Hard Interest, Soft Illusions. Southeast Asia and American Power 9780801450549, 2011040498

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HARD INTERESTS, SOFT ILLUSIONS

HARD INTERESTS, SOFT ILLUSIONS Southeast Asia and American Power Natasha Hamilton-Hart

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS

ITHACA AND LONDON

Copyright © 20 I 2 by CQIHSH University

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof; must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850.

First published 2012 by Cornell University Press Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publicatio11 Data HalTlilto1'1-Hart, Natasha, 1969I-Iarcl interests, soft illusions : Southeast Asia and American power 1' Natasha Hamilton-Hart.

p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8014-5054-9 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Southeast Asia--Foreign relations-United States. 2. United States-Foreign relations-Southeasl Asia.

4. Geopolitics-*United States. DS525.9.U6H36 2012 32159073--dez3

3. Geopolitics--Southeast Asia.

I. Title.

2011040498

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For Andilca, who need take only the best fronz history.

Contents

Acknowledgments

Beliefs about American Hegemony in Southeast Asia

ix

1

1.2. Behind Beliefs: Hard Interests, Soft Illusions

16

3.

The Politics and Economics of Interests

48

4.

History Lessons

88

5. Professional Expertise 6.

Regime Interests, Beliefs, and Knowledge

143 190

Appendix: Interviews References

203

Index

237

207

Acknowledgments

Writing this book has often felt like an exercise in. trespassing: straying over the territory of others and infringing on their kindness. I have tried not to be the sort of trespasser who leaves gates open and damages the crops. But I have been Lincomfortabljr aware that the nature of Lhis project suggests an unwarranted conceit on my par t. Setting out to "explain" someone else's beliefs is a presumptuous and rather impolite undertaking. Although I have relied greatly on the willingness of many individuals to share their beliefs and insights, the intellectual task undertaken in this book is not to explain individual beliefs but prevailing patterns of belief. The respondents who so very kindly gave their time to be .interviewed were more sophisticated and nuanced in their answers to my questions than the fragments reproduced here can convey. \Nhere l have sometimes noted that a respondent did not mention something during the interview, this should carry no implication that he or she was unaware or uncaring of it. I must also make it clear that those who consented to be interviewed do not necessarily agree with my argument or my interpretation of their interview responses. I have tried to ensure that I captured the meaning of interview responses accurately; but

ultimately there is an unavoidable layer of interpretation for which I must take r e p o risibility. Since many of those interviewed wished to remain anonymous,

I thank them collectively here and ask for their forgiveness if I have made errors in interpreting their responses. For very helpful advice and other types of assistance, I thank (in Southeast Asian-style name order) Bruce Lockhart, Chie Ikcya, Chong ]a Ian, Don Pat fan, Douglas Kamrnen, Evelyn Goh, Goh Benglan, aime Naval, Jamie Davidson, lance Bially Mattern, Lina Alexandra, Marie Tanyag, Michelle Tan, Mohamed Jaw far

Hassan, Nguyen Do ThuyAnh, Pham Quang Minh, Puangthong Rungswadisab, Richard Stubbs, Richard Robison, Rizal Snkma, Simon Tay, Soravis layanania, Tanya Laohathai, Thitinan Pongsudhirak, and Zacharia Haji Ahmad. I am also grateful Lo Roger Haydon at Cornell University Press for his enthusiasm for the project and his sharp suggestions for making it better. Tran Anh Dao cheerfully translated Vietnamese history textbook material. As in the case of those interviewed for this book, those who helped in numerous other ways did so without necessarily agreeing with my analysis or, in the case of those who facilitated my visits to Iakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Hanoi, Bangkok, and Manila-being aware of the book"s argument, which was then still under development. ix

x

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The research for this book was completed when I held a position in the Southeast Asian Studies department at the National University of Singapore,

where I spent ten years immersed in an "area studies" milieu and, for most of this time, happily distant from my disciplinary home in political science. As I worked on this project, I became more appreciative of the strengths of both approaches to scholarship and, at least at times, hopeful that they could be happily married. Grants from the Academic Research Fund and the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences of the National University of Singapore supported parts of the fieldwork on which this book draws. The events that hit the world news headlines in the years from 2002 onward

form part of the backdrop of this book. l would probably not have written it, however, if it had not been for a number of outstanding historians and journal-

ists whom l have never met in person but whose work opened my eyes.

HARD INTERESTS SOFT ILLUSIONS

7

1 BELIEFS ABOUT AMERICAN HEGEMONY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

There is little effusive sentimentality about the Unfited States among foreign

policy elites in Southeast Asia today. More than sixty years have passed since President Manuel Rotas of the Philippines declared that the safest course tor his newly-independent country was to follow in the "glistening wake" of American His view was emphatically rejected by many Southeast Asians at the time and does not resonate in a region formally committed to independence and norms of noninterference.2 Extravagant statements professing a kindred spirit and shared vision sometimes still adorn oMcial speeches and connnuniqués, but these appear intended for diplomatic consumption only Leaders and foreign .policy thinkers in Southeast Asia more often seem to identify with Lord Palmerston's dictum: "Nations have no permanent friends or allies, they only have permanent interests." They generally paint themselves as rational and pragmatic, dealing with external powers according to the dictates of national interest rather than sentiment. Yet behind the apparently hard-headed calculations of interest lie beliefs that cannot be explained as straightforward responses to a set of external conditions. Rather than being the product of formal reasoning, assessments of probability, or self-aware attempts to navigate tradeoffs and uncertainties, many core beliefs informing foreign policy orientations reflect comrnitnients

1. Quoted in lose 1998, 40?-408. 2. Acharva 2009.

1

CHAPTER 1

and biases that are political, cognitive, and affective. Beliefs in this sense are both powerful and independent?

This book investigates one such set of beliefs: beliefs about the international role and power of the United States held by foreign policymakers and practitioners in six Southeast Asian countries. Their beliefs are the basis on which they

define some countries as potentially threatening and others as relatively benign. Such beliefs are foundational in the sense of making possible specific foreign policy decisions as well. as underlying broad foreign policy orientations of alignment, opposition, or nonalignment. With some qualifications and exceptions, majorities in the foreign policy communities of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Phil-

ippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam see the United States as a relatively benign international power. Although they may dislike many aspects of U.S.

foreign policy, it is close to axiomatic ir1 foreign policy circles that the United States is, "overall," a benign and stabilizing power. This belief underlies Southeast

Asian support for a regional order in which the United States has exercised predominant power and is thus instrumental in sustaining American power in the region4 Beliefs therefore matter. But what drives the beliefs themselves? For those who share a belief in the benign nature of American global predominance, it may seem unnecessary to explain why some people believe the

United States to be benign. If people manage to see an external reality more or less as it is, why bother to explain this? This book argues that foundational foreign policy beliefs are not straightforward reflections of an external reality and in many cases cannot be tested against an external reality. They inevitably reflect

the interests and position of the believer. They depend on implicit tradeoffs that are not only incommensurable but also affectively disturbing. They frequently rest on attitudinal positions of liking or disliking and affective (feeling) dispositions, neither of which can be considered accurate or inaccurate. This does not mean that beliefs are insincere or merely instrumental rationalizations. Interests influence beliefs, but how they do so depends on available information, the social organization and practices of a professional sphere, and the prevailing standards

for generating knowledge. Quite a lot changes if beliefs are understood in this ways Rather than seeing responses to American power a.s primarily dependent on what the United

States is or does, this approach directs our attention to Lhose holding beliefs about the United States. For Ms book, it means locating foreign policy elites in domestic contests for political power and material advantage and speci-fying the ways in which American actions have affected domestic contenders 3. Jervis 2006, 65T.

4. Goh 2009.

BELIEFS ABOUT AMERICAN HEGEMONY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

3

for power. Understanding the beliefs of foreign policy elites in Southeast Asia also requires paying attention to the conditions under which they operate: the

practical demands of their work, the information that is most abundant and available to them, and the .standards of evaluation and reasoning to which they

are exposed. Ultimately, this provides greater leverage for explaining shifts in beliefs about the United States--and divergent beliefs across different groups of people-than approaches that focus mostly on American material capacities, motives, or actions. American power and the uses to which it is put matter, but to understand responses to the United States, we need to look at the local processes through which beliefs are fashioned.

American Primacy The United States has made no secret of its claim to primacy in Asia. The United States Pacific Command, based in Hawaii, displays on its website a map of the Pacific Rim and the Indian Ocean. The parts marked in red-from New Zealand

and Australia in the south to Iapan and China in the north, an area that includes India and all of Southeast Asia are designated its "Area of Responsibility," while the "Area of Interest" is »colored blue: Canada, the western part of South and Central America, the Middle East, and the east coast of Africa This graphic, public depiction of claimed responsibilities by the United States generally passes without comment in the region, in contrast to the speculation, frequently tinged with suspicion, regarding the power projection capacities of the Chinese military." Other indicators of the U.S. claim to primacy are not hard to find: they are written in major policy documents, and every American president since the early 19905 has made explicit assertions of primacy7 Although official statements since 2009 have given more space to the need to work with allies and friends, the military might of the United States continues to intake it more than merely first

among equals. For the time being, no other country comes close to matching its

5. The map was prominently displayed on the website of the Joint Interagency 'Iaslr Force West of the Pacific Command, at least between 2007 and April 2010, at www.pacon1.mil,*'staff.f.iiatIi»vestr' index.shtml. 6. China's 2008 Defense White Paper presents its naval mission as "offshore defensive operations" with the air of improving its capability for "i.ntegrated offshore operations, strategic deterrence and

strategic counterattacks, and to gradually develop its capabilities of conducting cooperation in distant waters and co Lan tering non~traditional security threats." Available at www.chi11a.org,.cr1»'goverr1rner1ll central_govcrnn1cntf2U09-01/20}content_17l555?'7.htm. The de facto Area of Responsibility of the People's Liberation Army Naw (PLAN) remains subject to speculation by outsiders. his thanks to

Chong la Ian for very helpful advice on Chinese military maps and the PLAN. T. Layne 2009, 148.

CHAPTER 1

4

firepower, force projection capacities, technological sophistication, or economic wealth."

This global American preeminence has endured for nearly two decades and unambiguous signs that other countries are actively seeking to balance against the United States are hard to find. This ha.s led to a whole series of coinages, from "soft balancing" to "pre-balancing" and "hedging," to describe what might be indicators that the rest of the world wants to see the scales weighted more evenly." Yet against such signs, there is an equally telling accumulation of evidence that

much of the world has been fairly content to live with American primacy. In the last twenty years, a long list of countries has offered increased access to the U.S.

military in terms of basing or other facilities, while only a few have chosen to reduce such access." Despite the widespread condemnation of American foreign policy and military adventurism in the years between 2001 and 2008, many governinents stepped up programs of bilateral cooperation with the United States.

This is not inconsistent with a simultaneous desire to see the "tamiiig" of American power-a reduction in its unilateralism and aggression, greater respect for international law and multilateral institutions, and less hypocrisy on issues such as human rights." Nonetheless, in the absence of decisive moves to help shore up potential countervailing centers of power, enhanced cooperation on issues ranging from counterterrorism to bilateral preferential trade agreements and facilitation of American military operations speaks in favor of the idea that many governments still see the United States as the "indispensable nation" more than as a potential threat.12

The United States and Southeast Asia: Elite Views and Continued Cooperation Foreign policy elites in Southeast Asia, a region that has lived with American hegemony since the end of World War II, appeal? lu see the United States in a rela-

tively positive light. In 2004, when worldwide approval of the United States was at its lowest, and majorities in many countries were citing the United States as

8. See, for example, the measLlres of military, technological, and other aspects of U.S. power in Walt 2005. This does not mean that U.S. preponderance' is assured for much longer, as discussed in Layne 2009. 9. The collected articles in Brown et al. 2008 give a sense of this scholarly debate. Work on Southeast Asia tends to be less explicitly anchored in debates about polarity; see, e.g., Acharya 2005; Goh 2008. 10. Johnson 2004.

ii. 'Nah 2005. 12. Kazan 2006b.

BELIEFS ABOUT AMERICAN HEGEMONY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

5

the greatest threat to international peace and stability, a group of Southeast Asian foreign policy experts was brought together by the Asia Foundation to voice

opinions on American foreign policy. The rapporteur, a prominent Singaporean diplomat, reported some concerns but embedded them within the larger judgment that "Southeast Asia appreciates the indispensable role which the United States has played in the maintenance of regional security a.nd its positive role in spurring the region's rapid social and economic clevelop1nent....Since the end of Worlcl War II, the U.S. has provided Southeast Asia with a security umbrella that has been a stabilizing factor for the development of the region.Ja]8' There is, of course, likely to be a pro-American bias in a group of respondents selected by the

Asia Foundation. However, similar references to the United States playing a positive, if not indispensable, role in ensuring regional security and prosperity over the past sixty years are commonplace in Southeast Asian foreign policy circles. 14 Increased attention to American unilateralism and aggression in the wake

of 2001 dented this apparent consensLls in the foreign policy community only

minimally. American foreign policy certainly had plenty of Southeast Asian critics in this period, but as several accounts of bilateral relations have concluded, countries in the region put whatever feelings of "unease" they may have felt behind them and moved to cement their ties with the United States." The chair-

man of a Singaporean think tank asserts, "Most in Asia do not desire an end to U.S. primacy. Indeed, U.S. presence is what they have known, lived with, and largely prospered from over the past few decades. The overarching wish of Asian states is instead that the present hour of U.S. primacy continues to provide sta-

bility and show benevolence for all, even in the face of post-9/1.1 exigencies and iinperatives."'" Similarly, a scholar at a security think tank notes, "American predominance and leadership continue to be acknowledged and valued generally in Southeast Asia" despite "reduced comfort" due to the Iraq War and the Bush administration's "style of conducting business." Nonetheless, "Southeast Asians by and large prefer U.S. dolninance."" Although not usually acknowledged so explicitly, a hierarchical regional order led by the United States appears to be accepted by most Southeast Asian governments, just as it has been--with some caveats by China and ]apart.188

13. Koh 2004, 35, 38. Similar language is used in the 2001 and 2008 Asia Foundation reports. Koh 2008; Yamamoto ct al. 2001. 14. For example, Chan 2005; Jaw far 1995; Kwa and Tan 2001; 'Ion 2002; Wanandi 2006b. Ciorciari 2010 argues that Southeast Asian states have favored limited, rather than "tight," alignment or nonalignmcnl since 1975. 15. Acharya 2005; Bison 2006; Goh 2005; I-Iadiz ed. 2006; Khadijah 2003; Mauzy' and Job 2007. 16. Tay 2004, 128. 17. Goh 2005, 192. 18. Goh 2008; Khong 2004; Van Ness 2002. .Lake 2007 discusses international hierarchy more

gclletFllly,

6

CHAPTER 1

Elite perceptions of a benign America do not necessarily resonate with public opinion in Southeast Asia. Indeed, consonant with declining American standing globally in the years after 2001, the United States was distinctly unpopular in

some Southeast Asian countries at this tilne.l9 Public opinion polling data, however, are volatile and tend to capture views that may be superficial and disconnected from policy and behavior." In most Southeast Asian countries, according to Simon Tay, "Despite some negative public opinion in many societies and perhaps private doubts, anti-Americanism has not been entrenched as state opinion. Asian leaders have instead responded quite promptly, whether as true allies or opportunistic ambulance chasers, to align their own agenda with that of the

United States. Singapore stands out among Southeast Asian countries as the most consistent and unequivocal in its support for U.S. foreign policy after 2001. lt sent a

small noncombat unit to Iraq, increased counterterrorism and military cooperation with the United States, and concluded a bilateral preferential trade agreement with the United States in 2003. Singaporean leaders vehemently took up the American claim that the invasion of Iraq was justified as a response to an alleged Iraqi weapons program." The Philippines and Thailand, treaty allies of

the United States in the region, also joined the "coalition of the willing" in support of the war against Iraq. Thailand's early equivocation was rumored to have been overcome with some arm-twisting of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra by American officials. Thaksin. overcame any initial reluctance to support U.S. policy (as well as anger at American criticisms of his human rights record) and

oversaw increased cooperation in military and security arenas as well as the pursuit of a bilateral trade agreement with the United States." The Philippines not only sent a small contingent to Iraq, it also invited U.S. troops to act as "advisers" in the fight against insurgency and terrorism in the south of the country. The

payoffs-increased military aid and improved positioning for contracts in occupied Iraq--were widely noted.24 The sour point in relations was the withdrawal of the Philippine contingent earlier than scheduled due to the kidnapping of a Filipino national.. This move, however, was taken in the context of a generally supportive, pro-American stance. IQ. Capie 2004; Chan 2005. 20. Katzenstein and Keohane 2007. 2 1. Tay 2004, 122. 22. Acharya 2005, 210; Koh and Chang 2003; Lee 2007. 23. Connors 2006; Rodan and I-Iewison 2006. 24. Reid 2006; Toner 2005. 25. Popular attitudes favored the decision to withdraw but also favored the return of the U.S. military to the Philippines; public opinion polls showed solidly positive views of the United States. Abinales 2006. .

BELIEFS ABOUT AMERICAN HEGEMONY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

T

In Indonesia and Malaysia, public anger at American foreign policy presented some constraints for political leaders. The Indonesian vice president Hamzah Haz in 2002 was among many politicians who criticized the United States publicly,

including calling the United States the "real terrorist.an2" However, quiet cooperation actually increased in this period, particularly after the terrorist attack in Bali in October 2002. President Megawatt Sukarnoputri was accused by political opponents of being overly supportive of the United States but she was defeated in the presidential elections of 2004 by her own former security minister, Susilo BambangYL1dhoyono, a retired army general who had longstanding friendly relations with the United States, which he pursued in office." Malaysia's prime min-

ister, Mahathir Mohammad, accused the United States of using the "war on terror" to dominate the world in publ.ic speeches to global as well as domestic audiences. However, his stinging criticisms of the United States were interpreted by many members of the foreign policy community in Malaysia to reflect a mixture of his own well-known proclivity for combative, antiwestern rhetoric and his desire to be seen as an independent spokesman for the developing world. Given the popular Malaysian antipathy to the American "war on terror" and war against Iraq, the political motive for doing so was fairly apparent.28 As noted by the head of a government-linked Malaysian institute, despite these criticisms, "Malaysia's bilateral ties have improved significantly in the last two years.1)3° Malaysia continued military cooperation with the United States and did not cancel exercises such as an annual military fraMing program, which continued as usual in the months after the invasion of Iraq?" Mahathir" statements were not prominently echoed by his eventual successor, Najib Abdul Razak.3' Overall, the pattern of bilateral relations behveen the United States and most Southeast Asian countries suggests that the government is of these countries are basically comfortable with U.S. influence and presence. Notwithstanding bursts of criticism from outspoken leaders such as Mahathir and Thaksin, at a moment 26. Quoted in Mauzy and Job 2007, 638. 22. Bourchier 2006; Hadiz 2006a. 28. Nesadurai 2006. 29. Khaclijah 2003, 99. 30. See, e.g., the U.S. i\Iavy's report on its annual CARAT [Cooperation Afloat Readiness and 'Irain'mg) exercises with Malaysia in 2003. Banc 2003. 31. In a 2002 speech made in his capacity as minister of defense, Najib Abdul Razak extolled the "special 1'elationsl1ip" between the United States and Malaysia and noted the longstanding cooperation that has existed between the two countries as well as the increased cooperation since 2001. I-Ie said that the United States "averages more than 1,000 overflights per year. Since September 11, this number has increased dramatically, and all requests have been approved.... 1,500 Malaysian defense personnel have benefited from the U.S.-sponsored MET (international military education and training) program." He went on to note the "more than 75 U.S. militant ship visits in the past two and a half years." Najib 2002.

8

CHAPTER 1

when U.S. unipolar preponderance at the global level was unprecedented and its foreign policy was attracting extraordinary levels of condemnation, the main response front Southeast Asian governments was to increase cooperation and continue efforts to deepen engagement with the United States. Popular opinion set some constraints on cooperation in the case of Malaysia and Indonesia but has not had enduring consequences. Perceptions of the United States were returning to more positive levels even before the end of the George W. Bu.sh presidency." Indeed, only a short while afterwards at a time when most causes for grievance against the United States remained fundamentally unaltered positive views of

the United States were significantly higher than negative views in many countries." Not only is public opinion volatile, observe Peter Katzenstein and Robert

Keohane, but "the consequences of anti-American views are more difficult to detect than one would think on the basis of claims made by the Left....Superficial manifestations of anti-Americanism seem to have few systematic effects on policy."3* There is no assurance that this will continue." But if foundational beliefs about the United States are in the process of changing, an explanation of why this is so needs to begin with an understanding of where the beliefs come from. Why were Southeast Asian policy elites inclined for so long to see U.S. hegemony as benign?3"' Debates about U.S. primacy present glimpses of how other parts of the world respond to the United States. Critics of the United States cite negative public opinion polls and nonstate retaliation against the United States,

while defenders claim discontent is peripheral and transitory." 'l`llere is a cluster of work on public opinion and social altitudes, and some collections present avowedly elite or nonrepresentative views." It remains that far more attention has been given to the United States-its motives, actions, and ideas-than to the

countries affected by it. Integrating analyses of what the United States does with explanations of how other countries perceive it is a challenge for critics of U.S. foreign policy in particular. They have catalogued the negative consequences of

82. Izlte1'r1atio11al opinion polls showed plumbing support tor the United States from 2002, with majorities or pluralities in many' countries judging American influence to be mostly negative. Al the nadir oiliLs standing in 2003-2004, polls showed the United States being identified as a greater threat to world peace than any oLhcr county Be 2006, however, opinions in several countries had become more positive. Carlson and Nielson 9003; Kamnstein and Kcohane 2007. BBC 2010. 34. Katzenstein and Keohanc 2007, 11.

35. Mahhuhani 2008; Tay 2010. 36. This does not prelude significant points of conflict or a desire to maximize leverage in the relationship. Ciorciari 2010; McMahon 1999 provide overviews of U.S.-Southeast Asia relations. 37. Compare, e.g., Johnson 2000; Kagan 2006 2006b. 38. Carlson and Nielson 2008; Farber 2007; Katzenstein and Keohane 2007; Lennon 2002.

BELIEFS ABOUT AMERICAN HEGEMONY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

g

American foreign policy and may have explained why people "hate America," but they have not paid serious attention to the question of why, given these grievances, "blob-ack" has been so li1:nited.'*" For structural realists who predict a return to balancing behavior and the erosion of bipolarity, the question must be why signs of balancing against the United States Br great powers (and bandwagoning with such powers by smaller states)-to the crtent they exist-have been so ambiguous and so slow to materialize. After all, the United States has presented the world with the challenge of primacy since die beginning of the 19905. The simplest explanation for the lack of clear balancing responses is that the United States is not perceived as a paten rial threat because it is not a threat." '1`he belief that U.S. power and presence in

-

Southeast Asia is, overall, positive for the region is almost axiomatic in foreign policy circles. Before concluding that those who see the United States as a distinc-

tively benign hegemonic power have got it right, however, we must investigate m ore fully the politics behind perceptions of the United States and the question of whose perceptions matter in policy terms.

The Argument in Brief Beliefs about American power in Southeast Asia merit investigation not because they necessarily rest on misperceptions (although sometimes they do) but because they rest on a combination of specific interests and illusions. These interests and illusions deviate from common understandings of the sources of foreign policy. The interests that drive orientations towards the United States are primarily the regime interests of the governing party or ruling elite in each country-that is, the interests of the country's political leadership in securing power and rewarding supporters and, in subsidiary fashion, the career interests of practitioners and others in the foreign policy community who depend on the support of political powerholders."' For the nonconnnunist political elites of Southeast Asia, notwithstancling some ups and downs in bilateral relations, the 39.

10h1150n

2000, Sardar and Davies 2002.

40. On the United States as a benign hegemony, sec, c.8., Ikeuber18»' 2000; Walt 2002. 4 I. This book thus draws inspiration from arguments about the domestic political foundations of alignment and IOreign policy; sec Ayoob l998; Christensen 1996; Narizny 2003, 2007; Putnam 1988, Schiller 2004. In relation to Southeast Asia, the argument that domestic concerns shape Foreign and security policy is well established; sec Alagappa l 998; Ganesan and Amer 2010; Leifcr 2000. However, studies of foreign policy' and security in Southeast Asia routinely blur the distinction between presumed aggregate national interests (and threats to them) and the interests specific to governing regimes or ruling coalitions. Such studies also generally accept policvrnakcr beliefs as exogenous givens; exceptions include Beeson 2006; I-Iadiz ed. 2006; ones 2010; Robison 2006; Sulelief8al

People do of course update their beliefs when information becomes sufficiently compelling or engages their personal interests." Thus, as argued in the first section of this ch apter, policymakers are unlikely to niisperccive their interests (or behavior that impinges on their interests) over the long term. When the

United States starts acting in ways that negatively affect the personal or sectional interests of ruling groups, they tend to notice. Information that would speak to beliefs in the more generalized impact of the United States, however, is not likely to be registered with the same force, given that motivational pressures work to reduce the weight accorded to belief-discrepant information. People may well be

aware of belief-discrepant information, including counterfactual scenarios, but tend to favor evidence that accords with their own prior ontloolc." These belief maintenance biases are just that-b -biases, not impenetrable barriers preventing accurate updating of beliefs. fIumalls have evolved a great capacity to learn from experience and evidence and obviously often do update beliefs. However, in the case of many foundational foreign policy beliefs, the principal

mechanism bringing this about-corrective feedback is inlieren tly weak.*'°' Unambiguous corrective feedback is mostly* lacking, given that core beliefs involve complex and unavoidably uncertain judgments infused with strong normative and affective elements. is the United States a benign hegernon or an aggressive unilateralist? The judgment either way can never rest on unambivuU

ous, value-free evidence but can easily appear to receive validation if information that speaks to one characterization is accorded greater weight than discrepant information. And asymmetry in how different types of evidence are weighed (either consciously or unconsciously, as a result of differential attention and

memory retention) is particularly likely in the case of core foreign policy beliefs because they are almost never specified in terms that lend themselves to clear falsification. Instead, loose formulations mean that what counts as confirming evidence is elastic, consistent with what Thomas Gilovich has termed "multiple endpoints.PS5

80. 81. 82. 85. 84.

Rabin and Schrage 1999. Blank et al. 2008. Gerber and (Green 1999. Tetlock 2005, 148-~ 162. On the importance of corrective feedback, arid why in the case of certain lopes of belief it is

only we kly present or registered, see Gzilcivich 1991

85. Giluvich 199 I, 5.»'-62.

.

42

CHAPTER 2

Although some foreign policy beliefs are inherently difficult to subject to clear disconfirming evidence, many could be expressed in terms of falsifiable proposi-

tions. The epistemic norms and standards of professional expertise prevailing in the foreign policy community, however, do not favor this mode of knowledge generation. As detailed in chapter 5, standards of appropriateness for generating professionally validated knowledge do not include a clear specification ofhypotheses, let alone attention to methodological issues relating to testing them. Rather,

standards for expertise in the foreign policy community more closely match lay epistemologies, which favor explanation (the construction of a plausible causal chain or theory) over evidence." W'hat foreign policy expertise does provide is an abundance of "reasons" and pieces of information that can be enlisted to support

beliefs through the construction of intuitively plausible narratives and scenarios. Simply imagining such scenarios can make them seem more plausible, making it easy to neglect base rate information that would provide a better estimate of probability."" This is consistent with the finding of Philip Tetlock's major study of political experts that domain experts overpredicted change signifi cantle more than "dilettantes" who were less equipped in information terms to generate pla L1sible scenarios. .s It is reasonable to ask whether foreign policy professionals do not have overriding interests in accuracy that will bring forth sufficient cognitive effort and de-

biasing procedures to overcome incentives to rely OI1 intuitive reasoning. Motives for accuracy do make a difference, and foreign policy is surely a high-stakes arena. However, not only are other motives also present, but the meaning of "accuracy" also depends on goals and context.E*" Policymakers have overriding interests in remaining in their positions and, over the longer term at least, are likely to recognize as erroneous beliefs that are not functional. For foreign policy professionals advising high-status colleagues and political leaders, the limits of accuracy are set in part be the goals and interests of those higher up the hierarchy: they define

what counts as a relevant question in the first place. For the most part, these limits are not communicated (or interpreted) as directives that run counter to expert knowledge. The epistemic context of the foreign policy community provides multiple apparently valid reasons for accepting many core beliefs on the basis of a plausibility check

rather than scrutinizing them in the light of evidence

86. Kuhn 2001. These standards are important in that a major limit LO wishful thinking is our ability to construct. a justification for belief that confol'nls with prevailing standards of acceptability

in reasoning; see Kunda 1990. 87. Tversky' and Kallllcman 2002. On reason-based choice more generally, see Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky 1993. 88. Tm:tlocl< 2005, 57.

89. Tctlock 2002.

BEHIND BELIEFS

43

that is less abundantly available (given the information environment created by doing foreign policy work) and according to methodological procedures that are almost never used by members of the professional community. The foreign policy establishments of Southeast Asia are largely divorced from

the norms of self-consciously social scientific reasoning that prevail in parts of the scholarly world, but this is not exceptional. Repeated failures to employ social scientific methodological safeguards and techniques have also been found in the U.S. intelligence bureaucracy, despite the enormous resources devoted to information collection and analysis." American foreign policy decision -making on high-stakes issues has not been immune from pressures to make judgments OD the basis of superficial indicators and .intuitive reasoning.'" It is also worth noting that even in academic disciplines and professions where epistemic standards are demanding-calling for de-biasing measurement procedures, control groups, sophisticated statistical techniques, and double-blind peer review-the "mundane and very human motives" of individual scientists affect bol;l1 the production of knowledge and as the values and practices that define the culture of science." Psychologists have found numerous examples of cognitive shortcuts and tendencies to "sharpen and level" evidence among their own peers." Applied studies in high-stakes professions find that individual experts frequently under-perform in comparison with nonhuman diagnostic tools and actuarial methods.94 Not all individuals in a professional field will be equally susceptible to overconfiden ce. Philip Tetlock's study of political experts found that th use who fit the intellectual profile of Isaiah Berlin's "hedgehog"-who knows "one big thing"were particularly likely to engage in the construction of "belief system defenses" that enabled them to maintain beliefs with extraordinary tenacity in the face of contradictory evidence." While we have no reason to assume that intellectual "hedgehogs" are disproportionately present in the foreign policy community, there are some reasons for thinking that they may be particularly successful and prominent within it. Tetlock's own work has found that experts who regularly acted as policy advisers, consultants, or media commentators were significantly more overconfident than those who did not. He notes that "integratively sim-

plistic rhetoric often has a political-psychological advantage over more complex

90. Iervis 21110.

.

91 For example, Khuxm 1995. 92. Crandall and Scllaller 2004, 201. 98. Lrandall and Schaller 2004, (1ilLwir.'h 1991, 88-90. 94. For cxanlplc. diagnostic tools that work xlriL:lly un the basis of logarithmic calculations employing base rate data. flilovich, Griffin, and Kal1111r;11*1aI1 eds. 2002 includes several applied studies

of real-world expertise in professions such as finance. medicine. and fnre::'zxlin;!. 95. Terlocla 2005. especially 125-1 39.

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rhetoric.""" While not definitive, other work suggests that individuals with the profile of "internal encoders"-who have a greater propensity to interpret "enviro mental cues" in terms of preexisting schemata, which are thereby reinforced are likely to adapt comparatively well to new social environments such as living abroad (a. ca.pacity that favors those who make their careers in for-

eign ministries). Internal encoders were also found to be more likely to choose vocations in the arts, humanities, and business m anagernent, in contrast to exter-

nal encoders who favored careers such as computer programming, engineering, and accounting." An interesting finding from a set of repeated cross-cultural experiments is that East Asians (groups from Taiwan, Singapore, and l o n g Kong) were markedly more overconfident than their peers in North America, despite the stereotypical view (which was also held by the subjects of some of these experiments) that Americans are more prone to overconfidence."

Affect and the Unthinkable How members of the foreign policy community feel about the United States is likely to influence what they believe about it. There is "compelling evidence for the proposition that every stimulus evokes Elli affective reaction," write Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick." A recent review of work on the centrality of emotions argues that without knowing how one feels about something, it is

impossible to assess risk, future gains and losses, or another actor's credibility. In the case of many beliefs, "emotion constitutes and strengthens a belief. .. [making] possible a generalization about an actor that involves certainty beyond evidence."'°" AlLhoL1gl1 emotion is integral to rational decision-making, it can also be a source of errors and biases. Subjective feelings of favor or disfavor toward an object (often referred to as attitudes) influence both the search for evidence and tlle significance accorded. to different pieces of evidence.!"! People

may also practice exposure control, deliberately avoiding exposure to affectively disturbing inforlnation.EOE. Sometimes, we may be aware of this basis for forming judgments about other people or countries. One prominent Singaporean diplo-

mat, for example, observed that "maybe l have too much affection for America.,

96. 'lbtlock 2005, 63, I 19. 91 Lewicki 2005,205-207. 98. Yéitcs it al. 2002. The study suggests that a variant of reason-bascrd choice PrL\CriSSES plalL15i'l>ly aiTecls confidence judgments (2002, 289-290). 99. Iiahneman and Frederick 2002, 56. 1

100. 'Mercer 2010, 8. 101. l\flarsh and \*V%lllac¢.' Zflfli.

102. Wilson, Gilbert. and Wheatley 1998.

BEHIND BELIEFS

45

and so my views may not be entirely rational."'°" The more we like a person, the more we think they are good; the more we believe they are good, the greater the tendency to believe that the consequences of their actions must be good.104 Individual feelings about the United States vary, both from person to person and over time. However, there are several reasons to think that the distribution of attitudes toward the United States and subjective experiences involving the United States in foreign policy circles in Southeast Asia are not randomly distributed. Far more than nonelite sections of their own societies, members of the foreign policy community are likely to have had significant personal exposure to the United States and its people. Altho ugh not all of this exposure is positive, the self-reported views of many suggest that feelings of personal liking were formed through educational experiences, cultural exposure, and friendships and working relationships with Americans. The large investments in public diplomacy, educational exchanges, and professional networking made by the United States during the Cold War thus seem to have had an enduring effect on the elites targeted.1D5 Although many Southeast Asian foreign policy professionals expressed distaste and anger at the foreign policy actions of the United States during the George W. Bush presidency, many expressed their feelings in terms of shock and disappointment. This was not what they expected from a country they liked, and many were inclined to see this period as aberrational. Those who did not express such positive feelings about the United States as a society were far more likely to see the 2002-0S period as representative of enduring American tendencies to abuse its power. Strong affective responses to certain types of tradeoff are also likely to influence beliefs about the United States. Forming judgments about whether the United States is "overall" a benign great power that has "by and large" exercised i.ts power in ways that benefit Southeast Asia involves not just overcoming a great deal of uncertainty but also arriving at ways of making tradeoffs. Thinking explicitly about tradeoffs is often uncomfortable and effortful: it is easier

to list just the benefits than to try to weigh them against costs (or vice versa), especially when the two involve incommensurable variables. Nonetheless, not only do people make decisions requiring tradeoffs routinely, when primed for 103. '1i7mm}' Koh. Remarks at the launch ol"'Asia Alone: The Dangerous Post-Crisis Divide from America," Singapore, 1? June 2010. 104. Two processes are at work here: the tendency to "turn the subjective experience of feelings into an objective property of a11 actor" (Mercer 2010, 15) and common heuristics that lead us to infer that "like goes with 1i1>13o The author offers lo independent scrutiny of Lee's assertions. Another recent history evokes the affective ties between ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia and the mainland and implies that the domestic communists threatening Singapore would draw the country into the PRC's orbit.131 The book's treatment of In.donesia's Confrontation of Malaysia attributes it mostly to Sukarno's wish to find an external distraction and the PKI's ambition. Initial American reluctance to press Sukarno too forcefully is explained in these terms: "The Americans were containing the

communist tide on the mainland of Southeast Asia, with neutralization in Laos and war in Vietnam, and the last thing they needed was a situation offering com-

munism to make gains in island Southeast Asia."l32 After the Cold War, communism was replaced by race as the "primordial faultline in Singapore as a nation" in national histories." The labored emphasis on this "fault-line" has immediate connections to Singapore's nearest neighbors, consistently presented as sharing a "Malay-l\flusliln" identity that is hostile to

197. 128. 129. 130. 131.

Interview 50. Interview 44. Lau 1975, 44-45, 25. The Indonesian contraction is actually Gesmpra. Quoted in Tan 2008, 45. Lee 2008, 135.

132, Lee 2008, 224-225.

133. Hong and Huang 2008, 20, 22.

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Singapore.H4 Histories of the "trauma" of' separation from Malaysia are often invoked for understanding Singaporean obsessions with vulnerability and the country's need for a. strong military deterrent-both in the form of building

up its own defense forces and in the form of implied American protection.135 The image of latent, ethnically based hostility also penetrates Singaporean writ-

ing on its one experience of external aggression, Indonesia's Confrontation of Malaysia. Thus an establishment historian writes of Confrontation: "The Indonesians had their own axes to grind with Malaysia, which they saw as a rival to their own vision of relays Raya (Greater Malay Nation), a greater Malay world of which Indonesia would constitute is cultural and political center, the antecedents of which, the Indonesians claimed, were evident in the pre-colonial empires of Srivijaya and Maja.pahit.Ja 13G This .i.s presented as so obviously valid as to not

require a single piece of evidence." Far more than in Malaysia itself, Singaporean leaders have repeatedly referred to Confrontation as a defining historical event, despite the extraordinarily limited nature of the conflict in Singapore.1:*"' Malaysian and Indonesian post-1965) accounts of Confrontation also emphasize the role of the PKI and Sol1s Another prefixed the explanation for why Vietnam wished

to see an American security presence in the region with the observation that ASEAN wished to see the United States remain committed to the region, citing the widely reported concerns of the original ASEAN members in the early postCold War period about whether the United States would remain. When asked

why this should apply to Vietnam, the response was that Vietnam held this view "as a member of ASEAN" and that it needed the United States to balance China.19

15. Other respondents were not clear on this point, including a relatively' high proportion of' Vietnamese interviewees. Even if their 11on committal answers are interpreted to mean that they con sidered the United States to he at least potentially destabilizing, this remained a minority view in the

sample as a whole. 16. Lee 2002.

1.7. Quoted in Straits Times, 29 October 2009. The news report, which carried 21 picture of Lee Kuhn Yew and Henry Kissinger embracing, continued: 'Io stellar cast of the U.S. capital's political and business heavyweights turned out to h o n o r [Lee Kuhn Yew], including three U.S. Presidents who sent messages in writing or via vid.eo...i1nages of former presidents Bill Clinton and George i-l. W. Bush were projected on giant screens as they paid tribute to Mr. Lee. .. .Two long-time friends-elder

statesman Dr. Henry Kissinger and Dr. George Shultz-also flew into the capital for the dinner." 18. Interview 69.

19. Interview 67.

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The idea that a bipolar balance of power is stabilizing has a long heritage in international relations school arship, but the assertion that American military

engagement in Asia produces a balance is peculiar?" Not only does American military capacity dwarf that of any other power, it has also repeatedly and explicitly laid claim to eXercising a preponderance of power in the region." It would be Lincomfortable for Southeast Asian leaders to admit openly to a preference for American predominance, given official proclamations of nonalignment and independence. Singaporean leaders are exceptional in calling so openly for the United States to play a "balancing" role." Their preferences, however, resonate quite widely in Southeast Asian foreign policy circles. One Indonesian official stated that "although we wouldn't say so openly," Indonesia was actually glad to see Singapore take the lead in this respect, as it would be poli.tically uncomfortable for Indonesian leaders to do so." Several Malaysian respondents noted that it was necessary to discount some of the public rhetoric of leaders such as Mahathir and pay attention to la-Talaysia's actual record of military and other cooperation with the United States as well as the willingness of many Malaysian leaders to extend a warm welcome in private to controversial U.S. officials such as Paul WoIfowitz.84 No one wishes to live with U.S. "dominance" in the sense of being dictated. to, but a strategic predominance of power exercised by the United States appears Lo be the preference of many." Identifying the U.S. role as providing a "balance" offers a way of presenting the status quo in palatable terms. lAther queried about the term balance, respondents all agreed that the status quo actually represented an imbalance of power in favor of the United States. Many also pointed out that this did not mean that the United States always gets what it wants. "America needs us too" was a widespread sentiment. Despite acknowledging an actual imbalance in power, especially military power, only a

small minority considered the United Stafes to be a potential threat. Even if tlle vi'ws of those who were somewhat tentative in considering the United States a

potential threat or source of' instability are taken to mean that they do consider it

20. Inconsistent use of the terms balrmcirigancl brvlnrice repower by policymakers and scholars is widespread. See Haas 1953 for an early statement and Ncxon 2.009 for a recent discussion. 2 1. This does not prevent claims such as the following: "'\nleriea'5 security presence has ensured Lhat Southeast Asia has not been dominated by any one power; a core objective of U.S. sccurily strategy in the region." Koh 2008, 39. 22. Lee Kuan Yew frequently asserts that Lhe United States has played an essential, stabilizing role as a security guarantor since World War IL He claims that there is a need to maintain a "balance between the United States and Iapan on one side and China on the other" and is silent on the imbalance of military power in this arrangement. Lee 2000, 762.

23. Interview 2. 24. Interviews 21, 22, 25, and 28.

25. This is consistent with the Endings of other analyses. See, et.,Goh 2005; Khong 2004.

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a potential threat, nearly six times as many respondents made unequivocal statements that the United States is either not threatening or, at a minimum, much less threatening than alternative great powers on the horizon. Respondents gave a varied set of reasons for seeing the United States as (at least in relative terms) a benign hegemonic power. One of the simplest was to downgrade the importance of discrepant information. Thus many compartment talized what they judged to be destabilizing actions of the United States, maill-

-

taining, for example, that while the American "war on terror" was misguided and had probably worsened the terrorist threat, overall the United States played a stabilizing role. The belief that American foreign policy in the 2002-08 period was an aberration facilitated this conclusion. Only among Filipino and Vietnam ese respondents did a majority disagree with the idea that this period marked a fundamental departure from the norm for American foreign policy behavior. A second line of argument, as discussed in chapter 4, was to point to history for evidence that the United States is a stabilizing, nonaggressi.ve power, relegating actions such as the Vietnam War (if it was seen as a mistake at all) to marginal rel-

-

evance. A third reason raised by several respondents was the geographic distance of the United States from Asia. Finally, many referred to domestic checks and balances in the American system of democracy, often in conjunction with references to the good intentions and war-averse nature of the American population. Even

in the case of respondents from Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam, countries that have often been at odds with the United States on issues relating to the interpretation of democracy, many claimed that the nature of American democracy .made

it a relatively nonaggressive country and one that was capable of self-correction. These causal arguments all circulate widely in parts of the world. Respondents who cited them were presenting "reasoned" beliefs that enjoy considerablealbeit far from uncontested-status. As with the use of history to validate beliefs about the nature of the United States, however, these arguments require taking a

perspective on both the present and the past that is highly positional and selective. First, it is clear that China the most frequently cited source of potential future instability or uncertainty is held to a different standard than the United States, both in terms of current policy a.nd past actions. Second, the basis for implicitly weighing different historical episodes unequally postwar economic largesse, for example, trumping the bombing of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam-

is left unspoken . Other inconsistencies were left unresolved by interviewees or were resolved through further selective reasoning. Many who cited history, geography, or the restraints of the democratic system as reasons for seeing the United States as a benign power had, earlier in the interview, criticized post-2001 U.S. foreign policy for the decision to wage war without the authorization of the UN (in a.

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region ju.st as geographically distant from the United States as East Asia), human rights abuses, and other breaches of international law. Besides treating these episodes as aberrational, some respondents cited them as examples of how American democracy is capable of self-correcting policy errors over time and is thus

"overall" prone to lawful act.ion. One Vietnamese academic, for example, made the claim that democracies are more peaceful, transparent, and less war-prone clue to internal checks and balances, despite noting earlier in the interview many features of American policy that did not conform to this generalization. Vietnarn's own experience was relatively marginalized, with the side comment that Vietnam had had "not-so-good experiences with U.S. . . .but that was in context of the Cold War.was Similarly, a respondent from the Philippines explained why the United States was not a threatening power because of its universal values of equality, liberty, and fairness' "The .American people are ultimately fair, and this is a constraint on government over the long term." China, in contrast, could not be trusted in the same way." A Singaporean diplomat, citing the force of democratic principles and institutions, concluded that "at the end of the day, it is the American people who will say that Guantanamo was wrong. ...It would not be so if it was run by China or India."2** At one level, the proposition that the United States will eventually self-correct its errors is almost irrefutable. Whether this is at all relevant for understanding the potential consequences of U.S. power depends on how much one cares about what happens before "self-correction" takes effect. Those who contest the assessment of the United States as a particularly benign power weigh episodes and incidents involving the United States differently. Within the foreign policy community, Filipino respondents were most likely to express the belief that the United States is potentially threatening and destabilizing. A significant minority of Malaysians too, especially those most critical of the United States in the contemporary period, dismissed the idea that the United States is needed to balance China or any other country, and some argued that i.t was the United States that was more destabilizing. One brusquely asked, "What has China done in the last hundred years? Are they the country that has colonized, invaded, tortured all around the world?J:2" Several Vietnamese respondents more circumspectly rejected the idea that the United States was necessarily a stabilizing power. One Vietnamese scholar observed that there was a need for other (unspecified) states to maintain a balance against the United States." Another

26. Interview 65. 27. Interview 35. 28. interview 46. 29. Interview 22.

30. Interview 74.

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noted that "balance with too much ambition can be imbalance" and that if the United States pursued "hegemonistic ideas" in the region, "people in the region know how to unite.3)5' One mentioned as a potential threat the possibility that the United States would use its economic power as leverage against Vietnam, and several regarded the United States as potentially destabilizing on domes-

tic issues such as human rights and religion." These voices appear to represent a minority stream of opinion in foreign policy circles, but they also draw on arguments and narrative images of the United States as a destructive power that circulate widely outside of those circles." These lines of reasoning enjoy no less of an intellectual lineage than images of the United States as a benign hegemony. A politically neutral assessment of which set of beliefs about the United States is more accurate is not attempted here. Rather, my argument is that a concern with externally verifiable accuracy is not the most plausible reason why meinbers of the foreign policy community hold certain foundational beliefs about the United States. Beliefs are not necessarily the product of attempts to weigh competing evidence and examine alternative arguments. The mechanisms by which "professional expertise" is constructed and disseminated mean that it is more plausible to see foundational beliefs as reflecting relatively "unthouglit" responses to an epistemic environment that remains biased toward a positive assessment of the strategic role of the United States.

Routines, Information Exposure, and Reasoning in Professional Settings Identifiable aspects of the professional foreign policy environment make it more likely that core beliefs about the United States are absorbed despite, not because of, their degree of externally verifiable accuracy, First, professionals face strong

incentives to work within the parameters of official policy. Most activity focuses on policy implementation, and discussion is largely limited to questions of how to implement policy, not whether the policy itself-let a.lone its underlying

assumptions is appropriate. Organizational hierarchy, time pressures, a.nd rewards for compliance reinforce incentives to accept fundamental policy orientations. These incentives are related to a second type of influence on belief formation 31. Interview 73. 32. Interviews 67, 74, and 71. 33. Southeast Asian perspectives are provided in Al111af 2006; Benson 2006; Budiantzi 2007; Chang 2005a, 2U05b. The case for seeing the United States as dcstrilctivc and aggressive power has been made across a range of diverse intellectual app1'oa.cl'Jes, spine secular, others informed

Br religious perspec-

tives. For example, Ali 2002; Blum 2001; Johnson 2000, 2004, 2006; So rear and Davies 2003.

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in foreign policy' settings: the sheer availability all"information" that provid es evi-

dence for Lhe correctness of official policy. This information is generated through the work process itself, in the form of countless memoranda, official statements, speeches, and file notes. The third feature of the professional environment that is likely to influence belief formation involves standards for evaluating information

and generating knowledge. The nature of many core beliefs means that they are rarely subject to unambiguous "corrective feedback," probably the most common mechanism bringing beliefs into line with external validity measures.8"' In addition, the feedback that is most readily available to members of the fo reign policy community supports belief-confirming modes of hypothesis testing.

Routine Learning Evidence of the degree to which official policy sets the parameters of professional

expertise is fragmented, but many respondents pointed to the impact of policy and government priorities. The first response of one Singaporean former senior

diplomat to the question of why he did not consider the United States a potential threat was to cite an "instinctive" preference for the status quo." He went on to say that Southeast Asian. countries (apps rently with the exception of Singapore) were not strong states and did not have strong governing systems that operated on the basis of societal consensus and common purpose. "So the governments of the day resort to the only strategy they know, to find a big brother to help them stay in powel'.""" A retired Thai ambassador who had been chief of the Southeast Asia des.k in the Thai foreign ministry at the time Vietnam invaded Cambodia said that the "domino theory" had been an influential analogy enlisted to support beliefs of a Vietnamese th real to Thailand. He also noted'

We never really stopped to analyze. The interpretation was that they arc coming to Bangkok. T only began to have an opinion later. At the time, I

was too close to have an opinion, and in any case would have been overruled by the military. I had no reason 'FO argue, and it would have been impossible anyway. I would have been considered a traitor." This does not appear to be abnormal. Most acc Lmts show that senior political leaders set the direction of foreign policy and initiate change. 'l'llus in the ease

34. See the cliscussioii in chapter 2. 35. Interview 48. 36. The United States, he believed, was a benign and idealistic power that did not challenge the status quo, at [east 1101 in at l:I'L1L:le way.

IT. Interview 59.

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153

o/ Malaysia, for example, one former politician, editor, and politically appointed ambassador said, "The PM sets the policy: Wisma Putra [the Malaysian foreign ministry] fine-tunes and advises on how to implement it. Maybe they have a greater role with a weak prime minister.118*' New initiatives in Malaysian foreign policy all emanated from the political leadership." Prime Minister Tun Razz was thus able to lead the change in policy to recognize China in 1974, at a time when, according to one Malaysian diplomat, "it was Linthinl