governments versus Russian interests.427 The country is trying to diversify pipeline routes in order to decrease its dependency on Russian pipelines (and their often high transit fees) for its exports to the West.428 Overall, Kazakhstan’s resources play a significant role for both the political and economic priorities of the state. However, scholars and practitioners have often highlighted the resource dependency as a one-sided path, as it can result in a dangerous reliance on many external factors, such as the price of oil, the access to export routes, and so forth. The 2015 economic crisis in Kazakhstanpartly owing to the fall in oil prices-serves as a clear indication of risks and vulnerabilities arising from inadequate economic diversification, stressing the need for further structural reform.429 As stated by the BBC, “Kazakhstan is heavily dependent on oil exports and because of the drop in oil prices, its revenues plummeted creating budget deficit and the decline of living standards… The state had to decrease its expenditure, while the national currency tenge was devalued in half.”430 Kazakhstan needs to diversify its production structure to reduce the economy’s dependence on world market commodity prices, decrease external vulnerability,

425 Pinar Ipek, “The role of oil and gas in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy: looking East or West?” Europe-Asia Studies 59, no. 7 (2007): 1179. 426 Fatima Qamar and Zafar Sumera, “New Great Game: Players, Interests, Strategies and Central Asia,” South Asian Studies - A Research Journal of South Asian Studies 29, no. 2 (2014): 627. 427 Reuel R. Hanks, “Multi-vector politics’ and Kazakhstan’s emerging role as a geostrategic player in Central Asia,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 11, no. 3 (2009): 265. 428 Michael Rywkin, “Stability in Central Asia: Engaging Kazakhstan A report on (with policy recommendations) U.S. Interests in Central Asia and U.S.- Kazakhstan Relations. Central Asia Project,” National Committee on American Foreign Policy (May 2005): 10. 429 IHS Economics and Country Risk, Country Reports – Kazakhstan (IHS Global Inc, Nov 2015), 2. 430 BBC, Kazakhstan’s Land Reform Protests Explained, 28 April 2016. Accessed 1 August 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36163103.

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and support long-term growth.431 Moreover, the state has to produce internal power sources, other than oil, to mediate among global players and achieve its objectives. Geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic dimensions are all interconnected and the development of one dimension affects the other;432 this is evident in the Kazakhstani case. It is imperative for the state to invest in other sources of power and develop endogenous forces to increase its economic and political power. States traditionally think that a strong economic background creates powerful nation-states. However, this is not always the case: It’s tempting to assume that power is synonymous with a large economy - that big GDP equals big power. Hence many analysts point to China’s huge economy and rapid growth as evidence that the country will soon gain superpower rank, if it hasn’t already. Just project forward the average annual growth rates of the past 30 years, and Chinese GDP will equal that of the United States and exceed that of the EU within just two decades. But GDP doesn’t stand for great diplomatic power. If institutions aren’t in place to translate economic output into military hardware-and if the economy grows faster than public interest in foreign affairs-then product is nothing more than potential power.433

Moreover, there is an argument that access to oil is a key to having power; however, once again, it may not be necessarily the case. Sustained economic growth is only possible with access to plentiful, cheap oil. So if petroleum reserves are the key, wouldn’t true power lie with the oil-producing nations of the Arab world? The realities here are stark. The Middle East accounts for 31 percent of world oil production but just 6 percent of consumption. North America accounts for about 18 percent of world oil production but consumes 30 percent. Even more sobering, however, are the figures for world oil reserves: The United States has just 6 percent of them; the Middle East 65 percent. Nevertheless, oil doesn’t necessarily make one powerful, though it certainly can make one rich. The strategic importance of Middle Eastern oil makes it a safe bet that the United States will seek to increase rather than diminish its influence in that region.434

Importantly, relying solely on economic growth and oil production could lead to the resource curse and a one-way development model. In fact, the respondents

431 IHS Economics and Country Risk, Country Reports – Kazakhstan (IHS Global Inc, Nov 2015), 4. 432 Fatima Qamar and Zafar Sumera, “New Great Game: Players, Interests, Strategies and Central Asia,” South Asian Studies - A Research Journal of South Asian Studies 29, no. 2 (2014): 627. 433 Niall Ferguson, “Think Again: Power,” Foreign Policy, November 3, 2009. Accessed 1 August 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/03/think-again-power/. 434 Ibid.

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of the current empirical study-including the top government officials-have confirmed the urgency for Kazakhstan to orient toward other sources of power.

A Way for Soft power In an increasingly globalized world, energy issues remain of great significance; they have also become a significant factor in shaping a new geopolitical and geoeconomic global structure “where Kazakhstan is aimed at providing stable and secure export routes for domestic hydrocarbon resources.”435 Following the review of power resources in Kazakhstan, it is evident that geographical location and natural resources are Kazakhstan’s most significant power resources, while population and military force are not. The state relies heavily on its hard power sources, such as natural resources, in devising political and economic strategies. However, this is revealed to be risky, as illustrated in the recent economic recession and devaluation crisis in Kazakhstan. The emphasis on geopolitics and natural resources puts Kazakhstan’s strategies in the realist framework. The multi-vector policy is led by two key concerns of the Kazakhstani state: state security and economic development,436 which are in line with realist assumptions. To reiterate, realists believe that the world is anarchic; states require strong military tools since they cannot trust anyone; and survival is the key objective.437 On the other hand, Kazakhstan is automatically excluded from the heavy realist thinkers as it voluntarily relinquished all of its nuclear power. According to Byrganym Aitimova, the Chair of the Senate Committee on International Relations and the Special Envoy of the President of Kazakhstan: “Kazakhstan’s primary instrument for cooperation with other countries and its positioning on the international arena is the voluntary renunciation of the nuclear power.”438 Thereby, while one could argue that Kazakhstan’s multi-vector survival policy that seeks the maximization of power is within the realm of the realist school of thinking, the relinquishing of nuclear materials symbolizes the shift from traditional hard power.439 In other words, the removal of nuclear materials is 435 Kuralai I. Baizakova, “Energy security issues in Kazakhstan,” American Foreign Policy Interests 32 (2010): 103. 436 Reuel R. Hanks, “Multi-vector politics’ and Kazakhstan’s emerging role as a geostrategic player in Central Asia,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 11, no. 3 (2009): 260. 437 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 30–31. 438 Byrganym Aitimova. Personal Interview. 09.06.2015. Astana, Kazakhstan. 439 Ibid.

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a sign toward soft power. McClory states that “soft power is a critical factor in the ability of all countries–with the possible exception of those with rich natural resources–to attract economic partners and achieve prosperity-linked foreign policy objectives.”440 However, in light of the complex geopolitical context and resource dependency issues, this is also questionable. The respondents confirm that Kazakhstan can no longer rely on resources alone in the long-term. Erlan Idrissov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, comments: “As a state in a central geopolitical space, we are balancing between the Great Powers; however, soft power is a new important trend and we are developing the appropriate understanding and instruments.”441 Soft power resources in Kazakhstan are numerous: history, culture, nature, and sports, among others. According to Aidos Sarym, a Kazakhstani political scientist: While Kazakhstan certainly tries to activate soft power, there are more and less successful projects and often programs are downplayed by systemic efforts. Currently, most effective soft power is Kazakh sports, where individual people in areas of boxing, track, cycle racing and other are widely recognized thanks to their individual effort.442

Idrissov continues: “Indeed, soft power programs are complex and require large investments.” Kazakhstan tries to increase the attractiveness of its state through hosting various high-profile international events, including the Universiade, Asian Winter Games, and the upcoming World Expo in 2017 titled “Future Energy.” While hosting these events is certainly useful for Kazakhstan’s external image, there is a question of their long-term effects and sustainability.443 Significantly, the respondents of the empirical research point to the importance of investing in the educational sector and human capital of Kazakhstan. As a result of technological changes and globalization of markets, “industrial countries with resource-based economies worldwide are transforming into knowledge-driven economies”; this has made human capital one of the leading public policy themes.444 Quality higher education and training is crucial for economies 440 Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 17. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portland-communications. com/publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/. 441 Erlan Idrissov. Personal Interview. 09.06.2015. Astana, Kazakhstan. 442 Aidos Sarym. Personal Interview. 13.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 443 Erlan Idrissov. Personal Interview. 09.06.2015. Astana, Kazakhstan. 444 Mireille Laroche, Marcel Mérette, and G. C. Ruggeri
, “On the Concept and Dimensions of Human Capital in a Knowledge-Based Economy Context,” Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques 25, no. 1 (1999): 88.

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that want to move up the value chain beyond simple production processes and products.445 Moreover, today’s globalizing economy requires countries to create well-educated workers who are able to perform complex tasks and adapt rapidly to their changing environment and the evolving needs of the production system.446 An important question, however, concerns the best way to achieve this. Idrissov emphasizes that “Kazakhstan is a young, rapidly developing, forwardlooking, secular, liberal society with appropriately emerging institutions; the foundation of the Kazakhstani development lies in the modernization, economic diversification, developed human capital and the rule of law.”447 Aitimova further states: “Cultural and educational policies are a vital part of the development of Kazakhstan.”448 Ulzhan Raimzhanova, an expert at the Institute for Economic Research in Kazakhstan, continues: “Considering Kazakhstan’s dependency on oil and gas resources and the uncertain future of developing alternative energies, the long-term strategic goal should be competent education.”449 Andrew Auster, the First Head of the British Haileybury School in Kazakhstan, agrees: “the best resource that Kazakhstan possesses is not its oil or gas, but its people.”450 Following the theoretical discussion in the previous chapters, building a highquality, attractive educational system could not only contribute to soft power but also affect the human capital formation and economic development. As highlighted before, education provides benefits to the larger society, so-called external benefits “because they extend beyond the direct recipients of education in the form of more effective economic, political, and social interactions that benefit the entire population.”451 The question is, however, where to invest; in other words, where–and how–education is able to become a power source, both soft and hard. Hence, the next stage of analysis will focus on which forms of education

445 Robert E. Lucas, Jr. “On the Mechanics of Economic Development,” Journal of Monetary Economics 22 (1988): 3–42. 446 Xavier Sala-I-Martín, Beñat Bilbao-Osorio, Attilio di Dattista, Margareta Drzeniek Hanouz, Caroline Galvan, Thierry Geiger, The Global Competitiveness Index 2014– 2015: Accelerating a Robust Recovery to Create Productive Jobs and Support Inclusive Growth (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2014), 7. 447 Erlan Idrissov. Personal Interview. 09.06.2015. Astana, Kazakhstan. 448 Byrganym Aitimova. Personal Interview. 09.06.2015. Astana, Kazakhstan. 449 Ulzhan Raimzhanova. Personal Interview. 01.12.2012. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 450 Andrew Auster. Personal Interview. 12.12.2012. Astana, Kazakhstan. 451 Clive R. Belfield and Henry M. Levin, The price we pay (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 101.

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in Kazakhstan are most efficient and competent to potentially contribute to hard and soft power. To illustrate Kazakhstan’s power resources, the following diagram is offered. The diagram follows the categorization of Education resource presented in Chapter 4 i.e. as a smart power resource category. Figure 17.  Kazakhstan’s power resources

To reiterate, geography, natural resources and economy (all relative considering the arguments against oil-led economies) belong to Kazakhstan’s hard power arsenal. Meanwhile, soft resources include sports, nature, and culture; however, these are also relative and small in significance, according to the interviewees. The question then is what could be done to include education in the list of power 115

resources. As stated before, whether one categorizes education as smart or, separately, as hard and soft power resource, is not principal in this case. Categorization of education as either would presume that it possesses hard and soft power attributes.

Chapter Summary This chapter has overviewed the empirical research methodology that included a case study approach, interpretative method of analysis, and interviews as a data collection method. Then the researcher moved on to framing the discussion of Kazakhstan’s power sources. The analysis revealed high dependency on hard power resources in the face of the country’s geopolitical position and foreign policy priorities. Meanwhile, the relinquishing of nuclear power symbolizes a shift toward soft power vision. In order to move away from high resource dependency and its possible detrimental effects, the respondents accept the need to invest in soft power resources and, in particular, highlight education as a sustainable source of development. This falls in line with the argument that education is an effective power resource–both hard and soft–as outlined in Chapter 4. The question now is which educational programs or institutions could be regarded as potential power sources.

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Chapter 6. Education as a Power Resource in Kazakhstan Introduction The purpose of this book is to expand knowledge on the forms of power identified by Joseph Nye. The analysis of the soft power concept has identified several issues, including the shortcomings with regard to its resource categorization. Later, the publication focused on the resource of education as it represents an ambiguous power resource. It was argued that education is not only an effective soft power resource but also has the potential to become a hard power resource through its connection to economic growth - a traditional hard power pillar. Later, in line with the proposed smart power theorization, education was illustrated as a smart power resource, i.e. a resource that can contribute to both hard and soft power. In order to expand this discussion, it was necessary to see empirically how education can become a more effective power resource. Thereby, the author conducted an empirical study. Chapter 5 has provided an overview of the empirical research methodology and set the framework for the discussion of the case study. In order to see whether education is a power resource in Kazakhstan, it was first necessary to outline Kazakhstan’s power strategies. The analysis has revealed the state’s high dependency on hard power resources, such as natural resources, in the face of Kazakhstan’s geopolitical context. Meanwhile, the voluntary relinquishing of nuclear power by the state symbolizes a shift toward soft power vision. In order to effectively move away from the resource dependency and its negative implications, the state needs to invest in sustainable soft power sources. In particular, the empirical study respondents, such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Senate Chair of International Relations Committee, have outlined educational investments as a key factor in building both soft and hard power. The key question now is which parts of education are most competent and effective in Kazakhstan. To reiterate, the rationale for answering the case study research questions is the following: If one were to find most competent forms of educational systems and programs, then that would signify that those have a potential to contribute to hard and soft power (or, if you accept the theorization of Chapter 4, smart power).

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Path to Modernization Educational legacies In order to evaluate education as a power resource in Kazakhstan, the chapter will start by overviewing the country’s educational sector and its inherent strengths and weaknesses. In the specific case of Kazakhstan, the efforts to build a competent educational system are largely affected by the Soviet legacies. As a former Soviet state, the country has retained many historical ties with that era. This section will begin by outlining some of the positive and negative aspects of the Soviet educational legacy. The accomplishments of the Soviet system in education were numerous. The first is the almost total elimination of illiteracy. There was full attendance in elementary and secondary education. As defined by UNESCO, adult literacy was universal.452 The second is high levels of scientific and mathematical knowledge. The empirical study confirms this numerously. According to Galimkair Mutanov, the Rector of the Kazakh National University: “Soviet system of education was oriented at a fundamental scientific preparation.”453 The third accomplishment is the nearly universal provision of education at primary and secondary levels.454 The fourth is an equal gender enrollment at all levels of the population, including tertiary education. Post-secondary female enrollment was greater than 50 percent.455 Overall, the accessibility to education as well as its fundamental and systematic character are highlighted as key advantages of the Soviet educational system.456 Education during the Soviet era, however, was also associated with a number of significant weaknesses, as revealed in the Bolormaa Shagdar’s study on human capital challenges in Central Asia. Firstly, there was the ideological monopoly by the Party, especially in social sciences and humanities.457 The Soviet system of

452 Kathryn H. Anderson and Stephen P. Heyneman, “Education and Social Policy in Central Asia: The Next Stage of Transition,” Social Policy and Administration 39, no. 4 (2005): 361. 453 Galimkair Mutanov. Personal Interview. 04.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 454 Bolormaa Shagdar, “Human capital in Central Asia: trends and challenges in education,” Central Asian Survey 25, no. 4 (2006): 515. 455 Stephen P. Heyneman, “Transition from party/state to open democracy: the role of education,” International Journal of Educational Development 18, no. 1 (1998): 26. 456 Victor A. Sadovnichii, Ed. Obrazovanie kotoroe my mozhem poteryat (Education We Can Lose) (Moscow: MSU Publications, 2001). 457 Bolormaa Shagdar, “Human capital in Central Asia: trends and challenges in education,” Central Asian Survey 25, no. 4 (2006): 515.

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education played a significant role in the formation of Soviet ideals and, hence, was often used as a propaganda tool. The empirical study has confirmed this. For instance, the Rector of the Kazakh National University Galimkair Mutanov has argued that the subjects in humanities were “heavily ideological and that is problematic for acquiring a well-rounded education.”458 The prominent Kazakh political scientist Aidos Sarym continues: “The Soviet schools and universities, despite their correct fundamental principles, were ideological instruments.”459 Secondly, there was a uniform application of pedagogical practices regardless of ability, age, or subject of interests.460 All schools and higher educational institutions of the country used the same generalized curricula and textbooks.461 The Soviet educational system made one take many subjects, without consideration for individual skills and preferences. Suna Park, a graduate of one of the leading international schools in Almaty with a previous experience in a public school, argues that “the Soviet-style education made you take some unnecessary subjects, while Western-style schools pay attention to student’s inclinations and emphasize well-rounded education.”462 Moreover, it is considered that while Soviet students knew a lot, they did not always know how to apply their knowledge in practice.463 The third important shortcoming was the systematic denigration of academic and religious freedom, “while scientific research and academic freedom are integral parts of modern competitive educational systems.”464 A significant challenge concerned the nature of what was taught. Religion, sociology, economics, political science, journalism and business management were either unknown, tolerated with suspicion, or perceived as heresy.465 According to an interviewee who studied both in a Soviet-style institution and an international school: “In comparison to 458 Galimkair Mutanov. Personal Interview. 04.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 459 Aidos Sarym. Personal Interview. 13.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 460 Bolormaa Shagdar, “Human capital in Central Asia: trends and challenges in education,” Central Asian Survey 25, no. 4 (2006): 515. 461 Kurmangali Bekishev, “Trends in Development of the Educational System in the Republic of Kazakhstan,” Russian Journal of General Chemistry 83, No. 3 (2013): 594. 462 Suna Park. Personal Interview. 04.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 463 Kurmangali Bekishev, “Trends in Development of the Educational System in the Republic of Kazakhstan,” Russian Journal of General Chemistry 83, No. 3 (2013): 594. 464 Bolormaa Shagdar, “Human capital in Central Asia: trends and challenges in education,” Central Asian Survey 25, no. 4 (2006): 515. 465 Kathryn H. Anderson and Stephen P. Heyneman, “Education and Social Policy in Central Asia: The Next Stage of Transition,” Social Policy and Administration 39, no. 4 (2005): 363.

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Soviet education, the Western-style programs emphasize flexibility and the equal importance of natural sciences, humanities, and social sciences in curricula and, furthermore, emphasize the skills of critical analysis.”466 Fourthly, as a centrally planned economy, the Soviet education system produced many narrow specialists with their numbers determined by central planning and inertia rather than demand. The jobs were created within and for the system; thereby, with the fall of physical and symbolic borders, the ex-Soviet states had to re-evaluate the professions in demand and adapt to local, regional and international markets. The transition from a command to a market economy (and allocation of resources) devalued many skills that were essential under the planned economy but became unnecessary in the market industry. The Soviet system’s inflexibility and inability to adapt to change are often defined as its key inherited challenges. As a result, although adult literacy and mean years of schooling were still high, there was an indication of the decline of human capital stock in the first years of Kazakhstan’s independence. The economic downturn and lack of employment opportunities have led to the migration of people from the Central Asian region and a brain drain to Russia and neighboring countries in the first years post independence.467

Modernization efforts Soviet legacies posed a significant challenge for policy-making in the sphere of education after gaining the independence in 1991. Moreover, the period of political and economic transition created additional challenges for the educational sector. The Central Asian economies experienced a 5–10 year period of economic instability in the 1990s.468 As a result, there was a lack of funding at all levels. Expenditures on education have been reduced and the disruption of the economic regime of the command economy has put large strains on education budgets.469 An important challenge had to do with finance, property, and taxation. Another significant issue was governance. The higher education institutions within the Soviet Union were heavily controlled. There was a prohibition 466 Suna Park. Personal Interview. 04.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 467 Bolormaa Shagdar, “Human capital in Central Asia: trends and challenges in education,” Central Asian Survey 25, no. 4 (2006): 515–520. 468 Jane Falkingham, “The End of The Rollercoaster? Growth, Inequality and Poverty in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” Social Policy and Administration 39, no. 4 (2005): 340–360. 469 Bolormaa Shagdar, “Human capital in Central Asia: trends and challenges in education,” Central Asian Survey 25, no. 4 (2006): 521.

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against private education.470 Meanwhile, as Aitimova confirms, post independence the universities had a legislative right to go public and to attract sponsors and trustees.471 Other challenges in Kazakhstan post-independence included the overall deterioration of the quality of education due to underpaid teachers, instances of corruption, outdated facilities and school equipment, lack of appropriate training of teachers in modern pedagogy, and increased urban–rural gaps. In particular, teacher-training institutions required radical reorganization, including reforms and re-training in curriculum design, delivery and education management.472 Finally, the absence of the previous experience in independent policymaking and macroeconomic management has made the changes in educational sector extremely difficult. All the while, accumulating human capital appropriate for the market economy was of greatest importance for all Central Asian states.473 To summarize, in order to form an effectively functioning Kazakhstani model of the educational system, the following changes were implemented: introduction of common national testing; transition to specialized training in the upper secondary school; transition to a twelve-year general secondary education; creation of the post-secondary vocational training system; transition to a three-level system of professional training (bachelor – master – doctorate programs) based on the system of academic credits; and the creation of the national system for evaluation of the quality of education.474 Modernization of education was also illustrated through improved efficiency measures (i.e. the unit costs per child); curriculum reform (e.g. content and structure); introduction of new teaching and learning practices, the introduction of fees at tertiary and vocational education levels; decentralization of public spending on education, and the creation of competition in the sector through the promotion of private education.475

470 Kathryn H. Anderson and Stephen P. Heyneman, “Education and Social Policy in Central Asia: The Next Stage of Transition,” Social Policy and Administration 39, no. 4 (2005): 362–363. 471 Byrganym Aitimova. Personal Interview. 09.06.2015. Astana, Kazakhstan. 472 Bolormaa Shagdar, “Human capital in Central Asia: trends and challenges in education,” Central Asian Survey 25, no. 4 (2006): 527. 473 Ibid., 520. 474 Kurmangali Bekishev, “Trends in Development of the Educational System in the Republic of Kazakhstan,” Russian Journal of General Chemistry, 83, No. 3 (2013): 595. 475 Bolormaa Shagdar, “Human capital in Central Asia: trends and challenges in education,” Central Asian Survey 25, no. 4 (2006): 520.

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However profound, these changes constituted only the first step in the educational transition.476 The De-Sovietization process was ongoing and incomplete. As empirical study respondent states, The key problem in our educational system is that the state educational institutions are still Soviet in their nature. The schools no longer promote Soviet ideology, but the gap of critical analysis in social sciences and humanities still exists…477

Idrissov, The Minister of Foreign Affairs, continues: From the first days of our independence, there have been efforts to make reforms in the educational system – primary, secondary, and tertiary, but these efforts are continuing. Although the principal reforms are implemented–such as the unified system of national tests, a unified system of meritocracy, a single grant system–the total renovation of the system has not yet occurred.478

Internationalization of education In outlining Kazakhstan’s complex path in modernizing its educational system, one can highlight an important trend of internationalization. In fact, all respondents of the empirical study highlight internationalization efforts as a significant driver of development in Kazakhstan’s educational sector. As a result of globalization, the opening of borders and the creation of new market industries, one of the most important goals was for “Kazakhstani educational system to be integrated into the global educational system.”479 Internationalization of programs, curriculums, and training was done in efforts to create a competitive pool of graduates. Aitimova also states that inviting visiting professors and offering local teachers educational grants remain effective stimulating instruments.480 Mutanov agrees and adds: A useful instrument in modernization and internationalization is the process of accreditation of educational programs… the implementation of international standards in our universities leads to their recognition by the international community and allows us to cooperate with universities and offer double-degree programs, among other changes…481

476 Kathryn H. Anderson and Stephen P. Heyneman, “Education and Social Policy in Central Asia: The Next Stage of Transition,” Social Policy and Administration 39, no. 4 (2005): 377. 477 Aidos Sarym. Personal Interview. 13.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 478 Erlan Idrissov. Personal Interview. 09.06.2015. Astana, Kazakhstan. 479 Byrganym Aitimova. Personal Interview. 09.06.2015. Astana, Kazakhstan. 480 Ibid. 481 Galimkair Mutanov. Personal Interview. 04.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan.

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Exogenously, the modernization and internationalization efforts were driven as a result of joining the Bologna Process (1999) and the ratification of the Lisbon Recognition Convention (1997) by Kazakhstan. According to the Nazarbayev Educational Foundation (from here on after as ‘Foundation’), the patron of the leading international institutions in Kazakhstan: “These events were great impulses for the country to start to integrate into the world educational society on equivalent terms and led to drastic changes in the educational policies.”482 The Bologna declaration required all Kazakhstani universities to work in accordance with the principles of the Bologna process, such as the three-stage training of students, among other elements.483 Another internationalization effort was the nationwide promotion of the English language. English language proficiency is stressed in many countries as the most important skill that enables to compete in the global economy. Similarly, English is being extensively promoted in Kazakhstan at the curriculum level through state efforts.484 Moreover, the Ministry of Education plans to introduce it as the third language of instruction in state schools, in addition to Russian and Kazakh options. Political scientist Sarym, however, is concerned about the feasibility of this: I have some scepticism regarding the implementation of the trilingual system of education in state schools, as it will be hard to find so many English-speaking teachers of specialized subjects, such as physics and chemistry, especially in the rural areas. This means that there would still be the school-leaders and schools-outsiders…485

This points to the importance of comprehensive reforms and structural changes. The experts often outline a serious implementation gap and implementation failure in the context of Central Asian policies, including in the sphere of education.486 A beacon of internationalization efforts in Kazakhstan is the Bolashak program, unique on all the former Soviet Union territory. As stated by Idrissov:

482 Nazarbayev Educational Foundation. Cumulative interview. 20.12.2012. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 483 Galimkair Mutanov. Personal Interview. 04.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 484 Bolormaa Shagdar, “Human capital in Central Asia: trends and challenges in education,” Central Asian Survey 25, no. 4 (2006): 526. 485 Aidos Sarym. Personal Interview. 13.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 486 Bolormaa Shagdar, “Human capital in Central Asia: trends and challenges in education,” Central Asian Survey 25, no. 4 (2006): 530.

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In answering the most important question, of how competitive are our programs on international stage, the Bolashak program is probably one of the most effective. It started off at the bachelor level programs, now moved to master’s and Ph.D.487

The Bolashak scholarship, which is more than 20 years old, allows Kazakhstani citizens to obtain a degree at any foreign university–usually in the United Kingdom and the United States–with coverage of fees and expenses for all years of study. In their turn, the students who are accepted into the Bolashak program are required to keep up a high GPA and work in Kazakhstan (in any sector) for five years after graduation. In addition to academic skills, students also fully immerse into a different language environment and culture of people,488 which makes studying abroad a well-rounded learning experience. Some practitioners argue that it is not worth for the state to invest in Bolashak, as there are no visible results of innovation brought by the students. However, as stated by Asylbek Kozhakhmetov, the Rector of Almaty Management University, in an interview for the Central Asia Monitor: “It takes up to 10 years for a graduate to build up his knowledge base and apply them to practice, making Bolashak a small price to pay for investment in human capital and brand of the country.”489 Still, because of the financial issues, the program underwent certain changes starting from 2011. Whereas in the first years the program had bachelors trained abroad, there is currently a gradual shift away from this educational practice to master and Ph.D. levels only.490 Nevertheless, as stated by Alister Bartholomewthe Project Director of the Haileybury Schools in Kazakhstan-who has an extensive experience in international education: “Bolashak program deserves huge compliments and is a unique advancement of internationally competitive human capital.”491 Today, the ex-Bolashak scholars are already attaining high-power positions, such as the Mayor of Almaty city, Minister of Economy, several ViceMinisters, and other.

487 Erlan Idrissov. Personal Interview. 09.06.2015. Astana, Kazakhstan. 488 Kurmangali Bekishev, “Trends in Development of the Educational System in the Republic of Kazakhstan,” Russian Journal of General Chemistry 83, No. 3 (2013): 600. 489 Kenzhe Tatilya, “The Benefits of Getting Education Abroad for Kazakhstanis” (Обучение казахстанских студентов за рубежом: какая от этого польза?) 22.01.2016. Accessed 15 September 2016 http://camonitor.kz/21022-obucheniekazahstanskih-studentov-za-rubezhom-kakaya-ot-etogo-polza.html. 490 Kurmangali Bekishev, “Trends in Development of the Educational System in the Republic of Kazakhstan,” Russian Journal of General Chemistry 83, No. 3 (2013): 600. 491 Alister Bartholomew. Personal Interview. 12.12.2012. Astana, Kazakhstan.

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Finally, the empirical study respondents highlight international educational programs within the country as an important driver of educational progress. Idrissov argues that quality human capital formation in Kazakhstan is often the result of collaborative educational projects, such as the examples of KIMEP University, Kazakh-British Technical University, and Nazarbayev University.492 The latter is a unique institution in the former Soviet Union - a Western-university model from the bottom up that is co-managed by the foreign staff and operates in collaboration with top American and European universities. Meanwhile, on the secondary level education, the following institutions participate in Kazakhstan’s positioning in the international educational sphere, according to the interviewees: Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools, Nazarbayev Educational Foundation (patron of the Miras International School, among others), Haileybury British Schools, American International School, Kazakh-Turkish Lycees, and other.493 The current empirical study–which follows a case study research method–has focused on the following institutions in the Kazakhstani secondary education sector: 1)  Miras International School (in the face of Foundation as a cumulative interviewee) and 2) Haileybury British International Schools in Almaty and Astana. The key reason behind this choice was the fact that these schools represent one of the most ‘international’ ones, i.e. completely or more than 50% taught by foreign staff out of all the international schools. Moreover, the educational rankings place these schools among the leaders in Kazakhstan; the respondents of the empirical study confirmed this as well. The schools’ high reputation stem primarily from the accredited programs that they offer, such as 1) The International Baccalaureate Diploma and 2) The A-levels, among others.

492 493

Erlan Idrissov. Personal Interview. 09.06.2015. Astana, Kazakhstan. Aidos Sarym. Personal Interview. 13.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. Erlan Idrissov. Personal Interview. 09.06.2015. Astana, Kazakhstan. Byrganym Aitimova. Personal Interview. 09.06.2015. Astana, Kazakhstan.

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International Education in Kazakhstan Private international supply As outlined before, post independence in Kazakhstan the sources of finance have been diversified and educational providers now include both private and public authorities.494 According to the Foundation, the Patron of Miras International School, The creation of an international type of school in Kazakhstan was dictated primarily by endogenous factors – the demand for international educational programs on the educational market. The private supply of education spurred out of growing private demand for alternative modes of education. The high demand for innovative and internationally approved kindergartens, primary, secondary and high schools grows each year. The competitive advantage of these schools is in that they give the opportunity for students to complete internationally recognized programs, without leaving the country and get admitted to the universities abroad without the entrance exams or a foundation course. The Miras International School, founded in 1999, offers an integrated program…495

The Miras School incorporates local and international streams, and the latter hires foreign teachers as instructors for international programs such as the IGSCE and International Baccalaureate (IB) programs. According to one of the school’s top graduates, “the IB diploma gave me a straight access to universities in the UK and the USA, both in terms of the general requirements and the exposure to an international educational system.”496 While teachers and supervisors in the international stream at the Miras School are expatriates, the management team is local. Another model of an international school in Kazakhstan is the Haileybury franchise; two British schools that are run fully by expatriate specialists. Haileybury Almaty opened in 2008 in association with Haileybury College in the UK to offer education in the traditions of British independent schooling, which includes the A-level graduating program. “The launch night brought three times more people than expected; the demand in Kazakhstan was and remains extremely high.”497 Following the success of Haileybury Almaty, another school opened in Astana, the capital of the country. The existence of Haileybury schools 494 Kathryn H. Anderson and Stephen P. Heyneman, “Education and Social Policy in Central Asia: The Next Stage of Transition,” Social Policy and Administration 39, no. 4 (2005): 377. 495 Nazarbayev Educational Foundation. Cumulative interview. 20.12.2012. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 496 Suna Park. Personal Interview. 04.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 497 Andrew Auster. Personal Interview. 12.12.2012. Astana, Kazakhstan.

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is unprecedented in Kazakhstan, as well as in the broader region. On all of the territory of the former Soviet Union, Haileybury schools in Kazakhstan are the only branded schools in full partnership with British institutions i.e. full franchises.498 The expansion of the private educational sector is an important trend worldwide including in Kazakhstan. The growth of private … education has been the result not only of increased demand, but also of differentiated demand in many countries, where government provision of higher education may not be meeting the demand, for example, for religious education or short-term training in the areas of greatest employment growth such as business or computer science, or English language instruction.499

In case of Kazakhstan, the demand for the schools in question was spurred primarily out of the demand for internationally accredited and reputable programs. According to Baitassov, whose children study at Haileybury: “we are attracted by the quality of education in the international private schools, not least of which is the access to English-speaking community within and outside of the classroom…”500 The schools incorporate trilingual curriculums and international teaching methods. According to Nurgul Ertaeva, a philanthropist and a parent at the American International School in Almaty: What I like in international education is their method of teaching and the quality of education; there is no isolation and they emphasize the importance of dialogue, critical thinking, looking at arguments from all angles, as well as the willingness to hear the opposing view; there is also a wide variety of offered subjects, especially in the arts…501

As a graduate of an international high school program, Park confirms: “IB gives a good combination of subjects and their depth, allowing to attain certain credits at the university level in the U.K.”502 Park went on to study in the UK after the Miras school and eventually graduated from the London School of Economics with a Master of Arts degree. The first Head of Haileybury concludes: “our academic achievements to date are high, and they need to be, otherwise people wouldn’t pay the fees and send their children here.”503 To date, international schools in 498 Alister Bartholomew. Personal Interview. 12.12.2012. Astana, Kazakhstan. 499 Bikas C. Sanyal and D. Bruce Johnstone, “International Trends in the Public and Private Financing of Higher Education,” Prospects 41, no. 1 (2011): 163–164. 500 Armanzhan Baitassov. Personal Interview. 02.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 501 Nurgul Ertaeva. Personal Interview. 02.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 502 Suna Park. Personal Interview. 04.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 503 Andrew Auster. Personal Interview. 12.12.2012. Astana, Kazakhstan.

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Kazakhstan, including the ones mentioned above, maintain a high demand for their services.

Private sponsorship The findings of the empirical study suggest that the private international sector in Kazakhstan that offers internationally recognized programs forms a competent pool of graduates. Importantly, the international schools under study were created primarily through private efforts. For instance, the Foundation, the Patron of the Miras School, is a private organization. Some institutions, such as Miras kindergartens in Astana and Atyrau, were created under the auspices of the Foundation in additional partnerships with large oil and gas companies as a result of demand in those areas.504 Similarly, the Haileybury schools were financed through private means. For instance, the Capital Partners Development Group in Almaty financed the Haileybury Almaty school “in hopes of advancing educational opportunities on the secondary level in Kazakhstan.”505 This falls in line with the argument from Chapter 3 – that businesses across the world have started to actively pursue corporate social responsibility. In Kazakhstan’s case, the Capital Partners Development Company’s commitment to developing education played a significant role in the creation of the Haileybury project: Quality education is a key focus for the company, as it is linked to economic and social well-being of the nation; from the beginning, the Chairman stressed the non-profit nature of the school with any excess revenue being plowed back into scholarships.506

The private educational endowment has a long history in the West, a great example of which would be the Gates Foundation. To this, a prominent Kazakhstani businessman, Baitassov comments: The history of capitalism in the West and here are different, so it’s hard to compare… nevertheless, many local millionaires support various educational programs, including their own alma maters. Personally, I am head of the trustees at the Almaty Management University and a member of the endowment foundation at the Kazakh National University.507

504 Nazarbayev Educational Foundation. Cumulative interview. 20.12.2012. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 505 Alister Bartholomew. Personal Interview. 12.12.2012. Astana, Kazakhstan. 506 Ibid. 507 Armanzhan Baitassov. Personal Interview. 02.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan.

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It seems that private actors are able to affect changes in the Kazakhstani educational sector in an efficient manner. This adds to the argument that private players are significant power agents worldwide. According to Baitassov, “At this moment in Kazakhstan, in many ways, the school that is opened under private auspices is more effective and efficient than a state one…”508 Private sponsorship symbolizes an effective driver for the educational sector; however, this also brings up the question of who gets to benefit from these institutions.

Elitist demand Importantly, the creation of international private schools through the efforts of private organizations is linked to the issue of elitist access. According to Park, “the high fees act as barriers to entry and, currently, the leading schools remain exclusive to those who can afford it.”509 Alister Bartholomew, the Project Director at Haileybury, agrees: “there is what you might describe as an elitist demand for international education.”510 So while international education is a positive trend appearing in Kazakhstan, one needs to consider that there is a gap in the provision of education for the various layers of population.511 The empirical study has found that the main customers at private international schools are the representatives of the business community, the government community, and the staff of embassies and diplomatic missions. At the same time, however, the representatives of the middle class “were also always among the consumers; those parents who like what we offer, make sacrifices and send their children here.”512 One may argue that after considering the funds spent on creating and running these international schools, the school fees can be regarded as justifiable. For instance, the Haileybury Almaty School came at about 56 million dollars, excluding land and equipment; the Haileybury Astana school cost around 40 million dollars: “The project totaled to what is effectively an excess of 120 million dollar investment.”513 As a result of hiring international teaching staff, among other factors, the fees at these schools are much higher than those at other schools in Kazakhstan. To address this issue, the schools such as Miras

508 509 510 511 512

Armanzhan Baitassov. Personal Interview. 02.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. Suna Park. Personal Interview. 04.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. Alister Bartholomew. Personal Interview. 12.12.2012. Astana, Kazakhstan. Suna Park. Personal Interview. 04.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. Nazarbayev Educational Foundation. Cumulative interview. 20.12.2012. Almaty, Kazakhstan. Alister Bartholomew. Personal Interview. 12.12.2012. Astana, Kazakhstan. 513 Alister Bartholomew. Personal Interview. 12.12.2012. Astana, Kazakhstan.

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and Haileybury offer scholarship opportunities for gifted children: “As the cost of bringing child to school is prohibitive for many families, the school has started a scholarship program.”514 Significantly, Auster highlights that “being part of the community and the society rather than looking inwards is very important for the Haileybury ethos; yet, we are highly dependent on state programs and policies on this.”515 Importantly, one can observe the evidence of a trickle down effect from the creation of elite schools to larger layers of population. For example, both Miras and Haileybury at first had an experimental license from the Ministry of Education.516 However, as a result of successful lobbying, in January 2012, there has been an official addition to the educational legislature, giving international schools full approval status in recognition of their programs. Bartholomew agrees: “the close affiliation with the influential people of Kazakhstan certainly helps to promote reforms in the educational sector.”517 According to Park, the changes in the educational system are visible: When I studied in Miras many years ago, I felt that the opportunity to study there was in many ways elitist, but it’s changing… The creation of Nazarbayev University– which offers Presidential grants–and other innovative initiatives is reflecting a change towards a more competent distribution of international educational opportunities in Kazakhstan. Even if it’s not a private school, the staff is implementing new methods of education.518

Evidently, the creation of private international schools has affected the educational system in Kazakhstan and promoted important reforms. An educationalist comments on the issue of elitist demand in the following manner: The situation in Kazakhstan is that there is a mass experience of higher education, but at fairly mediocre levels… in order to change that, you have to bring in scholarship, sponsorship, and elitist opportunities–in some ways–for some because they will be the flight-bearers for others.519

514 Andrew Auster. Personal Interview. 12.12.2012. Astana, Kazakhstan. 515 Ibid. 516 Nazarbayev Educational Foundation. Cumulative interview. 20.12.2012. Almaty, Kazakhstan. Alister Bartholomew. Personal Interview. 12.12.2012. Astana, Kazakhstan. 517 Alister Bartholomew. Personal Interview. 12.12.2012. Astana, Kazakhstan. 518 Suna Park. Personal Interview. 04.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 519 Alister Bartholomew. Personal Interview. 12.12.2012. Astana, Kazakhstan.

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While essentially agreeing, Sarym adds: While innovative centres in educational system need to exist and have their place in affecting both human capital and changes in the educational system, the overall success of the nation will depend on the level of education of a nation as a whole; thereby, it is imperative to create opportunities for gifted children and support intellectual youth.520

In this regard, Baitassov argues that the state needs to subsidize education in the form of bonuses and stipends to allow more students to go to private international schools.”521 These arguments point to the important role of the state in the implementation of international education in Kazakhstan.

Institutional barriers In general, Kazakhstan is characterized by a favorable economic and political context for the creation of private educational institutions and the development of international programs. As confirmed by Baitassov: “The opening of international schools such as Haileybury is accepted well in Kazakhstan; the Ministry of Education was lenient and the founders did not have significant problems.”522 At the same time, certain factors slow down the successful development and implementation of international programs. Bureaucratic structures are often a barrier: “one is always one big stamp away from getting the permission to do something.”523 Auster continues: While we have some influence with the government, if Kazakhstan is serious about opening up more international schools, there needs to be more facilitation. It’s a question of mutual consideration and cooperation…524

In other words, on the one hand, “the correlation between education and growth is recognized by Kazakhstan as it places human capital on the strategic priority agenda.”525 On the other, “effective investments in education require time and patience, while the desire for quick solutions in some state structures is difficult to overcome…”526 Hence, an effective and professional management is essential. 520 Aidos Sarym. Personal Interview. 13.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 521 Armanzhan Baitassov. Personal Interview. 02.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 522 Ibid. 523 Howard Bullock. Personal Interview. 13.12.2012. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 524 Andrew Auster. Personal Interview. 12.12.2012. Astana, Kazakhstan. 525 Galimkair Mutanov. Personal Interview. 04.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 526 Ulzhan Raimzhanova. Personal Interview. 01.12.2012. Almaty, Kazakhstan.

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Anderson and Heyneman argue that the demand for skills and managerial training and background in the former Soviet Union are unprecedented.527 The educational system of any country is a complex machine, making changes in which is difficult. Moreover, in the case of Kazakhstan, there is often a need to “implement new programs on the basis of existing institutions.”528 Hence, it is important to make reforms with consideration to the existing structures and programs: “one needs to evolutionize carefully and through new blood change the scientific and educational environment in the country; this requires being open to new things and smartly using the available resources.”529

Brain drain concerns In developing international programs and educational opportunities, one may have concerns about brain drain as a negative externality in Kazakhstan. In this regard, the previous chapters have highlighted that high-skill emigration does not necessarily deplete the home country’s human capital and, in fact, can generate positive network externalities. Endogenous high-skill emigration could provide multiplier effects, such as an effect on institutional quality.530 The empirical study respondents agree with this statement. If Kazakhstanis achieve high results, say, in chemistry, and cannot find application of those skills in the country and leave, it is not a brain-drain per se, but rather an important long-term investment; the notion of brain-drain today is relative…531

Moreover, if substantial brain drain has occurred, according to the Foreign Affairs Minister, it was at the dawn of the state’s independence: “today the issue is less acute and we are trying to create an environment that would be attractive for Kazakhstanis in applying their skills.”532 According to Park:

527 Kathryn H. Anderson and Stephen P. Heyneman, “Education and Social Policy in Central Asia: The Next Stage of Transition,” Social Policy and Administration 39, no. 4 (2005): 377. 528 Byrganym Aitimova. Personal Interview. 09.06.2015. Astana, Kazakhstan. 529 Erlan Idrissov. Personal Interview. 09.06.2015. Astana, Kazakhstan. 530 Frédéric Docquier and Hillel Rapoport, “Globalization, Brain Drain and Development,” IZA Discussion Paper 5590 (2011): 1–62. Frédéric Docquier, Elisabetta Lodigiani, Hillel Rapoport, and Maurice Schiff, “Emigration and democracy,” World Bank Policy Research Paper 5557 (2011): 1–49. 531 Armanzhan Baitassov. Personal Interview. 02.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 532 Erlan Idrissov. Personal Interview. 09.06.2015. Astana, Kazakhstan. Byrganym Aitimova. Personal Interview. 09.06.2015. Astana, Kazakhstan.

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In comparison to other developing countries, Kazakhstan manages to keep its people inside the country… I have many friends who, after many years of studying abroad and having the opportunities to stay, choose to go back and work in Kazakhstan… I think this has to do with the fact that it is, indeed, hard to adapt and integrate into the work life in the West–I am still in this process, even though I opened a business here–and secondly, since there is an elitist aspect in educating abroad, many students who graduate from the institutions here have platforms to go back to…533

In any case, brain drain is not revealed as a significant factor in Kazakhstan and, in spite of its possible occurrence, both state and private actors are oriented at promoting the internationalization of education in Kazakhstan. The appointment of Erlan Sagadiyev as a Minister of Education, a fierce defender of international and particularly Western forms of education, is a vivid illustration of that. In sum, the case of Kazakhstan illustrates that international education– spurred by elitist demand and private sector efforts–is an effective driver of educational reforms. However, there is a need for further sponsorship and scholarship opportunities to drive educational changes and allow a wider scope of the population to benefit from these opportunities. The state is committed to developing education; however, faces institutional barriers and management issues. While Kazakhstan’s leaders acknowledge the need to diversify the economy and promote effective educational reforms, as with any other developmental issue, the road from planning to practical implementation is a long one. Indeed, “educational reforms are one of the most complex.”534

Implications of Empirical Findings for the Theory The aim of the empirical research was to see which forms of education are most effective and competent in Kazakhstan. The empirical findings suggest that the international education sector, which offers internationally accredited programs and the opportunity to get admitted to the universities worldwide, is a potential driver of change and innovation in Kazakhstan. In particular, the study has found that, on the secondary level, the A-level and IB programs represent the opportunity for a high-quality education and can potentially affect the formation of a competitive human capital in Kazakhstan. Hence, schools such as Miras and Haileybury are potential power sources.

533 Suna Park. Personal Interview. 04.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 534 Erlan Idrissov. Personal Interview. 09.06.2015. Astana, Kazakhstan.

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With regard to the theoretical base of education as a soft power resource, the relationship is straightforward. As illustrated in the previous chapters, education is one of the most effective and sustainable sources of soft power. Importantly, however, only the countries with well-developed and internationally reputable educational systems can offer attractive opportunities.535 Thereby, only if Kazakhstan were to effectively modernize and internationalize its educational sector–from primary, secondary to tertiary level–education could become an element in determining its soft power. Ideally, the goal for the state should be to create a regional education hub. According to Knight, an education hub may be defined as a “critical mass of education and knowledge actors aiming to exert greater influence in the new education marketplace and to strengthen relations between local and international counterparts.”536 The benefits are numerous: from economic effects to knowledge generation, innovation, human resource development, and, finally, using such an education hub for status, soft power, and geopolitical influence.537 Kazakhstan boasts a significant number of foreign students coming in from the neighboring exSoviet countries, as well as other Asian and Middle East countries. Thereby, there is a significant potentiality if the educational sector will continue to develop effectively. As presented in Chapter 4, apart from affecting soft power, investments in education can lead to economic growth, making education a hard power resource. From studies on income growth, it became increasingly evident that less tangible resources, such as knowledge, play a larger role than formerly believed.538 The implication of the human capital perspective is that “the investment in knowledge and skills brings economic returns, individually and collectively.”539 The empirical study respondents agree and continue:

535 Kishore Chakraborty, “Cultural Diplomacy: A Review, a Stocktaking and an Outline of Directions for Further Research” (working paper, Berlin, 2014), 9. 536 Jane Knight, “International Education Hubs: Collaboration for Competitiveness and Sustainability,” New Directions for Higher Education 168 (2014): 84. 537 Ibid., 83–96. 538 Gary S. Becker, “Investment in Human Capital: A theoretical analysis,” The Journal of Political Economy 70, no. 5 (1962): 9. 539 Tom Schuller, “The Complementary Roles of Human and Social Capital” (OECD, 2001), 3. Accessed 1 September 2015. http://www.oecd.org/innovation/research/1825424.pdf.

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Education forms human capital… and in the context of globalization, it is imperative for Kazakhstan to have a competitive international sector of education and a strong intellectual capital to build its welfare and achieve sustainable development…540

Specifically for the theory of education as a determinant of growth, this study offers several notes. As highlighted previously, while numerous scholars agree that human capital accumulated through education plays an important role in achieving economic growth, they differ in their methodologies. For instance, school enrollment rates are often considered a primary measurement parameter for human capital.541 However, Kazakhstan has already had a mass experience of education-with over 95% literacy rate-both before and after the fall of the Soviet Union. This makes the enrollment parameter not the final determinant factor in the case of Kazakhstan. Based on empirical findings, the research presents a new parameter for estimating human capital: international educational sector. Moreover, most of the existing studies consider public expenditure as a key driver of change. Agénor, Blankenau, Simpson, and Tomljanovich, and Greiner assert the importance of productive public spending and stress the role of governments in financing education.542 Meanwhile, the findings of the current empirical research reveal the important role of private sector and private investment in education sector. Private educational establishments have intensified the educational markets worldwide and, thereby, need to be considered in studies on education and human capital. Finally, this study provides evidence of a positive effect of secondary-level education and its connection with the formation of human capital and, subsequently, economic growth. Sequeira and Martins reported a positive relationship

540 Byrganym Aitimova. Personal Interview. 09.06.2015. Astana, Kazakhstan. Suna Park. Personal Interview. 04.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 541 Robert J. Barro, “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, no. 2 (1991): 407–33. 542 Pierre-Richard Agénor, “Schooling and Public Capital in a Model of Endogenous Growth,” Economica 78, no. 309 (2009): 108. William F. Blankenau, Nicole B. Simpson and Marc Tomljanovich, “Public Education Expenditures, Taxation and Growth: Linking Data to Theory,” AEA Papers and Proceedings 97, no. 2 (2007): 393–97. Alfred Greiner, “Human Capital Formation, Learning by Doing and the Government in the Process of Economic Growth,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy 59, no. 1 (2012): 84.

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between education and growth at the secondary level of education.543 Thereby, this study has added to the existing literature on human capital as a determinant of growth in more than one way: first, by showing evidence of an international educational sector as a factor in building human capital; second, by incorporating private educational supply in the analysis; and, finally, by looking specifically at the secondary education level. The current research accepted the conclusions of Chapter 4 as a foundation for the empirical study, i.e. we already ‘knew’ that education and economic growth have a positive correlation, but wanted to see the empirical implications of where it could work most efficiently. As always with empirical studies, it is necessary to state that generalizations are not always appropriate. Permani comments on the danger of extreme conclusions: Education is a necessary condition to enable a country to ‘catch up’ to the technology frontier; but it is not a sufficient condition. There are other policies and measures, such as promoting foreign direct investment and foreign technology, maintaining macroeconomic stability, developing effective regulation, adopting a transparent financial system, and developing effective and respectful governance… [One also needs] to take noneconomic and financial aspects into account, such as cultural conservation and social cohesion. Another important lesson is that we should not expect immediate impacts on economic growth from educational developments. It may take time but education appears to be a worthwhile investment in the long run.544

Similarly, the empirical study respondents warn about one-sided conclusions in the sphere of education. Byrganym Aitimova, who had a long diplomatic career and was formerly the Minister of Education, an Ambassador and the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the UN in New York, comments: I had numerous meetings with the Ministers and state leaders of other countries; of both the developed and developing states… they all remain in search of better, more effective and efficient systems of education.545

Nevertheless, if we proceed in the manner outlined in Chapter 4 and accept the link between education and economic growth, it could be stated that, overall, the findings of the empirical study confirm that educational investments are a significant power resource, potentially contributing to both hard and soft power (or smart,

543 Tiago N. Sequeira and Elsa V. Martins, “Education public financing and economic growth: an endogenous growth model versus evidence,” Empirical Economics 35 (2008): 361–77. 544 Risti Permani, “Role of Education in Economic Growth in East Asia: a survey.” AsianPacific Economic Literature 23, no. 1 (2009): 16. 545 Byrganym Aitimova. Personal Interview. 09.06.2015. Astana, Kazakhstan.

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if we refer to the proposed theorization from Chapter 4). As outlined before, this monograph defines a smart power resource as a resource that can contribute to both hard and soft power. The specific instrument that allows education to become a power resource–as evidenced in the case of Kazakhstan–is the international educational sector that offers internationally recognized diplomas. Figure 18.  Education as a Power Resource in Kazakhstan

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Chapter Summary In answering the question of whether education is a power resource in Kazakhstan, the empirical research demonstrates that private international educational programs at the secondary level offer competitive and high-quality educational options. In other words, there is evidence that international education is a driver of human capital formation and can potentially contribute to both hard and soft power resources. However, to activate education as a source of power in the Kazakhstani case–and this answers the question of how to increase the efficiency of reforms–there is a need for further state involvement in the form of institutional changes, legislative changes, and financial subsidies. The state also needs to work toward a more competent distribution of international education to the population and adopt holistic practices in attending to reforms, taking into account the Soviet legacies. In terms of insights for the economic theory of education as a determinant of growth, the case of Kazakhstan provides evidence that the secondary international educational sector, spurred by private sector efforts, could be regarded as another parameter of estimating human capital and economic strength of the country. Going back to the framework of the whole research, this chapter has enabled us to see the relevance of the IR theory for the political reality and policies that can be adopted by states. Obviously, the current study represents only one facet of the issue; still, current findings could be representative of the larger picture. In particular, the findings from this case study could have valuable implications not only for countries with similar background, such as ex-Soviet, resource-dependent or Central Asian states, but for all the developing states as well. This monograph represents one of the first attempts to apply the concept of soft-hard-smart power in relation to education and power. My previous answer, based on the theoretical research, is positive. The inquiry into the general empirical realities supports the argument that education could be regarded as a power resource.

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Chapter 7. Conclusion Coming to a concluding chapter is a great responsibility – one has to appropriately summarize the results of the study, outline key contributions, and offer directions for future research. This monograph has primarily dealt with the concept of power. Power has always been and remains a key topic of interest for academics. Despite a great deal of attention, however, there are notable debates over power’s definition and features, which lead to the topic’s ambiguity. Many aspects of Power are still not well understood, for instance, the notion of power as hard and soft. To offer clarification of certain types of power, this publication has focused on the power forms identified by Joseph Nye: hard, soft, and smart. The imperative to study and develop the theory of soft power stems from the growing relevance of soft power and, simultaneously, the need to critically assess its conceptual foundation. In International Relations Theory, Power has been primarily viewed in the realm of the realist school and, thus, associated with hard power resources. In this respect, Barnett and Duvall argue that the belongingness of power to the realist tradition has generated a limit for the concept of power.546 The importance of military force, a focus of the realist school, “has been exaggerated,” while “the role of nonmilitary forms of power has been underestimated.”547 Thereby, the research aim was to critically contribute to the development of sub-categories of power and fill the gap in studying Nye’s frames. Among other issues, the resource framework of soft power required clarification. Hence, apart from assessing Nye’s soft power, the goal was to evaluate education as a resource of power. To reiterate, the research questions which this publication explored

546 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59, no. 01 (2005): 39–75. 547 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, in Handbook of International Relations 2nd ed., ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 285.

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were three-fold: First, what are the key shortcomings of the soft power theory and practice? Second, does education represent a hard power resource, in addition to being a soft one? If yes, what are the underlying reasons for this? And third, how can education become a more effective power resource, based on the results of the empirical study? In International Relations Theory, Power has been primarily viewed in the realm of the realist school and, thus, associated with hard power resources, such as military and economy. The unifying theme of the realist thinking is that nations exist in a state of anarchy with no guarantees for their security. In such circumstances, it is rational for states to compete for power.548 Although the realist school continues to attract academicians and policymakers, since the end of the Cold War there have been criticisms of realist assumptions on the grounds that they are declining in relevance in a globalized world.549 In fact, the belongingness of power to the realist tradition has generated a limit for the concept.550 Realism’s key weakness is in emphasizing that the dimension of power that can be seemingly operationalized is military.551 The preoccupation with military power has led to the neglect of other forms of power.552 However, as the discipline of IR was evolving, the rigid interpretation of power started to change as well. In particular, Joseph Nye argued that the changing nature of international framework has re-emphasized the use of intangible forms of power, such as culture, ideology, and institutions. The growing social mobilization makes the factors of technology, education, and economic growth as, if not more, significant as geography, population, and resources.553

548 Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmit, “Realism,” in The Globalization of World Politics: an Introduction to International Relations, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 165. 549 Ibid. 550 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59, no. 01 (2005): 39–75. 551 Pinar Bilgin and Berivan Elis, “Hard Power, Soft Power: Toward a more realistic analysis,” Insight Turkey 10, no. 2 (2008): 11. 552 Kira Petersen, “Four Types of Power in International Relations: Coercive Power, Bargaining Power, Concerted Power, and Institutionalized Power” (working paper, IPSA, XXII World Congress of Political Science, Madrid, 2012), 3. 553 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 167, 154.

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To reiterate, Nye split power resources into two forms: hard and soft. This monograph considered hard and soft power as “ideal-type or pure” forms of power.554 Figure 1.  Power (Nye, J. 2008)

Hard or command power is linked to the oldest understanding of power, in which nation-states exist in a system of anarchy and, as a result of not having a higher authority, have to rely on power politics. Meanwhile, soft power, according to Nye, “rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others” and is “associated with intangible assets such as attractive personality, culture, political values, institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority.”555 In The Future of Power Nye defined soft power more fully: “as the ability to affect others through the co‐optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.”556 With regard to soft power’s conceptual development, Bilgin and Elis sum up Nye’s contribution in the following way: Nye’s (soft) power analysis complements that of realist IR in two ways. First, it highlights non-material forms of power that are overlooked in realist power analysis. Second, in the

554 Matteo Pallaver, “Power and Its Forms: Hard, Soft, Smart” (master’s thesis, London School of Economics, 2011), 99. Accessed 1 May 2015. etheses.lse.ac.uk/220/1/ Pallaver_Power_and_Its_Forms.pdf. 555 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 95. 556 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 20–21.

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attempt to capture the ways in which non-material power is expressed, it looks at nonvisible forms of power relations - what Lukes refers to as the ‘second face of power’.557

Although the idea of soft power and its resources is not new,558 it is only now that soft power is growing in its theoretical development and practical recognition. However, wider usage of the concept does not symbolize wider understanding.559 In outlining Nye’s definitions, we encounter several problematic aspects. For instance, one of the issues with the theory is the ambiguity of Nye’s term of ‘attractiveness,’ which constitutes an integral part of the definition. Nye defines soft power as “the ability to affect others to obtain preferred outcomes by the cooptive means of framing the agenda, persuasion and positive attraction.”560 However, Mattern appropriately argues that attraction is a subjective experience and the process of attraction is both ambiguous for the academic impulse for theoretic clarity, but also in relation to the practical uses of soft power.561 A nation’s ‘attractiveness’ to others is not a factor that can be easily exploited
 in any coherent way.562 Another problematic issue is the distinction between soft power as a practical category and a conceptual category. The concept of soft power, given its adaptations by both practitioners and scholars, has so far led a dual existence as a category of practice and a category of analysis.563 In studying soft power, it was imperative to state the inherent weaknesses of the theory before moving on to the analysis of soft power resources. Among others, the resources of soft power represent a significant point of ambiguity. Power resources are numerous; yet, their nature and categorization are not always straightforward. To begin the evaluation of soft power resource framework, Chapter 3 has started with hard power resources. Nye associates 557 Pinar Bilgin and Berivan Elis, “Hard Power, Soft Power: Toward a more realistic analysis,” Insight Turkey 10, no. 2 (2008): 6. 558 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 167. 559 Joseph Nye’s Foreword, in Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 7. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www. portland-communications.com/publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/. 560 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Power and foreign policy,” Journal of Political Power 4, no. 1 (2011): 19. 561 Janice B. Mattern, “Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics,” Journal of International Studies 33, no. 3 (2005): 584. 562 Barry M. Blechman, “Review of Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 4 (2004/2005): 680. 563 Todd H. Hall, “An Unclear Attraction: A Critical Examination of Soft Power as an Analytical Category,” Chinese Journal of International Politics (2010): 7.

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hard power with traditional politics, which emphasizes military and economic power.564 Historically, hard power has been associated with population size, territory, natural resources, military force, and social stability.565 The unifying aspect of these resources is that they are ‘material’ and visible in nature. Figure 2.  Hard power resources

In comparison to hard power resources, soft resources are more complex. According to Nye, the soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).566 Figure 3.  Soft power resources (Nye, J. 2008)

While Nye’s original categorization of soft power resources (culture, political values, and foreign policies)567 and the subsequent categorizations such as those of McClory (Government, Culture, Diplomacy, Education, and Business/Innovation568 564 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 95. 565 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A smarter, more secure America (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2007), 6. 566 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 96. 567 Ibid. 568 Jonathan McClory, The New Persuaders II. A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power (Institute for Government, 2011), 10. Accessed June 1, 2015. http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/The%20New%20PersuadersII_0.pdf.

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or Government, Culture, Engagement, Education, Digital, and Enterprise569) are innovative and influential, they do not get into highlighting all the possible agents of soft power and, moreover, the various instruments they could employ. Thereby, to include a wider range of soft power resources, I offered an alternative conceptualization. The key idea was that many non-traditional actors such as NGOs, multinational corporations, civil society groups, and individuals are becoming significant power players. Dahl calls the objects in the relationship of power as actors; his term is inclusive and refers to individuals, groups, roles, governments, nationstates, and other human aggregates.570 I apply this definition to soft power actor as well. Foreign policy in a multi-polar and global world “includes more actors, more platforms, and more interests than ever before.”571 Hence, it was imperative to outline soft power resources and distinguish between the vehicles and the agents (implementers) of soft power. The AGENTS index addresses the numerous power actors that are able to create and mobilize soft power initiatives: state, supranational bodies, NGOs, Private sector, Individuals, Networks, Civil Society, Hybrids, and so forth. The PILLARS/ SPHERES index refers to the multiple spheres where soft power could be created or activated: Foreign Politics; Domestic Politics; Culture and History; Education and Science; Business; Creative Industries; Technologies; Tourism; Sport; Environment, and so forth. Finally, the INSTRUMENTS index addresses the specific instruments/vehicles through which soft power is mobilized/ instrumentalized: Laws and policies; Agreements (domestic, regional, int’l); Programs (e.g. in foreign exchanges, cultural diplomacy, nation branding, so forth); Media outlets; Events, conferences, symposia, exhibitions, competitions, concerts; publications; and so forth.

569 Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 21–22. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portland-communications.com/ publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/. 570 Robert A. Dahl, “The concept of power,” Behavioral Science 2, no. 3 (1957): 203. 571 Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 15. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portland-communications. com/publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/.

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Figure 6.  Soft power resources (Raimzhanova, A. 2015)

Agents, Pillars/Spheres, and Instruments are all part of the soft power resource arsenal. While the variety of soft power actors and the spheres of their activity may be evident, to progress the theory, I incorporated all of them in soft power’s theoretical framework. As stated by McClory, “without a full and clear picture of these resources, there can be little hope of deploying soft power in a strategic, coordinated, and–ultimately–effective way.”572 An expanded version of this diagram could be presented in the following way:

572 Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 9. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portland-communications. com/publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/.

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Figure 7.  Soft power resources expanded (Raimzhanova, A. 2015)

To reiterate, the proposed model of resources was ultimately motivated by a desire to offer an alternative to soft power resource categorization and develop a clearer understanding of the distinction between the various resources of soft power i.e. its instruments, pillars/spheres of activity, and agents. To reiterate, this diagram is only one version of categorizing soft power resources; further developments are both possible and necessary. In evaluating problematic aspects of soft power, the chapter has also highlighted certain practical aspects, which prevent soft power’s recognition and deployment. One of the key reasons why soft power is not widely acknowledged is because it is difficult for practitioners who see the immediate results of investing into it. The practice of soft power is further complicated by an inadequate institutional support. The institutions of hard power are disproportionately larger, better funded, and, thereby, more influential and powerful than the institutions of soft power. Bureaucratic structures are often a barrier toward an efficient production of soft power. Finally, a significant barrier is the rigid mentality of the policy-makers and practitioners. Many support soft power initiatives in principle but tend to give it a 146

low priority in practice, since they have to deal with a wider range of issues within a shorter timeframe and on tighter budgets.573 The challenges of soft power agencies in budget, clout, and organizational effectiveness must be addressed as a serious matter.574 Chapter 4 continued to deal with the issue of resource ambiguity by taking on the resource of Education for analysis. Education constitutes a vital aspect of the soft power theory. Educational programs and exchanges are able to shape opinion, create goodwill and attract temporary migrants. Conceptually, Nye considers education as part of his culture resource: Culture is the set of practices that create meaning for a society, and it has many manifestations. It is common to distinguish between high culture such as literature, art, and education, which appeals to elites; and popular culture, which focuses on mass entertainment.575

Figure 8.  Education in soft power theory

While presenting the resource of Education in Nye’s theory is straightforward, it is difficult to see clearly what the term entails. Education is an expansive term that could refer to anything from educational policies and reforms to specific institutions and programs. The review of Nye’s literature illustrates

573 Simon Mark, “A Greater Role for Cultural Diplomacy,” Clingendael Discussion Paper in Diplomacy, No. 114 (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, 2009), 3. 574 Ernest J. III Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 121. 575 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 96.

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that his framework of Education resource refers to the benefits of an effective educational system in attracting foreign students, conducting public diplomacy, and promoting ideas abroad. To highlight the significance of education’s place in soft power theory, McClory took Education outside of the cultural resource category because he felt that a number of references to higher education’s impact on soft power warranted it a separate sub-index. Following Nye, The Education sub-index in his conceptualization refers to “the factors of foreign exchange effectiveness and includes measures on the number of foreign students in a country, the relative quality of its universities and the output of academic publishing.”576 While acknowledging education’s integral place in soft power theory, this research assessed whether education could represent a hard power resource as well. The eventual answer was yes. The process of getting to this conclusion was the following. Figure 2.  Hard power resources

To argue that education has hard power traits would mean that it is connected to one of the hard power resources. The Economy became a possible candidate since economic strength is spurred by economic growth. Although in practice it could be challenging to differentiate between hard and soft aspects of economic power, and economic elements can complement soft power as well, economic strength is primarily associated with hard power.577 This research viewed economic strength as a hard power resource. I then hypothesized that education could have hard power characteristics through its connection to economic growth. 576 Jonathan McClory, The New Persuaders II. A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power (Institute for Government, 2011), 11. Accessed June 1, 2015. http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/The%20New%20PersuadersII_0. pdf. 577 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011). Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 22. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portland-communications.com/ publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/.

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In examining education as a hard power resource, the discussion in Chapter 4 incorporated the economic literature on growth theories and human capital. The analytical framework in looking at whether education represents a hard power resource was the following: If based on the existing literature one were to find a plausible connection between education-either separately or through the human capital element-and economic growth, then that would signify that education is one of the resources of hard power. The importance of human capital as a source of progress and economic growth has long been recognized in the economic literature. Adam Smith was the first classical economist to include human capital in his definition of capital.578 From studies on income growth, it became evident that less tangible resources, such as knowledge, play a larger role than formerly believed.579 Many scholars have found a positive correlation between education and economic growth, among them Barro (1991), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), Barro and Lee (1993), Barro and Salai-Martin (1995), Krueger and Lindahl (2001), and others.580 Schuller summarizes: Human capital focuses on the economic behaviour of individuals, especially on the way their accumulation of knowledge and skills enables them to increase their productivity and their earnings – and in so doing, to increase the productivity and wealth of the societies they live in. The underlying implication of a human capital perspective is that investment in knowledge and skills brings economic returns, individually and therefore collectively.581

Following a critical review of the literature, one may suggest that there is, indeed, a positive correlation between educational investments and economic strength of a nation-state. Despite the discrepancies in various studies-which could be partially 578 Mireille Laroche, Marcel Mérette, and G. C. Ruggeri, “On the Concept and Dimensions of Human Capital in a Knowledge-Based Economy Context,” Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques 25, no. 1 (1999): 87. 579 Gary S. Becker, “Investment in Human Capital: A theoretical analysis,” The Journal of Political Economy 70, no. 5 (1962): 9. 580 Robert J. Barro, “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, no. 2 (1991): 407–33. N. Gregory Mankiw, David Romer, and David N. Weil, “A contribution to the empirics of economic growth,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, no. 2 (1992): 407–37. Robert J. Barro and Jong-Wha Lee, “International Comparisons of Educational Attainment,” Journal of Monetary Economics 32, no. 3 (1993): 363–94. Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Economic Growth (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995). Alan B. Krueger and Mikael Lindahl, “Education for growth: why and for whom?” Journal of Economic Literature 39, no. 4 (2001): 1101–36. 581 Tom Schuller, “The Complementary Roles of Human and Social Capital” (OECD, 2001), 5. Accessed 1 September 2015. http://www.oecd.org/innovation/research/1825424.pdf.

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attributed to estimation issues and choice of variables-there is empirical evidence of a positive relationship between investments in education and economic growth, either directly or through human capital proliferation. Figure 10.  Relationship between Education, Human Capital, and Economic Growth

This suggests that the hypothesized place of education in the hard power resource framework is confirmed: Figure 9.  Education in hard power resource framework

To reiterate, the discussion in Chapter 4 has illustrated that education represents not only a soft power resource but also a hard power resource, as educational investments are able to impact economic growth. The latter is an important finding, widening the scope of education in International Relations Theory. It was illustrated that hard power resources are expansive and include education as well. This has not been previously outlined in research regarding education or power. However, to take one step further, Chapter 4 has suggested that education could be illustrated not only in soft and hard power resource frameworks but also in a smart power category. The argumentation was as follows. First, as a result of the previous discussion, it seems that education belongs in both hard and soft power resource frameworks. Education is a ‘gray’ resource 150

area, as it has both soft and hard dimensions to it. The soft dimension is in the connection to soft power’s ‘culture’ category. The hard dimension is revealed in its connection to economic growth i.e. economic strength. Figure 11.  Resource of Education

If one were to look at hard and soft power through its resources and employ Venn diagrams, circle A would then represent hard power resources and circle B would symbolize soft power resources. Meanwhile, the Middle darker oval  C would represent their overlapping resources. In other words, as the resource of Education has both hard and soft power characteristics, it is located in the oval C. Education in both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ sense refers to the quality of the educational system, its programs and graduates i.e. they are somewhat equivalent. One could, therefore, equalize the two resources. However, going back to the discussion of Chapter 3, there already exists a power form that unites both soft and hard power, namely, smart power. Smart power is “the ability to skilfully combine hard and soft power for the development of integrated strategies.”582 Alternatively, it is defined as “the capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that the actor’s goals are advanced effectively and efficiently.”583 Graphically, smart power could be illustrated in the following way:

582 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Jr. Nye, CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A smarter, more secure America (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2007), 7. 583 Ernest J. III Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power, ” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 115.

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Figure 12.  Smart power

The existing definitions posit smart power as the ability to utilize both hard and soft power. As another infant academic concept, however, it requires further theorizations and practical applications. As argued by Pallaver, first and foremost, “smart power is the recognition of the different forms of power and the instruments it can employ.”584 While there has not been an explicit discussion of smart power’s resources, following Nye and Wilson’s definitions, smart power (i.e. ability to combine soft and hard resources) then must include both soft power resources and hard power resources listed in the Figures 2 and 3. Of course, smart power is not simply ‘having’ both soft and hard power resources, but combining them to achieve desired results. However, if one accepts that any form of power can be evaluated through the system of resources, then smart power resources could be illustrated in the following way:

584 Matteo Pallaver, “Power and Its Forms: Hard, Soft, Smart” (master’s thesis, London School of Economics, 2011), 105. Accessed 1 May 2015. etheses.lse.ac.uk/220/1/ Pallaver_Power_and_Its_Forms.pdf.

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Figure 13.  Smart power resources

One can see how education is duplicated twice – in hard power and then soft power resource arsenal. Alternatively, smart power resources could be illustrated in a different manner, using the Venn diagrams employed in Figure 11. Figure 14.  Smart power resources Alternative

This diagram is similar to the previous list-version. The key difference is that it shows the smart power resource arsenal using Venn diagrams and illustrates the overlapping resource of Education in a clearer manner. The key point again is that it illustrates the resource of Education in the overlapping area C as belonging not only to hard and soft but also to the smart power arsenal. Illustrating the arsenal of smart power resources means that smart power resources exist (as a combination of hard and soft power resources). Figure 14 shows 153

that Education resource does not belong to hard and soft power separately, but is inside the circle that belongs to both. Following the unique position of Education resource, I propose to consider it a pure smart power resource. Pure in this sense means that it does not represent a mix of different resources, but in itself, it already possesses hard and soft power attributes. To reiterate, this publication suggests that smart power resources exist and defines a smart power resource as a resource that can contribute to both hard and soft power, in other words, exist in both hard and soft power arsenal. Figure 15.  Education in the soft-hard-smart power framework

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So far, the monograph has used theoretical research to progress the argument. However, a practical outlook is a necessary step in strengthening a theoretical discussion. Wilson appropriately argues that the critique of soft and smart power is justified as their arguments suffer from methodological flaws, pointing to a need for better definitions and conceptualization of soft power, greater attention to the institutional realities, and a more systematic effort to incorporate real-world dynamics.585 Hence, the next step in this research was to assess the phenomenon of education as a power resource empirically. The empirical research methodology included a case study approach, an interpretative method of analysis, and interviews as a data collection method. The traditional agent of power is a nation-state; so a logical choice was to choose a specific country case and evaluate the educational system of that country. To narrow down the options, the author has taken into consideration the fact that the previous chapters have revealed gaps in knowledge with regard to emerging countries in both the areas of soft power and education as a determinant of growth. Meanwhile, the imperative to study the developing nations is growing, not least because of their rise as power sources. Due to these and other considerations, the choice for the case study fell on the emerging state of Kazakhstan. After reworking the research focus on Kazakhstan, the research questions were thus: Is education an effective hard/soft power resource in Kazakhstan? Which forms of education are effective in contributing to soft/hard/smart power in Kazakhstan? How can education become a more effective power resource in Kazakhstan? In order to see whether education is a power resource in Kazakhstan, it was first necessary to outline Kazakhstan’s power strategies. The analysis revealed the state’s high dependency on hard power resources in the face of Kazakhstan’s geopolitical context. Geography, natural resources, and growing economy belong to the hard power arsenal of Kazakhstan. The emphasis on geopolitics and natural resources puts Kazakhstan’s strategies in the realist framework. However, while Kazakhstan’s multi-vector survival policy that seeks the maximization of power resembles the realist school of thinking, the relinquishing of nuclear materials symbolizes the shift from traditional hard power toward soft power.586 In order to effectively move away from resource dependency and its negative implications,

585 Ernest J. III Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 114. 586 Byrganym Aitimova. Personal Interview. 09.06.2015. Astana, Kazakhstan.

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the state needs to invest in sustainable soft power sources. Soft power resources in Kazakhstan include sports, nature, and culture; however, these are relative and small in significance, according to the interviewees. In particular, the empirical study respondents, such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Senate Chair for International Relations, outline educational investments as a key factor in building both soft and hard power. The question is, which parts of education, if at all, are most competent and effective in Kazakhstan. The rationale for answering the research questions was the following: If one were to find most competent forms of educational systems and programs, then that would signify that those have a potential to contribute to hard and soft power (or, if you accept the theorization of Chapter 4, smart power). Figure 17.  Kazakhstan’s power resources

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To reiterate, whether one categorizes education as smart or, separately, as hard or soft power resource, is not principal in this case. Categorization of education as either would presume that it possesses hard and soft power characteristics. This empirical study focused on the leaders in the international education sector at the secondary level: Miras International School (in the face of Educational Foundation) and Haileybury British International Schools. The empirical findings suggest that the international education sector, which offers internationally accredited programs and the opportunity to get admitted to the universities worldwide, is a potential driver of change and innovation in the educational sector of Kazakhstan. In other words, the case of Kazakhstan illustrates that international education–spurred by the elitist demand and private sector efforts–is an effective driver of educational reforms. In particular, the study found that, on the secondary level, the A-level and IB programs represent the opportunity for a high-quality education, which can potentially affect the formation of a competitive human capital. Hence, the schools such as Miras and Haileybury may be regarded as potential power sources. However, to activate education as a source of both hard and soft power in the Kazakhstani case–and this answers the question of how to increase the efficiency of reforms–there is a need for further state involvement in the form of institutional changes, legislative changes, and financial subsidies. As stated previously, education is one of the most effective and sustainable sources of soft power. Importantly, however, only the countries with welldeveloped and internationally reputable educational systems can offer attractive opportunities.587 Thereby, only if Kazakhstan were to effectively modernize and internationalize its educational sector–from primary, secondary to tertiary level–education could become an element in determining its soft power. As argued in Chapter 4, apart from affecting soft power, investments in education can lead to economic growth, making education a hard power resource. The implication of a human capital perspective is that “investment in knowledge and skills brings economic returns, individually and therefore collectively.”588 The empirical study respondents agreed and continued:

587 Kishore Chakraborty, “Cultural Diplomacy: A Review, a Stocktaking and an Outline of Directions for Further Research” (working paper, Berlin, 2014), 9. 588 Tom Schuller, “The Complementary Roles of Human and Social Capital” (OECD, 2001), 3. Accessed 1 September 2015. http://www.oecd.org/innovation/ research/1825424.pdf.

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Education forms human capital… and in the context of globalization, it is imperative for Kazakhstan to have a competitive international sector of education and a strong intellectual capital to build its welfare and achieve sustainable development…589

In terms of the existing literature on education and human capital as determinants of growth, the study has contributed in the following way: by showing evidence of an international educational sector as a factor in building human capital and economic growth; by incorporating private educational supply in the analysis; and by looking specifically at the secondary education level. Private educational establishments have intensified the educational markets worldwide and, thereby, need to be considered in studies on education and human capital. Overall, it could be stated that findings of the empirical study confirm that educational investments are a significant power resource, potentially contributing to both hard and soft power (or smart, if we refer to the proposed theorization from Chapter 4). What allows education to become a potential smart power resource–as evidenced in the case of Kazakhstan–are the changes and reforms in the international educational sector. If one were to summarize the empirical study’s results in a diagram form, the following could be offered:

589 Byrganym Aitimova. Personal Interview. 09.06.2015. Astana, Kazakhstan. Suna Park. Personal Interview. 04.06.2015. Almaty, Kazakhstan.

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Figure 18.  Education as a Power Resource in Kazakhstan

Referring to the framework of the whole monograph, Chapters 5 and 6 have enabled us to try and see the relevance of the IR theory for political reality and policies that can be adopted by states, in particular, the state of Kazakhstan. This study represents one of the first attempts to apply the concept of power in relation

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to education. The inquiry into the general empirical realities supports the argument that education could be considered a power resource. Going back to the research aims, as a result of fulfilling research objectives, the following insights are offered: 1) Resource ambiguity is outlined as one of the key shortcomings of the soft power theory. Soft power resources are expanded to include new resources in an updated framework of soft power, specifically, Actors, Spheres/Pillars, and Instruments of soft power; 2) Education is outlined not only as a soft but also a hard power resource, given the analysis of the corresponding economic literature; 3) A new theorization of smart power is proposed to include the notion of smart power resources. Smart power resource is defined as a resource that can contribute to both hard and soft power; 4) Following that, Education could be considered a smart power resource since it has both hard and soft power characteristics; 5) Following the empirical study, international education programs such as the IB, IGCSE, and A-levels offered at international schools such as Miras and Haileybury are illustrated as one of the most competent in Kazakhstan; thus, they are potential power sources; 6) The international education sector is illustrated as an effective driver of educational reforms in Kazakhstan. Hence, the international education sector is proposed as a parameter of estimating a hard and soft power of a country; 7) Empirical research also provides evidence that secondary-level institutions and private educational supply drive the formation of human capital and, subsequently, affect economic growth. The findings above are, of course, not the last word on the subject; rather, they are meant to illustrate alternatives to the current conceptualizations and empirical realities of soft power and categorizations of hard, soft, and smart power resources. It goes without saying that the propositions of this research deserve more refinement. The aim here is not to issue a final pronouncement, but to offer ideas that provoke further reflection and debate. The aim of this publication was to contribute to the development of subcategories of power and assess Nye’s forms of power: hard, soft, smart and, specifically, evaluate education as a resource of power. While the concept of education as a smart power resource may be evident to some scholars and practitioners, there is no publicly available research to help illustrate that point. This 160

research seeks to begin filling that gap. While in science it is never possible to be certain that one’s understanding of anything is correct,590 I believe that correctly conceived and developed education and smart power–in combination or separately–could be the basis for social progress and sustainable development. Whatever shortcomings this research attempt had, it will hopefully drive further research. To start off, continued evaluation of soft power resources is imperative: “Without a full and clear picture of these resources, there can be little hope of deploying soft power in a strategic, coordinated, and–ultimately– effective way.”591 Moreover, to activate smart power, one needs to understand the tools to be employed, as well as how and where to deploy them.592 Future theoretical engagements could continue looking at resources and, moreover, study the relationship between resources and outcomes, among other issues. As stated by Baldwin, power analysis is simultaneously one of the oldest, but also one of the most promising approaches to study world politics for the years ahead.593 Furthermore, in my opinion, the topic of education as a source of power deserves critical attention. The changing global economy and politics are creating unprecedented challenges and opportunities for continued progress in human development. In these circumstances, education is an integral piece in a complex set of both lifeworld and system relations. It is a subject of high topicality in any age and the search for the best forms of education is eternal. It was impossible to look at all the different facets of education as a power resource within one research. Hence, future developments are imperative. Investments in education do not bring quick and easily measurable results, but their effects are gradual and deep. One could view education as a global good, sustainable

590 E. Brian Davies, Why Beliefs Matter: Reflections on the Nature of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 47. 591 Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30 Report: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Portland, 2015), 9. Accessed January 15, 2016. http://www.portland-communications. com/publications/a-global-ranking-of-soft-power/. 592 Ernest J. III Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 115. 593 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, in Handbook of International Relations 2nd ed., ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 291.

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investments in which could generate positive spillover effects not only for individuals and nation-states but for the global society as well. Referring back to the aphorism offered at the beginning of the monograph, Education is the most powerful weapon, which one can use to change the world.594 

594 Valerie Strauss. Nelson Mandela on the Power of Education. December 5, 2013. Accessed 15 August 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/ wp/2013/12/05/nelson-mandelas-famous-quote-on-education/.

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DIA-LOGOS Schriften zu Philosophie und Sozialwissenschaften Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences Herausgegeben von Edited by Tadeusz Buksiński & Piotr W. Juchacz ''Dia-Logos. Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences is a peer-reviewed book series publishing val­ uable monographs and edited volumes on various aspects of philosophy and social sciences. The series is intended to be an interdisciplinary forum of deliberation according to our firm belief that challenges of the contemporary world require common and multilevel research. The Dia-Logos series does not represent a single ideology or school of thought, but it is open to different trends and various styles of reflection, trying to understand better the contemporary world. We invite the submission of manuscripts of monographs and edited volumes from academic philosophers and social scientists.'' Bd./Vol. 1 Piotr W. Juchacz/Roman Kozłowski (Hrsg.): Freiheit und Verantwortung. Moral, Recht und Politik. 2002. Bd./Vol. 2

Norbert Leśniewski/Ewa Nowak-Juchacz (Hrsg.): Die Zeit Heideggers. 2002.

Bd./Vol. 3

Marek Kwiek (ed.): The University, Globalization, Central Europe. 2003.

Bd./Vol. 4 Ewa Czerwińska-Schupp (Hrsg.): Philosophie an der Schwelle des 21. Jahrhunderts. Geschichte der Philosophie, Philosophische Anthropologie, Ethik, Wissenschaftstheorie, Politische Philosophie. 2003. Bd./Vol. 5 Danuta Sobczyńska/Pawel Zeidler/Ewa Zielonacka-Lis (eds.): Chemistry in the Philo­ sophical Melting Pot. 2004. Bd./Vol. 6 Marek Kwiek: Intellectuals, Power, and Knowledge. Studies in the Philosophy of Culture and Education. 2004. Bd./Vol. 7

Marek Kwiek: The University and the State. A Study into Global Transformations. 2006.

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Andrzej Przylebski (Hrsg.): Das Erbe Gadamers. 2006.

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Ewa Czerwińska-Schupp (ed.): Values and Norms in the Age of Globalization. 2007.

Bd./Vol. 10 Tadeusz Buksiński (ed.): Democracy in Western and Post-Communist Countries. Twenty Years after the Fall of Communism. 2009. Bd./Vol. 11  Marek Zirk-Sadowski/Mariusz Golecki/Bartosz Wojciechowski (eds.): Multicentrism as an Emerging Paradigm in Legal Theory. 2009. Bd./Vol. 12 Bartosz Wojciechowski: Philosophical Approach to the Interculturality of Criminal Law. 2010. Bd./Vol. 13  Marek Nowak/Michał Nowosielski (eds.): (Post)transformational Migration. Inequalities, Welfare State, and Horizontal Mobility. 2011. Bd./Vol. 14 Tadeusz Buksiński (ed.): Religions in the Public Spheres. 2011. Bd./Vol. 15  Bartosz Wojciechowski/Piotr W. Juchacz/Karolina M. Cern (eds.): Legal Rules, Moral Norms and Democratic Principles. 2013. Bd./Vol. 16  Ewa Nowak/Dawn E. Schrader/Boris Zizek (eds.): Educating Competencies for De­ mocracy. 2013. Bd./Vol. 17 Tadeusz Buksiński (ed.): Identities and Modernizations. 2013. Bd./Vol. 18  Karolina M. Cern: The Counterfactual Yardstick. Normativity, Self-Constitutionalisation and the Public Sphere. 2014.

Bd./Vol. 19 Vito Breda / Lidia Rodak (eds.). Diverse Narratives of Legal Objectivity. An Interdisciplinary Perspective. 2016. Bd./Vol. 20 Marek Woszczek: Platonic Wholes and Quantum Ontology. Translated by Katarzyna Kretkowska. 2015. Bd./Vol. 21 Roman Hauser / Marek Zirk-Sadowski / Bartosz Wojciechowski (eds.): The Common European Constitutional Culture. Its Sources, Limits and Identity. 2016. Bd./Vol. 22 Aigerim Raimzhanova: Hard, Soft, and Smart Power – Education as a Power Resource. 2017. www.peterlang.com